Yoritomo and the Founding of the First Bakufu: The Origins of Dual Government in Japan 9780804780100

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Yoritomo and the Founding ofthe First Bakufu

Yoritomo and the Founding of the First Bakufu THE

ORIGINS

GOVERNMENT

OF

DUAL

IN JAPAN

jeffrey P. Mass

STANFORD STANFORD,

UNIVERSITY PRESS CALIFORNIA I999

Stanford University Press Stanford, California © 1999 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University Published with the assistance of the Japan Fund of the Institute for International Studies, Stanford University Printed in the United States of America data appear at the end of the book

CIP

For Edwin B. Lee, my first teacher of Japanese history

Contents

Preface

IX

Note on Citations

XIV

Introduction

PART ONE

JAPAN

BEFORE 1180

I.

The Taira Moment

13

2.

The Missing Minamoto

37

PART1WO

THE

GENPEI

WAR

3·

The East on the Move

4·

Shugo and]ito Imagined

PART THREE

THE

DUAL

102

POLITY

5·

The Four Corners

133

6.

A Place in the Sun

r68

PART FOUR

CONSTABLES AND

MANAGERS

7·

A Shugo in Every Province

191

8.

The Indiscipline of]ito

225

Epilogue Bibliography Index

Preface

When the first edition of this book appeared twenty-five years ago, a field of Japanese history before 16oo scarcely existed in the West. To be sure, the books by Shinoda (1960), Hall (1966), and Varley (1967, 1971) were there to point the way and to inspire the kind of confidence that would be required. But it was not until a cohort of Ph.D. students completed their degrees during the early 1970s that a field made up of specialists with similar interests really came into being. The multiauthor volume Medieval japan: Essays in Institutional History (1974) announced most of the new scholars to the profession. A few of their dissertations were soon converted into books and articles, and one of the new books was my "Warrior Government in Early Medieval japan: A Study ofthe Kamakura Bakufo, Shugo, andjito (1974). The present study (published in the eight hundredth year following Yoritomo's death) is a total reworking of that original volume. A quarter of a century ago, I had been intent on accomplishing three objectives. First, I wanted to tell the story of the establishment ofJapan's first shogunate from the perspective of contemporary primary sources. As had become clear, these were the materials most relied on by Japanese scholars. Second, I wanted to juxtapose my original research with the very best of the scholarship emanating from Japan. And third, I wanted to contribute to the surge of interest in the pre-16oo epoch that was then starting to build in America. Now, so much later, much in that original volume seems out of date, beginning with the title itself In 1974, I equated the Kamakura Bakufu with Japan's first "warrior government" and the Kamakura era with the "early medieval" period. Though both phrases were wholly uncontroversial at the time, they now represent the guiding assumptions that are most in need of

X

PREFACE

rethinking. I do not mean that the new shogunate of Yoritomo was not a regime of the provincial elite or that it was not, at the level of the most obvious, a government of "warriors." However, when we view the new authority from the angle ofhow it conceived of itself and how it functioned, the military emphasis now seems to explain very little. In other words, we have here an organization that mostly repudiated the use of force, stressing mediation, persuasion, and procedure instead. In its maturity, the Kamakura Bakufu was remarkably noncoercive yet still somehow effective, with the recording of verdicts, following elaborate court trials, as the ultimate sanction. In a sense, Kamakura waged a war of words against violence and aggressive behavior throughout the era, as it sought to transmute what it saw as the most threatening forms of human competition into verbal exchanges in the courtroom. At any rate, having written so extensively on the judicial temper of the Kamakura age (The Development ofKamakura Rule, 1979), I could no longer find much comfort in a title whose emphasis was on "warrior government." Instead, I felt I needed to emphasize a new regime's search for a place in a very old polity, which led it to defend the ancient order of which it now became a part. As the best alternative to the deployment of armed men, it decided instead to deploy patience on behalf of just settlements. Kamakura's goals, then, were the antithesis of a militarization of authority, and even its greatest invention, the office of jito was not, in its essence, a military commissiOn. The core of the new book lies in its rigorous reassessment of the Genpei War experience and its aftermath, the era ofMinamoto Yoritomo (1147-99), who bequeathed to Japan not merely the shogunate but its unique CourtBakufu "dual polity." In terms of approach, I have sought to view the world of the n8os as Yoritomo himself might have seen it, while acknowledging the obvious limitations on what we are able to recapture. Ironically, what Yoritomo knew and understood is both more and less than the data at our disposal today. Whereas he had the knowledge of what was reported to him daily, we have the accumulated traces from the whole of Japan from that period as well as from earlier and later. Like him, therefore, we have an abundance of information to sift through and analyze, though the respective experiences are obviously very different. We know that much that could not be corroborated reached Kamakura, requiring Yoritomo to plan for each to-

PREFACE

Xl

morrow in a context of uncertainty. In our own case, much of what has come down to us is fragmentary or distorted, though it is rarely instantly clear what is true and false; the task of reconstruction is a minefield of easyto-make wrong steps. To capture the flavor of this dilemma, it is worth mentioning that the well-known painting ofYoritomo that adorns several of my books has recently been declared-though without conclusive proof-to be of Ashikaga Tadayoshi, a major historical figure of a century and a halflaterP Or, again, the large body of documents traditionally credited to Yoritomo's authorship or inspiration has now been interrogated anew, with-dare I say it?-another division into the trustworthy and suspect. 2 With the past literally changing before our eyes, the current book, almost necessarily, is different in substance and emphasis from my effort of a generation ago. Yet the main features of the era arguably seem closer on this second visit. In particular, I now see a more modest achievement by Yoritomo in the n8os, though one that is still hugely impressive given the constraints and obstacles that confronted him. From a different angle, though I once thought ofYoritomo as having accomplished so much more, a lesser figure might have failed utterly whereas he succeeded. Or again, if Yoritomo was the greatest person of his age, this distinction was owing to the fact that he did not achieve everything that was once credited to him. If the rationale for a new book lies in the recasting of certain large themes, a number of other considerations have also influenced me. For example, when I completed the original manuscript in 1972, the great compendium of documents on the period, the Kamakura ibun, was only in the earliest stages of its publication. Necessarily, then, I was obliged to work with numerous older collections of sources, which I proceeded to cite extensively. These references had the value of introducing to readers the range of already published materials, many of which resided unused in U.S. research libraries. However, the Kamakura ibun is now virtually complete in fifty volumes, allowing an easy shift of priorities. The utilization of a single, inclusive series will greatly facilitate access to sources by the current generation of readers.

r. Yonekura Michio, Minamoto Yoritomo zo-chinmoku no shiJziJga. 2. Hayashi Yuzuru, "Minamoto no kao ni tsuite." For earlier stages in the debate, see Kurokawa Takaaki, Minamoto Yoritomo monjo no kenkil, shiryo hen, and a subsequent critique of that work by Uejima Ariuji: "Jingoji no Minamoto Yoritomo monjo."

XU

PREFACE

A rewritten edition affords yet another opportunity-to correct multiple categories of errors, ranging from misreadings of Japanese sources, to page references that, embarrassingly, were never completed ("see p.ooo"), to the misspelling of both old names and new ones. As I have discovered, the only way to make a book young again is to redo it entirely. Then, too, what was a first book in 1974 became a first volume in a series, taking on, at least potentially, an enhanced importance. For that reason, I have elected to refer "ahead" to fuller treatments of topics in volumes that have appeared since 1974, and I have also cited any subsequently published translations of documents (in KB, DKR, and LA!; see the note on citations). Finally, the appearance of this new book with Stanford University Press means that the series will now bear a single imprint. Needless to say, the persons whom I thanked so long ago deserve to be mentioned again, though their circumstances, in so many cases, have obviously changed. Much like our historical interpretations (or the bells of the Gion Shrine), impermanence resonates here vividly. Then as now, Professor John Whitney Hall ofYale, who died in 1997, must be mentioned first. At the time of this work's initial version as a Ph.D. thesis, Professor Hall was a deeply involved and sympathetic mentor, and he remains, as he always will, my greatest inspiration. In Japan, I continue to owe a great debt to Professor Seno Seiichiro, who was then at Tokyo University's Historiographical Institute, and is now a senior professor at Waseda's Faculty of Letters. Every week for almost two years I studied old documents with him, and the trajectory of my approach to historical research owes much to that experience. The person to whom this new book is dedicated is Edwin Borden Lee, the teacher (at Hamilton College) who first introduced me to Japan. We have been friends for the whole of my adult life, and I have long wanted to register my indebtedness to him in some appropriate way. Since he was my first teacher of]apanese history, I have thought it fitting to have his name appear on the dedication page of this new version of "Volume r." My colleagues and friends from those early days certainly deserve special mention too, in particular Paul Varley, Cappy Hurst, Neil Kiley, Gordon Berger, and Pres Wintersteen; only the last in this group has been lost to our profession. The same is of course sadly true ofTom Swann, who was not

PREFACE

Xlll

only my closest friend from those formative graduate years, but an incomparably dedicated professional who influenced me in so many ways. Finally, I need to express my gratitude to my three institutions-to Yale for its financial support even beyond the Ph.D., providing me with the released time (1971-73) to work on \.Vttrrior Government; to Stanford, whose faculty I joined in 1973, and whose history department encouraged me to complete the project and get on with the next one; and to Hertford College, Oxford, where, in recent years, I have been able to do so much of the writing of this latest, and, I should say, for me, final version. I leave it to others to rewrite the extraordinary history ofJapan in the second half of the twelfth century.

Note on Citations

The following abbreviations are used in the notes:

AAJ

Antiquity and Anachronism in japanese History

AK

Azuma kagami

DKR

The Development ofKamakura Rule, n8o-I25o

HI

Heian ibun

LAl

Lordship and Inheritance in Early Medieval japan

KB

The Kamakura Bakufo: A Study in Documents

KI

Kamakura ibun

WG

"Warrior Government in Early Medieval japan

Most documents are cited in full in the notes, usually to HI or KI. The exceptions are documents that I have translated, which are cited to where they appear-DKR, KB, or LA!. All secondary sources are cited in the notes in an abbreviated form (author, title, and pages); publication data are contained in the bibliography. Primary sources are arranged by volume title in the bibliography, rather than by compiler.

Yoritomo and the Founding ofthe First Bakufu

Sea of Japan

'o (t

HO N H O

a

TSUSHI\V,

Pacific Ocean

J

The provinces of Japan in the 1330s

Introduction

In the mid-twelfth century, the dominant authority over both the government and the land of Japan was held by a civil aristocracy consisting of the imperial house, noble families, and Buddhist and Shinto religious heads. Building atop a great state structure that had been established in the eighth century, 1 this narrow elite ruled from a magnificent capital, presiding over rank and title hierarchies that embraced central and local officialdom. For approximately half a millennium, these seemingly effete courtiers were able

r. The most authoritative and challenging new account is Joan R. Piggott, The Emergence of japanese Kingship. Also useful are selected chapters in Delmer Brown, ed. The Cambridge History ofjapan, vo!. r. See also Bruce Batten, "Foreign Threat and Domestic Reform: The

Emergence of the Ritsuryo State;" idem, "State and Frontier in Early Japan: The Imperial Court and Northern Kyushu, 645-n85," chaps. 1-2; Wayne Farris, Population, Disease, and Land in Early japan, 645-900; and Paul Wheatley and Thomas See, From Court to Capital: A Tentative Interpretation of the Origins of the japanese Urban Tradition, 103-58. In fact, the scholarly literature in English on early Japan is now quite vast, including a number of articles by Koreans and Japanese.

2

INTRODUCTION

to immobilize the social hierarchy, and thereby perpetuate their hegemony with, for us, surprising ease. 2 The key to this continued dominance lay in changes that eroded the public essence of imperial government without weakening its grip. Fundamentally, a bureaucratic monolith came to be absorbed and distributed among its leading officials, who used their offices much like poker chips to bid for private wealth. Admission to the game remained carefully restricted, with only persons of the most privileged ancestries eligible to participate. On the one hand, ranking aristocrats were colleagues meeting in council to decide affairs of state, while on the other, they were now serving as the heads of competing patronage blocs with privatized offices at their disposaP In both cases, common goals and a common background precluded any involuntary seepage of real authority to social inferiors. In addition to the privatization of the central bureaucracy, a parallel process gradually unfolded in the provinces. However, courtiers enjoyed the upper hand here too, since they, or those working for them, controlled the flow of patronage. The prices they exacted for their support were not especially heavy, allowing men of local power and wealth to emerge in the provinces. Yet success of this type did not lead to a condition of growing autonomy since much of the influence enjoyed by locals continued to derive from central sources. In this world, the more lucrative the office or privilege enjoyed beyond the capital, the greater the likelihood that the assignment, and its protection, had come from Kyoto. As a consequence, there was little chance of a premature estrangement developing between the capital and the countryside, so that powers could be devolved upon provincial clients without much risk to their patrons. Since social disesteem was the inevitable condition of even the most powerful of provincial men, the latter remained fixed in the middle range of the central-to-local hierarchy.

2. The length (indeed, the lengthening) of the Heian period has become a subject of increasing interest in recent years. See my own AA] and, especially, Karl Friday, Hired Swords: The Rise ofPrivate Wtirrior Power in Early japan; and Mikael Adolphson, "Monks, Courtiers, and Warriors in Premodern Japan: The Secular Power of Enryakuji in the Heian and Kamakura Eras." 3· The standard treatments of this subject remain G. Cameron Hurst III, Insei: Abdicated Sovereigns in the Politics ofLate Heian]apan: ro86-n8s; and Cornelius J. Kiley, "Property and Political Authority in Early Medieval Japan."

INTRODUCTION

3

The gradual reduction of public domain was another expression of the general trend toward privatization. As the concept of private property grew, it fueled one of the Heian period's major developments. From the late eleventh century, the greatest of the central families and religious institutions began purposefully to build up blocs of privately owned estates. By soliciting local commendations in return for the promise of protection from provincial tax collectors, the central elite managed to gain control of domains called shoen, for which they then sought to acquire legal immunities. To the extent that the government's tax collectors and constabulary were now denied entrance to shoen, these latter were becoming true enclaves of private property, beyond the state's purview in any public sense. 4 Two categories of administration over land had evolved by the early twelfth century: the shoen, which were fashioned into the income-producing domains of their capital-based proprietors, and the kokugaryo (literally "provincial holdings"), which were now acknowledged as the increasingly private spheres of provincial governors. 5 Eventually, the provinces themselves came to be reconfigured as "proprietorships" (chigyokoku), with distribution controlled by the dominant policymaking group at court and with the resulting configuration representing the rough balance of power at any moment. Since recipients acquired the right to nominate provincial governors from among their own allies and clients, public taxes came openly to be channeled into private coffers. Yet it was the shoen pattern that tended, in most areas, to prevail, since the arrangements associated with it seemed to promise greater permanence, and since the interests of the main parties seemed so well served. 6 In return for the commendation of small public-sector units, central aristocrats would expedite their removal from the purview of governors and would allow their

4· Though we still await a "standard" treatment of the shoen, the literature on the subject is now substantial. A selection of studies that can be recommended includes the following: Kudo Keiichi, "Shoen"; Oyama Kyohei, "Medieval Shoen"; Elizabeth S. Sato, "Proprietors and Peasants: Oyama Estate in Early Medieval Japan"; and Thomas Keirstead, The Geography

ofPower in Medieval japan. 5· For kokugaryo, see Nagahara Keiji, "Land Ownership under the Shoen-Kokugaryo System''; and Peter J. Arnesen, "Suo Province in the Age ofKamakura." 6. The classic elaboration of this phenomenon is Cornelius J. Kiley, "Estate and Property in the Late Heian Period."

4

INTRODUCTION

donors to assume greater control over dues collection, policing, and other aspects of local government. Conversely, however, the shoen came to be registered as the private holdings of their central recipients, who would henceforth draw revenues from them and exercise overall jurisdiction. Moreover, since the proprietors were virtually always absentee owners, they could multiply their holdings by replicating these transactions, with portfolios coming to be distributed across many provinces. In this way, the imperial realm was progressively divided into an expanding complement of shoen, which was concentrated in the hands of a few dozen of the country's most privileged aristocrats and clerics. Moreover, each of the new proprietors constructed an administrative apparatus by which to coordinate his expanding empire, lending weight to a perception that it was the elite of Kyoto who owned, truly, the entire country. Courtiers needed to offer attractive packages to prospective local clients. That is, mutually acceptable bases for agreements had to be found. In time, a condition of shares of authority started to take shape, with the parties perceived as holding rights to portions of joint enterprises. The notion of shares within shoen came to be expressed by a new lexicon of entitlements, known to historians as the shiki system? Basically, shiki were conceived of as "belonging" to mutually exclusive tiers of social eligibles, a concept that effectively separated the classes. In this way, courtiers and clerics were able to possess a monopoly of the proprietorships, with no one in the middle social range capable of aspiring to that status. At the same time, provincials at the top of that range monopolized the main managerial tides, for which proprietors, in turn, were themselves ineligible. Competition was thus restricted to interests on an intraclass basis, which worked to immunize those of the highest ranks from being pressed from below. Of course, shoen were also expanses of territory identified by their boundaries, whose markers could be, and often were, adjusted in various ways. Not only did shoen expand and contract in size, but they also were differentiated internally by a variety of criteria. In this way, they represented multiple interests with potentially different historical experiences, so that several officials typically held different types of authority and rights over them. And 7· Asakawa Kan'ichi introduced this subject to a Western audience; see his collected papers in

Land and Society in Medieval japan.

INTRODUCTION

5

thus despite the fact that shiki are most easily grasped as a hierarchy of titles, they ought, more accurately, to be represented as a pyramid, with the middle segment within each shoen interconnecting with adjoining segments. In other words, shiki were cleaved both vertically and horizontally, and bound people as much they separated them. 8 Parallel to the shoen as a form of top-down landholding was a concept of local hierarchy that favored those who were highest on the imperial scale. Families with strong central connections and genealogies linking them to the capital enjoyed a huge advantage over houses that were strictly indigenous. The former came to hold virtually all of the major positions in the governor's headquarters, and they were also in the best position to gain extensive managerships in shoen. To this social and economic dominance was then added military supremacy, as there developed a noticeable increase in local lawlessness over time. Armed units started to be formed in the provincial and district headquarters, though these are not simply to be thought of as incipient warrior lordships. Contrary to the views of earlier historians, there was no vacuum of authority in the countryside that warriors might simply occupy, much less an emergent "feudalism" that foreshadowed Kyoto's downfall_9 Throughout, the leaders of provincial society remained strictly limited in their goals, to the point that it is rather the obstacles that confronted them that command our attention. 10 The leading houses were unable to transcend the outer limits of the rights that had been conferred on them, which left them in a state of dependency whose limits were defined essentially by courtiers. Not only did they have no chance to become an estate-owning class in their own right, but they remained, conceptually and institutionally, blocked in what they might do for their "own men." Moreover, a majority of the leading families in the provinces bore clan names that became a further impediment to their autonomy. The names were Taira, Minamoto, and Fujiwara, all of central origin and all increasingly represented across the breadth of the whole country. The names identified 8. For an elaboration, see my "Of Hierarchy and Authority at the End ofKamakura." 9· The classic expressions of the earlier view appear in the works of Asakawa, Reischauer, and Sansom. All studies published since the I970s have been highly critical of it, beginning, perhaps, with the original edition of this book (WG). 10. See, e.g., Peter Arnesen's evocative tide: "The Struggle for Lordship in Late Heian Japan: The Case of Aki," or my "The Missing Minamoto in the Twelfth Century Kanto."

6

INTRODUCTION

their holders as being descendants of ancestors from the capital, and thereby linked them inextricably to the old order. Thus there were Taira, Minamoto, and Fujiwara, who sank roots in specific areas, as well as local persons who used their ingenuity to coopt these names falsely-to all went the luster of a "distinguished" origin. This integration with the center was then strengthened further by supra-provincial lineages that came to be recognized for their national service. Eventually a single trunk line was acknowledged for the Taira and Minamoto especially, each with a chieftain who usually resided in Kyoto. The heads of these main lines were rotated through a sequence of provincial governorships, and they were also appointed, when needed, to regional command posts. Their bridging role thus helped to narrow the gulf between Japan's two spheres, making them one of the ultimate buttresses for the Heian order. In historical terms they were therefore anything but subversive, contrary to long-established conventional thinking. The first two chapters of this book treat the Taira and the Minamoto during the twelfth century. The Taira, as the leading clients of the imperial family, enjoyed an upward trajectory, which was then capped by the emergence of Kiyomori, one of Japanese history's most intriguing figures, in the II50S. Kiyomori's career has been the subject of intense scrutiny though with little consensus-he was originally thought of as Japan's first warrior hegemon, and then, in a strikingly opposite view, as its last ruling courtier. A third interpretation has emphasized a career that went through traceable phases, with the peak of his power coming near the end of his life rather than earlier. I basically adopt this view in chapter 1, in which Kiyomori is depicted as chronically handicapped by his family's century-long clientage under the imperial house. Meanwhile, the main line of the Minamoto had experienced a sequence of setbacks during that same period, leaving it in disarray for much of the twelfth century. Not only were its chieftains of much less than heroic mettle, but its inability to sustain family coherence became endemic. The experiences of the Minamoto during this entire era seemed to weaken any realistic prospects for renewal. In both these chapters, the common thread is our effort to understand the conditions that contributed to the outbreak and nature of the Genpei War of n8o-85.

INTRODUCTION

7

On the surface, the fighting that began in n8o involved a confrontation between kin-based armies, the one (the Taira) in power, the other (the Minamoto) challenging from without. However, the conflict was never quite the bloodletting of later legend, nor was it the product of an intense rivalry that had been building for centuries. 11 The Taira and Minamoto labels masked tensions that were mostly local, and chapter 3 describes a civil war of mostly small engagements. As it happened, Yoritomo was his family's first chieftain of talent during the twelfth century, and it was he who now came to shepherd Japan into a new phase. In less than a generation, he oversaw the first stage of a shift from a hitherto hegemonic court to a countryside that now began to apply pressure in new ways. From a base area in the east that had to be constructed virtually from nothing, Yoritomo announced a regional authority that would be built upon patents of confirmation issued by himself and also on the Minamoto revival that he would spearhead. By promising to guarantee directly the rights and offices of the men who would pledge to him, he was smashing the age-old notion that only Kyoto, as the home base of the aristocrats, might confirm and certifY. A nimble experimenter, Yoritomo moved quickly to establish a headquarters and to consolidate his position, all the while seeking to identifY policies that would win him support locally. Within months he was the virtual master of the east, though it was events outside that region that created a new situation. Men from the central and western parts of the country now started calling themselves "Minamoto," using the name to register gains against traditional local rivals and also, more portentously, against absentee landlords; it all happened without any prompting from Kamakura. From this point forward, Yoritomo was a national figure in the making. Yet even after making peace with the court, he remained bunkered in Kamakura, electing not to travel to Kyoto and thus imperil his autonomy. In the event, a contradictory situation was created, since many of those joining him sought his support for claims that were increasingly destabilizing. As Yoritomo soon realized, he would have to rein in the exuberance of his own men, whose numbers continued to expand dangerously. Controlling the men who were calling themselves "Minamoto" took up more and more of his time. n. See my "The Mixing of Past in Present," in M].

8

INTRODUCTION

Though the Taira were defeated in the third month of 1185, many of the most flagrant troublemakers were on the side of the victors. In search of a formula to deal with this problem, Yoritomo now sought to coopt a phenomenon that was wholly new. Chapter 4 will describe the progress of the emerging concept of jito and the process by which it came to be identified with Kamakura in 1184 and 1185. Although this chapter also treats the antecedents of the post of shugo, the origins of these two titles are actually unrelated, and their linking is a product of Kamakura's own later chronicle, the Azuma kagami. Having come to represent an unprecedented notion of locally-generated power, the jito concept was claimed by Yoritomo for his own use in late 1185. Denominating it a shiki and distributing it to the most expectant and/or deserving of his men, he now sought to create a reward and control device that would anchor them firmly to the traditional land system. Persons who were jito would constitute a provincial elite while simultaneously being burdened with managerial duties on behalf of central estate owners. In effect, Yoritomo was charging his men with delivering on his promise to restore national order, and making his own government responsible for their adherence to this mandate. The way Kamakura went about its business now and for the next century derived from its having to contain its own jito. As Yoritomo soon realized, to be a peacekeeper required a willingness to be a taskmaster, though not to such an extent as to raise too much disquiet among his own men. He thus found himself moving in the direction of judicial solutions to problems, which meant allowing persons who faced charges some reasonable chance to defend themselves. Though never prepared to surrender his own discretionary authority in such matters, Yoritomo sought to inculcate a respect for the laws and customs of the past, and this led him to uphold traditional hierarchies and to seek to define his own regime's limits. He would, in short, have to commit himself to bolstering the jurisdictions of both Kamakura and Kyoto. Known to historians as the "dual polity," the dyarchy thereby initiated became Yoritomo's most enduring legacy. In the matter ofKamakura's own security there was still much to be done. The constancy of the men who called themselves Minamoto needed to be tested, and some explicit designation invented by which to identify them. A process of adding and subtracting followers continued piecemeal for a while,

INTRODUCTION

9

until a new idea took its place alongside that ofjito as one of the era's breakthroughs. In the 1190s, the concept of a countrywide complement of"Minamoto housemen'' under the term gokenin was devised, with individual contingents under the direction of a provincial officer. In this way, Kamakura established for itself a permanent national presence, with men in its service now located in every province. Chapter 5 analyzes the progress of the several programs that Yoritomo devised to consolidate his regime. In the meantime, the holders of}ito posts were pushing the limits of their new assignments, inducing the country's two governments to deploy resources in a joint effort to control them. In the first place, the appointments themselves were limited to two basic types, each intended to be minimally disruptive. Either awardees had their own prewar managerships upgraded to }ito status, or they were granted tides that had been renamed for offices confiscated from the Taira. Either way, recipients were expected to be staunch upholders of local custom. However, since }ito were the first managers not subject to the direct authority of estate owners, many sought to exploit their new immunity, inducing proprietors to petition Kamakura for redress. Chapter 6 treats the nature of the new challenge for both capitals. In chapter 7, we tackle one of the most intractable of all major topics, the progress that led ultimately to the invention and assignment of shugo. In the view that I present, Yoritomo did not live to see the office named or defined, even as he obviously contributed to the context that led to its creation. Once established, shugo came to be aligned with the top-down governance of the past, emerging as Kamakura's principal agents at the level of the province. If }ito were seeking to surmount the constraints imposed on them by the two governments, shugo were part of the environment of control. Chapter 8 seeks to profile the Kamakura }ito and to show how they constituted the start (but only the start) of an attack on the privileges of the aristocratic center. The position I take is that for all the vigor and variety of their lawless efforts, their quotient of success was actually quite limited. Moreover, contrary to the thrust of my argument in "Warrior Government, there are central issues involving this new elite that continue to puzzle us. In particular, I examine the tendency of }ito to administer their offices from afar, to function, as it were, as a new category of absentee interests. How do we square an image of}ito as relentless local self-aggrandizers with another image of so

IO

IN T R0 D UCT I0 N

many of them living so far from their localities? Along with a treatment of what remained beyond the }ito's aspirations and capacities, the chapter dwells on the hitherto unexplored subject of their deputies. In the matter of an overall assessment of what Yoritomo helped to set into motion, we are left with a fundamental dilemma. Is it more accurate to emphasize the institutionally new, or the resilience of inherited tradition and the tenacity of the old? Put differently, is it the jito, always chafing under the status quo, that is the more logical focus, or the dual polity and its principal creator and defender, the Kamakura Bakufu? It is the central contention of this book that, thanks to the policies fashioned by Yoritomo in the period before 1200, the traditional order in Japan was extended for another century.

CHAPTER ONE

The Taira Moment

The establishment of the Bakufu in Kamakura was preceded by a period of Taira ascendancy of controversial character and length. For one scholarly tradition, the Taira established the country's first military government, anticipating the Minamoto achievement by a generation: in 1185, one group of warrior overlords succeeded another, with the Taira coming to be toppled by a more advanced military system. 1 In a second scholarly tradition, contrasts, rather than comparisons, have been stressed: the Taira and the Minamoto approached power differently, and what is important is the chasm rather than the bridge between them. 2 Only near the end of their tenure did the

This view has been the standard one from the beginning, a consequence of the Taira's martial origins in the provinces and of their defeat at the hands of the Minamoto in the Genpei War. Having started and ended as warriors, how could they have been anyrhing different during their period of ascendancy? An example of such thinking is George B. Sansom, A History of]apan to I334, chaps. 12-14; and, more recently, William Wayne Farris, Heavenly Wttrriors, chap. 7· 2. This was the view pioneered in the West by John Whitney Hall; see Government and Local Power in japan, 500-I700, 141-47. The works of Takeuchi Rizo and Ishimoda Sho, among others, inspired him. For references, see notes 14 and 15 below. I.

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Taira seek to surmount their dependence on central institutions, and the difficulties they encountered go far toward explaining the Minamoto success. It was the Taira's misfortune to have settled in the capital and also, in a sense, to have come first. The respective characterizations of the Taira are obviously central to how historians have interpreted the twelfth century. The Heian order succumbed in either the n6os or the n8os, with the Taira either its conquerors or its last victims. Yet both views, it can now be argued, distort the Taira role by exaggerating what they accomplished whether in victory or defeat. Their legacy now seems somewhat slighter either way, since much of the Heian state, as we now believe, survived into the Kamakura age. At all events, the Taira were much more visible than the Minamoto for the first eighty years of the twelfth century, and therein lies a tale, on its own account, that must be told. As we shall see, their prominence is not to be confused with an autonomous presence, but was rather merely a function of a highly successful junior partnership with their traditional patrons, the retired emperors. The emphasis of this chapter will be on a diminished Taira achievement, which will lead, in turn, to a view of a diminished Taira legacy.

THE TAIRA

BEFORE

KIYOMORI

As with so much else, the major impetus for the "rise of the Taira'' derived from changes occurring as much in the capital as in the provinces. In the late eleventh century, the imperial line, which had been dependent on its maternal relatives, the Fujiwara, for generations, now undertook to regain control of its own affairs. 3 A bolstering of the in-no-cho (the chancellery of a retired emperor) was central to this effort, since it turned this institution into a headquarters from which an ex-emperor might manage his family's interests. By noo, the imperial house-the original embodiment of the public system-had accepted the new conditions of privatized authority, with most of the actual revival the achievement of ex-emperor Shirakawa. During more than four decades (w86-n29), he sought to construct a base of support within the provinces, built around private estates and a corps of 3· For this subject, we remain beholden to Hurst, Insei.

THE

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15

local clients. As part of this program, the ex-emperor recruited a branch of the Taira and forged an alliance with them that would prosper for three generations. The lineage that entered service with Shirakawa had settled in Ise Province during the opening decades of the eleventh century. 4 As it happened, Iga, adjacent to lse, was a major base of the Todaiji, a Nara-based temple that possessed shoen and local supporters throughout the region. As a consequence, the newly arrived Taira found their progress largely blocked as they set about advancing their own interests. An opportunity did not present itself until ro97, when Taira Masamori commended land units in lga to the Rokujo-in, a chapel that had been created to receive such endowments. 5 A relationship between the ex-emperor and the Taira was initiated thereby, which would flourish, to mutual advantage, for more than seven decades. A major element in this alliance was the retired emperor's capacity to confer a share of the country's provincial governorships. As a result, by his calculated support of favored proteges, Shirakawa was able to advance the interests of both parties. In the event, Masamori was appointed the governor of Wakasa Province, which was followed by his transfer soon thereafter to lnaba. 6 During the course of his long career, Masamori was promoted, in sequence, to as many as nine governorships, which took him, administratively, far beyond his original base area. 7 In the process, he was working to promote the landed interests of the imperial house while also obstructing the shoen (or shoen plans) of imperial competitors. But Masamori was active on his own behalf as well, exploiting, for example, his authorized use of military power. Among his many exploits were the suppression of a disturbance by Yoshichika, head of the Minamoto, for which he was rewarded with the governorship ofTajima (no7). Similarly, he put down an armed uprising by the monks of Mount Hiei (m3), and he

4· Taira Korehira became governor oflse in roo6; Uwayokote Masataka, "Jokyu no ran rekishiteki hyoka," 25. The Taira's relationship with this region in the eleventh century is treated in many accounts, e.g., Yasuda Motohisa, Heike no gunzo, 41-48. 5· The register of commended parcels is reproduced in Takeuchi Rizo, "Heishi seiken seiritsu no shojoken," 9· The full story ofMasamori's alliance with the retired emperor appears in Ryo Susumu, "Rokujo-in ryo to Taira Masamori." 6. Yasuda, Heike no gunzo, 42. 7· Iida Hisao, "Heishi to Kyushu," 50.

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quelled an upsurge of banditry in the streets of Kyoto (m9). In return for this final act and for his suppression of a rebellion in Kyushu (m9), he was promoted to a court rank (junior fourth, lower grade) that marked him as a figure of rising stature who would have to be reckoned with. Moreover, Masamori was active on behalf of temples and shrines, collecting revenues for repairs that helped to earn him additional promotions. He became the governor ofTanba and then ofBizen, provinces that were much coveted because of their wealth. His access to the tax receipts of such provinces contributed to the prosperity of the imperial patronage bloc of which he himself was now an indispensable element. 8 The alliance between the imperial house and the Taira was able to survive the deaths of the two principals. Indeed, Toba, the next ex-emperor (IIOJ56), and Taira Tadamori (1096-1153) now carried their cooperation to new levels of success. Like his father before him, Tadamori became a muchtraveled governor, receiving (like his father also) title to nine provinces, all (again, as with his father) in central and western Japan. 9 Moreover, Tadamori was active within shoen, working in various capacities in private domains around the countrr Thus, he involved himself in Ushigahara Estate in Echizen Province in 1132 and accepted the custodianship of Kanzaki Estate in Kyushu a year later. Typically, both domains were landed holdings of the imperial house. 10 In fact, Tadamori became a major influence in Kyushu from this juncture, even promoting the start of a lucrative trade with China. Yet he was also active simultaneously in suppressing piracy in the Inland Sea, 11 as well as in successfully advancing his career at court. When he was selected to be a member of the in-no-cho, he acquired a visibility that made him the best known "warrior-aristocrat" of his day. As governor of prestigious Mimasaka

8. Yasuda, Heike no gunzo, 44-45. 9· Iida, "Heishi to Kyushu," 50. 10. Ushigahara, founded in 1090 by ex-emperor Shirakawa, was assisted in 1132 by Tadamori in his capacity as governor ofEchizen; see Daigo zajiki, 1132/9h3 kan senshi, in HI, 5=190810, doc. 224I (for a translation, see Asakawa, Land and Society in Medieval japan, 42-46). For Kanzaki, see Seno Seiichiro, comp., Hizen no kuni Kanzaki-no-sho shiryo, p. 8, doc. 9; and Batten, "State and Frontier," 288. n. See ibid., 288-93, for the Taira's growing influence in Kyushu; and Yasuda, Heike no gunzo, 46-47, for Tadamori's exploits along the Inland Sea.

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in the late IIJOS, his magistrate's title of"Mimasaka no kami" now appeared on the edicts issued by Toba's central headquarters. 12 Tadamori died in II53 and was succeeded by his son Kiyomori, who had already begun a career of the familiar type. Starting as the governor of Higo Province in Kyushu, he became the governor of Aki in n46, a post he was able to retain for a full ten years (for the Taira in Aki, see chapter 4). The line that began with Kiyomori's grandfather had come a long way in half a century-from its initial base in lse, to its breakthrough in lga, to a fledgling network of interests throughout much of central and western Japan. Nevertheless, the viability of such a network had not yet really been tested. As we shall see, a career of service that was built around a sequence of governorships did not provide the necessary springboard for an independent base of power.

THE

RISE

OF

KIYOMORI

In n56, a dispute over the imperial succession and other issues led to various Taira and Minamoto being called into the capital. The resulting skirmish, known as the Hogen Disturbance, was followed three years later by the Disturbance ofHeiji, fought out among survivors of the earlier encounter. 13 In n6o, what remained of the Minamoto leadership was scattered into exile, whereas Kiyomori, for his own part, now began his rise in Kyoto. It was Kiyomori who was to lead his family to political mastery of the capital and to the brief hegemony that bears the Taira name. It is most significant, however, that such mastery developed only very

12. His name ("Mimasaka no kami, Taira ason") appears in the signature area of two such edicts dating from n38; see Waseda daigaku shozli monjo, II38/ 5!20 and II38/nii6 Toba ln-nocho kudashibumi, in HI, 10:3873-75, 3876-77, docs. 5001 and 5004. We know that the reference is to Tadamori since he issued governor's edicts in II37 and n39; see Tonanin monjo, II37/I0/12 Mimasaka no kami (Taira Tadamori) kudashibumi, HI, p013, doc. 2377; and Todaiji monjo, II39/3f23 Mimasaka no kami (Taira Tadamori) kudashibumi an, HI, po28, doc. 2407. 13. There have been many treatments in English of Hogen and Heiji, among them those by Sansom, Reischauer, Hurst, Farris, and Wilson. We also have translations of the Tale of Hogen (Wilson) and the Tale ofHeiji (Reischauer).

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slowly. Contrary to the picture that was standard until recently, Kiyomori did not immediately become ruler of anything-not the court, not the capital, and certainly not the country at large. In a number of ways he continued, as before, to be a junior partner of the new ex-emperor, Go-Shirakawa (n58-92), until a coup finally eliminated that patron in 1179. 14 Such a notion of shared power is obviously central to our understanding of Kiyomori's career and to our assessment as well of the overall Taira achievement. To the extent that the Taira under Kiyomori are diminished as an independent entity, our view of what followed after 1180 will be affected in turn. It is eminently clear that the incidents of Hogen and Heiji, while serving to push the Minamoto from center stage, took place above all on behalf of Go-Shirakawa's power bloc. In 1160, the victorious Kiyomori remained a provincial aristocrat, waiting, in effect, to be rewarded by his family's traditional patron. The point is underscored by the settlements that followed the disturbances. Thus Kiyomori exchanged the governorship of Aki for that of Harima in 1156 and simultaneously became the assistant governor general of Kyushu. 15 Yet he seems not to have received any particular rights in land, whereas Go-Shirakawa seized proprietorships from estate owners who had been on the losing side and conhscated managerships from Taira and Minamoto, who had experienced the same fate. 16 Not surprisingly, the Heiji settlement of 1160 was far more favorable to the Taira, but even here the division of the spoils seems strikingly traditional. Taira managers may have been assigned to a variety of shoen, but the same shoen were now registered as imperial estates. In short, a patron-client rela-

I4. Ishimoda Sho was the first to develop fully this concept of shared authority; see his "Heishi seiken to sono botsuraku," 384-402, and "Heishi seiken ni tsuite," 470-87. Not all scholars accepted this approach even at the time, e.g., Matsumoto Shinpachiro, "Rokuhara jidai," 23I-50, which emphasized a conquest from the provinces. There have been various other challenges more recently; see below. I5. Takeuchi, "Heishi seiken to insei," 72. For a document signed by "Kiyomori, the governor of Harima," see Kofokuji betto shidai ura monjo, II56/wh3 Harima no kami Taira Kiyomori shojo, HI, 6:2352, doc. 2854. I6. A register oflands confiscated from three persons-Left Minister Fujiwara Yorinaga, Taira Masahiro, and Taira Tadasada-reveals the discrepancies in rank and land tenure between the high nobility and persons bearing the Taira name. This register, along with other source excerpts relating to the Hogen land settlement, appears in Omori Kingoro, Buke jidai no kenkyu, 1:289-99.

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19

tionship oflong standing was bolstered, not dispensed with, and the battlefield victories credited by historians to Kiyomori did not lead to his taking over or transforming the polity. Thus, his name appears on the roster of GoShirakawa's in-no-cho in 1161, exactly as it had, before Heiji, in 1159. 17 In fact, there is little difference, in this respect, from his own father's membership of a generation earlier. On the other hand, Kiyomori's career as a journeyman governor now ended when no further such appointments were solicited, offered, accepted, or refused. To that extent he was now breaking out of the mold of his forebears, though whether that would have been instantly obvious in n6o is unclear. It is actually only from hindsight that we can measure his progress through the lens of his promotions in Kyoto. In view of his own background, Kiyomori may not have been certain at first of what should come next. The rise of Kiyomori at court has traditionally been portrayed as utterly foreordained-the product of an overweening ambition and the corresponding weakness of the courtiers all around him. Though he may well have been determined now to push to become the first of his line to enter the ruling hierarchy, he could not have been unaware that there was no way for him to dominate it. His accomplishment may not even have seemed all that unusual in terms of where he now was, since Taira and Minamoto predecessors had spent long periods in Kyoto, and we do not know when he decided never again to leave it. Moreover, he must certainly have realized that any promotions to unprecedented levels would have to be guided by GoShirakawa. As it happened, the latter needed the support of someone like Kiyomori at that very moment, since the ex-emperor was being challenged by the sitting emperor Nijo. At any rate, Kiyomori, in quick succession, became an advisor (sangi) to the state council (daijokan), a captain of the outer palace guards, and the chief of the capital city's central police office-even as he remained a member of Go-Shirakawa's in-no-cho. 18 Kiyomori's promotions, then, may be interpreted, at least in part, as the product of a political

q. Koyasan monjo, II59/5f28 Go-Shirakawa ln-no-cho kudashibumi, HI, 6: 2449-51, doc. 2979; Myohoin monjo, rr6rlr and n6rl2126 Go-Shirakawa ln-no-cho kudashibumi, HI, 7=2516-17, 2520-21, docs. 3123 and 3138. r8. Ibid. (Myohoin monjo, where he is designated as sangi); and Takeuchi, "Heishi seiken to insei," 68-69.

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situation in which his support, in time-honored fashion, was being solicited and rewarded by the ex-emperor. 19 At the same time, Kiyomori was becoming adroit in maneuvering through Kyoto's thickets, and his successes clearly fueled a rising ambition. For example, in n64, he arranged a marriage between his nine-year-old daughter, Moriko, and the imperial regent (sessho), Fujiwara Motozane, which took a dramatic turn when Motozane died two years later. For Kiyomori now conspired to have Moriko inherit a portion of the landed assets that had traditionally belonged to the Fujiwara. 20 In the meantime, Yorimori, Kiyomori's brother, succeeded him in Go-Shirakawa's chancellery, which might have been viewed as an early move by the Taira in the direction of greater independence. 21 At all events, if Kiyomori was not yet in control of the court, he was beginning to make life more difficult for his patron, who still was. Shortly thereafter (u67), Kiyomori achieved one of his most heralded successes, appointment to the highest office in the imperial bureaucracy, the post of daijodaijin. This revealed not only the extent now of his aspirations, but also his disdain for the conventions that would earlier have thwarted them. Following the usual practice, the Taira leader soon stepped down from this exalted office, bur his rapidly expanding influence was in no way compromised. By becoming a retired prime minister, he sought to be recognized as virtually the peer of the retired emperor. But, as Kiyomori now discovered, respect and full acceptance could not be coerced; the social gulf between himself and Go-Shirakawa remained unbridgeable. Symptomatic of this was the promotion of Kiyomori's heir, Shigemori, who was now allowed to succeed his father as military commander of Kyoto. On the one hand, Kiyomori had engineered an important transfer of power to his designated heir. But on the other, the promotion itself had been authorized by the ex-emperor, and the role itself was a familiar one, now into its fourth generation. As many might have observed, the Taira, though obI9. The Gukansho, written in I2I9, provides valuable details on the triangular relationship involving Kiyomori, Go-Shirakawa, and Nijo; see Delmer Brown and Ishida Ichiro, trans., The Future and the Past: A Translation and Study ofthe Gukansho, 110-I3, 117-I8. 20. The marriage strategy is described in the Gukansho, in Kokushi taikei I4:512 (The Future and the Past, 120-21). 2I. Nyuya jinja monjo, 11661!/w Go-Shirakawa In-no-cho kudashibumi, HI, 7:2664-65, doc. 3375·

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21

viously restless, were continuing to serve the state and the imperial house in traditional ways. To promote his family's prestige beyond what had traditionally been possible, Kiyomori now attempted to initiate something new. He would seek to insinuate himself into the very cream of the aristocracy by reviving, as it were, his family's imperial origins. Having earlier arranged a marriage between Moriko and the Fujiwara regent, Kiyomori now placed another daughter, Tokuko, within the imperial house itself The future Kenreimonin became a secondary consort of the emperor Takakura in 1171, and seven years later she gave birth to a son who would ascend the throne in n8o. 22 As indicated here, Kiyomori's strategy was coming to center on appropriating the privileges of the second most prestigious family in Japan. He had succeeded through one daughter in siphoning away a portion of the Fujiwara's wealth, and now through another daughter in intruding upon its right to provide imperial consorts. From one angle, the Fujiwara, as the traditional patrons of the out-of-favor Minamoto, could now be undermined by Kiyomori in his capacity as protege of the ex-emperor. But from another angle, he was actually beginning to challenge Go-Shirakawa himself, a central element of whose supremacy had derived from the imperial family's renewed control of its own succession. And yet considerable evidence exists to show that, even in the II70S, Kiyomori and Go-Shirakawa were still marching together. Typically for the times, long-standing relationships that linked unequals were proving difficult to break. In particular, Kiyomori was not yet appropriating sufficient authority of his own over the countryside. Thus, far from Kiyomori's coming to serve as a major protector of central-to-local hierarchies, the in-no-cho retained its supremacy in the critical areas of guaranteeing provincial land rights and prohibiting local outrages. 23 For that matter, it was the in-no-cho, not Kiyomori, that continued to issue documents that confirmed Taira land rights. Clearly, their holdings tended to remain joint possessions with the imperial house (see below, pp. 24-25). 22.

The Future and the Past,

122.

For example, "public officials countrywide" (shokoku no zaichokanjin) were ordered to suppress all local lawlessness committed against estates belonging to the Iwashimizu Shrine; Iwashimizu monjo, II76/6/w Go-Shirakawa In-no-cho kudashibumi an, HI, 7:2901-2, doc. 3765. 23.

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By the mid-1170s, however, this hierarchical arrangement was starting to be tested. One indication of this is the fact that the rivalries that had led to Hogen, Heiji, and their aftermath, and which had solidified the original alliance, were now being replaced by a new set of relationships. The entourage of the ex-sovereign was more determined in its opposition to the Taira, whereas Kiyomori had opened lines of communication with a potentially new patron, the Enryakuji on Mount Hiei. In 1177, a dispute involving the temple flared into a major incident, which saw Go-Shirakawa confiscate the estates of the abbot, Meiun, while he also ordered Meiun's arrest. But when the priest was unexpectedly rescued by a contingent ofHiei monks, and the ex-emperor looked to Kiyomori for assistance, the latter showed that he was reluctant now to provide it. 24 Almost immediately a plot against Kiyomori's own family surfaced and was exposed, which persuaded him to move against his opponents rather than against the monks. In effect, Kiyomori was electing to attack members of the retired emperor's own clique, thereby precipitating a downturn in the relationship between them. Known as the Shishigatani Affair, the incident led to a decision by the ex-emperor to move more aggressively against the Taira leadership. 25 The anti-Taira feelings at court were given further impetus by two personal misfortunes that befell Kiyomori in 1179. In the sixth month, his daughter Moriko, the widow of the late Regent, suddenly died, and GoShirakawa used the event to have the lands she had earlier inherited restored to the Fujiwara main line. Then in the eighth month, Kiyomori's heir, Shigemori, also fell ill and died, and the retired emperor moved quickly here too. He confiscated the proprietorship of Echizen Province, which Shigemori had hitherto controlled. At any rate, with the vulnerability of the Taira seemingly exposed by these two episodes, Kiyomori, resentful and frustrated, now made a fateful decision. Gathering troops from nearby areas in the eleventh month of 1179, he entered the capital and proceeded to order the dismissal of all who stood in his 24. For details, see Mikael Adolphson, "Monks, Courtiers, and Warriors in Premodern Japan: The Secular Power of Enryakuji in the Heian and Kamakura Eras," chap. 4; and Yasuda Motohisa, Nihon zenshi 4, chiisei I, I9-24. 25. For the Shishigatani Affair, see Adolphson, "Monks, Courtiers," I40-4I; and Hurst, Insei, 206-7.

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way. The ex-emperor himself was placed, unprecedentedly, under house arrest, and a new round of government appointments now commenced. 26 Taira dominance over the capital was quickly secured. In a sense, a sequence of events traditionally dated to rr6o actually began now. The ease with which Kiyomori accomplished this takeover was deceptive, however. On the debit side was the revulsion in Kyoto against an act of violence, the sole aim of which was the aggrandizement of the Taira leader himself Hogen, and by extension Heiji, had been fought on behalf of"imperial authority." By contrast, the net effect of the events of the moment was a massive enlargement of Kiyomori's own power, entirely at the expense of both established procedure and the economic and political interests of official Kyoto. Moreover, by forcibly upsetting the basic collegiality of central governance, the Taira leader was sowing the seeds of his own isolation. A5 he would discover, it was easier to gain enemies than to win friends. And thus, at the point that he would come to face his greatest challenge in the form of the rr8o uprising by the Minamoto, he would find that his backing and his resources were insufficient to meet the threat. Kiyomori's assets and allies make up a central part of the Taira story. In evaluating these, Kiyomori's supremacy can be shown to have rested on a miscellany that had been thrown together all too hurriedly. As we shall now see, the overall chronology needs to be shortened and the volume of acquisitions and innovations reduced, leading (once again!) to a diminished accomplishment and legacy.

TAIRA

RELATIONSHIPS

WITH

LAND

AND

MEN

A well-known passage from the Gukansho states that more than 500 landed holdings (chigyo no shoryo) were ultimately confiscated from the Taira. Interpreted by many historians as meaning five hundred shoen, the total seemed to prove the enormity of the war chest at Kiyomori's disposal. 27 However, no 26. For the deaths of Moriko and Shigemori, see The Future and the Past, 126; for the coup and its aftermath, Gyokuyo, entries for II79/nlr4-29, 2: 306-r8; and Hyakurensho in Kokushi taikei 14, entries for II79/nlr5-28, pp. 130-3I. 27. The reference appears in Gukansho, 536. For its equivalent to "five hundred shoen," see, e.g., Government and Local Power, 144.

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more than one-fifth of that number can now be corroborated, and doubt is cast on the longevity and the autonomy of many of the tenures. 28 Moreover, the Fujiwara estates, as we noted, were actually lost. At any rate, it was only at the end of the 1170s that Kiyomori came to hold most of what has been traditionally credited to him much earlier. He thus had little time and opportunity to exploit them fully, as in the case of a bundle of estates confiscated from Nara temples in n8o. 29 We can divide Taira relationships with shoen into three major categoriesproprietary, custodial, and the lower managerial rights of provincials. Regarding the first group, where the proprietor's (ryoke) title was held by Kiyomori or a dose kinsman, the ex-emperor or an imperial stand-in typically served as the patron (honke). In the classic model of the shoen, the proprietor, not the patron, exercised the greater power, though the influence here seems to have been channeled the other way: the ex-emperor/Taira alliance virtually dictated that. 30 One key indicator is the paucity of documents tying Kiyomori to the administration of his own shoen-in other words, the absence of a paper trail that started specifically with him (see below). What little we know of the second category-the custodial titles known as azukari dokoro-tends to corroborate a subordination to the ex-sovereign. Ota Estate in Bingo Province is the best known example, though here the evidence can be read in two ways. On the one hand, Kiyomori's son, Shigehira, was invested with the Ota custodianship by Go-Shirakawa, which would appear to be a manifestation of the usual superior/inferior relationship. 31 On the other hand, the division of the income actually flowing from the estate seems dearly to have favored Shigehira. 32 The hierarchy of rights over Munakata Shrine in northern Kyushu is equally interesting. We have knowledge here of three levels: the patron's au28. Yasuda Morohisa, "Heike mokkanryo ni tsuite," 316. 29. For the confiscations from the Onjoji and Kofukuji, see Hyakurensho, n8o/6ho and 8/I6,

P· 134. 30. This is one of the main arguments in Yasuda, "Heike mokkanryo," 324-25, 336. The pattern, indeed, is anticipated in a case of n59, where Shiraku Estate in Tanba is listed as belonging to an imperial chapel, with Kiyomori's name appearing in a subordinate position; Toji hyakugo monjo, II59/int.5 Hoshogon-in ryo shoen no chumon, HI, 6:2454-55, doc. 2986. 31. Nibu jinja monjo, n66!IIw Go-Shirakawa In-no-cho kudashibumi an, HI, ]:2664-65, doc. 3375· 32. Nagahara, "Land Ownership under the Shoen-Kokugaryo System," 279-80.

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thority in the hands of the imperial house, the proprietor's authority held by Yorimori (Kiyomori's brother), and the custodianship possessed by Taira Moritoshi, a leading Taira retainer. Unfortunately, we do not know the circumstances that led to this division, though it was the ex-emperor's chancellery that presumably issued the authorizing documents. 33 In this vein, a chancellery edict from as late as 1178 confirmed one Taira Masako in the hereditary custodianship of Kyushu's Matsura Estate. Three years earlier, Masako had commended the area to Taira Shigeko, who was the consort of Go-Shirakawa and who was also, conveniently, the sister-in-law of Kiyomori. 34 Here at least we are able to see the consequences for the Taira whose connections with the area won them some advantage. For Matsura Estate became a center ofTaira partisanship after n8o, though it eventually produced a large number ofKamakura housemen (gokenin). 35 The third category, subcustodialland rights, takes us down to the level of rank-and-file Taira. Two important qualifications need to be made here. First, there is an enormous difference between men who fought during the Genpei War under the Taira banner and the much smaller group making up the earlier Kiyomori band. The managerial rights confiscated by Yoritomo came mostly from men who joined the Taira side after n8o-when, finally, there was a choice that had to be made. In other words, we need to be skeptical ofTaira totals overall, lest they be anachronistic. Second, families that possessed links with the Taira from previous generations did not necessarily remain active as Taira after n56. The name itself, as noted, is insufficient as evidence, and we need to look for actual partisanship during the period under review. Affiliations before n56 and after n8o are potentially irrelevant. Who, then, were Kiyomori's armed retainers? His bands of horsemen in n56 and n6o have been calculated at approximately three hundred each, drawn unevenly from a scattering of provinces. 36 These totals and their geographic distribution are highly revealing. Though the chieftain's line of the 33· For the details here, see Munakata jinja monjo, 1256/r daigu-in-no-cho kudashibumi, KI, n:r38-39, doc. 7958; Koga monjo, n84/4/6 Minamoto Yoritomo kudashibumi, HI, 8:3129, doc. 4152; and Munakata jinja shi, 3:692-93. 34· Toji hyakugli monjo, rq8/612o Go-Shirakawa In-na-cho kudashibumi, HI, 8:2948-50, doc., 3836; and Saga kenshi, r:4o8-o9. 35· Seno Seiichiro, "Chinzei ni okeru t6-Matsura to t6 no baai," 70. 36. For a discussion, see Farris, Heavenly Wtirriors, 268-73; also Yasuda, Chusei, 14.

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Taira might be characterized as one of professional governors, their provinces obviously did not produce organized blocs of sustainable "Taira." Nor can we determine how many of those who responded to the call to arms, acting as individuals, might have been beholden to the ex-emperor's patronage system, making them more receptive to Kiyomori. At any rate, it was men like Taira lesada, Taira Moritoshi, and Saeki Kagehiro who bore the brunt of recruiting on behalf of Kiyomori. The first rwo men were active in Kyushu, with both ranging widely across several provinces. Iesada was that rarity, a carryover from the age of Kiyomori's father, and he was made chief deputy for the whole island; his son succeeded him in a like capacity. 37 Meanwhile, Moritoshi was active in the northern and southern parts of the island, and reappeared much later (after n8o) in the central region. 38 Both men were obviously well traveled. By contrast, Saeki Kagehiro was Kiyomori's leading subordinate in Aki Province, a relationship that was nourished during Kiyomori's long governorship there (n46-56). Kagehiro was still active there years later on the Taira's behalf, and he eventually became the governor himself (1182). 39 However, the Taira, even in Aki, experienced serious difficulties, despite the province's having been designated the family's home base. The extent of the Taira's achievement in Aki remains subject to debate. 40 Additional deputies such as the three just mentioned are hard to identifY, leaving us with a sense of an enterprise of limited size and success. We are thus far from being able to infer a corporate Taira existence, and the aggregate term "Heike," as we now realize, was a post-Taira invention. 41 Moreover, when we examine the era after Kiyomori took up residence in the capital, the evidence seems to add up to a profile of a man whose preoccupations 37· Iida, "Heishi to Kyushu," 52-53. 38. For his Kyushu activities, see Asakawa Kan'ichi, The Documents ofIriki, 95, and note 33 above. For his appointment to an important new post in Tanba province in n8I, see below, p. 35· 39· See Itsukushima jinja monjo, n8z/3 Aki no kami Saeki Kagehiro yuzurijo, HI, 8:3064, doc. 4026. 40. For details on the Taira's travails in Aki, see Arnesen, "The Struggle for Lordship in Late Heian Japan''; Ishii Susumu, "Heishi-Kamakura ryoseiken ka no Aki kokuga," 7-8; and chapter 4 below. 41. I.e., a post-n85 neologism. For an elaboration of this point, see my Mj, 49, 93-94, and (making the same point about the "Minamoto") chapter 2 below.

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were now overwhelmingly urban, not rural. Kiyomori, if he was doing anything, was planning his rise up the ladder of imperial rank and office and was not imagining that he would need to use force at some point in the future. Thus, there is little to indicate the development of a regular rewards program to attract provincial followers during these years, and we search in vain for any confirmations oflocally possessed land rights. In fact, for the entire generation of Kiyomori's residence in Kyoto, a single document of a type that other central magnates were issuing in large numbers survives-a decree that on Kioyomori's own authority confirmed a local managerial right. 42 Nor is it imaginable that Kiyomori could have been at the center of an expanding network of provincial men without any of this being recorded. As noted, those wishing to become "Taira" might attach themselves to his few agents, and the agents, for their part, doubtless encouraged such relationships. But there are no documents that show a personalized effort at recruitment from the top, which leaves us to surmise a central-to-local patronage system of the traditional type, whose summit was occupied by Go-Shirakawa, not Kiyomori. To the extent that the ex-emperor's chancellery provided the confirmations, it is hard to see how Kiyomori could have surmounted what he was inextricably a part o£ Thus, the leadership of the Taira was seemingly unable to overcome its reliance on the in-no-cho, though why this was so still needs to be explored a bit further. A product himself of that very legacy, Kiyomori appears to have done little more than to attempt to manipulate it rather than displace it. Thus he was either less than assiduous in developing his own central organization, or found that when he actually tried to do so he was not very successful. Though we know that Kiyomori actually did open his own chancellery (mandokoro), its near invisibility is arguably its most distinguishing feature. 43

42. Itsukushima jinja monjo, n64/6 gon-chunagon (Taira Kiyomori) ke mandokoro kudashibumi, HI, 7:2609, doc. 3285. This point was obviously central to the argument devel-

oped by Ishimoda and Takeuchi, the pioneers of this approach. Farris also acknowledges it even as he argues around it; Heavenly \Vtzrriors, 282. 43· Apart from the document cited in note 42, the only surviving edict issued by Kiyomori's mandokoro is Itsukushima jinja monjo, II79/n saki no daijodaijin ke (Taira Kiyomori) mandokoro kudashibumi, HI, 8: 2985, doc. 3891. The most recent supplements to HI have turned up no new documents that can be attributed to Kiyomori.

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The foregoing notwithstanding, Wayne Farris, in a valuable reexamination of the question ofTaira military strength, has summarized the findings of Japanese scholars who have been reassessing the conclusions of their predecessors. As he shows, these scholars are now crediting Kiyomori with more energy and success than the previous generation thought possible, in a sense returning us to a prewar view of the Taira as Japan's first warrior government. Feudalism's main courier, after all, was none other than Kiyomori! 44 Yet the weaknesses inherent in this line of reasoning remain formidable, positing "vassal relations" without visible rewards or proof of regular contact. 45 It seems much more likely that Kiyomori and Shigemori simply called for troops as they needed them, thereby mobilizing the relatively small numbers required. Thus, the identity of those who responded probably varied from incident to incident, with a rush to return home just as soon as the emergency was over. Though their names may have been retained as potential recruits for the future, this was hardly the same as being included on regular provincial vassal rolls. Or perhaps we might even liken this situation to a call-up of"royal troops" by an imperial commander in Kyoto. 46 However we interpret it, the men who fought for the Taira were not necessarily "Taira." How these recruits might have been compensated takes us to the crux of

the problem. Without a provable pattern of confirmations or rewards we can only imagine something much less. Either they received payment in a form other than land, which terminated at the conclusion of service, or else, as mentioned, it was the in-no-cho, not a Taira equivalent, that was the ultimate provider. In cases of the latter kind, the men receiving preferments might have seen themselves under the command of a Taira general without necessarily feeling that they were members of his band. Or, phrased differently, if Kiyomori himself owed his own investitures to his imperial patron, why should we assume that most men serving under him were not equally cognizant of the virtues of such an arrangement? Finally, we cannot even be sure of any awareness at the time of the desirability of constructing the kind of national corps of private retainers that 44· Farris, Heavenly ~rriors, chap. 7· 45· The matter of the Taira and their use of the jitli tide is dealt with in chapter 446. Farris, Heavenly \Vttrriors, 280. The reference here is to Shigemori, whose accession at court was actually identical to that of his father-each became an imperial advisor (sangz) before going on to become palace minister (naidaijin). We see little novelty here.

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Kiyomori is assumed by some to have been intent on building. With the Minamoto in powerless exile, there would have been little reason to ruminate on the potential future uses of local organization. In the circumstances of the times, Kiyomori's entrance into the ruling elite probably seemed revolutionary enough, with his goals and perceptions fixed on the capital and on how better to succeed there. As we know, of course, the ancestry that had served him so well as a favored client of the ex-emperor came to be viewed among his fellow courtiers as the pretentiousness of a social upstart. Without the respect that he so greatly desired, he began to incline in the direction of gaining by coercion what his pedigree denied him. And thus in the later II?OS he became less circumspect about the use of force, though without in any way abandoning his preoccupation with his career in the capital. At any rate, the career itself must be viewed in its several phases and not seen simply as the logical playing out of a drive, developed early, to construct the first warrior government. At the same time, as Kiyomori ascended the ladder of preferment at court, the view of him might have changed in the countryside. The more he sought to model himself as a central aristocrat, the more he might have seemed remote from the local men he no longer mixed with. Though he ought to have been positioning himself now as an alternative courtier patron, his organizational laxness, and the increasingly low esteem in which he was held, must have hampered him. Nor could it have been much easier for Shigemori, whose whereabouts, though less certain, still identified him with Kyoto. To the extent that Shigemori coordinated the imperial guard services, as suggested by Farris, he would likely have acquired some leverage over provincial recruits. 47 But when Shigemori predeceased his father in II79, the contacts he had made may have been largely lost. Though we know that Kiyomori personally gathered troops in order to engineer the arrest of GoShirakawa in II79/n, it is difficult to credit this episode as the work of a disciplined group of long-serving vassals. Such a raid on the capital seems more reminiscent of a hastily assembled band of bullies and mercenaries. In sum, though the Taira obviously had men whom it would have called "Taira'' in emergencies, there could not have been much confidence in the 47· Ibid. Yet there are no known documents that were issued by him, and the only one bear-

ing his name (from n6r) is as a member of the ex-emperor's in-no-chiJ.

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power of that claim to spark a significant turnout. And though the same would have been true of the Minamoto at that time, it was the Taira who were now starting to position themselves in new ways. Finding himself, after the coup, in an unprecedented situation, Kiyomori now had to confront the demands of governing on his own; the in-no-cho, all of a sudden, was no longer available. 48 As we shall see, though Kiyomori's isolation now drove him to great excesses of behavior, it also lit the spark that ignited the final creative stage of his career. Before turning to the events of n8o, we need to review a final body of evidence, which, for earlier historians, was the most obvious proof of a countrywide vassalage. Several highly subjective, retrospective summaries form the basis of an old assumption that the Taira possessed half or more of the country's full complement of governorships. 49 As a consequence, Kiyomori's conversion into vassals of the warrior units (rota) attached to those provinces' headquarters (kokuga) must have facilitated his recruitment of an eager throng of willing followers. 50 Beginning as long ago as the 1950s, an opposite view became standard to the effect that provincial officials were more likely to resist than submit to his overtures. On the personal side, Kiyomori was now judged to have excluded local magnates from the governorships at his disposal, in deference, it was argued, to his own closest relatives. As a consequence, an opportunity was lost to bridge the chasm between governors and local officialdom. Put differently, a network of indigenous governors owing their preferments to Kiyomori failed to evolve at any point during his career. Equally damaging, the agents known as mokudai, who were dispatched by the Taira governors, proceeded to antagonize the local officials, who now realized that they had little in common with the Taira of Kiyomori. The proof for this revised view remains basically persuasive today. For one thing, the Taira did not obtain the great majority of their thirty-plus provinces until very late. In terms of time and space, the Taira's field of opera48. The ex-emperor's house arrest was accompanied by an apparent closure of the in-no-cho. At least, we find no surviving edicts between II79/8II8 (HI, 8:2982-83, doc. 3884) and n8o/12 (HI, 8:3010-II, doc. 3946, issued by the "new ex-emperor's chancellery" [shin-in-no-cho] of Takakura joko). 49· For example, the fictional war tale, Genpei seisuiki, cites "more than thirty proprietary provinces"; reproduced in Watanabe Tamotsu, Genji to Heishi, I39· 50. For this argument, see, e.g., Saro Shin'ichi, "Shoki hoken shakai no keisei," 7·

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tions was narrower than once thought. Moreover, among the fewer than ten provinces that the Taira held for more than brief periods, they had possessed only Wakasa, Echizen, and Noto continuously since the mid to late n6os. 51 Yet the war effort of the Taira (from n8o) would fail ignominiously in all three of these provinces, with the complement of indigenous officers-nominal subordinates of their Taira governors-going over to the Minamoto en bloc. 52 Viewed chronologically, then, Kiyomori's portfolio of governorships followed the same pattern as that of his shoen: the numbers became truly significant only near the end. Upon his admission to the inner circle at court in n6o, his share of provinces was advanced from one to three. Though he added to this total during the next twenty years, he still had fewer than ten as late as near the end of the II70S. Moreover, it is certainly worth observing that the five hundred estates and thirty provinces are totals cited in sources that postdate the Taira defeat. As such, they appear to be largely glosses designed to reinforce the bitter memory of a generation-long tyranny. 53 Finally, it remains no more than a supposition that Kiyomori sought to convert nominal subordinates into vassals. It may well be that, in fact, his search for aggrandizement was targeted in a different direction. That is, proprietary provinces continued to be viewed as a resource in land and a political lever at court, much as they had been for the whole of the twelfth century. 54

THE TAIRA AFTER II80

The year n8o was a momentous one for the Taira, embracing both the peak of their influence and the beginning of their decline. On 2/21, Kiyomori saw his own grandson (the offspring of emperor Takakura and Kenreimon-in)

51. The originator of the revised (i.e., "later") chronology was Kikuchi Takeo; see his "Heishi zuryo hyo," 159-62. Compare his data with the chart prepared by Ishimaru Hiroshi, "Insei ki chigyokokusei ni tsuite no ichikosatsu-toku ni Heishi chigyokoku kaimei no mezashite," 40-41. Ishimaru shows the rapid accumulation of Taira provinces coming only with the late 1179 coup. 52· See the entries for n8o/nh8, n8r/7h4, and n81/9h, in Gyokuyo, 2:446, 518, 525. 53· In chapter 2 we will encounter the opposite for the victorious Minamoto-a gloss designed to show the depth of that family's historic roots in the Kanto. 54· For a full accounting, see Ishimaru, "Insei ki chigyokokusei," 10-42.

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ascend the throne as the new emperor, and on 6/2 he moved Antoku, and the government as well, to his own country estate (Fukuhara) in Settsu Province.55 On the surface, the Taira might appear to have achieved new heights, having established their own regime in their newly designated capital. But the rationale for this move can be variously interpreted. As just suggested, the move to Fukuhara can be seen as a logical climax to Kiyomori's ambitions-the capstone to a polity now dominated by the Taira. A usurpation by a warrior chieftain had proceeded to the stage of a physical shift of the actual seat of government. A second view stresses not so much a culmination as its opposite, a move dictated by a sudden awareness of weakness. According to this theory, Kiyomori returned to the provinces so that he might mount a defense against the Minamoto. The move to Fukuhara, then, was in response to an unexpected challenge by his historic enemy. The challenge, as is well known, had been sparked by a call to arms by Prince Mochihito, who was none other than the recent failed aspirant to the throne. At any rate, Kiyomori hustled the government off to Fukuhara in an attempt to recruit local sources of support. A final explanation (the most persuasive) emphasizes a different kind of enemy-not the Minamoto, who had not yet answered the call to arms, but the entrenched interests of the central region from whom Kiyomori was now increasingly estranged. True, the Mochihito initiative had already been squelched, with the prince taking his own life at the end of the fifth month. But the anti-Taira animus was still growing, now with a more formidable opponent as its main protagonist. During the spring of n8o, Go-Shirakawa, the father of Mochihito, made overtures to sectarian strongholds (among them, Onjoji, Mount Hiei, and Kofukuji), in an attempt to win from them some fresh support. When the conspiracies were exposed, Kiyomori felt free to confiscate the temples' estates, and proceeded to do so. 56 Here, at any rate, was the context in which the Taira entourage left Kyoto for Fukuhara in the sixth month. But conditions, as we know, forced a reversal of the Fukuhara strategy. When the Minamoto declared war (on 8!I9) and then could not immediately be defeated, Kiyomori felt obliged to return to Kyoto (in the eleventh 55· Gyokuyo, n8o/6h,

2:4I3-I4

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month) in order to deny it to his new enemy. Repression, not isolation, became the new order of the day, a policy that was graphically expressed by Kiyomori's most notorious act of vengeance. In the twelfth month, he had his son, Shigehira, put the torch to two centers of anti-Taira agitation, the Todaiji and the Kofukuji of Nara. 57 By this act of wanton destruction, Kiyomori ended all possibility of any closing of ranks around himself. In fact, the policies that he now adopted showed the continuing weakness of his position. For example, in the twelfth month, Kiyomori released the exemperor and restored him to "active" retired status. 58 Obviously, the authority of the country's senior imperial figure was now to be placed at his own disposal. Or, as Kiyomori must have viewed it, the patron/client relationship that had always bound him to the ex-emperor was now, at long last, to be tipped on its head. The trouble was that imperial commands, by their own strength, could no longer guarantee compliance in the provinces, as the country now started to descend into civil war. Moreover, the fact that Kiyomori, in late n8o, was still governing through established channels proved that he remained quite unable to govern in any other way. Though the Taira leader made generous use of imperial commands, the effectiveness of these orders proved to be disappointing. For example, a capture order for Yoritomo was issued as early as the ninth month, whereas a mandate to suppress the "eastern rebels" (Kanto zokuto) followed two weeks later. 59 On another level, when a requisition order went out to four proprietary provinces (chigyokoku), only two within the group delivered any militia or rice. 60 As the sources from this period make clear, Kiyomori was not finding it easy to assemble the means-the men and the supplies-with which to wage war. Actually, the Taira were now beset with a whole host of problems, the most revealing of which was Kiyomori's difficulty in garrisoning the capital city itself The estate owners of Kyoto were evidently so resentful of Kiyomori that they resisted providing the needed armed men. 61 In frustration, the Taira leader ordered a census of the city's residents, presumably to 57· Ibid., nSo/12!28, p. 136; Gyokuyo, n8o/12!28,12!29, 2:455-56; Gukansho, 520. 58. Gyokuyo, n8o/12/r8, 2:453. 59· Hyakurensho, nSo/9/5, 9/22, p. 134. 6o. Sankaiki, nSo/12/ro, excerpted in Kokushi shiryoshu, 2:10. 6r. Ishimoda Sho, "Kamakura bakufu ikkoku jito shiki no seiritsu," 40-42.

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identify those persons who were holding back. 62 At any rate, the fragmented nature of the Taira rulership now lay increasingly exposed. Faced with rising resistance seemingly on all sides, Kiyomori was now driven to innovate. Early in 1181 he established two new local offices that were designed to expedite prosecution of the war. In n81II, he invested Munemori, his third son, with a military authority, called sokan, for nine named provinces in the central region. 63 As it happened, three on the list were to the east of the capital, where efforts to mount a defense were encountering difficulties. 64 Clearly, Kiyomori was now aware of the need to create a more efficient command structure. Pressed in this fashion, he arranged to have his own heir-designate appointed as the commander in chief for the whole of the central region. As far as can be determined, the authority linked to this post was to be implemented through an appropriation of the "pursuit and punishment" powers normally attaching to the individual provincial headquarters. But, as Munemori must have discovered, he found himself handicapped in various ways. For one thing, he gained no lawful power over general administration; he enjoyed no authority over land or taxes. 65 For another, he could not simply expect "former Taira'' to fall in behind him; no mechanism existed for him to become the chieftain of an all-Taira army. In fact, though a commander in chief seems only logical in the circumstances, it was an authority for which Kiyomori felt he required a precedent. Accordingly, when Munemori was appointed as the new sokan, an ancient namesake was cited from the eighth century. 66 In a sense, the precedent is at least as revealing as the post itself, since without it the title seemingly would not have been used. And thus, though Kiyomori was now in control of the central government, he was unable to shape it according to his own needs. Even now, the Taira leader was largely bound by the past.

