Worldviews, Ethics and Organizational Life (Ethical Economy, 60) 3030823547, 9783030823542

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Ethical Economy. Studies in Economic Ethics and Philosophy

Michel Dion

Worldviews, Ethics and Organizational Life

Ethical Economy Studies in Economic Ethics and Philosophy Volume 60

Series Editors Alexander Brink, Wirtschafts- und Unternehmensethik University of Bayreuth, Bayreuth, Bayern, Germany Jacob Dahl Rendtorff, Department of Social Sciences and Business Roskilde University, Roskilde, Denmark

Ethical Economy describes the theory of the ethical preconditions of the economy and of business as well as the theory of the ethical foundations of economic systems. It analyzes the impact of rules, virtues, and goods or values on economic action and management. Ethical Economy understands ethics as a means to increase trust and to reduce transaction costs. It forms a foundational theory for business ethics and business culture. The Series Ethical Economy. Studies in Economic Ethics and Philosophy is devoted to the investigation of interdisciplinary issues concerning economics, management, ethics, and philosophy. These issues fall in the categories of economic ethics, business ethics, management theory, economic culture, and economic philosophy, the latter including the epistemology and ontology of economics. Economic culture comprises cultural and hermeneutic studies of the economy. One goal of the series is to extend the discussion of the philosophical, ethical, and cultural foundations of economics and economic systems. The series is intended to serve as an international forum for scholarly publications, such as monographs, conference proceedings, and collections of essays. Primary emphasis is placed on originality, clarity, and interdisciplinary synthesis of elements from economics, management theory, ethics, and philosophy. The book series has been accepted into SCOPUS (March 2019) and will be visible on the Scopus website within a few months. More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/2881

Michel Dion

Worldviews, Ethics and Organizational Life

Michel Dion École de gestion Université de Sherbrooke Sherbrooke, QC, Canada

ISSN 2211-2707     ISSN 2211-2723 (electronic) Ethical Economy ISBN 978-3-030-82354-2    ISBN 978-3-030-82355-9 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-82355-9 © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

To my beloved wife, Marie-Claude To our current grandchildren Jasmine, Lily, Benjamin, Éloïc And to our future grandchildren…

Contents

1 Introduction����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    1 1.1 Structure of the Book������������������������������������������������������������������������    5 1.2 Limitations of the Study�������������������������������������������������������������������   11 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   11 2 Defining Moral and Post-Moral Worldviews����������������������������������������   13 2.1 Introduction��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   13 2.2 Defining Morality and Developing a Moral Worldview ������������������   16 2.2.1 The Ontic Quest for Truth-Itself ������������������������������������������   17 2.2.2 The Organizational Path Towards a Moral Worldview ��������   28 2.3 Developing a Post-Moral Worldview by Criticizing Morality and Revealing the Emptiness of Ethical Values/Virtues ������������������   30 2.3.1 The Existential Need for Possibilities-to-Be and the Primacy of Interpretation ����������������������������������������   31 2.3.2 The Ontic Need for the Will-to-Power and the Primacy of the Free Mind����������������������������������������   38 2.3.3 The Ontic Need for the Transmutation of Values/Virtues ������������������������������������������������������������������   46 2.4 The Organizational Path Towards a Post-Moral Worldview������������   54 2.5 Summary ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   56 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   57 Part I The Paradoxical Path 3 Moral Education and Organizational Life: Deepening the Meaning and Scope of a Moral Worldview������������������   63 3.1 Introduction��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   63 3.2 The Substance and Scope of Moral Education ��������������������������������   64 3.2.1 Understanding the True Nature of Morality�������������������������   65 3.2.2 Truths and Lies���������������������������������������������������������������������   70 3.2.3 Deepening Our Knowledge and Changing Our Habits/Customs��������������������������������������������������������������   72 vii

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3.2.4 Eliminating Our Disturbing Emotions and Attitudes������������   76 3.2.5 Developing Positive Emotions and Attitudes������������������������   79 3.3 The Foundations of Moral Education ����������������������������������������������   86 3.3.1 Just Social Institutions and the Basic Equality of Human Beings������������������������������������������������������������������   86 3.3.2 The Social Contract��������������������������������������������������������������   88 3.4 Summary ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   94 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   95 4 Technology and Instrumental Reason: Developing an Anti-technocratic Concern, or Moving from a Moral Worldview to a Post-moral Worldview��������������������������   99 4.1 Introduction��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   99 4.2 The Primary Way the Basis of a Moral Worldview Is Shaken����������  100 4.2.1 The Subjective Thinker ��������������������������������������������������������  101 4.2.2 The Human Situation, Freedom, and Indetermination���������  104 4.2.3 The Interconnectedness of Subject and Object��������������������  106 4.2.4 Technology, Idolatry, and Human Destruction ��������������������  109 4.3 How the Basis of the Post-moral Worldview Is Evolving����������������  111 4.3.1 Human “In-the-Worldliness” and the Temporality of Presence����������������������������������������������������������������������������  111 4.3.2 Participation in the World, Existential Anxiety, and Ontic Uncertainties��������������������������������������������������������  114 4.3.3 Intersubjectivity and Communicational Truth����������������������  116 4.4 The Final Changeover from Moral Worldview to Post-­moral Worldview: The Anti-technocratic Concern and the Ontic Revolt Against Morally Stigmatized Concepts����������  118 4.5 The Breakthrough of the Transcendent Position: The Passion for the Infinite ��������������������������������������������������������������  121 4.6 Summary ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  126 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  127 Part II The Annihilating Path 5 Being Responsible for Others: The Ontic Roots of a Moral Worldview������������������������������������������������������������������������������  131 5.1 Introduction��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  131 5.2 Incontrovertible Otherness and Responsibility-for-Others ��������������  131 5.2.1 The “There-Is” and the Ontic Project-to-Be ������������������������  132 5.2.2 Other’s Face and Responsibility-for-Others ������������������������  134 5.2.3 The Infinite and Moral Life��������������������������������������������������  140 5.2.4 Time and the Infinite ������������������������������������������������������������  143 5.3 Summary ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  145 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  145

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6 Ideological Mindset and Meaninglessness: Developing an Anti-Totalizing Concern, or Moving from a Moral Worldview to a Post-Moral Worldview��������������������������  147 6.1 Introduction��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  147 6.2 The Primary Way the Basis of a Moral Worldview is Shaken����������  148 6.2.1 Relativizing the Quest for Happiness ����������������������������������  148 6.2.2 The Fight for Self-Realization����������������������������������������������  153 6.3 The Way the Basis of the Post-Moral Worldview is Evolving����������  159 6.3.1 Quest for Truth and Being-Free��������������������������������������������  159 6.3.2 Perceptions, Interpretations, and Ontic Questioning������������  162 6.3.3 The Growing Intensity of Uncertainties and Doubts������������  164 6.3.4 The Awareness of Existential Limit-Situations��������������������  165 6.4 The Final Changeover from Moral Worldview to Post-­Moral Worldview: The Anti-Totalizing Attitude and the Metaphysical Revolt Against Meaninglessness��������������������  168 6.4.1 The Anti-Totalizing Attitude ������������������������������������������������  168 6.4.2 The Metaphysical Revolt Against Meaninglessness ������������  171 6.5 Summary ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  175 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  176 Part III The Foundational Path 7 Rational Deliberation on Ethical Issues in Business: Overcoming Moral/Post-­Moral Dualism and Promoting Mutual Understanding����������������������������������������������������������������������������  179 7.1 Introduction��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  179 7.2 Revealing the Tension in Moral/Post-Moral Dualism: Time/Self and Truth/Morality Dualisms ������������������������������������������  180 7.2.1 The Interconnectedness of Time and Self����������������������������  182 7.2.2 The Interconnectedness of Truth and Morality��������������������  184 7.3 Overcoming Moral/Post-Moral Dualism and Promoting Mutual Understanding in Business: Moral Deliberation Processes��������������  186 7.4 Summary ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  195 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  195 8 Overcoming Moral/Post-Moral Dualism and Enhancing the Presence of the Infinite: Endorsing a Non-dualistic Approach to Interreligious Dialogue in the Organizational Setting������������������������������������������������������������������  199 8.1 Introduction��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  199 8.2 Revealing the Tension in Moral/Post-Moral Dualism: The Relation Between Morality and Religion����������������������������������  200 8.2.1 The Ever-Changing Borders Between Good and Evil����������  200 8.2.2 Faith, Detachment, and Morality������������������������������������������  205

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8.3 Overcoming Moral/Post-Moral Dualism and Enhancing the Presence of the Infinite in Business��������������������������������������������  207 8.3.1 Finite Beings and the Infinite������������������������������������������������  207 8.3.2 Faith, Doubt, and the Unknowability of God������������������������  210 8.3.3 Being-Itself and the Ground of Being����������������������������������  212 8.3.4 The Unconditional����������������������������������������������������������������  215 8.3.5 Faith, the Protestant Principle, and the Sacred ��������������������  216 8.4 Ethical Leadership and the Interreligious Dialogue��������������������������  223 8.5 Summary ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  225 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  226 Conclusion��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  229 Index������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  233

Chapter 1

Introduction

We could examine business ethics either from a multidisciplinary perspective, or from an interdisciplinary viewpoint. A multidisciplinary approach to business ethics issues would put the discourse of various disciplines in parallel, without overcoming the limitations of dialogical processes. Business ethics courses often adopt a multidisciplinary approach. Consequently, concepts and studies from sociology, psychology, philosophy, and the visual arts are used for various pedagogical motives and in-class activities, such as case studies. Adopting an interdisciplinary approach to business ethics issues implies identifying common areas and creating linguistic units, while acknowledging the interface between various disciplines. An interface is not simply a common area in which discourses could meet, as though it were an issue of conceptual commonality. An interface is a social construct which is developed in our present situation. It largely depends on the social, economic, cultural, political, and even religious/spiritual background of communicational partners. The interface is built up through communicational exchanges, while safeguarding the essence of specific disciplines. Developing an interface is the ultimate consequence of deepened understanding. This book focuses on worldviews that are enhanced and eventually improved by drawing upon philosophy and theology/spirituality as basic sources of ethical reflection. The structuring processes of worldviews are rarely described in connection with organizational issues. When this is the case (Madden 2014), then worldviews are defined neither from an interdisciplinary perspective nor from a philosophical viewpoint. We can be existentially troubled by others’ worldviews. Business ethics deals with various opportunities for dialogue about mutual worldviews. Dialogues are rooted in worldviews of individuals, groups, organizations, and institutions (Stückelberger 2009, 335). The fundamental sources of ethical reflection (philosophy, theology, and spirituality) can allow people to better understand and eventually revisit the depth and scope of their worldview. The interdisciplinary approach to worldviews can have various positive effects on self-understanding. Firstly, it could give people the opportunity to assess their life and world, and thus deepen the meaning of their values, as well as their scope of application (the axiological aspect). © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 M. Dion, Worldviews, Ethics and Organizational Life, Ethical Economy 60, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-82355-9_1

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Secondly, people can better understand how their worldview influences their attitudes and behaviours (the attitudinal and behavioural aspect). Thirdly, people can become more aware of their own worldview. The awareness of our worldview can either be a result of the contents of our worldview or can stem from the process through which such a worldview has been built up over the years (the cognitive aspect). The interdisciplinary approach requires a basic openness to various worldviews. Everybody can check the validity of his/her own worldview and have the possibility of modifying it, when comparing it to others’ worldviews (the dialogical aspect). Worldviews are interconnected to the system of meanings, including beliefs, values/ virtues, and symbols. Any worldview is permeated with one’s system of meanings. Systems of meanings address moral issues. Worldviews can be either “moral” or “post-moral.” Worldviews can also be “amoral,” but such moral indifference makes them irrelevant to this book. Of course, their amoral character could be transitory. Eventually, we could adopt a moral or post-moral viewpoint. Sometimes, an individual may move from a moral worldview to a post-moral worldview. The opposite move is also possible. However, in this book, we will focus on the changeover from a moral worldview to a post-moral worldview. We will also explore the way to overcome the dualism of moral and post-moral worldviews (the “transcendent” position). Various kinds of worldviews include moral positioning: amoral worldviews; moral worldviews; post-moral worldviews; and the transcendence of the dualism of moral and post-moral worldviews. Everybody could proceed to the next step or return to the previous one. This is the inner dynamics of worldviews. A “moral” worldview is developed by defining the substance and scope of values, virtues, and principles of decision/action. It is based on a quest for Truth-itself (or Absolute Truth). A “post-moral” worldview is developed by unveiling the emptiness of morally crystallized values, virtues, and principles of decision/action. It is based on the primacy of the free mind. It focuses on the interpretative function of our being and existence. The changeover from a moral worldview to a post-moral worldview mirrors either an anti-totalizing concern nurtured by uncertainties and doubts or an anti-technocratic concern. In both cases, the changeover from a moral worldview to a post-moral worldview reflects the need for intersubjectivity and communicational truth. The “transcendent” position is developed through the interconnectedness of Time and self, and between Truth and morality. It opens the door to the Infinite (the Unknowable God) and to the Sacred. The “transcendent” position requires an anti-­ ideological concern (the Protestant Principle). The general objective of this book is to deepen the various meanings of lived experiences in the organizational setting, while endorsing an ontic viewpoint (centred on entities, that is, on existing beings). The fact of existing does not belong to the ontological level, although it is related to any ontological analysis. Entities are existing beings, while the question of “being as being” is intrinsically linked to the ontological questioning and discourse. In the organizational setting, lived experiences mirror the way organizational members (as existing beings) are interpreting/ reinterpreting their existential situation. Entities’ lived experiences have an intrinsic narrativity that is closely linked to the fact of existing. This book can allow people

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to revisit their values and virtues (the axiological realm), their attitudes and deeds (the attitudinal/behavioural realm), their emotions and sentiments (the affective realm), their ideas and representations (the cognitive realm), their dialogical capacities for moral deliberation and interreligious dialogue (the dialogical/communicational realm), and even their connection to the Infinite (the religious/spiritual realm). Organizational life refers to the various modes of “living-in” the organizational setting. It gathers all lived experiences together, in a relational wholeness. We could define organizational life as one of the various subcategories of our individual life: family life, organizational life, professional life, community life, societal life, natural life, or religious/spirituel life. Nonetheless, in doing so, we would reduce the scope of organizational events and phenomena. The various layers of one’s individual life do not necessarily follow the same structure and explanatory pattern. Each one has its own particularities. The meaning of “living-in” may be different, when applied to the family, to the organization, to the professional association, to the community, to society, to natural environments, and to religious/spiritual quests for meaning. “Living-in” always refers to the ontic realm, and thus, to the lived experiences of entities. Understanding organizational life from an ontic perspective is seizing the complexity of lived experiences that arise from organizational systems (related to the organizational strategies, ethics, and culture). Organizational life is composed of organizational members’ lived experiences with internal and external stakeholders. Although a given organization is connected to other organizations (including NGOs, public interest groups, national and international associations), organizational life belongs to the realm of “lived experiences”. The ontic notion of organizational life cannot be isolated from the complexity of “lived experiences”. On one hand, the “lived experiences” required a “consciousness of something”, or intentionality (Husserl 2001, 109–117; 2008, 64–82). More precisely, any lived experience is a mental phenomenon in which there is the “intentional in-existence”, that is, “the reference to something as an object” (Brentano 2015, 101–102). In any mental phenomenon, there is a presentation of the object (of consciousness). Schutz (1967, 73–74) explained that “the meaning of a lived experience undergoes modifications depending of the particular kind of attention the Ego gives to the lived experience”. In the organizational setting, organizational members are constantly interpreting/reinterpreting their own words/deeds as well as others’ words and actions. In doing so, their “being-in-quest-for-meaning” is always challenged by those interpretations and reinterpretations. On the other hand, any ontic quest for meaning occurs in complex situations. Coping with complexity requires the acknowledgment that any meaning cannot exist once for all, as though it would represent a wholeness. Anyone can never grasp the meaning of a wholeness, since human finitude cannot be overcome (human rationality, sense organs, and knowledge are existentially finite). Any wholeness implies uncertainties about its components and their interrelations, and above all, about their potential set of meanings (Morin 2005, 2008). The general aim of the book is to allow readers to deepen their worldview and sense of morality, while analyzing the ontic dimension of organizational life. This book is philosophically oriented. It does not deal with concrete issues in business

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and decision-making processes. Rather, this book deals with individuals’ lived experiences in the organizational setting. It deepens the various aspects of existing, when being involved in the organizational life. Unveiling the ontic dimension of organizational life involves distinguishing between the ontological level (Dasein’s Being: Heidegger) and the ontic level (lived experiences). Dasein asks the question of Being and is inherently linked to ontological temporality. The question of Being reveals the basic distinction between the ontological and the ontic levels (Eilenberger 2019, 348–349). The ontological and the ontic levels are not parallel roads. Rather, they are closely interrelated. In this book, we will define the interconnectedness of Dasein’s calls and ontic quests. In doing so, we will link worldviews, morality, and existence. Ontological temporality is related to Dasein’s Being, while ontic temporality belongs to entities historicity. The ontic level is based on the ontological level. But the ontological level needs the ontic level to make manifest the structure of existence. Ontological temporality needs ontic temporality, and vice versa. Ontological temporality is the structure of existence, while ontic temporality is the mood of existing. Heidegger (1962, 173) rightly understood mood as a “fundamental existentiale.” Dasein has mood, since Dasein is “existing.” Heidegger (1962, 337) did not believe that the ordering of lived experiences over the years provides any knowledge of “what-it-means-to-exist”, or even of the phenomenal structure of existing. Makkreel (1992, 368–372) rightly said that Heidegger (1962, 291, 449–455) did not look at life from an historical perspective. Heidegger emphasized an ontological interpretation of life and, thus, Dasein’s Being. Heidegger searched for a primordial unity between the ontic (entities) and the historical. He assumed that “the question of historicality is an ontological question about the state of Being of historical entities” (Heidegger 1962, 455). The historicality of Dasein is intrinsically linked to the temporal basis of Dasein’s Being. Dasein’s Being is grounded in ontological temporality. That is why Dasein can be historical. Without its temporal basis, Dasein could not historicize itself in Being-with-Others (Heidegger 1962, 428–429, 434, 438). Heidegger believed that the basic task of philosophy is not the formation of worldviews. Nonetheless, philosophy can analyze the theoretical structure of worldviews. Heidegger asserted that philosophy and worldview are radically incompatible. Unlike a worldview, philosophy is the foundation of the truth of Being, given that Being can never be reduced to the Being of entities (Heidegger 2013, 58). Our “Being-in-the-world” is actualized in everydayness and is always experienced from an ontic perspective (Heidegger 1962, 86). Anything that belongs to the ontic level is related to Dasein’s ontic concerns, that is, one’s decisions about one’s existence. From an ontological perspective, understanding is focused on the structure of existence. Any ontic concern (with lived experiences) implies a pre-ontological understanding of Being and of one’s existence (Heidegger 1962, 33). Considering the ontic dimension of existence is presupposing that being covers all entities (Nicholson 1996, 362). If being covers all entities, then it must be an entity itself rather than being. Heidegger (1962, 26, 29) clearly asserted that the “Being of entities is not itself an entity, although there cannot be any Being without entities”. The ontological level requires an ontic level. Unlike nonhuman beings, human beings have the

1.1  Structure of the Book

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capacity to develop a pre-ontological understanding of Being, that is grounded in their lived experiences (Heidegger 1962, 25–28; and Käufer 2005, 483).

1.1  Structure of the Book Deepening our understanding and widening the scope of our own worldview can be accomplished through an interdisciplinary approach. The purpose of this book is to highlight ontic dimensions of organizational life, while unveiling different approaches to worldviews. Worldviews are interconnected with morality, in one form or another. Nonetheless, organizational ethics usually neglects worldviews, as though they were implicitly present in moral discourse. Worldviews can be moral, amoral (moral indifference), or post-moral. They can be a precious tool for better understanding morality in organizational life. Paul Ricoeur (1999, 258–270) explained that the ethical aim (“visée éthique”) has primacy over moral norms (Kant) since it opens the way to practical wisdom and prudence (Aristotle). The ethical aim needs to be actualized through the prism of moral normativity. Ricoeur asserted that moral norms must be subjected to the ethical aim when they give birth to value conflicts. The ethical aim may refer to various ideals and virtues. Ricoeur believed that the ethical aim is based on just social institutions. Indeed, the ethical aim cannot neglect social justice since collective wellbeing and individual happiness can never be separated from social justice. Nonetheless, the interpretations/reinterpretations of social justice vary from one country to another, from one period to another. That is why the ethical aim is closely linked to the existential quest for meaning. Like Ricoeur, Hans-Georg Gadamer (1999, 18–36) agreed that Kant’s moral formalism and Aristotle’s ethics of virtues do not “do justice to the possibility of philosophical ethics per se, but both can do so for their parts of it”. Wilhelm Dilthey (2019, 134) asserted that the unconditional moral judgment (Kantianism) does not imply any uniform duty. Our moral judgments rather unveil great differences between moral obligations. Moral obligations (and norms) could largely vary, as regards the situations/contexts. The way the ethical aim is understood could also be subjected to various conditioning factors. The organizational discourse about good and evil could be either morally focused (moral normativity) or ethically oriented (primacy of the ethical aim). Corporate moral discourse unveils the narrative about moral norms of behavior, while corporate ethical discourse expresses the narrative about ethical consciousness-raising. Preuss and Dawson (2009, 137) considered that “meso-level” narratives shape the organizational culture. This is precisely what corporate moral and ethical discourse is all about. The morally focused corporate documents are the code of ethics and the organizational policies. Their narrativity deepens the basic moral norms of organizational behavior. Those documents constitute the ground of organizational morality. Code of ethics could even be considered as conveying “a story with a plot” (Statler and Oliver 2016, 94). It is certainly the case when readers can rebuild the events/phenomena that constitute the historical basis of its provisions. But it is never

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an easy task of interpretation. Corporate ethical discourse rather puts the emphasis on ethical self-development, value clarification, and ethical judgment. The ethically focused corporate documents include the values statement and the corporate social responsibility/sustainable development/good citizenship reports. Their narrativity strengthens the ethical aim, regarding all organizational strategies, operations, and activities. Those documents represent the ground of organizational ethics. An organization could also enhance ethical training sessions and values clarification activities. In doing so, the organization expresses the importance of the ethical aim. Such sessions and activities allow organizational members to deepen their practical wisdom and prudence, when being confronted with ethical conflicts and dilemmas. Organizations usually neglect to look at worldviews, as though they were implicitly present in their moral or ethical discourse. Worldviews can be moral, amoral (moral indifference), or post-moral. Worldviews can be a precious tool for better understanding morality and ethics in the organizational life. Moral worldviews refer to moral normativity and could be closely linked to morally focused corporate documents. Post-moral worldviews deny the absolute worth of moral normativity. Thus, moral norms could never be subjected to the ethical aim since they do not have any imperative worth. The moral/post-moral dualism makes the interconnectedness of moral normativity and ethical aim impossible. Sometimes, moral worldviews could “relatively” enhance the quest for the ethical aim. Sometimes, post-moral worldviews are “relatively” compatible with moral normativity. But the interconnectedness of moral normativity and ethical aim can only be reached “beyond the moral/ post-moral dualism”. In this book, three basic philosophical paths mirror some plausible modes of change. Each path has its own philosophical a priori since it can never claim to gather all truths into a Wholeness. Each philosophical path could be radically challenged by the mere existence of the other two. There is no contention that the three philosophical paths represent the only possible ways to reinvent our worldview. However, such paths show how ontic and moral challenges stem from worldviews. Moral worldviews share three basic assumptions we can identify in Aristotle’s works: (1) Truth-itself and relative truths can coexist; (2) there is an Absolute Truth that must be the ultimate basis of all relative truths; and (3) Truth-itself is the self-­ disclosedness of Being and that relative truths are not related to Truth-itself. Post-­ moral worldviews have three basic assumptions that are unveiled in Friedrich Nietzsche’s works: (1) there must be a morality beyond all moralities; this doubt becomes an integral element of faith; (2) all moralities must be annihilated; and (3) moral concepts and dualisms could still be reinterpreted. There are three philosophical (and sometimes theological) paths to reinvent morality. Firstly, the “paradoxical path” emphasizes subjectivity and communicational truth. It is based on two philosophical a priori: (1) the existence of Absolute Truth (and thus the justification of all moralities) is criticized to some degree: Truth-itself can never be the absolute foundation of relative truths (the intermediary position: Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Chap. 3); and (2) moralities must be renewed, and finite

1.1  Structure of the Book

7

beings can be reunited with the Infinite (the transcendent position: Soeren Kierkegaard, Chap. 4). Secondly, the “Annihilating path” focuses on the absoluteness of subjectivity and relative truths. Two a priori philosophical tenets characterize such a path: (1) the existence of Absolute Truth (and thus the justification of all moralities) is criticized (the intermediary position: Emmanuel Levinas, Chap. 5); and (2) morality must be isolated from religion (the transcendent position: Albert Camus, Chap. 6). Thirdly, the “foundational path” is centred on intersubjectivity and its implications for moral/cultural/religious pluralism. It is grounded in two philosophical convictions: (1) truth-claims can never have any absoluteness (the intermediary position: Jürgen Habermas, Chap. 7); and (2) human beings are ultimately concerned with the Unconditional (the transcendent position: Paul Tillich, Chap. 8). Anybody can embrace a moral worldview, the intermediary position, a post-­ moral worldview, or the “transcendent” position. We can change our moral positioning throughout our life. Worldviews can be built up in various ways. However, if we adopt an interdisciplinary approach, then we accept the great and profound challenge of interdisciplinary dialogue. In this book, philosophy and theology are at the heart of such a dialogue. Creating our worldview in an interdisciplinary way involves analyzing meaningful and relevant works of various human sciences. Moral and post-moral worldviews are worldviews which address ontic issues (such as interpretation, knowledge, freedom, and happiness) and moral issues (such as the boundaries between good and evil). Paul Tillich (1957, 148; 1971, 101–105) described the “transmoral conscience” as the transcendence of moral commands. A transmoral conscience is not subjected to moral laws. The term “transmoral” could refer either to the continuous search for morality beyond moralities (for instance, the biophilic morality of the Overman: Nietzsche) or to the destruction of all moralities (as suggested by nihilistic philosophies and totalitarian regimes). A post-moral worldview does not necessarily imply the destruction of all moral systems. Morality is still important and relevant. However, a post-moral worldview could involve eliminating some moral concepts and dualisms. A post-moral worldview could move beyond traditional moralities, while reinterpreting some moral concepts and dualisms. Thus, it reflects an intermediary position between two extremes: either a morality beyond all moralities or the destruction of all moralities. For instance, we could describe the moral worldview in analyzing the works of Aristotle. Aristotelian ethics is one of the basic ethical theories used in business ethics courses. Moreover, it has deeply influenced the historical development of Christian ethics. Aristotle took for granted that there are relatively stable borders between good and evil. Aristotle sought Truth-itself. In contrast, the post-moral worldview could be defined in referring to the works of Friedrich Nietzsche. Nietzsche’s philosophy is the strongest philosophical criticism of moral worldviews since it uprooted the belief in absolute truths. In this book, we will see how some philosophers and theologians could fit readily into either a moral worldview or a post-moral worldview. Others mainly embrace a moral worldview, while developing post-moral ideas. Still others seem to be quite comfortable with a post-moral worldview, although their works are structured in a traditional/moral way. There is no clear-cut dualism between moral

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and post-moral worldviews. Rather, there is an intermediary position between moral worldviews and post-moral worldviews. Such an intermediary position mirrors a strong criticism of moral worldviews and opens the door to post-moral thinking. There is also a path beyond post-moral worldviews. This is the “transcendent position.” It overcomes the dualism between moral and post-moral worldviews. The transcendent position is another mode of transmoral conscience. It presupposes overcoming moral concepts and dualisms, while favouring virtuous self-­ transcendence at any moment of one’s life. The final purpose of the transcendent position is to perfectly apply moral virtues in practice, so that all moral concepts and dualisms become useless. The transcendent position compels us to develop a virtue-­ centred mode of transmoral conscience. The way individuals internalize a moral or post-moral worldview, choose an intermediary position between moral and post-moral worldviews, or focus on a transcendent position may vary. Any change in one’s worldview could require a different set of paradigmatic steps. This is determined by dead ends which are progressively overcome. From an ontic perspective, the human being is “living-in” a world. Like any other sentient being, a human being “lives.” But unlike other species, a human being lives “in-the-world.” His/her own self is intrinsically linked to his/her “in-the-worldliness”. The self and the world are interconnected. Every person is a “self-in-a-world”. Living-in follows from our existential “in-the-worldliness” that is, from Being-in-the-world. From an ontological viewpoint, the human being is a Being-in-the-world. From an ontic perspective, every person “lives-in” various components of his/her world. “Living-in” expresses that the “in” is not external to our life. Rather, the “in” is inherently involved in any human life. That is why we use the term “living-in” rather than “living in.” The hyphen mirrors our constitutive “in-the-worldliness.” Human life implies active participation in-the-world, that is, in a family, group, community, organization, social institution, or society. These are the basic loci of ontic living-in. Innumerable causes and conditioning factors deeply influence the way we live-in our world. “Living-in-an-organization” is not only being subjected to various causes and conditioning factors, but also actively seeking the meaning of our organizational life. In this book, we deal with the ontic situation of human beings, when working in business organizations. Organizational life will mostly refer to business life. We will use philosophy, theology, and spirituality to highlight various meanings of ontic living-in business organizations. Then, we will see how those meanings could be applied in organizational life, mainly business life. We will present three ontic modes of “living-in-an-organization.” From a moral worldview, living-in-an-organization involves searching for meanings throughout the organizational life. Any inner call (Dasein’s call) arises from one’s inwardness. Any ontic quest is a way to respond to Dasein’s call. Inner calls and ontic quests demonstrate that individuals search for a meaningful life. Being-free entails searching for meanings. Any inner call is related to an ontic quest: the inner call for interpretation and the quest for knowledge; the inner call for morality and the quest for happiness; the inner call for virtues and the quest for wisdom; and the inner call for self-identity and the quest for the meaning of our ontic temporality. Dasein is “Being-the-There”. Inner calls are Dasein’s calls. They call for our

1.1  Structure of the Book

9

“Becoming-oneself” as well as for our “Being-with-Others.” Our “Becoming-­ oneself” expresses that being-oneself is a continuous process of becoming. Dasein’s calls require our “ontic decisiveness, that is, our resoluteness to enhance and strengthen our ‘Becoming-oneself’.” From an ontic perspective, Dasein’s calls ask for an ontic response. Such a response comes from our “Becoming-oneself” and from our “Being-with-Others”, which are interconnected dimensions of our “being-­ in-­the-world”. Our “in the-worldliness” needs a response to Dasein’s calls. Existing involves interpreting reality and searching for the meaning of things, beings, events, and phenomena. Any response mirrors our ontic decisiveness since it constitutes an integral part of our “being-who-interprets-reality” and of our “being-in-quest-formeaning.” Moral worldviews express a basic quest for Truth-itself. The intermediary position between moral worldviews and post-moral worldviews retains some components of moral worldviews, while moving towards post-moral convictions. In a post-moral worldview, living-in-an-organization is choosing “possibilities-to-be”, while avoiding technocratic, ideological, and totalizing systems. Any “possibility-­ to-­be” is a potential way to become “who-we-would-like-to-be”. An ontic need is a need whose satisfaction is required to have a meaningful existence. An ontic primacy defines the way we can meet our ontic needs, while transcending Truth-itself (or Absolute Truth). Ontic needs and primacies reflect the reality that people choose their own possibilities-to-be. Being-free is attempting to become who-we-are. Any ontic need is related to an ontic primacy: the ontic need for possibilities-to-be and the primacy of interpretation, the ontic need for the transmutation of values and the primacy of natural instincts, and the ontic need for the will-to-power and the primacy of the free mind. The “transcendent” position overcomes the dualism between moral worldviews and post-moral worldviews. In the “transcendent” position, living-­in-an-organization involves enhancing the presence of the Infinite/Sacred, while avoiding ideological and totalizing systems. The interconnectedness of Time/ self or between Truth/morality unveils an openness to the Infinite/Sacred. Being-­ free is enhancing the presence of the Infinite/Sacred in one’s life. Organizational life could be assessed in different ways. Traditional morality gives birth to a static hierarchy of values/virtues based on a belief in Truth-itself (the moral worldview). The post-moral worldview arises from the radical questioning of Truth-itself, and the consequent disappearance of stable borders between good and evil. Clarifying our interconnected values and beliefs calls for self-centredness. Self-centredness is quite different in moral and post-moral worldviews. It can also vary from one organization to another. Self-centredness is inherently linked to our ontic attempts at self-transcendence. It is related to our “becoming-oneself”. Organizational culture re-orders work itself, while being subjected to dehumanizing powers. Some negative powers, such as the spreading of a totalitarian state of mind, the growing phenomenon of technocracy, and the threats of instrumental reason, permeate organizational life. Such critical phenomena could adversely affect organizational life. Cultivating ethical values should reduce the intensity of such phenomena in organizational life. Our self-understanding and our capacity for understanding others’ beliefs/values are grounded in our notion of Truth. The communicational component of Truth

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plays a major role in self-perception and self-identity processes. Opening our minds signifies allowing for the coexistence of various ideas, beliefs, and representations. Opening our hearts involves enhancing the coexistence of different emotions and feelings. Any dialogue requires both kinds of openness. Yet any openness to the radical Otherness occurs “in-time.” Thus, we must take our ontic temporality into account, when dealing with our ideas/beliefs and emotions/sentiments. Hope reflects the futureness of our present, that is, the becoming of our own being. The way we assess organizational life largely depends on the capacity for self-projection into the future. Hope is rooted in Dasein’s self-projection. There is no hope without our “Becoming-oneself.” However, the present is not only imbued with futureness. There is also the pastness of the present. Compassion, altruism, and love can be part of various relational modes of Being-with-Others. In each case, the present is not only present. It also has its own pastness: the past is still influencing the present. Finally, the present “is” present. In this presentness of the present (Augustine 1964, 269), we create our values and beliefs. The internalization of our own values and beliefs could eventually undermine institutional stability and introduce a lack of harmony into the organizational system. Basic values, such as truth, hope, compassion, altruism, and love, always enhance the balance between alternative ways of thinking, speaking, feeling, and behaving. There is a philosophical path beyond the moral/post-moral dualism. Such a path could promote better mutual understanding. It begins with authentic dialogue. Any dia-logos (or multi-logos) implies multiple communicational partners, each of them having his/her own logos. The co-presence of various discourses unveils the co-­ presence of different selves. Insofar as human beings can be related to the Infinite (such as God), Divine discourse allows organizational members to deepen their religious and spiritual beliefs/values and to participate in a metaphorical dia-logos. The possibility of an interreligious dialogue lies in one’s capacity to face the challenges of mutual understanding. In Habermassian moral deliberation, every participant acknowledges others’ human dignity and searches for the consensual norms of organizational behaviour. The relation of human beings to the Infinite forms an integral part of the paradoxical path, the annihilating path, and the foundational path. It can express the way an individual evaluates his/her life, behaves in his/her life, and develops a world-­ picture. However, most of the time, each path focuses on a specific component of a worldview. In Chap. 1, the distinction between moral and post-moral worldviews is clarified. The “paradoxical way” (the moral worldview) is explained in Chap. 2 and Chap. 3 (the progressive changeover from moral worldview to post-moral worldview). The “annihilating way” is described in Chap. 4 (the moral worldview) and Chap. 5 (the progressive changeover from the moral worldview to the post-moral worldview). Chapters 6 and 7 (the way the moral/post-moral dualism can be overcome) mirror the “foundational way.” The general aim of the book is to deepen the substance of moral and post-moral worldviews, from an ontic and organizational viewpoint. We will propose an ontic analysis of organizational life referring to basic organizational experiences. Martin Heidegger said that any worldview is basically ontical. Every worldview is “a

References

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positing knowledge of beings and a positing attitude towards beings” (Heidegger 1988, 11). Various components of Heidegger’s philosophy could allow us to examine how an ontic view of organizational life should never be confused with an ontological analysis. “Living-in-an-organization” is experiencing organizational temporality leading to an “organizational-within-time-ness.” In organizational life, organizational members are confronted with an “organizational inter-presence”, and thus with intersubjectivity and communicational truth. “Living-in-an-organization” involves being “in-front-of-others” and “in-dialogue-with-others.” “Being-with-­ others” means being “in-front-of” others’ selves and “in-dialogue-with-others” about mutual perceptions and interpretations of organizational realities.

1.2  Limitations of the Study This book provides a creative way to deal with moral/post-moral worldviews and their impact on the way we are “living-in-an-organization.” Two disciplines have been chosen: philosophy (including philosophy of religion), and Christian theology/ spirituality. In so doing, we have excluded other possibilities of interdisciplinary dialogue. The history of religions, the sociology of religion and the psychology of religion are not used in the way we address the issue of moral and post-moral worldviews. From a philosophical perspective, this book focusses on works of the nineteenth century (Kierkegaard and Nietzsche) and of the twentieth century (Camus, Levinas, and Habermas). It also refers to philosophers from Greek Antiquity (Aristotle) and the eighteenth century (Rousseau). Tillich’s works represent a theological and philosophical perspective. From a theological and spiritual viewpoint, this book has clear limitations: Hindu, Jewish and Islamic theologies, as well as Buddhist, Confucian, and Daoist philosophies, have not been included in this interdisciplinary approach. This book intends to offer an exciting outlook on organizational life, while endorsing an interdisciplinary approach. We have identified philosophers and theologians whose works could have good and predictable results for this interdisciplinary dialogue. Yet different interdisciplinary outcomes can be obtained from other disciplines and authors.

References Augustine. 1964. Les Confessions. Paris: Garnier-Flammarion. Brentano, Franz. 2015. Psychology from an empirical standpoint. London/New York: Routledge. Dilthey, Wilhelm. 2019. Selected works. Volume VI- Ethical and World-View Philosophy. Princeton/Oxford: Oxford University Press. Eilenberger, Wolfram. 2019. Le temps des magiciens. 1919–1929. L’invention de la pensée moderne. Paris: Albin Michel. Heidegger, Martin. 1962. Being and time. New York: Harper and Row Publishers.

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———. 1988. The basic problems of phenomenology. Bloomington/Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. ———. 2013. Apports à la philosophie. De l’avenance. Paris: Gallimard. Husserl, Edmund. 2001. Idées directrices pour une phénoménologie. Paris: Gallimard. ———. 2008. Méditations cartésiennes. Introduction à la phénoménologie. Paris: Vrin. Käufer, Stephan. 2005. The nothing and the ontological difference in Heidegger’s what is metaphysics? Inquiry 48 (6): 482–506. Madden, Bartley J. 2014. Reconstructing your worldview. The four core beliefs you need to solve complex business problems. Naperville: LearningWhatWorks. Makkreel, Rudolf A. 1992. Dilthey. Philosopher of the human studies. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Morin, Edgar. 2005. Introduction à la pensée complexe. Paris: Points. ———. 2008. La complexité humaine. Paris: Flammarion. Nicholson, Graeme. 1996. The ontological difference. American Philosophical Quarterly 33 (4): 357–374. Ricoeur, Paul. 1999. Lectures 1. Autour du politique. Paris: Seuil. Schutz, Alfred. 1967. The phenomenology of the social world. Evanston: Northwestern University Press. Statler, Matt, and David Oliver. 2016. The moral of the story: Re-framing ethical codes of conduct as narrative processes. Journal of Business Ethics 136: 89–100. Stückelberger, Christoph. 2009. Dialogue ethics: Ethical criteria and conditions for a successful dialogue between companies and societal actors. Journal of Business Ethics 84: 329–339. Tillich, Paul. 1957. The protestant era. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. ———. 1971. Le fondement religieux de la morale. Paris: Le Centurion/Delachaux & Niestlé.

Chapter 2

Defining Moral and Post-Moral Worldviews

2.1  Introduction In the Western world, the history of morality has been mainly constructed by religions/spiritualities and philosophies. Aristotle was involved in the whole process of elaborating a moral worldview. Nietzsche promoted a post-moral worldview favouring the continuous self-transcendence of the human being. Other philosophers could have been chosen to unveil the breakthrough between a moral worldview and a post-moral worldview. However, the moral path followed by Aristotle differs radically from the post-moral path embraced by Nietzsche. The contrast in these ways of developing a worldview could mirror our historical situation, at the moral/post-­ moral crossroads. A moral worldview mirrors the way given values, virtues and principles are intertwined. The interconnectedness of values, virtues, and principles within one’s self also reveals an internal and external basic drive: self-transcendence. Self-­ transcendence is never ultimately reached. It is an ongoing process involving Dasein’s call (from the depth of our self) and an ontic quest (“in-our-worldliness”). Self-transcendence needs self-projection in the future. However, moral worldviews emphasize self-centredness as the linchpin of self-transcendence. When morality characterizes a specific worldview, it unveils interdependence between Dasein’s call and an ontic quest. The internal call (or Dasein’s call) is never wholly answered, not only because our self cannot grasp its unconscious drives, but also because an original and conscious internal call is always preceded by similar calls from the depths of our self. A basic continuity between Dasein’s calls safeguards the unity of the self. Nonetheless, the multiplicity of internal calls creates various ontic quests. Any ontic quest is mainly related to its internal call. However, it could also be closely linked to other internal calls. Moreover, the multiplicity of ontic quests expresses the impossibility of reaching Truth-itself. Finally, any ontic quest is continuously questioned by its internal call. Any philosophical questioning opens the way to experiential paths which belong to the same ontic quest. Moral thinking gives us a © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 M. Dion, Worldviews, Ethics and Organizational Life, Ethical Economy 60, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-82355-9_2

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good conscience, as if our moral principles of action, values and virtues were stumbling blocks against immorality. In any case, immorality can be personally, socially, politically, economically, or religiously/spiritually induced. From an ontic viewpoint, morality is temporally based. It could focus either on the past (traditions) or on the future (possibilities-to-be). A post-moral worldview does not refer to any internal call (from the depth of one’s self) or to any ontic quest since Truth-itself does not exist at all. Any “self-ina-world” has no intrinsic meaning. The interdependence between the self and the world is not an issue of Truth-itself. This does not mean that any attitudinal/axiological basis is impossible, or irrelevant. Rather, a post-moral worldview is never constrained by moral concepts, dualisms, standards, and principles. Thus, post-moral worldviews prioritize one’s awareness of ontic needs. The internal calls (from the depth of the self) are replaced by the various ontic needs of a living and conscious being. Ontic needs must be met in a “personalized here-and-now.” If there is no Truth at all, then the lack of trust of others, society and God is progressively growing. A lack of Truth provokes an absence of interpersonal, social, political, and even religious/spiritual trust. The opposite phenomenon could also be observed: a lack of interpersonal, social, political, and even religious/spiritual trust can make Truthitself disappear. A lack of trust then leads to the loss of Truth-itself. In both cases, doubt largely reduces the realm of beliefs, convictions, and certainties. Post-moral thinking presupposes that there is no way to transform such ontic losses of meaning into an ontic recovery of meaning. The revival of meaning is impossible since Truthitself does not exist. Uncertainties are then always pervading Time. We can never obtain a global perception of past events and phenomena, either from the past or the present. We can only develop a specific interpretation/re-­interpretation of past/present perceptions. Moreover, we can neither predict our perceptions of future events/ phenomena nor identify in advance our interpretations/re-interpretations of such perceptions. A moral worldview emphasizes the ontic quest for meaning. In organizational life, it presupposes a specific mode of “living-in.” “Living-in-an-organization” is a continuous search for the meaning of organizational realities and experiences, including corporate events and phenomena. All organizational realities and experiences can be meaningful. The potential meaning of organizational realities stems from the basic belief in Truth-itself. The existence of Truth-itself is an issue of personal conviction and belief. It allows organizational members to be “in-quest-for-­ meaning” in their organizational life. However, organizational members must identify the meaning of their experiences, when involved in organizational life. Such meanings can be found since there is Truth-itself. The meaning of organizational realities depends on the existence of Truth-itself. It does not imply that Truth-­ itself directly influences the substance of organizational realities. Throughout our organizational life, we can instead develop different interpretations/re-­interpretations of organizational realities. However, any meaning of organizational realities is intrinsically linked to the existence of Truth-itself. There is no systemic interconnectedness of Truth-itself and the various meanings of organizational realities. Yet, without the existence of Truth-itself, organizational members could never articulate

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15

any meaning of organizational realities and experiences. Organizational members are, consequently, deeply involved in an endless quest for meaning. They can never find the ultimate meaning of organizational realities, once and for all. A post-moral worldview unveils the need to focus on our ontic possibilities-to­be, since it enhances our “Becoming-oneself.” “Becoming-oneself” is intrinsically related to “Being-with-Others” and to our “in-the-worldliness.” The ontic substance of “Becoming-oneself” refers to self-transcendence processes of any “self-in-aworld.” It uncovers our ontic “living-in”, whether it is realized in family, group, organizational, institutional, or societal life. “Living-in-an-organization” entails continuously choosing our possibilities-to-be. Choosing given possibilities-­to-­be is an ontic decision. It is expressing our ontic decisiveness towards our “Becomingoneself.” Every ontic decision calls for our chosen possibility-to-be. Every ontic decision unveils “who-we-would-like-to-be.” It expresses our self-­projection in the future. Organizational members must decide “who-they-would-­like-to-be” in their organizational life. Any project of self-realization in the organizational setting must become explicit since it influences the way someone actually “lives-in” his/her organization. At any moment of organizational life, organizational members must choose their ontic project-to-be. A post-moral worldview presupposes that there is no Truth-itself. There are only truth-claims. Organizational members hold truthclaims which are intrinsically relative. Any truth-claim about organizational realities and experiences can never be related to Truth-itself. Nobody can say that he/she holds absolute truths about the meaning of any organizational reality/experience. All interpretations/re-interpretations of organizational realities and experiences unveil the way we realize our ontic project-to-be in our organizational life. Being confronted with organizational realities and experiences necessitates interpreting them. Our ontic possibilities-to-be are constantly present in every word, feeling, attitude, and deed. “Living-in-an-organization” is searching for the optimal way to become “who-we-would-like-to-be”, in the organizational here-and-­now. In the organizational setting, the optimality of our ontic project-to-be depends on various organizational, institutional, societal, cultural, political, economic, and even religious/spiritual conditioning factors. It is always an issue of interpretation since every organizational member defines “who-he/she-would-like-to-be.” The ontic level of analysis refers to entities’ lived experiences. All aspects of lived experiences are thus covered by the ontic analysis: realities, events, forms, and phenomena; categories, needs and quests, passions, feelings, desires, and sentiments; concrete existence, situation, and existential positioning; freedom, reflection, interpretation, choice/decision, decisiveness, and resoluteness; individualization, uniqueness and absorption, commitment, participation, togetherness, dialogue, qand responsibilities; awareness, knowledge and ignorance, beliefs, truth-claims, concerns, disquiet, certainties/uncertainties, doubts, and contradictions; fear, suffering, anxiety, distress, meaninglessness, courage, and hope/despair; estrangement, limitations, finitude, and nothingness; temporality, everydayness, becoming, and here-and-now; threats and caring for our “Becoming-oneself”, belongingness, possibilities-to-be, and project-to-be; inner calls and quests for meaning (or loss of meaning), question and response dialectics; happiness and

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unhappiness; loneliness, relationships, relationality, “inter-presence”, otherness, and neighbourhood; mystery and the Presence of the Infinite. Those ontic aspects of lived experiences may be applied in the organizational setting since individuals are “living-in-an-organization.” The ontic level of analysis should never be considered as a purely psychological and relational component of human life. Rather, it refers to our concrete existence (as existing entities). Nonetheless, the ontic level of analysis is never determined by psychological and relational conditioning factors. It mirrors the philosophical questioning about our concrete existence, without directly addressing the ontological issues.

2.2  Defining Morality and Developing a Moral Worldview A moral worldview defines morality and the substance of ethical values/virtues. It is based on an ontic quest for Truth-itself. A moral worldview may refer either to religious/spiritual virtues or to philosophically based virtues. Moreover, virtues cannot be put into effect in the organizational culture without considering the dominant corporate telos (Mackey 2014, 140). Yet defining the dominant corporate telos involves taking moral worldviews into account. Creating a moral worldview begins with the ontic quest for Truth-itself. Any quest for Truth-itself is fundamentally influenced by philosophical questioning. Embracing a moral worldview entails being involved in an ontic quest for Truth-­ itself. In the organizational setting, organizational members are confronted with some basic pre-philosophical challenges. Firstly, they must acknowledge that Dasein’s call for interpretation is limited by the existence of Truth-itself. Only post-­ moral worldviews open the way to an endless “quest-for-interpretation.” If Truth-­ itself does not exist, then organizational members are constantly interpreting/ re-interpreting realities and past experiences. But such post-moral thinking does not permeate a moral worldview. In a moral worldview, interpretations are limited since there is Truth-itself. We want to accumulate knowledge, but we must accept the existence of Truth-itself. Our ontic search for knowledge can be a philosophically based locus for identifying our path of interpretation. Secondly, organizational members must look at organizational ethics as a path for an organizationally based “being-happy.” Organizational ethics can be connected not only to job satisfaction, but above all, to a sense of happiness throughout organizational life. Our ontic search for happiness can be a philosophically based locus for embracing our moral values and norms of behaviour. Thirdly, organizational members can improve their way of thinking, feeling, speaking, and behaving, since organizational life is an opportunity to acquire wisdom. Our ontic search for wisdom can be a philosophically based locus for endorsing moral virtues in organizational life. Fourthly, organizational members can identify their organizational temporality, as a specific form of ontic temporality. In so doing, they can improve their self-consciousness, while being aware of their “organizational-within-time-ness.” Ontic temporality needs the appropriation of our “within-time-ness.” Our “within-time-ness” can be

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appropriated through internalizing/externalizing processes. Internalizing processes open the way to a personalized “within-time-ness”, while externalizing processes can create an impersonal “within-time-ness.” Externalizing processes can give birth to different expressions and meanings of impersonal “within-time-ness”, whether in family, group, organizational, professional, institutional, or societal life. “Organizational-­within-­time-ness” is one of the impersonal modes of appropriation. Our ontic “within-time-ness” is an expression of our ontological temporality. Our ontic search for the meaning of our organizational temporality can be a philosophically based locus for unveiling our quest for self-identity.

2.2.1  The Ontic Quest for Truth-Itself Wondering is the basic source of ethical reflection. It requires the acknowledgment of our ignorance and the capacity to question reality itself (Aristotle 2000, 9: 982b18–19). There is a paradox in the way we wonder about reality. We admire something we consider relative. We discover something that seems to be absolute. But any apparent absoluteness is limited, that is, existentially finite. Although we still admire such “pseudo-absolutes”, we search for their absolutized form. The beauty of a harmonious universe is not so beautiful and harmonious that it could never be improved. That is why we attempt to define Beauty-itself, either from a philosophical viewpoint or from a religious/spiritual perspective. We admire people showing generosity, benevolence, and compassion. However, those values are limited, although they display human goodness. We want to investigate how Goodness-­ itself is possible in daily life. We may be fascinated by the way people and social institutions are just and fair. However, we observe that justice is always threatened by various conditioning factors. So, we question reality about the existence of Justice-itself. When searching for Beauty-itself, Goodness-itself, and Justice-itself, we are walking on the philosophical road towards the ultimate Truth (or Truth-­ itself). We feel that an absolute Beauty, an absolute Goodness, and an absolute Justice are impossible without an absolute Truth. In moral worldviews, Truth-itself is the ultimate ground for Beauty-itself, Goodness-itself, and Justice-itself. Philosophical speculation aims at Truth-itself (Aristotle 2000, 61: 993b21–23). Truth could imply thought in accordance with the nature of things/beings/phenomena (Aristotle 2004, 68: 1051b4–5). Then, truth is something our thought could eventually hold. The question of Truth-itself leads to four basic paths of philosophical questioning. Those paths could be applied in the organizational setting: (a) the call for interpretation and the quest for knowledge: any ontic search for knowledge is a pre-philosophical response to the call for interpretation. However, our interpretative quest is existentially limited. Any organizational interpretation of past experiences has inevitable limitations; (b) the call for morality and the quest for happiness: any ontic search for happiness is a pre-philosophical response to the call of morality. No organizational ethics can ever claim absoluteness. It is merely one interpretation

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among many others. “Being-happy” in our organizational life is responding to the ontic call for morality. Every organizational member can compare organizational ethics with his/her ontic search for happiness; (c) the call for virtues and the quest for wisdom: any ontic search for wisdom is a pre-philosophical response to the call for virtuous behaviour. Every organizational member must find the way he/she would like to deepen his/her quest for wisdom, in his/her organizational life; and (d) the call for our self-identity and the quest for the meaning of our ontic temporality: any search for the meaning of our ontic temporality is a pre-philosophical response to the call for self-identity. The ontic temporality of organizational members allows them to better circumscribe and express their self-identity throughout organizational life. The ontic quest for Truth-itself implies an internal call coming from our “Becoming-oneself” and aiming at self-transcendence. It also requires an external quest expressed in our “in-the-worldliness.” Internal calls focus on internalization processes, such as interpretation, morality, virtues, and freedom. External quests aim at externalization of our “Being-in-the-world.” They are related to knowledge, happiness, wisdom, and the meaning of our ontic temporality. A moral worldview could be imbued with an internal call and its related ontic quest. 2.2.1.1  The Call for Interpretation and the Quest for Knowledge There is no truth without knowledge. Unknowable truths are useless. This does not mean that human intellect can fully grasp Truth-itself. However, we can seize the idea of Truth-itself. We can use our minds to discover the meaning and substance of Truth-itself. Aristotle said knowing something is seizing it through our sense organs and reason, and expressing it through language (2004, 70: 1051b23–25). It is an issue of perception, interpretation, and expression. The human being is a “being-in-­ language.” He/she is “endowed with the gift of speech.” Only human beings can distinguish between good and evil, or between just and unjust behaviours (Aristotle 1943, 54–55; 1253a, 8–18). If knowledge is intrinsically related to Being-itself, then it is ontologically rooted. Being could be interpreted in different ways, although it always remains the same (Aristotle 2000, 110: 1003a31–33; 2004, 117: 1060b28–30). Various interpretations of Being are rooted in our perceptions, values, and experiences. From an ontic viewpoint, they uncover “who-we-are” (our self-­ perceived self) and “who-we-would-like-to-be” (our self-projection in the future). Our relation to knowledge can convey distorted interpretations of our self-­ perceived self. Self-important people cannot meet others’ expectations about knowledge since knowledge is existentially limited. Rationality, knowledge, and understanding are existentially finite. Thus, we should always be prudent in our interpretations. Our interpretations of phenomena/events perceived through our sense organs could vary from one individual to another. We transform things/beings, when interpreting them. We are no longer able to know the essence of things/beings. Any essence is continuously distorted by sense organs. Our sense organs are fallible. The human being is the “being-who-interprets-reality.” The human being

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interprets his/her “self-in-a-world”, Nature/Cosmos, and even God/Ultimate Reality. All realities could fall into one’s interpretative quest. Some of our knowledge can be shared with others. Our opinions could partially come from others’ viewpoints. We should always be humble and detached from our ideas. Such an attitude allows us to become wiser. We may personally develop wisdom. But wisdom cannot be borrowed from other people. Wisdom cannot even be transmitted from one individual to another. It must be personally integrated into one’s mind/heart. Every human being has a “potentiality-for-wisdom.” Every person “lives-in” his/her world, since he/she is a “self-in-a-world.” An impersonal world is a depersonalized world, that is, a world for an anonymous self (or the Heideggerian “they-self”). An impersonal world cannot be experienced since it is not directly connected to our “in-the-worldliness.” Only “our” world could be interdependent with “our” self. There is no impersonal interdependence between the self and the world, at least from an ontic perspective. Our self is both individualizing and representing humankind. Knowledge is always personally determined. Perceptions through sense organs do not mirror “reality-as-it-is.” Representations of reality never coincide with reality itself. Representing reality is “re-presenting” beings, things and phenomena which are “in-front-of-us.” Beings, things, and phenomena are “self-presenting” in front of our “being-who-interprets-reality.” “Re-presenting” is taking such a presentiation into account. “Re-presenting” is reappropriating “what-was-presentiated” in-front-of-us (Heidegger 2008, 81). Reality is already present in the impersonal “there.” However, reality must be reappropriated in order to become an integral part of human existence. The mind/heart accomplishes such reappropriation. Throughout own existence, we “re-present” reality. However, we can explain why some representations seem closer to “reality-as-it-is” than others. Being “in-quest-for-organizational-knowledge” is knowing the ontic limitations of knowledge, including organizational knowledge and learning. It entails a basic openness to various interpretations, insofar as the existence of Truth-itself is safeguarded. Organizational members who embrace moral worldviews then become “interpretative guardians” of Truth-itself in their organizational life. Assuming the “interpretative” challenge of organizational life signifies being open to various interpretations of organizational realities, without endorsing innumerable and potentially conflicting truth-claims. Organizational members who are “in-quest-for-­ organizational-knowledge” respond to an ontic call for interpretation. The ontic mode of “Being-the-There” (Dasein) always implies both an ontic call (question) for interpretation and an ontic quest (response) for knowledge. The ontic call for interpretation comes from the actualization of “Being-the-There” in our concrete existence, while the ontic quest for knowledge expresses the way our “Being-the-­ There” answers the call for interpretation. The ontic call for interpretation and the ontic quest for knowledge are grounded in “Being-the-There.” Dasein’s call for interpretation gives birth to an endless quest for knowledge. Our quest-for-­ knowledge is a response to Dasein’s call for interpretation. From an ontic viewpoint, “Being-the-There” requires the ontic call for interpretation and the ontic quest for knowledge. In the organizational setting, every organizational member expresses his/her mode of “Being-the-There, from an ontic perspective. He/she

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receives an ontic call for interpretation and responds to that call through an ontic quest for knowledge. Interpreting his/her organizational life is one way (among others) to receive the ontic call from “Being-the-There.” Searching for organizational knowledge is one way (among others) to answer the ontic call from “Being-the-­ There.” Managing the ontic call for interpretation and our ontic quest for knowledge is “being-in-quest-for-meaning” through organizational life. “Living-in-an-­ organization” entails not only receiving the ontic call for interpreting our organizational life, but above all, responding to that call through an ontic quest for organizational knowledge and learning. The “question/response dialectics” is translated into a dialectics between interpretation and knowledge. But any dialectics between interpretation and knowledge unveils the existentially based dialectics between an ontic call (question) and an ontic quest (response). It also expresses how philosophical questioning arises in the organizational setting, when organizational members are confronted with various challenges of interpretation and knowledge. Moral worldviews shape themselves around interpretation and knowledge. Interpretation can only be rooted in an ontic call from “Being-the-There, while knowledge can only be grounded in an ontic quest from “Being-the-There.” In organizational life, organizational members’ “Being-the-There” is at the true origin of their interpretation and knowledge. 2.2.1.2  The Call for Morality and the Quest for Happiness Morality is not a realm in which everything is easily knowable. Instead, it is full of uncertainties. Existing is “living-in” an historically based situation. Being “historically-­rooted” entails being subjected to uncertainties and doubts. The multiplicity of interpretations reveals that uncertainty is the experiential basis of human consciousness. Morality can never provide any certainty at all (Aristotle 1996, 4–6). Aristotelian ethics is grounded in common sense. It is continuously revisiting common opinions to deepen our interpretation of reality (Hartman 2008, 320). Moral worldviews presuppose that knowledgeable truths which do not make us happy are not truths at all. Truths must enhance the level of happiness we have attained in our existence. Every being is searching for his/her own good (Aristotle 1996, 3). Happiness is the ultimate good (or end) in human existence. It should never be instrumentalized to get something else, such as honour or pleasure. Happiness is self-sufficient, since it is the final good for every existing being. Each action aims at happiness, said Aristotle (1996, 11–12). Every meaningful action aims at happiness. Actions could convey any meaning at all without being meaningless. Happiness needs an attitude of perfect goodness that is regularly put into practice and safeguarded in the long-term (Aristotle 1996, 17, 22). Aristotle distinguished between household management and retail trade. Unlike retail trade, household management has an ontic limit: the ceaseless quest for wealth “is not its business” (Aristotle 1943, 69–70; 1257b17–1258a38–40). Relativizing any ontic quest for wealth introduces an ethical dimension into economic issues. Aristotle linked ethics and economics (Dierksmeier and Pirson 2009, 418).

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Wealth has no impact on self-knowledge, self-consciousness, self-­understanding, or personal happiness/well-being. We could believe that the future of our own world largely depends on our capacity to reach consensus with others, at least about the boundaries between good and evil. We can even see the good, while refusing to put it into practice. But it is always foolish to nurture evil. It is a fatal weakness to let evil evolve in our “self-in-a-world.” Morality regulates our relationships, emotions/ sentiments, thoughts, and imagination through agreements about applicable moral norms of behaviour. Nowadays, some individuals define their own morality, independent of institutionalized forms of morality. People love life, beauty, and health. However, they must be able to use them correctly. Our faults follow either from our weaknesses or from our wickedness. Faults generally imply willful blindness. The rules of reason are voluntarily forgotten. Faults related to wickedness could be grounded in personality. In moral worldviews, faults are an integral part of human existence. We are existentially fallible, since our rationality, knowledge and understanding are existentially finite. Our fallibility can even come from our weak selfcontrol. Wickedness is not necessarily an effect of ontic finitude. Systematized wickedness is rather a distortion of our existential fallibility. Being “in-quest-for-organizational-happiness” is knowing the existential limitations of happiness, including the various paths of happiness in organizational life. It implies a basic openness to various moralities. In moral worldviews, Truth-itself remains inherently linked to morality. Organizational members who embrace moral worldviews then become “moral guardians” of Truth-itself in their organizational life. Assuming the basic existential challenge of organizational life involves being open to various moral values and norms of organizational behaviour, without endorsing potentially conflicting moralities. Organizational members who are “in-­ quest-­for-organizational-happiness” are responding to Dasein’s call for morality. The ontic mode of “Being-the-There” (Dasein) always implies both an ontic call (question) for morality and an ontic quest (response) for happiness. The ontic call for morality comes from the actualization of “Being-the-There” in daily life, while the ontic quest for happiness expresses the way “Being-the-There” answers the call for morality. Dasein’s call receives Dasein’s response. The ontic call for morality and the ontic quest for happiness are grounded in “Being-the-There.” We cannot be “Being-the-There” without calling upon our Dasein for morality in daily life. We cannot be “Being-the-There” without being in quest-for-happiness as a response to the call for morality. From an ontic viewpoint, “Being-the-There” requires the ontic call for morality and the ontic quest for happiness. In the organizational setting, every organizational member receives an ontic call for morality and responds to that call through an ontic quest for happiness. Embracing a moral worldview in our organizational life is one way (among others) to receive the ontic call from “Being-­ the-­There.” Searching for organizational happiness is one way (among others) to answer the ontic call from one’s “Being-the-There.” Managing the ontic call for morality and our ontic quest for happiness is “being-in-quest-for-meaning” throughout organizational life. “Living-in-an-organization” is receiving the ontic call for emphasizing morality in organizational life. It is also responding to the call through an ontic quest for organizational happiness. Moral worldviews mirror an ontic

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dialectics between morality and happiness. Morality needs happiness, and viceversa. Morality and happiness are interdependent. The “question/response dialectics” is translated into a dialectics between morality and happiness. But any dialectics between morality and happiness reveals the existentially based dialectics between the ontic call (question) and the ontic quest (response). It also expresses how philosophical questioning arises in the organizational setting, when organizational members are confronted with various challenges of morality and happiness. Moral worldviews shape themselves around morality and happiness. Morality can only be rooted in an ontic call from “Being-the-There, while happiness can only be grounded in an ontic quest from “Being-the-There.” In organizational life, “Beingthe-There” is the true foundation of our morality and happiness. Morality and happiness converge in “Being-the-There” throughout organizational life. 2.2.1.3  The Call for Virtues and the Quest for Wisdom Knowledgeable truths can make us happy and free beings. Happiness and freedom are intrinsically linked to action. Aristotle (1943, 57; 1254a, 8) defined life as action. Every changing being/thing is modified by conditioning factors/causes (Aristotle 2004, 160–161). Virtues are internal dispositions that determine our choices and create a happy state of mind/heart (Aristotle 1996, 39). Virtues depend on choices related to strong internal dispositions (Macaulay and Arjoon 2012, 555). The human being is a social agent, that is, a “being-who-acts.” Action is the moral locus of virtues, whether they are intellectual virtues (wisdom, prudence: virtues of the intellect), or moral virtues (courage, temperance, generosity, justice: character virtues). Intellectual virtues make it impossible to apply moral virtues in a radical way. Aristotle considered prudence practical wisdom. Prudence requires deliberative choice: deliberating, selecting a given action, and orienting our desire accordingly (Aristotle, 1996, 61). Prudence makes us avoid the trap of excessive (vicious) behaviour. Any excess produces vice. Aristotle looked at vices from a dualistic perspective. There are two extremes virtuous people should absolutely avoid: extreme lack and extreme over-abundance. Both excesses undermine the way we practice virtues in daily life. Aristotelian virtues always focus on the “middle way” between deficiency and over-abundance. They could be applied in organizational life, and even to management consultants’ ethical practices (Blok 2020). Prudence gives us the right means to reach a moral end. Being prudent is choosing the “middle way”, given the circumstances. Prudence allows us to actualize moral virtues (Aristotle 1996, 161, 188). Prudence is required to become happy (Strandberg 2000, 76–77). Being prudent involves taking particular facts into account. Facts are directly related to the situation decision-makers must face. Prudence emphasizes action (Aristotle 1996, 152). Any general principle/rule can never determine the optimal choice, given the circumstances. Even moral rules cannot provide any guidance to decision-­ makers (Curzer 2007, 224). Moral virtues are formed by daily habits, while intellectual virtues result from continuous learning and past experiences (Mintz 1996, 829). Intellectual virtues aim at excellence in reasoning, while moral virtues focus

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on excellence in moral life (Macaulay and Arjoon 2013, 517). Aristotle enhanced the balance between over-abundance and deficiency, since over-abundance and deficiency are extremes (vices) that could have detrimental effects on people. Aristotle proposed the “middle way” between the two extremes. Virtues always arise in the “middle way.” Aristotle (1943, 70: 1257b40–1258a3) described the basic motive behind an excessive search for wealth: people try to improve their living conditions. Morality and happiness allow us to “live-in” harmony with others. Aristotle acknowledged that altruism plays a decisive role in social life (Aristotle 1954, 58: 1366b34–1367a7). Aristotle believed that justice is a perfect virtue. Justice establishes the following principle of the observance of the middle way: complying with laws and pursuing equality and fairness. Unlike other virtues, justice absolutely requires a middle way (Aristotle 1996, 113–125). Virtues are acquired when they are continuously put into practice. We become just by undertaking just actions (Aristotle 1996, 13, 24, 33–41, 46). Virtuous action teaches us to be virtuous. Aristotle defined moral virtues as the observance of the middle way: “in relation to things that inspire confidence or fear” (courage) and “in relation to pleasures” (temperance, or self-control) (Aristotle 1996, 68–73). It is harder to endure suffering (through courage) than to abstain from pleasure (through temperance), said Aristotle (1996, 71). Being courageous implies feeling pain, whether it is actualized in the present moment or projected into the future. Courageous personalities do not feel pleasure when they “do the right thing” (Bragues 2006, 346). Rather, they accept suffering because of their loyalty towards righteousness. Virtuous personalities naturally “do the right thing” (Hartman 1998, 548). Unlike post-moral worldviews, moral worldviews presuppose that the meaning of “doing the right thing” is crystal-clear. This is particularly true for Aristotelian ethics. Virtue ethics emphasizes the person “we-ought-to-be” (Buyan 2007, 45). The person “we-ought-to-be” (morally oriented self-projection) is not always identical to the person “we-would-like-to-be” (self-projection of one’s self-identity). But virtue ethics tries to make them identical. We must distinguish between values and virtues. Consciously or not, we could put our values into practice, when involved in our daily life. Virtues are continuously at the centre of our thoughts, words, emotions and sentiments, attitudes, and behaviours. Virtuous individuals are always focussed on their virtues. They search for meaning in their lives and try to be happy. They consider virtues as offering the perfect path to happiness. Aristotle (1996, 273) concluded that happiness follows from an “activity in accordance with virtue.” Knowledgeable truths that make us happy are those favouring the optimal exercise of freedom. At the very least, “being-free” is being our own end rather than others’ end (Aristotle 2000, 9: 982b25–27). Virtuous actions become virtuous habits. Only virtuous habits teach us how to be virtuous here-and-now, as well as in the long-­ term. Happiness follows from sustained virtuous habits. Prudence is not an abstract virtue. Rather, it must be actualized through prudent actions. Endorsing virtues creates a basic continuity between our words and our deeds (the “walk the talk” principle). Death, sickness, and suffering are basic categories of human life. Being patient could allow us to reduce the intensity of our ontic pain. We must accept the inevitability of death. Learning to die is learning to

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live. Seeing our youth dying is much more painful than looking at the death of old age. Death is an integral part of our existence. At any moment of our life, we are “towards-our-death”: we are involved in an ontic path that will end in our death. Nothingness is undefinable. Dying is not being in nothingness since we can never “be-in-nothingness.” Dying individuals can become existentially anxious about the hypothesis of life after death. Death is intrinsically related to existential anxiety since existing entails being anxious about our “death-to-come.” Virtues make death far from our daily concerns. Being virtuous is being focused on the actualization of virtues as if our “death-to-come” were not so important. Nonetheless, our “deathto-­come” largely contributes to our ontic search for the meaning of our own life. Virtuous life does not erase the existentiality and “futurality” of our death-to-come. Our death-to-come is both an integral part of human existence and an inherent component of our temporality. Virtues are centered on daily life. The present moment is the only one we can use to be more virtuous. Vices are various ways to make virtues degenerate. Hatred, cruelty, and greed are strong attempts to annihilate virtuous life. The worst vices shock our moral conscience since they are inherently oriented towards Evil. Avoiding vicious thoughts, words, emotions, and actions requires a total awareness of our personalized “here-and-now.” To do so, we need to develop prudence. Virtues can never be excessive, since they aim at the optimal level of harmony, goodness, compassion, altruism, and justice. Embracing a given virtue through excessive actions/decisions is not complying with such a virtue. Any excessive way to practice a given virtue distorts its own telos. Every virtue requires temperance and prudence. We should love virtues for themselves (as ends). Virtues should never be instrumentalized. “Instrumentalizing” virtues entails considering that virtues are not intrinsically linked to happiness. Virtues are then tools (means) to maximize our self-interest, regardless of consequences. When virtues become day-to-day habits, they cannot be shaken by various negative conditioning factors, such as shame, suffering, and indigence. We should only actualize virtues for their own sake. The laws of consciousness arise from habits and customs. Every person is prone to endorse opinions, attitudes and behaviours which are approved in the group to which he/she belongs. He/she will feel remorse, when deviating from group-based or community-based norms. We can only control our own will. We cannot control the innumerable effects of our decisions and actions. We always choose the best among multiple “possibilities-to-be.” We know that our “being-free” is existentially finite. So, various ontic conditions and causes could affect our freedom. Being subjected to disturbing passions, such as anger and hatred, means losing part of our ontic freedom. We remain existentially “being-free.” However, we have abandoned part of our possibilities-to-be in favour of disturbing emotions. Being subjected to disturbing emotions means reducing the scope of our ontic freedom. Self-control should be our main ontic purpose because it could allow us to reach a peaceful state of mind/heart. Being subjected to disturbing passions is losing part of our self-control. “Being-free” involves exercising self-control. Our being is filled with disturbing emotions, such as vengeance, jealousy, anger, and cruelty. Disturbing emotions are intertwined with positive emotions, like

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compassion. Feeling compassion toward people who are suffering implies enhancing their own strengths and talents. Compassion needs respect and esteem for people who are suffering. Jealousy makes us overestimate ourselves. Self-control is the only way to get rid of such disruptive emotions. Being “in-quest-for-organizational-wisdom” involves knowing the existential limitations of a virtuous life, including the various paths of wisdom in organizational life. It implies a basic openness to different kinds of virtuous thought, speech, and behaviour. However, Truth-itself remains inherently linked to virtues. Organizational members who embrace moral worldviews then become “virtuous guardians” of Truth-itself in their organizational life. Assuming the ontic challenge of organizational life means being open to various moral virtues in organizational life, without embracing potentially conflicting virtues. Organizational members who are “in-quest-for-organizational-wisdom” are responding to Dasein’s call for a virtuous life. The ontic way of “Being-the-There” (Dasein) always implies both an ontic call (question) for virtuous life and an ontic quest (response) for wisdom. The ontic call for a virtuous life comes from the actualization of “Being-the-There” in our concrete existence, while the ontic quest for wisdom expresses the way “Being-­ the-­There” answers Dasein’s call for a virtuous life. The ontic call for virtuous life and the ontic quest for wisdom are grounded in “Being-the-There.” We cannot be “Being-the-There” without calling our Dasein for a virtuous life in our concrete existence. We cannot be “Being-the-There” without being in quest-for-wisdom as a response to Dasein’s call for a virtuous life. From an ontic viewpoint, “Being-the-­ There” requires the ontic call for a virtuous life and the ontic quest for wisdom. In the organizational setting, every organizational member receives an ontic call for a virtuous life and responds to that call through an ontic quest for wisdom. Practicing virtues in our organizational life is one way (among others) to receive the ontic call from “Being-the-There.” Searching for organizational wisdom is a way (among others) to answer the ontic call from “Being-the-There.” Managing Dasein’s call for a virtuous life and our existential quest for wisdom is “being-in-quest-for-meaning” throughout organizational life. “Living-in-an-organization” is receiving Dasein’s call for a virtuous organizational life. It is also responding to the call through an ontic quest for organizational wisdom. Moral worldviews reflect an existentially based dialectics between a virtuous life and wisdom. A virtuous life needs wisdom, and vice-versa. A virtuous life and wisdom are interdependent. The “question/ response dialectics” is translated into a dialectics between virtuous life and wisdom. But any dialectics between a virtuous life and wisdom unveils the existentially based dialectics between the ontic call (question) and the ontic quest (response). It also expresses how philosophical questioning arises in the organizational setting, when organizational members are confronted with various challenges of a virtuous life and wisdom. Moral worldviews shape themselves around a virtuous life and wisdom. The practice of virtues can only be rooted in an ontic call from “Being-the-­ There, while wisdom can only be grounded in an ontic quest from “Being-the-­ There.” In organizational life, “Being-the-There” is at the true origin of our virtuous life and wisdom. The way we deploy our virtuous life and practice wisdom unveils

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the ontic horizon of “Being-the-There.” It opens the way to endless ontic questioning and fosters the various responses to such pre-philosophical questioning. Organizational members’ “Being-the-There” needs the full deployment of virtuous life and wisdom. 2.2.1.4  T  he Call for Our Self-Identity and the Quest for the Meaning of Our Ontic Temporality Knowing who-we-are involves loving and cultivating ourselves, while avoiding useless thoughts and experiences. Everything we learn changes us since our self can never neglect its accumulated knowledge. Even when we deny the value of an object of “internal knowledge”, all objects of internal knowledge still influence our state of mind/heart. Vanity reduces our openness to others’ radical otherness and our capacity to learn something important from others’ past experiences. The self is always changing. The becoming of our self largely depends on the awareness of our capacities for self-transcendence and of our weaknesses. Our weaknesses are basic obstacles to self-transcendence. Memory safeguards some reminiscences from the past or makes them disappear. In dialogical relationships, people who neither listen to themselves nor respect others are used to focussing on reminiscences. They lack judgment. Developing our opinions and deepening our judgment prompts us to search in the dark. The strangeness of things disappears as soon as we become more familiar with them. It is an issue of habits rather than of science and knowledge. Seizing the novelty of given things makes us search for their causes. Others’ judgment and opinions, as well as laws and social customs, allow us to acknowledge the finite character of our own judgment. This is the only way to uncover our existential finitude and ontic weaknesses. Appearances are not reliable criteria for decision-making processes. They could wrongly orient our moral sensitivity and make us neglect very important aspects of others’ self. The human being usually “lives-in” inconsistency. He/she always lacks inner consistency. Vices imply disruption and immoderation. In the present moment, we are never “at-home” with ourselves. In the past, we lacked any reliable reminiscence to be used in decision-making processes. Our present fear, desire and hope are future-oriented, although they could be related to past events and phenomena. Being “in-quest-for-the-meaning-of-organizational-temporality” is knowing the existential limitations of any meaning, including the various meanings available for explaining and justifying organizational realities/experiences. This implies a basic openness to various kinds of self-identity. However, Truth-itself remains inherently linked to organizational members’ self-identity. Organizational members who embrace moral worldviews then become “self-centred guardians” of Truth-itself in their organizational life. Assuming the ontic challenge of organizational life involves being open to various kinds of self-identity, without endorsing innumerable and potentially conflicting self-identities. Organizational members who are

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“in-quest-­for-the-meaning-of-organizational-temporality” respond to Dasein’s call for self-­identity. The ontic way of “Being-the-There” (Dasein) always implies both an ontic call (question) for self-identity and an ontic quest (response) for the meaning of organizational temporality. Dasein’s call for self-identity comes from the actualization of “Being-the-There” in daily life, while the ontic quest for the meaning of organizational temporality expresses the way “Being-the-There” answers Dasein’s call for self-identity. The ontic call for self-identity and the ontic quest for the meaning of organizational temporality are grounded in “Being-the-There.” We cannot be “Being-the-There” without calling our Dasein for defining our self-identity in daily life. We cannot be “Being-the-There” without being in “quest-for-the-­ meaning-of-organizational-temporality” as a response to the call for our self-­identity. From an ontic viewpoint, “Being-the-There” requires the ontic call for self-identity and the ontic quest for the meaning of organizational temporality. In the organizational setting, every organizational member receives an ontic call for self-identity and responds to that call through an ontic quest for the meaning of organizational temporality. In organizational life, defining our self-identity is a way (among others) to receive the ontic call from one’s “Being-the-There.” Searching for the meaning of organizational temporality is a way (among others) to answer the ontic call from one’s “Being-the-There.” Managing Dasein’s call for self-identity and our ontic quest for the meaning of organizational temporality is “being-in-­quest-for-meaning” throughout our organizational life. “Living-in-an-organization” is receiving the ontic call for defining our self-identity in our organizational life. It is also responding to the call through an ontic quest for the meaning of organizational temporality. Moral worldviews reflect an existentially based dialectics between organizational members’ self-identity and the meaning of organizational temporality. Self-identity needs the meaning of organizational temporality, and vice-versa. Organizational members’ self-identity and the meaning of organizational temporality are interdependent. The “question/response dialectics” is translated into a dialectics between organizational members’ self-identity and the meaning of organizational temporality. But any dialectics between organizational members’ self-identity and the meaning of organizational temporality unveils the dialectics between ontic call (question) and ontic quest (response). It also expresses how philosophical questioning arises in the organizational setting, when organizational members are confronted with various challenges of organizational members’ self-identity and meaning for organizational temporality. Moral worldviews shape themselves around organizational members’ self-identity and the meaning of organizational temporality. Organizational members’ self-identity can only be rooted in an ontic call from “Being-the-There, while the meaning of organizational temporality can only be grounded in an ontic quest from “Being-the-There.” In organizational life, “Being-the-There” is at the true origin of our self-identity and the meaning of organizational temporality.

