Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning [First Thus Used] 0687117089, 9780687117086

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EMPTINESS.

A Study in Religious Meaning

EMPTINESS =A Study

FREDERICK

J.

STRENG ABINGDON PRESS NASHVILLE NEW YORK

in Religious

Meaning

EMPTINESS

MEANING

A STUDY IN RELIGIOUS

Copyright

©

1967 by Abingdon Press

All rights in this book are reserved.

No

may

part of the book

be reproduced in any

manner whatsoever without written permission of the publishers except brief quotations embodied in critical articles or reviews.

Abingdon

For information address

Number: 67-11010

Library of Congress Catalog Card

Thanks

are

due to The

Tennessee.

Nashville,

Press,

University

permission to include material from of Symbolic Structures in Religious

my

of

Chicago

article

Press

for

"The Problem

Apprehension," found in

History of Religions, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 126-253 (Copyright 1964 by The University of Chicago); and to I'lnstitut Beige des

Hautes Etudes

Chinoises

for

permission

to

translate

the

on the restored Sanskrit text edited by E. H. Johnston and Arnold Kunst, "The VigrahavyavartanI of Nagarjuna with the Author's

seventy verses of Nagarjuna's Yigrahaiyavartant

Commentary," Melanges

chinois

et

bouddhiques,

based

IX

(juillct

1951), pp. 108-51.

by permission of from The Bhagavad Gita, trans, by Franklin Edgerton, copyright 1944 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. Passages from Astasahasrika Prajfiapdramitd ire reprinted by permission of the publisher from Astasahasrika Prajndpdramitd, trans, by Edward Conze, copyright 195 8 by Verses from the Bhagaiad Git a are reprinted

the

publisher

The

Asiatic Society, Calcutta.

AND BOUND BY THE AT NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA SET UP, PRINTED,

PARTHENON

PRESS,

TO RUTH who

contributed to this study in such measure as

only wives of graduate students and university teachers can appreciate.

CONTENTS ABBREVIATIONS

9

PREFACE

Part

I.

1.

2.

Part

11.

11

THE RELEVANCE

of

STUDYING "EMPTINESS"

THE PROBLEM THE RELIGIOUS CONTEXT OF NAGARJUNa'S EXPRESSION

IMPLICATIONS

of

"EMPTINESS"

for

17 28

UNDERSTANDING

SOME BASIC BUDDHIST CONCEPTS 3.

4. 5.

6.

Part

III.

ELEMENTS AND FACTORS THAT CONSTITUTE EXISTENCE (dharmas) "causal relations" (pratityasamutpada) nirvana wisdom (prajna)

43 58

69 82

STRUCTURES of RELIGIOUS APPREHENSION in INDIAN THOUGHT the mythical structure the intuitive structure

101

8.

9.

nagarjuna's dialectical structure

139

7.

Part IV. 10. 11.

THE SIGNIFICANCE

of

RELIGIOUS

122

KNOWLEDGE

THE religious MEANING OF "eMPTINESs" RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE AS A MEANS FOR ULTIMATE TRANSFORMATION

155

170 7

Emptiness:

A

Study

in Religious

Meaning

APPENDIXES A. Translation of Mulamadhyamakakarikas: fundamentals of the

MIDDLE "WAY B. Translation of

181

Vigrahavyavartani: averting the arguments

....

221

BIBLIOGRAPHY

229

INDEX

249

ABBREVIATIONS S.

Schayer,

Ausgewdhlte

Kapitel

aus

der

Prasannapadd

(Krakowie, 1931)

N. Dutt, Aspects of Mahayana Buddhism and Hinayana (London, 1930)

Its

Relation to

A. Bareau, L'Absolu en philosophie bouddhique: evolution de

la

notion d'asamskrta (Paris, 1951) C. A. F. Rhys Davids, Buddhist Psychology (London, 1914)

and African Studies (UniLondon) E. Conze, Buddhist Thought in India (London, 1962) Buddhist Wisdom Books: The Diamond Sutra and the Heart Bulletin of the School of Oriental versity of

Sutra, E. Conze, trans. (London, 195 8)

T. Stcherbatsky, The Central Conception of Buddhism and the

Meaning of the Word "Dharma" (Calcutta, 1961) T. R. V. Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism (London, 1955) K.

N.

Jayatilleke,

Early

Buddhist Theory of Knowledge,

(London, 1963) Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics,

J.

Hastings, ed. (Edin-

burgh, 1908-26) E.

Lamotte, Histoire du Bouddhisme indien, des origines

a I'ere

Saka (Louvain, 1958)

Indogaku Bukkyogaku Kenkyil Indian Historical Quarterly

G. K. Nariman,

A

Literary History of Sanskrit

(Bombay, 1920) Melanges chinois

et

bouddhiques

Buddhism

Emptiness:

MMK

A

Study In Religious Meaning

Mulamadhyamakakdrikds {Mddhyamikasutras) de Ndgdrjuna avec la Prasannapadd, Comment aire de Candrakirti, L. de La Vallee Poussin, ed. (St. Petersbourg, 1913 ) (This work is also abbreviated

MSFC

R.

as Kdrikds.)

H. Robinson,

"Madhyamika

China," UnpubHshed

Ph.D.

Studies

in

Fifth-century (University

dissertation

of

PEW

London, 1959) L. A. Govinda, The Psychological Attitude of Early Buddhist Philosophy (London, 1961) Philosophy East and West

PL

E. Conze, Prajnapdramitd Literature ('s-Gravenhage, 1960)

PWES

Astasdhasrikd Prajndpdramitd {The Perfection of

PAEBP

Eight Thousand Slokas)

,

SBE

Sacred Books of the East, F. M. Miiller, ed.

TGVS

Le

Traite

de

grande

la

vertu

(Mahdprajndpdramitd-sdstra)

Louvain, 1944

W

&

,

E.

de

sagesse

10

eds.,

de

in

Ndgdrjuna

Lamotte, trans.

(2

vols.;

1949)

"The Vigrahavyavartani of Nagarjuna," A. Kunst,

Wisdom

E. Conze, trans. (Calcutta, 1958)

MCB, IX

E.

H. Johnston and

(July, 1951), 108-51

PREFACE During the past three thousand years there has been an awakening consciousness that the phenomenon of "man" transcends tribal, national, or cultural determination.

Human

history, understood as the

self-consciousness in relation to his physical

seen today in a universal context

the statement that "the earth

is

—we

and

social

forms of man's

environment, can be

are discovering the implications of

round." This recognition draws attention

and practical need of understanding forms of human contact appear strange and even meaningless.

to the possibility

Hfe that on

first

Religion participates in

human

history;

it

expressed in

is

different

concepts, attitudes, specific symbolic actions (ritual), and social patterns.

These forms which are relevant to

human meaning

appear to be irrelevant in another context. Thus a religious

phenomenon with

of meaning, regard

It as

if

one

reference to

to understand

Is

significant.

The

tension of relating the genius

effort

its

its

in one context often

it is

own

crucial to interpret

intention and pattern

relevance for those persons

toward such understanding

found In the particular

historical

who

results in a

phenomenon

with the universal categories that make any understanding of different

phenomena

possible at

all.

The term "emptiness" (which

in the past also has been translated

"nothingness" or "relativity") suggests for

many

by

Westerners the notion of

chaos, nonreahty, or the opposite of anything positive. This

Is,

of course,

understandable in the context of Western philosophical, poetical, and

In trying to understand the meaning of

religious expression.

the thought and force,

life

however, we

attitudes about life

book

Is

of any Eastern people where

Buddhism

this Is

term

In

a cultural

must ask how this notion relates to other notions and that form a cultural matrix different from ours. This

presented as an effort to understand the notion of "emptiness" 11

Emptiness: as

A

Study

expressed

by

a

In Religious

Meaning

second-century Buddhist religious

The

it

will

and for the

life,

human communication.

reader interested in the problems of il

I

hopefully

seer;

be useful for both the professional student of religious

material in each of the four parts contributes to the analysis. Part

gives a description of the

problem

in interpretation

with which we are

confronted, and a brief examination of the historical background for

Nagarjuna's religious teaching. While Part discussion,

it

is

II

contains the most technical

not meant to be read only by the

insight into the significance of using the

by

a

much

term "emptiness" than

we have

section were omitted. In Part III

Buddhist

specialist in

philosophy; perseverance by the reader will be rewarded

clearer if

related Nagarjuna's use

this

of

"emptiness" to other expressions in Indian religious thought; in Part IV the significance of "viewing

all

existing things as

empty"

is

examined

within the context of the more general religious concern to transform

man's limited existence into the

The

fullest, freest reality.

difficulty in translating ideas

problem. This problem

from one language

to another

is

an old

aggravated in translating religious symbols and

is

awareness, in part because words themselves are regarded as inadequate

conveyors of the reality perceived in the religious awareness. Thus the

words which express "the inexpressible" in one language and context have perhaps correlate terms in another language, but the context

One

is

aid in

religious religious

so different that the translations lose their original "intention."

overcoming

a single term,

though

this

it is

problem

is

the use of several terms to translate

self-evident that in doing so the translator runs

the risk of losing the multi-dimensional character of the most important

notions in a religious tradition.

The

word to translate a body of the book, where the notions

used the same English the

the translation. For instance, duhkloa translations, while

interpretation;

though

it

is

rendered

or prajfld

is

we have used here is we have almost always

general principle

that in the translations found in the appendixes

as

is

certain Sanskrit term; while in

as

as

as

"wisdom"

varied

"sorrow" in the

"pain" or "turmoil"

translated

also as "spiritual insight" in the explanation.

always translated

we have

are interpreted,

always found

as well in

in the

the

appendixes,

Siinyata

is

almost

"emptiness." Wherever the English terms refer to a

Sanskrit technical religious term, the Sanskrit terms are placed in parentheses

immediately following them. Since most of the primary source

material for this study

is

in Sanskrit,

we have used mostly

Sanskrit termi-

nology; however, in referring to Buddhist thought found in materials preserved in Pali, the Pali terms are used. 12

^ The Study of "emptiness" earlier analyses

to Nagarjuna,

is

is

Preface

my

not entirely new, and

indebtedness to

quite clear. Outside of using the Sanskrit texts attributed

my

reading has been directed to scholars writing in Western

languages, though I have had the opportunity to speak personally with

Indian and Japanese Buddhist scholars about Nagarjuna's use of "emptiness" and

Madhyamika thought. An attempt

to understand religious life

by the stimulation and guidance given by individuals who themselves are involved with interpreting this complex area of human expression. Therefore I want to take this opportunity to acknowledge gratefully the help given to me by the following men from the University is

greatly aided

of Chicago: Dr. Mircea Eliade through his courses and books has provided

many

stimulating insights into the structures of religious expression. Dr.

my

Joseph Kitagawa, in his personal interest in

studies

and help

in suggest-

ing resources for this particular investigation, has been a constant source of aid.

To Dr. Bernard Meland

theological concerns to structures of J.

I

owe

the stimulation for extending

toward the problem of relating

human

expression.

A. B. van Buitenen for spending

want

I

to express

many hours with me

my

religious awareness

my

thanks to Dr.

reading, correcting,

and making suggestions for improving the translation of the two Sanskrit works by Nagarjuna which provide the textual basis for this study. I would like to acknowledge the opportunity for nine months study in India through a Fulbright Student Grant during the academic year

me by

1961-62, and the consideration given to States Educational

universities shared their time

T. R. V. Murti

Hindu

who was my would

with me;

host while

I I

the officers of the United

A

Foundation in India.

number of scholars at Indian want to mention especially Dr.

was

a "casual student" at Benaras

my former

colleague Dr. Gene Tucker for reading the first six chapters of the manuscript and suggesting improvements in style and expression.

University.

I

also like to

thank

FREDERICK

J.

STRENG

13

Part

THE RELEVANCE "EMPTINESS"

of

I

STUDYING

I

THE PROBLEM This study

is

concerned with the relationship between religious

and symbolic expression.

It

is

avv^areness

of religious meaning found in the conceptual, or "theoretical," expression.

To

we

illuminate this problem

(MMK,

Religious awareness

"knowledge"

human as

—

a

is

xxiv. 19

mode

of

on the meaning of one truth in Buddhism: all exist-

will focus

of the most important expressions of spiritual

ing things are empty.

^|;

an investigation into the nature and dynamics

&

20; xxv. 22;

stated in propositional

form

VV,

59.)

in order to give

knowledge claiming to be the most profound of any It is knowledge which has been labeled

apprehension or cognition.

"Truth"

transform

in the

human

most

significant sense, truth

lives

radically.

which has the power to

The knowledge of

this

when

truth,

coupled with certain activity, permits the transformation from chaos to

from death to life, or from greed to indifference. Religious (i.e., transforming) knowledge is affirmed by its adherents to have its ultimate source in a transhuman dimension of existence. Therefore, besides appealing to such norms of truth as personal experience and logical inference, its final appeal is to a dimension of human awareness variously known by such terms as "insight," "revelation," and "enlightenment." Religious knowlorder,

more than give information or transform by the power inherent in it.

edge, then, purports to do it

claims to

Religious knowledge, however, to be

changed

is

a bit here or there.

not something simply "given," just It is

only gropingly discovered and

rediscovered. It participates in the process of as

history.

As

such,

it

is

related to

human

thought, and individual sensitivities; and is

assert a "fact";

its

human

fabrication

known

vocabularies, structures of

value as transforming-truth

dependent on the cognitive patterns by which such truth can be known.

"To know" means

to have a conditioning (and conditioned) apparatus

for interiorizing existence. Existence becomes hiivian existence interpreted;

when

it is

and human existence includes the interpretive scheme provided 17

;

A

Emptiness:

by

Study

cognition.

A

person apprehends that aspect of existence which his pat-

terns of sensitivity permit gets

from

general

Meaning

in Religious

him

a reUgious assertion

human

is

and the meaning which one it to more

to perceive;

dependent, in part, on relating

While rehgious truth

structures of thought.

is

sometimes

considered as an abstract entity "floating above" the

human

living, here it will be regarded as a part of the living

organism of culture

which

in

it

The importance

emerges.

concerns of

of this consideration for

our study

is

that the relationship between religious awareness and verbal expression

is

considered to be reciprocal. In the context of this investigation, the term

"conceptual expression"

is

Thus,

apprehension."

ceptual

meant

to cover

apprehension-expression

conceptual

religious awareness are codeterminate;

necessary counterpart, "con-

its

no

and

nor temporal

logical a priori

precedence needs to be established.

The problem of

the relationship between religious awareness and verbal

expression is very large and can be structured into different problem areas. For instance, distinctions can be discerned and described along lines of structure, content, and function, as suggested by Joachim Wach in A

Comparative Study of

Religions.'^

Or

religious

symbols can be viewed

a variety of archetypal patterns expressing the "sacred," as seen in

Eliade's Patterns in

Comparative Religions.^ Or the problem can be ap-

proached systematically Theology.'^

as

Mircea

The approach

as

done by Paul Tillich in

is

to the problem here, however,

description, a hermeneutical technique, nor an approach

theological perspective;

it is

Systematic

his is

not a general

from

a systematic

an attempt to expose something of the nature

and dynamics of one kind of religious expression: the formulation and articulation of Ultimate Truth. In this expression we will seek to expose a deep, underlying organizing force within religious meaning: the structure

by which the knower apprehends "transforming truth" or ultimate reality since truth and reality are complementary elements of the sacred. "We

—

intend to examine a dimension of man's predisposition for accepting certain

meanings and for rejecting

religious

investigation to conceptual expressions

others.

Thus, we are limiting our

which

are formulations that can be

denied, attacked, defended, and explained.

Two ^

observations must be

Joachim Wach,

A

Mircea

Eliade,

at this point

Comparative Study of Religions,

University Press, 195 8); see *

made

Patterns

esp.

in

chap,

iii,

ed. J.

"The Expression

Comparative

Religions,

concerning the use of

M. Kitagawa (New York: Columbia

of Religious Experience in Thought."

trans.

R.

Sheed

Ward, 1958). 'Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology (Chicago: The University of Chicago see esp. the Introduction and Pt. I, "Reason and Revelation."

18

(London: Press,

Sheed

and

1951), Vol.

I,

— The Problem

conceptual expressions for exposing religious awareness. These suggest the

problematic

but

at the

religious

religious

from

character

examining

statements

religious

truth,

mode

of

religious activity; they, to the contrary, reflect the inner struggle of as

he

a part.

homo

religiosus to

understand himself and the existence of which

Thus, they are a dynamic force in the bipolar process of re-

and fabrication of what

ligious awareness: the apprehension

human

real for the

is

being.

In the context of a religious

knowledge often

is

community

the direct concern with religious

localized in a relatively small

to preserve, explicate,

statements.

and defend the

The impetus

truth which admittedly

religious intention

for this concern

is

group of people

is

much more than

internal to the truth,

who

seek

and insight of these

the articulation of truth

the propositions indicated

the statements. Yet, this articulation of truth has a certain is

of

this

phenomena. The first observation is that statements expressing knowledge are more than just speculative fabrication removed

man is

of

same time indicate the importance of studying

and the internal norm

is

by

norm which

intrinsically related to

power of transformation. Thus the formulations of creeds and doctrines of the "prophetic" world religions and the metaphysical and psyschological analyses of the "gnostic" world religions should not be regarded as mere speculations, but as self-conscious attempts to convey the richness and depth of true existence. The fact that there is such a thing as a history of religious ideas and doctrines indicates the dynamics of lively minds reformulating the inherited patterns of religious awareness in reaction to new and particular situations. The theoreti-

the religious vision which has the

cal

dimension of religious awareness

is

not somehow added to the "factual";

it helps to mold what is known as the "factual" itself. The second observation concerning the use of verbal expressions

rather

manifesting religious awareness

is

for

that religious expressions participate in

modes of apprehension. There is no phenomenon which is "pure religion." Whenever man thinks, he uses conventions of thought, either consciously or unconsciously, which he has learned as a social being. Also, "secular"

when he

participates in religious life he incorporates religious truth based

on the norms for deriving meaning which, are learned

from

his experiences

at least in post-archaic times,

both inside and outside the religious com-

munity. If the internal (and often unconscious) norms of meaning derived

from

his religious activity are at great variance

his secular activities,

he

may

with those derived from

repress one for the other or exist

with a

cognitive schizophrenia. Nevertheless, his religious understanding originates 19

Emptiness:

A

with, and

Study is

Meaning

nurtured by, patterns of expression and modes of thinking

which operate

The

in Religious

as

norms for rehgious

as

well as nonreligious knowledge.

fact that certain possibilities for religious apprehension are produced

while others are suppressed accentuates the historical character of the

which

choices religious it

are available to a person. It

is

just this

involvement of

knowledge with the secular structures of apprehension that makes

relevant for

human

life,

and

is

at the

same time the source of the

diflSculty

in understanding various expressions of religious knowledge.

Our

and dynamics of

investigation of the nature

religious

meaning

will

not lead to some general theory of religious expression; rather, this concern is

relevant to the extent that

particular religious

will focus primarily

ji '

is

it

provides insights for "understanding" a

phenomenon. The concrete phenomenon on which we is

comparatively "late" in the history of religions;

the term "emptiness"

(siinyatd)

it

used by the Buddhist philosopher

I

Nagarjuna

j

in India

during the second century a.d. to express the nature

"emptiness"

is

An

investigation of Nagarjuna's use of the

term

instructive for opening avenues of understanding

from

of ultimate reality.^

1

several perspectives. For instance, "emptiness"

which Indian monastic Buddhism presents ligion; for this

God

(as the

form of Buddhism frames

term

is

is

the epitome of the

anomaly

in comparative studies of reits

vision without recourse to

used in Christianity, Islam, Shinto, or even the bhakti

I

form of Hinduism). This term

I

character of existence.

How

religious inspiration? Also, in the is

suggests an emphasis

then can such

a

on the "negative"

formulation be the source of

narrower scope of Buddhist studies there

continual reinterpretation of such apparently "negative" concepts as

nirvana, "nonself" (andtman), and "impermanence" (aniiya)

,

as well as

"emptiness" {si'inyatd). Buddhist scholars seek to get some insight into this

element of Buddhist religious

epistemological implications

life

*

To

word

to the ontological

and

which such terms have. Concretely the prob-

lem in Nagarjuna's use of "emptiness" other

by turning

is

that he denies that

for an inexpressible Ultimate Reality behind

use such terms as "ultimate reality" in expressing emptiness

is

all

it is

just an-

phenomenal

problematic. In this study

however, distinguish between "Ultimate Reality," which means the source of all existence referred to by language (in those structures of religious apprehension which assume such a relationship) e.g., God, and "ultimate reality" which refers to the practical notion that there is a

we

will,

distinction between "what is real" and appearance (without assuming that this ultimate reality .has the nature of self-existent being). The term that best takes the place of Ultimate Reality in ,/: Nagarjuna's thought might be Ultimate Truth, which means a way of apprehending the phenomenal world that does not bind man to its limitations; while this truth is partially expressed through words and propositions, it is not to be identified with one proposition over against another. ,

20

The Problem

on the one hand; on the

existence

nihihsm.

The question

is:

What

other, he denies that this

mean

does this term

as it

a

is

used in

is

form of

own

its

context of thought?

An

investigation into the use of "emptiness" to articulate ultimate

reality

is

useful in understanding the universal

ing religious knowledge.

thought because

which

own

is

who it

human

It is especially useful

activity of express-

for students of religious

stand within the Jewish, Christian, and Muslim traditions

norm

denies the validity of the internal

for religious affirmation

most prominent in Western thought, thereby suggesting that

their

assumptions are not the only bases for religious meaning. The internal

norm "God

for

much

is,"

and any meaningful

of Western religious knowledge

the recognition that

is

must be

religious statement

related to His

may be defined) Human religious discussion does not begin until after God has acted; the discussion assumes God as the One with whom man interacts, and the concern of the discussion revelation of Himself (however this

is

.

the proper knowledge and service of God. Nagarjuna, to the contrary,

stands within the Buddhist tradition that begins the religious discussion

with the general clarifies

human

situation of incompleteness

and frustration; he

the basis of this feeling of frustration, which then

Thus we

reconsidered views and appropriate action.

mean

standing of "emptiness" does not

ceived as an essence with attributes but

a definition of

rectified

by

an under-

something con-

term used to

a

is

is

will see that

shift the

mode

of apprehending "existence" and "ultimate reality."

The foci,

present study of Nagarjuna's use of the term "emptiness" has

two

each of which has a bearing on the other. These foci represent the two

One

aspects of study for a historian of religions.

focus

a

is

the religious meaning of a concrete religious phenomenon.

concern with the universal

human

concern with

The

other

activity of religious expression. It

is

is

a

not

surprising that the investigation of one should enhance an understanding

of the other.

On

ness extends

beyond any particular

the one hand, the activity of expressing religious aware-

an understanding of the universal

religious

human

phenomenon; on the

religious activity

speculation unless it is based on a detailed Nagarjuna used the term "emptiness" with

analysis of the concrete data. a

keen awareness of the prob-

lems involved in expressing the inexpressible; so a study of the used to articulate

its

other,

becomes vague

apprehension of transforming truth

may

way

it

was

provide an

problem of articulating religious knowledge. However, not an investigation of Nagarjuna's use of "emptiness" aid in under-

insight into the

only

may

Standing the relationship between religious awareness and verbal expres21

Emptiness;

A

but

slon,

Study in Religious Meaning

concern with the

a conscious

latter, I

beUeve, will provide an

important clue for understanding the religious significance of "emptiness."

The

difficulties

and those of gated

of this topic are familiar to scholars of Indian thought

religious expression.

as a philosophical

of Nagarjuna and those of

texts

"Emptiness" has been most often investi-

term. There

is

certainly sufficient material in the

with which to construct a

his disciples

systematic presentation of such perennial problems as the nature of cause

and

eflfect, reality,

existence,

studies of T. Stcherbatsky,

work

to suggest the

that has been done

Closely related are those scholars

meaning of

explicating the

exerted

We

and knowledge.

need only to

recall the

A. B. Keith, T. R. V. Murti, and E. Frauwallner,

by elements of the

this

from

who took term in

a philosophical perspective.

more

a

historical perspective,

light of the shifting pressures

cultural milieu, such as Louis de

La Vallee

men

are

whose considered judgments we must resort; nevertheless, concern with the material is somewhat different.

my

Poussin, Surendranath Dasgupta, and Etienne Lamotte. All these specialists to

own

Certain factors which contribute

to

meaning need

religious

analyzed by formulating questions of a general and specific sort:

to

What

be is

the relation between the half-rejected, half -seized glimmer of existence and

the full illumination which purifies and transforms the textual materials,

we would

ask:

human

life?

In terms of

How does the structure of Nagarjuna's Madhyamika mean religiously

apprehension of truth help to define the manner in which

Buddhism

expresses "the

way

of release"?

What

does

it

for Nagarjuna to articulate his awareness of truth through a dialectic?

Thus,

this

study seeks to examine the

so, it

religious awareness

The problem of knowledge and

used the term "empti-

an uncompromising dialectic to express Ultimate

ness" together with

Truth. In doing

way Nagarjuna

probes into one aspect of the relationship between

and verbal expression. the relationship between the articulation of religious

religious awareness

is,

I believe, central to

understanding

assertions of religious truth made with a self-consciousness about the limita-

tions of conceptual structures. This

the question about implicit gests that there

knowledge

as

may

problem

norms for

important because

words meaningfully;

it raises it

sug-

be more than one or two norms for judging religious

"true" or "false." Some acquaintance with Nagarjuna's re-

two more common "internal norms" for The two norms are those found and myth. Intuition regards concepts as mere "analo-

ligious dialectic suggests that the

establishing religious truth do not apply.

in religious intuition

22

is

relating

The Problem gles," as discussed by Rudolf Otto in The Idea of the Holy.^ Myth, says Mircea Eliade, in being told "establishes a truth that is absolute." ® Both the

"intuitive" and "mythical" normative structures for apprehending religious

truth require an objective Ultimate Reality to which they refer. This as-

sumption that

religious concepts require

an absolute referent

is

denied by

who declares that both the phenomenal and ultimate realms "empty." By comparing the internal norms for making meaningful

Nagarjuna, are

religious statements

prehension,

we can

and correlating these to the structures of

religious ap-

perceive the significance of using the term "emptiness"

to articulate Ultimate Truth.

This study of Nagarjuna's use of the term "emptiness" in the context of the relationship between religious awareness and verbal expression has

Our concern with religious expression is based on judgment that man in nature and society must be taken seriously because man is made for God. Mankind with its hopes and fears, its striving theological implications.

the

for meaning, creation.

An

its

struggle to express the truth,

understanding of

is

an integral part of God's

human

tion of the Christian gospel are

religious awareness and the articulacomplementary elements in the task of

systematic theology under the category of "revelation."

considering revelation

is,

Our approach

in

however, an indirect one and attempts to analyze

the religious meaning of an expression which appears to be radically different

from the Judeo-Christian

tion of

By

affirmation of a concrete historical revela-

God.

suggesting theological implications

ness," in the

we

are not inferring that "empti-

form used by Nagarjuna, can be

successfully integrated into

an articulation of the Christian gospel. Rather, apprehension quite unlike the

within the Christian tradition;

classic it

it

represents a religious

mythical and analogical structures

therefore -may present an alternative

meaning-structure in an age whose religious awareness

up of half -forgotten myths that secular language.

ception

On

may

What may

itself

admittedly made

by

a literal

provide the structure for a

new transforming power. may be of a more is important to know the

the other hand, the reader's religious sensitivities

possibilities

of rehgious awareness

—not

it

as a possible alternative

but

as a

Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy, trans. John W. Harvey (New York: Oxford University 195 8), see esp. chaps, i and vii. Mircea Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane, trans. Willard Trask (New York: Harcourt,

Press, '

or

appear to be the dissolution of religious per-

exclusive, traditional nature. In such a case

^

is

are being transplanted

Brace and

Company, 19S9),

p.

9S.

23

A

Emptiness:

Study

in Religious

Meaning

position to be rejected. This analysis will not take

suggestion in any systematic way; rather,

it

up an elaboration of

this

intends to probe one area in

the expression of religious knowledge and give an insight into the re-

between

lationship

and the articulation of

religious awareness

religious

truth.

Our problem and the data help to define broad methodological assumpTo "understand" religious phenomena involves at least two aspects:

tions.

one is

preserving the integrity of the particular phenomenon; the other

is

structuring the interpretation along lines whereby the intentions of the

investigation are most appropriately met. Thus, crete data

found

be aware of the limitations and

sumed

we must

activity

possibilities

and

deal with con-

at the

of the perspective

same time

we have

as-

for understanding.

The aim from

tiated

human

in the history of

to "understand," as conceived in this study, a

Buddhist

know

aim to

disciple's

must be

differen-

the truth of "emptiness."

"While both the Buddhist disciple and the historian of religions express a desire

1

to

know

the

realize this personally

-

meaning of "emptiness," the

phenomenological distinctions that we will make here i

1

a

diversion

from

to know its meaning by relating which we organize or structure data. From our perspective, to "understand" requires a confrontation with the concrete, particular, historical data, and an interpretation of these data his goal. it

1

wants to

disciple

within himself and would find the historical and

We, on

the other hand,

want

to categories of thought through

human

in their relation to the universal

effort of religious expression.

"We

proceed with the assumption that the expressions, the statements of religious

knowledge, the cultic

that the character of

meaning

spiritual concerns.

A

ligious imperialism

whereby

found

as those

of

activities,

and the symbols have meaning and

in those statements pertains

to ultimate

concern for the concrete data hopes to correct all

religious data are regarded to be the

in the investigator's

own

religious apprehension

a re-

same

(or lack

it).

We

contend that assuming

datum

a

between

relation

and a general concern with religious

presuppose that

all religious

phenomena

a

particular

phenomena does not

religious

necessarily

are basically the same; rather,

men who

(

1

cerns which are so termed because they have some characteristics in

i

mon

f

human

with other concerns termed

"religious."

involves the capacity to have some

We

form of

it

act with religious con-

implies that within every society there are

com-

do assume that to be religious awareness.

To

say this does not minimize in the least the difficulty of empathizing with 24

The Problem a religious

apprehension emerging in a historical context different from

that of the investigator.

On

make

the other hand, this difficulty does not

such a study worthless.

There are

number of ways

a

in

which concrete

can be

historical data

handled, depending in large part on what kind of data are appropriate to the task at hand. Since

we

are concerned

with the problem of symbolic

apprehension rather than with the development of the religious community as a social

and

religious texts

our data will be found primarily in

political institution,

which

articulate the religious awareness.

While

these textual

data must be seen in the cultural milieu appropriate to them, they are

not seen simply ness"

mon

from the

Our approach

historicistic

to understanding "empti-

approach which has been so com-

during the past half century. Rather than simply describing the

torical

which "changed"

influences

outside, a

product.

as its

different

is

we

a

attempt to understand

will

religious

This approach

tries

to

by

this expression

few elements within the inner dynamics of

his-

from the

apprehension

investigating

religious thought.

understand "emptiness" by analyzing three

determinants of religious meaning: 1) the conceptual milieu which provides the vocabulary tives,

2) the internal

and patterns of thought for evaluations and perspec-

norm

for truth or the regulative pattern of inter-

any human attempt to make meaningful and 3) the distinctive "religious" significance derived from the knowledge that is articulated. The first determinant will be con-

related concepts inherent in assertions,

religious

sidered through an analysis of the relation between "emptiness" (hlnyatd)

and four important Buddhist concerns: constitute existence (dharmas) 3)

nirvana, and 4)

religious

,

1)

The nature of

the factors that

2) causal relations (pratUya-sainutpdda),

wisdom (prajnd)

.

The second

be ap-

v/ill

proached by comparing three "structures of religious apprehension" manifested in phenomena which can be regarded these structures within Indian thought. It these three structures are not

meant

as "classical

as

types" of

might be mentioned here that

means

to represent the only symbolical

of apprehending religious truth but are given, in part, to establish the fact that there

is

a variety of apprehending-processes.

The

third deter-

minant will be considered through an analysis of the nature of "religious meaning" by explicating the religious contents of "emptiness" and exposing the implications of this interpretation for a general understanding of the significance of religious statements. After

a brief

chapter outlining

Budform a

the religious context of Nagarjuna's expression within the history of dhist thought, each determinant will be considered in turn

and

will

25

Emptiness;

A

Study in Religious Meaning

major section of

this study.

Each

section attempts to

complement the

others in an ever expanding context for understanding "emptiness" as a

rehgious term. Reciprocally, "emptiness"

is

particularly useful in portraying

the importance of each of these elements, for

each has in the emergence of

it

brings to light the role

meaning.

this religious

this study, we must which themselves would be fruitful for study but which, for practical considerations, must be omitted. One of these areas is the historical origin and development of Buddhism as an institutionalized "Way," such as found in the writings of N. Dutt, ]&. Lamotte, and T. "W. Rhys Davids. This is the realm of the Buddhologist or Indologist. Another

Regarding the particular hermeneutical task of

also delimit clearly areas

which

area of study it is

h

found

j

Rudolf Otto's The

in

Language, or area j

j

which

found

F. S. C.

it is

a

we

will

sidering

how

dimensions of

religious awareness

In sum, our task

is

third

is

a vehicle of

may

as

be

As suggested communica-

comes to consciousness, without con-

symbols are related to the

human

as

whose intent stands outside

philosophy or phenomenology of language

simply assume that the symbol

by which the

A

Northrop's The Meeting of East and West.

in the writings of E. Cassirer, S. Langer, or E. Sapir.

before,

with

phenomena, such

Idea of the Holy, Ian Ramsey's Religious

directly related to this study but

is

the scope of

tion

related to this investigation but not identical

is

a systematic analysis of the nature of religious

aesthetic,

emotional, or social

existence.

to investigate Nagarjuna's use of the

term "emptiness"

to aid our understanding of the relationship between religious awareness and conceptual expression. We will proceed with the working

hypothesis all

that

human

symbolization

a

is

participating

factor

of

expressed religious awareness; therefore, a study of the dynamics of

religious

thought

will

both illuminate the meaning of a

phenomenon and contribute

specific religious

to an understanding of the

articulating religious knowledge.

Our method

human

for understanding

is

role In

partly

determined by the formulation of the problem. But it also helps define the way in which data are used to solve the problem. To understand the religious meaning of "emptiness" involves an examination of three expanding areas of reference.

The narrowest

area

is

the specific Buddhist articula-

tion of religious knowledge in India at the beginning of the Christian

wider area is the Indian religious environment In which can be seen several structures of religious apprehension; and finally, the third area is the human problem of articulating religious knowledge.

era; the second,

We shall try to move within workable 26

limits of the

problems involved in

The Problem

knowing Ultimate Truth. However, the nature of the problems a centrifugal force

which

carries the investigator into

displays

dangerous realms

phenomenon such as religious apprehension we have to make the choice (perhaps more unconscious than conscious) of whether we will let the subject matter draw us on, or whether we will set a more un-Promethean goal. Recognizing that this study represents an of

pitfalls.

In approaching a

opportunity to crystallize some of the pression

by an

issues in

analysis of the concrete data,

we

understanding religious expresent

it as

an investigation

of one aspect of a vast problem.

27

2 of

THE RELIGIOUS CONTEXT NAGARJUNA'S EXPRESSION

In order to interpret Nagarjuna's use of "emptiness" in

we should The first is

context

indicate briefly three factors

usage.

the historical information

the second a

is

the influence of

two

its

historical

which contribute to

this

we have about Nagarjuna;

religious traditions:

one which emphasizes

conceptual analysis, the other which emphasizes meditation; and the

third factor deals with the basic religious concepts and presuppositions used

by

the Buddhists which

formed the conceptual matrix out of which

Nagarjuna's expression emerged.

Nagarjuna's Place in the History of Buddhism

Very

little historical

present time.

information about Nagarjuna

The consensus of

scholarly opinion

is

is

available at the

that Nagarjuna sys-

tematized his view on "emptiness" during the second half of the second

century

a.d.,

and that while originating

in

South India

his influence

quickly

spread to the Ghandhara area in North-West India. ^ Another fact, which

acknowledged by many authorities, is that Nagarjuna was from a Brahmin family. This would at least not argue against his having a high is

degree of education including training in metaphysical discussion.

The accounts of Nagarjuna found in the Chinese and Tibetan traditions regard him as an alchemist and possessor of superhuman powers.^ These, ^Bareau, APB,

p.

173. Lamotte,

TGVS,

I,

x.

La Vallee Poussin, "Madhyamika," ERE, VIII

(1916), 23J. Nariman, LHSB, p. 93. Conze, BTI, p. 238. Murti, CPB, p. 87. Robinson, MSEC (pp. 3 5-37), summarizes the problem of dating Nagarjuna's life in light of the various sources concluding that Nagarjuna lived about a.d. 113-213.

Max

"The

Nagarjuna from Tibetan and Chinese Sources," A. A. Probsthain, B. Schindler, ed. (London, 1922), pp. 421-55; M. Winternitz, History of Indian Literature, S. Ketkar and H. Kohn, trans. (Calcutta, 1933), II, 341-48; Mircea Eliade, Yoga: Immortality and Freedom, W. Trask, trans. (New York, 1958), pp. 402, 415; t.. Lamotte, TGVS, p. x. Robinson has given the accounts of Hui-yan, Seng-chao, and Kumarajlva '

See

trans.,

in

Walleser,

Life of

Hirth Anniversary Volume,

MSEC, 2i

pp.

33-35.

The

Religious Context of Nagarjuna's Expression

however, present a better picture of the reHgious concerns and attitudes of juna.

Buddhism than a Hteral account of the activities of NagarSuch biographies served two purposes for the Buddhist community:

first,

they estabhshed

fifth-century

of spiritual leadership in a succession of

a principle

patriarchs; and secondly, they defended the rights of

Madhyamika

principles

to be considered as the Buddha's original dhanna.^ Likewise in the Indian literature of the

end of the

millennium

first

of medical and alchemist treatises,

make

a direct

Nagarjuna, the author

a.d.,

mentioned; however,

is

it is difficult

to

connection between the alchemists and spiritual healers on

the one

hand and the second-century

From

the limited material available

religious dialectician

we can

sift

on the

other."*

out certain general facts

that permit a reconstruction of the philosopher Nagarjuna only in barest

We know

outline.

and

nothing that would deny that he received the spiritual

intellectual training of a

know nothing which would from elements outside the Hindu and

Brahmin, and we

suggest extraordinary influence

Buddhist religious milieu of second-century India. writings

it is

clear that he

From

evidence in his

was acquainted with the various philosophical

"wisdom" (prajna) Abhidharma literature)

schools of thought as well as the practice of realizing

through

the process of analysis (as reflected in the

and contemplation (dhydna).

Two

Abhidharma and Vrapidparamita

Traditions Converge:

According to the Theravada Buddhist tradition, the Buddha's teaching summarized in the Four Noble Truths, where we find that all existence (dtikkha) that this turmoil arises from a is characterized by turmoil "thirst" for objects of man's mental and emotional fabrication, that there is freedom from turmoil, and that the means for attaining this freedom is

,

the Middle Path, referred to as the Noble Eightfold Path. This teaching

is

included not only a view of

method

a

life

but

conduct and complex which

also principles of ethical

for controlling the mental-emotional-physical

appears as our empirical "selves." Insight into the nature of existence, ^

Walleser in Schindler, pp. 452-54. La Vallee Poussin, "Faith and Reason in Buddhism" (ProceedThird International Congress for the History of Religions, Pt. II [Oxford, 1908], p. 36).

ings of the *

Walleser (Schindler,

p.

one in which Nagarjuna

as

VI,

A

Sanskrit

Biography

is

of

glorified.

the

"Nagarjuna

et

national des Orientalistes

Ibid.,

Siddhas

New

p.

and

Some Questions Connected with Nagarjuna,"

XXVI (1930), 142. Benyotosh Bhattacharyya, (London: Oxford University Press, 1932), p. 67. Jean Agastya, medecins, chimistes et sorciers," Actes du XXe Congres Inter-

Jonrnal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, An Introdiictrott to Buddhist Esoterism Filliozat,

text. The History of Eighty-Four Sid d has, 421. Giuseppe Tucci, "Animadversiones Indicae:

421) mentions the Tibetan

(Brussels,

1940),

p.

Series

229.

29

.

Emptiness;

A

Study in Religious Meaning

morality, and psycho-physical control were to be perfected

more or

less

simultaneously since each interacted with the other.

Pervading the Buddhist teaching were several notions about the nature

One of the most imporhuman being has no permanent

of existence and the meaning of spiritual insight. tant of these notions was the assertion that a essence (dtman)

and

is

only a changing conglomerate of material, mental,

and psychic factors {d harm as) enced world

as

we

are

.

These factors interact to form the experi-

aware of

it

and

in everyday living,

all

objects of

perception or ideas are seen to be without independent bases of existence.

The

"arising of existence,"

which generally

also the arising of turmoil,

is

comes about through interdependent and reciprocal forces of the factors (dharmas) forces which find their roots in man's ignorant clinging to

—

the objects that "he" unwittingly

is

fabricating!

existence" to cease, the fabricating ignorance

of ignorance requires spiritual insight

norance

is

must

(prajna)

.

For "the arising of

cease;

When

fabricating ig-

overcome and the residue of the fabricating force has nirvana

—the "dying out" of the flame of

During the seven

centuries between the life of the

then there

and the quelling

is

dissipated,

desire for illusory

objects.

Buddhist adept Nagarjuna,

this doctrine

Abhidharma

different ways. In the

the

Buddha and the was elaborated and explained in

many factors

were defined, analyzed, and catalogued for

a

of existence {dharmas)

more perfect understanding

by those who sought wisdom. Together with intellectual comprehension went the meditational practices, each providing a reciprocal thrust into new possibilities of insight. About three hundred years before Nagarjuna, a body of literature began to develop which emphasized the perfection of

wisdom (Prajndpdramita literature) whereby one understood how phenomena arose, the interdependent nature of all factors of existence, and the release from fabricated attachment that was achieved as understanding deepened. At its highest point the perfection of wisdom led to the awareness that all things are "empty." It was in this intellectual and Nagarjuna systematized

religious milieu that

Buddhist Middle

Way

his

understanding of the

(Mddhyamika)

Nagarjuna's basic work, the Madhyamakakdrikds, shows the influence of two streams of religious concern: the abhidharmic concern with analysis

and

clarification,

and the Praptdpdramitd concern with the practice of

spiritual realization.

The term ^'Abhidharma"

applies

both to a method

of understanding and to the treatises formulating the understanding which 30

The

Religious Context of Nagarjuna's Expression

became the third section of the Buddhist canonical writings.^ Though there was a concern to clarify and classify different aspects of the teaching (dharma) very early in the life of the Buddhist community, the development and formulation of the Abhidharma texts which are available to us

now

took place primarily between the time of Asoka (third century B.C.)

and Kani§ka

(first

century a.d.). This period was a time for consolidating

new conceptions, and for grouping into "schools." While there developed more than one recension of the Abhidharma, all doctrines, for expressing

the schools recognized the four trends of logical analysis

bhida)

.

{cafu-patisam-

These were (1) the analysis of the meaning (attha) of words and

{dhamma), which means analysis which may mean here grammar and of knowing (patibbdna) from a psycho-

sentences, (2) analysis of the teaching

of causes,

(3)

analysis of nirutti,

and (4)

definitions,

analysis

epistemological standpoint.®

The purpose for the elaborate classification of elements in the Abhidharma was not to add to the Buddha's teaching. Rather, it was to help the faithful community "eliminate false assumptions about man and existence that supported clinging to illusion. The intent was soteriological, not speculative. Originally the Abhidharma literature systematized the tenets found scattered in different sermons by the Buddha as an aid for instruction,

and

in

time

it

developed a technique of

of reality and the cause of suffering were

its

own

in

which the nature

The techniques terms of momentary cog-

analyzed topically.

include: (1) a strict treatment of experience in

nizable states and definition of these states, (2) creation of a "schedule" consisting of a double and triple classification for sorting these states,

and

(3) enumeration of twenty-four kinds of conditioning relations.'^

Such an

analysis

resulted

in

extensive

classifications

of the

factors

(dharmas) that combined to form everyday experience. These factors were defined and contemplated

bondage of

his

upon

in order to release the Buddhist

common, day-to-day attachment

from the

The attempt

to "things."

to get a fully consistent systematization of elements together with an ade-

quate theory of relating them casually was a religious goal. It to formulate a fully consistent understanding of elements

the

Madhyamika

dialectic of

is

the struggle

which

led to

Nagarjuna. The dynamism of the early teach-

ing that there was no essential reality in existence {andtmavdda) could not '

We

will indicate the difference

by using "Abhidharmi^' {Pali: Abhidhamma) method of tmderttanding.

to refer to the

canonical texts, and "abhidharma" to refer to the

'See Jayatilleke '

Bhikkhu

EBTK,

i>Janamoli,

310-13.