62. Gyokuyo, n81/z/w, 2:481. 63. The nine provinces included those that constituted the central region (the Kinai), plus Ise, Iga, Omi, and Tanba. See Hyakurensho, n81/r/8, p. 137; and Gyokuyo, n81/rlr9, 2:466. Ishimoda Sho has examined the sokan in detail in "Heishi seiken no sokan shiki setchi." 64. Ishiyamadera shozo monjo, late n8o Takakura joko inzen, HI, 8:3008, doc. 3940; and Hyakurensho, n8olr2/r, p. 135. 65. Ishimoda, "Heishi seiken no sokan setchi," 8-9. 66. The precedent dated from 731; ibid., 4-5.

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The limitations inherent in the sokan conception were offset, at least in part, by another title, that of steward in chief, or sogesu over shoen. Actually, only one such stewardship is recorded, that ofTaira Moritoshi (appointed in n81h), but scholars have surmised that there may have been others, joining Moritoshi, who was assigned to Tanba Province. 67 Faced with shortages of rice and presumably of other provisions as well, Kiyomori obviously hoped to coordinate requisitioning from private estates. Though we have no proof, he may also have hoped to open a new channel to shoen officials, whom he now, belatedly, would have been seeking to recruit. Unfortunately, there is no way to judge the effectiveness of either of these new posts. Since their names do not reappear, and since the shortages of men and supplies were dearly not allayed, 68 neither experiment may have survived for very long. Moreover, Kiyomori himself died a month later (in the intercalated second month) and was succeeded by Munemori, the new sokan. It is possible that the job of head of the Taira was burdensome enough, so that it compromised, or terminated, his tenure as commander in chief. 69 At all events, the Hight of the Taira leadership from Kyoto two years later (see chapter 3) suggests a failure, ultimately, of all coordinated Taira programs in the central region.

SUMMARY

Were the Taira, then, destined to be hegemonic figures only momentarily? Unlike Minamoto Yoritomo, who would capitalize on his outlaw status by appropriating what he wanted, Kiyomori could neither alter the central structure on which his authority depended nor rush to convert the land system into a resource for war. As the protector of the public order, he could

67. For the reference to the Tanba sogesu, see Gyokuyo, n8rl2/8, 2:474; for a discussion, Ishimoda, "Ikkoko jita," 36-45. At the end of n8o, a "subjugation officer" (tsuitoshr) had been sent to Kii Province to collect commissariat rice (hyoromar); cited in Negoro yosho, n84!2 Daidenbo-in shoshi ge an, HI, 8: 3n9, doc. 4141. 68. See, e.g., Gyokuyo, n8r/int.2/6, 3/6, 2:486, 492, for references to such shortages. 69. Kiyomori (aged sixty-three) died on n8r/int.2/ 4, and Gyokuyo, in its entry of the next day (2:485), provides a brief obituary on his life and career. For Munemori's succession, see Gukansho, 522.

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not set aside all precedents for the sake of raising and equipping troops, even though that was what the conditions of war obviously required. Accordingly, we should not be too surprised that Kiyomori channeled his levy and conscription orders through traditional agencies. 70 Similarly, we should not be too surprised to find almost a complete lack of evidence of a new approach to the question of rewards. For reasons that I will elaborate in chapter 4, the Taira were not much involved with the evolving concept of a localized ''jitiJ'' authority, and in any event they did not develop it as the basis of a rewards program. Indeed, since the Minamoto did not move in that direction themselves until very late, it is hard to imagine the Taira as having gotten there first. The full implications of these deficiencies will become clearer as we proceed to explore the condition of provincial houses in eastern Japan. As we shall see, greater (if still undeveloped) local strength held the potential for a greater explosion of negative feelings against the very system on which the Taira so clearly depended. In the end, the Taira were toppled as much by a combination of new techniques and resources as they were by their own inadequacies and links with the past. The Taira, then, proved effective at raising tensions in both the capital and the countryside, and these contributed significantly to what came next. But their legacy remains mostly limited to the wall of constraints that continued to surround and thwart them, a fact that helps us to fit them into the history of Japan's twelfth century. 70. Ishimoda, "Ikkoku jito," 4I-47, shows how manpower and supply levies continued to go

through governors and provincial headquarters on the one hand, and through proprietors and estate managers on the other.

CHAPTER TWO

The Missing Minamoto

The provinces lying in the eastern region of Japan, where the Kamakura Bakufu came to be founded, have traditionally been accorded a special status. From earliest times they had a reputation for being home to a hardy class of residents, and also for having been less than fully integrated into the imperial realm. Moreover, for historians, the knowledge that Japan's first Bakufu was established there seemed to strengthen the idea of semiindependence. In other words, the apparent ease with which the area came to be disengaged from the central polity after n8o seemed to furnish the best proof of its near autonomy earlier. 1 Yet the story, as we now realize, is not so clear-cut. For one thing, the history of the region shows similarities with the histories of other outlying areas; what differences existed were not constitutional in nature. For example,

r. For this position in its most extreme form, see Murakami Yasusuke, "le Society as a Pattern of Civilization," 297-301, 314-19. The argument on behalf of the east's near autonomy also informs Farris, Heavenly ~rriors, along with the work of many historians in Japan. As will be apparent, I take a position that is very different.

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there was the same hierarchy of offices, intrusion of private property, emergence of heritability, and advance of militarization; the shiki system embraced both east and west. 2 Moreover, the orders and communiques that traveled between the capital and the east were no different in purpose and content from those sent elsewhere. If the east in fact was notable for anything unusual, it was for a greater number of celebrated incidents and individuals, which ultimately became the scaffolding for the history that has come down to us. In a drama in which warriors were portrayed as essentially their own masters, the main dynamic was one of rivalry between the Taira and Minamoto, with the Kanto as the primary stage for that competition. 3 In fact, during the Heian age, the soil in the Kanto was not substantially more fertile than elsewhere to nourish a growth of provincial warriors to anything approaching full maturity. Since the capital did not surrender its basic leverage over the countryside, the potential for local autonomy remained constricted everywhere. In particular, as we have already noted, the top level of provincial entitlements (shikz) never broke free of central control, and, indeed, there are no recorded instances of warriors granting other warriors landed offices. Instead, all documents of investiture or confirmation of provincial officeholders were issued by courtiers or clerics or their direct agents. 4 A5 a consequence, the conventional hub for feudal relations is elusive before n8o, obliging us to rethink an old equation. 5 In fact, various old assumptions need to be reviewed. To cite a further example, the absence of Minamoto leaders from the Kanro for exceedingly long periods is indicative of a set of priorities that we are not prepared for. It suggests that military lordship, under Minamoto chieftains, was less a fixture 2. I first began to develop these ideas in the early I98os, i.e., some years after the appearance of WG. See my "Patterns of Provincial Inheritance in Late Heian Japan," 67-95. 3· The quintessential expression of the "remembered narrative" approach is Sansom, A History ofjapan to I334, chap. Iz. 4- Even in-family transmissions by will required the confirmation of higher authority; see, e.g., Kuri monjo, II26/6/r9 Iwami kokushi chosen, HI, 6:I790-9I, doc. 2076. Holders could not transfer named entitlements to any other than their very closest relatives. 5· Professor Kawane has put it this way: "Before the establishment of the Kamakura Bakufu, there was no way for a warrior to be given an estate (including land and seigneurial rights) as reward for his military exploits." Kawane Yoshiyasu, "Process of Formalization of Military Exploit Documents in Medieval Japan," 5·

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than a fiction, as the succession of Minamoto heads, as with their Taira counterparts, built their careers mostly in Kyoto. Implicit in older treatments is a steady expansion of Minamoto interests, and a corresponding shrinkage of central influence. More accurately, successes of the moment proved difficult to sustain, and in any event were all too readily abandoned. Just as in the case of the Taira, no bloc concept ofMinamoto existed. The name itself identified persons on four levels: (1) courtiers of the highest ranks, who had no connection with either warriors or provincial service; (2) courtiers who served as governors, including the lineage that provided the historic "chieftains"; (3) the courtiers who over time settled in the provinces and became the top stratum of a newly armed local elite; and (4) the descendants of the former indigenous elite (kuni-no-miyatsuko et al.), who somehow were able to acquire the Minamoto name. The last two (along with Taira and Fujiwara of similar background) gradually came to dominate the provincial governments and increasingly were referred to as "resident public officials," or zaichokanjin. 6 In short, all who were Minamoto shared a prestigious ancestry (real or invented) and served to bolster the established hierarchy at their respective levels. Quite at variance with early Europe where the "shortness ... of pedigree" hastened the onset of feudalism/ the zaichokanjin in Japan were of distinctly aristocratic origin. It was a condition in Japan of the very highest importance, which helped to keep the center and periphery from rupturing prematurely. Nevertheless, the disparity of status between governors and zaichokanjin had the potential to cut in both directions. On the one hand, it provided the basis for joint action on behalf of mutual self-interest. During the Heian age, governors were second to none in their reputations for venality, a notion captured by their popular labeling as "recipients of wealth," or zuryo; 8 some of

6. The word zaichokanjin became current in documents in the mid-eleventh century, and by the twelfth century implied a distinct social class. See Takeuchi Rizo, "Zaichokanjin no bushika." 7· Marc Bloch, Feudal Society, 2:284. 8. Though it dates from the eighth century, the term's earliest pejorative usage is in the famous "Owari no kuni gebumi" of the late tenth century, which is a petition against the governor of Owari brought by the beleaguered residents of that province; see HI, 2:473-85, doc. 334· By the twelfth century, various schemes had been evolved to divide a province's assets between a Kyoto-resident governor and local officials.

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this wealth devolved upon their lieutenants. But on the other hand, a balance of interests was often difficult to maintain. In particular, since governors had limited tenures while zaichokanjin were now indigenized, the appointment of a new governor was frequently destabilizing. Sometimes the latter exerted pressure against subordinates, or the subordinates themselves became disobedient. 9 But whatever the situation in individual cases, locals who had pretensions continued to rely on capital-based patrons. By the twelfth century, zaichokanjin had the choice of remaining under the jurisdiction of a governor, or of seeking an alternative within the framework of a shoen. Yet neither option held out the prospect of genuine autonomy, since the proprietors of all shoen were ranking courtiers and clerics. Phrased differently, no person whose primary identity was in the provinces could be the owner of record of any of the country's Heian-era shoen. 10 For the Minamoto heads, a multiplicity of competing patronage networks, all centering in the capital, worked to undermine the potential of regional organization. Nor was the bond of common ancestry a viable substitute. Since the practice of the age was partible inheritance, a kindred's lateral integration was always under pressure. 11 Thus even as local families might have shared the Minamoto name, they were just as likely to share as well a fierce rivalry. Finally, and as we shall see, the Minamoto were beset by a host of leadership problems, which further strained relations among the branches. For a variety of reasons, then, the times were not conducive to the emergence of a "Minamoto east." The Kanto became the home of individual, province-based zaichokanjin, some of whom bore the Minamoto name. But, in the era before n8o, it did not become the center of a concrete entity that, with any historical accuracy, could be called "the Minamoto."

9· The classic example of the first was a governor's ouster of the prestigious Chiba family in n36 (see below, p. 55-56); for the second, see, e.g., a governor's reproach to the zaichokanjin of Echizen Province for their failure to forward taxes; Daigo zojiki, nJ8/nh8 Echizen kokushi chosen an, HI, 5:2023, doc. 2400. IO. Registers of shoen holdings exist for various courtier houses and religious institutions, whereas none exists for even the most exalted "warrior." As we shall see below, provincial commenders allowed the authority to make executive decisions to pass to the central figures who became owners of shoen. n. For an elaboration of this theme, see my LA!, chap. r.

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EAST

The greatest of the Minamoto generals in the period before Yoritomo were his eleventh-century ancestors, Yoriyoshi and Yoshiie. 12 The former (d. 1075) established his reputation in what is known as the Former Nine Years War (1053-62), which was waged against the warlike families of northern Japan. An army of the court served under the command ofYoriyoshi, who for his part was appointed governor ofMutsu Province as well as "pacification general" of the north. Thus, in the recruitment of his army, Yoriyoshi was operating under the authority of the court, though this did not mean that the enlistments themselves were unambiguously "public." It was Yoriyoshi's status as a courtier, and hence his personal connections, that made it possible for him to assemble and hold troops. 13 Recognizing that, the Mutsu waki, a literary account of Yoriyoshi's exploits, was able to gloss over what might otherwise seem contradictory. This work refers to his fighting force as a "government army'' (kangun) while simultaneously underlining its private character. 14 At any rate, men of the highest prestige had the potential to construct government armies around themselves. But the point is that no one for the entirety of the Heian period had the ability to pass on such entities to an heir. In that sense, there was no continuing phenomenon that can be referred to as "the Minamoto" until Yoritomo finally created one in the n8os. As is well known, the Minamoto, in the form of the Bakufu, came to be inherited by his successors, Yoriie and Sanetomo. The evidence for such an assertion may be derived from an examination of the Minamoto leadership beginning with the generation ofYoshiie (1039no6). Having spent his youthful years fighting in the Former Nine Years War, Yoshiie went on to become governor ofMutsu and pacification general, like his father before him. But in the later 1080s, he decided on a course of action that has been interpreted as having led in a new direction. Specifically, he determined to wage a further campaign in the north, which would

I2.

A full and provocative treatment of father and son appears in Yasuda Motohisa, Minamoto

Yoshiie, which is also a history of the Minamoto in the eleventh century. 13. Yasuda Motohisa, Bushidan, 64-65. I4. See Helen McCullough, trans., "A Tale ofMutsu," q8-2n.

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be private in inspiration and pursued without the imprimatur of the court. In the view of most historians, the men whom he recruited and who fought under his command gradually came to think of themselves as his retainers. 15 Yet even granting such a characterization, the tie came to be undone soon thereafter. For at the conclusion of the fighting, Yoshiie returned to the capital, where he elected to remain essentially for the rest of his life. His primary identity remained that of a central aristocrat; and his life and career need to be assessed as a whole, and not just on the basis of what he achieved in the ro8os. So judged, Yoshiie was far from being a revolutionary figure. The proof for such a conclusion seems overwhelming. For one thing, it is startling to find that Yoshiie is not known to have held any land rights in Sagami Province, where his well-known military headquarters ofKamakura was located. 16 Since the situation was not much different in the other nearby provinces, no economic base can be said to have existed that might have nurtured a retainer network into the future. 17 But even if there had been such a base, his physical presence would have been required. k it was, Kyoto became and remained his home of personal choice. At the same time, the members of his band had their own base areas to worry about, where the rivalries of the past quickly resurfaced. As a consequence, individual lineages placed their own interests and integration ahead of those of any larger combination. In the absence of dynamic leadership and the opportunity to fight as in the north, any chance to sustain a viable union seems to have been lost. There is one additional episode that is frequently cited as proof of a new level of warrior development in Japan. In 1091, the court issued a decree prohibiting Yoshiie from accepting commendations of land, and, a year later, from incorporating new shoen. 18 According to earlier historians, here is evidence of Yoshiie's intention to introduce feudal relations. As they see it, Yoshiie would now be able to construct a system of landholding in which his tenants would simultaneously become his vassals. 19 The problem with such reasoning is that it is predicated on a perception ofYoshiie as an incipient military lord, which ignores the contemporary con15. Yasuda Motohisa, Minamoto Yoshiie, 100-101. 16. Yasuda Motohisa, "Kodai makki ni okeru Kanto bushidan," 23. 17· Ibid., 23-25. 18. The decrees are reproduced in Yasuda, Bushidan, 134-35. 19. E.g., Sansom, A History ofjapan to I334, 254.

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text. For one thing, no middle-level aristocrat such as Yoshiie-a career governor-could simply elevate himself into an elite owner of shoen. 2° For another, the actual commenders referred to were untitled persons (hyakusho) well below the level of zaichokanjin. Presumably their goal would have been less membership in a military coalition than participation in a network of economic patronage. At any rate, no confirmation or other documentation survives, much less the formal contracts that zaichokanjin were starting to demand, and to receive, from courtiers and clerics. In short, whatever Yoshiie's intentions, his plan did not envision a permanent vassal system. In fact, the era was one of prohibitions generally against shoen, and the decree directed at Yoshiie fits easily into that mold. 21 Moreover, six years later, the ex-emperor Shirakawa chose Taira Masamori as his principal ally rather than the more famous-and potentially more formidable-Yoshiie. As we know, Masamori proved to be a loyal client of the imperial house, content to be cast and to prosper in the role for which his genealogy had prepared him. As for Yoshiie, his return to the capital worked to negate his achievements in the field, a situation that the ex-emperor was aware of and sought to exploit. 22 At any rate, though illustrious beyond comparison among his peers, Yoshiie was not thinking of a program designed to keep a private corps of loyal retainers. The heir ofYoshiie, Yoshichika, had the misfortune not to be of the mettle of his father or grandfather. As early as IIOI, while Yoshiie was still alive, Yoshichika, then the governor ofTsushima, was attacked and exiled to Oki Island. 23 Following his succession to the family headship in no6, he was relocated, by court edict, to Izumo, where he proceeded to murder the governor's personal deputy (mokudai). At this juncture, Taira Masamori was 20. Yoshiie eventually came to achieve the senior fourth rank, lower grade, an accomplishment that left him short of the highest nobility; see Yasuda, Minamoto Yoshiie, I96. Professor Fujiki imputes to Yoshiie a desire, before all else, to rise within courtier society; Fujiki Kunihiko, Nihon zenshi J, kodai, 2:26I-62. But when Yoshiie died in uo6, he was remembered as merely the "former governor of Mutsu Province." 21. See, e.g., those of !093/3/3 and I099/5/I2, cited in the diary of Fujiwara Moromichi (known as the Go-Nijo Moromichi-kz). For an explanation that emphasizes the court's desire to be punitive toward Yoshiie owing to his quarrelsomeness and unpaid debts, see Farris, Heavenly Wtzrriors, 239-40. 22. Ibid., 257-58. Also, Yasuda, Minamoto Yoshiie, u8-36. 23. Hyakurensho, uor/7/7, no2/ro/z8, p. 6o.

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ordered to exact proper justice, a charge that the Taira leader energetically carried out. When the severed head ofYoshichika was displayed in Kyoto, a dramatic downturn in Minamoto fortunes commenced. Demoralized and suddenly without a mature chieftain, the Minamoto began to disintegrate at its top level. In an incident that seemed to typify its new low state, Tameyoshi, the next head, was maneuvered into attacking his own great-uncle, Yoshitsuna-who in fact was the last surviving brother of Yoshiie. 24 A youthful chieftain-designate had now made war against the most senior figure in the trunk line of the Minamoto. But not only was the leadership now turned against itself; it also turned its attention away from the east. Neither Yoshichika nor Tameyoshi is known to have traveled there, which meant that for half a century, no chieftain of the Minamoto was personally involved with the Kant6. 25 And though there were other close collaterals who did go out to the east, the situation was actually complicated as a result. For when Yoshitomo, Tameyoshi's heir, proceeded there in the II40S, he encountered kin who saw little reason to submit to him. As they might have viewed it, Yoshitomo was the representative of a line of courtiers that had long ago forsaken its eastern connections. Moreover, even at the level of provincial organization, the reality of a "Minamoto east" scarcely existed. Indeed, the concept of warrior bands organized under the Minamoto is predicated, before all else, on the existence of the bands themselves. But bushidan as real phenomena are caught up in a contradiction, since the term, which embraces the concept, is a modern invention. Seemingly influenced by the idea of the comitatus, the prefeudal war band in the West, scholars simply assumed the existence of bushidan, a Japanese equivalent, and then allowed the term's imagery to convey the necessary solidarity. Even more serious, these alleged bands of warriors were then portrayed as having been molded into "the Minamoto" by actual chieftains-rather than by the posterity that clearly took up that cause. 26

24. Ibid., II09hh6, p. 64.

25. Tameyoshi, based in Kyoto, became governor of Izumo and then of Awaji, both in the west; Yasuda, "Kodai makki," 9· 26. Friday, Hired Swords, 93-121, elaborates on the institutional weaknesses of "warrior bands," and affirms that the term did not actually exist at the time.

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Our interpretation here needs to begin with an admission of ignorance on two levels-of the entities known as bushidan, and of any larger composite under the Minamoto name. The organizational potential of provincials was hampered at almost every turn. For instance, though family headship might have provided an opening for the development of a concept of chieftainship, partible inheritance, which was the current practice, worked the other way. The reason was that siblings and collaterals normally sought to avoid subordinate status-the very problem, at a higher level, that bedeviled the Minamoto leadership as well. A classic example was the rivalry between Yoshiie and his brother Yoshitsuna in the I090S, which weakened the Minamoto main line at the height of its influence. 27 In fact, such centripetal tendencies within twelfth-century kin groups probably represented the dominant pattern overall. In practice, then, groupings of coequal lineages shared little more than a common ancestry, which left the trunk line heads with little real authority. For instance, when quarrels over inheritances reached a serious level, they were resolved not by the senior figure of the affected kindred but rather by the senior proprietor of the disputed lands. This meant that tribunals in the capital judged the property suits oflocal magnates, even when the disagreements were between close kin. Put differently, the larger the local social and/or territorial unit, the more independence it inevitably conceded to the center. As a test of this hypothesis we can examine the career of Minamoto Yoshitomo, who abandoned Kyoto for the east in the mid-n4os. Though it could reasonably be argued that his main goal was to restore Minamoto glories there, a rivalry with his own father, Tameyoshi, intervened and became of greater concern. At any rate, since Tameyoshi was a Kyoto resident whose primary interests were in central Japan and the west, the twenty-year-old Yoshitomo headed east as his father's intended representative in that region. 28 The obstacles Yoshitomo encountered will tell us much about the organizational limits of what he was seeking to achieve, and also much about the region in which his own son, Yoritomo, would eventually prosper.

27. For the intrafamily inheritance problems of the late Heian, see LAJ, chap. r. For Yoshiie and his brother, see Yasuda, Minamoto Yoshiie, I2I-25. 28. Born in Kyoto in n23, Yoshitomo probably went out to the Kanto in II42 or n43; Yasuda, "Kodai makki," 8-9, 31.

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According to Yasuda Motohisa, Yoshitomo succeeded in fashioning an alliance whose heartland region consisted of four provinces-Sagami, Musashi, Shimosa, and Kazusa. 29 His experience was actually different in each of these provinces, and was nowhere an achievement that could be considered complete. On the one hand, the physical presence of a member of the Minamoto trunk line proved to be effective; but on the other, the difficulties of constructing a regional vassalage were amply demonstrated. Sagami Province was the site of the original Minamoto headquarters of Kamakura, which seems to have lapsed as an active base following the departure ofYoshiie. For that reason, Yoshitomo had no easy time of it half a century later, and force had to be added to persuasion to turn the area into a Minamoto enclave. A crucial event came in 1144 when, at the head of a force of a thousand men, Yoshitomo launched an attack on a family, the Oba, which earlier had fought under Yoshiie. 30 Such a turn ofloyalties lay at the heart of the dilemma facing Yoshitomo more generally. In the case at hand, despite the Oba's earlier ties to the Minamoto, it commended some of its homelands in III7 to lse Shrine. As a result, lse became the patron (honke) of a new shoen, while the head of the Oba was appointed the estate's hereditary manager (gesu). The Minamoto were not involved. Soon afterwards, a challenge to the new shoen's exempt status was initiated from within the provincial headquarters. To counteract this effort, the Oba, with lse's help, was able to take advantage of the full extent of the Heian appeals process. Wending their way through a hierarchy of intermediaries, including the governor, several Oba petitions were forwarded to the ranking counselors at court. This effort led to decrees being handed down confirming the estate's exemptions, which had the effect also of strengthening the Oba's authority locally. In this sequence, too, the leadership of the Minamoto had not been involved. As a result, when Yoshitomo became active in Sagami, he confronted a situation in which he was not likely to win universal support. By allying himself, as he did, with the province's entrenched officeholding class, he was al-

29. Yasuda, Bushidan, 92-roo. 30. For Yoshitomo and the Oba, see Yasuda, "Kodai makki," 42-48; and Nishioka Toranosuke, Shoen shi no kenkii, 2:639-46.

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most destined to clash with the Oba, who had sought their security in the

shoen system. In the event, though Yoshitomo's invasion of the Oba homelands was successful, his efforts were undone in the legal battle now initiated by his enemy. Eventually, the Oba were reconfirmed in their status as estate managers, fully justifying their dependence on a central patron. Among other things, the case proved that a judicial decision might still undo any physical occupation of property even by so prestigious a figure as Yoshitomo. Yet two most interesting chapters, typical of another pattern of that era, follow in the story. In n56, the heir to the Oba head elected to ally with Yoshitomo in the Hogen Incident, despite the clear-cut enmity of a dozen years earlier. But in n8o, the family refused at first to submit to Yoritomo, opting instead to join the Taira. 31 Thus, in situations in which a local family sought its security in hereditary managerial titles, its steadfastness as hereditary vassals was undermined. In the case of the Oba, it entered into an enduring arrangement with lse Shrine, and fought both for and against the Minamoto at different times. In the context of the II40S, there were other families of Sagami for whom the protection of a shoen and the camaraderie of Yoshitomo's band were seemingly not in contradiction. For example, the Yamanouchi ofKamakura District, whose lands had been incorporated within a shoen, submitted to Yoshitomo when he set up nearby. This family also fought under his command in u56. 32 Yet, typically, the next generation went the other way. In n8o, when Yoritomo was raising his army, the heir to the Yamanouchi refused at first to submit to him. 33 As we have seen, the Oba and the Yamanouchi were houses of a middling size whose lands had been converted into shoen. For Yoshitomo, however, the winning over of zaichokanjin whose support was indispensable for any provincewide alliance was more important, and within this group, the Miura, hereditary vice governors of Sagami, stood first. For Sagami as a whole, the Miura held the policing authority known as the kendan as well as the ultimate responsibility for collecting taxes and tribute. 34 That the Miura should have joined with Yoshitomo, who was then

31. Omori, Buke jidai no kenkyu, 1:425; and AK, n8o/8f23, 9/3. 32. Yasuda, Bushidan, 94· 33· Ibid., 96-97. 34· Ibid., 97-99.

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twenty-one years old, reveals the gulf between a family of zaichokanjin status and the representative of a distinguished lineage from the capital. On the other hand, even after the alliance was formed and was able to defeat the Oba on the battlefield, it was defeated, as we have seen, in the judicial battle at court. Clearly, even a minor house with access to the center might defend itself successfully against superior military force. Nevertheless, for the first time in living memory, the top rank of officialdom had been assembled under a trunk line Minamoto banner in an eastern province. Though not the governor of Sagami, Yoshitomo had successfully organized its zaichokanjin. In adjacent Musashi Province, the heads of a number of families similarly fell in behind him. Musashi, indeed, was notable for its lack of any single house of the stature of the Miura. It was not that Musashi's military potential was underdeveloped, but rather that its separate families tended to neutralize one another. In particular, kinsmen tended to branch and to divide rather than submit to a dominant head, in a way that was symptomatic of the high level of rivalry among families that shared a common ancestry. At any rate, Yoshitomo, standing above such rivalries, was able to convert the various heads into a corps of more or less equal provincial lieutenants. However, when he abandoned the Kanto for Kyoto around 1146, the earlier competition in Musashi quickly resurfaced. 35 In the provinces of Shimosa and Kazusa, the situation was different yet again. In the era before Yoshitomo, a family ofTaira lineage had divided, and each branch had taken up residence in one of the respective provinces. The two families, known historically as the Chiba and Kazusa, were invested with prestigious titles and became dominant within their provincial headquarters. Nevertheless, by the time ofYoshitomo's arrival, the Chiba were under siege from various quarters, and Yoshitomo determined to take advantage of that situation. Thus he neither sought to bolster a leading family, as he did in Sagami, nor moved to coordinate relative equals, as in Musashi. Instead, he attempted to wrest leadership away from the Chiba by laying claim to at least a portion of that family's homelands. The full implications of this episode will be elucidated presently. For the moment we need only note that Yoshitomo sought to exploit weaknesses in the Chiba's position by commending vulnerable holdings to lse Shrine. In Sagami, we should recall, it 35·

Ibid., 102-4.

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was the same lse Shrine that facilitated the defeat ofYoshitomo by successfully defending the Oba homelands through the courts. Though there is no proof that Yoshitomo succeeded at this time in gaining a working control over the Chiba or their collaterals in Kazusa, Yasuda has reckoned that he accomplished both. Thus four provinces-Sagami, Musashi, Shimosa, and Kazusa-fell mostly under his sway. But there were other nearby provinces where Yoshitomo demonstrably failed, and his failures are as informative as his successes. It was not merely that Yoshitomo's term of residence in the Kanto was too brief, but rather that he encountered obstacles that proved insurmountable. In addition to the kinds of problems already discussed, he found that he was unable to win the support of his own closest kin. For not only was his own father, with whom he was feuding, still alive, but there were lineages in the east that were unprepared to accept his leadership. The weak lateral integration that was plaguing families everywhere worked a particular hardship on the Minamoto, who had been so visibly fragmented since the era of Yoshiie. In Hitachi, for example, both the Satake and the Shida elected not to submit to Yoshitomo. Behind this decision lay the Satake's descent from Yoshiie's youngest brother, Yoshimitsu, which meant that the Satake head was a cousin ofYoshitomo; the roots of the two scions were almost equally distinguished. A condition of near parity was even more in evidence with the Shida, whose progenitor was Yoshitomo's own younger brother, Yoshihiro. In both instances, then, the closeness of the relationship hindered an acknowledgment of the trunk line's superiority. Nor did the situation improve over time. At an early juncture in the Genpei War, Yoritomo was obliged to attack and destroy the Satake and Shida. 36 Conditions in Shimotsuke and Kozuke provinces reveal a variation of this pattern. In the early twelfth century, Yoshikuni, another son ofYoshiie, settled in Shimotsuke and established a base there. Upon his death in 1155, his line, as was typical, divided into rival branches. His first son, Yoshishige, settled in Nitta District in Kozuke, where he either inherited an already established private domain from his mother's side, or supervised the opening and commendation (to the regent's line of the Fujiwara) of a new estate. 36. Yasuda, "Kodai makki," 33-34, 40; AK u8o/u/7, u/8; n8IIint. 2l2o, 2l23.

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Whatever the actual case, in II57 he was appointed manager (gesu) of what was now called Nitta Estate. 37 Moreover, in a parallel development, Yoshishige's brother and rival, Yoshiyasu, inherited his late father's claim (itself contested) to Ashikaga Estate in Shimotsuke. 38 At any rate, here were two uncles ofYoshitomo who apparently saw no reason to respond to his overtures.39 At the same time, these Minamoto collaterals were initiating a pair of families whose greatest fame would be reserved for two centuries later. In the 1330s, the Nitta and the Ashikaga played a central role in engineering the destruction of the Kamakura Bakufu. For Yoshitomo, the significance of these prominent offshoots was that they were able to ignore his posturings as Minamoto leader-in-waiting. This was especially true of Ashikaga Yoshiyasu, who was now head of a line descended from one of Yoshiie's own brothers and older than the youthful Yoshitomo by a generation. As a mark of his own distinction, Yoshiyasu became a member of the ex-emperor's private guards and a holder of the prestigious title of central police captain (kebiishi). In n56, though he fought on the winning side with Yoshitomo and Taira Kiyomori, he did so as the independent commander of his own mounted troops. 40 The picture in Shimotsuke was further complicated by the presence of a fully distinct family that was also coming to be called Ashikaga. Descended from the Fujiwara and based in the same Ashikaga District, this second house became a bitter rival of the Minamoto Ashikaga. Indeed, under the headship ofToshitsuna, it contested the managerial authority within Ashikaga Estate, and took advantage of the premature death of Ashikaga Yoshiyasu in II 57· The struggle for local lordship of the estate was now picked up by Nitta Yoshishige, Yoshiyasu's brother, but the matter was ultimately resolved in favor of the Fujiwara Ashikaga. 41 As if conditions in Shimotsuke were not complicated enough, a collateral

37· Masaki monjo, II57/3/8 saemon no kami ke mandokoro kudashibumi, HI, 6:2363-64, doc. 2875. 38. Yasuda, "Kodai makki," 35· 39· Farris observes that these two Minamoro brothers had become "vassals" of Kiyomori; Heavenly Wtirriors, 281-82. Interpreted slightly differently, such was their reluctance to remain true to their Minamoto birthright! 40. Nishioka, Shoen, 2:623. 41. For details, see Friday, Hired Swords, ro2-5.

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of the Fujiwara Ashikaga, named Oyama, was also an active force within the province. Almost needless to add, they were bitter rivals of their Ashikaga cousins, which also made them prospects for recruitment by the Minamoto. Nevertheless, the fragmented nature of the rivalries in Shimotsuke worked against any larger success there by Minamoto Yoshitomo. Even the latter's tenure as governor for several years seems to have done little to advance his organizational efforts. 42 For by the mid-n5os, Yoshitomo had long since departed the region; he became a governor of the traditional type, that is, in absentia. As with other Minamoto before him, then, his separation from the capital proved to be only momentary, and contemporary sources place him in the east only infrequently. On the other hand, Yoshihira and Tomonaga, his eldest sons, are believed by some to have been born there, whereas Yoritomo, his third son, is thought to have been born in Kyoto (n47). 43 At any rate, from that point until his death in n6o, Yoshitomo was a resident of the capital city, where he became, with Kiyomori, a joint victor of Hogen (n56), the juncture at which he finally succeeded his estranged father. For the final four years of his life, Yoshitomo may have thought that he had successfully restored his family's fortunes, but that, as we know, was to be an achievement only of the next generation. In sum, Yoshitomo's failures come closer to capturing the spirit of the times than do his accomplishments. The major reason for this is that the world he occupied remained riven by rivalries-among his own family, as we have seen, but also at a lower level among the zaichokanjin of the various provinces. This circumstance is well illustrated by the experiences of the Oyama, whose chieftain held a hereditary vice governorship and constableship for Shimotsuke. Yet despite these advantages, the Oyama were never 42. A document of II 53 is signed "Shimotsuke governor Yoshitomo"; Sonkeikaku-zo buke tekagami, II53/8h7 Minamoto Yoshitomo ukebumi, HI, 10:3885, doc. 5023. A diary entry of n56 refers to Yoshitomo as governor (Heihanki, II56/7/5, reproduced in Omori, Buke jidai, 1:385), and he may have retained that office into II 59 when, momentarily, he seems to have be-

come the governor of Harima (see excerpt from the Horekikanki, in William R. Wilson, trans., Hogen monogatari: A Tale ofthe Disorder ofHogen, 146; Brown and Ishida, The Future and the Past, 109). Nevertheless, a record of n61 refers to the recently deceased Yoshitomo as "the former governor ofShimotsuke"; Ichiki monjo, n61/r Minamoto Yoshimune kishinjo an, HI, 7=2514-15, doc. 3121. 43· Yasuda, "Kodai makki," 31; Nagahara Keiji, Minamoto Yoritomo, 10-11.

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able to achieve a province-wide hegemony. On the debit side were the two Ashikaga families noted earlier-one a recent offshoot of the Minamoto trunk line, and therefore an unlikely prospect for subordination; the other, one of its own branches, which happened, like itself, to be in possession of substantial lands. 44 Only in n8o, when Oyama Masamitsu submitted to Yoritomo, did the prospects for real power come within reach. By 1200, the offspring of Masamitsu had been showered with honors, all under the aegis of the newly established Kamakura Bakufu.

EASTERN WARRIORS AND

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As noted, the fact that Yoshitomo's achievement was modest and ephemeral can be explained variously. Not only were there divisions within his own kindred, but there were similar competitions within other families. Moreover, Yoshitomo did not have even the nucleus of a program that might have led to regional governance by his own retainers; he had neither the imagination nor the drive to evolve and then to execute a plan of action. Finally, in the absence of some as yet unforeseen crisis in Kyoto, the potential vulnerability of the capital was not yet visible. As they always had been, warriors remained in service to courtiers. Only in the most limited way, then, had the alliance that Yoshitomo fashioned provided even a foretaste of the future. Put differently, no one had yet conceived of using the umbrella of a Minamoto lordship to alter the fundamental balance of authority. And thus, as so many of his forebears had done before him, Yoshitomo, after a time, returned to Kyoto. Without ever imagining that he might oppose the distributors of patronage, he took his place instead as one of their prime beneficiaries. It was a decision that might have been rationalized by the best of precedents, since it was reminiscent of that taken by Yoshiie. Yet it was not as if the issue that would become the source for radical behavior was not already fully apparent. The courtiers who occupied the summit of the social hierarchy laid claim to universal proprietorship as a right that flowed directly from their privileged birth. As a consequence, the power to invest, and the power to confirm and judge, resided with men from the

44. Yasuda, Bushidan, 106; AK, n8I/int.2!23.

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capital exclusively, with provincials as the mere recipients of such largesse. Yet because the latter were limited to entitlements at the level of management, they could not compete equally with provincial governors. This meant that the twelfth century not only failed to produce warrior autonomy; it experienced a heightened search for protection by traditional means. It was out of such a condition of congenital insecurity that provincial commendations leading to shoen now surged. Commendation itself, leading to the incorporation of immune estates, provided a means for provincials to insulate their homelands from civil governors. Yet though the concept was sound in theory, the practice was sometimes different. In particular, commenders might find themselves vulnerable to new abuses-at times from the very proprietors who had just been courted as new "protectors" (see below, pp. 55-58). Nevertheless, the prospect of acquiring relief from the levies and the intrusions of governors was obviously a powerful incentive at the time. For example, Anrakujuin was one of the more prosperous of imperially sponsored chapels that converted donations of land into shoen. In 1156, a retired emperor's edict called on the managers of Anrakujuin's holdings to report any violations by governors or their agents; any lawlessness would then be prohibited by imperial writ. 45 Three years later, a blanket decree of the central government's State Council declared an immunity for each of the enumerated estates possessed by that temple. 46 In this regard, it is of more than passing interest that one of the holdings cited was Ashikaga Estate in Shimotsuke, where Yoshitomo may still have been the provincial governorY If so, the Ashikaga, who were his relatives, would have been immunized from the potential intrusions of their own kinsman. Governors and families like the Ashikaga were also in frequent competition over peasant land and labor. Here, in fact, was another inducement behind commendation, since a formula guaranteeing a supplemental "land rental" (kajishi) from farmers was frequently part of the contract with commenders.48 Moreover, commenders who were appointed managers often became responsible for the daily administration of estates. They became the 45· Anrakujuin monjo, n56/3 Toba In-no-cho kudashibumi, HI, 6:234I, doc. 2834. 46. Ibid., II59/9h9 daijokan cho an, HI, 6:2470-71, doc. 3029. 47· See above, note 42. 48. Uchida Minoru, "Heian makki ryoshusei kenkyu no isshiten." For an actual case, see the references in Ichiki monjo, II46/8/ro Taira Tsunetane kishinjo, HI, 6:2187-88, doc. 2586.

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shoen's constable, agricultural overseer, and tax collector, displacing agents of the governor in the process. For the peasantry itself, these newly empowered officials now came to represent the highest level of visible authority. Though the peak for new shoen was clearly the first half of the twelfth century, the creation of such estates advanced unevenly in the east. The region's remoteness, reputation for unruliness, and relatively lower productivity obviously worked to dampen the enthusiasm of potential central proprietors. A notable exception in this regard was lse Shrine, which became the owner of new estates in at least five provinces at this time. 49 But even here, as we shall see, only some of the region's commenders received the protection that they had anticipated. Most importantly, the incorporation of new shoen sometimes failed to restrain governors from seeking to retain areas on the public tax rolls. These latter became adept at searching for Raws in a shoen's paperwork. Moreover, the proprietors of new estates might at times be ineffectual, and in some instances they actually sought to eliminate their own newly enrolled managers. In fact, all of these experiences befell one of the east's most distinguished families, the Chiba, whom we will remember as the leading zaichokanjin of Shimosa Province. Notwithstanding that status, the Chiba were obliged to endure an extraordinary sequence of buffetings, centering on violations of their homelands by virtually everyone in a position to assist them. That being so, the episode makes a fitting backdrop to the appeal ofYoritomo's program in n8o. The Chiba, at one with others of their class, held an extensive portfolio of titles and the lands accompanying them. 5° Yet the Chiba's history shows that its leaders were constantly in need of patronage from those higher on the social scale. As already noted, the Chiba and the Kazusa had branched from a family ofTaira origin early in the twelfth century. Not long after that, Soma District in Shimosa, already hereditary with the Chiba, fell under the control of Kazusa Tsunetoki, the elder brother of Chiba Tsunekane. 51 The circumstances of this appropriation are unknown, but Tsunetoki succeeded in acquiring immunity for the district from certain unwanted provincial 49· Yasuda, "Kodai makki," 28-29. 50. For the Chiba genealogy and related information, see Takeuchi, "Zaichokanjin no bushika," 32. 51. Most of what we know about this story is detailed in an important document of n46, cited in note 48 above. The full complement of nineteen Heian period documents from this collection (the Ichiki collection) appears in Ichikawa shishi, shiryo, kodai-chiisei, 5:363-74.

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levies. He then arranged for the return of authority to the line of his brother-first by adopting the latter's son, Chiba Tsuneshige, and then by bequeathing him Soma District in 1124. The title of district head was confirmed to Tsuneshige two years later by the governor. 52 Unfortunately, we do not know what prompted the next move, but in II30 the new Chiba head took the customary step of commending a major share of his family's heritage to a central owner, in this instance, to the Inner Shrine oflse. Three copies of his deed of alienation were sent to lse for countersignature, two of which ended in the possession of the new proprietor, the shrine's head priest, who was henceforth to receive the area's annual rents. At the next level down there was to be a custodian (azukari dokoro), who was presumably to be an agent of the shrine. Finally, there was the commender, Tsuneshige, who was to hold the title of manager (gesu) and to be eligible for land rent (kajishi) collected from local residents. The tides were declared to be permanent and hereditary at all levels, statuses that were then confirmed by the provincial governor. In a decree by the governor dated the last month of II30, Tsuneshige was recognized as the gesu of "Soma Estate" (Soma no-sho) and also reaffirmed as Soma's district chief (gunjt). 53 Though we do not have particulars on Tsuneshige's motivation, obviously more was at stake than his avowals of piety and concern for the shrine's prosperity. 54 Since the governor gave his approval immediately, evidently no danger was seen from that quarter. Instead, Tsuneshige's goals may have centered on a desire to freeze the inheritance now within his own line. If that was indeed his thinking, his precautions turned out to be well advised, since a dispute would later develop between his own son and the lineal son of his adoptive father. Anyway, to assuage this concern, Tsuneshige willed his title to his own lineal son, Tsunetane, barely nine years after he had received the inheritance himsel£5 5 Though he had not gone into retirement, he had invoked the proprietor's guarantee of heritability by deeding his managerial tide to his own chosen heir. But, in fact, all of this sensible concern proved to be misdirected, at least 52· Referred to in Ichiki monjo, II46/8/ro Taira Tsuneshige kishinjo, HI, 6:2I87-88, doc. 2586. 53· Ibid., II30/6/n Taira Tsuneshige kishinjo an, HI, p87I-72, docs. 2I6I-62; and II30Ir2 Shimosa kokushi chosen an, HI, p879, doc. 2176. 54· Referred to in ibid., n46/8/ro Taira Tsuneshige kishinjo, HI, 6:2I87-88, doc. 2586. The title of jinushi (an equivalent of gesu) is the one referred to here. 55· Ibid.

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at this early juncture; for in 1136 a newly appointed governor acted to void the certification of a hereditary managership that had been issued six years earlier by his predecessor. Claiming that taxes had not been paid from "public paddies," the new governor ordered Tsuneshige arrested and fined, and then obliged him, through pressure exercised by the governor's deputy (mokudaz), to surrender the Chiba claim to a portion of Soma. In effect, Tsuneshige and his son were forced to agree to a "sale" of the disputed units as well as to a transfer to the governor of other nearby holdings. 56 What happened during the next few years is unknown, but in the midII40S Minamoto Yoshitomo entered the picture, and once again the Chiba situation became confused. The family rivalry now heated up, pitting Tsunetane against his Kazusa cousin, who was also, we recall, his own foster brother. In n43, that cousin leveled some slander (jitgen) against Tsunetane, which somehow gave the opportunistic Yoshitomo an opening. By exploiting some deeds of release given up earlier by the Chiba, Yoshitomo now laid claim to the entire Soma area. 57 Even worse, in II45 Yoshitomo now himself commended Soma to lse Shrine and had the temerity to petition for hereditary investiture of its managerial authority (gesu shiki). Where this left the Chiba is uncertain, but events took another turn a year later. In 1146, Tsunetane paid a large indemnity to the governor's office and was reappointed to the headship of Soma District. He also re-commended Soma Estate to Ise Shrine, and received a formal investiture as the domain's gesu. 58 Thus, once again, the Chiba seem to have regained all that was originally theirs, though only, it seems certain, after agreeing to extortionate terms. How far Yoshitomo had succeeded in his plans cannot be determined, though by 1146 he had clearly lost out in Soma. This was also the year he probably returned to Kyoto, never again to take up long residence in the east. Yet in one of those reversals for which we have no explanation, Tsunetane fought under Yoshitomo's command in the Hogen lncident. 59 On the surface, the terms of the n46 contract between the Chiba and the shrine were little different from those of II30. The same head priest was 56. Ibid. 57· Ibid., 1145/3/n Minamoto bo kishinjo an, HI, 6:2I50-51, doc. 2549. Although Yoshitamo's name does not appear in this document, it does in the 1146 record (above, note 52). 58. See above, note 52. 59· Yasuda, "Kodai makki," 38-39 n. 4·

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named proprietor, though the post of custodian was more explicitly reserved an agent of the shrine. For what the promise was worth, the gesu post, along with the land rent, was reconfirmed, in heredity, to the Chiba. 60 Conditions seem to have become fixed in this mode throughout the 1150s. 61 Then, in the wake of the Heiji Incident, another crisis sprang up, stemming from the Chiba's association with the now-dead Yoshitomo. A new challenge (and challenger) appeared to the Chiba's status within Soma Estate. Responding quickly, Tsunetane re-commended those holdings again to lse Shrine, barely ahead of a parallel effort by Minamoto Yoshimune, a man of unknown origins. What is remarkable about this episode is that once more, the Chiba lost out in a competition over their own homelands. The case presented by Yoshimune was supported by several arguments. First, he openly criticized Tsunetane for committing "violations" and for neglecting his duties on behalf oflse Shrine. Second, he promised to defend Soma Estate against the "treacherous acts" (akugyaku) of followers (roju) of the traitor (daimuhonnin), Yoshitomo. Third, Yoshimune justified his own claim by asserting that the Chiba's deeds of release of 1136 to the governor had been conveyed by the latter's son to himself Fourth, he directed his commendation to the Outer Shrine (gaigu) at lse. And fifth, he appealed for an investiture as estate custodian, not merely its manager (gesu). 62 In other words, parallel to the rivalry between Yoshimune and Tsunetane, there was also now set in motion a competition at the next level up, pitting the Inner Shrine against the Outer Shrine, each with its respective candidate for custodian. Within a month of Yoshimune's commendation, a pair of tax documents showed that it was he who was now performing as Soma's chief administrator. 63 Though Tsunetane rallied to his own defense, his efforts, however spirited, were destined to fail. In the second month of n6r, after recounting the history of his family's possession of Soma, he took the altogether resourceful step of offering his services to both shrines at lse. Then, two months later, in another brief, he gave details on how his family had in fact lost Soma again. to

6o. See above, note 52. 6r. Or at least the Ichiki Collection is silent between u46 and u6r. Nor are there retrospective comments in the later documents that suggest major changes during the missing fifteen years. 62. Ichiki monjo, n6IIr Minamoto Yoshimune kishinjo an, HI, 7:25I4-I5, doc. 3121. 63. Ibid., n6Ih Minamoto Yoshimune ukebumi an, HI, 7=2525, docs. 3I42-43·

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In this account, he noted that when Minamoto Yoshitomo had had his holdings confiscated in n6o, the governor of Shimosa had mounted a new claim to the disputed estate-even though, as Tsunetane argued, it had never, in any lawful way, belonged to Yoshitomo. In response, the governor now authorized an investigation at the provincial level, but, typically, had to concede jurisdiction to Kyoto, where a decision was hammered out in consultation with lse. The Soma region would remain an immune estate owing services to both shrines. 64 Moreover, Yoshimune, rather than the Chiba, was to administer it, a decision that might be explained by the new claimant's apparent willingness to increase the volume oflse's revenues. 65 In this episode, then, the scope of the leverage exercised by central proprietors emerges in bold relie£ Not only were such proprietors able to manipulate local rivalries, but they were also able to influence the venue (and even the course) of justice. In the case at hand, the Chiba had sought protection from seemingly all potential patrons-the governor, the shrine(s), and, ultimately, Minamoto Yoshitomo. Yet in each instance it was forced to defer to those higher on the political ladder. Based on these results, we are probably safe in drawing some important conclusions. First, despite a rise in the volume and intensity of local instability, conditions were not so severe that the central command structure was in danger of losing control. Indeed, such was the need for a forum for the resolution of local disputes that persons of noble status continued to be sought out as patrons. Second, contention over land rights remained very much within a legal framework. Documents, as we know, might be withheld, stolen, or forged, but the fact that they served as the underpinning for what was lawful worked to keep the basic hierarchy of interests intact. Third, to the very eve of the Genpei War, the system remained weighted in favor of those at the center, or (much the same thing) in favor of those with the strongest central connections. In this situation, lse was not merely the passive recipient of commended income but was instead the arbiter of which among the contending parties it would have as its representative. By exploiting its power to legitimize, it was able to increase its revenues while simultaneously jettison-

64. Ibid., n6Ihh7 Taira Tsunetane ge an, HI, T2522-23, doc. 3I39; 1162/4/I Taira Tsunetane moshijo an, HI, 7:2527-28, doc. 3I48. 65. Compare the figures in ibid., n66/6/3 Minamoto bo kishomon an, HI, 7:2673-74, docs. 3392-94, with those of n6I, cited above, note 63.

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ing Soma's original commenders. Fourth and last, the experiences of the Chiba show that even a provincial house of great distinction was unable to gain immune control over full-sized estates. Provincial office was important for a family's rise to local prominence and for its acquisition of a limited authority over land. But a "proprietorship" in which central aristocrats were not involved was an achievement that was still entirely in the future. At this juncture, a possession that was secure was a possession that was tied, since a guarantee of tenure could only be granted from above. Nor, as we have seen, was military organization a viable option. Except for brief emergencies, no indigenous group could easily agree on how to work together or on whom to have as its leader; persons with shared interests also shared rivalries. Moreover, there was little independent backing that a provincial chieftain might provide: the more intense a local dispute, the more likely he would not be able to resolve it without going to his own patron. And, in fact, the ultimate weakness of local coalitions was their lack of autonomous control over the land system. In the Japan of 1150, the protection of lives-but not livelihoods-was the main purpose of local alliances. In this context, submission to a chieftain whose own position could be so easily undone was a decision that could never be more than guarded and temporary. The Chiba are our best example. After resisting Yoshitomo in the 1140s, they fought under him at Hogen in 1156 and were then tarred, with devastating results, by that association in n6o. Though we have no data on the lesser families of Shimosa Province, they could scarcely have remained indifferent to the haplessness of the Chiba. The reputation of the latter as men of stature must have suffered in direct proportion to their inability to hold on to their own homelands. In fact, what must have begun to loom ever larger was the unbridgeable legal gulf between the limited authority that families like the Chiba might aspire to and the degree oflocal interference that even the most "effete" courtiers might claim as a consequence of their birth. At the same time, a bloc concept of shoen possession was already well advanced. During the course of the twelfth century, central owners increasingly issued single edicts to all their estates, as if the domains in question had now become uniformly held. 66 On 66. This presumption, in turn, was strengthened by government agencies, which began to issue uniform guarantees on behalf of proprietors' entire portfolios of shoen. See, e.g., Anrakujuin monjo, II59I9h9 daijokan cho an, HI, ]:2470-7I, doc. 3029.

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the receiving end of such directives were the elite of the countryside, men who were expected to allow their domains to serve as the source of support for absentee privilege. Disobedience, as we have seen, was always possible, but negligence or noncompliance entailed great risk. A withdrawal of central patronage and its conferral on someone else might lead to a transfer oflocal authority to one's bitterest enemy. As the foregoing account clearly reveals, then, the time had not yet come when a self-contained alternative to dependence on the capital was being even remotely contemplated. The flow oflegitimacy had traveled in only one direction for centuries, and this would only begin to change in the wake of the historic events of n8o.

CONCLUSION

For many historians, the Minamoto under Yoshitomo might have seemed a more likely choice as hegemons than the Taira under Kiyomori. This was because the Minamoto were supposed to have built their power in the east, where the advance of warrior autonomy, and the resistance to being "metro-

politanized," were always believed to have been the greatest. In fact, both assumptions were derived from subsequent events: the Taira, who had set up in Kyoto, were defeated, and the Minamoto, who remained in the east, were victorious. From the perspective of contemporaries, the progress of militarization was nowhere so advanced that it was conceived as being easily translatable into an authority system. When such a system was actually constructed in the period after n8o, the process of rationalizing what had happened inevitably followed. In time, the families associated with the Bakufu had their linkages to both the east and the Minamoto fixed and commingled, and this then became the basis of a history, even a destiny. It is in precisely such a context that Yoshitomo could be remembered in the Azuma kagami as the "lord of many tens of thousands of armed horsemen'' and the "administrative head of fifteen eastern provinces." 67 Yet if the n8os victory of the Minamoto needed to be physically won and

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not merely inherited, there are reasons, on the side of the Taira, to explain why Kiyomori emerged first. For one thing, the Taira of Kiyomori were a narrower kin group, whose leadership was unquestioned and whose prosperity was promoted by the retired emperor. For another, the Minamoto were more an assemblage of lineages, whose trunk line (that ofYoshitomo) had failed to have its primacy acknowledged by all kin. Hence the Taira exhibited greater internal house cohesion than the more visibly fragmented Minamoto. A final reason has to do with chronology. Historical memory to the contrary, Kiyomori and Yoritomo were not really contemporaries; Kiyomori and Yoshitomo were. Each of these points merits brief consideration. As we know, Kiyomori served as the head of a kindred with a leadership that had been unified and uncontested for generations. Kiyomori himself was the son and grandson ofTadamori and Masamori; he groomed his sons for leadership; and he shared generously with his own brothers. By contrast, the Minamoto were wracked by divisions for the entirety of the twelfth centurya disarray that began with the outlaw Yoshichika (d. no7) and reached its peak when Yoshitomo took up arms against Tameyoshi, his own father (n56). In the matter of patronage, a succession of three retired emperors was contemporaneous with a like succession of three Taira chieftains; the prosperity of each of the principals was interdependent. By contrast, the main line of the Minamoto was linked at its top to the Fujiwara, a relationship that could not have been as beneficial as it might have been earlier.

Moreover, since there is little surviving evidence as to how this alliance functioned in actual practice, this may also tell us something about the relative positions of the Taira and Minarnoto. Finally, Yoshitomo (b. n23) was a contemporary ofKiyomori (b. m8) and also, it should be said, of Go-Shirakawa (b. rr27). Nevertheless, in the aftermath of Hogen, Yoshitomo fell irretrievably behind his Taira counterpart. Whereas Kiyomori became a governor (of Aki) and an assistant governor general (of Kyushu), Yoshitomo became the head of the "Imperial Stables," a sinecure. Fewer than four years later he and his two eldest sons died in the midst of the Heiji Disturbance, and his remaining progeny were scattered into exile. In n6o, Yoritomo, the eldest survivor, was a boy of thirteen, in contrast with Kiyomori, who was a man of forty-two. In effect, the Taira chieftain had divested himself of a Minamoto counterpart. It is also to be remembered that both Hogen and Heiji were incidents

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rather than wars, struggles that were inherently political and that affected mostly the capital. In this regard, the pace or degree of militarization was irrelevant to the outcome. On the other hand, because patronage systems extended from the capital to the countryside, the death and disgrace of Yoshitomo had its effect on families like the Chiba. In fact, little had changed on this point. Situations generated entirely in Kyoto might still exercise a profound influence in the provinces, a condition, which in reverse, was almost never true. The brevity of the Taira's rule remains to be considered. Clearly the ascendancy of Kiyomori was a product of his own fortuitous positioning as the leading client of the ex-emperor. He did not storm out of the provinces to overrun a mere residue of a capital city, but rather built up his influence by insinuating himself into the capital's still dominant ruling elite. Nevertheless, his palace coup of 1179 revealed something of dramatic moment to provincial families-that both Kiyomori and the court might be vulnerable to united action. Based on what we have seen, the mounting of such an effort would obviously need to go through a series of difficult stages, beginning with a Minamoto victory over itself; the trunk line would have to be regrafted to its main limbs. Beyond that, a program of incentives would have to be created so as to induce houses like the Chiba, itself ofTaira ancestry, to abandon its search for protection from traditional central sources and to pin its future on a now indigenized Minamoto movement. In fact, historical corners would have to be turned, and new definitions of legitimacy invented. In the process, men of the provinces would be obliged to work together toward goals that they shared, and also to see the center in a different perspective from before. During the final two decades of the twelfth century, both of these historic conditions were essentially met.

CHAPTER THREE

The East on the Move

In the wake of the Heiji Disturbance the five surviving sons of Minamoto Yoshitomo were scattered and sent into exile. The eldest, Yoritomo, was placed under the guardianship of Hojo Tokimasa, the twenty-two-year-old head of an obscure family claiming descent from the Taira. The home province of the Hojo was lzu in the Kanto, and it was there that Yoritomo spent the years n6o-8o. In II77, at the age of thirty, he was married to the eldest child (Masako) of his guardian Tokimasa. Historians have traditionally made much of these developments, as if Taira Kiyomori was almost knowingly contributing to his own downfall: he had not only "repatriated" a Minamoto head to his dan's ancestral region, but he had allowed him to marry into the family of his captor, thereby encouraging the latter's treachery against his Taira kinsmen. 1 In this version, much of what came to occur in n8o had been facilitated by a naive, and even witless, Kiyomori. Yet the case against the Taira chieftain seems much less r. A5 A. L. Sadler put it, "Kiyomori's lenience was to prove the downfall of his house." Sadler, A Short History ofjapan, 87.

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clear-cut than that, at least from the perspective of those times. A5 we shall now see, Kiyomori's actions provide a useful insight into the thinking of contemporaries. In n6o, the death ofYoshitomo and his eldest sons was viewed, almost certainly, as having eliminated the Taira leader's only conceivable Minamoto challengers. Likewise, Kiyomori would have known that, save for the limited period of time spent by Yoshitomo in the east, no chieftain since Yoshiie had made the Kanto his base area. Thus the geographic association that has been made by historians would have seemed much more ambiguous at the time. Equally to the point, since Kyoto was the headquarters of all twelfth-century Minamoto (and Taira) heads, the absence from the capital of main line survivors such as Yoritomo would have been seen more as a safeguard than a danger. In fact, only in hindsight do the provinces seem a logical venue for launching an attack on the Taira at court. From the perspective of the generation of n6o, the scattering ofYoshitomo's youthful progeny was simply proof of the Minamoto's irreversible decline. At the same time, nothing occurred in the years following n6o that might have caused Kiyomori any anxiety in this connection. The problems of the Taira chieftain were all in the capital, with not so much as a hint of a Minamoto threat from the provinces. Consequently, the marriage of Yoritomo into an obscure branch ofKiyomori's own clan might have been viewed with genuine enthusiasm in Taira circles at court. It would have been seen as marking a significant advance in the accelerating erosion of the Minamoto's identity. The situation of the Hojo reinforces this basic impression. The absence of reliable data on Tokimasa's forebears suggests that his family was much smaller than some of the eastern houses we have encountered. Moreover, whereas Izu was a proprietary province of the Taira, its deputy in residence was an appointee who had been dispatched from the capital. In short, Tokimasa had not even been entrusted with this basic authority. Nor do we know whether the Hojo had so much as access to the provincial headquarters, which would have been the normal starting point for military organization. Despite an uncorroborated claim of descent from a vice governor of Kozuke Province, the Hojo may not have enjoyed the status of true zaichokanjin. At all events, it was in the company of this minor family in this

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remote corner of the east that Yoritomo spent an uneventful adolescence and early adulthood. 2 Yet a world of new possibilities was about to be revealed. By the end of n85, the Taira would be defeated and the unity of Kyoto's authority challenged, with a new regime, the Bakufu, in the early stages of being integrated into the fabric of national governance. The context for these developments was the Genpei War, which we now need to examine in new perspective.

THE

GENPEI WAR-BEFORE

THE START

In the fourth month of n8o, some two months after the emperor Antoku's enthronement, the prince who had just been bypassed (see above, pp. 31-32) sent out a call to arms directed against the Taira "usurpers." Though later cited by Yoritomo to justifY his own rebellion, the form that the prince's call took scarcely singled out Yoritomo. To the contrary, it took cognizance of the disarray within the Minamoto by targeting other potential respondents as well. The Fujiwara of the eastern circuits were specifically named, but aid was also solicited from warrior units that were not even identified. 3 That Yoritomo was not envisioned as the rallying point for a rebellion expressed well the perception of fragmentation within the Minamoto. Moreover, since the families of the east did not rally or rise in any spontaneous way, war was not declared until the eighth month of n8o, a "delay" that has long puzzled and intrigued historians: either Yoritomo was indecisive or the Minamoto fickle. In fact, the questions of whether to respond and in what form and at what point were ones that could only have been easy in

2. For the low status of the Hojo in their own base area, see Takeuchi Rizo, "Zaichokanjin no bushika," 37-38; and Saro Shin'ichi, "Kamakura bakufu seiji no senseika ni tsuite," 97-98. The reference to Tokimasa's descent from the vice governor appears in AK, n8o/ 4l27. In fact, nothing reliable is known about the Hojo before Tokimasa. 3· The decree, which vents the prince's anger by enumerating the long list of crimes committed by Kiyomori, was addressed, in effect, to any provincial units that might listen; AK, n8o/4l27. It also called for the support of the native gods and the Buddhist priesthood, and such anti-Taira temples as the Onjoji and Kofukuji were directly solicited; ibid. and AK, n8o/5l27.

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hindsight. 4 Indeed, there were many who were still alive who remembered the refusal of Minamoto collaterals to submit to Yoshitomo, and Yoritomo may himself have been haunted by that memory. In addition, Yoritomo was the heir only because of the death of his elder brothers; he had hardly been the choice of his father to succeed him. There was also the matter ofYoritomo's lengthy exile, which might well have been interpreted negatively by contemporaries. Since no heir to the Minamoto had ever been so obscure for so long a period of his life, a natural rallying to him by men of the Kanto could hardly have been expected. Indeed, in view of the totality of his eclipse and the divisions of the society that he inhabited, it might have seemed remarkable that he decided to come forward as a challenger, and that he then survived the consequences of such a rash act. There was certainly scant if any basis for optimism at first. Little more than a month after Mochihito's call to arms, the prince and his courtier partisans were captured and summarily executed (5l26). 5 Moreover, though Yoritomo had done little more than to monitor events to that point, the Taira decided to mount a punitive expedition. It was only then that Yoritomo was prompted to his first tentative reaction (6II9). Calling for the support of traditional Minamoto, he obtained a response from two prominent families, the Miura of Sagami and the Chiba of Shimosa (6l27). Yet almost simultaneously, the Hatano and the Yamanouchi of Sagami declared for the Taira (7/ro), revealing a pattern that would be replicated elsewhere. Much as in the past, neighbors who were rivals were more likely to divide than to coalesce. It was a matter, it might be said, of looking sideways, since a decision to align with Yoritomo would mean a decision, almost certainly, to oppose specific others. But the most important decision was the one that had not yet been made-that of the putative leader himself There was little reason for locals 4- In his pioneering study of the Genpei War, Minoru Shinoda suggested that the response to Yoritomo's overtures was slow and disappointing; Shinoda, The Founding ofthe Kamakura Shogunate, n8o-n8s, 48-59. In his book, Shinoda has translated many of the Azuma kagami's entries from the period of the war. His translation and accompanying history remain an invaluable source. 5· Dates in parentheses, and dates otherwise not explained in a footnote, are drawn from entries in the AK.

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to declare themselves prematurely when it was not yet clear what Yoritomo himself would do. Would he attempt, if attacked, simply to defend himself, or would he seek to organize a regional army capable of going on the offensive? If the latter, how would he win the allegiance of his closest collaterals, from whom, at this juncture, there was only embarrassing silence? As Yoritomo himself must have realized, he had neither a plan nor a program designed to overcome traditional rivalries. For every partisan of whatever background who swore loyalty, another of similar provenance was likely to swear enmity. As we know, the warriors of the east had not been waiting for some longanticipated savior. Accordingly, they would need to be jolted by something that was new: by a compelling set of programs offered by a persuasive, charismatic leader. Though no record ofYoritomo's thinking has come down to us, we can imagine him in strategy sessions at this juncture, listening, calculating, and pondering. What he decided on ultimately was unprecedented: to construct a regional military lordship under himself, to be supported by a patronage system whose summit would lie in the provinces. In effect, Yoritomo was choosing to bank on the readiness of a provincial constituency to embrace an idea that had never been truly tested. As Yoritomo must have envisioned it, individuals would be invited to take stock of who they were and who they wished to be. That is, they would be offered the chance to separate from older groups, mostly kin, and to have their hold over lands and offices significantly strengthened. For example, though the Chiba bore the same clan name as that ofKiyomori, his rise, and their setback, had occurred in n6o-6r. We can only assume that their vulnerability at the hands of traditional, centrally based patrons now contributed to the thinking that evolved into Yoritomo's locally based program of guarantees. Conversely, of course, when a family considered its hold on its lands to be secure, its support for the existing order would likely have prevailed over the uncertainties of protection under an untested, new system. Thus the Oba were unlikely prospects for conversion to the Minamoto, since they had no basis for harboring grievances against the Kyoto establishment. As we noted in chapter 2, the Oba had been confirmed in their tenures after a fierce legal struggle with their longtime rivals, the Miura. In the opposite fashion, the Miura, who had joined with Yoshitomo against the Oba in the II40S, now

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in n8o saw an opportunity to prevail. Whereas the Miura, quite dearly, embraced a hope of a significant improvement, the Oba, just as dearly, recoiled from the prospect of change. A family's relations with its neighbors thus joined the condition of its homelands among the most powerful influences affecting its choice of partisanship. A further consideration was a family's own internal circumstances. Rivalries among branch lines or between a main line and its branches frequently helped to decide the issue one way or the other. For example, the Oyama and their rival cousins, the Ashikaga, divided on that basis soon after the start of the war. The case is even more interesting because the two houses were descended from the Fujiwara. They continued their rivalry in n8o by becoming Minamoto and Taira, respectively. On the other hand, enmity toward kin did not necessarily lead to a division into rival alignments. Instead, it could lead to a division of the families themselves on some new basis. That is, relatives who were rivals could seemingly hold out for recognition of themselves as the heads of new houses. It is entirely to Yoritomo's credit that he was acute enough to recognize that kinship was a tie that would only bind if the collaterals were willing. Thus, desirous as he was of winning the support of related provincials, he was prepared to acknowledge them in whatever configuration they insisted on. In this context, the Edo and Kasai, with a common great-grandfather, were initially recognized by Yoritomo as constituting a single unit, an arrangement that proved unworkable and that might have driven one or the other into the Taira camp. Adjusting to the situation, Yoritomo quickly acknowledged each as a separate family. 6 Indeed, here was one of the lasting consequences of the war. As we shall see, it was not simply the victory of one group of families over another, bur the emergence of divisions and subdivisions under new surnames among the victors? It is dear, in any event, that the sudden possibility of upheaval in n8o brought tensions of a diverse nature to the surface. Yet out of this potentially destructive release of energies, Yoritomo was able to find a common de-

6. AK, n8o/9h9; and Edo shi kankei monjo shu, p. 1. See LA!, 41-42, for other patterns and examples. 7· For the proliferation of new surnames beginning in the n8os, see the opening sections of my "Identity, Personal Names, and Kamakura Society," AA], chap. 4·

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nominator. By declaring himself the successor to the court's authority over the east, he was able to take the first steps toward creating an umbrella of patronage whose ultimate source was not the court itself. For the first time, the concerns of men who were not at the top of the social ladder would be placed at the top of a new hierarchy of priorities.

THE

GENPEI

WAR-OPENING

PHASES

On the seventeenth day of the eighth month, local partisans of Yoritomo staged an attack on the resident deputy of the Taira governor oflzu Province. The action proved to be important for several reasons. First, as an unprovoked initial thrust against the Taira, the murder of the latter's deputy was unambiguous: Yoritomo and those supporting him had declared war. Second, the offensive marked a first step toward taking over a first province-an approach that would become integral to the Minamoto's future strategy. And third, the attack on the Taira deputy underscored the limited trust that had been accorded by Kiyomori to the indigenous Hojo of lzu. Obviously, someone other than Tokimasa had been made Kiyomori's chief representative in that province. 8 Two days later (8!I9), Yoritomo moved to wrap this opening military action in a political context. Based on the authority deriving from Prince Mochihito's decree, he announced that he was assuming full governance over the east. He then underlined the point by issuing his earliest known decreea public order, on his own authority, to the lzu provincial headquarters to the effect that Mishima Shrine was to exercise governance over a traditional subdistrict (go). 9 Not only had Yoritomo thus affixed his name to a decree of a type issued only by representatives of the court, but he had also asserted prerogatives over the provincial land and tax system. Though no one could have fully appreciated it at the time, it was a harbinger of behavior that would be replicated many times over. As simple as the act of usurpation

8. The events of 8!I7 are graphically recounted in the AK entry of that date. 9· Mishima jinja monjo, n8o/8/r9 Minamoto Yoritomo kudashibumi an, HI, 9:3782-83, doc. 4883. According to AK, n8o/rohr, the shrine received other lands from Yoritomo as well.

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might seem to us in hindsight, such an exercise of undelegated authority was revolutionary in n8o. 10 This is not meant to argue that Yoritomo saw himself as a revolutionary. The challenge of the moment was how to win a level of support that had the potential of not disintegrating in the near future. His solution lay in a program of inducements that represented a logical extension of the prince's original call to arms. To raise and keep intact a regional army, Yoritomo now began to make promises that were extravagant-pledges of a type that he might need to reconsider later on. Basically, in return for an oath of allegiance to himself, he now agreed to protect, through personal confirmations, the lands and the offices that enlisting followers claimed to be their own. In the short run, this practical form oflargesse cost Yoritomo little. Already declared an outlaw by the Taira-controlled court, Yoritomo now commenced to live up to this reputation by offering to underwrite what he neither owned nor administered. Moreover, having arrogated to himself a right of military confiscation, he was able to seize what clearly belonged to others. In effect, by confirming what was old and awarding what was new, he was doing what no predecessor had dared to contemplate. He had initiated a program that would concentrate local land rights in the hands of a provincial elite, all without any recourse to the authority of Kyoto. On the other hand, in the absence of the reinforcing sanction of traditional authority, force might be required to bridge the gap between what Yoritomo promised and what he could deliver. As a rebel who had been stripped of all rank and office, he had little more than his own name at the outset, a name, moreover, that was shared by kinsmen of roughly comparable stature. Accordingly, his prospects for success would be tied to such intangibles as his ability to inspire risk-taking and to lead. Vision and charisma, then, bulked large in the early going as Yoritomo sought to win supporters for what amounted to an unprecedented challenge to the established order. ro. In the first monographic treatment of the subject in the English language (1933), Asakawa underscored the importance of an initial phase of lawlessness before a more orderly restructuring might commence; Asakawa Kan'ichi, "The Founding of the Shogunate by Minamotono-Yoritomo," 269. Though Asakawa's point here is well taken, he cannot be said to have fully appreciated the extraordinary novelty of what Yoritomo was now attempting.