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2.2.2  The Organizational Path Towards a Moral Worldview In organizational life, a moral worldview can be the basis for organizational ethics and culture. It is a profound challenge to unify the entire organizational moral discourse around a given moral worldview. There are five main steps in any organizational path towards a moral worldview: First step: Organizational members are generally searching for Truth-itself, regardless of their cultural, social, political, or religious/spiritual background. Any search for Truth-itself is an ontic search for meaning that gives birth to “truth-­ claims.” However, truth-claims do not arise ex nihilo. Rather, they are produced by the way a system of interconnected meanings and symbols is progressively strengthened. In the organizational setting, employees and managers can search for Truth-itself. Cultural, ethnic, and religious/spiritual pluralism could influence the way employees and managers aim at divergent or convergent paths. The development of a moral worldview needs the involvement of organizational members to enhance and deepen their ontic search for meaning. Second step: Organizational members can question their beliefs, values/virtues, and principles, while comparing them to others’ viewpoints. The certainty of holding absolute truths makes dialogue impossible. Being reluctant to relativize our truth-claims hinders us from participating in cross-cultural and interreligious dialogue about meaningful issues of organizational life. The willingness to question our own beliefs, values and virtues largely depends on our resilience and social open-mindedness. Avoiding ontic anxiety and distress remains our basic concern. Our system of meanings gives us an encompassing meaning for life in general, including our organizational life. Such an encompassing meaning could provide a serene and peaceful state of mind/heart. Organizational members must develop their resilience and social open-mindedness if they want to participate in the process of building a moral worldview. Third step: Organizational members agree that everyone tries to interpret realities and to have a happy life. A human being is a “being-who-interprets-reality.” Happiness is the basic purpose of human life. Yet it cannot be reached without taking our interpretative quest into account. Organizational members should acknowledge that there is a multiplicity of interpretations drawn from the same event/phenomenon, as well as various ways to define happiness in daily life. In doing so, they could open their mind/heart to others’ viewpoints and experiences. Fourth step: Organizational members are not reluctant to engage in internalization processes. They are open to various modes of wisdom. Internalization processes are culturally, socially, and religiously/spiritually determined. Whether such processes are oriented towards the human soul, spirit, mind, or heart, they attempt to establish a harmonious and peaceful inner life. However, internalization processes involve looking at ourselves “as-we-are” and defining our “project-to-be-­ oneself” (“who-we-would-like-to-be, or our “Becoming-oneself”). Internalization processes need determination and courage, not only towards our present self, but also towards our “Becoming-oneself.” Some organizational members could be

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reluctant to commit themselves to internalization processes. Moreover, there is no promise that internalization processes could result in a deeper understanding of wisdom. If so, then we face another important challenge: being open to others’ notions/experiences of wisdom. In organizational life, the deployment of a moral worldview requires the general agreement to participate in internalization processes and a general tolerance of different paths to wisdom. Fifth step: Organizational members would like to raise the level of self-realization in the workplace. Internalization processes and the ontic quest for wisdom make the need for self-realization in the workplace self-evident. However, what does self-realization in organizational life imply? Organizational members should pursue the best means to self-realization. Self-realization is a constant issue, everywhere in the organization (various spatial loci: units, departments, and so forth), regardless of job tasks, and anytime. A static conception of space/time would confine opportunities of self-realization to some organizational (spatial) loci and temporal units. It would open the door to static ceremonies and unchanging rituals of self-realization. However, it would close the way to self-realization, as an unlimited and absolute concern for every organizational member. Those five steps characterize the organizational path towards a moral worldview. They are prerequisites for the development of such a worldview in any corporate culture. Any corporate moral discourse is not necessarily grounded in a moral worldview. However, when this is the case, then it has a very strong basis. The implementation of a moral worldview would imply an essential continuity between organizational culture/life and the components of such a moral worldview. It would also allow organizational members to develop a deep sense of community life, given that they would generally share the substance of a given moral worldview. The standards and norms of organizational ethics are more applicable in daily life. “Living-in-an-organization” entails receiving various ontic calls and responding to them through simultaneous ontic quests. There are four ontic calls coming from “Being-the-There:” the call for interpretation, the call for morality, the call for a virtuous life, and the call for self-identity. Those four ontic calls converge in Dasein’s call for self-transcendence. We can overcome some ontic limitations, although we are existentially finite. There are four objects of self-transcendence. In each case, every Dasein’s call is counterbalanced by an ontic quest. Every ontic quest is Dasein’s response to Dasein’s call. Firstly, the object of self-transcendence can be our interpretation of realities. Our “being-who-interprets-reality” has developed usual modes of interpretation that could confine our mind/heart to a one-track approach. Dasein’s call for self-transcendence allows us to overcome any self-­ imposed limitation of our interpretative actions. Our ontic quest for knowledge shows our ontic response to Dasein’s call for interpretation. Secondly, the object of self-transcendence can be our own morality. Embracing a moral worldview involves endorsing given values and norms of behaviour. However, organizational morality (moral normativity) and organizational ethics (ethical aim) are not always suitable for organizational members’ morality/ethics. Dasein’s call for self-transcendence makes us aware that we can overcome any self-imposed limitation of our moral

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standards. Our ontic quest for happiness expresses our ontic response to Dasein’s call for morality. Thirdly, the object of self-transcendence can be our virtuous life. A virtuous life is not a by-product of morality. Unlike virtues, values and behavioural norms do not constantly influence our way of thinking, feeling, and behaving. A virtuous life makes us go a step further than morality. Dasein’s call for self-­ transcendence makes us overcome the self-imposed limitations of an organizationally based virtuous life. A virtuous life is always beyond all preconceptions of virtue. Our ontic quest for wisdom mirrors our ontic response to Dasein’s call for a virtuous life. Fourthly, the object of self-transcendence can be our own self-identity. We can become “who-we would-like-to-be” because our self-identity is “self-­ created.” Dasein’s call for self-transcendence allows us to improve the knowledge/awareness of “who-we-are” throughout organizational life. Our quest for the meaning of our ontic temporality reflects our response to Dasein’s call for self-identity.

2.3  D  eveloping a Post-Moral Worldview by Criticizing Morality and Revealing the Emptiness of Ethical Values/Virtues A post-moral worldview criticizes morality and unveils the emptiness of ethical values/virtues. Such a worldview is based on four ontic needs: (1) the ontic need for possibilities-to-be and the primacy of interpretation; (2) the ontic need for the will-­ to-­power and the primacy of the free mind; (3) the ontic need for the transmutation of values/virtues and the primacy of natural instincts; and (4) the ontic need for social change and the primacy of tolerance, courage, and responsibility. A post-­ moral worldview could unveil any of these ontic needs/primacies. A moral worldview is centered on Dasein’s call for self-transcendence. In contrast, a post-moral worldview emphasizes Dasein’s ontic needs of a “Becoming-oneself.” From a post-­ moral perspective, Being-oneself is an endless process. From an existential perspective, existing is “Becoming-oneself.” “Being-oneself” is always “Becoming-oneself.” Being-oneself “needs” to be, since it is a “Becoming-oneself.” However, Dasein’s disclosure of ontic needs unveils the way we should prioritize our path of becoming who-we-are. Four primacies express such prioritization. The primacy of interpretation makes it clear that any limitation to our “being-who-interprets-reality” is a basic distortion of Dasein’s Being. The primacy of our free mind reflects how we can exploit Dasein’s need for will-to-power. Our mind/heart can be imprisoned in traditional values/virtues, which are strongly enhanced by moral worldviews. Such a situation is a basic obstacle to our “being-free.” Post-moral worldviews resist any attempt to imprison our mind/heart.

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2.3.1  T  he Existential Need for Possibilities-to-Be and the Primacy of Interpretation The existential need for possibilities-to-be is related to the primacy of interpretation. Searching for our possibilities-to-be is defining which possibilities-to-be could be suitable for our ontic situation. Our ontic choice of possibilities-to-be is grounded in our “being-who-interprets-reality.” Without our ontic interpretation, we would be unable to choose our “optimal” possibilities-to-be, given the circumstances. The existential meaning of interpretation cannot neglect our “in-the-worldliness” and the historicality of our being. In organizational life, Dasein’s need for possibilities-­ to-­be and the primacy of ontic interpretation are quite relevant. A post-moral worldview focuses on “living-in-an-organization” as the endless choice of possibilities-to-be throughout organizational culture. Organizational members’ project-to-be is actualized in their organizational life. Organizational life and culture influence the way organizational members define their project-to-be and put it into practice. “Living-in-an-organization” is choosing “who-we-would-like-to-be” (our project-to-be), given the various conditioning factors of organizational life. In the organizational setting, “living-in” involves being confronted with various organizational events and phenomena which are an integral part of our “in-the-­ worldliness.” “Organizational everydayness” is basically linked to our subjective interpretation of the flow of time. “Living-in-an-organization” allows our “Becoming-oneself” to be involved in its historical situation. The historicality of Dasein’s Being can never be separated from our ontic need for ownmost possibilities-­ to-­be, whether our “in-the-worldliness” can be. 2.3.1.1  Existence and Phenomena/Events in-the-World Existing is “being in-the-world.” We cannot “exist” without being surrounded by things, beings, events, and phenomena. Our “being-a-self” cannot be isolated from our “in-the-worldliness.” Our world and self are interdependent. Our participation in ongoing events defines “who-we-would-like-to-be.” Defining events and circumscribing their meaning and scope allow us to affirm who-we-are and to improve our self-awareness. Participating in given event presupposes that such an event is an integral part of a whole system (or general historical situation). There are no isolated events. All events occurring “in-the-world” are related to our “in-the-­ worldliness.” They express the historicality of our being. But understanding the meaning and scope of a given event involves grasping its underlying idea/principle. Ideas form the basis of ontic events and phenomena. Any cause is an effect of a prior cause. Any effect is the cause of future effects. So, in the “presentness of the present”, the distinction between cause and effect seems to be quite strong. But if we consider the “pastness of the present” (or living stains from the past) and the “futureness of the present” (or seeds of futurality), then the distinction between causes and effects becomes less clear-cut.

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In a post-moral worldview, the primacy of interpretation can be applied to organizational life and culture. Affirming the primacy of interpretation requires overcoming any ontic limitation and choosing our possibilities-to-be throughout organizational life. The primacy of interpretation presupposes the non-existence of Truth-itself. A “being-who-interprets-reality” is the only way to get truth-claims. There is no Truth-itself. Existing involves being confronted with inevitable uncertainties and doubts, since uncertainties and doubts are rooted in our existential finitude. Organizational life is, thus, permeated with uncertainties and doubts that organizational members must shoulder. There is no ultimate/absolute interpretation. Every interpretation gives birth to a truth-claim. Organizational members who embrace post-moral worldviews then become “interpretative guardians” of truth-­ claims in organizational life. Assuming the ontic challenge of organizational life entails strengthening dialogue about organizational events and phenomena, without endorsing any conception of Truth-itself. Organizational members who are wholly “beings-who-interpret-reality” freely choose their ownmost possibilities-to-be. The ontic mode of “Being-the-There” (Dasein) always implies both an ontic need (question) for possibilities-to-be and an ontic primacy (response) of interpretation. The ontic need for possibilities-to-be comes from the actualization of “Being-the-There” in daily life, while the ontic primacy of interpretation expresses the way “Being-the-­ There” responds to Dasein’s need for possibilities-to-be. The ontic need for possibilities-­to-be and the primacy of interpretation are grounded in “Being-the-­ There.” We cannot be “Being-the-There” without responding to Dasein’s need for possibilities-to-be. We cannot be “Being-the-There” without strongly affirming the primacy of our “being-who-interprets-reality” as a response to Dasein’s need for possibilities-to-be. From an ontic viewpoint, “Being-the-There” requires ontic possibilities-­to-be and the primacy of interpretation. In the organizational setting, every organizational member can understand Dasein’s need for possibilities-to-be and find a way for the ultimate primacy of subjective interpretation. Interpreting our organizational life is one way (among others) to understand Dasein’s need for possibilities-­to-be. Endorsing the primacy of interpretation is one way (among others) to grasp Dasein’s need for possibilities-to-be. Managing Dasein’s need for possibilities-to-be and the ultimate primacy of our “being-who-interprets-reality” is choosing our ownmost possibilities-to-be throughout organizational life. “Living-­ in-­an-organization” is not only understanding Dasein’s need for possibilities-to-be but, above all, expressing the ultimate primacy of interpretation, regardless of the nature of organizational realities. Post-moral worldviews mirror an existentially based dialectics between possibilities-to-be and interpretation. Interpretation needs our ownmost possibilities-to-be, and vice-versa. Our interpretations and ownmost possibilities-to-be are interdependent. The “question/response dialectics” is translated into dialectics between Dasein’s need for possibilities-to-be (question) and the primacy of interpretation (response). But any dialectics between interpretation and knowledge unveils the dialectics between an ontic call (question) and an ontic quest (response). It also expresses how philosophical questioning arises in the organizational setting, when organizational members are confronted with the ontic choice of their possibilities-to-be and the ultimate primacy of interpretation. Post-moral

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worldviews shape themselves around our ownmost possibilities-to-be and the ultimate primacy of interpretation. Our ownmost possibilities-to-be are rooted in the ultimate primacy of our “being-who-interprets-reality, while the primacy of interpretation can only be grounded in Dasein’s need for our ownmost possibilities-to­be. In organizational life, “Being-the-There” is at the true origin of our ownmost possibilities-to-be and of the ultimate primacy of interpretation. 2.3.1.2  T  he Ontic Basis for Interpreting Reality and Identifying Possibilities-to-be Our existence is meaningless, since we are not responsible for our own existence and life circumstances (Nietzsche 1977, 65). The human being has projected his/her will, mind and self out of himself/herself. We have found in things what we had projected in them, argued Nietzsche (1977, 59). Giving meaning to any being/event/ phenomenon is projecting a given will, as though it were originally present in that being, event, or phenomenon. This is the process of religious faith that promises happiness for every believer (Nietzsche 1975, 125; 1977, 17). It is a form of self-­ estrangement (Nietzsche 1978b, 99). Nihilism implies that existence does not have any intrinsic meaning (Nietzsche 1968b, 96; 1976, 155–156, 218–219). Suffering is existentially shocking, since it does not have any intrinsic meaning (Nietzsche 1979, 94). Nihilism is the affirmation of meaninglessness. It has been caused by the faith in traditional morality (Nietzsche 1968b, 7–9). The ambiguities of life are counterbalanced by our ontic need to interpret them. The world could give birth to an infinite set of interpretations (Nietzsche 1982, 350). There are no facts, only interpretations, argued Nietzsche. Necessity is not a fact, only an interpretation. There is no “thing-in-itself.” Nietzsche (1968b, 300) strongly criticized Kant’s assertion that the “thing-in-itself” is still apparently present. Our acts of will are interpretations. The thing-in-itself cannot be the ultimate basis of reality. If there is no “thing-in-itself,” then there cannot be any “fact-in-itself.” The “will-to-power” requires the power of interpretation. Every meaning is an interpretation and, thus, an exercise of the will-to-power. Everything is always “in-­ becoming.” So, there can never be any “knowledge-in-itself” (Nietzsche 1968b, 267, 297, 301–303, 317, 323, 327, 330, 352). Any “in-itself” would imply an unchanging reality. We can only define unchanging beings, things, and phenomena. Any changing being, thing or phenomenon is indefinable. So, everything in human existence is indefinable, since the human being is historically rooted (Nietzsche 1979, 112). Morality is always changing. Everything that changes is uncertain. Only immutable things can be certain. Yet nothing in human existence is immutable. Morality is, therefore, inherently uncertain (Nietzsche 1975, 108). Nietzsche explained that social and political institutions are based on a desire for tradition/ authority/responsibility and a desire for intergenerational solidarity, over the centuries (Nietzsche 1977, 126). Any doubt comes into conflict with the need to be right. The human personality is comprised of habits and prejudices. When a given prejudice becomes a habit, it is

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transformed into a stereotype. It is quite difficult to get rid of prejudices since they have been strongly reinforced by daily habits. Every human being is subject to multiple conditioning factors and could eventually display all possible weaknesses. Internal contradictions make human life ambiguous. The ambiguities of life, however, are not the cause of existential anxiety. Existential anxiety is the anxiety to exist, as finite being. The ambiguities of life can make existential anxiety much more intolerable. The human being is a being with infinite possibilities-to-be. The exercise of our ontic freedom involves choosing a possibility-to-be among many others. When choosing a possibility-to-be, we are involved in individuation processes and actualize our humanity. Ontic realities are ambiguous. We admire the beauty of the perfectly harmonious Universe, while searching for Beauty-itself. We admire goodness, as it is reflected in our interpersonal relationships, while pursuing Goodness-itself. We cannot know the essence of Beauty-itself, Goodness-itself, and Justice-itself. Such notions are defined in a transcendent manner. The human being admires the immanence of beauty, goodness, and justice. But simultaneously he/she searches for their transcendent form, as though it could be known rationally. But such is not the case. This is the ambiguity of human life. There cannot be any life ambiguity without the project of improving our living conditions. Fate does not limit our awareness of life’s ambiguities. “Being-courageous” involves taking existential anxiety upon ourselves. It allows us to face life’s ambiguities and to develop plans to improve our own existence. The basic worth of our realizations lies in the fact that we are fully aware of our possibilities-to-be, sentiments, and projects. Prejudices and traditions impose some limitations on our possibilities-to-be. We can never hold “reality-as-it-is.” If reality is meaningful, then there must be a meaning for every possibility-to-be. “A possibility-to-be” is not equivalent to “reality-as-it-is.” When possibilities-to-be are freely chosen, they become actualized. A possibility-to-be implies a will to favour our “Becoming-oneself.” It can even open the door to a “will-to-utopia.” Reality awakens possibilities-to-be in our own existence. Some realities then become “possible.” Losing the sense of reality extinguishes our possibilities-to-be. Thus, we cannot believe in any meaning of “what-is-possible.” If we lose the sense of reality, we destroy the sense of possibilities. At the very end, “what-is-possible” remains an abstraction that does not have any connection with reality. The meaning of given things and phenomena is not necessarily identical for groups and for their members. Many individuals who search for a meaning in life settle for preformulated answers and half-truths. If the meaning of life were subjected to any order, then its contradiction would also reflect a given order. All thought, action, work and personality could be considered meaningful. Any meaningful substance is considered to have a given worth. But how can we ascertain such worth? What are the relevant criteria? Are there various levels of meaningfulness? If so, what are the principles justifying the systematic hierarchy of worthy things, beings, or events? Such a hierarchy could come from the objective mind. A given thing/being is never “what-it-is-in-itself” (reality-as-it-is), but rather “what-it-is-in-situation.” The human being is an historically based “being-in-­ situation.” Reality-as-it-is is never equivalent to situational reality. The “in-itself” of

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“reality-as-it-is” excludes the “in-situation” of our “Becoming-oneself.” Their meanings can never converge. Meanings are always connected to our personalized “here-and-now.” The essence of things, beings, events, or phenomena is always actualized in given historical situation. It does not exist as an essence. The essence can only be grasped in experiential moments. It is never “in-itself.” It always lies in our personalized “here-and-now.” From a post-moral worldview, the primacy of interpretation is based on the universal and inevitable becoming of “everything-that-is.” Organizational life is subjected to such unavoidable becoming. Embracing the primacy of interpretation necessitates transcending our ontic limitations. Choosing our ownmost possibilities-­ to-­be is the only way to freely interpret our organizational life. The non-existence of Truth-itself is rooted in the universal and inevitable becoming of all beings, things, and phenomena. All truth-claims mirror the ultimacy of a “being-whointerprets-­reality.” In organizational life, uncertainties and doubts can never be eliminated. Indeed, they are existentially rooted. The coexistence of innumerable and potentially conflicting truth-claims unveils the existentiality of universal becoming. In organizational life, our uncertainties and doubts reflect “what-itmeans-to-exist, more particularly the meaning of “living-in-an-organization.” Every interpretation is “in-becoming.” There is no irreversible interpretation. No interpretation totally remains in its original form. Rather, it is continuously changing. Every truth-claim is then “in-becoming.” It cannot eternally remain the same, regardless of circumstances. Organizational members who embrace post-moral worldviews then become “interpretative guardians” of their ontic “in-becoming,” as it is expressed in their organizational life. Assuming the ontic challenge of organizational life entails enhancing and fostering dialogue about organizational events and phenomena, while strongly asserting the ontic and universal “in-becoming.” Organizational members who are wholly “beings-who-interpret-reality” cannot freely choose their ownmost possibilities-to-be without endorsing the ontic and universal “in-­becoming.” Our existential “in-becoming” is the basis of Dasein’s need for possibilities-­to-be (question) and an ontic primacy (response) of endless interpretation. Without our existential “in-becoming”, Dasein’s need for possibilities-to-be would not be possible. There would not be any ontic way of Dasein’s self-­disclosure. Our “in-becoming” is existentially based. Existing is “being-inbecoming.” Our “being-in-becoming” opens the door to Dasein’s need for possibilities-to-be. The ultimate primacy of interpretation allows the various ontic forms of “in-becoming.” Ontic forms of “in-becoming” reflect the existentiality of endless change. Dasein’s need for possibilities-to-be and the ultimate primacy of endless interpretation are grounded in our “being-in-becoming.” We cannot be “Being-theThere” without “being-in-becoming.” Dasein’s Being requires the ultimate primacy of our “being-­who-­interprets-reality, as a response to Dasein’s need for possibilities-to-be (question). In the organizational setting, every organizational member can understand his/her “being-in-becoming” as intrinsically linked to Dasein’s need for possibilities-­to-­be and to the ultimate primacy of endless interpretation. Interpreting our organizational life is one way (among others) to understand our “being-in-becoming” as mirroring Dasein’s ontic need for possibilities-to-be.

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Endorsing the ultimate primacy of endless interpretation is one way (among others) to understand our “being-­in-­becoming,” since every interpretation sends us back to Dasein’s ontic need for possibilities-to-be. Managing Dasein’s need for possibilities-to-be and the ultimate primacy of our “being-who-interprets-reality” is unveiling the interconnectedness of our “being-in-becoming” and the ontic choice of our ownmost possibilities-to-be throughout organizational life. “Living-in-anorganization” involves grasping our “being-in-becoming” as the basis of Dasein’s need for possibilities-to-be. It is also revealing the ultimate primacy of endless interpretation, regardless of the nature of organizational events and phenomena. Interpretation needs our ownmost possibilities-­to-be, and vice-versa. Our “beingin-becoming” unveils the interconnectedness of our ownmost possibilities-to-be and our endless interpretation. The “question/response dialectics” is grounded in our “being-in-becoming.” “Being-in-­becoming” is the existential basis for any dialectics between Dasein’s need for possibilities-to-be (question) and the ultimate primacy of endless interpretation (response). But any dialectics between Dasein’s need for possibilities-to-be and the ultimate primacy of endless interpretation discloses an existential interconnectedness of Dasein’s “Becoming-oneself” and the various expressions of our “being-in-­becoming” in our family, group, organizational, institutional, and even societal life. Organizational members are confronted with philosophical questioning about organizational events and phenomena (including organizational ethics), when their “being-in-becoming” must reflect the ultimate primacy of endless interpretation. Post-moral worldviews shape themselves around our “being-­in-­becoming” as the existential basis of Daseins’ need for our ownmost possibilities-to-be and the source of the ultimate primacy of endless interpretation. In organizational life, our “being-­in-­becoming” is at the true origin of Dasein’s need for our ownmost possibilities-to-­be and of the ultimate primacy of endless interpretation. 2.3.1.3  The Historical Situation and the Flow of Time Ontic suffering occurs “in-time”, that is, in given historical situation. It is affected by reminiscences from the past, our present state of mind/heart, and any self-­ projection into the future. We overestimate the way the presentness of the present is felt or apprehended. It is quite difficult to always “live-in” the present moment. The present is continuously going back to the past. In the present, our whole being exists in a specific space (“here”) and time (“now”). Everyone has a personalized “here-­ and-­now.” In the past, the specificity of the space was determined by memory, so that it could vary over the years. The specificity of space/time becomes intangible. The “there” and the “on-that-day” are mnemonic transformations of the “here” and of the “now.” Every present instant could become the turning point of History. We can acknowledge that throughout History, there has never been any will to go back to the past. We can imagine that humankind will never reach its own end. If we cannot go back to the past, we cannot have any future at all. The futureness of the

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present depends on both the presentness and the pastness of the present. Producing chaotic situations makes it impossible to actualize wisdom (and all virtues) in daily life. But it also opens the way to the will-to-power and an absolutized freedom. In a post-moral worldview, the ultimate primacy of endless interpretation is related to our everydayness since this is the basis of our personalized “here-and-­ now.” Organizational members can experience organizational everydayness, when becoming aware of the mineness of their personalized here-and-now. Organizational everydayness provides the opportunity to appropriate existential “hereness” and “nowness.” From an existential perspective, “hereness” and “nowness” are interconnected, that is, interdependent. Existing entails appropriating the sense of “hereness” and the sense of “nowness.” Such appropriation is ontic (and thus subjective) since it refers to entities’ lived experiences. It meets Dasein’s need for possibilities-­ to-be. “Being-in-becoming” mirrors the endless process of appropriation. We can never find a decisive meaning and substance for our organizational “hereness” and “nowness.” In organizational life, we are constantly interpreting what it means to be here-and-now, in “this” organizational temporality. Organizational life is subjected to the unavoidable becoming of our “hereness” and “nowness.” Endorsing the ultimate primacy of endless interpretation involves transcending our organizational everydayness. In organizational life, the appropriation of our “hereness/nowness” allows us to improve the way we understand our historical situation. Organizational members interpret/re-interpret organizational history and traditions. Organizational everydayness is not merely a continual duplication of the past. Rather, organizational history and traditions still influence the way people interpret/re-interpret their organizational life. This is a collective “having-been-­present.” Organizational history and traditions belong to the past. They represent the collective “having-been.” But when organizational history and traditions still influence organizational members in their “hereness/nowness, then they make a given collective “having-been” presentiate itself. This is the collective “having-been-­present.” The non-existence of Truth-itself permeates the way organizational members appropriate their “hereness/nowness.” Organizational members’ truth-claims are related to their capacity to interpret/re-interpret their organizational everydayness. In organizational life, every interpretation is “in-becoming.” Our “being-in-­becoming” takes our “hereness/nowness” into account. “Being-in-becoming” does not allow the continual duplication of the past. Interpreting is always reinterpreting. There is no original interpretation. A “true origin” of all interpretations does not exist at all. At any moment of organizational life, organizational members reinterpret organizational history and traditions as well as their organizational everydayness. Being in the “organizational-here-and-now” involves understanding our “hereness/nowness” throughout organizational life. Organizational members’ truth-­claims are grounded in their “organizational-here-and-now.” Any “organizational-­ here-­ and-now” is intrinsically linked to organizational temporality. Organizational members who embrace post-moral worldviews are the “interpretative guardians” of their ontic “hereness/nowness”, as it is actualized in their organizational life. Assuming the ontic challenge of organizational life entails revealing the temporal basis of any

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dialogue about organizational events and phenomena, while being open to the everchanging confluence of organizational history and traditions. Our existential “hereness/nowness” is the basis for Dasein’s need for possibilities-to-be (question). We can never choose given possibilities-to-be without having the sense of our “hereness/nowness.” Any attempt to enhance an endless interpretation/reinterpretation of organizational realities allows us to grasp the existentiality of our “hereness/nowness.” Without our existential “hereness/nowness,” Dasein’s need for possibilities-to-be and the ultimate primacy of endless interpretation would not be possible. Our “hereness/nowness” is the basis of Dasein’s self-disclosure and “in-­ the-­ worldliness.” Existing is “being-in-the-here-and-now.” Our “being-in-­ becoming” can never abandon its “hereness/nowness.” In organizational life, we can perceive our “hereness/nowness” as the existential basis of Dasein’s need for possibilities-­to-be and the existential ground of our “being-who-interprets-reality.” Our “organizational-hereness-and-nowness” actualizes Dasein’s need for our ownmost possibilities-to-be and the ultimate primacy of endless interpretation.

2.3.2  T  he Ontic Need for the Will-to-Power and the Primacy of the Free Mind The will-to-power gives the free mind its ultimate primacy. It has many consequences for our sensations, perceptions, and sentiments. It also influences the way our reason is connected to our thought. The will-to-power and the free mind could radically change the way we do business and politics. Such a revolutionary principle is based on inevitable ontic uncertainties and doubts. Dasein’s need for the will-to-­ power and the primacy of the free mind can be applied in organizational life. In post-moral worldviews, “living-in-an-organization” is the locus of power games and conflicting virtues/values. Organizational members’ project-to-be can never exclude power relations in their organizational life. Organizational life and culture influence the way organizational members can manage power relations and strengthen their free minds. From a post-moral worldview, “living-in-an-­ organization” entails actualizing our will-to-power and searching to release our mind/heart, while being subjected to powerful conditioning factors. In the organizational setting, “living-in” means participating in power relations. Power relations are inevitable in ontic “in-the-worldliness.” “Organizational everydayness” is mixed with power relations. Organizational members can never have free minds without actualizing their will-to-power. “Living-in-an-organization” allows our “Becoming-­ oneself” to be involved in power relations. Power relations constitute an integral part of Dasein’s “Becoming-oneself.”

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2.3.2.1  Sensations, Perceptions, and Sentiments We can never fully grasp the human mind in its existential loneliness. Important things, phenomena and events do not follow logical guidelines. We perceive ourselves as objects, that is, something external to who-we-are. When we feel sad/ happy, we believe that sadness/happiness pervades our hearts/minds. But such feelings are not present in ourselves. Even our self is not “there.” Our self is in the “here-and-now” (our present “self-in-a-world”) and in continuous becoming (our projected self, or “Becoming-oneself”). Too often, however, the self-perception of “who-we-are” is crystallized in our hearts/minds. We believe that we could change something in who-we-are. Yet, too often, we do not know what should/could be changed in our heart and mind. Convictions make us totally present to who-we-are (“being-a-self”), as well as to others (“being-with-others”). We often develop altruism without eliminating our egocentric attitudes and thoughts. Love should exclude hatred, jealousy, and wickedness. The ultimate challenge is to be detached from ourselves. We would like to make others’ perception of ourselves identical to our self-perception. Such an attempt expresses the very strong need to create and safeguard a positive self-image. Egocentrism is a firm belief that the whole world is (or should be) within us. It is extreme self-love. Egocentrism is a distortion of self-­ centredness. We are who-we-are. But we also are someone else, as though we were strangers to our becoming-oneself. Our own strangeness is a stumbling block for our self-transcendence. We must overcome it. We can only discover our self through external things, beings, and phenomena. Unfortunately, we often move far away from internalization processes. Externalization processes could be a strong obstacle to the deployment of internalization processes. Perceptions and feelings are constrained by duration. This is especially true for our affective life. The interconnectedness of all instants makes the interconnectedness of feelings possible. Ontic temporality is inherently linked to perceptions, feelings, and sentiments. The evolution of a given sentiment depends not only on its import (substance), but above all, on its circumstances. In our personalized “here-­ and-­now,” we can never be sure that we are correctly interpreting our sentiment. Sentiments are intrinsically related to actions. We cannot say anything about the most intense and ontic sentiments, such as anxiety. Ontic sentiments, such as fear and anxiety, remain in the realm of the unsaid. Philosophical questioning can only find various ways to identify them, while philosophical answers always remain unsatisfactory. Nonetheless, philosophical questioning implies doubt about any philosophical answer. The unsaid allows us to constantly renew our philosophical questioning. Will and freedom are interconnected. Our will can only be free. Otherwise, it cannot be a true will. Freedom does not exist if it is not conveyed by human will. Unlike will, motivation has nothing to do with freedom. We cannot subject our motivations to the conflict between constraints and freedom. Motivations constitute extreme constraints, as well as extreme freedom. Motivations are closely linked to emotions. Disruptive emotions, such as hatred, jealousy and anger, could distort our representation of reality. Such a distortion makes the intensity of those emotions

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soar. Distorting reality allows us to perceive the unreal as real. So, disruptive emotions are continuously nurtured by those unreal components of a given situation. Sentiments become convictions, or ideas. Every sentiment also presupposes a non-­ appetitive mode of existence: we are then oriented towards inaction. Sentiments are dying. At the real beginning, every affective relationship is influenced by provisional perceptions and representations of reality. Then, it produces its own perceptions and representations of reality. Any sentiment reorganizes its own field of action. Passions cannot satisfy themselves. The nothingness of internal life means that forms are continuously changing, even in our hearts. Internal life has a universal worth only if the object of universal worth can permeate it. In a post-moral worldview, the primacy of the free mind can be applied to organizational life. Embracing the primacy of the free mind involves transcending all sensations, perceptions, and sentiments. These can limit organizational members’ mindsets to static ways of thinking, feeling, speaking, and behaving. The primacy of the free mind takes the non-existence of Truth-itself for granted. A free mind mirrors the absoluteness of our “being-who-interprets-reality.” Truth-claims remain relative since Truth-itself does not exist. Nonetheless, our “being-who-interprets-­ reality” holds absoluteness. Existing entails being subjected to sensations, perceptions, and sentiments. These continuously build up our subjectivity. There is no organizational life without organizational members’ sensations, perceptions, and sentiments. Nevertheless, a free mind is never totally free. It is always subjected to different conditioning factors. Sensations, perceptions, and sentiments are conditioned in various ways. Every truth-claim is intrinsically related to prior sensations, perceptions, and sentiments. Organizational members who embrace post-moral worldviews attempt to safeguard their free minds and subjectivity, when involved in organizational life. Assuming the ontic challenge of organizational life involves expressing our will-to-power, while releasing our mind/heart from any subjection to sensations, perceptions, and sentiments. Organizational members who have free minds are ready to actualize their will-to-power. Dasein’s need for the will-to-power is oriented towards our free minds. The primary object of the will-to-power is our “imprisoned mind.” “Being-imprisoned-in-our-mind” means we have lost part of our ontic freedom to define who-we-are (our self-identity as “self-in-a-world”) and “who-we-would-like-to-be” (our “Becoming-oneself”). “Being imprisoned-in-our-­ mind” and “having-a-free-mind” depend on the way we deal with our sensations, perceptions, and sentiments. Dasein’s need for the will-to-power releases our mind from possibilities of internal/external self-annihilation. Sensations, perceptions, and sentiments can reveal the way we assume Dasein’s need for the will-to-power. Dasein’s need for the will-to-power overcomes all obstacles to our free mind. The primacy of our free mind is a response to Dasein’s need for the will-to-power. In the organizational setting, every organizational member can grasp Dasein’s need for the will-to-power. Every organizational member can see how one can release one’s mind from any mode of ontic estrangement. Ontic estrangement refers here to the annihilation of the self. It can be realized either by the self (self-estrangement) or by others (relational estrangement), by organizations and institutions (organizational/ institutional estrangement), or even by social, cultural, and political structures

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(societal estrangement). In all cases, estrangement is a way to lose one’s power over one’s own mind and life. “Having-a-free-mind” involves releasing our mind from all those forms of estrangement. It concretely needs a will-to-power. “Living-in-an-­ organization” is actualizing our will-to-power and seeking to release our mind from all forms of ontic estrangement. Post-moral worldviews mirror a dialectics between Dasein’s need for the will-to-power and the primacy of the free mind. Dasein’s need for the will-to-power requires a free mind, and vice-versa. The “question/response dialectics” is translated into a dialectics between Dasein’s need for the will-to-­ power (question) and the primacy of the free mind (response). It also expresses how philosophical questioning is intrinsically linked to our will-to-power and our free mind. Post-moral worldviews shape themselves around Dasein’s need for the will-­ to-­power and the primacy of the free mind. We can never become “who-we-would-­ like-to-be” without realizing our will-to-power and becoming free minds. In organizational life, “Being-the-There” is at the true origin of our will-to-power and of our free mind. 2.3.2.2  Reason and Thought Nietzsche (1983, 29–31) analyzed the assertion “I think.” Such an assertion implies five basic beliefs: (1) the belief that something is thinking in ourselves, that is, the “I;” (2) the belief that thinking is an action (effect) caused by our own being; (3) the belief that there is an “I;” (4) the belief that the meaning of “I think” has already been proven; and (5) the belief that we know “what-it-means-to-think.” Our reality largely depends on opinions to which we are strongly attached. All “food for thought” is an opinion. Opinions could determine the way we deploy our thought. When opinions powerfully influence our way of thinking, our reason becomes attached to them, as though such opinions were meta-cognitive foundations of thought. Such absolutized opinions endanger the exercise of free will. They can even largely reduce our capacity for knowledge. We can only grasp specific dimensions of given things, beings, events, or phenomena. The global reality absolutely overcomes our rationalizing processes and capacities. It can only generate ontic uncertainties about its import/meaning. We can never obtain any certainty about interconnected parts of reality. Uncertainties may be related to the self, the world, Nature/Cosmos, or even God/Ultimate Reality. Every reality is always changing. Present things/thoughts could look like past things/thoughts. They could also continuously change over the years. Nothing remains constant. Even our thoughts are always changing. Thoughts are used for communicating with others. They have a social (externalizing) raison d’être. But we cannot perceive the borders between given personal thoughts and their impersonal modification. Nowadays, the growing intensity of rationality in all fields of human activity makes us rationalize every being, thing, event, or phenomenon. The hyper-rationalization of every reality characterizes a society in which communicational activities are subjected to the ultimate power of reason. Thoughts are not developed to be isolated from reality. Rather, the applicability of thoughts to reality

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is their raison d’être. Some thoughts cannot be explained since they would be radically distorted by language. Sometimes, it is difficult to put thoughts into words without distorting their real substance. Unfortunately, words are communicational means that make the ontic deployment of thoughts impossible. Thought and language do not share the same approach, when dealing with reality. Thought provides an abstract representation of our “self-in-a-world.” Language gives an abstract representation of thought. Excluding wrong answers to philosophical questioning involves renouncing the unveiling of ontic questions. In a post-moral worldview, the primacy of the free mind needs rational reflection and thought, particularly in organizational life. Endorsing the primacy of the free mind entails using our rationality to release ourselves from any unchanging mode of thinking, feeling, speaking, and behaving. Using rationality does not mean absolutizing reason. Thoughtful reflections do not necessarily imply making our sensations, perceptions, and sentiments diminish in importance. A free mind always tries to balance sensations, perceptions, sentiments, and the use of reason/thought. The primacy of the free mind always denies any worth and existence to Truth-itself. The existence of Truth-itself can never be rationally grounded. A free mind mirrors the absoluteness of our “being-who-interprets-reality” without absolutizing rationality and thoughtful reflection. Reason and thought remain existentially finite. However, a free mind needs a constant quest for self-transcendence. Reason and thought can strengthen any attempt of self-transcendence, without denying the contribution of sensations, perceptions, and sentiments to our “Becoming-oneself.” Truth-claims must be rationally grounded. Otherwise, the free mind can never justify them. Reason and thought do not overrule our sensations, perceptions, and sentiments. They must be adapted to realities. Their optimality mirrors the human capacity to take circumstances and others’ situation into account. Reason and thought allow us to optimally actualize our will-to-power. Reason and thought can release our mind from any kind of ontic estrangement. Reason and thought can allow us to optimally actualize our will-to-power and liberate our imprisoned mind. Reason and thought do not contradict our inwardness. However, they set up inner limitations to the free expression of sensations, perceptions, and sentiments. In post-­moral worldviews, the search for objectivity does not overrule any subjective substance of our “self-ina-world.” But reason and thought have a relative impact on the way we grasp and actualize our will-to-power. Reason and thought do not ultimately decide “what-itmeans-to-have-a-free-mind.” They can only allow people to counterbalance the influence of their sensations, perceptions, and sentiments. Our minds cannot become ultimately free in using sensations, perceptions, and sentiments. A subjective thinker is still a reasonable being. So, “having-a-free-mind” can never exclude the influence of reason and thought. Every truth-claim must be analyzed by reason and thought. Otherwise, it can only be the pure expression of sensitivity. Organizational members who endorse post-moral worldviews safeguard their reason and thought, while opening the way to their sensations, perceptions, and sentiments. Assuming the ontic challenge of organizational life involves searching for the optimal balance between sensations/perceptions/sentiments and the use of reason/thought. Reason

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and thought can allow organizational members to optimally assume Dasein’s need for the will-to-power. 2.3.2.3  The Will-to-Power Human will is a mixture of sentiments/thoughts and a passion to command (Nietzsche 1983, 32). Nietzsche believed that the will-to-power makes the progress of humankind possible (Nietzsche 1982, 43). The will-to-power is the essence of life (Nietzsche 1978b, 15; 1979, 111). However, the will-to-power is not a metaphysical principle (Kirkland 2004, 584). The will-to-power is rather the psychological desire for freedom (Nietzsche 1968b, 407; 1979, 124–125). The will-to-power is the will-to-life, that is, the enhancement of natural instincts and processes (Nietzsche 1983, 213). The will-to-power is the basis of natural instincts (Nietzsche 1979, 205). Natural instincts could be grounds for knowledge. But sometimes, they resist knowledge (Nietzsche 2006, 21). The will-to-power can make us happy (Nietzsche 1978b, 12). However, “biocidal values” in Christianity and Buddhism, as “religions of decay, have strengthened a “will-of-annihilation.” They have denied any worth to natural processes and instincts (Nietzsche 1978b, 33–35). Nietzsche interpreted Buddhism as distancing itself from any self-mystification of moral concepts. Buddhism is beyond good and evil. In Buddhism, the potential for perfection is everywhere, since the buddha-nature (or inherent perfection) is present in every sentient being. Ignorance is the blind interpretation of reality, as though relative realities were absolute. Eliminating ignorance opens the way to Enlightenment. However, Buddhists do not fight chaotic situations. Rather, they try to be at peace with disturbing contexts and emotions (Dienstag 2001, 931). Perfection is the rule rather than the exception. The mind is primordially pure. In Buddhism, bodhisattvas can reach Enlightenment, because of their inherently perfect mind (or “buddha-­ nature”). In Christianity, perfection is the exception rather than the rule (Nietzsche 1978b, 33–36). Christian mystics are exceptions to the rule. However, they express their own inability to reach perfection. According to Nietzsche (1979, 246), the human being prefers to develop a “will-­ to-­nothingness” rather than acknowledge an empty will. A “will-to-nothingness” is unveiled through biocidal, nihilistic, or degenerating values/virtues. Traditional moralities imposed biocidal values, as if they were inherently true. Not favouring natural instincts and processes entails hurting life itself. Any morality that does not express the basic conditions of life in given community/country is “biocidal” (Nietzsche 1978b, 20–21, 44). Nietzsche instead promoted “biophilic values, since natural processes and instincts really matter for human existence”. Life makes us create values because it enhances “reality-as-it-is.” Any morality centred on natural instincts and processes enhances “life-as-it-is.” Instead, traditional morality strengthens a decaying and condemned life (Nietzsche 1977, 50–51). Compassion requires the power of reminiscences (a past-centred attitude), as well as the power of imagination (a future-centred attitude) (Nietzsche 1975, 104). Compassion needs both a past-oriented and a future-oriented approach to suffering: reminiscences

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(past) and imagination (future) are inherently involved in any compassionate attitude. Nietzsche asserted that we must invent our own virtues/morality. A free mind operates a “transmutation of values.” What is considered as untrue (natural instincts and processes) is true. What is considered as true (biocidal values) is indeed untrue (Nietzsche 1978, 152; 1978b, 22–24, 120). A free mind is closer to natural instincts and processes and, thus, closer to life itself (Nietzsche 1975, 11–12). Desires are subjected to the power of will and reason. “Being-free” does not mean “doing everything we want to do.” Otherwise, we would be unable to have any desire. Desire implies a lack to be filled. Sometimes, the end, such as a desire, is projected onto given means. Freedom is more closely linked to wills than to desires. Wills and desires can be explicitly/implicitly present in one’s thoughts, emotions, words, attitudes, and deeds. This is the way our wills can be internalized. “Being-­ free” signifies “being-a-free-mind.” When our desires create an inner thunderstorm, then we are not totally free. In such a situation, we are subjected to the power of desires. Desires are then subjugating our internalized will. In ontic situations, our internalized will is not necessarily free. The internalized will is determined by the act of thinking. Moreover, we should always distinguish between an individual and a collective will. Throughout the history of philosophy, the arising of a collective will in a group/society has never been clearly explained. In some groups and societies, members blindly follow the explicit/implicit will of their leader, without any critical reflection. Self-transcendence involves rising above the pure utility of things, beings, events, and phenomena. “Being-free” is positioning our self over things, beings, events, and phenomena, and even over morality (Nietzsche 1982, 120, 151). Nietzsche strongly opposed utilitarianism as consequentialist ethics since causality remains quite problematic. Notions of happiness and the common good are philosophically questionable. Freedom requires five types of internalized will: the will to be responsible for ourselves; the will to keep a distance from others; the will to become indifferent to suffering (even in our own life); the will to sacrifice individuals (including oneself) for a collective cause; and the will to prioritize natural instincts. Any other conception of free will introduces the degeneration of natural instincts, argued Nietzsche (1977, 124, 130). The phenomenon of such degeneration is a necessary effect of life’s evolution. Human progress needs prior degeneration (Gemes 2001, 355). Nihilism is the logics of degenerating natural instincts/processes through biocidal values and ideals (Nietzsche 1968b, 4; 1976, 201, 204). Nietzsche firmly opposed nihilism as biocidal philosophy. Ideals are only “temporary cures” (Nietzsche 1968b, 130). Ideals of traditional morality harm natural instincts which constitute “reality-as-it-is.” Degeneration needs to escape from “reality-as-it-is” and to embrace ideals. Ideals generally make us lie about “reality-as-it-is.” Traditional moralities, especially Christian morality, mirror the instinct of degeneration, that is, the urge to deny life’s instincts and processes (Nietzsche 1968b, 189, 228; 1978, 78–79, 145–146). The Christian God is “a turning away from life.” From an historical perspective, nihilism is the necessary step, before any transmutation of values (Nietzsche 1968b, 4, 91). Nietzschean philosophy aims at the destruction of all

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traditional and biocidal moralities. Nietzsche dreamed about a “biophilic morality, that is, a morality that radically enhances natural instincts”. We must become who-we-are. We must be “who-we-would-like-to-be” (Nietzsche 1974, 263; 1982, 219). Such becoming is realized through our words and deeds (Nietzsche 1973, 41). Nonetheless, we do not know who-we-are. Everybody is a stranger “in-face-of-his/her-own-self” (Nietzsche 1974, 126; 1979, 7–8; 1982, 270). We can say absolutely nothing about the “thing-in-itself.” No one can ever be the ultimate appraiser of realities (Nietzsche 2009, 78). Only the ultimate appraiser of reality can adopt an encompassing perspective on global reality. The human being does not have any access to such a perspective. Existential finitude is the inevitable obstacle to any encompassing perspective on global reality. Every human being considers that the “thing-in-itself” is empty (Nietzsche 1975, 34; 1976, 180). If the “thing-in-itself” is empty, then it can never give us access to absolute knowledge. In human existence, absolute knowledge does not exist (Nietzsche 2006, 41). Self-knowledge through “prior measures” (sensations or perceptions) is required to know the nature of our world and existence (Nietzsche 2009, 71, 82). All evidence of truth follows from our sense organs (Nietzsche 1983, 98). We can know who-we-­ are only if we can acquire an encompassing knowledge of things, beings, events, and phenomena (Nietzsche 1974, 63). This is clearly impossible for any finite mind/ heart. Thus, we can never know who-we-are (Nietzsche 1983, 195). Self-­ transcendence requires not fearing who-we-are. It needs us to reject any identification of who-we-are with our “desired self” (Nietzsche 1979, 225–226). Nietzsche suggested that self-transcendence is a life-affirming way to exist. Self-transcendence opens the way to the Overman, a “superior type of humankind” (Nietzsche 1968b, 519; 1978b, 14; 2006, 47–49). The Overman follows from the death of God (Nietzsche 1982, 169–171; 1985, 22–23; 2006, 51). The Overman is the meaning of our own being. Human beings are beings that must continuously surpass themselves, repeated Nietzsche (1978, 32; 1983, 210; 1985, 22, 29, 50–51, 149, 248, 323). The Overman is the symbol of biophilic morality that could follow from the destruction of traditional moralities. Biophilic morality is a “morality beyond biocidal moralities.” In a post-moral worldview, embracing the primacy of the free mind is balancing rational reflection/thought and the expression of sensations, perceptions, and sentiments. On one hand, rationality and thought can allow us to criticize our own sensations, perceptions, and sentiments. Our mind assesses how sensations, perceptions and sentiments can be rationally grounded. On the other hand, sensations, perceptions, and sentiments can allow us to avoid the pitfalls of “hyper-rationalization.” “Having-a-free-mind” entails balancing rationality/thought and sensations/perceptions/sentiments. Our mind is free when it is not absolutely subjected to our rationality/thought. “Hyper-rationalization” confines our minds to one-track. Our minds are free when they are not infinitely subjected to our sensations, perceptions, and sentiments. “Hyper-sentimentalism” restricts our heart to a one-track affective life. “Having-a-free-mind” involves avoiding the pitfalls of hyper-rationalization and hyper-sentimentalism. It also entails actualizing our will-to-power. The will-to-­ power is the only way to release our mind from hyper-rationalization. It also

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liberates our heart from the temptations of hyper-sentimentalism. “Having-a-freemind” is the perfect way to actualize our will-to-power. It is also denying the existence of any Truth-itself. Avoiding hyper-rationalization presupposes the strong belief in relative truth-claims. Excluding any form of hyper-sentimentalism requires the firm conviction that sensations, perceptions, and sentiments can distort our truth-claims. Truth-claims are relative because our reason and thought are existentially finite. Our sensations, perceptions and sentiments make our truth-claims relative. The temptations of hyper-rationalization and hyper-sentimentalism reveal the way Dasein’s need for the will-to-power can be distorted. They diminish such an ontic need. Hyper-rationalization and hyper-sentimentalism are modes of Dasein’s “degenerated-­ will-to-power.” “Having-a-free-mind” involves releasing Dasein from those risks of deterioration.

2.3.3  The Ontic Need for the Transmutation of Values/Virtues The ontic need for the transmutation of values/virtues has many consequences for moral education, particularly for the development of ideas/ideals. The human being remains “Being-with-Others.” Yet the transmutation of biocidal virtues into biophilic virtues radically changes human relationships and human “in-the-­worldliness.” Morality then becomes centred on biophilic virtues. The biocidal virtues of traditional moralities are destroyed since they become the worst vices. They were grounded in Truth-itself. The transmutation of virtues makes them untruths. Nietzsche did not seek a symmetric transmutation of virtues. Biophilic virtues can never be considered the components of Truth-itself. Rather, Truth-itself does not exist at all. Biophilic virtues only show the ontic path to the Overman. They never claim to hold any absolute truth. Dasein’s need for transmuting virtues is grounded in our Being-with-Others. Being-with-Others involves being confronted with radical otherness, and thus with unfamiliarity. Unfamiliarity is ontic strangeness that is expressed through multiple values and virtues. Dasein’s need for the transmutation of virtues can be reflected throughout organizational life. A post-moral worldview focuses on “living-in-an-organization” as mirroring the ontic need to transmute virtues. “Living-in-an-organization” is transmuting traditionally accepted virtues into “revolutionary virtues.” It can never strengthen the power and burden of organizational traditions. 2.3.3.1  Moral Education, Ideas/Ideals, and Being-With-Others “Being-with-Others” entails being responsible for others’ well-being and suffering. However, such moral responsibility is quite limited. The object of moral responsibility for others’ well-being and suffering is the set of internalized ideas, ideals, values, and virtues. We are responsible for the way ideas, ideals, values and virtues are evolving in the depths of our “Becoming-oneself.” Ideals always remain

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unsatisfactory since they cannot give birth to any sustainable happiness. Conforming rigorously to given ideals makes them meaningless. We should develop a sense of flexibility towards our own ideals. Otherwise, any ideal could be converted into one-­ track thinking. An open-minded person accepts criticism. Humility is the best way to embrace an ideal. Ideas and ideals give meaning to life. Traditional moralities link happiness and morality. If happiness has something to do with morality, then what is morality? How could we circumscribe Dasein’s call for morality? Traditional moralities emphasize duties (“Do that”) and prohibitions (“Never do that”). Morality can never provide infinite happiness. Unlimited happiness does not exist. Because of our ontic finitude, everything that happens in human life is finite. So, even our pursuit of happiness is finite. Morality is the way momentary states of mind/heart are made sustainable. The great challenge is to behave in accordance with such emotions and sentiments. Our emotions and sentiments are continuously changing. They cannot be the grounds for any morality. Morality needs a stable foundation. Otherwise, it can never promote specific duties and prohibitions. There is no morality at all since no morality has a permanent basis. Existing means being finite. So, we can never perfectly comply with our duties and prohibitions. This is the “post-moral credo.” The outcome of such a “pseudo-fact” is a powerful fight between individual moralities. Post-morality claims to have deeper/stronger moral foundations than traditional moralities. Traditional moralities are so focused on duties and prohibitions that they do not really believe in the natural goodness of humankind. Rather, being far removed from traditional moralities implies strongly believing in the moral goodness of humankind. From an historical perspective, any morality uses principles, emotions, and sentiments to reach its own end (happiness). Happiness is always grounded in convictions. Duties and prohibitions occur throughout the course of History. Happiness does not depend on our basic purpose. Rather, happiness follows from our capacity to reach happiness in our historical situation. In traditional morality, happiness/unhappiness is ontic. Happiness then requires making contradictions disappear, and not resolving them. Morality should never deny that we “live-in” ontic contradictions. Duties and prohibitions are used to fight our weaknesses and personal/social faults. In traditional moralities, duties are social constructs that could reduce the negative impact of human weaknesses. Duties and prohibitions are integral parts of every traditional morality. When the power of a given morality grows, then moral discourse emphasizes duties. This is the way traditional moralities have historically evolved. The human being wishes to discover moral convictions, since moral convictions could give him/her a sustainable meaning in life. We generally believe that it is impossible to live without morality. Yet our sentiments often undermine all morality. We would like to live without any disturbing emotion and sentiment. However, such a purpose seems unattainable. The substance of a given action/decision can be the contents an action/decision is conveying, as though it were an expression of our conscious/unconscious motives and intents (“internally-driven substance”). It can also be the basic orientation of the action/ decision. If so, decision-makers emphasize the predictable/unpredictable impact of their decisions and actions (“externally-driven substance”).

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Some immoral thoughts, words or actions seem to be true marks of courage. Morality is the way mind/heart, things, beings, phenomena, and events are ordered and interconnected. Being virtuous should theoretically be the most enjoyable experience. Traditional moralities crystallize an internal movement that has nothing to do with moral issues. At the highest level of self-development, the dualism between good and evil does not exist. Rather, we choose either faith or ontic doubt, when facing moral issues. The progressive deployment of a false good increases the intensity of evil. A moral crisis makes personal reliability disappear. We can no longer learn to trust each other. People who belong to the same group, society or culture/ religion seem much more reliable than those who do not share such belongingness. Group identity gives birth to expectations of mutual trust. It is also resistant to external diversity. If there is any diversity in the group, it is overruled by group identity. The resistance to external diversity creates misunderstandings and conflicts. It does not fit with the post-moral conception of humankind. In post-morality, humankind can never be adversely affected by diversity. Diversity imposes respect and listening. It is the only path to mutual understanding. Unconditional compassion is quite rare. Jealousy, anger, hatred, and vengeance make compassion conditional. Some people deserve our compassion, others do not. Jealousy implies the will to own love, as though love were an object. The meaning of a given moral event depends on other moral events. Moral events are interconnected. However, moral norms are continuously shifting. They are not immutable. Post-morality is compatible with the moving character of moral events. Any other kind of morality does not have any ontic ground. Moral events are always changing since Truth-itself does not exist. Only truth-claims exist. From an ontic perspective, truth is inherently subjective. Subjectivity makes moral events evolve and change. Traditional moralities are grounded in static borders between Good and Evil. From a post-moral viewpoint, the existence of Evil is denied. Post-moral worldviews presuppose that the foundation of morality is not external to our own actions. Some philosophies have defined the “bases of morality.” In doing so, they have expressed a naive faith in traditional moralities. Nietzsche said that such philosophies have strengthened the social and political power of traditional moralities, as though it were impossible to develop different moral thoughts (1983, 108). Rather, the basis of morality is present in the various internal movements of our conscience. It can never be defined and imposed from external sources, such as social institutions and political/religious organizations. Post-moral worldviews denounce those long-term side effects of traditional moralities. In a post-moral worldview, Dasein’s need for the transmutation of virtues is interconnected with Being-with-Others. Any morality we can invent/re-invent is intrinsically related to Being-with-Others. The Other is not an abstract subject we can imagine. He/she is our own “ontic neighbour.” In my existential predicament, the Other is my neighbour. All human beings share the same structure of existence (ontological level) and the same lived experiences (ontic level), regardless of the specificity of perceptions, beliefs, values, and interpretations. The “existential neighbourhood” expresses our “onticity”. Existing means sharing the ontic predicament with other living beings. It implies the awareness of the commonality of ontic

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categories. In a post-moral worldview, we cannot experience the “ontic neighbourhood” without actualizing Dasein’s need for the transmutation of virtues. Traditional moralities hurt Dasein’s self-disclosure. They imprison our “Becoming-oneself” in a “moral cage” that largely reduces existing to interpreting our own existing. “Being-with-Others” is closely linked to our “in-the-worldliness”, although they are not identical. Our “in-the-worldliness” allows for Dasein’s need for the transmutation of virtues. Without our “in-the-worldliness, Dasein’s need (as a question) would never be met (as a response). Our “Being-with-Others” needs our “in-the-­ worldliness” to be actualized “in-the-world.” Organizational members who endorse post-moral worldviews become the “guardians of the ontic neighbourhood” in their organizational life. Organizational members will fight any conception of Truth-­ itself and applaud innumerable truth-claims throughout organizational life. In the organizational setting, every organizational member can understand Dasein’s need for the transmutation of virtues. Endorsing the primacy of life processes is a way to understand Dasein’s need for the transmutation of virtues. Managing Dasein’s need for the transmutation of virtues is focusing on our “Becoming-oneself.” “Living-in-­ an-organization” is seizing Dasein’s need for the transmutation of virtues, without considering the essence of organizational events and phenomena. The “question/ response dialectics” is translated into a dialectics between Dasein’s need for the transmutation of virtues (question) and the primacy of natural instincts (response). Organizational members are confronted with a philosophical questioning, when transmuting their personal and organizational virtues. The transmutation of virtues depends on the ultimate primacy of our “Becoming-oneself.” Re-interpreting virtues unveils our “being-who-interprets-reality.” Such reinterpretation would be impossible without our “Becoming-oneself.” In organizational life, our “Becoming-­ oneself” is at the true origin of our transmutation of virtues. 2.3.3.2  Transcending Virtues of Traditional Moralities Life is based on a disciplined egoism which produces an organized structure. An egotistical attitude makes us dominate everything around us. The more we can forget our self, the more we can be involved in our community life. Good and evil constitute a wholeness. They can never exist separately. Everybody believes he/she would never voluntarily commit wrong actions, since he/she strongly believes in his/her own basic goodness. Moreover, many wrong actions have some good effects. For instance, regret and remorse are good effects resulting from wrong actions. In post-moral worldviews, the borders between Good (virtues) and Evil (vices) become unclear. Those who love virtues should always search for Goodness-itself. Most of the time, people do not know that the desire for Goodness-itself requires a very high level of wisdom and prudence. Virtues and vices are closely related to our daily behaviour. The power to act implies the power to choose virtues/vices. The meaning of our actions can never be drawn from them. The worth of a given action/ quality does not depend on circumstances. However, the human being finds his/her self-identity through his/her actions. Acting makes us identify our basic motives

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behind any specific deed. Motives constitute the ultimate conditioning factor of decision-making processes. Becoming “who-we-are” requires identifying our basic motives. Consciously or not, some motives determine the way we choose alternative actions. This is much more difficult than searching for truth. In post-moral worldviews, there are only truth-claims. The contradictions between all truth-claims would then lead to social, economic, political, and even religious/spiritual chaos. Truth is always “in-between.” All truth-claims have a relative worth. No truth-claim can attain absoluteness. Pride is essentially involved in moral worldviews. In post-­ moral worldviews, Truth is “in-between” since it can never be identified with any specific truth-claim. It can never constitute the entirety of all truth-claims. From an ontic viewpoint, Truth overcomes particularistic approaches to truth-claims and ideological attempts to totalize “reality-as-it-is.” Being-with-Others involves being “in-front-of” other’s convictions, beliefs, and values/virtues. Convictions and beliefs could be strongly reinforced by our state of mind/heart. Some people could easily make their convictions and beliefs coexist with ontic doubts and uncertainties. In some situations, we can be convinced that given realities lack any intrinsic meaning. We can strongly believe that the human intellect can never grasp “reality-as-it-is”, from an all-encompassing perspective. In other situations, the coexistence of conviction and ontic doubt is not a general rule, but rather an exception. The coexistence of conviction and ontic doubt often makes it impossible to predict the various effects of given actions. Conviction and ontic doubt then fight for primacy. The choice of alternative actions could be unpredictable. Regardless of the presence of ontic doubt, acting involves searching for truth. Searching for truth is attempting to define a truth-claim. Existing means creating a system of principles that cover our possibilities-to-be. Existing is also having the certainty of our “death-to-come.” Ontic doubt can coexist with one’s quest for truth. Philosophical questioning always involves focussing on questions rather than fragmentary/transitory answers. An Eternal being is not an acting being since it will never die. The acting being is also a “being of thought.” But thought does not have an all-encompassing role in human life. Unlike sentiments and emotions, thought does not necessarily have a deep impact on action. Human action is determined by the awareness of our “death-to-come,” as well as the internalization of given emotions/sentiments. In a post-moral worldview, Dasein’s need for the transmutation of virtues overcomes traditional moralities. Moralities, philosophies, and religions/spiritualities can develop and strengthen a will-to-tradition, if they convey the belief in Truth-­ itself. Ideologies and utopias could be developed either by revolutionary thinkers or by counter-revolutionary thinkers. They can fight the will-to-tradition or enhance it. Revolutionary ideologies and utopias seem to focus on revolution rather than tradition. However, eventually, their revolutionary ideas will constitute a new tradition. So, revolution can never eliminate the will-to-tradition, except if it directly fights the various forms of the will-to-tradition. The “ontic neighbourhood” does not need any will-to-tradition. The will-to-tradition is the basis of Truth-itself. Believing in Truth-itself is expressing a will-to-tradition. Defeating any form of the

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will-to-­tradition cannot be accomplished once and for all. Instead, people who embrace a post-moral worldview are constantly denouncing the will-to-tradition, regardless of circumstances. In a post-moral worldview, we cannot experience the “ontic neighbourhood” without fighting all forms of the will-to-tradition. The disappearance of the will-to-tradition cannot become a new tradition, since the “ontic neighbourhood” does not give birth to any will-to-tradition. Revolutionary ideas can eventually constitute a new tradition. But having a free mind signifies rejecting the will-to-tradition. If there is no will-to-tradition, then new traditions cannot arise in our collective/personalized “here-and-now.” Organizational life produces a collective “here-and-now” that does not necessarily coincide with organizational members’ personalized “here and now.” The will-to-tradition can be strengthened either by an “organizational-here-and-now” or by a “personalized-here-and-now.” Post-­ moral worldviews enhance the foundational release from any will-to-tradition, that is, a human will that is free of tradition (or a “will-free-of-tradition”). Any new tradition is the by-product of the will-to-tradition. Organizational members who endorse post-moral worldviews become the “guardians of a will-free-of-tradition” in their organizational life. Assuming the ontic challenge of organizational life entails fighting any will-to-tradition and enhancing the arising of a “will-free-of-­ tradition.” In a post-moral worldview, “living-in-an-organization” is actualizing the “will-free-of-tradition.” The transmutation of virtues requires the transition from a will-to-tradition to a “will-free-of-tradition.” Organizational members’ philosophical questioning is then centered on optimal ways to make such a transition possible, given the circumstances. 2.3.3.3  Transcending Truth-Itself Truth needs dialogue. Nobody can hold any truth at all, except through dialogical processes (Nietzsche 1982, 217). Truth is not something we can own (Nietzsche 1978b, 96). Unfortunately, the human being is driven by the absolute “will-to-truth.” Everybody who seeks truth believes in a more perfect world that rises above his/her life, Nature, and History (Nietzsche 1982, 287–289). The “more perfect world” is then impersonal, supranatural, and transhistorical. Those who believe in such a perfect world deny any worth to their “here-and-now world.” The “here-and-now world” is the world of a personalized “here-and-now” that is appropriated by a “self-in-a-world.” Nietzsche radically questions the validity of the “will-to-truth” and the ultimate worth of Truth-itself (Nietzsche 1979, 230–232). Those who embrace a post-moral worldview are deeply aware of our “will-to-truth” and let traditional moralities die. Truth does not have any metaphysical worth, said Nietzsche (1979, 229, 244). Nietzsche denied any worth to metaphysical discourse. In so doing, Nietzsche did not endorse a non-metaphysical mode of thought (Cowan 2007, 539). Anti-metaphysical language is a subproduct of metaphysical thinking. There is no absolute Truth, but only truth-claims. Truth-claims are metaphysical appearances. As falsities, truth-claims come from our ontic anxiety and need for

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final answers to our philosophical questioning. Errors of rationalization make truth-­ claims possible (Nietzsche 1975, 111, 114). The “will-to-truth” is an ontic tragedy since it is illusory. Such an illusion of Truth-itself is produced by our will-to-truth. We need illusions (untruths) and interpret them as real truths, because of our “will-to-truth.” Truth is a social, cultural, political, and even religious/spiritual need. Living-together needs the “will-to-­ truth.” Any “will-to-truth” gives birth to social, cultural, political, and religious/ spiritual expectations about truthful words, emotions, attitudes, and behaviours. Traditional moralities strengthen truths, while denouncing truth-claims as pure illusions. But traditional moralities convey truth-claims, since they can never prove the existence of Truth-itself (Nietzsche 2009, 48, 53–55, 75, 123). Traditional moralities use concepts and dualisms to hide the illusory character of their own truth-­ claims. Nietzsche believed that concepts and dualisms distort “reality-as-it-is.” Concepts and dualisms are essentially delusive (Glenn 2004, 576). Truth can only be a truth-claim (Nietzsche 2009, 135). Truth-claims are convictions that one possesses the truth. But any conviction is a mental prison in which we live. Every conviction has its socially, culturally, politically, and even religiously/spiritually induced history. Every truth is a truth-claim and, therefore, a faith in truth. Every truth and belief claim to be true (Nietzsche 1968b, 14; 1976, 181; 1978b, 96–100). All convictions are crystallized opinions. Every conviction is a belief in holding the absolute truth, in a specific realm of human knowledge. Nietzsche described the three structural components of such belief. Firstly, there are absolute truths. Secondly, we have good means and methods to reach absolute truths. Finally, everyone could apply such means and methods, given one has a deep conviction (Nietzsche, 1973, 151, 193, 199). There are multiple truth-claims, since Truth-itself does not exist (Nietzsche 2006, 67). If Truth-itself could allow multiple and potentially conflicting truth-claims, it would be meaningless. Moral worldviews presuppose that truth-claims can never be conflicting and that there is Truth-itself. If Truth-itself existed, then it would be unknowable because of our limited rationality (Nietzsche 2009, 140). Post-moral worldviews imply that truth-claims can be conflicting and that Truth-itself cannot exist. Having a truth-claim is believing that something is true. It is based on our “will-to-truth” (Nietzsche 1978b, 39). We can never know if our values, virtues, or principles of action/decision are true or false since Truth-itself does not exist. We can only know if something is consistent with our truth-claims. There is no instinct of truth, but only an instinct to believe in truth. The instinct related to our “will-to-truth” searches for the pleasures related to our ontic need for truth (Nietzsche 2009, 137, 139). Self-knowledge depends on the fact that we have relationships with others. Respect for others involves projecting ourselves beyond ourselves. We are, rather, involved in a continuous process of self-becoming (“Becoming-oneself”). That is why we can never know totally “who-we-are.” Everything that is “in-becoming” can never be totally known, since the processes that orient its change cannot be spatially/temporally identified. We have limited self-knowledge, including the awareness of our needs, desires, values/virtues, and faults/weaknesses. Everybody

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feels that he/she is entirely faultless. He/she tries to safeguard a very positive self-­ image. We can easily know our faults and feel guilty. Both good and wicked people are responsible for the “world-as-it-is-now” and the “world-as-it-is-becoming.” Too often, we do not feel responsible for our own faults since we interpret them as mistakes. Our faults are then seen as stains within a wonderful landscape. Faults and guilt could allow us to change something in our own existence. In some situations, a group-identity stays between our vague/positive self-perception and a “pseudo-­ self” which supposedly comes from our ancestors. Such an “in-between” condition of one’s self implies interconnectedness of past events and the present moment. Being “who-we-are” involves existing in such an interconnected ontic temporality. Moreover, being “who-we-are” is knowing that we can be more than “who-we-are-­ now.” We are our endless project-to-be. The future is an integral part of the whole picture. Most of the time, we are unaware of such an ontic principle. We must create “who-we-are, although “who-we-are” remains unknowable. Interdependence makes our self interconnected with other selves, with the world we live in, with Nature, and even with History. Creating “who-we-are” could only improve our self-knowledge. It does not mean that our true self is knowable. Interdependence mirrors the interconnectedness of past, present and future. It requires an ever-changing “self-in-­aworld, that is, a “Becoming-oneself.” In a post-moral worldview, Dasein’s need for the transmutation of virtues transcends any morally based conception of Truth-itself. Moralities, philosophies, and religions/spiritualities are traditional guardians of Truth-itself. Ideologies and utopias can fight the “will-to-Truth-itself” or enhance it. Revolutionary ideas can eventually provide a new conception of Truth-itself. The revolutionary mindset does not necessarily imply the disappearance of the “will-to-Truth-itself.” That can only be the case if the revolutionary spirit needs the continuous fight against all forms of the “will-to-Truth-itself.” The “ontic neighbourhood” does not need any “will-to-Truth-­itself.” Organizational members who endorse a post-moral worldview continuously fight all forms of the “will-to-Truth-itself, regardless of various conditioning factors. In a post-moral worldview, experiencing our “ontic neighbourhood” implies constantly fighting all forms of the “will-to-Truth-itself.” The disappearance of the “will-to-Truthitself” means the absence of any absolutized truth-claim. Every truth-claim remains relative. Absolutizing any truth-claim is creating a new form of Truthitself. In a post-moral worldview, an “ontic neighbourhood” excludes all possible forms of the “will-to-Truth-itself.” “Having-a-free-mind” eliminates the “will-­to-­Truth-itself.” If there is no “will-to-Truth-itself, then truth-claims can never be absolutized. Any absolutized truth-claim follows from the “will-toTruth-itself.” Post-moral worldviews enhance the foundational release from any “will-to-Truth-­itself”, that is, a human will that is free of absolute truths (or a “will-free-of-Truth-itself”). Any absolute truth is the by-product of the “will-toTruth-itself.” Organizational members who embrace post-moral worldviews become the “guardians of a ‘will-free-of-Truth-itself’” in organizational life. Assuming the ontic challenge of organizational life entails fighting any

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“will-to-Truth-itself, while safeguarding our relative truth-claims. In a postmoral worldview, “living-in-an-­organization” is actualizing the “will-free-ofTruth-itself.” The transmutation of virtues needs the shift from a “will-to-Truth-itself” to a “will-free-of-Truth-itself.”

