Xenophon’s Peloponnesian War [ebook ed.] 3110668319, 9783110668315

Citation preview

Aggelos Kapellos Xenophonʼs Peloponnesian War

Trends in Classics – Supplementary Volumes

Edited by Franco Montanari and Antonios Rengakos Associate Editors Stavros Frangoulidis · Fausto Montana · Lara Pagani Serena Perrone · Evina Sistakou · Christos Tsagalis Scientific Committee Alberto Bernabé · Margarethe Billerbeck Claude Calame · Jonas Grethlein · Philip R. Hardie Stephen J. Harrison · Richard Hunter · Christina Kraus Giuseppe Mastromarco · Gregory Nagy Theodore D. Papanghelis · Giusto Picone Tim Whitmarsh · Bernhard Zimmermann

Volume 82

Aggelos Kapellos

Xenophonʼs Peloponnesian War

ISBN 978-3-11-066065-4 e-ISBN (PDF) 978-3-11-066831-5 e-ISBN (EPUB) 978-3-11-066737-0 ISSN 1868-4785 Library of Congress Control Number: 2019945527 Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available on the Internet at http://dnb.dnb.de. © 2019 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston Editorial Office: Alessia Ferreccio and Katerina Zianna Logo: Christopher Schneider, Laufen Printing and binding: CPI books GmbH, Leck www.degruyter.com

Foreword I have spent quite a few years trying to grasp Xenophon. Focusing more vigorously on the great historian I have written a series of papers devoted to Xenophon’s Peloponnesian War but this was not enough for me, since I felt that there was still a lot of space for research and the completion of a monograph. It is a proof of Xenophon’s greatness that newer generations of scholars have increased their interest in reading and writing about him. My practice has been to cite works of respected scholars which I have found particularly useful, because their incisive, original work on Xenophon has changed our (my) understanding of him. Without their research current scholarship on Xenophon would be much diminished. I acknowledge these works on every page of this book. Whenever I disagree with them, this does not mean that I disapprove of their effort to interpret Xenophon. In fact, this disagreement has greatly sharpened or clarified my own thought. So this book is a venture of adding to the massive Xenophon bibliography1 with the conviction that despite or rather because of all of the previous work, original and useful insights are still possible. Very few books are written without assistance. I shall always remain grateful to the scholars who generously left their own research to make mine possible. It is an honor and pleasure to acknowledge the many personal debts accumulated during the writing of this book. Words cannot express the tremendous gratitude I owe to Professor I.N. Perysinakis (University of Ioannina) for the care and attention he has been giving me for many years, from my days as a student to the completion of my thesis and then of my commentary on Lysias 21. I thank him for our endless, enjoyable discussions on matters of methodology and content during the writing of this book. Suffice it to say I have learned far more from him than this book reveals. My thanks go to the assistant professor Dr. M. Tamiolaki (University of Crete), who encouraged me to pursue my research in Germany. In preparing this study I have been assisted by DAAD in 2012, which awarded me a visiting fellowship of two months at the University of Heidelberg under the hospitality of Professor J. Grethlein. My work in the library of the Department of Klassische Philologie and the UB Heidelberg was productive and enjoyable thanks to the warm welcome and instant help of all the people there. For the publication of this monograph in the series Trends in Classics I am most grateful to the editors, Professor A. Rengakos (University of Thessaloniki) and Professor Montanari (University of Genoa) once again. Moreover, I am most

 1 See Tuplin and Hobden, 2012, 2 n.3 for recent bibliography on Xenophon. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110668315-202

VI  Foreword grateful to Professor P.J. Rhodes (University of Durham) and Professor C.J. Tuplin (University of Liverpool) for careful reading and strenuous criticism: their natural modesty forbids me to laud them in the terms they deserve. It is enough to say that with their avuncular concern for my interests they have helped me to complete this book. I also express my gratitude to Professor D. Konstan (Brown University) for his eagerness to read the present study and his continuous support for my research interests. A big part of this book is devoted to emotions. I could not have written my work without his valuable works. My citations on friendship owe much to his book Friendship in the Classical World, which he sent me as a present. I have the honor and pleasure to express my gratitude to Professor F. Pownall (University of Alberta) for her constant support in reading my works on Xenophon and now the present book. The fact that our interests overlap and my thought follows her work several times has been a blessing for me. I thank Professor T. Rood (University of Oxford) for his willingness to read an earlier draft of that part of the book which now constitutes Chapter 4. His works have been inspirational for my research on Xenophon. I also thank Professor A. Chaniotis (Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton) for his advice and encouragement to pursue my present investigation to its very end and Professor A. Papathomas (University of Athens) for his valuable advice and actual support in seeing this study concluded. The influence of my examiners and the other aforementioned scholars must be regarded as present throughout the work. Their perceptive and informed criticism has saved me from errors. Nevertheless, I did not follow them in all their remarks. So for possible omissions or mistakes the responsibility is mine. I am grateful, beyond the ability of words adequately to express, to my parents, who have patiently endured my many difficult moments arising from this effort. There is no doubt that my morale and enthusiasm has been sustained by them, especially my mother. However, I shall not dedicate this book to them. I shall give my sentimental priority to my little daughter Sotiria-Athanasia. Her birth has made me more than happy and strong to complete the present study.

Contents Foreword   V Introduction  1 Xenophon and modern scholarship  1 Interpreting Xenophon’s Peloponnesian War  2 Methodology  3 Chapter 1: Alcibiades and Athens  10 . Alcibiades’ military intervention in the Hellespont  10 . Alcibiades and Tissaphernes  15 . Alcibiades’ preparations for a sea battle against Mindarus  16 . Alcibiades at Cyzicus  17 . The sea battle at Cyzicus  20 . Alcibiades’ collection of money  21 . Thrasyllus as a general: an implicit contrast with Alcibiades  23 . Alcibiades’ financial and military action continued  30 . Cyrus’ intervention and the Athenian reaction  36 . Alcibiades before his return  39 . Alcibiades and the Plynteria  41 . Alcibiades’ return and the reaction of the mob  44 . The supporters of Alcibiades  46 . The dissenters  65 . Xenophon’s assessment of Alcibiades  66 . Alcibiades’ arrival at the Peiraeus  67 . Alcibiades’ defense speech and the reaction of the Athenians  69 . Alcibiades commander-in-chief  71 . Alcibiades and the Mysteries  75 . Alcibiades’ departure  77 . Lysander and Cyrus  79 . Alcibiades and Tissaphernes again  83 . Alcibiades at Notium  85 . The victory of Lysander  89 . The Athenians’ reaction towards Alcibiades  90 . Alcibiades’ flight from Notium  93 . The aftermath of the defeat at Notium for the Athenians  96

VIII  Contents Chapter 2: Callicratidas’ generalship  98 . Callicratidas vs Lysander and the Persian money  98 . Callicratidas and the Milesians  113 . The military action of Callicratidas and his economic problems  119 . Callicratidas’ end  126 Chapter 3: The trial after Arginousai  133 . The military events after the sea battle at Arginousai  133 . The deposition of the generals  140 . The reaction of the generals  141 . Archedemus’ trial against Erasinides  142 . The generals in the Council  144 . The meeting in the Assembly  145 . The two fold scheme of Theramenes  151 . Xenophon’s assessment of Theramenes  159 . Xenophon’s assessment of Callixenus  162 . The trial of the generals  163 . The speech of Euryptolemus  174 . The aftermath of the trial  209 Chapter 4: Athens against Lysander at Aegospotami-the end of the war  217 . The situation in the Spartan fleet  217 . Lysander’s return  217 . Cyrus and Lysander: the last encounter  219 . Spartans and Athenians before the battle of Aegospotami  220 . Xenophon’s two striking ‘ellipses’  226 . Lysander’s movements  229 . The appearance of Alcibiades  232 . The generals’ reaction: their political and personal motives  236 . Lysander’s attack  242 . Lysander, Philocles, Adeimantus and the execution of the Athenian prisoners  247 . Lysander after the defeat–the reaction of the Athenians  252 Chapter 5: Conclusion  255 Xenophon as a historian  255

Contents  IX

Bibliography  261 Index of Sources  277 General Index  291

Introduction Xenophon and modern scholarship Hellenica Books 1–2 is the only fully extant narrative of the end of the Peloponnesian War written by a contemporary author, Xenophon. The Hellenica as a whole is a historical work1 which corresponds to contemporary definitions of the historical genre.2 On the other hand, it does not present itself to its readers with any programmatic explanation, save that implicit in the formal fact of continuation of Thucydides’ account3–and that is a formal fact which does not allow us to assume anything about Xenophon’s purpose / viewpoint4 except that the war was a historical phenomenon whose complete narration was desirable. Moreover, the protagonists of the Hellenica all have elements of ambiguity about them, sometimes apparently admirable, sometimes not, a fact which gives the opportunity to the readers to respond to them in differing ways (as is apparent from the differing views found in modern literature).5 Therefore, figuring out the overall effect and thus inferring the author’s point and purpose is peculiarly difficult.6 Our only way to make out what we are meant to make of Xenophon’s narration is to read it and assess, episode by episode, the impact it seems calculated to make on the reader, by taking into consideration (a) what we think we might be able to know of other ancient views on the question7 and (b) of what we can be more certain of knowing about Xenophon’s personal world view8 and his history-writing practice elsewhere in his oeuvre9

 1 See Tamiolaki, 2008, 15–52. 2 See Nicolai, 2014a, 67. 3 See MacLaren, 1979, 228–232. 4 For a survey of the attempts of older scholars to define Xenophon’s purpose see Tuplin 1993, 14–18. 5 See e.g. Prentice 1934, Higgins, 1977, Proietti, 1987, Roisman, 1987, Gray, 1989, Krentz, 1989b, Due, 1991, Moles, 1994, Laforse, 1998, Pownall, 2004. 6 For this important issue see the studies of Gray, 1989 and Pownall, 2004. 7 Cf. the alternative historical traditions in Plutarch’s Parallel Lives and especially in our case the Lives of Alcibiades and Lysander and Diodorus Siculus’ Bibliotheca Historica. For the legitimacy of this approach to Xenophon’s text cf. Most, 1994. 8 See Dillery, 1995. See Gray, 2012, 1–61 about Xenophon’s theory of leadership. 9 Cf. Xenophon’s Cyropaedia, Anabasis, Agesilaus and Memorabilia. See Tuplin, 1993, 18–20. For a comparison of the common historiographical themes in the Anabasis and the Hellenica see Marincola, 2017, 106–115. For the historiographical dimension of the Cyropaedia see Tamiolaki, 2017, 182–189. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110668315-001

2  Introduction (without forgetting the differences of opinion that exist about when he wrote this section of his history).10 Moreover, Xenophon occupies an odd place in the modern history of Greek historiography, in the sense that he is often treated as though not quite belonging to the canon. Classicists study Herodotus, Thucydides, Polybius and fragmentary historians as much as they study Xenophon.11 However, some scholars implicitly regard Xenophon as doing his own thing–or they just pick (odd) bits that can be related to standard topics of historiographic study.12 Working on the section of Xenophon’s history that implicitly interacts with Thucydides offers an opportunity to examine this phenomenon. This is another aspect of literary location that potentially could have an impact on the discipline, since the advances in Xenophontic studies of the last generation have still not resulted in a definitive literary treatment of the Hellenica 1–2.13 For these reasons Xenophon’s description of the Peloponnesian War deserves closer examination.

Interpreting Xenophon’s Peloponnesian War It is the purpose of this project, based on the framework sketched above, to show that Xenophon has crafted his narrative in such a way as to reinforce the opinion of his predecessor Thucydides, whose work he continued, that the development of the Peloponnesian War depended to a great extent on Persian money, but the factors that ultimately determined its outcome were the moral virtues and the skills of the military leaders of Athens and Sparta. In regard to Athens, I argue that what Xenophon wants to show is the fact that despite Persia’s support of Sparta, the leading city of Greece lost the war because of (a) its troubled relationship with Alcibiades; (b) the moral disintegration of the Athenians who condemned illegally the Arginousai generals; and (c) the appointment of generals who were greatly inferior. Concerning Sparta I argue that Xenophon leads us to believe that in spite of–not because of–the interference of Persia in the Peloponnesian War14

 10 See Tuplin, 1993, Gray, 1991, 201–228, Dillery, 1995, 13–15, Gray, 2004, 132. 11 See e.g. Fornara, 1983, Marincola, 1997. 12 For this tendency in scholarship see Tuplin, 1993, 11–18. 13 For instance, Krentz’s fine commentary, 1989b, oscillates between historical analysis and literary assessment. Proietti, 1987, Gray, 1989 and Pownall, 2000; 2004 have offered studies important for our understanding of Xenophon’s Hellenica 1–2 but they have not exhausted the subject. 14 Tuplin, 2009, 341 shows that Persia does not appear in the Hellenica as a component of Greek history in its own right. In my analysis I attempt to strengthen Tuplin’s argumentation.

Methodology  3

and its continuous economic support for Sparta,15 the moral and military qualities of Lysander16 and Callicratidas were what turned the course of the war either in favor of or against Sparta in each phase of the war.

Methodology I will attempt to shed more light on the text by performing a careful close reading of it, following the opinion of Tuplin17 that this is the most important evidence for the interpretation of an ancient literary composition, and treating it in a linear fashion because of the chronological sequence of the events narrated by Xenophon,18 but, most important, because of the structure of the work, which relates one theme to another. In my investigation I deal with a number of high-profile personalities (Alcibiades, Lysander, Callicratidas, and also Conon and Philocles) and a number of high-profile episodes (Alcibiades’ military achievements, his return to Athens, the Athenian defeat at Notium and Lysander’s victory, the meeting between Lysander and Cyrus, the short conversation between Lysander and Callicratidas, the failure of Callicratidas to meet Cyrus, the events preceding and following the sea battle at Aegospotami) by focusing on Xenophon’s literary versions of these figures and events. By reopening questions relating to the political and military career of these men19 and Xenophon’s presentation of the aforementioned facts, I hope that that this work will be a contribution to classical scholarship, since it will: (a) shed further light on the literary character of the work;20 (b) offer a new interpretation of passages and themes for which there is scholarly debate;21 (c) put emphasis on passages that scholars have not pointed out and which offer important insights into the thought of Xenophon22 and (d) shed new light on the depiction of individuals in Greek literature.23  15 Krentz, 1989b, 86 says that ‘Xenophon appreciates the Persians’ importance’. 16 Cartledge and Debnar, 562 have remarked that the Spartans ‘eventually defeated the Athenians and did so in large part through the brilliant ruthlessness of the Spartan Lysander, in command of a Peloponnesian fleet funded by Persian gold’ (my emphasis). 17 Tuplin, 1993, 18. 18 For this choice of Xenophon see Riedinger, 1991, 102 who talks about ‘une veritable loi de succession’. 19 Cf. e.g. Bloedow, 1973, Due, 1987, Pownall, 1998 on Alcibiades. 20 Cf. e.g. Gray, 1989, Riedinger, 1991, Kapellos, 2012. 21 Cf. e.g. Krentz, 1989b, and Tuplin, 1991. 22 Cf. e.g. Herman, 1987. 23 Cf. Brown Ferarrio, 2014.

4  Introduction In my approach I shall argue for a conceptual unity of the Hellenica.24 When somebody reads all the Hellenica, he realizes that, although it is a complete work, the books of the Hellenica are implicitly linked by Xenophon’s casual references forward and back to what he has written or will write;25 references which often span hundreds of modem pages and criss-cross the whole work. This means that a great deal of interpretative space is left for readers to draw their own lessons. Ultimately, it is up to readers to provide answers based on how they understand Xenophon’s narrative.26 On the basis of the historian’s choice of this kind of writing I will attempt to shed light on specific issues, for instance Theramenes’ character. Of special importance in my research will be intertextuality, more specifically the fact that Xenophon continued the history of Thucydides, which reflects a coherent interpretation of the war,27 and presupposed that his readers knew his predecessor. In this regard, taking into consideration that the first two books of the Hellenica continue the history of another historian is a necessary precondition for understanding many features of this work,28 which are not fully treated or given any explanation in modern scholarship. Thus, I shall build on Rood’s thesis that Xenophon expected his readers to make verbal and thematic links between the two works in order to realize his own message of the facts and the persons included.29 What surfaces from Xenophon’s text about his audience is that he wrote the Hellenica for fellow aristocrats,30 Athenians, Spartans and other Greeks.31 On the other hand, the issue of Xenophon’s audience is a tricky question. Someone might say that it is impossible to say just how much knowledge of Thucydides Xenophon’s readers had. This means that we cannot be certain about the character and range of responses we can expect on the part of an ancient reader of the Hellenica. This is right, but I believe that an adequate connection and comparison between the two authors was possible for those readers who had the time and

 24 See Gray, 1989. 25 For this reading of Xenophon’s Hellenica see Kapellos, 2018, 5. 26 See, Flower, 2017, 304. 27 See Rood, 1998. 28 Thus my interpretation of the Hellenica argues that Krentz’s argument that Xenophon may have not read Thucydides’ last book before the continuation (see 1989a, 15–18) cannot be right. 29 See Rood, 2004. 30 See Kelly 1996, 149–163; Pownall 2004, 65–112. 31 For Xenophon writing for a panhellenic audience see Gray, 1989, 181–82. Cuniberti, 2011, 62– 63, 67–68 argues that Xenophon writes for Spartans and friends of Spartans from the Peloponnese.

Methodology  5

leisure to study the texts carefully.32 I may remark that for Xenophon leisure was an ideal which characterized a class-determined lifestyle.33 Thus his readers had leisure and therefore would have been able to read Thucydides’ and his account and achieve a rich interpretation of the Peloponnesian War.34 But although I insist that Xenophon expected his readers to respond to Thucydides’ work, my investigation is an attempt to make sense of what Xenophon says on his own terms.35 In specific points of this investigation, I shall also argue that Xenophon presupposed that his readers knew Herodotus.36 This book will try to put his prospective readers in the position of the Athenians and the rest of the Greeks, who read the Hellenica.37 Intratextuality will also play a significant role in my investigation. I will put emphasis on Xenophon’s account of the Syracusan generals’ exile by the demos (1.1.27–31). It is my belief that the recounting of this story, which seems a kind of παρέκβασις,38 bears a meaning for the interpretation of Books 1–239 and it deserves to be examined carefully.40 It will appear that in this way the passage about the Syracusan generals gains a larger significance than it might seem to have at first reading.

 32 Cf. Plut. Mor.604d1 who classifies ἀνάγνωσις as one of the activities during σχολή. 33 See Johnstone, 2010, 140. 34 For such enriching interpretations of Xenophon’s Hellenica see more recently Baragwanath, 2012, 316–44, 2016, 32–57, 2017b, 155–71. 35 For this necessity when we read Xenophon and compare him with Thucydides see Dillery, 1995, 9–10 and Marincola, 2017, 106–6. Cf. Ludwig, 2017, 515–30, who argues that we must approach Xenophon as a Socratic reader of Thucydides. 36 See Tamiolaki, 2008, 33. Cf. Gray, 2012, 1–54. 37 We should not identify ancient with modern readers at least for one reason, that is because their moral standards are not always the same (see Ludwig, 2017, 519). 38 I say ‘a kind’ because Xenophon declares when he wants to deviate from his main narrative linguistically (see Buijs, 2005, 11). 39 See Krentz a, 1989, 103 who connects the Syracusan democracy’s exile of its generals and the Athenian democracy’s execution of its generals after Arginousai. 40 Henry, 1967, 9 argues that 1.1.27–31, where Hermocrates bids farewell to his soldiers, is not an important scene. Anderson, 1974, 65 thinks that Hermocrates is simply mentioned as an example of how a general should behave to his men. However, Due, 1991, 50 points out that by finding, combining and understanding contrasts and parallels, echoes, references and allusions, we will be able to grasp the full meaning of Xenophon’s text. Riedinger, 1991, 66 considers the episode of the Syracusans an exemplary incident. Pownall, 2000, 513 argues that the episode of Arginousai introduces narrative devices such as the anticipation of parallel episodes and the privileging of positive models through which Xenophon reinforces important themes in the Hellenica. I shall follow this line of thought in my analysis.

6  Introduction I will also focus on an important facet of Xenophon’s method of writing in the Hellenica, i.e. his use of irony,41 his focus on words and actions that do not jibe. Xenophon rarely states outright what ought to be the reaction to an event or a speech. However, despite his unwillingness to say too much, he crafts the wording, content, and structure of his narrative to suggest conclusions that he does not explicitly proclaim and thus creates a tug between what is apparently being said and what is actually the case, a tension between the pretence and the truth. This discrepancy between appearance and reality is the source of Xenophon’s ironic humor. Thus irony bridges the gap between appearance and reality and fuses seriousness with playfulness.42 The historian’s message was transparent to the coterie which alone seems to be the audience for his irony, the kaloi kagathoi.43 In my analysis I shall put much emphasis on the importance of moral values as a key to interpretation. This is necessary because, although distinguished scholars have focused on the importance of morality for Xenophon,44 there is still space for a better understanding of the Hellenica by using these studies along with a new reading of the surviving Greek literature. For both books 1 and 2 of the Hellenica I shall analyze the emotions of the people involved in the history, since Xenophon reveals through them the personalities of his heroes (Callicratidas, the Athenian generals at Aegospotami), the reaction of the speakers’ audiences (Callicratidas and the Milesians) and the dangers facing democracy in Athens (the trial after Arginousai).45 In my study I hope that I will be able to expand some of the arguments of specialists on emotions.46 In my investigation I shall make an extensive rhetorical analysis of the speeches reported in the Hellenica 1–2. Xenophon records speeches to show the role of the individual in the real conditions of the late 5th century B.C. Xenophon uses direct speeches which punctuate the narrative, slowing it down and inviting

 41 For irony in Xenophon’s Symposium, Cyropaedia, Oeconomicus, Anabasis and Memorabilia see Gray, 2012, 5–24, 26–38. 42 For irony in the Hellenica see Higgins, 1977, 12–13, Gray, 2012, 25–26. 43 See Gray, 2012, 2. 44 See e.g. Gray, 1989, Pownall, 2004 or for the Greeks see Dover, 1974, Adkins, 1975, Blundell, 1989, Konstan, 1998, Rademaker, 2005. 45 Thus, I shall refute the opinion of Luginbill, 75 n.1 that the interest in motivations and psychological states is one of the more prominent characteristic of Thucydides’ History, distinguishing it from Xenophon’s Hellenica. 46 See Cairns, 1993, Konstan, 2006.

Methodology  7

readers to pay closer attention and enter into a more reflective mode of engagement.47 At this point I must make a methodological statement concerning the interpretation of the speeches in Xenophon’s Hellenica. There are occasions where we realize that Xenophon’s information in the account agrees with what a speaker says. However, things become difficult when a speaker’s claims are incompatible with the historian’s account. This is a crucial issue for the interpretation of Xenophon’s work. There are scholars who interpret the Hellenica trusting what the protagonists say in defiance of Xenophon’s narrative or who put equal weight on the narrative and the speeches of the historian’s characters.48 But either of these claims amounts to saying that Xenophon has set his audience puzzles to which he has not provided a key; so such methods could be used to demonstrate that the Hellenica would mean anything the critics like. It is my contention and a methodological key tool of interpretation of this study that Xenophon’s narrative has a higher status of authority than that of the speeches; so we must evaluate the claims and arguments of Xenophon’s speakers in terms of their truth or falsity on the basis of the historian’s narrative.49 Thus the extent to which a speaker repeats information that Xenophon has mentioned focuses attention on the speaker’s reliability. On the other hand, when a speaker gives some details not found in the earlier narrative, this is crucial because exploring how they supplement, complement or contrast with the surrounding narrative is important for what it reveals about him as a person. Therefore, when these speeches are read in comparison with the narrative, they reveal moral and political issues, the

 47 See Baragwanath, 2017a, 287. 48 The most discussed case in modern scholarship is the contrasting speeches of Critias and Theramenes in the Council. Perrin, 1904, 660–63 argues that we must supplement Xenophon’s narrative with what Theramenes asserted in order to rehabilitate him. Missiou, 1992, 92–95, comparing Xenophon’s narrative about Sparta’s refusal to destroy Athens with the speeches of Critias and Theramenes, shows that these two men evaluated the supposedly beneficient role of the Spartans on a basis profoundly different from the historian. However, Missiou does not really clarify if Xenophon or the two men’s opinions have a higher authority. Sordi, 1992, 14 trusts Xenophon and not what Theramenes says. Gish, 2012, 206, 209 seems to trust Xenophon on one occasion but in the end he says that it is perhaps impossible to reconcile all of the various alternatives proposed in the account of Xenophon, both by those involved in the account and also by the author. 49 Gray, 1989, 91 rightly says that what Theramenes says at his own trial should never be preferred to the narrative for which Xenophon himself takes responsibility. Krentz, 1995, 132–36 and Pownall, 2000, 510 judge the speeches of Critias and Theramenes in the Council taking into consideration what Xenophon himself has said in his narrative. For the argument that Xenophon’s account and interpretation of the facts should be preferred to that of the protagonists see also Kapellos, 2010, 389–390.

8  Introduction speakers’ real character, motives, possibilities and mistakes, and the sharpest possible choice of actions. For my part, I shall offer detailed readings of the speeches of Alcibiades, the speech of Euryptolemus50 and the speeches of Callicratidas and their settings. Such an approach has not been done for Xenophon and remains a desideratum.51 In my entire project I shall make extensive use of narratology.52 A narrative needs a beginning, a direction and an end. In his work Xenophon masters the whole story. The narrator of Hellenica usually narrates events in sequence, that is to say ‘when each event occurs’. However, linear progress can be abandoned or replaced in preference for what the author considered the opportune moment. Thus Xenophon’s narrative does not present a straightforward account of the events leading up to the defeat at Aegospotami. Instead, in some cases the historian manipulates narrative time, using the narrative device of prolepses and analepses.53 Xenophon’s manipulation of narrative time is a key element in his attempt to write interpretative history. Narratological devices shape and modify our expectations as we read a text. These devices are designed mainly to inspire readers’ belief in what they say, mark their presence, mark the importance of a theme and above all engage their narratees.54 In this way the historian conveys his message to his readers more clearly but implicitly. Finally, Athenian and Spartan law constitutes part of this study in shedding light on the cities’ institutions. Taking these tools of interpretation as not only present but also self-evident in the text, I shall attempt to show how Xenophon leads his readers not only to find out what happened but also to ask how and why it happened, and what its significance was for the future of Greece. Therefore this study of Xenophon is written first and foremost with classicists in mind, that is, I attempt a literary approach to Xenophon’s Hellenica: we are not dealing with what happened but only with what is described as having happened. However, it also raises issues which, I hope, are of interest to those working in other disciplines, such as history and political theory.

 50 Due, 1983 has made an interesting contribution to the subject but there is much more to be done. 51 Usher, 2007a, 235 n.9 remarks that a modern study of Xenophon’s speeches is required. Marincola, 2010, 269–279 has analyzed Xenophon’s speeches in Books 6–7. 52 See e.g. Rood, 1998, 2007, Gribble, 1998, de Jong, 2007. 53 Prolepsis involves the narration of a story-event before earlier events have been told. Analepsis the narration of an event later than the point at which it occurred. 54 See Gray, 2004, 129–130, 134.

Methodology  9

In what follows I have made extensive use of Marincola’s excellent translation.55 I have taken into account the translation of Krentz as well,56 while I have also given different translations of the text according to the passages discussed. Unless stated otherwise, all references are to the Hellenica. The study will be divided into chapters and sub-chapters as indicated in the Table of Contents.

 55 Marincola, 2009. 56 Krentz, 1989b.

Chapter 1: Alcibiades and Athens In this chapter I shall argue that Xenophon proves Thucydides’ statement that Alcibiades’ military offer to the war against Sparta was of immense importance, but he also castigates him for his past or present behavior or acts. Thus a coherent judgement of Alcibiades does not appear, because Xenophon was aware of the deficiencies of the man.

. Alcibiades’ military intervention in the Hellespont In order to understand the naval engagements that Xenophon describes in the beginning of the Hellenica readers must read Thucydides first. The Spartan navarch Mindarus waited at Miletus for the Phoenician ships to come according to the promises of Tissaphernes. When he was informed that the ships would never come and that the satrap was thoroughly dishonest in his dealings with them, he departed from Miletus with seventy-three ships and set sail for the Hellespont. In that region a Peloponnesian force had already arrived with sixteen ships and had overrun a portion of the Chersonese. However, meeting with a storm Mindarus was driven into Icarus, and having been detained there by stress of weather, he put in at Chios (8.99). Although Thrasyllus made Lesbos his headquarters in order to prevent Mindarus from getting into the Hellespont (8.100), he was close to the strait. The Athenians who lay in wait with eighteen ships at Sestus found out that Mindarus’ fleet was on the point of sailing into the Hellespont, so they moved towards Elaius in the hope of reaching the open sea before Mindarus arrived. Indeed, the Athenians passed unseen the sixteen Peloponnesian ships which were at Abydus and chased Mindarus’ fleet (8.102), who had already managed to enter the region and arrive at Rhoetium (8.101.3). In this engagement Mindarus’ ships managed to destroy some of the Athenian vessels, but most of them escaped to Imbrus. Then the Peloponnesian ships from Abydus joined Mindarus; now the united fleet numbered eighty-six ships and sailed to Abydus (8.103.1). The Athenians followed the Spartans to the Hellespont, so they went to Elaius, where they remained at anchor, while the ships which had taken refuge at Imbrus joined them; the next five days were spent in making preparations for the impending engagement (8.103.2). The Athenians now had seventy-six ships, while the Peloponnesians had eighty-eight. In the following battle at Cynossema Thrasyllus commanded the left wing of the Athenians, Thrasybulus the right. The Syracusans led the right wing of the Peloponnesians; Mindarus led the other wing. The Athenians were victorious (8.104–05). The Athenians lost fifteen ships, https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110668315-002

Alcibiades’ military intervention in the Hellespont  11

i.e. they now had sixty-one ships. Most of the Peloponnesians escaped to Abydus, but the Athenians took from them twenty-one ships, while the Peloponnesians had sixty-seven ships (8.106.3). Therefore the Peloponnesians had only six more ships than the Athenians. Then the Athenians attacked eight Peloponnesian ships, which had moved from Abydus to Harpagium and Priapus, and took the ships (8.107.1). By now the Athenians numbered seventy-five ships, i.e. they outnumbered their enemies, who now had been left with fifty-nine, by sixteen vessels. Then the Athenians recovered Cyzicus, which was unwalled, and exacted a contribution from the inhabitants. Meanwhile, the Peloponnesians sailed from Abydus to Elaius, and recovered as many of their own captured vessels as were still seaworthy; the rest had been burnt by the Elaiusians. Moreover, they sent Hippocrates and Epicles to Euboea to bring up the ships which were there (8.107.2). Obviously, the Peloponnesians by now had some more ships than fiftynine but Thucydides does not give us a precise number. What matters is that the Athenians had not defeated the Peloponnesians who were still resisting. At this moment Xenophon begins his account in order to complete Thucydides’ unfinished work, and narrates events that took place some time after the last events reported by Thucydides.1 Thus he says that Thymochares came from Athens bringing a few ships with him. The Athenians and the Lacedaimonians fought immediately; the latter won under the command of Agesandridas (1.1.1). The new number of the Athenian fleet remains vague; Xenophon is not clear as Thucydides was in regard to the number of the ships the Peloponnesians recovered at Elaius. The similar writing between the two authors gives the impression that the size of both fleets had not changed. The Athenians had more ships than the Spartans, but what matters is that they could not defeat them. A little after these events, at the beginning of the winter, Dorieus, the son of Diagoras, sailed from Rhodes into the Hellespont at dawn with fourteen ships. The Athenian lookout on duty for the day saw him and signaled to the generals. The Athenian commanders sailed out against Dorieus with twenty ships, but he escaped from them and he got away, trying to beach his triremes around Rhoetium (1.1.2). Obviously, Dorieus realized that, since he was outnumbered by the Athenians, he could protect his ships on the land. His plan was right, because when the Athenians drew near they fought from the sea and the land, until, having accomplished nothing, they sailed away to Madytus, tired because of the long rowing, to join the rest of their forces (1.1.3).2 Mindarus, watching the fleet from Ilion, where he was sacrificing to Athena, set out to help (ἐβοήθει) by sea, and  1 See MacLaren, n. 3 p. 1. 2 For this point see Krentz, 1989b, 89.

12  Chapter 1: Alcibiades and Athens when he launched his own triremes, sailed off (ἀπέπλει) so that he might pick up those of Dorieus (1.1.4). Xenophon uses the imperfect tense to show that Mindarus went on helping and sailing off to Dorieus, which lasted a period of time, perhaps some hours. The imperfect was the appropriate tense for the historian to show Mindarus’ delay. In my view, Mindarus’ slow response to Dorieus leads us to think that the Athenian generals could have even been defeated if Mindarus had arrived on time. The Athenians had not achieved anything. Thus they continued their effort, and putting to sea they fought a sea battle along the shore around Abydus, fighting from morning until late afternoon. The Athenians were victorious in some places and were defeated in others, a fact which indicates that they were having a difficult time.3 At this juncture Alcibiades sails up (ἐπεισπλεῖ) to join the fight with eighteen ships (1.1.5). The Peloponnesians fled to Abydus (1.6). It is noteworthy that Xenophon chooses to introduce Alcibiades in the Hellenica by using a historical present. This is a technique that Thucydides used to create the illusion of immediacy4 and emphasize Alcibiades’ help to the Spartans in the past.5 Now Alcibiades helps his compatriots. Thus readers are allowed to infer that Xenophon uses the historical present with a special intention in this passage, namely to mark a turning point in the account6 and introduce a new series of states of affairs.7 We will also see that Xenophon uses the historical present in other parts of Hellenica 1–2 in order to highlight crucial moments in the evolution of the Peloponnesian War. It is worth reading Thucydides to understand how Alcibiades appeared in the Hellespont. According to him, Alcibiades wanted to return to Athens, so he had magnified to the Athenians at Samos his power with Tissaphernes and promised them supplies and the Phoenician fleet (8.81.3). The Athenians there immediately appointed Alcibiades a colleague of their other generals, and placed everything in his hands; having been elected general, Alcibiades said he would make the

 3 Note Lys. 2.38, who says that for a long time the battle of Salamis was evenly matched, so now the Athenians seemed to be victorious (νενικηκέναι) and safe, now defeated and destroyed. 4 See Allan, 2013, 375. 5 See Thuc. 8.12.1, 14.1–3 with Liotsakis, 2017, 33. 6 Cf. [Long.] On the Sublime 25, who points out that if an author introduces events that are past in time as happening at the present moment, he turns his passage from mere narrative into drama. The author of the treatise cites an example from Xenophon’s Cyropaedia. Sicking and Stork, 1997, 131–68 have studied the use of the historical present in Thucydides and Xenophon’s Anabasis, among other works, but not the Hellenica. Gray, 2017, 224–25 points out that Xenophon uses the present tense in past narrative to show us where the emphasis lies in a storyline. 7 For this use of the historical present among imperfects and aorist indicatives see Rijksbaron, 1994, 22–24.

Alcibiades’ military intervention in the Hellespont  13

conduct of the war his first care, and go at once to Tissaphernes. And he went straight from the assembly, in order that he might be thought of as doing nothing without Tissaphernes (Thuc. 8.82.1). Then Alcibiades sailed back to Samos from Caunus and Phaselis, having thirteen ships, and announced that he had prevented the Phoenician fleet from going to the assistance of the enemy; and that he had made Tissaphernes a greater friend of the Athenians than ever. He then manned nine additional ships, and exacted large sums of money from the Halicarnassians. He also fortified Cos, where he left a governor, and towards the autumn returned to Samos (Thuc. 8.108). Now Alcibiades had twenty-two ships, but when he arrived at the Hellespont he had eighteen. Perhaps he left four ships to support the governor in Cos and then he moved to the Hellespont. The Athenians had ninety-seven ships in total. But why did Alcibiades come now? Thucydides had told us that Mindarus wanted to pass from Samos secretly, but he delayed in Chios (8.99.1). When Thrasyllus, who was in Samos, found out about Mindarus’ plan, he tried to stop him but he failed as I mentioned earlier. In the meantime, Dorieus also had entered the Hellespont. Alcibiades needed to prove to his compatriots that he was worthy of their decision to elect him a general, so the best way to do that was to help the fleet in an ambivalent moment.8 The Athenians were unable to defeat the Peloponnesians,9 but when the latter saw Alcibiades coming, they fled to Abydus, obviously believing that they could not defeat him.10 Although the Athenians were superior in numbers, they could not defeat the Spartans. Xenophon is clear that Alcibiades’ appearance tipped the balance. This was a first sign of what Alcibiades could do against the Spartans and a moment of hope for the Athenians about the future. Xenophon then says that Pharnabazus was helping the Peloponnesians during the battle at Abydus. He fought, even riding his horse into the sea, and went

 8 Krentz, 1989b, 91 says that Alcibiades might have been assigned to watch Dorieus at Rhodes and prevent him from joining Mindarus in the Hellespont. If this is true, Alcibiades certainly failed, but I do not think that Thucydides’ text allows such an interpretation. 9 Krentz, 1989b, 86 says that ‘Xenophon begins with an Athenian defeat and the presents Athenian fortunes as improving gradually until, with the arrival of Alcibiades, the Athenians win a major victory’. I have to disagree, since Xenophon’s account of the military engagements between the two parties shows the inability of the Athenians to win, as I argued earlier. 10 Bloedow, 1973, 49 n. 297 shows that the Spartans refused to accept battle unless they were certain of a considerable numerical superiority. Thus, Bloedow, 1992, 51 says that Alcibiades’ participation in the battle of Abydus was not important and that Mindarus took fright, thinking that many more reinforcements were arriving. Nevertheless, Thucydides’ text sheds a different light on Xenophon’s account and shows that this was not always the case.

14  Chapter 1: Alcibiades and Athens on encouraging his horsemen and infantry (1.1.6). To understand Pharanabazus’ presence we must read Thucydides, who says that Pharnabazus attempted to persuade the Lacedaimonians to bring their fleet to the Hellespont. Nevertheless, Alcibiades had convinced the Spartans to side with Tissaphernes and pursue the war in Ionia (8.6.3). Later, when the Spartans saw that Tissaphernes did not give them the money he had promised them, they contacted Pharnabazus, with whom they agreed to fight in the Hellespont.11 Thus, now that Pharnabazus had finally achieved his goal to bring the Spartans and their allies into his region, he proved his determination to support them militarily at this point, even with his presence. However, the satrap did not help them financially, since the Lacedaimonians had not accepted his offer in the past to provide them with food (8.80.2). The Peloponnesians fought by packing their ships closely together and drawing up in line along the shore of Abydus, while Pharnabazus was supporting them. Given that the Peloponnesians had fifty-nine vessels in contrast to the Athenians who had ninety-seven, as I showed earlier, this was a wise move. The united forces of the Spartans and Pharnabazus put pressure on the Athenians for a land engagement.12 Then Xenophon describes directly what happened after the fight: the Athenians sailed away to Sestus after capturing thirty ships without their men and recovering the ships they themselves had lost (1.1.7). This means that the Athenians numbered now one hundred and twenty-seven vessels. From there all except for forty ships, i.e. eighty-seven ships, would be scattered to collect money (ἐπ’ ἀργυρολογίαν) outside the Hellespont. Moreover, Thrasyllus, one of the generals, sailed to Athens to report all the incidents which took place in the Hellespont before and after Alcibiades’ arrival13 and to request troops and ships (1.1.8). Xenophon specifies the nature of the expedition. The term ἀργυρολογία is a word which most often refers to extortions of money.14 These expeditions were prompted by special pressure caused by the war, authorized by the Athenian demos and headed by the Athenian generals.15 Thucydides says that after the Sicilian expedition the Athenians did not have χρήματα ἐν τῷ κοινῷ (Thuc. 8.1.2); so it is not surprising that in such a moment of pressure the Athenians would search

 11 For the relationship between Pharnabazus and the Lacedaimonians see Krentz, 1989b, 92. 12 The fighting that followed was more in the nature of a land engagement, as Bloedow, 1973, 44 remarks. 13 The pronoun ταῦτα must refer to events before and after Alcibiades’ intervention. See further below. 14 See Kallet-Marx, 1993, 160–64. 15 For the relevant passages see Kallet-Marx, 1993, 201–02.

Alcibiades and Tissaphernes  15

for money to preserve their power in the Greek world. The fleet would act somewhat independently, since it did not have the authority of the demos, but the Athenians would not remain ignorant of the generals’ plans, since Thrasyllus would return to Athens. It is noteworthy that Thrasyllus would not ask for money and provisioning, since Athenian resources were inadequate; consequently the expeditionary force needed to acquire provisions through raids and plundering. But the city could provide hoplites and marines in order to fight the Spartans at sea and Pharnabazus’ land forces more vigorously.

. Alcibiades and Tissaphernes After these events Tissaphernes came to the Hellespont. Alcibiades paid a visit to him, trying to create a guest-friendship through the delivery of gifts (ξένιά τε καὶ δῶρα) and thus secure mutual promises of loyalty.16 However, Tissaphernes seized and imprisoned him, saying that the King ordered him to fight the Athenians (1.1.9). It is worth considering that Thucydides recorded eight xeniai which Alcibiades had inherited or had established earlier. Xenophon now records for the first time the effort of Alcibiades to start a new relationship with a view to cooperation.17 So we can suspect that the historian implied the high expectations of Alcibiades through this xenia with the satrap, most probably that he would secure Persian money and military support for the Athenian fleet, which would work as a counter balance to Pharnabazus’ help for the Spartans. However, Alcibiades could not imagine that he would end up in jail. Now the Athenians would have to fight both Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes. Alcibiades was not disheartened and certainly he was not an easy player. Tissaphernes’ home was in Caria,18 a place which did not have horses.19 Thus, it is logical to suspect that Tissaphernes transferred Alcibiades to his home, probably in order to secure that he would not escape. He was wrong. Within thirty days, Alcibiades escaped on horse at night, with a man called Mantitheus who had been captured in Caria, and went from Sardis to Clazomenai, which was still in

 16 For the creation of guest-friendships between Greek aristocrats and foreigners and the exchange of gifts and mutual promises of loyalty see Herman, 1987, 34–35, 45–46, 50, 96–97, 128– 29. See also Mitchell, 1997, 12–14 and especially 18–20 for the importance of gifts. 17 See the relevant passages of Thucydides collected in Herman, 1987, 180–81. 18 Xenophon explicitly says this in 3.4.12 and in Ages.1.15. 19 Xen. 3.4.12, Anab.1.15: ἡ Καρία ἄφιππος ἦν.

16  Chapter 1: Alcibiades and Athens Athenian hands (1.1.10).20 Through this escape Xenophon implicitly praises Alcibiades21 and indicates that he was unstoppable.

. Alcibiades’ preparations for a sea battle against Mindarus In the meantime, the Athenians, who were at Sestus when they learned that Mindarus would sail against them with sixty vessels, slipped away by night to Cardia. Alcibiades went there from Clazomenai with five triremes and a skiff. Learning that the vessels of the Peloponnesians had set sail from Abydus to Cyzicus, he went on foot to Sestus but he ordered the ships to sail around and meet him there (1.1.11). Obviously, the Athenian victory at Abydus had not crushed the Spartan fleet. Since most of the ships had gone outside the Hellespont to collect money in order to continue their campaign, the Athenians had no other choice than to remain inactive after their victory in Abydus. Mindarus was informed that the Athenians now had twenty ships less than his sixty, so he thought this was the best opportunity to destroy them. The Athenians had to move to Cardia, which offered them safety. Alcibiades had a close eye on his city’s fleet, since he was informed of their movement to Cardia, joined them there and even managed to bring with him a few ships to increase their power. When the Athenian ships arrived at Sestus, Alcibiades was just about to put out to sea and engage in a naval battle. At that moment, Theramenes and Thrasybulus, who had been collecting money, arrived with twenty ships each, from Macedonia and Thrace respectively (1.1.12). Evidently, both commanders had succeeded in their mission to collect money. Xenophon uses the historical present for a second time in his account, in this case the verb ἐπεισπλεῖ, to highlight that the Athenian fleet would be larger by forty vessels now.22 Alcibiades ordered the two generals too (καί)23 to remove their sails (τὰ μεγάλα ἱστία) and follow him, while he himself sailed to Parium. This means that: (a) Alcibiades had already removed the sails of his ships and was ready to attack Mindarus without the forces of the two generals; and (b) he instructed his colleagues to prepare themselves for a sea battle at speed.24 Given that Xenophon mentioned that the Athenian fleet  20 For Clazomenai being under Athenian control see Krentz, 1989b, 95 for all the relevant references in Thucydides. 21 Thus, I must disagree with Gribble, 1999, 202 that Alcibiades’ escape was undignified. 22 For Xenophon’s use of the historical present see above p. 12. 23 The participle here is responsive. Cf. Denninston, 1954, 293. 24 For the upcoming sea fight cf. Xen. 6.2.27, where the historian says about Iphicrates τὰ μεγάλα ἱστία αὐτοῦ κατέλιπεν, ὡς ἐπὶ ναυμαχίαν πλέων. For the speed of the attack cf. Dio Cassius

Alcibiades at Cyzicus  17

did not want to fight Mindarus because he outnumbered them, it seems strange that Alcibiades intended to seek a naval battle with the Peloponnesians and, most important, that the crews were not reluctant to follow him. Although this information seems to contradict Xenophon’s previous account about the importance of the Spartan superiority in ships, it indicates Alcibiades’ determination to fight the Spartans at Cyzicus, inventing a plan of action on the spot, and his ability to inspire confidence in his men. The total number of ships gathered at Parium was eighty-six.

. Alcibiades at Cyzicus On the following night the Athenians set out, and they arrived at Proconnesus the next day around breakfast time (1.1.13). There they found out that Mindarus was in Cyzicus and Pharnabazus with the infantry. This information is important because it is connected with the previous detail that Alcibiades already knew that the Peloponnesians had sailed to Cyzicus. Apparently, Alcibiades watched the movements of his enemy. In this way Xenophon leads us to think that the Athenians could not win against Mindarus without Alcibiades. The fact that none of them asked Alcibiades about what they were doing, but they followed his orders without any question, proves that they trusted him. On that day the Athenians remained at Proconnesus, but the next day Alcibiades, summoning an assembly, exhorted them that it was necessary to fight on sea and land and at the walls (ἀνάγκη εἴη καὶ ναυμαχεῖν καὶ πεζομαχεῖν καὶ τειχομαχεῖν). Then he said ‘we do not have enough money, while our enemies have plenty from the Persian King’ (Οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν, ἔφη, χρήματα ἡμῖν, τοῖς δὲ πολεμίοις ἄφθονα παρὰ βασιλέως–1.1.14). Xenophon is not in a rush to move on to the description of the prospective battle, but he wants us to learn Alcibiades’ plan. It is precisely with regard to military matters that Xenophon stresses the decisive importance of speech for commanding human beings, as distinguished from speechless animals;25 so it is worth assessing this speech. The form of the text is striking, i.e. what we read is Xenophon’s words and then Alcibiades’ own words. The combination of indirect and direct speech cannot be just a matter of stylistic variation, since Xenophon could

 Hist.Romanae 50.31.1–2 that Caesar hoped that by swift sailing he could speedily capture Antony and Cleopatra; however, he did not attack because his men’s use of sails (ἱστίοις) would slow down the attack. 25 See Mem. 3.3.11, On Horsemanship 8.13.

18  Chapter 1: Alcibiades and Athens either have cited both sentences in oratio recta or both in oratio obliqua. Obviously, the historian used both modes of reportage because he wanted to emphasize that the second sentence of Alcibiades carried more weight in regard to its content. For this reason we must read these sentences separately. Regarding the first one, I may remark that Alcibiades’ mentioning of fighting on sea and land is logical, because his men would have to fight the united forces of Mindarus and Pharnabazus, as they had been informed. The reference to the fighting against walls is not explained by what Xenophon has said so far, but it possibly means that Cyzicus had walls; so Alcibiades envisaged this kind of fighting too.26 In this way the historian implies that Alcibiades foresaw all kinds of military engagement and prepared his men for this. Concerning the second sentence, readers realize that the financial support of the King to the Spartans would make the war difficult for the Athenians. This statement is important, because Xenophon has not said anything until now about the provision of Persian money in the war. For this issue we must look to Thucydides. Peisander had told the Athenians that the King and Tissaphernes were supplying the Spartans with money (βασιλέως τε αὐτοῖς καὶ Τισσαφέρνους χρήματα παρεχόντων), while theirs was all gone (Thuc. 8.53.2). This argument brings Alcibiades’ responsibility to the fore, since he had pronounced at Samos that he had made Tissaphernes friendlier to the Athenians than before (Thuc. 8.108.1). However, we saw earlier that although he had tried to prove this through an act of guest-friendship, Tissaphernes imprisoned him. The whole myth of of his relations with Tissaphernes became exposed once and for all, as this incident shows.27 One might expect that the Athenians would react angrily when they saw Alcibiades returning with empty hands, but Xenophon’s silence implies that nobody reacted openly, although they must have been disappointed. Besides, Alcibiades had escaped from Tissaphernes and led them swiftly against Mindarus. This incident must have improved their morale, but the question why the satrap arrested Alcibiades remains unanswered. Through these words, when Alcibiades said that the King supported the Lacedaimonians, he insinuated that this happened because Tissaphernes would provide money to their enemy, following his King’s orders. This is what the satrap had told him and since now they were enemies, he had to imprison him. For this reason Alcibiades should not be blamed for Tissaphernes’ change of stance, although he had to admit implicitly the failure of his goal to bring the satrap to the Athenian side. This was Alcibiades’ argument, so someone could  26 Thus Rawlings, 1981, 220 n. 9. 27 This was remarked by Bloedow, 1973, 44.

Alcibiades at Cyzicus  19

have reacted to this after he ended his speech. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that Xenophon does not report any reaction to way to Alcibiades’ failure to bring Persian aid. This silence on the part of the historian implies that the Athenians were convinced by Alcibiades. Nobody could think that Alcibiades had deceived them, even if this was the truth.28 It is worth remembering that Alcibiades had begun his speech with an emphasis on the efforts needed in the battlefield. His message was that under his leadership the Athenians could defeat the Spartans despite the Persian money. Alcibiades’ conduct so far had made his men fully accept his leadership. This is something that Xenophon highly approved if we consider that in 5.1.4, one of the passages where Xenophon states his own selection criteria,29 he justifies his decision to praise Teleutias because his conduct made his men accept his leadership fully, and says that this is an achievement of a true man that is much more worthy of note than much money (πολλῶν χρημάτων) and many dangers. On the previous day, when the Athenians had anchored at Proconnesus, Alcibiades kept all the boats (τὰ πλοῖα), even the small ones, with him, so that nobody might inform the enemy about the number of the Athenian vessels, and proclaimed death as penalty for anyone caught sailing to the other side of the strait (1.1.15). Readers may understand that Alcibiades gave this order before speaking to his men, but Xenophon chose to report the speech first in order to put more emphasis on it. Moreover, we understand that Alcibiades foresaw that a small boat could escape the attention of the guards, go to the enemy camp,30 inform Mindarus about the forthcoming attack of Alcibiades31 and thus allow him to escape. This was implicit praise of Alcibiades on the part of Xenophon. We will see from now on several times that Alcibiades proved that he had foresight, one of the positive characteristics that Thucydides showed that Themistocles and Pericles possessed.32

 28 Bloedow, 1973, 47 n. 285 finds it difficult that Alcibiades deceived the Athenians to such a degree and thinks that it must have come as a rude shock to them they had lost their only source of direct negotiation with Persia. However, Xenophon shows that they were not shocked and that Alcibiades was persuasive. 29 See Nicolai, 2006, 699–703. 30 Cf. Diod. 15.43.5, where it is said that Conon decided to leave the camp in secret, so he prepared a boat (πλοῖον) and escaped afterwards to Athens. 31 Cf. Xen. 3.4.1, where the historian says that Herodas from Syracuse took the first ship (πλοῖον) which sailed to Greece and informed the Lacedaimonians about the plans of the King and Tissaphernes. 32 See Bloedow, 1992, 141, Price, 2001, 53.

20  Chapter 1: Alcibiades and Athens

. The sea battle at Cyzicus Then Xenophon turns back to the day when Alcibiades made his speech and says that Alcibiades made preparations for a sea battle (ἀνηγάγετο) and set out for Cyzicus as heavy rain was falling (ὕοντος πολλῷ). But as he approached Cyzicus, the rain stopped, the sun came out and Alcibiades watched from some distance33 the ships of Mindarus, sixty in number, practicing their maneuvers far from the harbor and cut off (ἀπειλημμένας) from it by his own fleet (1.1.16). Sailing under heavy rain was an obstacle34 but not an unsurpassable one, since it was not night35 and there was no storm and wind at that time. Xenophon indicates that Alcibiades would not endanger his fleet.36 Things went even better for the Athenian general. The rain stopped, so Alcibiades could see that Mindarus was following the Spartan practice of training his men throughout a campaign,37 even under rain.38 The problem for Mindarus was that he was so absorbed in his crews’ training that he did not even observe that Alcibiades had intercepted his safe return to the port. Alcibiades’ plan could lead to the defeat of the Spartan fleet.39 The Peloponnesians, seeing that the ships of Alcibiades were more numerous than before and were nearer the harbor of Cyzicus, fled to the shore. After beaching their vessels the Peloponnesians fought against the Athenian ships as the latter were sailing in against them (1.1.17). Alcibiades hoped for a naval battle and he was right to prevent Mindarus from learning that the ships of Theramenes and  33 I translate the verb καθορᾷ in this way taking into consideration Thuc. 3.23.4, Xen. 1.7.7, 6.2.29. Marincola, 2009, 7 translates the verb as ‘spy’. 34 Cf. Xen. Anab.4.2.2, where he says that the Ten Thousand had to move under heavy rain (ὕδωρ πολὺ ἦν). Moreover, cf. 4.5.4, where Xenophon says that Agesilaus’ men were suffering after a rain (ὕδωρ). 35 Cf. Thuc. 8.42.1: καὶ αὐτῷ ὑετός τε καὶ τὰ ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ξυννέφελα ὄντα πλάνησιν τῶν νεῶν ἐν τῷ σκότει καὶ ταραχὴν παρέσχεν and Xen. 1.6.25, saying that Callicratidas chased Conon during the day and 1.6.28, where Callicratidas ἀνήγετο during the middle of the night to attack the Athenians, but heavy rain and thunder prevented περὶ μέσας νύκτας, ὡς ἐξαπιναίως προσπέσοι· ὕδωρ δ’ ἐπιγενόμενον πολὺ καὶ βρονταὶ διεκώλυσαν τὴν ἀναγωγήν. See p. 125. 36 Cf. Artemid. Onerocr.2.8: ὑετὸς ἄνευ χειμῶνος καὶ πολλοῦ ἀνέμου πᾶσιν ἀγαθὸς. For the opposite case cf. Dio Cassius Hist.Rom.50.31.2, who says that Caesar would conquer the navy of Antonius because a violent rainstorm (ὑετός λάβρος), accompanined by a mighty wind, had struck Antonius’ fleet, though not his own, and had thrown it utterly into confusion. See also Hist.Rom.40.34.3, 56.20.3–45, 21.3. Finally, see pp. 136–37. 37 Cf. Xen.Lac.Pol.12.5, where the historian says that the Lycurgan law required all Lacedaimonians to practice gymnastics regularly throughout a campaign. 38 Cf. n. 34 again. 39 Cf. Thuc. 7.52.2, who says that the Syracusans intercepted (ἀπολαμβάνουσι) Eurymedon in the inner bay of the port (τοῦ λιμένος) of Syracuse; because of this they destroyed his fleet.

Alcibiades’ collection of money  21

Thrasybulus had increased the Athenian forces. For their part, the Spartans were wise enough not to accept battle, since they were inferior in numbers. Alcibiades took another course of action, that is, he took twenty ships with him and disembarked on land. When Mindarus saw this, he himself likewise disembarked. Alcibiades had said earlier to his men that they would also have to fight on land. Apparently he believed that Mindarus would accept the challenge, and he was right. Then Xenophon mentions that Mindarus died while fighting on the shore. At first glance the Spartan commander might be considered courageous, since he did not flee. Nevertheless, I believe that Xenophon does not really praise Mindarus, since he does not mention a plan of counteraction against Alcibiades, but that he fought to the death as if he had to. Obviously, this was the predictable reaction of Spartan commanders,40 and perhaps Alcibiades knew it; that is why he disembarked first. Nevertheless, Mindarus’ reaction was not the reaction of his men, who fled when they saw him dying.41 Then the Athenians went to Proconnesus and took all the ships of the Peloponnesians except for those of the Syracusans which they burnt themselves, and on the next day they sailed to Cyzicus (1.1.18). Because of the development of the military engagement, Pharnabazus could not intervene and help the Peloponnesians. The Athenians had achieved a great victory thanks to Alcibiades.

. Alcibiades’ collection of money The next move of Alcibiades was to start collecting money. Xenophon presents this as the plan of Alcibiades by using the third person singular. First, Alcibiades took a great deal of money (χρήματα πολλὰ) from the people of Cyzicus, while staying there for twenty days, but he did their city no other harm (1.1.19–20). Xenophon’s remark that Alcibiades did not cause any physical damage to this city implies that he could have destroyed it but violence was not his goal. Moreover, it indicates the general’s ability to impose discipline on his men, since they stayed

 40 See Humble, 2006, 219–33. 41 Note that in Diod. 13.51.5–6 we read that Mindarus exhorted his men not to disgrace the glory of Sparta (μὴ καταισχῦναι τὸ τῆς Σπάρτης ἀξίωμα), especially in a land-battle. He organized a heroic battle by the ships and risked his own life in the front line; he killed many of those ranged against him, but in the end he was killed by Alcibiades’ troops, having fought in a manner worthy of his country (ἀξίως τῆς πατρίδος ἀγωνισάμενος). When this man had fallen, the Peloponnesians and all the allies ran together and, struck with fear, turned to flight. Diodorus highlights the general’s courage and his patriotism and praises Mindarus’ death (see Hau, 2016, 103–05). However, he also reports that the allies fled.

22  Chapter 1: Alcibiades and Athens in a city for so many days. Alcibiades also took money from the Perinthians and the Selymbrians (1.1.21). This act recalls Alcibiades’ own words that the King would offer χρήματα ἄφθονα to the Spartans. So Xenophon allows us to infer that Alcibiades had to cover Athens’ financial gap in this way. Then the historian says that the Athenians went to Chrysopolis in Calchedonia, fortified it, established a customs house and began to collect the 10% tax from the merchant vessels coming from the Black Sea. They also left a guard of thirty ships and the generals Theramenes and Eumachus in order: (a) to look after the place; and (b) to harm the enemy in any other way they could. The rest of the generals returned to the Hellespont (1.1.22) with the remainder of the fleet, that is fifty ships. At this moment Alcibiades disappears from the narrative, but Xenophon shows emphatically the consequences of Alcibiades’ success. Thus, he describes the situation in the Spartan camp and reports that Hippocrates, Mindarus’ viceadmiral, whose chief function was the correspondence with the home authorities,42 sent a message to their city, saying that: (a) they had lost their fleet; (b) their leader was dead; and (c) the crews were hungry (1.1.23). Xenophon reports this short letter, typical of the Spartan laconism, in the Doric dialect43 to give vividness to his text44 and make his message more forceful by letting a lot be evident in a little:45 the Spartans were desperate because of Alcibiades’ overwhelming victory. At the same time, readers realize that Xenophon produces the content of the letter when it is read in Athens, which means that the Spartans never received it, since the Athenians successfully captured the Peloponnesian ship. The historian allows us to believe that the Athenian generals wanted to improve the morale of their fellow citizens in Athens by sending this letter to them, while the Spartans at home must have been shocked.46 Another proof of the low Peloponnesian morale becomes clear through Pharnabazus, who exhorted the army of the Peloponnesians not to become disheartened over timber, as long as they were alive, since there was plenty in the land of the King; he gave each man a cloak and money and two month’s rations; and after giving arms to the sailors, he made them guards of his territory on the

 42 See Pritchett, 1974, 46. 43 ῎Ερρει τὰ κᾶλα. Μίνδαρος ἀπεσσύα. πεινῶντι τὤνδρες. ἀπορίομες τί χρὴ δρᾶν. 44 See Colvin, 1999, 72–73. 45 For this manner of writing see Ahl, 1984, 176. Gray, 2017, 224 stresses that Xenophon deliberately recreates the Spartan Doric dialect in this passage, which suggests a rather conscious approach. I hope I have been able to explain why he writes in this way. 46 Bearzot, 2014, 100 says: ‘Xenophon probably cites the letter, which had clearly been made public in Athens, in order to underline the striking situation at Sparta after the battle of Cyzicus.’

Thrasyllus as a general: an implicit contrast with Alcibiades  23

coast (1.1.24). These words remind us of Xenophon’s earlier report that the Peloponnesians even abandoned their ships to flee and confirms the impact of Alcibiades’ victory. Moreover, the fact that Pharnabazus gave arms to the sailors and made them guards of his land near the sea indicates that he wanted to protect his land, almost certainly from an attack by Alcibiades. There is no doubt that Pharnabazus’ lavish financial outlay after Cyzicus confirmed Alcibiades’ remark that the Peloponnesians would be supported by the King’s money. The impression we get is that superfluity of resources was a characteristic of the Persian empire. On the other hand, Pharnabazus’ concern about Alcibiades implies that the Persian money was not enough to protect Persia from Alcibiades.

. Thrasyllus as a general: an implicit contrast with Alcibiades In this part of his account Xenophon shows the importance of Alcibiades by devoting a long account to Thrasyllus. We read earlier that this general would return to Athens to inform his fellow citizens about the situation in the Hellespont and the intervention of Alcibiades. Now we read that, while Thrasyllus was in Athens, Agis made a foray from Deceleia up to the very walls of the Athenians (ἐκ τῆς Δεκελείας … πρὸς αὐτὰ τὰ τείχη ἦλθε τῶν ᾿Αθηναίων (1.1.33). According to Thucydides, the Spartan King Agis was at Deceleia (ἐν τῇ Δεκελείᾳ–Thuc. 8.70.2) and when he received a large army from the Peloponnese, as he had asked, he moved against the walls of the Athenians (ἐκ τῆς Δεκελείας φρουρᾷ … κατέβη πρὸς αὐτὰ τὰ τείχη τῶν ᾿Αθηναίων–Thuc. 8.71.1). However, because of the resistance of the Athenians he retreated with his army and remained at Deceleia with his men, while he sent back the army that had joined him (ἀπήγαγε πάλιν τὴν στρατιάν … ἐν τῇ Δεκελείᾳ ἔμενον–Thuc. 8.71.2). Evidently, Agis insisted on his plan, but Thrasyllus, leading out all the Athenians and all those who were in the city, marshaled them by the Lyceium gymnasium, intending to stop the Spartans if they approached. Agis retreated quickly (ἀπήγαγε ταχέως), because he could not achieve anything, while a few of his men in the rear were killed by the Athenian light-armed troops. This was not a great success of Thrasyllus since it was not the first time that the Athenians resisted the Spartan attacks in this way. On the other hand, because of this victory the Athenians were more eager than before to approve Thrasyllus’ request, so they voted that he should enroll one thousand hoplites, one hundred cavalrymen and fifty triremes (1.1.34). This means that the Athenians were eager to give Thrasyllus men and ships before defeating Agis, while the pre-

24  Chapter 1: Alcibiades and Athens sent victory confirmed their initial opinion that they should support their generals in the Hellespont. Thus, through a psephisma the demos decided the exact number of the expedition force but let Thrasyllus choose his men and carry out their conscription,47 obviously aided by the taxiarchs,48 cavalry commanders49 and trierarchs.50 The process of conscription must have been set in motion immediately after the Assembly’s vote in favour of this military campaign. But surprisingly we read that the Athenians fortified Thoricos and that Thrasyllus departed in the next year, taking the ships that had been voted for him and making leather shields for five thousand of the sailors so they could serve together with the regular peltasts, sailed out for Samos at the beginning of the summer (1.2.1). The question that arises is why Thrasyllus did not depart immediately. A careful reading of Thucydides about the number of ships available immediately and ready for war reveals that Athens had twenty ships.51 Xenophon shows that these became fifty, i.e. thirty more were built despite the depleted treasury. We can infer that the people tried really hard to help the Athenian fleet in the Hellespont to defeat the Lacedaimonians. Thrasyllus should succeed and join Alcibiades soon. Instead, Xenophon’s readers discover that Thrasyllus chose to go to Samos. At a first glance this seems strange, but Thucydides’ narrative allows Xenophon’s readers to infer that the Ionian satrapy of Tissaphernes was an excellent choice as a target for attack. Not only was it a hot-bed of rebellion against the Athenian imperial system, but it was militarily vulnerable, since the Peloponnesians had temporarily deserted Tissaphernes for Pharnabazus, leaving the former in a quandary about the overall defense of his province.52 This is confirmed by Xenophon himself who has said that Tissaphernes was in the Hellespont (1.1.9). Moreover, the Athenians knew that the Spartans had been well and truly worsted in the Hellespont, so it was time to attack a different target. Xenophon now focuses on Thrasyllus’ military action and planning. The Athenian general sailed to Pygela and there he set about ravaging the country and attacking the wall. Some men of Miletus brought help and pursued some of the light-armed troops of the Athenians who were scattered (διεσπαρμένους) there (1.2.2). At this point we must read Thucydides to understand the intervention of the Milesians. These people were subjects of the Athenians in the past

 47 See Christ, 2001, 400. 48 See Jordan, 1975, 131, Christ, 2001, 402. 49 See Bugh, 2014, 53–54. 50 See Gabrielsen, 1994, 108. 51 See McCoy, 1977, 273. 52 See McCoy, 1977, 281.

Thrasyllus as a general: an implicit contrast with Alcibiades  25

(7.57.4) but joined the Spartans afterwards (8.17.4). The Athenians had not succeeded in capturing Miletus in the past (8.25.1–5, 30.2, 38.5), so it is not surprising to read in Xenophon that the Milesians helped the Pygelians. The fact that the Athenians were scattered means that they could have been defeated.53 The reason why this did not happen is that the Athenians were superior in numbers. Thus the peltasts, who could run very fast,54 and two regiments of hoplites helped their light-armed troops and killed all those who had come from Miletus except for a few. Therefore, capturing up to two hundred shields and setting up a trophy (1.2.3) seems more a matter of luck than good organization on the part of Thrasyllus. Someone might think that Thrasyllus needed to set up a trophy to make his men more confident about the future battles. On the other hand, it is noteworthy that Xenophon has not reported that he put one up in his engagements with the Spartans and their allies. On the next day (τῇ δὲ ὑστεραίᾳ), the Athenians sailed into Notium, and after making preparation they were heading to Colophon, whereupon the people of Colophon came over to their side. On the following night, they made a raid into Lydia at that time of the year while the grain (τοῦ σίτου) is at its height, and they burnt many villages and took money, slaves and much other plunder (καὶ κώμας τε πολλὰς ἐνέπρησαν καὶ χρήματα ἔλαβον καὶ ἀνδράποδα καὶ ἄλλην λείαν πολλήν) (1.2.4). The fact that the Athenians marched well prepared against Colophon and that the Colophonians had no support from Tissaphernes must have convinced them that it was pointless to resist; so they had no choice but to join the Athenians. The easy destruction of Lydia must also be considered a result of the absence of Persian resistance in the region. The deed itself was something to be expected. Acquiring wealth through the accumulation and distribution of spoils by the victors and through raids for the purpose of plunder was a crucial and normal aspect of ancient life.55 Moreover, Xenophon’s emphasis on the food, money, slaves and plenty of booty through the repetitive use of καί stresses the Athenians’ need for supplies. Thrasyllus

 53 Isocr. 4.65 stresses that when someone fights against people who come from various place, he must attack when they are still scattered (διεσπαρμένοις). The men of Themistocles sank many Persian ships while their enemies were scattered (διεσπαρμένοις–Diod. 11.12.6). Gelon’s men captured many of their enemies because they were scattered without order (διεσπαρμένοις–Diod. 11.21.2). The general Neon, while he was under siege, attacked his enemies when he saw them being scattered (διεσπαρμένοις–Plut. Tim.18.4). Antigonus hoped that if he attacked his enemies suddenly while they were scattered (διεσπαρμένοις), the generals of the other camp would not easily gather their soldiers and resist (Plut. Eum.15.5). 54 See How, 1919, 40–42. 55 See Kallet-Marx, 1993, 11.

26  Chapter 1: Alcibiades and Athens could hope to pay his men from the proceeds of spoils.56 However, Xenophon’s reference to the Persian Stages, the lieutenant of Tissaphernes (Thuc. 8.16.3), who was in this area, and who attacked the Athenians, because they were scattered (διεσκεδασμένοι) from their camp, pursuing private plunder, implies Thrasyllus’ inability to impose discipline on his men. The one hundred cavalrymen that Thrasyllus had with him overtook their enemies because they were on foot;57 so they saved most of their fellow soldiers. But Xenophon does not allow his readers to consider this an Athenian victory, because he emphasizes that Stages still managed to capture one Athenian alive and kill seven others (1.2.5). This indicates that if the Athenians did not have cavalrymen, their losses would be greater. Thrasyllus’ inability to impose discipline on his soldiers, who fought scattered twice, prompts readers to think that if Tissaphernes was in Ionia, he would have suffered a major defeat. From Xenophon’s narrative it becomes clear that Thrasyllus’ men were involved in two engagements in which the soldiers were scattered. After this, Thrasyllus led the army to the sea, intending to sail against Ephesus. However, Tissaphernes, who perceived Thrasyllus’ enterprise, reacted quickly; he started collecting a substantial army and dispatched cavalry, announcing to all that they must bring help to Ephesus in favour of Artemis (1.2.6). Thucydides reports that Tissaphernes had made a sacrifice to the goddess Artemis when he first visited Artemis’ temple in the past.58 Things now became more difficult for Thrasyllus because the Persian satrap had returned from the Hellespont to Ephesus again and made a religious argument, whereby the Athenians seemed to be impious invaders. Xenophon records how Tissaphernes sought to exploit the factor of divine favour in his own interest and how the satrap wanted his action to be viewed with respect to divine goodwill. Xenophon refrains utterly from passing judgement on whether the goddess favoured Tissaphernes, but it is clear that religion played a crucial role in the psychology of the Ephesians because the satrap convinced them to resist Thrasyllus. In this incident Xenophon approaches religion like Thucydides, who refrained utterly from passing judgement on whether the gods favoured one side or the other; but he recorded how

 56 Xen. Anab.7.4.1–2: Τῇ δ’ ὑστεραίᾳ κατακαύσας ὁ Σεύθης τὰς κώμας … τὴν μὲν λείαν ἀπέπεμψε διατίθεσθαι ῾Ηρακλείδην εἰς Πέρινθον, ὅπως ἂν μισθὸς γένοιτο τοῖς στρατιώταις. Cf. also Xen. Anab.7.3.11, where Seuthes tells his men that he will provide them σῖτα in order to secure them their salary. 57 For the ability of horses to overtake men on foot see Spence, 1993, who cites Xen. 5.4.54. 58 Thuc. 8.109.1: ἀφικόμενος πρῶτον ἐς ῎Εφεσον θυσίαν ἐποιήσατο τῇ ᾿Αρτέμιδι.

Thrasyllus as a general: an implicit contrast with Alcibiades  27

humans sought to exploit the factor of divine favour in their own interests.59 Xenophon wrote in this way to show how Tissaphernes managed to make Thrasyllus fail in his goal. Thus, after an incursion of sixteen days Thrasyllus sailed off.60 Thrasyllus changed his plan, i.e. he disembarked his hoplites at Coressus, while he stationed the hoplites, the peltasts and all the rest around the marsh (πρὸς τὸ ἕλος) on the other side of Ephesus. At dawn he led the units forward (1.2.7). Thrasyllus’ enemies also were determined to resist, because they advanced to meet him, as did the allies whom Tissaphernes had brought there, namely the Syracusans who reinforced their navy61 and two ships of Selinus (1.2.8). All these at first attacked the Athenians hoplites in Coressus, routed them and killed about one hundred of them, pursuing them (καταδιώξαντες) down to the sea. Having in mind other incidents from Thucydides, Xenophon’s readers can realize that the pursuit of the Athenians indicates their total defeat.62 Then the enemies of Thrasyllus turned to assault those alongside the marsh. There too, the Athenians were put to flight, and about three hundred of them were killed (1.2.9). The defeat of the second Athenian unit is not surprising, because a swamp made men weary, as Thucydides shows in his account of the Sicilian expedition.63 Moreover, the choice to attack a city which was naturally protected was a doubtful choice from the very beginning.64 Thus Thrasyllus and his men were defeated but they were quite lucky because they did not suffer heavy losses. On the other hand, the Ephesians had every reason to celebrate their victory, so they set up a trophy in their city and another one at Coressus. This victory raised their morale because they rewarded their Syracusan and Selinuntian allies with prizes of valour and other prerogatives (1.2.10). Tissaphernes, the Ephesians and their friends had inflicted on the Athenians the only setback they had experienced after 411 B.C. and Thrasyllus was responsible for this. The Athenians had to ask for the recovery of their dead under truce. This fact and the two trophies of the Ephesians

 59 See Furley, 2006, 415–38. 60 Munn, 2000, 173 believes that it was the goddesses that forced the Athenians to withdraw but Xenophon focuses only on the human plane. Cf. previous n. 61 See Krentz, 1989b, 113. 62 The Corcyreans καταδιώξαντες the Corinthians (Thuc. 1.49.5); the Athenians καταδιώξαντες the Spartans at Rion (Thuc. 2.84.4). Cf. also other pursuits in Diod. 11.19.2, 13.11.5, 14.64.2, 14.83.7. 63 The Athenian generals at Syracuse saw that their soldiers were weary of remaining in the island because the place they had encamped was damp (τὸ χωρίον … ἐν ᾧ ἐστρατοπεδεύοντο ἑλῶδες … ἦν–Thuc. 7.47.2). 64 Cf. Dio Cassius Hist.Rom.40.34.3, who says that it was hard for an enemy to approach the city of Avaricum because it was bordered on one side by almost trackless swamps.

28  Chapter 1: Alcibiades and Athens indicate that the latter controlled the battlefields.65 Xenophon’s readers could think that Thrasyllus’ trophy at Pygela meant nothing for his men now. Thrasyllus and his fleet had no reason to remain there, so they departed from the island, went to Notium, and after burying their dead they sailed immediately for Lesbos and the Hellespont (1.2.11). The burial of the war dead at Notium is noteworthy because Athenian warriors were usually buried in Athens but in some exceptional cases they were buried on the battlefield. One of these exceptions was the burial of the dead at Notium.66 For this reason Xenophon emphasizes that the Athenians buried them ‘there’ (κἀκεῖ). Most probably the decision of the Athenians to violate their custom of burying their dead in the fatherland was a result of their defeat and their need to move away from Ephesus as soon as possible. This incident must have been quite embarrassing to the surviving soldiers and Thrasyllus. When the twenty-five Syracusan ships sailed past from Ephesus, Thrasyllus’ fleet, which had anchored at Methymna on Lesbos, put out against them, captured four with their crews and chased the rest back to Ephesus (1.2.12). This was certainly a success for Thrasyllus, but Xenophon’s readers should not regard it as a great victory, since he had fifty ships (1.1.34). Moreover, the fact that Thrasyllus captured only four but gave up the pursuit of the rest when they entered Ephesus means that he knew that he had no chances to achieve anything more. The Athenian general had already been defeated by the Ephesians, as we saw earlier. Thrasyllus sent all the Syracusan prisoners to Athens except for one Alcibiades, who was a cousin and fellow exile of Alcibiades, whom Thrasyllus ordered to be stoned to death. From there Thrasyllus sailed to Sestus to join the rest of the army and then the entire force crossed over to Lampsacus (1.2.13). The punishment of Alcibiades by stoning deserves attention. If Thrasyllus wanted to have Alcibiades judged, he could have sent him back to Athens along with the Syracusan prisoners. But it was he who condemned him to death with this brutal and unusual method of execution. Probably Thrasyllus had in mind the Athenian councillor Lyciscus, who had been executed by his fellow citizens, because he had proposed to surrender to Persia in 479 B.C., and was still remembered until the 4th century B.C.67 On the other hand, this was not the case with this Alcibiades, whose execution was not remembered by his contemporaries and the Athenians of the future generations. For this reason, it is justifiable to believe

 65 As Krentz, 1989b, 114 remarks. 66 See Arrington, 2015, 48–49. 67 See Rosivach, 1987, 232–246.

Thrasyllus as a general: an implicit contrast with Alcibiades  29

that Xenophon reports this incident not in order to add another incident of execution by stoning but in order to imply that Thrasyllus wanted to make a strong impression on his men about his determination to punish a traitor because of his recent failures. Even so, this incident could not change the disappointing result from Thrasyllus’ actions. All this account devoted to Thrasyllus could be explained as a contrast between his defeats and the previous as well as future successes of Alcibiades. After making this comparison readers cannot but admit that Alcibiades was much superior in abilities to his colleague. This impression is strengthened by the reaction of Alcibiades’ men at Lampsacus. His veteran soldiers refused to serve in the same ranks with Thrasyllus’ men (συντάττεσθαι), claiming that they were undefeated (ἀήττητοι), while the others had been defeated. Still, all of them remained there, fortifying Lampsacus (1.2.15). This incident reveals how a general like Alcibiades could strengthen the morale of his men and proves that any victory was the result of his skills to lead them in war.68 On this occasion we could fear that Alcibiades would boast about his victories and abilities, as he had done before the Sicilian expedition.69 On the contrary, Alcibiades was not factional or spiteful with his colleague but remained rational in such a situation. This becomes apparent even before Thrasyllus’ arrival, because Alcibiades had organized the entire army into a single formation (συντάττοντος). His plan was predetermined and no soldier could refuse to obey his orders. Without explicitly praising him, Xenophon reveals that Alcibiades knew how to build unity and esprit de corps in a body of men.70 Readers are led to the conclusion that Thrasyllus, despite his efforts, did not have the skills to defeat his Persian enemies, failing in almost all cases, while his few successes were unimportant for the course of the war. Thus the implicit contrast between him and Alcibiades makes the latter’s superiority appear more clearly. However, Xenophon shows that Alcibiades was not factional or spiteful with his colleagues, but, on the contrary, cooperative as he had been in some other cases in his career.

 68 Note that the Syracusan generals told their men that they had been victorious (ἀήττητοι) because they led them (Xen. 1.1.28). 69 Cf. Thuc. 6.15.2, 16.1. 70 Rahn, 1971, 507 n. 17 remarks that the accounts of Dercylidas’ leadership in Asia (3.2.6–7), Agesilaus’ activity at Ephesus (3.4.16–19) and Teleutias’ relationship to his soldiers (5.1.3–4) are evidence of Xenophon’s interest in how one builds unity and esprit de corps in a body of men. Cf. Gray, 2011, 2–12 on Xenophon’s emphasis on willing obedience in all his works. I would add this passage as exemplary in Xenophon’s text.

30  Chapter 1: Alcibiades and Athens

. Alcibiades’ financial and military action continued Xenophon now brings Alcibiades to the fore again. The Athenians made an expedition against Abydus. Pharnabazus met them with many cavalrymen but he was defeated in battle and fled. Alcibiades pursued him with the cavalry and one hundred and twenty hoplites commanded by Menander until the night fell (μέχρι σκότος) (1.2.16). Alcibiades’ decision to stop pursuing the satrap when it became dark was wise.71 Thucydides narrates that when the Athenian general Demosthenes and his men attacked Epipolai in Sicily during the night (ἐν νυκτὶ) they surprised the Spartan commander Gylippus and his troops. But then the Athenians, in the confidence of victory, began to fall into disorder (ἐν ἀταξίᾳ) as they advanced; they wanted to force their way as quickly as they could through all that part of the enemy which had not yet fought, and they were afraid that if they relaxed their efforts the Syracusans might rally. However, the Boeotians attacked the Athenians, turned them, and put them to flight (7.43.5–7). The whole army was soon in utter confusion, and the perplexity was so great that from neither side could the particulars of the conflict be exactly ascertained. Thucydides explains this situation saying that in the daytime the combatants see more clearly; though even then only what is going on immediately around them, and that imperfectly, nothing of the battle as a whole. However, in a night engagement (ἐν δὲ νυκτομαχίᾳ) like this in which two great armies fought–the only one of the kind which occurred during the war, the historian adds–nobody could be certain of anything. The moon was bright, and the two enemies saw before them, as men naturally would in the moonlight, the figures of one another, but were unable to distinguish with certainty who was friend or foe (7.44.1).72 Besides, many successful generals did the same.73 As a result of this victorious battle, the soldiers of Alcibiades came together of their own accord and welcomed Thrasyllus’ men. Moreover, they also went out on some other campaigns into the land of Persia and ravaged it (1.2.17). In only a few lines of text Xenophon refers to the Athenian

 71 Cf. Hom. Il.7.293, who says that it is good to stop fighting at the fall of night. 72 For this difficulty during night attacks as a reason for breaking off battles at nightfall see Pritchett, 1974, 162–63. 73 Xen. Anab.4.2.2–4 says that he and the Ten Thousand tried to pass a steep hill from which the barbarians rolled down round stones but they stopped when it became dark (μέχρι σκότος). This was a wise choice because the enemy did not stop rolling down their stones throughout the night. Plut. Alex.33.11 says that Alexander stopped pursuing Dareius when it became dark (σκότους ὄντος). In Eur. Rhesus 61–70 Hector says that he would not stop the fight when night fell, but the seers told him to wait for the light of the day. Cf. van Wees, 2004, 135: ‘[a battle] might continue without decision until dusk, when darkness would force both sides to pull back’.

Alcibiades’ financial and military action continued  31

soldiers again in order to show that Alcibiades’ ability to coordinate the Athenian forces could unite the soldiers and bring about positive results. Thrasyllus has disappeared from the narrative. Alcibiades now repeated the plan of Thrasyllus to ravage the Persian land, but he did this with full success, as Xenophon implies, since nobody resisted him. In the next year the Athenians sailed to Proconnesus with their whole force (1.3.1). Setting out from there against Calchedon and Byzantium, they camped near Calchedon. The Calchedonians, perceiving that the Athenians were approaching them, deposited all their movable property, which was in reality what the Athenians considered their booty (λείαν), with their neighbours the Bithynian Thracians (1.3.2). Xenophon has said that Pharnabazus went to help Calchedon (1.1.26) but he had not done anything specific. Agis also had failed to support Byzantium and Calchedon because the Athenians had prevented him (1.1.35–36). Now it was the right time for Alcibiades and his men to take the control of these cities. Through the decision of the Calchedonians to remove their property to another city, readers understand that the Athenians continued their plan of collecting money.74 Alcibiades, having some hoplites and the cavalrymen, and ordering the ships to sail around to Bithynia, demanded the property of the Calchedonians; and said that if they did not give it over to him, he would attack them. So they handed it over (1.3.3). Alcibiades’ threat of making a siege against the Bithynians was effective, since they gave him the money without resistance. His authority brought about the desirable result. At the same time, the impression is that if Alcibiades had decided to lay siege to this city with just a part of his forces, he would have conquered it. Then Alcibiades returned to his camp, having collected the booty (τήν λείαν) and having made an agreement with the Bithynians. Thus in return for their cooperation Alcibiades secured an alliance with these people. Now, using all his forces, Alcibiades began to wall off (ἀπετείχιζε) Calchedon from sea to sea, including as much of the river as possible (τοῦ ποταμοῦ), with a wooden wall (1.3.4). The Athenian commander was determined to force the Calchedonians to surrender by depriving them of the possibility of replenishment. Hippocrates, the Spartan governor, tried to prevent him by leading his army out from the city. The Athenians lined up opposite him, and Pharnabazus from the encircling wall brought help with his army and many cavalrymen (1.3.5). We read earlier that Pharnabazus had tried to defend Abydus from Alcibiades, but he was defeated mainly by Alcibiades in battle and fled (1.2.15). Due to this  74 Cf. 1.2.4 again, where we read that Thrasyllus took money, slaves and λείαν πολλήν from Lydia.

32  Chapter 1: Alcibiades and Athens escape Pharnabazus reappears now in Xenophon’s account. In this battle Thrasyllus led the Athenian hoplites. He and Hippocrates fought for a long time against their enemies until Alcibiades brought assistance with some hoplites and his cavalry. Hippocrates was killed while those with him fled into the city (1.3.6). Once again Thrasyllus was inferior to Alcibiades as a general. Alcibiades’ intervention in favour of the Athenian army in this ambivalent fight recalls the undecided sea fight of Abydus until he appeared and turned the Spartans to flight.75 At the same time, Pharnabazus, who had not been able to join up with Hippocrates because of the narrowness of the land (διὰ τὴν στενοπορίαν), since the river and the fortifications (τοῦ ποταμοῦ καὶ τῶν ἀποτειχισμάτων) were not much distant from each other, retreated to the Heracleium of the Calchedonians, where he had his camp (1.3.7). Comparing Alcibiades’ plan and his efficiency in dealing with the lack of space, as becomes clear through the failure of Pharnabazus, readers cannot help but praise his military foresight. In fact, the result seems certain if we consider the defeat of the Spartans by the Thebans because of the στενοπορία in a battle that Xenophon reports in another part of the Hellenica (3.5.20). For a second time readers understand that Pharnabazus was no match for Alcibiades, as in the sea battle of Abydus, where the satrap had tried to help the Peloponnesians.76 Alcibiades was always better than the satrap, since he had the foresight to anticipate or overcome his actions. Pharnabazus could not turn the balance in favour of the Calchedonians, so he was forced to retreat. Because of this fact (ἐκ τούτου) Alcibiades went to the Hellespont and the Chersonese to collect money (χρήματα). Once again, Xenophon leads his readers to recall Alcibiades’ remark that Athens had no money.77 In the meantime, Calchedon remained a beleaguered city. The rest of the Athenian generals (οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ στρατηγοὶ) came to an agreement with Pharnabazus that: (a) he would pay twenty talents to the Athenians; (b) the Calchedonians would pay the customary tribute (τὸν φόρον) to the Athenians; (c) they would repay the amount they owed and (d) the Athenians would not make war on the Calchedonians until envoys returned from the King (1.3.8–9). This was a decision made on the spot by the Athenian generals in charge. The demand for tribute takes Xenophon’s readers back to Thucydides, who reports several incidents where the Athenians demanded from

 75 See p. 12–13. 76 See p. 14. 77 See p. 17.

Alcibiades’ financial and military action continued  33

their allies to pay them in cash;78 with or without making war on them.79 Now readers realize that Calchedon became subject to Athens again by paying tribute.80 Thus, through the report of this agreement Xenophon shows that the Athenians were more interested in the payment of the tribute by the Calchedonians and the collection of a ‘fine’ by Pharnabazus than in the capture of the city itself at this point in the war. Moreover, by writing of the Athenians’ wish to meet the King himself the historian shows that the former wanted to convince the latter that all they wanted was to continue the collection of tribute in the region. The satrap on his part seemed more willing to give money to his enemies than to allow the destruction of Calchedon. Since the Spartans were losing the war, he had no other solution but to let his King decide about the evolution of the war (1.3.13). It is certain that this agreement was an achievement of the Athenian generals and that Alcibiades was not involved in it,81 since he continued his effort to take control of the region by conquering Selymbria and moving against Byzantium (1.3.10). On the other hand, Xenophon tends to report Alcibiades’ actions distinctly from those of the other Athenian generals in order to emphasize his leading skills but he always implies that he was in cooperation with them.82 Thus it is difficult to believe that Alcibiades left Calchedon without any prior agreement

 78 For the meaning of the word φόρος as cash see Kallet-Marx, 1993, 49–50. Xenophon’s passage also proves that the Athenians wanted cash, since he refers to ‘the money owed’ after mentioning the word ‘tribute’. 79 The Aeginetans came to terms with the Athenians, dismantling their walls, surrendering their ships, and agreeing to pay tribute (φόρον) for the future (Thuc. 1.108.4). The Athenians allowed some of the Cytherians to live in their country, paying a tribute (φόρον) of four talents (Thuc. 4.57.4). The Athenians made a treaty with their allies that the latter should pay the tribute (τὸν φόρον) and after the conclusion of this, the Athenians should not make a war upon them to their hurt, so long as they paid the tribute (τὸν φόρον–Thuc. 5.18.5). Finally, note that Pharnabazus wanted to induce the cities in his province to revolt from the Athenians, that he might obtain the tribute (διὰ τοὺς φόρους) from them (Thuc. 8.6.1). For the issue of the Athenians imposing tribute on their allies see Kallet-Marx, 1993, 50, 52–53, 56–57, 62–66, 68, 122, 144–45. 80 See Amit, 1973, 447. 81 See Bloedow, 1973, 62. 82 In 1.1.8 we read that most of the Athenian ships assumed the task of collecting money in the Hellespont, while Thrasyllus went to Athens to inform his fellow citizens about their plans and ask for military help. Given that Alcibiades had joined the Athenian fleet, it is logical to assume that the tasks in the Hellespont and Athens were the result of the cooperation between Alcibiades and the rest of the generals. In 1.1.12 we read Alcibiades united his forces with his colleagues Theramenes and Thrasyllus before attacking Mindarus at Cyzicus. In 1.2.13 Xenophon tells us that Thrasyllus united his forces with Alcibiades, although Xenophon does not mention how Thrasyllus knew where Alcibiades was stationed.

34  Chapter 1: Alcibiades and Athens with his colleagues. Moreover, Xenophon leaves no doubt about Alcibiades’ importance because Pharnabazus involved him in the agreement, asking for his oath (1.3.11). This indicates that the satrap considered Alcibiades a strong enemy, who could even act independently from the rest of the Athenians.83 Xenophon’s readers become certain of this because Xenophon says that Pharnabazus did not trust Alcibiades at all; that is why he waited for him not only to give the common oath but also to give assurances personally (1.3.12). Thus it is clear the satrap considered Alcibiades the political leader of Athens. Regarding the man himself, Xenophon’s readers realize that Alcibiades was supreme in warfare, but this was only a means for future diplomacy. The present common agreement between the two parties ended the hostilities, while there was also hope that the war could end with the King’s consent. The inclusion of the Argive ambassadors among the Athenians implies Alcibiades’ influence on them. Thucydides has shown that Alcibiades had a close political association with the Argives after the Peace of Nicias.84 When Alcibiades had abandoned the Athenian fleet in Sicily, he went to Argos because of his policy of alliance with the city.85 The Argives fought against the Milesians once but they were defeated (Thuc. 8.25.3, 27.6). When the fleet at Samos decided to revolt against the Four Hundred, envoys from Argos were also present, who had proved their loyalty to the Athenian demos by surrendering the envoys of the oligarchs to their fellow citizens and had gone directly to the island, proffering their aid to the Athenian people and bringing with them Argive ambassadors. Alcibiades complimented them, and requested that they come with their forces when they were summoned and then dismissed them (Thuc. 8.86.8–9). Evidently, military help never came, but it is certain that the ties between the two cities had remained strong; so these two aristocrats from Argos were trusted and hence included with the Athenian envoys. On the other hand, the vigorous presence of the Argives implies that they trusted Alcibiades and recognized him as the true political leader of Athens. While Pharnabazus was escorting the envoys, the Athenians (οἱ ᾿Αθηναῖοι) besieged Byzantium (1.3.14). Since there was no agreement between Athens and  83 See also Amit, 1973, 445, Gribble, 1985, 87. Mitchell, 1997, 6 argues that an exchange of oaths would act as a guarantee of trust and includes among her proofs Xen. 1.3.12, saying that Alcibiades exchanged oaths with Pharnabazus to seal their private friendship. Micthell, 1997, 117–18 analyzes this passage again and calls the agreement of Pharnabazus with Alcibiades ‘friendship’. Although Xenophon supports her argument about the importance of oaths, I disagree with her opinion that Pharnabazus considered Alcibiades his friend. 84 See Mitchell, 1997, 101–2; Gribble, 1999, 84. 85 This remark is due to Romilly, 1995, 124.

Alcibiades’ financial and military action continued  35

Persia yet, Alcibiades and the Athenians could continue the war against Sparta. In fact, they could believe that they would force the Persian King to come to a compromise by seeing Sparta being defeated. Thus the Athenians built an encircling wall at Byzantium and made assaults around its city wall (1.3.14), but they could not accomplish anything by force. So they (οἱ ᾿Αθηναῖοι) persuaded some of the Byzantines to betray the city (1.3.16). Clearchus, the garrison commander, thinking that nobody would betray Byzantium, arranged everything as well as he could and, entrusting things to Coiratadas and Helixus, crossed over the straits to Pharnabazus, to get pay for his soldiers and make a fleet (1.3.17). This information deserves attention. A city could not ordinarily be captured by direct attack, while should this happen it involved a high incidence of casualties. Moreover, besides the fact that a siege was not always successful, it needed time and money.86 This means that the Athenians did not have the time and the money to assume the task of a siege. Finally, Clearchus had just left the city and entrusted everything to two local men. For these reasons the Athenians chose to take Byzantium by treachery, which was a common tactic in the Peloponnesian War.87 This happened because the Byzantine Anaxilaus could not bear seeing the women and children of his city perishing from famine, while Clearchus was giving all the food to his soldiers. Thus the Byzantines allowed the army and Alcibiades to enter their city through a small gate (τὰς πύλας … εἰσήγαγον τὸ στράτευμα καὶ τὸν ᾿Αλκιβιάδην), a fact which forced the defenders of the city Elixus and Coiratadas to surrender (1.3.19–21). Alcibiades played an important role in this victory. On the other hand, Xenophon’s account of this incident does not seem to put Alcibiades in the limelight from the very beginning. It is ‘the Athenians’ who besiege Byzantium and it is ‘the Athenians’ again who persuade some Byzantines to betray their city. Only when the Athenians enter the city does Xenophon mention Alcibiades. In my opinion, the historian changes the focus of his attention in order to show Alcibiades’ ability to take a city when a battle failed. The historian describes the attempt of the Athenians to conquer the city. Since Alcibiades was the leader of the army, it is fairly certain that he put that plan into action. When this failed, Alcibiades must have ordered his men to convince some Byzantines to betray their city, but he did not participate in these contacts. If this does not seem plausible, we can compare it with Theramenes’ plan in the Arginousai trial, where his men persuaded (ἔπεισαν) Callixenus to accuse the generals in the Assembly (1.7.8).88 If this is  86 See Losada, 1972, 30–41. 87 See Losada, 1972, 15–24. 88 See p. 155.

36  Chapter 1: Alcibiades and Athens right, we cannot doubt that Alcibiades was the master mind behind these contacts. In addition, we must not forget Alcibiades’ warning to his men that they had no money.89 This means that the Athenian general should not delay any further. However, when the time for action came, Alcibiades took an active role again by leading the army inside the city. In fact, we can claim that Xenophon implies that the Byzantines knew that their plan would not succeed if Alcibiades did not enter their city. Alcibiades captured Byzantium in a way that resembles somehow the way he had forced the Cataneans to surrender during the Sicilian expedition. Thucydides narrates that while Alcibiades spoke to the assembly of Catana, his men entered a small gate (πυλίδα τινὰ) in secret; so when the Cataneans saw the Athenian soldiers, they decided to ally with Athens (Thuc. 6.51.1–2). The capture of Byzantium was another great success for Athens, because it helped it to restore its position in the Ionian war.90 At this point Alcibiades disappears from Xenophon’s narrative. We will see that he is suddenly introduced in 1.4.8, waiting to go home.

. Cyrus’ intervention and the Athenian reaction When Pharnabazus and the ambassadors continued their journey, they met the Spartan ambassador Boeotius and his colleagues, returning from the Persian King, who said that they had gained everything they had asked from him (1.4.2). Thucydides shows that the Spartans had sent many envoys to the King.91 In all their efforts they failed to explain to him what they really wanted, because the change of ephors at home meant a change in Spartan policy and the communication between Sparta and Susa needed several months.92 Now Xenophon’s readers learn93 that the Spartans had sent one more embassy along with representatives of their allies,94 and they overcame their previous difficulties and made a crystal clear proposition to Dareius, who consented to their demands. Their claim was

 89 See p. 17. 90 See Losada, 1972, 28. 91 For Thucydides’ references to the diplomatic missions of Sparta to Persia and the Athenian efforts to prevent them see Mitchell, 1997, 114–15. 92 See Cartledge and Debnar, 2006, 578–79. 93 Athough I agree with Henry, 1967, 7 that Xenophon has not mentioned that a Spartan embassy had been sent to the King, I dissent from his view that we should consider this an ‘omission’. This seems to be a deliberate choice of the historian. 94 For my argument that the messengers who escorted Boeotius were representatives of the allies of Sparta cf. Thuc. 2.9.