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To construct actual influence over men and territory, Yoritomo now began to issue confirmations and grant rewards. As early as the twenty-third day of the tenth month, he honored twenty-four followers in Sagami by granting them one or the other of these preferments. The diversity of the emoluments is striking-from confirmations of estate managerships, to a confirmation of a vice governorship, to awards, fashioned from recently confiscated holdings, of shoen and go. In effect, Yoritomo was ignoring the distinction between public and private jurisdictions, electing to confirm or shift both as circumstances warranted. In return, he demanded only a commitment ofloyalty and a willingness to fight. The equation of the moment was straightforward: those who refused to join him, such as Oba Kagechika, were attacked as enemies, whereas those who gave their support, like the latter's kinsman Oba Kageyoshi, were rewarded. 11 As already indicated, a choice of alignment by one relative was often a function of an opposite choice by another. The twenty-four rewards a_nd confirmations, just cited, were all in Sagami, though entries in the Azuma Kagami contain similar accounts for nearby provinces. 12 In fact, much of the initial success of Yoritomo's brand of patronage stemmed from its marked difference from earlier versions. Whereas traditional patrons were looking to become the proprietors of commended lands, Yoritomo set his price for assistance in strictly personal terms. Thus, rather than oblige followers to surrender part of what they possessed, he offered them a strengthened, or new, tenure, in return for military service. For provincials for whom the display of martial skills would have been a source of pride, the price for strengthened and expanded land rights hardly seemed exorbitant. Indeed, for most it was probably viewed as being almost too good to be true. How Yoritomo envisioned the future at this juncture remains, of course, problematic. Presumably he viewed his goal as one of an indefinite superintendence of the eastern region, pending some ultimate settlement with the court. 13 But at the start he could not have more than dimly perceived how such an arrangement might affect his own and his men's condition. At any n. AK, n8o/8/z3, 9/3, and wh3. 12. For references to a number of these provinces, see my "The Emergence of the Kamakura Bakufu," 136-42, and WG, 65-68. 13. Most scholars assume the impossibility of any permanent breakaway kingdom; the pedigree ofYoritomo tied him inextricably to his aristocratic origins. To have surrendered those

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rate, Yoritomo's ideas about the future are unknown; we have only his deeds from which to attempt to extrapolate a sense of his priorities. In particular, his decision to coopt the agencies of government in the east proved central to his entire war period effort, and to achieve this goal he sought to entice the top stratum of the zaichokanjin. This meant wooing and winning over the dominant families in their respective provinces, houses like the Chiba, Oyama, Miura, Kazusa, and a few others. As Yoritomo obviously realized, shoen were but a minority presence in the Kanto, so that the primary repositories of influence remained in the public sector. Since the kokuga (provincial headquarters) stood as the matrix of local government in each province, Yoritomo determined to make them the essential constituents of his own new authority. In this regard, we have already noted the takeover by force of the headquarters in lzu. But it was in Shimosa and Kazusa that the basic pattern took form. As early as the beginning of the ninth month, Yoritomo called on the heads of the Chiba and Kazusa to eliminate the governor's agent (mokudai) in each of their provinces, and then to take governmental matters into their own hands (9/r, 9ir3). In effect, Yoritomo was encouraging those who were locally entrenched to challenge their jurisdictional superiors, who had been dispatched from the capital. For many historians, this juxtaposition of central and local interests-of mokudai and zaichokanjin-effectively captures the essence of the opening phase of the Genpei War. 14 In other provinces, where no clearly dominant local house existed, the attack on the mokudai might actually be by Yoritomo himself. Thus, in Suruga, he mounted a large force and killed the deputy (mokudaz) of that province (9ho, w/14). Elsewhere the target was less personalized-perhaps defined simply as the "prerogatives of the governor," as in Awa. In the absence of a mokudai, Yoritomo simply seized local governance in Awa by issuing edicts of the type that was usual for a governor. By authorizing the imorigins would have worked to the advantage of rival kinsmen who might now upstage him. For the power of this pedigree, or kishu, see G. Cameron Hurst III, "The Kobu Polity: CourtBakufu Relations in Kamakura]apan," 5-7. 14. To brilliant effect, Ishimoda Sho developed the notion of central-local conflict in this form, beginning in n8o; see Ishimoda, "Kamakura seiken no seiritsu katei ni tsuite," 2-16. Yet without the armed challenge of that year, the relationship between zaichokanjin and mokudai would have continued as one basically between subordinates and superiors.

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munity of a certain Sunosaki Shrine, Yoritomo was coopting a privilege that had belonged by right to a court appointee (n81h/ro). The effectiveness of a policy that was demonstrably "anti-mokudai" expressed itself in the support it engendered among the top level of indigenous officers. It was not, as we know, that the zaichokanjin were a unified group, and many were still subject to fierce and divisive rivalries. But after the separating and the coalescing of the early weeks of the war, the options became fewer as the Minamoto gained strength. Yoritomo had suffered an early and nearly catastrophic defeat at the battle oflshibashi in Sagami (8!23), less than a week after his successful takeover in lzu. But in the next two months, the tide turned inexorably in his favor. The explanation for this change-of the emergence of Yoritomo as the warrior lord of the east-is what makes n8o so important in Japanese history. Most crucially here, Yoritomo was seen to be putting his program into practice, and doing it in person. He was thus confirming, rewarding, and immunizing, just as he had said he would do. Simultaneously, he was converting the name "Minamoto" into more than a receptacle for related kindreds: he was reconfiguring it into a label broadened to include persons of diverse origin. And though the practice itself was not new, the regional character of its application clearly was, with persons from other clans in the Kanto now referred to as Minamoto. To an extent, a similar phenomenon occurred for the "Taira'' as well, though the absence of a focus of personal loyalty (Kiyomori) left it obviously handicapped. AI; a consequence, most of the choosing and then switching assumed a Taira-to-Minamoto direction, as, for instance, the decision of Nitta Yoshishige, an uncle of Yoritomo. When Yoshishige elected to forsake the Taira for the clan of his own origin, he was conceding that the Taira were no longer a viable option. 15 At any rate, within several months of the outbreak of the Genpei War, the Kanto was ceasing to be its main venue. The point at which the Taira's failure in the east might have been acknowledged was the historic battle of Fujigawa on who. Occurring in Suruga to the west of the Kanto proper, it marked the final time that Taira

15. Yoshishige's initial refusal (nSo/9/30) to respond to Yoritomo's overtures was replaced by an acceptance of his nephew's lordship a couple of months later (12/22). The relationship remained an uneasy one.

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from the capital would get even that dose to the Minamoto's new power base. The victory of Yoritomo's forces there was actually of profound significance, since the country's eastern half was now divided into de facto spheres. On the one hand, the ten or so provinces from Suruga and Kozuke eastward now became essentially a Minamoto enclave: no Taira from the center could hope to reach it, and no Taira from the Kanto could expect to survive there. On the other hand, Taira forces that might now be deployed would henceforth have to be concentrated in the area between the Kanto and Kyoto-in the region known as the Chubu and the western Hokurikudo. The dynamics of such a deployment exerted great influence on the way the Minamoto movement now developed. Secure for the most part from the danger of external attack, Yoritomo turned his attention away from the Taira before the end of n8o, and toward a set of political and military goals in the Kanto itself

THE

KANTO,

CHUBU,

AND

HOKURIKUDO,

II80-II83 Yoritomo pursued policies along several tracks in his eastern base area. Before all other requirements, he needed to reinforce his personal claim to the Minamoto chieftainship, which meant destroying or subordinating all the collaterals who might challenge him. The earliest test of this kind occurred in Hitachi Province, the home of the Satake and Shida, the lineages that had spurned Yoritomo's father in the 1140s. So pressing was his perception of danger from that quarter that Yoritomo turned eastward toward Hitachi a week after Fujigawa, rather than westward toward the defeated and retreating Taira. Satake Hideyoshi, his recalcitrant uncle, was the immediate target, a holdover from the generation ofYoshitomo. But whereas Yoshitomo had not been able to induce the Satake to submit, Yoritomo, with superior force, simply attacked and forced Hideyoshi to flee. Yoritomo then confiscated and redistributed his uncle's holdings. 16 The case of the Shida is, if anything, even more interesting. Following the r6. The flight of Hideyoshi to the north, and the burning of his headquarters, is graphically recounted in AK, n8o/n/5, and n/6.

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defeat of the Satake, Shida Yoshihiro, another ofYoritomo's uncles, took an oath to his nephew that proved to be false. Several months later Yoshihiro forged an alliance with the Fujiwara-Ashikaga of neighboring Shimotsuke, another ofYoritomo's father's old enemies. At this point, the Oyama, the latter's kinsmen as well as their traditional rivals, attacked both the Shida and the Ashikaga, soundly defeating the former and forcing the latter to flee, eventually to Kyushu. For their efforts, the Oyama were richly rewarded by a grateful Yoritomo, with both parties-lord and follower-having reason to exult. Each had seen the elimination of an unwanted collateral.' 7 At the same time, Yoritomo, who had moved in the early months from one province to another (in sequence, to Sagami, Awa, Hitachi, Shimosa, Musashi, Sagami, Suruga, Hitachi again, and back to Sagami), decided in the eleventh month to establish a permanent headquarters. Apparently, he now felt sufficiently secure to settle down. The site he selected was Kamakura in Sagami, which had associations with his forebears (albeit not kept up) from the previous century. The selection of Kamakura had a strategic and a legitimizing purpose. It was not only well positioned geographically and historically, but worship services could now take place at a longneglected "patron shrine" (the Tsurugaoka Hachimangu). At the same time, we can at least imagine the beginnings of the myth claiming a long history ofYoritomo's ancestral line in Kamakura. 18 At any rate, ground was now broken in Kamakura, and a campaign of active construction commenced; Yoritomo moved into a new and ultimately permanent residence in the twelfth month. Gradually, the town was forged into the physical expression of a new concentration of regional authority, with enormous potential significance for Yoritomo. Henceforth, whenever he prohibited local outrages, authorized fiscal exemptions, assigned new lands, or issued orders to "public officials," he would be doing so from a

17· AK, n8o/n/7, n8rh/9, 2/r8, int.2ho, int.2h3, int.2h5, int.2h7, int.2h8, 9/7. r8. For the early history of the shrine into the n8os, see Kamakura shishi, shaji hen., 3-5; almost all information, including the date of its supposed establishment (1063), derives from the AK (n8o/ro/12). In the same vein, the earliest surviving document in the shrine's own archive is one from Yoritomo dated n83; Tsurugaoka Hachimangu komonjo, doc. r. For Yoritomo and the shrine, see Martin Collcutt, "Religion in the life of Minamoto Yoritomo and the Early Kamakura bakufu," ror fE Yoritomo's arrival in Kamakura occurred on ro/6, though he did not truly settle there until nlr7 (AK).

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stationary base he could call his capital. 19 Before the year was out, the transition from temporary military encampments had been completed, and everyone now knew where Yoritomo, the head of the Minamoto, was domiciled. The flow of petitions and decrees into and out ofKamakura added to the sense of a new and vibrant political center. By early 1181, there were clear indications that Yoritomo's successes in the east were becoming common knowledge. A spirit of rebellion now started to be ignited elsewhere, which led, among other actions, to takeovers by zaichokanjin from mokudai in certain provinces of the Hokurikudo. 20 Of even greater significance, the indigenous officers involved were justifYing their actions by calling themselves Minamoto. Yoritomo, who had not authorized their behavior, could only have learned about it later. A second mode of rebellion outside the Kanto was also of a familiar kind. Long-standing rivalries among locals now found a convenient outlet. In other words, families or parts of families might divide into Taira and Minamoto, justifYing their actions by claiming adherence to one side or the other, as in Shikoku's lyo Province. Though the contest there was essentially for local supremacy, the two leading houses now declared for the opposing sides. 21 Hostilities even reached Kyushu at a surprisingly early juncture, where they were played out in ways that were becoming typical. In the second month of 1181, the Dazaifu, a Taira stronghold, was burned by local rebels; and, a little later, a sizable contingent of Taira was attacked by a force of warriors from Bungo and Higo. 22 A third type of rebellion was the most portentous of all, since it involved an assault on the rights of absentee estate owners. In 1181-82, Yoritomo's earlier encouragement to Kanto locals became the pretext for a rise in violence both there and farther afield. Though such lawlessness against shoen did not

19. In order, Sonkeikaku shozo monjo, n8o/w/r8 Minamoto Yoritomo gechijo, HI, 10:3908, doc. 5066; ibid., n8o/n/8 Minamoto Yoritomo kudashibumi, HI, 9:3783, doc. 4884; Kashima jingu monjo, n8r/3 Minamoto Yoritomo kishinjo, HI, 8:3019, doc. 3961; and Mishima jinja monjo, n8r/7fz9 Minamoto Yoritomo kishinjo, HI, 9:3783, doc. 4885. 20. For much the same development in Wakasa, Echigo, Noto, Echizen, and Kaga, see the sequential entries in the Gyokuyo, n8o/n/z8, n8r/7/r, 7fz4, 9/z, and 9/ro. The consequences of these actions were dire for the court; see, e.g., notes 33 and 34 below. 21. Tanaka Minoru, "Kamakura jidai ni okeru Iyo no kuni no jita gokenin ni tsuite," 275. 22. Gyokuyo, n8r/z/r5; AK, n8rlzlz9; and Hyakurensho, n8r/4/14.

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peak until later, its emergence and early growth posed an ominous threat. It also set into motion an ironic role change for Yoritomo. Beginning in the KantO and expanding beyond it, petitions for local relief started to be sent to Kamakura. As a result, the head of a rebel group that was formally at war with the emperor's government now began to be viewed, at least potentially, as an enforcement officer and keeper of the peace. It was an experience, as we shall see, that would echo into the future. 23 After the victory at Fujigawa, Yoritomo moved to establish a defense perimeter in the next province to the west (Totomi); his goal was to seal his borders from further attack. As it happened, Kiyomori, in the capital, was thinking along the same lines. Absorbing the lessons of his defeat at Fujigawa, he elected now to seek to isolate his enemy rather than to risk additional setbacks. The basic policy of the Taira thus became one of imposing a form of blockade, though there were, unsurprisingly, attendant costs. For example, when the court decreed a levy on behalf of repairs at the Kofukuji, the Kanto, which was now beyond the pale, was necessarily exempted. 24 More broadly, a quarantine meant a sanctuary, with the Kanto effectively conceded to Yoritomo. On the other hand, the Taira were now on record as having drawn a line in the sand. They were declaring their determination to keep the rebel kingdom at arms length. The outcome of a celebrated proposal by Yoritomo must be interpreted in the same light. In n81/8, Kamakura offered a division of the country into respective spheres, with the east (the Kanto plus Chubu-Hokurikudo) to be administered by the Minamoto, and the center and west by the Taira. However, the heirs of the late Kiyomori (d. n81/int.2) rejected the plan outright, since acceptance would have inflated the Minamoto's jurisdiction and ended their outlaw status. 25 On the other hand, not all elements within 23. A covert effort to open communications with (especially) the central region's religious institutions seems to have begun early. By promising that rents from Kanto-based estates might be restored, Yoritomo was demonstrating his respect for legitimate authority, while also emphasizing his authority over the east; see Ishimoda, "Kamakura seiken," 8-12. 24. Gyokuyo, n8I/3/21. 25. The historicity ofYoritomo's offer continues to be debated, with the reference itself appearing in the war period's most famous catalogue of rumors-the Gyokuyo, n8I/81I. The AK, the war period's most famous catalogue of errors (and deceptions), does not mention it. The offer itself naturally positioned Yoritomo as an imperial loyalist. See the discussion and summary in Iida Hisao, "Kamakura jidai ni okeru chobaku kankei," 42-43, and his notes I and 2.

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Kyoto necessarily embraced such a view, since it was the revenues of proprietors that had been interrupted. 26 At any rate, it was in this kind of context that Yoritomo extended his offer, hoping to drive a wedge into the Tairacontrolled court. For the time being, however, the grip of the Taira showed no signs of weakening, as they succeeded in maintaining their claim to most of Japan. Until the middle of n83, the purview they asserted included the whole of the islands minus only the Kanto. Though the main Taira and Minamoto armies did not face one another during this phase, a fairly high level of military activiry was actually occurring to the west of the Kanto. The bloc of provinces constituting the Chubu-Hokurikudo now became a war zone, with Minamoto (Kiso) Yoshinaka (n54-n84) and Minamoto Yukiie (?-n86) shouldering most of the fighting. With the passage of time, the profiles of these two kinsmen of Yoritomo became progressively larger, as they manned the front lines while the chieftain remained busy in Kamakura. Yoshinaka in particular emerged as one of the era's major figures. 27 After declaring against the Taira in the ninth month of n8o, and after a brief period of fighting in Kozuke Province to the east, he hastened back to his base area in Shinano, which he now made his headquarters. 28 From this juncture, the Azuma Kagami begins to impute to him dark designs, and he seems evidently to have been restive under Yoritomo's overall command. For example, he is known to have started to issue confirmations under his own seal, a privilege that Yoritomo jealously reserved to himself. From as early as n8o/n, Yoshinaka was guaranteeing the holdings of warriors in his native Shinano, and also in such nearby provinces as Etchu in the Hokurikudo. 29

26. See note 20 above; and Ishimoda, "Ikkoku jiro shiki," 39 ff., for an enumeration of the alleged outrages being committed by the capital-based Taira. 27. The Kiso line was begun by Minamoto Yoshikata, the second son ofTameyoshi and the younger brother of Yoshitomo, who was Yoritomo's father. Yoshinaka and Yoritomo were therefore first cousins, with Yoritomo the older by seven years. For the activities ofYoshinaka during the early war years, see Yasuda Motohisa, Minamoto Yoritomo, 140-61; and Nagahara Keiji, Minamoto Yoritomo, 102-6. 28. For these three events, see AK, n8ol9!7, w/r3, and 12!2429. Ichikawa monjo, n8o/nlr3 Minarnoto (Kiso) Yoshinaka kudashibumi, in Shinano shiryo, 3:65 (also in HI, 8:3007, doc. 3937). No attribution of authorship of this document is made in the HI, though the Shinano shiryo attributes it to Yoshinaka. The reference to Yoshinaka's confirmation of a managerial tide to a village in Etchil appears in KB, doc. 71 (n62/3/r Kanto gechijo; all documents cited from KB, DKR, and LA! are in English translation).

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For the remainder of the war, no other Minamoto carried his personal pretensions to that level, issuing documents that might have been conceived as being independent of Kamakura. For the time being, however, Yoritomo must have been of two minds about his headstrong cousin, who was absorbing, as noted, much of the military pressure. Yoshinaka even went so far as to go on the offensive, registering significant successes in the Hokurikudo, 30 whereas Yukiie, for his part, spearheaded the fighting in the Chubu, and was especially active in Mikawa, Owari, and Mino. 31 In fact, many of the Taira's initial war policies were keyed to Yukiie, whose operations were nearest to the capital: the sokan and sogesu appointments are an obvious case in point (see chapter r). Another is an edict of late n8o directed to owners of shoen in Omi Province, which called upon them to guard barriers and roads, prohibit non-Taira travel, and beware of traitors. 32 For most of its first three years, then, the Genpei War tended to be staged in a region beyond Yoritomo's natural orbit, with two members of rival Minamoto lineages commanding troops, and therefore attention. As we know, Yoshinaka would eventually decide to challenge for the leadership itself, thereby plunging the Minamoto into another family crisis. Though the Taira, it may be presumed, would have been unable to draw Yoritomo out of the Kanto, a threat from within his own dan was much more serious. In late 1183, Yoritomo took steps to end Kamakura's regional focus forever.

THE YEAR OF

RECKONING-II83

During the early part of the war, the Taira's hold on Kyoto appears to have tightened, engendering a growing tide of resentment. Though Taira generals led repeated forays into the Chubu and Hokurikudo, they had few military successes that they could point to. Moreover, taxes and rents from those areas were declining, and a total stoppage was alleged to have occurred in 30. AK, n8r/9/4, n82/9/r5, ro/9. The Heike monogatari, Genpei seisuiki, and numerous other narratives are eloquent on Yoshinaka's various exploits. All of these references and excerpts from n8o to n83 are collected in the Shinano shiryo, 3:55-301. 31. Beginning with a defeat in Mino (AK, n8r/3/ro), Yukiie went on to bedevil the Taira in the western Chubu; AK, n8r/n/5, n82/5lr9, 5!29; and Gyokuyo, n8r/rol27, n83/5/r6. 32. Ishiyamadera shozo monjo, late n8o Takakura joko inzen, HI, 8:3008, doc. 3940.

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Echizen. 33 All communication with Noto had ceased; and a Taira-imposed war levy in lse was being condemned locally. 34 In these circumstances, a gradual change of attitude toward the eastern rebels began to develop, which encouraged Yoritomo to start making cautious overtures to the center. In his communications, which went mostly to temples and shrines, he promised, using respectful language, to restore rents. 35 In particular, he opened a direct channel to lse Shrine and granted it favors, which led the Taira to place the institution under surveillance. 36 Precisely when Yoritomo began to glimpse a different future can only be guessed at. Though his condemnations of the Taira were unrelenting, he had offered, as we noted, a compromise as early as mid-n8r. In fact, the awkwardness of his position was all too apparent. He was violating the court's edicts, which continued to be issued regularly, even as he viewed them as unrepresentative of the imperial will. For example, he refused to recognize the era changes to Yowa (n81-82) and to Juei (n82-84), and was still usingJisho (n77-81) as late as 1183. 37 The essence of such a protest could scarcely have been missed by anyone who was looking: the Taira were usurpers of the legitimate authority of the court. Clearly, the tyrants would ultimately have to be driven out of Kyoto, an event that finally occurred in mid-1183. However, when it happened it was not an army ofYoritomo that could take the credit. Instead, it was forces under the command ofYoshinaka and Yukiie. The Taira, for their part, fled westward, taking the emperor and the 33· See, e.g., Daigo zojiki, n82/12/r4, in Asakawa, Land and Society in Medieval japan, Japanese section, n. The reference here is to the blockage of rents bound for the Daigoji from Ushigahara Estate, with the blame attributed to the "eastern provinces" (togoku). Messengers were not able to get through. 34· Kujo ke monjo, n83/IO/r9 Kanto senshi, in Kujo ke monjo, 2:45, doc. 295 (Noto); andAK, n8r/rhr, for the unpopular war levy in Ise. 35· Ishimoda, "Kamakura seiken," 8-12. 36. Yoritomo's expressed desire for Ise Shrine to be secure dated from early in the war (AK, n8r/3/6), and a member of the Ise hierarchy visited Kamakura in n8r (who). By the beginning of n82, Yoritomo and his men were offering gifts to the shrine (n8zlrh8), and Yoritomo soon followed that with a special prayer whose quite extraordinary text appears in AK, n82h/8. The surveillance by the Taira is attributed to the shrine's growing support of the Minamoto cause; AK, n8z/r2/r. 37· For documents by Yoritomo with the years "Jisho 6" and "Jisho i' (n8z and n83), see HI, 8:3028-29, docs. 3974-78. Among these five, the first and the last are suspected ofbeing forgeries (according to the HI).

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retired emperor with them (though the latter would soon escape). But Kyoto had now effectively been liberated, and the Taira, as was natural in such circumstances, were branded the new "rebels." Among other things, Yoritomo felt free to begin affixing the era name Juei to his documents. 38 Within a short time, however, Yoshinaka began to make his presence felt in Kyoto in ways that were reminiscent of the immediate past. Though the Taira were no longer there, their practice of extorting edicts from the court was given new life. At the same time, Yoshinaka was quick to accept imperial offices and landed proprietorships, becoming director of the Left Horse Bureau and governor of Echigo, and also assuming 140 domains confiscated from the Taira. In the same vein, his confederate, Yukiie, became the governor of Bingo and then of Bizen, and simultaneously took control of ninety estates. 39 Permission from Yoritomo had not been sought by either man. At such a juncture, past experience might have dictated a Minamoto chieftain's next move-a rush to Kyoto to stave off the eclipse of one's imperial status by a rival kinsman. But though the lord of Kamakura was indeed anxious to negotiate, he was unwilling to do so in person. Instead, he would send ambassadors who would represent him, and in the process would turn another corner. Equally important, he would seek a substantial share in the administration of the country for himself and would also seek the reduction of his kinsmen to properly subordinate roles. Yoshinaka and Yukiie had to be cut down to size. Yoritomo's initial overtures to the court were clearly designed to please. Rejecting the license he had earlier extended to his own followers, he now offered to guarantee the integrity of shoen in the Kanto and Hokurikudo. By doing so, he was promising to concentrate on what the Taira and Yoshinaka had ignored or failed to pursue-to restart the flow of rents from estates in his own and Yoshinaka's home areas. 40 Significantly, the retired emperor had already anticipated such a move by beginning to issue edicts of a type not 38. The earliest of these was actually dated the second month of the second year of Juei (n83h), several months in advance of the Minamoto occupation of Kyoto; Tsurugaoka Hachimangu monjo, n83hh7 Minamoto Yoritomo kishinjo, HI, 8:3080-81, doc. 4071. Yoriromo was obviously anticipating the future. 39· Hyakurensho, n83/8!Io, 8!I6; Shinano shiryo, 3=199-201. The AKhas no entries for the entirety of n83, skipping from the last day of n82 to the first day of n84. 40. Gyokuyo, n83/7/3o; Hyakurensho, n83/7/3o.

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seen since the Taira had imposed their blockade in n8o: admonitions for estates in the Kanto to be restored to their prewar conditionY The thaw thus implied suggests that Kyoto and Kamakura were already trying to find a new basis for peace. Several weeks after his initial pledge regarding the Kanto and Hokurikudo, Yoritomo expanded his offer to include the entire region east of the capital. As if on cue, Yoshinaka's peremptoriness now increased, to the point that many in Kyoto seemed prepared to call in his cousin from the Kanto. 42 Ultimately, the retired emperor issued a decree in the tenth month of 1183 that authorized Yoritomo to discharge major responsibilities on behalf of the state. It was a seminal turn of events, somewhat unreal in view ofYoritomo's having been cast for most of his life in the sequential roles of exile and outlaw. But it was a development that would soon lead to an expansion of Kamakura's interests into the remaining parts of Japan. Before discussing the contents of the imperial edict, we should complete the story of Yoshinaka, who, by the end of the tenth month, could now count virtually everyone in authority as his enemy. During this period, he is known to have been responsible for what courtiers were branding as outrages, but also to have been granting confirmations to warriorsY The two activities were actually closely related, and were little different from those by Yoritomo in n8o. But the chieftain in Kamakura was now an established figure, and was attempting to become a pillar of respectability. At any rate, challenged by a kinsman who was increasingly active in the east and west, Yoritomo now determined to take the fight to Yoshinaka. Since he could no longer consider serving as his own general, he looked within his own lineage and found Yoshitsune. In a portentous move, he assigned his youngest brother to lead Kamakura's first military campaign beyond the Kanto.

41. The earliest of these documents was a confirmation of a shoen in Awa Province in the heart of the Kanto; Tamon'in monjo, n83f7/w Go-Shirakawa joko inzen, HI, 8:3098, doc. 4097. 42. Gyokuyo, n83/9/5. 43· See, in particular, KB, doc. 7 (n84/5 Go-Shirakawa in-no-cho kudashibumi), which recounts the travails of a single estate in Echizen Province, with despoilments starting at the time of the buildup ofYoshinaka's "rebellion" (muhon). Indeed, the word muhon was extensively used in reference to Yoshinaka; see, e.g., Gyokuyo, n831int.10/z2. For the full extent of the complaints about Yoshinaka, see Shinano shiryo, 3:204-301, covering the five months beginning in n83/8.

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Yoshitune's advance down the corridor from Kamakura was exceedingly quick. Within days he had driven as far as lse at the western end of the Chubu. Once there, he declared full authority over this one-time Taira base area, implicitly claiming jurisdiction over all the territory in between. 44 Yoshinaka now responded with military preparations of his own. But he also adopted a strategy that betrayed the desperation of his position. After three years of hostile action waged against the Taira, he now offered to make peace with them and to mount a joint invasion of the Kanto. 45 The Taira, to their credit, rejected this flight from reality, thereby obliging Yoshinaka to play his final card. Still in the capital, he secured a new imperial order branding Yoritomo a rebel, and then capped this act by extorting the tide of sei-i-tai-shogun- "barbarian-subduing great general. "46 However, the effort was in vain, since Yoshitsune and another brother, Noriyori, were successful now in occupying Kyoto themselves. At their behest, Yoshinaka was proclaimed the enemy of the court, and was soon hunted down and killed in nearby Omi. 47 For reasons not explained in any of our sources, Yukiie was somehow able to escape a similar fate. He had obviously broken with Yoshinaka, though his whereabouts and his role at this time are unrecorded. Indeed, the Azuma Kagami is silent on Yukiie for a full eighteen months, until his implication in the most famous Minamoto treachery of all. The titanic clash that ended with Yoshitsune's becoming a fugitive in 1185 finally brought the resilient Yukiie down as well. Returning to the agreement of n83/IO between Kamakura and Kyoto, the

44· In Gyokuyo, n8J/int.w/q, we encounter a reference to Yoritomo's naming his brother a general (taishogun) and ordering him to travel to Kyoto. (Interestingly, this is the diary's earliest reference to Yoshitsune, whom it refers to as "Kuro-real name unknown.") Watanabe Tamotsu, Minamoto Yoshitsune, 41, describes Yoshitsune's arrival in lse during that same month. 45· Yoshinaka sought an imperial command to make his proposal more appealing; Gyokuyo, n83/int.who, int.w/n. 46. See Hyakurensho, n83/12/IO, for a reference to the imperial order; and AK, n84!I/w, for Yoshinaka's being appointed shogun. In the meantime, Yoshinaka had also secured an imperial order naming him beneficiary to the "Taira's confiscated lands" (Heike mokkanryo); Hyakurensho, n83/nh5, nh. 47· The Gyokuyo recounts Yoshinaka's final days in almost daily entries in n84!I. AK, n84!Iho, records Yoshinaka's death.

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survival of differing copies of the ex-emperor's edict has fueled a continuing and ultimately irresolvable debate. The document's major inconsistencies are in two areas: (1) courtier and religious estates were to be resuscitated in either two or all three of the country's eastern circuits; and (2), Yoritomo was either empowered to handle local lawlessness, or he was limited to ordering apprehension by the regular authorities. 48 For historians, the differences in the language have stood at the core of a proper understanding ofYoritomo's future role in national affairs. The constitutional question of what was authorized has always been the key issue. For one school, the court had actually acknowledged Yoritomo's independence, to the point that it had now recognized a new authority, that of the Bakufu. For the other school, Yoritomo had been largely neutralized by being maneuvered into serving the court as a regional policeman. 49 For both, however, the edict was seen more as a culmination than as a starting point. In fact, Yoritomo used the edict as he had Prince Mochihito's call to arms-as an enabling device whose limits he would define. In the event, he now set about to expand his interests beyond the Kanto. He would be a warmaker and a peacekeeper in the Chubu and Hokurikudo, and he would also seek to assume similar roles in central Japan and the west. In n83/IO, then, the official rehabilitation ofYoritomo allowed him to begin constructing a jurisdiction that would reach across the entire country. By the start of n84, the character and scope of that authority-in a sense, the future role of the Kamakura Bakufu-was already starting to become visible.

YORITOMO AS AND

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From the very moment of his formal recognition, Yoritomo began to issue edicts of confirmation on behalf of central estate owners. The phenomenon 48. The four extant versions of the edict (all different) appear in Gyokuyo, n8J/int.rolrJ, int.roho, and im.ro/22; and Hyakurensho, n83/int.rolr4. 49· These positions have been staked out by the two leading constitutional historians of the second half of the twentieth century, Ishii Ryosuke (the first view) and Saro Shin'ichi (the second view). See Ishii, "Kamakura bakufu no seiritsu jiki," I34-40; and Saro, Kamakura bakufo sosho seido no kenkyu, chap. I, pt. r.

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marked a clear reversal of past practice in which institutions at the center had always been the country's ultimate guarantors. But now, in the circumstances of the current crisis, writs bolstered by force began to supplement those issued by a weakened court. For example, in the earliest known case, Yoritomo issued an order guaranteeing the security of the landed holdings belonging to Kyoto's Kamowake Shrine. By citing, as he did, an edict of the retired emperor, he was acknowledging the authority of the court; but he was also underlining his own authority in the area of national peacekeeping. The decree, dated n83/ro, presumably came in the immediate wake of the court's recognition of Kamakura. 50 By the early months of n84, the range ofYoritomo's involvement in central affairs had expanded dramatically, to the extent even of occasionally mediating proprietors' land disputes. Thus, after examining the evidence in a case oflga Province, Yoritomo judged in favor of one side (Todaiji) over the other. 5 1 Responses to accusations of local wrongdoing were obviously more common, and here Kamakura's role spread quickly beyond the east. In the sixth month, for example, Yoritomo issued a desist order against a resident ofKii, in response to a complaint by the Jingoji, a temple in Kyoto. 52 Though orders of this kind became the most frequent form in which Kamakura exercised jurisdiction, it did not limit itself in any consistent way. Thus, about the same time as the case in Kii, Yoritomo intruded upon public and private authorities in widely dispersed areas. In Settsu, for instance, he appointed a local figure to a shoen's managerial authority, whereas in lwami he appointed a zaichokanjin to a provincewide constabulary post. 53 Though he was responsive, in particular, to religious petitioners, he did not hesitate to circumvent other authorities, especially governors. The handling of a dispute between absentee owners is particularly worthy 50. Kamowake Ikazuchi jinja monjo, n83lro/10 Minamoto Yoritomo kudashibumi, HI, 8:3102-3, doc. 4109. 51. Kashiwagi shi shozli monjo, n84/4/3 Minamoto Yoritomo kudashibumi, HI, 8:3125, doc. 4147· 52· KB, doc. r (n84/6 Minamoto Yoritomo kudashibumi). 53· For the Settsu appointments (to gesu and kumon posts), see Aida Niro shushu eisha monjo, n84/5/r8 Minamoto Yoritomo kudashibumi, HI, 10:246, supp. doc. 245. For the constableship (oryoshi shikz) in Iwami, see Hagi-han Masuda ke monjo, n84/5 Kajiwara Kagetoki kudashibumi, HI, 8:3137, doc. 4175· (Kagetoki was one ofYoritomo's principal deputies in the west; see below, notes 67, 76, and 84.)

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of note, since the ex-emperor's recognition of Kamakura had hardly had such an authority in mind. Faced with this situation, the court now commenced to seek to clarify its earlier edict, attempting to establish working limits to Kamakura's involvement. Yoritomo was explicitly admonished to defeat the Taira and to see to the suppression of local outrages. 54 Nevertheless, the delegations of power were left essentially for him to interpret, a condition that made him answerable to himself. The court's edicts gave him an indispensable place in the official organization of government. But it was Yoritomo's own boldness that prevented him from being assimilated into that traditional machinery. As the ineffectiveness of Kyoto's own sanctions became more apparent, unprecedented lawlessness gripped much of the country. For some, an overturning of the old order might now have started to seem possible, though such hopes did not take into account the changing position ofKamakura on the question. As Kamakura's responsibilities around the country expan&d, its need to be able to control events increased. In a sense, order was becoming more important than disorder to its survival. As Yoritomo must have seen it, much of his regime's potential would need to be tied to its ability to respond to appeals for redress, whatever their source. In that situation, he now accelerated his own issuance of desist orders, and then moved to expedite them by establishing his own headquarters in Kyoto. Nothing like it had ever been seen before in the city of the emperor. The tasks that were assigned to Yoshitsune, who became the new office's first head, were to forward most of the petitions that had been submitted to it, and to deal responsibly with the rest. A handful of common features characterizes the guarantees he issued on his own. First, almost all the documents attributed to him prohibited the mustering of military levies (men and rations) from particular shoen. Second, the owners of those shoen tended to be religious institutions, both temples and shrines, suggesting a calculated decision to win their support. Third, since the sources yield data on only six provinces in the central region, Yoshitsune's authority may have been geographically limited. 55 On the other hand, the provinces coincided with no 54· The two edicts, dated r/26 and 21I9, are recorded in Gyokuyo, n84hl23. 55· For the general subject of his new authority in Kyoto, see Tanaka Minoru, "Kamakura dono otsukai ko." The six provinces were Tanba, Settsu, Kawachi, Kii, Izumi, and Omi, all to the immediate west of Kyoto save Omi, which bordered the capital city on the east. For further details, see my "The Emergence of the Kamakura Bakufu," 148-49.

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bloc or circuit, and the documents were in response to appeals from institutions inside and outside of Kyoto. 56 Once again, therefore, if the edicts of the court were the basis for Kamakura's authority, its actual contours seem to have been the product of an accumulation of ad hoc arrangements . .A5 must have been apparent to persons of the highest ranks, the effectiveness of Yoshitsune was now, indeed, a matter of growing importance to themselves. Naturally, it was not merely the interests of estate owners that were the objects of Kamakura's concern. Since the Taira were still at large and since outlawry was spreading, Yoritomo now sought to insinuate himself into the relationships among local men, and also between those men and their lands and offices. This meant holding out the prospect of rewards or confirmations-promises that, if kept, might conflict with the guarantees being extended to estate owners. Put differently, a reassertion of the status quo ante, which was the message to temples and shrines, was hardly what was on offer to potential provincial recruits. Nevertheless, in the context of a scene that was rapidly changing, few would have had the foresight to be able to spot contradictions. From early in n84, Kamakura stepped boldly into the middle of a network of traditional relationships and offered to provide patronage for both warriors and courtiers. Yoritomo's efforts, from the very start of his movement, had required great resourcefulness . .A5 we have seen, provincials were unaccustomed to acknowledging a noncentral figure as their ultimate protector, and main line Minamoto, true to form, were cautious about recognizing a close relative. From the beginning, these had been Yoritomo's special problems in the Kanto. In the Chubu and the Hokurikudo, where there were numerous Minamoto branches, the task confronting him was, if anything, even greater. From n84, Yoritomo launched a vigorous consolidation drive in these reg10ns. Some of our most interesting data focus on the Hokurikudo, to which Yoritomo sent a personal deputy, Hiki Tomomune, early in that year. Bearing the tide of "administrator for agriculture" (kannosht), Hiki was apparently assigned the task of restoring the flow of taxes to Kyoto. Though

56. The full complement of documents appears in HI, 8:3n6 (Kasuga Shrine), 3135 (Koyasan Temple), 3137 (Koya Denpoin Temple), 3149 (Kasuga Shrine), 3160 ((Matsuo Temple); and HI, 10:3915 (unnamed shrine). One of the foregoing appears in translation, in KB, doc. 2 (n84/5l24 Minamoto Yoshitsune kudashibumi).

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nothing is known of how he carried out such duties, we do see him in his other capacity as Yoritomo's personal agent. Thus, he was active in seeking to secure local residents in their home areas, with documented cases in Wakasa and Echizen. 57 At the same time, the governors of both provinces, who happened to be generals fighting for the Taira, were now attacked as part of Kamakura's policy. At the start of the war, residents of the area had risen up in opposition to governors' deputies, but now the declared enemy was the governors themselves. 58 The obvious beneficiaries here were the zaichokanjin, who now had an additional reason to seek to strengthen their ties with Kamakura. In fact, active recruitment beyond the east now commenced-an altogether unprecedented development. As we have seen, there had been persons from distant areas who claimed to be loyal Minamoto from the moment news of the war began filtering around the country; but now Kamakura itself was sending agents into foreign territories. At the same time, Yoritomo was starting to welcome men to Kamakura who had traveled long distances in pursuit of a personal audience. 59 The Minamoto, in n84, were becoming a national phenomenon. The battle of Ichinotani (n84h), the first encounter between main armies of the Taira and the Minamoto since Fujigawa in n8o/10, was of critical importance to Kamakura's evolving stature. First, as the new guardians of the court and the capital, the Minamoto needed to make a dramatic military gesture. The destruction of Yoshinaka had taken obvious precedence (n84/r), and a defeat of the Taira could now be pursued safely. At all events, an army under the command of Yoshitsune and Noriyori swept to a dramatic victory. 60 Second, the site of the battle, on the border between Settsu and Harima, was the Minamoto's initial military effort in western Japan. No 57· For Wakasa, see ]ingoji monjo, u84(?)/ 4/4 Minamoto Yoritomo shojo, HI, 8:3125, doc. 4184. For Echizen, see KB, doc. 7 (n84/5 Go-Shirakawa in-no-cho kudashibumi). 58. AK, u84h/7. Also, Kanemaki Kunio, Fukui ken no rekishi, 61; and Fukui ken, comp., Fukui kenshi, I:J00-301. The Heike monogatari names seven provincial governors (including those of Wakasa and Echizen) who died at the battle of Ichinotani in n84!2; Helen Craig McCullough, trans., The Tale ofthe Heike, 320. 59· For example, Hara Takaharu from Owari Province (AK, n84/3!I3); and Fujiwara Tomotsuna, a former Taira, from Kyoto (AK, n84/5!24). Courtiers came too, e.g., Ichijo Yoshiyasu; AK, u84/ 4/u. 6o. AK, u84h/4, 2/5, 2/7, 2/8. The Heike monogatari describes the campaign in great detail.

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longer were there any barriers to where the forces of Kamakura might fight. And third, success in this encounter carried a clear message that the Minamoto would now be active as recruiters countrywide. Upon the pretext of pursuing a national enemy, Kamakura was expanding its interests beyond the Chubu-Hokurikudo. Thus, when the leadership of the Taira decided to encamp in Shikoku, Yoritomo targeted the island immediately for active recruitment. Several weeks after lchinotani, Yoritomo addressed a memorial to the retired emperor in which he declared himself to be the emergency protector of the entire country. In that capacity, he exhorted the court to restore "virtuous rule" (tokusei) by making judicious appointments to the office of governor (zuryo to). He also announced that Yoshitsune would be his principal commander in the west, but noted that his own approval would be required for rewards from the court. This too, it may be said, was unprecedented. Finally, Yoritomo declared his special patronage of temples and shrines, and pledged to oversee a renewal of their prosperity. 61 In short, only a few years after staking his future on a declaration of independence, Yoritomo's involvements were now everywhere. For the duration of the countrywide emergency, Kyoto and Kamakura would govern jointly. For the remainder of n84, Yoritomo confronted the reality not only of great distances, but also of the differing circumstances among the provinces of the west. Some remained closely integrated with the capital, with traditional governance, even in the midst of the war, not fundamentally threatened.62 On the other hand, certain provinces in the west possessed prominent zaichokanjin, who were likely to have been chafing under the rule of civil governors, who, for their part, were now, in some cases, appointees of the Taira. At any rate, the challenges for Yoritomo were manifold. From his seat in Kamakura, many days' ride to the east, he would need to win the support of the leading men in the west in order to establish what he was now obviously seeking: a national identity for the Minamoto of which he was the now triumphant chieftain. 61. AK, n84hh5. Unfortunately, the original of this extraordinary document does not SUfVIVe.

62. The Bow of documents to and from the capital can be traced for individual provinces, with major upheaval not readily visible; the content of many of these records seems unchanged from earlier (and later).

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The rhetoric that has come down to us via the Azuma Kagami suggests that Yoritomo, as early as the third month, was promising blanket enrollments and even landed confirmations to all men of substance in the west. The authenticity of such pronouncements seems somewhat doubtful, however, on the grounds of both their timing and their comprehensive message. In particular, an offer to absorb unknown men virtually on demand seems unlikely, even more so because of the inclusion of Kyushu, which had not yet been reached. 63 In practice, a mere handful ofYoritomo's deputies now fanned out throughout the west, leading to a variety of experiences that we must sample. In Shikoku, Tachibana Kinnari was assigned to Sanuki, a province in which the Taira had been especially active. In n84/5, he forwarded a list containing the names of fourteen men who had submitted to him, though we do not know the number of eligibles overall. 64 There might well have been others who were approached but who refused. Moreover, we have no information on the remaining three provinces of Shikoku. In n82, Yoritomo's younger brother, Mareyoshi, had been murdered in Tosa (his earlier place of exile), but we find no references to recruitment there as we do for Sanuki. In Awa we have no data of any kind, and in Iyo recruitment was coordinated locally in the context of a civil war. 65 In western Honshu, three deputies ofYoritomo were active across a wide swath of provinces. For example, his own brother Noriyori is recorded as having recruited in Aki, Suo, and lwami. In the first (which was a major Taira stronghold), he distributed reward lands. In the second, he issued confirmations of lands already held. And in the third he participated in the recruitment of the major zaichokanjin. 66 Meanwhile, another general, Kajiwara

63. The offer to the men (junin) ofKyushu was allegedly made on n84/3!I (AK), though the advance into that island did not occur until the next year. A reiteration of the offer appears in AK, n85!I/6. However, the originals of what are presented to us as formal edicts from Yoritomo do not survive, and, accordingly, many scholars give them scant credence. 64- The list of n84/5 and Yoritomo's response of n84/9 are both recorded in AK, n84/91I9. No reason is given for the delay. 65. For the circumstances of Mareyoshi's death, see Kochi ken, comp., Kochi kenshi, kodaichiisei hen, 233-41, and AK, n82/9h5, nho. The AK's earliest reference to the province of Awa in Shikoku comes near the end of the war; AK, n85h!I9 (a different province, also named Awa, was in the Kanto). For Iyo, see AK, n8I/int.2/12, 9!27; and Tanaka, "Kamakura jidai ni okeru Iyo," 267-78. 66. For Aki, AK, n84/w/n; for Suo, Tokyo daigaku shozo monjo, n84/I0/3o Minamoto

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Kagetoki, was hop-scotching across Honshu, and is referred to as having been active in Awaji, Bitchu, and lwami. Finally, Doi Sanehira was assigned to Bitchu and Bizen. 67 Yet several provinces are not cited in any source, a fact that not only shows the vastness of the region itself, but implies, perhaps, that the war did not reach everywhere. Until recently, scholars assumed that Yoritomo's recruitment efforts were facilitated by a mature concept of "vassalage," expressed by the term gokenin. Indeed, the word appears in the Azuma kagami from its opening entries in n8o. 68 However, it now seems much more likely that gokenin did not enter the lexicon until much later and that battlefield promotions during the whole of the war had none of the formality implied by such a term. 69 In short, when Yoritomo elected to acknowledge the fourteen Sanuki loyalists, he did not (the Azuma kagami notwithstanding) address them as gokenin. The problem is much more serious than simply an anachronistic usage in the Azuma kagami, for it also raises questions about some other sources as well. For example, lwami, at the western end of Honshu, is one of the few provinces for which we have a small body of documents dealing with recruitment. However, because they regularly invoke the term gokenin, they are now considered suspect by many scholars. 70 Though it is certainly possible to see them merely as clever forgeries, we have not yet reached a point where we can dismiss them, and most compendia of sources continue to indude them. 71 At any rate, the message conveyed by these half dozen records is that Kamakura, having identified the leading zaichokanjin in lwami, Masuda Kanetaka, commenced now to move aggressively to enlist him. It did this by recognizing him as the province's constable (oryoshz) and by placing him in command of all Minamoto loyalists in the province. For their Noriyori kudashibumi, HI, 10:3917, doc. 5090; and for lwami, a series of six documents between n84/5 and n85/6, in the Shinshu Shimane kenshi, shiryo hen, r: 540-42 (for a discussion, see Kobayashi Hiroshi, "Iwami no kuni Masuda-shi no ryoshusei ni tsuite," 122-32). 67. SeeAK, n84/roh7 (Awaji);]ingoji monjo, n84/ro/r8 Kajiwara Kagetoki shojo, HI, 8:3151, doc. 42n (Bitchu); Hagi han Masuda-ke monjo, n84/5 Kajiwara Kagetoki kudashibumi an, HI, 8:3138, doc. 4178 (Iwami); AK, n84/3h5 (Bitchu); andAK, n84/12/r6 (Bizen). 68. The earliest usage is in AK, n8o/6h4, well before the start of the war. 69. For an elaboration of this point, see my "Yoritomo and Feudalism," in AA], 78-88; and Yasuda Motohisa, "Gokenin-sei seiritsu ni kansuru isshiki ron," 8r-no. 70. For example, by Seno Seiichiro in a private conversation. 71. Both the HI and the Shinshu Shimane kenshi, e.g., include them without comment.

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part, the loyalists were urged to search out and destroy the Taira, in return for which they would receive rewards from Kamakura. Finally, the constable himself had his portfolio of lands confirmed by Yoritomo, via edicts issued, by proxy, by Yoritomo's deputies. The edicts appeared under the signatures ofNoriyori, Yoshitsune, and Kajiwara Kagetoki. 72 In the context of the times, the logic of such records seems quite credible even if (as I suspect) they were produced somewhat later. In other words, though the documents may have postdated the actual events they describe, Kanetaka did emerge as Kamakura's stalwart in lwami. From Yoritomo's point of view, the Masuda had willingly recognized his own superior authority, despite the fact that they enjoyed no prior association with him, having acknowledged, as did all others, only Kyoto. And even if the established ties were less formal than the documents imply, a wedge had been driven between the Masuda and Kyoto that might be turned to advantage. To the extent that Kamakura was successful in creating a viable patronage system in provinces like lwami, the notion of an alternative source of authority to Kyoto was being promoted. Kamakura's targeting of the Masuda in lwami can be highlighted in another way. Here was a western province in which shoen were fewer in number than "provincial lands," or kokugaryo? 3 As a result, Kanetaka, the leading zaichokanjin, wielded power that might only be checked by his superior, the governor. In that circumstance, a substitution of Kamakura for Kyoto might have made sense to him. By contrast, in provinces with either many or no local contenders, Kamakura's prospects might have suffered, as in neighboring lzumo. With no Masuda-level magnate to be courted there by Yoritomo, the Masuda, in Iwami, were ordered to invade instead. 74 That Kamakura experienced a variety of difficulties in lzumo seems almost certain. Responding to an appeal from a local shrine in that province, it confessed its inability to control lawless locals there, at least some of whom, ironically, had been invoking the Minamoto name! 75 72. See the six Masuda documents cited in note 66 above. 73· The totals, as calculated by Kobayashi ("Iwami no kuni Masuda-shi," 125), were 837.6 chli of kokugaryli and 638.4 chli of shlien acreage. 74· Hagi han Masuda-ke monjo, n84/5 Kajiwara Kagetoki kudashibumi an, HI, 6:3138-39, doc. 4178. 75· Kitajima monjo, n84/rol28 Minamoto Yoritomo kudashibumi, HI, 13 (hoi): 131, doc. 422 (suppl.).

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Moreover, Kamakura's efforts to stabilize the country and to win adherents were now, as anticipated earlier, increasingly in conflict with each other. By the third month, the court was already complaining of provincials running amok, two of whom turned out to be Yoritomo's own generals. Kajiwara Kagetoki and Doi Sanehira were repeatedly cited for misbehavior, and each had to be reprimanded more than once. 76 Also, as the number of those professing to be Minamoto continued to swell, defections were likely to follow in some cases, even in the east. In n84/5, a major rebellion of Minamoto had to be put down in Kai and Shinano, and three months later rebels were still at large in Hitachi in the Kant6. 77 With increasing frequency, Yoritomo now found himself responding to appeals from persons at different levels. Some wished to have lands restored that had been seized by the Taira, but other petitioners were former Taira themselves. 78 In this environment, a sense of natural constituency was proving to be elusive, with the "Minamoto" becoming ever more diffuse. Yoritomo must have felt he was struggling to keep abreast of his commitments, even as the continuation of the war allowed him to postpone honoring all his pledges. But, in fact, the war was now only months away from its spectacular conclusion.

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As we have seen, the war never involved all people and places. A disparateness of motivations meant a disparateness of roles and degrees of commitment. Yet the sense of a national upheaval must have been very real by the start of n85, with novelty pressing tradition even as both characterized the era. A substantial number of courtiers, clerics, and warriors were now engaging in activities previously unknown to them. In that sense, the expectations of appropriate behavior were changing before people's eyes, though no rules for the future had yet been set. 76. For the court's complaints, see AK, u84/3/9. For complaints of violations by Kagetoki, see AK, n84frol27 and KB, doc. 4 (u85/5!I Kanto gechijo). For Sanehira, see AK, u84/3!I7, n85/ 4/26. 77· AK, II84/51I, 8!I3. 78. See AK, u84l2/30, for a restoration to a courtier; and AK, u84/3/ro and 31I3, for two former Taira supporters being forgiven by Yoritomo.

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The Azuma kagami actually captures much of this spirit of flux by recounting episodes occurring across much of the country and involving many people. To that extent, it is elaborating a national experience, arguably the first such experience that Japan ever had. Moreover, persons from one part of the country, the Kanto, were now for the first time interacting with, and influencing, people elsewhere. Simultaneously, however, the provincial elite were being courted, even propositioned, by someone who was arguably himself from the provinces, and who was seeking to invent new ways to protect and represent them. Inhibitions and taboos were being smashed everywhere, even as no one could have known remotely how it would all come out. This profound sense of uncertainty needs to be underlined, since historians have tended to castigate Yoritomo's generals for moving too slowly, as if the outcome, before it happened, was obvious. As we have seen, "delays" along the way actually redounded to Kamakura's advantage, since organizational infrastructure took time to put into place. The actual pace of the war was thus important to the result. At any rate, a first concerted drive to pursue the Taira was launched at the beginning of n85 and led, before anyone might have predicted it, to a resounding Minamoto victory. From the start of that year, the Taira were pursued on two main fronts, in

Kyushu by Noriyori from the end of the first month, and in Shikoku by Yoshitsune from the second month. By all accounts, Yoshitsune cut a decisive path across Shikoku, and then began to prepare for a naval assault in the Inland Sea. On n85/3h4, he attacked and destroyed the Taira fleet at Dannoura, bringing hostilities to a spectacular end and providing the basis for the conflict to be vividly remembered above all as a great trial of arms. In other words, the destruction of the Taira leadership in such stunning fashion allowed a multidimensional clash of interests over a five-year period to become, ever after, the "Genpei War." In the actual event, Kiyomori's widow and grandson (the former emperor Antoku) were lost at sea, along with the imperial sword and various members of the Taira main line. The finality of such a fate proved irresistible to later commentators, but it also helped to obscure much of the larger picture, which was still being sketched. Finality is an inappropriate concept for assessing n85. If the interlude in which Kiyomori and his kinsfolk were major players was now ending, the conclusion of the war actually sorted out very little else. In particular, Yoritomo's role in national affairs, and Kamakura's place in the national

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polity, had not yet been addressed. At the same time, law and order desperately needed to be restored, and the country's war zones needed to be demilitarized. Locals who were engaging in criminal behavior had to be induced to stop, and a variety of armed contingents needed to be disbanded. A start on the first of these goals had been made in 1184, but now, a year later, the need for order became much more compelling. In pursuit of that objective, Yoritomo upgraded his representation in Kyoto by dispatching a pair of agents with an enhanced mission. Kamakura was still spreading its wings. The new commissioners were Nakahara Hisatsune and Kondo Kunihira, depicted in the sources as a combination of pen and sword, with Nakahara the man of letters and Kondo the warrior stalwart. Once appointed, the two agents began issuing documents that had the effect of strengthening Kamakura's claim to permanent status: their area of declared jurisdiction was now inflated to eleven provinces (Yoshitsune's had been a de facto six), and the edicts opened with a memorable preamble, "The commissioners of the lord of Kamakura do hereby order ... " Moreover, the orders were in response to complaints lodged by traditional proprietors, who now included not only religious institutions (as under Yoshitsune) but also courtiers. Most important of all, the documents were the first ever to invoke dual higher authorities-the retired emperor, who was cited first, followed by the "lord of Kamakura." It was virtually as if the two had now become near equals. 79 Unfortunately, a discrepancy exists on one important issue. Whereas the orders themselves called for the cessation of local despoilments, the Azuma kagami seems to refer to something far grander, citing "the disposition (seibaz) of petitions (zasso) in the central region. "80 Yasuda Motohisa, for one, accepts the reference at face value, seeing in it proof of a formal, comprehensive jurisdiction. 81 However, the documents reveal little more than a coordinated policing authority, which was in fact quite sufficient to keep the new headquarters busy. Not only did this authority continue to operate after the defeat of the Taira, but six new assistants were dispatched from

79· For the appointment of these two agents and the reference to eleven provinces, see AK, n85h/5. For the opening preamble and the invocation of the dual higher authorities, see the translation of one of their edicts in KB, doc. 4 (u85/5/r Kanto gechijo). 8o. See AK, n85/ 5!25 and 6/r6. 8r. Yasuda Motohisa, ]ito oyobi }ito ryoshusei no kenkyu, 163-64.

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Kamakura soon thereafter. 82 In a major way, patronage from the east was now issuing from both capitals. Once the war was over, an unprecedented number of people were set in motion. Most were simply seeking to return home. But others clearly left their homes in search of war booty, while still others were expelled from them as a result. In the case of the many who were now accused of having fought for, or been sympathetic toward, the Taira, Kamakura was faced with the task of determining their fate, which was a matter of assessing relative war guilt and then deciding what to do next. Whether to confiscate land rights was perhaps the ultimate question. Moreover, to the extent that the Taira who were disbanding needed to be monitored, Yoritomo would have felt obliged to keep some of his men in place. In this context, Noriyori was ordered to remain in Kyushu for the time being, along with many of the easterners who had fought under him. 83 In this way, an army in the field was transformed into an army of occupation, effectively extending the period of uncertainty into the future. Moreover, locals were now coming forward in large numbers to claim merit as Minamoto, meaning that Kamakura was not concerned merely with identifying former enemies. Friends and foes had to be carefully separated. Beyond that, "winners" from top to bottom were becoming the objects of complaints. To assist in the resolution of this growing problem, Yoritomo appointed Doi Sanehira and Kajiwara Kagetoki to be special constables for the home provinces (kinkoku no sotsuibushi), men who might lend support in the field to the new Kyoto headquarters. However, this proved to be a case of posting foxes to guard chickens, and both men, as earlier, were immediately accused of committing violations. 84 How to curtail indiscipline by one's own men increasingly lay at the heart of the problem. This last condition was exacerbated by the court's age-old practice ofhon-

82. AK, n85/5h5. Less than three weeks earlier, an edict was issued by a pair of assistants (presumably) to the rwo agents; see KB, doc. 5 (u85/5/6 Kanto gechijo). 83. AK, n85/5/5, 5/7. Yoritomo's intentions for Kyushu were enumerated in a detailed plan that included keeping easterners on duty on that island for the time being; AK, n85/5/8. See below, chapter 5, for Kamakura's policies in Kyushu from n86. 84. Their joint appointments are recorded in AK, n85/4h6. Five days later, Kajiwara was cited for a violation (see the reference in note 76 above). Doi Sanehira could not stay out of trouble; see, e.g., KB, doc. 31 (n86/9/5 Minamoto Yoritomo kudashibumi).

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oring warriors on the winning side. From the court's point of view, it was merely seeking to absorb its armed defenders by integrating them into traditional hierarchies. From Kamakura's point of view, Kyoto was actually contributing to the problem by undermining Yoritomo's efforts to maintain the coherence of his following beyond the lifetime of a public crisis, i.e., the war. Finally, to add to all the other complications, Yoritomo's endeavors now became embroiled in the latest phase of the feud that had riven the Minamoto for decades. A breach between Yoritomo and Yoshitsune now took center stage. In its essence, the rift was the result of the fame and success achieved by both brothers, combined with the need for the head of the lineage to reassert his dominance. As we have noted, siblings and other kin of the same generation commonly failed to enjoy a stable relationship owing to the conditions and requirements of their respective statuses. When leadership was the prize and mutual ambition was the engine, estrangement was a very frequent result.85 In the case ofYoshitsune and Yoritomo, the court's patronage of the former now served to fan the anger of the latter. We have already noted Yoritomo's opposition to the court's advancement of rank-and-file warriors. His response to the advancement of his brother, a potential challenger, was obviously much more dramatic. Yoritomo's relationship with Yoshitsune is recorded in some detail in the Azuma kagami. The final rupture between then came late in 1185 and is central to the story of the emergence of the jito post (see chapter 4). But the estrangement had other consequences as well, among them the potential impact on certain local areas, such as lyo in Shikoku where the struggle for supremacy had been unusually intense. As in other matters, the issue came to a head wholly apart from the Minamoto's victory at Dannoura. The appointment ofYoshitsune as governor of Iyo was the catalyst. Even before the ouster of the Taira from Kyoto in n83, a civil war had enveloped Iyo in which the Kono, who declared for the Minarnoto, confronted the Nii, who became Taira. The bitterness thus engendered survived the formal conclusion of the war. On 8!29, Yoshitsune was appointed governor of lyo upon the earlier recommendation of his brother, despite the fact that 85. For a discussion of this subject in the context of the late twelfth century, see my LA!, chaps. r-2.

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Yoritomo had now changed his mind. When the ex-emperor refused to rescind the appointment, Yoritomo was obliged to adopt a fresh strategy. Unable on his own to terminate Yoshitsune's governorship, he took steps to compromise its viability instead. On ro/q, he appointed the Kono head and a cohort of his followers to a network of administrative posts (goshi shiki) in Iyo, which led to the outcome that Yoritomo must have been hoping for. In the words of a well-known diarist, Yoshitsune was now rendered "unable to discharge provincial affairs." 86 One by-product of this experience was to provide Yoritomo with a fresh insight for the future. The power to invest, not merely to nominate or to confirm, had shown its potential value in western Japan. Ultimately, this idea would contribute to the concept of twin networks of appointees who would be assigned, on a countrywide basis, as jito and shugo. However, in the context of the second half of n85, the Yoshitsune affair became simply the dominant divisive issue of the day, transcending its origin as a fraternal feud by drawing in players of various stations and locales. In a sense, the rivalry between the brothers now replaced the rivalry of the Taira and Minamoto, providing a new outlet for unresolved tensions. As such, and because Kamakura's place in the polity hung in the balance, the headquarters of Yoritomo became a hive of activity, with messengers coming and going almost daily. Information had become a kind of coin of the realm, as Yoritomo strained to keep abreast of developments in far-flung areas. How, for example, was he to maintain a beachhead in Kyushu, where his influence was reportedly languishing, and where Yoshitsune was now seeking an authority of his own? 87 Most of all, how was he to prevent what had been the undoing of all his predecessors-a loss of identity and absorption into the central polity after victory had been won? As the chieftain of the Minamoto was now coming to realize, winners and losers were equally

86. AK, n8s/8h9; and Gyokuyo, n8s/ro/q. 87. Noriyori was not permitted to leave Kyushu until 7/12 (AK) when he was replaced by Yoritomo's erstwhile deputies in Kyoto, Kondo and Nakahara; the latter were seemingly ineffective and were replaced in turn (see chapter 5 below). In the eleventh month, the court suddenly appointed Yoshitsune to an island-wide stewardship over Kyushu, which helped to push the crisis into its next stage; AK, n8s/n/7. Though some scholars have raised doubts about this version of events, the Gyokuyii, n85/I2h7, confirms that the Kyushu appointment had indeed been made (see below, pp. 127-28, for further details on the stewardship).

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capable of being manipulated under a countrywide system of offices in which there remained but a single hierarchy. Somehow, the conversion of wartime measures into peacetime institutions would be required if the lord of Kamakura was to emerge as the head of the Kamakura Bakufu.

CHAPTER

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For a long time, historians of Japan identified the eleventh month of n85 as marking the institutionalization of the Kamakura shugo and }ito. As described in the Azuma kagami, a court order authorized Yoritomo to make appointments to both titles, 1 which he then proceeded to do with great vigor. The basis for a permanent identity for his regime was thereby set in place-in the form of these twin networks of officials. Out of the Minamoto movement had come the Kamakura Bakufu. As we now know, the Azuma kagami's summary of the court edict is in error in a major respect, since shugo did not appear until substantially later. The notion of a dual creation was thus a product of a later rationalizationof a time when shugo and }ito were the regime's defining institutions. In the context of the Bakufu's formative period, however, the two offices had remarkably little connection, though convention and convenience warrant our treating them together. As we shall see, there were no shugo as such until after r. The key entries are n85/nl28, n/29, and n/6-easily the AK's most famous sequence.

(Where dates in parentheses appear in the text, they are citations to entries in the AK)

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though another office, that of sotsuibushi, was often confused with it. k for jito, a concept that had been poorly defined as late as n8o emerged from the Genpei War with an explosive new meaning, and went on to become a defining basis for the new Kamakura age. Though the historical origins of each of the terms belong to a much earlier period, the words came to assume a new prominence during the Genpei War. The problem is that the prominence led to a dramatic outcome only in the case of}ito; the evolution of the shugo concept is much more obscure. In fact, as we shall see, officials bearing the shugo name had their formal entrance onto the national stage delayed by almost a generation. 2 1200,

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The Heian period had no officers called shugo though the term actually predates that era itself. It appears in the Nihon shoki in an entry of 689 in the literal meaning of "persons who guard" (shugonin) district-sized units. 3 In Heian times, at least one comparable usage can be cited, though the shugonin in question was a guardian of imperial tombs. 4 More common was the word shugo employed as a verb, in the context of either devotional protection or defense of property. In the period before n8o, we encounter it more than fifteen times in these general meanings. Thus individuals would perform acts of "protection" through their piety or their personal vigilance. 5 However, though persons may have behaved in such a protective manner, no one was appointed to a shugo office, or to a responsibility using that designation in a formal sense. During Heian times, there were guardian-type officers of quite another 2. The story of the shugo's beginnings has bedeviled historians for a long time. For a good general introduction to the subject, which also describes the positions of leading scholars in Japan, see Yasuda Motohisa, Shugo to jito, r-67. 3· Nihon shoki, book 30, 689/8, p. 553· 4· Yanagiwara ke kiroku, III3/12 genban no tsukasa cho an, HI, 5=1633, doc. r8or. 5· For the first, see, e.g., Kokokuji monjo, II38/3h5 sa konoe gon no chujo kishinjo, HI, por6, doc. 2384; for the second, e.g., Tonanin monjo, no4/5 udaijin Fujiwara Tadazane ke mandokoro kudashibumi an, HI, 4:1474-75, doc. r6r3. Such usages continued into the n8os, e.g., the shugo responsibilities of a protector of a shrine, in ]ingu zassho, n8rh Kotai jingil kannushi cho an, HI, 8:3017-r8, doc. 3957·

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sort-the constabulary officials known as kebiishi, oryoshi, tsuibushi, and tsuitoshi, 6 who might be considered a rough collective prototype for the later shugo. The only actual references to a shugo as an official appear in a pair of documents of 1126 and u64. The first is a copy from the Kamakura age with the date obviously wrong, and the second is a deliberate later forgery. 7 If the contexts in which the word shugo was used did not advance very far in Heian times, the term sotsuibushi may not have existed at all. 8 As mentioned, we encounter a different situation after u8o, with both words now in evidence though with the sources that use them the main problem. The Azuma kagami is egregious in this regard, with every one of its early usages of shugo highly suspect. One solution has been to trot out the possibility of a decade of sotsuibushi as a kind of antecedent figure, followed by an entire historical epoch of shugo. 9 However, a sequence of titles, though suggestive of a logical and staged growth, cannot be sustained. The best we can do is to point to the assignments of emergency officers who operated under no explicit framework, and who bear, in fact, little resemblance to the mature shugo. Yet it is also true that Kamakura's early experience in appointing men to whole provinces must be considered the essential prologue to the shugo story. The Azuma kagami's earliest reference to a shugo engages us in interpretive difficulties from the start. From a condition in which province-sized shugo did not exist at all, Yoritomo is suddenly depicted as making a pair of appointments under that designation in u8o (n8o/rohr). Apart from the terminology, however, the circumstances surrounding the episode do make sense. The assignments were to Suruga and Totomi provinces, which were converted into a defense perimeter and buffer area following the victory at Fujigawa. Yasuda Yoshisada and Takeda Nobuyoshi were authorized to protect this new western frontier, and the Azuma kagami's identification of their 6. For an expert and detailed treatment, see Friday, Hired Swords, chap. 4· 7· See Negoro yosho, rn6/8 Kii kokushi chosen an, HI, 5:1794-95, doc. 2083, to which the following signature is appended: "shugo, Fujiwara ason" (the editors have placed a mama, i.e., "sic," in the margin next to the word shugo); and Kitajima ke monjo, n64/n/5 Tokimura uchiwatashijo, HI, shinzoku hoi, 94, doc. 344· 8. Though Yasuda Motohisa makes assertions to the contrary, he does not actually cite any examples; see Yasuda, Shugo to jitli, 25. I have not been able to find any appearances of the term. Nor has Karl Friday; see his "Teeth and Claws: Provincial Warriors and the Heian Court," 179, note n8. 9· For example, this is the general position taken by Yasuda in Shugo to jitli, 27-36. See also note 20 below for the view of Miura Kaneyuki that shugo replaced slitsuibushi in n85.

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task as similar to that of the later shugo was correct even if they did not have the actual title. Indeed, the Azuma kagami corrected itself a year later by using shugo as a verb to refer to one of these men. 10 We are left with the impression of a responsibility that combined pacification, recruitment, and requisitioning, all entirely logical in the circumstances that followed Fujigawa. 11 During the next three years, there are no further usages of the term shugo in the Azuma kagami or any other source, 12 and our next encounter is with the earliest surviving reference to a sotsuibushi, though, tantalizingly, with no connection to Kamakura. Appointed for the purpose of protecting Kasuga Shrine lands, the sotsuibushi here was the object of a suit calling for his dismissal, on the grounds that no precedent for such an officer existed. 13 The contemporaneity of the record, combined with the shiki context in which the term is cited, suggests that the first sotsuibushi preceded the first shugo. In n84, coincident with the push westward of Kamakura's interests, four prominent figures are referred to as engaging in the activities of a shugo. According to the Azuma kagami, Doi Sanehira and Kajiwara Kagetoki were ordered by Yoritomo to "protect" Harima, Mimasaka, Bizen, Bitchu, and Bingo provinces, by assigning individual agents to each (n84hii8). On the basis of this entry, scholars have listed the two men as shugo from n84, even though they are cognizant of the problems of timing and conceptualization.14 On the other hand, Doi and Kajiwara were unmistakably involved with these five provinces, confirming and appointing residents to shiki on Yoritomo's behalf, and investigating complaints of various kinds. 15 Yet they

ro. AK, n8I/3/3. In other words, even if the AK's compilers were using a source that included the word shugo, the usage almost certainly would have been as a verb. Subsequently, both Nobuyoshi and Yoshisada fell afoul ofYoritomo, the former in n84 (see AK, n84/6/r6 and n86/3/9), the latter in II93 (AK, II93/nl28, 12/5). II. In n8I, Yoshisada complained of foot-dragging by locals in providing laborers for the construction of fortifications in Totomi; AK, n8I/3/3. I2. Near the end of n83, the diary Gyokuyo uses the words bushi no shugo, seemingly "warrior protectors"; see Gyokuyo, 2:654. I3. Tenri toshokan shozo monjo, n83/ 4/n san-i Fujiwara Yoshisue moshibumi an, HI, 8:309I, doc. 4083. 14· See, e.g., Saw Shin'ichi, Zotei-Kamakura bakufo shugo seido no kenkyu, I53-70. 15. E.g., AK, n84/3l25 (Doi in Bitchu confirming persons dispossessed earlier by the Taira); and AK, n84/I2/I6 (Doi in Bizen investigating an appeal by Kibitsu Shrine, a prominent religious center).

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were also involved in each other's provinces on occasion, and are referred to, confusingly, as sotsuibushi (not shugo) for the central region in n85/4. 16 Much the same kind of confusion affects Ouchi Koreyoshi, the Azuma kagami's shugo of Iga from n84, but the sotsuibushi there in a more contemporary source of two years later. 17 Moreover, in a document of n84, Ouchi uses no designation of any kind as he addresses the zaichokanjin of Iga and renders a tax judgment favorable to the Todaiji. 18 As the site of a century-old competition between the Taira and that temple, the province would have been viewed as potentially amenable to approaches from Kamakura, and hence the assignment of Koreyoshi there, if not as shugo. The Hyakurensho, a later chronicle, cites a Kyoto edict of the middle of n85 in which Kamakura's appointments of sotsuibushi (not shugo) were ordered canceled. 19 Some scholars have seen this reference as a solution to the larger problem, since the tide of the war years would now, following its prohibition, have to be succeeded by something else. 20 However, Ouchi, as just noted, was a sotsuibushi in II86, and the chronology, in another source, is different yet again. According to the Masu kagami, a network of sotsuibushi (shokoku no sotsuibushi) was launched in n85/I2. 21 Finally, a certain Teshima Aritsune rounds out the group of alleged shugo from the later war period (Doi, Kajiwara, Ouchi, and Teshima). In this case, however, he is referred to as a shugonin, not a shugo, a term that has a more contemporary ring to it and may be credible because of its possible unrelatedness to Kamakura. 22 Aritsune, the provisional governor (gon no kamz) of Kii, was accused of violating a temple's immunities by his superior, the gov-

16. E.g., Kajiwara in Doi's Bitchu in a local land-confirmation case; ]ingoji monjo, n84(?)/ ro/r8 Kajiwara Kageroki shojo, HI, 8:3151, doc. 42n. For the sotsuibushi reference, see AK, II85/4/z6. !7· AK, n84/3ho; Tada-in monjo, n86/nh5 Oe Hiromoto hosho an, KI, r:n6, doc. 195. r8. Tonanin monjo, n84/8/9 Ouchi Koreyoshi kudashibumi an, HI, 8:3143, doc. 4193. 19. Hyakurenshio, n85/ 6/r9, p. 151. Perhaps the reference is to the alleged appointment two months earlier of Doi and Kajiwara as kinkoku no sotsuibushi; see note 16 above. 20. This was the view, e.g., of the great constitutionalist Miura Kaneyuki; see the summary by Yasuda, Shugo to jito, 23. 21. Masu kagami, 28. See chapter 7, note 15. 22. See KB, docs. 131, 133 (Negoro yosho, n84/8/5 Kii kokushi ukebumi; and ibid., n84f8/8 Kii kokushi chosen an). Saro and other historians assume an appointment by Kamakura, as did I in KB, published in 1976.