2.4  T  he Organizational Path Towards a Post-Moral Worldview Organizations may use a post-moral worldview as the basis of their organizational ethics and culture. However, usually, organizational members will embrace post-­ moral worldviews, without any connection to organizational goals and values. Unlike the moral worldview, the post-moral worldview does not unify the entire organizational moral (moral normativity) and ethical (ethical view) discourse. From a post-moral worldview, there is no Truth-itself. That is why the post-moral worldview cannot incorporate all morally and ethically focused documents in a coherent global message. There are six steps in the organizational path towards a post-moral worldview: First step: Organizational members generally conceive Truth-itself as an elusive concept. Cultural, philosophical, or religious/spiritual systems can never claim to hold any ultimate truth. If Truth-itself does not exist, or if its substance is unattainable for the human mind, then nobody can presuppose that he/she could possess absolute truths. All truths become purely relative. The worth and substance of truths are culturally, socially, politically, and religiously/spiritually defined. The absence of Truth-itself relativizes any truth-claim that could be used in communicational exchanges. Without Truth-itself, all truth-claims lack a transcendental foundation. Truth-claims are “atranscendental.” Organizational life could be the ontic locus of truth-centred communications, although ontic truths are groundless. A post-moral worldview does not deal with the divergence/convergence between truth-claims. There is no “will-to-totalize-reality.” Instead, a post-­ moral worldview requires an anti-totalizing attitude. It could easily tolerate a divergence of views about meaningful issues of organizational life and culture. Second step: Organizational members can radically question their own beliefs, values/virtues, and principles. No one can ever obtain absolute truths. If Truth-itself does not exist, or if it is incomprehensible for the human mind, then every truth is questionable, regardless of its cultural, social, political, or religious/spiritual roots. Organizational members can question their truth-claims as well as others’ truth-claims. Such radical questioning requires mutual respect, tolerance, and understanding. However, there is no wish to obtain a totalizing knowledge of organizational beliefs and values, events, and phenomena. Post-morality requires an anti-totalizing attitude. Third step: Organizational members agree that the human being is a “being-who-­ interprets-reality.” The quest for happiness is always subjected to social, cultural,

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political, and even religious/spiritual conditioning factors. Happiness has no intrinsic meaning. There are no facts, only interpretations (Nietzsche). Any concept/dualism is an interpretation. Things, beings, events, and phenomena do not have any intrinsic meaning. Intrinsic meanings could only be grounded in Truth-­ itself. But any belief in Truth-itself is an attempt to totalize realities. An anti-­ totalizing attitude requires denial of absolute facts. Absolute facts are not based on past/present interpretations since they strengthen the totalizing mindset. Absolute facts do not exist at all. There are only interpretations. Facts are appearances. They are defined through the prism of our interpretative quest. Organizational members would not allow the development of a totalizing mindset. Nothing can be totalized. There cannot be any non-interpretative wholeness. Fourth step: Organizational members emphasize the free choice of possibilities-to­be. A free mind is never constrained by any conventional truth. A totalizing mind would impose given ways of thinking, speaking, and acting in organizational life. But a post-moral worldview strongly resists any attempt at totalization. Organizational members can freely define and choose their possibilities-to-be, that is, their own ways of thinking, speaking, and behaving in organizational life. A post-moral worldview is not concerned with traditional moralities. It cannot be constrained by conventional truths. Employees and managers are free to choose their “Becoming-oneself.” Fifth step: Organizational members are always centered on transcendent processes. Any “project-to-be-oneself” (or “Becoming-oneself”) involves self-­ transcendence. It is not only an issue of self-realization in the workplace. Above all, everyone needs to overcome his/her ontic limitations. Self-realization emphasizes the need to be oneself in a personalized “here-and-now”, while self-­ transcendence focuses on the need to become oneself. Self-realization is a present-oriented attitude (“who-we-are:” self-identity), while self-transcendence is future-oriented (“who-we-would-like-to-be:” “Becoming-oneself”). In a post-­ moral worldview, both attitudes should be strengthened by organizational culture. Sixth step: Organizational members can transmute conventional values/virtues, while acknowledging the fragile borders between good and evil. They unveil the substance of a new kind of morality in business. The substance of such a new morality can reveal conscious/unconscious processes of decision-making (“internally-­driven substance”). It can also be centered on the predictable/unpredictable consequences of its principles, values, and virtues (“externally-driven substance”). Self-transcendence occurs when there are shifting borders between conventional truths, such as the good/evil dualism. When conventional truths dominate organizational life, there is no ontic locus for self-transcendence. Nonetheless, self-realization could still be possible and reinforced by organizational culture. In a post-moral worldview, nothing is unconditionally true. All dualisms become frail. A post-moral worldview tries to develop non-dualistic thinking. Self-transcendence is the ultimate outcome of any post-moral worldview.

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2  Defining Moral and Post-Moral Worldviews

Those six steps in the organizational path towards a post-moral worldview are prerequisites for the development of such a worldview in corporate culture. Corporate moral and ethical discourse is rarely rooted in a post-moral worldview. The implementation of a post-moral worldview would require a basic consistency between the organizational culture/life and the substance of such a post-moral worldview. The substance of a post-moral worldview refers either to conscious/ unconscious processes of moral/ethical reflection (“internally-driven substance”) or to the predictable/unpredictable consequences of the implementation of its own principles, values, and virtues (“externally-driven substance”). The implementation of a post-moral worldview would not necessarily contribute to favouring a sense of community life, since it does not convey any belief in Truth-itself. The values (ethical view) and norms (moral normativity) enhanced in corporate moral/ethical discourse would always remain questionable. A post-moral worldview would leave philosophical questioning about moral/ethical issues permanently unresolved. It would actively promote absolute open-mindedness in organizational life.

2.5  Summary The Enlightenment certainly witnessed a basic philosophical shift, at least concerning the interrelation between reason, morality, and faith. However, post-modernity signals a more radical breakdown of all beliefs and principles held to be intrinsically (or at the very least, philosophically) true. The philosophical status of Truth-itself becomes radically questionable. The post-modern societies have reinterpreted traditional values, while mixing them with imagination, sensitiveness, emotion, and sense of humanity (Küng 1991, 46–47). Post-modernity is an ongoing historical process. Some types of worldviews might have taken such a historical breakthrough into account, while others have not. Moral worldviews are still internalized by many decision-makers. Yet others are venturing on the uncertain path to a post-moral worldview. This is especially the case for anti-totalizing/anti-ideological decision-makers. In moral worldviews, “living-in-an-organization” is actualizing Dasein’s call for interpretation, morality, virtues, and self-identity. Organizational members provide an ontic response to this Dasein’s call, that is, searching for knowledge, happiness, wisdom, and the meaning of organizational temporality. In post-moral worldviews, “living-in-an-organization” opens the way to organizational members’ “possibilities-­ to-­be”, while assuming their own “being-who-interprets-reality.” Post-moral worldviews are also centered on the ontic need for the will-to-power. Our “Becoming-oneself” is closely linked to “having-a-free-mind.” Post-moral worldviews express the ontic need for the transmutation of virtues. “Living-in-an-­ organization” requires fighting all forms of the will-to-tradition and of the “will-to-Truth-itself.” Organizational culture conveys given traditions and strengthens a “will-to-Truth-itself.” Organizational members who embrace post-moral worldviews emphasize the ontic need to get rid of any will-to-tradition/

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will-to-­Truth-itself. They search for an ontic “will-free-of-tradition” and “will-freeto-­Truth-itself.” The “question/response dialectics” is involved in any transition from the “will-to-tradition/will-to-Truth-itself” to the “will-free-of-tradition/willfree-of-­Truth-itself.” Any Dasein’s call requires an ontic quest. Any ontic need opens the way to a given primacy favouring our “Becoming-oneself.” Every ontic question requires an ontic response. “Living-in-an-organization” is an opportunity to participate in the “question/response dialectics.” Our “in-the-worldliness” is closely tied to such ontic dialectics. Our “Being-in-the-world” is related to the way we provide an ontic response to an ontic questioning. A moral worldview mirrors a basic concern with an ontic quest for meaning since there is Truth-itself. Truth-itself is the ground of all ontic quests and responses to Dasein’s calls: the call for interpretation and the quest for knowledge; the call for morality and the quest for happiness; the call for virtues and the quest for wisdom; the call for self-identity and the quest for the meaning of our ontic temporality. Any moral worldview enhances Dasein’s call for self-transcendence. Truth-itself can never be defined, once for all, regardless of circumstances. That is why organizational members are constantly searching for the meaning of organizational events and phenomena. In a moral worldview, “living-in-an-organization” requires a continuous search for the meaning of organizational events and phenomena, as they are connected to Truth-itself. A post-moral worldview puts the emphasis on ontic possibilities-to-be and thus on our “project-to-be.” There is no Truth-itself. There are only truth-claims. So, organizational members’ actualization of their project-to-be is related to their “Being-with-Others” and to their “in-the-worldliness.” A post-moral worldview is centered on Dasein’s need for our “Becoming-oneself.” The need for possibilities-­ to-­be unveils the primacy of ontic interpretation. Every interpretation could give birth to a truth-claim. Interpreting an event or phenomenon is looking at its inherent “in-becoming.” Every truth-claim mirrors the “in-becoming” of beings, things, events, and phenomena. The ontic need for the will-to-power uncovers the primacy of the free mind. The ontic need for the transmutation of values/virtues is related to the progressive arising of the free mind. Post-morality proposes an explanatory model for transcending the limitations of traditional moralities, while denying any worth to Truth-itself. Post-morality opposes any attempt to totalize realities, events, and phenomena since everything is constantly changing (and is thus undefinable). In a post-moral worldview, “living-in-an-organization” requires enhancing organizational members’ possibilities-to-be and fighting all forms of Truth-itself and its related will-to-tradition.

References Aristotle. 1943. Politics. New York: The Modern Library. ———. 1954. The Rhetoric & The Poetics. New York: The Modern Library. ———. 1996. The Nicomachean Ethics. Ware: Wordsworth Editions.

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———. 2000. Métaphysique. Tome 1. Livres A-Z. Paris: Librairie philosophique J. Vrin. ———. 2004. Métaphysique. Tome 2. Livres H-N. Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin. Blok, Vincent. 2020. Aristotle and the Management Consultants: Shooting for Ethical Practice. Philosophy of Management 19: 21–44. Bragues, George. 2006. Seek the Good Life, not Money: The Aristotelian Approach to Business Ethics. Journal of Business Ethics 67: 341–357. Buyan, Nisigandha. 2007. The Role of Character in Ethical Decision-Making. The Journal of Value Inquiry 41: 45–57. Cowan, Robert Bruce. 2007. Nietzsche’s Attempted Escape from Schopenhauer’s South Asian Sources in “The Birth of Tragedy”. German Studies Review 30 (3): 537–556. Curzer, Howard J. 2007. Aristotle: Founder of the Ethics of Care. The Journal of Value Inquiry 41: 221–243. Dienstag, Joshua Foa. 2001. Nietzsche’s Dionysian Pessimism. American Political Science Review 95 (4): 923–937. Dierksmeier, Claus, and Michael Pirson. 2009. Oikonomia Versus Chrematistike: Learning from Aristotle About the Future Orientation of Business Management. Journal of Business Ethics 88: 417–430. Gemes, Ken. 2001. Postmodernism’s use and Abuse of Nietzsche. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2): 337–360. Glenn, Paul E. 2004. The Politics of Truth: Power in Nietzsche’s Epistemology. Political Research Quarterly 57 (4): 575–583. Hartman, Edwin M. 1998. The Role of Character in Business Ethics. Business Ethics Quarterly 8 (3): 547–559. ———. 2008. Socratic Questions and Aristotelian Answers: A Virtue-Based Approach to Business Ethics. Journal of Business Ethics 78: 313–328. Heidegger, Martin. 2008. Le principe de raison. Paris: Gallimard. Kirkland, Paul E. 2004. Nietzsche’s Honest Masks: From Truth to Nobility “Beyond Good and Evil”. The Review of Politics 66 (4): 575–604. Küng, Hans. 1991. Projet d’éthique planétaire. In La paix mondiale par la paix entre les religions. Paris: Seuil. Macaulay, Michael, and Surendra Arjoon. 2012. Harmonizing the Individual and the Organization: An Aristotelian-Thomistic Model of Corporate Governance. International Journal of Organization Theory and Behaviour 15 (4): 548–576. ———. 2013. An Aristotelian-Thomistic Approach to Professional Ethics. Journal of Markets & Morality 16 (2): 507–527. Mackey, Steve. 2014. Virtue ethics, CSR and “corporate citizenship”. Journal of Communication Management 18 (2): 131–145. Mintz, Steven M. 1996. Aristotelian Virtue and Business Ethics Education. Journal of Business Ethics 15 (8): 827–838. Nietzsche, Friedrich. 1968a. Basic Writings. New York: The Modern Library. ———. 1968b. The Will to Power. New York: Random House. ———. 1973. Humain, trop humain. In Un livre pour les esprits libres. Tome II. Paris, Denoël/ Gonthier. ———. 1974. Aurore. In Pensées sur les préjugés moraux. Paris: Gallimard. ———. 1975. Humain, trop humain. In Un livre pour les esprits libres. Tome I. Paris, Denoël/ Gonthier. ———. 1976. Le nihilisme européen. Paris: 10–18. ———. 1977. Crépuscule des Idoles, ou Comment philosopher à coups de marteau. Paris: Gallimard. ———. 1978a. Ecce Homo. In Comment on devient ce que l’on est. Paris: Gallimard. ———. 1978b. L’antéchrist. In Imprécation contre le christianisme. Paris: Gallimard. ———. 1979. La généalogie de la morale. Paris: Gallimard. ———. 1982. Le gai savoir. Paris: Gallimard.

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———. 1983. Par-delà le bien et le mal. In Prélude d’une philosophie de l’avenir. Paris: Gallimard. ———. 1985. Ainsi Parla Zarathoustra. Paris: Gallimard. ———. 2006. Fragments posthumes sur l’éternel retour. Paris: Allia. ———. 2009. Le Livre du philosophe. Paris: GF-Flammarion. Strandberg, Caj. 2000. Aristotle’s Internalism in the Nicomachean Ethics. The Journal of Value Inquiry 34: 71–87.

Part I

The Paradoxical Path

Chapter 3

Moral Education and Organizational Life: Deepening the Meaning and Scope of a Moral Worldview

3.1  Introduction Moral education comprises an integral part of the institutionalization of organizational ethics. Organizational ethics cannot be endorsed by organizational members if organizational culture does not incorporate moral education processes. Usually, ethical training sessions and values clarification activities allow organizational members to address such crucial challenges in organizational life (the ethical aim). However, these organizational activities are not necessarily centered on moral education. This would be the case if ethical training sessions and values clarification activities emphasized moral reasoning through educational processes. But this does not always occur, for two basic reasons. Firstly, “ethically focused activities” are sometimes intertwined with organizational goals of legal compliance. Thus, they distort the meaning of ethics and its scope of application in organizational life. Secondly, “ethically focused activities” are not basically linked to moral education when moral education has never been defined throughout organizational life and history. Indeed, moral education inevitably deals with philosophical concepts of truth and goodness. However, like all educational processes, moral education must allow decision-makers to deepen their knowledge about moral issues. Above all, moral education should provide concrete ways to change our habits and customs in daily life. Moral education must have an impact on organizational life. Otherwise, it could become an ideological tool, totally disconnected from organizational realities. Moral educational processes can even become instruments for totalizing organizational realities. Habits and customs are behavioural expressions of social life. Moral education can change the words we choose when speaking with other organizational members. Moral education can allow organizational members to develop and strengthen mutual understanding and respect in organizational life. Emotions and attitudes determine the way we speak and behave in daily life. Moral education must allow decision-makers to root out their disturbing emotions and attitudes, such as vanity, anger, hatred, jealousy, and vengeance. Moral education can enhance © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 M. Dion, Worldviews, Ethics and Organizational Life, Ethical Economy 60, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-82355-9_3

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positive emotions and attitudes, such as humility, altruism, compassion, goodness, and righteousness. Decision-makers will be unable to initiate such radical change without acknowledging the basic equality of all human beings. If decision-makers accept such an ontic challenge, then they can better strengthen social harmony and reinforce the development of just social institutions. The way social harmony and justice are actualized and strengthened could create a more effective deployment of the social contract. Jean-Jacques Rousseau is clearly a very important philosopher whose works have explored the meaning of the social contract and its implications. Decision-­ makers should acknowledge the interdependence between all social constituents. They should favour the fulfillment of moral duties and continuously seek the common good. This is what a moral worldview entails. This is exactly what Porter and Kramer (2006, 84) asserted, when dealing with the interdependence of business corporations and society. Porter and Kramer claim that such interdependence reveals a “shared value” for corporations and society. Consciously or not, Porter and Kramer embraced a moral worldview. A “shared value” reinforces the borders between Good and Evil. Moral worldviews promote the implementation of moral values/ virtues. They bolster the most effective ways to eliminate disturbing emotions/attitudes and to favour positive emotions/attitudes. Moral worldviews are oriented towards a more just society. Organizational members who embrace moral worldviews fully accept their family, group, organizational, institutional, and societal duties. Any assumption about corporate social responsibility/sustainability as a “prerequisite for business in a stable social context” (De Geer et al. 2009, 281) conveys a moral worldview.

3.2  The Substance and Scope of Moral Education Education entails practices rather than theoretical principles (Rousseau 1966a, 42). Living-in-the-world is acting. Action determines the way our self participates in-­ the-­world (Rousseau 1966a, 43). Any “self-in-a-world” is an acting self. Action can produce both vicious and virtuous deeds. Moral education enhances various ways to avoid evils, vices, and mistakes. This is “negative education” (Rousseau 1966a, 112–113). Defining Evil is easier than circumscribing the realm of Good. It is easier for anybody to teach others “the right thing to do” than to do so ourselves (Rousseau 1971, 87, 92). Moral education presupposes that teachers can lead by example. If teachers are unable to comply with their own moral principles, then their teaching becomes irrelevant and useless. If such principles are so morally rooted, why are teachers themselves unable to conform to those principles? Leading by example is the only way for organizational leaders to foster moral education processes in organizational life. In moral worldviews, moral education is intrinsically linked to rationality (Rousseau 1966a, 106). Moral decision-making processes must be rationally based. Rationality is inherently linked to ethical practices, conflicts, and dilemmas in daily life. Facing our evils, vices and mistakes is a prerequisite for any moral

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education. Past evils, vices, and mistakes could adversely affect our present judgment (Rousseau 1988, 482). Exercising our moral judgment involves learning from our past evils and vices. Moral education allows people to develop self-­consciousness and self-criticism. Too often, we judge others’ words and deeds, taking our own words and deeds as the basic reference point (Rousseau 1966a, 314). In so doing, we claim to hold an absolute truth. This is pure vanity. The power of vanity makes egocentrism and excessive pride possible. The only personality traits we can improve are our own. Moral judgment implies moral sensitivity and moral reasoning. Moral sensitivity makes us more aware of the moral/immoral substance of events, words, actions, and phenomena. Moral reasoning challenges rationality about moral issues. Yet rationality is only part of the global picture. Our capacity for judging aesthetic, social, cultural, economic, and political events/phenomena must also be actualized. In every judgment, sentiments are at stake. We know things, beings, and phenomena through the prism of sentiments. Sentiments allow us to deepen wisdom through our lived experiences. They are prerequisites for deepening our self-understanding. In organizational life, moral education could allow organizational members to understand the true nature of morality and to change their habits/customs accordingly. Moral education can develop a clear distinction between truths and lies. It makes people more aware of the potential discrepancy between their emotions and their attitudes/deeds. Moral education could propose concrete means to eliminate disturbing emotions/attitudes and to develop positive emotions/attitudes. A moral worldview focuses on such inner processes of moral education, which were well described by Rousseau.

3.2.1  Understanding the True Nature of Morality Rousseau (1966a, 144) defined two different kinds of morality. On one hand, morality can be expressed in words/texts. On the other hand, morality is conveyed by socially oriented deeds. Rousseau acknowledged that our intuition of good/evil precedes any rational analysis and judgment. Intuitively, we feel what is good and evil, regardless of societal norms and rules of ethical behaviour. Searching for good and avoiding evil require sincerity. Otherwise, the borders between good and evil disappear. Opportunistic words, attitudes, and behaviours presuppose that any good/evil ultimately depends on our absolutized self-interest. Consequently, sincerity is non-­ existent. Only an apparent sincerity is expressed. An upright and sincere heart is the most important instrument of truth, said Rousseau (1988, 219, 341, 369, 507, 563). Human beings are reasonable and free beings. Their ontic search for truth is basically influenced by their limited rationality and freedom (Rousseau 1971a, 158). Any ontic search for truth requires sincerity. We might have accomplished right actions in the past. But those past actions cannot be systematically erased by the present evil we are committing (Rousseau 1988, 614). From a moral viewpoint, there is no systematic balance between past and

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present deeds. Our mind/heart can actualize the good, as well as the bad, within us. Human nature is neither morally perfect nor morally perverse. The human heart and mind are not originally perverse, vicious, and wicked. They are not perfectly pure. Ontic freedom makes us choose good or evil. Self-love is the only natural passion of human beings. Self-love is morally neutral. Depending on the way self-love is applied in personal/social relationships and organizational life, it could become morally right or wrong. That is why self-love must be guided by rationality (Rousseau 1966a, 111, 415). Rationality can never eliminate ontic passions, desires, and mysteries. Ontic passions, desires and mysteries can influence the way people rationally judge any situation. Ontic passions are experienced in the personalized “here-and-now”, while ontic desires emphasize the future (and our “Becoming-­ oneself”). Ontic mysteries fall into the realm of the incomprehensible. Is virtuous life mysterious? If virtuous actions were mysterious, then evil could be actualized, rationalized, and eventually justified (Rousseau 1988, 406). It would be impossible to know the difference between virtues and vices. All interpretations of virtues/vices would be implicitly justified. But virtuous life is not a mystery at all. The virtuous life places virtues at the core of our daily life. At every moment, virtuous people attempt to abide by virtuous thoughts, words, emotions, attitudes, and deeds. There is no mystery in moral concepts and dualisms. Mysteries can never be grasped and understood (Rousseau 1966a, 336). From an ontic perspective, it is difficult to circumscribe the realm of good and the realm of evil. However, these realms are not incomprehensible. Every ontic concern is not necessarily a mystery. If this were the case, then our ontic search for meaning/truth would be useless and meaningless. Mysteries can never be solved. The meaning of our existence is not mysterious at all. Rather, our interpretative quest allows us to identify different meanings of life throughout our existence. Our moral life is not mysterious. A moral worldview proposes moral virtues/norms that could allow decision-makers to find meaning in their individual, organizational, and social life. What is morally right/wrong depends on the intent. We could have good intentions (to do what is morally right), or malicious intentions (to do what is morally wrong). The good always follows from an enlightening rationality. Using our rationality allows us to define evil (vices that must be avoided) and good (virtues that must be emphasized). Doing “the right thing” is being just, human, beneficent, kind, and generous (Rousseau 1966a, 111–115). It makes people happier than they were (Rousseau 1967, 103). In contrast, evil makes them shameful and unhappy (Rousseau 1968, 197). We generally know the probabilities of positive and negative effects stemming from our vices, for ourselves as well as for others (Rousseau 1988, 471). This is especially true for vices that constitute an integral part of human culture, from one historical period to another. Human nature is not composed of such vices. Rather, those vices are so frequently actualized that they seem to be perfectly natural: pride; the spirit of domination; self-love; and wickedness (Rousseau 1966a, 77). Wicked persons are people who still suffer. Hypocritically hiding our wickedness signifies demeaning honesty and developing the vices of trickery and cowardice. Hypocritical individuals can never express goodness and generosity (Rousseau 1971, 91). A hypocritical individual always attempts to distort “reality-as-it-is.” He/

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she tries to modify others’ perceptions and interpretations of his/her own self. Vices adversely affect our modes of being/speaking/feeling/behaving. From a moral worldview, nothing is more admirable than the practice of virtues (Rousseau 1966a, 379, 437). Wisdom is then the foundation of all moral virtues. However, wisdom could lead to complacency, so that we judge the future in using the data of the here-­ and-­now. Self-criticism is continuously required to avoid blind self-justification. The true basis of virtues is the sense of humanity. The sense of humanity should unify humankind. Lacking the sense of humanity in given situations could make us lose it in the long run (Rousseau 1988, 131, 135, 348, 524, 661). The sense of humanity is not already acquired on a permanent basis. It can be distorted and corrupted. Corrupting one’s heart and mind means that some virtues will be lost and replaced by skills. Virtues require a strict and total engagement in the virtuous life. Skills are much more flexible. We can develop skills (competencies) without being morally engaged in the organization. Unlike virtues, skills have no moral import. Skills could strengthen our communicational exchanges about truth and morality. But they cannot improve moral behaviour. Skills can even coexist with vicious deeds. Focusing on skills means neglecting the importance of virtues (Rousseau 1971, 62). The development of cultural competencies implies multiple dimensions of intercultural relations (Sue 2001). However, if is does not call for a virtuous mode of being, speaking, and behaving, then something meaningful is missing. From a moral worldview, the development of our moral character does not stem from our skills, but rather from the continuous practice of virtues. A lack of humanity opens the way to interpersonal dehumanization. Loving virtues means putting our sense of humanity into practice, regardless of personalities and situations. Having a virtuous life implies that we are never subjected to societal expectations and customs. We are engaged in our virtues rather than in social expectations and customs. Wise people do not blindly conform to societal expectations and customs. They do not endorse social mimicry. Loving virtues entails applying them in every situation, particularly when it is painful to put them into practice (Rousseau 1988, 131, 227, 656). Being virtuous means being ultimately attached to our moral duties, such as speaking the truth and “doing the right thing” (Rousseau 1966a, 409; 1988, 132). The “duty of speaking the truth” is self-evident only if it is unconditional. Otherwise, many kinds of situations, especially in business, could reduce our capacity to meet “the duty of speaking the truth.” In organizational life, the substance of “doing the right thing” is not self-evident. If it is an “internally driven matter”, then “doing the right thing” refers to conscious/unconscious processes of decision-making. If it is an “externally driven matter”, then it focuses on the predictable/unpredictable consequences of given actions/decisions. Moral duties are concrete ways to practice virtues, regardless of personalities and situations. They must be unconditionally practiced. Being virtuous implies that we will accomplish our moral duties, regardless of personalities and circumstances. A virtuous life means an unconditional engagement in our virtues and moral duties. The sense of honour makes us cherish our moral duties. Being virtuous is denying any worth to vices. Our thoughts, emotions, attitudes and gestures, words and behaviours should continuously actualize our virtues, regardless of the people involved and the

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particularities of situations/contexts. However, Rousseau warned against the perils of philosophical pride. Focussing on an unachievable target makes it impossible to put wisdom into action, since it denies concrete existence and human finitude (Rousseau 1988, 133, 226, 431, 670, 679). We must never fall into the trap of a “lip service philosophy”. Such an attitude could deny any worth to a moral education and worldview. Accomplishing our duties is impossible without the fear of being unable to do so. However, being courageous entails acknowledging our fear. Sometimes, we must be heroic. However, such unusual circumstances call for humility. Embracing a moral worldview means being humble, regardless of personalities and situations. Being virtuous means being humble. It is extremely difficult to put our virtues into practice, at any moment of life. Any virtue-centered individual knows his/her true capacity to actualize his/her virtues and accomplish his/her moral duties. Our conscience gives us our moral duties. It basically orients our actions (Rousseau 1988, 341, 657, 687). Our moral duties represent “what-weshould-do”, that is, the “right thing to do.” They largely depend on our self-­ consciousness, that is, “what-we-­should-believe-in” (Rousseau 1967, 54). Rousseau explained that some “universals” exert the power of objective constraints. Some authors assert that universal values are consensual in various nations, cultures, and religions (Schwartz 2005, 32). However, the appearance of consensus hides a multiplicity of worldviews. Moreover, it hurts cultural and religious/spiritual diversity. There is no value that could “presumably be considered to be somewhat universal in nature.” Such an assumption presupposes that any kind of broad consensus could open the door to universalization. It denies cultural and religious/spiritual diversity. We can never reach such universalization. National, cultural, and religious/spiritual differences are unavoidable, especially in employee relations (Langlois and Schlegelmilch 1990, 528). Instead, we should seek a balance between cultural/religious pluralism and moral universalism (Helin and Sandström 2008, 289). Being virtuous signifies fulfilling our moral duties. Knowing our moral duties depends on our moral sensitivity and awareness. Being aware of our moral duty means being “aware-of-something-within-us.” Being aware of our existence entails being led by the instinct of self-preservation (Rousseau 1971a, 205). Our first duty is our duty towards ourselves, that is, our duty of self-preservation. Every sentient being must favour its own well-being. In our interpersonal relationships, especially in organizational life, the sentiment of justice depends on the expectation that we will receive “what is owed to us” (Rousseau 1966a, 118). Justice implies truth. There is no justice without truth. An untruthful justice is no justice at all. Justice can only be attained through truthful assertions and practices. Lying always produces unjust outcomes. Justice focuses on others’ well-being, while truth is centered on one’s self. Justice and truth have tremendous influence on our interpersonal relationships (Rousseau 1967, 73, 78, 87). Goodness favours morally right actions. Rousseau (1988, 255) believed that virtues can allow us to avoid evil. We are always aware of our morally wrong actions. But are we deeply aware of our morally right actions? It is easier to define evil than to define good. On one hand, the meaning and scope of evil are circumscribed through a set of prohibitions and taboos and their scope of application. Many of

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them are almost universally shared, although the motives for such prohibitions and taboos vary significantly from one country to another. On the other hand, exploring the meaning and scope of good is more challenging. Various conditioning factors could affect the nature and scope of evil. But they are much less important than the conditioning factors behind the nature and scope of good. Such a comparison is especially sustainable for the most universally shared prohibitions and taboos. Prohibitions and taboos unveil social expectations about evil. Are we choosing the virtuous path, in any situation? Having a virtuous life means being uncertain of undertaking the right action. Such moral uncertainty coexists with the conviction that virtues are rationally grounded. Thus, a moral uncertainty and a moral conviction coexist. A virtuous life appears to be paradoxically oriented. Disinterested virtues can overcome all ontic obstacles. At the outset, putting virtues into action is very demanding. But changing our attitudes and habits allows us to deepen our virtuous life. True happiness follows from virtuous thoughts, emotions, words, attitudes, and deeds (Rousseau 1988, 283, 289, 526). Virtues are intrinsically related to moral character. From a moral worldview, our moral character gives us an ontic “potentiality-for-happiness.” Virtues allow us to be who-we-were (in the past) and who-we-are (in our personalized “here-and-now”) (Rousseau 1988, 652). Our “already-having-been” and our “who-we-are-now” are required for our virtuous life. “Being-virtuous” depends on our “already-having-been,” as well as on our “who-we-are-now.” Our “having-been-present” is a past that still influences our present. Our “not-already-there” mirrors our self-projection into the future. Both our “having-been-present” and our “not-already-there” could determine our ontic decisiveness to embrace virtuous life. Who-we-are is continuously evolving. “Who-­ we-­are-now” does not look like “who-we-were” (our “already-having-been”) and “who-we-will-be” (our “not-already-there”). But can we be “strangers” to who-we-­ are? “Being-free” is choosing “who-we-would-like-to-be”, that is, projecting our self into the future (our “Becoming-oneself”). Being who-we-are is actualizing our ontic project-to-be, at every moment of our life. In so doing, we can never be strangers to who-we-are. There is no strangeness in our “Becoming-oneself”, since we are “Being-free.” In moral worldviews, being “in-quest-for-organizational-happiness” is acknowledging the existential limitations of our moral education. Such existential limitations can be found in family, group, organizational, institutional, and societal modes of moral training. Understanding the true nature of morality requires a continuous openness to various kinds of morality. Organizational members who embrace moral worldviews are the “guardians” of the essence of “Truth-itself” throughout organizational life. Organizational members must enhance multiple moral values/norms of organizational behaviour, while safeguarding the essence of Truth-itself. Organizational members who are “in-quest-for-organizational-happiness” are expressing the essence of Truth-itself, although such an essence can only be interpreted/re-interpreted. Dasein’s call for morality demands that every organizational member should define the nature of morality, while strengthening the belief in Truth-itself. In so doing, organizational members make Dasein’s self-disclosure possible. Defining the essence of morality means acknowledging the existence of

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Truth-itself. In the organizational setting, it can be the most efficient way to institutionalize organizational morality (moral normativity). “Living-in-an-organization” entails circumscribing the limitations of organizational ethics. This is a specific response to Dasein’s call for morality since it enhances and justifies organizational members’ “quest-for-organizational-happiness.”

3.2.2  Truths and Lies Too often, people do not say what they believe in. They are too deeply preoccupied with others’ perceptions and interpretations of themselves. We often try to make others internalize our self-image. We emphasize what others “should” perceive and remember about our selves. Interpersonal relationships give rise to some expectations of truth. In all cases, the extent to which organizationally based expectations of truth are met influences interpersonal trust amongst organizational members. Zealous truth telling may be criticized. Either this reflects the uncertainty of holding absolute truth or it hides the primacy of self-interest. Hopefully, others will perceive that we believe in what we say (Rousseau 1988, 209, 218). Sometimes, we believe what we are saying (authenticity). Sometimes, we don’t (lies). Sometimes, we are uncertain about the moral and even ontic validity of what we say. Sometimes, we choose silence, because of an overwhelming uncertainty about our truth-claims. The “unsaid” hides something that should/must be said. Everything that should/ must be said is not always said. Choosing silence about what should/must be said can be morally and philosophically questionable. This is especially the case for “truths that are difficult to define”. This is a dangerous trap we must avoid (Rousseau 1963, 276). In the organizational setting, employee silence could be an acquiescent silence (based on resignation), a defensive silence (grounded in fear), or even a prosocial silence (enhancing cooperation), said Van Dyne et al. (2003). Silence can also be combined with selective remembering and forgetfulness which are socially induced and enhanced within the organization (Cuc et al. 2007). Employee silence does not necessarily reflect ontic uncertainty about one’s truth-claims. Sometimes, this is precisely the kind of silence that is chosen. Truth does not mirror empirical facts (“what-is”), but rather the right decisions, words, and actions in given situations (“what-should-be”). The greatest ethical challenge is to know “what-should­be, in order to rightly judge “what-is” (Rousseau 1966a, 505, 600). From a temporal perspective, Rousseau defined two types of lies. On one hand, a “factual lie” emphasizes reminiscences from the past. It concretely implies a false memory. A “factual lie” is past-oriented. It denies our past words and deeds. On the other hand, “de jure lies” emphasize both the past and the future. They constitute a promise to do something we do not want to do, or something we are consciously unable to do. “De jure lies” are past-oriented and future-oriented. When we break our promise, we remember it. But we also remember our desire not to keep this promise, or our conscious inability to keep it. Making a promise is being future-­ oriented. Remembering a promise is being past-oriented. The “de jure lie” is a

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“retrospective lie”, said Rousseau. There could also be a contradiction between the expressed intention and the implicit (hidden) intention. In both cases, a conventional act infringes upon the principle of freedom. We could lie because there is a duty of obedience. Lying is then a way to free oneself from such a duty, because of its impact on our daily life (Rousseau 1966a, 123–125). Lying is hiding truths we should/must unveil. Lying is hiding “mandatory truths.” Sometimes, it is not morally mandatory to disclose given truths. Not voicing those “not-mandatory truths” is not lying. This does not produce any unjust result since this is a truth we did not have to share with others. It is not a disguised lie. However, if we are saying the opposite of “not-mandatory truths”, are we lying? Rousseau did not provide clear moral guidelines. If I am giving counterfeit money to someone to whom I do not owe any debt, I am deceiving him/her, but I am not stealing from him/her. “Not-­ mandatory truths” can be used to deceive others. Saying the opposite of a “not-­ mandatory truth” is as unjust as hiding a “mandatory truth” (that should/must be said), argued Rousseau (1967, 70–74). Rousseau did not develop any consequentialist ethical theory. Effects largely vary from one situation to another. The intention of the social agent is the main criterion for distinguishing between moral and immoral actions, said Rousseau (1967, 139). Lying presupposes the intention to deceive someone. Could there be “white lies”? White lies require the absence of any malicious intent and the certainty that our lies will never harm anyone. Rousseau acknowledged that it is quite difficult to reach such certainty. That is why white lies are very rare. From an intent-focused perspective, Rousseau defined three kinds of lies. Firstly, we can lie to favour our self-interest (imposture). Secondly, we can lie to benefit others (fraud). Thirdly, we can lie to harm others (slander). Imposture and fraud are informal lies, while slander is a more formal and explicit kind of lie. Lying without any benefit or harm to anyone, including ourselves, is not lying at all. It is pure fiction. It does not contradict justice and truth. Heavenly beings, such as gods, cannot say anything without lying, except if they wrongly judge the morality of hypothetical facts. In that case, imaginary beings contradict moral truth much more deeply than the morality of facts. Moral truth mirrors the right representation of natural passions and sentiments (Rousseau 1967, 74–80). It is not an abstract truth. Rather, such truth is closely linked to the ontic situation we are experiencing in our personalized “here-and-now.” Giving any advantage to someone who is not entitled to receive it creates disorder and unjust consequences. Anything that contradicts truth reduces the scope of justice (Rousseau 1967, 76, 87). As soon as we feel dependent upon others’ will/judgment, we can easily lie. It is much less important to know truths than to know to unveil them, in every situation. When confronted with problematic situations, we must know the ontic path to truth. But knowing such a path largely depends on our moral awareness and sensitivity. Explaining truths to people who are unable to hear/criticize them opens the door to misunderstandings and misinterpretations (Rousseau 1966a, 126, 267, 337). In organizational life, lies strengthen the liar’s self-interest and make communicational exchanges much more difficult to interpret. An organizational culture that allows lies transforms lies into trivialized evils. Such a culture greatly diminishes

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organizational members’ expectations of mutual honesty (Grover and Hui 1994, 301). Describing lies as “maintaining social bonds” (Curtis 2003, 294) or as an amoral issue (Schein 2004, 260) is confusing morality with social life. Social acceptability does not necessarily coincide with moral acceptability. Moral judgment is not subjected to social expectations and habits. Moral justification is not equivalent to social, cultural, political, historical, or even religious/spiritual explanation. Otherwise, morality would not be autonomous. It would totally depend on the needs of family, group, organizational, institutional, and societal life. Morality would then be instrumentalized. It would lose its own nature and scope. In moral worldviews, being “in-quest-for-organizational-happiness” is knowing the ontic boundaries between truths and lies. Moral education emphasizes the duty to tell the truth. Telling the truth entails practicing Good, while lying is actualizing Evil. The “moral/immoral dualism” is then translated into a “truth/lie dualism.” The “truth/lie dualism” presupposes self-evident borders between truths and lies. Half-­ truths can never be truths. Rather, they constitute a specific kind of lies. Half-lies can never be lies since they are a particular sort of truths. Half-truths are generally oriented towards “telling-the-truth”, while half-lies emphasize lying. Half-truths are grounded in a “general will to tell the truth”, while half-lies are rooted in a “general will to lie.” Moral worldviews reduce half-truths to lies, and half-lies to truths. In doing so, they foster unchanging borders between truths and lies. Understanding the true nature of truths/lies means being continuously open to various kinds of morality. Organizational members who embrace moral worldviews are the “guardians” of the borders between truths and lies. They can criticize any organizational attempt to reduce their capacity for “telling-the-truth.” Organizational systems and structures can encourage organizational members to tell the truth and discourage them from lying. In doing so, they are training organizational members to comply with an unchanging “truths/lies dualism.” Dasein’s call for morality demands that every organizational member circumscribe the borders between truths and lies, except if the existence of Truth-itself is endangered. Defining the borders between truths and lies means embracing a predetermined essence of morality. “Living-in-an-­ organization” involves deepening our understanding of the “truths/lies dualism.”

3.2.3  D  eepening Our Knowledge and Changing Our Habits/Customs All knowledge is interpretation. Every human being interprets others’ behaviour, while being-interpreted by others. Our interpretative quest is existentially based. Every human being is a “being-who-interprets-reality.” Any interpretative quest presupposes ignorance about the nature and scope of given realities. Sometimes, our interpretative quest is an attempt to grasp causal relationships and correlations. Any worldview is subjectively oriented. Being subjective means being open to ontic knowledge arising from action. Actions are grounded in our worldview.

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Unfortunately, we are often subjected to injustice and dishonesty. We can undertake unjust and dishonest actions. We can generally trust someone who meets the “walk the talk criterion.” Others assess our own behaviours, while using the “walk the talk criterion.” Are we open to others’ criticism? It is an issue of integrity and mutual trust. If one’s words are put into practice, then they express the reliability of the speaker. Thus, we know we can trust this person. Integrity is a basic trait of ethical leaders (Treviño et  al. 2003, 18; Resick et  al. 2006; Mayer et  al. 2010, 13; and Engelbrecht et al. 2017). Trust is grounded in others’ integrity (Crews 2015, 45). Reliability and integrity are closely related to authenticity. Authenticity could be defined as “being true to oneself”, that is, developing the interconnectedness of our self-perception/values and our own deeds (Simons 1999, 101; Zhu et al. 2004, 23; and Edwards 2010, 194–195). “Being true to oneself” means being humble. It requires a deep awareness of our existential finitude (Caldwell et  al. 2017, 727). “Being true to oneself” is acknowledging that we are existentially finite. Existential finitude translates into ontic imperfection. “Being-imperfect” is accepting and tolerating others’ imperfection (Duignan and Bhindi 1997, 206). Existential finitude affects all human beings since it is an integral part of “what-it-means-to-exist.” Authenticity is inherently ontic since it follows from our ontological finitude. Authenticity is not only ontic, but also basically relational. Only others can legitimate our authenticity. Our self-perception of being authentic is not self-sufficient (Lawton and Páez 2015, 642). In the organizational setting, authentic leadership positively influences employees’ work engagement (Men and Hung-Baesecke 2015; and Reis et al. 2016, 1099, 1102) and the development of organizational trust (Onorato and Zhu 2014, 37). Authentic people are not perfect individuals. Rather, they take their existential finitude upon themselves. The continuity between their words and deeds is not always realized, for conscious as well as unconscious motives. We often obey unconscious thoughts. But authentic people always try to safeguard an axiological coherence between their desired values and their words/ emotions/attitudes/behaviours in daily life. Being “who-we-are” often entails being subjected to unconscious processes. The unconscious refers to an internal and finite “unknown.” The unknown could also affect external objects. It overcomes the realm of known things, beings, and phenomena. “What-is-known” cannot exist without the “unknown”, and vice-versa. The “unknown” creates discomfort and fear, while the “what-is-known” gets rid of ontic distress. Sometimes, we turn a blind eye to some important social, economic, political, and even religious/spiritual issues. We then try to avoid suffering. Experiencing the unknown makes us apparently more peaceful than being confronted with “reality as-it-is.” Remaining in the realm of the unknown could enable us to avoid ontic distress. In given situations, an overwhelming unknown can make our ontic anxiety increase. At the very least, the unknown can encourage us to deepen our self-knowledge. Self-improvement should be the basic aim of learning. Without “what-is-known”, the unknown can never appear in our self-consciousness. The unknown can create psychological anxiety. Anxiety is grounded either in anticipated realities or in the emptiness of our knowledge. There is an unknowable continuity between “what-is-known” and the unknown. Without such continuity, nothing

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could be discovered. The unknown can never disappear. Knowledge can never be acquired. “What-is-known” is limited by the scope of the unknown. Reduction of the unknown can enhance our understanding. However, we are never sure how an “absolute unknown” (or the “Unknown”) can exist. The “Unknown” is the Undefinable. Moral education must deal with appearances and realities. It is often difficult to distinguish between appearances and realities. Appearances seem to be realities. Perceived realities can be pure appearances. In both cases, our mind is at the true origin of the borders between appearances and realities. If everything continuously changes, then immutable borders between appearances and realities do not exist at all. Continuous change makes the “appearance/reality dualism” disappear. Everything is always changing, at every moment. Our self and our world are constantly changing (Rousseau 1967, 148; 1988, 222, 233, 486, 661). Our “self-in-a-­ world” is “being-in-becoming.” Appearances are deceptive: guilty people can show a high level of boldness and pride, while the innocent can feel awkward and shameful (Rousseau 1968, 231). Appearances can give rise to prejudices and stereotypes (or crystallized prejudices). Prejudices and stereotypes can adversely affect mutual understanding, particularly in intercultural relations (Fontaine 2007, 128–129). Moral education needs to eliminate our prejudices and stereotypes. Prejudices and stereotypes are continuously corrupting one’s heart (Rousseau 1988, 151). It is easier to internalize prejudices than to develop our objective/rational judgment. Internalizing prejudices makes us unaware that we are prey to prejudice. Rather, the true nature of prejudice is then hidden. Internalized prejudices become an integral part of our beliefs and convictions (Rousseau 1966a, 220, 242). Internalizing prejudices/stereotypes and eliminating them depend on our inwardness. Everything depends on our interiority (Rousseau 1971, 89). Everyone has his/her own traditions, meanings, customs, and prejudices which continuously mould his/her beliefs and convictions (Rousseau 1966a, 395). We could get rid of our prejudices/stereotypes in two different ways: either through the accomplishment of our moral duties or through the attractiveness of virtues. Prejudices/stereotypes and self-interest can distort our perception of good and evil. We could avoid such distortion by focusing on others’ happiness (Rousseau 1966a, 321, 329). Prejudices and stereotypes cannot exist without very strong habits and customs. Habits need time to be developed and become deeply rooted in our personality (Rousseau 1966a, 259). Strong habits make it impossible for imagination to arise. Imagination can provoke important changes in the way we are connected to things, beings, and phenomena. It is a very powerful tool of internal and external change. Imagination can make our self and our world radically change, insofar as “what-is-imagined” becomes reality. Habits and customs constitute the basic means to strengthen the status quo. They search for the blind repetition of the past. Imagination produces newness and, thus, discontinuity with respect to past habits (Rousseau 1966a, 171). Strong habits replicate the same ways to deal with “things-as-they-are” (“reality-as-it-is”). However, imagination expresses “what-could-be” (possibilities) and “what-we-are-dreaming-about” (desired possibilities). The further we move from the “state of nature”, the more we acquire habits (as a “second nature”). Our “second nature” (habits and customs)

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makes us forget the substance of the state of nature (Rousseau 1966a, 193, 203). In the state of nature, the human being does not have any social identity (Inston 2010, 402). Our social identity follows from different means of socialization to which we have been subjected. It is created with the emerging of habits and customs. Our social identity is inclined to remain stable. But imagination makes self-­transcendence possible. It allows us to choose our possibilities-to-be and to express our desires and dreams. Imagination is required for our “Becoming-oneself.” Powerful habits/customs are counterbalanced by the revolutionary power of imagination. This is especially true in our interpersonal and social relationships. Too often, we have developed two different sets of principles: principles for our dialogical relationships (dialogically based principles) and principles for concrete action in daily life (reality-oriented principles). Rousseau considered that such dualism is meaningless. The discrepancy between dialogically based principles and reality-oriented principles has become trivialized. The dialogically based principles can stand out, like a light in our personal existence. They are not oriented towards their actualization. They can even hold theoretical truths. But we do not know how to define and actualize such theoretical truths. Dialogically based principles mirror a given discourse, while reality-oriented principles emphasize the optimal decisions/actions in given circumstances. Honest people could choose a given discourse (dialogically based principles). However, their actions do not directly follow from their dialogical principles. In such a situation, reality-oriented principles take priority over dialogically based principles. It is generally easier to remember others’ discourses (dialogically based principles) than their actions (reality-oriented principles). But whoever does not behave in accordance with his/her own words does not speak the “language of the heart”, said Rousseau (1988, 210, 214, 218, 232, 450). Reality speaks louder than words. Being “in-quest-for-organizational-knowledge” is knowing the existential limitations of moral education processes. Various interpretations/re-interpretations of organizational life inevitably coexist throughout organizational life. Moral worldviews strengthen all interpretations/re-interpretations as means to confirm the existence of Truth-itself. Organizational members who embrace moral worldviews become “interpretative guardians of moral education” in organizational life. Assuming the ontic challenge of organizational life involves being open to different interpretations/re-interpretations of organizational morality (moral normativity). However, in moral worldviews, the existence of Truth-itself does not necessarily allow a synergetic mix between conflicting interpretations/re-interpretations of organizational realities. Organizational members who are “in-quest-for-­ organizational-knowledge” are responding to Dasein’s call for interpretation. Improving moral education processes in organizational life is a way to enhance and strengthen belief in the existence of Truth-itself. Emphasizing moral education processes in organizational life/culture is responding to Dasein’s call for interpretation. Moral education processes are closely linked to Dasein’s call for morality and the organizational quest for happiness. They are also directly connected to Dasein’s call for interpretation and organizational members’ quest for knowledge. Organizational members participate in given moral education processes (centred on the ethical

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aim), such as ethical training sessions and values clarification activities. They respond to Dasein’s call for morality, as well as to Dasein’s call for interpretation. Organizational members are confronted with a pre-philosophical questioning about the nature of morality and the substance of organizational ethics. They also pre-­ philosophically question their ontic capacity to interpret/re-interpret organizational realities. Moral education processes in the organizational setting arise at the crossroads of Dasein’s call for morality and Dasein’s call for interpretation. Organizational members discover the convergence between their ontic quest for happiness and their ontic quest for knowledge. Deepening our organizational knowledge can allow us to change our habits and customs. But above all, it is a way to respond to our Dasein’s ontic call for knowledge. It is a way to enhance our “Becoming-oneself.” Organizational members’ “Becoming-oneself” can never be separated from their response to Dasein’s call for knowledge.

3.2.4  Eliminating Our Disturbing Emotions and Attitudes Yielding to temptations entails multiplying them. Shame and the sense of honour could prevent some bad habits and customs. However, some unethical behaviours can be strengthened by a false sense of shame. The fear of being blamed could make us hide our unethical behaviours. Is there any basic source for all unethical behaviours? Rousseau believed that pride is at the root of unethical behaviours. Pride denies any wrongful character to temptations (Rousseau 1988, 130, 248, 281, 482, 658). Pride magnifies our self-importance. Some individuals always search for more power and renown. Vanity is the source of all human pains (Rousseau 1988, 140, 561). Vanity is only possible when we can be seen by others. It can never evolve without others’ perceptions and interpretations of a “self-glorified self.” Only lived experiences can allow someone to master his/her vanity. Such experiences can deeply influence the way he/she thinks, speaks, feels, and behaves. Lived experiences allow us to rightly judge our own knowledge. Self-important people could seek consolation by observing “inferior individuals.” A “self-glorified self” cannot arise without social/interpersonal hierarchization (Rousseau 1966a, 166, 319, 322, 376, 435). Any feeling of superiority over others could be grounded in low self-esteem, and sometimes in jealousy. Feigning jealousy means strengthening personal vanity (Rousseau 1988, 242). Ruling over all people involves being subjected to public opinion and to others’ prejudices. Those who rule over others do not always totally dominate them, since they are dependent on public opinion and prejudices. The influence of public opinion is particularly strong in religious/spiritual matters, argued Rousseau (1966a, 98, 339). Rousseau believed that being sociable entails being subjected to others’ opinions. Our opinions are not really “ours.” Rather, they come from various external sources. Consciously or not, we have made a creative synthesis of different opinions. Anger eliminates the influence of our reason, when choosing our words/deeds. But human reason is not perfect. Rationality is limited since the human being is

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existentially finite. Extreme expressions of anger can lead to intolerant and fanatical behaviours. Only reason can make us avoid all distorted and uncontrolled emotions. Only reason deeply aims at the Good (Rousseau 1988, 237, 349). Arrogance is a by-product of self-glorification. “Being-arrogant” is expressing a “self-glorified self.” Philosophizing with arrogance leads to fanatical beliefs, words, and deeds (Rousseau 1966a, 409). Arrogance nurtures anger, hatred, and vengeance. It is useless for effective decision-making processes. Anger only creates destruction. Jealousy cannot make us happy. Our unhappiness does not disappear when jealousy is quite active in our hearts and minds. Jealousy makes our unhappiness increase. We can never be calm and peaceful, when consumed with jealousy. Hatred and jealousy require a high level of anger. Little tantrums do not have enough energy to make jealousy and hatred arise in our heart and mind. They quickly disappear. Over the years, the accumulation of little tantrums could provoke hatred, jealousy, and vengeance. Little tantrums are not always harmless. The most wicked people could dream about their “idealized self.” In all cases, an idealized self is full of goodness and generosity. When wicked people consider “what-is-beautiful” in others’ selves, they hate themselves. They can clearly observe their inner ugliness (Rousseau 1988, 200). The self-glorification of wicked people mirrors the feeling of inner ugliness. Sometimes, a “self-glorified self” can make jealousy increase/decrease. In both cases, a “self-glorified self” seems to be the only way to feel comfortable with one’s mind/heart and body. When we are hurt by wicked people, we are prone to express anger, hatred, and vengeance. Being hurt makes anger arise. But nobody wants to suffer. Consequently, the power of hatred comes into play. We hate those who hurt us. Unlike the energy of unconditional love/compassion, the energy of hatred/jealousy is readily available. Unlike unconditional love/compassion, hatred and jealousy do not demand a serious and sustained effort. Finally, when hatred dominates our mind/heart, we develop plans for revenge. Being hurt makes it difficult to resist temptations of vengeance. Plans for revenge depend on the power of anger and hatred. Without anger and hatred, there would not be any plan for revenge. Unconditional compassion is extremely demanding. We are not always ready to be compassionate towards those who hurt us. We can quickly hate wicked people since they hurt us. Unveiling others’ flaws makes wickedness increase (Rousseau 1966a, 151, 317). Laws can never get rid of wickedness since wickedness is an integral part of the human heart. But goodness and wickedness do not reflect any ontological fate. Wickedness gives birth to jealousy, anger, hatred, and vengeance. Wicked people are not truly free, since they largely depend on those disturbing emotions. “Being-free” involves favouring goodness and abandoning any expression of wickedness. Wicked people have hard hearts. Human nature remains basically good. Actualizing our “Becoming-oneself” means being aware of “what-we-should-not-become.” Otherwise, we are condemned to continuously repeat the same vices and mistakes. Moral education uses the power of habits and customs. Moral experience is the conscious attempt to reconcile moral principles and values/virtues with the various requirements of daily life (reality-­ oriented principles). It is not inherently mysterious since any mystery can never be solved (Smith 2012). Moral existence absolutely requires ontic freedom (Cladis

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1995, 196). Moral education, especially in organizational life, should emphasize individuals’ capacity to change their habits and customs. It should also make organizational members more aware of their capacity to remain realistic, when putting their values and virtues into practice. Responding to Dasein’s call for self-identity entails favouring our “Becoming-­ oneself and being “in-quest-for-the-meaning-of-ontic-temporality.” Our “organizational-­within-time-ness” influences the way we interpret the meaning of organizational temporality. Dasein’s call for self-identity implies the ontic need to eliminate disturbing emotions/attitudes. Every disturbing emotion/attitude fosters a self-destructive identity. It can also reduce our ontic capacity for “Being-with-­ others” throughout our family, group, organizational, institutional, and societal life. Organizational temporality is inherently linked to our organizational self-identity. Organizational members’ “Becoming-oneself” can never be separated from their “organizational-within-time-ness.” Actualizing our “Becoming-oneself” entails deepening our organizationally based self-identity. Organizational members can continuously try to eradicate their disturbing emotions and attitudes. In so doing, they become “self-centered guardians of peaceful mind/heart” throughout organizational life. Organizational members’ “Becoming-oneself” is centered on the elimination of disturbing emotions and attitudes. Organizational members’ response to Dasein’s call for self-identity is a way to deepen the meaning of their organizational temporality. “Living-in-an-organization” is attempting to eliminate all disturbing emotions/attitudes. The meaning of our organizational temporality depends on our response to Dasein’s call for “Becoming-oneself.” Organizational members who embrace moral worldviews become “emotional/attitudinal guardians of a peaceful mind/heart” in organizational life. They try to eliminate their own disturbing emotions and attitudes throughout organizational life. Organizational members who are “in-quest-for-the-meaning-of-organizational-temporality” are responding to Dasein’s call for self-identity. Promoting moral education processes in organizational life/culture involves responding to Dasein’s call for self-identity. Moral education processes are closely linked to Dasein’s call for self-identity and the ontic quest for the meaning of organizational temporality. Organizational members can actively participate in given moral education processes. In so doing, they are responding to Dasein’s call for self-identity, as well as to Dasein’s call for interpretation. Moral education processes are basically linked to Dasein’s call for self-­ identity and Dasein’s call for interpretation. Organizational members unveil the convergence between their ontic quest for self-identity and their ontic quest for knowledge. Organizational members’ “Becoming-oneself” is closely linked to Dasein’s call for knowledge. Organizational members’ ontic response to Dasein’s call for knowledge/interpretation unveils their basic will to deepen their “Becoming-­ oneself.” Organizational members’ “being-who-interprets-reality” is closely linked to their “Becoming-oneself”, when facing organizational realities.

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3.2.5  Developing Positive Emotions and Attitudes Rousseau believed that ontic passions can be either “attractive and kind” or “disturbing.” Some ontic passions are basically “attractive and kind:” goodness, compassion, and benevolence. Other ontic passions essentially “disturb” our peaceful mind/heart: vanity, jealousy, anger, hatred, and vengeance. Attractive and kind passions favour a serene mind/heart, while disturbing passions work against this. Attractive passions are those passions we share with others. Any passion which denies our self-interest is negatively perceived since human beings always search for their self-interest. That is why altruism is extremely demanding. Being altruistic means reducing the ontic quest for our self-interest. Developing kind emotions allows us to control disturbing passions. Being totally subjected to our ontic passions signifies losing our freedom and rationality (Rousseau 1966a, 289, 297, 318, 428–429). Having kind passions makes us reluctant to practice any vice. We are then prone to undertake right actions and to be benevolent towards others (Rousseau 1971a, 196). Comparing ourselves to others could increase vanity and hatred. This is especially true when others are in a better situation than us. Social comparison nurtures vanity, hatred, and jealousy. Self-esteem makes us unveil our “relative self.” Any “being-a-self” is always compared with others’ “being-a-self.” Our “Being-with-­ Others” implies an ontic positioning “in-front-of-others.” Without others’ self-­ identity, we cannot deepen and define our own self-identity. Being “in-front-of-others” means having the opportunity to make social comparisons. We are always comparing ourselves to others (Rousseau 1966a, 293, 317). Low self-esteem can make somebody exacerbate the inequality of people and even promote vicious behaviours, such as vanity, hatred, shame, and envy (Rousseau 1971a, 210; and Neuhouser 2013, 193). The inequality of human beings is the primary source of evil (Rousseau 1971, 89). Comparing ourselves to someone else means judging the other, while neglecting to judge ourselves. We always perceive the radical difference between others’ “being-a-self” and our own “being-a-self.” Others’ project-to-be can differ radically from our own project-to-be. However, any comparison goes beyond first impressions. The feeling of others’ radical difference is not powerful. Indeed, it largely depends on our interpretation of interpersonal differences. Our interpretation of radical otherness can be the source of disturbing emotions. Social comparison can make us favour our own “self-in-a-world.” Favouring our “self-in-a-world” and our “Becoming-oneself” to the detriment of radical otherness is claiming to hold ultimate truths. Any comparison unveils similarities and differences between perceived objects/beings (Rousseau 1966a, 351). Acknowledging and enhancing radical otherness means being radically open to others’ “self-in-a-world”/”Becoming-­ oneself.” The conviction of a natural equality of all human beings can even disappear (Rousseau 1971a, 213). We can fall into the traps of chauvinism and ethnocentrism. The feeling of superiority is not only a mode of self-glorification, but above all, it is a way to avoid any questioning about radical otherness. Too often, we feel superior to those we hate. Sometimes, we unconsciously feel inferior to

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those we hate. Our hatred is then rooted in our low self-esteem. Low self-esteem usually produces good and bad results (Rousseau 1966a, 319). This is especially true for family, group, organizational, institutional, and societal relationships. Self-­ esteem can give birth to virtues and vices. Low self-esteem is often related to the universal desire for honour and recognition. Honour should coexist with virtue. Reason should coexist with wisdom (Rousseau 1971a, 231, 234). But in organizational life, nothing is so easy. Too often, the sense of honour is closely linked to self-gratification and jealousy. Honour often remains problematic. It can justify the uncontrolled deployment of disturbing emotions. The sense of honour can become the ultimate basis of morality, so that all disturbing emotions can be morally justified. Such extreme forms of honour destroy the nature of morality. They eliminate humility, benevolence, and compassion. All positive emotions are then irrelevant, because of the ultimate primacy of the sense of honour. An extreme sense of honour makes humility and wisdom disappear. Humility allows us to become wise people, said Rousseau (1988, 660). Humility implies a deep awareness of our ontic ignorance. Ontic ignorance is not an issue of theoretical knowledge, but rather a crucial issue of self-knowledge/self-awareness. Ontic ignorance mirrors the existential (unsurpassable) finitude of human beings: our rationality, judgment, and knowledge are existentially finite. Humility is certainly one of the basic traits of ethical leaders (Caldwell et al. 2017). Ontic ignorance is not an issue of theoretical knowledge, but rather a crucial issue of self-knowledge/self-awareness. “Ontic ignorance” unveils the lack of inwardness. False humility is an expression of “ontic ignorance.” False humility is vanity, that is, self-glorification (Rousseau 1966a, 319, 442). Courtesy and politeness are intrinsically tied to the sense of honour. Rousseau identified two basic kinds of honour. Firstly, the “honour following from public opinion” is grounded in changing prejudices and stereotypes. It does not have any impact on one’s happiness. It can even distort the true worth of things, persons, events, and phenomena. Secondly, the “honour following from self-esteem” is based on the eternal truths of morality. It presupposes a permanent state of inner satisfaction, given that eternal truths of morality can only give birth to such states of mind/heart (Rousseau 1988, 58, 133, 535). Happiness comes from our inwardness. An extreme form of honour can never allow us to be happy since it opens the way to uncontrolled disturbing emotions. Rather, happiness comes from positive emotions, such as benevolence, love, generosity, and compassion. The attitude of compassion implies the interplay of reason and imagination. We use our imagination when putting ourselves in the shoes of unhappy people. More rarely, our imagination allows us to put ourselves in the shoes of the happiest individuals. We are lucky we are not subjected to others’ suffering. Sometimes, we are deeply compassionate towards others who suffer, while being happy to be safe and healthy. Envy makes us feel unhappy. Being envious is believing that we are much less happy than others (Rousseau 1966a, 287–290, 297; 1971a, 198). We can be compassionate towards people who suffer without necessarily experiencing the same suffering in our personalized “here-and-now.” In some situations, sharing the same painful experience can allow us to be more compassionate towards others. In other situations, this commonality of pain does not have any positive impact on

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compassion. Instead, we are centered on our own suffering, while ignoring the reality that others are subjected to the same pain. Rousseau said that imagination makes us perceive and understand others’ suffering (1966a, 297, 300). The attitude of compassion can eventually make us feel more psychologically anxious than people who suffer (Rousseau 1967, 160). Practicing compassion opens our mind/heart to our existential predicament. Existing is a painful experience since there is no intrinsic meaning of our existence and death. Trying to release ourselves from ontic pains often entails exchanging them for more cruel suffering. Suffering always remains an integral part of human existence. Existing without any pain is being dead (Rousseau 1988, 315, 519, 682). Compassion does not make existential suffering disappear. Suffering is existentially based. In a moral worldview, suffering is inevitable. Compassion is the required attitude to cope with our existential suffering in an efficient and serene way. Painful experiences are required to be kind, affectionate, and compassionate when facing individually and socially induced pains. We learn a lot from our lived experiences, especially when they were painful. Our existential predicament can make us more compassionate towards others, since it is universally shared (Rousseau 1966a, 103, 286). The structure of existence implies unavoidable suffering. Suffering is a dimension of any finite existence. Existential suffering is counterbalanced by the existential presence of compassion. “Naturally-based suffering” needs “naturally-based compassion.” If suffering is an integral part of human existence, then it is “naturally-based suffering.” “Naturally-based suffering” calls for “naturally-based compassion.” Without the presence of an “existentially based compassion”, there would not be any grounds for our ontic hope. Ontic despair would be the last word on ontic suffering. Like suffering, compassion is a structural component of finite existence. However, moral worldviews do not embrace the notion of an existentially based compassion. In a moral worldview, suffering and compassion are limited. They can never become infinite. In a moral worldview, compassion can never become unconditional since every human existence is conditioned. The experience of ontic suffering makes us find the power to endure it. Seeing people suffer is a painful experience. Others’ suffering cannot be the ultimate foundation for our happiness. Compassion could reduce the intensity and extent of self-love (or self-gratification) (Wong 2015, 188). It precedes any rational reflection (Rousseau 1966a, 327, 478). Reason does not necessarily promote human self-preservation. Human beings can use their reason to justify self-destructive practices, at the individual, group, organizational, institutional, or societal level. Unlike reason, compassion directly contributes to the self-preservation of humankind. Moral and political inequality in civil society make compassion and universal benevolence increasingly scarce. Benevolence towards human/non-human beings presupposes that we are all sentient beings. Unfortunately, the use of reason is not the determinant criterion, when observing various expressions of pain. If this were the case, then human beings would feel justified unnecessarily mistreating non-human beings, which are not endowed with reason (Rousseau 1971a, 153, 197–199, 220). Rousseau described three determinant factors for distinguishing between human and non-human beings. Firstly, freedom constitutes a basic difference between human and non-human

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beings. Human beings are existentially free agents. Non-human beings obey their instincts, while human beings are always free to obey/disobey their instincts. Secondly, the capacity for self-improvement can also make the difference between human and non-human beings. Passions can improve our reason. They are rooted in our needs. Passions can be controlled through more effective knowledge. Thirdly, unlike animals, human beings know they will die. They are aware of their “deathto-­come” (as objective fact) and of their “having-to-die” (as subjective experience). Human beings can experience the ontic anxiety of “having-to-die” (Rousseau 1971a, 171, 182). Our “having-to-die” is subjectively experienced, while our “death-to-come” is objectively analyzed. Compassion should be applied to all human beings, regardless of their personalities and their ontic situation. We are members of the same species. That is why the attitude of compassion must be universally applied (Rousseau 1966a, 329–330). In a moral worldview, compassion must be universalized, at least between human beings. Compassion is intrinsically related to goodness and generosity. Rousseau (1966a, 127) defined two levels of “low generosity.” We can give “disinterested gifts” which are useless for us. We can also give “gifts with precise expectations of reciprocity,” meaning we are convinced that others will give them back to us. A disinterested gift is not necessarily the most altruistic one. Indeed, giving “things we love and use” is more altruistic than giving “what is useless for us.” Giving something “with expectations of reciprocity” can mirror cultural habits and customs. It is not the most altruistic form of gift since it is not disinterested. Any altruistic gift is related to the attitude of compassion. Nobody loves to see the situation of the poor and the needy, especially when he/she feels powerless with respect to their painful condition. Giving alms, or providing advice, health services, friendship, and protection to the poor and the needy is helping them. Helping the poor and the needy is creating good memories and eternal pleasure in our own mind/heart (Rousseau 1988, 282, 524). In so doing, we strongly foster our self-interest. Giving something to the poor and the needy presupposes that we already own something we could reasonably give to them, without endangering our self-preservation. However, Rousseau acknowledged that gifts are social conventions. Some implicit social agreements define customs, habits and expectations towards gifts (Rousseau 1966a, 119). Compassion is the basis of all social virtues, such as generosity, clemency, and benevolence. Generosity is compassion towards the weakest. Clemency is compassion towards the wrong and guilty. Benevolence is compassion towards the whole of humanity (Rousseau 1971a, 197). Any compassionate attitude that nurtures anger and hatred is fundamentally flawed. Compassion can never coexist with disturbing emotions. In organizational life, leaders’ emotional expressivity could make their vision of organizational change more acceptable (Groves 2006). Emotional intelligence could even positively influence the way followers perceive leaders’ effectiveness (Sivanathan and Fekken 2002, 201). Leader-follower value congruence could also influence leaders’ moral efficacy (Lee et  al. 2017). Investors and employees can strongly influence the level of transparency in corporate social responsibility (CSR) reporting (Fernandez-Feijoo et al. 2014, 60). However, employees’ pressure on corporate sustainability does not always have the same positive impact on the quality

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of sustainability reporting. Rudyanto and Siregar (2018, 243) have rightly explained how in some cultures, sustainability reporting is considered “detrimental to the company.” Unfortunately, compassion seems to be excluded from the global picture, when considering emotional expressivity and intelligence. Human beings can search for “what-is-impossible.” In so doing, they mould “what-is-impossible” into true possibilities-to-be. This is true for ideals, and partly true for utopias. Ideals could be fragmentarily actualized, while utopias are unreachable. Our lived experiences could allow us to make the changeover from “what-is-­ impossible” to true possibilities-to-be. Desiring “what-is-impossible” is very important for social and political change. It makes us actively work for collective ideals and even for utopias. Desiring “what-is-impossible” develops a free and just society, in the collective “here-and-now.” Ideals must be actualized in deeds. The ideal of social and economic equality must be translated into daily practices. Poverty can be eliminated only if social, economic, and political structures are radically modified. Such a noble purpose needs to change our mindset. The human mindset can always be modified since the human being is a “being-who-interprets-reality.” Social, cultural, political, and religious/spiritual revolution comes from the fact that we have collectively desired “what-is-impossible”, as though it were totally attainable. The revolutionary spirit presupposes that a given state of things must be changed. This is an optimal way to rehumanize our societies. Embracing ideals should never exclude the exercise of prudence. Obeying the most powerful people is often an act of necessity and a prudent decision. The duty of obedience is intrinsically linked to our ontic freedom. When physical, moral and even spiritual power makes us obedient, we do not have any duty of obedience. Excessive constraints can never justify any duty of obedience. Any excessive constraint gives us the moral duty to disobey immoral requests. It is an issue of transcendental dignity and ontic freedom. Rousseau said that power can never be the true origin of positive law. The duty of obedience can only be applied to legitimate authorities and, thus, to reasonable constraints (Rousseau 1966, 44–45). Being prudent entails knowing our strengths and weaknesses. Without strength, virtue is impossible (Rousseau 1988, 478, 510). Peace requires harmony. Inner peace needs inner and relational harmony. Peace of mind unveils harmony-oriented ideas, ideals, representations, beliefs, and convictions. Peace of heart reflects harmony-oriented emotions and sentiments. The human being embodies the interconnectedness of mind and heart. The human being “is” mind/heart. We can never separate mind and heart since they are interrelated. Values and virtues make the interconnectedness of mind and heart possible. There is no relational peace without a peaceful mind/heart. There is no peaceful mind/ heart without relational peace. Relational and inner peace does not vary from one situation to another. The human being is the by-product of his/her own environment. The level of wisdom we have reached mirrors our responsiveness to suffering. Everyone can continuously improve himself/herself, without making such existential limitations disappear. Any virtuous path continuously requires total self-­ surrender. This is a path we can choose, at any moment of our life. It is a personal choice. Nonetheless, our inner and relational peace nurtures the arising of universal

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peace. Religions and spiritualities can contribute to universal peace since they enhance mutual understanding and respect. However, every religious/spiritual believer has an individual responsibility to favour universal love, reconciliation, forgiveness, and non-violence. Every religion/spirituality bears the same collective duty to work for universal peace (Küng 1986, 606). Courage and hard work are more easily developed when addressing basic needs and social requirements (Rousseau 1963, 47). Searching for pleasant experiences is “working for us” (egoistic attitude) (Rousseau 1971, 101). Humankind is essentially based on the sense of humanity. Fighting for the common good should always be connected to our sense of humanity. Otherwise, any desired good can create dehumanizing effects on individuals and communities. The sense of humanity is not compatible with egocentric intentions and behaviours. Rather, it mirrors a deep orientation towards altruism and the common good. Working for others means exploiting our talents for others’ benefit (an altruistic attitude). Ethical leadership could be defined as an “internalized moral identity” (Skubinn and Herzog 2016, 258). A moral identity follows from a moral worldview. It can never justify dehumanizing practices. Rather, a moral identity favours positive emotions/attitudes, such as benevolence, altruism, love, and compassion. In the organizational setting, an altruistic attitude is often linked to perceptions of ethical leadership (Khuntia and Suar 2004, 23–24; and Mayer et al. 2010, 13). However, any trait of ethical leaders is always connected to their own worldview. It makes sense only in the context of such a worldview. Designing the substance of ethical leadership should not make us misunderstand the nature of worldviews. Mostovicz et  al. (2011, 492) believed that worldviews reflect socially driven attitudes towards uncertainty and the basic need for social bonds. This is not the domain of moral worldviews. Leadership, trust, personal responsibility, and responsibility-for-others can be related to various worldviews. They can differ substantially if they are embedded in moral or post-­ moral worldviews. Wang et al. (2017) asserted that ethical leadership is a multidimensional construct. Grasping the difference between moral and post-moral worldviews unveils that ethical leadership as a construct cannot be reduced to any limited set of traits. The various traits of ethical leaders could have a different meaning and scope of application, when being closely linked to moral or post-moral worldviews. Existing involves interpreting/re-interpreting reality. The human being is a “being-who-interprets-reality.” Our social consciousness often misunderstands the complexity of our world and the need for various styles of personality. This is basically due to our existential finitude. Individual responsibility and collective responsibility for the evolution of our world are interconnected since we are “Being-in-the-world” and “Being-with-Others.” A peaceful moral consciousness does not guarantee that our moral judgments can be infallible. Inner and relational consciousness allows us to make sincere and authentic moral judgments. It emphasizes a universal respect for living beings. Organizational, institutional, and social/ political processes express the substance of integrity, honesty, and reliability. The substance of such virtues can refer either to conscious/unconscious processes of decision-making (“internally-driven substance”) or to predictable/unpredictable

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consequences of given decisions/actions (“externally-driven substance”). The substance of compassion can refer either to the conscious/unconscious processes of compassionate thoughts, words and deeds (“internally-driven substance”) or to their predictable/unpredictable consequences (“externally-driven substance”). Anyone who embraces compassion is fulfilling his/her moral duties. But at every moment of our life, we must be concerned with others’ dignity. Being compassionate is being able to allow others to save face. We are never sure to have undertaken the right and just actions. If everything is existentially uncertain, then there is no certainty about good and evil, regardless of personalities and circumstances. Moral normativity could thus open the way to the ethical aim. Moral development is a universal duty. The various levels of morality could be applied to employee relations and human resource management (Klikauer 2012). Moral development implies the deployment of our moral consciousness beyond its limitations. Even a moral worldview cannot exclude the possibility that our foundations can be strongly shaken. Such a chaotic situation does not necessarily make a moral worldview useless and incoherent. Embracing a moral worldview means accepting the challenge of moral dialogue. “Being-in-dialogue” is being “in-relation” with people who justify opposite viewpoints, values, and principles. Baucus and Beck-Dudley (2005) believed that organizations could progress through the various stages of moral development. This is a relevant hypothesis. However, the “moral progress” of organizations is nothing but a pure analogy. Organizations do not have internalization processes. Only individuals’ moral development can use internalization processes to uncover ethical values, conflicts, and dilemmas related to the ethical aim. Moreover, the analogy of an “organizationally-­ based moral progress” neglects the deep influence of societal cultures and religions/ spiritualities. Pava (2002) identified three stages of the moral development of organizations: ethical improvisation (leaders refer to “their own sense of right and wrong”), ethical institutionalization (“leaders distinguish between their own sense of right and wrong and the demands of organizational ethics”), and ethical revival (“organizational members search for integrative solutions”). Ethical improvisation seems to convey a naive form of relativism, since it absolutizes personal values and moral standards, as though nothing else exists. Ethical institutionalization appears to be linked to consciousness-raising activities, since it enhances organizational members’ awareness of personal/organizational ethics. An ethical revival opens the way to deliberative processes about ethical issues. It mirrors an ethics of pluralism. Any stage of moral development could give birth to a specific ethical climate. Ethical climates can vary widely, not only by organizational departments and subsidiaries, but also by country, culture, and religion/spirituality (Newman et  al. 2017, 501). Responding to Dasein’s call for self-identity entails choosing our “Becoming-­ oneself” and being “in-quest-for-the-meaning-of-ontic-temporality.” Dasein’s call for self-identity implies the ontic need to develop positive emotions and attitudes. Every positive emotion/attitude strengthens our peaceful mind/heart and our peaceful relationships with others. It can deepen the meaning and substance of our “Becoming-oneself.” Every positive emotion/attitude makes us actualize our

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“Being-with-others” throughout our family, group, organizational, institutional, and societal life. Organizational members can constantly develop their positive emotions and attitudes. Eliminating disturbing emotions and attitudes is not enough. Inner peace (of mind/heart) and relational peace (with-others) require us to deploy our capacity for inner/relational harmony. Organizational members can be “self-­ centered guardians of inner/relational peace” throughout organizational life. Our “Becoming-oneself” is centered on the deployment of positive emotions and attitudes. “Living-in-an-organization” is attempting to foster positive emotions and attitudes. Organizational members who endorse moral worldviews are “emotional/ attitudinal guardians of inner/relational peace” in organizational life. They constantly try to develop positive emotions and attitudes.