The Path of

Purification

(Colombo: R. Semage, 1956), xxix.

31

A

Emptiness:

Study

in Religious

Meaning

any

allow positing an eternal reality in a factor of existence {dharma)

more than

.'

/

*

in the individual entity

(dtman)

rather, the recognition of emptiness in

and

structure,

states,

For Nagarjuna,

it

required,

any mental category: in a rational

in an absolute intuition.

The abhidharma mental

.

and

schools

had

common

categories for analyzing existence,

stages of spiritual progress. Likewise, part of the con-

cern of the classification found in the Abhidharma was to define the terms

which were used to interpret human life, so that the monk would be clear about the components of existence. In the sixth book of the present Pali Abhidhavima, Yamaha, we find "a thesaurus of terms," which "tries to give a logical clarification and delimitation of all the doctrinal concepts, as to their range and contents." ^ Other words are given ordinary definitions, such as a "seat" {asana), said to be "where people sit." These categories and definitions became the object of Nagarjuna's critical analysis and were declared to be figments of the imagination. These categories

included classifications of conditioned factors of existence (samskrta) such

components (skandhas) that made up an individual person, the and universal elements (dhdius) which

as the

"bases of cognition" {dyatanas)

unite to

,

form the stream of moments which most people commonly

existence."

call

^

In the Kdrikds and Yigrahavydvartant Nagarjuna analyzes the concepts

and problems expressed in the Abhidharjna^^ and judges their adequacy criteria of logical consistency and precision of thought found

by the in the

Abhidharma. Nevertheless, he did not simply compile more

fications or write

classi-

another commentary on the meaning of words.

He

rejected the kind of answers provided by the abhidharma scholars and tried to show the inadequacy of defining and classifying elements of

'

i

existence

by carrying

this analytical

concern to

its

logical end.

However,

Nagarjuna's notions are expressed in terms of the vision which emerged

through the Prajndpdramitd

literature,

and which formed the mystique

of the Mahayana. This was the apprehension of emptiness {sunyatd) the Buddhist tradition *

scholarship connect

Nyanatiloka Mahathera, Gitide through the Abhidhamma-Titaka

Sabha, 1957), *

and modern

A

p.

.

Both

Nagarjuna and

(Colombo: Bauddha Sahitya

88.

precise exposition of these three classifications

is

given in catechetical form in the Dhatii-

Khata. See Nyanatiloka Mahathera, Gtiide through the Ahhidhamma-Pitaka, pp. 52-5 9. ^° See Stanislaw Schayer, Ausgewahlte Kapitel aus der Prasannapada (Krakowie: Nakladem Polskiej Akademji Umiejetnosci, 1931), pp. ix ff. for a general statement on Nagarjuna's use of conceptual categories provided by Hinayana schools, and Conze, BTI, p. 251, for the analytical tradition accepted

32

by Nagarjuna.

The the

Madhyamlka School

Religious Context of Nagarjuna's Expression

directly with the concerns in the Prajndpdramlia

literature to realize "emptiness."

What

On

the relation between the Prajndpdramitd and the

is

the one hand, there

(prajnd)

is

a

common

Abhidharma?

element in that both hold wisdom

to be the highest goal in spiritual development.

heritage

is

seen

concretely,

for

instance,

in

the

A

common

numerical summaries

prominent in each. Nyanatiloka Mahathera indicates the imlist of terms which precedes the first book of the Abhidhamvia Pifaka, the Dha^nmasanganJ: (indfrkds)

portance of this

A

close

imder is

a

not, as

but

is

examination reveals

great it is

number of

it

as

embracing the entire universe, classifying

psychological, ethical and doctrinal aspects.

sometimes assumed, merely

basic for the

a part

of the

whole Abhidhamma, serving

most important of the seven books.

It

may

as the

it

The list analytical Dhammasangani, explicit framework for the .

.

.

be compared to a mould, or matrix,

for casting metal. ^^

Concerning

their

"In these mdtrkds

importance for the Prajndpdramitd, Conze remarks, we must, I think, see the forerunners of the lists which

figure so prominently in the Prajiiaparamita Sutras."^^

The concern

for

analyzing phenomenal existence in both the Abhidharma and the Pra-

jndpdramitd suggest that there was a

common

regarded the clear apprehension of reality release.

release

On

as

religious sensitivity.

Both

coincident with spiritual

Both were born from the same matrix: the Buddhist struggle for from the attachment to apparent reality.

the other hand, the Prajndpdramitd perspective opposed the abhi-

dharma method of perceiving the true nature of

things. It rejected the

abhidharma concern to define and catalogue the factors (dharmas) which constitute existence, and denied that one can attain knowledge of the Ultimate Truth through contemplating how they arise and dissipate.-^^

Whether

the Prajndpdramitd literature was a reaction to a specific

abhidharma school

is

not at

all clear,

in the Mahdprajiidpdramifopadesa notions.-^*

The

^^

Nyanatiloka,

^'^

Conze, PL,

^* Conze, ^*

relation p.

p.

it

but judging from the thought found arose in opposition to Sarvastivadin

between one of the early

texts, the Astasdhasrikd

4.

13.

BTI, pp. 2 2 0-2 J.

Conze, PL,

p.

12. See esp.

Lamotte,

TGVS,

I,

xv, 782, 811, 939, 1035. In B"^B, p.

8J, E.

Conze states, "The Prajfidparamitd texts work with the Abhidharma of the Sarvastivadins." Louis de La Vallee Poussin ("Mahayana," ERE, VIII [1916], 336) states: "The Abhidharma of the Sarvastivadins (Hinayana) is accepted by the Madhyamikas (Mahayana)." And Bareau (APB, p. 179) maintains that Nagarjuna knew the Sarvastivadin literature very well.

3}

Emptiness:

A

Study in Religious Meaning

Prajndpdramitd, and the Sarvastlvadins

is

not certain since no distinctive

work

Sarvastlvadin doctrines are ever referred to;^^ but this

does beUttle

the understanding of traditional abhidharma as held by the monk Sariputra and according to the Theravada abhidharma treatise Atthasdlini, Sariputra is considered a master of analytic knowledge (patisambhidd) .^^

As a preview of the criticism which Nagarjuna will level at the abhidharma theories, it would be well to delineate various contrasting elements between these perspectives. Conze summarizes five points of contrast :^'^ (1) The ideals, aims, and career of a bodhisattva as articulated in the Prajndpdramitd are

opposed to those of the arhat and pratyekabuddha.

(2) The "perfection of wisdom" {prajndpdramitd) is contrasted to the "wisdom" of the old schools on the basis of its relative purifying or transforming power. (3) The Prajndpdramitd rejects the method of "reviewing"

the elements of existence {dharmas). (4) In contrast to the abhidharma theories of the "origination"

and "cessation" of elements, the Prajndpdra-

mitd held that there was "non-production" of elements.

( 5 )

Instead of re-

garding the nature of reality to consist of a multiplicity of elements, the

Prajndpdramitd held that the apparent multiplicity was simply the product of imagination. j

,

many

From

the standpoint of highest truth there were neither

particulars nor an absolute single reality: all

ontologlcal determinations. While the terminology

the

Abhidharma and Prajndpdramitd

receive a

new

significance.

Among

texts, the

the

new

is

was empty of such

much

the same in

terms for ultimate reality

ideas expressed in the Pra-

means" whereby, for the spiritually enlightened, all activities become related to becoming a bodhisattva. Another new notion is the transfer of merit from the one-who-has-attained to others. In summary, the Prajndpdramitd expresses the highest religious aim as

jndpdramitd

is

the "skill in

the all-encompassing knowledge for the benefit of

which

clearly perceives that there

is

no knowledge

all

knowledge no bodhisattva,

beings, a

as such,

no path for attainment, or no being who has knowledge, or who bodhisattva, or who proceeds on the path. 1

1

Our

the

interpretation of "emptiness," then, will reflect the religious con-

cerns expressed in the ^*

is

Abhidharma and

the Prajndpdramitd literatures.

12. Also see his translation of this work into English: AstasahasrikJ p. {The Perfection of Wisdom in Eight Thousand Slokas) trans, and ed. Edward Conze (Bibliotheca Indica, Work No. 284, Issue No. 1578 [Calcutta: The Asiatic Society, 1958]). ^® See A. Migot, "Un grand disciple du Bouddha, Sariputra," Bulletin de I'Ecole, Frangaise d'Extreme-Orient, XLVI (1954), 405-554. Conze, "Sariputra," found in: Buddhism, Its Essence and Development (New York: Harper and Bros., 1959), pp. 90-93.

Conze,

PL,

Prajndpdramitd

^^

Conze,

34

PL,

,

p.

14.

The It recognizes that the

Religious Context of Nagarjuna's

Exp ression

term "emptiness" has two functions in expressing

Nagarjuna's reHgious awareness. These functions might be termed

which

dialectical function,

( 1 )

the

an absolute dependence on

seeks to destroy

the logical and discursive structure in speech for expressing Ultimate

Truth, and

(2)

the formulative function, which uses the logical and

discursive structures for probing

and expanding the scope of meaning and symbols. Though words serve both functions in the Abhidharma literature and in the Prajndpdramiid texts, the Abhidharma emphasizes in ideas

the formulative function in

its

systematic elaboration of elements, while

the Prajndpdramitd stresses the dialectical function. This

Abhidharma

is

not surprising

mostly with the mundane elements of experience while the Prajndpdramitd expresses the mind-baffling Ultimate insofar as the

Truth

deals

—emptiness.

was the genius of Nagarjuna's articulation that the term "empti-

It

ness" served both dialectical and discursive functions. It

which

is

this

combination,

key for understanding his presentation of truth through the concept "emptiness" (stlnyatd). The fact that both these elements are peculiar to Nagarjuna's expression is borne out by the fact in part,

that each of

serves as a

two

schools of interpretation, following within a

of his original expression, emphasized one of the functions. ^^ school, represented in the writings of Aryadeva,

few centuries The Prdsangika

Dharmapala, Buddhapalita,

Candraklrti, and Santideva, emphasized the transcendence of

all

logic

and concepts. Such an emphasis led to the assertion that in reahty the Buddha had never uttered a word, for the only true language of emptiness is

silence.

and

For Buddhapalita,

since existence

all mental activity produced only illusion, was simply the fabrication of mental images it did

not even have phenomenal existence. The other school, the Svdtantrika,

is

by Bhavaviveka, who held that logical discourse was beneficial negating wrong views and that the visible world had phenomenal

represented for

reality

—though

By keeping

these

it

was not

two

real

uses of the

from the viewpoint of ultimate

truth.

term "emptiness" in mind, we can better

understand the significance of Nagarjuna's expression than accept one tradition's interpretation over

if

we would

another. ^^

^* Murti's short

summary of these developments (pp. 9 J -103) is helpful for understanding the Madhyamika took. ^* Most modern scholars lean toward the Prasarigika view, e.g., Conze in Buddhist Thought in India, Stcherbatsky in Conception of Buddhist Nirvana, Murti in The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, Stanislaw Schayer, "Das Mahayanistische Absolutum nach der Lehre der Madhyamikas," forms which

Orientalistische Literaturzeitung, in

The

Essentials

XXXVIII

(1935), 401-15.

of Buddhist Philosophy, ed.

W.

On

the other hand, Junjiro Takakusu

T. Chan and Charles A. Moore

(Honolulu:

35

,

.

A

Emptiness:

Study in Religious Meaning

Basic Presuppositions in Nagarjuna's Perspective

Though

reinterpreting the

work of

accepted certain ontologlcal are is

the abhidharma advocates, Nagarjuna

and epistemological presuppositions which

fundamental to Buddhist reHgious

a radical

forms

dynamism

The

first_of these

in reality; or, stated otherwise,

suggestions of "being."

all

life.

A

second

is

"becoming" trans-

that knowledge and "becom-

know

ing" are coextensive; one becomes what he knows, and he can

|J

that there

is

only

what is available to his "becoming." A third presupposition is that there are two kinds of truth: the mundane truth, valid for practical living, and the Ultimate Truth, which is the beginning and end of release from worldly •

J

turmoil. These presuppositions structure the basic pattern of Nagarjuna's

*

concern with "transforming knowledge" and

up the

set

attaining this knowledge. These three presuppositions related, for the realization of

man's true nature

are

criterion

for

inextricably

dependent on proper

is

apprehension.

Existence as '^Becoming"

dynamic quality of life was was some factor in existence quality self-establishing about it. It was a reaction which had a permanent to a "being" defined in the Sarhkhya manner as an absolute being, a thingin-itself independent and immutable. The late Professor J. Takakusu has called attention to the fact that Buddhism was a philosophy of "thusness"

The Buddhist claim

(

'

\

\

for the intrinsically

a reaction to the prevalent claim that there

,

(tatbafd)

,

in distinction to the Upanishadic

thought of "thatness" {tattva)

and "started with the theory of becoming, admitting no dtman, Individual or universal, and no eternalism whatever." ^° "Impermanence" (anicca)

Hindu

ontologlcal term sat (being) "becoming" must be distinguished from the common view of change, which regards change as pertaining to a state or form of some more basic substance. When a person passes through the

replaced the crucial

The notion of

radical

stages of infancy, youth, maturity,

there

is

some basic

reality

(called

and old age the assumption

throughout. Or, empirical existence In general University of Hawaii, 1947), has

We

follow the lead of L. de

la

classified

Is

that

by the same name) which continues

Madhyamika under

Vallee Poussin, in "Bhavaviveka,"

is

considered to be

real,

the rubric "Negative Rationalism."

MCB,

II

(1933), 65,

who

suggests

that together the Prasaiigikas and Svatantrikas show the "middle way," one destroying the voidness of existence and the other destroying the existence of the void. '° Junjiro Takakusu, "Buddhism as a Philosophy of Thusness," Philosophy Charles A. Moore (Princeton: University Press, 1944), p. 69.

36

—Easi

and West,

ed.

The

To

while forms change.

Religious Context of Nagarjuna's Expression

the contrary, the traditional Buddhist view

—

that the world "becomes" continually posit a being-ness about the world, sciously,

say

which occurs to

and the cause for

illusion

is

(as the

"is" nothing.

it

thing"

The

is

the

a large extent

suffering. It

To

first step in

characteristics

uncon-

that a thing does

direct attention to "a

the direction of affirming a self-sufficient entity.

"impermanence"

of

is

to

even misleading to

is

Buddhist school of Sarvastivadins did)

not exist even for two consecutive moments.

The attempt

{anicca,

anitya)

,

"turmoil"

{dukkha, duhkha), and "non-soul" {anatta, andtina), which applied to all

existing things,

i.e.,

were used to suggest that

"entities"

all

were nonentities,

only mental constructs.

The anatma-te2ich.m^ essence of

man which

which we

call a

of

pre-Mahayana Buddhism had

could be considered unchanging.

"person" was regarded simply

as a

denied

any

The phenomenon

composite of factors

(dharnias) which were related in an orderly manner, but which were continually in flux. This doctrine also denied the existence of an absolute universal essence and suggested that the proper place to gain an understanding of reality was with phenomenal existence, which unlike most Western is seen as a succession of constructions. This is

or elements

philosophies

which think of the "uncombined"

and which begin with the simple absolute interpreting

the

teaching to show

nature of

how

equivalent to "simple"

as

fundamental category for Nagarjuna extended this andtma-

reality.

as a

"the un-combined"

is

logically

and

linguistically

dependent on the "combined" {samskrta) Thus the notion "un-combined" .

functions in

Madhyamika

substantial connotations,

philosophical thought,

and

(2)

as

a

(1)

without necessary

term dependent on conceptual

fabrication.

In denying the reality of a self-sufficient entity, early Buddhism expressed the continuity of one

moment

to the next

"dependent co-origination" {pratttya-samtitpdda) of existence into an orderly process, while character of any

.

by

emphasizing the transient

moment. Phenomena "arose" or became

the interaction of a vast complex of factors

be identified as having characteristic

the notion of

This placed the flux

features

actual through

(dharmas) intrinsic

which could to

themselves.

Nagarjuna accepted the notion that existence was a composite of interdependent relations, but extended the dynamics of the dependent coorigination notion to the causal process

itself.

For him, "radical becoming"

did not allow for a self -existent causal principle

from the

earlier explanation.

While on the

—

as

might be inferred

level of conventional truth

37

A

Emptiness:

Study In Religious Meaning

such a causal process served to deny any essential nature of phenomenal

from the highest perspective

reality,

this

supposed principle disintegrated

along with the other empty phenomena. Therefore, the dynamics of

not pertain to only the mundane

reality did

level.

A

two-level world (of

—the

time and eternity) was dissolved within the dynamics of emptying

emptying activity of highest truth. The fact of temporality was not a problem in Itself; it was simply the "becoming" on a conventional level. The real problem was to overcome the illusion that there was an eternal, unchangeable, static reality either in the visible or ideal areas of experience; it

is

the fabrication of a being-In-itself

—which

(svabhdva)

was always that was

coextensive with the desire for, or grasping after, such an entity

—

a perversion of "indifferent becoming."

Through Knowing

^'Becoming*'

From

the perspective of Ultimate Truth, "becoming" loses a distinctively

dynamic e.g.,

character.

static:

No

more can be said about it, for every designation, non-empty, real: non-real, is dissolved.

dynamic, empty:

Indeed, to talk about "it"

to fabricate an illusion.

is

At

this

point

we can

perhaps most clearly perceive the meaning of the second presupposition: that

"becoming" and knowledge

two elements

"realize" captures the

"realize" certain possibilities.

In Buddhism,

bilities.

as in

He

are

coextensive.

in the sense that

The English word

man

can be said to

both "knows" and "becomes" the possi-

other yogic forms of "realization," the char-

knowledge and the character of "becoming" change along the from illusion to ultimate knowledge {pra]na = wisdom). Unen-

acter of scale

man

lightened

w

is

U

constructs his existence through his discrimination and

produces emotional attachments in the process. As long

I

discriminatory.

about "things,"

I.e.,

man

is

energies {karma) to continue this fabrication. Mrs.

as his

knowledge

simply producing the

Rhys Davids succinctly

describes the problem:

Thinking

results in desire,

and what we

However, i

dislike,

through

desire objects are divided into

hence envy and

as the false

selfishness,

what we

like

hence quarreling and fighting.^^

images of "things" are dissipated, the accompanying

and

emotional content and

its

hate are cooled. Here

the recognition that feelings and mental structures

It

is

J are intrinsically related.

"BP,

pp.

58

87-88.

energies are dissipated: the heat of greed

The

The lead to

problem

basic religious

more

sathsdra

is

to

Religious Context of Nagarjuna's Expression

come

to terms with the emotions that

(the flow of existence)

.

By

bringing the nature

of the trouble before the mind, the feelings which are concomitant with ignorance are eliminated. As the energies of construction and craving

knowledge discriminates less and less between "things" or between "me" and "not-me." Reciprocally, the knowledge that all are dissipated, one's

fabricated

phenomena

are

empty of

self-nature empties the binding energies

of "becoming," and the cessation of the binding energies dissipates the

emotional attachment of knowledge about "things." TtL>o

A

Kinds of Truth

which Nagarjuna accepted was that there were two kinds of truth that were useful in the "world of becoming": the mundane truth valid for practical living and the Ultimate Truth, which is the beginning and end of release from worldly turmoil. Both kinds third presupposition

of truth have a valid place in his articulation of the Middle if

Way; though

misused they are like any binding force which produces turmoil and

frustration.

Since there are distinction

no

intrinsically

different

reality. It refers, rather, to the

truth

is

e.g.,

the world and ultimate

manner by which "things"

are perceived.

based on the intellectual and emotional attachment

to ideas or sense objects as if

of knowledge, the

between "mundane truth" and "ultimate truth" does not

pertain to different objects of knowledge,

Mundane

objects

whereby such

objects of

knowledge were used

they had an existence independent of the perceiver. Such truth dis-

and categorizes segments of existence as "door," "room," "money," "I," "you," or any mental or sensual object of cognition. All men use such truth to carry on the everyday affairs of life. Likewise all religious doctrines and theories about the nature of existence

criminates, identifies,

fall

within the bounds of

mundane

Ultimate Truth, on the other hand,

is

truth,

for they

are

fabrications.

a quality of life expressed in the

complete Indifference to the construction or cessation of "things." Ulti-

mate Truth is the realization of dependent co-origination whereby there not even to the formulation is no attachment to fabricated "things"

—

of dependent co-origination.

Nagarjuna accepted the practical distinction between the two kinds of truth, and because this was only a practical distinction he felt free to use

mundane

dispel the

truth, that required logical and semantic conventions, to

attachment to the products of

this

truth and thereby lead 39

.

Emptiness;

A

Study

in Religious

Meaning

the religious student toward Ultimate Truth.

A

concern for the right

understanding of the Buddha's Path was one of the impulses for Nagarjuna's articulation of "emptiness."

He

Abhidharma had hidden the

contended that the explanations of the

right

approach to knowing

reality,

and

therefore he reinterpreted the concepts of dhamias (factors of existence)

and pratitya-sarmitpada

(dependent co-origination).

In

their

concern

to articulate the right view the early Buddhists used discursive thought

and

rational

a

criterion

of truth ;~^

and,

while

opposing some basic

Theravada notions, the Mahayana formulations owe much of

their habits

of thinking to the traditional methods.^^

The aim of

]

it

—not

articulating this religious vision, however,

simply to talk about

Truth and

it.

The

difference

theories about the nature of existence

was to "realize"

between the Ultimate

was emphasized because

the former intended to "see things as they really are," and a theoretical articulation proposed

to

do

this

with the implication that there was

an absolute understanding of existence. Speculative questions and answers

were not fruitful in the eyes of early Buddhism^* or of Nagarjuna. Indeed, the abhidharmic effort had intended to deny the categories of contemporary speculative metaphysics. Thus, the analytical procedure was quite usable ii

in attaining wisdom, but if

it

became an end in itself, or if the analysis it became detrimental speculation.

led to absolutizing "a conclusion," then

^^ See Guenther, pp. 22-30, for a technical account of the relation between the karmic process and mental process. Regarding rational techniques in Buddhism, see Conze, BTI, p. 27 &., and Louis de La Vallee Poussin, Way to Nirvana (Cambridge: University Press, 1917), p. 3 1 ff ^^BP, pp. 5 ff. La Vallee Poussin, ERE, VIH, 3 3 6. Nalinaksha Dutt, Aspects of Mahayana Buddhism and Its Relation to Hinayana (London: Luzac & Co., 1930), pp. 45 ff. ^* See Majjhima Nikaya I, par. 431; Samyutta Nikaya III, par. 139; and Samyutta Nikaya I,

par. 4, for

40

denying the usefulness of speculation.

Part II

IMPLICATIONS

"EMPTINESS" for UNDERSTANDING SOME BASIC of

BUDDHIST CONCEPTS

3 ELEMENTS AND FACTORS

THAT CONSTITUTE As

a Buddhist,

EXISTENCE (DWmas)

Nagarjuna stood within

a particular

that informed his rehgious and philosophical concerns.

reHgious tradition

He

is

however, for rejecting part of the expression of Buddhism

remembered, as

misleading

and detrimental to the intention of that expression. Thus his religious problems were defined to a considerable extent by the Indian Buddhist perspective, but he reformulated what he regarded as the central concern

Way

of the Middle

and

in doing so redefined basic concepts.

concern was to express the Middle "Way so

attachment to

illusion.

This required interpreting basic concepts about

existence and about the realization of

that

all

His central

as to aid others in loosing their

Truth

in light of the apprehension

things are empty.

In this and the next chapters

we

will

examine Nagarjuna's under-

standing of basic Buddhist concepts used to explain the existence,

and

see that in light of the

are regarded as

emptiness of

all

rise

of phenomenal

things these concepts

no more than constructing forms. To begin with the is somewhat arbitrary since the proper

notion of phenomenal existence

understanding of existence presupposes the religious vision of nirvana and highest truth.

However, we

problem of accounting formed in reaction to the

will begin with the

for existence since Nagarjuna's articulation

is

abhidharma meditation on dharmas and the understanding of cause. Nagarjuna relegated this abhidharma concern to conventional knowledge, and a

it Is

new The

in going

beyond

this that his expression of

Ultimate Truth has

significance for Buddhist thought.

elaboration of long

of their combination in the

lists

of basic elements {dharmas) and theories

Abhidharma were meant

to permit the Buddhist

many factors which constituted the apparent entities monks called "human beings." By thus penetrating into the process of "becoming," to see the

every monk,

as the

Buddha, could reverse the process and be released 43

\

i

.

A

Emptiness:

Study

in Religious

Meaning

was important to know the "marks" {laksana) and the "ownbeing" (svabhdva) of the elements which made up existence, and to

from

It

it.

contemplate on these marks.

What was

ultimate transforming knowledge for the abhidharma scholar

became for Nagarjuna a practical knowledge. This, by no means, relegated to a realm of unimportance but simply indicated the context in

it

which it was meant to have importance. By analyzing the teaching of the Abhidharma from the perspective that all ideas are "constructs" dependent on other constructed things which are themselves dependent on other constructed things Nagarjuna hoped to release the thoughts and inten-

—

—

tions of his students for Ultimate Truth.

No One

Essential Distinctions

of analyzing the abhidharma material in light of "the

result

emptiness of

Between Existing Things

all

things" was to deny the significance of the distinctions

between aspects of existence. Perhaps the most important distinction which Nagarjuna denied is that between svabhdva ("self -existence," that essential nature by which something is what it is and not something else) and parabhdva ("other-existence"). Chapter xv of his most important work, Madhyamakakdrikds, is devoted to an analysis of svabhdva. In the first

three verses the notion of svabhdva

the basic Buddhist position that

other things. 1.

He

all

is

shown

existence

to be incompatible with

produced dependent on

is

writes:

The production of

a self-existent

thing by

a

be "something which 2.

How,

is

is

not possible,

self -existent

thing would

conditioning cause

[For] being produced through dependence on a cause, a

produced" (krtaka)

indeed, will a self -existent thing

become "something which

is

pro-

duced"? Certainly, a self-existent thing [by definition]

pendent of anything 3.

If there

is

is

"not-produced" and

is

inde-

else.

an absence of

a self-existent thing,

how

will

an other-existent

thing {parabhdva) come into being? Certainly the self-existence of an other-existent thing

The next

three verses extend the

is

called "other-existence."

argument to deny the

distinction

between

existence and non-existence: 4.

Further,

existence?

44

how can

a

thing

[exist]

without either self-existence or other-

Elements and Factors that Constitute Existence (Dharmas) If either self-existence or other-existence exist, then an existing thing, indeed,

would be proved. If there

5.

no proof of an existent thing, then

is

a non-existent

thing cannot be

proved. Since people call the other-existence of an existent thing a "non-existent thing."

Those who perceive self-existence and other-existence, and an existent thing

6.

and

a non-existent thing,

Do

not perceive the true nature of the Buddha's teaching.

In the same way, the final five verses deny the distinction between the broadest categories of ontology: being and nonbeing, the aflSrmation of

each leading to eternalism or nihilism respectively. Either alternative objectionable

No

is

from the Buddhist point of view.

Between the Phenomenal World and "Unconstructed Reality"

Essential Difference

Nagarjuna could argue that the distinctions between existing things a nature which was uniquely intrinsic to a thing (and therefore essentially different from something else), and that such If

depended on assuming a

"being-in-itself" logically

not possible in an existence that

is

pendently originated, then the

way

between the most cherished antipathies in Buddhism. are the distinction

between "that which

is

Among

bound"

"that which has gained spiritual release" (muchanta) as

19,

20).

The

characteristics

de-

those denied

(badhyanta)

(XVI.

between samsdra (the course of phenomenal existence)

(XXV.

Is

open to negate the distinctions

is

and

5), as well

and nirvana

by which entitles were defined, more than conventional designa-

therefore, were not indicative of anything tions useful for daily living.

to refer to existing realities

While

be useful

a

as

practical measure to distinguish

between

would be detrimental If one forgot that even "things" do not exist apart from our giving them names.

sajiisdra

these

may

it

Such antithetical notions could not be said which had antithetical natures at the bases.

and nirvana,

It

This notion that even religious ideals were empty of self-established natures and characteristics literature.

is

related to that

records that both "beings" and nirvdna like

found

in the Prajndpdramifd

For instance, the Astasdhasrikd Prajndpdramitd dramatically

magical

Illusions.

The

(as

disciple SubhutI,

well as

Buddhahood)

are

while instructing the gods

regarding the perfect wisdom, astounds the gods by saying: 4i

/

— A

Emptiness:

Study in Religious Meaning

Like a magical illusion are those beings, like

dream. For not two different

a

things are magical illusion and beings, are dreams and beings. All objective facts

magical

also are like a

A

Gods: is

Subhuti: Even Nirvana,

much more

—

fully enlightened

dream? Buddhahood

like a

dream. The various

illusion, like a

Streamwinner to Buddhahood

also are like a

magical

Buddha also, you say, is you say, is like a magical magical

I say, is like a

would say

magical

illusion,

is

like a

is

like a

illusion,

dream?

dream.

How

is

like

an

illusion,

is

like a

dream?

perchance there could be anything more distinguished, of that

if

it is like

and Nirvana,

illusion

a

illusion,

—from

dream.

so anything else?

Subhuti: Even I

like

also,

Gods: Even Nirvana, Holy Subhuti, you say, too

classes of saints

illusion, like a

are

an

illusion, like a

dream. For not two different things are

dreams and Nirvana.^

Likewise the terms for ultimate reality used in well-known Buddhist texts are the objects of Nagarjuna's analysis

—and

found to be without

inherent ontological status. For instance, in chapter xxii of the

mikakdrikas the terms "tathagata" (the "fully

and "sunyata" (emptiness)

shown

are

ten verses are devoted to showing

to be without referents.

how

Madhya-

completed" = the Buddha)

The

first

the tathdgata cannot exist simply

in an unrelated condition or simply in a related condition, resulting in the

judgment that the tathdgata

is

empty. Verses 9 and 10 summarize

this

conclusion: 9.

10.

when

So

And

if

there

there

is

no

is

dependence, self-existence {svabhava) does not exist;

self -existence

whatever,

Thus "dependence" and "that which

how is

is

an other-existence possible?

dependent" are completely empty

(^sunya).

How

is

that

empty "fully completed one" known through that which

is

empty?

Verses 12-16 indicate that no definition reveals the tathdgata, not because the tathdgata

human

is

activity,

some absolute

herent ultimacy from arising. 14.

reality standing aloof

and unrelated to

but because the tathdgata precludes the thought of in-

Concerning that which

The

is

final three verses

empty by

its

own

summarize

this position:

nature, the thoughts do not

arise that:

The Buddha 15.

"exists" or "does not exist" after death.

Those who describe

in detail the

Buddha, who

is

unchanging and beyond

detailed description

all

Those, completely defeated by description, do not perceive the "fully completed [being]." *

Conze,

46

PWES,

p.

18, pars. 40-41;

reprinted

by permission of The

Asiatic Society.

— Elements and Factors that Constitute Existence (Dharmas)

The

16.

self-existence of the "fully completed [being]"

is

the self-existence of

the world.

The "fully-completed [being]"

is

without self-existence [and]

the world

is

without self-existence.

In verses 10, 11, and 14 of this chapter

we

see that the

terms "empty" and

"emptiness" are used to denote the tathdgata; yet, to avoid any interpretation of a substantial reality in emptiness, verse

that "emptiness"

emphatically states

simply a designation for conveying knowledge:^

is

One may not

11.

11

say that

there

is

"emptiness," nor that

there

"non-

is

emptiness."

Nor

that both [exist simultaneously], nor that neither exists; the purpose for

saying ["emptiness"]

"Emptiness" too express

is

is

only for the purpose of conveying knowledge.

empty of any inherent

being. Just as these terms do not

some unconditioned absolute reality, so also sadbhava (real XXIV. 16), dharma (universal principle, XXV. 24), and

existence,

sd^vata (eternity,

due to their

own

XXVII. 10-15) do not denote something which

real

is

self -existing natures.

Emptiness of the Basic Categories for Understanding Existence It

must

logically follow that if there

between constructed things

is

really

no ultimate

distinction

and "non-constructed things"

(samskrta)

(asamskria) then the three basic characteristics with which traditional Buddhism had identified all existing things aniiya (impermanence), duhkha (turmoil or sorrow), and andtma (without-being-in-itself) are

—

also

empty.^

This

is

borne

Madhyamakakdrikds. In chap,

out

various

in

we

xxiii. 13, 14,

passages

of

Nagarjuna's

read that the notion of im-

permanence cannot be considered to be any truer to the Ultimate Truth than that of permanence. 13.

Even

if

the notion

"What

is

permanent

is

in

something impermanent"

is

in

error,

How

can

this

notion be in error since "what

is

impermanent" does not

exist in

emptiness? *

7,

Other kdrikds indicating that "emptiness" does not and XX. 17, 18.

refer to

some actual entity include XIII.

8, '

Dutt

(AMBRH,

pp.

26-27)

points

out:

"The

Sarvastivadins

are

also

responsible

for

the

though the word conveyed no Mahayanic meaning as it connoted no other sense than anatma: see Lalita Vistara, 419, Divydvadana, 266, 367, and Kosa VI, 163 and VII, 3 1 ff regarding the relationship of Mahayana and Hinayana." addition of a fourth term, 'sunya,' to the usual trio

.

.

.

.

47

.

Emptiness:

A

Even

14.

Study in Religious Meaning if

the notion

"What

is

permanent

is

in

something impermanent"

is

in

error,

not then the notion concerning emptiness,

Is

In chap,

xii,

that

i.e.,

it

impermanent, in

is

nine verses deny that "turmoil" {dulpkha) can be produced

according to any of the accepted causal theories. Again Nagarjuna uses the

argument that any element which and

is

defined according to an independent

cannot account for the cause of things which are de-

sui gejzeris reality

by interdependence with other elements. Therefore he concludes:

fined 10.

Not only

But

also

are the four causal interpretations not possible in respect to turmoil.

none of the four causal interpretations

external things

possible even in respect to

is

{bhava)

Even the "touchstone" of

scholastic

Buddhism, the andtma

(non-self)

doctrine, cannot be maintained in the formlessness of silnyatd. In chap,

we

xviii. 6 6.

There

read: is

the teaching of "individual self" {atma)

individual self"

{anatnia)

and the teaching of "non-

,

;

But neither "individual

self"

nor "non-individual self" whatever has been

taught by the Buddhas.

Thus, the general characteristics of conditioned phenomena which were the object of meditation for the students of the Abhidharma were denied validity in ultimate or perfect knowledge.

The

denial of an essential distinction between samsdra

and nirvana was

concomitant with the denial of the three independent stages in the producconstructed things in samsdra. These stages are "origination"

tion of

and "cessation" (nirodha). As in the case with svabhdva, and parabhdva, or bhava and abhava, Nagarjuna assumes that his opponent differentiates between the three stages by positing a unique, self-sufficient reality in each; he then denies this distinction on {utpdda), "duration"

the grounds that there

{sthita),

is

no such independent entity

of such reality. Also, Nagarjuna argues that

1.

The

first

But

is

a

composite product (savtskrfa)

[of existence: origination, duration, if

origination

is

,

is

"empty"

then the three character-

and dissolution]

a non-composite (asamskrta)

characteristics of a composite product?

4S

stage

three verses of chapter vii establish his line of argument:

If origination

istics

—each

the stages are of a self-

then either an infinite regress or an eternal entity must

sufficient nature, result.

if

,

then

are

how

appropriate.

[could there be]

:

Elements and Factors that Constitute Existence (Dharmas)

When

2.

the three are separate, origination of either of the other

two character-

does not suffice to function as a characteristic.

istics

If united in a composite product,

how

could they

be at one place at one

[all]

time? If origination, duration,

3.

and dissolution

are other [secondary] characteristics

of composite products. It

an infinite regress. If

is

The following three stages,

another; and ingless.

is

not

so,

they are not [really] composite products.

verses in this chapter elaborate the

argument that

is

And

these

which have causal implications, cannot exist unrelated to one if they are identical, the distinction between them is mean-

Therefore he concludes:

Because the existence of production, duration, and cessation

3 3.

there

this

is

not proved,

no composite product (samskrta) if a

composite product

is

not proved,

how can

a

non-composite product

(asathskrta) be proved? 34.

As

a

magic

Just so should

trick, a

we

dream or

a fairy castle.

consider origination, duration, and dissolution.

Similar to the denial of the three stages of existence

the rejection of

is

the triple "time-points": past, present, and future. In the eight verses of

chapter xi he denies that the limits (boundaries) of past and future can be defined as mutually exclusive, and therefore "past," "present," and

"future" cannot be said to exist ultimately

as such.

The

first

two

verses

indicate the dialectic use: 1.

The

great ascetic [Buddha] said:

"The extreme

limit of the past cannot be

discerned."

Existence-in-fiux

(scnhsdra)

is

without bounds; indeed there

no beginning

is

or ending of that [existence]. 2.

How

could there be a middle portion of that which has no "before" and

"after"? It

follows that "past," "future," and "simultaneous events" do not obtain.

Also in chapter xix, the segments of time are denied

and the nonstatic character of time

is

individual entities,

as

indicated. Verses

5

5. A non-stationary "time" cannot be "grasped"; and which can be grasped does not exist.

How,

then, can one perceive time

if it is

a

and 6

state:

stationary "time"

not "grasped"? 49

A

Emptiness:

Study

Since time

6.

Meaning

in Religious

dependent on

is

a

thing {bhava),

how can

time [exist] without a

thing?

There

is

not any thing which

j

"Time," says Nagarjuna,

J

the danger of binding itself it

exists;

a

is

man

to

how, then, will time become [something]?

mental construction and it if it is

regarded

is

susceptible to

ultimate; though

as

by

has no inherently evil quality. Again, in chapter xxvii, in the

("views," or "perspectives"), the designation of "past"

analysis of drsti

is based on assumptions about the real or nonreal "past-beingness." * In the context of the some characteristic of Madhyamakakdrikds, time or some segment of time becomes a problem

is

denied because

when is /,

it is

crystallized into

not that

man

it

some kind of

a process of

it is

an ultimate being-ness in

posits

Madhyamika point

of view there

is

existence-as-such; one cannot escape I

distinct entity.

becoming; but that in it

The problem,

illusion

or in segments of

then,

and craving, it.

From

the

no "level of reality" like temporalfrom it because there is no "it" to

escape from.

Not only

are the elements of the conditioned

world and "the uncon-

ditioned," and the three segments of time devoid of self-sufficient "ber

comingness" {svabhdva)

,

of becoming are empty of

and the object of action entities.

Chapter

also the three factors explaining the process

but

self -existence.

The person

acting, the activity,

are judged as conventional designations, not actual

of the Kdrikds deals with this problem, establishing a

ii

model for future analyses involving the subject of object of the action.

The notion analyzed

action, the activity,

in this chapter

is

and

"motion,"

and Nagarjuna uses his dialectical analysis to show that the terms "goer," "going to," and "what is gone to" do not possess referents that have mutually exclusive essential natures.^ He shows how each term, considered as

an independent self-determined entity, denies the

His method

any

is

to point out

real relationship;

process of

and

how

possibility of motion.

a substance-attribute

a relationship

is,

notion precludes

of course, necessary for the

"becoming" to occur. This problem cannot be separated from

the question of "origination," "duration," and "cessation" since motion, as all

constructed products (samskrta) of existence,

designations. *

See

The

difficulties resulting

from

is

also related to these

a substance-attribute

notion

Appendix A.

discussion of this chapter, Murti (pp. 178 ff.) calls attention to the comparison between Nagarjuna's denial of motion and that of Zeno. He rightly points out that Zeno, while denying motion, presupposed rest. On the other hand, "Nagarjuna denies both motion and rest.

"In

Each

is

his

nothing by

50

itself

or together."

;

,

.

Elements and Factors that Constitute Existence (Dharmas) arise

from

7.

8.

9.

no "going" (gamana) without

is

The "goer"

It

come

will the "goer"

What

special relationships.

seen in the following excerpts

is

If there

How

and

causal as well as temporal

of arguing

a

when

into being

from chapter

"goer" (ganidra) there

no "going"?

is

does not go; consequently a "non-goer" certainly does not go.

third [possibility] goes other than the "goer" and "non-goer"? is

When

"The

said:

How

*goer' goes."

is

that possible,

without the "act of going" (gamana) no goer

is

produced?

Those who hold the view that the "goer" goes must

10.

The manner

ii.®

[falsely] conclude [

That

there

"goer" without the "act of going" since the "act of going"

a

is

is

obtained by a "goer."

The

12.

"state of going to"

gone to" (gatam)

Nor is "the Where then is 13. "Present

,

state of going to"

not begun in "that which

is

begun in "present going to" (gamyamdna)

is

is

already gone to" exist where the "act of going"

not yet gone to"?

is "that which is already gone to" {gatam), {gamyamdna) and "that which is not yet gone to" {agatam) ,

;

Therefore, the beginning of the "act of going"

Chapter vi

1.

already

mentally fabricated what

"present going to"

(rdga).

is

not yet gone to" {a gat am)

going to" does not exist previous to the beginning of the "act of

[begins] in "that which is

is

begun?

it

going," nor does "that which

14. It

(gaium)

nor in "that which

The

a similar analysis of the

is

first

If the "one

two kdrikds

who

desires"

one

reflect the

would

is

not seen in any way.

who

desires (rakta)

and

desire

argument:"^

exist before "desire" itself, then "desire"

may

be disregarded.

When

"desire" becomes related to "one

who

desires,"

then "desire" comes into

existence. 2.

If there

[And

true for "one

The

is

no "one who

the question]

who

See

^

See

Appendix Appendix

A A

how

then will "desire" come Into being? exists or does

not exist likewise holds

desires."

inability to attribute a

the action itself '

desires,"

whether "desire"

is

unique reality to an agent of action and to

also the basis of

Nagarjuna's denial of the argument in

for the translation of the whole

chapter.

for the translation of the whole chapter.

51

'

Emptiness:

chapter

Study

"origination" originates

vii that

and darkness. By defining

itself

clusive essences,

Nagarjuna

effective relationship. 9.

Meaning

in Religious

and something other than

itself

Nagarjuna's opponent argues by analogy to a lamp illuminating

itself.

both

A

There

What

no darkness in the

is

When

is

light

and there where the light

the darkness destroyed

by the

if

can have no

darkness

come

by

destroyed

is

is

placed.

is

the getting rid of darkness.

light being originated,

the light, being originated, does not

But then,

11.

mutually ex-

as

states:

could the light illumine? Indeed illumination

How

10.

He

and darkness

light

logically demonstrates that they

a

in contact

with darkness?

having no contact with

light

[darkness],

[A

light] placed here will destroy the darkness of the entire world.

and that which

12. If the light illuminated both itself

Then, without than

13. If it has if it

after that 14. In

how

not yet originated,

itself

itself.

and that which

is

other

which

is

does origination produce itself?

when

has already originated

it

is

being produced, what

no way does anything originate by "what

it

is

produced

already produced?

already originated," or

Just as is

doubt, darkness will cover both

other than

itself.

And

is

a

is

"what

is

being originated," "what

is

not [yet] originated."

has been said in [the analysis of] "presently going to," "that which

already gone to," and "that which

is

not yet come to."

Nagarjuna's denial of distinctions correlates with the Buddha's opposition to theoretical speculations.