Cyrus’ intervention and the Athenian reaction  37

not true, because there had been a heavy price. Thucydides has shown that the Spartans for reasons of expediency deprived the Greeks of Asia of their freedom by making an alliance with Persia in three different treaties under very degrading terms.95 Xenophon’s audience understands that the Lacedaimonians wanted to frighten the Athenians by arguing that they had signed a new agreement.96 In addition, Cyrus was to take the command of all those on the coast who would fight together (συμπολεμήσων) with the Spartans. Boeotius had with him a letter with the royal seal, addressed to all those on the coast, in which he said ‘I am sending down Cyrus as κάρανον of all those who muster at Castolus’. Xenophon explains that this word means commander (1.4.3). Xenophon repeats the exact words of the King by using direct speech and includes a Persian word which he translates into Greek in order to explain its meaning to his readers. Evidently, his purpose here was to engage the attention of his readers and give a specific impression concerning the gravity of the situation for the Athenians. Thus his conveyance of Persian information to the Athenians becomes simultaneously conveyance of information to his readers. This was a prestigious letter, since it was written by the King himself, and confirmed to Persians and Greeks alike the need to acknowledge the authority of the young prince.97 The Peloponnesian War could take a new turn because of Cyrus’ personal participation. This was an unexpected development in the evolution of the war concerning the Athenians, and Xenophon reserved this information to this point to attract the attention of his audience. In my opinion, this is quite certain if we consider Thucydides, who has already recognized by his proleptic mention of Cyrus’ mission in 407 B.C. that the Persian involvement was not decisive for the outcome of the Peloponnesian War: even when Cyrus, the son of the King, joined in the war and supplied the Peloponnesian fleet with money (Κύρῳ τε ὕστερον βασιλέως παιδὶ προσγενομένῳ, ὃς παρεῖχε χρήματα Πελοποννησίοις ἐς τὸ ναυτικόν), the Athenians continued to resist, and were at last overthrown, not by their enemies, but by themselves and their own internal dissensions (2.65.12). In the present context, we should also consider Thucydides’ suggestion that the relationship between Alcibiades and his fellow citizens was one of the reasons for

 95 For the treaties see Thuc. 8.43.1–4 with Hornblower, 2008, 876–78. For this characterization of the treaties see Hornblower, 2008, 801. For signing these terms for reasons of expediency see Rawlings, 1981, 198–207. 96 For the view that Sparta made a new agreement with Persia at this point, the so-called treaty of Boeotius, see Lewis, 1977, 108–25; against see Tuplin, 1987, 133–35. 97 See Bearzot, 2014, 100–01.

38  Chapter 1: Alcibiades and Athens the city’s downfall (6.15.4). We will see in this book that Xenophon, as a continuator of Thucydides, invites his readers to consider the importance of Persian money in the Peloponnesian war from now onwards. In the present chapter I will try to show how Cyrus’ involvement affected Athens but I will also show how Xenophon shows that the relationship between Alcibiades and his fellow citizens was one of the reasons why Athens lost the war. When the Athenian ambassadors heard the Spartans and saw Cyrus, they wanted more than ever to see the King, but if this could not be arranged they wished to return home (1.4.4). Obviously, the Athenians believed that they could change the King’s mind if they talked to him in person; otherwise, their fellow citizens at home would decide about the involvement of Dareius and Cyrus in the war. The Athenian fleet could not continue the war without the decision of the citizens at home. What the envoys thought was right, as the reaction of Cyrus reveals. The Persian prince told Pharnabazus that he should either hand over the envoys to him or not allow them return home, because he did not wish the Athenians at home to know what was being done (1.4.5). Cyrus was afraid that his father could change his mind but he also wanted to keep the agreement between Persia and Sparta a secrect, because he feared that the Athenians would continue the war more fiercely. It is worth wondering if Cyrus had this thought especially now, since Alcibiades was in command of the fleet and had defeated the Spartans and Pharnabazus in previous fights. Alcibiades appears in Xenophon’s account again. It is noteworthy that Alcibiades wanted to return to Athens, although he did not know about Cyrus’ arrival as yet. This indicates that he knew that he could not continue fighting the Spartans for ever without going back home. On account of this, he went immediately to Samos. Taking twenty of the ships there, he sailed to the Ceramic Gulf in Caria, from which he collected one hundred talents and then returned to Samos (1.4.8– 9). If the new spring which Xenophon omitted was that of 407 B.C., in 1.4.11, we can pin down the previous year as 408,98 which means that Alcibiades spent one year in the region in order to collect this money. The historian focuses on the fact that Alcibiades successfully collected this impressive amount;99 so it is logical to think that he must have made a concerted effort to collect this money in various ways.100 Xenophon’s point is that despite the King’s full support for Sparta and

 98 There is a problem in that Xenophon marks only three new years between 410 and 406 when he ought to have marked four. For the date I use in the main text see Krentz, 1989b, 11–14. 99 Cf. Kallet-Marx, 1993, 145. 100 Robertson, 1980, 287, thinks that Alcibiades engaged into further military engagements. Cf. Van Wees, 2004, 26: ‘sums up to 100 talents, probably not much less than half of most cities’

Alcibiades before his return  39

Cyrus’ appointment as his representative, Alcibiades could not be stopped but continued vigorously to accumulate more money for Athens. His ability to increase the flow of revenue for Athens is impressive. From the preceding narrative it becomes clear that Alcibiades was a man of outstanding qualities and actions, an intelligent general. Xenophon has created a consistent picture of Alcibiades as keen for Athens to succeed through his efforts. The historian has proved Thucydides’ claim that Alcibiades’ conduct of the war was excellent (6.15.4). However, the war itself had not ended. The Athenian fleet was divided in three parts. Alcibiades remained at Samos. Thrasybulus went to Thrace with thirty ships and subdued all the lands that had gone over to the Spartan side, including Thasos (1.4.9). Thrasyllus returned to Athens with the rest of the army (1.4.10).

. Alcibiades before his return The Athenians had been informed of the several victories of the Athenian generals; so this must have been the reason why they chose as generals Alcibiades, Thrasybulus who was abroad, and from those at home Conon (1.4.10). At this point Thrasyllus’ generalship ends. If we remember that Xenophon has shown in his narrative that Thrasyllus was no match for Alcibiades, it is plausible to think that the people at home must have realized that Thrasyllus could not offer them anything more. Thrasybulus was still considered necessary for the war, while Conon was favoured by them. However, the real architect of the Athenian victories was Alcibiades, who was φεύγων. The meaning of this word needs attention. In 411 B.C. the Five Thousand passed a vote recalling Alcibiades and others from exile (Thuc. 8.97.2). Alcibiades had had his political rights reinstated by the Five Thousand. And the fact that he had not returned to his city for four years means that he remained in a sense an exile. Therefore Xenophon uses the participle to emphasize that Alcibiades had not stayed in Athens to face trial and defend himself for the scandals of the Herms and the Mysteries, but had chosen to live as an exile.101 Now the Athenians honored him by electing him a general. This decision  movable wealth were regularly demanded by besieging armies. Herman, 1987, 153 n. 95 says that Alcibiades’ collection of money can be attributed to argyrologia or to provision by xenoi. Munn, 2003, 165, believes that Alcibiades sold the slaves he had taken in the past. However, Xenophon is not interested in showing how Alcibiades collected this money. 101 Cf. Andoc. 1.4, who says that many of his enemies said that he would not stay but would certainly get away into exile (οἰχήσομαί τε φεύγων); there would be no point of him staying for such a serious trial but he could travel (πλεύσαντι) to Cyprus; with Thuc. 6.53.1 and 6.61.4– 5, where it is said that the Salaminia had come from Athens for Alcibiades with orders for him to

40  Chapter 1: Alcibiades and Athens was honorable but also odd. Alcibiades would not be put on trial now,102 but he had to defend himself about the scandal of the Mysteries, since he still faced the curses of the Eumolpidai and the Ceryces.103 We must remember that when Peisander went to Athens and insisted that Alcibiades should be recalled, those two families protested on behalf of the Mysteries, mentioned the cause of his banishment, and called upon the gods to avert his recall (Thuc. 8.53.1–2). But before his return he had to settle some other things first. Alcibiades left Samos, having the money (ἔχων τὰ χρήματα), and went to Paros. This phrase reminds us of Xenophon’s previous narrative about the need of the Athenians to collect money and Alcibiades’ achievement of gathering one hundred talents. Now Alcibiades would bring this money to the Athenian treasury104 and help the Athenians financially to continue the war against Sparta. At the same time, Alcibiades still regarded himself as the leading commander of Athens and remained steadfast in his fight against Sparta. Thus he sailed to Gytheium to spy on the construction of thirty Peloponnesian vessels, as his informers had told him. Alcibiades continued to be one step ahead of the Spartans. However, he did not go directly to Athens for his own reasons as well, i.e. he wanted to find out how the city would react to his return home (1.4.11). Alcibiades was not certain that his fellow Athenians would recognize his military achievement and that they would welcome him home. Evidently, he had not learned yet that he had been elected a general. When he finally found out that the city was favourably inclined towards him (εὔνουν), the Athenians had elected him a general and his own friends called on him individually to return, he sailed into the Peiraeus (1.4.12). In my opinion, Xenophon’s use of the word εὔνουν is remarkable and no coincidence for two reasons. First, the fact that Athens was favourable towards Alcibiades was a unique phenomenon, because it showed that the city  sail home to answer the charges (ἀποπλεῖν ἐς ἀπολογίαν, ἀπολογησομένῳ ἀκολουθεῖν). Then read Thuc. 6.61.6, where Alcibiades and his fellow accused sailed off (ἀπέπλεον) as though to return to Athens and finally 6.61.7, where Alcibiades is ἤδη φυγὰς. Moreover, cf. Isocr. 11.39: ῾Υπὲρ ὧν τὴν μὲν ἀξίαν δίκην οὐκ ἔδοσαν … ἄλλος δὲ φεύγων τὴν πατρίδα, and Aesch. 2.124: ῾Ο μὲν γὰρ Λεωσθένης, ὁ φεύγων ἐνθένδε διὰ τοὺς συκοφάντας. For Alcibiades as an exile see also Krentz, 1989b, 129. 102 Note that the word φεύγων is used to denote the legal status of an Athenian citizen. Cf. Lys. 10.12, Isocr. 18.1, 20.16, Dem. 23.66, 35.45, 37.26, 45.50. 103 Garland, 1984, 77 discusses the relationship between the Eleusinian priesthood and the political authority of the demos and rightly notes that opposition to Alcibiades’ return on the part of the Eleusinian priesthood did nothing to delay it. Gagné, 2009, 229 corroborates Garland’s point. On the other hand, we must not neglect the fact that the priests had not rescinded the curses. 104 This remark is due to Bloedow, 1973, 67.

Alcibiades and the Plynteria  41

had to convince him of its worth and not vice versa, which was the norm.105 The city treated Alcibiades not as a citizen but almost as its equal, although this relationship was common only between city-states.106 Second, according to Aristotle, people ‘say that one must wish good things for the sake of a friend and they call those who wish good things in this way well-disposed (εὔνους), if the same wish does not occur on the other person’s part as well (Nic.Eth.1155b27–33). The philosopher adopts the term εὔνους, because this is a one-way fondness for another person but it is not a philia, since it is not mutual.107 This means that the demos started believing that Alcibiades was its friend,108 but the latter did not consider the former as such.109 This reaction of Alcibiades gives some explanation of the fact that he had chosen to remain an external entity to the city. Apparently, Alcibiades suspected that the Athenians could change their opinion about him. The logical conclusion is that Alcibiades was not favourably inclined (εὔνους) to the city. Xenophon makes clear the separation between Alcibiades and Athens from the very beginning.110

. Alcibiades and the Plynteria Alcibiades sailed into the Peiraeus the day the city celebrated the Plynteria, when the statue (τοῦ ἕδους) of the goddess Athena had been totally covered (κατακεκαλυμμένου); a thing that some (τινες) divined as an ill omen for him and the city as well. That is (γάρ), Xenophon explains,111 on that day none of the Athenians would dare to take up any serious business (1.4.12). The Athenians held this festival at the end of the month Thargelion during which Athena’s temple was spring-cleaned and her sacrosanct wooden statue washed in the sea.112 It is noteworthy that Xenophon chooses to mention one specific step of this ritual, the covering of the goddess, since it was this that caused the reaction of some Athenians.  105 Cf. Lys. 12.65, 13.93, 14.10, Andoc. 1.36, [Andoc.] 4.36, Dem. 18.6, 84, 110, 171, 321, 23.162, 25.64, 67, 68, Prooem.25.3, 50.2, Lett.3.32. 106 Cf. Thuc. 3.47.2, 58.3, Dem. 15.33. Note that the only person that could be εὔνους to a city was the Persian King. See Xen. Ages.8.3. 107 This remark is due to Konstan, 2001, 173. 108 Cf. Arist. Eth. Eud.1241a12–13: ἔστι γὰρ ἡ εὔνοια ἀρχὴ φιλίας· ὁ μὲν γὰρ φίλος πᾶς εὔνους, ὁ δ’ εὔνους οὐ πᾶς φίλος. 109 See Konstan, 1998, 65. 110 See Brown Ferrario, 2014, 186. 111 For the use of this particle as explanatory see Denniston, 1954, 58. 112 Cf. Porph. Abst.2.18: τὰ παλαιότατα ἕδη … ξύλινα ὑπάρχοντα. See Deubner, 1966, 20, Parke, 1977, 152–54.

42  Chapter 1: Alcibiades and Athens On the basis of the participle, I believe that an explanation for this reaction must be sought in its symbolic meaning. The Greeks considered veiling as a response to an affront, which would cause retaliation against the offence.113 It may not be a coincidence that the word ἕδος occurs in contexts in which blasphemy against the gods is also relevant.114 Thus, it is probable that Xenophon used this word to remind his readers that Alcibiades had committed a profane act. This seems to be the case, considering that in Soph. Oed.Tyr.886 the Chorus says of someone οὐδὲ δαιμόνων ἕδη σέβων that he will suffer a bad fate. The message was that the gods will become indignant at direct human affronts to their honor. The play of Sophocles must be accepted as a source of popular belief because Xenophon also testifies that some Athenians thought that the goddess would be indignant at Alcibiades’ direct human affront to her honor. This meant that the goddess would not be favourable to him and the city. Thus the opinion of those scholars who argue that Alcibiades’ impiety prepares the readers to believe that his downfall will ensue is justified.115 The questions which arise now are: (a) since the notion of divine intervention was strong among some citizens, why did Alcibiades not take care not to return on the day of the Plynteria? (b) was he not afraid about the consequences of such an act for him and the city? Given that Alcibiades would defend himself about the Mysteries, as I argued earlier, it is difficult to believe that he would be insensitive towards this festival which was a ἡμέρα ἀποφράς.116 Probably the celebration of the Plynteria had been delayed that year and coincided with the day of his return, and the crowd at the Peiraeus, along with Alcibiades and his supporters, had all been unaware that this was the day of the festival.117

 113 For anger and the veil in Greek culture see Cairns, 2001, 18–32. Cf. Plut. Alc.34.1–2, who says that the goddess seemed to veil herself and drive Alcibiades away from herself rather than to receive him with friendly goodwill. 114 See Plut. Per.13.14–15, Isocr. 15.2 with Too, 2008, 89–90. 115 Due, 1991, 42 remarks that the introduction of the bad omen gives a sinister tone to the following narrative, preparing the reader for coming disasters, and hereby adds a discrete criticism of Alcibiades’ planning; Alcibiades should not forget a religious feast of great importance, thus suggesting a lack of care for the festival. Pownall, 1998, 262 argues that Xenophon indicates that Alcibiades’ second fall from grace in Athens comes about as punishment for the violation of the Plynteria. Thus Alcibiades’ end comes as no surprise. Rood, 2004, 369 believes that the historian foreshadows Alcibiades’ downfall by revealing that he returned on the day when Athens was celebrating the Plynteria. 116 Cf. Pollux Onom.8.141: ἐν ταῖς ἀποφράσι ... οἷον Πλυντηρίοις καὶ ταῖς τοιαύταις ἡμέραις. 117 For this information regarding the Plynteria see Nagy, 1994, 275–83. Goodman and Holladay, 1986, 151 n. 1 wrongly say that ‘Xenophon was a notably pious man and had an axe to

Alcibiades and the Plynteria  43

Thus we are allowed to infer that, although Xenophon mentioned that Alcibiades committed an impious act, he did not consider it so important because it was not a deliberate act. This becomes clearer if we consider another incident of impiousness. We know that Cinesias was the head of a club the members of which called themselves κακοδαιμονισταί and who gathered on the ill-fated days of each month to show disrespect to the gods. Cinesias was punished by the gods with chronic illness, while the other members of the group died.118 It is clear that Cinesias and his men were punished by the gods because they deliberately challenged them, while Xenophon indicates that Alcibiades did not do that on purpose. Given that the festival days in Athens totalled one hundred and fifty a year, while the ἡμέραι ἀποφράδες were only a few, probably thirty-six maximum,119 it seems that Alcibiades was unlucky. On the other hand, it is ironic that Alcibiades, who was concerned about the eunoia of the city, turned out to have forgotten about the eunoia of the city’s patron goddess while he was returning to Athens. This creates a negative impression about Alcibiades. Xenophon on his part by recording the reason for the reaction of the Athenians who observed the religious calendar so carefully invited his readers to think that Alcibiades should have been more careful. Such a thought becomes stronger, if we remember Thucydides who devoted a long account in his text to refer to the accusations against Alcibiades about impiety in 415 B.C. and the positive reaction of the Athenians to them.120 Thus being unlucky in religious matters could be a sign that everything is going to go wrong for Alcibiades. These are thoughts that Xenophon allows his readers to make through the voice of others and the text of his predecessor, so the prospects for Alcibiades seem chilling.121 At the same time, impiety was not the only factor that brought about Alcibiades’ downfall. Xenophon did recognize the presence and the superiority of the divine but he also believed that the intervention of the divine has limits and that humans were also responsible for their fate. The most striking proof of this is 7.5.11–13. The historian says that Epameinondas did not invade the city of Sparta at the place where he would have to fight on level ground. Instead, he chose a spot where he could descend. Nonetheless, Archidamus with a few men was able to drive him back either because of the divinity or because in their desperation  grind in stressing the importance of the Plynteria. Alcibiades and his friends obviously thought that it would not do him any harm to return on that day’. 118 On this issue see Lysias fr. LXXXV and fr. LXXXVI (Carey), Aristoph. Birds 1372–1409 with Mikalson, 1975, 22, Fisher, 1992, 146, Furley, 1996, 90. 119 See Hansen, 1987, 32. 120 See Thuc. 6.53.1, 6.61 with the discussion of Furley, 1996, 41–42. 121 For the same opinion see also Brown Ferrario, 2014, 186–87.

44  Chapter 1: Alcibiades and Athens the Spartans fought exceptionally well. When those Spartans continued to go after the Thebans beyond the appropriate moment, they also met their deaths. Then Xenophon completes his passage by saying that he described up to what point the divine gave victory to Sparta. Such a stance is also valid for Alcibiades’ case. Xenophon gives a religious dimension to his return, but we must be alert to the fact that Alcibiades is also responsible for another reason in the human sphere. This reason will appear later on in my analysis.

. Alcibiades’ return and the reaction of the mob When Alcibiades sailed into the Peiraeus, ὁ ὄχλος both from the Peiraeus and the city (ὅ τε ἐκ τοῦ Πειραιῶς καὶ ὁ ἐκ τοῦ ἄστεως ὄχλος) gathered together at the ships, admiring and wanting to see him (θαυμάζοντες καὶ ἰδεῖν βουλόμενοι– 1.4.13). Xenophon uses this phrase to emphasize the attachment but also the separateness between the city of Athens and the Peiraeus in the Athenians’ minds.122 Athens and the Peiraeus become one on this occasion through the word ὄχλος which meant the throng, but when it had a political sense it could mean ‘mob’.123 Thucydides uses this word in order to criticize the Athenians.124 Moreover, Alcibiades expressed his real opinion about the Athenians in his speech in Sparta by using the same word: they were not citizens but ὄχλος, ‘mob’ (6.89.5).125 Alcibiades did not have in mind only the people who lived in the Peiraeus but also the Athenians who lived in the city. In Xenophon it is the historian himself who uses this word, not his fellow citizens. Thus, since the opinion of the mob for Alcibiades was something independent of Xenophon’s stance towards them, it is certain that the historian uses this word to alert his audience to what they are going to read in his report of this gathering. It will be clear, I hope, that Xenophon follows Alcibiades in his criticism of the Athenians when he called them ὄχλος and denigrates their opinion. Xenophon pinpoints the Athenians’ admiration for Alcibiades, because this was a somewhat unique phenomenon. In the 4th century B.C. men usually admired the people of a city as citizens,126 but there was also a tendency to admire  122 For this concept regarding Athens and Peiraeus see von Reden, 1995, 24–37. 123 See LSJ s.v. ὄχλος. See also Aesch. 1.60 with Allen, 2000, 106 for an obscure use of the word. 124 See Hunter, 1988, 17–30. 125 For this meaning of the word ὄχλος in this passage see Hunter, 1988, 20–21. 126 Cf. Isocr. 12.241, where the pupil of Isocrates comments on the Athenians and the Spartans and asserts that all men praise the Athenians but some also praise and admire (θαυμάζειν) the Spartans.

Alcibiades’ return and the reaction of the mob  45

famous political men. However, this did not happen in the 5th century, at least to the same extent.127 This admiration of the mob for Alcibiades recalls Nicias’ warning to the Athenians before the Sicilian expedition that he wanted to be admired (θαυμασθῇ–Thuc. 6.12.2). With this argument Nicias pointed to Alcibiades’ wish to excel.128 The fact that the Athenians admired Alcibiades leads Xenophon’s readers to realize that his protagonist achieved his goal. Thus, by means of this word Xenophon continues Thucydides’ emphasis on the emergence of the individual as the beginning of a new world.129 Moreover, the expression of admiration meant that the Athenians wanted to have him as their friend.130 This is a development compared to the previous reaction of the Athenians, who had started believing that Alcibiades was their friend. It seems that the people’s reaction towards Alcibiades became more positive as the time was coming for his return. On the other hand, I may point out that if men admired someone, this meant that they wanted to know him,131 not that they really knew him. Moreover, men admired those whose reputation had been least tested.132 This implies that the mob really needed to know about Alcibiades and not just have a vague impression about him; otherwise their relationship would be fragile. This impression is also strengthened by the use of the infinitve ἰδεῖν, since knowledge in the Athenian conceptual world was thought to be generated out of visual experience.133 Therefore Xenophon alerts his readers that the relation between the Athenians and Alcibiades was still fragile and that he was still an external and somewhat alien

 127 According to Demosthenes his fellow citizens have a very low self-esteem and admire (θαυμάζειν) one or two political men (Dem. 23.210), while in the past military victories were identified not with Themistocles and Miltiades but with Athens itself (Dem. 23.198; cf. Ferrario, 2014, 1–2). Note that in: (a) Aristoph. Birds 1133 the first messenger believes that he deserves admiration, but he receives none; (b) Xen. Mem.3.6.18 Socrates admits that Glaucon can be admired by the city, but he regards this as impossible because of Glaucon’s wrong assessment of his duties as a public person. 128 For this connection between admiration and excellence see Arist. Eth.Nic.1239a26–27, 29– 30. 129 Cf. Αλεξίου, 2016, 52–53 who points out that the struggle between the city’s wish to subordinate the individuality of the person to the public interest and the person’s ambition makes its mark in the literary texts, and rightly includes Alcibiades among those unique men of the 5th century B.C. 130 Cf. Arist. Rhet.1381a25–28 that people like to have friends (φίλοι) those whom they admire (ἐν τοῖς θαυμάζουσιν αὐτούς). 131 For this concept see Arist. Rhet.1371a32–33. 132 This opinion is expressly stated by Nicias in Thuc. 6.11.4–5. 133 See Allen, 2000, 66 and Kallet, 2001, 22 n. 2.

46  Chapter 1: Alcibiades and Athens entity. So the question which arises now is: what did the mob know about Alcibiades? Xenophon reports what the Athenians said about him (λέγοντες). The opinion was not unanimous, but the mob was divided into two groups, as the οἱ μὲν– οἱ δέ (1.4.13–17) shows. This statement of Xenophon is interesting because it proves that there was a mismatch between Alcibiades who regarded Athens as a monolith, either eunous or not, and the clearly divided views of the Athenians.

. The supporters of Alcibiades The first group said that Alcibiades was the most able (κράτιστος) of all citizens. This characterization had double importance. First, Xenophon helps his readers to realize that a part of the mob confirms Thucydides’ statement that Alcibiades’ conduct of military affairs was excellent (κράτιστα διαθέντι τὰ τοῦ πολέμου6.15.4). Second, this adjective creates a specific image of the Athenians about their hero, i.e. of a successful athlete. Given that the mob refers to Alcibiades’ ability in war and then to his exile, we can safely assume that they had in mind Alcibiades’ performance in the Olympic Games. In his own speech before the Sicilian expedition Alcibiades had argued that his fellow citizens should see him as a living spectacle due to his various victories in the chariot races (6.16.2). Given that the adjective κράτιστος could be connected with athletics and the Olympic Games in some cases,134 we can safely infer that the mob still treated him as a victorious athlete at Olympia. Moreover, if we recall that the people in Peiraeus admired and wanted to see Alcibiades, we can also strengthen the impression that they considered him an athlete.135 Once again the Athenians identified politics with athletics.136  134 LSJ s.v. κράτιστος shows the meaning of the adjective as ‘best, excellent’. This is right but the word is also related to athletics. Cf. Aesch. 3.179: ‘Do you think (οἴεσθ’ ἄν) men of Athens, that anyone would ever choose to train for the Olympics … if the crown was given not to the strongest (τῷ κρατίστῳ) but to the man who schemed to win it?’ and Philostr. On Athletics 33 who refers to the way that the athletes of the Olympic Games could become κράτιστοι. The importance of the opinion of the Athenians about their athletes will appear later on in my analysis. 135 Cf. Philochorus FHG fr. 17: ᾿Αριάδνη παροῦσα πρός τε τὴν ὄψιν ἐξεπλάγη τοῦ Θησέως καὶ τὴν ἄθλησιν ἐθαύμασε πάντων κρατήσαντος. Moreover, cf. Lucian Anacharsis 36, that in the Olympic Games many people gather to see (ὀψόμενοι) the young athletes and Philostratus On Athletics 2, who mentions mythical ἀθλητάς …θαυμασίους. 136 Cf. Pl. Alc. I 119b5–10, where Alcibiades seems to say that if contemporary politicians were educated, anyone wanting to compete against them would have to learn and practice, as though he were entering a competition ὡς ἐπ’ ἀθλητάς. Moreover, cf. Dem. 25.97, where the orator explains how the ancestors of the present Athenians were involved in politics and calls them

The supporters of Alcibiades  47

Then this part of the mob said that Alcibiades was the only one who had been exiled unjustly (μόνος οὐ δικαίως φύγοι).137 For this decision they said that Alcibiades ἐπιβουλευθεὶς δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν ἔλαττον ἐκείνου δυναμένων μοχθηρότερά τε λεγόντων καὶ πρὸς τὸ αὑτῶν ἴδιον κέρδος πολιτευόντων. Thucydides ascribes intellectual and emotional motives to his characters through the use of participles.138 In Xenophon’s account motives also play an important role, because the mob claimed to know the intellectual motives of Alcibiades as the use of several participles reveals. Xenophon reported these thoughts of Alcibiades’ supporters. It is interesting to assess this part of the mob’s claim about Alcibiades’ exile with another episode that Xenophon has reported in the beginning of his work, the Syracusan generals’ exile by the demos (1.1.27–31). Xenophon tells us that the Syracusan generals learned that they had been exiled (φεύγοιεν) by the demos. The generals called their men together, and Hermocrates, their spokesman, bemoaning their misfortune, said that they had been exiled unjustly (ἀδίκως φεύγοιεν) (1.1.27). Xenophon does not mention why the generals were exiled, but since the mob claims that Alcibiades’ enemies conspired against him, we can assume that the political opponents in Syracuse convinced their fellow citizens to exile them. The crews shouted that Hermocrates and his colleagues should continue in command (1.1.28). This reaction shows that the crews agreed with the opinion of their superiors. In Alcibiades’ case it is interesting that part of the mob also said that the general had been exiled unjustly. Alcibiades’ supporters believed that he had been slandered by those who were less powerful than him,139 and who talked in public about his love for pleasures and gain,140 but in reality they conducted public affairs in such a way that served their own gain.

 ἀθληταὶ τῶν καλῶν ἔργων, and Aesch. 3.180, who urges the jurors to consider themselves ἀγωνοθέτας πολιτικῆς ἀρετῆς. See also Tuplin, 1998, 283 n. 8. 137 Canfora, 1982, 142 argues that we should preserve in the original text of Xenophon the words ἀπελογήθη ὡς, because it sheds light on 1.4.20, where the historian says very briefly that Alcibiades ἀπολογησάμενος that he did not profane the Mysteries. In my opinion, these words cannot be preserved because in 1.4.13 Alcibiades has not landed yet, and this happens only in 1.4.18. 138 See Tamiolaki, 2013a, 41–72. 139 This is the meaning of the participle οἱ δυνάμενοι in political contexts. Cf, Thuc. 8.39.2, Xen. 6.4.18, Mem.2.3.3, Lys. 12.57, Isocr. 18.23. 140 For the meaning of the adjective μοχθηρός cf. Isocr. 1.33: τὰ μὲν ἄλλα μοχθηρὰ πάντες κερδαίνοντες πράττουσιν and Xen. Cyrop.5.1.13–14: οἱ μοχθηροί … κλέπτειν ἐπιχειροῦσι καὶ οὐκ ἀπέχονται τῶν ἀλλοτρίων … τὰ μοχθηρὰ ἀνθρώπια πασῶν οἶμαι τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν ἀκρατῆ ἐστι. Then the speaker contrasts these men with the kalous kagathous, who do not desire gold, horses and women, but are able to abstain from anything that is contrary to justice.

48  Chapter 1: Alcibiades and Athens These words recall Thucydides, who says that there were politicians who were jealous of Alcibiades’ influence over the people and believed that if they could get rid of him they would become the leaders of the demos. These men took up and exaggerated the charges against Alcibiades, clamorously insisting that both the mutilation of the Herms and the profanation of the Mysteries were part of a conspiracy against the democracy and that he was at the bottom of the whole affair (6.28). Alcibiades’ enemies exerted themselves to postpone his trial and to this end they suborned fresh speakers, who said (ἔλεγον) in public that he should sail at once and not delay the expedition, but should return and stand his trial within a certain number of days (6.29). Moreover, Thucydides says in 2.65.7 that Pericles’ successors struggled for their own private gains (ἴδια κέρδη) and governed (ἐπολίτευσαν) the city and their allies in a bad way. Given that the Athenians believed that corrupt politicians cared only for private gain141 and grumbled at wealthy people who sought gain without any concern for the benefit of their fellow citizens,142 we can be certain that these men within the mob believed that Alcibiades’ opponents could not be trusted any longer. It seems that they had realized now the bad consequences of the rhetoric of Alcibiades’ enemies. Moreover, it is tempting to infer that Xenophon wanted his readers to realize that this part of the mob showed some political maturity, since it coincided with Thucydides’ opinion about Athenian democracy after Pericles. On the contrary, regarding Alcibiades, this group within the mob believed that he always increased the state’s wealth from both his own resources and those of the state (ἐκείνου ἀεὶ τὸ κοινὸν αὔξοντος καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν αὑτοῦ καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ τῆς πόλεως δυνατοῦ–1.4.14). The Athenians used the phrases τὸ κοινόν and τῶν αὑτοῦ to refer to the assumption of choregiai and triearchies by the rich citizens,143 the money these men gave for public expenses144 and the taxes they paid.145 The aristocrats who assumed these duties created a positive impression in their fellow citizens. More specifically, the Athenians believed that such a man was trained

 141 Cf. Lys. 12.57: οἱ μεῖζον δυνάμενοι καὶ θᾶττον πλουτοῦντες. 142 See Dover, 1974, 171–74. 143 This is explicitly testified by Aristotle in Nic.Eth.1122b19: ἔστι δὲ τῶν δαπανημάτων … πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν εὐφιλοτίμητὰ ἐστιν, οἶον εἴ που χορη γεῖν οἴονται δεῖν λαμπρῶς τριηραρχεῖν … τὴν πόλιν. Cf. Lys. 21.1–5, 11, 13, 14, 16 where the speaker says that he has assumed many liturgies, trierarchies, has paid two eisphorai and he is willing to continue this activity; so he must not be deprived of his property (τῶν ἐμαυτοῦ). See Kapellos, 2014a, 25, 63–79, 111–12, 119–20–22. Then cf. Lys. 29.8, 30.26, Isaeus 7.38, Dem. 36.42, 37.50, [Dem.] 49.46, where each speaker claims that his opponent had not given any of τῶν αὑτοῦ for the city. 144 Cf. Dem. 42.25. 145 Cf. Dem. 41.10.

The supporters of Alcibiades  49

by his father to benefit the common interest, and thus proved his public spiritedness.146 Applying these concepts to Alcibiades, Xenophon’s readers would understand that for this part of the mob Alcibiades had internalized the Athenian democratic ideology, which advertised that the elite should work for the masses.147 This impression becomes stronger through the assertion of Alcibiades’ watchers that their hero had assumed public offices through which he increased public wealth, using the city’s available resources. The mob knew that the finances of Athens had been reduced during the war,148 so they were happy to believe that Alcibiades had given his best. Xenophon’s Athenian readers knew that men of their class assumed these tasks, because they wanted to prove to their fellow citizens that they were useful to their city.149 But they also knew that their fellow aristocrats aimed at achieving public recognition through the assumption of public duties.150 In the present case, Alcibiades seemed to have succeeded in his policy of aggrandizement before he fled to the Spartans,151 because now that he returned to his city his supporters within the mob remembered his generosity to the populace. However, Alcibiades’ past does not confirm these views about Alcibiades’ motives. In fact it creates a contrast with the presentation of motives described earlier by the mob and annuls their validity. More specifically, Xenophon’s readers should doubt that the interests of Alcibiades exhibited a total solidarity with those of the people, the democracy and the city despite the wish of the Athenians.152 This becomes clear on reading Thucydides, who presents a different view of Alcibiades. Nicias had said that he did not think the worse about the citizen who took a little thought about his property, because he believed that the sense of a man’s own interest would quicken his interest in the prosperity of the city (6.9.12). Regarding the Athenian state, he reminded his fellow citizens that they had only just recovered in some measure from the plague and the war and they were beginning to make up their loss in money (ἠυξῆσθαι–6.12.1). Then he warned his fellow citizens that Alcibiades, thinking only of his own interest (τὸ  146 Cf. Isocr. 10.37. Cf. Dem. 14.26, who claims that Aristeides and Miltiades gave their property in order to τὸ κοινὸν αὔξειν. 147 Cf. [Xen.] Ath.Pol.2.19 with Wilson, 2000, 173, who remarks about the Athenian aristocrats: ‘many had doubtless internalized the democratic ideology of the system.’ 148 See Σακελλαρίου, 1999, 258–63. 149 See Seager, 1973, 20–25. 150 See Rhodes, 1986, 141–44. 151 For this issue see Connor, 1971, 18–22 and especially 21 for Alcibiades. 152 For the idea that the interests of individuals were expected to exhibit a total solidarity with those of the people, the democracy and the city see Seager, 1973, 15.

50  Chapter 1: Alcibiades and Athens ἑαυτοῦ), recommended them to sail against Sicily; and that because of his love of horses he wanted to make something out of his command which would maintain him in his extravagance. Thus, the Athenians should not give him the opportunity of indulging his own lavish tastes at the expense of the state and should remember that men of this stamp impoverish themselves and defraud the public (6.12.2). Nicias attempted to isolate Alcibiades by denying his goodwill toward the people and suggesting that his interests and the city’s interests were not the same.153 For him Alcibiades was nothing but a selfish member of the elite.154 This was not hollow rhetoric. Thucydides endorsed this impression through his narrative intervention before reporting Alcibiades’ speech;155 he said that Alcibiades was hoping through the conquest of Sicily and Carthage to repair his private fortunes and gain money as well as glory. Such was his goal because he was devoted to horse-racing and other pleasures which outran his means (6.15.2–3). Moreover, Alcibiades had described himself in a totally different way from the mob. He boasted that his doings, such as his horse victory at Olympia, were an honor to himself and his ancestors. Also, whenever he gained distinction by providing choruses or by the performance of some other public duty, his fellow citizens were naturally jealous of him because of these acts of munificence. Alcibiades believed that a man could benefit not only himself but also the city (τήν πόλιν) at his own cost. Contrary to common demands, Alcibiades tried to present himself as a useful citizen in a highly individual way.156 His behavior gave the impression of replacing the city and not representing it.157 By emphasizing his inequality with his fellow Athenians Alcibiades expressed not only a sheer aristocratic ideology158 but also an undemocratic and unAthenian position.159 Once again, we have the sense of Alcibiades as an external entity. This speech was undoubtly unconventional.160 But this cruel commentary on the deficiencies of the Periclean ideal of individualism through his open contempt, by his way of life, for the institutions and moral tone of the Athenian democracy acted for his benefit. Thucydides shows that the people followed him, believing that they could  153 For this point see Seager, 1973, 15. 154 See Greenwood, 2006, 39. 155 See Gribble, 1998, 55–56, 61, Kallet, 2001, 35–36. 156 See Macleod, 1983, 71. 157 This remark is due to Waterfield, 2009, 86–87. 158 Waterfield, 2009, 65. 159 See Macleod, 1983, 75. 160 See Harris, 2016, 145–46, who proves this point by analyzing the speech of Alcibiades in the Assembly and the speeches of Euryptolemus (cf. pp. 174–209) and Cephisodotus (7.1.12–14) in Xenophon.

The supporters of Alcibiades  51

become like him, if they conquered Sicily.161 Xenophon, in his turn, intimates that, since Alcibiades had brought one hundred talents to Athens, this part of the mob forgot that Alcibiades had wanted to lead the Sicilian expedition to cover his huge personal expenses. This dubious image of Alcibiades continues further in Xenophon’s account. His supporters among the mob said that Alcibiades had wanted to go on trial immediately when he was charged with profaning the Mysteries, but his personal enemies by postponing what was considered a just request deprived Alcibiades of his homeland, while he was away from Athens (ἐθέλοντος δὲ τότε κρίνεσθαι παραχρῆμα τῆς αἰτίας ἄρτι γεγενημένης ὡς ἠσεβηκότος εἰς τὰ μυστήρια ὑπερβαλλόμενοι οἱ ἐχθροὶ τὰ δοκοῦντα δίκαια εἶναι ἀπόντα αὐτὸν ἐστέρησαν τῆς πατρίδος–1.4.14). These words recall Thucydides again, who says that while the Athenians were in the midst of their preparations for the Sicilian expedition, the faces of the Herms were mutilated. While the Athenians were trying to find the offenders, some metics and servants said that the Mysteries were repeatedly peformed in private houses ἐφ’ ὕβρει. For this impiety the informers also accused (ἐπῃτιῶντο) Alcibiades among others. This accusation was serious, because such behavior meant contempt of the gods and the ordinary conventions of society and demonstration of an undemocratic contempt for the laws.162 At this moment Alcibiades’ enemies exaggerated the charges against him in the preliminary hearing of the case. They clamorously insisted that both the mutilation of the Herms and the profanation of the Mysteries were part of a conspiracy against the democracy and that Alcibiades was at the bottom of the whole affair (6.28.2). Alcibiades strove there and then to clear himself of the charges (ἀπελογεῖτο) and he also offered to be tried (κρίνεσθαι) before he sailed, in order that, if he were guilty, he might be punished, or should he be acquitted he might retain his command (6.29.1). But since his enemies postponed the trial, the mob used emotional language, i.e. the verb στέρομαι, to indicate Alcibiades’ calamity163 along with the word πατρίς, which was thought almost as a next of kin, the sweetest thing on earth, the proper place to be buried, something for which one would lay down

 161 See Hussey, 1985, 132. 162 For this interpretation of the two events see Murray, 1990, 155–56, 158. 163 Cf. Eur. Phoen.388: τί τὸ στέρεσθαι πατρίδος; ἦ κακὸν μέγα; with Xen. Mem.4.2.33, who says that Daedalus τῆς τε πατρίδος … ἐστερήθη. Moreover, cf. Antiph. 5.13, who refuses the possibility that being banned from the city (στέρεσθαι … τῆς πόλεως) was of no concern to him and Pl. Crit.53b2, where the Laws tell Socrates that if he leaves Athens, he will be deprived of it (στερηθῆναι τῆς πόλεως).

52  Chapter 1: Alcibiades and Athens one’s life.164 By arguing that Alcibiades did not profane the Mysteries, the mob implicitly claimed that their leader did not want to become a tyrant.165 However, this account of the past is half the truth. Thucydides’ account helps Xenophon’s readers to understand the responsibility of the people in Alcibiades’ trial. The mob did not mention that Alcibiades’ enemies accused him of the profanation of the Mysteries by choosing as τεκμήρια the excesses of his ordinary life, which were unbecoming in a citizen of a free state (Thuc. 6.28.2). Τεκμήριον is a necessary sign in a syllogism which causes us to know. More specifically, τεκμήριον syllogisms give one a knowledge of the necessity of the conclusion, demonstrate the fact of the conclusion, but they do not give a demonstration of the reasoned fact of the conclusion, which is to say a knowledge of why it is a necessary conclusion.166 In Alcibiades’ case this means that his enemies gave knowledge to the Athenians about why Alcibiades must have been implicated in the scandals and why he was aiming at tyranny. However, they did not give knowledge of why their accusations necessarily proved that Alcibiades was responsible for the scandals and why he was aiming at tyranny. Thus the lack of other kinds of evidence indicates that for Thucydides Alcibiades’ enemies did not have a strong a case against him.167 Alcibiades was clever enough to know that his enemies would not stop their attacks against him while he was in Sicily.168 So he wanted to be judged while he was in Athens, adjuring his fellow citizens not to listen to calumnies, which might be propagated against him in his absence (ἀπόντος), and said that they would be wiser not to send on such an important command a man who had so serious an accusation hanging over him (6.29.1–2). Alcibiades wanted to convince his fellow citizens that he abode by the city’s laws, while his wish to remain in Athens and be tried before the expedition indicated, if it did not not prove, that he was innocent.169 Alcibiades’ enemies did not want him to defend himself in court at once,

 164 See Nielsen, 2004, 50–51, 53–54, 56–58. 165 For the connection of the concepts of impiety and tyranny in the Athenian mentality see Dillery, 2016, 254. 166 See Grimaldi, 1980, 387–89. 167 Τεκμήρια were distinguished from other kinds of evidence such as μάρτυρες, νόμοι, πίστεις. See Grimaldi, 1980, 398 n. 12. 168 Cf. Lys. 19.50, where the speaker points out that when a certain Diotimus returned to Athens, he found that he had been slandered in the Assembly by his enemies during his absence. 169 Cf. Antiph. 1.13, who claims that his opponent charges that if he had been set free, he would not have awaited a trial but he would have departed. Then the speaker replies that if being banned (στέρεσθαι) from Athens was of no concern to him, he could equally well have not come

The supporters of Alcibiades  53

because they feared that the Athenians would be lenient to him. Obviously, they felt that they did not have a good case, so they had better stay out of court,170 at least for the time being. Thus they exerted themselves to postpone the trial. To this end they orchestrated a conspiracy; they suborned other politicians in the Assembly,171 who proposed that Alcibiades should sail at once and not delay the expedition, but should return and stand his trial (κρίνεσθαι) within a certain number of days. Their intention was that Alcibiades should be recalled and tried when they had stirred up a stronger feeling against him, which they could do better in his absence (ἀπόντος). The Athenians decided that Alcibiades should sail (6.29.3). What happened on this occasion was beyond the control of Alcibiades, who had to accept the decision of his fellow citizens that no trial would take place.172 Thus the Athenians helped unconsciously the sycophantic action of Alcibiades’ enemies. When Alcibiades was in Sicily, his enemies (τῶν ἐχθρῶν) continued their machinations. The postponement of Alcibiades’ trial helped them173 to stir up a popular feeling against him. After the punishment of those supposed to be guilty of the scandal of the Herms, (Alcibiades was not included among them), the Athenians were more than ever convinced that the violation of the Mysteries, which had been laid to his charge, was done by him for the same purpose, and it was a part of the conspiracy against the state (6.61.1). Then the presence of the small Lacedaimonian force in the Isthmus and a suspicion against the Argive friends of Alcibiades that they would attempt to conspire against the Argive democracy led the Athenians to decide to have Alcibiades tried (ἐς κρίσιν) and executed (6.61.4). Without any doubt Thucydides is clear that the case against Alcibiades rested on no evidence, only on hearsay. By mentioning that Alcibiades was recalled to Athens Thucydides implied that the political background necessitated that Alcibiades had to be found guilty. Xenophon, continuing the history of Thucydides, shows that Alcibiades’ supporters among the mob did not want to remember that it was they who had done this great injustice to Alcibiades. But he also implies that, since the mob praised Alcibiades’ performance of liturgies and  when summoned and lost the case the case by default or he could have made his defense but left after his first speech (ἀπολογησαμένῳ). 170 Cf. Dorjahn, 1941, 185, who has made this comment regarding the thoughts of prospective plaintiffs before a trial. 171 This is certain because of the use of the word ‘orators’. Cf. Arthurs, 1994, 3. 172 Therefore the argument of Bloedow, 1973, 16 that Alcibiades should have done something against the accusation is not right, because he could not overcome the legal procedures. 173 For the point that the postponement of a trial could help one of the contending parties see Rubinstein 1998, 132 n. 28.

54  Chapter 1: Alcibiades and Athens offices as well as his military successes before and after his exile, it was convinced that Alcibiades was not guilty of the profanation of the Mysteries. This judgement about Alcibiades’ guilt from the mob resembles the defendants’ rhetorical presentation of ἦθος in court. Through the adroit presentation of the ‘facts’ of a case, which took the form of a ‘narrative’ and had the potential of ‘proof’, a defendant could claim that the accusations against him were not true. The acceptance of ethos was achieved, because the Athenians tended to view the trial as a detail in a broader canvas rather than an occurrence isolated from the rest of the life of litigants. In such a context, the general conduct of an individual offered a useful means of determining the balance of probability in the individual instance.174 On the present occasion, Xenophon intimates that Alcibiades’ supporters among the mob acted as if it spoke on behalf of Alcibiades, defending him in court. Such a strategy would seem logical if it was made by Alcibiades himself in court and not by the mob that had acted as judge. In this way, Xenophon shows that the rabble turned into a spectator of Athenian politics in order to exculpate itself from responsibility regarding Alcibiades’ unjust condemnation from the city. Alcibiades’ supporters then referred to his life in exile and tried to justify his flight from the city. They asserted that, because of his helplessness and his lack of financial resources, Alcibiades had no capacity for autonomous action but he was forced to act like a slave and serve the bitterest enemies (ὑπὸ ἀμηχανίας δουλεύων ἠναγκάσθη μὲν θεραπεύειν τοὺς ἐχθίστους, κινδυνεύων ἀεὶ παρ’ ἑκάστην ἡμέραν ἀπολέσθαι). They had in mind Alcibiades’ decision to go over to the Spartans (Thuc. 6.88.9). The Athenians regarded as a matter of shame the possibility that some of their citizens could choose to become slaves to the enemies of the city.175 So the rabble emphasized that Alcibiades cooperated with the Spartans,

 174 For these remarks about ethos as a rhetorical means of persuasion and examples from the Athenian litigants see Carey, 2007a, 36. 175 Cf. Lys. 14.38–39, where the prosecutor of the son of Alcibiades claims that the Athenians should feel shame for those who became slaves (τῶν δουλευσάντων) of the Spartans and Lys. 26.19, where the speaker claims that the Three Thousand chose to cooperate with the democratic exiles instead of becoming slaves (δουλεύειν) of the Spartans. Cf. also Isocr. 20.10, who says that the supporters of the two oligarchic regimes in Athens wanted to become slaves (δουλεύειν) to the enemies of the city.

The supporters of Alcibiades  55

the bitterest enemies of Athens,176 against his own will,177 living with no honor as a slave,178 i.e. in a way unworthy of the Athenians.179 At the same time, Alcibiades’ supporters claimed that he watched his dearest citizens and relatives and all the city making mistakes, but he had no way to help them because of his exile (τοὺς δὲ οἰκειοτάτους πολίτας τε καὶ συγγενεῖς καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἅπασαν ὁρῶν ἐξαμαρτάνουσαν, οὐκ εἶχεν ὅπως ὠφελοίη φυγῇ ἀπειργόμενος). The argument that Alcibiades considered his fellow citizens and relatives οἰκειοτάτους implies that he felt closer to his compatriots than to any other Greek180 and that he was very close sentimentally to his city.181 In fact, Alcibiades pitied182 Athens when he watched her making mistakes because of the wrong advice of the politicians and the bad way the city conducted the war. The mob claims that all the decisions of the Athenians about the Sicilian expedition, Alcibiades’ trial included, were not conscious but just proofs of their ignorance (1.4.15).183 For them Alcibiades was an able leader with the potential for historymaking action, while the city was actually unable to pursue the ‘right’ course without the intervention of this able man.184 Τhis point is significant, because it implies that Alcibiades’ supporters believed that if he had remained in command of the fleet in Sicily, the expedition would have succeeded. Moreover, they believed that Alcibiades was ready to do acts worthy of Athens, because he had foreseen the Athenian affairs regarding the Sicilian expedition in their beginning as well as their consequences and he had been ready to foretell them to his fellow  176 For the force of the adjective in the superlative degree cf. Lys. 29.7, who says that his opponent Philocrates claims that he was the bitterest enemy (ἔχθιστος) of Ergocles. 177 For this meaning of the idea of necessity see Allen, 2000, 87. 178 For the concept of honor and political status in Athens see Allen, 2000, 60. 179 Cf. Pl. Men.238e4–239a2, who says that all Greek cities are heterogeneous collections of all sorts of people, so the result is that the citizens regard each other as slaves (δούλους) or masters; however, in Athens the citizens regard each other as brothers born of a single mother, and so do not think themselves worthy to be each other’s slave (δοῦλοι) or master. 180 Cf. Xen. Cyrop.8.7.14: πολῖταί ἄνθρωποι ἀλλοδαπῶν οἰκειότεροι. 181 Cf. Isocr. 4.24, who claims that the Athenians can address their relatives with the same names as they address their city: τῶν ὀνομάτων τοῖς αὐτοῖς οἷσπερ τοὺς οἰκειοτάτους τὴν πόλιν ἔχοντες προσειπεῖν. 182 Pity was a kind of pain in the case of an undeserved misfortune that someone suffered and which one experienced, because he was subject to the kind of suffering that afflicted the other, and was near to him (see Konstan, 2001, 49–50). The pitier was always to some extent in the position of an observer rather than a participant in the experience of the other. See Konstan, 2001, 60–61. 183 Cf. Xen. Cyrop.3.1.39: ὁπόσα δὲ ἀγνοίᾳ ἄνθρωποι ἐξαμαρτάνουσι, πάντ’ ἀκούσια ταῦτ’ ἔγωγε νομίζω. 184 See Brown Ferrario, 2014, 187–88.

56  Chapter 1: Alcibiades and Athens citizens. According to them, Alcibiades was oriented toward future benefits for Athens rather than past grievances, and knew that what was happening to the city was a great misfortune;185 but he could not save her and her people with his money, skills, courage, and accomplishments186 because of his wretched and dangerous exile.187 Apparently, the great issue that this part of the mob raised through its opinion about Alcibiades was determinism, i.e. whether men should believe that the course of history is shaped by a concatenation of events over which man has no control; that is, no matter how much he may plan and try to implement his plans, forces greater than him vitiate his intent and make him their victim. Alcibiades’ ἀνάγκη was very important, because it had a heavy bearing on the course of the Peloponnesian War.188 But was Alcibiades’ reaction compelling? Did Alcibiades deserve this rhetorical defense image and praise as a compassionate leader who watched his city and wanted to save it?189 A close reading of Thucydides indicates that Xenophon alerted his readers that Alcibiades’ stance was not deterministic, because no ἀνάγκη forced him to flee to Sparta and betray his city. When Alcibiades went there, he delivered a speech in which he bluntly said that he did not feel disappointed or fearful for leaving his country. Moreover, he reminded his audience that he had served as a Lacedaimonian proxenos, had done much good to the Spartans and would not have stopped serving them, if they had not negotiated through his enemies (6.89.2). Then he commented on the constitution of Athens and said that his family always retained the leadership of the people in their

 185 Cf. Andoc. 2.5–6, who makes the following, explicit, statement: μεγάλη δὲ δήπου καὶ τὸ ἐξαμαρτεῖν δυσπραξία ἐστί, καί εἰσιν εὐτυχέστατοι μὲν οἱ ἐλάχιστα ἐξαμαρτάνοντες. 186 What is meant here is not clear to us, but Lyc. 1.139–40 proves what the Athenians had usually in mind: τοὺς ἄλλους … ὠφελῶν … εἴ τις τετριηράρχηκε λαμπρῶς ἢ τείχη τῇ πατρίδι περιέβαλεν ἢ πρὸς τὴν κοινὴν σωτηρίαν ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων συνευπόρησε. Moreover, cf. Thuc. 7.64.2, where Nicias says that whoever of his men excels another in skill and courage must display them now because he will not have a better opportunity to become ὠφέλιμος to himself and σωτήριος to his fellow citizens. 187 Cf. Plut. Mor.599f3–4: δεινόν, ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσι καὶ ᾄδουσιν, ἡ φυγή and Dem. Lett.2.13, who protests about his φυγῆς ἐπικινδύνου. 188 For necessity in Thucydides as a psychological force that has the ability to produce unlikely behavior and action during wartime see Luginbill, 1999, 46–48. 189 For the defense image cf. Dem. 18.101, 161 who justifies his policy before the battle of Chaeronea, saying that he acted as he thought best because he watched Athens’ mistakes (he uses the participle ὁρῶν in both passages). Moreover, cf. Hyp. 6.10, who praises the general Leosthenes, saying that he assumed the war against Macedon, because he watched (ὁρῶν) Greece suffering from the politicians who had been bribed by Philip and Alexander.

The supporters of Alcibiades  57

hands. Thus, living under a city which was a democracy (τῆς πόλεως δημοκρατουμένης), they had to a great degree to conform to the circumstances (πολλὰ ἀνάγκη ἦν (6.89.4). These words constitute the autobiography of an opportunist who ἠναγκάσθη to benefit his fellow Athenians, not of a man who ἠναγκάσθη θεραπεύειν τοὺς ἐχθίστους. Even worse, Alcibiades proved further that he did not care about the Athenians and the city. Thus he instructed the Spartans: (a) to send troops and a competent commander to Sicily in order to support the Syracusans against the Athenian forces; and (b) to fortify Deceleia in Attica, explaining in detail all the consequences for the Athenians because of this measure (6.91). Alcibiades knew that the Spartans would suspect that he was speaking with the eagerness of an exile (τὴν φυγαδικὴν προθυμίαν), but he boldly said that he was a φυγάς from the wretchedness of those who had exiled him but not from his benefit (ὠφελίας) to the Spartans. Moreover, he said that he loved his city (φιλόπολι) in so far as he enjoyed the privileges of a public speaker who could influence politics190 and repeated his wish to benefit (ὠφελοίην) the Spartans (6.92.3–5). These statements are certainly shocking but not surprising, if we remember that Alcibiades had said in his speech before the Assembly that whatever brought glory to him also brought benefit (ὠφελίαν) to Athens (6.16.2). Alcibiades’ benefit could become everybody’s benefit as long as he achieved his own goals. Moreover, these words reveal this man’s self-centered personality, his indifference to democracy and his determination to go against his city and show the enemies of his city how to harm it.191 Alcibiades was the citizen who severed the bonds between himself and the community to safeguard his own existence, and he did it without any scruples.192 The result of this speech was that the Lacedaimonians followed his advice and created grave problems for Athens. The mob’s appeal to necessity was just a rhetorical argument to exculpate Alcibiades’ cooperation with the Spartans. Moreover, could have Athens won the war in Sicily if Alcibiades had remained as one of the commanders of the expedition? His supporters’ opinion leads Xenophon’s audience to remember Thucydides’ own opinion that the expedition in Sicily failed (ἡμαρτήθη) not so much because it was an error of judge-

 190 This interpretation derives from Alcibiades’ use of the verb ἐπολιτεύθην (6.92.4), which denoted a man’s public activity as an orator (see Whitehead, 1986, 68, Ober, 1989, 106, Hyp. 3.27 with Whitehead, 2000, 229). 191 See also Palmer, 1992, 97–100, Williams, 1998, 231–35. 192 About the role of Alcibiades’ self-interest during his political activity see Macleod, 1983, 72, Connor, 1984, 59, 69, 163–165, Williams, 1998, 227–37, Kagan, 2009, 195.

58  Chapter 1: Alcibiades and Athens ment (ἁμάρτημα), but because the Athenian citizens took disadvantegous decisions for those who participated in the expedition, above all their decision to recall Alcibiades for trial (2.65.11–12).193 The coincidence of the claim of his supporters about Alcibiades’ wish to help Athens in Xenophon with Thucydides’ judgement about the Athenians’ responsibility regarding the result of the Sicilian expedition is impressive, because it exalts Alcibiades’ role as a general. On the other hand, Thucydides is not so clear about Alcibiades’ prospects. When the Athenians realized that the Egesteans did not have the money they had promised (Thuc. 6.46), Alcibiades’ plan that the fleet should remain in Sicily and persuade the inhabitants to revolt from the Syracusans was accepted (Thuc. 6.48). However, his plan, although not entirely mistaken,194 was not so easy to achieve. When Alcibiades asked the Cataneans to receive the Athenian army in their city, they refused. It was only because the Athenian soldiers managed to break down a postern gate, while Alcibiades was speaking in the Assembly, that the Cataneans accepted the Athenian fleet (6.51). Nonetheless, the Athenians were not so lucky with the Camarineans, who did not join them (6.52).195 Immediately after that the Athenians called Alcibiades to return to the city and defend himself regarding the scandals (6.53). Therefore, nobody could know whether Alcibiades’ plan would have succeeded or not. But if someone believed that Alcibiades’ partial success at the beginning of the expedition convinced people that he could have succeeded,196 the Athenian fleet was at a great disadvantage in Sicily. This was because Gylippus, the commander whom the Spartans sent following Alcibiades’ scheme, united the inhabitants against Athens (7.11–12).197 So what would have Alcibiades done? Would he have convinced the Athenians that it would be a disgrace for the fleet to return to Athens, since they had not achieved much, as he had argued in the past (6.48.1)? Would he have convinced the Athenians to replace Nicias who was ill and had asked to be recalled (7.15.1–

 193 For this translation and interpretation of the passage see Hornblower, 2003, 348. I say ‘the Athenian citizens’ in the main text, since the participle οἱ ἐκπέμψαντες refers to the Athenians who voted for the expedition (cf. 6.9.1, where Nicias urges his fellow citizens to rethink sending (ἐκπέμπειν) the fleet to Sicily). 194 See Kagan, 2009, 178. 195 See Bloedow’s reservations about Alcibiades’ success in Sicily (1973, 11–12). 196 For a defense of Alcibiades’ plan and an accusation of Nicias as having destroyed its prospects see Kagan, 2009, 188–90, 194. 197 Kagan, 2009, 196–97, 200 first argues that Gylippus’ efficiency in Sicily was beyond Sparta’s reasonable expectations but admits that the unification of Sicily against the Athenians occurred because of the zeal of Gylippus. Even if he is right, the sending of a Lacedaimonian commander was the result of Alcibiades’ scheme.

The supporters of Alcibiades  59

2)? Meanwhile, Deceleia had been fortified by the whole Peloponnesian army under the instruction of Alcibiades, and the sufferings of the Athenians were terrible (7.27–28).198 Alcibiades’ supporters did not raise the question of what he might have achieved if the scandals of the Herms and the Mysteries had not got in the way. In fact, it is striking that the Athenians did not speculate about how much better things could have been for Athens, not just for Alcibiades, if he had not fled into exile. Apparently, Alciviades’ supporters could not give a definite answer to these questions, perhaps because of the Sicilian distaster, but they judged Alcibiades in the light of his recent victories and disregarded these facts in order to defend him. On the other hand, on the basis of Thucydides’ account of Alcibiades and Sicily, Xenophon’s readers could have had reservations about Alcibiades’ success plan because of his own instructions to the Spartans about how to destroy Athens. The aristocratic audience of Xenophon should not view the past as deterministic like the mob, at least in this case.199 On the contrary, it should judge it objectively and what is most probable is that it should consider Alcibiades the worst kind of man since he had chosen to harm his city.200 Xenophon subscribed to morality and did not agree that the Athenians should be trampled on by Alcibiades’ ἀνάγκη for self-preservation. Lastly, one more point should be made about Alcibiades’ supposedly slavish and dangerous exile. The mob knew at the moment of Alcibiades’ entrance to the Peiraeus that his exile had ended, but strikingly it did not comment on how it had ended. Xenophon’s readers knew the truth through Thucydides, who says that it was only after the Spartans decided to kill Alcibiades that he did all he could to injure them by retiring to Tissaphernes and working with him (8.45). Thus the claim that Alcibiades was facing dangers always and every time was real from the latter’s point of view, i.e. when he was fighting for Sparta’s victory. Therefore, while there is clarity on the surface of the demos’ claims about Alcibiades, it only obfuscates what is really at issue, i.e. that the man who was

 198 Kagan, 2009, 196 attempts to underestimate Alcibiades’ role in the Spartan decision to fortify Deceleia, saying that this happened more than a year after his speech. Thucydides agrees with this but he also implies that the Spartans were slow (6.93.2). Alcibiades knew this; that is why he insisted on pushing the Spartans to fortify Deceleia and finally convinced them (7.18.1–2). 199 In this respect Xenophon seems to follow Thucydides, whose view of history was not deterministic in all cases (see Ostwald, 1988, 42). For a clear example of determinism in Xenophon cf. Mem.4.2.33, where Euthydemus says to Socrates: τὸν Δαίδαλον, ἔφη, οὐκ ἀκήκοας ὅτι ληφθεὶς ὑπὸ Μίνω διὰ τὴν σοφίαν ἠναγκάζετο ἐκείνῳ δουλεύειν καὶ τῆς τε πατρίδος ἅμα καὶ τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἐστερήθη. 200 Cf. Isocr. 12.219–20, who explicitly says that the Athenians believed that those who harmed their relatives (τοὺς οἰκειοτάτους καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς συγγενείας μετέχοντας) were the worst men.

60  Chapter 1: Alcibiades and Athens praised so much had betrayed his city and had instructed the Spartans how to destroy it. Nevertheless, the Athenians forgave those who benefited their city by sacrificing their life for her in war.201 So Alcibiades, who had fought so fiercely against the Spartans, ready to meet death, should be praised like his brave fellow warriors. This glorious assessment of Alcibiades was justified for his supporters; otherwise he would have continued cooperating with the Spartans against Athens, have achieved his return with their help and then have become a tyrant.202 But since Alcibiades’ great victories against the enemy had annulled the fears of a prospective tyranny (Thuc. 6.60–61.4), Xenophon indicates that his supporters were also ready to assess the problematic behavior of this most ambivalent person in Athenian political life. His supporters said that it was not characteristic of men like Alcibiades (οἵωνπερ αὐτὸς ὄντων) to want a new situation (καινῶν πραγμάτων)203 or a violent change of regime (μεταστάσεως),204 since he had won far more distinction (πλέον ἔχειν) from the people (ἐκ τοῦ δήμου) than his contemporaries (τῶν τε ἡλικιωτῶν) and had not been considered inferior to his elders (τῶν τε πρεσβυτέρων) (1.4.16). The use of the pronoun οἵωνπερ was used by litigants to point out their ethos and convince the jurors that they were reliable as citizens.205 The assertion that Alcibiades did not want a violent change of regime recalls the Syracusan general Hermocrates, whose exile seems to be a counterpart to Alcibiades’ exile. Xenophon has said that the Syracusan general took money from Pharnabazus and with this he prepared mercenaries and triremes for his return to Syracuse (1.1.31). This reaction of Hermocrates means that he did not accept his exile and that he wanted to return to his city even by force. Comparing Hermocrates with Alcibiades we can be certain that the Athenian general did not turn against his city in this way. In fact, the word μετάστασις reflects events of the recent historical past of Athens. Thucydides narrates that the Four Hundred sent envoys to the fleet at Samos after the return of Alcibiades. In an assembly which was held there, the envoys endeavoured to speak but the soldiers shouted  201 Cf. Pericles who refers to the ‘bad’ citizens in his funeral oration and claims that these men ἀγαθῷ γὰρ κακὸν ἀφανίσαντες κοινῶς μᾶλλον ὠφέλησαν ἢ ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων ἔβλαψαν (Thuc. 2.42.3). 202 Cf. Isocr. 16.42, who claims that Charicles τοῖς μὲν πολεμίοις δουλεύειν ἐπεθύμει, τῶν δὲ πολιτῶν ἄρχειν ἠξίου …κατελθὼν δὲ κακῶς ἐποίει τὴν πόλιν. 203 For this meaning of the word πράγματα see LSJ. s.v. 204 The difference in meaning between the two words rests on the presence or not of violence. See Canfora, 1982, 143. Marincola, 2009, 21 translates the two words as ‘a change in the political order’ and ‘revolution’ respectively, but I follow Canfora because his translation, which is more literal, sheds a better light on the meaning of the text (see below). 205 See Lys. 21.1: οἵου τινὸς ὄντος ἐμοῦ with Kapellos, 2014a, 63.

The supporters of Alcibiades  61

(ἐβόων) death to the subverters of democracy (τοὺς τὸν δῆμον καταλύοντας). When quiet was restored with difficulty, the envoys told them that the change (ἡ μετάστασις) was not meant for the destruction but for the preservation of the state; and that there was no intention of betraying Athens to Sparta, which might have been effected by the new government already if they had chosen to do this during the recent invasion. But the sailors were not convinced and were determined to sail to the Peiraeus. At that juncture Alcibiades intervened. Thucydides praises him, saying that his hero did as eminent a service (ὠφελῆσαι) to the state as any man ever did. He explained his opinion, pointing out that if the Athenians at Samos in their excitement had been allowed to sail against their fellow citizens, the Spartans would instantly have obtained possession of Ionia and the Hellespont. This Alcibiades prevented, and at that moment no one else could have restrained the multitude: but he did restrain them, and with sharp words protected the envoys against the fury of individuals in the crowd. He then dismissed them with the reply that he had nothing to say against the rule of the Five Thousand, but that the Four Hundred must be got rid of, and the old council of the Five Hundred be restored. If they had reduced their expenditure in order that the soldiers on service might be better off for supplies, he highly approved. For the rest he entreated them to stand firm, and not give way to the enemy; if the city was preserved (σῳζομένης τῆς πόλεως), there was good hope that they might be reconciled among themselves; but if once anything happened either to the army at Samos or to their fellow citizens at home, there would be no one left to be reconciled with (8.86.1–7). It is tempting to think that by means of the use of the same word by his supporters Xenophon wants to show their conviction that Alcibiades did not do anything against democracy during the government of the Four Hundred. So he never wanted to do such a thing, although he was given the chance to do so. Moreover, this instance indicates that his supporters still remembered the oligarchic regime and the fear that the overthrow of democracy would lead to the victory of Sparta at war. The importance of the regime of the Four Hundred will appear in my analysis of the Arginousai trial.206 Through the light that Thucydides’ account sheds on Xenophon’s text, we should think about the expectations the Athenians could have from Alcibiades upon his return to the city. Thucydides has shown, as we saw earlier, that Alcibiades harmed his city while he was an exile in Sparta through the advice he gave to the Spartans.207 So it is difficult to say that he was better than Hermocrates.

 206 See pp. 156, 168, 193–94. 207 See p. 57.

62  Chapter 1: Alcibiades and Athens However, Alcibiades did help his city at Samos, because he prevented the occupation of Ionia and the Hellespont by the Lacedaimonians. For this reason, Xenophon’s readers should wonder what Alcibiades could have done to keep Ionia under Athenian control and keep the Hellespont. In fact, they should wonder what Alcibiades could do to save the city and lead her to defeat the Spartans. The phrase ἐκ τοῦ δήμου occurs in inscriptions and illustrates that all powers and rewards come from the people.208 The phrase πλέον ἔχειν is closely related to the assumption of military offices and trierarchies by Athenian aristocrats, on their own will, and emphasizes their competition to receive honors from the people.209 The word ἡλικιώτης was used in rhetorical contexts210 and the same applies to the word πρεσβύτερος, which was associated or set in opposition with the word ‘younger’ (νεώτερος).211 It is for this reason that these words could lead the audience of Xenophon to read the speeches of Nicias and Alcibiades before the Sicilian expedition in Thucydides. Nicias had implicitly referred to Alcibiades, saying that he was too young (νεώτερος) to serve as a general for his post, expressing the opinion that an expedition like this was a serious business, and not one which a mere youth (οἷον νεωτέρῳ) could plan and carry into execution (6.12.2). Moreover, he warned his fellow citizens that the youth of whom he was speaking had summoned to his side young men like himself, sitting by him in the Assembly, and appealed against them to the elder citizens (τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις) to vote against war (6.13.1).

 208 See IG II² 1349, IG II² 1539, IG II³,1 1419, IG II³,1 1023. 209 Isaeus 5.46 doubts that his opponent has participated in the recent wars of Athens and anticipates that he will claim to have an advantage over him (πλέον ἔχειν) through his famous ancestor Aristogeiton, the tyrant-slayer. Isaeus 11.47 claims that his opponent lies about the size of their fortune and says that people who cannot say anything fair about these issues must produce arguments like these so that by slandering their opponents they can gain an advantage (πλέον ἔχειν) over them. Isocr. 18.50 charges that, although his opponent has proved to be a man of such character by his conduct towards the Athenians, he is not content to be on equal terms with the others; instead, he seeks to be treated better than the jurors (πλέον ἔχειν), as if either he alone had suffered injury, or was the best of the citizens, or had met with the gravest misfortunes on their account, or had been the cause of the most numerous benefits to the city. Isocr. 8.28 believes that all men desire to be better off (πλέον ἔχειν) than the rest. The Old Oligarch contends that the poor and the people generally are right to have more (πλέον ἔχειν) than the highborn and wealthy for the reason that it is the people who man the ships and impart strength (τὴν δύναμιν) to the city. 210 See [Lys.] 20.36, Andoc. 1.48, Pl. Euthyphr.2b12–c8, Pl. Apol.33d9, [Dem.] 40.59, 53.4. 211 See Lys. 2.72, 14.39, 24.17, Isocr. 6.1, Isaeus 7.13, Dem. Lett.2.10, Aesch. 1.49. Cf. Xen. Mem.2.1.31, Pl. Men.234a6–b1.

The supporters of Alcibiades  63

Alcibiades responded to this speech. He asked the Athenians whether in the management of public affairs any man had surpassed him, claiming that he, without involving them in any great danger or expense, had combined the most powerful states of Peloponnese against the Lacedaimonians. Alcibiades boasted that he had compelled the Spartans to stake all they had in one day at Mantinea; and even to this hour, although they were victorious in the battle, their courage had hardly recovered (6.16.3). Alcibiades explained these successes as achievements of his youth (ἡ ἐμὴ νεότης) and urged his hearers not to be afraid of it but use it while he was in the flower of his days (6.17.1). Additionally, he said that Nicias should not divert them from their purpose by trying to set the young against the old (τοῖς νέοις ἐς τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους); rather in their accustomed order, old and young (νέοι), taking counsel together, after the manner of their fathers who raised Athens to this height of greatness, should strive to rise yet higher. For Alcibiades the Athenians should consider that youth (νεότητα) and age have no power unless united (6.18.6). In the end, all the Athenians were seized with a passionate desire to sail, the elder (τοῖς … πρεσβυτέροις) convinced that they would achieve the conquest of Sicily; the youth determined to see with their own eyes the marvels of a distant land and confident of a safe return (6.24.3). Thus, comparing those two speeches with the opinion of his supporters about Alcibiades and his relationship with the younger and older men, Xenophon’s readers should conclude that the Athenians: (a) recognized that Alcibiades was worthy of being the most prestigious Athenian among his co-equals because of his several distinctions; (b) accepted that Alcibiades could even have an almost equal level to his elders; thus repeating in a similar way the reaction of the elders before the Sicilian expedition; and (c) believed that this special place of Alcibiades within the city was fully controlled by the people because it was they who put Alcibiades in the limelight. Therefore Alcibiades’ supporters in Xenophon’s account reversed the image of a man who served his personal ambitions and harmed his city, and put the blame on Alcibiades’ enemies and exculpated him. The supporters of Alcibiades closed their assessment by commenting on his enemies again. They said that his enemies were exactly the same men as they had been before his exile; then, when they became powerful (δυνασθεῖσιν),212 they destroyed (ἀπολλύναι) the best men (τοὺς βελτίστους), and since they themselves were the only ones left, they were loved (ἀγαπᾶσθαι) by the citizens (τῶν πολιτῶν) exactly for this reason, i.e. because they did not have other, better ones whom they could employ (χρῆσθαι) (1.4.16). The argument that Alcibiades’ enemies had

 212 For this meaning of the word see n. 140 above.

64  Chapter 1: Alcibiades and Athens remained the same was based on the fact that the Athenians tended to view character as stable and unchanging.213 But this claim seems problematic when we consider the rest of the criticism about how the politicians treated their opponents and how the people reacted to this. Saying that Alcibiades’ enemies were δυνάμενοι means that they wanted to have the monopoly of all good things in democracy. This interpretation of the word is found in Thucydides’ speech of Athenagoras (6.39.2). On the other hand, we must consider that Thucydides says that this man was δήμου προστάτης (6.35.2) and that he portrays him as a demagogue who fanned the flames of civil strife.214 This fact alerts Xenophon’s readers because he indicates that men of this kind cared most for their personal ascendancy. Such politicians, who finally took the upper hand in Athens, were not content to impose their politics on the Assembly and thus defeat their elite opponents,215 but they exterminated them by achieving their conviction in court and/or even their death.216 Thus, Alcibiades’ supporters viewed the competition between the politicians as a zero-sum game, i.e. as an extreme competition, where one man enhanced his standing at the expense of his rivals, leading to their defeat.217 In this situation the people had their own responsibility. First, it was they who acted as jurors and thus voted for the condemnation of the enemies of the victors. Second, it was they who showed their regard for the victorious politicians to a degree that was equal to sexual love, as the infinitive ἀγαπᾶσθαι shows.218 A wise citizen would proudly say that Athens itself and its administration should be the object of ἀγάπη,219 not opportunist politicians. Thirdly, ideally the citizens

 213 See Dover, 1974, 88–95. 214 See Yunis, 1996, 111–12, Andrews, 2009, 1–12. 215 For the word βελτίστους as a mark of elite status cf. [Xen.] Ath.Pol.1.14, 3.11. 216 As the infinitive ἀπολλύναι denotes: Antiph. 5.73 says that the jurors must acquit him and not let his opponents destroy (ἀπολλύναι) him unjustly; Lys. 13.96 says that the Thirty set Agoratus free because he was ready to see the generals and the taxiarchs who opposed the subversion of democracy dead by testifying against them (ἀπολλύναι); Lys. 25.25–26 maintains that Epigenes, Demophanes and Cleisthenes accused Athenians who had not done any injustice in court so the jurors convicted (ἀπολλύναι) them; these men did not stop until they brought the city εἰς στάσεις. 217 See Cohen, 1995, 63. 218 See LSJ s.v. ἀγαπάω, Dover, 1989, 50. 219 Isocrates claims that the glory of Athens is such that it becomes the object of love (ἀγαπᾶσθαι) of all men (4.46) and that when Solon became προστάτης τοῦ δήμου he legislated and managed the affairs of the city in such a way that his administration is the object of love (ἀγαπᾶσθαι) until today (15.232).

The dissenters  65

had the right to choose those politicians who would serve them well.220 But since the people knew the private motives of their leading men, it is strange that they showed this passion for them. In this way, the mob self-consciously approved and enhanced the zero-sum game of the elite, which was one of the symptoms of civil war and ultimately dissolved the political community.221 Thucydides has said that the Athenians were already in civil strife (ἤδη ἐν στάσει ὄντες) before the launching of the Sicilian expedition (2.65.12). Xenophon confirms this through the very words of the people, who are self-aware that through the acts of their politicians and their active participation in the struggle of the elite their city will end up in destruction. There is no doubt that the mass and the elite were equally responsible; that is why Thucydides referred to the Athenians’ civil strife and Xenophon illustrates how all of them allowed this vicious circle to take place. In the end, through the language that the mob uses and the ideological and moral meaning it gives to it, its self-characterization as ‘citizens’ should be treated as ironical by Xenophon’s readers.

. The dissenters Xenophon clarifies that not all the Athenians had the same opinion about Alcibiades. Some said that he alone (μόνος) had been responsible for their past evils; and there was a danger that he alone (μόνος) would be the author (ἡγεμών) of future evils that they feared would befall the city (1.4.17). In this passage the mob’s fierceness against Alcibiades is striking, as the double use of the adjective ‘alone’ reveals. We saw earlier that Xenophon reported bluntly Alcibiades’ failure to find out that he was returning during the celebration of the Plynteria. To this we must add the bluntness of the hostile view of Alcibiades because it creates a very negative impression. On the other hand, the argument itself is surprising. On the basis of my previous analysis of the opinion of the supporters of Alcibiades, this part of the mob was not right as well. These men forgot that they had consented to the opinion of those politicians who argued that Alcibiades should participate in the Sicilian expedition but should be put on trial sometime after that. Moreover, there is no  220 Isocr. 8.133 maintains that if the Athenians accept the advice of the prudent men, they will be able to use (χρῆσθαι) the politicians in a better way; Din. 2.14 wonders if the Athenians want to employ (χρῆσθαι) as a speaker in the Assembly (see Worthington, 1992, 302) Aristogeiton, who has been condemned by them; Xen. Mem.1.2.48 claims that Criton and other men associated with Socrates so that they would be in good service (χρῆσθαι) to the city and the citizens. 221 See Cohen, 1995, 26–28.

66  Chapter 1: Alcibiades and Athens doubt that Alcibiades’ betrayal was astonishing, but the disaster of the fleet in Sicily lay with Nicias, who had the central role in it.222 On the other hand, this reaction should rather be expected for two reasons. The first is that Alcibiades had returned to the city during the Plynteria, so the goddess Athena could punish all the Athenians for his impiousness. The second is that the Athenians were not willing to criticize themselves. At this point we must read Thucydides, who says that when the Athenians learned about the disaster in Sicily they became furious with the orators who had joined in promoting the expedition, as if they had not voted it themselves (8.1.1). At that moment the Athenians were in fear (φόβος), because they believed that their enemies in Sicily and Greece, along with their revolted allies, would sail against the Peiraeus (8.1.2). Fear was a cognitive response and depended on the knowledge or understanding that a person is dangerous. One cause of fear was the anger of people who had the power to inflict harm on others.223 Moreover, fear was a continuous emotion;224 so the mob expressed it again, in other words it still believed that the enemies of Athens would attack her one day. This would happen through Alcibiades who would lead Athens to disaster because of his future wrong decisions. These Athenians disregarded Alcibiades’ recent victories and prospects of winning the war. The praising word ἡγεμών 225 had an ironical meaning now. The reaction of this group implies that although the Athenians elected Alcibiades a general, not all of them agreed with that. It is quite certain that they had not voted for his election but they were the minority.

. Xenophon’s assessment of Alcibiades Xenophon claims to know what is in the minds of the mob and presents the views of the polarized Athenians. The division between the supporters and dissenters is in some tension with Alcibiades’ impression that the city was eunous to him. The space devoted to each group’s ideas is disproportionate. The pro-Alcibiades group speaks at length and tries to defend the general’s past. This praise of Alcibiades is a mirror image of Nicias’ (and Thucydides’) condemnation of him. It is quite certain that Xenophon devoted such a lengthy account to the assessment of Alcibiades’ previous action by his supporters because this was a difficult subject  222 For this issue see the thorough analysis of Kagan, 2003, 188–221. 223 See Konstan, 2006, 129–32. 224 See Konstan, 2006, 149. 225 Cf. Hyp. 6.10, who says that when Leosthenes saw that Athens needed a man, Athens appointed him general (ἡγεμών) of the city’s troops.

Alcibiades’ arrival at the Peiraeus  67

which needed an extensive analysis. Perhaps this explains why these men did not say anything about the future. On the contrary, the anti-Alcibiades group gets a pithily phrased bon mot (ἡγεμών), which includes not just a judgement about the past but also a prediction about the future. Its sheer bluntness gives it a force disproportionate to its length.226 It is certain that there was a lack of communication between the supporters of Alcibiades and the dissenters and a different perspective regarding the past, the present and even the future, as we will see later on. Xenophon does not play a part in this conversation but it is certain that the views of both the pro- and anti- Alcibiades groups are extreme and sit ill when they are compared with Thucydides’ History.

. Alcibiades’ arrival at the Peiraeus Alcibiades arrived near the shore but he did not disembark immediately, fearing his enemies (φοβούμενος τοὺς ἐχθρούς). Instead, standing on deck, he checked if his associates were present (1.4.18). Xenophon reports Alcibiades’ emotion and explains in this way that Alcibiades believed that his enemies would try to harm him.227 This information is revealing because it proves that there was not only one division in Athens, i.e. between Alcibiades and the mob. We find out that there was also a division between Alcibiades and his rival politicians. This means that Alcibiades regarded his enemies as a group separate from the citizens, who would not stop opposing him even now that his return was the people’s desire. This information in Xenophon can be understood only if we recall that Thucydides says that Alcibiades’ enemies (τῶν ἐχθρῶν) accused him before the Sicilian expedition (6.61.1), while the same men later protested (τῶν ᾿Αλκιβιάδου … ἐχθρῶν) that he should not return to the city, since he had violated the laws (8.53.2). All of them except for one were still alive.228 When Alcibiades saw his nephew Euryptolemus, son of Pleistoanax, and his other relatives and friends with them, then he did disembark and went up to the city. It is noteworthy that Xenophon mentioned in 1.3.12 that Euryptolemus was  226 Tamiolaki, 2016, 11 n. 20 believes that Xenophon seems to be sympathetic towards him in the Hellenica because he describes in detail the positive sentiments of the Athenians towards him, while he devotes only one phrase to those who criticised him. Perhaps Tamiolaki has in mind Thucydides’ usual technique of giving preference to one strong interpretation (see Baragwanath, 2008, 85), but in this case Xenophon does not follow his predecessor. 227 For this interpretation of fear see above p. 66. 228 The only enemy of Alcibiades who was no longer alive was Androcles, who was killed by the associates of Peisander (Thuc. 8.6.52).

68  Chapter 1: Alcibiades and Athens one of the ambassadors of Alcibiades. Now Xenophon mentions Euryptolemus with his patronymic. The historian vary rarely identifies someone by anything beyond a single name in his work.229 Thus we can assume that this man will play an important role in Athens in the near future. At the present moment, readers can be certain that Alcibiades trusted him more than anyone else to welcome him. Helping behavior in Athens was largely limited to relatives and friends. Within the family, Athenians were expected as a matter of course to provide mutual support in daily life and in time of crisis.230 Outside the family, friends should also help each other.231 On this occasion, the task of relatives and friends was really difficult, that is, they were prepared, holding arms (τῶν παρεσκευασμένων),232 not to allow anyone to touch him or even worse to kill him (ἅπτοιτο).233 The existence of a bodyguard to protect Alcibiades indicates that that they were afraid that some would consider him a tyrant.234 This reaction betrays the insecurity of Alcibiades upon his homecoming.235 At a first glance, this seems an incident between Alcibiades and some politicians. But it is not. In his description of the symptoms of civil strife Thucydides said that he who on a favourable opportunity first took courage and struck at his enemy when he saw him off his guard (ἄφαρκτον) had greater pleasure in a perfidious manner than he would have had in an open act of revenge (ἐτιμωρεῖτο–3.82.7). Such a plan had succeeded in the past when an Athenian stabbed Phrynichus, a leading member of the Four Hundred, in the agora (8.92.2). Applying Thucydides’ analysis to the case of Alcibiades, Xenophon’s readers realize that Alcibiades and his fellows knew that there were politicians in the city who were ready to take revenge by

 229 See Whitehead, 1988, 145–47. 230 See e.g. Dover, 1974, 273–276. 231 See e.g. Konstan, 1997, 56. 232 Cf. Xen. 7.1.17, where it is said that the Thebans attacked their enemies παρεσκευασμένοι and hit them who were ἀπαρασκεύαστοι, and Anab.5.5.21–22, where we read that the mercenaries said that they were prepared (παρεσκευασμένοι) to stop anyone who might attempt to harm them. 233 Cf. Pl. Theaet.192d3–6, where Socrates says that he touches (ἄπτομαι) Theodorus and Theaetetus because he knows them. For the meaning of ἅπτομαι as kill see LSJ s.v.2. 234 Xenophon says in his Hiero 6.4 that one of the reactions of the tyrant was τὸ δὲ φοβεῖσθαι μὲν ὄχλον … φοβεῖσθαι δὲ ἀφυλαξίαν … καὶ μήτ’ ἀόπλους ἔχειν ἐθέλειν περὶ αὑτὸν. Cf. Pownall, 2018, 350: ‘Alcibiades feared his enemies and required the services of a bodyguard (one of the stereotypical attributes of a tyrant) on his approach to the city.’ 235 Socrates lists personal sources of security–friends and weapons–in a context where he emphasizes the vulnerability of a man without a homeland: οἱ μὲν πολιτευόμενοι ἐν ταῖς πατρίσι … φίλους πρὸς τοῖς ἀναγκαίοις καλουμένοις ἄλλους κτῶνται βοηθούς … καὶ ὅπλα κτῶνται οἷς ἀμυνοῦνται τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας (Mem.2.1.14–15).

Alcibiades’ defense speech and the reaction of the Athenians  69

assassinating him. This means that Athens was still in the atmosphere of stasis, characteristic of the troubles of 411 B.C. We are allowed to infer that Alcibiades knew that the only way he could protect himself was by having his friends and relatives around him, ready to kill with their swords anyone who might think to murder him.236 At the same time, and this is more important, it becomes obvious that Athens was in stasis because of the determination of some to take revenge. Xenophon shows the ramifications of revenge in his description of the trial of the Arginousai commanders.237 A careful reader could also observe that this proneness to violence made the Athenians of this time seem similar to the Thirty who were to kill many of their fellow citizens because of enmity (ἔχθρας ἕνεκα–2.3.21).

. Alcibiades’ defense speech and the reaction of the Athenians Alcibiades entered the city safely. He defended himself (ἀπολογησαμένος) in the Council and the Assembly, saying that he had not committed impiety (ἠσεβήκει) and that he had been treated unjustly (ἠδίκηται). Other things of that sort were said, and no one spoke in opposition (ἀντειπόντος), because the Assembly would not have tolerated it. Alcibiades referred to the profanation of the Mysteries. This becomes clear from Xenophon’s report of the words of the mob, which remembered that Alcibiades had been accused of profaning the Mysteries (ἠσεβηκότος εἰς τὰ μυστήρια–1.4.14). His readers realize that Alcibiades also had the same concerns about the past as his fellow citizens. Moreover, Alcibiades’ contention that he had not beeen treated fairly recalls the mob’s opinion that he was exiled οὐ δικαίως (1.4.13).What the Athenians did not do when the scandal shocked the city, i.e. allow Alcibiades to defend himself, occurred now. Xenophon indicates that Alcibiades and his fellow Athenians wanted to clarify the misunderstanding of the past and look at the future without any apprehensions. Alcibiades’ speech was accepted easily. This should not surprise readers because Xenophon has illustrated that the opinion of his supporters had already prepared the ground for his full reception.238 At this moment, the Athenians must have rescinded the curses against Alcibiades.239

 236 Note that Ajax protests that he is ἄφαρκτος φίλων (Soph. Ajax 910) and that the adjective ἄφαρκτος was used to show the need for military preparation (Thuc. 6.33.3). 237 See pp. 166–67, 171. 238 See pp. 46–65. 239 For the curses against Alcibiades, see above p. 40.

70  Chapter 1: Alcibiades and Athens However, the historian forewarns his readers that Alcibiades did not convince all his fellow citizens; that is why we read that the body of the Assembly did not allow any disagreement. We must not forget that there were also dissenters among those who watched Alcibiades returning to the city and that they had a very bad opinion about him. For them he would be responsible for all future troubles. I think that it is justifiable to suppose that nobody could talk against Alcibiades in this harsh way in public, but it is certain that there could be a discussion about Alcibiades’ dubious past. Thus it is not surprising that the Athenians did not let anyone express his disagreement. Xenophon reports this incident as one extremity of Athenian democracy.240 This becomes certain if we consider two other incidents reported by Thucydides, who shows that when everybody expressed his opinion freely and in public that was a characteristic of a normal democratic procedure and mentality. First, in 411 when Peisander tried to convince the Athenians that it would be in the interest of the city to call Alcibiades back, many objected to this (ἀντιλεγόντων). Amid shouts of opposition (ἀντιλογίαν) Peisander came forward and asked the objectors (τῶν ἀντιλεγόντων) if they had a better plan (8.53.1–2). Second, when the Four Hundred were ready to take power in Athens, nobody talked against them (ἀντέλεγε); if any one did utter a word (ἀντείποι), he was put out of the way (8.66.2).241 Moreover, Xenophon himself reports two incidents which emphasize the importance of ἀντιλογία. First, he reports in the dialogue between the two leaders of the Thirty that Critias objected (ἀντέλεγε) to Theramenes’ opinion that they should not exterminate the strong citizens of the city (2.3.16). Second, Theramenes defended himself in the Council, saying that he objected (ἀντεῖπον) to the decision of his associates to disarm the Athenian citizens (2.3.41). Therefore, Xenophon expected his readers to consider the lack of ἀντιλογία after Alcibiades’ speech a blow to democracy, where it was supposed that everybody could speak. This mismatch between Alcibiades’ opinion about Athens and the divided opinion of the people about him is confirmed by Xenophon once again here. We saw earlier that Alcibiades had many enemies whom he feared.242 Thus we could suspect that among those who wanted to object to Alcibiades’ return  240 Lévy, 1990, 146 has made this observation regarding this incident. I shall attempt to prove that he is right. 241 Cf. also other incidents in Thucydides: (a) the Corinthians and the Corcyreans ἐς ἀντιλογίαν ἦλθον (1.31.4); (b) the Athenians tell the Spartans that their allies ἀντέλεγον that the weaker must not give way to the stronger (1.77.3); (c) there was πολλῆς ἀντιλογίας in Argos between Alcibiades and the anti-democratic faction (5.76.3); (d) many Athenians ἀντέλεγον against the Sicilian expedition (6.15.2). 242 See p. 67.

Alcibiades commander-in-chief  71

could be his enemies. However, Xenophon is clear that everybody was silenced. This means we should conclude that Alcibiades had no open opponents any more because of the demos’ choice. For Xenophon Alcibiades did not deserve the honor that the mob ascribed to him. However, he did not go so far as to say that Alcibiades did not deserve to be rehabilitated because of the consequences of his past actions. For such a decision the Athenians were responsible. Xenophon’s duty was to report the new consequences of this approach between Alcibiades and the mob.

. Alcibiades commander-in-chief Alcibiades’ military successes in the Hellespont in combination with his successful rhetoric strengthened the trust of his fellow citizens in him; so they elected him as commander-in-chief. Those who opposed Alcibiades’ return had said that he would become ἡγεμών of the city’s disasters.243 Now the Athenians took the opposite decision; Alcibiades became ἀναρρηθεὶς ἁπάντων ἡγεμὼν αὐτοκράτωρ. We saw earlier that the anti-Alcibiades group used the word ἡγεμών to emphasize their disapproval of Alcibiades for his possible involvement in Athenian politics. We read afterwards that although some Athenians did not agree with Alcibiades’ defense speeches in the Council and the Assembly, nobody dared to speak. Now all the Athenians elected him. Nobody doubted Alcibiades. The word ἡγεμών turns from its ironical meaning and becomes a military title. Moreover, we should pay attention to the word αὐτοκράτωρ. The closest prior example to Alcibiades’ appointment comes from Thucydides, where Nicias, Lamachus, and Alcibiades were named στρατηγοὶ αὐτοκράτορες for the expedition to Sicily (Thuc. 6.8.2, 26.1). Now we read in Xenophon that Alcibiades would have had greater power than his colleagues. For the time being, Alcibiades could be happy and believe that the city was really eunous to him (1.4.11). The assumption of such an office was the opposite of exile.244 Xenophon shows that the Athenians made full restitution to Alcibiades who always wished to hold a privileged position in Athenian politics.245 On the other hand, Xenophon did not give such power to Alcibiades unconditionally. The historian explains that the Athenians took such a decision: ὡς οἷός τε ὢν σῶσαι τὴν προτέραν τῆς πόλεως δύναμιν. Each of these words deserves analysis.

 243 See p. 65. 244 Cf. Plut. Mor.599d5–7: φυγὰς δὲ καὶ ἀδοξίας καὶ τιμῶν ἀποβολάς, ὥσπερ αὖ τἀναντία … ἀρχὰς. 245 See pp. 50–51.

72  Chapter 1: Alcibiades and Athens The conjunction ὡς expresses the opinion of the Athenians, not that of Alcibiades, which means that Xenophon lets his readers cast doubt on this, or at least alert them to what is going to happen from this point onwards. The pronoun οἷος was used earlier by the mob to put emphasis on the moral qualities of Alcibiades.246 The word σωτηρία is inextricably connected with Athens and Alcibiades’ role in this. Thucydides narrates that in the winter of 412/11 B.C. Peisander, as instructed by his fellow oligarchs, told the Athenian people that if they restored Alcibiades and modified their democracy they might secure the alliance of the King and gain victory over the Peloponnesians. When the people were opposed strongly to any change in the democracy, Peisander pointed out to each objector that the Peloponnesians had a fleet ready for action as large as their own, that they numbered more cities among their allies, and that they were furnished with money by Tissaphernes and the King; whereas the Athenians had spent everything. He then asked them whether there was the least hope of saving (σωτηρίας) the country unless the King could be won over. They all acknowledged that there was none; so he told them not to care about democracy so much as for the safety (σωτηρίας) of the city and to restore Alcibiades, who was the only man living capable of saving them. The people were very angry at the first suggestion of an oligarchy; but when Peisander proved to them that they had no other way of saving the city (σωτηρίαν), they consented (Thuc. 8.53.1–54.1). Moreover, when Alcibiades claimed that Tissaphernes would not trust the Athenians and that he would not give them money unless he was restored and became surety for them (Thuc. 8.81.3), the Athenians immediately appointed him a colleague of the other generals, and placed everything in his hands; no man among them would have given up for all the world the hope of salvation (τῆς σωτηρίας) (Thuc. 8.82.1). These incidents reveal that there was insecurity about the future of Athens. The word δύναμις includes a strong military connotation, referring to the accumulation of money and navy and the use to which they are put by the leader or the state. More specifically, it was the talents on the Acropolis and the ships in Peiraeus. This was something the Athenians could see and which was tangible.247 The concept of Athens’ affluence and military power leads us to read Thucydides’ narration of the events just before the Sicilian expedition once again. In his speech in the Assembly Alcibiades had claimed that the energy which was shown by his successes at Olympia created an impression of power (δύναμις) for Athens (Thuc. 6.16.2). Moreover, he boasted that it was he who, without involving the  246 See p. 61. 247 See Kallet-Marx, 1993, 205.

Alcibiades commander-in-chief  73

Athenians in any great danger or expense, had united the power (τὴν δύναμιν) of the Peloponnesians against the Lacedaimonians (Thuc. 6.17.1).248 Alcibiades linked his personal expenditure with the city’s power249 and pointed out the use of others’ money as a means to support Athens’ effort to win the war. On the other hand, it is worth remembering that Nicias had warned the Athenians that the Greek cities of Sicily were fully provided with means of warfare similar to them, i.e. they had numerous hoplites, archers, javelin-men, triremes, cavalry, corn, which they had because of temple treasures and tributes which they received from barbarian tribes (Thuc. 6.20.1–4). Thus Nicias warned his fellow citizens that against such a power (πρὸς τοιαύτην δύναμιν) they should embark not only a significant force of marines but also a multitude of infantry, javelin-men, archers and food (Thuc. 6.21.1–23). Nicias insisted on public wealth for the certainty of success in the war. But because of these words250 the Athenians became more enthusiastic about the project of the expedition, approved of his advice and were seized with a desire to sail. The elderly were convinced that the expedition would succeed with such a strong expeditionary power (δύναμιν– Thuc. 6.24.3).251 In this case the Athenians made the mistake of relating success with resources, and thus launched an expedition which led them to put their money and power at risk.252 After the disaster of the fleet in Sicily, the Athenians could not place absolute reliance on public wealth for their power.253 Xenophon shows that the Athenians were aware that the glorious strength of Athens belonged to the past (hence the word προτέρα); so they put their hopes on Alcibiades’ ability to bring more money to Athens again and win the war. However, Alcibiades’ previous military successes and his return changed the mood of the Athenians. Now they believed not only that Alcibiades would preserve Athens but also that he would restore its power. This was because Alcibiades followed the evolution of the war with the Spartans from the moment he was engaged in policy and knew their intentions. This was a strong public image for Alcibiades, which revealed the high expectations the Athenians had of him.254  248 Cf. above, p. 57. 249 Kallet, 2001, 37. 250 See Kallet, 2001, 34–35, 42–45. 251 See pp. 62–63. 252 For this point see Kallet, 2001, 46–47. 253 See p. 14. 254 Cf. Demosthenes who says at the time when Philip had captured Elateia the voice of the fatherland called for the man who would talk about her salvation (ὑπὲρ σωτηρίας (18.170; he should be devoted and must have followed events from the beginning and figured out correctly what Philip was aiming at and what his intentions were in taking the action he did (18.172).