3.3  The Foundations of Moral Education The undeniable equality of all human beings and the evolution of good/just social institutions constitute the Rousseauist foundation of moral education. Moral education focuses on how human beings “should-be” in order to influence the path of their own becoming. The ultimate objective of moral education processes is to foster our “Becoming-oneself.”

3.3.1  J ust Social Institutions and the Basic Equality of Human Beings Rousseau distinguished between natural equality and conventional equality. In the natural order, all human beings are equal. Every society is based on conventional equality of human beings, or things (objects). Conventional equality requires positive law. Otherwise, we can never be sure that conventional equality will be actualized in daily life. Natural needs are the same for every human being since the natural order integrates humankind. In social life, positive law should guarantee that everyone has access to the same livelihoods (Rousseau 1966a, 41, 245, 251). Every human being has naturally the right to fulfill his/her basic natural needs (Rousseau 1966, 56). Evil follows from the artificial multiplication of needs, although such invented needs are not true and basic needs. Evil makes us subject ourselves to untrue needs (Rousseau 1971, 121). All human beings are naturally equal. Nobody has inherent authority over other people (Rousseau 1966, 41–42, 45, 306–307). The natural state (the natural order) established incontrovertible/natural physical inequality (age, physical strength, health, and qualities of mind/soul). But the civil state/order could impose and justify various kinds of moral and political inequality, which are based on conventional prejudices/stereotypes. Such inequality has nothing to do with human nature. Moral

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and political inequality is supported by the consent of the most powerful groups. Socially induced inequality can be reinforced by laws, although this contradicts natural law (Rousseau 1966a, 307; 1971a, 150, 157, 202, 235; and Neuhouser 2013, 194). Rousseau rejected any socially induced inequality between the rich (and powerful) and the poor (and weakest), regardless of personalities, communities, and circumstances. Such inequality threatens equal freedom for all people (Neuhouser, 2013, 220; and Niimura 2016, 893). In the civil state, specific interests can be preferred to the public interest (Rousseau 1966a, 307). A social contract gives rise to the moral and legitimate equality of human beings, although individuals can have natural inequalities (in terms of their physical power and mental faculties). The social contract makes all human beings basically equal through law/regulation and social convention (Rousseau 1966, 58–59). Rousseau believed that we must analyze humankind itself. Humankind mirrors the commonality of all human beings, regardless of eras, religions, and cultures. The notion of humankind allows us to avoid a self-biased knowledge of others’ selves (Rousseau 1966a, 312, 332). Analyzing the substance of humankind implies three basic steps. Firstly, we must deepen our self-understanding: listening to our consciousness and observing our passions (internalizing processes). Secondly, we must analyze others’ behaviours and use our reason to judge them (externalizing processes). Thirdly, we must overcome our individual perspective (generalization processes) (Rousseau 1971, 38, 59). Our behaviours express parts of ourselves. Knowing someone should entail an attitude of impartiality towards him/her. We should be deeply sensitive to his/her ontic passions. Rousseau believed that good and just social institutions are those which can relativize citizens’ individual selves and make them an integral part of a community. Social institutions are always subjected to foolish and contradictory requests and claims. Looking at our interdependence can allow us to overcome contradictory desires and wishes (Rousseau 1966a, 39, 96, 253, 318, 595). Being “in-quest-for-organizational-wisdom” is knowing how to put justice and equality into practice. Organizational members who endorse moral worldviews become “virtuous guardians of justice/equality” in their organizational life. Justice and equality enhance and structure organizational life. They constitute an integral part of Dasein’s call for a virtuous life. Organizational members who are “in-quest-­ for-organizational-wisdom” are responding to Dasein’s call for justice and equality. Organizational members can practice wisdom throughout organizational life. Organizational members can learn how to be wise, when “Being-with-Others” in the organizational setting. They should never internalize an “organizationally-driven wisdom”, as though it were the final word on human wisdom. Instead, every organizational member receives Dasein’s call for justice and equality throughout his/her organizational life. Practicing justice and equality in organizational life is being “in-quest-for-wisdom.” Organizational members’ response to Dasein’s call for justice and equality reflects their “ontic decisiveness” towards their own “Becoming-­ oneself,” as well as towards their “Being-with-Others.” “Ontic decisiveness” unveils our ontic response to Dasein’s call for equality and justice. “Living-in-an-­ organization” entails receiving Dasein’s call for equality and justice throughout

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organizational life. A virtuous life needs justice and equality. We cannot search for wisdom without practicing justice and equality, in our family, group, organizational, institutional, and societal life. Moral worldviews can never exclude the continuous practice of justice and equality. Being “morally-focused” entails practicing justice and equality at every moment of our life. Practicing justice and equality in our organizational life means responding to Dasein’s call for a virtuous life. It is also the best way to follow the ontic road towards wisdom. The meaning and substance of justice/equality are never crystal-clear. Organizational members must use their rationality and common sense to avoid the pitfalls of unfair/unjust practices throughout organizational life. Their moral judgments follow from “common sense moral intuitions” (Redekop 2009, 407). Organizational members must constantly open their mind/heart to pre-philosophical questioning about the optimality of organizational justice/equality.

3.3.2  The Social Contract A moral worldview is basically concerned with the incontrovertible (existential) equality of human beings. Organizational members who embrace moral worldviews try to maintain and strengthen existential equality in social, economic, and political institutions. Any moral worldview can never be separated from social contracts and their social/political effects. The social contract allows organizational members to focus on their “Being-with-Others.” Organizational members can respond to Dasein’s call for a virtuous life. They can choose their own quest for wisdom throughout organizational life. In so doing, Dasein’s call for social justice and equality can become a reality. 3.3.2.1  Social Conventions and Social Order Every social order is guided by laws and regulations. It is grounded in social conventions. Searching for our self-preservation is the primary law of family life, since families constitute the first political bodies (Fermon 1994, 439). All legitimate authorities are based on social conventions (Rousseau 1966, 41–47). Rousseau said that the natural state could be a parameter for judging the present state of things (the social and civil state). Ignoring human nature makes the notion of natural law incomprehensible. Knowing the natural state of human beings can allow us to define natural law (Rousseau 1971a, 151–153). In the natural state (natural order), instincts represent the basic power guiding all deeds. They are used to “live-in-Nature.” In the civil state (civil order), justice requires moral substance for every behaviour, the fulfillment of moral duties, and the use of reason (Rousseau 1966, 55). Reason is helpful for “living-in-society” (Rousseau 1971a, 194). However, instincts still play a major role in our daily life. Since instincts represent our natural state, they should never be destroyed. Rather, instincts must be controlled through the fulfillment of

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our moral duties. However, moral duties are never absolute. They always involve rules and exceptions (Rousseau 1966a, 437). Fulfilling our moral duties means controlling our instincts (Williams 2005, 390). When we use our instincts (self-­ preservation) to help the poor and the needy, we transform them into virtues. In doing so, our instincts are enlightened by our rationality and freedom (Rousseau 1971, 109; 1971a, 171). Only moral freedom can allow us to control ourselves. “Being-free” signifies obeying laws we have created, because laws unveil the general will (Rousseau 1966, 56). We are free and autonomous beings, when complying with laws we have designed and defined. Unfortunately, social conventions and duties sometimes give rise to lies and deceit (Rousseau 1966a, 123). The ethics of the social contract can become quite fragile, when opening the door to unethical agreements. Every social contract implies self-sacrifice for the benefit of collective well-­ being (Rousseau 1966, 51, 68). In the organizational setting, ethical leadership focuses on collective well-being rather than on organizational goals (Kalshoven et al. 2016, 510). Ethical leaders can increase their employees’ well-being. They can have a positive impact on followers’ job satisfaction (Yang 2014, 521; Ahmad and Umrani 2019, 542). Ethical leadership could improve employee in-role performance (Kia et al. 2019), particularly when employees are engaged in organizational identification processes (Yang and Wei 2017, 1514). The self-perception of one’s ethical leadership can make someone believe in the ethical culture of his/her organization (Huhtala et al. 2013, 263). However, the notion of an “ethical organizational culture” remains vague. We need the correct criteria to determine the ethical character of an organizational culture. Too often, those criteria are totally disconnected from philosophy, theology, and spirituality—which are the basic historical sources of ethical reflection. Ethical criteria can only be found in various ethical theories. Assessing the ethical character of an organizational culture depends on the ethical theory we embrace. It also involves knowing the hermeneutic approach we endorse (Kakabadse and Steane 2010). An ethical theory gives us a specific perspective from which to analyze the ethical character of an organizational culture. It deeply orients our ontic and interpretative quest. This is the first analytical step when assessing the ethical character of an organizational culture. The second step focuses on the organizational means for institutionalizing ethics. The third step unveils how the results of the first step (ethical theory and the hermeneutic approach) could be related to those of the second step (the organizational means to institutionalize ethics). The Rousseauist notion of the social contract expresses the changeover from the state of nature to a morally focused individual (Williams 2005, 390). Every citizen is an indivisible part of the social contract (Rousseau 1966, 52). Every social contract constructs a moral and collective body, that is a “common self” (or “we-ness”) (Rousseau 1966, 52). The greatest challenge of ethical leaders is to define the substance of such “we-ness.” The substance of “we-ness” can refer either to the conscious/unconscious process of “Being-with-Others” (“internally-driven substance”) or to the predictable/unpredictable consequences of being “in-front-of-others” (“externally-driven substance”). Ethical leaders must circumscribe the limitations

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of our collective responsibility for the future of the society we live in, if not for the future of humankind. They must have the capacity to lead sustainable and systemic changes in their organization, industry, and society (Brenkert 2019, 921). The social contract could be developed in various political regimes (Cervellati et  al. 2008, 1360). However, morality is deeply involved in the way any social contract is built up (Vauleon 2014, 101). In the State, a social contract lays the groundwork for all human rights (Rousseau 1966, 56). The social contract makes all citizens socially equal (Rousseau 1966, 137). The social contract between the Sovereign (the people as a body) and individual citizens is the basis of civil society (Rousseau 1966a, 603–604). The social contract is a way to reduce the extent of natural freedom. But it opens the door to civil liberties, including property rights. From Rousseau’s perspective, renouncing our liberties amounts to distorting the spiritual substance of human beings (Rousseau 1966, 46; and Horkheimer 2013, 18). Natural freedom is limited by individual powers, while civil freedom is reduced by the general will (Rousseau 1966, 55–56). What is the optimal level of freedom we can reach in daily life? “Being-free” is intrinsically linked to “Becoming-oneself.” We cannot be existentially free without any self-projection into the future. But our “Becoming-­ oneself” requires courageous decisions. “Ontic decisiveness” is the ontic resoluteness to safeguard our project-to-be, at all costs. “Being-free” means being responsible for our thoughts, emotions, words, attitudes, and deeds. Thought determines the way we perceive, feel, and interpret events and phenomena. It deeply influences “who-we-would-like-to-be.” Our ontic freedom is limited. We are existentially finite beings. The individual or collective will can be distorted by desires, disappointments, and illusions, or by the dark depths of the unconscious. The human will is not infinitely powerful. It may be troubled by internal phenomena. Sometimes, we do not know how to get rid of our inner “thunderstorms.” Being “in-quest-for-organizational-wisdom” involves strengthening organizational traditions, as though any organizational tradition (or “traditionally-based convention”) were an efficient tool for virtuous life. Organizational conventions define the basic orientations and expectations of organizational behaviour. Organizational members interpret/re-interpret organizational traditions and criticize the substance of organizational justice and equality. The substance of organizational justice/equality can refer either to conscious/unconscious processes of any ontic quest for justice/equality (“internally-driven substance”) or to the predictable/unpredictable consequences of such ontic quests (“externally-driven substance”). Organizational members who embrace moral worldviews are “virtuous guardians of organizational traditions” in organizational life. Organizational conventions should be optimal means to enhance and institutionalize justice and equality in the workplace. They make Dasein’s call for a virtuous life an organizational reality. Organizational members who are “in-quest-for-organizational-wisdom” take organizational conventions into account, as though such conventions could allow organizational members to take Dasein’s call for justice and equality into account. The “ontic neighbourhood” is involved in any attempt to structure and foster organizational conventions. It makes every organizational member respond to Dasein’s call for justice and equality in the workplace. “Being-in-quest-for-organizational-wisdom” entails being in

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dialogue with other organizational members. Such virtue-centered dialogue deals with the optimality of organizational conventions. Any unjust/unfair effect of organizational conventions can be criticized, while safeguarding the existence of Truth-­ itself. Searching for justice and equality in organizational life signifies constantly deepening our “being-in-quest-for-organizational-wisdom.” Organizational members’ response to Dasein’s call for justice and equality mirrors a basic openness to their “ontic neighbourhood.” “Ontic decisiveness” towards organizational members’ “Becoming-oneself” and “Being-with-Others” requires a deep sensitivity about their “existential neighbourhood.” “Living-in-an-organization” involves acknowledging our “ontic neighbourhood, while continuously improving our “ontic decisiveness.” Organizational conventions cause organizational members to respond to Dasein’s call for a virtuous life. There is no “quest-for-organizational-wisdom” without organizational members’ interpretation/re-interpretation of organizational conventions. Organizational members deepen their awareness of the optimality of organizational conventions, while remaining concerned with the meaning/substance of organizational justice/equality. 3.3.2.2  The Sovereign and General Will The Sovereign is composed of all members of the State. Everyone can have individualistic wills that could differ from the general will (Rousseau 1966, 54; 1966a, 606, 608). Specific wills emphasize self-interest. But some can still mirror the general will, in enhancing public interest through social customs and laws. Nobody really wants to “live-in” a violent society. Rousseau said that the more disturbing passions are explicitly violent, the more the repressive power of the State can be justified (1966a, 607; 1971a, 199). The Sovereign is a collective being which acts through general wills and laws (Rousseau 1966, 63; 1966a, 604–605). The general will is the will of the people (as a political body). It is the true source of positive law (Rousseau 1966, 64; 1966a, 605). Laws are the acts of the Sovereign. They are universally compelling (Rousseau 1966, 54, 129). When laws are not universally compelling, then their partial applicability opens the door to tyranny, oligarchy, or despotism. Sometimes, specific wills can be compatible with the general will. But it is not often the case. Rousseau explained that specific wills focus on individual preferences, while the general will emphasizes the basic equality of all citizens. A general will aims at collective well-being, the common good, or the public interest. It always acknowledges the basic equality of all citizens (Rousseau 1966, 63, 66, 70; 1966a, 606). Social and economic justice is a basic and necessary constraint on the general will (Williams 2005, 388, 408). We cannot search for the common good without fighting for more social and economic justice. A general will enhances and strengthens the common good. Nonetheless, it is not equivalent to the “will of all people, that is, the sum of specific wills” (Rousseau 1966, 66). However, various social groups and associations can have very particular wills and interests that constitute an “inner general will” for their members. Yet, these are specific wills when compared to the State. If a given social group/association becomes so powerful that

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its own specific wills and interests take precedence over all others, then it becomes impossible to have any general will. The overwhelming will can never become a general will (Rousseau 1966, 67; 1971, 40). A specific will can never represent the general will (Rousseau 1966, 69). Most of the time, individual interests are expressed by specific wills and contradict the public interest (Rousseau 1967, 73). The general will is always right. But the judgment that orients the general will is not always enlightened. The general will is always attacked by specific wills. A general will makes all citizens free and equal (Rousseau 1966, 76, 125, 149). Thus, we must prevent our individual will from overruling the general will. Organizational members who embrace moral worldviews are “virtuous supporters of the general will” in organizational life. A general will is socially acceptable and strengthened if it fosters justice and equality in the workplace. Dasein’s call for a virtuous life can never be separated from such a general will. From a Rousseauist perspective, a general will orients the way organizational realities should be perceived and interpreted/re-interpreted. Organizational members who are “in-quest-­ for-organizational-wisdom” embrace a general will that universalizes equality and justice. In every group, organization and social institution, equality and justice are considered the true foundations of society. Equality and justice in the organizational setting make the “ontic neighbourhood” possible. It is not always easy to put equality and justice into practice, regardless of circumstances. Various social, cultural, political and religious/spiritual obstacles can be encountered in daily life. In moral worldviews, equality and justice are transcendental virtues. They are “meta-norms” of human behaviour since they mirror the essence of humankind. The commonality of the existential predicament opens the door to a feeling of “ontic neighbourhood.” The “ontic neighbourhood” allows everyone to search for the best ways to actualize equality and justice in the workplace. “Living-in-an-organization” involves taking our “ontic neighbourhood” into account. It is acknowledging a general will that strengthens the universalization of equality and justice. Organizational members’ interpretation/re-interpretation of organizational ethics can contribute to institutionalize equality and justice for all stakeholders. In so doing, organizational members are responding to Dasein’s call for the virtuous life. 3.3.2.3  Common Interest, Interdependence, and Duties At any moment of our lives, we need each other. Our minds and hearts are open to others because of social interdependence. Seeing the social order means observing the place and function of societal components. Grasping the “Whole” entails embracing various specific viewpoints, while acknowledging given components of the Whole. Human beings are integral parts of the Whole, although they do not feel part of the Whole. The good is ordered for the benefit of the Whole, argued Rousseau (1966a, 249, 287, 324, 354, 380). The common good is shared by various specific wills. Its meaning and scope of application are conveyed by social relationships. Social bonds are the foundations of every society (Rousseau 1966, 63). Everyone favours his/her self-interest. Rousseau claimed that, unfortunately, nobody is deeply

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concerned with the common good (for instance, ownership rights, which are conventionally based), except when the common good and self-interest converge (1966a, 376; 1971a, 225; 1988, 210; please see: Neuhouser 2013, 214). Others’ freedom does not follow from social conventions. Rather, it mirrors the natural equality of human beings (Rousseau 1971a, 225). Most of the time, individual interests are conflicting with one another (Rousseau 1988, 210). A moral worldview emphasizes the natural equality of human beings. It takes the ontic need to actualize common good into account. The most powerful individuals are those who can transform their physical, moral, and even spiritual power into laws. They are not concerned with blind obedience. Rather, they continuously try to fulfill their moral duties. Conventions and laws are required to make rights and duties interdependent. They usually define the true object of social justice. Social justice entails rights and duties reflecting the basic equality of human beings. Laws represent the way the general will is put into practice. Every law should identify the basic conditions of a harmonious and peaceful social life. However, all citizens are not readily aware of the advantages of such laws, when compared with their disadvantages. Laws can reduce their freedom and control over their own goods (Rousseau 1966, 44, 74–75, 79). The moral justification of laws remains their authentic expression of the general will (Rousseau 1966, 129, 135, 168). Fulfilling our moral duties requires as much power and self-control as heroic deeds (Rousseau 1963, 149). It is a pleasant experience, insofar as the practice of virtues has become a year-round habit (Rousseau 1967, 107). The true source of heroism is the powerful and attractive character of laws and moral norms (Rousseau 1971, 108). This is the essence of a moral worldview. Being “in-quest-for-organizational-wisdom” means accepting our own moral duties. In a moral worldview, wisdom requires moral duties. The object of our moral duties can vary from one group to another, from one organization to another, and even from one society to another. It can focus on objects and the rights of ownership, on our interpersonal and social relationships, on the protection of public health/the environment, and so forth. The interpretation of our moral duties arises from the prism of legal systems, while being subjected to various conditioning factors. Responding to Dasein’s call for the virtuous life entails demonstrating “ontic decisiveness.” Carrying on with our moral duties is an excellent way to exercise our “ontic decisiveness”, when responding to Dasein’s call for the virtuous life. Organizational members interpret/re-interpret their moral duties towards the organization, while being focused on the common interest and the transcendental virtues of equality and justice. Organizational members who embrace moral worldviews are “virtuous guardians of the common interest” in organizational life. The common interest needs the practice of equality/justice in organizational life. Otherwise, the common interest would become a disguised self-interest. Practicing equality and justice in the workplace allows organizational members to focus on the common interest. However, the nature and substance of any common interest can give birth to various interpretations/re-interpretations. Searching for the common interest means deepening our ontic “quest-for-organizational-wisdom.” It involves exploring the best ways to bolster our “ontic neighbourhood” throughout organizational

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life. Searching for the common interest entails relativizing our self-interest and being open to others’ interests and needs. Being “in-­ quest-­ for-­ organizational-­ wisdom” means participating in an organizational dialogue about the common interest. It expresses organizationally based “ontic decisiveness”, while acknowledging our “ontic neighbourhood” in our organizational life.

3.4  Summary A moral worldview presupposes that moral education is a prerequisite for any deep social, economic, political, and cultural change. Moral education could have two basic kinds of impact. On one hand, moral education can allow individuals to change their habits/customs, to discard their disturbing emotions/attitudes, and to develop positive emotions/attitudes. On the other hand, moral education can contribute to institutionalize the natural equality of all human beings. It can strengthen social, economic, political, and cultural institutions which are continuously implementing better collective justice. This is what a moral worldview could achieve if it permeates the means and ends of moral education. In organizational life, moral education processes foster the internalization of moral worldviews and endorse the existence of Truth-itself. The way organizational members participate in moral education processes shows their ontic response to Dasein’s call for morality, interpretation, self-­ identity, and the virtuous life. Organizational members then experience the “ontic neighbourhood” through their own “in-the-worldliness.” They exercise their “ontic decisiveness, when assuming the pre-philosophical challenge of ontic quests. Any ontic quest is chosen through our “Becoming-oneself”, as the appropriate response to a given Dasein’s call. This is particularly true for the way justice and equality are put into practice. Organizational members assume their moral duties through their response to Dasein’s call for the virtuous life. A Rousseauist interpretation of moral worldviews would put the emphasis on the various challenges of moral education and development. It is rooted in the existence of Truth-itself. Controlling our passions and desires is then the ontic path to self-­ transcendence, while strengthening personal morality. It requires the development of wisdom/prudence and the acknowledgment of universal equality (between all human beings). A moral worldview based on Rousseau’s philosophy would enhance the sense of humanity, the practice of virtues, and the constant compliance with one’s moral duties. It unveils moral normativity as the linchpin of any ontic path to truth. A relative importance is attributed to the ethical aim.

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Chapter 4

Technology and Instrumental Reason: Developing an Anti-technocratic Concern, or Moving from a Moral Worldview to a Post-moral Worldview

4.1  Introduction The shift from moral worldviews to post-moral worldviews requires a growing anti-­ technocratic concern. Technocracy has raised the intensity and complexity of bureaucracy at the highest level, while strengthening the power of natural sciences and technologies over human and social sciences. Technocracy can have both positive and detrimental effects on society, the national economy, the State, and the environment. From an economic perspective, technocrats can unintentionally reduce the scope of entrepreneurship. In so doing, technocracy could adversely affect a country’s economic growth. However, technocrats could also encourage the deployment of an innovative spirit at all levels of society. From a societal viewpoint, technocracy could neglect social relationships, as though only scientific and technological tools could give birth to true social bonds. It could even reinforce our psychological and social dependence on scientific/technological tools. However, technocracy could make people more aware of their responsibilities, when using scientific/technological means. From a political viewpoint, technocracy could endanger the status of democratic institutions, in fostering the invasiveness of scientific/technological tools throughout political life. It could open the way to computer crimes on a national and international scale. But we must also acknowledge that technocracy could eventually favour participatory democracy. From an environmental perspective, technocracy could justify the human destruction of specific ecosystems. It could also contribute to safeguarding ecosystems, but only for (human) instrumental motives (anthropocentrism). A post-moral worldview concludes that the detrimental effects of technocracy have much more devastating consequences than the positive effects on society, the economy, the State, and the environment. Technocracy is blindly focused on the purity of scientific/technological means. It then opens the way to ideological thought. A post-moral worldview criticizes any technocratic attempt to deny human finitude and to strengthen human idolatry. Technocracy encourages a static view of subject/object dualism without taking intersubjectivity © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 M. Dion, Worldviews, Ethics and Organizational Life, Ethical Economy 60, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-82355-9_4

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and communicational truth into account. Technocracy tries to avoid ontic uncertainties and doubts, as though such hermeneutic traps could stop/slow down the pace of technological progress. Technocrats are not deeply concerned with ontological temporality and finitude. Consequently, they do not favour consciousness-raising activities/projects related to the ethical aim. Technocrats are unable to perceive temporality as presence and nowness. Post-moral worldviews strongly oppose the way technocracy deals with technology, intersubjectivity, participation in the world, and temporality. The “transcendent position” could break that deadlock, while dealing with the passion for the Infinite and the presence of the Mystery. The works of Soeren Kierkegaard allow us to further explore the meaning of subjective thought and intersubjectivity. The presence of mysteries in human existence can be meaningful. Even the infinite passion for the Infinite can be experienced in our daily life. The works of Martin Heidegger could allow us to better understand how the interconnectedness of temporality and being sheds light on the ontic challenges of the “transcendent position.”

4.2  T  he Primary Way the Basis of a Moral Worldview Is Shaken Moral worldviews may strongly criticize human practices, beliefs, values, and rituals. They could even strengthen the idolatry of technological tools and their makers/ users since they focus on human “in-the-worldliness.” Moral worldviews take for granted that the gap between human temporality and divine eternity can never be closed. The relation between finite beings and the Infinite remains quite relevant. However, the idea of the Infinite does not create dualisms. Temporality and eternity, as well as subject and object, are related in a dualistic way. The interconnectedness of subject and object could have important effects on the idea of the Infinite since the Infinite is the basis of the existentially based “subject/object structure.” The subject/object structure cannot be rooted in existentially finite beings. If that were the case, then our relationship with others would never open the door to radical otherness. The distinction between subject and object would remain ungraspable. The infinite strangeness between an “I” and a “Thou” would be impossible. Experiencing the Infinite in our existence is making us open to radical otherness. However, moral worldviews do not deal with the interconnectedness of the presence of the Infinite and the openness to radical otherness. In “techno-centred” worldviews, science and technology fully occupy the possible field of ontic reflection. Post-moral worldviews denounce the absence of ontic reflection in techno-centred worldviews. Moreover, technology could become a way to distort the subject/object structure, in objectifying human beings, as though persons could be reduced to daily users of technological means. Technology could even contribute to “subjectify” technological tools (for instance artificial intelligence). Moral worldviews do not accept all the consequences and risks of distortion arising from the

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interconnectedness of subject and object. The way we could move from a moral worldview to a post-moral worldview reveals an anti-totalizing attitude (Chap. 3), but also an anti-­technocratic concern. Technocracy is organizational bureaucracy that promotes self-subjection to technological tools. Consequently, when technology is distorted, the human being is dehumanized: he/she is estranged from his/her “essence.” A post-moral worldview denounces such a way of impoverishing human life. It rejects the objectification of the human person and the “subjectification” of technological means. The changeover from a moral worldview to a post-moral worldview is influenced by the development of an anti-technocratic concern. In organizational life, technocracy introduces a possibility for organizational members to endorse an impersonal self (or “anonymous self”). Such an “anonymous self” can be subjected to various organizational factors. At the very least, an “organizational-anonymous self” can be deployed in organizational life and culture. An “organizational-anonymous self” unveils organizational members’ absolute identification with their organization. Individual selves become the extension of organizational identity. The “organizational-­ anonymous self” is an organizationally based estrangement. Organizational members then lose part of their “Becoming-oneself.” Post-moral worldviews refer to a more radical mode of “Becoming-oneself.” They focus on organizational members’ choice of possibilities-to-be. Organizational history makes a collective (organizational) “having-been-present” arise in daily life. Above all, post-moral worldviews emphasize the “organizational-here-and-now” as a means to overcome “organizational everydayness.” In organizational life, organizational members’ “Being-with-Others” makes the “organizational-inter-presence” possible. Their “in-the-worldliness” allows them to experience “organizational temporality.”

4.2.1  The Subjective Thinker Moral worldviews can justify the objective quest for Truth-itself. They can enhance the “inquiring subject.” In contrast, post-moral worldviews emphasize the subjective quest for truth and are open to a multiplicity of truth-claims. They strengthen the various lived experiences of the “subjective thinker” since the subjective thinker is ultimately concerned with his/her own existence. Kierkegaard (1974, 23, 118) described the way the “inquiring subject” looks at truth and faith. The inquiring subject focuses on objective truth but rejects any subjective truth. Kierkegaard’s subjective truth is “the truth of appropriation and assimilation.” Appropriating and assimilating knowledge are basic expressions of subjectivity. The inquiring subject is never deeply concerned with such manifestations of subjectivity. He/she is only concerned with objective truths. His/her existential concern for objective truths can never give rise to any infinite passion for truth since passion is subjectively oriented. An infinite passion is ultimately subjective. The inquiring subject is not infinitely concerned with his/her relationship to truth. Kierkegaard suggested that the

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inquiring subject could adopt either an attitude of faith (believing in the truth of Christianity) or an attitude of contemplation (without any subjective concern for his/her own faith). In both cases, the inquiring subject does not emphasize the appropriating/assimilating processes of truth since he/she is not a subjective thinker. The inquiring subject could believe in the truth of intensely concerned Christianity, but he/she is never infinitely concerned with the Infinite/God. Ontic truth is subjectivity. It implies relationships with God (Jacoby 2002, 30, 37). The inquiring subject instead looks at the truth of Christianity from a purely objective perspective, as though Christian truths were never subjectively appropriated and assimilated. The inquiring subject focuses on the historical data of Christianity, as if he/she deals with objective facts. He/she is unable to subjectively grasp, analyze, and criticize the “pseudo-objective” substance of Christianity (Kierkegaard 1974, 25, 28, 31). The inquiring subject is unaware that historical data are pure approximations. Any objective approach to historical data could only give rise to approximation since the human being is a “being-who-interprets-reality.” We can never objectively analyze a given event/phenomenon, since we cannot access the entire picture. At every moment of our life, we perceive and analyze beings, things, events, and phenomena, from a specific perspective. The human mind is unable to gather all possible perspectives together. Any historical data can only be drawn from a specific viewpoint that excludes other possible viewpoints. Historical data provide uncertainties. So, if the inquiring subject is passionate about the historical origin of Christianity, then he/she must acknowledge that such a historical origin is unattainable. Any theological, sociological, and even political discourse about the origin of Christianity, such as the words and deeds of the historical Jesus, is composed of historical approximations. Historical data can never be the real basis for one’s faith in eternal happiness since faith is an infinite passion for the Infinite. Passion for the Infinite characterizes the subjective thinker. It is never experienced by the inquiring subject. Faith is subjective. It has nothing to do with objective/historical data. Kierkegaard explained that the inquiring subject renounces his/her passionate interest, since he/ she is exclusively concerned with objectivity. Being focused on objective data requires devaluing subjectivity, as though passions, emotions and sentiments constitute lower parts of the human personality. When passion disappears, faith loses its ultimate foundation. Faith is an infinite passion for the Infinite. It has nothing to do with any intense concern for objective data. Historical approximations can never be the basis of faith in eternal happiness. If this were the case, then faith would entail an attitude of pure objectivity. But objective approximations cannot be reliable foundations for an objective faith since they are undeniably approximations. An objective faith is not faith at all. Kierkegaard (1974, 32) considered that an objective faith is a self-contradictory notion. That is why he called it “comical.” The inquiring subject cannot be infinitely concerned with historical approximations, when searching for eternal happiness as the “highest good of the infinite” (absolute telos). Kierkegaard unveiled the inner contradiction in the pseudo-objective faith of the inquiring subject. Searching for eternal happiness cannot be grounded in historical approximations. Rather, it is a basic subjective dimension of faith. Searching for eternal happiness means being infinitely passionate about the Infinite. We cannot

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objectively search for something that is an historical approximation. We cannot even be intensely concerned with historical approximations that are related to any ontic belief in eternal happiness. This can only be an issue of subjective passion for the Infinite. Any historical data, event or phenomenon is uncertain. The only ontic certainty we have is our own existence (Kierkegaard 1974, 84, 116). Existence is the act of existing, said Kierkegaard (1974, 75). In that sense, only the human being exists. However, individuals could forget they are existing. This is a “comic” situation, that is, a self-contradictory positioning of our existence. Individuals could even focus on their own existence. Speculative philosophy could search for the general meaning of human existence. Nonetheless, this confuses one’s being with humankind. Subjective thinkers are ultimately concerned with their own individual existence. In the ethical life, the subjective thinker is aware of his/her own existence. He/she can never forget it (Kierkegaard 1974, 109–111, 113, 271). The ethical life of the subjective thinker eventually opens the way to the religious life. The inquiring subject is so focused on objectivity that he/she loses his/her infinite passion for eternal happiness. An ultimate concern can never arise from an objective and even contemplative reflection. The inquiring subject does not feel that he/she avoids an ultimately important decision. He/she remains in the absence of infinite decisiveness. Ontic decisiveness remains quite relative (Kierkegaard 1974, 199). As subjective truth, inwardness implies a paradoxical relationship to one’s identity and to others’ selves. On one hand, the subjective thinker “thinks the universal.” He/she exists only when he/she thinks the universal. On the other hand, the subjective thinker is subjectively isolated from others. He/she is subjectively involved in relationships, events, and phenomena. Passion is the highest stage of inwardness. It is the highest mode of subjectivity, at least for an existing subject (Kierkegaard 1974, 68, 177–178, 181, 206). Truth is paradoxical since it is inherently related to an existing subject. The passion for the Infinite relates Truth to one’s existence. The subjective act of existing is the original locus of ontic truth. Inwardness “is” truth. Truth is supposed to be something beyond subjective existence. Truth should overcome objective uncertainties. But such Truth is not existentially grounded. Objective uncertainties are fundamental expressions of passionate inwardness. They constitute the most excellent manifestations of ontic truth. From an essentialist perspective, truth is not paradoxical. However, truth becomes paradoxical when intimately connected to an existing individual (Kierkegaard 1974, 177–178, 183). Being a “subjective thinker” involves opening up our “Becoming-oneself” to various possibilities of self-identity (or ontic “possibilities-to-be”). In post-moral worldviews, there is no Truth-itself. Organizational members can progressively abandon moral worldviews for post-moral worldviews. In doing so, they follow the road of “free self-transcendence.” Our ontic freedom becomes the basis of our “Becoming-oneself.” Organizational members then express their “self-centered stewardship of self-identity.” The “organizational-anonymous self” tries to absorb organizational members’ “Becoming-oneself”, as though organizational identity were identical to organizational members’ self-identity. Organizational members must take care of their “Becoming-oneself.” Otherwise, they will be unable to freely

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choose their ownmost possibilities-to-be. Caring for our “Becoming-oneself” entails safeguarding our ontic freedom. The “ontic caring” for our “Becoming-­ oneself” allows for the true existence of the subjective thinker. Without “ontic caring, Dasein’s calls would never make ontic quests possible. In organizational life, every organizational member tries to raise the level of his/her self-realization. In doing so, he/she accomplishes his/her “Becoming-oneself.” His/her self-identity should never be totally subjected to the substance of organizational identity. The substance of organizational identity refers either to conscious/unconscious processes of self-identity (“internally-driven substance”) or to predictable/unpredictable consequences of organizational life (“externally-driven substance”). Every organizational member should take care of his/her “Becoming-oneself.” His/her “ontic caring” reflects his/her mode of existing. Being a subjective thinker signifies unveiling an “ontic caring” for our “Becoming-oneself.” “Living-in-an-organization” entails assuming our “ontic caring”, when choosing our possibilities-to-be. Our possibilities-to-be differ at every moment of our life. They can be deeply influenced by our historical, social, cultural, political, economic, and even religious/spiritual situation. We have “possibilities-to-be-in-an-organization”, since we “live-in-an-­ organization.” In organizational life, our “ontic caring” is based on our freedom to choose our “possibilities-to-be-in-an-organization.” The main object of organizational members’ philosophical questioning is the concrete realm of “possibilities-­ to-­be-in-an-organization.” Moral worldviews take the existence of Truth-itself for granted. Dasein’s calls unveil ontic quests since there is Truth-itself. Post-moral worldviews, in contrast, focus on multiple and relative truth-claims. They emphasize the ontic need for constant self-transcendence and self-realization. “Possibilities-­ to-­ be-in-an-organization” can always be criticized, while unveiling an anti-technocratic concern.

4.2.2  The Human Situation, Freedom, and Indetermination The human being is historically “in-situation.” “Being-in-situation” means being subjected to various conditioning factors and determinisms. The historical and “bodily felt” existence is actualized in various ontic realms, such as the family, group, organizational, institutional, and societal life. For any organizational member, this philosophical question is implicitly posed: If “I-am-a-body-in-thishistorical-situation”, then how could I identify myself with any organization? Organizational identity processes aim at aligning the personal/social identity of organizational members with the organizational identity. But how could a “personalized-­body-in-a-given-historical-situation” be aligned with an impersonal entity (organization), without opening the door to depersonalization? Depersonalization is an absolute identification with the “organizational-anonymous self.” Organizational identification processes use individual thoughts, emotions, attitudes, and behaviors to construct a specific social identification. Any specific social identification is closely related to the organizational life and culture (Ashforth

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and Mael 1989, 22; and Vijayakumar and Padma 2014, 51) and to the perceived organizational distinctiveness/prestige (Mael and Ashforth 1992). Our social identity could be drawn from our work group and department (in the workplace), our community group (volunteering), our political membership (political activities), or even the religious/spiritual group we belong to (religious/spiritual practices). The greatest hermeneutic challenge is to grasp the mix of social identity and organizational identity, without exerting any excessive ideological pressure on organizational members’ “Becoming-oneself.” The way organizational identification processes evolve shows the importance of organizational members’ self-awareness. Knowing who-we-are allows organizational members to identify themselves with their organization. Knowing our “essence” is a prerequisite for participating in organizational identification processes. It also involves the interconnectedness of subject (being) and object (of thought), as well as of the infinite and the finite. Neglecting such interconnectedness would result in lower levels of organizational members’ self-understanding and, thus, in reduced capacity to align one’s self with the organizational identity. Organizational identification processes are intrinsically linked to the individual sense of self (Hogg and Terry 2000, 135). Being a “subjective thinker” means being historically rooted. A subjective thinker defines his/her “Becoming-oneself” in referring to his/her historical situation. Being “in-an-historical-situation” implies our “within-time-ness.” Every organizational member is “being-in-an-historical situation”, while being involved in his/ her “organizational-within-time-ness.” “Being historically-rooted” opens the door to various ways to be aware of one’s existence and self-identity. Our “Becoming-­ oneself” can be deployed through our family, group, organizational, institutional, and societal identity. “Living-in-an-organization” involves conveying a given “organizational-­self-identity.” Hopefully, organizational members do not totally endorse any “organizational-anonymous self.” Any authentic self requires a basic and continuous orientation towards our “Becoming-oneself.” In moral worldviews, the notion of an authentic self is related to the existence of Truth-itself. Being an authentic self then requires an ontic response to Dasein’s calls. In post-moral worldviews, an authentic self is oriented towards “Becoming-oneself.” In organizational life, organizational members resist any attempt to absorb our “Becoming-oneself” into an “organizational-anonymous self.” Organizational members then play the role of “historically-based stewards of Becoming-oneself.” “Ontic caring” for our “Becoming-oneself” is a prerequisite for understanding our own historical situation. Any historically based being searches for the “optimal” ways to unveil his/her “Becoming-oneself”, given the circumstances. Post-moral worldviews emphasize the ontic need to freely choose our possibilities-to-be. “Ontic caring” needs the historicality of “Becoming-oneself, that is, its ontic self-projection into the future. The subjective thinker is always centered on his/her “ontic caring.” In so doing, he/ she freely actualizes his/her “Becoming-oneself.” “Living-in-an-organization” is using our ontic freedom, when participating in our historically based organizational life. “Ontic caring” is taking care of our historically based situation. The object of organizational members’ philosophical questioning is the substance of our historically based organizational life, particularly its technocratic orientations. The

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substance of organizational life can refer either to conscious/unconscious processes of decision-making and behaviour (“internally-driven substance”) or to their predictable/unpredictable consequences (“externally-driven substance”).

4.2.3  The Interconnectedness of Subject and Object Existing entails living among unavoidable uncertainties. Existing means being thrown into an ontic “dis-quiet.” We can never overcome our ontic disquiet since uncertainties constitute an integral part of our existence. We can never “live-in” a quiet state of mind/heart. Whoever takes a moral worldview upon himself/herself knows that he/she constantly “lives-in” an ontic disquiet. His/her moral worldview is not tranquillizing his/her existence. Those who embrace moral worldviews must respond to ontic uncertainties and doubts. Ontic disquiet expresses the strangeness of our own essence, as it is revealed by innumerable uncertainties and doubts. We are strangers to ourselves, because of ontic uncertainties and doubts about our self, our world, and even our own existence. Being in an ontic disquiet is “living-in” the existential uncertainty about the interconnectedness of subject and object. Are there possibilities of distorting such interconnectedness? Can we know how the interconnectedness of subject and object reveals the whole structure of our existence? Heidegger believed that such existential unveiling can be understood through Dasein’s disclosedness. The “essence” of human existence is Dasein’s disclosedness that allows any relation to entities (Heidegger 1980b, 158, 163, 175). The interconnectedness of subject and object is particularly involved in the interaction between human beings and technological tools. An idolatrous relation to technological tools could diminish our own subjectivity. When technology is considered the “supreme form of rational consciousness, then meditation becomes impossible”, argued Heidegger. The absence of meditation could show the individual inability to focus on what merits attention and questioning. Heidegger (1980a, 100) believed in the interconnectedness of the absolutization of technology and the absence of meditation. Hyper-rationalization could be provoked by the idolatrous view on technological tools. Any idolization of technological tools reduces our capacity to meditate. It adversely affects our capacity to call our practices, values, and deeds into question. Paradoxically, hyper-rationalization does not allow totalization. Rather, it opens the door to nothingness. Hyper-rationalization makes us more aware of our ontic nothingness. The idea of “being-guilty” conveys a “not.” Ordinary significations of guilt reveal that something is lacking: something is “not-­ Being-­present-at-hand.” But Heidegger clearly said that the signification of the “nullity” is not related to any “not-Being-present-at-hand.” Rather, nullity mirrors the thrownness of Dasein’s Being. Being-guilty lacks moral significance, since morality presupposes the primordiality of Being-guilty (Heidegger 1962, 328–332). Heidegger (1962, 211) explained that any ontological interpretation of Dasein cannot be reduced to a “moralizing critique of everyday Dasein.” Nothingness expresses the “nullity by which Dasein, at its very basis, is defined; and this basis itself is a

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thrownness into death” (Heidegger 1962, 356). Existential anxiety reveals our ontic nothingness. Concretely speaking, our self and world are not “nothing.” Our “self-­ in-­a-world” is concrete since it is intrinsically linked to our corporeal existence. Our ontic experience of nothingness makes self-evident that nothingness is nothing at all. But we could imagine voidness within our self and our world. The imagined nothingness and the “real” nothingness are not substantially different. They are both expressions of voidness. Their voidness is identical (Heidegger 2006b, 55, 59). Only things could be described since they have thingness. The notion of the Heideggerian “no-thingness” is indescribable. “Being-in-the-world” is the true object of existential anxiety: “Anxiety throws Dasein back upon that which it is anxious about—its authentic potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world” (Heidegger 1962, 232). Our ontic nothingness is expressed in two different and complementary ways. On one hand, our existential anxiety has no object at all. Rather, it mirrors the possibility to choose authentic/inauthentic possibilities-to-be. We are existentially anxious about our authentic/inauthentic possibilities to “be-in-the-world.” Our existential anxiety deals with ontic decisiveness about authenticity/inauthenticity, that is, our capacity to acknowledge our existential finitude. On the other hand, the thrownness of our “Being-in-the-world” implies that we are not “at-home” in our existence (Heidegger 1962, 231, 321). Our ontic nothingness is grounded in existential anxiety and thrownness. The interconnectedness of subject and object does not necessarily justify totalizing systems and philosophies. Totalizing realities means identifying subject with object. Being is then identified with thought. However, such an identity between being and thought is a useless abstraction. Moreover, it distorts the existence of knowers as existing individuals. The inquiring subject could make being and thought identical. In so doing, he/she excludes the possibility that essential knowledge could be related to his/her own existence (Kierkegaard 1974, 176–177, 183). Unlike subjective thought and truth, objective thought and truth are not concerned with the existing subject. Objective thought focuses on abstract participation in-the-world and on the abstract knowledge of the interconnectedness of thought (object) and being (subject). Unlike the inquiring subject, the subjective thinker is totally engaged in his/her act of existing (Kierkegaard 1974, 112, 172). From the perspective of the subjective thinker, the act of existing mirrors an infinite passion for one’s existence. The inquiring subject is overwhelmed by abstract thought. He/she is not concerned with concrete beings, events, or phenomena. The inquiring subject is not passionate about ontic and subjective processes. Abstract thought does not consider the existing being as “a synthesis of the temporal and the eternal situated in existence” (Kierkegaard 1974, 267). Abstract thought cannot deal with contradictions. It eliminates contradictions. Contradictions are basic obstacles for the objective thought of any inquiring subject. If objective truth can be reached by the human mind, then it cannot be disturbed by contradictions. Contradictions are not objectively manageable. Contradictory assertions are inconsistent. Nothing objectively true can arise from contradictory assertions. Objective thought is unable to deal with contradictions in one’s mind/heart. Sometimes, contradictions can be solved. In other situations, contradictions cannot be satisfactorily solved. In such situations,

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objective thought eliminates contradictions since it cannot cope with them. Objective thought then considers that any contradiction is an unreal inconsistency. Abstract thinkers extinguish the infinite concern for one’s act of existing. Eliminating the ontic and infinite concern for our existence signifies “ceasing to be a human being”, because the human being is “a synthesis of the finite and the infinite”. The human being is the synthesis of temporal/finite possibilities and Eternal/ Infinite necessity. Freedom makes the interconnectedness of the finite/temporal and the Infinite/Eternal possible (Kierkegaard 1968, 146, 162; 1974, 268). “Being-free” means having possibilities-to-be in our finite/temporal existence. The subjective thinker is infinitely passionate about his/her existence. He/she is infinitely passionate about his/her ontic choice of given possibilities-to-be. Moreover, the subjective thinker is also oriented toward the Infinite/Eternal. Becoming aware of the synthesis of the finite/temporal and the Infinite/Eternal entails being a concrete individual who is temporally connected with the Infinite/Eternal. Becoming concrete implies a twofold inner movement: “(…) moving away from oneself infinitely by the process of infinitizing oneself and returning to oneself infinitely by the process of finitizing” (Kierkegaard 1968, 162–163). Being concrete is being imbued with our historicality (Kierkegaard 1992, 68). The inquiring subject is absolutely oriented towards objective thought. He/she is unable to become concrete. His/her lack of concreteness can make him/her fall into ontic despair. The human self is a synthesis of the finite and the Infinite, said Kierkegaard. Any human self is a synthesis of ontic freedom (chosen “possibilities-to-be”) and absolute necessity (the Eternal). Ontic despair could be caused either by a lack of possibilities-to-be or a lack of absolute necessity (Kierkegaard 1968, 163, 168, 171). Existing means being thrown into the possibility of despair. Existing means “potentially-being-in-despair.” “Being-in-despair” is an ontic possibility-to-be. Being concrete makes us avoid the possibility of despair. But the concreteness of our existing is not something that is already given, as though it were an “essence.” Rather, our ontic concreteness must be continuously achieved. Choosing the Eternal/Infinite (or Absolute) means positioning our existing being. It allows us to be infinitely concrete. Conquering our concreteness means constantly fighting against ontic despair. Despair requires the full awareness of our existential (inevitable) finitude. Assuming the ontic potentiality-­for-­despair entails reaching the absoluteness of our existing being (Kierkegaard 1992, 515–524). Being aware of our ontic potentiality-for-despair makes us infinitely concerned with our existence (Kierkegaard 1968, 175, 179, 211). Being a subjective thinker involves knowing the interconnectedness of subject and object. Any subjective thinker attempts to better understand such interconnectedness. The existentially based subject/object structure is continuously featuring our existential finitude. “Being-with-Others” is being-in-relation with others. Others are subjects, since any Other is an “I” to himself/herself. Objectifying Others involves subjecting them to ontic estrangement. In organizational life, organizational members can be “self-centered stewards of self-identity.” In so doing, they reduce the opportunities of ontic estrangement, since they constantly acknowledge others’ inevitable subjectivity. The “organizational-anonymous self” is a continuous threat against our “Becoming-oneself.” It also denies the interconnectedness of our

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“Becoming-oneself” and our “Being-with-Others.” “Ontic caring” is the best way to fight all forms of ontic estrangement. It continuously strengthens our “Becoming-­ oneself” and encourages our ontic quest for self-identity. Searching for our self-­ identity is an integral part of “living-in-an-organization.” We can never “live-in-an-organization” without being connected to our “Becoming-oneself.” But we must avoid the pitfall of an absolute identification with our organization. We must exclude any temptation for an “organizational-anonymous self.” Post-moral worldviews acknowledge the possibility of falling into a more radical pitfall: ontic despair. Being a subjective thinker involves being aware of “ontic potentialities for despair.” We cannot search for our “Becoming-oneself” without acknowledging the “possible nullification of our possibilities-to-be.” Ontic despair claims that our possibilities-­to-be are nullified. Our “Becoming-oneself” then comes to a dead end. The ontic nullification of our possibilities-to-be does not mean that our possibilities-­ to-­be suddenly disappear, once and for all. Instead, the ontic nullification of our possibilities-to-be is a true possibility-to-be. Ontic despair is not the end of our possibilities-to-be. It is rather a specific possibility-to-be that implies the loss of other possibilities-to-be. Ontic despair reveals the emphasis on its own possibility-­ to-­be that excludes any other possibility-to-be. The nullification of other possibilities-­ to-­be contradicts the way we experience ontic despair. Being subjected to ontic despair means being aware of the very last possibility-to-be. It does not presuppose the absence of any possibility-to-be. “Being-in-despair” is choosing the ontic possibility-­to-be “without-any-other-possibility-to-be.” In organizational life, ontic despair is a possibility-to-be for any organizational member. Indeed, the ontic search for self-identity can never exclude the possibility of ontic despair, since ontic despair is a possibility-to-be that must never be neglected. Existing signifies having the “possibility-to-be-in-despair.”

4.2.4  Technology, Idolatry, and Human Destruction Weapons of mass destruction and widespread pollution everywhere in the world are potential tools for destroying humankind, if not the biosphere. This is not an impossibility. It is concretely possible. The subjective thinker believes that his/her existence is the “end-in-itself.” Believers can strongly affirm that faith is the infinite passion for the Infinite. In doing so, they presuppose that faith is an “end-in-itself.” Then, believers must explain how faith is interconnected with the infinite passion for one’s existence. Self-identification processes are often related to technological tools, such as computers. The subjective thinker criticizes any technologically driven self-identity. This is particularly the case when technology has replaced the human being as the spatial locus of the end-in-itself. Technology has been “subjectified”, and the human being has become objectified. Defining technology as an end-­ in-­itself dehumanizes our world and adversely affects our transcendental dignity. The human being loses his/her constitutive subjectivity. Technological tools are crucial for business competitiveness and constitute an integral part of business strategy

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(West 2001; Halal 2015). But in organizational life, such a purpose must never make dehumanizing processes philosophically necessary. The transcendental character of human dignity should never be destroyed, by any means. Being a “subjective thinker” entails being historically rooted. In moral worldviews, Dasein’s call for self-identity expresses the quest for our “Becomingoneself.” However, our group, organizational, institutional, and societal life unveils technocratic attitudes and idolatrous self-manifestations of our “Becoming-oneself”, as though technological means radically influence self-­ identity processes. Technological tools strengthen technologically based bureaucracy. Technocracy implies an idolatrous attitude towards technologically oriented bureaucrats, as well as towards technological tools. Technologically oriented bureaucrats manage the way technological tools must be used and justified. “Being-­idolatrous” signifies raising finite realities to the rank of the infinite. It is denying existential finitude. Technologically oriented bureaucrats and technological tools can be idolized. Idolizing is infinitizing a finite reality. Any idolization is a mode of infinitization. The main purpose of idolization can be the “infinitization” of human beings, or the infinitization of human creations. “Being-idolatrous” involves distorting the nature and substance of our “Becoming-oneself.” Post-moral worldviews are deeply sensitive to such ontic distortion of our “Becoming-oneself.” They emphasize the ontic need for possibilities-to-be. “Being-idolatrous” is a basic obstacle to self-­ transcendence. Self-transcendence requires the acknowledgment of our existential finitude. Any changeover from our “Becoming-oneself” to our “Being-­idolatrous” constitutes a strong obstacle to self-transcendence. In organizational life, organizational members should never fall into the pitfall of idolatry. Idolatry can take two forms: the infinitization of creators/users of technological tools and the infinitization of technologically oriented bureaucrats. In both cases, idolatry is a self-­ destructive attitude towards our “Becoming-oneself.” Post-moral worldviews allow organizational members to be “anti-technocratic stewards of self-identity.” “Ontic caring” needs an anti-technocratic attitude. It fights any attempt to reify our “Becoming-oneself.” Any reification of our “Becoming-oneself” transforms it into “Being-idolatrous” in our daily life. “Living-in-an-organization” involves fighting any reification of one’s “Becoming-oneself.” Enhancing our “Becoming-oneself” is the best way to avoid the arising of “Being-idolatrous.” Organizational life is full of “possibilities-to-be-idolatrous.” “Being-idolatrous” means that one’s possibilities-­ to-­be, from now on, are decisively idolatrous. Organizational members should criticize their own “possibilities-to-be-in-an-organization.” Otherwise, they might let an idolatrous mindset influence their way of thinking, speaking, feeling, and behaving. People who embrace post-moral worldviews are deeply aware of such pre-­ philosophical challenges. “Possibilities-to-be-in-an-organization” can be either authentic (acknowledging one’s existential finitude) or inauthentic (falling into idolatry).

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4.3  How the Basis of the Post-moral Worldview Is Evolving When the foundations of moral worldviews are deeply shaken, then post-moral worldviews evolve. They can acquire increasing credibility. Thus, we consider that technology is implicitly connected to human inwardness. The notion of communicational truth goes hand in hand with intersubjectivity. Temporality becomes focused on presence. The way we participate “in-the-world” takes all ontic uncertainties and doubts into account.

4.3.1  H  uman “In-the-Worldliness” and the Temporality of Presence The past is “what-is-no-longer-present”, while the future is “what-­ is-­ still-­ not-­ present”. The past and the future can only “be” in the present, said Augustine. Whowe-­are could still be influenced by who-we-were. Who-we-are is the basic source of who-we-will-be. Who-we-will-be is rooted in “who-we-would-like-to-be” (our “Becoming-oneself”). The future is both projected and expected. Who-we-are (the presentness of our present) is the pivotal point between who-we-were (the pastness of our present) and who-we-will-be (the futureness of our present). Who-we-were could still influence who-we-are. It is then our “having-been” that is present in our here-and now (or our “having-been-present”). Who-we-are could also be permeated with our self-projection into the future. It is our “having-not-already-become.” The past is created by the flow of successive instants. This is the first dimension of the pastness of the present (the dying process of the present instant). Times runs after “not-being”. Reminiscences from past events belong to our memory. They could still influence our present situation. The present actualizes itself, while continuously rebuilding some past events, encounters, and phenomena. The present “presentifies” itself through reminiscences. This is the second dimension of the pastness of the present (the efficiency of the past in the present). So, the past is both the flow of successive instants and the living reminiscences in the present moment. The past is intrinsically linked to reminiscences of past events and phenomena. Without any successive instants, the past would not exist at all. The present moment is becoming a past instant, while the future is the next successive moment. The present is the temporal locus of “arisingness.” Something is always arising in our personalized “here-and-now.” The presentness of the present is its effectiveness. Without the pastness of the present, there would be neither past nor future. The presentness of the present has two basic dimensions: the present moment is continuously dying, while simultaneously opening the way to the past and to the future. The presentness of the present is direct intuition, said Augustine. Without the presentness of the present, present and past would not exist. There would not even be a future. The futureness of the present also has two dimensions: it allows the present moment to become a past instant. The futureness of the present is also the temporal locus of

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self-­ projection into the future (anticipation). It is the present choice of given “possibilities-­ to-­ be-in-the-future.” Without the futureness of the present, there would be neither present nor future. Temporality is continuous becoming. Becoming is existentially based. Finite beings are condemned to an endless becoming. Existing is “being-in-becoming.” Existence is always on-going. Existing is being “in-time.” The human being is not “facing-the-world”. Rather, he/she is the world. We are historically existing. Our historical situation is the historical basis of our own existence. It is the incontrovertible limitation of our own being. The historicity of our being makes us progressively aware of our ontic freedom. We cannot totalize the historical situation of humankind without taking our historical situation into account. We can never grasp the entire picture of our historical situation. There is no way to generalize about the substance of the historical situation in given era. We cannot exclude ourselves from the whole picture. Totalizing the whole past and future is impossible since it would imply the absoluteness of the present. But the flow of time presupposes sequential infinitesimal units. The present is, thus, ungraspable. Nonetheless, the present is not nothingness. Rather, the present gives birth to the past and opens the way to the future. If the present were nothingness, then the past and the future would never be possible. We “are” possibilities-to-be which are connected to our past and future. The present makes past and future possible. The interconnectedness of our present possibilities-­ to-­be and who-we-were/who-we-will-be can allow us either to abstractly define Time itself or to concretely remind ourselves of who-we-were and concretely project “who-we-would-like-to-be.” The choice of given possibilities-to-be is made in the present. However, it could be influenced by our “having-been-present” and by our “having-not-already-become.” Choosing specific possibilities-to-be is referring to who-we-were (in our influential past) and to “who-we-would-like-to-be” (in our self-projection into the future). Existing means “being-in-presence”, that is, arising “in-presence.” Dasein is the ontological “essence” of human existence. Dasein is “Being-the-There” and “Being-­ in-­the-world” (Heidegger 1988, 296–297). Being is being-present (Heidegger 1962, 47). However, human “in-the-worldliness” cannot be compared to the way other sentient beings “are” in the world. Animals’ “in-the-worldliness” is inconceivable (Heidegger 1980b, 56). Heidegger was not concerned with theological and anthropological discussion about the principal differences between human beings and animals. Animals cannot question reality. Instead, they are dependent on it (Heidegger 2011, 199). Questioning reality is questioning the Being of entities. Only human beings can question existing realities, and eventually choose to leave some realities unquestioned. We do not question the essence of entities, but rather the Being of entities (Heidegger 2017, 74–85). Animals have and do not have a world: “the not-­ having of world is not merely a case of having less of world in comparison with man, but rather a case of not having at all – but this now in the sense of not-having, i.e., on the basis of a having” (Heidegger 1995, 270). Only the human being is present, that is, existing “in-the-world.” Only the human being “exists”, since existing is being aware of our own existence and of its various conditioning factors (Heidegger 2006b, 35). Only in human existence can Dasein deploy its “essence.” Only the

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human being “exists”. Dasein’s Being is being “in connection with all entities” (Heidegger 1979, 290). However, Dasein’s Being is not human (Heidegger 2006a, 214). Dasein in general is the foundation of “primitive phenomena, such as dependence on the world, anxiety, care, life and death”, said Hans Jonas (2017, 187). Such primitive phenomena are the substance of Dasein in general and are always present in every historical form of Dasein: “(…) ‘primitive phenomena’ are often less concealed and less complicated by extensive self-interpretation on the part of the Dasein in question. Primitive Dasein often speaks to us more directly in terms of a primordial absorption in ‘phenomena’ (in a pre-phenomenological sense)” (Heidegger 1962, 76). Primitive Dasein is related to the “life of primitive people.” It has its own kind of everydayness, said Heidegger (1962, 76). Dasein can take various historical forms. Thus, any moral worldview could hinder us favouring the full expansion of Dasein’s Being. A moral worldview is prone to stigmatize modes of Being, while imposing its moral concepts/dualisms very efficiently. A post-moral worldview does not accept such an ideological constraint on Dasein’s historicity. Post-moral worldviews presuppose that our “in-the-worldliness” is the basis for the temporality of presence. “Being-with-Others” is being “co-present” with others through our respective “in-the-worldliness.” Every co-presence is an “inter-­presence” of human beings. Such an inter-presence follows from our intersubjectivity. The temporality of presence allows the arising of “having-been-present.” Any “havingbeen-present” belongs to personal or collective reminiscences from the past. The collective forms of the “having-been-present” can be actualized in family, group, organizational, institutional, and societal life. The “organizational-having-­ beenpresent” mirrors the way organizational traditions and conventions can reveal the interconnectedness of collective history and organizational members’ “Becomingoneself.” Embracing a post-moral worldview involves an awareness of the interconnectedness of collective forms of “having-been-present” and our “Becoming-oneself.” Any “organizational-having-been-present” is intrinsically linked to organizational everydayness. Some reminiscences from the organizational past can still influence organizational decision-making processes and behaviour. This is the way a given “having-been-present” is experienced throughout one’s organizational life. Organizational members can experience various kinds of “organizational-­havingbeen-present.” But every “organizational-having-been-­present” is closely linked to organizational members’ “in-the-worldliness”, because any collective form of “having-been-present” expresses the way an individual participates in-the-world. Any participation in-the-world is historically based, because of the historicality of one’s “Becoming-oneself.” Organizational members who endorse a post-moral worldview safeguard their “having-been-present”, whether it concerns their personal, family, group, organizational, institutional, or societal life. Existing signifies having the possibility of innumerable “having-been-present” moments. “Being-in-the-here-andnow” means experiencing personal and collective forms of “having-been-present.” Organizational members cannot actualize their “Becoming-oneself” without the presence of the “organizational-having-been-­present.” The ontic presence of “organizational-having-been-present” allows organizational members to deepen their self-transcendence, while remaining historically rooted beings. Their

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“Being-with-Others” and “Becoming-oneself” converge, when their “organizational-within-time-ness” is translated into an “organizational-having-been-present.”

4.3.2  P  articipation in the World, Existential Anxiety, and Ontic Uncertainties Existing means being present “in-a-world.” Participating in “our” world involves participating in a specific world that we have appropriated and internalized. Such in-the-worldliness makes “us” existentially free. Our existentiality can never be objectified. Existentiality cannot be reduced to interpersonal relationships because it defines our innermost being. Existentiality overcomes ontic relationality. Participating in a world is both a structure of human existence (existentiality) and an ontic/relational experience (onticity). Our participation in the world makes our “self-in-a-world” possible. It also provokes our “anxiety to exist.” Ontic anxiety is the anxiety of our “death-to-come.” It characterizes the Kierkegaardian “subjective thinker.” Being infinitely concerned with our existence means experiencing ontic anxiety. The object of our anxiety is either the past or the future. Being existentially anxious entails being constantly concerned with our finite temporality (Kierkegaard 1992, 153). Our anxiety about death deals not only with death as “not-beingness” (“beinglessness”), but above all, with the psychological/symbolic death of the individual self. Whether ideologies are politically or religiously/spiritually based, they can unveil a “dying mindset.” Such ideologies provoke the symbolic death of the individual self. It is then psychologically tragic since fellow humans in such a predicament do not exist. Humankind has imploded. However, in organizational life, organizational controls and systems can make the intensity of ontic anxiety increase. This is especially the case when organizational morality (moral normativity) presupposes that basic distinctions between good and evil are self-evident. Managers can acknowledge that organizational life could give birth to good and evil. They can be reluctant to participate in “anxiety-intensifying-systems” (Voyer et al. 1997). Ontic anxiety influences how organizational members are ready to identify themselves with their organization. When organizational systems make the level of ontic anxiety overwhelm self-identity, then they reduce the propensity of organizational members to identify themselves with their organization. Organizational identity can be redefined, while excluding any undesirable effect of organizational life. However, sometimes it is too late. Organizational members could take some of their social, family, cultural, and even religious/spiritual experiences into account. But sometimes, the former organizational identity is either dying, or replaced by a new one (Bartel 2001, 404). Such a process of substitution does not always foster the unity of organizational culture and identity. Organizational identification processes are quite dynamic. They include both identification and “disidentification” processes with given dimensions of the organizational identity. Organizational members could

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be identified with specific dimensions of organizational identity, while being disidentified from other dimensions. Identification and “disidentification” can also be applied to the entire organizational identity, as it is perceived and understood by organizational members. Organizational identification processes could even give birth to indifference towards the organizational identity. Organizational members could adopt a neutral attitude towards organizational identity. They can reduce the intensity and scope of their organizational behaviour (Kreiner and Ashforth 2004, 4–5). Some organizational processes deal with the “ethical” organizational identity (Verbos et al. 2007, 21). Again, identification as well as “disidentification” can be observed, depending on the credibility of the ethical organizational reputation, corporate image, and ethics program. Identifying with or disidentifying from the organization is always a communicational action (Larson and Pepper 2003, 530). Post-moral worldviews could easily address the issue. Organizational identity does not necessarily bear morally stigmatized concepts and dualisms. Post-moral worldviews could increase the potential to empower organizational identity processes. In a post-moral worldview, participation in-the-world takes various forms. In organizational life, it implies the interconnectedness of organizational members’ “Becoming-oneself” and organizational identity. Defining our “organizational-self-­ identity” means avoiding the pitfall of “organizational-anonymous self.” Any absorption of our self-identity into an “organizational-anonymous self” can distort our “Becoming-oneself.” Organizational members’ “in-the-worldliness” safeguards their “Becoming-oneself” against any potential loss of self-identity (or “ontic absorption”). The “ontic neighbourhood” is found in organizational life. However, it does not imply any absorption of self-identity into collective forms of identity. Organizational members are the “interpretative guardians of “Becoming-oneself.” They fight any attempt to institutionalize an “organizational-anonymous self.” Our “being-who-interprets-reality” is ultimately concerned with our “ontic neighbourhood.” Every interpretation takes place in the here-and-now and through our “in-­ the-­worldliness.” Organizational members cannot be ultimately concerned with their interpretation of organizational realities. Their interpretation is a specific truth-­ claim. No truth-claim has absoluteness. Only absoluteness can make the ultimate concern arise. Organizational members who embrace post-moral worldviews relativize their own interpretation of organizational realities. In so doing, they reflect their basic openness to the “ontic neighbourhood.” In post-moral worldviews, the “ontic neighbourhood” needs the coexistence of relative truth-claims. The “ontic neighbourhood” can never be separated from our “in-the-worldliness.” It unveils the commonality of our existential predicament, especially our “anxiety-to-exist” and our “having-to-die.” Moreover, it makes us aware of our ontic uncertainties and doubts. Existing means being subjected to unavoidable uncertainties and doubts. The “ontic neighbourhood” deepens our awareness of such a common experience of existing. “Living-in-an-organization” signifies experiencing the “ontic neighbourhood.” “Living-in-an-organization” entails facing our existential finitude and, thus, our finite rationality and knowledge. “Living-in-an-organization” involves improving our awareness of ontic experiences, while being influenced by various

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organizational, institutional, and societal determinisms. Organizational members learn to be existentially free, when confronted with their ontic uncertainties and doubts.

