World Power Forsaken: Political Culture, International Institutions, and German Security Policy After Unification 9780804763189

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World Power Forsaken

JOHN S. DUFFIELD

World Power Forsaken Political Culture, International Institutions, and German Security Policy After Unification

STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS STANFORD, CALIFORNIA

Stanford University Press Stanford, California © 1998 by the Board of Trustees ofthe Leland Stanford Junior University Printed in the United States of America CIP data appear at the end of the book

To my parents, Richard and Mary Rose Duffield

Preface

The end of the Cold War transformed the academic landscape just as surely as it altered global politics. In particular, it toppled many of the prominent landmarks that had previously provided highly stable theoretical and empirical reference points for students of international relations and European security. Even as we cheered the rapid collapse of communist regimes throughout Eastern Europe in 1989, one could already begin to feel the potentially unsettling professional repercussions, as, almost overnight, topics that had long preoccupied the minds of leading scholars and filled the pages of journals were rendered moot or uninteresting. In fact, the tumultuous events of that period, which culminated in the dissolution of the Soviet Union itself, did occasion an abrupt shift in research and publishing priorities that was highly disruptive for a number of scholars, especially those in the early stages of their careers. Nevertheless, by shattering old paradigms and opening new vistas, the end of the Cold War has been, on balance, beneficial for the enterprise of intellectual inquiry. Not least of all, it helped to rescue the field of international relations from increasingly technical debates about such topics as the U.S.-Soviet military balance and the requirements of deterrence, raising to prominence instead a variety of more fundamental issues in world politics. It also set the stage for the emergence of a range of pressing new security concerns in Europe and elsewhere that have merited sustained attention and careful scholarly analysis. Among these new issues was the question of united Germany. Not infrequently, especially in the early 1990s, speculation was voiced regarding how a newly unified German nation in the middle of Europe would behave. In particular, a good number of scholars and other commentators opined that the world might soon be confronted once again with an assertive and possibly aggressive Teutonic state.

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Preface

Although I was not a German expert at the time, these expressions of concern struck me as misleading and unfounded. Having been impressed by the Federal Republic's exemplary record of cooperation within NATO, I could not imagine that German behavior in the international arena would change as sharply or as profoundly as some suggested. Consequently, I felt compelled to explore the issue of German security policy after unification in some depth. My initial hypothesis was that the continuing presence in Europe after the Cold War of so many entangling international institutions would greatly influence German policy, keeping at bay the specter of a militant Germany outfitted with hobnailed boots and spiked helmet. This suspicion followed naturally from the bulk of my scholarship up to that point, which had emphasized the role of an international regime in shaping NATO's military posture. The further I explored the subject, however, the more convinced I became that another influence was at work, something that had to do with the Germans themselves. Such a quality was frequently hinted at in the writings of German experts and even in those of German policy makers. Eventually, I came to the conclusion that this characteristic was best captured by the concept of political culture. I did not arrive at this position readily or by design. When I began the project, the concept of political culture was even less familiar to me than were the intricacies of German politics. It had never come up in my graduate training and was virtually absent from the theoretical literature on international relations and foreign policy. Nevertheless, the more I explored the subject, the better it seemed to fit the German case. And perhaps I benefited from my ignorance, as I was able to discover the seminal works on political culture afresh, unblinkered by the criticisms, some merited but some not, that have been directed against the approach since it fell out of fashion in the 1960s and 1970s. Given the previous neglect of political culture in the international relations literature, I regard the book's discussion and application of the concept as perhaps its most important conceptual and theoretical contributions, although international institutions also figure prominently in the following analysis. I hope that, after familiarizing themselves with my arguments, other international relations scholars will be more inclined to take political culture seriously as a possible explanation of important aspects of state behavior in the realm of foreign and security policy.

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Since I began work on this project, a number of other studies have appeared that emphasize the role of cultural factors in accounting for various international phenomena. Of particular relevance are recent works on strategic culture, organizational culture, and, where they stress the impact of liberal values, norms, and ideologies on state behavior, the democratic peace. Many of these writings have helped me to refine my own understanding and definition of political culture, valuable assistance that I have sought to acknowledge in the notes. None, however, duplicates the conceptual and theoretical analysis presented here. Many individuals and institutions have contributed to the realization of this undertaking. My thanks go first of all to my wife, Cheryl Eschbach, who helped me to recognize at a critical early juncture, when alternative research projects vied for my attention, the value of a study of German security policy. Since then, she has remained an invaluable sounding board as well as a constant source of encouragement. A number of professional colleagues have provided guidance and sound advice, served as references in the quest for financial support, or commented on draft chapters. They include Robert Beck, Alice Holmes Cooper, Dale Copeland, John Echeverri-Gent, Melvyn Leffler, Jeff Legro, Volker Rittberger, Wolfgang Schlor, Richard Ullman, David Waldner, and Stephen Walt. Valuable research assistance was provided by Jim Sheire, Andrea Pereira, and Scott Woodard. I have only myself to blame for any errors of fact or judgment that the reader may encounter in the text. Intellectually, I owe a special thanks to Professor John Mearsheimer of the University of Chicago. Although I have disagreed with much ofhis writing in recent years on the future of Europe and international institutions, his forceful arguments, more than those of anyone else, have helped me to crystallize my thinking on this and other subjects. For financial support, I am particularly indebted to the United States Institute of Peace. Funding from the Institute's Grant Program enabled me to devote myself full-time to the project for a semester and, in combination with grants from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD), to make two summer research trips to Germany. Additional financial assistance was provided by the University of Virginia in the form of a Fourth Year Research Assignment and two summer research grants, and some incidental expenses were defrayed by an award from the Roland Egger Small Grants Program

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administered by the Department of Government and Foreign Affairs at U.Va. Although no money changed hands, I am very grateful to the Center for Russian and East European Studies at U.Va. and to its director, Professor Allen Lynch, for providing an institutional home during the months in which I made final revisions in the manuscript. The task of gathering data was greatly facilitated by the dozens of German, U.S., and NATO officials who willingly granted interviews and gave freely of their time. Dr. Martin Ney of the German Embassy in Washington, D.C., Dr. Joseph Halgus of the U.S. Department of Defense, and Dr. Karl-Heinz Kamp of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Bonn also put me in touch with many additional contacts. In the United States, I received extensive assistance from the German Information Center in New York and its able staff, especially Hannelore Kohler, which sent me a steady stream of useful documents. I was able to make optimal use of my time in Germany thanks to the German Society for Foreign Policy (Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Auswartige Politik, or DGAP), which generously provided an office and access to its extensive library, and to the helpful and friendly members of its research staff, especially Frau Gisela Gottwald. I wish also to acknowledge the access I was permitted to the comprehensive press archives of the Bundestag and of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation. And I would like to extend heart-felt thanks to the many Germans in Bonn, Bad Godesberg, Boppard, Marburg, and elsewhere who befriended me, especially the Knetsch family, Christian Schneller, and Maria Rey. They helped to turn what could very easily have been two dreary stays in the country (given the weather in Germany, even in summer) into a most enjoyable and culturally enriching personal experience. I am grateful to Muriel Bell, Senior Editor at Stanford University Press, for taking an early interest in the project and for helping to steer the manuscript through the potentially treacherous shoals of the editorial review process. I wish also to thank John Feneron at the Press for his responsiveness, careful attention to detail, and good humor during all phases of the editing and production process. A very preliminary version of the following analysis appeared in my article "German Security Policy After Unification: Sources of Continuity and Restraint," Contemporary Security Policy 15, no. 3 (Dec. 1994). Finally, I would like to mention my parents, Richard and Mary Rose Duffield. Although they did not play a direct role in this project, they

Preface

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nevertheless contributed to its realization in several unmistakable ways. During my youth, their nurturing support and encouragement enabled me to acquire the basic intellectual tools and the love of learning that are indispensable to the completion of an endeavor such as this. Even after I had left home, my mother nevertheless exerted an unexpectedly decisive influence on my professional development when she encouraged me at the beginning of my sophomore year in college to take a course in art history (instead of chemistry), which turned out to be the first step in a rather unusual journey from physics to international relations. My budding curiosity in things European was then strongly reinforced by the delight I took in spending two weeks the following summer visiting castles and cathedrals in France with my father. Since then, and especially during the years that I have worked on this project, their interest in my scholarship has been unstinting. Thus it· is to them that I wish to dedicate this book. Thanks, mom and dad. J.S.D.

Contents

Acronyms 1. Introduction

Part One: The Sources of German Security Policy

XV

1

11

2. Explaining National Security Policy: A Framework of Analysis

13

3. International Sources of German Security Policy

40

4. Domestic Sources of German Security Policy

54

Part Two: Major Issues in German Security Policy After Unification

77

5. Shaping the External Security Environment

83

6. Strengthening Europe's Security Institutions

113

7. Transforming the German Armed Forces

144

8. Responding to International Crises and Conflicts: The Out-of-Area Debate

9. Conclusion

173 223

Abbreviations

257

Notes

259

Bibliography

349

Index

379

Tables

2.1. Determinants ofNational Security Policy

15

2.2. Interviews

38

7.1. German Defense Budget, 1990-1997

150

9 .1. Determinants of German Security Policy After Unification

231

Acronyms

ACE A WACS CDU CFE CFSP CIS CSCE CSU DM EC EF A EPC ESDI EU FDP HVK IFOR IGC IMF KRK KSZE NACC NATO NVA OSCE PiP SEA

Allied Command Europe (NATO) Airborne Warning and Control System Christlich-Demokratische Union (Christian Democratic Union) Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Common Foreign and Security Policy Commonwealth of Independent States Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe Christlich-Soziale Union (Christian Social Union) Deutsche Mark European Community European Fighter Aircraft European Political Cooperation European Security and Defense Identity European Union Freie Demok:ratische Partei (Free Democratic Party) Hauptverteidigungskrafte (Main Defense Forces) Implementation Force (NATO) Intergovernmental Conference International Monetary Fund Krisenreaktionskrafte (Crisis Reaction Forces) Konferenz iiber Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa (see CSCE) North Atlantic Cooperation Council North Atlantic Treaty Organization Nationale Volksarmee (National People's Army) Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Partnership for Peace Single European Act

xvi SFOR SPD

Acronyms

Stabilization Force (NATO) Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party) START Strategic Arms Reduction Talks TA Territorial Army TEU Treaty on European Union UN United Nations WEU Western European Union

World Power Forsaken With the restoration of full sovereignty, we Germans have gained not only more freedom of action but also more responsibility. That is how our international partners see it. They expect united Germany to do justice to this new role. It has absolutely nothing to do with unilateral efforts or even power ambitions. -German Chancellor Helmut Kohl

We are not a world power, and we have neither the capability nor the desire to be one. -Former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt

The newly-won latitude of united Germany will most certainly not be used for a new policy of power politics. -Hans-Dietrich Genscher (German Foreign Minister until May 1992)

Germany will never become a world power. -Klaus Kinkel (German Foreign Minister since May 1992)

We are not a world power. -Volker Riihe (German Defense Minister since Aprill992)

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

The formal termination of the postwar division of Germany in October 1990 was marked by widespread celebration. Nevertheless, as German unification quickly went from being at most a distant possibility to a concrete reality in the span of but one year, a number of commentators, both in Germany and abroad, expressed misgivings. They warned that the reappearance of a united Germany in the heart of Europe could be a mixed blessing, if not a decidedly destabilizing development. 1 According to these pessimistic observers, the foreign and security policy of united Germany would, at a minimum, be characterized by much greater independence and unilateralism. The new Germany would also be more assertive, overbearing, and even aggressive than had been the Federal Republic during the Cold War. And in the worst case, it would seek to dominate its neighbors and even to expand at their expense. 2 How will Germany behave in its external relations after unification? In particular, will German national security policy undergo pronounced change? Will Germany increasingly act more independently and assertively, like a traditional great power, as. some have feared? Or will its policy continue along the lines of moderation and self-restraint laid down during the postwar era? This book offers preliminary answers to these questions by examining the principal patterns and trends in German security policy thus far in the wake of unification. Beyond describing German actions, it seeks to identify the most important domestic and international determinants of this consequential area of German state behavior during the years since the Berlin Wall was breached. By understanding these influences, it should be possible both better to anticipate the likely future course of German policy and to recognize the opportunities that exist for helping to steer the German ship of state safely past hazards that may lie ahead.

2

Introduction

With the end of the East-West confrontation in the center of Europe, Germany's security situation has improved tremendously. Indeed, Germany may be more secure than at any time since it was first unified in 1871. Rather than lying on the dividing line between two hostile blocs, Germany is now entirely surrounded by allies and other friendly countries, and it faces no significant direct military threats, as German leaders and commentators have frequently pointed out. 3 Germany cannot yet afford to do completely without a national security policy, however. Even in the much more benign environment of postCold War Europe, Germany faces numerous if lesser threats and risks that it must protect itself against or seek to prevent and neutralize. As Chancellor Helmut Kohl has stated before the German parliament, "the fate of Germany and of its people will be determined by its foreign and security policy." 4 Because of its size, central location, and strong economy, moreover, united Germany will inevitably exert considerable influence over developments in Europe, if not the rest of the world. Both German actions and inaction can have a major impact on its neighbors. Thus how Germany shoulders this responsibility, be it welcome or not, and uses its new power will be major determinants of whether the continent remains stable and peaceful after the Cold War. 5 Given united Germany's importance, it should not be surprising that the question of how it will conduct itself in world affairs has received much attention. In view of how a unified Germany has behaved in the past, moreover, it should also come as no surprise that many observers viewed the prospect of unification with alarm. After all, it was Germany, more than any other state, that helped to plunge virtually all of Europe into war twice in the twentieth century. Such popular fears appeared to receive early confirmation by some aspects of German state behavior. In 1990, for example, the Federal Republic was initially reluctant to offer firm guarantees of Poland's western border. Then in late 1991, Germany exerted considerable pressure on its European Community partners to recognize the breakaway Yugoslav republics of Slovenia and Croatia. 6 These fears seemed further substantiated by the predictions ofneorealist theory, one of the leading approaches to the study of international relations. Although neorealism is often described as a theory of international outcomes rather than of foreign and national security policy/ these

Introduction

3

two phenomena cannot in fact be so easily separated. Indeed, variants of neorealism have been frequently invoked to explain the external behavior of individual states. 8 As a theory of national security policy, neorealism emphasizes the causal influence of a state's external environment and its position within the international system, especially its relative power. Consequently, neorealism would suggest that German security policy might well change significantly as a result of unification and the end of the Cold War. 9 The dissolution of the Soviet bloc and of the Soviet Union itself swept away many of the external constraints that had straitjacketed German policy during the postwar era, especially the military threat posed by the Warsaw Pact and the Federal Republic's consequent security dependence on its Western allies, resulting in much greater freedom of action. At the same time, unification augmented Germany's already substantial power resources, thereby further enhancing its opportunities for pursuing influence in Europe and beyond, while the potential for instability in Central and Eastern Europe and actual conflicts in the Balkans generated considerable pressure on Germany to act to ensure its security. From these greatly altered geopolitical circumstances, one might logically have expected a profound reorientation of German security policy to follow. Indeed, neorealists suggested that a united Germany would seek to acquire nuclear weapons and that it would allow its previous alliance ties to lapse. 10 Overall, German security policy might well have been characterized by increased unilateralism and assertiveness, including the use of force, as Germany once again sought to play the role of a great power.

The Argument In contrast to such expectations, however, German security policy since unification has been marked by a high degree of continuity and moderation. Far from setting off in adventurous new directions, Germany has exercised considerable restraint and circumspection in its external relations since 1990. On the one hand, it has continued to stress cooperative approaches to security involving heavy reliance on international institutions. Germany has assiduously sought to maintain its previous alliance ties while creating and strengthening other European security frameworks that have promised to foster cooperation and stability in the region. On

4

Introduction

the other hand, it has continued to emphasize the use of non-military means wherever possible to achieve security. Germany has been an outspoken advocate of arms control agreements of all types, and it has done more than any other country to promote political and economic reform in the former communist states of Central and Eastern Europe. At the same time, its overall military capabilities have declined considerably, and German officials have evinced no interest whatsoever in the acquisition of nuclear weapons. In short, notwithstanding initial fears to the contrary, Germany has acted with little more assertiveness and independentmindedness in the area of national security than it did during the Cold War. 11 Indeed, its leaders have consciously forsaken the role of a traditional great power. To be sure, a few noteworthy departures have occurred in German security policy since 1990. Germany's altered international circumstances have necessitated some adjustments. Most conspicuously, the Federal Republic has become increasingly involved in international peace missions outside the NATO area. Nevertheless, most of these changes have been highly consistent with Germany's overall approach to security in the postwar era, especially its multilateral character. Thus few if any German actions have provided legitimate grounds for concern, and some changes, such as reductions in the German armed forces, have had the effect of making Germany even less threatening to its neighbors rather than more so. How can one best account for German security policy since 1990? This record of continuity and restraint clearly does not fit easily with the expectations of neorealist theory, whose emphasis on the international distribution of power suggests the likelihood, if not the certainty, of substantial, even menacing, change. It certainly does not square with the increased unilateralism and assertiveness that, according to neorealist tenets, might have been expected to follow from Germany's enhanced relative capabilities and the greater freedom of maneuver it has enjoyed after the Cold War. If neorealism is an inadequate guide, where should one then turn? There is no simple answer to this question. As will be discussed in Part Two, German security policy has multiple components, each of which may be shaped by numerous factors. Indeed, this book argues that a variety of powerful influences have militated against sharp and pOS§ibly destabilizing departures from the pre-unification status quo. Soriie are lo-

Introduction

5

cated at the level of the international system, or Germany's external environment, and of these, a few are even consistent with neorealist theory, especially if one broadens it to include features of the international environment other than the distribution of power, such as the character of nearby states. Other important moderating influences are to be found in the domestic setting of German security policy. Nevertheless, two sets of decidedly non-neorealist factors deserve particular stress as sources of continuity and restraint. At the international level, German security policy has been greatly shaped by the dense network of European security institutions in which Germany has been enmeshed. These institutions have affected German policy primarily in two general ways. On the one hand, they have placed concrete constraints on some aspects, especially Germany's military posture. On the other hand, they have provided Germany with valuable opportunities for addressing security concerns and otherwise pursuing its national interests, which have served to channel German policy in predictable, non-threatening directions. While not always fully sufficient from the German perspective, institutionalized cooperation with other countries has continued to offer Germany greater returns at less cost than would have a more assertive, unilateral policy. At the domestic level, the guiding and constraining effects of international security institutions have been complemented and reinforced by Germany's distinct postwar national security culture, which was little changed by unification and the end of the Cold War. 12 German society as a whole, and German political elites in particular, can be characterized as sharing a well-defined set of fundamental beliefs and values that are of potentially great relevance to national security policy. These include deep skepticism about the appropriateness and utility of military force, a pronounced preference for multilateral over unilateral action, a fervent desire to be perceived as a reliable partner, and a strong aversion to assuming a leadership role in international security affairs. Clearly, these attitudes contrast sharply with those that were prevalent in Germany prior to the two world wars. This national security culture, which is a subcomponent of German political culture, has been an important source of Germany's emphasis on non-military instruments of security policy. It has also enhanced the influence of European security institutions on German policy. More than their counterparts in most countries, German leaders have been inclined

6

Introduction

to comply with institutional rules and to work through institutional channels. They have also been more favorably disposed toward maintaining and strengthening existing international institutions and toward creating new ones. In sum, the preponderance of influences on German security policy after unification have promoted continuity with the past and restraint. Nor is there any compelling reason to suppose that this situation is likely to change in the foreseeable future. Rather, solid grounds exist for expecting the current pattern of German security policy to persist. In particular, Germany's postwar political culture virtually rules out a return to traditional great power politics, while Europe's thick web of security institutions largely obviates the need for such a shift. Moreover, these important influences on German security policy are unlikely to be greatly modified anytime soon. Both political cultures and international institutions can be highly stable. Thus, barring the emergence of a set of extremely adverse external circumstances sufficient to overturn the post-Cold War European security order and to subject German society to intense stress, there is little reason to be concerned about how unified Germany will behave. Previously expressed fears reflected an inadequate understanding of the most important sources of German policy after unification and thus hadand continue to have-little basis in reality.

Contributions to the Process of Theory Development This study seeks to contribute to the theoretical literature on security studies and foreign policy in three ways. First, it serves as a disciplinedconfigurative case study of an important subject, German security policy after unification. As described by Alexander George, such studies employ available general hypotheses to explain the outcome in particular cases. In this instance, German security policy is described and interpreted in terms of several theoretical approaches to the study of national security policy. 13 In an important sense, however, this analysis is more than a disciplined-configurative case study. Given the relatively limited theoretical attention devoted thus far to international institutions and political culture in the field of security studies, it can also be regarded as a plausibility

Introduction

7

probe of the general hypothesis that these can be important determinants of national security policy. As Harry Eckstein has noted, "a plausibility probe into theory may simply attempt to establish that a theoretical construct is worth considering at all, i.e., that an apparent empirical instance of it can be found." Nor do the many singular features of the German case limit its usefulness in this regard. In Eckstein's view, plausibility probes typically "confront theory with lesser challenges that they must certainly withstand if they are not to be toppled by greater ones." 14 Finally, this book constitutes to some degree a crucial experiment. 15 It pits against one another alternative theories of state behavior that offer competing predictions of how united Germany will act. Given the contrasting expectations of neorealism (increased assertiveness and unilateralism), on the one hand, and those of theoretical approaches stressing international institutions and political culture (continuity and restraint), on the other, this analysis should help to establish their relative explanatory power and thus help to resolve an important debate among international relations scholars, even if it does not definitively refute one approach or another. 16 A priori, moreover, one might expect such an experiment to favor neorealism. Neorealist approaches have dominated the study of security affairs in recent years. In contrast, institutional theory has been developed primarily with respect to non-security matters such as international political economy and cooperation on environmental issues, while neorealists have pointedly argued that international institutions exert little influence on state behavior. 17 Likewise, political culture has rarely been used to explain foreign or national security policy. Even more pointedly, conditions that, according to neorealist tenets, should precipitate a change in state behavior have existed since 1990 in the form of German unification and the end ofthe Cold War in Europe. Thus the case of German security policy should prima facie constitute a hard test for institutional and cultural approaches. Consequently, finding that the factors emphasized by neorealism by themselves cannot provide a satisfactory account of German security policy and that institutional or political cultural factors must also be included in the explanation would be noteworthy. To be sure, the case of German security policy falls short of fully qualifying as a crucial experiment in at least three respects. First, at least two of the theoretical approaches emphasized here--especially the institutionalist and political-cultural-may require further development before

8

Introduction

they can be subject to such a test. Second, and relatedly, neorealist, institutionalist, and cultural theories are all somewhat indeterminate. They are unable to offer many specific predictions of how Germany should behave after unification. As a result, some aspects of German policy may arguably be consistent with all three approaches. Third, it may be too soon to reach firm conclusions about the determinants of German security policy after unification. Nevertheless, even a less than conclusive indication of the applicability and relative power of these theories, especially the limitations of neorealism and the potential utility of international institutions and political culture as explanations of security policy, would constitute an important theoretical contribution.

Organization of the Book The book is divided into two parts. Part One, which consists of three chapters, identifies and describes the most likely sources of German security policy after unification. Chapter Two defines national security policy and presents the framework of analysis. This framework contains two main components: potentially important determinants of national security policy that reside in the international environment and those located at the domestic level. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the methodologies employed in the study. The next two chapters of Part One establish the values for the potential independent variables that are identified in the theoretical framework. Chapter Three examines possible external determinants of German policy. It considers both the structure of the post-Cold War European state system, which has been emphasized by neorealists, and relevant international security institutions. Chapter Four reviews possible internal determinants of German security policy. It surveys in tum domestic factors that shape Germany's capacity to pursue different security policies, possible sources of distinctive German policy preferences (including German national security culture), and the German policy process. Part Two has two purposes. One is simply to describe the evolution of German security policy after unification through 1996, while the other is to assess the actual influence on German policy of the various factors identified in Part One. It begins with a discussion of the central concerns of German security policy since unification, each of which is then treated in more detail in a separate chapter. Chapter Five looks at the ways in

Introduction

9

which Germany has sought to shape its external security environment in order to reduce real and potential threats. Chapter Six examines German efforts to preserve, strengthen, and adapt Europe's security institutions in order to make them more capable of addressing possible dangers and preventing the emergence of new ones in the post-Cold War environment. Chapter Seven discusses the transformation of the German armed forces since 1990. And Chapter Eight analyzes how Germany has in fact responded to regional and international crises and_ conflicts, especially the debate over the deployment and use of German forces outside of the NATO area. Because of the complex and multi-dimensional nature of the subject matter, the bulk of each chapter is devoted to describing German policy while a final section evaluates the impact of different potential internal and external sources. A concluding chapter summarizes the record of German security policy since unification, defending the thesis of continuity and restraint against alternative interpretations. It then identifies the most important determinants, both international and domestic, of German actions and the specific influences that they have had. Based on this analysis, the conclusion also discusses the likely future course of German policy, offering several caveats regarding possible, if unlikely, developments that could significantly alter what is otherwise an optimistic forecast and pointing out the ramifications for the policies of Germany's Western allies, especially the United States. Finally, it considers the implications of the analysis for the theoretical study of national security policy, especially the potential applicability and limitations of institutional and cultural approaches.

CHAPTER TWO

Explaining National Security Policy: A Framework of Analysis Most students of national security accord pride of place to material forces that define the balance of power between states. They have no patience for intangibles like culture. -Peter J. Katzenstein

This chapter presents a framework for explaining the national security policies of states. It identifies and describes a variety of factors that are likely to be important determinants of national security policy in a wide range of settings. For analytical purposes, these factors can be usefully grouped into two broad categories: those associated with a state's external environment and those residing within the state itself. I give particular consideration to the concept of political culture, which has received less attention than the other variables considered here as a possible source of national security policy.' The chapter concludes with a discussion of the methodologies employed in the study to establish the values of these factors and to determine their relative influence on German security policy after unification.

National Security Policy and Its Determinants Before elaborating this explanatory framework, it is necessary to specify more precisely the dependent variable of the study, national security policy. The term "national security" is a highly contested concept. Even at the height of the Cold War, it was described as an "ambiguous symbol,"2 and as the overall level of East-West conflict diminished, analysts argued with increasing frequency that the concept of security had often been cast too narrowly in purely military terms. 3 With the end of the Cold War, which did so much to defme the national security policies of

14

The Sources of German Security Policy

states, this debate has only intensified. Today, many people hold a broad conception of security that includes, and sometimes even stresses, economic, social, environmental, and other non-military dimensions. 4 Nevertheless, an overly expansive concept of security is no more helpful a guide to policy makers and to scholars than is an excessively narrow one that is unduly focused on military issues. The former risks blurring altogether the distinction between national security policy, on the one hand, and other aspects of foreign and domestic policy, on the other. It also risks underestimating the continuing role of military factors in shaping international affairs and in determining the security of states. In fact, the problems posed by the potential· for military conflict inherent in the international system will continue to occupy a distinct and important, if not always the central, place in every state's security policy. 5 Appropriately, this analysis is confined to those externally oriented aspects of national security policy that have in one way or another a military dimension. By the same token, it excludes those aspects of national policy, such as economic or environmental security, that would command attention even in a world from which the danger of military conflict had been removed. This military dimension may be present in the instruments of national security policy, although these need not be limited to national armed forces but may also include a variety of international institutions with military functions. Or it may inhere in the nature of the external dangers and threats that a state seeks to address or forestall, whether or not it uses military instruments to do so. In fact, national security policy may comprehend the use of an extensive variety of means to address actual or potential external military threats. Thus even this somewhat restrictive definition encompasses a wide range of aspects of national policy, and, as will be argued at the beginning of Part Two, it is consistent with the core concerns of German security policy since unification. 6 What are the most important determinants of national security policy? Where are the principal sources of national security policy likely to lie? Traditionally, scholars have sought to explain national security policy, and foreign policy more generally, in two basic ways. Some, notably those working in the realist tradition, have looked to the state's international environment and have asked how it has influenced state behavior. Others have focused primarily on the domestic sources of policy, including the decision-making process.

Explaining National Security Policy

15

TABLE 2.1

Determinants ofNational Security Policy International Setting International Structure International Institutions Domestic Setting National Capacity National Predispositions Ideas/Political Culture National Institutions Policy Process

Both of these broad approaches, or levels of analysis, have contributed to our understanding of national security policy. By the same token, neither alone has proved capable of explaining all aspects of policy that may be of interest. Consequently, this study employs a comprehensive analytical framework that integrates both approaches. It embraces potential determinants of national security policy that reside both in the international setting and in the domestic arena. Likewise, it includes material, institutional, and ideational variables. The principal criterion for selection has been the poten~ial generalizability of each factor: Does it promise to be useful for explaining national security policy in a large number of cases? Before describing the framework in detail, however, several limitations should be made clear. First, the framework is oriented toward general and sustained patterns and trends in national security policy rather than specific decisions and actions. 7 Second and relatedly, its focus is national security policy in times of relative peace rather than wartime or crisis behavior. Third, it seeks mainly to explain the national security policies of liberal democracies, in which political power is widely dispersed, rather than those of states with unitary or cartelized political systems, in which policy is controlled by a small number of powerful interest groups or individuals. 8 Each of these limitations influences the types of explanatory factors that are considered and emphasized. Indeed, the elements of the following framework are drawn primarily from the theoretical literature on the foreign and security policies of relatively large, relatively developed countries with democratic political systems based on the rule of law, notably the United States. This bias reflects the fact that the framework is intended to be highly applicable to the case of German security policy after unification.

16

The Sources of German Security Policy

Despite this admittedly restricted focus, however, the framework also promises to be of growing relevance to the study of the national security policies of medium to great powers more generally. With the end of the Cold War, the possibility of war and even acute tensions between such states appears to be significantly reduced. Thus medium- to long-term tendencies in the security policies of states are likely to command relatively greater interest than wartime or crisis behavior. During the past two centuries, moreover, the proportion of medium to large powers that are liberal democracies has grown from a small minority to a solid majority, and current trends suggest that the percentage is likely only to increase.

The International Setting The international or external setting is perhaps the most logical starting point for any analysis of national security policy. It shapes policy by placing constraints on state behavior, providing opportunities, and, in some instances, generating pressures to act. It is the ultimate source of the security concerns that a state may want to address, notably, but not limited to, military threats. It may also be a critical source of resources that are useful for dealing with security concerns, such as allies or international organizations. Despite these commonalities, however, scholars whose work considers the international sources of state behavior employ a diversity of approaches emphasizing a variety of determinants.

International Structure The external setting of national security policy is most frequently equated with the realist school of international relations theory. As a group, realists regard states as rational, unitary entities that seek to maximize their utility and that make choices among alternative policies on the basis of cost-benefit calculations. States are assumed, moreover, to have stable and broadly similar preferences, headed by the security-related goals of survival and autonomy. Realists give short shrift not only to possible domestic determinants of policy but also to international factors that do not have a direct bearing on power and threats. 9 Yet even realists disagree over precisely which external factors to emphasize. The sparest approach is neorealism, which stresses the causal influence of the material structure of the international system, especially the

Explaining National Security Policy

17

distribution of power among states. Neorealists seek to explain national security policy primarily in terms of a state's power capabilities relative to others. Thus a shift in a state's relative power position may be expected to cause a change in its external behavior. 10 In some realist explanations of national security policy, however, the relevant aspects of the external setting are not limited to purely powerstructural factors. They may also include geography, especially the proximity of powerful adversaries, and the types of military capabilities that states possess. Whether states can and do acquire offensive or defensive capabilities can have important implications for their behavior and that of others, although the consequences will vary depending on the relative advantage of offensive and defensive military postures. 11 Departing even further from their neorealist brethren, more traditional or "classical" realists also consider the internal properties and character of other states, especially insofar as these bear on their interests, preferences, motivations, and intentions, as determinants of national security policy. Of particular importance is whether powerful and thus potentially threatening states are revisionists or whether they seek to preserve the international political and territorial status quo. 12 To this list we might add, especially in view of developments in Central and Eastern Europe since the late 1980s, the internal stability of other states and their openness to outside influence. A final structural feature of the international system that merits attention is economic dependence, as measured by the levels of economic transactions between states and the costs to states of reductions in those flows. 13 Although economic dependence is rarely if ever included in analyses of national security policy, it can nevertheless have an important bearing. In particular, highly dependent states will be more sensitive to how their actions are viewed by their economic partners. Measures that threaten economic partners may result in costly reductions in economic flows that, if not compensated for, can reduce national security in the long term. Overall, the structure of the international system, however narrowly or broadly defined, can influence national security policy in several basic ways. It determines the nature of the security problems a state may face, such as whether these stem from the internal instability of neighboring regions, the aggressive intentions of expansionist powers, or simply the mere existence of states with offensive military capabilities. It governs

18

The Sources of German Security Policy

the magnitude and the immediacy of these problems, which are influenced by proximity and relative power capabilities. And it shapes the basic avenues of response that are open to the state, such as whether allies are available to help address the problems at hand, and the costs and benefits of each.

International Institutions Realist approaches to the study of foreign and security policy generally pay little attention to international institutions, such as international law, treaties, regimes, and international organizations. Yet these, too, can exercise great influence over state behavior, even in security affairs. 14 Like international structure, international institutions can shape and alter the incentives that even rational, unitary states face in the external environment. Thus state behavior should vary as the institutional context changes, even if the distribution of power is constant. 15 International institutions can influence national security policy in three general ways. 16 First, they may effectively constrain state behavior. Treaties, regimes, and other agreements contain norms and rules defining the actions that states are expected to or may legitimately take (or not take) under specific circumstances. As a result, international institutions may regulate many aspects of security policy, such as levels of armaments, often in great detail. States comply with such rules for several reasons. 17 Although international institutions often lack means for enforcing compliance, the violation of accepted rules and obligations is never cost-free, and it may incur significant penalties. Breaking the rules is likely to result in some combination of forgone benefits, a reduced reputation for trustworthiness, the enmity of other states, and the imposition of punitive sanctions. Conversely, adherence to institutional rules may yield a variety of advantages. For example, it may foster greater compliance by other participants, effectively conferring a degree of control over their military capabilities and activities. Or it may enhance a state's reputation, resulting in lower levels of mistrust and a greater willingness on the part of others to cooperate on additional issues. Consequently, the degree of compliance with international institutions is often quite high. 18 The benefits of compliance with institutional rules suggests a second general way in which international institutions can shape state behavior: by providing valuable opportunities for addressing security concerns and

Explaining National Security Policy

19

otherwise pursuing national interests. International institutions may facilitate some types of steps and may even create whole new lines of action that otherwise would simply not exist. As a result, by using international institutions, states may be able to achieve some security goals more effectively or at less cost. Indeed, some goals may be attainable only through international institutions. Alliances, for example, typically enhance the security of states vis-a-vis external threats and may even permit them to maintain smaller military forces. 19 Likewise, arms control agreements may enable states to forgo the acquisition of certain military capabilities and other possibly destabilizing actions by placing constraints on and providing information about others' capabilities and activities. Additional international institutions may provide authoritative procedures and decision-making mechanisms for dealing effectively with new security concerns as they arise. And by acting through established institutional channels, states may be able to reassure others about their intentions, thereby reducing international tension and mistrust. In view of the various opportunities that international institutions can provide, states may have powerful incentives to work within them and to make them more effective, even if doing so entails accepting restrictions on their freedom of action. In fact, some states may willingly tolerate a high level of constraint in order to exploit such opportunities. In contrast, if policy makers disregard institutional rules and procedures, they risk jeopardizing useful instruments of policy. Thus, in this way as well, international institutions may strongly channel state behavior in predictable directions. Third and finally, international institutions may occasionally be a source of pressure to adopt certain policies. By joining or participating in an institution, a state may assume obligations to take actions in some contingent circumstances that it otherwise might not wish to take. In particular, mutual alliance commitments may oblige states to provide assistance to one another, even at the risk of being drawn into war.

The Domestic Setting While the external setting may be a necessary starting point for the analysis of national security policy, it is by itself rarely sufficient to provide a fully satisfactory account. 20 On the one hand, although the structure of the international system can sometimes be a source of very specific

20

The Sources of German Security Policy

pressures and constraints, it is often indeterminate, suggesting only broad directions for national security policy rather than compelling specific actions.21 As a result, a range of policies may be consistent with a given distribution of power. On the other hand, even where the international structure does offer fairly clear injunctions, states do not always conform their behavior to these guidelines. Instead, considerable disjunctures may appear between the national security policy that an "objective" observer might prescribe and that pursued by a state in a given set ofstructural circumstances. Just as puzzling, states that find themselves in similar strategic situations may nevertheless act differently. Likewise, while international institutions may provide very specific guidance for state action in certain areas, compliance is not automatic, and rules for behavior in other areas may be lacking. Consequently, one must also in many instances consider the domestic setting. 22 Domestic political, economic, and social conditions can be the source of important additional pressures and constraints on state action and thus greatly shape national security policy. Such factors are needed to explain why states in similar international circumstances may behave differently and why states may even act in defiance of international structural and institutional imperatives. 23 The domestic setting affects national security policy in two general ways. First, it determines the ability of a state to pursue different courses of action, or what might be called the national capacity. Even states that share similar rankings in the international distribution of power at a given time may vary strikingly in their ability to support particular types of policies. Second, and more fundamentally, the domestic setting influences estimations of the necessity, effectiveness, appropriateness, and thus the desirability of alternative policies, which can be thought of as national predispositions. The category of national predispositions encompasses the more familiar concepts of national interests and national preferences?4 In realist analyses, interests and preferences are often deduced from international systemic conditions (and in game-theoretic analyses, they are often simply assumed). In fact, interests and preferences may be strongly determined by domestic factors and can consequently vary significantly temporally and cross-nationally, even when external circumstances are controlled for. 25 This two-fold conceptualization of the impact of the domestic setting is potentially applicable to all states. The most important domestic de-

Explaining National Security Policy

21

terminants of national capacity and national predispositions, however, will vary from case to case and thus cannot be stated a priori. The specific factors discussed below were selected on the basis of their potential usefulness for explaining the security policies of liberal democratic states based on the rule oflaw, such as Germany, and thus may be less relevant to non-democratic states. Likewise, given the emphasis that is placed here on understanding medium- to long-term patterns and trends in national security policy, particular attention is devoted to factors that capture the common characteristics of societies rather than domestic fault lines and schisms.

National Capacity The national capacity to support various security policies in states with democratic political systems is shaped by three sets of domestic factors. First, it is a function of the total material and non-material resources that are potentially available for national activities. The magnitude of these resources is in turn shaped most immediately by economic, technological, and demographic conditions, such as the level of economic activity and the number of people potentially available for military service. To be sure, the size of a state's total resources has a bearing on its relative power position in the international system. But absolute levels of resources also have an important qualitative impact on the types of policies that states are able to pursue, such as whether they can produce nuclear weapons or field the full range of conventional military capabilities deemed vital for national defense. Second, national capacity depends upon the ability of the state to mobilize and extract resources from the economy and society. 26 In general, the state's extractive capacity is determined by constitutional, political, economic, and its own administrative structures. 27 Where consent of the populace is required, as with taxation and conscription, extractive capacity may also vary with the state's authority and legitimacy. Third, national capacity is affected by the presence of competing claims on state resources. The use of resources for domestic and social programs necessarily limits what is available for national security policy. Thus it is important to know what competing claims exist and how strong they are. Many of the domestic determinants of national capacity are relatively constant, varying only slowly over time. A few, such as the performance

22

The Sources of German Security Policy

of the national economy and the magnitude of competing societal demands, however, can be subject to sharp short-term fluctuations. As a result, the ability to pursue particular policies may vary significantly for domestic reasons even as a state's overall international power position remains unchanged. Nevertheless, the impact of national capacity, especially as a constraint, on national security policy should not be overstated. National capacity does not influence all aspects of policy equally. In fact, it is only directly relevant to those that require substantial resources, chiefly the armed forces and foreign assistance, although it may also affect alliance choices indirectly by generating resource needs that can be provided only from abroad. 28

National Predispositions The domestic setting also shapes the types of national security policies that a particular society is inclined to adopt independently of its ability to do so, or what I have termed "national predispositions." For what purposes and in what ways should the resources available for national security policy be used? More broadly, what policy ends should be adopted, and by what means and strategies should they be pursued? Even societies similarly situated in the international system may offer different answers to these questions. A given political community may demand, prefer, or permit certain national security policies while overlooking or rejecting others, independently of external circumstances. 29 Of course, not all societies have distinct, dominant predispositions in the realm of national security policy. Sometimes, not only the details but even the general thrust of national security policy may be highly contested. In those situations where alternative preferences are strongly held by different factions within a society, the nature of the resulting national security policy will be determined by a variety of other domestic factors, some of which are briefly summarized in the next section of this chapter on the policy process. But where distinct national predispositions can be said to exist, it is very useful to identify them, since doing so may greatly simplify the task of explaining national security policy. There are two principal sources of national predispositions. One consists of sets of ideas relevant to security policy that are widely shared within a society or by its political elites. Other national predispositions may derive from national institutions.