74  Chapter 1: Alcibiades and Athens Perhaps such a statement was an over-assessment of the abilities of Alcibiades, given that the war continued, the Spartans still blockaded Deceleia and the Persians continued to help them.255 On the other hand, we can explain this trust by saying that the Athenians shared Alcibiades’ view, expressed in Thucydides, that a state must always strive to become more powerful because the alternative is loss of power (6.18.2–3). In the end, it appears that Alcibiades’ return was the right occasion for the Athenians to discuss and contemplate the past, present and future of their city. Now it is time to define Alcibiades’ limits of office. One safe way to understand Alcibiades’ generalship is to pay attention to the context of the passage.256 In our case the meaning of the term ‘commander-in-chief’ can be derived from the context of 1.4.20–22: (a) Alcibiades became the head of the whole army before his departure, since it was he who conducted the procession of the Mysteries leading out all the soldiers; (b) he recruited (κατελέξατο) the force he would take with him, i.e. one thousand five hundred hoplites, one hundred and fifty cavalrymen and one hundred ships, i.e. three thousand men who would serve in the navy; and (c) he would take all the decisions during the expedition.257 Concerning the time-limit of Alcibiades’ office, we can suspect that the sentence ‘Alcibiades could recover the city’s previous power’ indicates that he was not exempt from the normal scrutiny and disciplinary procedure to which the Athenian generals were subject.258 So if he failed in his mission, he would have to explain why this happened. In this way the Athenians were certain that no officer would turn into a tyrant.259 Given that the Athenians feared Alcibiades because they thought he wanted to become a tyrant (Thuc. 6.15), this decision before the expedition is not

 255 As Romilly, 1985, 202 remarks. 256 Thus I follow Dover, 1970, 228 who argues about the word autokrator in Thuc. 6.8.2 in his commentary that ‘the respect in which an official is made autokrator is …obvious from the context’. 257 Note that Alcibiades is the subject of almost all the verbs of these chapters: ἐποίησεν– κατελέξατο–ἀνήχθη–ἀπεβίβασε–ἔστησε–ἔπλευσεν–ἐπολέμει. The verbs συνεπέμφθησαν–ἐτρέψαντο–κατέκλεισαν–ἀπέκτειναν refer to Alcibiades’ generals Aristocrates and Adeimantus and his troops. 258 For this issue in the Athenian generalship see Hamel, 1988, 201–3. 259 Note that in Hdt. 3.83.4 Dareius contends that when someone is admired by the demos, he turns out to be a monarch (θωμάζεται οὗτος δὴ ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου, θωμαζόμενος … μούναρχος). Cf. also Dion.Hal. Ant.Rom.4.74.2 that an official who has no end in his tenure and whose actions are never examined is grievous to all and nourishing to tyranny.

Alcibiades and the Mysteries  75

surprising. Therefore, it is evident to Xenophon’s readers that the Athenians annulled Alcibiades’ condemnation to death but they did not do so out of φιλανθρωπία260 or πραότης261 but because of their need to find a solution to their crisis.262 They did not separate justice from interest; they were pragmatists.263 Alcibiades’ superiority was firmly dependent on the goodwill towards him of the demos, as we saw earlier.264 On the other hand, the fact is that Alcibiades also accepted the terms of his office; a fact which implies that he could not know beforehand that this goodwill would continue for ever.

. Alcibiades and the Mysteries Alcibiades’ first move was to achieve the celebration of the Mysteries, as they had taken place in Athens in the past but now could not because of the war. Xenophon makes a contrast between the past and the present, saying that although the procession of the Mysteries had been previously (πρότερον μὲν)265 conducted or celebrated266 by sea because of the war, Alcibiades conducted the procession to Eleusis over land, leading out all the army (1.4.20). Xenophon’s readers can explain this decision of Alcibiades by considering his past actions again. At this point we must go back to Thucydides, who says that Alcibiades had advised the Spartans to fortify Deceleia (Thuc. 6.91.5), and remember that Xenophon has said that Agis  260 For this view see Gray, 1989, 92–93. But the word is missing from the text in this passage and the content of the word is not one that characterizes the Athenians’ reaction here. 261 Romilly, 1974, 95 points out that πραότης is among the mild and tranquil virtues, which are usually appreciated between friends, or within a family, and which are the ornaments of peace. More specifically Romilly, 1974, 99–100 remarks that Xenophon uses the word many times but she points out that Athens never used it. 262 Xenophon reminds his readers that all these happened because Athens was at war (διὰ τὸν πόλεμον–1.4.20). 263 See Pecorella Longo, 2004, 89–90, 108–10. 264 Seager, 1967, 9 has made this point, citing as a proof 1.4.16, but Gray, 1989, 92 is more right to point out that Xenophon explicitly mentions the goodwill of the Athenians in 1.4.12. For my part, I think we should better put more emphasis on 1.4.20, because it shows the extent of the demos’ goodwill. 265 Kovacs, 2011, 752 argues that we must emend the text from πρότερον μὲν to πρῶτον μὲν because it sets up a contrast between Alcibiades’ first and second act. But μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα is not preceded by πρῶτον μὲν in the Hellenica, while in 1.7.28, 2.24 and 5.1.16 we read μὲν πρότερον preceding δέ. Therefore I prefer to keep this reading. 266 Kovacs, 2011, 751–52 argues that the genitive absolute ἀγόντων means that the Athenians were celebrating (not conducting) the Mysteries by sea. I think that this could be right if we consider Hdt. 1.147 ᾿Απατούρια ἄγουσι (see LSJ s.v. ἄγω IV).

76  Chapter 1: Alcibiades and Athens was occupying Deceleia (1.1.35). It is noteworthy that Xenophon refers to the celebration of the Mysteries without connecting it with Deceleia. This indicates that the Spartans cared only to see Athens subdued. But the fact that Alcibiades led the army out reminds Xenophon’s readers that the countryside of Attica was still occupied by the Spartans. This inevitably leads us to Alcibiades’ role in it.267 Thus it is logical to believe that the supreme commander of Athens was aware that his betrayal to the Lacedaimonians had also affected the celebration of the festival. Xenophon implicitly considers Alcibiades responsible for this situation. So this was a time for action with a specific meaning for Alcibiades and his fellow citizens. In the past Alcibiades had been exiled from Athens on charges of impiety.268 In the present, the Athenians had just accepted Alcibiades’ defense speech that he had not offended the gods.269 The Athenians considered the piety of their fellow citizens according to the performance of their actions and not their beliefs.270 Therefore it is quite certain that Alcibiades demonstrated his outward civic piety to the Athenian demos and their ancestral rites by leading the procession from Athens to Eleusis.271 Regarding the city, Xenophon allows us to infer that Alcibiades’ action had a strong symbolic meaning for the Athenians and their self-image. The people had been forced to give up the usual manner of the procession and conveyed the ‘Holy Things’ of Eleusis to and fro by sea. This must have altered the whole character of the occasion and reduced the popular participation in it,272 although the rule was that all the Athenians accompanied the procession during the Mysteries (Plut. Alc.34.4). This allows us to think that Alcibiades decided to use all the military forces of the Athenians in order to increase the number of citizens who would participate in the procession and strengthen the common impression of his fellow citizens that he could protect them. Thus Xenophon intimates that Alcibiades moved the whole population of the city outside the city walls after so many years of war and attempted to improve their morale. Moreover, we must remember that Athens’ decision that her allies should participate in the Mysteries was an attempt to stress, increase and express symbolically the cult’s Panhellenic  267 See p. 57. 268 See p. 48. 269 See p. 69. 270 See also Ostwald, 1987, 528, Bremmer, 1994, 6. 271 Cf. Yunis, 1988, 40: ‘the religious beliefs held by an individual were not primarily a matter of public record nor a matter of public concern, although the individual’s religious behaviour was certainly both visible to the public and of public concern. Beliefs influence behaviour’ (my emphasis). 272 See Parke, 1977, 68.

Alcibiades’ departure  77

dimension.273 But Xenophon says that only the Athenians celebrated the festival. Perhaps this implies that Athens’ allies did not participate in the celebration. If this is the case, the celebration of the Mysteries was a message of Alcibiades to his fellow citizens that Athens had not lost the war. One might think that since the cult of Demeter in Sparta did not have the importance it had in Athens the Spartans could attack the procession.274 However, Xenophon leaves no doubt that Alcibiades’s conduct of the Mysteries was successful; so given that the Spartans did not attack, it is most probable to think that they feared him.275

. Alcibiades’ departure What Xenophon’s readers expect to read now is Alcibiades’ military action. Two months after his return home (τὸν κατάπλουν), Alcibiades sailed for Andros, which had revolted (ἀφεστηκυῖαν) from the Athenians, and with him were sent Aristocrates and Adeimantus, the son of Leucolophides, who had been chosen as generals to operate on land (1.4.21). Xenophon had pointed out before Alcibiades’ return that he wanted to know before his return home (τοῦ οἴκαδε κατάπλου) how the city would treat him (1.4.11). This word introduces and ends Alcibiades’ presence in Athens. After two months of preparations, his next step was to take military action again. First, he decided to suppress the revolt of one of Athens’ subjects. An examination of similar occasions as reported by Thucydides276 allows us to infer that this was a common method of Athens during the war, which Alcibiades repeated, since the allies would not stop wanting to be free.277 Obviously, this would not be an easy mission for Alcibiades. Most probably, this explains why Xenophon says that the Athenians also appointed two men  273 See Sourvinou-Inwood, 1997, 152, Garland, 1984, 98, Clinton, 1994, 161–72, 2007, 345. 274 See Parker, 1989, 150–51. 275 Romilly, 1995, 204 suggests that the Spartans feared Alcibiades. I agree. Aen.Tact.Poliorc.4.8–11, who writes from the point of view of a city under siege (see Whitehead, 2001, 1–21), confirms this impression: when Peisistratus was general at Athens, the Megarians planned an attack on the Athenian women during their celebration of the Thesmophoria in Eleusis. Peisistratus was able to stop them because he received information of this plan, a fact which allowed him to lay an ambush against them. 276 The revolt of Poteidaia (ἀφεστηκυίας–Thuc. 1.60.1) and the cities of Chalcidice (ἀφεστᾶσι– Thuc. 1.61.1) led Athens to intervene. The Athenians also moved against Cyzicus when it revolted (ἀφεστηκυῖαν–Thuc. 8.107.1). 277 Phrynichus had said that the revolted (αἱ ἀφεστηκυῖαι) cities would not return to the Athenians because they wanted to be free (Thuc. 8.48.5).

78  Chapter 1: Alcibiades and Athens connected with Alcibiades in the past, Aristocrates and Adeimantus. The reason why the people chose these men is for readers to work out. Concerning Aristarchus, Xenophon refers to Arisocrates without identifying him by his father’s name, because he expected his readers to do so by reading Thucydides, who provides us with his political past. This man, the son of Scellias, was one of the chief authors of the Four Hundred in the beginning. Later he turned against his collaborators, claiming that he feared Alcibiades; in reality he was attached to him because of the great power of Alcibiades at Samos and an impression that the oligarchy was not likely to be permanent (Thuc. 8.89). The fact that this man turned against the Four Hundred must have convinced the Athenians of his democratic credentials. Moreover, his earlier cooperation with Alcibiades must be regarded as a reason why the Athenians chose him to support his old collaborator. Regarding Adeimantus, Xenophon presents him with his patronymic. I have pointed out that he very rarely identifies someone in his work by anything beyond a single name.278 So it is logical to suspect that Xenophon deliberately chose to add Adeimantus’ patronymic in order to allow readers to identify him,279 distinguish him from any other280 and recall that he was the old friend of Alcibiades who had been denounced for profaning the Mysteries (Andoc. 1.16). Adeimantus’ assumption of his office necessarily means that the Athenians rescinded the curse against him, before or after Alcibiades’ arrival.281 Adeimantus, the friend and accomplice of Alcibiades, was considered the right person to cooperate with him for the city’s salvation. This suggests that the mistakes of the past had been pardoned. However, whether they had been forgotten or not is something that Xenophon has not clarified yet. On a personal level, it is logical to assume that Alcibiades must have been happy with the prospect of a new cooperation with his old associates, Aristocrates and Adeimantus. Alcibiades disembarked the army at Gaurium in the land of Andros. The Athenians routed those Andrians who came out to oppose them, shut them up inside the city and killed a few of them as well as the Laconians who were there. Alcibiades set up a trophy and after remaining there for a few days sailed for Samos. Making the island his base, he continued the war (1.4.22–23). The Athenians killed some of their enemies, which implies that it was not a great victory, but

 278 See Whitehead p. 68 n. 229. 279 A man’s patronymic was the most usual way of identifying someone in Athens. See Bicknell, 1972, 43–44. 280 Krentz, 1989b, 133 says that Xenophon probably wants to distinguish him from Plato’s brother. 281 See pp. 39–40, 44.

Lysander and Cyrus  79

they forced them to remain inside their city. Obviously, the Andrians and the Lacedaimonians knew that they would not be so lucky if they met the Athenians in the battlefield again. Alcibiades sealed his victory with a trophy but he could not wait for the Andrians for ever, so he headed to Samos to meet the main forces of the Spartans in the Aegean. Andros remained in revolt but she could not threaten Athens any more after Alcibiades’ intervention. Alcibiades was unsuccessful in suppressing the revolt at Andros, but this failure did not really matter for this phase of the war. What he really wanted to do was to move the battlefield to Ionia; so he returned to Samos, which was his base in the past. Earlier Xenophon made his readers wonder what Alcibiades could do to keep Ionia under Athenian control and keep the Hellespont.282 Now he leads his readers’ thought one step further and draws their attention to how Alcibiades would achieve his plan.

. Lysander and Cyrus Lysander appears in 1.5.1 when he succeeds Cratesippidas as the new Spartan admiral. Xenophon breaks the linear manner of his narrative, saying that Lysander assumed his duties not long before Alcibiades returned to Athens and became commander-in-chief (πρότερον τούτων οὐ πολλῷ χρόνῳ). This wording makes clear the historical significance of this event.283 Readers could think that Sparta had a new commander who could resist the plans of Athens to win the war. Lysander arrived at Rhodes, gathered ships from there, and took up his position at Ephesus, waiting for Cyrus to come from Sardis. Since Sparta had reached an agreement with the King and the prince would be responsible for Persia’s contribution,284 it is obvious that Lysander had to meet him. However, Lysander did not go alone but he met ambassadors who came from Sparta, probably to Ephesus, and accompanied him to Sardis. There Lysander and ambassadors285 asked Cyrus to be προθυμότατος towards the war (1.5.2). The Spartans worried whether Cyrus would wholeheartedly support them or not. But the prince was determined to do so. Thus not only did he repeat that he was a delegate of his father but also he assured them that he would do everything his father had instructed him, and in order to prove this he said that he had come  282 See p. 62. 283 See Riedinger, 1991, 107. 284 For Cyrus note the use of the preposition in the verb συμπολεμήσων. 285 In 1.5.1 Xenophon says that Lysander visited Cyrus with the ambassadors. From 1.5.2 to 1.5.5 the historian uses the plural number, which proves that the ambassadors and Lysander talked to Cyrus: ἔλεγον–οἱ δὲ ταῦτά τε ἐπῄνουν καὶ ἐκέλευον–ὁ δὲ καλῶς μὲν ἔφη αὐτοὺς λέγειν.

80  Chapter 1: Alcibiades and Athens with five hundred talents. With this information Xenophon’s readers could be absolutely certain about the ready cash of the King and his determination to fight the Athenians, something which Xenophon has already reported from the beginning of his work.286 What is very new and important now is Cyrus’ claim that if the five hundred talents were not enough, he would use the money that his father had given him, and if even this were not enough too he would coin into money the silver and gold throne on which he sat (1.5.3). It is noteworthy that although Cyrus made a descending climax in the enumeration of the resources, the efficiency of his argument functions vice versa, since it proves his personal willingness to support the Spartan cause. The Spartans could not but commend him for what he promised and urged him to fix the pay at one Attic drachma for each sailor, explaining that in this way the Athenian sailors would desert and that he would spend less. Apparently, the Lacedaimonians thought that, since Cyrus was ready to offer even his own personal money, an increase in the wages of their sailors would leave the Athenians without men to row their ships, make them less able to conduct the war and bring the war to its end sooner. Such a thought was justified, since the prince was aware that the longer the war lasted the more money he would spend, if we consider the three-stage provision of money he had calculated to give. Thus the Spartans would save time and Cyrus would save much of his money.287 We can find an explanation for this argument in Thucydides. During the Sicilian expedition some of the foreign sailors who served as rowers in the Athenian fleet deserted to recover runaway slaves when they realized that they would not make money,288 while by the time Tissaphernes financed the Spartan fleet the wages of the Athenian crews were half a drachma.289 Having these facts in mind, Xenophon allows his readers to infer that the ambassadors expected that the Athenian crews would desert once again. Although Cyrus accepted their argument, he refused by saying that: (a) it was impossible for him to act contrary to the King’s orders; and (b) according to the agreement the King would provide thirty mnai for each ship each month, for no matter however many vessels the Spartans wanted to maintain. The prince immediately realized the argument of the ambassadors and admitted that what they

 286 See pp. 17–18. 287 Xenophon has already said that Lysander had seventy ships, while the Athenian fleet one hundred ships (1.5.1 and 1.4.21 respectively). Moreover, he has pointed out that the construction of new triremes was time- and money-consuming (1.1.25, 4.11). 288 See Thuc. 7.13.2 with Hornblower, 2008, 563–64. 289 See Thuc. 8.45.2 with Pritchett, 1971, 14–24.

Lysander and Cyrus  81

said was right, but he reminded them that his father was still his superior as the King of Persia; that is why he called him with his official title now.290 Moreover, according to the conditions of the agreement, the content of which we are informed for the first time now, Dareius and the Spartans had agreed that the former would provide thirty mnai per vessel for each month as the latter wanted. At this point we must go to Thucydides again who has said that one of the conditions of the third Spartan–Persian treaty was that Tissaphernes would provide maintenance for the number of ships the Spartans had at present, at the rate of a drachma per day;291 but when the Phoenician fleet arrived the Spartans would be free to maintain their own ships, if they wished, or to borrow Persian money. The use of common words in both histories allows us to think that Xenophon expected his readers to make the thematic connection between the two works292 and realize that: (a) the treaty of Boeotius was not a new agreement; instead it confirmed that the cities of Ionia would not become autonomous but would remain in the hands of the King;293 and (b) the King now expressed clearly his previously ambivalent possibility of subsidizing the Spartan fleet.294 Since the ambassadors wanted one drachma for each sailor, it is logical to think that they still wanted the one drachma that Tissaphernes had agreed to give them. On the other hand, the agreement of Boeotius was not concerned with the daily wages of the crews, and, since Sparta was satisfied with these terms as Xenophon has already revealed to us (1.4.2), Cyrus was justified in refusing.295

 290 Note that although Cyrus used the word father twice when he referred to the King earlier, obviously as a sign of his affection for him, he now uses the word King. Gray, 1989, 16 has noted the change in the way Cyrus refers to the King as a proof of his unwillingness to give hard cash. 291 See Thuc. 8.58.6 with Hornblower, 2008, 929. 292 Cf. Thuc. 8.58.6: Λακεδαιμονίους δὲ καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους … ἢν βούλωνται, τρέφειν ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῖς εἶναι and Xen. 1.5.5: ὁπόσας ἂν βούλωνται τρέφειν Λακεδαιμόνιοι. The verbal resemblance is striking. This resemblance is an indication that Xenophon had read the 8th Book of Thucydides. Cf. p. 4 n. 28. 293 This is the opinion of Tuplin, 1987 n. 153, which Xenophon confirms. 294 For the translation of Thuc. 8.58.6 see Hornblower, 2008, 930–31, who remarks that the treaty left open the possibility of paying the Spartan fleet beyond the point at which the King’s Phoenician fleet would arrive. 295 Kagan, 1987, 305 believes that ‘Cyrus was forced to admit that his rhetoric had gone beyond his instructions’, while Gray, 1989, 16 says that there is a contrast between Cyrus’s extravagant promises of financial aid at the beginning and his refusal of the Spartan demands. In my opinion, Cyrus did not contradict himself, because the Spartans asked for more than they had initially agreed; so Persia was not obliged to assist its allies in the way they now wanted.

82  Chapter 1: Alcibiades and Athens We saw earlier that Lysander spoke to Cyrus with the ambassadors. Now Xenophon focuses exclusively on him. Lysander realized that this conversation between the two sides would not bring any new result; so he rightly remained silent at that time.296 Nevertheless, this does not mean that he would give up so easily but that he would attempt to find another occasion in order to obtain what he wanted. This opportunity was given when Cyrus made a toast during the lavish symposium which he held for the Spartan embassy, probably as a symbolic way to show his power,297 and asked Lysander what χάρις he could do to him in order to please him. Then he replied ‘if you could add an obol to each sailor’s wage’. War was a good context for the conclusion of ξενίαι and one trustworthy device to generate xenia was for one of the two parties to act as benefactor.298 Cyrus decided to forge such a relationship between himself and Lysander299 on the basis of the reciprocity according to which he would do a charis to Lysander and the latter would return this favour to him in the future.300 We understand that the Spartan commander grasped the opportunity301 and, speaking in a way approved for a Spartan, i.e. packing into one sentence the essence of his request,302 accepted the offer of this favour, defining it as an increase in the wages of his crews. Such an act is important. Xenophon shows that Lysander gave a boost to the progress of the war (ἐκ τούτου),303 i.e. his army became πολὺ προθυμότερον, while the Athenians felt exactly the opposite, ἀθύμως, when they first heard the news. Cyrus’ official role to help Sparta and the transformation of Lysander’s contact  296 According to Spartan morals a man should not remain silent when somebody spoke. Cf. Plut. Lac.Apophth.215e9–12, 216a8–12. 297 For this issue in regard to Persian symposia see Davidson, 1997, 283–84. Nevertheless, Xenophon is not interested in the details of the Persian symposia; so he suppresses all the distracting oriental décor and selects one common feature which is shared between East and West, the toast of a symposiastic man, in our case Cyrus. For an oriental drinking in Xenophon cf. Anab.4.5.26, 32. For this subject see further Davidson, 1997, 285–86. 298 For this subject see Herman, 1987, 45–46, 48–49. 299 However, note that although Xenophon knew that benefaction was only one of the preliminary devices of xenia and displays the other devices which were necessary to convert strangers into xenoi in other parts of his history (see Herman, 1987, 58–60, 66), he does not do the same thing here because it does not serve his historical purposes. 300 For the concept of reciprocity see Arist. Nic.Eth.1133a2–4. Cf. Herman, 1987, 121. For Cyrus’ plans the reader has to wait until 3.1.1–2. 301 In some cases a ritualized friendship could start when a man who wanted to become somebody’s xenos gave him money as Xenophon indicates in Cyrop.6.2.1 (see also Hdt. 3.21). 302 For the approval of this kind of speech in regard to Spartans cf. Plut. Mor.511a and Pl. Prot.342d with Francis, 1991, 198–99. 303 Xenophon uses this phrase in some cases to show when and how some of his protagonists advance the course of events. Cf. 2.3.18 (Theramenes), 3.1.2 (Cyrus), 5.1.5 (Ierax), 5.1.35 (the King).

Alcibiades and Tissaphernes again  83

with Cyrus from an ephemeral contact into a permanent bond resulted in a complete failure of the Athenian embassy to see him and change his mind (1.5.8–9). We ought to remark that Xenophon’s narrative creates a contradiction, namely, although Cyrus said that he could not disobey the King, he now did the opposite. This is not a real problem, because Xenophon shows later that the prince could influence his father’s opinion because of their emotional attachment and mainly because they had plenty of money.304 In my view, Xenophon wanted to make the readers focus exclusively on Lysander’s driving force and regard the issue of money as Cyrus’ problem but not as something that should bother them.

. Alcibiades and Tissaphernes again Xenophon has shown so far the high prospects the Athenians had from Alcibiades and the latter’s plan to win the war. However, Xenophon also warns us that Alcibiades had a gloomy past, which influenced Athens in the present. Hearing the decision of Cyrus to raise the wage of the Spartan soldiers, the Athenians became discouraged and sent envoys to Cyrus through Tissaphernes. It is striking that the best the Athenians could hope for diplomatically was to persuade Cyrus to be a half-hearted Spartan supporter, not actually to switch sides. The prince was not receiving them. We saw earlier that Lysander had convinced him to support Sparta. Lysander’s influence can be realized from the fact that although Tissaphernes kept beseeching Cyrus and saying (δεομένου … καὶ λέγοντος) that the King would do exactly what he was doing, persuaded by Alcibiades, to see to it that none of the Greeks becomes powerful (ἰσχυροὶ ὦσιν) but keep all of them weak by making strife (αὐτοὶ ἐν αὑτοῖς στασιάζοντες) among them (1.5.9). Xenophon shows that Tissaphernes’ plans were different by revealing his true motives. If Persia did not help Sparta now, it would seemingly help the Athenians. But with Persian help for Sparta the balance would turn in favour of Sparta, so both cities would become weaker. What is significant here is that this plan was not Tissaphernes’ but Alcibiades’. This was an old idea of Alcibiades. We can understand this by reading Thucydides, who says that Alcibiades advised Tissaphernes not to be in a hurry about putting an end to the war, to adopt a balanced policy towards both sides with a

 304 See 2.1.13–15, where Xenophon uses the word ‘father’ in regard to the King three times in order to show Cyrus’ affection to his parent. Last, it is probable that Tissaphernes advised Cyrus not let the Spartans become stronger than the Athenians (1.5.9), because he hoped that the son could change his father’s plans because of their mutual love.

84  Chapter 1: Alcibiades and Athens view of achieving mutual attrition (8.45.2–3). Thucydides reveals that Alcibiades had a national motive, to help Athens through an alliance with Persia, but also a private one, i.e to prepare the way for his own return from exile. Alcibiades knew that if he did not destroy his country altogether the time would come when he would persuade his countrymen to recall him. Thucydides stresses that Tissaphernes was strongly inclined to this course, since he gave his full confidence to Alcibiades, whose advice he approved; and he kept the Peloponnesians ill-provided and thus impaired the efficiency of their navy, which had once been in firstrate condition (πάνυ ἰσχυράν–8.46.5). Thucydides also points out that there were many other ways in which the satrap showed openly and unmistakably that he was not in earnest in the cause of his allies (8.46–47). Thucydides believed beyond all question that Tissaphernes wanted to wear out and to neutralize the Hellenic forces; his object was to damage them both and not strengthen either of them by his alliance (8.87.4). Xenophon leaves no doubt that the present difficult condition of Athens was a result of Alcibiades’ previous diplomacy. The present situation justifies in some part those voices which were apprehensive about Alcibiades and believed that he was responsible for their past troubles.305 Moreover, what makes Alcibiades appear in the worst possible light is Xenophon’s reference to στάσις. Thucydides consciously viewed and presented the Peloponnesian War in terms of a condition of stasis, i.e. a situation of internal disturbance in both individuals and states, which led the Greeks to the breakdown of language and communication, to unusual brutality and cruelty, and to overall disregard for genuinely Hellenic customs, codes of morality and civic loyalty.306 In Xenophon it is interesting that this view of the Peloponnesian War as a destructive internal war was a situation in which Alcibiades was willing to place Greece for his own interests. Moreover, the phrase αὐτοὶ ἐν αὑτοῖς στασιάζοντες is not only an allusion to metaphorical stasis between the Greek cities but also a description of the situation in each city individually. Concerning Athens, we saw earlier that Alcibiades was afraid that someone might attempt to assassinate him and that Xenophon implies that Athens was in stasis because of such behavior.307 What is new now is that since Alcibiades had worked against his own city, he became a victim of his own plan. In regard to Sparta, we shall see later in this study that her lack of money allowed Lysander to create civil strife in order to

 305 See p. 65. 306 See Price, 2001, 6–321. 307 See above pp. 68–69.

Alcibiades at Notium  85

harm Callicratidas.308 It is quite certain that Xenophon did not approve Alcibiades’ stance. When the Syracusan soldiers told their generals to continue in command, although they had been exiled, Hermocrates and his colleagues said that they would not engage in civil strife (στασιάζειν) against their own city (1.1.27– 28). Moreover, Xenophon says that Jason of Pherae gave the Spartans friendly advice as the Spartan proxenos (6.4.24) and points out immediately afterwards that this man’s motive was to play off the Thebans and the Spartans against one another for his own advantage (6.4.25). But why did Xenophon choose to expose Alcibiades to his readers at this moment, although he seems to treat him favorably in the Hellenica?309 In my opinion, the answer lies in the influence of Socrates310 whose concern was ‘that men of enterprising talent channel their energy towards the city’s good and thus their own good as well’311 in contrast to Alcibiades who acted vice versa.312 This is something that our author could not forgive and forget even in the Hellenica because of the philosopher’s condemnation to death.313 This was not the only incident that proved the problematic relationship between Athens and Alcibiades, as Xenophon shows immediately afterwards.

. Alcibiades at Notium Lysander reorganized the fleet (συνετέτακτο), dragged ashore his ninety ships and remained quiet, repairing and drying them out (1.5.10). Before his arrival at Ephesus readers were informed that Cratesippidas was his predecessor. But since no action is recorded,314 we can assume that the Lacedaimonian fleet had been at

 308 See above pp. 101–03. 309 Hatzfeld’s opinion that Xenophon is ‘toujours favorable à Alcibiade’ (1940, 315) has an exception, as the present passage shows, but this is the general impression. See Xen. 1.1.5, 1.1.10, 1.1.11, 1.1.16, 1.3.1–22, 1.4.23 with Krentz, 1989b, 91, 92, 95, 96, 98, 117–123, 133. 310 For Xenophon as influenced by Socrates’ thought when he wrote the Hellenica see Ludwig, 2017, 515–18. 311 The citation comes from Higgins, 1977, 131 and finds proof in Xen. Mem.1.2.48: ‘those who followed Socrates did so not that they might shine in the courts or the Assembly, but that they might become gentlemen, and be able to do their duty to their city and fellow citizens’. 312 Cf. Xen. Mem. 2.1.24–25 for Socrates’ moral dissociation from Alcibiades. Higgins, 1977, 171 n. 63 aptly says: ‘Xenophon could admire Alcibiades’ mental ability but loathe his total amoral self-seeking’. 313 See Waterfield, 2012, 269–305. 314 See Brownson, 1903, 34–35.

86  Chapter 1: Alcibiades and Athens sea for a long time; so Lysander was justified in wanting his ships to be in a good condition.315 This meant for Alcibiades that Lysander would not attack him immediately. Thus, when Alcibiades heard that Thrasybulus was fortifying Phocaia, he left his pilot (κυβερνήτην) Antiochus in charge of the ships with orders not to attack the ships of Lysander (1.5.11). Thrasybulus’ presence in Phocaia and Alcibiades’ move there finds its explanation in Thucydides’ account. During the Ionian war Astyochus was at some time at Phocaia (Thuc. 8.31.4) but then he sailed to Chios (Thuc. 8.32.1), Miletus (8.33.1) and Erythrai (Thuc. 8.33.3). In Xen. 1.1.31 we read that Astyochus was at Sparta along with Hermocrates. So Phocaia was not under Spartan control any more, but it was also not friendly to the Athenians. On the contrary, the fact that the Spartans went there after their defeat at Arginousai, as we will see,316 indicates that it was a hostile territory for the Athenians.317 Regarding Thrasybulus, Xenophon has told us that, when Alcibiades returned to Athens, Thrasybulus had gone to Thrace and had subdued all the lands there that had gone over to the Spartan side. At that time the Athenians had just elected Thrasybulus general, although he was absent, along with Alcibiades and Conon.318 Now Xenophon tells us that Thrasybulus had gone to Phocaia. When Alcibiades started his expedition to Ionia, the two men did not act in cooperation; that is the reason why Xenophon says that Alcibiades heard about the action of his colleague at Phocaia and went to him.319 Alcibiades’ wish to support his colleague reminds us that he had also worked with Thrasyllus in the past for the benefit of Athens.320 The plan of Thrasybulus is not clear because Xenophon’s text is corrupt here: †τειχίζειν. Did Thrasybulus wall off (ἀποτειχίζειν) Phocaia or circumvallate (περιτειχίζειν) it? These were ways for an attacker to take a place321 but they were  315 See Harrison, 1999, 170. 316 See p. 136. 317 As Marincola, 2009, 24 n. 1.5.11b remarks. 318 See p. 39. 319 Note that Plutarch and Diodorus mention different reasons for Alcibiades’ absence. In Plut. Alc.35.6 we read that Alcibiades went to Caria to collect money. Diod. 13.71.1 says that Alcibiades went to Clazomenai, because this city was under siege by fugitives. In both accounts Alcibiades does not meet or cooperate with any Athenian general. 320 See p. 29. 321 For ἀποτειχισμός: the Acarnanians begged Demosthenes, the Athenian general, to cut Leucas off by a wall (ἀποτειχίζειν), thinking that they could easily take the city (Thuc. 3.94.2); Alcibiades ἀπετείχιζε Calchedon in order to conquer it (Xen. 1.3.4); the Thirty wanted to ἀποτειχίζειν Phyle in order to cut off the access routes by which Thrasybulus and his men could obtain supplies and to lay siege to the place (Xen. 2.4.3). For περιτειχισμός: the Peloponnesians surrounded Plataea with a wall (περιετείχιζον) by making trenches on the inner and the outer side of the wall.

Alcibiades at Notium  87

time-consuming and costly in finance and in manpower.322 So I think that Thrasybulus’ plan was to build a fort on the frontier of Phocaia to serve as the basis of operations against it (ἐπιτειχίζειν),323 especially by raiding and socio-economic disruption. This was a technique that Pericles had urged his fellow citizens to use during the war324 and indeed the general Demosthenes used at Pylos in 425 B.C. (Thuc. 4.32.3–4). It is also noteworthy that at Alcibiades’ instigation (Thuc. 7.18.1) the Spartans established a base at Deceleia in 413 B.C., causing great trouble to the Athenians.325 Phocaia was outside the Hellespont; so it is justifiable to think that Thrasybulus wanted to make a place of refuge and even rebuilding of supplies for the Athenian fleet in the King’s territory. This becomes clear in 2.1.18, where we read that the Athenians went straight from Chios to the Hellespont without having a place to anchor during their journey. The significance of this failure will appear later.326 Moreover, Xenophon creates the impression that Alcibiades considered the plan important for Athens’ cause. Readers cannot exclude the possibility that Xenophon implied that Alcibiades was showing foresight about future phases of the war. Moreover, as in the case of Thrasyllus, where Alcibiades had proved himself cooperative for the benefit of Athens,327 readers feel that the commander-inchief wanted to do the same again. On the other hand, Xenophon is explicit that although Alcibiades went to Phocaia he did not risk taking part of his fleet with him, because this was not his own plan. In any case, by Alcibiades’ personal presence Xenophon leads us to believe that Thrasybulus would complete his plan faster and more easily. Therefore Alcibiades’ intermediate plan to help Thrasybulus was a good plan. Now Xenophon focuses on how Alcibiades organized his fleet before leaving for Phocaia. He is clear that Alcibiades gave an explicit order to his kybernetes Antiochus not to attack Lysander. Obviously, Alcibiades knew that it was only he who could defeat Lysander and foresaw that if his captain moved against him,

 They then drew off their army, leaving a guard on one half of the wall, while the other half was guarded by the Boeotians; the disbanded troops returned to their homes (Thuc. 2.78.1). 322 See Westlake, 1983, 13, 17. 323 See LSJ, s.v. ἐπιτειχίζω for the relevant passages in Thucydides and Xenophon. 324 Pericles told his fellow citizens that if the Spartans raised a fort in their territory the Athenians would do mischief to some part of their lands, but they could also raise forts (ἐπιτειχίζειν) against them (Thuc. 1.142.4). 325 For Alcibiades and Deceleia see p. 57. For the use of ἐπιτειχισμός in the Peloponnesian War see Ober, 1985, 36. 326 See p. 222. 327 See p. 29.

88  Chapter 1: Alcibiades and Athens Lysander might not have missed the opportunity to offer a counter attack. Alcibiades’ order to Antiochus also functions as Xenophon’s warning to his readers that Lysander would be a serious enemy of the Athenians. Alcibiades’ order to his captain needs analysis. Other incidents in the Hellenica indicate that generals were closer to their trierarchs and that they contacted them often.328 On the other hand, a general could hear what his subordinates had to say in difficult moments.329 Nevertheless, in this case it was Alcibiades who spoke to his captain and entrusted him with the fleet. Thus Xenophon insinuates that Alcibiades’ choice was unusual. For some reason the commanderin-chief of Athens did not trust any of the trierarchs of his fleet. But Alcibiades’ stationing of the fleet at Notium explains his plan further. Earlier Alcibiades had stationed at Samos (1.4.23), but now Xenophon informs his readers that he moved to Notium. This movement can be explained through Thucydides. Notium was the port of Colophon and had a fort (τεῖχος), which provided safety and security to those who inhabited it. Thanks to the Athenians, the place was inhabited by philo-Colophonians and new settlers whom they sent out from Athens (Thuc. 3.34). The strategic advantage of Notium indicates that Alcibiades foresaw that Lysander, who was not interested in a sea battle at this moment, would not risk attacking the Athenian fleet, since it was protected in a port.330 Thus whether Alcibiades trusted his captain or a trierarch did not matter as much as the implementation of his order.331 Responsibility now lay with Antiochus, not Alcibiades.

 328 When the Syracusan generals were exiled by their fellow citizens, the trierarchs, the marines and the captains (οἱ κυβερνῆται) urged them to remain in charge of the fleet (1.1.28); Hermocrates called into his tent every day the best of his trierarchs, captains (κυβερνητῶν) and marines (1.1.30); the generals of Arginousai ordered their trierarchs to collect the crews (1.6.35), but not the captains of the ships. 329 As the short dialogue between the Spartan commander Callicratidas and his captain (κυβερνῶν) Hermon shows. Hermon told his general that it would be better not to fight the Athenians at Arginousai (1.6.32; see pp. 126–27). 330 Note that when Callicratidas pursued Conon into the harbor of Mytilene, he destroyed many Athenian ships but all the crews escaped to land, while Conon beached the rest of his ships beneath the wall (ὑπὸ τῷ τείχει). So Callicratidas had no other choice but to besiege the city (1.6.17– 18). 331 Thus, I disagree with Gish, 2012, 168 who believes that Alcibiades was imprudent in leaving a junior officer in charge during his absence.

The victory of Lysander  89

. The victory of Lysander The captain Antiochus immediately afterwards disobeyed the orders of his general and with his own ship and one other sailed out from Notium into the harbor of the Ephesians and passed by the very prows of the ships of Lysander (1.5.12). Antiochus challenged the Spartan commander. At first, Lysander launched a few ships in order to pursue him, but when the Athenians came to Antiochus’ aid with more ships, Lysander arranged all his ships in formation (συντάξας) and attacked. The Athenians also launched their remaining ships, but they fought with their ships scattered (διεσπαρμέναις), while the Peloponnesians fought ἐν τάξει. Xenophon stressed in his account of Thrasyllus that τάξις was necessary in all stages of a military engagement;332 so it is praiseworthy that Lysander achieved it fully and in short time.333 The outcome of the sea battle was victory for the Spartans, a good but not a great one, since the Athenians lost fifteen ships, which Lysander added to his fleet, but most of them escaped. The Spartan commander set up a trophy at Notium and sailed to Ephesus, while the Athenians could not stay there any longer and went to Samos again (1.5.12–14).334 After these events, Alcibiades returned to Samos and drew up all his fleet in formation (ἀνήχθη) in front of the harbor of Ephesus in case someone (τις) wanted to accept a new fight at sea. But Lysander chose not to put out against a fleet which outnumbered his, so Alcibiades sailed back to Samos (1.5.15). In regard to this battle, Xenophon shows that Lysander knew when and how he should set a limit to his victory, since he returned to his base and did not wait to fight the Athenians again under all circumstances. Taking into consideration that Xenophon has explicitly said that Mindarus’s fleet did not fight the much more numerous triremes of Alcibiades (1.1.17) and that Lysander did exactly the same at Notium, we can argue that readers should approve this deliberate inactivity.335 This victory of Lysander allowed the Lacedaimonians to take (αἱροῦσι) Delphinium and Eion. Xenophon’s use of the verb in the historical present is deliberate and aims at alerting his readers about the importance of this success.336 Once again we must read Thucydides. In 412 B.C. the Athenians attacked Chios  332 See pp. 24–26. 333 Given that Xenophon says that Diphridas was a μᾶλλόν τε συντεταγμένος … στρατηγός than Thibron (4.8.22) and points out twice Thrasybulus’ decision to attack the cities of Lesbos after having marshalled (συντάξας) his forces (4.8.28), praise should be taken for granted. 334 I argue this because Pharnabazus said that the safety of lives of the men was more important than the existence of ships (1.1.24). See further Kapellos, 2013, 467. 335 For a positive evaluation of Lysander’s victory at Notium see also Due, 1987, 57. 336 Cf. p. 12.

90  Chapter 1: Alcibiades and Athens and fortified Delphinium, which was not far distant from the town of Chios and had the double advantage of being strong by land and of possessing harbors (Thuc. 8.38.2). The fortification of Delphinium made the Spartan Pedaritus and the Chians desperate, so they sent messengers to Astyochus and implored him to come to their help with his whole fleet. They said that they were blockaded, and that he should not allow the chief ally of Sparta in Ionia to be cut off from the sea as well as being overrun and devastated by land (8.40.1). The Chians pressed upon the Lacedaimonians the necessity of coming to their assistance while there was still hope of interfering effectively; the fortification of Delphinium, though not yet completed, was in progress, and the Athenians were beginning to extend the lines of defense which protected their army and ships (8.40.3). However, the Spartans were slow. Even when the Lacedaimonian Xenophantidas brought word to Rhodes from Pedaritus that the Athenian fortification was now completed, and that if the Peloponnesians with their whole fleet did not come to the rescue at once Chios would be lost, the Spartans simply began to think of sending help. Pedaritus and the Chians attacked the Athenians, but they were defeated and Pedaritus and many men were killed (8.55.2). Chios would have fallen, but when Strombichides was informed that the Spartan Dercylidas had arrived at the Hellespont he hastened there from Chios with twenty-four ships (8.62.1–2). It is certain that the Athenians had left a garrison at Delphinium; that is why Xenophon says that Lysander’s fleet conquered the place. This comparison between the accounts of Thucydides and Xenophon leads us to conclude that Lysander was not slow in his moves like his compatriots337 and that he foresaw that the Spartans and their allies would have a stronghold in the Aegean and an ally against Athens. This will appear later. Therefore Xenophon’s report of this incident is important because it makes the effects of Notium seem greater338 and reveals Lysander’s thought step by step.339

. The Athenians’ reaction towards Alcibiades Antiochus’ disobedience of his general’s orders proved the problematic relationship between Athens and Alcibiades. Xenophon says that the Athenians received  337 For slowness as a national characteristic of the Spartans in Thucydides see Luginbill, 1999, 84, 88–89. 338 Note that Diod. 13.76.3–4 mentions that it was Callicratidas who captured Delphinium, his first great success, and then he took Teos, not Eion. 339 Thus I disagree with Henry, 1967, 7 who believes that this passage is an extraneous notice, which bears no formal relation to the story being told.

The Athenians’ reaction towards Alcibiades  91

news about the sea battle (οἱ δὲ ἐν οἴκῳ ᾿Αθηναῖοι, ἐπειδὴ ἠγγέλθη ἡ ναυμαχία). Most probably this means that Alcibiades sent messengers to his fellow citizens to report what happened at Notium.340 From the preceding narrative readers can assume that Alcibiades informed his fellow citizens that he: (a) had stationed the fleet at Notium safely; (b) had ordered Antiochus not to attack Lysander; (c) had sailed off to Phocaia in support of Thrasybulus; and (d) had not managed to convince Lysander to accept a naval battle.341 Obviously, Alcibiades wanted to convince his fellow citizens that he was not responsible for the defeat at Notium. This sentence recalls Thucydides’ use of the same words to report that news arrived in Athens about Sicily: ἐς δὲ τὰς ᾿Αθήνας ἐπειδὴ ἠγγέλθη (8.1.1). Moreover, Xenophon used a similar sentence to record that the Syracusan generals were exiled by their demos: ἠγγέλθη τοῖς τῶν Συρακοσίων στρατηγοῖς οἴκοθεν (1.1.27). In my opinion, this can hardly be a coincidence but serves as a warning that something bad might follow. Indeed, the Athenians: (a) got angry with Alcibiades (χαλεπῶς εἶχον), thinking (οἰόμενοι) that he was responsible for the destruction of the ships because of negligence and lack of control (δι’ ἀμέλειάν τε καὶ ἀκράτειαν); and (b) elected a different group of ten as their generals: Conon, Diomedon, Leon, Pericles, Erasinides, Aristocrates, Archestratus, Protomachus, Thrasyllus and Aristogenes (1.5.16). The Athenians did not believe the excuses of their general. The key word in this passage is the participle οἰόμενοι, because it shows that the Athenians were not absolutely certain about Alcibiades’ responsibility. It is necessary to note that Thucydides also used the verbs χαλεπῶς ἔχω and οἵομαι to show the tension between the Athenians and Alcibiades. More specifically, Thucydides says that the Athenians got angry (χαλεπῶς ἐλάμβανον) with Alcibiades when they heard his enemies accusing him about the scandal of the Herms and when someone testified that he knew what had really happened in the scandal. On that occasion, the demos accepted this information, because it thought it knew (ᾤετο) the truth (6.60.4). Thus like his predecessor Xenophon emphasizes that this was another major crisis in Athens during the war, and the reasons were the supposed dissolute behavior of Alcibiades, as the words ἀμέλεια and ἀκράτεια denote. The

 340 Cf. the following passages in Thucydides: (a) When the Plataians had killed their Theban prisoners, they sent a messenger (ἄγγελον) to Athens and gave back the dead to the Thebans under a flag of truce; they then took the necessary measures for the security of the city. The news had already reached Athens (τοῖς δ’ ᾿Αθηναίοις ἠγγέλθη) (2.6.1–2); and (b) Nicias sent to Athens a full report (ἀγγέλλων) of his circumstances in Syracuse, as he had often done before (7.8.1). 341 Gish, 2012, 170 rightly says that Alcibiades’ excuse for failure was that he had delegated authority to a subordinate who had not implemented his orders.

92  Chapter 1: Alcibiades and Athens first term denoted an act of negligence342 and was a serious charge,343 because people thought that it could lead to the loss of the war.344 This word also equated Alcibiades to an athlete who neglected his duties.345 The second term referred to something reproachable346 and was considered a vice because it led to the wrong kind of pleasures,347 that is, food, wine and prostitutes.348 The people believed that the man who was ἀκρατής was aware that he had made the wrong choices because of his passions.349 This was bad because self-control (ἐγκράτεια) was necessary for a general, who should not be overcome by pleasures and but should always remain faithful to his duty.350 Three things must be remarked. First, the fact that the Athenians thought that Alcibiades neglected his duties as an athlete contradicts their earlier equation of him with the victorious athlete of the Olympic Games.351 Second, the concepts ἀμέλεια and ἀκράτεια were closely associated in Greek thought,352 but it was not

 342 Cf. Arist. Rhet.1379b36–37: ἡ ἀμέλεια ὀλιγωρία τίς ἐστιν. 343 Cf. Thuc. 1.122.4: the Corinthians tell the Spartans that they do not know how to avoid one of three more serious charges, ἀξυνεσίας ἢ μαλακίας ἢ ἀμελείας. 344 Cf. Dem. 1.10, who says that the Athenians have lost many times in the war because of their ἀμελείας. Xenophon reports that when Alcetas went down from the acropolis of Thebes, focusing all his attention on a boy called Oreus, the prisoners saw τὴν ἀμέλειαν, seized it and the city revolted from the Spartans (5.4.57). 345 Cf. Xen. Mem.1.2.24, where Socrates says that Alcibiades, honored by the demos, and achieving supremacy with ease, ὥσπερ οἱ τῶν γυμνικῶν ἀγώνων ἀθληταὶ ῥᾳδίως πρωτεύοντες ἀμελοῦσι τῆς ἀσκήσεως, οὕτω κἀκεῖνος ἠμέλησεν αὑτοῦ. Moreover, cf. Mem.2.1.6: πλείστας πράξεις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις … οἷον τάς … πολεμικὰς … τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς ἀγυμνάστως ἔχειν πρός τε ψύχη καὶ θάλπη οὐ δοκεῖ σοι πολλὴ ἀμέλεια εἶναι; 346 Cf. Arist. Eth.Nic.1114a23–25. In Oec.1.19 Xenophon considers neglect to be πονηρία. 347 Cf. [Arist.] On Vices and Virtues 1250a22–25: ἀκράτεια δ’ ἐστὶ κακία τοῦ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ, καθ’ ἣν παρασύρουσι τῇ ἀλογίᾳ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ὠθοῦσαν ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν φαύλων ἡδονῶν ἀπολαύσεις. 348 Cf. Xen Mem.1.5.3–4: ἀκρατῆ … ὃν εἰδείη τῷ ὄψῳ τε καὶ τῷ οἴνῳ χαίροντα μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς φίλοις καὶ τὰς πόρνας ἀγαπῶντα μᾶλλον ἢ τοὺς ἑταίρους. Moreover, cf. [Pl.] Eryxias 397a7–b3, that ἀκρατεῖς are those who must abstain from σίτων καὶ ποτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἡδέων δοκούντων εἶναι. Finally, cf. Plat. Laws 886a9–b2, 934a4. 349 Cf. Arist. Eth.Nic.1145b12–13: ὁ ἀκρατὴς εἰδὼς ὅτι φαῦλα πράττει διὰ πάθος. 350 Cf. Xen. 4.8.22, where the historian says about Diphridas: οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐκράτουν αὐτοῦ αἱ τοῦ σώματος ἡδοναί, ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ πρὸς ᾧ εἴη ἔργῳ, τοῦτο ἔπραττεν. 351 Cf. Xen. Mem.3.5.13, where Socrates tells Pericles that as the athletes (ὥσπερ καὶ ἀθληταί) who are the best (κρατιστεῦσαι) grow slack and thus drop below their rivals the Athenians have become degenerate as a consequence of their great superiority, and grow careless of themselves (ἀμελῆσαι), with Xen. 1.4.13: κράτιστος … τῶν πολιτῶν. See p. 46. 352 Cf. Arist. Eth.Nic.1250a2: τοῦ δὲ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ ἥ τε ἀκολασία καὶ ἡ ἀκράτεια.

Alcibiades’ flight from Notium  93

necessary that someone would be accused of them simultaneously.353 This combination of the two concepts illustrates the seriousness of the bad opinion the Athenians had about Alcibiades. Third, at this juncture it would be logical to expect that the enemies of Alcibiades would seize the opportunity to slander him to his fellow citizens. Nonetheless, Xenophon is clear that nobody accused Alcibiades;354 it is the Athenians themselves who did not trust him, although he did not deserve this moral condemnation.355 This reaction finds its explanation in Thucydides, who says that the demos was dissatisfied with Alcibiades’ private life, although he excelled in military matters. More specifically, the Athenians feared the magnitude of the παρανομία Alcibiades displayed with respect to his body in his lifestyle (6.15.2–4). Paranomia was the result of being affected by bad pleasures.356 Thucydides emphasized the two sides of Alcibiades’ character, i.e. his conduct in the war vs his private habits.357 Xenophon proves that his predecessor’s division in the personality of Alcibiades358 remained a constant problem for the Athenians, and gives meaning to and completes Thucydides’ opinion: καὶ δημοσίᾳ κράτιστα διαθέντι τὰ τοῦ πολέμου ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστοι τοῖς ἐπιτηδεύμασιν αὐτοῦ ἀχθεσθέντες, καὶ ἄλλοις ἐπιτρέψαντες, οὐ διὰ μακροῦ ἔσφηλαν τὴν πόλιν (6.15.4).359 Readers inevitably expect to read from now on how the end of Athens did come.

. Alcibiades’ flight from Notium Alcibiades’ end of office came ingloriously. Someone might expect that the reaction of his soldiers would be better than that of the Athenians at home. However,

 353 Cf. Xen. Cyr.8.1.16 that Cyrus considered that those who were not on duty ἡγεῖτο ἢ ἀκρατείᾳ τινὶ … ἢ ἀμελείᾳ ἀπεῖναι. 354 Harris, 2013, 339, citing this passage, says that Alcibiades’ enemies blamed him for the defeat, but Xenophon says that nobody intervened between the demos and Alcibiades. Cf. Plut. Alc.36.1, 4 who names Thrasybulus, the son of Thrason, who went back to Athens and accused Alcibiades and clearly states that the Athenians believed all the accusations against him. 355 I disagree with Tamiolaki, 2012, 568 that Xenophon classifies Alcibiades among the least virtuous in his hierarchical system of virtue. The accusations of ἀμέλεια and ἀκράτεια come from the lips of the Athenians not from the narratorial voice of the historian. 356 Cf. Plato’s Resp., which discusses the danger that a young man might be led εἰς πᾶσαν παρανομίαν (572e1). On such an occasion, the author continues, the appetites buzz around him, filling the air with incense, myrrch, wreaths, wine and the pleasures (ἡδονῶν) that are released in such revelries (573a4–6). 357 For this issue see Williams, 1998, 229–30. 358 See Gribble, 2006, 462–64, 467–68. 359 For the same opinion see also Due, 1991, 47–48.

94  Chapter 1: Alcibiades and Athens the opposite happened. Alcibiades was treated badly (πονηρῶς) even in the fleet (καὶ ἐν τῇ στρατιᾷ).360 This reaction is rather shocking in that Alcibiades was unpopular not only at home but also in the army. The negative reaction of the soldiers is in complete contrast with their reaction in 1.2.15, where Xenophon says that Alcibiades’ men were enthusiastic for him because they were undefeated. Moreover, this situation is an implicit contrast with the situation starting back in 412–411 B.C, as narrated in Thucydides, where Alcibiades was popular with the army in Samos (8.48.3) but not welcome in Athens (8.53.2). Xenophon’s readers are certain that the situation could not have been worse for the man who had achieved so many victories for the Athenian army. It seems that all the Athenians accepted the opinion of those who had said that Alcibiades would be solely responsible for all the future misfortunes of their city.361 There is no doubt that the historian demonstrates the ficklensess of the Athenians.362 Alcibiades’ reaction was a crucial matter. The question that arises is ‘how far could Alcibiades trust the Athenians?’363 Xenophon says that Alcibiades took a trireme and sailed (ἀπέπλευσεν) to Chersonnese (1.5.17). He showed earlier that the Athenians deprived Alcibiades of his office because of a cursory examination of the events at Notium, and then we saw that the soldiers put the blame on him for their defeat. Thus it is certain that Alcibiades left the fleet because he did not trust his fellow citizens. On the other hand, the Athenians did not put Alcibiades on trial, although they could have done so.364 Xenophon’s real point is that Alcibiades abandoned his men. This statement by itself proves that the historian does not forfeit his own critical judgement about the Athenian general, but, on the contrary, he is critical of him. This can be realized further by attempting to understand Xenophon’s work through the internal relationships that can be uncovered in the Hellenica, and in particular by drawing a parallel between the response of the Syracusan generals, when they received the news from home that they had been exiled by the demos (1.1.27–31) and Alcibiades’ response after Notium. Xenophon says that when the Syracusan generals were at Antandrus with their fleet an announcement came from home. This message said that a sentence of exile had been passed against them by the people. The Syracusan generals called together their soldiers and  360 The particle is responsive here and means ‘even’. Cf. Denniston, 1954, 293. 361 See above, pp. 65–66. 362 See Brown Ferrario, 2017, 70. 363 Woodhead, 1970, 81 has pointed out that, while the Athenians doubted if they could trust Alcibiades, scholars have not considered the reverse question, i.e. ‘how far could Alcibiades trust the Athenians?’ 364 See p. 74.

Alcibiades’ flight from Notium  95

(with Hermocrates as spokesman) lamented their own misfortune, saying that they were all being exiled (φεύγοιεν) unjustly and against the law (1.1.27). Moreover, they encouraged the soldiers to be enthusiastic in the future as they had been in the past. When the crews shouted that their superiors should remain in command, the generals replied that they would not revolt against their city and they called whoever wanted to speak against them to do so, remembering how many naval battles they had won and how many ships they had captured (1.1.28). The differences between the Syracusan generals and Alcibiades are striking: (a) the Athenians got angry with Alcibiades and punished him by electing other generals, but they did not exile him; here there is a contrast with the fate of the Syracusan generals; (b) Alcibiades could have called together his men to defend himself and protest against the injustice of his deposition; (c) he could have encouraged them to continue to be enthusiastic about the war, since they outnumbered Lysander’s ships and had defeated their enemy so many times in the past; and (d) he could have reminded them of the battles of Abydus, Cyzicus, and even the refusal of his men to unite with Thrasyllus because they were always victorious under their commander. But this was not Alcibiades. He left with one trireme as when he had fled from Sicily with his own ship (Thuc. 6.61.1). Perphaps Alcibiades was afraid that if he returned home he would have to submit to an audit and then to a trial which could have led to a more formal accusation. It seems that Alcibiades did not forget that the Athenians had recalled him to the city to put him on trial and have him executed, while he was in office in Sicily (Thuc. 6.53.1, 61.4–5). Moreover, Xenophon reveals that Alcibiades always had in his mind the possibility of leaving in case something went wrong, since he had made forts in Thrace.365 This seems to be a preplanned decision because Alcibiades never trusted his fellow citizens. At least this time Alcibiades did not go off to join the Spartans again. Alcibiades became a fugitive again of his own will. His flight was equivalent to self-exile, a self-inflicted exclusion from the community he had denied in the Council and the Assembly that he had betrayed in the past. We saw that before Alcibiades’ return to Athens Xenophon had called him φεύγων, to point out that the commander had chosen to live as an exile. Now readers realize that this word has foretold the destiny of Alcibiades: once an exile, always an exile! At this point we should read Thucydides’ account about Alcibiades’ self-exile. The Salaminia had come from Athens for Alcibiades with orders for him to sail home to answer the charges (ἀποπλεῖν ἐς ἀπολογίαν (6.53.1), ἀπολογησομένῳ ἀκολουθεῖν (6.61.4– 5). However, Alcibiades and his fellows sailed off (ἀπέπλεον) as though to return  365 As Romilly, 1995, 216 remarks.

96  Chapter 1: Alcibiades and Athens to Athens (6.61.6) but they never did. Finally, we read in 6.61.7 that Alcibiades was ἤδη φυγὰς. We must note now that Xenophon says in 1.3.13 that when Hermocrates went to Sparta, he was ἤδη φεύγων from Syracuse. However, Hermocrates had been exiled by his fellow citizens while Alcibiades was only deposed after Notium, as we saw. The inescapable conclusion is that Alcibiades condemned himself in a worse way than any of his enemies could have done in any court.366 In the end, Xenophon’s audience understands that the mistrust between the Athenians and Alcibiades created tension and finally destroyed the good order which should govern their lives. Thucydides has shown that leading politicians such as Pericles and Cleon boasted that democracy created an atmosphere of mutual trust.367 Xenophon proves that this was only a rhetorical argument.

. The aftermath of the defeat at Notium for the Athenians After these events, Conon sailed from Andros to command the fleet at Samos with the twenty ships he had there, according to the vote of the Athenians. To replace Conon at Andros they sent Phanosthenes with four ships (1.5.18). We saw earlier that Andros remained in revolt but she could not threaten Athens any more after Alcibiades’ intervention.368 It seems that the Athenians wanted to follow Alcibiades’ plan. Nonetheless, Xenophon’s silence about any success of Conon implies that he had failed to conquer the island. The Athenians did not put any blame on Conon but sent him to Samos because they believed that the control of the Aegean Sea and Ionia remained their primary goal. Xenophon indicates that Conon and his colleagues should continue Alcibiades’ plan to accumulate money and ships.369 The Athenians still believed that they should keep control of Andros; so they sent Phanosthenes with only a few ships. Since Conon failed to take the island with twenty ships, Phanosthenes’ presence with just four vessels indicates

 366 Cf. Andoc. 1.4, who says that many of his enemies said that he would not stay but would certainly get away into exile (οἰχήσομαί τε φεύγων); there would be no point in his staying for such a serious trial but he could travel (πλεύσαντι) to Cyprus. Moreover, cf. Isocr. 11.39: ῾Υπὲρ ὧν τὴν μὲν ἀξίαν δίκην οὐκ ἔδοσαν … ἄλλος δὲ φεύγων τὴν πατρίδα, and Aesch. 2.124: ῾Ο … Λεωσθένης, ὁ φεύγων ἐνθένδε διὰ τοὺς συκοφάντας. For Alcibiades as an exile see also Krentz, 1989b, 129. 367 See Pope, 1988, 285. 368 See p. 79. 369 See pp. 21–22, 30–31.

The aftermath of the defeat at Notium for the Athenians  97

the desperation of the Athenians. The only thing Phanosthenes could achieve was to capture two triremes from Thurii, which were passing there (1.5.19). Conon came to Samos and took over the fleet which was despondent; he fitted out seventy ships in place of the previous ones, which numbered more than one hundred, and sailed with these, bringing the other generals with him and disembarking at different places, conducting raids and plundering the enemies’ land (1.5.20). When Conon arrived at Samos, he did not find Alcibiades in position but only the crews without a leader. Conon must have had a difficult time then, because the crews were discouraged. Although the defeat at Notium was not serious, Xenophon implicitly emphasizes that Alcibiades should not have left the fleet, since this harmed the morale of his men.370 One more thing happened to the Athenians. Conon managed to put crews aboard seventy ships, while previously there had been more than one hundred. The Spartans’ hope that the Athenian sailors would desert in the future became true because of Lysander’s charisma in making Cyrus his ξένος.371 Xenophon shows the results of Lysander’s diplomatic success in turn.372 Conon seemed to be considered more competent compared to the other generals, since they followed him. The Athenian fleet still faced financial problems because Conon had to plunder the territory of the Persian King, as Thrasyllus had done in the past.373 Moreover, Conon and his colleagues marked time rather than doing anything more positive. Xenophon’s readers might think that Conon was inferior to Alcibiades who had managed to collect ample money for Athens and had been very active against the enemy.374

 370 Gish, 2012, 168 remarks that the defeat at Notium did more damage to Alcibiades’ reputation than to the naval war effort, since the Athenians lost only fifteen triremes, while most of the crews escaped. But, as he notes himself, when Conon replaced Alcibiades, the crews were discouraged. Thus, although I cannot but agree that the losses were not great, I think that we must take into account the effort of Conon through discipline and further military enterprises to make them return to normal. 371 See p. 82. 372 Gray, 1989, 17 says that the effects of the pay rise on the course of the war are entirely neglected in the subsequent narrative, but I think that this passage proves the opposite. Hunt, 1998, 94–95, 2001, 370 has already pointed out the desertion of the crews but he approaches the subject from a different aspect. 373 See pp. 25–26. 374 See pp. 21–22, 30–31.

Chapter 2: Callicratidas’ generalship . Callicratidas vs Lysander and the Persian money In 1.6.1 Xenophon begins the narrative of a new year of his account by reporting the replacement of the Spartan commander after the expiration of his office with a new commander, as he did in 1.5.1. But before readers get the impression that the change of the navarchs was a routine we realize that the succession could not always be the same. The historian now recounts the personal contact between Lysander and Callicratidas and reports the following conversation: when Lysander was handing over the ships to his successor, he told him that he did this as θαλαττοκράτωρ and that he was a victor in a naval battle. The new commander replied to him to he should hand over the ships in Miletus after sailing along the coast from Ephesus on the left of Samos, where the Athenian fleet was stationed, and then he would agree that Lysander was the master of the sea. Then Lysander ended this discussion by saying that he would not meddle (πολυπραγμονεῖν) when another man had the command (1.6.2–3). This short dialogue that Xenophon reports in indirect speech is of unique importance, because it allows us to realize the character of the two men through the deviation of both from the social norms of their city. This occurred because, although Sparta inculcated in the Spartans’ mind their love for competition, it also controlled and enhanced cooperation through obedience and self-control.1 The two men, however, being away from Sparta and not having any Spartans around to control them, acted badly towards each other. In Thucydides the Corinthians asserted, before the beginning of the war, that the Spartans did not act abroad according to the rules and institutions which they followed at home (Thuc 1.77.6). This statement finds its proof at this moment.2 Let us see why Xenophon shows that it was true. Lysander first claimed that he was the ‘master of the sea’. Taking this literally, we must agree with the scholars who argue that Lysander was wrong because he had won the battle of Notium but had been unable to follow up his victory when Alcibiades arrived.3 Nonetheless, it is the opinion of the present author, on the basis of Xenophon’s text, that this word also meant that the Spartan fleet was superior in numbers compared to  1 See Lendon, 1997, 109–23. 2 Lendon, 1997, 114 n. 28 has already made the excellent remark that Spartans acted badly abroad because of the lack of many Spartans to shame them and cites the aforementioned passage of Thucydides. I shall attempt to expand this argument. 3 See Prentice, 1934, 38, Roisman, 1987, 21. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110668315-003

Callicratidas vs Lysander and the Persian money  99

the Athenian fleet and that for this reason Lysander believed that he was dominant at sea. Xenophon established in his previous account the numerical disparity between the Athenians and the Peloponnesians and spelled out in great detail the Spartan naval superiority. I have discussed the issue of the numbers of the two fleets in previous parts of this book. But I shall comment on this issue again here because of Lysander’s argument. In 1.4.21 we read that the Athenian fleet numbered one hundred ships, while in 1.5.10 we read that Lysander had increased his ships from seventy (1.5.1) to ninety. In the naval battle of Notium the Athenians lost fifteen ships, which Lysander captured, as we saw earlier (1.5.14). After the battle the Athenians had eighty-five ships, while Lysander had some more than he had had initially; but he did not add them to his fleet, probably because of the lack of men to serve on them.4 In 1.5.15 we read that Alcibiades returned with some ships from Phocaia, which he added to the Athenian fleet in Samos, and that his fleet outnumbered the Spartan fleet when he challenged Lysander to a new battle. In 1.5.18 Conon took the command of the fleet from Alcibiades and added to it twenty ships which he already had in Andros, but when he set out to plunder the territories around Samos he put crews aboard seventy ships, although the Athenians had more than one hundred, as Xenophon himself says. Thus, Conon used seventy, i.e. he had fewer ships than the one hundred ships (approximately) of Lysander. Therefore, the word ‘master of the sea’ is meant in Xenophon to express the numerical superiority of the Spartan fleet, as it expresses the same thing in Thucydides and other authors too.5 However, what is surprising here is that Lysander did not say that Sparta was master of the sea, but that he was. In this way the Spartan commander equated himself with Sparta itself or even substituted himself for the city. This is surprising because it was a common belief that it was the cities and not the commanders who controlled the seas.6 Moreover, Lysander’s self-characterization as victor in a naval battle contradicts Thucydides and Xenophon, who pointed out that the success

 4 Xenophon clarifies that Callicratidas added fifty more ships and finally enumerates one hundred and forty in all, but he does not add to this number the ships that Lysander captured after Notium (1.6.3). 5 For the same meaning of the word cf. also Thuc. 8.30.2 and 8.38.2, 41, who says that the Athenian generals in 412/11 B.C. believed that they exercised control around Samos and Miletus, because they had more ships than the Spartans, while the latter were afraid to fight them, because they had fewer ships. See Hornblower, 2008, 839–40, 866. See also Thuc. 1.43.4, 3.32.3, 7.48.2 and [Xen.] Ath.Pol.2.14. 6 For parallel passages in Thucydides see the previous n. Xenophon says that the Corinthians ἐθαλαττοκράττουν in the gulf of Achaia and Lechaeum (4.8.10). Plut. Lys.6.2 presents Lysander surrendering θαλασσοκρατοῦν τὸ ναυτικὸν to Callicratidas, while the latter classified himself and

100  Chapter 2: Callicratidas’ generalship of a sea battle should be and was bestowed upon the city regardless of its leader.7 For these reasons Lysander was not justified or entirely accurate in talking in this way;8 and therefore he gave the impression of a man who was fond of praising himself. Xenophon alerts his readers to Lysander’s constituting the second character in Hellenica 1–2 (after Alcibiades) who shows the emergence of the individual in a new world.9 However, such a boast exceeded the Spartans’ tolerance of self-praise.10 At the same time, this way of speaking reduced the military status of Callicratidas. Callicratidas returned these unpleasant words and took revenge11 by ‘ordering’ Lysander to attack the Athenians immediately. Through these words Callicratidas imposed his authority on his predecessor and implicitly blamed him for not attacking the Athenians for as long as he was leading the fleet.12 Apparently, Callicratidas insinuated that what mattered for him was action and not words. Lysander caught the message of his interlocutor and by his refusal to meddle insinuated that he never ceased having as his aim to defeat the Athenians; but since his term had expired, he would respect his colleague.13 Since the Spartans and Xenophon did not consider πολυπραγμοσύνη a positive value,14 we could approve this statement of Lysander. We could believe for a moment that although both  his interlocutor as members of Sparta’s navy (εἰ θαλασσοκρατοῦμεν). Diodorus says that the Tyrrhenians θαλαττοκρατήσαντες around the sea of Italy (5.40.1) and that after the victory of the Greeks over the Persians and their numerical superiority the King decided to return to Asia, because the Greeks had more ships than he had (τῶν ῾Ελλήνων θαλαττοκρατούντων–11.19.6). Polybius says that the Rhegians were afraid of the Carthaginians because they were masters of the sea (θαλαττοκρατοῦντας–1.7.6). For this important issue see also Moles, 1994, 72. 7 For Thucydides see 8.94–95 and 104–6, for Xenophon see 1.1.1, 5–7, 16–18, 5.11–14, 6.29–34. 8 Although my analysis of the word ‘master of the sea’ is different from that of Kagan, 1987, 32 and Laforse, 1988, 63, I agree with them that Lysander’s boast was not fully justified or entirely accurate. 9 See above, p. 45. 10 See Laforse, 1998, 63. 11 For this way of returning the evil and taking revenge see Blundell, 1989, 30. Cf. McHardy, 2008, 91. 12 At this point I agree with Moles, 1994, 71–72 that Callicratidas did not really want to endanger his fleet recklessly. 13 Laforse, 1988, 63 says that Lysander refused the challenge of Callicratidas in order to back up his boast, but I think we should place more emphasis on the former’s supposed consciousness to put limits on himself. 14 In Anab.5.1.15–16 Xenophon gives another instance of meddling, reporting that someone called Dexippus, one of the perioeci, πολυπραγμονῶν in Thrace at the court of Seuthes, was put to death by the Laconian Nicander. For the notion of μηδὲν πολυπραγμονεῖν as a positive virtue cf. Xen. Cyrop.8.6.3.

Callicratidas vs Lysander and the Persian money  101

men had forgotten the demand of their city for self-control during this war,15 it was Lysander who knew when it was the right moment to put an end to this antagonism. On the other hand, we must pay attention to the fact that Lysander’s lack of polygragmosyne is strictly related to the war, not that he was ἀπράγμων by nature. In my opinion, this is an implicit message of Xenophon that the character of the Spartans, or at least of Lysander, had undergone a fundamental change. I make this argument on the basis of Thucydides who, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, presented this quality to be a trait of the Athenians in contrast to the Lacedaimonians who totally lacked it.16 This becomes evident afterwards.17 Callicratidas apparently thought that he had put Lysander in his place; so he took the fleet, manned fifty more ships from the allies and started preparing himself to meet the Athenians (1.6.3).18 This activity gives the impression that the new Spartan commander was a man of quick action and that, since he now had more vessels than his predecessor, he had no reason to delay. However, he found out at this moment that Lysander’s Spartan friends were conspiring very strongly (καταστασιαζόμενος) against him.19 This: (a) means that Lyander’s friends did not carry out Callicratidas’ orders with enthusiasm; (b) suggested among the allied cities, which provided the ships, that the Lacedaimonians had made a mistake by changing admirals; and (c) that they risked a defeat, since the new admiral was unqualified, inexperienced in naval affairs and ignorant of how to handle human beings. The word φίλοι is the key word in this passage. It reveals that according to the ideology of reciprocity in φιλίαι, which obliged the partners to render each

 15 Cf. Archidamus in Thuc. 1.84.3–4, who argues that Spartans should retain their self-control and that no Spartan should feel superior to another. This passage in combination with Lendon’s analysis (p. 98 n. 1) indicates that Spartans should never forget the need for self-limitation and avoiding competition. 16 See Ehrenberg, 1947, 46–47, 51. Although Ehrenberg defines the meaning of polypragmonein as ‘not to interfere’, he is not right, in my opinion, to say that ‘there is nothing in Xenophon’s books to show that he had realised the importance in foreign policy which Thucydides ascribed to polypragmosyne’ or that in all the instances from Xenophon’s writings the word is without any particular significance, because this ‘was certainly not a feature of the Spartan character’ (56– 57). 17 Gray, 1989, 24 believes that Lysander’s refusal to meddle was used by Xenophon as a sign of his hero’s moderation. 18 Hence the use of the imperfect tense of the verb παρεσκευάζετο. Cf Goodwin, 1889, 11–12. 19 Note Xenophon’s emphasis given to the conspiracy through the prefix κατα, which shows the degree of opposition. Cf. Diod. 13.63.1, who says that Hermocrates κατεστασιάσθη by his political opponents.

102  Chapter 2: Callicratidas’ generalship other mutual service,20 Lysander had created a network with fellow aristocratic Spartans for a specific reason.21 This can only be that these men would create a general mutiny among Sparta’s allies in order to force the authorities in Sparta to remove Callicratidas and hopefully to reinstate Lysander to this position. In his turn, he would somehow reward them in the future.22 It is evident that Lysander would attempt to remove from his office not only Callicratidas but any successor. One’s mind goes back to the wider theme of Alcibiades and Athenian stasis and Alcibiades’ advice to Tissaphernes to keep the Greeks autoi en hautois stasiazontes.23 Earlier we saw that Callicratidas’ invective to Lysander for not fighting the Athenians remained unanswered. Now we can suspect that since the creation of this network must have been time-consuming to some degree and Lysander was not afraid of Conon, who had no men and money,24 this is a plausible reason for Lysander’s lack of military action after Notium.25 But regardless of the true reason, what is most important is that at this point Xenophon reveals to his readers the extent of Lysander’s polypragmosyne through his report of internal strife. Thucydides tells us that Sparta was the only city in Hellas that avoided stasis until this war, and had a regime that had not changed its laws in four hundred years (1.18.1). Thus it is no surprise that Thucydides does not report any civil strife in Sparta in his account. On the other hand, we must not forget that Thucydides has written his narrative of stasis (3.81–83) as a model so ‘the reader may refer to it to fill in some of the major features of these other conflicts and in general assume that the combatants in each instance behaved according to patterns described to the model’.26 Then he presented the career of Brasidas in such a way as to make  20 See e.g. Goldhill, 1986, 80–83, Konstan, 1998, 281–88. 21 Although we might suspect that Lysander could have also added in his network ritualized friends from the allied cities, we must not forget that for the Greeks stasis was the condition of a city which was internally divided (see Price, 2001, 68–70). For the importance of xeniai in our text see further below. 22 Xenophon chooses not to reveal it right now, but he says after the victory of Lysander over the Athenians at Aegospotami that he appointed Sthenelaus the Laconian as harmost in Byzantium and Calchedon and appointed decarchies in the Greek cities (see 2.2.2 and 3.4.2 with Parke, 1930, 51–53); so the reader can infer that these positions would be their rewards. Such a thought is allowed by Xenophon in Lac.Pol.14.1. 23 See above, pp. 83–85. 24 See pp. 96–97. 25 Laforse, 1998, 61 blames Lysander for his idleness. But, given the Athenians’ monetary deficiency, I believe that Xenophon insinuates that Lysander believed that it would not be difficult to exterminate the Athenians. 26 Price, 2001, 12–13.

Callicratidas vs Lysander and the Persian money  103

his readers realize that full-blown stasis might have come to even as stable a regime as Sparta’s if he had not died at Amphipolis; the great strength of Sparta’s regime was trust among the leading Spartans; the advent of a truly remarkable commander at Sparta, in itself, posed a threat to the stability of that regime.27 Such a threat appeared again with Lysander. In picturing Sparta as suffering a form of stasis Xenophon is not speaking casually. On the contrary, he indicates through his continuation that Lysander’s ‘hunger for power inspired by greed and personal ambition and his unwillingness to restrain himself with regard to the interests of his city’28 created stasis, although this took place at a geographical distance from the city. In picturing Sparta as suffering a form of stasis Xenophon wanted to emphasize that Lysander endangered his city in the midst of the war and moved away from the traditions of Sparta.29 We can be certain that Xenophon did not want any of his readers to move in favour of Lysander. Thucydides in his analysis of stasis regarded the lust for power as one of the two deepest causes of the perturbed and immoral conditions of the Peloponnesian War (3.82.8). Moreover, Xenophon himself: (a) has already pointed out that, although the Syracusan generals were exiled by their fellow citizens unjustly, they did not accept the opinion of their subordinates that they should remain in command, because this would be stasis (στασιάζειν) against their city (1.1.27–28); and (b) praises Agesilaus because he stopped the staseis (στασιαζούσας) in the Greek cities after the cessation of the Athenian empire (Ages.1.37). What readers would expect is the reaction of Callicratidas, and this is what Xenophon reports. Because of this uneasy situation Callicratidas thought it proper to call together the Lacedaimonians who were present at Ephesus and speak to them (1.6.5). At this point it is necessary to pause for a while and make some preliminary remarks about Xenophon’s setting of the speeches. First of all, we may remark that this speech and the following speech to the Milesians are both parts of the story of the war and complementary to it. Xenophon cites the speeches of Callicratidas in oratio recta, begins with a passage explaining the circumstances of the speech, which we can call ‘preamble’, and ends with a passage  27 See Palmer, 2017, 414–17. 28 I have almost quoted verbatim Thuc. 3.82.8. Cf. also Plut. Lac.Apophth.232c, where a legendary Spartan king said that the best form of government was that in which most of the citizens are willing to compete with each other without stasis. 29 According to Plut. Agis et Cleom.2.3 the Spartan law-giver had introduced philotimia and contention into his civil polity as an incentive to virtue; but this principle should not be accepted without some reservations, because an immoderate passion for fame in all affairs was dangerous and in political matters destructive.

104  Chapter 2: Callicratidas’ generalship recording the outcome, which we can call ‘postscript’. In both speeches we must study these preambles (something which I have already done with the first and I shall do later with the second) and postscripts and consider what can be learned from them. Both of them are brief, straightforward and factual. The preambles supply only such information as is necessary to explain why the debate took place. The historian does not define the aim of the speaker in advance, but this emerges only from the substance of the speech. On the other hand, no definition of aims is needed because they are easily deducible from the preceding narrative. The postscripts record the reaction of the audiences and lead readers to realize whether these auditors understood the message of the speaker in a way other than he wished. As readers of Xenophon we must compare Callicratidas’ reflections on past, present and future developments with the foregoing and following narrative,30 because the combination of speeches and course of events allows us to judge Xenophon’s presentation of the Spartan commander safely. In the end, the speaker’s personality shines through more clearly.31 Reading carefully Thucydides’ setting of the speeches32 and Xenophon’s setting, we can see that they are almost similar, so one could suspect influence of the former on the latter. However, what matters most is Xenophon’s own artful writing; so let us now follow up the development from speech to result. In regard to the structure of the speech, I may remark that the particle μέν which follows the pronoun έμοί gives it emphasis, has an antithetical sense and serves to prepare the mind for a contrast, while δέ (δ’ in our text) couples this sentence with the previous one, makes a contrast and is translated as ‘but’. It is notable that the μέν … δέ at first sight makes an antithesis between two references to Callicratidas (‘I on the one hand’ … ‘I on other hand’). In this antithesis the substantive contrast is between οἴκοι μένειν and πεμφθείς. Moreover, the second δέ connects this sentence with the previous one which starts with ἐμοὶ μὲν, it is also adversative and balances two opposed ideas. Finally, I may point out the use

 30 For this necessity see pp. 7–8. 31 Pownall, 2004, 98 has made this excellent remark in regard to the use of direct speech in Xenophon, but I may remark that the setting of the speeches also helps the reader to make a more complete judgement on the character of the speaker. 32 For Thucydides’ settings of speeches see Westlake, 1973, 90–108, who terms the historian’s introductory remarks ‘preambles’ and his comments after the speeches ‘postscripts’. I borrow these terms from him.

Callicratidas vs Lysander and the Persian money  105

of τε–καί where it is used when the thought implies a more elaborate relationship than that of mere addition and means ‘not only…but also’. 33 This structure is interwoven with the content of the speech. Callicratidas’ repeated references to himself kick off the speech by emphasizing that the Spartan general was very egocentric. An explanation for this could be that from the very beginning Callicratidas realized that if he did not answer to the challenge that Lysander was a better commander, he could not really assume the leadership of the fleet. Thus he says that it would be enough for him to remain in Sparta and refers directly to his predecessor, saying that he does not hinder him or anyone else who claims to be more experienced than him in regard to naval matters. Nevertheless, he also makes it clear that he does not accept that his predecessor is more experienced than him; that is why he says that Lysander ἐμπειρότερος ... βούλεται εἶναι.34 Such a statement obviously comes from the fact that although Lysander had more ships than the Athenians and had defeated them at Notium, this was not so important, as Callicratidas implies, obviously because the Athenian fleet had not been destroyed. Then, his next statement that he has no other choice than to follow the city’s orders in the best way he can35 presents him as a man fully conscious of his duty and fully obedient to the Spartan authorities. In this way Callicratidas justifies his assuming of the command of the fleet. Thus the first contrast, which is finished here, is rather mild and everybody realizes that Sparta should and did make all the decisions. However, in the second contrast between Callicratidas and his fellow Spartans (ὑμεῖς δὲ), things become more serious, because he presents his ambitions and the accusations against their city as interconnected.36 Φιλοτιμία was an acceptable Spartan virtue;37 so the commander was justified to say that in public. But how could his audience know all (πρὸς ἃ) the objects of his ambition beforehand? What they could guess is that Callicratidas would certainly like to defeat the Athenians. Nevertheless this phrase indicates, in my opinion, some other things before the final victory. Since what Callicratidas wanted to achieve was simultaneously what Lysander’s friends accuse him of, I believe he meant that he had the ambition to prove that the Spartans had done no wrong in changing from

 33 See Denniston, 1954, 359–60, 162, 165 and 514–15 for the use of these particles. In my analysis I expand the analysis which Moles, 1994, 1974 has already made in regard to the style of the speech, but I do not agree with him that ἐγώ τε ... ἡ πόλις constitutes an antithesis. 34 For this meaning of this expression cf. e.g. Arist. Eth.Eud.1245a29–30. 35 As the use of the superlative degree of the adverb κράτιστα denotes. 36 Note my initial remark about τε–καί. 37 Cf. e.g. Plut. Alc.24.4, Lys.2.1–2, Lyc.25.3–4, Ages.20.6.

106  Chapter 2: Callicratidas’ generalship Lysander and appoint him as the new commander of the fleet. Moreover, the content of the second part of this sentence, i.e. that the listeners know about the accusations, is real and does not need any explanation. However, it is noteworthy that Callicratidas does not define them as accusations against him but against Sparta itself38 and puts the blame for them not on his audience but on some unspecified others.39 It is interesting to note that the sentence ἴστε γὰρ αὐτὰ ὥσπερ καὶ ἐγώ, which is put in parenthesis, interrupts the natural flow of the text and gives it the immediacy of the spoken word.40 Moreover, it successfully enhances his syllogism, because it looks like the rhetorical topos ‘as you all know’41 which was used to create remorse and guilt in those listeners who seemed to be ignorant of what everyone else had known for sure. Xenophon’s readers should be certain that Callicratidas wanted to impress his auditors about his abilities to win this war and thus exert pressure on them to stop questioning his authority. Last, his encouragement to his hearers to advise him whether he should remain in his post or return to Sparta and report there about the situation is his final rhetorical device. We must remember that the verb συμβουλεύω was used in speeches where the speakers advised the audience, not vice versa.42 It is important to note that Callicratidas points out that his fellow Spartans should decide with a view to their own interests.43 But this was a rather ironic statement and a covert threat, since the hearers knew that although they did not want Callicratidas as their leader, they should not let him leave the command of the fleet and report the mutiny in Sparta, if they wanted to avoid punishment. Consequently, Callicratidas’ previous claim about giving up his leadership was just a sophistry, while his message was clear: ‘those who turn against me also turn against Sparta; so are you with Sparta or against it?’ and in order to achieve this he employed persuasion and a covert threat.44 Concerning the style of the speech, it is characterized by its coherent organization, its neatly balanced sentences and its even tone. The rhetorical aspects of

 38 Hence: ἡ πόλις ἡμῶν. 39 That is why he uses the verb in the passive voice αἰτιάζεται. 40 For this rhetorical usefulness of parentheseis see Herm. On Types of Style 1.6. 41 For this topos see Arist. Rhet.1408a32–6. This is a topos of Attic oratory. See p. 183. 42 For the use of this verb in Xen. cf. 1.7.19 (see p. 133), 2.4.40 and especially 6.1.15, where Polydamas addresses a Spartan audience. Finally, see Anab. 2.1.19, 2.3.20, 7.1.30. 43 The personal pronoun ὑμῖν acts as a dative of advantage here. 44 Laforse, 1988, 64 n. 39 says that Callicratidas ‘showed admirable tact’, but Gray, 1989, 82 is right that Callicratidas used intimidation. In my view, Moles, 1994, 74 is not right to believe that Callicratidas was not threatening the Spartans by saying that he would report them at home. Threat is a means to achieve an end.

Callicratidas vs Lysander and the Persian money  107

the speech depict Callicratidas as a skillful speaker, possessing more rhetorical art than Spartans possessed. On the other hand, the brevity, the syntactical simplicity and the terseness of the speech, which were traits of the Spartan speeches,45 allow him to remain laconic in outlook. What is rather strange is the use of the personal pronoun five times in such a short speech. Reading Thucydides, it is noteworthy that Brasidas in his speech to the Acanthians used self-referential pronouns ten times, a fact which made a scholar remark that an outstanding feature of his speech is its egotism.46 I may compare this speech with the speech of Callicratidas and say that the former is almost ten times longer than the latter,47 a fact which justifies those scholars who describe Callicratidas as egotistic48 or self-centered.49 We could think that he felt that he was defending himself; so he felt obliged to talk more about himself.50 However, such usage was in no way obligatory, because Xenophon presents Theramenes defending himself in front of the Council after the accusations of Critias using the pronoun only twice, in 2.3.48–49, in a speech which is written down in fourteen paragraphs (2.3.35– 49). Therefore the historian’s effort to impart the quality of thought and cast of language of Callicratidas should alert readers to the character of this man.51 In regard to the result of the speech, Xenophon clarifies that the Spartans obeyed the authorities at Sparta, obviously because they followed their principles.52 Nevertheless, he shows that the listeners of Callicratidas were not persuaded either by his words, ideas and arguments or by the way these words, ideas and arguments were uttered. This happened because Callicratidas put his audience into a position in which they could only ‘advise’ him to remain in his post, but he did not persuade them that it was right and proper that he was the new commander. So although his rhetoric permitted him to achieve the goal of silenc-

 45 Concerning the Spartan speeches note that Thucydides also presents them in the same way, that is as brief (see Allison, 1984, 13 n. 10, Francis, 1991, 198–200, 203), terse (see Francis, 1991, 204, Arnold, 1992, 52) and syntactically simpler than those of Athenians (see Francis, 1991, 203). 46 See Debnar, 2001, 183. 47 Brasidas’ speech extends from 4.85.1 to 87.3, while Callicratidas is given only 1.6.15! 48 See Gray 1989, 82, who has pointed out the insistence of Callicratidas on the use of the personal pronoun and calls him egotistic. 49 See Krentz, 1989b, 146. 50 See Tuplin, 1991, 25, Moles, 1994, 1974. 51 It is certain that Xenophon is a stylistic tactician, since in all the speeches in the Hellenica we find a number of speakers who are stylistically distinctive, while their style of speech is inseparable from their characters. See Gray, 1989, 82, 89–90, 97–98, 101–2, 127–28. 52 Cf. Xen. 2.3.34, 7.1.8, Lac.Pol.2.14, Ages.1.36. Cf. also Thuc. 5.9.9 and Plut. Ages.2.1. Last, see Proietti, 1987, 13 n. 7.

108  Chapter 2: Callicratidas’ generalship ing his critics, it did not permit him to change their minds about him. Callicratidas achieved his goal,53 but his rhetoric according to Xenophon failed.54 It is beyond question that since Lysander’s friends considered Callicratidas their enemy55 he had every right as commander not to accommodate them and to stop the mutiny against him. On the other hand, we may wonder why Callicratidas did not argue in such a way as to full the fears of his audience in regard to his command; did not make an attempt to win their sympathy by identifying himself with their wish to defeat the Athenians; and stuck only to the point that he and they should comply with the city’s orders. That Callicratidas’ perception was deficient is borne out by the fact that Xenophon believed that commanders should inspire discipline in their men and not just impose it.56 This fact allows us to think that the Spartan leader made a bad start in his relations with his fellow soldiers and lost the opportunity to start turning their enmity to friendship.57 In this way, he remained sentimentally isolated, since nobody trusted him. This is a contrast with the scheming networker Lysander. Callicratidas could fight the Athenians at last. However, the fact that he had collected a large fleet was not enough, because he needed the Persian money for which the two parties had agreed almost a year ago; so he went to ask for it from Cyrus (1.6.7).58 It was supposed that this meeting would be easy, since Cyrus would just validate the treaty again and provide his money to the new Spartan commander. Xenophon’s readers can assume that, since Callicratidas did not go straight to Cyrus but decided to do so after preparing his crews for a military engagement, he was certain that he would secure it immediately.

 53 Pritchett, 1974, 44 says that since the theme of the speech is the need for obedience to home authorities ‘the general’s remonstrance, pointed and dignified, produced its effect, since no one dared to propose anything other than to obey the Spartan authorities’. Roisman, 1987, 24 says that Callicratidas ‘managed to silence the malcontents in the army quite effectively’ (my emphasis). 54 Moles, 1994, 74 calls this an ‘excellent speech’. I hope that with my analysis of the rhetorical subtleties of the speech I have fully subscribed to that, but we must not pass unnoticed that Xenophon is clear on the result. 55 For this concept in Greek ethics see Dover, 1974, 180–81, Blundell, 1989, 26–59. 56 Cf. Xen. 1.1.28, Ages.1.27, Anab.1.9.8. 57 On the transitivity of friendship and enmity see Blundell, 1989, 47–48. 58 Thus I disagree with Meiggs, 1972, 353 who says that it was less easy for the Spartans at home to be reconciled with the idea of cooperating with the Persians and that this ambivalence was brought into sharp relief when Callicratidas succeeded Lysander. On the contrary, both the Spartans and Callicratidas knew what they were doing with Persia, as Xenophon shows. See my analysis further below.

Callicratidas vs Lysander and the Persian money  109

Obviously, the prince knew the reason for Callicratidas’ visit, but he told him to wait for two days.59 We have already seen that a close relationship had been created between Lysander and Cyrus.60 For this reason we could suspect that the two men had agreed to prevent Callicratidas from fighting the Athenians if the new commander did not take the agreed money. However, we should not consider the relationship of Cyrus with Lysander stronger than that of Persia and Sparta in order to break the agreement so easily.61 Xenophon shows several times that the prince was consistent in his commitment to the Spartan cause.62 But even if we believe that there was a plot here, this could not be fulfilled without Callicratidas’ unwitting cooperation on account of his character. The prince defined the exact time he needed in order to see his visitor.63 This means that Cyrus was not opposed to meeting Callicratidas,64 and that he did not cause him any real delay in his fight against the Athenians.65 Surprisingly, Callicratidas became irritated because of the delay and angry (ὀργισθείς) at waiting ἐπὶ τὰς θύρας of Cyrus.

 59 Note that in Plut. Lys.6.5–6 Callicratidas waited ἐπὶ θύραις of Cyrus: when someone told him that the prince was drinking, he waited. When he went for a second time ἐπὶ θύρας, he realized that he would not meet him. 60 See p. 83. 61 Kagan, 1987, 331 says that this delay was a deliberate insult in order to humble Callicratidas and make him understand his dependence on and subordination to Cyrus and a good chance to breach the agreement between Sparta and Persia and restore Lysander. Laforse, 1988, 66 argues in the same vein, while Roisman, 1987, 22 assumes that Lysander must have planned his return. Munn, 2003, 179 believes that Tissaphernes’, if not Dareius’, encouragement to Cyrus of the balanced attrition of the Athenians and the Spartans persuaded the prince to withhold pay from Callicratidas at this moment. Nevertheless, see next n. 62 When Tissaphernes advised Cyrus to support not only the Spartans but also the Athenians in order to make both of them weak (1.5.9), the prince refused. Even when Lysander took over the command of the fleet again, Cyrus reminded him that he was his personal friend but first of all he said that he was a friend of Sparta (2.1.14); and on the basis of this friendship he asked for their help (3.1.1) at a time when the commander was not in a leading position any more. Xenophon clarifies in the aforementioned passage that Cyrus needed the Spartan help to fight his brother. So it is logical to suspect that Cyrus saw in Lysander a man useful in order to ahieve his goal more easily, but the narrative itself proves that he could go on without him. 63 A clear contrast is Pharnabazus’ delay of the Athenian ambassadors without any explanation, as Xenophon explicitly says (1.4.6–7). Cf. also 2.2.17, where Theramenes reports to the Athenian Assembly that Lysander had detained him for four months. 64 Thus, I have to disagree with Proietti, 1987, 22 that the prince was less than receptive to the Spartan commander. 65 Cf. Dem. 19.155, who complains that the Athenian envoys delayed twenty-three days before arriving in Macedonia because his colleagues were reluctant to follow their orders; so Philip had the time to conquer many areas of Athenian interest.

110  Chapter 2: Callicratidas’ generalship Xenophon defines the emotion of Callicratidas to help his readers understand what the commander thought. For the Greeks anger was interpreted as a slight and involved a judgement of intentions. It was a belief about something seeming worthless. There were three classes of anger. The first class was contempt, which meant that one treated a person as of no value. The second class was spite, i.e. the offender sought no personal advantage but wished to block the wishes of another. The only explanation for such a gratuitous hindrance of another's wishes was that one neither feared him nor sought his friendship; he was thus useless, whether for good or ill. The third category was arrogant abuse, that is, speaking or acting in ways that caused shame to another, not so that something might happen, but for the sheer pleasure derived from a sense of superiority.66 Obviously, Callicratidas believed that Cyrus would meet him and give him the money at once, as he had done with Lysander and the ambassadors. Cyrus delayed, so Callicratidas thought that he was treating him as a man of no value, way trying to block his wish to defeat the Athenians and was making a show of his superiority to a Greek.67 This impression becomes stronger through the phrase ‘in front of the doors’ which symbolized for the Greeks the power of the Persian court and the boundary between the Persian Empire and the rest of the world;68 a position of humiliation for males;69 and inferiority for those who waited.70 So Callicratidas said that the Greeks were in a wretched position, because they had to  66 See Konstan, 2006, 41–46. 67 For such a reaction to delays cf. Thuc. 1.130.2, who says that the Spartans became suspicious of Pausanias because he made himself difficult of access. 68 When Tissaphernes invited the Ten Thousand for reconciliation, the soldiers told Clearchus that the satrap would never willingly let them go to Greece and allow them to say that although they were few they defeated the King ἐπὶ ταῖς θύραις αὐτοῦ (Anab.2.4.4). Nevertheless, Clearchus accepted the offer of Tissaphernes, so the generals passed through his doors and entered his courts ἐπὶ θύραις while the captains stayed in front of them ἐπὶ ταῖς θύραις (Anab.2.5.31). This concept also becomes clear in the Cyropaedia. Cyrus said to his mother that by watching the Persians ἐπὶ ταῖς θύραις he realized that his grandfather was excellent (1.3.2), while the allies of Cyaxares went to meet him ἐπὶ τὰς θύρας (Xenophon uses the phrase once again, twice–8.1.33– 34). Last, see Plut. Them.29.1, where the Persian King calls to himself Themistocles, who sees Dareius’ friends ἐπὶ θύραις. 69 When the Spartans elected their gerontes, many young men and women praised the winner, but only the women who were related to him assembled ἐπὶ ταῖς θύραις of the phidition and asked for the portion of food he had saved (Plut. Lyc.26.1–4). Moreover, in the topsy-turvy world of Aristophanes’ Eccl.865–66, when Chremes asks the Citizen, who stands ἐπὶ ταῖς θύραις, what he will do if admission is forbidden to him by the women, the latter replies that he will seize upon the dishes as they pass (865–66). 70 According to Plut. Mor.179b4–6, Philip was sleeping for days (ἡμέρας) while the Greeks who had gathered ἐπὶ θύραις had become upset and accused him for his behavior to Parmenion.