4.3.3  Intersubjectivity and Communicational Truth Unlike moral worldviews, post-moral worldviews emphasize the way truth is communicated. Communicational activities are at the core of truth itself. Truth requires a basic and unconditional openness to dialogue. Communicating our own truth means accepting the possibility of being contradicted. Otherwise, this is not communicational truth. The communicability of truth is a constituent part of truth itself. Moral worldviews are concerned with the substance of truths. The substance of truths refers either to conscious/unconscious processes of our ontic “quest-for-­ Truth-itself” (“internally-driven substance”) or to its predictable/unpredictable consequences (“externally-driven substance”). Post-moral worldviews focus on the potentiality of truth-claims to be communicated. A moral worldview could meet the needs of abstract thinkers. But subjective thinkers need to take the communicability of truth into account. Truth is “communication-to-be.” Every self is intersubjective. Any self-identity is elaborated “in-front-of-otherness.” Existentially, we are “with-­ others.” Our search for truth must be communicational, that is, intersubjective. Every self is subjectivity and, thus, inwardness. In daily life, various selves are interrelated. We cannot become who-we-are without “Being-with-Others.” Truth can never be achieved in our ontic temporality. Communicational activities and processes are endless. From an existential viewpoint, we cannot reach any truth at all. Rather we are individually and collectively searching for truth. Being aware that truth is inherently communicational means being involved in “unconditional communication” with-others. Only communicated truths are ontic truths since every human being is a “being-in-quest-for-truth” and “Being-with-Others.” Human existence is based on communicational activities. Absolutized truths claim to be the only truths that should be universally and unconditionally acknowledged. Communicational truth is the sine qua non condition for inner freedom and peace. Nobody could claim that he/she holds ultimate truths. Communicational truth excludes all absolutized truths. There is no absolute truth (or “Truth-in-itself”). We never know the essence of truth. We even never understand why there are multiple truths. The essence of truth remains unknowable. Holding truth-claims should always coexist with the certainty of the unknowability of truth. Existing is being both in objectivity and in subjectivity. We are “in-a-world.” We only exist with-others since our own being is existentially related to others. Subjectivity is intersubjective. The subjective thinker lives with-others in his/her world. The notion of intersubjective communication is quite relevant for the organizational setting. Organizational identification processes imply the alignment of individual/social identity (self) with the organizational culture. Organizational identification processes presuppose the interconnectedness of top managers’ and

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stakeholders’ beliefs about the “essentials” of the organizational culture (Scott and Lane 2000, 44). Organizational identification processes are stronger in collectivistic cultures than in individualistic and hyper-individualistic cultures. The self-concept plays a much less decisive role in collectivistic societies than in individualistic societies (Lee et al. 2015, 14). Post-moral worldviews emphasize intersubjectivity and communicational truth since there is no Truth-itself. Intersubjectivity expresses ontic “inter-presence.” “Ontic inter-presence” is realized in family, group, organizational, institutional, and societal life. It has two interdependent dimensions: intersubjectivity and communicational truth. On one hand, intersubjectivity implies ontic positioning “in-front-of-­ others.” Such ontic positioning makes our self and others’ selves interconnected. No one can ever be wholly who-he/she-is without “being-in-front-of-others.” “Ontic inter-presence” mirrors the interconnectedness of our self-identity and others’ self-­ identity. On the other hand, communicational truth unveils our “being-in-dialogue.” From an ontic perspective, we cannot express our truth-claims without being “in-­ dialogue-­with-others.” Both dimensions of “ontic inter-presence” can be observed in organizational life. Everyone has a complex self-identity combining various sources of self-identity. Our family, group, organizational, institutional and societal life contributes to constructing our self-identity. Our organizationally based self-­ identity (or “organizational-self-identity”) is developed through our ontic “in-front-­ of-others” (intersubjectivity) in our organizational life. It is also basically influenced by our “being-in-dialogue” with other organizational members (communicational truth). The “ontic neighbourhood” is expressed in an “ontic inter-presence.” Post-­ moral worldviews presuppose that there is no “ontic neighbourhood” without “being-in-front-of-others” (intersubjectivity) and “being-in-dialogue” (communicational truth). “Living-in-an-organization” is expressing our “ontic neighbourhood” with other organizational members, and even with all stakeholders. In post-moral worldviews, one of the basic hermeneutic challenges is to avoid ontic despair, while safeguarding strong criticism against morally stigmatized concepts and dualisms. Ontic despair is a possibility-to-be, and not a loss of hope. Marcel defined mystery as “meta-problematic.” Unlike enigmas, mysteries can never be problematized. A moral worldview would suggest that ontic despair arises because of the degeneration of the meta-problematic (mystery) into the problematic. A post-moral worldview instead asserts that despair and hope are free and alternative choices “in-front-of-reality-as-it-is.” Post-moral worldviews emphasize the “beingness” of the subjective thinker’s inwardness. They strongly criticize any attempt to be absorbed into the realm of “havingness.” Being is not synonymous with “having-a-being.” The absorption of our “Becoming-oneself” into the realm of “havingness” constitutes a distortion of our ontic project-to-be (“ontic absorption”). Our self-identity should never be absolutely determined by “havingness.” Otherwise, our “Becoming-oneself” becomes a “thing-to-be-owned.” Reducing our “Becoming-­ oneself” to a “thing-to-be-owned” means falling into self-estrangement. We become estranged from who-we-are and from “who-we-would-like-to-be.” The realm of “havingness” is an ontic threat against our “Becoming-oneself.” Reluctance to fall into “havingness” allows us to deploy our “Becoming-oneself” throughout our

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existence. Falling into the realm of “havingness” is endorsing any attempt of reification. It means losing our own subjectivity to the advantage of technocratic means and powers. Being a “subjective thinker” involves safeguarding our “Becomingoneself” and resisting the temptation to fall into the realm of “havingness.” “Beingreified” is replacing our “beingness” by “havingness.” “Being-reified” is accepting a new form of ontic belongingness. However, belonging to the realm of “havingness” creates self-estrangement and, thus, the loss of an authentic self-identity. In organizational life, “being-reified” signifies falling into an inauthentic existence, since it implies losing part of our subjectivity. Our self-identity is subjectively defined. If our self-identity is reified, then it is separated from who-we-are and from “who-we-­would-like-to-be.” Any changeover from our “Becoming-oneself” to our “Being-­reified” is a basic obstacle to self-transcendence. In organizational life, organizational members should never fall into the pitfall of reification. The source of our self-­estrangement could be either our reification as creators/users of technological tools or our reification as technologically oriented bureaucrats. In both cases, reification processes destroy our “Becoming-oneself.” Post-moral worldviews allow organizational members to fight any attempt of reification. “Living-in-anorganization” involves being a subjective thinker throughout organizational life. Enhancing our “Becoming-oneself” could make organizational members avoid the chasm of “Being-reified.”

4.4  T  he Final Changeover from Moral Worldview to Post-­moral Worldview: The Anti-technocratic Concern and the Ontic Revolt Against Morally Stigmatized Concepts The final changeover from moral worldview to post-moral worldview depends on our openness to mystery. Our capacity to develop co-presence in daily life can also be a very influential conditioning factor. Being “co-present” entails being with-­ others, while being existentially alone. It requires the acknowledgment that human beings share the same existential predicament. Co-presence is not only a joint presence of beings. It also reflects the interconnectedness of beings who are present with each other. Co-presence is “inter-presence.” “Being-present-to-others” is intrinsically linked to others’ “being-present-to-us.” “Being-present-to-us” is not only being “in-front-of-others”, but above all, being presentiated before others. We can only be “present-to-others” when others are “present-to-us”, although mutual presence does not imply any identity. The temporality of “co-presence” focuses on nowness, especially in connection with our self-projection into the future. Post-moral worldviews strongly criticize all expressions of extremist thought and consciousness. Any extremist thought and consciousness mirrors the growing power of dehumanizing ideologies. A post-moral worldview always insists on our moral

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responsibility for our thoughts, words, attitudes, and deeds in daily life since our inwardness is the ontic locus for world change. The “essence” of time is endlessly on-going. The instant is a “now.” It is almost simultaneously living (“present now”) and dying (“past now”). The temporal distance between the “present now” and the “past now” is imperceptible. But there is such a distance. Otherwise, there would be a temporal immutability. The succession of nows makes things, beings and phenomena continuously change. Any specific now has its uniqueness. If nows were the replica of the same instant, they could not successively arise. Temporal change requires the uniqueness of every now. The structure of the instant can never be isolated from the past and the future. The succession of nows makes past and future possible. Time can only give “what it holds.” Any specific instant is both “falling-into-the-past” and “opening-the-future”. Any specific instant dies: it falls into the past. Any specific instant allows the arising of the next instant. It opens the door to the future. Nowness is something “in-between”, that is, between “falling-into-the-past” and “opening-the-future.” Time makes nowness present, said Heidegger (2010, 75). Any specific “now” is not a present, but rather an immediate instant. Nothing occurs in any specific “now”, since nowness is constantly and immediately passing away. The present is composed of a specific set of “nows”, of recovered past (lived) experiences, and of our projections into the future. However, the processes through which given “nows” are selected are often unconscious. We are not fully aware of the way past (lived) experiences are recovered. The way our self is projected into the future is not always conscious. But the present realizes the unity of selected “nows”, past experiences which still influence us (our “having-been-present”), and self-projections into the future (the “not-yet-­ here”). Nowness is the only thing we can perceive about Time (Heidegger 2003, 195). A Being is being pre-sent, that is, being involved in the actual flow of time. The past is “what-is-already-absent” (our “already-having-been”), while the future is “what-is-still-absent” (the “not-yet-here”). In both cases, it has something to do with nowness. Nowness is not only the “present now.” It is also “what-is-already-­ absent” and “what-is-still-absent.” Nowness is the “past now” (“already-having-­ been”) and the “future now” (“not-yet-there”). The Being of an existing entity is the being-present of the “entity-that-is-present” (Heidegger 2010, 75–76, 215, 225). Proximity gives a specific kind of feeling towards entities. Pre-sence means being-there “in-front-of” (pre-) any feeling provided by proximity (“sentia”). Ab-sence means being far from any feeling which arises from proximity. But such farness is preserved by nearness. Nothing is “in-proximity.” Nearness is making something near, that is, transforming “what-is-far” into “what-is-near” (Heidegger 1971, 175). Nearness is nearing the being-present (Heidegger 2008b, 198–201). Nearness is the interplay between past, present, and future. This is the fourth dimension of Time (Yao 2007, 525). A post-moral worldview emphasizes being-present, while being open to all ontic characteristics of entities. It lets existing entities be what-they-are. It strongly criticizes any anthropocentric attitude conveyed and strengthened by moral worldviews. Moreover, a post-moral worldview eliminates crystallized representations of reality. Using our imagination and memory essentially means re-presenting, that is, pre-sencing again from a new perspective.

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Re-presenting is taking the present entity as-it-is and then making the “feeling-­ following-­from-proximity” penetrate our mind. Re-presentation is a way to handle a given presence (Heidegger 2008a, 81). Re-presenting reality is a way to renew our interpretation of such reality and to criticize our own prejudices about it. This is a basic goal of a post-moral worldview. Post-moral worldviews emphasize the temporality of nowness. The historical situation of one’s “Becoming-oneself” opens the way to self-projection and self-­ transcendence. Self-projection into the future is the prerequisite for any attempt at self-transcendence. We cannot become “who-we-would-like-to-be” without projecting our self into the future. Any ontic project-to-be requires self-projection. But self-projection occurs in a “personalized” here-and-now. Self-projection is basically subjective. Only the subjective thinker can project his/her own self into the future. Only the subjective thinker can “be” an ontic project-to-be. Self-projection happens in our personalized “here-and-now.” The mineness of the here-and-now is constitutive of ontic temporality. There is no “general” here-and-now. Any here-and-now is appropriated by a subjective thinker. Our subjectivity makes this here-and-now “ours.” A “general” here-and-now is empty and meaningless. Dasein’s need for possibilities-to-be requires the mineness of the “hereness,” as well as the mineness of “nowness.” Any project-to-be presupposes the appropriation of a here-and-now in one’s inner life. Such appropriation processes occur in family, group, organizational, institutional, and societal life. The appropriation of “hereness/nowness” gives birth to an “organizational-here-and-now.” Any “organizational-here-and-­ now” can never be wholly personalized, although it is concretely related to our “Becoming-oneself.” Organizational members must fight any organizationally based attempt to make us internalize an “organizational-here-and-now”, as our “personalized” here-and-now. An “organizational-here-and-now” should never overpower our free choice of possibilities-to-be. Resisting any attempt of ontic absorption is the best way to avoid a side effect of “organizational everydayness”, that is, depersonalization. Post-moral worldviews unveil how our “Becoming-oneself” is interconnected with our “Being-in-the-world,” more precisely with our “in-the-worldliness.” Any “in-the-worldliness” positions our self “into-a-world.” But it also makes ontic responsibilities arise in our hearts/minds. No one can ever remain who-he-she-is since he/she “is” in-the-world. His/her “in-the-worldliness” does not belong to the realm of “havingness,” but rather to the realm of “beingness.” Our “in-the-­ worldliness” is not an issue of appropriation. Rather, it defines who-we-are, in our personalized “here-and-now.” “Becoming-oneself” entails being an ontic projectto-­be. Any project-to-be is intrinsically related to a given self-identity. It is a specific attempt of self-transcendence. We overcome who-we-are in becoming “who-we-­ would-like-to-be.” Self-transcendence needs such ontic becoming. Any ontic becoming occurs “in-a-world.” It is concrete and highly subjective. We cannot become who-we-are without deploying our “Becoming-oneself.” We cannot actualize our “Becoming-oneself” without projecting who-we-are in a personalized “here-­ and-­ now.” The subjective thinker is not externally related to his/her “in-the-worldliness.” Rather, any “in-the-worldliness” gives “ontic participation” its

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substance. The substance of an “ontic participation” in-the-world refers either to conscious/unconscious processes related to our “in-the-worldliness” (“internally-­ driven substance”) or to predictable/unpredictable consequences of our “self-­ participating-­in-a-world” (“externally-driven substance”). Participating in-the-world means being totally involved in our ontic project-to-be. Dasein’s need for possibilities-to-be mirrors the interconnectedness of our “Becoming-oneself” and our “inthe-worldliness.” Above all, it reflects our “ontic participation” in a personalized “here-and-now.” We cannot be a “self-in-a-world” without the substance of our “ontic participation.” Post-moral worldviews resist all ideological and totalizing attempts to crystallize ontic realities. Ideologically oriented worldviews enhance and strengthen a conformist mindset. Totalization is the best way to make philosophical questioning disappear. Ideological thought and totalization are concrete attempts to destroy ontic becoming and self-transcendence processes. Our “Becoming-oneself” is threatened by ideological thought and a totalizing attitude. Being subjected to ideological thought deprives our ontic project-to-be of its constitutive freedom. Showing a totalizing attitude reveals how our self-projection in the future is irrelevant and meaningless. Ideological thought and a totalizing attitude often stem from an extremist consciousness. An extremist consciousness is deeply conditioned by a specific ideology, or totalizing attitude. Anyone who has developed an extremist consciousness has lost part of his/her ontic freedom, since he/she cannot freely decide “who-he/she-would-like-to-be.” Ideological thought and totalizing attitudes reify our personalized “here-and-now”, as though it were a pure object. The temporality of nowness is intrinsically related to our subjectivity. Being in a personalized “here-and-now” means being a subjective thinker. Objectifying our here-and-now is reifying our “hereness” and our “nowness.” It is a form of ontic estrangement. In organizational life, ideological thought and totalizing attitudes constitute real threats with which we should be coping. Ideological thought can crystallize our “organizational-­here-and-now” and make it a tool of depersonalization. A totalizing attitude strengthens all depersonalization processes since it eliminates our inwardness. Ideological thought and a totalizing attitude can make us subject to “organizational everydayness.”

4.5  T  he Breakthrough of the Transcendent Position: The Passion for the Infinite Moral worldviews can prove satisfying for a given period. But sometimes, their foundations are fundamentally shaken, so that post-moral worldviews can freely evolve. During this first transition, people can embrace intermediary positions between moral worldviews and post-moral worldviews. But at the real end of the process, moral worldviews could eventually disappear and be replaced by post-­ moral worldviews. A second transition could happen when the openness to the

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Infinite becomes unavoidable. This is the phase of “transcendental breakthrough”, that is, the breakthrough of the “transcendent position.” Kierkegaard (1974, 33, 38, 51, 55) defined Christianity as inwardness and, thus, as subjectivity. Inwardness implies the inner transformation of the subject. Subjectivity is an infinite passion for our eternal happiness. An ultimate decision evolves into an infinite concern. We are then “in-subjectivity.” A subjective thinker lives “in-his/her-subjectivity.” Subjectivity can never be separated from our existence. Existing entails being-subjective. This is the way Kierkegaard defined inwardness. The passion for the infinite is subjectivity. It is an integral part of human existence. The passion for the infinite is truth, since truth is subjectivity, said Kierkegaard. It does not have any other substance. The infinite passion for inwardness gives birth to faith in God. The passion for the infinite is eternal decisiveness. The passionate moment of decision “in-front-of-the-infinite” takes place in human (finite) temporality (Kierkegaard 1974, 179, 181–182-183). Kierkegaard’s notion of truth is enlightening: “an objective uncertainty held fast in an appropriation-process of the most passionate inwardness is the truth, the highest truth attainable for an existing individual” (Kierkegaard 1974, 182). Appropriation processes are individually based and related to an individual act of existing, because truth “is” subjectivity. If essential truth is universally knowable, then it is objectified (Kierkegaard 1974, 217). Nonetheless, the existing individual who has embraced a moral worldview “lives-in” a world of ontic uncertainties and doubts. His/her moral worldview is constantly undermined by ontic uncertainties and doubts. Truth implies tolerating objective uncertainties, while expressing an infinite passion for the infinite. Then, truth becomes an expression of faith, argued Kierkegaard. Faith becomes the “contradiction between the infinite passion of the individual’s inwardness and the objective uncertainty” (Kierkegaard 1974, 182). Rejecting objective uncertainties is not nurturing our faith. Rather, it could destroy the foundations of faith. Faith implies risk. There is no risk without the active presence of ontic uncertainties and doubts (Kierkegaard 1974, 182, 188). This is the way subjective thinkers try to keep their moral worldview, while being continuously attacked by ontic uncertainties and doubts. Looking at Christianity from a speculative/objectivist perspective means considering Christianity as a purely historical phenomenon (Kierkeggard 1974, 49, 52–53). If those who embrace a speculative approach to Christianity are right, then nobody should ever perceive Christianity as subjectivity. On the other hand, if Christianity “is” subjectivity, then no subject should ever use a purely speculative/objectivist approach. Christianity only exists in subjective truth. From an objective viewpoint, Christianity does not exist at all (Kierkegaard 1974, 51, 116). Speculative philosophy can never be ultimately concerned with eternal happiness since it focuses on objective data and excludes subjectivity. Any attempt to unify eternal happiness (absolute telos) and speculative philosophy is even “comical”, since an infinite passion for eternal happiness cannot coexist with purely objective speculation (Kierkegaard 1974, 53–54). The impossibility of such a coexistence unveils an ontic contradiction. The realm of the “comical” is the realm of ontic contradictions. Speculative philosophy claims to know the truth about Christianity. Truth is not

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already given and available for understanding processes. If that were the case, then Truth would be objectively knowable. But Truth is not something we can understand so readily. We must appropriate any substance of truth through a process of understanding. In so doing, we actualize our subjectivity. We are subjective thinkers (Kierkegaard 1974, 200). The inquiring subject identifies himself/herself with speculative philosophy. He/she focuses on objective thought and does not want to be a subjective thinker. The inquiring subject refuses to be ultimately concerned with his/her own existence. Unlike the inquiring subject, the subjective thinker is always “in-becoming” and cannot be ultimately concerned with an objective result of empirical inquiry. The process of one’s becoming is always ongoing, since existing is “being-in-becoming.” Every dimension of our existence is a process. Existing is “being-in-process”, that is, “being-in-becoming.” Kierkegaard asserted that “being-­ in-­becoming” inevitably produces ontic uncertainties in the human world and existence (Kierkegaard 1974, 67, 74–75, 79, 84, 176). Everything that is “in-becoming” is unpredictable and, therefore, gives rise to ontic uncertainties and doubts. Everything concrete is in-becoming. “Being-in-becoming” is being a spirit, said Kierkegaard (1974, 169–170, 272). The inquiring subject denies any worth to inner processes of spiritual becoming. He/she is concerned with “world-historical” realities and, therefore, with conditioned phenomena. World-historical realities can be objectively known. But we cannot be ultimately concerned with them. World-­ historical realities do not challenge our subjectivity. The inquiring subject looks at the world-historical significance of events, objects and phenomena that can be objectively known (Kierkegaard 1974, 76, 123–124). The inquiring subject is so concerned with objective data that he/she devalues subjectivity, and thus the spirit itself. Truth is inwardness and, thus, subjectivity. There is no objective inwardness. We cannot objectively know our inwardness. Inwardness is subjectively perceived and developed. Objective truth does not exist at all. Any objective knowledge of Christian beliefs and doctrinal propositions is “untruth.” The truth of Christianity is inwardness, that is, subjectivity (Kierkegaard 1974, 201). Every truth is subjectively appropriated. Subjective truth—and, thus, one’s existence—can never be wholly communicated (Kierkegaard 1974, 71, 78, 244). Our finite mind cannot encompass the entire reality. Knowing realities is adopting a specific perspective. We cannot simultaneously adopt all possible perspectives for rightly understanding given realities. Our existential finitude makes such an approach impossible. Moreover, everything is always changing. Everything that changes is ungraspable. Unchanging things, beings and phenomena could be objectively known. But changing things, beings and phenomena can never be totally known. Kierkegaard acknowledged that there is an incontrovertible dimension of secrecy in any subjective truth. Objective truth implies that we are related to pure being. The ontic locus of objective truth is pure being, while the ontic locus of subjective truth is existing. Subjective truth is related to our existing. Only the subjective thinker can be existentially concerned with subjective truth. The inquiring subject is, instead, preoccupied with objective truth. The subjective thinker is always infinitely concerned with his/her existence. It is a matter of inwardness and, therefore, of subjectivity. His/her infinite concern

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cannot be stopped by itself, argued Kierkegaard. From an ontic perspective, the subjective thinker “mirrors” the basic (ontological) structure of human existence. The subjective thinker continuously realizes his/her own inwardness (Kierkegaard 1974, 71, 78, 102, 107–108, 169). Given that everything is in-becoming, we cannot trace the origin of truth. The subjective truth becomes approximative, since it is inbecoming (Kierkegaard 1974, 169–170). Objective reflection looks at truth, as though it were purely objective. Then, the existing individual is not important at all. Objective reflection does not concern itself with subjective truth. Only in subjectivity could there be ontic decisiveness. Ontic decisiveness is the ultimate decision for one’s existing and subjective truth. Existence is the moment of ultimate decision about one’s existing. If existence is the act of existing, then it requires ontic decisiveness (Kierkegaard 1974, 192, 262). Yet subjective reflection considers truth subjective. The appropriation of truth through inwardness is a crucial issue for the subjective thinker. Eternal decisiveness is grounded in subjectivity (Kierkegaard 1974, 171, 173, 175, 181, 191). The “Eternal-in-time” is the breakthrough of the Eternal into human temporality. The “eternal-in-human-existence” mirrors the way the subjective thinker perceives and interprets the “Eternal-in-time.” The “Eternal-in-time” (the breakthrough) and the “eternal-in-human-existence” (the human interpretation of the breakthrough) are interconnected (Kierkegaard 1952, 276). According to Kierkegaard (1969, 52, 54), the inquiring subject does not believe in any infinite instant of ontic decisiveness. The non-existence of any infinite instant makes totalization of human existence possible. Christianity focuses on the breakthrough of the Eternal into human temporality. It emphasizes the infinite Instant that has an absolute worth for every subjective thinker. The infinite instant of ontic decisiveness presupposes that nobody could already own absolute truth. Otherwise, if it were possible to own absolute truth, then the instant of decisiveness would lose its infinity. As a subjective thinker, any believer is the untruth he/she unveils “in-front-of-the-infinite-instant.” The infinite instant makes any believer an untruth. Without the infinite instant, we would fall again into Socratism, argued Kierkegaard (1969, 55, 62, 73–74, 89, 106, 115). The Christian Paradox is the object of faith. It is the passion of thought, since thought seeks to grasp something that is elusive: the ultimate limit of thought (Kierkegaard 1969, 87, 89, 96–97, 120). The Christian Paradox is the infinite passion for the infinite instant. The subjective thinker perceives the infinite instant as a paradox and, consequently, as something meaningless (Kierkegaard 1969, 100–101, 106–107). Christianity is unclear about eternity. There is a dualism between eternal happiness and eternal unhappiness. The ontic decision to choose eternal happiness or unhappiness must be taken “in-time.” Kierkegaard unveiled the paradoxical nature of the Christian faith. The Christian faith uses time and historical events/ phenomena, while dealing with eternity. Anything that is historical is not necessary, but rather contingent. “Being-in-becoming” needs contingency. Otherwise, nothing could evolve in a necessary way. Christianity is essentially paradoxical (Kierkegaard 1974, 87–90, 95). “The eternal truth has come into being in time: this is the paradox” (Kierkegaard 1974, 187). The interconnectedness of an eternal truth and an existing (temporally based) individual is paradoxical. Kierkegaard (1974, 188) even

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talked about the absurd substance of faith: “The absurd is—that the eternal truth has come into being in time, that God has come into being, has been born, has grown up, and so forth, precisely like any other individual human being, quite indistinguishable from other individuals.” The absurd is absolute paradox. There is an infinite gap between the finite (the human being/temporality) and the infinite ­(God/ eternity). Kierkegaard asserted that the absurd (or absolute paradox) is the object of Christian faith. Believers must agree with the absurd reality of God’s Incarnation. Believers should then never try to get any historical certainty about God’s Incarnation. Instead, they must take the absurd upon themselves. Otherwise, they will lose their faith. Searching for the historical certainty of God’s Incarnation signifies losing our faith. Then, we deny the absoluteness of the absurd (Kierkegaard 1974, 189, 191, 194–195). Faith is passion, inwardness, and subjectivity. Kierkegaard explained that believers are confronted with the elusiveness of God’s Life and Will. Nothing about God can ever be crystal-clear. Mystery is the basis of any spiritual relation to God (Kierkegaard 1974, 219–220). Objective faith does not necessarily emphasize historical certainties. It could also refer to a set of absolutized beliefs and doctrinal assertions. Instead, Christianity is essentially paradoxical. Having faith entails being loyal to the Christian Paradox (Hughes 1995, 207). Removing the paradox from Christian faith destroys the essence of faith (Kierkegaard 1974, 193–194). Asserting that “the Christian Paradox is relative” means that the Christian Paradox could eventually be overcome, as though it were a relative paradox rather than an absolute paradox. Such a possibility of transcending the Christian Paradox has tragic consequences for believers. Believers could consider that their own existence is “relatively” important. Believers are then inquiring subjects who deny their infinite passion for the infinite. Kierkegaard (1974, 196) suggested that those individuals are “absent-minded.” An absolute paradox implies that the existence of the paradox is itself paradoxical. A relative paradox is the loss of the absolute paradox (Kierkegaard 1974, 197, 203). Forgetting “what-it-means-to-exist” means neglecting our inwardness and subjectivity and, therefore, shifting far from truth (Kierkegaard 1974, 216, 223). Post-moral worldviews open the way to the “transcendent position.” The infinite passion for the Infinite can never be developed without overcoming the basic virtues of traditional moralities. Transcending traditional virtues radically changes the way we look at the Infinite. Only the subjective thinker can overcome traditional virtues and be open to the Presence of the Infinite in his/her existence. The infinite passion for the Infinite follows from our subjectivity. More generally, our inner life gives birth to various ontic passions that are closely related to the Infinite. Being passionate about the Infinite can never be an abstract thought. Ontic passions mirror our inwardness. A Kierkegaardian subjective thinker resists the temptation to focus on abstract thought, since abstract thought makes our inwardness degenerate. In post-­ moral worldviews, “living-in-an-organization” is being passionate about the Presence of the Infinite throughout organizational life. Organizational members’ philosophical questioning makes them more aware of the presentiation of the Infinite in their organizational life.

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Post-moral worldviews imply an anti-technocratic critique of social, cultural, economic, political, and even religious/spiritual practices. Post-moral worldviews allow us to deepen the meaning and implications of our “Becoming-oneself” and of our “in-the-worldliness”, since they acknowledge the basic worth of our “passion-­ for-­the-Infinite.” “Being-passionate-about-the-Infinite” involves being aware that our infinite passion for the Infinite can allow us to actualize our “Becoming-oneself” and our “in-the-worldliness.” Organizational members can be “passionate-about-­ the-Infinite” through organizational life. In so doing, they can choose given possibilities-­to-be, while criticizing any technocratic attempt at “ontic absorption.” “Living-in-an-organization” means being open to the ontic Presence of the Infinite. However, the Infinite always remains undefinable. Any notion of the Infinite is inherently linked to a mystery. Any ontic presence of the Infinite is a mystery. Organizational members who are deeply concerned with the ontic Presence of the Infinite acknowledge the presence of mystery in human existence. Mysteries comprise an integral part of human existence. The realm of mysteries has no borders. Lived experiences of an ontic mystery can permeate our family, group, organizational, institutional, and societal life. In a post-moral worldview, “living-in-an-­ organization” is being passionate about the ontic Presence of the Infinite throughout organizational life.

4.6  Summary The shift from moral worldviews to post-moral worldviews may be analyzed from four different perspectives. Firstly, we can consider temporality as the basis of Dasein’s Being. Moral worldviews generally acknowledge that there is an inevitable gap between temporality and divine eternity. Post-moral worldviews are not concerned with eternity since eternity does not allow us to be “co-present.” Eternity does not provide any ontological structuring to nowness. Post-moral worldviews enhance a temporality of presence and abandon the issue of eternity. They eventually focus on nowness, as it is “presentiated” in the past as well as in the future. In so doing, post-moral worldviews consider that our self-projection into the future is the basis of Dasein’s disclosedness. Secondly, we can examine Dasein’s participation in the world (Being-in-the-world). Moral worldviews could accept the idea that the historically based human situation implies Being-in-the-world. They could endorse the absolute uniqueness of the human historical situation that is “in-the-­ worldliness.” However, moral worldviews are grounded in morally stigmatized concepts/dualisms, so that they cannot seriously take ontic uncertainties and doubts into account. Post-moral worldviews integrate ontic uncertainties and doubts into a concrete notion of post-moral responsibility. Thirdly, we can consider subjectivity. Moral worldviews deal with subjectivity and acknowledge the interconnectedness of subject and object. Yet their morally stigmatized concepts/dualisms make it impossible to develop the notion of intersubjectivity. Post-moral worldviews focus on intersubjectivity, first as the basis of communicational truth, and then as the

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expression of “co-presence.” Moreover, post-moral worldviews strongly denounce extremist consciousness, because of its ideological substance. The ideological substance of an extremist consciousness refers either to conscious/unconscious processes of ideological thought (“internally-driven substance”) or to predictable/ unpredictable consequences of the extremist consciousness (“externally-driven substance”). Fourthly, we may examine technology. Moral worldviews criticize the human destruction of the environment and the idolatry of technological tools. Post-­ moral worldviews go a step further. They make technology and inwardness interconnected. In so doing, post-moral worldviews presuppose that authentic technology could open the door to the mystery, at least the mystery of Being. The changeover from moral worldviews to post-moral worldviews could be analyzed using those four criteria. Post-moral worldviews presuppose that there is not Truth-itself. Only truth-­ claims and possibilities-to-be can contribute to make ontic freedom (and “Becoming-­ oneself”) possible. Organizational members who embrace a post-moral worldview display a high level of ontic caring for their “Becoming-oneself”, while being confronted with ontic uncertainties and doubts (ontic disquiet). They cannot avoid their ontic decisiveness (towards their project-to-be) and ontic nothingness (arising from their existential finitude and anxiety). Even the possibility of an ontic despair can never be ruled out. Organizational members’ lived experiences in the organizational setting are related to their “project-to-be”, given their Being-with-Others (organizational neighbourhood) and organizational identification processes (ontic participation).

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Part II

The Annihilating Path

Chapter 5

Being Responsible for Others: The Ontic Roots of a Moral Worldview

5.1  Introduction A moral worldview implies a philosophical and ethical positioning on the self/others dualism. Ethics is basically concerned with the way interpersonal and social relationships evolve. Emmanuel Levinas’ philosophy focuses on the radical Otherness that strengthens individuation processes and makes the idea of the Infinite arise. Incontrovertible Otherness could explain how we develop our self-­ consciousness, as well as our spiritual connection to the Infinite. Radical Otherness increases our commitment to others’ responsibility and freedom. We are responsible for assuring and reinforcing ontic conditions for equality amongst all human beings. This is an “Otherness-focused moral worldview.” Human responsibility towards others/society/Nature is not defined in the same way. It could have a very different impact when applied in the organizational setting. Developing love, compassion and altruism in organizational life is a way to maintain and strengthen positive relationships with all organizational members, regardless of their personalities and situations. This “drive to bond” is an integral part of humanistic management (Pirson 2017, 62–68, 92–94).

5.2  Incontrovertible Otherness and Responsibility-for-Others A moral worldview presupposes that universal truths could be known through the exercise of reason. Levinas said that universal truths can be accepted by every reasonable being (1983, 38). Believing that our responsibility-for-others follows from incontrovertible Otherness is conveying a truth-claim. Any truth-claim can be subjectively perceived as a universal truth. People with an “Otherness-focused moral worldview” are convinced that undeniable Otherness explains the infinite gap © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 M. Dion, Worldviews, Ethics and Organizational Life, Ethical Economy 60, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-82355-9_5

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between self and others. Being oriented towards the Other means that, in being “faced-with-others”, one is responsible for their “Becoming-oneself.” It implies our responsibility for others’ freedom to be “who-they-would-like-to-be.” Being in-­ front-­of-others is acknowledging the inherent worth of their ontic project-to-be. The inevitable Otherness has a deep impact on the way we seize the idea of the Infinite. It could also influence the way we orientate our moral life. Organizational members who embrace moral worldviews must confront the pre-philosophical challenge of grasping the substance of incontrovertible Otherness and shouldering their ontic responsibility-for-others.

5.2.1  The “There-Is” and the Ontic Project-to-Be “Being” an ontic project-to-be means being ultimately concerned with our existence. However, we are limited by something impersonal from which our project-to­be inevitably arises. Our ontic project-to-be is personalized and, thus, subjectively oriented. But it is strictly linked to prior impersonal being. If we want to shed light on the undeniable Otherness, then we must first understand the nature of such personal/impersonal dualism. Something in the Being-in-general resists any attempt at being personalized. This is the “there-is.” Saying “there is” entails unveiling the impersonal being that precedes our ontic project-to-be. The “there-is” overcomes the distinction between inwardness and exteriority. The “there-is” is an all-embracing absence that is a kind of presence. The “there-is” is already and always “there.” The “there-is” mirrors the presence of an absence. The “there-is” is basic anonymity, that is, the abyssal absence of any personalized entity. Being a consciousness means being torn away from the impersonal “there-is.” It means being a subjectivity (Levinas 1947, 93–95, 98–100, 105, 109; 1994, 104–113). The “there-is” reflects the presence of an impersonal being. The “there-is” is not a phenomenon of being. But neither is it absolute nothingness. That is why the “there-is” is so dreadful, said Levinas. The “there-is” does not worry about the potentialities of an existence (or “what-can-exist”). Moreover, the “there-is” does not convey any meaning at all. Only our responsibility-­ for-­others could release us from the abyssal and impersonal presence of the “there­is” (Levinas 1968, 165; 1994, 105, 109; 1996, 37–43). The “there-is” is impersonal existence. It implies the absence of “Being-oneself.” The “there-is” tragically expresses the presence of “no-selfhood” (Levinas 2007, 27). The “there-is” claims the absence of any existing entity. Consciousness releases us from the sway of the anonymous “there-is” because it is subjectivity (Levinas 1968, 117, 133, 246, 248; 1994, 108–109). The “there-is” makes subjectivity possible, although it is “the enveloping presence of anonymity” (Levinas 1999, 99). Levinas (2007, 24–26) has shown how Heidegger’s notion of thrownness should be understood and extended. Heidegger (1962, 174, 223) explained that Dasein’s Being has been thrown into existence. Thrownness belongs to Dasein and reveals Being-in-the-world. Thrownness implies that Dasein is involved in three successive

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modes of being. Thrownness makes us “live-in” the ontic mode of inauthenticity. Then, Dasein’s choice of given possibilities-to-be allows the projection of an authentic life. At the end of the process, Dasein’s Being can recover the mode of authenticity. Projecting possibilities-to-be means that Dasein has been thrown “into” them. Possibilities-to-be are not external to Dasein (Rolland 2003, 13). Rather, they are inherently linked to Dasein’s disclosedness, since Dasein “has-to­be.” Possibilities-to-be are what Dasein could choose to be. Thrownness is “beingthrown” into inauthenticity, while being “in-front-of” multiple possibilities-­to-­be. Dasein must choose given possibilities-to-be that will be actualized. Being-­thrown implies a specific family history and social existence (Polizzi 2011, 135–136). Levinas asserted that the Heideggerian thrownness referred to a prior existence, as though an existing being were pre-existing. In so doing, Heidegger strongly affirms the independence of existence and existing entities. Levinas believed that the “thereis” is anonymous existence without any existence. An anonymous existence is free of subjectivity. Thrownness into inauthentic existence does not presuppose any willto-exist. Otherwise, such a will-to-exist would precede one’s existence. Beingthrown excludes any prior will-to-exist (Levinas 2003, 69, 75). It is “being-without-having-chosen-to-be” (Levinas 1999, 19). Projecting “who-we-would-like-to-be” in the future means being responsible for who-we-will-become and for who-we-are in our personalized “here-and-now.” We cannot perceive the Other’s face without precisely defining “who-we-would-like-to-­ ­be.” Our ontic project-to-be is developed in-face-of-others. It can never exclude the presence of undeniable Otherness. Our responsibility-for-others is clarified when we connect the Other’s face and our individuation processes. Moral worldviews emphasize our ontic position of “being-in-front-of-others.” “Living-in-an-­ organization” is searching for the meaning of such ontic positioning. “Being-in-­ front-of-others” is required for “Becoming-oneself.” However, its meaning is never crystal-clear. The meaning and implications of our “Being-in-front-of-others” can be influenced by the substance of our family, group, organizational, institutional, and societal life. The substance of our multidimensional life refers either to conscious/unconscious processes of communicational exchanges (“internally-driven substance”) or to predictable/unpredictable consequences of “Being-in-front-ofothers” (“externally-driven substance”). Various conditioning factors can exert a decisive role in the way we circumscribe the meaning of our “Being-in-front-ofothers.” Social, cultural, economic, political, and even religious/spiritual factors can be very influential in one’s ontic positioning “in-front-of-others.” The deployment of such factors in organizational life mirrors Dasein’s call for self-identity. No one can ever actualize his/her “Becoming-oneself” without taking his/her “in-the-­ worldliness” into account. The actualization of our “Being-in-front-of-others” takes place in given world. It cannot be separated from our family, group, organizational, institutional, and societal life. Organizational members are “in-front-of-others”, while searching for their self-identity. “Living-in-an-organization” is closely linked to Dasein’s call for self-identity. It is a specific quest for self-identity that allows the deployment of organizational members’ “Becoming-oneself.”

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5.2.2  Other’s Face and Responsibility-for-Others Every experience of the world is an experience of our own self (Levinas 1983, 23). If the self and the world are interconnected, then any experience of the self is also an experience of our world. The human being is always “in-relation-with-others” (Levinas 1983, 188). We are not responsible-for-others because of our free decision to take such a responsibility upon ourselves. The unlimited and initial responsibility-­ for-­others precedes any exercise of freedom. It is “prior-to-any-reminiscence” (past-­ focused) and “beyond-any-accomplishment” (future-focused) (Levinas 2010, 71; 2011, 24, 31, 197–198). Being “responsible-for-others” entails building up a world in which all human beings are “ontically” equal. We are responsible for concretely enhancing the basic equality of all human beings. Liberties vary from one culture to another. We are responsible for any lack of equality of different cultures. It is an issue of social justice. On one hand, if social justice were not an ontic demand, then our responsibility-for-others would be concretely infinite. Any ontic demand is related to finite beings. Our responsibility-for-others can always be improved. But it is not infinite. Finite beings cannot be infinitely responsible for others. Nonetheless, nobody can eliminate his/her responsibility-for-others. Being responsible-for-­others means continuously working for social justice. On the other hand, we could criticize how political, social, economic, cultural, or religious/spiritual practices and structures contribute to a more just society. Such an ontic contribution is based on our relation to the Other’s face (Levinas 2010, 115). In daily life, our responsibility-­for-­ others is limited by the way we are concerned with our own selves. Any fight for social justice is based on our responsibility-for-others. The most important ethical challenge is to take responsibility-for-others upon ourselves. It expresses the quest for the ethical aim. Humankind has not achieved equality everywhere, without exception. Unfortunately, people could forget that everyone has an ontic responsibility-­for-others (Levinas 2011, 203–204). Social justice is the real foundation of consciousness (Levinas 1999, 144). Without social justice, individual consciousness could destroy human sociability. Social justice is a by-product of human solidarity, given that all human beings share the same ontic predicament. But our endless responsibility-for-others makes us uncertain about whether we have taken the morally correct actions. We are never totally sure of “having done the right thing” (Fagan 2009, 12). The limitations of moral normativity could open the way to the constant quest for the ethical aim. In organizational life, practices of procedural justice can affect organizational members’ citizenship behaviour. This is particularly true when procedural justice is connected to perceived organizational support (Moorman 1991; and Moorman et al. 1998). Organizational members are more frequently engaged in organizational citizenship behavior when they perceive their ethical leaders as being “flexible in their ethical convictions” (Babalola et  al. 2019, 96–97). Ethical leadership could also positively influence employee work engagement (Ahmad and Gao 2018). Organizational citizenship behaviour is also conditioned by the propensity to trust organizational members. Organizational members could also believe that

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“collective or group interests should have precedence over individual self-interest” (Van Dyne et al. 2000). Such a belief can strongly influence organizational citizenship behaviour. Guillén Parra et al. (2011, 612) defined trust as “an interpersonal and two-way relationship where the trustor freely decides to make him or herself vulnerable to the actions of the trustee.” Trust needs the trustor’s conviction that trustees adhere to his/her ethical principles (Luu 2012, 135). But this is not always the case. The trustor takes such a risk upon himself/herself. The risk itself largely depends on the trustor’s conscious choice of most desirable actions (Koeszegi 2004, 645). Justice plays a major role in organizational life, culture and ethics, especially in “ethically focused” (such as value statements and corporate social responsibility/ sustainability/citizenship reports) and “morally focused” organizational documents (such as corporate policies and codes of ethics). Adopting a text-centred hermeneutic approach to ethically focused organizational documents could show how justice is an organizationally desired value. Justice is an ideal that waits for concrete evidence of its applicability. The way organizational members deal with the requirements and expectations of justice determines the level of trust reached and reinforced in daily organizational life. Building up justice in the organizational setting needs to focus on organizational and interpersonal trust. Levinas (2010, 103, 111–112) dealt with the ethical perspective of the “inter-­ human.” The “inter-human” implies universally shared responsibility-for-others. The “inter-human” arises before any altruistic decision towards others’ well-being and happiness. The “inter-human” is the perspective from which our responsibility-­ for-­others takes place. Being responsible-for-others means being responsible for others’ responsibility. Every day, we shoulder such responsibility. This is an integral part of our everydayness. Others could accuse us of not protecting their capacity for being responsible (Levinas 1996, 92; 2011, 185–186, 198). We are responsible for our ontic freedom. But we are also responsible for others’ freedom. This is our ontic responsibility-for-others. Our responsibility-for-others must not imply any expectation of reciprocity (Levinas 1996, 94–95; 2010, 71; 2012, 91). Otherwise, the meaning of our responsibility-for-others would be distorted. It would be equivalent to calculated exchange of noble sentiments. Rather, the meaning of our responsibility-­ for-­others requires an altruistic and compassionate attitude which is centered on others’ freedom and self-realization. “Being-free” entails building up a world in which everyone could be as free as we are (Levinas 1968, 140). The normative level of freedom is a “general freedom”, that is, the highest level of actualized freedom that has generally been reached by people. A “general freedom” requires basic compliance with social, cultural, political, and sometimes religious/spiritual norms and rules of behaviour. This is more theoretical than practical. A “general freedom” is not subjectively based. Rather, it refers to the freedom of “averageness.” Such a normative pattern cannot be easily defined. It is intrinsically connected to ontic freedom, while being disconnected from the multiplicity of contexts and circumstances. Existential freedom has a rational and immutable basis since it is a constituent part of the structure of existence. However, in daily life, the exercise of freedom can be reduced by ontic conditioning factors. The normative level of freedom is an ideal we are continuously pursuing. Our daily challenges deal with ontic freedom.

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Business ethics allows us to create a “space of freedom” (Verstraeten 1998, 118; and Falise 1985, 39). A space of freedom is a space of mind (mental space) and heart (emotional space) that enhances and favours our self-consciousness and self-­ accomplishment. Sheldrake and Hurley (2000, 141–142) described the “containing space as the space allowing for that conversation between the self and others through which we define ourselves and, eventually, find the courage to be.” We cannot be who-we-are without being responsible-for-others, said Levinas (1996, 97; 2012, 53). Taking our responsibility-for-others upon ourselves is an endless process. Existing means being liable for the scope of others’ ontic freedom (Levinas 2012, 10–12). Being-with-Others is limited by our ontic loneliness (Levinas 2007, 21). The human being is Being-with-Others. He/she is also continuously alone in his/her mind/heart. Externally, the human being lives with-Others. But inwardness presupposes ontic loneliness. Hwa (2011, 243) rightly said that Heidegger’s notion of ontological authenticity “cannot prescribe an ethical concern.” The Heideggerian Being-with-Others “subordinates the relation with the Other to ontology.” Levinas enhanced the primacy of the Other, without reducing it to any ontological framework. He then opened the way to the ontic dimension of alterity. Heidegger (1962, 155–157) asserted that Being-in-the-world is Being-with-­ others, since Dasein is “for the sake of Others.” Being-with-Others is existentially related to Being-in-the-world (Habermas 2011, 177). If Being-with-Others “is” Being-in-the-world (Heidegger), does this imply that the “is” mirrors an identity or an externalization? The hypothesis of an identity is meaningless. It does not add any relevant analysis of Being. Habermas rightly explained that it is an externalization. Being-with-Others expresses “what it means to-be-in-the-world.” The externalization process from Being-in-the-world to Being-with-Others also gives us the opportunity to deepen the understanding of Being. Any relationship with Others depends on our understanding of Being in general and, thus, on the way we understand our Being-with-Others. Levinas (1994, 127–129) believed that Being-with-Others is not ontological, but rather “pre-ontological.” Any relation to any existing entity precedes ontology (Levinas 1968, 18). Ontology seizes the Being of existing entities (Levinas 1968, 132). The Other’s face has a pre-ontological status. It is the way others reveal who-­ they-­are. It transcends any idea of the Other we have developed in our mind (Levinas 1968, 21, 53). The Other’s face presupposes the anteriority of existing entities over Being itself. Immediacy is the basis of our ontic relationships. We are confronted with the Other’s face, before philosophically questioning Being itself. The Other’s face is, thus, pre-ontological. Levinas did not agree with the way Heidegger considered Being as the basis of entities. Levinas did not believe that Being is the horizon from which entities emerge. Moreover, Levinas criticized the way Heidegger has forgotten the Others’ face. Indeed, Heidegger’s existential analysis of Being does not take any pre-ontological externalization of Being-with-Others into account. Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein’s Being always remains existentially oriented. Our responsibility-for-others comes from our unjustified “There” in our Dasein: “I already ask myself whether my being is justified, whether the Da of my Dasein is not already the usurpation of someone’s place (…) The alterity of the other is the

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extreme point of ‘Thou shalt not commit homicide,’ and, in me, fear for all the violence and usurpation my existence, despite its intentional innocence, risks committing. The risk of occupying, from the moment of the Da of Dasein, the place of another, and thus, concretely, of exiling him, of condemning him to a miserable condition in some ‘Third’ or ‘Fourth’ World, of killing him” (Levinas 1999, 28, 30). According to Levinas, when Heidegger dealt with intersubjectivity, he talked about coexistence. But coexistence has nothing to do with the immediate face-to-face. Coexistence does not mirror the Other’s face (Levinas 1968, 22–23, 39). The Other’s face reflects the Other’s difference. Seeing the Other’s face makes us aware of the difference between our self/world and others’ self/world. The Other’s difference is incontrovertible. The proximity of the other can be neither defined nor integrated (Levinas 1999, 138). Levinas’ responsibility-for-others means “proximity of the other.” We cannot neglect the Other’s difference (or radical otherness). We cannot be “in-different” towards the Other’s difference. In all situations, we are rather “dis-­ quieted” by such radical difference. Moreover, the proximity of the other is fraternity. It makes us responsible for others. Our responsibility-for-others is grounded in the proximity of the other. The proximity of the other reveals the Other’s face. Fraternity makes us deeply concerned with the Other’s face, that is, radical otherness (Levinas 1998, 71–72, 95, 162; 1999, 23, 94). We have access to the Other’s radical otherness through our daily relationships with others (Levinas 1968, 94). We can never escape the Other’s difference. The proximity of the other is existentially inescapable. We can never avoid our responsibility-for-others, although we can deny it (Levinas 1998, 92). Denying or reducing our ontic responsibility-for-others does not affect it. We remain fully responsible-for-others. The object of our responsibility-­for-others is others’ ontic freedom. We are responsible for others’ capacity to exercise their ontic freedom. We are responsible for enhancing and working for the respect of basic human rights and liberties. Business ethics can contribute to “strengthen the social cohesion of a society from the local to the global level in multiple ways.” It allows us to better circumscribe the notions of public wealth and enhance “human rights as public goods” (Enderle 2018, 626). We must ensure that others can fully exercise their ontic freedom in their personal, social, political, and even religious/spiritual life. We are also responsible for allowing others to find meaning in their ontic experiences, such as guilt, suffering, sickness, and death. We are responsible for allowing others to face the meaning of their “death-to-­ come.” We cannot be indifferent towards others’ death. We are even responsible for the collective situation in which others’ death occurs (Levinas 1998, 163; 1999, 29). The proximity of the other is our responsibility for others’ death-to-come (Levinas 1999, 24–25). The Other is revealed through his/her ontic face (Levinas 1983, 378). The Other’s face is closely linked to our participation in-the-world. Existing is Being-with-­ Others and Being-in-the-world. But the Other’s face makes us aware of the ontic presence of radical otherness. Such an awareness opens the way to any thematization of the world we “live-in.” Through its ontic presence “in-front-of-us”, the Other suggests a given way to thematize the world. In doing so, the Other is self-­disclosing. The world then becomes something we can deal with. Our participation

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in-the-­world can be a matter we could discuss with others. The thematization of the world is realized through language. Thematizing the world is proposing a “worldto-live-­in.” Any “proposal-of-world” to others informs the existing entity of the phenomena of the world and, thus, of the Infinite of the Other. An “Otherness-focused moral worldview” develops such a “proposal-of-world” that refers to universal truths. It inevitably uses ontic possibilities-to-be to manifest its basic attitudinal and axiological orientation. Relationships with others involve “proposing a given world” to others. In so doing, relationships with others constitute an ontic opportunity to transcend ourselves. Being “in-front-of-others” is choosing a given path of self-­ transcendence. “Being-with-Others” allows us to deepen our “Becoming-oneself.” Receiving a “proposal-of-world” from others gives us the possibility of looking at our own world differently. It allows us to revise our ontic project-to-be. Discourse is communicational exchange about various proposals-of-world. It mirrors our ethical concerns about others, society, Nature, and even God. Discourse is relationships with others and, therefore, communicational exchanges with others about the “world-we-could-live-in.” The essence of Discourse is ethical because of its basic concern for radical otherness (Levinas 1968, 176, 184, 188, 191). Seeing the Other’s face entails speaking about the world we could “live-in.” It also implies an openness to other worlds in which people participate (Levinas 1968, 69, 72, 148–149). Any self is inherently linked to a specific world, since it is a “self-in-a-world”, in a personalized “here-and-now.” The way the self evolves makes its world evolve, and vice-versa. Seeing the Other’s face reminds us of radical otherness and, therefore, of the plurality of selves and worlds. Language is the presence of the Other’s face, that is, the presence of the Other’s infinite. The Other’s infinite is radical otherness of the Other. Language depends on the Other’s face. The Other’s face is the self-­ disclosure of the Other “in-front-of-us” (Levinas 1968, 146, 169, 177, 181–182, 187–188). The presence of the Other’s face calls our ontic freedom into question (Aasland 2007, 223). Our ontic face makes us available to others. Any relationship with others is based on the Other’s face. The Other’s face brings together existing entities. Seppäla et al. (2013, 412) defined social connection as “a person’s subjective sense of having close and positively experienced relationships with others in the social world.” Being “in-front-of” the Other’s face is the true origin of our moral consciousness (Levinas 2010, 20–22). Our relationships with others are morally oriented, since they focus on a shared responsibility-for-others (Levinas 1968, 146). Our responsibility-­ for-others has an intrinsic moral meaning, said Levinas. Our responsibility-­for-others makes us actively work for basic equality amongst all human beings. Being responsible-for-others means fighting any inequality and enhancing our common humanity. The object of our responsibility-for-others is clearly morally oriented (moral normativity). Safeguarding freedom (and equality) in the world entails promoting respect and justice. This is a basic ethical concern. Moral consciousness makes us experience radical and irreducible otherness, since it opens our mind/heart to the Other’s face (Levinas 1983, 376). Levinas tried to avoid the extreme concern for the autonomy of the self, as emphasized by the Aufklärung (Knights and O’Leary 2006, 135). Levinasian ethics reveals the decisive role of our

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“heteronomous relation to the Other” but, above all, our “endless responsibility for the Other” (Bevan and Corvellec 2007, 209, 216). Thus, it enhances the quest for the ethical aim. The presence of the Other’s face is the presence of fellow human beings (Levinas 2010, 43). All human beings belong to humankind and experience a similar ontic predicament. The Other’s face is basically linked to responsibility-for-­ others. It brings to the fore the requirements of social justice. Our responsibility-for-others assumes an ontic form, regardless of others’ personal traits and lives (Levinas 2010, 114–116). Relationships to the Other emphasize social justice (Levinas 1968, 62, 188). Human relationships require ontic analysis of the Other’s face (Levinas 1996, 83–84). The Other’s face makes us aware that our being is not limited to itself. We are not existentially condemned to be alone. Our ontic loneliness is counterbalanced by our Being-with-Others. Sociality is the relationship to the Other’s face. It is a de-centring process from our own being (Levinas 1999, 56). The Other’s face speaks to us. It is self-revealing. If the Other’s face were not self-revealing, then it could not make communicational exchanges possible. There would be no possibility of Discourse. The Other’s face is Discourse. It is the experience of absolute strangeness which is “in-front-of-us.” Others are strangers to our own “Being-oneself.” There cannot be any objective knowledge of the Other’s face. The Other’s face is always subjectively perceived and interpreted because it mirrors others’ “Being-­ oneself.” This is the meaning of Levinasian intersubjectivity. The Other absolutely transcends who-we-are. The Other’s face reveals the radical difference between our “self-in-a-world” and others’ “self-in-a-world.” The Other is, thus, infinite. Discourse makes us connected to the infinite/transcendent (Levinas 1968, 37, 46–47, 168–169, 182). The Other’s face opens the way to close relationships with the Divine/Infinite (Levinas 1968, 50). We can deploy our relationships with the Infinite/God. We can experience the infinite transcendence of the Other’s face. Without the Other’s face, we would be unable to grasp the Presence of the Infinite in our own lives. Levinas (1983, 87, 169) considered that spiritual life is basically moral life. Spiritual life is inherently concerned with economic issues since the structure of the national/international economy is confronted with ethical conflicts and dilemmas. Morality requires the materially based commitment which is expressed throughout economic life. Moral worldviews open the door to the ontic Other’s Face. From an ontic perspective, the Other’s Face reflects Dasein’s call for self-identity. We cannot become “who-we-would-like-to-be” without responding to Dasein’s call for self-identity. Moral worldviews emphasize our ontic “responsibility-for-others.” “Being-­ responsible-­for-others” is the only way to seriously take the Others’ Face into account. “Living-in-an-organization” means being responsible for others’ responsibility and freedom throughout organizational life. The Others’ Face unveils the ontic need to assume our responsibility for others’ responsibility and freedom. Organizational members’ ontic freedom can be limited by various organizationally based determinisms. The capacity to assume our responsibility in-front-of-others can be reduced by power games and relational tensions. That is why we are “responsible-­ for-others.” Our “responsibility-for-others” mirrors the way we

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strengthen others’ responsibility and freedom in their organizational life. Allowing others to be “responsible-and-free-beings” entails assuming our ontic responsibility towards the Others’ Face. In the organizational setting, organizational members respond to Dasein’s call for self-identity, while favouring others’ ontic responsibility and freedom.

5.2.3  The Infinite and Moral Life The Infinite can never be reduced to any thematic synthesis (Levinas 1968, 186). The Infinite is elusive. Thematizing the Infinite means believing in our capacity to grasp the Infinite, as though the Presence of the Infinite were “as-it-is.” In so doing, the Infinite is considered a “thing-to-be-known.” Instead, the Infinite transcends the finite since it is the Absolutely Other. The Infinite even transcends the idea of the Infinite because any idea of the Infinite is finite (Levinas 1968, 20, 22). Any idea of the Infinite is developed by existentially finite beings. The idea of the Infinite could assume innumerable forms and contents. But in all cases, those forms and contents are developed by finite beings. So, the idea of the Infinite can never mirror the essence of the Infinite. Only the Infinite knows its infinity. Only the Infinite can have perfect knowledge of its essence. The remnants of the Infinite’s presence overcome the present. We can never recover them (Levinas 2011, 27). Innumerable ideas of the Infinite have been historically proposed. But none of them can reflect the essence of the Infinite. Rather, our existentially based ideas of the Infinite are finite representations and interpretations of the Infinite. The Infinite is the Absolutely Other (Levinas 2012, 67). The Infinite is radical Otherness. It can never be assimilated. It is the Ungraspable. The Infinite is. The “It-ness” (illéité) of the Infinite cannot be revealed or concealed. Its It-ness cannot be represented, since representing needs the possibility of unveiling the object of representation, or of concealing it (Levinas 1996, 102; 2010, 68–69; 2012, 65). The “It-ness” of the Infinite cannot be wholly represented since it transcends all finite representations and interpretations. The “It-ness” of the Infinite is the absolute/fundamental Otherness. We cannot experience the presence of the Infinite/God without having experienced the Other’s face, that is, radical otherness in human existence. The “It-ness” of the Infinite is even the origin of relative/radical otherness between human beings (Levinas 2012, 69). The Infinite is the radical (incontrovertible) and absolute (ontological) Otherness. Human beings are interconnected through radical (incontrovertible) and relative (ontic) Otherness, because of their common humanity. The idea of the Infinite comes from the fact that we are “in-front-of” the Other’s face. Our ontic positioning “in-front-of-others” implies an undeniable otherness (Levinas 1996, 101). We are in relationship with the ungraspable Infinite. But any human relationships with the Infinite must never reduce the Infinite to the rank of finite and knowable things (Levinas 1968, 33; 2012, 54). Being finite means being knowable. The Infinite is ungraspable. Its infinity expresses its unknowability. The idea of the Infinite expresses the metaphysical Desire of the Absolutely Other (Levinas 1968,

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154, 170). The idea of the Infinite is produced “in-dialogue-with-others.” The Other’s face is others’ radical otherness in human existence. Unlike Descartes, Levinas asserted that having the idea of the Infinite means Desire. Desire is hospitality towards the Absolutely Other. The idea of the Infinite conveys moral substance since it is the true beginning of moral consciousness. Any moral consciousness requires one’s ontic freedom (Levinas 1968, 52, 55–56, 66, 171, 194). Hospitality towards the Absolutely Other is moral consciousness. Moral consciousness is Desire that makes aconceptual experiences possible. Desire is not restricted by concepts and dualisms. Moral consciousness results in metaphysics. Entities cannot exist without morality. Entities exist because of the Other’s face (Levinas 1968, 74, 239–240). Morality means interpersonal goodness that is self-transcendence. It requires our being-for-others (Levinas 1968, 281–283). Hospitality could be neglected or forgotten in our daily life. But in so doing, we deny the Other’s transcendence. The Other’s radical otherness is then eliminated (Levinas 1968, 147, 156). God is made available in the way social justice is realized through the ontic face-­ to-­face. An ontic face-to-face is the basis of language and, consequently, the “ultimate situation” (Levinas 1968, 51, 53, 182). Without being “in-front-of” the Other’s face, we would be unable to communicate with others. Language would be useless. We are not existentially “in-front-of” God/the Infinite. Nonetheless, we can be in relation with God/the Infinite. God/the Infinite is “In-finite.” God/the Infinite cannot be indifferent to finite beings. Being the “In-finite” entails being concerned with finite beings. Divine Life mirrors the non-indifference of the Infinite towards finite realities. There is no Divine Life without an absolute openness to subjectivity (Levinas 1994, 252–257). The “In-finite” is both negation of the finite and the presence of the Infinite within the finite. The “Infinite-within-us” is the idea of the Infinite. The “Infinite-within-us” is the metaphysical Desire for the Infinite (Levinas 1998, 63, 67). The Infinite always transcends the idea of the Infinite since the Infinite can never be compared with historically based representations of the Infinite. Subjectivity is hospitality towards the Other. It is grounded in the idea of the Infinite. The Other is an ontic infinite that can never be reduced to the rank of a thing/object (Levinas 1968, xiii–xvi, 206–207). The idea of the Infinite requires inwardness (Levinas 1968, 122). Only inwardness can make the idea of the Infinite arise in one’s consciousness. The metaphysical Desire for the Absolutely Other can never be satisfied. The Other can never be totalized. Transcendence refuses to be totalized (Levinas 1968, 3–4, 10, 24, 269; 2012, 11). Totalizing transcendence would make it purely immanent, as though transcendence were easily perceived, known, and managed. Safeguarding the absoluteness and unknowability of transcendence entails fighting attempts of ideologically based totalizing processes. The presence of the Infinite in the finite is accomplished as Desire (Levinas 1968, 21). The Desire for the Absolutely Other is metaphysical, since the Other is itself metaphysical (Levinas 1968, 59). Metaphysics represents relationships with the Other and makes hospitality towards others possible. Metaphysics leads to the essence of the “beyond-being” (Levinas 1968, 273, 276). The “other-of-being” is “otherwise-than-being”, “outside-­ of-­ being, or “beyond-being.” It is “not-being” (Levinas 2011, 33). The

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“beyond-­being” expresses an ontological difference between being and transcendence (the Infinite, God) rather than between being and nothingness. It mirrors the separation between beingness and “beyondness” (Levinas 1994, 136, 140). The “beyond-­being” allows us to understand Being itself (Levinas 1994, 156). It is “the tearing of this equality to self which is always being” (Levinas 1998, 82). The “beyond-being” is the exteriority of being (or metaphysical exteriority). According to Levinas (1968, 278), the “beyond-being” is morality (Levinas 1968, 278). Morality needs dialogue because it implies notions of freedom, consciousness, and good/evil. Morality is actualized in interpersonal relationships and communicational exchanges. Dialogue is the non-indifference towards the Other’s difference. Indifference towards the Other’s radical otherness would make dialogue impossible, or at least meaningless. Dialogue could give birth either to disturbing emotions (anger, jealousy, hatred, vengeance) or to positive emotions (love, altruism, compassion). Dialogue is basically the transcendence (dia) of self-centredness, as it is expressed in given words and sentences (logos). Dialogue is the way beyond self-­ centredness. Transcendence is “the dia of the dialogue.” The true origin of ethics lies in dialogue (Levinas 1998, 147, 150). The dia of the dialogue is the distance created by radical otherness in human existence. The proximity of the other gives birth to fraternity. It is also an incontrovertible distance, since it is existentially rooted (Levinas 1999, 93–94). Absolute morality is equivalent to absolute freedom. The requirements of absolute morality are the requirements of an absolute freedom. Morality would need absolute freedom. Otherwise, morality would admit that some individuals must have more liberties and rights than others. Morality requires the same liberties and rights for everyone. This is the ultimate basis of moral normativity. However, “absolute freedom” also presupposes the absence of constraints on any exercise of freedom. Absolute freedom is, thus, self-contradictory. It has two opposite components. Universalizing given liberties and rights for everyone is one thing. Allowing the unlimited exercise of freedom for everyone is another challenge. Absolute freedom could give rise to an immoral world, since the first dimension of absolute freedom (respecting basic liberties and rights) can be destroyed by its second dimension (absolute freedom in decision-making processes). Absolute freedom can destroy moral life. The possibility of negating morality is inherent in the essence of morality itself. Morality searches for absolute freedom (Levinas 1983, 105). Only subjects “who-are-there” can have moral experiences. Every moral experience is an ontic experience that is historically situated in a spatiotemporal unity (Levinas 1998, 90). An ontic experience is a mode of “living-in-the-­ world.” Only free entities are (existing) entities (Levinas 1968, 78). Freedom is an integral part of human existence. An “Otherness-focused moral worldview” always protects stable borders between good (moral) and evil (immoral), regardless of individuals and circumstances. An “Otherness-focused moral worldview” strengthens the way human needs and desires are fulfilled, while being deeply concerned with others’ needs and desires. Moral worldviews take the Others’ Face into account since the Others’ Face mirrors the others’ self-identity. Any expression of others’ self-identity is inherently linked to Dasein’s call for self-identity. Actualizing our “Becoming-oneself”

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requires mutual expressions of self-identity. The way the Others’ Face reflects one’s self-identity unveils the infinite strangeness of ontic otherness. Ontic otherness can only be infinite, that is, radical. Otherwise, ontic otherness would become a replica of one’s self-identity. Acknowledging the infinite character of ontic otherness opens our mind/heart to the Infinite. If ontic otherness can be infinite, then the Infinite is the Undefinable. The Undefinable is ungraspable. It overcomes our finite rationality and knowledge. The Others’ Face opens the door to the experience of the Infinite. Moral worldviews connect moral life and the experience of the Infinite. “Living-in-­ an-organization” means acknowledging the presence of the infinite in radical otherness. Radical otherness means that nobody can ever know others’ self-identity (O’Brien 1986, 469). Others’ “Becoming-oneself” remains ungraspable. “Living-­ in-­an-organization” means being subjected to organizational values and norms of behaviour. Those values and norms constitute the foundations of organizational morality (moral normativity) and ethics (ethical aim). They also reveal how an organization copes with otherness. An organization can be open to radical otherness. In doing so, it clearly accepts the infinite character of the Others’ Face. An organization then shows its capacity to deal with the ontic Presence of the Infinite, in various contexts.

5.2.4  Time and the Infinite Levinas believed that the “temporalization of time” is the essence of being. The temporalization of Time is the unrecoverable length of time. The human being is powerless, when confronted with ontic temporality (Levinas 2011, 53, 87–90). The temporalization of Time means the “beyondness” of being and non-being (Levinas 1994, 144). Ricoeur (1991a, 116–136, 141–169; 2003, 463) rightly said that Heidegger’s notion of temporalization implies three different levels: fundamental/ radical temporality, historiality, and “within-time-ness” (intra-temporality as “the time in which entities within-the-world are encountered:” Heidegger 1962, 278). According to Heidegger (1962, 374), temporality is the phenomenon that “has the unity of a future which makes present in the process of having been.” The Heideggerian notion of temporality focused on the basic unity between “being-­ towards-­possibilities” (fundamental temporality), having-been (historiality), and making-present (within-time-ness). Being-towards-death makes the future essential. Our “death-to-come” implies that the future has priority over the present. Everyone “is” a personalized “death-to-come.” The future makes the past meaningful: “only so far as it is futural can Dasein be authentically as having been” (Heidegger 1962, 373). We can choose our utmost possibilities-to-be because we are subjectively aware of our “having-to-die.” Knowing our “death-to-come” makes us choose “who-we-would-like-to-be.” Fundamental temporality focuses on the future, that is, on our “being-towards-possibilities” (Ricoeur 1991a, 150). Anticipatory resoluteness constitutes Dasein’s authentic existence. It involves accepting in advance the radical effects of our existential finitude, especially our

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death-to-come. Such ontic positioning characterizes human Dasein (Heidegger 1962, 370–372). Ricoeur (1991a, 123) said that the Heideggerian emphasis on anticipatory resoluteness unveils a Stoic influence. Historiality is the stretch between birth and death. “Being historial” means being existentially aware of living between our birth and our death. We live in-the-world, while evolving between our birth and death. This is an existential “in-between”, that is, the conjunction between our being-in-the-world and our death-to-come. Historiality is the ontological ground of History. It focuses on the past (“already-having-been”). Our “within-time-ness” is intrinsically linked to our existential thrownness into the world. “Within-time-ness” needs an extended length of time. Nowness is the present time of the authentic Caring about worldly things and beings. Caring implies protection of and respect for worldly things and beings. The past world does not “exist” in the here-and-now, except in the form of a “having-been-present.” What made an integral part of that past world is still “present-at-hand” as a “having-been.” “Being-in-time” does not refer to the linear succession of nows (Heidegger 1962, 432, 470, 475–480; and Ricoeur 1991b, 117–125; 1991a, 131, 134, 150, 155, 456–457). Heideggerian notions of temporality and temporalizations of Time were a way to oppose “clock-­ time”, since “chronological time” does not represent the existential category of Time. The “public time” (or “world-time”) is based on Dasein’s thrownness and fallenness (Heidegger 1962, 467–468). Historiality and within-time-ness are based on fundamental/radical temporality. Caring is the basis for temporalization of Time into future, past, and present. The present (“making-present”) is the time of Caring. Caring makes temporalizations of Time possible (Ricoeur 1991a, 124–131, 150, 249). Caring is Dasein’s Being (Heidegger 1962, 465). Levinas (2000, 30–31, 44–46) clearly explained the threefold structure of human existence and temporality in Heidegger’s Being and Time: “being-always-already-­ in-the-world” (facticity), “being-alongside-of” (being alongside other entities in the world: being close to entities), and “being-out-ahead-of-oneself” (the project-to-be-­ oneself: “ek-sistence:” see Heidegger 1962, 377). Levinas was deeply concerned with the essence of Time. He was not preoccupied with the socially, culturally, and religiously/spiritually induced idea of Time. Time is not only the ontic experience of duration, but above all, an ontic relation to the unattainable Otherness. Time is an ontic relation to the Absolutely Other (Levinas 1996, 54; 1998, 95; 2007, 9–11, 17). Levinas (2000, 19) claimed that Time is the relationship with infinity. Time is not an existential constraint on human action, but rather the way the human being is existentially related to the Infinite. Unlike Heidegger, Levinas did not define Time as Being-toward-death (Levinas 2000, 93). The essence of Time is the infinite (Levinas 1968, 260). Time means that the Infinite (the Absolutely Other) and finite realities never coincide with each other. Time is the relation between (finite) human beings and the Infinite, in terms of expectation and hope. Time is also the “face-to-face-­ with-others” (Levinas 2007, 10, 68–69). Time belongs to the Infinite. It is transcendence, that is, “unto God” (Levinas 1998, 81, 83). Time is the relationship to the Infinite (“relation-unto-God”) that can never be grasped (Levinas 1998, 108, 120). The “unto-God” makes our “relation-unto-God” possible, since it lies in our mind/ heart (Levinas 1998, 167).

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5.3  Summary Responsibility for others’ well-being and freedom can never be excluded from any moral worldview, since it strengthens the inner structure of existential concerns towards others, society, and Nature. It improves interpersonal and social relationships, while enhancing inner serenity (peace of mind/heart) as well as external peace (social harmony). A moral worldview could describe the path of responsibility-­ for-­others since the self/others dualism is safeguarded because of radical Otherness (Levinas’ philosophy). Levinas’ philosophy intrinsically links ethics (the existential quest for the ethical aim) and metaphysics. It unveils an “Otherness-focused moral worldview.” Levinas’ philosophy enhances moral normativity (the universal grounds for moral behavior, given the commonalities of existential predicament), while opening the way to the quest for the ethical aim (acknowledging the Otherness as the basic framework for intersubjectivity). Ontic responsibility-for-others could then have a moral component (universal norms for ontic freedom; universal truths) and an ethical dimension (the existential quest for the ethical aim as a way to overcome the limitations of moral normativity).

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Chapter 6

Ideological Mindset and Meaninglessness: Developing an Anti-Totalizing Concern, or Moving from a Moral Worldview to a Post-Moral Worldview

6.1  Introduction The changeover from a moral worldview to a post-moral worldview expresses an anti-totalizing concern. An anti-totalizing concern denies any worth to totalized realities. Totalizing self, world, society, and Nature makes them more comprehensible and coherent, while reducing the scope of philosophical questioning. Philosophical questioning can never provide any definitive answer since it is an endless process of free thinking. Totalization makes philosophical questioning disappear. It severely harms our interpretative quest. The human being is a “being-­ who-­interprets-reality.” Totalization destroys such a basic component of human nature. Totalizing realities is a mechanism of self-estrangement that denies any worth to our “being-who-interprets-reality.” Totalizing means being determined by a “spirit of system”, as though every being, thing, event, or phenomenon were integrated into a given system of predetermined ideas and representations. Being opposed to any totalizing attempt entails strongly criticizing conventional truths. Fighting any totalizing spirit could give rise to the feeling of ontic meaninglessness. Totalization could artificially eliminate ontic distress. If every being/thing/phenomenon could be totalized, then its own nature and substance are not philosophically questionable. Totalization seems to exclude any possibility of ontic distress, once and for all. However, such a “pseudo-quiet” state of mind hides an anthropological degeneration. The human being is thrown into a kind of cognitive nothingness since he/she cannot philosophically question “reality-as-it-is.” Totalization can be strengthened by moral worldviews. So, the anti-totalizing concern radically threatens the basis of moral worldviews. Thus, the basis of post-moral worldviews is progressively arising. The ontic quest for happiness becomes relativized. The borders between good and evil are suddenly vulnerable. Then, the changeover from moral worldview to post-moral worldview can begin. It requires a metaphysical revolt against meaninglessness (Albert Camus).

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6.2  T  he Primary Way the Basis of a Moral Worldview is Shaken The basis of a moral worldview can be shaken primarily by the way our ontic quest for happiness and self-transcendence processes are relativized. The fight for self-­ realization certainly contributes to increasing our happiness. However, it does not absolutize happiness. Happiness cannot exist without being surrounded by unhappiness and suffering. Moral worldviews propose an absolutized path to happiness in daily life, while post-moral worldviews emerge on a relativized path to happiness. Post-moral worldviews presuppose that we “live-in” a world of ontic uncertainties and contradictions.