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ernor, who referred to him in this context as a shugonin. In short, Aritsune, a traditional protector of a temple's security, was now being upbraided for forsaking his responsibilities. The linking of the term to persons who were no longer providing adequate protection seems to have been a new development of n84-85, one to which Yoritomo himself may have contributed. Thus, in early n85, he cited "protecting warriors" (shugo no bushi to) for violating the immunities of lwashimizu Shrine lands in some ten provinces. 23 Three months later, theretired emperor made a similar charge involving a different shrine, though on this occasion shugonin and }ito were accused of committing the outrages. 24 This is a pairing of terms that cannot be duplicated during Yoritomo's lifetime, suggesting either pure chance or a later forgery. 25 Once again, however, a promising line of analysis is weakened by the remaining references to shugo (or shugonin) in the Azuma kagami. Thus, a shugonin was allegedly posted to the remote island province ofTsushima on n85/5h3, and an award for merit of a "shugo shiki"was made in Harima on 8/24. Not only are the two recipients never again mentioned in connection with these provinces/6 but the words "shugo shiki" are not seen in a contemporary record until the 1220s. 27 The final reference in the Azuma kagami to a shugo in n85 alleges a posting to lse Province, a Taira stronghold, on wh. However, the entry once again employs language that is anachronistic, referring to the "headquarters of a shugo" (shugosho). 28 The person named in this connection cannot otherwise be related to Ise.

23. Iwashimizu monjo, n85/r/9 Minamoto Yoritomo kudashibumi an, HI, 8:3159-60, doc. 4227: "In recent years, owing to the campaign against the Heike, protector-warriors have re-

peatedly been withholding the annual rent or imposing commissariat levies." 24. Kamowake ikazuchi jinja monjo, n85/ 4h9 ln-no-cho kudashibumi, HI, 8:3I74, doc. 4244. 25. The pairing emerges early in the thirteenth century; see chapter 7, note 88. 26. Saw, Zlitei-shugo, 24I (Tsushima), I54 (Harima). In the case of Harima, moreover, Kajiwara Kagetoki was the AK's "shugo" there before and after. 27. See, e.g., LA!, doc. 36 (Shimazu ke monjo, I227/ro/ro shogun sodehan kudashibumi), which refers to the shugo shiki of Echizen and Satsuma provinces. (A reference to a "shugo shiki" in II93 is suspect because the work containing it, the Toboki, was a product of the fourteenth century.) 28. Such headquarters obviously appeared only later; see, e.g., KB, doc. I47 (Kitajima monjo, 1215/7 lzumo no kuni shugo gechijo).

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The Azuma kagami's extravagance reaches its peak in its handling of events at the end of 1185. According to the entry of 11/12, Oe Hiromoto, a Kyoto-born advisor to Yoritomo, proposed twin networks of officials called shugo and }ito, which the retired emperor then authorized several weeks later. In this fashion, the titles most emblematic of the mature Kamakura regime were accorded, as we have noted, a simultaneous genesis. They appeared together, their legitimacy the basis for the Bakufu's permanence. The problem of course lies with the shugo half of this duality, for which no corroboration of any kind can be adduced. No scholar today accepts the Azuma kagami's verston. Nevertheless, to reject the standard account is not to deny the progress that led eventually to a shugo-like concept. From early in the war, Yoritomo assigned trusted loyalists to duties within whole provinces, with the scope of their responsibilities varying as conditions seemed to warrant. Military requirements obviously bulked large here, with assignments in areas that needed to be secured. Thus Totomi and Suruga, adjoining the Kanto, were important in 1180, whereas Iga and lse, at the end of the eastern corridor, were significant in 1184-85. Similarly, the strategic bloc assigned to Doi and Kajiwara was essential to denying the Taira an easy route back to Kyoto in 1184. Notwithstanding, even a casual perusal of the map suggests major gaps that we are unable to explain. Since Kamakura seems to have emerged from the war with contacts, if not rooted interests, in most parts of the country, its inconsistency in assigning provincial coordinators remains difficult to understand. In fact, much of our problem may derive from the expectation of a uniform nomenclature of appointments, which is itself the result of the Azuma kagami's theme of "institutionalization" following the war. As a consequence, historians have all but banished those episodes not actually citing the word shugo or sotsuibushi, leaving out such illustrious houses as the lnaba, Kono, and Tachibana, whose heads performed province-based duties in Wakasa, lyo, and Sanuki, respectively. In short, the rationale for omitting them is that none on the list was ever referred to as a shugo or sotsuibushi, despite the fact that they seem little different from the men who were so referred to. They were different, indeed, in only a single respect, in the matter of where they happened to hail from. According to the thirteenth-century practice, which the Azuma kagami would have represented, noneasterners

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such as the Inaba, Kono, and Tachibana were forever ineligible to become

shugo. 29 Though Kamakura named no "shugo" during the war years, the words shugo and shugonin were obviously known to it. Persons who "protected" were performing as "protectors." Moreover, the word shugonin was being applied to provincials who were failing as guardians, a development, in hindsight, that assumes new significance. As we shall see, it was just such a condition that helped to create enthusiasm for the new concept ofjito. On the other hand, the less accelerated pace of the word shugo's development might usefully be considered. First, there was obviously only a limited number of provinces, which reduced the potential for rapid growth during the war years. Second, the title sotsuibushi came to be accepted as appropriate for assignments to provinces. Never used as a verb, and an obvious elaboration from tsuibushi, it was able to emerge all but fully formed. And third, from as early as u84, the court granted Yoritomo the right to nominate selected civil governors, meaning that the imperative to invent a substitute may, for the time being, have been averted. When the notion of a shugo network was ultimately evolved later on, it occurred within a context that dearly required it. Finally, regarding the question whether all wartime appointees should be viewed as forerunners of the later shugo, the connection, however convenient, is not very instructive. The provincial appointees of the war years were part of the helter-skelter of military exigency, and were given a general assignment rather than defined duties. By contrast, the shugo were created with mostly nonmilitary requirements in mind.

']ITO' BEFORE II80

If anything, the origins and early usages of the word ''}ito" are more complex than those of "shugo." The confusions regarding shugo really began in the u8os when a verb with a straightforward meaning may have started to be used in new contexts; the word's later history then distorted our sources' view of the usage in the u8os. The confusions over sotsuibushi are likewise a 29. For data on these families see the references in the index.

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product of the n8os. By contrast, the meaning of)ito is uncertain from the very start, with additional problems relating to its becoming a shiki in the mid-twelfth century, and to its usage by the Taira during the latter's period of ascendancy. Moreover, by the end of the Genpei War, when the muddle concerning shugo was now reaching its height (at least for historians), the future of the institutionalized )ito was being set. A5 we observed at the outset, the histories of the pre-Kamakura usages of both terms have no connection with one another. The early history of)ito is a subject replete with controversy. A5 noted by many scholars, the earliest surviving usage of the word dates from 896, when it appears in the meaning of someone's "homeland," located, coincidentally, in a swampy area. 30 The term all but disappears during the tenth and eleventh centuries, 31 only to reemerge in the twelfth, with some degree of frequency. However, its appearances in the record have not led to a consensus of interpretation. There are two principal areas of dispute, which we have actually already touched on: how the word )ito first became a shiki name, and how that shiki was then used by the Taira. The nub of the debate concerning the first centers on genealogy-whether )ito ought to be traced more through the private or public land systems. The conventional view, which favors a shoen origin, is the one reflected in earlier English language scholarship. Thus for kakawa, Hall, and Kiley, who obviously knew of the )ito's prominence in Kamakura-era shoen, there was little reason to imagine other than an identical origin. 32 Many specialists in Japan basically shared that view, even as they differed on the tightness of the connection binding )ito to central proprietors. At any rate, )ito were commender-managers whose private lands had been incorporated into shoen. A contrary view, stressing a "provincial office" origin, was introduced by

30. Hakushaku kyuzli monjo, 896/5lr9 bo gocho ge utsushi, HI, 1:216-q, doc. r82. 31. It appears in only two documents of the tenth century, one in the meaning of a "site" that had been plundered, the other as a "site" marking a northern boundary; see Yakushi-in monjo, 9III4/n Todaiji joza ureijo, HI, 1:317, doc. 206, and Komyoji monjo, 934/nlr9 Iga no kuni Natsume go tone ge an, HI, r:359, doc. 244. It appears in only a single document of the eleventh century, of ro89; see note 34 below. 32. Asakawa, The Documents ofIriki, 3, 91, 98; Hall, Government and Local Power, n3; Kiley, "Property and Political Authority," 198-200.

'sHU G 0

AND

J IT 0'

IMAGINED

III

Uwayokote Masataka in 1957. 33 In particular, the view isolated a recurrent phrase that was obviously central to the word's meaning. During roughly the half-century antecedent to the office's emergence as a shiki, officials were referred to in documents as "going to the site" (jito ni nozomu). Clearly traveling on business, they engaged in such activities as the posting of estate boundaries, the interrogation oflocal residents, and the investigation of crop failures. 34 According to Uwayokote, the administrative nature of these missions "to the jito" had to be significant. The usage not only distinguished the word from others that had already become shiki, but it hedged the term with meaning when the latter finally became an entitlement itself. Thus, whereas azukari dokoro and gesu were part of the very fabric of shoen, to be found, in particular, on the estates of great temples, the office of jito was usually associated with institutions that controlled governorships and provincial lands. In other words, courtiers much more than clerics were involved in the term's evolution, and there are few examples of jito on Buddhist estates. 35 In the end, however, the data remain too scattered to explain the transformation itself. Somehow the emphasis on administrative agents making official visits "to the jito" shifted in the direction of those in control of the local sites in question. But was the control itself mostly in the hands of the visiting agents, or did it come to lie with the principal residents of the areas being visited? A possible though speculative answer may be that competition for local authority may have contributed to a shift in emphasis from the land 33· Uwayokote Masataka, "Jiro genryu ko," I9-33· For a comment on this approach as well as a general summary of the data, see Yasuda, ]ito oyobi, 21-30, and 52 n. 13. Also see Yoshie Akio, "Kamakura bakufu jiro shiki no seiritsu," pt. 2, 15-36, for a further review of the evidence. 34· The earliest such reference appears in a document of 1089, and the latest is in a record of n65; see Tonanin monjo, ro89!9ho Dazaifu kumonjo kanchu an, HI, 4:1256-57, doc. 1277, in which "inspectors were sent our to interrogate local elders at the site." And Negoro yosho, n65/7/4 daijokan cho an, HI, 7:2649-50, doc. 3353, in which the travelers "to the site" were agents of the retired emperor, the governor, and the estate. (There is also a diary usage of a year later; Heihanki, n66/rolr5.) In the intervening period, some half a dozen documents invoke this exact phrase, whereas a number of others use a slight variation, e.g., jito ni tsukawasu (Tonanin monjo, n62/5/r kan senji, HI, 7:2563, doc. 3214). 35· Uwayokote, "Jiro genryu-ko," 24- Yasuda broadens this outlook somewhat in]ito oyobi, 24-26; and Yoshie, "Kamakura bakufu," pt. 2, 15-24, searches for similar contexts that do not necessarily cite the word jito itself.

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unit itself to the identity of that unit's dominant figure. The person so denominated might now have himself acquired the name of the office ofjito. 36 The earliest reference to a jito shiki appears in a document of II47, which, coincidentally, is also the second oldest record in the collection translated by Asakawa. 37 Thus, the view in the West that jito had deep roots in the Heian period was the product of pure happenstance, followed by a logical if unfortunate inference: since Asakawa could not have known that his jito was the oldest in any surviving record, he left the impression of a history that was more ancient than was in fact the case. Though a "deputy jito" (jitodaz) of II39 is mentioned in a document of 1220, 38 and though ''jito persons" (jitonin) are cited in a record of u44, 39 the ''jito shiki" of II47 is the oldest that we have. In its circumstances, it is also one of the most revealing of the entire pren8o epoch. The jito was appointed in remote southern Kyushu, and had nothing to do with the Kanto or with the Taira or Minamoto. Thus, the office's subsequent linkage with the east and close identity with the Bakufu could not have been anticipated from its origins, at least as we know them. 40 At the same time, the episode helps to show how the concept ofjito evolved. In n47, one Torno Nobufusa, a zaichokanjin who was also an official of Shimazu Estate, petitioned the latter's proprietor, the Fujiwara chieftain, for a confirmation of two village-level jito shiki. The villages in question owed both taxes and rents, and were considered part of the respective provincial and estate hierarchies. 41 At any rate, the tide of jito was obviously deemed worthy of a leading local notable, and it was also deemed appropriate to the mixed status of the two villages. Nevertheless, the outcome for Nobufusa 36. It is to be emphasized that no scholar has taken us from "site" to "office" with any kind of step-by-step precision; the sources do not permit it. 37· Asakawa, The Documents oflriki, doc. 2, pp. 91-93 (Iriki-in monjo, II47fzl9 lriki-in benzaishi bettO Torno Nobufusa ge, HI, 6:2194-95, doc. 2601). 38. Cited by Uwayokote from a record of 1220; "Jito genryu ko," 19. 39· Todaiji monjo, II44/I/n Kanzeonji ryo shoshi tO ge an, HL 6:2130-31, doc. 2523. 40. Of course we cannot be sure that this remote jito was in fact the earliest of all; indeed it very likely was not. Moreover, we cannot be certain that this jitli originated strictly in II47= though the petition refers to an earlier assignment, the confirmation (in a different hand, and citing ''jitli shik/') was added later. 41. This mixed public and private land (yose-glirz) is described in Asakawa, The Documents of Iriki, 92.

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seems not to have been as he had hoped: whereas he was confirmed as the

jito of one of the villages, a centrally dispatched deputy (mokudat} was awarded the otherY Possibly this deputy had earlier been sent on business "to the [two) jito," which then became the objects of a rivalry with Nobufusa. In II47, a contested authority over these "sites" was resolved when individual jito shiki came to be fashioned. Shiki, as we have noted, were formalized by written instruments from on high. That meant that the court, almost by definition, would be involved, which in turn tended to encourage the spread of a tide's usage into new locales. Perhaps this is what happened in the case of a jito of n56, located in Kii Province, entirely remote from Kyushu. In that year, a priest named Tankei bequeathed a jito shiki to his younger brother, the origins of which he proceeded to describe in his will. Tankei had been the recipient of a piece of land that he had purchased from its "original holder" (honshu) in II45· Tankei then commended it to the ex-emperor Toba's consort, Bifukumon'in, who saw to the area's incorporation as a shoen and authorized his own investiture as a jito. 43 Unfortunately, there is no way of knowing why the term jito was used, when in so many similar instances it was gesu or azukari

dokoro. In fact, in a follow-up document of a generation later, the shiki being conveyed in the younger brother's will is now actually referred to by a different name. Instead of jito, the office in II75 has become hoshi, the normal jurisdictional tide for a unit of provincial land. 44 What had happened? Possibly the area in question was obliged (as in southern Kyushu) to discharge a dual commitment-owing taxes and rents to two authorities and making use, in that circumstance, of two tides. Or perhaps the shoen had now been disallowed, thereby favoring the substitution of a tide deemed to be more suitable. 45 The confusion over shiki names is revealed in yet another sequence of

42. See the 1147 document; note 37 above. 43· Ganjoji monjo, II56/nhr so Tankei yuzurijo, HI, 6:2354, doc. 2857. The II45 purchase is recorded in the seller's deed of release; Kii zoku fudoki, II45/n/r Hata Moritoshi sariwatashijo an, HI, 6:2167, doc. 2566. The dates of the commendation and authorization of the jito shiki

are unknown, but these transactions obviously occurred during the intervening decade. 44· Ganjoji monjo, II75/8fr9 so Soken yuzurijo, HI, 7:2873> doc. 3702. 45· For a discussion ofTankei and his brother, see Wakayama kenshi, shiryo hen, 2:1084-85. Unfortunately, our questions are not addressed.

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documents, this one involvingjito and gesu. In n52, a local official in Kyushu affixed his name and jito title to a local appointment document, whereas thirteen years later he (or his son) signed himself, in an identical decree, ''jito and gesu" (jito ken gesu). 46 What might have happened in between is not explained, though possibly a private jurisdiction had now been fused with a public authority. The mysteries of the term's early usages continue to defY simple explanation. In this vein, a further pair of documents shows jito used in still another meaning-neither as a "site" nor as a shiki but now as "encroachers against land." In the first document, the actual term cited is jitonin, and the reference is to a violation of a Kyushu temple's holdingsY In the second, a decree of the lga governor demanded an end to unauthorized entry into an estate by "provincial agents" and ''jito," the latter of whom are identified as monks representing a rival central institution. 48 The significance of these usages can only be appreciated from the perspective of the n8os. We have already encountered "shugonin" used as a pejorative, and presently we shall address the word jito, which would be similarly claimed as a cover for lawless behavior. Though it cannot be proved, it is tempting to see in the documents just cited a new hint of an emerging connotation of disruptiveness toward the established order. As late as the n6os, we encounter jito still being used in the meaning of "site," in the case of officials, or even documents, dispatched to a local area. 49 But we also find jito used in conjunction with other shiki. Thus the phrase jito azukari dokoro shiki might imply either a "local" custodian or the holder of more than one title-as in jito ken gesu, which we saw a moment ago. 50 Yet surprisingly, usages become fewer in the II70s, and belong, almost exclu46. Umezu monjo, II52hlr3 Kitano TenmangU mandokoro shiki buninjo, HI, 6:2291, doc. 2752, HI, 7:2651-52, doc. 3357· The two signatures read as follows: "jita dairan(?) Fujiwara lezane ason," and "jita ken gesu dairan(?) Fujiwara Iekane ason'' (the two names are either different, hence perhaps a father and son; or they represent a misprint). I have not been able to check these documents against other possible transcriptions. 47· See the citation in note 39 above. 48. Todaiji monjo, II75/nho Iga kokushi chosen an, HI, 7:2880, doc. 3716. 49· See the citation in note 34 above. 50. Toji hyakugo monjo, n64/12h7 Nakahara Chikasada ge, HI, 6:2636-37, doc. 3322, and note 46 above. For a ''jito-mandokoro shiki," see Nitta hachimangu monjo, n65/7 kengyo hoin kudashibumi an, HI, 7:2659, doc. 3364.

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sively, to our final category of references-those that appear in some kind of connection to the Taira. On this last question, a famous entry in the Azuma kagami seems to settle the matter in favor of the Taira: "Formerly, those who were called jito were mostly retainers of the Heike." 51 Yet, with a single important exception, the absence of hard evidence on Taira-appointed }ito makes this view difficult to accept . .A5 I interpret it, the Azuma kagami's statement was serving a political end by helping to rationalize Kamakura's new policy of appointing jito into former Taira lands. More accurately, the }ito were replacing Taira who possessed more conventional titles, with gesu and other managerial offices what were confiscated. Not a single example of a jito post being seized can be cited. 52 In fact, Taira-related jito are found only in Aki Province, where Kiyomori had served as governor, and where the ltsukushima, his patron shrine, was located. In the other well-known enclaves ofTaira influence (Iga-lse, northern Kyushu, etc.), there are no references to Taira appointees that can be considered credible. 53 Even so, the case of Aki remains a compelling one, and we need to review it in some detail. Did Kiyomori evolve a practice of making appointments to this office, which we might then view as an example and prototype for Yoritomo's later version? In two recent studies on the subject, Wayne Farris and Peter Arnesen have adopted opposite positions, the former positing a broad usage of}ito before n8o, the latter rejecting even the Aki documents as forgeries. 54 The account 51· AK, u85/I2/zr; see the discussion, which accepts the entry at face value, in Kiley, "Property and Political Authority," 200-202. For doubt concerning the reliability of the entry, see Oae Ryo, "Jiro shiki o meguru shomondai," 25 n. 6; and Uwayokote, Nihon chusei seijishi kenkyu, 257· 52. The following reference is fairly typical: "The former gesu Shigetsune had his lands confiscated because of his Heike affiliation." Contained in KB, doc. 34 (Toji hyakugo monjo, 1204/9/6 Kanto gechijo an). Or see KB, doc. 71 (Kanazawa toshokan shozo monjo, 1262/3/r Kanto gechijo) for an episode in which it is agesu shiki that existed at the start of the Genpei War, but a jito shiki that replaced it at war's end. 53· The three or four cases cited by Farris are all less than clear-cut, and they also represent the sum total for the entire country beyond Aki; they hardly serve as a basis for a Taira program of}ito placements; see Farris, Heavenly Wdrriors, 285. For a discussion of the most intriguing case (from u83), see note 62 below. 54· Farris, Heavenly Wdrriors; and Arnesen, "The Struggle for Lordship," 123-35. In fact, there have been numerous attempts to grapple with this subject, upon which consensus continues

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that follows mostly adheres to Arnesen's key argument-that there are no Taira-appointed jito before, at the earliest, n8o. To the extent that any part of the country might have been the object of a program ofTaira-initiated appointments, Aki was certainly the most likely candidate. Kiyomori himself had been the governor there for a decade beginning in n46, and was succeeded by two of his brothers for a brief period thereafter. A hiatus of several years began in n58, but the Taira grip over the province was restored in n66, and it continued more or less uninterrupted into the early n8os. Along the way, a certain Saeki Kagehiro became the priest-administrator (kannushi) ofltsukushima Shrine as well as a retainer of Kiyomori, and it was he who was destined to become-whether in fact or memory-the jito of seven subdistricts (go). The date affixed to the document of his appointment was 1176. 55 The background to this development, which is the key to affirming or refuting the assignment, is nothing if not tortuous in its detail. It centers on a competition of local interests over the area in question, on a commendation of the land units to the shrine, and on a desire to have the authorities approve this removal of territory from public jurisdiction. The appointment of Kagehiro as jito in n76 thus rests on whether such a transfer to the shrine had indeed occurred. By arguing in the negative on this point, Arnesen invalidates the historicity of the 1176 appointment and calls into question the existence of any Taira jito policy at this time. We may gain further insights into the matter by examining the 1176 document itself. Though none of the printed versions is flagged as a possible forgery, and though there are no obvious features to make us doubt its authenticity, 56 its authorship does evoke some surprise. For it is an investiture neither by the shrine nor by Kiyomori, but rather one by decree of the provincial governor. The shrine, we must remember, was seeking jurisdiction over the seven go, and Saeki was its current chief administrator. Later forgers

to be elusive. See, e.g., Uwayokote, Nihon chusei seijishi kenkyu, 257-92; Yasuda, ]ito oyobi, 34-36, 67-74; and Hiroshima kenshi, kodai-chusei shiryo, p8-26. 55· Itsukushima jinja monjo, n76/7 Aki kokushi chosen, HI, 7:2905, doc. 3771. See Arnesen, "The Struggle for Lordship," 123-35, and WG, ro8-n, for a fuller discussion of the Taira in Aki. 56. The most authoritative transcriptions of the Heian-era documents in the Itsukushima collection appear in the Hiroshima kenshi, kodai-chusei shiryo hen 3· Nowhere in this volume is there a suggestion that any of the records in question might be bogus.

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might have been contributing a bit of antiquity to what had not yet happened. Arnesen draws our attention here to the identity of the governor. Was he a client, like Saeki, of the Taira chieftain, or was he a link in a hierarchy that led at the moment to another patron? As he contends, any absence of a firm connection with the Taira would lend weight to the supposition that the edict was forged. And if the document is a fake, the proof for a Taira program evaporates. However, if the document is authentic, it may not have come about as the result of a Taira initiative. 57 Conditions were changing by the end of the II70S. In an effort to stifle opposition at court and in the provinces, Kiyomori staged his celebrated coup in Kyoto and set about launching a more aggressive policy locally. A particular development in Aki may now have brought the }ito concept to his attention. In 1179/11, he saw fit to cancel a }ito post belonging to a local officer who opposed him. 58 In other words, Kiyomori's initial experience may have been of a negative kind, inducing a reaction that included a policy of cooption. At any rate, Saeki's appointment as a go-level }ito was now authorized a year later, with Kiyomori, we can only presume, the force behind the decision. 59 Yet not only were Saeki's investitures issued by the Aki governor, but parallel investitures as subdistrict head (gosht) as well. 6°Clearly, an inclusive authority required both titles, which could only be formalized by the provincial magistrate. Based on such evidence, it is hard to see the basis here for a new kind of reward system. Kiyomori's "jito policy" seems scarcely worthy of the name. The ultimate expression of the Taira's success in Aki came not in the form of a network of new }ito, but rather in the elevation of Saeki Kagehiro himself to the office of governor in 1182. 61 Yet the success of this achievement was 57· Arnesen, "The Struggle for Lordship," 130-32. 58. Itsukushima jinja monjo, II79/n saki no daijodaijin ke mandokoro kudashibumi, HI, 8:2985, doc. 3891. 59· Ibid., n8o/8h7 Aki kokushi chosen, HI, 8:2999, doc. 3920 (for Kuriya go); and ibid., n8o/9/6 Aki no kuni rusudokoro kudashibumi, HI, 8:3000, doc. 3923 (for Mitago). 6o. Ibid., n8o/ro Aki kokushi chosen, HI, 8:300I -2, doc. 3927 (for Kuriya go); and ibid., n8o/ro Aki kokushi chosen, HI, 8:3002, doc. 3928 (for Mita go). 6r. See ibid., n82/3 Aki no kami Saeki Kagehiro yuzurijo, HI, 8:3064, doc. 4026. A generation earlier it had been Kiyomori who was governor; ibid., II55/roii4 kokushi chosen an, HI, 6:2335-36, doc. 2818 (see the same document in Hiroshima kenshi, kodai-chusei shiryo, 2:1239, doc. 1751, in which the editor-compiler has added an identification to Kiyomori).

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to be short-lived, since representatives ofKamakura were actively recruiting in that province in 1184, and Aki had all but gone over to the Minamoto by the end of that year. In this context, the absence of concrete evidence of an active Taira policy toward jito is almost certainly a reflection of the reality. And thus, belying the Azuma kagami's imaginative version of events, most former jito had not been Taira. 62 In the period before the outbreak of the Genpei War, only a single reference to a jito shiki in the east is known to exist, and it appears in a later document, adding to our surprise. 63 Specifically, an edict of the governor of Hitachi Province was alleged to have canceled the authority (sata) of a jito holder between 1175 and 1177. However, the term's contemporaneity cannot be corroborated, and the single document of the period (1174) bearing on the episode does not use it. 64 For that matter, apart from a single usage ofjito in the accustomed meaning of "site," 65 the word is otherwise unknown for the Kanto, at a time when we have encountered it variously in the central and western regions. Put differently, during the decades ofYoritomo's long exile in the east, the currency of the term jito there appears to have been minimal, and he probably had a more limited knowledge of it than Kiyomori. Yet Kiyomori, as we have seen, did not seek to exploit it, whereas Yoritomo, in u85, chose to stake most of his future on it. Obviously, the key to this remarkable development needs to be sought in the experiences of the war years.

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Of one thing we can be certain: in its opening phases, the Minamoto movement was not built around any single office name. The emphasis was on land confirmations using the full range of traditional shiki, and the jito post, if it 62. We have really only a single non-Aki reference that might connect the Taira with a jito shiki, and it involves a local takeover by a Taira partisan, not an investiture by the Taira chieftain. The jito tide in question belonged to the heir of the original holder from II47 (see note 37 above), which now in the midst of the Genpei War was seized by someone who had dedared for the Taira. See Asakawa, The Documents ofiriki, doc. 4, pp. 95-96 (Iriki-in monjo, n83/8/8 Shimazu-no-sho betto Torno Nobuakira ge, HI, 8:3roo, doc. 4ror). 63. KB, doc. 35 (Kashima jingu monjo, 1205/8!23 Minamoto Sanetomo kudashibumi). 64. Kashima onegi ke monjo, II74/12 Hitachi kokushi chosen, HI, 7 2844, doc. 3669. 65. See Ichiki monjo, n6r/4/r Chiba tsunetane moshijo an, HI, 7:2527-28, doc. 3148, with its reference to "an investigation at [or of] the site" in a matter involving Shimosa Province. The

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was used at all, would have played only a minor role. Indeed, for the whole of the war period, only a tiny number of references to Kanto jito survive, with most appearing in retrospective accounts. We need to try to assess these vanous usages. In the very earliest of the group, one Fujiwara Tomoie of Shimotsuke is cited as having been appointed a district-level jito on n8o/nh7. However, since the reference itself comes in a "reappointment" edict of n92, it is possible that Tomoie had been confirmed as a district chief (gunjt) in n8o, to be repackaged as a jito shiki only later. 66 A second example of a possible upgrade came in the same year when an appointment alleged to have originated in n83/8 in the same province was recertified using the new documentary format in n92. 67 A total of three }ito shiki are referred to in the Azuma kagami for n8r-82. The first, involving a shoen in Sagami, mentions an unnamed }ito being ordered to secure the person and the possessions of the former wet nurse of Yoritomo. 68 The second notes the appointment ofYamada Shigetsumi to a village-leveljito post, of unspecified location; and the third is an account of the authorization of ajito title in Musashi's Kumagai-go. 69 Of all the pre-n85 jito in the Kanto, this last is the most persuasive since the Azuma kagami purports to reproduce Yoritomo's edict of appointment, which, in the original, is not extant. Though the Kumagai documents constitute one of the richest of all Kamakura period collections, its earliest surviving record is from II9I, so that there is no corroboration of the original title? 0 What can we learn from these early references? If all were persuasive enough to be considered credible, we would be able to aver that jito assignments were going forward across virtually the entire spectrum of administrative units-from district, to subdistrict, to estate, down to village. And

next closest province for such a usage is Owari, much nearer the capital; Engakuji monjo, n44/roho Owari kokushi chosen an, HI, 6:2142, doc. 2540. 66. Mogi monjo, II92/8/22 shogun ke mandokoro kudashibumi, KJ, 2:23-24, doc. 6o8. 67. Matsudaira shi shozo monjo, II92I9II2 shogun ke mandokoro kudashibumi an, KJ, 2:44, doc. 6r8. 68. AK, n8r/im.2/7. Shinoda's translation-in which it is the wet nurse who is receiving the jito-shiki-is in error; The Founding of the Kamakura Shogunate, 207. Professor Uchida has Doi Tohira as the }ito; Uchida Minoru, "Jiro-ryoshusei to Kamakura bakufu," r6. 69. AK, n82/3/5; n82/6/5. 70. LA!, doc. 7 (Kumagai ke monjo, II9II3!I Kumagai Naozane yuzurijo).

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second, we would know that Yoritomo was already making use of the jito tide in ways that were altogether innovative. In effect, he would have been assigningjito shiki that were mature. The post's later dual quality-as areward device saddled with administrative duties-would have already been in existence by the early u8os. But if all of this were true, we would need to know the source of the stimulus for doing what had not been prepared for in the east, or doing what would then leave no contemporary traces. However one approaches these conundrums, it is easier to discredit than to credit early jito in the Kanto. For example, it seems striking in the extreme that, given the fairly large number of surviving wartime documents by Yoritomo, none until after the war appoints a }ito. For that matter, only a single document from the entire corpus surviving from the war period (about four hundred) uses the word jito in any kind of Kanto-related context. In that document, ''jito-myoshu" from a portion of Sagami Province were admonished by Yoritomo, a combination of venue and involvement by the chieftain that might lead us to conclude that Yoritomo was now disciplining his own appointees. 71 However, there is nothing to prove that such appointments were being made, and, indeed, the usage may not even refer to persons called }ito, rather only to "residents (myoshu) in those locales (jito)." At any rate, we can cite no piece of evidence from the Genpei War era that records an unambiguous appointment of a jito by Yoritomo. In fact there were developments of a wholly different kind that were working to change the meaning and context of the word }ito forever. Beginning in late u83, a handful of episodes occurring on the fringes of the central region served to underline this new context for contemporaries. As the crisis of local instability now began to deepen, men started to refer to themselves as jito, i.e., persons of local standing who might defy the centuries-old trajectory of shiki as preferments that had been authorized exclusively from the top. As I would like to argue, it was this development and not some prior experience with appointments that led Yoritomo to his historic rendezvous with a new concept. 71. Hence the appearance of this reference in Uchida's list of u8o-85 jitli appointees; "Jito ryoshusei," r6. For the document, see KB, doc. 8 (Tsurugaoka Hachimangu monjo, u84/6/3 Minamoto Yoritomo kudashibumi).

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The sources clearly elucidate the process that was now unfolding. In a case that took place in Tajima Province, we are able to trace a remarkable sequence of events. In 1166, a provincial unit, following its commendation, was incorporated as an imperial shoen, causing agents to go out to the "site" (jito) for the purpose of setting the boundary markers. All of this was recorded in an edict of the retired emperor. 72 Eighteen years later, another edict from the same source picked up the story after 1166, but also now reconstructed it using the altered frame of reference of 1184. Owing to the favorable circumstances of a certain Taira Hirosue as }ito in the 1160s, he was appointed to the gesu shiki of the new shoen, and this led in time to a condition of spiraling deficits. By the end of 1183, all efforts to prohibit his outrages had been unavailing, prompting the local authorities to submit a new petition. In it, they requested revocation of the ''jito-gesu shiki," which led the ex-emperor to issue his decree. He now ordered what he called the ''jito shiki" to be abolished, and he directed that Hirosue be banished from the estate. 73 In effect, then, the "site" had become the basis of the status of its dominant figure, which allowed that person to be formally invested as a gesu. Moreover, in another part of the document that rehearses the same events, the word jinushi-"local magnate" -appears as a substitute for jito, suggesting an equivalency in meaning between generic terms. By contrast, gesu was well understood to be a titled office, and it became the logical object of the investiture. By the 1180s, however, the words gesu and }ito were merging and becoming confused, though the latter, because it was newer, seemed somehow more threatening for the court (see below, p. 123). At any rate, the chancellery of the ex-emperor elected to emphasize it, abolishing it as well as banishing its holder. A somewhat parallel case in Echizen Province provides an even richer body of details. This episode began in 1183/9 when one Tomozane, who was identified as a police captain (kebiisht), was cited for justifying a local reign of terror by invoking his alleged status as a jito-gesu. In response, the exemperor ordered the outrages to cease, and directed that the estate custodian (azukari dokoro) be secured. Management of the shoen was to lie with the 72. Yoshida shi shozo monjo, n66/3/8 In-no-cho kudashibumi an, HI, 7:2669-70, doc. 3386. 73· Kozanji monjo, 1184/4 In-no-cho kudashibumi an, HI, 8: 3133-35, doc. 4166.

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holder of that office. 74 At this juncture, then, it was not yet deemed necessary to respond to the culprit's claim to the status of a jito-gesu, but rather only to the outrages (ranbo) of a police captain. A second stage followed about six months later when a different lawbreaker was condemned by the ex-emperor for violations committed in the same estate. This man, who was designated simply as a monk (so), had chosen to call himself a jito, but also to cite "the orders of Tonai, the special deputy of the Kamakura Lord. "75 The petition containing these charges concluded with a flourish that captured the very essence of the drama that was now unfolding. In a tone that seems to betray genuine bewilderment, the local authorities queried as follows: "Who is it who would dare to call himself a jito-gesu without an authorization from a proprietor (ryoke no gechi)?" Responding to this plea, the ex-emperor issued a three-part order that the hereditary custodianship be secured, and that the ravagings of the Minamoto ("Genke") and the jitodai (deputy jito) be ended. As will be obvious, inconsistencies of language run throughout this episode, which are either attributable to the novelty, and hence confusion, of what was happening, or to the subjective perception of those involved. For example, }ito had obviously become the term of choice for the misbehaving monk, since it must have seemed to him to convey an authority drawn from the "site." By contrast, gesu would have been understood as an appointive office. At the same time,jito-gesu was the original phrase of the on-site petitioners, though in the end their plea had to call for proscription of a "wayward and unrestrained jito" (mudo jiyu no jito). However, there is still the problem of the reference to a jitodai, which is the earliest such usage encountered in any source. 76 In fact, another juxtaposition of terms may help us out here. The principal object of the petition was to secure the authority of the hereditary manager, referred to in three places as azukari dokoro, but cited at one point as jito-azukari dokoro. This usage of jito might have been merely as a conditioner of no consequence, or it could have been an effort to preempt the monk. 77 Since the managerial authority was intended to be inclu-

74· Ninnaji monjo, n83/9f27 In-no-cho kudashibumi, HI, 8:3ro2, doc. 4!07. 75· KB, doc. 7 (Ninnaji monjo, n84/5 In-no-cho kudashibumi). 76. See note 38 above for a record of 1220 that "remembers" a "deputy }ito" of II39· 77· The reference is to the "jito-azukari dokoro shiki" that was supposedly confirmed years

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sive, the estate could have had no separate package of rights called )ito. At any rate, such thinking may also have been what was behind the usage ofjitodai. When the ex-emperor's chancellery ordered "the despoilments of the jitodai ... to cease," it may have been stating what was obvious from the vantage point of the court. The authority-holder of record was the custodian, to which any local empowerment would have been subordinate. In other words, the jitodai was neither a }ito nor a "deputy" )ito, rather only a local figure who was "on site." Finally, and as was noted, the self-appointed }ito sought to bolster his position by citing the orders of the Kamakura lord's "special deputy." As it appears here, he was not claiming to have been invested with his status, rather only to have received the patronage of a representative ofYoritomo. Perhaps, as elsewhere, this otherwise unsanctioned person was hoping to be confirmed by Kamakura under a seemingly available new entitlement. But whatever his strategy, its impact was obviously greatest on a bemused court. A status that derived from coercive control was unprecedented, and had the potential to weaken one of the pillars of aristocratic rule. A third episode of the same month can be seen to have carried events a crucial step further. Trouble in a shrine's holdings had led to an edict of the retired emperor, followed by the dispatch of a contingent of agents to the estates themselves. Upon arrival, they encountered "men of military bent who ... styled themselves as privately appointed }ito (shi'nin no )ito)." So obstructed, the shrine now adopted a new strategy. Forsaking its reliance on imperial sanctions, it forwarded a petition to Kamakura, accompanied by the retired emperor's failed edict. Yoritomo responded by issuing a desist order under his own name. 78 Two strikingly new developments had thus been merged into a single incident. For the first time, local outlaws were not calling themselves merely jito, but rather, more ominously, "privately appointed" jito. It may have been a recognition that the sanction of higher authority was still more persuasive than a self-proclaimed-and hence unlegitimatized-status. We cannot be

earlier-in a document of II34 issued by Taikenmon-in, a consort of the ex-emperor. That document survives, but it makes no mention of ''jito." See Ninnaji monjo, II34/inr.nlr5 Taikenmon-in-no-cho kudashibumi, HI, 5=1956, doc. 2310. In it, the words azukari dokoro stand alone. 78. KB, doc. 6 (Omori Kiita shi shozo monjo, n84/5/8 Minamoto Yoritomo kudashibumi an).

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certain as to whom the reference was intended, whether to Kamakura or to one of its representatives, or simply to an anonymous higher authority. But the seeming absence of explicitness did not matter, for the shrine was encouraging such a link by forwarding its petition to Kamakura. Though Yoritomo's connection to the }ito phenomenon had probably been only marginal to this point, it now advanced in response to the surge of new claimants. During n84, Yoritomo's policy seems to have been mostly reactive. By late in that year, however, what was implicit was starting to become accepted wisdom. Though Kamakura may not itself have been appointingjito, it was increasingly responsible for rooting them out. For example, the retired emperor himself now sought Yoritomo's assistance in such matters, and this led, in one instance, to a highly revealing response. After establishing that a local shrine in Tanba had been untroubled in the past, Yoritomo posed the question of why there were now persons there claiming to be }ito. He then personalized the incident by condemning the local figure who had been accused by the exemperor, and proceeded to cite this outlaw for something we have not yet seen: for falsely claiming to possess a Kamakura warrant?9 In other words, the accused had sought to justifY his actions by claiming to have been appointed a }ito by Kamakura. If the account is accurate, it would represent a further narrowing between actual conditions and a new reality in the making. The Genpei War ended in n85/3, but, as we have seen, with little more resolved than the identity of the victors. There remained the problem of finding an institutional basis upon which the authority of Kamakura might be perpetuated. The phenomenon of self-styled and privately-appointed }ito eventually pointed the way. In n85/ 4, a pair of retired emperor edicts evoked the nature of the growing emergency in bold perspective. In the first, relating to Kyushu, the following statements appear: "In recent years, influential locals in Kyushu (Chinzei no yusei domin to) have become the powerful retainers ofKamakura (buke no roju) or have ravaged the shoen under the designations of jito or gesu, claiming to possess investitures (atebumi) from the head abbot .... Only if)ito and gesu are rooted out, can we anticipate a revival of both shoen and temple prosperity. "80 In another part of the edict, the outrages of}ito and 79· AK, II84/9120. So. Itozu monjo, n85/4/22 In-no-cho-kudashibumi an, HI, 8:3172-73, doc. 4241.

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gesu are cited as the most common object of grievances "in these times," whose elimination is the key to a return "to former ways" (kyugt). Significantly, the admonition to restore stability went to the Dazaifu, with the only reference to Kamakura the indirect one cited above. Moreover, neither the locals nor the ex-emperor linked Kamakura to the jito and gesu assignments. In Kyushu at least, it was unclear whom to credit or to blame for a phenomenon, which, notwithstanding, was no less real. The locals were obviously invoking a traditional authority, whereas the court, by calling on the Dazaifu, was doing the same. But Kamakura was now directly involved with Kyushu, since Noriyori, at this moment, was consolidating his military occupation of the region. We can only surmise that Kamakura's assumption of responsibility for the problems of the area was now on the minds of the affected interests there. A week later, the retired emperor issued another edict, this time raising the specter of}ito in Harima nearer the capital. In this instance, all manner of fighting men (ko-otsu no bushi) were accused of using the "pursuit of the Taira'' (Heike no tsuito) as a pretext for a wave of private lawlessness. As a consequence, orders were to be given proscribing the misdeeds of "shugonin and jitif' (shugonin to ii, }ito no tomogara to it). 81 And thus we encounter yet another form of reference to Kamakura, since those claiming to be anti-Taira would, in their own minds and in the minds of others, be candidates for being labeled as Minamoto. Moreover, the generic nature of the referencesto untitled persons who were shugonin and }ito-is striking from the perspective of the future of these two terms, though, as already mentioned, the linkage itself is unique among surviving records from the twelfth century. In the context of the moment, it is perhaps }ito without gesu that is most noteworthy here. Though we have encountered these terms together many times, when one of them stands alone in this meaning it is virtually always jito. To an extent, a "crisis of}ito" was now underway, a condition that only Kamakura had the resources to confront. With the Taira now defeated, the implications of the new emergency must have started to be debated, to be interwoven with the regime's search for an institutional basis. Nevertheless, for the whole of n84 and the first half of n85, there are no hard data to indicate that Kamakura might now have been making its own 81. Kamowake Ikazuchi jinja monjo, n85/4l29 ln-no-cho kudashibumi, HI, 8:317 4, doc. 4244. See above, p. 107, for a discussion of this document in connection with shugonin.

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}ito appointments. What we have are a few references in the Azuma kagami, of which only one is explicit on this point: a former Taira named Fujiwara Tomotsuna was recorded as having been assigned a }ito shiki in lga. 82 Yet this same Tomotsuna was castigated in a lawsuit of thirty years later for pretending to be a }ito, a charge that Kamakura duly confirmed by calling on Kyoto to handle the matter itsel£83 Moreover, the references to assigned }ito actually cease in the Azuma kagami with the example just cited, with no further instances for more than a year. 84 And since there are no other sources that adduce jito appointments before nSs/6, whether Yoritomo had been assigning them earlier might be questioned again. In the sixth month of that year, a pair of investiture edicts authorized separate }ito posts in lse Province. The documents, which are originals bearing the seal of Yoritomo, clearly anticipate the many dozens of like documents from n86 onward, and also appear to be authentic in every way. 85 As described therein, a certain member of the Taira had had his land rights confiscated, and these were then reassigned by Yoritomo in the form of}ito shiki. In effect, an award to a retainer was being combined with a set of responsibilities, revealing the classic dualism of the mature }ito post. 86 Though the concepts so well expressed here suggest a maturity of thinking in mid-n85, these are the only documents of their kind for the whole of n85. Moreover, Tadahisa's other assignment of that year was to the post of gesu in distant Satsuma, "in compliance with an order of the proprietor." 87 The authentic feel of this second entitlement is enhanced by its conversion in n86/4-the appropriate time context-into ajito authority. 88 Nevertheless, we cannot simply discount the lse tides of mid-n85; we must acknowledge the evidence that Yoritomo made the appointments, which may or may 82. AK, n84/5l24. The only other references to possible jito assignees are in n84/r/3 and n84/ 4l23, though neither makes it clear that Kamakura was the appointing authority. 83. AK, m6/n/8. 84. Between n84/ 5l24 and nearly the end of n85, the normally voluble AK makes no mention of new jito assigned by Kamakura. 85. See the KB book jacket for a photographic reproduction of one of these. 86. Shimazu ke monjo, n85/6/r5 Minamoto Yoritomo, kudashibumi, HI, 8:3179, docs. 425960. (the first appears in translation in KB, doc. 9). 87. See Asakawa, The Documents oflriki, doc. 6a, p. roo (Shimazu ke monjo, n85/8/I7 Minamoto Yoritomo kudashibumi). 88. Ibid., doc. 6c, p. roo (Shimazu ke monjo, n86/4/3 Minamoto Yoritomo kudashibumi).

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127

not have been the first of their kind. Either way, they would not have constituted more than a response to a particular situation, since there is nothing to suggest that a network had now been launched. Yet the realities of the day were becoming too vivid to ignore, and Yoritomo must now have been thinking, at least, about jito. On his mind were jito who were lawful and jito who were not. In n85/7 and n85/8, a pair of unrelated documents, both dealing with the Kanto, make dear Yoritomo's growing familiarity with jito in his own home region. In the first, a jito "appointed by Kamakura" to a shrine in Sagami Province was anonymously accused of failing to pay rent to the proprietor (ryoke). 89 In the second, Yoritomo issued an order condemning a jito's despoilments in Hitachi, though the jito in question may not have been appointed by himself.9° Farther afield, the Azuma kagami recorded an order by Yoritomo to Noriyori in Kyushu, that holdings seized from the Taira should henceforth be assigned to persons now called jito (n85/7/n). It had of course long been the regular practice for losers to be displaced by those who had defeated them, though the court, as we know, had always controlled the process. On this occasion, however, Yoritomo appears to have been acting on his own authority. Even more importantly, if dusters of appointments were actually being referred to under a new generic title, the process that we have been tracing would now, at long last, have been quickening. The next piece of evidence, from the tenth month, conveys a sense of momentum. It is the story, noted earlier, which appears in a contemporary diary, the Gyokuyo, ofYoshitsune's being neutralized in Iyo by Yoritomo's assignment there of a network ofjito. 91 To offset Yoshitsune, who had just been appointed governor of that province, Yoritomo named locals as jito to the holdings of persons who had been designated as Taira. The apparent success of that venture could only have helped Yoritomo to contemplate the implications of the jito phenomenon more fully. The melding of two disparate circumstances led directly to the historic denouement oflate n85. The first was Kamakura's need to find a reward and 89 Kozanji monjo, rr85/7 bo chushinjo an, HI, rr:I3I-32, doc. 425. 90 KB, doc. ro (Kashima]ingu monjo, rr85/8hi Minamoto Yoritomo kudashibumi). For the background to the jito authority here, see KB, doc. 35 (Kashima jingu monjo, I205/8h3 Minamoto Sanetomo kudashibumi), and p. rr8 above. 91. Gyokuyo, rr85/ro/q.

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control device that could be applied uniformly over large areas. Former holdings of the Taira were now eligible for confiscation, but to seize them under their original names might have confused the traditional hierarchy of land rights. In the midst of a general breakdown of order, a revival of the shiki system was increasingly seen by Kamakura as essential. Though conditions were too unsettled for Yoritomo to place limits on his own peacekeeping duties, he might seek a single track of authority for his rewards. And if the rewards, under a new title, could be properly hedged with responsibilities, a network of appointee peacekeepers might be the result. Finally, since large numbers of the greatest troublemakers were in fact "Minamoto," the need to find new ways to circumscribe them seemed especially pressing. The second circumstance leading in the direction of a clear }ito policy was Yoshitsune's dramatic appointment to that post for the island of Kyushu. Frustrated by his brother's jito assignments in lyo in the tenth month, Yoshitsune was named jito for Kyushu by the ex-emperor in the eleventh month. Simultaneously, Yukiie, Yoritomo's uncle, was appointed jito for Shikoku. 92 Yoritomo thus found himself threatened from an unanticipated direction. Not only had Yoshitsune obtained an energetic new patron, but the vacuum of national authority over }ito had now, at a stroke, been filled by Go-Shirakawa. For his own part, Yoritomo remained the lord of an assemblage of followers who lacked any common identity. Moreover, Yoritomo now had to watch as his two kinsmen eluded capture, and to watch also as they were named jito over large regions. Kyushu and Shikoku, two former Taira strongholds, were suddenly placed under the lawful authority of his bitterest enemies. Yoritomo was galvanized into action. Just as when he was challenged by Yoshinaka in n83, he was provoked to innovate by a threat from within his own family. He dispatched an armed mission to Kyoto under the command of Hojo Tokimasa, a mission whose accomplishments have been debated ever after. In the version of events immortalized in the Azuma kagami, Yoritomo now extracted from the court the right to appoint shugo and jito around the country. 93 92. AK, n85/n/7. The Gyokuyo (n85/12h7, p25) corroborates these island-wide assignments. For a discussion, see Ishimoda Sho, "Kamakura bakufu ikkoku jito shiki no seiritsu," 25-36. 93· An excellent account of this mission, based on the AK's description, appears in Shinoda, The Founding ofthe Kamakura Shogunate, 126-34. The basic sources are n85/nh8, nh9, and !2/6.

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There is not much to dispute here at the level of grossest generalization: clearly, the new authority in the provinces had now been recognized by the court. However, there is much to argue over concerning specifics-most conspicuously, as we know, the post of shugo. Yet the origins of a national jito authority at this juncture are unmistakable, even though the only corroborating source for the Tokimasa mission is silent on the subject. 94 Beginning early in n86,jito appointments began issuing from Kamakura in large numbers, a date that is confirmed in numerous later references. 95 The public status of the jito office had now been formally linked to Kamakura, which meant that Yoritomo's regime would not have to fold its tent and disband. To the contrary, Kamakura's life had now been lawfully extended, with consequences that could hardly have been imagined. It is important to seek further perspective on what had and had not happened. Clearly, a military clique had by no means taken over the entire country, superseding imperial government in the process. Rather, one group of provincials had defeated another on a large scale, though there were obviously others who had not been drawn into the conflict at all. Moreover, courtier institutions emerged from the war mostly intact, even as their prestige and effectiveness had clearly suffered. At the same time, courtiers and clerics continued to dominate the shiki system, the new jito office notwithstanding. In other words, the traditional aristocracy remained the country's all but exclusive landed proprietors, whereas provincial men, as before, managed their estates. Nevertheless, the sovereignty of Kyoto had now been compromised in two important ways. First, the policing of the countryside continued to require Kamakura's involvement, with appeals for its assistance still on the in94- The Gyokuyo (n85/nh8, 3=119) states merely that the men (roju) ofKamakura would have the right to levy a commissariat tax (hyorli) of five sho per tan in land holdings they received in central and western Japan. The discrepancy with the AK, which cites shugo and jitli in its entry of the same day, has prompted almost endless speculation. For a small sampling, see Tomoda Kichinosuke, "Bunji gannen shugo jito setchi ni tsuite no saikento," n-29; Ishii Susumu, "Bunji shugo jiro shiki ron," 1-37; and Yasuda,]itli oyobi, 90-ro4. The commissariat privilege was relinquished by Yoritomo several months later; AK, n86/3hr. 95· For the earliest in this sequence, see KB, doc. n (Shimazu ke monjo, n86/r/8 Minamoto Yoritomo kudashibumi). For retrospective references to n86, see, e.g., documents of n92 (KB, doc. 16); of I217 (DKR, doc. 68); of 1232 (DKR, doc. 33); of 1238 (KB, doc. 99); and of 1248 (KB, doc. 45).

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crease. As he had sought to do from the beginning, Yoritomo continued to intervene in the disputes of all who asked him. And second, though the post of jito may have been located in the middle of the hierarchy of rights, Yoritomo's authority over it was now intended to be total. In this way, the seamlessness and inviolability of the shiki system had been breached, a breach that would eventually widen into a chasm. Title to the office of }ito would be distributed exclusively by Yoritomo, though within estates, as in the past, owned by aristocrats in the capital. At any rate, the outline of a dual polity would begin to take shape from these modest beginnings, a polity whose elaboration would come to occupy the next several generations. The precise nature of what had changed needs to be addressed. A new local status had been molded from a term whose meaning had never become fixed. Indeed, it was this absence of a fixed meaning that had allowed the word to emerge as a new commodity in the marketplace of ideas. For the provincial men who claimed an authority under its umbrella before the end of n85, it was an entitlement that sprang from their management of, and residence on, the land. By contrast, for the aristocracy of Kyoto, it was a selfproclaimed, hence unlawful, authority, that was now being asserted by men who were little more than outlaws. Finally, for Kamakura, it was a source of growing instability if simply ignored, but a source of potential legitimacy if aggressively coopted. Henceforth, a lawful jito would be one who had been denominated as such by Yoritomo, who would now administer a broadly dispersed network of armed managers. The particular insight that led to this decision to insist on a "monopoly" ofjito was inspired by an adroit reading of the trends of the day. Determined as Yoritomo was to exploit the raw energy that was so visible locally, yet resolute in his desire to fashion something that owed little to Kyoto, he appropriated, recast, and elevated the concept of jito, converting it in the process into something that was wholly new. Under his direction, the office of jito would become a badge of special distinction, which only the lord of Kamakura might distribute. In the remaining years of his life (d. II99), Yoritomo was preoccupied with the nurturing of a set of institutions that might survive him, a goal that no "warrior" before him had ever realistically envisioned. The strategies he devised, and the obstacles that he needed to overcome, will tell us much about the nature of the regime that was his great legacy.

CHAPTER

FIVE

The Four Corners

During the second half of the n8os, the leadership in Kamakura had reasons for confidence. The new regime had survived the initial shock of the end of the war and had turned its victory into a true victory for itself more than for the court. It accomplished this unprecedented feat by refusing to be absorbed into the imperial hierarchy and by finding an institutional basis for an ongoing national presence. Yoritomo had achieved what had not seemed possible a few years earlier, and he was now, in the late n8os, the most influential man in the country. He was admired, envied, and ofcourse feared. For its part, the court felt deep and genuine ambivalence; it had never had to be dependent on any entity apart from itself. Thus even as Yoritomo was earning respect for his willingness to respond to courtier grievances, GoShirakawa, the country's senior statesman, was never able to accept his junior partner's autonomy. Unable to lure Yoritomo into any kind of condition of real dependence, the ex-sovereign was limited to political maneuvering-to testing, shifting, and even reneging. During the period up to n89, much of this trial of wills centered on the reactions of the two national leaders to events in the northern region, the one part of the country that had been

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unaffected by the Genpei War. Ultimately, Yoritomo spearheaded an unauthorized invasion of the north, which made it plain that he would not be prevented, even by the retired emperor, from having his own way.

THE

NORTHERN

CAMPAIGN

OF

II89

For nearly a century, the two northern provinces of Mutsu and Dewa had been under the semi-independent control of a local family calling itself Fujiwara. Known to historians as the "Oshu [Northern] Fujiwara," its scions had remained in a proper but uneasy relationship with Kyoto, using the long distance from the capital to insulate themselves from excessive intrusions. Communications were sent and received with at least some regularity, 1 as the court did its best to use the disbursement of traditional patronage to maintain the facade of imperial control. There was also a scattering of centrally owned shoen in the two provinces, 2 as well as considerable religious and cultural interaction withj Kyoto. 3 Opinions vary on the extent to which Hiraizumi, the Fujiwara headquarters, was the capital of a true territorial enclave. 4 However, there is no question that Hiraizumi and its leadership were The historical sources relating to the Osha Fujiwara have been collected in Oshii Fujiwara shiryo, So- 200. Lists of Kyoto's governor-level officials for the two Oshu provinces (Mutsu and Dewa) appear in ibid., 203-15; and in Oishi Naomasa et al., Chusei Ou no sekai, appen-

I.

dixes, 7-I9. 2. The standard inventory of shoen lists fifty-six estates in Mutsu and twenty-six in Dewa; Takeuchi Ri2o, ed., Shoen sakuin, 50-51. Takeuchi has also prepared maps showing forty shoen in Mutsu and thirteen in Dewa; idem, Shoen bunpu zu, I: 126-32. Finally, Oishi Naomasa has prepared inventories of shoen in the two provinces (with smaller totals), containing data on proprietors and earliest references in sources; Chusei Ou no sekai, appendixes, 2-6. 3· See the excellent new study by Mimi Yiengpruksawan: Hiraizumi: Art and Regional Politics

in Twelfth-Century japan. 4· The usual assumption has favored something akin to George Sansom's "great and virtually independent kingdom in the northern provinces" (see A History ofjapan to IJJ4, 325), a view accepted by historians from a wide range of perspectives. Thus, Takahashi Tomio simply likened the Hiraizumi "regime" (seiken) to both the Taira regime and the Kamakura Bakufu (scarcely acknowledging their differences), whereas Amino Yoshihiko saw it as obvious proof that there were multiple Japans. See Takahashi, Oshii Fujiwara-shi jidai, 2-8; and Amino Yoshihiko, Higashi to nishi no kataru Nihon no rekishi. But the sources can be interpreted to tell a more modest story than that. For the crosscurrents of opinion on this complex subject, see Yiengpruksawan, Hiraizumi, chap. 7·

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thorns in the side of Kyoto's aristocrats, who could not easily tolerate the notion of provincials not subject to manipulation from afar. Thus, ten years before the outbreak of the Genpei War, Fujiwara Kanezane reacted to the appointment of his namesake to the office of "Pacification General" (chinjufo shogun) with the lament that such were the times: Hidehira was a "frontier barbarian" (Oshu iteki). 5 Mostly ignored by the Taira under Kiyomori, the Oshu Fujiwara loomed large as war threatened in n8o. At a point at which Yoritomo was still ruminating upon what to do, he was advised in the sixth month to take refuge in the north -counsel, of course, that he did not take. 6 However, after the actual outbreak of formal hostilities, the Taira-controlled court ordered the three eastern circuits to attack the Minamoto and made sure that a copy of the order reached Hiraizumi. By the end of n8o, rumors were rife in Kyoto that Hidehira had agreed that Yoritomo should be destroyed? But Hidehira never moved out of his own headquarters, despite Kanezane's belief to the contrary. As he recorded in a mistaken diary entry of n81, Hidehira was now moving on Karnakura at the head of some twenty thousand troops. 8 A month later, however, Kanezane was describing the fears in the Taira camp that Hidehira was actually allying now with Yoritomo; the inaccuracy of that rumor was noted several months after that. 9 In the meantime, the court, feeling uneasy, had already begun to consider appointing Hidehira as governor of Mutsu, a strategy utterly condemned by Kanezane for whom Hidehira had all the stature of a mere "local notable" ("Mutsu junin Hidehira''). When the court actually went ahead, Kanezane could only grieve. 10 All the while, Hidehira simply kept his own council, and seems to have allowed his silence to speak for him, a policy that was proving highly effective. 11 But with the flight of the Taira westward in 1183, the onus of concern

5· Gyokuyo, rqo/5l27. For the life and times ofHidehira, see Takahashi, Oshu, 120-52. 6. AK, n8o/6/r9, 6l22, 6l24. 7· Gyokuyo, n8o/12/4, 12/12. 8. Ibid., n8r/3lr7. 9· Ibid., n8r/ 4f21, 8/12. ro. Ibid., n8r/8/6, 8/r5. n. Thus, the court's order to its newly appointed governor ("Mutsu no kami Fujiwara Hidehira'') to attack Yoritomo was unavailing. For the title, see ibid., n8r/8/r5. For the order to attack, AK, n8r/8/r3.

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about the north now shifted to Yoritomo as he began to deploy his men in the direction of the capital. But Yoritomo was no more successful than anyone else in eliciting a response from Hidehira, and the war ended with the Oshil Fujiwara having managed not to become embroiled. However, unforeseen circumstances now intervened, when Yoshitsune, Yoritomo's fugitive brother, was suddenly rumored to be receiving support from Hidehira. 12 Though there was no apparent truth to the account at this time, Yoritomo now started to devote greater attention to the north, and he began by seeking to identifY new ways of acquiring influence. In 1186/4, for example, Hidehira agreed to transmit his annual governor's tribute of horses and money via Kamakura, and three horses and 4 50 ryo of cash were actually sent in the fifth and tenth months. 13 From Yoritomo's point of view, he had now established himself as the new intermediary between Hiraizumi and Kyoto. But the complexion of the relationship changed abruptly when Yoshitsune was reported to have been given refuge by Hidehira in the second month of 1187. 14 Yoritomo immediately petitioned the court for an imperial order rebuking Hidehira's "treason" (hangyaku), and this was followed by a messenger from Kamakura actually carrying the court's response to Hiraizumi. Hidehira apologized and declared that his actions were without malice, though the messenger, upon his return, reported that Hiraizumi was preparing for whatever might come. 15 In fact, Yoritomo was now laying a trap of his own, having ordered Hidehira to send thirty thousand ryo for repairs for the Todaiji, which Hidehira, with some justice, claimed to be excessive. In his report to the court, Yoritomo called the response "outrageous." 16 The sixty-five-year-old Hidehira died a month later (1187/10!29), which led to squabbling among his heirs as well as to the succession of the inept Yasuhira. Two months later Kanezane reported to his diary that the testament of the late Hidehira had called on his heirs to rally behind Yoshitsune, 17

12. Gyokuyo, n85/ro/r3. During the II70s, Yoshitsune had taken refuge with Hidehira in the north, and was referred to as "Oshu Kuro" when he arrived at Yoritomo's camp in n8o; see AK, n8o/rof2r. 13. AK, n86/ 4/24, 5/ro, ro/r. 14- AK, n87f2/ro. 15. AK, II871914. r6. Gyokuyo, u87/9i29. 17· Ibid., u88/r/9. Takahashi speculates on Hidehira's age at the time of his death; Takahashi, Oshu, r2r.

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a rumor no doubt welcomed in Kamakura, which was already laying serious plans for an invasion. At this juncture, however, diplomacy by the court intervened, with a succession of calls to Yasuhira to surrender Yoshitsune; otherwise, a punitive force would be sent. 18 In fact, Go-Shirakawa had every reason to seek a peaceful settlement, just as Yoritomo had every reason (see below) to wish to invade. In n88/10, a court edict was issued promising northerners rewards (onsho) for meritorious service (kunko), if only Yoshitsune were surrendered. 19 As seems apparent, the three sides were committed to different policies. In n89h, Yoritomo called for a series of punishments including death for Yasuhira; stern measures against the priests of Mt. Hiei who were supporting Yoshitsune; and the dismissal of partisans who were loyal to OshU. 20 After a messenger returned empty-handed from the north, Yoritomo urged the court, in the third and fourth months, to authorize a punitive expedition. A month later (5/22), Kamakura learned that Yasuhira had murdered Yoshitsune (on int.4/3o), and a week after that Kanezane spoke of "the joy of heaven" (tenka no yorokobt). 21 Though the court obviously hoped that the crisis would now recede, Yoritomo renewed his call for a formal punishment declaration (tsuito no senshz). More to the point, he now began to mobilize his forces, and punctuated that decision by invoking precedents from the past. In particular, he ordered Chiba Tsunetane to prepare a war banner of exactly the same proportions as that used by Minamoto Yoriyoshi at the time of the latter's hostilities against the north in the eleventh century. 22 Yoritomo also dispatched another messenger to Kyoto, who urged that the war declaration be sent by special courier. But then without waiting for it to arrive he launched the campaign anyway (7!I9). As Yoritomo discovered only later, the long-awaited senshi had been issued on that very day. 23 The progress of the campaign was lightning-swift, with Hiraizumi entered and occupied on 8/22. Yasuhira fled northward and was killed by his 18. A pair of court edicts to Yasuhira, dated n88l2/21 and 2l26, are quoted in full in AK, n88/ 4/9. 19. Quoted in AK, n88!Iol25. 20. AK, II8912122. 21. AK, n89l2l2s, 2l26, 3l22, inql21, 5/22; Gyokuyo, n89/5l29. 22. AK, n89/6l24, 612s, 6l27, 6!3o. 23. AK, n89/7!I9; the senshi, dated 71I9, is quoted in AK, n89l9!9.

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own retainer on 9/3, thereby ending, in the words of one historian, the "brief 23 months ofYasuhira's administration." 24 Just as in the case ofYoshitsune's death three months earlier, the head ofYasuhira was displayed before Yoritomo, in this instance on n89/9/6. In the meantime, Kunihira, Yasuhira's elder brother, had been defeated and killed while commanding the major Fujiwara force, contributing to the demise of the northern regime. 25 The socalled "three generations of the Fujiwara'' were now to be succeeded by the authority ofYoritomo and Kamakura.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE VICTORY

Yoritomo achieved a number oflong- and short-term goals as a consequence of the events of n89. In terms of his relationship with the court, he had demonstrated an impressive sense of propriety until the unexpected death of Yoshitsune on int.4/3o. For example, on the occasion of a substantial tribute payment by Hiraizumi in n88, Yoritomo rejected the advice of Miura Yoshizumi to appropriate the Kyoto-bound wealth. 26 However, with his plans suddenly in jeopardy after the murder of his brother, Yoritomo decided to move before the momentum for a campaign dissipated. He was decisive at a point when hesitation could have cost him dearly. At any rate, the psychological contest with Go-Shirakawa and the court ended with an unambiguous victory for Yoritomo. A Kamakura that was larger and stronger was the obvious new reality. The Bakufu's expanded territorial reach was another major development. The north must have looked especially inviting to Kamakura because of the lack of complexity of competing jurisdictions there. The interests of Kyoto were relatively few, and the destruction of the Fujiwara had left a vacuum of power. There would thus be few impediments to or complaints against Yoritomo's placement of another round of}ito, and he would also be free to fashion a suitable new structure of authority there. The }ito question seems to have been a significant one, to judge from the

24. Mori Kahe' e, lwate ken no rekishi, 43· 25. AK, n89/6/r3, 8/ro, 9/6. 26. AK, n88/ 6/n.

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immediate backdrop. In the late n8os, lawsuits calling for dismissals had led Kamakura to examine the rationale for some of its earlier appointments; and grievances stemming from }ito misbehavior were becoming a challenge to Kamakura's sense of its own priorities. This was even more the case when the complaints, as at least some now were, were concentrated in the region of the east itsel£27 As a result, Yoritomo's search for new locations for appointments seems to have fixed on lands with fewer layers of entrenched authority. While he continued to review whether particular units had once been associated with the Taira, he also now issued directives to open new lands. A case in point, coming only months before the Oshu campaign, was an order to survey the provinces of Awa, Kazusa, and Shimosa in the east, in an effort to identify potential new sites. 28 In such a context, the opening up of the northern region meant the creation of a great new frontier for willing colonists. The elimination of the Fujiwara and its aftermath was filled with drama. Yoritomo stayed on in the northern capital for more than a month, departing for Kamakura on 9l28, and taking nearly another month to reach home (10l24). In the meantime he was calculating his next moves, decisions that would set the course for his governance in Oshu. One of his first steps was to guarantee the security of the great temples in Hiraizumi itself, a measure that had the effect of establishing him as their ultimate patron and also the protector of their estates. 29 Several days later he requisitioned the account books (shocho) and surveys (tabumi) of the two provinces, and he also inquired into the region's "old ways" (kojitsu) by calling on its once dominant family, the Kiyowara, to submit maps and charts (ezu). 30 Then just before departing he placed Kasai Kiyoshige, of a minor eastern family, in charge of Minamoto retainers in Mutsu, and he also appointed him police commissioner (kebiishz) for the Hiraizumi district. In effect, Yoritomo had promoted Kasai to be his own resident deputy. 31 Several days later, while stopping off

27. On n88/6/4 (AR), a petition from the court citedjitiJ misdeeds in twenty-three shoen, mostly in the east (either the Kant5 proper or the Chubu, i.e., the region between the Kanto and the Kinai provinces of the center). Such complaints, in fact, were relentless; see chapter 6 on this subject. 28. AK, II89f2/30. 29. AK, n89/9/ro, 9/n. In the entry of 9lr3, efforts to restore general order are referred to, following "the loss of children and grandchildren, and the separation of husbands and wives." 30. AK, II89191r4. 31. AK, II8919/22, 9124.

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at the Mutsu headquarters in Taga, he called on its local officialdom to continue the precedents laid down by Hidehira and Yasuhira. 32 It was a policy that must have seemed safe since Yoritomo had effectively succeeded the last Fujiwara, and it might also have gone some distance toward winning over the entrenched elite. Finally, on the very day of his return to Kamakura, he ordered the elite of Dewa, the other northern province, to conduct an extensive land survey, but also to be respectful of the rights of local residents. 33 On n89/n/7, Yoritomo dispatched Oe Hiromoto to Kyoto to negotiate Kamakura's future authority over the north. Any rewards that were offered by the court to any of his men were to be rejected, an instruction that was repeated two months later. On 12/6, Yoritomo's aims were met in spectacular fashion. From the following spring, he was to be invested with a broad jurisdiction (onsata) over the public lands (jige no kanryo) of both northern provinces, which doubtless meant that he was now free, pending the expected surveys, to infiltrate his own men. On the same day, he was also authorized to send into exile the surviving members of the Oshu Fujiwara kindred, referred to here, disparagingly, as "prisoners of war." The persons so affected were now scattered across four eastern provinces. 34 In n9o, a onetime retainer ofYasuhira rebelled, providing the pretext for a takeover of the Mutsu provincial headquarters (rusudokoro) itself. A minor figure, Izawa Iekage, was sent as Yoritomo's personal deputy. Described literally as a private functionary (zoshikt) who had been on monthly retainer (geppo), lzawa was now to become the dominant authority (holder of the rusu shiki) in Mutsu. 35 Within less than a year, we see him promoting "prosperity" (kuni no fukko) by improving agricultural production (kanno); and we also see him dealing with complaints of lawlessness (rangyo) and with problems in meeting provincial obligations (kokumu). 36 It was the start of an illustrious career, which led to an illustrious family history. The house of Rusu (meaning "proxy governor") was descended from the once obscure Izawa Iekage. 37 32. AK, u89/ro/r. 33· AK, II89/IOI24. 34· AK, n89/u/7, u/6. 35· AK, u89/3lr5; and Fukuda Toyohiko, "Yoritomo no zoshiki ni tsuite," r6. 36. AK, II9olro/5. 37· The Rusu family documents have been collected and thoroughly analyzed in Kaisetsu chu-

sei Rusu ke monjo.