Callicratidas vs Lysander and the Persian money  111

flatter the barbarians for the sake of money, and that if he returned to Sparta safe he would do everything to reconcile the Athenians and the Lacedaimonians; and he sailed off to Miletus (1.6.8). The notion of Hellenic ethnic identity and the concomitant polarization of Greek and barbarian as generic opposites, which rapidly developed as a result of the Persian invasions,71 arose once again in Callicratidas’ mind. He called the Persians disparagingly ‘barbarians’72 but also the Greeks κόλακες, i.e.men of no free spirit who spoke in such a way as to please their hearer and did so in order that some advantage might fall to them in respect of money.73 It is evident that Callicratidas abruptly disagreed with the decision of the Spartans and their allies74 to send an embassy to Persia and sign a treaty with the King and did not agree with the ambassadors and Lysander who asked for money for the troops from Cyrus.75 However, I believe that Xenophon would not like his readers to agree with Callicratidas’ reaction. I make this argument having in mind: (a) Thucydides, who reports Archidamus’ wariness lest Spartan judgement be undermined by ὀργή as he later tried to do to the Athenians,76 and various other cases in which he warns his readers about the possible consequences of anger;77 (b) Lac.Pol.4.6, where Xenophon says in regard to the game of Hippagretai that when the combatants did not stop coming to blows, first the peacemaker and then the ephors inflicted heavy penalties in order to have it well understood that anger must never over-

 71 See Hall, 1989, especially 3–13, Hall, 1993, Hall, 1997, 44–48, Vlassopoulos, 2013, 157, 190– 93. 72 Xenophon uses the words ‘barbarians’ and ‘Persians’ interchangeably in other parts of the Hellenica (3.2.12, 4.13–15, 4.24; see also Ages.1.35), but it is my impression that because of the use of the word in this context its meaning is negative. For another disparaging characterization of the Persians as barbarians see 6.5.43. 73 For this definition of the flatterers cf. Arist. Eth.Eud.1233b29–31, Eth.Nic.1124b30–1125a2, Pol.1263b21–22, 1313b41–1314a4, Pl. Resp.465c1, [Pl.] Def.414e9–10, Plut. Mor.58c8–9,58e5– 8,539d11, Theophr. 2.1. 74 The messengers who escorted Boeotius in his mission to Persia were representatives of the allies of Sparta (see p. 36); so Callicratidas refers to his fellow Spartans and their allies. Although the Athenians also wanted to reach an agreement with the King (see pp. 32–33), the possibility that Callicratidas included the Athenians among the Greeks is implausible because of his feelings towards them. See below. 75 I make this remark connecting Xenophon’s report that Cyrus and the Spartans had a δεῖπνον (1.5.6) with Eupolis’ Flatterers fr. 159.11–13 (Kock) who comments on the behavior of the κόλαξ in a δεῖπνον with a foreigner. 76 For this point in the speech of Archidamus see Francis, 1991, 208. 77 See 1.22.1, 2.22, 37, 59.3, 65.3–4, 3.36.2, 38.1, 42.1, 43.5,44.4, 45.4, 84.1–2, 5.63.2, 6.17.1.

112  Chapter 2: Callicratidas’ generalship ride obedience to law; and (c) 5.3.7, where Xenophon first describes the fatal mistake of Teleutias in attacking the Olynthians in anger and then comments in the first person in order to blame Teleutias78 that he who attacks an enemy under the influence of passion rather than of judgement is in absolute error, because wrath is but a blind impulse devoid of foresight (5.3.7).79 Moreover, Xenophon showed earlier that it was the Spartans who reached an agreement with the Great King in order to support them financially and asked Cyrus to change the terms of the treaty again in a better way for them. Callicratidas was aware of the relationship of his fellow Spartans with the Persians and had agreed to assume the leadership under these terms; so he had no justification for calling his compatriots flatterers.80 Through this reaction Xenophon presents a commander who contradicts himself and because of his anger changes the conditions under which Sparta would continue the war. In addition, Callicratidas’ concept of Greek unity against Persia was not a panhellenism which would take place right now. Callicratidas’ wish to return to Sparta alive indicates that he would remain in his post and defeat the Athenians, and only then would he try, according to his power, to reconcile the two sides. Callicratidas confirmed his earlier statement about his ambition to defeat the enemy81 but there is also no doubt that he dreamed of a leading role in Spartan politics after the end of the war. Last, it is noteworthy that Callicratidas moved the fleet to Miletus, which had been the Spartan base in the recent past.82 The geographical proximity of Ephesus to Sardis, which made contact between people in these places fairly easy,83 forces readers to think that the geographical drift of the fleet to a place further away

 78 For this point see Gray, 2010, 558. 79 Note also that Xenophon has a firmly negative opinion about anger in all his works. In On Horsemanship 6.12 he repeats that anger is an impulse devoid of foresight and warns his readers that they should not even make their horses angry (6.12, 9.2, 7). In Anab.2.6.9 Xenophon says that Clearchus punished his men in anger. He points out that the Spartan commander regretted it afterwards, in order to indicate that he did not agree with actions done under emotion. Last, see Mem.2.6.21, 23, Cyneg.7.5, 10.9, 10.15. 80 Proietti, 1987, 13 argues, citing Xen. Lac.Pol.7.2, that Callicratidas’ posture followed the law of Lycurgus that the Spartans should not have contact with money-making. But I think that we should not forget that it was Sparta itself that had asked for the Persian money. Callicratidas should have followed Sparta’s orders even though his city was not the same as it used to be in the past, as Proietti himself 1987, 74 points out. 81 See p. 105. 82 See Thuc. 8.17.3 with Hornblower, 2008, 799. 83 Xenophon defines in 3.2.11 the distance of Ephesus from Sardis as three days away.

Callicratidas and the Milesians  113

from Cyrus was a symbolic act of Callicratidas. Evidently, he wanted to show Cyrus that he had no need to have contact with him and that he could continue the war alone. However, his decision to alienate himself from Persia meant that he did not do what was best for his city, despite his claim that his tenure as a navarch was a proof of his obedience to the Spartan authorities.84 Moroever, Callicratidas’ reaction contrasted with Spartan training, which educated its citizens to be always obedient to the decisions of the city.85 These were signs of bad leadership.86 Callicratidas now had only one choice in regard to money in order to continue the war, that is, to ask for it from Sparta; and he did this by sending messengers back to Lacedaimon for this reason. However, his city had persistently asked for Persian money,87 since it did not have money of its own, as Thucydides says (1.80.4). Therefore it is difficult to imagine how the Spartan authorities could support Callicratidas even if they believed that Cyrus had decided not to provide ready money. Until Sparta took measures, Callicratidas should either delay and wait or seek for other sources.

. Callicratidas and the Milesians Xenophon reports the next step of the Spartan commander. When Callicratidas arrived in Miletus, he called an assembly of the citizens. His immediate summoning of the Milesians indicates that he had something in mind, which Xenophon reveals by reporting a speech in oratio recta for a second time (1.6.8–11) in order to help his readers assess Callicratidas’ personality even better. The structure of this speech is in part similar to that of the first speech of Callicratidas, that is the particle μέν which follows the pronoun ἐμοί also gives it emphasis, having an antithetical sense which serves to prepare the mind for a contrast, while δέ couples this sentence with the previous one, makes a contrast and  84 See p. 105. 85 See Vernant, 1991, 221 who points out, citing Lac.Pol.4.5, that the Spartans entered into war aiming to surpass their fellow citizens, but they always acted together with the others to defend the city best. However, the rest of Xen.’s Lac.Pol. ‘does not incline us to share his optimism about the claimed natural convergence between the individual quest for honor and the total devotion of all to the public good’. Moreover, Vernant, 1991, 222 argues that one of the purposes of the Lacedaimonian agoge was to ‘discover which ones will be most apt to remain faithful to the maxim that ought ever to inspire them: to do in all circumstances what is best for the city’ (my emphasis). 86 See Seager, 2001, 385–86 for relevant references in Xenophon’s works that the good leader should always regard the common weal as paramount. 87 See p. 108.

114  Chapter 2: Callicratidas’ generalship is translated as ‘but’. Three more sentences begin with δέ, connecting each one of them with the previous one, while all of them in the end create two opposed ideas. Concerning the content, Callicratidas repeats things we have already read in the narrative, but we are also informed about new facts. He begins his speech by using the same argument he had used in his speech to the Spartans, i.e. that he must obey the authorities at Sparta. The meaning of this argument is that Callicratidas’ personal opinion about the war is immaterial, since he is merely the servant of Sparta.88 The Milesians on their part should be extremely enthusiastic in this war, since they have suffered the greatest damage by living among the barbarians. Callicratidas does not define the reasons which should make the Milesians think beyond their allegiance to Sparta. Nevertheless, the use of the infinitive πεπονθέναι indicates that the speaker refers to something that occurred before the time of the present narrative. This is the time of the Ionian Revolt when most of the men of Miletus were killed by the Persians, the women and children were sold into slavery and their city was burnt to the ground.89 This old unpleasant story allows Callicratidas to use the disparaging characterization of the Persians as ‘barbarians’ again, as he did after leaving Cyrus’ palace. However, these statements about the Persians must have sounded strange to the Milesians because of the present political condition of this city. We have already seen that the Spartans for reasons of expediency had deprived the Greeks of Asia of their freedom by making an alliance with Persia.90 In regard to Miletus, Xenophon’s readers should remember Thuc. 8.84.5, where Lichas says that the Milesians and the other inhabitants of the King’s land must be the slaves of Tissaphernes, behave properly and seek his favour, till the war was well settled. If this meant a surrender of the internal government of Miletus and the other cities to Persia for the duration of the war at least,91 the Milesians (and Xenophon’s readers) should judge what Callicratidas says as contradictory and ironical, since it was Sparta which had made this agreement and had surrendered the control of Miletus to the Persians!92 Last, nothing had changed since then, because even when the Spartans signed the treaty of Boeotius the cities of Ionia remained in

 88 See Tuplin, 1987, 136. 89 For this fact see Proietti, 1987, 14 n.11, Pontier, 2013, 175–76. 90 See p. 37. 91 As Parke, 1930, 47 says. 92 This becomes clear in the same passage (8.84), where Thucydides says that there was already a guard-house with a garrison of Tissaphernes’ troops there, although Astyochus was operating from the same city as his base. See Parke, 1930, 48.

Callicratidas and the Milesians  115

the hands of the King.93 So the hearers were led to believe that the relations between Sparta and Persia had changed and that by defeating the enemies, that is the Athenians, the Milesians could get rid of their Eastern rulers.94 Xenophon once again stresses that Callicratidas was not a real panhellenist95 and that he wanted to continue the war against a city which he still considered his opponent. For this reason Callicratidas chose an exemplary role for the Milesians, that is, they and he would show the other allies how they could do the most damage in the shortest time to the Athenians until money came from Lacedaimon. The latter part of this syllogism, the lack of cash, explains why the Spartan commander could not argue for a large-scale and long-time military engagement against Athens. This is strange, because all the Greeks who served under Sparta’s leadership knew that subsidies came from Persia and that Lysander had succeeded in increasing the wages of the crews, as we have already seen.96 So there should be some reason for this change, and this was nothing else but Lysander himself, who had returned the money to Cyrus. This fact allows Callicratidas to say with a heavy irony that his predecessor gave it back as if it were a surplus, while everybody now knew that it was anything but surplus. Through this public denunciation Callicratidas wanted to show that Lysander did not really care about Spartan success in this war without himself as a leader; otherwise, he implies, he should have left the money to him. At this point Xenophon reveals that Lysander’s excessive ambition and his rivalry towards his successor led him to make another move against Callicratidas in order to weaken him. Thus he indicates for a second time that this antagonism endangered the development of the war.97 On the other hand, Xenophon has also shown that Lysander had taken this money because of his friendship with Cyrus when he was in charge. So Lysander could argue that he had returned the remaining money to Cyrus because it was his personal gift,98 and that he left the newcomer to make his own arrangement with Cyrus or take the money that the two

 93 See p. 81. 94 Tuplin, 1987, 136. 95 Thus, I disagree with Meiggs, 1972, 353 that when Callicratidas left Cyrus’ palace, he came out boldly for a Hellenic policy. 96 See p. 82. 97 Cf. Proietti, 1987, 15 and his analysis of the dangers of rivalry for Spartan society. 98 For this concept see Herman, 1987, 128, 130, who points out that the networks between the elite appeared to their contemporaries as organizations of supply for the individuals involved in them rather for the cities to which the individuals belonged, and that one of these supplies was money. Thus Hodkinson, 2000, 345 is right to say that Lysander returned the remaining money to Cyrus as if it were a personal gift.

116  Chapter 2: Callicratidas’ generalship sides had agreed in the treaty of Boeotius.99 Nevertheless, it is strange that Callicratidas wanted the money that Lysander had taken from Cyrus, since he called his compatriots flatterers earlier. This is another sign of contradiction, which was born from the need for money. What about the rest of the Persian money? Callicratidas had just called the Persians barbarians, but he did not explain if or why the relationship between Sparta and Persia had changed. Now Xenophon gives Callicratidas the same words which he used when he narrated his visit to Cyrus in direct speech. But Callicratidas has changed one very important detail. Then Xenophon said that Cyrus had told Callicratidas to wait for two days, while Callicratidas says that Cyrus always postponed talking to him. Obviously, Callicratidas hoped that his hearers would believe him, because they did not know what had happened in Cyrus’ court. But since Xenophon’s readers know that Callicratidas was lying, the historian warns us not to approve this behavior.100 Moreover, Callicratidas’ admission that he could not persuade himself to attend Cyrus’ court is intended to make his audience agree with him that it would be humiliating if he remained there, but it also reveals an impatient man who is in contrast to the patient Lysander, who waited until he got what he wanted. After these arguments it was clear to the Milesians that Callicratidas wanted them to carry the burdens of the war until Sparta sent him money; that is why he promised to return to them χάριν ἀξίαν for the money they would contribute. Χάρις was a common concept in Greek politics during the Peloponnesian War,101 but the speaker is vague about what this charis would be.102 Then, making the common appeal in military harangues for help from the gods,103 Callicratidas urged the Milesians to show the barbarians that even without fawning on them (θαυμάζειν)

 99 As Prentice, 1934, 38 remarks. Nevertheless, I cannot agree with him that Lysander returned the money to Cyrus on the ground that it was superfluous, since Xenophon points out not only here but also in 1.5.2–7 that the Lacedaimonians really needed this money. 100 Cf. also 3.4.6 and Ages.1.11–12, where Xenophon emphasizes Agesilaus’ great fidelity in contrast to the lying Tissaphernes. 101 For charis in the Peloponnesian War see Missiou, 1998, 181–97, who analyzes many passages in Thucydides and Xenophon’s works, but does not include the present passage. For a careful assessment of an alliance on the basis of charis cf. Thuc. 6.12.1–2, where Nicias says to his fellow citizens that the Egestans want them to fight their battles and, if saved, will prove ungrateful (κατορθώσαντας χάριν μὴ ἀξίαν εἰδέναι). 102 Parke, 1930, 49 says that Callicratidas’ promise of compensation to the Milesians in the future means Spartan help against Persian domination and some modification in the terms of Lichas’ treaty, but this is more than the text warrants. 103 Cf. Anab.2.3.23, 3.1.23, 1.42, 2.8, 2.11, 2.15, 6.5.23, 6.32, 7.3.36.

Callicratidas and the Milesians  117

they could punish the enemy. This statement could be an admission of the ambivalent feelings of the Greeks for the Persians.104 Otherwise, Callicratidas referred to the Persians derogatorily for the last time and implied that his audience knew that Sparta and her allies pretended to admire the Persians105 for their money; but now they should despise them106 and base their future on their own powers. Thus, once again Callicratidas seemed to repeat his earlier opinion that the Greeks should stop flattering the Persians for money. Concerning the style of the speech, we may remark that it is syntactically more complex than his first speech. The whole speech consists of four long periods, with no dependent clauses in the first period, but it has four dependent clauses in the second period, and one dependent clause in each of the third and fourth periods. In this way his speech is not terse like his previous one, something which is rather necessary, because Callicratidas was not speaking to fellow Spartans. Nonetheless, one noteworthy characteristic common with the previous speech is the use of the personal pronoun five times, which gives the impression once again that Callicratidas is an egotist and/or self-centered leader, which is of course of a piece with his irritation at being kept waiting by Cyrus. The result was once again positive for Callicratidas, but we must read Xenophon very carefully: many Milesians, and especially those who were accused of opposing him, proposed a grant of money and offered to make private contributions themselves, for one and only one reason: they feared (δεδιότες) him (1.6.12). Xenophon’s definition of the Milesians’ emotion is very important for our assessment of the efficacy of the speech. In the first speech Callicratidas played a single rhetorical game, manoeuvring his audience into a cul-de-sac. This time he made an attempt at persuasive rather than logically manipulative rhetoric, with appeals to emotion, that is, suffering at barbarians’ hands, an offer of charis and an appeal to Hellenic consciousness. Callicratidas succeeded in obtaining the money he wanted, but the participle dediotes undermines any suggestion that he

 104 Cf. Rhodes, 2007, 31–44 about the development of the complex relationship between Greeks and Persians and especially his analysis of the manner in which the real or perceived Persian threat along with Persian money and meddling influenced the inter-Greek politics and struggles for power. 105 Cf. Arist. Rhet.1371a33–34: φαινόμενος γὰρ θαυμαστὴς … ὁ κόλαξ ἐστίν. Cf. also Plutarch, who urges his readers not to compare themselves and admire (ὅταν οὖν πάνυ θαυμάσῃς) those whom they consider as superiors, e.g. the Persian satraps and their King, and reports a story where Socrates says to another man that he should think that their affairs are wonderful, because they do not live in flattery (Mor.470a11–b7, 470e2–471a3). 106 For contempt as the opposite of admiration cf. Xen. Mem.3.6.17.

118  Chapter 2: Callicratidas’ generalship actually persuaded anyone.107 The truth is that the Milesians feared that he would punish them if they did not do what he wanted.108 Callicratidas’ Spartan concept of obedience to the authorities109 probably made him believe that the Milesians were following his orders willingly. However, the truth is that he behaved like a tyrant who caused fear to his inferiors110 and since they could not speak freely111 they followed him without being able to do otherwise.112 In short, he had failed to inspire obedience,113 so it is difficult to approve his communicative tactic.114 Xenophon also reveals that there was some sub-category among the Milesians, those who feared Callicratidas for three reasons: (a) they had opposed (ἐναντιοῦσθαι)115 his command from the beginning of his tenure; (b) probably they had attempted to create internal strife in their city;116 and (c) they were exposed now by their fellow citizens after Lysander’s removal. It is certain that Xenophon chose to make an analepsis to reveal the backdoor influence of Lysander who thanks to his Spartan collaborators had extended his coalitions with upper-class Milesians through a network of ξενίαι,117 where both sides would satisfy their own

 107 If my analysis is anywhere near correct, I cannot agree with Laforse, 1988, 65 and Roisman, 1987, 29 that Callicratidas was really successful in this speech, since he raised money from the Milesians. 108 For this interpretation of fear see p. 66. 109 Cf. Strauss, 1939, 518 n. 2 who points out ‘the scarcely disguised identification of fear with obedience’ in Sparta, citing Lac.Pol.8.3 (my emphasis). 110 Cf. Soph. Antig.585, Eur. Hel.483. 111 cf. Isocr. 9.31: γενομένων δ’ αὐτῷ τῶν … περὶ τὸν τύραννον ἀνταγωνιστῶν … δεδιότες … τὴν ἀρχὴν. Cf. also Soph. Antig.505, Philoc.569, Oed.Rex 591, Eur. Alcmeon fr. 88a (Kannicht). 112 Cf. Thuc. 3.12.1, where the Mytileneans describe their relations with the Athenians as follows: οἱ μὲν ἡμᾶς ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ δεδιότες ἐθεράπευον, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἐκείνους ἐν τῇ ἡσυχίᾳ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐποιοῦμεν. This was an idea that Xenophon himself knew well. Cf. Anab.7.7.29–30. 113 Note that in Cyrop.8.1.23–33 Xenophon includes in Cyrus’ virtues the ability to inspire obedience. The instilling of fear in the Milesians proves the opposite for Callicratidas. 114 Munn, 2000, 180 says that Callicratidas, spurned by Cyrus, turned the lack of Persian funding into a virtue, because he challenged his audience to man and maintain a large fleet and fight Athens without relying on Persia. But his analysis is not supported by Xenophon’s text. 115 Critias praises the Spartan constitution, because even if one of the ephors tried to censure the government and to oppose (ἐναντιοῦσθαι) what was being done instead of obeying the majority, all the Spartans would sentence him to death (2.3.34). For the problem of opposing superiors cf. also Oec.21.4 and the use of the same infinitive. 116 Cf. Arist. Pol.1302a34–35, who says that men ὑπὲρ … τῶν φίλων στασιάζουσιν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν. 117 For xenia as an upper-class institution see Herman, 1989, 34–35. For the function of xeniai see Herman, 1989, 150.

The military action of Callicratidas and his economic problems  119

interests of course.118 This shows that the extent of Lysander’s meddling was bigger than we had initially thought. Callicratidas was not safe even in a place that he thought better for his interests than Ephesus.

. The military action of Callicratidas and his economic problems After taking this money Callicratidas also secured from Chios five drachmai for each sailor’s travel expenses (1.6.12). It is evident that the improvised plan of collecting money from the Milesians did not bring the necessary results, not even the travel expenses of the crews; that is why Xenophon explains that this was secured by another ally of Sparta (ἐφοδιασάμενος). But given that: (a) the sailors needed monthly wages, as Xenophon has already shown in the meeting between Lysander and Cyrus;119 (b) the Greeks called ἐφόδιον the provision for a long voyage, which every soldier should carry with him over and above his public pay;120 and (c) this would be enough only for his maintenance for a short period,121 readers can be almost certain that Callicratidas would have financial problems very soon. He first sailed against Methymna and asked the citizens to surrender. When they refused to do so, because there was an Athenian garrison in the city and those who had power favoured Athens (1.6.13), Callicratidas took it by storm. This was certainly a victory.122 His men seized all the money they found in the city, since they did not have as much as they needed. In fact, they were not satisfied with this booty only. When Callicratidas gathered the citizens and the slaves of that city in the agora,123 they urged him to sell not only the slaves but also the  118 For the expectations of long-term reciprocation in xeniai cf. Herman, 1989, 91. 119 See p. 82–83. 120 This becomes clear in Thuc. 6.31.5, when the historian comments on the scale of the Sicilian expedition and the ἐφόδιον of each soldier. Cf. also Thuc. 2.70.3–4. 121 Xenophon says in 1.1.24 that Pharnabazus gave the Spartans ἐφόδιον for two months. In Anab.7.8.1–2 Xenophon also implies that the ἐφόδιον could not last for long, since it was not enough for him to return home. 122 Diod. 13.76.5 gives similar information, i.e. Callicratidas sailed to Lesbos and with his force attacked Methymne, which held a garrison of Athenians. Nevertheless, Diodorus ascribes less glory to the Spartan commander. He says that, although Callicratidas launched repeated assaults, at first he accomplished nothing, but soon afterward, with the help of certain men who betrayed the city to him, he broke inside its walls. Then he plundered its wealth, but he spared the lives of the inhabitants and returned the city to the Methymnians. 123 See Proietti, 1987, 17.

120  Chapter 2: Callicratidas’ generalship Methymnians,124 most probably in order to secure more cash.125 It is evident that Sparta’s allies did not believe in the idea of panhellenism126 and did not care that it was not the people of Methymna but the Athenian garrison and those who favoured Athens who had not agreed to surrender the city. Callicratidas had no objection to the selling of the slaves, since he knew that his men needed this money. Nonetheless, he showed decisiveness127 and repeated almost verbatim his old words that so far as it was in his power128 none of the Greeks would be enslaved. As in the case of the Spartans who had mutinied against him after Lysander’s removal,129 Callicratidas had once again to assert his authority over his men and, in fact, he succeeded. Thus on the next day he released the citizens of Methymna and sold the captured slaves; but he also sold the Athenian garrison. This statement is really problematic because, although he had excluded the Athenians from his urge for panhellenism in his speech at Miletus, he gave the impression now that the Athenians, who were Greeks, should not be enslaved. For this reason we can deduce that his men would have found his behavior contradictory, and this prompts the question to what degree they could trust a leader who changed his mind so quickly.130 This was a problem for a Lacedaimonian commander. The Spartans disdained words unsupported by deeds131 and Sthenelaidas was ironic towards the Athenians because of the contrast between their words and actions.132 Thus we can say that Xenophon also becomes ironic towards Callicratidas because of this decline from traditional Spartan ways and castigates him for this inconsistency.133 At the same time, the historian reminds

 124 As becomes clear from the use of καί in the passage: ἀποδόσθαι καὶ τοὺς Μηθυμναίους. 125 For other similar cases see van Wees, 2004, 27. Note also that Xenophon sold slaves whom he took during a march in order to take money (Anab.5.3.4–13). 126 See Proietti, 1987, 18. 127 Gray, 1989, 24 believes that Callicratidas’ refusal to yield to the allies’ demands was egotistic. Although the general’s words ἑαυτοῦ γε ἄρχοντος are similar to those of the selfish Athenian generals who told Alcibiades at Aegospotami that αὐτοὶ γὰρ νῦν στρατηγεῖν (2.1.27; see p. 178), I think that in this case the projection of Callicratidas’ ego was quite justified and that Xenophon wanted to show Callicratidas’ instant decisiveness. 128 Cf. 1.6.7: κατά γε τὸ αὑτοῦ δυνατὸν and 1.6.13: εἰς τὸ ἐκείνου δυνατὸν. The verbal resemblance is striking. 129 See pp. 101–02. 130 Note that Thucydides reports that the Acanthians decided to fight alongside Brasidas because he could match his words with action (see Francis, 1991, 210–11). 131 See Debnar, 2001, 5. 132 See Allison, 1987, 13. 133 Cf. Higgins, 1977, 11–12 about Xenophon’s ironical writing.

The military action of Callicratidas and his economic problems  121

us that his protagonist had promised himself the role of a panhellenic leader after the end of the war and that he still considered Athens his enemy.134 Callicratidas’ next target was the Athenian general Conon, to whom he sent word ὅτι παύσει αὐτὸν μοιχῶντα τὴν θάλατταν (1.6.15). Unfortunately, a definition of μοιχεία in Sparta is not possible for modern readers, owing to the lack of evidence.135 But, since the recipient of these words was Conon and since adultery in Athens was defined as illicit sex with a married woman,136 we can be certain that Callicratidas metaphorically equated himself with a husband, his enemy with a man who committed adultery with his wife and the sea with that wife. The subject of moicheia was treated humorously in comedy and to some degree in judicial speeches, and caused laughter among the Greeks.137 So I suspect that the Athenian readers of Xenophon would laugh at what Callicratidas said.138 The same goes for Spartan readers, since laughter was part of their education.139 At the same time, adultery was a serious situation. The husband had the right to humiliate the adulterer by forcing him into a passive sexual role or even to kill him.140 So the message of Callicratidas to Conon and of Xenophon to his audience was that this is what Callicratidas would do to Conon when he caught him. Moreover, since the adulterer was considered effeminate,141 Callicratidas implicitly defined himself as

 134 Cf. the concise comment of Krentz, 1989b, 148. 135 Carey, 1995b, 407 n.2 stresses that our evidence for the definition of moicheia in other Greek cities is minimal. In regard to Sparta we can say that the common use of the words διαφθείρω (cf. Lys. 1.33, 38 and Plut. Alc.23.7–8), ὕβρις (cf. Lys. 1.3, 4, 16, 25, 26 and Plut. Alc.23.8) and ἐχθρόςἔχθρα cf. Lys.1.16, 44 and Plut. Alc.24.3) in texts which refer to adultery in Athens and Sparta is an indication of the seriousness of the offence but nothing more. To this I suspect we could also add Xenophon’s selection of the Doric μοιχῶ instead of the Attic μοιχεύω (cf. Krentz, 1989b, 149). 136 See Carey, 1995b, 407–8, Todd, 2007, 48–49. 137 See Carey, 1989, 61, Porter, 1997, 422–23, 425. 138 For humor in Greek literature and life and Xenophon’s fondness for laughter see Bassett, 1917, 656–74, Hau, 2016, 229, Baragwanath and Foster, 2017, 15–18, Gray, 2017, 232–35. 139 See David, 1989, 1–25. 140 For the humiliation and execution of the adulterers after catching them in the act of adultery with the wives see Carey, 1989a, 64–65, 1993, 53–55, Kapparis, 1996, 63–77, Herman, 1993, 407–10, 417. 141 See Davidson, 1997, 165, Brulé, 2003, 105.

122  Chapter 2: Callicratidas’ generalship a symbol of masculinity in the eyes of the other Greeks.142 By using this expression, which indicates vulgarity,143 Callicratidas wanted to slight144 Conon and imply his superiority and final triumph over him. This is an exaggeration because Xenophon has shown that Callicratidas had achieved only one victory until now and no victory in a sea-battle. This fact means that readers should regard Callicratidas as a highly self-confident man. Last, Xenophon allows his readers to infer that Callicratidas thought of himself as the lawful husband of the sea. At this point it is worth remembering that Lysander had told Callicratidas that he was ‘master of the sea’. This means that Callicratidas did not accept that Lysander was a better navarch than him, as he had said in his speech to his fellow Spartans.145 Callicratidas tried to prove his claim by pursuing Conon with a fleet of one hundred and seventy ships and attempting to cut off his route to Samos. We have

 142 Brown, 1989, 283–90 argues that when Hephaestus caught the adulterer Ares with his wife Hera in flagrante he summoned the other gods, because he expected them to mock the illegal pair. Hornblower, 2008, 652, comments on Thuc. 7.56.2 that Thucydides makes a metaphor from the Panhellenic games in order to show that the Greeks were spectators of the conflict/contest between Syracuse and Athens. Given that adultery was a panhellenic problem (cf. Xen. Hieron 3.4, Lys. 1.3, Plut. Alc.23.7–8, Lac.Apophth.228b–c, Com. adespota, fr. 3–5 (Kock)), it is plausible to suggest that Callicratidas believed that the Greeks were watching his moves. 143 Perhaps a modern reader needs the translation ‘I will stop you screwing my sea’ in order to capture the bluntness of Callicratidas’ words (van Wees, 2009, 199). If we believe that Callicratidas also wanted to use such an expression but he did not in order to seem a little priggish (Tuplin, 1991, 26), this means that he wanted to avoid ribaldry, since this was not acceptable in Sparta (cf. Xen. Lac.Pol.5.7; see also Halliwell, 1991, 284 n. 15). Someone might also think that Xenophon used the verb μοιχῶ instead of the verb βινῶ or some other synonym, because such verbs were not proper for the genre of historiography (see Bain, 1991, 51–77). On the other hand, since: (a) Xenophon cared about the truth and did not write things which he knew were false (Rhodes, 1994, 167); (b) the verb μοιχῶ had serious connotations for the honor of the husband (see Brown, 1989, 288, Herman, 1993, 412–14, 418–19); and (c) the word moichos suggests that it is a vulgar term of abuse (see Patterson, 1998, 122), I side with Moles (1994, 79) and those scholars who talk about vulgarity here. 144 Halliwell, 1991, 280, 283 shows that the Greeks made a distinction between playful and consequential laughter (citing among other sources Xen. Cyr.5.2.18) and argues that the second kind of laughter is directed toward some definite result e.g. causing embarrassment or shame, signalling hostility, damaging a reputation, contributing to the defeat of an opponent. Moreover, he points out that its deployment is marked by an appropriate range of ridiculing tones, from mild derision to the vitriolic or outrageously offensive; and finally, it arouses feelings which may not be shared or enjoyed by all concerned, and typically involve some degree of antagonism (see now Halliwell, 2008, 19–38). In my view, Callicratidas’ joke should be classified in this category. 145 See p. 105.

The military action of Callicratidas and his economic problems  123

seen that the Athenians made their base in Samos and that they started plundering the King’s territory with their seventy ships.146 When Conon saw that Callicratidas had more ships, he selected the best rowers from many crews and put them into a few ships in order to sail faster and take refuge in Mytilene. Everything seemed to be a matter of speed now: Conon was successful in fleeing and entering the harbor, while Callicratidas also sailed into the harbor after the Athenian fleet. Then Conon had to fight near the harbor against the Mytileneans; so he lost thirty ships but the crews escaped to the land, while he dragged up the remaining ships under the wall (1.6.16–17). The lawful husband did not achieve the capture of the adulterer, so he anchored in the harbor and besieged the city, controlling the entrance. There is no doubt that Callicratidas was determined to exterminate the Athenians. For this reason he exploited his previous purposeful leniency towards the Methymnians, who now came to fight with him,147 while he also brought the army from Chios. Readers can infer that Lysander’s friends were not right, at least on this occasion, to accuse Callicratidas of not knowing how to handle human beings.148 But this was not enough to defeat Conon, because a successful siege required time and therefore money for the preservation of the army.149 Callicratidas had not received money from Sparta yet, as he expected, if he was ever to receive any; a solution had to be found. The monetary problem was finally solved by Cyrus who was watching Callicratidas’ moves. Since Callicratidas had achieved some victories so far, Cyrus had to prove that he was still devoted to the common agreement between his father and Sparta.150 When he saw Callicratidas blockading Conon, he realized that the Spartan commander would not hold the siege for long without money, so he decided to send it unprompted.151 Probably he provided thirty mnai for each ship for the current month and would provide the same amount for the following months according to the treaty.152 On the other hand, Callicratidas, even if he did not forget his anger with Cyrus, was forced now to accept that he could not continue the war without Persian

 146 See p. 97. 147 For Callicratidas’ tactful management of the Methymnians before and the exploitation of it now see also Moles, 1974, 79. 148 See p. 101. 149 About the need of money in order to preserve an army during a siege cf. Thuc. 2.70.1–3. 150 See pp. 80–81. 151 Moles, 1994, 79. 152 Proietti, 1987, 21 says that some money came from Cyrus, but I cannot think of any reason why he would choose to give less money. See pp. 80–81.

124  Chapter 2: Callicratidas’ generalship money. Xenophon then allows us to infer that his the commander’s words in Cyrus’ court about ‘independence from Persian control and a determination to pursue a different policy without reliance on Persian money’153 should be forgotten and his iron-clad distinction between Greeks and barbarians should melt away because of his need for cash. Indeed, Callicratidas took the money that Cyrus provided. In one sentence Xenophon shows Callicratidas’ contradictory and inconsistent behavior.154 From this point onwards we must keep in mind that Calllicratidas overcame the previous economic problems of the recent past through his compromise with Cyrus. Therefore readers should judge Callicratidas from his military action. Xenophon leads his audience’s thought in this direction. Now everything should be easy for Callicratidas, since he would simply have to wait for the surrender of Conon at Mytilene. However, this was his big mistake, because instead of imposing strict discipline on his men he let them become loose more and more every day. Because of this, on the fifth day two Athenian ships attempted to break the blockade after completing the stratagem of Conon to put up side-screens so that the enemy would not see what they were doing before escaping. The Lacedaimonians’ fleet managed to overtake the first ship, but the other reached Athens and reported the news (1.6.19–22).155 Since Conon was the adulterer and Callicratidas the husband, it is worth wondering if Xenophon’s readers would applaud the former who deceived the latter by his novel device.156 As in comedy the wife tried to get her lover out of her house by holding up a large garment for her husband to admire, which served as a screen behind which her lover escaped, so here the Athenian general used the equipment of his ship for the same reason. If this is correct, we can suspect that through the humor Xenophon wanted to make his readers realize that a commander should not boast, especially before defeating his enemy.157 In the meantime, Diomedon came to help Conon with twelve ships and anchored in the straits of Mytilene. Callicratidas attacked him suddenly (ἐξαίφνης) and captured ten triremes, but not all of them, since the Athenian general fled with his own and one other (1.6.22–23). Xenophon indicates that Callicratidas  153 As Kagan, 1987, 331 says. 154 χρήματά τε παρὰ Κύρου αὐτῷ ἦλθεν. Thus I cannot share the opinion of Proietti, 1987, 19 that Xenophon’s style is understating and thus makes the fact that Callicratidas received money from Cyrus almost go unnoticed. 155 For this point see the analysis of Proietti, 1987, 19. 156 For the theme of deception and its approval by the audience in comic genres see Murphy, 1972, 184. 157 Cf. Halliwell, 1991, 280 that ‘the forces contained in or expressed by laughter were a recurrent subject of Greek moralizing’ (my emphasis).

The military action of Callicratidas and his economic problems  125

firmly held to his opinion that the Spartan fleet should attack the enemy without any delay158 (that is why he followed this tactic), but he also warns us that such a plan would not necessarily be totally victorious, since two ships escaped. Within thirty days the Athenians managed to embark both slaves and free men who were of military age and send a fleet of one hundred and fifty ships (1.6.24–25). Callicratidas, who knew that the day of the final encounter was not far off, left fifty ships at Mytilene under the command of Eteonicus in order to continue the blockade of Conon, and headed to Cape Malea with one hundred and twenty vessels (1.6.26). Given that Xenophon has already pointed out the importance of the numerical superiority of a fleet in order to defeat its enemy, we can deduce that Callicratidas set out against the Athenians with a serious disadvantage by having thirty fewer ships than them. Obviously, the Spartan general did not care for what his predecessors Mindarus and Lysander considered a problem or he thought he had no other option. What mattered for him was fast action, as he had stated in his conversation with Lysander. When he was informed that his enemies had anchored at Arginousai, he attempted to put to sea around midnight in order to attack them unexpectedly (ἐξαπιναίως), i.e. to repeat what he had done to Diomedon. However, heavy rain and thunder prevented his plan (1.6.27–28). Such a plan of night attack should be rather expected of a Spartan because of his Spartan education.159 Callicratidas’ eventual decision not to do that because of the weather could also be assessed as an indication that he was not so foolish160 as to endanger the safety of the fleet during a storm. Xenophon’s readers can agree with Callicratidas’ wise decision by reading Thuc. 8.41.3–42.1. When Astyochus sailed to Syme at night in the hope that he might come upon the Athenian squadron in the open sea, he did not make it because the rain and the cloudy state of the atmosphere caused confusion among his ships, which lost their way in the dark. The result was that when dawn broke, the fleet was dispersed and the left wing alone was visible to the Athenians, while

 158 See p. 100. 159 See Lac.Pol.2.7–8, where Xenophon says that Spartan children were trained to forgo sleep in order to become more warlike. See also Plut. Lyc.16.3, who says that women took pains to train babies not to be afraid in the dark or when left alone, and Lyc.12.7 that, when the boys were later taken over by the state to be educated, any travelling they had to do at night was to be without lights of any kind so that they might become accustomed to journey at night boldly and without fear. 160 For this characterization of the man who attempts to sail on the sea while the weather is bad at sea see Mem.8.16.3.

126  Chapter 2: Callicratidas’ generalship the other ships were still straggling off the shore of the island.161 In my opinion, these natural phenomena should not be considered a sign of divine re-tribution because of Callicratidas’ immoral action.162 If Xenophon does not clearly connect the phenomena with divine intervention,163 readers should rather consider them signs of the natural world.164

. Callicratidas’ end At dawn both sides were ready for battle. Callicratidas sailed against Arginousai, while the Athenians also put out into the open sea. Xenophon is very detailed in the description of this battle. The Athenian generals knew that their crews were inexpert,165 a fact which did not allow them to use their well-known tactic of διέκπλους and περίπλους.166 Thus they decided to put their squadrons in two lines abreast in order not to the give the enemy a chance of using against them the first stage of this tactic and then achieving the second.167 On the other side, the Spartan fleet was ready to fight in squadrons in a single file (1.6.29–31).168 In battles the right wing was considered by the Spartans the most honorable but also the most dangerous.169 The fact that Callicratidas commanded it is a proof of his bravery and his determination to defeat the Athenians. However, the formation of the Spartan fleet was not enough to decide the outcome but the numerical difference of the two fleets. Hermon realized the impending danger and told Callicratidas that αὐτὸν ὅτι εἴη καλῶς ἔχον ἀποπλεῦσαι, i.e. this was not the right moment to  161 Cf. also Thuc. 2.4.3, 8.31.3, 32.1, 34.1. For the reasonable choice not to fight under such weather circumstances see also below, Chapter 3, The Arginousai trial, pp. 135–39. 162 For this opinion see Pownall, 2004, 94–95. 163 For such cases cf. Xen. Anab.1.6.1, 4.18, 3.1.11 with Bowden, 2003, 236. 164 See Riedinger, 1991, 249–50. Cf. also: (a) Xen. 4.5.4: when Agesilaus encamped with his men in the open in an area where there had been a fall of rain and hail towards evening and saw them shivering in the dark, he sent up to them as many as ten porters carrying fire in earthen pots; so all fell to oiling themselves and many ate again; (b) Anab.4.2.2: two thousand men were marching during heavy rain. In both passages no connection is made between these incidents and the favour of the gods. But note that Euryptolemus considers the storm at Arginousai τῶν ἐκ θεοῦ ἀναγκαίων (1.7.33; see p. 203). 165 See van Wees, 2009, 212. 166 For the ability of the Athenians to use these tactics see Holladay, 1988, 151 n. 2. 167 van Wees, 2009, 228 suggests that the two maneuvers were stages of a single tactic. Xenophon’s careful report only of the first stage is a good indication that this opinion is right but, most important, of the author’s good knowledge of sea fights. 168 For the formation of the two fleets in this naval fight see Lazenby, 1987, 173–74. 169 See Pritchett, 1974, 190–92, 200. See also Lazenby, 1987, 171.

Callicratidas’ end  127

fight the Athenians.170 It is noteworthy that Xenophon mentions the opinion of this captain about the dangers of the prospective battle. In my opinion, this is not a coincidence. We have seen that Alcibiades had ordered his captain Antiochus not to fight Lysander because Lysander might not have missed the opportunity to offer a counter attack. However, Antiochus disobeyed the orders of his superior and attacked Lysander, a fact which led to the Athenian fleet’s unnecessary defeat.171 Hermon seems to realize what Xenophon has implied in his description of the defeat of the Athenians at Notium: the Spartans should not fight the Athenians at Arginousai at the present moment; they could fight them when a better opportunity appeared in the future. Callicratidas gave a twofold answer, i.e. that: (a) Sparta would not be governed (οἰκεῖται) worse if he died; and (b) if he fled, this would be disgraceful (φεύγειν δὲ αἰσχρὸν ἔφη εἶναι–1.6.32). This answer reveals once again that Callicratidas was a self-centered man, since his pilot referred to the fleet but the commander replied about what he should do. The first part of the answer is important, because it answers the question how a city should be considered to be governed well. Callicratidas’ opinion reveals what a Spartan could think about the government of his polis. The answer that Callicratidas gave to this question was to put Sparta above himself. I think that Xenophon expected his readers to pause at this moment and reflect on Callicratidas’ answer. We must remember that Callicratidas had already disobeyed Sparta in regard to the issue of taking Persian money;172 so one may wonder how right the commander was to allege that he followed orders every time this suited his purpose.173 This puzzle becomes more serious with the second part of Callicratidas’ reply He understood the words of Hermon as an inversion of the Spartan ideal καλῶς ἔχειν μένειν174 and used the neuter singular adjective αἰσχρόν in order to refer to the warrior who returned from a military enterprise without a fight. Evidently Callicratidas wanted to make a constrast of what he considered good and bad.175 Αἰδώς was considered a virtue where somebody’s honor was bound up with one’s  170 See Moles, 1994, 81. 171 See p. 89. 172 See p. 112. 173 See p. 105. 174 Cf. Tyrtaeus fr. 10.1 (West): τεθνάμεναι γὰρ καλὸν ἐνὶ προμάχοισι πεσόντα / ἄνδρ’ ἀγαθὸν περὶ ἧι πατρίδι μαρνάμενον and Hdt. 2.20.2: Λεωνίδην, ἐπείτε ᾔσθετο τοὺς συμμάχους ἐόντας ἀπροθύμους καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλοντας συνδιακινδυνεύειν, κελεῦσαί σφεας ἀπαλλάσσεσθαι, αὐτῷ δὲ ἀπιέναι οὐ καλῶς ἔχειν. Cf. also Tyrtaeus fr. 10.1 (West) with Tyrtaeus fr. 10.16 (West): μηδὲ φυγῆς αἰσχρῆς ἄρχετε, fr. 12.17 (West): αἰσχρῆς δὲ φυγῆς ἐπὶ πάγχυ λάθηται. 175 That καλόν and αἰσχρόν constitute opposites in this context cf. Adkins, 1976, 157–58.

128  Chapter 2: Callicratidas’ generalship obligation to others176 and was a matter for honor for each Greek separately and his community collectively.177 For Sparta in particular aidos was one of the constituent parts of education; so Callicratidas’ emphasis on it is very crucial for his evaluation.178 Through it he looked forward to ‘what people will say’;179 anticipated the judgement of his fellow citizens, although there was no real audience or any actual criticism at that moment;180 and brought himself to a negative evaluation in respect of Sparta’s ideal of not abandoning battle.181 However, since aidos was more like a feeling or emotion than a rational response, this meant that it should be a part of the dilemma ‘should I fight my enemies or not?’ and not a means to its solution, i.e. ‘I certainly fight my enemies’.182 Therefore Xenophon’s readers are entitled to consider whether the Spartan commander was right to go into battle on the basis of his prospective disgrace or he should have tried to withdraw safely, even if this would not be easy, since the two fleets were facing each other.183 Many passages in the Greek authors prove that Spartan warriors did not have to fight at all costs and at any time, and that if they did not they were not regarded by their fellow citizens as cowards.184 First let us read an incident described in great detail by Herodotus. At Plataia the Persian Mardonius told the Lacedaimonians that it was not true that they did not flee in war nor leave their posts but stay there and either destroy their enemies or perish themselves. This was so because before engaging in battle and in hand-to-hand conflict the Spartans had already

 176 See Cairns, 1993, 14 n. 29. 177 See Cairns, 1993, 13, 14 n. 29, 70. For the Spartans’ sensitivity to honor and shame see Lendon, 1997, 105–26. See also McHardy, 2008, 94, citing the passage under discussion, with whom I disagree. 178 For aidos in Spartan education see Humble, 1999, 341–43 and Christesen, 2017, 385; for its connection with the evaluation of somebody’s character cf. Cairns, 1993, 141: ‘aidos reflects the individual’s own values, character and ideals’. 179 Cf. Cairns, 1993, 51. 180 Cf. Cairns, 1993, 16. 181 Cf. Cairns, 1993, 18. 182 For aidos as an emotion see Rademaker, 2005, 52. 183 We have already seen that when the Athenians realized that Mindarus would attack them with more ships they escaped to Cardia (1.1.11). Moreover, Xenophon says that Eteonicus ordered his men to sail to Chios at once and that his fleet managed to escape from the Athenians (1.6.37– 38). 184 Loraux, 1977, 105–20, has persuasively argued that, although the Spartans were severe towards cowards (see also MacDowell, 1986, 42–46), their pragmatism presided over their code of bravery. See also Lazenby, 1985, 122–23. I shall expand this opinion here.

Callicratidas’ end  129

fled and left their station (9.48.1–3). For the Persian commander the Lacedaimonians were cowards. But Herodotus has made it clear that the Spartans had already suffered damage from the Persian cavalry; so they moved in front of the city of the Plataians in order not to suffer any more damage from their enemies (9.51). However, one Spartan commander, called Amompharetus, said that he would not flee from the Persians nor by his own will would he disgrace Sparta (οὐδὲ ἑκὼν εἶναι αἰσχυνέειν τὴν Σπάρτην–9.53). Apparently, this man did not consider that many of his fellow warriors had met death from the attacks of the Persian cavalry. His superiors Pausanias and Euryanax did not accept Mardonius’ challenge and did not consider their plan an act of cowardice but a way to save their men and an opportunity to fight the Persians under better circumstances. So they were greatly disturbed that Amompharetus did not obey them and still more that they should be compelled to leave his division behind, believing that it would perish from being left behind (9.53). Herodotus points out that no Spartan agreed with Amompharetus. Nevertheless, this man insisted on his opinion, saying that he would not flee from the Persians (ἔφη μὴ φεύγειν–9.55), so Pausanias considered him irresponsible towards his men,185 and ordered the continuation of the retreat of the army. Amompharetus had no other choice than to join the army, since he realized that he could not fight the Persians alone. In the meantime, Mardonius still thought that the Lacedaimonians were fleeing from battle and that they were men of no worth; so he ordered his men to pursue them. But the result was the opposite, i.e. the Persians were turned to flight by the Lacedaimonians (9.58, 59). Herodotus’s message was that aidos was not the right feeling at this juncture. Such an ideological approach to war was also Plato’s conception. Laches, one of Socrates’ interlocutors, says that a man should be considered brave if he fought his enemies without fleeing from his post (μὴ φεύγοι–Lach.190e5–6). Socrates did not reject that but he added that a temporary retreat might sometimes be necessary, so moving from one’s post should not be equated to flight. He cited as an example the Lacedaimonians at Plataea, who when they came upon the light shields of the Persians were not willing to stand and fight but fled; but when the ranks of the Persians were broken they turned upon them and won the battle. On the other hand, if someone did not consider that his enemies would be more numerous than him, regardless of whether he fought on land or at sea, but still endured and remained at his post, this was foolish endurance (190e5–191e3).  185 In particular, he called him a madman and one who was not in his right mind. For the interpretation of madness as irresponsibility, which I offer in the text, cf. Rademaker, 2005, 253– 54.

130  Chapter 2: Callicratidas’ generalship Thus it is no surprise that Thucydides and Xenophon show that many times during the Peloponnesian War the Spartans did not always accept challenges to battle. Thucydides tells us that in 425 B.C., when the Athenian fleet sailed to Pylos and drew up for an engagement in the open sea, the Spartans refused the challenge and remained quiet on shore. In 412/11 B.C. Astyochus did the same when the Athenians attacked him at Miletus. In 411 B.C. the Spartans did not set out to meet the Athenians at Miletus again, even though they were superior in numbers. Xenophon, writing in a similar vein, has reported that Lysander did not fight Alcibiades after Notium and shows later, as we will see,186 that Lysander did not accept battle against the Athenians at Aegospotami regardless of the thoughts of his opponents.187 Thucydides gives an explanation of this through a specific incident. When the Lacedaimonian Therimenes challenged the Athenians to battle, the Athenian generals Onomacles and Scironides wanted to remain and risk a battle, but Phrynichus refused and declared that neither he himself would fight nor would he allow them or anyone else to fight if he could help it. For when they could discover the exact number of the enemy's ships and the proportion which their own bore to them, and, before engaging, make adequate preparations at their leisure, he would not be so foolish as to risk all through fear of disgrace. Moreover, he said that there was no dishonor in retreating before an enemy's fleet when circumstances required, but there would be the deepest dishonor under any circumstances in a defeat; and the city would then not only incur disgrace, but would be in the utmost danger. It cannot be a coincidence that the adjective αἰσχρόν is repeated four times (8.26.1–27.3). We must note that Thucydides intervenes consciously in the narrative (8.27.6), justifying the thoughts of Phrynichus,188 and praises Phrynichus’ ξύνεσις, i.e. (a) his ability to conceive a policy which is consonant with the needs and/or best interests of his state; and (b) his ability to carry out such policy, and at the same time his foresight so as to be able to anticipate positive and especially negative fallout.189 Although this incident is seen from the Athenian perspective, the priority of good calculation over spontaneous reaction also applies to Sparta. Xenophon strengthens and/or continues the analysis of his predecessor that logic

 186 See p. 232. 187 For these sea-fights and the issue of disgrace see Pritchett, 1974, 151–52. In my analysis I shall expand his arguments in regard to my subject. 188 Cf. Gribble, 1998, 46, 65. 189 Cf. Bloedow, 1992, 141, Gribble, 1999, 204.

Callicratidas’ end  131

should prevail over aidos, at least in some cases. He explicitly says in his Agesilaus that he is not going to maintain that his hero fought his enemies in Boeotia in spite of having far fewer and inferior forces, because such an assertion would only reveal the senselessness of the general and the folly of the writer who should select as praiseworthy the reckless imperilling of mighty interests (12.7). Xenophon’s opinion fully coincides with the opinion of Pausanias in Herodotus, which we saw earlier. Therefore Xenophon’s readers should come to the conclusion that honorable action had its fitting time and when this was not the right one, a man should renounce his ambition, adopt a policy of safety and not consider this shameful.190 This suggests that Callicratidas should not have insisted on fighting the Athenians at all costs, although he had initially set out in search of a battle. This was not the only mistake of Callicratidas. After this short dialogue between Hermon and the Spartan commander Xenophon reports that the Peloponnesian ships fought in close order at first but then they spread out (ἁθρόαι– διεσκεδασμέναι). Considering that he has reported that: (a) Stages killed most of the men of Thrasyllus, because they had spread out from their camp (διεσκεδασμένοι–1.2.5); (b) Clearchus intended to draw the Athenians away from the besieged Byzantium by attacking with all the ships ἁθρόαι (1.3.17); and (c) in the battle at Aegospotami Lysander captured most of the Athenians, because they were scattered away from their ships (διεσκεδασμένων), and only Conon and a few more ships escaped because they put out to sea ἁθρόαι (2.1.28), the outcome could not have been good for the Peloponnesian fleet.191 Hermon’s judgement proved right that their fleet should not fight their enemies at this moment. Callicratidas rammed an Athenian ship, but the man who considered himself ‘husband’ of the sea had an inglorious death, since he did not die fighting but disappeared into the sea.192 At this point we must remember Mindarus, who had  190 According to Plut. Ages.36.2, Agesilaus believed that honorable action had its fitting time and that it was the observance of due bounds that constituted the difference between honorable and base actions. Laforse, 1988, 60–61 points out that there were few Spartan commanders noted for their well-timed boldness’ (my emphasis). 191 For disorder as a predictor of defeat see also Dillery, 1995, 28–30. On my understanding of the text, nowhere does Xenophon allow us to say that the battle of Arginousai was an ‘unexpected result’, as Laforse, 1988, 61 says. 192 I argue this because in 4.3.12 Peisander died at the battle of Cnidus fighting (ἐπὶ τῇ νηὶ μαχόμενον ἀποθανεῖν–my emphasis). Cf. also Polyb. 16.5.2, who says that when Autolycus’ ship ἐμβαλούσης εἰς πολεμίαν ναῦν (the same wording as that of Xenophon), he fell into the sea after suffering injuries, while his marines died fighting. Thus I disagree with Hau, 2016, 226 who claims that in all battlefield narratives in Xenophon’s Hellenica the commander’s death signals the defeat of his troops, for which he often bears a large part of the blame, but his heroic death ensures the preservation of his reputation (my emphasis). On the contrary, cf. Diod. 13.99.4–5

132  Chapter 2: Callicratidas’ generalship accepted Alcibiades’ challenge to fight although his army was inferior in numbers. The result was that Mindarus’ men fled when they saw that he had died.193 Xenophon shows that the same happened on this occasion too. Callicratidas chose a supposedly honorable death like Mindarus. But Protomachus’ defeat of the left wing of the Spartans made the surviving Spartan vessels flee to Chios and Phocaia, while the majority was destroyed in the sea-fight (1.6.33–34). Thus, although Callicratidas thought the recipient of his action would be the Spartans at home, in fact it was the allies of Sparta who suffered. The choice of the Spartan ships to go to Phocaia was justified because Thrasybulus had failed in his epiteichismos of the place.194 The fate of the remainder of the Spartan fleet remained unknown. Readers might think now that after the defeat of the Spartans and their allies at Arginousai the Athenians had better prospects of winning the war. The generals who had replaced Alcibiades proved themselves worthy of the present victory. However, things will prove more complex.

 who says that in the engagement between the ships of Callicratidas and Pericles the former died after receiving several wounds. 193 See p. 21. 194 See pp. 87–88.

Chapter 3: The trial after Arginousai . The military events after the sea battle at Arginousai The Athenians returned to Arginousai (1.6.33). Thucydides stresses in 7.34.6 that there was no pursuit after the sea battle at Naupactus, a fact which implies that this was something exceptional. Xenophon implies that the Athenians chose not to pursue the escaping Peloponnesian fleet. Then he reports the losses of the two fleets. The Athenians lost twenty-five ships together with their men (αὐτοῖς ἀνδράσιν) except for few who made their way to the shore (πρὸς τὴν γῆν). The fact that only few managed to save their lives indicates that something bad had happened. Such a thought is borne out by Thuc. 7.34.6, who says that after a naval battle off Naupactus the Corinthians and the Peloponnesians were fighting close to the land (πρὸς τῇ γῇ) and thus their crews escaped. Xenophon emphasizes that the loss of men was great. This is not coincidental. In 1.6.24 he said that the Athenians embarked on their ships all their available men, free and slaves. Readers understand that the Athenians who already lacked manpower had lost a considerable number of their fellow citizens in a single battle. Xenophon’s readers should regard this as something exceptional. Thucydides reports that in the battle of Oropus the Peloponnesians defeated the Athenians but the latter landed on the shore (Thuc. 8.95.5). Moreover, Thucydides does not mention any losses for the Athenians at Cynossema (8.106). Xenophon himself does not mention any loss of lives in the battle of Abydus (1.1.5–7). Then he describes the battle at Cyzicus which started as a naval battle but ended up as a land battle (1.1.17). The battles mentioned above give the impression that the human losses were not great in naval engagements because the crews could fall into the water and swim to the shore. This is quite certain because Xenophon says in 1.5.14, when he narrates the battle of Notium, that the majority of the Athenians got away by swimming until they reached the shore. On the other hand, the loss of ships was not significant for the Athenians. Xenophon reported earlier that before the sea battle the Athenians had one hundred and fifty ships (1.6.25), so since they lost twenty-five vessels at Arginousai, they now numbered one hundred and twenty-five ships (1.6.34). The losses were much greater for the Peloponnesian fleet. The Lacedaimonians lost nine out of the ten ships they had, and their allies lost more than sixty. So the Peloponnesian fleet lost at least sixty-nine ships out of one hundred and twenty (1.6.26), which means that about fifty fled from Arginousai. This fact makes the question why the Athenians did not go after the Peloponnenians more pressing.

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110668315-004

134  Chapter 3: The trial after Arginousai Then Xenophon reports in oratio obliqua the decision (ἔδοξε) of the generals: (a) Thrasybulus, Theramenes and some of the taxiarchs (τῶν ταξιάρχων τινὰς) would sail (πλεῖν) with seventy-four ships to the vessels which had sunk and their crews (ἐπὶ τὰς καταδεδυκυίας ναῦς καὶ τοὺς ἐπ’ αὐτῶν ἀνθρώπους); and (b) the rest of the fleet would attack Eteonicus’ ships, which were conducting the siege at Mytilene. Readers come to the conclusion that the generals went back to Arginousai because they had two concerns, namely to save their men in the sea and to prevent Eteonicus from forcing Conon to surrender or destroying him. Xenophon said earlier that the Athenians had lost twenty-five ships with their men. Now readers understand that he is turning back in time to explain how this happened. The ships had sunk but their crews were still alive. This explains why the Athenians did not chase Eteonicus at once. It is noteworthy that Xenophon says that the commanders referred to their crews using the word ἀνθρώπους. Such a word has an emotional colour, i.e. it reveals the humanistic side of the generals and proves that they wanted to save their men.1 Eteonicus had been stationed at Mytilene with fifty ships and was laying siege to Conon (1.6.26). So now that the Athenians had one hundred twenty-five ships, that is, they outnumbered their enemy, they could easily defeat him. Xenophon’s audience should consider this plan logical, since the Arginousai islands were on the opposite side of Mytilene (1.6.26–27). This twofold plan explains why the Athenians did not go after the defeated ships of Callicratidas. In addition, this plan indicates that the generals trusted the two trierarchs and proves that the initial formation of the fleet according to which the the ten vessels of the taxiarchs were close to Diomedon (τῶν ταξιάρχων δέκα) (1.6.29) would change now. Some of them would assume the task of collecting the shipwrecked sailors. Reading this plan, Xenophon’s readers can rightly think that the generals took time in returning to their original position and then they put their plan into action. However, Xenophon is clear that the commanders believed that they had time both to collect their men and to destroy Eteonicus; they knew what they were

 1 Cf. Andoc. 1.57, who tries to put his jurors, who are safe, in the position of those who risked losing their lives in war and urges them to admit from a humane point of view (ἀνθρωπίνως) that many would prefer to live instead of dying nobly. Moreover, cf. Xen. 7.1.7, where Procles says to the Athenians that what is in danger in naval battles is the lives of ἀνθρώπων. In our case the generals are safe and think humanely about the lives of their crews who would not die fighting but would lose their live because of the bad weather. Such a concern was related to Athens’ selfimage as is testified by Pl. Men.237d4–e7, who says in regard to autochthony that Athens gave birth to human beings (ἄνθρωπον).

The military events after the sea battle at Arginousai  135

doing.2 This is the reason why he says that although the generals wanted to do these two things (ταῦτα βουλομένους), a strong (μέγας) wind (ἄνεμος και χειμών) prevented them from saving their men and attacking Eteonicus. This means that the generals could not have predicted the coming weather. Neither could Callicratidas have done (1.6.28). So Xenophon implies that there was nothing reprehensible in the generals’ plan.3 On the other hand, readers cannot but wonder what happened to the crews. Thucydides has narrated that when tidal waves swamped parts of Euboea, those who failed to escape in time to the uplands were drowned (Thuc. 3.89.2). Xenophon told us previously that only a few Athenians managed to arrive at the shore (1.6.34). This means that almost all the shipwrecked men were drowned because of the storm. But why did the generals not try to collect their men during the storm? Xenophon’s readers should find an answer to this question in Thucydides. He shows that a storm could change the course of a fleet or even worse cause damage to it. Thus, he says that Mindarus put to sea from Miletus and set sail for the Hellespont, but meeting with a storm (χειμασθεὶς δὲ ἀνέμῳ) he was driven into Icarus and was detained there five or six days by stress of weather (8.99.1). Moreover, he says that when Gylippus, travelling from Taras along the coast of Italy, was caught in the Terinaean gulf by a wind (ἁρπασθεὶς ὑπ' ἀνέμου), he was carried into the open sea. After experiencing a most violent storm (χειμασθείς) he returned to Taras, where he drew up those of his ships which had suffered in the gale (ὑπὸ τοῦ χειμῶνος) and refitted them (Thuc. 6.104.2). However, when the storm was heavy, human lives were lost. Thucydides reports that a fleet of thirty Athenian triremes encountered three Chian ships near Cape Arginus and chased them toward the city of Chios. When a great storm (χειμών μέγας) blew up, the Chian ships with difficulty escaped into their harbor, but of the Athenian ships the three which were most zealous in the pursuit were disabled and driven ashore near the city of Chios; the crews were either lost or taken captive. The remainder of the fleet found shelter in the harbor called Phoenicus (Thuc. 8.34.1). These incidents explain the inaction of the Arginousai commanders. They chose to remain at Arginousai in order to keep their ships and men safe from the storm, although  2 Perrin, 1904, 658–59 emphasizes the fact that the generals consumed time to return to their base at Arginousai but he does not take into account that Xenophon is clear about the generals’ plan. 3 Perrin, 1904, 659 believes that the generals made two grave mistakes: (a) they failed to rescue the surviving crews of the disabled vessels before the storm made such rescue impossible and; (b) they failed to attack either of the two divisions of the Spartan fleet while separated from one another and disheartened by defeat. This reading does not take into account Xenophon’s narrative.

136  Chapter 3: The trial after Arginousai this meant that the men of the disabled ships in the open sea would be drowned. The generals knew that they had no choice but to wait for the end of the bad weather. However, Gish argues that the storm did not prevent: (a) the bulk of the Athenian fleet from landing ashore, where the generals discussed their plan of action; (b) a few survivors from being saved, among them the man who was saved on a meal tub and then spoke in the Assembly; (c) the rest of the Spartan ships from regrouping after the defeat and sailing safely to Mytilene or Phocaia, where they rejoined the ships of Eteonicus and sailed off altogether to Chios; (d) Conon from launching his own contingent after the end of the blockade of Eteonicus and then meeting the rest of the Athenian fleet which sailed back into Mytilene; and (e) the Spartan dispatch boat from arriving at Mytilene, informing Eteonicus about the sea battle and sailing out of the harbor, there, twice.4 I should say that these arguments need a thorough refutation. First, I should point out that Gish’s sequence of events is not as it is presented, quite clearly actually, in 1.6.35. Xenophon says that when the Athenian fleet landed at Arginousai and the generals convened about a plan of action the weather was still good. In fact, it was because of the good weather that the generals were certain that they could save their crews; later on, when the storm came, they did not put their plan into action. Second, the fact that some men managed to survive was the exception to the rule in sea storms, as I argued earlier on the basis of Thucydides. This is the reason why Xenophon says that most of the Athenian crews lost their lives ἐκτός ὁλίγων. I shall return to this issue later, discussing the role of the anonymous man who spoke in the Assembly. In any case, it was clear to Xenophon’s audience and the Athenians that only a very few men could be have been saved from a storm. Third, when the Spartan fleet was defeated at Arginousai, it left straight for Chios and Phocaia (1.6.33); it was only after the arrival of the dispatch boat that Eteonicus had sailed to Chios (1.6.36). Now let us consider the movements of the Athenian fleet and the fleet of Eteonicus on the basis of the weather. Xenophon reports after his mention of the failure of the generals to save the crews and the number of the losses of the two fleets that a Spartan messenger boat carried news of the battle to Eteonicus at Mytilene. This ship had certainly been sent to Eteonicus when the Peloponnesians started to flee to Chios and Phocaia, but they never rejoined at this phase of the war. This boat informed Eteonicus that the division of the Spartan fleet which fought at Arginousai had fled to Chios and Phocaia,5 since Eteonicus did sail to  4 Gish, 2012, 208. 5 This is clear by the use of the phrase πάντα τὰ περὶ ναυμαχίαν.

The military events after the sea battle at Arginousai  137

Chios. The fact that Eteonicus wanted to find refuge at Chios reminds Xenophon’s readers that this island was safe for the Spartans because they had captured Delphinium thanks to Lysander’s victory at Notium.6 Xenophon implicitly keeps the memory of Lysander alive in the minds of his readers. How was the weather at that moment? Xenophon says that Eteonicus ordered his fleet to sail to Chios because ἧν τὸ πνεῦμα οὔριον. Xenophon’s use of the words χειμών and πνεῦμα reminds us that the Greeks had different words for different weather phenomena.7 He means with this sentence that a wind8 blew to the stern of the Peloponnesian ships;9 so Eteonicus took advantage of it and fled. This does not necessarily mean that the weather was not bad in Mytilene. Xenophon says immediately afterwards that Conon, who was pent up at Mytilene, decided to launch his ships when Eteonicus had already left10 and ὁ ἄνεμος ἧν εὐδιαίτερος. When the wind was mild someone could travel on the sea with favourable conditions;11 so Conon also took advantage of the improvement of the weather to meet the Athenian fleet.12 What is noteoworthy here is the use of the comparative degree of the adjective εὐδιαίτερος instead of the positive degree εὔδιος, which means that Conon launched his vessels at a time when the wind was not mild yet. The reason for such a move is that Conon was certain that his fleet would not be in danger because of the wind. At the same time we can be certain that Eteonicus was also in danger on account of the bad weather and not because there was no wind at all.

 6 See pp. 89–90. 7 Cf. Plat. Crat.410c5–7: Αἱ μὲν δὴ ὧραι ᾿Αττικιστὶ ὡς τὸ παλαιὸν ῥητέον, εἴπερ βούλει τὸ εἰκὸς εἰδέναι· ΗΟΡΑΙ γάρ εἰσι διὰ τὸ ὁρίζειν χειμῶνάς τε καὶ θέρη καὶ πνεύματα καὶ τοὺς καρποὺς. 8 In my analysis I translate the words πνεῦμα and ἄνεμος as ‘wind’, since the meaning of the two words was identical ([Arist.] On the World 394b8–9: ἄνεμος … ἅμα καὶ πνεῦμα λέγεται). Obviously, Xenophon used two words in order to avoid repetition. 9 Cf. schol. in Oppianum s.v. Οὔριον· οὔριος ὁ ἐπιτήδειος ἄνεμος, καὶ οὔριον πνεῦμα κυρίως ὁ ἀπὸ τῆς οὐρᾶς τῶν νηῶν, Himerius Or.47: πολὺς δὲ πνεύσας κατὰ πρύμνης οὔριος ἐλαύνει τὴν ὀλκάδα τῷ πνεύματι, Chariton Chaereus and Calliroe 1.11.1: ἀναχθεῖσα δὲ ἡ ναῦς ἐφἐρετο λαμπρῶς. Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐβιάζοντο πρὸς κῦμα καὶ πνεῦμα τῷ μὴ προκεῖσθαι τινα πλοῦν ἴδιον ἀυτοῖς, ἀλλ’ ἅπας ἄνεμος οὔριος αὐτοῖς ἐδόκει καὶ κατὰ πρύμναν εἱστήκει, 3.5.9–6.1: ᾿Εξελθὼν δὲ τοῦ λιμένος Χαιρέας καὶ ἀποβλέψας εἰς τὸ πέλαγος ... πνεῦμα δὲ φορὸν ὑπέλαβε τὴν τριήρη, schol. in Euripides Andromache 554 ll. 33–6. s.v. ἄλλως· ὃν τρόπον οὔριος ἄνεμος ἱστίοις, οὓτως κἀγὼ ταύτῃ φανήσομαι, τουτέστι· τοῦ περιέχοντος αὐτὴν χειμῶνος ἀπαλλάξω. ὁ γὰρ οὔριος ἄνεμος ὄπισθεν πνέων εὐκταῖος ἐστι καὶ σωτήριος τοῖς ναυτιλλομένοις ταραχῆς αὐτοὺς ἀπαλλάσσων. See also Herodianus Περὶ ὀρθογραφίας 3.2, 562 and Hesychius s.v. οὔριος. 10 Ηence the use of the verb ἀποδιδράσκω in the pluperfect. 11 Cf. Lucian Scythian 11: εὔδια πάντα καὶ πλοῦς οὔριος καὶ λειοκύμων ἡ θάλαττα. 12 Cf. Artemid. Onerocr.2.8: μετὰ γὰρ τοὺς μεγάλους χειμῶνας εὐδία γίνεται.

138  Chapter 3: The trial after Arginousai However, we realize this after we have read what Xenophon has to say about Conon. Moreover, it is important to note that Xenophon shows the haste of the Athenians to fight against Eteonicus before the wind died out by saying that when Conon moved out of the port of Mytilene the Athenian fleet had already left Arginousai; that is why they met him first.13 However, it was already late, because as Conon told them Eteonicus had already left. In any case, what matters for our understanding of the movements of the two fleets is that both Eteonicus and Conon had moved their ships even though the sea was not completely calm. Thus we can realize that the weather was bad at Arginousai and Mytilene at the same time, before the storm, and that it became better some time afterwards. One more point should be made about the storm. Xenophon reports that the dispatch boat arrived at Mytilene, while I have argued that the weather was bad. This inescapably means that the weather was still bad when this boat entered the port of Mytilene. In my opinion, Xenophon allows us to think that the dispatch boat faced the same bad weather at sea during its trip to Mytilene, but it preferred to continue travelling at all costs in order to inform Eteonicus about the defeat. Finally, it arrived at the port of Mytilene. Being now safe from the storm, Eteonicus ordered the crew of this boat to sail out and sail back to where it had come from immediately, crying out that the division of their fleet at Arginousai had defeated the Athenians. But sailing in and out from where? It is true that Xenophon uses the infinitive ἐκπλεῖν in 1.6.36. Moreover, it is worth noting that Xenophon said in 1.6.18 that Callicratidas controlled the way out to the sea (τὸν ἔκπλουν ἔχων) and in 1.6.20 that Conon’s two ships sailed out from the harbor (ἐξέπλευσαν ἔξω τοῦ λιμένος), one heading for the Hellespont, the other for the open sea (εἰς τὸ πέλαγος). However, the case now is not the same, because Xenophon clarifies that Eteonicus told the dispatch boat to ἐκπλεῖν and then πλεῖν εἰς τὸ ἑαυτῶν στρατόπεδον. Now the meaning of the text becomes clear: Eteonicus told these men to sail back to their camp, not to the open sea.14 Therefore he did not put them in danger again. Xenophon’s readers can understand this having in mind Thuc. 4.23.2: at night the entire Athenian fleet was moored around the island of Sphacteria except on the side towards the sea when the wind was high (πλὴν τὰ πρὸς τὸ πέλαγος, ὁπότε ἄνεμος εἴη).

 13 Note that Xenophon uses the participle in the present perfect, ἀνηγμένοις, and emphasizes that with the adverb ἤδη, and then he uses the verb ἔφρασε in the past tense. The temporal priority of the military action of the generals before Conon is clear. Cf. the translation of Krentz, 1989b, 57 Conon ‘met the Athenians, who had already set out from Arginousai’ (my emphasis). 14 For other examples of the meaning of the verb πλέω in Xenophon see van Rossum-Steenbeek, 1994, 456–57, who, however, does not include this passage in her analysis.

The military events after the sea battle at Arginousai  139

Thus Xenophon shows what the Spartan and the Athenian fleet did. When the wind changed in Mytilene, Eteonicus and Conon moved from the island, each one for the reasons which I mentioned above, while the bulk of the Athenian fleet remained at Arginousai, fearing the storm. But the Spartan dispatch boat traveled despite the bad weather. After the storm the whole area of Arginousai would be full of corpses, not only of those who lost their lives during the sea battle but also of those who were drowned. This prompts the question why the generals did not try to collect the corpses of their lost men. In my opinion, Xenophon hoped that his readers could find the answer by reading Thucydides, who refers to the failure of the Athenians to recover bodies after battle in his description of the burial custom in Athens. More particularly, Thucydides says that at the time of the funeral the bones were placed in chests, one for each tribe, and conveyed on hearses. However, apart from these ten indistinguishable chests, the Athenians also carried a single empty coffin decked with a pall for all whose bodies were missing and could not be recovered after the battle (ἀναίρεσιν–2.34.1–4). The failure to collect bodies after a naval battle must have been one of the occasions that the Athenians envisaged. Thucydides seems to have had this in mind, when he said that after the naval battle at Sybota the Corcyraeans took up the wrecks and dead bodies which were carried towards them by the current and the wind (τά τε ναυάγια καὶ νεκροὺς ἀνείλοντο τὰ κατὰ σφᾶς ἐξενεχθέντα ὑπό τε τοῦ ῥοῦ καὶ ἀνέμου–1.54.1). By saying that the Corcyreans could take up only the corpses which had drifted close to their ships, Thucydides took it for granted that the Corcyreans could not collect the others. The failure to collect the corpses after a battle was shocking for the Athenians, because it was an old custom and ancestral law to bury their dead.15 On the other hand, the Athenians accepted the possibility that they would not always be able to recover all the corpses after a battle. Therefore Xenophon’s readers could realize that the strong wind did not allow the collection of dead bodies. In fact, they could be certain that the Athenians were in a worse position than the Corcyreans because they left Arginousai while the wind was still blowing, as I argued above. So they had no chance to collect their dead. When the storm stopped, the generals set up a trophy for their victory and remained at Arginousai (1.6.35).

 15 Cf. Isocr. 12.169, who says that Adrastus from Thebes asked for the help of Theseus, because he could not ἀνελέσθαι τοὺς τετελευτηκότας and was afraid to see his ἄνδρας ἀτάφους γενομένους; something which was an old custom and ancestral law for all people.

140  Chapter 3: The trial after Arginousai

. The deposition of the generals The Athenians at home deposed the generals. With the phrase οἱ ἐν οἴκῳ Xenophon implies that the generals sent a letter to their fellow citizens (1.7.1), since this was a case of emergency.16 His audience already knows that the generals failed to save the crews due to the bad weather (1.6.35). So Xenophon avoided repeating what was already known to his audience. But the aforementioned phrase should alert the readers about what would ensue. The historian has narrated that Alcibiades informed the Athenians after Notium about what happened there in order to convince them that he was not responsible for the defeat of the fleet; however, οἱ ἐν οἴκῳ did not believe him.17 The interaction of generals in the field with the home-city becomes a recurrent theme. In my opinion, Xenophon’s choice of the same phrase aims at warning his readers that, although the generals hoped that they would convince their fellow citizens about the problems that the storm created at Arginousai, they would not receive a warm welcome. Indeed, Xenophon confirms that the citizens at home did not believe the letter of the commanders and deposed them. The only logical conclusion one can draw is that the Athenians did not accept the generals’ claim that they were not able to save the shipwrecked because of the storm. The Athenians did not depose Conon, who was blocked in Mytilene, as Xenophon has shown. We can safely assume that the Athenians believed that Conon could not be involved in the loss of the crews at Arginousai. In addition, the Athenians elected new generals, Adeimantus and Philocles (1.7.2). Regarding Adeimantus, Xenophon mentioned earlier that he had been elected general, accompanying Alcibiades in the Hellespont (1.4.1). The fact that he was reelected now indicates that Alcibiades’ failure at Notium did not affect the Athenians’ opinion about him. On the other hand, it is noteworthy that Xenophon’s silence about Adeimantus implies that this man had not done anything important as a general to deserve his office again. Xenophon mentions Philocles for the first time. Comparing the victorious generals of Arginousai with Adeimantus and Philocles, Xenophon’s readers could have doubts whether the new ge 16 The phrase is found in a lead letter of the early 4th century B.C. in which one Articon is away from home and writes to his family (τοῖς ἐν οἴκῳ) in Athens, presumably during winter, to send him cheap leather items (see Eidinow and Taylor, 2010, 30–62, especially 38 for this letter). For another moment of crisis cf. Plut. Dem.29.3 who mentions that, when Demosthenes was pursued by the Macedonians as far as the temple of Poseidon at Calauria, he obtained from Archias some time to write a letter home (τοῖς οἴκοι). The meaning of the phrase is proved a little later by Theramenes. See further below. 17 See pp. 90–91.

The reaction of the generals  141

nerals would be competent to win the war against Sparta. But the Athenians thought they should trust them more than the commanders who had achieved such a great victory against Sparta. Moreover, it is surprising that the Athenians did not feel any joy for this victory, although this should have been their expected reaction.18 Through the absence of any report of excitement on the part of the Athenians, Xenophon seems to imply that on hearing of this mixture of good news with bad, the Athenians valued only the latter. Moreover, he gives the impression that the Athenians took a hurried decision against the generals. This seems to be the case, if we compare the present reaction of the Athenians with the one earlier. Thus although in 1.5.16 and 1.6.24 Xenophon made his readers realize the passing of time by using temporal sentences, recounting the Athenians’ reactions after the defeat at Notium and Conon’s blockade at Mytilene,19 nothing of the kind is written here. Finally, it is noteworthy that paragraph 1.7.2 is a long period, which reports many incidents. This also indicates that everything happened quickly. Let us examine each one of them separately.

. The reaction of the generals Out of the eight generals, two, Protomachus and Aristogenes, did not return to Athens (οὐκ ἀπῆλθον); the other six, Pericles, Diomedon, Lysias, Aristocrates, Thrasyllus and Erasinides chose to go back home all together.20 Trying to explain the reaction of Protomachus and Aristogenes, we should read Thucydides who reports similar reactions of other generals, which constitute a precedent: (a) the general Demosthenes decided not to return to Athens after his defeat in Aetolia in 427/26 B.C. because he was afraid of the Athenians on account of what had  18 I make this thought having in mind the messenger in Aeschylus’ Agamemnon (636–660), who describes a similar situation: an angry storm (649: χειμῶνα, 656: χειμῶνι) and fierce winter hit the Achean fleet. When the bad weather stopped, the Achaeans saw the Aegean in full bloom with the corpses of Greek men and the floating ruins of their fleet. When the people at home heard the news, they said that this was a day with pleasant news but which was destroyed later with ill announcements. 19 1.5.16: οἱ δὲ ἐν οἴκῳ ᾿Αθηναῖοι, ἐπειδὴ ἠγγέλθη ἡ ναυμαχία, χαλεπῶς εἶχον τῷ ᾿Αλκιβιάδῃ; 1.6.24: οἱ δὲ ᾿Αθηναῖοι τὰ γεγενημένα … ἐπεὶ ἤκουσαν, ἐψηφίσαντο. 20 Munn, 2012, 402 n. 18 argues that Diomedon and Erasinides were replaced and returned home prior to the call of the other generals because Xenophon reports that the Athenians initially appointed two replacement generals, Adeimantus and Philocles. However, he presents the return of Diomedon and Erasinides along with the other generals (1.7.2) and nothing allows us to say that they went home earlier.

142  Chapter 3: The trial after Arginousai happened (3.98.5); and (b) Nicias feared that many or most of the very soldiers who were crying out that their case was desperate in Sicily would raise the opposite cry when they reached home and would say that the generals were traitors (καταπροδόντες–7.48.4).21 There was a climate of tension between the Athenians at home and their generals abroad.22 Thus we can infer that Protomachus and Aristogenes preferred voluntary exile because they feared that they would be convicted in an ensuing trial.23 The other generals returned home because they hoped that the Athenians would hold a fair trial on the basis of the law. Xenophon allows us to think this by considering other trials. We read in Thucydides that when Alcibiades was accused of the Mysteries before the Sicilian expedition, he wanted to be judged without delay and adjured his fellow citizens not to listen to calumnies which might be propagated against him in his absence (ἀπόντος–Thuc. 6.29.1–2). Alcibiades wanted to convince the Athenians that he abode by the laws and that he was innocent. The Athenians did not hear his protests, so when he was called to face charges Alcibiades chose not to return but to live as an exile.24 Moreover, the case of Callixenus, which we shall see later in this chapter, sheds light on the decision of the commanders to return. When the Athenians ordered the imprisonment of Callixenus on the charge that he had deceived the demos, he escaped when he found an opportunity, knowing that he was guilty.25 However, Xenophon shows that things turned out differently for the Arginousai commanders.

. Archedemus’ trial against Erasinides The first general who received a hostile reception was Erasinides. Archedemus, the current champion of the demos (προεστηκώς), who took care of the two-obol allowance (τῆς διωβελίας ἐπιμελόμενος), imposed a fine on Erasinides and accused him in court, claiming that he held money from the Hellespont (ἐξ ῾Ελλησπόντου), which belonged to the demos. Archedemus also accused Erasinides in connection with his generalship. The jury decided to imprison Erasinides  21 For other examples from Thucydides which show that Athenian generals were afraid that their fellow citizens would punish them if they failed, see Hamel, 1998, 118. 22 See Rood, 2004, 376. 23 Andrewes, 1974, 113 remarks that Xenophon leaves quite unexplained the decision of Protomachus and Aristogenes not to return home. This is true but he does not consider that Xenophon expected his readers to know Thucydides. 24 See pp. 47–49. 25 See pp. 209–10.

Archedemus’ trial against Erasinides  143

(1.7.1–2). The term προεστηκώς is cognate with the word προστάτης.26 It was used in democratic contexts to refer to the orators who interposed themselves between the people and the dangers that threatened them and attacked internal enemies of the people in the courts.27 Xenophon took it for granted that his readers knew about the διωβελία. This seems to have been a subsistence grant available to citizens who did not receive any other money from the state.28 On the basis of these data, we understand that Archedemus attacked Erasinides in order to appear popular. However, the accusation that Erasinides had the administration of this money and that he embezzled it does not find support in Xenophon’s account. He has said that the Athenians occupied Chrysopolis of Calchedon and made a custom house there, leaving Theramenes and Eumachus in charge in order to collect taxes from the ships coming in and out of the Hellespont (ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου–1.1.22).29 Besides, Xenophon does not say that Erasinides was responsible for the taxes from the Hellespont. Perhaps the Athenians expected resources to have come from the region, but when this did not transpire Archedemus turned against Erasinides. Through this incongruity between the account and Archedemus’ accusation Xenophon implicitly condemns Archedemus30 and considers him a sycophant.31 In addition, Archedemus took advantage of the negative opinion of the Athenians about the generals and accused Erasinides about his generalship at Arginousai as well. We have seen in Xenophon’s account that the commanders wanted to save the crews. So the historian leads his readers to disapprove of Archedemus’ attack. The jurors believed Archedemus and punished Erasinides with imprisonment.32 This verdict about Erasinides must have worsened the position of the other generals in the eyes of the Athenians.

 26 Xenophon himself clarifies in his Poroi 1.1 that the two words are identical. 27 See Ober, 1989, 316. 28 See Rhodes, 1981, 355–56. 29 Since Theramenes served as trierarch at Arginousai, he must have been replaced by someone else or Eumachus remained at Chrysopolis alone. 30 Blok, 2013, 93, 99 remarks that Xenophon’s account of Archedemus is not overtly negative but then she notes that if the accusation against Erasinides was true, it would have affected the money for the diobelia (my emphasis). If my interpretation of the text is correct, Xenophon did not agree with Archedemus’ action against Erasinides. See also next n. 31 In Aristophanes’ Plutus the sycophant describes himself as τῶν τῆς πόλεως ἐπιμελητὴς πραγμάτων (907), who helps the laws so that nobody can do wrong to them (914–15). However, Dicaeus does not believe that he has sincere motives and says that Athens πονηρόν γ’ ἆρα προστάτην ἔχει (920). 32 For imprisonment as punishment see Allen, 1997, 121–35.

144  Chapter 3: The trial after Arginousai Thus although nothing in Xenophon’s account suggests that Archedemus’ prosecution was part of a political plot against the generals as a group,33 this man was no better than Theramenes, who turned against all the generals;34 that is why Xenophon chose to record his action. In fact, such a man could only put Athens in grave danger and not save it.35 This becomes quite certain because by defining Archedemus as a προστάτης τοῦ δήμου Xenophon knew that he defined him as a factional leader, the representative of the demos’ interests against its enemies in a period of stasis.36 This recalls Thucydides who said that the Athenians were in civil strife even before the Sicilian disaster (ἤδη ἐν στάσει ὄντες) and that they were were at last overthrown, not by their enemies, but by themselves and their own internal dissensions (2.65.12). Xenophon confirms the existence of civil strife in his city by mentioning the leading role of Archedemus.

. The generals in the Council Then the generals διηγοῦντο in the Council περί τε τῆς ναυμαχίας καὶ τοῦ μεγέθους τοῦ χειμῶνος (1.7.3).37 I argued earlier that the commanders had sent a letter to Athens, explaining that they had defeated the Spartans but had failed to save the crews owing to the bad weather.38 Now Xenophon’s readers realize that the commanders repeated orally what they had written in their letter and that they remained stable in their interpretation of the events at Arginousai. However, Timocrates said that the rest of the generals also should be imprisoned and put in chains (καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους δεθέντας),39 and then be delivered to the demos. It is noteworthy that Timocrates reminded the Councillors that Erasinides had already been put in jail. This fact confirms our previous suspicion that Erasinides’ imprisonment worsened the opinion of the Athenians about the generals. By putting the generals in prison the Councillors took a precautionary measure,40 which aimed  33 As McCoy, 1991, 319 n. 62 says. 34 Blok, 2013, 99 tries to justify Archedemus’ action, saying that Xenophon calls him a leader of the demos; however, he does not range him among those who accused all the generals in one stroke after the Arginousai but only Erasinides. 35 Cf. Din. 1.76, who claims that only one thing can save the city, τὸ προστατῶν ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ συμβούλων σπουδαίων τυχεῖν. 36 For this meaning of the word προστάτης see Rosenbloom, 2004, 91. 37 Cf. [Plut.] Lives of the Ten Orators 850b1–2: διηγεῖσθαι τὰ πραχθέντα. 38 See p. 140. 39 As the participle δεθέντας and the verb ἔδησε denotes. See Allen, 2000, 226 and 395 n. 107. For other examples see Hunter, 1997, 308. 40 For imprisonment as a precautionary measure see Hunter, 1997, 307.

The meeting in the Assembly  145

at preventing the generals from leaving Athens.41 On the basis of Xenophon’s account of the events at Arginousai, we can suspect that the bouleutai did not believe that the heavy storm prevented the generals from saving the shipwrecked. Xenophon gives the impression that this Timocrates proposed the imprisonment of the generals, acting on his own. So readers can think that Timocrates, like Archedemus, was not a member of a political conspiracy against the commanders. Nonetheless, Xenophon leaves no doubt that this man turned the Councillors against the generals. The importance of Timocrates’ move against the generals will appear later.

. The meeting in the Assembly After the meeting of the Council and everything said and decided there (μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα) the Athenians gathered on the Pnyx. In this session of the Assembly some men, whom Xenophon prefers to keep anonymous and just calls them ‘others’ (ἄλλοι), were accusing (κατηγόρουν) the generals because they did not collect the shipwrecked men. The man who accused the generals most fiercely (μάλιστα) was Theramenes, asking them to explain why they οὐκ ἀνείλοντο τοὺς ναυαγούς. The question that arises is: when did Theramenes come back to the city? Xenophon has said that the trierarchs Theramenes and Thrasybulus were ordered to collect the crews (1.6.35), while we learn later that the generals would sail against Eteonicus.42 After the failure of the Athenians to collect their shipwrecked men, they were stationed at Samos. It was there that the generals learned about their deposition. Since the six generals returned to Athens, it is logical to assume that they returned to the city with their ships under the commands of their trierarchs. At the same time, readers can assume that Theramenes and Thrasybulus also returned to Athens with their own vessels because their superiors had told them to do so. Alternatively, we can think that Theramenes and Thrasybulus returned to the city earlier than the generals43 but certainly not after them. In either case, readers can assume that the generals trusted their subordinates and even hoped that they would support them in an ensuing trial. This relationship between commanders and subordinates is something that should attract our attention. We have seen that Alcibiades had trusted Antiochus before

 41 As MacDowell, 1978, 288 remarks. 42 Xen. 1.7.35. See p. 134. 43 Cf. Diod. 13.101.2, who says that the two trierarchs returned to Athens before the generals.

146  Chapter 3: The trial after Arginousai leaving for Phocaia,44 but the Athenians put the blame on him for the defeat at Notium. In the present episode we see that the Arginousai generals trusted Theramenes and Thrasybulus, but the Athenians put the blame on them for the loss of the crews. This coincidence should make readers suspect that the future of the commanders would not be better than that of Alcibiades. Theramenes appeared in the Assembly and spoke against his superiors. Xenophon focuses his readers’ attention on him, while his silence about Thrasybulus indicates that this man did not appear to accuse the commanders. In order to show that the generals did not accuse anybody else (οὐδενὸς ἄλλου), Theramenes displayed as evidence the letter (ἐπιστολὴν ἐπεδείκνυε μαρτύριον) that the generals had sent to the Council and the demos in which they blamed nothing else but the storm (ἄλλο οὐδὲν αἰτιώμενοι ἢ τὸν χειμῶνα–1.7.4). Theramenes’ mention of the content of this letter is very important for readers’ understanding of the previous events. Xenophon’s audience realizes that the first men who heard the letter of the generals were the Councillors; the bouleutai sent the case to the Assemblymen, who decided to depose the generals. When the commanders returned to Athens, they repeated orally to the Councillors what had happened; but they were unconvincing again. Thus they failed to persuade the Boule about their good intentions twice. Moreover, Xenophon’s readers can be certain that this meeting of the Assembly would be the second one regarding the commanders’ case. As far as Theramenes is concerned, Xenophon allows us to observe that he was the only man who thought of mentioning the generals’ letter once more. It is noteworthy that Theramenes was more resourceful than the others who spoke in the Assembly. However, he did not present the letter to support the generals’ innocence but to blame them. His insistence that his superiors were solely responsible for the failure to collect the crews indicates that he wanted to divert the Athenians’ mind from himself. This is proved by Xenophon who said that the generals commanded Theramenes to collect the shipwrecked men (1.6.35). Xenophon’s audience understands that Theramenes could not forget that he was responsible for not executing their order. On the other hand, readers cannot disregard the fact that the generals said in their letter that rescuing the men had been prevented by the storm. Moreover, it is possible that the generals said that they had given the task to Theramenes and Thrasybulus but they had been prevented by the storm. So we understand that this is the reason why the Athenians did not accuse him. Therefore Xenophon insinuates that by mentioning that letter

 44 See pp. 87–88.

The meeting in the Assembly  147

Theramenes did not try to save his life;45 his reaction should be attributed only to personal motives.46 His behavior towards the generals is in complete contrast to that of the Syracusan trierarchs who decided to bring their generals back from exile when they returned to their city (1.1.29). Xenophon already insinuates something about Theramenes’ character. Xenophon slows down his speed of narration and reports in detail what took place in this session. So he says that after the speeches of Theramenes and the others (μετὰ ταῦτα) each of the generals defended himself briefly (οἱ στρατηγοὶ βραχέως ἕκαστος ἀπελογήσατο). This information is worthy of attention. Xenophon reported earlier that the generals took a collective decision about the shipwrecked men and Eteonicus.47 Now we read that each one of the six generals gave an individual, short speech. This allows Xenophon’s audience to infer that some discussion between the generals must have taken place at Arginousai. But Xenophon explains, using a parenthesis, that the commanders were not given the time prescribed by law (οὐ γὰρ προυτέθη σφίσι λόγος κατὰ τὸν νόμον). Thus through the adverb ‘briefly’ Xenophon means that the law stipulated that a man should be allowed to defend himself for a specific length of time. Obviously the session became tense at this moment. The only logical explanation that readers could give is that for the Assemblymen the decision of the commanders was only collective. Thus the generals τὰ πεπραγμένα διηγοῦντο. They said that they sailed against the enemies (ἐπὶ τοὺς πολεμίους πλέοιεν), while for the collection of the shipwrecked (τὴν ἀναίρεσιν τῶν ναυαγῶν) they gave orders to the trierarchs, who were competent men and had already served as generals (ἱκανοῖς καὶ ἐστρατηγηκόσιν ἤδη), Theramenes and Thrasybulus and other men of this kind (καὶ ἄλλοις τοιούτοις). Xenophon has explained to us that the generals decided that Theramenes and Thrasybulus, who were trierarchs (τριηράρχους), would sail towards the sinking ships and the men, while the generals would move against Eteonicus (1.6.35). We can detect a small difference between the defense of the generals and Xenophon’s account. The commanders implied that they sailed first and the vessels under the orders of the trierarchs moved a little later, while the historian does

 45 Sordi, 1992, 14 has noted that Theramenes did not accuse the generals to save himself, but she did not analyze Xenophon’s text. 46 Krentz, 1989b, 131 remarks that Theramenes spoke only after the generals had been recalled and after the charges were referred to the Assembly. However, this does not explain his aggressive stance towards the generals. 47 See above p. 134.

148  Chapter 3: The trial after Arginousai not report this detail. This can mean either that the generals lied or that Xenophon expected his readers to accept this claim. In my opinion, we should choose the second scenario, because it does not contradict the essence of the plan. Moreover, all the Athenian ships had anchored at Arginousai. One of the two divisions should sail first, so this must have been the division of the generals. In this way they would save time and thus they would be able to catch Eteonicus, while the division of the trierarchs could save the shipwrecked. Thus, a temporal priority was given to the second part of the plan. A careful reader of Xenophon could find this explanation in Thucydides, who says about Leon and Diomedon ὁπότε ποι πλέοιεν, κατέλειπον φύλακας (8.73.5). Therefore, in my opinion, Xenophon’s readers should believe that the commanders told the truth. In addition, the generals explained why they had assigned the difficult mission of the collection to the two trierarchs, whom they named. The reason was the trierarchs’ ability. This information is new and is not found in Xenophon’s account. In fact, Xenophon focused on how the Athenian generals formatted their fleet at Arginousai in order to defeat Callicratidas (1.6.29–30). This is not surprising because in the Hellenica the trierarchs always have a secondary role compared to the generals.48 Moreover, the importance of trierarchs in a sea battle becomes clear if we consider that the Syracusan generals said that, when they were leading the fleet, the trierarchs had been undefeated because they kept the strongest formation in the sea owing to their willingness to obey (1.1.28). If we compare this passage with Xenophon’s emphasis on the order of the Athenian fleet at Arginousai under the leadership of the generals,49 his readers can be certain that the commanders really appreciated the abilities of their trierarchs. Our previous assumption that the generals chose the two trierarchs because they trusted them50 becomes a certainty now. Thus, it is no surprise that the generals called them ἱκανοί, which was an adjective that the Athenians used to praise a man’s military abilities.51

 48 Lysander put men as trierarchs in his ships (2.1.12); when Iphicrates became a general, he forced the trierarchs to embark the men on ships (6.2.14); Teleutias knew that the Athenian trierarchs slept at home (5.1.21). 49 Cf. Xen. 1.6.29–30: ᾿Αριστοκράτης … ἡγεῖτο πεντεκαίδεκα ναυσί and the multiple uses of the verb τάττομαι: παρατεταγμένοι–ἐπετέτακτο–τεταγμένοι–ἐπετέτακτο–ἐτάχθησαν. 50 See p. 134. 51 Cf. Thuc. 6.72.2, who praises Hermocrates as a man κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἐμπειρίᾳ τε ἱκανός γενόμενος and Xen. Symp.8.39, where it is said that Themistocles was ἱκανός to free Greece.