6.2.1  Relativizing the Quest for Happiness Moral worldviews are related to a world in which we can obtain absolute truths and “live-in” a quiet “forest of uncertainties.” In contrast, post-moral worldviews take for granted that our world of ontic uncertainties and contradictions can never be overcome. We must learn to live more serenely in such a world, while relativizing all truth-claims. Serenity comes from the capacity to abandon our belief in absolute truths. 6.2.1.1  The Quest for Happiness The human being always searches for happiness throughout his/her existence. Such an ontic quest is an integral part of human life. However, the way happiness is defined may vary widely from one country to another and from one period to another. The means for reaching happiness in one’s existence could vary from one person to another. Some means could be perfectly in tune with one’s historical situation. The human quest for happiness seems to be universally shared. Nonetheless, cultural, social, political, and religious/spiritual conditioning factors play a major role in the way such an ontic quest occurs. We can believe in our “Becoming-­ oneself”, as though our present happiness were comparable to our desired happiness. The only thing we really know is our feeling of happiness. The ultimate substance of happiness is unknowable. We can only say that we were happy. The sentiment of happiness does not have any “transhistorical” basis” since it is drawn from our historical situation. Any conception of happiness appears in a specific spatiotemporal unit. It is evolving throughout space and time. Thus, there is no transhistorical conception of happiness. The sentiment of happiness is paradoxical. On one hand, it is closely linked to past experiences. We cannot prove our present happiness since the present moment is constantly changing. The feeling of happiness is past-focused. It is the subjective outcome of past events and phenomena and can

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have various origins. But, in all cases, it has been caused by past events and phenomena. “Presentiating” is making something present in our personalized “here-­ and-­now.” “Presentiatingness” unveils the spatiotemporal state of presentiating. Every representation distorts the object it is representing/symbolizing. Every representation is re-presenting reality. Re-presenting is making a reality “present again”, in a different form. Presentiating is making such spatially and temporally based re-presentation possible. Every being, thing, event, or phenomenon is present, here-and-now, in given world. This is the “externalized presentiation” that reflects an impersonal here-and-now. However, when a being, thing, event, or phenomenon is represented by consciousness, then it is endowed with an “internalized presentiation.” Reality that is re-presented is “presentiated” by our consciousness, in our here-and-now. Re-presenting reality is adopting a given perspective to look at it. Thus, it is another kind of presentiation. Realities are then endowed with an attributed presentiation. Externalized presentiation and internalized presentiation are not two parallel paths. Rather, they are interdependent. They are different sides of the same coin. Their interdependence reflects the human power of re-presenting realities, that is, “presentingness.” World pictures cannot be built up without taking presentingness into account. World pictures cannot represent the whole world. We are existentially finite. So, no one can ever grasp the wholeness of the world. Human beings are an integral part of the Whole they would like to represent. Our world-­ picture cannot be divorced from our lived experiences. Our world of representations is rooted in our lived experiences. It is deeply influenced by life lessons we have drawn from lived experiences. Our world of representations is also rooted in day-to-­ day conduct since it defines the world as we see it. We can only behave in a world we define as “existing.” A nonexistent world could never attract our attention and drive our attitudes and behaviours. Our world-picture provides the set of “possibilities-­to-be” we will use in our lived experiences and day-to-day conduct. Our lived experiences and day-to-day conduct allow us to choose “possibilities-to­be” which are suitable for our world-picture. Denying any worth to such possibilities-­ to-­be means eliminating the validity and coherence of our world-picture. Our historical consciousness makes the presentiation of the past (into the present) possible. Any sentiment of happiness requires the “presentiation” of the past. That is why we can feel happy and talk about our feeling of happiness. Time flows so rapidly that any sentiment of happiness cannot be grounded in the present moment. Nonetheless, it can be experienced in our personalized “here-and-now.” On the other hand, happiness remains imperfect. Therefore, the ontic quest for happiness is necessarily future-oriented. We are continuously searching for happiness since we have failed to actualize the “optimal” form of happiness (“for-us”). The meaning of happiness is not indefinable. But neither is it easy to circumscribe such a meaning. The sentiment of happiness is past-focused, while being future-oriented. The meaning of ontic happiness is, consequently, quite paradoxical. A happy life implies ontic freedom and openness to otherness. The human being is “Being-free”, “Becoming-oneself, and “Being-with-Others.” Every quest for happiness requires ontic courage. Otherwise, we would distance ourselves from happiness. Ontic courage cannot be theoretical. It can have teleological and interpersonal

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dimensions. From a teleological viewpoint, there is something good in life itself (Camus 2009a, 169). Metaphysical happiness is the true end (telos) of human existence (Camus 1977, 127; 2009a, 44; 2012, 17, 57). Happiness needs conscious and courageous choices. It requires a clear-headed will to be happy (Camus 2012, 136, 167-168). Happiness requires the courage to acknowledge our existential anxiety (Camus 1967, 11, 34). Our “having-to-die” unveils the subjective experience of our objective “death-to-come.” Ontic anxiety is basically linked either to our “having-­ to-­die” or to the meaninglessness of existence itself. Ontic anxiety about experiencing our having-to-die cannot be eliminated. Rather, we must learn to take it upon ourselves. But meaninglessness is not something we can accept since it is the true origin of ontic suffering. We must take our having-to-die and the meaninglessness of our existence upon ourselves. This is the only way to aim at ontic happiness. Ontic happiness and meaninglessness go hand in hand (Camus 1977, 165). The meaninglessness of our existence makes us free beings (Camus 2015, 75, 148, 207). From an interpersonal perspective, happiness cannot coexist with hatred (Camus 1969, 116). Hatred destroys what love has built up, and vice-versa. Love seems to be involved in any ontic quest for happiness. Being happy arises from our “Being-­ with-­Others.” Our existential loneliness can never be separated from our “Being-­ with-­Others.” Happiness can never exclude others’ well-being. Our own happiness and others’ happiness are essentially interdependent. Love makes such interdependence possible. Without love, our own happiness could not be intrinsically linked to others’ happiness. We would become estranged from our Being-with-Others and would eventually be unhappy. We could even fall into ontic despair. We cannot lose part of our being, especially our Being-with-Others, without falling into ontic despair. Hope comes from the way we strengthen our Being-with-Others. Happiness cannot arise when someone feels a deep lack of love in his/her life (Camus 1975, 163). Loving others implies loving ourselves (Camus 1995, 38). This is particularly true for an unconditional/all-encompassing love, altruism, and compassion. Self-­ love and love-for-others are interconnected. Happiness is intrinsically linked to an all-encompassing love (Camus 1975, 65). Existentialism makes us responsible for our own being. Camus (2018, 131-132) asserted that compassion is then excluded from an existentialist way of thinking, feeling, and acting. Moral worldviews embrace the notion of Truth-itself, while post-moral worldviews convey truth-claims. Moral worldviews considered that Truth-itself is the ultimate reality. Post-moral worldviews affirm that absolute truths do not exist. People who embrace moral worldviews follow Dasein’s call for morality. They are “in-quest-for-happiness.” Happiness then seems to be intrinsically related to Truth-­ itself. Only “subjective thinkers” (Kierkegaard) can endorse post-moral worldviews. Being a “subjective thinker” entails relativizing our ontic quest for happiness. Truth-itself does not exist at all. The subjective thinker is infinitely concerned with his/her own existence. Post-moral worldviews enhance a radical critique of moral worldviews since they deny the existence of Truth-itself. Human life is inherently linked to dialogue (Camus 2009, 208; 2019a, 121). Organizational members often embrace moral worldviews. However, they can eventually be confronted with the non-existence of Truth-itself. Organizational members can question the existence of

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Truth-itself. If so, the foundations of their moral worldview can be fundamentally shaken. Organizational members can open their mind/heart to innumerable truth-­ claims. They can assume the pre-philosophical challenge to participate in a cross-­ cultural/interreligious dialogue about truth-claims. In doing so, organizational members take their ontic quest for happiness upon themselves. They do not refer to any Truth-itself. Thus, they become subjective thinkers who can criticize the way the ontic quest for happiness is experienced in organizational life. “Living-in-an-­ organization” can be related to moral and post-moral worldviews. However, moral worldviews do not have the same meaning and implications as post-moral worldviews. Fostering the concrete implementation of Truth-itself strengthens stable borders between Good and Evil. It becomes mandatory to find a basic link between Truth-itself and one’s beliefs/values/virtues. Denying the existence of Truth-itself weakens the borders between Good and Evil. The subjective thinker progressively abandons his/her moral worldview and eventually embraces a post-moral worldview. Such a changeover from a moral worldview to a post-moral worldview has important consequences for his/her ontic quest for happiness. 6.2.1.2  The Fragile Borders Between Good and Evil A perfect being/thing does not have any ontic becoming. From an ontic perspective, becoming entails being subjected to various conditioning factors, causes, and determinisms. “Being-perfect” is being unconditioned. Any perfect thing, being, or phenomenon can never become other than “what-it-is.” Perfection is changeless. If perfection is unconditioned, then how could imperfect beings eventually reach the level of the unconditioned? Unlike perfect beings, imperfect beings are subjected to various causes and conditioning factors. Thus, there would not be any possible path from imperfection to perfection, that is, from the conditioned to the unconditioned. Moral worldviews presuppose that there is a path to perfection, although imperfect beings will never be “naturally-perfect.” Imperfect beings could be transformed by an eternal closeness with a Perfect Being. Post-moral worldviews strongly affirm that such an ontic path to perfection cannot exist. Otherwise, it would contradict itself. Any self-aggrandizing mindset distorts the notion of perfection. It transforms our self-identity into an absolute reality. Our self-identity is suddenly idealized. Beings who are existentially finite can only reach relative perfection. But how could a “relative perfection” be possible? Existing things, beings, and phenomena are neither imperfect nor perfect. Existing entails being confronted with a continuous mix of perfection and imperfection. The mix of perfection and imperfection in our “in-the-worldliness” can allow us to distinguish between human perfection and Divine perfection. In God, perfection is absolute, without slight imperfections. God’s Perfection constitutes an integral part of God’s Essence and Life. Perfection actualizes Goodness-itself, while imperfection opens the door to evil powers. The dualism between perfection and imperfection is related to self-knowledge and to our capacity to know others’ selves. Events allow us to deepen our knowledge of the world and our self-knowledge. Due to our existential finitude, our self-knowledge

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always remains quite limited and fragile. Only a perfect world can be interconnected with a perfect self, and vice-versa. Our “self-in-a-world” expresses our undeniable finitude. We cannot have a perfect self without a perfect world. Existential finitude makes our “self-in-a-world” imperfect since our self and world are imperfect. A perfect being is not subjected to the self/world dualism. A perfect being would overcome the self-world dualism since it would be its ultimate foundation. Even “relatively perfect” human beings are still dependent on the self/world existential structure, since their being is “in-the-world.” Thus, our “in-the-worldliness” hinders us from denying the self/world dualism. An imperfect self sometimes denies the relevance of generosity, kindness, respect, and compassion. Love is the driving force of our “Being-with-Others.” However, the imperfect self sometimes denies the worth of mutual respect, altruism, and compassion. In so doing, the imperfect self builds up an imperfect world. The fragile borders between good and evil should never make our ontic distress increase. We do not know “what-should-be.” A post-moral worldview presupposes that good and evil cannot be separately defined. Moreover, it takes for granted that the projection of moral duties is not rationally grounded. The gap between “reality-­ as-­it-is” (“what-is”) and “moral reality” (“what-should-be”) can never be bridged. Sadness comes from the fact that “reality-as-it-is” is not “what-should-be” (Camus 1970, 39). True benevolence and love need to eliminate self-reinforcing ignorance (Camus 1995a, 124). Everyone justifies his/her innocence, as though his/her supposed faults were related either to human nature (Christianity) or to the exercise of our ontic freedom (Buddhism), or even to Heaven’s Decrees (Confucianism). If everybody is innocent, then guilt does not exist. Without guilt, there cannot be any process of self-improvement. Without guilt, nobody is concerned with his/her own self-transcendence (Camus 1995, 86, 88). Guilt is a social construct (Camus 1995, 116). It is connected to various expectations of integrity and trust. A moral worldview presupposes that Evil is knowable. We can know the realm of Evil, because of its social, cultural, economic, political, and religious/spiritual effects. However, it is harder to define the realm of Good. The indefinable character of Good is the basis of any post-moral worldview. If Good is indefinable, then morality lacks transcendental substance. If so, morality becomes a purely immanent phenomenon. Unlike Good, Evil is definable. Thus, traditional morality has lost its foundational dualism between Good and Evil. In a post-moral worldview, everyone must discover his/her own morality. When the borders between good and evil become fragile, we are totally autonomous, from a moral viewpoint (moral normativity) and ethical perspective (the quest for the ethical aim). A post-moral worldview asserts that morality cannot be universally applied. Then, the influence of moral relativism grows at a faster pace. Moral worldviews are progressively perceived as obsolete. However, we cannot grasp any reliable boundaries between Good and Evil. Moral phenomena, dualisms and concepts are historically based. They are ever-changing. People who embrace moral worldviews always protect stable distinctions between Good and Evil. Stable borders between Good and Evil strengthen the existence of Truth-itself. But those who would like to endorse post-moral worldviews

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must abandon any belief in Truth-itself. Post-moral worldviews presuppose that only innumerable truth-claims exist. Endorsing a post-moral worldview means becoming a subjective thinker and emphasizing our ontic possibilities-to-be. “Becoming-oneself” is then at the heart of our ontic concerns, regardless of traditional virtues. Organizational members could find it very difficult to abandon their belief in Truth-itself. In so doing, they can fall into ontic distress. That is why the changeover from moral worldview to post-moral worldview is a lengthy process. Organizational members can easily criticize morally based borders between Good and Evil. But abandoning such borders and opening the way to ontic uncertainties and doubts can be more harmful. Becoming a “subjective thinker” is not an easy task. It requires ontic courage to face uncertainties and doubts, without any possible reference to Truth-itself. But that is the price of endorsing a post-moral worldview. “Living-in-an-organization” then becomes an experience of continuous uncertainty/ doubt since uncertainties and doubts are existentially based. Organizational life could deepen organizational members’ ontic uncertainties and doubts. But endorsing a post-moral worldview entails facing our ontic uncertainties/doubts with courage and serenity.

6.2.2  The Fight for Self-Realization Our ontic quest for self-realization is intrinsically linked to our ontic quest for happiness. Self-realization is the basic path to happiness. Searching for our self-­ realization means taking others’ well-being into account. However, the awareness of powerlessness in the social, cultural, economic, political, and religious/spiritual realm deepens the relative quest for happiness/self-realization. The feeling of powerlessness is strengthened by the ontic limitations of human reason, will, and desires. In the organizational setting, organizational members can fight for their self-­ realization. Seeking self-realization entails actualizing our “Becoming-oneself.” Our self-transcendence processes then become our ultimate concern. Organizational members can be ultimately concerned with their ownmost possibilities-to-be since they are ultimately concerned with their ontic becoming. If so, they can strongly oppose any “organizational-anonymous self.” The “organizational-anonymous self” is a very powerful instrument for organizationally based self-estrangement, since it makes organizational members disconnect from their “Becoming-oneself.” Organizational culture could encourage employees and managers to forget or deny their ultimate concern, by strengthening their attachment to finite realities and phenomena.

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6.2.2.1  Reason, Will, Desires, and Their Ontic Limitations Reason does not have any permanent meaning and substance. The substance of reason can refer either to conscious/unconscious processes of reflection/analysis (“internally-driven substance”) or to predictable/unpredictable consequences of rationalization (“externally-driven substance”). The use of reason changes from one country to another, from one period to another. This is particularly true for political rationality. The irrationality of fears is not grounded in their disconnectedness from reality. Rather, irrational fears dominate our state of mind/heart. Fears strengthen existential uncertainties. They shake our conviction of holding unchanging truth about given things, beings, events, or phenomena. In post-moral worldviews, truth-­ claims mirror rationally oriented and multifaceted consciousness. Objective facts do not exist at all. Distancing oneself from the pseudo-objectivity of facts makes reason radically anxious about “reality-as-it-is.” The pseudo-objectivity of facts has been created by social, scientific, economic, and political customs, rituals, and agreements. Economic powers and institutions rule over individual interests and needs. Thus, Nature and non-human beings become pure objects for human ends. An absolutizing Reason presupposes that everything is determined, from its real origin. Reason can be as totalitarian as social, economic, political, and religious/ spiritual systems and ideologies. The human intellect makes us forget our natural origin. It positions humankind “in-front-of-Nature”, as though Nature were an object for radical human exploitation of natural resources. The human being is then uprooted from his/her naturalness. Natural beings become ideological tools that have a purely instrumental value for human beings (strong anthropocentrism). Instrumental reason dominates human thought and decision-making processes. The human intellect can divide and objectify any object “in-front-of-us.” It can also allow us to distance ourselves from such an object. The human intellect has historically tried to deny its naturalness. Human beings can no longer be aware of their “being-in-Nature.” They can dominate Nature, ecosystems, and non-human beings, and exploit them as much as possible (anthropocentric mindset). However, authoritarian capitalism makes the satisfaction of all needs and desires quite impossible. Thus, it prepares for the long-term destruction of humankind. That is why desires and superfluous needs should never be the ultimate basis of thought. Desires are at the heart of ecological crises since they are intrinsically linked to consumption and production processes. We may desire “what-is-impossible.” However, we cannot seriously think about impossibilities. Impossibilities constitute the object of dreams and utopias. They can never be the object of realities and ideologies. Desires are not replicas of past events and phenomena. Rather, desires are clearly future-oriented. They are developed in the present moment, while implicitly referring to past events and phenomena. Desires are often so powerfully focused on past events/phenomena that they neglect their future-oriented nature. In such a case, desires could imprison our minds in the past. Although desires are rooted in the past, they express the will to be released from the powerful influence of past events and phenomena. Sometimes, desires seem to be pure replicas from the past, without any change at all. Indeed, desires can never be pure replicas from the past since they

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attempt to renew the past. The renewal of past events/phenomena follows from our ontic freedom. This is the future-focused dimension of desires. Desires can be either the basis of freedom or the ultimate constraint on freedom. Desires can allow us to reinvent the past, or to repeat it in the “eternal return of sameness.” Desires constitute the basis of ontic freedom. Our “Becoming-oneself” implies a metaphysical desire. We must choose ontic “possibilities-to-be-in-the-world.” Free actions are closely linked to prior wishes and desires. This is the past-focused dimension of desires. But the human will is not free, when subjected to strong desires. The ontic quest for knowledge could eventually change the world. The substance of humankind refers either to conscious/unconscious processes of a humanizing self (“internally-driven substance”) or to predictable/unpredictable consequences of humanizing the world (“externally-driven substance”). If we were only “who-we-­ are” without any primordial connection to our species, then we would lose our moral/social responsibility for the future of humankind. Our mind/heart is the bearer of humankind. This is the basis of our moral and social responsibility for the ontic becoming of our world. Moral and social responsibility for the future of humankind and for the future of the Biosphere requires knowing the impact of our decisions/ actions in the long-run and acknowledging our ecological ignorance. Ecological ignorance can allow us to take ecologically prudent decisions and actions. Ignorance is the lack of knowledge about “reality-as-it-is.” The awareness of our ecological ignorance could make us more prudent, when undertaking given actions. Relational ignorance strengthens the power of prejudices. But the awareness of our relational ignorance could unveil the presence of prejudices and stereotypes. Being aware of our ignorance means overcoming the detrimental effects of ignorance. Most of the time, our accumulated knowledge coexists with our ignorance. Such coexistence of knowledge and ignorance can produce misinterpretations and misunderstandings. We are then in a cognitive state of confusion. The human mind cannot sustain uncertainties and misunderstandings in the long run. The most efficient way to eliminate such confusion is to abandon the dualism between the known and the unknown. Some phenomena are known, others “not-already-known.” The “not-already-­ known” could eventually be known. Other phenomena are unknowable since they constitute an integral part of mystery. Accepting the existence of the unknowable and of the “hardly-knowable” entails deepening our humility. It can open our mind/ heart to the mysterious dimension of existence. The “already-known”, the “not-­ already-­known”, the “hardly-knowable”, and the unknowable constitute the basic orientations of human knowledge. In each case, knowledge allows us to be responsible. Responsibility cannot exclude the use of reason and the influence of desires. Being a “subjective thinker” means being existentially finite. The human situation is existentially limited, “in-the-world”, and historically based. The existential predicament means that every part of human existence is limited. Our reason, will, desires, and knowledge are existentially finite. Existential finitude is undeniable since it is an integral part of human existence. We cannot “exist” without being aware of our incontrovertible existence. The meaning of one’s existence arises from such ontic awareness. People can endorse a given meaning of existence, while developing ontic uncertainties and doubts. They can also observe the

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meaninglessness of human existence since there is no intrinsic meaning of existence. Being aware of our existential finitude does not give rise to any precise meaning of existence. Such awareness does not convey any meaning of existence. We are always free to give meaning to our existence. Such meaning can continuously evolve. The awareness of our existential finitude takes place in the context of our ontic situation. Our ontic situation is an existential positioning of our “self-in-a-­ world.” We cannot be aware of our existential finitude without actualizing our “self-­ in-­a-world.” But our “self-in-a-world” has a given historical situation. Being a “self-in-a-world” is being determined by a personalized “here-and-now.” Existing means being historically grounded in a personalized “here-and-now.” The subjective thinker fights any ideological attack from family, group, organizational, institutional, or societal “hereness/nowness.” The various attempts to absorb our personalized “here-and-now” into an “impersonal-here-and-now” unveil the pitfall of various “they-selves:” “family-based anonymous self”, “group-based anonymous self”, “organizational-anonymous self, “institutional-anonymous self”, or “societal-­ anonymous self.” Any kind of “anonymous self” can depersonalize our “hereness/nowness.” “Living-in-an-organization” means being confronted with the “organizational-anonymous self.” The “organizational-anonymous self” is a powerful tool for the ideological depersonalization in the organizational setting. Organizational members must safeguard their own self-identity without being totally absorbed by the “organizational-anonymous self.” Post-moral worldviews emphasize the need to preserve our “Becoming-oneself” from ideological attacks. Choosing our ontic possibilities-to-be entails safeguarding our ontic freedom. Unlike moral worldviews, post-moral worldviews denounce any ideological mindset that threatens one’s ontic freedom. 6.2.2.2  Self, World and Unconscious Processes Existing means Being-with-Others. Our Being-with-oneself has its own “in-the-­ worldliness.” The world is the ontic locus of being’s self-realization “in-front-of-­ others.” Being-with-Others implies that the “I-within-myself” (focusing on thought, interiority) is open to others. When I am thinking about my inwardness, I am no longer connected to others. The human being is both “being-alone” and Being-with-­ Others.” Existing means being aware of our personalized “here-and-now.” Being in our personalized “here-and-now” is knowing that our world is not necessary at all. If our world were not a necessity, then our own self would not be a necessity. Self and world are accidental. But their interdependence is existentially rooted. Our being is “there”, in a personalized “here-and-now.” “This” self “is” in “that” world. Our “in-the-worldliness” is spatially and temporally determined. Our self is not predetermined. Our world is not predefined. Not being a necessity makes possibilities-­to-be almost infinite. The interdependence of self and world constitutes an integral part of human existence. Becoming who-we-are is the ultimate act of ontic freedom. “Being-free” is intrinsically related to our “Being-oneself.” We need to know “who-we-were”

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(retrospective outlook: our “having-been”) and “who-we-would-like-to-be” (projective outlook: “not-already-there”). An “internal what-we-should-be” is equivalent to “what-we-would-like-to-be.” Our project-to-be is our own self-driven duty. Any externally driven “who-we-should-be” is not related to our self-transcendence processes. Rather, it comes from family, group, institutional, and societal expectations about the person we should become. It is then a basic constraint on our existential freedom. Who-we-are is the only reference framework for existential freedom. We can only be who-we-are (Camus 1995a, 229). But nobody knows who he/she really is because he/she is continuously “in-becoming.” Our self-knowledge is existentially limited because of our limited rationality/knowledge and because of unconscious processes. Sometimes, we can elucidate what we are certainly not. The negation says something positive about our own self. We are “who-we-would-liketo-­be” (Camus 1975, 142, 150). Such selfhood allows the actualization of our ontic freedom through our “in-the-worldliness.” Our being is both “in-a-self” and “in-the-world.” Every human being conveys the transcendental substance of humankind. Our being is not a necessity. Only necessary beings could know why they exist. Our own being is not necessary. We are not already who-we-are. Who-we-are in our personalized “here-and-now” is not totally “who-we-could-be.” “Who-we-could-be” is always open to changes in our own self. We are constantly changing. We are our “project-to-be.” Being a “self-in-a-world” is “Becoming-oneself.” “Being-in-becoming” implies that part of “who-we-are-­ now” will be abandoned and become “who-we-were” (our “having-been”). Self-­ transcendence is the existential attempt to be another “I”, in realizing “who-we-would-like-to-be.” The project to be “another-I-than-I” mirrors the projection of a specific “another I.” We do not try to substitute another self. Rather, “another I” is simply a different version of our “I.” “Being-in-becoming” makes the “another-I-than-I” possible. Self-transcendence is then quite paradoxical. We would like to be another “I”, while remaining who-we-are. If the self and the “I” were identical, then there would not be any attempt to become “another-I-than-I.” The paradoxical relation between the self and the “I” would disappear. Without such a paradoxical relation between the self and the “I”, our own being could not constantly be “in-becoming.” The “I” has been built up through various socialization processes. It has been subjected to different conditioning factors. We are not fully aware of any “another-I-than-I.” We hope that every “another-I-than-I” is only an expression of our ontic uniqueness. Being aware of the successive layers of “another-­ I-­than-I” unveils the multiple layering of our self. That is why it is so difficult to know who-we-are. We cannot become someone other than who-we-are. Every “another-I-than-I” is a specific layer of who-we-are. The layers of selfhood in a self are socially, culturally, politically, and even religiously/spiritually induced. They are totally individualized. Only the Absolute is never subject to change. Every individual is irreplaceable. This uniqueness has both true and hidden aspects. Every personality is a mixture of kindness and wickedness, good and evil. Being wise means being aware that good and evil are integral parts of the human personality. Every personality can change. We can improve the way we choose positive emotions/sentiments, such as love,

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kindness, altruism, and compassion. We can deepen our courage to eliminate disturbing emotions/sentiments, such as anger, hatred, jealousy, and vengeance. In both ways, we deploy our “ontic resoluteness.” Social constructs can always be modified. Post-moral worldviews promote the human power of self-transcendence and strongly challenge static borders between good and evil. The thinking self is simultaneously the “self-observing self.” “Being-oneself” is “being-in-becoming.” Unconscious processes constitute an integral part of the human self. Some unconscious motives and emotions can eventually resurface in our conscious self. This is the hypothesis of the “changing unconscious.” An unconscious self is then a “conscious-to-be.” Other parts of the unconscious self seem to be constantly unreachable. This is the hypothesis of the “static unconscious.” An unconscious self then remains unconscious for ever. We are not aware of the way the changing unconscious and the static unconscious are evolving. Any knowledge of our true self is always a distortion of it. This is a basic obstacle to any continuous overlapping of selfhood’s layers. Our own self is always changing. Changing things, beings and phenomena are subjected to external conditioning factors. They do not have any permanent substance. Existing means “Being-oneself.” Every personality deploys its “self-in-a-world”, given its own in-the-worldliness. Every individual self is realized “in-a-world.” Being “in-a-world” is being in a personalized world, since Being-in-the-world is Being-oneself. The interconnectedness between the self and its world shows that the self cannot be wholly “within-itself.” The self inhabits a personalized world. However, our world cannot remain a purely external reality since it is “our” world. The presentiation of the self implies the presence of the world “within-the-self.” The presentiation of the world requires the presence of the self “within-the-world.” Attachment to our own self can mirror the negation of the presentiation of the self to the advantage of the presentiation of the world. It can also reflect the negation of the presentiation of the world to the advantage of the presentiation of the self. Being a “subjective thinker” means being “in-front-of-others.” Our “Becoming-­ oneself” implies an ontic positioning of our “self-in-a-world” “in-front-of-others.” Being in relationships with others is positioning our “self-in-a-world” with others’ self-in-a-world. Such ontic positioning can improve our self-awareness. Being “in-­ front-­of-others” allows us to better know “who-we-are” and define “who-we-would-­ like-to-be.” Being connected to others’ “self-in-a-world” entails assuming the challenge of our self-identity. Being “who-we-are/who-we-would-like-to-be” can never be separated from others’ “self-in-a-world.” We cannot actualize our “Becoming-oneself” without being closely related to others’ “Becoming-oneself.” Being “in-front-of-others” means becoming more aware of self-identity processes in our inner life. However, it does not exclude the influence of unconscious processes. Very often, we are not conscious of the way others’ “Becoming-oneself” influences our own “Becoming-oneself.” Our self-projection into the future can be unconsciously determined by others’ self-projection. Conscious and unconscious processes occur in family, group, organizational, institutional, and societal life. “Living-in-an-organization” entails being confronted with conscious and unconscious processes of self-identity. Organizational members can deploy their

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self-identity without being totally aware of their “organizational-anonymous self.” The awareness of our “self-in-a-world” can be partially realized. Our “Becoming-­ oneself” is not necessarily free of unconscious processes. It is never easy to define who-we-are and “who-we-would-like-to-be”, since our “Being-oneself” is always “in-becoming.” Our “being-in-becoming” connects our “Being-oneself” and our “Becoming-oneself.” Unconscious processes can exert a stronger influence than the daily awareness of our self-identity. They can determine the way we define ourselves in our organizational life. “Living-in-an-organization” means being subjected to unconscious processes that determine our “Becoming-oneself” in organizational life.

6.3  T  he Way the Basis of the Post-Moral Worldview is Evolving Post-moral worldviews could find a way to influence decision-makers’ mindset, given that perceptions and interpretations mirror a pluralistic conception of Truth. Uncertainties and doubts expand exponentially with pluralism. The ontic and historical situation of human beings is comprised of existential limit-situations. Post-­ moral worldviews make the ontic quest for Truth much less intense and convincing. “Being-free” remains our ultimate concern, regardless of circumstances.

6.3.1  Quest for Truth and Being-Free World peace needs inner and relational peace. Inner peace requires ontic freedom. “Being-free” means being subjected to truth-claims. In moral worldviews, ontic freedom is a continuous search for Truth-itself. Truth could provide inner peace. However, we are never certain of holding any truth at all. There are only truth-­ claims. In post-moral worldviews, truth lies in the way we think about beings, things, or phenomena. Truth is a communicational issue. In post-moral worldviews, our ontic quest for truth requires our participation in communicational exchanges. Communicational exchanges involve linguistic and para-linguistic units and have teleological dimensions. But above all, they unveil the existential and historical basis of Being-itself. Our way of thinking, feeling, and speaking could allow communicational exchanges with others. Then, we are “in-truth.” We cannot be free beings without being open to truth. In moral worldviews, the ontic quest for truth requires a basic openness to Truth-itself. We could try to find inconspicuous dimensions of Truth-itself and take them upon ourselves. In post-moral worldviews, we look at the emptiness of Truth-itself and focus on truth-claims in communicational exchanges. The actualization of Truth-itself in daily life could take different forms. Communicational exchanges deal with the various ontic forms of truth

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(truth-claims). Only the ontic forms of truth can be grasped by the human mind. If Truth-itself existed, then it would remain unattainable. Truth-itself can never be found in midst of communicational exchanges. Our dialogical responsibility has something to do with the ontic forms of truth. The various ontic forms of truth make it impossible to grasp it in a rational and coherent way, since they can contradict one another. Truth is communicationally based. Absolute truths crystallize Truth-itself in specific historical forms. Truth cannot coexist with multiple a priori. Truth only mirrors the process of exchanging truth-claims. In moral worldviews, the “substance” of Truth can refer either to conscious/unconscious processes of “internalized truths” (“internally-driven substance”) or to predictable/unpredictable consequences of the ontic quest for truth “in-front-of-others” (“externally-driven substance”). Whether it is internally or externally driven, the substance of Truth is not the ultimate ground of innumerable truth-claims. In post-moral worldviews, Truth is the intersubjective process of exchanging truth-claims. Truth does not convey any basic substance at all. Post-moral worldviews presuppose that there is no Truth-itself. In post-moral worldviews, communicational exchanges about truth-­ claims do not convey any “substance of Truth.” Post-moral worldviews make us more aware of our moral responsibility towards our relative truth-claims. We should never absolutize our truth-claims since we are existentially finite beings. The essence of things, beings and phenomena is unknowable. If the essence of things, beings, and phenomena would be knowable, then realities could be totalized. Post-­ moral worldviews denounce the totalizing dimension of Truth-itself. However, absolutizing our truth-claims could open the way to vicious and egocentric behaviours (Camus 1995, 88). There is no absolute truth, only innumerable truth-claims (Camus 1977, 34). Everyone creates his/her own morality and truth (Camus 1994, 181). Absolutizing our truth-claims is denying our existentially limited rationality and knowledge. Truth must be ascertainable. Prejudices often arise in our mind/ heart. We are morally responsible for checking their validity. There are many sources of suffering resulting from truth-claims. Facing stronger truth-claims than ours could be painful. Grasping the ultimate consequence of actualizing truth-­ claims in our personalized “here-and-now” can also be painful. Our motives can be ethically based when they enhance the ontic quest for the ethical aim. Sometimes, our freedom to act in the right way could be subjected to opposing forces. Ethical decision-making could have side effects that adversely affect others. Ethical decision-making processes could initiate philosophical questioning about the intrinsic meaning of existing realities. If realities do not have any intrinsic meaning, then they are meaningless. The human being is a “being-who-­ projects-meaning.” Unlike moral worldviews, post-moral worldviews presuppose that realities do not have any intrinsic meaning. Conventional truths are socially, culturally, politically, and even religiously/spiritually based. We are always free to endow a thing, being, event, or phenomenon with meaning. Our “being-who-­ interprets-­reality” is a “being-in-quest-for-meaning” of ontic realities. Ontic realities can be perceived as meaningful or meaningless. Moral worldviews embrace conventional truths (or “pseudo-truths”), while post-moral worldviews deny any worth to all “pseudo-truths.” Post-moral worldviews fight the absolutization of

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conventional truths, since “pseudo-truths” reduce the scope of our ontic freedom. Conventional truths build up a bureaucratic and totalizing meaning of “we-ness.” They crystallize prohibitions that reduce the scope of our ontic freedom. Principles of action must take all predictable consequences into account. Our existentially finite rationality and knowledge reduce our capacity to look at a given event/phenomenon in a holistic/systemic way. Even the notion of “predictable consequences” remains quite vague. Indeed, predictable consequences of a given action can never be clearly defined, once and for all. They largely depend on the particularities of lived experiences and ethical issues. Predictable consequences would not be the same, from one situation to another, from one ethical issue to another. Post-moral worldviews strongly resist any attempt to totalize the predictable consequences of given actions. According to Camus, the ontic phenomenon of the “plague” refers to the loss of freedom, the inability to engage in open discussions, and the loss of any future, from an individual and collective perspective. It would be foolish to resign oneself to the plague, said Camus (1995a, 42, 119). Freedom is existentially and historically based. Resignation would be a form of self-estrangement. We should always fight the plague in free and honest ways of feeling, speaking, and behaving (Camus 1995a, 151). The State can be the potential “Annihilator” of individual liberties, argued Camus (2009a, 79). Camus acknowledged that commanding is an integral part of human life (Camus 1995, 49). However, there can be wrong and abusive ways of commanding. Unfortunately, every individual eventually tries to rule over groups and popular masses (Camus 1995, 60-61). The exercise of our ontic freedom can be deeply detrimental to others (Camus 1970, 68; 2009a, 172). Our ontic freedom is exercised through our “Being-with-Others.” The exercise of individual freedom influences others’ lives since everyone lives “with-others.” “Being-free” means refusing to exert terror or be subjected to it (Camus 2008, 183). “Being-free” is letting others be “who-they-would-like-to-be.” Slavery and oppression make any individual freedom impossible. Everybody must be free. Otherwise, nobody is free, said Camus (1969, 16). Freedom is individually and collectively conquered (Camus 2019a, 81, 338). Individual freedom should never be absolutized, since “Being-­ oneself” is “Being-with-Others.” Our “Being-oneself” means “Being-in-the-world” and “Being-with-Others.” In materialistic societies, products supposedly represent the Truth, as though Truth were close at hand. However, they misrepresent realities. They are not connected to Truth-itself/Beauty-itself. Post-moral worldviews acknowledge that our ontic quest for truth is never oriented towards Truth-itself. Rather, post-moral worldviews emphasize the ontic need to develop our own truth-claims. “Ontic inter-­ presence” is affirming the coexistence of various truth-claims, while denying the existence of any Truth-itself. It strengthens our ontic quest for truth and enhances our “Being-free.” Every ontic quest for truth requires an ontic choice of meaning for our existence/self. Searching for relative truths (truth-claims) is disclosing our “Being-free.” Any deployment of truth-claims is an ontic choice. Every ontic choice presupposes the projection of a given meaning for our existence/self. We cannot be “in-quest-for-truth” without realizing our “Being-free.” Realizing our “Being-free”

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is choosing grounds for our ontic quests. “Living-in-an-organization” is being “in-­ quest-­ for-truth, while realizing our “Being-free” in the organizational setting. Choosing our truth-claims entails relativizing any organizational notion of truth. Organizational morality (corporate policies and codes of ethics) and ethics (value statements; corporate social responsibility/sustainability/citizenship reports) are often based on a moral worldview. Truth-itself seems to be predefined and predetermined. Organizational members who embrace post-moral worldviews deny any worth to Truth-itself, while enhancing Truth-itself as the basis of organizational morality and ethics. They fight any ideological attempt to absorb organizational members’ truth-claims. “Living-in-an-organization” is safeguarding our “being-in-­ quest-for-truth” and, therefore, being infinitely concerned with our “Being-free.”

6.3.2  Perceptions, Interpretations, and Ontic Questioning Philosophical questioning is endless since the subjective thinker is ultimately concerned with his/her finite/conditioned existence. Every finite/conditioned existence implies the ontic limitations of knowledge, interpretation, perception, and experience. Those ontic limitations make the philosophical quest possible. The Infinite cannot have any philosophical quest, since the Infinite overcomes all finite knowledge, interpretation, perception, and experience. Philosophical questioning does not give rise to definitive answers. Otherwise, philosophy would be destroyed. Philosophical questioning is the ontic basis of our “being-who-interprets-reality.” Without any philosophical quest, there is no path for interpreting ontic events and phenomena. Truth-itself would absorb any individual principle. Thus, our ontic freedom to choose our beliefs/virtues/values would vanish. Philosophical questioning cannot come to an end, since its potential scope and duration are infinite. Any philosophical questioning produces many more questions than precise answers. Preliminary and fragmentary answers constitute the cradle of philosophical questioning. Any answer to a prior philosophical question is a further question that deepens the area covered by the previous question. The philosophical journey always calls the status quo into question since it expresses the subjective thinker’s ultimate concern for his/her existence. Anything that threatens the stability, coherence, and harmonious deployment of one’s existence strengthens the status quo. The various forms of philosophical questioning could vary from one country to another and from one period to another. Our finite rationality must admit that the deepest nature of beings, things, events, and phenomena is unknowable. However, it is still possible to raise philosophical questions about the unknowable. Philosophizing about unknowable phenomena unveils something important about the ontic limitations of philosophizing/knowing and about the nature of such phenomena. Knowledge could be very different for internal and external phenomena. Philosophical questioning could widen the scope of our interpretations and multiply the various alternative actions available.

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Philosophical questioning could mirror the continuous change in “reality-as-iti­s.” Any existing thing, being, or phenomenon depends on innumerable conditioning factors. Conditioned beings, things, and phenomena are interdependent. Their interconnectedness makes them constantly change. Being, things, and phenomena are interconnected. The ontic interconnectedness of all beings, things, and phenomena presupposes changing modes of interdependence. Interdependence does not remain the same. Rather, it is an ever-changing process. What is changing is continuously changing. Change cannot be stopped. Knowing the world means contributing to world change. Knowledge processes deeply influence the way the “world-we-live-in” evolves. Our interpretations of events/phenomena can change throughout our existence. Nothing is external to our interpretative quest since the human being is a “being-who-interprets-reality.” No human being can eliminate ontic distress, once and for all. The possibility of ontic distress arises when facing meaningless events and phenomena. Being confronted with meaninglessness could make our ontic doubts and uncertainties exponentially increase. In some situations, we resign ourselves to existentially meaningless events and phenomena. The possibility of ontic distress largely depends on our capacity to cope with existentially meaningless situations, events, and phenomena. We always choose our interpretations of reality. Our interpretations are grounded in our interests, desires, will, and good conscience. They can be socially, culturally, politically, and even religiously/ spiritually induced. The possibility of ontic distress constitutes an integral part of human existence. Existing is having the “possibility-to-be-in-despair.” Unlike moral worldviews, post-moral worldviews insist on the endless ontic questioning about the meaning of things, beings, events, and phenomena. Embracing a post-moral worldview entails being open to innumerable perceptions and interpretations of realities. In organizational life, organizational members who endorse post-moral worldviews can manage various (and sometimes conflicting) perceptions and interpretations/re-interpretations of organizational realities. The subjective thinker can easily accept the validity of post-moral worldviews since he/she is infinitely concerned with his/her existence. Perceptions and interpretations of ontic realities reveal the way the subjective thinker is “in-front-of-others.” Communicational exchanges about truth-claims express our capacity to deal with conflicting perceptions and interpretations/re-interpretations of organizational realities. “Ontic inter-presence” is realized in family, group, organizational, institutional, and societal life. Organizational members can deepen their ontic questioning, when confronted with conflicting perceptions and interpretations/re-interpretations of organizational realities. “Ontic questioning” is philosophical questioning about the meaning of our existence and about the meaning of our “self-in-a-world.” It allows us to deepen the substance and implications of our “ontic neighbourhood.” In the organizational setting, organizational members can better understand organizational realities, if they exploit their ontic questioning. In doing so, they will eventually strengthen their ontic neighbourhood, as it is realized throughout organizational life.

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6.3.3  The Growing Intensity of Uncertainties and Doubts Existentially finite/conditioned beings “live-in” the realm of uncertainties and doubts. They could have various beliefs, needs, and desires. The Infinite does not have any belief, need, or desire. The Infinite is not subject to uncertainties and doubts since uncertainties and doubts belong to existentially finite/conditioned existence. Hope is the only available springboard for self-realization in a world of ontic uncertainties and doubts. The deepest interpretative challenge is to rationally “live­in” an irrational and self-contradictory world. Even the meaning of beings, things, events, and phenomena is never immutable. Meaninglessness knocks at our doors. Moreover, Time modifies our interpretative quest. Constant change is rooted in the flow of Time. Eternity never changes because it is not related to any flow of Time. Temporality requires the continuous flow of Time that makes every being, thing, event, or phenomenon constantly change. Our knowledge of reality is existentially finite. We can never know the essence of our own self and of others’ selves. Our rationality is existentially finite. The more uncertainties are growing, the more ontic doubts are multiplying. Ontic doubt could stem from our lack of knowledge, rationality, or faith. Faith does not make our existential doubts disappear. Ontic doubt does not exclude any possibility of faith. The subjective thinker does not agree with any purely objective interpretation of ontic realities. Ontic uncertainties permeate our experience of “in-the-worldliness.” We live but remain uncertain of existing. Living is an objective state of body, mind, and heart. It can be scientifically proven. Existing is a purely subjective state of body/mind/heart that puts the emphasis on interpretative quests (our “being-who-­ interprets-reality”). Existing is interpreting reality. “Not-existing” would imply that our being is not involved in any interpretative quest. Losing our interpretative quest means dying. Death brings a definitive end to our “being-who-interprets-reality.” Totalitarian regimes make our interpretative quests disappear. The strong and cruel influence of totalitarian ideologies unveils the possibility of facing nothingness in daily life. But it is only a specific way of facing nothingness. Nothingness is not multifaceted. Rather, there are various modes of “closeness-to-nothingness.” If nothingness were existentially certain, then it would not be an ontic threat. Nothingness always surrounds and threatens human existence. The presence of nothingness in human existence is the true origin of existential anxiety. Ontic anxiety takes two basic forms: either the fear of an eternal loneliness or the fear of endless ontic questioning. Both fears can coexist with the possibility of life-­ after-­death (Camus 2010, 91). Existing is “living-in” an inevitable and universal anxiety. What is the meaning of “meaning”? How can we know the meaning of “meaning”, given that the essence of “meaning” is a prerequisite to the question itself? The “fore-questioning meaning” is the preliminary meaning of meaning that allows the question about the essence of “meaning.” It is a conventional and pre-­ critical notion of meaning. Ontic anxiety presupposes that the “fore-questioning meaning” can never be totally clarified. The “fore-questioning meaning” remains an abyss of language. It makes our ontic truths quite fragile. Any philosophical

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questioning is based on the pre-critical notion of a “fore-questioning meaning.” Every ontic hope/despair is based on a “fore-questioning meaning.” We always remain uncertain about the meaning of our own hope/despair. Hope is then not necessarily more meaningful than despair, and vice-versa. Hope cannot exist without the possibility of ontic despair. Ontic despair cannot exist without the possibility of hope. The experience of ontic despair shows that nothingness can be productive. However, we are always uncertain about the justification of our ontic despair. Ontic despair is a by-product of the presence of nothingness in one’s existence. It is an ontic possibility-to-be. Choosing ontic despair is the ultimate consequence of the presence of nothingness in one’s existence. Without the ontic possibility of despair in human existence, hope would be absolute and meaningless. Hope cannot exist without doubt. The growing doubt could eventually give birth to despair, and hope would disappear. Ontic despair is a process. Embracing a post-moral worldview means being imbued with ontic uncertainties and doubts. There is no Truth-itself. So, nothing is ultimately certain. Existing means being subjected to endless uncertainties and doubts about our existence/self. We can never know the true substance of things, beings, events, and phenomena. The intensity of our ontic uncertainties and doubts can even increase, when confronted with conflicting truth-claims. The growing intensity of our ontic uncertainties and doubts inevitably nurtures our ontic anxiety. “Being-anxious” entails being aware of our undeniable finitude. Our “Being-anxious” has an ontological basis as well as ontic expressions. In our family, group, organizational, institutional, or societal life, we can experience an ontic anxiety that follows from the structure of human existence. Organizational members can have ontic uncertainties and doubts about the substance and implications of organizational ethics. Ontic anxiety can stem from various sources, including organizational life. Organizational members’ ontic anxiety can be influenced by anxiety-driven phenomena. Organizational life can be the true source of performance expectations. It can strengthen organizational members’ ontic anxiety. “Living-in-an-organization” means being confronted with “anxiety-­driven experiences” throughout organizational life. Organizational members are constantly confronted with “organizationally-based anxiety.”

6.3.4  The Awareness of Existential Limit-Situations Our participation in Being-itself is historically rooted, since our being has an historical basis. Being in-the-world presupposes the historicality of our being. The historicality of our being creates the interconnectedness of Being-itself and our ontic “experience-to-be.” Our ontic “experience-to-be” is moulded by our “Being-­ oneself”, “Being-with-Others” and “Becoming-oneself”, since we are a “self-in-a-­ world” that is “in-front-of-others.” We cannot overcome our historical roots. Existing means having an historical foundation. Existing is being historically rooted in a personalized “here-and-now.” We cannot transcend History. The human being does not have access to any “transhistorical experience-to-be.” Everything in human

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life arises from an historical basis. The historicality of our being is the basis of its existentiality. Existence needs temporality and the flow of Time. There is nothing beyond History. The most important limit situation is “being-in-historical-­situation.” Our self-knowledge mirrors part of humankind. Our self-consciousness presupposes our belongingness to humankind. How can we understand the meaning and scope of our belongingness to humankind? We do not know the essence of humankind. But we are responsible for all images of human beings we can produce and transmit to others. They can eventually be translated into words, attitudes, and behaviours favouring a given future for humankind. However, we must avoid the pitfall of such anthropological images. “Being-free” entails being responsible for our anthropological viewpoint. “ “Being-­ free” means overcoming our ontic limitations, although our limited rationality/knowledge and finite existence are incontrovertible. We are existentially finite. However, self-transcendence allows us to transcend some ontic limitations. But self-transcendence will never open the door to an infinite existence. We always remain existentially finite. Self-transcendence is rooted in the historicality of our being. “Becoming-oneself” is grounded in “Being-in-historical-situation.” As a finite being, “Being-in-the-world” makes us overcome our ontic limitations, while participating in a finite world. Humankind is not rooted in any specific historical situation, except world history. Only individuals have a specific historical situation. Our “Being-oneself” is manifested only when we are “in-front-of” others’ “Being-­ oneself.” What is the meaning of “Being-free” when all human beings are not equally free in their existence? Finite rationality reduces our capacity to understand an existential freedom. We can only observe its ontic manifestations. “Being-free” can never be separated from our “Being-oneself” and from our “in-the-worldliness.” Any ontic commitment “in-the-worldliness” has political dimensions, since it transforms “reality-as-it-is.” Political freedom makes externalized self-affirmation possible. However, the essence of who-we-are is “in-process.” Self-knowledge is only possible for static components of the self. Existing entails “being-anxious” about the following structural components of human existence: Guilt: Moral responsibility requires the possibilities of repentance and forgiveness. If repentance and forgiveness are totally excluded from the overall picture, then there cannot be any moral responsibility. Ridding ourselves of any moral responsibility requires the impossibility of repentance and of forgiveness. Depending on his/her membership group, the individual can only choose the kind of responsibility he/she has to take upon himself/herself. In the organizational setting, the experience of guilt could express “the desire to correct a transgression and to engage in prosocial behaviours” (Salvador et al. 2012, 126). Organizational guilt could follow from the transgression of organizational policies and codes of ethics (moral normativity). Organizational members could also feel guilty when denying any worth to organizational values (and to the ontic quest for the ethical aim). Suffering: Suffering implies that vital powers are adversely affected. It is a preparatory anticipation of our “death-to-come.” Moreover, suffering is the constant reminder of our “having-to-die.” Our “having-to-die” is the subjective awareness of

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our objective “death-to-come.” Our “death-to-come” is an objective fact that we are prone to subjectively neglect and forget. Rather, our “having-to-die” presupposes that we subjectively accept the inevitability of our objective “death-to-come.” A preparatory anticipation of our death does not necessarily imply any search for the meaning of suffering. A constant reminder of our objective “death-to-come” creates an active and subjective quest for the meaning of our “having-to-die.” Organizational suffering may assume various forms, such as burn-out, performance anxiety, anxiety about organizational change, psychological and sexual harassment, work accidents, and so forth. Struggle: Unlike death and suffering, guilt, and struggle are produced by our words and deeds. Organizational life gives rise to awareness of our existential struggle since organizational members fight for their livelihoods. In some situations, organizational changes could threaten our organizational position and promote applications. Death: The world is ordered by death (Camus 1995a, 121). Our “relationships” to dead people are socially, culturally, and religiously/spiritually induced. Can we imagine “life-after-death”? Our imagination is an important source of our peace of mind/heart. Everything begins in our consciousness. However, we cannot experience “life-after-death.” Death implies the elimination of consciousness. An experience that does not have any connection with consciousness is not an experience. Therefore, there is no experience of death. Physical death implies the death of one’s consciousness (Camus 1977, 27, 30). Our sentiment of meaninglessness does not exist in “life-after-death” (Camus 1977, 49). It does not deny our attachment to life. The meaning of meaninglessness can even strengthen our attachment to lived experiences, emotions, words, attitudes, and deeds. Acting is loving life (Camus 2012, 152). However, our subjective “will-to-live” expresses our desire for personal duration and the anxious awareness of our “death-to-come.” Every perishable being would like to have the longest possible duration (Camus 1975, 65, 99). We prefer life to death, because “life-after-death” is ultimately uncertain. Living is knowing “what-it-means-to-live.” We know nothing about “life-after-death.” Only dead persons could know the implications of their “life-after-death.” But that is only true if our consciousness survives after our death. Moreover, it can only be true if the state of consciousness in the “life-after-death” retains the capacity to know something and to compare such knowledge with reminiscences of beliefs (when people were still living). If there is any consciousness in “life-after-death”, then it must involve knowledge and memory. The state of consciousness in “life-after-death” requires the “living memory” of our principles, convictions, values, virtues, and beliefs. Living is being “in-becoming” and being aware of our subjective “having-to-die.” Existential anxiety is the anxiety of our “having-to-die.” We can define the meaning of our existence or resign ourselves to ontic meaninglessness. Our reflection about our “having-to die” could contribute to nurturing our meaning of life. But in some cases, it could open the door to the metaphysical revolt against meaninglessness. Reflecting on the meaning of our existence does not necessarily unveil a specific meaning of our “having-to-die.”

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Post-moral worldviews allow us to deepen our “ontic awareness.” “Ontic awareness” mirrors the capacity to cope with our existential finitude. It opens the way to an authentic existence. “Being-authentic” is acknowledging our existential finitude. More precisely, “Being-authentic” is knowing that our “Becoming-oneself” is existentially finite. “Ontic authenticity” is basically linked to the awareness of our finite self-identity. “Being-authentic” means being related to our personalized “here-and-­ now.” It is fighting any ideological attempt of “ontic absorption.” The “organizational-­ anonymous self” reflects the way the organizational life/culture can destroy our “Becoming-oneself” and our personalized “here-and-now.” It radically enhances an “organizational-here-and-now.” “Being-anxious” is being aware of such ideological attempts to distort our self-identity. “Living-in-an-organization” entails being confronted with an organizationally based absorption of our self-identity. Assuming the pre-philosophical challenge of organizational life means remaining resolute, from an ontic perspective. “Ontic resoluteness” unveils our determination to safeguard our “Becoming-oneself” in spite of all attempts of ontic absorption.

6.4  T  he Final Changeover from Moral Worldview to Post-­Moral Worldview: The Anti-Totalizing Attitude and the Metaphysical Revolt Against Meaninglessness The final changeover from moral worldview to post-moral worldview expresses the anti-totalizing attitude and the metaphysical revolt against meaninglessness. Both elements of the perceptual/conceptual changeover are crucial, and they are interconnected. Nothing is unconditionally true. If so, then there is no permanent basis for meaning. Meanings are not intrinsically related to any absolute truth. Rather, they are projected by the human mind. Events, phenomena, and situations are meaningless since they do not have any intrinsic meaning.

6.4.1  The Anti-Totalizing Attitude An integral whole can have harmonious parts. In such a case, there is a slight contribution of individual parts to the way such a wholeness has been developed. A wholeness can have antagonistic parts. A dialectical interaction between the various parts of a wholeness presupposes that any conflict between various interests, needs, values, and desires can provide a new synthesis. Totalizing realities means denying nothingness. If History were “free of nothingness”, then History would totalize realities. However, History can never be totalized. Everything in human life is historically grounded. Totalizing History implies that History is the ultimate project of the human mind. People who embrace post-moral worldviews do not agree with any form of totalization. The Whole is the realm of the untrue. So, a wholeness can

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already be harmonious, if its constituent parts safeguard such internal harmony. A wholeness can also be the interplay of internal conflicts, when its constituent parts are oriented towards a “harmony-to-be.” Totalization opens the way to various abuses of power. It makes every being, thing, event, or phenomenon subject to the so-called “intentionality” of the wholeness. Power is socially, culturally, and politically connected to knowledge. Tyranny requires the absolute control of knowledge. A tyrant creates a legal system based on his/her own personality. Abuses of power make oppression omnipresent. Tyranny denies any worth to radical otherness. It rather strengthens one-track thinking. Nonetheless, plurality is a sine qua non for human action, attitude, and speech. It implies the basic equality of all human beings. Acknowledging the basic equality of all human beings entails favouring mutual understanding and relational peace. Plurality also refers to the distinctiveness of individuals. Speech and action allow us to be who-we-are. Political debates could make ontic freedom disappear if they deny our ontic freedom. “Onticity” refers to the ontic conditions of existence, while existentiality reflects the ontological structure of human existence. Ontic freedom is based on principles of action/decision. It is intrinsically linked to action. Ontic freedom is the capacity to undertake any desired action. “Being-free” needs free action and choice. Freedom is a phenomenon of human will. Religious/spiritual beliefs can deal with metaphysical and moral concerns. But religion does not have a monopoly of moral sense. Traditional moralities strengthen moral sense through conventional truths. This is particularly the case for institutionalized religions. Religious moralities are often related to devotional practices and religious beliefs that have nothing to do with moral issues. Even Mahamat Gandhi’s attempt to unify multiple (theistic) religions is based on the interconnectedness of morality and religion. Moral principles are constantly nurturing religious beliefs and practices (Gandhi 1989, 164-171). Individuals endorse given religious beliefs, virtues, rituals, and practices because they find them meaningful: “somebody professes a religion because he cannot do otherwise”, said Gandhi (1961, 197). Institutionalized religions provide a general set of meanings that allow people to orient their own life, perceptions, interpretations, and actions. Everybody is prone to consider his/her religion as the “supreme religion”, argued Gandhi (1986, 568). Institutionalized religions reinforce their foundational beliefs by making them strictly linked to moral behaviour. They interpret the foundation of realities as something “transrational.” The basis for all realities is not irrational. It overcomes any kind of rational thought. The “transrational” basis of realities could then become the springboard for superstition. If the “transrational” can never be irrational, then every devotional practice could overcome pure rationality. Superstitions open the way to any “transrational” practice. Religious belief in something “transrational” produces “areas of mystery” in which reason is powerless. Superstitions belong to popular culture. Any belief is a projection of “what-is” towards “what-could-be.” “What-could-be” is not an ontic possibility-to-be, but rather alternative realities. It is “not-already-real-in-the-here-and-now.” Areas of mystery are the interface between the finite and the infinite. Finite beings cannot grasp the nature of the infinite. If that were possible, then the gap

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between the finite and the infinite could eventually be bridged. This does not exclude any connection between the finite and the infinite. Only human capacity to seize the nature of the infinite is challenged. Sacredness can be considered the supernatural presence of the infinite in finite existence (supernatural sacredness). It can also refer to the natural sanctity of human beings/Nature (natural sacredness). Sacredness can reflect the balance between supernatural sacredness and natural sacredness. Moral worldviews emphasize supernatural sacredness. Instead, post-moral worldviews focus on natural sacredness. Ideologies and utopias could use natural sacredness as a tool of propaganda. Sacredness could paradoxically strengthen the revolutionary spirit and fight it quite efficiently. Sacredness can be wrongly identified with the revolutionary cause, and even with its idolized leaders. It can even be applied to given temporal and spatial units. Quasi-religions, such as communism and Nazism, distort the meaning and scope of natural sacredness to justify power abuses and totalitarian regimes. The infinite is relegated to the status of finite/conditioned reality. In other situations, sacredness can be rightly identified with the revolutionary cause, without developing any idolatry. The inevitable borders between the finite and the infinite remain the same. The revolutionary cause conveys a spiritual substance since it is strictly linked to the infinite. It aims at a balance between the supernatural and the natural. Some people could argue that liberation theologies embrace such a notion of balanced sacredness. Believing in God means perceiving that our existence is strengthened by the presence of sacredness. Indeed, the Infinite must be useless since it is not a “being-­ alongside-­other-beings.” If that were the case, then the Infinite would not be Infinite. Even for believers, God is useless. Otherwise, the Infinite is desecrated, as though the Infinite were free of any supernatural sacredness. If the Infinite is a useful object, then it cannot give rise to supernatural sacredness. Such a desecrated Infinite can only produce natural sacredness. The idea of God could be useful when we are anxious about our “having-to-die.” However, from a theological viewpoint, God must be useless. Otherwise, God would become an object among others (“being-­ alongside-­other-beings”). The uselessness of God is theologically grounded. It safeguards God’s Infinity. Nonetheless, the uselessness of God does not deny that the idea of God could be psychologically and socially useful. God’s Essence and Life are useless. But the idea of God in human consciousness could be quite useful since it can favour the exercise of human freedom. However, the idea of God in our self-­ consciousness could also endanger our ontic freedom. The issue of human freedom is always at stake, when dealing with Divine intervention in History. Every devotional practice does not necessarily reinforce our freedom and individuality. Prayers to God can be rationally criticized when they constitute means to abandon part of our ontic freedom. Prayers to God should never express any fear of being existentially free, said Camus (1995, 140-141). Safeguarding our ontic freedom means fighting abuses of power, without considering their ideological “pseudo-­ justifications.” Otherwise, the ideological/totalitarian state of mind will absorb our capacity to choose our possibilities-to-be. Post-moral worldviews oppose all attempts at totalizing realities. Every totalization mirrors an ideological perception and interpretation of reality. Totalization

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needs ideological thought to justify its trends of ontic absorption. Totalizing organizational life means eliminating our freedom to choose our possibilities-to-be. Totalizing is providing all explanations and getting rid of all ontic uncertainties and doubts. Thus, organizational members who embrace post-moral worldviews are severely shocked by ideologically based totalization. Totalization is the best way to make one’s “Becoming-oneself” disappear. Organizationally based totalization is the worst attack on organizational members’ “Becoming-oneself” since it claims to hold absolute truth about organizational realities. Any critique of organizationally based totalization could then be perceived as an unjustified attack on such an absolute truth. Organizationally based totalization can be exploited by moral and political worldviews. In both cases, it adversely affects organizational members’ “Becoming-oneself.” Post-moral worldviews express an anti-totalizing attitude towards all attempts of ontic absorption, whether they are organizationally based or not.

6.4.2  The Metaphysical Revolt Against Meaninglessness Multiple meanings could be either compatible or contradictory. The level of compatibility between multiple meanings could vary from one meaning to another. Any unifying orientation for multiple meanings must deal with compatible and contradictory meanings. It can only realize an optimal unification of meanings, given the circumstances. It cannot make all contradictions disappear. A unifying orientation of multiple meanings cannot always eliminate the feeling of meaninglessness. The human being can realize the meaninglessness of his/her life and world and, thus, the inevitable absence of ontic hope. The feeling of meaninglessness presupposes the radical awareness of human finitude. If we are not radically aware of our incontrovertible finitude, then we cannot feel and describe the meaninglessness of human existence. Internalizing our existential finitude means walking on the road to meaninglessness. Can our ontic positioning about the meaninglessness of human existence be meaningful? The metaphysical revolt against meaninglessness is the only way to find meaning for our ontic positioning about meaninglessness. The metaphysical revolt against meaninglessness can never lead to religious beliefs. If religious beliefs were compatible with meaninglessness, then meaninglessness would be resolved (Camus 1977, 50, 56, 60, 71, 77, 124). Religious beliefs could eventually make meaninglessness disappear. They would even describe how people could be released from meaninglessness. If meaninglessness could be resolved, then it would only be comprised of enigmas. Only enigmas are problematic. Unlike enigmas, mysteries can never be resolved. Meaninglessness is not a misunderstanding of mysteries. The metaphysical revolt against meaninglessness destroys mystery as a “metaphysical catch-all.” There is no hidden meaning we should uncover. The metaphysical revolt against meaninglessness radically calls the coherence of realities into question. It attempts to avoid the “traps of ontic hope.” Denouncing meaninglessness means denying any worth to ontic hope. Thus, ontic hope is not a

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possibility-to-be. Rather, it is a distortion of our “Becoming-oneself.” If there is no possibility for ontic hope, then there is no available meaning for any being, thing, event, or phenomenon. Without ontic hope, meaninglessness is all-encompassing. Ontic hope means resignation “in-front-of” ontic uncertainties and doubts. Rebelling against meaninglessness entails denouncing all forms of ontic hope. “Living-in” a world of uncertainties and contradictions is refusing to resign ourselves “in-front-­ of-meaninglessness” (Camus 1975, 49). The metaphysical revolt against meaninglessness resists any form of ontic hope. Meaninglessness dismisses God. Only nothingness really exists and permeates “reality-as-it-is.” Nothingness is present in the self, in society, and even in Nature (Camus 2009a, 99). However, nothingness always remains unattainable (Camus 1975, 108). Nothingness does not provide any explanation since it is “nothing” at all. We cannot grasp the “nature” of nothingness since nothingness has no nature at all. Otherwise, it could not be “nothing.” The metaphysical revolt against meaninglessness fights any notion of Divine Eternity. It is not compatible with religious moralities. The metaphysical revolt against meaninglessness is not compatible with moral worldviews. Rather, it characterizes post-moral worldviews. There cannot be any continuity between human temporality and Divine eternity. There is a qualitative leap between human (finite) temporality and Divine (infinite) eternity. This qualitative leap involves an extrinsic link between eternity and temporality. It is much more comprehensible when we look at time-consciousness. Objective time is compartmentalized. I “was” who-I-­ was when a given past was my present. Is our time-consciousness staying in hope or despair? Is it related to any will to transform the world we “live-in”? Does God’s existence change anything in the human predicament? The metaphysical revolt against meaninglessness fights ontic despair. Our time-consciousness allows us to develop our revolutionary spirit. However, if there is no God at all, then there must be social/political justice in the real world. We should never have any expectation about justice in “life-after-death” (Camus 1969, 126), since “life-after-death” is unknowable. The fight for earthly justice makes us avoid the trap of ontic despair (Camus 1975, 113). Justice, freedom, and dignity for all human beings and interconnected (Camus 2019a, 33, 173, 205). The power of freedom is a continuous struggle against injustice (Camus 2020, 139). Believing in the meaninglessness of human existence opens the way to our metaphysical revolt. But we eventually reach a metaphysical crossroads. On one hand, we are not free/responsible being since Almighty God is responsible for Evil. On the other hand, we are free/responsible beings since Almighty God does not exist. We must make an ontic choice. The sentiment of meaninglessness makes our freedom of action increase. Believing in having been given meaning in life makes us “slaves of our own freedom.” Our decisions and actions must be in accordance with our meaning of life. Otherwise, we fall into the trap of cognitive inconsistency. This is Camus’ notion of “living-better.” We are then influenced by a hierarchy of transcendental values. Moral worldviews embrace the purpose of “living-better”. The feeling of meaninglessness could instead provide a deeper sense of freedom. Camus explained how we can emphasize the multiplicity and variety of lived experiences. This is Camus’ notion of “living-more” as passion for Life-itself. This is the third effect of meaninglessness (Camus 1977,

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79-89). “Living-in” meaninglessness makes us practice universal love. We can, thus, improve the way we love every person we meet in daily life. Love then becomes unlimited (Camus 1973, 56, 109). The feeling of meaninglessness does not imply a lack of moral norms. Remorse is always useless, said Camus (1977, 94). It cannot change the past. Moreover, remorse could radically reduce the field of our possibilities-to-be. Remorse could stifle our self-transcendence processes. Illusions must be destroyed. Illusions about the past and the future define predetermined meaning. Illusions about our own ontic freedom must be annihilated (Camus 2019, 125). Post-moral worldviews strongly oppose predetermined meanings and uncritical interpretations. The world we “live-in” could seem meaningful, while being illusory. Making illusions disappear unveils the ontic strangeness of human beings in-the-world. Then, the sentiment of meaninglessness arises. We are strangers to ourselves. Our self-identity seems to be disconnected from our “Being-oneself.” Our “self-in-a-world” is constantly threatened by the alien, chaotic, and unreasonable world we “live-in.” Meaninglessness connects human beings and the world (Camus 1977, 18, 29, 34, 36-37, 44, 48-49). It makes our life unsustainable. Anyone may live serenely if Life-itself is meaningless. Living a meaningless life cannot coexist with happiness (Camus 1970, 53, 113). The metaphysical revolt against meaninglessness is based on the absence of Truth-itself. If there were any Truth-­ itself, then meaninglessness would be a metaphysical distortion of it. But if the world has no truth at all (Camus 1970, 94), then our quest for Truth-itself is useless. Living entails being confronted with meaninglessness at any moment of our life (Camus 1977, 76). Consequently, searching for truth is attempting to unveil the meaninglessness of human existence. The most powerful challenge is to grasp the meaning of History, given that human existence is meaningless. A meaningless existence does not destroy the human quest for meaning. Otherwise, it would open the way to absolute relativism and moral indifference towards those who suffer in body and in spirit (Camus 2019a, 100-101). There is no logic in meaninglessness (Camus 2020, 111). Human being is meaningful, although human existence is meaningless. The meaningfulness of human being stems from his/her capacity for making meaning (Camus 2020a, 71). The so-called “laws of historical development” could make people admire the power of History. Nietzsche said they could allow them to blindly focus on historical outcomes, and then to look at facts as unconditional realities (2008). Nietzsche strongly believed that there are no facts, but only interpretations. So, historical outcomes are merely conditioned interpretations. Human existence is historically grounded. The historicality of human existence makes all events and phenomena historically oriented. History is an infinite field of interconnected interpretations. The structure of human temporality can never be destroyed. The flow of Time is always moving forward. Objectively, it cannot be stopped. However, the flow of Time could lose part of its consistency, at least from a subjective viewpoint. Any subjective loss of ontic temporality is related to our time-consciousness. We cannot recover past events. Any thing, event and phenomenon has a “what-has-been”, while any being has a “having-been.” “Being-oneself” is conveying various layers of “having-been” within our “self-in-a-world.” But a “having-been” can still

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influence us, in our personalized “here-and-now.” This is “having-been-present.” The present moment is open to past and future. The present moment is open to the past since it could still be influenced by past events/phenomena. It is open to the future because it conveys our ontic project-to-be. Being in the present moment means making the past (as having-been) and the future (as not-already-there) present in our personalized “here-and-now.” Our self-consciousness makes our “knowledge” of the past and “knowledge of the future” possible. The “knowledge of the past” is a fragmentary knowledge of past events and phenomena. Knowing the past is also knowing how past events and phenomena still influence us in our personalized “here-and-now.” The “knowledge of the future” is a fragmentary knowledge of our ontic project-to-be. The present moment makes the “knowledge of the past” and the “knowledge of the future” presentiate in our personalized “here-and-now.” The flow of Time needs an infinitesimal substance of the present moment. Time is formless. It is socially, culturally, politically, and religiously/spiritually induced. Any representation takes place in our personalized “here-and-now”, while being developed with past (and impersonal) interpretations. We should never be too strongly attached to them. Otherwise, Camus said, we would lose part of our ontic freedom (2012, 99). Our “Becoming-oneself” would be adversely affected by such an attachment to past events and phenomena. Expiating the past occurs in the present, as well as in the future. The presence of any “having-been-present” in our life does not deny that the past is past. But it unveils the influential power of such “having-been” in our present life. The presence of any “not-already-there” in the present does not mean that the future is already present. Beings, things, and phenomena are existentially perishable. Metaphysical revolt comes from an awareness of the unjust/incomprehensible human predicament. Metaphysical revolt against meaninglessness strongly criticizes the basic purposes of humankind. It aims at social, economic, and political transformations of the world we “live-in.” Metaphysical revolt implies the subjective certainty that the meaninglessness of human life can never be mitigated. Thus, our values can only be drawn from a metaphysical revolt against meaninglessness. Values are not transcendental, but rather purely immanent. The metaphysical revolt against meaninglessness is the historical reality of the human being, argued Camus (1966, 21, 26-45). The human will could be the will “to-be-all”, that is, self-identification with universal values. Universal values are then the common values of humanity (Camus 2019a, 149-150). However, the human will does not necessarily take meaninglessness into account. It could also be the will “to-be-nothing”, that is, self-identification through the acknowledgment of radical decay (death and finitude), said Camus (1966, 27-29). The “will to-be-all” characterizes moral worldviews, while the “will to-be-­ nothing” is emphasized in post-moral worldviews. Post-moral worldviews presuppose that such metaphysical acceptance of reality is the only available mode of “Being-oneself”, in a world of ontic uncertainties, doubts, and contradictions. Post-moral worldviews oppose all ideologically based attempts at totalization. They involve a basic critique of dehumanizing processes. Totalizing realities is denying our ontic freedom of choice. Totalization makes our “Becoming-oneself” disappear, as though our self-projection into the future were intrinsically linked to totalized

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perceptions and interpretations. Totalization can give birth to extremist consciousness. It can strengthen the various expressions of extremist consciousness, regardless of their social, cultural, political, and religious/spiritual substance. Moral worldviews presuppose the existence of Truth-itself and, therefore, the existence of some intrinsic meanings. Instead, post-moral worldviews allow the metaphysical revolt against meaninglessness. If there is no Truth-itself, then there is no intrinsic meaning for any thing, being, event, or phenomenon. Organizational members who endorse post-moral worldviews can choose the metaphysical revolt against meaninglessness. Organizational life can be interpreted/re-interpreted as meaningless. If so, then organizational members must denounce such meaninglessness. The metaphysical revolt against meaninglessness can be realized in our family, group, organizational, institutional, and societal life. In post-moral worldviews, our “Becoming-oneself” fights any ideologically based attempt of totalization. Safeguarding our self-identity from ontic absorption means rebelling against totalization.