Explaining National Security Policy

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Ideational Sources of National Predispositions: Political Culture. An important ideational source of national predispositions and thus of national security policy, especially in its broad outlines and over the long term, may be a society's political culture. The term "political culture" has been used to denote the subjective and often unquestioned orientations toward and assumptions about the political world that characterize the members of a particular society or social unit and that guide and inform their behavior. Similar descriptions include mindsets; patterns of attitudes, sentiments, and cognitions; and systems of beliefs, expressive symbols, and values. However political culture is defined, scholars have distinguished three basic components: the cognitive, which includes empirical and causal beliefs; the evaluative, which consists of values, norms, and moral judgments; and the expressive or affective, which encompasses emotional attachments, patterns of identity and loyalty, and feelings of affinity, aversion, or indifference. 30 As such, political culture is more comprehensive than alternative ideational concepts, such as images, belief systems, and ideologies. 31 Apart from their content, political cultures have three important characteristics. First, they are a property of collectivities rather than simply of the individuals that constitute them. 32 The term implies a focus on the beliefs and values that are shared by most if not all of the members of a society or its political elites rather than on those of individual members. 33 Second, political cultures are in principle distinctive. The political culture of one society or its political elite is not likely to be identical to that of another, and profound differences may often exist. 34 This characteristic may not be at issue when one simply seeks to explain state actions that are inconsistent with external imperatives and constraints. But the potential distinctiveness of political culture may be important for understanding differences in behavior by states that are similarly situated in the international system. Third, political cultures are highly stable, especially in comparison with material conditions. 35 Most of the time, political culture changes only very slowly, if at all, even in the presence of an evolving material environment. Significant adjustments over short periods usually occur only as the result of dramatic events or traumatic experiences, which are typically required to discredit thoroughly core beliefs and values, and thus are infrequent. Consequently, political cultures can be quite autonomous from, rather than merely a subjective reflection of, external condi-

24

The Sources of German Security Policy

tions, although the latter ultimately place some constraints on the former. Political cultures are resistant to change for at least three reasons. First, the fact that their content is widely shared means that alternative sets of ideas are relatively few and enjoy little support within the society, thus limiting the possibility that a given political culture might be readily supplanted. Second, some elements, especially the evaluative and affective components, are inherently difficult to disconfirm. Third, even the potentially disconfirmable cognitive elements are buffered by the psychological phenomenon of consistency seeking. Information that reinforces existing images and beliefs is readily assimilated, while inconsistent data tend to be ignored, rejected, or distorted in order to make them compatible with prevailing cognitive structures. 36 In any case, evidence that irrefutably contradicts existing cognitive constructs is rare in international relations. 37 Components relevant to national security policy. The concept of political culture has rarely been used to explain foreign policy and, even less often, national security policy. 38 Much more common are analyses of "strategic culture." Inexplicably, however, this seemingly related concept has in fact been developed independently, with little or no reference to the literature on political culture. One consequence of this disregard is that definitions of strategic culture typically omit the normative and affective components of political culture, which, as argued below, may importantly influence national security policy. More generally, attempts to apply strategic culture have often been hampered by tautological reasoning and limited largely to questions of military strategy. 39 Many aspects of a society's political culture will have little or no bearing on national security policy. Nevertheless, one can identify an important subset of potentially widely shared attitudes that may be of direct relevance to security issues, or what might usefully be termed the national security culture. 40 These attitudes fall into five categories. 41 Although all of these components of political culture can have important implications for national security policy, however, they are not likely to be equally determinative in all cases. One category consists of world views, or empirical beliefs about the nature of the external environment, in this case the international system, and the state's place within it. As Alexander George has noted, such beliefs are needed to simplify and structure an otherwise confusing and

Explaining National Security Policy

25

complex world in order to cope with it. 42 World views can be further subdivided into several key concepts. One is the basic structure of the international system: What are its principal features? What are the main actorst 3 Another is the fundamental nature of international relations: Is conflict inevitable or avoidable? What are the possibilities of cooperation and the peaceful resolution of disputest 4 Also of concern here are views of the character and nature of other states: Are they hostile or friendly? Do they pose threats or nott 5 Finally, there is a state's self-image: What is its position in the international systemt6 A second category, which follows from the expressive or affective component of political culture, concerns matters of identity, loyalty, and emotional attachments. How strong is the sense of national identity? Are there feelings of affinity, aversion, or indifference toward other states? Do members of society identify with and express loyalty toward larger regional or global political entitiest7 A third category, a subset of the evaluative component of political culture, consists of the principal goals and values of political life. 48 What are the appropriate and desirable aims of national security policy? How should they be prioritized? Put in more familiar terms, what is the national interest? 49 Two further types of attitudes are likely to have the most direct bearing on state action. One comprehends causal beliefs, which, in the presence of uncertainty about the external environment, are needed to provide guidance for how to achieve preferred outcomes. 50 What are the likely consequences of alternative courses of action? Will the benefits of an action outweigh the costs? Which kinds of instruments are most useful for achieving security policy goals? In particular, how effective is the use of military force? 51 The fifth and final category encompasses shared norms concerning appropriate political behavior. 52 What actions and policy instruments are legitimate for achieving the goals of policy? What are the proper and ethical forms of conduct? Such norms may include both positive and negative behavioral injunctions. It is unlikely that these various elements of national security culture can ever exist entirely independently of one another. To the contrary, as with belief systems, there is likely to be at least some interrelationship and perhaps even a considerable degree of hierarchy. 53 But the determi-

26

The Sources of German Security Policy

nation of the nature and strength of the links between the various components is not necessary in order to study their impact, individually and collectively, on political behavior. The influence of national security culture on policy. Having identified the components of political culture of potential relevance to national security policy, we must next consider how they can affect policy. Through what causal mechanisms do they operate? 54 One of the weaknesses of much of the original literature on political culture is that it paid insufficient attention to the nexus between attitudes and behavior. 55 National security culture can influence each step of the process by which decisions are made, whether by individuals or groups. It can thus affect policy through a variety of mechanisms, with each of the aforementioned elements coming into play in one or more ways. 56 First and most fundamentally, world views condition the range of issues to which attention is devoted by influencing what people notice in the external environment. The general effect is to focus attention selectively, causing some phenomena to be overlooked while the importance of others is magm.fi1ed .57 Second and relatedly, world views and the affective component of national security culture affect the perception and interpretation of the environment. They influence the diagnosis of political situations and may strongly shape how security issues are defined. 58 What is the nature of the threat? What is its source? As Kenneth Boulding has argued, The people whose decisions determine the policies and actions of nations do not respond to the "objective" facts of the situation, whatever that may mean, but to their "image" of the situation. It is what we think the world is like, not what it is really like, that determines our behavior. 59

Third, by molding definitions of the national interest, national security culture helps to determine the policy objectives to be pursued in a given situation. On the one hand, certain minimal necessary goals of national policy follow from the world views people hold. On the other hand, basic values may establish a range of desirable, if not essential, ends that policy might be designed to achieve. Fourth, national security culture shapes the formulation and identification of policy options. At a deep level, world views define the universe of possibilities for action. 60 They condition the types of options that are seen to exist. As a result, some alternatives might not even be conceived of. In

Explaining National Security Policy

27

addition, norms define the instruments and tactics that are considered acceptable or legitimate, placing further limits on the types of the policies that can be pursued. 61 Fifth and finally, national security culture influences the evaluation of the available policy options and thus the choices that are made among them. 62 Cause-effect beliefs condition assessments of the likely consequences of alternative courses of action. At the same time, values shape estimates of the expected costs and benefits. The overall effect of national security culture is to predispose societies in general and political elites in particular toward certain actions and policies over others. Some options will simply not be imagined. Of those that are contemplated, some are more likely to be rejected as inappropriate or ineffective than others. Of course, political culture is not deterministic. It may not and often does not precisely determine state behavior. But it can significantly narrow the range of policies likely to be adopted in a given set of circumstances. 63 Going further, one may conclude that national security culture promotes continuity in policy. 64 Continuity follows from the relative stability of political culture, in comparison with material conditions. Even as external circumstances change, decision makers may persist in defining security problems in traditional ways, or they may continue to favor familiar approaches in trying to address new security concerns. Thus political culture promises to be particularly useful for explaining cases of puzzling persistence in national security policy. 65 Conditions ofinfluence. National security culture is likely to have the greatest impact on policy under two conditions. First, its influence will be particularly strong when the international setting is characterized by relatively high levels of complexity, uncertainty, and ambiguity, as it has been in Europe after the Cold War. In such circumstances, the security problems a state faces are less clear, and the objective costs and benefits of different courses of action are less obvious. 66 As a result, decision makers can or must more readily fall back on their pre-existing world views and notions of the effectiveness of alternative policies. Moreover, these elements of political culture are less likely to be discredited by the steady arrival of discrepant information about the external environment. National security culture will also figure more importantly as an explanation when policy is not the exclusive province of only one person or a very small number of decision makers. It is not unusual for some varia-

28

The Sources of German Security Policy

tion to exist in the attitudes of particular individuals. Thus the less influence a single individual or small group exercises over policy, the more policy is likely to conform to the general directions suggested by national security culture and not to be colored by idiosyncratic beliefs and values. This condition is more closely approximated in democratic political systems than in dictatorships or autocracies. It is also more likely to obtain if one considers broad trends in policy over long periods rather than specific actions decided under conditions of high secrecy, such as in wartime. Nevertheless, political culture may be a useful starting point for the analysis of national security policy even in these less conducive settings on the assumption that the beliefs and values of key individuals do not stray markedly from collective norms. Despite its potential usefulness, however, political culture is not likely to be an explanatory panacea. Its ability to account for national security policy may be highly limited and even non-existent in some circumstances. First, national security culture may be vague or incomplete. As a result of such indeterminacy, it may offer little or no useful guidance on certain issues or aspects of policy. As Sidney Verba has pointed out, The relationship between basic political beliefs and political behavior is not unambiguous. The same belief can be converted into action in a number of ways, just as the same action can have its roots in many alternative beliefs. 67

Second, national security culture may be internally inconsistent. As Verba has also noted, Not all political cultures are well integrated and consistent. There may be sources of strain within them. 68

As a result, national security culture may offer conflicting diagnoses and prescriptions and thus push policy simultaneously in different directions. Finally, the concept may be of little use if there is no dominant national security culture within a given political community. In some cases, societies and political elites are divided into groups with differing political subcultures. 69 Thus national security policy may vary significantly depending on which group controls the relevant positions of state authority. Alternatively, most of the members of a society may share a wide range of beliefs and values but will hold differing attitudes on an important subset of issues. Or there may be a single small subgroup with a distinct culture, such as the military, that may exert disproportionate influence

Explaining National Security Policy

29

over certain aspects of policy. 70 In such cases, it may be necessary to identify the relevant cleavages and to consider the policy process in order to achieve a satisfactory account of security policy. Nevertheless, where a single national security culture can be said to exist, and especially where it is detailed, comprehensive, and internally consistent, it may exert a strong influence over and thus offer a parsimonious explanation of important aspects of policy.

Institutional Sources of National Predispositions. The second basic source of national predispositions consists of national institutions. Frequently, these are the vestiges of previously dominant policy-related ideas, possibly including elements of a society's political culture, which have become embedded in the missions, rules, and procedures of policy making and administrative structures. Once institutionalized in this way, certain beliefs and values may continue to constrain the range of possible policy options and actual policy choices long after they have lost their grip over the minds of individuals and sometimes even after they have been supplanted in society by new sets of reigning ideas. 71 Alternatively, the rules embodied in international institutions may be translated into domestic law or become incorporated into the practices and standard operating procedures of government bureaucracies responsible for setting . 72 po1ICy. One institutional source of national predispositions may be a state's constitution or any equivalent basic political texts. To the degree that aspects of national security policy are formalized in such documents, they may serve as important enduring sources of constraints or imperatives. In general, however, constitutions, where they exist, offer few explicit or substantive guidelines for the content of policy. And where they do provide such guidelines, they may nevertheless not decisively determine policy. For example, Japan's constitution explicitly prohibits the reconstitution of Japanese armed forces. Yet over the years, Japan has created powerful "self-defense" forces with many of the capabilities of a fully fledged national military establishment. 73 Consequently, more important institutional sources of national predispositions are likely to reside in the central governmental organs charged with the formulation and execution of policy. These institutions may shape policy in three general ways. First, organizational processes, routines, and standard operating procedures may constrain the types of in-

30

The Sources of German Security Policy

formation to which decision makers are exposed. 74 Like ideas, institutions may act as lenses that structure interpretations of external circumstances and of their implications for national interests. 75 Second, national institutions delineate the specific repertoires of policy instruments and actions that are available at a given time. They preclude some policy options while making others possible. In the short to medium term, "existing organizational routines for employing present physical capacities constitute the range of effective choice open to government leaders confronted with any problem."76 Third, national predispositions may derive from the preferences of the bureaucracies and organizations responsible for formulating and implementing policy, as determined by their roles, missions, and functions. Other things being equal, organizations tend to advocate policies that serve their interests and otherwise further what they regard as their organizational "essence." 77 Thus far, scholars have paid particular attention to the preferences of military organizations and their impact on specific aspects of national security policy, especially military strategy. 78 But the possibility that other central institutional bodies may at times exert similar influences should not be ruled out. Like that of political culture, the general effect of national institutions is to promote continuity in national security policy over time. This consequence follows from the relative stability or "stickiness" of organizations. Once in place, institutional structures resist change, even as the forces that forged them dissipate and the material and ideational circumstances of their creation evolve and assume new forms. 79 Nevertheless, one must also recognize the limits of national institutions as sources of national predispositions. In many instances, they may not incline policy very strongly in one direction or another. For example, in some policy areas, a wide range of options may exist or may be readily constructed. Likewise, few if any bureaucracies may have strong vested interests in specific policies. Although military organizations may exert considerable influence over certain aspects of policy, such as military doctrine and the procurement of armaments, they do not always do so, and their impact on other aspects may be negligible. The effects of government agencies may have more to do with the details rather than with the broad sweep of national security policy. Alternatively, two or more bureaucracies may have strong but conflicting preferences, making the identification of a single clear national predisposition problematic. Fi-

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nally, more important than the interests of central governmental organs in many cases may be the beliefs and values of the individuals who head them, which are often not strongly determined by institutional position. 80

The Policy Process In some instances, both the international and domestic settings may fail to offer clear guidance for national security policy. Not only may the international environment be ambiguous or only loosely constraining, but no clear-cut national predispositions may exist. A leading cause of the latter condition will be the absence of a single, dominant political culture. Instead, sharp differences of opinion may exist among elements of society or its political elites. 81 Alternatively, dominant ideas may clash with institutionalized tendencies, or the preferences of central governmental organs may conflict with one another. In such circumstances, the substance of national security policy may be greatly influenced by the overall policy process. It is the institutional structures and rules of the policy process that determine how differing preferences are distributed and aggregated and thus which subsets of beliefs and values will have the greatest bearing on which aspects of pol.

ICy.

82

It is difficult to generalize about the policy process because it varies markedly from state to state. Nevertheless, there are several features common to all policy processes that can be described and analyzed case by case. One is the formal structure of policy-making authority. What are the main institutional actors? How is authority and responsibility dispersed among them? How centralized or decentralized is political power?s3 One can find considerable variation in this aspect of the policy process even among liberal democracies. For example, effective authority to determine policy may be vested to varying degrees in the executive and legislative organs. Even within the executive, moreover, the allocation of power and responsibility may be more or less centralized. 84 A second and closely related feature of the policy process is the distribution of policy preferences among the major actors. Actor preferences may be situationally determined, following logically from organizational interests, as suggested by the maxim "Where you stand depends on where you sit." Or, as noted above, they may hinge on the precise identity ofthe individuals who occupy the key policy-making positions. Especially

32

The Sources of German Security Policy

where no single political culture can be said to exist, different groups of decision makers representing distinct subcultures may interpret the external environment differently, establish different policy goals, and prefer different policy instruments. Thus it may be essential to know the distribution of portfolios among factions or political parties. Who is in power? How are the positions of authority filled? In liberal democracies, this feature of the policy process is shaped by party structures and electoral rules, and here as well one can find considerable variation. At one extreme, the members of a single political party may occupy all of the significant policy-making positions, as in the British political system. At the other extreme, power may be divided between opposition parties, as frequently occurs in the U.S. political system. And in the middle of the spectrum of possibilities, policy authority may be shared by not entirely like-minded coalition partners, which has typically been the case in the Federal Republic ofGermany. 85 Finally, it may be necessary to consider procedural norms and rules of the policy process. These are likely to be especially important when authority is decentralized and the occupants of various positions hold differing views. In situations of this nature, such norms and rules will help to determine how interests are aggregated and how conflicting policy preferences are reconciled.

Methodological Considerations So far, this chapter has presented a variety of factors that promise to be useful for explaining national security policy. Before proceeding with the analysis of German security policy, however, it is important to elucidate the methodologies employed in this study. Two basic tasks must be accomplished. One is to establish the values of the various possible explanatory factors and of the dependent variable, in this case German security policy after unification. The other is to determine the actual degree of influence of each of the former on the latter. With regard to the first task, describing most of the potential causal variables, such as the structure of the European state system, European security institutions, and the German policy process, is relatively unproblematic. Likewise, the record of German actions (and inaction) in the security realm can be established in a relatively straightforward manner. Instead, the principal challenge lies in delineating German national se-

Explaining National Security Policy

33

curity culture, especially if it is to be specified precisely enough so as to have clear behavioral implications. 86 Although the existence of a distinct German political culture has been assumed and confirmed by various studies aimed at ascertaining the stability of democratic political institutions in the Federal Republic, 87 it is not possible to infer on the basis of such studies alone that Germans share a set of basic assumptions that are of potential relevance to national security policy and to identify what those beliefs and values are. In comparison with material and institutional factors, moreover, ideational variables such as political culture are relatively hard to measure. The difficulty of describing political culture is compounded by the need to avoid making inferences from behavior, since otherwise one confounds the dependent and independent variables and the argument becomes tautological.ss In order to overcome these obstacles to measuring German political culture, this study pays particular, although not exclusive, attention to the beliefs and values of German political and administrative elites. Robert Putnam has concisely defined the political elite "as those who in any society rank toward the top of the (presumably closely intercorrelated) dimensions of interest, involvement, and influence in politics." 89 This focus has several advantages over an analysis of political culture in German society at large, especially as it may be revealed in public opinion. First, elite political culture is typically easier to describe and measure comprehensively, short of conducting public opinion polls that are sufficiently elaborate to reveal underlying attitudinal structures. Political elites express their views frequently and often in great detail. The relative abundance of information on elite attitudes, moreover, simplifies the task of measuring political culture independently of behavior in order to avoid tautological reasoning. Second, political culture as revealed in the attitudes of elites is likely to be much more elaborate and detailed. Political leaders and policy makers often have quite sophisticated and complex political belief systems, which are also usually more cqherent and logically consistent than those of ordinary individuals. 90 Consequently, elite political culture is more likely to contain beliefs and values of relevance to the whole range of national security issues and thus to provide meaningful guidance for policy. Third, as suggested by the definition of political elites, elite attitudes are likely to have a much more immediate bearing on national security

34

The Sources of German Security Policy

policy than are those of the general public. It is political and administrative elites who are directly responsible for making policy, while members of the public often have little interest in or knowledge about security policy issues. In addition, where public opinion is clearly expressed and appears to run counter to what political leaders prefer, they may defy it or seek to reshape it, especially in the areas of foreign and security policy. 91 Indeed, Germany expert Elizabeth Pond has argued that German elites are far more willing to disregard public opinion on important issues than are their American counterparts. 92 This is not meant to deny that public opinion can serve as an important constraint on or motive force behind policy, as is suggested by the extensive democratic peace literature, or to suggest that elite and mass attitudes of relevance to national security policy often diverge. To the contrary, although one must be attentive to the possibility of such differences, 93 the two are generally consonant with one another in Germany. 94 One reason is the leveling and homogenization of German society that took place after World War II. As a result, most Germans, including political elites, have undergone highly similar processes of political socialization. Another reason lies in postwar Germany's political institutions, including its large, catch-all political parties and the widespread use of proportional representation. The views of German political elites are unlikely to deviate significantly for long from those of the general public, since the electoral process tends to reward those who hold more similar attitudes, or who at least act as though they do. 95 Instead, elite views are broadly representative of those of German society as a whole. 96 The main differences are likely to lie in the relative complexity and specificity of elite and mass attitudes rather than in their fundamental orientations. Nevertheless, even an elite focus cannot eliminate-and may even exacerbate in some ways-the basic methodological difficulty of describing political culture, that of "gaining consistent, reliable access to what is inside people's minds."97 What individuals write and say does not always accurately reflect what they actually think. Indeed, political leaders may have more reason than most people to dissimulate or to use communications instrumentally rather than to represent their true beliefs and values. 98 The second task, that of determining the relative influence of different possible explanatory factors on German security policy, is complicated by the fact that this study considers only a single case, and then only over a

Explaining National Security Policy

35

relatively brief time span. As a result, there is no cross-national and little temporal variation in the independent and dependent variables to provide analytical leverage. In such situations, one can make recourse to two basic methods, both of which are employed in this sttidy. 99 The simplest is what Alexander George has termed the "congruence" procedure. By this method, one seeks to establish whether a correspondence exists between the dependent variable and the types of policy outcomes that one would logically expect to find, given the observed values of the various independent variables under consideration. The presence of such a correspondence is a necessary condition for establishing causality. Thus this study attempts to establish at a minimum that many aspects of German security policy after unification have been inconsistent with the expectations of neorealism while being congruent with what consideration of Germany's international institutional environment and German political culture would lead one to predict. Reliance on the congruence procedure alone, however, is unlikely to suffice in this case. Because of the variety of possible explanatory variables examined and the indeterminacy of some of the theories considered here, some elements of German security policy may be consistent with the expectations of more than one theoretical approach. In addition, some correlations may be spurious. Consequently, it may not be possible to identify the most important influences and to establish their. relative weights using this method alone, although some alternative explanations may be ruled out. 100 Instead, this study also employs to the greatest extent possible what George has called the "process-tracing" procedure. This method involves investigating and explaining the decision process or causal pathways by which various initial conditions are translated into outcomes. Was a hypothesized factor of influence indeed operative in the decision-making process, or was it absent? If present, did it influence policy in the expected way, or through some other mechanism? By scrutinizing the motives, reasoning, and arguments of policy makers, one is better able to rule out some explanations and to differentiate among and determine the relative importance of other sources of policy. 101 Two methodological issues remain to be discussed: the nature of the sources that are used and the methods by which inferences are drawn from the data. Both describing political culture and process tracing im-

36

The Sources of German Security Policy

pose large data requirements on the researcher. Consequently, I have made a systematic effort to identify and examine all sources of potential relevance. A natural starting point is the secondary literature on German security policy after unification. Given the contemporaneity of the subject, however, detailed secondary sources are relatively few, and much of what has been written is primarily prescriptive in nature. 102 Therefore, this study has necessarily relied heavily on primary source materials in order to make inferences about the content of German political culture and the influence of various factors on German security policy. In the first place, I have examined many of the public statements and writings of German political leaders and drawn upon other available German government and political party documents and publications. 103 These extensive documentary sources provide numerous clues to both the general attitudes of the German political elite and the reasons for the adoption of specific policies. Of course, such sources suffer from two significant limitations that make it unwise to rely on them exclusively. First, they do not provide all the information one may need to answer the questions raised by this study. Substantial gaps in the written record exist and will persist at least until personal accounts by all the top decision makers and confidential official documents, including records of high-level meetings, pertaining to the events in question are made public. Nevertheless, this first limitation is probably not as severe in the case of Germany as it is for most other countries. Postwar German leaders have placed a premium on openness, partly in order to foster an image of Germany as benign and transparent, and the German government consequently publishes a wealth of documents concerning its activities. Second, and more seriously, many of these materials may be biased. As suggested above, public statements and official documents are often instrumental in nature, being designed to persuade others and to advance particular political goals rather than simply to inform. As a result, they may not reveal the true attitudes or motives of policy makers, creating validity problems if one relies upon them too heavily. Although this difficulty cannot be definitively resolved, it can be managed in various ways. One partial solution to the problem of bias is to ensure that one's sample includes the writings and statements of individuals from a range of political affiliations and before a variety of audiences. 104

Explaining National Security Policy

37

Should regularities in the views expressed be found where differences might otherwise be expected to appear, then one can have greater confidence in the validity of one's inferences. Another strategy is to corroborate the views expressed by political elites themselves in potentially instrumental communications with those as described in relatively objective sources, such as press reports, the analyses of independent experts, and, where they reveal deeper attitudinal structures rather than merely views on specific policy issues, public opinion data. 105 To this end, I have systematically culled through the press clipping files of both the Press Documentation Office of the Bundestag and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, and the translations contained in the daily reports of the U.S. government's Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). A third approach, which can help to compensate for both potential bias in and the incompleteness of the public record, is to conduct confidential interviews. Interviews provide an opportunity to solicit from knowledgeable and influential individuals information about particular aspects of security policy and their attitudes toward security issues that is not available elsewhere. Although not fool-proof, the use of confidentiality, by eliciting more candid responses, should in general yield more accurate inferences about the beliefs and motives of interview subjects. Accordingly, this study incorporates the findings of dozens of confidential interviews with German policy makers, party officials, and other close observers of German policy making. These subjects do not represent a random sample of potential interviewees within the German political and administrative elites. But those interviewed were generally representative of the main political parties and the principal government agencies responsible for the formulation of German security policy. 106 Nevertheless, and in view of the obvious difficulties associated with the replication of interview-based findings, it should be stressed that few of the inferences contained in this study are based on interview material alone. Rather, it has served primarily to corroborate information obtained from public sources. Two basic methods exist for drawing descriptive inferences about the content of political culture and causal inferences about the determinants of political behavior from data of this nature. 107 The initial wave of political-cultural studies self-consciously sought to employ what were then viewed as more scientific, behavioral methods, such as quantitative con-

38

The Sources of German Security Policy TABLE 2.2

Interviews German Officials Government Officials Chancellory Foreign Ministry Defense Ministry German Embassy, Washington, D.C. German Mission to NATO, Brussels Political Party Officials Christian Democratic Union (CDU) Social Democratic Party (SPD) Free Democratic Party (FOP)

3

8 6 4 3 2 4 4

Officials in Party-affiliated Research Institutes Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (CDU) Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (SPD)

2 2

Other Interviews U.S. Government Officials Department of State Department of Defense U.S. Embassy, Bonn U.S. Mission to NATO, Brussels NATO Officials

2 4 2 3 5

Interviews were conducted over a two-year time period spanning two trips to Germany in I 993 and 1994. Several individuals were interviewed twice.

NOTE:

tent analysis of documents and statements and structured interviews in addition to sample surveys. These techniques were deemed more objective, precise, rigorous, reliable, and amenable to replication than were .. . 10s preva11mg practtces. The behavioral approach soon encountered strong criticism, however. As even some of its leading proponents acknowledged, the employment of structured formats risked failing to capture the true meaning of responses, especially in the context of cross-national comparisons. 109 Instead, some scholars began to advocate the use of more subjective, interpretive techniques. They held that qualitative content analysis and openended interviews would increase one's ability to explore the richness, subtlety, and nuance of respondents' views and thus would be especially useful when the dimensions and likely structure of those views were not readily apparent ex ante. As one discussion of the latter technique concludes, "broader predispositional data are captured better with less structure .... There is a high analytic risk in imposing structure when expectations are not well defined." 110 In view of these considerations, I have opted to employ an interpretive method in this study. On balance, the advantages were judged to outweigh those of more structured formats. An additional consideration was that, given resource and time constraints, an interpretive approach made it possible to analyze a significantly larger number of documents and statements than if each one had had to be carefully coded. In any case, my primary reliance on publicly available sources, for all of which full cita-

Explaining National Security Policy

39

tions are provided, makes it possible for others to check the validity of my inferences. Finally, one should be careful not to exaggerate the distinction between behavioral and interpretive methods. Even quantitative content analysis, for example, involves a not insignificant degree of interpretation. As one practitioner has noted; when trying to code the number of appearances of a theme in a document, "no clear rule of thumb can be offered; there is an element of judgment involved." 111 Taking a more forceful position on the issue, Anthony Giddens has asserted that "all so-called 'quantitative' data, when scrutinized, tum out to be compositions of 'qualitative' ... interpretations." 112 Whichever method one chooses, however, one should proceed with a healthy dose of skepticism and humility. As Keith Shimko concludes, "we can never be absolutely certain that we are measuring beliefs accurately .... [T]he best we can do is take steps that increase our confidence in the validity of our data and to recognize the significance of whatever residual doubts remain." 113

CHAPTER THREE

International Sources of German Security Policy

Chapter Two presented a framework that promises to be useful for analyzing patterns and trends in national security policy, especially with regard to middle to large powers with liberal democratic political systems. Drawing upon that framework, this chapter identifies and characterizes the principal potential international sources of German security policy after unification. It seeks to establish the values of the relevant aspects of the external setting so that their effects and relative influence can be assessed in the chapters of Part Two. Chapter Four considers the most likely domestic determinants. Germany's external environment has changed dramatically since the end of the 1980s. Many of the international constraints that shaped the security policy of the Federal Republic during the Cold War, especially the former Soviet threat, have been significantly reduced. In addition, the end of the Cold War has greatly expanded Germany's opportunities for influence and self-assertion in Central and Eastern Europe. As a result, Germany has enjoyed potentially much greater freedom of action than at any time since the founding of the Federal Republic. At the same time, Germany has been confronted by a number of new challenges, demands, and pressures to act that have prompted it to play a larger role in European security affairs. Whether considered individually or jointly, these external developments have suggested the strong possibility, if not the necessity, of substantial change in German security policy. It should nevertheless be acknowledged that the international setting has also provided grounds for expecting continuity and restraint in German security policy after unification. Some of the Cold War international structural constraints have endured, albeit in more attenuated forms. In particular, Germany has remained constrained, if less directly, by its unusual degree of economic dependence, which has exerted a moderating

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41

influence on all aspects of German external policy. Finally, a dense network of international security institutions, some old and some new, has continued to blanket the European security landscape. These institutions have remained important potential influences on German security policy, regulating a number of aspects of German diplomacy and military preparations, sometimes in great detail, while providing opportunities for addressing various security concerns.

The Structure of the European State System The starting point of the framework of analysis presented in Chapter Two is the structure of the international system. By any account, the structure of the international system, especially its European sub-component, and Germany's position within it were profoundly altered by German unification and the end of the Cold War. As a result, Germany has faced far fewer constraints, greatly increased opportunities, and new pressures to act in its external environment. Although the previous structural constraints have not disappeared completely, these developments have, on balance, pointed to the possibility, even the likelihood, of significant change in German security policy and have thus raised questions about Germany's future course.

The Cold War Structure: Sources of Constraint In order to understand the nature and magnitude of these changes, it is helpful first to review the international structural incentives that the Federal Republic faced before the end of the Cold War. During that period, German security policy was dictated to an exceptional extent by external circumstances. In particular, these circumstances greatly limited West Germany's room for maneuver, although the degree of constraint did decline gradually over time. 1 Four international structural constraints on German security policy during the Cold War stand out. The first was the Soviet threat, as defined by both the military power of the Soviet Union and its ideological hostility toward the West. West Germany was located on the front line in the principal theater of East-West confrontation. It more than any other West European state was subject to Soviet coercion and risked being overrun by a Soviet-led invasion or destroyed in the process.

42

The Sources of German Security Policy

Consequently, the first priority of German policy was to achieve security vis-a-vis the Soviet threat. If West Germany were not to be reduced to the status of a Soviet satellite state or "Finlandized," the achievement of this goal required forging and maintaining strong alliance links with the Western powers and, once German rearmament was permitted, making a large military contribution to its own defense. It also dictated that Germany tread with extreme caution diplomatically and militarily outside the European theater, lest it antagonize the Soviet Union and provoke Soviet actions that might heighten tensions on the continent. A second and closely related constraint was West Germany's resulting security dependence on the United States and, to a lesser extent, the other states of Western Europe. This dependence might not have been so acute had West Germany been permitted to build nuclear weapons of its own, but renunciation of such weapons was part of the price that Bonn had to pay for admission to NATO and conventional rearmament. West Germany's dependence also served to inhibit it from pursuing policies that might contribute to conflict with the West, since the Federal Republic could not risk losing the protection provided by the United States and its other Western security partners. The need to maintain Western support continued to constrict German security policy even as many of the formal controls that had been originally placed on German armaments were lifted over the years. A third source of constraint was the postwar partition of Germany. That simple fact ensured that unification, or at least a mitigation of the social consequences of division, would be a leading objective of West German policy. The consequences of the division of Germany for German security policy played themselves out in two different ways. On the one hand, West Germany's need for Western support to achieve unification, especially during the 1950s and 1960s, only increased its dependence on its Western allies and thus further inhibited Bonn from clashing with them on issues of security policy. 2 On the other hand, once German policy accepted that at least a minimum level of cooperation with the Soviet Union was necessary to achieve its goals, as was the case beginning in 1969 with the adoption of Ostpolitik, West Germany had additional incentives to avoid steps that might antagonize the Soviet Union and imperil detente. The second of these consequences meant that German security policy was sometimes pulled in directions that conflicted with the desires and expectations of its Western partners, as exemplified

International Sources

43

by the dispute over the Euromissiles in the 1980s, but it never occasioned any fundamental weakening of the Federal Republic's Western orientation. A fourth source of constraint resided in the historically conditioned attitudes of Germany's neighbors, in both halves of Europe, toward the Federal Republic. Because of Germany's past transgressions, many people in these countries were strongly inclined to view all German actions with suspicion and mistrust. As a result, West Germany was more likely to encounter resistance and even had explicit fetters placed on its security policy, especially those associated with the inception of German rearmament in the mid-1950s. These psychological conditions created further reasons for Germany to adopt policies intended to reassure its neighbors that it would never again pose a threat to them and to avoid actions that might raise new alarms. Although this reassurance imperative did not determine the general outlines of Germany policy, it did influence the specific ways in which the policy was implemented, such as the continued high degree of integration of the Bundeswehr into NATO. As a result of these several constraints, German security policy differed in notable ways from the policies of all other major powers in Europe. 3 First, it was highly parochial. German policy was almost exclusively concerned with national defense and the stability of the Central Region in Europe, evincing little interest in out-of-area strategic involvements. Second, the Federal Republic accepted unique restrictions on the numbers and types of armaments, including but not limited to nuclear weapons, that it could produce and field. Third, West Germany forwent other important elements of an autonomous military capability for pursuing its interests, such as a national planning and command structure, relying instead on its allies and multinational NATO structures to provide them.

The Post-Cold War Structure As a result of unification and the end of the Cold War, these international structural constraints on German security policy were, if not swept away, significantly reduced. At the same time, Germany was presented with new opportunities for self-assertion. Consequently, Germany has enjoyed a much more permissive external environment. It has had much more leeway in how it defines its security policy than at any time since World War 11. 4

44

The Sources of German Security Policy

Unification itself had two main structural consequences. First, it augmented Germany's raw power resources relative to those of other European states. By incorporating the five new eastern Lander, the Federal Republic increased its population by roughly one-fifth, its land area by more than 40 percent, and even its economic base by some 10 percent, according to conservative estimates. As a result, Germany's economic power and its military potential, insofar as these depend on material factors, have grown, thereby enhancing its ability to achieve its security policy goals unilaterally, at least in the long term. 5 In addition, unification extended the frontiers of the Federal Republic eastward. Since 1990, it has bordered on Poland, shared a much longer frontier with the Czech Republic (formerly Czechoslovakia), and possessed a lengthy coastline on the Baltic Sea. The effect of these alterations in the map of Europe was to restore Germany to its traditional role as a Central European power in addition to being a part of Western Europe. The second major structural change in Germany's security environment was the sharp reduction that took place in the Soviet threat during the late 1980s and early 1990s. This change occurred along two principal dimensions. Most easily measured are its military aspects. The ability of the Soviet Union and then Russia to threaten Germany militarily declined dramatically in the early 1990s. As a result of the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe and then the breakup of the Soviet Union itself, the previous danger of a massive conventional offensive launched with little or no warning was eliminated. German officials now assumed that any direct conventional military threat would be preceded a usable warning period of at least one year. Even an attack by Russia mounted after a prolonged period of mobilization would be an extremely difficult undertaking and thus was regarded in Bonn as most improbable. 6 Less tangible but no less important were the changes that took place in Soviet and Russian attitudes toward the West in general and Germany in particular. As a result of the new thinking on security policy introduced by former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, the disbandment of the Communist Party, and subsequent attempts at democratization in Russia, the West was no longer regarded as implacably hostile, at least by large segments of the Russian political elite. Instead, since the mid-1980s, many Soviet and Russian leaders have been eager to cooperate with the West to a significant extent.

International Sources

45

The decline in the former Soviet threat has had important implications for German security policy. It has meant that Germany need not concern itself nearly as much about the requirements of deterrence and defense against direct military threats and that it need not devote as many resources to its military forces for those purposes as it did during the Cold War. As German leaders have frequently noted, unified Germany's security situation is the most favorable ir1 modem history. 7 Nor has Germany had to pay as much heed to possible Russian concerns about and adverse reactions to its actions. The smaller threat has also reduced Germany's security dependence on its Western allies. Thus Germany has been freer to act at variance with the preferences of the other European and world powers. 8 A further source of Germany's increased room for maneuver has stemmed from the new opportunities for German influence and self-assertion in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics that the end of the Cold War created. The termination of Soviet domination of Eastern Europe and the collapse of communist regimes throughout the Soviet bloc left a political vacuum in much of the region. In addition, the tremendous economic and technical needs of many former communist countries, especially those that have embarked upon ambitious programs of economic reform, have made them receptive to German assistance and advice.

New Challenges and Pressures The international structural setting of German security policy after the Cold War has not been merely permissive, however. In addition, this aspect of the external environment has placed large new demands on Germany, putting the country under increasing pressure to adopt a more active security policy. In the first place, the end of the Cold War did not spell the end of external security concerns. Rather, Germany has faced a range of new threats and risks. 9 Foremost among these new concerns has been conflict within and among the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, as exemplified by the fighting in the former Yugoslavia. The potential for instability and actual hostilities in the area grew markedly with the dissolution of the Soviet empire. The region has been rife with domestic and inter-state ethnic, territorial, and religious tensions that were simply suppressed during some four decades of communist rule and will require time to be resolved. To

46

The Sources of German Security Policy

make matters worse, these underlying fault lines have been subject to exacerbation by setbacks or failures in the difficult experiments in political and economic reform that have been attempted in many places. 10 Although less dangerous than the former Soviet threat, intense and prolonged hostilities and instability in Central and Eastern Europe has had the potential to threaten Germany in several ways. As the situation in the former Yugoslavia has already demonstrated, armed conflict can generate large numbers of refugees. It might spill over onto the territory of neighboring countries. And in the worst case, outside states might feel compelled to intervene, risking an expansion of hostilities. Even where no fighting occurs, political and economic collapse could result in mass migrations to the West. For Germany, these dangers have been compounded by its central location, which has made the country particularly vulnerable and exposed to the consequences of conflict and instability in the east. During the first half of the 1990s, Germany absorbed some 400,000 war refugees from Croatia and Bosnia, far more than did any other country. 11 At the same time, the number of people, many from former communist states of Central and Eastern Europe, seeking asylum in Germany mounted steadily during the early part of the decade, reaching a total of 438,000 in 1992, before Germany tightened its asylum laws the following year. 12 It is clear that Germany cannot hide from such regional problems. The potential for conflict and instability in Central and Eastern Europe has had important implications for German security policy. Germany has had strong motives to act to prevent regional conflicts from arising in the first place and to contain and resolve them where they have occurred anyway. Indeed, the need to stabilize its eastern flank has been characterized as Germany's number one security concem. 13 As Ronald Asmus has noted, "Germany has little choice but to become actively involved in reform and change in Eastern Europe, for its own domestic stability and security requirements are intimately intertwined with the fate of reform and democracy in that region." 14 A second German concern after the Cold War has been the danger posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range means for their delivery. 15 Although this has not been an entirely new apprehension, it was significantly heightened by the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which raised the possibility that Soviet nuclear weapons, materials, technology, and expertise might make their way into the hands of

International Sources

47

rogue states or terrorist groups located within Europe or in nearby regions. Particularly worrisome was the danger that, with the collapse of the Soviet military-industrial complex, displaced scientists might become technical mercenaries who would sell their knowledge to the highest bidder.16 Government officials have pointed out with growing frequency that Germany lies within range of missiles launched from North Africa and the Middle East and that it may soon be threatened by developing countries with weapons of mass destruction. 17 Finally, Germany has come under growing external pressure to assume greater global responsibility for the promotion and preservation of peace. Germany's allies and the leaders of international organizations, notably the United Nations (UN), have repeatedly asked Germany to make contributions to multilateral efforts that are commensurate with its economic strength and enhanced political status. In particular, as the war against Iraq and subsequent developments in Somalia and elsewhere have demonstrated, the international community has increasingly expected Germany to participate in UN -authorized peacekeeping and even peacemaking and peace-enforcing measures without reservation. 18 Thus Germany has no longer been able to remain aloof even from crises and conflicts outside the European theater that have not directly impinged upon its security.

