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EMPTINESS.
A Study in Religious Meaning
EMPTINESS =A Study
FREDERICK
J.
STRENG ABINGDON PRESS NASHVILLE NEW YORK
in Religious
Meaning
EMPTINESS
MEANING
A STUDY IN RELIGIOUS
Copyright
©
1967 by Abingdon Press
All rights in this book are reserved.
No
may
part of the book
be reproduced in any
manner whatsoever without written permission of the publishers except brief quotations embodied in critical articles or reviews.
Abingdon
For information address
Number: 67-11010
Library of Congress Catalog Card
Thanks
are
due to The
Tennessee.
Nashville,
Press,
University
permission to include material from of Symbolic Structures in Religious
my
of
Chicago
article
Press
for
"The Problem
Apprehension," found in
History of Religions, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 126-253 (Copyright 1964 by The University of Chicago); and to I'lnstitut Beige des
Hautes Etudes
Chinoises
for
permission
to
translate
the
on the restored Sanskrit text edited by E. H. Johnston and Arnold Kunst, "The VigrahavyavartanI of Nagarjuna with the Author's
seventy verses of Nagarjuna's Yigrahaiyavartant
Commentary," Melanges
chinois
et
bouddhiques,
based
IX
(juillct
1951), pp. 108-51.
by permission of from The Bhagavad Gita, trans, by Franklin Edgerton, copyright 1944 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. Passages from Astasahasrika Prajfiapdramitd ire reprinted by permission of the publisher from Astasahasrika Prajndpdramitd, trans, by Edward Conze, copyright 195 8 by Verses from the Bhagaiad Git a are reprinted
the
publisher
The
Asiatic Society, Calcutta.
AND BOUND BY THE AT NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA SET UP, PRINTED,
PARTHENON
PRESS,
TO RUTH who
contributed to this study in such measure as
only wives of graduate students and university teachers can appreciate.
CONTENTS ABBREVIATIONS
9
PREFACE
Part
I.
1.
2.
Part
11.
11
THE RELEVANCE
of
STUDYING "EMPTINESS"
THE PROBLEM THE RELIGIOUS CONTEXT OF NAGARJUNa'S EXPRESSION
IMPLICATIONS
of
"EMPTINESS"
for
17 28
UNDERSTANDING
SOME BASIC BUDDHIST CONCEPTS 3.
4. 5.
6.
Part
III.
ELEMENTS AND FACTORS THAT CONSTITUTE EXISTENCE (dharmas) "causal relations" (pratityasamutpada) nirvana wisdom (prajna)
43 58
69 82
STRUCTURES of RELIGIOUS APPREHENSION in INDIAN THOUGHT the mythical structure the intuitive structure
101
8.
9.
nagarjuna's dialectical structure
139
7.
Part IV. 10. 11.
THE SIGNIFICANCE
of
RELIGIOUS
122
KNOWLEDGE
THE religious MEANING OF "eMPTINESs" RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE AS A MEANS FOR ULTIMATE TRANSFORMATION
155
170 7
Emptiness:
A
Study
in Religious
Meaning
APPENDIXES A. Translation of Mulamadhyamakakarikas: fundamentals of the
MIDDLE "WAY B. Translation of
181
Vigrahavyavartani: averting the arguments
....
221
BIBLIOGRAPHY
229
INDEX
249
ABBREVIATIONS S.
Schayer,
Ausgewdhlte
Kapitel
aus
der
Prasannapadd
(Krakowie, 1931)
N. Dutt, Aspects of Mahayana Buddhism and Hinayana (London, 1930)
Its
Relation to
A. Bareau, L'Absolu en philosophie bouddhique: evolution de
la
notion d'asamskrta (Paris, 1951) C. A. F. Rhys Davids, Buddhist Psychology (London, 1914)
and African Studies (UniLondon) E. Conze, Buddhist Thought in India (London, 1962) Buddhist Wisdom Books: The Diamond Sutra and the Heart Bulletin of the School of Oriental versity of
Sutra, E. Conze, trans. (London, 195 8)
T. Stcherbatsky, The Central Conception of Buddhism and the
Meaning of the Word "Dharma" (Calcutta, 1961) T. R. V. Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism (London, 1955) K.
N.
Jayatilleke,
Early
Buddhist Theory of Knowledge,
(London, 1963) Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics,
J.
Hastings, ed. (Edin-
burgh, 1908-26) E.
Lamotte, Histoire du Bouddhisme indien, des origines
a I'ere
Saka (Louvain, 1958)
Indogaku Bukkyogaku Kenkyil Indian Historical Quarterly
G. K. Nariman,
A
Literary History of Sanskrit
(Bombay, 1920) Melanges chinois
et
bouddhiques
Buddhism
Emptiness:
MMK
A
Study In Religious Meaning
Mulamadhyamakakdrikds {Mddhyamikasutras) de Ndgdrjuna avec la Prasannapadd, Comment aire de Candrakirti, L. de La Vallee Poussin, ed. (St. Petersbourg, 1913 ) (This work is also abbreviated
MSFC
R.
as Kdrikds.)
H. Robinson,
"Madhyamika
China," UnpubHshed
Ph.D.
Studies
in
Fifth-century (University
dissertation
of
PEW
London, 1959) L. A. Govinda, The Psychological Attitude of Early Buddhist Philosophy (London, 1961) Philosophy East and West
PL
E. Conze, Prajnapdramitd Literature ('s-Gravenhage, 1960)
PWES
Astasdhasrikd Prajndpdramitd {The Perfection of
PAEBP
Eight Thousand Slokas)
,
SBE
Sacred Books of the East, F. M. Miiller, ed.
TGVS
Le
Traite
de
grande
la
vertu
(Mahdprajndpdramitd-sdstra)
Louvain, 1944
W
&
,
E.
de
sagesse
10
eds.,
de
in
Ndgdrjuna
Lamotte, trans.
(2
vols.;
1949)
"The Vigrahavyavartani of Nagarjuna," A. Kunst,
Wisdom
E. Conze, trans. (Calcutta, 1958)
MCB, IX
E.
H. Johnston and
(July, 1951), 108-51
PREFACE During the past three thousand years there has been an awakening consciousness that the phenomenon of "man" transcends tribal, national, or cultural determination.
Human
history, understood as the
self-consciousness in relation to his physical
seen today in a universal context
the statement that "the earth
is
—we
and
social
forms of man's
environment, can be
are discovering the implications of
round." This recognition draws attention
and practical need of understanding forms of human contact appear strange and even meaningless.
to the possibility
Hfe that on
first
Religion participates in
human
history;
it
expressed in
is
different
concepts, attitudes, specific symbolic actions (ritual), and social patterns.
These forms which are relevant to
human meaning
appear to be irrelevant in another context. Thus a religious
phenomenon with
of meaning, regard
It as
if
one
reference to
to understand
Is
significant.
The
tension of relating the genius
effort
its
its
in one context often
it is
own
crucial to interpret
intention and pattern
relevance for those persons
toward such understanding
found In the particular
historical
who
results in a
phenomenon
with the universal categories that make any understanding of different
phenomena
possible at
all.
The term "emptiness" (which
in the past also has been translated
"nothingness" or "relativity") suggests for
many
by
Westerners the notion of
chaos, nonreahty, or the opposite of anything positive. This
Is,
of course,
understandable in the context of Western philosophical, poetical, and
In trying to understand the meaning of
religious expression.
the thought and force,
life
however, we
attitudes about life
book
Is
of any Eastern people where
Buddhism
this Is
term
In
a cultural
must ask how this notion relates to other notions and that form a cultural matrix different from ours. This
presented as an effort to understand the notion of "emptiness" 11
Emptiness: as
A
Study
expressed
by
a
In Religious
Meaning
second-century Buddhist religious
The
it
will
and for the
life,
human communication.
reader interested in the problems of il
I
hopefully
seer;
be useful for both the professional student of religious
material in each of the four parts contributes to the analysis. Part
gives a description of the
problem
in interpretation
with which we are
confronted, and a brief examination of the historical background for
Nagarjuna's religious teaching. While Part discussion,
it
is
II
contains the most technical
not meant to be read only by the
insight into the significance of using the
by
a
much
term "emptiness" than
we have
section were omitted. In Part III
Buddhist
specialist in
philosophy; perseverance by the reader will be rewarded
clearer if
related Nagarjuna's use
this
of
"emptiness" to other expressions in Indian religious thought; in Part IV the significance of "viewing
all
existing things as
empty"
is
examined
within the context of the more general religious concern to transform
man's limited existence into the
The
fullest, freest reality.
difficulty in translating ideas
problem. This problem
from one language
to another
is
an old
aggravated in translating religious symbols and
is
awareness, in part because words themselves are regarded as inadequate
conveyors of the reality perceived in the religious awareness. Thus the
words which express "the inexpressible" in one language and context have perhaps correlate terms in another language, but the context
One
is
aid in
religious religious
so different that the translations lose their original "intention."
overcoming
a single term,
though
this
it is
problem
is
the use of several terms to translate
self-evident that in doing so the translator runs
the risk of losing the multi-dimensional character of the most important
notions in a religious tradition.
The
word to translate a body of the book, where the notions
used the same English the
the translation. For instance, duhkloa translations, while
interpretation;
though
it
is
rendered
or prajfld
is
we have used here is we have almost always
general principle
that in the translations found in the appendixes
as
is
certain Sanskrit term; while in
as
as
as
"wisdom"
varied
"sorrow" in the
"pain" or "turmoil"
translated
also as "spiritual insight" in the explanation.
always translated
we have
are interpreted,
always found
as well in
in the
the
appendixes,
Siinyata
is
almost
"emptiness." Wherever the English terms refer to a
Sanskrit technical religious term, the Sanskrit terms are placed in parentheses
immediately following them. Since most of the primary source
material for this study
is
in Sanskrit,
we have used mostly
Sanskrit termi-
nology; however, in referring to Buddhist thought found in materials preserved in Pali, the Pali terms are used. 12
^ The Study of "emptiness" earlier analyses
to Nagarjuna,
is
is
Preface
my
not entirely new, and
indebtedness to
quite clear. Outside of using the Sanskrit texts attributed
my
reading has been directed to scholars writing in Western
languages, though I have had the opportunity to speak personally with
Indian and Japanese Buddhist scholars about Nagarjuna's use of "emptiness" and
Madhyamika thought. An attempt
to understand religious life
by the stimulation and guidance given by individuals who themselves are involved with interpreting this complex area of human expression. Therefore I want to take this opportunity to acknowledge gratefully the help given to me by the following men from the University is
greatly aided
of Chicago: Dr. Mircea Eliade through his courses and books has provided
many
stimulating insights into the structures of religious expression. Dr.
my
Joseph Kitagawa, in his personal interest in
studies
and help
in suggest-
ing resources for this particular investigation, has been a constant source of aid.
To Dr. Bernard Meland
theological concerns to structures of J.
I
owe
the stimulation for extending
toward the problem of relating
human
expression.
A. B. van Buitenen for spending
want
I
to express
many hours with me
my
religious awareness
my
thanks to Dr.
reading, correcting,
and making suggestions for improving the translation of the two Sanskrit works by Nagarjuna which provide the textual basis for this study. I would like to acknowledge the opportunity for nine months study in India through a Fulbright Student Grant during the academic year
me by
1961-62, and the consideration given to States Educational
universities shared their time
T. R. V. Murti
Hindu
who was my would
with me;
host while
I I
the officers of the United
A
Foundation in India.
number of scholars at Indian want to mention especially Dr.
was
a "casual student" at Benaras
my former
colleague Dr. Gene Tucker for reading the first six chapters of the manuscript and suggesting improvements in style and expression.
University.
I
also like to
thank
FREDERICK
J.
STRENG
13
Part
THE RELEVANCE "EMPTINESS"
of
I
STUDYING
I
THE PROBLEM This study
is
concerned with the relationship between religious
and symbolic expression.
It
is
avv^areness
of religious meaning found in the conceptual, or "theoretical," expression.
To
we
illuminate this problem
(MMK,
Religious awareness
"knowledge"
human as
—
a
is
xxiv. 19
mode
of
on the meaning of one truth in Buddhism: all exist-
will focus
of the most important expressions of spiritual
ing things are empty.
^|;
an investigation into the nature and dynamics
&
20; xxv. 22;
stated in propositional
form
VV,
59.)
in order to give
knowledge claiming to be the most profound of any It is knowledge which has been labeled
apprehension or cognition.
"Truth"
transform
in the
human
most
significant sense, truth
lives
radically.
which has the power to
The knowledge of
this
when
truth,
coupled with certain activity, permits the transformation from chaos to
from death to life, or from greed to indifference. Religious (i.e., transforming) knowledge is affirmed by its adherents to have its ultimate source in a transhuman dimension of existence. Therefore, besides appealing to such norms of truth as personal experience and logical inference, its final appeal is to a dimension of human awareness variously known by such terms as "insight," "revelation," and "enlightenment." Religious knowlorder,
more than give information or transform by the power inherent in it.
edge, then, purports to do it
claims to
Religious knowledge, however, to be
changed
is
a bit here or there.
not something simply "given," just It is
only gropingly discovered and
rediscovered. It participates in the process of as
history.
As
such,
it
is
related to
human
thought, and individual sensitivities; and is
assert a "fact";
its
human
fabrication
known
vocabularies, structures of
value as transforming-truth
dependent on the cognitive patterns by which such truth can be known.
"To know" means
to have a conditioning (and conditioned) apparatus
for interiorizing existence. Existence becomes hiivian existence interpreted;
when
it is
and human existence includes the interpretive scheme provided 17
;
A
Emptiness:
by
Study
cognition.
A
person apprehends that aspect of existence which his pat-
terns of sensitivity permit gets
from
general
Meaning
in Religious
him
a reUgious assertion
human
is
and the meaning which one it to more
to perceive;
dependent, in part, on relating
While rehgious truth
structures of thought.
is
sometimes
considered as an abstract entity "floating above" the
human
living, here it will be regarded as a part of the living
organism of culture
which
in
it
The importance
emerges.
concerns of
of this consideration for
our study
is
that the relationship between religious awareness and verbal expression
is
considered to be reciprocal. In the context of this investigation, the term
"conceptual expression"
is
Thus,
apprehension."
ceptual
meant
to cover
apprehension-expression
conceptual
religious awareness are codeterminate;
necessary counterpart, "con-
its
no
and
nor temporal
logical a priori
precedence needs to be established.
The problem of
the relationship between religious awareness and verbal
expression is very large and can be structured into different problem areas. For instance, distinctions can be discerned and described along lines of structure, content, and function, as suggested by Joachim Wach in A
Comparative Study of
Religions.'^
Or
religious
symbols can be viewed
a variety of archetypal patterns expressing the "sacred," as seen in
Eliade's Patterns in
Comparative Religions.^ Or the problem can be ap-
proached systematically Theology.'^
as
Mircea
The approach
as
done by Paul Tillich in
is
to the problem here, however,
description, a hermeneutical technique, nor an approach
theological perspective;
it is
Systematic
his is
not a general
from
a systematic
an attempt to expose something of the nature
and dynamics of one kind of religious expression: the formulation and articulation of Ultimate Truth. In this expression we will seek to expose a deep, underlying organizing force within religious meaning: the structure
by which the knower apprehends "transforming truth" or ultimate reality since truth and reality are complementary elements of the sacred. "We
—
intend to examine a dimension of man's predisposition for accepting certain
meanings and for rejecting
religious
investigation to conceptual expressions
others.
Thus, we are limiting our
which
are formulations that can be
denied, attacked, defended, and explained.
Two ^
observations must be
Joachim Wach,
A
Mircea
Eliade,
at this point
Comparative Study of Religions,
University Press, 195 8); see *
made
Patterns
esp.
in
chap,
iii,
ed. J.
"The Expression
Comparative
Religions,
concerning the use of
M. Kitagawa (New York: Columbia
of Religious Experience in Thought."
trans.
R.
Sheed
Ward, 1958). 'Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology (Chicago: The University of Chicago see esp. the Introduction and Pt. I, "Reason and Revelation."
18
(London: Press,
Sheed
and
1951), Vol.
I,
— The Problem
conceptual expressions for exposing religious awareness. These suggest the
problematic
but
at the
religious
religious
from
character
examining
statements
religious
truth,
mode
of
religious activity; they, to the contrary, reflect the inner struggle of as
he
a part.
homo
religiosus to
understand himself and the existence of which
Thus, they are a dynamic force in the bipolar process of re-
and fabrication of what
ligious awareness: the apprehension
human
real for the
is
being.
In the context of a religious
knowledge often
is
community
the direct concern with religious
localized in a relatively small
to preserve, explicate,
statements.
and defend the
The impetus
truth which admittedly
religious intention
for this concern
is
group of people
is
much more than
internal to the truth,
who
seek
and insight of these
the articulation of truth
the propositions indicated
the statements. Yet, this articulation of truth has a certain is
of
this
phenomena. The first observation is that statements expressing knowledge are more than just speculative fabrication removed
man is
of
same time indicate the importance of studying
and the internal norm
is
by
norm which
intrinsically related to
power of transformation. Thus the formulations of creeds and doctrines of the "prophetic" world religions and the metaphysical and psyschological analyses of the "gnostic" world religions should not be regarded as mere speculations, but as self-conscious attempts to convey the richness and depth of true existence. The fact that there is such a thing as a history of religious ideas and doctrines indicates the dynamics of lively minds reformulating the inherited patterns of religious awareness in reaction to new and particular situations. The theoreti-
the religious vision which has the
cal
dimension of religious awareness
is
not somehow added to the "factual";
it helps to mold what is known as the "factual" itself. The second observation concerning the use of verbal expressions
rather
manifesting religious awareness
is
for
that religious expressions participate in
modes of apprehension. There is no phenomenon which is "pure religion." Whenever man thinks, he uses conventions of thought, either consciously or unconsciously, which he has learned as a social being. Also, "secular"
when he
participates in religious life he incorporates religious truth based
on the norms for deriving meaning which, are learned
from
his experiences
at least in post-archaic times,
both inside and outside the religious com-
munity. If the internal (and often unconscious) norms of meaning derived
from
his religious activity are at great variance
his secular activities,
he
may
with those derived from
repress one for the other or exist
with a
cognitive schizophrenia. Nevertheless, his religious understanding originates 19
Emptiness:
A
with, and
Study is
Meaning
nurtured by, patterns of expression and modes of thinking
which operate
The
in Religious
as
norms for rehgious
as
well as nonreligious knowledge.
fact that certain possibilities for religious apprehension are produced
while others are suppressed accentuates the historical character of the
which
choices religious it
are available to a person. It
is
just this
involvement of
knowledge with the secular structures of apprehension that makes
relevant for
human
life,
and
is
at the
same time the source of the
diflSculty
in understanding various expressions of religious knowledge.
Our
and dynamics of
investigation of the nature
religious
meaning
will
not lead to some general theory of religious expression; rather, this concern is
relevant to the extent that
particular religious
will focus primarily
ji '
is
it
provides insights for "understanding" a
phenomenon. The concrete phenomenon on which we is
comparatively "late" in the history of religions;
the term "emptiness"
(siinyatd)
it
used by the Buddhist philosopher
I
Nagarjuna
j
in India
during the second century a.d. to express the nature
"emptiness"
is
An
investigation of Nagarjuna's use of the
term
instructive for opening avenues of understanding
from
of ultimate reality.^
1
several perspectives. For instance, "emptiness"
which Indian monastic Buddhism presents ligion; for this
God
(as the
form of Buddhism frames
term
is
is
the epitome of the
anomaly
in comparative studies of reits
vision without recourse to
used in Christianity, Islam, Shinto, or even the bhakti
I
form of Hinduism). This term
I
character of existence.
How
religious inspiration? Also, in the is
suggests an emphasis
then can such
a
on the "negative"
formulation be the source of
narrower scope of Buddhist studies there
continual reinterpretation of such apparently "negative" concepts as
nirvana, "nonself" (andtman), and "impermanence" (aniiya)
,
as well as
"emptiness" {si'inyatd). Buddhist scholars seek to get some insight into this
element of Buddhist religious
epistemological implications
life
*
To
word
to the ontological
and
which such terms have. Concretely the prob-
lem in Nagarjuna's use of "emptiness" other
by turning
is
that he denies that
for an inexpressible Ultimate Reality behind
use such terms as "ultimate reality" in expressing emptiness
is
all
it is
just an-
phenomenal
problematic. In this study
however, distinguish between "Ultimate Reality," which means the source of all existence referred to by language (in those structures of religious apprehension which assume such a relationship) e.g., God, and "ultimate reality" which refers to the practical notion that there is a
we
will,
distinction between "what is real" and appearance (without assuming that this ultimate reality .has the nature of self-existent being). The term that best takes the place of Ultimate Reality in ,/: Nagarjuna's thought might be Ultimate Truth, which means a way of apprehending the phenomenal world that does not bind man to its limitations; while this truth is partially expressed through words and propositions, it is not to be identified with one proposition over against another. ,
20
The Problem
on the one hand; on the
existence
nihihsm.
The question
is:
What
other, he denies that this
mean
does this term
as it
a
is
used in
is
form of
own
its
context of thought?
An
investigation into the use of "emptiness" to articulate ultimate
reality
is
useful in understanding the universal
ing religious knowledge.
thought because
which
own
is
who it
human
It is especially useful
activity of express-
for students of religious
stand within the Jewish, Christian, and Muslim traditions
norm
denies the validity of the internal
for religious affirmation
most prominent in Western thought, thereby suggesting that
their
assumptions are not the only bases for religious meaning. The internal
norm "God
for
much
is,"
and any meaningful
of Western religious knowledge
the recognition that
is
must be
religious statement
related to His
may be defined) Human religious discussion does not begin until after God has acted; the discussion assumes God as the One with whom man interacts, and the concern of the discussion revelation of Himself (however this
is
.
the proper knowledge and service of God. Nagarjuna, to the contrary,
stands within the Buddhist tradition that begins the religious discussion
with the general clarifies
human
situation of incompleteness
and frustration; he
the basis of this feeling of frustration, which then
Thus we
reconsidered views and appropriate action.
mean
standing of "emptiness" does not
ceived as an essence with attributes but
a definition of
rectified
by
an under-
something con-
term used to
a
is
is
will see that
shift the
mode
of apprehending "existence" and "ultimate reality."
The foci,
present study of Nagarjuna's use of the term "emptiness" has
two
each of which has a bearing on the other. These foci represent the two
One
aspects of study for a historian of religions.
focus
a
is
the religious meaning of a concrete religious phenomenon.
concern with the universal
human
concern with
The
other
activity of religious expression. It
is
is
a
not
surprising that the investigation of one should enhance an understanding
of the other.
On
ness extends
beyond any particular
the one hand, the activity of expressing religious aware-
an understanding of the universal
religious
human
phenomenon; on the
religious activity
speculation unless it is based on a detailed Nagarjuna used the term "emptiness" with
analysis of the concrete data. a
keen awareness of the prob-
lems involved in expressing the inexpressible; so a study of the used to articulate
its
other,
becomes vague
apprehension of transforming truth
may
way
it
was
provide an
problem of articulating religious knowledge. However, not an investigation of Nagarjuna's use of "emptiness" aid in under-
insight into the
only
may
Standing the relationship between religious awareness and verbal expres21
Emptiness;
A
but
slon,
Study in Religious Meaning
concern with the
a conscious
latter, I
beUeve, will provide an
important clue for understanding the religious significance of "emptiness."
The
difficulties
and those of gated
of this topic are familiar to scholars of Indian thought
religious expression.
as a philosophical
of Nagarjuna and those of
texts
"Emptiness" has been most often investi-
term. There
is
certainly sufficient material in the
with which to construct a
his disciples
systematic presentation of such perennial problems as the nature of cause
and
eflfect, reality,
existence,
studies of T. Stcherbatsky,
work
to suggest the
that has been done
Closely related are those scholars
meaning of
explicating the
exerted
We
and knowledge.
need only to
recall the
A. B. Keith, T. R. V. Murti, and E. Frauwallner,
by elements of the
this
from
who took term in
a philosophical perspective.
more
a
historical perspective,
light of the shifting pressures
cultural milieu, such as Louis de
La Vallee
men
are
whose considered judgments we must resort; nevertheless, concern with the material is somewhat different.
my
Poussin, Surendranath Dasgupta, and Etienne Lamotte. All these specialists to
own
Certain factors which contribute
to
meaning need
religious
analyzed by formulating questions of a general and specific sort:
to
What
be is
the relation between the half-rejected, half -seized glimmer of existence and
the full illumination which purifies and transforms the textual materials,
we would
ask:
human
life?
In terms of
How does the structure of Nagarjuna's Madhyamika mean religiously
apprehension of truth help to define the manner in which
Buddhism
expresses "the
way
of release"?
What
does
it
for Nagarjuna to articulate his awareness of truth through a dialectic?
Thus,
this
study seeks to examine the
so, it
religious awareness
The problem of knowledge and
used the term "empti-
an uncompromising dialectic to express Ultimate
ness" together with
Truth. In doing
way Nagarjuna
probes into one aspect of the relationship between
and verbal expression. the relationship between the articulation of religious
religious awareness
is,
I believe, central to
understanding
assertions of religious truth made with a self-consciousness about the limita-
tions of conceptual structures. This
the question about implicit gests that there
knowledge
as
may
problem
norms for
important because
words meaningfully;
it raises it
sug-
be more than one or two norms for judging religious
"true" or "false." Some acquaintance with Nagarjuna's re-
two more common "internal norms" for The two norms are those found and myth. Intuition regards concepts as mere "analo-
ligious dialectic suggests that the
establishing religious truth do not apply.
in religious intuition
22
is
relating
The Problem gles," as discussed by Rudolf Otto in The Idea of the Holy.^ Myth, says Mircea Eliade, in being told "establishes a truth that is absolute." ® Both the
"intuitive" and "mythical" normative structures for apprehending religious
truth require an objective Ultimate Reality to which they refer. This as-
sumption that
religious concepts require
an absolute referent
is
denied by
who declares that both the phenomenal and ultimate realms "empty." By comparing the internal norms for making meaningful
Nagarjuna, are
religious statements
prehension,
we can
and correlating these to the structures of
religious ap-
perceive the significance of using the term "emptiness"
to articulate Ultimate Truth.
This study of Nagarjuna's use of the term "emptiness" in the context of the relationship between religious awareness and verbal expression has
Our concern with religious expression is based on judgment that man in nature and society must be taken seriously because man is made for God. Mankind with its hopes and fears, its striving theological implications.
the
for meaning, creation.
An
its
struggle to express the truth,
understanding of
is
an integral part of God's
human
tion of the Christian gospel are
religious awareness and the articulacomplementary elements in the task of
systematic theology under the category of "revelation."
considering revelation
is,
Our approach
in
however, an indirect one and attempts to analyze
the religious meaning of an expression which appears to be radically different
from the Judeo-Christian
tion of
By
affirmation of a concrete historical revela-
God.
suggesting theological implications
ness," in the
we
are not inferring that "empti-
form used by Nagarjuna, can be
successfully integrated into
an articulation of the Christian gospel. Rather, apprehension quite unlike the
within the Christian tradition;
classic it
it
represents a religious
mythical and analogical structures
therefore -may present an alternative
meaning-structure in an age whose religious awareness
up of half -forgotten myths that secular language.
ception
On
may
What may
itself
admittedly made
by
a literal
provide the structure for a
new transforming power. may be of a more is important to know the
the other hand, the reader's religious sensitivities
possibilities
of rehgious awareness
—not
it
as a possible alternative
but
as a
Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy, trans. John W. Harvey (New York: Oxford University 195 8), see esp. chaps, i and vii. Mircea Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane, trans. Willard Trask (New York: Harcourt,
Press, '
or
appear to be the dissolution of religious per-
exclusive, traditional nature. In such a case
^
is
are being transplanted
Brace and
Company, 19S9),
p.
9S.
23
A
Emptiness:
Study
in Religious
Meaning
position to be rejected. This analysis will not take
suggestion in any systematic way; rather,
it
up an elaboration of
this
intends to probe one area in
the expression of religious knowledge and give an insight into the re-
between
lationship
and the articulation of
religious awareness
religious
truth.
Our problem and the data help to define broad methodological assumpTo "understand" religious phenomena involves at least two aspects:
tions.
one is
preserving the integrity of the particular phenomenon; the other
is
structuring the interpretation along lines whereby the intentions of the
investigation are most appropriately met. Thus, crete data
found
be aware of the limitations and
sumed
we must
activity
possibilities
and
deal with con-
at the
of the perspective
same time
we have
as-
for understanding.
The aim from
tiated
human
in the history of
to "understand," as conceived in this study, a
Buddhist
know
aim to
disciple's
must be
differen-
the truth of "emptiness."
"While both the Buddhist disciple and the historian of religions express a desire
1
to
know
the
realize this personally
-
meaning of "emptiness," the
phenomenological distinctions that we will make here i
1
a
diversion
from
to know its meaning by relating which we organize or structure data. From our perspective, to "understand" requires a confrontation with the concrete, particular, historical data, and an interpretation of these data his goal. it
1
wants to
disciple
within himself and would find the historical and
We, on
the other hand,
want
to categories of thought through
human
in their relation to the universal
effort of religious expression.
"We
proceed with the assumption that the expressions, the statements of religious
knowledge, the cultic
that the character of
meaning
spiritual concerns.
A
ligious imperialism
whereby
found
as those
of
activities,
and the symbols have meaning and
in those statements pertains
to ultimate
concern for the concrete data hopes to correct all
religious data are regarded to be the
in the investigator's
own
religious apprehension
a re-
same
(or lack
it).
We
contend that assuming
datum
a
between
relation
and a general concern with religious
presuppose that
all religious
phenomena
a
particular
phenomena does not
religious
necessarily
are basically the same; rather,
men who
(
1
cerns which are so termed because they have some characteristics in
i
mon
f
human
with other concerns termed
"religious."
involves the capacity to have some
We
form of
it
act with religious con-
implies that within every society there are
com-
do assume that to be religious awareness.
To
say this does not minimize in the least the difficulty of empathizing with 24
The Problem a religious
apprehension emerging in a historical context different from
that of the investigator.
On
make
the other hand, this difficulty does not
such a study worthless.
There are
number of ways
a
in
which concrete
can be
historical data
handled, depending in large part on what kind of data are appropriate to the task at hand. Since
we
are concerned
with the problem of symbolic
apprehension rather than with the development of the religious community as a social
and
religious texts
our data will be found primarily in
political institution,
which
articulate the religious awareness.
While
these textual
data must be seen in the cultural milieu appropriate to them, they are
not seen simply ness"
mon
from the
Our approach
historicistic
to understanding "empti-
approach which has been so com-
during the past half century. Rather than simply describing the
torical
which "changed"
influences
outside, a
product.
as its
different
is
we
a
attempt to understand
will
religious
This approach
tries
to
by
this expression
few elements within the inner dynamics of
his-
from the
apprehension
investigating
religious thought.
understand "emptiness" by analyzing three
determinants of religious meaning: 1) the conceptual milieu which provides the vocabulary tives,
2) the internal
and patterns of thought for evaluations and perspec-
norm
for truth or the regulative pattern of inter-
any human attempt to make meaningful and 3) the distinctive "religious" significance derived from the knowledge that is articulated. The first determinant will be con-
related concepts inherent in assertions,
religious
sidered through an analysis of the relation between "emptiness" (hlnyatd)
and four important Buddhist concerns: constitute existence (dharmas) 3)
nirvana, and 4)
religious
,
1)
The nature of
the factors that
2) causal relations (pratUya-sainutpdda),
wisdom (prajnd)
.
The second
be ap-
v/ill
proached by comparing three "structures of religious apprehension" manifested in phenomena which can be regarded these structures within Indian thought. It these three structures are not
meant
as "classical
as
types" of
might be mentioned here that
means
to represent the only symbolical
of apprehending religious truth but are given, in part, to establish the fact that there
is
a variety of apprehending-processes.
The
third deter-
minant will be considered through an analysis of the nature of "religious meaning" by explicating the religious contents of "emptiness" and exposing the implications of this interpretation for a general understanding of the significance of religious statements. After
a brief
chapter outlining
Budform a
the religious context of Nagarjuna's expression within the history of dhist thought, each determinant will be considered in turn
and
will
25
Emptiness;
A
Study in Religious Meaning
major section of
this study.
Each
section attempts to
complement the
others in an ever expanding context for understanding "emptiness" as a
rehgious term. Reciprocally, "emptiness"
is
particularly useful in portraying
the importance of each of these elements, for
each has in the emergence of
it
brings to light the role
meaning.
this religious
this study, we must which themselves would be fruitful for study but which, for practical considerations, must be omitted. One of these areas is the historical origin and development of Buddhism as an institutionalized "Way," such as found in the writings of N. Dutt, ]&. Lamotte, and T. "W. Rhys Davids. This is the realm of the Buddhologist or Indologist. Another
Regarding the particular hermeneutical task of
also delimit clearly areas
which
area of study it is
h
found
j
Rudolf Otto's The
in
Language, or area j
j
which
found
F. S. C.
it is
a
we
will
sidering
how
dimensions of
religious awareness
In sum, our task
is
third
is
a vehicle of
may
as
be
As suggested communica-
comes to consciousness, without con-
symbols are related to the
human
as
whose intent stands outside
philosophy or phenomenology of language
simply assume that the symbol
by which the
A
Northrop's The Meeting of East and West.
in the writings of E. Cassirer, S. Langer, or E. Sapir.
before,
with
phenomena, such
Idea of the Holy, Ian Ramsey's Religious
directly related to this study but
is
the scope of
tion
related to this investigation but not identical
is
a systematic analysis of the nature of religious
aesthetic,
emotional, or social
existence.
to investigate Nagarjuna's use of the
term "emptiness"
to aid our understanding of the relationship between religious awareness and conceptual expression. We will proceed with the working
hypothesis all
that
human
symbolization
a
is
participating
factor
of
expressed religious awareness; therefore, a study of the dynamics of
religious
thought
will
both illuminate the meaning of a
phenomenon and contribute
specific religious
to an understanding of the
articulating religious knowledge.
Our method
human
for understanding
is
role In
partly
determined by the formulation of the problem. But it also helps define the way in which data are used to solve the problem. To understand the religious meaning of "emptiness" involves an examination of three expanding areas of reference.
The narrowest
area
is
the specific Buddhist articula-
tion of religious knowledge in India at the beginning of the Christian
wider area is the Indian religious environment In which can be seen several structures of religious apprehension; and finally, the third area is the human problem of articulating religious knowledge.
era; the second,
We shall try to move within workable 26
limits of the
problems involved in
The Problem
knowing Ultimate Truth. However, the nature of the problems a centrifugal force
which
carries the investigator into
displays
dangerous realms
phenomenon such as religious apprehension we have to make the choice (perhaps more unconscious than conscious) of whether we will let the subject matter draw us on, or whether we will set a more un-Promethean goal. Recognizing that this study represents an of
pitfalls.
In approaching a
opportunity to crystallize some of the pression
by an
issues in
analysis of the concrete data,
we
understanding religious expresent
it as
an investigation
of one aspect of a vast problem.
27
2 of
THE RELIGIOUS CONTEXT NAGARJUNA'S EXPRESSION
In order to interpret Nagarjuna's use of "emptiness" in
we should The first is
context
indicate briefly three factors
usage.
the historical information
the second a
is
the influence of
two
its
historical
which contribute to
this
we have about Nagarjuna;
religious traditions:
one which emphasizes
conceptual analysis, the other which emphasizes meditation; and the
third factor deals with the basic religious concepts and presuppositions used
by
the Buddhists which
formed the conceptual matrix out of which
Nagarjuna's expression emerged.
Nagarjuna's Place in the History of Buddhism
Very
little historical
present time.
information about Nagarjuna
The consensus of
scholarly opinion
is
is
available at the
that Nagarjuna sys-
tematized his view on "emptiness" during the second half of the second
century
a.d.,
and that while originating
in
South India
his influence
quickly
spread to the Ghandhara area in North-West India. ^ Another fact, which
acknowledged by many authorities, is that Nagarjuna was from a Brahmin family. This would at least not argue against his having a high is
degree of education including training in metaphysical discussion.
The accounts of Nagarjuna found in the Chinese and Tibetan traditions regard him as an alchemist and possessor of superhuman powers.^ These, ^Bareau, APB,
p.
173. Lamotte,
TGVS,
I,
x.
La Vallee Poussin, "Madhyamika," ERE, VIII
(1916), 23J. Nariman, LHSB, p. 93. Conze, BTI, p. 238. Murti, CPB, p. 87. Robinson, MSEC (pp. 3 5-37), summarizes the problem of dating Nagarjuna's life in light of the various sources concluding that Nagarjuna lived about a.d. 113-213.
Max
"The
Nagarjuna from Tibetan and Chinese Sources," A. A. Probsthain, B. Schindler, ed. (London, 1922), pp. 421-55; M. Winternitz, History of Indian Literature, S. Ketkar and H. Kohn, trans. (Calcutta, 1933), II, 341-48; Mircea Eliade, Yoga: Immortality and Freedom, W. Trask, trans. (New York, 1958), pp. 402, 415; t.. Lamotte, TGVS, p. x. Robinson has given the accounts of Hui-yan, Seng-chao, and Kumarajlva '
See
trans.,
in
Walleser,
Life of
Hirth Anniversary Volume,
MSEC, 2i
pp.
33-35.
The
Religious Context of Nagarjuna's Expression
however, present a better picture of the reHgious concerns and attitudes of juna.
Buddhism than a Hteral account of the activities of NagarSuch biographies served two purposes for the Buddhist community:
first,
they estabhshed
fifth-century
of spiritual leadership in a succession of
a principle
patriarchs; and secondly, they defended the rights of
Madhyamika
principles
to be considered as the Buddha's original dhanna.^ Likewise in the Indian literature of the
end of the
millennium
first
of medical and alchemist treatises,
make
a direct
Nagarjuna, the author
a.d.,
mentioned; however,
is
it is difficult
to
connection between the alchemists and spiritual healers on
the one
hand and the second-century
From
the limited material available
religious dialectician
we can
sift
on the
other."*
out certain general facts
that permit a reconstruction of the philosopher Nagarjuna only in barest
We know
outline.
and
nothing that would deny that he received the spiritual
intellectual training of a
know nothing which would from elements outside the Hindu and
Brahmin, and we
suggest extraordinary influence
Buddhist religious milieu of second-century India. writings
it is
clear that he
From
evidence in his
was acquainted with the various philosophical
"wisdom" (prajna) Abhidharma literature)
schools of thought as well as the practice of realizing
through
the process of analysis (as reflected in the
and contemplation (dhydna).
Two
Abhidharma and Vrapidparamita
Traditions Converge:
According to the Theravada Buddhist tradition, the Buddha's teaching summarized in the Four Noble Truths, where we find that all existence (dtikkha) that this turmoil arises from a is characterized by turmoil "thirst" for objects of man's mental and emotional fabrication, that there is freedom from turmoil, and that the means for attaining this freedom is
,
the Middle Path, referred to as the Noble Eightfold Path. This teaching
is
included not only a view of
method
a
life
but
conduct and complex which
also principles of ethical
for controlling the mental-emotional-physical
appears as our empirical "selves." Insight into the nature of existence, ^
Walleser in Schindler, pp. 452-54. La Vallee Poussin, "Faith and Reason in Buddhism" (ProceedThird International Congress for the History of Religions, Pt. II [Oxford, 1908], p. 36).
ings of the *
Walleser (Schindler,
p.
one in which Nagarjuna
as
VI,
A
Sanskrit
Biography
is
of
glorified.
the
"Nagarjuna
et
national des Orientalistes
Ibid.,
Siddhas
New
p.
and
Some Questions Connected with Nagarjuna,"
XXVI (1930), 142. Benyotosh Bhattacharyya, (London: Oxford University Press, 1932), p. 67. Jean Agastya, medecins, chimistes et sorciers," Actes du XXe Congres Inter-
Jonrnal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, An Introdiictrott to Buddhist Esoterism Filliozat,
text. The History of Eighty-Four Sid d has, 421. Giuseppe Tucci, "Animadversiones Indicae:
421) mentions the Tibetan
(Brussels,
1940),
p.
Series
229.
29
.
Emptiness;
A
Study in Religious Meaning
morality, and psycho-physical control were to be perfected
more or
less
simultaneously since each interacted with the other.
Pervading the Buddhist teaching were several notions about the nature
One of the most imporhuman being has no permanent
of existence and the meaning of spiritual insight. tant of these notions was the assertion that a essence (dtman)
and
is
only a changing conglomerate of material, mental,
and psychic factors {d harm as) enced world
as
we
are
.
These factors interact to form the experi-
aware of
it
and
in everyday living,
all
objects of
perception or ideas are seen to be without independent bases of existence.
The
"arising of existence,"
which generally
also the arising of turmoil,
is
comes about through interdependent and reciprocal forces of the factors (dharmas) forces which find their roots in man's ignorant clinging to
—
the objects that "he" unwittingly
is
fabricating!
existence" to cease, the fabricating ignorance
of ignorance requires spiritual insight
norance
is
must
(prajna)
.
For "the arising of
cease;
When
fabricating ig-
overcome and the residue of the fabricating force has nirvana
—the "dying out" of the flame of
During the seven
centuries between the life of the
then there
and the quelling
is
dissipated,
desire for illusory
objects.
Buddhist adept Nagarjuna,
this doctrine
Abhidharma
different ways. In the
the
Buddha and the was elaborated and explained in
many factors
were defined, analyzed, and catalogued for
a
of existence {dharmas)
more perfect understanding
by those who sought wisdom. Together with intellectual comprehension went the meditational practices, each providing a reciprocal thrust into new possibilities of insight. About three hundred years before Nagarjuna, a body of literature began to develop which emphasized the perfection of
wisdom (Prajndpdramita literature) whereby one understood how phenomena arose, the interdependent nature of all factors of existence, and the release from fabricated attachment that was achieved as understanding deepened. At its highest point the perfection of wisdom led to the awareness that all things are "empty." It was in this intellectual and Nagarjuna systematized
religious milieu that
Buddhist Middle
Way
his
understanding of the
(Mddhyamika)
Nagarjuna's basic work, the Madhyamakakdrikds, shows the influence of two streams of religious concern: the abhidharmic concern with analysis
and
clarification,
and the Praptdpdramitd concern with the practice of
spiritual realization.
The term ^'Abhidharma"
applies
both to a method
of understanding and to the treatises formulating the understanding which 30
The
Religious Context of Nagarjuna's Expression
became the third section of the Buddhist canonical writings.^ Though there was a concern to clarify and classify different aspects of the teaching (dharma) very early in the life of the Buddhist community, the development and formulation of the Abhidharma texts which are available to us
now
took place primarily between the time of Asoka (third century B.C.)
and Kani§ka
(first
century a.d.). This period was a time for consolidating
new conceptions, and for grouping into "schools." While there developed more than one recension of the Abhidharma, all doctrines, for expressing
the schools recognized the four trends of logical analysis
bhida)
.
{cafu-patisam-
These were (1) the analysis of the meaning (attha) of words and
{dhamma), which means analysis which may mean here grammar and of knowing (patibbdna) from a psycho-
sentences, (2) analysis of the teaching
of causes,
(3)
analysis of nirutti,
and (4)
definitions,
analysis
epistemological standpoint.®
The purpose for the elaborate classification of elements in the Abhidharma was not to add to the Buddha's teaching. Rather, it was to help the faithful community "eliminate false assumptions about man and existence that supported clinging to illusion. The intent was soteriological, not speculative. Originally the Abhidharma literature systematized the tenets found scattered in different sermons by the Buddha as an aid for instruction,
and
in
time
it
developed a technique of
of reality and the cause of suffering were
its
own
in
which the nature
The techniques terms of momentary cog-
analyzed topically.
include: (1) a strict treatment of experience in
nizable states and definition of these states, (2) creation of a "schedule" consisting of a double and triple classification for sorting these states,
and
(3) enumeration of twenty-four kinds of conditioning relations.'^
Such an
analysis
resulted
in
extensive
classifications
of the
factors
(dharmas) that combined to form everyday experience. These factors were defined and contemplated
bondage of
his
upon
in order to release the Buddhist
common, day-to-day attachment
from the
The attempt
to "things."
to get a fully consistent systematization of elements together with an ade-
quate theory of relating them casually was a religious goal. It to formulate a fully consistent understanding of elements
the
Madhyamika
dialectic of
is
the struggle
which
led to
Nagarjuna. The dynamism of the early teach-
ing that there was no essential reality in existence {andtmavdda) could not '
We
will indicate the difference
by using "Abhidharmi^' {Pali: Abhidhamma) method of tmderttanding.
to refer to the
canonical texts, and "abhidharma" to refer to the
'See Jayatilleke '
Bhikkhu
EBTK,
i>Janamoli,
310-13.