6.5  Summary Philosophizing entails fighting for our autonomy. Autonomy is never totally reached. It always remains an ontic quest. Being autonomous means being detached from any good and instinct. Philosophical questioning requires not clinging to ultimate truths. Anybody who claims to hold ultimate truths can never take on the challenge of a philosophical journey. Every being, thing, or phenomenon is connected to other beings, things, and phenomena. Truth-itself cannot explain and justify the interconnectedness of conditioned events and phenomena. The notion of Truth-itself is too often used to totalize realities. Totalization tries to eliminate the interconnectedness of all conditioned events and phenomena. It also destroys any Unknowable. Being philosophically wise entails making all aspects of reality interconnected. Philosophy does not provide any definitive knowledge. Instead, it opens the door to endless philosophical questioning. Philosophical answers are always fragmentary and transitional. They can never be definitive. Philosophical questioning is a temporal and spatial sequence of philosophical questions and answers. Philosophizing involves acknowledging our ignorance. Philosophizing deals with the coherence and plausibility of relative truthclaims. Philosophical questioning about truth-claims is the true basis of post-moral worldviews. Anybody who agrees with a post-moral worldview relativizes his/her quest for truth and happiness. He/she acknowledges the fragile borders between good and evil. He/she is aware of his/her finite rationality and knowledge. Having a postmoral worldview requires us to “live-in” a world of ontic uncertainties, doubts, and contradictions. There is no way out of such a world. Embracing a post-moral worldview means fighting totalization and rebelling against meaninglessness. Post-moral worldviews that embrace an anti-ideological concern could open the way to an ontic awareness of meaninglessness. Any post-moral worldview that favours a metaphysical revolt against meaninglessness is based on an ontic distress and anxiety, given that existence does not have any intrinsic meaning. We must then

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cope with ontic uncertainties and doubts since there is no Truth-itself. Ontic courage is then a primordial attitude and virtue since it allows us to assume our ontic anxiety, suffering, and despair. Ontic freedom is actualized through courageous decisions and actions, when being confronted with existential contradictions and limitations. The post-moral path to self-transcendence is rooted in our ontic courage, when being involved in a meaningless world. Our ontic positioning “in-the-world” is determined by our capacity to revolt against meaningless realities. A post-moral positioning puts the emphasis on truth-claims. It mirrors an endless ontic questioning about the meaning of all realities, events, and phenomena. Organizational members who endorse a post-moral worldview can never find any satisfying answer to their ontic questioning since there is no Truth-itself. Unlike Truth-itself, truth-claims are ever-changing. Organizational members know that they can develop either ontic hope or ontic despair. In both cases, they can recover their lost hope or fall into the depths of despair. However, organizational members are always committed towards a more just organization and society to “live-in”.

References Camus, Albert. 2009. Actuelles. Écrits politiques. Paris: Gallimard. ———. 1970. Caligula, suivi de Le Malentendu. Paris: Gallimard. ———. 2008. Chroniques algériennes. 1939-1958. Paris: Gallimard. ———. 2019. Carnets I- Mai 1935 – février 1942. Paris: Gallimard. ———. 2020. Carnets II- Janvier 1942 – mars 1951. Paris: Gallimard. ———. 2018. Carnets III- Mars 1951 – décembre 1959. Paris: Gallimard. ———. 2019a. Conférences et discours. 1936-1958. Paris: Gallimard. ———. 1995. La chute. Paris: Gallimard. ———. 2010. Le Malentendu. Paris: Gallimard. ———. 2012. La mort heureuse. Paris: Gallimard. ———. 1995a. La peste. Paris: Gallimard. ———. 1977. Le mythe de Sisyphe. Paris: Gallimard. ———. 1973. L’envers et l’endroit. Paris: Gallimard. ———. 1994. Le premier homme. Paris: Gallimard. ———. 1969. Les Justes. Paris: Gallimard. ———. 2015. Les Possédés. Paris: Gallimard. ———. 2009a. L’État de siège. Paris: Gallimard. ———. 2020a. Lettres à un ami allemand. Paris: Gallimard. ———. 1967. L’Exil et le Royaume. Paris: Le livre de poche. ———. 1966. L’Homme révolté. Paris: Gallimard. ———. 1975. Noces, suivi de L’été. Paris: Gallimard. Gandhi, Mahatma. 1986. Autobiographie, ou mes expériences de vérité. Paris: Quadrige/Presses Universitaires de France. ———. 1989. Lettres à l’âshram. Paris: Albin Michel. ———. 1961. Non-Violent Resistance. New York: Schocken Books. Nietzsche, Friedrich. 2008. Deuxième considération intempestive. Paris: Mille et une nuits. Salvador, Rommel O., Robert Folger, and Manuela Priesemuth. 2012. Organizational Apology and Defense: Effects of Guilt and Managerial Status. Journal of Managerial Issues 24 (2): 124–139.

Part III

The Foundational Path

Chapter 7

Rational Deliberation on Ethical Issues in Business: Overcoming Moral/ Post-­Moral Dualism and Promoting Mutual Understanding

7.1  Introduction Moral worldviews presuppose that Truth-itself exists and can eventually be grasped. In contrast, post-moral worldviews assert that Truth-itself does not exist at all. If Truth-itself existed, then it would be reachable through a universal consensus about its essential substance. Yet, nothing is further from reality. Post-moral worldviews presuppose that the substance of Truth is existentially ungraspable, if such a Truth exists. They conclude that Truth-itself does not “exist,” since the only graspable truths can be truth-claims. Truth-itself is subjective, because only a “being-who-­ interprets-reality” can seek ontic truths. Subjective thinkers are ultimately concerned with their own existence. Kierkegaard concluded that Truth “is” subjectivity. Unlike Nietzsche, Kierkegaard opened the way to a deep and meaningful relation with the Infinite. But Kierkegaard and Nietzsche represented the way post-moral worldviews can be philosophically justified. Consequently, a wide gulf separates moral and post-moral worldviews. These worldviews seem irreconcilable. Nonetheless, there is a way out of such dualism. We can overcome moral/post-­ moral dualism by reinventing our process of understanding and our relationship with the Infinite. Rational deliberation in organizational life and culture seems to be self-evident, as though decision-makers would not have limited rationality and knowledge. Organizational everydayness does not coincide with such an unrealistic view of rationality and knowledge. Nonetheless, deliberative processes about moral/ethical issues absolutely need rationality. Moral and ethical issues call for organizational members’ worldviews since those worldviews could be oriented either towards moral normativity or towards the ethical aim. Such worldviews could be moral/ post-moral, mainly depending on the way Truth is apprehended and defined. The dualism between moral and post-moral worldviews can create an incontrovertible gap between organizational members, insofar as some people embrace moral worldviews and others post-moral worldviews. The contradiction between moral and © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 M. Dion, Worldviews, Ethics and Organizational Life, Ethical Economy 60, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-82355-9_7

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post-moral worldviews is so fundamental that we need to work to overcome such dualism. Otherwise, it could be very difficult for organizational members to reach mutual understanding.

7.2  R  evealing the Tension in Moral/Post-Moral Dualism: Time/Self and Truth/Morality Dualisms The dualism between moral and post-moral worldviews entails a conceptual tension that needs to be overcome. Otherwise, we cannot reinvent morality from a dualistic approach. Moral and post-moral worldviews constantly oppose each other. The ultimate area of contradiction remains the issue of Truth. Defining an Absolute (and Objective) Truth means denying the crucial importance of subjectivity. Thus, moral worldviews exclude a subjective thinker who is ultimately concerned with his/her own existence. Everything is reduced to objective/empirical knowledge. Only an objective Truth can exist. Instead, post-moral worldviews consider that Truth is purely relative/subjective. Nothing objective can be said about Truth. The “inquiring subject” seems to be non-existent. The subject/object existential structure is deeply threatened by moral/post-moral dualism. Moral worldviews deny the subjective thinker, while post-moral worldviews make the inquiring subject non-existent. Moral worldviews are basically open to the presence of the Infinite, while post-­ moral worldviews strongly criticize its ideological interpretations. Both moral and post-moral worldviews can have adverse and long-lasting effects on the substance of morality. The substance of morality can refer either to conscious/unconscious processes of moral reflection and decision-making (“internally-driven substance”) or to predictable/unpredictable consequences of morally based words, attitudes, and deeds (“externally-driven substance”). Moral and post-moral worldviews can influence the way we develop relationships with others in our temporally based situation. Moral deliberation processes could be an attempt to bridge moral and post-moral worldviews. But they have their own pitfalls. That is why we need to deepen the meaning and scope of the process of understanding. Moreover, overcoming moral/ post-moral dualism will also require us to better understand our relationship with the Infinite, without any ideological or totalizing concern. Moral worldviews aim at Truth-itself, while post-moral worldviews focus on the undefinable and relativistic character of Truth. Moral worldviews enhance totalization and absolute truths. In contrast, post-moral worldviews convey an anti-­totalizing attitude and welcome the emergence of innumerable truth-claims. Moral worldviews, as well as post-moral worldviews, are concerned with human relationships. The human being is ontically “being-in-relation.” Being-with-Others is not the foundation of “being-in-relation,” since the ontological (Being-itself) is not the foundation of the ontic (entities). Being-with-Others has ontic consequences. It is not only an existential structure. There is a “Being of entities.” However, Being can never be reduced to the Being of entities. The existential structure of

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Being-with-­Others can never be reduced to its ontic manifestations. The ontological and the ontic realms are interconnected. The existential structure of Being-withOthers needs its ontic manifestations. Our “being-in-relation” is an ontic manifestation of the ontological structure of “Being-with-Others”. Being-with-Others and being-in-­relation are interconnected. But “Being-with-Others” is not the “basis” of being-in-­relation. Being is not the “basis” of entities. Otherwise, we would fall into the metaphysical forgetfulness of Being. We need to distinguish between ontological and ontic perspectives. Being-with-Others makes “ontic togetherness” possible. However, it has nothing to do with ontic familiarity and closeness. Moral worldviews do not address the issue of togetherness in the same way as post-moral worldviews. They have a very different understanding of the way human beings could be in relationship with others and with the Infinite. The first tension in moral/post-­ moral dualism lies in the human capacity for “ontic togetherness” and for any relationship with the Infinite. Post-moral worldviews allow organizational members to “be-in-relation-withthe-­Infinite.” However, any relationship with the Infinite depends on organizational members’ ontic temporality, since the interconnectedness between the Infinite (Eternal) and finite (temporally based) beings is dialectical. Any relationship with the Infinite calls for a dialectics between Eternity and ontic temporality. In organizational life, organizational members can acknowledge the various sources of their ontic temporality, while being connected to the Infinite. Organizational life reveals a collective “having-been-present.” In organizational life, any collective “having-­ been-­present” is related to a sense of ontic togetherness, since organizational members then share some reminiscences from the past. Ontic togetherness can arise from our family, group, organizational, institutional, or societal life. Organizational members experience “organizational togetherness,” when becoming aware of their collective “having-been-present.” Organizational traditions and conventions can still influence the way organizational members think, feel, and behave in daily life. Any collective “having-been-present” conveys reminiscences from the past and enlightens “organizational-hereness-and-nowness.” The different experiences of “hereness” and “nowness” make us more aware of the various dimensions of our ontic temporality. In the organizational setting, our temporally based experiences can open our mind/heart to the Presence of the Infinite, regardless of its religious/ spiritual connotations. The dualism between moral and post-moral worldviews is expressed in the way Time and self are interconnected. It is also revealed in the way Truth and morality are interrelated. Moral and post-moral worldviews do not display the same interconnectedness between Time and self, or between Truth and morality. Notions of self and ontic temporality can be used to emphasize either the historical burden of the past (moral worldviews) or “Being-oneself”’s centredness on the present (post-­ moral worldviews). Truth is either absolute (moral worldviews) or purely subjective (post-moral worldviews). If Truth is absolute, then the borders between good and evil are unchanging. If Truth is subjectivity, then the borders between good and evil are ever-changing.

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7.2.1  The Interconnectedness of Time and Self Time-consciousness is permeated with reminiscences and forgetfulness (past-­ centredness). It is basically oriented towards nowness as the temporal linchpin. Any now is infinitesimal, while opening the way to reminiscences/forgetfulness and to expectations/desires. Mindfulness is an awareness of the ever-changing nowness. It is the inner dynamics of Time-consciousness (present-centredness). Time-­ consciousness is also developed from expectations and desires (future-centredness). Thus, there are three loci of Time-consciousness: memory (reminiscences and forgetfulness), mindfulness (nowness), and self-projection (expectations and desires). Forgetfulness deeply affects the notion of Time. If everything is perishable, then it is “going-to-nothingness.” The flow of time is the archetype of degeneration. From a chronological viewpoint (clock-time), Time is the infinite succession of “nows.” Every instant is constantly dying and giving birth to the next moment. If the flow of time expresses degeneration, then every temporal being, thing, event, or phenomenon is also constantly degenerating. Time is essentially degeneration. That is why Eternity is not a dimension of Time. Eternity excludes any form of degeneration. Every temporally based being is perishable, while an “Eternal Being” can never degenerate. Perishable beings, things, and phenomena are ever-changing and degenerating. Degenerating things, beings, and phenomena can never be totally grasped, since their “essence” is constantly changing. We always attempt to come to terms with “reality-as-it-is.” Unfortunately, we continuously find nothingness. Reality seems to be reluctant to be absorbed by nothingness. This is particularly true for memories. Nothingness is contradicted by reminiscences from the past. If nothingness were overwhelming, then there would never be any reminiscence from the past. Reminiscences are constantly shifting. When the past (our present memories) was the present (as living experience), it was oriented towards the future. Due to the flow of time, this future has become the past. A “future-oriented past” has been safeguarded in our memory, given that it has not been realized until now. Preserving the future cannot be realized in the immediate joy of the present moment. A “future-­ oriented past” can still be a possibility-to-be. It can be realized in our personalized “here-and-now.” Focusing on the present moment cannot allow us to preserve such a “future-oriented past.” We can avoid the degeneration of our “future-oriented past” in remembering the “lessons of wisdom” we have drawn from past events. Some past events are intrinsically related to our “future-oriented past.” We have learned a lot from such events. Remembering such learning could make our “future-­ oriented past” arise in our personalized “here-and-now.” Our “future-oriented past” could give us new possibilities-to-be. It can even provide and strengthen relevant “world-dreams” for our personalized “here-and-now.” The “future-oriented past” in the here-and-now is qualitatively different from its original substance and scope. We “live-in” a personalized “here-and-now.” The context has changed. The way the “future-oriented past” will be realized cannot be compared to the probable way it would have been actualized in its “original present.” The future could already

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inhabit our mind/heart, even unconsciously. “Ontic decisiveness” can involve choosing our “future-oriented past” as our utmost possibility-to-be. Being “in-time” is being a “self-in-a-world.” Every self is comprised of innumerable selves that successively die. We are continuously becoming who-we-are. The human being can never escape himself/herself. Even imitating someone is not becoming him/her. It is only a way to renew our “Being-oneself.” It is a mode of “Becoming-oneself.” Our self-identity is influenced by the discrepancy between our desired self-projection and others’ perception of our self. Our self-identity is created “in-front-ot-others.” We need others’ self-identity to define our own. Choosing our thoughts, words, feelings, attitudes, and actions entails exploring the depths of our “Being-oneself.” However, any self is “in-a-world” and “with-others.” We cannot identify our own self without being “in-front-of-others.” Our “in-the-worldliness” is closely linked to our ontic “being-in-front-of-others.” Such ontic positioning could eventually provoke misunderstandings and conflicts as much as understanding and peace. Everybody is temporally conditioned and existentially being-free. The ontic expressions of our being-free imply a temporally based choice of possibilities-to­be. “Ontic decisiveness” reveals such a temporally based choice of possibilities-to­be. Those choices are crucial for our ontic project-to-be. They allow us to create our self-identity. From an ontic perspective, our self-identity is related to the ontic search for love and happiness. On one hand, love seems to be at the core of human relationships. It is the driving power of human life. We could love anyone, although we usually do not know why we love him/her. Love is multidimensional. Being understood by others involves feeling the expression of their love. Being loved implies, at the very least, being understood by others. The search for mutual love is an intrinsic component of human relationships. Nobody wants to be hated. Hatred and love are interconnected. The more intensely we love someone, the less we are prone to hate him/her. The more intensely we hate someone, the less we can love him/her. The lack of hate strengthens love, while the lack of love nurtures the power of hatred. In some situations, we love what we do not own. In other situations, we can hate what we do not want. Such hatred makes jealousy arise. In some cases, the power of imagination can give birth to love, while in others it can open the way to jealousy. Without love, we could always “live-in” misunderstandings and conflicts. Love makes us search for happiness and social harmony in daily life. A “general happiness” is not a true happiness since it is not related to an ontic quest for happiness. Only a specific notion of happiness can allow us to be “in-quest-for-­happiness.” Every path to happiness expresses a possibility-to-be that can be chosen. Such a multiplicity of possible lives (or possibilities-to-be) enhances our personality. We are continuously choosing given possibilities-to-be, while excluding others. In so doing, we choose a given path to happiness/unhappiness. Being happy should be the only objective of our life. It necessarily excludes egoistic attitudes and behaviours. Egocentrism can only give birth to unhappiness. Altruism never makes someone unhappy. Rather, it nurtures our happiness, as well as others’ happiness.

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7.2.2  The Interconnectedness of Truth and Morality Searching for Truth and defining morality are inextricably linked. Desires can enlighten our search for truth and even the borders between good and evil. We can only desire what we believe to be substantially existing. However, our desires are not always convergent. Sometimes they contradict each other. The way we meet our desires does not open the door to sustainable happiness, since further desires inevitably arise. Moreover, opposite causes and conditioning factors are reinforced by other desires. Things, beings, and phenomena do not have any intrinsic power. Desiring them can never allow us to become happy in the long run. Giving meaning to things, beings, and phenomena can never be based on empirical facts. The human being is not an enquiring subject, but rather a subjective thinker (Kierkegaard). Empirical facts can be useful for understanding the nature of beings, things, and phenomena. However, “giving-meaning processes” are not objectively oriented. Facts are related to empirically observable things, beings, events, and phenomena. Only the inquiring subject is infinitely concerned with empirical facts. Instead, beliefs are linked to intuition, imagination, hope, and desires. The subjective thinker is ultimately concerned with his/her own existence. The subjective thinker cannot have any belief without taking his/her ontic doubts into account. Everything is existentially uncertain. Every ontic questioning is endless. The human being is “in-­ quest-­for meaning,” since he/she is a “being-who-interprets-reality.” The ontic quest-for-meaning can be either a search for Truth or a search for morality. In moral worldviews, meanings are related to Absolute Truth (Truth-itself). They are not objective. But they aim at an absolute and knowable Truth. In post-moral worldviews, meanings are closely linked to truth-claims. Meanings are then subjectively defined. They are not related to any Truth-itself. On one hand, we must take our ontic quest for Truth into account. Moral worldviews presuppose the existence of Truth-itself. Searching for Truth is, thus, appropriating Truth-itself. However, post-moral worldviews believe in relative truths (truth-claims). Searching for Truth entails exchanging our truth-claims with others. In moral worldviews, we can connect ourselves to Truth-itself. But in post-moral worldviews, there is no Truth-itself. In moral worldviews, Truth-itself seems to be graspable. Moral worldviews do not take ontic uncertainties and doubts into account. If that were the case, then any preconception of Truth-itself would be radically shaken. Doubting means accepting the possibility that we are following the wrong path. Being uncertain and doubting are cognitive and moral attitudes that undermine the existence of Truth-itself. Ontic uncertainties and doubts make the borders between good and evil fragile. There is nothing absolutely good/evil. Good and evil are always changing. Every action has morally good and bad consequences. We can never define good without evil, and vice-versa. It does not mean that Evil is historically needed. Rather, the existence of Evil mirrors the necessity to orient ourselves towards the Good. Truth can never be reduced to “what-we-can-imagine.” In moral worldviews, Truth-itself always overcomes the power of our imagination. In

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post-moral worldviews, truth-claims are intersubjective. The power of imagination is inherently linked to truth-claims. Nobody can give us Absolute Truth. On the other hand, the human being continuously searches for morality. Seeking morality means listening to our mind/heart. Self-listening entails being involved in dialogical processes. Listening to the voice of our own self involves talking to an “ideal/external I.” In so doing, we develop our ontic passions, emotions, and sentiments. We can subjectively know others’ passions. But such knowledge is always limited. Others’ passions can make us internalize our own. Ontic passions are rarely altruistic. In some situations, ontic passions can allow us to deepen the meaning and implications of unconditional love, altruism, and compassion. Unconditional love is not related to self-understanding. It does not depend on the way we can understand others’ selves. Unconditional love does not depend on anything at all. Others’ selves remain unknowable for us. Unconditional love makes us overlook others’ faults and weaknesses. We usually hate whoever looks like us. Our greatest challenge is to change our “self-in-a-world” and to abandon its self-idealized form. Unconditional altruism and love can be influenced by ontic passions. Any ontic search for morality is compatible with unconditional altruism and love. However, self-control is also very important. Otherwise, ontic passions can reduce our capacity to express unconditional altruism and love. If ontic passions are rationally controlled, then they can strengthen our path to unconditional altruism and love. People who embrace post-moral worldviews are confronted with basic dualisms. Firstly, the dualism between Time and self reveals our temporally based “Becoming-­ oneself.” It expresses the awareness of our existential finitude and the ontic need for self-transcendence. Any dualism between Time and self justifies and strengthens self-projection in the future. Any choice of possibilities-to-be is rooted in the dualism between Time and self. Post-moral worldviews criticize the crystallized borders between Time and self. They emphasize the interconnectedness between our “Becoming-oneself” and our “within-time-ness.” In so doing, post-moral worldviews question the status quo. Unlike moral worldviews, post-moral worldviews cannot easily cope with the dualism between Time and self since they strongly affirm the interconnectedness between our ontic temporality and our self-­ transcendence processes. Instead, post-moral worldviews insist on our unavoidable “Becoming-oneself.” Secondly, the dualism between truth and morality mirrors our ontic quest for truth. Crystallized borders between truth and morality imply that morality can be used to reach Truth-itself. Unlike moral worldviews, post-moral worldviews can never acknowledge the validity of such a principle. Post-moral worldviews enhance and justify the multiplicity of truth-claims. The only way to be “post-morally-oriented” is to deny the existence of Truth-itself. In so doing, the dualism between truth and morality disappears. Post-morality imposes the coexistence of innumerable truth-claims and the indefinability of Good and Evil. In the organizational setting, organizational members can overcome dualisms by referring to post-moral worldviews. Thus, they open the way to different ways of thinking, feeling, speaking, and behaving in organizational life. Transcending the dualism between Time and self means relativizing all sources of ontic temporality and selfhood. Consequently, organizational members can criticize the various expressions

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of organizational temporality, as well as the ontic possibilities of self-realization/self-­ transcendence in organizational life. Overcoming the dualism between Time and self can improve the way organizational members perceive and interpret the Presence of the Infinite. The Presence of the Infinite can be even more clearly perceived and interpreted if organizational members do not believe in any dualism between truth and morality.

7.3  O  vercoming Moral/Post-Moral Dualism and Promoting Mutual Understanding in Business: Moral Deliberation Processes The organizational setting is a spatial locus of communicational exchanges. Depending on cultural, social, political, and even religious influences, communicational exchanges could be focused either on dialogue or on agreement about given norms of behaviour. We always behave in a communicational way. The most important thing to know is the basic purpose of communicational exchanges. There is no Truth-itself. We can only participate in a dialogue about our mutual truth-claims. Truth is then an ontic dialogue about truth-claims. Participants in the dialogue do not search for an Absolute Truth. Rather, they attempt to present their own truth-­ claims and listen to others’ truth-claims. Jürgen Habermas’s philosophy allows us to go a step further. Habermas believed that deliberation processes could aim at a consensus about moral values and norms of behaviour. Communicational exchanges about truth-claims are not enough. Reaching a consensus about moral issues requires democratic processes that are properly monitored. Habermas suggested that only “communicational rationality” can allow a consensus to emerge among participants in deliberative processes. Communicational rationality applies to all “claims-to-validity” (Habermas 1992, 166, 170). A “claim-­ to-­validity” is not equivalent to a truth-claim. Every truth-claim is based on claims-­ to-­validity. So, if we circumscribe the meaning and substance of claims-to-validity, then communicational exchanges about truth-claims could be more transparent, efficient, and fruitful. According to Habermas, there are four basic claims-to-­validity on which participants in deliberative processes must agree: (1) intelligibility as a sine qua non of communication: participants must attempt to make the practical meaning of their statements intelligible. Those statements could be assertions, orders, or assessments. Without any concern for intelligibility, deliberative processes are inefficient and useless. Proposals of meaning and truth-claims must be intelligible. Otherwise, participants in the dialogue will be unable to discuss them; (2) propositional truth: participants must acknowledge the truth of the propositional contents of their statements. To be confirmed and justified, a propositional truth must be based on lived experiences and must be consensually accepted through deliberative processes. A propositional truth that is not based on lived experiences is simply irrelevant. It would not be useful for deliberative processes about ethical

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values and moral norms of behaviour. A propositional truth that is not consensually accepted cannot allow participants to identify the ethical values and moral norms of the behaviour they are seeking; (3) normative accuracy: participants must recognize the accuracy of proposed norms. Accuracy is the claim-to-validity of the normativity of given statements. Any lack of accuracy would undermine the capacity for propositional truth to become normative. The accuracy of proposed norms is at the heart of deliberative processes; and (4) sincerity: participants must never question others’ sincerity. Unlike the truth of propositional contents and the accuracy of norms, sincerity is non-discursive. Sincerity does not have to be checked through discussion. Sincerity is the claim-to-validity of the intention revealed by given statements. Deliberative processes about ethical values and moral norms of behaviour are rooted in a basic expectation of sincerity. Every participant in the dialogue is expected to be sincere. Without sincerity, no propositional truth can ever be sustained in-front-of-others. Habermas contended that sincerity allows all participants to deepen mutual trust and understanding (2005, 283–288, 295, 309, 410; 2018, 138). Beliefs and values convey claims-to-validity that must be checked through deliberative processes. Communicational rationality implies intersubjectivity. Intersubjective communication means that participants are members of a “community of equal subjects.” Everyone must be recognized as a subject and as equal to others. Recognizing other participants as subjects (and never as pure means) does not necessarily imply the basic equality of all human beings. That is why such transcendental equality must be strongly affirmed. All participants in deliberative processes must acknowledge the transcendental equality of all human beings, regardless of their differences. Any experience is shared with other participants, while using symbolic, linguistic, and axiological systems (Habermas 2018, 57). There is an inherent connection between communicational practices and rationality. Every communicational activity that focuses on intersubjectivity reveals a communicational rationality rather than a subject-focused and self-referential rationality. Communicational rationality aims at a decentred understanding of reality. Communicational actions are inherently connected to the “lived world,” that is, the wholeness of various interpretations of lived experiences transmitted from generation to generation. They are basically linked to concrete life forms. Communicational rationality is deeply involved in the intersubjective search for consensual norms (Habermas 2011, 93–94, 356, 372–373, 381, 383, 402). Searching for consensus on moral norms is the main prerequisite for communicational rationality. Rationalizing the “lived world” historically releases the potential for rationality of any communicational act (Habermas 1987, 86; 1987a, 170). Deliberation seeks the strongest arguments about moral norms and their power to provoke a normative consensus among participants. This is the consensual power of arguments (Habermas 2005, 307, 322). Habermas defined rationality in terms of communicational exchanges between discursive partners (or dialogical participants). Meanings and values are always subjective. They can never be universalized (Schnebel 2000). Ethical standards are rules that must be subjected to communicational processes. Only communicational exchanges could give rise to consensual moral principles of decision-making/action (Meisenbach 2006, 41–42; and Stückelberger 2009, 330).

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Any deliberation about moral normativity and ethical aim requires to put the emphasis on communicative rationality and its impact on business and society (Scherer and Patzer 2011, 154–155). Cross-cultural management requires the capacity to strengthen dialogical processes between internal or external stakeholders. Dialogical processes occur in complex situations (Meier 2010, 185–186). Organizational members should then have the capacity to cope with uncertainties and doubts. There is no ultimate truth about moral normativity. There is no ultimate truth about the “best” interpretations of the ethical aim. Everything is on the table. This is the sine qua non condition for successful dialogical processes in the organizational setting. Habermassian ethics of deliberation eliminates the Kantian categorical imperative. The processes of moral argumentation are based on the principle that only consensual moral norms can claim to be valid. Consensual moral norms are identified through processes of practical deliberation. The principle of universalization presupposes that participants in the practical/moral deliberation are deeply aware of “predictable” consequences related to the universalization of those consensual moral norms. But who can assess the predictability of consequences? Participants in deliberative processes can identify some predictable effects, while neglecting others. People who do not participate in deliberative processes could identify other predictable consequences that have been forgotten by participants. So, the analysis of predictable consequences can never be exhaustive. Participants in deliberative processes should always remain prudent, because of possible unforeseen consequences. Furthermore, the acceptance of given moral norms must always be free, without any physical, verbal, mental, or moral constraint. It is easy to prohibit and monitor physical and verbal constraints imposed on other participants. However, this does mean that we can easily identify and control mental/moral constraints that can be implicitly imposed on participants in deliberative processes. Hopefully, the expectation of sincerity among all participants can require everyone to disclose any mental/moral constraint. The acceptance of given moral norms makes those norms morally and practically valid. So, it is crucial to free deliberative processes of any constraint. Consensual moral norms are perceived as good for everyone, in given “community of subjects.” That is why participants in deliberative processes comply with such consensual moral norms. They have been able to put themselves in others’ shoes (Habermas 1992, 17, 26, 34, 127, 133, 139–142, 153). The principle of universalization is the basis of the ontic search for consensus on moral arguments. Only the moral norms which seek a consensual collective interest among all participants in deliberative processes can be universalized, since they have received an intersubjective acknowledgment (Habermas 2006, 78, 86–87, 114). Participating in communicational exchanges implies believing in our own proposal of moral norms and ethical values. Every participant believes that his/her proposal of ethical values and moral norms is a priori valid and should be mandatory. However, there is no guarantee that we can reach a consensus on given norms/values for decision-making and action (O’Donovan 2013, 126). Such a consensus arises through practical deliberation among all those who could be affected by given consensual moral norms and ethical values (Cameron and Ojha 2007, 76). Practical deliberation checks the validity of hypothetical moral norms (Habermas 2006, 137). Perceptions convey

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hypothetical claims-to-validity, since they give birth to specific interpretations (Habermas 2018, 70). Habermas explained that cultural values can only eventually be recognized by participants as “promoting universal interest.” Cultural values are so rooted in given context that they cannot claim any normative validity. Cultural values are so deeply embedded in specific contexts that they cannot promote and enhance the universal interest (Habermas 2006, 1235, 131). All participants in practical/moral deliberation are considered free and equal beings. They all seek the best moral argument. Anyone can exert decisive power/ influence over others (Habermas 1992, 18–19). This is clearly the “ideal situation” of communicational exchanges. Habermassian ethics of deliberation involve enhancing the principle of justice (community rights/interests) and the principle of benevolence (individual rights/interests), since these principles are interdependent. Without benevolence, justice is unreachable. Without justice, benevolence can never be attained. Community rights/interests depend on individual rights/interests, and vice-versa. Equality and solidarity require the reciprocal acknowledgment of participants as responsible and equal subjects. They clearly express the principle of justice. A “normative claim-to-validity” implies that the conditions for having a valid assertion have been met. Any action undertaken by responsible subjects takes “normative claims-to-validity” into account. Justice and solidarity presuppose a reciprocal acknowledgment of participants as equal subjects, whose actions are based on claims-to-validity. Habermassian ethics of deliberation generalizes about the presuppositions of intersubjective human behaviour. Such presuppositions are related to a community in which “ideal communication processes” allow anyone to participate in moral deliberation. The ethics of deliberation seeks the common interest, while affirming the basic equality of participants. Any consensual interest can only be realized through an open and intersubjective deliberation among participants (Habermas 1992, 21–24, 69–70, 120, 141, 155). The greatest challenge is to identify the right criteria for having a “common” interest. Intersubjectivity leads to “inter-understanding” (Habermas 2006, 204; 2011, 351). The crossroad of subjectivity needs a crossroad of understanding. “Being-in-front-of-others” means meeting various subjectivities and allowing for the coexistence of different paths of mutual understanding. Unlike Kantian principles, Habermas’s universalization principles are not drawn from reason, but rather from discourse processes and rules of argumentation (Niemi 2008, 260). Principles of universalization are intrinsically linked to discourse and, thus, to action. Rationality depends on communicational processes. This is not an issue of an a priori understanding of realities. However, it is not crystal-clear how managers could implement Habermas’s deliberative ethics in organizational life and culture. Habermas’s philosophy must be translated into pragmatic and realistic guidelines for deliberation and decision-making about moral standards (French and Allbright 1998, 191). But organizational processes and culture do not necessarily align with Habermas’s processes of moral deliberation. It is not only an issue of process but, above all, an issue of “ethical fit” between Habermassian principles and organizational values/decision-making principles. Seeking consensual norms in the organizational setting is challenging. Processes of argumentation must be steered in the right direction. Otherwise, they will

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inevitably fail. Habermas defined four a priori rules of argumentation. Firstly, all individuals who would like to participate in deliberative processes can actively participate. There should never be any passive participant who silently agrees with a given normative consensus. Otherwise, the consensus would be flawed. Secondly, all participants have the same rights and duties when participating in deliberative processes. Such a requirement follows from the acknowledgment of all participants as responsible and equal beings. Thirdly, deliberative processes exclude any attempt at constraint. Every participant should remain free to speak in his/her own way. This is not always easy. Some participants could be leaders, others could be followers. Hierarchical levels and power games can make free and open discussion an unrealistic “ideal.” Fourthly, all participants want to reach a consensus on moral norms. Every proposed moral norm is discussed with sincerity. The strongest arguments will be consensually accepted. Without sincerity towards oneself and others, deliberative processes will inevitably fail. But sincerity will not suffice. Mutual understanding and openness require putting ourselves in others’ shoes. Every participant is open to seeing his/her proposed moral norms criticized by the others. He/she can be empathetic and compassionate, when listening to others’ proposals and interpretations (Habermas 2001, 236–238). Lived experiences represent the basis of claims-­ to-­validity. Claims-to-validity are grounded in lived experiences that are consistent with those claims. Claims-to-validity are even strengthened by such lived experiences. However, when lived experiences contradict the essence of a given claim-to-­ validity, then the constitutive arguments related to such a claim-to-validity are strongly shaken Habermas 2018, 137). Any claim-to-validity is still not justified, if its constitutive arguments have not been discussed with the other participants in deliberative processes. Its justification follows from the collective promise to reach a rational/moral consensus about rationally acceptable and applicable moral norms. Claims-to-validity can always be questioned and criticized. Their legitimacy must be proved through argumentation. However, the four basic claims-to-validity have nothing in common (Habermas 2018, 60, 71, 140). Habermas (2005, 331) believed that the four claims-to-validity are intrinsically linked to the four aspects of intersubjective community. Firstly, reciprocal understanding mirrors the claim-to-­ validity of intelligibility. We cannot reach mutual understanding without sharing intelligible proposals. Secondly, shared knowledge reflects the claim-to-validity of propositional truth. We cannot share knowledge if we do not believe in the truth of our own proposals. Thirdly, reciprocal trust is closely linked to the claim-to-validity of sincerity. We cannot trust each other if we are not sincere. Fourthly, convergence of visions is related to normative accuracy. We cannot make various visions converge if given proposals lack normative accuracy. Only propositional truth and normative accuracy are discursive. Reciprocal trust and sincerity are not discursive. They are not inherently linked to the deployment of discourse. Rather, reciprocal trust and sincerity are attitudes that strongly influence deliberative processes. The existence of norms and their social utility do not prove that such norms are valid. The intersubjective acceptance of given norms does not say a single word about their justification (Habermas 2006, 80, 82). Normative accuracy is intrinsically linked to the transformation of normative structures in given group, organization,

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institution, or society (Habermas 2012, 26). The accuracy of moral judgments is determined through argumentation. Normative accuracy depends on the ideal acceptability of moral judgments. Norms acquire accuracy when favouring and enhancing the “common” interest of participants in moral deliberation. Habermas rightly said that such a common interest is “presupposed.” There must be a realm of universal interests we can explore and identify. If a larger field of universal interests did not already exist, then participants in moral deliberation would be unable to identify any common interest (Habermas 2001, 213, 233). A “common” interest should not be implicitly/explicitly distorted by the balance of formal powers among participants in deliberative processes. The best argument should be the strongest, regardless of the person proposing it. However, defining a “common” interest is not a purely rational process. Indeed, it is shared by organizational role models and images of corporate power. Therefore, it can be difficult to identify a “common” interest that is not distorted by organizational and political structures/roles. Habermas’s notion of the “ideal situation of speech” failed to take such factors into account. According to Habermas, the four claims-to-validity are related to different kinds of speech acts. Firstly, interpretations as “grammatical/pragmatic speech acts” mirror the claim-to-validity of intelligibility. Interpretations must be intelligible. Otherwise, they are irrelevant and useless. Secondly, assertions and explanations as “observing speech acts” are related to the claim-to-validity of propositional truth. Making any assertion/explanation presupposes that we believe in its constitutive truth. Otherwise, such an assertion/explanation would not be grounded in subjectivity, that is, in lived experiences. Thirdly, justifications as “regulatory speech acts” reflect the claim-to-validity of normative accuracy. Justifying given practices and deeds means producing normative accuracy. Without normative accuracy, any justification becomes useless for deliberative processes. Fourthly, “representative speech acts” express the claim-to-validity of sincerity. Without sincerity, speech acts can make deliberative processes vulnerable and flawed (Habermas 2005, 287; 2018, 140–141). The more explanations we provide about a given thing/phenomenon through a structure of questions/answers, the more we understand it. The propositional truth of given statements/judgments depends on its capacity to resist all attempts of falsification (Habermas 2001, 217). Normative propositions can never be considered true since they do not describe realities. Habermas said that we must set forth a preliminary hypothesis: normative propositions can only seek an acknowledged validity that “looks like” propositional truth (as a claim-to-validity). Intersubjectively recognized validity is “analogous to” a requirement of truth (Habermas 2006, 77–78, 89). The “ideal situation of speech” implies four required conditions. Firstly, all participants in deliberative processes have the same opportunities to speak with sincerity. Secondly, all participants in deliberative processes must have the same opportunities to present their ideas, interpretations, justifications, and recommendations. Every participant can sincerely criticize others’ proposals, while remaining open to others’ criticism of his/her own proposals. Thirdly, any person who requires an unequal distribution of opportunities to express his/her ideas, feelings, and wishes cannot participate in deliberative processes. All participants in deliberative

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processes are responsible and equal beings. Fourthly, any person who seeks an unequal distribution of opportunities to oppose, allow, order, or be accountable for his/her actions cannot participate in deliberative processes. Those four conditions are always required for moral deliberation. Habermas was fully aware that the “ideal situation of speech” could sometimes be difficult to arrange. He concluded that participants in deliberative processes can never be certain of being involved in an “ideal situation of speech.” They could be involved in “pseudo-discussions/pseudo-­ consensus” when practical constraints are imposed on deliberation. This is especially the case when power games, organizational constraints, and communicational distortions are at play among participants (Habermas 2005, 323–325; 2018, 149, 151). Participants in deliberative processes can distinguish between a true consensus and a pseudo-consensus, in analyzing the truth and sincerity of statements and the normative accuracy of actions. Anticipating the ideal situation of speech opens the door to rationally based deliberation. But participants can never know how illusory such a priori anticipation is (Habermas 2018, 147–149). The stakeholder approach denies that business is separated from morality, as though business decisions were necessarily amoral (Freeman 1994). Amoral positioning is not inherently linked to business practices. If that were the case, then business would require amoral decisions and actions. Business decisions can be either strongly influenced (moral worldviews) or indifferent to moral issues (amoral positioning). They could also criticize any search for Truth-itself as well as moral concepts/dualisms (post-moral worldviews). Amoral positioning is a possibility. But it is not the only one. The stakeholder approach should take for granted that decision-makers can embrace the moral worldview, the post-moral worldview, or amoral positioning. But decision-makers could also seek a way to overcome moral/ post-moral dualism, without falling into the interpretative trap of amoral positioning. Phillips et al. (2003, 493) defined the stakeholder theory as a theory of organizational ethics. However, the stakeholder theory does not explain how to balance the various (and conflicting) interests of stakeholders in any situation, either from a pragmatic viewpoint or from a theoretical perspective. The balance between conflicting interests is always contextual (Phillips et al. 2003, 485). Agle et al. maintained that the stakeholder approach theorizes about good management (2008, 166). The problem is that the meaning of “good management” is not crystal-clear. How can we determine that a given management style is “good”? The various purposes of stakeholder theories can shed light on important challenges of “good management.” Donaldson and Preston said that stakeholder theory could be used for three distinct purposes (1995, 70–74): descriptive, instrumental, and normative. Stakeholder theory could be used to revisit past decisions of corporations and to shed light on crucial present and future corporate decisions (descriptive use). Stakeholder theory could reveal the absence/presence of connections between listening/responding to stakeholders’ interests and aiming at traditional business purposes (instrumental use). Stakeholder theory could allow various stakeholders to interpret the social, economic, cultural, political, and even religious/spiritual function of business corporations, from a moral and philosophical viewpoint (normative use). Wicks (2014, 303) asserted that the way organizational life makes

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“meaning-making” possible reveals a basic link between spirituality/religion and stakeholder theory. According to Donaldson and Preston (1995, 74), the normative aspect of the stakeholder theory constitutes its basis. The instrumental dimension of the stakeholder theory instead strengthens its descriptive aspect. Jones and Wicks (1999, 212, 215) explained that the normative basis of the stakeholder theory is moral in nature. However, we cannot easily morally define the normative basis of stakeholder theory. The source of morality can be the normative basis of the stakeholder theory, but it remains undefined. It could open the way to various moral theories and, thus, to different stakeholder theories, each having a distinct moral basis. The indefinable character of any source of morality allows stakeholders to embrace moral worldviews, post-moral worldviews, amoral positioning, and even the “transcendent position” (beyond moral/post-moral dualism). These are the four basic ontic positions on moral issues (moral normativity) as well as on ethical issues (the quest for the ethical aim). They express moral pluralism in our family, group, organizational, institutional, and societal life. In the business milieu, the dominant model emphasizes profit maximization and instrumentalizes the balance of stakeholders’ interests. It has its inner morality. Ferrero et al. (2014, 42) acknowledged that Milton Friedman’s position on profit maximization took social rules and expectations into account. Friedman’s perspective did not absolutely exclude any concern for all stakeholders. However, the basic orientation of business decision-making is to maximize corporate profit, while complying with social and ethical standards in the legal, cultural, and political environment. Some individuals could elucidate the nature and scope of the moral ground, while being realistic and pragmatic (Stieb 2009). Such an ontic choice implies endorsing a moral worldview. It represents only one possible position on moral issues. Stakeholder theory does not provide any moral foundation for decision-making. An ethics of care could provide such a moral basis (Burton and Dunn 1996, 141–145; and Oruc and Sarikaya 2011). Caring means being courageous. Being courageous entails taking all aspects of situations/ conflicts into account, while coping with complexity and interdependence (Kawamura 2013, 114). However, an ethics of care presupposes a moral worldview. It can hardly be compatible with post-moral worldviews. Sometimes, contexts are much more powerful than an individual will. We could even neglect the historical course of events because we are too focused on our egotistical motives and interests. We can never grasp the whole set of historically based conditions/causes behind a given event or phenomenon. According to Hill and Jones (1992, 151), stakeholders attain more power from exogenous shocks. Their sense of innovation can also give them more power and influence. In both cases, a cultural shock creates a lack of balance in the way power is shared by the focal organization and its stakeholders. Stakeholder theory is open to “the plurality of moral agents, their interests, and reciprocal moral relationships” (Werhane 2000, 176). A very strong power affects every historically based event and phenomenon. Power games could adversely affect the way an organization can respond to stakeholder needs, interests, rights, and expectations. They can also influence our capacity to choose a moral worldview, a post-moral worldview, an amoral positioning, or the transcendent position, in given organizational culture. So,

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we cannot neglect the way organizational power could influence organizational members’ moral positioning. Building up a very positive and challenging organizational culture presupposes having courageous leaders (Yasin et al. 2008, 407). But what does it mean to be “morally courageous”? Does it imply embracing a moral worldview, while followers endorse a post-moral worldview? Does it mean that morally courageous leaders will resist any attempt to widen the scope of amoral positioning? Should morally courageous leaders always be open to the transcendent position, regardless of circumstances? Heath (2006, 551–552) suggested a “market failures approach of business ethics” that could provide moral constraints to profit maximization. However, he did not explain the nature and basis of such moral constraints, from a philosophical perspective. Moral constraints could follow from moral worldviews, post-moral worldviews, and the transcendent position. They could be related either to moral normativity or to the quest for the ethical aim. The basic link between morality and the stakeholder approach could depend on the way we classify the various types of stakeholders. Phillips (2003) distinguished between normative stakeholders and derivative stakeholders. The focal organization has moral duties towards normative stakeholders: employees, financiers, suppliers, customers, and communities. Derivative stakeholders are stakeholders of the focal organization only because they can affect it. The focal organization does not have any moral duty towards derivative stakeholders, such as news media, activists, and competitors. Firm performance could be defined as “the total value created by the firm through its activities, which is the sum of the utility created for each of a firm’s legitimate stakeholders” (Harrison and Wicks 2013, 102). Stakeholder theory does not contradict value maximization. Taking all stakeholders’ interests into account is a basic way to maximize value. However, stakeholders’ interests could conflict (Jensen 2002, 241, 246). Stakeholder theory must then explain how we could solve such conflicts between stakeholders’ interests, while favouring value maximization. Value maximization is not equivalent to profit maximization. Value maximization mirrors the fact that given decisions substantially increase the interests of the focal organization and the various interests of stakeholders. The greatest moral challenge of the stakeholder theory is to explain the mode of conflict resolution or stakeholders’ conflicting interests and, above all, its moral foundation. Stakeholders have multiple and interdependent interactions with each other (Ackermann and Eden 2011). A stakeholder culture has been defined as “the beliefs, values, and practices that have evolved for solving stakeholder-related problems and otherwise managing relationships with stakeholders.” Five types of stakeholder cultures have been identified: agency culture, corporate egoist culture, instrumentalist culture, moralist culture, and altruist culture. In each type of stakeholder culture, various ethical theories could be combined. An amoral culture (or agency culture) would imply the absence of any concern for others. It is quite difficult to imagine how managerial egoism could coexist with the absence of a basic concern for shareholders’ interests. Corporate egoist and instrumentalist cultures emphasize shareholders’ interests, while neglecting other stakeholders’ interests. Moralist and altruist cultures require a basic concern for all stakeholders’ interests. The altruist culture needs to focus on normative stakeholders only. Derivative stakeholders

References

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(activists, news media, and competitors) will be totally neglected. Thus, the altruist culture mirrors a very narrow meaning of altruism, at least from a philosophical viewpoint. Ethical theories are not intrinsically linked to any stakeholder culture. Organizational members can embrace various ethical theories, while strengthening the same kind of stakeholder culture. Moreover, any classification of stakeholder cultures cannot mirror the complexity and multiplicity of ethical theories.

7.4  Summary The interconnectedness between Time and self, or between Truth and morality mirrors the daunting task of promoting mutual understanding, when organizational members do not share the same meaning of “within-time-ness” or of an ontic quest for truth. The Habermassian notion of moral deliberation processes could be greatly enhanced since it seems to favour organizational democracy and mutual respect. Unfortunately, it cannot eliminate implicit power games and the psychological influence of organizational role models on behavioural expectations. Moreover, Habermas’s moral deliberation processes do not allow for a bridging of moral and post-moral worldviews, mainly because they are inclined to oppose moral universalism. Rational deliberation could address moral issues (moral normativity), while opening the way to ethical reflection (the quest for the ethical aim). It promotes mutual understanding/respect and allows people to overcome the moral/post-moral dualism. However, annihilating the moral/post-moral dualism requires deepening the meaning and scope of Time/self and Truth/morality dualisms. Organizational members who are engaged in rational deliberation about moral and ethical issues may access to ontic togetherness. Organizational members are called upon by dialogical challenges, when being confronted by ethical conflicts and dilemmas. They can share their own truth-claims with internal and external stakeholders, insofar as their truth-claims could be part of rational deliberation processes about moral normativity and the quest for the ethical aim.

References Ackermann, Fran, and Colin Eden. 2011. Strategic Management of Stakeholders: Theory and Practice. Long Range Planning 44: 179–196. Agle, Bradley R., Donaldson Thomas, R. Edward Freeman, Michael C. Jensen, Ronald K. Mitchell, and Donna J.  Wood. 2008. Dialogue Toward Superior Stakeholder Theory. Business Ethics Quarterly 18 (2): 153–190. Bird, Allan, Mark Mendenhall, Michael J. Stevens, and Gary Oddou. 2010. Defining the content domain of intercultural competence of global leaders. Journal of Managerial Psychology 25 (8): 810–828.

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Chapter 8

Overcoming Moral/Post-Moral Dualism and Enhancing the Presence of the Infinite: Endorsing a Non-dualistic Approach to Interreligious Dialogue in the Organizational Setting

8.1  Introduction One of the most important challenges of interreligious dialogue in the organizational setting is to avoid dualistic thinking about Good/Evil, belief/unbelief, and moral/immoral. Dualistic thinking is a very powerful obstacle to mutual understanding and relational peace. Dualistic thinking closes the door to religious/spiritual pluralism. Dualistic thinking does not allow us to apply communicational truth to the presence of the Infinite. Dualistic connectedness between the Infinite and finite realities cannot give birth to fruitful interreligious dialogue. Only non-­dualistic interconnectedness between the Infinite and finite realities could make any interreligious dialogue in organizational culture relevant and fruitful. The notion of the Sacred could open the door to a non-dualistic interconnectedness between the finite and the Infinite. An interreligious dialogue in organizational life may be quite successful and sustainable in the long-term only if it provides multiple interpretations of the Sacred. The various self-manifestations of the Infinite can never be perceived in their own essence. Any self-manifestation of the Infinite is always a matter of subjective perception and interpretation since the human being is a “subjective thinker” (Kierkegaard). The Infinite does not have any objectively knowable substance. Finite beings “live-in” ontic temporality. Being “in-front-of-others” means that we define our “self-in-a-world,” when confronted with others’ “self-in-a-­ world.” But the Infinite can never be compared to other human beings. Human beings share the same existential predicament. However, the Infinite is the Unknowable and Undefinable. Finite beings cannot essentially share anything with the Infinite. Nonetheless, the human being experiences the presence of the Sacred. He/she is confronted with various kinds of sacredness. The historically based situation of human beings reveals the ontic positioning of being “in-front-of-the-Sacred.” The Sacred is the way human beings interpret the self-manifestation of the Infinite. If the Sacred is an interpretation, then it can only be the object of subjective interpretation and experience. The only way to grasp the Sacred is to be aware of the way © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 M. Dion, Worldviews, Ethics and Organizational Life, Ethical Economy 60, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-82355-9_8

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we interpret/re-interpret it. The notion of the Sacred as interpretation implies eliminating dualistic thinking and searching for its plurality of meanings and symbols. A non-dualistic notion of the Sacred could be the basis of a non-dualistic approach to an interreligious dialogue. The human being is “in-front-of-the-Sacred,” while never being “in-front-of-the-Infinite.” He/she can be existentially confronted with manifestations of the Infinite, while being unable to grasp the essence/life of the Infinite. The human being is “in-front-of-the-Sacred,” since he/she is a “being-who-­ interprets-reality.” The various manifestations of the Infinite are faith-based interpretations of the Sacred. The tension between moral and post-moral worldviews appears in a dualistic mode of thinking. It imprisons us in extreme connection/disconnection between morality and religion. However, there is a way to overcome such a dualistic approach to moral issues. Enhancing the presence of the Infinite and acknowledging the Sacred as interpretation can release us from any subjection to dualistic thinking. If the Sacred is an historically based and culturally induced interpretation of the self-­ manifestation of the Infinite, then it can give birth to innumerable interpretations. We will see how such openness to the Infinite and to the Sacred could have theological and philosophical foundations.

8.2  R  evealing the Tension in Moral/Post-Moral Dualism: The Relation Between Morality and Religion The dualism between moral and post-moral worldviews creates a tension that can never give rise to a creative renewal of moralities. The borders between Good and Evil remain fragile. Post-moral worldviews radically question the dualism between Good and Evil. From a philosophical viewpoint, the contradiction between moral and post-moral worldviews is not easily resolved. However, from a theological perspective, it strengthens the dualism between faith and morality, as though morality were an integral part of any religion. So, we need a creative path to overcome the dualism between moral and post-moral worldviews, from a philosophical, theological, and spiritual perspective.

8.2.1  The Ever-Changing Borders Between Good and Evil The way we circumscribe the borders between Good and Evil determines the scope and substance of our morality. Post-moral worldviews have questioned the relevance of moral worldviews since they presuppose the non-existence of Truth-itself. But they are generally not open to the presence of the Infinite. They render religious/ spiritual phenomena incomprehensible, as though they were unknowable. The experience of the Sacred remains totally questionable for people who embrace

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post-­moral worldviews. Revisiting the borders between Good and Evil entails looking at reason and virtues differently. In so doing, we can better understand the scope and substance of wisdom and love, as the constituent elements leading to ontic happiness. Mind and heart are interdependent. Too often, moral ideas and convictions are distorted for various ideological motives. Ideologies distort moral worldviews, without ever embracing any post-moral worldview. In their most extreme forms, ideologies could even justify and strengthen amoral positioning. No ideology can ever allow us to overcome the dualism between moral and post-moral worldviews. Spinoza believed that every action based on reason is morally right. Other kinds of action could be either right or wrong. In such situations, immutable borders between Good and Evil seem to be non-existent. No action is intrinsically either right or wrong. A given action could be right or wrong. In various existentially based situations, the basic link between reason and virtues is not crystal-clear. Human instincts are so powerful that they can hinder us from accepting the rational necessity of virtues in our personal, family, group, organizational, institutional, and social life. Self-preservation is not the only absolute law of humankind. Morality is certainly an important support for humankind. However, reason can never define the ultimate substance of Good and Evil. So, the ultimate foundation of Good and Evil remains unknowable. If there were any Truth-itself, it could never be fully grasped. The human being can search for Truth, but he/she can never claim to hold absolute truths. The existence of Truth-itself is not denied. But Truth-itself is ungraspable. So, nobody can ever claim to hold absolute truths. Loving humankind means loving anyone. Without unconditional love, we are lost in the vast space of conditional love. Conditional love means that our capacity for universal love depends on predetermined criteria. If some conditions are met, then we can love someone. Otherwise, we could be unable to love him/her. This is the essence of conditional love. Conditional love neglects the transcendental unity of human dignity. Conditional love is compatible with fixed borders between Good and Evil. Paradoxically, moral worldviews can enhance unconditional love, while never strongly criticizing the various forms of conditional love. Every word/action that falls into the realm of Evil cannot be subjected to an “unconditional love.” Every word/action that falls into the realm of Good can give birth to an “unconditional love.” Unchanging borders between Good and Evil strengthen conditional love and make an appearance of “unconditional love” possible. Without accepting radical otherness, we cannot unconditionally love anyone. Only unconditional love can become universally expressed. Instead, conditional love chooses people to love and people to hate, while justifying both love and hate. Enduring happiness depends on our capacity for unconditional love. Universal and unconditional love needs wisdom since wisdom understands love as a prerequisite for enduring happiness. Loving someone entails letting him/her freely become his/ her own self (others’ “Becoming-oneself”). We cannot love others’ “Being-oneself” “as-it-is,” since we do not have access to the essence of their “self-in-a-world.” We can only love others’ “Being-oneself” “as-it-could-become,” that is, as a continuous self-projection into the future. We can only love others’ “Becoming-oneself.” Love

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makes inner and relational harmony possible. There is no duty of love. Self-love is the most powerful obstacle to unconditional love. In its extreme form, self-love contradicts unconditional and universal love. Any expectation of reciprocity presupposes a basic condition to be met. Unconditional love does not expect any reciprocity. Loving others unconditionally implies the absence of any satisfaction/joy when there is reciprocity. But self-love is a very powerful obstacle to unconditional and universal love. We deeply appreciate support and empathy from people we already love. But can we have the same feeling when people we hate are empathetic to our suffering? The basic worth of empathy and compassion does not depend on given traits of personality. It is not related to our judgment about others’ self. Self-love is an ontic trap for anyone who would like to practice unconditional love. The human being does not always behave selfishly. It has never been proven that human nature is egocentric. We often underestimate/overestimate the importance and relevance of our personal interests. Our reason could err. “Becoming-oneself” is deciding “who-we-would-like-to-be.” It is “Being-­ oneself”s self-projection into the future. Actualizing our “Becoming-oneself” is “living-in” ontic decisiveness since it is deciding to use self-transcendence processes to become who-we-are. If the awareness of our self-identity implies the immutability of our “Being-oneself,” then it makes us lose various possibilities of psychological, moral, and even spiritual growth. Every human being has a moral responsibility for the way he/she defines the borders between Good and Evil. Good has a positive impact on inner and relational peace. Saying that there is no other ultimate basis for Good is embracing a post-moral worldview. Our deeds should always be chosen rationally and prudently. In moral worldviews, the borders between Good and Evil are unchanging. The universal Good remains unknowable. The way we circumscribe the borders between Good and Evil reveals our notion of ontic freedom. Unchanging borders between Good and Evil give birth to predetermined limitations to our ontic freedom. Instead, ever-changing borders between Good and Evil widen the scope of our ontic freedom, without any predetermined limitations. Ontic freedom, emotions and attitudes are interconnected. We cannot exercise our freedom without developing specific emotions and attitudes. We cannot express our emotions and adopt given attitudes without exercising our ontic freedom. Emotions and attitudes could be either positive (love, altruism, compassion) or disturbing (hatred, egocentrism, cruelty). However, various religions and spiritualities can have different meanings of altruism. The way altruism is applied and expected from others can also vary from one religion to another. But it is not self-­ evident that all human beings will agree on the meaning and implications of mutual understanding and compassion. Societal cultures, religions and spiritualities can deeply influence the interpretation of mutual understanding and compassion. “Being-free” means being aware of the basic motivations behind our deeds. Indeed, we cannot be who-we-are without exercising our ontic freedom. True wisdom implies serenely “living-in” ontic uncertainties. This is a post-moral way of thinking. Post-moral worldviews do not eliminate all ontic uncertainties since uncertainties constitute an integral part of finite existence. We must learn to “live­in” ontic uncertainties and doubts. Love, kindness, altruism, and compassion build

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up the most reliable path to happiness. Hatred, anger, egocentrism, and cruelty can never open the door to happiness. Aristotle believed that happiness can only be reached through virtuous behaviour. Happiness requires virtuous words, attitudes, and deeds. Nonetheless, unhappy people can embrace virtuous existence. Unlike altruism, egocentrism can easily open the way to hatred, anger, jealousy, and vengeance (disturbing emotions). Egocentrism is incompatible with a virtuous existence, since it can multiply vicious words, attitudes, and behaviours. Loving virtues entails avoiding the trap of vicious thoughts, words, and behaviours. Happiness is rooted in universal and unconditional goodness. Our scientific knowledge cannot allow us to practice universal and unconditional goodness, love, and generosity. Knowing the philosophical meaning of happiness does not make us happier than others. The feeling of happiness follows from our emotions and attitudes. We cannot be happy without being open to radical otherness and without practicing forgiveness. The capacity for respect, love, and forgiveness are virtuously oriented. Science is not helpful, when designing our capacity for universal love, altruism, and compassion. However, virtues could make science more humanely focused. Ontic freedom could allow us to deepen our humaneness. We learn to be more humane, while learning “what-it-means-to-be-free.” Existing is “being-in-an-­ historical-situation.” Being responsible for others’ historical situation means knowing and accepting our existential predicament. All human beings are subject to the same existential predicament. That is why they can develop and express unconditional love, altruism, and compassion towards others. We are responsible for others’ situation because the way we exercise our individual freedom can affect, even indirectly, others’ historical situation. Absolute freedom would inevitably lead to misunderstandings and conflicts. Moreover, it would deny our responsibility for others’ situation. Absolute freedom would also contradict our existential finitude. Our freedom is existentially finite. Human beings share the same existential predicament. We are responsible for the exercise of our individual freedom, insofar as our ontic freedom could adversely affect, in one way or another, others’ historical situation and ontic freedom. We are responsible for enhancing others’ ontic freedom and responsibility. The problem is that we are often deeply convinced of our right motives. Any self-justified conviction of “personal goodness” mirrors the impression that someone is “optimally perfect,” given the circumstances. An “optimal perfection” presupposes the impossibility of being more perfect in specific situations. It can make us forget that the exercise of our ontic freedom can harm others’ historical situation and ontic freedom. The conviction of being “optimally perfect” reduces our capacity for self-transcendence. It cannot allow us to deepen our altruistic and compassionate concern towards others. Inaction can be as destructive as action. Inaction in the face of cruel, unjust, and violent deeds is a very powerful factor in the destruction of the world. Such inaction reveals the absence of decisiveness towards “what-the-world-should-become.” It can indicate that we do not have any “world-dream.” It can also reflect our inability to enhance and strengthen our “world-dream” in daily life. Others’ suffering can open the way to unconditional love, altruism, and compassion. The courage to live implies the courage to face our existential (undeniable)

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predicament. “Living-in-the-world” entails assuming our existential finitude. The courage to change our self requires an awareness that we can overcome some of our ontic limitations. It is the courage to choose our “Becoming-oneself.” We can improve our “Being-oneself.” We can become a better person. We can improve the way we express our love, altruism, and compassion. The courage to change ourselves can never be separated from the courage to change our own world, since we are a “self-in-a-world.” Changing our world means developing and strengthening a “world-dream.” Any “world-dream” is grounded in fundamental virtues and values. Unconditional love, altruism, and compassion can certainly be part of the overall picture. Unconditional compassion can make the “ego-others dualism” disappear. However, the “ego-others dualism” cannot suddenly disappear through unconditional compassion. Unconditional and universal compassion needs to revise our representation of human relationships. The “ego-others dualism” presupposes an unsurpassable gap between self and others. Getting rid of such dualism involves reinterpreting the relationships between ourselves and others. The common belongingness to humankind can allow us to eliminate the gap between our “Being-­ oneself” and others’ “Being-oneself.” Being-happy is existentially grounded in our “Being-free.” Our ontic freedom profoundly influences the way we perceive and interpret our lived experiences. If we strongly believe in our personal wisdom, then we can lose our capacity for self-transcendence. The absolutized belief in personal wisdom is an obstacle to self-transcendence. It could strengthen the “fortress of the Ego” and make us neglect our “Becoming-oneself.” Absolutizing our capacity to become a wise person is lacking too much humility. It is also forgetting that we cannot change our world without changing our “Being-oneself.” Existing is being a “self-in-a-world.” Practicing wisdom means changing our “Being-oneself” and the world we “live-in.” Absolutizing our capacity for personal wisdom can even crystallize our “world-dream,” as though it could never be improved. “Being-responsible” means having the courage to define/revise our ontic project-to-be (“who-we-would-­ like-to-be”). It involves the courage to favour non-violence and to develop a universal/unconditional love, altruism, and compassion. “Being-responsible” entails being actively involved in the humanization of the world we “live-in.” People who want to overcome “moral/post-moral dualism” are confronted with the ever-changing borders between Good and Evil. Embracing a post-moral worldview involves abandoning any belief in Truth-itself. Strengthening a moral worldview means fighting any relativistic attempt to enhance innumerable and conflicting moral positions. Closing the gap between moral and post-moral worldviews is challenging. Any belief in Truth-itself is denied by the belief in relative truth-claims. Moral worldviews affirm the absoluteness of Truth-itself, while post-moral worldviews resist any kind of absoluteness. Overcoming “moral/post-moral dualism” means adopting an “ontic meta-positioning” that reveals interconnected realities. Shouldering the basic pre-philosophical challenge of organizational life entails developing an “ontic meta-positioning.” Any ontic positioning is intrinsically linked to our “in-the-worldliness” and implies the daily positioning of our “self-in-a-­ world” “in-front-of-others.” An ontic “meta-positioning” can never deny the structure of human existence. Rather, it is a way to reinvent our ontic positioning, while

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eliminating crystallized dualisms. One of the most important challenges of an “ontic meta-positioning” is to seriously take the ever-changing borders between Good and Evil into account, without being absolutely subjected to moral relativism. Adopting an “ontic meta-positioning” requires authenticity, courage, and “ontic resoluteness.” Our “Becoming-oneself” must always be safeguarded since it is the true basis of our existential freedom. Organizational members can assume the pre-philosophical challenge of developing and expressing an “ontic meta-positioning” throughout organizational life. In so doing, they must overcome the limitations of moral/post-­ moral worldviews, while meeting basic behavioural/attitudinal expectations.

8.2.2  Faith, Detachment, and Morality Faith can be closely intertwined with morality. In some cases, it can be quite difficult to distinguish between a faithful/unfaithful and a moral/immoral attitude. Morality is then so inextricably linked to faith that the borders between faith and morality can be truly perceived and rightly interpreted. Moral worldviews reveal the acceptance of ungraspable borders between faith and morality. In contrast, post-­ moral worldviews express how moral worldviews confuse matters. They criticize the way morality rules over faith, as though faith would not exist without morality. In daily life, believers need to know how they could avoid any confusion between faith and morality. Lived experiences can make us confuse faith and morality, regardless of theoretical differences. The feeling of the Infinite makes it self-evident that morality should never rule over faith. Seizing the meaning and implications of such ontic feeling makes believers aware of the constant danger of mixing morality and faith. The notion of the “feeling of the Infinite” is the ontic guardian against any faith-based totalizing attempt. Detachment is beyond conditional love, humility, and compassion. Without detachment, conditional love/altruism/compassion can be continually expressed towards others. It can only give birth to attachment. But without unconditional love/ humility/compassion, there is no perfect detachment. Detachment and unconditional love/altruism/compassion are interdependent. “Being-attached” means being dependent on given objects, beings, events, and phenomena. It reduces our capacity to freely decide “who-we-would-like-to-be” and to create/revise our world-dream. “Being-attached” means losing our freedom to define our “self-in-a-world.” It is being attached to existentially finite concerns. Instead, “Being-de-tached” involves being released from any kind of attachment. Detachment excludes any absolutization of existentially finite concerns. Without any finite concern, our soul can be full of God’s presence. Detachment opens the door to the presence of the Infinite in our daily life. Detachment requires self-abnegation. “Being-in-God” means that our mind and heart are open to the presence of the Infinite in our life. It does not mean that our self is projected into God’s presence, as though we could be directly connected to God’s Life and Essence. We can easily become attached to images and representations of God. However, such an attachment is the opposite of faith since

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it transforms the Infinite into a finite reality. The Infinite then becomes a “being-­ alongside-­other-beings.” We should never be ultimately concerned with existentially finite images/representations of God. Being ultimately concerned with the Infinite is “being-de-tached” from all existentially finite realities, including any image and representation of God. Images and representations of God can be so attractive that we easily become attached to them. Detachment is a sine qua non for eternal happiness since it allows us to safeguard the borders between the finite and the Infinite. “Being-de-tached” entails embracing virtuous behaviour, at any moment of our life. When our virtuous thoughts, emotions, attitudes, words, and deeds become stable, they can allow us to overcome all conceptual borders between good and evil. Being perfectly and constantly virtuous means going beyond the conceptual dualism of good and evil. Virtuous perfection is challenging. We must work very hard to reach it. But virtuous perfection is not unreachable. It needs unconditional love, altruism, and compassion. Perfect detachment is unconditional. “Being-de-tached” is unconditionally destroying all forms of attachment. Anything that is unconditional has a religious/spiritual dimension. Paul Tillich believed that the moral imperative has a religious dimension because of its unconditional character. Kantian categorical imperatives are inherently unconditional. They are never subjected to conditioning factors and causes. Universal/unconditional love (agapè) is the ultimate moral principle that presupposes justice, said Tillich. Unconditional love needs unconditional justice. It overcomes the limitations of conditional justice. Unconditional love allows us to transform conditional justice into unconditional justice. Moral imperatives are unconditional only because they are grounded in universal/unconditional love (Tillich 1971, 41, 43, 59, 62–64, 67, 113). “Love is unconditional” (Tillich 1980, 145). Unconditional love transforms all values into unconditional virtues. Heidegger (1962, 314) said that “the call of conscience has the character of an appeal to Dasein by calling it to its ownmost potentiality-for-­ Being-its-Self; and this is done by way of summoning it to its ownmost Being-­ guilty.” Tillich (1957a, 148) rightly asserted that Heidegger’s notion of a call of conscience implies guilt is a contradiction of one’s conscience. “Resoluteness transcends the moral conscience, its arguments and prohibitions. It determines a situation instead of being determined by it. The good, transmoral conscience consists in the acceptance of the bad, moral conscience, which is unavoidable wherever decisions are made, and acts are performed” (Tillich 1957a, 148). Some believe that unconditional love necessarily gives rise to a strong belief in God and in the immortality of the human soul. Without faith in the immortality of the human soul, all words, attitudes, and behaviours are allowed. Then, the borders between good and evil disappear. In such a case, egocentrism and altruism can never be justified. Unlike altruism, egocentrism does not impose any duty on anyone. Being altruistic means affirming the absoluteness of a specific “should-be” rather than strengthening the absoluteness of every “what-is.” “Moral/post-moral dualism” provokes a tension between morality and religion. Unlike moral worldviews, post-moral worldviews criticize any intrinsic link between morality and religion. An “ontic meta-positioning” can mirror an intuition

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of the Infinite, insofar as it is separated from institutionalized religions. Without detachment, we cannot be authentically related to the Infinite. “Being-de-tached” can open our mind/heart to the presence of the Infinite. Detachment allows us to consider the Infinite as Infinite. Being subjected to given representations of the Infinite is “being-attached.” Our “being-attached” is created by the powerful influence of traditional moralities and institutionalized religions. An “ontic meta-­ positioning” expresses the intuition of the Infinite and the detachment from any representation of the Infinite. We will see how Tillich’s notion of ultimate concern can be intertwined with those components of an “ontic meta-positioning.”

8.3  O  vercoming Moral/Post-Moral Dualism and Enhancing the Presence of the Infinite in Business Overcoming the dualism between moral and post-moral worldviews is not an easy task since moralities and post-moralities reinforce their own conception of Truth without taking the opposite view into account. From a religious perspective, we must consider the relation between finite beings and the Infinite. Faith is inherently linked to the interconnectedness between finite beings and the Infinite. Post-moral worldviews focus on existential doubt as a constituent element of faith. Existential doubts reveal our finite knowledge and rationality. Faith can never eliminate existential doubt since existential doubt is incontrovertible. Existing entails having finite knowledge and rationality. The awareness of our existential finitude makes us doubt the meaning and substance of all beings, things, events, and phenomena. Existential doubt prevents believers from grasping and understanding God’s Essence and Life. Our finite rationality and knowledge can never grasp the Infinite since the Infinite is the Unknowable. Nonetheless, we can conceive God as the Ground of Being, that is, the unconditioned Ground of conditioned things, beings, and phenomena. With the Tillichian approach, we could certainly define faith as “the state of being shaken by an ultimate concern.” However, faith must be safeguarded from the pitfalls of idolatry and profanation. The Tillichian notion of a “Protestant Principle” allows believers to criticize ideologies and utopias, as possible means of idolatry and desecration.

8.3.1  Finite Beings and the Infinite The Presence of the Infinite in finite realities has a paradoxical structure. It does not imply that God’s Will rules over History. Rather, it presupposes that finite realities are simultaneously “already-separated-from” and “potentially-reunited-with” the Infinite. On one hand, the existence of the Infinite requires a radical otherness between finite realities and the Infinite. The absence of any gap between finite

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realities and the Infinite would mean either the universalization of finite realities (there is no Infinite) or the universalization of the Infinite (finite realities do not exist). Finite beings are “already-separated-from” the Infinite. This is the pastfocused component of the paradox. On the other hand, finite realities can eventually be “reunited with the Infinite.” The reunion of finite realities with the Infinite is at the core of religious discourse. This is the future-focused component of the paradox. The Presence of the Infinite in finite realities is paradoxical, since the past and the future coexist in the present. Facing the gap between finite realities and the Infinite means opening our mind/heart to the possibility of “being-­ reunited-­ with-­ the-­ Infinite.” Looking at the possibility of being reunited with the Infinite reminds us of the gap between finite realities and the Infinite. Confrontation with the religious paradox in our daily life can allow us to grasp the presence of the Infinite, without absolutizing its concreteness. In so doing, we avoid the desecration of the Infinite. It also implies that finite beings are never idolized. If there is a gap between finite realities and the Infinite, then there is an infinite distance between human wisdom and Divine Wisdom. Nonetheless, Divine Wisdom must be “one-with-Nature.” Otherwise, Divine Wisdom would not be in accordance with Divine Creation. Such an outlook on the Universe would be self-contradictory. The supernatural cannot eliminate natural laws because natural laws are intrinsically linked to God’s Creation. Finite beings cannot exist without the Infinite. Existential finitude is inherently linked to the Infinite, regardless of its Absolute essence and life. There is no Infinite without finite beings, and vice-versa. The existence of finite realities without the Infinite would be meaningless since existential finitude needs the Infinite as a focal point. On the other hand, the Infinite exists only if there are finite beings, things, and phenomena. The existence of the Infinite without any finite reality would be useless since it would make the reunion with the Infinite absurd. In such a case, the Infinite would be the only reality. Finite beings can observe the contradiction between finite beings and the Infinite. But in God’s Life, this contradiction does not exist at all. The Infinite is all-encompassing. Küng (1988, 253) defined religion as “the expression of all-encompassing meaning, of highest values, of unconditioned obligation”. Any religious motivation mirrors a basic “trust in an ultimate supreme reality” (Küng 1993, 59). Religion thus provides an ultimate ground for all meanings and a set of “highest values” believers should internalize. The all-encompassing meaning and “highest values” are grounded on unconditioned duties since the Infinite is the Unconditional. God’s names are anthropomorphic and distorted representations of the Infinite. If there were a contradiction between finite realities and the Infinite, then God’s Creation would be self-contradictory. Finite realities can be created by the Infinite since the Infinite can create everything at any time. The Infinite (God) overcomes any gap between finite realities and the Infinite. There is nothing more encompassing than God’s Essence. The Infinite is present in every finite being. Finitude is potentially present in the Infinite. But any finitude that potentially permeates the Infinite is eternally overcome. The presence of finitude in the Infinite must be presupposed, because of the identity of the maximum and the minimum. However, such finitude is never actualized. It only remains a potentiality.