Enduring Structural Constraints Not all of the postwar international structural constraints on German security policy were lifted by unification and the end of the Cold War in Europe. At least four structural influences that would tend to promote continuity and restraint in German security policy have endured. First, despite the significant decline in the former Soviet threat described above, the threat did not disappear altogether. German policy makers have of necessity continued to be attentive to the residual military power of the former Soviet Union and how it might be used. In particular, they have had to reckon with Russia's still substantial nuclear capabilities, which have continued to qualify Russia as one of the world's two nuclear superpowers. Nor have they been able to rule out completely the possibility that these imposing forces might someday be brandished in a bid for political advantage. Events in Russia have suggested that the path toward the establishment of a stable democracy there remains strewn with obstacles, creating uncertainty among German leaders about future Russian intentions even as they have sought to remain optimistic. 19

48

The Sources of German Security Policy

The remote possibility that a Russian military threat could someday reemerge has not sufficed to justify the maintenance of a large Bundeswehr or the development of a national nuclear capability. 20 It has, however, generated some residual dependence on Germany's Western allies, especially the United States, for nuclear protection. 21 If Germany were to try to assume a larger role in international peace efforts, moreover, it would remain reliant on the United States in other ways as well during at least the short to medium term. Any large-scale German participation in military operations outside the NATO area, for example, would probably require the use of American strategic lift capability and U.S. assets for command, control, communication, and intelligence for some time to come. 22 A third enduring source of constraint has taken the form pf the historically conditioned attitudes of Germany's neighbors. Germany has continued to be watched more closely and with greater mistrust than would another country in the same geopolitical circumstances, while German initiatives have still been more likely to be met with suspicion, criticism, and even resistance. 23 Although this dispositional factor may fade with the passage oftime, it has remained a very real element of Germany's security environment, and one that has been no less important for its subjective nature. 24 Consequently, Germany has continued to have strong incentives to act cautiously in order to reassure its neighbors that they have nothing to fear. A final structural factor to consider is Germany's economic dependence. As noted in Chapter Two, this phenomenon is typically overlooked as a possible determinant of national security policy. Yet while Germany's economic dependence is not itself a security issue in the narrow sense of the term (although it does have implications for economic security), it has served as an important constraining influence on German security policy. Since World War II, Germany has become the leading trading state of all the world's medium and large powers. Approximately 30 percent of Germany's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and one out of every three jobs in Germany have been generated through exports in recent years, making the country far more dependent on access to foreign markets than is either the United States or Japan. Some two-thirds of these exports are now taken by Germany's European Union (EU) partners. Germany has also imported large amounts of raw materials, including oil, and food.

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49

This situation of dependence, moreover, could not be quickly or easily altered. Much of the German economy has been structured to produce goods for export, while Germany would be hard pressed to find domestic substitutes for many of the energy supplies and other natural resources that have come in large quantities from abroad. Thus it would not be too much of an exaggeration to describe Germany as "existentially dependent" on free trade and open markets. 25 Given this high degree of economic dependence, Germany has had a further good reason not to allow its relations with its Western trading partners to become strained, notwithstanding its reduced security dependence on them. To the contrary, Germany has possessed additional powerful incentives to remain as close as possible to these countries in all respects and to avoid actions that might antagonize them, since any major falling out could lead to high economic costs. Consequently, Germany's economic dependence has reinforced its strategic interests in maintaining strong Western security ties. 26

International Security Institutions In sum, the transformation that has taken place in the structure of the European state system as a result of the end of the Cold War has set the stage for potentially fundamental changes in German security policy. The external setting of German security policy has not been limited to structural factors, however. Since unification, just as beforehand, Germany has been party to a large number of international security institutions. Most of those that shaped German policy during the Cold War have continued to exist, although many have been modified to conform better to the circumstances of the post-Cold War era, while some new ones have been established since 1989. As a result, such institutions have remained important potential influences on German security policy. Most of the international security institutions of relevance to German security policy fall into two broad categories: regional security organizations and arms control agreements. The principal exception to this categorization is the United Nations (UN), which the Federal Republic joined in 1973. Although Germany's obligations as a UN member are rather general, they are also quite fundamental in nature. Most importantly, the UN Charter enjoins member states to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of armed force. In addition, it calls upon them

50

The Sources of German Security Policy

to give the UN every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the Charter. As we shall see in Chapter Seven, the latter injunction became a leading consideration in the heated debate that took place in Germany in the 1990s over the purposes for which the Bundeswehr might be used.

Regional Security Organizations The most important regional security organization to which Germany has belonged is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which was founded in 1949 and which the Federal Republic joined in 1955. During the Cold War, German security policy was developed primarily within the NATO framework. Although the Federal Republic's dependence on NATO has presumably diminished with the passing of the former Soviet threat, continued involvement in the alliance subjects Germany to a variety of norms, rules, and procedures that have potential implications for its behavior. Most obvious among these are the obligations enshrined in the North Atlantic Treaty to consult with the other parties whenever one of them is threatened (Article 4) and to provide assistance to any members that are subject to an armed attack (Article 5). More important on a day-to-day basis, however, are the norms of consultation and cooperation that reign within the alliance's elaborate organizational structure, which is headed by the North Atlantic Council. Overall, the security policy-making machinery of Germany and the alliance have been highly integrated. 27 A further set of potential NATO influences on German security policy flows from Germany's participation in the alliance's integrated military structure. All of the military forces of the Federal Republic have been assigned to NATO, and although this arrangement has not formally precluded independent operations, the use of the Bundeswehr during the Cold War for purely national purposes was all but inconceivable. 28 In addition, the capabilities of the German armed forces have been determined over the years in no small part by the NATO defense planning process, which generates a set of force goals for each country bi-annually, and irregular ad hoc conventional-force improvement initiatives. 29 Closely associated with NATO during the Cold War was the Western European Union (WEU), which the Federal Republic also joined in 1955. Although established in 1948 prior to the founding of the Atlantic alliance, the WEU was quickly subordinated to NATO and became largely

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moribund. In the mid-1980s, however, transatlantic differences breathed new life into the organization, which subsequently sought to establish a profile independent of NATO by coordinating the naval deployments of member states in the Persian Gulf during both the Iran-Iraq War and the coalition war against Iraq. In addition, a separate WEU naval task force was established to monitor and enforce the arms embargo imposed on the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. Although the WEU has continued to lack a military organization and consultative mechanisms as elaborate as those ofNATO, it nevertheless rests on formal obligations more stringent than those contained in the North Atlantic Treaty. 30 A third important set of Western security institutions in existence at the time of German unification was that linking Germany bilaterally with France. These structures had their origins in the 1963 Elysee Treaty on military cooperation. Although little came of this agreement initially, it served as the basis for a flourishing of Franco-German security ties in the 1980s, which saw the establishment first of a Commission on Security and Defense involving frequent meetings of the foreign and defense ministers of the two countries and several permanent working groups and then of a Defense and Security Council that would bring together the two heads of state as well as their top advisers twice a year. In addition, France and Germany began to hold regular military exercises, undertook a number of cooperative armaments projects, and agreed to form a joint . military brigade. 31 In 1990, the European Community (EC) was still of only minor relevance for German security policy. Throughout most of its lifetime, the EC had carefully avoided involvement in security matters, which in any case lay outside the ambit set down in the Treaty of Rome. The only exception to this rule was contained in the 1986 Single European Act (SEA), which, in the process of formally incorporating the parallel foreign policy coordinating mechanism known as European Political Cooperation (EPC) into the Rome framework, provided for coordination on the political and economic aspects of security. In addition, the SEA obligated EC members to inform and consult each other on any foreign policy matters of general interest before making final policy decisions. Nevertheless, the EC would not potentially move fully into the security realm until the implementation in 1993 of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union (TEU), which established a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and even then the European Union (EU) would rely on the

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WEU to elaborate and implement decisions and actions that had defense implications. 32 The final regional security organization of potential relevance for German security policy at the time of unification was the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which was created in 1975 with the signing of the Helsinki Final Act. The CSCE, in contrast to the others described above, was pan-European in scope, including not only the members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact but most neutral and nonaligned states as well. For that reason, it was also far less institutionalized than either NATO or the EC, conferring few rights and responsibilities on its members. Instead, it served primarily as a forum for discussing security issues and facilitating regional arms control negotiations. Nevertheless, as the Cold War came to an end, many Europeans placed great hopes in the CSCE precisely because of its inclusive, bloc-transcending nature.

Arms Control Agreements Since unification, Germany has also remained party to a number of politically binding arms control agreements. The most prominent of these have concerned nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons of mass destruction. In 1954, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, as part of his strategy to secure German membership in NATO and the restoration of German sovereignty, declared that the Federal Republic would not manufacture such weapons. In 1969, West Germany signed the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which broadened this restriction to include the possession and control of nuclear weapons. These commitments were reaffirmed in the 1990 Treaty on the Final Settlement With Respect to Germany, which resulted from the Two-plus-Four talks on the conditions of German unification. 33 In addition, the size and capabilities of Germany's conventional forces have been regulated by several international legal instruments. By 1990, all of the original restrictions on the production and possession of conventional armaments by West Germany, which were imposed as a condition of rearmament, had been lifted. During the unification process, however, the Federal Republic stated that the personnel strength of the armed forces of a united Germany would be reduced to 370,000 within three to four years, a pledge that was codified in the Final Settlement. 34 At the same time, Germany signed the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in

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Europe (CFE), which placed ceilings on the number of major pieces of military equipment Germany may field. 35 And a CFE follow-up agreement established personnel limits for all the states in the region, creating a multilateral framework in which to anchor the levels agreed to by Germany in 1990. Finally, the activities of the German armed forces in peacetime, such as exercises and troop movements, have been governed to some extent by a series of regional accords. Although the first such operational restrictions were contained in the Helsinki Final Act, which called for prior notification of major military maneuvers, the most important sources have been the 1986 Stockholm and 1990 Vienna agreements on confidenceand security-building measures (CSBMs). This chapter has described features of Germany's external environment that have had the ability to influence German security policy after unification. A number of international structural factors have provided opportunities, pressures, and constraints that German policy makers might well have taken into account. In addition, Germany has continued to participate in many international security institutions, whose rules and procedures have had further potential implications for German state behavior. Nevertheless, the mere presence of such factors is no guarantee of influence, since leaders might fail to heed structural incentives or choose to disregard the injunctions of international institutions. Rather, the nature and magnitude of their actual effects on German security policy remain to be established, which is the task of Part Two.

CHAPTER FOUR

Domestic Sources of German Security Policy Whether or not a state will seek to change the international system depends ultimately on the nature of the state and the society it represents. -Robert Gilpin

As argued in Chapter Two, a state's national security policy is rarely determined exclusively by the external environment. It is usually also shaped, sometimes critically, by internal political, economic, and social conditions. This chapter examines the additional opportunities, pressures, and constraints that have been generated by the domestic setting of German security policy. It first analyzes Germany's capacity to pursue different policies after unification. While acknowledging Germany's unrivaled economic power in Europe, it stresses the significant limitations resulting from the medium-term costs of German unification and the country's long-term structural economic and demographic difficulties. The chapter then considers how Germany has been inclined to use the resources at its disposal, or German national predispositions. Although it also reviews potential institutional sources of such predispositions, the analysis places particular emphasis on Germany's postwar political culture, which consists of relatively stable values and beliefs that are widely shared, especially among political elites. Both the very existence of a distinct political culture and its specific content have favored continuity and restraint in German security policy after unification. Finally, the chapter describes the German security policy process. The structures and rules of policy making can play an important role in determining outcomes in areas where elites hold conflicting preferences. In fact, several features of the German policy process itself tend to mute the

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effects of such differences and militate against sudden or dramatic departures from the status quo.

Germany's National Capacity Even before unification, Germany had the largest population and economy within the European Community. Unification only increased its advantages in these traditional indices of national power. Indeed, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, united Germany has possessed the most powerful economy in all of Europe. Consequently, one might expect Germany to be able to sustain a relatively resource-intensive national security policy. Such aggregate measures do not tell the whole story, however. For several domestic reasons, fewer human and material resources have been available for German security policy since unification than one might expect. In the short to medium term, Germany has been and will remain constrained by the high costs of unification. In the longer term, it will be hamstrung by both unfavorable demographic trends and structural economic problems. The impact of these constraints should not be exaggerated. Because of the general improvement in Germany's external security environment, the country's security policy has required fewer resources since unification and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, as will be discussed in Part Two, material resource constraints have already pinched sharply in several important areas, especially Germany's efforts to promote reform in Central and Eastern Europe and the defense budget. And they militate against the adoption of a significantly more assertive or militarized security policy that would require greater resources.

The Impact of German Unification A leading domestic constraint on German security policy since unification has been the overarching need to rehabilitate eastern Germany both politically and economically after four decades of communist rule. As German leaders have repeatedly stated, the completion of German unity is Germany's primary task. 1 Yet this process has placed tremendous demands on Germany's economic resources.

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Much of eastern Germany's economic infrastructure, such as its antiquated telecommunications system, has been rebuilt from scratch or completely overhauled. In addition, the privatization of the East German economy during the early 1990s proved to be more expensive than anticipated, ultimately saddling the government with some DM 275 billion in debt. 2 Although the sale of manufacturing and other concerns generated considerable revenue, this income was surpassed by the cost of closing uncompetitive enterprises and subsidizing others until they could be sold. And unification substantially increased spending on social welfare programs, as pensions, medical care, and unemployment compensation in the new eastern states were brought up to western German standards. To meet these costs, Germany was required to transfer substantial amounts of public funds from the old to the new Lander. Between 1991 and 1995, these transfers ranged between DM 140 billion and DM 180 billion (roughly $90-120 billion) per year, for a total of some DM 850 billion. 3 And it has been commonly estimated that similar sums would be necessary through the end of the decade. 4 When confronted with these costs, the federal government had two basic options. It could borrow the requisite funds or it could raise taxes. Because the ruling coalition had been reelected in 1990 on a platform that denied the need for new taxes, it was reluctant to pursue the second option and thus relied primarily on borrowing. This choice had significant economic consequences. First, it contributed to large government deficits and thus a soaring public debt. Largely because of the costs of unification, the total public deficit reached DM 160 billion in 1992 and then DM 200 billion in 1993, the latter figure equaling 7 percent of Germany's Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 5 As a result of these persistent deficits, the total public debt grew rapidly, reaching some DM 2 trillion by 1995. This amount represented more than 50 percent of Germany's GDP and an increase of more than 100 percent over the pre-unification level. 6 And as the second half of the decade began, the level of borrowing remained high. 7 These unprecedented levels of borrowing and deficit spending prompted the Bundesbank, Germany's autonomous central bank, to raise interest rates substantially in order to contain inflationary pressures. 8 These higher interest rates contributed, in tum, to a sharp slowdown in the Germany economy, through two separate mechanisms. First, they increased the costs of borrowing, which discouraged private investment.

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Second, they caused the German currency, the deutschmark, to appreciate in value, which reduced demand for domestically produced goods both by raising the price foreign importers would have to pay for them and by making foreign exports to Germany less expensive. Indeed, after initially stimulating an increase in the level of economic activity, as eastern Germans eagerly tried to use their new deutschmarks to make up for over four decades of socialist privations, the government's financial management of unification, in combination with a more general global economic slowdown, helped to tip the German economy into recession. In 1993 alone, the country's GDP shrank by more than 1 percent overall and. nearly 2 percent in western Germany. 9 The recession, which was described as the most serious since the founding of the Federal Republic in 1949, 10 produced record levels of unemployment, as the number of jobless reached more than 4 million in early 1994. 11 The difficulties of internal unification have had significant implications for German security policy. At a minimum, the project has occupied a considerable amount of the time and energy of German political leaders. Consequently, the government has been less able to devote attention to international issues. 12 More concretely, the heavy costs imposed by the rehabilitation of eastern Germany have meant that fewer economic and financial resources have been available for defense and foreign policy initiatives. Since the early 1990s, the government has been under constant pressure to make deep cuts in the federal budget in order to curb borrowing. 13 As Chancellor Helmut Kohl has exclaimed, internal unification "pushes Germany to the limits of its resources." 14

Structural Economic Problems Many observers have expected Germany to surmount the material, if not the social and psychological, challenges of unification by the end of the 1990s or early in the next century. Thus of greater importance for German security policy in the long run are Germany's underlying structural economic problems. These have compounded the difficulty of paying for unification and, if unresolved, could threaten the very basis of Germany's postwar prosperity. The principal manifestation of these problems has been the relatively slow growth of economic productivity since the early to mid-1980s. 15 In fact, production costs have risen faster than productivity in many sectors. This trend has been fostered by high energy prices, extensive government

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The Sources of German Security Policy

regulation, and heavy business taxes. But it has been most often attributed to Germany's high labor costs. German workers receive among the highest wages and the most generous social benefits in the world. At the same time, they enjoy shorter working weeks, longer holidays, and shorter working lives than their counterparts in most other countries. 16 These problems have only been exacerbated by unification, since unit wage costs have been considerably higher in the eastern states, where worker productivity remains much lower. 17 Partly as a result, German labor costs have risen more than twice as fast as in the United States (22 versus 10 percent) since 1990. 18 The slow growth in productivity has hurt the German economy in several ways. It has reduced the international competitiveness of German producers. In particular, the ability of German exporters to compete in world markets has declined markedly. 19 In addition, it has reduced Germany's relative attractiveness as a location for industry, discouraging foreign direct investment and prompting German investors to send their money abroad. 20 Especially since the end of the Cold War, German manufacturers have shifted production to sites in Eastern Europe and elsewhere where costs have been decidedly lower. 21 These developments have contributed in tum to Germany's slow and sometimes negative economic growth, high unemployment, and substantial budget deficits in the 1990s. And even when the economy was performing relatively well, as in 1994, it generated little or no job growth. 22 In fact, unemployment levels reached record highs in 1996 and again in 1997 despite a steady, if modest, rise in Germany's GDP in those years.Z 3 As will be discussed in Part Two, Germany's various economic problems have already constrained German security policy in at least two important respects. They have greatly limited the amount of money available for promoting stability in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics. And they have prompted the government to make further cuts in the already much-reduced military budget, greatly complicating the task of restructuring the German armed forces (Bundeswehr) for the post-Cold War environment.

Demographic Trends Germany's national capacity has also been constrained by unfavorable demographic trends. In the early 1990s, Germany experienced an unusually sharp, short-term decline in the number of draft-age males, which

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bottomed out in 1994. This development, in combination with the fact that in the early 1980s the government had greatly eased the difficulties of obtaining conscientious objector status/4 meant that the Bundeswehr would have trouble filling its requirement for conscripts in the mid1990s?5 Of greater long-term consequence for German security policy are two other trends. Because of low birth rates, the population is likely to decline during the first decades of the next century, to as few as 70 million people. At the same time, the average age of the population will rise significantly. Whereas only one in five Germans was age 60 or older in the early 1990s, every third German will fall into that age group by the year 2030. Meanwhile, the share of Germans of working age (20-60) will fall from 58 to 48 percent. 26 These trends will impose two additional constraints on German security policy. First, they mean that the number of young men of the age traditionally associated with military service will continue to be relatively low in comparison with postwar levels. Second, they suggest that competing claims on ecomomic and human resources will grow substantially as the percentage of the population that is sick, in retirement, or otherwise in need of care increases, resulting in fewer resources for defense and other national security-related needs. Indeed, the fact that the ratio of workers to non-workers will decline substantially is bound to aggravate Germany's other structural economic problems.

German National Predispositions Despite these noteworthy limitations, the resources available for German security policy have been and will continue to be substantial. Moreover, not all aspects of German policy have required large amounts of material, financial, or human assets. And even significant resource constraints can be overcome or offset when the political will to do so exists. Thus an equally if not more important domestic determinant of German security policy has been how the Germans are inclined to use the means that are actually or potentially at their disposal. More generally, what types of security policy are they predisposed to adopt and pursue? Following the framework presented in Chapter Two, such general national predispositions, where they exist, can have both institutional and ideational sources.

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Institutional Sources of German Security Policy Perhaps the most important institutional source of German national predispositions has been the German constitution or Basic Law (Grundgesetz). The Basic Law contains several provisions of potential relevance to the content of Gerinan security policy. 27 Article 26 declares as unconstitutional "any activities apt or intended to disturb peaceful international relations, especially preparations for military aggression." Article 87 authorizes the federal government to "establish Armed Forces for defence purposes" while offering the caveat that "other than for defence purposes the Armed Forces may only be employed to the extent explicitly permitted by this Basic Law." At the same time, Article 24 permits the government, "with a view to maintaining peace," to "become a party to a system of collective security; in doing so it shall consent to such limitations on its sovereign powers as will bring about and secure a peaceful and lasting order in Europe and among the nations of the world." Finally, Article 23, which was completely revised after unification, states that "with a view to establishing a united Europe the Federal Republic of Germany shall participate in the development of the European Union .... To this end the Federation may transfer sovereign powers by law with the consent of the Bundesrat." These articles have both placed constraints on and created opportunities for German security policy. Most obviously, they have prohibited German participation in wars of aggression and possibly a range of other possible uses of the Bundeswehr. At the same time, they have allowed, and even mandated in the case of the European Union (EU), deep German involvement in a wide range of existing or prospective international security institutions. Nevertheless, in most specific instances, the Basic Law has offered only extremely general guidelines for policy makers, and it has been silent on many important issues. Where it has seemed to offer more detailed guidance, especially the cryptic discussion in Article 87 of the purposes for which the Bundeswehr might be used, moreover, it has been subject to conflicting interpretations, as will be discussed in Chapter Eight. As national institutions, Germany's central governmental organs are even less likely to incline security policy clearly in one direction or another. A wide range of policies would have been compatible with the organizational structure and machinery of government. Far more important

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are likely to be the preferences of the individuals who occupy the positions of authority within the federal government. The principal exception to this rule concerns the limited capabilities of the Bundeswehr, which have greatly constrained Gern1any's ability to engage in a more active and geographically expansive security policy. Prior to unification, as discussed in Chapter Seven, the German armed forces were designed almost exclusively to defend German territory against a Warsaw Pact attack. Consequently, despite its relatively large size in terms of military personnel, the Bundeswehr was far less prepared than were the armed forces of Germany's major partners to participate in the defense of distant allies or in missions outside the NATO area when the Cold War ended. Although these deficiencies could be remedied relatively quickly through the appropriate targeting of defense resources and are gradually being overcome, they have nevertheless posed real limits on the policies that Germany has been able to pursue since 1990.

Ideational Sources: Germany's Postwar National Security Culture In view of the limited potential of Germany's national institutions to determine security policy, a more comprehensive and detailed source of national predispositions has been Germany's postwar political culture. German society as a whole, and German political elites in particular, can be characterized as possessing a distinctive, widely shared, and rather elaborate set of beliefs and values of potentially great relevance to national security policy, which were little altered by unification. The existence of this political culture has contributed to a high degree of consensus on security issues since 1990. 28 These attitudes were shaped primarily by two sets of historical experiences. The first was the traumatic and ultimately disastrous experience o~ the Nazi dictatorship and World War II. These events discredited much of Germany's previous political culture and increased German receptiveness to alternative beliefs and values, creating a situation in which a new political culture could take root. Also important was the generally successful and thus positive foreign policy experience of the postwar years, which reinforced the newly dominant political orientation that was • 29 emergmg. These experiences had a profound effect on the thinking of the first two postwar generations of German leaders, who either lived through the

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The Sources of German Security Policy

war or who grew up surrounded by the devastation it had wrought. The lessons drawn from them were deeply internalized and became accepted by a substantial majority of the German political elite. These attitudes have been passed on, moreover, to succeeding generations through formal education and informal processes of socialization.

German World Views and Identity. The logical starting point for an examination of German political culture insofar as it relates to security policy is with German world views. The contrast with the world views many Germans held earlier in this century could hardly be starker. Take, for example, German conceptions of the nature of international relations. Prior to the two world wars, many Germans subscribed to a crude form of Social Darwinism. 30 They regarded inter-state relations as an intensely competitive and unforgiving struggle for existence. In contrast, many German leaders today strongly believe in the possibility of cooperation among states and that most, if not all, international disputes can be resolved peacefully. 31 Thus during the weeks preceding the initiation of Operation Desert Storm in January 1991, they were among the foremost advocates of additional negotiations with Iraq, a stance that grew out of the conviction that a diplomatic solution could yet be found and further hostilities thereby avoided. 32 Also fundamentally altered have been Germans' views of their own country's status and proper place in the world. Previously, many Germans regarded their country as a great power that merited a substantial role in world affairs. Germans today, in contrast, tend to minimize their country's international importance. The dominant view is that, rather than act as a global power, Germany can and should limit its role largely to Europe. 33 Related to the change in Germany's self-image after World War II has been a profound redefinition of the German national identity. The powerful, even radical, nationalism that animated the country during the first half of the twentieth century was discredited by the war and has largely abated. 34 Although the lack of a German national consciousness has probably been exaggerated, German identity has been supplemented and even supplanted to a significant extent by two other sets of more transcendental loyalties. First, Germany, the former "land in the middle" that practiced a "seesaw" policy of playing its eastern and western neighbors off one another,

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has acquired a dominantly Western orientation. 35 Most Germans now strongly associate themselves with Western liberal democratic values and traditions. As former President Richard von Weizsacker has stated, "Germany has become a completely Western country and will fully remain so following unification." 36 Similarly, noted diplomatic correspondent Christoph Bertram has observed that German foreign ministry officials have grown accustomed to defining German interests mostly from the point of view of the entire West. 37 At a minimum, this Western identity has placed additional, internal constraints on possible German initiatives toward the east, which have consequently been limited to bringing the former Eastern bloc states either closer to or, ideally, into the West. At the same time, Germans have developed a European identity that transcends the purely national. They are inclined to see themselves as members of a larger European entity as well as of the German nationstate.38 As Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel has argued, "Germany's vital national interests continue to coincide with those of Europe as a whole." 39 And Chancellor Kohl has described Germany's European orientation as one of the foundations of German political culture. 40

Normative Guidelines and Causal Beliefs. Of most direct relevance to German security policy has been the normative component of German political culture. The experiences of the twentieth century have generated strong and relatively clear normative guidelines for Germany's external behavior, including both negative and positive injunctions, that are widely endorsed. The existence of these principled beliefs stands in sharp contrast to the virtual absence of normative constraints on German foreign policy prior to the two world wars. Perhaps the most striking lessons of Germany's recent past concern the military and the use of force. Since World War II, anti-militarism and even pacifism have acquired strong roots in Germany. 41 Well before unification took place, most Germans exhibited a "reluctance or, depending on the political camp, an open refusal to consider military means as a legitimate instrument of foreign policy."42 Indeed, a not insignificant number of Germans have been inclined to consider peace an absolute value, rejecting the use of force even for the purpose of safeguarding or restoring other transcendental political goals such as justice and international law, let alone for pursuing German national interests. 43 These normative views have been reinforced by shared causal beliefs

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The Sources of German Security Policy

about the utility of force. Germans have tended to see only the disadvantages and inefficacy of military action, viewing it as unlikely to be effective, risky, and even counterproductive. 44 Thus during the debate that preceded the beginning of Operation Desert Storm in 1991, "many German politicians spoke of the dangers of escalation and the potential costs of military conflict. ... To them, the risks and costs of using military force seemed to outweigh whatever potential benefits might be gained." 45 Consequently, it long ago became conventional wisdom that the fimctions of the Bundeswehr should be limited almost exclusively to national self-defense and that Germany should never again develop a significant power projection capability. 46 This highly restrictive view of Germany's military role, sometimes characterized as an "obliviousness to power,"47 has been little modified since unification. 48 Indeed, continued anti-militarism has been manifested in the broad concept of security that many Germans have espoused. 49 Instead, "Germany maintains a strong preference for economic, political, and diplomatic instruments, arms control, and dispute settlement as the preferred means of security policy." 50 As Kinkel has frequently stressed, Germany's contributions to the promotion and preservation of peace continue to be above all political and economic in nature. 51 Not surprisingly, non-military instruments have been widely seen as more effective than the use of force, a view that may even have been reinforced by the experience of unification. 52 Closely related to these attitudes toward the use of force have been deep-seated fears of the potentially pernicious domestic effects of militarism and a consequent distrust of military institutions. Many Germans have continued to be concerned about a possible renewal of military domination of national security decision making, as occurred during the time of the Prussian General Staff. Likewise, they have been wary of the emergence of a professional army that could once again become "a state within the state" largely unaccountable to political authorities, as took place during the interwar years. 53 Consequently, most Germans have felt that as long as the Federal Republic must maintain armed forces, they must be integrated into German society to the greatest possible extent. 54 A second important set of widely shared norms that are rooted in Germany's recent past has concerned the proper modes of German action in security affairs. Here, a leading imperative has been to avoid acting alone (Alleingiinge) or pursuing a special path (Sonderweg). Germans have ex-

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hibited a strong distaste for, even an abhorrence of, unilateralism. As one German commentator has put the matter, "the burden of the past rules out categorically and forever any idea of Germany going it alone. . .. The new Germany's flexibility for action ... is paralysed by memories of the past." 55 Such sentiments have been expressed by virtually all German political leaders. 56 This norm as well has been reinforced by commonly held cause-effect beliefs. German leaders have feared the consequences of unilateralism, believing that it can lead only to diplomatic isolation, insecurity, and conflict. As von Weizsacker has argued, "we would be the ones to suffer the most if we were to relapse into a nationalistic approach." 57 Putting the matter in a more positive light, Chancellor Kohl has frequently noted that no European country can ensure peace and freedom, economic prosperity, and social stability on its own. 58 The previous German penchant for nationalism and unilateralism has been supplanted by a degree of support for international cooperation and even integration, involving the sacrifice of national prerogatives, that is unparalleled. German leaders have greatly preferred pursuing Germany's security interests in close cooperation with other countries over acting alone. 59 As Kinkel told the UN General Assembly in September 1995, "the fundamental principle of German foreign policy ... is to give priority to multilateral cooperation."60 Indeed, he remarked on another occasion, "Germany's aim is to integrate with others and to merge our interests with theirs. Our intention not to pursue a separate national course represents the basic consensus inherent in German foreign policy."61 To be sure, multilateralism and integration have also been viewed as serving concrete German interests. 62 They are useful for reassuring Germany's neighbors, they prevent a return to national rivalries, and they are essential for avoiding diplomatic isolation and future conflicts. 63 In addition, they may be the only way to address many security concerns. As Chancellor Kohl has stated, "in the future as well, Germany will be able to meet the security policy challenges only in close cooperation with its friends and partners."64 But multilateralism has not been just instrumental. For many German leaders, it has become a leading goal in and of itself.65 Or as noted commentator Josef Joffe once put the matter, multilateralism has virtually become an unwritten constitutional principle. 66 A direct corollary of German multilateralism is the importance German political elites have attached to international institutions. German

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leaders have constantly emphasized the need for Germany to work through and to be anchored firmly within the structures of international cooperation, be they transatlantic, West European, pan-European, or global. 67 As two observers have noted, the debate in Germany has "centered not on whether Germany ought to act through institutions, but on which ones should be employed and whether any adjustments in their structure and/or brief were required."68 Indeed, it may not be too much of an exaggeration to state that "Germany sees the strengthening of institutions in Europe and worldwide as the primary objective of its foreign policy."69 At the same time, German leaders have been strongly inclined to abide by the rules that these institutions often embody. This approach, which served Germany so well during the postwar era, has been viewed as being of continued relevance to German security policy for the indefinite future. 70 Also related to the German commitment to multilateralism and international institutions has been the tremendous importance that German leaders have attached to Berechenbarkeit, or calculability, in foreign policy.71 They have been anxious for their country to be perceived as a reliable, predictable, dependable partner, a concern that they frequently and openly articulate. As Kinkel has said, "there must be no doubt of our reliability and calculability." 72 Similarly, the platform adopted by the opposition Social Democratic Party (SPD) in November 1993 stated that "in international politics, Germany must be a reliable partner that shows solidarity."73 Indeed, one commentator has described the Germans as "obsessed with predictability." 74 This imperative "has created a presumption against any government reneging upon, let alone renouncing, the basic substance of established foreign-policy commitments."75 Not to fulfill Germany's international obligations and responsibilities would undermine the country's credibility in the eyes of its partners. Thus stability and continuity in German security policy have become leading normative guidelines in their own right. Finally, most German political leaders have been reluctant to see their country assume a strong leadership role in international affairs, especially security affairs, even within multinational institutions. 76 As Chancellor Kohl once said, "the Germans should not be the first to stick their necks out. One will not be overlooked even if one remains a bit more in the background."77 Likewise, the German public has instinctively rejected a great power role. 78

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Instead, German leaders have preferred to proceed cautiously on the world stage and to maintain a low profile. They have been content to let others, such as the United States, lead while Germany works behind the scenes. 79 Thus, for example, "the notion of Germany assuming primary responsibility for managing change in Eastern Europe is still an alien one." 80 Although this posture has stemmed in part from a belief that such a role would not be accepted by Germany's neighbors, it has also reflected a profound disinclination toward assertiveness in security affairs, which German leaders have termed the "culture of reticence" (Kultur der Zuriickhaltung). 81 Possible Changes in German National Security Culture. Of course, as discussed in Chapter Two, a nation's political culture is not irrevocably fixed. It may change gradually over time and even, on rare occasions, sharply. Thus one should be alert to possible disjunctures in Germany's national security culture as a result of the momentous events of recent years. In particular, some observers have wondered whether the sudden incorporation of 16 million former East Germans into the Federal Republic might have a significant impact on German political culture and, by extension, German security policy. Certainly, eastern and western German views on a variety of core security issues have been marked by notable differences, especially in the first years after unification. For example, the level of support for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a continued U.S. troop presence, and American nuclear weapons was initially much lower in the eastern part of the country. 82 In addition, eastern Germans have shown relatively more interest in having Germany play greater role in Eastern Europe. 83 The significance of these differences should not be exaggerated, however. Former East Germans constitute only 20 percent of the population of united Germany, and their actual influence on security policy has been and is likely to be disproportionately smaller, at least in the medium term. Instead, "responsibility for foreign and security policy issues remains largely in the hands of a West German elite." 84 For the time being, moreover, eastern Germans have shown relatively little interest in matters of national security, since, on the whole, they have been "more concerned with everyday issues."85 Finally, eastern German views on security issues may be somewhat more malleable and thus likely to be reshaped along western lines, given that they are largely the product of 40 years of com-

a

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The Sources of German Security Policy

munist propaganda. 86 Thus unification has had and is likely to have little impact on those aspects of German political culture of relevance to national security policy. 87 Another possible shift in German political culture is suggested by the considerable emphasis that many German leaders have recently placed on having Germany assume greater regional and global responsibility, especially with regard to the defense of peace and intemationallaw. 88 This increased responsibility has followed, in their view, from a combination of Germany's past behavior and its heightened international political significance following unification. Such a move has been regarded, moreover, as necessary for preserving Germany's credibility and reputation for reliability.89 What this new responsibility has meant in concrete policy terms, however, has often been left unspecified. But it is unlikely to conflict with the existing normative guidelines contained in German national security culture, since its fulfillment is almost certain to be sought in the context of collective efforts and multilateral fora, with priority being given to diplomacy and other non-military instruments. 90 Finally, the recent remarks of some political leaders have suggested a greater willingness to sanction the use of armed force. In some cases, they have increasingly acknowledged, diplomacy and other non-military instruments will not suffice to settle conflicts or to stop aggression. Instead, diplomatic efforts must be backed by the threat of force, which may have to be employed if all other means fail. 91 As Kinkel has pointed out on more than one occasion, military power was required to put an end to the Hitler regime. 92 At the same time, however, German leaders have been quick to stress that the use of force is fraught with risk and must remain a last resort. In the words of President Roman Herzog, "military interventions are not a panacea and they must not take the foreground in our thinking." 93 Instead, in their view, peaceful solutions to conflict must continue to have first . . 94 pnonty.

Implications for German Security Policy. Germany's distinctive and rather well-defined postwar political culture has had important implications for German security policy after unification. In the first place, it has formed the basis for a high degree of consensus on many basic aspects of German policy among elites located across most of the political spectrum.95 Indeed, opposition leaders have openly and frequently expressed

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their satisfaction with the fundamental orientation of German foreign policy. 96 At a minimum, this broad consensus has limited the potential impact on German policy of possible changes of government. Second, the specific content of Germany's political culture has promoted continuity and restraint in German security policy. In particular, it has greatly limited the country's potential for unilateral, assertive, and, especially, aggressive behavior. Instead, it has mandated that Germany continue to devise and execute its security policy almost entirely in cooperation with others and within the context of international security institutions. At the same time, German leaders have been strongly inclined to respect the injunctions contained in such institutions. In both of these ways, Germany's political culture has enabled international security institutions to exercise considerable influence over German policy. Indeed, continuity and restraint have been the hallmarks of the crossparty elite consensus on security policy. 97 This consensus has included a desire for close ties with the United States, strong backing for NATO and a continued American military presence in Europe, support for further European integration, and the conviction that Germany must remain firmly anchored in the West even as it reaches out to the east. In addition, there has been agreement that German forces should remain integrated in NATO and possibly other multinational European security structures and that their deployment and use outside the NATO area can only take place in a multinational context. 98

The German Security Policy Process The existence of a broad consensus on security policy rooted in a welldefined political culture may not preclude significant differences of opinion on some specific issues. Indeed, German political elites have held contrasting views on several policy questions. For example, although most German leaders have attached a high value to participation in international security institutions in principle, they have sometimes disagreed, even within the governing coalition, over which institutions to stress in practice. Since the end of the Cold War, they have pushed, at different times but occasionally simultaneously, in three directions. One group, usually associated with former Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, has placed particular emphasis on creating and strengthening pan-European institutions, notably the Conference on (now Organization for) Se-

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curity and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Others, led by Chancellor Kohl, have pressed especially hard for expanding the competence and capabilities of the European Union and the Western European Union (WEU) in the security realm. And yet others have remained primarily Atlanticist in their orientation, emphasizing the continuing importance of security ties to the United States and NAT0. 99 Another noteworthy area of disagreement has concerned the Bundeswehr. As discussed in Chapter Seven, German leaders have been somewhat divided over the appropriate size and structure of the German armed forces in the post-Cold War environment as well as the importance of maintaining conscription (Wehrpflicht). In this case, however, the principal fault lines have lain between the government and the opposition. Most divisive of all has been the question of the use of the Bundeswehr outside the NATO area. German leaders have disagreed sharply over both the types of out-of-area military missions in which Germany should be willing to participate and whether any such actions were permissible under the Basic Law. On these issues, both the government and the opposition have been deeply divided at times. The implications of such differences for German security policy have depended to varying degrees on how policy is made. In theory, the existence of conflicting preferences could herald future changes in German security policy as a result of coalition changes and other political realignments. So far, however, the potential for sharp departures has been limited by several features of the policy process. Thus the process has reinforced the tendency toward continuity and restraint in German policy fostered by Germany's national security culture. This final section describes both the formal institutional structures and the informal norms of German security policy making as well as the German electoral system, which strongly determines how policy-making positions are filled. 100

Policy-Making Structures The German policy process operates at various times and to varying degrees within three principal organizational structures: the federal executive, the federal legislature, and the Federal Constitutional Court. Of these, it is the executive branch (Bundesregierung) of the federal government that plays the most important role in all aspects of German security policy making. 101 Policy initiatives almost always originate in the

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federal executive, and many important security issues are decided within the executive arena with little or no parliamentary involvement. Within the Bundesregierung, the central figure is the chancellor. Although weaker than those of the American president, the powers of the chancellor exceed those of prime ministers in parliamentary systems where cabinet responsibility is shared, as in Britain. Under Article 65 of the Basic Law, the chancellor has the power to organize the executive branch and to determine the general guidelines of government policy (Richtlinienkompetenz). He also appoints cabinet ministers, who are responsible to the chancellor rather than to the parliament, and may dismiss them, although dismissals have been extremely rare. The powers of the chancellor are far from absolute, however. First, all proposals submitted to the legislature must pass through and receive the approval of the cabinet as a whole, which is expected to function as a collective decision-making body. Second, in coalition governments, the chancellor has no influence over appointments to the ministerial posts allotted to the coalition partner, and he can dismiss those appointees only at the risk of provoking a governmental crisis. Third, the ministers, even those from the chancellor's own party, possess a significant degree of autonomy. Article 65 also states that within the chancellor's guidelines, "each Federal Minister shall run his department independently and on his own responsibilitiy." Thus, the chancellor is barred from immersing himself in the day-to-day affairs of a department and from bypassing a minister by issuing direct instructions to his subordinates. 102 Instead, his role on most policy matters is largely limited to reacting to proposals that are formulated and submitted by the ministers. While laboring under these constraints, the chancellor can nevertheless wield considerable influence. He is the ultimate arbiter of decisions within the cabinet, and he can weigh in on issues of particular concern to him when they reach the cabinet level. In addition, only the chancellor can set priorities among policies. And he possesses substantial bureaucratic resources within the Chancellor's Office (Kanzleramt) for monitoring and coordinating the work of the ministries and, occasionally, generating policy initiatives independently of them. Indeed, the Chancellor's Office plays a central role in structuring the governmental decision-making process, determining when and the form in which matters are considered by the cabinet.