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Kasai Kiyoshige and his heirs enjoyed a similar success. In fact, the two families came to hold their key posts as hereditary positions, and were ultimately referred to as the "Northern Administrators" (Osha sobugyo). 38 But Yoritomo was issuing documents to the region from the very beginning of a type that made clear that it was he who was now Osha's dominant authority.39 In future, the Hojo would succeed the Minamoto as hegemons in the area, with the Hojo chieftain (or his brother) usually occupying the governorship ofMutsu itself. 40 A third major consequence of the Osha campaign had to do with consolidation of the larger Minamoto membership, since Yoritomo used the fighting as a test of loyalty and service that might help him begin to select the membership of his permanent band. As we have already noted, no formal concept ofMinamoto status, i.e., vassalage, existed during the whole of the n8os, with the honorific term gokenin becoming standardized only after n90. That being so, there must have been great uncertainty as to the pool of eligibles for Bakufu confirmations, as well as, conversely, for Bakufu calls to service. Those who had been granted }ito shiki were obviously among the favored; but those who had been bypassed or had simply been kept waiting could not have known precisely where they stood. The point is that Yoritomo and his top advisors seemingly did not know either. It would be easier to contemplate such hard decisions after a general mobilization. In fact, there had never been the kind of mobilization that Yoritomo now undertook. In the Genpei War, the scope of the operations expanded with time, with the recruitment effort spreading over an ever wider area and coming to include increasingly unfamiliar territories. A handful of eastern deputies confronted the vastness of Japan. Conversely, however, most of those who were recruited probably did not have to travel very far, and were expected to secure their home provinces by taking the fight to local enemies. 38. For the sobugyo, see Sasaki Mitsuo, "Oshu sobugyo," in Toyoda Takeshi, ed., Tohoku no rekishi, 1:226-28. 39· See, e.g., Shiogama jinja monjo, n93/7 shogun ke mandokoro kudashibumi an, KJ, 2:7071, doc. 661, in which Yoritomo added the weight of his authority on behalf of a special levy for the "government shrine" (ichinomiya) of Mutsu Province. 40. Hojo Yoshitoki began affixing his name to Bakufu documents after the assassination of Minamoto Sanetomo in 1219. Using his highest imperial title, he signed himself "Mutsu no kami" from that point forward; see, e.g., KB, docs. 25 and 27 (nw/w!I4 Kanto gechijo, 1220/n/q Kanto gechijo). For the voluminous holdings of the Hojo in Mutsu Province, see the inventory in Okuromi Takayuki, Kamakura Hiijli shi no kisoteki kenkyu, 268-69.

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Oshu in all respects was obviously different. The military objectives here were limited and clear, involving the subjugation of a distant enemy; a national army, under a unified command, would defeat a regional one in a frontier area. At the same time, Yoritomo now had lieutenants who knew the geopolitics of local areas. Though such men were not yet shugo assigned to individual provinces, they were nonetheless experienced veterans familiar with the major families in their locales. The calls to service conveyed by such figures sent messages that were close to being mandates; to fail to respond was to be omitted or dropped from Kamakura's orbit, whereas to answer and to distinguish oneself was to become (or to remain) eligible for some more regularized acknowledgment. These themes were graphically expressed in the limited documentary record bearing on recruitment, with a directive of n89h perhaps the most revealingY Addressed by Yoritomo to his main representative in southern Kyushu, it called on Koremune Tadahisa to muster troops and to arrive in Kamakura no later than the seventh month, tenth day. Several points are noteworthy here, beginning with the dates. Long before the death ofYoshitsune, and while Kyoto was still seeking to negotiate a settlement, Yoritomo had already decided to launch his military operation in five months' time: it will be recalled that the campaign actually began on 7fr9. Second, southern Kyushu was farther from the Oshu region than any other part of Japan; the summons therefore symbolized that the campaign was to be truly national in scope. Third, the men targeted for mustering were not specified as those with prior Minamoto ties, but rather as the collective officialdom (shokan) of the massive Shimazu Estate. 42 In effect, the performance slate lay pristine, with one's prospects all in the future. Fourth, those who were recruited were to be "capable of fighting," and were also to "bring their weapons" with them. Those demonstrating loyalty (chusetsu) might then be granted a personal audience (kezan) with the lord. And fifth (though this was left unsaid), those not answering the call would be duly notedY In every respect, then, the mounting of a national campaign

41. KB, doc. 40 (u89h/9 Minamoto Yoritomo kudashibumi). 42. Shimazu itself included much of the territory of the three southern Kyushu provinces of Satsuma, Hyuga, and Osumi. The literature in Japanese on Shimazu Estate is appropriately vast, but a good place to begin is with Asakawa, The Documents oflriki, 98-103. 43· Unfortunately we do not know who actually made the trip and fought in the north.

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against weak resistance promised rich benefits for Kamakura and Yoritomo. Conversely, a heavy burden of performance lay on the recruits, with no guarantees even for those who elected to respond. I have called this a national campaign though we do not know this absolutely. For example, though the size of Kamakura's army is put by the Azuma kagami at a phenomenal 284,000, the names actually coming down to us are fewer than two hundred. 44 Moreover, all but a small number of the two hundred derive from the Azuma kagami itself, especially from the entry of 1189/71I9, which describes the historic departure from Kanakura. In that entry, 144 names are included though without specifYing their places of origin. Scholars like Hotta and Kasai have sought to provide identifications, noting the unusual concentration from the Kanto and the Chubu. 45 The fact that very few seem to have been natives of western provinces is suggestive in several ways. Obviously, since Tadahisa and other easterners recruited westerners for the campaign, the latter must have been viewed as rank and file, to be excluded from the main inventory appearing in the Azuma kagami. It follows that that inventory tells us little of where those who were listed may have been doing their own recruiting. Thus an independent source notes that Kajiwara Kagetoki prepared a roster of participants (gunpei chumon) from Mimasaka in the west, though it is not stated that he personally led that contingent eastward. 46 Clearly, Kajiwara was one of the veterans cited earlier who had been active in the west, though we are not able to trace his movements in the period up to the campaign itself. At the same time, the army divisions, while en route, clearly picked up late-arriving contingents, though the trajectory of their progress toward the north probably means that few were from the westY Finally, there is the matter of the unexpectedly high number of participants coming from the Chubu, which Kasai, for one, sees as central to Yoritomo's entire strategy. In effect, the Osh\l campaign was an integral part 44· SeeAK, n89/9/4, for the 284,000 figure. For a small number of those who are named, the

AK refers to the respective sizes of their support troops (from tens to thousands); see, e.g., n89/7/z8 and 8/8. 45· See the notes that accompany the entry for n89/7lr9, in Hotta Shozo, ed., Azuma kagami hyochu, 2:42-43. Also see Kasai Sachiko, "Oshu heiran to togoku bushidan," 38-40. 46. Cited in Ishii, "Bunji shugo jiro shiki ron," 37 n. 28. 47· E.g., AK, n89/ro/z8.

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of Yoritomo's continuing drive to consolidate his power: he was targeting pockets of autonomy and pressing to include persons never before fully assimilated. Specifically, he was thinking of Minamoto kin and zaichokanjin from provinces that had once been associated with Yoshinaka and Yukiie. In effect, then, Yoritomo would go to war, though not against the Chubu recalcitrants themselves. Instead, these persons would be positioned on the campaign's roll of honor, but placed under the command of his own generals. That Yoritomo had something like this in mind became fully apparent only later. A5 we shall see, a number of Chubu magnates who joined Kamakura's campaign in the north would find themselves not honored but pressured or purged. 48 The command structure that was utilized has long been well known. The army was divided into three divisions, a Tokaido division led jointly by Chiba Tsunetane and Hatta Tomoie (from Shimosa and Hitachi, respectively); a Hokurikudo division under Hiki Yoshikazu and Usami Sanemasa (from Musashi and lzu); and a Tosando division led by Yoritomo himself, with Hatakeyama Shigetada (from Musashi) as his executive officer. The subordinate commanders included Kajiwara and Doi Sanehira, plus Miura Yoshizumi and Shimokabe Yukihira. Not only were the command honors distributed among Yoritomo's longest-serving adherents, but he named himself the overall commander in chief Not since the earliest days of the Genpei fighting in n8o had Yoritomo actually led men into battle. For almost the entire generation until his death Yoritomo had been a statesman, a patron, and a jurist, but not a general. However, now in n89, he rode forth to military glory. The question of why men joined him remains to be considered, especially as regards those who had not done so earlier. In large part the way he organized the campaign might have been seen to have closed out other options, since fence-sitting would have been considered tantamount to disloyalty, leading to possible retribution. These were conditions that had been wholly absent during the Genpei War, except for Yoritomo's own closest kin and for families in the Kanto. In the circumstances of n89, the failure to answer arecruitment call might have been made the equivalent of joining an enemy, 48. Kasai Sachiko, "Oshu heiran to togoku bushidan," 38-40, refers, in particular, to the complement of Chubu-based families known historically as the "Kai Genji."

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with confiscation and replacement the implied threat, in particular for those who might earlier have been favored. Sometimes the punishment was immediate and sometimes delayed, but "the failure to appear" was obviously logged and remembered. For example, a jito from northern Kyushu was dispossessed for having failed to answer a pair of military service calls, one in n87 in a local matter, but the other in n89 on the occasion of Oshu. 49 The notion of a balance sheet on performance seems to have included the "round-trip experience" -from answering the original call-up to making it home, while remaining on one's best behavior. Most of the credit for the victory itself went to Yoritomo's commanders and his old comrades, but he also singled out for praise retainers oflow rank. 5° For their part, rank-and-file recruits might have served with distinction in the north, only to run afoul of the authorities on their way home. For example, a contingent returning to Aki in the west was accused of committing violations en route, and faced the prospect of confiscations instead of rewards. 51 At the same time, behavior that had been genuinely meritorious might be acknowledged, as in the case of a southern Kyushu native who was confirmed in his district headship in Satsuma. 52 Yet the evidence on rewards remains very sparse. 53 On the one hand, there is the conquest of the north by Yoritomo at the head of a great army. On the other, there is the immediate aftermath, with Yoritomo seemingly rushing to handle lawsuits forwarded by the court. What we do not see is the chieftain's busying himself with the rewarding of those who had served him. On this matter of rewards, an entry in the Azuma kagami refers to regulations meant to guide the "new jito" (shin jito) in Osha., including a threat of confiscation for misbehavior. 54 But, in a discrepancy that we are wholly unable to explain, no documents showing actual appointments have survived 49· KB, doc. 37 (n92hl28 Minamoto Yoritomo kudashibumi utsushi). The delay regarding the action in this case is intriguing. 50. See, e.g., AK, n89/9ho, for rewards to stalwarts bearing famous names, in this case, Chiba, Oyama, and Hatakeyama (though no }ito shiki are cited). The same entry refers to banners awarded to men oflesser distinction. 51. AK, n89/rol28. 52. Kokubunji monjo, n89/nf24 Kanto migyosho, KI, 1:340, doc. 413. 53· Indeed, the AK during the several months following the Oshil victory depicts a Yoritomo who can best be described as niggardly and ungenerous. 54· AK, II90!IOI5.

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of the type we encounter after the Genpei and Jokyu (1221) wars. 55 It might be speculated that "unrecorded" placements were made in public-sector units in the north, where Yoritomo, especially in Mutsu, now enjoyed the status of a provincial proprietor. But the absence of a written record showing what happened to the rights of a defeated enemy remains puzzling, obliging us to acknowledge that we cannot actually prove an expansion now of}ito. In this connection, Endo Iwao's inventory of jito in the north is filled with problematic entries, with question marks added by him to unprovable early dates. Yasuda Motohisa, for his part, identifies no appointments in Mutsu and Dewa in the immediate wake of Oshu, 56 and indeed, our only real data come from much later sources. For example, a half century after the n89 conquest itself, a litigant referred to a }ito post in Dewa that had been bestowed "owing to my military merit (gunko) in the Oshu Campaign." 57 But we have no original investiture to tell us whether the award had been made in that context. On a related point, though our notion of a "countrywide mobilization" for Oshu may be true in a symbolic sense, that did not mean that the entire country was fully or equally involved. Beyond the east, data on participation survive from only a scattering of provinces, with some provinces very likely not contributing at all. 58 Thus, rather than interpreting the years following Oshu as witnessing an expansion ofYoritomo's }ito system, it might be better to view it as marking the start of a more authoritarian phase, a major characteristic of which was the launching of a regional purge. Extending across several years, it was a program that was mostly concentrated in the

55· Not a single such document survives. There were, of course, a number of new appointments in n92, though none of these refers to service in Oshil; see, e.g., KB, doc. 12 (II92/JOI21 shogun ke mandokoro kudashibumi). Most scholars have simply assumed that the n89 victory led to some dramatic in crease in the number ofjitii; see, e.g., Takahashi, Oshu, 147-48, and, especially, Oishi Naomasa, "Kamakura bakufu to Ou ryokoku," in Chusei Ou no sekai, 51-5456. For these inventories, see Oishi et al., Chusei Ou no sekai, appendix, 20-25; and Yasuda, ]ito oyobi, appendix, 13-14. Beyond the names of a few senior figures who are listed in theAK, the sources are remarkably stingy in yielding information on appointments. 57· LA!, doc. 39 (1239/n/5 Kanto gechijo an). 58. Taking Shikoku, for example, Kono Michinobu, oflyo, traveled to Oshil and served (AK, n89/7/r9), but no one from neighboringTosa is recorded as doing so; see Kochi kenshi, shiryii

hen, kodai-chuisei.

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provinces of the Chubu, with Yoritomo now moving to replace entrenched figures with loyalists from the east.

THE

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The circumstances of these removals varied from case to case, with Yoritomo using whatever pretexts seemed to be available. Thus, in the fourth month of 1190, a pair of obstructive )ito were the object of a complaint by provincial authorities, inducing Yoritomo to dismiss them while also promising replacements. 59 Since the venue here was Mino Province, the incident may have been mostly a political reprisal, with deserving combatants in the Oshu perhaps slated to replace recalcitrants from the Chubu. However, the sources do not actually say that, revealing to us only a seemingly responsible action in a lawsuit. Two months later, however, our information becomes more explicit. Yoritomo now complains of his difficulties in administering some six provinces to the west of Sagami and Musashi, and he referred in particular to obstructiveness (taikan) in and around Owari. That said, he called for the implementation of what he called "justice" (goseibar). 60 Soon after that, an exile order for three stalwarts from the Chubu came to be issued. The three were ltagaki Kanenobu, a }ito of Suruga; Takada Shigeie of Owari; and Yamada Shigetaka of Owari and Mino. All were accused of disobedience to "imperial authority'' (ichoku), with Yoritomo presuming to execute the court's exile edict. Of the three, Kanenobu had been associated with the Minamoto from as early as 1184, and had subsequently been named a jito over an Ise Shrine "tribute estate" (mikuriya), in spite of his unease under Kamakura's authority. He was subsequently cited for violations in his capacity as a )ito, which led to efforts to have him formally banished. The two from the region of Owari had actually been cited by Yoritomo earlier, at the time of his initial complaint about his problems in the general area. At any rate, save for the fact that Shigetaka had once been the governor of Sado, we know little more about the backgrounds of either man. The order to banish all three was issued in the eighth month, only to be thwarted for a time 59· AK, n9o/ 4/4, 4/IS. 6o. AK, II9o/6h9.

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by a rebellion instigated by the pair from Owari. 61 As Yoritomo, ruefully discovered, to pacify the Chubu would require his continuing attention. The removal of entrenched leaders like Shigetaka and Shigeie was followed by an effort to reach out to lesser figures in the area. By n92, Yoritomo was ordering those who had accepted his authority in Mino to obey the commands of Ouchi Koreyoshi, his own personal deputy in that province. 62 Identified as Kamakura's representative in Mino since n87, Koreyoshi was later remembered as having been one of the first in the new officer category of shugo. 63 At any rate, the region ofMino and Owari at the far end of the Chubu seems to have been drawn into the operational orbit of Kamakura's authority only very slowly. Meanwhile, there remained problems at the eastern end of that region, in provinces like Suruga and Totomi, much closer to Kamakura. Yoritomo's last remaining brother, Noriyori, was serving as the governor of Suruga (Suruga no kami) at rhe time, but then, as in the case of his other siblings, the two fell out. Accused of treachery in n93, Noriyori was now exiled in disgrace to Izu. 64 In fact, Suruga along with Izu now became the primary base of Yoritomo's in-laws, the Hojo, who succeeded in finally subduing Suruga. 65 Totomi, which adjoined Suruga, proved more difficult, and it required a complex sequence of events to transform the political balance there. From n84 to I190, Yasuda Yoshisada had served as the civil governor (Totomi no kami), while also exercising high-level policing duties. 66 However, he was shifted to the governorship of Shimosa in the Kanto following his service in Oshu, only to be reinstated in Totomi in n91; his holdings and his power base had remained there. But in n93, following a crime committed by Yoshisada's son, the father was judged guilty by association and stripped of his entire portfolio. Eight months after that he was executed for conspiracy, 6r. AK, n84h/5, 3fr7; n89/5/22; II9o/6h9, 8/r3, nh; and Kasai Sachiko, "Bunji gonen Oshu seibatsu ni tsuite no ichi shosatsu," 35. 62. KB, doc. 135 (II92/6ho saki no utaisho ke mandokoro kudashibumi, contained in AK, II92/6ho). 63. AK, n87/3/3, and Saw, Zotei-shugo, So; also ibid., 7-8, and Tanaka Minoru, "Kamakura bakufu gokenin seido no ichikosatsu-Wakasa no kuni no jiw gokenin o chushin to shite," 270-72. See chapter 7 for the context of the shugo institution's emergence. 64. AK, II9318/q. 65. Saw, Zotei-shugo, 53-54· 66. The governorship is cited in AK, II94/8/r9; also Saw, Zotei-shugo, 50.

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and Hojo Yoshitoki, Yoritomo's brother-in-law, succeeded to his homelands.67 A final episode, concerning the Jo family of Echigo, will underscore the resistance that was still possible even after Osha.. The scion of the house, Nagashige, first appears as a partisan of the Taira in n8o, a status he seems to have maintained for the duration of the war. Placed in the custody of Kajiwara Kagetoki, he was eventually pardoned by Yoritomo. Later he appeared in response to the Osha. call-up with two hundred followers, though he does not seem to have improved his standing with Kamakura as a result. In the II90S, we see him only fleetingly, still acknowledging, if only nominally, the authority of Yoritomo. However, soon after the latter's death in n99, Nagashige raised an army and petitioned the court for a punishment order against Kamakura, wholly reminiscent of Kamakura's own request for a mandate against the north. But conditions had now changed and Nagashige was not only denied by Kyoto; he was immediately hunted down and killed by Bakufu forces. There followed a campaign by Kamakura to absorb the major families of Echigo, even as partisans there and in Sado and Shinano continued to resist assimilation. 68 As we have seen, then, a priority for Yoritomo was to use his newly acquired strength and countrywide status to weaken and to dislodge as many of the long-entrenched Chubu families as possible. During his lifetime, however, his regime never really succeeded in outgrowing its original Kanto base, except in the defeated provinces of the north. In the Chubu, Yoritomo's ambitions simply outpaced his capacities, despite the fact that the court had conceded to him a great advantage. In addition to his expanding control of his network of jito there, he was granted the right to nominate civil governors in some of the region's provinces. 69 Yet Yoritomo, in the end, failed to develop an original and integrated program for the western half of the east, which might have enhanced his ability to truly govern there. The area's

67. AK, n89/7lr9; II9oh/w, 2!25; II93/nl28, 12/5; II94/8/r9, int.8/7. 68. AK, n8o/9/7; n8r/5/r6; n82/9!28, w/9; n88/9lr4; n89/7lr9; II92/6/r3; 12orh/3, 2/5, 3/4, 31r2, 412, 413, 51r4. 69. The pages of AK contain a variety of references to governor appointees ofYoritomo. Yet we know almost nothing about how the Bakufu exploited this traditional lever of authority; see my "Black Holes in Japanese History," in AA], r68-75.

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physical proximity to the Kanto increased its importance to Yoritomo, who never entirely succeeded in absorbing it?0

THE

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OF JAPAN

In central and western Japan, Yoritomo was guided by policies that included appointingjito to onetime Taira holdings, with his oldest followers from the Kanto receiving most of these assignments. That left noneasterners in an ambiguous relationship with Kamakura, mostly as gesu (or gesu types) in an environment where only }ito tides guaranteed a true connection (see below, pp. 182-87). In practice, there were westerners whose service against the Taira made them at least eligible for recognition, and westerners who of course had been part of the Taira enemy itsel£ Significantly, the larger problem for Yoritomo concerned the former group, whose future status would somehow have to be clarified. During the final months of the war, Yoritomo had shown himself eager to work through the leading zaichokanjin in the west, leaving their traditional command structures mostly intact. Victory in n85 did not much change that situation, and Yoritomo was unable to make much contact with provincial rank and file. For the time being, his usual policy was to withhold most rewards from their commanders. In u89, the recruitment efforts of his own officers must have gone part way toward reaching men at the lower levels, though more ambitious programs of this kind were still needed. There followed the start of appointments to provincial officers under no uniform designation (see chapter 7); the introduction of a formal concept of retainer status under the tide gokenin; and the start of a campaign to oust some of the local strongmen in the west, on whom Yoritomo had only quite recently depended. The process of beginning to distinguish who was and who was not to be classified a "Minamoto" started in earnest only after the Oshu victory. As we have seen, holders of managerial tides were recruited for service in n89, and data on participation and performance were evidently compiled. Though 70. The complexities of Kamakura's regional jurisdictions in the east are dealt with in Sat6,

Kamakura bakufu sosho seido no kenkyu,

8-21.

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some areas almost certainly escaped involvement in the episode and were not evaluated, the victory, as we have already seen, extended Kamakura's field of play to the "whole country." At any rate, despite theAzuma kagami's prolific use of the term gokenin in the run-up to Oshu, there is no evidence that the word existed in its mature meaning, so that Kamakura's recruiters had no predefined category of supporters to draw from. 71 Instead, the concept of "housemen" from the country's provinces seems to have crystallized only after the victory, obliging us to examine the changes in the environment from that juncture. One important development was the formalization of the Bakufu's central structure in n9o. In the tenth month of n9o, the victor over the north left for Kyoto at the head of an entourage containing the Kanto's finest. It was Yoritomo's first visit to the place of his birth since the humiliating defeat of his family thirty years earlier, and he obviously wanted the occasion, and the symbolism, to be right. His five-week stay in Kyoto proved to be an event without precedent in Japanese history, taking the form of a "state visit" by a dignitary who was not a foreigner. As Yoritomo knew only too well, protocol and prestige lay at the heart of Kyoto's advantage over the countryside, as the highborn flaunted their superiority over those who came to pay court. For that reason, the visitor was determined not to be overawed in the customary ways, and to maintain his dignity and independence. He also seems to have anticipated how he would respond to the inevitable round of flattery and honors. On n/7 and n/22 respectively, he was appointed a "Great Counselor" (dainagon) and a "Great Captain of the Right" (utaisho), titles that he duly retired from on I2/3. However, as long as he was able to do so on his own terms, he would use all the privileges that accompanied such honors. Arriving back in Kamakura on r2i29, he immediately commenced a flurry of activity, crowned by the opening of his first formal chancellery (mandokoro). From this point forward, his edicts would adopt the form of those that the highest nobility had issued for centuries. 72 Moreover, Yoritomo moved, simultaneously, to staff other agencies and offices,

71. For the problems of understanding the origins of the gokenin concept, see my "Yoritomo and Feudalism," in AA], 78-85. 72. AK, II9o/n/7, n/22, 12/3, 12!29; II9rll!I5. For the form taken by the earliest mandokoro edicts, see, e.g., KB, doc. 91 (n9rhhr saki no utaisho ke mandokoro kudashibumi).

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giving life to his expanded vision of a bureaucracy now centered in his own capital. In fact, Yoritomo had now decided to stress the civilian dimensions of his authority. The Oshu campaign was over, and there was no anticipated further need to mobilize large numbers of troops or to promote an institutional system that rested primarily on force. Indeed, everything Yoritomo had already said or would ever say about his network ofjito appointees was aimed at neutralizing their coercive potential. From II90, he now sought to inculcate the same spirit into his central government, with the edicts of his mandokoro a model of restraint and consistent procedure. At the same time, Yoritomo must now have been thinking of how best to have a representation of personal followers around the country who would be answerable to his authority in some regularized way. In the early II90s, cohorts of a manageable size under personal deputies sent out from the east were the formula that he gradually came to favor. Though we know the end result-gokenin units of thirty to forty under a shugo to administer them in each province-we know little of how any of this came to be implemented. The starting point, we can only imagine, was the creation of registers of names, which might then become the basis of provincial rolls of gokenin. But the circumstances of the lists leave us only with questions, and we have no idea when the term gokenin was actually given its new meaning. 73 Moreover, the role of Yoritomo himself is unknown-to what extent was he the author of the new concepts, and in what degree did he immerse himself in each province's inventory? Also, where are the events of II92 to be fit in this context? Since the death of Go-Shirakawa occurred in the third month of that year, it might have seemed a propitious moment to seek to implement the policies that had been evolving since Oshu. On the one hand, the almost ceaseless flow of petitions from the exemperor was suddenly stilled, whereas on the other, the appointment of Yoritomo as shogun now went forward. At the age of forty-five, the

73· A number of specialized studies of the gokenin of individual provinces has been published, but no historian has been able to illuminate the circumstances of the start of the process. The work ofTanaka Minoru on Wakasa, Iyo, and Sanuki provinces was pioneering in this regard, as were Seno's on Hizen, Sotoyama's on Bungo and Buzen, and Gomi's on Satsuma. Several other provinces have been similarly analyzed.

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Kamakura chieftain now became the country's dominant statesman?4 Yet the tabulations that have come down to us are but a tiny handful out of a total of sixty-six provinces. The sequence from Oshu, to Kyoto, to the office of shogun yields not so much an end point to the Bakufu's becoming a countrywide authority through its men, as it does the regime's ultimate commitment to pursuing such a course. The dates normally given for this formalization of a network ofKamakura vassals are 1192-99. 75 The lists from Wakasa and Satsuma are the clearest of the genre, even though the data they contain have long puzzled historians. The Wakasa list, bearing thirty-four names, is conventionally viewed as an inventory of the gokenin of that province, even though that is not what the document says. Dated the sixth month of 1196, it refers to itself as a list of the Minamoto and Taira ( Genpei ryoke) in Wakasa, which may make it simply an inventory of that province's leading men. 76 It would then have been left to Yoritomo to decide whom to enroll permanently. Two observations support such a speculation. First, the term gokenin does not appear in the document. And second (see below, p. 156), the most eminent person on the list was purged three months later. The Satsuma list, from 1197, is actually three lists, all appearing in translation (or paraphrase) in Asakawa's Documents of Iriki. 77 The first is an inventory that purports to include a full listing of the gokenin in Satsuma, Hynga, and Osumi provinces. 78 The Satsuma portion contains thirty-one names, but the list, in Asakawa's words, was compiled "more than 500 years later." The second, from 1197, is drawn from a cadastral survey of Satsuma Province, and it contains more than seventy names. And the third, from the

74· See "Yoritomo and Feudalism," in AAJ, 71-78, for the origins of the shogunal tide. Emperor Go-Toba was twelve years old upon Go-Shirakawa's death, and became the country's next "retired emperor" six years later in n98; see DKR, 6-w. 75· Tanaka, "Kamakura-Wakasa," 270 76. Toji hyakugo monjo, n96/6 Wakasa no kuni chushinjo an, KI, 2191-92, doc. 854. Takeuchi, the compiler-editor of KJ, calls this document a "Wakasa no kuni gokenin chushinjo an." Tanaka Minoru also refers to it as a list ofgokenin; Tanaka, "Kamakura-Wakasa," 28!. 77· Asakawa, The Documents oflriki, 104-7. 78. Asakawa is concerned only with Satsuma; hence he omits the data for the other two provinces.

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same year, is a roster for the imperial guard service in Kyoto; it contains a total of twenty-four names.Y9 It is possible, with some imagination, to suggest that these lists are not in contradiction. 80 As in Dewa and Mutsu earlier, Satsuma had been ordered to prepare a survey oflocal jurisdictions that resulted in a list that included personal names, place names, and shiki. From that "Who's Who?" of Satsuma Province, Koremune Tadahisa and Yoritomo were somehow able to select a final roster of gokenin. The recruitment to peacetime guard service in Kyoto came next, containing the list of men who were now considered permanent Minamoto. Sent by Koremune, who would subsequently become the province's shugo, it was addressed to the ''jito and kenin of Satsuma Province." 81 The reference to jito and kenin seems especially important here since two distinct classes of adherents were at last being formalized around the country. Indeed, the cadastral survey referred to such office holders as jito, gesu, gunji, and goshi, which the guard duty roster now simplified into jito and kenin. To be sure, serious ambiguities remained concerning the second status, which would have consequences, in various provinces, at the time of the Jokyu War in 1221: numerous gokenin who were not jito would join the court side against Kamakura. 82 But for the time being, men whose status had been unclear were now designated as gokenin, a badge of distinction that could only have been welcomed by recipients. At the same time, we know that certain gokenin actually traveled to Kamakura to seek an upgrade to jito status, a step that was actively discouraged by the Kanto authorities. Though the overwhelming majority of petitioners seems to have failed in such efforts, persistence, at least occasionally, did pay off, as in the well-documented case of the Nejime of Osumi. 83 But 79· The survey is translated separately by Asakawa, in The Documents of Iriki, m-r6. The guard service (known as the oban'yaku) became incumbent on all gokenin, and also played a key roll in the emerging conceptualization of the shugo post; see chapter 7· So. Indeed, Asakawa gives us the three lists arranged in tabular form, allowing us to compare the names; ibid., roS-9. It is not his fault that he is unable to explain precisely what had happened. Sr. Ibid., 107 (KI, 2:277, doc. 955). For the n9os origin ofKoremune Tadahisa's shugo post, see chapter 7, pp. 203-6 below. S2. See DKR, chap. 2, for details. S3. Okuromi Takayuki, "Kamakura bakufu kuni gokenin-sei no kenkyu," 22.

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most westerners had to learn to settle for a second-class status within the Bakufu, which the latter itself freely admitted some decades later: During the age ofYoritomo, gokenin from the western provinces were listed in registers by shugo. Yet even though the imperial guard and other services were discharged by them, there were few who possessed (jito] shiki and were granted edicts of confirmations by Kamakura (Kanto kudashibumt). 84 With expectations left unmet, it must have become a sobering reality for the new housemen. On the question, finally, of the "missing" registers (and accompanying documents) from each province, scholars have no answer whatever. Even if the process of establishing gokenin units extended over a decade or even more, where are the recorded traces from what must have been, at best, a complex endeavor? That the gokenin themselves received no written appraisal of their new status has long been known, since only appointments to shiki required formal paperwork. 85 To be a gokenin, then, was to have one's name included on a provincial register compiled and kept by a shugo, and to be publicly identified by being included on a roster for guard service in Kyoto. 86 Evidently, this distinction was deemed sufficient for the time being, with one's newly acquired status a potential lever of influence over neighbors and kin. Yet the advantage here clearly redounded to Kamakura, which was now able to proclaim a countrywide presence through men whose services it had mostly been able to buy cheaply.

84. Shinpen tsuika, 68 (1234/51!), in Chusei hosei shiryoshii, 1:91. The reference to Yoritomo-era "shugo" is probably anachronistic. 85. For further discussion of the gokenin concept and its significance, see my "Of Hierarchy and Authority at the end ofKamakura," in The Origins of]apan's Medieval World, chap. r. For

the entirety of the Kamakura age, I have encountered no formal written investitures of anyone as a gokenin. See also Thomas Conlan, "State of War: The Violent Order of Fourteenth Century Japan" (Ph.D. diss., Stanford University, 1998), chap. 2, for an interesting recent treatment of the subject of gokenin. 86. To receive a call to service was tantamount to being acknowledged as a gokenin; see KB, doc. 158 (12151Io/4 Kanto migyosho an), for a Kamakura order to Koremune Tadahisa as shugo, directing him to mount a three-month guard service consisting of the gokenin of Satsuma, Hyrrga, Osumi, and Iki provinces.

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THE WEST

Paralleling the process of inclusion that we know was occurring at this time was a drive in the opposite direction toward exclusion. If the first half of the 1190s was devoted mostly to the Chubu in this respect, the second half was devoted to provinces farther west. In fact, the year 1195 had witnessed a severe political setback for Yoritomo in Kyoto, where his ill-considered plan to make his own daughter the imperial consort had failed. 87 He now chose to concern himself once more with extending his influence territorially, which obliged him to initiate additional purges. One of the most dramatic was in Wakasa Province, where, as we have just seen, a survey of "Minamoto and Taira'' was completed in n96. The register included but did not single out lnaba Tokisada, despite the fact that he was Wakasa's dominant local figure. During the war, Tokisada had been eagerly recruited by Yoritomo, though he was not, despite his contribution and stature, elevated to jito status subsequently. In fact, no indigenous figure from Wakasa is known to have been appointed a )ito for the entire Kamakura period, further proof of the existence of two tiers of gokenin. Conversely, however, few easterners had made much headway in Wakasa before n96, 88 which led Yoritomo to target the province for a purge. The reason seems to have been that the presence ofTokisada and his vast portfolio of managerial shiki constituted a barrier to large-scale infiltration ofWakasa from the east. Everything changed on the first day of the ninth month of n96, when Tokisada was accused by Kamakura of rebellious intentions, and then divested of his entire collection of landed holdings. 89 In typical fashion, his gesu-level assemblage was now restructured into jito tides and accompanying rights, with the entire package assigned to a Yoritomo protege, the hitherto obscure Tsutsumi Tadasue, who in fact was the son ofYoritomo's former wet nurse. By 1200, Tadasue held twenty-five jito posts within two of the province's three districts, with a small number of additional )ito tides now being distributed there to other easterners. 90 87. See DKR, 8-ro, for details. 88. Tanaka, "Kamakura-Wakasa," 254, 260-61, 285. 89. The confiscation is recorded in a later document known as the "Wakasa no kuni shugo shiki shidai," in Dai Nihon shiryo, 4th ser., 5:267. Tokisada's son later came to possess a few minor holdings; Tanaka, "Kamakura-Wakasa," 269. 90. Tanaka, "Kamakura-Wakasa," 254-55.

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On the question of whether Yoritomo had the legal right to confiscate a package of holdings outside his own jurisdiction, he might have been able to justify it as a consequence of the recent formalizing of his roster of housemen. That is, ifTokisada was now a gokenin, his treachery might permit an appropriate response. At all events, from a bastion of near impenetrability Wakasa now became literally an occupied territory, indeed one of the Bakufu's most conspicuous outposts in the central region. An easterner now controlled its provincial headquarters (kokuga) and most of its jito posts, and there were other easterners scattered across its public and private domains as jito. As aresult, Wakasa became the venue for some of the country's most bitter judicial disputes involving proprietors and jito, with well-documented disputes over estates such as Tara and Kunitomi. 91 Finally, Tadasue, Yoritomo's favorite, came to combine in himself the most important of the new and old powers in Wakasa. These included the provincial tax office (saisho) and the posts of shugo, jito in chief for two districts, and jito for twenty-five estates. He was thus the ranking locally based officer of both capitals, even though he was only incidentally a representative of Kyoto. More accurately, he was the coordinator ofWakasa's gokenin and its richest and most powerful figure overall, which, ironically, made him the potential target of a purge himself. In the 1220s, the Hojo engineered a confiscation identical to that of a generation earlier, though now with themselves as the intended beneficiaries. The Hojo remained the dominant power in Wakasa until the Bakufu was destroyed a century later. 92 The elimination of the lnaba ofWakasa in n96 was not an isolated incident. A second major dispossession occurred in Bingo Province the same year. Ota Estate, one of the wealthiest private domains in western Japan, had had a pair of brothers serving as gesu. Viewed as troublemakers by the proprietor of the estate, they had acquired a reputation that made them easy pickings for Kamakura. Accused of what were cited as "rebellious offenses" (muhon no toga), they were divested of both their Ota rights and their status 91. For Tara, see Kozo Yamamura, "Tara in Transition: A Study of a Kamakura Shoen," and Iida Yoshiharu, "Wakasa no kuni Tara-no-sho," in Shibata Minoru, Shoen sonraku no kozo, 199-307. For Kunitomi, see KB, docs. 92-93 (no7/n Kama gechijo, r2r6/8/r7 shogun ke mandokoro kudashibumi), and the discussion of these two documents in chapter 8, pp. 23133 below. 92. Tanaka, "Kamakura-Wakasa," 258-6o.

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as gokenin. 93 The motivation of the Bakufu became clear when another close confidant ofYoritomo was appointed as the new jito. In this instance, however, the recipient was a onetime court noble who had entered Bakufu service during the war, the highly respected Miyoshi Yasunobu. Once again, therefore, Yoritomo had conferred a rich prize on a personal aide lacking his own territorial base, a condition that now changed with this appointment. For its own part, the proprietor, the Koyasan monastery, was left deeply disappointed, its hopes for a jito-free estate in ruins. 94 In the thirteenth century, Ota, like Tara and Kunitomi in Wakasa, became the target of some of the period's fiercest courtroom battles. 95 Japanese historians have linked the Wakasa and Bingo purges by virtue of their identical timing and nature. 96 The argument is persuasive even though no other example in central and western Japan can be cited from this time. Nevertheless, the enrollment of men as gokenin only to purge them soon thereafter is consistent with Yoritomo's behavior in the Chubu during that decade. As we shall see, Kyushu, despite its physical remoteness, also became a major focus of concern at this time.

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The elimination of native houses of consequence and their replacement by low-ranking easterners was a strategy that Kamakura pursued in Kyushu only in a limited sense. On the one hand, there were few indigenous families of substance that had survived the war intact. On the other, the circum-

93· For the problems experienced by Koyasan in Ota at the hands of the brothers, see Koyasan monjo, n9o/n Kongobuji moshijo an, KI, 1:379-81, doc. 495· The dispossession of the brothers in n96 is described in a document of 1206, itself quoted within a record of 1223; see ibid., 1223/n Ota-no-sho jita chinjo an, KI, 5:239-46, doc. 3180. Many scholars have analyzed these events, and the literature on Ota Estate is vast. All of the sources relating to Ora Estate have been published in Seno Seiichiro, comp., Bingo no kuni Ota-no-sho shiryo. 94- See ibid., II96/wl22 saki no utaisho ke mandokoro kudashibumi, KI, 2:198, doc. 867, for Miyoshi's initial appointment as Ora }ito. Koyasan's attempts to have the post eliminated were in vain; see DKR, doc. 59 (1205/inq/12 Kanto migyosho). 95· See, e.g., DKR, doc. 39 (1234hh3 Rokuhara migyosho), for just one document among dozens dealing with Ora's judicial problems. 96. E.g., Tanaka, "Kamakura-Wakasa," 269-70.

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stances of that region required special policies anyway. In particular, Kamakura needed to evolve a set of working arrangements with the Dazaifu, the island-wide headquarters that was still being administered by appointees of the court in n85. As we shall see, the changing character of this relationship has left us with many unanswered questions. At the end of the war, the tidying up of conditions in Kyushu seems to have been unusually demanding. Within several months, Minamoto Noriyori and his deputy, Chiba Tsunetane, were recalled to Kamakura, to be replaced by Kamakura's recent representatives in Kyoto, Kondo and Nakahara. Since these two figures had functioned mostly as judicial troubleshooters (see above, pp. 97-98), the change may be thought to have signified a shift of priorities from war to peace. Moreover, since the court formally acknowledged the reassignment of the two officials, earlier scholars made much of this development: Kyoto's edict of n85/7 was likened to its decree of n83/10, with each symbolizing the court's cession of governance over another part of the country. According to a once dominant view, the east and the far west had fallen to Kamakura as a consequence of the war. 97 Nowadays a more moderate appraisal of Kamakura's progress in Kyushu holds sway, with the survival of the Dazaifu as an agency of the court seen as the key point. 98 In short, the dual polity came to operate in Kyushu as elsewhere, even though it remains difficult to specifY the precise jurisdictional division. As we shall see, both capitals made use of the Dazaifu for their own purposes, with the situation continuing to remain fluid even beyond Yoritomo's lifetime. 99 Not surprisingly, the bureaucrats, Kondo and Nakahara, enjoyed only a momentary presence in Kyushu, to be replaced by a deputy better suited to pacifYing a still unstable region. Amano Tokage was a minor figure from lzu, 97· Drawing inspiration from Sata Shin'ichi, Ishii Susumu has long been a leading spokesman for this view; see, e.g., his "Dazaifu kiko no henshitsu to Chinzei bugyo no seiritsu" and "Kamakura bakufu ron." For a more comprehensively argued statement along these lines, see Ishii, Nihon chusei kokkashi no kenkyu, 40-u7. 98. Takeuchi Rizo and Seno Seiichiro have developed this view; see, especially, the latter's "Chinzei bugyo ko," and an elaborated view in Seno, Chinzei gokenin no kenkyu, 14-77. 99· A classic illustration of this condition is revealed in a dispute of 1205 over the chief abbottship ofTakeo Shrine in Hizen. Both the shugo and the Dazaifu came to be drawn in, with each rendering a verdict on behalf of the other candidate. See DKR, doc. 57 (1205/4/z5 Kanto gechijo).

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the province ofYoritomo's long exile, and was exactly the kind of protege that the chieftain felt secure with. Arriving in Kyushu early in n86, he had clearly been granted a brief that was broader than that of his predecessors, and the Azuma kagami actually refers to him as the new "Kyushu Administrator" ( Chinzei bugyo). 100 Though some historians have therefore seen Amano as the first holder of a formal deputyship for the whole island, most recent scholars have tended to be more cautious. Not only are there no contemporary references to such a tide until much later, but the authority it implied seems to be contradicted by the evidence in at least two ways. First, it now seems all but certain that Amano never approached full control over the Dazaifu during his tenure, since a number of the latter's edicts are lacking his signature. 101 And second, whereas Amano was clearly active on a number of fronts, the sum of his involvements does not answer the central question about his authority. We have some evidence of what he did, but no indication of his mandate. Though his predecessors had received the blessing of the court, Amano had not. Surviving records indicate that Amano added his own enforcement orders to Kamakura's confirmations of land rights, and he also co-signed the Dazaifu's confirmations of Kamakura's jito awards. At the same time, he was part of the chain of command that canceled }ito posts now withdrawn, and he was also involved in granting levy exemptions to religious institutions. 102 Finally, Amano was unambiguously a commander of armed men, charged with leading forays (sometimes unsuccessfully) against local recalcitrants, even as he was himself sometimes charged with criminal behavior. 103 At all

AK, n86/12/10. See, e.g., Kawakami jinja monjo, n86/8/6 dazaifu cho kudashibumi, KI, 1:96-97, doc. 154· 102. In order, see Shimazu ke monjo, n89/71I9 Amano Tokage kudashibumi, quoted ibid., 1329/10/5 Kanto gechijo, Dazaifu-Dazaifu tenmangu shiryo, 7:196-97; Kokubunji monjo n88/31I3 dazaifu shugosho kudashibumi, KJ, 1:184, doc. 318; Munakata jinja monjo, II91/81I Kanto migyosho an, KJ, 1:420-21, doc. 545; and ibid., n88(?)/4/10 Kanto migyosho, Dazaifu-Dazaifu tenmangu shiryo, 7:191-92. 103. In n87, for example, Amano was ordered to mount a naval attack on the island of Kikaigashima, the site of supposed partisans ofYoshitsune; AK, n87/9!22. At almost the identical moment, intrusions into Shimazu Estate by an agent claiming to be under the orders of Amano were condemned, while the rights of Koremune Tadal!isa were upheld; Shimazu ke monjo, n87/9/9 Minamoto Yoritomo kudashibumi, KJ, r:r6r, doc. 262. Or again, involving Shimazu, see ibid., n89(?)/51I4 Kanto migyosho, Dazaifu-Dazaifu tenmangu shiryo, 7:196. IOO.

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events, Amano was Yoritomo's principal representative in Kyushu until c. n95, a symbol of the strength or weakness ofKamakura's position according to different scholars. 104 His involvements show perseverance and some freedom of action, but they also reveal frustration and a failure to break local resistance. The circumstances of Amano's tenure probably cannot be separated from the unusual program ofjito appointments pursued in Kyushu. From the very start of Yoritomo's distribution of these titles in n86, he began to award them to natives of that island. It was a practice mostly unseen in other parts of Japan, but it can only have been the product of a plan to weaken potential blocs of recalcitrants by allowing them to become jito. Yoritomo even appointed men who had fought as Taira until the very end. 105 Yet having done so, he now needed to cope with a distant corps of native appointees, which would require innovative policies of control. A first such policy involved the infiltration of the Dazaifu in new ways. A second focused on the promotion of a few low-ranking easterners to administer the new contingents of housemen. And a third rested on the distribution of supra-jito offices, also to easterners. An eastern warrior of obscure background named Muto Sukeyori was assigned by Yoritomo to the Dazaifu in c. n95, thereby initiating a relationship for his family that would survive the Kamakura era itself Sukeyori's plan was to open an autonomous office within the Dazaifu, which would then have the power to issue documents of its own; he would also become an actual emigrant to Kyushu. However, he did not (or could not) seize control of the Dazaifu, which was not absorbed into the Bakufu's machinery until a generation later. 106 In the mid- to later II90S, the new provincial administrators arrived in Kyushu-a total, it would seem, of four men: Nakahara Chikayoshi, Koremune Tadahisa, Otomo Yoshinao, and (again) Muro Sukeyori. The first, a onetime courtier who had entered service with Yoritomo, may have been assigned to Bungo and Chikugo provinces. The second was the Oshil recruiter 104. Seno, Chinzei gokenin no kenkyu, 14-29. 105. His recruitment among members of the Matsura bloc of families in Hizen is the classic example; see the references in note 108 below. 106. For the swirl of debate about Sukeyori and the Dazaifu, see Seno, Chinzei gokenin no

kenkyu, ro8-zo.

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whom we encountered earlier, and a man who had been associated with southern Kyushu on Kamakura's behalf since 1185. The third was a minor warrior from the east who had become a favorite of Yoritomo, as well as Nakahara Chikayoshi's adoptive son. The fourth, who, as we saw, was given the assignment within the Dazaifu, was also assigned, it would appear, to three individual provinces. 107 At any rate, rather than purging local magnates as in other parts ofJapan, Yoritomo was seeking to place locals in Kyushu under new administrative controls. For this purpose, a cohort of four men now replaced an overextended single deputy, and Muto (if not the others) elected to settle on site. At the same time, Yoritomo was giving notice that he sought a special influence in the part of Japan that was farthest from Kamakura. In order to establish an authority that embraced the entire country, he obviously needed an especially firm foothold in its polar extremities. But there was still the situation of the numerous native-born jito in Kyushu whose appointments had begun in a rush starting in n86. Perhaps the generally small size of the sites they controlled simply militated against a policy of seeking to remove the largest of them, as in Hizen where many dozens of new jito were left unpurged. 108 Or perhaps Yoritomo, in Kyushu, just decided to try something else. Whatever the case, he began in the 1190s to introduce concentric appointments, with native holders in a position subordinate to that of easterners, who, for their part, now came to be thought of as supra-jito (so-jito). 109 The practice of making appointments at two levels was unique to

107. The most comprehensive treatment of Nakahara Chikayoshi appears in ibid., 51-77. For the origins of the Koremune and their connections with Kyoto and the regent's line of the Fujiwara, see Thomas Nelson, "The Early Shugo: A Study Based on the Chomo Clan of Northern Kyushu," (D.Phil. thesis, Universiry of Oxford, 1998), chap. 2. For Tadahisa and Yoritomo, see Saro, Zotei-shugo, 231-39. For Yoshinao in Oshil and his adoption by Chikayoshi, see AK, n89/8/9; for his shugo posts, see Saro, Zotei-shugo, 2II-I2, 216, 224. For the Muro, see note 106 above; Seno, "Chinzei ni okeru rogoku gokenin," pt. I, 17-18; pt. 2, 4142; and Saro, Zotei-shugo, 213-15, 220-23, 225-28. 108. See Seno, "Chinzei ni okeru to-Matsura to no baai." In one shoen alone, some twenry or more Matsura becamejito; idem, "Hizen on kuni ni okeru Kamakura gokenin," 34· Also see Hyung-sub Moon, "The Matsura-to: Pirate Warriors in Northern Kyushu, II50-1400" (Ph.D. diss., Stanford Universiry, 2000). 109. See Yamakuma Korezane, "So-jiro ni tsuite," 56-62.

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Kyushu. In other areas where the tide of so-jito was occasionally used, it referred to men who controlled district-sized sites, replacing magnates who had just been eliminated by Kamakura's own actions. Thus, Tsutsumi Tadasue was made the so-jito of two ofWakasa's three districts in the wake of the ouster of the Inaba in 1196; and Hatakeyama Shigetada was appointed to a district in Mutsu following the defeat of the Oshil Fujiwara. 110 Moreover, there were also usages of the term so-jito in estates where the holder was simultaneously the custodian (azukari dokoro), 111 as well as usages among family members to designate the lineage's principal jito. 112 But the situation in Kyushu was different in each of these respects, where unrelated persons now came to hold vertically arranged, concentric posts. Not all scholars have seen these appointments in Kyushu within a strategic framework. Some, like Yasuda, view them simply as honoraria for meritorious easterners; so-jito were no more than a supplemental awards program.113 Admittedly, these tides did constitute an additional source of income, a characterization of the office that actually strengthened over time. For unlike regular jito offices that would soon become heritable, so-jito titles tended to be rotated among easterners who were unrelated to their predecessors.114 On the other hand, institutions in their mature form often bear little resemblance to their earlier condition, and the question of original motivations for the so-jito policy remains. In view of the timing of the introduction of these entitlements in the II90S, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that they were originally conceived as an additional layer of control from the east. The prototype for the so-jito was almost certainly Koremune Tadahisa, who was appointed the }ito proper for the massive Shimazu Estate in n86. By 1187/5 he was being referred to as its so-jito, 115 presumably as a consequence no. For Tadasue, see Tanaka, "Kamakura-Wakasa," 254-60. The timing of Shigesada's assignment is unknown, though it might be assumed to have come soon after the victory; the so-jitli reference itself appears in AK, I200/5f28. nr. See, e.g., Nakayama monjo, 12oo/6 so-jito ken azukari dokoro kishinjo, KI, 2:395-96, doc. n46; and Munakata jinja monjo, I2I2/rol26 so-jiro ken azukari dokoro kudashibumi, KJ, 4:47, doc. 1947. m. E.g., DKR, doc. 68 (I249/I2fr5 Nakano Yoshinari yuzurijo). II3. Yasuda,]itli oyobi, 405-25. n4. See, e.g., the lists of the sequence of sli-jitli in KB, doc. 45 (1248/9fr3 Kanto gechijo), and KB, doc. 46 (1227/3fr9 Kanro gechijo an). n5. Shimazu ke monjo, n87/5/3 Minamoto Yoritomo kudashibumi, KJ, 1:141, doc. 233.

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of the numerous smaller jito appointed there. Tadahisa's special status bore fruit in n89, as we know, when he used his superior standing to recruit local subordinates. Moreover, we see him a bit later expediting the Bakufu's transfer of a confiscated unit to a deserving houseman, who was now being appointed a jito by Kamakura.ll 6 Since this last activity was evidently only one of a sequence of similar actions occurring simultaneously, Tadahisa was literally becoming a so-jito in the process: a growing number of sub-jito were now being placed under him. In this instance, the jito in chief was dearly the first jito to be appointed; the size of Shimazu Estate permitted smaller assignments to be made subsequently. But the pattern was evidently reversed in the mid-n9os when so-jito came to be appointed to areas that already had native jito. Examples can be cited for different parts of the island. The most striking of the known cases occurred in Kozuma Estate in Chikugo Province, and is recorded in a remarkable judgment of the midthirteenth century. 117 The verdict recounts a twisting interaction across more than fifty years, and also underscores the difficulty of clarifying the rationale behind the original appointment. To summarize, a native ofKyushu was made the jito over his homelands in n86/5, with the strongman of the moment, Amano Tokage, appointed to the same units subsequently; the affected parts of Kozuma now had two levels of jito. There is no indication of either the timing or the circumstances of Amano's appointment, though we do know that he became the so-jito of other estates at about the same time. 118 To confuse matters even more, additional units within Kozuma received a jito appointee in n93, who had no connection with either Amano or the sub-jito of n86. The histories of the respective parts of Kozuma were thus unrelated, with some areas supporting two jito but others just one. ll 9 At all events, Amano's successor as so-jito was Nakahara Chikayoshi, who promoted the superior-inferior relationship between the two levels of jito. n6. KB, doc. 43 (n9z/whz Kanto migyosho an), in which Tadahisa is the addressee. rq. KB, doc. 45 (1248/9/r3 Kanto gechijo). n8. He is cited, e.g., as the first so-jito in Saga Estate in Hizen; KB, doc. 46 (r227/3lr9 Kanto gechijo an). n9. For the "one jito" parts of Kozuma, see KB, doc. I7 (u93/ 6/r9 shogun ke mandokoro kudashibumi an); and doc. r66 (rzo8/rlr7 Chikugo shugosho kudashibumi an); and DKR, doc. 65 (rzrz/rzlr3 shogun ke mandokoro kudashibumi an).

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The balance of local power now swung decidedly toward the so-jito, who proceeded to exploit the weaknesses of his local namesake. Though the sub}ito had himself been confirmed by Kamakura in rr97, his circumstances now led him to seek a further confirmation from the so-jito. The latter, not surprisingly, was quick to oblige, and in 1201 he referred to the petitioner as his own deputy (jitodai). However, the relationship changed yet again some years later, now in the direction of greater equality between the two holders. Eventually it was the so-jito who brought suit against his local rival, using an argument deriving from an interpretation of the events of the II90S. As the so-jito put it, the original appointment to his own post had superseded the appointment of his local subordinate-an ingenious argument that might have won the day. However, the sub-jito simply produced the Bakufu's confirmation of n97, which was shown to have come after the initial so-jito's appointment. As the judges now concluded, it had been the Bakufu's clear intention for there to be concurrent jito, which, they added, was "the regular practice in Kyushu (Chinzei) during the age ofYoritomo." 120 The verdict, in the end, then, confirms what we already know-that the link between the so-jito and Kyushu began in the n9os. Yet, unfortunately, it fails to elucidate the original motivation. Nor do other examples clarifY the matter. For instance, Chiba Tsunetane, who had been in Kyushu in n85, was appointed to a jito title over Iriki within Shimazu, which was then upgraded to a so-jito office later. As we will recall, Koremune Tadahisa was so-jito for the whole of Shimazu during this era, so that at least on paper, there were no less than three levels of }ito. Tsunetane's appointment seems to have lapsed upon his death. 121 In a second example, the so-jito of Saga Estate in Hizen was named a defendant by a sub-jito in the mid-1220s. The rationale for the original appointment is once again unclear, though a list of the sequential so-jito is suggestive. Beginning with Amano and Nakahara, the names of six other persons are included, revealing incumbencies that were all very short. At the

120. For an elaboration of additional aspects of this episode, see WG, 163-65. 121. Tsunetane's involvement with Shimazu Estate actually began in n86, though as a "district head" (gunjt); Shimazu ke monjo, n86/8/3 Minamoto Yoritomo kudashibumi, Kl, 1:94, doc. 150. His so-jito post is referred to in a document of 1250, translated by Asakawa; The Documents oflriki, 132-33. Tsunetane died in 1201.

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same time, the case underscores the practice of equal income for the two levels of jito, which the Bakufu confirmed in its verdict of 1227. 122 Evidently, then, concentric jito in which the holders were separated by place of birth had now evolved into one of the curious realities of local history in Kyushu. Yet the distribution of the known so-jito titles makes no strategic sense whatever. Though the institution can only have been conceived of in the context of large numbers of native jito, why do we have evidence of so few so-jito overall? Indeed, even if we allow that Yoritomo was the driving force behind the policy, its appeal to easterners, one might have thought, should have permitted its expansion after his death. But in fact the so-jito institution actually had little to commend it over the long term. In the first place, the notion of vertically arranged jito placements carried its own threat since there was always the possibility that easterners might be placed over other easterners. It was a situation that actually befell the Fukabori ofKazusa and that prompted a bitter feud and lengthy litigation. 123 Or again, though few might have been reluctant to become so-jito in the 1190s, all sub-jito, it was soon realized, were jito also. Two holders now had to share a single source of income, and two holders now had access to Kamakura's courtrooms. At any rate, the practice of appointing vertically arranged jito does not seem to have spread even within Kyushu, even as the initial round of assignments, from the II90S, was allowed to stand. Finally, it is worth noting that we have data on as many as ninety nonnatives who received land rights in Kyushu, almost all in the form of standard jito posts. Of this total only one hailed from a province to the west of Owari in the Chubu, with the others "men of Kamakura" in the fullest sense. 124 By contrast, no native of Kyushu ever received anything from Kamakura outside that island, a situation that prevailed for 150 years. 125 One's place of origin, a mark of the ancient order, still mattered. Situated at the fringes of civilization for centuries, the Kanto now sent its sons to all parts of the country, even as those sons were forced to submit to a very challenging regimen. As we shall see in the next chapter, men who

122. KB, doc. 46 (1227/3lr9 Kanto gechijo an). 123. See DKR, 121-22 (1257/12h4 Rokuhara migyosho an, 1258/roh Rokuhara migyosho an). 124. For the numbers here, see Seno Seiichiro, "Chinzei ni okeru t5goku gokenin," 38-40. 125. Seno Seiichiro, "Kamakura bakufu no seiritsu to Kyushu chiho no doko," 44·

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were honored as new }ito were ordered to insinuate themselves into the existing patterns of local government without so much as a flutter of tension or trouble. In committing itself to the furtherance of this goal, Kamakura found both its raison d'etre and its bete noire. One of the Bakufu's central policies now became the policing of the very men whom it had honored when it was young.

CHAPTER SIX

A Place in the Sun

The general climate of upheaval that attended the historic events oflate n85 gave few signs of abating in the months that followed. A context of continuing violence resulted in flashpoints everywhere, underscoring the exposed weaknesses of the old order. Kamakura's responsibilities for peacekeeping were now manifold, with court decrees in some cases having to be bolstered by orders from Yoritomo. Though there was no thought of dispensing with the sanctions of traditional authority altogether, they seemed no longer capable of having the decisive, and inevitable, impact they had had for centuries. In the midst of all this confusion, Yoritomo took possession of his new mandate over the }ito, with no models, past or present, to help him with implementation. As he must have realized, the notion of a countrywide network of estate stewardships under a single authority violated every precedent of the individualized shiki system. A resident of the provinces had now been invested with a national authority, which no one, including himself, could quite have known what to do with. Moreover, it could not have been obvious that Yoritomo would be able to harness the raw power of the concept,

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which drew its momentum, as we have seen, from the land. Acknowledgment of his own exclusive right of appointment would be required from all quarters, including those who had styled themselves }ito during the war years; the inherent anarchy of self-promotion had to be extinguished. On the other hand, there was also the possibility that Yoritomo would seek to manipulate what he had acquired, making it a wedge for a broader assertion of powers. As viewed from the court, no one could have been certain that the Kamakura chieftain would not move to claim a comprehensive authority in local matters, thereby converting himself into the final arbiter of all major conflicts affecting the countryside. As we know, the range (and the inchoateness) of his involvements began to narrow as the crisis in the provinces gradually receded. Guided by a sense of practicality and proportion, he encouraged a division of responsibilities as the core of a new reality, which led in time to the emergence of more or less distinct tracks of authority. By the end of his life, jurisdictions that were separate had yielded twin hierarchies, which might operate autonomously in the absence of trouble, but which frequently collided when the interests of rivals overlapped. Yoritomo's main burden, as he seems to have realized, was to maintain the separation between the twin pillars when possible, but to mediate between them when it was not. In the Japan of his mature years, then, the country was not so much divided into autonomous regions of east and west as it was into parallel, estate-based jurisdictions across the entire country. In a situation in which Kamakura and Kyoto would have extensive interests in each other's base areas, the presence of a jito in a particular locality would mean a condition of shared governance there between them. Naturally, the divisions, as here described, did not burst upon the scene fully formed, and the current chapter will seek to trace their early development.

THE

ORIGINS

OF

DUAL GOVERNMENT

The confusion that prevailed even after the enunciation of the new jito policy illustrated just how complex creating two governments from one would be. On the one side was the generally unstable environment in the countryside, and on the other was Yoshitsune's continued, and, for Yoritomo, vexing

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freedom. Such extraordinary conditions demanded powers not subject to Kyoto's veto or delay, nor to any limitations imposed locally. At first, therefore, the new jito monopoly was deemed insufficient by all concerned to solve every problem, a situation that was underlined by the range of petitions flooding into Kamakura. To illustrate the point, we might cite the surviving desist orders issued by Yoritomo on a single day in n86, proscribing serious violations in the estates of six provinces. 1 None dealt with misbehavior by anyone referred to explicitly as a jito, though in one instance the accused person had styled himself that way. Moreover, though the guilty parties in the first two cases were unnamed, in the next three they were a triumvirate of stalwarts from Yoritomo's own inner circle. The last was the bogus jito just referred to. 2 At this stage, Yoritomo's authority over jito was merely the hub of something that was necessarily larger. In n86, we actually encounter a range of highly disparate activities-from the initial wave of assignments of lawful jito, 3 to a parallel wave of confirmations of lawful non-jito, 4 to the issuance of general and specific policing and desist orders, 5 to the sorting out of disputes within and between families and classes. 6 Only gradually was there a move in the direction of a The provinces were Yamashiro, Harima, Omi, Tanba, Suo, and Kaga; see note 2 for citations. 2. In sequence (all six documents are "Minamoto Yoritomo kudashibumi," dated n86/9/5), (r) Kamo chushin zatsuki, in KJ, r: 106, doc. r67; (2) Torii ojimonjo, in KJ, r:w6, doc. r68; (3) AK; (4) KB, doc. 30; (5) KB, doc. 31; and (6) KB, doc. 58. Though numbers (3), (4), and (5) may actually have involved men who held }ito posts, none of these documents refers to them by that title. 3· For actual surviving investitures, see, e.g., KB, doc. n (n86!I/8 Minamoto Yoritomo kudashibumi), and Kozuma monjo, n86/5/6 Minamoto Yoritomo kudashibumi an, KJ, r:66, doc. 98. There are also fairly numerous later references to investitures having occurred specifically in n86; see, e.g., KB, doc. r6 (n92/6/3 saki no utaisho ke mandokoro kudashibumi an); KB, doc. 45 (1248/9!I3 Kanto gechijo); and KB, doc. 99 (1238/ro!I9 Rokuhara gechijo). 4· See, e.g., KB, doc. 64 (n86/6 Minamoto Yoritomo kudashibumi), for the confirmation of a gesu titleholder whose rights were being violated; or Sakiyama monjo, n86/ 5/7 Minamoto Yoritomo kudashibumi an, KJ, r:66, doc. 99, for the confirmation of a transmission of property interests (unnamed) from a father to his sons. 5· See, e.g., KB, doc. 29 (n86/int.7h9 Minamoto Yoriromo kudashibumi), for a general desist order against unnamed violators in Takebe Estate, Omi Province; and Kuwahata monjo, n86/n/3 Hojo Tokimasa gechijo an, KJ, suppl., r:26, doc. 40, for a similar kind of condemnation in Kyushu's Osumi Province 6. See, e.g., KB, doc. 15 (n86/8/9 Minamoro Yoriromo kudashibumi an), for the resolution of I.

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more rational set of policies, which would seek to define and clarifY rather than to appropriate jurisdictions. Nor can such a trend be easily dated, since it clearly overlapped with a penchant, driven by the war, to widen and broaden. A set of concerns more narrowly focused on Kamakura's own interests became a true priority only in the later n8os. The inflated, often unwieldy, involvements of the middle years of the decade would, perforce, need to give way to a greater emphasis on the office ofjito. As Yoritomo himself gradually came to realize, Kamakura's resources in manpower were already mortgaged beyond capacity. There was the obvious pressure of demands of various kinds on the leadership itself, but there were also serious problems in the field. With the dispersal of the several armies of occupation, there was no regular network of Kamakura officialdom to provide any backing for Yoritomo's decrees. Moreover, apart from the emerging patchwork of }ito appointees, there was no corps of men who would have been universally recognized as tied to Kamakura; a permanent status denoting Minamoto membership (gokenin) was still in the future. Most serious of all, the implementation of Kamakura's }ito authority did not yet rest on uniform standards or procedures. Increasingly, all other involvements must have seemed extravagant. The burdens deriving from the emerging network of }ito were vast. Not only did undeserving claimants need to be identified, but so did undeserving appointees as well. From the very start, there were claimants who were challengers to other claimants, as well as claimants who had to be unmasked as self-promoters. 7 Moreover, there were appointees to estates judged later to have been immune, as well as appointees to areas wholly uncontaminated by a Taira connection. 8 Put differently, Yoritomo would now find himself stretched to the limit merely to gain a working control over his new author-

a dispute over which of two unrelated claimants should hold a }ito post; or Koyasan monjo, n86/31I7 Kanto kudashibumi, Kl, 1:30, doc. 73, for the sorting out of a dispute between

members of the Koyasan monastic hierarchy. 7· For Yoritomo's review of competing claims and his branding of one as false, see KB, doc. 14 (n87/5/9 Minamoto Yoritomo kudashibumi an). For the unmasking of a bogus }ito, see KB, doc. 58 (n86/9/5 Minamoto Yoritomo kudashibumi). 8. See, e.g., the account of an appointment made on the basis of a supposed Taira connection that was later challenged and overturned when the original affiliation was disproved; KB, doc. 34 (r2o5/31I3 Kanto gechijo an).

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ity. In such a context, it was small wonder that he began to look to the court for help in matters that were unrelated to jito. Seen in this light, the retrenchment and restraint that now came to be reflected in Yoritomo's decisions are not the striking anomaly that they might seem. All power had not gone to the recent victor. Rather, a vacuum of real authority now existed in many local areas, which prodded Yoritomo in the direction of seeking to bolster traditional hierarchies and sanctions. There is no other way to explain some of the initiatives he now took, which represent a clear retreat from earlier positions. For example, fewer than six months after assuming full powers oflocal intervention, he renounced the countrywide commissariat levy privilege that he had obtained at the same time that he had received his authority over jito. 9 The thinking behind this action was less to assuage estate proprietors' sensibilities than to deny local men everywhere a pretext for abuses. 10 Similarly, his announcement in mid-n86 that jito appointments would be limited to former Taira and "rebel" areas was a policy that made sense in the context of a search for definitions. 11 To declare that the only valid jito would be those whom he designated as properly appointed was to affirm that the status could no longer be seen to derive from local sources, i.e., from a "site." Nor, at another level, could it be permitted for the court to seek to dismiss a jito on its own, and Yoritomo expressed strong opposition to such efforts from the beginning. 12 As we have already seen, most of the visible momentum for stabilization came from Kamakura, as did most of the hard work designed to revive central authority. Of course, the ex-emperor would scarcely have agreed with that diagnosis, and probably mistook his own obstructionism for a program 9· AK, n86/3/21. The right to exact this tax (called hyoromai) was included in the court edict that authorized Yoritomo'sjito authority; AK, n85/nl28, n/29. IO. Abuses followed by exemptions started almost immediately; see, e.g., AK, n86II/9, 1/n, 2/21, 2/22, 2!28, 31!, 3!2, 3/7, and 31!6. But troubles continued even after the general abolition on 3/21, e.g., AK, n86/6/21. For the range of scholarly opinions about the hyoromai during these contentious several months, see Uwayokote, Chusei seijishi kenkyu, 200-213. n. The emergence of this policy can be traced in the pages of AK during the first half of n86, with the limitations, in their final form, announced on 7/7. 12. As Yoritomo put it in the fourth month of n86, "The regulations (seibai no jo) governing jito countrywide are the responsibility (shinshi) of Kamakura." See Shimazu ke monjo, n86/4/3 Minamoto Yoritomo kudashibumi, KJ, 1:34, doc. 82.

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of reform. Moreover, though the courtiers of the capital remained arrogant and dismissive to the end, they frequently failed to commit themselves energetically to a reassumption of real responsibility. Thus, instead of a collective effort aimed at a genuine revival, individual interests and short-term gains were allowed to take precedence. Those who bore grievances found it easy to petition Yoritomo, and dozens of packets containing such petitions, as in n86/7, arrived in KamakuraY Yoritomo devised a series of innovative policies to reduce some of this case load. In n86/6, he urged the court to revive the kirokujo, an imperial office with investigative powers dating back to the eleventh century. 14 The original charge to that agency had been to examine shoen charters and related documents, but the exigencies of the n8os required an altered set of priorities. The new kirokujo was to function as a kind of clearing house for complaints that arose out of the new conditions of postwar misconduct. Burdened as Yoritomo was by requests for assistance, the Kamakura chieftain was, in effect, seeking assistance himself. He thus called for a court-based agency to parallel his own efforts. Though the revived kirokujo went on to achieve a high profile, 15 the extent to which it alleviated Kamakura's burden is unclear. Large numbers of petitions were still being sent eastward, which induced Yoritomo to announce a further step. Henceforth, only papers screened and forwarded by the court would be accepted. 16 Thus, even as Yoritomo was emphasizing the autonomy of]apan's two governments, he was simultaneously binding them together. Though the court would need to centralize its procedures and take greater responsibility for itself, the old and the new regimes were becoming inextricably linked. The dependence of Kyoto on Kamakura was the natural consequence of warrior pressure on local estates. Though the actual extent of the violence

13. Cited to the AKby Iida Hisao, "Kamakura jidai ni okeru chobaku kankei," 43-44 n. n, though the month-the seventh-is clearly incorrect (there is no entry in theAK on that subject in n86/7). According to lida, Yoritomo issued 252 desist orders in response to these complaints. 14. See AK, n86/6/9 and ro/r. 15. See, e.g., Gyokuyo, n87f2/4, 2!28; Tonanin monjo, n88/4/r6 sessho Kujo Kanezane migyosho, KJ, 1:323, doc. 382; and AK, n88/9/3. 16. AK, n8812h.

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remains difficult to quantifY, surviving documents paint a bleak picture for individual proprietors. For example, a register of the Saidaiji, a temple in Nara, lists twenty-seven "collapsed" estates (tento shoen) and nine others that existed "in name only." 17 Another record of the period shows the Iwashimizu Shrine of Kyoto spinning itself into a web of dependence on Kamakura. As an imagined deterrent to locals who were bent on encroachments, the shrine threatened intervention by the Bakufu in instances of lawlessness. In effect, the shrine, rather than Yoritomo, was seeking to strengthen and to extend Kamakura's commitment to help. 18 At any rate, if we multiply such expectations by the number of proprietors that were experiencing trouble locally, Yoritomo's attempts to return authority to the court become more comprehensible. Here then was the ironic outcome of Kamakura's advanced position of late n85: a series of piecemeal retreats that had the effect of strengthening not one government but two. As a counterweight to continued violence, both regimes saw virtue in restoring traditional hierarchies and attitudes. On the other hand, Kamakura's authority over the }ito had to be made absolute, a task that required a multilevel commitment. For example, when the Fujiwara owner of Shimazu Estate moved to reject the just appointed }ito, Kamakura had to stand firm on behalf of its own rights. 19 At the same time, militant locals needed to be reminded that "on-site" }ito were a thing of the past. 2° Finally, the men who were now appointed to the new title had to be fully cognizant of the extent of Kamakura's authority. The right to appoint and to dismiss them was to lie exclusively with Yoritomo, so that he would be the ultimate arbiter in all }ito matters.

ESTABLISHING A

JITO'

POLICY

As soon became apparent, an authority applying to all ofJapan did not mean a comprehensive right of appointment. Principles and guidelines would q. Saidaiji monjo, II9I/5fr9 Saidaiji shoryo shoen chumon, KI, 1:413-16, doc. 534· The twenty-seven were spread across sixteen provinces. 18. KB, doc. 47 (n91hfro lwashimizu hachimanguji betto gechijo an). 19. Shimazu ke monjo, n86/4/3 Minamoto Yoritomo kudashibumi, KI, 1:34, doc. 82. 20. There were self-styled jito even after n9o, typically for the purpose of justifying a campaign of lawlessness; see note 18 above for one such example.