The Path of
Purification
(Colombo: R. Semage, 1956), xxix.
31
A
Emptiness:
Study
in Religious
Meaning
any
allow positing an eternal reality in a factor of existence {dharma)
more than
.'
/
*
in the individual entity
(dtman)
rather, the recognition of emptiness in
and
structure,
states,
For Nagarjuna,
it
required,
any mental category: in a rational
in an absolute intuition.
The abhidharma mental
.
and
schools
had
common
categories for analyzing existence,
stages of spiritual progress. Likewise, part of the con-
cern of the classification found in the Abhidharma was to define the terms
which were used to interpret human life, so that the monk would be clear about the components of existence. In the sixth book of the present Pali Abhidhavima, Yamaha, we find "a thesaurus of terms," which "tries to give a logical clarification and delimitation of all the doctrinal concepts, as to their range and contents." ^ Other words are given ordinary definitions, such as a "seat" {asana), said to be "where people sit." These categories and definitions became the object of Nagarjuna's critical analysis and were declared to be figments of the imagination. These categories
included classifications of conditioned factors of existence (samskrta) such
components (skandhas) that made up an individual person, the and universal elements (dhdius) which
as the
"bases of cognition" {dyatanas)
unite to
,
form the stream of moments which most people commonly
existence."
call
^
In the Kdrikds and Yigrahavydvartant Nagarjuna analyzes the concepts
and problems expressed in the Abhidharjna^^ and judges their adequacy criteria of logical consistency and precision of thought found
by the in the
Abhidharma. Nevertheless, he did not simply compile more
fications or write
classi-
another commentary on the meaning of words.
He
rejected the kind of answers provided by the abhidharma scholars and tried to show the inadequacy of defining and classifying elements of
'
i
existence
by carrying
this analytical
concern to
its
logical end.
However,
Nagarjuna's notions are expressed in terms of the vision which emerged
through the Prajndpdramitd
literature,
and which formed the mystique
of the Mahayana. This was the apprehension of emptiness {sunyatd) the Buddhist tradition *
scholarship connect
Nyanatiloka Mahathera, Gitide through the Abhidhamma-Titaka
Sabha, 1957), *
and modern
A
p.
.
Both
Nagarjuna and
(Colombo: Bauddha Sahitya
88.
precise exposition of these three classifications
is
given in catechetical form in the Dhatii-
Khata. See Nyanatiloka Mahathera, Gtiide through the Ahhidhamma-Pitaka, pp. 52-5 9. ^° See Stanislaw Schayer, Ausgewahlte Kapitel aus der Prasannapada (Krakowie: Nakladem Polskiej Akademji Umiejetnosci, 1931), pp. ix ff. for a general statement on Nagarjuna's use of conceptual categories provided by Hinayana schools, and Conze, BTI, p. 251, for the analytical tradition accepted
32
by Nagarjuna.
The the
Madhyamlka School
Religious Context of Nagarjuna's Expression
directly with the concerns in the Prajndpdramlia
literature to realize "emptiness."
What
On
the relation between the Prajndpdramitd and the
is
the one hand, there
(prajnd)
is
a
common
Abhidharma?
element in that both hold wisdom
to be the highest goal in spiritual development.
heritage
is
seen
concretely,
for
instance,
in
the
A
common
numerical summaries
prominent in each. Nyanatiloka Mahathera indicates the imlist of terms which precedes the first book of the Abhidhamvia Pifaka, the Dha^nmasanganJ: (indfrkds)
portance of this
A
close
imder is
a
not, as
but
is
examination reveals
great it is
number of
it
as
embracing the entire universe, classifying
psychological, ethical and doctrinal aspects.
sometimes assumed, merely
basic for the
a part
of the
whole Abhidhamma, serving
most important of the seven books.
It
may
as the
it
The list analytical Dhammasangani, explicit framework for the .
.
.
be compared to a mould, or matrix,
for casting metal. ^^
Concerning
their
"In these mdtrkds
importance for the Prajndpdramitd, Conze remarks, we must, I think, see the forerunners of the lists which
figure so prominently in the Prajiiaparamita Sutras."^^
The concern
for
analyzing phenomenal existence in both the Abhidharma and the Pra-
jndpdramitd suggest that there was a
common
regarded the clear apprehension of reality release.
release
On
as
religious sensitivity.
Both
coincident with spiritual
Both were born from the same matrix: the Buddhist struggle for from the attachment to apparent reality.
the other hand, the Prajndpdramitd perspective opposed the abhi-
dharma method of perceiving the true nature of
things. It rejected the
abhidharma concern to define and catalogue the factors (dharmas) which constitute existence, and denied that one can attain knowledge of the Ultimate Truth through contemplating how they arise and dissipate.-^^
Whether
the Prajndpdramitd literature was a reaction to a specific
abhidharma school
is
not at
all clear,
in the Mahdprajiidpdramifopadesa notions.-^*
The
^^
Nyanatiloka,
^'^
Conze, PL,
^* Conze, ^*
relation p.
p.
it
but judging from the thought found arose in opposition to Sarvastivadin
between one of the early
texts, the Astasdhasrikd
4.
13.
BTI, pp. 2 2 0-2 J.
Conze, PL,
p.
12. See esp.
Lamotte,
TGVS,
I,
xv, 782, 811, 939, 1035. In B"^B, p.
8J, E.
Conze states, "The Prajfidparamitd texts work with the Abhidharma of the Sarvastivadins." Louis de La Vallee Poussin ("Mahayana," ERE, VIII [1916], 336) states: "The Abhidharma of the Sarvastivadins (Hinayana) is accepted by the Madhyamikas (Mahayana)." And Bareau (APB, p. 179) maintains that Nagarjuna knew the Sarvastivadin literature very well.
3}
Emptiness:
A
Study in Religious Meaning
Prajndpdramitd, and the Sarvastlvadins
is
not certain since no distinctive
work
Sarvastlvadin doctrines are ever referred to;^^ but this
does beUttle
the understanding of traditional abhidharma as held by the monk Sariputra and according to the Theravada abhidharma treatise Atthasdlini, Sariputra is considered a master of analytic knowledge (patisambhidd) .^^
As a preview of the criticism which Nagarjuna will level at the abhidharma theories, it would be well to delineate various contrasting elements between these perspectives. Conze summarizes five points of contrast :^'^ (1) The ideals, aims, and career of a bodhisattva as articulated in the Prajndpdramitd are
opposed to those of the arhat and pratyekabuddha.
(2) The "perfection of wisdom" {prajndpdramitd) is contrasted to the "wisdom" of the old schools on the basis of its relative purifying or transforming power. (3) The Prajndpdramitd rejects the method of "reviewing"
the elements of existence {dharmas). (4) In contrast to the abhidharma theories of the "origination"
and "cessation" of elements, the Prajndpdra-
mitd held that there was "non-production" of elements.
( 5 )
Instead of re-
garding the nature of reality to consist of a multiplicity of elements, the
Prajndpdramitd held that the apparent multiplicity was simply the product of imagination. j
,
many
From
the standpoint of highest truth there were neither
particulars nor an absolute single reality: all
ontologlcal determinations. While the terminology
the
Abhidharma and Prajndpdramitd
receive a
new
significance.
Among
texts, the
the
new
is
was empty of such
much
the same in
terms for ultimate reality
ideas expressed in the Pra-
means" whereby, for the spiritually enlightened, all activities become related to becoming a bodhisattva. Another new notion is the transfer of merit from the one-who-has-attained to others. In summary, the Prajndpdramitd expresses the highest religious aim as
jndpdramitd
is
the "skill in
the all-encompassing knowledge for the benefit of
which
clearly perceives that there
is
no knowledge
all
knowledge no bodhisattva,
beings, a
as such,
no path for attainment, or no being who has knowledge, or who bodhisattva, or who proceeds on the path. 1
1
Our
the
interpretation of "emptiness," then, will reflect the religious con-
cerns expressed in the ^*
is
Abhidharma and
the Prajndpdramitd literatures.
12. Also see his translation of this work into English: AstasahasrikJ p. {The Perfection of Wisdom in Eight Thousand Slokas) trans, and ed. Edward Conze (Bibliotheca Indica, Work No. 284, Issue No. 1578 [Calcutta: The Asiatic Society, 1958]). ^® See A. Migot, "Un grand disciple du Bouddha, Sariputra," Bulletin de I'Ecole, Frangaise d'Extreme-Orient, XLVI (1954), 405-554. Conze, "Sariputra," found in: Buddhism, Its Essence and Development (New York: Harper and Bros., 1959), pp. 90-93.
Conze,
PL,
Prajndpdramitd
^^
Conze,
34
PL,
,
p.
14.
The It recognizes that the
Religious Context of Nagarjuna's
Exp ression
term "emptiness" has two functions in expressing
Nagarjuna's reHgious awareness. These functions might be termed
which
dialectical function,
( 1 )
the
an absolute dependence on
seeks to destroy
the logical and discursive structure in speech for expressing Ultimate
Truth, and
(2)
the formulative function, which uses the logical and
discursive structures for probing
and expanding the scope of meaning and symbols. Though words serve both functions in the Abhidharma literature and in the Prajndpdramiid texts, the Abhidharma emphasizes in ideas
the formulative function in
its
systematic elaboration of elements, while
the Prajndpdramitd stresses the dialectical function. This
Abhidharma
is
not surprising
mostly with the mundane elements of experience while the Prajndpdramitd expresses the mind-baffling Ultimate insofar as the
Truth
deals
—emptiness.
was the genius of Nagarjuna's articulation that the term "empti-
It
ness" served both dialectical and discursive functions. It
which
is
this
combination,
key for understanding his presentation of truth through the concept "emptiness" (stlnyatd). The fact that both these elements are peculiar to Nagarjuna's expression is borne out by the fact in part,
that each of
serves as a
two
schools of interpretation, following within a
of his original expression, emphasized one of the functions. ^^ school, represented in the writings of Aryadeva,
few centuries The Prdsangika
Dharmapala, Buddhapalita,
Candraklrti, and Santideva, emphasized the transcendence of
all
logic
and concepts. Such an emphasis led to the assertion that in reahty the Buddha had never uttered a word, for the only true language of emptiness is
silence.
and
For Buddhapalita,
since existence
all mental activity produced only illusion, was simply the fabrication of mental images it did
not even have phenomenal existence. The other school, the Svdtantrika,
is
by Bhavaviveka, who held that logical discourse was beneficial negating wrong views and that the visible world had phenomenal
represented for
reality
—though
By keeping
these
it
was not
two
real
uses of the
from the viewpoint of ultimate
truth.
term "emptiness" in mind, we can better
understand the significance of Nagarjuna's expression than accept one tradition's interpretation over
if
we would
another. ^^
^* Murti's short
summary of these developments (pp. 9 J -103) is helpful for understanding the Madhyamika took. ^* Most modern scholars lean toward the Prasarigika view, e.g., Conze in Buddhist Thought in India, Stcherbatsky in Conception of Buddhist Nirvana, Murti in The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, Stanislaw Schayer, "Das Mahayanistische Absolutum nach der Lehre der Madhyamikas," forms which
Orientalistische Literaturzeitung, in
The
Essentials
XXXVIII
(1935), 401-15.
of Buddhist Philosophy, ed.
W.
On
the other hand, Junjiro Takakusu
T. Chan and Charles A. Moore
(Honolulu:
35
,
.
A
Emptiness:
Study in Religious Meaning
Basic Presuppositions in Nagarjuna's Perspective
Though
reinterpreting the
work of
accepted certain ontologlcal are is
the abhidharma advocates, Nagarjuna
and epistemological presuppositions which
fundamental to Buddhist reHgious
a radical
forms
dynamism
The
first_of these
in reality; or, stated otherwise,
suggestions of "being."
all
life.
A
second
is
"becoming" trans-
that knowledge and "becom-
know
ing" are coextensive; one becomes what he knows, and he can
|J
that there
is
only
what is available to his "becoming." A third presupposition is that there are two kinds of truth: the mundane truth, valid for practical living, and the Ultimate Truth, which is the beginning and end of release from worldly •
J
turmoil. These presuppositions structure the basic pattern of Nagarjuna's
*
concern with "transforming knowledge" and
up the
set
attaining this knowledge. These three presuppositions related, for the realization of
man's true nature
are
criterion
for
inextricably
dependent on proper
is
apprehension.
Existence as '^Becoming"
dynamic quality of life was was some factor in existence quality self-establishing about it. It was a reaction which had a permanent to a "being" defined in the Sarhkhya manner as an absolute being, a thingin-itself independent and immutable. The late Professor J. Takakusu has called attention to the fact that Buddhism was a philosophy of "thusness"
The Buddhist claim
(
'
\
\
for the intrinsically
a reaction to the prevalent claim that there
,
(tatbafd)
,
in distinction to the Upanishadic
thought of "thatness" {tattva)
and "started with the theory of becoming, admitting no dtman, Individual or universal, and no eternalism whatever." ^° "Impermanence" (anicca)
Hindu
ontologlcal term sat (being) "becoming" must be distinguished from the common view of change, which regards change as pertaining to a state or form of some more basic substance. When a person passes through the
replaced the crucial
The notion of
radical
stages of infancy, youth, maturity,
there
is
some basic
reality
(called
and old age the assumption
throughout. Or, empirical existence In general University of Hawaii, 1947), has
We
follow the lead of L. de
la
classified
Is
that
by the same name) which continues
Madhyamika under
Vallee Poussin, in "Bhavaviveka,"
is
considered to be
real,
the rubric "Negative Rationalism."
MCB,
II
(1933), 65,
who
suggests
that together the Prasaiigikas and Svatantrikas show the "middle way," one destroying the voidness of existence and the other destroying the existence of the void. '° Junjiro Takakusu, "Buddhism as a Philosophy of Thusness," Philosophy Charles A. Moore (Princeton: University Press, 1944), p. 69.
36
—Easi
and West,
ed.
The
To
while forms change.
Religious Context of Nagarjuna's Expression
the contrary, the traditional Buddhist view
—
that the world "becomes" continually posit a being-ness about the world, sciously,
say
which occurs to
and the cause for
illusion
is
(as the
"is" nothing.
it
thing"
The
is
the
a large extent
suffering. It
To
first step in
characteristics
uncon-
that a thing does
direct attention to "a
the direction of affirming a self-sufficient entity.
"impermanence"
of
is
to
even misleading to
is
Buddhist school of Sarvastivadins did)
not exist even for two consecutive moments.
The attempt
{anicca,
anitya)
,
"turmoil"
{dukkha, duhkha), and "non-soul" {anatta, andtina), which applied to all
existing things,
i.e.,
were used to suggest that
"entities"
all
were nonentities,
only mental constructs.
The anatma-te2ich.m^ essence of
man which
which we
call a
of
pre-Mahayana Buddhism had
could be considered unchanging.
"person" was regarded simply
as a
denied
any
The phenomenon
composite of factors
(dharnias) which were related in an orderly manner, but which were continually in flux. This doctrine also denied the existence of an absolute universal essence and suggested that the proper place to gain an understanding of reality was with phenomenal existence, which unlike most Western is seen as a succession of constructions. This is
or elements
philosophies
which think of the "uncombined"
and which begin with the simple absolute interpreting
the
teaching to show
nature of
how
equivalent to "simple"
as
fundamental category for Nagarjuna extended this andtma-
reality.
as a
"the un-combined"
is
logically
and
linguistically
dependent on the "combined" {samskrta) Thus the notion "un-combined" .
functions in
Madhyamika
substantial connotations,
philosophical thought,
and
(2)
as
a
(1)
without necessary
term dependent on conceptual
fabrication.
In denying the reality of a self-sufficient entity, early Buddhism expressed the continuity of one
moment
to the next
"dependent co-origination" {pratttya-samtitpdda) of existence into an orderly process, while character of any
.
by
emphasizing the transient
moment. Phenomena "arose" or became
the interaction of a vast complex of factors
be identified as having characteristic
the notion of
This placed the flux
features
actual through
(dharmas) intrinsic
which could to
themselves.
Nagarjuna accepted the notion that existence was a composite of interdependent relations, but extended the dynamics of the dependent coorigination notion to the causal process
itself.
For him, "radical becoming"
did not allow for a self -existent causal principle
from the
earlier explanation.
While on the
—
as
might be inferred
level of conventional truth
37
A
Emptiness:
Study In Religious Meaning
such a causal process served to deny any essential nature of phenomenal
from the highest perspective
reality,
this
supposed principle disintegrated
along with the other empty phenomena. Therefore, the dynamics of
not pertain to only the mundane
reality did
level.
A
two-level world (of
—the
time and eternity) was dissolved within the dynamics of emptying
emptying activity of highest truth. The fact of temporality was not a problem in Itself; it was simply the "becoming" on a conventional level. The real problem was to overcome the illusion that there was an eternal, unchangeable, static reality either in the visible or ideal areas of experience; it
is
the fabrication of a being-In-itself
—which
(svabhdva)
was always that was
coextensive with the desire for, or grasping after, such an entity
—
a perversion of "indifferent becoming."
Through Knowing
^'Becoming*'
From
the perspective of Ultimate Truth, "becoming" loses a distinctively
dynamic e.g.,
character.
static:
No
more can be said about it, for every designation, non-empty, real: non-real, is dissolved.
dynamic, empty:
Indeed, to talk about "it"
to fabricate an illusion.
is
At
this
point
we can
perhaps most clearly perceive the meaning of the second presupposition: that
"becoming" and knowledge
two elements
"realize" captures the
"realize" certain possibilities.
In Buddhism,
bilities.
as in
He
are
coextensive.
in the sense that
The English word
man
can be said to
both "knows" and "becomes" the possi-
other yogic forms of "realization," the char-
knowledge and the character of "becoming" change along the from illusion to ultimate knowledge {pra]na = wisdom). Unen-
acter of scale
man
lightened
w
is
U
constructs his existence through his discrimination and
produces emotional attachments in the process. As long
I
discriminatory.
about "things,"
I.e.,
man
is
energies {karma) to continue this fabrication. Mrs.
as his
knowledge
simply producing the
Rhys Davids succinctly
describes the problem:
Thinking
results in desire,
and what we
However, i
dislike,
through
desire objects are divided into
hence envy and
as the false
selfishness,
what we
like
hence quarreling and fighting.^^
images of "things" are dissipated, the accompanying
and
emotional content and
its
hate are cooled. Here
the recognition that feelings and mental structures
It
is
J are intrinsically related.
"BP,
pp.
58
87-88.
energies are dissipated: the heat of greed
The
The lead to
problem
basic religious
more
sathsdra
is
to
Religious Context of Nagarjuna's Expression
come
to terms with the emotions that
(the flow of existence)
.
By
bringing the nature
of the trouble before the mind, the feelings which are concomitant with ignorance are eliminated. As the energies of construction and craving
knowledge discriminates less and less between "things" or between "me" and "not-me." Reciprocally, the knowledge that all are dissipated, one's
fabricated
phenomena
are
empty of
self-nature empties the binding energies
of "becoming," and the cessation of the binding energies dissipates the
emotional attachment of knowledge about "things." TtL>o
A
Kinds of Truth
which Nagarjuna accepted was that there were two kinds of truth that were useful in the "world of becoming": the mundane truth valid for practical living and the Ultimate Truth, which is the beginning and end of release from worldly turmoil. Both kinds third presupposition
of truth have a valid place in his articulation of the Middle if
Way; though
misused they are like any binding force which produces turmoil and
frustration.
Since there are distinction
no
intrinsically
different
reality. It refers, rather, to the
truth
is
e.g.,
the world and ultimate
manner by which "things"
are perceived.
based on the intellectual and emotional attachment
to ideas or sense objects as if
of knowledge, the
between "mundane truth" and "ultimate truth" does not
pertain to different objects of knowledge,
Mundane
objects
whereby such
objects of
knowledge were used
they had an existence independent of the perceiver. Such truth dis-
and categorizes segments of existence as "door," "room," "money," "I," "you," or any mental or sensual object of cognition. All men use such truth to carry on the everyday affairs of life. Likewise all religious doctrines and theories about the nature of existence
criminates, identifies,
fall
within the bounds of
mundane
Ultimate Truth, on the other hand,
is
truth,
for they
are
fabrications.
a quality of life expressed in the
complete Indifference to the construction or cessation of "things." Ulti-
mate Truth is the realization of dependent co-origination whereby there not even to the formulation is no attachment to fabricated "things"
—
of dependent co-origination.
Nagarjuna accepted the practical distinction between the two kinds of truth, and because this was only a practical distinction he felt free to use
mundane
dispel the
truth, that required logical and semantic conventions, to
attachment to the products of
this
truth and thereby lead 39
.
Emptiness;
A
Study
in Religious
Meaning
the religious student toward Ultimate Truth.
A
concern for the right
understanding of the Buddha's Path was one of the impulses for Nagarjuna's articulation of "emptiness."
He
Abhidharma had hidden the
contended that the explanations of the
right
approach to knowing
reality,
and
therefore he reinterpreted the concepts of dhamias (factors of existence)
and pratitya-sarmitpada
(dependent co-origination).
In
their
concern
to articulate the right view the early Buddhists used discursive thought
and
rational
a
criterion
of truth ;~^
and,
while
opposing some basic
Theravada notions, the Mahayana formulations owe much of
their habits
of thinking to the traditional methods.^^
The aim of
]
it
—not
articulating this religious vision, however,
simply to talk about
Truth and
it.
The
difference
theories about the nature of existence
was to "realize"
between the Ultimate
was emphasized because
the former intended to "see things as they really are," and a theoretical articulation proposed
to
do
this
with the implication that there was
an absolute understanding of existence. Speculative questions and answers
were not fruitful in the eyes of early Buddhism^* or of Nagarjuna. Indeed, the abhidharmic effort had intended to deny the categories of contemporary speculative metaphysics. Thus, the analytical procedure was quite usable ii
in attaining wisdom, but if
it
became an end in itself, or if the analysis it became detrimental speculation.
led to absolutizing "a conclusion," then
^^ See Guenther, pp. 22-30, for a technical account of the relation between the karmic process and mental process. Regarding rational techniques in Buddhism, see Conze, BTI, p. 27 &., and Louis de La Vallee Poussin, Way to Nirvana (Cambridge: University Press, 1917), p. 3 1 ff ^^BP, pp. 5 ff. La Vallee Poussin, ERE, VIH, 3 3 6. Nalinaksha Dutt, Aspects of Mahayana Buddhism and Its Relation to Hinayana (London: Luzac & Co., 1930), pp. 45 ff. ^* See Majjhima Nikaya I, par. 431; Samyutta Nikaya III, par. 139; and Samyutta Nikaya I,
par. 4, for
40
denying the usefulness of speculation.
Part II
IMPLICATIONS
"EMPTINESS" for UNDERSTANDING SOME BASIC of
BUDDHIST CONCEPTS
3 ELEMENTS AND FACTORS
THAT CONSTITUTE As
a Buddhist,
EXISTENCE (DWmas)
Nagarjuna stood within
a particular
that informed his rehgious and philosophical concerns.
reHgious tradition
He
is
however, for rejecting part of the expression of Buddhism
remembered, as
misleading
and detrimental to the intention of that expression. Thus his religious problems were defined to a considerable extent by the Indian Buddhist perspective, but he reformulated what he regarded as the central concern
Way
of the Middle
and
in doing so redefined basic concepts.
concern was to express the Middle "Way so
attachment to
illusion.
This required interpreting basic concepts about
existence and about the realization of
that
all
His central
as to aid others in loosing their
Truth
in light of the apprehension
things are empty.
In this and the next chapters
we
will
examine Nagarjuna's under-
standing of basic Buddhist concepts used to explain the existence,
and
see that in light of the
are regarded as
emptiness of
all
rise
of phenomenal
things these concepts
no more than constructing forms. To begin with the is somewhat arbitrary since the proper
notion of phenomenal existence
understanding of existence presupposes the religious vision of nirvana and highest truth.
However, we
problem of accounting formed in reaction to the
will begin with the
for existence since Nagarjuna's articulation
is
abhidharma meditation on dharmas and the understanding of cause. Nagarjuna relegated this abhidharma concern to conventional knowledge, and a
it Is
new The
in going
beyond
this that his expression of
Ultimate Truth has
significance for Buddhist thought.
elaboration of long
of their combination in the
lists
of basic elements {dharmas) and theories
Abhidharma were meant
to permit the Buddhist
many factors which constituted the apparent entities monks called "human beings." By thus penetrating into the process of "becoming," to see the
every monk,
as the
Buddha, could reverse the process and be released 43
\
i
.
A
Emptiness:
Study
in Religious
Meaning
was important to know the "marks" {laksana) and the "ownbeing" (svabhdva) of the elements which made up existence, and to
from
It
it.
contemplate on these marks.
What was
ultimate transforming knowledge for the abhidharma scholar
became for Nagarjuna a practical knowledge. This, by no means, relegated to a realm of unimportance but simply indicated the context in
it
which it was meant to have importance. By analyzing the teaching of the Abhidharma from the perspective that all ideas are "constructs" dependent on other constructed things which are themselves dependent on other constructed things Nagarjuna hoped to release the thoughts and inten-
—
—
tions of his students for Ultimate Truth.
No One
Essential Distinctions
of analyzing the abhidharma material in light of "the
result
emptiness of
Between Existing Things
all
things" was to deny the significance of the distinctions
between aspects of existence. Perhaps the most important distinction which Nagarjuna denied is that between svabhdva ("self -existence," that essential nature by which something is what it is and not something else) and parabhdva ("other-existence"). Chapter xv of his most important work, Madhyamakakdrikds, is devoted to an analysis of svabhdva. In the first
three verses the notion of svabhdva
the basic Buddhist position that
other things. 1.
He
all
is
shown
existence
to be incompatible with
produced dependent on
is
writes:
The production of
a self-existent
thing by
a
be "something which 2.
How,
is
is
not possible,
self -existent
thing would
conditioning cause
[For] being produced through dependence on a cause, a
produced" (krtaka)
indeed, will a self -existent thing
become "something which
is
pro-
duced"? Certainly, a self-existent thing [by definition]
pendent of anything 3.
If there
is
is
"not-produced" and
is
inde-
else.
an absence of
a self-existent thing,
how
will
an other-existent
thing {parabhdva) come into being? Certainly the self-existence of an other-existent thing
The next
three verses extend the
is
called "other-existence."
argument to deny the
distinction
between
existence and non-existence: 4.
Further,
existence?
44
how can
a
thing
[exist]
without either self-existence or other-
Elements and Factors that Constitute Existence (Dharmas) If either self-existence or other-existence exist, then an existing thing, indeed,
would be proved. If there
5.
no proof of an existent thing, then
is
a non-existent
thing cannot be
proved. Since people call the other-existence of an existent thing a "non-existent thing."
Those who perceive self-existence and other-existence, and an existent thing
6.
and
a non-existent thing,
Do
not perceive the true nature of the Buddha's teaching.
In the same way, the final five verses deny the distinction between the broadest categories of ontology: being and nonbeing, the aflSrmation of
each leading to eternalism or nihilism respectively. Either alternative objectionable
No
is
from the Buddhist point of view.
Between the Phenomenal World and "Unconstructed Reality"
Essential Difference
Nagarjuna could argue that the distinctions between existing things a nature which was uniquely intrinsic to a thing (and therefore essentially different from something else), and that such If
depended on assuming a
"being-in-itself" logically
not possible in an existence that
is
pendently originated, then the
way
between the most cherished antipathies in Buddhism. are the distinction
between "that which
is
Among
bound"
"that which has gained spiritual release" (muchanta) as
19,
20).
The
characteristics
de-
those denied
(badhyanta)
(XVI.
between samsdra (the course of phenomenal existence)
(XXV.
Is
open to negate the distinctions
is
and
5), as well
and nirvana
by which entitles were defined, more than conventional designa-
therefore, were not indicative of anything tions useful for daily living.
to refer to existing realities
While
be useful
a
as
practical measure to distinguish
between
would be detrimental If one forgot that even "things" do not exist apart from our giving them names.
sajiisdra
these
may
it
Such antithetical notions could not be said which had antithetical natures at the bases.
and nirvana,
It
This notion that even religious ideals were empty of self-established natures and characteristics literature.
is
related to that
records that both "beings" and nirvdna like
found
in the Prajndpdramifd
For instance, the Astasdhasrikd Prajndpdramitd dramatically
magical
Illusions.
The
(as
disciple SubhutI,
well as
Buddhahood)
are
while instructing the gods
regarding the perfect wisdom, astounds the gods by saying: 4i
/
— A
Emptiness:
Study in Religious Meaning
Like a magical illusion are those beings, like
dream. For not two different
a
things are magical illusion and beings, are dreams and beings. All objective facts
magical
also are like a
A
Gods: is
Subhuti: Even Nirvana,
much more
—
fully enlightened
dream? Buddhahood
like a
dream. The various
illusion, like a
Streamwinner to Buddhahood
also are like a
magical
Buddha also, you say, is you say, is like a magical magical
I say, is like a
would say
magical
illusion,
is
like a
is
like a
illusion,
dream?
dream.
How
is
like
an
illusion,
is
like a
dream?
perchance there could be anything more distinguished, of that
if
it is like
and Nirvana,
illusion
a
illusion,
—from
dream.
so anything else?
Subhuti: Even I
like
also,
Gods: Even Nirvana, Holy Subhuti, you say, too
classes of saints
illusion, like a
are
an
illusion, like a
dream. For not two different things are
dreams and Nirvana.^
Likewise the terms for ultimate reality used in well-known Buddhist texts are the objects of Nagarjuna's analysis
—and
found to be without
inherent ontological status. For instance, in chapter xxii of the
mikakdrikas the terms "tathagata" (the "fully
and "sunyata" (emptiness)
shown
are
ten verses are devoted to showing
to be without referents.
how
Madhya-
completed" = the Buddha)
The
first
the tathdgata cannot exist simply
in an unrelated condition or simply in a related condition, resulting in the
judgment that the tathdgata
is
empty. Verses 9 and 10 summarize
this
conclusion: 9.
10.
when
So
And
if
there
there
is
no
is
dependence, self-existence {svabhava) does not exist;
self -existence
whatever,
Thus "dependence" and "that which
how is
is
an other-existence possible?
dependent" are completely empty
(^sunya).
How
is
that
empty "fully completed one" known through that which
is
empty?
Verses 12-16 indicate that no definition reveals the tathdgata, not because the tathdgata
human
is
activity,
some absolute
herent ultimacy from arising. 14.
reality standing aloof
and unrelated to
but because the tathdgata precludes the thought of in-
Concerning that which
The
is
final three verses
empty by
its
own
summarize
this position:
nature, the thoughts do not
arise that:
The Buddha 15.
"exists" or "does not exist" after death.
Those who describe
in detail the
Buddha, who
is
unchanging and beyond
detailed description
all
Those, completely defeated by description, do not perceive the "fully completed [being]." *
Conze,
46
PWES,
p.
18, pars. 40-41;
reprinted
by permission of The
Asiatic Society.
— Elements and Factors that Constitute Existence (Dharmas)
The
16.
self-existence of the "fully completed [being]"
is
the self-existence of
the world.
The "fully-completed [being]"
is
without self-existence [and]
the world
is
without self-existence.
In verses 10, 11, and 14 of this chapter
we
see that the
terms "empty" and
"emptiness" are used to denote the tathdgata; yet, to avoid any interpretation of a substantial reality in emptiness, verse
that "emptiness"
emphatically states
simply a designation for conveying knowledge:^
is
One may not
11.
11
say that
there
is
"emptiness," nor that
there
"non-
is
emptiness."
Nor
that both [exist simultaneously], nor that neither exists; the purpose for
saying ["emptiness"]
"Emptiness" too express
is
is
only for the purpose of conveying knowledge.
empty of any inherent
being. Just as these terms do not
some unconditioned absolute reality, so also sadbhava (real XXIV. 16), dharma (universal principle, XXV. 24), and
existence,
sd^vata (eternity,
due to their
own
XXVII. 10-15) do not denote something which
real
is
self -existing natures.
Emptiness of the Basic Categories for Understanding Existence It
must
logically follow that if there
between constructed things
is
really
no ultimate
distinction
and "non-constructed things"
(samskrta)
(asamskria) then the three basic characteristics with which traditional Buddhism had identified all existing things aniiya (impermanence), duhkha (turmoil or sorrow), and andtma (without-being-in-itself) are
—
also
empty.^
This
is
borne
Madhyamakakdrikds. In chap,
out
various
in
we
xxiii. 13, 14,
passages
of
Nagarjuna's
read that the notion of im-
permanence cannot be considered to be any truer to the Ultimate Truth than that of permanence. 13.
Even
if
the notion
"What
is
permanent
is
in
something impermanent"
is
in
error,
How
can
this
notion be in error since "what
is
impermanent" does not
exist in
emptiness? *
7,
Other kdrikds indicating that "emptiness" does not and XX. 17, 18.
refer to
some actual entity include XIII.
8, '
Dutt
(AMBRH,
pp.
26-27)
points
out:
"The
Sarvastivadins
are
also
responsible
for
the
though the word conveyed no Mahayanic meaning as it connoted no other sense than anatma: see Lalita Vistara, 419, Divydvadana, 266, 367, and Kosa VI, 163 and VII, 3 1 ff regarding the relationship of Mahayana and Hinayana." addition of a fourth term, 'sunya,' to the usual trio
.
.
.
.
47
.
Emptiness:
A
Even
14.
Study in Religious Meaning if
the notion
"What
is
permanent
is
in
something impermanent"
is
in
error,
not then the notion concerning emptiness,
Is
In chap,
xii,
that
i.e.,
it
impermanent, in
is
nine verses deny that "turmoil" {dulpkha) can be produced
according to any of the accepted causal theories. Again Nagarjuna uses the
argument that any element which and
is
defined according to an independent
cannot account for the cause of things which are de-
sui gejzeris reality
by interdependence with other elements. Therefore he concludes:
fined 10.
Not only
But
also
are the four causal interpretations not possible in respect to turmoil.
none of the four causal interpretations
external things
possible even in respect to
is
{bhava)
Even the "touchstone" of
scholastic
Buddhism, the andtma
(non-self)
doctrine, cannot be maintained in the formlessness of silnyatd. In chap,
we
xviii. 6 6.
There
read: is
the teaching of "individual self" {atma)
individual self"
{anatnia)
and the teaching of "non-
,
;
But neither "individual
self"
nor "non-individual self" whatever has been
taught by the Buddhas.
Thus, the general characteristics of conditioned phenomena which were the object of meditation for the students of the Abhidharma were denied validity in ultimate or perfect knowledge.
The
denial of an essential distinction between samsdra
and nirvana was
concomitant with the denial of the three independent stages in the producconstructed things in samsdra. These stages are "origination"
tion of
and "cessation" (nirodha). As in the case with svabhdva, and parabhdva, or bhava and abhava, Nagarjuna assumes that his opponent differentiates between the three stages by positing a unique, self-sufficient reality in each; he then denies this distinction on {utpdda), "duration"
the grounds that there
{sthita),
is
no such independent entity
of such reality. Also, Nagarjuna argues that
1.
The
first
But
is
a
composite product (savtskrfa)
[of existence: origination, duration, if
origination
is
,
is
"empty"
then the three character-
and dissolution]
a non-composite (asamskrta)
characteristics of a composite product?
4S
stage
three verses of chapter vii establish his line of argument:
If origination
istics
—each
the stages are of a self-
then either an infinite regress or an eternal entity must
sufficient nature, result.
if
,
then
are
how
appropriate.
[could there be]
:
Elements and Factors that Constitute Existence (Dharmas)
When
2.
the three are separate, origination of either of the other
two character-
does not suffice to function as a characteristic.
istics
If united in a composite product,
how
could they
be at one place at one
[all]
time? If origination, duration,
3.
and dissolution
are other [secondary] characteristics
of composite products. It
an infinite regress. If
is
The following three stages,
another; and ingless.
is
not
so,
they are not [really] composite products.
verses in this chapter elaborate the
argument that
is
And
these
which have causal implications, cannot exist unrelated to one if they are identical, the distinction between them is mean-
Therefore he concludes:
Because the existence of production, duration, and cessation
3 3.
there
this
is
not proved,
no composite product (samskrta) if a
composite product
is
not proved,
how can
a
non-composite product
(asathskrta) be proved? 34.
As
a
magic
Just so should
trick, a
we
dream or
a fairy castle.
consider origination, duration, and dissolution.
Similar to the denial of the three stages of existence
the rejection of
is
the triple "time-points": past, present, and future. In the eight verses of
chapter xi he denies that the limits (boundaries) of past and future can be defined as mutually exclusive, and therefore "past," "present," and
"future" cannot be said to exist ultimately
as such.
The
first
two
verses
indicate the dialectic use: 1.
The
great ascetic [Buddha] said:
"The extreme
limit of the past cannot be
discerned."
Existence-in-fiux
(scnhsdra)
is
without bounds; indeed there
no beginning
is
or ending of that [existence]. 2.
How
could there be a middle portion of that which has no "before" and
"after"? It
follows that "past," "future," and "simultaneous events" do not obtain.
Also in chapter xix, the segments of time are denied
and the nonstatic character of time
is
individual entities,
as
indicated. Verses
5
5. A non-stationary "time" cannot be "grasped"; and which can be grasped does not exist.
How,
then, can one perceive time
if it is
a
and 6
state:
stationary "time"
not "grasped"? 49
A
Emptiness:
Study
Since time
6.
Meaning
in Religious
dependent on
is
a
thing {bhava),
how can
time [exist] without a
thing?
There
is
not any thing which
j
"Time," says Nagarjuna,
J
the danger of binding itself it
exists;
a
is
man
to
how, then, will time become [something]?
mental construction and it if it is
regarded
is
susceptible to
ultimate; though
as
by
has no inherently evil quality. Again, in chapter xxvii, in the
("views," or "perspectives"), the designation of "past"
analysis of drsti
is based on assumptions about the real or nonreal "past-beingness." * In the context of the some characteristic of Madhyamakakdrikds, time or some segment of time becomes a problem
is
denied because
when is /,
it is
crystallized into
not that
man
it
some kind of
a process of
it is
an ultimate being-ness in
posits
Madhyamika point
of view there
is
existence-as-such; one cannot escape I
distinct entity.
becoming; but that in it
The problem,
illusion
or in segments of
then,
and craving, it.
From
the
no "level of reality" like temporalfrom it because there is no "it" to
escape from.
Not only
are the elements of the conditioned
world and "the uncon-
ditioned," and the three segments of time devoid of self-sufficient "ber
comingness" {svabhdva)
,
of becoming are empty of
and the object of action entities.
Chapter
also the three factors explaining the process
but
self -existence.
The person
acting, the activity,
are judged as conventional designations, not actual
of the Kdrikds deals with this problem, establishing a
ii
model for future analyses involving the subject of object of the action.
The notion analyzed
action, the activity,
in this chapter
is
and
"motion,"
and Nagarjuna uses his dialectical analysis to show that the terms "goer," "going to," and "what is gone to" do not possess referents that have mutually exclusive essential natures.^ He shows how each term, considered as
an independent self-determined entity, denies the
His method
any
is
to point out
real relationship;
process of
and
how
possibility of motion.
a substance-attribute
a relationship
is,
notion precludes
of course, necessary for the
"becoming" to occur. This problem cannot be separated from
the question of "origination," "duration," and "cessation" since motion, as all
constructed products (samskrta) of existence,
designations. *
See
The
difficulties resulting
from
is
also related to these
a substance-attribute
notion
Appendix A.
discussion of this chapter, Murti (pp. 178 ff.) calls attention to the comparison between Nagarjuna's denial of motion and that of Zeno. He rightly points out that Zeno, while denying motion, presupposed rest. On the other hand, "Nagarjuna denies both motion and rest.
"In
Each
is
his
nothing by
50
itself
or together."
;
,
.
Elements and Factors that Constitute Existence (Dharmas) arise
from
7.
8.
9.
no "going" (gamana) without
is
The "goer"
It
come
will the "goer"
What
special relationships.
seen in the following excerpts
is
If there
How
and
causal as well as temporal
of arguing
a
when
into being
from chapter
"goer" (ganidra) there
no "going"?
is
does not go; consequently a "non-goer" certainly does not go.
third [possibility] goes other than the "goer" and "non-goer"? is
When
"The
said:
How
*goer' goes."
is
that possible,
without the "act of going" (gamana) no goer
is
produced?
Those who hold the view that the "goer" goes must
10.
The manner
ii.®
[falsely] conclude [
That
there
"goer" without the "act of going" since the "act of going"
a
is
is
obtained by a "goer."
The
12.
"state of going to"
gone to" (gatam)
Nor is "the Where then is 13. "Present
,
state of going to"
not begun in "that which
is
begun in "present going to" (gamyamdna)
is
is
already gone to" exist where the "act of going"
not yet gone to"?
is "that which is already gone to" {gatam), {gamyamdna) and "that which is not yet gone to" {agatam) ,
;
Therefore, the beginning of the "act of going"
Chapter vi
1.
already
mentally fabricated what
"present going to"
(rdga).
is
not yet gone to" {a gat am)
going to" does not exist previous to the beginning of the "act of
[begins] in "that which is
is
begun?
it
going," nor does "that which
14. It
(gaium)
nor in "that which
The
a similar analysis of the
is
first
If the "one
two kdrikds
who
desires"
one
reflect the
would
is
not seen in any way.
who
desires (rakta)
and
desire
argument:"^
exist before "desire" itself, then "desire"
may
be disregarded.
When
"desire" becomes related to "one
who
desires,"
then "desire" comes into
existence. 2.
If there
[And
true for "one
The
is
no "one who
the question]
who
See
^
See
Appendix Appendix
A A
how
then will "desire" come Into being? exists or does
not exist likewise holds
desires."
inability to attribute a
the action itself '
desires,"
whether "desire"
is
unique reality to an agent of action and to
also the basis of
Nagarjuna's denial of the argument in
for the translation of the whole
chapter.
for the translation of the whole chapter.
51
'
Emptiness:
chapter
Study
"origination" originates
vii that
and darkness. By defining
itself
clusive essences,
Nagarjuna
effective relationship. 9.
Meaning
in Religious
and something other than
itself
Nagarjuna's opponent argues by analogy to a lamp illuminating
itself.
both
A
There
What
no darkness in the
is
When
is
light
and there where the light
the darkness destroyed
by the
if
can have no
darkness
come
by
destroyed
is
is
placed.
is
the getting rid of darkness.
light being originated,
the light, being originated, does not
But then,
11.
mutually ex-
as
states:
could the light illumine? Indeed illumination
How
10.
He
and darkness
light
logically demonstrates that they
a
in contact
with darkness?
having no contact with
light
[darkness],
[A
light] placed here will destroy the darkness of the entire world.
and that which
12. If the light illuminated both itself
Then, without than
13. If it has if it
after that 14. In
how
not yet originated,
itself
itself.
and that which
is
other
which
is
does origination produce itself?
when
has already originated
it
is
being produced, what
no way does anything originate by "what
it
is
produced
already produced?
already originated," or
Just as is
doubt, darkness will cover both
other than
itself.
And
is
a
is
"what
is
being originated," "what
is
not [yet] originated."
has been said in [the analysis of] "presently going to," "that which
already gone to," and "that which
is
not yet come to."
Nagarjuna's denial of distinctions correlates with the Buddha's opposition to theoretical speculations.