The meeting in the Assembly  149

Xenophon’s readers could even wonder if there was an intimacy between the generals and the two trierarchs.52 Indeed, this seems to be a factor in the choice of Thrasybulus. Reading Thucydides, we can infer that Thrasybulus served with Diomedon as a trierarch in 412 B.C. in the Aegean Sea, supporting the victory of the Samian democrats.53 Then Xenophon told us that Diomedon and Thrasybulus again found themselves on a campaign as general and trierarch respectively. Therefore we can be certain that Theramenes and Thrasybulus were the appropriate men to save the crews. This was also the opinion of the commanders about the rest of their subordinates, whom they avoided naming but also praised as ἄλλοι τοιούτοι.54 Xenophon records the rest of the speech of the generals in direct speech. We have seen that he also recorded Alcibiades’ speech to his men before the battle of Cyzicus in direct speech in order to alert the readers to the importance of these words.55 Xenophon uses the same technique again. Thus we read that the generals said: ‘if you should blame someone (the subject of δέοι is ὑμᾶς) for the matter of the collection of the shipwrecked men, it should be nobody else than those to whom the order had been given. Yet we shall not lie because they accuse us’,56 the generals said, ‘claiming that they are guilty, but it was the magnitude of the storm (τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ χειμῶνος) that prevented the rescue of the shipwrecked’. Hearing Theramenes accusing them, the generals reacted to his attack. They became more accurate about the real responsibility for the failure to collect the shipwrecked and pointed out that they had given orders (προστάξαιεν) to their subordinates to complete the mission. Their rhetorical point was that if the Athenians wanted to accuse those who were actually answerable for the failure to collect the crews, it was not the generals who failed to do their duty but the trierarchs. But at the same time they removed the blame from the trierarchs by saying that the real reason for what happened was the bad natural phenomena of the day. We

 52 Cf. Xen. 1.1.30, where it is said that Hermocrates called to his tent the most capable of his trierarchs whom he had come to know for a time; there he shared with them what he intended to do and instructed them accordingly. 53 See Thuc. 8.21 with McCoy, 1991, 306–11. 54 For the use of the pronoun τοιοῦτοι to avoid identifying someone cf. Dem. 14.34. For its use to make a positive evaluation cf. Isocr. 15.116, where Isocrates praises the general Timotheus for choosing the best of his officers to be useful to the city: ὁ δὲ τοῖς μὲν τοιούτοις λοχαγοῖς ἐχρῆτο καὶ ταξιάρχοις, ὧν ἔνιοι διὰ τὴν μετ’ ἐκείνου στρατείαν ἄξιοι λόγου καὶ χρήσιμοι τῇ πόλει γεγόνασιν. Cf. also Isocr. 4.83, 8.13, [Lys.] 20.31, Lys. 2.10. 55 See above pp. 17–18. 56 Munn, 2000, 184–85 interprets Xenophon’s text as meaning that Theramenes defended himself. But the generals spoke as men who were being accused: κατηγοροῦσιν ἡμῶν (1.7.6).

150  Chapter 3: The trial after Arginousai cannot miss the point that the commanders knew that if they put the blame on the trierarchs they would be lying (οὐ ψευσόμεθα).57 As διηγοῦντο οἱ στρατηγοὶ περί … τοῦ μεγέθους τοῦ χειμῶνος in the Council, they did the same now by repeating their first testimony.58 Readers cannot doubt that the commanders remained firm, consistent and truthful regarding the facts at Arginousai. There is one point worth noting in this reply. The generals use the verb κατηγοροῦσιν, which seems to respond to the κατηγόρουν ἄλλοι τε καὶ Θηραμένης (1.7.4). Among these ‘others’ Thrasybulus is not included; otherwise Xenophon would have named him. Nonetheless, the generals did not seem to have in mind those who spoke against them but the two trierarchs. This leads us to think that the generals were certain that Thrasybulus must have supported Theramenes in his attack against them, even though he did not talk against them openly. Evidently, the commanders suspected collaboration between the two trierarchs but Xenophon does not confirm this.59 This is important because Thrasybulus’ silence in the trial indicates something about the quality of his character,60 which is so different from that of Theramenes. The commanders furnished as witnesses the captains and many of those who sailed with them (τῶν συμπλεόντων–1.7.6). Xenophon has said that the generals ordered the trierarchs πλεῖν towards the shipwrecked (1.6.35). It is certain that the crews learned about the order of their generals to save their fellow warriors. The testimony of these men was of crucial impotance because they participated in the fleet at Arginousai. So it is not surprising to read here that the sailors supported their commanders. The generals were persuading (ἔπειθον) the demos (1.7.6). Moreover, many ordinary Athenian wanted to stand pledge for the generals. Xenophon’s account gives the impression that this must have been a lively session and most of all time-consuming, since so many people wanted to support the generals. So it comes as natural to read that it was resolved that the matter be postponed to another session, because it was late and the Assemblymen were not able

 57 Thus I disagree with Bauman, 1990, 70 who says that the generals blamed the trierarchs. 58 Therefore I disagree with McCoy, 1991, 319 who says that Xenophon makes it clear that the generals reacted to the accusations of Theramenes and others and thus changed their testimony by saying that they had assigned the rescue operations to the appointed trierarchs Theramenes and Thrasybulus. 59 Hansen, 1975, 85 says that Thrasybulus attacked the generals. McCoy, 1991, 321 says that Xenophon hints in this passage that Thrasybulus may have been a party to some sort of intrigue, but he admits that he nowhere implicates the trierarch by name. Lang, 1992, 272 n. 15 wonders if by this the generals meant that Thrasybulus joined Theramenes in the accusation. Sordi, 1992, 14 remarks that Thrasybulus was careful not to accuse the generals. 60 For other reasons of Thrasybulus’ silence in the trial see McCoy, 1991, 322.

The twofold scheme of Theramenes  151

to see clearly the show of hands. Moreover, the Council should prepare a measure to the Assembly as to how the commanders should be tried (1.7.7). Since the Assemblymen seemed to be persuaded by the testimonies of so many people, the impression we get is that the generals would be acquitted.61

. The twofold scheme of Theramenes .. The fake mourners After the incidents that took place in the second session of the Assembly (μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα), the feast of the Apatouria was taking place in which fathers and their relatives (οἵ τε πατέρες καὶ οἱ συγγενεῖς) met together. Considering Xenophon’s reference to this festival against the background of the issue under discussion, i.e. the loss of the crews, readers can think that in that celebration many Athenians would not be able to meet their relatives who had been lost at Arginousai. This means that the atmosphere during the festival would be heavy. Theramenes appears again in Xenophon’s narrative. He shows that Theramenes did not miss the opportunity of the adjournment of the meeting of the Assembly but prepared a twofold plan. Readers cannot be surprised by his action since Thucydides has shown Theramenes’ experience in conspiracies as one of the leaders of the Four Hundred.62 First, under his instructions, his associates (οἱ περὶ τὸν Θηραμένην)63 prevailed upon many persons (πολλούς) and finally prepared them (παρεσκεύασαν)64 to wear black clothes (μέλανα ἱμάτια) and have their hair shorn close (ἐν χρῷ κεκαρμένους) during the festival so that when they went (ἥκοιεν) to the Assembly, it might appear that they were relatives (συγγενεῖς) of the men who had lost their

 61 Epstein, 2011, 97 says that we do not know what the outcome of the first meeting would have been had it not been adjourned because of the fall of dusk. But Xenophon shows that the Assemblymen seemed to turn in favour of the commanders. 62 For this subject see McCoy, 1997, 172. 63 This is the meaning of the phrase οἱ περὶ τὸν Θηραμένην. See LSJ s.v. περί C.I.2. 64 Hansen, 2014, 385–89 has recently argued that the meaning of the verb παρασκευάζω here must be ‘prevail upon’. I think that the meaning of the verb as ‘prepare’ cannot be excluded. For this meaning see LSJ s.v. παρασκευή I3, Heath, 1990, 158 n. 18. For the connection of the verb to conspiracies see Roisman, 2006, 2. Cf. also Xen. 1.3.20, where he says that when the Byzantines prepared the betrayal of their city to the Athenians (ἐπεὶ δὲ αὐτοῖς παρεσκεύαστο), they opened their gates to Alcibiades and his men.

152  Chapter 3: The trial after Arginousai lives (τῶν ἀπολωλότων) (1.7.8). Some of the Athenians who celebrated the Apatouria could attend the Assembly now. But the participants in the Apatouria were not so many; that is why Xenophon says that the addition of the fake mourners in the festival (πολλοί) increased the number of the relatives. Modern readers cannot be certain whether the black colour was related to the Apatouria.65 In any case clothing was a visual aspect of persuasion.66 The fact that many men would appear in black is what matters here. This is so because the Greeks explained colours as a sensory quality.67 More particularly, they believed that the black colour was felt as rough, irregular and uneven to the touch.68 Moreover, it was especially associated with death, mourning and the underworld;69 it was a sign of grief, revenge and anger;70 and finally it indicated a wish for punishment.71 We must remember that the Greek ideal was that those who mourned should not leave their doorway; so the others would not see that they were wearing black clothes or that they had had their hair cut off.72 An explanation for that view must have been a wish for the relatives’ self-control of their grief but also the need not to influence emotionally their fellow citizens.73 Moreover, regarding hair, we know

 65 Amit, 1965, 68 and Maxwell-Stuart, 1970, 113 believe that the black colour was not related to the Apatouria. Lambert, 1998, 151 says that ‘the coincidence with the black worn by the mourners remains striking. It may, of course, be no more than coincidence, but it is possible that the events of 406 or perhaps simply Xenophon’s account of them, easily enough misinterpreted, combined no doubt with the central role played in the Apatouria myth with the Dark One, Melanthus’. But see further below. 66 See Hall, 1995, 52. 67 See Struycken, 2003, 278, 281, 297. 68 This was the opinion of Democritus (see Baldes, 1978, 91), but it was also the opinion of all the Greeks, because Plutarch implicitly equates hard colours with mourning (Dem.22.6). 69 Cf. Plut. Mor.609a-b, who says that people who had lost their dear ones wore ἱμάτιον πένθιμον and refers to βαφὰς ἐσθῆτος μελαίνας. Cf. Lys. 13.40–41 in the next n. 70 See Deacy and Villing, 2009, 117–18. Cf. also Lys. 13.40–41, where the accuser of Agoratus says that the wife of Dionysodorus, who was in prison and was about to be executed, went there wearing a μέλαν ἱμάτιον. When the two of them met, Dionysodorus charged his wife, believing her to be with child by him, that if she should bear a son, she should bid the child execute his father’s vengeance on Agoratus for his murder (Lys. 13.42). 71 Cf. that in Aesch. Eumen.52 the Furies are still μέλαιναι, i.e. they still wear their dark garments, a sign of their punitive power (see Chiasson, 2000, 155–56). 72 For this ideal see Plut. Mor.609f, who explicitly says that the mourners should stay indoors. See also Plut. Dem.22.5, who says that the loss of a relative was a domestic misfortune which should not been shown in public. 73 Cf. Plut. Mor.164f1 that every emotion is like a deception (ἀπάτη). To my knowledge, the first scholar who pointed out that the mourners must have made an impression on the Athenians was

The twofold scheme of Theramenes  153

that when somebody cut off his hair this was considered a sign of mourning.74 Thus we are allowed to infer that the plan was as follows:75 the supposed mourners would deceive the Athenians and make them believe that they were the true relatives of the dead.76 Their sad appearance77 in the Assembly would give the impression that the relatives of the dead not only felt grief78 for the loss of their loved ones but also that they were angry, and thus hungry for revenge.79 In this case, the fake mourners could act as a silent testimony, just by their physical presence, supporting the accusers of the generals.80 But when they heard something with which they did not agree, they could interrupt the supporters of the generals by heckling. A last point must be made about the mourners. Xenophon has shown that Theramenes and the generals referred to the collection of the shipwrecked men but they did not say anything about the corpses of the dead.81 It remained a fact that the bodies of the drowned men were not recovered and thus remained unburied. Thus, by saying that the fake mourners would appear as relatives of the lost (τῶν ἀπολωλότων), Xenophon means that Theramenes would also emphasize the issue of the unburied corpses of the drowned. To assess the prospect of success for Theramenes’ plan we can compare it with two similar events. First, the Roman historian Justin narrates that in the 420’s B.C. ambassadors from Catana of Sicily came to Athens to appeal to the

 Amit, 1965, 68. However, he did not explain the consequences for the human mind of the use of the black colour. 74 See LSJ s.v. κείρω. In Rhet.1411a31–b1 Aristotle quotes a passage from a funeral speech which calls for the cutting of hair as a sign of mourning at the tomb. 75 Gray, 1989, 88 rightly remarks that the precise part these bogus mourners would play in the next Assembly is not described in detail. 76 Cf. the protest of Pl. Phaedo 83a4–b2 that the eyes and the ears and the other senses are full of deceit (ἀπάτης). Philosophy urges the soul to withdraw from these, except in so far as their use is unavoidable, and exhorts it to trust nothing except itself; there is no truth in that which it sees by other means and which varies with the various objects in which it appears, since everything of that kind is visible and apprehended by the senses. 77 When somebody mourned, it was considered natural that he should appear sad (cf. Aesch. 3.77, Plut. Dem.22.3). 78 Cf. Dem. 60.33: οὓς … ἡ πατρὶς θάπτει δημοσίᾳ … ποθοῦσι … συγγενεῖς. 79 Cf. Konstan, 2006, 245: ‘surely grief could influence the opinion of a juror or member of the Assembly, whether over private or public losses’ and 248: ‘loss can be the consequence of an action, as when someone, through … culpable negligence brings about the death of another ... in that case we ... are angry with the author of the deed.’ Then Konstan, 2006, 249–52 shows that grief and anger, leading to revenge, can cooexist. 80 For this role of the silent supporters of litigants see Chaniotis, 1992, 69–73. 81 See pp. 145–46.

154  Chapter 3: The trial after Arginousai Athenians to send back to them the military force that had recently been withdrawn. The ambassadors appeared before the Assembly in mourning: their filthy clothes, unkempt hair and beards and their miserable appearance were designed to excite pity. Tears accompanied their entreaties, and such was the compassion they aroused in the people by their appeals that a motion was passed condemning the generals who had withdrawn the reinforcements from them (Just. 4.4.1– 2). Second, the orator Aeschines says that among the Athenians who had been taken prisoner in Olynthus were Iatrocles and Eueratus. The relatives of these men supplicated the Assembly in solemn form, laying an olive branch upon the altar and beseeching the Athenians to take steps to obtain the liberation of the captives. This was one of the reasons why the Athenians sent an embassy to Philip (Aesch. 2.15). Both authors describe emotionally fraught scenes and show a noticeable emphasis on dramatic elements which would increase pathos. Xenophon forewarns his readers that what would take place in the Assembly is what Justin and Aeschines describe. He leaves no doubt that Theramenes was an evil man who foresaw the usefulness of the festival, exploited the symbolic power of the black colour and brought his men into the Assembly. In this way, he foreshadows the bad fate of the Arginousai commanders. Finally, I wish to comment on the name of the festival of Apatouria and Theramenes’ ruse. Krentz suggests that since the origin of the festival is related to the deception of Melanthus and his killing of Xanthus, Xenophon may be playing on this connection with deception, as it suggests Theramenes’ ploy.82 On the other hand, Lambert believes that we have no evidence that anyone in antiquity perceived any thematic connection between festival and myth; so the connection between the apate of Melanthus and the name of the festival is quite artificial.83 In my opinion, Krentz is probably right if we take into consideration Plato’s Cratylus, whose subject is ἡ ὀρθότης τῶν όνομάτων. We read there that Hermogenes, Cratylus and others had come to the conclusion that there is no principle of correctness in names other than convention and agreement (384c9–11). Socrates talks about the correctness of names and castigates the sophists Prodicus, Protagoras and the rest of them for their teachings about language (391b11–c4), but he confirms that the Greeks had a strong interest in language.84 Xenophon also seems to confirm this interest, since he also speaks against the sophists in his Cynegeticus, saying that ὀνόματα οὐκ ἂν παιδεύσειε and that many others also ac-

 82 Krentz, 1989b, 161. 83 Lambert, 1988, 152. 84 For this issue see Webster, 1939, 169–70, Sedley, 1998, 141–42.

The twofold scheme of Theramenes  155

cuse them that ἐν τοῖς ὀνόμασι σοφίζονται (13.5). Regarding our case, a connection between the festival and myth finds support in Hellanicus (FGrH 4 F 125), who says that the Athenians connected the myth, the festival and its name. Moreover, Polyaenus and the lexica also confirm such a connection.85 Finally, I would like to draw the readers’ attention to a client of Demosthenes who claims that his father accepted as his lawful child his opponent Boeotus because he had been deceived (ἐξαπατηθείς) by this man’s mother. Thus the speaker’s father enrolled Boeotus as his child on the list of the clansmen in the festival of Apatouria (τοῖς Ἀπατουρίοις–39.3–4). In my opinion, the fact that Demosthenes stressed that his client’s father was deceived and then described what happened at the Apatouria is not a coincidence but was based on the fact that the jurors knew about the festival and the origin of its name. Now if an orator chose to make such an argument implicitly in order to make it more persuasive, we can understand that Xenophon’s treatment of the subject as a historian should be as covert as Theramenes’ evil plan.

.. Callixenus’ role Then Theramenes moved to the second part of his plan. His associates convinced (ἔπεισαν) Callixenus to accuse the generals in the Council (ἐν τῇ βουλῇ κατηγορεῖν τῶν στρατηγῶν) (1.7.8). Through the verbs πείθω86 and κατηγορῶ87 Xenophon pinpoints the conspiracy against the generals. Conversing in private,88 Theramenes’

 85 For Polyaenus see Strateg. 1.19. For the lexica see Suda s.v. ἀναρρύει, Lex.Segueriana s.v. Ἀπατούρια. Scholia which refer to the Apatouria such as that on Aristoph. Peace s.v. ἀνάρρυσιν seem to derive from Suda or from the same source, since they use the same words. 86 Cf. Lys. 13.17–20, where the speaker claims that Theramenes and the Thirty persuaded (πείθουσι) Agoratus to act as informer against the generals and commanders who wanted to thwart their plans for surrendering Athens under the severe conditions of Sparta. Moreover, cf. Lys. 30.10, where the speaker claims that those who wanted to do away with Cleophon persuaded (πείθουσι) Nicomachus to produce a law which said that the Council should judge the case together with the jurors. 87 Cf. Andoc. 1.121–22, who describes the legal conspiracy Callias prepared against him with others, then asked for a compromise but the orator replied: εἶπον αὐτῷ καὶ κατηγορεῖν καὶ παρασκευάζειν ἄλλους. 88 As the verb ἔπεισαν denotes: in Plato Crito 46a8 Crito talks with Socrates and tries to persuade his teacher (πείθου μοι) to escape; Lys. 18.5 says that his father Eucrates was invited to take part in the oligarchy by those who were plotting against the democracy but he refusted to listen to them (οὐκ ἠθέλησεν αὐτοῖς πείθεσθαι).

156  Chapter 3: The trial after Arginousai men convinced Callixenus through bribery and/or false promises89 to continue what Theramenes and others did in the Assembly (τῶν στρατηγῶν κατηγόρουν1.7.4). This was a cunning choice on the part of Theramenes. Xenophon has reported that the Council imprisoned the generals under Timocrates’ motion and sent the case to the Assembly. He informs us that Callixenus was a member of the Council, so we can infer that Theramenes instructed Callixenus to inflame the hostility of the Boule against the generals. This was necessary for his plan. Xenophon has shown that Timocrates proposed the imprisonment of the generals and that the Councillors accepted it. Thucydides says that before the overthrow of democracy the conspirators in 411 B.C. controlled the speakers in the Council (8.66.1). For this reason we could suspect that this Timocrates was a man of Theramenes. But Theramenes did not control the whole body of the Boule. Thus, we could suspect that Theramenes did not want to attract the attention of the Councillors by having the same man accusing the generals again. Now another Councillor was needed, Callixenus. In this case nobody would suspect that Callixenus, one of hundreds of citizens who served as ἐλάττονες ῥήτορες and whose task could be to serve as accusers in political trials or propose decrees,90 was part of a conspiracy against the generals. Xenophon confirms these thoughts in his narrative immediately afterwards. Callixenus achieved his mission through a proposal which was not favourable to the commanders of Arginousai. The historian makes this clear by citing Callixenus’ decree in full (1.7.9). It is necessary to read it in detail. First, I may remark that Callixenus mentions that the Asssembly has heard those who accused the generals and that the latter have given their defense individually in the previous meeting of the Assembly (τῶν τε κατηγορούντων κατὰ τῶν στρατηγῶν καὶ ἐκείνων ἀπολογουμένων ἐν τῇ προτέρᾳ ἐκκλησίᾳ ἀκηκόασι). Nobody could object to the fact that Theramenes and others spoke against the generals in the previous session. Nonetheless, Xenophon has emphasized that the generals were not given the appropriate time to defend themselves individually (ἐκκλησία ἐγένετο … οἱ στρατηγοὶ βραχέως ἕκαστος ἀπελογήσατο–1.7.4–5). So Xenophon’s audience is surprised to read that the Council accepted the motion of Callixenus to violate the legal right of the commanders to make individual speeches. This is

 89 The meaning of πείθειν is enigmatic. Gray, 1989, 85 and Azoulay, 2004, 168 n. 90 interpret the verb as ‘bribe’, but the passage is not clear as Xen. 5.4.20: πείθουσι … Σφοδρίαν, χρήματα δόντες. So I agree with Tuci, 2002, 68 who argues for both meanings here. 90 For this role of minor orators see Hansen, 1990, 353–54. See also Perlman, 1963, 329–330. Perlman, 1963, 330 n. 11 calls on his readers to compare Demosthenes’ accusations against Aeschines with Xen. 1.7.8–9. However, he does not classify Callixenus among the minor politicians.

The twofold scheme of Theramenes  157

important because the next meeting of the Assembly would be a trial session.91 Xenophon alerts his readers’ attention because the Assemblymen were called to judge the generals by having accepted already the violation of the law. Second, Callixenus wrote that the Athenians should base their verdict on δόξα (ὅτῳ δοκοῦσιν) for the injustice committed by the generals (ἀδικεῖν οἱ στρατηγοὶ). The secular meaning of the word δόξα was rhetorical persuasion, which could be deceptive, but not real knowledge and hence truth.92 Bearing in mind Theramenes’ plan to deceive the Athenians, readers can assume that the Assemblymen could be deceived regarding the generals’ guilt. Moreover, the phrase that the generals had committed an injustice seems to contradict the proceedings of the previous meeting according to which the Athenians were ready to believe that the generals were innocent on the basis of the testimony of witnesses. Third, Callixenus repeated the basic problem of this case, namely that the generals did not collect the crews (οὐκ ἀνελόμενοι τοὺς νικήσαντας ἐν τῇ ναυμαχίᾳ). I showed earlier that the Athenians discussed in the first Assembly the issue of the non-collection of the shipwrecked sailors. Moreover, I argued that by presenting fake mourners in the Assembly Theramenes put more emphasis on the fact that the relatives could not see their men buried because of the responsibility of the generals. Now we can suspect that the participle τοὺς νικήσαντας was deliberately vague and could refer to the lost men as both shipwrecked and dead.93 Fourth, Callixenus defined the lost men as the victors of the sea battle. This statement annulled the leading role of the generals, because Xenophon implied that the Athenians won the sea battle at Arginousai because of their good leadership (1.6.29) and then he referred to them as τῶν ναυμαχησάντων στρατηγῶν (1.7.2). Fifth, if the commanders were found guilty, the consequence would be capital punishment: they would be sentenced to death and handed over to the Eleven, their property would be confiscated and a tenth would be given over to the goddess (ἂν δὲ δόξωσιν ἀδικεῖν, θανάτῳ ζημιῶσαι καὶ τοῖς ἕνδεκα παραδοῦναι καὶ τὰ χρήματα δημοσιεῦσαι, τὸ δ’ ἐπιδέκατον τῆς θεοῦ εἶναι–1.7.10). The logical conclusion for an attentive reader is that Callixenus’ decree aimed at making the Athenians forget that the majority of them did not consider the generals guilty. Concern for the city was only a pretext.

 91 See Bauman, 1990, 73. 92 See Poulakos, 2001, 65–66. 93 Thus I may enhance Rubel, 2014, 292 who has ingeniously pointed out the vagueness of the participle.

158  Chapter 3: The trial after Arginousai The content of the decree leads us back to Theramenes. Xenophon’s audience can be certain that he based his scheme on deception and violation of the law. This is of the outmost importance because these two were techniques of civil strife. Both of these ploys are detailed in Thucydides. For the first one we must read the words of the Spartan general Brasidas who renounced a possible stasis at Acanthus and those who chose to pursue their aims through deception (ἀπάτῃ) because this was equal to the plotting of intentional injustice (γνώμης ἀδίκου ἐπιβουλῇ–Thuc. 4.86.6).94 For the second one Thucydides himself observed that in times of stasis groups of men acted in defiance of the established laws (οὐ γὰρ μετὰ τῶν κειμένων νόμων) and coveted a political office as a prize to be won for selfish gain (3.82.6). This inescapably meant that men did not fear the law.95 The interpretation of Theramenes’ plan through the lens of civil strife takes us to the very end of Athens itself. Thucydides showed that one of the main problems after Pericles’ death was that his successors were selfish and thus ready to produce stasis and so ended up destroying Athens.96 This happened because stasis was almost always pursued to the very end, i.e., the total defeat or even annihilation of one side by the other.97 A politician in Athens who appeared as the representative of the vices of stasis, such as slander of opponents, was Cleon.98 But he did not manage to lead his fellow citizens into civil strife, so Athens was lucky not to fall in civil strife until 411 B.C., when the Four Hundred took command of the city.99 Since the oligarchs tried to betray their city to the Spartans, Athens could have lost the war. However, the oligarchy could not prevail in Athens and was deposed only after four months in power.100 Once again Athens was saved from destruction. Nevertheless, Thucydides believed that civil strife was always at least dormant and the war between the Spartans and the Athenians could bring it into being any time.101 Thucydides’ emphasis on the selfishness of individuals and their ruthless insistence on the acquisition of political offices put Xenophon’s audience in the right frame of mind to explain Theramenes’ behavior. We realize that Theramenes was determined to have the generals executed even if this might mean the defeat of Athens

 94 For Brasidas and stasis see Price, 2001, 297. 95 See Desmond, 2006, 365. 96 See Pouncey, 1980, 11. 97 See Price, 2001, 71–72. 98 See Edmunds, 1975, 75–76, 82. 99 See Raaflaub, 2006, 197–98. 100 See Raaflaub, 2006, 213–16. 101 See Edmunds, 1975, 88.

Xenophon’s assessment of Theramenes  159

in the Peloponnesian War. Therefore, we must examine the reason why Theramenes acted in this way.

. Xenophon’s assessment of Theramenes In my opinion, Xenophon allows his readers to find an answer as to what Theramenes had in mind by examining his military career from the beginning of the Hellenica until the sea battle at Arginousai. We read that when Alcibiades led the war triumphantly in favour of Athens at Abydus, all the Athenians generals stepped behind him. Theramenes, who had gone to Macedonia to collect money, followed Alcibiades’ instructions as well.102 When the Athenians established a custom house at Chrysopolis, they left behind as guards Theramenes and Eumachus to watch over the land and the ships sailing out of the Hellespont and to do any damage they could to the enemy when an opportunity arose.103 Obviously, Theramenes was considered able to achieve this task, while he had no objection to being in charge there. When Alcibiades fell from favour after Notium and a new board of generals was elected, Theramenes was not among the Arginousai generals. His name appears again in Xenophon’s narrative when we learn that he served as a trierarch at Arginousai and that he was ordered to collect the shipwrecked men. It is worth noting that although the Athenians seemed to have forgotten that Theramenes had been a general in the Hellespont, the commanders of Arginousai still remembered it. In fact, this was the reason, as they confessed in public, why they chose him to collect the drowning men. Nonetheless, Theramenes cannot have been happy serving in the second greatest rank in Athens after that of the generals,104 as his plan against the commanders shows. One reason why he acted in this way must have been the power that arose from the office. Xenophon’s readers realize the prestige and egoism of being a general, considering that, when Alcibiades approached the Athenian camp at Aegospotami, all the generals told him αὐτοὶ γὰρ νῦν στρατηγεῖν, οὐκ ἐκεῖνον in order to make him feel envy.105 If the commanders in the Hellespont had this high opinion of themselves as leaders of the Athenian fleet, readers may suspect that Theramenes envied his superiors. For the Athenians φθόνος was an emotion that arose not because the other person was underserving, but simply  102 See p. 16. 103 See p. 22. 104 For this issue regarding the trierarchs and the generals in Athens see Roberts, 1986, 362– 64. 105 See pp. 236–39.

160  Chapter 3: The trial after Arginousai because he was equal or similar; and such a person, we feel, ought not to be successful.106 In Theramenes’ case this means that he envied them for being generals because although he was their equal he had not been elected to their position. Thus he wanted to find a way to turn the victory of the generals into a disaster for them. When the generals gave him the order to collect the floating men, he had to obey. Later, when he could not execute their order because of the bad weather, the generals did not put the blame on him and Thrasybulus but only on the weather. When the Athenians deposed the commanders, Theramenes seized the opportunity. He could insist that the generals were solely responsible for the loss of men, and since they had not put the blame on anyone else they should be judged on the basis of their responsibility towards the lost crews. Theramenes must have thought up the idea of a joint trial of the generals during the first session of the Assembly, when he saw that the Athenians were violating the lawful right of the commanders to speak individually in full time.107 Theramenes did not have to care about the consequences of this decision, since it was Callixenus who would accuse the generals in the Council. So nobody would think that it was Theramenes behind this scheme. Xenophon’s readers cannot doubt that Theramenes did not care that his superiors and his fellow citizens were victorious in the naval battle of Arginousai. If he put the generals out of his way, he could be elected a general again or take another great office. Theramenes chose108 to be a πονηρός trierarch in and out of Athens109 to achieve his evil plans. In this way he would regain his ascendancy. In fact, this is what happened if we read what Xenophon says about Theramenes’ role in Athens after the defeat at Aegospotami. He appealed directly to the Assemblymen and convinced them to send him to Lysander to find out the real reasons why the Spartans wanted the demolition of the Walls. But he delayed more than three months, waiting for the moment when the Athenians would agree to any proposal because their supply of corn would have been consumed (2.2.16–

 106 See Konstan, 2006, 112–13. 107 Bauman, 1990, 74 argues that Theramenes thought up the idea of a mass trial when the generals reported to the Council. However, Xenophon is clear that there was no violation of the law in the meeting of the Boule. 108 Cf. Plut. Mor.553c who says that in some men προαιρεῖται τὸ πονηρόν. 109 Cf. Aristoph. Thesm.837: τριήραρχον πονηρὸν; [Lys.] 20.14, who says that his father sailed to Eretria, ἐδόκει ἐκεῖ τὴν ψυχὴν οὐ πονηρός εἶναι ἐν ταῖς ναυμαχίαις; Hyp. 2.18 who asserts that the military officer who is πονηρός in Athens cannot be χρηστός in another place in which he serves his city.

Xenophon’s assessment of Theramenes  161

17). His plan succeeded (2.2.21–22), and when the city surrendered he became one of the Thirty (2.3.2) and subverted the democracy (2.3.11). Through Theramenes Xenophon implicitly raises the important issue of men’s inner awareness and consciousness (συνείδησις)110 of the ramifications of their deeds. Homer, Hesiod, the presocratic philosophers, Plato and Aristotle related consciousness with the gods’ reaction, public shame, justice, punishment, emotions, focused on man’s awareness that an act was good or bad and urged for the good. However, the sophists had a different opinion, i.e. they argued that what defined morality was the service of one’s private interests and thus approved self-preservation at all costs.111 Xenophon, who detested the sophists’ doctrines,112 also aligned himself with those intellectuals who preached that men should work only for good. It is true that we do not find discursive self-analysis in Xenophon’s account about Theramenes. He acts and does not exteriorize his inner mood. However, the very deliberateness of his deceptive plan is evidence that he is deeply aware of his motives. Thus through his double scheme we have experienced his strength and capacity for action against the generals. In his ‘doings’ the historian reveals the ‘being’ of Theramenes’ character. Therefore Xenophon depicts Theramenes as a villain and opportunist whose interests are irreconcilably at odds with the interests of the citizen population.113 In contrast to Theramenes comes Thrasybulus. Xenophon said that before Alcibiades returned to Athens the citizens elected him as a general, while he was still absent (1.4.10). A little later we read that Thrasybulus was fortifying Phocaia and that Alcibiades went there to meet him (1.5.10). Thrasybulus also was not reelected general when Alcibiades left the fleet, but he did not have a problem serving his country as a trierarch. Obviously, Theramenes and Thrasybulus were different men with different characters.

 110 The word is not found as such in Xenophon’s oeuvre but the participle and the infinitive are. See LSJ. s.v. σύνοιδα. The closest passages to my analysis are: (a) Mem.2.9.6, where the author says that Crito συνειδὼς αὑτῷ πολλὰ καὶ πονηρὰ he did everything he could to get rid of Archedemus, i.e. the man who prosecuted the general Erasinides as we saw earlier and; (b) Apol.24, where Socrates tells the jurors that those who instructed the witnesses that they must bear false witness against him, perjuring themselves to do so, and those who were won over to do, must feel in their hearts a guilty consciousness of great impiety and iniquity (συνειδέναι ἀσέβειαν καὶ ἀδικίαν). 111 For the important issue of consciousness, its meaning and implications in these authors see Sayre, 1950, 326–27 and now more fully Μαντζάνας, 2012, 183–93. 112 See pp. 154–55. 113 See Rood, 2004, 375.

162  Chapter 3: The trial after Arginousai

. Xenophon’s assessment of Callixenus Finally Xenophon calls on his readers to contemplate Callixenus. One can wonder why Callixenus accepted Theramenes’ plan to accuse the generals. Since the Council sent the generals to be heard by the Assembly, readers can be certain that Callixenus was already hostile to the generals. On the other hand, he must have attended the previous Assembly, and would know that the Assemblymen were inclined to believe that the commanders should not be held responsible for the loss of the crews. Most importantly, Callixenus knew that the generals had not been given the time to defend themselves individually. This is the reason why Xenophon says that Callixenus mentioned in his decree that the commanders had defended themselves in the previous session of the Assembly. Callixenus also knew that the Assembly had not allowed the generals to speak individually but only briefly. So we cannot doubt that he acted against Athenian law. In my opinion, this fact is the key that Xenophon gives to his readers to understanding the stance of Callixenus. We saw earlier that according to Thucydides there were men during civil strife who coveted a political office even if they had violated the laws. I think that Xenophon expected his readers to appreciate the aggression of Callixenus against the innocent generals through the lens of stasis. This means that he must have believed that if he prosecuted the generals he would advance his political career. Such a man who participated in a conspiracy against the generals could be regarded only as πονηρός.114 Moreover, Callixenus did not respect divine law, which was also a symptom of civil strife. Thucydides says that the seal of good faith for the people in stasis was not divine law but fellowship in illegality (τῷ θείῳ νόμῳ … παρανομῆσαι–Thuc. 3.82.6). This fact leads Xenophon’s readers to consider the consequences of such unlawfulness in the case of a Councillor. The bouleutai took an oath according to which they would counsel the best things for the city. If someone of them violated his oath and deceived his colleagues, he would be cursed and a divine punishment would befall him because the gods were aware of the invidual acts of humans.115 There were citizens who commited perjury, because they did not believe in the gods’ omniscience in matters concerning oaths and preferred financial or

 114 Cf. Lys. 30.11, where the speaker claims that the conspirators against Cleophon achieved his conviction and the subversion of democracy thanks to Nicomachus who was πονηρότατος. 115 Cf. Dem. 23.97: εἴ τις εἰδὼς ἐκείνους ... ἐξαπατᾷ, οὗτός ἐστ’ ἔνοχος τῇ ἀρᾷ. Διόπερ καταρᾶται καθ’ ἑκάστην ἐκκλησίαν ὁ κῆρυξ, οὐκ εἴ τινες ἐξηπατήθησαν, ἀλλ’ εἴ τις ἐξαπατᾷ λέγων ἢ βουλὴν ἢ δῆμον.

The trial of the generals  163

social gain instead of personal or socially recognized piety. However, the Athenians believed that the gods intervened and punished impious perjurors by implementing the curse attached to the oath, so that the perjurors could not expect to escape divine punishment.116 Callixenus must have believed that he would remain unpunished by gods and men. But Xenophon, who always notes acts of impiety in the Hellenica, the breaking of oaths included, and illustrates their results for the perpetrators,117 must have expected his readers to believe that gods would punish Callixenus.118 Thus what remains for us is to read is how Xenophon depicts Callixenus’ downfall. A last point must be made before the generals’ trial. The connection between the bad weather at Arginousai and the civil strife in Athens in Xenophon recalls Aeschylus’ Prom.Bound 1085–88, who says that ‘the blasts of all the winds leap forth and array their conflicting strife; the sky is thrown into confusion with the sea’ (σκιρτᾷ δ’ ἀνέμων / πνεύματα πάντων εἰς ἄλληλα / στάσιν ἀντίπνουν [ἀποδεικνύμενα]·/ ξυντετάρακται δ’ αἰθὴρ πόντῳ). The poet uses the word στάσις metaphorically,119 while the historian uses it literarally. However, one thing is certain. Up to this point in the text, Xenophon’s readers are certain that the bad weather at Arginousai revived στάσιν in Athens and the results of it would not be good.

. The trial of the generals In the Assembly (εἰς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν) someone (τις) mounted the platform, made a formal speech (παρῆλθε)120 and said that he was saved by clinging to a grain barrel (ἐπὶ τεύχους ἀλφίτων). The presence of a man talking in front of his fellow citizens was legitimate. In each session the herald addressed the body of the citizens and

 116 For a reconstruction of the curse see Rhodes, 1972, 36–37. For the gods, impiety and oaths in Athens see Mikalson, 1983, 31–38, 98–99. For the intervention of the gods see Garland, 1996, 96. 117 For the condemnation of the impious in Xenophon see Pownall, 1998, 251–77. If my analysis is correct, I may include Callixenus’ case among those which Pownall, 1998, 276 includes in her appendix as cases of impiety related to the breaking of oaths. 118 Cf. Mikalson, 1983, 109 who remarks that ‘Xenophon’s religious beliefs were virtually identical to those of his contemporaries’. 119 See LSJ s.v. στάσις. 120 As the verb πάρειμι shows. For verbs like this used of formal speeches see Bers, 1997, 155.

164  Chapter 3: The trial after Arginousai invited anyone who wanted to speak saying: τίς ἀγορεύειν βούλεται.121 Nevertheless, it is worth noting that Xenophon does not name this man. This fact recalls Thucydides, who said that in the meeting of the Assembly before the Sicilian expedition someone (τις) came forward and spoke against Nicias, who urged the Athenians not to delay (Thuc. 6.25.1). Thucydides did not identify the anonymous man because he did not consider him significant. Xenophon’s identical writing denotes his negative opinion about that unknown person.122 This person articulated the drowning men’s throes in indirect speech. He said that those who were drowning commanded him, if he should be saved (ἐὰν σωθῇ), to make known (ἀπαγγεῖλαι) to the Athenians that the generals did not save those who had fought bravely for their country (οὐκ ἀνείλοντο τοὺς ἀρίστους γενομένους ὑπέρ τῆς πατρίδος–1.7.11). The anonymous man describes an incident which readers should place chronlogically not when the crews were waiting for their rescue but when the storm hit them (1.6.35). This man used a hypothetical sentence to show that nobody knew who would survive from the storm. Then the future dead bade farewell to him and their fellow citizens. The selection of the words which the dead used to convey their message is significant, because they came from the genre of funeral speeches.123 This becomes clear from Plato’s Menexenus where Socrates, who is portrayed as delivering a funeral oration,124 brings to life the dead fathers who have fallen to save Athens and says in a serious tone125 to their children: ‘it is right to tell you what your fathers enjoined us to announce (ἀπαγγέλλειν–246c3) to their survivors in the event they suffer some harm … you must think that you are listening to your parents directly when you hear what I report’ (246b5–c8). The speaker gave to his words the shape of the common rhetorical figure of προσωποποιία, which allowed

 121 Cf. Dem. 18.70, Aesch. 3.4. See Woodhead, 1967, 129, 131. 122 For this point see also Krentz, 1989b, 163 who comes to this conclusion using different evidence. 123 Munn, 2000, 186 has ingeniously remarked that the words of the anonymous man are the language of the funeral orations, but he does not cite any texts from the genre. A generic treatment of the funeral speeches (cf. Loraux, 1986, 10–12, Carey, 2007, 242); see Lys. 2.69–81 with Todd, 2011, 268–74, Dem. 60.32–37, Hyp. 6.41–43 with Worthington, 1999, 224–25 and Herrman, 2009, 107–9 respectively) is legitimate and necessary in my analysis. 124 Although a parallel statement of fathers addressing their sons is not found in the surviving speeches, a fact which would allow us to assume safely that it constituted a conventional feature of the genre (see Westlake, 1982, 235), Plato referred to ideas found in all the funeral orations (see Coventry, 1989, 3; see also Rosenstock, 1994, 333–36 that Plato has given us a standard specimen of the funeral orations). 125 For the serious tone of this passage see Henderson, 1975, 45, Dean-Jones, 1995, 52–55.

The trial of the generals  165

him to represent the dead persons as interested observers of the present scene.126 Moreover, the oblique construction that he used enhanced the impression of tidings from afar.127 By saying that the drowning men protested that the generals were not rescuing them, he implied that his fellow soldiers believed that they could have been saved but their superiors deliberately left them helpless. In addition, by claiming that the drowning men believed that the generals chose not to rescue them, he urged the Assemblymen to look forward to the fact that their bodies would remain unburied.128 Thus, although the Athenians accepted the possibility that their military officers could not always recover the bodies of their men after a sea battle,129 in this case the Assemblymen should realize the religious crime of the impious generals. The rest of the man’s sentence also consists of words which we meet in the funeral orations. The orators praised the dead by calling them ἄνδρες ἀγαθοί;130 the word πατρίς denoted that the city was the proper place for them to be buried and the cause for which they would lay down their lives;131 and the phrase ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος was used in order to have an emotional impact on the audience.132 Thus the message of the funeral orations seemed to be conveyed and repeated through the words of the dead, as this man reported them. At the same time, we should not overlook the fact that the words and concepts of the funeral speeches were adjusted to the present circumstances. The dead praised themselves by using the adjective ἀγαθός in the superlative degree in order to emphasize their moral worth, their bravery in the sea battle and their belief that they were the best of all. The drowned men did not die during the naval battle but they should be treated as if they had because this was their intention.133 Given that the Athenians could  126 For this definition of the rhetorical figure see Usher, 1999, 368. 127 Note that Socrates (Pl. Resp.10.614b) relates in oratio obliqua Er’s report of his experiences after death for the same reason (see Tarrant, 1955, 223). 128 Note that Andocides reminded his jurors that a man is in the greatest peril when he travels at sea during the winter (ἀνθρώποις … χειμῶνος ὥρᾳ πλεῖν τὴν θάλατταν) and that in such a juncture it was in the gods’ power to let his body even be denied due burial (ταφῆς τὸ σῶμα ἀξιωθῆναι–Andoc. 1.137–38). Andocides’ argument represented contemporary religious beliefs (see Furley, 1996, 113). 129 See p. 139. 130 Note that Thucydides’ Pericles begins his speech claiming the inferiority of words of one man to match the deeds of ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν (2.35.1). Cf. also Lys. 2.25: ἄνδρες ἀγαθοί, 2.73: ἄνδρες ἀμείνους, Hyp. 6.1: ἄνδρες ἀγαθοί, ἄνδρας ἀμείνους. 131 See Nielsen, 2004, 50–51, 53–54, 56–58. 132 See Lys. 2.17 with Todd, 2007, 228. 133 For the idea that the phrase ἄνδρες ἀγαθοί γενόμενοι denotes not death but the intention that motivates death see Loraux, 1986, 101.

166  Chapter 3: The trial after Arginousai remember these words from the funeral speeches which they heard so often on various occasions,134 this man must have frozen in the imagination of the Athenians the last words of the drowning men. An argument on the basis of the concept of the funeral speeches emphasized the military ethos of the shipwrecked men and aimed at showing that they were supporters of Athens. Automatically, this implied that, since they were dying for democracy, those who let them drown, the generals, were against it. This vivid report of the last words of the drowning men aimed at giving an emotional aspect to the present trial. Thus several scholars define this moment as such,135 while others become more specific, saying that the masses became angry with the generals.136 On the other hand, Gish rightly remarks that Xenophon never uses the word ‘anger’ to describe the character of the demos at any time in the whole affair.137 However, I shall argue that the emotion of anger is still what emerged at this moment in the trial through the form of revenge.138 Modern research has shown that anger was felt when someone attacked the social standing or honor of another man and it entailed a desire to restore his position by a compensating act of retribution. The primary characteristic of anger was the desire for revenge. Therefore anger entailed or was reducible to revenge.139 The Athenians believed that, when a citizen became an aggressor towards another one, the latter had the right to retaliate against the former.140 However, a citizen could seek revenge only through a lawsuit.141 Thus, although the key word τιμωρία could have the meaning of ‘vengeance’, in the end it took the meaning of

 134 Cf. Aesch. 3.152, who calls the jurors to remember the virtue of the war dead of Chaeronea (τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν … τὴν … ἀρετήν). For the engraving of the funeral speeches in the collective and individual memory of the Athenians see Loraux, 1986, 10–11 and Shear, 2013, 511–36. For examples where the wording and ideas of the funeral orations were used in dicanic speeches see e.g. Kapellos, 2014a, 156–57, 160–61 and 2014b, 41, 44. 135 Rahn, 1971, 504, Sordi, 1992, 13, Thomas, 2011, 173. 136 Strauss, 2000, 269, Asmonti, 2006, 3, 5. 137 Gish, 2012, 175. 138 Such a point has been made about the Arginousai trial but it has not attracted further attention. Amit, 1965, 69 has remarked that the man of the flour-jar asked for vengeance, but he did not analyze his opinion. Lavelle, 1988, 40 also speaks about ‘the vengeful Assembly’ but he does not give any further explanation. 139 For anger see Konstan, 2006, 42–43, Leighton, 2009, 600. Price, 2001, 25 shows how revenge is closely related to anger in Greek literature. For the notion that revenge dwells in our mind when we get angry and we imagine revenge when we get angry see Konstan, 2007a, 119. 140 See Dover, 1974, 184. 141 See Cohen, 1995, 127, Christ, 1998, 150–53, Allen, 2000, 124, Herman, 2006, 189–94, McHardy, 2008, 98.

The trial of the generals  167

‘punishment’.142 People could not always take revenge themselves; it was the task of their relatives to take revenge for those who were about to suffer an unjust death. Thus the speaker of Antiphon’s Against the Stepmother says that the victims of plots know nothing until the evil is already done and they realize the destruction that has come on them. Then, if they can and have enough time before their death, they summon their friends or relatives as witnesses, tell them who is causing their death (ἀπόλλυνται), and direct them to take vengeance (τιμωρῆσαι) for the wrongs they are suffering. This ligitant proves his thesis by saying that his father revealed the facts to him and laid this charge upon him (ἐπέστειλεν–1.29– 30). When revenge was sought not by the living accusers for their own benefit but on behalf of the dead, the pressure became higher for them.143 In this case revenge became a demanding religious obligation for the sons and nearest male relatives because there would be no rest and peace for the souls of the dead until retribution had been exacted.144 The concept of revenge and the use of the same words in Xenophon and Antiphon145 reveal that the supposed message of the dead to the living in the Arginousai trial was to become angry and hence seek revenge for their death. Readers may appreciate that religious exploitation became part of Theramenes’ scheme. But would the Athenians ask for retaliatory justice or they would defy their law? It cannot be a coincidence that the unkown speaker appeared first in the Assembly, immediately after the reading of the decree. Xenophon’s readers could suspect that Theramenes knew that the only way to force the Assemblymen to accept Callixenus’ illegal decree was by convincing them through the anonymous man to take revenge in violation of the generals’ right for a due process. Should the wish for unlawful revenge prevail, Athens would fall into civil disorder. In my opinion, Xenophon alerted his audience to the imminent danger for Athens, since Thucydides has demonstrated how during stasis revenge governed all political relations (3.82.7–8). This plan was evil, so one may wonder if the anonymous man

 142 See Herman, 2006, 184–94. For the passage from private vengeance to lawful punishment cf. also Lys. 13.35: φράζειν τῷ γενομένῳ ὅτι τὸν πατέρα αὐτοῦ ᾿Αγόρατος ἀπέκτεινε, καὶ κελεύειν τιμωρεῖν ὑπὲρ αὑτοῦ ὡς φονέα ὄντα with 13.97: ἐὰν οὖν τὰ ἐναντία τοῖς τριάκοντα ψηφίζησθε … τοῖς ὑμετέροις αὐτῶν φίλοις τετιμωρηκότες ἔσεσθε. 143 For the psychological need for revenge through court punishment see Debrunner Hall, 1996, 89. 144 See Rohde, 1907, 264–65. 145 Antiphon’s speech refers to a homicide case. MacDowell, 1963, 1 cites this passage to show that when a killed person had suffered wrong it required vengeance, which was the duty of his family to obtain for him. Although the Arginousai trial is not a homicide case, the common wording between the orator and the historian shows that the concept transcedes genres.

168  Chapter 3: The trial after Arginousai appeared on the rostrum on his own initiative or if he followed someone’s orders. Xenophon avoids answering this question, but since the concept of revenge appeared during stasis readers could plausibly suspect that the intervention of this person was part of Theramenes’ plot.146 Euryptolemus, the son of Peistoanax, and some others were opposed to Callixenus and tried to block the decision-making process by the threat of a γραφή παρανόμων before the motion was carried (τὸν δὲ Καλλίξενον προσεκαλέσαντο παράνομα φάσκοντες–1.7.12). We saw that Euryptolemus appeared in the narrative in 1.4.19 and that Xenophon introduced him with his patronymic. I argued there that Xenophon paved the way for Euryptolemus’ appearance in his text.147 Indeed, Xenophon draws attention to the appearance of Euryptolemus in his narrative by mentioning his patronymic again and by saying that this man took action in the trial through the graphe paranomon. The mention of this public action reminds Xenophon’s audience of the oligarchic coup of 411 B.C. Thucydides informs us that the conspirators suspended this procedure and threatened anyone who might think to use it again with heavy fines (Thuc. 8.67.2). He insinuated that the oligarchs were against the graphe paranomon because it safeguarded the laws and hence democracy itself; so they discouraged with financial measures anyone who might oppose them. At the time when the Arginousai trial took place, democracy had been restored. So Xenophon’s readers could expect that Euryptolemus and others could use the graphe paranomon again to protect the democratic constitution from Callixenus’ illegal decree, which deprived the generals of their right to defend themselves individually. Their purpose was to stop before it was passed by the Assembly.148 Because of this legal objection the Assemblymen were divided into two groups: some of the δῆμος showed their approval of the words and acts (ἐπῄνουν)149 of Euryptolemus. These men understood that the democracy was in

 146 Amit, 1968, 68–69 says that the second meeting of the Assembly was cunningly ‘staged’, given that the proceedings were interrupted by the sailor who escaped from the storm in a flourjar. Pownall, 2000, 509 believes that, since Theramenes’ faction brought fake mourners from the Apatouria to the Assembly, it is likely that Xenophon intends the reader to infer that this tale is a fabrication by the Theramenes faction. Munn, 2000, 185 says that Theramenes produced the dramatic testimony of one survivor. I agree. 147 See p. 68. 148 See Hansen, 1974, 49. 149 This is the meaning of the verb, as becomes clear from the orators: (a) Dem. 18.317–18 says that even the sycophants praised (ἐπῄνουν) their eminent ancestors; (b) Dem. 19.334 claims that he would praise (ἐπῄνουν) and urge for bestowal of a crown on those citizens who do not lie to

The trial of the generals  169

danger. The second group, which Xenophon calls τὸ πλῆθος, hysterically shouted (ἐβόα)150 that it would be a terrible thing if anyone did not allow the δῆμος to do what it wished (δεινὸν εἶναι εἰ μή τις ἐάσει τὸν δῆμον πράττειν ὃ ἂν βούληται). In 1.7.13 Xenophon uses the verb ἐπεθορύβησε, that is, he uses the verbs βοῶ and θορυβῶ as identical.151 Θόρυβος in the Assembly and the lawcourts meant that emotions prevailed152 and thus influenced, or even worse, obfuscated the judgement of the jurors.153 Given that Xenophon earlier used the adjective δεινόν the relevant emotion here is anger.154 It is evident that those who belonged to the πλῆθος still called themselves δῆμος. Xenophon’s use of two different words to define the same group is significant for the interpretation of the passage. Although the word πλῆθος can be translated as ‘the majority’ οn other occasions,155 here it has the same meaning as the word ὄχλος immediately afterwards, since Xenophon says the mob shouted again (1.7.13). So the πλῆθος is equivalent to the ὄχλος in this context.156 It is obvious that Xenophon uses the word δῆμος to refer to the Athenians who thought and acted as citizens, and the word ὄχλος, which has the political sense ‘mob’,157 to refer to those who did not respect the law and supported the decree of Callixenus.158 We have seen that Xenophon used this word with negative connotations to criticize implicitly the Athenians who watched Alcibiades returning to  their fellow citizens; and (c) Isocr. 12.264 says that his students gathered around their fellow student and praised him (ἐπῄνουν) for his courage in objecting the orator himself. 150 For this meaning of the verb see Bers, 1997, 187 and Debnar, 2013, 280. Cf. also Thuc. 6.28.2: the enemies of Alcibiades έβόων in the Assembly that the mutilation of the Herms was aimed at the overthrow of democracy; Thuc. 8.53.2: Alcibiades’ enemies διαβοώντων that he should not come back to the city, since he had violated the laws; Pl. Laws 700 c3, where the Athenian refers to the βοαὶ πλήθους. 151 For this identification see also Plato Laws 876b3, who says that Athenian courts θορύβου μεστὰ … ἐπαινοῦντά τε βοῇ. See also Tacon, 2001, 183–84 for other, similar passages. 152 Cf. Plato Laws 876b5, who takes for granted that the thorybos of the lawcourts presupposes χαλεπόν πάθος which is usually transmitted to the whole city. 153 See Konstan, 2006, 33–34. 154 The comic poet Epicrates fr. 11 (K–A) narrates a story according to which a doctor heard some young lads discussing about animals, trees and vegetables. When he told them that they were just chattering, they δεινῶς ὠργίσθησαν χλευάζεσθαί τ’ ἐβόησαν. 155 This is one of the meanings of the word in the political vocabulary of the Greeks. See Roncali-Zagaria, 1980, 213–14. 156 For other assimilations of the word πλῆθος with ὄχλος see Roncali-Zagaria, 1980, 219. 157 See LSJ s.v. ὄχλος 2. 158 Cf. Arist. Pol.1292a5–6: κύριον δ’ εἶναι τὸ πλῆθος καὶ μὴ τὸν νόμον. τοῦτο δὲ γίνεται ὅταν τὰ ψηφίσματα κύρια ᾖ ἀλλὰ μὴ ὁ νόμος and Anonymi in Intr.Proleg.Hermog.Rhet.14.274: ἡ δημοκρατία ἢ κατὰ νόμον ἄρχει καὶ λέγεται δημοκρατία ἢ παρὰ νόμον καὶ λέγεται ὀχλοκρατία.

170  Chapter 3: The trial after Arginousai the Peiraeus.159 He uses the same word on the present occastion for the same purpose. Respect and disrespect for the law allowed him to make such a strong differentiation between citizens and mob. The reason for this reaction of the rabble becomes clear through the adjective δεινόν, which was used by the demos to express its discomfortwhen it felt that democracy was threatened.160 At this point it is necessary to recall Thucydides’ description of the atmosphere in Athens after the mutilation of the Herms. The verbal resemblance in the two incidents invites us to consider that Xenophon wrote of the present affair having in mind the previous incident and expected his readers to connect them in their minds. Thucydides says that the enemies of Alcibiades shouted that the mutilation of the Herms and the profanation of the Mysteries were part of a conspiracy against the democracy (ἐπὶ δήμου καταλύσει) (6.28.2). Alcibiades responded to the accusations by saying that he might be punished with death if he were guilty (ἀποκτείνειν, εἰ ἀδικεῖ) (6.29.2). After the departure of the expedition the Athenians did not investigate the character of the informers, but in their suspicious mood listened to all manner of statements, and seized and imprisoned (κατέδουν) some of the most respectable citizens on the evidence of wretches; For the people, who had heard by tradition that the tyranny of Pisistratus and his sons had ended in great oppression and knew moreover that their power had been overthrown by the Lacedaimonians, were in a state of incessant fear (ἐφοβεῖτο αἰεὶ) and suspicion (6.53.2–3). Because of the anger (ὀργιζομένων) of the Athenians that there was a conspiracy against them, many men of high character had ended up in prison (ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ) (6.60.2). When someone testified that he knew what had really happened, the Athenians were delighted at finding out what they supposed to be the truth; they thought it terrible (δεινὸν ποιούμενοι) that the conspirators (τοὺς ἐπιβουλεύοντας) against the democracy would never be known. Then they brought the accused to trial, and executed such of them as could be found (6.60.4). Later, Alcibiades’ enemies protested that δεινὸν εἴη if he returned to Athens, although he had violated the laws (8.53.2).  159 See above, p. 44. 160 Lévy, 1990, 149 has remarked that the term δεινόν suggests that the crowd believed that the democracy was threatened. He is right. Cf. Aristoph. Pl.329–30: Δεινὸν γὰρ εἰ τριωβόλου μὲν οὕνεκα / ὠστιζόμεσθ’ ἑκάστοτ’ ἐν τἠκκλησίᾳ, Eccl.399–400: ὁ δῆμος ἀναβοᾷ … / οὐ δεινὰ τολμᾶν τουτονὶ δημηγορεῖν and Achar.352–55: Δεινὸν … / τὸν θυμὸν ἀνδρῶν ὥστε βάλλειν καὶ βοᾶν / ἐθέλειν τ’ ἀκοῦσαι μηδὲν ἴσον ἴσῳ φέρον / ἐμοῦ ‘θέλοντος … λέγειν. Finally, cf. Aesch. 3.250: δεινὸν ὑμῖν εἶναι δοκεῖ, εἰ … ὁ δῆμος παρορᾶται and Din. 2.6, where the speaker says that all the public prosecutors of the Harpalus affair will declare how terrible it is (ἀναβοήσωμεν ὡς δεινόν ἐστιν) to acquit those who have been caught in the act of taking bribes against the country (κατὰ τῆς πατρίδος).

The trial of the generals  171

On the basis of Thucydides’ text we can infer that Xenophon implies that most of the Assemblymen suspected that the commanders had wanted to strike a blow against the democracy by deliberately letting the shipwrecked sailors drown. For a moment, during the second meeting of the Assembly, the Athenians believed that the commanders were telling the truth. However, the speech of the anonymous man convinced them that the generals had let their crews die, so they grew angry and wanted to take revenge. The Athenians already lacked manpower,161 so it would be more difficult for them to continue the war against Sparta and defeat her. Therefore the failure to collect the crews was not politically innocuous. It must have been a plan of conspiracy.162 Such a thought helped the Athenians to deal with the discrepancy between their expectation of keeping manpower and reality. Xenophon’s readers could give an explanation to this reaction of the Athenians by having in mind the subversion of democracy by the Four Hundred in 411 B.C. as is described by Thucydides (8.66–70), because it was an incident of the recent past. Euryptolemus will make such an implicit connection between the previous and the present situation, as we will see later. Theramenes’ estimation that the speech of the anonymous man would force the Athenians to disregard the law and seek revenge proved right. Obviously the mob disliked the fact that Euryptolemus and others wanted to block the procedure through the graphe paranomon; that is why it cried out that it could do whatever it liked. But by not respecting the law the demos turned into a tyrant.163 Undoubtedly, this was an extreme moment. Looking backwards, Xenophon’s audience cannot fail to note that Thucydides stressed that in the witch-hunt for conspirators in 415 B.C. the Athenians behaved in a tyrannical way.164 Looking to the future and later chapters in the Hellenica, readers should realize that the demos behaved like the

 161 See above p. 125 that the Athenians embarked on ships all the available men. 162 Cf. Lys. 12.36 who says that the Thirty did everything they could to see Athens being defeated at Aegospotami and then they took power in the city. A little later, the orator says that after the naval battle at Aegospotami there was still democracy in Athens, but the Thirty conspired against it and started a civil strife in the city (12.43). Cf. also Lys. 13.5–6, who says that after the naval battle at Aegospotami the political situation became more fragile in Athens; when the ships of the Lacedaimonians arrived in the Peiraeus, those who conspired against the democracy and wanted to subvert the regime took action against it. 163 Cf. Xen. Mem.4.6.12: τὴν … ἀρχὴν … μὴ κατὰ νόμους, ἀλλ’ ὅπως ὁ ἄρχων βούλοιτο, τυραννίδα with Pownall, 2018, 354. Cf. also Pl. Gorg.473c5–7, who says that a tyrant who lives in a city can do whatever he likes (ὃ τι ἄν βούληται) and Pl. Resp.562b1–2, 564a6–8 that democracy can turn into tyranny. 164 See Gribble, 1999, 193, Herman, 2006, 343.

172  Chapter 3: The trial after Arginousai Thirty, who killed many Athenians in order to do whatever they liked (ποιεῖν αὐτοῖς ὅ τι βούλοιντο–2.3.21),165 and exterminated even Theramenes because they believed that he would be an obstacle to their plans (ποιεῖν ὅ τι βούλοιντο–2.3.23). The situation became even worse. Lyciscus said that Euryptolemus and the others should be judged by the same vote (τῇ αὐτῇ ψήφῳ) as the generals unless they withdrew their call for a trial against Callixenus. The intervention of this Lyciscus was not accidental. Lyciscus urged for another trial within the present one. He urged the Assemblymen to regard the supporters of the generals as supporters of the conspiracy against the democracy. However, Lyciscus’ proposal was unjustified because Euryptolemus had not fought at Arginousai; so there was no reason for him to be tried under Callixenus’ decree.166 Τhe readers of Xenophon can be quite certain that Lyciscus’s purpose was to intimidate the supporters of the generals. This raises questions about the identity of Lyciscus. Xenophon said that there were some Athenians who accused the generals along with Theramenes. But these men were not Theramenes’ supporters and Xenophon does not say that these men agreed with the violation of law. Another explanation should be sought. If we consider that there were ἐλάττονες ῥήτορες in Athens, namely men who were supporters of other politicians and who were entrusted with the task of creating uproar, we can infer that Xenophon expected his readers to regard Lyciscus as one of Theramenes’ men.167 The violent intervention of this man plunged the Athenians further into stasis.168 This becomes evident if we recall Thucydides

 165 Lévy, 1990, 130 compares this passage with 2.3.21 and argues that Xenophon chose to narrate the Arginousai trial and the rule of the Thirty to show the extremities of the two constitutions. See also Rood, 2004, 377 and Fordsyke, 2007, 197–98 for this behavior as a feature of the tyrannical rule of the Thirty. 166 So I disagree with Gish, 2012, 184 who justifies Lysicles’ action by saying that the latter proposed that Euryptolemus and his followers should suffer the same penalty with the generals if found guilty (my emphasis). 167 For these politicians see Perlman, 1963, 329 who cites Hyp. 5.12: τοῖς ἐλάττοσι ῥήτορσιν … τοῖς θορύβου μόνον καὶ κραυγῆς κυρίοις. See also Milns, 2000, 209 that the major politicians had their organised groups of supporters, whose partisan spirit was not limited to warm applause of their own political masters. The verbal resemblance between the passages in Xenophon and Hyperides is striking. Henry, 1967, 196 has said that Lysicles belonged to Theramenes’ faction but he did not explain why this should be right. 168 Cf. Dem. 25. who says against Aristogeiton: πᾶς ὁ τῆς πόλεως καὶ τῶν νόμων κόσμος … συνταράττεται καὶ διαφθείρεται κατὰ τοῦτον (19) … εἰς τοῦθ’ ἥκει πονηρίας ὥστ’ ἐνδεδειγμένος ἤδη βοῶν, συκοφαντῶν, ἀπειλῶν οὐκ ἐπαύετο (49) … πάντας εἰς ταραχὴν καὶ στάσιν ἐμβάλλειν ζητήσας (50).

The trial of the generals  173

who stressed that one of the vices of stasis in Greece was the appearance of violent men who slandered and shouted and thus stirred the angry passions of a mob.169 Lyciscus’ intervention was successful. The mob approved his proposal, because it shouted again (ἐπεθορύβησε πάλιν ὁ ὄχλος) so that Euryptolemus and those who agreed with him were forced to abandon bringing their legal demands for a trial (1.7.13). Xenophon leaves no doubt that the mob was ready to put on trial even the supporters of the generals. This did not happen because Euryptolemus and the other supporters of the generals withdrew their proposal. An illegal chaos seemed to rule in this Assembly.170 Some of the prytaneis, the committee which presided over the meetings of the Assembly and the Council,171 refused to allow the motion to come to a vote on the grounds that it was contrary to the law. The fact that only some and not all the prytaneis objected to Callixenus’ decree means that most of them could not resist the mob despite the violation of the law. Callixenus mounted the platform again and made the same accusation against the prytaneis (κατηγόρει). This must mean that Callixenus repeated his accusations against the generals in the Council172 and turned them against the prytaneis as well. For him whoever supported the generals was guilty of complicity. Callixenus was successful, because the mob shouted to him (ἐβόα) to serve a summons against those prytaneis who refused to allow a vote (1.7.14).173 Xenophon’s use of the verb βοῶ once again, as in 1.7.12, emphasizes the continuation of the hysteria. This threat frightened (φοβηθέντες) all (πάντες) the prytaneis, namely even those who did not express any disagreement, into agreeing to put the matter to the vote; all except for Socrates (πλὴν Σωκράτους), son of Sophroniscus, who said he would do nothing except in accordance with the law (1.7.15). Xenophon’s mention of the emotion of the prytaneis is crucial for our understanding of their reaction. As I have said, fear was a cognitive response and depended on the knowledge or understanding that a person is dangerous.174 By  169 See Edmunds, 1975, 82. 170 Gish, 2012, 191 interprets the reaction of the demos as spiritedness, which did not lead to violence or cause the proceedings to collapse into chaos or anarchy. I disagree. 171 See Rhodes, 1972, 21, Hansen, 1987, 250. 172 Note that in 1.7.8 Xenophon said: Καλλίξενον ἔπεισαν ἐν τῇ βουλῇ κατηγορεῖν τῶν στρατηγῶν. 173 I interpret in this way the sentence Καλλίξενος … κατηγόρει αὐτῶν τὰ αὐτά, since what precedes it in Xenophon’s account is Lyciscus’ intervention, who accused Euryptolemus of not letting the Athenians do what they liked. 174 See p. 66.

174  Chapter 3: The trial after Arginousai mentioning their emotion, Xenophon means that the prytaneis feared the angry mood of the mob175 and accepted the violation of the law because they were certain that their fellow citizens would condemn them to death. So the prytaneis stopped resisting the mob’s unlawful will. Xenophon implied that this was a bad omen for the future of Athenian democracy and the outcome of the war. In a comparable way, Thucydides reports that, when the Athenians gathered in the Assembly to discuss the necessary preparations for the Sicilian expedition, Nicias urged the presiding officer to put the matter to the vote and recognised that the prytanis might fear being called to account for doing so (6.14.1). The prytanis did not follow Nicias’ advice and the disastrous expedition followed. On the present occasion Xenophon emphasizes that one man was fearless. This was Socrates, whom he identifies with his patronymic so that nobody should fail to recognize him as the famous philosopher.176 In this framework Socrates’ reaction serves as an example of historical remembrance and admiration and points out the frenzy of the situation even further. This explains why Socrates could not manage to stop the whole procedure. Thus, we could infer that the prytaneis outvoted him.177 This justifies in the readers’ minds the speech of Euryptolemus, which comes immediately afterwards in the text.

. The speech of Euryptolemus After these events (μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα), Euryptolemus mounted the platform. Μετά must be temporal here, so that if the cause is to be inferred, the explanation is strictly speaking a post hoc propter hoc one: Euryptolemus spoke in the Assembly after Socrates’ refusal to violate the law but also because of Socrates’ refusal. Thus because of Socrates’ intervention Euryptolemus overcame his previous fear of being sentenced to death and seized the opportunity to defend the generals.178

 175 Note Isocr. 9.45, who says that a man could inspire fear (φοβερός) because of his anger at many. 176 Socrates is the second person after Adeimantus in Books 1–2 who is identified with his patronymic. This is something very rare. See p. 78. 177 Krentz, 2009, 320 mentions the outvoting of Socrates as one of the alternatives for the continuation of the trial. 178 Henry, 1967, 198 believes that Xenophon failed to separate the scene of Socrates’ refusal to disobey the law from the scene where Euryptolemus defended the generals. However, Nails, 2002, 81 remarks: ‘Socrates alone among the prytaneis was left standing against Callixenus, refusing to disobey the law, but his refusal to allow the vote had the effect of gaining time. Euryptolemus used that time to make an eloquent speech in defense of the generals.’

The speech of Euryptolemus  175

Thus Socrates’ intervention was decisive. Considering that the generals spoke after Theramenes in the previous meeting of the Assembly,179 I believe that Xenophon expected his readers to think that Euryptolemus spoke immediately after Socrates’ strong refusal to violate the law.180 Before examining what Euryptolemus said a few remarks must be made about the status of speech at the end of the 5th century B.C. and Xenophon’s decision to record it. Euryptolemus’ speech was given extemporaneously, which means that he had only little time to think what he would say. In this way it resembled more a deliberative speech.181 Moreover, his speech would be forgotten after a while, since speeches which were delivered in the Assembly were not regularly published in the 5th century.182 So Xenophon assumed the task of recording and preserving Euryptolemus’ speech because he believed that it was worth disseminating. In fact, three points show Xenophon’s emphasis on it: (a) it is the last recorded speech of the Peloponnesian War, as narrated by Thucydides and himself; (b) it seems to be highly authoritative: Euryptolemus has no opponents when he speaks and nobody dares to interrupt him; and (c) it covers a great amount of space.183 This prompts two questions. How should the readers react to Euryptolemus’ rhetoric? Was it civic instruction or flattery? Which was Xenophon’s opinion of it? From Homer’s world to the time of the city-states, rhetoric remained a prerogative of those at the top of society and it was used in order to control the rest. The issue was whether the intellectuals and the aristocrats who were involved in politics would remain committed to the truth or they would manipulate words and minds, as the sophists taught.184 Due argues that Euryptolemus’ speech is a flattering one.185 If this is right, then Xenophon believed that rhetoric was a form of flattery which did not care for truth or justice.  179 See p. 147. 180 Thus I disagree with Munn, 2000, 302 who says that Euryptolemus had prepared his speech. See also next n. 181 The deliberative speeches were unwritten oratory. There was not a text in advance from which to read or to perform from memory. Moreover, an orator in the Assembly did not have the time to write a speech. These speeches could be spontaneous or prepared only in the sense of merely having been thought out before (see Hudson-Williams, 1950, 162, Tuplin, 1998, 293–95). The orator Demosthenes who wrote his speeches before speaking in the Assembly in the 4th century was an exceptional case (see Trevett, 1996, 436–37). 182 See Nicolai, 1996, 95–113, Edwards, 1998, 86–87. 183 See Rahn, 1971, 502–3, Gray, 1989, 83–84, 91, Pontier, 2006, 84–85, Kroeker, 2009, 221. 184 See Morgan, 2007, 303, 306–8. Morgan rightly includes Xenophon among the intellectuals concerned with rhetoric and truth. 185 See Due, 1983, 39–40.

176  Chapter 3: The trial after Arginousai I argued earlier in this study that Xenophon implicitly criticized Theramenes because he followed the doctrines of the sophists through his scheme against the generals.186 So is it right to say that Xenophon wrote down the speech of Euryptolemus as an example of bad rhetoric/flattery and approved the preachings of the sophists? In my opinion, this is wrong for three reasons. First, if Xenophon did this, he would contradict himself in relation to his condemnation of Theramenes’ evil methods against the generals. Second, we should bear in mind that Thucydides imagined political rhetoric as a way to instruct the citizens and not to flatter in order to avoid disasters.187 So Xenophon could follow his predecessor and record a sample of good rhetoric. Third, Xenophon did not consider every speech an act of flattery. A survey of his opinion on rhetoric in his other works reveals that for him rhetoric was not amoral when it defended the truth and did not come in contrast with the law, but it could be subservient to the true political cause.188 In the Arginousai trial justice should be served, and in an effort to obtain these, the truth needed rhetorical assistance. I shall argue that Xenophon forced his readers through the speech of Euryptolemus to make an implicit distinction between sophistic rhetoric and a genuine rhetoric guided by a concern for the truth. I shall attempt to show that Euryptolemus’ rhetoric seeks to elicit knowledge rather than mere belief, solve the serious misinterpretation of the facts, harness the emotions of the Athenians, which overcame rationality, and change the mind of the citizens to what was best for them. Readers can realize this through a thorough comparison between Euryptolemus’ speech and Xenophon’s account. Thus through multiple readings of the text we can prove that Euryptolemus told the truth.189 In the end, it will appear that Euryptolemus is the expression of the ideal orator, who wants to shift the audience’s  186 See pp. 154–55. 187 See Yunis, 1996, 59–116, who shows how flattering rhetoric led the Athenians to the disaster of Syracuse. 188 Xenophon structured the Memorabilia like a classic defense speech (see Higgins, 1977, 150 n. 23 and Gray, 1998, 26–104) and showed that Socrates did not neglect rhetoric (see Anderson, 1974, 25, Dorion, 2014, 21–22, 34–35) but considered it potentially a good form of education (see L’Allier, 2012, 487). So Socrates questions Glaucon, an aspiring orator and politician, to discover if he has the knowledge required for speaking in the Assembly and giving the right advice (συμβουλεύῃ–3.6.8). In the Cyneg. Xenophon insisted that the difference between his work and that of a sophist resided in the intent and not in the manner in which it was written (see L’Allier, 2012, 486). In Cyrop. Xenophon presents Cyrus as an eloquent adviser (see Nicolai, 2014b, 179– 94). 189 Thus I partly disagree with Krentz, 2009, 320 who says that ‘Euryptolemus’ speech repays close reading, for reading Euryptolemus’ description of what happened is not entirely consistent with Xenophon’s earlier narrative’.

The speech of Euryptolemus  177

perception rather than submit to its demands.190 In this way, Euryptolemus’ rhetoric seems to resemble the instructional rhetoric of Pericles,191 who used logos because it could alter men’s moods and opinions192 in meetings where debates and decisions could be spontaneous.193 On the other hand, this does not mean that this kind of rhetoric could always be successful. Thus Xenophon’s presentation of Euryptolemus as wise adviser turns him into a ‘tragic warner’, known to us from Herodotus. Such a man advised another person, an autocratic ruler, not to do something, but this person neglected the advice, so he met with destruction.194 Xenophon used this literary model and adapted it to the present case, i.e. he presented Euryptolemus as speaking not to one person but to the whole body of the Assembly, which seemed like an autocrat by saying that ‘I can do what I want’, as we saw earlier. The numerical difference does not really matter, because the Athenians would decide as one political body. What is important here is that Euryptolemus’ speech foreshadowed what was to come and pointed up the rashness of the Assemblymen, who neglected his advice. Let us now examine the speech itself. Euryptolemus begins his speech by addressing the Assemblymen as ὦ ἄνδρες ᾿Αθηναῖοι. He explains that he had mounted the bema of the Assembly, probably showing it with a gesture (ἐνθάδε), to accuse Pericles who is his relative and Diomedon who is his friend, but also to defend them vigorously and to give his advice (συμβουλεύσων) about what he considers best for the entire city (1.7.16). Reading that Euryptolemus accuses the two generals seems surprising, but Xenophon’s readers could suspect that the speaker aimed at avoiding the prejudice of the Assemblymen due to his close relation to them.195 At the same time, Euryptolemus shows self-reflexive concern by calling himself a defender of the generals and adviser of the city. The verb συμβουλεύω denoted a man who spoke and made proposals to the Assembly but also gave advice in lawcourts.196 Through his self-definition as adviser of the city

 190 See Gray, 1998, 7–8. 191 See Yunis, 1991, 180–86. Cf. Tamiolaki, 2008, 35–36 about Xenophon’s adaptation of himself in the Anabasis and Polydamas of Pharsalus in the Hellenica as a new Pericles. 192 See Hunter, 1986, 426. 193 For such examples see Finley, 1962, 12–13 and Missiou, 1992, 174. 194 See e.g. Lattimore, 1939, 24–35, especially 25–26. 195 Gray, 1989, 85 rightly remarks that Euryptolemus was aware that there was a tension between the demands of friends and relatives and the demands of the whole city. 196 See Hansen, 1974, 23, 1987, 50–63, 1989, 14 n. 29 and Ober, 1989, 107.

178  Chapter 3: The trial after Arginousai Euryptolemus attempts to secure the goodwill of the Assemblymen197 and thus achieve a favourable hearing. Such a man would be defined as rhetor.198 These oratorical powers of the highest order explain why Euryptolemus was determined to make himself heard by and to keep the attention of his fellow citizens for a significant amount of time.199 But it is also important to note that Xenophon’s audience has not read how Euryptolemus spoke as an orator. This fact has the merit of focusing our attention on what is known of this particular Assembly, the issues and appeals involved rather than Euryptolemus’ stand on other issues, his background,200 political associations and family connections with prominent men such as Alcibiades, whom he had welcomed upon his return to the Peiraeus.201 In this way Xenophon leads his readers to consider that what is important here is what is said rather who speaks. The use of such a model of orator is known to the readers from Thucydides’ Diodotus.202 Obviously, Xenophon found this role of speakers attractive. Euryptolemus uses οὖν to mark the next stage in the progress of his thought.203 He accuses Pericles and Diomedon because they changed the mind of their colleagues, who had wanted to send a letter to the Council and the Assembly, stating that they had ordered Theramenes and Thrasybulus to collect the shipwrecked men with forty-seven ships but these two had not taken them up (ἀνελέσθαι τοὺς ναυαγούς, οἱ δὲ οὐκ ἀνείλοντο–1.7.17). I showed earlier that the generals sent a letter to Athens while they were at Arginousai in which they did not accuse anyone but the weather.204 Euryptolemus reveals that the commanders had aimed at sending a different letter to the Council and the Assembly, accusing Theramenes and Thrasybulus of not collecting the crews. But this letter remained a ‘planned’ one, since it was never sent.205 Instead, the generals wrote the letter which we already know they did send. Euryptolemus’ claim that the generals found it right to accuse the trierarchs relied on the fact that the former had given a clear order to the latter. Moreover, it implies that the generals feared that the Athenians would accuse them if they  197 Cf. Arist. Rhet.1378a5. 198 See Hansen, 1989, 14. 199 For the need for oratorical powers in order to face such a large audience see Milns, 2000, 209. 200 Cf. Harris, p. 50 n. 160. 201 See above, pp. 67–68. 202 See Connor, 1971, 23. 203 For this use of the particle see Denniston, 1954, 425–26. 204 See p. 141. 205 See Bearzot, 2014, 101.

The speech of Euryptolemus  179

did not put the blame on the trierarchs. In retrospect, Xenophon has already shown that the commanders were wrong not to accuse their subordinates, especially Theramenes, but they found an excuse for what had happened by pointing out the storm. However, Pericles and Diomedon convinced their colleagues that Theramenes and Thrasybulus could not help the crews. From this account Xenophon’s readers can guess that Pericles and Diomedon informed Euryptolemus about the planned letter. However, we cannot be certain that the hearers also knew of this letter or heard about it for the first time now. The historian will make this clear later. Obviously the commanders hoped that the Athenians would believe that they told the truth and would let them go unpunished; except for Protomachus and Aristogenes who regarded voluntary exile as the only way to be safe. Thus Euryptolemus argues that the content of the letter which was sent was wrong because the responsibility lay with Theramenes and Thrasybulus, who did had executed the order of their superiors. This opinion of the speaker recalls the opinion of the generals themselves who had said that if the Athenians were to blame someone, they should accuse those who had been given the orders to collect the crews. Nonetheless, the generals said that nobody should take the blame for what happened because the real problem was the bad weather. Thus Euryptolemus disregards the natural phenomena as an excuse for Theramenes and Thrasybulus and considers them responsible for the present situation. Therefore, the speaker’s blame is honest and simultaneously puts the generals in a positive light.206 The number of ships that would be sent for this mission is known from Xenophon’s account (1.6.35); it is beyond doubt that Euryptolemus gives the correct information here. Euryptolemus’ next argument is formulated in the form of a question: ‘so now (νῦν) are the generals to be blamed in the same way as those (ἐκείνων) who failed to do their individual duty (ἰδίᾳ ἁμαρτόντων) and, instead of their generosity (φιλανθρωπίας) then (τότε), are they now (νῦν) to be intrigued against (ἐπιβουλευόμενοι) by them (ὑπ’ ἐκείνων), and some others (τινων ἄλλων) and to run the risk of being destroyed? (1.7.18). Euryptolemus creates an implicit contradiction between what happened at Arginousai (τότε) and what happens now (νῦν), i.e. the generals (a) are accused as being guilty; and (b) are under attack by Thrasybulus and Theramenes. For him the Assemblymen should regard Theramenes and Thrasybulus as those mainly responsible for the loss of the shipwrecked men; so he defines their deed as ἁμαρτία. In Greek ethics there were  206 Lavelle, 1988, 20 n. 4 says that Euryptolemus was more interested in saving Pericles than he was in saving the lives of the other generals and that he spoke mainly to detach him from the rest. I disagree.

180  Chapter 3: The trial after Arginousai three types of actions: unjust actions deliberately committed, culpable errors (ἁμαρτίαι), which did not occur because of any moral vice (πονηρία),207 and actions for which men were not responsible.208 In this way Eurtyptolemus repeats the claim of the generals that Theramenes and Thrasybulus had been ordered to collect the shipwrecked, but they should not be considered responsible for the loss of the men because of the bad weather (1.7.6). Thus the speaker seems to follow the defense of the generals and makes his implicit accusation that the trierarchs did not execute the order of their superiors seem milder. Readers would agree with Euryptolemus that indeed Theramenes and Thrasybulus should have rescued the crews. On the other hand, we have seen that Xenophon implied that Theramenes did not really care about the floating men.209 Euryptolemus could say that the commanders were not responsible for what had happened and thus repeat their assertion that they were innocent. Instead, he defines the generals’ decision to save their men as φιλανθρωπία. This term denoted a disinterested feeling of friendship or love of men, borne out of the compassion for man’s situation of abandonment and weakness.210 With one word Euryptolemus implies that the generals instantly realized that their men were in danger, showed compassion for them and tried to save them. His argument finds support in Xenophon’s own statement that the generals decided that Thrasybulus and Theramenes should sail towards the sunk ships and τοὺς ἐπ’ αὐτῶν ἀνθρώπους (1.6.35). Thus readers would agree with Euryptolemus’ defense of the generals. Moreover, they would feel that Xenophon’s defense of the generals through the record of Euryptolemus’ speech was necessary to fight back the injustice done to them. This seems plausible if we bear in mind that Xenophon called Socrates φιλάνθρωπος (Mem. 1.2.60–61) to defend him from the accusations of his opponents.211 The use of the same word to praise the generals and Socrates leads readers to consider the commanders equal to Socrates and innocent victims of a prospective injustice.212 Moreover, Xenophon calls Cyrus φιλανθρωπότατος (Cyrop.1.2.1), and presents him as the perfect incarnation of the

 207 Cf. Arist. Rhet.1374b7–8: ἁμαρτήματα δὲ ὅσα … μὴ ἀπὸ πονηρίας. 208 For these types of actions see Harris, 2013, 279. 209 See p. 160. 210 See Dover, 1974, 201. 211 See Gray, 1989, 44. 212 For another example of equation between the generals and Socrates see Baragwanath, 2017a, 291. For further arguments which indicate the connection between the Arginousai trial and the trial of Socrates as unjust cases see Pownall, 2018, 355–59.

The speech of Euryptolemus  181

ideal leader.213 Having this in mind, we can say that the Arginousai generals are classified among ideal leaders in Xenophon’s oeuvre. On the other side of the moral balance Euryptolemus puts ἐκείνους, namely Theramenes, Thrasybulus, and some others (τινων ἄλλων). This accusation is right in regard to Theramenes and his associates. However, the accusation against Thrasybulus is not justified, on the basis of Xenophon’s account, as I have argued.214 Euryptolemus’ claim can be explained by the fact that he could not know the real details behind the scheme; so he could not imagine that Theramenes was acting on his own. Regardless of this, it was the seriousness of the action of the enemies of the generals that mattered. Euryptolemus’ selection of the verb ἐπιβουλεύομαι gives to his argument a political dimension, since the Athenians used it to denote the acts of those who conspired against the democracy.215 This argument also aimed at dissociating the generals from the accusation that they had conspired against the democracy. An efficient way for the speaker to exclude them from the category of the conspiring political figures was to portray them as the victims of a political plot.216 This was a serious accusation. Xenophon’s readers should take into account that according to Thucydides conspiracy (τὸ ἐπιβουλεύσασθαι) was a characteristic of civil strife, indulged in by men against others when they themselves were safe (Thuc. 3.82.4). We have seen that Alcibiades’ enemies accused him of a conspiracy but in reality it was they who had conspired against him without caring about the success of the Sicilian expedition.217 Thus Euryptolemus warns his readers that the democracy was in danger, because these men were determined to lead their city into stasis. Xenophon’s readers can be certain that Euryptolemus was a truthful orator who wanted to ward off strife.218 Euryptolemus declines the possibility that the commanders would be sentenced to death by beginning his next argument with οὔκ, ἄν which serves as a retort-what is called λύσις in the technical language of rhetorical analysis-and has a strong adversative force.219 He says that this will not occur if the Assemblymen are persuaded by him (ἂν ὑμεῖς γέ μοι πείθησθε) to do what is just and pious (τὰ δίκαια καὶ ὅσια), from which  213 See Noël, 2006, 133–46. 214 See p. 161. 215 See Bearzot, 2000, 125–27. 216 For the rhetorical tactic of speakers to exclude themselves from the category of conspiring politicians and their portrayal as the objects of political plots see Roisman, 2006, 87–88. 217 See p. 53. 218 This is one of the tasks of the well-tempered, just and sound in counsel orators according to Eur. Autolycus (Nauck TGF 441). 219 See Cooper, 1979, 36.

182  Chapter 3: The trial after Arginousai they will learn the truth perfectly (ἀληθῆ), and not, changing their minds later (μετανοήσαντες ὕστερον), find out that they have erred (ἡμαρτηκότας τὰ μέγιστα) most severely against the gods and themselves. Like all speakers in the courts220 and the Assembly,221 Euryptolemus was aware that he had to convince his fellow citizens. Thus, he acknowledged with the hypothetical sentence that the prerequisite for the right legal procedure was the Assemblymen’s being persuaded. If they listened to him, they would be just, i.e. they would follow the procedure described by the law, and they would be pious, i.e. they would give an honest verdict according to their oath.222 By doing this, they would forget their anger and they would give their verdict on the basis of real facts.223 If they did otherwise, Euryptolemus claims, the Assemblymen would reconsider the case when it would be too late and realize that, though not because of vice, they had made a grave mistake.224 Euryptolemus advises his hearers not to be deceived (ἐξαπατηθῆναι) by him or anyone else in these matters, but, having full knowledge of the facts, they will punish (κολάσεσθε) the wrongdoers in any form of trial they want, either all together or each one separately. Τhe Assemblymen should do this by giving the generals one day, if not more, to defend themselves (ἀπολογήσασθαι), not trusting in any others but themselves (1.7.19). The real danger if the Assemblymen would not follow Euryptolemus’ advice was deception. One of the dangers of oratory was that there were speakers who could deceive the jurors by robbing them of the complete and accurate version of what they had sworn to listen to. If that happened, it destroyed the democracy.225 Euryptolemus exploits the anti-rhetorical prejudice and says that not only those who accuse the generals but even he could deceive the Assemblymen. He knew that Callixenus had deceived the Assemblymen by having lied under the oath that he was protecting the interests of the demos. Nonetheless, Euryptolemus could not explicitly say so, because he would alienate his angry audience. Thus, by putting himself in the same position as the opponents of the generals, he implicitly projected his own ethos as an experienced, trustworthy

 220 See Lys. 21.12 with Kapellos, 2014a, 117. 221 Cf. Dem. 6.6, 8.10, 11.7, 15.9, 18.176, Prooem.18.1, Isocr. 17.116. 222 For this meaning of the two adjectives see Dover, 1974, 186 and 250 respectively. 223 Cf. Lyc. 1.116, who says that the jury’s ancestors consistently punished traitors with death because of truth (δι’ ἀλήθειαν) rather than anger. 224 For the use of μετανοῶ as a way to suggest that the item under reconsideration is a mistake see Fulkerson, 2004, 255. For ἁμαρτία as vice see p. 180. 225 See Whitehead, 2007, 72, 74.

The speech of Euryptolemus  183

individual/politician and implicitly undermined the character of Callixenus.226 Then Euryptolemus emphasizes the power of the people through the verb κολάζω, which the Athenians used to refer to cases where the public was understood to be the punisher and the issue was the relationship of the wrongdoer to the community.227 Euryptolemus’ emphasis on the need to allow the generals to defend themselves in an adequate time recalls Xenophon’s earlier remark about the generals βραχέως ἕκαστος ἀπελογήσατο (1.7.5). For Euryptolemus the Assemblymen should not believe (πιστεύοντες) any accuser or defendant but themselves, since it was they whom the citizens trusted as jurors.228 Euryptolemus urges the Assemblymen to feel confidence, the opposite emotion of fear, which arose when there was hope accompanied by an impression of imminent safety and frightening things were either non-existent or remote.229 On this occasion it is the application of the law that would produce confidence. For this reason Euryptolemus mentioned two laws. The first one is the decree of Cannonus, which he says that the Athenians know well (ἴστε, ὦ ἄνδρες ᾿Αθηναῖοι, πάντες) and which he characterizes as very harsh (ἰσχυρότατον). The claim that the jurors know what a speaker says was made by litigants to manipulate their audience, but was also directly linked to egalitarian ideology.230 So Euryptolemus implies his loyalty to the democracy and his belief in the ability of the Assemblymen as jurors to handle the case lawfully. He introduces this decree to his audience by using the adjective ἰσχυρόν in the superlative degree to place emphasis231 and then mentions its content: it orders that if anyone harms (ἀδικῇ) the demos of the Athenians, he shall make his defense in chains (δεδεμένον) in front of the people (ἐν τῷ δήμῳ); and if he is judged guilty, he will be executed and then be thrown into the pit (ἀποθανόντα εἰς τὸ βάραθρον ἐμβληθῆναι);232 his property will be confiscated and one tenth of it will be devoted to the goddess (τὰ δὲ χρήματα αὐτοῦ δημευθῆναι καὶ τῆς θεοῦ τὸ ἐπιδέκατον εἶναι) (1.7.20).

 226 For this tactic and the topos ‘I shall not try to deceive you’ see Kremmydas, 2013, 57–58, 73, who rightly includes this passage. 227 See Allen, 2000, 69. 228 For this concept cf. Andoc. 1.103, Isaeus 1.3. 229 See Konstan, 2006, 81–82. Cf. Arist. Rhet.1390a30–31, who says that those who are overconfident should not be πιστεύοντες in everything. 230 See Ober, 1989, 149–50. For the use of ‘everybody knows’ argument see further Hesk, 2007, 378–79, Kapellos, 2014a, 83. 231 Cf. Isocr. 1.36, who does the same thing by referring to the ἰσχυρότατον … νόμον. 232 I accept the manuscript reading ἀποθανόντα εἰς τὸ βάραθρον ἐμβληθῆναι for which see Allen, 2000, 218–20.

184  Chapter 3: The trial after Arginousai This decree has important similarities to the decree of Callixenus: ἀδικεῖν οἱ στρατηγοὶ … ἂν δὲ δόξωσιν ἀδικεῖν, θανάτῳ ζημιῶσαι καὶ τοῖς ἕνδεκα παραδοῦναι καὶ τὰ χρήματα δημοσιεῦσαι, τὸ δ’ ἐπιδέκατον τῆς θεοῦ εἶναι (1.7.10). Moreover, it reminds us that the generals were already imprisoned: δεθέντας εἰς τὸν δῆμον παραδοθῆναι, ἡ βουλὴ ἔδησε (1.7.3). Euryptolemus urges the Athenians to judge the generals by this decree, and if by Zeus (νὴ Δία) they decide to do so, he says, let his kinsman Pericles be the first. This should happen because it is shameful (αἰσχρόν) for him to place more value on him than the whole city (1.7.21). By appealing to Zeus Euryptolemus indicates his persistence in the traditional religious beliefs of the Athenian society and demonstrates this through his good character and his consistency in his view, when he urges his fellow citizens earlier to be pious (1.7.29).233 Euryptolemus connects this decree with his kinsman Pericles, whom he mentions for a second time in this speech, in order to avoid making the jurors suspect that he cared only to save his relative. He claims that if he thought otherwise, this could cause the contempt and hostility of his fellow citizens.234 Moreover, Euryptolemus urges the jurors, if they wish, to use one more law, as the positive imperative κρίνατε indicates: they can judge the generals according to the law set up for sacrilegious people and traitors (προδόταις), which states that, if someone betrays (προδιδῷ) the city or steals sacred property, he is to be judged in court (κριθέντα ἐν δικαστηρίῳ); and, if he is convicted, he is not to be buried (μὴ ταφῆναι) in Attica and his property is to be confiscated (τὰ δὲ χρήματα αὐτοῦ δημόσια εἶναι) (1.7.22). This decree also has similiraties to the decree of Callixenus, i.e. it condemns the generals to death and confiscates their money (τὰ χρήματα δημοσιεῦσαι) (1.7.10). If we compare Callixenus’ decree with the two laws that Euryptolemus cites, it is significant that death and the post-mortem confiscation of property appear in all three punishments; moreover, in all of them what is stipulated is the non-burial of the corpses of the convicted.235 Therefore, Euryptolemus offers the demos the opportunity to punish the generals in the same way that Callixenus proposed.236 However, the significant difference was that Callixenus’ decree asked for the collective execution of the generals without a due process.  233 Cf. Edwards, 2008, 108–110 that the orators’ calling on Zeus increases from the 5th to the 4th century B.C. and probably indicates the persistence of traditional religious values in Athens. For appeals to religion in rhetoric as a way to give a right impression of the speaker’s character see King, 1955, 365. 234 For the use of the adjective αἰσχρός to express an act that causes contempt and hostility see Adkins, 1975, 31–33, 156–58, Dover, 1974, 70. 235 See also Allen, 2000, 324–25 for a comparison of the three laws. 236 Bauman, 1990, 71 made this point first but did not offer arguments to prove his view.

The speech of Euryptolemus  185

Then Euryptolemus explains why he chose these laws: both of them allow a proper trial on the basis of the allotment of time. He says that by whichever law the Athenians want, they must allow the generals to be judged each one individually (κατὰ ἕνα ἕκαστον), with the day (τῆς ἡμέρας) divided in three parts: one in which the Assemblymen must gather and vote (συλλέγεσθαι … καὶ διαψηφίζεσθαι) whether the generals have done injustice or not (ἐάν τε ἀδικεῖν δοκῶσιν ἐάν τε μή), one for the prosecution and one for the defense (ἀπολογήσασθαι) (1.7.23). We saw earlier that Euryptolemus said that the Assemblymen could judge the generals all together or each one separately as long as they gave them at least one day to defend themselves (καθ’ ἕνα ἕκαστον, εἰ μὴ πλέον, ἀλλὰ μίαν ἡμέραν δόντες αὐτοῖς ὑπὲρ αὑτῶν ἀπολογήσασθαι (1.7.19). Now Euryptolemus changes his previous statement and says that each general should be tried individually. Apparently he believed that, when the Athenians heard each general defending himself in a single trial, they would find out that he told the truth. On the other hand, he insists on the matter of time and repeats that one day was the time required for a proper trial. Through the infinitive συλλέγεσθαι Euryptolemus reminds his audience not only of their right to participate in the Assembly and the courts237 but also of their belief that what called together (συλλέγεσθαι) the Council, drew the people in the Assembly, filled the courts and enabled the whole of the state to be carried on and preserved was the laws (τοὺς νόμους) and the obedience that all men yielded to them. The Athenians knew that, if the laws were done away with and every man were given licence to do as he liked (ὅ τι βούλεται ποιεῖν), the constitution would vanish (Dem. 25.20). As I argued earlier, Euryptolemus knew that through the violation of the law that gave the generals the time to defend themselves the Athenians put their own constitution in danger.238 Nevertheless, the Assembymen had accepted the call of the anonymous man for revenge and had shouted that the demos would what it liked (πράττειν ὃ ἂν βούληται–1.7.12). So what Euryptolemus did now was to call his fellow citizens to respect the law and protect the democracy. Moreover, he urges them to vote, not as Callixenus invited them to do (διαψηφίσασθαι ᾿Αθηναίους–1.7.9), i.e. in violation of the law, but in respect for the law, which gave each defendant the appropriate time to defend himself. Euryptolemus maintains that, if things are done in this way, those who are unjust (οἱ ἀδικοῦντες) will pay (τεύξονται) the greatest penalty (τιμωρίας) and the innocent will be set free (ἐλευθερωθήσονται) by the Athenians (ὑφ’ ὑμῶν) and will

 237 The word σύλλογος refers to the Assembly and the people’s court (see Hansen, 1989, 197). Cf. also Pl. Resp.492b5–7, who says that the Athenians gather εἰς ἐκκλησίας ἢ εἰς δικαστήρια and defines these places as κοινὸν πλήθους σύλλογον. 238 See p. 168.