The

distinctions, claims

Nagarjuna, are not

conducive to the cessation of ignorance and craving because they suggest

what "marks" it

that

w

is

off

distinguished

recognize that a chair clay,

not.

has

from something is

some kind of else.

intrinsic

In practical

life

not a table, that a gold coin

it is

reality is

which

necessary to

not the same

as

and that a merchant who cheats is not identical with one who does However, a person who does not slip into the error of regarding

these practical distinctions as ultimate facts

indeed neither one absolute substance nor

is

able to see that there

many

is

individual substances.

Every object of perception or imagination requires a mental fabrication, and therefore every distinction participates in this fabrication. If, on the other hand, this distinction

is

accompanied by the assumption or convic-

tion of an absolute reality, then psychic energies are stimulated

V

bind the person to the fabrication. J2

It

is

this

which

being bound to fabrication

.

Elements and Factors that Constitute Existence (Dharmas)

which reality

is

samsdra. Because of the danger in language to posit an essential

within

mental activity has been regarded with disfavor

ideas,

as a

means for realizing Ultimate Truth (see Vigrahavydvartaiii 29, 59). "We might sum up Nagarjuna's judgment on the ability to indicate reality through mental activity by saying that in tional usage, verbal terms indicate

but on analysis

a proposition,

something which

is

i.e.,

there,

in conven-

phenomenally;

—from the ultimate point of view—that which

cording to conventional thought does not exist

as

exists ac-

an absolute entity.

The Emptiness of Dhannas denying the validity of distinctions made in early Buddhism, Nagarjuna also denies the reality of the factors of existence {dharmas) These factors are forces that combine to form our world of experience. In

To

emphasize the dynamic character of factors, T. Stcherbatsky has de-

scribed

them

as

"synergies":

The elements of

existence were regarded as something

= samskrta

[safhskdra

[cittacaitta]

energies never

more

similar to energies

dharma] than to substantial elements. The mental elements

were naturally moral, immoral, or neutral forces.

worked

in isolation, but always in

.

.

.

Since the

mutual interdependence according

to causal laws, they were called "synergies" or co-operators [suThskdra].^

Nagarjuna's quarrel with abhidharmic thought resulted from a shift in

understanding the elements of existence.

From

his point

of view, the

elements were given the characteristics of substantial and self-sufficient entities,

which denied the

original intention of the "synergies" as part

of the scheme of dependent co-origination.

Knowledge of the dharmas was important in the older schools of Buddhism as the basis for knowing the nature of existence and the source In general, the dharmas were considered to be non-

of sorrow (dukkha)

.

substantial essences

{bhava)

exist

.

Most early schools held that the dharmas this is denied by the Sarvdstivddins)

only for an instant (though

;

dharmas influenced one another according to the law of Despite their impermanence they preserved an identity or a

nevertheless, the causality.

proper character, and

it

was the self-appointed task of the Abhidharma

composers to clarify the characteristics and show the process of interrelation.

By *

contrast the Astasdhasrikd Prajndpdramitd explicitly denied that the

Theodor Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic ('s-Gravenhage: Mouton, 1958),

p.

5.

53

A

Emptiness:

Study in Religious Meaning

bodhisattva sees dharmas and stated that only ignorant people identify distinctive elements in existence.

Here the Buddha

denied that discrimination between elements

is

is

reported to have

useful for overcoming

attachment:

The Lord: seize

on

who

If a person

past, future

belongs to the vehicle of the Bodhisattvas does not

and present dharmas, does not mind them, does not get at

them, does not construct, nor discriminate them, does not

them with

considers

the conviction that

construction, unborn, not is

come

all

nor review them,

see

forth, not come, not gone,

ever produced or stopped in the past, future, or present;

dharmas in such

a

way, then

of those dharmas, and so

is

his jubilation

his

is

if

he

dharmas are fabricated by thought

in accordance

and that no dharma if

he considers those

with the true nature

transformation (of the merit) into full enlighten-

ment.^

In the

first

half of the

Madhyamakakarikas Nagarjuna

is

especially con-

cerned to show that the dharmas were not individual real entities which combined to construct sensuous existence since they themselves were the

—

product of the defining and distinguishing activity of

human

minds.

He

systematically denies that these categories of Buddhist thought, which were meant to give an understanding of existence and release from it,

pertained to anything actually

real.

This denial extended the dissolution of

dharma theory had brought about in rela"an existing thing" which tion to the dtman. For Nagarjuna, both the dhnan and the dharmas were the

mental constructions.

artificial

The

three classifications

of elements^^ were

(1)

the

skandhas

five

("heaps" or groups), (2) the twelve dyatanas (sense-fields), and (3) the dhdtus

(irreducible

elements). Chapter

Madhyamakakdrikds to pendent

with the *

Conze,

is

the

deal with the classifications

reality of the six indriyas six sense-objects to

PWES,

iii

(sense-faculties),

first

chapter in the

by denying the indewhich

are correlated

form the twelve dyatana.^^ The

p. J2. See also pars. 31, 39,

sense-fields

139-54, 399, 482-85. Likewise see the "Heart Sutra"

(trans, by Conze in BWS, p. 89) which states that in emptiness there are no dharmas. ^° In CCB, Stcherbatsky has outlined these classifications (pp. 5-9) as expounded

from the

Sarvastivadin point of view in the Abhidharmakoia and devotes the whole of this short book to an

explanation of the importance of the concept "dharma" in understanding existence; the discussion viii) is more concise and considers the three classificaLamotte (HBI, pp. 65 8-70) gives the triple classification by the Theravadins and the quadruple classification of rupa, citta,

of the classifications by Conze (BTI, chap, tions in their usefulness for meditation.

of rilpa, cetasika, and citta caitta,

and dharma of the Sarvdsiivddins.

^^ Besides the five senses

objects"

(plus the five sensations)

form the remaining two 54

recognized in the West,

"mind" and "mind-

senss fields for the Buddhist theory of perception.

Elements and Factors that Constitute Existence (Dharmas)

form the

or "locale" where mental activity originates and

basis,

formed. Nagarjuna, again interpreting the dyatana

pendent entity, opposes on

logical

as a self-sufficient,

who

such 7.

III.

The

1-6).

the birth of a son

Knowledge

said to

is

is

last three verses

said to

inde-

that vision, "the

is

interdependent entities;

all

one another none actually

relative to

(MMK, As

and the "object seen" are

sees,"

and in being

per-

grounds the contention that an indriya

can be the basis for any mental activity. The argument person

is

exists

independently as

conclude:

occur presupposing the mother and father,

occur presupposing the eye being dependent on the visible

forms. 8.

Since the "object seen" and the "vision" do not exist, there

is

no fourfold

[consequence]: knowledge, etc. [cognitive sensation, affective sensation, and desire].

Also, then,

how

will the seizing

and

its

consequences

existence, birth, ageing,

[i.e.,

and death] be produced? 9.

[Likewise] hearing, smelling, tasting, touching, and thought are explained

as vision.

Indeed one should not apprehend the "hearer," "what

is

to be heard," etc.

[as

entities].

The skandhas, hkewlse, denied in chapter

iv.

are

analyzed and their independent reality

Buddhist abhidharma accepted

of universal elements). Again, the basic reality of

argument

is

five

any dharma considered among the skandhas, and takes the form

of denying every causal theory

as

an explanation for a skandha,

(form) The pattern of the argument can be seen in the .

1.

skandhas (groups

against the individual

Visible

(jupakdrana)

form {rupa)

is

first

e.g., ricpa

three verses :^^

not perceived without the basic cause of visible form

;

Likewise the basic cause of visible form does not appear without the visible form. 2.

form

If the visible

follow that visible form

But there 3.

On

The

the other hand,

a

from

its

basic cause,

it

would

logically

without cause;

is

nothing anywhere [arising] without cause. if

there

would be

a basic

cause apart from visible form.

would be without any product; but there

basic cause

without *^ See

is

existed apart

is

no

basic cause

product.

Appendix

of riipa to include

A all

for karikds 4-7

which continue the argument and generalize the

skandhas.

55

analysis

A

Emptiness:

Study In Religious Meaning

chapter v analyzes the nature of the "irreducible elements" (dhatus).

by the argument that they canas such, and there can be no definition without something to be defined. Nagarjuna's basic argument is that the object of definition and the definition are dependent on each These too are denied not exist

self -sufficient reality

dbaius before they are defined

as

other and therefore the object, in this case dkdsa, cannot be said to exist itself as dkdsa. It exists

should not be taken

as

only because

the type of phenomenalism

"creates" the object of naming. This

noted, never does say position

is

how

the

is

whereby the naming Nagarjuna,

also denied.

naming and the named

and therefore such

a

concern

is

must be

it

are related; for his

empty of

that ultimately "they" as objects of knowledge are

reality as such,

vain speculation

—uncon-

ducive to realizing their basic emptiness. The form of argument clear in the first

two

(dkdsalaksana) If it

would

is

made

verses:

Space (dkdsa) does not exist at

1.

by

has been named. Yet, this position

it

all

before the defining characteristic of space

.

exist before the defining characteristic,

then one must falsely conclude

that there would be something without a defining characteristic.

In no case has anything existed without a defining characteristic.

2.

If an entity (bbdva)

without

a defining characteristic does

not

exist, to

what

does the defining characteristic apply?

The concluding

verse of the initial

Therefore space

7.

r something to which

is

argument

states:

neither an existing thing nor a non-existing thing, neither

a defining characteristic applies

nor

a defining characteristic.

Also, the other five irreducible elements can be considered in the same

way

as

space.

This

is

followed by the religious implication of regarding elements as

neither existing nor nonexisting:

But those unenlightened people who

8.

either aflSrm reality

or non-

(astitva)

reality (ndsiiiva)

Do The ^'

not perceive the blessed cessation-of-appearance of existing things.

verses in this chapter attempt to The term dhatu

show how

has been used in Buddhist parlance in at least three different

the three planes of existence {kdma-, rupa-, and arupadhdtu) fire,

the "existence" of dhdtus^^

water, space, consciousness), and

(3)

,

(2)

the eighteen phenomenal elements

plus six corresponding "sense-consciousnesses").

S.

Schayer

(AKP,

p.

3

fif.)

(1)

(earth, air,

(the twelve ayatanas

points out

cording to Buddhaghosa the six dhatus and the eighteen dhatus are identical. Also,

56

ways:

the six mababhiitas

I

that

ac-

would agree

Elements and Factors that Constitute Existence (Dharmas)

dependent on mental

are

activity.

Even such

a

primal factor, claims

Nagarjuna, cannot be said to exist (or not-exist) by reality.

By means

its

own

sui generis

of this rigorous dialectic to which Nagarjuna subjected

the elements of existence, he denied that there were any self-existent entities

which possessed

static absolute characteristics.

dislodge the seeker after truth

found as

In doing

so,

he attempted to

from the assumption that truth was

to be

in identifying concepts with segments of existence as if they existed

such.

May's judgment that the fifth chapter is best understood as part of a unit together with and iv (May, CPM, p. 11). Here it is clear that Nagarjuna has in mind the six universal elements (mahdbhuias) but whether regarded as one of the eighteen phenomenal elements of experience or one of the six more "substantial" elements of existence, the dhitu was regarded as a minimal root factor in the composite products of existence. with

J.

chaps,

iii

;

^7

"CAUSAL RELATIONS" From

the above discussion

we

see that in the

(Pratityasamutpada)

context of emptiness,

no-

( 1 )

tions about Ultimate Reahty are regarded as phenomenal constructs, (2) the early Buddhist categories for understanding existence do not refer to real self -substantiated entities of existence, (3) there are no dharmas (basic j

factors of existence) that exist as such. tains

The

early Buddhist concepts,

Nagarjuna, must be recognized simply

as

main-

notions which have no

ultimate validity in themselves for attaining release from suflfering.

A

which is abphenomenal the solute and indeed is the ground for the forms that make up world? No, the denial of independent entities in the phenomenal world

person might ask, however:

Is

there not a causal principle

did not lead Nagarjuna to accept a principle of causal relations as "the

phenomena. Rather, the denial of cause, as an reality, was inherently involved in denying the self-

real" behind ephemeral

ultimate self-existent existence

of

the

dharmas.

In

this

chapter

we want

show,

to

first,

Nagarjuna's denial of the efficacy of any causal relations which assumed a self -existent reality

(svabhdva)

;

secondly, Nagarjuna's interpretation of

the notion "dependent co-origination"

{pratttyasamutpada)

,

which had

served for centuries to express the Buddhist understanding of the production of existence;

and

thirdly, the significance of this reinterpretation for

karma (the causal force for, and the result of, action). The Madhyamakakarikds begins in the first chapter with an analysis of

the notion of

causal relations. "Causal relations"

had been an important concern of the

early Buddhists; and this concern took concrete

form

in the elaboration of

abhidharma thought, which examined the elements and conditions from which the phenomenal world was constructed. The focus on causal relations

is

not surprising, for

substratum

{brahman)

this

notion took the place of a substantive

underlying

changing,

phenomenal

reality

in

Upanishadic thought, and accounted for the origination and cessation of

"Causal Relations" (Pratltyasamutpada)

The Buddhist

phenomena.-^

teachings of impermanance of every thing

(aniiya) and the absence of any "self" {anatman) required that another

notion bear the explanation of "cause." In place of a causal notion based

on an absolute

was the notion of "dependent co-origination,"

"final cause"

with

its emphasis on the interdependency of different factors {dharmas) which combined to form existence as we experience It. From a subjective orientation, the construction of the phenomenal world was seen to depend on craving (tr^na) for illusory "things"; this construction, however, re-

life, and this bondage is experienced as means of correlating the human phenomenon of sorrow with the limiting power of producing forms in our experienced world, "causal relations" had taken on a dual significance as representing (1) the states in the "phenomenal becoming" of every person, and (2) the course of the cosmos pulsating in and out of existence.

sulted in binding the energies of

sorrow {duJpkha)

Denial of

.

Any

As

a

Self-substantiated Reality for Explaining Cause

Nagarjuna regarded the causal

relations, as

conceived in early Buddhism,

to be true only from the practical, conventional point of view. It accounted

for

phenomenal "becoming" and

at least served to

turn a person's attention

away from positing Independent reality within visible forms. However, It was far from perceiving the nature of phenomenal-becoming as empty, that Is, empty of any self -existent conditions or relations. Nagarjuna maintained that both practical truth and the highest truth affirm that

phenomena produced by latter point of

causes are

view there

is

empty by Inherent

nature.

no cause or conditioning process

From

at all;

all

the

from

the viewpoint of practical truth, production does not result In a selfsubstantiated entity because every production

any

denial of

pendency

Is

self-sufficient entity does

Itself

an ultimate principle.

truth, the "causal process"

That one should hope *

The

Is

a

is

conditioned.^ Nagarjuna's

not entail an affirmation that de-

From

the standpoint of highest

mentally fabricated

Illusion.

to find a self-sufficient reality In the causal rela-

significance of this shift

in Indian

thought,

as

formulated in the notion of pratitya-

portrayed by Takakusu in his Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy (esp. pp. 29-41) though his discussion reveals strong influence of the Yogacara school. Also see Satkari Mookerjee, Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 193 5). where pratltya-

samutpada,

samutpada

is

is

analyzed as the major ontological category and the technical details of the mechanics are devoted to the "teaching of emptiness." 5 6-73

of the causal relations are elaborated. Pp. '

La Vallee Poussin rightly

criticizes

T. Stcherbatsky for ignoring Nagarjuna's

monistic idealism and making "universal relativity" into an eternal principle. See

MCB,

denial II,

59

of

8-14.

a

Emptiness:

A

Study

in Religious

themselves

tions

denied

is

Madhyamakakdrikas. The 1.

Never have any

From

Meaning

already

the

in

verse of chapter

first

the

of

1

found to originate

existing things been

themselves, or from something

chapter

first

states:

or

else,

from both, or from no

cause.

which determine the form of a particular phenomenon at any given time are denied any innate selfsuflScient being. This is made clear in the second and third verses: Also, the conditioning causes (prafyaya)

2.

There are four [accepted] conditioning causes:

A

cause (hehi), objects of sensations, the "immediately preceding condition,"

and of course the predominant influence 3.

Certainly, there

no

is

—

there

is

no

self-existence (svabbaia)

fifth.

of existing things in condi-

tioning causes, etc.;

And

if

no

self-existence exists, neither does an "other-existence"

The following four entities

is

then what

is

any causes are self-sufficient with anything else; and if they are not

called "a cause"

something different from what

it is

when

it

is

before the result

effecting a result is

effected.

By

same method Nagarjuna denies that the other accepted conditions, objects of sensations, the immediately preceding condition,

dominant influence can be considered an explanation for only

is

there

.

verses then argue that if

they cannot have relations

*'real" causes,

(parabhdva)

no independent

cannot be related to the

effect

on

i.e.,

and the pre-

real causes.

reality in the cause or effect,

the

Not

but the cause

logical grounds. This follows

from de-

fining the cause and effect {phala = "£ruit" or product) in a mutually ex-

way, leaving only two alternatives of relationship: (1) identity and (2) radical difference, both of which preclude any causal relations. Verses 10 and 11 indicate the argument:

clusive

10. Since existing things

not possible at

It is

all

which have no

self-existence are not real.

that: "Tliis thing 'becomes'

upon the existence of that

other one." 11.

The product

(pbala) does not reside in the conditioning causes individually

or collectively,

So

how

can that which does not reside in the conditioning causes result from

conditioning causes?

The

net result, and the most crucial effect, of the notion that "things are

formed in existence depending on other things" is

that

it

60

(pratiiya-samufpdda)

denies a "first cause." "Cause" should not be regarded through

"Causal Relations" (Pratityasamutpada)

the imagery of a chain reaction leading back to an original source, but as

—

which themselves are conNagarjuna does not simply use his negative dialectic to preserve the abhidharma notion of cause. He recognizes that "things originate due to conditions" and that actions lead to an orderly

set

of circumstances or conditions

ditioned. Because he redefines "cause,"

certain results; but this insight

pose the

common

is

for

him

mundane

a

context of emptiness, "dependent co-origination" for fabricating a system of cause

and

truth, useful to op-

phenomenal

belief in the reality of

existence. In the

loses its force

(impulse)

effect.

In the abhidharma understanding of dependent co-origination, various parts of the experienced world were used as the basic categories for ex-

plaining "cause,"

e.g.,

the three stages in the arising of phenomena; the

maker, the process of making, and what

is

made; or the unification

(samsarga)

of subject, object, and the relationship between

results in a

phenomenon. Nagarjuna denied that any of

them

these categories

There

refer to a self-suflScient primal point in the production of existence. is

no origination, duration, or

an intrinsic nature

something having

VII). Origination of conditioned existence

is

any of the three "marks" of existing things is understood as self-sufficient reality; for, as in the case with the causes and effects which

not possible a

(MMK,

cessation if they represent

that

are

if

assumed to be

and

self -sufficient,

difference. Likewise, the

garded

independent

as

existence.

At

"maker" and the "making" cannot be

realities,

is

that each

is

produced depending on the other:

The producer proceeds being dependent on

12.

re-

for each requires the other to appear in

the same time one cannot deny that they exist phenomenally.

Therefore the conclusion VIII.

the only possible relationships are identity

the product, and the prod-

uct proceeds being dependent on the producer.

The

cause for realization

13. In the

is

seen in nothing

else.

same way one should understand the "acquiring" on the

basis of the

"giving up," etc. of the producer and the product.

By means

of [this analysis of] the product and the producer

all

other things

should be dissolved.

The same

basic

argument

is

by which phenomenon, i.e.,

used in the analysis of the process

the subject, object, and the sensation coalesce to

form

a

samsarga (unification). The dilemma which Nagarjuna presents either

with

two

itself.

basically different things

The

is

become united, or something

conclusion, similar to other analyses,

is:

61

that

unites

— Em ptiness: A

Study in Religious Meaning

XIV. 8. Unification is not possible by [uniting] one thing with that one nor by [uniting] one thing with a diflferent thing;

thing,

who

unites

Thus, the becoming unified, the state of being united, and the one are not possible.

Another argument against svabhava

which assumes a

relationship

causal

a

the denial of a preexistent reality (purva) as the real cause for

is

existing entities. This argument,

found

in chapter ix, also logically de-

mands that the only relation obtaining between a svabhava and something else is identity and radical difference. Such a self-contained reality could not be known, nor could

A

produce anything new.^

it

few kdrikds

will

suflSce to show the repeated line of argument:

But that

3.

How

And

4.

definite entity

previous to sight, hearing, etc., and sensation, etc.

is

can that [entity] be known? if

that

[entity]

is

without sight

determined

[and other

sensory

faculties],

Then, undoubtedly, those [sensory faculties] will

Someone becomes manifest by something; something

5.

How

would someone

exist

without something?

without that [entity].

exist is

How

manifest by someone.

would something

exist

without someone?

In early Buddhism there were several analogies used to describe the causal relationship. These included the relationship of fuel to

to a jar,

and threads to

Nagarjuna to show exist fire

The

first

of these analogies

is

of clay

analyzed by

that, whereas fire does not exist in fuel, neither does

it

that

if

independent of

and

cloth.

fire,

fuel.

Again, the

basis of the logical analysis

is

fuel are considered to be self -sufficient entities they cannot exist;

and, insofar as they exist phenomenally, the relationship cannot assume a self-sufficient reality

{svabhava), for

tionship assuming svabhava

must be

it is

empty. Thus

rejected.*

The

all

five

theories of rela-

concluding verses

of chapter x express this clearly: 12. Fire does

not exist in relation to kindling; and

fire

does not exist wwrelated

to kindling.

KindUng to

does not exist in relation to

fire;

and kindling does not

exist Mwrelated

fire.

"See also MMK, xxiv. 26, 31, 32 and xxvii. 12, 16. * This same argument is at the basis of the denial of causal relations in xxiv.

27-30.

62

iv.

1-6,

ii.

7-11, and

—

.

(Pratityasamutplda)

'Causal Relations"

13. Fire does not

The remaining "that which

is

come from something

else;

and

[analysis] in regard to kindling

being gone to," "that which

is

fire

is

does not exist in kindling.

described

by [the

analysis of]

gone to," and "that which

is

not

yet gone to." 14. Fire

is

not identical to kindling, but

not in anything other than

fire is

kindling. Fire does not have kindling as

and vice 15.

its

property;

the kindling

also,

is

not in

fire

versa.

By

[the analysis of] fire and kindling the syllogism of the individual self

(dima) and "the acquiring" (updddna) Is

other 16.

fully and completely explained, as well as "the jar" and "the cloth" [

Those who specify the nature of the individual

(bhdva)

as

radically

Those people

I

do not regard

The arguments

as

ones

who know

is

and of existing things

the sense of the teaching.

as

Emptiness

against causal relations between

which we have given above themselves. It

self

different

Dependent Co-origination

are based

on

self-existent

important to note that nowhere does Nagarjuna himself

seen,

he denies that the entities exist by virtue of their

that,

even

no

if

As we have

causal relationship could obtain. In reality of the

what

of "dependent coorigination" to be understood?

given in JVIMK, xxiv. 18

&

being and

i.e.,

does

arising at all?

How

The answer

then,

is

is

the notion

dramatically

19:

"originating dependently"

This apprehension,

sense,

phenomenal world

Or, to formulate the question in Buddhist terminology:

The

own

such an impossible assumption of self-existence were ac-

Nagarjuna understand the

18.

entities

a logical critique of the theories

give a theory describing the operation of causal relations.

cepted,

and

analogies ]

we

call

"emptiness."

taking into account

[all

other things],

is

the under-

standing of the middle way. 19. Since there

No

is

no dharma whatever originating independently.

dharma whatever

exists

which

is

not empty.

Considered in the context of emptiness

pendently

loses its

meaning

as the link

(hlnyatd), co-originating de-

between two "things"; rather

it

becomes the form for expressing the phenomenal "becoming" as the lack of any self-suflScient, independent reality. 63

A

Emptiness:

A is

Study in Religious Meaning

consideration for the phenomenal aspect of "originating dependently"

given in chap, xxvi where the root cause for constructed phenomena

The "reahzation" of

designated as ignorance.

is

(the emptiness of

h'lnyatd

svabhdva), on the other hand, prevents the continuation of fabrication. This

is

clear in verses 10-12.

Thus the ignorant people construct the conditioned things (samskdra)

10. is]

made

;

[that

the source for existence-in-flux.

The one who constructs

is

ignorant; the wise person

is

not [one

who

constructs]

because he perceives true reality.

WTien ignorance

11.

(

\

the

ceases,

constructed phenomena

do not come into

existence.

A

person's cessation of ignorance proceeds

on the

basis

of "becoming"

[en-

lightened] through knowledge.

1 1

12.

Through

cessation of every

[component] none functions;

I

That

single

From

mass of sorrow

is

thus completely destroyed.

the ultimate point of view "originating dependently"

zation of emptiness, while at the same time

of causation" from the

Iness" became

mundane

it is

is

the reali-

the causal law, or "chain

point of view. For Nagarjuna, "empti-

the best verbal expression for "originating dependently." It

avoided the illusion of

self -existence

{svabJodva)

most completely, and

omitted the necessity for a law of causation which related

entities that

were presupposed in a '^svabhdva perspective." If 11 '

In a "radical becoming" view of existence there

no necessity to would

is

postulate an absolute principle of relationship, for such a principle

presuppose some static essence underlying a process of "becoming."

complete

loss

A

of self-sufficient reality (or realities) involves a diflferent kind

of ontological quality than one based on the relationship between being

and becoming. In such a context not only does the individual "being" disappear, but also a universal "being" which could provide the basis for any visible or imagined thing. The mundane construction and the cause of construction both drain emptiness. Mrs. cerns

by

away through

Rhys Davids has indicated

calling attention to

the "radical becoming" of

this shift in ontological

two shades of meaning

(1) lack of eternal being-ness, and (2) alteration

has a coefficient n which

Nagarjuna, ^C. A.

64

F.

I

suggest,

may

alter

in

—the

con-

impermanence:^

fact that every

x

x to become continually non-x.

had both shades of meaning in mind when he con-

Rhys Davids, Buddhist Psychology,

p.

217.

"Causal Relations'* (Pratltyasamutpada)

mundane

sidered

existence as impermanent. Emptiness simply becomes;

it

"becoming process." If it were the conclusion of such process, then would have to be shown how it resulted from the process, a it which, in turn, entails an explanation of how this process and emptiness are different and how they are related. It is specifically the reality of "relationship" which Nagarjuna denies when, in MMK, xx, he denies that the conjunction (sdmagrt) of cause and is

not the end of

a

conditions can account for arising of existence.

He

argues that

impossible to relate entities (such as conditions and effects)

it is

same time he indicates that

their self-suflScient reality; at the

logically

one assumes

if

it

un-

is

necessary to postulate any necessary relationship in the light of emptiness.

In the

first

instance, the relationship

is

either an identity or

an uncompro-

mising difference, which in both cases does not permit an effect to be produced. In the second instance, the emptiness of any self-sufficient reality destroys the conventional distinctions between real and nonreal, cause and so in the last analysis

eflFect,

(or

"nonempty

entity")

it is

incorrect to say that an

"empty

that a self-sufficient "real cause"

is

impossible,

and that such

even irrelevant when one truly perceives the emptiness of seen in the following excerpt 15. If there

is

entity"

produced or destroyed. Nagarjuna argues

is

all

a notion

things

—

is

as

from chapter xx:

no concomitance whatever, how would the cause produce the

product?

Or

if

a

concomitance

16. If the cause

If the cause 17.

A

is

empty of

not empty of

is

how would

exists,

a

the cause produce the product?

how would it produce the product? how would it produce the product?

product,

a

product,

non-empty product would not be

originated,

[and]

non-empty

a

[product] would not be destroyed.

Then 18.

that

How

non-empty which

is

will not originate or not disappear.

would that be produced which

stroyed which

is

is

empty?

How

would that be de-

empty?

It logically follows, then, that

which

is

empty

is

not originated and not de-

stroyed.

To sum up of emptiness,

Nagarjuna's concern with constructed phenomena in light

we would point

to his assertion that mental distinctions are

only imaginary fabrication, that there are no self-establishing characteristics

of "things," and that there

is

no

real diflFerence

between accepted

dichotomies such as nirvana and samsdra (flux of existence)

.

Correlative 6f

Emptiness;

A

Study in Religious Meaning

to this assertion

is

the denial of real entities in conditioned

phenomena or

the "unconditioned," the denial of a succession of moments in time, and a

and

denial of the triple factors: subject, object,

then without real entities there conceived ,

is

chain of events,

as a

fabrication powerful

enough

no

man

to bind

The

to

more

is

true,

causal process itself,

mere fabrication

a

is

activity. If all this

real cause.

—though

indeed a

fabrication.

The Impotence of Karma The

recognition

doctrine of karma.

"cause"

that

The

is

significance

"empty" has implications for the of karma as a soteriological term in

Indian thought seems originally to have been related to the efficacy in

magic, or to ritual origination of reality, and in purification through repetition of formulas.

Karma

(action)

is

the fabrication of reality which

has the efficacy for both good and bad existence. In early release {nirvana)

was conceived

(duhkha) of existence was the

as the

Buddhism

final

exhaustion of kartna, for the turmoil

result of

karma.

In the centuries preceding Nagarjuna, the term karma had been used to designate the potential for future existence as well as the result of past actions.® In

points of controversy center are.*^

The

work Kafhdvattbu, for instance, several around what the results of karma actually

the philosophical

limits of its efficacy also

Buddha, for

it

became involved

in the

Image of the

was suggested In the Mahaparanibbdna Suttanta

Buddha could have

lived for an eon If he

had wished.

We

^

that the

need not go

into the details of the controversy here^ except to point out that the

Sthaviravadins stressed the efficacy of karma for determining the length of existence even In the case of the Buddha, whereas the Mahasanghikas (the

precursors of

Mahay ana) emphasized

the possibility of overcoming the

power of karma through yogic powers, claiming that the Buddha could, indeed, have lived an eon *

See Stcherbatsky

(CCP, pp.

had he wished. Thus the end of

16, 17,

27-30) for a brief account of equating volition {cetana)

with karma according to the Abhidharmakosa. La Vallee Poussin

"Karman is

religious life

(Way

to "Nirvana, p.

68)

says:

twofold: (1) volition {cetatia), or mental or spiritual action (matiasa) and (2) what born from volition, what is done by volition, 'what a person does after having willed,' namely is

,

bodily and verbal action." In this book La Vallee Poussin gives a very readable introduction {ibid., pp.

5 8-101) to the many-faceted notion of karma in Buddhism. 'See Kathdvatthu VIL 7, 8; XVI. 8; VIL 11; XIL 3; XV. 11;

*

Digha Nikaya

II.

103. See Dialogties of the Buddha, trans.

C

XVIL

3;

VTL

10.

A. F. Rhys Davids and T.

Rhys Davids, II (3 vols.; London: Luzac and Co., 1956), 111. ' Padmanabh Jaini has succinctly described the main elements of this controversy "Buddha's Prolongation of Life," BSOAS, XXI, Pt. Ill (195 8), 546-52.

66

W.

in his article

'Causal Relations"

(Pratityasamutpada)

could be defined either entirely within the framework of the karmic process or in terms of another force to counteract the karmic process.

Nagarjuna established alternative correctly

more extensive revolution by denying that either understood the problem of existing in karma but a

gaining release from karma.

What

then

The answer

the relation of emptiness to the binding force of

is

made

is

explicit in

realizing emptiness there

thing" originates, karma

21 where

xvii.

no individual

is

is

MMK,

we

karma;

reality of

karma?

find that in since

no

"real

vulnerable to the same analysis as any aspect of

the cause-effect process. Whereas in early Buddhism^® the Eightfold Noble

Path

is

regarded

"inverted pratityasamutpada," a sequence of non-

as

origination, the notion of emptiness requires

the karmic process.

The Prajndpdramitds

more than the

reversal of

already reversed the original usage

of "dependent co-origination" as an understanding of existence. In

them

doctrine represented an-utpdda (non-origination) because the phe-

this

nomenal

and the process of

reality

its

"dependent co-origination"

definition of

origination are empty. This

new

summarized in the Dedication

is

of the Kdrikds, which maintains that nothing disappears or appears; nothing has an end or tion;

eternal; there

is

and there

is

is

no monistic

self -identity

nor differentia-

no coming or going. Thus, that which

in the early

Buddhist insight explained the existence of phenomena, in the Prajndpdramitds became an insight into the nonexistence of phenomena. If

karma

evil {klesa

is

=

only a mental construction, the relationship of action and

desire),

which

is

at the base of the

kar-ma, also does not obtain for Nagarjuna.

tion of

karma and

its

product (phala), where

duced by action does not 26.

An

action

is

concern to eliminate bad

MMK,

xvii analyzes the rela-

it is

shown that

evil

pro-

do not

really

exist as such:^-^

that whose "self" (dima)

is

desire,

and the

desires

exist.

If these desires

27. Action If action

do not

and

and

really exist,

how would

the action really exist?

desire are declared to be the conditioning cause of the body.

desire are

empty, what need one say about "body"?

*° See

Maryla Falk, Ndma-Rupa and Dharma-Kupa (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1943), and Lama Anagarika Govinda, The Psychological Attitude of Early Buddhist Philosophy (London: Rider and Co., 1961), pp. 67-75 for a summary of the relationship between dependent

pp. 59

£f.;

co-origination and the Eightfold Noble Path. ^^

See also

MMK,

xxiii.

2-5 where the klesas are analyzed and

shown

to be without self-existence.

67

{

— Emptiness;

The

A

Study in Religious Meaning

by showing how action on the one hand is not a selfon the other, is produced by conditions; thus, it

analysis continues

suflScient entity and,

cannot be called an existent or nonexistent.^^ The chapter concludes: by

31. Just as a teacher,

And

this

32. Just so the

act performed Is

!

like a

his

magical power, formed a magical form.

magical form formed again another magical form

who forms"

"one

is

himself being formed magically; and the

by him

magical form being magically formed by another magical form.

and products

33. Desires, actions, bodies, producers, i

,

Are

like a fairy castle,

To summarize the we must note how

resembling a mirage, a dream.

significance of emptiness for understanding existence,

the early Buddhists had maintained that the basic

cause for suffering and continual production of ,

karma was "craving" or

"grasping." Nagarjuna used a rigorous dialectic and an expression of reality in terms of "emptiness" to negate any object of craving,

subject of

I

craving, or situation of craving. In the Kdrikds he denied any real "arising" (origination) or destruction of entities.

when

in the Prajndpdramiids that

and that there

is

origination

there

is

we

{pratUya-samtitpdda)

perfect in

is

This argument

arising.

call entities are results .

At

the same time,

Nothing

arises

is

no longer seen

from another

thing, nor

as a

from

is

of dependent co-

we must The

no thing like a "product" according to the Kdrikds.

of dependent co-origination ciple.

who

no ontological process of

based on the claim that what

found wisdom

articulated the insight

he knows that there are no entities to

realizes the truth of "emptiness," arise

He

the person

say that principle

cause-and-effect prin-

itself.

The same

analysis

holds true for the relation of consciousness of something and the object of consciousness.

Here the question concerning the

causal priority of the idea

or the objective concrete entity cannot even be raised. Because there real entity (e.g., a piece of cloth) in

which the

Ultimate Truth, there

characteristic of "result" can apply;

and

if

is

there are

is

no

nothing to

no

results,

the argument continues, there can be no condition. Nagarjuna's aim is to reorient the concern for the appearance of phenomena and the effort to

pinpoint "good" and "bad."

He

stayed in the Buddhist tradition in his

concern to properly apprehend the everyday fact of existence; but he intended to prevent this concern from blinding the *'

Also see

68

vss.

29-31 of Averting the Arguments, in Appendix B.

way

to release.

.

NIRVANA In the

two chapters we saw that according to Nagarjuna's no real distinctions. "What human beings

last

of existence there are as distinctive entities

These

tion.

entities,

exist because

or segments of existence

Nagarjuna

they are "named"

claims,

—

mental fabrica-

a result of

is

do not

analysis

perceive

exist in themselves;

from something

distinguished

else.

they

And

the names given to that conglomerate of impulses, perceptions, and sensations called "things" are useful only for a practical, conventional level of life.

Likewise the causal relations which were held to bring about the

origination and cessation of the entities are to be regarded on the level

of conventional truth.

They

as

well as their constructs are

empty of

self-

established reality.

Had Nagarjuna istence

ended

his critique

with an analysis of conditioned ex-

(samskrfa), he would have, in effect, expressed an ontological

duality designating "the unconditioned"

{asaihskrta)

against the unreal conditioned existence. This terial,

however, was precluded by

way

as

the real over

of handling the

ma-

his original denial of real distinctions

is ultimately no different from "the conditioned world," the usual means for understanding these

between things. Because "the unconditioned" terms

as "levels

of reality" did not obtain.

He

could not say that the

conditioned world was just fabrication while "the unconditioned" referred to

some inexpressible

Both

real.

fell

under the jurisdiction of "dependent

co-origination" {pratttya-samutpdda) understood

In this chapter

we

will

examine

how

ness informs his notion of the highest reality

The terms nirvana and tathdgatha

(lit.

complete spiritual to entities

"blowing out,"

(lit.

"thus

release,

as

i.e.,

(nirvana, tathdgata)

elimination of attachment)

gone" = the Buddha)

are useful for indicating

Nagarjuna maintains, only

which become objects for "grasping." The

avoiding this subtle fabrication

is

emptiness (sunyatd).

Nagarjuna's understanding of empti-

to

if

they do not refer

first

remember that

requirement for

there are

no 69

real

A

Emptiness:

Study in Religious Meaning

MMK,

ontological distinctions. For instance,

who

8

reminds us that those

affirm either reality or nonreality cannot perceive nirvana:

But those unenlightened people who

8.

Do

either affirm reality or non-reality

not perceive the blessed cessation-of-appearance of existing things.

Likewise, the emptiness of as

v.

all

means that there

entities

are

no such things

"being bound" or "ultimate release." In chap, xvi, Nagarjuna subjects

same analysis

these notions to the

conceived

counted

"things" {bhava)

showing that if phenomenal change cannot be ac-

The importance of avoiding

for.

"release"

as

as self-sufficient entities their

is

,

the fabrication of the entity

seen in verses 9 and 10: be released without any acquisition." "Nirvana will be mine."

9. "I will

Those who understand thus hold too

much

to "a holding

on"

[i.e.,

both to the

acquisition of karma, and to a viewpoint]. 10.

Where

there

no super-imposing of nirvana [on something

is

else],

nor

a

removal of existence-in-flux,

What

is

the existence-in-flux there?

The same conclusion

is

What

nirvana

reached in chapter

viii

is

imagined?

by showing that

the object

of action {karjna) and the person acting {kartaka) do not exist Verses

and 5.

and 6 deny the

5

final release If the

(moksa)

6.

If there

Thus

nor the

born from that does not

ultimate

no

is

real

do not

etc.,

(adharma)

false reality

If neither the true reality

(phala)

as such.

the path to heaven,

as things in themselves:

producing action,

{dharma) nor

dharma (truth),

reality of

exist,

then neither can the true reality

exist.

false reality exists,

then also the product

exist.

product, then there also exists no path to heaven nor to

release. it

logically follows that all

Whatever notions

are

producing actions are without purpose.

assumed to possess

self-sufficient reality are subject

to Nagarjuna's analysis; thus, even the itotion of "misunderstanding"

regarded

as a

misunderstanding

standing in an absolute way. In chapter

and "bad"

—which, —

mental fabrication

shown

in the are

from

is

correct under-

"misunderstanding," "good,"

are held to be the conditions for

to be void of self-existence.

They

are also

on the grounds of dependent co-origination, for

then they are already regarded 70

xxiii,

Abhidharma,

shown

to be insignificant

distinguished

if it is

as

empty. Verses 24 and 25 sum up the

Nirvana

irrelevancy of deciding as

24. If

How is

any kind of self-existent impurities belong to somebody,

in all the

world would they be eliminated?

Who

can eliminate that which

self-existent?

25. If

How is

"misunderstanding," "good," and "bad" exist

if

such or not:

any kind of

in

all

self -existence impurities

do not belong to somebody,

the world would they be eliminated?

Who

can eliminate that which

non-self -existent?

In the Prajiidparamitd tradition already there were dramatic denials that the

character

essence-attribute

applied

Astasdhasrikd, for instance, has the

pendent

reality of the

"what

to

Buddha

true attribute

really

deny the inde-

explicitly

(sva-laksana)

The

exists."

of reality. In the

chapter on "Skill in Means" the Buddha gives instruction regarding concentration on emptiness, and says:

He

should contemplate form,

with an undisturbed

series

etc., as

empty. But he should contemplate that

of thoughts in such a is

something which,

(i.e.

emptiness)

emptiness)

dharmas

The

is

as

a real entity.

as a real thing,

that,

as a result

of

own

its

true nature

But when he does not regard that true nature of

then he cannot realize the reality-limit.^

fact that "release"

is

not distinct from "illusion" in the sense that

mean

each term represents an ultimate ontological distinction does not that "release" and "illusion"

may

practical or conventional level. says in

MMK,

xvlli. 5

not be very useful

Using the term

that nirvana

is

attained

by

as designations

on

a

way, Nagarjuna

In this

dissipation of action

and

evil energies: 5.

On

account of the destruction of the pains (klesa) of action there

for pains of action exist for

is

release;

him who constructs them.

These [pains] result from phenomenal extension (prapanca) enal extension comes to a stop

;

but

this

phenom-

by emptiness.

Here, however, the very emptiness of the action and energies position of

Is

the presup-

such attainment. The conventional terms used to express

nirvana are also used to explain "what actually

is"

{tattva)

.

In both cases

the terms stress nonsubstantiality and the quality of Indeterminateness. ^Conze, PWES,

p.

\

when he contemplates

empty," he does not regard that true nature of

the fact that "form, etc.,

dharmas

(i.e.

way

143.

71

,

.

.

A

Emptiness;

Chapter

Study in Religious Meaning

xviii.

when

nirvana

7-11

expresses

the

in

dIflSculty

using designations

in the very designating process there

for

a denial of the

is

realization of nirvana.

7.

When

stated"

the

domain of thought has been

dissipated,

"that which can be

dissipated.

is

Those things which are unoriginated and not terminated, stitute the true

8.

Everything

nirvana, con-

like

doctrine {dbar mat a)

is

"actual" {tathyam) or "not-actual," or both "actual-and-not-

actual,"

Or 9.

"neither-actual-nor-not-actual": This

"Not caused by something

else,"

is

the teaching of the Buddha.

"peaceful," "not elaborated by discursive

thought," "Indeterminate," "undifferentiated": such are the characteristics of true reality {tattva).

Whatever

10.

being dependent

exists,

[on something

else]

is

certainly

not

identical to that [other thing].

Nor

is

a thing different

The immortal

1 1

from

that; therefore,

it is

neither destroyed nor eternal.

essence of the teaching of the Buddhas, the lords of the world,

is

Without

singleness or multiplicity;

Again, in xxv. 3.

3

we

it is

not destroyed nor

is it

eternal.

read:

Nirvana has been

said

to be neither eliminated nor attained, neither an-

nihilated nor eternal.

[To have]

neither disappeared nor originated.

Likewise, in conventional speech, sunya (empty) designates that which is

beyond human expression;

as

such this term indicates the nature of

ultimate reality. Because of the non-substantiality of this ontology, "emptiness"

is

not used to designate a state of existence, but rather a condition

which precludes

MMK, 18.

which

a static ontological character.

This usage

is

exemplified in

XX. 18:

How would is

that be produced which

empty?

How

would that be destroyed

empty?

It logically follows, then, that

72

is

which

is

empty

is

not originated and not destroyed.

Nirvana

A

more complete development

is

given in xxiv, 20-40. Chapter xxiv

analyzes the notion of the four holy truths {caturdryasatya)

juna

insists

tive.

As

things,

of

that only

if all

empty can

here Nagar-

;

the holy truths be effec-

before, emptiness refers to the conditioned co-origination of

and nonemptiness

things. Emptiness

all

things are

refers to the self-sufficient reality

the condition

is

(i.e.,

all

(svabhdva)

dependent co-origination)

which must exist before any phenomenal causes and conditions can "produce" entities; at the same time it is the condition which denies the ultimate reality of phenomenal entities. The claim that emptiness is the condition for both mundane action and the release from sorrow is seen in the concluding five verses of this chapter:

36.