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The two ministries with the greatest responsibility for German security affairs are the Foreign Ministry (Auswartiges Amt) and the Defense Ministry (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung). The Foreign Ministry enjoys the lead role in most aspects of security policy making. It is responsible for conducting bilateral relations with other countries and for orchestrating German activities within multilateral fora. The Defense Ministry, in contrast, is primarily responsible only for matters concerning the Bundeswehr. Thus, formally, the Defense Ministry plays only a relatively small part in the security policy process, especially in comparison with its American counterpart. This reflects in large part the relatively restricted role of the Bundeswehr as an instrument of German security policy. Nevertheless, there is some functional overlap between the two ministries, especially on questions with direct military implications, such as arms control, and in these areas, both maintain analytical staffs, and considerable policy coordination takes place between them. In practice, moreover, the influence of the Defense Ministry has at times been considerably enhanced by the presence of an assertive, energetic, or bureaucratically adept Defense Minister, as has been the case under Volker Riihe's leadership. The German military itself has a very limited role in shaping security policy. The postwar organizational structure of the government and the Defense Ministry were designed to ensure tight civilian control. Nevertheless, the Defense Minister has only a small civilian staff and must rely heavily on the military for advice. Indeed, the principal responsibility of the highest ranking military officer, the Chief of Staff (Generalinspeckteur) of the Bundeswehr, is to serve as "military adviser to the Minister and the Federal Govemment." 103 A third department with a significant voice in security policy is the Finance Ministry. Most security policy matters lie outside of its competence, but when they have budgetary implications, the Finance Ministry exercises important and often decisive influence. Indeed, the Finance Minister can veto all legislative proposals that exceed the government's budget. 104 Occasionally, important policy decisions are made within the Federal Security Council, which is a cabinet committee with responsibility for defense and security affairs. Members of the committee include the chancellor and the Foreign, Defense, and Finance ministers. In addition, the Generalinspekteur participates as a non-voting member. 105

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In Germany, the federal legislature consists of two institutions. The parliament (Bundestag) is the principal legislative body. The federal council (Bundesrat) represents the Lander at the federal level on issues that concern them. These bodies, but especially the Bundesrat, are involved only irregularly in the security policy process, and they have much less influence over policy than does the federal executive. 106 The Bundestag has three principal formal responsibilities of relevance to national security affairs in peacetime. 107 First, it must approve the federal budget each year. Second, it must ratify treaties. Third, according to a ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court in July 1994, it must approve all deployments of the Bundeswehr for purposes other than humanitarian assistance and the defense of Germany and its allies. Despite these important powers, the effective independent influence of the Bundestag is greatly limited by the fact that most legislative matters can be decided by a simple majority and that the federal executive, as in other parliamentary systems, can almost always count on having a majority within the Bundestag. Even where a majority in the Bundesrat opposes a piece of legislation, its veto can be overridden by a simple majority in the Bundestag on matters such as defense that are not directly related to the responsibilities of the states. Thus the federal legislature is very unlikely to block policy initiatives coming from the federal executive. One exception to this situation of limited parliamentary influence over security policy concerns those infrequent matters that involve a revision of the Basic Law, which may be difficult to effect. In the event that a desired policy initiative requires a constitutional amendment, the government must secure a two-thirds majority in both the Bundestag and the Bundesrat. This is clearly not an insuperable obstacle, since the Basic Law has been altered far more frequently than has the U.S. Constitution.108 But in instances where the government and opposition are divided, a two-thirds majority is usually unattainable, and the former must compromise with the latter if it is to achieve even a portion of its objectives. Thus where the Basic Law is directly relevant to an aspect of security policy, this requirement may constrain sharp departures in policy, as will be shown in Chapter Eight on the debate over out-of-area missions for the Bundeswehr. The final federal body that may occasionally exert influence over German security policy is the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesver-

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fassungsgericht). The Court is assigned no formal role in the policy process. But it does have a broad mandate to resolve political disputes that revolve around interpretations of the constitution. 109 Although such cases are infrequent in the area of security policy, the Court did play a decisive role in resolving the out-of-area debate.

Procedural Norms In additional to the formal structures of the policy process, the content of German security policy may also be influenced by informal procedural norms, although these owe their significance in turn to the dispersion of policy-making authority within the cabinet and the rules for amending the constitution. One important norm is that of party discipline. Once the party position on a policy issue has been defined, party members, including those who hold high government or party positions, are expected to toe the party line, even as they may work within the party to modify positions with which they disagree. Party discipline is relaxed to allow members to vote their conscience only rarely and in exceptional circumstances. 110 Party discipline tends to promote continuity in policy in two ways. First, it helps to ensure the government, as long as it remains unified, of the support of a majority in the Bundestag at all times. Parliamentary majorities are highly stable and predictable. 111 Second, party discipline also reduces the impact of strong individuals and personnel changes on the policy process. Since unification, turnover has occurred in several key leadership positions. In April 1992, the Minister of Defense portfolio passed from Gerhard Stoltenberg, who resigned, to Volker Rtihe, both of whom belonged to the Christian Democratic Union (CDU). And the following month, Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who had held that position since 1974, stepped down and was replaced by fellow Free Democrat Klaus Kinkel. While new leaders may seek to put their personal stamp on the party platform, their reluctance to break sharply and openly with existing positions limits the potential consequences of personnel changes for policy in the short to medium term. A second important norm of the German policy process, one which is rooted in Germany political culture, is the emphasis that is placed on solidarity and consensus-building. As numerous students of the German political system have observed, German leaders have a distinct aversion to conflict and seek to avoid fundamental confrontation. Instead, they prefer to try to develop a consensus among competing interests through a

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process of dialogue and compromise. 112 This tendency, although useful for ensuring that policies have the widest possible support, necessarily slows down the process and militates against bold initiatives and sharp departures from the status quo.

The German Electoral System Given the considerable influence of a relatively small number of policy-making positions, especially those located in the federal executive, it is important to consider how those key positions are filled. In fact, the German electoral system, which consists of proportional representation modified by the requirement that a party must receive at least 5 percent of the vote in most cases in order to gain representation in the Bundestag, has a significant impact in this regard and thus, indirectly, on policy outcomes themselves. The German electoral system exerts a moderating influence on German security policy, as well as all other aspects of policy, in three ways. First, it prevents rapid swings in the composition of the Bundestag and thus reduces the likelihood of changes in government. The three principal governing coalitions of the Federal Republic have served in office for an average of 14 years. Second, it has encouraged the growth of large, "catch-all" parties that must compete for votes primarily in the middle of the political spectrum. As a result, both of the major parties, the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union 113 and the Social Democratic Party, have developed strong centrist wings, and the extremes of the political spectrum are of relatively little electoral significance. This situation tends to reinforce the broad consensus on security policy issues that is rooted in German political culture and thus minimizes the policy consequences of changes of government when they do occur. 114 Third, proportional representation helps to prevent a single party from dominating the policy process. In part because of Germany's electoral system, only once (1957-61) has a single German party enjoyed an absolute majority in the Bundestag. Consequently, the two major parties have routinely had to govern in cooperation with at least one small party. Usually, the coalition partner has been the centrist Free Democratic Party (FDP), which has held the influential position of Foreign Minister since 1969. In order to stay in power, the dominant party has regularly had to compromise with the FDP on foreign and security policy issues, which has further tended to pull German policy toward the center. 115 And in ex-

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ceptional circumstances, as during the CDU/CSU-SPD Grand Coalition of 1966--69, the major parties may choose to work with each other, forcing them to suppress their policy differences. This system of government by coalition acts as a further brake on major initiatives and encourages incremental policy change. 116 In sum, the various features of the policy process impose numerous additional constraints, making radical and sudden policy changes more difficult, if not impossible, to effect. Indeed, these constraints have been judged by one leading student of German politics as even greater in the area of foreign and security policy than in the domestic arena for most of the postwar era. 117 This chapter has discussed several potentially important domestic sources of German security policy since 1990. German policy makers have faced significant resource constraints as a result of the unexpectedly high costs of unification and Germany's long-term structural economic problems. In addition, Germany has possessed a well-defined national security culture that has been a source of rather distinct national predispositions with regard to security issues. Finally, the features of the German policy process suggest that it can shape outcomes in those areas where German political elites are not of one mind. The remainder of this book seeks to assess the actual degree of impact that such domestic factors, as well as the potentially important international factors identified in Chapter Three, have had on the national security policy of unified Germany.

PART TWO

Major Issues in German Security Policy After Unification

Introduction Part One identified and described those international and domestic factors that are likely to be the most important determinants of German security policy after unification. Part Two examines the influence and interplay of these factors in the actual shaping of German security policy since 1990. The purpose of this introduction is to distinguish the principal components of German security policy. Most of Germany's security policy-related activities have fallen into four categories: (1) Germany's efforts to shape its external security environment so as to make it less threatening; (2) its actions intended to preserve, adapt, and strengthen Europe's security institutions in order to make them more capable of addressing possible threats and of preventing the emergence of new ones; (3) the transformation of the German armed forces to conform better to the requirements of the post-Cold War security environment; and (4) actual German responses to international crises and conflicts and the parallel debate over the constitutionality and desirability of German participation in military operations outside the NATO area.

How Germans Think About Security Since unification, German political leaders have tended to employ a broad concept of security, one that includes political, economic, social, and ecological as well as military dimensions. Such expansive definitions gained prominence in the 1980s on the left side of the political spectrum, among members of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Greens. Representative of this thinking is the comprehensive security concept developed by the SPD in the aftermath of unification:

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Major Issues in German Security Policy [Security] includes ecological and economic stability, social justice, selfsustaining development, peaceful resolution of social, ethnic, and religious conflict, the containment of mass migrations by addressing the causes, and protection against international organized crime.... Security can exist only on the basis of political, economic, social, and ecological cooperation, that is, as cooperative security leading to comprehensive, non-military conflict prevention and resolution, so that the military dimension becomes less important.1

These views have been expressed routinely by leading SPD politicians, such as Rudolf Scharping, the party's chancellor candidate in 1994, and Hans-Ulrich Klose, the head of the SPD parliamentary group in the Bundestag. As the latter has succinctly noted, "security is not just a military problem."2 Since unification, however, leading members of the governing parties, the conservative Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) and centrist Free Democratic Party (FDP), have increasingly articulated similar conceptions. As Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the CDU stated in 1993, We must base our efforts on a broad concept of security. Between domestic political, economic, and social stability and international stability exists an indissoluble link. To the threats to international stability belong poverty, hunger, destruction of the environment, and international criminality as well as uncontrolled armament. 3

Likewise, the FDP's Klaus Kinkel, Foreign Minister since 1992, has remarked: Security is more than the absence of military threat. Economic dislocation, nuclear disaster-civilian or military-large-scale migration and organized international crime pose new threats. We need a comprehensive approach to security which combines economic, political, and military elements. 4

In other statements, Kinkel and other government officials have noted that security has social, cultural, and ecological dimensions as well. 5 German officials have even given this comprehensive approach to security a name: extended security. This concept assigns priority to solving conflicts by political means. It also attaches considerable importance to preventing crises and conflicts from arising in the first place and, should they occur anyway, from attaining a military dimension. 6 Whether expressed by members of the government or of the opposi-

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tion, these broad conceptions of security have reflected in part Germany's altered strategic circumstances. Since unification, cross-border military threats of a traditional nature have been far fewer and much more remote. As a result, in the view of German political leaders, much less attention has needed to be devoted to precautionary military preparations than was the case during the Cold War.

Central Issues in German Security Policy Nevertheless, these broad conceptions of security are somewhat misleading. Many Germans have recognized that military power will continue to play an important role in shaping European and world affairs and thus must remain an important concern of German security policy. 7 Indeed, at its core, German security policy has continued to be ultimately concerned with violence, the use of force, and their possible consequences. It has sought to address not only actual or potential direct military threats to Germany but also militarized conflicts that, while posing no direct threat, could nevertheless adversely affect German interests and other situations that require Germany to maintain and possibly to use armed forces. With this common denominator in mind, we may identify four main sets of security concerns that have been the object of German policy since unification. Although they have varied widely in their likelihood, immediacy, and potential significance, all four have revolved around the risks to Germany posed by the possibility of intra- or inter-state violence and thus have had actual or potential military dimensions. One focus of concern has been the possible reemergence of direct military threats to Germany in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union as well as the emergence of new threats in more distant regions as a result of the spread of military technology. Another has been militarized conflicts within Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union that have the potential to generate large flows of war refugees, to spill over onto the territory of neighboring countries, and even to expand as a result of outside intervention. A third has involved hostilities in more distant regions that could nevertheless result in economic dislocation at home, widespread human rights abuses, or the erosion of international law and other accepted norms. Most remote of all but of potentially the greatest significance has been the possibility of an increase in tension and a breakdown of coop-

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eration between Germany and its Western partners, which could in the long term lead to renewed national rivalry and even military conflict among them. Germany's efforts to address these security concerns can be logically divided into four broad categories, which are the subjects of the chapters in Part Two. Into the first category fall Germany's efforts to shape and moderate its external security environment. Germany has not passively accepted this environment as a given and then responded to threats as they have arisen. Rather, as analyzed in Chapter Five, it has actively sought to ameliorate existing threats and to forestall the emergence of new ones. 8 Closely related to these activities has been German policy toward regional security institutions. Like the external environment, such institutions may be not only influences on but also objects of national policy. Thus a second important thrust of Germany's security policy after unification, the subject of Chapter Six, has been its efforts to maintain and to strengthen Europe's leading post-Cold War security institutions: the Conference on (now Organization for) Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the several elements of an emerging (West) European security and defense identity. Indeed, Germany has played a leading role in the further development and adaptation of all three of these sets of institutions to fit the circumstances of post-Cold War Europe. Armed forces constitute a central component of the security policy of all major powers, even after the Cold War, and Germany has been no exception. As Kinkel has argued, The old logic of deterrence also applies to the effectiveness of preventive diplomacy. Crossing the threshold toward the use of force is prevented most easily if the aggressor must expect the use of superior force in return. In other words, in order not to have to fight, one must be able to fight. In addition, after the end of the East-West conflict, peace cannot be assured lastingly without the possibility of using armed forces if necessary. Therefore, we continue to need functioning and democratically anchored armed forces. They are an indispensable element of a policy of preventive security.9 Appropriately, Chapter Seven examines the major issues in the evolution of German policy for the Bundeswehr since 1990: the basic purposes of the German armed forces after the Cold War, their overall size and how they should be structured and equipped, and the degree to which they

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should continue to rely on conscription, which has been a cornerstone of German military policy since rearmament began in the mid-1950s. Even the most successful preventive security policy is unlikely to be able to avert all international crises and conflicts. Accordingly, Chapter Eight analyzes how unifed Germany has actually responded to such developments. Since 1990, Germany has repeatedly been confronted with difficult decisions regarding the appropriate response to hostilities occurring outside its territory and that of its NATO allies. Indeed, the first of these conflicts, the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War, erupted even before the process of political unification had been formally completed, while fighting took place almost continuously in the former Yugoslavia between mid-1991 and late 1995. These conflicts triggered a more general debate over the conditions under which and the purposes for which, if any, German forces might be used outside of the NATO area. During the Cold War, this question almost never arose. Both West Germany and its alliance partners were largely content to have the Federal Republic focus its military efforts on deterring and defending against attacks directed at Germany and neighboring allies. 10 Since unification, however, Germany has been under increasing pressure to contribute to international peacekeeping and peacemaking efforts, forcing a divisive reconsideration of its former policy of abstention from such activities.

CHAPTER FIVE

Shaping the External Security Environment Naturally, we will continue to exploit all diplomatic means to prevent a new military threat to our country from arising. -Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel

German security policy has contained an important proactive dimension since at least the late 1960s, when the Federal Republic jettisoned its initially obdurate stance toward the Soviet bloc and adopted instead a strategy of cooperation and reconciliation with the East, which became known as Ostpolitik. In the words of its leading architect, former Chancellor Willy Brandt, this new approach sought "to relieve and improve the external circumstances of the divided Germany and the people in it whenever the opportunity arose." 1 Through Ostpolitik, West Germany essentially accepted the postwar territorial status quo in order to ameliorate East-West political and ideological antagonisms and thereby gradually to establish the preconditions for eventually overcoming Germany's division. Unification marked the ultimate success of Ostpolitik, but it did not spell the end of German efforts to shape the external security environment. Indeed, and consistent with the emphasis on preventive action in the new security concepts that Germans have articulated, this dimension of German security policy has achieved even greater salience since 1990. Germany has sought to ameliorate existing threats and to forestall the emergence of new ones in two broad ways. First, Germany has attempted to limit the military capabilities that could possibly be directed against it or otherwise used to destabilize the continent by placing constraints on the existing military capabilities of potential adversaries and preventing potentially hostile states from acquiring weapons that might pose a threat. To this end, it has been a leading proponent of arms control measures of

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all types, it has worked hard to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and it has enacted particularly stringent export controls. Second, and more fundamentally, unified Germany has made great efforts to influence the future intentions of nearby states. German policy has been aimed at preventing the reemergence of potentially hostile regimes and fostering friendly relations with its eastern neighbors in order to make them more favorably disposed toward Germany. More generally, Bonn has tried to promote stability in neighboring countries that have been susceptible to internal disorder and conflict, which might spill over, draw in other powers, or generate large outflows of migrants and refugees. Germany has sought to achieve this second set of objectives primarily by promoting political and economic reform (e.g., democracy, rule of law, market economies, and respect for human and minority rights) in the former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the successor states of the Soviet Union. To do so, it has provided large amounts of financial and economic assistance and, increasingly, worked to draw those states into Western political and economic institutions. A related German strategy has been to enhance the security of reform states in Central and Eastern Europe with respect to possible external threats. Although these German efforts to moderate the external security environment have met with considerable success, progress has sometimes been slow and difficult, and the long-term outlook for some critical factors, especially the future political orientation of Russia, has remained uncertain. This mixed record is due in no small part to the magnitude of the challenges involved, but it also reflects the limitations of Germany's own capacities to effect change. In addition, sharp conflicts have emerged between some policy goals, forcing Germany to limit the means and vigor with which it has pursued them.

Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Perhaps even more than during the last two decades of the Cold War, the promotion of arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation has constituted a central objective of German security policy since unification. 2 Germany has been one of the most vocal proponents of restrictions on and the elimination of both conventional forces and weapons of mass destruction, at both the regional and the global levels. Its efforts, more-

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over, have contributed materially to the formulation, ratification, and observance of a variety of important international agreements, including those governing conventional forces in Europe and strategic nuclear arms, the Treaty on Nuclear Non-Proliferation, and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. 3 Germany's strong interest in arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation has flowed naturally from its unique geopolitical circumstances.4 In addition, Germany has sought to exploit the unique opportunities to establish a new European peace order that were presented by the end of the Cold War. And if those reasons were not sufficient to make arms control a high priority, considerable additional impetus was provided by the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which threatened to result in new military dangers. The Soviet collapse created uncertainty about whether the Soviet Union's powerful arsenal of nuclear and chemical weapons would remain under secure control. It also raised deep concerns in Germany that Soviet nuclear expertise and the technology and materials required to produce nuclear weapons might find their way into the hands of third parties, especially rogue states in the Third World. 5 As an official German study noted, "the danger of an unbridled proliferation of these weapons and the materials, equipment, and knowledge necessary for their manufacture suddenly became real. " 6

Conventional Arms Control In the area of conventional arms control, Germany has pursued two main objectives. First, it doggedly sought to secure the prompt ratification and unqualified implementation of the' Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, which was signed in late 1990. German leaders have regarded the treaty as one of the most important components of the new European security architecture and a stimulus for the development of additional arms control measures as well as a vital source of contractual controls over the military potential of the former Soviet Union. 7 As evidence of the importance that it attached to the treaty, the German government fulfilled its CFE obligations six months ahead of schedule, even though it was required to destroy far more major weapons systems (approximately 8,600) than any other country but Russia. 8 In 1991, achievement of this goal appeared to be seriously jeopardized by the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which greatly complicated the task of putting the treaty into force even as it made implementation of the

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CFE provisions seem even more urgent. Consequently, Germany officials made repeated pleas to the Soviet successor states to ratify the treaty by mid-1992, when the next follow-up meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was scheduled to be convened in Helsinki, and they even threatened to make aid to the former Soviet republics conditional on their adherence to the arms control agreements that the Soviet Union had signed. 9 Once the treaty had been ratified and entered into force, German officials insisted that its provisions be implemented to the letter. In particular, they strongly resisted Russia's repeated requests, beginning in late 1993, to lift the subceiling on the number of forces that could be stationed on its southern flank. They feared that any exceptions, no matter how well justified, would jeopardize the treaty's integrity and encourage other demands for waivers. In their view, any necessary adjustments would have to await the review conference planned for 1996. 10 Germany's second principal goal in the area of conventional arms control was a follow-on agreement to the CFE treaty that would establish limits on troop strength for all countries in the region. 11 Interest in such an accord stemmed from the fact that Germany alone was bound by personnel restrictions as a result of the commitments it had made during the unification process and did not wish to remain singularized in that respect. It too, however, was heightened by the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the resulting fear that competitive arms buildups might ensue among the successor states. Thus German leaders successfully pressed for the signing of an agreement by the time of the CSCE Helsinki meeting in July 1992. 12

Nuclear Arms Control Despite, or perhaps because of, its non-nuclear status, Germany has also strongly promoted nuclear arms control since unification. These efforts have been concentrated in two areas. Immediately after unification, German leaders repeatedly called for the rapid removal of all short-range nuclear-armed missiles and nuclear artillery shells in the European theater. Following the end of the Cold War, they held, such weapons could no longer serve any meaningful military or political purpose. 13 These appeals were renewed with even greater urgency in the wake of the failed Soviet coup of August 1991, which raised the troubling prospect of a loss of centralized control over such weapons. 14

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This objective was largely achieved by the parallel unilateral initiatives undertaken by the United States and the Soviet Union in the fall of 1991 to reduce their tactical nuclear arsenals greatly. Nevertheless, German leaders were not entirely satisfied with this outcome. They would have preferred a negotiated arms control regime that contained provisions for verification, even if it took longer to achieve. In their view, a negotiated regime would have made it easier to obtain information about the disposition of Soviet nuclear weapons and to legitimize the continued presence in Germany of an allied air-based nuclear component. 15 The other way in which Germany has been active in the nuclear arms control arena has been through its efforts to ensure the implementation of the START I Treaty by the Soviet successor states. Most importantly, it has provided assistance to Russia for the dismantlement of strategic nuclear weapons that were scheduled to be eliminated under the terms of the accord. In both 1993 and 1994, Germany spent approximately DM 5 million for this purpose, much of it in the form of specialized equipment for the handling and transportation of dangerous nuclear materials. 16 Germany offered similar assistance to Ukraine, which was required to give up all of the strategic nuclear weapons that it had inherited from the Soviet Union. Because of initial divisions among Ukrainian leaders over whether to foreswear a nuclear capability, however, the first concrete German-Ukrainian cooperation agreement was not signed until late 1994. 17

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Parallel to their eagerness to see that the Soviet successor states implemented the START I agreement, German officials have also been anxious to control the heightened risk of nuclear proliferation occasioned by the breakup of the Soviet Union. To be sure, they have viewed these issues as linked, since the destruction of former Soviet weapons would simultaneously reduce the danger of unauthorized transfers to other states. 18 Nevertheless, they have seen additional measures as necessary to prevent the dispersal of nuclear materials, technology, and know-how with which third parties might be able to construct weapons. In this regard, Germany has sought to counter the danger of proliferation primarily by developing attractive alternative employment opportunities for nuclear weapons experts who lost their jobs as a result of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. As early as January 1992, top German

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officials voiced the need for some form of Western financial assistance for that purpose and opened talks with the United States on the subject. 19 And the following month, it was Germany along with Russia and the United States that announced plans to establish an International Science and Technology Center that would support nuclear scientists and engineers from the former Soviet Union in order to "minimize incentives to participate in proliferation activities. " 20 This largely German initiative culminated in a November 1992 agreement, according to which the United States, Japan, and the European Community would jointly provide $75 million to finance the proposed center. 21 Germany's concern about the proliferation risks stemming from the breakup of the Soviet Union has been part and parcel of its strong stance against proliferation in general. Indeed, a government spokesman once described this as "the most urgent objective of our disarmament policy." 22 To this end, German leaders made the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty on Nuclear Non-Proliferation (NPT), which was scheduled to be reviewed in 1995, a top priority. 23 From their perspective, the NPT had become more indispensable than ever, given the new postCold War dangers of nuclear smuggling, nuclear terrorism, and the possible use of nuclear weapons in internal conflicts. In addition, they believed that non-signatory threshold powers could be more easily persuaded to join the treaty if it were extended indefinitely, while a limited extension would cause the treaty to crumble when it expired. Finally, Germany did not want to remain isolated as the only state to have unilaterally and bindingly renounced nuclear weapons. 24 Consequently, Germany went to great lengths to ensure that the NPT review conference would be a success. Prior to the meeting, German diplomats crisscrossed the globe, lobbying key holdout states like India and Pakistan. At the same time, Germany promoted the achievement of a comprehensive nuclear test ban (CTB) and called for further steps toward nuclear disarmament, both of which German officials viewed as prerequisites for obtaining support for the NPT from developing countries, even though doing so risked incurring the displeasure of its nuclear-armed allies.25 Germany advocated a cutoff of fissile material production and the establishment of a reliable international control regime for salvaged plutonium and highly enriched uranium. 26 And Kinkel made a personal appearance at the conference, signaling his country's strong interest. These efforts were bolstered by Germany's non-nuclear status, which made its

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opposition to proliferation especially credible. 27 As Kinkel argued, "since Germany has no rights to defend, no one can suspect it of wanting to perpetuate a two-class international society."28

Chemical Weapons Of equal importance to Germany in the early 1990s was the establishment of a global ban on chemical weapons. 29 Consequently, Germany played a critical role in the achievement of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which prohibits the production, possession, and use of chemical weapons throughout the world. In early 1992, when such a treaty first seemed to be a real possibility, then-Foreign Minister Genscher made a strong public appeal to the Geneva Disarmament Conference, where negotiations were being conducted, urging the participants to bring their deliberations to a successful conclusion. 30 Perhaps more importantly, Genscher granted the chief German negotiator, Adolf von Wagner, who was serving that year as chair of the ad hoc negotiating committee on chemical weapons, complete freedom of action so as to facilitate an agreement. During the following months, von Wagner played a key part in the process of bridging the differences among the parties, especially those that divided the industrialized West and the developing world. 31 Thus the successful achievement of the CWC accord, which was signed in January 1993, could be attributed in no small part to German efforts.32 Subsequently, moreover, Germany provided assistance to Russia for the destruction of the latter's chemical weapons stocks. 33 Export Controls A final area in which united Germany has actively worked to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has been that of export controls. 34 Prior to 1989, the Federal Republic had among the least stringent rules among the industrialized countries regarding the export of goods with military applications. Priority was given instead to the promotion of trade, with relatively little regard for its consequences. Following the revelation that year that a German chemical company had supplied Libya with a chemical weapons plant and the subsequent discovery that German industries had provided valuable assistance to Iraq's nuclear program, however, the German government moved vigorously to strengthen the country's export control system, transforming it

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within three years into one of the strongest within the group of supplier countries. 35 The range of punishable offenses was broadened, penalties were considerably stiffened, and the government's capacity to detect violations was greatly strengthened. 36 One of the considerations motivating German officials was the damage that Germany's reputation would suffer if export controls were not tightened. 37 At the same time, Germany began to press for commensurate changes in international arrangements governing the export policies of supplier countries. Germany pursued these efforts in several fora: the nuclear suppliers group and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), where it sought the adoption of full-scope safeguards and more demanding reporting requirements; the Group of Seven industrialized countries (G-7); and, most importantly, the European Community/ 8 where it pushed for the development of a joint export control system based on the newly restrictive German model. The need for the last of these measures was heightened by the EC's establishment at the beginning of 1993 of the Single Market. Intended to eliminate barriers to trade among the EC members, the Single Market potentially created opportunities to circumvent the stringent German regulations via the transshipment of prohibited goods through other EC countries with weaker export controls. 39 Despite strenuous German lobbying and some areas of consensus, however, Germany was unable to achieve a comprehensive EC agreement on export controls that did not compromise the stringent nature of the German system. Consequently, Germany maintained its relatively restrictive national standards pending the adoption of common EC policies that would accord with them. 40 In the meantime, however, this failure contributed to growing domestic pressure for a relaxation of the German restrictions. On the one hand, German firms argued that tough German export laws placed them at a disadvantage vis-a-vis their competitors in other EC countries. 41 On the other hand, the German laws appeared to stand in the way of arms cooperation with EC states, thus impeding the more general process of European integration. 42 Nevertheless, these proposed changes were strongly opposed by the Foreign Ministry.

Promoting Reform in the Former Soviet Bloc In addition to its arms control efforts, the other general way in which Germany has sought to shape its external security environment has been

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by promoting political and economic reform in the countries of the former Soviet bloc. Top-level German officials have repeatedly stressed the importance of making progress toward democracy and market economies irreversible in Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet successor states. Indeed, the need to support these reform efforts has been perhaps the dominant theme in their public statements. 43

German Motives The reasons for Germany's interest in promoting reform in the countries to its east are not hard to fathom. Above all, German leaders have regarded support for reform as a vital contribution to the stability of Europe as a whole and to German security in particular. 44 As Chancellor Helmut Kohl has remarked, "firmly grounded democracies and successful social market economies are the best guarantees of a lasting peace order in Europe." 45 Similarly, Klaus Kinkel has argued that "the best long-term investment in our security is to support democratization and economic reforms in [the] countries [of Central and Eastern Europe]. What we fail to do now will inevitably cost us more later." 46 And in the words of Defense Minister Volker Riihe, "the most important investment in stability and security today lies in supporting the Eastern reform process." 47 Nevertheless, these security-related motives can be further disaggregated. In this regard, it is useful to distinguish between German concerns about (1) Germany's more immediate neighbors in Central and Eastern Europe and (2) the Soviet Union and, since 1991, the Soviet successor states, especially Russia. The stabilization of the countries on and near Germany's eastern borders has often been described as its leading security interest and thus the most important challenge of German security policy. 48 "Without stability in Central and Eastern Europe," Riihe has argued, "there can be no security in Europe."49 In the view of German officials, the failure of political and economic reform there could have considerable negative security implications. On the one hand, it could result in a return to authoritarian or communist political systems, which might be more aggressive in general and more hostile toward Germany in particular. 5° On the other hand, the failure of reform could lead to internal disorder, conflict, or even collapse, which might produce mass migrations or large refugee flows toward the west. 51 In either case, German officials have frequently noted,

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Germany would feel the effects of instability in the region most immediately and intensely. 52 German security-related motives for supporting the process of political and economic reform in first the Soviet Union and then Russia have been no less strong. There, German leaders have been particularly anxious to forestall a return to authoritarian rule, a revival of chauvinistic nationalism, or simply the assumption of power by hard-liners with anti-Western attitudes, for two main reasons. Through 1994, German leaders were eager to ensure a smooth and timely withdrawal of the Western Group of Forces that had been stationed on the territory of the former East Germany. In the longer term, they have wanted to avoid a renewal of confrontation between Moscow and the West, especially Germany. Although Russia's ability to threaten Germany directly is much reduced, it is not insignificant, and Germany is potentially more vulnerable to Russian military power than any other Western country. Thus Kohl has repeatedly warned that a return to confrontation with Russia would place burdens on Germany that would be much greater than the present levels of economic assistance. 53 And even if Germany were not directly threatened, setbacks in Russia could foster instability in Central and Eastern Europe, which would also impact Germany negatively. 54 Either way, "the effects of tremors in the Moscow epicenter would inevitably reach Germany."55 Consequently, German leaders have repeatedly expressed their willingness to do everything in their power to support the reform process. 56 It should be noted, however, that German support for the reforms in the former Soviet bloc has not been entirely an outgrowth of security concerns. For example, Kinkel has argued that Germany has a special responsibility toward the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, in view of German aggression toward them in the past. 57 In addition, German leaders have acted to a substantial degree out of gratitude. They have been grateful first to Mikhail Gorbachev, for ending the Cold War and agreeing to German unification, and then to Boris Y eltsin, for carrying out the withdrawal of the Western Group of Forces on schedule. They have also sought to demonstrate their appreciation to those Central and East European countries, especially Hungary, that played important roles in helping to make unification possible. 58 Nevertheless, security considerations have always loomed large in German assessments of the situation in the region.

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Bilateral Assistance Much German support for political and economic reform in the former Soviet bloc countries has taken the form of bilateral economic and financial assistance. During the period 1989-94, Germany provided some DM 100 billion in aid to the Soviet Union and the Soviet successor states. 59 The largest share (more than DM 40 billion) consisted of credits, credit guarantees, and export guarantees. 60 In addition, Germany has rescheduled or allowed Russia to defer payments on much of its foreign debt as well as money owed for purchases made from the former East Germany, the so-called transfer ruble balance. 61 A further significant portion of the German assistance was associated with the withdrawal of the Western Group of Forces from Germany. In 1990, Germany pledged a total of DM 13.4 billion to support the withdrawal, including DM 7.8 billion to finance the construction of 36,000 housing units in the Soviet Union, DM 3 billion for the support of the forces during the withdrawal period, and DM 1 billion in transportation costs. 62 In December 1992, Germany committed a further DM 550 million for housing construction, in return for which Russia agreed to complete the withdrawal four months early, by the end of August 1994. 63 Finally, Germany has been the leading source of emergency assistance and humanitarian aid to the Soviet Union and Russia. Between 1990 and 1994, it provided some DM 3.5 billion in humanitarian assistance, much of which was given during the winter of 1990-91 and in 1992 after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. 64 Although German bilateral assistance to the reform states in Central and Eastern Europe has not been as large as that afforded to the Soviet Union and its successor states, it has nevertheless been substantial. 65 From 1990 to 1994, Germany provided some DM 45.4 billion in aid, of which approximately DM 34 billion was destined for the four Visegrad republics. 56 Germany has also helped to ease the debt load of those countries, especially Poland. 67 As great as German bilateral assistance has been, at least three caveats must be noted. First, German financial support for reform, especially in the Soviet Union and Russia, has also been strongly influenced by economic considerations. The industries in the new eastern German Lander have been dependent on exports to the Soviet Union and its successor states. 68 Thus it could be argued that substantial German export guarantees were intended in the first instance to benefit those firms. 69 In addi-

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tion, the reform states have owed large sums of money to the German government and German banks. 70 Thus Germany has had a strong interest in seeing that those debts are repaid. 71 And assistance has been seen as a way to secure lucrative future trade and investment opportunities in the potentially large markets of the region. 72 Indeed, the amount of German trade with and investment in Central and Eastern Europe has grown steadily during the 1990s. 73 Second, there is the qualified nature of much of Germany's bilateral assistance. The largest share has been in the form not of grants but of loans and credit guarantees, which will eventually have to be repaid. Many of the direct subsidies and transfers, moreover, were associated with the withdrawal of the Western Group of Forces and thus were not primarily intended to promote reform. Finally, Germany's willingness and ability to provide assistance on a bilateral basis has steadily declined, largely as a result of the mounting costs of unification. Indeed, as early as August 1991, in the wake of the failed coup attempt in the Soviet Union, German leaders claimed that their country had reached the limits of its ability to help. 74 This theme has been a constant refrain in their public statements ever since. 75 Instead, Germany has looked more and more to its Western partners to help promote the reform process, and its own efforts have increasingly focused on pressing them to do so. As Helmut Kohl has argued, "this great task cannot be left to us Germans or even to the Europeans alone. The democratization of the reform states and their economic reorientation is in the interest of the entire West." 76

Multilateral Approaches Consequently, Germany has increasingly sought to promote reform in the former Soviet bloc through a variety of multilateral channels. In part, this shift of emphasis has reflected the limits of Germany's own capabilities and its resulting dependence on its Western partners to contribute a large share of the necessary resources. It has also followed from Germany's insistence that the burden of supporting reform be shared equitably.77 Germany has provided more assistance to the Soviet Union, its successor states, and Central and Eastern Europe than has any other single country. Indeed, it has been the source of approximately half of all the aid given by the West. 78 Nevertheless, as will be seen, much of the burden of multilateral efforts as well has fallen on Germany.