186  Chapter 3: The trial after Arginousai not be unjustly (ἀδίκως)239 destroyed (ἀπολοῦνται) (1.7.24). It is obvious that he does not forget Callixenus’ decree which said ἀδικεῖν οἱ στρατηγοὶ (1.7.9). Euryptolemus does not disagree with the punishment of those who are guilty but he maintains that this should be done legally through the word τιμωρία, which meant vengeance through lawful punishment.240 But this could be accomplished only in the future, as the use of the two verbs in the future tense reveals. This temporal choice is not accidental. In its exemplary character punishment differed from revenge in two important aspects: (a) in its temporal orientation, i.e. punishment looked to the future, while revenge reflected only the past offence; and (b) in its social purpose, i.e. punishment was intended to benefit many, while revenge affected only the perpetrator.241 The dilemma between revenge, which was to be taken hastily and rashly when a man was in the heat and hurry of passion, and punishment, which should take place in due season and by convenient means, remained in Athenian society.242 Xenophon’s readers could remember that in the Mytilene debate Cleon and Diodotus disagreed about whether punishment should be retrospective in character and thus closer in spirit to revenge or should be prospective in character and thus closer in spirit to deterrence.243 Euryptolemus reminds the Assemblymen that they should not forget that it was their duty to inflict punishment rationally and not judge angrily.244 He does so because he knew that a man could vent his anger on somebody, but then it took some time to recover the energy that was needed for a new eruption of anger.245 Evidently Euryptolemus hoped that when the generals were put on trial, the Athenians would not be angry and they would decide that the defendants were worthy of pardon.246 If this happened, the commanders would be set free and would not be in danger of being condemned to death as they would at the present hot-tempered moment. In my opinion, Xenophon’s use of the adverb ἀδίκως is not coincidental but leads readers to think that

 239 Here I accept the reading of Marincola, 2009, 35. 240 See pp. 166–67. 241 See Missiou, 1992, 179–80. 242 Cf. Plut. Mor.553d1–3, who makes this differentiation between punishments (τὰς τιμωρίας) and vengeful, i.e. hasty decisions. 243 See Herman, 2006, 294. 244 Cf. Dem. 21.76 who says: παρὰ τοῦ τὴν τιμωρίαν ὧν πέπονθ’ ἀποδοθῆναι προσήκει; ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι παρ’ ὑμῶν καὶ τῶν νόμων. 245 For this idea see Rapp, 2006, 200. 246 Dem. 18.274 observed that when some people do wrong (ἀδικεῖ) willingly, the Athenians have anger and a desire for vengeance/lawful punishment (ὀργὴν καὶ τιμωρίαν) against them; but those who do wrong unwillingly are worthy of pardon instead of punishment (τιμωρίας).

The speech of Euryptolemus  187

the Athenians were in danger of equating themselves with the Thirty who killed many fellow citizens ἀδίκως (2.3.17).247 Euryptolemus keeps looking to the future. He says that, if the Assemblymen give the generals the appropriate time to defend themselves, they will judge and finally give their verdict (κρινεῖτε)248 according to the law (κατὰ τὸν νόμον), with reverence towards the gods and fidelity to their oath (εὐσεβοῦντες καὶ εὐορκοῦντες). Moreover, they will not fight on the same side (συμπολεμήσετε) as the Spartans by destroying (ἀπολλύντες) the generals, who had deprived them of seventy ships, without a trial (ἀκρίτους) against the law (παρὰ τὸν νόμον) (1.7.25). The speaker creates this period, focusing on lawfulness and lawlessness. The first possibility is proved through two participles which create ὀμοιοτέλευτον and παρίσωσις. Euryptolemus focuses on the need for εὐσέβεια, because it was not only a moral obligation of the Athenian jurors249 but also a legal necessity since it was an impious act to condemn someone without a trial.250 The second possibility connects the present trial with the war of Athens against Sparta. For the first time in his speech Euryptolemus connects the verdict of the trial with the Peloponnesian War. He asserts that by condemning the commanders the Assemblymen will offer future help to the Spartans, although the Spartans had been defeated by the defendants. Connecting the previous narrative, where Xenophon recorded that the Peloponnesians lost more than sixty-nine ships (1.6.35), with Euryptolemus’ reminder that the generals had been victorious, readers cannot doubt the validity and force of his argument. Finally, through his emphasis on the danger of taking an illegal decision, Xenophon takes his readers back to Thucydides once again. We realize that the present situation was far from Pericles’ ideal that the Athenians did not do illegal acts (οὐ παρανομοῦμεν) because they feared their magistrates and their laws (Thuc. 2.37.1). If Pericles boasted in this way about the morality of the Athenians,251 Xenophon’s audience can realize that the Assemblymen would prove themselves immoral. Euryptolemus then asks: ‘what is it that you fear so much (δεδιότες σφόδρα) that leads you to act in such haste (ἐπείγεσθε)?’ A reference to this emotion in the Assembly was not unusual. When the Athenians went to the Pnyx, they could not

 247 Note also that in 2.3.22 Theramenes objected to the decision of the Thirty to kill metics, saying that these men μηδὲν ἀδικοῦντας and that there would not be acts ἀδικώτερα than these. 248 For the double meaning of the word κρίσις see Whitehead, 2000, 176. 249 Dem. 18.7 says that each one of the jurors τὴν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς εὐσέβειαν φυλάττων. 250 Cf. Dem. 23.25: a condemnation without trial (ἄνευ κρίσεως) is not pious (εὐσεβές). 251 See Romilly, 1956, 120, 126–27.

188  Chapter 3: The trial after Arginousai deliberate and judge without being influenced by personal experiences, prejudices, values and fears, much of it in the subconscious.252 One of their fears was the loss of political stability.253 Such fear among the citizens could contribute to the preservation of the regime but it could also be destructive if an orator emphasized its supposed existence too much. Thucydides shows that such a negative example of an orator was Cleon, who criticized his fellow Athenians because they falsely believed that they lived free from the fear of conspiracies among themselves and their allies. Fortunately for the Athenians, Cleon was not persuasive at that time, but things changed after the Sicilian disaster. Thucydides showed how, gripped by fear and necessity, the Athenians were persuaded that to maintain their imperial rule they had to let go of democracy.254 Then the Four Hundred took control of the city because the Athenians were handicapped by pluralistic ignorance and thus were unable to rise up en masse against their oppressors. However, it was the assassination of Phrynichus that set in motion the revolutionary bandwagon that ultimately brought down the regime. So, in the end, the coup of the Four Hundred taught Athenian democrats important lessons about mobilizing in defense of the regime.255 The rest of Thucydides’ History and Xenophon’ Hellenica until 1.7.1 give the impression that the Athenians did not fear any conspiracy against them any more. However, through the narration of the Arginousai trial and Euryptolemus’ reference to fear Xenophon alerts his readers to the fact that the Assemblymen were afraid for the safety of their democracy. It is certain that Xenophon chose to report the fear of the Athenians in the speech of Euryptolemus to emphasize how emotions operated in Athenian society in a time of crisis. This leads us to read the previous account again and to conclude that the Athenians suspected that the generals had lied in their letter about their plan to save the crews256 and deliberately let them drown. Although the Assemblymen believed for a moment that the commanders had told the truth, the words of the anonymous man had stimulated fear in them257 and convinced them such a plan could only have been an attack on the democracy. Xenophon’s readers can be  252 As Finley, 1962, 13 remarks. 253 See Konstan, 2006, 139–40. 254 See Gish, 2012, 163–67. 255 See Teegarden, 2012, 434–45. 256 Cf. Dem. 23.158–62, who claims that the general Charidemus had sent letters to the Assembly giving misleading information about his actions, while he was still in Asia, in order to trick his fellow citizens. 257 For the idea that words stimulated emotions which could effect the judgement of jurors and thus convince them to take a decision see Konstan, 2007, 411–21.

The speech of Euryptolemus  189

certain that the previous subversion of the constitution by the Four Hundred functioned as an ominous precedent, which continued to haunt the demos after the restoration of democracy.258 Having this overwhelming fear, the Athenians thought that they should hurry up259 and convict the generals even without a lawful trial in order to stop the supposedly evil plans of the generals. Euryptolemus understood this and by acknowledging that the Athenians were afraid he proved that he was able to follow their thought. But he also contended that the Athenians’ fear of a conspiracy was excessive and misplaced and hence produced an irrational reaction. So the tone of his question sounds like mild astonishment. Xenophon implicitly praises Euryptolemus for his ability to allay the fear of his fellow citizens through rational consideration.260 Euryptolemus’ reaction is explained by his next question: ‘do you fear that you will not be able to sentence to death261 and free anyone you want (ἢ μὴ οὐχ ὑμεῖς ὃν ἂν βούλησθε ἀποκτείνητε καὶ ἐλευθερώσητε), if you judge according to the law; but you will be able to do so by acting against the law (ἂν κατὰ τὸν νόμον κρίνητε, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἂν παρὰ τὸν νόμον) like Callixenus, who convinced the Council to introduce the decree about one vote in the Assembly (τὴν βουλὴν ἔπεισεν εἰς τὸν δῆμον εἰσενεγκεῖν μιᾷ ψήφῳ)?’ (1.7.26). In this type of questions the focus is not on the referent but on the sender. It is asked in such a way that it cannot be denied. The μὴ οὐ indicates that a speaker is actually making a strong negative statement posed as a question and is not expecting an answer or intending to supply one; but he poses a question that cannot be denied.262 Euryptolemus urges the Athenians not to be afraid263 by reminding them of their power to treat any citizen as they want but only according to the law. Undoubtedly he has in mind the reaction of his fellow citizens earlier, when they were shouting that the demos will do ὃ ἂν βούληται (1.7.22). Euryptolemus always hoped that the generals might be acquitted, because he says here that the Assemblymen might decide that someone is not guilty, as in 1.7.24, where he said that

 258 This brilliant remark belongs to Gish, 2012, 167, which I hope I have proved right. 259 Cf. Plut. Mor.722e10, who says that men talk and act μετὰ πάθους ἐπείγοντος. 260 Tamiolaki, 2013b, 31–33 shows that Xenophon presents an agent knowing the emotion of others in order to show that emotions can become the object of rational consideration and hence are viewed as a factor which influences the course of events. She focuses on other Books of the Hellenica, but her analysis is also valid for the Arginousai trial. 261 For this meaning of the verb ἀποκτείνω see Harris, 2006, 391–404. 262 For these features of this type of rhetorical questions see Cronjé, 1992, 418–21. 263 Tamiolaki, 2013b, 38–39 shows that speeches of the Hellenica could be roughly divided into two categories: those dominated by the ‘don’t be afraid’ motif and those pervaded by the ‘be afraid’ motif. I would add Euryptolemus’ speech to the first category.

190  Chapter 3: The trial after Arginousai those who are not guilty ἐλευθερωθήσονται ὑφ’ ὑμῶν. In my view, Euryptolemus tries to arouse the emotion of πραότης in the Assembly. This emotion was elicited by the humble behavior of the offender, and enhanced the public respect and esteem of the offended party, which could be the jurors.264 Euryptolemus bases his argument on the fact that the generals accepted that the Athenians had complete power over them by returning home and facing a trial. But, if the Athenians still believed that the generals were guilty, they should follow the rule of law, since they believed that it restrained oligarchic revolutionaries and in general prevented civil conflict.265 Otherwise, they would fall into stasis by their own mistake, because it was only then that fear could prevail over trust.266 Regarding Callixenus, Euryptolemus mentions his action as an example of illegality, since he convinced the Council that the generals should be judged by one vote. Xenophon has told us that Callixenus convinced the Councillors to bring before the Assembly his decree (ἐκκλησίαν ἐποίουν, εἰς ἣν ἡ βουλὴ εἰσήνεγκε τὴν ἑαυτῆς γνώμην Καλλιξένου εἰπόντος–1.7.9). Xenophon indicates that when somebody succeeded in convincing the Boule, things could be easier in the Assembly. Xenophon’s proof of this lies in Thucydides, who says that Alcibiades was afraid that if the Spartan ambassadors convinced the Councillors, they would easily convince the Assemblymen (5.45.1). On the other hand, Xenophon left his audience wondering how Callixenus succeeded in his plan. He delayed in explaining why Callixenus’ decree was passed by the Council and chose this as the artistically opportune moment to fill the knowledge gap of his audience. Euryptolemus says that Callixenus persuaded the Councillors because of their fear. We can be certain now that unsafety in Athens gave rise to a politics of fear which men like Theramenes and Callixenus utilized to achieve their own private ends. Callixenus acted like Cleon in the past, i.e. he abused the fear of the Councillors regarding the safety of the democracy and thus he wickedly convinced them to accept his decree.267 The bouleutai were swayed by the rhetoric of this unscrupoulous orator and accepted his proposal that the generals should not be given time to defend themselves but instead be judged innocent or guilty with one vote. So Euryptolemus warns the Athenians not to make a hasty decision on the basis of the emotions of the hour. Euryptolemus’ question required that his audience would elaborate his message and be

 264 See Konstan, 2006, 77–90. 265 For this prohibitive function of the rule of law see Hitz, 2009, 371. 266 For stasis and fear see Price, 2001, 309. 267 Cf. Lys. 30.22: ἡ βουλὴ … ἀναγκάζεται … τῶν ῥητόρων τοῖς πονηρότατα λέγουσι πείθεσθαι and Dem. 22.36: πείθοντος ἃ βούλοιτο τὴν βουλήν.

The speech of Euryptolemus  191

convinced because the quality of his question cannot be denied. Xenophon informs his readers about the dangers of bad rhetoric exercised by Callixenus by connecting his previous narrative with Callixenus’ speech. Then Euryptolemus warns the Assemblymen about the dangers of an illegal decision. He says that if his hearers condemn (ἀποκτείναιτε) someone who is not responsible for a misdeed (οὐκ αἴτιον ὄντα) they may regret it later (ἴσως … μεταμελήσει δὴ ὕστερον). We must remember that Euryptolemus said earlier that οἱ ἀναίτιοι will be set free if the Assemblymen follow the law (1.7.24) but that the Assemblymen have the power to sentence to death (ἀποκτείνητε) whomever they want because this is what the law ordains (1.7.26). Xenophon’s readers understand that Euryptolemus emphasizes the responsibility of the Assemblymen. The speaker’s mention of μεταμέλεια emphasizes the moral dimension of the trial, since metameleia always contains a moral component. It has an inner recognition of a wrong done to another because of anger, which is perceived as serious and often irreparable act. Moreover, it is retrospective. Because of the rethinking of the wrong action, where possible, the agent will most often attempt to undo this action, because he accepts the responsibility for his action, even if this was unintentional or done without full knowledge of the consequences. But this mistake cannot be fixed.268 Euryptolemus intimates or rather takes for granted that the Athenians are angry at the generals and warns them that, if they let momentary passion overcome rational thought, it is probable that they will look back to the past and will not remain content with their decision. But even if they change their minds then, they will not be able to fix their mistake because the supposedly guilty will be dead by then. Xenophon’s readers could compare the present case with that of the revolution of the Mytileneans as reported by Thucydides. The Athenians took a hasty decision, based on anger, to execute the revolutionaries, but then they had second thoughts (ὑπὸ ὀργῆς … ἀποκτεῖναι … τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ μετάνοιά τις … τοὺς αἰτίους–Thuc. 3.36.2–4). Although Cleon argued that the Athenians should not feel remorse (μεταμελείᾳ–Thuc. 3.37.2), Diodotus convinced his fellow citizens to reconsider the subject; so they found the time to change their decision before the destruction of the Mytileneans (Thuc. 3.41–49). However, on the present occasion the generals would meet their death immediately and there would not be another trial. Thus, it is not surprising that Euryptolemus projects metameleia into the future and uses it a warning about the gravity of the present decision, implying that his fellow Athenians will put their morality to test in the future if they convict the generals.

 268 See Fulkerson, 2004, 253, 257.

192  Chapter 3: The trial after Arginousai Euryptolemus urges the Assemblymen to remember (ἀναμνήσθητε) how painful and injurious regret already is (ἀλγεινὸν καὶ ἀνωφελὲς ἤδη ἐστί), even more when they have been mistaken (ἡμαρτηκότες) about the condemnation of a man to death. Euryptolemus uses a common rhetorical claim, i.e. he reminds the Assemblymen of earlier trials in which they had convicted citizens who were innocent.269 Nevertheless, in order not to infuriate the Assemblymen, he avoids mentioning trials of the past in which the Athenians violated the rule of law.270 He emphasizes the importance of an unlawful verdict because of a culpable error271 by using the adjectives ἀλγεινόν and ἀνωφελές, which were used in contexts where there was a parallelism and equation between medicine and justice.272 We can take for granted the familiarity of the Athenians with the basic aspects of medicine given the use of medical language in oratory. An impressive precedent for this analogy between medicine and rhetoric is found in Thucydides, who placed in the mouths of Nicias and Alcibiades clear allusions to medical literature in their public debate before the Sicilian expedition.273 Obviously, Euryptolemus used this medical imagery because he believed that there would be a positive reception by his audience. Euryptolemus does not mean physical pain for the Athenians but remorse and social suffering. Through these words he  269 Cf. Lys. 22.18: ἀναμνήσθητε δέ … ὅτι πολλῶν ἤδη ἐχόντων ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν, ἀλλ’ ἀμφισβητούντων καὶ μάρτυρας παρεχομένων θάνατον κατέγνωτε, πιστοτέρους ἡγησάμενοι τοὺς τῶν κατηγόρων λόγους; Lys. 30.25: ἀναμνήσθητε δὲ ὅτι πολλοὺς ἤδη τῶν πολιτῶν ἐπὶ κλοπῇ χρημάτων ἀπεκτείνατε. 270 Cf. Andoc. 1.80: ἐγὼ οὐδὲν δέομαι … ἀναμιμνῄσκειν ὑμᾶς τῶν γεγενημένων κακῶν. For this tactic of the orators see in detail Kapellos, 2014a, 95. 271 See p. 180. 272 For the first adjective: in Plato’s Gorgias Socrates and Polus equate medicine with justice and agree that the justice of the court reforms people and makes them more just, and acts as a medicine for wickedness (ἰατρικὴ γίγνεται πονηρίας ἡ δίκη–478d6–7). Moreover, they agree that those who avoid justice behave like the man who was the victim of the worst disease and chooses not to take the prescribed treatment, fearing it as being painful (τὸ ἀλγεινὸν–479b6). Cf. also Plut. Mor.46e11–f5: ‘just as one who runs away from the physician after an operation, and does not submit to be bandaged, sustains all the pain (τὸ ἀλγεινὸν) of the treatment, but waits not for its benefits: thus, when the speech has cut and wounded a man’s foolishness, if he gives it no chance to heal and quiet the wound, he comes away from philosophy with a smart and pain but with no benefit. For the second adjective: in Xenophon’s Mem.1.2.51 the accuser of Socrates claimed that the philosopher caused his companions to dishonor not only their fathers, but their other relations as well by saying that invalids and litigants get benefit not from their relations, but from their doctor or their counsel. Xenophon objects and says that for Socrates a man’s dearest friend is himself: yet even in his lifetime he removes or lets another remove from his body whatever is useless and unprofitable (ἀνωφελές–1.2.54). 273 See Thuc. 6.14.1 with Dover, 1970, 240, Jouhana, 2012, 21–38.

The speech of Euryptolemus  193

speaker assumes the role of a doctor–political advisor who tries to protect his city before they become ‘sick’.274 His message is that the Athenians can avoid future misfortunes if they abide by the laws of the city and respect human life (περὶ θανάτου ἀνθρώπου). Xenophon’s readers can remember that the generals respected the lives of the crews and were conscious that they had to save τοὺς … ἀνθρώπους on the sinking ships (1.6.35). Euryptolemus compares the illegality of the present trial with the lawfulness of the trial of another man, Aristarchus. He achieves this by creating an argumentum ex contrariis, i.e. an argument which is based on the contradiction of the ideas it contains (μὲν–δὲ). Thus, he says that the Athenians would do a terrible thing (δεινά) if they gave to Aristarchus, who had previously subverted the demos (τὸν δῆμον καταλύοντι) and then betrayed (προδιδόντι) Oenoe to the Thebans, who were their enemies (πολεμίοις), one day to defend himself (ἔδοτε ἡμέραν ἀπολογήσασθαι) in the way he wanted and did everything else according to the law (κατὰ τὸν νόμον προύθετε), but deprived the generals (τούς στρατηγοὺς), who did everything for the Athenians (ὑμῖν) κατὰ γνώμην and defeated the enemies (νικήσαντας δὲ τοὺς πολεμίους), of the same legal rights (1.7.28). Let us examine the two parts of Euryptolemus’ argument. Regarding the first part, Euryptolemus takes it for granted that the Athenians knew about Aristarchus, since he does not make any introductory comment about him. Thanks to Thucydides, Xenophon’s readers can also know who this man was. So we read that when ἡ ἐν ταῖς ᾿Αθήναις δημοκρατία κατελέλυτο in 411 B.C. (Thuc. 8.63.3), Aristarchus was among the leading men of the Four Hundred and that he had always been the most thorough-going enemy of the people (τῷ δήμῳ). Aristarchus and the other leaders of the coup, both at the first imposition of the oligarchy and again later, when the army at Samos declared for the democracy, sent envoys of their own number to Lacedaimon and were always anxious to make peace (8.90). But the Athenians deposed the Four Hundred, so all the leaders of the oligarchy left for Decelea except for Aristarchus. Thucydides describes an incident which proves this man’s enmity for the people. As he was one of the generals (στρατηγῶν) at the time, he gathered round him hastily a few archers of the most barbarous sort and made his way to Oenoe, a fortress on the confines of Attica and Boeotia, which was garrisoned by the Athenians whenever war broke out and was the point at which the Peloponnesians intended to enter Attic territory (2.18.2). At that time the Corinthians, having  274 For the physician analogy in the orators and the concept of ‘poliatrics’ see Campbell, 1982, 810–24, especially 811–21. Cf. Wooten, 1979, 157–60 for the orator Demosthenes assuming the role of a doctor.

194  Chapter 3: The trial after Arginousai called the Boeotians to their aid, were besieging the fortress in order to avenge an overthrow inflicted by the garrison of Oenoe upon a party of them who were going home from Decelea. Aristarchus communicated with the besiegers and deceived the garrison by telling them that the Athenian government had come to terms with the Lacedaimonians, and that in accordance with one of the conditions of the peace they were required to give up the place to the Boeotians. The Athenians defending the fortress, trusting him as a general (ὡς ἀνδρὶ στρατηγῷ), and utterly ignorant of what had happened because they were under siege, capitulated and came out. In this way Oenoe was taken and occupied by the Boeotians. This was the last incident before the oligarchical revolution at Athens came to its end (Thuc. 8.98.3–4). Euryptolemus’ reference to Aristarchus allows Xenophon’s readers to think once again that the Assemblymen were haunted by the fear of the regime of the Four Hundred. In the law of eisangelia two of the charges provided for were an attempt to overthrow the democracy and acts of military treason.275 Although these misdeeds were mentioned as different accusations, they were seen as related to each other and were deemed conspiratorial.276 Therefore Euryptolemus’ reference to Aristarchus implies that the Athenians saw some similarities between the oligarchic regime of 411 B.C. and the present situation. Most probably, they believed that the generals had conspired to let the crews die at Arginousai and had taken advantage of the bad weather to harm the democracy. If this is not right, it is difficult to explain why Euryptolemus reminded his readers of Aristarchus who had subverted the regime, or even worse to think that the speaker was unwise to draw this analogy. For this reason Euryptolemus appeals to the collective memory of his audience277 and reminds it that Aristarchus, who put down the laws of the city278 and betrayed Oenoe, was put on trial. By reminding the Athenians that they gave Aristarchus one day to defend his actions he repeats his earlier argument that the Assemblymen should give one day, if not more, to the generals to explain their actions (εἰ μὴ πλέον, ἀλλὰ μίαν ἡμέραν δόντες αὐτοῖς ὑπὲρ αὑτῶν ἀπολογήσασθαι– 1.7.19). Moreover, by saying that the Athenians acted in this way because they followed their law, Euryptolemus reminds us of Xenophon’s remark that the  275 Hyp. 4.7–8: ἢ συνίηι ποι ἐπὶ καταλύσει τοῦ δήμου ἢ … ἐάν τις … προδῶι ἢ ναῦς ἢ πεζὴν ἢ ναυτικὴν στρατιάν. 276 See Roisman, 2006, 86–87. 277 For the orators’ appeal to collective memory see Lanni, 2004, 164–65. 278 This is the meaning of Euryptolemus’ phrase τὸν δῆμον καταλύοντι. Cf. Dem. 24.152: δεινὸν καὶ ἀνόσιόν ἐστι καὶ δήμου κατάλυσις, πάντας ἂν οἶμαι ὁμολογῆσαι. ἡ γὰρ πόλις ἡμῶν, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, νόμοις καὶ ψηφίσμασιν διοικεῖται.

The speech of Euryptolemus  195

Athenians did not allow the generals to speak individually in violation of the law (οὐ γὰρ προυτέθη σφίσι λόγος κατὰ τὸν νόμον–1.7.5). It is noteworthy that Euryptolemus claims that the citizens who judged Aristarchus were the same men who judged the generals now. Although the possibility that some of the Assemblymen could have heard Aristarchus defending himself cannot be ruled out, the claim that the entire audience judged him is an exaggeration. Nevertheless, litigants often used direct address when referring to an action carried out on behalf of Athens even when it was impossible for many on the jury to have participated. This rhetorical fiction allowed the Athenians to imagine the rule of the people as transcending time and place, as well as individuals and institutions, and to represent the demos as eternal and unchanging. Through rhetoric, the jury acquired its authority and the Athenians preserved their link to the past even as the composition of the courts changed and even as new juries rendered new verdicts.279 Therefore through the use of the trial of Aristarchus as an example280 Euryptolemus tries to help Athens to remain focused on the concept of law and be consistent in its use by giving each general the right for a proper trial.281 Concerning the second part of Euryptolemus’ argument, Xenophon’s readers can make several remarks. First, it is worth noting his emphasis on the undisputed military authority of the generals compared to Aristarchus. Reading the narrative of Thucydides, we can observe that he mentioned twice that Aristarchus was a general. Nevertheless, we cannot disregard the fact that Thucydides reports the office of Aristarchus not to praise him but, on the contrary, to emphasize his treacherous behavior towards the demos. Euryptolemus does not call Aristarchus στρατηγόν, obviously because he insinuated that a man like him did not deserve this honorable title. Euryptolemus puts the Arginousai commanders on the other side of his esteem because they really deserved their post. This is the reason why Euryptolemus uses the word γνώμη, which indicates the result of a mental process in which one examines the particulars of a situation and then forms a judgement, opinion or policy about it.282 For Euryptolemus the generals acted according to their best judgement and did everything which they could have done for the people’s benefit, serving Athens, as the dative ὑμῖν shows. The result was that  279 See Wolpert, 2003, 537–55. 280 Due, 1983, 39 calls Euryptolemus’ mention of the case of Aristarchus a ‘historical example’, but I should say that this term is not quite right, since it took twenty years for an event to pass from current politics to the realm of history (see Nouhaud, 1982, 369). On the other hand, it is certainly an example. 281 Cf. Dem. 23.81: τοῦτον εὐθὺς ἄνευ κρίσεως κολάζει. πῶς ἂν ἢ δεινότερον γένοιτ’ ἢ παρανομώτερον τούτου ψήφισμα; 282 See Price, 2001, 51.

196  Chapter 3: The trial after Arginousai the commanders defeated the Lacedaimonians, whom he is certain that everybody recognized as the true enemy and hence calls οἱ πολέμιοι. For these reasons Euryptolemus tries to dissuade (μὴ) the Assemblymen from depriving the generals of their right to a due process. Instead, he urges them to treat the laws as an asset or a property (ἑαυτῶν ὄντας τοὺς νόμους).283 Xenophon narrated earlier that Euryptolemus tried to bring a graphe paranomon against Callixenus to safeguard the laws and democracy but he was forced to withdraw his proposal because of the reaction of the Assemblymen.284 Now Euryptolemus returns to the issue of protecting the Athenian constitution, having in mind the idea that the jurors were the guardians of the laws.285 He asserts that the only means (δι’ οὓς) through which the Athenians are the greatest is the laws which they must cherish as if they were preserving their patrimony (φυλάττοντες).286 Without them (ἄνευ τούτων), Euryptolemus asserts, the Athenians must not attempt (πειρᾶσθε) to do anything should they want to remain true citizens (1.7.29).287 Euryptolemus urges the Assemblymen to reconsider (ἐπανέλθετε) the events themselves in which the failings (αἱ ἁμαρτίαι) of the generals are supposed (δοκοῦσι) to have occurred. This verb prepares the audience of Xenophon to read pieces of information which they could compare with the historian’s narrative and thus assess the claims of the speaker. Moreover, Euryptolemus asserts that the actions of the generals should not be considered culpable errors, i.e. actions which occurred because of moral vice.288 In a context like this ‘errors’ would appear to encompass cases of negligence in which one did not intend harm to occur but could have foreseen the possibility that it might occur and taken measures to prevent it.’289 His point is that the commanders not only did not neglect their duty but also they could not have foreseen the disaster because of the unexpected bad weather. We can be certain that Euryptolemus is telling the truth because Xenophon has said that the storm prevented the generals from executing their rescue plan (1.6.35). It is quite certain that Euryptolemus chose the word ἁμαρτία deli 283 See Carawan, 2007, 48. 284 See p. 169. 285 For this concept see Hansen, 1974, 18. 286 For this meaning of the participle cf. [Dem.] 44.24, who claims that his opponents preserved (φυλάττοντες) their patrimony. 287 Cf. Isocr. 3.62, who equates his words with the laws (τοὺς λόγους τοὺς ἐμοὺς νόμους εἶναι νομίζοντες πειρᾶσθε τούτοις ἐμμένειν) and Dem. 23.141, who criticizes Charidemus because he chose to live ἄνευ νόμων. 288 See p. 180. 289 Harris, 2013, 282.

The speech of Euryptolemus  197

berately, trying to convince the Assembly to follow a legal procedure regarding the generals. We have seen that Callixenus’ decree said that the commanders did injustice (ἀδικεῖν) to their crews (1.7.9); thus Euryptolemus urged his fellow citizens to try the defendants according to the decree of Cannonus or the law about traitors and temple-robbers, because then those who had done unjust acts (οἱ ἀδικοῦντες) would be punished with death lawfully (1.7.24). Now he tries to convince the Assemblymen that the action of the generals should not even be regarded as ἁμαρτία, which was something milder.290 The only logical conclusion is that the whole situation at Arginousai should be considered an ἀτύχημα, namely that the drowning of the crews occurred contrary to expectation and not because the generals were wicked.291 Nevertheless, Euryptolemus does not explicitly call the loss of men at Arginousai an ἀτύχημα, because the Athenians should regard the sea fight there as νίκη καὶ εὐτυχία, as he says a little later on (1.7.33). Then Euryptolemus includes a narrative which reminds the Assemblymen of the facts of the case,292 and functions as a vehicle of persuasion293 about the innocence of the generals. Euryptolemus does not offer a ‘counter-narative’ but repeats what had already been accepted and was indeed true. He does his best to undermine the rival story of the anonymous man, insisting on the facts in order to annul the accusation of evil intent on behalf of the commanders. He begins this section of his speech with the particle γάρ, which is typical in the introduction of narratives in the orators,294 and ends it with the verb ἔπραξαν in 1.7.28.295 Euryptolemus claims that when the generals had won the battle they went to the land (εἰς τὴν γῆν κατέπλευσαν). This information is true. Xenophon has said that after the sea fight the Athenians landed at Arginousai (οἱ δὲ ᾿Αθηναῖοι πάλιν εἰς τὰς ᾿Αργινούσας κατέπλευσαν–1.6.33 and αὐτοῦ ηὐλίζοντο–1.6.35). Euryptolemus reveals that the generals had different opinions about what they should do regarding the crews and the Spartan fleet. (a) Diomedon said that all of them should put out to sea in columns and take up the shipwrecked boats and men. His plan of sailing in order (ἐπὶ κέρως) meant that they could save the crews swiftly and safely. Euryptolemus is telling the truth. We must remember

 290 Cf. Arist. Rhet.1374b4–5: τὸ τὰ ἁμαρτήματα καὶ τὰ ἀδικήματα μὴ τοῦ ἴσου ἀξιοῦν. 291 Cf. Arist. Rhet.1374b6–7: ἀτυχήματα … ὅσα παράλογα καὶ μὴ ἀπὸ μοχθηρίας. 292 Anaximenes believed that every speech should have a narrative in some form: even if the facts are already known to the audience, it is still necessary to remind them (Rhet.ad.Alex. 1438a2–16). 293 For this function of narratives see de Braw, 2007, 194–95. 294 See de Brauw, 2007, 193. 295 Cf. Anax. Rhet.ad.Alex.1438a4, who mentions the narrative section as αἱ πράξεις.

198  Chapter 3: The trial after Arginousai that Xenophon has narrated in detail the full formation of the Athenian fleet before the sea fight at Arginousai, saying that Protomachus led the right column (τὸ δεξιὸν κέρας–1.6.30), and has reported that the generals ordered Theramenes and Thrasybulus to sail towards the disabled ships and their crews (1.6.35). Evidently Diomedon’s priority was to save the people on the sinking vessels and let Eteonicus escape. (b) Erasinides said that they should sail as quickly as possible (τὴν ταχίστην πλεῖν) against the enemy, who were at Mytilene. Erasinides believed that the Athenians would finish off the remaining Spartan fleet through a fast attack.296 This plan was right, because the Athenians were superior in numbers after the naval battle (1.6.34). On the other hand, he had no plan for the collection of the crews. (c) Thrasyllus said that they could do both if they left some ships there and went against the enemy with the rest. Evidently Thrasyllus combined the two plans of action. Euryptolemus’ silence about the rest of the generals implies that they did not make any proposal. Euryptolemus reports these generals’ individual proposals, the final decision, the exact plan and the officers ordered to complete the task. He vividly re-presents the acts in progress and reveals the generals in the process of committing them in order to make the Assemblymen eye-witnesses to it. The Assemblymen were uncovering the act as Euryptolemus’ narrative unfolded. He uses the topos of possibility297 to show that the generals were in a really difficult position about what to do and that they were only humans who could not take the right decision instantly. Xenophon’s readers cannot but admire the rhetorical competence of Euryptolemus. On the other hand, readers must assess the information that Euryptolemus provides to his audience. Xenophon did not report in 1.6.35 how the generals debated before taking an official decision. Should we think that Euryptolemus was lying? I believe not. Xenophon said in 1.7.5 that each general defended himself briefly. Thus, although he did not report the content of the individual speeches of the commanders, Xenophon’s readers should think that Diomedon, Erasinides and Thrasyllus mentioned in the second meeting of the Assembly what Euryptolemus says here. Therefore, Xenophon’s audience learns further details about the plan of the generals at Arginousai only at this point because he chose to structure the content of his work in this way.

 296 In Xen. 2.1.28 we read that Lysander ordered his ships at Aegospotami τὴν ταχίστην πλεῖν against the Athenian fleet. He was victorious. See p. 243. 297 See Usher, 2007b, 11.

The speech of Euryptolemus  199

Then Euryptolemus reports the next move of the generals. They decided (δοξάντων) that each of them, eight in total, would leave behind three ships from his group, ten from the ships of the taxiarchs (τῶν ταξιάρχων δέκα), ten from the Samians (τῶν ταξιάρχων δέκα) and three from the navarchs (τῶν ναυάρχων τρεῖς); all these total forty-seven (ἑπτὰ καὶ τετταράκοντα), four for each of the twelve that had been lost (τῶν ἀπολωλυιῶν) (1.7.30). Through this detailed report of the plan of the generals Euryptolemus illustrates their determination to complete their victory by saving the crews and destroying the remaining fleet of the enemy at Mytilene. Readers can be certain that he is telling the truth, because Xenophon gives the same information in two parts of his narrative: (a) the generals decided (ἔδοξε) that some of the taxiarchs (τῶν ταξιάρχων τινὰς) should sail with fortyseven ships (ἑπτὰ μὲν καὶ τετταράκοντα) to help the vessels which had already been sunk (ἐπὶ τὰς καταδεδυκυίας ναῦς) (1.6.35); and (b) the Samians were next to Diomedon (οἱ Σάμιοι δέκα ναυσὶν), next to these were the ten vessels of the taxiarchs (τῶν ταξιάρχων δέκα) and behind these the three ships of the navarchs (αἱ τῶν ναυάρχων τρεῖς) (1.6.29). There is one important difference between Xenophon’s account and Euryptolemus’ speech, which requires explanation. Xenophon says that twenty-five ships were lost (ἀπώλοντο) at Arginousai (1.6.34), while Euryptolemus says that only twelve ships had been lost (τῶν ἀπολωλυιῶν) (1.7.30). In my opinion, we can explain this discrepancy, since Euryptolemus and Xenophon are referring to different times. Euryptolemus refers to the plan of the commanders which was going to take place before the storm, while Xenophon says that twenty-five ships were lost with their crews after it. This means that twelve had been lost before the storm, while their crews were still alive, floating in the water. Τhe other thirteen were probably crippled but had not sunk yet, so the crews were not in imminent danger.298 These twelve vessels must be the ships whose crews were supposed to have perished because the generals did not rescue them. For whatever reason Euryptolemus behaves as though the other thirteen ships were not relevant to his discussion. However, all of them were destroyed after the storm. Euryptolemus reminds the Assembly that among the trierarchs who had been left behind were Thrasybulus and Theramenes (τῶν δὲ καταλειφθέντων τῶν τριηράρχων ἦσαν καὶ Θρασύβουλος καὶ Θηραμένης), the latter being the one who had accused the generals in the previous ecclesia (ἐν τῇ προτέρᾳ ἐκκλησίᾳ  298 Perrin, 1904, 659 believes that the twelve ships that Euryptolemus mentions were crippled. In my view, this is not right given the different tenses of the verb ἀπόλλυμι. Nevertheless, I agree that there were crippled ships, thirteen in number.

200  Chapter 3: The trial after Arginousai κατηγόρει τῶν στρατηγῶν). The commanders were sailing (ἔπλεον) with the rest of the ships against the enemy vessels (ἐπὶ τὰς πολεμίας). Thus he justifiably asks ‘What of these things did they not do sufficiently (ἱκανῶς) or well (καλῶς)? Therefore it is just (δίκαιον) that, as those who were posted (ταχθέντας)299 to go against the enemy should give an account (ὑπέχειν λόγον) of those things they did not do well (τὰ … μὴ καλῶς πραχθέντα), so those who did not follow the orders of the generals concerning the collection (πρὸς τὴν ἀναίρεσιν) of the shipwrecked should be put on trial (κρίνεσθαι), because they did not collect (οὐκ ἀνείλοντο) their crews’. Euryptolemus’ argument about the two trierarchs and their task is confirmed by Xenophon’s account.300 However, he makes a remarkable distinction between the two trierarchs, namely he mentions Thrasybulus without any comment but emphasizes that Theramenes was accusing his superiors in the previous session. It is evident that Euryptolemus seems to change his opinion about Thrasybulus now, because he said earlier that both trierarchs conspired against the generals (1.7.18).301 This inconsistency implies either that he was not certain about Thrasybulus’ participation in the scheme against the generals or that he believed that only Theramenes was behind it; so he chose this moment to remind his audience of this. In any case, Xenophon’s readers can be certain that Euryptolemus casts doubt on real motives of Theramenes and implicitly urges the Assemblymen to suspect that he had personal motives for accusing his superiors. Readers can be certain that Euryptolemus is telling the truth on the basis of Xenophon’s narrative.302 Then in one sentence Euryptolemus focuses on the generals again and uses the imperfect ἔπλεον, which implies that the fleet set out but was unable to meet the enemy303 because of the bad weather. His claim finds support in Xenophon’s statement about the wish of the generals to put their plan into action.304 The facts themselves allow Euryptolemus to ask what in all this was done insufficiently or badly. Obviously, such a question after his account of the facts needs the answer ‘everything was done sufficiently’; therefore the Assemblymen should believe that the generals were innocent. Xenophon’s readers should pay attention to Euryptolemus’ use of the adverb ἱκανῶς because it implied that the

 299 Marincola, 2009, 36 translates the participle as ‘they were ordered’. I prefer to follow the translation of LSJ s.v. τάσσω as ‘posted’ because it differentiates them from the trierarchs who should have done ἃ οἱ στρατηγοὶ ἐκέλευσαν, as Euryptolemus says immediately afterwards. 300 See p. 134. 301 See p. 181. 302 See pp. 146–47. 303 This remark belongs to Kagan, 1987, 359 n. 16. 304 See pp. 134–35.

The speech of Euryptolemus  201

generals had prepared their fleet to achieve its task. This finds proof in Thucydides305 and Xenophon himself.306 The same goes for the adverb καλῶς.307 Thus Euryptolemus claims that it would be just according to the law308 that the Assemblymen should ask the generals to explain (λόγον ὑποσχεῖν) τὰ … μὴ καλῶς πραχθέντα. This claim makes a contrast with the speaker’s previous argument that the generals did everything καλῶς. Xenophon’s readers should consider this an astute but also sincere argument, made on the basis of the law which allowed each speaker his allotted time. In fact, Euryptolemus had in mind Theramenes’ speech in the previous Asssembly in which he had said that the commanders should explain (λόγον ὑποσχεῖν) why they did not collect the shipwrecked (1.7.4). In this way, he reminds them that they were violating their law. Moreover, he claims that the Assemblymen should also ask for explanations from the trierarchs, who had not executed the orders of their superiors. In this way, he repeats the claim of the generals that they had ordered the trierarchs to perform τὴν δὲ ἀναίρεσιν τῶν ναυαγῶν (1.7.5). For this reason, Euryptolemus argued that Theramenes and Thrasybulus should be put on trial. This was a clever argument. Since the generals did not put the blame on the trierarchs, it was quite impossible that the Athenians would attach any responsibility to Theramenes and Thrasybulus. Xenophon’s readers should understand that Euryptolemus wanted to press the Assemblymen to follow the law and secure a legal trial for the generals and for the trierarchs also. Euryptolemus knew that neither the generals nor the trierarchs were responsible for the loss of the crews. He points out that he can say so much in defense of both (ὑπὲρ ἀμφοτέρων) generals and trierarchs, that the storm prevented them (ὁ χειμὼν διεκώλυσε) from doing anything the generals had prepared (παρεσκευάσαντο). Witnesses of these preparations (τούτων δὲ μάρτυρες οἱ σωθέντες) are those who were saved by chance, among them one of the generals, who was saved from a sinking ship (ἐπὶ καταδύσης νεὼς διασωθείς) and who himself needed rescuing–and yet he is

 305 Thucydides says that: (a) when the generals Nicias and Demosthenes thought that their preparations were complete (ἱκανῶς παρεσκευάσθαι), the army began to move (Thuc. 7.75.1); and (b) the general Phrynichus said that the Athenians would not engage in a battle before making adequate preparations (ἱκανῶς … παρασκευασαμένοις–Thuc. 8.27.2). 306 In Cyrop. 2.1.21 we read that Cyrus ordered his soldiers to furnish ready-made a liberal supply (ἱκανῶς) of everything they needed; when he prepared this (παρασκευάσας), he marched for war. 307 In Thuc. 6.41.2 we learn that a Syracusan general tells his fellow citizens to prepare themselves well (καλῶς … παρασκευασόμεθα) in order to resist the Athenian invaders. 308 For the concept that δίκαιον meant that the jurors should give their verdict having regard solely for the law see Dover, 1974, 183.

202  Chapter 3: The trial after Arginousai among those whom they order to be judged by the same vote (τῇ αὐτῇ ψήφῳ κρίνεσθαι) as those who had not done what they had been ordered to do (τὰ προσταχθέντα) (1.7.32). Euryptolemus repeats the argument of the generals, τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ χειμῶνος εἶναι τὸ κωλῦσαν τὴν ἀναίρεσιν (1.7.6), and says explicitly what he implied earlier, i.e. he stresses through the verb παρασκευάζομαι that the generals had a plan to save their men. His argument about the witnesses leads Xenophon’s audience to remember that in the previous Assembly the generals had provided as witnesses (μάρτυρας–1.7.6) sailors who served under their command at Arginousai. Xenophon’s use of this word and Euryptolemus’ use of the μάρτυρες indicates to readers that these men had testified in favour of their generals in the previous Assembly. In my opinion, Euryptolemus means that the Athenians had managed to save some men and the general mentioned from their ship as they were returning to Arginousai.309 This rescue cannot have taken place after the decision of the generals to collect the shipwrecked men, because Xenophon has said that those who were saved made their way to the shore and that the storm prevented the generals from saving the crews.310 It is worth emphasizing that Xenophon has not reported this incident in his account of the events at Arginousai. In my view, he expected his readers to believe that this general mentioned in his short, individual speech how he was saved.311 This fact adds one important piece of information to Xenophon’s account about the rescue of the crews. Readers can rethink the meeting of the generals and consider that this general strengthened the will of his colleagues to collect the shipwrecked. Now we can confirm that Xenophon’s previous emphasis on the philanthropia of the commanders312 is repeated here in a subtle but efficient way. On the other hand, it remains a mystery for the readers who this general was. We can suspect that Euryptolemus deliberately chose not to mention his name. In fact, his point was to persuade his audience that the need for individual trials was imperative. Battles were the most conspicuous moments of collective action. Athens’ generals fought alongside their subordinates and shared with them the

 309 To my knowledge, the closest we can get to shedding light on Xenophon’s particular passage is Alciphron Epist.1.5.1: τῆς ἐπὶ Σαλαμῖνι ναυμαχίας … καταδύσης … νηὸς Περσικῆς αὐτοῖς ἀνδράσι. 310 See pp. 133–35. 311 Cf. above, p. 147. 312 Krentz, 1989b, 168 is right that Xenophon’s narrative does not mention how this general was saved. But if my argument is correct I cannot agree with him that readers should doubt Euryptolemus’ truthfulness. For the short defense speeches of the generals see above p. 147.

The speech of Euryptolemus  203

risk of dying in combat.313 The common fate between a general and his co-warriors during and after a sea battle proved to the Athenians that the trireme was a ‘school of democracy’.314 The fact that even one of the generals had been been a victim of shipwreck in battle should lead the Assemblymen to contemplate that he should be immune from prosecution. But the situation is different, as Euryptolemus points out, because this general would be judged with the same vote as the rest of the commanders. Euryptolemus seems to repeat his previous argument that the generals should not be judged μιᾷ ψήφῳ. At that time he said that Callixenus convinced the Council to introduce the decree about one vote in the Assembly (1.7.26), but now he refers to those who κελεύουσι for such a decision. What is the subject of the verb? In my opinion, Xenophon leads his readers to think that Euryptolemus has in mind those who spoke against the generals earlier, i.e. Callixenus and Lysicles. For him such a procedure is not right for that unnamed general, because he also needed rescuing. This is a less overt way of arousing sympathy for this general. Thus Euryptolemus makes a double-edged argument and dissuades his auditors: (a) from acting, in the face of victory and good fortune (ἀντὶ μὲν τῆς νίκης καὶ τῆς εὐτυχίας), as if they were defeated and unfortunate (τοῖς ἡττημένοις τε καὶ ἀτυχοῦσιν); and (b) in the face of divine compulsion (ἀντὶ δὲ τῶν ἐκ θεοῦ ἀναγκαίων), from seeming to be ungrateful (ἀγνωμονεῖν) by condemning the generals for treason (προδοσίαν) instead of helplessness, since they were unable to carry out the instructions. For him it would be more just (δικαιότερον) to reward the victors with garlands (στεφάνοις γεραίρειν τοὺς νικῶντας) than to punish them with death (θανάτῳ ζημιοῦν), being convinced by wicked men (πονηροῖς ἀνθρώποις πειθομένους) (1.7.33). Concerning the first part of the argument, I may remark that the combination between victory versus defeat in war and good luck versus bad luck was a common argument in Athens.315 However, Xenophon’s readers should not regard Euryptolemus’ argument as empty rhetorical words. First, Euryptolemus’ emphasis on the present victory invites Xenophon’s readers to remember that they still had a free passage at sea, so they could continue importing grain from the Hellespont. He has reported Agis’ conclusion that Sparta could bring Athens to its knees only

 313 See Hamel, 1998, 204–9. 314 For this idea with several examples see Strauss, 1996, 313–26. 315 Lys. 2.60 claims that after the defeat of the Athenians at Aegospotami Greece became εὐτυχής, while the King of Persia became δυστυχής; Isocr. 5.60 says Λακεδαιμονίους δὲ τοὺς τότε δόξαντας εὐτυχεῖν εἰς τὰς νῦν ἀτυχίας δι’ ᾿Αλκιβιάδην καθεστάναι; Hyp. 6.24 maintains that the victorious war dead of the Lamian War should be considered εὐτυχεῖς rather than ἀτυχεῖς.

204  Chapter 3: The trial after Arginousai if it cut the grain supplies coming by sea (κατὰ θάλατταν) (1.1.35).316 It is clear that through the warning of Euryptolemus Xenophon leads his readers to realize that if another Spartan commander defeated the Athenians he would deprive them of supplies.317 Indeed, Xenophon’s readers, who knew that the war ended with the defeat of Athens by Lysander,318 could realize that Euryptolemus as an adviser foreshadowed what was to come, i.e. the defeat of the Athenians in the war. Second, Thucydides says that when the Athenians heard that their fleet had defeated the Peloponnesians at Cynossema, they considered τὴν εὐτυχίαν incredible. Because of this victory the Athenians were greatly encouraged, since they thought that their affairs were no longer hopeless and that if they were energetic they might still win (Thuc. 8.106.5). Nonetheless, Xenophon shows that the Athenians seemed to neglect their own hopes for a better future despite the victory at Arginousai. Euryptolemus realized this and implied that εὐτυχία can become transitory if men destroy it with their wrong decisions.319 Moreover, he intimates that the εὐτυχία of the Athenians in the sea battle of Arginousai should be regarded as given by the gods.320 This is because the Athenians believed that the gods granted them a general superiority in naval battles.321 This impression about the favour of the gods should be more evident to the Athenians now because of their victories at Cynossema, Abydus, Cyzicus and Arginousai.322 Concerning the second part of the argument, Euryptolemus knew that the loss of the crews was something that the Assemblymen could not forget. For this  316 See p. 22; cf. 222–23. 317 Cf. Andoc. 3.19, who implies that the decision of the Spartans to leave the sea (τὴν θάλατταν) open to the losers (τοῖς ἡττημένοις) was something exceptional, since they had won (ἐνίκων) the battles. 318 See Kapellos, 2018, 4. 319 Cf. Isocr. 7.12, who says that, although Greece was under the control of Athens after the generalships of Conon and Timotheus, the Athenians did not keep their good luck (οὐδένα χρόνον τὰς εὐτυχίας κατασχεῖν ἠδυνήθημεν) but destroyed it themselves quickly. Moreover, cf. Isocr. 5.53, who says to Philip that, although the Thebans were victorious in battle, διὰ τὸ μὴ καλῶς χρῆσθαι ταῖς εὐτυχίαις οὐδὲν βέλτιον πράττουσιν τῶν ἡττηθέντων καὶ δυστυχησάντων. 320 For the common belief that good luck was the proof of the favour of the gods see Dover, 1974, 247–49. 321 This is the argument of Mikalson, 1983, 19 on the basis of Xen. 7.1.9, where Procles says to the Athenians: ὁ θεὸς … δέδωκεν … ὑμῖν κατὰ θάλατταν εὐτυχεῖν. Cf. next n. 322 The Athenians were defeated at Oropus (Thuc. 8.94–95) but these three victories ensued (8.104–6, Xen. 1.1.5–7 and 1.1.16–18). Then the Athenian fleet was defeated at Notium (1.5.11–14) but the victory at Arginousai changed the balance again. The general belief should be that the gods favoured the Athenians. Cf. Xen. 7.1.5: ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν θεῶν δέδοται ὑμῖν εὐτυχεῖν ἐν τούτῳ· πλείστους γὰρ καὶ μεγίστους ἀγῶνας ἠγωνισμένοι κατὰ θάλατταν ἐλάχιστα μὲν ἀποτετυχήκατε, πλεῖστα δὲ κατωρθώκατε.

The speech of Euryptolemus  205

reason, he implied that it was the gods’ will that prevented the generals from rescuing their men even though they had defeated the Spartans. But he did not violate the common rule that nobody should accuse the gods explicitly when a natural phenomenon followed a naval victory.323 Instead, he chose to use a euphemism to treat this difficult issue,324 since the Athenians believed that the gods felt goodwill towards their city.325 Moreover, he urged his fellow citizens to terminate their ἀγνωμοσύνη by changing their minds.326 For him now that the Athenians had good fortune they should prove their humanity towards the generals and offer them a due process327 instead of accusing them of having abandoned their crews to drown328 in order to harm the democracy. Finally, Euryptolemus asks his audience to judge the generals329 as men deserving of honor (γεραίρειν) and offer them crowns (στεφάνοις) instead of punishing them with death. This is an important assessment of the action of the Arginousai commanders. The Athenians welcomed their victorious athletes and successful generals with crowns330 or honored them in this way afterwards,331 since they had proved their virtue.332 On this occasion, Euryptolemus identifies

 323 This is made explicit in Aesch. Agam.634–37. The chorus says to the herald: πῶς γὰρ λέγεις χειμῶνα ναυτικῷ στρατῷ / ἐλθεῖν τελευτῆσαί τε δαιμόνων κότῳ;; and he replies: εὔφημον ἦμαρ οὐ πρέπει κακαγγέλῳ / γλώσσῃ μιαίνειν· χωρὶς ἡ τιμὴ θεῶν. 324 For the orators using a euphemism when they connected the gods with their military engagements see Carey, 1997, 30–32. 325 See Mikalson, 1983, 18, Parker, 1997, 143–60, Kapellos, 2009, 265. 326 Cf. Dem. Lett.2.8 who urges his fellow Athenians to stop their ἀγνωμοσύνη through τῷ μεταγνῶναι. 327 Dem. Lett.3.11 says that the demos of the Athenians (τὸν δῆμον τὸν ᾿Αθηναίων) should not show itself less ungrateful (ἀγνωμονέστερον) than Philip, who thought that at the moment of his greatest good fortune (ηὐτύχησεν μάλιστα) he ought to be seen acting with the greatest humanity (ἀνθρωπινώτατα), and did not venture to cast into chains the men who had faced him in the battle line; Lyc. 1.54 urges the jurors not to be the most ungrateful of all men (πάντων … ἀνθρώπων … ἀγνωμονέστατοι) by letting Leocrates free. 328 For the word προδοσία denoting the act of giving up beforehand, abandoning or forsaking in need see Sinclair, 1988, 147. 329 For the use of the adjective δίκαιον to denote a lawful trial see Dover above p. 183 n. 222. 330 Cf. Aesch. 3.179, who says that the people give the στέφανον to the best athletes who participate in the Olympic Games or in any other of τῶν στεφανιτῶν ἀγώνων. See Blech, 1982, 112– 13. 331 Cf. Dem. 23.151, who refers to the general Timotheus and says that Athens gave him στεφάνους. 332 Cf. Dem. 22.75, 24.183, who explicitly says that the crowns were considered σημεῖον ἀρετῆς by the Athenians.

206  Chapter 3: The trial after Arginousai the generals with victorious athletes333 and uses the verb γεραίρω to praise their victories.334 The mention of the bad alternative, i.e. death, proves that Euryptolemus always had in mind Callixenus’ decree which specified the punishment of the generals as θανάτῳ ζημιῶσαι (1.7.10). His final characterization of the generals is οἱ νικῶντες. This is a deliberate choice on his part. He said earlier twice that the Athenians should not condemn illegally τοὺς … νενικηκότας (1.7.25), the generals who νικήσαντας the enemy (1.7.28). Now he uses this term to remind the Assemblymen that Callixenus wrongly called the crews τοὺς νικήσαντας in his decree (1.7.9). Euryptolemus ends his speech, warning his hearers that they should not be convinced by the πονηροί ἄνθρωποι who wanted to have the generals executed. This phrase might remind Xenophon’s readers of Thucydides’ account about the scandal of the Herms. Thucydides says that the Athenians were wrong to decide on the matter on the basis of πονηρῶν ἀνθρώπων (6.53.2). The result was that the Athenian fleet at Sicily continued fighting without the services of Alcibiades. Euryptolemus’ words lead Xenophon’s readers to think that, if the generals were convicted, the Athenians would have to continue the war with Philocles, Adeimantus and other commanders who would not be equal to their predecessors. Euryptolemus uses the word πονηροί to imply that those who spoke against the generals were immoral,335 men who hated democracy336 and acted as sycophants.337 Most probably, Xenophon’s readers should think that Euryptolemus was referring to Timocrates, who spoke in the Council against the generals, and Callixenus and Lyciscus, who spoke against the commanders in the present trial. On the other hand, he did not name these men, probably because he was attacking them as a group of people rather than individuals338 and he did not have a personal rivalry with them.339 Given that Xenophon indicated in his preceding  333 For a clear connection between war and athletics cf. Thuc. 4.121.1–2: the people of Scione received Brasidas with honor and in the name of the city crowned him with a golden crown (στεφάνῳ) as the liberator of Hellas; many too, placed garlands on his head, and congratulated him, as if he had been a victor (ὥσπερ ἀθλητῇ) in the games. 334 Cf. Pindar Isthm. 1.2.17, Olymp.3.1–4. Note that Xenophon says in his praise of Cyrus that his hero ἐγέραιρεν all the others in all kinds of honors (Cyrop.8.1.139). 335 See Pritchard, 2012, 37. 336 For this meaning of πονηρός see Αλεξίου, 2016, 31. 337 For the association of the adjective πονηρός with the activity of the sycophants see Harvey, 1990, 109. 338 Cf. Montiglio, 2000, 127 and Worthington, 2004, 140 that in the Assembly the orators did not name their opponents because they were attacking groups of people rather than individuals. 339 Cf. Tsakmakis and Kostopoulos, 2011, 181–82, who argue that Diodotus and Alcibiades named Cleon and Nicias in their speeches respectively because of their personal rivalry.

The speech of Euryptolemus  207

narrative the villainous methods of the accusers of the generals,340 readers can be certain that Euryptolemus’ warning is true and honest. Xenophon has drawn a contrast between the rhetorical activism of the accusers of the generals, which is deceitful and harmful to the city, and the honest and beneficial activism of Euryptolemus. His audience waits to read the reaction of the Assemblymen. Xenophon tells us that after uttering these words Euryptolemus made a motion (γνώμην) that the men should be judged separately (κρίνεσθαι τοὺς ἄνδρας δίχα ἕκαστον) according to the decree of Cannonus (κατὰ τὸ Καννωνοῦ ψήφισμα). The Council’s motion was that all of them should be judged together (μιᾷ ψήφῳ ἅπαντας κρίνειν). We understand now that Euryptolemus chose one of the two laws which he had mentioned in his speech, that of Cannonus. He had said that this decree gave the right to the generals to be judged each one individually (κατὰ ἕνα ἕκαστον–1.7.23). So we can infer that Euryptolemus’ purpose was to secure a legal trial for the generals and thus overturn the proposal of Callixenus. Xenophon also reports that the motion of the Council mentioned the opposite to what Euryptolemus wanted, i.e. the generals should be tried μιᾷ ψήφῳ (1.7.26). The adoption of the words of Euryptolemus indicates that Xenophon agreed with him about the need for a lawful trial. We must not miss the fact that Xenophon does not mention that someone interrupted Euryptolemus while he spoke. This should lead us to consider similar incidents in Thucydides’ History. Thucydides shows that an unthinking mass elided individual distinctions, was moved by collective emotions, ignored reason, and could be manipulated. Democracy as mass collective action could be salvaged only by getting the crowd to listen. Pericles spoke as if the Athenians did listen and then made decisions based upon what they had heard. The Athenians also remained silent and listened during the Sicilian debate, when Athenian political culture seemed so strained. Alcibiades managed to temper the worst inclinations of the Athenian soldiers in Samos. Thus the inescapable conclusion is that when the Athenian crowd grew silent, it turned into a demos that could judge. Healthy politics in Thucydides is thus marked by a significant silence, while civil stife in Corcyra involved noisy tumult. The silence of the people allowed for a kind of interaction through rhetoric that tapped into both the special knowledge of the speakers and the ability of the demos to listen to and make sound judgements about rival proposals.341

 340 See pp. 172–73. 341 See Zumbrunnen, 2017, 485–87.

208  Chapter 3: The trial after Arginousai Xenophon showed earlier that Euryptolemus grasped the opportunity to speak in the Assembly because of Socrates’ refusal to violate the law.342 The impression is that the Athenians remained silent because they wanted to make a judgement. Comparing the Athenians’ silence in the cases that I mentioned in Thucydides with Xenophon’s text we can safely say that the expectation is that the Assemblymen would judge rationally and thus they would acquit the generals. Civil strife could be stopped even at this moment. Indeed, when these motions were put to a vote, the Assemblymen at first decided for the motion of Euryptolemus. For a moment we get the impression that the appeal of Euryptolemus was successful. The Athenians had finally understood their grave mistake in planning to try the generals illegally. But this impression changes shockingly fast. However, when Menecles made an objection on oath and demanded a repetition of the votes,343 the Assemblymen voted again and approved the proposal of the Council (ἔκριναν τὴν [γνώμην] τῆς βουλῆς). Xenophon repeats almost verbatim the words he used before reporting the decree of Callixenus: ἡ βουλὴ εἰσήνεγκε τὴν ἑαυτῆς γνώμην (1.7.9). This swift change cannot but surprise the readers who unavoidably come to the conclusion that the demos was fickle. After this, the Athenians sentenced to death the eight generals who had fought in the naval battle at Arginousai. The generals who were present, six in number, were put to death (τῶν ναυμαχησάντων στρατηγῶν ὀκτὼ ὄντων· ἀπέθανον δὲ οἱ παρόντες ἕξ) (1.7.34). Xenophon reminds us of his initial account of the reaction of the generals: τῶν δὲ ναυμαχησάντων στρατηγῶν Πρωτόμαχος μὲν καὶ ᾿Αριστογένης οὐκ ἀπῆλθον εἰς ᾿Αθήνας, τῶν δὲ ἓξ καταπλευσάντων, Περικλέους καὶ Διομέδοντος καὶ Λυσίου καὶ ᾿Αριστοκράτους καὶ Θρασύλλου καὶ ᾿Ερασινίδου (1.7.2). Someone might think that the two commanders who did not return home made the right choice since they saved their lives. Nonetheless, Xenophon’s references to Alcibiades’ exile show that they would live in misery from now on: they would never be able to go back again.344 After such a long narration of the Arginousai trial, Xenophon’s audience sadly realizes that the generals became victims of their own fellow citizens, despite their great victory. For this outcome we should not underestimate Euryptolemus’ effort. His speech was well informed and well intentioned, but truth was not a sufficient condition for securing the belief or trust of the Athenians. What remains for Xenophon’s audience is to read whether Euryptolemus was right that  342 See p. 174. 343 For this interpretation of the participle ὑπομοσαμένου see Carawan, 2010, 21 n. 4. 344 See pp. 95–96.

The aftermath of the trial  209

the condemnation of the Arginousai generals would lead to the overthrow of the democracy.

. The aftermath of the trial In the process of time (οὐ πολλῷ χρόνῳ ὕστερον),345 the Athenians felt remorse (μετέμελε) and voted (ἐψηφίσαντο) that those who had deceived (ἐξηπάτησαν) the demos should have complaints lodged against them (προβολὰς αὐτῶν εἶναι) and should give sureties (ἐγγυητάς) until they stood trial, and that Callixenus should be one of them. Four others were also indicted (καὶ ἄλλοι τέτταρες) and were put in chains (ἐδέθησαν) by those who had given sureties for them (ὑπὸ τῶν ἐγγυησαμένων). Later, during some civil strife (στάσεώς τινος) that took place, in which Cleophon died (ἀπέθανεν), they escaped (ἀπέδρασαν) before being brought to trial. Callixenus returned to Athens (κατελθὼν) when the men of the Peiraeus (οἱ ἐκ Πειραιῶς) came back to the city (i.e. after the oligarchy of the Thirty), but was hated by all and died of starvation (μισούμενος ὑπὸ πάντων λιμῷ ἀπέθανεν) (1.7.35). Xenophon’s use of the verb μεταμέλει means that the Athenians realized that the harsh punishment of their commanders was wrong. The reason for this change of mind most probably was that the determination for revenge and the fear of the Athenians proved wrong. Xenophon implies that at last the Athenians viewed their decision in the light of reason. At the same time, he implicitly calls on his readers to compare the present passage with Euryptolemus. The orator had warned his fellow citizens that they might change their minds about the generals some time afterwards (μεταμελήσει δὴ ὕστερον–1.7.27). Moreover, he had told them that they should not be unthinking towards their commanders (ἀγνωμονεῖν–1.7.33).346 There is no doubt that Euryptolemus proved to be right. In this way, Xenophon has made a clear antithesis between the rashness of the Athenians and the pious and wise advice-giving of Euryptolemus.347 The Athenians thought that their mistake was serious but not irreparable. They voted that they would take legal measures through προβολαί348 against those

 345 The dative χρόνῳ denotes the process of time. See LSJ. s.v. χρόνος. 346 Cf. Plut. Comp.Alc.M.Cor.4.8 who says that Aristeides and Epaminondas did not become angry with the citizens who were unthinking (ἀγνωμονοῦσιν), but loved them when they regretted about their decisions (μεταμελομένων). 347 See Baragwanath, 2017a, 290–91. 348 For this procedure in the present occasion see Krentz, 1989b, 169.

210  Chapter 3: The trial after Arginousai who had deceived them (ἐξηπάτησαν). Through the report of this reaction Xenophon reminds us once again of Euryptolemus’ warning to the Athenians to follow their law in order not to be deceived (ἐξαπατηθῆναι–1.7.19). We have seen that Alcibiades’ opponents accused him of all the city’s mistakes in the past, although they also had been responsible for them.349 By recording the Athenians’ opinion that they had been deceived Xenophon indicates once again the inability of the demos to engage in self-criticism and assume responsibility. By saying that the Athenians prosecuted these men with probolai Xenophon implies that they considered them sycophants, the worst kind of πονηροί.350 Moreover, he insinuates that the Athenians acknowledged Euryptolemus’ opinion that those who turned against the generals were πονηροί (1.7.33). The accused had to provide ἐγγυητάς. This word inescapably connects the present passage with 1.7.7, where Xenophon said that many Athenians wanted to ἐγγυᾶσθαι for the generals. The question that arises now is whether the men suspected as deceivers would find fellow citizens willing to support them. Among the deceivers of the demos the Athenians named Callixenus. Now they suspected that he did not really care about its city and that he wanted to have the generals convicted for private reasons. Readers understand that the Athenians realized what Xenophon has already implied about Callixenus.351 At this point it is worth remembering that Callixenus had come into prominence because of his contact with Theramenes’ men. But their promises to Callixenus for a better political future vanished. Theramenes stopped accusing the Arginousai commanders after his presence in the Assembly, so the Athenians could not hold him responsible for the generals’ execution.352 Theramenes achieved the overthrow of Athens’ institutions under the guise of legality. Unavoidably, Calllixenus was left alone and exposed to Athenian critique. This must not have been surprising for Xenophon’s readers. For the Athenians and all the Greeks one quality of friendship was the equality of the partners. Nonetheless, the equality of social station was part of the Athenian ideology, not a social reality.353 The collaboration between two men created a balance between the socially superior and the socially inferior which could look like a friendship to the latter. However, friendship was distinct from clientship. The relationship between the two was

 349 See pp. 65–66. 350 Cf. Isocr. 15.13–14: κατὰ δὲ τούτων [τῶν συκοφαντῶν] … προβολὰς δ’ ἐν τῷ δήμῳ, νομίζοντες τοὺς ταύτῃ τῇ τέχνῃ χρωμένους ἁπάσας ὑπερβάλλειν τὰς πονηρίας. 351 See pp. 155–57, 162–63. 352 As Krentz, 1995, 131 remarks. 353 See Konstan, 1995, 332–33.

The aftermath of the trial  211

ended when the inferior partner got into trouble and/or the social superior did not need him any longer. If the inferior partner thought that he was a friend with the social superior, the hierarchical distinction arose again and he realized this because he was left alone and helpless. A proof of this principle, which was never stated openly in Athens, is provided by Xenophon who recounts that Callixenus was prosecuted. It is clear that Theramenes disappeared and did not try to cover Callixenus. Xenophon adds that four more men were accused of deception. It is noteworthy that he does not name them but he states their number. This kind of writing is deliberate and invites us to read the previous account of the Arginousai trial. Xenophon has said that: (a) Timocrates accused the generals in the Council; (b) Archedemus accused Erasinides in court; (c) Lyciscus spoke against the generals in the trial; and (d) Menecles asked for a repetition of the vote. These persons add up to the number that Xenophon reports. So it would be tempting for the readers to think that he showed his contempt for these men by not mentioning their names again.354 Callixenus and the others were put in chains (ἐδέθησαν) by those who had given sureties for them. Through the imprisonment of the deceivers Xenophon reminds his readers that the generals had been put in prison by the Council (δεθέντας … ἡ βουλὴ ἔδησε–1.7.3). But there is a difference now: it was not the demos but those who would give sureties for the accused who put them in prison. This indicates that they suspected that Callixenus and the others would try to escape. The only thing that Callixenus could do was to await his trial. But he must have known that the perception of the deceivers as sycophants meant that the Athenians were ready to turn him and the others into scapegoats.355 Xenophon confirms the suspicion of the Athenians about a possible escape of Callixenus and the other accused by reporting the death of Cleophon. Xenophon allows us to realize that one year after the trial the Athenians regretted their decision.356 How Cleophon’s death happened seems rather vague to modern readers357

 354 Lang, 1992, 277 has already made the following remark: ‘we know that Theramenes was not prosecuted in this connection, so it seems likely that the ‘four others’ were Archedemus, Timocrates, Lyciscus, and Menecles’. I hope I have strengthened her opinion. 355 For Callixenus as a scapegoat see Due, 1983, 40 with whom I fully agree. For the view of the sycophant as a scapegoat see Christ, 1998, 52. 356 See Rhodes, 1972, 145. 357 Baldwin, 1974, 46 remarks that Xenophon is vague regarding the death of Cleophon. Bearzot, 2001, 25 remarks that Xenophon does not clarify if he means the trial which led to Cleophon’s execution, which preceded the installation of the Thirty in power, and argues (see 1997, 259–60) that we should not press Xenophon’s wording too much. Todd, 1996, 18–19 notes ‘the allusive brevity of Xenophon’s passing reference’.

212  Chapter 3: The trial after Arginousai but we can give an explanation. The verb ἀποθνῄσκω could be used to denote the death which comes as the result of a court’s verdict,358 while the resistance of one man to the decision of many and his execution after a court sentence could be defined as στάσις.359 Thus, Xenophon must mean that some act of violence took place before or after the arrest of Cleophon and his execution.360 At this moment Callixenus and the others escaped from prison (ἀπέδρασαν)361 before they faced trial. Xenophon’s use of this verb in combination with his mention of other Greeks who escaped from their enemies362 gives the impression that Callixenus behaved as if he was an enemy of Athens. Through this contrast between Callixenus, who chose to flee from his city, and the Arginousai generals, who returned to Athens, Xenophon shows the former’s immorality and guilt and the latter’s morality and innocence. Xenophon exploits the fact that his readers were aware of the end of the Peloponnesian War363 and continues his negative depiction of Callixenus by reporting that he returned to Athens ὅτε καὶ οἱ ἐκ Πειραιῶς εἰς τὸ ἄστυ. In Book 2 Xenophon uses the phrase οἱ ἐκ Πειραιῶς to show the ideological conflict between Thrasybulus and the democrats and the Thirty and their supporters in the city (οἱ

 358 See Dosuna, 2012, 248. 359 In Anab.6.1.29 Xenophon mentions that, when his fellow soldiers urged him to become the new leader of the troops, he said in his speech that if his comrades did not approve his command, he would not make any resistance (οὐχ εὐρήσετε ἐμὲ στασιάζοντα). Moreover, in 2.3.12 he says that the Thirty arrested the sycophants in order to have them executed (ὑπῆγον θανάτου) and the Council convicted them. Then he says that the Thirty continued to put many people to death (ἀποθνῃσκόντων–2.3.17), but, since he does not refer to killings in battle, as he does in other passages (see 2.4.33, where he uses the verb ἀποθνῄσκει), we must infer that he still means the conviction of citizens through the Council. Finally, Thuc. 3.81.2 includes the execution of citizens through court decisions as one of the aspects of στάσις (3.82.1). Thus, I disagree with Mossé, 1974, 215 who thinks that the stasis was a result of the famine in Athens. 360 Cf. Thuc. 3.81.2–81, who describes the excess of violence in the στάσις of Corcyra; Pl. Resp.560a1–2, who says that μάχη came after στάσις and ἀντίστασις; and Diod. 15.57.3, who says that φόνος followed the στάσις in the city of the Argives. 361 For this meaning of the verb ἀπέδρασαν cf.: (a) Pl. Critias 53d5, where the Laws say to Socrates that he would have to escape (ἀπεδίδρασκες) from prison, if he wanted to avoid trial; and (b) Plut. Dem.26.2, where he says that Demosthenes escaped (ἀποδρᾶναι) from prison. If Xenophon had some other place in mind, he would have specified this, as he does in 1.3.22. 362 Alcibiades and Mantitheus escaped (ἀπέδρασαν) from the Persian satrap Tissaphernes (1.1.10); the Byzantine Coiratadas escaped (ἀποδράς) from the Athenians when they brought him to the port of Peiraeus as captive (1.3.22); Eteonicus and his fleet escaped (ἀπεδεδράκεσαν– 1.6.38). 363 See Kapellos, p. 204 n. 318.

The aftermath of the trial  213

ἐκ τοῦ ἄστεως).364 However, the first time that the historian uses this phrase in his Hellenica is now. This happens because Xenophon wanted to show that Athens had been defeated in the Peloponnesian War. We saw that Xenophon foreshadowed the future of Athens by indicating that the generals who replaced the Arginousai commanders would be inferior to their predecessors.365 We also saw that Euryptolemus warned the Athenians that a conviction of the generals would be equal to a defeat in war (1.7.33). Thus this phrase is a clear chronological marker which highlights how the political situation in Athens ended. In this way, Xenophon makes an implicit connection of the Arginousai trial with Athens’ defeat in the war.366 We shall also see later how Xenophon connects the defeat of the Athenian generals at Aegospotami with the Arginousai trial.367 There is no doubt that through this prolepsis Xenophon disapproves of the Athenian decision to condemn the victorious commanders368 and implicitly calls on his readers to reflect on the adverse consequences of acting under the influence of anger and revenge by mentioning the subversion of democracy by the Thirty.369 Concerning Callixenus, Xenophon makes it clear through the particle καί that during the violent civil strife between the two divided parties in Athens Callixenus did not choose sides as all Athenians should do in such a situation.370 Even now that Theramenes was one of the leading members of the Thirty371 he did not think to help Callixenus and call him back to the city,372 because he never thought of him as his friend. Instead, readers can infer that Callixenus waited

 364 For the phrase οἱ ἐκ τοῦ Πειραιῶς or οἱ ἐν τῷ Πειραιεῖ see 2.4.11, 2.4.27, 2.4.29, 2.4.31, 2.4.35, 2.4.36, 2.4.37, 2.4.39. For the term οἱ ἐκ τοῦ ἄστεως see 2.4.26, 2.4.37, 2.4.38, 2.4.39. 365 See pp. 140–41. 366 Thus I disagree with Lévy, 1990, 146 who believes that the Arginousai trial did not determine the history of the war because the Athenians replaced these generals with others and because the consequences of their conviction were less important than Alcibiades’ flight. Riedinger, 1991, 68 also believes that the trial is not connected with the Peloponnesian War. Alcibiades’ role was crucial in the war, as we have seen (see pp. 10–21, 30–96), but not more important than that of the Arginousai generals, as Xenophon’s account shows. 367 See p. 237. 368 See Rood, 2007, 154. 369 Konstan, 2007, 119 remarks that, although Aristotle does not discuss in the Rhetoric the adverse consequences of acting under the influence of anger, his contemporaries worried about the problem, and he cites as a proof Xen. 5.3.5–6. I may add that Xenophon chose to show to his audience the consequences of anger through narrating the trial of the Arginousai generals. 370 For the notion that no Athenian should remain neutral in a civil strife see Rhodes, 1981, 157. 371 See Xen. 2.3.15 about Theramenes as one of the leaders of the Thirty. 372 Cf. Xen. 2.2.23, where he says that the fugitives returned to Athens before the Thirty took power.

214  Chapter 3: The trial after Arginousai somewhere away from Athens, did not help the democrats to overthrow the Thirty, and then, continuing to be πονηρός, seized the opportunity to return at this moment.373 Thus he was absent in both στάσεις of his city.374 It is not difficult to explain why Callixenus went back to Athens. First, if we consider that Xenophon says in 2.4.43 that the Athenians agreed after the restoration of democracy not to remember past grievances but to enforce the amnesty, he could be certain that he could no longer be prosecuted for acts committed before 403 B.C. Moreover, he could hope that his fellow citizens would have forgotten that he had accused the Arginousai generals. However, Xenophon proves that Callixenus was wrong, because all the Athenians, the democrats and the Three Thousand,375 hated him. This means that they judged him ethically, expressed loathing for men of his kind and decided to harm him.376 This was an expected reaction by the Athenians.377 But why did even the supporters of the new regime (2.4.23) have this emotion against Callixenus? In my opinion, Xenophon allows his readers to give a plausible answer through his account of the regime of the Thirty. He says that the rich Athenians were happy to see that the new government378 punished the sycophants (2.3.12) and that it asked the help of Callibius to move away the πονηρούς (2.3.13). This leads us to suspect why one of the reasons that the Thirty found support was the political action of men like Callixenus. However, when the Three Thousand realized later that the Thirty had turned one citizen against another (2.4.20), and they came to terms of reconciliation with the men of Peiraeus (2.4.38), they found out upon

 373 Note that the accuser of Philon says that his opponent is πονηρός (Lys. 31.3) because he did not fight with the men from Phyle in their struggle to overthrow the Thirty but chose to return when the overthrow was achieved (Lys. 31.8–9). 374 Xenophon explicitly calls the civil war in Athens στάσις in 3.1.1. 375 In my opinion, Xenophon uses the phrase ὑπὸ πάντων to refer not only to the democrats but also to the Three Thousand. 376 For this definition of hate see Konstan, 2006, 185–87. 377 Cf. [Arist.] Ath.Pol.28.3: εἴωθεν γὰρ κἂν ἐξαπατηθῇ τὸ πλῆθος ὕστερον μισεῖν those who have led them to act in an improper way; Arist. Rhet.1382a7: μισεῖ … τὸν συκοφάντην ἅπας; in Pl. Resp.334c4–5 Polemarchus talks with Socrates about social justice (331c) and tells him that εἰκὸς … οὓς ἂν [τις ἡγῆται] πονηροὺς μισεῖν. 378 Xenophon says the Thirty were elected as a legal government (see Krentz, 1982, 50).

The aftermath of the trial  215

Callixenus’ return that this πονηρός, remained unpunished. Thus, all the Athenians isolated him by depriving him of food. This punishment was a terrible way of death.379 Callixenus made a great mistake in returning to Athens.380 Readers can be quite certain that Xenophon departed from the proper chronological order to tell us that this man was punished in the way he deserved for his injustice towards the generals.381 In my opinion, he implies that this collective misfortune was blamed upon Callixenus by the gods because of his violation of his oath as Councillor. Such a thought is justified, because the Athenians believed that the gods intervened in human affairs but not immediately.382 Xenophon’s readers can think that this was the time of punishment of Callixenus, although the historian avoids making any personal comment.383 But, given that the Athenians believed that the gods were concerned with men’s morality on this occasion,384 Xenophon implied that Callixenus suffered a divine punishment. He showed through this incident the gods’ observance of human deeds. Xenophon’s readers can conclude through the long account of the trial after Arginousai385 that the Athenians lost the war because they defeated themselves. The political events that took place in Athens later on prove that Euryptolemus was right to warn his fellow citizens that the people are more apt to wreak their insolence upon good men when they are prospering.386 Xenophon deliberately chose his narrative to remind his readers that the Athenians lost the war.387 The

 379 Drawing a parallel from tragedy, we can say that Callixenus’ fate was worse than that of the tragic hero Orestes, who, although he was not accepted to sit at the same table with the Athenians because he had killed his mother, was given food (see Eur. Iphig. in Tauris 947–60 with Allen, 2000, 73–74). 380 Cf. Lys. 19.4, where the speaker says that when the Athenians discovered that some plaintiffs lied, these men were hated by all (ὑπὸ πάντων … μισηθέντες) in the light of the true facts and left the city. 381 See Pownall, 2000, 502, Golfin, 2003, 77, 80. 382 See Mikalson, 1983, 53. 383 Golfin, 2003, 81 remarks that turning the history of the city-states into history of individuals is an approach to history favoured by Herodotus, who clearly states the punishment that gods reserve for humans. Xenophon seems to follow Herodotus but avoids personal judgement. In my opinion, Callixenus’ case constitutes an example of this. 384 See Garland p. 164 n. 115. 385 See Pownall, 2000, 512. 386 This opinion is explicitly stated by Plut. Phoc.2.1: οἱ δῆμοι μᾶλλον εἰς τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἐξυβρίζειν ὅταν εὐτυχῶσιν, ὑπὸ πραγμάτων μεγάλων καὶ δυνάμεως ἐπαιρόμενοι. 387 Rahn, 1971, 504–5 has shown that Xenophon wished to show his readers that the Athenians lost the war because they defeated themselves. I hope I have added to his argument.

216  Chapter 3: The trial after Arginousai internal disintegration of Athens inescapably meant an end to the war. Now what remains for readers is to see how the Athenians lost the war at Aegospotami.

Chapter 4: Athens against Lysander at Aegospotami–the end of the war . The situation in the Spartan fleet We saw earlier that Eteonicus escaped to Chios because of Lysander’s sucesss in capturing Delphinium. After the narration of the Arginousai trial Xenophon reports the situation in the Spartan camp. He stresses the poverty and degradation of the crews. Eteonicus’ men had to work on the land of Chios in order to earn their living in the summer. But, when they could not continue doing this in the winter and they lacked food, clothing and footwear, they planned to attack the city. Eteonicus was able to discover their plot and stop it. Moreover, he secured a month’s pay (μισθόν) from the Chians. This money was necessary at this moment but Xenophon’s readers could not consider it enough compared to the pay Lysander had secured for his men.1 Eteonicus knew that he could not stay at Chios any longer. He encouraged his men to bear the difficulties, gave them money and left the island (2.1.1–5). The need for a leader who would unite the fleet and secure money again was urgent. Xenophon has proved that only Lysander had been able to lead the fleet to victory.

. Lysander’s return Now it is time to see how Xenophon presents Lysander’s triumphant come-back. The Chians and the other allies went to Ephesus, the place that Lysander had made his base in the past,2 and decided to do two things simultaneously, i.e. report on the situation and ask for Lysander as commander of the fleet again. Xenophon’s emphasis on this twofold act3 shows that the allies believed that only Lysander could break the stalemate. Τhe reason was that they viewed him favorably from his earlier period of command, when he had also won the sea-battle at Notium (2.1.6). We have seen that he had not destroyed the Athenian fleet at Notium. On the other hand, we must take into account that he had defeated the Athenian fleet because he had fought in formation.4 So Xenophon allows us to

 1 See p. 82. 2 See p. 85. 3 This becomes obvious with the use of τε καί (cf. Denniston, 1954, 511–13). 4 See p. 89. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110668315-005

218  Chapter 4: Athens against Lysander at Aegospotami–the end of the war believe that Lysander’s ability to impose discipline on his men made them feel secure about the prospects of a future military success.5 At this juncture Cyrus appeared again and sent his messengers to accompany the ambassadors of the allies in order to ask for Lysander too (2.1.7). Since he intervened, Xenophon’s readers can assume that he had been watching their moves and wanted to see what they would do. Alternatively, we should remember that the geographical proximity of Ephesus to Sardis made contact easy.6 This means that Cyrus could have been informed about the plans of the allies at that moment. In any case, what matters is that he took an active part in the discussion. When he learned that they wanted his xenos back, he had every reason to prove to the Lacedaimonians that he still wanted them to win the war and at the same time wanted to work for his own ends through Lysander. The Spartans without any further thought granted the allies and Cyrus Lysander, despite their law which forbade a man to serve as admiral twice. They simply overcame this problem by appointing Lysander as secretary and Aracus as admiral (2.1.7). Xenophon makes it clear that there was no reason for formalities. This acceptance by the allies also means that Lysander did not need his friends and xenoi to reinstate him in his position, since the allies did this of their own will.7 If we did not appreciate his conspiracy against Callicratidas,8 we cannot doubt his acknowledged military talent. This fact increases readers’ interest in what Lysander would do to defeat the Athenians. Lysander returned to Ephesus, summoned Eteonicus from Chios, collected all the other ships he could find available and repaired them, while he also built others at Antandrus (2.1.10), as he had done before Notium.9 Apparently he had some money to make these preparations, but he needed more. Since the treaty between Persia and Sparta was still valid and Cyrus officially asked for his return from Sparta, Lysander went to Cyrus and bluntly asked for it. The prince told him

 5 Proietti, 1987, 22 argues that the the naval fight at Notium was strictly not the primary reason for this positive reaction of the allies. But Xenophon’s account is clear about Lysander’s military skills at Notium. See previous n. 6 See p. 112. 7 Mitchell, 1997, 87 says on the basis of 2.1.6 that Lysander’s philoi asked for Lysander’ return from the Spartans after Callicratidas’ death. Mitchell is right that this is valid for 1.6.4 (see pp. 101–03) but I disagree that it is valid for 2.1.6, where Xenophon is clear about the role of the allies in Lysander’s return. In fact, Mitchell corrects her interpretation later on (1997, 119) saying in regard to 2.1.16 that ‘the Chians and the other allies sent ambassadors to Sparta’, i.e. not the xenoi. 8 See pp. 101–02. 9 See p. 85.

Cyrus and Lysander: the last encounter  219

that the money from the King had been spent and a great deal more besides, and in order to prove this he showed Lysander how much each of the admirals had received. By this statement Cyrus meant that he had spent the five hundred talents the King had ordered him to give to the Spartan fleet, while the provision of extra money, which obviously came from his private resources, proved his old claim in the first meeting at Sardis that if the King’s cash would not suffice he would use his own.10 Moreover, by this giving of extra cash Xenophon shows us that Cyrus was helping Lysander and the Spartans and also promoting the interests of the Persian empire. It is noteworthy that Cyrus reminded Lysander of his official role as representative of Dareius by calling the recipients of this money ‘navarchs’ and did not name his interlocutor and Callicratidas. Nevertheless, Cyrus gave money to Lysander (2.1.11), which also came from the grants his father had given him at the time of his appointment. Thus for a second time he proved that he was individually committed to the success of Sparta and now even more, since his xenos was in command again. Lysander took the money, appointed trierarchs and gave the sailors the μισθόν he owed them (2.1.12). He wanted to control everything himself. He was certain that he would improve the morale of the soldiers by giving them their wages. Now Lysander was almost ready to fight the Athenians. Xenophon’s readers would be justified in thinking that Cyrus would be on his side.

. Cyrus and Lysander: the last encounter However, the King’s health problem forced Cyrus to visit his father in Media (2.1.13). He summoned Lysander and urged him not to fight the Athenians in a naval battle unless he far outnumbered them in ships. He justified his opinion by saying that the King and he had a lot of money (χρήματα πολλὰ καὶ βασιλεῖ καὶ ἑαυτῷ) in order to man many ships. By this he implied that he could convince his father to sign a new treaty with Sparta and offer them more money, while he would also do the same with money which he had in Persia. Xenophon’s readers could remember Alcibiades’ speech before Cyzicus, who had said that the Athenians did not have money, while the Lacedaimonians had a lot from the King (χρήματα … παρὰ βασιλέως–1.1.14). So Xenophon warns his audience that if Lysander waited for Cyrus’ return, the Athenians would lose the war.

 10 See p. 80.

220  Chapter 4: Athens against Lysander at Aegospotami–the end of the war On the other hand, we must also remember that the Athenians were defeated because of their own mistakes.11 The conflict between Lysander and the Athenian generals seems to be something that will appear in Xenophon’s narrative soon. Moreover, Cyrus assigned Lysander all the tribute that was his personally from the cities and gave him his remaining funds. Comparing the time when Lysander had had difficulty in obtaining more money from him12 with this moment, when Cyrus showed such generosity, and therefore his trust in Lysander’s military skills to defeat the Athenians, we can only be surprised. But the explanation for this change is given immediately afterwards by Xenophon. Before starting his journey in order to meet his father, Cyrus reminded Lysander of his friendship (φιλίας) to Sparta and him personally (2.1.14). At this point Xenophon prompts us to stop and consider that this is the third time that Lysander met Cyrus, since the first time was during the embassy at Sardis and the second before his departure for Sparta after the expiry of his tenure. Now readers are led to realize that Lysander had upgraded his relationship with Cyrus from xenia to philia13 and that he had gained this friendship very quickly. This is the last proof in Xenophon’s narrative of Lysander’s ability to create friendships with Greeks and barbarians. Both sides had high hopes that he would defeat the Athenians.

. Spartans and Athenians before the battle of Aegospotami After Cyrus had given Lysander all his funds and had been summoned and had gone to see his father, Lysander distributed the pay to his forces and set sail for the Ceramic Gulf in Caria. It is obvious that Lysander did the opposite to what Cyrus told him. Why did Lysander not wait for Cyrus to return? Readers could suspect that Cyrus would be delayed on such a long trip. So Lysander did not want to wait for him, although he could spend the Persian money on preserving his crews and keeping them ready for war.14 Nonetheless, it is my opinion that Xenophon has prepared his readers to think that the Athenians were determined on military engagements with the Spartans. This is because Xenophon has shown that the Athenians were victorious at Arginousai and that they attempted to exterminate the remaining ships of Eteonicus.15 This leads us to think that the Athenians would attempt to attack Lysander. This means that the Spartan commander  11 See pp. 37, 65, 215. 12 See pp. 80–82. 13 For raising a xenia to philia cf. Stanton, 1990, 42–54, especially 46–50. 14 Remember that Mindarus exercised his troops when Alcibiades attacked (1.1.16). See p. 20. 15 See p. 134.

Spartans and Athenians before the battle of Aegospotami  221

could not just wait for them. Indeed, from this moment onwards Xenophon presents Lysander as continually active and fast, and thus he implies that he had been slower than Callicratidas in the past because he had chosen to act in that way.16 Lysander first attacked a city called Cedreiai, which was an ally of Athens, took it by storm on just the second day’s assault and enslaved its inhabitants (2.1.15). Xenophon says that Lysander did this because its people were μιξοβάρβαροι. Ηε considered it necessary to explain the enslavement of a whole city because from the beginning of the war the Spartans had proclaimed that they wanted to liberate the Greeks from the rule of Athens in order to bring them to their side.17 On the other hand, the enslavement of a city whose people were genetically half-barbarian was justified from an Athenian18 but also from the Spartan point of view.19 Xenophon reports the Athenians’ moves. He says that they ravaged τῆς τῶν πολεμίων χώρας, i.e. the land of the Persian King, planned to attack Chios and Ephesus and prepared for a naval battle. Moreover, he adds that the Athenians in the Assembly20 chose three more generals, Menander, Tydeus and Cephisodotus. He emphasizes the rush of anxiety through the use of καί four times (2.1.16).21 The attack of the Athenians on Dareius’ land recalls the plan of Thrasyllus to collect booty.22 Conon also had used the same tactic earlier attacking the King’s land (τὴν

 16 Proietti, 1987, 24 has pointed out the striking contradiction between Lysander’s previous quietness and his present activity and suggests that this happened because of the absence of Alcibiades. However, Xenophon indicates that Lysander was not afraid of Alcibiades because he would have fought him at Notium if he had not been outnumbered by many ships. See p. 89. 17 This is explicitly said in Thuc. 4.81.2–3. 18 In his funeral oration Socrates says that the Athenians are αὐτοὶ ῞Ελληνες, οὐ μειξοβάρβαροι οἰκοῦμεν and hate foreign nature (Pl. Men.245d4–6). 19 The closest we can get to the Spartan mentality is the claim of the Athenian stranger in Plato’s Laws (692e6–693a5). This man says that, had not the joint planning of the Athenians and the Lacedaimonians warded off enslavement, nearly all the Greek peoples would have been mixed together (μεμειγμένα) and the barbarian races mixed with them and they with the barbarians, just as presently those over whom the Persians exercised their tyranny were all interspersed and intermingled. 20 The subject of the verbs ἐποίουν–ἐπέπλεον–παρεσκευάζοντο–προσείλοντο is οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι. With the first three verbs Xenophon refers to the Athenian fleet (cf. 1.7.1), but with the last verb to the citizens in the city (cf. 1.4.20–22). Note that he has already used this mode of writing in 1.6.24. 21 καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν Χίον καὶ τὴν ῎Εφεσον ἐπέπλεον, καὶ παρεσκευάζοντο πρὸς ναυμαχίαν, καὶ στρατηγοὺς ... προσείλοντο. 22 See pp. 24–26.

222  Chapter 4: Athens against Lysander at Aegospotami–the end of the war βασιλέως [χώραν]–1.5.21).23 Xenophon’s readers can be certain about the problem of the Athenians in finding supplies. The attack on Chios can be explained because the island provided Sparta with ships, money and shelter.24 Ephesus was also the base of Lysander and his fleet, as we saw earlier.25 However, Xenophon’s silence about a concrete result implies that the Athenians did not achieve anything. Their next goal was to prepare (παρεσκευάζοντο) their fleet to face Lysander in a naval battle (πρὸς ναυμαχίαν). Xenophon’s text allows us to infer that there was communication between the fleet and the Athenians at home, because the Assemblymen sent three more generals to support the generals already elected, Conon, Adeimantus and Philocles.26 Lysander went to Rhodes, sailed past Ionia and entered the Hellespont (ἐκπλεῖ πρὸς τὸν ῾Ελλήσποντον) to intercept the merchant ships sailing out of the region and to be near those cities that had revolted from the Spartan alliance. The Athenians set out from Chios but they sailed on the open sea because Asia was hostile to them (2.1.17). Given that Lysander went to Rhodes in the past to collect ships, we can assume that he went there again for the same reason.27 Lysander did not seem willing to fight them in the Aegean Sea. Then he easily passed Ionia since Cyrus was at his side, and finally entered the Hellespont. Xenophon emphasizes this fact by using the historical present ἐκπλεῖ, instead of ἐξέπλευσεν, for emphasis. It is important to remember here that he also emphasized the entrance of Alcibiades into the Hellespont with the same tense and then described the great victory of the Athenian fleet.28 He uses the historical present here again to prepare his readers for the final Spartan victory. Xenophon explicitly reveals that Lysander’s plan was to intercept the transportation of grain from Hellespont to Athens. His statement implicitly connects the present account with 1.1.35. When Agis saw many grain boats sailing into the Peiraeus, he realized that it was useless for his men to prevent the Athenians from tilling their land (τῆς γῆς), if they did not stop the grain that was coming to them by sea. Xenophon’s report of Agis’ thoughts confirms Thucydides who shows that, despite the efforts of the Spartans to cow the Athenians by destroying their

 23 See p. 97. 24 See pp. 10, 13, 86, 89–90, 119, 123. 25 See p. 217. 26 See p. 140. 27 See p. 79. 28 See p. 12.

Spartans and Athenians before the battle of Aegospotami  223

land,29 the latter still believed that it was not the land that gave power to their city.30 Agis decided to stop the import of grain from Calchedon and Byzantium by sending Clearchus there with fifteen troop-carriers. But the nine Athenian ships which always guarded the merchant ships in the Hellespont (ἐν τῷ ῾Ελλησπόντῳ) destroyed three of them (1.1.35–36). Through Lysander’s presence in the same region Xenophon wants us to realize that: (a) Agis had rightly realised how to bring Athens to its knees; (b) the Spartans had thought that by sending Clearchus to Calchedon and Byzantium they could persuade the citizens of these cities to revolt against Athens and prevent the transport of grain; (c) the Athenians knew the importance of the region for the safety of their city; that is why Athenian ships were always present in the Hellespont; and they immediately reacted by destroying the enemy vessels which approached the region; (d) the initial Spartan plan of sending a few ships was not enough but a full-scale plan was needed. Thus Xenophon makes it apparent that Lysander was the man who was determined to implement this plan by fighting the Athenians in the Hellespont. Xenophon implies that the Athenians quickly understood Lysander’s plan because they set out from Chios. But he stresses that this was not easy. The geographical detail about the Athenians’ trip and the reason for it reveals that although they followed Lysander they could not follow him strictly. Evidently they feared that they would risk a sudden attack by the people of Asia and miss the opportunity to fight him. This meant that they had to hurry and that they would become stressed as time passed. We can infer that the Athenian generals did not have the opportunity to order their crews to load extra provisions to cover their needs for some days, while those which they had would be finished soon.31 Lysander sailed along the coast from Abydus and headed for Lampascus, a city then allied with the Athenians. He found the people of Abydus and other cities there with their land forces, having the Spartan Thorax as their leader (2.1.18). It is noteworthy that Xenophon presents Lysander as leaving, not going to Abydus (hence he writes ἐξ ᾿Αβύδου). Lysander’s stop there was not a coincidence. Xenophon said at the beginning of the Hellenica that although the Athenians defeated the Spartans at Abydus they achieved a limited victory, since the Spartans

 29 Archidamus believed that the Athenians would surrender if they saw their land (τῆς γῆς) being destroyed (Thuc. 2.18.5). When the Athenians saw the Spartans destroying their land (γῆς τεμνομένης), they were in distress (Thuc. 2.21). 30 Cf. Thuc. 2.62.3, where Pericles had advised his fellow citizens not to consider their need for land (τῆς γῆς χρείαν) as the real reason for Athenian power. 31 For the importance of loading provisions for some days see Casson, 1995, 268.