You deny

When

all

mundane and customary

you deny emptiness

activities

dependent co-origination (praiitya-

[in the sense of]

samutpada). 37. If

you deny emptiness, there would be action which

There would be nothing whatever acted upon, and

is

unactivated;

producing action would

a

be something not begun. 38.

According to [the doctrine of]

the world

"self -existence"

is

free

from

different conditions;

Then,

it will exist as

unproduced, undestroyed, and immutable.

39. If non-emptiness does not exist, then something

attained

is

which was not

attained;

There 40.

is

cessation of sorrow

He who

and

actions,

and

all evil is

destroyed.

perceives dependent co-origination

Also understands sorrow, origination, and destruction

as

well as the Path.

In the Mahayana Buddhist tradition another important term for the ultimate reality

is

"tathagata"

(lit.

"thus-gone" or fully attained), which

is

reality conceived as the final cessation of defiling ignorance. Tathagata

is

a

synonym

for the Buddha, and

is

the object of a great deal of dis-

—

cussion in the Prajndpdramitd literature. Yet, this term

—comes under Nagarjuna's

representing the Absolute

as

other notions

analysis,

where

it is

to have no independent self -existence. Chapter xxii is devoted to showing that tathdgata is neither a "self -existing entity" nor is it a product of dependent relationships. Thus from the perspective of the Ultimate

shown

Truth,

it

has no essential ontological status.

that tathdgata, as other "things," cannot

The

"become"

first if it is

ten verses

show

assumed to be 73

a

;

A

Emptiness:

Study in Religious Meaning

self -existing thing, for this

would deny

real relatedness. Verses 9

and 10

conclude: 9.

So when there

And

if

there

is

no

is

dependence,

self -existence does

self-existence whatever,

how

is

not

exist;

an "other-existence" possible?

Thus dependence and "that which is dependent" are completely empty. {siinyatathdgata) known through is that empty "fully completed one" that which is empty? 10.

How

The next

six verses in

chapter xxii deny that any term, including "empty,"

can properly express the truth of the Buddha

way, for the terms do not refer to

What human

used in an absolute

if it is

qualities- or substances-in-themselves.

beings designate as the tatJoagata actually

is

what human

beings also designate as "the world"; and this truth must be realized before

one can perceive the "fully attained." Nagarjuna ends the chapter with the verse: 16.

The

self -existence

of the "fully completed" [being]

is

the self-existence of

the world.

The

"fully completed" [being]

is

without self-existence, [and] the world

is

without self-existence.

"Whatever name

used to designate the "ultimate reality," whether

is

nirvana, tathdgata, or tattva,

Nagarjuna

nature. Thus,

{hhava) .

i

I

,

it is

deals

it is

declared to be without a self-established

with nirvana

"conditions," or sense faculties. In

just as he does

MMK,

with "things"

xxv, which

is

devoted

entirely to an analysis of nirvana, he

shows that none of the alternatives

of the quatralemma

not an existent entity (verses 4-6)

it is

is

true: nirvana

is

not a wcwexistent entity (verses 7-10)

;

it is

not both an existent and

and it is not neither an same time (verses 15-16). Nirvana

nonexistent entity at the same time (verses 11-14) existent nor nonexistent entity at the

;

I

cannot be an existent thing because then

nomenon (samskrta)

.

cannot be

It

dependent on an existent

—which

is

a

it

would be

a constructed phe-

nonexistent because this

is

logically

denied. It cannot be both, again, be-

would be "constructed"; and it cannot be neither because this logically depends on the existence of both. The rationale for handling nirvana as any mental fabrication is expressly stated in verses 19 and 20: cause then

19.

There

it

is

nothing

whatever

which

differentiates

the

existence-in-flux

(samsdra) from nirvana;

And

there

flux.

74

is

nothing whatever which differentiates nirvana from existence-in-

.

Nirvana

The extreme

20.

limit {koti) of nirvdna

is

also the

extreme limit of existence-

in-flux;

There

not the slightest bit of diflference between these two.

is

Nirvana, for Nagarjuna, Ultimate Reality; misunderstood

too,

it,

is is

not a term which darkly reflects an absolute simply a fabrication of the mind which, if

Reality, will misguide the one relative,

i.e.,

term can

that

is

it is

and no designation,

who

seeks release.

Only

conventional,

as a

mind from which the term nirvana

be profitably used to direct the

it

The Ultimate Truth

ignorance and greed. ^ points

and independent Ultimate

as referring to a self-sufficient

to

without any designation;^ in actuality there just as visible

is

no

"it"

forms are not things-in-themselves which

have certain attributes.

The

difference between nirvana

and samsdra

ventional norms of truth, for ultimately both of

The "negative tendency"

misunderstanding that emptiness

them

are

empty

same"

^

identity"

whereby the nature of

as

"un-

important to prevent the

is

an Absolute in the sense of Brahman

is

Advaita-vedanta thought. Nirvdna and samsdra have

in

(silnya)

with nirvdna and samsdra

in dealing

differentiated" rather than as "the

applies only to the con-

a

"negative

reality in nirvdna consists in the lack

^ Though we cannot go into the comparative problem here, this interpretation of nirvdna would deny the Theravada claim of nirvdna as an asamskrfa denoting a qualitative difference from sarhskrta. La Vallee Poussin's La Morale Bouddhique (Paris: Nouvelle librairie nationale, 1927) delineates the meaning of deliverance in non-Buddhist thought (pp. 16 ff.) and Lamotte (HBI, pp. 675-76) summarizes the interpretation of nirvdna in the early schools. See also La Vallee

—

Way

Poussin,

to Nirvana, for a discussion of nirvdna as an object of salvation

recognition that there was (pp.

132-34), plus a

no

summary

Poussin's definition of nirvdna

clear

expression in Buddhist

scripture of

of interpretations by Western scholars

(pp. 107-20) with a

the

(pp.

nature of nirvdna

121-23). La Valine

an "unqualified deliverance,"

a deliverance of which "Nirvana" (ERE, IX) where he writes (p. 379) is 'void' that orthodox Buddhism held: "A saint after death, a nirvrta or liberated one {mukta) (silnya) therefore he can be said to be annihilated." The most thorough analysis of different modern interpretations of the early notion of nirvana is found in Dutt, AMBRH, pp. 141-69, as Mahayana understandings found in their respective literatures is a comparison of Theravada and

we have no

(p.

131)

is

right to predicate anything. Also see

,

;

pp. 184-203). Nagarjuna's interpretation would suggest a radical shift from the content of the yogic awareness of those Buddhists conceiving nirvdna as an immobile, static state. It would deny the aim of (ihid.,

Theravada Buddhism which was "to reach

a plane

beyond the three dhatus,

called the apariyapanna-

or Lokuttara-dhatu (the unincluded or transcendental sphere). According to the Patisamhhiddmagga

who have

reached the four maggas and have obtained the four Nibbdna" (Dutt, AMBRH, p. 17). Nevertheless, the wellknown imagery of the "extinguishing of fire" (see Nanomoli, p. 319, n.) could still be useful. ^ See MMK, xxv. 3. See also Dutt's discussion (AMBRH, pp. 2 14-1 J) on the basic characteristics (laksanas) of sunyatd as given in Mddhyaviikavrtti: aparapratyaya (not impartable by one (I,

84)

it

contains those beings

magga-phalas or the Asaiikhata,

to in

another),

santa,

i.e.,

prapdncairaprapancitatn

concepts), and ananartha

(inexpressible

in

speech),

nirvikalpa

(unrealizable

(devoid of different meanings).

*See May, Studia Philosophica, XVIII, 126-27.

75

A

Emptiness;

Study in Religious Meaning

of self-sufficient reality in the factors that constitute samsdra. ness of the

phenomenal world

is

also the

The empti-

emptiness of any "non-phenomenal

Samsdra

no more "empty" than

reality" that

is

conceived

nirvana; nor

is

nirvana more "empty" than samsdra from the highest point

of view

—though nirvdna

as self -existent.

is

is

more "empty" than samsdra from the conven-

tional, practical perspective.

The importance of recognizing that "emptiness" applies to both nirvdna is made clear by a brief examination of alternative interpreta-

and samsdra

Western

tions of emptiness that have characterized scholarship presented in

languages. These interpretations suggest

two extremes that

are suggested

by Nagarjuna's expression: 1) emptiness seen as "nothing-ness" or 2) as an absolute essence beyond every particular manifestation. The first alternative^ stresses the lack of a metaphysical

monism

or pluralism with

the presupposition that the only alternative to "something" (seen as a substantial reality)

The

is

alternative

v/ho see the

"nothing"

(i.e., as

by T. R. V. Murti and

represented

is

Madhyamika

"non-being" over against "being.")

dialectic as

is

The

basic presupposition in

that the plurality of different entities

be unreal, while the totality of being which contains entities

is

real.

However, such an interpretation

Buddhist thought in which the "whole" the constituents to be unreal,

itself.

^

as

the particular

not considered to be

The Conception

USSR, 1927),

p.

(2

vols.;

chariot, neither

New

in his article

"Sunyavada:

A

real

while

is

admitted to is

a philo-

resolved only in a

is

York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1949)

of Buddhist Nirvana

37, mentions

spirit of

well-known example of the

(Leningrad: The

H. Kern, M. Walleser, H.

other early interpreters of "emptiness" as nihilism. This emphasis

H. Narain

all

considered to

contrary to the

which admittedly

See C. F. Moore, History of Religions

307. T. Stcherbatsky, in

Sciences of the

is

is

Likewise, the claim regarding Absolute Being

sophical response to a question

I,

is

in the

which make up the

chariot and the parts

be real in

e.g.,

Schayer,"^

S.

only preparatory for the intuition of

the reality behind the illusory phenomena. this interpretation

^

Jacobi, and

Academy

of

A. B. Keith

was reaffirmed recently by

Reinterpretation," Philosophy East and West, XIII, No.

4 (Jan., 1964), 311-38. * See Part III, esp. Ch. IX, below for an analysis of Nagarjuna's linguistic usage which permits

him

to

avoid

this

dichotomy.

CPB, pp. 234-35, and S. Schayer, "Das Mahayanistische Absolutum nach der Lehre der Madhyamikas," Orientalistische Literaturzeitung, XXXVIII, 402 S. Other "positive" interpretations include S. C. A. Vidyabhusana, "History of the Madhyamika Philosophy of Nagarjuna," Journal of the Buddhist Text and Anthropological Society, V, Pt. IV (1897), 7-20; and more recently A. R. Bhattacharya, "Brahman of Sankara and Sunyata of Madhyamikas," IHQ, XXXII (1965), 270-85. Likewise, La Vallee Poussin, after his academic exchange with T. Stcherbatsky, called "emptiness" a sort of Brahman, which is at the same time void and the ^

See

Murti,

universal substance

76

(MCB,

II,

38).

Nirvana

transrational dimension of

As

life.

need not be equated only with

all

text for interpreting "emptiness" as a

by

E.

Conze who,

is

expressed

true connotations in the process of salvation, and

it

would

make

it

into a

an ontological meaning. The relative nothing ("this

is

absent

its

it

for religious truth

reality, explains:

be a mistake to regard thing, and give

name

The proper con-

in spite of repeated references to "the undifferentiated

whole" of ultimate "Emptiness" has

Absolute

a philosophical assertion, this

or only with nothing.^

it

purely intellectual concept, or to

as a

in that") cannot be hypostatized into an absolute nothing, into the non-existence

of everything, or the denial of

mean

all reality

and of

all

Nor

being.

the completely indeterminate, the purely potential,

does "emptiness"

which can become every-

thing without being anything.^

Nagarjuna's use of the term "emptiness" criticisms

from

his

contemporaries,

who

(sunyafd)

already brought

interpreted his analysis as an ex-

which nothing can be produced and no truth the sixth verse of MMK, xxiv sums up an opponent's

pression of nihilism in

known. For

instance,

criticism: 6.

You deny

And

all

the real existence of a product, of right and wrong,

the practical behaviour of the world as being empty.

The opponent's

criticism

based on interpreting emptiness as the op-

is

posite of real existence, of the causal process,

him emptiness state of

is

chaos. Conceived thus, emptiness

non-being

—the opposite of the

ontological basis with 7.

We reply

You 8.

it.

To

that you do not

this

The teaching by

regarded

is

state of being, while

comprehend the point of emptiness. its

purpose from

it.

the Buddhas of the dhartna has recourse to

Those who do not

as a static

on the same

Nagarjuna responds:

eliminate both "emptiness" itself and

The world-ensconced truth and 9.

and of moral judgment; for

know

the truth

which

is

two

truths:

the highest sense.

the distribution (vibhdgam)

of the

two kinds of

truth

Do '

not

This

know

critique

I'absolu dans I'ecole

the profound "point" (iativa) in the teaching of the Buddha. complies

with

the

defects

observed

Madhyamaka," Revue Philosophique de

by Jan la

W.

trance

et

de

Jong,

"Le Problem de

de I'Eiratiger,

CXL

323-27. *

Conze, BTI,

p.

61.

77

(1950),

A

Emptiness:

The

10.

And

Study

in Religious

highest sense

Meaning

not taught apart from practical behaviour,

is

without having understood the highest sense one

cannot

understand

nirvdna.

A nihilistic interpretation,

says Nagarjuna, does not perceive the "point"

of emptiness, for such an interpretation never gets beyond the concern

(expressed in "world-ensconced truth." From the ultimate standpoint, emptiness does not refer to some undifferentiated essence, nor to the negation of an assumed essence; rather, emptiness

making ^

As

essential differentiations.

the dynamics which avoids

is

verse 10 above suggests, the ultimate

standpoint cannot be separated from "practical behavior" or

and from

activity; release

from every

this

as

not something in

is

This denial that even "emptiness"

such

is

is

a

means

MMK,

clearly articulated in

itself; it, too, is

itself

xxii. 10-11,

where it

privilege of having a self-suflScient reality. Tathdgata

and therefore

tive construction,

10.

11.

Nor \

that

is

is

is

in the context of

not granted the

regarded

as a rela-

the given definition of emptiness.

find the explanation:

Thus "dependence" and "that which

How j

we

it fits

only a designa-

represents Ultimate Reality

an analysis of the "fully completed" {tathdgata),

In these verses

mundane

to realize ultimate

differentiated thing.

"Emptiness," then, tion.

standpoint silnyata

is

dependent" are completely empty.

empty "fully completed one" known through

One may not

say that there

is

that which

"emptiness," nor that there

is

is

empty?

"non-emptiness."

that both exist simultaneously, nor that neither exists; the purpose for

saying "emptiness"

Emptiness

only for the purpose of conveying knowledge.

is

empty of any self-sufficient reality. La Vallee Poussin Madhyamika use of "emptiness" in the following way:

itself is

summed up

the

For the Madhyamika, "vacuity"

immanent

principle,

is

neither nothingness nor

but the very nature of what

because of vacuity" {'silnyataya)

—conceived

a

transcendent-

"things are not void

exists;

as exterior to things

—"but

because

they are void," and they are "void" because they are produced by causes. "Vacuity"

means "production by causes," and

^"La Vallee

Poussin,

(London: G. Routledge of silnyatd

78

as a denial

ERE,

&

VIII,

Sons,

is

237.

1930),

p.

only an abstraction,

See

also

a

mere word.^^

D. T. Suzuki, Studies in Lankdiatara Sutra summary of the meaning

94, for a brief generalized

of realism and idealism.

— ^

Nirvana

Nagarjuna's denial that emptiness

an ultimate principle

is

is

under-

standable in the context of the assertions of the Prajfiaparamita literature.^

Here we find emptiness equated with form {rilpa) and even phenomenal illusion (mdyd), those forces which were regarded in early Buddhism as binding

human

have

seen,

only

when

beings to the cycle of painful existence. "Emptiness,"

from the factors (dbarmas) from them, "emptiness"

considered neither different

it is

of existence nor identical to them. If represents a nihilism; if

eternalism

—and

it

different

it is

identical to them, "emptiness" represents

is

must be avoided. "Form,"

these extremes

be regarded either as "bound" or free, for

{svabhdva)

{nirvana)

lease

it

is

the purity,

is

The purity of form,

—determines purity

for

same

the

who

One

identification

perfect

self,

nonattachment.

as

wisdom

Nevertheless,

il-

the

warned "being attached" or "empty." The Lord

has realized the true nature of things)

not to regard "form" either

Buddha

no

the qualitative distinction between truth and

is

bodhisattva (the one

re-

form of form or phenomenal

can be known. However, there

lusion,

cannot

the nonattachment, in which the

i.e.,

existence with impurity as such.

anything

as such,

without self-existence

is

According to the Astasdhasrikd^^ the crucial factor for

.

we

regarded as a useful term for expressing the highest reality

is

as

is

explains to his disciple Subhuti:

wisdom

courses in perfect

one does not course in the idea that form

if

And

with attachment, or without attachment. skandhas, the sight organ, etc.

.

.

.

When

for

as

is

form, so for the other

he courses thus, a Bodhisattva does not

generate attachment to anything, from form to all-knowledge. For all-knowledge is it.

unattached, It is

neither

it is

bound nor

freed,

and there

nothing that has risen above

is

wisdom through

thus Subhuti that Bodhisattvas should course in perfect

rising completely above all attachments. ^^

then, an ultimate end

Is there,

thing that

is

which

perfected? No, emptiness

is

is

called "perfect"? Is there

not something to be perfected or

crudely realized. Subhuti succinctly states: "This is

not."

^"^

He

then continues with

^^ Astasahasrikd,

sdhasrika

(para.

anything:

'form

lunyata

form.' "

is

pars.

118) is

185,

there

is

Also

186. a

See

chap,

^^Conze,

viii

PWES,

see

a perfection of

p.

48,

who

of expression concerning is

formula exactly

the

writes:

"In

iata-

non-existence of

(lit.

form is sunyata, and form =: material constituents of a

for

like

it.

In the Pancaviritsati (leaf 726),

this."

on Purity. p.

what

not outside form,

"Rupam any term may be put

in a footnote he adds:

a

is

of paradoxes including such

AMBRH,

Dutt,

not devoid of siinyatd, ^unyata

Then

body) has been taken here as x, i.e., 'Maya' has been used for 'sunyata' in ^"

a catalogue

common form

some-

66.

^*Ibid., p. 71.

79

A

Emptiness:

Statements

Study in Religious Meaning

"This perfection knows no purification, because no possible

as:

might have to be purified) can be apprehended," and, "Empty is this perfection, because all dharmas are not apprehended." The lack of any "thing" which can serve as a referent for "perfect wisdom" receptacle (which

(

=

nirvana)

O

Deep,

Lord,

by anyone, nor nothing at

wisdom

is

all

is

says:

by anything, nor wisdom

perfect wisdom. It cannot be developed

there anything nor anyone to be developed. For in perfect

is

been brought

has

like the

of the infinite, of

By

summed up by Subhuti when he

is

what

The development of perfect

perfection.

to

development of space, or of

all

dharmas, or of non-attachment,

not, of not-taking-hold-of.^^

is

no absolute essence to which "emptiness" (or "nirvana" and "perfect wisdom") refers, we recognize that when emptiness is described as inexpressible, inconceivable, and devoid of designation, it does not imply that there is such a thing having clearly understanding that there

these as characteristics. Emptiness

is

is

As

nonsubstantial and nonperceptible.

"nonsubstantially" does not indicate non-existence, but a denial that things

mean

are real in themselves, so "non-perceptibility" does not

consciousness; rather,

phenomena through conceptualization. Thus, "emptiness" in both an ontological self-sufficient being,

empty." Only relates the

if

and an epistemological

and

a state of

un-

serves to check the inclination to substantialize

it

it is

sense: "it"

empty

itself is

is

devoid of any

beyond both designations "empty" and "non-

both senses are kept in mind can we

see

how Nagarjuna

"emptiness of the phenomenal world" to the "emptiness of any

absolute entity or assertion."

When

emptiness works (yujyaie) then everything in existence works;

If emptiness does not

work, then

The "emptiness" which tablishes

existence

(i.e.,

denies

existence does not

all

any absolute,

existence

is

(xxiv. 14).

being also

self-sufficient

empty of any

through dependent co-origination; emptiness

work

self-existent

neither an absolute

es-

reality)

monism

nor nihilism. 'We can come to grips with the meaning of nirvana

as

empty of

all

con-

tent by remembering that the purpose of the term was to indicate "true

freedom"

—

^^Ibid., p.

final release.^^ It

was

first

a soteriological

—with

term

meta-

111.

"Nirvana means extinction of life and death, extinction of worldly desire, and extinction of space and time conditions. This, in the last analysis means unfolding a world of perfect freedom" (Takakusu, The Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy, p. 24). ^°

80

Nirvana

physical overtones. Nagarjuna, following the insights of the Prajndpdramitd

composers, held that the Abhidharma literature became so "tied up" with explanations of the nature and process of nirvana that freedom from

men-

Nagarjuna attempted to break the "righteous concern" had by subjecting the

fabrication could not be realized.

tal

bonds which even such

a

notions to a devastating dialectic. In destroying the illusion of self-beings

Nagarjuna was establishing the freedom which came from existing without attachment. for a

it is

It is this

freedom which applies both to existence and nirvana;

not conceived

as a self-contained state

of existence in the sense of

realm into which one "enters."

Fundamental to an understanding of nirvana is the perception of the "becoming" for which nirvana is the answer. If we see that the "becoming" is a fundamental ontological category denying the static "be-

reality of

ing," then there a "process of

is

no need

for a static ontological substratum to undergird

becoming"; and the question of whether there "is" or

not"

"is

something remaining when is no longer fabrication of existence does not apply. For Nagarjuna, common everyday living more often than not imposed an illusory absolute character on the everyday events and "things" there

of

on

life.

He

claimed that even the concern for spiritual insight could take

this illusory absolute character if nirvana,

were regarded

as self-existent realities.

existence without a self-sufficient status relations)

which takes (take) on an

"self -existence"

to

it.

Nirvana

is

(sva-bhdva)

is

tathdgata, or "emptiness"

Another way of saying is

this

is

that

an empty relation (or empty

illusory substantial

quality

when

emotionally and perceptually attributed

realizing the true,

empty

structure of becoming, which

then becomes religiously "more," but metaphysically "less" than "being" or "becoming."

81

6 WISDOM

(Prajni)

The fourth concept which we are considering, and for which "emptiness" has particular relevance, is "wisdom" (prajnd). Wisdom is a "means of knowing" which releases a person from the attachment to things. "Within the context of our discussion regarding emptiness, wisdom is the presupposition for, and the culmination of, the negation of self-sufficient entities.

The aim

of

wisdom

of "things." goal, its i.e.,

aim

Or is

is

and

to melt the chains of greed

to state the same thing

to relate oneself to

all

from

"things" in an empty relationship,

in total freedom.

As

the means of attaining becoming to a binding force.

total

If

freedom, however,

wisdom

is

"grasped"

absolute "view," is

it

differentiate

most susceptible

it is

conceived

as

an

simply becomes one of several mental constructions,

dynamics of

susceptible to destructive

sidering wisdom,

it is

as a thing-in-itself, it

will subtly be constructed into a delusive mirage; if

and

thirst for possession

the viewpoint of a religious

we must

own

its

repeat the intention of

genius. In con-

MMK,

8-10 to

xxiv.

between the two kinds of truth on the one hand, and, on the

other, insist that nirvana cannot be attained without the use of both. In

wisdom of

the context of emptiness, Nagarjuna claims, the solves the

attachment to "things" in the

visible

release dis-

world (known through

conventional truth) and dissolves the yearning for some "ulimate reality" (realized

through the highest truth). In

Nagarjuna's denial that wisdom things

—ultimately

implies that he

is

real, his

this

we

chapter

will

discuss

—

knowledge about something or some denial that the use of the term "emptiness"

articulating

is

some absolute

assertion,

and

his

own

use

of conventional truth to express the highest truth.

"Wisdom Without an Object of Knowledge In previous chapters

we have

the independent existence 82

discussed in detail

(svabhdva) of visible

how Nagarjuna entities.

denied

Thus the con-

:

Wisdom

MMK,

elusions in

iii.

7-8 and

iv.

or "causal relations" in themselves.

(Prajna)

4-5 indicate that there are no "things"

From

7-8 and

xviii.

xxiii.

23

we

learn

no differentiation, and that the differentiation made in the phenomenal world is not to be confused with the truth which knows these differentiations as empty. The that in the complete realization of emptiness there

result of the cessation of ignorance 23.

From

When

is

is

expressed in xxiii. 23:

the cessation of error ignorance ceases;

ignorance has ceased, conditioned things (samskdra) and everything

else

ceases.

True knowledge, however, should not be regarded as some absolute inis revealed every now and then. The knowledge of

formation which "emptiness"

not conceived

is

as

an expression of "something";

proposition about something. Rather

it

is

a

it is

operates throughout existence (or nonexistence, both or neither)

expressed in

MMK,

not

a

power which spontaneously This

.

is

xviii. 1 2

12. If fully-completed

Buddhas do not

arise

[in the

world] and the disciples

[of the Buddha] disappear,

Then, independently, the knowledge of the self-produced enlightened ones

is

produced.

In fact the assertion of some independent reality "behind" the expression of knowledge would preclude any knowledge of emptiness. Nagarjuna says: 24. If the path [of release] it

into existence {bbdvana) If that path

is

is

self-existent, then there

is

no way of bringing

;

brought into existence, then "self-existence," which you claim,

does not exist. 25.

When

What kind

sorrow, origination, and destruction do not exist,

of path will obtain the destruction of sorrow?

26. If there

is

any knowledge of Indeed,

is it

no complete knowledge

as to self-existence,

not true that "self-existence"

The "transforming knowledge" which to dissipate

how

could there be

it? is

is

that

which endures?

called

wisdom

is,

then, a means

any absolute notion about something. R. Robinson has

clearly

perceived the function of the term "emptiness" as Nagarjuna uses articulate absolute truth.

He

writes: 85

it

to

A

Emptiness;

Study in Religious Meaning

Emptiness

is

term within

it.

not

a

term outside the expressional system, but

Those who would hypostasize emptiness

No

system with the fact system.

from the

facts of language.

truth and absolute truth.

is

simply the key

are confusing the

symbol

metaphysical fact whatever can be established

The question arises as to the relation between worldly The term "absolute truth" is part of the descriptive

order, not part of the factual order. Like all other expressions,

empty, but

it is

it

has a peculiar relation within the system of designations. It symbolizes non-system, a surd within the

system of constructs.^

The concept "emptiness" attempts for the

knowledge of

that there

is

no

reality

j

'

(anatman doctrine)

reality in things-in-themselves

Mahdprajndpdramitd-sdsfra

.

to answer the Indian spiritual search

through an extension of the Buddhist insight maintains

that

the

teaching

.

The

emptiness

of

means both emptiness of beings (pudgala-silnyatd) and emptiness of the dbarfnas {dharma-sunyatd) .^ If the idea of an existing entity comes into mind, the bodhisattva knows that it is an illusion. It is the essence of wis-

dom

(prajnd) to realize that a disciple

who

has "attained the fruit of en-

tering the Stream" has not attained anything

nor the path of in a self

release. If a

(dtman)

"Wisdom"

,

—

person should think

dbarma (truth) he would have a belief

neither

so,

an independently existing entity.

Abhidharma and the Prajndpdramitd writings meant "looking at things as they are." However, whereas the Abhidharma had tried to see the nonsubstantiality of things by seeing the factors in both the

which composed them, the 'Pra]ndpdramitd maintained that the factors themselves were empty of independent reality, and that the notions of "path," "dharma," or "Buddha" were meaningless if they designated enwhich had particular and unique characteristics (laksanas = "marks") For instance in the Vajracchedikd PrajUdpdramitd when the

tities

.

Lord

is

telling his disciple

Bodhisattva-vehicle

Subhuti

should stand,

how "someone who has set out in how to progress, how to exert

the his

thought," he says: Although innumerable beings have thus been has been led to Nirvana.

all

And why?

led

to

Nirvana, no being

And why?

"being" should take place, he could not be called a "Bodhi-being."

He

is

not to be called

a

Bodhi-being, in

whom

the perception of a self or a

being would take place, or the perception of a living soul or a person. ^

MSFC, p. 72. TGVS, II, 1078

at

If in a Bodhisattva the perception of a

.

.

.

Robinson,

ff.; K. Venkata Ramanan, Ndgdrjuna's Philosophy as Presented in the Mahd-Prajnapdramifa-Sdstra (Tokyo, Charles E. Tuttle Co., 1966), see esp. ch. VIII "The World *

Lamotte,

and the Individual."

i4

—

^

W^Isdom (Prajna)

What do you

No

Subhuti:

Tathagata be

O

indeed,

seen.

possession of

Lord, not by the possession of his marks can the

And why? What

possession of marks, that

The Lord: Wherever is

by the

think, Subhuti, can the Tathagata be seen

marks?

his

is

there

is

possession of

no-possession of no-marks there

from no-marks

as

has been taught

by the Tathagata

as

the

truly a no-possession of no-marks.

is

marks there

is

fraud, wherever there

no fraud. Hence the Tathagata

is

to be seen

marks.

Likewise, in the Heart Sutra the

Buddha

explains the

manner by which

the Bodhisattva "attains" ultimate release. In the sixth section he says: Therefore, sattva,

O

Sariputra,

through having

it

relied

is

because of his non-attainmentness that a Bodhi-

on the perfection of wisdom, dwells without thought-

coverings [acittdvarana]. In the absence of thought-coverings he has not been

made

to tremble, he has

overcome what can upset, and

in the

end he attains

to Nirvana.^

In explaining the meaning of this paragraph,

What it

all

Edward Conze

writes:

one had to do was not to rely on anything, worldly or otherwise, to

go, to give the resulting emptiness a free run, unobstructed

whatever, or by the fight against

To

it.

nowhere any refuge or support, that

is

stop

relying

to be supported

let

by anything

on anything, to seek by the "perfection of

wisdom." The Perfection of Wisdom can, of course, be equated with Emptiness,

and

so at this stage the Bodhisattva relies

on nothing but emptiness.^

In conformity with the vision of ancient Buddhism, Nagarjuna denied that happiness in this

life

or any other could result

from any extreme.

Regardless of the earnestness expressed in any purificatory effort, effort

were not aware of

fabricating

its

own

it

if

such

was simply

more constricting action (karma). Indian Buddhism, by

cepting an ontology of "becoming"

made

nonessential character,

—

relatedness bear the weight of

in distinction to

its

ac-

one of "being"

metaphysical considerations.

By

taking the burden of existence from "things" or "elements" Buddhism

emphasized

Nagarjuna

the

nonsubstantiality,

the

nonautonomy,

of

existence.

stated this notion through the concept "emptiness," dissolving

every particular in a "negative identity." Even the notion of "emptiness" ^

trans. Edward Conze (Serie Orientale Roma VIII; Roma: Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1957), pp. 66-68. See also pp. 69, 71-73, 7S-77, 82, 85-87, 90 for the denial of any "thing" or "mark" which can be grasped as absolute.

Vajracchedikd

Istituto Italiano per 83, *

Conze,

^Ibid.,

BWB, p.

Prajnapdramitd,

il

p.

93.

94.

«5

— A

Emptiness:

Study

Meaning

in Religious

did not possess a peculiar ontological status, so that

when

a Bodhisattva

on emptiness, he does not rely on something outside the deof which the term "emptiness" might be conscription "emptiness" is

to rely

—

sidered the property.

From

this

we

wisdom, in the context of emptiness, negated any

see that

one-sided assertion which required bipolar distinctions, destruction, or reality

and

entities

ideas

—

At

nonreality.

were empty of

the same time

self -existence. It

e.g., it

production

maintained that

could do this because

did not regard emptiness as an object which had properties or as a

it

property of some essence. "Emptiness" can reveal the true nature of reality

only

when

it

is

used to eliminate the search for some ultimate,

absolute "being." Then, in order that

being

itself,

"emptiness"

loses its

The Ultimate Truth which

is

own

it is

not crystallized into an absolute

designations as the revelatory means.

beyond "being" and "becoming," beyond

"emptiness" and "non-emptiness,"

is

inexpressible. Yet, this last sentence

should not suggest the illusion, Nagarjuna would say, that there

is

"some-

thing" which is inexpressible. In traditional Buddhist thought there is a group of topics called "the inexpressibles" {avydkata, avydkrtavastiini) usually enumerated in fourteen statements.^ They concern the following topics:

whether the world

is

eternal or not, or both or neither; whether

the Tathdgata exists after death, does not, or both, or neither; and whether is identical with the body or different from it. When these queswere posed before the Buddha, the Ciila Mdlunkya Sutta informs us,

the soul tions

they remained unanswered."^ The Buddha, being conscious of the inter-

minable conflict in reason, refrained from giving either a definite "yes" or

"no" to any question. The "inexpressibles" represent a critical dialectic born from the rejection of any absolute (dogmatic) verbal formulations. It elaborates in the dialectic which Nagarjuna this same critical is Madhyamakakdrikds the dialectic which denies the ultimate validity of

—

any view.

As we have (i.e.,

seen before, Nagarjuna appeals to the fact that the Buddha) refused to state whether he existed after death

(MMK,

xv. 17-18) in order to argue that one cannot say that

Tathdgata or not

nirvana exists or does not '

These are found not only

in

exist.

As

the Buddha's silence, so Nagarjuna's

the canonical sutias, but also in the commentaries and other The Abhidharvia Rosa classifies the avyakrta as a type

subsequent literature, e.g., Milinda Patlha. of question which cannot be answered at

all

(sthapaniya). See Murti, p. 42.

usual interpretations of the Buddha's silence Buddha, himself, did not know, (2) the Buddha did not concern himself with metaphysical questions, and (3) this was a form of expressing a metaphysical nihilism. '

as

Dr.

Murti

follows:

86

(1)

(p.

37)

summarizes

the

three

"Wisdom

(Prajiia)

of the favorite notions of Buddhist philosophy and psy-

critical analysis

chology served to redirect mental energies which were caught in the net

However, Nagarjuna's

of_discourse.

that logic as he applied

it

analysis

went further

was

in the Kdrikds

in suggesting

a potent tool to cut into

dogmas based on the inherent

the net of illusory metaphysical

limitations

of discursive thought. Thus the logic which was the framework in which illusions

were perpetuated was

framework

to

its

also the

—

proper usage

mechanism which could reduce

this

the expression of conventional truth.

For Nagarjuna, the pursuit after

final

answers regarding the nature of .

For him, these "final answers"

were not to be found because there were no

essential self-determined ques-

Ultimate Reality was sophistry (prapanca) tions. Since there

was no "o ne to one" correlation between concepts and

their sup posed referent, the inquiry into the nature of thin gs

One can

endless.

is

up (or chain togethe r) inference upon inference, butthis activity does not~Ieadto Ultimate Truth and it never will because Ultimate Truth, in this method of inquiry, is imagined to be the last of a pile

—

—

Ultimate Truth, however,

series.

is

not a fact about an absolute "real," or

even intuitive knowledge of such a "real." Such a "thing" does not exist (ultim ately)

ment

.

Ult imate Trut h, rather was a p^wer for

to such a

,

phantom

Wisdom Just as in is

no

view is

wisdom

there

is

a Self-substantiated Assertion

no

self-existent object of

knowledge, so there

view which can claim to be an "eternal truth." That every

assertion or is

from attach-

reali ty.

Not

Is

release

ultimately false

is

a corollary to the recognition that ultimate reality

not a thing to be "possessed." Nagarjuna takes twenty-one verses in the

show that there is no self -existence (svabhdva) of either object of knowledge or means of knowledge; each depends on the other to produce knowledge. This work is structured to answer the questions relating especially to knowledge and how it operates to reveal what is true. In it, Nagarjuna's opponents try to show that Nagarjuna's denial Vigraha-vydvartani

®

to

of "self-existence" also negates his claim regarding emptiness.^ He, on the contrary, asserts that words themselves do not effect the negation of

the self -existing assertion; expressing * *

^°

mundane

Appendix B, Appendix B, See Appendix B, See

See

words simply serve the practical purpose of

(co-originated) notions.^*^

verses

verses

all

3 1

A word

(ue.,

ndm a = name)

0-51.

-4.

verses 21-28.

87

A

Emptiness; itself

Study in Reli gious Meaning

cannot be regarded

have the power to 57.

as

having

effect a result)

He who would

impute

a self-existence

Nagarjuna argues:

.

a really existing

Could be refuted by you; but we do not

58.

And

that

If it

were

thing, or if

a real is

it

were

a

to a really existing thing

name.

—would non-real thing—

is

real or a non-real thing?

entire proposition

name

assert a

"The name

[assertion]:

(which would then

unreal"

that

in both

relate

cases

to

a

your

refuted.

Also in verses 64-69 Nagarjuna argues against specific kinds of demon-

which presume that they

strations

view that holds to the

are negating a

notion of self-existence. Knowledge, therefore, does not have

and every emptiness

A

if it

similar

terms

In

assertion or

view must be regarded

claims to articulate the truth.

view was already articulated in the Prajndparamifd

of

gaining

Bodhisattvahood

Astasdhasrikd Prajndpdramitd recounts

Subhuti that no teaching {dharma) had perfect

wisdom

Subhuti: activities

is

But,

are

self -existence,

betraying the truth of

as

how

the Lord

self -existence,

literature.

nature),

told his

the

disciple

and that even the

empty:

since

the

Lord has taught that

lacking in own-being, and empty,

become one who

enlightened

(an

dharmas and

all

—how

all

mental

then can a Bodhlsattva

not lacking in mental activities associated with perfect wisdom,

is

or with all-knowledge?

The Lord:

If the

mind of

a

Bodhisattva works on the fact that

are through their own-being isolated and empty, and agrees that

he becomes one

who

is

all is

dharmas so,

then

not lacking in mental activities associated with perfect

wisdom and with all-knowledge. For perfect wisdom nor

this

is

empty,

it

neither increases

decreases. ^^

Almost immediately following the above explanation Subhuti series

asks in a

of questions whether anything specifically can be designated about

perfect wisdom. tion, are

Two

of these questions, together with the Buddha's nega-

Important for our discussion here:

Subhuti: Does the emptiness of perfect wisdom course in perfect wisdom?

The Lord: No, Subhuti ... ^^Conze, PWES,

p.

162. See also pp. 201-5.

—

:

Visdom

Can one apprehend

Subhuti:

in emptiness

any dharma that courses

(Prajna)

in perfect

wisdom?

The Lord: No, Subhuti.12

Then, in tions

manner, the Buddha asks Subhuti a

a catechetical

which

of ques-

series

an expression of the nature of perfect wisdom

results in

(prajna)

The Lord: Do you as a real

see that perfect

wisdom, in which the Bodhisattva courses,

thing?

Subhuti: No, Lord.

The Lord: Do you see as real that dharma which Has that dharma by any chance been produced, being produced, has

been stopped, will

it

it

oflfers

no

or will

basis for apprehension?

it

be stopped or

be produced, or

is

it

being stopped?

it

is

Subhuti: No, Lord.

The Lord: This which full

insight gives a Bodhisattva the patient acceptance of

to be produced.

fail

enlightenment.

.

.

When

he

is

endowed with

that, he

is

dharmas

predestined to

.^^

As Nagarjuna argued (ndma) was without

in

the

Vigraha-vydvartam

self -existence, so in

that

the Astasdhasrikd

every word

we

find the

explanation that "a thought can arise only with an objective support" just as in the case of acts of will

and deeds.^^ This

is

important for indicat-

ing that wisdom, which recognizes the emptiness of form (thought)

not produced "with an objective support." Perfect wisdom, in ference to

(empty) forms, does not

all

assert a teaching; the

one can receive from wisdom (prajnd)

When

words

is

them

Thus, a proposition that declares "emptiness is

not

.

.

.

,"

and vice

XXV.

24.

final verse

The

is

only "answer"

do not have

useful in conventional speech. is

.

.

." also

means "emptiness

versa. In light of this rejection that such universal

propositions give information about Ultimate Truth,

Nagarjuna's

,

indif-

silence.

are used to express the highest truth, they

the restrictive function which makes

its

of

MMK,

we can understand

xxv, the chapter which analyzes nirvana:

cessation of accepting everything [as real]

is

a salutary cessation

of phenomenal development.

No dharma anywhere has been taught by the Buddha of

anything.

^*lbid., pp. 162-63. ^*Ibid., p. 163. See also pp. 100, 117, 132. ^*Ibid.. p. 137.

89

— Emptiness:

A

Study in Religious Meaning

The claim

that "emptiness"

claim that

fruitless to

it is

not

is

at several places in the Kdrikas.

As

a

viewpoint

is

by Nagarjuna

expressed

we

early as the fourth chapter

find the

argue either for or against the reality of empti-

ness:

"Wlioever

8.

(vigraha)

—

argues

"emptiness"

against

in

order

For him everything, including the point of contention,

to

is

known

argument

an

refute

to go unrefuted.

"Whoever argues by means of "emptiness" in order to explain an under-

9.

standing

For him everything, including the point to be proved,

is

known

to be misunder-

stood.

In

xiii. 8

j

we

Emptiness

8.

find a classic expression of the claim that the truth of

emp-

cannot be restricted to a viewpoint:

tiness

is

proclaimed by the victorious one

as

the expulsion of

all

view-

points;

But those who hold "emptiness"

viewpoint are considered

as a

as

not having

attained [the truth]. I

Finally, the verses in chap, xxiv

which express the damning

of misconstruing the truth of emptiness clearly have in

mundane point

tion of this highest truth to a

spiritual result

mind

of view, which

the degenerais

enmeshed

in

the contradictions of everyday speech: 11. Emptiness, It is like a

having been dimly perceived, utterly destroys the slow-witted.

snake grasped wrongly, or [magical] knowledge incorrectly applied.

12. Therefore, the

the

mind of the

ascetic

[Gautama] was diverted from teaching

dharm a.

Having thought about 13.

Time and

the incomprehensibility of the dharina

made

again you have

a

by the

condemnation of emptiness,

But that refutation does not apply to our emptiness. 14.

When

emptiness "works," then everything in existence "works";

If emptiness does not

"work," then

all

15.

You, while projecting your own

Are

like a

^^ Cf.

existence does not "work." ^^

faults

on

us,

person who, having mounted his horse, forgot the horse!

Vigraha-vyavartani, verse 70:

All things prevail for

Nothing whatever

90

him

for

prevails for

whom

him

for

emptiness prevails;

whom

emptiness prevails.

stupid.

_Wisdom_(Prajna) "W^isdo

m

(

praj nd )

while using

,

with^onceptualjinowledgej

ment

m an's

intell ect,

true functj on

jts^

to the^ntitie^jwhich are fabricated

i s_

not jt o be equ ated

to drain

is

by the

m ind

away

the attach-

and ernot ions This .

mind or consciousness does not exist indepen of knowledg e'^_th at appear to be external to Jthe Buddhism onward, the conscious mind {vinndna,

capacity exists because the

dent of the "o bjec ts mind.^^

From

early

was understood not

vijndna)

existed independent of

a faculty that

as

perceived objects, but as arising from the interaction of "subjective" and

As every

"objective" elements.

existing

the

thing,

something which has "become"; and the becoming i.e.,

a stimulus. If the

Wisdom

is,

conscious is

mind

is

due to "food,"

stimulus ceases, then "what becomes" ceases.

which

in part, a concentrative exercise

dissolves the

mental

and emotional attachment of the apparent mind to "things" (including ideas or assertions), for it

Wisdom can

the awareness that

is

all

"things" are empty.

be a solution to the problems which are in the very nature

of existence because of the presupposition in Buddhism that one becomes

what he knows himself

becoming that

structures a kind of

The awareness of emptiness "no-becoming." The term

to be (or not to be).^^ leads to

hhdvana ("coming into being") was used

term for the realization

as the

of the highest truth. There was no escaping the universally conditioned

by "dependent co-origination." In her book Buddhist Psychology Mrs. Rhys Davids has pointed out how "wis-

character of existence expressed

dom"

participates in

mental constructions but

them. In ex-

also purifies

plaining that ideas are part of the spiritual "becoming," she writes:

In their arising

is

Involved creative, constructive

insight, that effort of intellectual

eflfort.