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Economic, Financial, and Technical Assistance. In the first place, Germany has worked hard to mobilize economic, financial, and technical assistance for the reform states on a multilateral basis. 79 Much of this effort has taken place within the EC. From 1990 to 1994, the EC provided the Soviet Union and its successor states with approximately $3.6 billion in technical assistance and food aid, and another $2.8 billion in credits and credit guarantees for food purchases, largely at Germany's behest. During the same period, the EC gave $13.7 billion in grants and credits to the states of Central and Eastern Europe. 80 It should be stressed that this assistance was not cost-free to Germany, whose share amounted to 28 percent. To a lesser but still significant extent, Germany has also used the G-7 forum to lobby for more Western assistance to the Soviet Union and its successor states. At the London summit meeting of July 1991, Germany was the strongest advocate of more direct financial aid for the Soviet Union. 81 And as the host of the next G-7 summit, in Munich, Germany placed the question of assistance high on the agenda. 82 Nevertheless, by the time of the 1994 summit in Tokyo, Germany's own financial constraints were clearly undermining its ability to exert leadership and to induce its partners to do more. Thus a U.S.-proposed $4 billion fund to promote privatization of the Russian economy had to be significantly scaled back in size, in part because Germany was able to pledge only $80 million. 83 Finally, Germany has played a central role in arranging for the rescheduling of the burdensome debts inherited by the Soviet successor states. Led by Germany, the G-7 agreed at Munich to extend the maturity dates by 10 years, including a five-year grace period on interest payments, for all public credits granted to the Soviet Union before 1991. 84 Then in December 1992, Germany promised it would press for a longterm rescheduling agreement between Russia and the Paris Club of Western government creditors. 85 A first such arrangement was worked out in April 1993, under which repayment of DM 24 billion due by the end of the year was spread out over a decade. 86 Similar accords, involving amounts of approximately DM 12 billion and DM 10 billion, respectively, and 15-year repayment periods, were reached in each of the following two years. As with EC assistance, these arrangements represented significant financial burdens for Germany, which held approximately half of the debt concerned. 87

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Access to Western Markets. The multilateral approaches that Germany has pursued have not been limited to direct forms of economic and financial assistance. As the money available for credits and loans dried up, German efforts focused increasingly on granting access to Western markets, especially those of the European Community, so that the reform states could strengthen their market economies and earn foreign exchange through exports. Indeed, German officials came to insist that, in the words of Helmut Kohl, "opening our markets contributes more to the success of economic reforms and consequently to stabilization than economic aid, know-how, and loans."88 They argued, moreover, that this course should be pursued notwithstanding the slowdown experience by European economies in the early to mid-1990s and that even sensitive industries should not be exempted from East European competition. 89 Consequently, at German prodding, the EC facilitated Russian access to its market under its Generalized System of Preferences90 and subsequently, in 1995, signed a comprehensive trade agreement with Russia that was to remove nearly all trade barrier by 1998 and granted Most Favored Nation status. 91 Likewise, Germany became a leading advocate of the speedy conclusion of "Europe" Agreements with the states of Central and Eastern Europe, which were signed in December 1991. These provided for the creation of a free-trade area in industrial goods over 10 years, although most tariffs and quotas would be abolished within five years. 92 The agreements did contain exceptions for imports of textiles, iron, and steel, which were designed to shield these sensitive sectors from competition, but EC leaders subsequently agreed to lift them as well, although agriculture remained excluded. 93 Not surprisingly, given its size and proximity, Germany has been the region's biggest Western trading partner, taking approximately half of all EC imports from Central and Eastern Europe in the early 1990s.94 Integration into Western Institutions. A further multilateral tack that Germany has pursued has been to integrate the reform states into Western political and economic institutions as quickly and as deeply as possible. In the case of Russia, this strategy has been seen as a way of ensuring benign attitudes toward the West as well as promoting reform. 95 As Klaus Kinkel once argued, "the economic inclusion of Russia is even more important than the security policy dimension. Russia must be fully included in the world economy."96

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To this end, German officials pressed as early as 1990 for Soviet membership in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, an effort that resulted in the granting of "associate member" status in those institutions at the London G-7 summit. 97 They also constantly lobbied for increasing Soviet and then Russian participation in the G-7 itself, which led to regular political consultations between Russian and Western leaders at the annual G-7 summits. 98 They actively worked to strengthen the political ties between Russia and the EC, helping to pave the way for the 1994 signing of a comprehensive partnership agreement. 99 And they strongly advocated Russian admission to the Council of Europe.100 Germany's most ambitious objective in this regard has been to bring the reform states of Central and Eastern Europe, especially the Visegrad states, closer to, and ultimately into, the EC. German officials began to articulate the goal of opening the EC to the east as early as the beginning of 1991, 101 and with the passage of time, their appeals became only more frequent and insistent. 102 Indeed, Kinkel has described Germany as the special advocate of its neighbors in their efforts to gain admission. 103 For German leaders, the process of opening the EC to the east has been closely linked to the issue of security. 104 In their view, the prospect of membership has been necessary to ensure the success of economic reform, while economic growth and prosperity would in tum provide the essential foundation for political stability. Conversely, to deny the populations of Central and Eastern Europe the hope of joining the EC would make them unwilling to bear the costs of reform and risk reviving nationalism and strife in the region. 105 In addition, support for EC enlargement became something of a point of honor. As Kinkel frequently remarked, "we can't now say there will be no room in the European house for the foreseeable future after telling them for decades to abandon Communism and join the Western community." 106 Finally, German leaders have invoked the issues of Germany's gratitude and historical responsibility toward the East as further reasons for their position. 107 German efforts to open the EC to the reform states of Central and Eastern Europe began during the negotiations on the Europe Agreements in 1991, when, contrary to the wishes of the European Commission, Germany insisted that a positive statement on the issue of membership be included in the preambles. 108 Germany also gave Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia strong assurances that it would support their attempts to

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join the EC. 109 And prior to the June 1993 meeting of the European Council in Copenhagen, German leaders called on the EC to take steps to help ready the reform states for full membership. 110 This lobbying was rewarded by the issuance of an important signal at the summit, when the EC countries expressed their intention to accept the new democracies as members as soon as they were able to fulfill the obligations of member. 111 shlp. Most significantly, Germany used its presidency of the EC during the second half of 1994 to try to bring the reform states of Central and Eastern Europe closer to the EC, placing the issue at the top of the EC agenda. 112 German leaders proposed closer political cooperation with the four Visegrad states and the three Baltic republics, including annual gatherings at the level of heads of government to discuss questions of mutual interest and semi-annual ministerial meetings. 113 They also called for the development of a concrete program for preparing the reform states for eventual membership and opening the EC to the east. 114 Many of these goals were achieved at the December 1994 Essen summit, where EC leaders adopted a "pre-accession" strategy intended to help establish the preconditions for membership. The document outlined a series of further EC trade concessions and a checklist of reforms that candidate states would have to implement in order to prepare themselves for accession. 115 Henceforth, in the view of many observers, the question would not be whether EC enlargement would occur but when and how. 116 Perhaps the principal disappointment from Germany's perspective was the rejection of a Commission proposal to increase EC aid to Central and Eastern Europe by nearly 30 percent over the next five years, but Germany was at least able to prevent any cuts in the existing level of fund. 117 mg. Nevertheless, for all their eagerness to open the EC to the east, German officials have recognized that the enlargement process would be both difficult and slow and have repeatedly warned against raising false hopes in Central and Eastern Europe. In their view, neither the potential new members nor the EC itself, which required a period of consolidation and internal reform following the incorporation of Austria, Sweden, and Finland in 1995, were yet ready for such a step. Moreover, they have pointed out, the main burden of the integration process would necessarily fall on the candidate states. Thus it was far too soon to set a concrete date for the admission of new members. Indeed, official negotiations on ac-

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cession could not even begin until after the completion of the EC's Intergovernmental Conference in 1996. 118

Security Ties with the East The final component of Germany's strategy for promoting reform in the east, one which merits separate discussion, has been its efforts to establish strong security ties between the states of the former Soviet bloc and the West. German leaders have viewed such links as helping to consolidate democracy in at least three ways. First, they can play a direct role by, for example, reinforcing professionalism in and civilian control of military establishments in the region. 119 Second, they can strengthen the position of reformers in Moscow by helping to prevent the renewed isolation of Russia. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, such ties can foster both political and economic reform indirectly by enhancing the security of Central and East European states vis-a-vis potential external threats. Many of these countries have been concerned in particular about possible adverse political developments within the Soviet Union and its successor states that could lead to a renewal of military coercion or armed conflict on their borders. If left to deal with these concerns on their own, they would feel pressure to acquire additional military forces and to take other precautionary measures that could be viewed as provocative by their neighbors, thereby undermining rather than enhancing stability. The enhanced sense of security produced by increasingly strong security links to the West, however, could help to allay these concerns, enabling Central and East European states to forgo potentially destabilizing actions and to pursue their ambitious agendas of domestic reform with greater confidence.

Bilateral and Trilateral Ties Where possible and appropriate, Germany has sought to create bilateral and trilateral security ties with reform states. In 1993, it signed an agreement with Russia on military cooperation, including regular contacts and exchanges of personnel. Later that year, Defense Minister Riihe proposed military planning, training, and exercises between the Bundeswehr and the Russian armed forces in preparation for possible joint UN and CSCE missions, and he and his Russian counterpart subsequently agreed

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to hold a series of annual joint exercises and maneuvers to begin in 1994. 120 Germany has also forged extensive bilateral security ties with Poland and the Czech Republic. Since 1993, the Bundeswehr has engaged in dozens of joint activities with its Polish and Czech counterparts and signed military cooperation agreements with seven other East European armies. 121 And Germany has helped organize frameworks for trilateral cooperation with France and Denmark, respectively, and Poland that involve regular meetings of their defense ministers and frequent military • 122 exerctses.

Multilateral Institutions Notwithstanding this activity at the bilateral and trilateral level, the principal focus of German attempts to strengthen security relations between the two former halves of the continent has been the existing multilateral institutions of European security. Beyond its efforts to expand the competences and capabilities of the CSCE as the leading pan-European institutional framework, which are detailed in Chapter Six, and as part of its strategy for opening the EC, Germany has sought to establish strong ties between many Central and East European states and the Western European Union (WEU), which was designated an integral part of the development of the European Union (EU) in the Maastricht Treaty. In mid1992, following a German proposal, the WEU formed a new consultative forum that included the former non-Soviet Warsaw Pact states and the three Baltic states. 123 And in late 1993, Germany along with France proposed that prospective EC members, especially the Visegrad and Baltic states, be made associated partners of the WEU, a status that was approved the following May and entitled those states to participate in semimonthly ambassadorial meetings, peacekeeping operations, and military maneuvers. 124 As Kinkel explained, "if we are serious about bringing these states closer to the European Union, then closer ties to the WEU must be achieved parallel to association with the EU." 125 Germany also played a leading role in the development of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), which brought together the NATO countries and all of the former Soviet bloc states. Initially, the NACC represented a response to the growing interest in joining NATO shown in early 1991 by Central and East European states. 126 At the time, Foreign Minister Genscher strongly opposed any eastward expansion of the alli-

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ance, arguing that it would lead to a new division of Europe and isolate the Soviet Union. 127 Nevertheless, German officials believed that some means must be found to strengthen the ties between the Central and East European states and NATO short of full membership. 128 Consequently, German officials responded enthusiastically when the United States suggested the idea of a new forum in bilateral discussions that spring. 129 At a meeting in May, Genscher and then-U.S. Secretary of State James Baker announced their strong support for establishing more intensive contacts between NATO and the former Warsaw Pact states. 130 And then, after developing the idea during the course of the summer, the two leaders formally proposed at a second encounter in early October the establishment of a routine set of meetings between the NATO countries and their new eastern partners, which was approved at the NATO summit in Rome the following month. 131 No sooner had the NACC begun to function in December 1991 than it faced a major set of challenges occasioned by the dissolution of the Soviet Union. One question that immediately arose concerned which of the successor states to include in the body. Some argued that it made little sense to invite the more distant republics, especially the new Central Asian states, to join. Nevertheless, Genscher insisted that all the former Soviet republics be immediately admitted as members. 132 In his view, the end of the Soviet Union had only increased the importance of the NACC as an instrument for addressing a variety of security concerns, including those raised by the Soviet collapse itself. In particular, the NACC could help to secure the implementation of the CFE treaty and the negotiation of a new treaty governing military personnel levels, to ensure the destruction of Soviet tactical nuclear weapons, to gain the signatures of the members of the Commonwealth oflndependent States (CIS) to the NPT, to ensure that displaced nuclear scientists could find civilian opportunities, and, more generally, to counteract the danger of nationalistic developments. 133 Subsequently, German leaders continued to regard the NACC as a valuable multilateral forum that promoted stability to Germany's east. It included Russia and thus worked against its isolation on the continent. It reduced the security concerns of the Central and East Europeans states by increasing transparency and by providing a framework for regular dialogue and in-depth cooperation on security issues among them and their neighbors, thereby helping to build mutual confidence and to reduce mis-

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trust. Indeed, it was the only place where the defense ministers and military chiefs of staff of the reform states regularly met. And it provided NATO members an opportunity to exert pressure on Russia and other states, as necessary. 134 Consequently, Germany continued to favor expanding the membership of the NACC and, prior to the creation of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) in 1994, broadening its functions. In 1993, Foreign Minister Kinkel proposed that the body be opened to all CSCE members, including the neutral and non-aligned countries in Europe. 135 He also suggested that the NACC should undertake regional crisis management tasks and could be used to orchestrate joint exercises, peacekeeping, and even peace-making operations with NATO's cooperation partners. 136 Even after the establishment of the PfP, German officials sought to preserve the NACC, which they viewed as advantageous in some ways given its more multilateral nature and its contributions to transparency. 137

The Issue ofNATO Enlargement The most controversial aspect of German efforts to strengthen the reform states' security ties with the West concerned the question ofNATO enlargement. This is one of the few issues on which government officials were clearly divided, at least initially. More fundamentally, and one reason opinions differed, here the goal of stabilizing Central and Eastern Europe clashed directly with that of promoting reform in Russia. Any attempt to address the security concerns of Germany's immediate neighbors to the east by admitting them to the alliance risked harming relations with Russia and thus making the overall security environment even more . 138 precanous. The Initial German Debate over Enlargement. The first suggestions in Germany that NATO should acquire new members in the east appeared in early 1992. 139 These initial trial balloons were roundly criticized by most German commentators as unrealistic. They feared that inclusion of the CIS would overextend and destroy the alliance and deemed the NACC as sufficient to meet the needs of the Central and East European . bemg. . 140 states tior the time It was not until early 1993 that German officials began to discuss the matter in earnest. The leading proponent of enlargement was Defense Minister Volker Rtihe, who had assumed his post in April 1992. In a se-

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ries of addresses, including a highly publicized speech at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, Riihe argued that future Central and East European members of the EC should not be excluded from NATO. Indeed, their accession to the alliance could occur first, since the process of preparing them for admission to the EC was likely to require more time than they could afford to wait for NATO security guarantees. Thus the alliance should begin to discuss the issue of expanding to the east. In his view, "the admission of new members is not so much a question of whether but of how and when. It is a question of timing and conditions."141 At the same time, Riihe explicitly ruled out any enlargement beyond the nearest states in Central and Eastern Europe. In his view, Russia's unmatched potential prevented it in particular from becoming a NATO member, while inclusion of all the CIS states would make the alliance too big and destroy its homogeneity. 142 Riihe's bold statements were balanced by much more reserved attitudes elsewhere in the government. 143 Officials in the Chancellor's Office reportedly attached importance to proceeding slowly, fearing that efforts to expand NATO could cause negative reactions in Russia and other East European states. 144 And even the parliamentary delegation of Riihe's own party, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), had reservations about the approach he proposed, concluding that conflict with Russia would be minimized if the Vise grad states joined the EC ftrst. 145 Above all, it was Foreign Minister Kinkel who publicly advocated a cautious approach. Kinkel acknowledged that states like Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, which were already closely associated with the EC, could not be excluded from NATO in the long term, and that the alliance should reconsider its negative stance on the issue. Yet he argued that the West must proceed with caution, since extending membership could create great problems. In particular, it was essential to avoid the isolation of Russia, which could strengthen the forces opposing reform there, and the creation of a new division of Europe along security lines. In any case, there was no need to make an immediate decision on the issue of enlargement. Instead, Kinkel advocated the search for a middle way between full membership and loose cooperation in the NACC in order to show Western recognition of the legitimate security concerns of the Central and East European states. 146 In response to this resistance, Riihe moderated his position as early as

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September 1993. At that time, he sought to make clear that what he had in mind was not immediate accession but the more modest objective of opening up the prospect of membership. In addition, he stressed that any expansion of NATO must be balanced through a partnership between the alliance and such large states as Russia and Ukraine. 147

German Endorsement of the Partnership for Peace. Most decisive in determining the outcome of this initial debate was Russian President Boris Yeltsin's sharp admonition in late September against any eastern enlargement of the alliance that did not include Russia. This intervention, and Yeltsin's subsequent need to use force to quell an uprising by his parliamentary opposition, greatly strengthened the proponents of a more cautious approach. 148 Not wanting to weaken the Russian leader's position, German leaders subsequently felt compelled to show even greater sensitivity toward Russian concerns in their public comments. Consequently, the following several months witnessed a significant degree of convergence between Rtihe's and Kinkel's positions, with the former ceding more ground than the latter, as Germany endorsed the U.S.proposed Partnership for Peace, despite, in the view of some observers, its temporizing nature. 149 German leaders agreed that NATO must take seriously the security concerns of the Central and East European states. The alliance must strengthen its relations with. the countries of the region. It should send a clear signal, moreover, at the NATO summit scheduled for January 1994 confirming its fundamental readiness in principle to admit new members. And, in their view, the PfP could serve as a preliminary stage toward eventual enlargement. At the same time, they cautioned that any future expansion should not lead to. new rifts and tensions. No country should be excluded a priori, and any such step should be worked out in cooperation with all the CSCE and NACC members. Russian interests in particular should be taken into account. In addition, any opening to the east must be accompanied by an upgrading of NATO-Russian relations-Rube spoke in terms of a "strategic partnership"-since stability could be achieved only with the support of and not against the will of Russia. In any case, it was far too early to name any specific candidates for membership or to fix a firm date for enlargement. Nevertheless, some differences of emphasis remained. Rtihe argued

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that the PfP was not a substitute for enlargement. Rather, it should facilitate the process by enabling countries seeking admission to cooperate even more closely with NATO and thereby to prepare themselves for membership. Opening NATO to the east remained of vital interest to Germany, and the process should begin at once. He also stressed that NATO should not effectively grant Russia a veto over expansion by focusing unduly on Russian interests, while Kinkel suggested that Russian .. agreement would be a necessary cond1hon. 150

German Policy After the Establishment of the PjP. Not surprisingly, the issue of NATO expansion remained a prominent aspect of the discussion over German security policy even after the PfP was established. The issue did not go away for several reasons. First, Central and East European states continued to press for admission and, as Riihe had predicted, used active participation in the PfP to strengthen their case for membership. Partially in response to this pressure, moreover, the United States abandoned its opposition to enlargement and became the leading proponent within the alliance in mid-1994. Second, the need to stabilize the region remained as compelling as ever, and German leaders continued to regard enhancing the external security of the Central and East European states through NATO enlargement as one of the most effective means, along with EC membership, of doing so. Not only would alliance membership foster economic growth and prosperity, but it would prevent a renationalization of the security policies of the reform states. 151 In this connection, some German leaders drew parallels with West Germany's own situation after World War II, when, in their view, its integration into NATO decisively accelerated its postwar recovery and its return to the community of Western democra•

CleS.

152

Finally, many Germans felt a moral obligation to allow the Visegrad states into NATO after the many years they had spent under Soviet domination and the contributions they had made to ending the division of Europe. After imploring them to break free of the Soviet yoke during the Cold War, it would be hypocritical for the West now to roll up the welcome mat. 153 Despite these compelling reasons-and strong pressures-to open NATO to the east, however, German officials continued to advocate a cautious approach, largely for fear of antagonizing or destabilizing Rus-

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sia. They reaffirmed their support for the goal of enlargement in principle. Yet they repeatedly insisted that the process not be allowed to lead to Russia's isolation, a renewed division of Europe, and, worst of all, arevival of bloc confrontation. Thus enlargement must take place gradually through a series of small, careful steps. Moreover, it must be part of an overall European security concept involving intensive cooperation with Russia and take Russia's legitimate security concerns and interests fully into account. 154 Consequently, Germany resisted pressures within the alliance for rapid expansion even as it sought to lay the groundwork for admitting new members some time in the future. In 1994, the government argued that the preparation of the proposed NATO enlargement study should not be rushed. 155 During much of the following two years, it opposed any moves that might weaken Yeltsin's position prior to the Russian presidential elections scheduled for mid-1996. And even after Yeltsin' s re-election victory, Kohl continued to demand a gradual approach, opposing an alliance decision on enlargement that year. 156 In addition, Germany sought to lower the expectations of the Central and East Europeans who wished to join the alliance. German officials frequently warned that the interests of those states would not be served by enlargement if it were to result in new rifts with Russia. 157 They argued that no candidate state yet fulfilled the requirements of membership. 158 And they suggested that enlargement could not proceed much beyond the four Vise grad states before it would begin to rob NATO of its effectiveness.159 In any case, in their view, it was too soon to designate specific dates or new members. 160 At the same time, however, German leaders went to great lengths to overcome Russian objections to expansion, employing several means to this end. 161 First, they endeavored to reassure Russia through conciliatory statements, insisting that the West did not seek to isolate Russia, that an expanded NATO would not threaten Russia, and that, quite to the contrary, enlargement would serve Russia's true interests by stabilizing Eastern Europe. 162 Second, they continued to pursue and even intensified their strategy of cooperating with Russia and involving Russia in regional and global institutions to the greatest possible extent. 163 In this connection, Germany attached great value to Russian participation in the peace implementation force established in Bosnia in late 1995, which was seen as

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having benefits that extended far beyond the settlement of that regional conflict. 164 In addition to overcoming Russian feelings of isolation, moreover, this strategy was also expected to raise the costs to Russia of a return to confrontation. 165 Perhaps most importantly, German leaders were leading proponents within NATO of establishing a special relationship between the alliance and Russia. 166 They repeated Riihe's call for a strategic partnership that went beyond Russian participation in the PfP. 167 In 1995, Kinkel sought to upgrade and elaborate this concept, proposing the conclusion of a "charter" between NATO and Russia, which would include a mutual renunciation of the use of force, a mechanism to facilitate close political consultation, and intensive cooperation in areas such as arms control, conflict prevention, and peacekeeping. 168 And the following year, he suggested the creation of a 17-member NATO-Russian consultation committee on security in which Russia would enjoy equal rights with members of the alliance. 169 Nevertheless, there were clear limits to Germany's willingness to accommodate Russia. German leaders continued to rule out the possibility of Russian membership in NATO. 170 They strongly maintained that Russia could have no veto power over NATO decision making on the issue of enlargement. 171 They insisted that Russia first join the PiP, which it finally did in mid-1995. As Kinkel stated, "unqualified acceptance of the PiP is the first important step toward the privileged relationship with NATO that has been offered." 172 They steadfastly rejected Russian suggestions that NATO be subordinated to the CSCE. 173 And they sought to condition the development of the NATO-Russian relationship on Russian behavior in related areas, such as implementation of the CFE treaty, ratification of the START II treaty, and compliance with regional codes of conduct. 174 Finally, German policy makers viewed NATO enlargement as intimately related to that of the EU. On the one hand, they showed little support for the idea of admitting Central and East European states to the alliance before they joined the EU. On the other hand, they insisted that new EU members should qualify automatically for membership in NATO. Not to do so would risk creating zones of unequal security within the EU and thus undermining the cohesion of the body. And as a practical matter, EU entrants could become de facto NATO members simply by virtue of their

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right to join the WEU, given the close ties between the two security organizations. Thus, in their view, the expansion of the EU and NATO should be closely coordinated, if not rigidly linked. 175 The frequency with which German officials articulated this last requirement declined rapidly as NATO moved steadily, at U.S. insistence, toward a formal decision to open the alliance to new members in Central and Eastern Europe at its summit meeting in mid-1997 even as the obstacles to an early widening of the EU remained as great as ever. N evertheless, they could take considerable satisfaction from the fact that their other concerns had been addressed. In particular, Russian objections and resistance to NATO enlargement appeared to have been overcome with the signing in May 1997 of the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation, and Security between the alliance and Russia. 176

Conclusion Since unification, Germany has gone to great lengths to shape its external security environment in an attempt to reduce current threats and to forestall the emergence of new ones. Germany has been an active and often leading proponent of many arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation measures. In addition, it has done more than perhaps any other country to promote stability via political and economic reform in the states of the former Soviet bloc. Between 1989 and 1994, Germany provided nearly DM 150 billion in various forms of financial, economic, and material assistance, or approximately half of the Western total. 177 And it has made numerous efforts to establish strong security ties between the states of the former Soviet bloc and the West.

Determinants of German Policy Obviously, the principal determinant of this important component of German security policy has been the conditions that Germany has faced in its external environment. But for the potential for instability in Central and Eastern Europe following the dissolution of the Soviet bloc and the collapse of the Soviet Union itself, many of the actions described above would have been unnecessary, and German policy would have assumed a decidedly different cast. Nevertheless, Germany has not been the only

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country that has been confronted by these conditions. Thus what concerns us here is to explain the particular modalities of Germany's response to them. One structural factor that has clearly distinguished Germany from its major Western partners has been Germany's unique degree of vulnerability to many actual and potential external threats, which has provided it with an especially powerful incentive to· seek to mitigate them. Because of its location along the former East-West divide, Germany has been particularly exposed to possible dangers emanating from the former Soviet bloc, whether they be due to internal instability, cross-border conflicts, the emergence of hostile governments, or simply the still considerable military power of the Soviet Union and its successor states. It lies closer than do its allies to regional flashpoints, sharing long borders with two Central European reform states. 178 Consequently, it is not surprising that Germany has paid more attention than have others to developments in the countries of the region and has been willing to devote more energy and resources in an attempt to influence their capabilities, intentions, and basic cohesiveness. 179 International institutions have also noticeably molded Germany's efforts to shape the external security environment, serving as important sources of constraints on and opportunities for German action. On the one hand, Germany's vulnerability has been further heightened by the unique institutional restrictions that it has accepted on its military capabilities. 180 In addition, prior involvement in and commitments to multilateral institutions, especially NATO and the EC, have limited what Germany could do by itself, such as opening its markets to the products of the reform states or extending security guarantees. On the other hand, these same institutions have effectively enhanced Germany's capabilities in some ways and increased the range of policy options at its disposal. They have furnished mechanisms for facilitating burdensharing with others when Germany's own resources have not sufficed to achieve its policy objectives. They have provided ready-made frameworks, especially NATO, that could be built on to enhance the security of reform states. And by working through such channels, Germany has sometimes been able to take strong actions that might otherwise have raised concerns among its Western partners and eastern neighbors. 181 Indeed, a multilateral approach, in part by endowing Germany with addi-

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tional sources of influence and leverage over other institutional participants, has often been the most effective-and sometimes the only-way to achieve its objectives. 182 As suggested above, Germany's efforts to shape the external security environment have clearly been constrained by the limits on its national capacity that have been imposed by the high costs of unification and Germany's structural economic problems. These limits have been most obvious with regard to economic and financial assistance to the reform states of the former Soviet bloc, which began to diminish noticeably as early as the summer of 1991. Consequently, Germany placed increasing emphasis on measures that did not involve direct government outlays, such as opening Western markets and strengthening institutional ties, as ways of promoting stability in the east. Even in the area of arms control, where costs have been comparatively small and thus Germany's freedom of action has been less bound by financial considerations, economic constraints have occasionally left their mark, as Germany has not been able to spend as much to promote nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation as many officials would have liked. Its contribution to the destruction of nuclear and chemical weapons in the former Soviet Union has been quite modest in comparison with the sums provided by the United States. 183 Germany has been unable to fund other desirable projects. 184 And it was keen to involve its EC partners in the underwriting of the International Science and Technology Center established in Russia in order to share the costs, even though doing so meant diminishing Germany's role in the project. 185 More difficult to discern is whether any underlying German national predispositions have had a marked impact on this aspect of German security policy. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to conclude that German political culture has influenced the types of policy options to which German officials have given serious consideration and the choices they have made among them. German anti-militarism has lurked behind the tremendous stress on preventive action in German policy and Germany's strenuous efforts effectively to demilitarize regional and global inter-state relations through the promotion of arms control and disarmament measures. Likewise, Germany's heavy reliance on international institutions, while serving German interests in a number of respects, is hard to explain in purely instrumental terms of convenience or necessity. Rather, it also appears to have been shaped by the emphasis on multilateralism and the

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high intrinsic valuation of such institutions that most Germans have shared. As a Foreign Ministry official reportedly stated, Germany has sought to help the countries of Eastern Europe through the EC rather than on a unilateral basis "out of conviction that it is the only way to go." 186

Tensions in German Policy It is important to emphasize in conclusion that German efforts to shape the external security environment have been and remain beset by several serious internal tensions. Already noted has been the conflict between Germany's desire to promote stability in the neighboring states of Central and Eastern Europe in part through their accession to NATO and its concern that nothing be done to set back the cause of reform in Russia. In addition, Germany has faced dilemmas with regard to the achievement of the various policy objectives that have concerned the Soviet Union or Russia alone. On a number of occasions, the goals of promoting political reform in Russia, obtaining Russian ratification and implementation of important arms control agreements, preventing nuclear proliferation from Russian soil, securing the repayment of Russia's foreign debt, and generally maintaining good diplomatic relations with Russia have clashed · with one another. These tensions in German policy have been particularly evident whenever setbacks have occurred in the reform process in first the Soviet Union and then Russia. On several occasions, German leaders have considered scaling back German assistance in response to adverse developments. But they have always refrained from doing so in the end for fear that it would only further hurt the cause of reform and possibly threaten the achievement of other goals. During the Soviet crackdown in the Baltic republics in early 1991, for example, Germany continued its bilateral assistance so as not to jeopardize Soviet ratification of the unification treaties even as the EC suspended $1.5 billion in recently appropriated aid. 187 Likewise, during the August 1991 Moscow coup attempt, when the EC froze more than $1 billion in aid, Germany decided against imposing sanctions in order not to endanger the Soviet troop withdrawals. 188 Then, in the fall of 1993, following the bloody seizure of the Russian parliament building and the national elections in which anti-reform candidates did surprisingly well, German leaders were quick to assure Y eltsin that there would be no flagging of German support for him. 189 Most controversially, German leaders refrained from taking any puni-

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tive action during the violent Russian suppression of the independence movement in Chechnya in 1995. Government officials initially characterized the conflict as a purely internal affair and argued that the West could do little to influence the situation. More to the point, they rejected the imposition of sanctions out of a concern that such a move could undermine the reform process and, even worse, destabilize Russia. 190 Although the government stepped up its public criticism of Russia's actions after its initial response was roundly condemned as inadequate by the opposition, it nevertheless continued to warn against the use of forms of diplomatic or economic pressure that might harm German-Russian relations and undermine Yeltsin's position. 191 Finally, tensions have existed between Germany's extensive use of international institutions and the achievement of its security policy objectives. Although a multilateral approach has been intrinsically desirable and sometimes essential, it has had the disadvantage of making the success of German policy hostage to the interests of its cooperation partners, which have not always coincided with those of Germany. Germany has been frustrated in particular by the reluctance of the other EU members to open their markets more rapidly and their resistance to expanding the community to the east. German proposals intended to facilitate the process of enlargement have been repeatedly rejected or watered down. Even at the December 1994 summit in Essen, which capped Germany's presidency of the EU, Germany failed to gain approval of a concrete timetable for expansion and was forced to settle for considerably less EU assistance to the reform states than it had requested. 192 Likewise, Germany has been stymied in its attempts to create a strong EU export control regime. Thus multinational institutions can often be only as useful to Germany as their other members allow them to be.

CHAPTER SIX

Strengthening Europe's Security Institutions In the development of a durable and capable security order for Europe and the world, the federal government is striving for a network of interlocking, mutually reinforcing institutions. -German Bundestag

Closely related to Germany's efforts to shape its external security environment, discussed in Chapter Five, has been its policy toward Europe's security institutions. Like the intentions, capabilities, and stability of nearby countries, these bodies have been not only influences on but also objects of Germany policy. In fact, many German actions since unification have been aimed at maintaining and strengthening Europe's primary security institutions: the Conference on (now Organization for) Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE),' the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and a European security and defense identity (ESDI) based on the European Union (EU) and the Western European Union (WEU). Indeed, Germany has played a leading role in the further development and adaptation of each of these structures so that they can best address German security concerns in the altered circumstances of post-Cold War Europe. 2 Some observers have viewed Germany's simultaneous support for all of these institutions as contradictory and have consequently criticized one aspect of German policy or another. German leaders, however, have seen no inherent conflicts between the different bodies, although the emphasis they have placed on each has varied. To the contrary, they have repeatedly insisted on the complementariness of the various institutions, regarding them all as important elements of the new European security architecture. And especially where real conflicts have arisen, the German government has worked assiduously to harmonize their functions and capabilities.

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This chapter analyzes the reasons for German support for each of the principal European security institutions and what Germany has done to maintain and strengthen them. It also discusses how Germany has responded to the criticisms that have been leveled at its policy, including its efforts to ensure the compatibility of the various institutions. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the principal underlying determinants of this second important component of German security policy.

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe Even before the end of the Cold War, Germany was the leading Westem proponent of creating and strengthening pan-European security institutions, and this distinction has not changed. The focus of this aspect of German policy has been the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which was established in 1975 with the signing of the Helsinki Accords but remained overshadowed by the confrontation between the two regional blocs and their respective security organizations, NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Since 1990, however, the CSCE has enjoyed a significant increase in both its mandate and its capabilities, and Germany has been a driving force behind this transformation. 3 Nevertheless, Germany's aspirations, if not its enthusiasm, for the CSCE have waned as the body's limits have become clearer with the passage of time.

Sources of German Interest in the CSCE The significance of the CSCE has been frequently noted by German leaders. They have described it as "essential," a "cornerstone" of the European security order, and "no less important for the preservation of peace and security" than other regional institutions. 4 Of course, German officials seemed to attach particular importance to the CSCE in 1990, when its further institutionalization was viewed as a way of overcoming opposition to German unification and Germany's continued membership in NAT0. 5 But even after the achievement of those goals, support for the CSCE remained a regular and prominent theme in statements on German security policy. · The reasons for German interest in the CSCE have been several. 6 Perhaps most important has been the CSCE's inclusive nature. As the only

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truly pan-European security institution, it has been open to and now includes all of the European states. This inclusiveness has in tum served several useful purposes. Above all, German leaders have viewed the CSCE as helping to prevent the isolation of the Soviet Union and then Russia, especially following the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, by ensuring Moscow's involvement in many important European developments and providing a forum in which Russian leaders could voice their concems. 7 As former Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and others have frequently argued, a peaceful Europe "cannot be created without or against the will of the Soviet Union."8 Consequently, support for strengthening the OSCE has been an important component of German attempts since 1994 to overcome Russian opposition to NATO enlargement.9 In addition, the inclusiveness of the CSCE has endowed it with greater political legitimacy on the whole of the continent and even a higher degree of effectiveness in some respects than other European security institutions. To be sure, its large number of members and the diversity of their interests and concerns have limited the areas in which consensus can be achieved. But, as German officials have pointed out, "problems are more easily resolved inside rather than outside a common security framework."10 Thus, for example, the CSCE has continued to serve as the most appropriate forum for the negotiation of further European arms control agreements. Similarly, it has in many cases offered the most promising institutional framework for providing early warning, preventing hostilities, managing crises, settling disputes, and otherwise addressing and resolving regional conflicts." And it has been the best-positioned of all the European security institutions to acquire certain new competencies, such as the ability to mandate peacekeeping and other military operations in the region. 12 Given its low degree of institutionalization, moreover, what the CSCE has been able to achieve could be accomplished at relatively low cost. 13 Finally, the CSCE has conferred upon Germany and its Western partners a not insignificant degree of leverage over the behavior of the former Soviet bloc states. It has committed its members to a variety of principles and rules pertaining to both inter-state relations and how they treat their own citizens. 14 And it has provided a forum in which Germany and other states could legitimately pose questions and demand explanations about actions that concern them, thereby putting pressure on other members to

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justify and even to change their policies. 15 Although agreements may be harder to reach, the CSCE's consensus rule "makes it more difficult for states to dissociate themselves from a decision once it is made." 16

German Efforts to Strengthen the CSCE Consistent with its interest in a strong pan-European security organization, Germany has actively promoted, both publicly and behind the scenes, the expansion of the CSCE's mandate and capabilities. In 1990; Germany was a leading proponent of the institutionalization of the CSCE. Early in the year, when the unification process was just gaining momentum, then-Foreign Minister Genscher repeatedly called for the establishment of a CSCE Council of Foreign Ministers and European centers for conflict management (later prevention) and arms control verification. 17 These ideas were subsequently endorsed and elaborated on in public by Chancellor Helmut Kohl, who proposed inter alia bi-annual CSCE summit meetings, regular meetings of the CSCE foreign and defense ministers, a permanent CSCE council, and the centers that Genscher had suggested.18 Although they did not all come to fruition, these and other German suggestions formed the basis for many of the sweeping decisions that were taken at the November 1990 CSCE summit in Paris to transform the CSCE into a true international organization. Germany's efforts to build up the CSCE continued apace during each of the next two years. In 1991, Germany worked to strengthen the organization's emergency decision-making procedures. Largely at Germany's urging, the Council of Foreign Ministers, meeting for the first time in Berlin in June 1991, approved a new mechanism for consultation and co. . . . . • 19 operation m cnsrs srtuahons. During the following twelve months, Germany made a number of proposals in preparation for the July 1992 CSCE summit meeting in Helsinki, which represented the next major opportunity to strengthen the body. It proposed the first significant departure from the consensus principle under which the CSCE had previously operated. According to this "consensus minus one" procedure, a state accused of violating agreed CSCE rules would not be able to veto political measures intended to enforce them. 20 Genscher lobbied for constituting the CSCE as a regional arrangement under Chapter Eight of the UN Charter and proposed inter alia that the CSCE be empowered to authorize peacekeeping operations. 21 He called for the adoption of a mandate for new talks on arms control and

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confidence-building measures. 22 And following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, he was one of the most vocal advocates of quickly admitting all the successor states. 23 Each of these goals was achieved at either the January 1992 meeting of the CSCE foreign ministers in Prague or the Helsinki summit itself. Since Helsinki, Germany has continued to work for a stronger CSCE. Along with France, it spearheaded the development of CSCE mechanisms for conciliation and arbitration, which were established in December 1992. 24 Germany also championed the creation of a permanent body, like those ofNATO and the EC, to oversee CSCE conflict prevention and crisis management efforts, which was approved at the December 1993 foreign ministers' meeting in Rome. 25 And Germany was a leading advocate of the Code of Conduct on politico-military aspects of security that was adopted at the Budapest summit in December 1994. 26 In 1994, Germany also proposed, jointly with the Netherlands, that the powers of the Chairman-in-Office and of the Secretary General be strengthened and that the CSCE be enabled to refer matters and make recommendations to the UN Security Council in the event that its own efforts at conflict resolution were unsuccessful, if necessary even without the consent of the states most directly involved, although these further recommendations were not immediately approved. 27 Despite these ongoing efforts, more recent years have witnessed a moderation of German hopes and expectations for the OSCE. Initial Gemmn optimism about the prospects for building a collective security system in Europe has given way to a more sober assessment of the OSCE's possibilities, in no small part because of the organization's inability to make a significant contribution toward halting the fighting in the former Yugoslavia.28 As Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel has observed, "the OSCE's options and instruments reach their limits when the parties in a conflict do not want peace. " 29 Instead, German policy has increasingly placed primary emphasis on developing the OSCE's capacity for the prevention and early warning of conflicts. 3° Kinkel has repeatedly suggested that the job of the OSCE should be to prevent fires, not to put them out. 31

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO was the central institutional focus of German security policy during the Cold War. One of the principal benefits to Germany of alliance

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membership was the security that NATO provided vis-a-vis the perceived Soviet threat. As the Soviet Union first tempered its ideological hostility toward the West and then retrenched militarily in the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, Germany's need for protection and thus its security dependence on its Western allies declined. Consequently, some observers suggested that Germany's ties to NATO would loosen. 32 In contrast to such pessimistic expectations, however, Germany's commitment to NATO has not wavered. German leaders across the political spectrum have continued to express strong support for the alliance and for close security ties with the United States, including an American military presence in Germany. They have continued to view NATO as uniquely capable of enhancing their country's security in a variety of ways. Consequently, an important goal of German security policy has been to preserve NATO, in part by contributing to the process of transforming the alliance so that it can best address the challenges of post-Cold War Europe and thereby retain legitimacy in the eyes of Western publics and of non-members alike.

German Support for NATO Since 1990, German leaders from across the political spectrum have repeatedly, and often enthusiastically, expressed their support for the alliance.33 Few major German government pronouncements on foreign and security policy have not referred to the continuing importance of NATO to Germany. Virtually every high-level official with responsibility for foreign and security policy, from Chancellor Helmut Kohl on down, has insisted on the need to maintain the alliance. They have variously described NATO as the "backbone," "foundation," and "cornerstone" of German security. Likewise, they have characterized the alliance as the "security anchor" for all Europe and the "bedrock" of Europe's security architecture.34 Closely linked to these statements have been equally strong expressions of support for close security ties with the United States. Government officials have frequently emphasized the continuing importance of deep American involvement in European security affairs, including the stationing of U.S. forces on the continent in militarily significant numbers. As Chancellor Kohl has argued, the security partnership with the United States is of"existential importance to Germany." 35 A striking feature of these sentiments is that they have been shared by

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many important figures in the opposition Social Democratic Party (SPD). Leading SPD officials such as Rudolf Scharping, Hans-Ulrich Klose, and Karsten Voigt have stressed the continuing value of NATO, close security relations with the United States, and the deployment of American forces in Europe in similar terms. 36 Although support for the alliance has not been as widespread in the rank and file of the SPD, there has nevertheless been a distinct trend within the party toward greater appreciation of the alliance. This evolution has been evident in the several party platforms that have been elaborated since 1990, which have recognized the usefulness of a continued American troop presence and described NATO as one of the two pillars (along with the European Union) on which Germany's stability and security is based. 37 It should be noted that, in at least one respect, the views of political leaders have not been fully shared by public opinion. According to surveys conducted since 1990, public support for the alliance has remained strong, especially in western Germany, where more than two-thirds of all respondents have usually agreed that NATO is essential to German security. Yet support for a continued American military presence has been weaker, with perhaps even a slight majority at times favoring a complete withdrawal. 38 German political leaders have come under little pressure to see that all U.S. troops leave the country, however. And as the size of the foreign military presence and the number and magnitude of military training activities in Germany have dwindled, the salience of the issue has declined markedly.