The
distinctions, claims
Nagarjuna, are not
conducive to the cessation of ignorance and craving because they suggest
what "marks" it
that
w
is
off
distinguished
recognize that a chair clay,
not.
has
from something is
some kind of else.
intrinsic
In practical
life
not a table, that a gold coin
it is
reality is
which
necessary to
not the same
as
and that a merchant who cheats is not identical with one who does However, a person who does not slip into the error of regarding
these practical distinctions as ultimate facts
indeed neither one absolute substance nor
is
able to see that there
many
is
individual substances.
Every object of perception or imagination requires a mental fabrication, and therefore every distinction participates in this fabrication. If, on the other hand, this distinction
is
accompanied by the assumption or convic-
tion of an absolute reality, then psychic energies are stimulated
V
bind the person to the fabrication. J2
It
is
this
which
being bound to fabrication
.
Elements and Factors that Constitute Existence (Dharmas)
which reality
is
samsdra. Because of the danger in language to posit an essential
within
mental activity has been regarded with disfavor
ideas,
as a
means for realizing Ultimate Truth (see Vigrahavydvartaiii 29, 59). "We might sum up Nagarjuna's judgment on the ability to indicate reality through mental activity by saying that in tional usage, verbal terms indicate
but on analysis
a proposition,
something which
is
i.e.,
there,
in conven-
phenomenally;
—from the ultimate point of view—that which
cording to conventional thought does not exist
as
exists ac-
an absolute entity.
The Emptiness of Dhannas denying the validity of distinctions made in early Buddhism, Nagarjuna also denies the reality of the factors of existence {dharmas) These factors are forces that combine to form our world of experience. In
To
emphasize the dynamic character of factors, T. Stcherbatsky has de-
scribed
them
as
"synergies":
The elements of
existence were regarded as something
= samskrta
[safhskdra
[cittacaitta]
energies never
more
similar to energies
dharma] than to substantial elements. The mental elements
were naturally moral, immoral, or neutral forces.
worked
in isolation, but always in
.
.
.
Since the
mutual interdependence according
to causal laws, they were called "synergies" or co-operators [suThskdra].^
Nagarjuna's quarrel with abhidharmic thought resulted from a shift in
understanding the elements of existence.
From
his point
of view, the
elements were given the characteristics of substantial and self-sufficient entities,
which denied the
original intention of the "synergies" as part
of the scheme of dependent co-origination.
Knowledge of the dharmas was important in the older schools of Buddhism as the basis for knowing the nature of existence and the source In general, the dharmas were considered to be non-
of sorrow (dukkha)
.
substantial essences
{bhava)
exist
.
Most early schools held that the dharmas this is denied by the Sarvdstivddins)
only for an instant (though
;
dharmas influenced one another according to the law of Despite their impermanence they preserved an identity or a
nevertheless, the causality.
proper character, and
it
was the self-appointed task of the Abhidharma
composers to clarify the characteristics and show the process of interrelation.
By *
contrast the Astasdhasrikd Prajndpdramitd explicitly denied that the
Theodor Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic ('s-Gravenhage: Mouton, 1958),
p.
5.
53
A
Emptiness:
Study in Religious Meaning
bodhisattva sees dharmas and stated that only ignorant people identify distinctive elements in existence.
Here the Buddha
denied that discrimination between elements
is
is
reported to have
useful for overcoming
attachment:
The Lord: seize
on
who
If a person
past, future
belongs to the vehicle of the Bodhisattvas does not
and present dharmas, does not mind them, does not get at
them, does not construct, nor discriminate them, does not
them with
considers
the conviction that
construction, unborn, not is
come
all
nor review them,
see
forth, not come, not gone,
ever produced or stopped in the past, future, or present;
dharmas in such
a
way, then
of those dharmas, and so
is
his jubilation
his
is
if
he
dharmas are fabricated by thought
in accordance
and that no dharma if
he considers those
with the true nature
transformation (of the merit) into full enlighten-
ment.^
In the
first
half of the
Madhyamakakarikas Nagarjuna
is
especially con-
cerned to show that the dharmas were not individual real entities which combined to construct sensuous existence since they themselves were the
—
product of the defining and distinguishing activity of
human
minds.
He
systematically denies that these categories of Buddhist thought, which were meant to give an understanding of existence and release from it,
pertained to anything actually
real.
This denial extended the dissolution of
dharma theory had brought about in rela"an existing thing" which tion to the dtman. For Nagarjuna, both the dhnan and the dharmas were the
mental constructions.
artificial
The
three classifications
of elements^^ were
(1)
the
skandhas
five
("heaps" or groups), (2) the twelve dyatanas (sense-fields), and (3) the dhdtus
(irreducible
elements). Chapter
Madhyamakakdrikds to pendent
with the *
Conze,
is
the
deal with the classifications
reality of the six indriyas six sense-objects to
PWES,
iii
(sense-faculties),
first
chapter in the
by denying the indewhich
are correlated
form the twelve dyatana.^^ The
p. J2. See also pars. 31, 39,
sense-fields
139-54, 399, 482-85. Likewise see the "Heart Sutra"
(trans, by Conze in BWS, p. 89) which states that in emptiness there are no dharmas. ^° In CCB, Stcherbatsky has outlined these classifications (pp. 5-9) as expounded
from the
Sarvastivadin point of view in the Abhidharmakoia and devotes the whole of this short book to an
explanation of the importance of the concept "dharma" in understanding existence; the discussion viii) is more concise and considers the three classificaLamotte (HBI, pp. 65 8-70) gives the triple classification by the Theravadins and the quadruple classification of rupa, citta,
of the classifications by Conze (BTI, chap, tions in their usefulness for meditation.
of rilpa, cetasika, and citta caitta,
and dharma of the Sarvdsiivddins.
^^ Besides the five senses
objects"
(plus the five sensations)
form the remaining two 54
recognized in the West,
"mind" and "mind-
senss fields for the Buddhist theory of perception.
Elements and Factors that Constitute Existence (Dharmas)
form the
or "locale" where mental activity originates and
basis,
formed. Nagarjuna, again interpreting the dyatana
pendent entity, opposes on
logical
as a self-sufficient,
who
such 7.
III.
The
1-6).
the birth of a son
Knowledge
said to
is
is
last three verses
said to
inde-
that vision, "the
is
interdependent entities;
all
one another none actually
relative to
(MMK, As
and the "object seen" are
sees,"
and in being
per-
grounds the contention that an indriya
can be the basis for any mental activity. The argument person
is
exists
independently as
conclude:
occur presupposing the mother and father,
occur presupposing the eye being dependent on the visible
forms. 8.
Since the "object seen" and the "vision" do not exist, there
is
no fourfold
[consequence]: knowledge, etc. [cognitive sensation, affective sensation, and desire].
Also, then,
how
will the seizing
and
its
consequences
existence, birth, ageing,
[i.e.,
and death] be produced? 9.
[Likewise] hearing, smelling, tasting, touching, and thought are explained
as vision.
Indeed one should not apprehend the "hearer," "what
is
to be heard," etc.
[as
entities].
The skandhas, hkewlse, denied in chapter
iv.
are
analyzed and their independent reality
Buddhist abhidharma accepted
of universal elements). Again, the basic reality of
argument
is
five
any dharma considered among the skandhas, and takes the form
of denying every causal theory
as
an explanation for a skandha,
(form) The pattern of the argument can be seen in the .
1.
skandhas (groups
against the individual
Visible
(jupakdrana)
form {rupa)
is
first
e.g., ricpa
three verses :^^
not perceived without the basic cause of visible form
;
Likewise the basic cause of visible form does not appear without the visible form. 2.
form
If the visible
follow that visible form
But there 3.
On
The
the other hand,
a
from
its
basic cause,
it
would
logically
without cause;
is
nothing anywhere [arising] without cause. if
there
would be
a basic
cause apart from visible form.
would be without any product; but there
basic cause
without *^ See
is
existed apart
is
no
basic cause
product.
Appendix
of riipa to include
A all
for karikds 4-7
which continue the argument and generalize the
skandhas.
55
analysis
A
Emptiness:
Study In Religious Meaning
chapter v analyzes the nature of the "irreducible elements" (dhatus).
by the argument that they canas such, and there can be no definition without something to be defined. Nagarjuna's basic argument is that the object of definition and the definition are dependent on each These too are denied not exist
self -sufficient reality
dbaius before they are defined
as
other and therefore the object, in this case dkdsa, cannot be said to exist itself as dkdsa. It exists
should not be taken
as
only because
the type of phenomenalism
"creates" the object of naming. This
noted, never does say position
is
how
the
is
whereby the naming Nagarjuna,
also denied.
naming and the named
and therefore such
a
concern
is
must be
it
are related; for his
empty of
that ultimately "they" as objects of knowledge are
reality as such,
vain speculation
—uncon-
ducive to realizing their basic emptiness. The form of argument clear in the first
two
(dkdsalaksana) If it
would
is
made
verses:
Space (dkdsa) does not exist at
1.
by
has been named. Yet, this position
it
all
before the defining characteristic of space
.
exist before the defining characteristic,
then one must falsely conclude
that there would be something without a defining characteristic.
In no case has anything existed without a defining characteristic.
2.
If an entity (bbdva)
without
a defining characteristic does
not
exist, to
what
does the defining characteristic apply?
The concluding
verse of the initial
Therefore space
7.
r something to which
is
argument
states:
neither an existing thing nor a non-existing thing, neither
a defining characteristic applies
nor
a defining characteristic.
Also, the other five irreducible elements can be considered in the same
way
as
space.
This
is
followed by the religious implication of regarding elements as
neither existing nor nonexisting:
But those unenlightened people who
8.
either aflSrm reality
or non-
(astitva)
reality (ndsiiiva)
Do The ^'
not perceive the blessed cessation-of-appearance of existing things.
verses in this chapter attempt to The term dhatu
show how
has been used in Buddhist parlance in at least three different
the three planes of existence {kdma-, rupa-, and arupadhdtu) fire,
the "existence" of dhdtus^^
water, space, consciousness), and
(3)
,
(2)
the eighteen phenomenal elements
plus six corresponding "sense-consciousnesses").
S.
Schayer
(AKP,
p.
3
fif.)
(1)
(earth, air,
(the twelve ayatanas
points out
cording to Buddhaghosa the six dhatus and the eighteen dhatus are identical. Also,
56
ways:
the six mababhiitas
I
that
ac-
would agree
Elements and Factors that Constitute Existence (Dharmas)
dependent on mental
are
activity.
Even such
a
primal factor, claims
Nagarjuna, cannot be said to exist (or not-exist) by reality.
By means
its
own
sui generis
of this rigorous dialectic to which Nagarjuna subjected
the elements of existence, he denied that there were any self-existent entities
which possessed
static absolute characteristics.
dislodge the seeker after truth
found as
In doing
so,
he attempted to
from the assumption that truth was
to be
in identifying concepts with segments of existence as if they existed
such.
May's judgment that the fifth chapter is best understood as part of a unit together with and iv (May, CPM, p. 11). Here it is clear that Nagarjuna has in mind the six universal elements (mahdbhuias) but whether regarded as one of the eighteen phenomenal elements of experience or one of the six more "substantial" elements of existence, the dhitu was regarded as a minimal root factor in the composite products of existence. with
J.
chaps,
iii
;
^7
"CAUSAL RELATIONS" From
the above discussion
we
see that in the
(Pratityasamutpada)
context of emptiness,
no-
( 1 )
tions about Ultimate Reahty are regarded as phenomenal constructs, (2) the early Buddhist categories for understanding existence do not refer to real self -substantiated entities of existence, (3) there are no dharmas (basic j
factors of existence) that exist as such. tains
The
early Buddhist concepts,
Nagarjuna, must be recognized simply
as
main-
notions which have no
ultimate validity in themselves for attaining release from suflfering.
A
which is abphenomenal the solute and indeed is the ground for the forms that make up world? No, the denial of independent entities in the phenomenal world
person might ask, however:
Is
there not a causal principle
did not lead Nagarjuna to accept a principle of causal relations as "the
phenomena. Rather, the denial of cause, as an reality, was inherently involved in denying the self-
real" behind ephemeral
ultimate self-existent existence
of
the
dharmas.
In
this
chapter
we want
show,
to
first,
Nagarjuna's denial of the efficacy of any causal relations which assumed a self -existent reality
(svabhdva)
;
secondly, Nagarjuna's interpretation of
the notion "dependent co-origination"
{pratttyasamutpada)
,
which had
served for centuries to express the Buddhist understanding of the production of existence;
and
thirdly, the significance of this reinterpretation for
karma (the causal force for, and the result of, action). The Madhyamakakarikds begins in the first chapter with an analysis of
the notion of
causal relations. "Causal relations"
had been an important concern of the
early Buddhists; and this concern took concrete
form
in the elaboration of
abhidharma thought, which examined the elements and conditions from which the phenomenal world was constructed. The focus on causal relations
is
not surprising, for
substratum
{brahman)
this
notion took the place of a substantive
underlying
changing,
phenomenal
reality
in
Upanishadic thought, and accounted for the origination and cessation of
"Causal Relations" (Pratltyasamutpada)
The Buddhist
phenomena.-^
teachings of impermanance of every thing
(aniiya) and the absence of any "self" {anatman) required that another
notion bear the explanation of "cause." In place of a causal notion based
on an absolute
was the notion of "dependent co-origination,"
"final cause"
with
its emphasis on the interdependency of different factors {dharmas) which combined to form existence as we experience It. From a subjective orientation, the construction of the phenomenal world was seen to depend on craving (tr^na) for illusory "things"; this construction, however, re-
life, and this bondage is experienced as means of correlating the human phenomenon of sorrow with the limiting power of producing forms in our experienced world, "causal relations" had taken on a dual significance as representing (1) the states in the "phenomenal becoming" of every person, and (2) the course of the cosmos pulsating in and out of existence.
sulted in binding the energies of
sorrow {duJpkha)
Denial of
.
Any
As
a
Self-substantiated Reality for Explaining Cause
Nagarjuna regarded the causal
relations, as
conceived in early Buddhism,
to be true only from the practical, conventional point of view. It accounted
for
phenomenal "becoming" and
at least served to
turn a person's attention
away from positing Independent reality within visible forms. However, It was far from perceiving the nature of phenomenal-becoming as empty, that Is, empty of any self -existent conditions or relations. Nagarjuna maintained that both practical truth and the highest truth affirm that
phenomena produced by latter point of
causes are
view there
is
empty by Inherent
nature.
no cause or conditioning process
From
at all;
all
the
from
the viewpoint of practical truth, production does not result In a selfsubstantiated entity because every production
any
denial of
pendency
Is
self-sufficient entity does
Itself
an ultimate principle.
truth, the "causal process"
That one should hope *
The
Is
a
is
conditioned.^ Nagarjuna's
not entail an affirmation that de-
From
the standpoint of highest
mentally fabricated
Illusion.
to find a self-sufficient reality In the causal rela-
significance of this shift
in Indian
thought,
as
formulated in the notion of pratitya-
portrayed by Takakusu in his Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy (esp. pp. 29-41) though his discussion reveals strong influence of the Yogacara school. Also see Satkari Mookerjee, Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 193 5). where pratltya-
samutpada,
samutpada
is
is
analyzed as the major ontological category and the technical details of the mechanics are devoted to the "teaching of emptiness." 5 6-73
of the causal relations are elaborated. Pp. '
La Vallee Poussin rightly
criticizes
T. Stcherbatsky for ignoring Nagarjuna's
monistic idealism and making "universal relativity" into an eternal principle. See
MCB,
denial II,
59
of
8-14.
a
Emptiness:
A
Study
in Religious
themselves
tions
denied
is
Madhyamakakdrikas. The 1.
Never have any
From
Meaning
already
the
in
verse of chapter
first
the
of
1
found to originate
existing things been
themselves, or from something
chapter
first
states:
or
else,
from both, or from no
cause.
which determine the form of a particular phenomenon at any given time are denied any innate selfsuflScient being. This is made clear in the second and third verses: Also, the conditioning causes (prafyaya)
2.
There are four [accepted] conditioning causes:
A
cause (hehi), objects of sensations, the "immediately preceding condition,"
and of course the predominant influence 3.
Certainly, there
no
is
—
there
is
no
self-existence (svabbaia)
fifth.
of existing things in condi-
tioning causes, etc.;
And
if
no
self-existence exists, neither does an "other-existence"
The following four entities
is
then what
is
any causes are self-sufficient with anything else; and if they are not
called "a cause"
something different from what
it is
when
it
is
before the result
effecting a result is
effected.
By
same method Nagarjuna denies that the other accepted conditions, objects of sensations, the immediately preceding condition,
dominant influence can be considered an explanation for only
is
there
.
verses then argue that if
they cannot have relations
*'real" causes,
(parabhdva)
no independent
cannot be related to the
effect
on
i.e.,
and the pre-
real causes.
reality in the cause or effect,
the
Not
but the cause
logical grounds. This follows
from de-
fining the cause and effect {phala = "£ruit" or product) in a mutually ex-
way, leaving only two alternatives of relationship: (1) identity and (2) radical difference, both of which preclude any causal relations. Verses 10 and 11 indicate the argument:
clusive
10. Since existing things
not possible at
It is
all
which have no
self-existence are not real.
that: "Tliis thing 'becomes'
upon the existence of that
other one." 11.
The product
(pbala) does not reside in the conditioning causes individually
or collectively,
So
how
can that which does not reside in the conditioning causes result from
conditioning causes?
The
net result, and the most crucial effect, of the notion that "things are
formed in existence depending on other things" is
that
it
60
(pratiiya-samufpdda)
denies a "first cause." "Cause" should not be regarded through
"Causal Relations" (Pratityasamutpada)
the imagery of a chain reaction leading back to an original source, but as
—
which themselves are conNagarjuna does not simply use his negative dialectic to preserve the abhidharma notion of cause. He recognizes that "things originate due to conditions" and that actions lead to an orderly
set
of circumstances or conditions
ditioned. Because he redefines "cause,"
certain results; but this insight
pose the
common
is
for
him
mundane
a
context of emptiness, "dependent co-origination" for fabricating a system of cause
and
truth, useful to op-
phenomenal
belief in the reality of
existence. In the
loses its force
(impulse)
effect.
In the abhidharma understanding of dependent co-origination, various parts of the experienced world were used as the basic categories for ex-
plaining "cause,"
e.g.,
the three stages in the arising of phenomena; the
maker, the process of making, and what
is
made; or the unification
(samsarga)
of subject, object, and the relationship between
results in a
phenomenon. Nagarjuna denied that any of
them
these categories
There
refer to a self-suflScient primal point in the production of existence. is
no origination, duration, or
an intrinsic nature
something having
VII). Origination of conditioned existence
is
any of the three "marks" of existing things is understood as self-sufficient reality; for, as in the case with the causes and effects which
not possible a
(MMK,
cessation if they represent
that
are
if
assumed to be
and
self -sufficient,
difference. Likewise, the
garded
independent
as
existence.
At
"maker" and the "making" cannot be
realities,
is
that each
is
produced depending on the other:
The producer proceeds being dependent on
12.
re-
for each requires the other to appear in
the same time one cannot deny that they exist phenomenally.
Therefore the conclusion VIII.
the only possible relationships are identity
the product, and the prod-
uct proceeds being dependent on the producer.
The
cause for realization
13. In the
is
seen in nothing
else.
same way one should understand the "acquiring" on the
basis of the
"giving up," etc. of the producer and the product.
By means
of [this analysis of] the product and the producer
all
other things
should be dissolved.
The same
basic
argument
is
by which phenomenon, i.e.,
used in the analysis of the process
the subject, object, and the sensation coalesce to
form
a
samsarga (unification). The dilemma which Nagarjuna presents either
with
two
itself.
basically different things
The
is
become united, or something
conclusion, similar to other analyses,
is:
61
that
unites
— Em ptiness: A
Study in Religious Meaning
XIV. 8. Unification is not possible by [uniting] one thing with that one nor by [uniting] one thing with a diflferent thing;
thing,
who
unites
Thus, the becoming unified, the state of being united, and the one are not possible.
Another argument against svabhava
which assumes a
relationship
causal
a
the denial of a preexistent reality (purva) as the real cause for
is
existing entities. This argument,
found
in chapter ix, also logically de-
mands that the only relation obtaining between a svabhava and something else is identity and radical difference. Such a self-contained reality could not be known, nor could
A
produce anything new.^
it
few kdrikds
will
suflSce to show the repeated line of argument:
But that
3.
How
And
4.
definite entity
previous to sight, hearing, etc., and sensation, etc.
is
can that [entity] be known? if
that
[entity]
is
without sight
determined
[and other
sensory
faculties],
Then, undoubtedly, those [sensory faculties] will
Someone becomes manifest by something; something
5.
How
would someone
exist
without something?
without that [entity].
exist is
How
manifest by someone.
would something
exist
without someone?
In early Buddhism there were several analogies used to describe the causal relationship. These included the relationship of fuel to
to a jar,
and threads to
Nagarjuna to show exist fire
The
first
of these analogies
is
of clay
analyzed by
that, whereas fire does not exist in fuel, neither does
it
that
if
independent of
and
cloth.
fire,
fuel.
Again, the
basis of the logical analysis
is
fuel are considered to be self -sufficient entities they cannot exist;
and, insofar as they exist phenomenally, the relationship cannot assume a self-sufficient reality
{svabhava), for
tionship assuming svabhava
must be
it is
empty. Thus
rejected.*
The
all
five
theories of rela-
concluding verses
of chapter x express this clearly: 12. Fire does
not exist in relation to kindling; and
fire
does not exist wwrelated
to kindling.
KindUng to
does not exist in relation to
fire;
and kindling does not
exist Mwrelated
fire.
"See also MMK, xxiv. 26, 31, 32 and xxvii. 12, 16. * This same argument is at the basis of the denial of causal relations in xxiv.
27-30.
62
iv.
1-6,
ii.
7-11, and
—
.
(Pratityasamutplda)
'Causal Relations"
13. Fire does not
The remaining "that which
is
come from something
else;
and
[analysis] in regard to kindling
being gone to," "that which
is
fire
is
does not exist in kindling.
described
by [the
analysis of]
gone to," and "that which
is
not
yet gone to." 14. Fire
is
not identical to kindling, but
not in anything other than
fire is
kindling. Fire does not have kindling as
and vice 15.
its
property;
the kindling
also,
is
not in
fire
versa.
By
[the analysis of] fire and kindling the syllogism of the individual self
(dima) and "the acquiring" (updddna) Is
other 16.
fully and completely explained, as well as "the jar" and "the cloth" [
Those who specify the nature of the individual
(bhdva)
as
radically
Those people
I
do not regard
The arguments
as
ones
who know
is
and of existing things
the sense of the teaching.
as
Emptiness
against causal relations between
which we have given above themselves. It
self
different
Dependent Co-origination
are based
on
self-existent
important to note that nowhere does Nagarjuna himself
seen,
he denies that the entities exist by virtue of their
that,
even
no
if
As we have
causal relationship could obtain. In reality of the
what
of "dependent coorigination" to be understood?
given in JVIMK, xxiv. 18
&
being and
i.e.,
does
arising at all?
How
The answer
then,
is
is
the notion
dramatically
19:
"originating dependently"
This apprehension,
sense,
phenomenal world
Or, to formulate the question in Buddhist terminology:
The
own
such an impossible assumption of self-existence were ac-
Nagarjuna understand the
18.
entities
a logical critique of the theories
give a theory describing the operation of causal relations.
cepted,
and
analogies ]
we
call
"emptiness."
taking into account
[all
other things],
is
the under-
standing of the middle way. 19. Since there
No
is
no dharma whatever originating independently.
dharma whatever
exists
which
is
not empty.
Considered in the context of emptiness
pendently
loses its
meaning
as the link
(hlnyatd), co-originating de-
between two "things"; rather
it
becomes the form for expressing the phenomenal "becoming" as the lack of any self-suflScient, independent reality. 63
A
Emptiness:
A is
Study in Religious Meaning
consideration for the phenomenal aspect of "originating dependently"
given in chap, xxvi where the root cause for constructed phenomena
The "reahzation" of
designated as ignorance.
is
(the emptiness of
h'lnyatd
svabhdva), on the other hand, prevents the continuation of fabrication. This
is
clear in verses 10-12.
Thus the ignorant people construct the conditioned things (samskdra)
10. is]
made
;
[that
the source for existence-in-flux.
The one who constructs
is
ignorant; the wise person
is
not [one
who
constructs]
because he perceives true reality.
WTien ignorance
11.
(
\
the
ceases,
constructed phenomena
do not come into
existence.
A
person's cessation of ignorance proceeds
on the
basis
of "becoming"
[en-
lightened] through knowledge.
1 1
12.
Through
cessation of every
[component] none functions;
I
That
single
From
mass of sorrow
is
thus completely destroyed.
the ultimate point of view "originating dependently"
zation of emptiness, while at the same time
of causation" from the
Iness" became
mundane
it is
is
the reali-
the causal law, or "chain
point of view. For Nagarjuna, "empti-
the best verbal expression for "originating dependently." It
avoided the illusion of
self -existence
{svabJodva)
most completely, and
omitted the necessity for a law of causation which related
entities that
were presupposed in a '^svabhdva perspective." If 11 '
In a "radical becoming" view of existence there
no necessity to would
is
postulate an absolute principle of relationship, for such a principle
presuppose some static essence underlying a process of "becoming."
complete
loss
A
of self-sufficient reality (or realities) involves a diflferent kind
of ontological quality than one based on the relationship between being
and becoming. In such a context not only does the individual "being" disappear, but also a universal "being" which could provide the basis for any visible or imagined thing. The mundane construction and the cause of construction both drain emptiness. Mrs. cerns
by
away through
Rhys Davids has indicated
calling attention to
the "radical becoming" of
this shift in ontological
two shades of meaning
(1) lack of eternal being-ness, and (2) alteration
has a coefficient n which
Nagarjuna, ^C. A.
64
F.
I
suggest,
may
alter
in
—the
con-
impermanence:^
fact that every
x
x to become continually non-x.
had both shades of meaning in mind when he con-
Rhys Davids, Buddhist Psychology,
p.
217.
"Causal Relations'* (Pratltyasamutpada)
mundane
sidered
existence as impermanent. Emptiness simply becomes;
it
"becoming process." If it were the conclusion of such process, then would have to be shown how it resulted from the process, a it which, in turn, entails an explanation of how this process and emptiness are different and how they are related. It is specifically the reality of "relationship" which Nagarjuna denies when, in MMK, xx, he denies that the conjunction (sdmagrt) of cause and is
not the end of
a
conditions can account for arising of existence.
He
argues that
impossible to relate entities (such as conditions and effects)
it is
same time he indicates that
their self-suflScient reality; at the
logically
one assumes
if
it
un-
is
necessary to postulate any necessary relationship in the light of emptiness.
In the
first
instance, the relationship
is
either an identity or
an uncompro-
mising difference, which in both cases does not permit an effect to be produced. In the second instance, the emptiness of any self-sufficient reality destroys the conventional distinctions between real and nonreal, cause and so in the last analysis
eflFect,
(or
"nonempty
entity")
it is
incorrect to say that an
"empty
that a self-sufficient "real cause"
is
impossible,
and that such
even irrelevant when one truly perceives the emptiness of seen in the following excerpt 15. If there
is
entity"
produced or destroyed. Nagarjuna argues
is
all
a notion
things
—
is
as
from chapter xx:
no concomitance whatever, how would the cause produce the
product?
Or
if
a
concomitance
16. If the cause
If the cause 17.
A
is
empty of
not empty of
is
how would
exists,
a
the cause produce the product?
how would it produce the product? how would it produce the product?
product,
a
product,
non-empty product would not be
originated,
[and]
non-empty
a
[product] would not be destroyed.
Then 18.
that
How
non-empty which
is
will not originate or not disappear.
would that be produced which
stroyed which
is
is
empty?
How
would that be de-
empty?
It logically follows, then, that
which
is
empty
is
not originated and not de-
stroyed.
To sum up of emptiness,
Nagarjuna's concern with constructed phenomena in light
we would point
to his assertion that mental distinctions are
only imaginary fabrication, that there are no self-establishing characteristics
of "things," and that there
is
no
real diflFerence
between accepted
dichotomies such as nirvana and samsdra (flux of existence)
.
Correlative 6f
Emptiness;
A
Study in Religious Meaning
to this assertion
is
the denial of real entities in conditioned
phenomena or
the "unconditioned," the denial of a succession of moments in time, and a
and
denial of the triple factors: subject, object,
then without real entities there conceived ,
is
chain of events,
as a
fabrication powerful
enough
no
man
to bind
The
to
more
is
true,
causal process itself,
mere fabrication
a
is
activity. If all this
real cause.
—though
indeed a
fabrication.
The Impotence of Karma The
recognition
doctrine of karma.
"cause"
that
The
is
significance
"empty" has implications for the of karma as a soteriological term in
Indian thought seems originally to have been related to the efficacy in
magic, or to ritual origination of reality, and in purification through repetition of formulas.
Karma
(action)
is
the fabrication of reality which
has the efficacy for both good and bad existence. In early release {nirvana)
was conceived
(duhkha) of existence was the
as the
Buddhism
final
exhaustion of kartna, for the turmoil
result of
karma.
In the centuries preceding Nagarjuna, the term karma had been used to designate the potential for future existence as well as the result of past actions.® In
points of controversy center are.*^
The
work Kafhdvattbu, for instance, several around what the results of karma actually
the philosophical
limits of its efficacy also
Buddha, for
it
became involved
in the
Image of the
was suggested In the Mahaparanibbdna Suttanta
Buddha could have
lived for an eon If he
had wished.
We
^
that the
need not go
into the details of the controversy here^ except to point out that the
Sthaviravadins stressed the efficacy of karma for determining the length of existence even In the case of the Buddha, whereas the Mahasanghikas (the
precursors of
Mahay ana) emphasized
the possibility of overcoming the
power of karma through yogic powers, claiming that the Buddha could, indeed, have lived an eon *
See Stcherbatsky
(CCP, pp.
had he wished. Thus the end of
16, 17,
27-30) for a brief account of equating volition {cetana)
with karma according to the Abhidharmakosa. La Vallee Poussin
"Karman is
religious life
(Way
to "Nirvana, p.
68)
says:
twofold: (1) volition {cetatia), or mental or spiritual action (matiasa) and (2) what born from volition, what is done by volition, 'what a person does after having willed,' namely is
,
bodily and verbal action." In this book La Vallee Poussin gives a very readable introduction {ibid., pp.
5 8-101) to the many-faceted notion of karma in Buddhism. 'See Kathdvatthu VIL 7, 8; XVI. 8; VIL 11; XIL 3; XV. 11;
*
Digha Nikaya
II.
103. See Dialogties of the Buddha, trans.
C
XVIL
3;
VTL
10.
A. F. Rhys Davids and T.
Rhys Davids, II (3 vols.; London: Luzac and Co., 1956), 111. ' Padmanabh Jaini has succinctly described the main elements of this controversy "Buddha's Prolongation of Life," BSOAS, XXI, Pt. Ill (195 8), 546-52.
66
W.
in his article
'Causal Relations"
(Pratityasamutpada)
could be defined either entirely within the framework of the karmic process or in terms of another force to counteract the karmic process.
Nagarjuna established alternative correctly
more extensive revolution by denying that either understood the problem of existing in karma but a
gaining release from karma.
What
then
The answer
the relation of emptiness to the binding force of
is
made
is
explicit in
realizing emptiness there
thing" originates, karma
21 where
xvii.
no individual
is
is
MMK,
we
karma;
reality of
karma?
find that in since
no
"real
vulnerable to the same analysis as any aspect of
the cause-effect process. Whereas in early Buddhism^® the Eightfold Noble
Path
is
regarded
"inverted pratityasamutpada," a sequence of non-
as
origination, the notion of emptiness requires
the karmic process.
The Prajndpdramitds
more than the
reversal of
already reversed the original usage
of "dependent co-origination" as an understanding of existence. In
them
doctrine represented an-utpdda (non-origination) because the phe-
this
nomenal
and the process of
reality
its
"dependent co-origination"
definition of
origination are empty. This
new
summarized in the Dedication
is
of the Kdrikds, which maintains that nothing disappears or appears; nothing has an end or tion;
eternal; there
is
and there
is
is
no monistic
self -identity
nor differentia-
no coming or going. Thus, that which
in the early
Buddhist insight explained the existence of phenomena, in the Prajndpdramitds became an insight into the nonexistence of phenomena. If
karma
evil {klesa
is
=
only a mental construction, the relationship of action and
desire),
which
is
at the base of the
kar-ma, also does not obtain for Nagarjuna.
tion of
karma and
its
product (phala), where
duced by action does not 26.
An
action
is
concern to eliminate bad
MMK,
xvii analyzes the rela-
it is
shown that
evil
pro-
do not
really
exist as such:^-^
that whose "self" (dima)
is
desire,
and the
desires
exist.
If these desires
27. Action If action
do not
and
and
really exist,
how would
the action really exist?
desire are declared to be the conditioning cause of the body.
desire are
empty, what need one say about "body"?
*° See
Maryla Falk, Ndma-Rupa and Dharma-Kupa (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1943), and Lama Anagarika Govinda, The Psychological Attitude of Early Buddhist Philosophy (London: Rider and Co., 1961), pp. 67-75 for a summary of the relationship between dependent
pp. 59
£f.;
co-origination and the Eightfold Noble Path. ^^
See also
MMK,
xxiii.
2-5 where the klesas are analyzed and
shown
to be without self-existence.
67
{
— Emptiness;
The
A
Study in Religious Meaning
by showing how action on the one hand is not a selfon the other, is produced by conditions; thus, it
analysis continues
suflScient entity and,
cannot be called an existent or nonexistent.^^ The chapter concludes: by
31. Just as a teacher,
And
this
32. Just so the
act performed Is
!
like a
his
magical power, formed a magical form.
magical form formed again another magical form
who forms"
"one
is
himself being formed magically; and the
by him
magical form being magically formed by another magical form.
and products
33. Desires, actions, bodies, producers, i
,
Are
like a fairy castle,
To summarize the we must note how
resembling a mirage, a dream.
significance of emptiness for understanding existence,
the early Buddhists had maintained that the basic
cause for suffering and continual production of ,
karma was "craving" or
"grasping." Nagarjuna used a rigorous dialectic and an expression of reality in terms of "emptiness" to negate any object of craving,
subject of
I
craving, or situation of craving. In the Kdrikds he denied any real "arising" (origination) or destruction of entities.
when
in the Prajndpdramiids that
and that there
is
origination
there
is
we
{pratUya-samtitpdda)
perfect in
is
This argument
arising.
call entities are results .
At
the same time,
Nothing
arises
is
no longer seen
from another
thing, nor
as a
from
is
of dependent co-
we must The
no thing like a "product" according to the Kdrikds.
of dependent co-origination ciple.
who
no ontological process of
based on the claim that what
found wisdom
articulated the insight
he knows that there are no entities to
realizes the truth of "emptiness," arise
He
the person
say that principle
cause-and-effect prin-
itself.
The same
analysis
holds true for the relation of consciousness of something and the object of consciousness.
Here the question concerning the
causal priority of the idea
or the objective concrete entity cannot even be raised. Because there real entity (e.g., a piece of cloth) in
which the
Ultimate Truth, there
characteristic of "result" can apply;
and
if
is
there are
is
no
nothing to
no
results,
the argument continues, there can be no condition. Nagarjuna's aim is to reorient the concern for the appearance of phenomena and the effort to
pinpoint "good" and "bad."
He
stayed in the Buddhist tradition in his
concern to properly apprehend the everyday fact of existence; but he intended to prevent this concern from blinding the *'
Also see
68
vss.
29-31 of Averting the Arguments, in Appendix B.
way
to release.
.
NIRVANA In the
two chapters we saw that according to Nagarjuna's no real distinctions. "What human beings
last
of existence there are as distinctive entities
These
tion.
entities,
exist because
or segments of existence
Nagarjuna
they are "named"
claims,
—
mental fabrica-
a result of
is
do not
analysis
perceive
exist in themselves;
from something
distinguished
else.
they
And
the names given to that conglomerate of impulses, perceptions, and sensations called "things" are useful only for a practical, conventional level of life.
Likewise the causal relations which were held to bring about the
origination and cessation of the entities are to be regarded on the level
of conventional truth.
They
as
well as their constructs are
empty of
self-
established reality.
Had Nagarjuna istence
ended
his critique
with an analysis of conditioned ex-
(samskrfa), he would have, in effect, expressed an ontological
duality designating "the unconditioned"
{asaihskrta)
against the unreal conditioned existence. This terial,
however, was precluded by
way
as
the real over
of handling the
ma-
his original denial of real distinctions
is ultimately no different from "the conditioned world," the usual means for understanding these
between things. Because "the unconditioned" terms
as "levels
of reality" did not obtain.
He
could not say that the
conditioned world was just fabrication while "the unconditioned" referred to
some inexpressible
Both
real.
fell
under the jurisdiction of "dependent
co-origination" {pratttya-samutpdda) understood
In this chapter
we
will
examine
how
ness informs his notion of the highest reality
The terms nirvana and tathdgatha
(lit.
complete spiritual to entities
"blowing out,"
(lit.
"thus
release,
as
i.e.,
(nirvana, tathdgata)
elimination of attachment)
gone" = the Buddha)
are useful for indicating
Nagarjuna maintains, only
which become objects for "grasping." The
avoiding this subtle fabrication
is
emptiness (sunyatd).
Nagarjuna's understanding of empti-
to
if
they do not refer
first
remember that
requirement for
there are
no 69
real
A
Emptiness:
Study in Religious Meaning
MMK,
ontological distinctions. For instance,
who
8
reminds us that those
affirm either reality or nonreality cannot perceive nirvana:
But those unenlightened people who
8.
Do
either affirm reality or non-reality
not perceive the blessed cessation-of-appearance of existing things.
Likewise, the emptiness of as
v.
all
means that there
entities
are
no such things
"being bound" or "ultimate release." In chap, xvi, Nagarjuna subjects
same analysis
these notions to the
conceived
counted
"things" {bhava)
showing that if phenomenal change cannot be ac-
The importance of avoiding
for.
"release"
as
as self-sufficient entities their
is
,
the fabrication of the entity
seen in verses 9 and 10: be released without any acquisition." "Nirvana will be mine."
9. "I will
Those who understand thus hold too
much
to "a holding
on"
[i.e.,
both to the
acquisition of karma, and to a viewpoint]. 10.
Where
there
no super-imposing of nirvana [on something
is
else],
nor
a
removal of existence-in-flux,
What
is
the existence-in-flux there?
The same conclusion
is
What
nirvana
reached in chapter
viii
is
imagined?
by showing that
the object
of action {karjna) and the person acting {kartaka) do not exist Verses
and 5.
and 6 deny the
5
final release If the
(moksa)
6.
If there
Thus
nor the
born from that does not
ultimate
no
is
real
do not
etc.,
(adharma)
false reality
If neither the true reality
(phala)
as such.
the path to heaven,
as things in themselves:
producing action,
{dharma) nor
dharma (truth),
reality of
exist,
then neither can the true reality
exist.
false reality exists,
then also the product
exist.
product, then there also exists no path to heaven nor to
release. it
logically follows that all
Whatever notions
are
producing actions are without purpose.
assumed to possess
self-sufficient reality are subject
to Nagarjuna's analysis; thus, even the itotion of "misunderstanding"
regarded
as a
misunderstanding
standing in an absolute way. In chapter
and "bad"
—which, —
mental fabrication
shown
in the are
from
is
correct under-
"misunderstanding," "good,"
are held to be the conditions for
to be void of self-existence.
They
are also
on the grounds of dependent co-origination, for
then they are already regarded 70
xxiii,
Abhidharma,
shown
to be insignificant
distinguished
if it is
as
empty. Verses 24 and 25 sum up the
Nirvana
irrelevancy of deciding as
24. If
How is
any kind of self-existent impurities belong to somebody,
in all the
world would they be eliminated?
Who
can eliminate that which
self-existent?
25. If
How is
"misunderstanding," "good," and "bad" exist
if
such or not:
any kind of
in
all
self -existence impurities
do not belong to somebody,
the world would they be eliminated?
Who
can eliminate that which
non-self -existent?
In the Prajiidparamitd tradition already there were dramatic denials that the
character
essence-attribute
applied
Astasdhasrikd, for instance, has the
pendent
reality of the
"what
to
Buddha
true attribute
really
deny the inde-
explicitly
(sva-laksana)
The
exists."
of reality. In the
chapter on "Skill in Means" the Buddha gives instruction regarding concentration on emptiness, and says:
He
should contemplate form,
with an undisturbed
series
etc., as
empty. But he should contemplate that
of thoughts in such a is
something which,
(i.e.
emptiness)
emptiness)
dharmas
The
is
as
a real entity.
as a real thing,
that,
as a result
of
own
its
true nature
But when he does not regard that true nature of
then he cannot realize the reality-limit.^
fact that "release"
is
not distinct from "illusion" in the sense that
mean
each term represents an ultimate ontological distinction does not that "release" and "illusion"
may
practical or conventional level. says in
MMK,
xvlli. 5
not be very useful
Using the term
that nirvana
is
attained
by
as designations
on
a
way, Nagarjuna
In this
dissipation of action
and
evil energies: 5.
On
account of the destruction of the pains (klesa) of action there
for pains of action exist for
is
release;
him who constructs them.
These [pains] result from phenomenal extension (prapanca) enal extension comes to a stop
;
but
this
phenom-
by emptiness.
Here, however, the very emptiness of the action and energies position of
Is
the presup-
such attainment. The conventional terms used to express
nirvana are also used to explain "what actually
is"
{tattva)
.
In both cases
the terms stress nonsubstantiality and the quality of Indeterminateness. ^Conze, PWES,
p.
\
when he contemplates
empty," he does not regard that true nature of
the fact that "form, etc.,
dharmas
(i.e.
way
143.
71
,
.
.
A
Emptiness;
Chapter
Study in Religious Meaning
xviii.
when
nirvana
7-11
expresses
the
in
dIflSculty
using designations
in the very designating process there
for
a denial of the
is
realization of nirvana.
7.
When
stated"
the
domain of thought has been
dissipated,
"that which can be
dissipated.
is
Those things which are unoriginated and not terminated, stitute the true
8.
Everything
nirvana, con-
like
doctrine {dbar mat a)
is
"actual" {tathyam) or "not-actual," or both "actual-and-not-
actual,"
Or 9.
"neither-actual-nor-not-actual": This
"Not caused by something
else,"
is
the teaching of the Buddha.
"peaceful," "not elaborated by discursive
thought," "Indeterminate," "undifferentiated": such are the characteristics of true reality {tattva).
Whatever
10.
being dependent
exists,
[on something
else]
is
certainly
not
identical to that [other thing].
Nor
is
a thing different
The immortal
1 1
from
that; therefore,
it is
neither destroyed nor eternal.
essence of the teaching of the Buddhas, the lords of the world,
is
Without
singleness or multiplicity;
Again, in xxv. 3.
3
we
it is
not destroyed nor
is it
eternal.
read:
Nirvana has been
said
to be neither eliminated nor attained, neither an-
nihilated nor eternal.
[To have]
neither disappeared nor originated.
Likewise, in conventional speech, sunya (empty) designates that which is
beyond human expression;
as
such this term indicates the nature of
ultimate reality. Because of the non-substantiality of this ontology, "emptiness"
is
not used to designate a state of existence, but rather a condition
which precludes
MMK, 18.
which
a static ontological character.
This usage
is
exemplified in
XX. 18:
How would is
that be produced which
empty?
How
would that be destroyed
empty?
It logically follows, then, that
72
is
which
is
empty
is
not originated and not destroyed.
Nirvana
A
more complete development
is
given in xxiv, 20-40. Chapter xxiv
analyzes the notion of the four holy truths {caturdryasatya)
juna
insists
tive.
As
things,
of
that only
if all
empty can
here Nagar-
;
the holy truths be effec-
before, emptiness refers to the conditioned co-origination of
and nonemptiness
things. Emptiness
all
things are
refers to the self-sufficient reality
the condition
is
(i.e.,
all
(svabhdva)
dependent co-origination)
which must exist before any phenomenal causes and conditions can "produce" entities; at the same time it is the condition which denies the ultimate reality of phenomenal entities. The claim that emptiness is the condition for both mundane action and the release from sorrow is seen in the concluding five verses of this chapter:
36.