And

this

is

intuition or

sympathy by which the mind can place

itself

within the mobile reality of things. Pannd [wisdom] was not simply exercise of

thought on matters of general knowledge and practice, nor was

—

nor desultory reverie. It was intelligence diverted by volition,

synergy, ^^ See as

"made

to

Govinda, PAEBP,

described in ^^

(as

from lower it

practical issues

become" that esp. parts

Abhidhamma

till,

as

a

which had not been

in

dialectic,

synthesis,

before. ^^

a discussion of the Buddhist notion of consciousness

tradition.

T. Stcherbatsky has summarized the Buddhist understanding of

depicted

it

—concentrated

fusion of sympathy,

spiritual vision

4-6 for

or rather as

the Abhidharmakosa)

.

It

is

representative

of

the

how knowledge philosophical

is

produced

milieu

against

which, and in which, Nagarjuna worked. See CCB, pp. 45-50. ^*

C. A. F.

Rhys Davids, BP,

p. 133. Mrs.

Rhys Davids

also

makes

a significant

comment about

the meditation practice as found in the Buddhist tradition. She maintains that there "is no sense

91

.

Emptiness:

A

Study in Religious Meaning

Emptiness

is

the basis for

all

becoming, since

it is

the "dependent co-

origination" that accounts for the production of phenomena; but "de-

pendent co-orignation"

is

not a principle of determinism which necessarily

perpetuates the attachment to existing things.

"empty" constructions that compose

Only when the naturally are embued with false

existence

notions of self -existence (which also brings attachment to "things")

they become fetters that produce frustration and turmoil ^

do (duhkha)

Those who have realized the empty nature of existence (or of themselves) evade the attachment that accompanies ignorance and thereby become

empty of any attachment. The importance of ing mental construction and attachments

5.

On

is

realizing emptiness for end-

stated in the

MMK,

account of the destruction of the pains (klesa) of action there

him who constructs them. These [pains] result from phenomenal extension (prapanca) nomenal extension comes to a stop by emptiness.

xviii.

is

5:

release;

for pains of action exist for

To

realize

wisdom, then,

is

to refrain

Use of Verbalizing

What

is

but

;

from constructing more

pain.

in Realizing Emptiness

the relationship between Nagarjuna's logical arguments and

the release from attachments to existence? Since every viewpoint (silnya)

phe-

this

of self -existence

own

{svabhdva)

^

is

according to Nagarjuna,

empty not

is

empty proposition? So his opponents argue; and he readily agrees. However, Nagarjuna maintains that the supposed victory of such an argument results from faulty reasoning. Nagarjuna's

denial of self -existence an

In the Vigraha-vydvartani he takes up this problem directly. In verses 20-

29 Nagarjuna use of

words

rejects the

as if

opponent's claim that his

they had

self -existence

own denial constitutes a He argues that in his

{svabhdva)

.

denial of self-existence he does not have to assume

what

sume; rather, he maintains, both the claims of

opponents and

denials

do not have

self -existence;

his

his

opponents

as-

own

his

they both exist on the level of con-

of union with the divine One, or any One, aimed at or

felt.

It

has the essential noetic quality

too strongly to permit of passivity as a constant. Intellect and volition, for Buddhist thought, arc

hardly distinguishable, and the jhdyin [the person

who

meditates] seems to be always master of him-

from and emerging There is a synergy about his jhana [meditation], combined with an absence of any reference whatever to a merging or melting into something greater, that for many may reveal a defect, but which is certainly a most interesting and significant difference." Ibid., pp. 114-15.

self

and

self-possessed, even in ecstacy, even to the deliberate falling into

trance.

92

.

.

.

Wisdom ventional truth. His denial

He

is

(Prajna)

phantom destroying another phantom.

like a

ends his argument with the verse:

29. If I

would make any proposition whatever, then by that

I

would have

a

logical error;

But

I

do not make

a proposition; therefore I

am

In verse 59 of this same work Nagarjuna

not in error. insists that, since his denial

does not presuppose an opposite absolute claim, he

When

sition.

is

not making a propo-

the opponent further argues that Nagarjuna unwittingly pre-

supposes an entity in order to deny

it,

Nagarjuna answers:

63. Since anything being denied does not exist, I

Therefore, [the statement]:

"You deny"

do not deny anything;

—which was made by you—

is

a false

accusation.

In the next verse he affirms that his expression

is

simply to convey some-

thing, and the mechanics of speech should not be construed to imply a

power which negates some metaphysical 64.

Regarding what was

of denial

is

said

entity:

concerning what does not

exist:

"The statement

proved without a word."

In that case the statement expresses: "[That object] does not exist";

[the

words] do not destroy that [object].

The

goal of complete unattachment through realizing the highest truth

of emptiness, claims Nagarjuna, tion of something

mundane

which

exists.

is

not a view and certainly not the nega-

Yet, in order to be a means of release from

must be expressed. As a verbal expresmust participate in the limitations of mundane speech in fact it capitalizes on the very nature of mundane speech, which operates through the projection of opposites and discrimination. The negative dialectic which is so prominent in the Kdrikds carries the principles of "opposites" sion

experience, "emptiness"

—

it

and discriminating analyses to

its

limits,

indicating thereby that

notions used are simply verbal constructions of

the

empty "becoming." By

criticizing every assertion which intends to bring the "reality of becoming" into the confines of a dogmatic perspective, Nagarjuna expressed the

Middle Way. "Emptiness" was not meant as an expression of chaos without "rhyme or reason," but, equally, it was not meant to refer to an absolute state of being from which all phenomena arose, or to an absolute structure (logos) of existence. traditional Buddhist affirmation of the

The

assertion in

MMK,

xxiv. 10 that the highest truth

is

not taught 93

A

Emptiness:

Study in Religious Meaning

from the mundane activity manner of handling the

exemplified in the subject matter and

apart

is

the

materials

Nagarjuna phenomena, to,

Madhyamakakdrikas.

e.g.,

mundane

"being dependent," "universal elements," "what

e.g.,

the going, and

ultimacy,

the

in

uses a logical analysis to criticize the views about

what

gone

is

not yet gone to." Also he subjects the notions of

is

nirvana, the four holy truths, and the tathdgata to the same

mundane phenomena. Both ultimate and mundane phenomena shown to be empty from the standpoint of the highest truth the

analysis as

—

are

highest truth_jwhich is^beyond^distinctions^^t the same time, according to the Kdrikds the emptiness of

all

phenomena becomes manifest through

the critical analysis of every viewpoint.

The Madhyamika school did not reject speech in order to ajBfirm an solute intuition. The followers of this school, for instance, used the cursive tool of negation

—negation which

what was negated. They

opposite of

approximation of things

as

did not admit (or affirm)

also

they really

dis-

the

used metaphors to suggest an

are,

i.e.,

"emptiness." This would

made between

suggest that no easy equation can be

ab-

logical reasoning

and

mundane truth on the one hand, and intuition and Ultimate Truth on the other.

The

reasoning

as

ability of

well

Ultimate Truth to manifest

as intuition,

itself

through

logical

furthermore, would be consistent with

Nagarjuna's recognition that "emptiness" applies both to mundane existence and to ultimate reality. This recognition does not deny that the

Ultimate Truth

beyond

is

all

distinctions in the sense that

can reduce the vitality of what stress the fact that discursive

physical content it

reason can be illusory

from the terms or

can be revelatory

if

used in

no statement

actually real to a proposition. It does

is

if

one derives meta-

logical structure of the discourse; or

a critical dialectic

to indicate the nonabsolute

quality of any assertion.

"What then does Nagarjuna mean when he says that there are two kinds of truth: the world-ensconced truth

Ultimate Truth (paramdrthafa) that

is

^' xxiv.

(lokasamvrtisatya)

and the

MMK,

xxiv. 1-6

appears clear from

world-ensconced truth refers to the practical understanding

the

which

? ^^ It

required to live.-° There

is

a practical value in

regarding tables

number of "truths" in Buddhism was variously catalogued. See La V. 15 9-87. However, this cataloguing itself was considered to be a mundane which was not "one" or "many," but the very presupposition for any designation of the Truth concern with truth in a prepositional form. ^" Dutt (AMBRH, pp. 216-17) has given three senses in which the term "sarhvrti" was used: 8-9.

Vallee Poussin,

(1)

identical

94

The

MCB,

—

with ignorance {avidya)

on account of

its

completely enveloping the reality,

(2)

"Wisdom (Prajna)

and chairs

as

"things" (which do not disintegrate because from an ultimate

viewpoint they are considered to be empty of

self -existence)

.

means and

It also

aflSrming general and broad distinctions between good and bad, real

and

illusory,

same

and empty

full

To

as practical distinctions.

say "Gold

is

the

Each of the two kinds of truth are valid when correctly applied; and wisdom (prajna) is insight into the nature of things whereby the proper means for

as dirt" is false

knowing

(a-satya) in the context of practical truth.

the truth

used in a given situation.

is

Nagarjuna did not say that the Ultimate Truth ensconced truth tence which

abolished.

is

known by

is

To

the world-ensconced truth

the Ultimate Truth of emptiness tical" truth

is

when

the world-

is

affirmed.^ ^

is

realized only

One might

when

say that "prac-

Ultimate Truth applied to daily living. For instance, nirvana

known through

practical truth

Ultimate Truth, nirvana sire" are

exists

the contrary, he maintained that exis-

is

cessation of desire, while

nothing in

is

itself, just as

known through

"cessation" and "de-

nothing in themselves. Professor Robinson has expressed the re-

lationship of the

two truths

way:

in the following

Worldly, conventional or expressional truth means language and verbal thought.

The

absolute truth

said to be inexpressible

is

and inconceivable. Yet realization

of this fact depends on comprehension of expressional truth. All the doctrines

taught by the Buddha are compatible with emptiness; that

is,

emptiness describes

every term in the system of expressional truths.^^

In asserting that both truths participate in the emptiness of

we must not underestimate

the difiference between them.

The

all

things,

distinction

between conventional truth (world-ensconced truth) and highest truth in Indian thought

^^ in

to point to the

two

general (non-Buddhist as well as Buddhist) intended

poles of (1) truth or clear perception,

rance or mistake. In conventional truth

and the identical

difficulty

is

with phenomenal, for

condition, and xxiv.

14.

(3)

we

that

are

we

prone to posit some kind of intrinsic value

implied a thing which

it

and (2) igno-

perceive only an appearance,

is

dependent, or subject to cause and

referred to signs or words current in the world, based on direct perception.

When

does not "work," then

emptiness all

"works," then

everything

in

existence

"works."

If

emptiness

existence does not "work."

^^ Robinson, MSFC, p. 71; For an analysis of the discussion in Mahdprajndpdramita-§dstra regarding the kind of knowledge available in pra]nd see V. K. Ramanan, Ndgdrjuna's Philosophy as Presented in the Mahd-Prajndpdramitd-Sdstra, chs. v-vii.

^*

K. N. Jayatilleke

"Logic and Truth," of

discusses

the relation

EBTK. He

of

the

two kinds of knowledge

traces this notion in the Pali suftas

plementary non-Buddhist expressions. See

esp. pp.

in

chapter VII,

and in relation to com-

361-68.

9i

'

\

Emptiness;

A

Study in Religious Meaning

to this appearance.

To

correct this illusion, a "higher vision"

must be

gained which can correct the apparent truth.

At

best, the

mundane truth had only

limited soteriological

eflFect;

it

was an indirect expression of truth. If thoughts of mundane "realities" were not imbued with an awareness of their emptiness, they perverted the truth and posited

a self -existence in the objects of sense or imagination. It

is

this

attachment to "things," towards which the mundane truth was prone, that

The mundane truth had value movement away from attachment to any

the truth of emptiness attempted to dispel. insofar as

inaugurated the

it

specific object,

which

it

might do, for instance, in distinguishing between

nirvana and avidya (ignorance), or in dissolving apparent entities into

was done in the abhidharma thought. Yet, it was only the ultimate understanding of truth which totally dissolved the their elements

(dharmas),

attachment to objects of

'

as

desire.

Wisdom reveals the Ultimate Truth; but according mundane truth which in a different context hides

—

/

\

How

is

uses

the Ultimate Truth.

this possible?

it is

truth."

rejected in the sense that

The

and

it is

transformed into "no

self -existent

things of the apparent world are not destroyed, but they are re-

evaluated in such a

way

that they no longer have the

power emotionally

human life. Thus, discursive thought is used human experience whereby a person perceived

intellectually to control

to analyze the factors of

"things '

it

According to Nagarjuna, the Ultimate Truth both nethe mundane truth at the same time. Mundane fruition to brings gates and truth is not rejected in the sense that it is replaced by another "truth," but

1

to Nagarjuna,

as

they really are." Such an analysis, which probes the deep mean-

ing of what most people take for granted, literature and-the

sight

Mahdydna commentaries.

is

found

Abhidharma wisdom has in-

in the

It indicates that

which conventional truth based on hasty interpretations of apparent

reality does not have.

We

should not forget that the Mahdydna schools, in-

cluding the Madhyamika, accepted the discursive expositions found in the

commentaries 1':

'

{sdstras, vrttis).

through the use of a without admitting

Wisdom was

critical dialectic,

its

i.e.,

expressed in the Kdrikds,

also,

the negation of every assertion

opposite.

The immediate followers of Nagarjuna's understanding wrestled with the role of reason in attaining wisdom. There were two groups who called themselves

Madhyamika who had

different interpretations of the exact

function of reason: the Svdtantrikas and the Prdsangikas. represented

96

by Bhavaviveka, recognized

The

Svdtantrikas,

the intention of their opponents*

Visdom

arguments and tried to show by proper

logical

(Prajna)

procedure that the op-

ponents' arguments were wrong. They, however, did not establish an

al-

ternate system of metaphysics since they did not accept the condition that in refuting one

view they must aflErm the contrary. The

applied only to conventional truth and in

Truth. ^"^

It

no way could

logical procedure

"establish" absolute

only denied the assertions of the metaphysicians by accepting

the rules of logic.

That Nagarjuna accepted the

rules of logic to defeat his

opponents in the Madhyamakakdrikds and the Vigraba-vydvartani

The

evident.

tetralemma, for instance,

Nagarjuna does not use

from the

use of words.

opponent

is

is

a

major element in

life

which

The one

reality,

The value of accepting

is

of meaning

a

to failure. Logical

a selective process,

and

means for deny-

the logical criterion of the

an absolute

as

discursive jhoiight.

norm

for truth of

and discursive thought prevents

able "to express the totality of existence, orj:he total is

meaning or

principles.

this selectivity

existence. This principle of selectivity

the

Further,

not something of absolute value.

is

hold logical relationships

doomed

is

own

his

use of logic, however, in itself

he

is

analysis.

that he can be refuted in terms of his principles of

tries to

quite

based on the improper inferences

is

he must be judged inconsistent with

is

alternative of

his

logic to destroy logic.^^ Logic

ing an understanding of

If

deny each

use of logical inference to

human

It

as a process

from being

experience of

both the strength and weakness of

On the one hand, It permits meaningful

communication;

o n the^other, it li mits the awareness according to habits of apprehension. It is the limiting character of thought which the other Madhyamlka group, the Prdsangikas emphasized. Therefore, such a representative of this

group

standing this

as

as

CandrakirtI did not recognize the logician's order of under-

having any validity

at all

when

referring to Ultimate Truth. For

group, Nagarjuna's critical dialectic served to reduce the logical pro-

cedure to absurdity

when

it

attempted to express Ultimate Truth. They

held that the mystical intuition was the only

mate Reality. This need not be interpreted cation" with the Absolute, since in radical bifurcation of the

absolute.

way

of apprehending Ulti-

In a Vedantic sense of "unifi-

Madhyamlka thought

two planes of

reality: the

there was

phenomenal and the

Taking the expressions of the two groups of Madhyamlka

^* See Y. Kajiyama, "Bhavaviveka Mahavihara Research Publication, ed.

no

fol-

Prasangika School," found in The Nava-NalandaMookerjee (Nalanda: Navanalandamahavihara, 1957), I,

and S.

289-331. ^^ See

R. Robinson, "Some Logical Aspects of Nagarjuna's System," Philosophy East and West,

VI, No. 4

(January,

1957), 307.

97

\

A

Emptiness:

lowers

Study in Religious Meaning

as guides, it

is

clear that the apprehension of emptiness involved

mental comprehension, but not the ordinary comprehension which

dis-

tinguished one thing to the exclusion of other things. k

/'

(wisdom), which permitted one "to

Prajiid

are,"

was

significant

from

a religious point of

see things

what one knew. In summary we would say that the ness of

all

as

they really

view since one "became" insight into the empti-

things destroyed illusion; for this illusion was created

by

positing

on "things" distinguished by perception or imagination. "Wisdom was not itself an ultimate view, nor was it an assertion about an absolute being. "Wisdom was the practice (carya) of dissolving the grasping-after-hoped-for-ultimates either in the phenomenal world or the realm

self-existence

of ideas.

98

To know

"emptiness" was to realize emptiness.

Part

III

STRUCTURES of RELIGIOUS APPREHENSION in INDIAN THOUGHT

7 THE MYTHICAL STRUCTURE From

the discussion in the previous chapters

we have

seen

how

Nagarjuna's

use of "emptiness" redefined the problem of realizing the truth within

Buddhist doctrine. The next three chapters are devoted to examining the process of symbolizing religious truth, chapter 9 dealing with the struc-

ture of religious apprehension reflected in Nagarjuna's use of "emptiness."

By comparing ligious milieu,

his use of

we hope

in the Indian re-

words with other expressions

to focus

on the significance of

his particular

con-

tribution to the Indian religious tradition.

The Problem of Apprehending Our concern with

knowing

religious truth. It

with which Rudolf Otto wrestled in

problem

how

his

from

the kind of problem

book The Idea of the Holy. The

to express the Inexpressible, or, in Professor Otto's terms:

God. His answer is that there is an a priori is the same in all religi ous experiences, factor requires that both the object of experience {mysterium

experience which ul timately

a priori

tremenduTn

et fascinans)

and an emotional-rational apprehension

a sui generis character called "religious."

known by

ly

is

to conceive the nature of

human This

is

Truth

structures of religious apprehension emerges

the general problem of

How

Religious

"ideograms,"

i.e.,

For him, the object

is

possess

conceptual-

concepts or symbols taken from the

"natural sphere" of experience which illustrate, without exhaustive ren-

meaning of the "wholly other." ^ The true religious knowlis intuitive and of a different order than the knowledge obtainable from the use of specific symbols. This way of knowing is based on an ontological commitment to two spheres of reality: the "natural sphere" and the "wholly other," the latter being both transcendent to and immanent in the former. dering, the

edge, however,

^

Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy,

p. 26.

101

i

Emptiness:

"

A

Study in Religious Meaning

Professor Otto makes

explanation of ( 1 )

two epistemological assumptions in giving his beings apprehend and express the Ineffable:

how human

Words which

pertain to the nature of reality have some sort of absolute

entity as their referent, and (2) the conceptual symbols which express a religious vision represent a secondary order of

structure of religious apprehension, which

apprehending the characterized

is

by

a priori

a

feeling

of mystery before the uncanny, and of fear before the awe-ful.

1

This interpretation seems to be particularly applicable to some religious

I

expressions while

it

hardly provides an adequate means for explaining

the basis of meaning in others.

i

we

I

suggest,

do not

result

The

differences in religious apprehension,

simply from choosing certain "ideograms,"

metaphors or analogies, in preference to others;

it is

i.e.,

way words

rather the

^function in expressing religious truth which determines more important j

[

differences than the choice of terms.

The

various ways in which words are

used are themselves indicative of differences in religious apprehension, for

norm

they provide an effective

for the meaning which

verbal expression. In an expression this internal

truth

reflects a certain

norm

is

available in a

for

meaning and

"structure of religious apprehension" which can be

described and compared with other epistemological structures.

The

process of symbolization includes physiological, subconscious, and

"mental" factors (e.g., rational thought, image formation, and imagination). A full discussion of the symboliza-

social determinatives as well as

would involve

tion process (

a

lengthy analysis of the roles played by non-

linguistic elements. In this study,

however, we will limit the meaning of

the term "symbolization process" to the conscious articulation of religious

truth

as it

Our

is

purpose

"a warrior" to 1

God

recorded in existing texts.

is

is

a

beyond an observation that to speak of God as metaphorical use of the term, or that every term referring is

to go

only an analogy to

symbol can be regarded or

why

human

life.

We

concepts related to one another in a

iaflSrmations concerning

why a men and not by others, specific way reflect particular are trying to analyze

meaningful by some

as

Ultimate Reality. Likewise, our attempt to

tinguish different processes of symbol formation

from defining grammatical relationship

must be

dis-

differentiated

rules if the latter are regarded as the

mechanical

between concepts. Linguistic conventions of grammar are in-

deed important forces in constructing conceptual meaning; however, the "logic of symbolic formulation"

grammatical rules in that

it

which we

will discuss

different

from

provides the context of conceptual experience

for the individual's use of grammatical rules. Thus, 102

is

two

individuals could

The Mythical Structure hear a grammatically correct statement and gain quite different meanings

from

because each presupposed a diflFerent process ("logic")

it

by which

the concepts are related.

When the

analyzing the symbolization process

number of

times a term

is

we

not simply note

will

of literature with a particular symbolization process. It general survey of early articulation within a

body from a

used, nor identify every expression in a

Hindu thought Is

clear

that there are different

body of writings such

Upanisads. Because symbolization

is

as the

ways of

Vedic hymns or the

a learned process, different processes

can be used unwittingly by the same person. While this fact makes the task of understanding religious speech agility of the

more complex.

In selecting religious expressions for study, tative

number from

examples

also suggests the

It

human mind. only a represen-

will use

various types of expression in the Indian milieu.

taken

are

we

from Vedic hymns, the Brdhmanas,

Our

Upanisads,

Bhagavad-gitd, and Buddhist philosophical thought with the Intention of pointing out

how

differences in religious views correlate

with particular

kinds of symbohzatlon processes. This Is not to suggest that these are the only ways of symbolizing religious truth. "We do intend to indicate that there

is

more than one such

process,

and that Nagarjuna's use of the term

"emptiness" cannot be reduced either to a mythical or intuitive structure of religious expression.

Two Since share

all

Characteristics of the Indian Religious Milieu

our examples were used in the Indian religious context, they

common

general characteristics.

One

of the most important

is

that

knowledge was considered to be valuable Insofar as it transformed life. The religious seer had become Ultimate Truth and therefore possessed transhuman power. Knowledge was not valued In Itself as an abstract understanding of existence;

it

was sought for

its

power

to transform chaos to

order or bondage into freedom.

This fact did not prevent the truth-seekers from constructing elaborate

and subtly argued metaphysical systems harina literature). Indeed, one's

own

It

(as seen in the

Buddhist Abhid-

gave an urgency to the effort of knowing

nature and/or the nature of reality. However, often the "in-

tuitive" structure of religious apprehension prevailed, in

which no value

was placed on concepts or particular symbols for knowing the truth. At the base of the argumentation was the awareness that Ultimate Truth 703

A

Emptiness:

Study

Meaning

in Religious

could not be expressed in words but could be realized within the person.

Knowledge meant

dramatic change in the individual

a

longed to this world; the true (real) "dead."

Professor

Eliade

states

man

replaced the

who no longer beman who was now

importance of such

the

metaphysical

knowledge in the following way: [Metaphysical knowledge]

necessarily

nature: rebirth to a nonconditional

mode

implies

of being.

consequence of

a

And

this

is

a

mystical

ilberation, absolute

freedom.^

Rehgious truth, then, was

a

means of transformation; and the philosopher's (i.e., apparent) world in

apprehension involved a rejection of the natural

order to participate in the unconditioned dimension of reality.

Each of the three structures of apprehension which we shall discuss also participates in the religious activity which Maryla Falk has suggested is

the "peculiar apex-form of conscious experience" of Indian religious

thought. This

is

the process of transforming reality through the transfor-

mation of consciousness. She describes the nature of

this process in the

following way: [Its

nature

is]

the experience of cosmic consciousness of

self,

equating the

psyche with the reality of the cosmos, and, in the speculative

reality of the

issues,

investing the latter with the constituent laws of the former.^

Interestingly, this kind of soteriological process can either

words and thought

ficacy of

as valid

deny the

ef-

revelatory mechanisms, or emphasize

the efficacy of special words and phrases for establishing the "real" be-

The epitome of where the word {vac)

cause they participate in the very essence of that reality. the latter

expressed in the Brahmanical tradition,

is

has the power to create. Professor

way

one

in

which the word

Vac and Brahman, word

naming

The

J.

it

A. B. van Buitenen describes

a creative force

is

when he

at least

writes:

seems, both stand for the powerful and powerfully creative

that creates a thing in

tinguishing

of

it

J.

its

from the common

individuality

stuflF it is

made

by pointing of.

it

out and thus

He who names

uses the

dis-

power

to create.**

fact that religious

*

Eliade, Yoga,

*

Falk, p.

knowledge

Immortality and Freedom,

is

p.

more than "mere words," then, can 4.

V.

* Ramdnuja's Veddrthasamgraha, Introduction, critical edition and annotated translation by A. B. van Buitenen (Poona: Deccan College Postgraduate and Research Institute, 1956), p. 12.

104

The Mythical Structure be manifested either in a rejection of the use of words in favor of intuition or in the particular use of words for manifesting the reaHty

itself.

Three Structures of Religious Apprehension In articulating "the real," religious expression operates within a frame-

work of thought which Each moves within sion;

and

a

this consciousness

through which the truth in

has one of several epistemological orientations.

kind of consciousness,

which words

is

is

i.e.,

a structure of

apprehen-

informed by an internal norm of meaning and verified. By analyzing the way

articulated

we hope

are used in a structure of apprehension

to indicate

that the nature of religious language permits a variety of processes or structures for

knowing (and becoming)

insight into elements

reality. Such an analysis will provide forming the context of religious apprehension in

which, and over against which, Nagarjuna uses the term "emptiness" to In using this term together with his critical

express ultimate reality.

Nagarjuna expresses a religious vision which must be distinguished from the "intuition of Ultimate Reality" that denies the phenomenal world

dialectic,

as real,

and from the notion that there

to take material

Each of the three cuss requires

its

to reveal truth. tal,

Ultimate Reality which

is

is

activated

forms by the creative force of sacred words or sounds.

we way words

different structures of apprehension that

own norm The

of meaning based on the

three are termed:

(1) "mythical"

magical), (2) "intuitive," and (3) "dialectical."

(i.e.,

will dis-

are used

sacramen-

Our concern with

these structures will not be to give an exhaustive analysis of each, but to

indicate

two elements

are (1) the implicit

available to each structure. These

norm

two elements

of meaning involved in the use of words, and

(2) the process or "logic" of language through is

which help deter-

in the process of symbolization

mine the kind of meaning

which

a

meaning-complex

formed. In the "mythical" form of apprehension particular (sacred)

words, phrases, or stories themselves are the creative powers of "the real"

which can be known in

existence.

The words

whereby the mundane and profane world ture of being which

is

is

are part of a ritual activity

sacralized,

i.e.,

given a struc-

based on an eternal archetype. Both the intuitive and

mythical structures of apprehension use words in a descriptive way, for they presume that there

is

a referent

having

static ultimate ontological

status as a correlate to the descriptive term. In the "intuitive" structure

of apprehension, however, words are used simply

as analogies

which lOi

refer

Emptiness:

A

Study in Religious Meaning

from them. The "real" phenomena, which requires

to something intrinsically different

is

apprehended

as the totality

a

mode

of

all

particular

of ap-

prehension different from mental apprehension. In the third structure of

by Nagarjuna's

apprehension,

exemplified

context of his

critical dialectic, neither the totality

nomena nor to show how

use

"emptiness"

of

of

all

in

the

individual phe-

We hope combines certain elements of the "intentional"

particular forms are the object of apprehension. this expression

and "mythical" apprehension, while making

a radical shift in the use of

words by denying the implicit theory of meaning which requires an extra-lingual referent of a

The The

first

the implicit

word for meaning.

Implicit

Norm

of

Meaning

we will discuss is The norm of meaning found in the struc-

element of the symbolizing process which

norm

of meaning.

tures of apprehension in this

and the next chapter might be called a "re-

I

l

I

lational

norm

ment

derived from

is

system.

The

of meaning." Here the practical meaning of a its

fact that the mythical

and

which a person

the affirmation of

its

state-

intuitive expressions attempt to

say something about ultimate reality as an absolute reality against

word or

relationship with a referent outside the language

defines himself

and

all

transforming power.

—

existence

By

—an

entity over

the very basis of

is

using the verbal symbols

images, representations, and substitutes for that which

is not a symbol meaning of the symbols is possible through their relation to that extra-lingual reality. Within these symIbolizing processes is the implicit judgment that the "real," or the "true," has its ontological status outside the symbol used to articulate it, and

as

(i.e.,

the Ultimate Reality itself), the

,

therefore the corollary a

on the "real" In a

to

is

that symbols have only a derivative reality based

which they

refer.^

relational norm of meaning, words and phrases have meaning by

presupposing something to which these utterances refer. While this point

—because many people today and throughout on grounds words have claimed meaning dynamics which provide of Ultimate Being— they may

appear

the ages

trivial

it

"

This, for instance,

is

part

does

control the symbolization process of

sion and the reality to

the

in religious discourse

for

refer to

much

that

the

religious discourse. It

becomes

R. Otto's presupposition in discussing the relationship of verbal expresit refers, for the "ideogram" is an analogical notion, a mode of

which

"rationalizing" a precedent experience. {The Idea of the Holy, p. 26.) This presupposition influences

Otto's interpretation of "emptiness" in Buddhism. See ibid., p. 30.

106

The Mythical Structure crucial to call attention to this element in dealing with a religious expression such as "emptiness," since

term with such

this

lows

him

norm

a

the freedom

Nagarjuna

from

the relational

function of words

norm

emotionally

as

reality.

meaning

of

establishes

the primary

that

becomes the primary problem; for

the mysterious and awesome,

usage of everyday speech.

The

\

How

is

this "reality,"

beyond the normal the ontological ground of existence to

,,

who

\\

is

be realized in the existential, limited, conceptual framework of those use language?

]

to denote something, the relation of the expression

is

to the inexpressible "real"

known

al-

the ontological implications connected with|i

assuming a "real" behind symbolic

Once

explicitly denies that he uses

of meaning. Nagarjuna's use of language

solution to this problem has taken (at least)

ferent forms in Indian thought, each of which,

we

suggest.

Is

two

I

dif-

coincidental

with a type of symbolization process. In the practical solution for relating

two regulatory processes or "logics" has operated The two kinds of symbol-combination processes are

the symbol to reality one of to express the reality.

mutual exclusion" and "logic of conver-

called in this study the "logic of

gence," each applying to one structure of religious apprehension:

former to the "mythical" and the will be the object of

Words

as

latter to the "intuitive" one.

study for the remainder of

the

The former

this chapter.

Paradigms in the ''Logic of Mutual Exclusion"

In the mythical structure of apprehension words are the tools for realizing Ultimate Reality. Certa in

words

are reg arded,^ s paradig ms or

symbols whose very form and/or nature reveals the basic structure of existence. Because certain

mately

real,

words have the power to bring forth the

they are regarded

as

ulti-

having exclusive Intrinsic value over

against other words. Thus, in this context, religious validity depends

on

the recognition that these particular words have an exclusive function in revealing Ultimate Truth.

The words themselves

an Inherent relation to divine This

way

Ellade in

reality,

are regarded as

having

and thereby become "hierophanles."

of symbolizing religious reality has been described by Mircea

Cosmos and History.^ The two main

features of this structure

trans. W. Trask (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959). See Comparative Religion, pp. 12-18, 417-56; and Eliade, Images and Symbols, trans. Philip Mairet (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1961), pp. 119-21. Prnf. Eliade's discussion of symbols includes material and ritual symbols as well as conceptual symbols; however, this does not significantly change the "logic" of meaning based on an archetypal schema. '

Eliade,

Cosmos and History,

also Eliade, 'Patterns in

107

I

— A

Emptiness:

Study

in Religious

Meaning

(1) the symbol itself structures or Ultimate Reality in existence, the and that (2) while gaining its forms

of religious apprehension are that

creative force through bridging the levels of the "sacred"

fane"

by an

does so

it

reproducing a

celestial

The paradigmatic

I

and the "pro-

exclusive use of a particular symbol,

through

use of words presupposes that there are

two

levels of

and human. The divine (or Ultimate) Reality is that reality which provides the basis or pattern for whatever reality there is in human existence. Thus, the paradigmatic use gains its meaning in part reality: the divine

I

by referring

»

lation

j

beyond

to a reality

itself.

between the symbol and the

from that found

ferent

'

However, the nature of the reis for the paradigm quite dif-

reality

we will see in the analysis of The paradigm itself participates in

in the analogy, as

the intuitive structure of apprehension.

the true or real structure of existence, so that the verbal

symbol expresses (or even emits) the .

"power of being"

^!l an ultimate structure, for those (

by

its

in-

by its form. By structuring the mass of potential reality, "name" establishes existential reality, since it is the imitation

of the ultimate structure (or activity) of

i

(or material)

either

trinsic nature or

the symbol or

\

e.g.,

archetype or repeating the acts of the gods.

who

life.

Because the symbol possesses

becomes the unique bearer of ultimate

it

use the symbol. Inherent in the

symbol

from the "profane." The

distinguishing the "holy"

is

the

reality

mechanism for

linguistic character of

li^this mechanism we have called the "logic of mutual exclusion."

The Mythical Structure of

Religious Apprehension in

the Brahmanic Sacrifice

One

of the most dramatic uses of the mythical structure of religious

apprehension

ample of

this

clusion"

is

is is

found found

in the

meaning-context of the

in the

sacrifice.

presupposed, and symbols serve as paradigms

existential reality.

Within

A

good ex-

Brahmanas, where the "logic of mutual ex-

the sacrificial

mode

for creating

of religious thinking three

items give evidence of the logic of mutual exclusion and the use of a

paradigmatic symbol: (1) reality

is

produced

in

human

existence through

the repetition of previous divine action; (2) the physical appointments

the ground, altars,

fire,

sacrificial

fuel

—

"real" in distinction to "non-real"; and

plus the time involved are the

(3)

the priests, in their

oflScIal

capacity, are the liaison between one world and the other, while their very t,

words or sounds are

The Brahmanas 108

vitalized

by

a creative quality not

represent an elaborate

form of

found elsewhere.

priestly thinking.

The

The Mythical Structure

mutual exclusion"

"logic of

when

evident in Satapatha-Brdhmana

is

vow

the rationale for entering into a

of the sacrifice

is

1.

I.

1.

4-6

based on the

absolute difference between the "holy" and the "profane":

Twofold,

4.

verily,

enter 5.

there

is this,

the gods are the truth, and

man

no

is

is

from untruth into truth," he

third, viz., truth

passes

from

the

men

Let him [the sacrificer] then only speak what

And

and untruth.

the untruth. Therefore in saying

...

now

to the gods.

vow

true; for this

is

verily

"I

indeed

the gods do keep, that they speak the truth; and for this reason they are glorious: therefore 6.

he who, knowing

is

upon the vow, he becomes,

In entering

now

in fact, he

himself (of the

The

as it

were, non-human;

[after the sacrifice] again becomes

vow) with

"Now

the text:

between the

difference

of events

speaks the truth.

this,

am

I

he

man,

who

sacrificial activity

let

him

I really

.

am."

and

as,

and the everyday sequence

that sacrifices are imitations of an original divine act. This

is

Satapatha-Brdhmana regarded

.

'^

explicitly stated in the explanation of the full-moon sacrifice

is

.

therefore divest

as a

6. 4.

I.

found

is

in

12 and 13 where the sacrificial performance

re-enactment of the demon Vrtra's slaughter by the god

Indra. 12.

The full-moon

means of

oblations,

assuredly,

Indra slew Vritra; and this

it

belong to the Vritra-slayer, for by

new-moon

oblation also represents the

slaying of Vritra, since they prepared that invigorating draught for

him who had

slain Vritra.

13.

An

offering in

Vritra, assuredly,

moon) he

is

honour of the Vritra-slayer, then,

the full-moon sacrifice.

not seen either in the east or in the west, then he (Indra) completely

is

(new moon

destroys

him by means of

that

of him.

And,

who knows

remaining of

verily, he

this,

sacrifice),

and leaves nothing remaining

overcomes

all

evil

and leaves nothing

evil.^

Another instance showing where the

is

no other than the moon; and when during that night (of new

sacrifice

is

a

this

is

found

in

Satapatha-Brdhmana VII.

re-enactment of the

sacrifice

5. 2.

5

of animals done by

the creator of the world, Prajapati: 5.

Now

indeed,

the same thing which the gods did

want

to

is

done

here.

The animals do

run away from him [the priest]; but when he does

not,

this, it

is

priest as

he

because he wants to do what the gods did.^ ^Eggeling, SBE, XII. 4. ^ Ibid., p. ^

Ibid.,

180.

XLI. 401. This Bralimanic explanation refers to the action of the advaryu

grasps the head of the sacrificial animal.

109

Emptiness;

A

Study in Religious Meaning

The re-enactment of a divine pattern was important as the point in time and space where two distinct realms, the sacred and profane, met. Every was held there was a hierophany. On an ontological meant that existence was being constructed in an otherwise meaningless, chaotic realm. The myth and ritual represented the infusion of structure, i.e., order and meaning, which is real because it originated in time that

a sacrifice

level, this

an unconditional plane, the sacrifice

1.

Now,

—can become

at

the

—

himself

real

beginning,

mortal and the immortal

SatapatJoa-Brahmana X.

illud tempore.

man

explicitly indicates that

—

4.

1.

1

paying for

in this case the person

Hke the gods by imitating them: was

Pragapati

(composed of)

both

the

these,

alone were immortal, his body mortal:

his vital airs

by this sacrificial performance, and by this order of proceeding, he makes his body uniformly undecaying and immortal. And in like manner is the sacrificer (composed of) both the mortal and the immortal mortal, his body mortal:

by

this

sacrificial

—

im-

his vital airs alone are

performance, and by

this

order of

proceeding, he makes his body uniformly undecaying and immortal. ^°

The above quotation not only existence the lasting reality

perience, but also indicates the

plane of existence. This reality in the

is

not found in

is

manner by which

sacrificial activity.

immediate present

and therefore students of

indicates the importance of bringing into

which

is

common reality

everyday ex-

comes into the

This fact of constructing

something that

is

often taken for granted,

religious life fail to see its significance as evidence

The

of a particular kind of articulation concerning the absolute reality.

one evidence that a

action, the construction, the doing-something,

is

break exists between reality and only apparent

reality.

recting this absence of reality, which

thinking,

ligious

indicates

radically different

that

from what

is

what

follows.

The

one of the major attitudes of reexists

The

before

the

heirophany

so if

man wants

is

structure of religious appre-

hension involved here requires that real and nonreal are radically to be possessed of the qualities of reality, he

thing or have something done for

real

desire for cor-

him which

diflferent;

must do some-

will reverse the existing

process.

The

action which accomplishes "the reversal" in the Brahnianas

course, the sacrifice

performed by the

priests.

The

sacrifice, indeed, at

Is,

of

times

appears to have autonomous power in distinction to any power given from a transcendental plane. "^Ubid., XLIII. 292.

110

After

all,

it

was the performance of the

sacrifice

.

The Mythical Structure

by Prajapati which gave him his immortaHty. Thus, while the sacrifices by the gods, the gods are not considered to

are repetitions of the actions

be self-sufficient beings

who bestow

favors "at will"; they use the means

of the sacrifice to become real themselves. This important force within the sacrifice

seen in an apology for the performance of the Agnihotra. In

is

Satapaiha-Brabmana 18.

By

this

world,

it

Vayu

read:

those gods were produced in the

offering,

reproduced, by

we

18

11. 2. 4.

way

in

which they were

they gained that victory which they did gain: Agni conquered the

And

and Surya the sky.

air,

the Agnihotra, he, indeed,

whosoever, knowing

this, offers

produced in the same way in which they were

is

then produced, he gains the same victory which they then gained; the same world with them, whosoever,

knowing

this, offers

—

indeed, he shares

the Agnihotra. There-

fore the Agnihotra should certainly be performed. ^^

The importance of

action

sacrificial

is

highlighted in the prominent

equation of Prajapati's creation of the world with the

sacrificial creation.

In creating the world, Prajapati became exhausted; his depleted.

Through

sacrifice (agni)

3 5.

6.

I.

3.

3

is

dependent on the

Now

Pragapati, doubtless,

of day and night

(i.e.,

sacrificial action.

5-37 Informs us:

After Pragapati had created the living beings,

relaxed.

being was

he was restored, and thus the preserva-

tion (continual creation) of the world

Satapatha-Brdhmana

own

is

his

joints

(parvan)

the year, and his joints are the

the twilights), the full

were

two junctions

moon and new moon, and

the

beginnings of the seasons. 36.

He was

by means of joint

unable to

rise

with

(which

consists of) the

his relaxed joints;

two junctions of day and

by means of the full-moon and the new-moon (which

consists of)

of the (three)

new moon,

the full and

Caturmasyas

.

.

.

and the gods healed him

by means of the Agnihotra they healed

these ha vis-offerings:

that

night, joined that together;

sacrifice

they healed that joint

joined that together; and

by means

they healed that joint (which consists of the

beginnings of the seasons, joined that together) 37.

which

With is

his joints thus repaired

here

(offered)

he betook himself to this food,

to Pragapati;

the fast at the very time (of full

and he who, knowing

moon),

—

this,

to the food

enters

time, and Pragapati favours him.^^ "Z^/i., XII. ^'Ibid., p.

upon

heals Pragapati's joints at the proper

327.

173.

Ill

A

Emptiness:

Study in Religious Meaning

This same emphasis in sacrificial construction can be found Agnichayana sacrifice, Satapatha-Brdhmana VI. 1. 2. 12 and

The

action of the sacrifice

and constructive because

beneficial

is

"the holy," the "absolutely other," the real activity, the

ficial

holy

ground on which the to the gods brings

manifested;

is

and

priests

itself.

In the

moment

walk

is

them into physical proximity. One of the

Satapatha-Brdhmana IX. And,

62.

with

all

The

passages deis

found

62:

1.

5.

is

holy ground; the appeal

claring in ontological terms the quality-change in the sacrificer in

it

of sacri-

gives structure to chaos.

it

sacrificer

also in the

13.^^

who carries about Agni becomes pregnant and he who builds him when he has not been

indeed, he [the sacrificer]

beings,

and with

gods;

all

carried about for a year kills

beings in the

all

In Satapatha-Brdhmana X.

3-5 there

3.

1.

form of an embryo.^^

an identification between the

is

bricks and mortar of the fire altar and Prajapati, the creator of

all

living

beings: 3.

The Gods gathered him

him which was (they gathered) a brick, 4.

whence

as clay.

And, indeed,

5.

—

and what those

these five forms

is

air,

is

must have within

that Pragapati

which became relaxed 3.

is

Now,

And when

built;

Pragapati

and those

^* See also

woman in "SBE,

I.

1.

XLIII.

'' Ibid., p.

112

are mortal

—

the hair

Fire-altar

which

is

here built up,

are these layers of bricks. ^^

it

the elements of the cosmos as well as the

290.

7.

272.

sacrifice

who became

1. is

2

1.

relaxed

who became

relaxed

1.

8.

2

and

3

the relation of the

the year; and those joints of

is

and nights.

joints of his, the days

and

expressed in the following terms:

are the days

tatapatha-Brdhmana XT. 8.

him

the point of contact between profane and sacred

cosmos to Prajapati through 2.

of

the eye, and the ear.