German Interests in Preserving and Adapting NATO Why has NATO continued to enjoy such strong support within Germany? German leaders have seen the alliance as serving the interests of their country in several important ways. European Stability and Transatlantic Ties. At the most general level, German leaders have viewed NATO as making a vital if not essential contribution to the maintenance of peace and stability throughout Europe, and thus Germany's own security. 39 They have regarded the alliance as the most tried and tested of Europe's security institutions as well as the only functioning instrument of collective defense. 40 Thus it would make little sense to abandon the alliance as long as no proven alternative existed. In addition, NATO has remained the leading Western forum for

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consultation, policy coordination, and the development of common positions on security issues. 41 Most importantly, German leaders have recognized NATO as the principal vehicle for promoting and maintaining U.S. involvement in European security affairs, which they have regarded in tum as indispensable for peace and stability on the continent. In their view, the alliance has remained the strongest link between Europe and North America, and it has served as the essential basis for the U.S. military presence. 42 As one official bluntly put the matter, continued U.S. security engagement m Europe is only imaginable through NAT0. 43

Preserving the Strategic Balance. Beyond such general arguments about NATO's contributions to stability, German officials have enumerated several more concrete ways in which NATO still serves German interests. Already discussed in Chapter Five is the role of the alliance in stabilizing Central and Eastern Europe. Another important function that NATO has continued to perform in their view is that of preserving the strategic balance in Europe, chiefly by offsetting Russia's military power. Although German leaders have hoped to maintain friendly, cooperative relations with Russia, they have also recognized that Russia remains the strongest military power and the only nuclear superpower on the continent. Thus maintaining stability in Europe has required neutralizing Russia's military power, including its nuclear capabilities, especially as long as any doubt remained about future Russian intentions. 44 As a non-nuclear power, Germany has been unable to perform this balancing function by itself. Instead, most German leaders have regarded the United States as a necessary counterweight to Russia's military power. And largely for this reason, they have considered a continued U.S. military presence in Europe to be vital, because it helps to make the American nuclear guarantee credible. Thus only with U.S. involvement in European security affairs could the strategic balance in Europe be preserved.45 As noted above, moreover, NATO has been viewed as the key institution for perpetuating this U.S. engagement. The alliance has both formalized the American security guarantee and facilitated the presence of U.S. troops in Europe. Without NATO, then, the strategic balance in Europe would be unstable and Germany would feel inadequately protected.46 Of course, Germany's security dependence upon the United States and

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NATO would be greatly reduced if it were to become a nuclear power in its own right. But there has been virtually no interest in Germany in doing so. Indeed, German political authorities have repeatedly rejected the possibility of acquiring a nuclear capability, which they have seen as conferring few if any advantages. As Kohl has said, Germany should have nuclear weapons "under no circumstances."47 Instead, German leaders have much preferred to continue to be able to rely on the U.S. nuclear guarantee.48 Likewise, few have believed that the other Europeans, even acting in concert, could ever provide a fully adequate counterbalance to Russian military power. They have placed little hope in particular in the development of a coherent West European nuclear force based on the British and French nuclear arsenals. They have viewed the states of Western Europe as unable to provide fully for their own security, or at least not without great difficulty, given their relatively small size and divergent interests. Thus only the United States, acting through NATO, has been able to offer adequate nuclear insurance to Germany with respect to the residual threat. 49

Addressing New Threats and Risks. German leaders have also viewed NATO as useful, even vital, for addressing the new threats that have emerged with the end of the Cold War. The existence of the alliance has shielded Germany from the worst consequences of possible negative developments in the region. It has ensured that Germany would not have to face hostile regimes or militarized conflicts on or near its borders alone. And just as NATO's nuclear forces and the U.S. nuclear guarantee have neutralized the potential threat inherent in Russia's nuclear capacity, they have helped to guard Germany against the risks that might arise from nuclear proliferation. 50 Increasingly, moreover, German government officials have seen NATO as playing an important role in managing, resolving, and even terminating regional crises and conflicts. They have envisioned the alliance engaging in preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement operations under the auspices· of the UN and the CSCE, new functions that were dictated in no small part by the alliance's unique capacities.51 Only NATO has been seen by German officials as possessing the means and experience of close cooperation needed to conduct such activities. Its elaborate consultative organs and integrated military struc-

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ture would enable NATO countries to respond more rapidly and effectively to crises and conflicts that might arise in Eastern Europe than would any other organization. In the absence of NATO's institutional mechanisms, efforts by member states to deal with such developments would inevitably be less well coordinated, less effective, and possibly even at cross-purposes. 52 As German officials noted well before the implementation of the 1995 Dayton peace agreement, any large-scale peacekeeping or peace-making operation, to be successful, would almost certainly require the participation of the United States. 53 And the events of 1995 and 1996 in Bosnia only confirmed in their minds the indispensability ofNATO and the United States for those purposes. 54

Reassuring Germany's Neighbors. Finally, German leaders of all political persuasions have regarded NATO as performing an important reassurance function. In their view, Germany's membership in the alliance has damped possible fears of German power among its neighbors, thereby helping to prevent the emergence of tensions and possibly even conflict between them. 55 To be sure, Germany's neighbors have had few if any objective reasons to be concerned about Germany. Germany has willingly accepted sharp limits on its military capabilities. Moreover, the values of democracy, anti-militarism, and international cooperation have been deeply entrenched within the Federal Republic. But Germany's past behavior has cast a long shadow. And the profound change that has occurred in its position within the European state system has inevitably raised questions about its future foreign policy orientation. West Germany's already substantial economic power and its long-term military potential were augmented by unification. In addition, Germany has faced fewer external constraints on its behavior while enjoying greater opportunities for selfassertion, especially those afforded by the reopening of Central and Eastem Europe. Thus it would not have been unnatural for countries that were victimized by Germany in the past to have been concerned that Germany might someday use its new power in ways that were inimical to their interests. German leaders have widely recognized the potential for the emergence of suspicion and mistrust among neighboring countries. 56 And they have seen NATO as an important, even an essential, tool for preventing

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such concerns from arising. In their view, two features of NATO in particular have helped to reassure Germany's neighbors. The first has been U.S. involvement in European security affairs and the American military presence, both of which, as noted above, have been greatly facilitated by NATO. By virtue of this engagement, the United States has been able to play a subtle balancing role among the European members of the alliance, whereby it has served as an implicit counterweight to Germany's power and military potential. As a result, Germany's neighbors have been assured that they need never face German power alone. In the absence of the United States, in contrast, NATO would be dominated by Germany, making the rest of Europe uneasy. 57 This function has been accepted and even encouraged by German leaders, who have recognized that "an American presence in Europe allows its neighbors to feel far more comfortable with the new and larger Germany."58 Second, NATO has provided a framework for the denationalization of German military policy. To an important extent, Germany has continued to formulate and execute its military policy primarily as part of the alliance rather than on a purely national basis. This denationalization through NATO has tempered the natural rivalry and competition that might otherwise have occurred among the European powers. Instead, it has promoted trust, mutual confidence, and understanding between Germany and its western neighbors, facilitating cooperation on a wide range of issues. 59 This effect has been most obvious with respect to the integration of the German armed forces, the Bundeswehr, into the alliance's military command and planning structure. As a result, Germany has foregone or at least deemphasized some of the ingredients essential to an independent military capability, such as a national command authority and balanced forces. Instead, Germany has relied on NATO staffs, collective military assets (such as the NATO fleet of AWACS aircraft), and allied forces to perform vital military functions, thereby limiting its capacity for unilateral action. 60 Consequently, German officials have regarded any change in NATO that fostered a renationalization of security policy as a major setback. In such an event, they have worried, relations within Western Europe would become less stable. Suspicions and fear could mount, leading to friction and possibly even to conflict. 61 Renationalization could have pernicious consequences at the domestic level as well. In particular, Germany's inte-

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gration in NATO has been regarded as helping to prevent a possible resurgence of German nationalism. 62

German Contributions to the Transformation ofNATO Given these strong bases of German support for NATO, it is not surprising that the Federal Republic has made important contributions to the transformation of the alliance since 1990. With the United States and Britain, Germany has played a leading role in this process. 63 Along the way, German leaders have been motivated by two general considerations. For the reasons outlined above, they have been anxious to ensure that NATO would survive the end of the Cold War and could continue to address German security concerns. At the same time, they have been sensitive to the need to adapt NATO to the new European security environment, fearing that Western publics would not long support the alliance in its old form. 64 Germany has made its principal contributions to the transformation of NATO in four areas: (1) the revision of the alliance's strategic concept, (2) the development of NATO's new force structure, (3) alliance efforts to reach out to the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, which were discussed in Chapter Five, and (4) the creation of links between NATO and other European security structures, especially the Eurocorps and the WEU, which are described in the penultimate section of this chapter. NATO's New Strategic Concept. One of the first areas in which Germany left its mark was in the development ofNATO's new strategic concept, which was adopted at the November 1991 Rome summit. During the first half of 1990, German officials insisted that the alliance would have to revise its existing military strategy of flexible response. They regarded such a move as necessary both to reflect the dramatic changes that were occurring in the European security environment and to help overcome opposition to German unification and Germany's continued membership in the alliance. They were eager in particular for NATO to reduce its nuclear reliance, in part by adopting a policy of no first use of nuclear weapons. 65 These efforts were reflected in the declaration adopted by NATO leaders at their July 1990 summit in London, which foresaw the development of a new strategy "making nuclear forces truly weapons of last resort. " 66

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Subsequently, German leaders influenced the content of the new strategic concept principally by pressing for a broad definition of the alliance's functions. They insisted that after the Cold War, NATO must be more than just a defense organization. In addition, they argued, it should engage all the countries of the region to the greatest possible extent,67 and it should be active in the prevention and management of crises and conflicts throughout Europe. 68 These positions were reflected in the considerable emphasis that the new strategic concept placed on dialogue, cooperation, and crisis management and conflict prevention. 69 German insistence on a broad definition of NATO's functions was clearly shaped by the country's relatively greater exposure to potential problems in Central and Eastern Europe. It was also consistent, however, with the broad approach to security that Germany has followed since the inception of Ostpolitik, which placed as much emphasis on the goal of improving East-West relations as it did on deterrence. 70 As noted in the introduction to Part Two, the end of the Cold War has only reinforced this tendency. NATO's New Conventional Force Structure. At the same time, German leaders sought to help reshape NATO's conventional force structure. Germany's principal contribution in this regard was its strong advocacy of deepening the level of integration through the creation of more multinational units. Indeed, German officials had proposed the formation of such units even before the July 1990 London summit, at which the transformation process was formally set in motion. 71 These efforts were rewarded by NATO's adoption in 1991 of a force structure that consisted almost entirely of multinational corps and contained mixed divisions as well. 72 German leaders have viewed multinational units as serving several interrelated purposes, all of which would contribute to NATO's reassurance function. They would make the deployment of U.S. and other NATO troops in Germany more acceptable to the German public and thus help to secure a lasting American military presence in Europe. They would help prevent a renationalization of security policy in Western Europe. And they would build confidence among Germany and its partners, helping to dispel latent fears of German power. 73 Since the 1991 Rome summit, Germany has sought to make good on its commitments to maintain and even deepen the integration of the Bun-

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deswehr in NATO's military structures. It has formed several multilateral corps, as called for in the 1991 plans. 74 And in early 1995, following the withdrawal of the last former Soviet troops from eastern Germany, the government formally reassigned the Bundeswehr units stationed in the region to NAT0. 75 In at least one respect, however, German security policy has unintentionally worked against the preservation of a high level of integration within NATO. As discussed in Chapter Seven, Germany has reduced the size of its forces substantially since 1990. As a result, Germany planned in the mid-1990s to maintain a force of only 22 combat brigades, of which at most 10 would be kept at high levels of readiness. The low readiness of the remaining forces created problems for NATO's new force structure, because of its heavy reliance on multinational corps and divisions. The German units in the two U.S.-German corps, for example, would be much less ready on average than their American counterparts. This disparity limited the amount of training that could be conducted at the corps level, reducing corps effectiveness. 76 Consequently, and more seriously, it created pressure to reestablish a separate U.S. corps, which would undercut the political objectives that the multinational corps were intended to serve. 77

A European Security and Defense Identity The third principal focus of German policy toward Europe's institutional security architecture has been the development of a European security and defense identity (ESDI) based on the European Union (EU) and the West European Union (WEU). Along with France, Germany has been the driving force behind this process. Together, they have played a leading role in the establishment of a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) under the auspices of the EU, the strengthening of the WEU, and the creation of the multinational Eurocorps. Nevertheless, through the mid-1990s, the results of these efforts still fell well short of a true ESDI, possessing an operational capability, that would be able to take decisive action on vital security issues.

German Motives for Developing an ESDI The reasons for the strong German interest in the development of an ESDI since 1990 have been closely related to Germany's motives for

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promoting the European integration process more broadly. German leaders, led by Chancellor Kohl, have been among the most fervent supporters of European unity. Kohl has described the creation of a united Europe as the "cornerstone" of German policy and as being in Germany's "existential interest."78 That goal has been shared, moreover, by the SPD and enshrined in the German constitution. 79 From the German perspective, further European integration has been important-indeed essential-for three main reasons. First, it has been necessary to enable the Europeans to meet the challenges that they have faced, to fulfill their international responsibilities, and to advance their political and economic interests. As German leaders have frequently argued, no European state acting alone could achieve its policy objectives. Rather, in Kohl's words, "we can solve the great economic, social, and ecological as well as the foreign and. security policy questions of the future only jointly in Europe." 80 A second commonly voiced argument has been that continued integration is indispensable for stability and lasting peace on the continent itself. Kohl has made the point most bluntly: "European unity is a matter of war and peace."81 On the one hand, from the German perspective, progress toward political union is a precondition for the stabilization of the reform countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. 82 On the other hand, it is critical to continued good relations among its own members as well. In the view of many German leaders, the integration process has played a central role in overcoming the rivalries of the past. Indeed, it has made the idea of war among the states of Western Europe virtually inconceivable.83 In contrast, the failure to achieve political union could lead to a resurgence of nationalism, the revival of old rivalries, and even a return to open conflict among its members. 84 As Kohl has warned: "If we do not establish [the European Union] ... , we will endanger everything that we have achieved so far." 85 Or as Kinkel has put the matter, the alternative to further integration is not the continuation of the status quo but disintegration. 86 Third, and finally, European integration, like NATO membership, has performed an important reassurance function. German leaders have recognized that, for historical and geographical reasons, Germany has been much more mistrusted than other countries. By dedicating itself to the integration process and embedding itself in the European Community,

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however, Germany has been able to allay many of the concerns of its neighbors. In the absence of such a well-developed institution, other countries would be more fearful and suspicious of Germany's intentions, leading in the worst case to its renewed isolation. 87 German leaders have viewed the development of an ESDI very much within this broader context. In the first place, true political union would not be possible in their eyes unless it included a common foreign and security policy and, eventually, a common European defense. These have also been the areas in which the danger of a renationalization of policy has been greatest. Thus an ESDI has been seen as an integral component of the overall European integration process. 88 German leaders have also regarded the development of an ESDI as necessary to ensure that the countries of Europe dispose of an efficient set of instruments for safeguarding their common interests. Europe would not be able to deal with regional and global challenges, or even be taken seriously, in their view, until it could speak with one voice in the areas of foreign, security, and defense policy. 89 These sentiments were significantly strengthened by the experiences of the 1990-91 Gulf War and the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, which starkly illuminated the limited ability of the EC to act as a cohesive unit. 90 The EC's failure to achieve a negotiated solution among the warring Yugoslav republics during the autumn of 1991 also underscored the need for a military capacity to back up its diplomatic efforts. 91 This second reason for an ESDI was reinforced by the initially passive American response to the events in Yugoslavia. U.S. inaction raised concerns that the European members ofNATO could not automatically count on the United States to help address crises and conflicts, especially lesser ones, that arose on the continent. Instead, some Germans reluctantly concluded, the Europeans might increasingly have to deal with regional . Issues . secunty aIone. n More often, however, German officials have argued that the construction of an ESDI would help to preserve NATO and to secure continued U.S. involvement in European security affairs. 93 By enabling the Europeans to assume more responsibility, it would reduce the burdens previously shouldered by the United States. It would strengthen the European pillar ofNATO and thus the alliance itself. And it would bring France closer to NATO. Indeed, Defense Minister Volker Ruhe has described Europe's

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development into an equal partner of the United States as a "prerequisite" for lasting American engagement. 94

German Efforts to Develop an ESDI For all of these reasons, Germany has been at the forefront of European efforts to establish an ESDI since 1990. It has played a leading role in the development of a framework for the elaboration of a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) for the European Union, as set forth in the Treaty on European Union (TEU) agreed to at Maastricht in December 1991. It has also worked to strengthen the operational capabilities of the WEU and to bring that organization closer to the EU. And, along with France, it founded the multinational Eurocorps, which several other West European states have subsequently joined. The CFSP had its origins in an April 1990 Franco-German proposal that the EC conduct a special intergovernmental conference (IGC) on political union, which would parallel the IGC on economic and monetary union already planned to begin in December of that year. The proposal, which took the form of a joint letter from Kohl and French President Fran9ois Mitterand to the EC President, requested that the IGC consider inter alia the definition and implementation of a CFSP. 95 Days before the IGC officially opened, Kohl and Mitterand sent a second letter, in which they spelled out their views on the form that the CFSP should take. 96 They proposed that the CFSP should extend to all areas. In particular, "the Political Union should include a genuine security policy, which should lead ultimately to a common defense." This proposal marked a sharp departure from previous EC cooperation in external policy, which had excluded all military aspects of security. In addition, they suggested, the IGC should examine how the political union and the WEU could establish a clear organic relationship and thus how the WEU could eventually form a part of the political union and elaborate the common security policy for it. Finally, they recommended that, although decisions should in principle be made unanimously, the treaty should allow for the possibility that certain actions could be decided by a majority. These proposals were repeated and elaborated upon in a further Franco-German paper on security policy cooperation within the framework of the CFSP, which was submitted jointly by Genscher and French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas in early February 1991. This paper

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stressed that the creation of the European Union would remain incomplete without a. common defense. It described in more detail the areas of security policy that might be the subject of a common policy. And it placed even greater emphasis on the important role of the WEU, which it described as "an integral component of the European unification project," and proposed specific measures for bringing the WEU closer to the political union. 97 Finally, as the 12 months allotted for the work of the IGC on political union drew to a close, Kohl and Mitterand submitted a third letter that focused entirely on the CFSP. This letter, which consisted largely of draft treaty language, devoted unprecedented attention to the defense aspects of the project. It referred to the WEU as the defense component of the political union, and it made a number of concrete proposals for strengthening the operational role of the WEU. These included the establishment of a WEU planning and coordination staff, regular meetings of the military chiefs of staff, and the creation of military units that would be assigned to the WEU. 98 These Franco-German proposals formed much of the basis for the provisions for a common foreign and security policy that were contained in the Treaty on European Union and the accompanying declaration by the members of the WEU on the role of the WEU and its relations with the EU and NATO. Much as German leaders had desired, the treaty established a CFSP embracing "all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence." It also provided for the WEU "to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications." Simultaneously, the WEU declaration set the goal of developing the WEU as "the defence component of the European Union" and announced a number of measures that would be taken to develop a close working relationship between the two bodies. It also endorsed most of the proposals for strengthening the WEU's operational role contained in the October 1991 Kohl-Mitterand letter. 99 In its capacity as President of the WEU during 1991-92, Germany continued to work to strengthen that body during the six months following the completion of the IGC. These efforts focused on the preparation of a further declaration, greatly influenced by Germany, which was adopted by the WEU foreign ministers at their meeting outside of Bonn

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in June 1992. 100 The Petersberg Declaration spelled out the tasks for which WEU military units could be employed, in addition to contributing to the common defense, which included humanitarian, peacekeeping, crisis management, and even peace-making missions. It also set forth the conditions under which EU members could become members or observers of the WEU as well, with the intention of maximizing the degree of overlap between the two bodies. 101 Despite Germany's efforts and these noteworthy achievements, much of the impetus for the development of an ESDI subsequently dissipated and progress slowed to a crawl. This loss of momentum coincided with the more general difficulties encountered by the integration process, as the ratification of the Treaty on European Union ran into serious obstacles in Denmark and France. In addition, the continuing inability of the West Europeans to have an impact on the situation in Bosnia caused many to lower their expectations for the ESDI. 102 Consequently, as the beginning of a second post-Cold War IGC, which was intended to assess the results of the Maastricht Treaty and to decide further integrative steps, approached in 1996, Germany mounted a large-scale effort to revive the faltering ESDI project. In addition to the usual reasons, this campaign was motivated by two further considerations. One was the perceived need to make the EU's decision-making structures more streamlined in advance of the body's anticipated enlargement to the east. 103 The other was renewed doubt about the willingness of the United States to remain engaged in European security affairs, as prompted by the strong domestic opposition voiced against U.S. participation in NATO operations first to secure the withdrawal of UN troops from Bosnia and then to implement the 1995 Dayton peace agreement.to4 To this end, German officials put forward three related sets of proposals in advance of the 1996 IGC. First, they called for increasing the organizational abilities of the EU in the sphere of foreign and security policy. In particular, they advocated the establishment of a permanent planning and analysis unit within the secretariat of the European Council, which would play a central role in preparing and implementing the Council's decisions with respect to the CFSP, and the creation of the position of secretary general, who might direct the work of the new unit and represent the European Union on CFSP issues. 105 At the same time,

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they urged further strengthening the operational capacity of the WEU so that it would be able to carry out the tasks outlined in the Petersberg Declaration. 106 Second, German leaders stressed the need to make the process of taking and implementing decisions in the area of foreign and security policy more efficient chiefly by a further loosening of the consensus principle. They argued that, in principle, all decisions should be made by a qualified majority. Only decisions with direct military consequences or on matters touching upon the most vital interests of particular countries, such as defense policy, military operations, and other troop deployments, would be exempted from this provision. In place of the need for unanimity, they would substitute the principle of "constructive abstention," whereby a state could register its reservations regarding certain actions without imposing a veto. Thus the presence of dissenters need not prevent a majority of members from acting, although the former could not be forced to participate in joint operations without their consent. 107 Third, German officials lobbied for a further tightening of relations between the EU and the WEU, whose merger they sought to achieve in the medium term through an incremental process of integration. 108 To this end, they suggested several concrete measures that could be taken in the interim. The European Council should be formally given the power to set guidelines for the WEU, thereby making possible common action in matters of defense as well as other aspects of security policy. In addition, the Treaty on European Union should be modified to include a general political solidarity clause, one that nevertheless stopped short of a mutual commitment to provide military assistance, and to incorporate the goals of the Petersberg Declaration. 109

Franco-German Security Cooperation and the Eurocorps Meriting separate mention are the primarily bilateral efforts undertaken by Germany since 1990 in conjunction with France that have been intended to help lay the foundation for an ESDI, most notably the establishment of the multinational Eurocorps. These efforts must be viewed within the broader context of the Franco-German relationship. It is difficult to exaggerate the importance that German leaders have attached to maintaining good relations with their western neighbor, which Kohl has described as being "of existential importance." 110 Not only are they fear-

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ful of possibly reopening the rifts that divided the two countries so deeply in the past, but they have viewed, perhaps not unjustifiably, close ties with France as essential for further progress toward European integration.111 Not surprisingly, this imperative for cooperation has extended to security affairs both during and after the Cold War. In the 1980s, as noted in Chapter Three, France and Germany engaged in a unique degree of bilateral security cooperation outside the NATO and WEU frameworks. As the most concrete expression of this engagement, the two countries agreed in 1987 to form a joint brigade, which was activated in October 1990. Building on that foundation, Kohl and Mitterand announced, in a brief addendum to their October 1991 letter, that the brigade would be expanded. This strengthened Franco-German unit, they hoped, could form the nucleus of a European corps, in which the forces of other WEU members could be included. They further suggested that such a structure could serve as a model for closer military cooperation among the WEU members more generally. 112 During the next half-year, Germany and France worked out detailed plans for the so-called Eurocorps, which were publicly unveiled by Kohl and Mitterand in La Rochelle in May 1992. The corps would have three missions: to defend the territory of NATO and WEU allies; to provide humanitarian assistance; and, most controversially, to conduct peacekeeping and even peace-making operations outside the NATO area in cases where the alliance declined to intervene. Initially, it would consist of the Franco-German brigade, a French armored division, and a German mechanized division of two brigades, but Kohl and Mitterand reiterated their invitation to other WEU countries to participate. As a first step, France and Germany would establish a planning staff in Strasbourg, where the corps would eventually be headquartered, and October 1995 was designated as the date on which the corps would become operational.113 Beyond its general interest in promoting cooperation with France, Germany had several specific motives for creating the Eurocorps. The October 1991 announcement was intended to give additional impetus to the IGC on political union at a time when the EC states remained divided over many aspects of the negotiations. Such an entity could provide the foundation for a European defense identity that German leaders believed

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would be a necessary element of any true political union. The announcement would also reaffirm Germany's commitment to integration and its willingness to accept the limits on its freedom of action that political union would entail. 114 A closely related concern was to reinforce Franco-German relations at a critical stage in the European integration process. 115 The events of the previous two years had placed the relationship under considerable strain. Most recently, French leaders had felt irked by Germany's agreement the previous May to the proposed NATO Rapid Reaction Corps, which had prevailed over an alternative French concept, and, more generally, the rapid progress being made in the NATO strategy and force structure review, which threatened to eclipse the steps being taken toward the ESDI they desired. 116 Finally, German officials viewed the Eurocorps as a mechanism for inducing France to retain a significant number of troops on German soil. In July 1990, Mitterand had announced that France would withdraw all of its forces in Germany, except those in the joint brigade, by the middle of the decade. 117 He had done so, moreover, despite repeated German assurances that French soldiers would continue to be welcome in Germany in the future. 118 The Eurocorps promised to provide an acceptable post-Cold War rationale for a continued French presence. This goal was promptly achieved at the end of October 1991, when France announced that one of the three divisions in Germany would stay to form part of the corps. 119 Subsequently, France and Germany undertook several additional noteworthy security-related initiatives. In 1994, they agreed to establish a joint armaments agency by 1996. Although its work would initially be focused on bilateral projects, such as the procurement of weapons for use in the Eurocorps, the body was intended to form the nucleus of a future European armaments agency. 120 That same year, Germany also decided in principle to become a major participant in the ongoing French military satellite program, later agreeing to contribute several hundred million deutschmarks to the development and production of a new photoreconnaissance satellite. 121 And in late 1996, Kohl and French President Jacques Chirac approved a common security and defense concept that called for further military and armaments cooperation, an intensification of joint strategic planning, and the initiation of a dialogue on the role of nuclear deterrence in the context of European defense policy. 122

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Resolving Conflicts in German Policy Outsiders have often viewed Germany's simultaneous support for the CSCE, NATO, and an ESDI as inconsistent, contradictory, and even counterproductive. They have leveled particular criticism at Germany's efforts to create a common foreign and security policy for the European Union and the Eurocorps proposal, which they have seen as conflicting with NAT0. 123 For the most part, German officials have rejected these criticisms as baseless. They have viewed the major European security institutions as complementary and mutually reinforcing. Nevertheless, when criticized, they have generally taken their allies' concerns to heart and worked to ensure the compatibility of the various organizations.

Tensions in German Policy Criticism of the Franco-German proposals for a common foreign and security policy emerged not long after the IGC on political union had begun. U.S. officials in particular voiced several concerns in a series of statements and demarches during the late winter and early spring of 1991. First, they feared that realization of the Franco-German proposals could lead to the creation of a European caucus within NATO, which might present the United States with non-negotiable positions as the EC had already done in other fora. Second, new European defense arrangements might weaken NATO's integrated military structure and even the alliance's security guarantees, especially insofar as they effectively afforded neutral EC members a say in NATO decisions. Third, European defense efforts, if not carefully coordinated with NATO, could result in duplication of effort and wasted resources. These concerns were shared by some European allies, especially Britain and the Netherlands, which worried that merging the WEU into the EC would suggest a weakening of European support for NATO. 124 Although such expressions of concern soon died down, a new and even more intense barrage of criticism greeted the October 1991 proposal to establish a European corps. The depth of the disquiet that the announcement caused in the United States was revealed most dramatically at the Rome NATO summit in early November. Departing from his prepared remarks, President George Bush declared: "If, my friends, your ul-

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timate aim is to provide independently for your own defense, the time to tell us is today." 125 Unlike the previous proposals, the creation of such an entity appeared to represent a clear challenge to NATO's primacy. It would duplicate the alliance's existing capabilities and possibly reduce its operational effectiveness. By diverting scarce defense resources, it would necessarily diminish the European commitment to NATO. And it might undermine public support for NATO in the United States and intensify Congressional pressure to accelerate the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the continent. Thus, all in all, it threatened to cause NATO to unravel. 126 The strongly negative reception to the European corps proposal was also undoubtedly influenced by the manner in which it was developed and presented. Within Germany, the initiative was prepared almost entirely within the Chancellor's Office. Little or no information was shared with officials in the Foreign and Defense ministries before its announcement. Consequently, insufficient prior consideration was given to the issues of what relationship the new body should have with NATO and how other states would react to the proposal. 127 And at a meeting of the NATO defense ministers several days later, German Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg was unable to answer his colleagues' many questions to their satisfaction, fueling speculation about Germany's true intentions. 128

German Attitudes German officials have tended to reject such criticisms as unfounded. They have seen no inherent conflict between the major European security institutions and thus no contradiction in supporting all of them simultaneously. To the contrary, they have viewed the CSCE, NATO, and the evolving ESDI as compatible, complementary, and even mutually reinforcing. Each would perform valuable functions and could be even more effective in the presence of the others. A variety of institutions, moreover, would offer greater flexibility and the opportunity for specialization. 129 German officials have consistently described a stronger CSCE as a complement to, not a substitute for, proven institutions like NATO, the EC, and the WEU. 130 Indeed, they have regarded NATO as necessary for the CSCE's success. For example, in their view, NATO's participation in CSCE peacekeeping missions would strengthen the latter organization's conflict management potential. 131 At the same time, they have resisted

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measures, such as the Russian proposal to subordinate NATO to the panEuropean body, that might reduce the alliance's effectiveness. 132 Similarly, all high-level German officials have stressed the complementariness ofNATO and an ESDI, both of which they have deemed vital to German and European security. 133 Consequently, they have repeatedly voiced their desire to avoid any weakening of the Atlantic Alliance even as they have sought to build up the ESDI. To the contrary, as noted above, they have viewed these efforts as in fact strengthening NATO and U.S. engagement in European security affairs. 134 And some Germans have even suggested that an ESDI might not be possible without NAT0. 135 As Kinkel has stated, a united Europe "can achieve inner balance and an external ability to act only with close transatlantic ties." 136 The same views have marked German attitudes toward the Eurocorps. German officials have insisted that the new military unit would pose no threat to NATO. In fact, it would reinforce the alliance by strengthening its European pillar and reducing the burdens shouldered by the United States. 137 They have also portrayed it as a means of drawing France closer to NATO's military structures. 138 The only occasion on which German leaders perceived a clear conflict between Franco-German security cooperation and Germany's transatlantic ties occurred in the late summer of 1995, when France floated the idea of "concerted deterrence" by the two countries. Although the concept was never publicly elaborated, it suggested that Germany would at a minimum be consulted in advance of and might even have a say in decisions regarding the use of French nuclear weapons. Anxious to ensure that neither the nuclear protection afforded by NATO and the United States nor Germany's commitment to a non-nuclear status was called into question, German officials responded to the French suggestion with noticeable reserve. 139

German Efforts to Resolve the Conflicts Although they have denied the existence of fundamental conflicts between the various European security organizations, German leaders have been sensitive to the concerns and criticisms of their allies. With the principal exception of the announcement of the Eurocorps, they have worked assiduously to avoid misunderstandings and, where they have nevertheless arisen, to issue clarifications. In cases where potential con-

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flicts have in fact existed, especially with regard to the Eurocorps, the Germans have sought to resolve such conflicts to the satisfaction of their allies. Prior to each of the major Franco-German pronouncements concerning the creation of a CFSP, German leaders labored to include language making clear that their intention was not to undermine or replace NATO. The December 1990 Franco-German letter stated that the IGC should respect the commitments previously made to members of the Atlantic Alliance and argued that NATO as a whole would be strengthened through an increase in the role and responsibility of the Europeans. 140 The Genscher-Dumas paper reiterated these themes but went considerably further.141 It stressed that the Atlantic Alliance, including a continuing American military presence in Europe, remained indispensable for European stability and security. It also described the WEU as the "channel" through which the political union and NATO would cooperate and the mutual strengthening of the European and transatlantic security structures would be guaranteed. And it concluded that a European security and defense identity should be expressed through the strengthening of a European pillar within the alliance. After strong U.S. concerns about the implications of the FrancoGerinan proposals for NATO nevertheless arose, German leaders went to great lengths to reassure their American counterparts. In a widely noted joint statement with then-U.S. Secretary of State James Baker in May 1991, Genscher agreed that NATO should be the principal venue for consultation and the forum for agreement on all policies bearing on the security and defense commitments of its members and that NATO should maintain an effective integrated military structure to provide for collective defense. 142 And in a major policy address later that month in Washington, Kohl insisted that his government did not want to see NATO weakened in any way, still less replaced, by a European defense structure: Where a common European foreign and security policy is concerned, it is for us not a question of either/or but of one as well as the other. The Western European Union can serve both to strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance and to develop a security policy dimension within the Community. 143

These and other less public efforts helped to allay the fears that were raised by the previous Franco-German announcements. Further assurances were contained in the October 1991 Franco-

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German letter and the Treaty on European Union itself. Nevertheless, German leaders failed completely to prepare their allies for the Eurocorps proposal. Instead, they were forced to engage in extensive damage control measures in order to dispel the concerns that had arisen, especially in the United States, that the Europeans wanted to establish an alternative to NATO. These efforts took two principal forms. First, on the diplomatic front, German officials immediately and repeatedly assured their allies that any troops designated for inclusion in the new corps would retain their NATO assignments and that the alliance would continue to have first call on them. 144 This commitment was embodied, moreover, in the May 1992 Franco-German declaration that formally established the 145 corps. The second German response was to make sure that the existence of the Eurocorps would be entirely compatible with NATO from an operational standpoint. In bilateral discussions with France during the following year, German officials insisted that it be possible to place the corps under NATO command in the event of an attack on allied territory. By creating such a formal link, moreover, Germany could also make good on the claim that the Eurocorps would bring France closer to the alliance. 146 These efforts eventually resulted in success. In December 1992, France and Germany announced their readiness to negotiate an agreement with NATO regarding the use of the corps by the alliance along the lines Germany had sought, and the details of the arrangement were worked out during the following month. Under the terms of the final agreement, the corps would be assigned to NATO for defense purposes in a crisis or if an alliance member were attacked on the condition that it be deployed only as an integral unit under its own commander. It could also be used in NATO-run peacekeeping operations, and the alliance would have the right to review the corps' operations in peacetime so as to determine its compatibility with NATO's planning, training, and doctrine. 147 Since then, German leaders have repeatedly insisted that an ESDI be compatible with and embedded in the NATO framework. 148 In particular, they have consistently opposed the duplication of existing NATO military structures even as they have sought to increase the operational capabilities of the WEU and the Eurocorps. 149 Instead, Germany has preferred to modify NATO's planning, command, and decision-making structures in ways that would enable the West European members of the alliance to conduct military operations independently of the United States, should it

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choose not to participate, while drawing upon common NATO assets. These efforts were given additional impetus by France's December 1995 decision to renew its participation in the alliance's military organs after an absence of nearly three decades, which also caused German officials to lend their support to French calls for apportioning to the Europeans more positions of leadership and responsibility within the NATO integrated military structure. 150 Nevertheless, German policy has continued to be predicated on the assumption that NATO would retain responsibility for the defense of all of its members while the WEU would focus its efforts on developing the capabilities required to conduct the additional tasks defined in the Petersberg Declaration. 151

Conclusion Europe's institutional security architecture has been an important focus of German security policy since unification. Germany has been a strong supporter of all of the continent's principal security institutions. It has played a leading role in strengthening the CSCE, maintaining and adapting NATO, and creating a new ESDI. The importance of doing so has been virtually an article of faith among German political leaders. 152 Of course, this general affinity toward security institutions has not meant that German political elites and parties have never differed over which institutions to stress and which specific policy actions to take. Former Foreign Minister Genscher and the opposition SPD have been the leading champions of pan-European structures, while Kohl and his party, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), have been the driving force behind Franco-German security cooperation and the development of an ESDI. In addition, the SPD has been sharply critical of the steps taken by the government to strengthen Western Europe's military capabilities and to broaden the operational mandates of its security institutions, viewing them as inappropriate attempts to use military integration as an engine of European integration and as increasing the probability of German involvement in military operations outside of the NATO area, as both the May 1992 Eurocorps agreement and the June 1992 Petersberg Declaration appeared to do. 153 No major disagreements have erupted, however, within the governing coalition. More importantly, a palpable shift of emphasis has occurred in German preferences and policy since unification. The hopes for the erection

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of a collective security system based on the CSCE that arose in 1990 soon gave way to more sober assessments of that institution's possibilities. Likewise, much of the initial urgency that attended German efforts to create an adequate ESDI subsided by 1993 even though the goal remained far from realization. In contrast, the importance German leaders have attached to NATO has only increased. Although a good number initially viewed the alliance largely as a short-term expedient that would eventually be eclipsed or subsumed by more appropriate post-Cold War security structures, almost all have come to regard NATO, if they did not already, as being of considerable value well into the future. This shift has been most marked within the SPD, many of whose leaders initially expected that the alliance would have no reason to exist once the Warsaw Pact dissolved. 154 By late 1993, however, the party had adopted the position that NATO would continue to play a stabilizing role until a fully effective European collective security system had been established, which meant that its usefulness would not soon dissipate. 155 Clearly, Germany's strong support for European security institutions after unification is difficult to reconcile with the expectations of realism. This record is certainly inconsistent with the common realist assumption that states will seek to maximize their autonomy and avoid external ties wherever possible. To the contrary, Germany has continued to devise and execute its security policy almost entirely in the context of international institutions, notwithstanding its much greater potential freedom of action following the end of the Cold War. Instead, this important component of German policy can be understood much more readily in terms of the premises of institutionalist theory, especially its emphasis on the opportunities that international institutions can provide to states. To be sure, German policy toward the various European security institutions has represented a response to concerns about aspects of Germany's external environment that are adequately captured by realist theory. Without such concerns, there would presumably be much less, if any, need for such institutions. What realism overlooks, however, are the ways in which Germany has been able to use international institutions as tools for addressing its security concerns and otherwise pursuing its interests. 156 NATO and, to a lesser extent, the emerging ESDI have performed the traditional function of providing protection against actual or potential military threats to Germany. NATO in particular has been vital for main-

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taining the strategic balance on the continent and has offered a shield against the danger of nuclear proliferation. Working within these institutions, Germany has been able to achieve higher levels of security at less cost than if it had acted on its own. Security institutions have also offered some of the few instruments available for managing and containing, if not resolving, regional crises and conflicts. Perhaps more importantly in the long term, especially from the German perspective, they have provided mechanisms for preventing new military threats and nearby tensions and hostilities from arising in the first place. To this end, Germany has sought to use them to build bridges between the two halves of the continent, thereby avoiding the isolation of any major power, especially Russia, and, as discussed in Chapter Five, to promote reform in the countries of the former Soviet bloc. Finally, security institutions have continued to play an indispensable role in sustaining cooperation and suppressing the residual potential for conflict among the states of Western Europe. German leaders have regarded them, and especially their integrative military structures, as essential for preventing a renationalization of Western security and defense policies. 157 Likewise, they have viewed them as vital for reassuring Germany's neighbors, who might otherwise have been unsettled by Germany's enhanced power and potential for self-assertion, by placing constraints on its military capabilities and signaling its benign intentions. 158 At the same time, international events and changing external circumstances, by favoring the development of some institutions over others, have been largely responsible for the shifts of emphasis in German policy. The difficulties encountered by the reform process in Central and Eastern Europe, and especially in the Soviet Union and then Russia, and the CSCE's ineffectiveness in the face of hostilities in the former Yugoslavia appeared to place limits on the degree to which German security could be entrusted to pan-European structures. The Gulf War experience and then the outbreak of fighting in the Balkans added fuel to the arguments for creating an effective ESDI, but the conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia subsequently tended to underscore the divisions among the Europeans and their continuing security dependence upon the United States. In contrast, most of these events reinforced the importance of NATO, either as an insurance policy against possible reverses in the reform process in Moscow or as the only practical instrument for bringing military force to bear in regional trouble spots, a conclusion that was tempered only by re-

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current doubts about American willingness to remain engaged in European security affairs. Despite these shifts, however, the tremendous emphasis that Germany has placed on finding institutional solutions to its security concerns has remained constant. The principal puzzle from an institutionalist perspective is not that Germany has failed to use international institutions but that it has championed so many different institutional forms simultaneously. This acrossthe-board approach has sometimes been dysfunctional, as when it has provoked sharp criticism by Germany's partners, who have viewed it as inconsistent, contradictory, and even counterproductive. It also stands in contrast to the policies of the other major West European states, which have been much more selective in their support for the various alternative . secunty arrangements. To be sure, a less discriminating approach may nevertheless have been instrumental from the German perspective. Each of the principal European security institutions has provided important benefits to Germany. But it is less problematic when viewed in the context of Germany's distinct national security culture. As argued in Chapter Four, most Germans have shared a deep aversion to unilateralism and an equally strong instinctive preference for international cooperation and multilateralism. In addition, they have strongly preferred that Germany maintain a low profile in international security affairs. These deeply held attitudes have inclined German leaders to place considerable intrinsic value on European security institutions independently of any careful cost-benefit calculations. They help to explain why German officials have seen no inherent contradictions in promoting all of the major regional bodies simultaneously and thus have underestimated the possible conflicts in such an approach. Instead, the importance of creating, maintaining, and strengthening such institutions wherever the opportunity to do so exists has been virtually an article of faith among the . . 1e1"tte. 160 German po1thea I~

CHAPTER SEVEN

Transforming the German Armed Forces Since 1990, [the Bundeswehr] has been undergoing the greatest transformation in its almost forty-year history. -Federal Ministry of Defense

Notwithstanding the end of the Cold War, armed forces remain an indispensable instrument of national security policy for major powers, and Germany is no exceptiop in this regard. Aside from this basic fact, however, virtually everything else having to do with the German armed forces has changed. In response to Germany's altered strategic circumstances, the Bundeswehr has undergone a profound transformation ~ince unification. While the need to be ready to defend the Federal Republic against a direct attack at a moment's notice has all but disappeared, the spectrum of tasks and responsibilities for which the Bundeswehr must prepare has grown much broader and more diversified. At the same time, the German armed forces have been reduced in size by nearly one-third from their Cold War maximum, and by as much as one-half if the forces of the former German Democratic Republic are taken into account. In order to be able to address its new tasks in the context of highly constrained resources, the Bundeswehr has been fundamentally restructured. The principal feature of this restructuring has been the differentiation of the Bundeswehr into two basic types of forces: highly ready units capable of rapid deployment to distant crisis regions and mobilizationdependent forces intended primarily for national defense. This restructuring has been hindered, however, by the very resource constraints that have necessitated it, which have in particular prevented or slowed the acquisition of equipment required by the new crisis reaction forces. In the meantime, moreover, the German government has been frequently sty-

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mied in its efforts to develop new national capabilities for the operational control of German armed forces in situations, such as UN missions beyond NATO territory, where they must operate outside of the alliance structures on which the Federal Republic has traditionally relied. Finally, these changes have raised questions about the desirability and feasibility of maintaining the Federal Republic's traditional commitment to universal military service for males (Wehrpflicht). Although the government has thus far staunchly defended conscription, it has nevertheless introduced significant modifications in the terms of military service in response to the need to reduce and restructure the Bundeswehr. Despite these difficulties, the transformation of the Bundeswehr has endowed it with capabilities for missions outside of Germany that it never before possessed. This development is no cause for alarm, however. The Bundeswehr will remain primarily an alliance army. German force planning continues to be premised on the maintenance of Western defense integration in NATO and possibly new West European security structures, and all operational German military units remain assigned to NATO for planning purposes. 1 In addition, the Bundeswehr's new capabilities are entirely consonant with what are widely perceived, both inside and outside of the country, to be Germany's expanded alliance and international obligations after the Cold War. Germany has no ambitions to create a purely national military posture. 2 Instead, Germany will remain largely dependent on its allies if it is to make full use of the Bundeswehr's increased capacity for out-of-country and out-of-area operations. 3 As a result, Germany's ability to project military power beyond its borders for narrow national purposes will continue to be extremely limited. And as discussed in Chapter Eight, even if the Bundeswehr's capabilities were not so restricted, Germany's political leaders would be willing to use the Bundeswehr only for missions that are undertaken in close cooperation with its allies and that have a clear international mandate.