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The potentiality of finitude must be constantly overcome through the infinite power of the Infinite. Otherwise, the Infinite would lose its infinity. The presence of the Infinite in the finite takes the form of an actualization, while the presence of finitude in the Infinite is nothing but potentiality, said Tillich (1968, 341, 373, 419, 441). The human being gives meaning to things, events, and phenomena. He/she can also consider that everything in human existence is meaningless. Acknowledging ontic meaninglessness is a form of sensemaking. The absence of intrinsic meaning in existence reveals a given meaning. We can give meaning to existing beings/ things/phenomena. Alternatively, we can recognize ontic meaninglessness. These two ontic paths reveal different interpretations of sacredness and the Infinite. Self-­ centredness reduces the capacity to connect ourselves to the Infinite. God can be the ultimate basis of “everything-that-exists.” We cannot believe in God without reinterpreting the meaning and scope of our self-consciousness. Being self-conscious does not imply the absolutization of self-centredness. If God is the basis of all existing realities, then our self-consciousness can only relativize our propensity to self-­ centredness. God is simple and perfect. The Infinite is the ultimate limitation that does not have any limitation. The Infinite is Unknowable and Indefinable. The Unknowability of God is an infinite limitation of our finite knowledge and rationality. The Divine Spirit is the unlimited limitation of “everything-that-is.” God’s Creation reveals that every essence of existing beings and things must be included in God’s Will. God’s Essence must include the essence of “everything-that-exists,” because God is the basis of all existing beings and things. “Everything-that-is” is something that has been created. From a theological perspective, nothing is self-created. “Being-religiously-oriented” means acknowledging that the Infinite overcomes the subject/object dualism. God is the Ground of “everything-that-is.” God lies within “the depths of our being.” That is why the “feeling” of the Infinite is an intuition, said Tillich (1968, 392–393). Tillich clearly made the point that God is unconditioned. But the Unconditional can never be identified with God (Tillich 1980, 24). Every emotion, sentiment, thought, or feeling is conditioned. So, the feeling of unconditional dependence on the Infinite must not be a feeling, but rather an intuition. Tillich (1968, 394) understood such unconditional dependence as an “ultimate concern.” The human being is existentially separated from the Infinite, while being simultaneously related to the Infinite. The Infinite is the creative Ground of every existentially finite being. There is an intrinsic relationship between finite beings and the Infinite. But the Infinite can judge the way finite beings think, speak, feel, and behave. Human beings are aware of their existential finitude. They know that they are separated from the Infinite. We are existentially aware of the “dis-union” between the finite and the Infinite. But human beings are also oriented towards the possibility of “being-reunited-with-the-Infinite.” Such a paradoxical relationship between human beings and the Infinite is the essence of every religion. Tillich asserted that the Infinite allows the “re-union” of the finite with the Infinite. The Infinite opens the way to a symbolic “re-union” with the Infinite (Tillich 2015, 146–148).

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An “ontic meta-positioning” involves looking at the relation between finite beings and the Infinite differently. The borders between finite beings and the Infinite always remain ungraspable since the Infinite is the Undefinable. Believers are confronted with the undefinable character of God, while being ultimately concerned with God’s Essence and Life. Such an ultimate concern can take various cultural, religious, and spiritual forms. It allows us to better circumscribe our pre-­philosophical challenge, when dealing with “moral/post-moral dualism.” Overcoming “moral/ post-moral dualism” means acknowledging and enhancing the Presence of the Infinite. Tillich’s notion of ultimate concern can allow people to deploy their own connectedness with the Infinite, while “being-de-tached” from any representation of the Infinite.

8.3.2  Faith, Doubt, and the Unknowability of God From an existential perspective, faith and doubt are interrelated. Doubt is existentially rooted since it constitutes an integral part of “what-it-means-to-exist.” Existential doubt follows from existential finitude. Only existentially finite beings can have ontic doubts. Faith is also existentially grounded since it mirrors the basic orientation of finite beings towards the Infinite. Without existential doubt, there is no faith. Without faith, there is no existential doubt. The interconnectedness between faith and doubt requires the unknowability of God. If God were totally knowable, then faith would not be intrinsically related to existential doubt. Existential doubt would not exist at all. Thus, human rationality and knowledge would be infinite. The human being would be an infinite being. The Unknowability of God is intrinsically related to human finitude. Finite beings must acknowledge their undeniable finitude. In doing so, they can observe the unknowability of God, without any absolutized truth-claim. The relation between finite beings and the Infinite mirrors the connection between human temporality and Divine Eternity. Philosophical reflection makes us question all certainties. When religions/spiritualities are institutionalized, they can give rise to ideological thinking. Faith can be deeply influenced by ideologies. If so, believers can lose their free connectedness to the Infinite. The institutionalization of religious/spiritual beliefs, values, and practices can reduce believers’ ontic freedom of “being-connected-to-the-Infinite.” It could radically impose certainties and exclude any kind of ontic uncertainty/doubt. Then, faith is subjected to religion, as though believers’ ontic freedom would disappear once and for all. Religions and spiritualities could distort the essence of faith in proposing and strengthening an ideological mode of thought, emotion/sentiment, speech and deed. Faith should never convey any certainty since believers are “subjective thinkers” (Kierkegaard). Instead, faith is grounded in hope. There is no hope without uncertainty. If there were absolute certainty, then hope could never arise. The uncertainty involved in any act of hope has the structure of an existentially based (incontrovertible) doubt. If there were no ontic doubt, there would not be any ontic quest for meaning. Any ontic quest for meaning is based on a basic hope. If

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ontic doubts were stronger than beliefs, then beliefs would be useless. Believers can hold ontic doubts, while “being-in-doubt.” Existential doubt is not fatal. Beliefs can allow us to take ontic doubts upon ourselves. “Being-in-doubt” is existentially related to “being-a-believer”. It does not imply that everyone must believe in God/ the Infinite. Rather, “being-a-believer” means that every human being has the capacity to develop beliefs, while “being-in-doubt.” The object of beliefs can vary from one individual to another, from one organization/institution to another, from one society to another, and even from one religion/spirituality to another. But the human being is existentially a “believer” and a “being-in-doubt.” Everyone tries to perfect his/her own self. The existence of Truth-itself makes it ungraspable and undefinable. But how can we remain silent about Truth-itself throughout our existentially based quest for truth? In the Nietzschean way, we can believe that there are no facts, but only interpretations (Nietzsche 1968, 267, 327). Facts are then meaningless. The human being is a “being-in-quest-for-meaning,” since he/she is a “being-who-interprets-reality.” In post-moral worldviews, there are only preliminary (relative) truths, that is, “truth-claims.” Then, doubt constitutes an integral part of faith, argued Tillich (1955, 60, 85). This is neither a methodological doubt nor a skeptical doubt. Rather, Tillich referred to “existential doubt.” Existential doubt expresses our existential (undeniable) finitude. Existential doubt is translated into ontic doubts. It comprises an integral part of human existence. We must take existential doubt upon ourselves. Existential doubt follows from our existential finitude. Shouldering our existential doubt means accepting our existential finitude. Existential doubt is always involved in acts of faith. Faith implies the courage to take existential doubt upon ourselves. Existing entails being subjected to multiple existential threats from nonbeing, explained Tillich. Courage as self-affirmation is still existentially possible. This implies the courage to affirm our own faith. Faith is oriented toward God as Being-itself. Our courage to be refers to an “ultimate concern” (Tillich 1957a, 16–22, 101, 104). If so, then we can never remain silent about Truth-itself, although we are rationally unable to define it. All truth-claims are relative, concrete, and conditioned. They can never attain absoluteness. Only the ultimate concern has absoluteness because its object is the Unconditional. Any claim to know the Unknowable God makes us fall into non-knowledge. The unknowability of God can never be overcome. We know we can never know God’s Essence, Life, and Will. We accept the consequences of the Unknowability of God. The only thing we know about God is a negative knowledge. We cannot directly know the essence of God/the Infinite. Things, beings, and phenomena exist in our personalized “here-and-now.” Our ontic temporality allows us to “imagine” the meaning and substance of Eternity. However, any idea about Eternity is only a finite representation of the Unknowable. We cannot grasp the various implications of the Infinite power of God. God is the universal principle, that is, the ultimate basis of every being and thing. The human being belongs to Eternity. Being aware of our existential finitude allows us to be “in-quest-for-the-Infinite.” However, the nowness of Eternity requires the interconnectedness of human ontic temporality and Divine Eternity. Eternity is the experience of timeless Good, while Time is the potential substance of Evil. Unlike post-moral worldviews, moral worldviews can accept the

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dualism between Good/Eternity and Evil/ontic temporality. The temporally based spirit participates in Eternity. It is not only temporally based, but above all, oriented towards Eternity. Our existential predicament implies that we can overcome ontic temporality and grasp the presence of Eternity in our existence. Atheistic humanism denies such ontic possibility-to-be. Divine Eternity includes ontic temporality and finitude. But Eternity eternally overcomes ontic temporality and finitude. Eternity should never be considered timelessness, that is, the negation of ontological temporality. Rather, it is a different kind of temporality: past and future are then interconnected (Tillich 1955, 77–78). Human existence is subjected to ontological temporality, while Divine Life implies “Divine Temporality as Eternity.” God is the Ground and power of being that eternally conquers nonbeing (Evil). God is Being-­ itself. Only God can be Eternal, since only God is Being-itself, said Tillich (1957b, 10–11, 69, 78; 1963, 283, 285–286, 290, 294). Defining God as Being-itself allows us to embrace moral worldviews. This is not necessarily meaningful in post-moral worldviews. In moral worldviews, the “eternal here” is the universal/unconditioned presence of God as the power of Being-itself. Spiritual actions release us from the absolute subjection to Time, since they open our heart/mind to the supratemporal, that is, to the Divine. The spiritual way of living, feeling, speaking, and behaving requires self-abnegation. An absolute self-centredness is a basic obstacle to spiritual/religious experiences. But we do not know the essence of human beings. The impossibility of knowing God’s Essence and Life has been projected onto human existence. We cannot say anything about human nature. We can never know, once and for all, “what-it-means-to-exist.” Our “self-in-a-world” is involved in an ontic and endless quest for meaning. Being temporally based and existentially conditioned involves being “in-quest-for-the-Eternal/Infinite.” Only existentially conditioned beings can infinitely search for the Unconditioned. Only existentially finite beings can have the intuition of the Infinite. An “ontic meta-positioning” is an attempt to overcome “moral/post-moral dualism.” However, it can never exclude all ontic uncertainties and doubts. Even faith implies doubt. Overcoming the dualism between moral worldviews and post-moral worldviews does not eliminate our ontic uncertainties and doubts. Otherwise, such ontic positioning would contradict our existential predicament. Existing means being subjected to uncertainties and doubts about the meaning of things, beings, events, and phenomena. An “ontic meta-positioning” can only allow us to eliminate “moral/post-moral dualism.” It can never make God more easily knowable. The Unknowability of God is inevitable since God the Infinite is infinitely transcending finite existence.

8.3.3  Being-Itself and the Ground of Being There is an existential connection between existing beings and Being-itself, since Being-itself must precede any existing being. A specific being needs Being-itself. Otherwise, it could not exist. We should distinguish between Being-itself and the

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Ground of Being. Moral worldviews can easily accept that God is both Being-itself and the Ground of Being. But post-moral worldviews are inclined to distinguish between Being-itself and the Ground of Being. Being-itself does not need any God at all. Heidegger strongly resists any attempt to define Being-itself as the Ground of Being. His post-moral philosophy mirrors the philosophical request to separate Being-itself from any Ground of Being. However, post-moral worldviews can be more open to the religious/spiritual notion of the Ground of Being. God the Creator is known as the Ground of all existing beings. God is the ultimate source of all existence and essence since God overcomes the dualistic structure of essence and existence. Only existentially finite beings can be “in-becoming.” Divine Life never changes. However, God’s images and representations make God change throughout History. God’s intervention in human existence can even take culturally based representations/images of God into account. God is ultimately present in “everything-that-is.” God is not a “being-alongside-other-beings.” Rather, God is the Ground of all existing entities. Things, beings, and phenomena “are” because of God’s Essence and Life. However, we can never know God’s Essence and Life. God overcomes anything that can be done, since God’s Life is “everything-that-can-be.” God’s Life and Essence can only be perfect. Otherwise, God could not be the Infinite. Finite beings are imperfect since they are existentially conditioned. God is perfect because of God’s infinity. Every existing substance is connected to God. Existing beings (entities) can never be separated from God. The subject/object structure is existentially based. God is beyond all existential structures since God overcomes the dualism between essence and existence. Any knowable being, thing, or phenomenon is subjected to the essence/existence dualism. Being-itself overcomes the dualism between subject and object, said Tillich (1952, 25). God is present in one’s existence since God has made human beings existentially free. God always overcomes our idea of the Divine, whether it is the Infinite, the Unconditional, or the Ultimate. Every notion of God distorts God’s Essence. God’s presence in the human spirit does not mean that we can grasp the Ground of all existing entities. The Ground of all existing beings, things and phenomena is both transcendent (overcoming existing realities) and immanent (permeating existing realities). The human being can intuitively know and love the Divine (God’s Essence, Being of God). Being-itself transcends nonbeing. It precedes finite realities, and even the negation of the finite by the Infinite. Being-itself overcomes the polarity between existential finitude and infinite self-transcendence. Tillich asserted that “Being-itself manifests itself to finite beings in the infinite drive of the finite beyond itself” (Tillich 1951, 191). Every existing being participates in Being-­ itself. But faith entails being grasped by the Unconditional, that is, by the power of Being-itself (Tillich 1952, 156). Tillich explained that mystics have an extremely intense experience of the power of Being-itself. Mystics feel united with Being-­ itself. They try to apprehend Being-itself. The Ground of all beings is the power to conquer nonbeing. It is involved in any ontic “courage-to-be.” Our “courage to be oneself” requires the power of being itself as the “ultimate self-affirmation.” Our courage to be is grounded in the power of being-itself to affirm itself “in spite of

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nonbeing.” Every act of existential courage expresses the Ground of all beings (Tillich 1952, 157, 166, 181). Tillich (1952, 181) mentioned that courageous self-­ affirmation is a way to participate in “the self-affirmation of being-itself” against nonbeing. Only finite beings can ask the question of being since the Infinite is Being-itself. Moreover, animals and plants cannot deploy any ontological questioning. The human being cannot avoid the question of being because he/she is separated from the power of being to which he/she belongs. The human being is aware of such separation and belongingness (Tillich 1955, 11–12, 14, 16). Being-­itself is the ultimate power of being. It is the basis of all finite realities. Being-itself is the ultimate meaning of all existing beings (Tillich 1957a, 63, 78, 89). It is the ultimate power of being in which all existing beings participate (Tillich 1980, 14, 25–26, 59, 61, 72). Faith is oriented toward the Ground of all beings. Believing in God is seeking to be reunited with the Ground of Being. “Faith is the state of being grasped by the power of being-itself.” Faith is the psychological and spiritual state in which we are seized by the power of Being. The unconditioned power of Being overcomes all conditioned beings and realities (Tillich 1952, 172–173). Ultimately, we can only be concerned with an “unconditioned Transcendent” represented by religious symbols. The “unconditioned Transcendent” is present in every religious act. The “unconditioned Transcendent” is the Ground of Being and, thus, the Ground of every meaning. Any specific meaning is rooted in the Ground of all existing beings. The “unconditioned Transcendent” can never be identified as a “Supreme Being.” Otherwise, the “unconditioned Transcendent” would be reduced to the rank of a “being-alongside-other-beings” (Tillich 1970, 147, 157, 160, 167). The human quest for an Ultimate Reality is an ontic quest for Being-itself, and thus, an ontic quest for the unconditioned power of being. The power of being is both “in and above all beings.” God is “in and above the world,” said Tillich (1955, 13, 20, 28, 74). The Unconditional is the “ground and abyss of all beings” (Tillich 1957a, 119). Idolatry is an absolutized identification of given symbols of the Holy (Sacred) with the Holy itself (Tillich 1980, 59–60). The ontic courage to assume our finitude is based on our faith in God as our ultimate concern (Tillich 1951, 273). Being-itself includes the potentiality of nonbeing. But such potentiality is never actualized. It is “eternally overcome” in the Divine Life. That is why Tillich called it the “power of being-itself” (Tillich 1952, 34, 179–180). Evil must exist in God. The Ground of all beings cannot exclude Evil. But Evil is then a potentiality that is continuously overcome. It is a potentiality that is never actualized. Evil would never be possible in human existence if it did not exist in Divine Life. Otherwise, God would not be the Ground of all existing beings (Tillich 2015, 152). The ultimate power of being is the Ground of our own being, since it can conquer nonbeing (Tillich 1951, 21, 110, 209, 236, 270). According to Tillich (1957b, 9), the notion of God as the Ground of Being has two basic consequences. On one hand, our knowledge about finite things/beings is the starting point for our knowledge of God’s Essence and Life. On the other hand, any knowledge about finite things/beings can never be applied to God since God eternally overcomes finitude. God should never be considered the “Highest Being.” Otherwise, God would be a

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“being-alongside-­other-beings.” Rather, God is the Infinite that can never be reduced to the realm of finite realities. God is Being-itself, that is, the Ground of every being and existence. God is the Ultimate power of being. God transcends the dualism between essence and existence. In God, there is an incomprehensible and undeniable unity between finitude and infinity. God is the Ground of all finite realities only if God incorporates the finite in God’s Essence and Life. However, any finitude in God is only a “potentiality-­ for-finitude.” It is never actualized (Tillich 1951, 235–238, 243, 252, 257; 1955, 82–83). An “ontic meta-positioning” requires the constant criticism of religious representations. “Being-de-tached” means criticizing all representations of the Infinite, since no representation of the Infinite should ever imprison God’s Essence and Life. “Being-attached” to images/representations of the Infinite entails considering God a “being-alongside-other-beings.” It is the best way to misunderstand God’s Essence and Life. God can only be God if God’s Being is never “alongside-other-beings.” Any attempt to overcome “moral/post-moral dualism” through an “ontic meta-­ positioning” must take for granted that God can never be a being. Even a “Supreme Being” is still a “being-alongside-other-beings.” Organizational members who believe in God can adopt an “ontic meta-positioning” when confronted with various images/representations of the Infinite.

8.3.4  The Unconditional In God’s Life and Essence, there is no conditioned dimension. Every being is led by self-preservation (remaining “what-it-is”) and self-accomplishment (improving and realizing itself). The Unconditional is involved in all religious experiences. It is neither a being nor a quality of being. Tillich said that the Unconditional is the object of our ultimate concern (1957a, 32). Tillich (1957a, 43–47) explained how we are open to the “dynamic presence of the unconditional:” we are then “turned toward the infinite.” “Without a transcendent element, the ultimate meaning of history cannot be maintained,” said Tillich (1957a, 26). The self-manifestation of the Eternal in History occurs in a “Kairos,” that is, the breakthrough of the Eternal/infinite into temporal/finite realities. Kairotic moments characterize historical periods in which the human being is open to the Unconditional. Finite realities can convey the Unconditional, although they are existentially conditioned. Human openness to the Unconditional is an “unconditional Yes to the unconditional” (Tillich 1957a, 50). Religious symbols are finite expressions of our relation to the Infinite. They constitute finite manifestations of a transcendent element (Tillich 1957a, 61–62). Ultimate Reality is the “formless Transcendent,” argued Tillich (2015, 142). The relation of the Infinite to conditioned/finite realities presupposes that the Unconditional is both the Foundation and the Abyss of conditioned realities. Finite realities cannot exist without the support of an Unconditional import. The Ground of all beings provides the meaning and substance of finite beings’ existence. Tillich explained that the Unconditional is also an Abyss of meaning. The Ground of all beings implies their

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negation through the undeniable gap between the finite and the Infinite. “Everything-­ that-­exists” is negated through its connectedness with the Infinite. Every sacred reality must be self-negated. Otherwise, we could fall into idolatrous traps (Tillich 1973, 82). Faith is the directedness toward the Unconditional. It can never be fully expressed through finite/conditioned forms (Tillich 1973, 91, 104). Our finite consciousness must use conditioned forms to express the Infinite (Tillich 1973, 35). Every finite being is inherently conditioned. Human knowledge and rationality are existentially finite and conditioned. Mysticism enhances the unity with the transcendent Abyss of meaning (Tillich 1973, 146). Mystics are not ultimately concerned with concrete and ontic forms since the Abyss of meaning is formless. The Unconditional overcomes the subject-object structure, since it is the ultimate Ground of subjects and objects (Tillich 1973, 125, 139). God is the Ground of every essence and existence. God is the Ground of every object and subject (Tillich 1980, 81). The Unconditional overcomes the “God of deism,” argued Tillich (1973, 125). When religion has been transformed into a purely cultural phenomenon, then it has lost its ontological basis, that is, its connection to the Unconditional. Tillich asserted that every religion is relative because it always “objectifies the Unconditional.” Any objectification of the Unconditional distorts the Unconditional itself. Religion is truthful only when it strongly affirms the Unconditional as the Incomprehensible/ Unknowable. According to Tillich (1973, 145–148), the philosophy of religion should be based on the Unconditional rather than on finite realities. “Religion in the sphere of knowledge is directedness toward the unconditionally existing as the ground and abyss of all particular claims and their unity” (Tillich 1973, 66). “Religion is directedness toward the Unconditional, and culture is directedness toward the conditioned forms and their unity” (Tillich 1973, 59). The Unconditional is both the Ground of conditioned forms/realities (the concreteness of the Ground) and its own Ground (the unconditionality of the Ground). The Unconditional does not have any other basis than itself (Tillich 1973, 137). The unconditional dimension of any religion creates an unavoidable tension between immanent concreteness and its transcendent unconditionality (Tillich 1970, 99). The Unconditional can never be owned, since it transcends all conditioned realities (Tillich 1957a, 171). No one can ever claim to own the Unconditional. Religious doctrines can never hold the Unconditional. The presence of the Unconditional in human life presupposes that every human being is ultimately concerned with the Unconditional (Tillich 1980, 23). The presence of the Unconditional in our daily life requires the immanent concreteness of an ultimate concern (Tillich 1980, 28).

8.3.5  Faith, the Protestant Principle, and the Sacred The Sacred is the interpretation of the self-manifestation of the Infinite into finite realities. The Sacred can only be, as the Infinite is, an interpretation since the object of the Sacred is ungraspable. The object of the Sacred is the self-manifestation of the Infinite. The Infinite is the Unknowable. So, every interpretation of the

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self-­manifestations of the Infinite is relative and questionable. It must never be absolutized. Every Sacred is a truth-claim. 8.3.5.1  Faith and the Ultimate Concern Faith involves “being grasped by an ultimate concern,” said Tillich (1955, 51; 1957a, 1; 1963, 154, 243, 278). An ultimate concern is an infinite concern about the “truly” Infinite, Unconditional, or Ultimate. It has nothing to do with false notions of the ultimate. False conceptions of the ultimate are distortions of true faith. Quasi-­ religions, such as communism and Nazism, conveyed distorted and politically induced notions of the ultimate (Tillich 1957a, 9, 12, 16). Ultimate Reality calls for a total (unconditional) self-surrender of believers. Ultimate Reality also makes promises of a whole (unconditioned) self-realization (Tillich 1957a, 1–3, 8). According to Tillich (1957a, 4–8), faith is the most centered act of personality, since it involves all cognitive, rational, and emotional components of our personality. “Faith is directedness toward the unconditioned meaning-import, operative in both and grounding both” (Tillich 1973, 78). “Religion is directedness toward the Unconditional” (Tillich 1973, 162). Tillich defined faith as the state of being shaken by an ultimate concern. It is the experience of the ontic (and kairotic) presence of the Eternal/Infinite in temporal/finite realities. The object of an ultimate concern is the intrinsic meaning of our being and existence. Religions imply an endless questioning about the unconditioned meaning of our existence (Tillich 2015, 151, 251, 360, 398, 421). Religion is the ultimate and unconditional concern, that is, an ontic concern about the Ultimate/Unconditional. Our ultimate concern must be concrete since it has an existential basis. It cannot remain an abstract concern (Tillich 2015, 209–210, 238). The ultimate concern is unconditional, total, and infinite. Every religious concern is an ultimate concern. However, idolatry implies that a finite/conditioned reality is raised to the rank of the Infinite/Unconditional. The ultimate concern can be actualized in any finite concern. The object of our ultimate concern is the meaning of our being and existence. The human being is ultimately concerned with the Ultimate/Infinite from which he/she is separated (Tillich 1951, 12–14). Finite/conditioned beings can never rightly represent their ultimate concern since the object of their ultimate concern is infinite/unconditional. The ultimate concern provides an answer to our finite/conditioned existence. It must then transcend every finite/conditioned reality. Only the Unconditional/Infinite could give meaning to conditioned/finite beings and to their existence (Tillich 1951, 118, 211). According to Tillich (1951, 12, 215), an ultimate concern requires believers’ infinite passion. Existing means being aware of our existential finitude and of the Infinite we existentially belong to, while being separated from the Infinite (Tillich 1951, 206). Religion is the state of being seized by an unconditional concern (Tillich 1970, 100–101; 1971, 49). The unconditional concern influences the way our conditioned/ finite concerns evolve. Any conditioned/finite concern is reinterpreted in the light of our ultimate concern. The object of our ultimate concern is the meaning of our own being and existence. The Unconditional is beyond beings, since it is Being-itself

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(Tillich 1970, 77–78, 85, 143). The ultimate concern is the basis of all meaning and existence (Tillich 1980, 50). Religion is our ultimate concern, said Tillich (1957a, 59; 1980, 8, 70). Tillich (1957a, 163) defined faith as “the state of mind in which we are grasped by the power of something unconditional which manifests itself to us as the foundation and judge of our existence.” Tillich (1980, 40–41) considered faith as the state of being existentially and concretely enveloped by an ultimate concern. An ultimate concern permeates all conditioned concerns. Otherwise, it would lose its unconditional character. An ultimate concern can be actualized in all fields of human creativity, whether morality, knowledge, or aesthetics. There is always a risk of distorting the meaning and substance of an ultimate concern. Quasi-religions have historically revealed how an ultimate concern could be politically oriented, without having any spiritual/religious substance (Tillich 1980, 8). Hopefully, philosophical reflection can allow us to criticize our own way of being “ultimately concerned.” Faith can only be strengthened if it is supported by pre-philosophical reflection. The Unconditional is Being-itself. God is the Ground of Being. The Sacred is our ultimate concern at every moment of our life, argued Tillich (1957a, 59, 175; 1980, 9, 59). The self-manifestation of the Infinite is rationally ungraspable and incomprehensible. The Sacred is our interpretation of the self-manifestation of the Infinite. It mirrors the immanence and concreteness of our ultimate concern. But this is true only if we perceive the Sacred as an interpretation. An “ontic meta-positioning” needs the deployment of the ultimate concern. However, an ultimate concern should never be ideologically driven. Even religions and spiritualities can become ideologies that distort the essence of an ultimate reality. An ultimate concern must never give birth to idolatrous beliefs and practices. “Being-idolatrous” means being ultimately concerned with relative realities. Only the Ultimate can truly open the way to an ultimate concern. The Ultimate should never express the idolization of our political, religious, or spiritual beliefs/principles. An idolized ultimate is an unreal and inauthentic ultimate. An “ontic meta-­ positioning” implies the strong criticism of any distorted/idolized ultimate. Considering finite realities infinite is distorting their essence. It is idolizing them. Organizational members who are ultimately concerned with God/the Infinite must be connected to an authentic Ultimate. Their ultimate concern can allow them to develop an “ontic meta-positioning,” when in relation with “morally-/post-morally-­ oriented” organizational members. “Being-in-dialogue” means being open to various perceptions/interpretations of the Ultimate. However, organizational members cannot be involved in any interreligious dialogue about the Ultimate if the aim of the dialogue is to cope with “distorted/idolized ultimates.” 8.3.5.2  The Protestant Principle and the Anti-Ideological Concern An ultimate concern is the religious substance of every culture, said Tillich (1980, 42–43). The Unconditional is involved in every culture. It is actualized in the form of an ultimate concern (Tillich 1957a, 58). Religion is the substance of culture, while culture is the form of religion, argued Tillich (1957a, 57; 1973, 59–60; 1980,

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42, 47). On one hand, cultural acts do not have any consciously religious intent. Artists, painters and writers do not intentionally focus on the Unconditional. However, their cultural acts express the human quest for an ultimate unity of meaning. They do not presuppose that an unconditioned meaning overcomes all meanings. Rather, cultural creations are oriented towards the Unconditional, regardless of their cultural substance. On the other hand, religious acts are consciously oriented toward the Unconditional, but only through “the unity of the forms of meaning.” The Unconditional is considered the source of the basic unity of innumerable meanings. From an historical viewpoint, religious acts take on a specific cultural form, even though they do not have any cultural intent. “Culture is the total sum of all spiritual acts toward the fulfillment of particular forms of meaning and their unity. Religion is the total sum of all spiritual acts directed toward grasping the unconditioned substance of meaning through the fulfillment of the unity of meaning” (Tillich 1973, 60). Culture is oriented toward conditioned forms, while religion focuses on the unconditioned meaning. The Unconditional is the source of unity between innumerable meanings (Tillich 1973, 72). Religious experience is the experience of the Sacred. The object of the Sacred is the self-manifestation of the Infinite in human temporality and historicity. Thus, it is unconditional and separated from conditioned realities. The attractiveness of the Sacred lies in its capacity to release us from the emptiness of our existential finitude. However, the Sacred reveals an unconditional power. Religious symbols are grounded in human experiences of the Sacred. The concrete symbols of the Ultimate can never claim to perfectly represent the Ultimate, since they are finite realities. Tillich neglected the nature of the Sacred as the interpretation of the self-manifestation of the Infinite. The human experience of the Sacred is the way the human being interprets the selfmanifestation of the Infinite in finite temporality. The Sacred can only mirror various interpretations of an unconditional power, given that the self-manifestation of the Infinite “is” such unconditional power. Paradoxically, finite/conditioned realities could convey the Unconditional (Tillich 1973, 95, 143). “Faith is an apprehension of the unconditioned substance through conditioned forms” (Tillich 1973, 105). Any objectification of the Unconditional distorts its substance. The Unconditional can never be an object since it overcomes the dualism between subject and object. Considering the Unconditional as an object means transforming the Unconditional into a conditioned reality (Tillich 1973, 71). “Faith is directedness toward the Unconditional in the theoretical and the practical act. The Unconditional as such, however, can never be an object but only the symbol in which the Unconditional is intuited and intended” (Tillich 1973, 76). Every act of faith is oriented toward the Unconditional “which is symbolically expressed in the object” (Tillich 1973, 77). Without faith, we cannot apprehend the Unconditional. Tillich rightly said that the object of faith can only be symbolic. It is oriented beyond its cultural form. The Unconditional overcomes all forms, since all cultural, social, political, economic, aesthetic, and religious/spiritual forms are conditioned (Tillich 1973, 79, 170). The unconditioned substance of the Unconditional is present in conditioned forms of culture, since religion is the substance of culture, said Tillich (1973, 97). Believers need to apprehend the

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Unconditional through conditioned forms, since they have finite/conditioned language, knowledge, and rationality. However, believers must criticize any attempt to absolutely objectify the Unconditional (Tillich 1973, 141). Faith is directedness toward an unconditioned substance. The unconditioned substance of the Unconditional is revealed through symbolic/conditioned forms. But such expressions of the Unconditional should never open the way to its objectification. Symbolic forms are always oriented toward something that infinitely overcomes their cultural substance. Tillich explained that faith requires the presence of the Unconditional in one’s life. So, the Unconditional as symbol requires practical acts from believers. Believers cannot remain passive in the presence of the Unconditional (Tillich 1973, 109–110). An existential doubt is always present in any act of faith. Tillich (1957a, 29) called it the “Protestant Principle.” The “Protestant Principle” implies criticizing all religious symbols that claim to perfectly represent the Unconditional. It emphasizes the impossibility of obtaining perfect representations of the Unconditional. The Protestant Principle fights all distortions of religious symbols, virtues, principles, rituals, and beliefs, said Tillich (2015, 207, 210–212, 429). Idolatry implies that finite things/beings become the objects of our ultimate concern (Tillich 1951, 216). Idolizing finite cultural creations means considering them as objects of our ultimate concern (Tillich 1957b, 51). “The risk of faith is that it could affirm a wrong symbol of ultimate concern, a symbol which does not really express ultimacy” (Tillich 1957b, 116). “Justice is the criterion which judges idolatrous holiness” (Tillich 1951, 216). Some people believe in the absoluteness of their religious values, virtues, rituals, and beliefs. Tillich (1957a, 111) considered that the holy is “demonized” (idolized) when it is separated from the Ground of all finite realities. Demonization raises a finite/conditioned reality to the rank of the Unconditional itself. The Protestant Principle is a “No” to any attempt to demonize the presence of the Unconditional in human life (Tillich 1957a, 208–209; 1980, 29, 60, 66). Endorsing an “ontic meta-positioning” entails criticizing any ideological and totalizing attempt to crystallize realities. Tillich’s notion of the Protestant Principle provides a theological basis for our anti-ideological concern. Believing in God means fighting ideological practices, beliefs, and values. In so doing, believers enhance the true Ultimate, while denouncing all “distorted/idolized ultimates.” The anti-ideological attitude is particularly important, when confronted with religious/ spiritual distortions of the Ultimate. We can expect that political ideologies could distort the notion of the ultimate. But religions and spiritualities can also fall into the same hermeneutic trap. When a given religion/spirituality has ideological bases, it cannot criticize its own principles, values, and beliefs. In such a case, it can develop a “distorted/idolized ultimate” that imprisons God’s Essence and Life. Organizational members should always remain open to various interpretations of the Ultimate throughout organizational life. Tillich’s notion of the Protestant Principle could allow them to denounce any idolization of relative concerns.

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8.3.5.3  The Experience of the Sacred The Sacred should never be identified with one person. It cannot be considered God. Rather, the Sacred is a finite interpretation of the self-manifestation of the Infinite. If the Sacred were God, then God would be a “Supreme Being,” that is, a “beingalongside-of-other-beings.” God would not be the Infinite. The Sacred transcends all finite realities, said Tillich (2015, 240). But this is true only if the Sacred is the self-manifestation of the Infinite, which is the Ungraspable. So, only the object of the Sacred is infinite. The Sacred as interpretation is existentially finite, since it is historically, socially, politically, or religiously/spiritually conditioned. The Sacred makes believers participate in the Sacred. This is the Sacred as “given” (or the Sacred of “what-is”). But the Sacred also requires something from believers. This is the Sacred of “what-should-be,” said Tillich. Every religion implies both meanings of the Sacred. A “sacramental” type of religion is grounded in the experience of the Sacred of “what-is,” as it is related to finite things, sites, buildings, words, symbols, and persons. But the Sacred also has a dimension of “what-should-­be.” Tillich asserted that such a dimension of the Sacred is the ethical component of every religion. It is a way to overcome the limitations of sacramental religions. The mystical way could also allow believers to transcend the sacramental basis of their religion (Tillich 2015, 216–218). The problem is that believers are interpreters of reality. Every human being is a “being-who-interprets-reality.” We can only observe the nature of the Sacred as the human interpretation of the self-manifestation of the Infinite. Any other dimension of the Sacred goes beyond our finite faculties and capabilities. The Sacred of “what-is” and the Sacred of “what-should-be” are concrete interpretations of the self-manifestation of the Infinite. Both dimensions of the Sacred have the structure of an ontic interpretation. Tillich described the four universal dimensions of religion. Firstly, the sacramental element is the presence of the Sacred in our rituals and practices. In sacramental religions, believers experience the presence of the Sacred in finite realities (the holiness of “what-is”). Finite/conditioned realities have an infinite worth. There is a sacramental element in every religion. The “holiness of what-is” expresses the presence of the Sacred in the here-and-now. It implies an ontological type of faith (Tillich 1957a, 56). Secondly, the mystical element goes beyond the concrete manifestations of the Sacred. Mystics try to reach the Ultimate Reality. In religions of mystical transcendence, believers know that the presence of the Sacred overcomes all sacred objects. Thirdly, the ethical element emphasizes “what-should-be.” Believers are aware that the Sacred requires something from them. This is the holiness of “what-should-be,” that is, Good-itself, Justice-Itself, and Truth-itself. The holiness of “what-should-be” requires an unconditional self-sacrifice to search for Good-itself, Justice-itself, and Truth-itself. Such self-sacrifice is a continuous attempt to improve the way we deal with goodness, justice, and truth in our daily life. “God is the basic symbol of faith, but not the only one. All the qualities we attribute to him, power, love, justice, are taken from finite experiences and applied symbolically to that which is beyond finitude and infinity” (Tillich 1957a, 47, 56). The “holiness of what-should-be” implies an ethical type of faith. Fourthly, the

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unifying element gathers those three elements. Tillich called it the “Religion of the Concrete Spirit,” which should never be identified with any specific religion. The Religion of the Concrete Spirit expresses that religion implies an internal fight against the demonic and idolatrous forms of religion, said Tillich (1966, 87–88; 1970, 189–190). “Systemic/holistic religions” can make the union between the sacramental, the mystical, and the ethical element possible. Tillich explained that those four elements could also be found in “quasi-religions:” the sacramental element (in the extreme forms of nationalism, especially in Nazism), the mystical element (in political Romanticism), the ethical element (in communism), and the systemic/ holistic element (in liberal humanism). Every quasi-religion implies idolatry since a finite reality is raised to the rank of the Infinite. A religion that implies idolatrous beliefs and practices is a “demonized religion.” It distorts the meaning and substance of the Sacred. It does not take for granted that the Sacred is a finite interpretation of the self-manifestation of the Infinite. Although quasi-religions require an unconditional self-sacrifice, they distort the meaning of the Unconditional, argued Tillich (2015, 252–255, 265–266, 272, 317, 321, 348–349, 434–435). In every quasi-religion, the self-manifestation of the Infinite is identified with concrete realities, such as the “Leader of the Nation” (the Führer (Hitler); the “Caudillo” (Franco); or the “Duce” (Mussolini). The Sacred then excludes any finite interpretation/representation of the self-manifestation of the Infinite. There is no way out of the concrete self-manifestation of the Infinite. Political, social, cultural, and religious criticism is prohibited by quasi-religious leaders. Quasi-religions impose a totalitarian mindset. The human being can no longer be “in-quest-of-the-Infinite.” He/she has lost his/her “being-who-interprets-reality.” Quasi-religions provide unquestionable truths and principles of action/decision. An “ontic meta-positioning” allows us to overcome “moral/post-moral dualism.” It involves reinterpreting our ontic experience of the Sacred. The Sacred is the interpretation/re-interpretation of the self-manifestation of the Infinite. Being involved in an “ontic meta-positioning” means acknowledging the Sacred as an historically based interpretation/re-interpretation. Any interpretation/re-interpretation of the self-manifestation of the Infinite is closely linked to our “being-who-interprets-­ reality.” Our cultural, social, political, historical, and religious/spiritual situation influences our interpretation/re-interpretation of the various self-manifestations of the Infinite. If the Sacred is crystallized in religious/spiritual forms, then it cannot reveal the Presence of the Infinite. In such a case, the Sacred becomes an ideological tool that strengthens the power of religious/spiritual institutions. An ideologically based Sacred is a “distorted Sacred.” An “ontic meta-positioning” implies the strong criticism of any distorted Sacred. It acknowledges our “being-who-interprets-­ reality,” while safeguarding the true ultimacy of the Ultimate.

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8.4  Ethical Leadership and the Interreligious Dialogue Religions influence the way moral authority is (or could be) legitimized. They contribute to building up moral communities. Religions can allow believers to deepen and widen the scope of their personal moral accountability (Bird 1990). Transcendence could have various meanings. It can mirror the experience of something that overcomes our direct and concrete experience. Transcendence can reflect something that can never be experienced directly. Transcendence cannot constitute an integral part of everyday life, although it can be existentially experienced (Luckmann 1990). Spirituality in the workplace could substantially increase organizational members’ reverence for their organization because it can make organizational life much more meaningful. Spirituality can also allow organizational members to improve their self-esteem and job satisfaction (Long and Mills 2010, 334). The notion of “spiritual depth” can open the way to various interpretations. Karakas et al. (2013, 808) defined it as “the underlying anchor and source of responsible management principles; as spiritual depth provides the inner meaning, strength, and inspiration for individuals to enrich the lives of other people.” Karakas and Sarigollu (2019, 816) explained how organizational spiritual reflexivity (the metaphor of organization “as a silent cottage for retreat”), organizational spiritual connectivity (the metaphor of organization “as a family cocoon”) and organizational spiritual responsibility (the metaphor of organization “as a collective journey of wisdom and service”) are all dynamic and double edged (positive and negative). From a philosophical viewpoint, spirituality, ethics, and national culture are interconnected (Beekun and Westerman 2012). Religion can exert a major impact on one’s ethical position (Cornwell et al. 2005, 542). Various styles of ethical leadership open the way to the human experience of transcendence. Cosmopolitan, Buddhist and spiritual leadership constitute non-theistic types of transcendence-­ focused leadership. Cosmopolitan leaders are totally comfortable with moral, legal, political, cultural, and religious/spiritual pluralism. They even strongly enhance various kinds of pluralism (Maak 2009). They can endorse moral or post-moral worldviews, as may be required in organizational life. Cosmopolitan leaders always recognize the equal worth and dignity of human beings. They have a strong sense of personal responsibility and accountability. They are concretely engaged in constant dialogue with all stakeholders. Cosmopolitan leaders favour sustainability and environmental stewardship (Maak and Pless 2009, 546–547). But they are also quite open to different experiences of the Transcendent. Cosmopolitan leadership is a path of interreligious understanding and universal respect. However, it does not require any spiritual involvement from leaders. Rather, it emphasizes tolerance and respect in the context of religious/spiritual pluralism. The sense of Transcendence then remains behind the scenes. Spiritual leadership could have a positive impact on organizational performance (Salehzadeh et al. 2015, 353). Crossman (2011, 562) explained that historical, philosophical, social, and cultural motives constitute the true basis of the synergy

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between environmental leadership and spiritual leadership. Spiritual leaders embrace a “higher purpose,” so that they can create and strengthen social innovations. Such a “higher purpose” could be a social and community cause. But it always enhances the common good, mutual understanding, and compassion (Klaus and Fernando 2016, 87–88). The “higher purpose” could also be compared to a holistic/ encompassing transcendence that can never be identified. Mackey, McIntosh, and Phipps (2020, 226) have not defined the essence of any “higher purpose.” They only suggested three basic paths of spiritual growth: the path based on contemplation and meditation; the path grounded in service, devotion, care, and selflessness; and the path expressing a personal commitment to a transcendent purpose, from a theistic or non-theistic perspective. What does it mean to leave room for spirituality in the workplace? Brophy (2015, 789) mentioned three main ways to implement spirituality in the organizational setting. Firstly, organizational leaders could identify shared “spiritual values” and focus on them. Secondly, they could include those shared spiritual values in basic corporate documents, such as organizational policies and codes of ethics (moral normativity), corporate social responsibility, and sustainability reports (the quest for the ethical aim). Such “ethically focused documents” constitute an integral part of the organizational culture. Thirdly, organizational leaders could facilitate the use of those shared spiritual values in all decision-making processes. Spiritual leadership is a path of interreligious respect towards various religious/spiritual beliefs and practices that focus on transcendence. But the meaning of a holistic/encompassing transcendence is not self-evident. Only a “meta-­positioning” could allow ethical and spiritual leaders to overcome the moral/post-moral dualism. Ethical leaders should develop their capacity to favour interreligious dialogue involving organizational members and even business partners. However, such self-­ development requires a deep openness to various modes of moral education since every religion/spirituality has its own process of internalizing and practicing values/ virtues in daily life. In a moral worldview, moral education allows ethical leaders to identify universal truths, when dealing with internal and external stakeholders. Their cosmopolitan attitude requires to define commonalities, when being engaged in complex situations of cultural and religious pluralism. In a post-moral worldview, ethical leaders are rather confronted with ontic uncertainties and doubts. Their moral education does not allow them to believe in universal truths. Only truth-­ claims are then relevant. Their cosmopolitan attitude mirrors the need to make organizational members and business partners involved in moral deliberation, without no hope of finding universal truths. According to Connerley and Petersen (2005, 23, 35), we should never overemphasize similarities and differences: no one size fits for all (never overemphasize similarities); differences do not necessarily imply the impossibility to reach a consensus (never overemphasize differences). Organizational members should sincerely acknowledge differences, without overestimating them. In doing so, they must be deeply aware of their own prejudices and stereotypes (Rosinski 2009, 47–60). Ethical leaders should rather strengthen a consensual agreement about given truth-claims, while attempting to unveil prejudices and stereotypes. Any agreement about truth-claims should be free of prejudices and stereotypes about the Other (or others’ radical otherness). Ethical leaders could endorse a

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moral or a post-moral worldview. In both cases, they could be role models for employees. Ethical leadership could reduce the propensity for workplace deviance (Gok et al. 2017, 271; Aryati et al. 2018, 241). Ethical leaders could even encourage employees to be a “a good role model who could promote group value congruence” (Peng and Lin 2017, 493). However, the propensity to reduce workplace deviance and to encourage good role models has never been related to the paradigmatic choice of ethical leaders (between a moral or a post-moral worldview).

8.5  Summary Post-moral worldviews try to redraw the borders between religion and morality. They are deeply concerned with the distorted interpretations provided by various ideologies and utopias. The critique of ideologies and utopias is a constant concern for everyone embracing a post-moral worldview. Moral concepts and dualisms, such as Good/Evil and religion/morality, must be reinterpreted. But such reinterpretation needs to view religion and morality differently. Ethical leaders are confronted with two basic spiritual challenges. Firstly, the paradox of the Presence of the Infinite in finite realities is the starting point of spiritual reflection. Faith and doubt are interrelated. The Unconditional is Being-itself as the basis of the subject-object structure. God as the Ground of Beings remains the Unknowable. The Tillichian notion of ultimate concern allows us to circumscribe the Sacred as the finite/conditioned interpretation of the self-­ manifestation of the Infinite. Some styles of ethical leadership are compatible with non-theistic notions of transcendence. However, the Presence of the Infinite is not clearly recognized as an integral part of the global picture. The Sacred could open the way to the Presence of the Infinite since it is the existentially based interpretation of the self-manifestation of the Infinite. Non-theistic notions of transcendence are useless if they are not closely linked to the Sacred. This is the first basic spiritual challenge of ethical leaders, when confronted with the interreligious dialogue in organizational life. Secondly, the Sacred is the finite/conditioned interpretation of the self-­ manifestation of the Infinite. Thus, the Sacred is the deepest mode of understanding Truth-itself since it makes the finite (the interpreter) and the Infinite interconnected. Truth-itself is not the unity of innumerable truth-claims. It is not the foundation of innumerable meanings. Rather, Truth-itself is the interconnectedness between the self-manifestation of the Infinite and its various historically based interpretations. The self-manifestation of the Infinite cannot exclude its philosophical, theological, and spiritual interpretations. The different interpretations can never confine the Infinite to specific modes of self-manifestation. This is the ultimate meaning of Truth-itself. Overcoming the tension in moral/post-moral dualism implies assuming two basic philosophical and theological challenges. Firstly, we must open the way to the Presence of the Infinite, while dealing with non-theistic notions of transcendence.

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Secondly, we must take for granted that Truth-itself should never distort self-­ manifestations of the Infinite. Both challenges for ethical leaders could allow them to be more deeply involved in interreligious dialogue. They could be advantageously applied in organizational life. “Living-in-an-organization” entails confronting religious/spiritual pluralism, whether on the national or the international scene. Both challenges could allow organizational members to better circumscribe their meaning of transcendence. From a religious/spiritual perspective, the “ontic meta-positioning” is basically linked to the “Being-de-tached” from all representations of the Infinite, and even from the presence of the Infinite in one’s life. It acknowledges the interpretative quest for the meaning of the self-manifestations of the Infinite. The Sacred is thus purely an interpretation that fits in one’s faith. An “ontic meta-positioning” presupposes the unknowability of God. It opposes all attempts to define God as a “Supreme Being”, that is, a “being-alongside-other-beings.” An “ontic meta-positioning” requires an unconditional openness to the plurality of religious/spiritual representations of the Infinite and interpretations of the Sacred. In the organizational setting, ethical and spiritual leaders who endorse an “ontic meta-positioning” could be involved in the interreligious dialogue with internal and external stakeholders, given the importance (and relevance) of religious/spiritual aspects of business in some countries.

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Conclusion

Any worldview is developed through reasoning and intuition. Every worldview is comprised of conscious and unconscious components. Any constituent part of our worldview can provide intellectual and emotional satisfaction. That is why we can become comfortable with such a worldview. Sometimes, the intellectual satisfaction is greater than the emotional satisfaction. The emotional satisfaction could be much more decisive than the intellectual satisfaction. Both kinds of satisfaction are important for building up our own worldview. Every constituent part of a given worldview could deal with different aspects of reality: self, others, society, Nature, and even God. Our worldview allows us to cope with ontic issues. Ontic issues arise from our relationships to existing realities (self, others, society, Nature, the Ultimate Reality/God). There is no ontic situation without relationality since the human being is “Being-with-Others.” However, the ontic level of analysis overcomes human relationality since it describes entities’ lived experiences, in their existential situation. It tries to answer an abyssal question: what does it mean to exist, when living given experiences? The answer is not ontological, but rather ontic. It does not deal with “being as being”, but rather with “being as existing entity.” In Chap. 2, we have distinguished between the basic foundations of moral and post-moral worldviews. Such a distinction influences the way we can look at “intermediary positions” between moral and post-moral worldviews, as well as projected modes to overcome the dualism between moral and post-moral worldviews (the “transcendent position”). We have identified three basic paths along which moral worldviews, post-moral worldviews and their intermediary positions could evolve: the paradoxical path, the annihilating path, and the foundational path. In Chaps. 3 and 4, we acknowledged the interconnectedness between subject and object. We observed that a moral worldview focuses on the quest for happiness and the struggle for self-realization. However, the use of technology was criticized for its idolatrous character. The growing importance of intersubjectivity and communicational truth opens the way to an intermediary position between moral worldviews and post-moral worldviews. Existential limit-situations are unavoidable limitations

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of human life that inevitably influence our thoughts, emotions, attitudes, and behaviours. Chapters 5 and 6 developed the process of the “annihilating path.” We called the substance of morality and the quest for the Infinite into question. In moral worldviews, the quest for Truth-itself is still present, although many of its constituent parts are no longer perceived as self-evident. In post-moral worldviews, Truth is purely subjective. Truth-itself is either ungraspable or non-existent. Subjective truth gives rise to ontic passions. Above all, it determines the ontic quest for meaning. The anti-totalizing concern takes a radical turn. Intersubjectivity is still present in human consciousness. However, the fight against totalizing and ideological thought becomes stronger and plays a decisive role in any self-consciousness. The passion for the Infinite is still possible, although it should never be distorted by any Truth-­ itself. Post-moral worldviews emphasize anti-totalizing concerns since the quest for Truth-itself is radically criticized. They also justify a metaphysical revolt against meaninglessness, as it is provoked by totalizing systems. In Chaps. 7 and 8, we have examined how some dimensions of post-moral worldviews are deepened along the “foundational path.” The most important trait of the foundational path remains a basic openness to the Infinite. The paradoxical path mirrors a philosophically based discomfort about any passion for the Infinite since the paradox of the Presence of the Infinite cannot be resolved. The annihilating path eliminates any uneasiness in dealing with the Infinite. However, the quest for the Infinite remains a philosophical question, regardless of its paradoxical substance. Along the foundational path, we can truly address the quest for the Infinite in an appropriate manner, for three reasons. Firstly, moral/post-moral dualism is revealed: the borders between Good and Evil are redrawn. Secondly, the interconnectedness between faith and doubt is acknowledged. Thirdly, the Presence of the Infinite is better defined, while recognizing the active presence of the ultimate concern (Tillich). The Sacred is then defined as the finite/conditioned interpretation of the self-manifestation of the Infinite. We have explained how openness to the Infinite and to the Sacred has theological and philosophical grounds. In doing so, we have proposed a way to overcome the limitations of Tillich’s discourse about the Infinite. Moreover, the Tillichian “Protestant Principle” remains quite active and influential since it allows us to develop and deepen our anti-ideological concern. But the Sacred remains a human interpretation of a supranatural event. The object of the Sacred is the ungraspable self-manifestation of the Infinite. Our ontic analysis of organizational life has emphasized the interconnectedness between Time, world, and self. Organizational life makes ontic experiences arise in specific forms. Firstly, “living-in-an-organization” means experiencing organizational temporality. Organizational members can be depersonalized through an ontic absorption of their self-identity into the “organizational-self-identity.” A personalized “here-and-now” can be lost, so that the “organizational-here-and-now” becomes the norma normans of organizational behaviour. The mineness of the here-and-now allows us to safeguard our personalized “here-and-now.” Organizational members must fight any organizationally based totalization. Any ontic absorption of organizational members’ “Becoming-oneself” can make organizational everydayness

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overwhelm one’s self-identity. Organizational life conveys traditions and conventions that constitute organizational history. Sometimes, an “organizational-having-­ been-present” still influences organizational members’ thoughts, emotions, words, attitudes, and deeds. However, an “organizational-having-been-present” is a collective “having-been-present” that should never determine any personalized “having-­ been-­ present.” Organizational togetherness does not imply the subjection of self-identity to any organizational identity. Secondly, “living-in-an-organization” entails experiencing “organizational inter-presence” as an expression of our “ontic inter-presence.” In organizational life, organizational members “live-in” intersubjectivity and communicational truth. They are “in-front-of-others” and “in-­dialogue-­ with-others.” Such ontic positioning of our “Being-in-the-world” does not annihilate ontic questioning about the meaning of things, beings, events, and phenomena. Rather, it is the basis of a pre-philosophical quest for meaning. Participating in-a-­ world involves having a personalized “in-the-worldliness” and experiencing the “ontic neighbourhood.” Thirdly, “living-in-an-organization” means fighting any ideological and totalizing attempt to impose an “organizational-they-self.” Organizational members’ “Becoming-oneself” is related to “ontic caring” and to our “being-who-interprets-reality.” So, it implies denouncing any “Being-reified” and “Being-idolatrous” as ideological tools of self-estrangement. Organizational life can also induce specific forms of anxiety. Organizational members’ “Being-­ anxious” can be subject to organizationally based anxiety that increases the intensity of ontic awareness. Organizational members’ authenticity is the best remedy for organizationally based anxiety, since it allows organizational members to choose authentic “possibilities-to-be-in-an-organization.” Organizational members can put “ontic resoluteness” into practice when confronted with organizational modes of inauthenticity, such as the “organizational-they-self.” Organizational members are often confronted with various representations of the Infinite throughout organizational life. Most of the time, such representations of the Infinite are conveyed in moral worldviews. Sometimes, post-moral worldviews open the way to the Presence of the Infinite. The “moral/post-moral dualism” can be overcome in the “transcendent position.” “Ontic meta-positioning” requires the Tillichian notion of ultimate concern. Those notions converge into “ontic meta-positioning.” “Ontic meta-­ positioning” allows organizational members to overcome “moral/post-moral dualism,” when involved in organizational life. However, it presupposes a specific notion of the Sacred. The Sacred is then the finite/conditioned interpretation of the self-­ manifestation of the Infinite. Only such a notion of the Sacred can allow organizational members’ “ontic meta-positioning” to transcend the “moral/post-moral dualism” in religious/spiritual matters. Our worldview is continuously evolving throughout our existence. It is influenced by our most significant experiences. Our worldview contributes to defining our meaning of life. It makes us develop a system of meanings, including interconnected symbols, values/virtues, beliefs, and principles of life/action. Our worldview is an interpretative prism orienting the way we choose our thoughts, words, attitudes, and deeds. We rarely change our worldview. Any substantial change in our worldview would require us to revisit our system of meanings and, thus, to question

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the meaning of our life. It could throw us into a spiritual void and ontic distress. It is clearly not something with which we are generally comfortable. Making substantial changes to our worldview creates two basic types of ontic uncertainty. On one hand, we are no longer convinced of the way things, beings and phenomena “are” and “should be.” Rather, we are constantly subjected to ontic doubt. On the other hand, we do not precisely know the basic outcomes of such substantial changes. Modifying our interpretation of reality could have unpredictable effects on various components of our life, including our moral convictions and values/virtues. Our ontic anxiety could increase. We are not always aware of the way our worldview is currently evolving. Consciously or not, our most significant experiences could deepen/weaken the influence of our worldview in the way we think, feel, talk, and behave. When our worldview exerts a minor role in our daily life, then it can be modified, or even replaced by another worldview. This is the case when we consider our worldview as useless, given problematic situations. It could also be the case when our worldview does not have any conceptual/axiological consistency. Our worldview is then dying. It will eventually be modified, if not replaced by another more satisfying worldview. Our worldview is constantly evolving since our experiences call the applicability and meaningfulness of our worldview into question.

Index

A Absorption, 15, 113, 115, 117, 120, 126, 168, 171, 175, 230 Aconceptual, 141 Altruism, 10, 23, 24, 39, 64, 79, 84, 131, 142, 150, 152, 158, 183, 185, 195, 202–206 Amoral, 2, 5, 6, 72, 192–194, 201 Anonymous self, 19, 101, 156 Anti-ideological concern, 2, 175, 218–220, 230 Anxiety, 15, 24, 28, 34, 39, 51, 73, 82, 107, 113–116, 127, 150, 164, 165, 167, 175, 176, 231, 232 Aristotle, 5–7, 11, 13, 17, 18, 20, 22, 23, 203 Atranscendental, 54 Authenticity, 70, 73, 107, 133, 136, 168, 205, 231 Awareness, 2, 14, 15, 24, 26, 30, 34, 48, 50, 52, 68, 71, 73, 80, 85, 91, 113, 115, 137, 153, 155, 156, 159, 165–168, 171, 174, 175, 182, 185, 202, 204, 207, 231 B Becoming-oneself, 9, 10, 15, 18, 28, 30, 31, 34–36, 38–40, 42, 46, 49, 52, 53, 55–57, 66, 69, 75–79, 85–87, 90, 91, 94, 101, 103–105, 108–111, 113–115, 117, 118, 120, 121, 126, 127, 132, 133, 138, 142, 143, 148, 149, 153, 155–159, 165, 166, 168, 171, 172, 174, 175, 183, 185, 201, 202, 204, 205, 230, 231 Being-alongside-other-beings, 170, 206, 213–215, 226 Being-de-tached, 205–207, 210, 215, 226

Being-free, 8, 9, 23, 24, 30, 44, 69, 77, 89, 90, 135, 149, 156, 159–162, 166, 169, 183, 202, 204 Being-in-becoming, 35–38, 74, 112, 123, 124, 157–159 Being-in-front-of-others, 117, 132, 133, 183, 189 Being-in-the-world, 4, 8, 9, 18, 31, 57, 84, 107, 112, 120, 126, 132, 136, 137, 144, 158, 161, 165, 166, 231 Being-itself, 18, 136, 142, 159, 165, 180, 211–215, 217, 218, 225 Being-with-Others, 4, 9–11, 15, 39, 46–50, 57, 78, 79, 84, 86–89, 91, 101, 108, 109, 113, 114, 116, 118, 127, 136–139, 149, 150, 152, 156, 161, 165, 180, 181, 229 C Camus, A., 7, 11, 147, 150, 152, 157, 160, 161, 164, 170–174 Caring, 15, 104, 105, 109, 110, 127, 144, 193, 231 Communicational truth, 2, 6, 11, 100, 111, 116–118, 126, 199, 229, 231 Compassion, 10, 17, 24, 25, 43, 48, 64, 77, 79–85, 131, 142, 150, 152, 158, 185, 202–206, 224 Consensus, 21, 68, 179, 186–188, 190, 192, 224 Contradictions, 15, 34, 47, 50, 71, 102, 107, 108, 122, 148, 171, 172, 174–176, 179, 180, 200, 206, 208 Corporate ethical discourse, 5, 6 Corporate moral discourse, 5, 29 Cosmopolitan leadership, 223

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234 Courage, 15, 22, 23, 28, 30, 48, 84, 136, 149, 150, 153, 158, 176, 203–205, 211, 213, 214 D Dasein’s calls, 4, 8, 9, 13, 57, 104, 105 Death, 23, 24, 45, 81, 107, 113, 114, 137, 144, 164, 167, 174 Decisiveness, 9, 15, 69, 87, 90, 91, 93, 94, 103, 107, 122, 124, 127, 183, 202, 203 Despair, 15, 81, 109, 117, 127, 150, 165, 172, 176 Detachment, 205–207 Dialogue, 1, 3, 7, 10, 11, 15, 28, 32, 35, 38, 51, 85, 91, 94, 116, 142, 150, 151, 186, 187, 199–226 Dilthey, W., 5 Discourse, 1, 2, 5, 6, 10, 28, 47, 51, 54, 56, 75, 102, 138, 139, 189, 190, 208, 230 Distress, 15, 28, 73, 147, 152, 153, 163, 175, 232 Disturbing emotions, 24, 47, 63–65, 76–80, 82, 86, 94, 142, 158, 203 Doubts, 2, 6, 14, 15, 20, 32, 33, 35, 38, 39, 48, 50, 100, 106, 111, 115, 116, 122, 123, 126, 127, 153, 155, 159, 163–165, 171, 172, 174–176, 184, 188, 202, 207, 210–212, 220, 224, 225, 230, 232 Dualism, 2, 6–10, 14, 48, 52, 55, 66, 72, 74, 75, 99, 100, 113, 115, 117, 124, 126, 131, 132, 141, 145, 151, 152, 155, 179–195, 199–226, 229–231 E Equality, 23, 64, 79, 83, 86–88, 90–94, 131, 134, 138, 142, 169, 187, 189 Estrangement, 15, 40–42, 101, 108, 109, 121 Ethical aim, 5, 6, 29, 63, 75–76, 85, 94, 100, 134, 139, 143, 145, 152, 160, 166, 179, 188, 193–195, 224 Ethical climate, 85 Ethical leadership, 84, 89, 134, 223–225 Everydayness, 4, 15, 31, 37, 38, 101, 113, 120, 121, 135, 179, 230 F Faith, 6, 33, 48, 52, 56, 101, 102, 109, 122, 124, 125, 164, 200, 205–207, 210–214, 216–222, 225, 226, 230

Index Finitude, 3, 15, 21, 26, 32, 45, 47, 68, 73, 80, 84, 99, 100, 107, 108, 110, 115, 123, 127, 143, 151, 152, 155, 156, 165, 168, 171, 174, 185, 203, 204, 207–215, 217, 219, 221 Freedom, 7, 15, 18, 22–24, 34, 37, 39, 40, 43, 44, 65, 66, 71, 77, 79, 81, 83, 87, 89, 90, 93, 103–106, 112, 116, 121, 127, 131, 132, 134–142, 145, 149, 152, 155–157, 159–162, 166, 169–174, 176, 202–205, 210 G Gadamer, H.-G., 5 God, 2, 10, 14, 19, 41, 44, 45, 102, 122, 125, 138–142, 144, 151, 170, 172, 205–216, 218, 220, 221, 225, 226, 229 Ground of Beings, 207, 212–215, 218, 225 Guilt, 53, 106, 137, 152, 166, 167, 206 H Habermas, J., 7, 11, 136, 186, 187, 189–192, 195 Happiness, 5, 7, 8, 15–18, 20–24, 28, 30, 33, 39, 44, 47, 54–57, 69, 74–76, 80, 81, 102, 103, 122, 124, 135, 147–153, 173, 175, 183, 184, 201, 203, 206, 229 Harmony, 10, 23, 24, 64, 83, 86, 145, 169, 183, 202 Having-been, 37, 111, 143, 144, 157, 172–174 Heidegger, M., 4, 11, 19, 106, 107, 112, 119, 132, 133, 136, 143, 144 Historiality, 143, 144 Historicality, 4, 31, 105, 113, 165, 166, 173 Historical situation, 13, 31, 35–38, 47, 105, 112, 120, 126, 148, 156, 159, 166, 203 Historicity, 4, 112, 113, 219 Hope, 10, 15, 26, 81, 117, 144, 150, 157, 164, 165, 171, 172, 176, 184, 210, 224 I Idolatry, 99, 100, 109–110, 127, 170, 207, 214, 217, 220, 222 Impartiality, 87 Inauthenticity, 107, 133, 231 Infinite, 2, 3, 7, 9, 10, 16, 33, 34, 47, 81, 100–103, 105, 107, 109, 110, 121–126, 131, 132, 134, 138–144, 156, 162, 164, 166, 169, 170, 172, 173, 179–182, 186, 199–226, 230, 231

Index Inner peace, 83, 86, 159 Inquiring subject, 101–103, 107, 123–125, 180, 184 Inter-human, 135 Inter-presence, 11, 16, 113, 117, 118, 161, 163, 231 Interpretation, 3–9, 11, 14–20, 28–38, 43, 48, 55–57, 66, 67, 70, 72, 75, 76, 78, 79, 91–94, 106, 115, 120, 124, 140, 159, 162–164, 169, 170, 173–175, 180, 187–191, 199, 200, 202, 209, 211, 216, 218–223, 225, 226, 230–232 Intersubjectivity, 2, 7, 11, 99, 100, 111, 113, 116–118, 126, 137, 139, 145, 187, 189, 229–231 In-the-worldliness, 8, 9, 15, 18, 19, 31, 38, 46, 49, 57, 94, 100, 101, 111–115, 120, 121, 126, 133, 151, 152, 156–158, 164, 166, 183, 204, 231 Inwardness, 8, 42, 74, 80, 103, 111, 116, 117, 119, 121–125, 127, 132, 136, 141, 156 K Kant, I., 5 Kierkegaard, S., 7, 11, 100–103, 107, 108, 114, 122–125, 150, 179, 184, 199, 210 Knowledge, 3, 4, 7, 8, 11, 15–21, 26, 29, 30, 32, 41, 43, 45, 52, 54, 56, 57, 63, 72–76, 78, 80, 82, 87, 101, 107, 115, 123, 139, 140, 143, 151, 155, 157, 158, 160–164, 166, 167, 169, 174, 175, 179, 180, 185, 190, 203, 207, 209–211, 214, 216, 218, 220 L Levinas, E., 7, 131–145 Lived experiences, 2–5, 15, 16, 37, 48, 65, 76, 81, 83, 101, 126, 127, 149, 161, 167, 172, 186, 187, 190, 191, 204, 205, 229 Living-in-an-organization, 8, 9, 11, 14–16, 20, 21, 25, 27, 29, 31, 32, 35, 36, 38, 41, 46, 49, 51, 54, 56, 57, 70, 72, 78, 86, 87, 91, 92, 104, 105, 109, 110, 115, 117, 118, 125, 126, 133, 139, 143, 151, 153, 156, 158, 159, 162, 165, 168, 226, 230, 231 Love, 10, 21, 24, 39, 48, 49, 77, 80, 82, 84, 131, 142, 150, 152, 157, 173, 183, 185, 201–206, 213, 221

235 M Meaninglessness, 15, 33, 147–175, 209, 230 Meta-positioning, 204–207, 210, 212, 215, 218, 220, 222, 224, 226, 231 Mind/heart, 19, 22, 24, 26, 28–30, 36, 38, 40, 45, 47, 48, 50, 66, 77–83, 85, 88, 106, 107, 136, 138, 143, 144, 151, 154, 155, 160, 164, 181, 183, 185, 207, 208 Moral deliberation, 3, 10, 180, 186–195, 224 Moral duties, 64, 67, 68, 74, 83, 85, 88, 89, 93, 94, 152, 194 Moral education, 46–49, 63–94, 224 Moral normativity, 5, 6, 29, 54, 56, 70, 75, 85, 94, 114, 134, 138, 142, 143, 145, 152, 166, 179, 188, 193–195, 224 Mystery, 16, 66, 77, 100, 117, 118, 125–127, 155, 169, 171 N Neighbourhood, 16, 48–51, 53, 90–94, 115, 117, 127, 163, 231 Nietzsche, F., 7, 11, 13, 33, 41, 43–46, 48, 51, 52, 55, 173, 179, 211 Nothingness, 15, 24, 40, 106, 107, 112, 127, 132, 142, 147, 164, 165, 168, 172, 182 Nowness, 37, 38, 100, 118–121, 126, 144, 156, 181, 182, 211 O Organizational culture, 5, 9, 16, 29, 31, 55, 56, 63, 71, 89, 114, 116, 117, 153, 193, 194, 199, 224 Organizational ethics, 5, 6, 16–18, 28, 29, 36, 54, 63, 70, 76, 85, 92, 165, 192 Organizational identification, 89, 104, 105, 114–117, 127 Organizational life, 3–6, 8–11, 14–16, 18–22, 25–33, 35–38, 40–42, 46, 49, 51, 53–56, 63–94, 101, 104–106, 108–110, 113–115, 117, 118, 121, 125, 126, 131, 133–135, 139, 140, 151, 153, 159, 163, 165, 167, 168, 171, 175, 179, 181, 185, 186, 189, 192, 199, 204, 205, 220, 223, 225, 226, 230, 231 Organizational morality, 5, 29, 70, 75, 114, 143, 162 Otherness, 10, 16, 26, 46, 79, 100, 131–145, 149, 169, 201, 203, 207, 224 Other’s face, 133–141

236 P Paradoxes, 17, 124, 125, 208, 225, 230 Possibilities-to-be, 9, 14, 15, 24, 30–38, 50, 55–57, 75, 83, 101, 103–105, 107, 109, 110, 112, 120, 121, 126, 127, 133, 138, 143, 149, 153, 156, 170, 171, 173, 182, 183, 185 Post-morality, 47, 48, 54, 57, 185 Prejudices, 33, 34, 74, 76, 80, 86, 120, 155, 160, 224 Presentiatingness, 149 Presentiation, 19, 125, 149, 158 Project-to-be, 15, 31, 38, 53, 57, 69, 79, 90, 117, 120, 121, 127, 132–133, 138, 157, 174, 183, 204 Protestant Principle, 2, 207, 216–222, 230 Q Quest for meaning, 3, 5, 14, 15, 57, 173, 184, 210, 212, 230, 231 R Relational peace, 83, 86, 159, 169, 199, 202 Resoluteness, 9, 15, 90, 143, 144, 158, 168, 205, 206, 231 Responsibility, 6, 15, 30, 33, 46, 64, 82, 84, 90, 99, 119, 120, 126, 131, 134, 135, 139, 140, 155, 160, 162, 166, 202, 203, 223, 224 Responsibility-for-others, 46, 84, 131–145, 203 Revolution, 50, 83 Ricoeur, P., 5, 143, 144 Rousseau, J.-J., 6, 11, 64–71, 75–77, 79–84, 86–89, 91–94 S Sacred, 2, 9, 199, 200, 214, 216–222, 225, 226, 230, 231 Sacredness, 170, 199, 209 Self-identity, 8, 10, 17, 18, 23, 26–27, 29, 30, 40, 49, 55–57, 78, 79, 85, 94, 103–105, 108–110, 114–118, 120, 133, 139, 140, 142, 143, 151, 156, 158, 159, 168, 173, 175, 183, 202, 230, 231 Self-transcendence, 8, 9, 13, 15, 18, 26, 29, 30, 39, 42, 44, 45, 55, 57, 75, 94, 103, 104, 110, 113, 118, 120, 121, 138, 141, 148, 152, 153, 157, 158, 166, 173, 176, 185, 186, 202–204, 213 Social contract, 64, 87–94

Index Social justice, 5, 88, 93, 134, 139, 141 Spiritual leadership, 223, 224 Stakeholders, 3, 92, 117, 188, 192–195, 223, 224, 226 Stereotypes, 34, 74, 80, 86, 155, 224 Subjective thinker, 42, 101–105, 107–110, 114, 116–118, 120–125, 150, 151, 153, 155, 156, 158, 162–164, 179, 180, 184, 199, 210 Suffering, 15, 23–25, 33, 36, 43, 44, 46, 73, 80, 81, 83, 137, 148, 150, 160, 166, 167, 176, 202, 203 T Technocracy, 9, 99–101, 110 Temporality, 4, 8, 10, 11, 15–18, 24, 26–27, 30, 37, 39, 53, 56, 57, 78, 100, 101, 111–114, 116, 118, 120–122, 124–126, 143, 144, 164, 166, 172, 173, 181, 185, 186, 199, 210–212, 219, 230 There-is, 132–133 Tillich, P., 7, 11, 206, 209, 211–216, 218–221, 230 Time-consciousness, 172, 173, 182 Togetherness, 15, 181, 195, 231 Transcendence, 2, 7, 139, 141, 142, 144, 221, 223–226 Transmoral consciousness, 7, 8, 206 Transrational, 169 Truth-claims, 7, 15, 19, 28, 32, 35, 37, 40, 42, 46, 48–54, 57, 70, 101, 104, 115–117, 127, 148, 150, 151, 153, 154, 159–163, 165, 175, 176, 179, 180, 184–186, 195, 204, 211, 224, 225 Truth-itself, 2, 6, 7, 9, 13–28, 32, 35, 37, 40, 42, 46, 48–57, 69, 70, 72, 75, 91, 94, 101, 103–105, 116, 117, 127, 150–153, 159–162, 165, 173, 175, 176, 179, 180, 184–186, 192, 200, 201, 204, 211, 221, 225, 226, 230 Tyranny, 91, 169 U Ultimate concern, 103, 115, 153, 159, 162, 207, 209–211, 214–218, 220, 225, 230, 231 Uncertainties, 2, 3, 14, 15, 20, 32, 35, 38, 41, 50, 69, 70, 84, 100, 102, 103, 106, 111, 114–116, 122, 123, 126, 127, 148, 153–155, 159, 163–165, 171, 172, 174–176, 184, 188, 202, 210, 212, 224, 232

Index Unconditional, 5, 7, 48, 67, 77, 81, 116, 150, 173, 185, 201–206, 208, 209, 211, 213–222, 225, 226 W Will-to-power, 9, 30, 33, 37–46, 56, 57

237 Will-to-tradition, 50, 51, 56, 57 Will-to-truth, 51, 52 Wisdom, 5, 6, 8, 16, 18, 19, 22–26, 28–30, 37, 49, 56, 57, 65, 67, 68, 80, 83, 87, 88, 93, 94, 182, 201, 202, 204, 208, 223 Within-time-ness, 16, 17, 105, 143, 144, 185, 195