"eternal." In Satapatha-Brdhmana X.

his

made

mortal parts there were of him, they are the layers of earth; and

five

it

clay and water, they

this,

and the marrow; and these are im-

no other than the

which were immortal they

Since the sacrifice time,

(bodily parts)

skin, the flesh, the bone,

that Pragapati

(earth): that part of

both clay and water.

the mind, the voice, the vital

Now,

this

and that which was in

Having gathered together both

a brick consists of

on the mouth, the mortal

from out of

[Prajapati]

in the water, they gathered as water,

is

this

very Fire-altar which here

and nights, which became relaxed are 3;

and the description of Manu's creation of

The Mythical Structure

no other than the bricks; altar)

—

thus,

had become relaxed: and thus

Yagus

We

when he

down

lays

he thereby restores to him those joints of

,

up and secured

built

is

it is

even in

these

(in the layers o£ the

(building of the altar)

this

which

the days and nights,

his,

that this

(for Pragapati).^^

imagery of the "navel of the world" in the

also find the archaic

sacrifice as the indication that the physical locus of the sacrifice

point of contact with divine reality. In Satapatha-Brahmana instruction

"with the text

means the

place thee' for the navel

.

centre,

*on the navel of the earth

.

.

and the centre

danger: for this reason he says, 'On the navel of the earth

This distinction of the place at which the gods contact in

22 the

given for the advaryu priest to place the rice used in the

is

sacrifice in a particular place I

1. 2.

I.

the

is

Satapatha-Brahmana

1.

I.

1.

which

11

I

safe

is

from

place thee.' "

man

is

^'

noted also

suggests, besides, that there

is

"boundary" around the human time Into which the gods move. The

a

In-

struction concerning the proper action of the sacrificer on the eve of the

performance of the 11. Let

him

sacrifice declares:

that night in the house of the Ahavaniya

sleep

house of the Garhapatya

and he

sleeps in the

fire.

For he

on the ground; for from below,

The

logic of

who

as it

on the vow

enters

midst of those very gods

whom

fire

the

or in

approaches the gods;

he approaches. Let him sleep

were, one serves one's superior. ^^

mutual exclusion operates

in designating the radical dis-

tinction between the sacred and profane, emphasizing the exclusive claim

that specific symbols and acts have creative power. Beside the sacrificial act

and the physical elements, the

hymns and

sacred

innate spiritual power. divine spheres.

priest

and the words of the

explanations which are heard) are regarded

The

The

priest

the mediator between the

is

divine quality of the priest

Satapatha-Brahmana

I. 2.

4. 3; also

is

Eggeling brings

new-moon sacrifice. He who will superintend

sruti as

(the

having

human and

noted, for instance, in this

out in his descrip-

writes that after the sacrificer has

tion of the

chosen the Brahmin

the ceremony, the

Brahmin

answers: I

am

the lord of the earth,

(mahabhuta)

Brahman,

!

earth! ether!

I

lord of the world,

heaven!

their lord of prayer

O

God

(Brihaspati)

I

lord of the great universe

Savitri, thee

they choose for their

^^ !

^^Ibid., p. 281. ^''

Ibid.,

sacrificial

XII.

18-19.

Also

see

Satapatha-Brahmana VI.

6.

3.

9

for

another reference

place as "the navel."

"^Ibid., p.

6.

^' Ibid.

113

to

the

Emptiness:

The

A

Study

Meaning

in Religious

particular words themselves

which

have a

are used in the sacrifice

creative power. Thus there follows in the above description a prayer to dispel the

powers of the rakshas, the

evil ones

who

are lurking about to

The

destruction through the misuse of sacrificial speech.

ejflfect

with which everything must be done

work

omission would

havoc.^" Indeed, every

in a

word. This attempt

have

a creative quality,

word

analysis to relate

it

the

and the number of

syllable,

seen in Satapatha-Brdhmana

is

bethought himself, "Verily,

whence they

of myself, to wit, the year; created

word uttered during

detail

syllables

is based on the understanding that certain words and the commentators use various techniques of the sacrificial activity with experienced life. The

extent to which they go

13. Pragapati

any

to,

and the Brdhmanas go into

sacrifice has ontological implications,-^

accounting for every word, every

precision

for

frequently attested

is

1. 6.

have created here

I

say,

Tragapati

inasmuch

to be a counterpart of himself

XL

well as Tragapati,' consists of four syllables, thereby

as it

a

13:

counterpart

the year';

is

'samvatsara (the year)

is

for he

(year),' a

as

counter-

part of him." 2^

We

might summarize the material discussed so far by giving general which typically use a logic of mutual exclusion. First, such expressions emphasize the distinction between the "holy" and the "profane." Secondly, this way of thinking is formulated through characteristics of the expressions

narrative;

it reflects

activity.

The

action of the sacrifice

divine action in a given sequence; there

Thirdly, there

who

act.

*° See

point

Hindu

is

is

correlated to

and an "after."

significant especially in recounting the origins

reality

Satapatha-Brdhmana XI.

In a modern

a "before"

the understanding of Reality in terms of divine beings

last

When

of the world.

*^

is

This

is

1.

is

6.

catechetical

seen through the mythical structure of ap35.

manual

intrinsic

this

power of holy words

is

forcefully

expressed:

The Mantra portion

[of the Vedas]

consists

of sounds has a particular power, produces to the Devas results

.

.

.

of Mantras, or sentences

certain

effects.

in

which the order

These are in the form of hymns

and when they are properly chanted by properly instructed persons, certain An Elementary Text Book of Hindu Religion and Ethics

{Sanatana Dharma:

follow.

[Benaras: Freeman and Co., 1904], p. 7.)

A

mantra

is

certain order;

a if

succession

of

sounds,

a

the sounds are changed

definite

sequence,

the vibrations

are

sounds being arranged in a changed, and the results will be

the

is why the mantra cannot be translated. (Ibid., p. 74.) the logic of mutual exclusion and the ontological implications of the paradigmatic use of symbols drawn to their farthest-reaching semantic conclusions, for here is the claim that certain vocables, set forth in a prescribed manner, possess intrinsically the holy, the real, in distinction

changed. That

Here

to

is

common

everj'day speech.

"Eggeling, SBE, XLIV. 14-H.

114

(

The Mythical prehension, there

The

is.

often a "creation

is

myth"

to account for existence as

Jl

it

—from the viewpoint

Reality in which the gods themselves subsist

of the intuitive structure of apprehension

The

Structui

—

!

not the focus of interest.

is

articulation begins with the attitude of the world's dependence

on

something which comes before

it, and the place to begin the religious speech is with the original point of contact between heaven and earth. Wherever there is the tendency to emphasize one or all of these characteristics, there,

we is

suggest, a logic of

mutual exclusion and

a paradigmatic use of symbols

in force.

Mythical Structure of Apprehension in the Vedic

Hymns

In the early Indian religious tradition the mythical structure of apprehension was not limited to the Brdhmanas.

It

found already

is

in the

Vedic hymns and prayers, and to a limited extent in the Upanisads and in the epics. In the Atharvaveda the

picted as the source of

being.

all

power of words and

The

ritual acts

de-

is

and imprecations

prayers, charms,

presuppose that evil forces actively engage in opposing good forces in the three-level cosmos. as

wel l

as create

Atharvaveda X.

The magical

^to 3.

curse as

use of

w ell^s

wo rds

bless.

means jo^ destroy The following charm found in is

a practical

1-3 expresses the importance of a prescribed activity to

repulse evil. 1.

This varana^^

my

(vrsan)

thy injurers (diirasy-)

amulet; with

oflf

foes

it

do

.

in front;

the hostile practice (abhydcdra) of the Asuras

to another.

This amulet, the varana, all-healing, thousand-eyed, yellow, golden

make thy

—

go downward; do thou, in front, damage them that hate

Also in Atharvaveda IV. is

rival-destroying, virile

foes, slaughter

by the varana warded

from one morrow 3.

[is]

Crush them, slaughter, take hold; be the amulet thy forerunner

the gods

6.

1-3 a

charm

it

shall

thee.^'*

against the harmful effect of poison

based on repeating divine events: 1.

The Brahman was born

first,

drank the soma; he made the poison ^'

A

species

I

|

(

/

//i/^ .1 cWi

thou take hold of thy 2.

I

with ten heads, with ten mouths; he

first

sapless.

of tree.

**

Atharva-veda Samhita, trans. "W. D. Whitney, revised and brought nearer to completion and edited by C. R. Lanman (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 190J), Part II, 572. Atharva-veda Samhita, trans. W. D. Whitney, published by the Harvard University Press; reprinted

by permission of the publishers.

115

A

Emptiness: 2.

As

Study in Religious Meaning

great as

heaven-and-earth by their width,

[are]

rivers spread out

[so far] have

(vi-stha),

I

as

much

the seven

as

spoken out from here these words

(vac), spoilers of poison. 3.

The winged {garumant)

eagle

consumed {av)

thee

not intoxicated (mad), thou hast not racked (rup)

first,

O

poison; thou hast

[him]; and thou becamest

drink for him.^^

The

charms and hymns addresses the object is an which is supposed to be intrinsic to the recitation In other words, here, at the time and place when the words are

fact that the reciter of the

indication of the potency itself.

voiced,

"the real";

is

The Rgveda,

it is a

creative force dispelling the evil forces.

sometimes expresses the nature of reality through a

also,

"mythical structure." The efficacy of the IX.

hymn

6-8. This

3.

used in the

sacrifice,

to

Soma

(the

and a deity)

sacrifice, for instance,

name

of a plant,

its

praises the juice's

juice

seen in

is

which was

wealth-producing

power: 6.

Praised

Rich

gifts

by the sacred bards, this God upon the worshipper.

7. Away he rushes with his stream, And roars as he is flowing on. 8.

dives into waters, and bestows

across the regions into heaven,

"While flowing, meet for sacrifice, he hath gone

The

up

to heaven across

regions, irresistible.-*'

In this hymn,

as in

other examples of a mythical structure of apprehension,

the imagery presents a spatial differentiation between the realm of the im-

mortals and human life, and a localization of the immortal and beneficent power in an active person. While most of the Vedic gods have no concrete personalities or "histories," a few are depicted with these qualities in varying degrees. The most colorful personality

among

the gods

is

is

most renowned feat

is

we do not

'"Ibid., '^ II,

Viewed from Part

Hymns

271.

116

I,

many

find an appeal to Indra as a

recollection of his feats has the

is

a

we

"born

slaying of Vrtra, the serpent which

enclosed the fertilizing rains. While in

context.

various references

young and impulsive; he enjoys drinking and

learn that he fighter." His

Indra

From

Indra.

power

this perspective,

of the

hymns

addressed to

god who answers prayer, the

to reenact the deed in

Indra

is

its

a positive creative

cosmic

power

1J3.

of the Rigveda. trans. R. T. H. Griffith

(Benares:

E.

J.

Lazarus and Co., 1892),

The Mythical Structure

who

grants fertility, wealth, and prosperity through his accomplishments.

The following

from two hymns, for

excerpts

show

instance,

a

human

de-

pendence on the past and continuing actions of Indra, the Magnanimous

One: I.

7. 2.

Indra hath ever close to

him

his

two bay

steeds

and word-yoked

car,

Indra the golden, thunder-armed.

I.

may

Indra hath raised the Sun on high in heaven, that he

3.

He

burst the mountain for the kine [streams of water].

see afar:

^^^

Lord of the thunder, thou didst burst the cave of Vala rich

11. 5.

The Gods came

pressing to thy side, and free

from

in cows.

terror aided thee.^^

Mythical Structure in the Upanisads Brahmanic thought

is

usually contrasted with Upanishadic thought, and

However, the Upanisads have

in general this contrast can be sustained.

been regarded from their composition forward tation of the

Brahmanic

sacrifice.

They

as

the culminating interpre-

are "the final chapters" of the

Brahmanic commentaries. While in the Upanisads the ritual activity of the sacrifice is no longer considered efficacious for knowing brahman, the sacrifice

is

"interiorized" within the individual

discipline; all of life

is

viewed

formed" continually (without concern

is

to perceive the

as

who

practices a spiritual

the cosmic sacrifice which

power of existence {brahman)

While much of the Upanishadic articulation concerning poses "the

from

One," and the

eternity, the

is

is

to

know

being "per-

in

religious

all

things.

reality presup-

the Self which exists

importance of tapas (austerity, heat)

articulated in the Maitrt reality

religious effort

is

and the

explicit ritual activity),

and

initiation

and Katha Upanisads suggests that the nature of

not found through discovery

as

would suggest that yogic apprehension

much

as

through creation. This

participates to

some extent

in a

mythical structure of apprehension.

In Maiirl Upanisad the ritual performance of articulating the contact between the

important thing for the one

who

=^ Ibid.,

I.

^Ubid.,

p.

I.

1

accepted

human and

as a valid

means

divine realms.

The

engages in religious practice, however,

to understand the sacrifice properly

Maitrt Upanisad

is

—

that

the reinterpretation

is

is,

as a

is

meditative exercise. In

evident:

9.

14.

117

Emptiness:

A

A

Study in Religious Meaning

Brahman, indeed,

sacrifice to

the laying (o£ the sacrificial

is

fires)

verily, does the sacrifice

Thus,

The

action

sacrificial

Tapas (heat) which of the

transformed into meditations and austerity.

produced by mental concentration

is

which served

sacrificial fire

self.

flawless. ^^

become complete and

is

of the

on the

ancients. Therefore let the sacrificer, having laid these fires meditate

as

is

the correlate

the point of contact between gods

and men.^° In a comparatively early upanisad such

the Brbad-dranyaka Upanisad

as

the practice of prdndydma (breath-control) takes the place of sacrifice. In I.

23 the

5.

Verily,

sacrificial effort is described:

what those (functions) undertook of

today. Therefore let

man perform

a

even that they accomplish

old,

one observance only.

He

should breathe

in and breathe out wishing, "Let not the evil of death get me." And when he performs it, let him try to complete it. Thereby he wins complete union

with that divinity and residence

Here we

see that the

author

in the

is

same world with him.^^

attempting to express a

new understanding

of the sacrifice, using the Brahmanic imagery and the logic of mutual exclusion in this mythical structure of religious apprehension.

In the Katha Upanisad the metaphysical speculation concerning reality is put into a narrative framework which involves a type of initiation for Naciketas, a lad seeking to discover the meaning of the lord of the dead, to reveal the mysteries of request concerns the meaning of the

Yama To

how

articulates

(in a

sacrificial fire

^*

The p.

Is

by

boundless world,

heart)" '*

{ibid.,

The

p.

question

direct answer, says:

as

I.

1.

.^^

S.

p.

the support

not entirely

Radhakrishnan (New York: Harper & Brothers, Ltd.; reprinted by permission. Brahmanic interpretation, is declared to be the

182.

Yama

14,

is

Unwin

795. Published by George Allen and

^'^The Principal Upanisads,

in the Brdhmatias)

that this frame of reference

Principle Upanisad s, ed. and trans,

Katha Upanisad

to him. His second

answering the question,

found

like that

^° Agni (fire), in various Vedic hymns and in mediator or messenger between the gods and men. ®^

Yama,

an introduction to Naciketas' all-important third

as

questlon,^^ but the point here

1953),

life

In

asks

the realms of heaven and earth meet through the

manner much

be sure, this serves

and

sacrifice,

He

sacrifice.

says:

"Know

(of the universe)

that

and

fire

as

to

be the means of attaining the

abiding in

the secret place

(of the

600). is

Yama

"This syllable

whether

a

man

"is" or

"is

discusses several topics, one of is,

verily,

the everlasting

not" after he has died. However, to avoid a

which

spirit.

is

the syllable

"aum." In

This syllable, indeed,

is

I.

the

2.

16

highest

Yama end;

knowing this very syllable, whatever anyone desires will, indeed, be his" {ibid., p. 616). The power of the symbol is, as we have seen, characteristic of a mythical structure of religious apprebetision.

in

!

The Mythical Structure

upanhad

foreign to the Upamsads. While this

vades every particular thing,

maintains the importance of yogic

also

it

expresses that the Self per-

The mental comprehension and knowledge not enough. The description of the nature of existence given

activity for attaining Truth.

of Reality are in

Katha Upanisad

is

not

but instruction for

a pseudo-natural-science,

action that negates activity.

Mythical Structure in the Bhagavad-Gitd

The

final area of

sidered here

with

its

Indian rehgious thought which will be briefly con-

the epic literature.

is

The

synthetic character of the GJtd

heterodox formulations make an analysis of the symbolization

processes very complex.

We

will

simply point out a few clear examples of

expressions conceived through a mythical structure of apprehension. First, it

important to note the narrative structure in which the Lord his full glory to the hero Arjuna. "While various speeches

is

Krsna manifests

by Krsna expound individual being

at times

is

is

known through an

seen to be absolutely different

Through Kr§na himself the

other beings.

God

his all-pervading character,

who

fullness of glory

is

from

all

manifested.

Verses 44-45 of chapter xi relate Arjuna's reaction to the hierophany: 44. Therefore, I

As

my

body,

a father to his son, as a friend to his friend,

As 45.

bowing and prostrating

beg grace of Thee, the Lord to be revered:

a lover to his beloved, be pleased to

Having

And

seen

what was never

(at the

Show me,

O

same time)

seen before,

my

heart

is

show mercy, I

am

is

a

God!

thrilled,

shaken with fear;

God, that same form of Thine

(as before)

Be merciful. Lord of Gods, Abode of the World!

Here

O

^^

hierophany completely different from the claim expressed by

Krsna when he says he can be seen

in

all

things. In fact

Krsna

explicitly

declares the exclusive nature of this experience in distinction to Arjuna's

day-to-day experience (XI. 52): 52. This

form that

Which thou '*

The Bhagavad

is

right hard to see,

hast seen of Mine,

Gtta, Franklin Edgerton, trans.

(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University

1944), pp. 115 and 117.

119

Press,

Emptiness:

A

Study In Religious Meaning

Of

this

form even the gods

Constantly long for the

^

sight. ^°

Also the "theistic" understanding of the whole universe structured in

Krsna

is

consistent with the mythical structure of apprehension, in

divine beings are at the opposite pole

The mythical

from natural

structure of apprehension

is

which

existence.

again evident in Krsna's ex-

planation of the sanctity of Arjuna's fighting. Arjuna, he says, should

go into battle with

a clear

conscience because he

pattern established by Krsna. In chapter

iii

following the divine

is

Krsna says to Arjuna:

23. For if I did not continue

At

My

all

in action, unwearied.

path (would) follow

Men

altogether, son of Prtha.

24. These folk If I did

And I

The imagery of

I

would

perish

not perform action,

should be an agent of confusion;

should destroy these creatures. ^^

the relationship between god and

(discipline of devotion)

is

that of changing

man

in bhakti-yoga

from one realm of

existence

to another. In chapter xii Krsna says: 6.

But those who,

all

actions

Casting on Me, intent on Me,

With

utterly unswerving discipline

Meditating on Me, revere Me, 7.

For them

From Become

When

I

the Savior

the sea of the round of deaths right soon, son of Prtha,

they have made their thoughts enter into

Me.^'''

In chapter ix Krsna defines the good from the bad actions according to the act of worship fined

by

^^Ibid.,

this

p.

117. 37.

^^ Ibid.,

121.

p.

the individual person. That

one ultimate commitment.

""Ubid., p.

120

by

is

to say, morality

is

de-

The Mythical Structure

Even

30.

very

if a

Reveres

He must

Me

evil

doer

with single devotion,

be regarded as righteous in spite of

all;

For he has the right resolution. ^^

In the foregoing examples of a mythical structure of religious ap-

symbol

prehension in Indian thought

we have

expressing "the real" itself

a formidable force in establishing the real.

The symbol

is

a

is

paradigm for human

tried to indicate that the

existence. In using the

paradigm

the religious person structures, and thereby "makes," existential reality. This use of the symbol is accompanied by the recognized need of forming, structuring,

making

the reality as the technique for

It also presupposes that there are

two realms of

the divinely established realm; and the lished

on the pattern of the

divine.

human

Given

knowing the

"real."

an ultimate

reality,

reality:

reality, that

which

is

estab-

this presupposition, the paradig-

matic nature of the symbol has crucial significance, for only the particular

symbol which expresses the ultimate It alone

reality

can establish the

can be the point of contact between the

of reality.

The

efficacy of

human

human and

reality.

divine levels

mental structures and the clear distinctions of

the real and nonreal are important considerations in

much

of the Indian

religious apprehension.

Ibid.,

p.

95.

121

8 THE INTUITIVE STRUCTURE In contrast to the mythical structure of apprehension, the intuitive struc-

meaning through combining concepts that would be reinconsistent or as idolatry in the logic of mutual exclusion. For instance, in the intuitive structure, absolute reality might be known as both "being" and "nonbeing," "here" and yet "not here," or as God and man. TJoe intefition of the expression is revealed by the paradox caused through the *' convergence" of the two {or more) qualifiers, and it is in the relationship itself that the meaning is formulated. The concept functions only as an analogy (rather than as a paradigm) which must be combined with other analogies to hint at or reflect the "real" which is totally other than any symbol. In this symbol-combination process every symbolic expression is a limitation, and in part a misapprehension of the "totally other." Mental activity, using concepts and symbols, is regarded as preparatory to the real mode of knowing the Unconditioned: intuition. Two well-known examples of this kind of expression found in the Upanisads are the declaration "tat tvam asi" ("you are that [ultimate ture provides

garded either

reality]"),^

as logically

and the

(individual self)

brahman (Ultimate Power) and dtman

assertion that

are one.^ In both these examples the religious

meaning

from the convergence of two terms which by themselves have opTo relate these terms through a logic of mutual exclusion

arises

posite meanings.

would

result in a logical fallacy or a meaningless phrase.

However, such

phrase can be meaningful within the "logic of convergence" because operates

by

a

logical pattern.

a it

symbolizing process which seeks to oppose the "normal"

The presupposition

Is

that the truth of the Unconditioned

Reality cannot be expressed through any one symbol,^ so the convergence

of terms can at least point to the "otherness" of the Unconditioned. ^Chdndogya UpanisaJ VI. IV.

4.

"Chdndogya Upanisad '

8.

7;

VI.

10.

3;

VI.

11.

3;

12-18. II.

5.

1-13; V. 18. 1;

See Brhad-dranyaka Upanisad IV. 4. 21.

122

III.

14. 1-4.

VI.

12.

3;

Brhad-dranyaka Upanisad

The

When we

read that the Self

is

Intuitive Structure

brahTiian, the All,^ the Self

is

not merely

name for brahman. The Self is the dtman, the particular expression of the Real. The meaning of this affirmation is not the tautology ^'brahman is brahman." The logic of convergence which is indicated here is affirmed another

by the contention of the

understanding

religious writers that the proper

on a strictly meaning context found

of these affirmations requires special insight. Indeed, even empirical level one would have to agree since the in everyday speech

speech. Likewise,

must be redefined to understand

when we

read that the self

this

kind of religious

smaller than a mustard

is

seed and greater than the earth,^ this does not suggest that "smaller"

"greater." Rather, the

meaning of

this

means

statement obtains from the logic

of convergence, which requires that the terms

—

opposites

by

definition

—

are

placed in juxtaposition.

Reality as Eternal Being

The

use of the logic of convergence has

plications.

The

"is there." It

is

"real"

is

complementary ontological im-

assumed to be something existing, something which

an eternal absolute which

is

archetype

as

is

is

not some-

i.e.,

Absolute,

to be discovered. It

thing constructed in existence on the basis of a divine,

the case in the mythical, or sacrificial, use of words. It

certainly true that

when

a person

is

"awakens" to the Ultimate Truth, he

new ontological status; but the "real" was there within him all time. The method of knowing through discovery correlates with the

attains a

the

ontological character of the "real." This character

And

because the "r eal"

ticular times

is,j.t

and places but

does^not manifest

is

one of

itself

static

"being."

exclusively_in_par-

in evej"y element of existence.

Every term used

to express It shares in the insufficiency of conditioned existence to announce

the Unconditioned. Yet, every term finds

conditioned potential, so the mere fact of

its

its

ultimate source in the

Un-

existence bespeaks an intrinsic

relationship with this reality.

Upanlshadic Use of Conceptual Symbols There are

many

examples of

this structure

as

Mere Analogies

of religious apprehension in

the Upanisads. Because any particular conceptual expression does not contain the fullness of the "real," the purpose of these expressions * ^

Brhad-dranyaka Upanisad II. Chandogya Upanisad III. 14.

5.

is

to evoke

1-15.

3.

12i

]\

:

Emptiness:

A

Study in Religious Meaning

the desire in the disciple for discovering in himself the transcendent reality.

In this attempt

of this

is

is

—

is

beyond any particular

beyond all names and forms. Explicit recognition Chdndogya Upanisad VII. 24. 1

indeed,

given in

"Where one that

clear that the ultimate reality

it is

name and form

nothing

sees

nothing

hears

else,

else,

the infinite. But where one sees something

understands something

that

else,

understands nothing

else,

something

else,

else,

hears

the small (the finite).^

is

Again, in the same upanisad (VI. 1.4): Just as ...

by one clod of clay

name

modification being only a is

just clay [so

is

that teaching

In the Katha Upanisad

is

all

is made of clay becomes known, the from speech while the truth is that it

that

arising

by which the unbearable becomes heard].

a list

of the progression from the senses to the

Supreme, indicating that the highest

human

faculty of discernment must

be transcended in order to realize the unmanifest I.

Spirit.

Katha Upanisad

10 and 11 maintain:

3.

Beyond the

10.

senses are the objects

is

the mind; beyond the

is

the great

mind

(of the senses)

and beyond the objects

the understanding and beyond the understanding

is

self.

Beyond the great

11.

Beyond the

spirit. is

'^

self

the unmanifest; beyond the unmanifest

is

spirit there

is

nothing.^ That

is

the end (of the journey)

the

is

;

that

the final goal.^

These quotations are indicative of the undifferentiated character of ,'

Ultimate Reality. Every perception, cognition, concept, and attitude limited because

i

differentiates.

it

The

being must be transcended in order to experience the Unmanifest. the above examples

it is

clear

( 1

)

is

individual conscious awareness of

From

that the terms used to describe Ultimate

Reality are often self -contradictory, and (2) that no particular words have

an exclusively valid quality for expressing Because Reality specific task *

The

^ Ibid.,

is

is

conceived

as

this reality.

being beyond

who approach

given to those

all

particular expressions, a

truth in this way. This task

Principle Upanisads, p. 486. pp. 446-47.

The phrase

translated

"Beyond the

This could be translated: "Beyond the

spirit

spirit

there

is

(purusa)

nothing" reads: purusdn na parath kincit. there

is

not anything," indicating that the

The English should not be confused with Nagarjuna's use of the term sunyatd (emptiness). ^ The Principal Upanisads, p. 625. spirit

is

the

124

terminal

entity,

the

highest

stage

of

awareness.

word

"nothing"

The is

to describe in the best

set

themselves

manner

ceptual means of knowing.

the objective realization

and ^'dtman." Both are the world-ground: brahman, the subjective realization is

called

is

dtman. In the articulation of

note that

regarded

it is

as

the restrictions they have

beyond comprehension and the conthe most common symbols used to ex-

is

Among

press the "real" are "brahmaJt"

called

—under

possible

—the Reality which

this

world-ground

an established thing;

it is.

have the burden of declaring that the particular

{dtman)

is

Upanhad

I.

eternal,

all,

ultimate. This

The knowing not

is

body

the

is

self,

verily,

all

gods,

all

II.

the lord of

is

spokes are held together in the beings,

the whole; the Self

Katha

for instance, in

worlds,

He

is

He

sprang from

unborn, eternal, abiding and primeval.

slain. ^^

In Brhad-dranyaka Upani^ad This

seen,

important to

Thus, the descriptions is

never born; nor does he die at any time.

self is

when

slain

is

it is

18:

2.

nothing and nothing sprang from him.

He

Intuitive Structure

15 the self

5.

professed to be the

things, the king of all beings.

all

hub and

all

is

As

all

all:

the

felly of a wheel, just so in this self, all

breathing creatures,

all

these

selves

are

held

together. ^^

Again, in the same upanhad (IV.

Whoever

maker of

the

we

13)

find:

has found and has awakened to the self that has entered into this (the body), he

perilous inaccessible place is

4.

all.

He

is

maker of the

the

is

the world; indeed he

is

the world

universe, for he

itself. ^^

Chdndogya Upanhad III. 13. 7 describes the convergence of the Ultimate with the self by placing the self within the description of the Ultimate: The

light

which

shines above this heaven, above

no higher,

highest worlds beyond which there are light

which

is

all,

above everything, in the

verily, that

is

the same as this

here within the person. ^^

In these expressions

we

see the description of reality

through a

combination of concepts. The above quotations declare that the the individual

Whether the or

is

is

only apparently limited

subject of the verse

is

the

when

in reality

^^Ibid., p.

Katha Upanhad

II.

1.

is

within

everything.

dtman experienced within

the unconditioned brahman, the Ultimate Reality

^°Ibid., p. 616. See also

it is

dialectical

self

a person

regarded

J-13.

20 J.

"ji/osing errors

Do

as

to

what

salutary and unsalutary

is

not

exist

do not 210

by

their

own

exist in reality.

nature {svabbdva)

;

therefore the impurities (klesa)

Translation of Mulamadhyamakakarikas; Fundamentals of the Middle 3.

The

(dtma)

existence or non-existence of the individual self

at

is

Way

not proved

all.

Without that

[individual self],

how

can the existence or non-existence of the

impurities be proved? 4.

For impurities

5.

somebody, and that person

exist of

is

not proved at

all.

not so that without someone the impurities do not exist of anybody?

Is it

In reference to the view of having a body of one's own, the impurities do not exist in

what

is

to the five-fold manner.

made impure according

In reference to the view of having a body of one's own, that which

impure does not 6.

The

errors as to

entities

exist in the impurities

what

is

is

made

according to the five-fold manner.

salutary and non-salutary do not exist as self-existent

(svabhdvatas)

Depending on which

what

errors as to

salutary and non-salutary are then

is

impurities? 7.

Form, sound,

taste,

touch, smell, and the dbarmas: this six-fold

Substance (vasiu) of 8.

Form, sound,

taste,

Merely the form of 9.

How

will "that

desire, hate,

and delusion

imagined.

is

touch, smell, and the dharmas are a fairy castle, like a

which

is

mirage, a dream.

salutary" or "that which

is

non-salutary" come into

existence

In a formation of a magical man, or in things like a reflection? 10.

We

submit that there

[And

is

no non-salutary thing unrelated to

depending on which, there

in turn]

is

a salutary thing.

a salutary thing; therefore, a

salutary thing does not obtain. 11.

We

submit that there

[And

in turn]

is

no salutary thing unrelated

depending on which, there

a

is

to a non-salutary thing,

non-salutary thing; therefore a

non-salutary thing does not obtain. 12. If

"what

And 13.

Even

if

is

salutary" does not exist,

"what

is

the notion

if

how

non-salutary" does not

"What

is

will there be desire [for it]?

how

exist,

permanent

is

in

will there be hatred [for it]?

something impermanent"

is

in

error.

How

can

this

notion be in error since "what

is

impermanent" does not

exist in

emptiness? 14.

Even

if

the notion

"what

is

permanent

is

in something

impermanent"

is

in

error, Is

not then the notion concerning emptiness,

i.e.,

that

it

is

impermanent, in

error? 15.

That by which a notion that which is grasped

is

formed, the notion, those

Whose

is

is

not existing either

the error?

notions, and

[in the notion]:

All have ceased; therefore, the notion does not 16. If a notion

who have

Whose

is

exist.

as false or true.

the non-error?

211

A

Emptiness;

Study in Religious Meaning

18.

Nor do errors of someone who has erred come into existence. Nor do errors of someone who has not erred come into existence. And errors of someone who is at present in error do not come into

existence.

19.

Now you examine of whom do errors really come into existence! How in all the world will errors which have not originated come into

existence?

17.

And

no being

20. Since

how can

errors are not originated,

if

Nor by

itself

produced by

is

itself,

and something different

there be someone involved in error?

nor by something at the

same time,

diflferent.

how can

there be some-

one involved in error?

"what

21. If the individual self,

pure," "what

is

eternal," and happiness really

is

exist,

Then

the individual self,

not 22.

But

if

not

pure," "what

is

is

eternal,"

and happiness

eternal,"

and happiness do

are

individual

"what

self,

pure," "what

is

is

exist.

Then non-individual sorrow do not 23.

"what

errors.

From

self,

"what

is

impure," "what

is

impermanent" and

exist.

the cessation of error ignorance ceases;

When

(samskara)

ignorance has ceased, conditioning forces

and everything

else cease.

24. If

any kind of

How is

25. If

self-existent impurities belong to

somebody,

world would they be eliminated?

Who

in all the

self -existent?

any kind of

How in is

can eliminate that which

all

self -existent

the world

impurities do not belong to somebody,

would they be eliminated?

Who

can eliminate that which

non-self -existent?

24

An [An opponent 1.

Analysis of the

Holy Truths

(dryasatya)

claims:]

If everything

is

Then you must

empty, there

is

no origination nor destruction.

incorrectly conclude that there

is

non-existence of the four

holy truths. 2.

If there

is

non-existence of the four holy truths, the saving knowledge, the

elimination [of illusion],

The "becoming"

[enlightened]

(bhdvand)

,

and the "realization"

[of

goal] are impossible. 3.

If there

is

non-existence, then also the four holy "fruits" do not exist.

In the non-existence of fruit there 212

is

no "residing

in fruit" nor obtaining.

the

Translation of Mulamadhyamakakarikas: Fundamentals of the Middle 4.

When

community

the

of persons"

do not

5.

And By

all

9.

dharma does

no dharma and community, how is

will the

Buddha

exist?

empty] certainly you deny the three

the Buddha, the dharma, and the community].

the real existence of a product, of right and wrong,

the practical behavior of the world as being empty. replies:]

reply that you do not comprehend the point of emptiness;

You

8.

[i.e.,

You deny

We

are obtaining]

non-existence of the four holy truths, the real

there are

if

[Nagarjuna 7.

is

speaking thus, [that everything

And

who

exist.

jewels 6.

[of Buddhists] does not exist, then those eight "kinds

four abiding in the fruit and four

exist.

Because there

not

[i.e.,

Way

its purpose from it. dharma has recourse to two truths: the truth which is the highest sense. Those who do not know the distribution (vibhdgam) of the two kinds

eliminate both "emptiness" itself and

The teaching by the Buddhas of The world-ensconced truth and

the

of truth

Do 10.

not

The

know

the profound "point" {tattva) in the teaching of the Buddha.

highest sense [of the truth]

And

is

not taught apart from practical behavior.

without having understood the highest sense one cannot understand

nirvana.

having been dimly perceived, utterly destroys the slow-witted.

11. Emptiness, It

like a

is

snake wrongly grasped or [magical] knowledge incorrectly applied.

12.

Therefore the mind of the ascetic [Guatama] was diverted from teaching

13.

Having thought about the incomprehensibility of the dharma by Time and again you have made a condemnation of emptiness,

the dharma. the stupid.

But that refutation does not apply to our emptiness. 14.

When

emptiness "works," then everything in existence "works."

If emptiness does 15.

16. If

17.

noi "work," then

all

existence does not "work."

You, while projecting your own faults on us. Are like a person who, having mounted his horse, forgot the

you recognize

real existence

horse!

on account of the self-existence of things.

You perceive that there are uncaused and unconditioned things. You deny "what is to be produced," cause, the producer, the instrument

of

production, and the producing action.

And 18.

the origination, destruction, and "fruit."

The "originating dependently" we This apprehension,

i.e.,

call

"emptiness";

taking into account

[all

other things],

is

the under-

standing of the middle way. is no dharma whatever originating independently, dharma whatever exists which is not empty.

19. Since there

No

213

.

Emptiness:

A

20. If

existence

all

Study in Religious Meaning is

You must wrongly 21.

Having

not empty, there

is

neither origination nor destruction.

conclude then that the four holy truths do not

originated without being conditioned,

how

exist.

sorrow come into

will

existence? It

is

22.

23.

sorrow

said that

own

How

is

not eternal; therefore, certainly

can that which

is

existing

by

For him

who

There

no destruction of sorrow

By

it

does not exist by

its

nature {svabhdva)

is

its

denies emptiness there

own

nature originate again?

no production.

is

by

if it exists

its

own

nature.

trying to establish "self-existence" you deny destruction.

24. If the path [of release]

self-existent, then there

is

into existence (bhdvana) If that

path

no way of bringing

is

it

;

brought into existence, then "self-existence," which you claim,

is

does not exist. 25.

When

sorrow, origination, and destruction do not exist,

What

kind of path will obtain the destruction of sorrow?

26. If there

no complete knowledge

is

any knowledge of Indeed, 27.

As

as

to self-existence,

[can there be]

it?

not true that self-existence

is it

how

is

that which endures?

in the case of complete knowledge, neither destruction, reaUzation, "bring-

ing into existence,"

Nor 28. If

are the four holy fruits possible for you.

you accept

How

can

"self -existence,"

be

it

known

and

a "fruit"

is

not

known by

its self-existence,

at all?

29. In the non-existence of "fruit," there

is

no "residing

in fruit"

nor obtaining

[the "fruit"];

When

the

community

[of Buddhists] does not exist, then those eight "kinds of

persons" do not exist. 30. Because there

not

And

if

is

non-existence of the four holy truths, the real dharma does

exist.

there

is

no dharma and community, how

who

31. For you, either the one

is

will the

Buddha

exist?

enHghtened {btiddha) comes into being

in-

dependent of enlightenment.

32.

Or enlightenment comes For you, some one who strives for

into being independent of the one is

a

non-buddha by

his

own

who

is

enlightened.

nature (svabhdva) but

enlightenment

Will not attain the enlightenment though the "way of

life

of becoming fully

enlightened." 33. Neither the

What

is

duced.

214

dharma nor non-dharma

produced which

is

will be

done anywhere.

non-empty? Certainly

self-existence

is

not pro-

.

.

Translation of Mulamadhyamakakarikas; Fundamentals of the Middle W^ay 34. Certainly, for you, there

a

is

product without [the distinction] of dharma or

noxi-dharma. Since, for you, the product caused 3 5.

for you, the product

If,

How

is

by dharma or non-dharma does not

exist.

caused by dharma or non-dharma,

can that product, being originated by dharma or non-dharma, be non-

empty? 36.

You deny

all

mundane and customary

"When you deny emptiness

activities

[in the sense of]

dependent co-origination (pratifya-

samutpdda)

you deny emptiness, there would be action which is unactivated. There would be nothing whatever acted upon, and a producing action would

37. If

be something not begun. 38.

According

world

to [the doctrine of] "self-existence" the

is

free

from

dif-

ferent conditions;

Then

will exist as

it

unproduced, undestroyed and immutable. something

39. If non-emptiness does not exist, then

is

attained

which

is

not at-

tained;

There 40.

and

cessation of sorrow and actions,

is

destroyed.

all evil is

perceives dependent co-origination {pratltya-samutpdda)

He who

Also understands sorrow, origination, and destruction

as well as the

path [of

release].

25

An 1.

[An opponent

Analysis of Nirvana

says:] If all existence

is

empty, there

is

no origination nor de-

struction.

Then whose nirvana through illusion] 2.

elimination [of suffering] and destruction [of

would be postulated?

[Nagarjuna repHes:]

If all existence

is

non-empty, there

is

no origination nor

destruction.

Then whose nirvana through elimination illusion] would be postulated? 3

Nirvana has been

[of suffering]

said to be neither eliminated

and destruction [of

nor attained, neither annihilated

nor eternal. Neither disappeared nor originated. 4.

Nirvana

by

is

certainly not an existing thing, for then

it would involve the become old and be without death.

In consequence

5.

And

it

would be characterized

old age and death.

if

nirvana

is

error that an existing thing

would not

an existing thing, nirvana would be a constructed product

{^samskrta),

215

— A

Emptiness:

.

Study in Religious Meaning

Since never ever has an existing thing been found to be a non-constructed-

product {asamskrta). 6.

But

nirvana

if

pendence [on something

8.

If nirvana

as

something without dependence.

not an existing thing, will nirvana become

is

Wherever there

is

But

is

if

could [nirvana^ exist without de-

else]?

Certainly nirvana does not exist 7.

how

an existing thing,

is

nirvana

no existing thing, neither thing,

a non-existing

dependence [on something Certainly nirvana

is

how

could [nirvana] exist without

else]?

not a non-existing thing which

is

a non-existing thing?

there a non-existing thing.

exists

without depen-

dence. 9.

That

which

state

is

the rushing in and out [of existence]

when dependent

or

conditioned

when not dependent

This [state], 10.

or not conditioned,

is

seen to be nirvana.

teacher [Gautama] has taught that a "becoming" and a "non-becoming"

The

(vibhava) are destroyed;

Therefore

obtains that: Nirvana

it

is

neither an existent thing nor a non-

existent thing. 11.

If

nirvana were both an existent and a non-existent thing,

Final release (moksa)

but that 12. If

not

is

would be [both] an

existent

and

a

non-existent thing;

possible.

nirvana were both an existent and a non-existent thing,

There would be no nirvana without conditions, for these both [operate with] conditions. 13.

How

can nirvana exist

For nirvana

a

is

both an existent thing and

as

non-composite-product {asamskrta)

,

a non-existent thing,

while both an existent

thing and a non-existent thing are composite products 14.

How

can nirvana

There

is

exist as

(samskrta)

both an existent and a non-existent thing?

no existence of both

at

one and the same place, as in the case of both

darkness and light. 15.

The Is

assertion:

proved

"Nirvana

is

neither an existent thing nor a non-existent thing"

if [the assertion]:

"It

is

an existent thing and

a non-existent

thing"

were proved. 16. If

nirvana

"Who can

is

neither an existent thing nor a non-existent thing,

really arrive at [the assertion]

:

"neither an existent thing nor a non-

existent thing"? 17. It

is

Or

not expressed

if

the Glorious

One

Buddha]

exists after his death.

does not exist, or both or neither.

18. Also, it

is

not expressed

if

the Glorious

world],

Or

[the

does not exist, or both or neither.

216

One

exists while

remaining [in the

—

.

—

Translation of Mulamadhyamakakarikas: Fundamentals of the Middle "Way 19.

There

nothing whatever which differentiates the existence-in-flux (samsdra)

is

from nirvana;

And

there

nothing whatever which differentiates nirvana from existence-

is

in-flux.

20.

The extreme

(koti)

limit

of nirvana

extreme limit of existence-

also the

is

in-flux;

There 21.

not the slightest bit of difference between these two.

is

The views a

whether that which

[regarding]

is

beyond death

limited

is

by

beginning or an end or some other alternative

Depend on

a

by

a

empty, what

is

nirvana

limited

beginning

(pHrvdnta)

and

an

end

(apardnfa)

dharmas

22. Since all

What 23.

is

both

there anything

Is

are

finite

and

which

infinite? is

this or

What

"What

finite? is

infinite?

is

neither finite nor infinite?

something

else,

which

is

permanent or im-

permanent,

24.

Which is both permanent and impermanent, or which The cessation of accepting everything [as real] is a tion of phenomenal development [prapanca)

No

is

neither?

salutary

(siva)

cessa-

;

dharma anywhere has been taught by the Buddha of anything.

26

An 1.

Analysis of the Twelve

"What

is

Components (dvddasdnga)

hidden by ignorance" (avidydnivrta) has caused the three kinds of

conditioned things (samskdra) to be

By

those actions

it

[i.e.,

"what

is

2.

Consciousness, presupposing that which

3.

When When

its

made

for rebirth

hidden by ignorance"] goes forward. is

conditioned (samskdra), enters on

course.

consciousness the

is

begun, the "name-and-form" (ndmarilpa)

"name-and-form"

is

instilled, the six

is

instilled.

domains of sense perceptions

(dyatana) are produced.

Having

arrived at the six domains of sense perceptions, the process of percep-

tion begins to function. 4.

Consciousness begins to function presupposing the eye, the visual forms, and ability of

mental association

Presupposing "name-and-form." 5.

That which

is

the coincidence {samnipata) of visual form, consciousness, and

the eye:

That 6.

is

sensual perception; and

from perception, sensation begins

"Craving" (trsna) [for existing things]

is

to function.

conditioned by sensation.

Certainly [a persan] craves for the sake of sensation.

The one who 217

craves

.

A

Emptiness:

Study in Religious Meaning

[namely sexual pleasure,

acquires the four-fold acquisition (iipaddna)

false

views, ascetic morality and vows, and the doctrine of self -existence] 7.