Redefining the Tasks of the Bundeswehr One of the German government's first tasks after unification was to redefine the missions of the armed forces, taking into account Germany's fundamentally altered geopolitical circumstances. Although some impor-

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tant decisions regarding the future size and structure of the Bundeswehr had already been made, such a redefinition was a necessary precondition for detailed force planning. During the Cold War, the Bundeswehr had one overriding military mission: to deter and, if necessary, to defend against a potentially largescale, Soviet-led Warsaw Pact attack on the Federal Republic launched with little or no waming. 4 Almost all military planning and resources were devoted to this primary contingency. In contrast, there was virtually no thought of using the Bundeswehr outside ofthe NATO area or even to defend NATO allies other than Germany's immediate neighbors. No one wanted West Germany to develop a major military role beyond territorial defense. 5 Following unification and the end of the Cold War in Europe, many people asked whether Germany still needed an army at all. Indeed, the Green Party formally called for the eventual dissolution of the Bundeswehr.6 Nevertheless, within the government and even most opposition leadership circles, no one questioned the need to maintain at least some armed forces. 7 At a minimum, they would be required for reasons of national defense, although purposes beyond that basic consensus remained controversial. The potential for controversy, however, did not inhibit the government from articulating a new definition of the military tasks of the Bundeswehr, including some that did not yet have a clear constitutional basis. These tasks were set forth most explicitly in a series of documents prepared intermittently over the course of several years in the Ministry of Defense. 8 Although the details of the definition varied somewhat, the essential content remained the same. 9 Most significantly, the mandate assigned to the Bundeswehr was much broader and more diverse than during the Cold War, reflecting the decline in the former threat and the increased relative salience of a range of other risks. The Bundeswehr was still conceived of primarily as an alliance army, not an instrument for independent military action by the Federal Republic. Accordingly, the core military task of the Bundeswehr was defined as the defense of Germany and its allies within the context of Germany's alliances, especially NATO. Although direct attacks on NATO countries were now viewed as highly unlikely, they remained the most dangerous risk to German security. 10 What was new about this formulation was the emphasis that it placed

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on the protection of Germany's allies, wherever they might be located. The defense of alliance territory was termed "extended national defense" and was accorded the same priority as the defense of Germany itself. 11 This task stemmed from Germany's alliance obligations as reinterpreted in the new circumstances. As Defense Minister Volker Riihe told the Bundestag in September 1992, "Our allies expect us to show the same solidarity that we were shown every day for decades in the face of an acute and existential threat. . . . [Thus] in the future, Germany must be ready to defend the alliance and other nations in the alliance area-just as others were ready to do for Germany for 40 years." 12 Closely related to the function of extended national defense was the use of the Bundeswehr in crisis management and conflict prevention measures undertaken by the alliance. As Riihe explained in a February 1994 speech, Crises and conflicts that erupt at smaller or larger distances but which may tum into a threat for individual or several alliance partners through regional escalation are more likely to occur in the future. It is in Germany's vital security interest to contain such critical developments regionally and to prevent them from spreading to Central Europe .... [Thus] the Bundeswehr must be in a position to contribute to settling probable international crises and conflicts together with allies and partners. 13

Insofar as this final alliance mission might involve operations outside the NATO area, it shaded into a third set of military tasks, those undertaken within the UN framework. The Bundeswehr was expected to be able to participate in a variety of international peace missions conducted under UN auspices, at least in those cases where the constitutional basis had been clearly established. These tasks ranged from the provision of humanitarian assistance, to traditional UN "Blue Helmet" peacekeeping operations, to measures intended to preserve or restore the peace, possibly including combat operations. 14 Alongside its military tasks, the Bundeswehr would also perform anumber of primarily political functions. For some, the armed forces served as an expression of German sovereignty. 15 Perhaps more importantly, they were deemed vital to Germany's ability to be part of an alliance (Bundnisfiihigkeit), which was equally essential to its security. 16 Similarly, Riihe frequently argued, the establishment of a common European security and defense policy, and thus progress toward European integration more generally, would not be possible without an appropriate German military

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contribution. 17 Within the context of alliances and international organizations, moreover, the maintenance of adequate armed forces was regarded as an important determinant of Germany's ability to exert influence. 18 In addition, the Bundeswehr might be used to promote reconciliation with and reform in Germany's eastern neighbors through joint military contacts, training, and exercises. 19 Finally, German soldiers would continue to participate in humanitarian missions, disaster relief efforts, and rescue operations.

Reducing the Size of the Bundeswehr Perhaps the most evident change to have occurred in the German armed forces during the years following unification has been a significant reduction in their overall size. The peacetime strength of the Bundeswehr fell to 340,000 men under arms, or to roughly two-thirds of its size during the height of the Cold War, while its potential maximum wartime strength following mobilization declined by approximately one-half. These reductions occurred, moreover, notwithstanding Germany's increased population and geographical area and the Bundeswehr's broader task spectrum. They reflected primarily the reduced need for armed forces in the generally less threatening post-Cold War security environment and sharp budgetary constraints brought about in no small part by the high and prolonged costs of unifying the country.

Initial Plans Following the decision to rearm in the mid-1950s, Germany had built up its armed forces to a peacetime strength of nearly 500,000 men. Upon mobilization, moreover, the Bundeswehr could have been nearly tripled in size, to more than 1.3 million combatants. During the year prior to the historic July 1990 agreement between Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev that paved the way for unification, however, the German government had made plans to reduce the size of the armed forces in response to the fundamental changes occurring at that time in the European security environment thanks largely to Gorbachev's initiatives. In 1989, the government agreed to allow the active peacetime strength of the Bundeswehr to decline to 420,000 men by deferring a long-planned increase in the length of conscription. 20 And in June 1990,

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then-Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg decided to reduce its wartime strength to 900,000. 21 These plans were soon rendered moot by the terms of the KohlGorbachev agreement, which were incorporated into the Treaty on the Final Settlement With Respect to Germany. In Article 3 of the treaty, Germany undertook to reduce the peacetime personnel strength of the armed forces to 370,000 by the end of 1994. The treaty also contained a subceiling of 345,000 for the German ground and air forces. 22 Subsequently, the government decided to lower the Bundeswehr's potential wartime strength by an even greater percentage, to a total of 650,000-700,000 men. 23 Additional upper limits on the number of major pieces of military equipment that Germany could retain were contained in the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), although these limits had little impact on the size of the Bundeswehr since the Federal Republic's equipment holdings exceeded them in only one category. 24 The task of reducing the size of the Bundeswehr to this agreed level was complicated by the need to absorb and dismantle the armed forces of the former German Democratic Republic, the Nationale Volksarmee (NVA). 25 The incorporation of the NVA increased the size of the Bundeswehr overnight by about 90,000 military personnel, to a total of some 520,000. 26 Although only 11,000 of the remaining NVA commissioned and non-commissioned officers (out of a total of nearly 50,000) were ultimately retained/ 7 the availability of conscripts from the new eastern states meant that the manpower contribution of the old Lander to the Bundeswehr would be well below 370,000. At the same time, considerable effort had to be expended to establish the Bundeswehr in eastern Germany. The cost of renovating barracks, rebuilding other defense-related infrastructure, and cleaning up former NVA facilities in the region was estimated at DM 16 billion. Another DM 4 billion would be necessary to destroy the enormous amounts of munitions (some 300,000 tons), weapons, and equipment inherited from the NVA. 28 As late as 1994, more than 10 percent of the defense budget was still devoted to such unification-related costs. 29

Pressures for Further Reductions The process of reducing the size of the Bundeswehr was far from complete when considerable new pressures arose to make further cuts. These pressures stemmed in part from the increased difficulty of justify-

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Major Issues in German Security Policy TABLE 7.1

German Defense Budget, 1990-1997 (in billions of current-year OM) Year

Defense Budget

Year

Defense Budget

1990 1991 1992 1993

57.54 53.60 52.76 49.85

1994 1995 1996 1997

47.23 47.86 47.11 46.29

SOURCES: SzS, no. 8 (Aug. 1993), 50-52; SzS, no. 8 (Aug. 1994), 45-46; SzS, no. 8 (Aug. 1995), 46; SzS, no. 6 (June 1996), 46; SzS, no. 8 (Aug. 1996), 40; and SzS, no. I (Jan. 1997), 50. NOTE: The 1990 figure includes a supplemental OM 4.17 billion for the former NVA during the second half of the year.

ing the preservation of the armed forces in the absence of a compelling military threat to German security, as had existed during the Cold War. More directly, however, they grew out of the acute financial constraints under which the government labored as it sought to cope with the unexpectedly high and sustained costs of rebuilding eastern Germany and paying for social services there and with the recession that Germany experienced in the early 1990s. These constraints prompted the government to reduce the defense budget in nominal-and even more in real-terms almost every year from 1991 to 1997.30 (See Table 7.1.) Most troublesome of all for the Bundeswehr were the cuts that were made in the 1993 and 1994 budgets. For 1993, the government had originally allocated DM 50.8 billion for defense, which already represented nearly DM 2 billion less than the previous year's allotment. This figure was sliced to DM 50.15 billion by the Bundestag, however. 31 And then the special Federal Consolidation Program (Solidarity Pact) that the government adopted in early 1993 mandated yet a further cut of DM 863 million, upsetting the Bundeswehr plans that had been worked out at the end of 1992. 32 In response to these unanticipated setbacks, Riihe repeatedly pleaded for budgetary stability. This aim appeared to be achieved in July 1993, when the cabinet approved its budget proposal for the following year. Although Riihe was forced to settle for a further reduction to DM 48.6 billion, considerably less than the DM 49.5 billion he had sought, this amount nevertheless represented more than Finance Minister Theodor Waigel had initially offered, and Riihe was promised a constant DM 47.5 billion for defense in each of the following three years (1995-97). 33

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Yet these promises were soon overwhelmed by new financial exigencies. Faced with an unanticipated increase in the federal deficit, the Bundestag trimmed the proposed defense budget to DM 48.48 billion and indicated that further cuts of up to DM 2.4 billion might be necessary in order to achieve an additional overall reduction in federal spending of DM 5 billion. Despite Riihe's warnings that such cuts would do considerable damage to the Bundeswehr, the 1994 defense budget was eventually slashed another DM 1.25 billion. 34 In fact, these budget cuts, exacerbated by the continuing unificationrelated expenses, did have a considerable negative impact on the Bundeswehr. Because personnel costs, which consumed half of the defense budget, were virtually fixed in the short term and because the Ministry of Defense was loath to allow readiness standards to slip markedly, much of the necessary savings was taken out of the investment share of the budget, which consists of research, development, testing, and evaluation; procurement; and funding for military installations and infrastructure. Traditionally, the Federal Republic had devoted approximately 30 percent of the defense budget to investment, and in view of the need to re-equip parts of the Bundeswehr in order to carry out its new tasks, German military leaders argued that this figure should be maintained, if not increased.35 As a result of the budget cuts, however, the investment share fell to under 24 percent in 1993 and then to approximately 22 percent in 1994 and 1995. 36 In view of the shrinking of the defense budget as a whole, one high-ranking Defense Ministry official estimated, the investment budget would fall by 55 percent and the funds available for weapons purchases by 60 percent between 1989 and 1995. 37 This decline meant that little money was available for the development of new weapons or procurement initiatives. 38 Despite the Defense Ministry's efforts to shield operational readiness, moreover, it too suffered from the bleak budgetary situation. Shrinking funds necessitated cutbacks in training, exercises, and maintenance, with deleterious consequences for the combat readiness of many units. 39 This already troublesome situation was greatly aggravated by the DM 1.25 billion cut imposed in early 1994, which forced reductions in flying hours and adversely affected even the highest-priority forces. 40 To make matters worse, the shortage of money and the considerable uncertainty that it engendered began to have an unfavorable effect on morale, as even the Ministry of Defense acknowledged in mid-1994. 41

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Arguments Against Further Reductions In the face of the serious and mounting budgetary consequences for modernization and readiness, the government was finally forced to reconsider its commitment to a peacetime military strength of 370,000 men. The possibility of further cuts in the size of the armed forces was first suggested by Kohl in a speech to defense experts at the annual Munich Conference on Security Policy in early February 1993, shortly after the Federal Consolidation Program had been adopted. The chancellor announced that he had asked Rtihe to review once again Bundeswehr planning, including the question of military manpower, with the intention of making decisions before the next federal elections about the development ofthe armed forces after 1995. 42 Kohl's statement was widely interpreted as indicating his intention to cut the Bundeswehr to a level of 300,000 men or even lower. 43 Through most of 1993, however, Rtihe stubbornly called for maintaining the existing target. 44 One argument that he and others offered in favor of the status quo was that it would not be possible to reduce the armed forces significantly while retaining universal military service. If the size of the Bundeswehr fell much below the existing level, it would not be able to accommodate all of the available conscripts. Yet compulsory military service could be preserved only as long as the majority of the men born in a given year actually served. Otherwise, questions of equity would arise. In fact, Kohl had used that very argument in 1990 in attempting to convince Gorbachev to accept an upper limit of 370,000. 45 One possible solution to this dilemma that was mooted was to reduce the length of military service from 12 months to 10 months or less. In the view of many experts, however, such a move would further erode combat readiness. When a 12-month term of service was approved in 1990, Stoltenberg described it as the minimum necessary to ensure the appropriate training of conscripts, 46 and official thinking on this question had not changed. 47 A second argument against a reduction in the size of the armed forces was that it could conflict with Germany's international obligations. As one commentary noted, "the yardstick for acceptable structures must be the capabilities that are required for military cooperation in the alliance and in the international arena. "48 Yet a significantly smaller Bundeswehr might make it difficult to turn NATO's new force structure, with its emphasis on multinational corps, into a reality or for Germany to play an ac-

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tive role in ensuring Europe's security. It would also tend to reduce Germany's influence within international bodies such as NATO and the EU. An even more serious source of concern was the impact that force reductions might have on Germany's allies. Another commentary observed that German austerity efforts were already encouraging other NATO countries to cut their forces. In particular, it was essential not to provide the U.S. Congress with an excuse for reducing the American military presence in Europe any further. Otherwise, the alliance's very existence might be threatened. 49

Further Reductions Imposed Riihe sought to postpone any fundamental changes in the size of the armed forces for as long as possible. At the end of 1993, however, in the face of yet more unanticipated budget cuts, he was forced to acknowledge that the status quo could no longer be sustained. Consequently, he announced that the Bundeswehr would be allowed to decline in size to 350,000 men by the end of 1994, chiefly by limiting the number of conscripts that were actually called up that year. 50 As a longer-term solution to the budgetary crisis, he subsequently proposed, in April 1994, a reduction in the peacetime size of the Bundeswehr to 320,000-340,000 during the second half of the 1990s, which would be achieved by cutting the duration of compulsory military service from 12 to 10 months. The potential conflict with the training requirements for conscripts would be avoided by eliminating the compensatory time off for over-time work that conscripts had traditionally received, which had limited the amount of training that could be conducted. The reduction would be implemented in such a way as to enable the Bundeswehr to be quickly expanded to 370,000 through the use oflow-level mobilization measures, and the planned wartime strength of 650,000-700,000 would not be affected. 51 According to high-level Defense Ministry officials, adoption of these measures would free up DM 1.6 billion per year that could be used for investment. They expected that another DM 1.5 billion could be obtained through further rationalization of defense spending and privatization of various support services. As a result, it would be possible to raise the investment share of the defense budget incrementally, reaching the desired level of 30 percent by the year 2000. 52 Riihe's proposal was initially opposed, however, by the Free Demo-

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Major Issues in German Security Policy

crats (FDP) and even some members of his own party. One substantive concern raised by his critics was that a reduction in the size of the Bundeswehr of as many as 50,000 men would require the closure of a number of additional military bases and would thus reopen the politically explosive debate over stationing during the runup to the federal elections that were scheduled for October 1994. Another worry was that such deep cuts would inevitably lead to the abolition of conscription. 53 These concerns were addressed in a series of coalition talks conducted over the next several months. Eager to resolve the issue before the elections, the government adopted a new set of Conceptual Guidelines (Konzeptionelle Leitlinie) for the further development of the Bundeswehr in mid-July 1994 that closely followed Ri.ihe's original proposal. 54 The personnel strength of the armed forces would be reduced to 340,000, Riihe's upper figure, by shortening the length of conscription. 55 The ability quickly to increase the size of the Bundeswehr to 370,000 would be preserved, however, by obliging conscripts to serve for up to an additional two months, should that be necessary. Likewise, there would be no change in the planned wartime strength of 650,000-700,000 men. 56 Even following these adjustments, the budgetary situation remained unsettled. After absorbing the additional cuts that were imposed in early 1994, Riihe once again secured a seemingly firm promise from Kohl and Waigel that the defense budget would be exempted from further reductions. In fact, the government agreed to maintain defense spending at a level of DM 47.9 billion through 1997, to be followed by an increase to DM 48.4 billion in 1998. 57 The next year, the cabinet advanced this timetable, and the Bundestag appropriated nearly DM 48.24 for 1996, a figure that would allow the investment share of the budget to rise to some 24 percent. 58 In mid-1996, however, renewed budgetary difficulties prompted the government to reduce that year's defense budget to DM 47.1 billion and to set the level of spending planned for 1997 at only DM 46.5 billion. 59 To make matters worse, the Ministry of Defense was expected to cover the entire DM 700 million cost of Germany's participation in the NATO Implementation Force in Bosnia, or DM 300 million more than planned. 60 This time, Riihe insisted that there would be no further cuts in the size of the Bundeswehr. Any additional reductions, he warned, would make conscription untenable and could possibly prompt the United States to withdraw more forces from Europe. Instead, he indicated, all necessary sav-

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ings would come out of the investment share of the budget. 61 Yet the outlook for obtaining the financial resources required to sustain even a force of only 340,000 was not bright. In fact, it was estimated that the Ministry of Defense would have to exceed its budget by as much as DM 2 billion during the 1996-97 period just to make ends meet. 62 Thus another round of fiscally driven retrenchment could not be ruled out.

Restructuring the Bundeswehr At the same time that the Bundeswehr was reduced in size, it was fundamentally restructured to reflect the wider range of military tasks for which it might be employed. The basic principle of this restructuring was the differentiation of the armed forces into two components: the main defense forces (Hauptverteidigungskrafte or HVK), which were intended primarily for national defense and would require substantial mobilization to be combat ready, and the smaller crisis reaction forces (Krisenreaktionskrafte or KRK), which could be used for the full spectrum of alliance defense, crisis management, and international peace missions and which would be fully ready and quickly deployable outside of Germany. The main outlines of this reorganization were worked out by the beginning of 1992 and subsequently underwent only relatively minor adjustments. 63 This restructuring marked a sharp break with the past. During the Cold War, virtually the entire Bundeswehr had been maintained at a high level of readiness. In the 1980s, the Field Army consisted of 12 divisions and 36 fully manned combat brigades, all of which were capable of providing considerable resistance to a Warsaw Pact invasion on short notice, as were most air force and naval units. The principal exceptions to this rule were to be found in the Territorial Army (TA) of 12 brigades, the majority of which were only partially manned or served merely as equipmentholding units in peacetime and thus were highly dependent upon the mobilization of reserves to achieve combat readiness. 64 After unification and the end of the Cold War, Germany's altered strategic circumstances and the broader task spectrum of the Bundeswehr indicated the need for greater differentiation in the readiness and thus the training of different units of the armed forces, depending upon their functions. Indeed, Riihe described differentiation as the most important principle of the new force structure. 65 On the one hand, the disappearance of an immediate threat of invasion allowed the readiness levels of the forces

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for national defense, which continued to constitute the bulk of the Bundeswehr, to be substantially reduced in peacetime. Indeed, the Ministry of Defense concluded that the operational training of some units could be deferred until the onset of a crisis.66 On the other hand, Germany would now need a relatively small number of highly ready forces that could be deployed rapidly throughout NATO territory and beyond for the purposes of extended alliance defense, crisis management and conflict prevention, and peace missions under UN auspices. These forces would have to be more flexible and mobile than anything that the Federal Republic had ever fielded. 67 These new criteria quickly found expression in a set of plans for restructuring the Bundeswehr, which was approved by the cabinet in February 1992. 68 Henceforth the armed forces would be divided into two basic categories. 69 The main defense forces would comprise all forces that would be employed in the defense of Germany and its allies. They would be maintained at varying levels of readiness, with some units highly cadred, and thus be heavily dependent upon mobilization. The crisis reaction forces would consist of those elements that could be employed for conflict prevention and crisis management in the alliance framework or as a contribution to international peace missions. In a sense, their purpose would be to help keep conflicts away from German territory. They would consist of about 50,000 troops from all three services and have a much higher proportion (75-80 percent) of professional soldiers and long-term servicemen than would the main defense forces. 70 The entire force would be available for military operations within 15 to 30 days of an alert, and some elements would be deployable within three to seven days. Crisis reaction units would constitute Germany's contribution to NATO's ACE Mobile Force (AMP), its Rapid Reaction Corps (RRC), its Multinational Division (Center), and the Eurocorps. 71 Of the three services, the army was most affected by this reorganization. Under the plans developed through early 1992, the Field Army and Territorial Army were to be consolidated. The number of divisions would be cut back from 12 to eight, which would also absorb the former TA military district commands, and the total number of combat brigades would be reduced from 48 to 28. Two of the brigades would be fully cadred, and 19 more would be mobilization dependent, consisting of two active and two cadre battalions each and being manned at about 60 percent in peacetime. The remaining seven brigades (three mechanized, two air-

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borne, one mountain, and the German component of the Franco-German brigade) would be fully manned and would constitute the army's contribution to the crisis reaction forces. 72 The army would set up two additional divisional staffs for contingency planning and the possible command of crisis reaction forces in operations outside of Germany. 73 And after taking office in 1992, Riihe decided to establish two special battalions for future German contributions to UN missions. 74 Although not subject to the same degree of differentiation, both the air force and the navy were significantly reduced in size. The air force would be cut from approximately 620 combat aircraft in some 28 squadrons to less than 500 combat aircraft in 20 squadrons. Of the remaining squadrons, six would be assigned to the crisis reaction forces. 75 The navy would eventually lose approximately 50 percent of its vessels, leaving a total of 80 or 90, although this reduction would take place over a longer period of time and the number of major combatants (destroyers and frigates) would remain roughly the same. Approximately 40 percent of the navy would be in the crisis reaction forces. 76 These initial restructuring plans were upset by the continuing decline in the defense budget and the consequent 1994 decision to reduce the overall size of the Bundeswehr to 340,000 troops in peacetime, which resulted in several modifications. Once again, the army was most affected. In December 1992, Riihe announced that two more brigades would be dissolved, 77 and he subsequently scrapped his plan to create two special battalions for UN missions. 78 More importantly, a revised army structure was devised on the basis of the 1994 Conceptual Guidelines. According to this plan, the army would now be reduced to just seven divisions and 22 combat brigades in peacetime, although the number of brigades could be increased to 26 through mobilization. Only six brigades, including the German component of the Franco-German brigade, would be assigned to the crisis reaction forces. 79 Equally noteworthy was the fact that the 16 brigades in the main defense forces would now vary considerably in readiness and manning levels. Four would be fully manned in peacetime. Four would be largely ready and would serve as the equipment-holding units for the four entirely mobilization-dependent brigades. And eight would be only partially ready, consisting of two active and two cadred battalions each. This further differentiation would facilitate a closer relationship between the crisis reaction and main defense forces. Such a step was desir-

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able in order to prevent the de facto segregation of the army into two classes, which had become a growing concern. Under the new plans, the four fully ready main defense brigades would be able to supplement or relieve the crisis reaction forces. In addition, every crisis reaction brigade would be assigned a main defense force battalion, and some crisis reaction force battalions would be placed under the command of main defense brigades in peacetime. 80 Nevertheless, the fact that the latter would consist of a considerably higher percentage of conscripts would continue to limit the interoperability of the two types of forces.

Re-equipping the Bundeswehr A major challenge facing Germany after unification was that of equipping the restructured armed forces for their new tasks. The exclusion of allied forces from eastern Germany meant that the air force now had sole responsibility for policing at least a good deal of German air space, a function that other NATO countries had previously performed. Of greater consequence, however, was the fact that the Bundeswehr's new mandate implied the need to acquire a number of new types of equipment if the crisis reaction forces were ever to be made ready for the range of contingencies they might face. For the first time in the history of the Bundeswehr, a number of army units would have to be highly mobile, rapidly deployable, easily controllable, and sustainable at great distances from the civilian infrastructure upon which they had traditionally been able to rely. Moreover, Bundeswehr units participating in UN missions outside of the alliance framework would likely have to provide for their own intelligence, reconnaissance, and communications needs, unlike in the past. 81 These requirements were placed in sharper focus by the Bundeswehr's experiences in missions outside of Germany during the early 1990s. 82 The dispatch of German combat aircraft and ground-based air defense units to Turkey during the Gulf War underscored the Bundeswehr' s logistical unpreparedness for out-of-area operations. It also revealed an embarrassing lack of airlift capability, when Germany was forced to tum first to the Soviet Union and then to the United States for help in transporting its anti-aircraft missiles. 83 The 1993 deployment to Somalia demonstrated the army's need to upgrade its combat service support capabilities, its

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limited medical facilities for out-of-area operations, and the unsuitability of many vehicles for long-distance transport. In addition, Germany had to borrow air-conditioning units and uniforms suited for the desert environment from its allies. 84 And the navy was forced to transport the last troops withdrawn from the region on frigates, highlighting its limited ability to . . 85 support overseas m1sswns. In response to these needs, and given that, as noted above, the investment share of the defense budget was steadily declining, the Ministry of Defense took two related actions. First, it assigned highest priority to equipping the crisis reaction forces. New procurement initiatives for the main defense forces would be largely forgone until the requirements of the crisis reaction forces had been met and the budgetary situation had improved. 86 Second, most existing procurement projects, many of which had begun before unification, were either canceled, stretched out, or reduced in size. The Bundeswehr plan for the period 1993-2005 that was proposed by Stoltenberg in January 1992 called for reducing expenditures on procurement by nearly DM 44 billion, to a total of no more than DM 117 billion over the 12 years. 87 At the end of the year, Riihe cut planned spending on equipment during the period by another DM 24 billion, or 21 percent. 88 And further short-term reductions were made following the cuts in the 1993 and 1994 defense budgets. 89 Despite these efforts, the Ministry's ability to find resources to invest in the crisis reaction forces remained extremely limited. 90 One source of constraint was the rigid nature of the budget itself. When the 1993 defense budget was drawn up, for example, some 90 percent of the investment share was firmly tied up in long-term contracts, leaving only DM 1.3 billion available for new investrnents. 91 If a project under contract were canceled, moreover, the affected firms could seek compensation for the unfilled portion, and in a worst-case scenario, this compensation could be just as great as the still-outstanding obligations. 92 A second constraint was the desire to preserve Germany's defense industrial base. By the end of 1993, according to one official estimate, cuts in the investment budget had already caused the loss of half of the 280,000 jobs in the German arms industry, and another 40,000-60,000 positions were threatened. These cuts had reduced Germany's ability to participate in multinational armaments projects and could create an undesirable degree of dependence on other states.93 Consequently, the De-

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fense Ministry decided, for example, to modernize a number of heavy Leopard II tanks in order to preserve a German capacity to manufacture armored weapons. 94 Finally, a few established projects could simply not be greatly modified, largely for political reasons. A case in point was the Fighter-90, or European Fighter Aircraft (EF A), which threatened to devour a substantial share of the investment budget. Development of the EF A began in the late 1980s under a consortium of German, British, Italian, and Spanish aerospace firms. For Germany, the EFA was intended to replace its large but aging fleet ofF-4 Phantom aircraft, which was scheduled to be retired at the end of the century. 95 The cost of the project quickly began to mount. In 1988, Germany had planned to buy approximately 250 of the aircraft for DM 65 million per complete system purchased, on top of an initial development cost of DM 3.5 billion. By the time Riihe took over the Defense Ministry in April 1992, however, the development costs had doubled, while the manufacturer's estimated system price had soared to DM 134 million. Moreover, Defense Ministry auditors calculated that the actual price per aircraft would be DM 175 million and possibly even DM 200 million, 96 and the completion of the first prototype, due in May 1992, was behind schedule.97 Faced with this grim situation, Riihe took drastic action at the end of June 1992. He obtained the agreement of the leaders of the governing coalition that while Germany still needed a replacement for the F-4 around the year 2000, its price would have to be reduced considerably. He insisted, moreover, that the technical requirements for the new aircraft, which had been established in 1984, could be substantially altered, given the much-improved security environment. Thus Germany would halt its participation in the EFA project and seek to develop a smaller and cheaper alternative. 98 As Riihe subsequently told the Bundestag, "we need a different fighter plane for different times." 99 Despite Riihe's attempt to shield himself by forging a coalition consensus, he soon found himself under mounting political pressure, both domestic and international, to reverse his decision. The affected aerospace firms offered to slash the system price of the EFA to DM 100 million. Since much of the German aircraft industry is located in Bavaria, home of the Christian Social Union, CSU leaders put up considerable re-

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sistance. And Riihe's allied counterparts, especially the British Minister of Defence, strongly lobbied Germany to stay in the project. 100 Consequently, the German government agreed to work with its partners to build a less expensive version of the EFA, dubbed Eurofighter2000, rather than start from scratch. Riihe claimed victory, arguing that the technical requirements of the fighter had been modified and that the cost would be some 30 percent lower than previously planned. 101 Others suggested, however, that the new aircraft was simply a stripped-down version of the old EF A, the cost of which would increase when previously indispensable but now optional components were added back on. 102 Indeed, by mid-1994, the estimated total price per aircraft had once again mushroomed to DM 150 million, while Germany's share of the development costs had continued to mount. 103 Thus Riihe had at most been able to play for time, since a final procurement decision would be deferred at least until 1996. 104 The net result of these various constraints was that the process of reequipping the German armed forces would be slow and difficult. The crisis reaction forces would not be fully ready before the end of the decade, 105 and the Bundeswehr would continue to lack some capabilities critical for deployments abroad for some time thereafter. 106 High on the list of these deficiencies was a large-capacity transport plane. Although the need for such an aircraft had long been recognized, Bundeswehr plans contained no money for its development or procurement before the second half of the 1990s. 107 In addition, the air force's reconnaissance capabilities had been greatly reduced by the decommissioning of older aircraft and program cancellations. 108 A further casualty of tight budgets was a planned multipurpose ship, which emerged as one of the priorities of Bundeswehr in 1994 in the wake of the Somalia operation. This vessel was to be designed to transport and supply a battalion of 1,200 men on overseas missions. It would also carry amphibious landing craft and helicopters, and it would serve as an offshore command center and hospital. 109 In 1995, however, Riihe expressed opposition to the DM 500 million project, citing financial constraints.110 This already dismal situation seemed to reach a nadir in mid-1996, when the defense budget was unexpectedly slashed another DM 1.1 billion. Riihe announced that all necessary cuts would be taken out of the

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investment share of the budget in order to preserve the size and strength of the Bundeswehr. Consequently, the acquisition of even high-priority items, such as the Eurofighter, the large-capacity transport aircraft, and satellite communications, would have to be stretched out yet further, while some other programs would have to be scrapped altogether. Particularly threatened were the research, development, and procurement projects that Germany had undertaken jointly with France. 1ll Thus the prospects for ever re-equipping the Bundeswehr at anything like a satisfactory pace continued to look bleak.

Developing New Command and Control Structures A further challenge confronting the German government following unification has concerned the development of a national command authority. Throughout the Cold War, the Bundeswehr lacked the military structures needed to plan and control military operations of any size involving more than one service. According to arrangements established in 1970, the highest-ranking officer (Generalinspekteur) of the armed forces had no command or control authority. Likewise, the three service chiefs were limited to exercising operational command and control over their respective services in peacetime. And the Joint Staff of the Bundeswehr (Fiihrungsstab der Streitkrafte) was not structured to exercise operational control. Although the air force and the navy had small service operational command headquarters, the army had no command structures above the corps level. As a result of these limitations, deployments of the German armed forces of any significance under national command would have . 'ble. 112 b een 1mposs1 This situation had never been a matter of concern because the Federal Republic had had no intention of employing its forces for purely national purposes. Instead, the only conceivable uses of the Bundeswehr had been in the context of alliance defense. All regular German forces had been assigned to NATO in peacetime, and in the event of a conflict, operational control over them would have been exercised by NATO commanders. As a result, combat operations involving the Bundeswehr had been almost entirely dependent upon NATO command and control structures.113 Following the end of the Cold War, however, this arrangement, which had served well for more than 30 years, was no longer adequate. In the

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first place, Germany needed to be able to conduct independent military operations for the defense of the new eastern states, at least temporarily, since forces there could not be assigned to NATO before 1995. More importantly in the long term; the Federal Republic might wish to contribute military units to international peace missions under UN auspices that took place outside of the alliance structures. 114 This second requirement became abundantly clear during the relief operations conducted by the Bundeswehr in Turkey, Iran, and Iraq in 1991 in the wake of the Gulf War. Although only some 500 military personnel were involved, communications had to be routed through 23 different offices in the Defense and other ministries. 115 Thus during the course of 1991, Bundeswehr and Defense Ministry officials came to the conclusion that Germany required some form of national operational command and control capability, a judgment that was only reinforced by subsequent experiences with outof-area deployments in Cambodia and Somalia. 116 This requirement was much more easily stated than satisfied, however. Significant hurdles would first have to be overcome. Although the purpose was to increase Germany's ability to fulfill its international obligations, German officials had to be attentive to the possibility that any move to establish an autonomous national command authority would be misinterpreted abroad and subjected to external criticism. In particular, they were anxious to avoid any suggestion that German interest in preserving NATO was waning. After all, a principal purpose of the constraining postwar arrangements to which the Federal Republic had willingly submitted was to dispel the fears of neighboring countries of a possible revival of German military power. 117 An even greater obstacle lay in the attitudes of the German public and in some elite circles. Because of the militaristic excesses of the German past, civil-military relations remained a sensitive issue in German politics. Many people were instinctively wary of a renewal of military domination of decision making on security issues, as had occurred during the time of the Prussian General Staff, and efforts to centralize operational control of the Bundeswehr could easily result in charges that the General Staff was being revived. 118 In the face of these obstacles, the government had little choice but to proceed with caution. Instead of seeking a major overhaul of the existing command and control arrangements, it settled for a number of incremental improvements in order to avoid creating any structures that might

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be reminiscent of the former General Staff. 119 These modifications took place at two levels. First, the operational command capabilities of the individual services were expanded. 120 Since the air force and navy already possessed service operational command headquarters, the most important development in this regard was the establishment of an Army Operations Command (Heeresflihrungskommando) in Koblenz. This new structure, which was activated in 1994, gave the Federal Republic for the first time the ability to conduct independent army operations above the corps level. 121 Second, and more controversially, the government sought to establish a central office that could exercise operational command and control over units from all three services simultaneously. This effort was far more sensitive because it more closely resembled the reconstitution of a General Staff and, as a result, suffered several setbacks. In early 1992, the Ministry of Defense proposed the establishment of a small Armed Forces Command (Fi.ihrungskommando der Streitkrafte), also to be located in Koblenz, that would be charged with planning and controlling multiservice Bundeswehr operations. Ri.ihe, however, upon becoming Defense Minister, rejected this plan, forcing Germany to continue to rely on the service operations commands to form ad hoc joint task forces as neces122 sary. Another attempt, which was both more successful and more modest, involved the creation in early 1993 of a very small operational staff (Einsatzflihrung Bundeswehr) and a coordination staff for operational tasks (Koordinierungsstab fur Einsatzaufgaben) within a section of the existing Joint Staff. 123 This relatively low-key approach nevertheless gave the Generalinspekteur, who heads the Joint Staff, responsibility for the coordination of military deployments. 124 Riihe and others soon deemed the new arrangements inadequate, however, and the Defense Minister sought to develop a more effective operational leadership staff for the control of Bundeswehr missions outside NATO command structures that would also involve increasing the powers of the Generalinspekteur. Yet this new proposal quickly leaked to the press, where it was described as the first General Staff in the history of the Bundeswehr, and the idea had to be temporarily shelved. 125 Consequently, it was not until the beginning of 1995 that a small central command center (Fiihrungszentrum) was fmally set up within the Joint Staff. This new entity would be responsible for both planning and

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coordinating joint Bundeswehr operations while informing and advising the Minister of Defense around the clock. Nevertheless, the Fiihrungszentrum was designed to handle only relatively small deployments, such as Germany might contribute to UN peace missions, and it would rely on the individual service commands to conduct essential staff work, since it lacked the necessary personnel. 126 Thus some six years after unification, Germany's national command and control capabilities remained quite modest. Germany still lacked the structures that would be needed to exercise operational control of the Bundeswehr in the event of a major war, and it was far from possessing a new General Staff, although this fact did not prevent the government from feeling compelled to stress that it had no intention of creating one. 127 It should be remembered, however, that Germany's requirements and intentions in this regard also remained highly circumscribed. The new capabilities were needed only for less-than-war missions conducted under UN auspices outside of an alliance framework. German leaders saw no need to create any kind of wartime national operational control capabilities that would duplicate those ofNATO. By and large, the planning for and control of military operations involving the Bundeswehr would continue to be carried out within alliance structures. 128

Reaffirming Conscription The final major issue that arose after unification concerned compulsory military service (Wehrpflicht): whether it should be maintained and, if so, the form that it should take. The Bundeswehr had always been an army of conscripts. Without universal military service, the Federal Republic would never have been able to raise a peacetime army of nearly half a million men. In addition, the use of conscripts was viewed as a bulwark against the emergence of a professional army that could once again form "a state within the state." 129 Consequently, successive German governments have affirmed the importance of conscription. As the 1980s began, the German armed forces faced a potential crisis. In order to maintain its size, the Bundeswehr needed to take in some 200,000 draftees annually. Because of a declining birth rate in the Federal Republic, however, the number of young men available for military service every year was projected to drop well below this level in the 1990s. In order to avert the coming crisis, the government decided in

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1984 to increase the length of military service from 15 to 18 months beginning in 1989. 130 Nevertheless, the urgency of taking this step was greatly reduced as the military threat to Germany declined at the end of the decade. In 1989, the government revisited its previous decision and agreed to postpone the planned extension until mid-1992. Then the following year, as unification became a reality, the cabinet approved a reduction in the term of service to 12 months. This change reflected both the sudden increase in the German population caused by the absorption of the new eastern Lander and the need to bring the size of the Bundeswehr down to 370,000 men by 1995. Under the new force structure that was initially developed, only 155,000 conscripts would henceforth be needed per year. 131

Arguments for the Abolition of Conscription The end of the Cold War also prompted more fundamental questions about whether conscription should be maintained at all. A growing number of voices, including some prominent members of the governing parties, called for the abolition of the draft and the establishment of an allvolunteer professional force. These calls reached a crescendo in 1993, when it became clear that the initial post-unification plans for the Bundeswehr would have to be scrapped because of the adverse budgetary situation. 132 The proponents of the establishment of a professional army offered several arguments, not all of which were consistent with one another. The principal argument concerned the long-troublesome issue of equity in conscription (Wehrgerechtigkeit). Draft equity required that the burden of military service be distributed as evenly as possible among the men eligible each year. As things stood, only about half of each year's cohort actually served in the Bundeswehr. The remainder were either found unfit for military service, were exempted for other reasons, or performed some other form of public service. 133 This already disturbing situation would only worsen and perhaps become untenable if the Bundeswehr were further reduced significantly in size as the need for conscripts declined commensurately. 134 A second and rather different argument was that too few, rather than too many, conscripts would be available for service in the Bundeswehr in the mid-1990s because the expected decline in the number of draft-age

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males was being exacerbated by an unanticipated rise in the number of conscientious objectors who chose to perform civilian alternative service. Those claiming conscientious objector status doubled from 74,000 in 1990 to 151,000 in 1991. This sudden increase could be attributed only in part to the Gulf War, which had triggered fears of German conscripts being sent off to fight wars abroad, since corresponding figures for the next three years remained well above historical averages. 135 Rather, it also reflected several other factors: the greater difficulty of justifying the need for the Bundeswehr and, by extension, military service in the absence of a clear military threat to German security; 136 the increasing personal and professional advantages of civilian alternative service; 137 and perhaps the more general indifference to politics (politische Verdrossenheit) then affecting German society. 138 A third argument for the abolition of conscription concerned the effectiveness of the armed forces. The nature of the new tasks of the Bundeswehr meant that it could no longer rely heavily, if at all, on conscripts, especially given the shortened term of service. Henceforth the Bundeswehr would require a much higher percentage of highly trained soldiers capable of participating in a wide range of missions and able to be deployed at a moment's notice. Yet conscripts only reached the highest training category at the end of their 12-month period of service. As a result, one commentary noted in 1992, not a single battalion in the Bundeswehr was available as a whole fqr the new missions. 139 In addition, as military equipment became more complicated and technologically advanced, fewer positions could be filled by conscripts. 140 Even if the adequacy of the training of conscripts could be assured, units containing them might be limited to deployments of a few weeks at most, which in most circumstances would be an unacceptable constraint. 141 And few conscripts might be willing to serve in the crisis reaction forces in the first place. 142 According to one analysis, the 1991 deployment in Turkey demonstrated that draftees were usually prepared to participate in missions abroad only if they viewed the conflict as posing an immediate threat to 143 . the1r own country.