You deny
When
all
mundane and customary
you deny emptiness
activities
dependent co-origination (praiitya-
[in the sense of]
samutpada). 37. If
you deny emptiness, there would be action which
There would be nothing whatever acted upon, and
is
unactivated;
producing action would
a
be something not begun. 38.
According to [the doctrine of]
the world
"self -existence"
is
free
from
different conditions;
Then,
it will exist as
unproduced, undestroyed, and immutable.
39. If non-emptiness does not exist, then something
attained
is
which was not
attained;
There 40.
is
cessation of sorrow
He who
and
actions,
and
all evil is
destroyed.
perceives dependent co-origination
Also understands sorrow, origination, and destruction
as
well as the Path.
In the Mahayana Buddhist tradition another important term for the ultimate reality
is
"tathagata"
(lit.
"thus-gone" or fully attained), which
is
reality conceived as the final cessation of defiling ignorance. Tathagata
is
a
synonym
for the Buddha, and
is
the object of a great deal of dis-
—
cussion in the Prajndpdramitd literature. Yet, this term
—comes under Nagarjuna's
representing the Absolute
as
other notions
analysis,
where
it is
to have no independent self -existence. Chapter xxii is devoted to showing that tathdgata is neither a "self -existing entity" nor is it a product of dependent relationships. Thus from the perspective of the Ultimate
shown
Truth,
it
has no essential ontological status.
that tathdgata, as other "things," cannot
The
"become"
first if it is
ten verses
show
assumed to be 73
a
;
A
Emptiness:
Study in Religious Meaning
self -existing thing, for this
would deny
real relatedness. Verses 9
and 10
conclude: 9.
So when there
And
if
there
is
no
is
dependence,
self -existence does
self-existence whatever,
how
is
not
exist;
an "other-existence" possible?
Thus dependence and "that which is dependent" are completely empty. {siinyatathdgata) known through is that empty "fully completed one" that which is empty? 10.
How
The next
six verses in
chapter xxii deny that any term, including "empty,"
can properly express the truth of the Buddha
way, for the terms do not refer to
What human
used in an absolute
if it is
qualities- or substances-in-themselves.
beings designate as the tatJoagata actually
is
what human
beings also designate as "the world"; and this truth must be realized before
one can perceive the "fully attained." Nagarjuna ends the chapter with the verse: 16.
The
self -existence
of the "fully completed" [being]
is
the self-existence of
the world.
The
"fully completed" [being]
is
without self-existence, [and] the world
is
without self-existence.
"Whatever name
used to designate the "ultimate reality," whether
is
nirvana, tathdgata, or tattva,
Nagarjuna
nature. Thus,
{hhava) .
i
I
,
it is
deals
it is
declared to be without a self-established
with nirvana
"conditions," or sense faculties. In
just as he does
MMK,
with "things"
xxv, which
is
devoted
entirely to an analysis of nirvana, he
shows that none of the alternatives
of the quatralemma
not an existent entity (verses 4-6)
it is
is
true: nirvana
is
not a wcwexistent entity (verses 7-10)
;
it is
not both an existent and
and it is not neither an same time (verses 15-16). Nirvana
nonexistent entity at the same time (verses 11-14) existent nor nonexistent entity at the
;
I
cannot be an existent thing because then
nomenon (samskrta)
.
cannot be
It
dependent on an existent
—which
is
a
it
would be
a constructed phe-
nonexistent because this
is
logically
denied. It cannot be both, again, be-
would be "constructed"; and it cannot be neither because this logically depends on the existence of both. The rationale for handling nirvana as any mental fabrication is expressly stated in verses 19 and 20: cause then
19.
There
it
is
nothing
whatever
which
differentiates
the
existence-in-flux
(samsdra) from nirvana;
And
there
flux.
74
is
nothing whatever which differentiates nirvana from existence-in-
.
Nirvana
The extreme
20.
limit {koti) of nirvdna
is
also the
extreme limit of existence-
in-flux;
There
not the slightest bit of diflference between these two.
is
Nirvana, for Nagarjuna, Ultimate Reality; misunderstood
too,
it,
is is
not a term which darkly reflects an absolute simply a fabrication of the mind which, if
Reality, will misguide the one relative,
i.e.,
term can
that
is
it is
and no designation,
who
seeks release.
Only
conventional,
as a
mind from which the term nirvana
be profitably used to direct the
it
The Ultimate Truth
ignorance and greed. ^ points
and independent Ultimate
as referring to a self-sufficient
to
without any designation;^ in actuality there just as visible
is
no
"it"
forms are not things-in-themselves which
have certain attributes.
The
difference between nirvana
and samsdra
ventional norms of truth, for ultimately both of
The "negative tendency"
misunderstanding that emptiness
them
are
empty
same"
^
identity"
whereby the nature of
as
"un-
important to prevent the
is
an Absolute in the sense of Brahman
is
Advaita-vedanta thought. Nirvdna and samsdra have
in
(silnya)
with nirvdna and samsdra
in dealing
differentiated" rather than as "the
applies only to the con-
a
"negative
reality in nirvdna consists in the lack
^ Though we cannot go into the comparative problem here, this interpretation of nirvdna would deny the Theravada claim of nirvdna as an asamskrfa denoting a qualitative difference from sarhskrta. La Vallee Poussin's La Morale Bouddhique (Paris: Nouvelle librairie nationale, 1927) delineates the meaning of deliverance in non-Buddhist thought (pp. 16 ff.) and Lamotte (HBI, pp. 675-76) summarizes the interpretation of nirvdna in the early schools. See also La Vallee
—
Way
Poussin,
to Nirvana, for a discussion of nirvdna as an object of salvation
recognition that there was (pp.
132-34), plus a
no
summary
Poussin's definition of nirvdna
clear
expression in Buddhist
scripture of
of interpretations by Western scholars
(pp. 107-20) with a
the
(pp.
nature of nirvdna
121-23). La Valine
an "unqualified deliverance,"
a deliverance of which "Nirvana" (ERE, IX) where he writes (p. 379) is 'void' that orthodox Buddhism held: "A saint after death, a nirvrta or liberated one {mukta) (silnya) therefore he can be said to be annihilated." The most thorough analysis of different modern interpretations of the early notion of nirvana is found in Dutt, AMBRH, pp. 141-69, as Mahayana understandings found in their respective literatures is a comparison of Theravada and
we have no
(p.
131)
is
right to predicate anything. Also see
,
;
pp. 184-203). Nagarjuna's interpretation would suggest a radical shift from the content of the yogic awareness of those Buddhists conceiving nirvdna as an immobile, static state. It would deny the aim of (ihid.,
Theravada Buddhism which was "to reach
a plane
beyond the three dhatus,
called the apariyapanna-
or Lokuttara-dhatu (the unincluded or transcendental sphere). According to the Patisamhhiddmagga
who have
reached the four maggas and have obtained the four Nibbdna" (Dutt, AMBRH, p. 17). Nevertheless, the wellknown imagery of the "extinguishing of fire" (see Nanomoli, p. 319, n.) could still be useful. ^ See MMK, xxv. 3. See also Dutt's discussion (AMBRH, pp. 2 14-1 J) on the basic characteristics (laksanas) of sunyatd as given in Mddhyaviikavrtti: aparapratyaya (not impartable by one (I,
84)
it
contains those beings
magga-phalas or the Asaiikhata,
to in
another),
santa,
i.e.,
prapdncairaprapancitatn
concepts), and ananartha
(inexpressible
in
speech),
nirvikalpa
(unrealizable
(devoid of different meanings).
*See May, Studia Philosophica, XVIII, 126-27.
75
A
Emptiness;
Study in Religious Meaning
of self-sufficient reality in the factors that constitute samsdra. ness of the
phenomenal world
is
also the
The empti-
emptiness of any "non-phenomenal
Samsdra
no more "empty" than
reality" that
is
conceived
nirvana; nor
is
nirvana more "empty" than samsdra from the highest point
of view
—though nirvdna
as self -existent.
is
is
more "empty" than samsdra from the conven-
tional, practical perspective.
The importance of recognizing that "emptiness" applies to both nirvdna is made clear by a brief examination of alternative interpreta-
and samsdra
Western
tions of emptiness that have characterized scholarship presented in
languages. These interpretations suggest
two extremes that
are suggested
by Nagarjuna's expression: 1) emptiness seen as "nothing-ness" or 2) as an absolute essence beyond every particular manifestation. The first alternative^ stresses the lack of a metaphysical
monism
or pluralism with
the presupposition that the only alternative to "something" (seen as a substantial reality)
The
is
alternative
v/ho see the
"nothing"
(i.e., as
by T. R. V. Murti and
represented
is
Madhyamika
"non-being" over against "being.")
dialectic as
is
The
basic presupposition in
that the plurality of different entities
be unreal, while the totality of being which contains entities
is
real.
However, such an interpretation
Buddhist thought in which the "whole" the constituents to be unreal,
itself.
^
as
the particular
not considered to be
The Conception
USSR, 1927),
p.
(2
vols.;
chariot, neither
New
in his article
"Sunyavada:
A
real
while
is
admitted to is
a philo-
resolved only in a
is
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1949)
of Buddhist Nirvana
37, mentions
spirit of
well-known example of the
(Leningrad: The
H. Kern, M. Walleser, H.
other early interpreters of "emptiness" as nihilism. This emphasis
H. Narain
all
considered to
contrary to the
which admittedly
See C. F. Moore, History of Religions
307. T. Stcherbatsky, in
Sciences of the
is
is
Likewise, the claim regarding Absolute Being
sophical response to a question
I,
is
in the
which make up the
chariot and the parts
be real in
e.g.,
Schayer,"^
S.
only preparatory for the intuition of
the reality behind the illusory phenomena. this interpretation
^
Jacobi, and
Academy
of
A. B. Keith
was reaffirmed recently by
Reinterpretation," Philosophy East and West, XIII, No.
4 (Jan., 1964), 311-38. * See Part III, esp. Ch. IX, below for an analysis of Nagarjuna's linguistic usage which permits
him
to
avoid
this
dichotomy.
CPB, pp. 234-35, and S. Schayer, "Das Mahayanistische Absolutum nach der Lehre der Madhyamikas," Orientalistische Literaturzeitung, XXXVIII, 402 S. Other "positive" interpretations include S. C. A. Vidyabhusana, "History of the Madhyamika Philosophy of Nagarjuna," Journal of the Buddhist Text and Anthropological Society, V, Pt. IV (1897), 7-20; and more recently A. R. Bhattacharya, "Brahman of Sankara and Sunyata of Madhyamikas," IHQ, XXXII (1965), 270-85. Likewise, La Vallee Poussin, after his academic exchange with T. Stcherbatsky, called "emptiness" a sort of Brahman, which is at the same time void and the ^
See
Murti,
universal substance
76
(MCB,
II,
38).
Nirvana
transrational dimension of
As
life.
need not be equated only with
all
text for interpreting "emptiness" as a
by
E.
Conze who,
is
expressed
true connotations in the process of salvation, and
it
would
make
it
into a
an ontological meaning. The relative nothing ("this
is
absent
its
it
for religious truth
reality, explains:
be a mistake to regard thing, and give
name
The proper con-
in spite of repeated references to "the undifferentiated
whole" of ultimate "Emptiness" has
Absolute
a philosophical assertion, this
or only with nothing.^
it
purely intellectual concept, or to
as a
in that") cannot be hypostatized into an absolute nothing, into the non-existence
of everything, or the denial of
mean
all reality
and of
all
Nor
being.
the completely indeterminate, the purely potential,
does "emptiness"
which can become every-
thing without being anything.^
Nagarjuna's use of the term "emptiness" criticisms
from
his
contemporaries,
who
(sunyafd)
already brought
interpreted his analysis as an ex-
which nothing can be produced and no truth the sixth verse of MMK, xxiv sums up an opponent's
pression of nihilism in
known. For
instance,
criticism: 6.
You deny
And
all
the real existence of a product, of right and wrong,
the practical behaviour of the world as being empty.
The opponent's
criticism
based on interpreting emptiness as the op-
is
posite of real existence, of the causal process,
him emptiness state of
is
chaos. Conceived thus, emptiness
non-being
—the opposite of the
ontological basis with 7.
We reply
You 8.
it.
To
that you do not
this
The teaching by
regarded
is
state of being, while
comprehend the point of emptiness. its
purpose from
it.
the Buddhas of the dhartna has recourse to
Those who do not
as a static
on the same
Nagarjuna responds:
eliminate both "emptiness" itself and
The world-ensconced truth and 9.
and of moral judgment; for
know
the truth
which
is
two
truths:
the highest sense.
the distribution (vibhdgam)
of the
two kinds of
truth
Do '
not
This
know
critique
I'absolu dans I'ecole
the profound "point" (iativa) in the teaching of the Buddha. complies
with
the
defects
observed
Madhyamaka," Revue Philosophique de
by Jan la
W.
trance
et
de
Jong,
"Le Problem de
de I'Eiratiger,
CXL
323-27. *
Conze, BTI,
p.
61.
77
(1950),
A
Emptiness:
The
10.
And
Study
in Religious
highest sense
Meaning
not taught apart from practical behaviour,
is
without having understood the highest sense one
cannot
understand
nirvdna.
A nihilistic interpretation,
says Nagarjuna, does not perceive the "point"
of emptiness, for such an interpretation never gets beyond the concern
(expressed in "world-ensconced truth." From the ultimate standpoint, emptiness does not refer to some undifferentiated essence, nor to the negation of an assumed essence; rather, emptiness
making ^
As
essential differentiations.
the dynamics which avoids
is
verse 10 above suggests, the ultimate
standpoint cannot be separated from "practical behavior" or
and from
activity; release
from every
this
as
not something in
is
This denial that even "emptiness"
such
is
is
a
means
MMK,
clearly articulated in
itself; it, too, is
itself
xxii. 10-11,
where it
privilege of having a self-suflScient reality. Tathdgata
and therefore
tive construction,
10.
11.
Nor \
that
is
is
is
in the context of
not granted the
regarded
as a rela-
the given definition of emptiness.
find the explanation:
Thus "dependence" and "that which
How j
we
it fits
only a designa-
represents Ultimate Reality
an analysis of the "fully completed" {tathdgata),
In these verses
mundane
to realize ultimate
differentiated thing.
"Emptiness," then, tion.
standpoint silnyata
is
dependent" are completely empty.
empty "fully completed one" known through
One may not
say that there
is
that which
"emptiness," nor that there
is
is
empty?
"non-emptiness."
that both exist simultaneously, nor that neither exists; the purpose for
saying "emptiness"
Emptiness
only for the purpose of conveying knowledge.
is
empty of any self-sufficient reality. La Vallee Poussin Madhyamika use of "emptiness" in the following way:
itself is
summed up
the
For the Madhyamika, "vacuity"
immanent
principle,
is
neither nothingness nor
but the very nature of what
because of vacuity" {'silnyataya)
—conceived
a
transcendent-
"things are not void
exists;
as exterior to things
—"but
because
they are void," and they are "void" because they are produced by causes. "Vacuity"
means "production by causes," and
^"La Vallee
Poussin,
(London: G. Routledge of silnyatd
78
as a denial
ERE,
&
VIII,
Sons,
is
237.
1930),
p.
only an abstraction,
See
also
a
mere word.^^
D. T. Suzuki, Studies in Lankdiatara Sutra summary of the meaning
94, for a brief generalized
of realism and idealism.
— ^
Nirvana
Nagarjuna's denial that emptiness
an ultimate principle
is
is
under-
standable in the context of the assertions of the Prajfiaparamita literature.^
Here we find emptiness equated with form {rilpa) and even phenomenal illusion (mdyd), those forces which were regarded in early Buddhism as binding
human
have
seen,
only
when
beings to the cycle of painful existence. "Emptiness,"
from the factors (dbarmas) from them, "emptiness"
considered neither different
it is
of existence nor identical to them. If represents a nihilism; if
eternalism
—and
it
different
it is
identical to them, "emptiness" represents
is
must be avoided. "Form,"
these extremes
be regarded either as "bound" or free, for
{svabhdva)
{nirvana)
lease
it
is
the purity,
is
The purity of form,
—determines purity
for
same
the
who
One
identification
perfect
self,
nonattachment.
as
wisdom
Nevertheless,
il-
the
warned "being attached" or "empty." The Lord
has realized the true nature of things)
not to regard "form" either
Buddha
no
the qualitative distinction between truth and
is
bodhisattva (the one
re-
form of form or phenomenal
can be known. However, there
lusion,
cannot
the nonattachment, in which the
i.e.,
existence with impurity as such.
anything
as such,
without self-existence
is
According to the Astasdhasrikd^^ the crucial factor for
.
we
regarded as a useful term for expressing the highest reality
is
as
is
explains to his disciple Subhuti:
wisdom
courses in perfect
one does not course in the idea that form
if
And
with attachment, or without attachment. skandhas, the sight organ, etc.
.
.
.
When
for
as
is
form, so for the other
he courses thus, a Bodhisattva does not
generate attachment to anything, from form to all-knowledge. For all-knowledge is it.
unattached, It is
neither
it is
bound nor
freed,
and there
nothing that has risen above
is
wisdom through
thus Subhuti that Bodhisattvas should course in perfect
rising completely above all attachments. ^^
then, an ultimate end
Is there,
thing that
is
which
perfected? No, emptiness
is
is
called "perfect"? Is there
not something to be perfected or
crudely realized. Subhuti succinctly states: "This is
not."
^"^
He
then continues with
^^ Astasahasrikd,
sdhasrika
(para.
anything:
'form
lunyata
form.' "
is
pars.
118) is
185,
there
is
Also
186. a
See
chap,
^^Conze,
viii
PWES,
see
a perfection of
p.
48,
who
of expression concerning is
formula exactly
the
writes:
"In
iata-
non-existence of
(lit.
form is sunyata, and form =: material constituents of a
for
like
it.
In the Pancaviritsati (leaf 726),
this."
on Purity. p.
what
not outside form,
"Rupam any term may be put
in a footnote he adds:
a
is
of paradoxes including such
AMBRH,
Dutt,
not devoid of siinyatd, ^unyata
Then
body) has been taken here as x, i.e., 'Maya' has been used for 'sunyata' in ^"
a catalogue
common form
some-
66.
^*Ibid., p. 71.
79
A
Emptiness:
Statements
Study in Religious Meaning
"This perfection knows no purification, because no possible
as:
might have to be purified) can be apprehended," and, "Empty is this perfection, because all dharmas are not apprehended." The lack of any "thing" which can serve as a referent for "perfect wisdom" receptacle (which
(
=
nirvana)
O
Deep,
Lord,
by anyone, nor nothing at
wisdom
is
all
is
says:
by anything, nor wisdom
perfect wisdom. It cannot be developed
there anything nor anyone to be developed. For in perfect
is
been brought
has
like the
of the infinite, of
By
summed up by Subhuti when he
is
what
The development of perfect
perfection.
to
development of space, or of
all
dharmas, or of non-attachment,
not, of not-taking-hold-of.^^
is
no absolute essence to which "emptiness" (or "nirvana" and "perfect wisdom") refers, we recognize that when emptiness is described as inexpressible, inconceivable, and devoid of designation, it does not imply that there is such a thing having clearly understanding that there
these as characteristics. Emptiness
is
is
As
nonsubstantial and nonperceptible.
"nonsubstantially" does not indicate non-existence, but a denial that things
mean
are real in themselves, so "non-perceptibility" does not
consciousness; rather,
phenomena through conceptualization. Thus, "emptiness" in both an ontological self-sufficient being,
empty." Only relates the
if
and an epistemological
and
a state of
un-
serves to check the inclination to substantialize
it
it is
sense: "it"
empty
itself is
is
devoid of any
beyond both designations "empty" and "non-
both senses are kept in mind can we
see
how Nagarjuna
"emptiness of the phenomenal world" to the "emptiness of any
absolute entity or assertion."
When
emptiness works (yujyaie) then everything in existence works;
If emptiness does not
work, then
The "emptiness" which tablishes
existence
(i.e.,
denies
existence does not
all
any absolute,
existence
is
(xxiv. 14).
being also
self-sufficient
empty of any
through dependent co-origination; emptiness
work
self-existent
neither an absolute
es-
reality)
monism
nor nihilism. 'We can come to grips with the meaning of nirvana
as
empty of
all
con-
tent by remembering that the purpose of the term was to indicate "true
freedom"
—
^^Ibid., p.
final release.^^ It
was
first
a soteriological
—with
term
meta-
111.
"Nirvana means extinction of life and death, extinction of worldly desire, and extinction of space and time conditions. This, in the last analysis means unfolding a world of perfect freedom" (Takakusu, The Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy, p. 24). ^°
80
Nirvana
physical overtones. Nagarjuna, following the insights of the Prajndpdramitd
composers, held that the Abhidharma literature became so "tied up" with explanations of the nature and process of nirvana that freedom from
men-
Nagarjuna attempted to break the "righteous concern" had by subjecting the
fabrication could not be realized.
tal
bonds which even such
a
notions to a devastating dialectic. In destroying the illusion of self-beings
Nagarjuna was establishing the freedom which came from existing without attachment. for a
it is
It is this
freedom which applies both to existence and nirvana;
not conceived
as a self-contained state
of existence in the sense of
realm into which one "enters."
Fundamental to an understanding of nirvana is the perception of the "becoming" for which nirvana is the answer. If we see that the "becoming" is a fundamental ontological category denying the static "be-
reality of
ing," then there a "process of
is
no need
for a static ontological substratum to undergird
becoming"; and the question of whether there "is" or
not"
"is
something remaining when is no longer fabrication of existence does not apply. For Nagarjuna, common everyday living more often than not imposed an illusory absolute character on the everyday events and "things" there
of
on
life.
He
claimed that even the concern for spiritual insight could take
this illusory absolute character if nirvana,
were regarded
as self-existent realities.
existence without a self-sufficient status relations)
which takes (take) on an
"self -existence"
to
it.
Nirvana
is
(sva-bhdva)
is
tathdgata, or "emptiness"
Another way of saying is
this
is
that
an empty relation (or empty
illusory substantial
quality
when
emotionally and perceptually attributed
realizing the true,
empty
structure of becoming, which
then becomes religiously "more," but metaphysically "less" than "being" or "becoming."
81
6 WISDOM
(Prajni)
The fourth concept which we are considering, and for which "emptiness" has particular relevance, is "wisdom" (prajnd). Wisdom is a "means of knowing" which releases a person from the attachment to things. "Within the context of our discussion regarding emptiness, wisdom is the presupposition for, and the culmination of, the negation of self-sufficient entities.
The aim
of
wisdom
of "things." goal, its i.e.,
aim
Or is
is
and
to melt the chains of greed
to state the same thing
to relate oneself to
all
from
"things" in an empty relationship,
in total freedom.
As
the means of attaining becoming to a binding force.
total
If
freedom, however,
wisdom
is
"grasped"
absolute "view," is
it
differentiate
most susceptible
it is
conceived
as
an
simply becomes one of several mental constructions,
dynamics of
susceptible to destructive
sidering wisdom,
it is
as a thing-in-itself, it
will subtly be constructed into a delusive mirage; if
and
thirst for possession
the viewpoint of a religious
we must
own
its
repeat the intention of
genius. In con-
MMK,
8-10 to
xxiv.
between the two kinds of truth on the one hand, and, on the
other, insist that nirvana cannot be attained without the use of both. In
wisdom of
the context of emptiness, Nagarjuna claims, the solves the
attachment to "things" in the
visible
release dis-
world (known through
conventional truth) and dissolves the yearning for some "ulimate reality" (realized
through the highest truth). In
Nagarjuna's denial that wisdom things
—ultimately
implies that he
is
real, his
this
we
chapter
will
discuss
—
knowledge about something or some denial that the use of the term "emptiness"
articulating
is
some absolute
assertion,
and
his
own
use
of conventional truth to express the highest truth.
"Wisdom Without an Object of Knowledge In previous chapters
we have
the independent existence 82
discussed in detail
(svabhdva) of visible
how Nagarjuna entities.
denied
Thus the con-
:
Wisdom
MMK,
elusions in
iii.
7-8 and
iv.
or "causal relations" in themselves.
(Prajna)
4-5 indicate that there are no "things"
From
7-8 and
xviii.
xxiii.
23
we
learn
no differentiation, and that the differentiation made in the phenomenal world is not to be confused with the truth which knows these differentiations as empty. The that in the complete realization of emptiness there
result of the cessation of ignorance 23.
From
When
is
is
expressed in xxiii. 23:
the cessation of error ignorance ceases;
ignorance has ceased, conditioned things (samskdra) and everything
else
ceases.
True knowledge, however, should not be regarded as some absolute inis revealed every now and then. The knowledge of
formation which "emptiness"
not conceived
is
as
an expression of "something";
proposition about something. Rather
it
is
a
it is
operates throughout existence (or nonexistence, both or neither)
expressed in
MMK,
not
a
power which spontaneously This
.
is
xviii. 1 2
12. If fully-completed
Buddhas do not
arise
[in the
world] and the disciples
[of the Buddha] disappear,
Then, independently, the knowledge of the self-produced enlightened ones
is
produced.
In fact the assertion of some independent reality "behind" the expression of knowledge would preclude any knowledge of emptiness. Nagarjuna says: 24. If the path [of release] it
into existence {bbdvana) If that path
is
is
self-existent, then there
is
no way of bringing
;
brought into existence, then "self-existence," which you claim,
does not exist. 25.
When
What kind
sorrow, origination, and destruction do not exist,
of path will obtain the destruction of sorrow?
26. If there
is
any knowledge of Indeed,
is it
no complete knowledge
as to self-existence,
not true that "self-existence"
The "transforming knowledge" which to dissipate
how
could there be
it? is
is
that
which endures?
called
wisdom
is,
then, a means
any absolute notion about something. R. Robinson has
clearly
perceived the function of the term "emptiness" as Nagarjuna uses articulate absolute truth.
He
writes: 85
it
to
A
Emptiness;
Study in Religious Meaning
Emptiness
is
term within
it.
not
a
term outside the expressional system, but
Those who would hypostasize emptiness
No
system with the fact system.
from the
facts of language.
truth and absolute truth.
is
simply the key
are confusing the
symbol
metaphysical fact whatever can be established
The question arises as to the relation between worldly The term "absolute truth" is part of the descriptive
order, not part of the factual order. Like all other expressions,
empty, but
it is
it
has a peculiar relation within the system of designations. It symbolizes non-system, a surd within the
system of constructs.^
The concept "emptiness" attempts for the
knowledge of
that there
is
no
reality
j
'
(anatman doctrine)
reality in things-in-themselves
Mahdprajndpdramitd-sdsfra
.
to answer the Indian spiritual search
through an extension of the Buddhist insight maintains
that
the
teaching
.
The
emptiness
of
means both emptiness of beings (pudgala-silnyatd) and emptiness of the dbarfnas {dharma-sunyatd) .^ If the idea of an existing entity comes into mind, the bodhisattva knows that it is an illusion. It is the essence of wis-
dom
(prajnd) to realize that a disciple
who
has "attained the fruit of en-
tering the Stream" has not attained anything
nor the path of in a self
release. If a
(dtman)
"Wisdom"
,
—
person should think
dbarma (truth) he would have a belief
neither
so,
an independently existing entity.
Abhidharma and the Prajndpdramitd writings meant "looking at things as they are." However, whereas the Abhidharma had tried to see the nonsubstantiality of things by seeing the factors in both the
which composed them, the 'Pra]ndpdramitd maintained that the factors themselves were empty of independent reality, and that the notions of "path," "dharma," or "Buddha" were meaningless if they designated enwhich had particular and unique characteristics (laksanas = "marks") For instance in the Vajracchedikd PrajUdpdramitd when the
tities
.
Lord
is
telling his disciple
Bodhisattva-vehicle
Subhuti
should stand,
how "someone who has set out in how to progress, how to exert
the his
thought," he says: Although innumerable beings have thus been has been led to Nirvana.
all
And why?
led
to
Nirvana, no being
And why?
"being" should take place, he could not be called a "Bodhi-being."
He
is
not to be called
a
Bodhi-being, in
whom
the perception of a self or a
being would take place, or the perception of a living soul or a person. ^
MSFC, p. 72. TGVS, II, 1078
at
If in a Bodhisattva the perception of a
.
.
.
Robinson,
ff.; K. Venkata Ramanan, Ndgdrjuna's Philosophy as Presented in the Mahd-Prajnapdramifa-Sdstra (Tokyo, Charles E. Tuttle Co., 1966), see esp. ch. VIII "The World *
Lamotte,
and the Individual."
i4
—
^
W^Isdom (Prajna)
What do you
No
Subhuti:
Tathagata be
O
indeed,
seen.
possession of
Lord, not by the possession of his marks can the
And why? What
possession of marks, that
The Lord: Wherever is
by the
think, Subhuti, can the Tathagata be seen
marks?
his
is
there
is
possession of
no-possession of no-marks there
from no-marks
as
has been taught
by the Tathagata
as
the
truly a no-possession of no-marks.
is
marks there
is
fraud, wherever there
no fraud. Hence the Tathagata
is
to be seen
marks.
Likewise, in the Heart Sutra the
Buddha
explains the
manner by which
the Bodhisattva "attains" ultimate release. In the sixth section he says: Therefore, sattva,
O
Sariputra,
through having
it
relied
is
because of his non-attainmentness that a Bodhi-
on the perfection of wisdom, dwells without thought-
coverings [acittdvarana]. In the absence of thought-coverings he has not been
made
to tremble, he has
overcome what can upset, and
in the
end he attains
to Nirvana.^
In explaining the meaning of this paragraph,
What it
all
Edward Conze
writes:
one had to do was not to rely on anything, worldly or otherwise, to
go, to give the resulting emptiness a free run, unobstructed
whatever, or by the fight against
To
it.
nowhere any refuge or support, that
is
stop
relying
to be supported
let
by anything
on anything, to seek by the "perfection of
wisdom." The Perfection of Wisdom can, of course, be equated with Emptiness,
and
so at this stage the Bodhisattva relies
on nothing but emptiness.^
In conformity with the vision of ancient Buddhism, Nagarjuna denied that happiness in this
life
or any other could result
from any extreme.
Regardless of the earnestness expressed in any purificatory effort, effort
were not aware of
fabricating
its
own
it
if
such
was simply
more constricting action (karma). Indian Buddhism, by
cepting an ontology of "becoming"
made
nonessential character,
—
relatedness bear the weight of
in distinction to
its
ac-
one of "being"
metaphysical considerations.
By
taking the burden of existence from "things" or "elements" Buddhism
emphasized
Nagarjuna
the
nonsubstantiality,
the
nonautonomy,
of
existence.
stated this notion through the concept "emptiness," dissolving
every particular in a "negative identity." Even the notion of "emptiness" ^
trans. Edward Conze (Serie Orientale Roma VIII; Roma: Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1957), pp. 66-68. See also pp. 69, 71-73, 7S-77, 82, 85-87, 90 for the denial of any "thing" or "mark" which can be grasped as absolute.
Vajracchedikd
Istituto Italiano per 83, *
Conze,
^Ibid.,
BWB, p.
Prajnapdramitd,
il
p.
93.
94.
«5
— A
Emptiness:
Study
Meaning
in Religious
did not possess a peculiar ontological status, so that
when
a Bodhisattva
on emptiness, he does not rely on something outside the deof which the term "emptiness" might be conscription "emptiness" is
to rely
—
sidered the property.
From
this
we
wisdom, in the context of emptiness, negated any
see that
one-sided assertion which required bipolar distinctions, destruction, or reality
and
entities
ideas
—
At
nonreality.
were empty of
the same time
self -existence. It
e.g., it
production
maintained that
could do this because
did not regard emptiness as an object which had properties or as a
it
property of some essence. "Emptiness" can reveal the true nature of reality
only
when
it
is
used to eliminate the search for some ultimate,
absolute "being." Then, in order that
being
itself,
"emptiness"
loses its
The Ultimate Truth which
is
own
it is
not crystallized into an absolute
designations as the revelatory means.
beyond "being" and "becoming," beyond
"emptiness" and "non-emptiness,"
is
inexpressible. Yet, this last sentence
should not suggest the illusion, Nagarjuna would say, that there
is
"some-
thing" which is inexpressible. In traditional Buddhist thought there is a group of topics called "the inexpressibles" {avydkata, avydkrtavastiini) usually enumerated in fourteen statements.^ They concern the following topics:
whether the world
is
eternal or not, or both or neither; whether
the Tathdgata exists after death, does not, or both, or neither; and whether is identical with the body or different from it. When these queswere posed before the Buddha, the Ciila Mdlunkya Sutta informs us,
the soul tions
they remained unanswered."^ The Buddha, being conscious of the inter-
minable conflict in reason, refrained from giving either a definite "yes" or
"no" to any question. The "inexpressibles" represent a critical dialectic born from the rejection of any absolute (dogmatic) verbal formulations. It elaborates in the dialectic which Nagarjuna this same critical is Madhyamakakdrikds the dialectic which denies the ultimate validity of
—
any view.
As we have (i.e.,
seen before, Nagarjuna appeals to the fact that the Buddha) refused to state whether he existed after death
(MMK,
xv. 17-18) in order to argue that one cannot say that
Tathdgata or not
nirvana exists or does not '
These are found not only
in
exist.
As
the Buddha's silence, so Nagarjuna's
the canonical sutias, but also in the commentaries and other The Abhidharvia Rosa classifies the avyakrta as a type
subsequent literature, e.g., Milinda Patlha. of question which cannot be answered at
all
(sthapaniya). See Murti, p. 42.
usual interpretations of the Buddha's silence Buddha, himself, did not know, (2) the Buddha did not concern himself with metaphysical questions, and (3) this was a form of expressing a metaphysical nihilism. '
as
Dr.
Murti
follows:
86
(1)
(p.
37)
summarizes
the
three
"Wisdom
(Prajiia)
of the favorite notions of Buddhist philosophy and psy-
critical analysis
chology served to redirect mental energies which were caught in the net
However, Nagarjuna's
of_discourse.
that logic as he applied
it
analysis
went further
was
in the Kdrikds
in suggesting
a potent tool to cut into
dogmas based on the inherent
the net of illusory metaphysical
limitations
of discursive thought. Thus the logic which was the framework in which illusions
were perpetuated was
framework
to
its
also the
—
proper usage
mechanism which could reduce
this
the expression of conventional truth.
For Nagarjuna, the pursuit after
final
answers regarding the nature of .
For him, these "final answers"
were not to be found because there were no
essential self-determined ques-
Ultimate Reality was sophistry (prapanca) tions. Since there
was no "o ne to one" correlation between concepts and
their sup posed referent, the inquiry into the nature of thin gs
One can
endless.
is
up (or chain togethe r) inference upon inference, butthis activity does not~Ieadto Ultimate Truth and it never will because Ultimate Truth, in this method of inquiry, is imagined to be the last of a pile
—
—
Ultimate Truth, however,
series.
is
not a fact about an absolute "real," or
even intuitive knowledge of such a "real." Such a "thing" does not exist (ultim ately)
ment
.
Ult imate Trut h, rather was a p^wer for
to such a
,
phantom
Wisdom Just as in is
no
view is
wisdom
there
is
a Self-substantiated Assertion
no
self-existent object of
knowledge, so there
view which can claim to be an "eternal truth." That every
assertion or is
from attach-
reali ty.
Not
Is
release
ultimately false
is
a corollary to the recognition that ultimate reality
not a thing to be "possessed." Nagarjuna takes twenty-one verses in the
show that there is no self -existence (svabhdva) of either object of knowledge or means of knowledge; each depends on the other to produce knowledge. This work is structured to answer the questions relating especially to knowledge and how it operates to reveal what is true. In it, Nagarjuna's opponents try to show that Nagarjuna's denial Vigraha-vydvartani
®
to
of "self-existence" also negates his claim regarding emptiness.^ He, on the contrary, asserts that words themselves do not effect the negation of
the self -existing assertion; expressing * *
^°
mundane
Appendix B, Appendix B, See Appendix B, See
See
words simply serve the practical purpose of
(co-originated) notions.^*^
verses
verses
all
3 1
A word
(ue.,
ndm a = name)
0-51.
-4.
verses 21-28.
87
A
Emptiness; itself
Study in Reli gious Meaning
cannot be regarded
have the power to 57.
as
having
effect a result)
He who would
impute
a self-existence
Nagarjuna argues:
.
a really existing
Could be refuted by you; but we do not
58.
And
that
If it
were
thing, or if
a real is
it
were
a
to a really existing thing
name.
—would non-real thing—
is
real or a non-real thing?
entire proposition
name
assert a
"The name
[assertion]:
(which would then
unreal"
that
in both
relate
cases
to
a
your
refuted.
Also in verses 64-69 Nagarjuna argues against specific kinds of demon-
which presume that they
strations
view that holds to the
are negating a
notion of self-existence. Knowledge, therefore, does not have
and every emptiness
A
if it
similar
terms
In
assertion or
view must be regarded
claims to articulate the truth.
view was already articulated in the Prajndparamifd
of
gaining
Bodhisattvahood
Astasdhasrikd Prajndpdramitd recounts
Subhuti that no teaching {dharma) had perfect
wisdom
Subhuti: activities
is
But,
are
self -existence,
betraying the truth of
as
how
the Lord
self -existence,
literature.
nature),
told his
the
disciple
and that even the
empty:
since
the
Lord has taught that
lacking in own-being, and empty,
become one who
enlightened
(an
dharmas and
all
—how
all
mental
then can a Bodhlsattva
not lacking in mental activities associated with perfect wisdom,
is
or with all-knowledge?
The Lord:
If the
mind of
a
Bodhisattva works on the fact that
are through their own-being isolated and empty, and agrees that
he becomes one
who
is
all is
dharmas so,
then
not lacking in mental activities associated with perfect
wisdom and with all-knowledge. For perfect wisdom nor
this
is
empty,
it
neither increases
decreases. ^^
Almost immediately following the above explanation Subhuti series
asks in a
of questions whether anything specifically can be designated about
perfect wisdom. tion, are
Two
of these questions, together with the Buddha's nega-
Important for our discussion here:
Subhuti: Does the emptiness of perfect wisdom course in perfect wisdom?
The Lord: No, Subhuti ... ^^Conze, PWES,
p.
162. See also pp. 201-5.
—
:
Visdom
Can one apprehend
Subhuti:
in emptiness
any dharma that courses
(Prajna)
in perfect
wisdom?
The Lord: No, Subhuti.12
Then, in tions
manner, the Buddha asks Subhuti a
a catechetical
which
of ques-
series
an expression of the nature of perfect wisdom
results in
(prajna)
The Lord: Do you as a real
see that perfect
wisdom, in which the Bodhisattva courses,
thing?
Subhuti: No, Lord.
The Lord: Do you see as real that dharma which Has that dharma by any chance been produced, being produced, has
been stopped, will
it
it
oflfers
no
or will
basis for apprehension?
it
be stopped or
be produced, or
is
it
being stopped?
it
is
Subhuti: No, Lord.
The Lord: This which full
insight gives a Bodhisattva the patient acceptance of
to be produced.
fail
enlightenment.
.
.
When
he
is
endowed with
that, he
is
dharmas
predestined to
.^^
As Nagarjuna argued (ndma) was without
in
the
Vigraha-vydvartam
self -existence, so in
that
the Astasdhasrikd
every word
we
find the
explanation that "a thought can arise only with an objective support" just as in the case of acts of will
and deeds.^^ This
is
important for indicat-
ing that wisdom, which recognizes the emptiness of form (thought)
not produced "with an objective support." Perfect wisdom, in ference to
(empty) forms, does not
all
assert a teaching; the
one can receive from wisdom (prajnd)
When
words
is
them
Thus, a proposition that declares "emptiness is
not
.
.
.
,"
and vice
XXV.
24.
final verse
The
is
only "answer"
do not have
useful in conventional speech. is
.
.
." also
means "emptiness
versa. In light of this rejection that such universal
propositions give information about Ultimate Truth,
Nagarjuna's
,
indif-
silence.
are used to express the highest truth, they
the restrictive function which makes
its
of
MMK,
we can understand
xxv, the chapter which analyzes nirvana:
cessation of accepting everything [as real]
is
a salutary cessation
of phenomenal development.
No dharma anywhere has been taught by the Buddha of
anything.
^*lbid., pp. 162-63. ^*Ibid., p. 163. See also pp. 100, 117, 132. ^*Ibid.. p. 137.
89
— Emptiness:
A
Study in Religious Meaning
The claim
that "emptiness"
claim that
fruitless to
it is
not
is
at several places in the Kdrikas.
As
a
viewpoint
is
by Nagarjuna
expressed
we
early as the fourth chapter
find the
argue either for or against the reality of empti-
ness:
"Wlioever
8.
(vigraha)
—
argues
"emptiness"
against
in
order
For him everything, including the point of contention,
to
is
known
argument
an
refute
to go unrefuted.
"Whoever argues by means of "emptiness" in order to explain an under-
9.
standing
For him everything, including the point to be proved,
is
known
to be misunder-
stood.
In
xiii. 8
j
we
Emptiness
8.
find a classic expression of the claim that the truth of
emp-
cannot be restricted to a viewpoint:
tiness
is
proclaimed by the victorious one
as
the expulsion of
all
view-
points;
But those who hold "emptiness"
viewpoint are considered
as a
as
not having
attained [the truth]. I
Finally, the verses in chap, xxiv
which express the damning
of misconstruing the truth of emptiness clearly have in
mundane point
tion of this highest truth to a
spiritual result
mind
of view, which
the degenerais
enmeshed
in
the contradictions of everyday speech: 11. Emptiness, It is like a
having been dimly perceived, utterly destroys the slow-witted.
snake grasped wrongly, or [magical] knowledge incorrectly applied.
12. Therefore, the
the
mind of the
ascetic
[Gautama] was diverted from teaching
dharm a.
Having thought about 13.
Time and
the incomprehensibility of the dharina
made
again you have
a
by the
condemnation of emptiness,
But that refutation does not apply to our emptiness. 14.
When
emptiness "works," then everything in existence "works";
If emptiness does not
"work," then
all
15.
You, while projecting your own
Are
like a
^^ Cf.
existence does not "work." ^^
faults
on
us,
person who, having mounted his horse, forgot the horse!
Vigraha-vyavartani, verse 70:
All things prevail for
Nothing whatever
90
him
for
prevails for
whom
him
for
emptiness prevails;
whom
emptiness prevails.
stupid.
_Wisdom_(Prajna) "W^isdo
m
(
praj nd )
while using
,
with^onceptualjinowledgej
ment
m an's
intell ect,
true functj on
jts^
to the^ntitie^jwhich are fabricated
i s_
not jt o be equ ated
to drain
is
by the
m ind
away
the attach-
and ernot ions This .
mind or consciousness does not exist indepen of knowledg e'^_th at appear to be external to Jthe Buddhism onward, the conscious mind {vinndna,
capacity exists because the
dent of the "o bjec ts mind.^^
From
early
was understood not
vijndna)
existed independent of
a faculty that
as
perceived objects, but as arising from the interaction of "subjective" and
As every
"objective" elements.
existing
the
thing,
something which has "become"; and the becoming i.e.,
a stimulus. If the
Wisdom
is,
conscious is
mind
is
due to "food,"
stimulus ceases, then "what becomes" ceases.
which
in part, a concentrative exercise
dissolves the
mental
and emotional attachment of the apparent mind to "things" (including ideas or assertions), for it
Wisdom can
the awareness that
is
all
"things" are empty.
be a solution to the problems which are in the very nature
of existence because of the presupposition in Buddhism that one becomes
what he knows himself
becoming that
structures a kind of
The awareness of emptiness "no-becoming." The term
to be (or not to be).^^ leads to
hhdvana ("coming into being") was used
term for the realization
as the
of the highest truth. There was no escaping the universally conditioned
by "dependent co-origination." In her book Buddhist Psychology Mrs. Rhys Davids has pointed out how "wis-
character of existence expressed
dom"
participates in
mental constructions but
them. In ex-
also purifies
plaining that ideas are part of the spiritual "becoming," she writes:
In their arising
is
Involved creative, constructive
insight, that effort of intellectual
eflfort.