When

the acquisition exists, the acquirer begins to function.

If he

were someone without acquisition, that being would be

would not That being

8.

is

released,

and

exist.

the five "groups of universal elements" (^skandha). Because of

a being, birth begins to function.

Growing

old, dying, sorrow, etc., grief

Despair and agitation:

9.

That "produced being"

is

a single

and

regrets,

from

all this results

birth;

mass of sorrows.

Thus the ignorant people construct the conditioned things

10.

(savtskdra)

;

[that

the source for existence-in-flux.

is]

The one who

constructs

is

ignorant; the wise person

is

who

not [one

con-

structs] because he perceives true reality.

When

11.

A

ignorance ceases, the constructed phenomena do not come into existence.

person's cessation of ignorance proceeds

lightened]

on the

basis of

"becoming" [en-

through knowledge.

Through cessation of every [component] none functions; That single mass of sorrow is thus completely destroyed.

12.

27

An

About Reality

Analysis of the Views (drsti)

Those [views] relating to the limits of the past

1.

reality are:

"The world

is

eternal," etc.,

2.

[And "I have existed in the past," "I have noi existed in the past," etc.].^ The assertion: "I will not become something different in a future time," "I will become [something diflferent]," and the alternative, etc., are relating

3.

[The

to an end [in the future]. assertion:] "I existed in a past

Since this [present being] 4.

Were he

is

time" does not obtain,

not that one

who

[was] in a former birth.

[in a previous birth], that individual self

(dtma) which he acquires

coming into existence] would be diflferent. Moreover, what kind of individual self is there without [in

5.

If

were held that: "There

it

Then

the individual self

vidual self [at 6.

The

is

no

acquisition (updddna)

?

individual self without the acquisition,"

would be [only] the

acquisition or

it is

not an indi-

all].

individual self

is

not the acquisition, since that [acquisition]

appears

and disappears.

Now *

really,

how

This part of karika

commentary.

21^

1

will "he

is

who

acquires"

become "that which

missing in the text; the content

is

reconstructed

is

acquired"?

from Candraklrti's

Translation of Mulamadhyamakakarikas: Fundamentals of the Middle "Way

Moreover,

7.

does not obtain that the individual self

it

is

different

from the

acquisition. If the individual self

but

quisition;

Thus that

8.

were

would be perceived without the

diflferent, it

[in fact] it

is

[individual self]

is

ac-

not so perceived.

not

from nor

diflferent

identical

to the ac-

quisition.

The

individual self

is

not without acquisition; but there

is

no certainty that

"It does not exist."

[The

9.

have not existed in a past time" does not obtain,

assertion:] "I

For that one [now living]

is

who was

not different from that one

in

a

former birth. 10. If that [persent person]

were

diflferent,

he would exist in exclusion of that

[former] one.

Therefore either that [former person]

persists, or

he would be born eternal!

11.4

There

12.

no existing thing which

is

is

"that which has not existed prior." There-

fore, the error logically follows that

Either the individual self

is

"what

is

produced" or

originates without a

it

cause.

Thus the view concerning

13.

the past

which

[asserts]

"I have existed," or "I

have not existed,"

Both ["existed and not existed"] or neither: [The views:] "I will become something in

14.

Or

"I will not

become [something],"

this does

not obtain at

all.

a future time,"

[should be considered] like those

etc.,

[views] of the past.

"This

is

For god

is

15. If

16. If

If 17. If

man man

man, this is a god" [obtains], then eternity exists. unproduced, and certainly something eternal would not be born.

a

is

diflferent

is

diflferent

one part were divine and another part human,

Then

would be something non-eternal [together with] that which

there

but that

eternal; 18. If

from god, there would exist something non-eternal. from god, then a continuity does not obtain.

is

is

not possible.

something both non-eternal and eternal were proved,

Then, no doubt, something "neither eternal nor non-eternal" 19. If someone,

Then

there

having come from somewhere, in some

way

is

proved.

goes somewhere again.

would be existence-in-flux with no beginning; but

this

is

not the

case.

20. If

someone who

Or who

is

eternal does not exist,

who

will exist being non-eternal.

being both eternal and non-eternal, or devoid of these two [charac-

teristics] ?

*

Verse

1 1

is

not available In the Sanskrit text, but

it

is

known from

the Tibetan translation.

219

A

Emptiness:

Study in Religious Meaning

21. If the world

would come

to an end,

how would

an other- world come into

existence? If the

world would not come to an end,

how would an

other- world

come

into

being? 22. Since the continuity of the "groups of universal elements" (skandhas)

[from

one moment to the next] functions Hke flames of lamps,

[The view:] "both having an end and not having an end" 23. If the

is

not possible.

former ["groups"] would disappear, those [new] "groups" which are

dependent on those [former] "groups" would not

arise;

come to an end. If the former ["groups"] would not disappear, these [new] "groups" which are dependent on those [former] "groups" would not arise; Therefore, the world would be eternal. Therefore, the world would

24.

25. If one part

were

finite

The world would 26. Therefore,

and the other were

infinite,

be both finite and infinite; but this

how can

it

be that one part of "one

who

is

not possible.

acquires" [karma] will

be destroyed.

27.

And one part not destroyed? This is How, indeed, can it be that one part

not possible. of the acquisition [of karina] will be de-

stroyed.

And

one part not destroyed? That, certainly does not obtain.

28. If the [view] "both finite

Then no doubt,

and infinite" were proved.

"neither finite nor infinite" could be proved.

29. Because of the emptiness of

How of 3 0.

To

existing things.

all

will the views about "eternity," etc.,

whom, and

him, possessing compassion,

For the destruction of

220

come

into existence, about what,

of what kind?

all

who

views

—

taught the

real

dharma

to him, Gautama,

I

humbly

offer reverence.

B

Appendix Translation of

VIGRAHAVTAVARTANI: AVERTING the ARGUMENTS In Averting the Arguments,

as in the

Kdrikds, Nagarjuna defends his insight

by reducing the notion of self -existence (svahhdva) to absurdity. The formal structure of this short work is that of a religious debate in which the opponent (s) state (s) a series of twenty verses in opposition to into the emptiness of

things

all

by one

emptiness, and Nagarjuna answers each argument one

The major contention

in this debate

fifty verses.

in

the basis for a valid argument concerned

is

with Ultimate Truth. Nagarjuna's opponents argue that in order for Nagarjuna's denial of "self-existent" to have

of denial has a reality of

its

any force he must assume that the statement

own

(2)

The

it.

Nagarjuna cannot

(1)

contend for the emptiness of everything without assuming 1-4 and 17-20), and

from

to counter something different

opponents' arguments seem to cluster around two foci:

(verses

self -existence

defense of self-existence through an appeal to the

accepted means of knowledge: direct perception, religious authority, inference,

and analogy (verses 5-16). In reply, Nagarjuna maintains that he need not assume the "self-existence" of his

own

statements to refute other statements which

"self-existence"

statements;

(verses 21-28). His

but

he

must engage

own arguments in

this

themselves have no

empty

are as

exercise

as

a

that words or statements do not have separate real existences

He

cannot stand anywhere

as such, since it

which claims such vahdity. From

is

this

is

insists

57,

58,

it

word or statement

viewpoint Nagarjuna denies that he (verses

29,

59)

is

or that

denying the thing "self-existence" (verse 63). His argument against the

opponents' defence of self-existence the

(verses

supposed to express reality; rather

the dissipation of any

making a proposition "about" the thing "emptiness" is

other

maintains that truth, from the viewpoint of "emptiness," does not

stand on the validity of a word which

he

all

mundane

Nagarjuna

necessity. In criticizing the opponents' defense of self-existence

64-69).

as

practical,

is

much

the same as in the Kdrikds in that

means of knowledge cannot be considered to have

its

own

reality

independent

of the object of knowledge, and vice versa (verses 30-51); and that the theory of

cannot

self-existence

Likewise,

he

concludes

"self-existence"

is

account that

all

for

change

and

the understanding

supposed to provide, but which

difference

which the is

distorted

(verses

52-56).

aflfirmation

by

it,

of

can be

had by recognizing the intention of emptiness (verse 70). 221

AVERTING Part

I

The Arguments of 1.

the

Opponents

(svabhava) does not exist anywhere in any existing thing,

If self-existence

Your

ARGUMENTS'

the

statement,

being without self-existence,

[itself]

is

not able to discard

self -existence. 2.

But

that statement has

if

own]

[its

then your

self -existence,

tion

is

refuted;

There

is

a [logical] inconsistency in this,

initial proposi-

and you ought to explain the grounds

of the difference [between the principle of validity in your statement and others]. 3.

Should your opinion be that [your statement] this

For

is

not

like

is

"Do not make

a sound,"

possible;

in this case

by

a [present]

sound there will be

a [future] prevention of

that [sound].

were that: "This

of a denial," that

not true;

4.

If [your statement]

5.

Thus your thesis, as to a defining mark (laksanata) not mine is If you deny existing things while being seen by direct perception. Then that direct perception, by which things are seen, also does not

6.

By

is

a denial

[denying]

perception inference

direct

is

denied,

is

—

—

as

also

in error.

exist.

Scripture and

analogy.

[As well

the points to be proved

as]

points to be proved 7.

The people who know

by

by inference and Scripture and

those

a similar instance [drstdnta).

the modes of the dharmas

know

[there

is]

a

good

self-

existence of good dharmas.

As 8.

to the others, the application

There

is

tive

And,

the same.

[dharmas] mentioned

as libera-

modes of dharmas.

Likewise, there 9.

is

a self -existence of liberation in those

if

there

that which

is

would be no

is

non-liberative, etc.

self -existence

of dharmas, then that would be "non-

self-existence";

In that case the

name (ndma) would not

without substance [to which 10. If [one asserts:] Tliat

dharmas does not

is

which

is

it

exist, for certainly there

is

nothing

refers].

self -existent exists,

but the self-existence of the

exist,

^ A translation of Vigrahavydvartani by Nagarjuna. The Sanskrit text used for this translation found in "The Vigrahavyavartani of Nagarjuna," E. H. Johnston and Arnold Kunst, eds., MCB,

IX

(July,

222

1951),

108-Jl.

;

.

Translation of Vigrahavyavartani; Averting the Arguments

One

should give the explanation concerning that of which there

self-

is

existence without dharmas.

As

11.

must be

there

"There

That

Or

12.

which

denial of yours

if

of something that exists, as [in the statement:]

a denial

not a pot in the house,"

is

is

seen

must be

that self -existence does not exist,

what does not

Certainly, the denial of

13. Just as children erroneously

a denial of self-existence that exists.

what do you deny by that statement? exist

is

proved without a word!

apprehend that there

"non-water" in

is

So you would erroneously apprehend a non-existing thing 14. If this

who

one

then there

so,

is

However,

is

denied" and the one

the apprehension,

if

prehends do not

Then

"what

the apprehension,

apprehended" and the

is

apprehends.

Also the denial, "what 15.

is

mirage,

a

as deniable.

"what

six all together.

denies

who

ap-

exist.

not true that denial, "what

is it

—

who

apprehended" and the one

is

denied," and the one

is

who

denies do

not exist?

"what

16. If denial,

Then

is

denied," and the one

you have eliminated 1

whence There

is

are

exist,

them

are

proved [since

is

no proof of any grounds

[of knowledge]

your grounds?

no proof of

a

"point" possible for you

proof of your denial of a

18. If the

do not

denies

their denial].

Because of non-self-existence there

7.

who

existing things as well as the self-existence of

all

self -existent

if it

thing

has no grounds.

is

not a result of grounds

of knowledge,

Then

my

affirmation of the existence of a self-existent thing

is

proved without

grounds. 19.

Or

if

you maintain: "The

self-existent thing

Because no thing

real existence of

(asvabbava)"

—

this

whatever in the

is

grounds not

is

such that

it is a

non-

justified;

world

exists

"what

is

lacking

its

own

nature

(nihsvabhava) 20.

When

it

[Denial]

is

is

said:

The

denial precedes

denied," this

is

not

justified.

not justified either later or simultaneously. Therefore self-existence

is real.

Part

II

Nagarjuna's Reply to the Arguments of the Opponents 21

.

If

my

thesis does

not bear on the totality of causes and conditions, or on them

separately. Is

not emptiness proved because of the fact that there

is

no

self-existence in

existing things?

223

A

Emptiness: 22.

Study in Religious Meaning

The "being dependent nature" of That which has

a nature of

existing things: that

"being dependent"

is

called "emptiness."

—

of that there

is

a non-self-

existent nature. 23. Just as a magically

formed phantom could deny

a

phantom

created

by

its

own

magic, Just so would be that negation.

[regarding emptiness]

24. This statement

therefore, there

There

is

is

no refutation of

not "that which

is

my

is

self -existent";

assertion.

[thus] the grounds for the difference need not

no inconsistency and

be explained. 25.

"Do

[Regarding]

make

not

a

sound"

—

this

example introduced by you

is

not pertinent, Since there

negation of sound by sound. That

a

is

is

not like [my denial of

self-existence].

26. For, if there

is

prevention of that which lacks self-existence by that which

lacks self-existence,

that which lacks self -existence would cease, and self -existence would be

Then

proved. as a phantom could destroy the erroneous apprehension concerning a phantom woman that: "There is a woman," just so this is true in our case. Or else the grounds [of proof] are that which is to be proved; certainly sound

27. Or,

28.

does not exist as real. For we do not speak without accepting, for practical purposes, the work-a-

day world.

would make any proposition whatever, then by that

29. If I

I

would have

a

logical error;

But

do not make a proposition; therefore

I

30. If there

ceptions,

am

not in error.

etc.,

aflSrmed or denied.

[It is]

I

something, while being seen by means of the objects of direct per-

is

That

of mine

[denial]

is

a non-apprehension of

non-things. 31.

And

if,

for you, there

is

a source [of

knowledge] of each and every object

of proof,

Then by

32. If

—

tell

how, in turn, for you there

other sources [of knowledge]

Or

proof of those sources.

would be the proof of

a

source

that would be an "infinite regress";

In that case neither 33.

is

there

if

there

is

a

beginning, middle, nor an end

is

proved.

proof of those [objects] without sources, your argument

is

refuted.

There 22^

is

a [logical] inconsistency in this,

and you ought to explain the cause

Translation of Vigrahavyavartani; Averting the Arguments

of the difference [between the principles of validity in your statement and others].

34.

That reconciliation of

diflSculty

is

not [realized in the claim:] "Fire illumines

itself."

Certainly 3 5.

And Then

it is

not like the non-manifest appearance of

according to your statement,

if,

not

this

is

like a fire

illumines

fire

which would illumine

its

its

pot in the dark.

a

own self. own self and

something

else?

36. If, according to

an "other

Then

your statement,

fire

would illumine both

its

"own

self"

and

self,"

also darkness, like fire,

would darken itself and an "other self." glow of a fire; and where the glow remains

37. Darkness does not exist in the

an "other individual

How 38.

could

you

[If

produce light? Indeed light

it

say:]

in

self,"

"Fire illumines

when

it

is

the death of darkness.

is

being produced," this statement

is

not true;

when being produced,

For, 39.

Now ing

Then

fire

certainly does not touch (prdpnoti)

darkness.

that glow can destroy the darkness again and again without touch-

if it,

that [glow] which

is

would destroy the darkness

located here

in "every

corner" of the world. 40. If your sources [of knowledge] are proved

by

their

own

strength {svatas),

then, for you, the sources are proved without respect to "that

which

is

to be

proved";

Then you have relation to

a proof of a source,

something

[but]

no sources

are

proved without

else.

41. If, according to you, the sources [of knowledge] are proved without being related to the objects of "that

Then 42.

Or

[The answer

which

Or

What

[you say]:

if

[sources of

43.

is

error

knowledge to

to be proved,"

there in thinking,

is

their objects]

is

"The

is

relationship of theee

[already] proved"?

not related to something

is

proved. Indeed "that

else.

the sources [of knowledge] in every case are proved in relation to

if

And

is

This would be the proving of what

is:]

not proved"

"what is to be proved," Then "what is to be proved" 44.

which

these sources will not prove anything.

if

"what

is

is

proved without relation to the sources.

to be proved"

is

proved without relation to the sources

[of knowledge], "Wliat [purpose]

is

the proof of the sources for you

of which those [sources] exist 45.

Or

if,

is

is

—

since that for the purpose

already proved!

for you, the sources [of knowledge] are proved in relation to

to be proved,"

225

"what

—

.

A

Emptiness;

Study In Religious Meaning

Then, for you, there

exists

an interchange between the sources and "what

is

to be proved." 46.

Or

if,

is

when

there

to be proved" exists

when

proved, then, for you, the proof of them both does not

exist.

for you, there are the sources [of knowledge] being proved

proof of "what

The

source

is

is

which

47. If those things

to be proved,"

are to be

48.

And

if

is

to be proved,"

how

the sources,

49. If a son

is

Then

You

is

are

how

proved

will they prove [anything]?

me, in

tell

are

by what

is

to be proved,

proved

will they prove [anything]?

produced by

very son [when he

50.

"what

those sources [of knowledge] are proved

and those things which

By

if

proved are proved by those sources [of knowl-

which

edge], and those things

By "what

and

a father,

and

if

that [father]

is

produced by that

born].

is

this case,

who produces whom?

me! Which of the two becomes the father, and which the son

tell

Since they both carry characteristics of "father" and "son"? In that case there

doubt.

is

51.

The proof of the sources [of knowledge] is not [established] by itself, not by each other, or not by other sources; It does not exist by that which is to be proved and not from nothing at all.

52. If those

who know

the

modes of the dharmas say that there

is

good

self-

existence of good dharmas,

That 53. If a

must be

[self-existence]

good

self -existence

stated in contradistinction to something

were produced in relation to [something

that self-existence of the good dharmas

Then

else.

else],

How,

an "other existence."

is

then, does [self -existence] exist? 54.

Or

if there is

something

that self-existence of good dharmas, while not being related to

else.

There would be no 55.

state of a spiritual

way

of

life.

There would be neither vice nor virtue, and worldly practical

activities

would

not be possible; Self-existent things

would be

eternal because that without a cause

would be

eternal.

56.

Regarding [your view of] bad, "liberative," and undefined [dharmas], there is

an error;

Therefore,

all

composite products (samskrta) exist

as

non-composite elements

(asamskrta) 57.

He who would

impute

a really existing

Could be refuted by you; but we do not 58.

And

that [assertion]:

a non-real thing?

226

"The name

is

name

to a really existing thing

assert a

unreal"

name.

—would

that relate to a real or

—— Translation of Vigrahavyavartani: Averting the Arguments If

it

were

tire

59.

The emptiness of

Or

if

—

a non-real thing

existing things has been demonstrated previously;

all

is

against that

which

not

is

my

thesis.

but that [self-existence] of dharmas

said]: "Self-existence exists,

[it is

both cases your en-

^in

refuted.

is

Therefore, this attack 60.

were

a real thing, or if it

proposition

does not exist"

That

is

62.

which was

questionable; but that

something

61. If the denial concerns

said

then

real,

[by me]

is

Then you would deny the non-self-existence of things. Or if you deny emptiness, and there is no emptiness. Then is not your assertion: "The denial concerns something

63. Since anything being denied does not exist, I

Therefore, [the statement]:

"You deny"

not questionable.

not emptiness proved?

is

real" refuted?

do not deny anything;

—which was made by you—

is

a false

accusation. 64.

Regarding what was denial

is

concerning what does not

said

exist:

"The statement

of

proved without a word,"

In that case the statement expresses: "[That object] does not exist"; [the

words] do not destroy that [object]. 65.

Regarding the great censure formerly made by you through the instance of the mirage

Now

hear the ascertainment whereby that instance [of the mirage]

66. If that apprehension it

is

is

logically possible.

"something which

self-existent,"

is

would not have originated presupposing [other things];

But that apprehension which

exists

presupposing [other things]

—

is

that not

emptiness? 67. If that apprehension

"something which

is

is

self-existent,"

with what could

the apprehension be negated?

This understanding [applies] in the remaining [five factors: "what

hended," the one

who

apprehends, the denial, "what

who denies] therefore By this [argument] the ;

68.

refuted

—on

that

is

is

appre-

denied," and the one

an invalid censure.

is

absence of a cause

[for denying self-existence]

is

the basis of the similarity [with the foregoing]:

Namely, that which was already

said regarding the exclusion of the instance

of the mirage. 69.

That which

is

the cause for the three times

is

refuted from

what

is

to that [given] before;

Negation of cause for the three times affirms emptiness. 70. All things prevail for

Nothing whatever

him

for

prevails for

whom him

emptiness prevails;

for

whom

emptiness prevails.

227

similar

BIBLIOGRAPHY Early Indian Religious Thought For

of the Indian reUgious and philosophical background

a general discussion

the following books are useful:

Dasgupta,

A

S.

History of Indian Philosophy, Vols.

&

I

II.

Cambridge (Eng.),

1922.

Edgerton, F. The Beginnings of Indian Philosophy. Cambridge (Mass.), 1965. Hiriyanna, M. Outlines of Indian Philosophy. London, 1932.

Hopkins, E.

Ethics of India. New Haven, 1924. The Religion and Philosophy of the Yeda and Upanishads. Cam-

W.

Keith, A. B.

bridge (Mass.), 1925.

Mehta, P. D. Early Indian Religious Thought. London, 1956. Prasad, J. History of Indian Epistemology,

Radhakrishnan,

Renou, Louis

&

paperback

as

Indian Philosophy, 2nd

Filliozat, Jean.

A

Sharma, C. D. in

S.

2nd

ed. Delhi,

Vol.

ed.,

L'Inde classique. 2

vols., Paris,

Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy.

A

Indian Philosophy:

2 vols. Calcutta,

S.

book with

&

1953.

3

York, 1962).

vols.

Leipzig,

1909-20

Ketkar and H. Kohn, Plistory of Indian Literature.

1927-33).

Zimmer, H. Philosophies of

A

1947

London, 1960 (available

New

Critical Survey.

Winternitz, M. Geschichte der indischen Literatur. (English translation by

1958.

London, 1929.

I.

India. Ed. Joseph Campbell.

approach to Indian philosophy

a fresh

tions of India's Philosophies

(Englewood

Cliffs,

N.

New

York, 1957.

Karl Potter's Presupposi-

is

1963). This

J.,

is

an analysis

of the grounds on which certain ideas that claim to lead to spiritual freedom are accepted or rejected. life is a

volume of

essays

(London, 1964). This

Another useful work for int€rpreting Indian

and

is

articles

religious

by Betty Heimann: Facets of Indian Thoiight

not a rigorous systematic analysis like Dr. Potter's book,

but expresses Dr. Heimann's insight into crucial factors of Indian thought; the essays collected in the chapters "Indian Metaphysics"

Style" deals

are

apropos

to

our study here.

and "Indian Grammar and

A

short

fully with the latter problem

is

B.

discussions of philosophical problems in Indian thought, in

East-West Philosophy,

Ch.

Ill

monograph which

Heimann's The Significance of in Sanskrit Philosophical Tervtinology (London, 1951). As summary

more

Prefixes

especially

ed.

two chapters of Essays

C. A. Moore (Honolulu, 1951) can be mentioned:

"Epistemological Methods in Indian Philosophy," by D. M. Datta, pp. 73-88;

229

Emptiness:

A

Study in Religious Meaning

and Ch. XI "Metaphysical Theories in Indian Philosophy," by P. T. Raju, pp. 21133. See also P. T. Raju, "Intuition as a Philosophical

East and West,

II,

No.

Method

in India," Philosophy

(Oct., 1952), 187-207; after a comparison of Indian

3

and "Western philosophical views, "Intuition"

in Indian

thought

described as

is

"the direct and unmediated knowledge" of the Ultimate Truth. Indian thought analyzed in terms of psychological expression

Indian Psychology, Vol.

(Zurich,

1945),

and P. Masson-Oursel, "Les

psychologic indienne," Kevue Philosophique de

la

1928), 418-29.

(Jull-Dec,

to reveal the religious

Two

of

studies

meaning of Indian

Yoga: Immortality and Freedom,

H. Zimmer, Myths and Symbols

(New York,

is

II,

found in

J.

Sinha,

Emotion and Will

and 1961); and in two shorter analyses: E. Abegg, Indische

(Calcutta, 1958

Psychologic

Cognition, 2nd ed., and Vol.

I,

trans,

a

la

France

more

et

special

essentiels

traits

de I'^tranger,

nature

spiritual expressions

are:

that

M.

de

CV seek

Eliade,

by "W. R. Trask (New York, 1958), and J. Campbell

in Indian Art and Civilization, ed.

1946).

have used English translations of Hindu sacred writings from the following:

I

W. D. "WTiitney, revised and brought nearer by C. R. Lanman. Cambridge (Mass.), 1905, Harvard

Atharva-veda Samhita. Trans, by to completion and edited

Oriental Series VII, VIII.

The Bhagavad Gita. Trans, by XXXVIII, 2 Pts.

F. Edgerton.

Cambridge (Mass.), 1944, Harvard

Hymns

by R. T. H.

Griffith. 2 vols. Benares,

Oriental Series

The by

S.

of the Rigveda. Trans,

1892.

Principal Upanisads. Edited with introduction, text, translation, and notes

Radhakrishnan.

Radhakrishnan,

New

S.,

York, 1953.

C,

and Moore,

eds.

Source Book in Indian Philosophy.

Princeton, 1957.

Satapatha-Brahmana. Trans, by of the East. Vols. XII,

J.

XXVI, XLI,

Eggeling. Oxford, 1889-1900. Sacred Books

XLIII, and XLIV.

Buddhism The most complete century a.d.

Buddhism du Bojiddhisme indien,

historical description of Indian

fitienne Lamotte, Histoire

is

Two

to the second des origines a

works on Buddhist history and thought development which describe Buddhism to about a.d. 1000 are by Edward Conze:

I'ere

Saka (Louvain, 1958).

Buddhism,

Its

shorter

Essence and Development

(New York,

1959; available in paper-

A

Short History of Buddhism (Bombay, 1960). B. C. Law, History of Pali Literature. 2 vols. (London, 1933) and G. K. Nariman, A Literary History of Sanskrit Buddhism (Bombay, 1920) complement each other in discussing the

back), and

literary sources in Indian

Buddhism. NaUnaksha Dutt has written about early the Spread of Buddhism and Buddhist

Indian Buddhism in Early History of 230

Bibliography

(London, 1925), and Early Monastic Buddhism, revised edition

Schools

cutta, 1960). Also helpful

by

P. V. Bapat and

is

A. C. Banerjee, found in 2500 Years of Buddhism,

Bapat (Delhi, 1959), pp. 96-157.

Buddhism

(Cal-

the essay "Principal Schools and Sects of Buddhism,"

A

useful

summary

ed. P.

V.

of the history, literature, and

found in the section "Der indische Buddhismus" (pp. III (Stuttgart, 1964). A different kind of study, which analyzes the symbolism of the art and architecture at Barabudur, should also be mentioned as a resource for studying early popular doctrine of

is

1-215) by Andre Bareau, in Die Religionen Indiens,

Buddhist thought;

this

Paul Mus, Barabudtir, Esquisse d'une histoire du Boud-

is

dhisme. 2 vols. (Hanoi, 193 5).

General discussions of the Buddha's teaching based on the Pali scriptures are

Ryukan Kimura, The Fundamental Doctrine Thought (Tokyo,

tion in Indian

Taught (New York, 1962); while Buddha's teaching before

it

v/as

of Gatitama Buddha and Its Posi-

What

n.d.); and Walpola Rahula,

the Biiddha

dramatic attempt to discover the "original"

a

formulated in the canonical expression

Rhys Davids, Sakya, or Buddhist Origins (London, 1931).

Two

C. A. F.

is

volumes which

give a survey of Indian Buddhist philosophy are A. B. Keith, Buddhist Philosophy in India

U

and Ceylon (Oxford, 1923), and P. Oltramare, Histoire des idees Tome II, La Theosophie bauddhique (Paris, 1923).

theosophiqties dans I'Inde:

The former

gives an analysis of Buddhist ideas

more of

overtones, while the latter expresses

which

sources

have become

available.

colored with rationalistic

Besides,

an intuitive appre-

two books were

hension suggested by Buddhist ideas. Since these

new

is

a sensitivity to

both

written,

many

have been superceded

by

E. Conze, Buddhist Thotight in India (London, 1962). Other works which have sections

on Indian Buddhist thought

are:

Frauwallner, E. Die Philosophic des Buddhismus. Berlin, 1956.

La Vallee Poussin,

L. de.

Le dogme

sur I'histoire des religions, VI.)

Takakusu,

The

J.

Paris,

et la philosophic

du Bouddhisme.

(fitudes

1930.

Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy. Eds.

W.

Chan and

T.

C. A. Moore. Honolulu, 1947.

Thomas, E.

Yamakami, For

a

J. S.

basic

The History of Buddhist Thought.

New

York, 1933.

Systems of Buddhist Thought. Calcutta, 1912.

introduction to the materials available in Buddhist philosophy

up to 1950, C. Regamey, Buddhistische Philosophic (Nos. 20/21 of Bibliographische EinfUhrungen is

in das Stjidium der Philosophic, ed.

very helpful. Also

III

(1933),

see Bibliographic

Bouddhique,

I.

M. Bochenski; Bern, 1950)

Paris, Vols. I

(1930),

II

IV-V (1934), VI (1936), VII-VIII (1937),IX-XX (1949)

A. Card, "Buddhism," Religions, ed. Charles

a

bibliography found in

Adams,

New

A

;

(1931),

Richard

;^

Reader's Guide to the Grcat-

York, 1965, pp. 83-160; and

P.

V. Bapat, 231

•

Emptiness: et. al.,

ed. P.

A

Study in Religious Meaning

"Buddhist Studies in Recent Times," found in 2500 Years of Buddhism, 3 80-442. Some basic dictionaries are:

V. Bapat, Delhi, 1959, pp.

Edgerton,

F.,

Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit

ed.

Grammar and

Dictionary.

New

Haven, 1953. Malalasekera, G. P., ed. Dictionary of Pali Proper

Names.

2 vols.

London, 1937-

38.

A

Monier- Williams, M.

Sanskrit-English Dictionary. Oxford, 1899.

Rhys Davids, T. W., and

Stede,

W.,

eds.

The

Text

Pali

Society's Pali-English

Dictionary. London, 1921-25.

English translations of

many

Buddhist

Society, Translation Series (London, 1909 ed. F.

Max

Miiller (London, 1895 ff.).

of the East, ed. F.

Max Mullen

A

scriptures

are

found in

Pali

Text

and Sacred Books of the Buddhists, few volumes are found in Sacred Books

flf.),

50 vols. (Oxford, 1879-1925).

The

translations

used in this volume and not mentioned elsewhere in the bibliography are:

Buddhaghosa. The Path of Purification (Visuddhimagga) tion

.

Trans, with introduc-

by Bhikkhu Nanamoli. Colombo, 1956.

Dialogues of the Buddha. Trans, with introduction and notes by C. A. F. and

T.

W. Rhys

Davids.

3 vols.

London, 1956;

first

published 1899-1921. Sacred Books

of the Buddhists, II-IV.

The Milinda-Qnestions. Trans, by C. A.

Rhys Davids. London, 1930.

F.

Regarding the development of Mahayana Buddhism in India,

of

Mahayana Buddhism and

Its

Relation to

parison of the Theravada arhat ideal with the

made by using two

Man

Perfected

are

very useful

is

Mahayana bodhisattva

ideal

can be

L B. Horner, Early Btiddhist Theory and Har Dayal, The Bodhisattva Doctrine

excellent studies:

(London, 193 6),

Buddhist Sanskrit Literature (London, 1932).

Buddhism

a still

NaUnaksha Dutt, Aspects Hinayana (London, 1930). A com-

study of some of the basic Buddhist terms

historical

Robert Armstrong,

"A

Two

essays

on the

rise

of in

of Mahayana

Discussion of the Origin of Mahayana

Buddhism," The Eastern Buddhist, IV (1926-28), 27-47, and Etienne Lamotte, "Sur la formation du Mahayana," Asiatica, eds. J. Schubert and U. Schneider (Leipzig, 1954), pp. 337-96; the latter is the better study. S. Yamaguchi gives an illuminating summary of Mahayana doctrinal development in "Development

of Mahayana Buddhist Beliefs," trans, by

K. Morgan

S.

"Watanabe, found in The Path of

the'

(New

York, 1956), pp. 153-81. D. T. Suzuki discusses basic religious concepts in Outlines of Mahayana Buddhism (London, 1907; avail-

Buddha,

ed.

able in paperback),

Two

though much of

this material

comes from non-Indian sources.

books on special topics of study are B. Bhattacharyya,

to Bjiddhist Esoterism

bouddhique 232

(Paris,

An

Introduction

(London, 1932); and L. de La Vallee Poussia, La Morale

1927).

A

synthetic view of the varied expressions of

Bud-

\

Bibliography is found in H. Nakamura's essay, "Unity and Diversity The ?ath of the Buddha, pp. 364-400.

dhism in

in

Buddhism," found

Abhidharma Three systematic discussions of Abhidharma philosophy and psychology were written by scholars with first-hand knowledge of the religious

empathy

for the

Govinda, Lama Anagarika. Philosophy and

The Psychological Attitude of Early Buddhist

Systematic Representation According to

Its

London, 1961

tion.

and an

texts

abhidharma concern:

(first publ.:

Guenther, H. V. Philosophy

Abhidhamma

Tradi-

Patna, 1937).

Psychology in the Abhidharma. Lucknow,

ajtd

1957.

Rhys Davids, C. A.

F.

Buddhist Psychology. London, 1914.

Readers interested in the contents of the Abhidharma literature should also

La Vallee Poussin,

L. de.

found in Bulletin de 98; Pts. Pts.

IV

II

&

&V

III

"Documents dAbhidharma,

traduits et annotes." Pt.

I

I'Ecole frangaise d'Extreme-Orient,

1930, pp. 1-28, 247found in Melanges chinois et bouddhiques, I (1932), 65 -125

found in Melanges chinois Mahathera.

Nyanatiloka

see:

Guide

et bouddhiques,

through

the

V

(1937), 7-1S7.

Abhidhamma-Pifaka.

2nd ed. by Nyanaponika Thera. Colombo, 1957. "On the Abhidharma Literature of the Sarvastivadins," Journal

revised and enlarged

Takakusa,

J.

of the Pali Text Society, 1904-5, pp. 67-146.

Another work, not an

analysis

of the

Abhidharma

literature

but

a perceptive

examination of the Buddhist notion of constructing forms in the phenomenal world within the context of the Indian religious-philosophical milieu, is Maryla Falk,

Nama-rupa and Dharma-rilpa

(Calcutta, 1943).

Buddhist Knowledge

A

thorough examination of epistemology in the Pali scripture

Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge (London, 1963);

such problems

as the role

it

of reason, meaning, and authority.

of lesser scope, though illuminating in

its analysis, is

is

K. N. Jayatilleke,

focuses specifically on

A much

shorter

work

E. R. Sarathchandra, Buddhist

Psychology of Perception (Colombo, 1958). Various

articles

on

specific

problems

include the following:

Bhattacharya, V. "Samdhabhasa,"

IHQ, IV (1928), 287-96.

Guenther, H. V. "The Levels of Understanding in Buddhism," Journal of

American Oriental

Society,

'LXXWll (1958),

19-28.

233

Emptiness:

A

Study in Religious Meaning

La Vallee Poussin, L. de. "Faith and Reason in Buddhism," Proceedings of the Third International Congress for the History of Religions (Oxford, 1908), Pt. pp. 32-43.

II,

Rhys Davids, C. A.

F.

"Dhyana

in Early

Buddhism," IHQ,

III

(1927), 689-715.

Suzuki, D. T. "Reason and Intuition in Buddhist Philosophy," Ch. I of Essays in

East-West Philosophy. Ed. C. A. Moore (Honolulu, 1951), 17-48.

Wayman, A. "The Meaning

Unwisdom

of

—Avidya,"

Philosophy East and

West, VII, nos. 1-2 (April, July, 1957), 21-25.

Wayman, A. "Notes on Oriental Society,

LXXV

the Sanskrit

Term

(1955), 253-68.

Buddhist Understanding of the World and

An

American

Jfiana," Journal of the

Its

"Cause"

made The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux (Calcutta, 193 5). More briefly, Junjiro Takakusu argues against a notion of an absolute static reality in "Buddhism as a Philosophy of Thusness," found in Philosophy East and West, ed. C. A. Moore (Princeton, 1944), pp. 69-108. A "classic disby

extensive examination of the Indian Buddhist view of existence was

Satkari Mookerjee in

cussion" of the nature of existence batskoi),

The Central Conception

'Dharma' (Calcutta, 1961;

first

of Great Britain and Ireland,

of

Theodor Stcherbatsky (Fedor Buddhism and the Meaning of

I.

is

publ. in

Enghsh by the Royal

1923), which, however,

Abhidharmako'sa (a fourth century a.d.

commentary) for

relies its

Shcher-

the

Word

Asiatic Society

heavily

on the

interpertation.

important Buddhist notion of "dependent co-origination" was expounded

two

outstanding scholars in the early part of this century: Louis de

Poussin, Theorie des douze Causes (Gnad, 1913), and Paul Oltramare,

The by

La Vallee

La formule

bouddhique des douze Causes: Son sens originel et son interpretation theologique (Geneve, 1909). Both studies deal primarily with the movement toward origination rather than with the reciprocal forces of "dependent co-origination" are seen in origination

and

alone was found in the

Law,

in

dissolution.

Abhidharma

"The Formulation of

Asiatic Society

meaning of

which

Such an emphasis on the force of origination texts themselves, as pointed out

by

B. C.

the Pratltyasamutpada," Journal of the Royal

(1937), pp. 287-92. Two other brief attempts to clarify the term are found in A. C. Banerjee, "Pratltyasamutpada"

this crucial

IHQ, XXXII (1956), 261-64, and N. Dutt, "The

Place of the Aryasatyas and

the Pratltyasamutpada in Hinayana and Mahayana," Journal of the Bhandakar

Oriental Research Institute (Poona), XI, Pt.

Related to this problem essay

"Kamma,

is

or the Buddhist

II,

pp. 101-27.

an understanding of "karma." Thera Narada's

Law

of Causation," found in B. C.

Law Volume,

though

limited, explanation of the

early Buddhist understanding of karma. In her essay

"Nairatmya and Karman,"

Pt. II (Poona, 1946), pp. 158-75,

found

in Jj)uis

234

is

a clear,

de La Vallee Poussin Memorial Volume (Calcutta, n.d.; pp. 429-64)

,

Bibliography

Maryla Falk

La Vallee Poussin's writings which wrestle with

critically reviews

how Buddhism could hold to a person's responsibility of action without affirming an atman. One more work, specifically on an important elethe problem of

ment of

existence,

is

in Indian Philosophy

Stanislaw Schayer, Contribution to the 'Problem of

Time

(Krakow, 1938).

Nirvana Since the notion of nirvana it

considered in

is

the bases to

is

basic to

any understanding of Indian Buddhism,

the discussions of Buddhist philosophy.

however, have published monographs on

scholars,

Way

all

for interpretation in

this

outstanding

which formed

Western scholarship. La Vallee Poussin wrote

Nirvana (Cambridge, Eng., 1917), and Nirvana

sur I'histoire des Religions, IV.

Two

subject

The

first

(Paris,

1925), Etudes

emphasizes the spiritual significance of

the Buddhist evaluation of the world, while the latter analyzes nirvana in relation to the explicit statements of the various Buddhist schools.

primarily with the expressions of nirvana in early Buddhism.

Both books deal

The second

scholar,

The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana (Leningrad, 1927; reprinted in Indo-Iranian Reprints, VI, The Hague, 1965), which is a discussion of the meaning of nirvana as expressed by various Buddhist schools in

Stcherbatsky, wrote

La Vallee Poussin and Stcherbatsky maintained an academic debate over of nirvana. La Vallee Poussin emphasized its "negative" character, meaning the judged as a nihilistic interpretation by Stcherbatsky, who emphasized and this was India.

that the negative language simply declared the inexpressible character of absolute Being. This debate, seen in the references given in this bibliography, basis

of a short article by La Vallee Poussin, "Nirvana,"

is

also the

IHQ, IV (1928), 347-48.

La Vallee Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, III, No. 2 (July, 1938), 137-60, and Th. Stcherbatsky, "Die drei Richtungen in der Philosophic des Buddhismus," Rocznik Orjentalistyczny, X (1934), 1-37. Two essays published in English by Shoson Miyamoto should also be mentioned; the first is entitled "Freedom, Independence, and Peace in Buddhism," Finally, each scholar affirmed the validity of the other's concern; see L. de

Poussin, "Buddhica,"

PEW, I, No. 4 (January, 1952), 30-40, and II, No. 3 (October, 1952), 208-25. Here Prof. Miyamoto summarizes various renderings of nirvana in "Western languages and compiles a table of seven interpretations of nirvana. The second is "Studies on Nirvana," found in

Commemoration Yolume

60th Birthday (Tokyo, 1960). The

first

study

is

of Dr.

entitled

"Is

Kojun Fukui's

Nirvana Nichts

or Peace"; the second: "Absolute Nirvana and the Limit of Inquiry." also call attention to the

nirvana found in

We

should

thorough analysis of different modern interpretations of

N. Dutt, Aspects

of

Mahayana Buddhism and

Its

Relation to

Hinayana, pp. 141-69, and to a comparison of the Mahayana and Theravada interpretations of nirvana

found on pp. 184-203.

A

classic

early interpretation

235

Emptiness;

A

Study in Religious Meaning

of nirvana in terms of

meaning

its

a religious experience

as

An

Die huddhistische Versenkung (Miinchen, 1918).

Friedrich Heiler,

is

outline of the development

of Western studies on nirvana expressed in early Buddhism

found in G. Richard

is

Walbon, "On Understanding the Buddhist Nirvana," History of No. 2 (Winter, 1966), 300-326.

Religions, V,

Prajfiaparamita

Some

representative studies of Prajndpdramitd

20th century are

as follows:

M. Walleser used

scholars during the

Vajracchedikd-prajndpdramiid

and

to translate portions of the Astasdhasrikd-

by Western

Indian, Tibetan, and Chinese sources in

Prajiidpdramiid, Die Vollkomrnenheit der Erkenntnis (Gottingen, 1914). In 1932,

Matsumoto pubUshed Die Prajndpdramiid Literatur (Stuttgart),

T.

discussed

Sanskrit,

Tibetan,

and

Chinese

of

texts

the

which he

in

Suvikrdntavikrdmi-

Prajndpdramitd. In the same year E. Obermiller published the essay "The Doctrine of Prajfiaparamita

as

Exposed in the Abhisamaydlamkdra of Maltreya," Acta

Orientalia, XI, 1-131, 334-54. Since then

much

further material has been

made

available in English. Giuseppe Tucci, for instance, presented the Sanskrit text,

P rapid pararnitd-

English translation, notes, and Tibetan translation of Dinnaga's

pinddrtha in "Minor Sanskrit Texts on the Prajfiaparamita," Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (1947), pp. 53-75. Also E. J.

from Sanskrit Mahayana

The Career of

scriptures

published

the Predestined Buddhas

Thomas translated short selections as The Perfection of Wisdom:

(London, 1952;

Wisdom

of the East

Series).

The scholar who has published most material on Prajndpdramitd in English is Edward Conze. His The Prajndpdramitd Literature ('s-Gravenhage, 1960), gives and an annotated bibliography of the

a chronological survey of the literature

printed editions, and translations

texts,

now

available.

His translations of the

Prajndpdramitd texts include the following:

Abhisamaydlamkdra. Roma, 1954

(Serie Orientale

Roma, VI). In

"Maitreya's Abhisamayalamkara," East and West, V, No. indicates the importance of this also his

work

for understanding

The Perfection

Slokas. Calcutta, 1958 (Bibliotheca Indica,

Btiddhist

Wisdom

Books:

of

Work No.

The Diamond Sutra and

Wisdom

London, 1961;

Selected Sayings

Pts. II

from

&

III,

in Eight

284, Issue

V, Nos.

Thousand

No. 1578).

the Heart Sutra. London, 1958.