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need to govern actual placements, and it would be left to Yoritomo to implement rules of his own devising. In practice, the restriction of assignments to former Taira holdings and the holdings of current "rebels" held out the promise of an authority that just might be workable. From the point of view of recipients, jito posts would be true prizes for a narrow elite; no one who was not a Minamoto would be granted one, but not everyone who was a Minamoto would either. Yet their creation held out the prospect of only a minimal disruption to the land system since the awards would be limited to what was lawfully confiscated. Finally, the jito shiki that were so created would balance rights and responsibilities in ways that would sustain the society's traditional divisions. It was a strategy for an era in which new privileges very much needed to be encumbered by restraints. But even granting that Kamakura was circumspect when it might have been overzealous, it certainly did not get every decision right. Nor could it have been able to proceed very confidently since so many of its placements rested on information that was incomplete at the time. The result might be a lengthy ordeal that began with the identification of confiscatable rights, even as their exact contours would have been unknown. A whole host of questions was thus waiting to come to the surface, which would require evolving new techniques in an attempt to supply answers, as well as a set of procedures that would convey an aura of competence. Beyond that, there was the matter of devising practical means for judging acceptable performance of duty as the basis for determining whether a tenure, lawfully grounded, might continue. Not surprisingly, Kamakura felt obliged to promote the interests of those it was most beholden to. These were the easterners who had been with Yoritomo the longest, and an initial round ofjito appointments was made to them. The awards themselves were of two basic types-confirmations over homelands, and assignments to new areas. Since the assumptions that guided each were quite different, we need to look carefully at both. In the case of confirmations, a gesu or other shiki holder was renamed a jito by Yoritomo. Though simple on the surface, the act was a radical one, affecting all the parties profoundly. In practice, estate owners surrendered their most fundamental rights over their former appointees-the powers to judge, to confirm, to discipline, and to dismiss. At any rate, since the rationale for making such confirmations would have had nothing to do with war guilt or confiscations from the Taira, and since the losses for estate owners

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would have been correspondingly bitter, Yoritomo seems to have proceeded cautiously here. In fact, the appointments in this area that scholars have always assumed occurred at once, appear rather to have evolved only gradually. A survey of known }ito in the Kanto shows few who were so appointed during Yoritomo's lifetime, and fewer still who were appointed before n92. 21 What are we to make of this observation? 22 Clearly, it suggests again the weakness of the roots of the jito concept in the Kanto. Either easterners linked to the lord of the East felt their tenures to be secure enough after the victory, or the }ito authority was not intended to be implemented as a major policy for the Kanto. Only later, after the context had changed appreciably, did easterners come to be appointed, or simply thought of, as }ito over their homelands, with their inclusion in their holders' wills making the point explicit.23 By contrast, if confirmation-type jito in the Kanto were not part of the phenomenon's opening phase, they were, by clear design, at the other end of the country. Fair numbers of native warriors were appointed in Kyushu beginning in n86, where local partisans, as we know, needed to be won over. 24 In the surveys done for Hyuga, Satsuma, and Osumi provinces in n97, the references to some dozens of jito (including "original" jito [hon jito]) are almost certainly not to pre-n8o holders of that title, but rather to natives who were recently confirmed in it. 25 At any rate, the formulation of 21. In Yasuda Motohisa's inventory of jito across Japan, he lists 147 jito posts in the nine provinces of the Kanro, along with the dates of their first appearances in sources. Of the total, some thirteen are datable to Yoritomo's lifetime. See Yasuda, ]ito oyobi, appendix, 4-13. Of course an unknown number would have originated earlier than their first recorded references, and a substantial number of new documents has come to light since Yasuda did his research (now published inclusively in the KI). 22. I am unaware of any work of scholarship that makes this point. Yasuda (Shugo to jito, 120) divides jito into three categories-confirmatory, newly appointed, and pre-n85 }ito. But he does not really take up the issue of numbers, save to argue that "shokoku" ("the provinces," the actual word used) did not mean zenkoku ("everywhere"); ibid., n3-14. 23. See, e.g., the regime's confirmations of jito posts that had been willed by their original holders. For Sagami, Musashi, and Kozuke provinces, respectively, see LA!, docs. 12, 13, and 15 (1205/z/z2 Kant5 gechijo, 12o8/3lr3 Kant5 kudashibumi an, and 1215/3/z3 shogun ke mandokoro kudashibumi). 24. For two in that year, see, e.g., Kozuma monjo, n86/5/6 Minamoto Yoritomo kudashibumi an, KI, 1:66, doc. 98; and the reference in KB, doc. 45 (1248/9fr3 Kant5 gechijo). There were obviously many, many more; see the numbers contained in the Bakufu's own inventories of II97 (note 25). 25. Shimazu ke monjo, II97!6 Hyuga no kuni zudencho, II97/6 Satsuma no kuni zudencho,

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the category as a device to entice westerners rather than to reward easterners is a speculation that obliges us to rethink Yoritomo's jito policy. But it is the second category-the "new" tides-that came to be seen as the cutting edge of the new phenomenon. In the standard pattern, easterners were rewarded with investitures beyond the Kanto, and were expected to conform to the "precedents" (senret) of the Taira managers they were replacing. The responsibilities and the perquisites of these displaced officers were to be enjoyed now by men assigned exclusively by Kamakura. Thus, in the surveys of Hyrrga, Satsuma, and Osumi just referred to, the confiscationtype jito are denoted by the word mokkan ("confiscated"), in contradistinction to those who had been "confirmed" (hon jito). 26 Unfortunately, the data deny us any sense of the overall demographics here and leave us with little more than an impression of an uneven distribution. We do not even know whether all the provinces were represented from the start, or whether, indeed, Yoritomo would have viewed that as a desirable goal. 27 In practice, the easterners who were so honored would enjoy entitlements that were assigned at the discretion of Yoritomo in disparate areas. We are never told why an appointee was chosen for his particular site, e.g., whether any prior link such as a wartime visit was a factor. Indeed, there is no discernible rationale for the bon dings that now were made, so auspiciously, between eastern men and western places. By authorizing these jito-ships in scattered and distant areas, Yoritomo was undoubtedly following his best instincts, which, as we know, tended to serve him well. Throughout this unprecedented display of personal will around the country, proprietors were not deceived about what they were witnessing. From the very first appointments, they did all they could to keep their estates free from jito, recognizing the extent of the threat. The fiction of "managers who had merely replaced other managers" was easily exposed,

KI, 2:233-43, docs. 922-23; and Kuwahata ke monjo, II97/6 Osumi no kuni zudencho, Kl, 2:243-50, doc. 924- See also Asakawa's translation of the Satsuma register as well as related lists, in The Documents oflriki, 104-16. 26. Asakawa, The Documents oflriki, 104-16. 27. For that matter, Yasuda's inventory reveals an astonishing twenty-seven provinces with five or fewer jito over the entire period! Yasuda,jito oyobi, appendix. Though his totals would need to be revised substantially on the basis of current knowledge, the basic point would still remain valid.

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and Kamakura was soon deluged by requests for immunities from jito or for

jito dismissals. During the early years, additions and subtractions of title holders actually became part ofKamakura's regular business, as Yoritomo sought to combine justice with the requirements of patronage. Unfortunately, the documents of the time are mostly laconic and unhelpful. IfKamakura, as was standard, issued investitures that omitted key data, its early cancellation edicts were little better. In fact, the potential for inconsistency across a broad range was substantial. For example, whereas Kamakura terminated jito posts in Omi and Tanba owing to their holders' encroachments, it refused to do so in Kaga, issuing a warning instead; a replacement, rather than a termination, was a further option. 28 Evidently, Yoritomo was insistent on retaining latitude over punishments for like crimes, increasing the comprehensiveness of his authority in the process. For Yoritomo, the notion of a stable network of jito did not become an early centerpiece of his policy, the proof for which is his numerous dismissals. But why surrender influence in local areas? The potential to resurrect a lapsed jito post was always present, in fact, allowing Yoritomo to sacrifice one set of relationships, where warranted, for another. In effect, proprietors and managers might receive alternating treatment, as in the case ofYoritomo's patronage ofKoyasan after n85. During the first month of n86, he prohibited jito on all of the monastery's estates in its home province of Kii, precisely the kind of gesture that would have won him praise in traditional circles, even as his own followers would obviously have interpreted it differently. 29 Moreover, the perspective from ground level conveys an even more complex picture, tending to show varia-

28. For the cancellations, see AK, n86/9/5 and KB, doc. 30 (u86/9/5 Minamoto Yoritomo kudashibumi). For the warning to a }ito whose misbehavior was clearly excessive, see AK, II90/5/I2. For dismissals and replacements, see, e.g., AK, n87/3!2 (in Etchu Province), AK, II90/4/r8 (in Mino), and Dazai kannushi Usa guki, II92/n/n shogun ke mandokoro kudashibumi an, KJ, 2:53, doc. 637. Or see the cancellations of}ito shiki in four shoen in Iga upon the urging of the retired emperor (Todaiji yoroku, II90/I2/I2 Minamoto Yoritomo kudashibumi, KJ, 1:381-82, doc. 497), even as Go-Shirakawa acknowledged Kamakura's rightful jurisdiction over these "confiscated Taira holdings" (mokkan no chi); ibid., II90/12 GoShirakawa in-no-cho kudashibumi, KJ, 1:383, doc. 501 29. Negoro yosho, n86/rl29 Kanto kudashibumi, KI, r:17, doc. 42; also AK, n86/r/9.

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tion as the result of circumstance. The shifting direction of patronage in Ota Estate, Bingo Province, provides an illustration. 30 In n85-86, Ora's custodial authority (azukari dokoro) was confiscated from its Taira holder, and Doi Sanehira, the wartime stalwart, was appointed jito in his place. Yoritomo's initial response had been to reward a trusted follower. However, the ex-emperor, Ora's patron (honke), now invested Koyasan with the proprietorship (ryoke) just as Kamakura was announcing its support of the temple more generally. At this particular moment, Doi began to engage in lawless behavior in Ota, and Yoritomo immediately canceled the }ito post he had so recently granted him. 31 This entire sequence of events had unfolded within a brief period. But patronage under Yoritomo was notable for its susceptibility to change. Time and again, what might have appeared a dosed matter to contemporaries could simply be reopened. A decade later, the Kamakura chieftain appointed one of his own closest advisors to the vacantjito post ofOta, following the ouster of a pair of local managers (gesu) whom Yoritomo had earlier supported but now opposed. 32 From that point on, Kamakura never tired of receiving and hearing the monastery's complaints about the }ito, even as it refused to consider dismissing him. A posture of steadfast admonishment of lawless behavior came to prevail, with the inconsistencies of the Yoritomo era long past. The pattern, as here described, can be applied to other proprietors as well. Kamakura, on the basis of its lawful involvement in Taira and rebel areas, maintained a local profile essentially of its own choosing. In that context, Yoritomo's relations with Ise Shrine invite comparison with those with Koyasan. As early as n86/3ho, Yoritomo ordered his various jito on shrine owned estates to honor their tax obligations, and a week later lse petitioned him to cancel the commissariat levy (hyoromar}, which those jito were

30. Ota has been one of the most studied of all shoen, with dozens of monographs, old and new, treating its long history (from late Heian to early Sengoku). For possibly the best of the bibliographies of classic shoen studies (sixty-eight pages, ten entries on Ota), see Abe Takeshi, Nihon shoen shi, appendix. 31. For these details, see Yasuda Motohisa, Shoen, 200. For the dismissal of Sanehira, see Koyasan monjo, n86/7/z4 Minamoto Yoritomo shojo, KJ, r:87, doc. 131. 32. For this story, told in the context ofYoritomo's purges of the mid-n9os, see Chapter 5, notes 93 and 94·

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abusing. 33 Three months after that, the chieftain dismissed a recent appointee on a shrine holding, acknowledging no jito misbehavior as he took this action, and also acknowledging the area as a legitimate Taira-confiscated land. 34 Exactly a year later, Yoritomo harshly condemned lawlessness by jito on shrine estates, threatening the offenders with dire consequences if they persisted, and actually confiscating the tide of one leading vassal three months later. 35 In the years that followed, Yoritomo repeatedly admonished jito for crimes committed against lse Shrine, even as he sent agents to lse and Shima provinces for the purpose of searching for "Taira-confiscated holdings" to which new postings might be made. 36 Then, in II99, Yoritomo's successor, his son Yoriie, dismissed half a dozen jito on lse holdings in what appears to have been a case of patronage and piety taking precedence over politics. 37 But six years later the politics of Kamakura had changed the situation again. In 1205, with Hojo Tokimasa now wielding arbitrary power, lse Shrine petitioned him for a jito cancellation, arguing that an innocent man had been labeled a Taira in the first place, and that Kamakura's posting there had thus been unwarranted. Though the original appointee was innocent of any crime, Tokimasa dismissed him (and others) with little fanfare, granting the shrine's petition on narrowly legalistic grounds. 38 As will be obvious, the overall context tended to influence general trends. Thus, when Yoritomo was seeking to impose his will on recalcitrant local areas soon after the war, he needed to have jito who would not themselves become part of the problem. That meant being prepared to police his own appointees, and he set about making a number of peremptory dismissals. At the same time, magnanimity on behalf of temples and shrines revealed his civility and piety. By the early II90s, however, new sites for appointments had become a priority, in the wake ofYoritomo's Oshu victory and visit to Kyoto. By n96, a phase as an active player in court politics had ended embarrassingly for Yoritomo, prompting him to adopt a more resistant line to33· AK, n86/3/10, 31I6. Hojo Tokimasa, Yoritomo's deputy, actually received the petition, which was prepared by lse's "administrator for collapsed holdings" (shinryo tento bugyo). 34· AK, n86/6h9, 7II. 35· AK, n87/6ho, 9!27, wii3. 36. AK, n89/7fio; II90/4fi9, 6/6; II91fi/7. 37· AK, II9913123. 38. KB, doc. 33 (I205/31I3 Kanto gechijo an).

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ward proprietors' suits, and also prompting him to complete the latest stage in his regional consolidation. It was not so much that he now shrank from the notion of equitable justice where possible, but rather that he was less indined to grant requests for inequitable dismissals. Yet the local peace on which the prosperity of both capitals depended ensured that an interactive dyarchy would need to continue to develop. From Yoritomo's death until late in 1205, a power struggle destabilized Kamakura itself, with unpredictable consequences for many senior vassals. Especially during 1204-5 when Hojo Tokimasa controlled the eastern regime, lse Shrine and other proprietors petitioned for }ito dismissals, and a number of these appeals were accepted, such as the petition discussed above. After that, policies more suited to securing the regime and its dominant families were introduced. The post of shogun was now made hereditary, and so were the posts of}ito enjoyed so broadly among the membership. The holders of entitlements now began to include them in wills, which Kamakura, in a new practice, confirmed by probate. 39 Aware of the risks to the regime of too much purging of its own ranks, Kamakura's leaders now prohibited }ito cancellations outright, and justice in the form of desist orders replaced dismissals.40 In 1221, however, the Jokyu War led to another round of confiscations, appointments, challenges, and cancellationsY Within the limits of what was politically viable at any moment, Kamakura's ability to manipulate the labels it had to hand might turn policies around. The Taira and Court partisanship labels of 1185 and 1221 are the prime examples, retaining their flexibility even decades after the wars themselves. For instance, just a few months after dismissing a }ito in lse on the grounds of wrongful appointment, Kamakura justified an assignment elsewhere under the identical principle. By classifYing an area a "former Taira holding" for the first time in 1205, it was able to appoint a }ito to fill a new

39· For the political climate and the dismissals of 1204-5, see DKR, 70-75, 80-81, and n. 77, which lists some of the cancellations that occurred. The conversion of the shogunal post into a hereditary position is treated in "Yoritomo and Feudalism," AA], 76-78, and the similar conversion of jito posts and their transmission starting c. 1205 are examined in LA!, 45-49. 40. See AK, no6/rl27, for the prohibition, and AK, I2I0/612o, for its usage in practice. The increasing emphasis on judicial solutions is traced in DKR, 81-83; also DKR, docs. 54-69. 41. See chapters 2 ("The Jokyu Settlement") and 4 ("The Era after Jokyu") in DKR; also DKR, docs. 13-37, 70-75.

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"vacancy." 42 Similarly, it continued to make Jokyu-related assignments until the I250S. 43 As just indicated, proprietors had no recourse but to appeal to Kamakura's sense of the moment, and to hold their fingers aloft to feel the flutter of political winds. In that situation, injustice was always a distinct possibility, and there were even estates, never associated with the Taira, that had jito imposed on them. In n86, for example, the head priest of a small shrine that had said prayers for the Minamoto was himself made the jito for one of the shrine's own shoen. Simultaneously, however, Kajiwara Kagetoki was appointed as his deputy, but events took a further (and unexpected) turn fourteen years later. On the occasion of the purge of Kagetoki that occurred in 1200, a new jito was appointed, displacing the priest. The protests of the latter were unavailing. 44 Though discretion in all jito matters lay with Kamakura, each decision, even the "inconsistent" ones, had the effect of reinforcing the lines of authority that now defined the dual polity. Even after the 1221 Jokyu victory and Kamakura's unprecedented expansion, the jurisdictional divisions pioneered by Yoritomo retained their importance. Indeed, the larger the overall entity, the greater the need for sharing the burden. And since the growth was largely measurable by the number of new jito posts after 1221, the need to continue to separate them from all other titles did not diminish. The distinction between jito and gesu, in this connection, assumed special importance.

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When Yoritomo began advancing the notion that his jurisdiction would be limited to jito, he was effectively ceding to proprietors an authority over gesu. It will be recalled that the two statuses had nearly merged during the course of the Genpei War, only to be separated by Kamakura itself as it elected to be associated with the newer concept. It then spent the next decade defining

42. Sagara ke monjo, 1205/7h5 Kanto gechijo an, KI, 3:242, doc. 1556. 43· See, e.g., DKR, doc. 36 (r250/roh3 shogun sodehan kudashibumi), which contains the following phrase: "the said [jito] shiki has been assigned as a Jokyu reward transfer." 44· Described, in graphic detail, in KB, doc. 99 (r238/rolr9 Rokuhara gechijo).

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and winning control over what it had claimed. At the same time, Kyoto was engaged in a parallel process of reassuming command over the gesu, which, like the jito, had been used as a cover for misconduct during the war. However, the effort of the court was compromised by many of its own members who were all too willing to entreat Kamakura to assist them. Typically, it was left to Yoritomo to persist in seeking to establish the principle of separate jurisdictions. Both before and after the war, gesu was the most frequent local product of the commendations that led to new shoen being incorporated. In other words, despite the concept's being strained during the final stages of the fighting, its basic meaning survived and then experienced a resurgence. Commenders continued to be appointed as gesu, and to serve absentee proprietors as onsite administrators. 45 Moreover, Kamakura's new emphasis on jito could not but have failed to strengthen this connection. For when proprietors sought immunity from jito, they were thinking of none other than retaining or appointing a gesu. Similarly, when proprietors requested dismissals ofjito, they were expecting to fill the vacated positions with gesu. 46 As a result, the two managerial authorities came to be viewed as parallel statuses, which meant that theoretically they would not co-exist. The presence of the one would preclude the existence of the other and would signify the ultimate line of demarcation between competence of the two capitals. Of course there were instances when it was not as simple as that, since Kamakura's equanimity about the prospect of thousands of gesu was never, at any time, reciprocated by Kyoto vis-a-vis jito. For aristocrats, an ideal world would have had no jito, and no Kamakura. Though for differing reasons, the emphasis in both capitals was on limiting the number ofjito. Kamakura had all it could handle just to abstain from involvement with gesu. At first, it simply succumbed to the pressure for immediate action. Thus, in n86, it not only moved to rescue a beleagueredgesu in one case, but it confirmed him by a personal decree ofYoritomoY Even a few years later Yoritomo might still be drawn into such matters, as when he intervened on 45· See, e.g., Yoshii Yoshinao-shi shozo monjo, n89/r/22 Ninnaji-gu-no-cho kudashibumi, KI, 1:204, doc. 361. 46. For the reinstatement of agesu following ajito dismissal, see KB, doc. 34 (1204/9/6 Kanto gechijo an). There are many such examples. 47· KB, doc. 64 (n86/6 Minamoto Yoritomo kudashibumi).

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behalf of a proprietor whose efforts to oust a gesu were being resisted. With assistance from Kamakura, the offending gesu was eventually banished by order of the estate holder. 48 In subsequent years, at least some of the energy that had once allowed proprietors to manage their own gesu problems reemerged. 49 To assist estate holders, however, Kamakura might now be obliged actually to refuse jurisdiction, as a way of underlining the appropriate chain of command. A case in point was a dispute over which of two rivals should hold the gesu post in Oi Estate, Mino. Details of the conflict were forwarded to Kamakura over a three-year period, but it declined to decide the matter, citing its lapsed jurisdiction; earlier, it had terminated its }ito on the estate. Eventually, Todaiji confirmed its own choice as gesu, noting that the Bakufu had acknowledged its authority. 50 An episode in which the forbearance was directed the other way is almost unimaginable. Of course Kamakura might still become involved with gesu and even appoint one-as in II93 over a unit in Suo Province. 5 1 Much more likely would be a compound usage, as in appointments to what were labeled jito-gesu shiki. 52 In the pre-n8o epoch such a designation might have implied an "onsite" gesu, but now the emphasis was clearly reversed. Such appointments were to ajito post that embraced, or superseded, agesu's authority. Moreover, in another configuration, an individual would have been considered a }ito if he possessed both tides, as in the case of a ''}ito plus gesu" (jito narabi ni gesu

shikz). 53 48. Negoro yosho, II93/9I23 Hachijo-in-no-cho kudashibumi, KI, 2:88-89, doc. 687. 49· See, e.g., KB, doc. 67 (1206/8 a2Ukari dokoro kudashibumi), for an episode involving a gesu that was handled by a proprietor and his deputy. 50. See DKR, doc. 64 (nn/5l24 Kanto migyosho), plus the cluster of related documents in Gifu kenshi, shiryo hen, kodai-chusei, 3:520-30, docs. 166-86. The full range of surviving sources relating to Oi Estate appears in this volume. 51. KB, doc. 65 (II93/41I6 shogun ke mandokoro kudashibumi). It is difficult to imagine the particular circumstances here. 52· For example, Tosa monjo, 1204/7126 Kanto kudashibumi, in Tosa monjo kaisetsu, doc. 1; and Takuma monjo, 1209/!2/n shogun ke mandokoro kudashibumi, KJ, 3=392, doc. 1821. 53· Presumably for this reason, a certain Minamoto Yoshikane, who had unlawfully seized a village in Kawachi, informed Kamakura that he was now "relinquishing" both titles. Yoritomo acknowledged receipt ofYoshikane's quitclaim and threatened reprisals for any additional trouble. Kongoji monjo, II95/6 Minamoto Yoshikane saribumi an, KI, 2:148, doc. 8oo; ibid., [II95]/61I5 Minamoto Yoritomo ukebumi an, KI, 2:148, doc. 801. The background to the episode is described ibid., II95/7/9 Hachijo-in-no-cho kudashibumi an, KJ, 2:149-50, doc. 804.

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In fact, in matters involving the usage of both terms, the authority of the

}ito was always superior. Thus a }ito-holder might confirm a hereditary gesuholder, while the debate (in another case) was over who controlled the gesu: was it the jito or the proprietor of the estate? 54 In no estate do we encounter a gesu who was superior to a }ito, though parity would have been the working assumption for the two in neighboring estates. 55 This last, indeed, takes us to the heart of the matter, with the importance of the respective tides residing in the authority systems that each was a part of Since }ito, by definition, were men ofKamakura, the two tides could not be permitted in precisely the same place, lest the jurisdictional boundary separating their hierarchies be blurred. In the multiple listings of managerial authorities in Satsuma and Osumi at the end of the twelfth century, there are dozens of separate jito and gesu, with the two tides found in the same place seemingly only once. 56 As in other areas of activity, the instability provoked by the Jokyu War tended to weaken the estate owner's authority over gesu. Thus, in one illustrative case, a gesu was expelled from his estate by outlaws, a situation that the proprietor (the Gion Shrine) could not deal with on its own. It appealed to Kamakura, which ordered its office in Kyoto to restore the gesu, and also, indirectly, the proprietorship itsel£57 As is obvious, the estate owner's need for assistance was reminiscent of the n8os, though the enforcement mechanism was appropriate to the 1220s. For not only did Kamakura call on its newly established deputyship in Kyoto (the Rokuhara tandai), bur the shugo ofTanba Province was called in as well. Incidents such as this one were the product of the highly volatile aftermath of the Jokyu War. In fact, the jito-gesu axis continued to remain viable, and, in some cases, the object of a dispute itself: whether one was a }ito or gesu might now be contested. In one episode, for example, a proprietor and his agents sought to treat a }ito as if he were a gesu, the tide actually held by 54· In 1229, e.g., a }ito and an agent of the proprietor jointly confirmed a gesu, but two years later thejito alone appointed the rival of thegesu to the same post; KB, docs. 74-75 (r229/9/n jito-otsukai rensho gesu shiki buninjo an, I231/nfi4 jito Minamoto bo kudashibumi). 55· In fact, it was extremely rare for the two to coexist, and the appointment of a }ito almost invariably meant the lapse of a gesu; for a graphic illustration, see DKR, doc. 41 (n4o/int.w/n Kanto gechijo). For parity between a jito and gesu on neighboring estates, see KB, doc. 73 (1245/71!7 Rokuhara gechijo an). 56. See the citations in note 25 above. 57· Yasaka jinja monjo, 122r/int.10h4 Kanto migyosho an, KJ, 5:65, doc. 2875; ibid., r22r/nh9 Rokuhara gechijo, KJ, 5:77, doc. 2904.

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his grandfather fifty years earlier. However, the }ito was able to prove that the gesu status had been superseded in 1205, a victory that was also a victory for the division itself. fu had now been made clear in a judicial verdict, either title might lawfully supersede the other, and determine, in the process, the location of final authority. 58 If a proprietor was prepared to go to such lengths to reinstate an original gesu's status, a gesu might seek, conversely, to be recognized as a }ito. In 1234, a gesu began impounding taxes and committing other lawless acts, all upon the pretext that he was a }ito. The proprietor appealed to Kamakura, which subpoenaed the evidence of the defendant; and the gesu turned out to be a gokenin but not a }ito. The outcome was therefore predictable. Mter issuing a stern warning to the troublemaking gesu, Kamakura encouraged the proprietor to dispose of the matter as he saw fit. The final word was to emanate from Kyoto, not from Kamakura. 59 With so much at stake, it is not surprising that original investitures and confirmations were among a lineage's greatest assets. An individual who began his career as a gesu but then became a }ito would not have wished to see the clock turned back. Before n8o, to become a gesu was to have achieved the limit of what was obtainable locally. Mter Genpei, to remain a gesu would have been to miss out on the opportunity of a lifetime-to become a }ito and, in the process, also a part of history. For all those who occupied the space above and below them, the presence of a }ito or gesu might of course be crucial. A shoen with the one was not the same as a shoen with the other. And since the two posts might have existed in one place at different times, disputes naturally turned on what happened and when. Decisions subsequently rescinded might make things even more complex. Though Yoritomo, as we know, liked to change his mind, such shifts, sometimes out of genuine confusion, were never actually eliminated. In one case, shifts back and forth actually occurred four times during a decade, with the lawfulness of the hapless }ito's placement finally rejected. In the process, the history of the estate concerned and its offices was reviewed back to n86, with Kamakura, against our expectations, re-ousting its own

58. See KB, docs. ro5-6 (1232/7127 Rokuhara gechijo an, I233/12/ro Kanto gechijo an). 59· Tannowa monjo, 1234/5120 saki no sadaijin ke mandokoro kudashibuni, KI, 7:125, doc. 4662. The trouble created by this gesu had begun earlier; see KB, doc. 69 (r228/5 Konoe ke

mandokoro kudashibumi).

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man. 60 Though guilty of absolutely no crime, the }ito in question was now superseded by a gesu. In ways such as this the jito-gesu principle had woven itself into the national fabric.

SUMMARY

In this chapter, we have traced the emergence of a civil-military division of authority in the era following the Genpei War. The major innovation was Kamakura's unfettered jurisdiction over }ito and its accompanying decision to avoid all else. Such a development, however, did not come in the first days after n85. As long as a sense of abnormal conditions continued, the potential for involvement by Kamakura was needed as the best hope for a national revival. Nor did avoidance, once declared, come easily. As we have seen, Kamakura often had to dirty its hands in order to make them dean. Eventually, however, the basic lines of a division emerged, which kept the sense of a still unitary Japan intact. The configuration that evolved not only forced Kamakura into constant contact with Kyoto, but placed it on an ultimately treacherous course. Since proprietors were to be denied a direct right of dismissal of unruly }ito, Yoritomo had to be prepared to deal harshly with his own men. At the same time, he discovered that he also had obligations toward those men, even more so as a consequence of a loophole in the law: }ito but not estate holders were subject to his sanctions, meaning that there was little to prevent proprietors from bringing mischievous charges. A further complication was Yoritomo's genuine desire to give support to more than merely his own men. In that situation, when temples or shrines, receiving his patronage, wanted to have }ito removed, how was Yoritomo in practice to react? During his lifetime, a }ito network in perpetual motion was the result. A corollary to Kamakura's responsibility for }ito was its promotion of the separation with gesu. By n85, this widening of an almost indistinguishable gulf between two middle-level statuses became the jurisdictional fulcrum of the new age. However, the task of keeping the gulf viable was left mostly to Kamakura. 6o. DKR, doc. 33 (1232/81!9 Kanto gechijo).

CHAPTER SEVEN

A Shugo in Every Province

Though the office of shugo had a long history, its starting point, as noted in chapter 4, was not part of the cluster of ends and beginnings of 1185. Nor, as we have indicated, did it become a titular entity soon after the war, and, indeed, regular Bakufu officers called shugo may not have appeared in Yoritomo's lifetime. Notwithstanding, we are obliged to pick up the story of the shugo well before that, tracing in what we might consider an interim phasean era of what I will call "pre-shugo." Though much of my account must remain speculative like all others, it represents a fresh stab at a famous and formidable problem-the origins of the Kamakura shugo. 1

r. I have tackled this problem before, but never as comprehensively as I seek to do now. For the evolution of my thinking, see WG, chap. 8; "Yoritomo and Feudalism," 8r -82; and "The Kamakura Bakufu," 6r-64. For a treatment that expertly summarizes the basic positions assumed by scholars in Japan, see Yasuda, Shugo to jitli, r -42. The subject itself has drawn less attention in recent years, with the emphasis now shifted away from origins and an inventory of holders, to understanding what it meant to be a Kamakura shugo. In this latter vein, see Nelson, "The Early Shugo" -a recent Ph.D. thesis built around the Chomo shugo house of northern Kyushu.

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.A5 noted earlier, conditions conducive to the appearance of a shugo-type figure emerged in the n9os when a primary aim of Kamakura policy lay in working out the limits of its jurisdiction in each province. Determining the provincial aggregates of housemen was central to this effort, as was creating the machinery to maintain and enforce the resulting connections. In a sense, once there were gokenin there would have to be shugo ("pre-shugo") whose mandate would be to mediate between the regime and its men. Such responsibilities would lie at the core of the concept during this phase, and are to be distinguished from a cluster of policing duties that would be added later. Carved from the jurisdiction of civil governors, these latter would eventually give the formalized shugo their own place in the governmental order, converting them into figures straddling the authorities of the two capitals. Like the )ito who owed services to their absentee landlords, shugo would come to owe services to the state. We have already encountered the confusions that attended the usages of the words shugo and sotsuibushi through the end of n85. Similar confusions continued into the II90S, leaving us with what I believe was an essentially "tideless," that is, informal, authority. For many scholars, sotsuibushi might be viewed simply as the forerunners of shugo, despite the fact that the record does not sustain, in any organized way, such a sequence. 2 For even if we grant that a handful of sotsuibushi were assigned after n85, no pattern of regularized deployment around the country can be detected. The office of shugo was an original invention of the early Kamakura ageeven more original, in some ways, than that of the )ito, as we shall see. Nevertheless, the circumstances of the shugo's beginnings have been genuinely lost to us, though our obligation to attempt to reconstruct them, as best we can, still remains.

THE

PERIOD

II86-II92

For the period to the start of n92, there appear to be no contemporary traces of the word shugo used as a Bakufu tide, 3 even though theAzuma kagami in-

2. Yasuda, Shugo to jito, 22-36, basically adopts this view. 3· At least there are no usages in contemporary records of the term as an actual tide. A newly discovered document of n89 has Yoritomo referring to "shugonin eta!." (ika), but only in the

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vokes it a full dozen times. Seven of these twelve usages cite four named shugo-Kajiwara Kagetoki, Sasaki Sadatsuna, Ouchi Koreyoshi, and Amano Tokage. 4 Save for the last, the others were clearly pre-shugo during the II90s, whose "titles" as shugo were then backdated by the Azuma kagami to the 1180s. No actual deception, in fact, may have been intended by the chronicle's compilers, who were simply following the regular practice of recalling the dead by their most prestigious titles. 5 But the confusion left by their choice of words is no less real for us. The Azuma kagami's reference to Amano as the "shugonin" for Kyushu seems startling since we are so accustomed to the term's exclusive association with the province. In Amano's case, two other designations seem more likely to be contemporaneous: a reference to him as a sotsuibushi in a document of 1187,6 and the labeling of him as "Chinzei administrator" (bugyo) in theAzuma kagami? On the other hand, he may also have been thought of informally as the island's literal "protector," a usage that seems to sum up the remaining appearances of the word in the Azuma kagami. Thus, "protector-warriors" (shugo no busht) are cited in entries of 1186 and 1187, with "protectors" (shugonin) of shrines and temples in the Eastern Circuit (Tokaido) in 1186. 8 There is, finally, an alleged linking of"shugo andgokenin" in the Oshu region in 1190, in the meaning of "commanders and rank and file" left to occupy the defeated area. 9 The meaning, it seems certain, could have implied no more than that since Mutsu and Dewa, the two northern provinces, never did receive shugo, and since the concept, transformed into a provincial title, did not yet exist. Ironically, also, the Azuma kagami actually fails to refer to shugo during the run-up to the Oshu Campaign, a stunning omission in

traditional context of "protecting" the interests of a local temple (in Suruga); see Chimanji monjo, n89/nh8 Minamoto Yoritomo kakikudashi, KJ, suppl., 1:46, doc. 93· 4- For Kagetoki, see AK, n86/3f24, n86/41I3, and n87/12/7; for Sadatsuna, n87f2/9; for Koreyoshi, n87/3/3 and II9I/6126; and forTokage, n87/n/5. Though theAKhas Sadatsuna as "the shugo of Omi" in n87, the Gyokuyo has him as its sotsuibushi four years later; Gyokuyo, II91f4f2. 5· For this subject, see my "The Mixing of Past and Present." In AA], 65-66. 6. Shimazu ke monjo, n87/9/9 Minamoto Yoritomo kudashibumi, KI, I:I6I, doc. 262. 7· AK, n86/12/IO. The designation is repeated in AK, II9IIIII5. There is a continuing debate as to whether or not Amano was the first in a succession of so-called Chinzei bugyo. The main protagonists have been SatO Shin'ichi, Ishii Susumu, Takeuchi Rizo, and Seno Seiichiiro. 8. AK, n86/612I and n871Io/3; andAK, n86/3f24, 41!3, and 5!29. 9· AK, II90II/8.

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view of that tide's later (and central) link to military recruiting. Thus, men like Kajiwara and Koremune Tadahisa who, in 1189, were functioning much like later shugo, were not, in an obvious oversight by the Azuma kagami, cited as such in the relevant entries. If it has seemed tedious to bring into our discussion the term's multiple uses during the 118os, I have done so to lay the groundwork for two conclusions. First, there were obviously no shugo in the historic meaning of that term, i.e., no one who received an explicit commission as such from Yoritomo. And second, our emphasis on the word itself to explain the origins of the shugo is clearly inadequate, obliging us to consider alternative strategies. One might be to return to the notion of sotsuibushi as transitional figures, though the problem here-no data showing a network-seems intractable, as suggested earlier. Another strategy might be to fix on the province itself, and to attempt to show how Kamakura was drawn in the direction of requiring provincial appointees. Such an approach has the advantage of being compatible with what seems almost certain: that the perception of a need for officeholders, one to a province, anticipated the choice of a name for the post and its regularization. The need, in turn, led to the conception, which then required a name. It was, in short, never foreordained that Yoritomo would press for a network of"shugo." As we have already seen, Yoritomo began to appoint military commanders to provinces from early in the war, though the cessation of formal hostilities left him in a quandary as to what to do next. The court, obviously intentionally, allocated him a cluster of civil governorships, just as it had previously done to Kiyomori and other Kyoto-based power holders; the idea was to wrap Yoritomo in the web of old hierarchies. But governorships of the traditional kind would have been ineffective at pacifying the still volatile countryside, and this led Yoritomo, at the end of 1185, to seize on the variable concept ofjito. TheAzuma kagami implies that he now began appointing certain trusted followers to province-sized }ito posts, of whom Hojo Tokimasa, his own father-in-law, was the most prominent. Since the postwar historian Ishimoda Sho first tackled this subject forty years ago, historians have sought to fit the brief experiment with "kuni-jito" -an experiment whose lifespan was limited to no more than a few months-into the larger context. 10 10. See Ishimoda, "Kamakura bakufu ikkoku jito shiki," 13-25. The key entries in the AK are

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As described by Ishimoda, provincial appointees had, for some decades, been levying and gathering commissariat rice (hyoromaz) and armed men (hyoshi) during military emergencies, but their efforts had always been impeded by the immunities acquired by shoen. As we noted in chapter r, the appointment of a "gesu" in Tanba Province was an early attempt to grapple with this problem by the Taira, which Yoritomo, in changed circumstances, confronted again in n85. In the context of the threat now posed by Yoshitsune, Yoritomo sought to circumscribe his brother's institutional base. He thus extracted the right to appoint jito for the whole country, in effect superseding Yoshitsune's jito authority for Kyushu. But he also obtained the right to levy a national commissariat tax, an impost that was to be set at five sho per tan of land and was to be assessable, at least potentially, on all public and private (shoko) paddy. 11 A lawful penalty would therefore be seen to follow anyone's decision to give aid and comfort to Yoshitsune, and Yoritomo proceeded to appoint men to enforce it. Tokimasa is alleged to have been granted a total of seven province-sized jito posts. 12 By the middle of n86, however, the court had succeeded in regaining a measure of its earlier equilibrium, and pressure was mounting to roll back the unpopular hyoromai levies; the n86hh8 entry in the Azuma kagami shows such taxes actually being collected. Moreover, this assessment was seemingly being deducted from proprietors' incomes rather than being imposed on peasants as an additional burden. 13 Thus, when the ex-emperor was II85/12/2I and II86/3!I, 3l2, and 3/7. Unfortunately, there is no corroboration of these "kunijito" in any contemporaneous source, and Ishimoda and his successors have had to content themselves with searching for provincial appointments of various kinds before and after II86; see note II below. II. Many years ago, Nakada Kaoru linked the simultaneous authorizations of hyorlimai and jitli by positing the former as the anticipated income share of the latter; Ishimoda then amended this connection by narrowing it so as to focus on the new kuni-jitli. In the meantime, Maki Kenji had rejected the link betweenjitli and hyorlimai altogether, a view affirmed by Yasuda and others. For a summary of these positions, see Yasuda, Shugo to jitli, II5-I9. Ishimoda himself has brilliantly summarized these earlier theories; "Karnakura bakufu ikkoku jit5 shiki," II-34· For the hyorlimai authorization and the problems it engendered, see above, chapter 6, notes 9 and ro. I2. We first learn of these appointments in AK, II86/3!I and 3/2, just at the point that Tokimasa was allegedly resigning them. However, the hyorlimai authorization was not rescinded until three weeks later, on 3l2r. Yasuda believes that the seven kuni-jitli posts were none other than slitsuibushi tides; Shugo to jitli, 31. 13. The chorus of complaints from proprietors and from the court seems clearly to suggest

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emboldened to seek to alleviate this emergency levy, it followed that he would be thinking of eliminating the provincial tax collectors-the kuni-

jito-too. Indeed, since the worst of the threat from Yoshitsune had now receded, Yoritomo was likewise seeking to restore greater order. As we know, he was responsive from the start to pleas from the court regarding lawless }ito, and he obviously now acquiesced in the dissolution of his provincial }ito. In a sense, neither the country nor the Bakufu was ready for a new network of permanent provincial appointees. However, events in the later n8os started to push Yoritomo toward a rethinking of his position. No longer concerned with exacting tribute from the estates of fractious nobles, he now had other things on his mind. For instance, it must have been obvious that recruitment for the Oshu campaign would have been simpler had Yoritomo been able to order a network of provincial officers to muster forces. Second, there was already the beginning of a realization that the Bakufu lacked any concrete machinery to maintain an identifiable corps of obedient men in each province, some of whom might not have been appointed (and therefore be controllable) as }ito. It was the age-old problem of how to sustain a viable relationship at the conclusion of an emergency. At any rate, in the wake of the expansion ofKamakura's authority to the whole country in n90, a greater awareness now dawned of the need to identify a permanent membership. Toward this end, the concept of gokenin was evolved for the rank and file of the Minamoto, with commanders, seemingly still untitled, designated to lead them. It has been suggested that, along with the other honors Yoritomo acquired during his visit to Kyoto in n90, he must have been appointed shugo in chief for the entire country, since how else could he have started to distribute this title? In fact, we have no contemporary record of any such appointments. Moreover, the Azuma kagami, normally so voluble, is uncharacteristically silent on what would have been a highly significant development in n90, perhaps because it had already "given" this authority to Yoritomo five years earlier! At any rate, n85 and n9o are both discredited in this connection for

this; AK, n86/r/9, r/n, 2/zr, 2/22, 2h8, 3/r, 3h, 3/7, 3lr6, 3/zr, and 4/r3. On 6/zr, we see a reference to the grievances of"all the people" (banmin). After mid-n86, the number of references to the now abolished tax rapidly diminishes.

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lack of evidence. As an alternative, some scholars, while rejecting a national

shugo authority in II90, have seen fit to substitute a national sotsuibushi authority instead, 14 and here at least a few retrospective references support the claim: long after Yoritomo's death he was remembered this way in a few narratives. 15 But there is nothing contemporaneous on which to base an argument for either tide, meaning that if something was authorized in n90 it was not acted upon-behavior most uncharacteristic ofYoritomo. Moreover, it is difficult to imagine a reenergized Go-Shirakawa acceding to a demand for an autonomous provincial authority of a type that he had successfully turned back in the middle of n86 (see above, p. 195-96). As we noted, the offices and the rank accorded to Yoritomo in n90 were all of an ancient vintage, and were designed not to strengthen but to compromise his independence. Put directly, the start of a formal network of provincial officers in n9o seems unlikely.

THE

EMERGENCE

OF THE

PRE-'SHUGO,

II92-1199 However, the death of the ex-emperor in n92left a sudden vacuum of power at court, which might have opened the way for real innovation. Yoritomo's accession to the office of shogun is frequently cited in this regard, and the "long-anticipated" network of provincial officers has been also. Yet we are left to surmise the start of a process without the vocabulary to give it a formal, or named, beginning. If a sense of what was required now started to be translated into reality, the enterprise still remained untitled. Thus, ad hoc mandates would have substituted for regular duties, with the drawing up of

I4. Ishimoda in particular, according to Yasuda; Shugo to jito, 45· Earlier scholars tended to equate the two titles, thereby avoiding the problem altogether; ibid., 26. Still another view, held by Ishii Ryosuke, is that Yoritomo enjoyed the national authority for both offices, which were different and therefore separate; ibid., 27, 35· Yasuda himself dates Yoritomo's countrywide shugo office to n9o; ibid., 46. I5. See, e.g., the Masu kagami reference to Yoritomo's becoming "shokoku no sotsuibushi" in II90/I2; excerpted in Koji ruien-Kan'i bu, 2:I93· The Masu kagami was written in the late fourteenth century, and has just appeared in English translation (George W Perkins, The

Clear Mirror: A Chronicle ofthe japanese Court during the Kamakura Period).

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the provincial rosters ofgokenin serving as the common denominator. Under such a scenario, progress would have unfolded unevenly in different parts of the country, a description that seems to mirror the reality, as best we can determine it. It is even possible that Kyoto was persuaded that Yoritomo's objectives here were honorable-that the men to be appointed to provincial authorities were under no mandate to tax them as before, but rather were to be ordered to maintain law and order. But whatever the case, we have no evidence of negotiations with the court on this subject, and no evidence, save for the Azuma kagami, of shugo, who were named as such, in the II 90S. In the Azuma kagami, the term shugo or shugonin appears nine times during n92-95, followed by a gigantic lacuna in the chronicle itself; the Azuma kagami does not start up again until II99· Several of the nine entries are tantalizing, showing the start of features that anticipate the later post. Thus, when the easterner Nakatsukasa Tsunetaka appears as the shugo ofTosa in n92, and Sasaki Sadatsuna is cited in Iwami and Nagato a year later, we are encountering a foretaste of what became standard-of a nonnative dimension to the shugo's authority, with westerners considered ineligible in their home provinces. 16 At the same time, shugo were now increasingly referred to in conjunction with a province's public and private land sectors, and they were also (in another entry) cited as the coordinators of the province-based reconstruction levies for the Todaiji. 17 But once again we are drawn to developments that do not invoke the shugo title itself as a way of surmising the beginnings of new provincial offices. For example, the same Sasaki Sadatsuna whom the Azuma kagami refers to as the shugo of Omi (and also of Nagato and Iwami) is cited in the diary Gyokuyo in n91 as the Omi sotsuibushi. 18 This particular usage, associating a provincial magnate with a known title instead of an unknown one, seems credible enough; a diarist in Kyoto might easily think of it. More to the point, we see the onset of a notion of responsibilities appropriate to Kamakura that would need to be decentralized if they were to be discharged effectively. I am not referring here to duties of an essentially policing nature, which, in my view, did not become part of the context of inducements until

16. AK, 1192/wii5; 1193/12l2o. 17· AK, 119413117, 5129. 18. AK, 1193/wl28; and Gyokuyo, 1191/4/2.

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slightly later. Rather, there were responsibilities of a much more symbolic nature that seem to comport with the early 1190s phase when Yoritomo was active at court. The oban'yaku, or imperial guard service, had been performed by provincial contingents of officers (zaichokanjin) for some decades. 19 Presumably, Yoritomo's initial involvement with this service was in the provinces whose governorships he now controlled. Though we have no actual proof for this, his nominees as civil governors probably administered the oban'yaku as a matter of course. In addition, however, the oban'yaku from other provinces might have been viewed as a convenient vehicle for Kamakura, as the Bakufu (for example, in Settsu) sought to increase its influence over contingents of

zaichokanjin. 20 .fu we know, controlling full clusters of zaichokanjin via the guard service was not the strategy that Yoritomo finally settled on. Instead, he narrowed his concern to those who were registered as his gokenin, and then moved to convert the service into their regular responsibility. We do not know where the idea came from, nor how (or even whether) it was negotiated with Kyoto. But a series of associations on this point was now, unmistakably, being encouraged. In practice, a cohort of armed men drawn from both the public and private land sectors would be obligated to serve in Kyoto at the behest of Kamakura. Perhaps it was only natural that the officers who had been given the task of working up the rosters of housemen would also be assigned the command of the contingents that would now travel, on state business, to the capital. This development, a phenomenon of the 1190s, moves us clearly in the direction of the emergence of the Kamakura shugo. Beginning in 1192, we encounter a handful of references to a mustering of gokenin for the palace guard by a provincial officer who was an appointee of Yoritomo. It is of the utmost importance that none of these officers is actually cited as a shugo, suggesting that the authority preceded the formal denomination under a uniform title. In other words, the recorders of the I9. For the pre-Kamakura oban service, see Gomi Yoshio, "Kamakura bakufu no gokenin taisei-Kyoto oban'yaku no rosei o chushin ni," I2-I3. The earliest surviving usage of the term oban dates from 982. 20. See AK, n87/9/r3, which brings together Kamakura, the officer corps of Sensu, and the Kyoto oban service. Gomi, "Kamakura bakufu no gokenin taisei," I4-I5, provides commentary.

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original gokenin registers who were also the first oban'yaku commanders were conceived of simply as "administrators" (bugyo) in the 1190s, and only became shugo as such subsequently. 21 In order for there to be shugo, several things still had to happen. We need to examine the evidence very closely. In 1192, the Azuma kagami reproduces a document that itself does not survive, though in both form and content it seems entirely authentic. 22 The document is a formal order (onkudashibumi) from Yoritomo's chancellery (mandokoro) to the housemen (kenin) of Mino Province, with the latter directed to obey the recruitment calls of [Ouchi] Koreyoshi. Significantly, Koreyoshi is nowhere cited as a titleholder in Mino, even though the Azuma kagami has elsewhere remembered him as its shugo-proof, if more were needed, of an officer's being recalled by the highest office he achieved, even if the recollection is anachronistic in the context of earlier Azuma kagami entries. 23 There are several items of note concerning the 1192 document. First, the word used for "housemen" is not gokenin but only kenin, a usage that might be explained by a membership process that was still in an early stage. Only when a number of administrators had produced registers that had been approved might a sense of a countrywide membership have been sufficiently achieved, which might then have induced Yoritomo to add the honorific, and to create, as a result, a new social category. Second, the stated rationale for the journey to Kyoto was to clear the city of troublemakers, and only secondarily to discharge the palace guard duty. We can at least imagine that the true priorities were reversed, which might depend on just how far the association of housemen and the service had advanced. Third, the date of the document-the twentieth day of the sixth month-would have been conducive to this kind of development in the immediate aftermath of the death of Go-Shirakawa (3!I3). Moreover, three weeks after the issuance of our document, Yoritomo came to be appointed shogun (7/12). Puzzlingly, however, the next piece of hard evidence concerning the

21. The designation "administrator" is given its clearest expression in KB, doc. 137 (II97/12/3 saki no utaisho ke mandokoro kudashibumi); see the extensive analysis of this document below. 22. KB, doc. 135 (n92/6ho saki no utaisho ke mandokoro kudashibumi). 23. Koreyoshi is explicitly cited as the "Mino Province shugonin" in AK, n87/3/3.

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Kyoto oban'yaku comes four years later; in the interim there is silence on the subject. In 1196, Yoritomo's chancellery issued an oban'yaku order to the housemen oflzumi Province, this time referring to them as gokenin, and this time citing no pretext beyond the call-up itself The mustering orders (saisoku) by Taira Yoshitsura were to be obeyed, even as Yoshitsura is not referred to as a shugo. 24 In later years, Yoshitsura was remembered as having been a shugo in the 1190s-after the vocabulary, typically, had caught up with the memory. 25 In the meantime, a document of 1195, relating to Kyushu, provides an insight into the start of a new usage for the word shugo. At about this time, Amano Tokage, Yoritomo's commander in Kyushu, was recalled, and Nakahara Chikayoshi and Muto Sukeyori were sent in his place. They apparently opened an office within the Dazaifu that began to be thought of as that agency's enforcement arm. Its name was the shugosho, or "protection headquarters," and it now became the institutional center of the Bakufu's involvement in the island. The document of 1195 was a recruitment call to the gokenin of Hizen Province to appear for a guard service (oban) to be performed at the shugosho. 26 Though Muto Sukeyori was remembered as having been the original shugo ofHizen, he was not, however, the issuer of the guard order in question, which had come from someone denoted as the province's sheriff, or oryoshi. 27 At all events, Kyushu now had its own shugosho, which began to issue its own documents, in that name, in II97. 28 However, this 24. KB, doc. 136 (n96/n/7 saki no utaisho ke mandokoro an). 25. See AK, 1207/6/24, for a remembrance ofYoshitsura as having been "the shugo of the two provinces oflzumi and Kii." 26. Otomo monjo, II95/8!25 Hizen no kuni gokenin ketsuban chumon an, KJ, 2:I52, doc. 8o8. A document of seven years earlier has been mistakenly labeled a "Dazaifu shugosho kudashibumi an'' in KI, I:I44, doc. 240. The term shugosho does not appear, and the document might more accurately be labeled a "dazaifu shigyojo" (for such a designation, see Seno Seiichiro, comp., Kyiishu chiho chusei hennen monjo mokuroku-Kamakura jidai hen, 3). 27. The full signature reads "Hizen no kuni oryoshi taigen Fujiwara Muneie," of apparently unknown identity. Seno calls the document simply a "Fujiwara Muneie chushinjo an" (Kyushu chiho, 9). 28. See the reference to a shugosho cho (edict) dated 5/22, appearing in a document of n97; Shimazu ke monjo, II971int.6 Satsuma no kuni zudencho, KI, 2:249, doc. 923. A document thought to be of the previous year calls for jito accused of tax sequestrations on Koya lands to be remanded to the shugosho; Koyasan monjo, II96(?)frlr5 Nakahara Chikayoshi shojo, KI, 2:175, doc. 826.

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shugosho had a jurisdiction over the whole ofKyushu, leaving us still short of shugo appointed to individual provinces. In 1197, we encounter our most persuasive evidence that Yoritomo was now promoting a concept-in-the-making. In the first month of that year, the Iwashimizu Hachiman Shrine of Kyoto issued a complaint that seems to capture the state of progress by that juncture. Referring to its own lands, which were spread across many provinces, it asserted its traditional immunity from recruitment efforts for labor and military services. Specifically, it cited the prior freedom of its holdings from levies of two particular kindsfrom the imperial guard service, and from labor assessments earmarked for the rebuilding of Todaiji. Yet, the complaint lamented, "such an authority (sata) is now reportedly being claimed." 29 Nowhere is there any mention of a shugo, though it seems certain that imperial guard levies were now violating the borders of otherwise immune estates. In other words, the oban'yaku was no longer a service provided by the resident officialdoms (zaichokanjin) of the individual provinces, but had now become a duty that fell on contingents of gokenin from the public and private sectors. In these circumstances, a Bakufu-appointed officer who was different from a civil governor would be required to expedite the service, which now, as we know, might involve intrusions into shoen. And in fact, an officer with precisely that mandate already existed in Kii, whom we find exempting a pair ofKoyasan-owned estates from gokenin services in the same month. 30 To aid us in our inquiry as to his identity, we have the signature that he affixed to the exemption order itself, as well as a gloss, added later, which, intriguingly, is not quite the same. In 1197, we encounter "the deputy (daikan) of the [Kii Province] sotsuibushi," but on the exposed portion of the document after it had been prepared for storage, we now find "the deputy of the Kii Province shugonin"! The times had changed, and so, correspondingly, had the vocabulary; an era of shugo had superseded the informalities and inconsistencies of earlier. A final insight comes in a document of eight months later when Yoritomo approved the exemption in Kii

29. KB, doc. 156 (n971r Iwashimizu Hachimangu kumonjo kudashibumi). 30. Koyasan monjo, II97/r/I7 Kii sotsuibushidai menjo, KI, 2:212, doc. 893 (the compilers of

KI call the author of this document a shugodai ("deputy shugo"), but surely this is an anachronistic labeling).

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in an edict of his own. Appropriately for an order from the year n97, the word shugo nowhere appears. 31 The experiences of both lwashimizu and Koyasan with the new recruitment efforts for the palace guard service seem to fit with what we know was happening in the late II90s. Proprietors, indeed, had good reason to worry since recruitment officers, appointed by Kamakura, were now starting to make their appearances. In 1215, for example, the same lwashimizu made a vain call for a resurrection of the ancient immunity of its estate in Kii, using language that underlines the distance traveled between then and 1197. For we now no longer have an unnamed Bakufu officer whose orders, according to the shrine, were to be ignored, but rather, instead, a magistrate who was a shugo. In the shrine's own words, "Estate officers and shrine personnel shall not answer the musterings of the shugo, except by direct authorization from the headquarters of the estate (honjo). 32 In 1197, there was merely bewilderment, in 1215, anger and anguish at the new reality. There are two other documents whose contents bear on the question of the timing of the shugo's origins. The first purports to name Nakahara Chikayoshi as the "Chinzei [Kyushu] shugonin" in 1195, though its preamble, identifYing it as an order of the "sei-i-tai shogun," is unprecedented in its language; it is therefore, almost certainly, a later forgery. 33 The second document seems similarly suspect, if for a different reason. An uncorroborated copy preserved in a much later family chronicle, it purports to be a portion of an 1197 gokenin register from Tajima Province. It is signed "Shugosho, Minamoto Chikanaga. " 34 In the final month of 1197, we encounter our most important piece of evidence on the progress of shugo before Yoritomo's death. In that month, an order was issued by the chieftain's chancellery to Koremune Tadahisa of southern Kyushu. In its own summary of the contents it declared as follows: "Elements of the duties to be discharged forthwith by the administrator of 31. Koyasan monjo, II97/8/r9 Minamoto Yoritomo migyosho an, KJ, 2:254, doc. 934· 32. KB, doc. I57 (1215/8/24 Iwashimizu Hachimangu kumonjo kudashibumi). 33· Otomo monjo, u95/5 sei-i-tai shogun ke mandokoro kudashibumi an, KI, 2:142, doc. 791.

This famous document has been reproduced in at least a dozen volumes, and the circumstances and dating of its production continue to be debated. It is only certain that it was not written in u95! 34· Hirohashi ke kokiroku, II97!7 Tajima no kuni gokenin kyomyo, KJ, 2:254, doc. 932.

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housemen (kenin budgyonin) for Osumi and Satsuma Provinces." In these references, and what follows them, we see in fact just how close we now are to a working definition of shugo. Yet significantly the word itself does not appear as a title. 35 The form of the document is one of its most noteworthy features. Unlike its predecessors in Mino and lzumi, 36 this order is an instruction addressed to a kenin bugyonin, not to the complement of housemen, as earlier. In other words, the order is designed to lay out for its own officer the full range of his anticipated duties in his assigned provinces. Though we cannot know whether this was the first document of its kind, we can at least be sure that it is the earliest of its type that survives. The instructions themselves-a total of three-are presented as separate items. Interestingly, they comprise a set of authorizations that actually exceeds the later shugo's duties, though they are instantly recognizable in terms of that officer. The first item centers exclusively on musterings for the oban'yaku; Tadahisa is to exercise that authority, and the kenin (not gokenin) are to serve. The second item is one that did not become a core element of the later definition, empowering Tadahisa to enforce the traditional prohibition against the buying and selling of humans. According to the document, repeated imperial edicts to this effect were being ignored, and violators were henceforth to be punished by Tadahisa. The third item is both prescient and revealing, since Tadahisa is enjoined to assume responsibility for prohibiting "murder" (setsugai) and "outrages" (rozeki), and in the process to provide "security" -shugo, used as a verb-to the two provinces. The mature definition of the shugo's authority would emphasize capital crimes-murder (setsugai) and acts by multiple persons resulting in serious bloodshed (muhon). But rozeki, or crimes of coercion involving property, would not be included, and were restored, under the Ashikaga Bakufu, only in the fourteenth century. 37 Clearly, the Kamakura era negotiations (internal and external) that set the initial formal definition for the shugo substituted the far more serious but less frequent phenomenon of muhon for the more commonplace acts of rozeki committed by individu-

35· KB, doc. 137 (II97/I2/3 saki no utaisho ke mandokoro kudashibumi).

36. See notes

22

and

24

above.

37· For a discussion of its fourteenth-century incarnation under the name karita rozeki, see

Peter Arnesen, The Medieval japanese Daimyo, 6r -62.

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als within established borders. In other words, both capitals sought to reserve to themselves the right to settle disputes involving violations of property, while also seeking not to emasculate too severely the powers of civil governors. As we shall see, policies that were designed to deny excessive autonomy to shugo would become a regular theme of proclamations issuing from Kamakura. The use of the verb "to provide security" (shugo) in its II97 edict should probably not be made too much of. It may have been the kind of literal usage so frequently encountered during this period. 38 Or it may have been simply a word that was gaining currency in Kyushu, in the wake of the new shugosho within the Dazaifu. Either way, we see here an initial fusing of the main categories of the emerging functional definition of the Kamakura shugo. A Bakufu officer assigned to a province had been enjoined to take responsibility for coordinating the several stages of the oban'yaku, in addition to exercising oversight over certain major crimes. The crimes, as we have indicated, would be pared back a few years later, but the combination of criminal jurisdiction and supervision of the palace guard had now been united in one person, who was shortly himself to be referred to as a shugo. In the closing lines of its edict of II97 the Bakufu included a particular admonition that resonates well in this context. Tadahisa was advised "not to cause distress to innocent persons upon some pretext." Here Yoritomo was giving expression to his well-known conservatism, fearful, as he always was, of releasing too much power even to people he trusted. Yet the edict goes on-typically-in the opposite vein also, admonishing "housemen not to oppose the administrator's orders under the umbrella of [Kamakura's] generosity." As always, Yoritomo was seeking to get the right balance, even as he was still experimenting with a network of officials that he had not named. Exactly three weeks after the edict to Tadahisa was dated and sent to him, the latter issued his own mustering call to perform the guard service. 39 Enumerating the names of the men from Satsuma who were expected to 38. See, e.g., the "protection authority" (shugo-sata) cited in an imperial edict (rinjz) calling for crime suppression on Mount Suzuka in Omi; in Yamanaka monjo, II94hh4 bo kudashibumi an, KI, 2:roi, doc. 7II (the KI's crediting of this document to Yoritomo is pure supposition; there is no identifying language of any kind). 39· Sappan kyuki zatsuroku, II971I2h4 dairi obanyaku shihai chumon, KJ, 2:277-78, docs. 954-56 (the three versions here are all slightly different from one another; Asakawa has translated one of them in The Documents ofIriki, I07).

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serve, he admonished them to go to the capital by the third month of the next spring. He addressed the joint directive to "the complement of jito kenin from Satsuma Province." However, he signed himself simply "saemon no jo" (a common, low-ranking title), and left the impression that he would meet his charges in Kyoto rather than lead them himself. At any rate, Tadahisa was now effectively a shugo-in-waiting. A famous entry in the Azuma kagami, purporting to record an actual appointment to a shugo post (shiki) in 1199, describes the contours of the mature authority, and is therefore anachronistic. 40 In citing both the oban'yaku and a jurisdiction over "rebels and murderers" (muhon setsugainin), it constitutes the earliest combination of these concepts. However, the notion of a definition now available for a shiki holder stretches credulity, and it is much more likely that the entry is a kind of summation of events that is intended to capture the sense of a progress that was now underway. We need to look at the men whom Yoritomo was starting to put forward for commissions. Insofar as the primary goal was to stabilize a Minamoto presence in each of the provinces, men in possession of administrative experience would have commended themselves. In this connection, Yoritomo evidently felt most comfortable advancing individuals of low warrior status, who might then be obliged to depend on the prestige of the chieftain in order to discharge their duties. Able men without substantial home bases or distinguished provincial ancestries seem to have been preferred by Yoritomo as he made his selections for assignments. Such men would have owed their careers to his continuing patronage. Though our data here, as elsewhere, are woefully incomplete, our examples tend to underscore a profile of lowranking favorites as pre-shugo. The observation concerning low status is a significant one, since it turns much of the conventional wisdom about the origins of the shugo on its head. During the 1190s, the ranking warriors within Kamakura's constituency tended not to be put forward for these assignments, yet another illustration ofYoritomo's pragmatism and caution. Thus, e.g., the Koremune, Chomo, and Muta who were assigned to Kyushu possessed, as we noted earlier, either bureaucratic ties to Kyoto or obscure warrior originsY Elsewhere, personal

40. KB, doc. 138 (AK, II99/I2h9). Instead of representing itself as a mature definition, the entry may actually be describing a real beginning; see notes 47 and 49 below. 41. See chapter 5, note 107.

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favorites like the Kajiwara and Tsutsumi received preferments in the central region; the second, it will be recalled, was the son of Yoritomo's own wet nurse. 42 Simultaneously, the Sasaki, originally from Omi but transplanted to Sagami after 1160, seem to have received a cluster of assignments, divided among the sons of the scion who was Yoritomo's old comradeY Conversely, however, there appear to have been no assignments to the oldest of the eastern zaichokanjin, which indicates the exclusion of the very families that made up the Minamoto core constituency. Save for the responsibilities they must have shouldered in their own home provinces, distinguished houses like the Chiba, Miura, and Oyama were seemingly not a factor in the introduction and promotion of the houseman concept beyond the east. Chiba Tsunetane, who had been assigned to Kyushu in 1185, was gone indeed within a matter of only a few months. 44

THE

ERA AFTER YORITOMO

The founder of the regime, who had initiated so much else during the course of two decades, was not, then, the ultimate creator of the network of shugo. Though Yoritomo contributed greatly to the package of concepts that would be brought together under the new label, he cannot be given credit as the formal author. Of course, a notion that seems merely unorthodox now would have been unimaginable then-which places into effective context the Azuma kagami's official version. In short, Yoritomo was remembered as having introduced shugo and }ito in 1185, bequeathing a formal scaffolding for his regime, at two levels. Later, when twin networks of officials actually became the period-defining figures of their age, it was almost impossible to conceive them as other than part of the original legacy.

42. Sara, Zotei-shugo, I53-64, for Kajiwara; Tanaka, "Kamakura-Wakasa," 254-60, for the Tsursumi. 43· Information drawn from several different sources, most of them unreliable, suggests as many as eighteen shugo posts distributed among the six sons; see Fuzanbo, comp., Kokushi jiten, 4:387-89, and the references to the Sasaki in the index of Sara, Zotei-shugo. Corroboration is impossible. 44· Though Tsunetane (aged sixty-eight) received a Kyushu assignment from Yoritomo in n86 (Shimazu ke monjo, n86/8/3 Minamoto Yoritomo kudashibumi, KJ, I:94, doc. I50), Asakawa and others suspect that he had already settled in Kamakura; The Documents oflriki, non. 47·

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However, our most authoritative piece of contemporaneous evidencethe 1197l12 directive to Koremune Tadahisa-gives us not quite a shugo but rather an "administrator for housemen" whose enumerated duties leave him looking a bit different. In fact, no historian has been able to put dates and events together to show how and when Japan first received officials under a name that would remain prominent all the way into the sixteenth century. The heavy lifting, I believe, occurred between 1199 and 1203. Yoritomo died on 11991III3, and during the months that followed the Azuma kagami is quite voluble on the subject of the shugo. The period itself was one of instability for the Bakufu as its leading members sought to solidify their positions under the nominal chieftainship of the seventeen-year-old Yoriie, Yoritomo's eldest son. An almost inevitable momentum now swung in the direction of converting the regime into the possession of its collective old guard rather than of its unstable young heir. Within three weeks, the preshugo were advised to keep a check on their respective housemen-an order that was sent, in the words of the Azuma kagami, to the "shugo of all the provinces" (shokoku no shugo). 45 We may reasonably be skeptical about the literalness of the language invoked here, even though the new leadership would have been logically concerned with what had troubled Yoritomo all his lifein effect, how to sustain a viable Minamoto entity into a new generation. The provincial contingents of gokenin could not be allowed to fragment. Yet the pre-shugo would have been the clients of the late Yoritomo, leaving them vulnerable to a purge. It was the need for some kind of review that may have helped to bring the advisability of a regularization of the network as a whole to the forefront. At any rate, Gow Motokiyo, the pre-shugo of Sanuki, was the first to be ousted (in 1199l3), in his case for unspecified crimes. 46 The hated Kajiwara Kagetoki, the pre-shugo of Mimasaka and Harima, was purged soon thereafter, 47 and Sasaki Tsunetaka, of Awaji, Awa,

45· AK, II99hl6. As if to be deliberately unhelpful, theAKhad used a virtually identical reference in its only two entries of II94 that use the term. In AK, II94/3/I7, the shokoku no shugonin were prohibited from violating public lands (kokuryli), whereas in II94/5f29 the shokoku shugonin were made responsible for coordinating the levy for the rebuilding ofTodaiji. The most we can imagine is an incomplete patchwork of pre-shugo (perhaps slitsuibushi) at this time. 46. AK, II991315. 47· For the confiscation in Mimasaka, seeAK, I20olrl25; for Harima, see note 40 above, and

AK, noo/2!22.

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and Tosa, followed (in uoo/8) for misconduct in Kyoto. 48 The converse side of such rapid ousters would have been a concern for continuity through new appointments. Though it is not until 1203 that we encounter a contemporaneous record that speaks unambiguously of a shugo, 49 it seems possible that the search for a name and an accompanying concept might have started in earnest now. On II99/9/I7, the Azuma kagami cites an order sent to the "country's shugonin" to the effect that they should prepare rosters for the palace guard duty. We see in this a pulling together of the notion of a network of provincial commanders, now associated, in a general policy sense, with coordinating the Kyoto service. At the same time, we encounter a deputy (daikan) and an agent (tsukat) of two additional shugo, suggesting the possible start of a regularization locally. 5° At the end of n99, the appointment of the illustrious Oyama Tomomasa to strategically important Harima may well have represented an important turning point in this regard. A famous elder from the east had now been given a commission that could not but have failed to enhance the stature of the post itsel£ When the Miura, Wada, and Chiba soon followed the Oyama as shugo, the holding of the title became synonymous with the upper echelons of the senior vassalage. But when and how did the responsibilities come to meld with the historic definition? According to an entry in the Azuma kagami for I202/int.IOII5, complaints had reached Kamakura that the "country's shugonin" were involving themselves too broadly, a practice that the Bakufu now vigorously condemned; those who persisted were threatened with dismissal and replacement. Though we are more than aware of the dangers of relying on the Bakufu's own history of itself, we have here what sounds like an initial stocktaking. Commissionings had been going forward since soon after Yoritomo's death, but the appointees, in the absence of firm guidelines, were overstepping their mandate. The time had come both to empower and to delimit concretely. In other words, the time had come to institutionalize a name and a working definition. As mentioned earlier, internal and external bargaining would have been

48. AK, noo/7!27, 812. 49· See the reference to a shugo in Harima Province, in KB, doc. I43 (1203/5/17 shogun ke mandokoro kudashibumi an). 50. AK, II99/IOI24, n/8.

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required for the formalization of any name, but the word "shugo" may have commended itself for several reasons. First, it had been in use for some time on an informal basis, making it a concept susceptible to reshaping. Second, it captured, in its literal meaning, the Bakufu's stated image of itself-as a protector and a defender of the status quo; a shugo, posted one to a province, would function as a legitimizer of the regime around the country. Third, the name shugosho had already been used to denote an agency, controlled by Kamakura, within the Dazaifu. Fourth, a network of officials with a name that would be new to the chart of provincial organization would give Kamakura what it had not previously had-a linking figure between itself and its men. And last (though this was not a function of the name per se), a network of province-level officials owing their tenures to Kamakura would promote the idea of coexisting chains of command. Our modern notion of a dual polity during the Kamakura age derives, in fact, from a close approximation to what was now emerging. At the same time, the introduction of any new layer of officialdom was bound to engender controversy and be potentially disruptive. Kamakura sought to minimize that problem for jito by characterizing them as "inheritances" from predecessors who had been dispossessed for cause; the income and rights would simply be changing hands. But any new network of provincial magistrates could not be so represented without, by implication, displacing the civil governors; no zero-sum equation applied here. In that sense, the notion of a network of shugo was revolutionary, proposing to add a figure who would stand parallel to, but not usurp the powers of, the Kyotoappointed governor. The mystery is how something so monumentally significant could have been negotiated without leaving any historical traces. The posture that Kamakura adopted was neither to displace nor to compete through its shugo with the old governors, but rather to have the shugo assume a modest share of the governors' duties. To the extent that the new shugo could be seen as acquiring formal powers unequal to those of the governors, those venerable symbols of continuity might remain the dominant provincial magistrates. Not only would such a stance have the best chance of winning approval from reluctant courtiers, but it would also promise to be the least disruptive locally. At the same time, it would stay close to the Bakufu's seeming policy in all things: to delegate only the minimum powers required to discharge duties. Coordination of the palace guard duty by shugo presumably generated no

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deep and complicated debate; Kamakura's pre-shugo had already been doing that. By contrast, agreeing on what particular share of the governor's criminal jurisdiction should be released to the new shugo must, we can only imagine, have been much more difficult. The fact that the more inclusive package given to Tadahisa in II97 seems not to have been replicated is revealing, suggesting a compromise of a kind that would have made sense. Thus references to the buying and selling of chattels are no longer seen in connection with shugo, and neither, as mentioned, is a generalized jurisdiction over unlawful incursion (rozeki). The policing of capital crimes was retained from 1197, and a similar policing of collective acts of major violence (muhon) may now have been added. The former might simply have seemed appropriate, but the latter, with Yoritomo now gone, might have been judged essential. Muhon were understood to be serious, interjurisdictional rejections of constituted authority, though another part of the concept may have commended it also. For Kamakura to have the power to declare war on its own enemies meant never having to await an authorization from the court (as in 1189!) to pursue "rebellious men." Henceforth, the Bakufu could simply commission its shugo to arrest them. This last, if it occurred now, would have established the authority of the shugo as being inclusive of the right to muster the gokenin in both war and peace. At any rate, if we can surmise that officers under the tide of shugo were now being put into place after the death ofYoritomo, it is unsurprising that questions about them should have arisen and then lingered. In particular, allegations of misbehavior flowed quite naturally from the myriad of uncertainties governing their new jurisdiction. Since the shugo and those working for them represented a fresh presence locally, nothing, or very little, could have been worked out in advance. 51 As we shall now see, there was much in fact that needed to be clarified. As early as 1203, a complaint was lodged by the temple proprietor of Todaiji, charging incursions by agents of the Harina Province shugo. In the words of the appeal, "When criminals appear, they are to be apprehended and delivered up by estate personnel." 52 Here, in fact, was the very type of

51. And thus, in 1202, the AK refers to complaints against shugo (shokoku no shugonin) whose presence was considered disruptive; the Bakufu would lay down regulations and seek to replace repeat offenders; AK, 1202/int.IO/r5. 52. KB, doc. 143 (1203/5/17 shogun ke mandokoro kudashibumi).