And
this
is
intuition or
sympathy by which the mind can place
itself
within the mobile reality of things. Pannd [wisdom] was not simply exercise of
thought on matters of general knowledge and practice, nor was
—
nor desultory reverie. It was intelligence diverted by volition,
synergy, ^^ See as
"made
to
Govinda, PAEBP,
described in ^^
(as
from lower it
practical issues
become" that esp. parts
Abhidhamma
till,
as
a
which had not been
in
dialectic,
synthesis,
before. ^^
a discussion of the Buddhist notion of consciousness
tradition.
T. Stcherbatsky has summarized the Buddhist understanding of
depicted
it
—concentrated
fusion of sympathy,
spiritual vision
4-6 for
or rather as
the Abhidharmakosa)
.
It
is
representative
of
the
how knowledge philosophical
is
produced
milieu
against
which, and in which, Nagarjuna worked. See CCB, pp. 45-50. ^*
C. A. F.
Rhys Davids, BP,
p. 133. Mrs.
Rhys Davids
also
makes
a significant
comment about
the meditation practice as found in the Buddhist tradition. She maintains that there "is no sense
91
.
Emptiness:
A
Study in Religious Meaning
Emptiness
is
the basis for
all
becoming, since
it is
the "dependent co-
origination" that accounts for the production of phenomena; but "de-
pendent co-orignation"
is
not a principle of determinism which necessarily
perpetuates the attachment to existing things.
"empty" constructions that compose
Only when the naturally are embued with false
existence
notions of self -existence (which also brings attachment to "things")
they become fetters that produce frustration and turmoil ^
do (duhkha)
Those who have realized the empty nature of existence (or of themselves) evade the attachment that accompanies ignorance and thereby become
empty of any attachment. The importance of ing mental construction and attachments
5.
On
is
realizing emptiness for end-
stated in the
MMK,
account of the destruction of the pains (klesa) of action there
him who constructs them. These [pains] result from phenomenal extension (prapanca) nomenal extension comes to a stop by emptiness.
xviii.
is
5:
release;
for pains of action exist for
To
realize
wisdom, then,
is
to refrain
Use of Verbalizing
What
is
but
;
from constructing more
pain.
in Realizing Emptiness
the relationship between Nagarjuna's logical arguments and
the release from attachments to existence? Since every viewpoint (silnya)
phe-
this
of self -existence
own
{svabhdva)
^
is
according to Nagarjuna,
empty not
is
empty proposition? So his opponents argue; and he readily agrees. However, Nagarjuna maintains that the supposed victory of such an argument results from faulty reasoning. Nagarjuna's
denial of self -existence an
In the Vigraha-vydvartani he takes up this problem directly. In verses 20-
29 Nagarjuna use of
words
rejects the
as if
opponent's claim that his
they had
self -existence
own denial constitutes a He argues that in his
{svabhdva)
.
denial of self-existence he does not have to assume
what
sume; rather, he maintains, both the claims of
opponents and
denials
do not have
self -existence;
his
his
opponents
as-
own
his
they both exist on the level of con-
of union with the divine One, or any One, aimed at or
felt.
It
has the essential noetic quality
too strongly to permit of passivity as a constant. Intellect and volition, for Buddhist thought, arc
hardly distinguishable, and the jhdyin [the person
who
meditates] seems to be always master of him-
from and emerging There is a synergy about his jhana [meditation], combined with an absence of any reference whatever to a merging or melting into something greater, that for many may reveal a defect, but which is certainly a most interesting and significant difference." Ibid., pp. 114-15.
self
and
self-possessed, even in ecstacy, even to the deliberate falling into
trance.
92
.
.
.
Wisdom ventional truth. His denial
He
is
(Prajna)
phantom destroying another phantom.
like a
ends his argument with the verse:
29. If I
would make any proposition whatever, then by that
I
would have
a
logical error;
But
I
do not make
a proposition; therefore I
am
In verse 59 of this same work Nagarjuna
not in error. insists that, since his denial
does not presuppose an opposite absolute claim, he
When
sition.
is
not making a propo-
the opponent further argues that Nagarjuna unwittingly pre-
supposes an entity in order to deny
it,
Nagarjuna answers:
63. Since anything being denied does not exist, I
Therefore, [the statement]:
"You deny"
do not deny anything;
—which was made by you—
is
a false
accusation.
In the next verse he affirms that his expression
is
simply to convey some-
thing, and the mechanics of speech should not be construed to imply a
power which negates some metaphysical 64.
Regarding what was
of denial
is
said
entity:
concerning what does not
exist:
"The statement
proved without a word."
In that case the statement expresses: "[That object] does not exist";
[the
words] do not destroy that [object].
The
goal of complete unattachment through realizing the highest truth
of emptiness, claims Nagarjuna, tion of something
mundane
which
exists.
is
not a view and certainly not the nega-
Yet, in order to be a means of release from
must be expressed. As a verbal expresmust participate in the limitations of mundane speech in fact it capitalizes on the very nature of mundane speech, which operates through the projection of opposites and discrimination. The negative dialectic which is so prominent in the Kdrikds carries the principles of "opposites" sion
experience, "emptiness"
—
it
and discriminating analyses to
its
limits,
indicating thereby that
notions used are simply verbal constructions of
the
empty "becoming." By
criticizing every assertion which intends to bring the "reality of becoming" into the confines of a dogmatic perspective, Nagarjuna expressed the
Middle Way. "Emptiness" was not meant as an expression of chaos without "rhyme or reason," but, equally, it was not meant to refer to an absolute state of being from which all phenomena arose, or to an absolute structure (logos) of existence. traditional Buddhist affirmation of the
The
assertion in
MMK,
xxiv. 10 that the highest truth
is
not taught 93
A
Emptiness:
Study in Religious Meaning
from the mundane activity manner of handling the
exemplified in the subject matter and
apart
is
the
materials
Nagarjuna phenomena, to,
Madhyamakakdrikas.
e.g.,
mundane
"being dependent," "universal elements," "what
e.g.,
the going, and
ultimacy,
the
in
uses a logical analysis to criticize the views about
what
gone
is
not yet gone to." Also he subjects the notions of
is
nirvana, the four holy truths, and the tathdgata to the same
mundane phenomena. Both ultimate and mundane phenomena shown to be empty from the standpoint of the highest truth the
analysis as
—
are
highest truth_jwhich is^beyond^distinctions^^t the same time, according to the Kdrikds the emptiness of
all
phenomena becomes manifest through
the critical analysis of every viewpoint.
The Madhyamika school did not reject speech in order to ajBfirm an solute intuition. The followers of this school, for instance, used the cursive tool of negation
—negation which
what was negated. They
opposite of
approximation of things
as
did not admit (or affirm)
also
they really
dis-
the
used metaphors to suggest an
are,
i.e.,
"emptiness." This would
made between
suggest that no easy equation can be
ab-
logical reasoning
and
mundane truth on the one hand, and intuition and Ultimate Truth on the other.
The
reasoning
as
ability of
well
Ultimate Truth to manifest
as intuition,
itself
through
logical
furthermore, would be consistent with
Nagarjuna's recognition that "emptiness" applies both to mundane existence and to ultimate reality. This recognition does not deny that the
Ultimate Truth
beyond
is
all
distinctions in the sense that
can reduce the vitality of what stress the fact that discursive
physical content it
reason can be illusory
from the terms or
can be revelatory
if
used in
no statement
actually real to a proposition. It does
is
if
one derives meta-
logical structure of the discourse; or
a critical dialectic
to indicate the nonabsolute
quality of any assertion.
"What then does Nagarjuna mean when he says that there are two kinds of truth: the world-ensconced truth
Ultimate Truth (paramdrthafa) that
is
^' xxiv.
(lokasamvrtisatya)
and the
MMK,
xxiv. 1-6
appears clear from
world-ensconced truth refers to the practical understanding
the
which
? ^^ It
required to live.-° There
is
a practical value in
regarding tables
number of "truths" in Buddhism was variously catalogued. See La V. 15 9-87. However, this cataloguing itself was considered to be a mundane which was not "one" or "many," but the very presupposition for any designation of the Truth concern with truth in a prepositional form. ^" Dutt (AMBRH, pp. 216-17) has given three senses in which the term "sarhvrti" was used: 8-9.
Vallee Poussin,
(1)
identical
94
The
MCB,
—
with ignorance {avidya)
on account of
its
completely enveloping the reality,
(2)
"Wisdom (Prajna)
and chairs
as
"things" (which do not disintegrate because from an ultimate
viewpoint they are considered to be empty of
self -existence)
.
means and
It also
aflSrming general and broad distinctions between good and bad, real
and
illusory,
same
and empty
full
To
as practical distinctions.
say "Gold
is
the
Each of the two kinds of truth are valid when correctly applied; and wisdom (prajna) is insight into the nature of things whereby the proper means for
as dirt" is false
knowing
(a-satya) in the context of practical truth.
the truth
used in a given situation.
is
Nagarjuna did not say that the Ultimate Truth ensconced truth tence which
abolished.
is
known by
is
To
the world-ensconced truth
the Ultimate Truth of emptiness tical" truth
is
when
the world-
is
affirmed.^ ^
is
realized only
One might
when
say that "prac-
Ultimate Truth applied to daily living. For instance, nirvana
known through
practical truth
Ultimate Truth, nirvana sire" are
exists
the contrary, he maintained that exis-
is
cessation of desire, while
nothing in
is
itself, just as
known through
"cessation" and "de-
nothing in themselves. Professor Robinson has expressed the re-
lationship of the
two truths
way:
in the following
Worldly, conventional or expressional truth means language and verbal thought.
The
absolute truth
said to be inexpressible
is
and inconceivable. Yet realization
of this fact depends on comprehension of expressional truth. All the doctrines
taught by the Buddha are compatible with emptiness; that
is,
emptiness describes
every term in the system of expressional truths.^^
In asserting that both truths participate in the emptiness of
we must not underestimate
the difiference between them.
The
all
things,
distinction
between conventional truth (world-ensconced truth) and highest truth in Indian thought
^^ in
to point to the
two
general (non-Buddhist as well as Buddhist) intended
poles of (1) truth or clear perception,
rance or mistake. In conventional truth
and the identical
difficulty
is
with phenomenal, for
condition, and xxiv.
14.
(3)
we
that
are
we
prone to posit some kind of intrinsic value
implied a thing which
it
and (2) igno-
perceive only an appearance,
is
dependent, or subject to cause and
referred to signs or words current in the world, based on direct perception.
When
does not "work," then
emptiness all
"works," then
everything
in
existence
"works."
If
emptiness
existence does not "work."
^^ Robinson, MSFC, p. 71; For an analysis of the discussion in Mahdprajndpdramita-§dstra regarding the kind of knowledge available in pra]nd see V. K. Ramanan, Ndgdrjuna's Philosophy as Presented in the Mahd-Prajndpdramitd-Sdstra, chs. v-vii.
^*
K. N. Jayatilleke
"Logic and Truth," of
discusses
the relation
EBTK. He
of
the
two kinds of knowledge
traces this notion in the Pali suftas
plementary non-Buddhist expressions. See
esp. pp.
in
chapter VII,
and in relation to com-
361-68.
9i
'
\
Emptiness;
A
Study in Religious Meaning
to this appearance.
To
correct this illusion, a "higher vision"
must be
gained which can correct the apparent truth.
At
best, the
mundane truth had only
limited soteriological
eflFect;
it
was an indirect expression of truth. If thoughts of mundane "realities" were not imbued with an awareness of their emptiness, they perverted the truth and posited
a self -existence in the objects of sense or imagination. It
is
this
attachment to "things," towards which the mundane truth was prone, that
The mundane truth had value movement away from attachment to any
the truth of emptiness attempted to dispel. insofar as
inaugurated the
it
specific object,
which
it
might do, for instance, in distinguishing between
nirvana and avidya (ignorance), or in dissolving apparent entities into
was done in the abhidharma thought. Yet, it was only the ultimate understanding of truth which totally dissolved the their elements
(dharmas),
attachment to objects of
'
as
desire.
Wisdom reveals the Ultimate Truth; but according mundane truth which in a different context hides
—
/
\
How
is
uses
the Ultimate Truth.
this possible?
it is
truth."
rejected in the sense that
The
and
it is
transformed into "no
self -existent
things of the apparent world are not destroyed, but they are re-
evaluated in such a
way
that they no longer have the
power emotionally
human life. Thus, discursive thought is used human experience whereby a person perceived
intellectually to control
to analyze the factors of
"things '
it
According to Nagarjuna, the Ultimate Truth both nethe mundane truth at the same time. Mundane fruition to brings gates and truth is not rejected in the sense that it is replaced by another "truth," but
1
to Nagarjuna,
as
they really are." Such an analysis, which probes the deep mean-
ing of what most people take for granted, literature and-the
sight
Mahdydna commentaries.
is
found
Abhidharma wisdom has in-
in the
It indicates that
which conventional truth based on hasty interpretations of apparent
reality does not have.
We
should not forget that the Mahdydna schools, in-
cluding the Madhyamika, accepted the discursive expositions found in the
commentaries 1':
'
{sdstras, vrttis).
through the use of a without admitting
Wisdom was
critical dialectic,
its
i.e.,
expressed in the Kdrikds,
also,
the negation of every assertion
opposite.
The immediate followers of Nagarjuna's understanding wrestled with the role of reason in attaining wisdom. There were two groups who called themselves
Madhyamika who had
different interpretations of the exact
function of reason: the Svdtantrikas and the Prdsangikas. represented
96
by Bhavaviveka, recognized
The
Svdtantrikas,
the intention of their opponents*
Visdom
arguments and tried to show by proper
logical
(Prajna)
procedure that the op-
ponents' arguments were wrong. They, however, did not establish an
al-
ternate system of metaphysics since they did not accept the condition that in refuting one
view they must aflErm the contrary. The
applied only to conventional truth and in
Truth. ^"^
It
no way could
logical procedure
"establish" absolute
only denied the assertions of the metaphysicians by accepting
the rules of logic.
That Nagarjuna accepted the
rules of logic to defeat his
opponents in the Madhyamakakdrikds and the Vigraba-vydvartani
The
evident.
tetralemma, for instance,
Nagarjuna does not use
from the
use of words.
opponent
is
is
a
major element in
life
which
The one
reality,
The value of accepting
is
of meaning
a
to failure. Logical
a selective process,
and
means for deny-
the logical criterion of the
an absolute
as
discursive jhoiight.
norm
for truth of
and discursive thought prevents
able "to express the totality of existence, orj:he total is
meaning or
principles.
this selectivity
existence. This principle of selectivity
the
Further,
not something of absolute value.
is
hold logical relationships
doomed
is
own
his
use of logic, however, in itself
he
is
analysis.
that he can be refuted in terms of his principles of
tries to
quite
based on the improper inferences
is
he must be judged inconsistent with
is
alternative of
his
logic to destroy logic.^^ Logic
ing an understanding of
If
deny each
use of logical inference to
human
It
as a process
from being
experience of
both the strength and weakness of
On the one hand, It permits meaningful
communication;
o n the^other, it li mits the awareness according to habits of apprehension. It is the limiting character of thought which the other Madhyamlka group, the Prdsangikas emphasized. Therefore, such a representative of this
group
standing this
as
as
CandrakirtI did not recognize the logician's order of under-
having any validity
at all
when
referring to Ultimate Truth. For
group, Nagarjuna's critical dialectic served to reduce the logical pro-
cedure to absurdity
when
it
attempted to express Ultimate Truth. They
held that the mystical intuition was the only
mate Reality. This need not be interpreted cation" with the Absolute, since in radical bifurcation of the
absolute.
way
of apprehending Ulti-
In a Vedantic sense of "unifi-
Madhyamlka thought
two planes of
reality: the
there was
phenomenal and the
Taking the expressions of the two groups of Madhyamlka
^* See Y. Kajiyama, "Bhavaviveka Mahavihara Research Publication, ed.
no
fol-
Prasangika School," found in The Nava-NalandaMookerjee (Nalanda: Navanalandamahavihara, 1957), I,
and S.
289-331. ^^ See
R. Robinson, "Some Logical Aspects of Nagarjuna's System," Philosophy East and West,
VI, No. 4
(January,
1957), 307.
97
\
A
Emptiness:
lowers
Study in Religious Meaning
as guides, it
is
clear that the apprehension of emptiness involved
mental comprehension, but not the ordinary comprehension which
dis-
tinguished one thing to the exclusion of other things. k
/'
(wisdom), which permitted one "to
Prajiid
are,"
was
significant
from
a religious point of
see things
what one knew. In summary we would say that the ness of
all
as
they really
view since one "became" insight into the empti-
things destroyed illusion; for this illusion was created
by
positing
on "things" distinguished by perception or imagination. "Wisdom was not itself an ultimate view, nor was it an assertion about an absolute being. "Wisdom was the practice (carya) of dissolving the grasping-after-hoped-for-ultimates either in the phenomenal world or the realm
self-existence
of ideas.
98
To know
"emptiness" was to realize emptiness.
Part
III
STRUCTURES of RELIGIOUS APPREHENSION in INDIAN THOUGHT
7 THE MYTHICAL STRUCTURE From
the discussion in the previous chapters
we have
seen
how
Nagarjuna's
use of "emptiness" redefined the problem of realizing the truth within
Buddhist doctrine. The next three chapters are devoted to examining the process of symbolizing religious truth, chapter 9 dealing with the struc-
ture of religious apprehension reflected in Nagarjuna's use of "emptiness."
By comparing ligious milieu,
his use of
we hope
in the Indian re-
words with other expressions
to focus
on the significance of
his particular
con-
tribution to the Indian religious tradition.
The Problem of Apprehending Our concern with
knowing
religious truth. It
with which Rudolf Otto wrestled in
problem
how
his
from
the kind of problem
book The Idea of the Holy. The
to express the Inexpressible, or, in Professor Otto's terms:
God. His answer is that there is an a priori is the same in all religi ous experiences, factor requires that both the object of experience {mysterium
experience which ul timately
a priori
tremenduTn
et fascinans)
and an emotional-rational apprehension
a sui generis character called "religious."
known by
ly
is
to conceive the nature of
human This
is
Truth
structures of religious apprehension emerges
the general problem of
How
Religious
"ideograms,"
i.e.,
For him, the object
is
possess
conceptual-
concepts or symbols taken from the
"natural sphere" of experience which illustrate, without exhaustive ren-
meaning of the "wholly other." ^ The true religious knowlis intuitive and of a different order than the knowledge obtainable from the use of specific symbols. This way of knowing is based on an ontological commitment to two spheres of reality: the "natural sphere" and the "wholly other," the latter being both transcendent to and immanent in the former. dering, the
edge, however,
^
Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy,
p. 26.
101
i
Emptiness:
"
A
Study in Religious Meaning
Professor Otto makes
explanation of ( 1 )
two epistemological assumptions in giving his beings apprehend and express the Ineffable:
how human
Words which
pertain to the nature of reality have some sort of absolute
entity as their referent, and (2) the conceptual symbols which express a religious vision represent a secondary order of
structure of religious apprehension, which
apprehending the characterized
is
by
a priori
a
feeling
of mystery before the uncanny, and of fear before the awe-ful.
1
This interpretation seems to be particularly applicable to some religious
I
expressions while
it
hardly provides an adequate means for explaining
the basis of meaning in others.
i
we
I
suggest,
do not
result
The
differences in religious apprehension,
simply from choosing certain "ideograms,"
metaphors or analogies, in preference to others;
it is
i.e.,
way words
rather the
^function in expressing religious truth which determines more important j
[
differences than the choice of terms.
The
various ways in which words are
used are themselves indicative of differences in religious apprehension, for
norm
they provide an effective
for the meaning which
verbal expression. In an expression this internal
truth
reflects a certain
norm
is
available in a
for
meaning and
"structure of religious apprehension" which can be
described and compared with other epistemological structures.
The
process of symbolization includes physiological, subconscious, and
"mental" factors (e.g., rational thought, image formation, and imagination). A full discussion of the symboliza-
social determinatives as well as
would involve
tion process (
a
lengthy analysis of the roles played by non-
linguistic elements. In this study,
however, we will limit the meaning of
the term "symbolization process" to the conscious articulation of religious
truth
as it
Our
is
purpose
"a warrior" to 1
God
recorded in existing texts.
is
is
a
beyond an observation that to speak of God as metaphorical use of the term, or that every term referring is
to go
only an analogy to
symbol can be regarded or
why
human
life.
We
concepts related to one another in a
iaflSrmations concerning
why a men and not by others, specific way reflect particular are trying to analyze
meaningful by some
as
Ultimate Reality. Likewise, our attempt to
tinguish different processes of symbol formation
from defining grammatical relationship
must be
dis-
differentiated
rules if the latter are regarded as the
mechanical
between concepts. Linguistic conventions of grammar are in-
deed important forces in constructing conceptual meaning; however, the "logic of symbolic formulation"
grammatical rules in that
it
which we
will discuss
different
from
provides the context of conceptual experience
for the individual's use of grammatical rules. Thus, 102
is
two
individuals could
The Mythical Structure hear a grammatically correct statement and gain quite different meanings
from
because each presupposed a diflFerent process ("logic")
it
by which
the concepts are related.
When the
analyzing the symbolization process
number of
times a term
is
we
not simply note
will
of literature with a particular symbolization process. It general survey of early articulation within a
body from a
used, nor identify every expression in a
Hindu thought Is
clear
that there are different
body of writings such
Upanisads. Because symbolization
is
as the
ways of
Vedic hymns or the
a learned process, different processes
can be used unwittingly by the same person. While this fact makes the task of understanding religious speech agility of the
more complex.
In selecting religious expressions for study, tative
number from
examples
also suggests the
It
human mind. only a represen-
will use
various types of expression in the Indian milieu.
taken
are
we
from Vedic hymns, the Brdhmanas,
Our
Upanisads,
Bhagavad-gitd, and Buddhist philosophical thought with the Intention of pointing out
how
differences in religious views correlate
with particular
kinds of symbohzatlon processes. This Is not to suggest that these are the only ways of symbolizing religious truth. "We do intend to indicate that there
is
more than one such
process,
and that Nagarjuna's use of the term
"emptiness" cannot be reduced either to a mythical or intuitive structure of religious expression.
Two Since share
all
Characteristics of the Indian Religious Milieu
our examples were used in the Indian religious context, they
common
general characteristics.
One
of the most important
is
that
knowledge was considered to be valuable Insofar as it transformed life. The religious seer had become Ultimate Truth and therefore possessed transhuman power. Knowledge was not valued In Itself as an abstract understanding of existence;
it
was sought for
its
power
to transform chaos to
order or bondage into freedom.
This fact did not prevent the truth-seekers from constructing elaborate
and subtly argued metaphysical systems harina literature). Indeed, one's
own
It
(as seen in the
Buddhist Abhid-
gave an urgency to the effort of knowing
nature and/or the nature of reality. However, often the "in-
tuitive" structure of religious apprehension prevailed, in
which no value
was placed on concepts or particular symbols for knowing the truth. At the base of the argumentation was the awareness that Ultimate Truth 703
A
Emptiness:
Study
Meaning
in Religious
could not be expressed in words but could be realized within the person.
Knowledge meant
dramatic change in the individual
a
longed to this world; the true (real) "dead."
Professor
Eliade
states
man
replaced the
who no longer beman who was now
importance of such
the
metaphysical
knowledge in the following way: [Metaphysical knowledge]
necessarily
nature: rebirth to a nonconditional
mode
implies
of being.
consequence of
a
And
this
is
a
mystical
ilberation, absolute
freedom.^
Rehgious truth, then, was
a
means of transformation; and the philosopher's (i.e., apparent) world in
apprehension involved a rejection of the natural
order to participate in the unconditioned dimension of reality.
Each of the three structures of apprehension which we shall discuss also participates in the religious activity which Maryla Falk has suggested is
the "peculiar apex-form of conscious experience" of Indian religious
thought. This
is
the process of transforming reality through the transfor-
mation of consciousness. She describes the nature of
this process in the
following way: [Its
nature
is]
the experience of cosmic consciousness of
self,
equating the
psyche with the reality of the cosmos, and, in the speculative
reality of the
issues,
investing the latter with the constituent laws of the former.^
Interestingly, this kind of soteriological process can either
words and thought
ficacy of
as valid
deny the
ef-
revelatory mechanisms, or emphasize
the efficacy of special words and phrases for establishing the "real" be-
The epitome of where the word {vac)
cause they participate in the very essence of that reality. the latter
expressed in the Brahmanical tradition,
is
has the power to create. Professor
way
one
in
which the word
Vac and Brahman, word
naming
The
J.
it
A. B. van Buitenen describes
a creative force
is
when he
at least
writes:
seems, both stand for the powerful and powerfully creative
that creates a thing in
tinguishing
of
it
J.
its
from the common
individuality
stuflF it is
made
by pointing of.
it
out and thus
He who names
uses the
dis-
power
to create.**
fact that religious
*
Eliade, Yoga,
*
Falk, p.
knowledge
Immortality and Freedom,
is
p.
more than "mere words," then, can 4.
V.
* Ramdnuja's Veddrthasamgraha, Introduction, critical edition and annotated translation by A. B. van Buitenen (Poona: Deccan College Postgraduate and Research Institute, 1956), p. 12.
104
The Mythical Structure be manifested either in a rejection of the use of words in favor of intuition or in the particular use of words for manifesting the reaHty
itself.
Three Structures of Religious Apprehension In articulating "the real," religious expression operates within a frame-
work of thought which Each moves within sion;
and
a
this consciousness
through which the truth in
has one of several epistemological orientations.
kind of consciousness,
which words
is
is
i.e.,
a structure of
apprehen-
informed by an internal norm of meaning and verified. By analyzing the way
articulated
we hope
are used in a structure of apprehension
to indicate
that the nature of religious language permits a variety of processes or structures for
knowing (and becoming)
insight into elements
reality. Such an analysis will provide forming the context of religious apprehension in
which, and over against which, Nagarjuna uses the term "emptiness" to In using this term together with his critical
express ultimate reality.
Nagarjuna expresses a religious vision which must be distinguished from the "intuition of Ultimate Reality" that denies the phenomenal world
dialectic,
as real,
and from the notion that there
to take material
Each of the three cuss requires
its
to reveal truth. tal,
Ultimate Reality which
is
is
activated
forms by the creative force of sacred words or sounds.
we way words
different structures of apprehension that
own norm The
of meaning based on the
three are termed:
(1) "mythical"
magical), (2) "intuitive," and (3) "dialectical."
(i.e.,
will dis-
are used
sacramen-
Our concern with
these structures will not be to give an exhaustive analysis of each, but to
indicate
two elements
are (1) the implicit
available to each structure. These
norm
two elements
of meaning involved in the use of words, and
(2) the process or "logic" of language through is
which help deter-
in the process of symbolization
mine the kind of meaning
which
a
meaning-complex
formed. In the "mythical" form of apprehension particular (sacred)
words, phrases, or stories themselves are the creative powers of "the real"
which can be known in
existence.
The words
whereby the mundane and profane world ture of being which
is
is
are part of a ritual activity
sacralized,
i.e.,
given a struc-
based on an eternal archetype. Both the intuitive and
mythical structures of apprehension use words in a descriptive way, for they presume that there
is
a referent
having
static ultimate ontological
status as a correlate to the descriptive term. In the "intuitive" structure
of apprehension, however, words are used simply
as analogies
which lOi
refer
Emptiness:
A
Study in Religious Meaning
from them. The "real" phenomena, which requires
to something intrinsically different
is
apprehended
as the totality
a
mode
of
all
particular
of ap-
prehension different from mental apprehension. In the third structure of
by Nagarjuna's
apprehension,
exemplified
context of his
critical dialectic, neither the totality
nomena nor to show how
use
"emptiness"
of
of
all
in
the
individual phe-
We hope combines certain elements of the "intentional"
particular forms are the object of apprehension. this expression
and "mythical" apprehension, while making
a radical shift in the use of
words by denying the implicit theory of meaning which requires an extra-lingual referent of a
The The
first
the implicit
word for meaning.
Implicit
Norm
of
Meaning
we will discuss is The norm of meaning found in the struc-
element of the symbolizing process which
norm
of meaning.
tures of apprehension in this
and the next chapter might be called a "re-
I
l
I
lational
norm
ment
derived from
is
system.
The
of meaning." Here the practical meaning of a its
fact that the mythical
and
which a person
the affirmation of
its
state-
intuitive expressions attempt to
say something about ultimate reality as an absolute reality against
word or
relationship with a referent outside the language
defines himself
and
all
transforming power.
—
existence
By
—an
entity over
the very basis of
is
using the verbal symbols
images, representations, and substitutes for that which
is not a symbol meaning of the symbols is possible through their relation to that extra-lingual reality. Within these symIbolizing processes is the implicit judgment that the "real," or the "true," has its ontological status outside the symbol used to articulate it, and
as
(i.e.,
the Ultimate Reality itself), the
,
therefore the corollary a
on the "real" In a
to
is
that symbols have only a derivative reality based
which they
refer.^
relational norm of meaning, words and phrases have meaning by
presupposing something to which these utterances refer. While this point
—because many people today and throughout on grounds words have claimed meaning dynamics which provide of Ultimate Being— they may
appear
the ages
trivial
it
"
This, for instance,
is
part
does
control the symbolization process of
sion and the reality to
the
in religious discourse
for
refer to
much
that
the
religious discourse. It
becomes
R. Otto's presupposition in discussing the relationship of verbal expresit refers, for the "ideogram" is an analogical notion, a mode of
which
"rationalizing" a precedent experience. {The Idea of the Holy, p. 26.) This presupposition influences
Otto's interpretation of "emptiness" in Buddhism. See ibid., p. 30.
106
The Mythical Structure crucial to call attention to this element in dealing with a religious expression such as "emptiness," since
term with such
this
lows
him
norm
a
the freedom
Nagarjuna
from
the relational
function of words
norm
emotionally
as
reality.
meaning
of
establishes
the primary
that
becomes the primary problem; for
the mysterious and awesome,
usage of everyday speech.
The
\
How
is
this "reality,"
beyond the normal the ontological ground of existence to
,,
who
\\
is
be realized in the existential, limited, conceptual framework of those use language?
]
to denote something, the relation of the expression
is
to the inexpressible "real"
known
al-
the ontological implications connected with|i
assuming a "real" behind symbolic
Once
explicitly denies that he uses
of meaning. Nagarjuna's use of language
solution to this problem has taken (at least)
ferent forms in Indian thought, each of which,
we
suggest.
Is
two
I
dif-
coincidental
with a type of symbolization process. In the practical solution for relating
two regulatory processes or "logics" has operated The two kinds of symbol-combination processes are
the symbol to reality one of to express the reality.
mutual exclusion" and "logic of conver-
called in this study the "logic of
gence," each applying to one structure of religious apprehension:
former to the "mythical" and the will be the object of
Words
as
latter to the "intuitive" one.
study for the remainder of
the
The former
this chapter.
Paradigms in the ''Logic of Mutual Exclusion"
In the mythical structure of apprehension words are the tools for realizing Ultimate Reality. Certa in
words
are reg arded,^ s paradig ms or
symbols whose very form and/or nature reveals the basic structure of existence. Because certain
mately
real,
words have the power to bring forth the
they are regarded
as
ulti-
having exclusive Intrinsic value over
against other words. Thus, in this context, religious validity depends
on
the recognition that these particular words have an exclusive function in revealing Ultimate Truth.
The words themselves
an Inherent relation to divine This
way
Ellade in
reality,
are regarded as
having
and thereby become "hierophanles."
of symbolizing religious reality has been described by Mircea
Cosmos and History.^ The two main
features of this structure
trans. W. Trask (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959). See Comparative Religion, pp. 12-18, 417-56; and Eliade, Images and Symbols, trans. Philip Mairet (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1961), pp. 119-21. Prnf. Eliade's discussion of symbols includes material and ritual symbols as well as conceptual symbols; however, this does not significantly change the "logic" of meaning based on an archetypal schema. '
Eliade,
Cosmos and History,
also Eliade, 'Patterns in
107
I
— A
Emptiness:
Study
in Religious
Meaning
(1) the symbol itself structures or Ultimate Reality in existence, the and that (2) while gaining its forms
of religious apprehension are that
creative force through bridging the levels of the "sacred"
fane"
by an
does so
it
reproducing a
celestial
The paradigmatic
I
and the "pro-
exclusive use of a particular symbol,
through
use of words presupposes that there are
two
levels of
and human. The divine (or Ultimate) Reality is that reality which provides the basis or pattern for whatever reality there is in human existence. Thus, the paradigmatic use gains its meaning in part reality: the divine
I
by referring
»
lation
j
beyond
to a reality
itself.
between the symbol and the
from that found
ferent
'
However, the nature of the reis for the paradigm quite dif-
reality
we will see in the analysis of The paradigm itself participates in
in the analogy, as
the intuitive structure of apprehension.
the true or real structure of existence, so that the verbal
symbol expresses (or even emits) the .
"power of being"
^!l an ultimate structure, for those (
by
its
in-
by its form. By structuring the mass of potential reality, "name" establishes existential reality, since it is the imitation
of the ultimate structure (or activity) of
i
(or material)
either
trinsic nature or
the symbol or
\
e.g.,
archetype or repeating the acts of the gods.
who
life.
Because the symbol possesses
becomes the unique bearer of ultimate
it
use the symbol. Inherent in the
symbol
from the "profane." The
distinguishing the "holy"
is
the
reality
mechanism for
linguistic character of
li^this mechanism we have called the "logic of mutual exclusion."
The Mythical Structure of
Religious Apprehension in
the Brahmanic Sacrifice
One
of the most dramatic uses of the mythical structure of religious
apprehension
ample of
this
clusion"
is
is is
found found
in the
meaning-context of the
in the
sacrifice.
presupposed, and symbols serve as paradigms
existential reality.
Within
A
good ex-
Brahmanas, where the "logic of mutual ex-
the sacrificial
mode
for creating
of religious thinking three
items give evidence of the logic of mutual exclusion and the use of a
paradigmatic symbol: (1) reality
is
produced
in
human
existence through
the repetition of previous divine action; (2) the physical appointments
the ground, altars,
fire,
sacrificial
fuel
—
"real" in distinction to "non-real"; and
plus the time involved are the
(3)
the priests, in their
oflScIal
capacity, are the liaison between one world and the other, while their very t,
words or sounds are
The Brahmanas 108
vitalized
by
a creative quality not
represent an elaborate
form of
found elsewhere.
priestly thinking.
The
The Mythical Structure
mutual exclusion"
"logic of
when
evident in Satapatha-Brdhmana
is
vow
the rationale for entering into a
of the sacrifice
is
1.
I.
1.
4-6
based on the
absolute difference between the "holy" and the "profane":
Twofold,
4.
verily,
enter 5.
there
is this,
the gods are the truth, and
man
no
is
is
from untruth into truth," he
third, viz., truth
passes
from
the
men
Let him [the sacrificer] then only speak what
And
and untruth.
the untruth. Therefore in saying
...
now
to the gods.
vow
true; for this
is
verily
"I
indeed
the gods do keep, that they speak the truth; and for this reason they are glorious: therefore 6.
he who, knowing
is
upon the vow, he becomes,
In entering
now
in fact, he
himself (of the
The
as it
were, non-human;
[after the sacrifice] again becomes
vow) with
"Now
the text:
between the
difference
of events
speaks the truth.
this,
am
I
he
man,
who
sacrificial activity
let
him
I really
.
am."
and
as,
and the everyday sequence
that sacrifices are imitations of an original divine act. This
is
Satapatha-Brdhmana regarded
.
'^
explicitly stated in the explanation of the full-moon sacrifice
is
.
therefore divest
as a
6. 4.
I.
found
is
in
12 and 13 where the sacrificial performance
re-enactment of the demon Vrtra's slaughter by the god
Indra. 12.
The full-moon
means of
oblations,
assuredly,
Indra slew Vritra; and this
it
belong to the Vritra-slayer, for by
new-moon
oblation also represents the
slaying of Vritra, since they prepared that invigorating draught for
him who had
slain Vritra.
13.
An
offering in
Vritra, assuredly,
moon) he
is
honour of the Vritra-slayer, then,
the full-moon sacrifice.
not seen either in the east or in the west, then he (Indra) completely
is
(new moon
destroys
him by means of
that
of him.
And,
who knows
remaining of
verily, he
this,
sacrifice),
and leaves nothing remaining
overcomes
all
evil
and leaves nothing
evil.^
Another instance showing where the
is
no other than the moon; and when during that night (of new
sacrifice
is
a
this
is
found
in
Satapatha-Brdhmana VII.
re-enactment of the
sacrifice
5. 2.
5
of animals done by
the creator of the world, Prajapati: 5.
Now
indeed,
the same thing which the gods did
want
to
is
done
here.
The animals do
run away from him [the priest]; but when he does
not,
this, it
is
priest as
he
because he wants to do what the gods did.^ ^Eggeling, SBE, XII. 4. ^ Ibid., p. ^
Ibid.,
180.
XLI. 401. This Bralimanic explanation refers to the action of the advaryu
grasps the head of the sacrificial animal.
109
Emptiness;
A
Study in Religious Meaning
The re-enactment of a divine pattern was important as the point in time and space where two distinct realms, the sacred and profane, met. Every was held there was a hierophany. On an ontological meant that existence was being constructed in an otherwise meaningless, chaotic realm. The myth and ritual represented the infusion of structure, i.e., order and meaning, which is real because it originated in time that
a sacrifice
level, this
an unconditional plane, the sacrifice
1.
Now,
—can become
at
the
—
himself
real
beginning,
mortal and the immortal
SatapatJoa-Brahmana X.
illud tempore.
man
explicitly indicates that
—
4.
1.
1
paying for
in this case the person
Hke the gods by imitating them: was
Pragapati
(composed of)
both
the
these,
alone were immortal, his body mortal:
his vital airs
by this sacrificial performance, and by this order of proceeding, he makes his body uniformly undecaying and immortal. And in like manner is the sacrificer (composed of) both the mortal and the immortal mortal, his body mortal:
by
this
sacrificial
—
im-
his vital airs alone are
performance, and by
this
order of
proceeding, he makes his body uniformly undecaying and immortal. ^°
The above quotation not only existence the lasting reality
perience, but also indicates the
plane of existence. This reality in the
is
not found in
is
manner by which
sacrificial activity.
immediate present
and therefore students of
indicates the importance of bringing into
which
is
common reality
everyday ex-
comes into the
This fact of constructing
something that
is
often taken for granted,
religious life fail to see its significance as evidence
The
of a particular kind of articulation concerning the absolute reality.
one evidence that a
action, the construction, the doing-something,
is
break exists between reality and only apparent
reality.
recting this absence of reality, which
thinking,
ligious
indicates
radically different
that
from what
is
what
follows.
The
one of the major attitudes of reexists
The
before
the
heirophany
so if
man wants
is
structure of religious appre-
hension involved here requires that real and nonreal are radically to be possessed of the qualities of reality, he
thing or have something done for
real
desire for cor-
him which
diflferent;
must do some-
will reverse the existing
process.
The
action which accomplishes "the reversal" in the Brahnianas
course, the sacrifice
performed by the
priests.
The
sacrifice, indeed, at
Is,
of
times
appears to have autonomous power in distinction to any power given from a transcendental plane. "^Ubid., XLIII. 292.
110
After
all,
it
was the performance of the
sacrifice
.
The Mythical Structure
by Prajapati which gave him his immortaHty. Thus, while the sacrifices by the gods, the gods are not considered to
are repetitions of the actions
be self-sufficient beings
who bestow
favors "at will"; they use the means
of the sacrifice to become real themselves. This important force within the sacrifice
seen in an apology for the performance of the Agnihotra. In
is
Satapaiha-Brabmana 18.
By
this
world,
it
Vayu
read:
those gods were produced in the
offering,
reproduced, by
we
18
11. 2. 4.
way
in
which they were
they gained that victory which they did gain: Agni conquered the
And
and Surya the sky.
air,
the Agnihotra, he, indeed,
whosoever, knowing
this, offers
produced in the same way in which they were
is
then produced, he gains the same victory which they then gained; the same world with them, whosoever,
knowing
this, offers
—
indeed, he shares
the Agnihotra. There-
fore the Agnihotra should certainly be performed. ^^
The importance of
action
sacrificial
is
highlighted in the prominent
equation of Prajapati's creation of the world with the
sacrificial creation.
In creating the world, Prajapati became exhausted; his depleted.
Through
sacrifice (agni)
3 5.
6.
I.
3.
3
is
dependent on the
Now
Pragapati, doubtless,
of day and night
(i.e.,
sacrificial action.
5-37 Informs us:
After Pragapati had created the living beings,
relaxed.
being was
he was restored, and thus the preserva-
tion (continual creation) of the world
Satapatha-Brdhmana
own
is
his
joints
(parvan)
the year, and his joints are the
the twilights), the full
were
two junctions
moon and new moon, and
the
beginnings of the seasons. 36.
He was
by means of joint
unable to
rise
with
(which
consists of) the
his relaxed joints;
two junctions of day and
by means of the full-moon and the new-moon (which
consists of)
of the (three)
new moon,
the full and
Caturmasyas
.
.
.
and the gods healed him
by means of the Agnihotra they healed
these ha vis-offerings:
that
night, joined that together;
sacrifice
they healed that joint
joined that together; and
by means
they healed that joint (which consists of the
beginnings of the seasons, joined that together) 37.
which
With is
his joints thus repaired
here
(offered)
he betook himself to this food,
to Pragapati;
the fast at the very time (of full
and he who, knowing
moon),
—
this,
to the food
enters
time, and Pragapati favours him.^^ "Z^/i., XII. ^'Ibid., p.
upon
heals Pragapati's joints at the proper
327.
173.
Ill
A
Emptiness:
Study in Religious Meaning
This same emphasis in sacrificial construction can be found Agnichayana sacrifice, Satapatha-Brdhmana VI. 1. 2. 12 and
The
action of the sacrifice
and constructive because
beneficial
is
"the holy," the "absolutely other," the real activity, the
ficial
holy
ground on which the to the gods brings
manifested;
is
and
priests
itself.
In the
moment
walk
is
them into physical proximity. One of the
Satapatha-Brdhmana IX. And,
62.
with
all
The
passages deis
found
62:
1.
5.
is
holy ground; the appeal
claring in ontological terms the quality-change in the sacrificer in
it
of sacri-
gives structure to chaos.
it
sacrificer
also in the
13.^^
who carries about Agni becomes pregnant and he who builds him when he has not been
indeed, he [the sacrificer]
beings,
and with
gods;
all
carried about for a year kills
beings in the
all
In Satapatha-Brdhmana X.
3-5 there
3.
1.
form of an embryo.^^
an identification between the
is
bricks and mortar of the fire altar and Prajapati, the creator of
all
living
beings: 3.
The Gods gathered him
him which was (they gathered) a brick, 4.
whence
as clay.
And, indeed,
5.
—
and what those
these five forms
is
air,
is
must have within
that Pragapati
which became relaxed 3.
is
Now,
And when
built;
Pragapati
and those
^* See also
woman in "SBE,
I.
1.
XLIII.
'' Ibid., p.
112
are mortal
—
the hair
Fire-altar
which
is
here built up,
are these layers of bricks. ^^
it
the elements of the cosmos as well as the
290.
7.
272.
sacrifice
who became
1. is
2
1.
relaxed
who became
relaxed
1.
8.
2
and
3
the relation of the
the year; and those joints of
is
and nights.
joints of his, the days
and
expressed in the following terms:
are the days
tatapatha-Brdhmana XT. 8.
him
the point of contact between profane and sacred
cosmos to Prajapati through 2.
of
the eye, and the ear.