The Large Sutra on Perfect Wisdom^, with Divisions of I,

Sttidies,

5.

Astasdhasrikd Prajndpdramitd:

Pt.

(Oct., 1954),

"Marginal Notes on the Abhisamayalamkara," Sino-Indian

3-4, pp. 21-3

a brief article,

Conze Mahayana thought. See 3

the Abhisamayalamkara.

Madison, 1964.

the Perfection of

Wisdom. London, 195 5.

Vajracchedikd Prajndpdramitd. Roma, 1957 (Serie Orientale Roma, XIII).

236

Bibliography

Two

essays

jnaparamita

by E. Conze

—

of the Prajnaparamita," article,

also

II," Oriental

bear mentioning:

Art,

PEW,

"empty dharmas"

are

III,

III,

No. No.

discussed

"The Iconography of

the Pra-

(1951), 104-9, and "The Ontology 2 (July, 1953), 117-29. In the latter 3

in

terms of the ontological status of

separate dharmas, the psychological attitudes toward them,

and the

logical struc-

made regarding them. A fruitful comparison can be made between the latter and D. T. Suzuki, "The Philosophy and Religion of the Prajnaparamita," found in Essays in Xen Buddhism (Third Series [London, 1934]), ture of statements

pp. 207-88, which stresses the devotional practice involved in the personal attainment of wisdom. Both these articles supercede an earlier and misleading article by S. C. Vidyabhusana, "The Philosophy of the Prajiiaparamita," ]otirnal of the Buddhist Text Society of India, IV (Calcutta, 1896), 9-16.

Life and

Works

of Nagarjuna

Summaries of the problem in identifying the works of Nagarjuna, the

who

historical

Madhyamika philosophy, are found in T. R. V. Murti, Central Philosophy of Buddhism (London, 195 5), pp. 87-91, in R. H. Robinson, "Madhyamika Studies in Fifth-century China," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. person

systematized

School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 1959, pp. 41-52,

V. Ramanan, Nagarjuna's Philosophy

and in K.

Prajfidpdramitd-Sastra

as

(Tokyo, 1966), pp. 25-37. See

Presented

in

also Bu-ston,

Mahd-

the

History of

trans, by E. Obermiller, Pt. I, The Jewelry of Scripture, The History of Buddhism in India and Tibet (Heidelberg, 1931, 1932; Materialien zur Kunde des Buddhismus, 18 & 19). Pt. I, pp. 50-51 deal with

Buddhism {Chos-hbyung) and Pt.

Nagarjuna's

from

,

II,

while Pt.

treatises,

a fourteenth-century a.d.

II,

pp. 122-3

give traditional biographies, as seen

Tibetan Buddhist perspective. Studies of the tra-

ditional Buddhist sources for information about

"Nagarjuna

Filliozat, J.

XXe

et

Nagarjuna include:

Agastya, medecins, chimistes et sorciers," Actes du

Congres International des Orientalistes (Brussels, 1940), pp. 228-31.

Tucci, G. "Animadversiones Indicae: VI.

A

Sanskrit Biography of the Siddhas

and Some Questions Connected with Nagarjuna," Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal,

New

Miyamoto,

S.

Series

XXVI

(1930), 125-60.

"Study of Nagarjuna," unpublished Ph.D.

dissertation,

Oxford

University, 1928. Pp. 1-96. Walleser,

M. "The

Life of Nagarjuna

from Tibetan and Chinese Sources."

Trans, by A. A. Probsthain, Hirth Anniversary Volume. Ed. B. Schindler. London, 1922. Pp. 421-55.

M. Winternitz

gives a

Indian Literature,

II,

summary of

the legends about Nagarjuna in his History of

341-48. See also

M.

Eliade,

Yoga, pp. 402

&

415; E. Lamotte, 2}7

Emptiness:

A

Study In Religious Meaning

Le Traite de

grande vertn de sagesse de Nagarjuna (Louvain, 1944), Vol.

la

x; and R. Gard,

"An

I,

Introduction to the Study of Madhyamika Buddhism," un-

published Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate School, 1951, pp. 99-107, for

more bibliographical information. Two articles, in which the philosopher named Nagarjuna is distinguished from the magician and healer by the same name on historical grounds, are V. W. Karambelkar, "The Problem of Nagarjuna," journal of Indian History, XXX (1952), 21-33, and P. S. Sastri, "Nagarjuna and

XXXI

Aryadeva," IHQ,

(195 5), 193-202.

Nagarjunakonda, which depicts and inscriptions found

facts

IHQ,

Inscriptions,"

Inscriptions

from

(1929-30),

1-37,

there,

is

study of the archaeological

between Nagarjuna and the

N. Dutt, "Notes on

VII (1931), 632-53. Also

J.

the

site

arti-

Nagarjunakonda

Ph. Vogel, in his article "Prakrit

Buddhist Site at Nagarjunakonda," Epigraphia Indica,

a

Buddhists at this

A

a relationship

XX

and a community of

shows evidence of popular worship site.

Various Sanskrit, Tibetan, and Chinese texts which have been credited with

Nagarjuna's authorship are discussed and translated into Western languages in the following:

Vidyabhusana, losophy, Series,

No.

S.

"A

C.

1," Journal

IV (1908), }67-79.

La Vallee Poussin,

MCB,

Descriptive List of "Works on the Madhyamika Phiand Proceedings of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, New

I

L.

de.

"Nagarjuna

et

Vasubandhu

sur

'3

les

natures',"

(1932), 404.

La Vallee Poussin, trois natures,"

L. de.

MCB,

"Le Petit

traite

de Vasubandhu-Nagarjuna sur

les

(1933), 147-61. This gives the Tibetan and Sanskrit

II

texts with a French translation of Svabhdvatrayapravesasiddhi (3 8 verses).

"On

Gard, R.

the Authenticity of the Chung-lun," IBK,

III,

No.

1

(Sept.,

1954), (7)-(13). Gard, R.

No.

2

"On

the Authenticity of the Pai-lun and Shih-erh-men-lun," 1KB,

In the two

last articles the

mentioned in the

In Le Traite de

of Chapters 1-3

la

grande vertn de sagesse de Nagarjuna {Mahapra'ptdpdramita-

found in

1944 and 1949), Etienne Lamotte provides

a translation

of the Kumarajiva's Chinese translation, Ta-chih-tu-lun, with

extensive footnotes. is

author questions Nagarjuna's authorship of the writings

titles.

sdstra), 2 vols. (Louvain,

text

II,

(March, 1954), 751-42.

a

An

illuminating analysis of Nagarjuna's contribution to this

"On

twenty-three page section, entitled

the

Author of 'Ta-chih-

tu-lun,' " of the Introduction to Siivikrdnta-vikrdini Pariprcchd Prajndpdramitdsutra, edited

with introduction by Ryusho Hikato

claims that there are three classes of passages: 1)

which

are additions

by the

translator Kumarajlva, 2)

could not have been made by a foreigner, and 3) 23 8

(Fukuoko,

1958). Hikato

those clearly not Nagarjuna's those of Nagarjuna

which

those questionable passages

Bibliography

which are Ramanan,

better

regarded

Nagarjuna's

as

as

traditionally

in Ndgdrjtma's Philosophy as Presented in the

Sdstra (Tokyo, 1966)

Venkata

K.

has given the material of the Ta-chih-tu-lun through an

of

translation

interpretative

held.

Mahd-Prajndpdramitd-

philosophical

the

work. Ramanan's interpretation

passages

found throughout

the

based on the traditional Buddhist view that the

is

was composed by Nagarjuna. Another important commentary, Akutohhayd, has been translated

entire Sdstra

tirety:

in

its

en-

Die mittlere Lehre des Ndgdrjuna, nach der tibetischen Version iibertragen,

by M. Walleser, Part II of Die buddhistische Philosophie in ihrer geschichtEntwicklung (Heidelberg, 1911). Most scholars today doubt Nagarjuna's authorship of this commentary, as exemplified in the resume of an article by Chotatsu Ikeda, "Is Nagarjuna the author of the A-kuto-Bhaya?" found in Comtrans,

lichen

memoration Volume: the Twenty-fifth Anniversary of the Foundation of the Professorship of Science of Religion in

Tokyo

Imperial University, Celebration

(Tokyo, 1934), pp. 291-93. See also Max Walleser, Die mittlere Lehre des Ndgdrjuna, nach der chinesischen Version iibertragen (Heidelberg,

Committee,

eds.

1912).

Giuseppe Tucci has made chapters lish translation

and IV of the Sanskrit text with Eng"The Ratnavali of Nagarjuna," Journal of

I, II,

of Ratndvali available in

the Royal Asiatic Society, 1934, pp. 307-25; and 1936, pp. 237-53, 423-35.

A

group of four hymns (Catuhstava) has been attributed to Nagarjuna; these hymns are discussed

and translated

La Vallee Poussin, Series

In

XIV

MCB

I

in:

Quatre Odes du Nagarjuna," Le Museon,

L. de. "Les

(1913), pp. 1-18. Here

(1932), 395, and

III

is

found

a

New

Tibetan text with French translation.

(1934), 374, La Vallee Poussin comments on

the problems of the hymns. Patel,

P.

"Catustava,"

Sanskrit restoration

Patel, P. "Catustava,"

for his choice of the four

Tucci, G. ciety,

IHQ, VIII (1932), 316-31 & 689-705. This

from the Tibetan

IHQ, X (1934), 82-89. This hymns in his earlier article.

"Two Hymns

is

a

text. article gives a justification

of the Catuh-stava," Journal of the Royal Asiatic So-

1932, pp. 309-25. This provides the Sanskrit text which was just then

discovered, with an English translation, of

On the Mahdydnavimsaka,

two of the four hymns.

attributed to Nagarjuna, see:

Bhattacharya, V. ed. Mahdydnavimsaka of Ndgdrjuna. Calcutta, 19}!. This gives a reconstructed Sanskrit text,

Tibetan and Chinese versions with an English trans-

lation.

Yamaguchi,

S.

"Nagarjuna's Mahayana-vimsaka," Eastern Buddhist, IV (1926),

169-71. This presents Tibetan and Chinese texts with an English translation and notes.

Text

editions

and

translations

of

Nagarjuna's

Vigraha-vydvartant

are:

239

"

A

Emptiness:

Study in Religious Meaning

Johnston, E. H. and Kunst, A. "The VigrahavyavartanI of Nagarjuna," MCB, IX (1951), 108-51. This is a critical edition of the Sanskrit text. Mookerjee, S. "The Absolutists' Standpoint in Logic," The Nava-Nalanda-

Mahavihara Research Publication. Vol.

I,

Mookerjee,

S.

1-175. This article contains an English translation and

ed.,

Nalanda [1957], pp.

commentary of

the Vigraha-

vydvartanh Robinson, R. "The Vigraha-vyavartanI," unpublished English translation based

on the Johnston and Kunst edition of the Sanskrit text (mimeographed). Tucci, G. "VigrahavyavartanI by Nagarjuna," found

XLIX). This

Series,

in

on Logic from Chinese Sources, Baroda, 1929

dhist Texts

gives a Tibetan text

Pre-Dinnaga

Bud-

(Gaekwad Oriental

with an English translation, and in-

cludes a vrtti (explanation) which, according to Tucci, circulated independently.

Yamaguchi,

S.

Jotirnal Asiatique,

from

CCXV

Tour

(1929), 1-86. This

is

ecarter a

les

vaines discussions,'

French translation, with notes,

Tibetan version.

a

The

"Traite de Nagarjuna,

text of the Mddhyamika-kdrikds

available in Sanskrit, Tibetan,

study

for this

is

is

to be

found only within commentaries

and Chinese. The edition of the Sanskrit text used

Mfdamadhyamakakdrikds

{Mddhyamikasutras)

Prasannapadd, Commentaire de Candrakirti, ed. Louis de

avec

la

(St.

Petersbourg, 1913).

The

la

de Ndgdrjtma Vallee Poussin

translation of the twenty-seven chapters

ing to La Vallee Poussin's edition)

in Candrakirti's

(accord-

Prasannapadd into Western

languages has been achieved in a piece-meal fashion;

they are given below in

chronological order of appearance:

Stcherbatsky, Th. Appendix to Conception of Buddhist Nirvana. Leningrad,

1927: Chs.

& XXV.

I

Schayer,

S.

Ausgewdhlte Kapitel

atis

der Prasannapadd. Krakowie, 1931: Chs. V,

XII-XVL Schayer,

"Feuer und BrennstoflF," Rocznik Orientalistyczny, VII

S.

(1931),

26-52: Ch. X.

Lamotte, E. "Le Traite de

I'acte

de Vasubandhu, Karmasiddhiprakarana,"

MCB,

IV (1936), 265-88: Ch. XVIL

De IX)

:

Jong,

May,

du

Cinq

J.

chapitres de

la

Prasannapada. Paris, 1949 (Buddhica Memoires,

Chs. XVIII-XXII. J.

Candrakirti Prasannapadd Madhyamakavrtti: Douze chapitres traduits

Sanscrit et

du

tibetain,

accompagnes d'une introduction, de notes

et

edition de la version tibetaine. Paris, 1959: Chs. II-IV, VI-IX, XI, XXIII,

d'une

XIV,

XXVI, XXVII. It should also

translation

[1957]. 240

be noted that H. N. Chatterjee gives the Sanskrit verses and English

of Chs. I-V in Mula-Madhyamaka-Karika of Nagarjuna,

Calcutta

Bibliography

Madhyamika Four

which

articles

thought

direct attention to the negative expression in Indian religious

are:

Heimann, B. C.

Dialectic

"The

B.

Lmv Volume,

Radhakrishnan,

Hibbert Journal,

Hindu

Significance of Negation in

Part

II,

Philosophical Thought,"

Poona, 1946, 408-13.

"The Teaching of Buddha by Speech and by

S.

XXXII

Silence,"

The

(Oct., 1933-July, 1934), 343-56.

Raju, P. T. "The Principle of Four-cornered Negation in Indian Philosophy," Review of Metaphysics, VII, No. 4 (June, 1954), 694-713. Wayman, A. "The Buddhist 'Not this, Not this,' " PEW, XI, No. 3 (October,

—

1961), 99-114. Material on the use and development of logic in Buddhism can be found in the publications of the following scholars: Chatterji,

D. C. "Sources of Buddhist Logic, from the

IHQ, IX (1933), 499-502. Dambuyant, M. "La dialectique bouddhique," Revue

traditional point

of

view,"

et

de I'Etranger,

CXXXIX

philosophique de

la

France

(1949), Nos. 7-9, 307-18.

Kajiyama, Y. "Bhavaviveka and the Prasangika School," The Nava-Nalandaed. S. Mookerjee, Nalanda, I [1957], 289-331.

Mahavihara Research Publication,

Kunst, A. "The Concept of the Principle of the Excluded Middle in Buddhism,"

Rocznik Orientalistyczny,

La Vallee Poussin, Schayer,

"Ober

S.

XXI

(1957), 141-47.

L. de. "Bhavaviveka," die

MCB,

(1933), 60-67.

II

Methode der Nyaya-Forschung," found

Moritz Winternitz, Leipzig, 1933, pp. 147-257. Stcherbatsky, Th. Buddhist Logic, 's-Gravenhage, Leningrad, 1930

as

Vol.

XXI,

work was

par

Madame

I.

also translated into

8

(first

published

in

Pt. II of Biblioteca Buddhica).

Stcherbatsky, Th. La theorie de tardifs, traduit

195

in Festschrift

la

connaissance et

la

logique chez

les

bo-uddhistes

de Manziarly et P. Masson-Oursel, Paris, 1926. This

German

as

Erkenntnistheorie

und Logik nach

der

Lehre der spateren Buddhisten, Miinchen, 1924. Tucci, G.

On Some

Aspects of the Doctrines of Maitreya [natha] and Asanga,

Calcutta, 1930.

The following

articles discuss

Buddhist dialectical expression in terms of symbolic

logic:

Nakamura, H. "Buddhist Logic Expounded by Means of Symbolic Logic," IBK, VII, No.

1

(Dec.

1958),

(1)-(21). This

Japanese in the same periodical. Vol. Staal,

J.

F.

Ill,

No.

article 1

was originally published

(Sept.,

"Correlations between language and

in

1954), 223-31.

logic

in

Indian thought," 241

A

Emptiness:

Study in Religious Meaning

Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, XXIII, Pt. I

(1960),

109-22.

"Negation and the law of contradiction in Indian thought; a comparative study," Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, XXV, Staal, J. F.

Pt.

(1962), 52-71.

1

Madhyamika Buddhism

Studies which expUcitly examine the use of dialectic in include:

Madhyamika Philosophy," found

Hatani, R. "Dialectics of the

Buddhism

Tokyo, 1939, Vol.

in Japan,

Mookerjee,

"The

S.

I,

5

Absolutists' Standpoint in Logic,"

Nalanda-Mahavihara Research

Ptiblication, Vol.

found in The Nava-

1-175.

I,

PEW,

Robinson, R. H. "Some Logical Aspects of Nagarjuna's System," No. 4 (January, 1957), 291-308.

We

on

in Studies

3-71.

VI,

should also point out that T. R. V. Murti's The Central Philosophy of Bud-

dhism thoroughly

discusses

topic in Pt.

this

"The

II,

Dialectic

System of

as

Philosophy."

Interpretations of

The most complete religious

thought

is

discussion of

Madhyamika Thought

Madhyamika philosophy

of the Madhyamika System (London, 1955).

Nagarjuna's

of

in relation to Indian

T. R. V. Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism:

dialectic,

though

it

It

is

a clear

and

incisive

considerable

reflects

A

Study

examination

from

influence

Stcherbatsky's view of "emptiness" as depicted in Conception of Buddhist Nirvana,

and

a

not altogether appropriate Kantian concern with epistemology alone in in-

terpreting

102-11,

is

Jacques May's

Nagarjuna's negations.

Madhyamika:

a

critical

a perceptive analysis of

"Kant

review

propos d'un livre recent," Indo-Iranian Journal,

III,

No.

2

et

le

(1959),

Dr. Murti's view.

Three doctoral dissertations must be noted for their investigations of Madhyamika thought.

The

1928, which

first is is

a

Shoson Miyamoto, "Study of Nagarjuna," Oxford University,

survey of the

and teachings of Nagarjuna

life

as

preserved in

both meditation- and devotion-traditions of Mahayana Buddhism. The Appendix (pp. 169-330)

gives a partial translation of Pingala's

Richard A. Gard,

"An

Chung-lun. The second

Claremont Graduate School, 1951. The primary importance of extensive

is

Introduction to the Study of Madhyamika Buddhism,"

information that has

bibliographical

been

collected

this

work

on the

is

the

history,

Madhyamika throughout its development in different The third is Richard H. Robinson, "Madhyamika Studies

philosophy, and texts of countries and languages.

in Fifth-century China," University of

transmission of

Madhyamika from

Chinese understood and accepted

\

242

London, 1959. This study concerns the

India to China and the degree to which the

it.

A

revision of this dissertation will soon be

Bibliography

published

as

Early Madhyamika in India and China by the University of Wisconsin

Press.

Two

monographs which interpret Madhyamika thought are Vicente (Argentina), 1941, and Poul Tuxen, Indledende Bemaerkningen til Bitddbistisk Relativisme, K0benhavn, 1936. Both short

Fatone, El Budismo "Nihilista," La Plata

of these general analyses depict Nagarjuna's dialectic as the negation of every particular entity in order to express the "whole" or "total" that

of

all

particulars. In his article

Visvabbarati Quarterly,

"A

Fresh Appraisal of the

XXVII, No. 3/4 (1961/62), 230-38, K. Venkata Ramanan

emphasizes that the central element in Madhyamika thought use of reason and concepts, not to negate them; thus

and affirmed. Harsh Narain, in "Sunyavada: (Jan.,

1964),

311-38,

the source

is

Madhyamika Philosophy,"

the

reasserts

A

all

is

to

know

the proper

views are likewise negated

Reinterpretation,"

PEW,

argument that "emptiness"

XIII,

is

No. 4

"absolute

form of Absolutism or Absolutistic monism." Four other writers give useful insights into Madhyamika thought through

nihilism rather than a

lating "the middle

way"

to aspects of the Buddhist

re-

tradition:

Dutt, N. "The Brahmajala Sutta," IHQ, VIII (1932), 706-46.

Miyamoto,

S.

"The Buddha's

First

Sermon and the Original Patterns of the

Middle Way," IBK, XIII, No. 2 (March, 1965), (l)-(ll); and "The Conception of 'Abhidharma' Viewed from the Standpoint of 'Ultimate Middle,' " found in

Commemorative Volume: The Twenty-fifth Anniversary of the Professorship of Science of Religion in Tokyo Imperial

the Foundation of University, Tokyo,

1934, pp. 315-21.

Madhyamic Interpretation," Yamaguchi Commemorative Volume,

Nagao, G. M. "The Silence of the Buddha and Studies in Indology and Buddhology:

S.

Its

Kyoto, 1955, pp. 137-51.

Bhikkhu U. Dhammaratana, "Nairatmya Doctrine Light of Sunyavada," unpublished Ph.D.

in Early

dissertation.

Theravada in the

University of Calcutta,

1961.

Two

articles

by La Vallee Poussin on Madhyamika

cyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, ed.

J.

are

Hastings, VIII

"Madhyamaka," En(1916), 23 5-37, and

Madhyamaka," MCB, II (1933), 1-59, additions and corrections: 139-46. The first of these is somewhat limited as a general interpretation; the later, longer, and more incisive article deals specifically with pratitya-samutpdda and tattva as basic concepts for understanding Indian Madhyamika. Regarding the historical development of Madhyamika philosophy, the writings of two other

"Reflexions sur

scholars

le

might be mentioned:

S.

C. Vidyabhusana discusses the place of

the

"The Madhyamika School," Joiirnal of the Buddhist Text Society, 1895, No. 2, pp. 3-9, and No. 3, pp. 9-23, and in "History of the Madhyamika Philosophy of Nagarjuna," Journal of the Buddhist Text Society, 1897, No. 4, pp. 7-20. Richard A. Card suggests some areas of in-

Madhyamika

school in Indian thought in

24}

I

A

Emptiness:

Study in Religious Meaning

Madhyamika

vestigation for learning about the demise of the

the

Madhyamika Decline?" IBK, V, No.

source

XVI,

is

Aryadeva

P. L. Vaidya, Etudes sur

1923; the

Paris,

first

cluding one entitled "Le

et la

A

most directly to

this study, in-

Madhyamapratipad."

Interpretations of "Emptiness" in

Madhyamika Thought

perceptive analysis of the "unconditioned" in Buddhist thought

Andre Bareau's Uabsolu en

philosopbie

"Why Did

et son Cahih'sataka: chapitres VIII-

three chapters pertain

Madhymika

school in

(March, 1957), (10) -(14). Another

2

boiiddhiqiie:

evolution

found

is

de

la

in

notion

d'asamskrta (Paris, 1951); see esp. pp. 174-86 on Nagarjuna's use of "emptiness."

Four

articles of

Madhyamika

in

De

high quality which analyze the meaning of "ultimate emptiness" are:

"Le Probleme de

I'absolu

dans

Philcsophique de la France et de Vttranger,

CXL

Jong,

May,

J.

"La philosophie

J.

(Separate Vol.)

Miyamoto,

S.

S.

Madhyamaka," Revue

(1950), 323-27. vacuite,"

la

Sttidia

Philosophlca

XVIII (1958), 123-37. "Voidness and Middle Way," found in Studies on Buddhism in

Japan, Tokyo, 1939, Vol. Schayer,

bouddhique de

I'ecole

I,

73-92.

"Das Mahayanistische Absolutum nach der Lehre der Madhyamikas,"

Orientalistische Literaturzeitung,

XXXVIII

(193 5), 401-15. In a later article

"Notes and Queries on Buddhism," Rocznik Orjentalistyczny, XI (193 5), 20613, Schayer gives the text, English translation, and explanation of the Tibetan of

version

Madhyamika

On see

in

Madhyamakaratnapradipa

to

illustrate

his

interpretation

of

the

absolute.

the elaboration of the meaning of "emptiness" in Prajndpdramitd thought,

A Note on the Twenty Modes of Sunyata" found CPB, and Eugene Obermiller, "A Study of the Twenty Aspects of Sunyata, T. R. V. Murti, "Appendix:

based on Haribhadra's Abhisamayalamkaraloka

prajnaparamita-sutra,"

and the Pancavimsatisahasrika-

IHQ, IX (1933), 170-87.

A

special

study regarding 119

"good dharmas" discussed in verses 7 and 52-5 5 of the Vigraba-vydvartani

is

H. Johnston, "Nagarjuna's Kst of Ktisala-dharmas," IHQ, XIV (1938), 314-23. Other essays on the meaning of "emptiness" include:

found

in E.

Bhattacharya, A. R. "Brahman IHQ, XXXII (1956), 270-85.

of Sankara

•Conze, E. "Meditations on Emptiness," The

and Sunyata of Madhyamikas,"

Maba

Bodbi,

May 2499/195 5,

pp.

203-11.

Coomaraswamy, A. K. "KJha and other Words denoting

'zero'

in

Connection

with the Metaphysics of Space," Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies, VII (1933-35), 487-97.

La Vallee Poussin, 30-31.

244

L. de.

"The Madhyamika and

the Tathata,"

IHQ, IX (1933),

Bibliography

___^ .

"Notes on (1) Sunyata and (2) the Middle Path," IHQ, IV

(1928), 161-68.

Mukhopadhya, Bbaraia,

"Doctrine of Shunyata in Mahayana Buddhism," Prabuddhi

S.

XLYIU

(1943), 327-29.

Hamilton, C. H. "Encounter with Reality in Buddhist Madhyamika Philosophy," journal of Bible and Religion,

XXVI

pression of the personal significance

1958), 13-22. This

(January,

is

an ex-

found in Nagarjuna's philosophy, based on

T. R. V. Murti's interpretation of emptiness.

"Emptiness" in Eastern Thought

A

very useful analysis that delineates the interpretations to which the use of

such a term teristics

"emptiness" easily

as

falls

prey

is

of Oriental Nothingness," translated

Shin-ichi Hisamatsu,

by R. De Martino

"The Charac-

in collaboration

with Jikai Jujiyoshi and Masao Abe, found in Philosophical Studies of Japan, Vol. II, Tokyo, 1960, pp. 65-97. Quite a diflFerent expression is found in Kitaro Nishida, Intelligibility and the Philosophy of Nothingness: Essays, translated and introduced

by R. Schinzinger

and T. Kojima, Tokyo, 1958. This

is

Three Philosophical

in collaboration

an attempt of

philosophical worlds of the East and West. In one of the essays,

World," absolute nothingness

is

regarded

as

with

I.

Koyama

a philosopher to integrate the

"The

Intelligible

an absolute being without the con-

The reader might also find helpful the essays in Part "The General Sense of Zen," of The Essentials of Zen Buddhism: Selected Writ-

notation of a static reaKty. I

ings of Daisetz T. Suzuki, ed. B. PhiUips

(New York,

1962)

,

for repeated references

to "negative" expressions in a major Far Eastern tradition of Buddhism. Also see

"A

Lin Li Kouan,

propos de

la

Sunyata (La Vide)," La Pensee bouddhique. No.

1940), pp. 8-12, for a summary of the meaning which early and later Buddhism found in the notion of "emptiness." Western writers attempting 5

(Juillet,

to interpret "emptiness" in relation to

Western categories include Betty Heimann,

Indian and Western Philosophy (London, 1937), and Massimo Scaligero, "The

Doctrine of the Void and the Logic of the Essence," East and West, XI (1960), 249-57.

Religious In this section sider

we

Meaning

will point to several

Nagarjuna's use of "emptiness."

works which do not necessarily con-

It also goes

without saying that

many

of

the works already mentioned could be placed together with other studies on religious

rived

meaning. Several works on language and the philosophical implications de-

from the use of language

Cassirer, E.

are:

Language and Myth. Trans, by ,

by R. Mannheim

S.

K. Langer.

Philosophic der symbolischen Formen. as

The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms.

New

Berlin,

New

York, 1946. 1923-29. Trans.

Haven, 1953. 245

A

Emptiness;

Study In Religious Meaning

Flew, A. ed. Essays in Conceptual Analysis. London, 1956. Langer,

K. Philosophy in a

S.

New

Key:

A

Study

Symbolism of Reason,

in the

Rite and Art. Cambridge (Mass.), 1942.

W. M. Language

Urban,

and Reality.

New

York, 1939.

Wittgenstein, L. Philosophische Untersuchungen.

English translation by G. E.

also includes the

New

York, 1953. This volume

M. Anscombe,

as

Philosophical In-

vestigations.

Various philosophers and theologians have dealt with the nature of religious

language and

relation to reality or truth.

its

The writings which have been most

helpful for this study include:

Meland, B. "Religious Awareness and Knowledge," The Review of Religion, III,

No.

(Nov., 1938), 17-32.

1

Moreau,

J. L.

Language and Religious Language. Philadelphia, 1961.

Moses, D. G. Religious Truth and the Relation between Religions. Madras, 1950.

Munz,

P.

Problems of Religious Knowledge. London, 1959.

Ramsey, L T. Religious Language. London, 1957. Slater,

R. Paradox and Nirvana. Chicago, 1951.

Smart, N. Reasons and Faiths:

An

Investigation of Religious Discourse, Chris-

and Non-Christian. London, 1958.

tian

TiUich, P. Systematic Theology, Vol.

A

I.

Chicago, 1951.

third focus in the problem of religious

structures or patterns of religious awareness. lications wrestle

the

meaning has been on describing the

The authors

in the following pub-

with the process and forms of symbolizing used by

man

to express

awesome power of the Divine:

Eliade, (first

M. Cosmos and History. Trans, by W. R. Trask. Mythe de I'eternel retour: archetypes et

published as Le

"History of Religions and a

.

ligions,

I,

No.

(Summer, 1961),

1

New

York, 1959,

repetition,

New Humanism."

1949).

History of Re-

1-8.

New

.

Images and Symbols. Trans, by P. Mairet.

.

Patterns in Comparative Religions. Trans, by R. Sheed. London,

.

The Sacred and

York, 1961.

1958.

W.

R. Trask.

New

Northrop, F.

S.

the Profane:

The Nature

C. The Meeting of East and West.

Otto, R. The Idea of the Holy. Trans, by (first

published in 1917 as Das Heilige).

246

of Religion. Trans,

by

York, 1959.

J.

W.

New

York, 1946.

Harvey.

New

York, 1958

Bibliography

Streng, F. J.

"The Problem of Symbolic Structures

History of Religions, IV, No.

J.

in Religious Apprehension,"

(Summer, 1964), 126-53. Wach, J. A Comparative Study of Religions. Ed. with an introduction by M. Kitagawa. New York, 1958. .

1

Types of Religious Experience:

Christian

and Non-Christian.

Chicago, 1951.

247

INDEX Abhidharma (Abhidhamma)

29,

,

30-3

5,

43-44, 58, 61, 70, 81, 84, 96, 163, 233

Absolute Being. See Reality, Ultimate, and

Asamskria Analogy, use

Anatman

123-27

of,

van Buitenen,

150,

157-60,

165,

167,

204,

also

J.

A.

104

B.,

Candrakirti,

3 5,

181

Cassirer, Ernst, 26, 174, 245

Anitya (anicca, impermanence), 36, 47,

219

reality), 45, 48, 49,

69, 216,

226

Atharvaveda, 115 (Self,

122-25,

165,

194,

196,

203-5,

illusion), 31, 45, 46,

96. See Prapanca

De

Jong,

32,

54,

198,

200, 217

of, 36-39,

59, 85, 91,

169. See also Existence, conditioned

119-21,

135-37

Bodhisattva, 34, 54, 79, 84, 88, 89, 168 as

co-origination.

the eternal energy and sub-

stratum of existence, 58, 117, 122-26;

"powerful creative utterance," 104

Brdhmana, 108-14, 118, 130 Brahmanic sacrifice, 108-14, 117, 118

Pratitya

See

samuipdda

Dharma:

as

existence,

Bareau, A., 9, 231, 244

244

77n., 240,

J.,

Desire (rdga)

(a basis of sense),

Bhagavad-gttd,

Dhydna and Yoga

10, 54w., 77, 85, 230, 231,

E., 9,

Dependent

Avidya (ignorance,

Brahman:

Concentration. See

36,

218-20

Becoming, process

127, 128

236-37, 244

permanent essence), 30,

127,

Chdndogya Upanisad, 124, 125,

Conze,

54, 71, 79, 88, 89

Ayaiana

and Prat-

Christian gospel, 23

Astasahasrika Prajnaparamitd, 45, 46, 53,

Aiman

See Pratityasamutpdda

Cause.

yaya

Asamskrta (unconditioned, non-composite

as

Buddha, 46, 86, 161, 201-3, 214. See

37, 47, 48,

,

209

59,

113

priest,

Brhad-dranyaka Upanisad, 118, 129 Tathdgata

(without-a-'^self ")

84,

59,

Brahmin

51, 189-90,

,

198

"factor" or "element" of

a

30,

31,

37,

143,

150,

183,

192,

222,

223,

226,

227;

or "Teaching," 84,

15

43-57, 201,

63,

58,

202,

213,

"Truth"

as

the

8,

199, 213-15,

220

Bhdtu

(basic element), 32, 54,

56,

188-

89

Dhydna

{jhdna,

contemplation,

tration), 29, 91«.,

Dialectic used 86,

148-50,

by Nagarjuna, 156,

concen-

234 161-63,

31,

3 5,

172,

242

249

76,

241,

Emptiness:

A

Dialectical

structure

Study in Religious Meaning of

appre-

religious

Intention of religious expression, 170-72

Divine action, 108-15 Drsti

(viewpoint,

tive),

50,

philosophical

perspec-

218-20

Duhkha (dukkha,

structure

Intuitive

hension,

of

religious

appre-

106, 122-3 8

105,

pain, sorrow, turmoil),

29, 30, 47, 48, 59, 149, 197

Dutt, Nalinaksha,

Indriya (sense: faculty), 54, 186-87 Insight. See Prajna

hension, 22, 139-52

Jayatilleke, K. N., 95«.,

9, 26, 75n., 79n.,

230,

233

Johnston, E. H., 10, 240, 244

232, 234, 235, 238, 243

Dvadasanga (twelve components), 217-18

Karma (kamma, tion),

Edgerton,

P.,

229, 230, 232

product of ac-

action,

66-68,

150,

85,

70,

168,

192-93, 201-3

Eliade, Mircea, 18, 23, 104, 107, 141, 230,

246

Katha Upanisad, 117, 124, 126, 127 Kathenotheism, 130, 132

Emptiness, awareness of, 161-66

Keith, A. B., 22, 229, 231

"Emptiness," notion of, 46, 64, 69, 72, 75n., 76-80,

84,

92-93,

155-69,

152,

198, 223, 224-27

Emptiness of

all

Enlightenment, Evil. See

161-63.

Duhkha,

30,

Klesa (evil, desire), 67, 71, 161, 204, 210

Knowledge, 4,

220

things, 17, 210,

See

Prajna

also

Klesa, Viparydsa

Existence, conditioned {samskrta) of,

38,

:

"Knowledge"

in Buddhist thought,

59-61, 68, 190-91, 207-9; dis-

233-

34

Knowledge of Truth. arising

103-

religious, 17, 19, 21, 83,

170-80

See

Truth

Krsna, 119, 120, 136, 137

Kunst, A., 10, 240, 241

solution of, 192, 207-9; nature of, 36-

and Samsara

38, 64. See also Prapaiica

Laksana

229, 237

(Noble)

(defining

tic), 44, 71,

"Fire," analysis of, 194-96

Four Holy

59«., 66n.,

de, 22,

75«., 78, 157, 231-35, 238-41, 243, 244

Falk, M., 104, 233, 235 Filliozat, J.,

La Vallee Poussin, L.

Truths

(caturary-

mark

or characteris-

84, 85

Lamotte, Etienne,

9, 10, 22, 26, 54«.,

230,

232, 237, 238

asatya), 73, 212-15

Nagarjuna's use

Logic,

Frauwallner, E., 22, 231

147-50.

See

also

of,

52,

Dialectic

94,

97,

used

by

Freedom. See Release, Spiritual

Nagarjuna Card, R. A., 231, 23 8, 242, 243

"Going

to," analysis of,

Govinda,

181, 184-86

51,

Lama Anagarika,

10, 233

"Logic of convergence," 107, 122, 123 "Logic of language," 102, 105-8 "Logic of mutual exclusion," 107, 108

Grasping. See Trsna

Madhyamaka Karikas (Fundamentals the Middle Way), 10, 30, 32, 44,

Guenther, H, V., 233

181,

Hatani, R., 242

Heimann,

B., 229, 241,

245

Hikato, R., 238

Hisamatsu, Shin-ichi, 162w., 245

182, 240

Mddhyamika (Middle Path

122, 165

Illusion. See

250

Avidya

School),

29,

50,96-97

30, 37,

Mahaprajnaparamita-sastra, 84, 238, 239

Mahay ana, Idolatry,

of 5 8,

32, 96,

168

Maitri Upanisad, 117

May,

J.,

57n., 240, 242,

244

,

Index

Meaning, implicit norm

105-7,

25,

of,

139, 142-44

Meaning,

"Perfect wisdom." See Prajna

Phala

Knowledge,

See

religious.

re-

product), 60, 193, 201-3,

(fruit,

205-7 Phantom-creation, 211, 224

ligious

Dhyana

Meditation. See

Meland,

Potter, K., 229

176, 246

B.,

Mental fabrication

50,

52,

Prapanca

59, 64, 67, 69. See also

S.,

23

Mookerjee,

S.,

59m., 14in., 234, 240,

67,

5,

242

Prapanca (phenomenal extension), 71, 87,

to,"

Prdsangika school,

96-97

3 5,

Pratitya samuipdda ("causal relations, de-

analysis of

Mulamadhyamaka

Kdrikds.

Madhy-

See

amaka Karikas

pendent co-origination"), 37, 147, 150;

"empty,"

as

Murti, T. R. V.,

9,

22,

50«.,

76, 86n.,

et fascinans,

101,

138 structure

58-67,

73,

166-69,

92,

215, 234-35

Pratyaya (conditioning cause), 60, 183-

148, 237, 242, 244

Mysterium tremendutH Mythical

in-

spiritual

82-97, 159-63

217. See also Mental fabrication

"Going

See

of.

17, 29, 30, 38,

73, 79, 81, 84, 85, 164, 236, 237

Moses, D. G., 172, 246 analysis

wisdom,

(paiind,

Prajndpdramita literature, 29, 30-3

237, 242-44

Miyamoto,

Motion,

Prajna sight),

Methodological assumptions, 24, 25 5,

109-12

Prajdpati,

(processes),

of

religious

appre-

84 Prayer.

See

Purusa:

as

Word pure

consciousness,

145;

as

primordial man, 132-33

hension, 105-21

Purva (previous, "pre-existent Reality"), 193-94, 196. See also Time

Nagao, G. M., 243 Nagarjuna,

28-40, 43,

20,

Nakamura, H.,

156m., 23

44,

237-40 Radhakrishnan,

241

3,

Negation. See Dialectic used by Nagarjuna

Nirvana

("dying out" of egotism), 30,

45, 69-81, 151, 161, 164-66, 200, 201,

plicit

of meaning." See Meaning,

norm

Ramanan, K. Reality,

V., 95m., 237, 239, 243

phenomenal.

Samsdra

See

and

Samskrta

204, 208, 213, 215-17, 235, 236

"Norm

229, 230, 241

S.,

Raju, P. T., 230, 241

im-

of

Reality, Ultimate, 102, 106, 108, 123-26,

132,

136-38,

133,

147,

162,

172.

See also Asamskrta

237

Reason.

231, 234

Release,

Obermiller

E., 236,

Oltramare,

P.,

Origination of arising

of;

existence.

See

Existence,

101,

106«.,

164-66,

Nagarjuna's

Logic,

spiritual

200,

{muchanta, 216.

See

138,

conceptual expressions, R.gveda, 131-3

141, 246

also

91,

of words.

See

"Logic

of mutual exclusion"

Past-present-future, denial of. See Purva,

Kdla Path, Buddhist, 29, 214

of

nirvana

17-19,

21,

F., 9, 38, 64,

231-34

Rhys Davids, T. W.,

26, 232

Ritual activity. See Brahmanic sacrifice

Robinson, R. H., 10, 83, 237, 240, 242 I^ta

(cosmic order), 131

Ritpa (form),

22

5

Rhys Davids, (Mrs.) C. A. Pain. See Dithkha

Paradigmatic use

use

moksa)

Religious awareness, 15 5-57, 170-80; and

and PrafJfyasamutpada

Otto, Rudolf, 23, 26,

See

5 5,

71, 79, 187

251

A

A

Emptiness:

Study in Religious Meaning Tattva ("what actually is"), 36, 71, 72,

Sacred/profane distinction, 107-8

Samagri

aggregate),

(conjunction,

65,

Samsara

(existence-in-flux),

45, 48,

39,

49, 65, 74-76, 151, 165, 169, 196

Samskdra

things),

Samskrta

198, 212,

188,

83,

forces

to producing existing

that contribute

(composite

217, 218

products,

condi-

tioned existence), 47-50, 69, 74, 19092, 215, 216, 226

Sarvastivada,

S.,

9,

56«., 76, 23

5,

world-

(conventional,

practical

samvritti-satya),

ensconced,

9

94,

5,

144 174

religious, 17, 101-3, 138, 172,

Ultimate

martha-satya)

240, 241,

50, 205.

Trsna (tanha, craving), 59, 68, 203, 217 Truth,

Truth,

Satapatha-Brahmana, 109-14, 135 Schayer,

246

See also Pilrva

Truth,

34

3 3,

I

18,

Time, process of (Kdla), 49,

elements,

(conditioned

Theravdda, 29, Tilllch, Paul,

Samsarga (unification), 61, 198-99

(highest

para-

truth,

18, 22, 23, 33, 39, 40,

,

44, 84, 86, 87, 94-97, 139, 145, 149,

171-73, 178, 179

244

Atman

Self. See

Truth, two kinds

Skandhas (components of

R.

L.,

person), 32,

a

220

54, 187-88, 200, 209,

Unconditioned

174, 246

Upanisad,

Smart, N., 175, 246 170-73, 176, 177

V pad ana

242

Staal, J. F., 241,

See Asamskrta

reality.

130.

123,

See

also

Brhad-

aranyaka, Chdndogya, Maitri

15 5-60,

Soteriology,

39-40, 144-46

of, 36,

TuccI, G., 236, 237, 239-41

Svabhdva

Self-existent being. See

Slater,

204, 209

Theology, 23

205-7

Stcherbatsky, T., 9,

helps 22,

54w.,

5 3,

167,

grasping

(acquiring,

produce

which

awareness of

the

per-

sonality), 200, 204, 218

234, 235, 240, 241 Strawson, P.

F.,

139-41

Yia negativa, 146

Structures of religious apprehension, 1013,

105-8, 151, 152 See

Siinyata.

ments), 10, 32, 87, 92, 144, 163, 221,

"Emptiness,"

notion

of

240

Suzuki, D. T., 232, 234, 237, 245

Svabhdva

Yigraha-vydvartani (Averting the Argu-

reality),

(self -existent

Viparydsa (errors), 210-12 44,

38,

58, 59, 62, 63, 73, 81, 82, 87, 88, 92,

143,

149,

183,

191,

199,

200,

207,

Svdiantrika school,

Symbolizing

3 5,

process.

Wach,

Wayman,

96, 97

Structures

See

of

36, 80»., 166, 231, 233,

Tathdgata ("thus gone"

=

234

234, 241

A.,

Wisdom. See Prajnd

Word J.,

170, 171w., 246

18,

"Wittgenstein,

religious apprehension

Takakusu,

J.,

Walleser, M., 236, 237, 239

209-11, 214, 221-24

Ludwig,

(Vac), power

104,

149

the Buddha;

252, 239, 240

the fully completed), 46, 47, 69, 73-

Yamaguchi,

74, 78-79, 86, 209-10

Yoga, 104, 126, 145

252

139-42, 246

of,

S.,

115,

116,