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question that must have been echoing everywhere: was the shugo's a right of entrance in pursuit of capital criminals, or of extradition and custody at a shoen's borders? Against the centuries-old backdrop of proprietors seeking immunity from entrance by constabulary officials, Japan was now witnessing a new subclass of would-be trespassers: a cohort of local deputies claiming to work for someone called a shugo! Thus, what now began was an effort not dissimilar to the one that had been aimed at governors over many centuries. Shugo, the new arrivals, would have to be monitored. Even if Kamakura's natural predilection was to be responsive to such petitions, easy solutions, as it soon discovered, would prove to be elusive. From the beginning, the Bakufu seems never to have contemplated general guidelines regarding apprehension and extradition, preferring to handle problems as they came up. Possibly this was the only way to proceed realistically, similar, as we shall see, to the infinite variety of local precedents that confronted new jito. Or perhaps the practice of responding piecemeal was how Kamakura initially reacted, making it difficult to depart from that approach later. In any event, the Bakufu began, very early, to receive complaints of two kinds: appeals for grants of total immunity against shugo on the one hand, and appeals for relief against unlawful entrance by them on the other. In the first category, the ground rules under which shugo might discharge their lawful duties began, from the very outset, to vary on a case-by-case basis. For example, in 1209, upon a review of a petition by Buzen Province's influential Usa Shrine, Karnakura decreed in a way highly favorable to the shrine. The landed holdings of the latter were not to be entered for any reason, and rebels and murderers (muhon setsugainin) were to delivered at the shugo's headquarters. Seemingly, the proprietor's own men were permitted to leave the shrine's holdings, and to traverse the province in order to deliver criminals, under the shugo's jurisdiction, to his jail. 53 The case of 1209 was an instance of a blanket immunity granted to a great proprietor. More common were surrenders of authority for individual estates. For example, a Kamakura edict responded to a petition of 1208 involving the situation of an estate in lwami belonging to the Kamowake lkazuchi Shrine. In the words of the edict, "This estate has been under total shrine jurisdiction since its commendation during the time of the late 53· Itozu monjo, I209/I2/6 Kama migyosho an, KI, J:39I, doc. r820.

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utaisho lord [i.e., Yoritomo]. The authority of the shugo's headquarters in it is prohibited, though performance of the imperial guard service is to follow precedent." 54 The intention here seems to have been to limit the shugo to a right of extradition at the domain's borders, though the reference to the guard duty is susceptible to two meanings: call-up orders were to be delivered either in person or by proxy. It is possible that the Bakufu itself did not know. Yet in other cases a right of entrance in the performance of official duties was in fact authorized. In 1212, for example, Kamakura decreed as follows in connection with an estate in Harima: "Let there be no entrance by agents save for matters concerning the palace guard duty and murderers. "55 In still other cases, the precincts of religious institutions received immunity from shugo with some regularity, though the fact that the privilege had to be recorded suggests that it was not automatic. One such authorization (actually, a reauthorization) involved the Kongoji of Kawachi: "During the time of the late utaisho lord it was judged that this temple should be free of the authority of the shugo's headquarters, and that total (ikko) jurisdiction (shintaz) should lie with temple personnel. " 56 Though the meaning of "total jurisdiction" remains unclear, the reference to the era ofYoritomo can probably be taken to mean the "opening era" of the shugo. The presence of a jito in an estate might lead to yet another variation on these themes, as in a case from 1223, involving lga Province: "The }ito has petitioned that during the terms of previous shugo, their agents did not enter this estate. Except for matters involving the imperial guard service, rebellion, and murder, these agents are not permitted to enter." 57 Clearly, the antagonists here were the shugo and a jito, with the matter resolved along the lines of the standard shugo definition. Of course, appeals against entrance having nothing to do with rebellion and murder became a common occurrence almost simultaneously with the initial round of challenges meant to clarifY the parameters oflawful entrance.

54· Quoted in a document of 1244; KB, doc. 142 (1244/6/3 Kanto migyosho an). 55· This prohibition was reiterated in a document of ten years later; DKR, doc. 23 (1222/5/ro

Kanto gechijo an). 56. KB, doc. 140 (1225/4/5 Rokuhara migyosho). 57· KB, doc. 145 (1223/8/6 Kanto gechijo).

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MANAGERS

The Bakufu's recently established network of constabulary officers was frequently accused of acts that, from the start, placed it on the wrong side of the law. In many of the actual cases the wrongdoers were deputies or agents, making the task of obtaining compliance that much more difficult. Clearly, a new and unwanted hierarchy was being introduced at this time, and this was leading to a heightening of the search for protection against the new "protectors." An altogether typical case began in 1216 when Kamakura granted immunity to a unit in Harima whose proprietor was a branch of the Gion Shrine of Kyoto. Six years later the Bakufu felt obliged to reaffirm the immunity, which the shugo, though not his deputy, readily acknowledged. Within months the deputy had been accused of forced entry into the homes of shrine officials, an obviously more serious crime than that of entrance into an immune territory. 58 Unlawful behavior by shugo and/or their agents might extend beyond matters of entrance, as new appointees now sought to expand their jurisdictions. For example, a shugo's claim of authority over arsonists in a pair of shrine holdings in lzumo Province was apparently recognized, at least to the extent of having his right of extradition approved. 59 Similarly, shugo were seeking to expand the leverage accruing from their musterings of the imperial guard duty, as occurred in Kii Province in 1215. In the complaint from the lwashimizu Shrine that we reviewed earlier, the issue was very squarely put: "Although the imperial guard service was made incumbent on housemen (gokenin) during the time of the utaisho lord, estate officials on shrine lands, and especially those who had had no formal audience of submission (kezan) [with Yoritomo], were declared exempt. All the more reason, then, that unrestricted recruiting calls by the shugo are not to be obeyed." 60 Shugo, with justification, needed to be watched. And so, it would seem, they in fact were, though politics, more than performance, seemed to influence the length of incumbencies. For example, Koremune Tadahisa lost his three titles in southern Kyushu in 1203, whereas Oyama Tomomasa lost his in Harima a decade later. In both cases, conspiracies within the Bakufu seem to have tainted the reputations of the two men,

58. KB, doc. 148 (1223/ro/25 Kanto gechijo). 59· KB, doc. 147 (1215/7 Izumo no kuni shugo Minamoto bo gechijo). 6o. KB, doc. 157 (1215/8/24 Iwashimizu Hachimangu kumonjo kudashibumi).

A 'sHUGO

IN EVERY PROVINCE

2!5

though in both instances they were later rehabilitated-Tadahisa soon afterward, though he was restored only in one province, and Tomomasa following the Jokyu War. During the interim, Goto Motokiyo, dismissed from Sanuki in 1199, was the shugo of Harima, only to lose his title again in 1221 for joining the court side. 61 The tying of incumbency to the political climate is ironic. Invested with a formal jurisdiction over rebels and by extension traitors, shugo were frequently ousted for being implicated in the same crimes. A shift in the composition of the Bakufu's leadership was often sufficient to make the charge stick, with members in a downward-moving faction being punished in this way. In addition, since the competition for influence might express itself as shifts among shugo titles, there may have been a disincentive to associate too closely with a province whose post might be lost. As a consequence, on-site residence by appointees was dearly unanticipated from the start, with Muro Sukeyori seemingly the only shugo, in the first generation, to move westward. 62 From the outset, therefore, an irregular physical presence became a standard feature of the shugo system as a whole, creating the conditions for abuse by unsupervised deputies and agents. In that respect, a carefully hedged authority for shugo served the national interest. The authority itself has been known to generations of historians as the "three regulations for great crimes" (taibon sankajo), comprising murder, rebellion, and the palace guard duty. The inconsistency of the language here (with only two crimes mentioned) was scarcely noted. However, scholars now believe that the phrase refers to murder, rebellion, and a duster of four other crimes, added later. By contrast, the word "sankajo," meaning "the three regulations," is the term we usually find, and it involves no linguistic contradiction of any kind. 63 As interesting and useful as this may be, it does nothing to help explicate either the circumstances or the timing of the notion of "the three regulations" themselves. Rather than the unnamed working definition of the post1200 era, we must look to the immediate aftermath of the Jokyu War when

6r. For the changing conditions in Harima, see Saro, Zotei-shugo, I54-55; for the changing fortunes of Koremune Tadahisa, see ibid., 233-38. 62. Seno Seiichiro, "Chinzei ni okeru togoku gokenin," I:I7-I8, 4I-42. 63. See Nitta Ichiro, "Kendan sata no seiritsu to kendan shisutemu saihensei," 67-93.

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negotiations of a wide-ranging nature were forced upon the court. Though the negotiations themselves were obviously not recorded, the formal definition appears in 1222-indeed, in the very earliest of Kamakura's new legislative pronouncements. 64 The matters dealt with were of such a public character that both governments, we can only presume, would have had to give their assent. The statements of 1222 empower and delimit. They authorize a jurisdiction over the guard duty, the pursuit of rebels, and the suppression of murderers, but they simultaneously prohibit action against thieves, arsonists, and kidnappers, reserving the control of such criminals to the province-based police headquarters of the civil governors. Further, they prohibit unlawful entrance by agents of the shugo, and require consultation with local authorities in the investigation of crimes and the arrest of criminals. A year later, a document mentions the guard duty, murder, and rebellion and nothing else, our first encounter with a practical application of the new shugo regulations. 65 A full generation after the Azuma kagami's description of the shugo's authority in the year of Yoritomo's death, the reality now provided the basis for the later anachronistic account. 66 The context here dearly favored this kind of hedged advance, since the large number of shugo traitors in 1221 casts an obvious spotlight on a network of officers that the Bakufu had failed to control effectivelyY Moreover, the war of 1221 was accompanied by a dramatic upsurge of local lawlessness by, or under the umbrella of, the shugo themselves. In particular, agents of various shugo were quick to abuse the temporary commissariat tax (hyoromaz) that had been authorized, leading to a new category of entrance questions. 68 At any rate, decisions of a serious nature were now required in order to separate the jurisdictions of governors and shugo, and, beyond that, to determine just what it was that Kamakura wanted. It was in this context that the 64. Shinpen tsuika, nos. 1-3, 1222/4/26, in Chiisei hosei shiryoshii, 1:61-62. 65. KB, doc. 145 (1223/8/6 Kanro gechijo). 66. The comparison here is between KB, doc. 145 and KB, doc. 138 (1223/8/6 Kanro gechijo and AK, II99II2h9). 67. For lists of the shugo who joined the court side in the Jokyu War, see Watanabe Sumio, "Kobu kenryoku to shoensei," 220; and Ishii, "Heishi-Kamakura ryoseiken ka no Aki kokuga," 6. See my discussion in DKR, 21-25. 68. See, e.g., DKR, docs. 21-22, 24-25, 28 (1221/8/24 Kanro gechijo, 1221/9/r4 Rokuhara migyosho, 122r/8/r3 Rokuhara migyosho an, 1221/8/r4 Rokuhara gechijo, 1222/5/6 Kanro gechijo).

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Bakufu's jurists finally got down to work, even as the complexity of the countryside continued to thwart them. For example, having denied shugo any responsibility for the crime of kidnapping in 1222, the Bakufu permitted that very authority to a shugo three years later in a district oflga. 69 The reconciling of general guidelines with particular situations was to prove a vexing problem. Of course, a chronology centering on the early 1220s does not invalidate the earlier spurts of activity regarding shugo duties, with the package, as we know, starting to form much earlier. Thus, responsibility for the palace guard duty evolved in the pre-shugo phase, with oversight over both murderers and rebels going back to the opening years (post-1200) of the formal institution itself. However, there remained a vast imprecision about these crimes of violence, which allowed shugo to use them as a kind of open door. Greater specification would obviously be required. By the post-Jokyu era, the Bakufu was finally in a position to dictate the jurisdictional boundaries of its own creation, if only it could make up its own mind. The inclusiveness of the authority was finally determined, and the language itself formally promulgated in the Bakufu's law code of 1232: 70 During the age of the utaisho house, the [shugo's] duties were defined as imperial guard recruitment and (the control of) rebels and murderers-these crimes [now] to include night raiding, violent burglary, brigandage, and piracy. In recent years, however, deputies have been appointed to districts and subdistricts, and tributes have been levied on private and public estates. [Shugo] are not governors (kokushz), yet they interfere in provincial business. They are not jito, yet they seek the profits of the land .... Forthwith, in accordance with practices from the time of the utaisho house, the involvement of shugo beyond the imperial guard service, rebellion, and murder is prohibited.... There is no need to refer again to the regime's tendency to credit its founder with authorship of the shugo institution. In one sense, of course, he was indeed the author, though not of the name or the office's precise clustering of

69. Compare Todaiji monjo, 1225/5/3 Kanto migyosho an, KI, 5:365, doc. 3376, with Shinpen tsuika, 1222/4/26 (note 64 above). The authorization of 1225 actually cut rwo ways: though the

shugo was now permitted to extradite kidnappers, his direct powers were limited to just that (extradition) for murderers. He was not to enter in pursuit even of capital criminals. 70. Goseibai shikimoku, clause 3, in Chmei hosei shiryoshii 1:4-5.

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duties. At the same time, the clause's failure even to refer to the problems flowing from entrance questions is noteworthy, and the Bakufu simply continued to confront such matters as they came up. As mentioned, it never attempted to legislate a solution to a question potentially susceptible to multiple answers. On the other hand, the clause included an expression of general anguish on a subsidiary issue, that involving "entrance" for purposes of recruiting. For non-gokenin were now seemingly offering their services to shugo, and then using them as a pretext to "resist the orders of governors (kokushi) and estate proprietors (ryoke)." Though the documents from this period do not explicitly substantiate such a claim, they do include numerous references to unnamed agents of shugo, men who would have had to be recruited from somewhere. 71 Moreover, the shugo, it is now clear, enjoyed a thoroughly public status, having been granted a specified share of provincial governance. As an official of the state, it would have been natural for him to become a magnet for the ambitious and disaffected. At any rate, the Bakufu, having formalized its network of provincial magistrates, now had to work to keep them within the bounded limits of their authority. As here described, it might seem as if the shugo had been launched on a trajectory that would lead inevitably to autonomy. In fact, this did not occur, or at least not with the frequency that would allow such a generalization. The built-in safeguards, which were a legacy ofYoritomo's own earlier caution, were perpetuated to the point that the office did not become a day-today presence, much less the centerpiece of a provincial lordship. A combination of circumstances worked to inhibit the growth of the shugo, a combination that we need to take stock of.

THE

SHUGO AS

STOCK CHARACTER

The narrowness of the shugo's authorized mandate has already been discussed. When the relevant decisions came to be made in the early 1220s, the Bakufu elected to slice the provincial apple unevenly, reserving to the civil governors a greater share of the total authority. The first point, then, is that 71. See, e.g., the documents cited in note 68 above. Typically, there is no indication of the numbers of "agents" implicated.

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shugo were intended to be no more than the unequal counterparts of the kokushi. Second, Kamakura never felt compelled to have a shugo assigned to every province in every year, and "gaps" in this respect were a substantial feature of the system itself. A few provinces never did receive a shugo, 72 whereas some others have yielded only the very faintest of traces over the course of more than a century. In cases where the data seem unusually sparse, it is hard to imagine an institutional presence of any real power or consequence. 73 Third, the incumbents themselves only rarely enjoyed secure tenures, which were viewed (unlike the position with the }ito) as fundamentally nonhereditary. It was not so much that there were no shugo titles that remained within single families, but that such "inheritances" might be approved only to be overturned later. A case in point is the title in Echizen that was willed and confirmed to Koremune Tadayoshi in 1227, only to be confiscated and reassigned in 1228?4 The specter of a political shake-up was always present, rendering these major symbols of prestige within the Bakufu vulnerable to confiscation. Fourth, the office itself was viewed as a provincial magistracy to be administered by nonnatives; only easterners might represent the Bakufu in central and western provinces. Though a few easterners were also the shugo of their ancestral provinces, their local powers rarely derived exclusively from those titles. In the east, their portfolios tended to have been inherited from family holdings dating from the Heian period, which were now no longer encumbered as they had been before n8o. They were shugo in their home

72. For example, Mursu and Dewa in the north, and Yamato and Yamashiro in central Japan. The Kofujuji ofNara held formal jurisdiction for Yamato, whereas Rokuhara apparently enjoyed the same for Yamashiro; Saro, Zotei-shugo, r -2. But there were constant difficulties and confusions in both cases; see, e.g., DKR, doc. 130 (1236/ro/3 Rokuhara migyosho an), for Yamato; and DKR, doc. Sr (1254/10/30 Kanto migyosho), for Yamashiro. 73· For example, despite the strategic location ofBitchu along the Inland Sea, Saro has found no references to a post-Yoritomo shugo there until the 1270s; Zotei-shugo, 167. Even more surprising is the absence of any reference to a shugo in the east's Kai Province for the entire duration of the Kamakura age; ibid., 58. Policy-based interruptions also occurred, as in Izumi and Kii before 122I; see WG, 217-18. 74· For the will and its confirmation, see LA!, doc. 36 (1227/ro/ro shogun ke ando kudashibumi); for the confiscation and reassignment, AK, r228/5/r6. The new appointee was Go to Mototsuna, son of Motokiyo (himself a shugo) who had defected to the court in I22I.

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provinces, then, because no outsider could be permitted to hold that title in their stead.75 In the rest of the country, the shugo were themselves the outsiders, in terms of both their origins and their infrequent visits. Deputies and agents represented them. Fifth, "office lands" only later became associated with title holding, meaning that the office itself was not originally conceived of as a source of profit. Of course, the shugo took advantage of his status just like everyone else. Thus, he seized the property of criminals placed in his custody, and he exploited whatever jito titles he might have been granted. However, his bureaucratic origins continued to remain visible throughout, with the perquisites of office never becoming a defining feature. 76 Moreover, the Bakufu never tired of condemning misconduct by a shugo, even as he was denied access to Kamakura's tribunals. Complaints might be lodged against a shugo, leading to an investigation; but a shugo as such was never a defendant in a lawsuit. Nor, for the same reasons, was he permitted to be a plaintiff. As an official of the state and in that capacity a nonlandowner, he was seemingly ineligible for the protections of Kamakura justice. However, this is not to argue that the shugo was uninvolved in judicial affairs-our sixth point. Rather than contemplating becoming a plaintiff or defendant, he was consigned to a perpetual adjunct's role in the judicial process. His provincial headquarters became Kamakura's principal on-site investigatory agency in lawsuits involvingjito and gokenin. This role, which commenced from the moment the first shugo were appointed, exercised a profound influence on the potential of the post during its formative period. In fact, to judge from the frequency of justice-related references in our sources, the shugo were facilitators of lawsuits more than they were constables or commanders of men. And to the extent that such an assessment is accurate, the image of their office as an autonomous instrument of power is correspondingly reduced. At any rate, as early as 1203, the Bakufu ordered a shugo's headquarters "to summon and interrogate an estate's officials as to the merits of the two sides, and to reach a disposition following the logic (dori)

75· For example, the Chiba in Shimosa, the Oyama in Shimotsuke, the Miura (until 1247) in Sagami, and the Adachi (until 1285) in Kozuke. 76. For a treatment of the range of opinions on the "office land" question, see WG, 225-27. The subject belongs mostly to the period after 1250.

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of the documents (monjo)." 77 Two years later, it ordered another shugo "to investigate the details on the two sides, and to prohibit the despoilments in accordance with justice." 78 In both instances, the suits had been lodged originally with Kamakura, which transferred jurisdiction only after examining the evidence itself. A third case (also of 1205) shows an important variation. The shugo of Awa Province was ordered "to stop the despoilments of a certain lawless person" who was the object of a petition to Kamakura by the Kasuga Shrine ofNara. However, the Bakufu added that "in the event of further particulars, a formal rejoinder (chinjo) [by the accused] should be forwarded [to Kamakura]." 79 A fourth case, of 1208, indicates an even shorter leash, with the shugo no more than an enforcer of a decision handed down by Kamakura. In this instance, the shugo headquarters of Chikugo reproduced the Bakufu's edict verbatim. 80 In all of these cases the shugo had been called on to expedite justice in one way or another; the complainants' petitions had all been directed to the Bakufu first. It was a procedure, in fact, that would never vary, a consequence of the centralized control of justice that Kamakura never relinquished, tempered by the delegations it chose to make from its own authority. In the period under review, there is, in fact, but a single example of a confusion of jurisdictions of a type that we might have anticipated more frequently. During the years 1203-5, the Dazaifu and the shugo headquarters ofHizen in Kyushu issued contrary preliminary judgments, which the Bakufu sought to work around by placing the rest of the investigation under the Dazaifu. 81 In effect, Kamakura had clarified the rungs within its own hierarchy in Kyushu, which brought to an end the momentary muddle that had occurred in 1205. In a more general sense, it could not, of course, bring to an end the possibility of wrong verdicts, which shugo might contribute to by being inefficient or worse. But the holders of the office seemed to know from the beginning that theirs was to be a judicial role that was complementary in nature. By the 1220s, the shugo headquarters had come to solidifY its place in the organizational chart of Kamakura justice, with involvements ranging from 77· DKR, doc. 54 (I203/I2/9 Hojo Tokimasa migyosho). 7S. KB, doc. I6I (I205/4/22 Kanto gechijo). 79· KB, doc. I63 (I205/5/I9 Kanto migyosho an). So. KB, doc. I66 (12oS/r/q Chikugo no kuni shugosho kudashibumi an). Sr. DKR, doc. 57 (I2o5/4!25 Kanto gechijo).

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gathering documents, to issuing summonses, to enforcing verdicts. At each stage, failures and frustrations were eminently possible, with unanswered summonses, in particular, quite typical. But these do not appear to have been failures of will or of effort, as shugo never tired of simply issuing the next summons. An ever closer identification with Kamakura flowed from this expenditure of energy, leading to a deepening integration into the Bakufu's system of "judicial governance." 82 The autonomy of shugo would have to wait.

CONCLUSION

The picture we have drawn here is a mixed one. From beginning to end, shugo headquarters were never reluctant to send out agents with mischief on their minds, a pattern of behavior that the Bakufu never tired of condemning. At the same time, the shugo himself seems to have remained more or less aloof from the activities of his deputies and agents, so that it is difficult to know the extent of the blame that points to him personally. In fact, this problem undoubtedly deepened over time, with the maturing of the concept of "deputy" of particular significance. In 1232, the Bakufu limited the shugo to one formal appointee whom it referred to as a daikan-literally, a "deputy." 83 It was a designation, however, that was soon to be superseded. In subsequent decades, the "deputies of shugo" became "deputy shugo," or shugodai, connoting a status that shared in their master's titular authority. 84 The question is to what degree they might now usurp that authority, especially where multiple shugodai came to be appointed. 85 Yet there is little indication of any dramatic departure from the original 82. See, e.g., DKR, docs. 97-99, n6-r9 (r258h/r6 Kanto migyosho an, I223/9h8 Kant6 migyosho an, r24r/6/3 Kanto migyosho, !246/9/5 Rokuhara migyosho an, I243/r2/3 Rokuhara migyosho an, I25I/8/r9 Rokuhara migyosho an, 1255/3125 Rokuhara migyosho). See the general discussion in WG, 220-23. 83. See note 70 above. 84. The designation shugodai became common in the r220s. See, e.g., a deputy (daikan) of Harima referred to later in the same document as a shugodai: KB, doc. 148 (r223/roh5 Kanto gechijo). or again, see a pair of Rokuhara directives to the shugodai of Kawachi: KB, docs. 140-41 (1225/4/5 Rokuhara migyosho, r227h/r4 Rokuhara migyosho). 85. See a reference, though from considerably later, to the shugodai of a single district in Omi Province: KB, doc. 153 (n85l2l24 Rokuhara migyosho an).

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vision of a network of provincial officers who represented the Bakufu. The posts themselves continued to be rotated in at least some cases, and the formal authority progressed only slowly beyond its early 1230s form. 86 The headquarters continued to function as investigative outposts of a centralized judicial authority, and the Bakufu, unambiguously, maintained ultimate control. Moreover, the infrequency of major crises worked against the emergence of autonomous shugo, and it remains uncertain to what extent the rank and file began to look to them as leaders. To have done so would have been to identify with a still mostly absentee figure, which would have made little sense to either party. Moreover, it is highly revealing that easterners who held jito posts in western lands continued, wherever possible, to retain their Kanto birthrights. Thus they performed the palace guard duty as members of contingents from their native provinces in the east, thereby diminishing the command authority of shugo in the west. 87 As we have seen, the office ofjito exploded on the scene in the n8os. By contrast, shugo were not really part of the landscape until after 1200. Yet within a decade, we encounter our first references to the two tides together, an important measure of the contemporary perception of their significance and identification with Kamakura. The document, of 1213, is a general prohibition against the excesses of the "shugo and jito of the country's provinces and estates" ("shokoku shoshoen shugo jito"). 88 In other words, the country at large

86. The responsibility for suppressing outlaw bands (akuto) and enforcing gambling prohibitions came to be added during the middle decades of the thirteenth century. See, e.g., AK, I248/4/3o, for the shugo of Hitachi being directed to control banditry in his province; cited by Saw, Zotei-shugo, 73· See also AK, 1250/n/28, for responsibility for controlling gambling in Hitachi and Shimosa placed in the hands of their respective shugo (Mutsu Province, with no shugo, was also included here, with jurisdiction to lie with the Bakufu-controlled "absentee governor's headquarters" [rusudokoro] there.) 87. The Fukabori, of Kazusa, are a clear case in point. Though their jito rewards were in Settsu, and later in Chikugo and Hizen, they retained their family link to their home province; see DKR, docs. 74, 36, 122 (1229/9/3 Kanto migyosho, 125o/wh3 shogun sodehan kudashibumi, 1258/wh Rokuhara migyosho an); and Fukabori ke monjo, 126o/8/7 Hojo Tokishige kyojo, KI, 12:15, doc. 8544. 88. Matsugi ke monjo, 1213/n kurododokoro cho, KI, 4:101-2, doc. 2064. The full phrase is shokoku shoshoen shugo }ito azukaro dokoro satanin, though at one point the phrase becomes shugo jito ika ko-otsu no hito-"shugo, jito, and others."

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was now abreast of a reality that posterity was given to believe had occurred some years earlier. 89 As we know, the compilers of the Azuma kagami dated the most original inventions of the regime to the era of its founder. More accurately, the evolution of the shugo was spread across two full generations, leaving us with a story of false starts and uncertain connections. This story, in many respects, is a more intriguing one than that of the mature shugo, whose main characteristic was his limited independence and, for the time being, his limited future. 89. A later copy (utsushz) of a document bearing the date II94 needs to be mentioned, since it contains the explicit phrase "shugonin and jinf' (shugonin }ito); it also purports to have been authored by Yoritomo. See Ashiba jinja monjo, II94/?/ro Minamoto Yoritomo kudashibumi ursushi, KI, suppl., 1:74, doc. 158. It is doubtful, however, that we can accept it as authentic, for the following reasons: (r) an utsushi is, by definition, a "copy'' prepared later, to be distinguished from an anmon, which is contemporaneous; (2) the document refers to someone found guilty of a "court-related crime" (kyo-gata no zaika), a phrase-kJ'o-gata-that we know in the context of court partisanship in the Jokyu War, but not from thirty years earlier; (3) the province in question is Echizen, which, according to Sat5 (Zotei-shugo, 103), had had Kamakura's provincewide jurisdiction there canceled in n91; a shugo, according to Sat5 (ibid.), was not appointed until much later; (4) oddly, the document is signed "Minamoto Yoritomo," with no titles or references to his recently achieved high court status. All other Yoritomo edicts from II94 were issued, bureaucratically, by his "shogunal chancellery."

CHAPTER EIGHT

The Indiscipline of ]ito

Unlike the shugo, who were still in an incipient stage at the end ofYoritomo's life, the }ito had already achieved a mature form and a corresponding reputation. In Kyoto, throughout the provinces, and to the farthest corners of the country, the people of Japan emitted a loud chorus of complaints with no mitigating praise, to the effect that }ito were now waging war against the traditional order. In almost every account of misconduct by these newly appointed }ito, we hear the anger and anguish of those who considered themselves among the law-abiding. To hear petitioners tell it, Japan was being visited by a new form of plague. Conversely, however, most of the new appointees saw the world quite differently, viewing their own origins as an all but insuperable weight. From start to finish, the restraining hand of the Kamakura Bakufu seemed never to let go. The }ito may thus have been unprecedented in breaking the jurisdictional stranglehold of estate holders, but not in achieving one of their own. fu we shall see, jito could imagine and even anticipate the future, but only their unborn descendants would experience it.

226

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THE WHO,

WHEN,

MANAGERS

WHERE,

AND WHY

Though Japan was divided into many thousands of administrative units, only some hundreds, in the opening era, received postings of}ito. The principal rationale, as we know, was twofold, with a selection of supporters granted confirmations over their homelands around the country, and a selection of easterners granted new tides converted from rights confiscated from the Taira. In theory, the distribution of actual posts was thus to conform to the pattern of military partisanship, with the holdings of winners and losers the only lands to be affected. In practice, the actual totals seem to have fallen far short of what was possible, though the chaos of the final result was scarcely diminished. The switching of sides, the timing, the fervor, and the postwar demeanor of friends and enemies all contributed to a map of}ito of great complexity. In addition, a further group of new tide holders was to be potentially appointable in areas experiencing the most extreme forms of local disorder. Known as muhon, or "rebellion," this condition of collective violence must have been especially hard to translate into consistent, legally based appointments. 1 Finally, there was Yoritomo's well-known penchant for tampering with and fine-tuning his new network, making any notion of an "inventory of}ito" a matter almost of the moment. When these problems are combined with that of the amount that has been lost from the record, the "who, when, where, and why?" of the }ito become highly elusive. We must acknowledge that we have only a tiny part of a rapidly changing picture. 2 The virtually limitless geographic diversity of the new postings provides a further insight into the notion of an aggregate that was untidy from the start. As viewed from the top, we encounter references to both the public The term itself has many usages. For Asakawa, muhon was "any disturbance of the peace by a body of armed men" (The Documents oflriki, 95). More recently, the inter-jurisdictional implications of muhon have come to be emphasized; see Nelson, "The Early Shugo," chap. I. Of course, the term might be used in a literal meaning, as in Yoritomo's condemnation of persons of "rebellious spirit" (muhon no kokoro); Masunaga monjo, II92/9fr8 shogun ke mandokoro kudashibumi, KI, 2:44-45, doc. 620. The word appears in more than a hundred places in the pages of the AK 2. For the extraordinary unevenness of what we know of the distribution and timing even in neighboring provinces, see Yasuda's inventory in ]ito oyobi, appendix. Not a single jito is known, e.g., in either the home province ofYamashiro or in Bitchu Province.

I.

THE IN DISC I P LINE

0 F

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and private sectors-hence ''jito in the provinces and districts" (kuni, gun jito to), 3 and ''jito in estates, subdistricts, and sub-subdistricts" (shokoku no shoen go ho no jito). 4 We know, indeed, that assignments might go much lower than that, with placements over tiny shards of interior jurisdictions a commonplace.5 Thus, the accumulated pieces of acknowledged subdivisions of the countryside might, or might not, receive their own jito, reflecting the different histories and circumstances of shoen and go portions. 6 For that matter, jito entitlements might be fashioned around a temple or shrine, seemingly without any accompanying "geography'' at alU Recipients of all this largesse were as varied as what they received. If most of the assignments went to men who would later be denominated as gokenin, there were also grants to distinctly nonwarrior clients. There were Kyotoborn aristocrats in service to Kamakura at one end of the spectrum, and lowly attendants at the other. 8 There were also the first provincial women ever to be granted shiki in their own names, though social "progress" was hardly part of Yoritomo's agenda. 9 In the same practical vein, he appears to have opposed the hereditary transmission of jito posts by their holders,

3· Cited in Masunaga monjo, II92/9/I8 shogun ke mandokoro kudashibumi, KI, 2:44-45, doc. 620. 4- AK, Iw4frolr8. 5· For a pair of myo within Chikugo Province's Kozuma Estate being assigned to one Sokua in n86, see the reference in KB, doc. 45 (I248/9Ir3 Kanto gechijo). 6. For example, in the same Kozuma Estate (see note 5), a different person entirely was granted another seven jito titles in n93, three of which he had to surrender in 1208; these latter were then slated for reassignment. See KB, docs. q, 166 (II93/6/r9 shogun ke mandokoro kudashibumi an, r2o8/r/q Chikugo no kuni shugosho kudashibumi an). In this sense, "Kozuma Estate" was really multiple places. 7· See, e.g., the references to jito over Tenpukuji in Omi, and over Lower Ikusawa Shrine in Sagami; AK, 1238/5/n, II91/4h7. For an actual appointment to a shrine, see Hirabayashi-shi monjo, 1236/7!28 shogun ke mandokoro kudashibumi, KI, 7:292, doc. 5016. 8. Oe Hiromoto and Miyoshi Yasunobu, illustrious advisors to Yoritomo, were granted various jito titles, e.g., several within Suo jurisdictions (to Hiromoto), and a major one to Ora Estate, Bingo (to Yasunobu); see KB, doc. 16 (n92/6/3 saki no utaisho ke mandokoro kudashibumi an); and Koyasan monjo, II96/ro/22 saki no utaisho ke mandokoro kudashibumi an, KI, 2:I98, doc. 867. For personal attendants (of both genders) as jito, see AK, I204/r2/22. 9· The practice, if indeed it was initiated by Yoritomo, was vastly accelerated after his death, especially to widows; see, e.g., AK, I2oo/6h9, I2I0/5/r4. For the appointment of a female jito in her own right in 1220, see LA!, doc. 37 (1228/3/30 Kanto gechijo). I have found no unambiguous references of this kind for the Yoritomo period.

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refusing to cede control over them to their possessors; though he entertained petitions he did not probate wills. 10 A final practice not seen under Yoritomo was the splitting of awarded entitlements into fractional parts. He eschewed "half" -assignments even over large units, paring a territory but never a shiki. To the end of his life, he envisioned a cohort of personally appointed jito whose tenures would remain under his control and at his disposal. On the other hand, some ofYoritomo's policies were more conducive to unwieldiness than to control. We have already noted the inconsistencies of distribution and size, as well as the potential for politics to compromise principle. Thus, instead of assigning all he could to large numbers of warriors in every lawful situation, Yoritomo sometimes made decisions that weakened his own supporters. Moreover, he made assignments of markedly different packages of awards to individual gokenin, compromising the notion of rewards for merit, objectively graded. For Yoritomo, this numerical and geographical lever was obviously a critical one, since it allowed him to apply his own criteria in the disbursement of patronage. But it also had the effect of leavingjito holders potentially disgruntled, with the regime seen as more important than its constituent parts. As a consequence, conditions were ripe for a shifting of priorities after 1200, which promoted the heterogeneity of the jito network beyond all imagining. Allowing holders to decide the futures of their own posts meant subjecting entitlements to partible inheritance, a condition confused still further by the introduction of fractional shares." With the corresponding loss ofboth coherence and centralized control,jito now had the potential of becoming the even more unmanageable figures that, to his credit, Yoritomo had always feared.

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In principle, jito acquired what they inherited-from their non-jito predecessors in the first generation, and from their fathers (and mothers) there-

ro. For details, see LA!, docs. 42-44. n. The new heritability ofjito tides, which mostly benefited sons, daughters, and wives, is described in LA!, docs. 45-57. The earliest reference to the splitting of a jito title (hanbun jito shikt) dates from 1209; LA!, doc. 18 (1209/7!28 shogun ke mandokoro kudashibumi an).

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after. However, the enunciation of this principle proved to be easier than the working out in practice of what such an inheritance included. The problem stemmed from the circumstances of the original appointments, in which Yoritomo could do little more than to call for an adherence to local customs-to the "precedents" (senret), which, by definition, varied from case to case. These latter would have been determinable only by a rigorous inquiry, on a scale that Yoritomo had no hope of seriously launching. The process was thus flawed from its opening moment, since few who were on or over a targeted estate would have been closely interrogated. For the most part, appointments simply went ahead, with Yoritomo anticipating publicly what he must have known privately was unlikely-that his jito would remain bound by limitations that had not yet been made explicit. At any rate, when we examine the contours of privileges and duties in any particular case, we need to be aware that these would have been unrecorded or unavailable, until some situation might arise that required their clarification. In a sense, it was left for the future to unlock the mysteries of the past. It will be useful to cite an actual example that will show both the variety and the nature of jito involvements and income rights (though drawn, admittedly, from a later time) .12 In 1223, an income register for the jito ofTsuu and Takahara estates, in Aki, included the following: 13 (r) Grant paddy (kyuden) of, in this case, five cho (kyuden was a basic category of remuneration for private- and public-sector officials, with r cho = 2.45 acres, to be worked by peasant labor). Its output was to go entirely to the jito, though the jito did not "own" these fields in the sense of being able to alienate them. (2) Grant dry fields (kyuhata) similarly of five cho, with the same expectations and restrictions. (3) A surtax (kachomaz) of five sho (nine liters) per tan (one-tenth of a cho) to be levied on the estates' total of paddy and dry fields. 14 (4) Rental receipts (chishz) of two sho per tan from the estates' chestnut grove. (5) Rental

I2. Kobayakawa ke monjo, 1223/6Tsuu-Takahara-no-sho jiw tokubun no chumon utsushi, KI, 5:210, doc. 3I26. 13. Though these two estates were in different districts they were contiguous and administered as one, and the various documents dealing with them always treat them together. Kamo Shrine was their proprietor, and Kobayakawa Shigehira their jitli. See Takeuchi, Shoen bunpu zu, 2:237, and note I5 below. I4. This surtax came to be regularized for jitli in a Bakufu enactment of a month later; Shinpen tsuika, 1223/7/6, no. IO, Chusei hosei shiryoshu, 1:65. The amount was to be the same as described here. See Yasuda,]itli oyobi, 290.

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receipts of one-third of the output from the salt farm. (6) One-third of the silk produced from the estates' mulberry trees. (7) One-third of the other fibers produced from the same trees. (8) One-third of the fibers produced from the estates' dry fields. 9) Final authority (jito ikko no sata) over the estates' constabulary post (sotsuibushi shiki). 15 It is typical that the register missed a few categories of income that we find for other jito. For example, no jito myo ("name-fields"), from which only the basic annual land rent (nengu) would have been owed, are mentioned, a land category, more or less alienable, and thus much in demand. Nor do we find either demesne (tsukuda) or lands that surrounded the }ito's residence (horino-uchi), both of which, at least in theory, were tax-free. 16 At the same time, we encounter nothing about the jito's range of responsibilities as a manager-nothing about his duties as a tax collector, justice of the peace, and works and agricultural commissioner. Whereas almost all jito were active in the fiscal and policing branches of local government, the actual range of their duties in fact varied enormously. Typically, they were obliged to share overall authority with a custodian (azukari dokoro) or other deputy appointed by the proprietor, in addition to being limited and restricted in a myriad of other ways-territorially, jurisdictionally, and numerically. In this situation, the status quo was in practice a composite, whose contours might legitimately be open to debate. For jito, testing the limits of what would be deemed lawful might therefore make sense, though there was also a potential price to be paid. In theory, the clearer the picture, the more difficult for the jito to claim half-remembered precedents as the basis for his own aggressive behavior. From the beginning, the need for this kind of fact-finding propelled the Bakufu in the direction of developing an organization and system of justice. As early as 1187, for example, the written proof of a pair of disputants was ex-

15. The terms as depicted herein became the object of a complex lawsuit in 1240; see DKR, doc. 41 (1240/im.ro/n Kanto gechijo). The jito won on some issues, but lost on others. (The sotsuibushi referred to here is obviously different from the provincial figures of the Yoritomo era; see chapter 7.) 16. For a case involvingjito tsukuda, see KB, docs. 92-93 (1207/12 Kanto gechijo, 1216/8/q shogun ke mandokoro kudashibumi). For a }ito's attempt to create a tax-free wne by calling it hori no uchi, see KB, doc. 94 (1209/3/17 Kanto gechijo an). For these (and other) categories of jito income, see Yasuda, ]ito oyobi, 303-6; also, Abe Takeshi, ed., Shoenshi yogo jiten, 161, 199.

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amined by Yoritomo before he issued his verdict. 17 However, it was not until after the death of the founder that procedures built around investigative techniques began to be regularized. An episode of 1207 shows the potential complexity of the challenge here, and of how, almost in spite of itself, Kamakura was learning to cope with the intractabilities of each set of precedents. As we see from its own verdict, the Bakufu was targeting the composite picture by breaking it into its constituent parts. 18 The case itself involved a }ito whose tenure had been initiated following the ouster of a }ito predecessor in Kunitomi Estate, Wakasa, in rr96. 19 As described in the 1207 edict, the limits of permissible practice had begun to be encroached upon gradually by the new }ito, until an appeal, issuing from the estate itself, made its way, via the proprietor, to Kamakura. The battle came to be joined in a Bakufu courtroom, which resulted in a comprehensive effort to reconcile the customs of Kunitomi Estate with the new reality. The }ito, as here described, had engaged in practices that resulted in a total of eleven charges now being brought against him. The first, which has been lost as a result of the tearing of a portion of the document, is recoverable, though only in summary, from a later edict (of 1216). At any rate, the jito had been using local residents to cultivate his demesne (tsukuda), and he was ordered to follow the precedents set by his predecessor. A custom, in short, had been identified and was to guide actual practice. In the second item, the }ito was held to be acting unlawfully on the grounds that a custom, in this case, did not exist: a miscellaneous tribute levy (zoji) was disallowed, and the jito agent's receipt of the income on a monthly basis was to cease. Firewood, however, was deemed to be an exception, and a levy, at a reduced rate, was now authorized. In the third item, a custom inherited from the former holder was identified, this time in connection with the conscription of residents for trout fishing. However, the service was not to disrupt workers during the busy harvest season. The fourth item revealed a variation and a compromise. A precedent was shown to exist for a hunting service that the }ito had imposed, though it was now prohibited from being enforced during the silkworm culture season.

q. KB, doc. I4 (n87/5/9 Minamoto Yoritomo kudashibumi). 18. KB, doc. 92 (1207/12 Kanto gechijo). I9. For this ouster in the context of other purges at this time, see chapter 5, notes 88-90.

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The residents, it seems, had pledged prompt delivery of flax that they owed, if only some shifting of the schedule for the hunting service were now authorized. When the jito noted a precedent of no complaints owing to his own leniency during busy times, the Bakufu confirmed the hunting service, though only out of season. The fifth item, terminating a service consisting of the production of indigo, involved an outright rejection of any local precedent. Much earlier, the proprietor had authorized an exemption from any such burden. The sixth item involved a prohibition of excessive demands concerning the care of horses owned by the deputy }ito and his men. The one or rwo horses belonging to the }ito proper were to be a different matter, however, and residents were not to submit any complaints about looking after them. In the seventh item we encounter a pledge by the jito that he would no longer commandeer any local flax-an implicit rejection of a precedent that he had alleged to exist, whereby he was entitled to do so in alternate years. The eighth item freed residents from having to supply labor and horses for the transport of taxes to Kyoto-which was coordinated by the }ito-with the sole exception of anything paid from his own fields. The ninth item involved a division of tribute, orginally in labor and horses but since commuted to rice, owed by the }ito to Kamakura: henceforth, he would have to shoulder one-half the total as opposed to shifting the entire burden onto local residents. The tenth item provides a rare glimpse inside a }ito's own family, with the prohibition of lavish "send-offs and welcomes" for his wife, which were being borne, with much anguish, by the residents. The final item, involving a division of the abandoned homestead areas of fleeing peasants, underlined the new balance of power. The }ito was accused of having moved quickly to add the abandoned areas to his own holdings, though the proprietor's appeal to have them all transferred to himself was also rejected. Henceforth, vacated homesteads were to be divided berween the proprietor and the jito equally, with both seeking "to invite unattached persons (ronin) to settle there." In this item, we see clearly how changes in local circumstances might work against custom and precedent, and how Kamakura, in violation of its own principles, was rewriting a local area's history. The ultimate beneficiary here was, of course, Kunitomi's }ito. Though scarcely the winner on each of the disputed points, he nevertheless had his dominant presence on the estate confirmed in various ways.

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Nor can there be any doubt that Kunitomi's residents knew that conditions had now altered. When the Bakufu, at the end of its edict, declared that the estate's "residents should be made secure and free of distress," it was admitting that such stability in fact no longer existed. Moreover, the jito in question, as events were to prove, sought to press his advantage. The trial of 1207 had come a decade after his initial posting; another decade passed, and there was a second court hearing. 20 By 1216, the jito and his principal deputy had invented new ways to abuse their powers, prompting an accusation that they were becoming "more lawless year by year." The suit, moreover, now added five items, which reveal an unmistakable new emphasis on physical coercion. In the first item, the jito was accused of having detained both a proprietor's official (the kumon) and local residents in 1209, and of extorting from them signed affidavits (kishomon) of their personal submission. Kamakura expressed its frustration that a tribunal had not been convened at the time, but ordered that any such signed oaths, if they existed, be "returned." In the second item, the jito was admonished to be more lenient in his service demands for five construction projects, even though his right to requisition the labor and materials was confirmed. In the third item we see the jito in his capacity as a thoroughly corrupt local policeman, fining people "upon the smallest of pretexts" and arresting their relatives. The fourth item seeks to guarantee security for a local papermaker who had been mistreated, and the last shows the jito "confining innocent people on the pretext that they had collaborated with a thief." In the words of the edict, "why would even his relatives have been punished if no guilt had been determined, and in view of the fact that no stolen goods had turned up?" Why, indeed? Such suits against jito, with their multiplicity of accusations, so soon after the first appointments were made, are reflective of the complexity of the packages of rights and duties that jito inherited. They also show how jito efforts to improve their situations might occupy their whole lifetimes, as well as those of their descendants. ]ito began their careers as the heirs of the managers they had just succeeded, whose own packages, dating from Heian times, tended to be quite limited. Before jito could even start to hope that they might claim some measure of parity with absentee lords, they would need to find ways to bring their income levels up much higher. Moreover, 20.

KB, doc. 93 (m6/8!I7 shogun ke mandokoro kudashibumi).

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though capable of obvious brutality toward local residents, they may not have been that much worse in that respect than some proprietors' agents, who might have made regular use of extortion and pressure, and who in fact did whatever they had to do in order to hinder a jito. As for the Bakufu, it distributed immune tides to the elite among its men, but it then tied their futures to a status quo that might require a series of judicial hearings to clarify. Kamakura stood guard over these existing conditions, but each new lawsuit tended to legalize some degree of change. ]ito, for their own part, came to understand the nature of this slow process, and reconciled themselves to preparing for the long haul. Though typicality, as we have seen, is not revealed in the particulars of individual cases, we are able to generalize about categories. The two Kunitomi episodes show a jito who was bent, before all else, on converting a local population into a service class. His enemy was only indirectly the estate's proprietor, a proportion of whose income he obviously wished to divert to himself But he nowhere attempted to seize outright the annual tax, lands associated with the proprietor, or local temples and shrines. The precedents he was working to subvert (or create) were more subtle. However, in other episodes we are able to cite more direct assaults, sometimes revealing programs targeted at entire hierarchies. As early as 1191, for example, a jito was accused of appropriating taxes that were bound for a shrine on the pretext of a crop failure; of arresting, and seizing the possessions of, local residents; and of imprisoning the male and female servants of an official who worked for the shrine. 21 Or again, ajito, in his effort to seize control of a shrine and its holdings, engineered a campaign of impressive ingenuity in 1209. Among other crimes, he was accused of absorbing different categories of shrine fields into his own holdings, of seizing the paddy belonging to the Fujiwara patron, of commandeering taxes and tributes of diverse kinds, and of seeking to control the "seating arrangement" at the shrine itself He was also dearly tampering with the conditions of local villages, going so far as to absorb one into his own holdings, and diverting another's traditional lamp oil tribute to himself. 22 21. KB, doc. 91 (1191!2/21 saki no utaisho ke mandokoro kudashibumi). 22. KB, doc. 94 (12o9/3fr7 Kanto gechijo).

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In still another case, a }ito who had explicitly promised to "forward, without negligence, the fixed annual tax and other levies," forgot, in the words of a judgment edict, his own "name" -that is, the obligations that accompanied his title. As part of his lapse of memory, he had appropriated the regular taxes from paddy and dry fields, withheld the quota of cloth over a twoyear period, and stolen the house and arrested the family of a servant of the custodian. When the servant was then murdered by order of the jito, the temple proprietor was moved to seek to dismiss him on its own, only to have the latter flaunt his Kamakura investiture and increase his abuses. At that juncture, the Bakufu moved to replace the offendingjito. 23 Of course, not all jito needed to be restrained by the appeals of proprietors and the judgments of Kamakura. There were many, indeed, who are not known to have been troublemakers at all, and at least some who were on the receiving end of lawless behavior. The most common victimizers of jito were of course their own siblings, 24 but there were also many others capable of doing the same thing. In 1206, for example, the jito of Horio Estate in Owari complained that an unnamed official of adjacent Nagaoka had violated Horio's boundaries; 25 and in 1227, a deputy jito complained that his master's headquarters had just been incinerated. In the latter case, the Bakufu called on the shrine proprietor to summon and judge the two arsonists, over whom it (and not Kamakura) exercised jurisdiction. 26 Most jito, of course, sought to manipulate, not defend, the status quo. They took what they were given and devised one strategy or another to expand the scope of their jurisdiction. Indeed, they took the most common sectors of their own mandates-and exploited them, as nowhere else, for their own advantage. Crime prevention(!) and the collection of taxes bound for proprietors held pride of place here, where malfeasance became all but synonymous with the jito office itsel£ 23. KB, doc. 97 (1216/51!3 shogun ke mandokoro kudashibumi). 24. There are countless examples; see, e.g., DKR, doc. 100 (1205/5/6 Kama gechijo an); LAJ, docs. 18, 27, 37 (1209/7l28 shogun ke mandokoro kudashibumi an, I222/12l23 dazaifu shugosho kudashibumi an, 1228/3/30 Kanto gechijo); and DKR, doc. 66 (1213/n/30 Kanto

gechijo an). 25. KB, doc. 8o (12o6/7/4 Kama gechijo an). 26. KB, doc. 81 (1227/8l24 Rokuhara migyosho an).

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At the beginning of the Kamakura age, no sharp distinction separated police, judicial, and related administrative functions. When the exercise of authority involved any part of the sequence from investigation to pursuit, capture, incarceration, and confiscation of criminals' property, it was referred to as the kendan, or "jurisdiction." 27 Needless to say, this authority was a complex of privileges whose possession would have been highly valued by a jito. Not only would it permit him to use legal force, but it would yield supplemental income and provide a means by which to seek influence over others. The problem, however, was that few )ito were granted the right to exercise the authority exclusively, being commonly obliged to share it with the proprietor's own deputy. Among the fiercest battles of the age, therefore, were those over control of the kendan. The assignment of the policing authority to local officers dated back to Heian times, as did the practice of allowing them to retain all, or part, of any confiscated wealth. In 1174, for example, a gesu and a kumon divided the various holdings of a convicted murderer. 28 The claim on assets was the main prize for two reasons: the wealth itself, and the control it implied over the opening phases of the jurisdictional sequence. A )ito of 1223 could thus consider himself fortunate. When challenged by the proprietor of Miri Estate on the extent of his kendan privilege, he was confirmed by the Bakufu in an undivided authority. How such an arrangement might have come into being is, as usual, unknown, but the }ito was able to cite a kendan that was two generations old. The claim by the proprietor that it was the estate's sotsuibushi who was the rightful holder was rejected by Kamakura as an attempt to distort a long-established precedent. In this instance, then, the jito was confirmed as an estate's chief of police, as well as its lead prosecutor, its highest judge, and its jailer. 29

27. The subject of the kendan has been much studied, from the pathbreaking scholarship of Ishii Ryosuke and Saw Shin'ichi in the 1930s and 1940s, to the recent work by Nitta Ichiro, Ueda Nobuhiro, and Yamamoto Koji, among others; see, e.g., their contributions in Kasamatsu Hiroshi, ed., Ho to sosho; and in Nishikawa Yoichi et a!., Tsumi to batsu no ho

bunkashi. 28. Todaiji monjo, II74/3 so Joshin ge, HI, 7:2835, doc. 3656. 29. Kumagai ke monjo, r223/3lr8 onrsukai Taira bo kudashibumi, KI,

s:rn, doc. 3074.

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But most jito were not so well favored by a domain's customs, and this prompted them to employ strategies of basically two kinds. In the absence of a precedent actually specified as a fractional share, they often worked to aggrandize themselves from the inside out: the jito ofKunitomi, as we noted, is an example. Moreover, when the prevailing division was describable as, say, "one-third," the jito might seek to obliterate that memory, resurrecting it, somewhat later, in altered form. For that matter, both sides in such "percentage" battles used the same tactics, desirous of increasing their share of the total. Thus, in a long-running quarrel that was finally resolved in 1243, the proprietor of Ushigahara Estate claimed that precedent gave him a twothirds share, whereas the jito, for his part, claimed one hundred percent. Former )ito, deputy )ito, and others were interrogated, and the dispute deteriorated into a battle of conflicting affidavits. Ultimately, the jito was awarded victory, though the verdict, it is clear, was guided by little more than hearsay. Whatever the disputed customs, they were "confirmed" in such a way as make the )ito the estate's constable. 30 Other episodes naturally had different resolutions, for example, a case of 1229 involving three claimants. In the words of the settlement: "Concerning the fines extracted from criminals, there are to be three shares-a proprietor's share, a )ito's share, and a tax official's (tadokoro) share." 31 Or in a dispute in Wakasa that was not resolved until 1247, the jito and the proprietor's deputy each claimed total authority, with each asserting a precedent that went back to the age of Yoritomo! The Bakufu did what it could to reconstruct the estate's recent history, even going so far as to solicit testimony from local residents. But it finally admitted that it had failed to uncover the prevailing custom, and it declared, in its verdict, a fifty-fifty division. 32 As a compromise this was, by definition, a violation of custom, revealing something fundamental about how conditions might change. Precedents, though seemingly immobile, were being altered all the time. 30. KB, doc. 88 (I243/7fr9 Kanro gechijo). 31. KB, doc. 90 (I229/7/9 Yoshida-sha azukari dokoro kudashibumi). 32. KB, doc. 89 (I247frol29 Kanto gechijo an). Moreover, except in cases in which ajito and a proprietor were able to cooperate, it is not at all clear how the kendan sequence would have been readily divisible. For such cooperation, see a }ito's hearing of a case and his issuing of a punishment order, in accordance with repeated edicts by the proprietor; Oyamazumi jinja monjo, r2o5/7fr4 jiw Taira bo kudashibumi, KI, 3:242, doc. I555·

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Local disturbances, which proprietors or their agents could not put down, frequently worked to the advantage of a jito. For example, in 1214 unauthorized persons had been hunting and cutting timber on lands that belonged to the Kinzanji of Bizen. The Bakufu, responding to a call for assistance, empowered a }ito to end the trouble, thereby marking not only the start of a }ito's involvement with the kendan authority, but also the beginning of what would become a tempestuous relationship. In the years to come, the }ito would himself be found guilty of violations in the exercise of his police power. 33 As in so many other cases, an officer initially assigned to guarantee local peace ended by disturbing it. The jito as a tax cheat is one of the ultimate evocations of Japan in the thirteenth century. The jito could never become the recipient, only the collector or payer, of the annual tax, and he was thereby separated from the revenues that flowed by right to estate owners. This limitation, which was part of the basic nature of his position, had been Yoritomo's clear intention. As a consequence,jito embezzled, misappropriated, and refused to pay, inventing all manner of exculpatory defenses in the process. For example, when a suit accused a jito of failing to pay more than a fraction of his debt for crops from certain fields for over seventeen years, the }ito claimed that the fields in question had been marshy and fallow, and that the alleged annual levy of twenty-five koku was, in any event, exaggerated. As he grandly put it, "Let the receipts be called in." He also called for an on-site survey and for his own deputy to be interrogated, should any irregularities actually be found. Finally, he protested against being "suddenly rebuked without being informed of details." The agent of the proprietor submitted a point-by-point reply, observing that an on-site survey had actually just been completed and that the lands in question were fully productive and the annual assessment correct. He then produced the receipts to prove all of his points, and showed that the }ito's deputy had been informed from the beginning. The Bakufu's verdict, not surprisingly, went against the jito, ordering him to pay off the accumulated debt of 300 koku over three years. 34

33· KB, docs. 87, 150-51 (r214f9h6 shogun ke mandokoro kudashibumi, 1232/int.9h6 Rokuhara migyosho, 1241/6/n Rokuhara migyosho). 34· KB, doc. 99 (1238/mlr9 Rokuhara gechijo).

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Other jito were deceptive in different ways. We have already noted the subterfuge of mislabeling categories of fields that owed dues at different levels, or of claiming a crop failure and a consequent inability to pay. Increasingly, there were disputes over cash and kind equivalencies, such as one in which a }ito sought to pay off a two-hundred-koku debt with eighty kan in coin. 35 On the other hand, doggedness was probably more effective than artfulness in the long run, as jito, who were ambitious, had to be prepared for campaigns that they likely would not be able to complete. These were wars of attrition that might be waged, indeed, for many decades, with the descendants of the original parties inheriting both the judicial arena and its documentary weapons. One of the most striking of these "hundred years wars" was the seemingly interminable struggle between the Koyasan Monastery and the local }ito to control the resources of Minabe Estate, Kii Province. The hardening of the classic battle lines in Minabe was actually slow in developing, since no jito was appointed until 1221. Nor was Koyasan, that most resilient of all }ito antagonists, wholly in command of Minabe from the start. Its own involvement there deepened only in the 1190s when it was granted a portion of the annual tax by an imperial princess. 36 At the time, the managerial authority lay with the holder of a gesu title, which was soon to come under Koyasan's jurisdiction as welJ.3 7 However, the gesu joined the court side in the Jokyu War, and was replaced, as was customary, by ajito, 38 who viewed his new assignment as an invitation to siphon rents. Within months he had become the defendant in a lawsuit in which he disputed the totals he was expected to pay. Kamakura enjoined him to deliver the customary amount-in effect, obliging a new jito to adhere to an "inherited" package of precedents. 39 35· Koyasan monjo, 1278/12127 Kanto gechijo, KI, 18:47, doc. 13.340. 36. Koyasan monjo, n94f 4 Saiin naishinno-no-cho kishinjo, KI, 2:105, doc. 721. The classic

study of this shoen remains that by Aida Niro in a three-part article: "Koyasan-ryo Kii-nokuni Minabe-no-sho no kenkyu." 37· Koyasan monjo, ?/n/3 naishinno ryoji, KI, 2:106, doc. 723. According to Yasuda, the princess died in 1208, marking the transfer of her remaining authority to Koyasan; Yasuda Motohisa, Shoen, 218. 38. Both the Jokyu crimes of the gesu and the new jito appointment are recalled in Koyasan monjo, 1278/12l27 Kanto gechijo, KI, 18:47, doc. 13,340. 39· Koyasan monjo, 1221/12124 Kanto gechijo an, KI, 5:76, doc. 2901.

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However, a second trial was called before the following year was out, and an even more explicit order was now imposed on the insubordinate )ito: he was to deliver the stipulated totals without fail. 4° From that point forward, revenue disputes· became endemic within Minabe, with charges and countercharges exchanged regularly, leading to promises, truces, compromises, and broken pledges. The )ito himself was replaced in 1247, though not owing to his crimes of peculation but rather to the alleged treachery of his family: he was a member of the ill-fated Miura who fell afoul of the Hojo in that year and were destroyed. 41 But the new )ito was just as grasping as his predecessor, and short deliveries from Minabe simply continued. 42 Finally, a full century after the initial post-Jokyu appointment, Koyasan sought (for the second time) to have the )ito office terminated, but accepted, as a second choice, another compromise: the debt, now calculated at an astronomical 1,396 koku, was to be repaid within a standard three-year limit, with the )ito to be suspended (but not terminated) if he failed to meet the deadline. There were to be additional periods of suspension if requiredY However, no actual solution was ever found, until Minabe itself was finally divided between the ancient antagonists,, a denouement that occurred only in 1393. 44 Few would have been left alive at that point who could remember the Kamakura Bakufu . .fu an example of the )ito-proprietor relationship, this episode may be interpreted in two ways. Perseverance and a series of agreements and judgments that were punitive only in the future may be said to have ultimately favored the )ito. However, it took the holder of that title the better part of two centuries to acquire title to but half an estate. Obviously, Koyasan's tenaciousness had matched that of the )ito point for point. In fact, so, it could be argued, had Kamakura's, with its never wavering calls for restitution. That meant that even if the )ito never got around to making the payments, his 40. Koyasan monjo, I222/91I3 Kanto gechijo an, Kl, 5=125, doc. 2997. 41. Yasuda, Shoen, 219. Though Koyasan sought to have the }ito post canceled outright in 1247, the Bakufu insisted on making a new appointment. 42. The travails of Minabe Estate are brilliantly summarized in the Bakufu's verdict of 1278; see note 38 above. 43· Kongobuji monjo, 13251! Koyasan Rengejoin gakuryo sojo, KI, 37:266-68, doc. 28, 963; Koyasan monjo, 1326/8/21 Minabe-no-sho nengu wayo ukebumi, KI, 38:151, doc. 29, 589. The initial period of suspension of the }ito's authority was to be five years, with the follow-up suspensions, if needed, for three years each. 44· Yasuda, Shoen, 219.

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gains continued to be considered ill gotten, a situation, from a legal standpoint, that never improved. On the other hand, proprietors like Koyasan rarely got what they wanted either-to be rid of ajito entirely, or to have sanctions imposed on ajito that truly hurt. The normal practice was for Kamakura to insist on immediate repayment for small amounts, and to mandate the three-year deadline for larger totals. However, failures to meet quotas tended to be followed by new schedules, heightening the sense of urgency for many proprietors to find other solutions. Direct negotiations, sooner or later, might take place, demonstrating that actions and words were both required and spoke together. Indeed, beginning in the eastern region where proprietors had fewer options, some owners agreed, very early, to a form of"receivership" (ukesho) in which they relinquished the right to send agents into their own estates. They did so in return for a written pledge that the }ito would deliver a fixed tax amount regardless of the harvest. Thus, a }ito in Kazusa Province entered into such an arrangement, promising to forward six hundred tan of secondclass cloth to Kyoto annually. The agreement, which allegedly dated back to the Yoritomo era, was confirmed to a "second-generation" }ito in 1216. 45 An ukesho of 1223 was even more explicit, though the source of the pressure on the tax is not elucidated. In the words of the accord, "This estate has found it difficult, under the custodian, to pay the one hundred rolls of cloth and the one thousand ryo of cash. As a consequence, the annual tax will be paid under authority of the jito." 46 An ukesho of 1232 is more explicit still, including a threat of what would follow if the }ito failed to pay: "Entrance by the custodian is hereby prohibited. Under the authority of the }ito, the fixed annual tax ... shall be paid without fail. ... In the event of his neglect or nonpayment, the [ukesho of the] }ito will be suspended, and an agent of the shrine will administer [the tax]." 47 Conversely, however, a proprietor could not lawfully tamper with such an arrangement as long as the }ito met his obligations. Thus, in a clear test case, an estate owner's attempt to send surveyors to assess a field count and the accompanying yield was denied by the Bakufu. 48

45· KB, doc. 120 (m6/8h6 Kanto migyosho). 46. KB, doc. r2r (1223/8 Todaiji betto kudashibumi an). 47· KB, doc. uS (1232/Shr Tsurugaoka HachimangU migyosho). 48. KB, doc. I24 (r244/7hr Kanto gechijo).

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As we have just seen, Kamakura was prepared to assent to and then defend whatever agreement might be reached by the parties, even when the terms proved unworkable. In Minabe Estate, the newly appointed }ito of 1221 had actually fallen heir to a formal ukesho, which, as we saw, he immediately abused. However, the }ito post itself was not terminated then or later, and neither side could ever seize victory in the subsequent sparring and bargaining. Such a result was actually quite typical, with jito left to press for what continued to elude them, whether acknowledgment of a greater share of an estate's revenues, or recognition of a greater authority over its residents. The status quo was the newest agreement between the parties, or the Bakufu's most recent settlement of their last dispute.

THE

JITO' AND THEIR DEPUTIES

If a substantial amount of time was required for the first deputies of shugo to become "deputy shugo," this was not at all the case with jito and jitodai. There are references to "deputy jito" during the Yoritomo period, and we can even see them being appointed before the end of the twelfth century. 49 They were also conducting local business and issuing documents of their own at the same time 50 and were starting, much like their masters, to get into trouble. The Bakufu addressed their presence in a more or less standard way: by obligingjito to assume responsibility for the good behavior of their own men. Actual implementation, however, might vary. For example, a petition of 1205 from an estate owner prompted Kamakura to promise to send an order to its jito directing the latter to dismiss the offender outright. 5 1 In the same year, however, another complaint of a deputy's misbehavior led to the }ito's being ordered simply to explain the circumstances. The reply by the }ito, moreover, sought to refute the accusation, causing Kamakura to direct 49· E.g., KB, doc. ro8 (n97/6 Hojo Tokimasa kudashibumi). 50. See, e.g., Yoshida jinja monjo, n92/ 4/7 Taira bo kudashibumi, K1, 2:16, doc. 588, for a ji-

todats signature affixed to an instrument of transmission to a daughter; obviously the jitodai was part of the process oflocal confirmation. A document of 1209 shows a jitodai confirming a local appointment in a document of his own composition; KB, doc. III (r209/3/9 jitadai Minamoto bo kudashibumi). 51. KB, doc. II4 (1205/7/8 Minamoto Sanetomo shojo).

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the newly established shugo headquarters to investigate further. In effect, the proprietor's complaint against a jitodai had become transformed into the start of a dispute involving the jito himself. 52 A third case, also from 1205, illustrates yet another variation. In this instance, the Bakufu ordered a cessation of a jitodai's misconduct but took no further steps. It held out no persuasive threat of a dismissal or any other sanction, since to have done so would have required involving the }ito himself, thereby inviting a more complicated procedure than the issuance of a desist order. 53 In fact, none of these courses of action could have inspired much confidence, since each acknowledged that jitodai, lawful and unlawful, stood beyond Kamakura's normal jurisdiction. By inference, jito were autonomous in the supervising and disciplining of their own appointees. As far as we can tell, the Bakufu imposed no organizational restrictions on its first generation of jito. Thus, the latter opened local headquarters and then set about finding the personnel to staff them. Unfortunately, we know little of how any of this might have unfolded, since, in the early period, the Hojo alone issued formal documents of investiture for jitodai, leaving the process unrecorded for all other families. 54 As a consequence, we almost never encounter anything about the circumstances of individual jitodai, making it all but impossible, for example, to determine even the mix of locals and nonlocals. A related question is the extent to which these deputies might have been drawn from a }ito's own family. In fact, there is very little proof that jitodai were drawn from the pool of kin, and I have found only one early example involving siblings. In that instance, a woman appointed a younger brother as her deputy following her own appointment as ajito in 1220. 55 Perhaps the arrangement flowed simply from the fact of her gender, though if that were so there ought to be other examples, since husbands and fathers were now regularly settlingjito posts

52. KB, doc. r6r (12o5/4/22 Kanto gechijo). 53· KB, doc. n3 (12o5/6/5 Kanto gechijo). 54· See note 49 above for an investiture of II97 by Tokimasa. For one by his son, Yoshitoki, see Nitobe monjo, I219f4h7 Hojo Yoshitoki kudashibumi, KI, 4:327, doc. 2494; and for one by Yoshitoki's son, Yasutoki, LA!, doc. 51 (1237f3!I3 Hojo Yasutoki kudashibumi). Later in the period, the Ashikaga joined the Hojo as issuers of jitodai investitures; Saw Shin'ichi, Komonjogaku nyumon, 132. 55· Referred to in LA!, doc. 37 (r228/3/3o Kanro gechijo).

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on wives and daughters. 56 At any rate, those same males seem never to have looked to their brothers (or sons) to serve them in the capacity of jitodai. The explanation must lie in the nature of the two posts, as well as in the complex dynamics ofjito families. As is clear, siblings sought overwhelmingly to be jito in their own right, a deeply ingrained wish that was granted, where possible, by bequeathing parents. In an era in which shiki splitting was becoming increasingly common, parents would have divided jito posts into ever smaller portions before they would ever dream of making one child the deputy of another. Conversely, no son or brother would ever aspire to such a humble assignment, symbolic of abject subordination to one's own sibling. 57 On the related question of whether a jito ever named his own child as his jitodai, the logic of such an apprenticeship, though not the evidence for it, is persuasive. We might conceive of a situation in which a son would be posted as a jitodai in preparation for his being named a successor in his parent's will. However, even though men and women might possess multiple jito posts, and therefore require deputies, there is little to suggest that their progeny were so named. 58 Though children represented their parents in court trials, in battle, and in the performance of guard duty, 59 they seem never to have been referred to as jitodai. 60 Faced with this gap, we are left to suppose that jitodai were either locals 56. See, e.g., the Bakufu's confirmation of the late Nitta Yoshikane's bequest ofjito tides to his wife; KB, doc. 24 (1215/3/22 shogun ke mandokoro kudashibumi an). Also, see the reference to a father-to-daughter transmission in 1210, in LA!, doc. 59 (1239/n/5 Kanto gechijo an). In the post-Jokyu era such transmissions to wives and daughters became commonplace. 57· In the exceptional example noted above (note 55), the brother and sister were soon locked in a dispute, which the Bakufu felt obliged to seek to adjudicate. Presumably, Kamakura would not have become involved had the troublesome deputy been oflow status. 58. Though, e.g., Oyama Tomomasa bequeathed holdings in five scattered provinces to his grandson, his testament is entirely mute on the subject of how they might have been administered; LA!, doc. 41 (123ol2ho Oyama Tomomasa yuzurijo). 59· For a late husband's adopted son representing his "mother" in an inheritance dispute, see DKR, doc. 138 (1238/w/27 Rokuhara gechijo; the relational status is clarified in KB, doc. 140, 1239/5/25 Kanto gechijo). For a son's standing in for his father in court, see LA!, doc. 61 (1241/8/22 Kanto gechijo). For a son's Jokyu War service becoming the basis for a confirmation of his father's jitiJ tide, see KB, doc. 21 (n21/7h6 KantO gechijo; another son had fought on the other side.) For a son's setting off for Kyoto to discharge his father's palace guard duty, see LA!, doc. 27 (1222/nh3 dazaifu shugosho kudashibumi). In this last case, the son is described as a "deputy'' (or "representative," daikan), but I doubt that he would have been thought of as a jitodai, a term we do not see. See note 6o below. 6o. At the same time, a non-kin "deputy" (daikan) might also represent a jito, as in a lawsuit;

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recruited expressly for the purpose, or private retainers dispatched from the east, as in the case of the Hojo. 61 The problem is that the assignments occurred without being recorded, virtually guaranteeing uncertainty both then and now. With nothing written down, nothing was stipulated. On the other hand, with nothing recorded, men of status would likely not have been interested. Locals who possessed no other shiki would have been the leading candidates and might, in practice, have been hard to dislodge once they had been assigned: since there were no investitures, there was nothing to invalidate. Moreover, since jitodai (unlike jito) would have had no pretensions to competing with proprietors over formal rights, their ambitions would have been directed in more practical ways-toward siphoning revenues, stealing movables, and abusing residents. Indeed, they would have had the potential to work either for or against their own masters, bringing us back to the elusive nature of the relationship. Neither the Bakufu nor the petitioners who had grievances are of much help here, referring, all but interchangeably, to jito and jitodai. The gap (if there was one) between strategist and perpetrator is obscured. For example, an unnamed deputy of a newly appointed jito in 1222 was ordered "to cease his ... seizures of the hereditary fertile fields of shrine personnel ... and [to cease] labeling them as belonging to the }ito's share (bun)." The crime, as so described, placed the onus of blame squarely on the deputy, though the Bakufu, in its judgment, stated that "the acts of the }ito are most willful." 62 Perhaps since the }ito was held responsible for the crimes of someone working for him, the court felt it had no need to expose a conspiracy, much less to seek to identify the jitodai by name. The background of the deputy and his relationship with the just-appointed }ito were irrelevant. In the same year, a bill of accusation was lodged with Kamakura in another case. This time we are treated to a tale of a local population under siege. In the words of the petition, "Nine deputy jito from the villages of this estate, five sotsuibushi (constables) and kumon (tax officers), and more than one hundred of their followers have been entering [the homes] of estate

e.g., DKR, doc. 4I (I24o/inuo/n Kanto gechijo). However, the daikan here (as in note 59 above) was probably different from the }ito's locally based jitodai. 61. For the proliferation of the retainer corps of the Hojo, see Okutomi, Kanakura Hojo-shi no kisoteki kenkyu, 2I5-23. 62. KB, doc. 112 (I222/7f24 Kanto gechijo).