"eternal." In Satapatha-Brdhmana X.
his
made
mortal parts there were of him, they are the layers of earth; and
five
it
clay and water, they
this,
and the marrow; and these are im-
no other than the
which were immortal they
Since the sacrifice time,
(bodily parts)
skin, the flesh, the bone,
that Pragapati
(earth): that part of
both clay and water.
the mind, the voice, the vital
Now,
this
and that which was in
Having gathered together both
a brick consists of
on the mouth, the mortal
from out of
[Prajapati]
in the water, they gathered as water,
is
this
very Fire-altar which here
and nights, which became relaxed are 3;
and the description of Manu's creation of
The Mythical Structure
no other than the bricks; altar)
—
thus,
had become relaxed: and thus
Yagus
We
when he
down
lays
he thereby restores to him those joints of
,
up and secured
built
is
it is
even in
these
(in the layers o£ the
(building of the altar)
this
which
the days and nights,
his,
that this
(for Pragapati).^^
imagery of the "navel of the world" in the
also find the archaic
sacrifice as the indication that the physical locus of the sacrifice
point of contact with divine reality. In Satapatha-Brahmana instruction
"with the text
means the
place thee' for the navel
.
centre,
*on the navel of the earth
.
.
and the centre
danger: for this reason he says, 'On the navel of the earth
This distinction of the place at which the gods contact in
22 the
given for the advaryu priest to place the rice used in the
is
sacrifice in a particular place I
1. 2.
I.
the
is
Satapatha-Brahmana
1.
I.
1.
which
11
I
safe
is
from
place thee.' "
man
is
^'
noted also
suggests, besides, that there
is
"boundary" around the human time Into which the gods move. The
a
In-
struction concerning the proper action of the sacrificer on the eve of the
performance of the 11. Let
him
sacrifice declares:
that night in the house of the Ahavaniya
sleep
house of the Garhapatya
and he
sleeps in the
fire.
For he
on the ground; for from below,
The
logic of
who
as it
on the vow
enters
midst of those very gods
whom
fire
the
or in
approaches the gods;
he approaches. Let him sleep
were, one serves one's superior. ^^
mutual exclusion operates
in designating the radical dis-
tinction between the sacred and profane, emphasizing the exclusive claim
that specific symbols and acts have creative power. Beside the sacrificial act
and the physical elements, the
hymns and
sacred
innate spiritual power. divine spheres.
priest
and the words of the
explanations which are heard) are regarded
The
The
priest
the mediator between the
is
divine quality of the priest
Satapatha-Brahmana
I. 2.
4. 3; also
is
Eggeling brings
new-moon sacrifice. He who will superintend
sruti as
(the
having
human and
noted, for instance, in this
out in his descrip-
writes that after the sacrificer has
tion of the
chosen the Brahmin
the ceremony, the
Brahmin
answers: I
am
the lord of the earth,
(mahabhuta)
Brahman,
!
earth! ether!
I
lord of the world,
heaven!
their lord of prayer
O
God
(Brihaspati)
I
lord of the great universe
Savitri, thee
they choose for their
^^ !
^^Ibid., p. 281. ^''
Ibid.,
sacrificial
XII.
18-19.
Also
see
Satapatha-Brahmana VI.
6.
3.
9
for
another reference
place as "the navel."
"^Ibid., p.
6.
^' Ibid.
113
to
the
Emptiness:
The
A
Study
Meaning
in Religious
particular words themselves
which
have a
are used in the sacrifice
creative power. Thus there follows in the above description a prayer to dispel the
powers of the rakshas, the
evil ones
who
are lurking about to
The
destruction through the misuse of sacrificial speech.
ejflfect
with which everything must be done
work
omission would
havoc.^" Indeed, every
in a
word. This attempt
have
a creative quality,
word
analysis to relate
it
the
and the number of
syllable,
seen in Satapatha-Brdhmana
is
bethought himself, "Verily,
whence they
of myself, to wit, the year; created
word uttered during
detail
syllables
is based on the understanding that certain words and the commentators use various techniques of the sacrificial activity with experienced life. The
extent to which they go
13. Pragapati
any
to,
and the Brdhmanas go into
sacrifice has ontological implications,-^
accounting for every word, every
precision
for
frequently attested
is
1. 6.
have created here
I
say,
Tragapati
inasmuch
to be a counterpart of himself
XL
well as Tragapati,' consists of four syllables, thereby
as it
a
13:
counterpart
the year';
is
'samvatsara (the year)
is
for he
(year),' a
as
counter-
part of him." 2^
We
might summarize the material discussed so far by giving general which typically use a logic of mutual exclusion. First, such expressions emphasize the distinction between the "holy" and the "profane." Secondly, this way of thinking is formulated through characteristics of the expressions
narrative;
it reflects
activity.
The
action of the sacrifice
divine action in a given sequence; there
Thirdly, there
who
act.
*° See
point
Hindu
is
is
correlated to
and an "after."
significant especially in recounting the origins
reality
Satapatha-Brdhmana XI.
In a modern
a "before"
the understanding of Reality in terms of divine beings
last
When
of the world.
*^
is
This
is
1.
is
6.
catechetical
seen through the mythical structure of ap35.
manual
intrinsic
this
power of holy words
is
forcefully
expressed:
The Mantra portion
[of the Vedas]
consists
of sounds has a particular power, produces to the Devas results
.
.
.
of Mantras, or sentences
certain
effects.
in
which the order
These are in the form of hymns
and when they are properly chanted by properly instructed persons, certain An Elementary Text Book of Hindu Religion and Ethics
{Sanatana Dharma:
follow.
[Benaras: Freeman and Co., 1904], p. 7.)
A
mantra
is
certain order;
a if
succession
of
sounds,
a
the sounds are changed
definite
sequence,
the vibrations
are
sounds being arranged in a changed, and the results will be
the
is why the mantra cannot be translated. (Ibid., p. 74.) the logic of mutual exclusion and the ontological implications of the paradigmatic use of symbols drawn to their farthest-reaching semantic conclusions, for here is the claim that certain vocables, set forth in a prescribed manner, possess intrinsically the holy, the real, in distinction
changed. That
Here
to
is
common
everj'day speech.
"Eggeling, SBE, XLIV. 14-H.
114
(
The Mythical prehension, there
The
is.
often a "creation
is
myth"
to account for existence as
Jl
it
—from the viewpoint
Reality in which the gods themselves subsist
of the intuitive structure of apprehension
The
Structui
—
!
not the focus of interest.
is
articulation begins with the attitude of the world's dependence
on
something which comes before
it, and the place to begin the religious speech is with the original point of contact between heaven and earth. Wherever there is the tendency to emphasize one or all of these characteristics, there,
we is
suggest, a logic of
mutual exclusion and
a paradigmatic use of symbols
in force.
Mythical Structure of Apprehension in the Vedic
Hymns
In the early Indian religious tradition the mythical structure of apprehension was not limited to the Brdhmanas.
It
found already
is
in the
Vedic hymns and prayers, and to a limited extent in the Upanisads and in the epics. In the Atharvaveda the
picted as the source of
being.
all
power of words and
The
ritual acts
de-
is
and imprecations
prayers, charms,
presuppose that evil forces actively engage in opposing good forces in the three-level cosmos. as
wel l
as create
Atharvaveda X.
The magical
^to 3.
curse as
use of
w ell^s
wo rds
bless.
means jo^ destroy The following charm found in is
a practical
1-3 expresses the importance of a prescribed activity to
repulse evil. 1.
This varana^^
my
(vrsan)
thy injurers (diirasy-)
amulet; with
oflf
foes
it
do
.
in front;
the hostile practice (abhydcdra) of the Asuras
to another.
This amulet, the varana, all-healing, thousand-eyed, yellow, golden
make thy
—
go downward; do thou, in front, damage them that hate
Also in Atharvaveda IV. is
rival-destroying, virile
foes, slaughter
by the varana warded
from one morrow 3.
[is]
Crush them, slaughter, take hold; be the amulet thy forerunner
the gods
6.
1-3 a
charm
it
shall
thee.^'*
against the harmful effect of poison
based on repeating divine events: 1.
The Brahman was born
first,
drank the soma; he made the poison ^'
A
species
I
|
(
/
//i/^ .1 cWi
thou take hold of thy 2.
I
with ten heads, with ten mouths; he
first
sapless.
of tree.
**
Atharva-veda Samhita, trans. "W. D. Whitney, revised and brought nearer to completion and edited by C. R. Lanman (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 190J), Part II, 572. Atharva-veda Samhita, trans. W. D. Whitney, published by the Harvard University Press; reprinted
by permission of the publishers.
115
A
Emptiness: 2.
As
Study in Religious Meaning
great as
heaven-and-earth by their width,
[are]
rivers spread out
[so far] have
(vi-stha),
I
as
much
the seven
as
spoken out from here these words
(vac), spoilers of poison. 3.
The winged {garumant)
eagle
consumed {av)
thee
not intoxicated (mad), thou hast not racked (rup)
first,
O
poison; thou hast
[him]; and thou becamest
drink for him.^^
The
charms and hymns addresses the object is an which is supposed to be intrinsic to the recitation In other words, here, at the time and place when the words are
fact that the reciter of the
indication of the potency itself.
voiced,
"the real";
is
The Rgveda,
it is a
creative force dispelling the evil forces.
sometimes expresses the nature of reality through a
also,
"mythical structure." The efficacy of the IX.
hymn
6-8. This
3.
used in the
sacrifice,
to
Soma
(the
and a deity)
sacrifice, for instance,
name
of a plant,
its
praises the juice's
juice
seen in
is
which was
wealth-producing
power: 6.
Praised
Rich
gifts
by the sacred bards, this God upon the worshipper.
7. Away he rushes with his stream, And roars as he is flowing on. 8.
dives into waters, and bestows
across the regions into heaven,
"While flowing, meet for sacrifice, he hath gone
The
up
to heaven across
regions, irresistible.-*'
In this hymn,
as in
other examples of a mythical structure of apprehension,
the imagery presents a spatial differentiation between the realm of the im-
mortals and human life, and a localization of the immortal and beneficent power in an active person. While most of the Vedic gods have no concrete personalities or "histories," a few are depicted with these qualities in varying degrees. The most colorful personality
among
the gods
is
is
most renowned feat
is
we do not
'"Ibid., '^ II,
Viewed from Part
Hymns
271.
116
I,
many
find an appeal to Indra as a
recollection of his feats has the
is
a
we
"born
slaying of Vrtra, the serpent which
enclosed the fertilizing rains. While in
context.
various references
young and impulsive; he enjoys drinking and
learn that he fighter." His
Indra
From
Indra.
power
this perspective,
of the
hymns
addressed to
god who answers prayer, the
to reenact the deed in
Indra
is
its
a positive creative
cosmic
power
1J3.
of the Rigveda. trans. R. T. H. Griffith
(Benares:
E.
J.
Lazarus and Co., 1892),
The Mythical Structure
who
grants fertility, wealth, and prosperity through his accomplishments.
The following
from two hymns, for
excerpts
show
instance,
a
human
de-
pendence on the past and continuing actions of Indra, the Magnanimous
One: I.
7. 2.
Indra hath ever close to
him
his
two bay
steeds
and word-yoked
car,
Indra the golden, thunder-armed.
I.
may
Indra hath raised the Sun on high in heaven, that he
3.
He
burst the mountain for the kine [streams of water].
see afar:
^^^
Lord of the thunder, thou didst burst the cave of Vala rich
11. 5.
The Gods came
pressing to thy side, and free
from
in cows.
terror aided thee.^^
Mythical Structure in the Upanisads Brahmanic thought
is
usually contrasted with Upanishadic thought, and
However, the Upanisads have
in general this contrast can be sustained.
been regarded from their composition forward tation of the
Brahmanic
sacrifice.
They
as
the culminating interpre-
are "the final chapters" of the
Brahmanic commentaries. While in the Upanisads the ritual activity of the sacrifice is no longer considered efficacious for knowing brahman, the sacrifice
is
"interiorized" within the individual
discipline; all of life
is
viewed
formed" continually (without concern
is
to perceive the
as
who
practices a spiritual
the cosmic sacrifice which
power of existence {brahman)
While much of the Upanishadic articulation concerning poses "the
from
One," and the
eternity, the
is
is
to
know
being "per-
in
religious
all
things.
reality presup-
the Self which exists
importance of tapas (austerity, heat)
articulated in the Maitrt reality
religious effort
is
and the
explicit ritual activity),
and
initiation
and Katha Upanisads suggests that the nature of
not found through discovery
as
would suggest that yogic apprehension
much
as
through creation. This
participates to
some extent
in a
mythical structure of apprehension.
In Maiirl Upanisad the ritual performance of articulating the contact between the
important thing for the one
who
=^ Ibid.,
I.
^Ubid.,
p.
I.
1
accepted
human and
as a valid
means
divine realms.
The
engages in religious practice, however,
to understand the sacrifice properly
Maitrt Upanisad
is
—
that
the reinterpretation
is
is,
as a
is
meditative exercise. In
evident:
9.
14.
117
Emptiness:
A
A
Study in Religious Meaning
Brahman, indeed,
sacrifice to
the laying (o£ the sacrificial
is
fires)
verily, does the sacrifice
Thus,
The
action
sacrificial
Tapas (heat) which of the
transformed into meditations and austerity.
produced by mental concentration
is
which served
sacrificial fire
self.
flawless. ^^
become complete and
is
of the
on the
ancients. Therefore let the sacrificer, having laid these fires meditate
as
is
the correlate
the point of contact between gods
and men.^° In a comparatively early upanisad such
the Brbad-dranyaka Upanisad
as
the practice of prdndydma (breath-control) takes the place of sacrifice. In I.
23 the
5.
Verily,
sacrificial effort is described:
what those (functions) undertook of
today. Therefore let
man perform
a
even that they accomplish
old,
one observance only.
He
should breathe
in and breathe out wishing, "Let not the evil of death get me." And when he performs it, let him try to complete it. Thereby he wins complete union
with that divinity and residence
Here we
see that the
author
in the
is
same world with him.^^
attempting to express a
new understanding
of the sacrifice, using the Brahmanic imagery and the logic of mutual exclusion in this mythical structure of religious apprehension.
In the Katha Upanisad the metaphysical speculation concerning reality is put into a narrative framework which involves a type of initiation for Naciketas, a lad seeking to discover the meaning of the lord of the dead, to reveal the mysteries of request concerns the meaning of the
Yama To
how
articulates
(in a
sacrificial fire
^*
The p.
Is
by
boundless world,
heart)" '*
{ibid.,
The
p.
question
direct answer, says:
as
I.
1.
.^^
S.
p.
the support
not entirely
Radhakrishnan (New York: Harper & Brothers, Ltd.; reprinted by permission. Brahmanic interpretation, is declared to be the
182.
Yama
14,
is
Unwin
795. Published by George Allen and
^'^The Principal Upanisads,
in the Brdhmatias)
that this frame of reference
Principle Upanisad s, ed. and trans,
Katha Upanisad
to him. His second
answering the question,
found
like that
^° Agni (fire), in various Vedic hymns and in mediator or messenger between the gods and men. ®^
Yama,
an introduction to Naciketas' all-important third
as
questlon,^^ but the point here
1953),
life
In
asks
the realms of heaven and earth meet through the
manner much
be sure, this serves
and
sacrifice,
He
sacrifice.
says:
"Know
(of the universe)
that
and
fire
as
to
be the means of attaining the
abiding in
the secret place
(of the
600). is
Yama
"This syllable
whether
a
man
"is" or
"is
discusses several topics, one of is,
verily,
the everlasting
not" after he has died. However, to avoid a
which
spirit.
is
the syllable
"aum." In
This syllable, indeed,
is
I.
the
2.
16
highest
Yama end;
knowing this very syllable, whatever anyone desires will, indeed, be his" {ibid., p. 616). The power of the symbol is, as we have seen, characteristic of a mythical structure of religious apprebetision.
in
!
The Mythical Structure
upanhad
foreign to the Upamsads. While this
vades every particular thing,
maintains the importance of yogic
also
it
expresses that the Self per-
The mental comprehension and knowledge not enough. The description of the nature of existence given
activity for attaining Truth.
of Reality are in
Katha Upanisad
is
not
but instruction for
a pseudo-natural-science,
action that negates activity.
Mythical Structure in the Bhagavad-Gitd
The
final area of
sidered here
with
its
Indian rehgious thought which will be briefly con-
the epic literature.
is
The
synthetic character of the GJtd
heterodox formulations make an analysis of the symbolization
processes very complex.
We
will
simply point out a few clear examples of
expressions conceived through a mythical structure of apprehension. First, it
important to note the narrative structure in which the Lord his full glory to the hero Arjuna. "While various speeches
is
Krsna manifests
by Krsna expound individual being
at times
is
is
known through an
seen to be absolutely different
Through Kr§na himself the
other beings.
God
his all-pervading character,
who
fullness of glory
is
from
all
manifested.
Verses 44-45 of chapter xi relate Arjuna's reaction to the hierophany: 44. Therefore, I
As
my
body,
a father to his son, as a friend to his friend,
As 45.
bowing and prostrating
beg grace of Thee, the Lord to be revered:
a lover to his beloved, be pleased to
Having
And
seen
what was never
(at the
Show me,
O
same time)
seen before,
my
heart
is
show mercy, I
am
is
a
God!
thrilled,
shaken with fear;
God, that same form of Thine
(as before)
Be merciful. Lord of Gods, Abode of the World!
Here
O
^^
hierophany completely different from the claim expressed by
Krsna when he says he can be seen
in
all
things. In fact
Krsna
explicitly
declares the exclusive nature of this experience in distinction to Arjuna's
day-to-day experience (XI. 52): 52. This
form that
Which thou '*
The Bhagavad
is
right hard to see,
hast seen of Mine,
Gtta, Franklin Edgerton, trans.
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
1944), pp. 115 and 117.
119
Press,
Emptiness:
A
Study In Religious Meaning
Of
this
form even the gods
Constantly long for the
^
sight. ^°
Also the "theistic" understanding of the whole universe structured in
Krsna
is
consistent with the mythical structure of apprehension, in
divine beings are at the opposite pole
The mythical
from natural
structure of apprehension
is
which
existence.
again evident in Krsna's ex-
planation of the sanctity of Arjuna's fighting. Arjuna, he says, should
go into battle with
a clear
conscience because he
pattern established by Krsna. In chapter
iii
following the divine
is
Krsna says to Arjuna:
23. For if I did not continue
At
My
all
in action, unwearied.
path (would) follow
Men
altogether, son of Prtha.
24. These folk If I did
And I
The imagery of
I
would
perish
not perform action,
should be an agent of confusion;
should destroy these creatures. ^^
the relationship between god and
(discipline of devotion)
is
that of changing
man
in bhakti-yoga
from one realm of
existence
to another. In chapter xii Krsna says: 6.
But those who,
all
actions
Casting on Me, intent on Me,
With
utterly unswerving discipline
Meditating on Me, revere Me, 7.
For them
From Become
When
I
the Savior
the sea of the round of deaths right soon, son of Prtha,
they have made their thoughts enter into
Me.^'''
In chapter ix Krsna defines the good from the bad actions according to the act of worship fined
by
^^Ibid.,
this
p.
117. 37.
^^ Ibid.,
121.
p.
the individual person. That
one ultimate commitment.
""Ubid., p.
120
by
is
to say, morality
is
de-
The Mythical Structure
Even
30.
very
if a
Reveres
He must
Me
evil
doer
with single devotion,
be regarded as righteous in spite of
all;
For he has the right resolution. ^^
In the foregoing examples of a mythical structure of religious ap-
symbol
prehension in Indian thought
we have
expressing "the real" itself
a formidable force in establishing the real.
The symbol
is
a
is
paradigm for human
tried to indicate that the
existence. In using the
paradigm
the religious person structures, and thereby "makes," existential reality. This use of the symbol is accompanied by the recognized need of forming, structuring,
making
the reality as the technique for
It also presupposes that there are
two realms of
the divinely established realm; and the lished
on the pattern of the
divine.
human
Given
knowing the
"real."
an ultimate
reality,
reality:
reality, that
which
is
estab-
this presupposition, the paradig-
matic nature of the symbol has crucial significance, for only the particular
symbol which expresses the ultimate It alone
reality
can establish the
can be the point of contact between the
of reality.
The
efficacy of
human
human and
reality.
divine levels
mental structures and the clear distinctions of
the real and nonreal are important considerations in
much
of the Indian
religious apprehension.
Ibid.,
p.
95.
121
8 THE INTUITIVE STRUCTURE In contrast to the mythical structure of apprehension, the intuitive struc-
meaning through combining concepts that would be reinconsistent or as idolatry in the logic of mutual exclusion. For instance, in the intuitive structure, absolute reality might be known as both "being" and "nonbeing," "here" and yet "not here," or as God and man. TJoe intefition of the expression is revealed by the paradox caused through the *' convergence" of the two {or more) qualifiers, and it is in the relationship itself that the meaning is formulated. The concept functions only as an analogy (rather than as a paradigm) which must be combined with other analogies to hint at or reflect the "real" which is totally other than any symbol. In this symbol-combination process every symbolic expression is a limitation, and in part a misapprehension of the "totally other." Mental activity, using concepts and symbols, is regarded as preparatory to the real mode of knowing the Unconditioned: intuition. Two well-known examples of this kind of expression found in the Upanisads are the declaration "tat tvam asi" ("you are that [ultimate ture provides
garded either
reality]"),^
as logically
and the
(individual self)
brahman (Ultimate Power) and dtman
assertion that
are one.^ In both these examples the religious
meaning
from the convergence of two terms which by themselves have opTo relate these terms through a logic of mutual exclusion
arises
posite meanings.
would
result in a logical fallacy or a meaningless phrase.
However, such
phrase can be meaningful within the "logic of convergence" because operates
by
a
logical pattern.
a it
symbolizing process which seeks to oppose the "normal"
The presupposition
Is
that the truth of the Unconditioned
Reality cannot be expressed through any one symbol,^ so the convergence
of terms can at least point to the "otherness" of the Unconditioned. ^Chdndogya UpanisaJ VI. IV.
4.
"Chdndogya Upanisad '
8.
7;
VI.
10.
3;
VI.
11.
3;
12-18. II.
5.
1-13; V. 18. 1;
See Brhad-dranyaka Upanisad IV. 4. 21.
122
III.
14. 1-4.
VI.
12.
3;
Brhad-dranyaka Upanisad
The
When we
read that the Self
is
Intuitive Structure
brahTiian, the All,^ the Self
is
not merely
name for brahman. The Self is the dtman, the particular expression of the Real. The meaning of this affirmation is not the tautology ^'brahman is brahman." The logic of convergence which is indicated here is affirmed another
by the contention of the
understanding
religious writers that the proper
on a strictly meaning context found
of these affirmations requires special insight. Indeed, even empirical level one would have to agree since the in everyday speech
speech. Likewise,
must be redefined to understand
when we
read that the self
this
kind of religious
smaller than a mustard
is
seed and greater than the earth,^ this does not suggest that "smaller"
"greater." Rather, the
meaning of
this
means
statement obtains from the logic
of convergence, which requires that the terms
—
opposites
by
definition
—
are
placed in juxtaposition.
Reality as Eternal Being
The
use of the logic of convergence has
plications.
The
"is there." It
is
"real"
is
complementary ontological im-
assumed to be something existing, something which
an eternal absolute which
is
archetype
as
is
is
not some-
i.e.,
Absolute,
to be discovered. It
thing constructed in existence on the basis of a divine,
the case in the mythical, or sacrificial, use of words. It
certainly true that
when
a person
is
"awakens" to the Ultimate Truth, he
new ontological status; but the "real" was there within him all time. The method of knowing through discovery correlates with the
attains a
the
ontological character of the "real." This character
And
because the "r eal"
ticular times
is,j.t
and places but
does^not manifest
is
one of
itself
static
"being."
exclusively_in_par-
in evej"y element of existence.
Every term used
to express It shares in the insufficiency of conditioned existence to announce
the Unconditioned. Yet, every term finds
conditioned potential, so the mere fact of
its
its
ultimate source in the
Un-
existence bespeaks an intrinsic
relationship with this reality.
Upanlshadic Use of Conceptual Symbols There are
many
examples of
this structure
as
Mere Analogies
of religious apprehension in
the Upanisads. Because any particular conceptual expression does not contain the fullness of the "real," the purpose of these expressions * ^
Brhad-dranyaka Upanisad II. Chandogya Upanisad III. 14.
5.
is
to evoke
1-15.
3.
12i
]\
:
Emptiness:
A
Study in Religious Meaning
the desire in the disciple for discovering in himself the transcendent reality.
In this attempt
of this
is
is
—
is
beyond any particular
beyond all names and forms. Explicit recognition Chdndogya Upanisad VII. 24. 1
indeed,
given in
"Where one that
clear that the ultimate reality
it is
name and form
nothing
sees
nothing
hears
else,
else,
the infinite. But where one sees something
understands something
that
else,
understands nothing
else,
something
else,
else,
hears
the small (the finite).^
is
Again, in the same upanisad (VI. 1.4): Just as ...
by one clod of clay
name
modification being only a is
just clay [so
is
that teaching
In the Katha Upanisad
is
all
is made of clay becomes known, the from speech while the truth is that it
that
arising
by which the unbearable becomes heard].
a list
of the progression from the senses to the
Supreme, indicating that the highest
human
faculty of discernment must
be transcended in order to realize the unmanifest I.
Spirit.
Katha Upanisad
10 and 11 maintain:
3.
Beyond the
10.
senses are the objects
is
the mind; beyond the
is
the great
mind
(of the senses)
and beyond the objects
the understanding and beyond the understanding
is
self.
Beyond the great
11.
Beyond the
spirit. is
'^
self
the unmanifest; beyond the unmanifest
is
spirit there
is
nothing.^ That
is
the end (of the journey)
the
is
;
that
the final goal.^
These quotations are indicative of the undifferentiated character of ,'
Ultimate Reality. Every perception, cognition, concept, and attitude limited because
i
differentiates.
it
The
being must be transcended in order to experience the Unmanifest. the above examples
it is
clear
( 1
)
is
individual conscious awareness of
From
that the terms used to describe Ultimate
Reality are often self -contradictory, and (2) that no particular words have
an exclusively valid quality for expressing Because Reality specific task *
The
^ Ibid.,
is
is
conceived
as
this reality.
being beyond
who approach
given to those
all
particular expressions, a
truth in this way. This task
Principle Upanisads, p. 486. pp. 446-47.
The phrase
translated
"Beyond the
This could be translated: "Beyond the
spirit
spirit
there
is
(purusa)
nothing" reads: purusdn na parath kincit. there
is
not anything," indicating that the
The English should not be confused with Nagarjuna's use of the term sunyatd (emptiness). ^ The Principal Upanisads, p. 625. spirit
is
the
124
terminal
entity,
the
highest
stage
of
awareness.
word
"nothing"
The is
to describe in the best
set
themselves
manner
ceptual means of knowing.
the objective realization
and ^'dtman." Both are the world-ground: brahman, the subjective realization is
called
is
dtman. In the articulation of
note that
regarded
it is
as
the restrictions they have
beyond comprehension and the conthe most common symbols used to ex-
is
Among
press the "real" are "brahmaJt"
called
—under
possible
—the Reality which
this
world-ground
an established thing;
it is.
have the burden of declaring that the particular
{dtman)
is
Upanhad
I.
eternal,
all,
ultimate. This
The knowing not
is
body
the
is
self,
verily,
all
gods,
all
II.
the lord of
is
spokes are held together in the beings,
the whole; the Self
Katha
for instance, in
worlds,
He
is
He
sprang from
unborn, eternal, abiding and primeval.
slain. ^^
In Brhad-dranyaka Upani^ad This
seen,
important to
Thus, the descriptions is
never born; nor does he die at any time.
self is
when
slain
is
it is
18:
2.
nothing and nothing sprang from him.
He
Intuitive Structure
15 the self
5.
professed to be the
things, the king of all beings.
all
hub and
all
is
As
all
all:
the
felly of a wheel, just so in this self, all
breathing creatures,
all
these
selves
are
held
together. ^^
Again, in the same upanhad (IV.
Whoever
maker of
the
we
13)
find:
has found and has awakened to the self that has entered into this (the body), he
perilous inaccessible place is
4.
all.
He
is
maker of the
the
is
the world; indeed he
is
the world
universe, for he
itself. ^^
Chdndogya Upanhad III. 13. 7 describes the convergence of the Ultimate with the self by placing the self within the description of the Ultimate: The
light
which
shines above this heaven, above
no higher,
highest worlds beyond which there are light
which
is
all,
above everything, in the
verily, that
is
the same as this
here within the person. ^^
In these expressions
we
see the description of reality
through a
combination of concepts. The above quotations declare that the the individual
Whether the or
is
is
only apparently limited
subject of the verse
is
the
when
in reality
^^Ibid., p.
Katha Upanhad
II.
1.
is
within
everything.
dtman experienced within
the unconditioned brahman, the Ultimate Reality
^°Ibid., p. 616. See also
it is
dialectical
self
a person
regarded
J-13.
20 J.
"ji/osing errors
Do
as
to
what
salutary and unsalutary
is
not
exist
do not 210
by
their
own
exist in reality.
nature {svabbdva)
;
therefore the impurities (klesa)
Translation of Mulamadhyamakakarikas; Fundamentals of the Middle 3.
The
(dtma)
existence or non-existence of the individual self
at
is
Way
not proved
all.
Without that
[individual self],
how
can the existence or non-existence of the
impurities be proved? 4.
For impurities
5.
somebody, and that person
exist of
is
not proved at
all.
not so that without someone the impurities do not exist of anybody?
Is it
In reference to the view of having a body of one's own, the impurities do not exist in
what
is
to the five-fold manner.
made impure according
In reference to the view of having a body of one's own, that which
impure does not 6.
The
errors as to
entities
exist in the impurities
what
is
is
made
according to the five-fold manner.
salutary and non-salutary do not exist as self-existent
(svabhdvatas)
Depending on which
what
errors as to
salutary and non-salutary are then
is
impurities? 7.
Form, sound,
taste,
touch, smell, and the dbarmas: this six-fold
Substance (vasiu) of 8.
Form, sound,
taste,
Merely the form of 9.
How
will "that
desire, hate,
and delusion
imagined.
is
touch, smell, and the dharmas are a fairy castle, like a
which
is
mirage, a dream.
salutary" or "that which
is
non-salutary" come into
existence
In a formation of a magical man, or in things like a reflection? 10.
We
submit that there
[And
is
no non-salutary thing unrelated to
depending on which, there
in turn]
is
a salutary thing.
a salutary thing; therefore, a
salutary thing does not obtain. 11.
We
submit that there
[And
in turn]
is
no salutary thing unrelated
depending on which, there
a
is
to a non-salutary thing,
non-salutary thing; therefore a
non-salutary thing does not obtain. 12. If
"what
And 13.
Even
if
is
salutary" does not exist,
"what
is
the notion
if
how
non-salutary" does not
"What
is
will there be desire [for it]?
how
exist,
permanent
is
in
will there be hatred [for it]?
something impermanent"
is
in
error.
How
can
this
notion be in error since "what
is
impermanent" does not
exist in
emptiness? 14.
Even
if
the notion
"what
is
permanent
is
in something
impermanent"
is
in
error, Is
not then the notion concerning emptiness,
i.e.,
that
it
is
impermanent, in
error? 15.
That by which a notion that which is grasped
is
formed, the notion, those
Whose
is
is
not existing either
the error?
notions, and
[in the notion]:
All have ceased; therefore, the notion does not 16. If a notion
who have
Whose
is
exist.
as false or true.
the non-error?
211
A
Emptiness;
Study in Religious Meaning
18.
Nor do errors of someone who has erred come into existence. Nor do errors of someone who has not erred come into existence. And errors of someone who is at present in error do not come into
existence.
19.
Now you examine of whom do errors really come into existence! How in all the world will errors which have not originated come into
existence?
17.
And
no being
20. Since
how can
errors are not originated,
if
Nor by
itself
produced by
is
itself,
and something different
there be someone involved in error?
nor by something at the
same time,
diflferent.
how can
there be some-
one involved in error?
"what
21. If the individual self,
pure," "what
is
eternal," and happiness really
is
exist,
Then
the individual self,
not 22.
But
if
not
pure," "what
is
is
eternal,"
and happiness
eternal,"
and happiness do
are
individual
"what
self,
pure," "what
is
is
exist.
Then non-individual sorrow do not 23.
"what
errors.
From
self,
"what
is
impure," "what
is
impermanent" and
exist.
the cessation of error ignorance ceases;
When
(samskara)
ignorance has ceased, conditioning forces
and everything
else cease.
24. If
any kind of
How is
25. If
self-existent impurities belong to
somebody,
world would they be eliminated?
Who
in all the
self -existent?
any kind of
How in is
can eliminate that which
all
self -existent
the world
impurities do not belong to somebody,
would they be eliminated?
Who
can eliminate that which
non-self -existent?
24
An [An opponent 1.
Analysis of the
Holy Truths
(dryasatya)
claims:]
If everything
is
Then you must
empty, there
is
no origination nor destruction.
incorrectly conclude that there
is
non-existence of the four
holy truths. 2.
If there
is
non-existence of the four holy truths, the saving knowledge, the
elimination [of illusion],
The "becoming"
[enlightened]
(bhdvand)
,
and the "realization"
[of
goal] are impossible. 3.
If there
is
non-existence, then also the four holy "fruits" do not exist.
In the non-existence of fruit there 212
is
no "residing
in fruit" nor obtaining.
the
Translation of Mulamadhyamakakarikas: Fundamentals of the Middle 4.
When
community
the
of persons"
do not
5.
And By
all
9.
dharma does
no dharma and community, how is
will the
Buddha
exist?
empty] certainly you deny the three
the Buddha, the dharma, and the community].
the real existence of a product, of right and wrong,
the practical behavior of the world as being empty. replies:]
reply that you do not comprehend the point of emptiness;
You
8.
[i.e.,
You deny
We
are obtaining]
non-existence of the four holy truths, the real
there are
if
[Nagarjuna 7.
is
speaking thus, [that everything
And
who
exist.
jewels 6.
[of Buddhists] does not exist, then those eight "kinds
four abiding in the fruit and four
exist.
Because there
not
[i.e.,
Way
its purpose from it. dharma has recourse to two truths: the truth which is the highest sense. Those who do not know the distribution (vibhdgam) of the two kinds
eliminate both "emptiness" itself and
The teaching by the Buddhas of The world-ensconced truth and
the
of truth
Do 10.
not
The
know
the profound "point" {tattva) in the teaching of the Buddha.
highest sense [of the truth]
And
is
not taught apart from practical behavior.
without having understood the highest sense one cannot understand
nirvana.
having been dimly perceived, utterly destroys the slow-witted.
11. Emptiness, It
like a
is
snake wrongly grasped or [magical] knowledge incorrectly applied.
12.
Therefore the mind of the ascetic [Guatama] was diverted from teaching
13.
Having thought about the incomprehensibility of the dharma by Time and again you have made a condemnation of emptiness,
the dharma. the stupid.
But that refutation does not apply to our emptiness. 14.
When
emptiness "works," then everything in existence "works."
If emptiness does 15.
16. If
17.
noi "work," then
all
existence does not "work."
You, while projecting your own faults on us. Are like a person who, having mounted his horse, forgot the
you recognize
real existence
horse!
on account of the self-existence of things.
You perceive that there are uncaused and unconditioned things. You deny "what is to be produced," cause, the producer, the instrument
of
production, and the producing action.
And 18.
the origination, destruction, and "fruit."
The "originating dependently" we This apprehension,
i.e.,
call
"emptiness";
taking into account
[all
other things],
is
the under-
standing of the middle way. is no dharma whatever originating independently, dharma whatever exists which is not empty.
19. Since there
No
213
.
Emptiness:
A
20. If
existence
all
Study in Religious Meaning is
You must wrongly 21.
Having
not empty, there
is
neither origination nor destruction.
conclude then that the four holy truths do not
originated without being conditioned,
how
exist.
sorrow come into
will
existence? It
is
22.
23.
sorrow
said that
own
How
is
not eternal; therefore, certainly
can that which
is
existing
by
For him
who
There
no destruction of sorrow
By
it
does not exist by
its
nature {svabhdva)
is
its
denies emptiness there
own
nature originate again?
no production.
is
by
if it exists
its
own
nature.
trying to establish "self-existence" you deny destruction.
24. If the path [of release]
self-existent, then there
is
into existence (bhdvana) If that
path
no way of bringing
is
it
;
brought into existence, then "self-existence," which you claim,
is
does not exist. 25.
When
sorrow, origination, and destruction do not exist,
What
kind of path will obtain the destruction of sorrow?
26. If there
no complete knowledge
is
any knowledge of Indeed, 27.
As
as
to self-existence,
[can there be]
it?
not true that self-existence
is it
how
is
that which endures?
in the case of complete knowledge, neither destruction, reaUzation, "bring-
ing into existence,"
Nor 28. If
are the four holy fruits possible for you.
you accept
How
can
"self -existence,"
be
it
known
and
a "fruit"
is
not
known by
its self-existence,
at all?
29. In the non-existence of "fruit," there
is
no "residing
in fruit"
nor obtaining
[the "fruit"];
When
the
community
[of Buddhists] does not exist, then those eight "kinds of
persons" do not exist. 30. Because there
not
And
if
is
non-existence of the four holy truths, the real dharma does
exist.
there
is
no dharma and community, how
who
31. For you, either the one
is
will the
Buddha
exist?
enHghtened {btiddha) comes into being
in-
dependent of enlightenment.
32.
Or enlightenment comes For you, some one who strives for
into being independent of the one is
a
non-buddha by
his
own
who
is
enlightened.
nature (svabhdva) but
enlightenment
Will not attain the enlightenment though the "way of
life
of becoming fully
enlightened." 33. Neither the
What
is
duced.
214
dharma nor non-dharma
produced which
is
will be
done anywhere.
non-empty? Certainly
self-existence
is
not pro-
.
.
Translation of Mulamadhyamakakarikas; Fundamentals of the Middle W^ay 34. Certainly, for you, there
a
is
product without [the distinction] of dharma or
noxi-dharma. Since, for you, the product caused 3 5.
for you, the product
If,
How
is
by dharma or non-dharma does not
exist.
caused by dharma or non-dharma,
can that product, being originated by dharma or non-dharma, be non-
empty? 36.
You deny
all
mundane and customary
"When you deny emptiness
activities
[in the sense of]
dependent co-origination (pratifya-
samutpdda)
you deny emptiness, there would be action which is unactivated. There would be nothing whatever acted upon, and a producing action would
37. If
be something not begun. 38.
According
world
to [the doctrine of] "self-existence" the
is
free
from
dif-
ferent conditions;
Then
will exist as
it
unproduced, undestroyed and immutable. something
39. If non-emptiness does not exist, then
is
attained
which
is
not at-
tained;
There 40.
and
cessation of sorrow and actions,
is
destroyed.
all evil is
perceives dependent co-origination {pratltya-samutpdda)
He who
Also understands sorrow, origination, and destruction
as well as the
path [of
release].
25
An 1.
[An opponent
Analysis of Nirvana
says:] If all existence
is
empty, there
is
no origination nor de-
struction.
Then whose nirvana through illusion] 2.
elimination [of suffering] and destruction [of
would be postulated?
[Nagarjuna repHes:]
If all existence
is
non-empty, there
is
no origination nor
destruction.
Then whose nirvana through elimination illusion] would be postulated? 3
Nirvana has been
[of suffering]
said to be neither eliminated
and destruction [of
nor attained, neither annihilated
nor eternal. Neither disappeared nor originated. 4.
Nirvana
by
is
certainly not an existing thing, for then
it would involve the become old and be without death.
In consequence
5.
And
it
would be characterized
old age and death.
if
nirvana
is
error that an existing thing
would not
an existing thing, nirvana would be a constructed product
{^samskrta),
215
— A
Emptiness:
.
Study in Religious Meaning
Since never ever has an existing thing been found to be a non-constructed-
product {asamskrta). 6.
But
nirvana
if
pendence [on something
8.
If nirvana
as
something without dependence.
not an existing thing, will nirvana become
is
Wherever there
is
But
is
if
could [nirvana^ exist without de-
else]?
Certainly nirvana does not exist 7.
how
an existing thing,
is
nirvana
no existing thing, neither thing,
a non-existing
dependence [on something Certainly nirvana
is
how
could [nirvana] exist without
else]?
not a non-existing thing which
is
a non-existing thing?
there a non-existing thing.
exists
without depen-
dence. 9.
That
which
state
is
the rushing in and out [of existence]
when dependent
or
conditioned
when not dependent
This [state], 10.
or not conditioned,
is
seen to be nirvana.
teacher [Gautama] has taught that a "becoming" and a "non-becoming"
The
(vibhava) are destroyed;
Therefore
obtains that: Nirvana
it
is
neither an existent thing nor a non-
existent thing. 11.
If
nirvana were both an existent and a non-existent thing,
Final release (moksa)
but that 12. If
not
is
would be [both] an
existent
and
a
non-existent thing;
possible.
nirvana were both an existent and a non-existent thing,
There would be no nirvana without conditions, for these both [operate with] conditions. 13.
How
can nirvana exist
For nirvana
a
is
both an existent thing and
as
non-composite-product {asamskrta)
,
a non-existent thing,
while both an existent
thing and a non-existent thing are composite products 14.
How
can nirvana
There
is
exist as
(samskrta)
both an existent and a non-existent thing?
no existence of both
at
one and the same place, as in the case of both
darkness and light. 15.
The Is
assertion:
proved
"Nirvana
is
neither an existent thing nor a non-existent thing"
if [the assertion]:
"It
is
an existent thing and
a non-existent
thing"
were proved. 16. If
nirvana
"Who can
is
neither an existent thing nor a non-existent thing,
really arrive at [the assertion]
:
"neither an existent thing nor a non-
existent thing"? 17. It
is
Or
not expressed
if
the Glorious
One
Buddha]
exists after his death.
does not exist, or both or neither.
18. Also, it
is
not expressed
if
the Glorious
world],
Or
[the
does not exist, or both or neither.
216
One
exists while
remaining [in the
—
.
—
Translation of Mulamadhyamakakarikas: Fundamentals of the Middle "Way 19.
There
nothing whatever which differentiates the existence-in-flux (samsdra)
is
from nirvana;
And
there
nothing whatever which differentiates nirvana from existence-
is
in-flux.
20.
The extreme
(koti)
limit
of nirvana
extreme limit of existence-
also the
is
in-flux;
There 21.
not the slightest bit of difference between these two.
is
The views a
whether that which
[regarding]
is
beyond death
limited
is
by
beginning or an end or some other alternative
Depend on
a
by
a
empty, what
is
nirvana
limited
beginning
(pHrvdnta)
and
an
end
(apardnfa)
dharmas
22. Since all
What 23.
is
both
there anything
Is
are
finite
and
which
infinite? is
this or
What
"What
finite? is
infinite?
is
neither finite nor infinite?
something
else,
which
is
permanent or im-
permanent,
24.
Which is both permanent and impermanent, or which The cessation of accepting everything [as real] is a tion of phenomenal development [prapanca)
No
is
neither?
salutary
(siva)
cessa-
;
dharma anywhere has been taught by the Buddha of anything.
26
An 1.
Analysis of the Twelve
"What
is
Components (dvddasdnga)
hidden by ignorance" (avidydnivrta) has caused the three kinds of
conditioned things (samskdra) to be
By
those actions
it
[i.e.,
"what
is
2.
Consciousness, presupposing that which
3.
When When
its
made
for rebirth
hidden by ignorance"] goes forward. is
conditioned (samskdra), enters on
course.
consciousness the
is
begun, the "name-and-form" (ndmarilpa)
"name-and-form"
is
instilled, the six
is
instilled.
domains of sense perceptions
(dyatana) are produced.
Having
arrived at the six domains of sense perceptions, the process of percep-
tion begins to function. 4.
Consciousness begins to function presupposing the eye, the visual forms, and ability of
mental association
Presupposing "name-and-form." 5.
That which
is
the coincidence {samnipata) of visual form, consciousness, and
the eye:
That 6.
is
sensual perception; and
from perception, sensation begins
"Craving" (trsna) [for existing things]
is
to function.
conditioned by sensation.
Certainly [a persan] craves for the sake of sensation.
The one who 217
craves
.
A
Emptiness:
Study in Religious Meaning
[namely sexual pleasure,
acquires the four-fold acquisition (iipaddna)
false
views, ascetic morality and vows, and the doctrine of self -existence] 7.