224  Chapter 4: Athens against Lysander at Aegospotami–the end of the war fled and found refuge there (1.1.6). The consequences of that limited victory become apparent now: because of the support of the Abydians and other allies Lysander acquired infantry forces to fight the Athenians. This allowed Lysander and his men to capture Lampsacus by force. Xenophon once again uses the historical present, αἱροῦσι, to emphasize the importance of this victory. This city was full of wine and grain (οἴνου καὶ σίτου) and other supplies, as Xenophon emphasizes.32 Lampsacus provided Lysander with ample food supplies, in order to conduct a military encounter in safety and with time. Moreover, Lysander was imitating Callicratidas, i.e he took the rich supplies of the city but left its citizens free (2.1.19). Nevertheless, there was a different aspect to Sparta’s policy of conquest now,33 i.e. Lysander propagated not Callicratidas’ ‘panhellenism’ but Sparta’s initial slogan of liberating the Greeks from Athens (Thuc. 2.9). Concerning the city itself, its capture meant that Lysander had secured a city to anchor his fleet. The tactical advantage of the Spartan fleet is already clear. The Athenians were anxious to catch Lysander. This becomes evident through Xenophon’s additional detail that they sailed right behind him (κατὰ πόδας) when they arrived at Elaious in the Chersonnnese with one hundred and eighty ships. While the Athenians were taking their meal, they learned of the fall of Lampsacus, and they immediately (εὐθύς) sailed for Sestus (2.1.20). Xenophon shows this by using the phrase κατὰ πόδας, which comes from the world of hunting and refers to hunting-dogs chasing rabbits.34 This connection between hunting and warfare, which goes back to Homer, finds its place in Xenophon, who implicitly equates men with animals,35 not only because of his love for hunting but mainly because of his conception that men should apply in warfare against

 32 Note Xenophon’s triple repetition of the particle καί. 33 Powell, 2006, 300 points out that since Astyochus (Thuc. 8.41.2), Callicratidas and Lysander followed the same policy in regard to the cities they conquered, this was a standard procedure. Although the treatment of the cities is the same, in my view, the communicative tactic is different. 34 See Proietti, 1987, 26. 35 See Cohen, 2010, 114 who says that the Homeric similes ‘clearly show that the motif of animal predation helped conceptualize not only human hunting but also human warfare and posited a certain affinity between human and animal’. Although Xenophon does not explicitly assimilate men with animals at this point in the Hellenica, he does this in 2.4.41, 4.1.33 and in Anab.5.7.24, 26. In some of these instances men are assimilated to dogs. For other examples where Xenophon assimilates men with animals see Rood, 2017, 270.

Spartans and Athenians before the battle of Aegospotami  225

men the lesson that they have learned from animals.36 However, Xenophon indicates that in the prospective encounter the prey was really fast, so the predator did not even have the time to enjoy its meal. The Athenians went straight to Sestus because they always used it as a base;37 their decision to take provisions was necessary after their rather time-consuming and difficult trip in the Aegean Sea. They loaded provisions on board at Sestus immediately (εὐθύς) and sailed for Aegospotami, a place opposite Lampsacus, where they took their evening meal. The Hellespont was about fifteen stadia wide (2.1.21). Xenophon shows the anxiety of the Athenians to catch Lysander through the double use of the adverb εὐθύς in two consecutive sentences. The fact that they sailed for Aegospotami indicates that this would necessarily be the site of the military encounter. Xenophon immediately takes note of the geography of the area and attempts to locate the exact position of Aegospotami. Thus he tries to convince his readers that he knows the topography of the area by defining the width of the Hellespont. It is not illogical to regard these details as indications that Aegospotami was not a well known place;38 thus Xenophon had at least two reasons for their inclusion. First, the historian was not able to include a map in his account; he had to create it in his readers’ minds through the mention of some coordinates.39 Second, this topographical information must have been necessary for his audience which did not have any other way of knowing where Aegospotami was. Xenophon found this way of taking them by the hand into this unknown area. Moreover, by means of the stadia Xenophon quantifies the distance between the two camps. We can

 36 For Xenophon’s love for hunting Anderson, 1985, 30–31. For this conception of hunting see Cyrop.1.6.39–40. For Xenophon’s belief that hunting was useful and appropriate training for war see Cohen, 2010, 130. 37 After Abydus the Athenians sailed to Sestus (1.1.7) and it was there that Alcibiades and his fellow countrymen planed their next moves against the enemy (1.1.11). Finally, it was at Sestus again that the Athenian fleet anchored and Thrasyllus sailed to join them (1.2.13). Xenophon mentions that, when Clearchus and his men were defeated by the Athenians in the Hellespont, his ships which were not destroyed escaped to Sestus and from there they made their way to Byzantium (1.1.36). Nevertheless, this incident seems an exception to the rule. The strict connection of Sestus with the Athenian fleet indicates that it was their base and not just a temporary shelter of some Athenian ships. 38 Munn, 2000, 198 rightly points out that Menander served with Alcibiades when Lampsacus was captured (1.2.15–16). However, Xenophon’s mention of the Athenian operations at Lampsacus does not allow his readers to think that Aegospotami may have been known to the Athenians as a useful position for operations against Lampsacus. 39 Hornblower, 2008, 469 has already made the point about the inability of Thucydides to include a map in his account; something which I believe is valid for Xenophon too.

226  Chapter 4: Athens against Lysander at Aegospotami–the end of the war suspect that the reason why he gives these pieces of information is that he considered them an important element in order to inform his readers about the place the Athenian generals chose to fight Lysander. This becomes quite certain if we bear in mind that Xenophon mentioned before the naval battles of Abydus (1.1.5– 7) and Notium (1.5.11–14) that the Athenian fleet was stationed in a well known place, i.e. Madytus (1.1.3) and Notium (1.5.12) respectively. Xenophon has created suspense about what will happen next.

. Xenophon’s two striking ‘ellipses’ We have seen that Xenophon gives precise numbers of ships to show that he wished his readers to keep track of the main movements of the Athenian and the Peloponnesian fleets. However, two problems arise here, one regarding the Spartans and the other the Athenians.40 Let us deal with the Spartans first. Reading Xenophon’s narrative we must stop and remark that, while he says that the Athenians numbered one hundred ships, he does not give any number for Lysander’s fleet.41 Since he has always informed his readers about the exact numbers of the ships of the two fleets regarding the sea-fights of Rhoiteion/Abydus, Proconnesus and Arginousai,42 it is strange that he does not mention the number of the Spartan ships here. This problem has its beginning in the previous narrative. In 2.1.6–7 he reports that Lysander set out from the Peloponnese, but he does not specify if the latter brought any ships with him. What he does instead is to insinuate that he arrived at Ephesus with just the ship which transported him (2.1.10). In order to get some numbers for the Spartan fleet we must turn back to the naval battle of Arginousai. Let me repeat some passages I discussed earlier from a different perspective. Xenophon informs us that Callicratidas left fifty ships under Eteonicus’ command in Mytilene and that he set out against the Athenians with one hundred and twenty ships (1.6.26). After the description of the battle Xenophon says that the Spartans and their allies lost seventy ships in total and

 40 I borrow the term ellipses in the title of this sub-chapter from Rood, 2007, 151 n. 6, who uses it to denote gaps which are inferred from the text. 41 Krentz, 1989b, 172 has already made the point, but I try to explain Xenophon’s silence. 42 Rhoiteium: Diagoras sailed into the Hellespont with fourteen ships, while the Athenians had forty ships, but the generals attacked with twenty. Alcibiades intervened with eighteen ships (1.1.2–5). Proconnesus: the Athenians had eighty-six ships, while Mindarus had sixty (1.1.11–13). Arginousai: the most detailed account. Xenophon explains in every detail how the Athenians increased their fleet from one hundred and ten ships, when they left Athens, to one hundred and fifty ships before the fight, while he does the same for the Spartan side (1.6.25–26).

Xenophon’s two striking ‘ellipses’  227

that some of them fled to Chios but most of them to Phocaia (1.6.33–34). Later on, we read that Eteonicus moved with the remains of the fleet to Chios (1.6.37), but then we suddenly learn that he, the Chians and the other allies assembled at Ephesus, where Lysander finally arrived. Since Lysander summoned Eteonicus and the fleet to Ephesus after his arrival, this probably means that Eteonicus had gone there alone first, but then he returned with his men following his commander’s orders. However, Xenophon does not number Eteonicus’ ships, while he adds the vague information that Lysander collected all the other ships, if there were any anywhere, although he previously said that most of the ships had fled to Phocaia. Since the allies assembled first at Chios, we understand that most of them moved to this island and left from Phocaia, but some of them for reasons unknown to us stayed behind. Xenophon then adds that Lysander repaired the remaining ships and built others at Antandrus (2.1.10), but once again he does not say how many the new ships were. He refers to this issue for the last time in 2.1.14, where he narrates that when Lysander visited Cyrus the prince urged him not to fight the Athenians in a naval battle unless he far outnumbered them in vessels. This kind of vague and confusing writing is striking and may reflect Xenophon’s uncertainty about Lysander’s ships.43 But the main issue here is that Lysander did not listen to Cyrus’ advice, but moved instead against Cedreiai, Rhodes and the Hellespont. This means either that Lysander was reckless or that he finally acquired an adequate armada to fight his enemies. Xenophon has insisted on the importance of the numerical superiority of ships in sea-battles by saying that: (a) the Peloponnesians fled to the land of Cyzicus when they saw that the Athenian triremes were much more numerous (1.1.17); (b) Lysander did not put out against Alcibiades at Notium, because he was outnumbered by many ships (1.5.15); and (c) Callicratidas did not follow his pilot’s advice not to fight the Athenians, because they had fewer ships, and thus the Spartans were defeated (1.6.32). Therefore, between the two options, I think he most probably expected his readers to realise that Lysander would not make such a fatal mistake as to fight his enemies with far fewer

 43 Bommelaer, 1981, 97 n. 77 and Kagan, 1987, 380, 382 rightly calculate that some time before the naval battle of Aegospotami Lysander’s fleet numbered something over one hundred and twenty-five ships, and perhaps as many as one hundred and fifty, but it is necessary to state that it is Diod. 13.104.3 and not Xenophon who adds that Lysander left the Peloponnese with thirtyfive ships.

228  Chapter 4: Athens against Lysander at Aegospotami–the end of the war vessels as his predecessors had done.44 Thus it becomes evident that Lysander indeed followed Cyrus’ advice to some degree, but Xenophon compressed the time span of his account, because he wanted to make his readers concentrate not so much on Lysander’s number of ships as on his decisiveness for war. I believe that, after Lysander’s aggressive policy at Cedreiai and Lampsacus and the Athenian response to it, Xenophon succeeded not only in overcoming this problem but also turning his readers’ interest towards the future fight. Concerning the Athenians, we may wonder why things ended up like this. Xenophon does not seem to give a clear answer, but a close reading of his previous account helps the reader to draw his own conclusions. In 1.6.33 he said that at Arginousai the Athenians defeated the Spartans, who fled to Chios and Phocaia. The Athenian generals decided that Theramenes and Thrasybulus should sail with forty-six ships to the aid of their disabled vessels and the men on them, while they themselves went with the remaining seventy-nine ships against the fifty Spartan ships anchored with Eteonicus at Mytilene (1.6.35, 1.6.26). The Athenians lost twenty-five ships at Arginousai (1.6.34), but they still had one hundred and twenty-five ships to destroy the far fewer vessels of Eteonicus; so they could quite easily exterminate their enemy once and for all. However, the weather prevented the generals from accomplishing their plan. When the wind became calmer the Athenians set out from Arginousai to attack Eteonicus in Mytilene. Xenophon does not say so explicitly. But this becomes clear from the information that Conon, who was trapped in Mytilene with thirtyeight ships left (1.6.17, 1.6.19), launched his vessels after the flight of the Spartans and the calming of the wind in order to join them, and informed them about Eteonicus’ move to Chios. Conon and the Athenian generals, united now with one hundred and sixty-eight ships, attacked Chios, but they did not accomplish anything; so they sailed back to Samos (1.6.38). Xenophon’s double reference to the Athenian plan to capture Eteonicus at Mytilene (1.6.35, 1.6.38) and their following failure in Chios leads readers to believe that the weather had prevented them from their ultimate victory. He refers to the situation in the Athenian fleet again in 2.1.12, where he says that the Athenians were preparing their navy. In 2.1.16 Xenophon refers for the last time to the position of the Athenian fleet and says that they attacked Chios and Ephesus. At this point he repeats his former information about the Athenian attacks on Eteonicus, but adds that they had also attempted to destroy Lysander at Ephesus, since he was in charge in that place  44 Proietti, 1987, 27–28 also has pointed out that Lysander could not have fought the Athenians with far fewer vessels, but, in my view, it is not right to say that numbers were not decisive for Xenophon.

Lysander’s movements  229

and not his subordinate. Thus Xenophon unites two different military events in one phrase and compresses time again. Moreover, once again he does not choose to explain why this enterprise failed too. However, since he says that the Spartan leader did not have his old ships ready for battle and that he was still building ships at Antandrus, it is safe to assume, as I argued above, that Lysander would not risk a fight at this moment. Regardless of this, what matters now is that in both cases the Athenians had lost the best opportunities to destroy their enemy and they were unable to force a battle. Nonetheless, it is interesting that Xenophon adds at this particular moment that the Athenians chose Menander, Tydeus and Cephisodotus, in addition to Conon, Adeimantus and Philocles (1.7.1). Since Conon had not been deposed, but remained in Samos as commander of the one hundred and sixty-eight ships, the five new generals most probably went to Samos at the same time and took with them twelve more ships. This inevitably means that the man really responsible for the failed enterprises in Mytilene and Ephesus was Conon, since it was he who waited alone in the Aegean Sea. Conon had probably informed the Athenians about their ships, even his attempts to exterminate the Spartans. So the citizens decided to send him a few more ships but also other generals in order to help him. Nevertheless, these men arrived rather late to propose a plan in order to stop Lysander at Ephesus. In my opinion, if the real problem of the Athenians was that they had fewer ships than they really needed to face the Spartans, and if the generals had brought a full armada with them and not just a few ships, Xenophon would have emphasized this number instead of hiding it as he does now. Therefore I believe that Xenophon is hiding Conon’s responsibility and speaking in general about ‘the Athenians at Samos’. A possible explanation of this curious silence will appear after the analysis of the defeat, but Conon’s failure was certainly the second reason which forced the Athenians desperately to chase Lysander to the Hellespont.

. Lysander’s movements Xenophon focuses on the Spartan side and says that the first day the two fleets faced each other Lysander gave the signal to his men to eat breakfast and board the ships. He also adds the important information that he prepared everything for a naval battle, putting out the side-screens and saying that no one should move from his position or put out to sea (2.1.22). Readers have the impression from the very first moment of the account that Lysander was imposing discipline on his men, because he wanted to fight the Athenians. At sunrise the Athenians drew up in line facing the harbor, i.e. the harbor of Lampsacus, as for a naval battle.

230  Chapter 4: Athens against Lysander at Aegospotami–the end of the war Although we would think that the battle would start, Xenophon says that Lysander did not put out against them. The Athenians waited until it was late in the day, but then they sailed back again to Aegospotami (2.1.23). One would rather expect to read that Lysander accepted the challenge, since Xenophon himself showed that he wanted this encounter. However, Xenophon alerts his readers to Lysander’s intention by saying that he ordered his fastest ships to follow the Athenians, watch them when they disembarked, and then sail back and report to him. Only when his scouts returned did he let his sailors disembark from the triremes (2.1.24). This information is very important, because it indicates that Lysander’s initial failure to respond to a challenge to battle was part of an already established plan. We must observe that Xenophon is vague concerning the distance from which the scout ships watched the Athenians and what exactly they recorded.45 Nevertheless, Xenophon has said that Alcibiades sailed to Gytheium in order to see the thirty triremes which he heard the Lacedaemonians were making ready (1.4.11), but he does not also feel the need to explain how this plan succeeded. Moreover, in 3.2.3 he says that the Bithynians learned first how many Odrysians were going out of their camp for booty and how many Greeks they were leaving behind as guards and then attacked them. But again nothing is said about how the Bithynians obtained this information. However inadequate and cursory this manner of writing is, Xenophon is not the only author who uses it, but the later historian Polybius does too. He says that Annibas, the Carthaginian general, conquered the passage of a river, brought his whole army across, pitched his camp for that night by the river-side and, in the morning, when he was told that the Roman fleet was anchored off the mouths of the river, he detached five hundred Numidian horsemen to reconnoitre the enemy and find out their position, their numbers, and what they were going to do (3.44.1–3). Polybius’ writing of two more incidents in the same way shows that this was a deliberate choice.46 If we compare Polybius with Xenophon, I think that

 45 Bommelaer, 1981, 110 seems certain that this information is wrong. I hope that my analysis will raise doubts, but most of all I want to show Xenophon’s historiographical thought and his creation of a positive image of Lysander. 46 A little later on, in 3.45.1–2, Polybius says that this reconnoitring party of Numidians returned in headlong flight, after losing more than half their numbers, because not far from the camp they had fallen in with a party of Roman horse, who had been sent out by Publius on the same errand (3.45.1–2). In 3.95.8 he says that Hasdrubal, having a fleet of forty ships and land forces, went to Iberia and let his crews coast past the country and his troops march along the shore towards the Iber, but when Gnaeus Scipio heard of the number of their troops, and the

Lysander’s movements  231

the lack of any specific information about how a reconnoitring force would manage to find out the exact number and movements of the enemy indicates that this method was common for at least two historians of different times, and perhaps other authors of this genre too, but also for different audiences. Besides, Polybius is not the only author who seems to confirm Xenophon’s technique but also the orator Aeschines and the biographer Plutarch, who follow the same line. Thus, the former says that the general Iphicrates arrived at Amphipolis with a few ships at first, for the purpose of examining the situation rather than of laying siege to the city (2.28), while the latter says that when the Athenians campaigned in Sicily and sailed for Syracuse, ten of the ships were sent to reconnoitre (Nic.14.5). Comparing Aeschines’ certainty about the reliability of Iphicrates’ espionage and Xenophon’s writing about Lysander makes me suspect that the two authors took it for granted that their readers would not only believe this report,47 but they would pass over it very easily and focus on the commander’s delaying tactic and his dangerous proximity. Xenophon’s readers could easily conclude that Lysander’s ships could cover the distance of the fifteen stadia quite quickly, return to Lampsacus and report to him. On the other side of the strait the Athenians waited every morning for Lysander to respond (2.1.24), a fact which indicates that they were in an inferior position. Since Xenophon has stated that Lysander wanted to intercept the grain ships, the Athenians could only prevent his plan by making war. A reader would be happy to learn why the Athenians did not have a ‘plan B’ instead of monotonously facing the enemy harbor. I think that our author has already given the answer in an earlier passage of his narrative. Despite the fact that Alcibiades set out with all his ships for the harbor of Ephesus, Lysander did not put out against him; and when Alcibiades sailed back to Samos, Lysander seized the opportunity a little later to take Delphiniun and Eion.48 When Alcibiades left Ephesus, Lysander had freedom of movement. Thus this passage seems to shed light on Lysander’s thought regarding the prospective sea battle at Aegospotami and the difficult position of the Athenians. The great difference now is that at this juncture the Athenians were not risking just the fate of two random cities, but that of Calchedon and Byzantium and then the control of the entire region.  great scale on which their preparations had been made, he put to sea with thirty-five ships, arrived near the mouth of the Iber and at a distance of about ten miles from the enemy and sent two swift-sailing vessels to reconnoitre. 47 I focus more on Aeschines, because he is interested as an orator in persuading his audience to vote in favor of him and names the commander, but it is noteworthy that Plutarch also does not seem to worry that his Roman readers will show disbelief in his testimony. 48 See pp. 89–90.

232  Chapter 4: Athens against Lysander at Aegospotami–the end of the war On the next day in the morning Lysander ordered his men to take their morning meal and go on board the ships. He prepared everything for a battle (πάντα δὲ παρασκευασάμενος ὡς εἰς ναυμαχίαν), had the side-screens placed on the ships and announced that no one should move from his position (ἐκ τῆς τάξεως) or put out to sea (2.1.22). At the same time the Athenians, when the sun was rising, arranged their ships in line in front of the harbor (ἐπὶ τῷ λιμένι) to offer battle (ὡς εἰς ναυμαχίαν). When Lysander did not sail out against them and the time grew late, they sailed back to Aegospotami (2.1.23). Xenophon told us earlier that the Athenians παρεσκευάζοντο πρὸς ναυμαχίαν (2.1.16). Now he shows that the Athenians believed that they would finally fight Lysander after so long a pursuit. The ‘rabbit’ would come out of his hole at last. But it is noteworthy that Lysander seemed to repeat Conon’s stratagem at Mytilene by keeping his men in their ships and using the side-screens.49 This is a coincidence that should alert readers to what would happen next. Moreover, the emphasis of Lysander on the orderliness of the crews reminds us that he had imposed the same discipline at Notium (ἐναυμάχησαν … ἐν τάξει–1.5.14). However, he knew that since his enemy outnumbered him in ships, he might risk a defeat; but if he stayed in the port of Lampascus, he would be safe.50 Lysander’s plan was right, because the Athenians could not force him to fight. Nevertheless, Xenophon indicates that Lysander did not intend to stay in the port for ever. The Spartan commander was sending his faster ships to watch what the Athenians did when they disembarked and report to him. Lysander did not let his sailors disembark from the ships until his scouts had returned. This was done for four consecutive days (2.1.24).

. The appearance of Alcibiades At this point Xenophon informs us about the appearance of Alcibiades in the Athenian camp. He gives the impression that he knows the man’s thoughts. Alcibiades watched the Athenians from his castle (ἐκ τῶν τειχῶν) and realized that: (a) they were anchored at a beach without a city nearby; (b) they were bringing their provisions from Sestus, fifteen stadia away from the ships; and (c) the enemy had everything (πάντα), being in a harbor (ἐν λιμένι) in front of a city. Xenophon presents Alcibiades as foreseeing the vulnerability of the position of the

 49 See p. 124. 50 Proietti, 1987, 27–28 argues that numbers in regard to the size of the two fleets were not decisive at Aegospotami. But numbers did matter; that is why Lysander followed this plan.

The appearance of Alcibiades  233

Athenian fleet. This was an implicit praise of Alcibiades. Then Xenophon presents him appearing in the Athenian camp instantly and giving his advice to the generals without any time indication.51 He told them that they were not anchored in a good place and urged them to move their camp to Sestus, where there was a harbor and a city. ‘If you are there’, he said, ‘you can fight a sea battle when you want’ (οὗ ὄντες ναυμαχήσετε, ὅταν βούλησθε’–2.1.25). Through Alcibiades’ intervention readers realize that: (a) Xenophon’s previous cartography of Aegospotami aimed at making them reflect on the military inferiority of the Athenians, who were anchored in an unprotected place; (b) the provisions which the Athenians brought from Sestus, when they first anchored there, were not enough and the distance over which they were foraging for food was long;52 and (c) Lysander’s control of Lampsacus’ harbor and its city, which had an abundance of consumable goods, as the use of the word πάντα emphatically indicates,53 proves that he had military superiority and consequently he could fight whenever he liked. Alcibiades told his fellow citizens what Xenophon’s readers have already realized, i.e. that the Athenians were anchored in a bad place, and he encouraged them to move to Sestus, where there was a harbor and a city. One more thing becomes clear now. Although we might think that since the Athenians seemed to have more ships than Lysander they could easily defeat him, on this occasion the size of their fleet could not be considered an advantage. Alcibiades’ appearance in the camp deserves an assessment. We saw that the Athenians did not depose him from his generalship but he departed voluntarily and went to his fortress (εἰς τὰ ἑαυτοῦ τείχη) in Chersonese (1.5.17). Xenophon’s readers understand that Alcibiades saw the fleet of the Athenians because he was really close to them. On the other hand, Alcibiades could not predict that the Athenians would not be able to stop Lysander before coming to the Hellespont or even worse that the last scene of the Peloponnesian War would take place there. This fact puts his presence there in a positive light. Then Xenophon puts emphasis by reporting Alcibiades’ words. These are a combination of the narrator’s words and Alcibiades’ own words, i.e. we have a combination of two modes of reportage, indirect and direct speech. It is interesting to note that Xenophon presented Alcibiades speaking in direct speech when he addressed his troops before

 51 For the writing of an achronical narrative cf. de Jong, 2007, 1–2. 52 Therefore, I would like to argue against Wylie, 1986, 129 that Xenophon is unclear about supplies. 53 Using this word, Xenophon avoids repeating the phrase of 2.1.9, but makes his point stronger.

234  Chapter 4: Athens against Lysander at Aegospotami–the end of the war the battle of Cyzicus.54 This is the second time in the Hellenica that Xenophon switches some of Alcibiades’ words to direct speech. There have been other incidents where he could have repeated the same technique,55 but he avoided it. Thus I believe that Xenophon’s preference for oratio recta is a part of his narrative strategy to present Alcibiades as a good adviser.56 Gray has argued that Alcibiades’ story is conventional, ‘since it is modeled on the pattern of the Wise Adviser ignored … a Herodotean motif’.57 In my opinion, although Xenophon’s narration conforms to some degree to the Herodotean format, it is not an exact imitation of it. I must repeat Lattimore’s thesis that there are two kinds of wise adviser, one called ‘the tragic warner’ and the other ‘the practical adviser’. The former advises another person not to do something, but that person does not pay attention to him, so he meets with destruction, while the latter urges somebody to follow his advice, his advice is taken and the results are as proposed.58 But I have argued that Xenophon used this literary model and adapted it to the person of Euryptolemus.59 I contend that Alcibiades’ case is similar. The distinction between the tragic warner and the practical adviser cannot be pressed too rigidly, because there are some striking differences. First, Alcibiades cannot be classified as a tragic warner, because he does not advise the generals not to do something, but the opposite, he proposes a specific plan. So he corresponds more closely to the practical adviser. The fact, however, that his audience does not follow his advice, as we shall see, transforms them into the audience of the tragic warner. Second, we have seen that Xenophon has shown that the Athenians were obliged to take provisions from Sestus before moving to Aegospotami; so their decision not to go there does not illustrate their folly or their ignorance, but their inability to find an alternative solution. Finally, this is not simply a discussion between two men but Alcibiades’ advice in front of the six

 54 See above, pp. 17–18. 55 See 1.3.11, 4.20, 5.11. 56 By this I do not mean that the use of indirect speech does not affect the narrative. On the contrary, Xenophon is equally able to pass rapidly over the speech of Alcibiades after his return to Athens, but he still shows that his fellow citizens believed him and elected him commanderin-chief (see pp. 69–70). However, in my opinion, Xenophon’s purpose is not the same. 57 Gray, 1989, 148. 58 See Lattimore, p. 177 n. 194. 59 See p. 177.

The appearance of Alcibiades  235

generals. Consequently, Xenophon borrowed Herodotus’ model, but slightly revised his form to praise Alcibiades.60 Now an assessment of Alcibiades’ advice that Aegospotami was a poor location must be made. First, I may point out that it finds support in Thucydides’ narration of two events, the blockade of Pylos and the defeat of the Athenians at Eretria. In the first incident we read that the Athenians did not have the possibility of landing because there were not harbors from which they could assist their countrymen (ἀλίμενα … ὁρμώμενοι–4.8.8). The Athenians blockaded the Lacedaimonians on the island, but the Peloponnesian forces on the mainland remained in their old position. As a result of this, keeping watch was tiresome for the Athenians, because they were in want both of food and water (σίτου ἀπορίᾳ); so the soldiers went to the acropolis to find provisions. Moreover, the Athenian garrison was crowded into a narrow space, and, their ships having no regular anchorage (τῶν νεῶν οὐκ ἐχουσῶν ὅρμον), the crews took their food on land by turns, one half of the army eating while the other lay at anchor in the open sea (4.26.1–3). On the other hand, the Lacedaimonians continued resisting because they had managed to convey into the island meal, wine, cheese or any other provision suitable for a besieged place (σῖτον … καὶ οἶνον–4.26.5). The difficult position of the Athenian garrison was also realized by the Athenians at home, since when they heard that their army was suffering in Pylos, while the Spartans introduced supplies (σῖτος) into the island, they began to be anxious. They reflected that their troops were in a desert place and the coast was without harbors (χωρίων ἀλιμένων–4.27.1). In the second incident we read that, when the Spartan Agesandridas sailed from Oropus to Eretria to attack Thymochares and his fleet, which was sixty stadia away, the Athenians began to man their ships, believing that their crews were close at hand. However, this was contrived because the soldiers were getting their provisions from houses at the end of the town, and not in the market. This happened because the Eretrians intentionally sold nothing there so that the men would lose time in embarking and the enemy could then come upon them before they were ready and they would be compelled to put out as best they could. In the end, the Athenians suffered a defeat (8.95.3–5). Since a fleet attacked another one sixty stadia away and defeated it because its sailors were away from their posts in order to buy provisions from the outskirts of a city, we can be quite certain that the outcome of an attack would be much worse at Aegospotami, since there was no city at all. Therefore, we can have no doubt that Alcibiades was right  60 Gray, 1986, 115–23 has shown Xenophon’s ability to invent new literary forms in her analysis of the Hiero. I believe that he is doing the same here.

236  Chapter 4: Athens against Lysander at Aegospotami–the end of the war to emphasize that Lysander had the advantage of position. The logical reaction of the Athenian generals should have been fear for their strategic disadvantage, and this should have made them leave Aegospotami immediately and go to a safer place.61 Second, Alcibiades’ emphasis on the need to move to Sestus, where the Athenians could fight whenever they liked, was right according to Thucydides’ narrative of the Sicilian expedition. He tells us that the Athenians had established themselves in an advantageous position away from Syracuse, where they could give battle whenever they pleased (ὁπότε βούλοιντο), because they were protected by walls, houses, trees, a marsh and a line of cliffs. Thus the Syracusan horses were least likely to harass them either before or during the engagement (6.66.1–2). Xenophon implies once again that Thucydides’ opinion about Alcibiades’ excellence in war was true.62 Readers have the impression that Alcibiades was a disinterested person who wanted to see the Athenian generals defeat Lysander even though he was not serving with them.63 On the other hand, this ability of Alcibiades did not mean much in practical terms in this case because he was not an Athenian general.

. The generals’ reaction: their political and personal motives Xenophon reports the reaction of the Athenian generals. When Alcibiades shared his plan with the generals, all of them,64 especially Tydeus and Menander, told him that they were the generals now and not he (αὐτοὶ γὰρ νῦν στρατηγεῖν– 2.1.26). Such a brusque answer cannot be explained as a reaction because the generals were clinging to their official responsibility.65 The author who justifies such an interpretation is Diodorus, because he says that the generals, consider-

 61 Cf. Xen. 4.8.8, where it is said that Conon φοβούμενος δὲ τήν τε ἀλιμενότητα τῆς χώρας (Lacedaimon) καὶ τὰ τῆς βοηθείας καὶ τὴν σπανοσιτίαν, ταχύ τε ἀνέστρεψε καὶ ἀποπλέων ὡρμίσθη τῆς Κυθηρίας εἰς Φοινικοῦντα. 62 See p. 39. 63 However, note that in Diodorus Alcibiades also had personal motives. He told the generals that the Scythians Medocus and Seuthes were his friends and that they had promised him that if he wanted to fight the Spartans they would help him with large forces. In exchange, Alcibiades wanted a share in the command of the fleet; his real reason was his wish to return to Athens again (13.105.3–4). 64 For this point see Kapellos, 2009, 262. 65 This is the opinion of Gray, 1989, 148.

The generals’ reaction: their political and personal motives  237

ing that in case of defeat the blame would attach to them and that in case of success all men would attribute it to Alcibiades, quickly bade him be gone and not come near the camp ever again (13.105.4). In this case, then, the reader faces a problem, but not an unsolvable one. In my opinion, Xenophon’s account of the Arginousai affair leads his audience to interpret the generals’ answer as a fearful reaction to the decision of the people to execute the generals who had fought in that naval battle. Most probably at that time Adeimantus and Philocles were elected generals, substituting for the Arginousai generals, but they were intimidated by the fate of the Arginousai generals. Thus they had every reason to be afraid that if they lost Lysander from their sight and failed to defeat him the demos would sentence them to death too. One year after the trial66 the Athenians also elected Menander, Tydeus and Cephisodotus. These generals were also among the citizens who had lived through the nightmare of the Arginousai trial, but despite that they decided to face Lysander. Would they now dare to go back to Athens when they had already seen the fickleness of their fellow citizens?67 Conon was not in Athens at the time of the trial. Probably he learned of the execution of his old colleagues when the new generals met him in Samos, if he had not already heard it. But it is difficult to believe that after his two failures to destroy the enemy68 he believed that the Athenians would give him another chance. We saw earlier that the Athenians regretted the execution of the generals one year after the trial.69 This allows us to be certain that the citizens’ repentance came after the appointment of the new generals for the mission to the Hellespont. Therefore the commanders at Aegospotami could not run the risk that their citizens would not repeat the same mistake. Thus their fear of failure did not allow them to leave this lonely beach of the Hellespont. However, this is one side of the coin. I believe that through a close investigation of the text Xenophon wanted his readers to suspect that the personal antagonisms of the generals played some role in Alcibiades’ rejection. Besides, Alcibiades did not blame them for their wrong strategical position but advised them.70 Let us attempt to explain the behavior, at least of some of them, by studying the previous parts of the Hellenica once again.

 66 See 2.1.10 with Krentz, 1989b, 11. 67 See p. 208. 68 See pp. 228–29. 69 See p. 211. 70 Cf. Plut. Lys.10.4, who says that Alcibiades blamed the generals for the bad position of the Athenian fleet.

238  Chapter 4: Athens against Lysander at Aegospotami–the end of the war Conon was elected general at a time when Alcibiades became a general of Athens again.71 Conon was elected general for a second time after the defeat at Notium and took over the command of the fleet at Samos at a time when Alcibiades had abandoned the fleet and the crews.72 His tenure was not successful afterwards, because he was responsible for the failed enterprises in Mytilene and Ephesus.73 Could Conon now open his arms and welcome Alcibiades? The answer is ‘no’. The same goes for the rest of the generals. Menander is an individual of secondary importance in the Hellenica. Xenophon has shown that the best thing he did was to support Alcibiades in his pursuit of Pharnabazus.74 Xenophon disregards the personal relationship between the generals, but given the present circumstances readers can realize that this cooperation in the past did not mean anything for the present. When Alcibiades abandoned the fleet at Notium, the Athenians elected ten other generals but not Menander. So why would he want to accept Alcibiades back and risk his personal glory? About Aristocrates nothing is known. Regarding Adeimantus, Xenophon implicitly called on his readers to remember that the present general was an old friend of Alcibiades.75 Now the reaction of Adeimantus reveals how easily the relations between close friends could change. If this is difficult to believe, we must also observe that Alcibiades escaped from Notium without informing anyone, not even his old friend, about his future plans. Nothing is said about Tydeus and Cephisodotus, but I do not think that Xenophon expected his readers to think otherwise about these men. Philocles’ role will appear later on in the narrative. Last, regardless of the personal reasons the generals had for rejecting Alcibiades, his decision to advise them most probably sounded to them as a disparagement of their ability to handle the situation. This explains why their answer indicates some kind of upset, egoism76 and malice.77 We must not forget that Xenophon has shown from the very beginning of his work that Alcibiades became

 71 See p. 39. 72 See p. 97. 73 See pp. 228–29. 74 See p. 30. 75 See p. 78. 76 In my view, the contrast of two persons through the use of pronouns αὐτός–ἐκεῖνος in Aesch. 2.66 or even ἐγώ–σύ in e.g. Dem. 18.22, 41, 180, 196–97, Aesch. 2.38 justify my interpretation. 77 I say that having in mind Aristotle who defines malice as blocking the wishes of another person not in order to have something for oneself, but rather so that the other should not have it (Rhet.1387b23–24).

The generals’ reaction: their political and personal motives  239

accepted by the fleet as a general because of his many military successes,78 whereas none of them, not even Conon, could consider himself equal to him. So why would the new generals want to share their authority with Alcibiades? At this point we should compare the answer of the Athenian generals with Cleon’s answer to Nicias. Thucydides reports that in the Pylos debate Cleon blamed Nicias for not sailing against the Spartans at Pylos at once. When Nicias offered to resign his generalship, Cleon tried to back out and said that not he but Nicias was the general (οὐκ ἔφη αὐτὸς ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνον στρατηγεῖν–Thuc. 4.28.2).79 However, Cleon was forced to lead the expedition in Pylos and achieved a great victory for Athens. Xenophon’s readers could think that the Athenian generals at Aegospotami also believed that they would be successful. As Xenophon shows in the continuation of his narrative, this was the only time before the defeat when the generals proved themselves united against someone and that was Alcibiades. Nevertheless, they would not be united against Lysander, and this is that mattered for the historian.80 Alcibiades left the Athenian camp without talking to anybody else.81 Then he disappears from Xenophon’s narrative. The Athenian generals were solely responsible in their prospective fight with Lysander. When the Athenians (τοῖς ᾿Αθηναίοις) sailed out on the fifth day and returned as before, Lysander instructed his men who followed them back that when they saw them disembarked and scattered (ἐσκεδασμένους) around Chersonese, they should sail back to him and raise a shield in the middle of their journey. Xenophon intensifies the attention of his readers. While he previously reported that Lysander watched the Athenian moves until late in the day, Lysander’s new instruction, i.e. the raising of a shield as a signal, means that the scouts should use the sun, as this could happen only during the day and not in the late hours of it. It is obvious that on the last day of the confrontation the Athenians drew up in line facing the harbor of Lampsacus from sunrise, as on all the previous days, but they did not wait until the late afternoon; that is why nobody paid attention to the Spartan movements. Moreover, at this moment Xenophon adds important new information, i.e. (a) the Athenians used to move away from their ships more and more every day, because they were bringing provisions from far away; and (b) they felt contempt  78 See pp. 12–13. 79 For the similarity of the two incidents and this verbal resemblance see Rood, 2004, 372. 80 Cf. Rood, 2004, 372. 81 Cf. Plut. Alc.37.2 who reports that Alcibiades did not leave alone but some men escorted him out of the camp and that he revealed to them that he could force the Lacedaemonians to fight the Athenians unwillingly or to desert their ships with the help of Seuthes and Medocus. Cf. above p. 236 n. 63.

240  Chapter 4: Athens against Lysander at Aegospotami–the end of the war (καταφρονοῦντες) for Lysander, because he did not put out to sea against them (2.1.27). It is obvious that, after the narration of the discussion between Alcibiades and the generals, Xenophon has moved in time one day further, by saying that this was the fifth day of the unsuccessful enterprise of the Athenians to make Lysander fight and that the latter continued his plan of spying on his enemies. Concerning Lysander, there is no doubt that Xenophon by this time increasingly stimulates his readers’ attention about what will happen next. The reaction of the Athenians deserves analysis. No reader could blame the Athenians for their effort to acquire food, since storage of provisions in triremes was minimal.82 On the other hand, none of them discharged this duty, while they did not even come back as fast as they could. This proves that there was no plan and that everyone could leave his post just like that. Moreover, the generals did not take any precautionary measures. More particularly, they should have posted guards to inform the fleet in case of a surprise attack. Xenophon showed at the beginning of his work that guards informed the Athenian generals about Dorieus’ entrance into the Hellespont.83 This lack of measures is surprising. Even worse, in underestimating their enemy the Athenians made a grave mistake, if we take into consideration the concept of καταφρόνησις in the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides has emphasized this several times.84 When the Spartans devastated Attica and the people had become desperate, Pericles used this word twice (καταφρονήματι, καταφρόνησις) and gave it a positive and aggressive sense in order to provide his audience with release from their sufferings, but the Corinthians had warned that contempt (καταφρόνησις) meant blind arrogance (1.122.4, 2.62.3–5).85 Nicias gave a positive meaning to this word (καταφρονήσαντες) in his exhortation speech to his men before the final battle of the Great Harbor at Syracuse (7.63.4). But this was a rhetorical argument86 used because of the seriousness of the moment and not something that he really believed. On the contrary, he had warned his fellow citizens before the Sicilian expedition not to despise (καταφρονήσαντες) the Spartans because of their chance mishaps (6.11.5). Xenophon also emphasizes the gravity of despising the enemy in other episodes in his history: (a) Pharnabazus defeated Agesilaus’ soldiers because they were getting their provisions in a disdainful fashion (καταφρονητικῶς–4.1.17–

 82 See Casson, 1995, 261. 83 See p. 10. Cf. also Xen. 6.2.28–29, where we read that when Iphicrates landed on a hostile shore he set guards against enemy attacks. See Casson, 1995, 268. 84 See Liotsakis, 2017, 143–47. 85 See Allison, 1997, 51–52. For Pericles see also Wohl, 2017, 451. 86 See Hornblower, 2008, 679.

The generals’ reaction: their political and personal motives  241

19); (b) when Struthas observed that the raiding expeditions of Thibron were carried out in a disdainful way (καταφρονητικῶς), he sent his horsemen drawn up in good order and attacked them successfully (4.8.18–19); and (c) Iphicrates exploited the fact that Anaxibius led his army with disdainful confidence (καταφρονήσας) and defeated him (4.8.36–37). On this occasion, the fact that the Athenians underestimated Lysander is contradictory to the previous narrative, where Xenophon insinuated that the Athenians did not have any alternative but waited for Lysander’s response. Such a reaction indicates that every day the Athenians returned they were forgetting their imminent problem, became arrogant and considered Lysander a worthless enemy.87 The use of the general and rather vague term ‘the Athenians’ means that this was the conception of the soldiers, the trierarchs, the generals, i.e. all of them. I have given as the climax the officers of the Athenian fleet, because this is related to the weight of responsibility on them. A few lines earlier Xenophon said that the generals told Alcibiades that they were in charge of the fleet, but now they are completely absent. Xenophon in previous chapters has clearly shown that the generals, not the soldiers, of all cities and not just of Athens, decided when and how to attack an enemy; so it would not be right to put the blame on the crews.88 If readers think that the generals could not find an efficient plan, the generals could have asked for the help of their best trierarchs, pilots and marines whom they knew and discuss with them. Xenophon has mentioned several incidents which point in this direction.89 Last, it would not be illogical to read that at this juncture the generals cooperated with each other and found a common plan of

 87 This is the meaning of this word in Greek thought. Cf. Thuc. 2.62.4, Arist. Rhet.1378b15–17, Theoph. 24.1. 88 In the battle of Rhoiteium the generals gave the order for putting out against Dorieus (1.1.2). Before the fight at Cyzicus Alcibiades called an assembly, where he informed the troops of impending dangers, and then he prepared them for a naval battle and put to sea (1.1.14–16). The Syracusan generals told their soldiers to respond like brave men to whatever orders they received from their replacements and reminded them that they had won many times, because they were under their command (1.1.27–28). 89 (a) Hermocrates used to talk with his trierarchs every day in the morning and in the evening during his office (1.1.30); (b) Pharnabazus called together not only the Spartan generals but also the trierarchs (1.1.25); (c) Hermon, the helmsman of Callicratidas, gave him the advice to sail away, because the Athenian triremes were much more numerous (1.6.32); and (d) the Arginousai generals gave specific orders to their trierarchs Theramenes and Thrasybulus to collect the shipwrecked men, because they considered them competent (1.6.35, 7.5).

242  Chapter 4: Athens against Lysander at Aegospotami–the end of the war action, since Xenophon mentioned in other parts of his work that it was necessary for the commanders to cooperate with each in order to defeat the enemy.90 Consequently, for Xenophon there are two main points in regard to the Athenian side: (a) the generals did not have any plan for fighting Lysander; and (b) they did not impose any discipline on their men, although they were responsible for that. These serious mistakes inescapably foreshadow the final result which comes in the narrative immediately afterwards.

. Lysander’s attack When Lysander saw the signal of his scout ships, he immediately launched an attack at full speed (τὴν ταχίστην πλεῖν), while Thorax, who was in command of the foot soldiers (Θώραξ τὸ πεζὸν ἔχων), followed him. In the Athenian camp, when Conon saw the attack, he signaled to the ships to go into action as quickly as possible. But, because the men were scattered (διεσκεδασμένων), the ships had on board only the sections of oarsmen trained to row in pairs or only sections of men trained to row in single file, while some had neither.91 Conon’s ship and seven others put to sea with him (ἁθρόαι) with full complements of rowers and the Paralus as well. Lysander captured the rest of the Athenian ships on the shore (ἐν τῇ γῇ). He also took prisoner the majority of the Athenian soldiers, but some fled (ἔφυγον) into small fortresses in the area (2.1.28). Other references in Xenophon’s works to the importance of speed allow us to think that Lysander would be victorious.92 Lysander also planned a double attack, from the land also, with the support of Thorax. Xenophon mentioned earlier that Lysander took with him the troops of the Abydians and other allies, who had followed Thorax (παρῆσαν  90 The Athenian generals’ attack on Dorieus (1.1.2) is an indication that they cooperated with each other and that this was a common decision. After the battle of Abydus the Athenian generals went outside the Hellespont, while Thrasyllus, one of them, sailed to Athens to inform the citizens and ask for military help (1.1.8). Xenophon also implies cooperation between the generals before the sailing of the fleet to Proconnesus (1.1.11–13) and the attack on Andros (1.4.21–22). Last, cooperation between the generals is taken for granted in the battle of Arginousai, where Xenophon even reports the exact position of each general in the formation and explains why they were arranged in this way (1.6.31). 91 This is the meaning of the words δίκροτοι–μονόκροτοι–κεναί regarding the Athenian triremes. See Jordan, 2000, 88. 92 In 6.4.21 Xenophon praises the military skills of Jason of Pherai, saying that many times speed (τὸ τάχος) could achieve more than violence. Anab.1.5.9 reports the thought of Cyrus, who planned to attack his brother Artaxerxes: he believed that the faster (θᾶττον) he moved against him the more unprepared (ἀπαρασκευαστοτέρῳ) the king would be to fight.

Lysander’s attack  243

ἡγεῖτο δὲ Θώραξ–2.1.18). Now he shows why Lysander wanted Thorax; he would participate in Lysander’s attack against the Athenians. In the other camp the only general who perceived that Lysander was attacking them was Conon. This implies that all the other generals were absolutely careless. Because of the irresponsibility of the Athenian commanders the crews of the ships were captured and only nine out of one hundred and eighty ships managed to escape. The use of the words διεσκεδασμέναι and άθρόαι leads readers to make a comparison of the present battle with other battles that Xenophon has already mentioned: (a) in the naval battle at Arginousai Callicratidas’ ships fought in close order (ἁθρόαι) in the beginning, but then spread out (1.6.33); and (b) Thrasyllus was defeated in Lydia because his men were διεσκεδασμένοι from the camp (1.2.5). Thus the contrast in the meaning between these two words foreshadows the result, which is the same in both cases, i.e. the scattered fleets lost the fights; so inevitably the same happened here. This is striking compared to Xenophon’s previous report that the Athenians prepared themselves everyday ὡς εἰς ναυμαχίαν (2.1.23). However, in the moment of action Xenophon deliberately omits to use the word ναυμαχία in order to indicate that there was no real naval engagement between the two fleets which would justify the use of this word. 93 He shows ironically the inconsistency between intentions and results.94 This battle is the inversion of the battle at Cyzicus, because in this one Lysander captured most of the Athenians ἐν τῇ γῇ and achieved a great victory while at Cyzicus Mindarus died fighting ἐν τῇ γῇ and the Spartans suffered a heavy defeat (1.1.18). This result occurred because Lysander exploited the contempt of the Athenians. His tactic was a clever Spartan tactic already applied in the Peloponnesian War, as Thucydides shows. Brasidas had said to his men that many times a smaller army could be a better match for a larger force, which despised (καταφρονοῦντας) their opponent and were caught unprepared by him (2.11.4–5). Xenophon confirms Brasidas’ claim because Lysander’s force was smaller than that of the Athenians. Taking into consideration that the Spartan educational system taught young men to think and act like foxes,95 readers can have no doubt

 93 See Kapellos, 2012, 97–98. 94 For irony in Xenophon see also above p. 114. 95 For the training of the Spartans as foxes see Vernant, 1991, 242 and David, 1993, 393–413 especially 396, 403–05 for his analysis of Xenophon’s texts in regard to Spartan hunting. In Plut. Lys.7.4 and Lac.Apophth.229b5, Lysander himself said that Spartans should behave like foxes abroad. Note also that the Athenians equated their enemies with this animal (see the soothsayer Hierocles who alludes to the Spartans as ‘little foxes… with treacherous souls, treacherous minds (Aristoph. Peace 1067–68).

244  Chapter 4: Athens against Lysander at Aegospotami–the end of the war that Lysander resembled this animal that concealed itself before it attacked96 and not a rabbit. The Athenians forgot that a hound should not hunt foxes because this could be ruinous.97 In my opinion, there is no better way to explain what Lysander did at Aegospotami than to remember the words of Brasidas that the most successful general was the one who discerned most clearly the mistakes of his enemy (Thuc. 5.9.5). Moreover, if we compare Xenophon’s narrative with Thucydides we realize that Lysander achieved the greatest military victory in the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides says that the Syracusans and their allies aimed at capturing the whole Athenian army in the Sicilian war so that nobody could escape either on the sea or on the land (μήτε διὰ θαλάσσης μήτε τῷ πεζῷ, διαφυγεῖν– 7.59.2). It is important to mention at this moment that Xenophon presents Lysander not only as the architect of the plan but also as the sole man responsible for its completion. Although Thorax and his land forces participated in the attack, the infantry forces disappear after the last notice and Lysander appears as the ultimate victor. At this point it is worth reading 2.1.16–28 again and observing that Xenophon puts emphasis on ‘Lysander’, but not on ‘Lysander and his men’ or on ‘the Spartans’. The wording of the text is striking: in 2.1.17–19 we read Λύσανδρος ἐκπλεῖ–παρέπλει–ἀφῆκε, while in the looting of Lampsacus Xenophon specifies that διήρπασαν οἱ στρατιῶται. In 2.1.22–24 and 27–28 we read again that Λύσανδρος ἐσήμηνεν–παρασκευασάμενος–παραβάλλων–προεῖπεν–ἐκέλευσεν– ἐξεβίβασεν–εἶπε–οὐκ ἀντανῆγεν–ἐσήμηνε–ἔλαβε–συνέλεξεν. In all these cases it is not Lysander alone who sails or prepares everything for naval battle or puts up the side-screens, but it is his men who do that; but in this way Xenophon maximizes his success. The only exception to this manner of writing is in 2.1.25, where Alcibiades talks in general about τοὺς πολεμίους. One question which we could logically ask here is: why did Lysander wait for five days until he launched his attack, since his crews were so disciplined, while the Athenians were not? The four-day delay before action in Lysander’s and Dercylidas’ incidents (3.1.17–18) has made modern researchers believe that this is ‘almost certainly a storyteller’s convention’ or ‘looks like a storyteller’s convention’.98 I may say that I agree more with the opinion that Lysander’s case looks like a storyteller’s convention than with the opinion that is almost certainly one. But before coming to any conclusions, I shall focus on another incident from

 96 For a description of a fox’s mind and tactic before attacking see Detienne and Vernant, 1991, 34–36. 97 Note that this was Xenophon’s advice in regard to dogs and foxes (Cyneg.6.3). 98 See Gray, 1989, 148, Krentz, 1989b, 176 respectively.

Lysander’s attack  245

Book 1, and argue that through this emphasis on the timetable of the battle Xenophon wanted to show that: (a) patience was a permanent trait of Lysander’s character; and (b) by means of that he made the Athenians’ lack of provisions worse and lulled them into careless contempt. Xenophon has shown in his narrative of the meeting between Cyrus and Lysander that Lysander’s patience and ingenious ability to grasp the right moment and take all he wanted was a clear lesson teaching that a good commander would have to wait.99 So we must not find it surprising that Lysander was patient once again. In fact, his patience in regard to the issue of securing the Persian money for his fleet would have been useless if he did not show the same trait a few moments before the final conflict. Thus through the story of Lysander and Cyrus which has paved the way for Lysander’s ability to wait, Xenophon prepares his readers to accept it as something to be expected. Coming to Dercylidas now, I may remark that Xenophon likes to specify the time this general needed to accomplish some of his enterprises; so he says that Dercylidas took over nine cities by their own consent in one day (3.1.16). In 3.1.17– 18 he sheds more light on Dercylidas’ skills and says that he did not attack Cebre, because the sacrifices he made were not auspicious for four days. A man called Athenadas thought that Dercylidas was acting foolishly by wasting time for sacrifice; thus he attempted to cut off the Cebrenians’ water supply. However, he failed because the men from the city came out, wounded him and killed some of his men. After some little time things changed, because heralds from the city said that they wanted to be reconciled with the Greeks, while a messenger of the commander of the city said that he also agreed with what his fellow citizens had just said. It is noteworthy that Xenophon does not say that Dercylidas immediately accepted the proposal of these men. Instead, he repeats that Dercylidas sacrificed that day again, the fifth day since he had started the siege, and only when the sacrifices became favourable did he lead his men toward the gates. In this incident Xenophon insinuates then that respect for the omens of the gods was always necessary,100 emphasizes Dercylidas’ patience and creates once again a contrast between the impatient and the patient military commander. Whether we read the Hellenica from the beginning to the end or vice versa, the case of Lysander strengthens Dercylidas’ attitude and vice versa, while the meaning is one and very specific: a general had to wait if he wanted to succeed in war. The four days’ delay of the two generals could be interpreted just as a

 99 Cf. Gray, 1989, 16. 100 For this issue see Kane, 1990, 4.

246  Chapter 4: Athens against Lysander at Aegospotami–the end of the war coincidence. Therefore Xenophon has created a specific picture of the good general through his presentation of Lysander: (a) he secured provisions for his soldiers by anchoring in a safe harbor; (b) he devised a good and intelligent plan which made his enemies undisciplined; and (c) he imposed order and discipline on his army. Turning to the Athenian camp, we may wonder: why was it only Conon who took notice of the attack and why was it only he who escaped? Gray has argued that “the story of how Conon broke the blockade of his fleet by Callicratidas at Mytilene (1.6.19–22) and the story of how Lysander won the battle of Aegospotami employ a ‘common pattern of action’ because of their many similarities.”101 Although there is no doubt about the similarities between the two episodes, there are also important differences: (a) Conon is besieged by land and sea in Mytilene, while there is no siege at Aegospotami; (b) he launches only two ships in the first incident as a preplanned plan, while his escape from Aegospotami is not described as such; (c) the Spartan blockaders at Mytilene ὀλιγώρως εἷχον when the Athenian ships tried to escape, while at Aegospotami it is the Athenians who are καταφρονοῦντες τοῦ Λυσάνδρου; the second feeling is more serious for the outcome of the battle; and (d) in the first event the Spartans fought against one of the two escaping ships, captured it and brought it back to their camp, while in the second the Spartans captured almost all the Athenian fleet, which did not even have the time to embark on its ships. But regardless of whether we put more emphasis on the common and uncommon elements of the two incidents or not, I suspect that through their combination Xenophon has something more to say about Conon and his military abilities: he proved himself the only efficient general in contrast to all the others, who did not even have a counter plan of action at this final moment, and thus have disappeared from the narrative. On the other hand, Conon comes to the fore only at the time of the attack and because of his success in escaping Xenophon follows his steps. He reports that when Conon, who was leaving (φεύγων) with the nine ships, realized that all was lost for Athens , he put in at Abarnis and seized the main sails of Lysander’s ships (τὰ μεγάλα τῶν Λυσάνδρου νεῶν ἱστία). Then he sailed (ἀπέπλευσε) to Evagoras in Cyprus with the eight vessels which escaped, while the Paralus went to Athens to announce the news (2.1.29). As in Alcibiades’ case, Xenophon seems to ‘watch’ the destruction of the Athenian camp from Conon’s ships and reports his thoughts. This selective narration indicates that Conon: (a) remained calm even  101 See Gray, 1989, 146–47. One more common element is that the Athenians tried to escape when it was day in Mytilene, while Lysander attacked during the day too, as the report of the raising of the shields shows.

Lysander, Philocles, Adeimantus and the execution of the Athenian prisoners  247

at this juncture; (b) still wanted to resist the Spartans; (c) when he realized that he could not go back and overturn the situation, secured his own safety by hampering a possible pursuit by Lysander;102 and (d) finally sailed to Cyprus. Conon’s decision not to return to Athens could be explained as an inescapable solution after the execution of the generals of Arginousai. The fact that he went (ἀπέπλευσε) to Evagoras in Cyprus is less easy to explain. Considering that Xenophon says that (a) the exiled Syracusan generals went wherever they wanted to go (1.1.29), and (b) Protomachus and Aristogenes did not return to Athens (1.7.2), but Conon sailed towards the king of Cyprus, this implies that he knew that he could find a safe shelter there.103 Moreover, given that Alcibiades waited for the moment to return home,104 readers can suspect that Conon would wait for the day when his fellow citizens would accept him back in the city.105 Last, I will conclude Xenophon’s reference to Conon and remind my readers of my previous analysis of Conon’s unsuccessful attempts to destroy Lysander and the author’s deliberate omission.106 Now it is time to suggest that Xenophon preferred to hide that old failure, because Conon was the only general who showed some signs of resistance to Lysander at Aegospotami and saved his own life. In this way he preserves the general good impression he has created about Conon here. However, even through Conon’s action Xenophon implicitly reminds his readers that the victor of Aegospotami was Lysander. The last proof of Lysander’s plan to fight the Athenians comes when Xenophon reports that Conon seized the main sails of Lysander’s ships. We must remember that Xenophon said that before Alcibiades attacked Mindarus he removed τὰ μεγάλα ἱστία of his triremes (1.1.13).

. Lysander, Philocles, Adeimantus and the execution of the Athenian prisoners Xenophon devotes the rest of his account to the fate of the prisoners. Lysander took the ships and the captives to Lampsacus, including Philocles, Adeimantus  102 As Krentz, 1989b, 179 comments. 103 Note that Alcibiades ἀπέπλευσεν to his fortress in the Chersonese (1.5.17). 104 Cf. 1.4.8: ᾿Αλκιβιάδης δὲ βουλόμενος μετὰ τῶν στρατιωτῶν ἀποπλεῖν οἴκαδε. 105 Xenophon’s audience reads later on that Conon along with Pharnabazus defeated the Persians in the battle of Cnidus (4.3.11–12), that he returned home (ᾤχετο ἐπ’ οἴκου ἀποπλέων–4.8.8) to rebuild the Long Walls (4.8.9–10) and that the Athenians appointed him an ambassador in Tiribazus (4.8.13). 106 See pp. 228–29.

248  Chapter 4: Athens against Lysander at Aegospotami–the end of the war and the other generals. He assembled the allies there and told them to consult about the defeated. Xenophon’s emphasis on Philocles and Adeimantus107 at the beginning of the paragraph works as a prelude to the continuation of a narrative whose events took place in the past and which indicates the historian’s moral view of the past.108 Xenophon disregards as unimportant the other things that Sparta’s allies said in this congress with the sentence ἐλέγετο δὲ καὶ ἄλλα πολλά109 and focuses on the two main accusations. The allies accused the Athenians that: (a) at Philocles’ instigation they voted that if they won the naval battle they would cut off the right hand of anyone captured alive; and (b) when they captured one Andrian and one Corinthian trireme they threw their crews overboard. For these reasons the allies sentenced all the captives to death except for Adeimantus (πλὴν ᾿Αδειμάντου) who alone (μόνος) had objected in the assembly to Philocles’ brutal decree (2.1.30–32). It is worth beginning my analysis by commenting on the decree. Xenophon’s mention of it recalls other decrees mentioned by Thucydides. When the Mytileneans revolted from the Athenians, the Athenians decided by a decree to put to death the adult male population of Mytilene and make slaves of the women and children. Fortunately for the Mytileneans, the Athenians changed their minds and after Diodotus’ speech based on expediency (Thuc. 3.47.5) a ship arrived in time before Paches was able to carry out the decree (Thuc. 3.49.4), and saved the lives of some. Some years later, when the people of Scione revolted against Athens, the Athenians voted a brutal decree on the same scale, that is, to recapture the city and put to death all its inhabitants (Thuc. 4.122.6), which they finally carried into effect (Thuc. 5.32.1).110 What is common in all these cases is the Athenians’ determination on violence and disrespect for human life. At this point it is  107 2.1.30: ἔλαβε δὲ καὶ τῶν στρατηγῶν ἄλλους τε καὶ Φιλοκλέα καὶ ᾿Αδείμαντον. Cf. Denniston, 1954, 511–13. 108 For Xenophon’s moral conception of the past and how this affects his temporal organization of the past cf. Golfin, 2003, 84: ‘L’organisation temporelle de la narration prouve que ce qui importe à l’historien, ce n’est pas l’ordre des faits, mais les liens que les faits entretiennent les uns avec les autres, – liens de cause à effet, d’où les retours en arrière dans le temps, liens thématiques, par lesquels on saisit les relations … d’hostilité qui existent entre les responsables politiques et militaires grecs ou barbares’. I shall argue that Golfin’s opinion about Xenophon applies to the passages under discussion here. 109 Cf. Lys. 12.74: Lysander spoke in the Assembly and ἄλλα τε πολλὰ εἶπε. Cf. also Diod. 17.14.3, who concludes the narration of the accusations by the Congressmen against the Thebans for their rebellion against Alexander, saying: πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα διελθόντες παρώξυναν τὰς τῶν συνέδρων ψυχὰς κατὰ τῶν Θηβαίων καὶ πέρας ἐψηφίσαντο. 110 Cf. Panagopoulos, 1978, 105: ‘it is remarkable that they [the Athenians] did not change their mind in more than two years’ time, although Cleon, who inspired such a resolution, was dead’.

Lysander, Philocles, Adeimantus and the execution of the Athenian prisoners  249

worth considering this Assembly decision with the decision to execute the generals of Arginousai. The short treatment of this Assembly decision prompted by Philocles proves that Xenophon did not regard it as of the same importance as the execution of the generals.111 Nevertheless, what is common to them is the Athenians’ treatment of people, because, if the Arginousai decision proves the Athenian departure from philanthropy towards its own citizens,112 it evolved into misanthropy towards the other Greeks. For these acts Sparta’s allies considered the Athenians and not Philocles responsible. This is certain because the subject of all verbs and participles in the text is ‘the Athenians’ not ‘Philocles’: [᾿Αθηναίοι] παρενενομήκεσαν– ἐψηφισμένοι–κρατήσειαν–λαβόντες–κατακρημνίσειαν. Taking into consideration these facts and that the Athenians called their political mistreatment of the other Greeks ὕβρις a little after the defeat (2.2.10), it is logical to think that Xenophon reported Philocles’ decree and the killing of the Peloponnesian captives as the final examples of their arrogance just a moment before the end.113 Moreover, this detailed description of the responsibility of the Athenians also implies Xenophon’s own opinion. I argued in my analysis of the Arginousai trial that Xenophon implicitly urged his readers to regard the demos as responsible for the condemnation of the generals and not Callixenus.114 Now Xenophon urges us to remember the Athenian ideology according to which the citizens were responsible for their actions,115 which means that the decision for the mutilation of the Peloponnesians was a conscious one. If we want to assess what Xenophon’s readers would think about the Athenians’ decision to mutilate their enemies, we can say that, although the Greeks were capable of doing such a brutal deed, this should have been incompatible with Greek values.116 At the same time Xenophon’s mention of this decree at this point in the narrative has a literary function,

 111 Cf. Rahn’s analysis of the Arginousai trial (1971, 502–505). 112 Gray, 1989, 83–91 has shown through Euryptolemus’ speech the Athenian departure from philanthropy towards its own citizens. 113 Wylie, 1986, 126 says but without any argument that the Athenian Assembly had ‘in desperation’ passed the decree. I could find one argument to support Wylie, borrowing it from Kagan, 1987, 395: ‘that cruel proposal was made in anger at the deserters from the Athenian fleet who were swelling the ranks of the enemy’. But it is difficult to explain why the Athenians wanted to take revenge on their deserters by punishing the enemies of the city. 114 See p. 210. 115 cf. Thuc. 2.40.2–3, [Arist]. Ath.Pol.41.2, [Andoc]. 4.12. 116 Herodotus points to this interpretation by telling us after Plataia that the Spartan king Pausanias was tempted by an Aeginetan to mutilate the corpse of Mardonius, but found the strength to refuse with noble words of indignation (Hdt. 9.78–9).

250  Chapter 4: Athens against Lysander at Aegospotami–the end of the war i.e. its content illustrates the discrepancy between what was expected to happen and what actually occurred. Thus its effect is ironic. Xenophon seems to follow Thucydides who cited the content of several documents in Books 4 and 5 for the same reason.117 Philocles’ role in Xenophon’s text emerges clearly at this moment.118 I stressed earlier the Athenians’ determination on brutality and misanthropy through the voting of Philocles’ decree. Now readers realize that this determination was shown when Philocles committed one more crime, independent of the decree, i.e. the killing of the defenseless Andrian and Corinthian captives.119 Then, if we think again about Alcibiades’ presence in the Athenian camp, we can imagine why Philocles rejected his offer: a general such as him, who had so arrogant a plan and had made such large promises to his fellow citizens, could not accept the help of an ἑκούσιος fugitive.120 Moreover, we must remember that Alcibiades had failed to capture Andros,121 so Philocles’ decision to throw the crews of an Andrian ship overboard showed that he was better than Alcibiades and that he was determined to kill anyone opposed to Athens. Last, it is now understandable why there was no cooperation between Philocles and Adeimantus. On the other hand, it is apparent that Philocles was not as good as he thought he was, because at the time of the stalemate he did not do anything. Because of all these defaults he ended up a prisoner. Thus for a second time Xenophon creates an ironic contrast of expectation and reality in order to castigate Philocles as a demagogue and an inhumane and incompetent general.122 In fact, it is safe to say that Xenophon wanted his readers to compare his account with Thucydides and classify Philocles among the politicians whom his predecessor considered inferior to Pericles (2.65.5, 7–10), because instead of suggesting

 117 Connor, 1984, 146–47 has argued that the content of the documents of books 4 and 5 of Thucydides illustrates the discrepancy between what was anticipated to happen and what actually occurred and thus creates irony. 118 Cf. de Jong, 2007, 4: “analepsis fills in the background of characters and the ‘prehistory’ of the narrative we read”. 119 This crime must be considered independent of Philocles’ decree, since it occurred after his departure from Athens. Therefore Kagan, 1987, 395 rightly says that ‘with the killing of the captives Philocles went beyond his cruel law’, but Henderson, 1973, 477 cannot be right in saying that the Athenian general ‘carried this policy of brutality to its logical conclusion by killing by putting to death the crews of the two ships’ (my emphasis). 120 See pp. 95–96. 121 See above, pp. 78–79. 122 See Kapellos, 2012, 98–99.

Lysander, Philocles, Adeimantus and the execution of the Athenian prisoners  251

a realistic plan, which would lead to the defeat of the Peloponnesians, he made his fellow citizens overconfident. Xenophon does not forget to remind us that Philocles was not alone on the expedition. The other generals were equally responsible. With the exception of Adeimantus, the fact that they assumed the command under the obligation to enforce their colleague’s decree insinuates that they silently approved it. Moreover, the fact that, Adeimantus included, they allowed Philocles to kill the crews of two enemy ships, means that they could not be absolved of all responsibility for this incident. This was guilt by association. Finally, a few words must be said about Adeimantus. Xenophon’s wording for Adeimantus reminds us of his praise of Socrates, who alone disagreed with the Assemblymen’s wish to convict the generals (πλὴν Σωκράτους–1.7.15).123 Because of Adeimantus’ reaction to the brutal decree of his fellow citizens, it is safe to argue that Xenophon praises his determination to disagree. And because of this resistance to the judgement of his colleagues the allies spared Adeimantus’ life. However, all the rest were butchered. It is interesting that Xenophon moves his readers to a later moment in time and stresses that not all Athenians remembered Adeimantus’ stance in that session of the Assembly. On the contrary (μέντοι), Adeimantus was accused by some men (ὑπό τινων) of betraying the ships, thus turning him into a scapegoat.124 Given that Xenophon has already used this manner of writing to depreciate the anonymous speaker in the Arginousai trial (τις–1.7.11),125 we can be quite certain that he is expressing his disapproval of those who blamed Adeimantus.126 Moreover, this is borne out by Xenophon’s account, which does not justify the opinion that Adeimantus could have betrayed the fleet.127 Thus we can be certain that this accusation was not substantive. Moreover, by this reference at this point in the narrative Xenophon stresses how easily some of his fellow citizens quickly sought a scapegoat for their own mistakes at Aegospotami. A new conspiracy theory was about to begin in Athens. Xenophon completes the narrative by presenting Lysander as repeating to Philocles only the second accusation of the allies, that of throwing overboard the Andrian and Corinthian crews, by questioning him, and then killing him. At a first glance, it is easy to say that Lysander respected his men’s wish; but, in my  123 See p. 174. 124 See Kapellos, 2009, 257. 125 See pp. 163–64. 126 Note that Xenophon in Cyneg.12.10 expresses his disagreement with those who say that one should not like hunting because it leads a man to neglect his domestic affairs, not naming them but referring to them vaguely as τινες. 127 See Kapellos, 2009, 258–59, 261–62.

252  Chapter 4: Athens against Lysander at Aegospotami–the end of the war opinion, this cannot be the whole truth. Due has argued that although Xenophon does not explicitly say in his narrative that Lysander supported the regime of the Thirty his name serves in the account as a framework for the establishment of the oligarchs.128 I believe that what we have here is a structural coincidence, i.e. Lysander’s name serves in the text as a framework for the slaughter: Xenophon first reports that Lysander ordered (ἐκέλευσε) the congress of the allies and that at the end he started the slaughter (ἀπέσφαξεν). The fact that he kept the initiative before and after the meeting in combination with the lethal decision of the allies reasserts his personal agency in the naval battle and underlines that the meeting of the allies was merely a means of achieving his own goal. If this is not correct, I cannot explain why Xenophon focused so much on Lysander, but let his readers believe at the end of the story that the crews themselves took the decisions, while Lysander remains absent in this part of the account. Therefore, it is better to think that Lysander was competent not only to impose discipline on his men but also to impose his own will through his men’s vote. Xenophon chose to display his military talent even after the engagement at Aegospotami. The narration of this episode in the Hellespont presents Lysander as the architect of the Spartan victory.

. Lysander after the defeat–the reaction of the Athenians Lysander’s role did not end here. The Athenians’ crimes against the Greeks gave him the opportunity to prove that Sparta was the liberator of Greece by inflicting capital punishment on the captives (2.1.30–32). Then Lysander left Sthenelaus the Laconian as governor of Byzantium and Calchedon (2.2.2). This act allows Xenophon’s readers to suspect that he was repaying charis to those fellow Spartans who had mutinied against Callicratidas.129 Then Xenophon indicates Lysander’s prestige after his victory by reporting the response to this success both in Sparta and Athens. This recalls Callicratidas’ ambition to have a major role in Greek politics after the end of the war.130 In regard to Sparta, we learn that the Lacedaimonians trusted Lysander so much that he and Agis in close cooperation blockaded Athens.131 At this juncture for the defeated city the Athenians believed that Lysander’s influence on Spartan politics was so great that they approved

 128 See Due, 1987, 59. 129 See p. 101. 130 See p. 112. 131 See Kapellos, 2010, 1–2.

Lysander after the defeat–the reaction of the Athenians  253

Theramenes’ proposal to send him to Lysander and ask for Lysander’s intervention in regard to the terms of their surrender (2.1.16–17). But Lysander was clever enough not to interfere. He never believed, like Callicratidas, that he should reconcile the two cities and turn against Sparta given that his fellow citizens did not believe it either.132 Then Xenophon brings Lysander’s prestige to its climax by reporting that the Spartans sent him to accept the official surrender of Athens and thus give the impression to the allies133 that Sparta really was the liberator of Greece (2.2.23). In this spirit we could also explain the outcome of the siege of Samos, the only city that did not revolt from Athens: in the beginning the people did not want to surrender, but when they saw that Lysander was going to capture their city they were afraid and gave in on the terms that they would leave them unharmed (2.3.6). Lysander made the Greeks believe for the last time that Sparta wanted to liberate all the Greeks. Nonetheless, Xenophon makes us suspect that this was not his only motive, since he appointed ten rulers to guard Samos (2.3.7). Up to this point readers realize the military and diplomatic mastery of Lysander and have forgotten the role of Persia’s money in this war. This constitutes the last information in the narrative concerning the war. Xenophon concludes that Lysander filled the public treasury of Sparta with four hundred and seventy talents, an amount which was almost the amount the King had given to help them in this war.134 We have already read twice that Lysander had paid the wages of his crews;135 so it is logical to believe that he had taken more than this amount and had spent some of it. On the other hand, since Xenophon has also told us that Cyrus had given him his περιττὰ χρήματα too (2.1.14), we could suspect that the navarch had spent only that money. Whatever we guess about the Persian money, what matters is that the Spartans accepted it, which is a proof that they did not share Callicratidas’ opinion for a moment that the money would be unwelcome.136 Lysander was the general they needed in order to win the war. On the Athenian side, Xenophon considered it very important to report that after the arrival of the Paralus the citizens were frightened about their prospective punishment (2.2.3, 2.2.10). Xenophon has shown that Alcibiades and his fellow soldiers did not believe that they would lose the war only because of the Persian

 132 Sparta’s remembrance of the Persian wars was hypocritical. See Kapellos, 2010, 2–3. 133 For this point see Kapellos, 2012, 132–38. 134 See pp. 79–80. 135 See pp. 82, 219. 136 See p. 113.

254  Chapter 4: Athens against Lysander at Aegospotami–the end of the war money.137 The Athenians who stayed back in the city also had the same opinion. Thus it is no surprise that no Athenian said that they were defeated because of Persia’s financial support to Sparta. The inclusion of such an idea would be useless and Xenophon knew that. Instead, he is keen to point out that despite their defeat in the war the Athenians did not engage in self-criticism again. As when some Athenians considered Alcibiades responsible for the city’s misfortunes, and all of them regarded Callixenus as responsible for the condemnation of the generals and not themselves, once again the Athenians were ready to find a new scapegoat in the person of Adeimantus. Combining the common reaction of the Athenians to the city’s mistakes, readers realize that the demos always thought it was blameless. Xenophon has shown to his audience that this opinion was wrong. Such writing proves that Xenophon did not excuse his fellow citizens for their mistakes.

 137 See pp. 17–18.

Chapter 5: Conclusion Xenophon as a historian Xenophon demands a sensitive and intelligent audience able to respond to the complexities of his intellectually stimulating work which gives lessons about good and bad military leadership. The topics which form the analytical core of Books 1 and 2 of the Hellenica are the progress of the Peloponnesian War (the causes and the conduct of the individual battles), the role of the leading personalities, the intentions of diplomacy, the reasons for Sparta’s success and Athens’ failure. Xenophon’s readers realize that Athens’ defeat in the Peloponnesian war is a procession of events whose origins can be traced and understood.1 We cannot understand Xenophon without considering Thucydides. Xenophon emphasizes some episodes at length, while in other cases he minimizes the importance of events by the brevity of his treatment (the opinion of the mob about Alcibiades in comparison with Alcibiades’ speech in the Council and the Assembly, Euryptolemus’ lengthy speech). He has selected and ordered his events in his own way and through the use of various literary techniques in order to mention and thereby commemorate what he considers commendable and reprehensible in regard to the military commanders of the Peloponnesian War. Treating his protagonists Xenophon does not explicitly praise or blame either of them, but lets events speak for themselves so that he will appear just in his evaluation.2 Behind his cool and distant style stands a passionate individual who writes about the most important events of the final years of the Peloponnesian War, about the destruction of his city and the gloomy rise of Sparta as the leading power of the Greek world. Xenophon guides his readers towards an unfavorable opinion by means of contrast with some other individuals, such as the Syracusan generals, whose actions in the same situation are seen to be praiseworthy or above reproach. It is only after a very careful reading of his work that the reader realizes that in some cases the Hellenica is less transparently honest than it seems, but, obviously, this kind of writing proves that Xenophon believed that he was fulfilling his educative role more efficiently. Persian money seems to be one of the themes which give Books 1–2 a unity of purpose and design. In regard to Athens, Xenophon shows the obstacles that Persian money created for the development of the war. Thus he is not in full  1 Cf. Kelly, 1996, 160: ‘Xenophon’s Hellenica is not ramshackle but put together with care’ (my emphasis). 2 Note that Lucian Hist.Cons.39 calls Xenophon ‘just in his evaluation of the individuals’. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110668315-006

256  Chapter 5: Conclusion agreement with Thucydides, who said that the Persian involvement was not decisive for the outcome of the Peloponnesian War. On the other hand, Xenophon agrees with Thucydides that the King’s supply of money to Sparta was not the only reason for the city’s defeat. For him the Athenians were overthrown by their own internal dissensions, that is, because of their bad relationship with Alcibiades, their condemnation of the Arginousai generals and Lysander’s military talent. Xenophon creates a consistent picture of Alcibiades as keen for Athens to succeed through his efforts. Xenophon presents him as the sole architect of Athens’ military enterprises and the leader that Athens needed to defeat Sparta regardless of the effort and cooperation of the rest of the generals. His long account of the deeds of Thrasyllus serves as an implicit contrast between him and Alcibiades and makes the latter’s superiority appear more clearly. Alcibiades was a man of outstanding qualities and actions, an intelligent and efficient general, who had the ability to collect money for Athens even without making war in many cases, and made the Athenians believe that nothing was lost. However, his dubious past, i.e. his betrayal to Sparta and his self-interest, haunted him. Thus the defeat of the fleet at Notium which occurred for no very good reason proved the mutual mistrust between the demos and Alcibiades and turned him into an eternal exile. Athens’ great chance to win the war was the victory at Arginousai. Xenophon illustrates the hurried decision of the Athenians to depose the generals and emphasizes that the Arginousai trial was wrongly handled, although the generals were telling the truth about their failure to save the shipwrecked at Arginousai. Xenophon castigates Archedemus for his demagogic methods against Erasinides. This is the only moment in the account of the trial when the historian indicates the financial problems in Athens. Then he describes in detail the conspiracy of Theramenes through the fake mourners and the cooperation of the unscrupulous Callixenus to convict the generals. The demos believed that the generals had let their crews drown because they wanted to harm the Athenian democracy. The demos was ready to take revenge for the loss of the crews, violating its law, and was transformed into a mob and a tyrant. Xenophon provides exempla of men which show that he took a pessimistic view of human nature and therefore of politics. Some individuals, such as the generals of Arginousai, by their moral qualities are entitled to positions of leadership and power. But the immorality of some others, such as Theramenes, makes power dangerous and corrupting, which leads to immoral behavior, and then to civil strife, war and destruction. Xenophon emphasizes the manipulation of the

Xenophon as a historian  257

democratic processes, the dangers of demagogic persuasion in the Athenian democracy. Xenophon’s narrative and the consistent view of the generals about what had happened indicate that they were telling the truth and that he approved their stance. Xenophon’s whole point is that the episode was unreasonable but it nonetheless happened because it was a piece of bizarre stasis or a symptom of a dangerously stasis-riven community. Xenophon makes it clear that the final defeat was the Athenians’ mistake. This mistake had already started earlier, when the Athenians unjustly executed the generals of Arginousai. The connection between the battle of Arginousai and the battle of Aegospotami is tight. Moreover, Xenophon makes an implicit comment on the issues of the successes and failures of the Athenian commanders and their fellow citizens’ reaction. Alcibiades leaves, two of the Arginousai generals do not return, Conon does not return. Xenophon shows the responsibility of the Athenian demos for its defeat in the Peloponnesian War in three time levels, which, although they seem to be separate, interweave temporally and thematically with each other. The first occurence is after his account of the trial of Arginousai, where he simply mentions that the Athenians elected new generals, but their responsibility becomes evident before, during and after the defeat of the fleet in the Hellespont. The second comes in his account of the Athenian assembly concerning Philocles’ decree, where he reports the response of the demos to it after the defeat of the fleet and during the meeting of the Spartan victors about their fate; while the third comes as a prolepsis during the same meeting of the victors again, but it concerns the Athenian reaction after Adeimantos’ return to the city. Thus Xenophon deliberately connects past, present and future in a literary way in order to show the political disintegration of his city. It is also striking that several incidents in Xenophon’s account of Athens’ political life reveal that Athens suffered from stasis: Alcibiades’ fear that his enemies would attempt to kill him in order to take revenge; the approval by the mob of the zero-sum game of the elite and their active participation in this struggle, although it knew that this would end in destruction; Alcibiades’ advice to Tissaphernes not to let the Greeks become powerful but to keep all of them weak by making strife among them; Theramenes’ determination to have the Arginousai generals executed even if this could mean the defeat of Athens in the Peloponnesian War; the Arginousai trial itself, which proves that Athens suffered from stasis. Regarding Sparta, Xenophon indicates through the report of Boeotius’ return from Persia that it needed the money of the Persian empire in order to win the

258  Chapter 5: Conclusion war. He pays attention to the qualities of Lysander and Callicratidas as individuals, since they play a major role in the course of events, while readers gradually discover what the two Spartan generals were like. Lysander’s literary portrait is mixed but he is presented as more competent than Callicratidas in all respects. Lysander reveals a very deep understanding of the men he is dealing with and thus emerges as a highly persuasive man. This becomes obvious when he induces Cyrus to make him his xenos and to provide the money he wants for the crews, but also when he creates a network of ritualized friends. His military skill first becomes clear in the battle at Notium. However, his philotimia becomes individualistic when he equates himself with Sparta and tries to prevent Callicratidas from leading the fleet against the Athenians. His military abilities and his moral qualities are in most cases revealed in a narrative fashion and through the use of a sentence in direct speech. However, Xenophon connects Lysander with the danger of stasis for Sparta, because he shows that Lysander undermined Callicratidas’ office through his friends. This was a unique situation for Sparta and incidates that even this city was not safe from civil strife. In regard to Callicratidas readers conclude that Xenophon’s treatment of him is also mixed but in most cases not flattering. Xenophon chooses to show his selfcentered personality through the record of two speeches and their settings. In the first speech he succeeded in imposing discipline on those of the Spartans who were unwilling to obey him but he was not persuasive. Then his irritable character forced him to act with recklessness and rashness and therefore disobey the ruling authorities at Sparta which demanded cooperation with the Persians in order to continue the war with their money. Because of this he attempted in another speech to persuade the Milesians to provide him with money, but although he collected some cash this speech was a failure too. Moreover, Callicratidas was a highly self-confident man in regard to his military abilities, but the financial problem forced him to show a contradictory behavior towards his men, although he was successful to a degree in his military operations. He was also ambitious to defeat the Athenians on the basis of the tactic of speedy attack, but his egocentrism in combination with his failure to realize the essence of Spartan values led to his death and a heavy defeat for his fleet. This allowed the return of Lysander under the willing request of the allies and Cyrus. From this point onwards Lysander emerges again and Xenophon’s narrative reveals a competent general who used the Persian money to pay his crews, but in particular a man with good planning and forethought for all his actions. As for the military engagement at Aegospotami, this constitutes the climax of the military encounters between Sparta and Athens in such a way as to convey a

Xenophon as a historian  259

particular impression about Lysander and the Athenian generals. More specifically, Xenophon praises Lysander for his decisiveness to fight the Athenians, his ability to impose discipline on his men, his delaying tactic, his patience, his skill in completing the plan of destruction of the enemy fleet, his deceptiveness and finally his competence to impose his own will through his men’s vote.3 Alcibiades is portrayed as a good adviser and patriot. In regard to the Athenian generals Xenophon implicitly justifies their rejection of Alcibiades, but he blames them collectively for not having any plan against Lysander and for not imposing discipline on their crews. Individually, he has a good word to say about Conon’s military abilities, while he castigates Philocles as a demagogue, inhumane and an incompetent general. Xenophon’s account of the events before, during and after the battle of Aegospotami leads his readers to conclude that Lysander was the type of soldier that Socrates dreamed of in Mem.3.1.6–7: καὶ γὰρ παρασκευαστικὸν τῶν εἰς τὸν πόλεμον τὸν στρατηγὸν εἶναι χρή, καὶ ποριστικὸν τῶν ἐπιτηδείων τοῖς στρατιώταις, καὶ μηχανικὸν καὶ ἐργαστικὸν καὶ ἐπιμελῆ καὶ καρτερικὸν καὶ ἀγχίνουν, καὶ … ὠμόν … καὶ ἐπιθετικόν, καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ φύσει καὶ ἐπιστήμῃ δεῖ τὸν εὖ στρατηγήσοντα ἔχει καλὸν δὲ καὶ τὸ τακτικὸν εἶναι· πολὺ γὰρ διαφέρει στράτευμα τεταγμένον ἀτάκτου.4 The victory at Aegospotami allowed Lysander to gain high prestige in the Greek world and in Sparta itself. The role of Persian money appears again at the end of the story, when Xenophon says that the Spartans accepted the Persian money that Lysander brought to their city for themselves. Thus apart from the Persian money Xenophon’s readers also realize that there are some other overarching features. First, Xenophon quite deliberately constructs both sides as stasis-riven. Second, Alcibiades and Lysander become the leading persons of the era of the Peloponnesian War who move history onwards. Finally, Hellenica 1–2 contains stories of dashed aspirations, because the reader is confronted with surprising reversals: the flight of Alcibiades from Notium follows his triumphant return; the inglorious death of Callicratidas follows his persistent chasing of the Athenian fleet, because the Athenians against all reasonable expectation manned another whole fleet; the conviction of the generals  3 For the opinion that Xenophon praises Lysander’s stratagem in the battle of Aegospotami see also Krentz, 1989b, 175. 4 Thus my analysis is in stark contrast with (a) Delebecque, 1957, 66 who believes that Xenophon does not highlight the ingenuity of Lysander but only his cruelty towards the Athenian captives; (b) Westlake, 1969, 216–22 who argues that Xenophon does not classify Lysander in his ideal image of general and undermines his achievements, when he ought not to have done that; and (c) Hamilton, 1979, 36 n. 44 who says that ‘Xenophon virtually ignores Lysander, in all probability because he failed to appreciate or to admire Lysander’s qualities’.

260  Chapter 5: Conclusion of Arginousai follows their great victory at Arginousai; the disaster at Aegospotami follows Philocles’ arrogant decree and its acceptance by the Athenians.

Bibliography Adkins A.W.H. (1975), Merit and Responsibility: A Study of Greek Values, repr. of Oxford 1960, Chicago. Adkins A.W.H. (1976), ‘‘Polypragmosyne and ‘‘Minding One’s Own Business’’: A Study in Greek Social and Political Values’’ in: CP 71, 301–27. Ahl F. (1984), ‘‘The Art of Safe Criticism in Greece and Rome’’ in: AJP 105, 174–208. Αλεξίου Ε. (2016), Η Ρητορική του 4ου ΑΙ. π.Χ.: Το Ελιξίριο της Δημοκρατίας και η Ατομικότητα, Αθήνα. Allan A.R. (2013), ‘‘History as Presence. Time, Tense and Narrative Modes in Thucydides’’ in: Thucydides Between History and Literature, M. Tamiolaki/A. Tsakmakis (eds.), Berlin/ Boston, 371–89. Allen D.S. (1997), ‘‘Imprisonment in Classical Athens’’ in: CQ 47, 121–35. Allen D.S. (2000), The World of Prometheus: The Politics of Punishment in Democratic Athens, Princeton. Allison J. (1984), ‘‘Sthenelaidas’ speech: Thucydides 1.86’’ in: Hermes 112, 9–16. Allison J. (1997), Word and Concept in Thucydides, Atlanta. Amit M. (1965), Athens and the Sea, Brussels. Amit M. (1973), ‘‘Le traité de Chalcédoine entre Pharnabaze et les stratèges Athéniens’’ in: AC 42, 436–57. Anderson J.K. (1985), Hunting in the Ancient World, Los Angeles/London. Andrewes A. (1974), ‘‘The Arginousai Trial’’ in: Phoenix 28, 112–22. Andrews J.A. (2009), ‘‘Athenagoras, Stasis, and Factional Rhetoric (Thucydides 6.36–40)’’ in: CP 104, 1–12. Arnold P. (1992), ‘‘The persuasive style of debate in direct speeches in Thucydides’’ in: Hermes 120, 44–57. Arrington N.T. (2015), Ashes, Images and Memories: the presence of the war dead in fifth-century Athens, Oxford. Arthurs J. (1994), ‘‘The Term Rhetor in Fifth-and Fourth-Century B.C.E. Greek Texts’’ in: Rhetoric Society Quarterly 23, 1–10. Asmonti N. (2006), ‘‘The Arginousai trial, the changing role of strategoi and their relationship between demos and military leadership in late-fifth century Athens’’ in: BICS 49, 1–21. Azoulay V. (2004), Xénophon et les grâces du pouvoir, Paris. Bain D. (1991), ‘‘Six Greek Verbs of Sexual Congress’’ in: CQ 41, 51–77. Baldes R.W. (1978), ‘‘Democritus on the Nature and Perception of ‘Black’ and ‘White’’ in: Phronesis 23, 87–100. Baldwin B. (1974), ‘‘Notes on Cleophon’’ in: AC 17, 35–47. Baragwanath E. (2008), Motivation and Narrative in Herodotus, Oxford. Baragwanath E. (2012), ‘‘A Noble Alliance: Herodotus, Thucydides and Xenophon’s Procles’’ in: Thucydides and Herodotus, E. Foster/D. Lateiner (eds.), Oxford, 316–44. Baragwanath E. (2016), ‘‘Emotions, Perceptions, Visual Images: Conceptualizing the Past in Xenophon’s Hellenica’’ in: Conceptualizing Past, Present and Future, Melammu Symposia 9, S. Fink/R. Rollinger (eds.), Münster, 32–57. Baragwanath E. (2017a), ‘‘Character and Function of Speeches’’ in: The Cambridge Companion to Xenophon, M.A. Flower (ed.), Cambridge, 279–297. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110668315-007

262  Bibliography Baragwanath E. (2017b), ‘‘Intertextuality and Plural Truths in Xenophon’s Historical Narrative’’ in: Truth and History in the Ancient World: Plularizing the Past, L.I. Hau/I. Ruffell (eds.), 155–71. Baragwanath E./Foster E. (2017), “Introduction” in: Clio and Thalia: Attic Comedy and Historiography, Baragwanath E./Foster E. (eds.), Newcastle upon Tyne, 1–30. Bassett S. (1917), ‘‘Wit and Humor in Xenophon’’ in: CJ 9, 565–74. Bauman R.A. (1990), Political Trials in Ancient Greece, London/New York. Bearzot C. (2000), ‘‘La terminologia dell’opposizione politica in Lisia: interventi assembleari (ἐναντιοῦμαι, ἀντιλέγω) e trame occulte (ἐπιβουλεύω)’’ in: L’opposizione nel mondo antico, M. Sordi (ed.), Milano, 121–34. Bearzot C. (2001), ‘‘Στάσις e πόλεμος nel 404’’ in: Il pensiero sulla Guerra nel mondo antico, M. Sordi (ed.), Milano, 19–36. Bearzot C. (2014), ‘‘The Use of Documents in Xenophon’s Hellenica’’ in: Between Thucydides and Polybius: The Golden Age of Greek Historiography, G. Parmeggiani (ed.), Washington, 89–114. Bers V. (1997), Speech in Speech: Studies in Incorporated Oratio Recta in Attic Drama and Oratory, Lanham. Bicknell P.J. (1972), Studies in Athenian Politics and Genealogy, Historia Einzelschriften 19, Wiesbaden. Blech M. (1982), Studien zum Kranz bei den Griechen, Berlin/New York. Bloedow E.F. (1992), ‘‘Alcibiades ‘brilliant’ or ‘intelligent’?’’ in: Historia 41, 139–57. Bloedow E.F. (1973), Alcibiades Reexamined, Wiesbaden. Blok J. (2015), ‘‘The Diobelia: On the Political Economy of an Athenian State Fund’’ in: ZPE 193, 87–102. Bommelaer J-F. (1981), Lysandre de Sparte, Paris. Blundell M.D. (1989), Helping Friends and Harming Enemies: A Study in Sophocles and Greek Ethics, Cambridge. Bowden H. 1994, ‘‘Xenophon and the Scientific study of Religion’’ in: Xenophon and his world, C.J. Tuplin (ed.), Historia Einzelschriften, 172, Stuttgart 2004, 229–46. Bremmer J. (1999), Greek Religion, Oxford. Brown C.G. (1989), ‘‘Ares, Aphrodite and the Laughter of the Gods’’ in: Phoenix 43, 283–93. Brownson C.L. (1903), ‘‘The succession of Spartan Nauarchs in Hellenica I’’ in: TAPA 34, 33–40. Brulé P. (2003) transl. by A. Nevill, Women of Ancient Greece, Edinburgh. Brumfield A.C. (1981), The Attic Festivals of Demeter and their relation to the Agricultural Year, New York. Brown Ferrario S. (2014), Historical Agency and the ‘Great’ Man in Classical Greece, Cambridge. Brown Ferrario S. (2017), ‘‘Xenophon and Greek Political Thought’’ in: The Cambridge Companion to Xenophon, Cambridge, 57–83. Bugh G.R. (2014), The Horsemen of Athens, Princeton, 1988. Buijs M. (2005), Clause Combining in Ancient Greek Narrative Discourse, Leiden. Cagnetta C./Petrocelli M. (1977), ‘‘πονηρός’’ in: QS 6, 155–72. Cairns D.L. (1993), Aidos: The Psychology and Ethics of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greek Literature, Oxford. Cairns D.L. (2001), ‘‘Anger and the Veil in Ancient Greek Culture’’ in: G & R 48, 18–32. Campbell B. (1982), ‘‘Poliatrics: Physicians and the Physician Analogy within Fourth-century Athens’’ in: The American Political Science Review 76, 810–24. Canfora L. (1982), ‘‘L’Apologie d’Alcibiade’’ in: REG 95, 140–44.

Bibliography  263

Carawan E. (2007), ‘‘The trial of the Arginousai generals and the dawn of ‘Judicial Review’’ in: Dike 10, 19–56. Carey C. (1989), Lysias: Selected Speeches, Cambridge. Carey C. (1994), ‘‘Rhetorical means of persuasion’’ in: Persuasion: Greek Rhetoric in Action, I. Worthington (ed.), London, 26–45. Carey C. (1995a), ‘‘The return of the radish or just when you thought it was safe to return to the kitchen’’ in: LCM 18, 53–55. Carey C. (1995b), ‘‘Rape and Adultery in Athenian Law’’ in: CQ 45, 407–17. Carey C. (1997), ‘‘Τα όρια του δημοσίου λόγου στην Αθήνα’’ in: Δωδώνη: Φιλολογία 26, 29–49. Carey C. 2007, ‘‘Epideictic Oratory’’ in: A Companion to Greek Rhetoric, I. Worthington (ed.), Oxford, 236–52. Cartledge P./Debnar P. (2009), ‘‘Sparta and the Spartans in Thucydides’’ in: Brill’s Companion to Thucydides, A. Rengakos/A. Tsakmakis (eds.), Leiden, 559–87. Casson L. (1995), ‘‘The Feeding of the Trireme Crews and an Entry in IG ii2 1631’’ in: TAPA 125, 261–69. Chaniotis A. (1992), ‘‘Watching a Lawsuit: A New Curse Tablet from Southern Russia’’ in: GRBS 33, 69–73. Chiasson C.C. (2000), ‘‘Σωφρονοῦντες ἐν χρόνωι’ The Athenians and Time in Aeschylus’ ‘‘Eumenidai’’ in: CJ 95, 139–61. Christ M. (1998), The Litigious Athenian, Baltimore/London. Christ M. (2001), ‘‘Conscription of Hoplites in Classical Athens’’ in: CQ 51, 398–422. Clinton K. (1994), ‘‘The Eleusinian Mysteries and Panhellenism in Democratic Athens’ in: The Archaeology of Athens and Attica under the Democracy, W. Coulson/O. Palagia/T.L. Shear/ H.A. Shapiro/F.J. Frost (eds.), Oxford, 161–72. Clinton K. (2007), ‘‘The Mysteries of Demeter and Kore’’ in: A Companion to Greek Religion, D. Ogden (ed.), Oxford, 342–56. Cohen A. (2010), Art in the Era of Alexander the Great: Paradigms of Manhood and their Cultural Traditions, Cambridge. Cohen D. (1995), Law, Violence and Community, Cambridge. Colvin S. (1999), Dialect in Aristophanes: The Politics of Language in Ancient Greek Literature, Oxford. Connor W.R. (1971), The New Politicians of Fifth-Century Athens, Princeton. Connor W.R. (1984), Thucydides, Princeton. Coventry L. (1989), ‘‘Philosophy and Rhetoric in the Menexenus’’ in: JHS 109, 1–15. Cooper G.L. III (1979), ‘‘Alcibiades’ Criticism of Nicias at Thuc. 6.18.1’’ in: TAPA 109, 29–38. Christesen P. (2017), ‘‘Xenophon’s Views on Sparta’’ in: The Cambridge Companion to Xenophon, M. Flower (ed.), Cambridge, 376–99. Cronjé J. wan W. (1992), ‘‘The stratagem of the rhetorical question in Galatians 4:9–10 as a means towards persuasion’’ in: Neotestamentica 26, 417–24. Cuniberti G. (2011), ‘‘The Direct Participation of Xenophon in the Narrated Events and His Historiographic Evaluation. Hellenica III–IV, 1: the Continued and Overturned Anabasis’’ in: Historika 1, 61–80. David E. (1989), ‘‘Laughter in Spartan Society’ in: Classical Sparta: Techniques behind her Success, A. Powell (ed.), London, 1–25. David E. (1993), ‘‘Hunting in Spartan Society and Consciousness’’ in: Echos du Monde Classique/Classical Views 12, 393–413.