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families. Besides [commandeering] supplies with no respite, they have condemned the smallest flaws. The people, entirely blameless, have been unable to endure these hardships and have lost all security. As a result, the temple's annual tax, labor services, and miscellaneous tributes have collapsed." 63 As in the previous case, the Bakufu condemned the jito alone for the breakdown of order. Though the jitodai and the other local officials were the obvious ringleaders, the jito, another new appointee, had to bear the burden of their guilt. In fact, accountability was clearly Kamakura's principal concern in the case, even as it took pains to add a revealing stipulation. Taking note of the multiple jitodai who were running amok, it ordered the deputies to be limited to one each in the north and south of the estate. 64 However, the identities of the offending deputies are not recorded, and there is no reference to how or when they might have been assigned. Moreover, though seven of the total of nine were now to be dismissed, the jito himself somehow escaped the punishment for his deputies' crimes. In fact, a generation later he was still there, locked in another judicial battle with the proprietor, with his deputies, current and former, continuing their reign of terror. Now, indeed, the estate was home to the }ito's "subdeputies" (mata daikan)-perhaps a strategy on his part to elude the stricture against more than two regular deputies. Or perhaps the gap between the jito, who was responsible, and his own subordinates had just become wider, with the hierarchy now having an additional rung. Either way, the reach of effective justice was being sorely tested. 65 When the Bakufu, in 1232, made the jito responsible for all acts committed in his name, it was formalizing a practice that it had adhered to for a long time. 66 To be sure, the law code did not elaborate further, failing to impose concrete restrictions of any kind. Thus, the number of deputies was not stipulated, and neither were they required to be registered and thus named. Still, the Bakufu had taken an important stand, which was played out now in new and interesting ways. For example, in a case of 1238, a jito who was on trial sought to blame a deputy, accusing him of failing to remain in touch. As the

63. KB, doc. n6 (1222/4/5 Kanto gechijo). 64. Ibid. 65. KB, doc. 88 (1243/7fr9 Kanto gechijo). 66. Goseibai shikimoku, art. 14.

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}ito argued it, the deputy, not the }ito himself, had been informed of the alleged irregularities. But the }ito now promised to interrogate his own deputy in order that he might be brought up to date! Unsurprisingly, the judges were unsympathetic to the )ito's plea for leniency, in which he protested his innocence, and his ignorance, on two counts: of any crimes actually committed by his jitodai, and of "the regulation that a shiki holder must bear responsibility for the acts of his deputy." 67 If the notion of "ignorance of the law" was now formally in place, ignorance about jitodai themselves continued to bedevil the judicial system. As we have just seen, a jito might seek protection behind an anonymous deputy; but, more ominously, a deputy might seek to hide behind a }ito as well. In 1252, a jitodai failed to answer a summons with the excuse that only the }ito himself was legally accountable. However, the Bakufu, at least in this case, took direct action by ordering the deputy shugo of lzumo Province to "summon and forward the [accused] deputy jito." 68 Though beyond the scope of the present study, this kind of bypassing of Kamakura's own regular chain of command became increasingly common as time passed. 69 As already suggested, deputy }ito were typically left nameless in documents, with only their land units properly identified. Occasionally, a single given name is recorded, as in an accusation of plundering by ''jitodai Ieshige," or an accusation of false imprisonment by ''jitodai Arimori." 70 The absence of anything more than that brings us back to the set of problems surrounding origins: if jitodai were as universal as they seem to have been, from where, in geographical and class terms, did they come? In 1218, Koremune Tadayoshi, the principal heir of the great Tadahisa of southern Kyushu, signed a local confirmation as a stand-in for his father, and sent it to "the deputy jito for Satsuma," who was to deliver it. 71 In other words, the presumptive heir of a )ito was a }ito-in-waiting, but the jitodai of a whole province did not even merit a name. If, as suggested before, family members were unlikely candidates for 67. KB, doc. 99 (I238/rolr9 Rokuhara gechijo). 68. DKR, doc. II3 (1252/6l27 Rokuhara migyosho). 69. See my "Of Hierarchy and Authoriry at the End ofKamakura," 25-31. 70. KB, docs. r6r, 93 (1205/4122 Kanto gechijo, I2r6/8/r7 shogun ke mandokoro kudashibumi). 71. KB, doc. 44 (I2r8/nl26 Koremune Tadahisa andojo).

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deputy status, holders of named local entitlements were probably equally ineligible. Thus, in the case cited above involving the nine jitodai in a single estate, those who pillaged beside them (the five sotsuibushi and kumon) were referred to separately. Evidently, a gap existed between persons who might be invested by courtier patrons, and those who might be assigned as deputies by jito. The holding of a named tide carried much greater prestige than the derivative authority of a deputy jito. In that circumstance, jitodai, as mentioned earlier, might tend to misuse their trust since they could have had no realistic hope, say, of becomingjito themselves. A handful of cases from Kyushu provide our final insights. As we will recall, a number of small holders, or myoshu, became "small jito" during the era ofYoritomo, with eastern }ito appointed over them in an unknown number of instances (chapter 5, pp. 162-66 above). One of the dynamics that appeared between these two levels of jito was a rivalry between superficial equals, with the easterners seeking to convert the smallholders into deputies. Thus, in an effort that unfolded over several decades, a }ito in chief referred to his local rival as both a myoshu and a jitodai, but never as what he now actually was-a jito in his own right. 72 According to Seno Seiichiro, a single, lengthy sequence of communications between a jitodai and a jito survives from the Kamakura age, involving a locality in Kyushu that became the object of a rivalry between them. 73 Though the status of the deputy is never actually cited as that of a "jitodai," Seno characterizes the relationship with the jito in precisely such terms. 74 The episode is revealing because of its comfortable fit within the changed context of the later Kamakura period. The jitodai was able to serve in the forces deployed against the Mongols, and this emboldened him to seek recognition as an independent gokenin. 75 In other words, once the lowly subordinate struck out on his own, a condition of deputy and master could no

72. KB, doc. 45 (rz48/91I3 Kanto gechijo). 73· Seno, "Jirodai yori jiro e no shojo," 98-roo. Seno transcribes the dozen communications themselves, all from the jitodai to the jito. 74- Ibid., roo. The actual title held by the "jitodai" was shimo sata shiki, suggesting an inferior status. Of course Seno may have been in error in equating these two authorities. In that case, we would no longer have even one sequence of communications between a jitodai and

jito. 75· Ibid.,

IOO-I02.

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longer survive. The basis for a network of deputies was the marked, and continuing, disparity of status between jito and jitodai. As Seno notes, the subject of the jitodai has always been ignored by scholars, as a result of a record that accords them an anonymity commensurate with their social status. 76 They are the unnamed perpetrators in countless episodes oflawlessness in which the jito, themselves named, were then found guilty. But if the relationship throws only glancing light on these omnipresent deputies, it shines as a beacon on the jito as the era's new absentee authorities. An entitlement whose literal meaning was "chieftain over the land" turns out not to refer to a residential officer in probably the majority of cases. Put differently, the local headquarters of a jito did not require the presence of its nominal head. In this regard, the jito was undoubtedly different from the holders of other managerial shiki,77 a condition whose origins are traceable directly back to the n8os. As a consequence of Yoritomo's own largesse, an elite minority of recipients was awarded more than one title, with the posts commonly granted in areas beyond the east. That meant that the awardees had no prior connection with the localities themselves, and most, indeed, were probably unfamiliar even with the provinces in question. From the start, therefore, they had strong incentives to administer their posts at long distance, and to authorize newly assigned deputies to exploit the new windfalls. To the extent that the jito themselves remained in their homelands in the east, the value of far-flung posts would have lain primarily in what could be wrung from them. Of course, estate owners were also absentees, though that status clearly accorded to them much more than it did to jito. As the principal dispensers of estate patronage, they issued the authorizing documents so coveted by the most prominent oflocal men. By contrast,jito attracted mostly the untitled into personal service, who entered into unwritten agreements in which shared expropriation was the primary goal. Yet the arrangements themselves can only be imagined, not analyzed. And thus, as much as we may know about jito as litigants and as family members, we know little of them as the organizers of their distant enterprises on the land.

76. Ibid. 77. The great exception here would be the post of "custodian," or azukari dokoro, of which an unknown percentage would have been held in absentia-just like }ito.

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At any rate, absentee authority, far from being destroyed by the appearance of these elite managers, was given an extended life by them for at least another century. An unknown number of the country's estates became the objects of dual and usually rival forms of legitimation, with the deputies of the two authorities as the main protagonists. The warriors who had themselves all been locally based clients during the Heian age now had their own agents on the ground during the Kamakura era. However, the jito were still the inferiors of their court-based rivals, seeking, by one tactic or another, to obtain what was not yet theirs.

THE

FUTURE

OF

THE

JITO'

Even decades after the office of jito was given its initial form and definition by Yoritomo, the outlines of that basic authority remained fundamentally unchanged. Estate proprietors, local residents, and the two governments were in basic agreement about keeping the jito bound by precedent to the extent possible. Major advances by tide holders required generations, with physical expansion limited to the internal units to which jito duties did not yet extend; jito could not look beyond their own estates. Moreover, estate owners and the authorities in Kyoto oversaw the boundaries that marked local jurisdictions, withjito tending to be no more than witnesses to this unfolding process. ]ito created no new territorial amalgams on their own. 78 Similarly, since performance of duty within shoen was admired but not extravagantly rewarded, there existed no means by which jito might receive what modern managers would call "regular increments." They could improve their lawful percentages by being more efficient; or they could jostle and squeeze and test the law and its protectors instead. If they chose the latter course as so many did, they were likely to have to answer for their behavior in a Bakufu courtroom. Worse still, whereas jito might be found guilty and punished in one way or another, no sanctions were possible against proprietor-plaintiffs who knowingly lodged "false charges" (ranso)? 9 78. ]ito were normally obliged to seek permission for almost anything they were not authorized to do, even, e.g., to open uncultivated fields; see KB, doc. 79 (1229!2!2r Matsura-no-sho ryoke kudashibumi). 79· See, e.g., KB, doc. 124 (r244f7!2r Kanto gechijo). There are many other examples, clustered, in particular, in the 1230s and 1240s; DKR, docs. ro8-r2.

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Ironically, many of the new, post-1221 jito were actually worse off than their predecessors, being handicapped by heavier restrictions and, obviously, a later starting point. Standardized percentages were now introduced for the first time, a departure from the practice of requiring a strict adherence to packages of "precedents." With a much larger contingent of}ito now in farflung areas after 1221, the Bakufu felt it had to make it harder for them to advance to higher levels of autonomy. Kamakura's own new laws and its upgraded judicial procedures of the 1220s and 1230s were aimed unambiguously at its }ito. As a by-product, competition within the families of}ito grew fiercer, exacerbated by the effects of partible inheritance on the relative size of shares. One result was the progressive reduction of unitary entitlements over whole estates. In such an environment, for each }ito who was looking ahead there were others now looking nervously over their shoulders. The legacy bequeathed by Yoritomo started to become less recognizable after about 1270. On the one hand, an increasingly large number of underprivileged }ito were now starting to alienate bits of their inheritance. On the other hand, there were now at least some jito who were squeezing concessions of an unprecedented nature from proprietors. Yoritomo would not have approved of either trend -of}ito who, by virtue of their poverty, were ceasing to be useful members of the Minamoto band, or of }ito who were now advancing their status in new and threatening ways. Indeed, it is hard to imagine Yoritomo easily contemplating what the Bakufu of a century later was prepared to confirm-virtually any kind of agreement that had been duly signed and sealed by the parties. For the founder, jito were estate managers who owed services to proprietors. With the onset of the practice of dividing shoen into separate }ito and proprietor spheres, a fundamental pillar of a stable world-the shiki system-was challenged for the first time. Unlawful behavior by jito could be slowed by Bakufu justice; but provincials who were starting to become estate "holders" was altogether another matter. For the most part, the territorial gains of even the most successful }ito remained limited to a third or a half of individual estates, which were still not registered, in any formal sense, in the jitos' own names. 80 Even had they been, a single half-estate would scarcely have achieved parity for them with the Kyoto-based owners whose holdings might number 8o. See my '']ito Land Possession in the Thirteenth Century: The Case of Shitaji Chubun."

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in the many dozens. On the other hand, even such a modest accomplishment would have been unimaginable in the era ofYoritomo when both the Bakufu and the )ito were in their opening phase. In sum, the indiscipline of }ito is explainable by the limited potential of the original office, which itself was influenced by the new regime's view of its own task. Yoritomo was determined not to give too much away, even as he was obliged to do something for those who had fought as Minamoto. The new )ito shiki fit these requirements effectively. They were a reward vehicle possessed of a real cachet in the n8os, but one that accorded little more that was new than security from arbitrary dismissal by proprietors. In that sense, )ito posts contained a contradiction that was potentially frustrating. Small wonder, then, that their holders sought to test the title's limits and the Bakufu's endurance, and were dismayed to discover that the limits were narrow and the endurance deep. Accordingly, the )ito who were able to enlarge the scope of their offices did so on a necessarily piecemeal basis, and this remained part of a continuing process that had no realistic end. Though few could have foreseen it, the death of the Bakufu would be required before conditions might change fundamentally. The office of }ito, then, was ultimately a Kamakura era phenomenon, which was absorbed, along with other titles, into the non-shiki category of "men of the province" (kokujin) in the succeeding age. In large measure, the )ito represented the country's final experience with the shiki system itselfthat graded hierarchy of titles that always worked to the best advantage of those at the next level up. When the )ito title came to be reconfigured into something that was no longer explainable as rights on someone else's estate, the traditional order was disappearing, and with it the need for the )ito entitlement itself.8 1 81. For an elaboration of this idea, see my "Of Hierarchy and Authority at the End of Kamakura." The book in which that essay appears (The Origins ofjapan's Medieval World) develops the notion of medieval beginnings in the fourteenth century.

Epilogue

As we have seen, the political environment ofJapan in 1200 was substantially different from what it had been only half a century earlier. In particular, the country was now host to two governmental centers, having navigated its way through the dislocations of the n8os. In order to restore stability to the provinces, the provinces were now accorded a new prominence, with a bipolar authority emanating from Kamakura and Kyoto. The two centers, as we have noted, had little choice but to march together, since to have marched in opposition would only have continued the disorder. It was the genius of Yoritomo to have understood the essential priorities-not aggrandizement on behalf ofKamakura's warriors, but some new kind of modus vivendi with Kyoto's courtiers. That the life of one man could have made such a difference is worth pondering. At the outset, Yoritomo had to see the advantage to his own prospects of making the most of Kiyomori's ill-conceived tamperings with the traditional hierarchy. In response to the latter's seizure of governance in n8o, his own position had to be stated in language that seemed appropriate to the crisis, even as its message to the men of the east would be one they had never heard before. It had to contain promises of a type that would be embraced by the warriors he was trying to recruit, while not totally undermining his credibility at other levels. Yoritomo, in short, had to be able to provide patronage to more than fighting men. Thus, no sooner had his movement survived its own most dangerous moment, which was its birth, Yoritomo began backpedaling, and now adopted a stance of law and order in the east. Though this new position tended to distinguish his goals from the aims of many of his men, it transformed him from the chieftain of a Kanro-based war band into the de facto governing authority of a major region of the

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country. When, moreover, persons beyond the east heard what was happening, Yoritomo became a national leader-in-waiting. While the Genpei War lasted, it is hard to imagine Yoritomo's being able to map out much of a blueprint for the future. In particular, there was no way he could have anticipated the growth of the new jito concept, which meant that he had still not found a pivot for his regime by the time the war ended. In the past, victory had always led to rewards from an appreciative court, followed by disbandment and absorption into the traditional hierarchy. Yoritomo only knew that he wanted to avoid such a fate, and this required him to seek some new springboard in order to survive his own success. Significantly, the experiences of the final phases of war had yielded an important lesson. The whole of]apan was still very much one country. Though many scholars in recent years have argued to the contrary, government and society were similarly organized in both the east and west. Public and private estates were governed more or less uniformly in all provinces, and the top level of provincial houses chafed under the same limitations. These families were also structured internally in the same ways. Thus Yoritomo found that he was able to win adherents everywhere and that all of these men wanted basically the same things: a greater security of tenure over their landed holdings, and a greater degree of autonomy from their own kin. Such indeed was the zeal on behalf of these goals that Yoritomo's problem was not too few supporters but too many. In particular when the war was finally won, the country fairly teemed with men claiming to be Minamoto. In n85, then, the horizons ofYoritomo extended over the whole ofJapan, as he sought to find some workable basis for a permanent national authority. .fu we know, the "office" of}ito became that basis, a new name with a new spin for an old managerial authority. Yoritomo would disburse jito entitlements among his men, and position himself as the country's jito in chief In all parts of Japan jito would function in a dual capacity-as the elite appointees of Yoritomo, on the one hand, but as managers on shoen still owned by central proprietors on the other. The consequences of the deployment of this network would go far in setting the parameters of the country's new dual polity. It seems likely that Yoritomo knew early that he would have to become the main conduit between the classes, a listener in the service of competing

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interests. Though his style was naturally authoritarian, he committed himself to decisions based on procedure and fair practice. While never willing to bind his own hands in individual cases, Yoritomo would ground himself in the rhetoric of consistency while also agreeing to mediate the most intractable disputes. He would make himself indispensable to the leading men in both the capital and the provinces. In the final dozen or so years of his life, Yoritomo was preoccupied with the manifold burdens of defining and clarifYing his new regime's limits. Increasingly, he came to understand the virtues of efficiency and organization. For example, whereas he never tired of purging those whose constancy he distrusted, he also introduced bureaucracies over which his personal oversight could not have been more than partial. When he agreed to a combined Minamoto membership made up of provincial cohorts of gokenin, he was effectively announcing his regime's demographic boundaries, while simultaneously institutionalizing its national presence. At the same time, once the notion of a continuing Minamoto entity became a reality, the fiction that it had "always" been there could be promoted. An age of the Taira and Minamoto could now be created, with the outcome of the Genpei War cast as a victory for the whole country. To argue, as I have done, for a more moderate appraisal of the achievements of the n8os flows out of Kamakura's own efforts to forestall the dislocative consequences of its origins. As Yoritomo himself seems to have recognized, the social and political order was not fatally stricken and therefore did not require radical surgery, which might only have led to a genuine confusion between the top and the middle. Positioning himself as a bulwark of the old order, Yoritomo now devised policies of a mostly resuscitative nature. The authority of the principal residents of Kyoto would not be usurped by figures in the provinces, and a time of troubles would not be permitted to spiral downward into anything more dangerous. In fact, as we know, the new regime played a vital role in restoring a viable link between the capital and the provinces, though now, in many cases, diverted through Kamakura. The anguish-filled voices of that decade belonged mostly to shoen owners, who were not quite capable of comprehending the larger picture. All they knew was that their desist orders were now being ignored as never before. Thus they could either issue another order that would likely achieve nothing, or else address their appeals to Yoritomo, urging him to issue one for

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them. As a result, calls for a return to the status quo began to flood the countryside from Kamakura and Kyoto, a condition that came to mark the new Kamakura age. The great unanswered question here is the extent to which the social hierarchy had been genuinely threatened. How deep was the crisis that Yoritomo's actions now helped to avert? To what extent had local men's sense of the possible been raised? That the new regime was itself the expression of the warriors' own aggressive behavior is the only view, albeit the traditional one, that we can categorically reject. The events of 1185 did not represent the seizure of the Japanese heartland by the country's fighting men, since Yoritomo and the Bakufu were now present to ensure that that did not happen. However, the question of the degree of the threat remains a historian's conundrum if ever there was one. In my opinion, few persons of local prominence would have felt they had more to gain by seeking some new and untested form of autonomy. For all the episodes of lawlessness that proprietors recorded in their complaints, there is little to suggest that some new vision was guiding those illegal acts. The violence that is described in our sources was random and intermittent, with neighboring estates very likely having different experiences. Put differently, there were no localized takeovers of anything much larger than the components of old units, and no territorial amalgams, newly claimed by warriors, with expanded boundaries. How do we know this? The documents not only continued to use all of the old geographical and administrative nomenclature, but many, indeed, were the product of efforts to conduct business as if nothing had happened. For all the grievances involving loss that we encounter, the more consistent theme is one of pursuing income in all the old ways. In particular, those types of activities that might have seemed the most susceptible to interruption appear to have survived the war and its aftermath in remarkably good shape. Thus, the worst of the lawlessness did not dampen enthusiasm for buying more land in distant places, and deeds of sale, drawn up in Kyoto, maintained their normal numbers. Moreover, we see nothing more revolutionary in the justifications provided by apprehended outlaws than efforts to retrieve what they alleged to be theirs, or efforts to begin administering what they had just been granted. As we know, an unknown number of claims grew out of managerial "appointments" that were somehow generated locally, the single phenomenon that

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we can characterize as utterly new. But no local person made a play for other than an appropriate level of authority, which no courtier would have wanted for himself anyway. The right to invest, not merely to receive, lay unclaimed beyond the capital. In short, then, men of the provinces were not seeking to bring about the collapse of the social hierarchy, rather only to obtain more within the accepted limits of what they had always been eligible for. In such a context, Yoritomo established the Bakufu with a mandate to ensure that the aspirations of warriors did not rise but rather held steady. In recent years, some scholars have started to advance the notion that because Japan possessed culture zones and was therefore not homogeneous, it was not subject to the sanctions and systems I have described in this book. There was no dominant mainstream since the interstices were so prominent. That the hierarchy did not embrace everyone was of greater moment than its control of the destinies of the elite. Scholars like Amino Yoshihiko and Murai Shosuke have spearheaded historical research into the people and the places that were "unattached." With all respect for the great worth of testing and querying old assumptions, it seems another matter to dispose of them altogether because their fit is seen to be looser than was once thought. The newly important cannot be judged so because it was ignored earlier; and the scaffolding cannot be declared illusory because it did not include everyone. What people were consumed by, as indicated by what they wrote about, cannot be made to defer to what they may have suffered in silence. Moreover, surely it cannot be claimed that the surviving record is somehow less reliable as a guide than the bits and pieces in its margins. Indeed, it is the repetition of themes and subjects that permits us to draw conclusions about what moved the men and women of that era most. Thus when siblings disputed endlessly over inheritances, we can scarcely think, along with earlier generations, that the core of social connectedness resided basically in the family. When Yoritomo went after his brothers with a vengeance, he was scarcely acting in a way that would have been considered abnormal by anyone. Nor can we puzzle over why Kamakura decided to devote the time it did to allowing families to divide and fragment as they wished. Similarly, in view of the unceasing flow of suits against )ito brought by their social betters, how can we deny the centrality of the face-off between that era's principal antagonists, as well as the

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judicial role foisted upon the Bakufu as a result? The sheer volume of written words on such subjects continues to impress, helping us to see that some things are more important, and evocative, than others. Of course, had he been less astute, Yoritomo might have missed some of the signposts along the way. Had that happened, the smoothness of the transition across the n8os would have been affected, and the history of this era would have required a different book.

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Index

Adachi family (Kozuke Province), 22on Aki Province, 26; Kiyomori's governship of, 17, r8, 6r; Noriyori's recruitment in, 92; Taira-related )ito of, II5- r8; Itsukushima Shrine, u6-I7; Kagehiro's governorship of, II7-r8; Kobayakawa family of, 229n; Tsuu and Takahara estates, 229-30 Akuto (outlaw bands), shugo jurisdiction over, 223n Amano Tokage (Kyushu administrator): Kyushu posts of, 159-61, 193; as so-jito of Kozuma Estate, 164; replacement of, in II95> 20! Amino Yoshihiko, cited, 134n, 257 Anrakujuin Temple, 53 Antoku, Emperor (grandson ofKiyomori), J2, 67 Arimori (a jitodat), 247 Aritsune (Teshima, provisional governor of Kii Province), 106-7 Arnesen, Peter, cited, II5-r6, II7 Asakawa Kan'ichi, cited, 72n, no, n2, 153, 154n, 226n Ashikaga Estate (Shimotsuke Province), 50, 53 Ashikaga family (Shimotsuke Province), 53; Minamoto and Fujiwara houses of, 50; Oyama collateral of, 51-52, 70, 77 Awaji Province, 93 Awa Province (Kanto), 139; anti-mokudai policy in, 74-75; Sunosaki Shrine, 75 Awa Province (Shikaku), 92, 221 Azukari dokoro (estate custodians), III, 230; Taira's rights as, 24-25; oflse Shrine, in II30, 55; use of)ito with, u4, 122-23; use of so-jito with, 163; as absentee holders, 249n

Azuma kagami, 6o, 73, 85, 92, 96, 99, r6o Azuma kagami citations: to gokenin, in u8o, 93; to Kamakura )ito, in n85, 102, 108, 126, 127; to Kamakura shugo, in n85, 102, 1078; to Kamakura shugo, in n8o, 104-5; to sotsuibushi, in n83, 105; to Kamakura shugo, in n84, 105-6; to Taira-appointed )ito, u5; to )ito shiki, in u8r -82, n9; to national )ito's origins, 128-29; to Oshu campaign, 143, 145, 193-94; to Kamakura

shugo, in n86-92, 192-93; to Amana as shugonin, 193; and omission of shugo, in n9o, 193-94, 196-97; to hyoromai levies, in u86, 195-96; to Kamakura shugo, in n92-95, 198; to kenin, in n92, 200; to shugo shiki, in II99, 206; to shokoku no shugo, in II99, 208; to order for provincial network, in II99, 209; to complaints against shugo, in 1202, 2nn Bifukumon'in (ex-emperor Toba's consort), II3 Bingo Province: Ota Estate, 24, 179, 227n; Yukiie's governorship of, 83; shugo assignment to, in u84, 105; Yoritomo's purge of, 157-58 Bitchu Province, 93, 219n; shugo assignment to, in n84, 105 Bizen Province: Masamori's governorship of, r6; Yukiie's governorship of, 83; Sanehira's assignment to, 93; shugo assignment to, in II84, 105 Bugyo (administrator): Amana cited as, 193; recorders of gokenin cited as, 200 Bungo Province, 78, r6r Bushidan (warrior bands), misuse of term, 44-45

268

INDEX

Buzen Province, 212 Chancellery of retired emperor. See ln-no-cho Chiba family (Shimosa Province), 40n, 4849; and commendations of Soma District, 54-58; limited autonomy of, 58-59; aligned with Yoritomo, 68, 69; excluded from pre-shugo assignments, 207; as shugo title holders, 209, 22on Chigyokoku (proprietorships), provinces as, 3 Chikanaga (Minamoto, shugosho ofTajima), 203 Chikayoshi (Nakahara, Kyushu administrator), r6r-62; so-jito post of, 164-65; Kyushu shugonin post of, 201, 203 Chikugo Province, 161, 221; Kozuma Estate, !64-65, 227 Children, named as jitodai, 244 Chinjufo shogun ("Pacification General"), Hidehira as, 135 Chinzei administrator (bugyo), Amano cited as, 193 Chubu region: Genpei War in, So-Sz; Oshu campaign recruitment in, 143-44; Yoritomo's purge of, 147-50 Civil governors. See Governors Comitatus {Western prefeudal war band), 44 Commendations: inducements for, 3, 53-54; to Ise Shrine, 46-47, 48-49, 54-58 Commissariat tax. See Hyoromai Confirmations: insufficiency of, by Kiyomori, 21, 27-28, 36; in the Kanto, before u8o, 38; Yoritomo's earliest edicts of, 71-73, 8687; in the west, by Yoritomo, 92, 94; afi:er Oshu campaign, 145-46; ofjiti!, in the Kanto, 176; ofjito, in Kyushu, q6-77; jitodai's role in, 242n Confiscation-type jito. See Mokkan Courtiers: privatized office and land of, 2- 5; levels of, in the Minamoto, 39-40; kangun of, 41; proprietorship rights of, 58, 59; and origin ofjito concept, uo- u; national jito's impact on, 129-30. See also Kyoto Custodians. See Azukari dokoro

Daijodaijin (an imperial office), Kiyomori's promotion to, 20

Daikan (depury), 214; cited with shugo, in u99, 209; superseded designation of, 222; as representative ofjito, 244n

Dainagon (Great Counselor), Yoritomo's title of, 151 Dannoura, battle at (u85/3h4), 96, 99 Dazaifu, the, 125; burning of, 78; Amano's appointment to, 159-61; Kamakura infiltration of, 161-62, 201; shugo's jurisdiction versus, 221 Depury. See Daikan Depury jito. See jitadai Dewa Province: Kyoto's relationship with, 134-35; Yoritomo's land survey in, 140; absence of jito expansion in, 146; absence of shugo in, 193, 219n Doi family, ro8. See also Sanehira; Tohira Dual-poliry initiatives: ofYoritomo, 8, 91, 172-74, 255-56; documents of Nakahara and Kondo as, 97-98; in Kyushu, 159 Echigo Province, 83, 149 Echizen Province: Ushigahara Estate, 16, 82n, 237; Taira's loss of, 31, 81-82, 90; disobedient zaichokanjin of, 40n; use of shugo shiki term in, 107n; use of jito term in, 121- 22; confiscated shugo title in, 219 Edo family, 70 Endo Iwao, cited, 146 Enryakuji Temple (Omi Province), 22 Etchu Province, So Ex-emperors. See Retired emperors Families: central ties ofleading, 5-6; centripetal tendencies ofMinamoto, 40, 45; rivalry of, with common ancestry, 49-50, 99; rivalry of Ashikaga, 50-52; Taira versus Minamoto, 60-61; central versus regional partisanship of, 69-70 Farris, William Wayne, cited, 28, 29, 43n, 50, Il5 Former Nine Years War (1053-62), 41 Friday, Karl F., cited, 44n Fujigawa, battle of (u8o/roho), 75-76 Fujiki Kunihiko, cited, 43 Fujiwara Ashikaga (Shimotsuke Province): Minamoto rivals of, 50; Oyama rivals of, 51- 52, 70, 77 Fujiwara estates, 20, 21, 22 Fujiwara family (Kyoto), 14, 61; central origins of, 5-6; confiscated lands of, by Kiyomori, 20, 21; restored lands of, 22. See also Fujiwara estates

INDEX

Fukabori family (Kazusa Province), 166, 223n Fukuhara (Settsu), 31-32

269

Gunji (district chief), II9 Gyokuyo (Fujiwara Kanezane), 105n, 127, 129n, 198

Gambling, shugo jurisdiction over, 223n Genpei seisuiki, JOn Genpei War (n8o-85): local nature of, 6-7; Taira policies during, 32-35, 79, 81; defeat of Satake and Shida in, 49, 76-77; delayed declaration of, 67-68; Yoritomo's political strategy in, 71-75, 82-84, 86-88; battle of Ishibashi, 75; battle ofFujigawa, 75-76; unauthorized rebellions in, 78-79; ChubuHokurikudo zones of, 79-81, 89-90; Yoshinaka's role in, 80-81, 82-83, 84-85; battle oflchinotani, 90-91; Yoritomo's western recruitment for, 91-94; and use of gokenin term, 93; battle of Dannoura, 96, 99; and use of shugo concept, ro8-9; and use ofjito term, II8-2o Gesu (hereditary manager), II 5; assigned to Tanba Province, 35, 81, 195;jito used with, in n52, n4; jito merged with, in n8os, 121-22, 182; as privately appointed, 12425; jito's replacement of, 156-58, 175-76; post-war resurgence of, 183-84;jito superior to, after n8os, 184-86 Gion Shrine (Kyoto), 185, 214 Go (subdistrict): and Yoritomo's first public decree, 71 -72; jito assignments to, 227 Gokenin (Minamoto housemen, vassals): origin of concept, 9, 93, 141, 151, 152, 196; of Matsura Estate, 25; Wakasa list of, 153; Satsuma lists of, 153-54; without jito status, 154-55; Yoritomo's purge of, in the west, 156- 58; and need for shugo, 192, 208; imperial guard service of, 199-201, 202 Goshi (subdistrict head), andjito post, n6-r8 Go-Shirakawa (ex-emperor, II58-92), 197; and Kiyomori, r8-23, 27, 29, 32, 33; and Taira shoen rights, 24-25; n83/ro edict of, 84, 85-86, 88; and Yoshitsune, 128; death of, 152, 200 Go-Toba (ex-emperor, II98-r221), 153n Governors: Taira network of, 30-31; status of zaichokanjin versus, 39-40; commendation's protection against, 53-54; Yoritomo's right to nominate, 149, 194; shugo's jurisdiction versus, 210-n, 216-17, 218-19 Guard service. See Oban'yaku Gukansho, 2on, 23

Hall, John Whitney, cited, ix, no

Hanbun jito shiki (splitting of jito title), 228n Harima Province, r8; references to shugo in, 105, 107; privately-appointed jito in, 125; jito violations in, 17on; Oyama's shugo post in, 209, 214; shugo violations in, 211- u; daikan violations in, 214; Motokiyo's shugo post in, 215 Hatano family (Sagami Province), 68 Heian period, 14; rise of shoen in, 3-5; confirmations in, 38n, 40, 45; governors versus zaichokanjin in, 39-40; shugo concept in, 103-4 Heiji Incident (n59), 17, r8, 23, 57, 6r-62 Heiji settlement (n6o), r8 Heike (Taira), 26 Hidehira (Fujiwara, governor of Mutsu), 13536 Hideyoshi (Satake, uncle ofYoritomo), 76 Hiei, Mount, 15, 22, 32 Higo Province, q, 78 Hiraizumi district: Kyoto's relations with, 134-35; Yoritomo's campaign in, 136-40 Hiromoto (Oe, advisor to Yoritomo), ro8, 140, 227n Hirosue (Taira, jito in the II 6os), 121 Hitachi Province, 49, 95; Yoritomo's wartime victories in, 76-77; references to jito in, n8, 127; shugo's jurisdiction in, 223n Hitsatsune (Nakahara, Kyoto agent ofYoritomo), 97, 159 Hizen Province, 162, 201; Kanzaki Estate, 16; Saga Estate, 165-66 Hogen Incident (n56), 17, r8, 23, 47, 51, 56, 59, 61-62 Hogen settlement, 18 Hojo family (Izu Province), 141; Yoritomo's marriage into, 65, 66-67; takeover of Chubu provinces by, 148-49; takeover of Wakasa Province by, 157;jitodai investiture by, 243· 245 Hokurikudo division (oshn campaign), 144 Hokurikudo region: anti-mokudai rebellion in, 78; Yoritomo's campaign in, 79-8o, 89-90; Yoshinaka's wartime role in, 8o81; rents restored in, 83-84

270

INDEX

Hon )ito, q6-77 Honke (patron), 24 Honshu region, 92-93 Horio Estate (Owari Province), 235 Hoshi (sub-sub-district head), n3 Hotta Shozo, cited, 143 Hyakurensho, 106 Hya-kusho (untitled persons), as commenders, 43 Hyoromai (commissariat tax): and Taira gesu appointment, 35n; and kuni-jito experiment, 129n94, 172, 195-96; Ise Shrine's petition against, 179-80; shugo abuse of, in 1221, 2!6 Hyuga Province: gokenin list of, 153;jito assignments in, q6, 177 Ichiki Collection, 57n Ichinotani, battle of (n84h), 90-91 Iekage (Izawa, personal deputy ofYoritomo), 140 Iesada (Taira, retainer ofKiyomori), 26 Ieshige (a jitodai), 247 Iga Province, 15, 87, 108, 217; reference to shugo and sotsuibushi in, 106; reference to jito in, n4 Iida Hisao, cited, 173n Inaba family (Wakasa Province), 15, 108-9, 156-57 Income register, example of, 229-30 Inheritance: during Heian period, 38, 40, 41, 45; of Chiba managerial title, 55-57; of jito post, after 1205, 181; Yoritomo's policy on, 227-28 Inland Sea, 16, 96 ln-no-cho (chancellery of retired emperor): privatization role of, 14-15; and Kiyomori, 19, 21, 27, 28; and Yorimori, 20; closure of, 30 Iriki family (Shimazu Estate), 165 Ise Province, 15, 82, 85, 108; reference to shugo in, 107; reference to )ito in, 126-27 Ise Shrine, 147; Oba's commendations to, 46-47; Chiba and Yoshitomo's commendations to, 48-49, 54-58; central ties of, 58; Yoritomo's gifts to, 82; petitions against )ito by, 179-80, 181 Ishibashi, battle of (n8o/8f23), 75 Ishii Ryosuke, cited, 86n, 197n Ishimaru Hiroshi, cited, 3m

Ishimoda Sho, cited, 18n, 27n, 36n, 194-95, 197n Itsukushima Shrine (Aki Province), n6-17 Iwami Province: constableship appointment to, 87; Yoritomo's recruitment in, 92, 9394; reference to shugo in, 198; Kamowake Ikazuchi Shrine estate in, 212-13 Iwashimizu Shrine (Kyoto), 21, 107, 174; guard service exemption for, 202, 203, 214 Iyo Province, 78, 92; Yoshitsune's governorship of, 99-100; Kono family of, ro8-9 Izumi Province, 201, 219n Izumo Province, 43, 94, 214 Izu Province, 144; Yoritomo's early years in, 65, 66-67; Mishima Shrine, 71; Yoritomo's wartime offensive on, 71 Jingoji temple (Kyoto), 87

]inushi (local magnate), as substitute for jito, 121 Jisho era name (n77-81), 82 ]ito (estate steward): burdens of, on Kamakura, 8, 124-25, 139, 169-73; confirmation and confiscation types of, 9, 175-77; absentee holders of, 9-10, 249-50; Taira's limited use of, 36, n5-18; dual creation view of shugo and, 102-3, ro8, 128-29, 207-8, 223; public versus private origin of, no-n; evolution of term, pre-n8o, 1n-18; Kanto's wartime use of, n8-2o; evolution of term, n8o-85, 121 -28; Yoritomo's formal authority over, 128-30, 168-69, 174, 187, 254; eligibility for post of, 141, 175, 177, 181-82, 226; following Osha campaign, 145-46; purge of, in Chubu, 14748; gokenin without status of, 154-55; purge of, in Wakasa, 156-57; concentric appointments of, in Kyushu, 161-66; in jurisdictional disputes, qo-71, 236-38; and patronage considerations, q8- 8o, 187, 228; heritability of, 181, 227-28; usage of gesu with, 184-87; province-sized experiment in, 194-96; in cases against shugo, 213; retained Kanta birthrights of, 223; diverse recipients of, 226-28; splitting of, 228n; rights and duties of, 228-30; claims to precedents by, 231-35, 256-57; victimizers of, 235; in tax disputes with proprietor, 238-41; in ukesho agreements, 241-42; jitodai's fusion with, 242-43, 245-47;)ito-

INDEX

dai as kin of, 243-44;jitodats communication with, 248-49; limited advancement by, 250-52; kokujin category of, 252 ]itodai (deputy jito): reference to, in 1220, 112; references to, in n8os, 122-23;jito's fusion with, 242-43, 245-47; geographic/kin sources of, 243-45; named title's authority versus, 248;jito's communication witlr, 248-49 ]ito myo (name-fields), 230 ]ito-myoshu ("residents in those locales"), wartime reference to, 120 ]itonin (jito persons), n2 ]ito ni nozomu (going to the site), nr ]ito tsukuda (lands surroundingjito's residence), 230 ]o family (Echigo Province), 149 Jokyu War (1221), 154, 181, 185; shugo's jurisdiction after, 215-17 Juei era name (n82-84), 82, 83 Kaga Province, 170n, 178 Kagechika (oba family, Sagami Province), 73 Kagehiro (Saeki, retainer of Kiyomori), 26, rr6-17 Kagetoki (Kajiwara, general ofYoritomo), 87n; in Genpei War, 92-93; and Masuda documents, 94; indiscipline of, 95, 98; cited as shugo, ro5-6, ro7n, 193; in Oshu campaign, 143; and Nagashige, 149; purge of, 182, 208; omission of shugo title for, 194 Kageyoshi (Oba family, Sagami Province), 73 Kai Province, 95, 219n Kajishi (land rental), 53, 55 Kajiwara family, ro8, 207 Kamakura, 7, 8-9, 42, 46, 77-78 Kamakura Bakufu, 50; reassessment of, ix-x, 255-57; burdens ofjito on, 8, 124-25, 139, 169-73; Kyoto's n83 agreement with, 84, 85-86; and twin network concept, ro2-3, ro8, 128-29, 207-8, 223; formaljito authority of, 128-30, 168-69, 174-76, 187, 254; Oshu policy/campaign of, 13946, 150-51; purge ofChubu by, 147-50; formal gokenin network of, 151, 152- 55; purge ofWakasa by, 156-57; purge of Bingo by, 157-58; Kyushu policies of, 15966; concentric jito appointments by, 16166;jito policy of, after 1205, 181-82; gesu policy of, 182-87; formal shugo network

271

of, 208-n; response of, to shugo misbehavior, 212-14, 215-20; and shugo's judicial role, 220-22; response of, to jito disputes, 230-42;jitodai-jito fusion by, 242-43, 245-47 Kamakura ibun, xi Kamowake Ikazuchi Shrine (Kyoto), 212-13, 229ll Kanenobu (Itagaki, jito of Suruga), 147 Kanetaka (Masuda, constable ofiwami), 93, 94 Kanezane (Fujiwara, imperial regent and ally ofYoritomo): Gyokuyo, 105n, 127, 129n, 198; on Hidehira, 135, 136-37; on death of Yoshitsune, 137 Kangun (government army), 41 Kannoshi ("administrator for agriculture"), in Hokurikudo, 89-90 Kannushi (priest-administrator), n6 Kanto region, Jill; status of, before n8o, 3738; the Minamoto's absence from, 38-39, 44; provincial government officials of, 3940; Yoshitomo in, 45; Yoritomo's repatriation to, 65-66; wartime response from, 67-69; restored rents in, 79, 83-84; Kiyomori's isolation of, 79-80; references to jito in, n8-2o, 176; jito misbehavior in, 139 Kanto zokuto (eastern rebels), 33 Kanzaki Estate (Hizen Province), 16 Kasai family, 70 Kasai Sachiko, cited, 143 Kasuga Shrine (Yamato Province), ro5, 221 Kawachi Province, 184n; Kongoji Temple, 213 Kawane Yoshiyasu, cited, 38n Kazusa family (Kazusa Province), 48, 54-55 Kazusa Province, 139; Yoshimoto's activities in, 46, 48-49; anti-mokudai policy in, 74; Fukabori family of, 166, 223n; so-jito placements in, 166; ukesho agreement in, 241 Kebiishi (police captain), ro4, 121-22 Kendan (policing authority): of the Miura, 47; based on precedent, 236; battles over share of, 236-38 Kenin (housemen), 200 Kenin bugyonin (administrator of housemen), II97 directive on, 203-5 Kidnapping crime, shugo's jurisdiction over, 217

272

INDEX

Kii Province, 35n, 87; reference to shugonin in, ro6-7; reference to jito shiki in, IIJ; prohibition ofjito in, 178-79; guard service exemptions in, 202-3, 214; absence of shugo in, 219n; Minabe Estate dispute in, 239-41, 242 Kikaigashirna Island, 16on Kikuchi Takeo, cited, 3m Kiley, Cornelius J., cited, no Kin. See Families Kinkoku no sotsuibushi (horne provinces), 98 Kinnari (Tachibana, deputy ofYoritorno), 92 Kirokujo (central judicial agency), 173 Kiso family, Son. See also Yoshinaka Kiyornori (Taira): conflicting views of, 6; governorships of, 17, n5, n6; in shared power alliance, 18-21, 27, 28; marriage strategies of, 20, 21; weak provincial network of, 21, 25-31; takeover ofKyoro by, 22-23, 62; shoen relationships of, 23-25, 27; Fukuhara strategy of, 31-33; wartime policies of, 32-36, 79-8o; death of, 35; and Minamoto Yoshishige and Yoshiyasu, 50n; reasons for ascendancy of, 6o-62; and Yorirorno's repatriation, 65-66;jito policy of, II5-16, II7 Kiyoshige (Kasai, deputy ofYoritorno), 139, 141 Kiyowara family (Iwami Province), 139 Kobayakawa family (Aki Province), 229n Kofukuji Temple (Yamato Province), 32, 33, 79. 219n Kokuga (provincial headquarters), 74 Kokugaryo (provincial holdings), 3; numbers of, versus shoen, 94 Kokujin ("men of the province"), 252 Kongoji Temple (Kawachi Province), 213 Kono family (lyo Province), 99-100, ro8-9 Korehira (Taira, governor oflse), 15n Korernune family, 206. See also Tadahisa Koreyoshi (Ouchi, deputy ofYoritorno), ro6, 148, 193· 200 Koyosan Monastery, 158; Yoritorno's relations with, 178-79; guard service exemptions for, 202-3; in Minabe Estate dispute, 23941, 242. See also Ota Estate Kozuke Province, 49-50, 66, 76, 220n Kozurna Estate (Chikugo Province), 164-65, 227

Kurnagai-go (Musashi Province), pre-n85jito title in, II9 Kumon (tax officers), in case againstjitodai, 245-46, 248 Kunihira (Fujiwara), 138 Kunihira (Kondo, Kyoto agent ofYoritorno), 97· 159 Kunijito (province-sized jito posts), 194-96 Kuni-no-miyatsuko (indigenous elite), 39 Kunitorni Estate (Wakasa Province), 157; suit againstjito in, 231-33, 234 Kyo-gata no zaika ("court-related crimes"), 223-24 Kyoto: leading families' ties to, 5-6; Kiyornori's role in, 19-20, 22-23, 33-34, 61; government's move from, 31-33; Minarnoro ties to, 38-40, 42, 45, 51, 52; liberated from Taira, 82-83; u83/ro edict of, 84, 85-86; Karnakura representatives in, 88-89, 97-98; compensation of warriors by, 98-99; national }ito's impact on, 129-30; Hiraizurni's relations with, 13435; Yoritorno's state visit to, 151; revived kirokujo of, 173; and Karnakura's gesu policy, 183, 185-86. See also Courtiers Kyuden (paddy), 229 Kyuhata (dry fields), 229 Kyushu: Tadarnori's role in, 16; Kiyornori's role in, 18, 61; Yorirorno's commendations in, 92; Yoshitsune's role in, roon, 128; jitO appointment to, in II47• n2-13; privately appointedjito in, 124-25; Oshu campaign recruitment in, 142, 145; Kondo and Nakahara's appointments to, 159; Arnano's appointment to, 159-61, 193; concentric jito appointments to, 161-66; confirmation-type jito in, 176-77; shugosho's origin in, 201 -2; jito-jitodai communication in, 248-49 Lower Ikusawa Shrine (Sagami Province), 227n Maki Kenji, cited, 195n Mareyoshi (Minarnoto, brother ofYoritorno), 92 Masako (Hojo, wife ofYoritorno), 65 Masako (Taira, custodian ofMatsura Estate), 25 Masarnitsu (Oyama), 52

INDEX

Masamori (Taira), 15-16, 43-44, 6r Masuda documents, 92-93n, 93-94 Masu kagami, 106, 197n Mata daikan (jito's sub-deputy), 246 Matsumoto Shinpachiro, cited, r8n Matsura Estate (Hizen Province), 25 Matsura family (Hizen Province), r6rn, r62n Meiun (abbot ofEnryakuji temple), 22 Michinobu (Kono, magnate oflyo Province), 146n Mikawa Province, 81 Mimasaka Province, r6-17, 105, 143 Minabe Estate (Kii Province), jito-proprietor dispute over, 239-41, 242 Minamoto family: central origins/ties of, 56, 38-40, 42, 45, 51, 52; kinship tendencies of, 6, 40, 45, 6o; and reconfigured "Minamoto" name, 7, 75, 94-95; Taira ascendancy and, 13-14; in Hogen and Heiji incidents, q, r8; and Kiyomori's Fukuhara strategy, 32; and reassessed feudal development, 41-45, 52-53, 59-61, 256-57; Ashikaga offshoots of, 50, 52; wartime response of, 67-71; Kyoto occupation by, 82-83;jito eligibility of, 141, 175 Mino Province, 81, 148; purge ofjito in, 147; Oi Estate, 184 Miri Estate (Aki Province), 236 Mishima Shrine (Izu Province), 71 Miura family (Sagami Province): Yoshitomo's alliance with, 47-48; response of, in Genpei War, 68, 69-70; excluded from preshugo assignments, 207; as shugo title holders, 209, 220n Mochihito, Prince, 32, 67, 68, 71 Mokkan (confiscation-type jito}, 177-78 Mokudai (agent of governor), 30, 56; Yoritomo's policy against, 74-75 Moriko (Taira, daughter ofKiyomori), 20, 22 Moritoshi (Taira, steward ofTanba), 25, 26, 35 Motokiyo (Goto), 219n; pre-shugo ofSanuki, 208; shugo of Harima, 215 Mototsuna (Goto, shugo ofEchizen), 219n Motozane (Fujiwara, imperial regent), 20 Muhon (rebellion): ofYoshinaka, 84n; shugo's jurisdiction over, 204-5, zn; in law code of 1232, 216; in shugo definition of 1222, 216; usages of term, 226n Munakata Shrine (northern Kyushu), 24-25

273

Munemori (Taira, son ofKiyomori), 34, 35 Murai Shosuke, cited, 257 Murder. See Setsugai Musashi Province, 46; family rivalries in, 48; references to jito in, n9; Oshu campaign leaders from, 144 Mut6 family (northern Kyushu), 206 Mutsu Province: Yoriyoshi's governorship of, 41; centrally owned shoen in, 134; Kiyoshige's appointment to, 139; Iekage's appointment to, 140; Hojo hegemony in, 141; absence of jito in, 146; absence of shugo in, 193, 219n Mutsu waki, 41 Nagaoka Estate (Owari Province), 235 Nagashige Go), 149 Nagato Province, 198 Nakada Kaoru, cited, 195n Nara temples, 219n; Kiyomori's attacks on, 24, 33; Kasuga Shrine, 105, 221; collapsed estates of, 174; Saidaiji Temple, I74 Nejime family (Osumi Province), 154 Nihon shoki, 103 Nii family (Iyo Province), 99 Nijo, Emperor, 19 Nitta Estate (Kozuke Province), 49 Nitta family (Kozuke Province), 50 Nobufusa (Torno, official of Shimazu Estate), II2-IJ

Nobuyoshi (Takeda, shugo in Suruga and Totomi), 104-5 Noriyori (Minamoto, brother ofYoritomo), 127; in Kyoto, 85; in battle of Ichinorani, 90-91; wartime recruitment by, 92; and Masuda documents, 94; in Kyushu, 96, 98, 10on; Kamakura's reassignment of, 159 Noto Province, 31, 82 Oba family (Sagami Province), 46-47, 69-70 Oban service, pre-Kamakura, 199n Oban'yaku (imperial guard service): gokenin's provision of, 154, 155, 199-201, 202; control of zaichokanjin via, 199; Iwashimizu's immunity from, 202-3, 214; Koyasan's immunity from, 202-3; combined with criminal jurisdiction, 204, 205; in edicts against shugo, 213; in shugo definition of 1222, 216; in law code of 1232, 217 Oi Estate (Mino Province), 184

274

INDEX

Oki Island, 43 Omi Province, 85, 207; Yoritomo'sjito posts in, 170n, 178; reference to sotsuibushi in, 198; Tenpukuji Shrine, 227n Onjoji Temple, 32 Oryoshi (provincial sheriff), 104, 201 Oshu campaign (n89), 137-38; Yoritomo's policies following, 139-41, 145-46; national recruitment for, 141-45, 150-51; army's command structure in, 144 Oshu Fujiwara family (Mutsu and Dewa provinces): Kyoto's relations with, 134-35; Yoritomo's campaign against, 136-38, 14243; exile of, 140 Oshu sobugyo ("Northern Administrators"), 141 Osumi Province, 170n; gokenin list of, 15354; references to jitiJ in, 176, 177; separate jito and gesu titles in, r85 Ora Estate (Bingo Province): Shigehira's custodianship of, 24; Bakufu's confiscation of, 157-58; Koyasan's proprietorship of, 179; Yasunobu's jitiJ title to, 227n Otomo family, 206 Otomo monjo, 203n Outlaw bands. See akutiJ "Owari no kuni gebumi," 39n Owari Province: governors as zuryo in, 39n; Yukiie in, 8r;jito as "site" in, n8-19n65; Yoritomo's purge ofjito in, 147-48; Horio and Nagaoka estates, 235 Oyama family (Shimotsuke Province), 51-52, 70,77> 207,220n Partible inheritance, 40, 45 Privatization, of office and land, 2-5, 14-15 Proprietors (ryoke): shoen network of, 3-5; Taira as, 24; and inheritance disputes, 45; violations of Soma shoen by, 54- 59; petitions for jitiJ dismissals by, 177-78, 1798r, r83; reinstatement of gesu by, r85 -86; hyoromai collections from, 195-96; in kendan disputes, 236-38; in tax disputes with jito, 238-42; in ukesho agreements, 24142; false charges against jito by, 250 Provinces: landholding categories in, 3; expansion of shoen in, 3-5; Kiyomori's weakness in, 21, 25-31; Kamakura's expanded jurisdiction over, in n85, 97-98 Provinces of the west: wartime recruitment

in, 91-94; Yoritomo's rewards to, 150; Yoritomo's purges of, 156-58 Provincial warriors: reassessed development of, as elite class, ix-x, 41-45, 52-53, 596r, 256-57; limited autonomy of, 2, 5-6, 58-59; shiki eligibility of, 4-5;jito and gokenin status of, 8-9; Kiyomori's conversion of, 30-31; without Heian-era shoen, 40; family considerations of, 69-71; Yoritomo's compensation of, 71-75, 86-87, 89, 206-7; in national upheaval, 95-96; Court's compensation of, 98-99; consequences of violence by, 173-74; low status of, with pre-shugo posts, 206-7

Ranso (false charges), by proprietors against jitiJ, 250 Rebellion. See Muhon Receivership (ukesho) agreements, 241-42 Religious institutions: Yoritomo's special patronage of, 91, 178-8o; consequences of violence against, 173-74; petitioning immunity from shugo, 2II-I4;jito assignments to, 227 "Remembered narrative" approach, 38n Retired emperors: in-no-chiJ office of, 14-15, 30; Shirakawa, 14-r6, 43; Taira's alliance with, 15-21, 6r; Toba, r6-17, IIJ; on crisis of self-appointed jito, 124-25; Go-Toba, r53n. See also Go-Shirakawa; In-no-cho Rokuhara (Bakufu branch), 2r9n Rokujo-in chapel, 15 RotiJ (warrior units), Kiyomori's conversion of, JO-JI Rozeki (outrages), omitted from shugo jurisdiction, 204, 205, 2n Rusu family, 140 Ryoke. See Proprietors Sadatsuna (Sasaki): shugo ofiwami, Nagato, and Omi, 193, 198; siJtsuibushi of Omi, 198 Sadler, A. L., cited, 65n Saga Estate (Hizen Province), 165-66 Sagami Province: Kamakura headquarters in, 42, 46, 77; Yoshitomo's activities in, 4648; Yoritomo's rewards in, 73; references to jito in, II9, 127; reference to jito-myoshu in, !20; Sasaki family of, 207; shugo of, 220n; Lower Ikusawa Shrine, 227n Saidaiji Temple (Yamato Province), 174

INDEX

Saisho (provincial tax office), 157 Sanehira (Doi, general ofYoritomo): wartime recruitment by, 93; indiscipline of, 95, 98, 179; as shugo, 105-6 Sanemasa (Usami), 144 Sanetomo (Minamoto, third Kamakura shogun), 41, 14m Sankajo ("the three regulations"), 215 Sansom, George B., cited, 38n, 134n Sanuki Province, 92, 93, 208; Tachibana family of, 108-9 Sasaki family (Omi and Sagami provinces), 207 Satake family (Hitachi Province), 49, 76 Sato Shin'ichi, cited, 86n, 219n, 223-24n Satsuma Province, 126; references to shugo shiki in, 107n; gokenin lists of, 153-54; references to jitiJ in, 176, 177; separate jitiJ and gesu titles in, 185; directive to jitiJ kenin from, 205-6 Sei-i-tai-shogun ("barbarian-subduing great general"): Yoshinaka's title of, 85; reference to, in n95, 203 Seno Seiichiro, cited, 20m, 248-49 Setsugai (murder), 204-5; in shugo definition of 1222, 216; in law code of 1232, 217 Settsu Province, 87, 199; Fukuhara Estate, 3132 Shida family (Hitachi Province), 49, 76-77 Shigehira (Taira, son ofKiyomori), 33, 229n Shigeie (Takada), 147 Shigeko (Taira, consort ofGo-Shirakawa), 25 Shigemori (Taira, son ofKiyomori), 20, 22, 28, 29 Shigetada (Hatakeyama, general of Yoritomo), 144, 163 Shigetaka (Yamada, governor ofSado), 147 Shigetsumi (Yamada, village-level jitiJ), II9 Shiki system: central control of, 4-5, 38; and jitiJ shiki II47 citation, m-13;jito's violation of, 129-30, 168-69, 251-52; and shugo shiki II99 citation, 206 Shikoku Island, 91, 96; Iyo Province, 78, 92, 99; Sanuki Province, 92, 93, 108-9, 208; Tosa Province, 92, 198; Awa Province, 92n, 221; Yukiie's appointment to, 128 Shimazu Estate: Oshu recruitment from, 142-43; Amana's intrusions into, 16on; siJjitiJ appointments to, 164, 165 Shimosa Province, 139, 144; Yoshitomo's

275

activities in, 46, 48-49; Soma District, 54-56, 57; anti-mokudai policy in, 74;jitiJ as "site" in, u8-19n65; Yoshisada's governorship of, 148; shugo of, 220n; shugo's jursidiction in, 223 Shimo sata shiki (title ofjitodai), 248n Shimotsuke Province: Yoshitomo's failures in, 49-51; Fujiwara-Ashikaga of, 77; reference to jitiJ in, n9; shugo of, 220n Shinano Province, So, 95 Shi'nin no jitiJ (privately appointed jitii), 12324 Shinoda Minoru, cited, ix, 68n, n9n Shirakawa (ex-emperor, w86-u29): privatized authority of, 14-15; Masamori's alliance with, 15-16, 43; Ushigalrara Estate of, 16n Shiraku Estate (Tanba Province), 24n Shishigatani Affair (n77), 22 Shoen (estates): center's control of, 3-4, 58, 59; shiki system of, 4-5; Taira relationships with, 16, 18-19, 24-27, 35; Taira number of, 23-24, 31; three categories of, 24; zaichokanjin in, 40; decree against, to Yoshiie, 42-43; commendations of, to Ise Shrine, 46-47, 48-49, 54-58; inducements for incorporation of, 46-47, 53-54; Kamakura intrusions into, 78-79, 87-89; numbers of, versus kokugaryo, 94; and jito's origins, no;jitii assignments to, 227;jitiJ and proprietor spheres of, 251-52 Shogun: Yoritomo's appointment as, 152-53, 197, 200; as hereditary post, 181 Shugo (provincial constables), 8, 9, 191; dual creation view ofjitiJ and, 102-3, 108, 12829, 207-8, 223; Heian use of term, 103-4; evolurion of term, n8o-85, 104-7; omission of wartime references to, 108-9; and registers of gokenin, 152-55, 192, 199-201; as "tideless" authority, 192, 197-200; Azuma kagamPs references to, in u92, 192-93; Azuma kagami's omission of, in II90, 193-94, 196-97; and shugosho office of n95, 201 -2; documentary evidence of, in II97, 202-6, 208; low warrior status of, 206-7; formalized nerwork of, 208-n; choice of name, 210; jurisdictional complaints against, 2n-14; jurisdiction/mandate of, 215-20, 222-23; judicial role of, 220-22

276

INDEX

Shugo ("to provide security"), II97 directive on, 205 Shugodai (deputy shugo), 222 Shugonin (protectors), !OJ; wartime use of term, ro6-7, ro9; postwar use of, withjito, 125, 223-24n; Amano cited as, 193; references to, n92-95, 198; Koreyoshi cited as, won; sotsuibushi replaced by, 202-3 Shugo no bushi to (protector-warriors), ro7, 193 Shugo shiki, use of, on n85/8h4, !07 Shugosho (protection headquarters of the Dazaifu), 203; preliminary to shugo office, 201-2 Shugosho cho (edict of protection headquarters), 20m So (monk), claiming status of jito-gesu, 122 Sogesu (steward in chief), 35, 81, 195 So-jito: uses of title, outside Kyushu, 162-63; Tadahisa as prototype for, 163-64; unclear rationale for, 164-66 Sokan (a military authority under Taira), 34, 81 Soma Estate (Shimosa Province): Tsunetoki's commendation of, 54-55: Tsuneshige's hereditary managership of, 55-56; Tsunetane's commendation of, 57 Sotsuibushi (constables), !OJ, ro4, ro9; earliest reference to, ro5, 192; confused with shugo, ro5-6; Amano cited as, 193; Yoritomo's national authority for, 197; replaced by shugonin, 202-3; on income register of 1223, 230; in case againstjitodai, 245-46, 248 Subcustodialland rights, ofTaira, n56-n8o, 25, 27 Sub-jito, 164-66 Sukeyori (Muro, shugo ofHizen), 161-62, 201, 215 Sunosaki Shrine (Awa Province), 75 Suo Province: Yorimoto's recruitment in, 92; jito violations in, 170n; gesu assignment to, 184; jito assignments to, 22 7n Suruga Province, ro8; anti-mokudai policy in, 74; battle ofFujigawa in, 75-76; shugo assignment to, ro4-5; purge ofjito in, 147; Hojo's takeover of, 148 Suzuka, Mount (Omi Province), 205n Tachibana family (Sanuki Province), 108-9

Tadahisa (Koremune, Kyushu administrator), 16on; jitii post of, 126; as Oshu recruiter, 142, 143, 194: gokenin roster of, 154, 155n: Kyushu post of, 161-62, 214-15; as so-jitii prototype, 163-64, 165; kenin budgyonin duties of, 203-4, 205-6, 208, 2n; shugo incumbency of, 214-15 Tadamori (Taira, father ofKiyomori), 16-17, 61 Tadasue (Tsutsumi, coordinator ofWakasa's gokenin), 156, 157, 163 Tadayoshi (Koremune, shugo ofEchizen), 219, 247 Tadokoro (tax official), in settlement dispute, 237 Taga (Mutsu headquarters), 140 Taibon sankajo ("three regulations for great crimes"), 215 Taikenmon-in (ex-emperor Toba's consort), 122-2Jn Taira family, 7, 8, 9; central origins/ties of, 56; conflicting views of, 13-14; ex-emperors' alliance with, 15-21, 61; shoen relationships of, 16,18-19, 24-27, 35; takeover of Kyoto by, 22-23; shoen totals of, 23-24, 31; provincial retainers of, 25-30; rewards program of, 28, 36; governorship portfolio of, 30-31; Fukuhara strategy of, 31-32; wartime policies of, 32-35, 79-82; limited jito policy of, 36, n5-18; Chiba and Kazusa offshoots of, 48, 54-55; kinship cohesion of, 61; Prince Mochihito's decree against, 67; in battle of Fujigawa, 75 -76; driven from Kyoto, 82-83; in battle of Dannoura, 96; and Kamakura jitii policy, 125-26, 127-28, 161, 171, 172, 181-82 Tajima Province, 15, 203 Takahara Estate (Aki Province), income register for jito of, 229-30 Takaharu (Hara), 90n Takahashi Tomio, cited, 134n Takakura, Emperor, 21 Takebe Estate (Omi Province), 170n Takeo Shrine (Hizen Province), 159n Takeuchi Rizo, cited, 27n, 134n Tameyoshi (Minamoto, grand nephew of Yoshitsuna), 44, 45, 61, Son Tanba Province, 16, 170n, 178; sogesu post in, 35, 195; privately-appointed jitii in, 124; and Gion Shrine, 185

INDEX

Tankei (priest in Kii Province), conveyance of jito shiki by, n3 Tara Estate (Wakasa Province), 157 Taxes: shoen's immunity from, 3, 53-54; jurisdiction over, in Sagami, 47; }ito-proprietor disputes over, 238-42. See also Hyoromai Tenpukuji Shrine (Omi Province), 227n Toba (ex-emperor, II03-56), r6-17, II3 Todaiji temple, 15, 136; Shigehira's burning of, 33; Yoritomo's judgment for, 87; Ouchi's judgment for, ro6; and Oi Estate, 184; references to shugo and, 198; complaints against shugo by, 2n-12 Tohira (Doi, son of Sanehira), n9n Tokaido division (Oshu campaign), 144 Tokimasa (Hojo, first Hojo head): as Yoritomo's guardian, 65; ancestry of, 66-67; Kyoto mission of, 128; jito dismissals by, r8o, r8r; province-sized }ito posts of, 194, 195; jitodai investiture by, 243n Tokisada (Inaba, Wakasa Province), 156-57 Tokuko (Taira, daughter ofKiyomori), 21 Tomoie (Fujiwara, district-level jito), II9 Tomoie (Hatta, general ofYoritomo), 144 Tomomasa (Oyama, son ofMasamitsu): as shugo of Harima, 209, 244n; shugo incumbency of, 214-15 Tomomune (Hiki, agent ofYoritomo in Hokurikudo), 89-90 Tomonaga (Minamoto, son ofYoshitomo), 51 Tomotsuna (Fujiwara,jitiJ in Iga), 90n, 126 Tomozane (police captain in Echizen), 121-22 Tosando division (Oshu campaign), 144 Tosa Province, 92, 198 Toshitsuna (Ashikaga), 50 Totomi Province, 79, 104-5, ro8, 148-49 Tsuibushi (constabulary official), 104 Tsuito no senshi (formal punishment declaration), 137 Tsuitoshi (subjugation officer), 35n, 104 Tsukai (agent), cited with shugo, 209 Tsunekane (Chiba, brother ofKazusa Tsunetoki), 54 Tsuneshige (Chiba, father ofTsunetane), 5556 Tsunetaka (Sasaki, pre-shugo of Awaji, Awa, and Tosa), 208-9 Tsunetake (Nakatsukasa, shugo afTosa), 198 Tsunetane (Chiba, son ofTsuneshige): inheritance of Soma to, 55-57; war banner of, 137;

277

Tokaido division under, 144; Kamakura's reassignment of, 159, 207; so-jitO post of, r65 Tsuneroki (Kazusa, brother of Chiba Tsunekane), 54-55 Tsurugaoka Hachimangu Shrine (Kamakura), 77 Tsushima Province, 43, 107 Tsutsumi family (Wakasa Province), 207 Tsuu and Takalrara estates (Aki Province), income register for }ito of, 229-30 Uchida Minoru, cited, n9n, 120n Ukesho (receivership) agreements, 241-42 Usa Shrine (Buzen Province), 212 Ushigalrara Estate (Echizen Province), r6, 82n, 237 Utaisho ("Great Captain of the Right"), Yoritomo's title of, 151 Utsushi (later copy of document), doubtful authenticity of, 223- 24n Uwayokote Masataka, cited, III Varley, H. Paul, cited, ix Vassals, see Gokenin Wada family (Sagami Province), 209 Wakasa Province, 15, 90; Taira's loss of, 31; Inaba family of, ro8-9; Minamota and Taira survey of, 153, 156; Yoritomo's purge of, 156-57; Kuniromi suit in, 231-33, 234; kendan dispute in, 237

Wttrrior Government in Medieval japan (Mass), 9 Warriors. See Provincial warriors Watanabe Tamotsu, cited, 85n Wills, 38n, r8r, 228 Women,jito posts of, 227, 243-44 Yamanouchi family (Sagami Province), 47, 68 Yamashiro Province, 170n, 219n Yamato Province: Kofukuji Temple, 32, 33, 79, 219n; Kasuga Shrine, 105, 221 Yasuda Motohisa: on Taira as proprietors, 24n; on Yoshiromo's four provinces, 46, 49; on dual polity, 97; on use of sotsuibushi, ro4n; }ito inventory of, 146, 176n, rnn, 226n; on so-jito in Kyushu, r63; on jito-hyoromai link, 195n; on Yoritomo's national shugo authority, 197n; on Koyasan's jurisdiction, 239n

278

INDEX

Yasuhira (Fujiwara, son ofHidehara), 136, I37-3S Yasunobu (Miyoshi, advisor to Yoritomo), I5S, 227n Yasutoki (Hojo, third shogunal regent), 243n Yoriie (Minamoto, second Kamakura shogun), 41, r8o, 20S Yorimori (Taira, Kiyomori's brother), 20, 25 Yoritomo (Minamoto): dual polity initiatives of, S, 91, 172-74, 255-56; and Kiyomori, 33, 6r; repatriated to Kanto, 65-66; provincials' wartime response to, 67-71; first public decree of, 71 -72; rewards program of, 71-73, S6-S9, 92, 94, 145-46, 150; aristocratic origins of, 73-74n; antimokudai policy of, 74-75; defeat ofSatake and Shida by, 76-77; compromise offer to Taira by, 79n, 79-So; Court's formal recognition of, S4, S5-SS; Kyoto headquarters of, SS-89; recruitment in the west by, 91-94; postwar goals/policies of, 9699; and Yoshitsune, 99-100; and twin network concept, 102-3, ro8, 128-29, 207-8, 223; formal jito authority of, 12S-3o, r6S69, 174-76, rS7, 254; and Hidehira, 13536; Oshil policy/campaign of, 139-46, 150-51; purge ofChubu by, 147-50; formal gokenin network of, 151, 152-55, 199, 255; Kyoto state visit by, 151; shogun appointment of, 152-53, 197, 200; purge ofWakasa by, 156-57; purge of Bingo by, 157-58; Kyushu policies of, 159-66; concentricjito appointments by, r6r-66; patronage considerations of, q8-8o, r87, 22S; gesu policy of, rS2-S7; province-sized jito experiment of, 194-96; death of, wS; as national leader, 253-55 Yoriyoshi (Minamoto, general and courtier), 41, 137 Yoshichika (Minamoto, son ofYoshiie), 15, 43-44, 6r Yoshihira (Minamoto, son ofYoshitomo), 51 Yoshihiro (Shida, brother ofYoshitomo), 49, 77 Yoshiie (Minamoto, general and courtier), 41-43> 45> 46 Yoshikane (Minamoto), rS4n Yoshikata (Minamoto, son ofTameyoshi), Son Yoshikazu (Hiki, general ofYoritomo), 144

Yoshikuni (Minamoto, son ofYoshiie), 49 Yoshimitsu (Minamoto, brother ofYoshiie), 49 Yoshinaka (Minamoto, first cousin of Yoritomo), So-Sr, S2-S3, S4-85, 144 Yoshinao (Otomo, adoptive son of Chikayoshi), r6r-62 Yoshisada (Yasuda, shugo in Suruga and Totomi), 104-5, r4S-49 Yoshishige (Nitta, uncle ofYoshitomo), 4950, 75 Yoshitoki (Hojo, brother-in-law of Yoritomo), 14m, 149, 243n Yoshitomo (Minamoto, father ofYoritomo): the Kanto's reaction to, 44; and Oba family, 46-47; and Yamanouchi family, 47; and Miura family, 47-48; and Chiba family, 48-49, 56-57, 59; failures of, in Shimotsuke, 49-51; reassessed warrior autonomy of, 52, 59-61; and Tsunetane, 56, 57; death of, and Kiyomori's prospects, 65-66; and Satake Hideyoshi, 76 Yoshitsuna (Minamoto, brother ofYoshiie), 44> 45 Yoshitsune (Minamoto, brother ofYoritomo), 94; in Genpei War battles, S4-S5, 90-91, 96; provinces under, SSn; Kyoto document responsibilities of, S8-89; Iyo governorship of, 99-100, 127; Kyushujito post of, roon, 12S, 195; and Hidehira, 136; death of, 137, 13S Yoshitsura (Taira, shugo of Izumi and Kii), 20I

Yoshiyasu (Ashikaga, uncle ofYoshitomo), 50 Yoshiyasu (Ichijo, courtier), 90n Yoshizumi (Miura, first chieftain), 13S Yowa era name (nSr-S2), S2 Yukiie (Minamoto, uncle ofYoritomo), So, 81, S2-S3, uS, 144

Zaichokanjin (resident public officials), 43; status of governors versus, 39-40; of Yoshitomo, in Sagami, 47-4S; and Yoritomo's anti-mokudai policy, 74-75; of Yoritomo, in Iwami, S7, 92, 93-94; of Yoritomo, in the west, 150; guard service for control of, 199; excluded from preshugo assignments, 207 Zuryo ("recipients of wealth"), governors as, 39-40

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Mass, Jeffrey P. Yoritomo and the founding of the first Bakufu : the origins of dual government in Japan I Jeffrey P. Mass. p. em. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN o-8047-3591-3 (cl. : alk. paper) 1. Japan-Politics and government-794-1600. 2. Aristocracy (Social class)-Japan-History. 3· Right of properry-Japan-History. 4· Land tenure-Japan-History. 5· Minamoto, Yoriromo, 1147-1199. I. Title. JQI631.M365 2000 320.452'09'022-dc21 99-37920 CIP §This book is printed on acid-free, archival quality paper. Original printing 1999 Last figure indicates the year of this printing: o8 07 o6 05 04 03 02 01 oo 99 Typeset by BookMatters in 111!4 Adobe Gararnond