When
the acquisition exists, the acquirer begins to function.
If he
were someone without acquisition, that being would be
would not That being
8.
is
released,
and
exist.
the five "groups of universal elements" (^skandha). Because of
a being, birth begins to function.
Growing
old, dying, sorrow, etc., grief
Despair and agitation:
9.
That "produced being"
is
a single
and
regrets,
from
all this results
birth;
mass of sorrows.
Thus the ignorant people construct the conditioned things
10.
(savtskdra)
;
[that
the source for existence-in-flux.
is]
The one who
constructs
is
ignorant; the wise person
is
who
not [one
con-
structs] because he perceives true reality.
When
11.
A
ignorance ceases, the constructed phenomena do not come into existence.
person's cessation of ignorance proceeds
lightened]
on the
basis of
"becoming" [en-
through knowledge.
Through cessation of every [component] none functions; That single mass of sorrow is thus completely destroyed.
12.
27
An
About Reality
Analysis of the Views (drsti)
Those [views] relating to the limits of the past
1.
reality are:
"The world
is
eternal," etc.,
2.
[And "I have existed in the past," "I have noi existed in the past," etc.].^ The assertion: "I will not become something different in a future time," "I will become [something diflferent]," and the alternative, etc., are relating
3.
[The
to an end [in the future]. assertion:] "I existed in a past
Since this [present being] 4.
Were he
is
time" does not obtain,
not that one
who
[was] in a former birth.
[in a previous birth], that individual self
(dtma) which he acquires
coming into existence] would be diflferent. Moreover, what kind of individual self is there without [in
5.
If
were held that: "There
it
Then
the individual self
vidual self [at 6.
The
is
no
acquisition (updddna)
?
individual self without the acquisition,"
would be [only] the
acquisition or
it is
not an indi-
all].
individual self
is
not the acquisition, since that [acquisition]
appears
and disappears.
Now *
really,
how
This part of karika
commentary.
21^
1
will "he
is
who
acquires"
become "that which
missing in the text; the content
is
reconstructed
is
acquired"?
from Candraklrti's
Translation of Mulamadhyamakakarikas: Fundamentals of the Middle "Way
Moreover,
7.
does not obtain that the individual self
it
is
different
from the
acquisition. If the individual self
but
quisition;
Thus that
8.
were
would be perceived without the
diflferent, it
[in fact] it
is
[individual self]
is
ac-
not so perceived.
not
from nor
diflferent
identical
to the ac-
quisition.
The
individual self
is
not without acquisition; but there
is
no certainty that
"It does not exist."
[The
9.
have not existed in a past time" does not obtain,
assertion:] "I
For that one [now living]
is
who was
not different from that one
in
a
former birth. 10. If that [persent person]
were
diflferent,
he would exist in exclusion of that
[former] one.
Therefore either that [former person]
persists, or
he would be born eternal!
11.4
There
12.
no existing thing which
is
is
"that which has not existed prior." There-
fore, the error logically follows that
Either the individual self
is
"what
is
produced" or
originates without a
it
cause.
Thus the view concerning
13.
the past
which
[asserts]
"I have existed," or "I
have not existed,"
Both ["existed and not existed"] or neither: [The views:] "I will become something in
14.
Or
"I will not
become [something],"
this does
not obtain at
all.
a future time,"
[should be considered] like those
etc.,
[views] of the past.
"This
is
For god
is
15. If
16. If
If 17. If
man man
man, this is a god" [obtains], then eternity exists. unproduced, and certainly something eternal would not be born.
a
is
diflferent
is
diflferent
one part were divine and another part human,
Then
would be something non-eternal [together with] that which
there
but that
eternal; 18. If
from god, there would exist something non-eternal. from god, then a continuity does not obtain.
is
is
not possible.
something both non-eternal and eternal were proved,
Then, no doubt, something "neither eternal nor non-eternal" 19. If someone,
Then
there
having come from somewhere, in some
way
is
proved.
goes somewhere again.
would be existence-in-flux with no beginning; but
this
is
not the
case.
20. If
someone who
Or who
is
eternal does not exist,
who
will exist being non-eternal.
being both eternal and non-eternal, or devoid of these two [charac-
teristics] ?
*
Verse
1 1
is
not available In the Sanskrit text, but
it
is
known from
the Tibetan translation.
219
A
Emptiness:
Study in Religious Meaning
21. If the world
would come
to an end,
how would
an other- world come into
existence? If the
world would not come to an end,
how would an
other- world
come
into
being? 22. Since the continuity of the "groups of universal elements" (skandhas)
[from
one moment to the next] functions Hke flames of lamps,
[The view:] "both having an end and not having an end" 23. If the
is
not possible.
former ["groups"] would disappear, those [new] "groups" which are
dependent on those [former] "groups" would not
arise;
come to an end. If the former ["groups"] would not disappear, these [new] "groups" which are dependent on those [former] "groups" would not arise; Therefore, the world would be eternal. Therefore, the world would
24.
25. If one part
were
finite
The world would 26. Therefore,
and the other were
infinite,
be both finite and infinite; but this
how can
it
be that one part of "one
who
is
not possible.
acquires" [karma] will
be destroyed.
27.
And one part not destroyed? This is How, indeed, can it be that one part
not possible. of the acquisition [of karina] will be de-
stroyed.
And
one part not destroyed? That, certainly does not obtain.
28. If the [view] "both finite
Then no doubt,
and infinite" were proved.
"neither finite nor infinite" could be proved.
29. Because of the emptiness of
How of 3 0.
To
existing things.
all
will the views about "eternity," etc.,
whom, and
him, possessing compassion,
For the destruction of
220
come
into existence, about what,
of what kind?
all
who
views
—
taught the
real
dharma
to him, Gautama,
I
humbly
offer reverence.
B
Appendix Translation of
VIGRAHAVTAVARTANI: AVERTING the ARGUMENTS In Averting the Arguments,
as in the
Kdrikds, Nagarjuna defends his insight
by reducing the notion of self -existence (svahhdva) to absurdity. The formal structure of this short work is that of a religious debate in which the opponent (s) state (s) a series of twenty verses in opposition to into the emptiness of
things
all
by one
emptiness, and Nagarjuna answers each argument one
The major contention
in this debate
fifty verses.
in
the basis for a valid argument concerned
is
with Ultimate Truth. Nagarjuna's opponents argue that in order for Nagarjuna's denial of "self-existent" to have
of denial has a reality of
its
any force he must assume that the statement
own
(2)
The
it.
Nagarjuna cannot
(1)
contend for the emptiness of everything without assuming 1-4 and 17-20), and
from
to counter something different
opponents' arguments seem to cluster around two foci:
(verses
self -existence
defense of self-existence through an appeal to the
accepted means of knowledge: direct perception, religious authority, inference,
and analogy (verses 5-16). In reply, Nagarjuna maintains that he need not assume the "self-existence" of his
own
statements to refute other statements which
"self-existence"
statements;
(verses 21-28). His
but
he
must engage
own arguments in
this
themselves have no
empty
are as
exercise
as
a
that words or statements do not have separate real existences
He
cannot stand anywhere
as such, since it
which claims such vahdity. From
is
this
is
insists
57,
58,
it
word or statement
viewpoint Nagarjuna denies that he (verses
29,
59)
is
or that
denying the thing "self-existence" (verse 63). His argument against the
opponents' defence of self-existence the
(verses
supposed to express reality; rather
the dissipation of any
making a proposition "about" the thing "emptiness" is
other
maintains that truth, from the viewpoint of "emptiness," does not
stand on the validity of a word which
he
all
mundane
Nagarjuna
necessity. In criticizing the opponents' defense of self-existence
64-69).
as
practical,
is
much
the same as in the Kdrikds in that
means of knowledge cannot be considered to have
its
own
reality
independent
of the object of knowledge, and vice versa (verses 30-51); and that the theory of
cannot
self-existence
Likewise,
he
concludes
"self-existence"
is
account that
all
for
change
and
the understanding
supposed to provide, but which
difference
which the is
distorted
(verses
52-56).
aflfirmation
by
it,
of
can be
had by recognizing the intention of emptiness (verse 70). 221
AVERTING Part
I
The Arguments of 1.
the
Opponents
(svabhava) does not exist anywhere in any existing thing,
If self-existence
Your
ARGUMENTS'
the
statement,
being without self-existence,
[itself]
is
not able to discard
self -existence. 2.
But
that statement has
if
own]
[its
then your
self -existence,
tion
is
refuted;
There
is
a [logical] inconsistency in this,
initial proposi-
and you ought to explain the grounds
of the difference [between the principle of validity in your statement and others]. 3.
Should your opinion be that [your statement] this
For
is
not
like
is
"Do not make
a sound,"
possible;
in this case
by
a [present]
sound there will be
a [future] prevention of
that [sound].
were that: "This
of a denial," that
not true;
4.
If [your statement]
5.
Thus your thesis, as to a defining mark (laksanata) not mine is If you deny existing things while being seen by direct perception. Then that direct perception, by which things are seen, also does not
6.
By
is
a denial
[denying]
perception inference
direct
is
denied,
is
—
—
as
also
in error.
exist.
Scripture and
analogy.
[As well
the points to be proved
as]
points to be proved 7.
The people who know
by
by inference and Scripture and
those
a similar instance [drstdnta).
the modes of the dharmas
know
[there
is]
a
good
self-
existence of good dharmas.
As 8.
to the others, the application
There
is
tive
And,
the same.
[dharmas] mentioned
as libera-
modes of dharmas.
Likewise, there 9.
is
a self -existence of liberation in those
if
there
that which
is
would be no
is
non-liberative, etc.
self -existence
of dharmas, then that would be "non-
self-existence";
In that case the
name (ndma) would not
without substance [to which 10. If [one asserts:] Tliat
dharmas does not
is
which
is
it
exist, for certainly there
is
nothing
refers].
self -existent exists,
but the self-existence of the
exist,
^ A translation of Vigrahavydvartani by Nagarjuna. The Sanskrit text used for this translation found in "The Vigrahavyavartani of Nagarjuna," E. H. Johnston and Arnold Kunst, eds., MCB,
IX
(July,
222
1951),
108-Jl.
;
.
Translation of Vigrahavyavartani; Averting the Arguments
One
should give the explanation concerning that of which there
self-
is
existence without dharmas.
As
11.
must be
there
"There
That
Or
12.
which
denial of yours
if
of something that exists, as [in the statement:]
a denial
not a pot in the house,"
is
is
seen
must be
that self -existence does not exist,
what does not
Certainly, the denial of
13. Just as children erroneously
a denial of self-existence that exists.
what do you deny by that statement? exist
is
proved without a word!
apprehend that there
"non-water" in
is
So you would erroneously apprehend a non-existing thing 14. If this
who
one
then there
so,
is
However,
is
denied" and the one
the apprehension,
if
prehends do not
Then
"what
the apprehension,
apprehended" and the
is
apprehends.
Also the denial, "what 15.
is
mirage,
a
as deniable.
"what
six all together.
denies
who
ap-
exist.
not true that denial, "what
is it
—
who
apprehended" and the one
is
denied," and the one
is
who
denies do
not exist?
"what
16. If denial,
Then
is
denied," and the one
you have eliminated 1
whence There
is
are
exist,
them
are
proved [since
is
no proof of any grounds
[of knowledge]
your grounds?
no proof of
a
"point" possible for you
proof of your denial of a
18. If the
do not
denies
their denial].
Because of non-self-existence there
7.
who
existing things as well as the self-existence of
all
self -existent
if it
thing
has no grounds.
is
not a result of grounds
of knowledge,
Then
my
affirmation of the existence of a self-existent thing
is
proved without
grounds. 19.
Or
if
you maintain: "The
self-existent thing
Because no thing
real existence of
(asvabbava)"
—
this
whatever in the
is
grounds not
is
such that
it is a
non-
justified;
world
exists
"what
is
lacking
its
own
nature
(nihsvabhava) 20.
When
it
[Denial]
is
is
said:
The
denial precedes
denied," this
is
not
justified.
not justified either later or simultaneously. Therefore self-existence
is real.
Part
II
Nagarjuna's Reply to the Arguments of the Opponents 21
.
If
my
thesis does
not bear on the totality of causes and conditions, or on them
separately. Is
not emptiness proved because of the fact that there
is
no
self-existence in
existing things?
223
A
Emptiness: 22.
Study in Religious Meaning
The "being dependent nature" of That which has
a nature of
existing things: that
"being dependent"
is
called "emptiness."
—
of that there
is
a non-self-
existent nature. 23. Just as a magically
formed phantom could deny
a
phantom
created
by
its
own
magic, Just so would be that negation.
[regarding emptiness]
24. This statement
therefore, there
There
is
is
no refutation of
not "that which
is
my
is
self -existent";
assertion.
[thus] the grounds for the difference need not
no inconsistency and
be explained. 25.
"Do
[Regarding]
make
not
a
sound"
—
this
example introduced by you
is
not pertinent, Since there
negation of sound by sound. That
a
is
is
not like [my denial of
self-existence].
26. For, if there
is
prevention of that which lacks self-existence by that which
lacks self-existence,
that which lacks self -existence would cease, and self -existence would be
Then
proved. as a phantom could destroy the erroneous apprehension concerning a phantom woman that: "There is a woman," just so this is true in our case. Or else the grounds [of proof] are that which is to be proved; certainly sound
27. Or,
28.
does not exist as real. For we do not speak without accepting, for practical purposes, the work-a-
day world.
would make any proposition whatever, then by that
29. If I
I
would have
a
logical error;
But
do not make a proposition; therefore
I
30. If there
ceptions,
am
not in error.
etc.,
aflSrmed or denied.
[It is]
I
something, while being seen by means of the objects of direct per-
is
That
of mine
[denial]
is
a non-apprehension of
non-things. 31.
And
if,
for you, there
is
a source [of
knowledge] of each and every object
of proof,
Then by
32. If
—
tell
how, in turn, for you there
other sources [of knowledge]
Or
proof of those sources.
would be the proof of
a
source
that would be an "infinite regress";
In that case neither 33.
is
there
if
there
is
a
beginning, middle, nor an end
is
proved.
proof of those [objects] without sources, your argument
is
refuted.
There 22^
is
a [logical] inconsistency in this,
and you ought to explain the cause
Translation of Vigrahavyavartani; Averting the Arguments
of the difference [between the principles of validity in your statement and others].
34.
That reconciliation of
diflSculty
is
not [realized in the claim:] "Fire illumines
itself."
Certainly 3 5.
And Then
it is
not like the non-manifest appearance of
according to your statement,
if,
not
this
is
like a fire
illumines
fire
which would illumine
its
its
pot in the dark.
a
own self. own self and
something
else?
36. If, according to
an "other
Then
your statement,
fire
would illumine both
its
"own
self"
and
self,"
also darkness, like fire,
would darken itself and an "other self." glow of a fire; and where the glow remains
37. Darkness does not exist in the
an "other individual
How 38.
could
you
[If
produce light? Indeed light
it
say:]
in
self,"
"Fire illumines
when
it
is
the death of darkness.
is
being produced," this statement
is
not true;
when being produced,
For, 39.
Now ing
Then
fire
certainly does not touch (prdpnoti)
darkness.
that glow can destroy the darkness again and again without touch-
if it,
that [glow] which
is
would destroy the darkness
located here
in "every
corner" of the world. 40. If your sources [of knowledge] are proved
by
their
own
strength {svatas),
then, for you, the sources are proved without respect to "that
which
is
to be
proved";
Then you have relation to
a proof of a source,
something
[but]
no sources
are
proved without
else.
41. If, according to you, the sources [of knowledge] are proved without being related to the objects of "that
Then 42.
Or
[The answer
which
Or
What
[you say]:
if
[sources of
43.
is
error
knowledge to
to be proved,"
there in thinking,
is
their objects]
is
"The
is
relationship of theee
[already] proved"?
not related to something
is
proved. Indeed "that
else.
the sources [of knowledge] in every case are proved in relation to
if
And
is
This would be the proving of what
is:]
not proved"
"what is to be proved," Then "what is to be proved" 44.
which
these sources will not prove anything.
if
"what
is
is
proved without relation to the sources.
to be proved"
is
proved without relation to the sources
[of knowledge], "Wliat [purpose]
is
the proof of the sources for you
of which those [sources] exist 45.
Or
if,
is
is
—
since that for the purpose
already proved!
for you, the sources [of knowledge] are proved in relation to
to be proved,"
225
"what
—
.
A
Emptiness;
Study In Religious Meaning
Then, for you, there
exists
an interchange between the sources and "what
is
to be proved." 46.
Or
if,
is
when
there
to be proved" exists
when
proved, then, for you, the proof of them both does not
exist.
for you, there are the sources [of knowledge] being proved
proof of "what
The
source
is
is
which
47. If those things
to be proved,"
are to be
48.
And
if
is
to be proved,"
how
the sources,
49. If a son
is
Then
You
is
are
how
proved
will they prove [anything]?
me, in
tell
are
by what
is
to be proved,
proved
will they prove [anything]?
produced by
very son [when he
50.
"what
those sources [of knowledge] are proved
and those things which
By
if
proved are proved by those sources [of knowl-
which
edge], and those things
By "what
and
a father,
and
if
that [father]
is
produced by that
born].
is
this case,
who produces whom?
me! Which of the two becomes the father, and which the son
tell
Since they both carry characteristics of "father" and "son"? In that case there
doubt.
is
51.
The proof of the sources [of knowledge] is not [established] by itself, not by each other, or not by other sources; It does not exist by that which is to be proved and not from nothing at all.
52. If those
who know
the
modes of the dharmas say that there
is
good
self-
existence of good dharmas,
That 53. If a
must be
[self-existence]
good
self -existence
stated in contradistinction to something
were produced in relation to [something
that self-existence of the good dharmas
Then
else.
else],
How,
an "other existence."
is
then, does [self -existence] exist? 54.
Or
if there is
something
that self-existence of good dharmas, while not being related to
else.
There would be no 55.
state of a spiritual
way
of
life.
There would be neither vice nor virtue, and worldly practical
activities
would
not be possible; Self-existent things
would be
eternal because that without a cause
would be
eternal.
56.
Regarding [your view of] bad, "liberative," and undefined [dharmas], there is
an error;
Therefore,
all
composite products (samskrta) exist
as
non-composite elements
(asamskrta) 57.
He who would
impute
a really existing
Could be refuted by you; but we do not 58.
And
that [assertion]:
a non-real thing?
226
"The name
is
name
to a really existing thing
assert a
unreal"
name.
—would
that relate to a real or
—— Translation of Vigrahavyavartani: Averting the Arguments If
it
were
tire
59.
The emptiness of
Or
if
—
a non-real thing
existing things has been demonstrated previously;
all
is
against that
which
not
is
my
thesis.
but that [self-existence] of dharmas
said]: "Self-existence exists,
[it is
both cases your en-
^in
refuted.
is
Therefore, this attack 60.
were
a real thing, or if it
proposition
does not exist"
That
is
62.
which was
questionable; but that
something
61. If the denial concerns
said
then
real,
[by me]
is
Then you would deny the non-self-existence of things. Or if you deny emptiness, and there is no emptiness. Then is not your assertion: "The denial concerns something
63. Since anything being denied does not exist, I
Therefore, [the statement]:
"You deny"
not questionable.
not emptiness proved?
is
real" refuted?
do not deny anything;
—which was made by you—
is
a false
accusation. 64.
Regarding what was denial
is
concerning what does not
said
exist:
"The statement
of
proved without a word,"
In that case the statement expresses: "[That object] does not exist"; [the
words] do not destroy that [object]. 65.
Regarding the great censure formerly made by you through the instance of the mirage
Now
hear the ascertainment whereby that instance [of the mirage]
66. If that apprehension it
is
is
logically possible.
"something which
self-existent,"
is
would not have originated presupposing [other things];
But that apprehension which
exists
presupposing [other things]
—
is
that not
emptiness? 67. If that apprehension
"something which
is
is
self-existent,"
with what could
the apprehension be negated?
This understanding [applies] in the remaining [five factors: "what
hended," the one
who
apprehends, the denial, "what
who denies] therefore By this [argument] the ;
68.
refuted
—on
that
is
is
appre-
denied," and the one
an invalid censure.
is
absence of a cause
[for denying self-existence]
is
the basis of the similarity [with the foregoing]:
Namely, that which was already
said regarding the exclusion of the instance
of the mirage. 69.
That which
is
the cause for the three times
is
refuted from
what
is
to that [given] before;
Negation of cause for the three times affirms emptiness. 70. All things prevail for
Nothing whatever
him
for
prevails for
whom him
emptiness prevails;
for
whom
emptiness prevails.
227
similar
BIBLIOGRAPHY Early Indian Religious Thought For
of the Indian reUgious and philosophical background
a general discussion
the following books are useful:
Dasgupta,
A
S.
History of Indian Philosophy, Vols.
&
I
II.
Cambridge (Eng.),
1922.
Edgerton, F. The Beginnings of Indian Philosophy. Cambridge (Mass.), 1965. Hiriyanna, M. Outlines of Indian Philosophy. London, 1932.
Hopkins, E.
Ethics of India. New Haven, 1924. The Religion and Philosophy of the Yeda and Upanishads. Cam-
W.
Keith, A. B.
bridge (Mass.), 1925.
Mehta, P. D. Early Indian Religious Thought. London, 1956. Prasad, J. History of Indian Epistemology,
Radhakrishnan,
Renou, Louis
&
paperback
as
Indian Philosophy, 2nd
Filliozat, Jean.
A
Sharma, C. D. in
S.
2nd
ed. Delhi,
Vol.
ed.,
L'Inde classique. 2
vols., Paris,
Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy.
A
Indian Philosophy:
2 vols. Calcutta,
S.
book with
&
1953.
3
York, 1962).
vols.
Leipzig,
1909-20
Ketkar and H. Kohn, Plistory of Indian Literature.
1927-33).
Zimmer, H. Philosophies of
A
1947
London, 1960 (available
New
Critical Survey.
Winternitz, M. Geschichte der indischen Literatur. (English translation by
1958.
London, 1929.
I.
India. Ed. Joseph Campbell.
approach to Indian philosophy
a fresh
tions of India's Philosophies
(Englewood
Cliffs,
N.
New
York, 1957.
Karl Potter's Presupposi-
is
1963). This
J.,
is
an analysis
of the grounds on which certain ideas that claim to lead to spiritual freedom are accepted or rejected. life is a
volume of
essays
(London, 1964). This
Another useful work for int€rpreting Indian
and
is
articles
religious
by Betty Heimann: Facets of Indian Thoiight
not a rigorous systematic analysis like Dr. Potter's book,
but expresses Dr. Heimann's insight into crucial factors of Indian thought; the essays collected in the chapters "Indian Metaphysics"
Style" deals
are
apropos
to
our study here.
and "Indian Grammar and
A
short
fully with the latter problem
is
B.
discussions of philosophical problems in Indian thought, in
East-West Philosophy,
Ch.
Ill
monograph which
Heimann's The Significance of in Sanskrit Philosophical Tervtinology (London, 1951). As summary
more
Prefixes
especially
ed.
two chapters of Essays
C. A. Moore (Honolulu, 1951) can be mentioned:
"Epistemological Methods in Indian Philosophy," by D. M. Datta, pp. 73-88;
229
Emptiness:
A
Study in Religious Meaning
and Ch. XI "Metaphysical Theories in Indian Philosophy," by P. T. Raju, pp. 21133. See also P. T. Raju, "Intuition as a Philosophical
East and West,
II,
No.
Method
in India," Philosophy
(Oct., 1952), 187-207; after a comparison of Indian
3
and "Western philosophical views, "Intuition"
in Indian
thought
described as
is
"the direct and unmediated knowledge" of the Ultimate Truth. Indian thought analyzed in terms of psychological expression
Indian Psychology, Vol.
(Zurich,
1945),
and P. Masson-Oursel, "Les
psychologic indienne," Kevue Philosophique de
la
1928), 418-29.
(Jull-Dec,
to reveal the religious
Two
of
studies
meaning of Indian
Yoga: Immortality and Freedom,
H. Zimmer, Myths and Symbols
(New York,
is
II,
found in
J.
Sinha,
Emotion and Will
and 1961); and in two shorter analyses: E. Abegg, Indische
(Calcutta, 1958
Psychologic
Cognition, 2nd ed., and Vol.
I,
trans,
a
la
France
more
et
special
essentiels
traits
de I'^tranger,
nature
spiritual expressions
are:
that
M.
de
CV seek
Eliade,
by "W. R. Trask (New York, 1958), and J. Campbell
in Indian Art and Civilization, ed.
1946).
have used English translations of Hindu sacred writings from the following:
I
W. D. "WTiitney, revised and brought nearer by C. R. Lanman. Cambridge (Mass.), 1905, Harvard
Atharva-veda Samhita. Trans, by to completion and edited
Oriental Series VII, VIII.
The Bhagavad Gita. Trans, by XXXVIII, 2 Pts.
F. Edgerton.
Cambridge (Mass.), 1944, Harvard
Hymns
by R. T. H.
Griffith. 2 vols. Benares,
Oriental Series
The by
S.
of the Rigveda. Trans,
1892.
Principal Upanisads. Edited with introduction, text, translation, and notes
Radhakrishnan.
Radhakrishnan,
New
S.,
York, 1953.
C,
and Moore,
eds.
Source Book in Indian Philosophy.
Princeton, 1957.
Satapatha-Brahmana. Trans, by of the East. Vols. XII,
J.
XXVI, XLI,
Eggeling. Oxford, 1889-1900. Sacred Books
XLIII, and XLIV.
Buddhism The most complete century a.d.
Buddhism du Bojiddhisme indien,
historical description of Indian
fitienne Lamotte, Histoire
is
Two
to the second des origines a
works on Buddhist history and thought development which describe Buddhism to about a.d. 1000 are by Edward Conze:
I'ere
Saka (Louvain, 1958).
Buddhism,
Its
shorter
Essence and Development
(New York,
1959; available in paper-
A
Short History of Buddhism (Bombay, 1960). B. C. Law, History of Pali Literature. 2 vols. (London, 1933) and G. K. Nariman, A Literary History of Sanskrit Buddhism (Bombay, 1920) complement each other in discussing the
back), and
literary sources in Indian
Buddhism. NaUnaksha Dutt has written about early the Spread of Buddhism and Buddhist
Indian Buddhism in Early History of 230
Bibliography
(London, 1925), and Early Monastic Buddhism, revised edition
Schools
cutta, 1960). Also helpful
by
P. V. Bapat and
is
A. C. Banerjee, found in 2500 Years of Buddhism,
Bapat (Delhi, 1959), pp. 96-157.
Buddhism
(Cal-
the essay "Principal Schools and Sects of Buddhism,"
A
useful
summary
ed. P.
V.
of the history, literature, and
found in the section "Der indische Buddhismus" (pp. III (Stuttgart, 1964). A different kind of study, which analyzes the symbolism of the art and architecture at Barabudur, should also be mentioned as a resource for studying early popular doctrine of
is
1-215) by Andre Bareau, in Die Religionen Indiens,
Buddhist thought;
this
Paul Mus, Barabudtir, Esquisse d'une histoire du Boud-
is
dhisme. 2 vols. (Hanoi, 193 5).
General discussions of the Buddha's teaching based on the Pali scriptures are
Ryukan Kimura, The Fundamental Doctrine Thought (Tokyo,
tion in Indian
Taught (New York, 1962); while Buddha's teaching before
it
v/as
of Gatitama Buddha and Its Posi-
What
n.d.); and Walpola Rahula,
the Biiddha
dramatic attempt to discover the "original"
a
formulated in the canonical expression
Rhys Davids, Sakya, or Buddhist Origins (London, 1931).
Two
C. A. F.
is
volumes which
give a survey of Indian Buddhist philosophy are A. B. Keith, Buddhist Philosophy in India
U
and Ceylon (Oxford, 1923), and P. Oltramare, Histoire des idees Tome II, La Theosophie bauddhique (Paris, 1923).
theosophiqties dans I'Inde:
The former
gives an analysis of Buddhist ideas
more of
overtones, while the latter expresses
which
sources
have become
available.
colored with rationalistic
Besides,
an intuitive appre-
two books were
hension suggested by Buddhist ideas. Since these
new
is
a sensitivity to
both
written,
many
have been superceded
by
E. Conze, Buddhist Thotight in India (London, 1962). Other works which have sections
on Indian Buddhist thought
are:
Frauwallner, E. Die Philosophic des Buddhismus. Berlin, 1956.
La Vallee Poussin,
L. de.
Le dogme
sur I'histoire des religions, VI.)
Takakusu,
The
J.
Paris,
et la philosophic
du Bouddhisme.
(fitudes
1930.
Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy. Eds.
W.
Chan and
T.
C. A. Moore. Honolulu, 1947.
Thomas, E.
Yamakami, For
a
J. S.
basic
The History of Buddhist Thought.
New
York, 1933.
Systems of Buddhist Thought. Calcutta, 1912.
introduction to the materials available in Buddhist philosophy
up to 1950, C. Regamey, Buddhistische Philosophic (Nos. 20/21 of Bibliographische EinfUhrungen is
in das Stjidium der Philosophic, ed.
very helpful. Also
III
(1933),
see Bibliographic
Bouddhique,
I.
M. Bochenski; Bern, 1950)
Paris, Vols. I
(1930),
II
IV-V (1934), VI (1936), VII-VIII (1937),IX-XX (1949)
A. Card, "Buddhism," Religions, ed. Charles
a
bibliography found in
Adams,
New
A
;
(1931),
Richard
;^
Reader's Guide to the Grcat-
York, 1965, pp. 83-160; and
P.
V. Bapat, 231
•
Emptiness: et. al.,
ed. P.
A
Study in Religious Meaning
"Buddhist Studies in Recent Times," found in 2500 Years of Buddhism, 3 80-442. Some basic dictionaries are:
V. Bapat, Delhi, 1959, pp.
Edgerton,
F.,
Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit
ed.
Grammar and
Dictionary.
New
Haven, 1953. Malalasekera, G. P., ed. Dictionary of Pali Proper
Names.
2 vols.
London, 1937-
38.
A
Monier- Williams, M.
Sanskrit-English Dictionary. Oxford, 1899.
Rhys Davids, T. W., and
Stede,
W.,
eds.
The
Text
Pali
Society's Pali-English
Dictionary. London, 1921-25.
English translations of
many
Buddhist
Society, Translation Series (London, 1909 ed. F.
Max
Miiller (London, 1895 ff.).
of the East, ed. F.
Max Mullen
A
scriptures
are
found in
Pali
Text
and Sacred Books of the Buddhists, few volumes are found in Sacred Books
flf.),
50 vols. (Oxford, 1879-1925).
The
translations
used in this volume and not mentioned elsewhere in the bibliography are:
Buddhaghosa. The Path of Purification (Visuddhimagga) tion
.
Trans, with introduc-
by Bhikkhu Nanamoli. Colombo, 1956.
Dialogues of the Buddha. Trans, with introduction and notes by C. A. F. and
T.
W. Rhys
Davids.
3 vols.
London, 1956;
first
published 1899-1921. Sacred Books
of the Buddhists, II-IV.
The Milinda-Qnestions. Trans, by C. A.
Rhys Davids. London, 1930.
F.
Regarding the development of Mahayana Buddhism in India,
of
Mahayana Buddhism and
Its
Relation to
parison of the Theravada arhat ideal with the
made by using two
Man
Perfected
are
very useful
is
Mahayana bodhisattva
ideal
can be
L B. Horner, Early Btiddhist Theory and Har Dayal, The Bodhisattva Doctrine
excellent studies:
(London, 193 6),
Buddhist Sanskrit Literature (London, 1932).
Buddhism
a still
NaUnaksha Dutt, Aspects Hinayana (London, 1930). A com-
study of some of the basic Buddhist terms
historical
Robert Armstrong,
"A
Two
essays
on the
rise
of in
of Mahayana
Discussion of the Origin of Mahayana
Buddhism," The Eastern Buddhist, IV (1926-28), 27-47, and Etienne Lamotte, "Sur la formation du Mahayana," Asiatica, eds. J. Schubert and U. Schneider (Leipzig, 1954), pp. 337-96; the latter is the better study. S. Yamaguchi gives an illuminating summary of Mahayana doctrinal development in "Development
of Mahayana Buddhist Beliefs," trans, by
K. Morgan
S.
"Watanabe, found in The Path of
the'
(New
York, 1956), pp. 153-81. D. T. Suzuki discusses basic religious concepts in Outlines of Mahayana Buddhism (London, 1907; avail-
Buddha,
ed.
able in paperback),
Two
though much of
this material
comes from non-Indian sources.
books on special topics of study are B. Bhattacharyya,
to Bjiddhist Esoterism
bouddhique 232
(Paris,
An
Introduction
(London, 1932); and L. de La Vallee Poussia, La Morale
1927).
A
synthetic view of the varied expressions of
Bud-
\
Bibliography is found in H. Nakamura's essay, "Unity and Diversity The ?ath of the Buddha, pp. 364-400.
dhism in
in
Buddhism," found
Abhidharma Three systematic discussions of Abhidharma philosophy and psychology were written by scholars with first-hand knowledge of the religious
empathy
for the
Govinda, Lama Anagarika. Philosophy and
The Psychological Attitude of Early Buddhist
Systematic Representation According to
Its
London, 1961
tion.
and an
texts
abhidharma concern:
(first publ.:
Guenther, H. V. Philosophy
Abhidhamma
Tradi-
Patna, 1937).
Psychology in the Abhidharma. Lucknow,
ajtd
1957.
Rhys Davids, C. A.
F.
Buddhist Psychology. London, 1914.
Readers interested in the contents of the Abhidharma literature should also
La Vallee Poussin,
L. de.
found in Bulletin de 98; Pts. Pts.
IV
II
&
&V
III
"Documents dAbhidharma,
traduits et annotes." Pt.
I
I'Ecole frangaise d'Extreme-Orient,
1930, pp. 1-28, 247found in Melanges chinois et bouddhiques, I (1932), 65 -125
found in Melanges chinois Mahathera.
Nyanatiloka
see:
Guide
et bouddhiques,
through
the
V
(1937), 7-1S7.
Abhidhamma-Pifaka.
2nd ed. by Nyanaponika Thera. Colombo, 1957. "On the Abhidharma Literature of the Sarvastivadins," Journal
revised and enlarged
Takakusa,
J.
of the Pali Text Society, 1904-5, pp. 67-146.
Another work, not an
analysis
of the
Abhidharma
literature
but
a perceptive
examination of the Buddhist notion of constructing forms in the phenomenal world within the context of the Indian religious-philosophical milieu, is Maryla Falk,
Nama-rupa and Dharma-rilpa
(Calcutta, 1943).
Buddhist Knowledge
A
thorough examination of epistemology in the Pali scripture
Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge (London, 1963);
such problems
as the role
it
of reason, meaning, and authority.
of lesser scope, though illuminating in
its analysis, is
is
K. N. Jayatilleke,
focuses specifically on
A much
shorter
work
E. R. Sarathchandra, Buddhist
Psychology of Perception (Colombo, 1958). Various
articles
on
specific
problems
include the following:
Bhattacharya, V. "Samdhabhasa,"
IHQ, IV (1928), 287-96.
Guenther, H. V. "The Levels of Understanding in Buddhism," Journal of
American Oriental
Society,
'LXXWll (1958),
19-28.
233
Emptiness:
A
Study in Religious Meaning
La Vallee Poussin, L. de. "Faith and Reason in Buddhism," Proceedings of the Third International Congress for the History of Religions (Oxford, 1908), Pt. pp. 32-43.
II,
Rhys Davids, C. A.
F.
"Dhyana
in Early
Buddhism," IHQ,
III
(1927), 689-715.
Suzuki, D. T. "Reason and Intuition in Buddhist Philosophy," Ch. I of Essays in
East-West Philosophy. Ed. C. A. Moore (Honolulu, 1951), 17-48.
Wayman, A. "The Meaning
Unwisdom
of
—Avidya,"
Philosophy East and
West, VII, nos. 1-2 (April, July, 1957), 21-25.
Wayman, A. "Notes on Oriental Society,
LXXV
the Sanskrit
Term
(1955), 253-68.
Buddhist Understanding of the World and
An
American
Jfiana," Journal of the
Its
"Cause"
made The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux (Calcutta, 193 5). More briefly, Junjiro Takakusu argues against a notion of an absolute static reality in "Buddhism as a Philosophy of Thusness," found in Philosophy East and West, ed. C. A. Moore (Princeton, 1944), pp. 69-108. A "classic disby
extensive examination of the Indian Buddhist view of existence was
Satkari Mookerjee in
cussion" of the nature of existence batskoi),
The Central Conception
'Dharma' (Calcutta, 1961;
first
of Great Britain and Ireland,
of
Theodor Stcherbatsky (Fedor Buddhism and the Meaning of
I.
is
publ. in
Enghsh by the Royal
1923), which, however,
Abhidharmako'sa (a fourth century a.d.
commentary) for
relies its
Shcher-
the
Word
Asiatic Society
heavily
on the
interpertation.
important Buddhist notion of "dependent co-origination" was expounded
two
outstanding scholars in the early part of this century: Louis de
Poussin, Theorie des douze Causes (Gnad, 1913), and Paul Oltramare,
The by
La Vallee
La formule
bouddhique des douze Causes: Son sens originel et son interpretation theologique (Geneve, 1909). Both studies deal primarily with the movement toward origination rather than with the reciprocal forces of "dependent co-origination" are seen in origination
and
alone was found in the
Law,
in
dissolution.
Abhidharma
"The Formulation of
Asiatic Society
meaning of
which
Such an emphasis on the force of origination texts themselves, as pointed out
by
B. C.
the Pratltyasamutpada," Journal of the Royal
(1937), pp. 287-92. Two other brief attempts to clarify the term are found in A. C. Banerjee, "Pratltyasamutpada"
this crucial
IHQ, XXXII (1956), 261-64, and N. Dutt, "The
Place of the Aryasatyas and
the Pratltyasamutpada in Hinayana and Mahayana," Journal of the Bhandakar
Oriental Research Institute (Poona), XI, Pt.
Related to this problem essay
"Kamma,
is
or the Buddhist
II,
pp. 101-27.
an understanding of "karma." Thera Narada's
Law
of Causation," found in B. C.
Law Volume,
though
limited, explanation of the
early Buddhist understanding of karma. In her essay
"Nairatmya and Karman,"
Pt. II (Poona, 1946), pp. 158-75,
found
in Jj)uis
234
is
a clear,
de La Vallee Poussin Memorial Volume (Calcutta, n.d.; pp. 429-64)
,
Bibliography
Maryla Falk
La Vallee Poussin's writings which wrestle with
critically reviews
how Buddhism could hold to a person's responsibility of action without affirming an atman. One more work, specifically on an important elethe problem of
ment of
existence,
is
in Indian Philosophy
Stanislaw Schayer, Contribution to the 'Problem of
Time
(Krakow, 1938).
Nirvana Since the notion of nirvana it
considered in
is
the bases to
is
basic to
any understanding of Indian Buddhism,
the discussions of Buddhist philosophy.
however, have published monographs on
scholars,
Way
all
for interpretation in
this
outstanding
which formed
Western scholarship. La Vallee Poussin wrote
Nirvana (Cambridge, Eng., 1917), and Nirvana
sur I'histoire des Religions, IV.
Two
subject
The
first
(Paris,
1925), Etudes
emphasizes the spiritual significance of
the Buddhist evaluation of the world, while the latter analyzes nirvana in relation to the explicit statements of the various Buddhist schools.
primarily with the expressions of nirvana in early Buddhism.
Both books deal
The second
scholar,
The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana (Leningrad, 1927; reprinted in Indo-Iranian Reprints, VI, The Hague, 1965), which is a discussion of the meaning of nirvana as expressed by various Buddhist schools in
Stcherbatsky, wrote
La Vallee Poussin and Stcherbatsky maintained an academic debate over of nirvana. La Vallee Poussin emphasized its "negative" character, meaning the judged as a nihilistic interpretation by Stcherbatsky, who emphasized and this was India.
that the negative language simply declared the inexpressible character of absolute Being. This debate, seen in the references given in this bibliography, basis
of a short article by La Vallee Poussin, "Nirvana,"
is
also the
IHQ, IV (1928), 347-48.
La Vallee Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, III, No. 2 (July, 1938), 137-60, and Th. Stcherbatsky, "Die drei Richtungen in der Philosophic des Buddhismus," Rocznik Orjentalistyczny, X (1934), 1-37. Two essays published in English by Shoson Miyamoto should also be mentioned; the first is entitled "Freedom, Independence, and Peace in Buddhism," Finally, each scholar affirmed the validity of the other's concern; see L. de
Poussin, "Buddhica,"
PEW, I, No. 4 (January, 1952), 30-40, and II, No. 3 (October, 1952), 208-25. Here Prof. Miyamoto summarizes various renderings of nirvana in "Western languages and compiles a table of seven interpretations of nirvana. The second is "Studies on Nirvana," found in
Commemoration Yolume
60th Birthday (Tokyo, 1960). The
first
study
is
of Dr.
entitled
"Is
Kojun Fukui's
Nirvana Nichts
or Peace"; the second: "Absolute Nirvana and the Limit of Inquiry." also call attention to the
nirvana found in
We
should
thorough analysis of different modern interpretations of
N. Dutt, Aspects
of
Mahayana Buddhism and
Its
Relation to
Hinayana, pp. 141-69, and to a comparison of the Mahayana and Theravada interpretations of nirvana
found on pp. 184-203.
A
classic
early interpretation
235
Emptiness;
A
Study in Religious Meaning
of nirvana in terms of
meaning
its
a religious experience
as
An
Die huddhistische Versenkung (Miinchen, 1918).
Friedrich Heiler,
is
outline of the development
of Western studies on nirvana expressed in early Buddhism
found in G. Richard
is
Walbon, "On Understanding the Buddhist Nirvana," History of No. 2 (Winter, 1966), 300-326.
Religions, V,
Prajfiaparamita
Some
representative studies of Prajndpdramitd
20th century are
as follows:
M. Walleser used
scholars during the
Vajracchedikd-prajndpdramiid
and
to translate portions of the Astasdhasrikd-
by Western
Indian, Tibetan, and Chinese sources in
Prajiidpdramiid, Die Vollkomrnenheit der Erkenntnis (Gottingen, 1914). In 1932,
Matsumoto pubUshed Die Prajndpdramiid Literatur (Stuttgart),
T.
discussed
Sanskrit,
Tibetan,
and
Chinese
of
texts
the
which he
in
Suvikrdntavikrdmi-
Prajndpdramitd. In the same year E. Obermiller published the essay "The Doctrine of Prajfiaparamita
as
Exposed in the Abhisamaydlamkdra of Maltreya," Acta
Orientalia, XI, 1-131, 334-54. Since then
much
further material has been
made
available in English. Giuseppe Tucci, for instance, presented the Sanskrit text,
P rapid pararnitd-
English translation, notes, and Tibetan translation of Dinnaga's
pinddrtha in "Minor Sanskrit Texts on the Prajfiaparamita," Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (1947), pp. 53-75. Also E. J.
from Sanskrit Mahayana
The Career of
scriptures
published
the Predestined Buddhas
Thomas translated short selections as The Perfection of Wisdom:
(London, 1952;
Wisdom
of the East
Series).
The scholar who has published most material on Prajndpdramitd in English is Edward Conze. His The Prajndpdramitd Literature ('s-Gravenhage, 1960), gives and an annotated bibliography of the
a chronological survey of the literature
printed editions, and translations
texts,
now
available.
His translations of the
Prajndpdramitd texts include the following:
Abhisamaydlamkdra. Roma, 1954
(Serie Orientale
Roma, VI). In
"Maitreya's Abhisamayalamkara," East and West, V, No. indicates the importance of this also his
work
for understanding
The Perfection
Slokas. Calcutta, 1958 (Bibliotheca Indica,
Btiddhist
Wisdom
Books:
of
Work No.
The Diamond Sutra and
Wisdom
London, 1961;
Selected Sayings
Pts. II
from
&
III,
in Eight
284, Issue
V, Nos.
Thousand
No. 1578).
the Heart Sutra. London, 1958.