264  Bibliography Davidson J. (1997), Courtesans and Fishcakes: The consuming passions of Classical Athens, Chicago. Dean-Jones L. (1995),’ ‘Menexenus-Son of Socrates’’ in: CQ 45, 51–57. Deacy S./Villing A. (2009), ‘‘What was the colour of Athenas’ Aegis?’’ in: JHS 129, 111–29. Deubner L. (1966), Attische Feste, 2nd ed. revised by B. Doer, Hildesheim. Debnar P. (2002), Speaking the same language: Speeech and Audience in Thucydides’ Spartan Debates, Ann Arbor. Debnar P. (2013), ‘Blurring the Boundaries of Speech: Thucydides and Indirect Speech’’ in: Thuydides between History and Literature, A. Tsakmakis/M. Tamiolaki (eds.), Berlin/ Boston, 271–85. Desmond W. (2006), ‘‘Lessons of Fear: A Reading of Thucydides’’ in: CP 101, 359–79. Detienne M./Vernant J.-P. (1991), transl. J.Lloyd, Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society, Chicago. de Brauw M. (2007), ‘‘The Parts of the Speech’’ in: A Companion to Greek Rhetoric, I. Worthington (ed.), Oxford, 187–202. Debrunner Hall M. (1996), ‘‘Even Dogs have Erinyes: Sanctions in Athenian Practice and Thinking’’ in: Greek Law in its Political Setting, L. Foxhall/A.D.E. Lewis (eds.), 73–89. Delebecque E. (1957), Essai sur la vie de Xénophon, Paris. Denniston J.D. (1954), The Greek Particles, Oxford 2nd ed. de Jong I.J.F. (2007), “Narratological theory on time’’ in: I.J.F. de Jong/R. Nunlist (eds.) Time in Ancient Greek Narrative: Studies in Ancient Greek Narrative 2, Leiden, 1–16. Dillery J. (1995), Xenophon and the History of his Time, London/New York. Dillery J. (2016), ‘‘Response and Further Thoughts’’ in: Aspects of Leadership in Xenophon, R.F. Buxton (ed.), Newcastle Upon Tyne, 243–77. Donlan W. (1978), ‘‘Social Vocabulary and its Relationship to Political Propaganda in Fifth-Century Athens’’ in: QUCC 27, 96–101, 106. Dorion L-A. (2014), ‘‘Le statut et la function de la rhétorique dans les ecrits socratiques de Xénophon’’ in: Xénophon et la rhétorique, P. Pontier (ed.), Paris, 17–40. Dorjahn A.P. (1941), ‘‘On the Athenian Anakrisis’’ in: CP 36, 182–85. Dosuna J.M. (2012), ‘‘To die in Ancient Greek: On the meaning of ἀπο- in ἀποθνῄσκειν’’ in: Dodona Oracular Tablets from Evangelidis’ Excavation, I. Vokotopoulou/S. Dakaris/ A-F. Christidis (eds.), Athens, 246–55. Dover K.J. (1974), Greek Popular Morality in the time of Plato and Aristotle, Oxford. Dover K.J. (1989), Greek Homosexuality, Cambridge Mass. Due B. (1983), ‘‘The trial of the generals in Xenophon’s Hellenica’’ in: C & M 34, 33–44. Due B. (1987), ‘‘Lysander in Xenophon’s Hellenica’’ in: C & M 38, 53–62. Due B. (1991), ‘‘The return of Alcibiades in Xenophon’s Hellenica I.IV, 8–23’’ in: C & M 42, 39– 53. Edmunds L. (1975), ‘‘Thucydides’ Ethics as reflected in the description of Stasis (3.82–83)’’ in: HSCP 79, 73–92. Edwards M. (1998), ‘‘Notes on Pseudo-Plutarch’s Life of Antiphon’’ in: CQ 48, 89–92. Edwards M. (2008), ‘‘The Gods in the Attic Orators’’ in: Papers on Rhetoric, L.C. Montefusco (ed.), Rome, 107–115. Ehrenberg V. (1947), ‘‘Polypragmosyne: A Study in Greek Politics’ in: JHS 67, 46–67. Eidinow E./Taylor C. (2010), ‘Lead-letter days: Writing, Communication and Crisis in the Ancient Greek World’’ in: CQ 60, 30–62.

Bibliography  265

Epstein S. (2011), ‘‘Direct Democracy and Minority Rule: The Athenian Democracy in its relation to the Demos’’ in: Stability and Crisis in the Athenian Democracy, G. Herman (ed.), Historia Eizelschriften, 220, Stuttgart, 87–102. Finley M.I. (1962), ‘‘Athenian Demagogues’’ in: Past & Present 21, 3–24. Fisher N.R.E. (1992), Hybris: A Study in the Values of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greece, Warminster. Flower M. (2017), ‘‘Xenophon as a Historian’’ in: The Cambridge Companion to Xenophon, M. Flower (ed.), Cambridge, 301–22. Fordsyke S. (2005), Exile, Ostracism and Democracy: The Politics of Expulsion in Ancient Greece, Princeton. Fornara C.W. (1983), The Nature of History in ancient Greece and Rome, Los Angeles/London. Francis D. (1991–93), ‘‘Brachylogia Laconica: Spartan Speeches in Thucydides’’ in: BICS 38, 198–212. Furley W.D. (1996), Andokides and the Herms: a Study of Crisis in fifth-century Athenian Religion, London. Furley W.D. (2006), ‘‘Thucydides and Religion’’ in: Brill’s Companion to Thucydides, A. Rengakos/A. Tsakmakis (eds.), Leiden, 415–38. Gabrielsen V. (1994), Financing the Athenian Fleet: Public Taxation and Social Relations, Baltimore/London. Gagné R. (2009), ‘‘Mystery Inquisitors: Performance, Authority and Sacrilege at Eleusis’’ in: CA 28, 211–47. Garland R. (1984), ‘‘Religious Authority in Archaic and Classical Athens’’ in: ABSA 79, 75–123. Garland R. (1996), ‘‘Strategies of Religious Intimidation and Coersion in Classical Athens’’ in: Religion and Power in the Ancient Greek World. Proceedings of the Upsala Symposium 1993, P. Hellström/B. Altroch (eds.), Uppsala, 91–99. Gish D. (2012), ‘‘Defending Demokratia: Athenian Justice and the trial of the Arginousai Generals in Xenophon’s Hellenica’’ in: Xenophon: Ethical Principles and Historical Enquiry, F. Hobden/C.J. Tuplin (eds.), Leiden, 161–211. Golfin E. (2003), ‘‘Essai sur la construction du temps dans la narration historique. L’exemple des Helléniques de Xénophon’’ in: AC 72, 75–94. Gomme A.W./Andrewes A./Dover K.J. (1970), A Historical Commentary on Thucydides, Volume IV, Books V 25–VII, Oxford. Gray V.J. (1989), The Character of Xenophon’s Hellenica, London. Gray V.J. (1991), ‘‘Continuous History and Xenophon, Hellenica 1–2.3.1’’ in: AJP 112, 201–228. Gray V.J. (1986), ‘‘Xenophon’s Hiero and the meeting of the wise man and tyrant in Greek literature’’ in: CQ 36, 115–23. Gray V.J. (1998), The Framing of Socrates, Stuttgart. Gray V.J. (2004), ‘‘Xenophon’’ in: Narrators, Narratees and Narratives in Ancient Greek Literature: Studies in Ancient Greek Narrative, vol. 1, I. de Jong/R. Nunlist/A. Bowie (eds.), Leiden, 129–46. Gray V.J. (2010), ‘‘Interventions and Citations in Xenophon, Hellenica and Anabasis’’ in: Xenophon, V.J. Gray (ed.), Oxford, 553–72. Gray V.J. (2012), Xenophon’s Mirror of Princes, Oxford. Gray V.J. (2017), ‘Xenophon’s Language and Expression’ in: The Cambridge Companion to Xenophon, M. Flower (ed.), Cambridge, 223–40. Greenwood E. (2006), Thucydides and the Shaping of History, London. Gribble D. (1999), Alcibiades: A study in literary presentation, Oxford.

266  Bibliography Gribble D. (2006), ‘‘Individuals in Thucydides’’ in: Brill’s Companion to Thucydides, A. Rengakos/A. Tsakmakis (eds.), Leiden/Boston, 429–68. Gribble D. (1998), ‘‘Narrator Interventions in Thucydides’ in: JHS 118, 41–67. Grimaldi W.M.A. (1980), “Semeion, Tekmerion, Eikos in Aristotle’s Rhetoric” in: AJP 101, 383– 98. Goldhill S. (1986), Reading Greek Tragedy, Cambridge. Goodman M.D./Holladay A.J. (1986), ‘‘Religious Scruples in Ancient Warfare’’ in: CQ 36, 151–71. Goodwin W.W. (1889), Syntax of the Moods and Tenses of the Greek Verb, London. Hall E. (1989), Inventing the Barbarian: Greek Self-Definition through Tragedy, Oxford. Hall E. (1993a), ‘‘Asia unmanned: Images of victory in classical Athens’’ in: J. Rich/G. Shipley (eds.), War and Society in the Greek World, London, 108–33. Hall E. (1993b), ‘‘Drowing by Names: The Greeks, Swimming and Timotheus’ Persians’’ in: Birth of the European Identity: The Europe-Asia contrast in Greek thought 490–322 B.C., H.A. Kahn (ed.), Volez, 44–80. Hall E. (1995), ‘‘Lawcourt Dramas: the Power of Performance in Greek Forensic Oratory’’ in: BICS 40, 39–58. Hall J.M. (1997), Ethnic Identity in Greek Antiquity, Cambridge. Halliwell S. (1991), ‘‘The uses of laughter in Greek culture’’ in: CQ 41, 279–96. Halliwell S. (2008), Greek Laughter: A Study of Cultural Psychology from Homer to Early Christianity, Cambridge. Hamel D. (1998), Athenian Generals: Military Authority in the Classical Period, Leiden. Hamilton C.D. (1979), Sparta’s Bitter Victories: Politics and Diplomacy in the Corinthian War, Ithaca/London. Hansen M.H. (1974), The Sovereignty of the People’s Court in Athens in the Fourth Century B.C. and the Public Action against Unconstitutional Proposals, Odense. Hansen M.H. (1975), Eisangelia: The Sovereignty of the People’s Court in Athens in the Fourth Century B.C. and the Impeachment of Generals and Politicians, Odense. Hansen M.H. (1987), The Athenian Assembly in the Age of Demosthenes, Oxford. Hansen M.H. (1989), The Athenian Ecclesia II, Copenhagen. Hansen M.H. (1991), The Athenian Democracy in the age of Demosthenes, Oxford. Hansen M.H. (2014), ‘‘Political Parties in Democratic Athens?’’ in: GRBS 54, 379–403. Harris E.M. (2006), ‘‘How to Kill in Attic Greek: The Semantics of the Verb (ἀπο)κτείνειν and their Implications for Athenian Homicide Law’’ in: Law and Society in Ancient Athens: Essays on Law, Society and Politics, Cambridge, 391–404. Harris E.M. (2007), ‘‘Did the Athenian courts attempt to achieve consistency? Oral tradition and written records in the Athenian administration of justice’’ in: Politics of Orality (Orality and Literacy in ancient Greece), vol. 6, C. Cooper (ed.), Leiden, 343–70. Harris E.M. (2013), The Rule of Law in Action in Classical Athens, Oxford. Harris E.M. (2016), ‘‘Alcibiades, the Ancestors, Liturgies, and the Etiquette of Addressing the Athenian Assembly’’ in: The Art of History: Literary Perspectives on Greek and Roman Historiography, V. Liotsakis/S. Farrington (eds.), Berlin, 145–56. Harrison C.M. (1999), ‘‘Triremes at Rest: On the Beach or in the Water?’’ in: JHS 119, 168–71. Harvey D. (1990), ‘‘The sycophant and sycophancy: vexatious redefinition’’ in: Nomos: Essays in Athenian law, politics and society, P. Cartledge/P. Millett/S. Todd (eds.), Cambridge, 103–21. Hatzfeld J. (1940), Alcibiade, Paris. Heath M. (1990), ‘‘Aristophanes and His Rivals’’ in: G & R 2, 143–58.

Bibliography  267

Henderson B.W. (1973), The Great War between Athens and Sparta, orig. publ. London 1927, New York. Henderson M.M. (1975), ‘‘Plato’s Menexenus and the distortion of history’’ in: AC 28, 25–46. Henry W.P. (1967), Greek Historical Writing. A Historiographical Essay based on Xenophon’s Hellenica, Chicago. Herman G. (1987), Ritualised Frienship and the Greek City, Cambridge. Herman G. (1993), ‘‘Tribal and Civic Codes of Behaviour in Lysias 1’’ in: CQ 43, 406–19. Herman G. (2006), Morality and Behaviour in Democratic Athens: A Social History, Cambridge. Herrman J. (2009), Hyperides: Funeral Oration, Oxford. Hesk J. (2007), ‘‘Despisers of the Commonplace”: Meta-topoi and Para-topoi in Attic Oratory’’ in: Rhetorica 25, 361–84. Higgins W.E. (1977), Xenophon the Athenian: The problem of the individual and the society of the polis, Albany. Hobden F./Tuplin C. (2012), ‘‘Introduction’’ in: Ethical Principles and Historical Enquiry, F. Hobden/C. Tuplin (eds.), Leiden/Boston 2012, 1–41. Hodkinson S. (2000), Property and Wealth in Classical Sparta, London. Holladay A.J. (1988), “Further thoughts on trireme tactics’’ in: G & R 35, 149–51. Hornblower S. (2003), A Commentary on Thucydides, Vol. I, Books 1–3, Oxford. Hornblower S. (2008), A Commentary on Thucydides, Vol. III, Books 5.25–8.109, Oxford. How W.W. (1919), ‘‘On the meaning of ΒΑΔΗΝ and ΔΡΟΜΩ in Greek Historians of the Fifth Century’’ in: CQ 13, 40–42. Humble N. (1999), ‘‘Sôphrosynê and the Spartans in Xenophon’’ in: Sparta: new perspectives, A. Powell/S. Hodkinson (eds.), London/Swansea, 339–53. Humble N. (2006), ‘‘Why the Spartans fight so well, even if they are in disorder–Xenophon’s view” in: Sparta and War, S. Hodkinson/A. Powell (eds.), Swansea, 219–33. Hudson-Williams H.Ll. (1950), “Forms of Debate and the Melian Dialogue” in: AJP 71, 156–69. Hunt P. (1998), Slaves, Warfare and Ideology in the Greek Historians, Cambridge. Hunt P. (2001), ‘‘The slaves and the generals of Arginousai’’ in: AJP 122, 359–80. Hunter V. (1988), ‘‘Thucydides and the Sociology of the Crowd’’ in: CJ 84, 17–21. Hunter V. (1994), Policing Athens, Princeton. Hunter V. (1997), ‘‘The Prison of Athens: A Comparative Perspective’’ in: Phoenix 51, 296–326. Hussey E. (1985), ‘‘Thucydidean History and Democritean History’’ in: Crux, Essays in Greek History presented to G.E.M. de Ste. Croix on his 75th birthday, P.A. Cartledge/F.D. Harvey (eds.), London, 118–38. Johnstone S. (2010), ‘‘Virtuous Toil, Vicious Work: Xenophon on Aristocratic Style’’ in: Xenophon, V. Gray (ed.), Oxford, 137–66. Jordan B. (1975), The Athenian Navy in the Classical Period: A Study of Athenian Naval Administration and Military Organization in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries B.C., Berkeley. Jordan B. (2000), ‘‘The Crews of Athenian triremes’’ in: AC 69, 81–101. Jouanna J. (2012), Greek Medicine from Hippocrates to Galen: Selected Papers, Leiden/Boston. Kagan D. (1987), The Fall of the Athenian Empire, Ithaca/London. Kallet-Marx L. (1993), Money, Expense and Naval Power in Thucydides’ History 1–5.24, Berkeley/Los Angeles. Kallet L. (2001), Money and the Corrosion of Power in Thucydides: the Sicilian Expedition and Its Aftermath, Berkeley/Los Angeles. Kane J. (1990), ‘‘Greek Values in Xenophon’s Hellenica’’ in: Polis and Politics: Essays in Greek moral and political philosophy, A. Loizou/H. Lesser (eds.), Aldershot, 1–11.

268  Bibliography Kapellos A. (2009), ‘‘Adeimantos at Aegospotami: innocent or guilty?’’ in: Historia 58, 257–75. Kapellos A. (2010), ‘‘Xenophon on Sparta’s reaction to the execution of the Athenian captives at Aegospotami’’ in: PP 65, 385–93. Kapellos A. (2011), ‘‘Xenophon Hell. II, 2, 23–A Note’’ in: PP 66, 132–38. Kapellos A. (2012), ‘‘Philocles and the Sea Battle at Aegospotami (Xenophon Hell.2.1.22–32)’’ in: CW 106, 97–101. Kapellos A. (2013), ‘‘Xenophon and the execution of the Athenian captives at Aegospotami’’ in: Mnemosyne 66, 464–72. Kapellos A. (2014a), Lysias 21: A Commentary, Berlin. Kapellos A. (2014b), ‘‘In Defence of Mantitheus: Structure, Strategy and Argumentation in Lysias 16’’ in: BICS 57, 23–47. Kapellos A. (2018), ‘‘Lysander and the execution of the Athenian captives at Aegospotami’’ in: Mnemosyne, 1–14. Kapparis K. (1996), ‘‘Humiliating the Adulterer: the law and the practice in classical Athens’’ in: RIDA 43 63–77. Kelly D. (1996), ‘‘Oral Xenophon’’ in: Voice into Text: Orality and Literacy in Ancient Greece, I. Worthington (ed.), Leiden, 149–63. King D.B. (1955), “The Appeal to Religion in Greek Rhetoric’’ in: CJ 50, 363–71+376. Konstan D. (1995), ‘‘Patrons and Friends’’ in: CP 90, 328–42. Konstan D. (1998), Friendship in the Classical World, Cambridge. Konstan D. (2001), Pity Transformed, Bristol. Konstan D. (2006), The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks: Studies in Aristotle and Classical Literature, Toronto. Konstan D. (2007a), ‘‘Aristotle on anger and the emotions: the strategies of status’’ in: Ancient Anger: Perspectives from Homer to Galen, S. Braund/G.W. Most (eds.), Cambridge, 99– 120. Konstan D. (2007b), ‘‘Rhetoric and Emotion’’ in: A Companion to Greek Rhetoric, I. Worthington (ed.), Oxford, 411–25. Kovacs D. (2011), ‘‘Two notes on Xenophon: Hellenica 1.4.20 and Agesilaus 2.26’’ in: CQ 61, 751–53. Kremmydas C. (2013), “The Discourse of Deception and Characterization in Attic Oratory’’ in: GRBS 53, 51–89. Krentz P. (1982), The Thirty at Athens, Ithaca/London. Krentz P. (1989a), ‘‘Had Xenophon read Thucydides VIII before he wrote the continuation (Hell. I-II.3.10)?’’ in: AncW 19, 15–18. Krentz P. (1989b), Xenophon, Hellenica I-II.3.10, Warminster. Krentz P. (1995), Xenophon, Hellenica II.3.11–IV.2.8, Warminster. Krentz P. (2009), ‘‘The Arginousai Affair’’ in: the Landmark Xenophon’s Hellenica: a new translation, R.B. Strassler (ed.), New York, 317–21. Kroeker R. (2009), ‘‘Xenophon as the critic of the Athenian democracy’’ in: History of Political Thought 30, 197–228. Laforse B. (1998), ‘‘Xenophon, Callicratidas and Panhellenism’’ in: AHB 12, 55–67. L’Allier L. (2012), ‘‘Why did Xenophon write the last chapter of the Cynegeticus?’’ in: Xenophon: Ethical Principles and Historical Enquiry, F. Hobden/C.J. Tuplin (eds.), Leiden/Boston, 477–97. Lambert S.D. (1998), The Phratries of Attica, Michigan, 2nd ed. Lang M. (1992), “Theramenes and Arginousai” in: Hermes 120, 267–79.

Bibliography  269

Lanni A. (2004), ‘‘Arguing from ‘Precedent’: Modern Perspectives on Athenian Practice’’ in: Law and Lawcourts in Ancient Greece, E.M. Harris/L. Rubinstein (eds.), London, 159–71. Lattimore R. (1939), ‘‘The wise adviser in Herodotus’’ in: CP 34, 24–35. Lazenby J.F. (1985), The Spartan Army, Warminster. Lazenby J.F. (1987), ‘‘The diekplous’ in: G & R 34, 169–77. Lavelle B.M. (1988), ‘‘Adikia, The Decree of Kannonos, and the trial of the generals’’ in: C & M 39, 19–41. Leighton S. (2009), ‘‘Passions and Persuasion’’ in: A Companion to Aristotle, G. Anagnostopoulos (ed.), Chichester, 597–611. Lendon J.E. (1997), ‘‘Spartan Honor’’ in: Polis and Polemos, C.D. Hamilton/P. Krentz (eds.), California, 105–26. Lévy E. (1990), ‘‘L’Art de la déformation Historique dans les Helléniques de Xénophon’’ in: Purposes of History: Studies of Greek History from the 4th to the 2nd Centuries, H. Verdin/ G. Schepens/E. Keyser (eds.), Louvain, 125–57. Lewis D.M. (1977), Sparta and Persia, Leiden. Liddell H.G./Scott R. revised by H.S. Jones, (1940), A Greek-English Lexicon, Oxford 9th. ed. Liotsakis V. (2017), Redeeming Thucydides’ Book VIII: Narrative Artistry in the Account of the Ionian War, Berlin/Boston. Loraux N. (1977), ‘‘La belle mort Spartiate’’ in: Ktèma 2, 105–20. Loraux N. (1986), trans. A. Sheridan, The Invention of Athens: The Funeral Oration in the Classical City, Cambridge (Mass). Losada L.A. (1972), The Fifth Column, Leiden. Luginbill R.D. (1999), Thucydides on War and National Character, Boulder. Ludwig P. (2017), ‘Xenophon as a Socratic reader of Thucydides’ in: The Oxford Handbook of Thucydides, R. Balot/S. Fordsyke/E. Foster (eds.), Oxford, 15–30. McCoy W.J. (1977), ‘‘Thrasyllus” in: AJP 98, 264–89. McCoy W.J. (1991), ‘‘Thrasybulus and his Trierarchies’’ in: AJP 112, 303–23. McCoy W.J. (1997), ‘‘The political debut of Theramenes’’ in: Polis and Polemos: Essays on Politics, War and History in Ancient Greece in Honor of Donald Kagan, C.D. Hamilton/ P. Krentz (eds.), California, 171–92. MacLaren M. (1979), ‘‘A supposed lacuna at the beginning of Xenophon’s Hellenica’’ in: AJP 100, 228–38. McHardy F. (2008), Revenge in Athenian Culture, London. Macleod C. (1983), ‘‘Rhetoric and History (Thucydides 6.16–18)’’ in: Collected Essays, Oxford, 68–87. MacDowell D.M. (1963), Athenian Homicide Law in the Age of the Orators, Manchester. MacDowell D.M. (1978), The Law in Classical Athens, London. MacDowell D.M. (1986), Spartan Law, Edinburgh. Μαντζάνας Μ.Κ. (2012), ‘‘Η έννοια της ηθικής συνείδησης κατά την αρχαία Ελληνική φιλοσοφία’’ in: ΕΕΦΣΠΑ 60, 181–98. Marincola J. (1997), Authority and Tradition in Ancient Historiography, Cambridge. Marincola J. (2009), The Landmark Xenophon’s Hellenica: a new translation, R.B. Strassler (ed.), New York. Marincola J. (2010), ‘‘The Rhetoric of History: Allusion, Intertextuality, and Exemplarity in Historiographical Speeches’’ in: Stimmen der Geschichte: Funktionen von Reden in der antiken Historigraphie, D. Pausch (ed.), Berlin, 259–289.

270  Bibliography Marincola J. (2017), ‘‘Xenophon’s Anabasis and Hellenica’’ in: The Cambridge Companion to Xenophon, M. Flower (ed.), Cambridge, 103–18. Maxwell-Stuart P.G. (1970), ‘‘Remarks on the Black Clothes of the Ephebes’’ in: PCPS 16, 113– 16. Meiggs R. (1972), The Athenian Empire, Oxford. Mikalson J.D. (1983), Athenian Popular Religion, Chapel Hill/London. Mikalson J.D. (1975), ‘‘HMERA APOFRAS’ in: AJP 96, 19–27. Milns R.D. (2000), ‘‘The public speeches of Demosthenes’’ in: Demosthenes: Statesman and Orator, I. Worthington (ed.), London/New York, 205–23. Missiou A. (1992), The subversive oratory of Andokides: Politics, ideology and decision-making in democratic Athens, Cambridge. Missiou A. (1998), ‘‘Reciprocal Generosity in the Foreign Affairs of Fifth-Century Athens and Sparta’’ in: Reciprocity in Ancient Greece, C. Gill/N. Postlethwaite/R. Seaford (eds.), Oxford, 181–97. Mitchell L.G. (1997), Greeks bearing gifts: The public use of private relationships in the Greek world, 435–323 B.C., Cambridge. Moles J.L. (1994), ‘‘Xenophon and Callicratidas’’ in: JHS 114, 70–84. Montiglio S. (2000), Silence in the Land of Logos, Princeton. Morgan T. (2007), ‘‘Rhetoric and Education’’ in: A Companion to Greek Rhetoric, I. Worthington (ed.), Oxford, 303–19. Mossé C. (1974), ‘‘Les procès politiques et la crise de la démocratie athénienne’’ in: DHA 1, 207–36. Most G. (1994), ‘‘Simonides’ Ode to Scopas’’ in: Modern Critical Theory and Classical Literature, I. de Jong/J.P. Sullivan (eds.), Leiden, 127–52. Munn M. (2000), The School of History: Athens in the Age of Socrates, Berkeley. Murray O. (1990), ‘‘The Affair of the Mysteries: Democracy and the Drinking Group’’ in: Sympotica: A Symposium on the Symposion, O. Murray (ed.), Oxford, 149–61. Murphy C.T. (1972), ‘‘Popular Comedy in Aristophanes’’ in: AJP 93, 169–89. Murphy T.M. (1992), ‘‘Lysias 25 and the Intractable Democratic Abuses’’ in: AJP 113, 543–58. Nails D. (2002), The People of Plato: A Prosopography of Plato and other Socratics, Indianapolis/Cambridge. Nagy B. (1994), ‘‘Alcibiades’ Second Profanation’’ in: Historia 43, 275–85. Nicolai R. (1996), ‘‘L’eloquenza perduta: Tradizioni Antiche sulle Orazioni di Pericle’’ in: QS 44, 95–113. Nicolai R. (2006), ‘‘Thucydides continued’’ in: Brill’s Companion to Thucydides, A. Rengakos/ A. Tsakmakis (eds.), Leiden/Boston, 693–719. Nicolai R. (2014a), ‘‘At the Boundary of Historiography’’ in: Between Thucydides and Polybius: The Golden Age of Greek Historiography, G. Parmeggiani (ed.), Washington, 63–87. Nicolai R. (2014b), ‘‘Cyrus orateur et ses maîtres (Grecques)’’ in: Xénophon et la rhétorique, P. Pontier (ed.), Paris, 179–94. Nicolai R. (2009), ‘‘Thucydides Continued’’ in: Brill’s Companion to Thucydides, A. Rengakos/ A. Tsakmakis (eds.), Leiden, 693–719. Nielsen T.H. (2004), ‘‘The concept of patris in archaic and classical sources’’ in: Once again: Studies in the Ancient Greek Polis, Stuttgart, Historia Einzelschriften 180, 49–76. Noël M-P. (2006), ‘‘Symposion, philanthropia et empire dans la Cyropédie de Xénophon’’ in: Philologia: Mélanges à M.Casevitz, P. Brillet-Dubois (ed.), Lyon, 133–46. Nouhaud M. (1982), L’utilisation de l’histoire par les orateurs attiques, Paris.

Bibliography  271

Ober J. (1985), Fortress Attica: Defense of the Athenian Land Frontier 404–322 B.C., Leiden. Ober J. (1989), Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens, Princeton. Ostwald M. (1986), From Popular Sovereignty to the Sovereignty of Law: Law, Society and Politics in Fifth-Century Athens, Berkeley. Ostwald M. (1988), ΑΝΑΓΚΗ in Thucydides, Atlanta. Palmer M. (2004), Love of Glory and the Common Good: The political thought of Thucydides, Lanham. Palmer M. (2017), ‘Stasis in the War Narrative’ in: The Oxford Handbook of Thucydides, R. Balot/S. Fordsyke/E. Foster (eds.), Oxford, 409–25. Panagopoulos A. (1978), Captives and Hostages in the Peloponnesian War, Athens. Parke H.W. (1930), ‘‘The Development of the second Spartan empire (405–371 B.C.)’’ in: JHS 50, 37–79. Parke H.W. (1977), Festivals of the Athenians: Aspects of Greek and Roman Life, London. Parker R. (1989), ‘‘Spartan Religion’’ in: Classical Sparta: techniques behind her success, A. Powell (ed.), London, 142–72. Parker R. (1997), ‘‘Gods Cruel and Kind: Tragic and Civic Theology’’ in: Greek Tragedy and History, C. Pelling (ed.), Oxford, 143–60. Patterson C. (1998), The Family in Greek History, Cambridge. Pecorella Longo C. (2004), ‘‘Il condono della pena in Atene in età classica’’ in: Dike 7, 85–111. Perlman S. (1963), ‘‘The Politicians in the Athenian Democracy of the Fourth Century B.C.’’ in: Athenaeum 41, 327–55. Perrin B. (1904), ‘‘The Rehabilitation of Theramenes’’ in: AHR 9, 649–69. Pope M. (1988), ‘‘Thucydides and Democracy’’ in: Historia 37, 276–96. Porter J.R. (1997), ‘‘Adultery by the Book: Lysias 1 (On the murder of Eratosthenes) and Comic Diegesis’’ in: EMC 40, 421–53. Poulakos T. (2001), ‘‘Isocrates’ use of ‘doxa’’ in: Philosophy and Rhetoric 34, 61–78. Pontier P. (2006), Trouble et ordre chez Xènophon, Paris. Pouncey P.R. (1980), The Necessities of War: A Study of Thucydides’ Pessimism, New York. Powell A. (2006), ‘‘Why did Sparta not destroy Athens in 404 or 403 B.C.?’’ in: Sparta and War, S. Hodkinson/A. Powell (eds.), Wales, 287–303. Pownall F.S. (1998), ‘‘Condemnation of the impious in Xenophon’s Hellenica’’ in: HThR 91, 251– 77. Pownall F.S. (2000), ‘‘Shifting Viewpoints in Xenophon’s Hellenica: The Arginousai Episode’’ in: Athenaeum 88, 499–513. Pownall F.S. (2004), Lessons from the Past: The Moral Use of History in Fourth-Century Prose, Ann Arbor. Pownall F.S. (2018), ‘‘Socrates’ Trial and Execution in Xenophon’s Hellenica’’ Mouseion 15, 347–68. Prentice W.K. (1934), ‘‘The Character of Lysander’ in: AJA 38, 37–42. Price J.J. (2001), Thucydides and Internal War, Cambridge. Pritchard D.M. (2012), ‘‘Aristophanes and de Ste. Croix: The Value of Old Comedy as Evidence for Athenian Popular Culture’’ in: Antichthon 46, 14–51. Pritchett W.K. (1971), Ancient Greek Military Practices I, Berkeley. Pritchett W.K. (1974), The Greek State at War II, Berkeley. Proietti G. (1974), Xenophon’s Sparta: An Introduction, Berkeley. Raaflaub K.A. (2006), ‘‘Thucydides on Democracy and Oligarchy’’ in: Brill’s Companion to Thucydides, A. Rengakos/A. Tsakmakis (eds.), Leiden, 189–222.

272  Bibliography Rademaker A. (2005), Sophrosyne and the Rhetoric of Self-Restraint: Polysemy and Persuasive Use of an Ancient Greek Term, Leiden. Rahn P.J. (1971), ‘‘Xenophon’s developing Historiography’’ in: TAPA 102, 497–508. Rapp C. (2006), ‘Interaction of Body and Soul: What the Hellenistic Philosophers saw and Aristotle avoided’’ in: Hellenistic Philosophy and Aristotle, Berlin/New York, 187–208. Rawlings III H.R. (1981), The Structure of Thucydides’ History, Princeton. Rhodes P.J. (1972), The Athenian Boule, Oxford. Rhodes P.J (1981), A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia, Oxford. Rhodes P.J. (1986), ‘‘Political Activity in Classical Athens’’ in: JHS 106, 132–44. Rhodes P.J. (1994), ‘‘In Defence of the Greek Historians’’ in: G & R 41, 156–71. Rhodes P.J. (2007), ‘‘The Impact of the Persian Wars on Classical Greece’’ in: Cultural Responses to the Persian Wars, E. Bridges/E. Hall/P.J. Rhodes (eds.), Oxford, 31–45. Riedinger J-C. (1991), Étude sur les Helléniques: Xénophon et l’histoire, Paris. Rijksbaron A. (1994), The Syntax and Semantics of the Verb in Classical Greek, Amsterdam. Roberts J.T. (1986), ‘‘Aristocratic Democracy: The Perseverance of Timocratic Principles in Athenian Government’’ in: Athenaeum 64, 355–69. Robertson N. (1980), ‘‘The Sequence of Events in the Aegean in 408 and 407 B.C.’’ in: Historia 29, 282–301. Rohde E. (1907), Psyche, 4th ed., Tubingen. Roisman J. (1987), ‘‘Kallikratidas: A Greek Patriot?’’ in: CJ 83, 21–33. Roisman J. (2006), The Rhetoric of Conspiracy in Ancient Athens, Berkeley/Los Angeles. de Romilly J. (1956), ‘‘La crainte dans l’œuvre de Thucydide’’ in: C & M 27, 119–27. de Romilly J. (1974), ‘‘Fairness and Kindness in Thucydides’’ in: Phoenix 28, 95–100. de Romilly J. (1995), Alcibiade, Paris. Rood T.C. (2004), ‘‘Xenophon and Diodorus: Continuing Thucydides’’ in: Xenophon and his World, C.J. Tuplin (ed.), Historia Einzelschriften 172, Stuttgart, 341–96. Rood T.C. (2007), ‘‘Xenophon’ in: Time in Ancient Greek Narrative: Studies in Ancient Greek Narrative, I.J.F. de Jong/R. Nunlist (eds.) 2, Leiden, 147–64. Rood T.C. (2017), ‘‘Xenophon’s Narrative Style’’ in: The Cambridge Companion to Xenophon, M.A. Flower (ed.), Cambridge, 263–8. Rosenbloom D. (2004), ‘‘Ponêroi vs. Chrêstoi: The Ostracism of Hyperbolos and the Struggle for Hegemony in Athen safter the Death of Perikles, Part I’’ in: TAPA 134, 55–105. Rosenstock B. (1994), ‘‘Socrates as Revenant: a reading of the Menexenus’’ in: Phoenix 48, 331–47. Rosivach V.J. (1987), ‘‘Execution by Stoning in Athens’’ in: CA 2, 232–48. Rubel A. (2015), ‘‘Afterlife and the living: The Arginousai Trial and the omission of burying the dead’’ in: Dacia 59, 277–97. Rubinstein L. (1998), ‘‘The Athenian Political Perception of the Idiotes’’ in: Kosmos: Essays in Order, Conflict and Community in Classical Athens, P.A. Cartledge/P.C.Millett/S. Von Reden (eds.) Cambridge, 125–143. Σακελλαρίου Μ.Β. (1999), Η Αθηναϊκή Δημοκρατία, Κρήτη. Shear J.L. (2013), ‘‘‘Their memories will never grow old’: The politics of remembrance in the Athenian funeral orations’’ in: CQ 63, 511–36. Seager R. (1973), ‘‘Elitism and Democracy in Classical Athens’’ in: F.C. Jaher (ed.), The Rich, The Well-Born and the Powerful, Urbana Ill., 7–26. Seager R. (2001), ‘‘Xenophon and Athenian Democratic Ideology’’ in: CQ 51, 385–97. Sealey R. (1967), ‘‘Alcibiades and the Charge of Aiming at Tyranny’’ in: Historia 16, 6–18.

Bibliography  273

Sedley D. (1998), ‘‘The Etymologies in Plato’s Cratylus” in: JHS 118, 140–54. Sicking C.M.J./Stork P. (1997), ‘‘The Grammar of the so-called Historical Present’’ in: Grammar as Interpretation: Greek Literature in its Linguistic Contexts, E.J. Bakker (ed.), Leiden, 131– 68. Sinclair R.K. (1988), Democracy and Participation in Athens, Cambridge. Sommerstein A. (2013), Oath and State in Ancient Greece, Berlin/Boston. Sordi M. (1992), La Dynasteia in Occidente, Padova. Sourvinou-Inwood C. (1997), ‘‘Reconstructing change: Ideology and the Eleusinian Mysteries’’ in: Inventing Ancient Culture. Historicism, Periodization and the Ancient World, M. Golden/ P. Toohey (eds.), London/New York, 132–64. Spence I.G. (1993), The Cavalry of Classical Greece: A Social and Military History, Oxford. Stanton G.R. (1990), ‘‘ΦΙΛΙΑ and ΧΕΝΙΑ in Euripides’ ‘Alkestis’’ in: Hermes 118, 42–54. de. Ste Croix G.E.M. (1972), The Origins of the Peloponnesian War, London. Strauss B.S. (1986), Athens after the Peloponnesian War, New York. Strauss B.S. (1993), Fathers and Sons in Athens: Ideology and Society in the Era of the Peloponnesian War, London. Strauss B.S. (1996), ‘‘The Athenian trireme, school of democracy’’ in: Demokratia: A conversation on democracies, ancient and modern, J. Ober/C. Hedrick (eds.), Princeton, 313–26. Strauss B.S. (2000), ‘‘Democracy, Kimon, and the Evolution of Athenian Naval Tactics in the Fifth Century BC.’’ in: Polis and Politics: Studies in Ancient Greek History presented to Mogens Herman Hansen on his sixtieth birthday, August 20, 2000, P. Flensted-Jensen/ T.H. Nielsen/L. Rubinstein (eds.), Copenhagen, 315–26. Strauss L. (1939), ‘‘The spirit of Sparta or the taste of Xenophon’’ in: Social Research 6, 502– 36. Struycken P. (2003), ‘‘Colour Mixtures According to Democritus and Plato’’ in: Mnemosyne 56, 273–305. Tacon J. (2001), ‘‘Ecclesiastic ‘Thorybos’: Interventions, Interruptions and Popular Involvement in the Athenian Assembly’’ in: G & R 48, 173–92. Tamiolaki M. (2008), ‘‘Les Helléniques entre tradition et innovation. Aspects de la relation intertextuelle de Xénophon avec Hérodote et Thucydide’’ in: CEA 45, 15–52. Tamiolaki M. (2013a), ‘‘Ascribing Motivation in Thucydides. Between Historical Research and Literary Representation’’ in: Thucydides Between History and Literature, M. Tamiolaki/ A. Tsakmakis (eds.), Berlin/Boston, 41–72. Tamiolaki M. (2013b), ‘‘Emotions and Historical Representation in Xenophon’s Hellenika’’ in: Unveiling Emotions II. Emotions in Greece and Rome: Texts, Images, Material Culture. Heidelberger althistorische Beiträge und epigraphische Studien (HABES), Bd 55, Stuttgart, 15–53. Tamiolaki M. (2014), ‘‘A l’ombre de Thucydide ? Les discours des Helléniques et l’influence thucydidéenne’’ in: Xénophon et la rhétorique, P. Pontier (ed.), Paris, 121–137. Tamiolaki M. (2016), ‘‘Athenian Leaders in Xenophon’s Memorabilia’’ in: Histos 5, 1–49. Tamiolaki M. (2017), ‘‘Xenophon’s Cyropaedia: Tentative Answers to an Enigma’’ in: The Cambridge Companion to Xenophon, M. Flower (ed.), Cambridge, 174–94. Tarrant D. (1955) , ‘‘Plato’s Extended Use of Oratio Obliqua’’ in: CQ 5, 222–24. Teegarden D.A. (2012), ‘‘The oath of Demophantos, Revolutionary Mobilization, and the Preservation of the Athenian Democracy’’ in: Hesperia 81, 433–65. Thomas R. (1989), Oral Tradition and Written Record, Cambridge.

274  Bibliography Thomas R. (2011), ‘‘And you, the Demos, made an uproar’: Performance, Mass audiences and text in the Athenian democracy’’ in: Sacred Words: Orality, Literacy and Religion. Orality and Literacy in the Ancient World, vol. 8, A.P.M.H. Lardinois/J.H. Blok/M.G.M. van der Poel, Leiden, 161–87. Todd S.C. (1993), The Shape of Athenian Law, Oxford. Todd S.C. (1996), ‘‘Lysias against Nikomakhos: The Fate of the Expert in Athenian Law’’ in: Greek Law in its Political Setting: Justifications not Justice, L. Foxhall/A.D.E. Lewis (eds.), Oxford, 101–31. Todd S.C. (2007), A Commentary on Lysias: Speeches 1–11, Oxford. Too Y.L. (2008), A Commentary on Isocrates’ Antidosis, Oxford. Trevett J. (1996), ‘‘Did Demosthenes publish his Deliberative Speeches?’’ in: Hermes 124, 425– 41. Tsakmakis A./Kostopoulos Y. (2011), ‘‘Cleon’s Imposition on his Audience’’ in: Thucydides-A violent teacher?: History and its representations, G. Rechenauer/V. Pothou (eds.), V&R unipress, 171–83, Tuplin C.J. (1987), ‘‘The treaty of Boeotius’’ in: Achemenid History II, H. Sancisi-Weerdenburg/ A.T. Kuhrt (eds.), Leiden, 133–53. Tuplin C.J. (1991), Review of Krentz ‘‘Xenophon’s Hellenika I-II.3.10’’ in: LCM 16, 24–26. Tuplin C.J. (1993), The Failings of Empire: A Reading of Xenophon Hellenica 2.3.11–7.5.27, Historia Einzelfschriften, Heft 76, Stuttgart. Tuplin C.J. (1998), ‘‘Demosthenes’ ‘‘Olynthiacs’’ and the Character of the Demegoric Corpus’’ in: Historia 47, 276–320. Tuplin C.J. (2009), ‘‘Persia in Xenophon’s Hellenica’’ in: The landmark Xenophon’ Hellenica: a new translation, R.B. Strassler (ed.), New York, 340–46. Tuci P.A. (2002), ‘‘La boulé nel processo agli strateghi della bataglia delle Arginuse: questioni procedurali e tentativi di manipolazione’’ in: D. Ambaglio (a cura di) Syngraphé. Materiali e appunti per lo studio della storia e della letteratura greca antica, 3, Como, 51–85. Usher S. (1999), Greek oratory. Tradition and originality, Oxford. Usher S. (2007a), ‘‘Symbouleutic Oratory’’ in: A Companion to Greek Rhetoric, I. Worthington (ed.), Oxford, 220–35. Usher S. (2007b), ‘‘Possibility: A Neglected Topos’’ in: BICS 50, 1–18. van Wees H., (2004), Greek Warfare: Myths and Realities, London. van Rossum-Steenbeek M.E. (1994), ‘Notes on Xenophon’’ in: Mnemosyne 47, 454–65. Vernant J.-P. (1991), ‘‘Between Shame and Glory: The Identity of the Young Spartan Warrior’’ in: Mortals and Immortals: Collected Essays, F. Zeitlin (ed.), Princeton, 220–43. von Reden S. (1995), ‘‘The Piraeus-A World Apart’’ in: G & R 42, 24–37. Vlassopoulos K. (2013), Greeks and Barbarians, Cambridge. Waterfield R. (2009), Why Socrates died, London. Waterfield R. (2012), ‘‘Xenophon on Socrates’ Trial and Death’’ in: Xenophon: Ethical Principles and Historical Enquiry, F. Hobden/C.J. Tuplin (eds.), Leiden, 269–305. Webster T.B.L. (1939), “Greek Theories of Art and Literature down to 400 B.C.’’ in: CQ 33, 166– 79. Westlake H.D. (1969), Essays on the Greek Historians and Greek History, Manchester. Westlake H.D. (1973), “The setting of Thucydides’ speeches’’ in: Speeches in Thucydides, P. Stadter (ed.), Chapel Hill, 90–108. Westlake H.D. (1982), ‘‘Review of J.E. Ziolkowski, Thucydides and the tradition of the funeral speeches at Athens, Salem, New Hampshire 1981’’ in: CR 32, 234–35.

Bibliography  275

Westlake H.D. (1983), ‘‘The Progress of Epiteichismos’’ in: CQ 33, 12–24. Whitehead D. (1986), The Demes of Attica 508/7 – ca. 250 B.C.: A Political and Social Study, Princeton. Whitehead D. (1988), “Athenians in Xenophon’s Hellenica’’ in: LCM 13, 145–47. Whitehead D. (2000), Hyperides: the forensic speeches, Oxford. Whitehead D. (2002), Aeneias the Tactician: How to Surive under Siege, Bristol. Whitehead D. (2007), ‘‘Theft’ in Greek Oratory’’ in: CQ 57, 70–76. Williams M.F. (1988), Ethics in Thucydides: The Ancient Simplicity, Lanham. Wilson P. (2000), The Athenian Institution of the Khoregia: The Chorus, the City and the Stage, Cambridge. Wohl V. (2017), ‘‘Thucydides on the Political Passions’’ in: The Oxford Handbook of Thucydides, R. Balot/S. Fordsyke/E. Foster (eds.), Oxford, 443–58. Wolpert A. (2003), “Addresses to the Jury in the Attic Orators’’ in: AJP 124, 537–55. Woodhead A.G. (1967), ‘‘ΙΣΗΓΟΡΙΑ and the Council of the 500’’ in: Historia 16, 129–40. Woodhead A.G. (1970), Thucydides on the Nature of Power, Harvard. Wooten C. (1979), ‘‘Unnoticed Medical Language in Demosthenes’’ in: Hermes 107, 157–60. Worman N. (2008), Abusive Mouths in Classical Athens, Cambridge. Worthington I. (1999), Greek Orators II: Dinarchus Hyperides, Warminster. Worthington I. (2004), ‘‘Oral Performance and the Demosthenic Prooemia’’ in: Oral Performance and its Context, C.M. Mackie (ed.), Leiden, 129–61. Wylie G. (1986), ‘‘What really happened at Aegospotami?’’ in: AC 55, 125–141. Yunis H. (1988), A New Creed: Fundamental Religious Beliefs in the Athenian Polis and Euripidean Drama, Gottingen. Yunis H. (1991), ‘‘How do the People decide? Thucydides on Periclean Rhetoric and Civic Instrucion’’ in: AJP 112, 179–200. Yunis H. (1996), Taming Democracy: Models of Political Rhetoric in Classical Athens, Ithaca/ London. Zumbrunnen Z. (2017), ‘‘Thucydides and Crowds’’ in: The Oxford Handbook of Thucydides, R. Balot/S. Fordsyke/E. Foster (eds.), Oxford, 475–89.

Index of Sources Aeschines 1.49 1.160 2.15 2.28 2.38 2.66 2.124 3.4 3.77 3.152 3.179 3.180 3.250

62 n.211 44 n.123 154 231 238 n.76 238 n.76 96 n.366, 40 n.101 164 n.121 153 n.77 166 n.134 46 n. 134, 205 n.330 47 n.136 170 n.160

Aeschylus Agamemnon 634–37 205 n.323 Eumenides 152 n.71 Prometheus Bound 1085–88 163 Anaximenes Rhetorica ad Alexandrum 438a 197 n.295 1438a4 197 n.295 1438a22–16 197 n.292 Andocides 1.4 1.16 1.29–30 1.36 1.48 1.57 1.80 1.103 1.121–22 1.137–38 2.5–6 2.105 3.19

39 n.101, 41 n.105, 96 n.366 78 167 41 n.105 62 n.210 134 n.1 192 n.270 103 n.228 155 n.87 165 n.128 56 n.185 56 n.185 204 n.317

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110668315-008

[Andocides] 4.36

41 n.105

Anonymi Intr.Proleg.Hermog.Rhet. 14.274 169 n.158 Antiphon 1.13 5.13 5.73

52 n.169 51 n.163 64 n.276

Aristophanes Acharnians 352–55 170 n.160 Birds 1133 45 n.127 1372–1409 43 n.118 Ecclesiazousai 399–400 170 n.60 865–66 110 n.69 Peace 1067–68 243 n.65 Plutus 329–30 170 n. 160 Thesmophoriazousai 837 160 n.109 Aristotle Eudemian Ethics 1241a12–13 41 n.108 1245a29–30 105 n.33 1233b29–31 111 n.73 Nicomachean Ethics 1114a23–25 92 n.346 1124b30–1125a2 111 n.73 1133a2–4 82 n.300 1145b12–13 92 n.346 1250a2 92 n.352 1239a26–27 45 n.128 1239a 29–30 45 n.128 Politics 1263b21–22 111 n.73

278  Index of Sources 1292ba5–6 169 n.158 1302a34–35 118 n.116 1313b41–1314a4 111 n.73 Rhetoric 1371a32–33 45 n.131 1371a33–34 117 n.105 1374b4–5 197 n.290 1374b6–7 197 n.291 1374b7–8 180 n.207 1378a 178 n.197 1378b15–17 241 n.87 1379b36–37 92 n.342 1381a25–28 45 n.130 1382a7 214 n.377 1387b23–24 238 n.77 1390a30–31 183 n.229 1408a32–6 106 n.41 1411a31–b1 153 n.74 [Aristotle] Athenaion Politeia 1.14 64 n.215 2.14 99 n.5 2.19 49 n.147 3.11 64 n.215 28.3 214 n.377 41.2 249 n.115 On the World 394b8–9 137 n.8 On Vices and Virtues 1250a22–25 92 n.346 Artemidorus Onerocriticus 2.8

137 n.12

Chariton Chaereus and Calliroe 1.11.1 137 n. 9 3.5.9–6.1 137 n. 9 Comica Adespota fr. 3–5 (Kock) 122 n. 142 Demosthenes 1.10 6.6 8.10

92 n.344 182 n.221 182 n.221

11.7 14.26 14.34 15.9 15.33 18.6 18.7 18.22 18.41 18.70 18.84 18.101 18.110 18.161 18.171 18.176 18.180 18.196–97 18.274 18.317–18 18.321 19.155 19.334 21.76 23.25 22.36 22.75 23.66 23.81 23.97 23.141 23.151 23.158–62 23.162 23.198 23.210 24.152 24.183 25.19 25.20 25.49 25.50 25.64 25.67 25.97 35.45 36.42

182 n.221 49 n.146 149 n.54 182 n.221 41 n.106 41 n.105 187 n.249 238 n.76 238 n.76 164 n. 121 41 n.105 56 n.189 41 n.105 56 n.189 41 n.105 182 n.221 238 n.76 238 n.76 186 n.244 168 n.149 41 n.105 109 n.65 168 n.149 186 n.244 187 n.250 190 n.267 205 n.332 40 n.102 195 n.281 162 n.115 196 n.287 205 n.331 188 n.256 41 n.105 45 n.127 45 n.127 194 n.278 205 n.332 172 n.168 185 172 n.168 172 n.168 41 n.105 41 n.10541 n.105 46 n.136 40 n.102 48 n.143

Index of Sources  279

37.26 37.50 39.3–4 41.10 42.25 45.50 60.32–37 60.33 Prooem. 18.1 25.3 50.2 Letters 2.8 2.10 2.13 3.11 3.32

40 n.102 48 n.143 155 48 n.145 48 n.144 40 n.102 164 n.123 153 n.78 182 n.221 41 n.105 41 n.105 205 n.326 62 n.211 56 n.187 205 n.326 41 n.105

[Demosthenes] 40.59 44.24 49.46 53.4

62 n.210 196 n.286 48 n.143 62 n.210

Dinarchus 1.76 2.6 2.14

144 n.35 170 n.160 65 n.220

Dio Cassius Historia Romana 40.34.3 50.31.2 56.20.3–45 56.21.3

27 n.34 17 n.24, 20 n.36 20 n.36 20 n.36

Diodorus Siculus 5.40.1 11.12.6 11.19.2 11.19.6 11.21.2 11.19.2 13.11.5 13.51.5–6 13.61.1

100 n.6 25 n.53 27 n.62 100 n.6 25 n.53 27 n.62 27 n.62 21 n.41 101 n.19

13.63.1 13.71.1 13.76.3–4 13.76.5 13.99.4–5 13.101.2 13.104.3 13.105.3–4 13.105.4 14.64.2 14.83.7 15.43.5 15.57.3 17.14.3

101 n.19 86 n.319 90 n.338 119 n.122 131 n.192 145 n.43 227 n.43 236 n.63 237 27 n.62 27 n.62 19 n.30 212 n.360 248 n.109

Epicrates fr. 11 (K–A)

169 n.154

Eupolis Flatterers fr. 159.11–13 (Kock) 111 n.75 Euripides Autolycus (Nauck TGF 441) Alcmeon fr. 88a (Kannicht) 118 n.111 Helen 483 118 n.110 Iphigeneia in Tauris 947–60 215 n.379 Phoenician women 388 51 n.163 Rhesus 61–70 30 n.73 Hellanicus FGrH4 F 125

155

Hermogenes On Types of Style 1.6 106 n.40 Herodianus Περὶ ὀρθογραφίας 3.2,562 137 n.9

280  Index of Sources Herodotus 1.147 2.20.2 3.21 3.83.4 9.48.1–3 9.51 9.53 9.55 9.58 9.59 9.58 9.59 9.78–79

75 n.266 127 n.174 82 n.301 74 n.259 129 129 129 129 129 129 129 129 249 n.116

Hesychius s.v. οὔριος

137 n.9

Himerius Oration 47

137 n.9

Homer Iliad 7.293

30 n.71

Hyperides 2.18 3.27 4.7–8 5.12 6.1 6.10 6.24 6.41–43

160 n.109 57 n.190 194 n.275 172 n.167 165 n.130 56 n.189, 66 n.225 203 n.315 164 n.123

Inscriptiones Graecae IG II² 1349 62 n.208 IG II² 1539 62 n.208 IG II³,1 1419 62 n.208 IG II³,1 1023 62 n.208 Isaeus 1.3 5.46 7.13

183 n.228 62 n.209 62 n.211

7.38 11.47

48 n.143 62 n.209

Isocrates 1.33 1.36 3.62 4.13 4.24 4.46 4.65 4.143 5.53 5.60 6.1 7.12 8.13 8.28 8.133 9.31 9.45 10.37 11.39 12.169 12.219–20 12.241 12.264 15.2 15.13–14 15.116 15.232 16.42 17.116 18.1 18.23 18.50 20.10 20.16

47 n.140 183 n.231 196 n.287 149 n.54 55 n.181 64 n.219 25 n.53 149 n.54 204 n.319 203 n.315 62 n.211 204 n.319 149 n.54 62 n.209 65 n.220 118 n.111 174 n.175 49 n.146 98 n.366 139 n.15 59 n.200 44 n.126 168 n.149 42 n.114 210 n.350 149 n.54 64 n.219 60 n.202 182 n.221 40 n.102 47 n.139 62 n.209 54 n.175 40 n.102

Justinus 4.4.1–2

154

Lex.Segueriana s.v. Ἀπατούρια

155 n.85

[Longinus] On the Sublime 25 12 n.6

Index of Sources  281

Lucian Anacharsis 36 Scythian 11

46 n.135 137 n.11

Lycurgus 1.54 1.116 1.139–40

205 n.327 182 n.223 56 n.186

Lysias 1.3 1.4 1.16 1.25 1.26 1.33 1.38 1.44 2.10 2.17 2.25 2.38 2.60 2.69–81 2.72 2.73 2.74 10.12 12.36 12.43 12.57 12.65 12.74 13.5–6 13.17–20 13.35 13.40–41 13.42 13.93 13.96 13.97 14.10 14.38–39 14.39 18.5

121 n.135, 122 n.142 121 n.135 121 n.135 121 n.135 121 n.135 121 n.135 121 n.135 121 n.135 149 n.54 165 n.132 165 n.130 12 n.3 203 n.315 164 n.123 62 n.211 165 n.130 248 n.109 40 n.102 171n.162 171n.162 47 n.139, 48 n.141 41 n.105 248 n.109 171 n.162 155 n.86 167 n.142 152 n.69 152 n.69 41 n.105 64 n.216 167 n.142 41 n.105 54 n.175 62 n.211 155 n.88

19.4 19.50 21.1 21.1–5 21.11 21.12 21.13 21.14 21.16 22.18 24.17 25.25–26 26.19 29.7 29.8 30.6 30.10 30.11 30.22 30.25 30.26 31.3 31.8–9 fr. LXXXV (Carey) fr. LXXXVI (Carey)

215 n.380 52 n.168 48 n.143, 60 n.205 48 n.143 48 n.143 182 n.220 48 n.143 48 n.143 48 n.143 192 n.269 62 n.211 64 n.216 54 n.175 55 n.176 48 n.143 155 n.86 155 n.86 162 n.114 190 n.267 192 n.269 48 n.143 214 n.373 214 n.373 44 n.118 44 n.118

[Lysias] 20.14 20.31 20.36

160 n.109 149 n.54 62 n.210

Philostratus On Athletics 2

46 n.135

Pindar Isthmionicus 1.2.17 Olympionicus 3.1–4

206 n.334

Plato Alcibiades I 119b5–10 Apology 33d9

46 n.136

206 n.334

62 n.210

282  Index of Sources Cratylus 384c9–11 391b11–c4 410c5–7 Critias 53d5 Crito 46a8 53b2 Euthyphron 2b12–c8 Gorgias 473c5–7 478d6–7 479b6 Gorgias 473c5–7 Laches 190e5–6 190e5–191e3 Laws 692e6–693a5 700c3 876b3 876b5 886a9–b2 934a4 Menexenus 234a6–b1 237d4–e7 238e4–239a2 245d4–6 246b5–c8 Phaedo 83a4–b2 Protagoras 342d Respublica 331c 334c4–5 465c1 492b5–7 560a1–2 562b1–2 564a6–8 572e1 573a4–6

154 154 137 n.7 212 n.361 155 62 n.211 51 n.163 62 n.210,62 n.210 171 n.163 192 n.272 192 n.272 171 n.163 129 129 221 n.19 169 n.150 169 n.151 169 n.152 92 n.348 92 n.348 62 n.211 134 n.1 55 n.179 221 n.18 164 153 n.76 82 n.302 214 n.377 214 n.377 111 n.73 185 n.237 212 n.360 171 n.163 171 n.163 93 n.356 93 n.356

614b Theatetus 192d3–6 [Plato] Definitions 414e9–10 Eryxias 397a7–b3

165 n.127 68 n.233

111 n.73 92 n.348

Plutarch Agesilaus 20.6 105 n.37 36.2 131 n.190 Alexander 33.11 30 n.73 Alcibiades 23.7–8 121 n.135, 122 n.142 23.8 121 n.135 24.3 121 n.135 24.4 105 n.37 34.1–2 42 n.113 34.4 76 35.6 86 n.319 36.1 93 n.354 36.4 93 n.354 37.2 239 n.81 Comparatio Alcibiades–Coriolanus 209 n.346 Demosthenes 22.3 153 n.77 22.5 152 n.72 22.6 152 n.68 26.2 212 n.361 29.3 140 n.16 Eumenes 15.5 25 n.53 Laconian Apophthegms 228b–c 121 n.142 229b5 243 n.95 Lycurgus 25.3–4 105 n.37 26.1–4 110 n.69 Lysander 2.1–2 105 n.37 6.2 99 n.6 6.5–6 109 n.59 7.4 243 n.95

Index of Sources  283

10.4 Moralia 46e11–f5 58c8–9 58e5–8 179b4–6 164f1 470a11–b7 470e2–471a3 511a 539d11 553c 553d1–3 599f3 599d5–7 604d1 609a–b 609f 722e10 Nicias 14.5 Pericles 13.14–15 Themistocles 29.1 Timoleon 18.4

237 n.70 192 n.272 111 n.73 111 n.73 109 n.70 152 n.73 117 n.105 117 n.105 82 n.302 111 n.73 160 n.108 186 n.242 56 n.187 71 n.244 5 n.32 152 n.69 152 n.72 189 n.259 231 42 n.113 110 n.68 25 n.53

Polybius 16.5.2 3.44.1–3

131 n.192 230

Polyaenus Strategemata 1.19

155 n.85

Porphyrius Abstinentia 2.18

41 n.112

Scholia Aristoph. Peace s.v. ἀνάρρυσιν 155 n.85 Euripides Andromache ll. 33–36 s.v. ἄλλως 137 n.9 Oppianum s.v. οὔριον 137 n.9

Sophocles Antigone 505 585 Oedipus Tyrant 886 Philoctetes 569

118 n.111 118 n.110 118 n.111 118 n.111

Suda s.v. ἀναρρύει

155 n.85

Theophrastus 2.1

111 n.73

Thucydides 1.22.1 1.122.4 1.43.4 1.49.5 1.54.1 1.60.1 1.61.1 1.77.6 1.80.4 1.84.3–4 1.108.4 1.122.4 1.130.2 1.142.4 2.4.3 2.9 2.18.2 2.18.5 2.21 2.22 2.34.1–4 2.35.1 2.37 2.37.1 2.59.3 2.62.3 2.40.2–3 2.42.3 2.62.3 2.62.4 2.65.3–4

111 n.77 92 n.343 99 n.5 28 n.62 139 77 n.276 77 n.276 98 113 101 n.15 33 n.79 240 110 n.67 87 n.324 126 n.161 36 n.94,224 193 223 n.29 223 n.29 111 n.77 139 165 n.130 111 n.77 187 111 n.77 223 n.30 249 n.115 60 n.201 223 n.30 241 n.87 111 n.77

284  Index of Sources 2.65.12 2.70.1–3 2.70.3–4 2.78.1 2.84.4 3.12.1 3.23.4 3.32.3 3.34 3.36.2 3.36.2–4 3.37.2 3.38.1 3.41–49 3.42.1 3.43.5 3.44.4 3.45.4 3.47.2 3.47.5 3.49.4 3.58.3 3.81.2 3.81.2–81 3.81–83 3.82.1 3.82.4 3.82.6 3.82.7 3.82.7–8 3.23.3 3.81.2–81 3.81.2 3.82.1 3.84.1–2 3.82.8 3.89.2 3.98.5 3.94.2 4.8.8 4.23.2 4.26.1–3 4.23.2 4.27.1 4.28.2 4.32.3–4 4.48.2

37 123 n.149 119 n.120 87 n.321 28 n.62 118 n.112 20 n.33 99 n.6 88 111 n.77 191 191 111 n.73, n.77 191 111 n.77 111 n.77 111 n.77 111 n.77 41 n.106 248 248 41 n.106 212 n.359 212 n.360 102 212 n.359 181 158,168 68 167 99 n.5 212 n.360 212 n.359 212 n.359 111 n.77 103 n.28 135 142 86 n.321 235 138 235 138 235 239 87 239

4.57.4 4.81.2–3 4.86.6 4.121.1–2 4.122.6 5.18.5 5.9.5 5.9.9 5.32.1 5.63.2 6.8.2 6.9.12 6.11.4–5 6.12.1–2 6.12.2 6.13.1 6.14.1 6.15 6.15.2 6.15.2–3 6.15.2–4 6.15.4 6.16.1 6.16.2 6.17.1 6.18.6 6.20.1–4 6.26.1 6.21.1–23 6.24.3 6.29.1–2 6.25.1 6.28 6.28.2 6.29.1 6.29.1–2 6.31.5 6.33.3 6.41.2 6.46 6.48 6.48.1 6.51 6.51.1–2 6.52 6.53 6.53.1

33 n.79 221 n.17 158 206 n.333 248 33 n.79 244 107 n.52 244,248 111 n.77 71, 74 n.256 49 45 n.132 116 n.101 45 62 192 n.273 74 29 n.69 50 93 39 29 n.69 72 73, 111 n.77 63 73 71 73 73 142 164 48 52, 169 n.150, 170 51 52 119 n.120 69 n.236 201 n.307 58 58 58 58 36 58 58 39 n.101, 43 n.120, 95

Index of Sources  285

6.53.2–3 6.60.4 6.60–61.4 6.61.1 6.66.1–2 6.61.4 6.61.4–5 6.61.6 6.61.7 6.72.2 6.88.9 6.89.2 6.89.4 6.89.5 6.91.5 6.92.3–5 6.95.1 6.104.2 7.1.7 7.8.1 7.11–12 7.13.2 7.18.1 7.27–28 7.34.6 7.43.5–7 7.44.1 7.47.2 7.48.2 7.48.4 7.52.2 7.56.2 7.57.4 7.59.2 7.64.2 7.75.1 8.1.1 8.1.2 8.6.1 8.6.3 8.6.52 8.12.1 8.14.1–3 8.16.3 8.17.3 8.17.4 8.21

170 170 60 95 236 39 n.101, 95 95 39 n.101 39 n.101 148 n.51 54 56 57 44 75 57 75 135 134 n.1 91 n.340 58 80 n.288 87 59 133 30 30 28 n.63 99 n.6 99 n.5 20 n.39 122 n.142 25 244 56 n.186 201 n.305 66 14 33 n.79 14 67 n.228 12 n.5 12 n.5 26 112 n.82 25 149 n.53

8.25.1–5 8.25.3 8.26.1–27.3 8.27.2 8.27.6 8.27.2 8.30.2 8.31.3 8.31.4 8.32.1 8.33.1 8.33.3 8.34.1 8.38.2 8.38.5 8.39.2 8.40.1 8.40.3 8.41 8.41.2 8.41.3–42.1 8.42.1 8.43.1–4 8.45 8.45.2 8.46.5 8.48.5 8.53.1–2 8.53.2 8.53.1–54.1 8.53.2 8.55.2 8.58.6 8.62.1–2 8.63.3 8.66.1 8.66.2 8.66–70 8.67.2 8.70.2 8.71.1 8.71.2 8.73.5 8.80.2 8.81.3 8.82.1 8.84.5

25 34 130 201 n.305 34 201 n.305 25, 99 n.5 126 n.161 86 86, 126 n.161 86 86 86, 126 n.161, 135 90, 99 25 47 n.139 90 90 99 n.5 224 n.33 125 20 n.35 37 n.95 59 80 n.288 84 77 n. 277 40 169 n.150 72 18 90 81 n.291, 81 n.294 90 193 156 70 171 168 23 23 23 148 14 72 13, 72 114

286  Index of Sources 8.86.1–7 8.86.8–9 8.89 8.90 8.92.2 8.94–95 8.95.3–5 8.97.2 8.98.3–4 8.99 8.99.1 8.103.1 8.103.2 8.104–05 8.104–6 8.106 8.106.3 8.106.5 8.107.1 8.108 8.108.1 8.109.1

61 34 78 193 68 204 n.322 235 39 194 10 13, 135 10 10 10 204 n.322 133 11 204 77 n.276 13 18 26 n.58

Tyrtaeus fr. 10.1 (West) fr. 10.16 (West) fr. 12.17 (West)

127 n.174 127 n.174 127 n.174

Xenophon Agesilaus 1.11–12 1.15 1.27 1.35 1.36 1.37 8.3 12.7 20.6 Anabasis 1.5.9 1.6.1 1.9.8 1.15 2.1.19 2.3.20 2.3.23

116 n.100 15 n.18 108 n.56 111 n.72 107 n.52 103 41 n.106 131 105 n.37 242 n.92 126 n.163 108 n.56 15 n.19 106 n.42 106 n.42 116 n.103

2.4.4 2.5.31 2.6.9 3.1.11 3.1.23 3.1.42 3.2.8 3.2.11 3.2.15 4.2.2 4.2.2–4 4.18 4.1.18 4.2.2 4.5.4 4.5.26 5.7.24 5.1.15–16 5.3.4–13 5.4.57 5.5.21–22 5.7.24 6.1.29 6.5.23 6.32 7.1.30 7.3.11 7.3.36 7.4.1–2 7.7.29–30 7.8.1–2 Cynegeticus 6.3 7.5 10.9 10.15 12.10 13.5 Cyropaedia 1.2.1 1.3.2 1.6.39–40 2.1.21 3.1.39 5.1.13–14 6.2.1 8.1.23–33

110 n.68 110 n.68 112 n.79 126 n.163 116 n.103 116 n.103 116 n.103 116 n.103 116 n.103 20 n.34, 126 n.164 30 n.73 126 n.163 126 n.163 n.34 20 n.34 20 82 n.297 224 n.35 100 n.14 120 n.125 92 n.344 68 n.232 224 n.35 212 n.359 116 n.103 116 n.103 106 n.42 26 n.56 116 n.103 26 n.56 118 n.112 119 n.121 244 n.97 112 n.79 112 n.79 112 n.79 251 n.126 155 180 100 n.68 225 n.36 201 n.306 55 n.183 47 n.140 82 n.301 118 n.113

Index of Sources  287

8.1.139 8.1.33–34 8.1.139 8.6.3 8.7.14 Hellenica 1.1.1 1.1.2 1.1.2–5 1.1.3 1.1.4 1.1.5 1.1.5–7 1.1.6 1.1.7 1.1.8 1.1.9 1.1.10 1.1.11 1.1.11–13 1.1.12 1.1.13 1.1.14 1.1.14–16 1.1.15 1.1.16 1.1.16–18 1.1.17 1.1.18 1.1.19–20 1.1.21 1.1.22 1.1.23 1.1.24 1.1.25 1.1.27 1.1.27–28 1.1.27–31 1.1.28 1.1.29 1.1.30 1.1.31 1.1.33 1.1.34 1.1.35 1.1.35–36

206 n.334 110 n.68 55 n.183 100 n.14 55 n.180 11, 100 n.7 11, 241 n.88, 242 n.90 226 n.42 226 12 85 n.309 100 n.7, 133,204 n.322 14, 224 225 n.34 14, 33 n.82, 242 n.90 24 16, 85 n.309, 212 n.362 16, 85 n.309, 128 n.183, 225 n.37 226 n.42, 242 n.90 16 33 n.82 17, 247 17, 219 241 n.88 19 20, 85 n.309, 220 n.14 100 n.7, 204 n.322 20, 89, 133, 227 21, 243 21 22 22 22 23 241 n.89 47, 91, 95 85, 241 n.88, 103 5, 47, 94 29 n.68, 95, 108 n.56 247 149 n.52 241 n.89 86 23 23 76 31

1.1.36 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.2.4 1.2.5 1.2.6 1.2.7 1.2.8 1.2.10 1.2.11 1.2.12 1.2.13 1.2.15 1.2.16 1.2.15–16 1.2.17 1.3.1 13.1–22 1.3.2 1.3.3 1.3.4 1.3.5 1.3.6 1.3.7 1.3.8–9 1.3.11 1.3.12 1.3.13 1.3.14 1.3.16 1.3.17 1.3.19–21 1.3.20 1.3.22 1.3.1–22 1.3.4 1.3.12 1.4.1 1.4.2 1.4.3 1.4.4 1.4.5 1.4.8 1.4.8 1.4.8–9 1.4.10

225 n.37 24 24 25 25, 31 n.74 243 26 27 27 27 28 28 28, 33 n.82, 225 n.37 29, 31 30 225 n.38 247 31 85 n.309 31 31 86 n.321 31 32 32 32 234 n.55 35 n.83 96 35 35 45 35 151 n.64 212 n.362 85 n.309 31, 86 n.321 34 140 81 37 38 38 247 n.104 247 38 39, 161

288  Index of Sources 1.4.11 1.4.12 1.4.13 1.4.13–17 1.4.14 1.4.16 1.4.17 1.4.13–17 1.4.18 1.4.19 1.4.20 1.4.20–22 1.4.21 1.4.21–22 1.4.22–23 1.4.23 1.5.1 1.5.2 1.5.2–7 1.5.5 1.5.8–9 1.5.10 1.5.11–14 1.5.12 1.5.14 1.5.12–14 1.5.15 1.5.16 1.5.17 1.5.18 1.5.19 1.5.20 1.5.21 1.6.3 1.6.7 1.6.8–11 1.6.12 1.6.15 1.6.16–17 1.6.18 1.6.20 1.6.19–22 1.6.22–23 1.6.24 1.5.25 1.6.24–25 1.6.25–26

77 40, 41, 75 n.264 44, 69, 92 n.351 46 48, 69 60, 63, 75 n.264 65 46 47 n.137, 67 168 47 n.137, 74, 75 74, 221, n.20 77, 80, n.287, 99 242 n.90 78 85 n.309, 88 98 79 116 n.99 81 n.292 83 161 100 n.7, 204 n.322, 226 89, 226 99 89 89, 227 91 233, 247 n.103 99 97 97 222 101 120 n.128 113 117 107 n.47 88 n.330 138 138 124, 246 124 133 133 125 226 n.42

1.6.26 1.6.26–27 1.6.27–28 1.6.28 1.6.29 1.6.30 1.6.29–30 1.6.29–34 1.6.31 1.6.32 1.6.33–34 1.6.33 1.6.34 1.6.33–34 1.6.35 1.6.36 1.6.37–38 1.6.38 1.6.4 1.6.5 1.6.8 1.6.19–22 1.6.25 1.6.26 1.6.28 1.6.29–30 1.6.32 1.6.33 1.6.34 1.6.33–34 1.6.35

1.7.1 1.7.2 1.7.1–2 1.7.3 1.7.4 1.7.5 1.7.4–5 1.7.6 1.7.7 1.7.8 1.7.9

133 134 125 20 n.35, 135 199 198 148 100 n.7 242 n.90 241 n.89 227 136, 197 133 227 241 n.89 136 128 n.183, 227 212 n.362 218 n.7 103 111 246 20 n.35, 135 133, 226 20 n.35 148 n.49 227 134, 243 133 132 88 n.328, 136, 139, 140, 145, 146, 147, 150, 164, 179, 180, 187, 193, 196, 197, 198, 199, 228, 241 n.89 188 247 143 184 156 241 n.89 156 180 20 n.33 152, 155 156, 185, 186, 190, 197, 206, 208

Index of Sources  289

1.7.8–9 1.7.10 1.7.11 1.7.12 1.7.13 1.7.14 1.7.15 1.7.16 1.7.17 1.7.18 1.7.19 1.7.22 1.7.23 1.7.24 1.7.25 1.7.26 1.7.28 1.7.29 1.7.30 1.7.32 1.7.33 1.7.34 1.7.35 1.7.43.5–7 2.1.1–5 2.1.6–7 2.1.6 2.1.7 2.1.10 2.1.11 2.1.12 2.1.13 2.1.14 2.1.15 2.1.13–15 2.1.16 2.1.16–28 2.1.17 2.1.18 2.1.19 2.17–19 2.1.17–19 2.1.20 2.1.21 2.1.22 2.1.23 2.1.24

156 n.90 157, 184, 206 164, 251 168 169, 173 173 173, 251 177 178 179, 200 106 n.42 184, 189 185, 207 186, 189, 191, 197 187, 206 189, 191, 203, 207 75 n.265, 206 184, 196 199 202 126 n.164 208 145 n.42 247 217 226 218 n.7 218 226, 227 219 219 219 227 221 83 n.304 217, 228 244 218, 222 243 224 244 244 224 225 232 243 230

2.1.22–24 2.1.25 2.1.26 2.1.27 2.1.28 2.1.29 2.1.30–32 2.2.21–22 2.2.23 2.3.2 2.3.11 2.3.12 2.3.13 2.3.15 2.3.16 2.3.17 2.3.21 2.3.22 2.3.23 2.3.34 2.3.35–49 2.3.41 2.3.48–49 2.4.11 2.4.3 2.4.20 2.4.23 2.4.26 2.4.27 2.4.29 2.4.31 2.4.35 2.4.36 2.4.37 2.4.38 2.4.39 2.4.37 2.4.40 2.4.43 3.1.1–2 3.1.16 3.1.17–18 3.2.3 3.2.12 3.2.6–7 3.4.1 3.4.12

244 244 236 120 n.127 198 n.296 246 248 161 213 n.372 161 161 100 n.7 100 n.7 213 n.371 70 187 172 187 n.247 172 107 n.52, 118 n.115 107 70 107 213 n.364 86 n.321 100 n.7 214 213 n.364 213 n.364 213 n.364 213 n.364 213 n.364 213 n.364 213 n.364 100 n.7 213 n.364 213 n.364 106 n.42 214 82 n.300 245 244, 245 230 111 n.72 29 n.70 19 n.31 15 n.19

290  Index of Sources 3.4.16–19 29 n.70 3.5.20 32 4.3.11–12 247 4.3.12 131 n.192 4.5.4 20 n.34, 126 n.164 4.8.8 236 n.61, 247 4.8.9–10 247 4.8.13 247 4.8.22 92 n.350 4.13–15 111 n.72 4.24 111 n.72 4.5.4 126 n.164 4.8.10 99 n.6 5.1.3–4 29 n.70 5.1.4 19 5.1.16 75 n.265 5.3.5–6 213 n.369 5.3.7 112 5.4.20 156 n.89 5.4.54 26 n.57 5.4.57 92 n.344 6.1.15 106 n.42 6.2.27 16 n.24 6.2.28–29 240 n.83 6.2.29 20 n.33 6.4.18 47 n.139 6.4.21 242 n.92 7.1.5 204 n.322 7.1.8 107 n.52 7.1.9 204 n.321 7.1.17 68 n.232 7.5.11–13 43 Hieron 3.4 122 n.142 6.4 68 n.234 On Horsemanship 6.12 112 n.79 8.13 17 n.25 9.2 112 n.79 9.7 112 n.79 Lacedaimonion Politeia 2.7–8 125 n.159 2.14 107 n.52 4.5 113 n.85 4.6 111

5.7 7.2 8.3 12.5 14.1 Memorabilia 1.2.24 1.2.48 1.2.51 1.2.60–61 1.5.3–4 2.1.6 2.1.14–15 2.1.31 2.1.24–25 2.3.3 2.6.21 2.6.23 2.9.6 3.1.6–7 3.3.11 3.5.13 3.6.17 3.6.18 2.3.3 4.2.33 4.6.12 8.16.3 Oeconomicus 1.19 21.4 Poroi 1.1 Symposium 8.39

122 n.143 112 n.80 118 n. 109 20 n.37 102 n.22 92 n.345 65 n.220, 85 n.311 192 n.272 180 92 n.348 92 n.345 68 n.235 62 n.211 85 n.312 47 n.139 112 n.79 112 n.79 161 n.110 259 17 n.25 92 n.351 117 n.106 45 n.127 47 n.139 51 n.163, 59 n.199 171 n.163 125 n.160 92 n.346 118 n.115 143 n.26 148 n.51

[Xenophon] Athenaion Politeia 1.14 64 n.215 2.14 99 n.5 2.19 49 n.147 3.11 64 n.215 11.2 62 n.209 28.3 214 n.377 41.2 249 n.115

General Index Accusation(s) 43, 51–58, 93, 95, 105– 107, 143, 150, 156, 170, 173, 180–81, 194, 197, 248, 251 Adeimantus 74, 77–78, 140–41, 174, 206, 222, 229, 237–38, 247–48, 250– 251, 254 Aegospotami 3, 6, 8, 102, 120, 130–31, 159, 171, 198, 203, 213, 216–17, 220, 225, 227, 230–37, 239, 244, 246–247, 251–52, 257–60 Alcibiades 2, 3, 8, 10, 12–23, 28, 30–79, 83–100, 102, 120, 127, 130, 132, 140, 142, 145–46, 149, 151, 159, 161, 169– 170, 178, 181, 190, 192, 206–208, 210, 212–13, 219–22, 225–27, 230–41, 244, 246–47, 250, 253–57, 259 Ambassador(s) 34, 36, 38, 42, 66, 68, 79, 80–82, 109–111, 153–154, 190, 218, 247 Anger 110–112, 123, 152–53, 166, 169– 70, 174, 182, 186, 191, 213, 249 Anonymous man 136, 145, 164, 167, 171, 185, 188, 197, 251 Antiochus 86–91, 127, 145 Apatouria 151–52, 154–55, 168 Archedemus 142–45, 161, 211, 256 Arginousai 3, 5–6, 35, 61, 69, 86, 88, 125–140, 142–43, 145–148, 150–151, 154, 156–157, 159–160, 163, 166–168, 172, 176, 178–81, 188–89, 194–95, 197–99, 202, 204–208, 210, 212–15, 217, 210, 225–226, 228, 237, 241, 243, 247, 249, 251, 256–257, 260 Aristocrat(s) 4, 15, 34, 48–49, 62, 175 Assembly 13, 17, 24, 35–36, 50, 52–53, 57–58, 60, 62, 64–65, 69–72, 85, 95, 109, 113, 136, 145–147, 151–157, 160, 162, 164, 166, 167–69, 171, 173–79, 182, 185, 187–90, 197–99, 202–203, 206, 208, 210, 221, 241, 248–49, 251, 255, 257 Athens 2, 3, 6, 7, 10–12, 14, 19, 22–24, 28, 32–34, 36, 38–41, 43–46, 49, 51– 64, 66–70, 72–73, 75–79, 83–85, 87– https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110668315-009

88, 90–91, 93–97, 115, 118–22, 124, 134, 139–41, 143–46, 153, 155, 158–61, 163–64, 166, 170–72, 178, 184, 187, 190, 194–95, 202–204, 209–216, 221– 24, 226, 234, 236–39, 241–242, 246– 48, 250–53, 255–56, 258–59 Athlete(s) 46, 92, 205–206 Attica 57, 76, 184, 193, 240 (naval) battle 3, 10, 12–13, 16–17, 20–22, 30–32, 35, 56, 63, 88–89, 91, 95, 98– 100, 116, 122, 126–31, 133–34, 136, 139, 148–49, 157, 159–60, 165, 171, 197–98, 201, 203–204, 208, 212, 217, 219–22, 226–27, 229–34, 236–37, 240–48, 252, 257–59 Boule (see also Council of the Five Hundred) 145, 156, 160, 190 Booty 25, 31, 119, 222, 230 Bribe(ry) 56, 156, 170 Byzantium 31, 33–34, 36, 102, 131, 223, 225, 231, 252 Calchedon 31, 33, 86, 102, 143, 223, 231, 252 Callicratidas 3, 6, 8, 20, 85, 88, 90, 98– 135, 138, 148, 218–19, 221, 224, 226– 27, 241, 243, 246, 252–53, 258–59 Callixenus 35, 142, 155–57, 160, 162–63, 167–69, 172–74, 182–86, 189–191, 196–97, 203, 206–15, 249, 254, 256 Captives 154, 247–50, 252, 259 Cash 33, 80–81, 115, 120, 124, 219, 258 Charge(s) 40, 48, 51–53, 76, 92, 95, 142, 147, 194 Chios 10, 13, 86–87, 89–90, 119, 123, 128, 132, 135–137, 217–18, 221–23, 227–28 Citizen(s) 22–23, 28, 33–34, 37–38, 40– 42, 44–50, 52–65, 67, 69–71, 73, 76– 77, 85, 87–88, 91, 93–6, 103, 110, 113, 116, 118–120, 128, 133, 140, 142–143, 152, 156, 158, 160, 161–64, 166, 168– 170, 174, 176, 178, 182–85, 187–89,

292  General Index 191–2, 195–97, 201, 205, 208–10, 212, 214–15, 221, 223–24, 229, 233–34, 237, 240, 242, 245, 247, 249–51, 253, 254, 257 Conon 3, 19–20, 39, 86, 88, 91, 96–99, 102, 121–25, 130, 131, 134, 136–41, 204, 221–22, 228–29, 232, 236–39, 242–43, 246–47, 257, 259 Colour 134, 152–54 Conspiracy 48, 51, 53, 101, 145, 155–156, 162, 170–72, 181, 188–89, 218, 251, 256 Contempt 50–51, 110, 117, 184, 211, 239– 40, 243, 245 Council of the Five Hundred 7, 61, 69– 71, 95, 107, 144–46, 150, 151, 155–56, 173, 178, 185, 189–90, 203, 206–208, 211– 12, 255 Councilors 28, 145–46, 156, 160, 162, 190, 215 Coward(ice) 128–129 Crew (s) 17, 20, 22, 28, 47, 80–82, 88, 95, 97, 99, 108, 115, 119, 122–23, 126, 133–36, 138, 140, 143–46, 149, 151, 157, 160, 162, 164, 171, 179–180, 188, 193–94, 197–202, 204–206, 217, 220, 223, 230, 232, 235, 238, 241, 243–244, 248, 250–53, 256, 258–59 Crown(s) 46, 168, 205–206 Cyrus 3, 36–39, 79–83, 93, 97, 108–19, 123–24, 176, 180, 201, 206, 218–20, 222, 227–28, 242, 245, 253, 258 Cyzicus 11, 16–18, 20–23, 33, 77, 95, 133, 149, 204, 219, 227, 234, 241, 243 Decree(s) 156–58, 162, 167–69, 172–73, 183–84, 186, 189–90, 197, 203, 206– 208, 248–51, 257, 260 Defeat 3, 8, 13, 20, 26–9, 32, 64, 86, 91, 93–94, 96–97, 101, 122, 127, 130–32, 135–36, 138, 140–41, 146, 158, 160, 203–204, 213, 229, 232, 235, 237–39, 243, 249, 251–52, 254–258 Defense 24, 53, 56, 69, 71, 76, 147, 156, 174, 177, 180, 183, 185, 188, 201 Defendant 54, 183, 185–86, 197 Delphinium 89–90, 137, 217

Democracy 5–6, 48–49, 51, 53, 57, 61, 64, 70, 72, 96, 155–156, 161–62, 166, 168–72, 174, 181, 183, 185–86, 188–90, 193–94, 196, 203, 205–207, 209, 213– 14, 256–57 Determinism 56, 59 Emotion(s) 6, 47, 51, 66–67, 83, 110, 112, 117, 128, 134, 152, 154, 159, 161, 165– 166, 169, 173–174, 176, 183, 187–90, 207, 214 Envy 159 Erasinides 91, 141–44, 161, 198, 211, 256 Euryptolemus 8, 50, 67–68, 126, 168, 171–209, 211, 213, 215, 234, 249, 255 Exile 5, 28, 39–40, 46–47, 54, 55–57, 59, 60, 63, 69, 71, 76, 79, 84–85, 88, 91, 94–96, 103, 142, 147, 179, 208, 247, 256 Fear 21, 29, 38, 53, 56, 60–61, 65–68, 70, 74, 77–78, 93, 108, 110, 117–118, 125, 130, 139, 142, 158, 160, 170, 173– 174, 178, 183, 187–90, 192, 194, 209, 223, 236–37, 257 Flattery(er) 111–12, 116–17, 175–76 Fleet (Athenian) (Spartan-Peloponnesian) 3, 10, 12–16, 20, 22, 24, 28, 34–5, 37–9, 55, 58, 60, 66, 72–73, 80–81, 85, 87–91, 94, 96– 101, 105–106, 108–109, 112, 118, 122– 28, 130–41, 148, 150, 159, 161, 197– 201, 204, 206, 212, 217, 219, 221–22, 224–230, 232–33, 236–46, 249, 251, 256–59 The Four Hundred 34, 60–61, 68, 70, 78, 102, 151, 158, 171, 188–89, 193–94 Friend(ship) 15, 34, 67–69, 75, 78, 82, 101–102, 105, 108–110, 115, 180, 210, 220 Fugitive 86, 95, 213, 250 General(s) 2, 5, 6, 11–12, 14–16, 22, 24– 25, 27, 30, 32–33, 35, 39, 47, 64, 72, 74, 77, 85, 88, 91, 95, 97, 99, 103, 110, 120, 126, 130, 132, 134–36, 138–168, 171–91, 193–203, 205–11, 213–15, 220–

General Index  293

23, 226, 228–29, 233–42, 245, 247–49, 251, 254–59 Guest-friend(ship) 15, 18 Hermocrates 5, 47, 60–61, 85–86, 88, 95–96, 101, 148–49, 241 Hermon 88, 126–27, 131, 241 Humor 6, 121, 124 Hunting 224, 243, 251 Hellespont 10–16, 22–24, 26, 28, 32–33, 61–62, 71, 79, 87, 90, 135, 138, 140, 142–43, 159, 203, 222–23, 225, 227, 229, 233, 237, 240, 242, 252, 257 Ionia 14, 26, 61–62, 79, 81, 86, 90, 96, 114, 222 Jury 142, 182, 195 Jurors 47, 60, 62, 64, 134, 143, 155, 161, 165–66, 169, 182–84, 187–88, 190, 196, 201, 205 Gods 26, 40, 42–43, 51, 76, 116, 122, 126, 161–63, 165, 182, 187, 204, 205, 215, 245 (Persian)King 15, 17, 18–19, 22–23, 32– 38, 41, 72, 79–83, 87, 97, 100, 110–112, 114–15, 117, 123, 203, 219, 221, 242, 253, 256 Lampsacus 28, 224–25, 228–29, 231, 233, 239, 244, 247 Law (s) 51–52, 67, 102, 142–43, 158, 162, 168–70, 183–85, 187, 193–94, 196, 207 Letter(s) 22, 37, 140, 144, 146, 178–79, 188 Liturgies 48, 53 Lysander 3, 79–80, 82–85, 87–91, 95, 97–103, 105–106, 108–11, 115–16, 118– 20, 122–23, 125, 127, 130–31, 137, 148, 160, 198, 204, 217–33, 236–37, 239– 47, 25–53, 256, 258–59 Mindarus 10–13, 16, 17–22, 33, 89, 125, 128, 131–32, 135, 220, 226, 243, 247 Mob 44–56, 58–59, 65–66, 68–69, 71– 72, 169–71, 173–74, 255–57

Money 2, 13–18, 21–23, 25–26, 31–33, 35–40, 48–49, 56, 58, 60, 72–73, 80– 84, 86, 96–98, 102–103, 108–111, 113, 115–20, 123–24, 127, 142–43, 159, 184, 217–20, 222, 245, 253–59 Mourners 151–53, 157, 168, 256 Mysteries 52, 55–57, 90, 187–88, Mytilene 88, 123–25, 134, 136–41, 186, 198–99, 226, 228–29, 232, 238, 246, 248 Narrative 1, 2, 4–8, 12, 22, 24, 26, 31, 36, 39–40, 42, 50, 54, 79, 83, 91, 97–98, 102, 104, 109, 114, 130–31, 135, 151, 156, 159, 168, 176, 187, 191, 195–200, 202, 207, 215, 220, 226, 231, 233–34, 236, 238–39, 241–42, 244–46, 248– 53, 257–58 Necessity 52, 55–57, 90, 187–88 Nicias 34, 45, 49–50, 56, 58, 62–63, 66, 71, 73, 91, 116, 142, 164, 174, 192, 201, 206, 239–40 Notium 3, 25, 28, 85, 88–91, 94, 96–99, 102, 105, 127, 130, 133, 137, 140–41, 146, 159, 204, 217, 221, 226–27, 232, 238, 256, 258–59 Oligarch(s) 34, 72, 158, 168, 252 Oligarchy 72, 78, 155, 158, 193, 209 (dis)order 25, 30, 131, 167 Peiraeus 40–42, 44, 46, 59, 61, 66–67, 72, 170–71, 178, 209, 212, 214, 222 Pericles 19, 48, 60, 87, 91–92, 96, 132, 158, 165, 177–79, 187, 207, 223, 240, 250 Pharnabazus 13–15, 17–18, 21–22, 24, 30–36, 38, 60, 89, 109, 119, 238, 240– 41, 247 Philocles 3, 140–41, 206, 222, 229, 237– 38, 247–51, 257, 259–60 Phocaia 86–87, 91, 99, 132, 136, 146, 161, 227–28 (im)piety 42–43, 51–52, 69, 76, 161, 163 Plynteria 41–42, 65–66 Prytanis(eis) 173–74

294  General Index Question(s) 41–42, 59, 172, 175, 189 Revenge 68–69, 100, 152–53, 166–68, 171, 185–86, 209, 213, 249, 256–57 Rhetoric 48, 50, 71, 81, 107, 108, 117, 175–77, 184, 190–92, 195, 207 Sailor(s) 22–24, 61, 80–82, 97, 119, 134, 150, 157, 168, 171, 202, 219, 230, 232, 235 Sardis 15, 79, 112, 218–20 Sestus 10, 14, 16, 28, 224, 225, 232–34, 236 Sicilian expedition 14, 27, 29, 36, 45–46, 51, 55, 58, 62–63, 65, 67, 70, 72, 80, 119, 142, 164, 174, 181, 192, 236, 240 Slaughter 252 Socrates 45, 51, 59, 65, 68, 85, 92, 117, 129, 154–55, 161, 164–65, 173–176, 180, 192, 208, 212, 214, 221, 251, 259 Soldier(s) 5, 25–31, 35–36, 58, 60, 74, 83, 85, 93–94, 108, 110, 142, 165, 201, 207, 212, 219, 235, 240–42, 246, 253 Sparta 3, 7, 10, 21–22, 35–38, 40, 43– 44, 56, 59, 61, 77, 79, 81–84, 86, 90, 96, 98–99, 102–103, 105–107, 109, 111–23, 127–30, 132, 141, 155, 171, 187, 203, 218–20, 222, 224, 252–59 Speech (es) 6–8, 17, 19, 20, 37, 44, 46, 50, 53, 56–57, 62–64, 69, 70–72, 76, 82, 98, 103–108, 111, 113–14, 116–118, 120–22, 147, 149, 153, 156, 163–67, 171, 174–77, 180, 184, 187–89, 191–92, 197–99, 201–202, 206–208, 212, 219, 233–34, 240, 248–49, 255, 258 –deliberative 175 –funeral 60, 153, 164–66, 221 Strategy of the speech 54 (rhetorical-communicative)tactic 118, 216, 185, 192, 224 (military)tactic 35, 125–26, 221, 231, 243–44, 258–59 Symposium 82 Syracusan (s) 5, 10, 20–21, 27, 30, 57– 58, 244

Theramenes 4, 7, 16, 20, 22, 33, 35, 70, 82, 107, 109, 134, 140, 143–47, 149–51, 153–62, 167–68, 171–72, 175–76, 178– 81, 187, 190, 198–201, 210–11, 213, 228, 243, 253, 256–57 The Thirty 64, 69, 70, 86, 155, 161, 171, 172, 187, 209, 211–14, 252 Thrasybulus 10, 16, 21, 39, 86–87, 89, 91, 93, 132, 134, 86–87, 89, 91, 93, 132, 134, 145–46, 149–50, 160, 178–81, 198–201, 212, 228, 241 Thrasyllus 10, 13–15, 23–33, 39, 86–87, 89, 91, 95, 97, 131, 141, 198, 221, 225, 242–43, 256 Tissaphernes 10, 12–15, 18–19, 24–27, 59, 72, 81, 83–84, 102, 109–110, 114, 116, 212, 257 Traitor (s) 29, 142, 182, 184, 197 Treason 194, 203 Tribute 220, 32–33, 73 Trierarch(s) 24, 48, 88, 134, 143, 145, 147–50, 159–61, 178–80, 199–201, 218, 241 Trireme 11–12, 16, 23, 60, 73, 80, 89, 94–95, 97, 135, 203, 227, 230, 240–42, 247, 248 Tyrant(tyranny) 52, 60, 74, 170–71, 221 Wage 80–83, 115, 119, 219, 253 War 1–5, 10, 13–14, 18, 24, 28–30, 32– 40, 46, 49, 55–57, 60–62, 65–66, 73– 75, 77–80, 82–84, 86–87, 91–93, 95, 97–98, 101–103, 106, 112–115, 121, 123, 128–129, 130, 132, 134, 136, 141, 158– 59, 166, 171, 174–75, 187, 193, 201, 203–204, 206, 212–15, 217–21, 225, 228, 231, 233, 236, 240, 243–45, 252– 59 –Civil 65, 214 –Peloponnesian 1–2, 5, 12, 35, 37–38, 56, 84, 87, 101, 103, 116, 130, 159, 175, 187, 212–213, 233, 240, 243–44, 255– 59 (Tragic) Warner 177, 234 Witnesses 150, 157, 161, 167, 198, 201– 202

General Index  295

γραφή παρανόμων 168 ἦθος 54 θόρυβος 169 μετάστασις 60–61 ξένος 97

πλῆθος 169 στάσις 84, 163, 212, 214 φιλανθρωπία 75, 179–180 χάρις 82, 116