The Large Sutra on Perfect Wisdom^, with Divisions of I,
Sttidies,
5.
Astasdhasrikd Prajndpdramitd:
Pt.
(Oct., 1954),
"Marginal Notes on the Abhisamayalamkara," Sino-Indian
3-4, pp. 21-3
a brief article,
Conze Mahayana thought. See 3
the Abhisamayalamkara.
Madison, 1964.
the Perfection of
Wisdom. London, 195 5.
Vajracchedikd Prajndpdramitd. Roma, 1957 (Serie Orientale Roma, XIII).
236
Bibliography
Two
essays
jnaparamita
by E. Conze
—
of the Prajnaparamita," article,
also
II," Oriental
bear mentioning:
Art,
PEW,
"empty dharmas"
are
III,
III,
No. No.
discussed
"The Iconography of
the Pra-
(1951), 104-9, and "The Ontology 2 (July, 1953), 117-29. In the latter 3
in
terms of the ontological status of
separate dharmas, the psychological attitudes toward them,
and the
logical struc-
made regarding them. A fruitful comparison can be made between the latter and D. T. Suzuki, "The Philosophy and Religion of the Prajnaparamita," found in Essays in Xen Buddhism (Third Series [London, 1934]), ture of statements
pp. 207-88, which stresses the devotional practice involved in the personal attainment of wisdom. Both these articles supercede an earlier and misleading article by S. C. Vidyabhusana, "The Philosophy of the Prajiiaparamita," ]otirnal of the Buddhist Text Society of India, IV (Calcutta, 1896), 9-16.
Life and
Works
of Nagarjuna
Summaries of the problem in identifying the works of Nagarjuna, the
who
historical
Madhyamika philosophy, are found in T. R. V. Murti, Central Philosophy of Buddhism (London, 195 5), pp. 87-91, in R. H. Robinson, "Madhyamika Studies in Fifth-century China," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. person
systematized
School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 1959, pp. 41-52,
V. Ramanan, Nagarjuna's Philosophy
and in K.
Prajfidpdramitd-Sastra
as
(Tokyo, 1966), pp. 25-37. See
Presented
in
also Bu-ston,
Mahd-
the
History of
trans, by E. Obermiller, Pt. I, The Jewelry of Scripture, The History of Buddhism in India and Tibet (Heidelberg, 1931, 1932; Materialien zur Kunde des Buddhismus, 18 & 19). Pt. I, pp. 50-51 deal with
Buddhism {Chos-hbyung) and Pt.
Nagarjuna's
from
,
II,
while Pt.
treatises,
a fourteenth-century a.d.
II,
pp. 122-3
give traditional biographies, as seen
Tibetan Buddhist perspective. Studies of the tra-
ditional Buddhist sources for information about
"Nagarjuna
Filliozat, J.
XXe
et
Nagarjuna include:
Agastya, medecins, chimistes et sorciers," Actes du
Congres International des Orientalistes (Brussels, 1940), pp. 228-31.
Tucci, G. "Animadversiones Indicae: VI.
A
Sanskrit Biography of the Siddhas
and Some Questions Connected with Nagarjuna," Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal,
New
Miyamoto,
S.
Series
XXVI
(1930), 125-60.
"Study of Nagarjuna," unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation,
Oxford
University, 1928. Pp. 1-96. Walleser,
M. "The
Life of Nagarjuna
from Tibetan and Chinese Sources."
Trans, by A. A. Probsthain, Hirth Anniversary Volume. Ed. B. Schindler. London, 1922. Pp. 421-55.
M. Winternitz
gives a
Indian Literature,
II,
summary of
the legends about Nagarjuna in his History of
341-48. See also
M.
Eliade,
Yoga, pp. 402
&
415; E. Lamotte, 2}7
Emptiness:
A
Study In Religious Meaning
Le Traite de
grande vertn de sagesse de Nagarjuna (Louvain, 1944), Vol.
la
x; and R. Gard,
"An
I,
Introduction to the Study of Madhyamika Buddhism," un-
published Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate School, 1951, pp. 99-107, for
more bibliographical information. Two articles, in which the philosopher named Nagarjuna is distinguished from the magician and healer by the same name on historical grounds, are V. W. Karambelkar, "The Problem of Nagarjuna," journal of Indian History, XXX (1952), 21-33, and P. S. Sastri, "Nagarjuna and
XXXI
Aryadeva," IHQ,
(195 5), 193-202.
Nagarjunakonda, which depicts and inscriptions found
facts
IHQ,
Inscriptions,"
Inscriptions
from
(1929-30),
1-37,
there,
is
study of the archaeological
between Nagarjuna and the
N. Dutt, "Notes on
VII (1931), 632-53. Also
J.
the
site
arti-
Nagarjunakonda
Ph. Vogel, in his article "Prakrit
Buddhist Site at Nagarjunakonda," Epigraphia Indica,
a
Buddhists at this
A
a relationship
XX
and a community of
shows evidence of popular worship site.
Various Sanskrit, Tibetan, and Chinese texts which have been credited with
Nagarjuna's authorship are discussed and translated into Western languages in the following:
Vidyabhusana, losophy, Series,
No.
S.
"A
C.
1," Journal
IV (1908), }67-79.
La Vallee Poussin,
MCB,
Descriptive List of "Works on the Madhyamika Phiand Proceedings of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, New
I
L.
de.
"Nagarjuna
et
Vasubandhu
sur
'3
les
natures',"
(1932), 404.
La Vallee Poussin, trois natures,"
L. de.
MCB,
"Le Petit
traite
de Vasubandhu-Nagarjuna sur
les
(1933), 147-61. This gives the Tibetan and Sanskrit
II
texts with a French translation of Svabhdvatrayapravesasiddhi (3 8 verses).
"On
Gard, R.
the Authenticity of the Chung-lun," IBK,
III,
No.
1
(Sept.,
1954), (7)-(13). Gard, R.
No.
2
"On
the Authenticity of the Pai-lun and Shih-erh-men-lun," 1KB,
In the two
last articles the
mentioned in the
In Le Traite de
of Chapters 1-3
la
grande vertn de sagesse de Nagarjuna {Mahapra'ptdpdramita-
found in
1944 and 1949), Etienne Lamotte provides
a translation
of the Kumarajiva's Chinese translation, Ta-chih-tu-lun, with
extensive footnotes. is
author questions Nagarjuna's authorship of the writings
titles.
sdstra), 2 vols. (Louvain,
text
II,
(March, 1954), 751-42.
a
An
illuminating analysis of Nagarjuna's contribution to this
"On
twenty-three page section, entitled
the
Author of 'Ta-chih-
tu-lun,' " of the Introduction to Siivikrdnta-vikrdini Pariprcchd Prajndpdramitdsutra, edited
with introduction by Ryusho Hikato
claims that there are three classes of passages: 1)
which
are additions
by the
translator Kumarajlva, 2)
could not have been made by a foreigner, and 3) 23 8
(Fukuoko,
1958). Hikato
those clearly not Nagarjuna's those of Nagarjuna
which
those questionable passages
Bibliography
which are Ramanan,
better
regarded
Nagarjuna's
as
as
traditionally
in Ndgdrjtma's Philosophy as Presented in the
Sdstra (Tokyo, 1966)
Venkata
K.
has given the material of the Ta-chih-tu-lun through an
of
translation
interpretative
held.
Mahd-Prajndpdramitd-
philosophical
the
work. Ramanan's interpretation
passages
found throughout
the
based on the traditional Buddhist view that the
is
was composed by Nagarjuna. Another important commentary, Akutohhayd, has been translated
entire Sdstra
tirety:
in
its
en-
Die mittlere Lehre des Ndgdrjuna, nach der tibetischen Version iibertragen,
by M. Walleser, Part II of Die buddhistische Philosophie in ihrer geschichtEntwicklung (Heidelberg, 1911). Most scholars today doubt Nagarjuna's authorship of this commentary, as exemplified in the resume of an article by Chotatsu Ikeda, "Is Nagarjuna the author of the A-kuto-Bhaya?" found in Comtrans,
lichen
memoration Volume: the Twenty-fifth Anniversary of the Foundation of the Professorship of Science of Religion in
Tokyo
Imperial University, Celebration
(Tokyo, 1934), pp. 291-93. See also Max Walleser, Die mittlere Lehre des Ndgdrjuna, nach der chinesischen Version iibertragen (Heidelberg,
Committee,
eds.
1912).
Giuseppe Tucci has made chapters lish translation
and IV of the Sanskrit text with Eng"The Ratnavali of Nagarjuna," Journal of
I, II,
of Ratndvali available in
the Royal Asiatic Society, 1934, pp. 307-25; and 1936, pp. 237-53, 423-35.
A
group of four hymns (Catuhstava) has been attributed to Nagarjuna; these hymns are discussed
and translated
La Vallee Poussin, Series
In
XIV
MCB
I
in:
Quatre Odes du Nagarjuna," Le Museon,
L. de. "Les
(1913), pp. 1-18. Here
(1932), 395, and
III
is
found
a
New
Tibetan text with French translation.
(1934), 374, La Vallee Poussin comments on
the problems of the hymns. Patel,
P.
"Catustava,"
Sanskrit restoration
Patel, P. "Catustava,"
for his choice of the four
Tucci, G. ciety,
IHQ, VIII (1932), 316-31 & 689-705. This
from the Tibetan
IHQ, X (1934), 82-89. This hymns in his earlier article.
"Two Hymns
is
a
text. article gives a justification
of the Catuh-stava," Journal of the Royal Asiatic So-
1932, pp. 309-25. This provides the Sanskrit text which was just then
discovered, with an English translation, of
On the Mahdydnavimsaka,
two of the four hymns.
attributed to Nagarjuna, see:
Bhattacharya, V. ed. Mahdydnavimsaka of Ndgdrjuna. Calcutta, 19}!. This gives a reconstructed Sanskrit text,
Tibetan and Chinese versions with an English trans-
lation.
Yamaguchi,
S.
"Nagarjuna's Mahayana-vimsaka," Eastern Buddhist, IV (1926),
169-71. This presents Tibetan and Chinese texts with an English translation and notes.
Text
editions
and
translations
of
Nagarjuna's
Vigraha-vydvartant
are:
239
"
A
Emptiness:
Study in Religious Meaning
Johnston, E. H. and Kunst, A. "The VigrahavyavartanI of Nagarjuna," MCB, IX (1951), 108-51. This is a critical edition of the Sanskrit text. Mookerjee, S. "The Absolutists' Standpoint in Logic," The Nava-Nalanda-
Mahavihara Research Publication. Vol.
I,
Mookerjee,
S.
1-175. This article contains an English translation and
ed.,
Nalanda [1957], pp.
commentary of
the Vigraha-
vydvartanh Robinson, R. "The Vigraha-vyavartanI," unpublished English translation based
on the Johnston and Kunst edition of the Sanskrit text (mimeographed). Tucci, G. "VigrahavyavartanI by Nagarjuna," found
XLIX). This
Series,
in
on Logic from Chinese Sources, Baroda, 1929
dhist Texts
gives a Tibetan text
Pre-Dinnaga
Bud-
(Gaekwad Oriental
with an English translation, and in-
cludes a vrtti (explanation) which, according to Tucci, circulated independently.
Yamaguchi,
S.
Jotirnal Asiatique,
from
CCXV
Tour
(1929), 1-86. This
is
ecarter a
les
vaines discussions,'
French translation, with notes,
Tibetan version.
a
The
"Traite de Nagarjuna,
text of the Mddhyamika-kdrikds
available in Sanskrit, Tibetan,
study
for this
is
is
to be
found only within commentaries
and Chinese. The edition of the Sanskrit text used
Mfdamadhyamakakdrikds
{Mddhyamikasutras)
Prasannapadd, Commentaire de Candrakirti, ed. Louis de
avec
la
(St.
Petersbourg, 1913).
The
la
de Ndgdrjtma Vallee Poussin
translation of the twenty-seven chapters
ing to La Vallee Poussin's edition)
in Candrakirti's
(accord-
Prasannapadd into Western
languages has been achieved in a piece-meal fashion;
they are given below in
chronological order of appearance:
Stcherbatsky, Th. Appendix to Conception of Buddhist Nirvana. Leningrad,
1927: Chs.
& XXV.
I
Schayer,
S.
Ausgewdhlte Kapitel
atis
der Prasannapadd. Krakowie, 1931: Chs. V,
XII-XVL Schayer,
"Feuer und BrennstoflF," Rocznik Orientalistyczny, VII
S.
(1931),
26-52: Ch. X.
Lamotte, E. "Le Traite de
I'acte
de Vasubandhu, Karmasiddhiprakarana,"
MCB,
IV (1936), 265-88: Ch. XVIL
De IX)
:
Jong,
May,
du
Cinq
J.
chapitres de
la
Prasannapada. Paris, 1949 (Buddhica Memoires,
Chs. XVIII-XXII. J.
Candrakirti Prasannapadd Madhyamakavrtti: Douze chapitres traduits
Sanscrit et
du
tibetain,
accompagnes d'une introduction, de notes
et
edition de la version tibetaine. Paris, 1959: Chs. II-IV, VI-IX, XI, XXIII,
d'une
XIV,
XXVI, XXVII. It should also
translation
[1957]. 240
be noted that H. N. Chatterjee gives the Sanskrit verses and English
of Chs. I-V in Mula-Madhyamaka-Karika of Nagarjuna,
Calcutta
Bibliography
Madhyamika Four
which
articles
thought
direct attention to the negative expression in Indian religious
are:
Heimann, B. C.
Dialectic
"The
B.
Lmv Volume,
Radhakrishnan,
Hibbert Journal,
Hindu
Significance of Negation in
Part
II,
Philosophical Thought,"
Poona, 1946, 408-13.
"The Teaching of Buddha by Speech and by
S.
XXXII
Silence,"
The
(Oct., 1933-July, 1934), 343-56.
Raju, P. T. "The Principle of Four-cornered Negation in Indian Philosophy," Review of Metaphysics, VII, No. 4 (June, 1954), 694-713. Wayman, A. "The Buddhist 'Not this, Not this,' " PEW, XI, No. 3 (October,
—
1961), 99-114. Material on the use and development of logic in Buddhism can be found in the publications of the following scholars: Chatterji,
D. C. "Sources of Buddhist Logic, from the
IHQ, IX (1933), 499-502. Dambuyant, M. "La dialectique bouddhique," Revue
traditional point
of
view,"
et
de I'Etranger,
CXXXIX
philosophique de
la
France
(1949), Nos. 7-9, 307-18.
Kajiyama, Y. "Bhavaviveka and the Prasangika School," The Nava-Nalandaed. S. Mookerjee, Nalanda, I [1957], 289-331.
Mahavihara Research Publication,
Kunst, A. "The Concept of the Principle of the Excluded Middle in Buddhism,"
Rocznik Orientalistyczny,
La Vallee Poussin, Schayer,
"Ober
S.
XXI
(1957), 141-47.
L. de. "Bhavaviveka," die
MCB,
(1933), 60-67.
II
Methode der Nyaya-Forschung," found
Moritz Winternitz, Leipzig, 1933, pp. 147-257. Stcherbatsky, Th. Buddhist Logic, 's-Gravenhage, Leningrad, 1930
as
Vol.
XXI,
work was
par
Madame
I.
also translated into
8
(first
published
in
Pt. II of Biblioteca Buddhica).
Stcherbatsky, Th. La theorie de tardifs, traduit
195
in Festschrift
la
connaissance et
la
logique chez
les
bo-uddhistes
de Manziarly et P. Masson-Oursel, Paris, 1926. This
German
as
Erkenntnistheorie
und Logik nach
der
Lehre der spateren Buddhisten, Miinchen, 1924. Tucci, G.
On Some
Aspects of the Doctrines of Maitreya [natha] and Asanga,
Calcutta, 1930.
The following
articles discuss
Buddhist dialectical expression in terms of symbolic
logic:
Nakamura, H. "Buddhist Logic Expounded by Means of Symbolic Logic," IBK, VII, No.
1
(Dec.
1958),
(1)-(21). This
Japanese in the same periodical. Vol. Staal,
J.
F.
Ill,
No.
article 1
was originally published
(Sept.,
"Correlations between language and
in
1954), 223-31.
logic
in
Indian thought," 241
A
Emptiness:
Study in Religious Meaning
Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, XXIII, Pt. I
(1960),
109-22.
"Negation and the law of contradiction in Indian thought; a comparative study," Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, XXV, Staal, J. F.
Pt.
(1962), 52-71.
1
Madhyamika Buddhism
Studies which expUcitly examine the use of dialectic in include:
Madhyamika Philosophy," found
Hatani, R. "Dialectics of the
Buddhism
Tokyo, 1939, Vol.
in Japan,
Mookerjee,
"The
S.
I,
5
Absolutists' Standpoint in Logic,"
Nalanda-Mahavihara Research
Ptiblication, Vol.
found in The Nava-
1-175.
I,
PEW,
Robinson, R. H. "Some Logical Aspects of Nagarjuna's System," No. 4 (January, 1957), 291-308.
We
on
in Studies
3-71.
VI,
should also point out that T. R. V. Murti's The Central Philosophy of Bud-
dhism thoroughly
discusses
topic in Pt.
this
"The
II,
Dialectic
System of
as
Philosophy."
Interpretations of
The most complete religious
thought
is
discussion of
Madhyamika Thought
Madhyamika philosophy
of the Madhyamika System (London, 1955).
Nagarjuna's
of
in relation to Indian
T. R. V. Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism:
dialectic,
though
it
It
is
a clear
and
incisive
considerable
reflects
A
Study
examination
from
influence
Stcherbatsky's view of "emptiness" as depicted in Conception of Buddhist Nirvana,
and
a
not altogether appropriate Kantian concern with epistemology alone in in-
terpreting
102-11,
is
Jacques May's
Nagarjuna's negations.
Madhyamika:
a
critical
a perceptive analysis of
"Kant
review
propos d'un livre recent," Indo-Iranian Journal,
III,
No.
2
et
le
(1959),
Dr. Murti's view.
Three doctoral dissertations must be noted for their investigations of Madhyamika thought.
The
1928, which
first is is
a
Shoson Miyamoto, "Study of Nagarjuna," Oxford University,
survey of the
and teachings of Nagarjuna
life
as
preserved in
both meditation- and devotion-traditions of Mahayana Buddhism. The Appendix (pp. 169-330)
gives a partial translation of Pingala's
Richard A. Gard,
"An
Chung-lun. The second
Claremont Graduate School, 1951. The primary importance of extensive
is
Introduction to the Study of Madhyamika Buddhism,"
information that has
bibliographical
been
collected
this
work
on the
is
the
history,
Madhyamika throughout its development in different The third is Richard H. Robinson, "Madhyamika Studies
philosophy, and texts of countries and languages.
in Fifth-century China," University of
transmission of
Madhyamika from
Chinese understood and accepted
\
242
London, 1959. This study concerns the
India to China and the degree to which the
it.
A
revision of this dissertation will soon be
Bibliography
published
as
Early Madhyamika in India and China by the University of Wisconsin
Press.
Two
monographs which interpret Madhyamika thought are Vicente (Argentina), 1941, and Poul Tuxen, Indledende Bemaerkningen til Bitddbistisk Relativisme, K0benhavn, 1936. Both short
Fatone, El Budismo "Nihilista," La Plata
of these general analyses depict Nagarjuna's dialectic as the negation of every particular entity in order to express the "whole" or "total" that
of
all
particulars. In his article
Visvabbarati Quarterly,
"A
Fresh Appraisal of the
XXVII, No. 3/4 (1961/62), 230-38, K. Venkata Ramanan
emphasizes that the central element in Madhyamika thought use of reason and concepts, not to negate them; thus
and affirmed. Harsh Narain, in "Sunyavada: (Jan.,
1964),
311-38,
the source
is
Madhyamika Philosophy,"
the
reasserts
A
all
is
to
know
the proper
views are likewise negated
Reinterpretation,"
PEW,
argument that "emptiness"
XIII,
is
No. 4
"absolute
form of Absolutism or Absolutistic monism." Four other writers give useful insights into Madhyamika thought through
nihilism rather than a
lating "the middle
way"
to aspects of the Buddhist
re-
tradition:
Dutt, N. "The Brahmajala Sutta," IHQ, VIII (1932), 706-46.
Miyamoto,
S.
"The Buddha's
First
Sermon and the Original Patterns of the
Middle Way," IBK, XIII, No. 2 (March, 1965), (l)-(ll); and "The Conception of 'Abhidharma' Viewed from the Standpoint of 'Ultimate Middle,' " found in
Commemorative Volume: The Twenty-fifth Anniversary of the Professorship of Science of Religion in Tokyo Imperial
the Foundation of University, Tokyo,
1934, pp. 315-21.
Madhyamic Interpretation," Yamaguchi Commemorative Volume,
Nagao, G. M. "The Silence of the Buddha and Studies in Indology and Buddhology:
S.
Its
Kyoto, 1955, pp. 137-51.
Bhikkhu U. Dhammaratana, "Nairatmya Doctrine Light of Sunyavada," unpublished Ph.D.
in Early
dissertation.
Theravada in the
University of Calcutta,
1961.
Two
articles
by La Vallee Poussin on Madhyamika
cyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, ed.
J.
are
Hastings, VIII
"Madhyamaka," En(1916), 23 5-37, and
Madhyamaka," MCB, II (1933), 1-59, additions and corrections: 139-46. The first of these is somewhat limited as a general interpretation; the later, longer, and more incisive article deals specifically with pratitya-samutpdda and tattva as basic concepts for understanding Indian Madhyamika. Regarding the historical development of Madhyamika philosophy, the writings of two other
"Reflexions sur
scholars
le
might be mentioned:
S.
C. Vidyabhusana discusses the place of
the
"The Madhyamika School," Joiirnal of the Buddhist Text Society, 1895, No. 2, pp. 3-9, and No. 3, pp. 9-23, and in "History of the Madhyamika Philosophy of Nagarjuna," Journal of the Buddhist Text Society, 1897, No. 4, pp. 7-20. Richard A. Card suggests some areas of in-
Madhyamika
school in Indian thought in
24}
I
A
Emptiness:
Study in Religious Meaning
Madhyamika
vestigation for learning about the demise of the
the
Madhyamika Decline?" IBK, V, No.
source
XVI,
is
Aryadeva
P. L. Vaidya, Etudes sur
1923; the
Paris,
first
cluding one entitled "Le
et la
A
most directly to
this study, in-
Madhyamapratipad."
Interpretations of "Emptiness" in
Madhyamika Thought
perceptive analysis of the "unconditioned" in Buddhist thought
Andre Bareau's Uabsolu en
philosopbie
"Why Did
et son Cahih'sataka: chapitres VIII-
three chapters pertain
Madhymika
school in
(March, 1957), (10) -(14). Another
2
boiiddhiqiie:
evolution
found
is
de
la
in
notion
d'asamskrta (Paris, 1951); see esp. pp. 174-86 on Nagarjuna's use of "emptiness."
Four
articles of
Madhyamika
in
De
high quality which analyze the meaning of "ultimate emptiness" are:
"Le Probleme de
I'absolu
dans
Philcsophique de la France et de Vttranger,
CXL
Jong,
May,
J.
"La philosophie
J.
(Separate Vol.)
Miyamoto,
S.
S.
Madhyamaka," Revue
(1950), 323-27. vacuite,"
la
Sttidia
Philosophlca
XVIII (1958), 123-37. "Voidness and Middle Way," found in Studies on Buddhism in
Japan, Tokyo, 1939, Vol. Schayer,
bouddhique de
I'ecole
I,
73-92.
"Das Mahayanistische Absolutum nach der Lehre der Madhyamikas,"
Orientalistische Literaturzeitung,
XXXVIII
(193 5), 401-15. In a later article
"Notes and Queries on Buddhism," Rocznik Orjentalistyczny, XI (193 5), 20613, Schayer gives the text, English translation, and explanation of the Tibetan of
version
Madhyamika
On see
in
Madhyamakaratnapradipa
to
illustrate
his
interpretation
of
the
absolute.
the elaboration of the meaning of "emptiness" in Prajndpdramitd thought,
A Note on the Twenty Modes of Sunyata" found CPB, and Eugene Obermiller, "A Study of the Twenty Aspects of Sunyata, T. R. V. Murti, "Appendix:
based on Haribhadra's Abhisamayalamkaraloka
prajnaparamita-sutra,"
and the Pancavimsatisahasrika-
IHQ, IX (1933), 170-87.
A
special
study regarding 119
"good dharmas" discussed in verses 7 and 52-5 5 of the Vigraba-vydvartani
is
H. Johnston, "Nagarjuna's Kst of Ktisala-dharmas," IHQ, XIV (1938), 314-23. Other essays on the meaning of "emptiness" include:
found
in E.
Bhattacharya, A. R. "Brahman IHQ, XXXII (1956), 270-85.
of Sankara
•Conze, E. "Meditations on Emptiness," The
and Sunyata of Madhyamikas,"
Maba
Bodbi,
May 2499/195 5,
pp.
203-11.
Coomaraswamy, A. K. "KJha and other Words denoting
'zero'
in
Connection
with the Metaphysics of Space," Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies, VII (1933-35), 487-97.
La Vallee Poussin, 30-31.
244
L. de.
"The Madhyamika and
the Tathata,"
IHQ, IX (1933),
Bibliography
___^ .
"Notes on (1) Sunyata and (2) the Middle Path," IHQ, IV
(1928), 161-68.
Mukhopadhya, Bbaraia,
"Doctrine of Shunyata in Mahayana Buddhism," Prabuddhi
S.
XLYIU
(1943), 327-29.
Hamilton, C. H. "Encounter with Reality in Buddhist Madhyamika Philosophy," journal of Bible and Religion,
XXVI
pression of the personal significance
1958), 13-22. This
(January,
is
an ex-
found in Nagarjuna's philosophy, based on
T. R. V. Murti's interpretation of emptiness.
"Emptiness" in Eastern Thought
A
very useful analysis that delineates the interpretations to which the use of
such a term teristics
"emptiness" easily
as
falls
prey
is
of Oriental Nothingness," translated
Shin-ichi Hisamatsu,
by R. De Martino
"The Charac-
in collaboration
with Jikai Jujiyoshi and Masao Abe, found in Philosophical Studies of Japan, Vol. II, Tokyo, 1960, pp. 65-97. Quite a diflFerent expression is found in Kitaro Nishida, Intelligibility and the Philosophy of Nothingness: Essays, translated and introduced
by R. Schinzinger
and T. Kojima, Tokyo, 1958. This
is
Three Philosophical
in collaboration
an attempt of
philosophical worlds of the East and West. In one of the essays,
World," absolute nothingness
is
regarded
as
with
I.
Koyama
a philosopher to integrate the
"The
Intelligible
an absolute being without the con-
The reader might also find helpful the essays in Part "The General Sense of Zen," of The Essentials of Zen Buddhism: Selected Writ-
notation of a static reaKty. I
ings of Daisetz T. Suzuki, ed. B. PhiUips
(New York,
1962)
,
for repeated references
to "negative" expressions in a major Far Eastern tradition of Buddhism. Also see
"A
Lin Li Kouan,
propos de
la
Sunyata (La Vide)," La Pensee bouddhique. No.
1940), pp. 8-12, for a summary of the meaning which early and later Buddhism found in the notion of "emptiness." Western writers attempting 5
(Juillet,
to interpret "emptiness" in relation to
Western categories include Betty Heimann,
Indian and Western Philosophy (London, 1937), and Massimo Scaligero, "The
Doctrine of the Void and the Logic of the Essence," East and West, XI (1960), 249-57.
Religious In this section sider
we
Meaning
will point to several
Nagarjuna's use of "emptiness."
works which do not necessarily con-
It also goes
without saying that
many
of
the works already mentioned could be placed together with other studies on religious
rived
meaning. Several works on language and the philosophical implications de-
from the use of language
Cassirer, E.
are:
Language and Myth. Trans, by ,
by R. Mannheim
S.
K. Langer.
Philosophic der symbolischen Formen. as
The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms.
New
Berlin,
New
York, 1946. 1923-29. Trans.
Haven, 1953. 245
A
Emptiness;
Study In Religious Meaning
Flew, A. ed. Essays in Conceptual Analysis. London, 1956. Langer,
K. Philosophy in a
S.
New
Key:
A
Study
Symbolism of Reason,
in the
Rite and Art. Cambridge (Mass.), 1942.
W. M. Language
Urban,
and Reality.
New
York, 1939.
Wittgenstein, L. Philosophische Untersuchungen.
English translation by G. E.
also includes the
New
York, 1953. This volume
M. Anscombe,
as
Philosophical In-
vestigations.
Various philosophers and theologians have dealt with the nature of religious
language and
relation to reality or truth.
its
The writings which have been most
helpful for this study include:
Meland, B. "Religious Awareness and Knowledge," The Review of Religion, III,
No.
(Nov., 1938), 17-32.
1
Moreau,
J. L.
Language and Religious Language. Philadelphia, 1961.
Moses, D. G. Religious Truth and the Relation between Religions. Madras, 1950.
Munz,
P.
Problems of Religious Knowledge. London, 1959.
Ramsey, L T. Religious Language. London, 1957. Slater,
R. Paradox and Nirvana. Chicago, 1951.
Smart, N. Reasons and Faiths:
An
Investigation of Religious Discourse, Chris-
and Non-Christian. London, 1958.
tian
TiUich, P. Systematic Theology, Vol.
A
I.
Chicago, 1951.
third focus in the problem of religious
structures or patterns of religious awareness. lications wrestle
the
meaning has been on describing the
The authors
in the following pub-
with the process and forms of symbolizing used by
man
to express
awesome power of the Divine:
Eliade, (first
M. Cosmos and History. Trans, by W. R. Trask. Mythe de I'eternel retour: archetypes et
published as Le
"History of Religions and a
.
ligions,
I,
No.
(Summer, 1961),
1
New
York, 1959,
repetition,
New Humanism."
1949).
History of Re-
1-8.
New
.
Images and Symbols. Trans, by P. Mairet.
.
Patterns in Comparative Religions. Trans, by R. Sheed. London,
.
The Sacred and
York, 1961.
1958.
W.
R. Trask.
New
Northrop, F.
S.
the Profane:
The Nature
C. The Meeting of East and West.
Otto, R. The Idea of the Holy. Trans, by (first
published in 1917 as Das Heilige).
246
of Religion. Trans,
by
York, 1959.
J.
W.
New
York, 1946.
Harvey.
New
York, 1958
Bibliography
Streng, F. J.
"The Problem of Symbolic Structures
History of Religions, IV, No.
J.
in Religious Apprehension,"
(Summer, 1964), 126-53. Wach, J. A Comparative Study of Religions. Ed. with an introduction by M. Kitagawa. New York, 1958. .
1
Types of Religious Experience:
Christian
and Non-Christian.
Chicago, 1951.
247
INDEX Abhidharma (Abhidhamma)
29,
,
30-3
5,
43-44, 58, 61, 70, 81, 84, 96, 163, 233
Absolute Being. See Reality, Ultimate, and
Asamskria Analogy, use
Anatman
123-27
of,
van Buitenen,
150,
157-60,
165,
167,
204,
also
J.
A.
104
B.,
Candrakirti,
3 5,
181
Cassirer, Ernst, 26, 174, 245
Anitya (anicca, impermanence), 36, 47,
219
reality), 45, 48, 49,
69, 216,
226
Atharvaveda, 115 (Self,
122-25,
165,
194,
196,
203-5,
illusion), 31, 45, 46,
96. See Prapanca
De
Jong,
32,
54,
198,
200, 217
of, 36-39,
59, 85, 91,
169. See also Existence, conditioned
119-21,
135-37
Bodhisattva, 34, 54, 79, 84, 88, 89, 168 as
co-origination.
the eternal energy and sub-
stratum of existence, 58, 117, 122-26;
"powerful creative utterance," 104
Brdhmana, 108-14, 118, 130 Brahmanic sacrifice, 108-14, 117, 118
Pratitya
See
samuipdda
Dharma:
as
existence,
Bareau, A., 9, 231, 244
244
77n., 240,
J.,
Desire (rdga)
(a basis of sense),
Bhagavad-gttd,
Dhydna and Yoga
10, 54w., 77, 85, 230, 231,
E., 9,
Dependent
Avidya (ignorance,
Brahman:
Concentration. See
36,
218-20
Becoming, process
127, 128
236-37, 244
permanent essence), 30,
127,
Chdndogya Upanisad, 124, 125,
Conze,
54, 71, 79, 88, 89
Ayaiana
and Prat-
Christian gospel, 23
Astasahasrika Prajnaparamitd, 45, 46, 53,
Aiman
See Pratityasamutpdda
Cause.
yaya
Asamskrta (unconditioned, non-composite
as
Buddha, 46, 86, 161, 201-3, 214. See
37, 47, 48,
,
209
59,
113
priest,
Brhad-dranyaka Upanisad, 118, 129 Tathdgata
(without-a-'^self ")
84,
59,
Brahmin
51, 189-90,
,
198
"factor" or "element" of
a
30,
31,
37,
143,
150,
183,
192,
222,
223,
226,
227;
or "Teaching," 84,
15
43-57, 201,
63,
58,
202,
213,
"Truth"
as
the
8,
199, 213-15,
220
Bhdtu
(basic element), 32, 54,
56,
188-
89
Dhydna
{jhdna,
contemplation,
tration), 29, 91«.,
Dialectic used 86,
148-50,
by Nagarjuna, 156,
concen-
234 161-63,
31,
3 5,
172,
242
249
76,
241,
Emptiness:
A
Dialectical
structure
Study in Religious Meaning of
appre-
religious
Intention of religious expression, 170-72
Divine action, 108-15 Drsti
(viewpoint,
tive),
50,
philosophical
perspec-
218-20
Duhkha (dukkha,
structure
Intuitive
hension,
of
religious
appre-
106, 122-3 8
105,
pain, sorrow, turmoil),
29, 30, 47, 48, 59, 149, 197
Dutt, Nalinaksha,
Indriya (sense: faculty), 54, 186-87 Insight. See Prajna
hension, 22, 139-52
Jayatilleke, K. N., 95«.,
9, 26, 75n., 79n.,
230,
233
Johnston, E. H., 10, 240, 244
232, 234, 235, 238, 243
Dvadasanga (twelve components), 217-18
Karma (kamma, tion),
Edgerton,
P.,
229, 230, 232
product of ac-
action,
66-68,
150,
85,
70,
168,
192-93, 201-3
Eliade, Mircea, 18, 23, 104, 107, 141, 230,
246
Katha Upanisad, 117, 124, 126, 127 Kathenotheism, 130, 132
Emptiness, awareness of, 161-66
Keith, A. B., 22, 229, 231
"Emptiness," notion of, 46, 64, 69, 72, 75n., 76-80,
84,
92-93,
155-69,
152,
198, 223, 224-27
Emptiness of
all
Enlightenment, Evil. See
161-63.
Duhkha,
30,
Klesa (evil, desire), 67, 71, 161, 204, 210
Knowledge, 4,
220
things, 17, 210,
See
Prajna
also
Klesa, Viparydsa
Existence, conditioned {samskrta) of,
38,
:
"Knowledge"
in Buddhist thought,
59-61, 68, 190-91, 207-9; dis-
233-
34
Knowledge of Truth. arising
103-
religious, 17, 19, 21, 83,
170-80
See
Truth
Krsna, 119, 120, 136, 137
Kunst, A., 10, 240, 241
solution of, 192, 207-9; nature of, 36-
and Samsara
38, 64. See also Prapaiica
Laksana
229, 237
(Noble)
(defining
tic), 44, 71,
"Fire," analysis of, 194-96
Four Holy
59«., 66n.,
de, 22,
75«., 78, 157, 231-35, 238-41, 243, 244
Falk, M., 104, 233, 235 Filliozat, J.,
La Vallee Poussin, L.
Truths
(caturary-
mark
or characteris-
84, 85
Lamotte, Etienne,
9, 10, 22, 26, 54«.,
230,
232, 237, 238
asatya), 73, 212-15
Nagarjuna's use
Logic,
Frauwallner, E., 22, 231
147-50.
See
also
of,
52,
Dialectic
94,
97,
used
by
Freedom. See Release, Spiritual
Nagarjuna Card, R. A., 231, 23 8, 242, 243
"Going
to," analysis of,
Govinda,
181, 184-86
51,
Lama Anagarika,
10, 233
"Logic of convergence," 107, 122, 123 "Logic of language," 102, 105-8 "Logic of mutual exclusion," 107, 108
Grasping. See Trsna
Madhyamaka Karikas (Fundamentals the Middle Way), 10, 30, 32, 44,
Guenther, H, V., 233
181,
Hatani, R., 242
Heimann,
B., 229, 241,
245
Hikato, R., 238
Hisamatsu, Shin-ichi, 162w., 245
182, 240
Mddhyamika (Middle Path
122, 165
Illusion. See
250
Avidya
School),
29,
50,96-97
30, 37,
Mahaprajnaparamita-sastra, 84, 238, 239
Mahay ana, Idolatry,
of 5 8,
32, 96,
168
Maitri Upanisad, 117
May,
J.,
57n., 240, 242,
244
,
Index
Meaning, implicit norm
105-7,
25,
of,
139, 142-44
Meaning,
"Perfect wisdom." See Prajna
Phala
Knowledge,
See
religious.
re-
product), 60, 193, 201-3,
(fruit,
205-7 Phantom-creation, 211, 224
ligious
Dhyana
Meditation. See
Meland,
Potter, K., 229
176, 246
B.,
Mental fabrication
50,
52,
Prapanca
59, 64, 67, 69. See also
S.,
23
Mookerjee,
S.,
59m., 14in., 234, 240,
67,
5,
242
Prapanca (phenomenal extension), 71, 87,
to,"
Prdsangika school,
96-97
3 5,
Pratitya samuipdda ("causal relations, de-
analysis of
Mulamadhyamaka
Kdrikds.
Madhy-
See
amaka Karikas
pendent co-origination"), 37, 147, 150;
"empty,"
as
Murti, T. R. V.,
9,
22,
50«.,
76, 86n.,
et fascinans,
101,
138 structure
58-67,
73,
166-69,
92,
215, 234-35
Pratyaya (conditioning cause), 60, 183-
148, 237, 242, 244
Mysterium tremendutH Mythical
in-
spiritual
82-97, 159-63
217. See also Mental fabrication
"Going
See
of.
17, 29, 30, 38,
73, 79, 81, 84, 85, 164, 236, 237
Moses, D. G., 172, 246 analysis
wisdom,
(paiind,
Prajndpdramita literature, 29, 30-3
237, 242-44
Miyamoto,
Motion,
Prajna sight),
Methodological assumptions, 24, 25 5,
109-12
Prajdpati,
(processes),
of
religious
appre-
84 Prayer.
See
Purusa:
as
Word pure
consciousness,
145;
as
primordial man, 132-33
hension, 105-21
Purva (previous, "pre-existent Reality"), 193-94, 196. See also Time
Nagao, G. M., 243 Nagarjuna,
28-40, 43,
20,
Nakamura, H.,
156m., 23
44,
237-40 Radhakrishnan,
241
3,
Negation. See Dialectic used by Nagarjuna
Nirvana
("dying out" of egotism), 30,
45, 69-81, 151, 161, 164-66, 200, 201,
plicit
of meaning." See Meaning,
norm
Ramanan, K. Reality,
V., 95m., 237, 239, 243
phenomenal.
Samsdra
See
and
Samskrta
204, 208, 213, 215-17, 235, 236
"Norm
229, 230, 241
S.,
Raju, P. T., 230, 241
im-
of
Reality, Ultimate, 102, 106, 108, 123-26,
132,
136-38,
133,
147,
162,
172.
See also Asamskrta
237
Reason.
231, 234
Release,
Obermiller
E., 236,
Oltramare,
P.,
Origination of arising
of;
existence.
See
Existence,
101,
106«.,
164-66,
Nagarjuna's
Logic,
spiritual
200,
{muchanta, 216.
See
138,
conceptual expressions, R.gveda, 131-3
141, 246
also
91,
of words.
See
"Logic
of mutual exclusion"
Past-present-future, denial of. See Purva,
Kdla Path, Buddhist, 29, 214
of
nirvana
17-19,
21,
F., 9, 38, 64,
231-34
Rhys Davids, T. W.,
26, 232
Ritual activity. See Brahmanic sacrifice
Robinson, R. H., 10, 83, 237, 240, 242 I^ta
(cosmic order), 131
Ritpa (form),
22
5
Rhys Davids, (Mrs.) C. A. Pain. See Dithkha
Paradigmatic use
use
moksa)
Religious awareness, 15 5-57, 170-80; and
and PrafJfyasamutpada
Otto, Rudolf, 23, 26,
See
5 5,
71, 79, 187
251
A
A
Emptiness:
Study in Religious Meaning Tattva ("what actually is"), 36, 71, 72,
Sacred/profane distinction, 107-8
Samagri
aggregate),
(conjunction,
65,
Samsara
(existence-in-flux),
45, 48,
39,
49, 65, 74-76, 151, 165, 169, 196
Samskdra
things),
Samskrta
198, 212,
188,
83,
forces
to producing existing
that contribute
(composite
217, 218
products,
condi-
tioned existence), 47-50, 69, 74, 19092, 215, 216, 226
Sarvastivada,
S.,
9,
56«., 76, 23
5,
world-
(conventional,
practical
samvritti-satya),
ensconced,
9
94,
5,
144 174
religious, 17, 101-3, 138, 172,
Ultimate
martha-satya)
240, 241,
50, 205.
Trsna (tanha, craving), 59, 68, 203, 217 Truth,
Truth,
Satapatha-Brahmana, 109-14, 135 Schayer,
246
See also Pilrva
Truth,
34
3 3,
I
18,
Time, process of (Kdla), 49,
elements,
(conditioned
Theravdda, 29, Tilllch, Paul,
Samsarga (unification), 61, 198-99
(highest
para-
truth,
18, 22, 23, 33, 39, 40,
,
44, 84, 86, 87, 94-97, 139, 145, 149,
171-73, 178, 179
244
Atman
Self. See
Truth, two kinds
Skandhas (components of
R.
L.,
person), 32,
a
220
54, 187-88, 200, 209,
Unconditioned
174, 246
Upanisad,
Smart, N., 175, 246 170-73, 176, 177
V pad ana
242
Staal, J. F., 241,
See Asamskrta
reality.
130.
123,
See
also
Brhad-
aranyaka, Chdndogya, Maitri
15 5-60,
Soteriology,
39-40, 144-46
of, 36,
TuccI, G., 236, 237, 239-41
Svabhdva
Self-existent being. See
Slater,
204, 209
Theology, 23
205-7
Stcherbatsky, T., 9,
helps 22,
54w.,
5 3,
167,
grasping
(acquiring,
produce
which
awareness of
the
per-
sonality), 200, 204, 218
234, 235, 240, 241 Strawson, P.
F.,
139-41
Yia negativa, 146
Structures of religious apprehension, 1013,
105-8, 151, 152 See
Siinyata.
ments), 10, 32, 87, 92, 144, 163, 221,
"Emptiness,"
notion
of
240
Suzuki, D. T., 232, 234, 237, 245
Svabhdva
Yigraha-vydvartani (Averting the Argu-
reality),
(self -existent
Viparydsa (errors), 210-12 44,
38,
58, 59, 62, 63, 73, 81, 82, 87, 88, 92,
143,
149,
183,
191,
199,
200,
207,
Svdiantrika school,
Symbolizing
3 5,
process.
Wach,
Wayman,
96, 97
Structures
See
of
36, 80»., 166, 231, 233,
Tathdgata ("thus gone"
=
234
234, 241
A.,
Wisdom. See Prajnd
Word J.,
170, 171w., 246
18,
"Wittgenstein,
religious apprehension
Takakusu,
J.,
Walleser, M., 236, 237, 239
209-11, 214, 221-24
Ludwig,
(Vac), power
104,
149
the Buddha;
252, 239, 240
the fully completed), 46, 47, 69, 73-
Yamaguchi,
74, 78-79, 86, 209-10
Yoga, 104, 126, 145
252
139-42, 246
of,
S.,
115,
116,