Arguments for Retaining Conscription The coalition government acknowledged some of these concerns, especially those about equity, and the need for reforms. 144 But it stubbornly

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insisted that universal military service should be preserved; "Es bleibt bei der Wehrpflicht" was a common refrain. In defense of this position, govemment leaders offered an array of counterarguments. The principal justification for conscription was that it served as an indispensable link between the Bundeswehr and the German people, helping to preserve their trust in the armed forces: "Universal conscription firmly establishes the armed forces in society. Through its conscripts, the Bundeswehr remains in close contact with every segment of the population, particularly the young generation. Conscription creates a high degree of social awareness and interest in issues concerning security and the armed forces among policy-makers and in society." 145 By the same token, it ensured that the Bundeswehr reflected the values of German society at large, whereas a more insulated professional army might not. This view was expressed by leaders of all of the mainstream parties. 146 A closely related argument was that conscription was an expression of every citizen's responsibility for the preservation of peace and freedom. It was vital that each person, or at least each male, spend some time in service to the state in order to enhance his awareness of this common obligation. 147 The proponents of conscription also offered several military rationales. The first was that as a continental power, Germany needed to be able to create a force two or more times the size of the peacetime Bundeswehr for the purposes of deterrence and national defense in the admittedly unlikely event that a significant military threat were to reemerge. As Riihe repeatedly argued, the mobilization capability of the Bundeswehr both made an important contribution to European stability and afforded Germany political influence within the alliance. 148 Since such a large force could not be created from scratch, however, this requirement could only be satisfied if there existed a large body of well-trained and highly motivated reserves that could be mobilized at a moment's notice. And the preservation of this mobilization potential necessitated in turn universal military service. 149 Even if this military requirement could be relaxed, conscription was said to offer various advantages over a volunteer force. Some doubted whether it would be possible to raise a professional army of more than 200,000 men unless the financial inducements for voluntary military service were significantly increased, in which case the Bundeswehr would become more expensive. 150 In fact, nearly half of all officers and longer-serving soldiers started their careers as conscripts, suggesting that

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it might be difficult to sustain a force of even 100,000 without military service. 151 Additionally, conscription ensured that the Bundeswehr would contain a cross section of German society, including the best-educated and most talented men in each cohort, while making the armed forces significantly younger and more vital. 152 As a result, according to one news report, the performance of units containing conscripts was markedly higher than that of comparable units in a volunteer army. 153 A final line of argument concerned the indirect social consequences of abolishing conscription. By the 1990s, the civilian alternative service had become virtually indispensable for safeguarding the social safety net. Providing care for the sick, handicapped, and elderly was now inconceivable without the contributions of the more than 100,000 young men who chose to perform community rather than military service each year. Yet the civilian alternative service would end with conscription unless an entirely new political and legal basis for it could be established. 154 For all of these reasons, the government worked hard to preserve compulsory military conscription even as it felt obliged to make further reductions in the size of the Bundeswehr after 1993. 155 The principal result of these efforts was a more differentiated form of conscription that more closely reflected the new structure of the Bundeswehr and somewhat blurred the distinction between compulsory and voluntary service. 156 When Riihe proposed in April 1994 that the basic period of military service be reduced from 12 to 10 months, he also suggested that conscripts be allowed to volunteer for the crisis reaction forces if they agreed to serve for at least one year. 157 In response, the FDP countered with a proposal involving even greater differentiation. According to this, basic military service would be cut to only nine months, but conscripts would have the option to stay on for up to 23 months. 158 The coalition partners struck a compromise on the issue in the summer, at the same time that they agreed upon the outlines of the revised force structure. The minimal period of conscription was set at 10 months, but conscripts could also choose to serve a further two to 13 months. 159 In addition, as noted above, the training of conscripts would no longer be limited to 40 hours per week without compensatory time off, which military leaders expected would result in a more effective force. 160 In May 1995, the cabinet approved the detailed legislation required to modify the military service laws, which was passed by the Bundestag in October and went into effect at the beginning of 1996. 161

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These adjustments did not put an end to the controversy over conscription, however. 162 Even before they took effect, the new arrangements were threatened by an unanticipated rise in the already high levels of those seeking conscientious objector status, which reached a record 161,000 in 1995, raising questions about the feasibility of maintaining the Bundeswehr even at the reduced level of 340,000 troops. 163 Early the following year, the Ministry of Defense announced additional modest measures intended to make military service more attractive, especially relative to civilian alternative service. 164 Yet it was not clear whether this or any other solution short of the abolition of conscription would amount to more than a short-term palliative, although a majority of Germans continued to oppose the creation of a professional army. 165 Rather, the government's main hope lay in the fact that the number of draft-eligible males would begin to increase again in 1998. 166

Conclusion Several of the factors emphasized in the theoretical framework employed by this study have had a noticeable impact on the transformation of the Bundeswehr after unification. Many of the changes that have taken place can be viewed largely as a rational response to Germany's altered strategic circumstances, although these have had somewhat contradictory effects. On the one hand, the decline in the former Soviet threat clearly allowed for substantial reductions in the size of the German armed forces and in their overall levels of readiness. A Bundeswehr of nearly half a million men, prepared to fight at a moment's notice, was no longer necessary or justifiable. On the other hand, the emergence of a variety of new risks, especially the potential for crises and conflicts within Eastern Europe and other regions bordering the NATO area, was the essential prelude to the significant broadening of the definition of the Bundeswehr's possible tasks that took place. The new contingencies also created a demand for the development of something like the highly ready, versatile, and mobile crisis reaction forces and a national operational control capability. The impact of the external environment on the German armed forces has not been limited to that of international structural factors alone, however. In addition, the new shape of the Bundeswehr has been influenced to an important extent by international institutions, which have both miti-

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gated and reinforced the consequences of changes in the structure of the European state system. The Final Settlement established precise upper limits on the future overall size of the armed forces. Although Germany had little or no incentive to exceed any of these ceilings, they provided a focal point for German force planning until this was rendered untenable by domestic economic developments. Also of significance have been Germany's alliance obligations. Its long-standing NATO commitment, in combination with the disappearance of a single, overriding direct military threat, has meant that Germany could no longer focus its efforts on the defense of its own territory. Instead, if Germany wished to continue enjoying the benefits of NATO membership, such as the nuclear protection afforded by the United States, it would have to be much more concerned with the defense of its allies and the management of crises and conflict on the periphery of the alliance. Likewise, the responsibilities of UN membership, of which Germany has been constantly reminded, have been widely regarded as obliging the Bundeswehr to acquire the ability to participate in a wide range of international peace missions outside the NATO area. These institutional considerations provided additional impetus for the development of the crisis reaction forces. Alliance ties have also meant that the Bundeswehr could not be reduced indiscriminately in size, even if external circumstances had permitted. Germany would have to make an adequate contribution to NATO's main defense forces in Central Europe. In addition, German officials have maintained that the crisis reaction forces should be roughly equal in size to their British and French counterparts. Domestic factors as well have played an important role in the transformation of the Bundeswehr. Difficult to overlook were the effects of the German government's highly constrained budgets in the early and mid-1990s. This situation was the proximate cause of the 1994 decision to reduce the overall size of the armed forces by a further 30,000 men, to a total of 340,000. It was also responsible for unplanned lapses in the operational readiness of many units and the steep decline in spending on investment that greatly slowed the process of re-equipping the Bundeswehr for its new tasks. Of course, these budgetary effects cannot be completely separated from those of the altered security environment, since the lack of an immediate threat made the task of justifying the defense budget far more difficult than it had been in the past. 167 Nevertheless, in the absence

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of such constraints, the process of transforming the Bundeswehr would have been much smoother and less crisis-prone. A domestic perspective is also necessary to account for at least two respects in which the Bundeswehr appears to have failed to adapt optimally to the new strategic environment. First, the German government has made only limited progress toward the development of new national capabilities for exercising operational control of the German armed forces in situations, chiefly UN missions beyond NATO territory, in which they would have to operate outside of the alliance structures on which the Federal Republic has traditionally relied. Second, the government has steadfastly refused to abandon the Wehrpflicht, despite its increasing dysfunctionality. As a result of the end of the Cold War, both the the military usefulness and the political legitimacy of conscription have been increasingly called into question, and not only in Germany. Even France, which invented the modern levee en masse, decided in 1996 to follow the lead of alliance partners such as Belgium and the Netherlands in moving to create a professional army, leaving Germany alone among the major Western powers as a practitioner of compulsory military service. Although troublesome from a realist perspective, both of these examples of maladjustment can be readily understood in terms of Germany's postwar political culture, especially the strong strand of anti-militarism that it contains. On the one hand, anti-militarism has lain at the root of widespread popular and, to a lesser extent, elite concerns about the possible reconstitution of a German General Staff that might be unaccountable to German political authorities. Consequently, the government has been forced to proceed with caution in its efforts to enhance Germany's planning and command capabilities, even though such improvements have been necessitated by Germany's multilateral commitments. On the other hand, anti-militarism has fostered a strong, if not universal, attachment to conscription, despite its disadvantages in the circumstances of the post-Cold War era. Compulsory military service, elites from across the political spectrum have believed, remains an indispensable link between the Bundeswehr and the German people, even though an increasing number of commentators have observed that Germany has nothing to fear from a professional army. 168 These attitudes have ensured that conscription would be preserved in Germany, even as its neighbors moved to abandon the draft.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Responding to International Crises and Conflicts: The Out-of-Area Debate The participation of the Bundeswehr in measures for securing world peace in the framework of the international community has become a central question of German foreign and security policy. -Chancellor Helmut Kohl

Since 1990, Germany has been confronted with a series of international crises and conflicts that have demanded a response. Even before the unification process had been completed, Iraq invaded Kuwait, threatening an important component of Europe's oil supplies and triggering the Western military buildup in the Persian Gulf that culminated in Operation Desert Storm early the following year. In mid-1991, fighting broke out virtually on Germany's doorstep in the former Yugoslavia and continued in one form or another for more than four years. As a result of these and other conflicts around the world, Germany has repeatedly come under pressure from the United Nations and its allies to contribute to a wide array of international actions outside the NATO area intended to keep or restore the peace. Unlike during most of the Cold War, Germany has no longer been granted the option of remaining aloof from such out-of-area operations in order to concentrate on the defense of its own territory. Germany's response to these challenges has been decidedly equivocal. On the one hand, an important shift in German security policy has taken place. Since 1991, Germany has agreed to contribute forces to a growing range of international peace missions. Bundeswehr units have been dispatched to locations as diverse as the Persian Gulf, Cambodia, Somalia, and the former Yugoslavia. Largely as a result of these deployments, a number of observers have spoken of a "normalization" of German foreign and security policy. Or in the words of Ronald Asmus, "German partici-

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pation in future peace support operations, as well as combat operations beyond Germany's borders, is no longer a question of whether but of when, where, and how." 1 At the same time, however, Germany's assumption of a growing international military role has been consistently marked by substantial reservations and numerous constraints. Germany has not always offered to make a military contribution to international peace missions, and at other times, it has done so only after considerable debate and with great ambivalence. Moreover, where German forces have deployed outside the NATO area, they have done so only in relatively small numbers, and they have been restricted almost exclusively to roles that have involved no risk of combat. Even Germany's drive to secure international recognition for the breakaway Yugoslav republics of Slovenia and Croatia in late 1991 was marked by significant limitations, notably Germany's reluctance to proceed unilaterally and its unwillingness to dispatch any forces to the region to back up its diplomatic efforts. One important cause of this mixed record, at least for the first four years after unification, was the prevailing interpretation of the German Basic Law, which was widely viewed as permitting the Bundeswehr to be used, apart from humanitarian missions, only for the defense of Germany itself and its allies. Consequently, although opinion was deeply divided on the types of out-of-area operations in which German forces should ideally be able to participate, even those political leaders who favored making a more substantial military contribution to international peace missions were obliged to limit their advocacy to actions that were not clearly inconsistent with these highly constraining guidelines. Nevertheless, even the lifting of the alleged constitutional restrictions by a landmark ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court in July 1994 failed to produce any profound reorientation of German policy. In particular, when faced with a series of allied requests beginning in late 1994 to contribute forces to the international efforts to bring peace to Bosnia, Germany continued to respond at times with amibivalence and to impose numerous conditions on its involvement, reflecting the enduring presence of more fundamental domestic constraints. Consequently, German responses to future international crises and conflicts are likely to remain more cautious and limited than those of its principal allies in several important respects. German leaders will continue to place particular emphasis on the search for non-military solutions,

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insisting that the Bundeswehr be deployed only as a last resort. Where Germany does intervene militarily, it will do so only as part of a multilateral coalition and only where a clear international mandate exists. And such actions will be justified much more often than not in terms of Germany's responsibilities and obligations rather than its national interests.

Constitutional Background: The Basic Law and Its Interpretations Through mid-1994, a central issue in the debate over how Germany should respond to out-of-area crises and conflicts was the meaning of the provisions of the German constitution, or Basic Law, regarding the purposes for which the German armed forces might be used. Article 26 contains an explicit ban on preparations for military aggression. Article 24 concerns German membership in international organizations. Paragraph 2 states that "with a view to maintaining peace the Federation may become a party to a system of collective security; in doing so it shall consent to such limitations on its sovereign powers as will bring about and secure a peaceful and lasting order in Europe and among the nations of the world." Finally, Article 87a, which was added when West Germany began torearm in 1956, provides the constitutional basis for the Bundeswehr. Paragraph 1 states that "the Federation shall establish Armed Forces for defence purposes," while paragraph 2 adds that "other than for defence purposes the Armed Forces may only be employed to the extent explicitly permitted by this Basic Law." 2 These rather ambiguous and somewhat contradictory provisions lent themselves to a wide range of interpretations. At one end of the spectrum, Article 87a could be interpreted, in conjunction with Chapter Xa of the Basic Law concerning the so-called state of defense, which was added in 1968, as allowing the Bundeswehr to be used only for the defense of German territory. That highly restrictive position, however, conflicted with the explicit obligations that Germany had undertaken as a member ofNATO and the Western European Union (WEU) to provide assistance to its allies in the event of an armed attack. At the other extreme, Article 24 could be construed as permitting German participation in any act of individual or collective self-defense, as provided for in Article 51 of the UN Charter, to which Germany had been a party since the early 1970s. 3

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Over the years, however, a strong cross-party consensus had formed around an intermediate, although still rather narrow, interpretation. According to this view, the Bundeswehr could be used for the defense of Germany and its allies but not for any other military purposes. Although justified in terms of Article 24, which was regarded as the constitutional basis for Germany's membership in alliances, as well as Article 87a, this position had been largely motivated by considerations of self-interest and political expediency. German leaders had feared that military involvement in out-of-area conflicts could lead to a direct clash with East German forces or provoke Soviet retaliation in Central Europe. Thus abstention from such missions was necessary to preserve detente in Europe and even to maintain the domestic consensus behind German security policy.4 In 1982, this restrictive interpretation was formalized in back-to-hack decisions by the cabinet-level Federal Security Council involving first the SPD-FDP coalition government (Sept. 1) just before its dissolution and then the new CDU/CSU-FDP government (Nov. 3) shortly after it took office. 5 It was reaffirmed in the late 1980s, when the Iran-Iraq War prompted Western states to send naval elements to the Persian Gulf. In response to renewed queries about the legitimacy of German participation in out-of-area missions, then-Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher reiterated that, in the view of the government, the Basic Law permitted Bundeswehr operations only for the purposes of national and collective self-defense within the framework of the alliances to which Germany belonged. A constitutional amendment would be necessary to allow even German involvement in UN peacekeeping operations. 6 Before 1990, however, these discussions were peripheral to the main concerns of German security policy, which continued to focus on the European theater and direct threats to German territory. Little thought was given to the possibility that the Bundeswehr would ever be used other than for repelling a Soviet attack on Germany itself. 7

The Issue Emerges: Germany and the Gulf War Germany was suddenly forced to reconsider these restrictions on the use of the Bundeswehr and to confront the more general question of the role that it should play in world affairs after the Cold War even before the final details of unification had been worked out when Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990. Although some Germari leaders were initially

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inclined to make a direct contribution to the international military efforts being mounted in the Persian Gulf, the government quickly decided to provide other forms of assistance exclusively in order to defer what was likely to be a heated domestic debate over the out-of-area issue. During the following months, Germany afforded crucial, albeit low-key, logistical support for the buildup of U.S. and British forces in the region. Yet public statements by German leaders stressed the importance of finding a peaceful solution to the crisis. And as the expiration of the UN deadline approached and, especially, during the two weeks following the beginning of Operation Desert Storm in mid-January, a combination of developments caused Germany to come under increasing foreign criticism for showing insufficient solidarity. In the end, Germany made one of the largest contributions to the UN coalition effort, providing more than DM 18 billion in cash, goods, and services. Nevertheless, Germany's assistance was almost exclusively of a financial and material nature. Militarily, Germany played an almost insignificant role in the conflict, notwithstanding its economic power.

Germany's Initial Response When Iraq invaded Kuwait, and especially after the United States made clear its determination to secure a complete withdrawal of Iraqi forces, the German government, led by Chancellor Helmut Kohl, was eager to show solidarity with its Western allies. It quickly approved unrestricted use by the United States of its bases and installations in Germany in support of U.S. operations in the Persian Gulf. It also agreed to dispatch a flotilla of minesweepers and supply ships to the eastern Mediterranean to replace American vessels that had been diverted to the Gulr_S More controversially, Kohl argued that Germany itself should consider sending minesweepers to the Gulf as part of a European naval task force. Such a move would further demonstrate Germany's solidarity with the international community as it sought to defend international law. In his view and that of his party, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), moreover, a military contribution of that nature would not require amending the Basic Law as long as a UN mandate existed. 9 This suggestion, however, immediately ran into trouble in the cabinet. Members of the Free Democratic Party (FDP), led by Foreign Minister Genscher, argued that any Bundeswehr deployment outside the NATO area, even under UN auspices, remained unconstitutional and thus re-

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jected Kohl's proposal. Nevertheless, they were not opposed in principle to German participation in UN-mandated peacekeeping operations, and they expressed their support for an amendment to the Basic Law that would make such activities possible. 10 Anxious to establish a common government position prior to an important meeting of the WEU scheduled for August 21 and eager to keep the issue out of the looming federal election campaign, the coalition partners worked out a compromise. They agreed that there would be no Bundeswehr deployment to the Persian Gulf but that they would seek to clarify and modify as necessary the relevant constitutional provisions after the national elections in December. 11 This position was then discussed with leaders of the main opposition party, the Social Democratic Party (SPD), who concurred that the Basic Law prohibited out-of-area deployments and that further discussion of the matter should be deferred until after the completion of unification. The three parties also agreed, however, on the common goal of making possible Bundeswehr participation in actions approved by the UN Security Council within the framework of the UN Charter. 12 A further factor influencing this decision was a widely shared concern not to allow the crisis to interfere with the unification process and the more general project of building a new European peace order based on cooperative relations with the Soviet Union. In particular, German leaders agreed on the importance of not sending any signals that might strengthen the hard-liners in Moscow until all the relevant treaties had been signed and ratified. Any deployment of German forces to the Persian Gulf was seen as conflicting with the need to reassure the Soviet Union of united Gern_mny' s continuing non-belligerent nature. 13

Subsequent German Actions Despite this apparent consensus, Kohl and the CDU evinced considerable dismay at the need to postpone a resolution of the issue. Kohl repeatedly stressed his intention to change the Basic Law as soon as possible after the December elections. The existing restrictions on the use of the Bundeswehr, he argued, were unacceptable, as they prevented Germany from assuming its international responsibilities. 14 In addition, the government provided a significant amount of assistance to the United States and to Middle Eastern states that were adversely affected by the UN embargo on Iraq. In mid-September, in re-

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sponse to a U.S. request that other countries help to share the financial burdens associated with the implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions, and some criticism in the U.S. Senate that Germany was not doing its fair share, 15 Germany offered DM 3.3 billion in aid, half in the form of military equipment and transportation costs for the United States and the remainder as economic assistance for the front-line states. 16 Out of the public eye, Germany also provided extensive support for the movement of U.S. and British forces based in Germany to the Gulf and the shipment of large supplies of ammunition. 17 Finally, German officials declared their strong backing for the actions undertaken by the UN Security Council. There could be no compromise with the principles of international law, they insisted. Iraq must end its occupation of Kuwait without conditions, since anything less would effectively reward Iraq for its aggression. They also warned, however, of the possible negative consequences of using force to expel the Iraqi forces in Kuwait. Instead, they insisted that every possible means of achieving a peaceful resolution of the crisis, including negotiations, be exhausted before any military action was initiated. 18

Germany and the Outbreak of the War Although the position of the German government was undoubtedly influenced by the strong public opposition to the use of force that was manifested during the run-up to Operation Desert Storm, 19 many German leaders, most notably Genscher, in fact possessed a strong faith in the efficacy of diplomacy. In part because of the peaceful way in which unification had just been achieved, they believed right up to the last minute that a non-military solution to the Gulf conflict could be found and that further war could be avoided. This conviction meant that it was difficult for many Germans to come to terms with the implications of Saddam Hussein's intransigence. 2° Consequently, they were entirely unprepared for the possibility that all diplomatic efforts might fail. Instead, as the mid-January UN deadline for an Iraqi withdrawal approached, the German government, led by Genscher, engaged in a flurry of last-ditch efforts to find a peaceful solution and a good deal of wishful thinking. Just before the New Year, Germany proposed a meeting of the EC foreign ministers to consider a new initiative intended to persuade Iraq to withdraw. Genscher argued that war was not inevitable and that diplomacy should be given another chance. 21 Even after Iraq had rejected

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the resulting EC overture and talks between U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz had broken down, German officials persisted in hoping that a peaceful solution might yet be found.Z 2 At the same time, the German peace movement, which had been conspicuously quiescent four months before when the crisis began, suddenly came to life. Hundreds of thousands of people took to the streets to attend rallies and to hold vigils in what were the largest such public demonstrations since the climax of the Euromissile debate in 1983. After air strikes began against Iraq in mid-January, moreover, the protests took on an antiAmerican cast, and later in the month, some 200,000 people turned out in Bonn to show their opposition to the war. 23 The government's response to the outbreak of hostilities, in contrast, was largely one of awkward silence. 24 Instead of offering strong expressions of support for the efforts of Germany's allies to enforce the UN Security Council resolutions, 25 German political leaders found themselves mired in an embarrassing debate over Germany's alliance obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty. In early January, in response to a Turkish request for protection against possible Iraqi reprisals, Germany had agreed to dispatch a force of 18 combat aircraft to Turkey as part of the air component of NATO's mobile force. Although this action represented the first significant operational deployment of the Bundeswehr outside of Germany since World War II, German officials felt obliged to stress the limited nature of the measure-it was intended only to deter aggression and to show solidarity with Germany's allies-and they made sure that the force was stationed far enough from the Iraqi border so that it could under no circumstances be perceived as engaging in offensive operations.26 Following the beginning of Operation Desert Storm, however, members of the SPD and even some members of the coalition parties began to question Germany's obligation to provide assistance to Turkey in response to an Iraqi attack. Since American bombers were conducting air operations against Iraq from Turkish bases, they argued, any offensive Iraqi action could be viewed as having been provoked. Nearly two weeks passed before the government unequivocally confirmed its readiness to come to Turkey's defense in the event of such an occurrence. 27 The German government's initial reserve and ambivalence sparked an outpouring of criticism, especially in the United States but also at home. Not only was Germany seemingly wavering in its support for its allies,

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but German companies had played a major role in enabling Iraq to arm itself with missiles and possibly weapons of mass destruction with which it threatened to impose heavy losses on their forces. In addition, Germany's initial financial contributions were beginning to look paltry in comparison with the mounting costs of the international efforts to liberate Kuwait. 28 These criticisms helped to prompt a strong, if belated, show of solidarity by the German government. German officials were also spurred into action by the Iraqi missile attacks on Israel, which raised the awful specter of Jews dying from chemical weapons that Germans had helped to make. 29 Late in January, they finally began to speak out forcefully in support of their allies and the international coalition. 30 In addition, the government decided to deploy air defense units to Turkey and additional naval vessels to the Mediterranean. 31 Most significantly, Germany greatly increased the amount of financial assistance that it was prepared to provide. In particular, it offered the United States $5.5 billion to help defray the costs of military operations during the first three months of the year and smaller sums to Britain and France. As a result, Germany's total contribution to the international measures taken during the Gulf crisis rose to some DM 18 billion, or the equivalent of more than one-third of its the annual defense budget, of which over DM 10 billion was earmarked for the United States. Thus Germany covered almost 10 percent of the total expenditure arising from the international response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and more than 12 percent of the military expenses incurred by the United States, levels of assistance that were exceeded only by those of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Japan. 32

The Out-of-Area Debate(!): Taking Positions Although the Gulf War lasted but a few weeks, it had an enduring impact on German security policy. It showed German leaders that they could not put off the task of grappling with the question of Germany's responsibilities for the preservation of peace outside of Europe, including the possible use of the Bundeswehr. As Volker Riihe, then Secretary General of the CDU, described the situation, "the Gulf War casts a bright light on the need to redefine united Germany's international role, particularly insofar as our readiness to commit our forces beyond the NATO area is concerned."33 Most political leaders were especially anxious to

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avoid a repetition of the situation that had prevailed the previous August, when Germany had found itself unable to participate militarily in any international peace efforts. 34 Consequently, during the following months, each of the major parties made a conscious effort to establish its position on the issue of out-ofarea military operations. Three questions in particular had to be addressed: In what types of military actions should the Bundeswehr be able to participate? Was a constitutional amendment required? How should decisions regarding the use of the German armed forces be made? 35

The Union Parties Of the major parties, the CDU and Christian Social Union (CSU) adopted the most expansive position on the issue. The Union parties strongly opposed limiting German involvement to UN peacekeeping operations. Kohl and other leaders argued that the Bundeswehr should be able to participate in the full range of military measures that might be authorized by the UN, including peace enforcement efforts under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and regardless of whether they were conducted under the UN flag or organized along the looser pattern of the Gulf War coalition. In addition, they felt that German forces should be able to take part in joint actions undertaken within the framework of a future European security structure even in the absence of a UN mandate. 36 Nevertheless, the Union parties explicitly placed an important qualification on their position. In their view, out-of-area military operations by the Bundeswehr were only conceivable within a multilateral framework such as the UN, NATO, or the WEU. There could be no question of Germany ever acting alone. 37 Union leaders offered several arguments for their position. First, Germany bore greater international responsibilities as a result of unification and the restoration of its sovereignty, and these included participation in measures intended to preserve and restore world peace. In particular, Germany must begin to fulfill all of the duties arising from its membership in the UN. 38 Closely related was the argument that the international community and Germany's allies expected as much. Consequently, if Germany insisted on playing a more limited role, its prestige, credibility, and reputation as a reliable partner would suffer, resulting in its increasing political isolation. 39 A further argument put forth by the Union was that the ability to par-

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ticipate in a broad array of international military actions was necessary in order to safeguard and pursue German interests. Otherwise, Germany's capacity to shape decisions concerning peace and war, as occurred during the Gulf War, and even less momentous issues would remain highly limited. As Rtihe later argued in his capacity as Minister of Defense, "the quality and size of .Germany's contribution influences its political capability and thus determines the weight that can be thrown behind its interests."40 Finally, such a posture was seen as necessary for European integration. As noted in Chapter Six, Union leaders were among the strongest German advocates of European Union, which in the long term would have to include a common European security policy and a joint defense. The achievement of this goal would only be possible, however, if Germany were able to participate without reservation. This meant that the use of the Bundeswehr could not be restricted to UN missions. 41 As for the second question, there was a broad consensus within the Union that the Basic Law already permitted the types of out-of-area military missions in which they wanted Germany to be able to participate. Thus an amendment was not technically necessary. 42 This position,. moreover, was buttressed by the views of most legal experts. 43 Nevertheless, many Union members, led by Kohl, believed that some form of supplementary clarifying amendment was highly desirable. 44 They wanted to put a definitive end to the debate over what the constitution allowed and to create a solid political consensus for out-of-area operations. Likewise, they were eager to establish a clear legal basis for such actions in order to avert possibly awkward constitutional challenges to future government decisions. Finally, they feared that simply to reinterpret a long-held policy would risk undermining the government's credibility with both the German public and foreign audiences. 45

The Free Democratic Party Although the Union parties dominated the government coalition, they neverthele;5s needed the support of their coalition partners in the FDP, led by Foreign Minister Genscher, if their views were to prevail. In fact, the positions of the governing parties coincided in some important respects. But significant differences precluded the early establishment of a consensus within the coalition. In terms of the types of actions in which the German armed forces

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should be able to participate, the positions of the Union and the FDP were quite close. 46 At the beginning of the Gulf crisis, Genscher had suggested that, beyond the defense of Germany and its allies, the Bundeswehr should be limited to UN peacekeeping operations. 47 Within weeks after the beginning of Operation Desert Storm, however, he and other party leaders were advocating that German forces be permitted to join all military operations covered by the UN Charter, including combat missions intended to implement UN Security Council resolutions, like those conducted in the Gulf. The reasons they offered for this position were very similar to those used by the Union. 48 In contrast to the Union, however, the FDP insisted that the Bundeswehr engage only in actions that were based on UN Security Council resolutions. Thus it ruled out German participation in out-of-area operations conducted by a European army that lacked an explicit UN mandate. The Liberals were eager to strengthen the UN's monopoly on the legitimate use of force. They were also confident in the wake of the Gulf War that the smooth operation of the Security Council would no longer be blocked by the type of antagonism that had prevailed among its members during the Cold War. Thus one could expect quick Security Council action in response to future cases of aggression. 49 The coalition partners also differed over the need for a constitutional amendment. Genscher and the FDP adhered firmly to the old interpretation, arguing that the Basic Law did not allow any out-of-area operations and thus that an amendment was absolutely necessary. 50 This position was strongly rooted in the very nature of the FDP, which viewed itself as the leading defender of individual rights and the rule of law. Consequently, the Liberals had traditionally taken a cautious approach on constitutional issues, attaching great weight to precedents and prior interpretations. 51 Like many of their Union counterparts, members of the FDP were also concerned about Germany's credibility. But their party's own reputation was also at stake, since Genscher and the FDP were most closely associated with the restrictive interpretation. A sharp reversal of the party's long-standing position would be politically awkward to say the least. 52 The FDP was also probably influenced by electoral considerations. Its survival depended on maintaining a profile that was distinct from that of the .Union. Otherwise, it would risk losing votes. 53 Finally, whereas the Union had remained largely silent on the issue of decision-making procedures, FDP leaders were adamant about giving the

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legislative branch an explicit role. Under the existing arrangements, they feared, it might be possible for the government to dispatch the Bundeswehr outside the NATO area without even consulting the parliament. Consequently, they insisted that all out-of-area deployments should have the support of at least a majority in the Bundestag. 54

The Social Democratic Party Of the major parties, the SPD adopted the most restrictive position on the out-of-area question. The Social Democrats shared the Liberal view that the Basic Law prohibited the use of the Bundeswehr for military purposes other than the defense of Germany and its allies and that a constitutional amendment was necessary. At most, German forces could legitimately participate only in humanitarian assistance operations without such a change. When it came to the types of military missions that ought to be made permissible by an amendment to the Basic Law, however, the positions of the SDP and the FDP diverged sharply. Previously, the Social Democrats had rejected German involvement in any form of out-of-area military mission, including peacekeeping operations. 55 Although this position remained popular with the party rank and file, in the wake of the Gulf crisis, a number of SDP leaders concluded that it was no longer tenable, since it risked isolating the party domestically and Germany internationally. 56 Consequently, in preparation for the party congress scheduled for May 1991 in Bremen, they successfully pressed the party executive committee to adopt a proposal calling for a constitutional amendment that would permit German participation in UN peacekeeping missions under UN command (Blue Helmet) but nothing more. 57 Although some prominent SDP leaders wanted to go even further, 58 even this modest departure from past policy ran up against strong criticism within the party. Many members still opposed any German military involvement outside the NATO area. They feared that participation in peacekeeping operations would open the door to other out-of-area military activities and possibly even a revival of militarism in Germany. 59 In the face of this opposition, the proponents of change were forced to settle for a highly qualified endorsement of German participation in Blue Helmet missions at the Bremen meeting. The resolution adopted by the party both defined the types of peacekeeping measures that would be acceptable and spelled out the conditions that would have to be met before

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German forces could join in. These included the existence of a Security Council resolution, agreement by the states involved in the conflict, control by the UN Secretary General, and no use of force except in selfdefense. In addition, the participation of German troops in Blue Helmet actions would have to be approved by the Bundestag in each instance. 60 All other forms of out-of-area operations were rejected. Even with these many caveats, the resolution passed by only a relatively small majority (230-179), and only after the new party leader, Bjorn Engholm, had made it a vote of confidence in his leadership. 61 This constellation of party positions ensured that the out-of-area issue would not soon be resolved. The leaders of each of the major parties agreed that Germany should assume greater responsibility for international peace, in part through a broader use of the Bundeswehr. They also recognized the importance of achieving a consensus as a political prerequisite for any future out-of-area deployments. But they disagreed on the form that the consensus should take. The FDP sought to cooperate with the Union on the matter, in part because of the similarity of their visions for the role of the Bundeswehr and in order to preserve the coalition. Its insistence on the need to revise the Basic Law, however, effectively ceded control over the issue to the opposition, since the coalition's representation in the Bundestag fell well short of the two-thirds majority required to pass a constitutional amendment. Yet the SDP would agree to no more than participation in UN peacekeeping, while the Union would settle for no less than the ability to contribute to the whole range of possible multilateral out-of-area operations.

Interlude: Germany and the Outbreak of Conflict in Yugoslavia Before any progress could be made on the out-of-area issue, the attention of German politicians was diverted by another foreign crisis: the outbreak of conflict in Yugoslavia. During the second half of 1991, Germany was actively involved in international efforts to bring a halt to the fighting in Slovenia and Croatia. Then in December 1991, Germany exerted considerable pressure on its EC partners to establish diplomatic relations with the breakaway republics, notwithstanding strong international

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opposition. And once a compromise solution had been reached, German leaders promptly extended recognition, in accordance with earlier promises to do so by Christmas, thereby violating the spirit if not the letter of the EC agreement. 62 Many observers regarded Germany's actions as a clear indication that it would henceforth pursue a more independent and assertive foreign policy. 63 These concerns were greatly exaggerated, however. They overlooked the unusual confluence of international and domestic pressures that compelled German leaders to act as they did. They also disregarded the considerable restraint that Germany exercised throughout the crisis. German leaders made extensive efforts to work within existing institutional structures to find a multilateral solution to the conflict, and German policy was also tempered by their unwillingness to employ the Bundeswehr in the Balkans under any circumstances.

Germany's Initial Response Like most Europeans, Germans were taken aback when nationalist tensions within Yugoslavia degenerated into armed conflict in the middle of 1991. Previously, German policy had been animated by the assumption that Yugoslavia could be kept intact and the differences among its ethnic groups resolved, in part with the help of external pressures and inducements.64 As soon as fighting broke out, however, the German government came under considerable pressure from all of the major political parties but the FDP to recognize Slovenia and Croatia, or at least to use the threat of recognition in order to deter further attacks by the Yugoslav army. 65 Despite this pressure, the government exercised notable restraint on the issue. To be sure, Kohl and Genscher dropped their previous insistence on maintaining Yugoslavia's unity and placed new emphasis on the right of the various Yugoslav peoples to self-determination. But they sought to play down the possibility of recognition. 66 When Genscher tentatively suggested in early July that the EC consider jointly recognizing Croatia and Slovenia if the Yugoslav army violated the current cease-fire, he quickly dropped the idea in the face of opposition from other Community members because of his concern to maintain EC unity. German leaders were also concerned about the possible repercussions of recognition in the Soviet Union, which was then tottering on the brink of dissolution.67 Instead, the German government focused its energies on using existing

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international institutions to achieve a peaceful solution to the conflict. Although Germany sought to utilize the CSCE's recently adopted emergency mechanism, 68 it made the bulk of its efforts within the EC, which promised to be more helpful because of its better-developed institutional capacities and its smaller and more homogeneous membership. Germany was a leading force behind the several EC initiatives that were generated during the summer and fall of 1991. In July, Genscher pressed for the dispatch of EC observers to Slovenia and, subsequently, an enlargement of their numbers and the extension of their mission to Croatia. 69 In early September, Germany along with France proposed the prompt convening of an EC-sponsored peace conference. 70 And later in the month, Germany strongly supported the creation of a WEU buffer force that could be used to help monitor the cease-fire and to protect EC observers. 71 Nevertheless, Germany's attempts to work through the EC were often frustrated by the resistance of some partners and the EC's lack of an international mandate to intervene. Consequently, as time passed, Germany increasingly pinned its hopes for finding a peaceful solution on the United Nations. In late September, Genscher appealed for an emergency meeting of the Security Council to discuss the situation in Yugoslavia. Only the world body could act effectively, he argued, since only it had the authority to adopt binding actions against the will of affected parties. 72 Yet this effort, too, provided little succor, since some members of the Security Council were not yet ready to intervene, in particular through the deployment of peacekeeping forces. 73

The Push for Recognition It was only in this context of unsuccessful efforts to find a solution through multilateral institutions that the option of recognition began to look increasingly attractive, and even imperative. German officials began to threaten to consider recognizing Slovenia and Croatia as early as August 1991 in an attempt to influence the behavior of the Serbs as the latter violated one cease-fire after another. 74 These warnings were stepped up in late August and early September as the opening of the EC-sponsored peace conference approached. 75 As Genscher told the German weekly Die Zeit, We would normally recognize a country's independence only at the end of a negotiation process. If the negotiation process is destroyed, however, it must

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be possible to take such a step earlier, and not to accept passively a policy that changes borders by force. 76

The Germans hastened to qualify their rhetoric, however, when opposition to such a course of action was once again voiced within the EC. 77 In mid-September, a government spokesman explained that recognition could only be considered if a peaceful settlement were no longer possible and that that stage had by no means been reached. 78 And subsequently, German officials maintained that the subject would remain off the agenda as long as the EC peace process continued. 79 Nevertheless, even as Germany once again seemed to place the issue on the back burner, the political groundwork was being laid for possible German and EC recognition before the year was out. In early October, the EC foreign ministers agreed to seek a political solution to the conflict that would include the possibility of extending diplomatic recognition to those republics that desired independence and that satisfied several conditions established by the EC, including protection of the rights of minority groups. It was hoped that a solution could be found within one month, but if necessary, the negotiations would be extended up to another month, until December 10. At that point, however, the EC would no longer be able to defer consideration of the issue of recognition, and Genscher regarded the agreement as giving Germany a green light to extend recognition once the two-month deadline had expired. 80 In the meantime, domestic pressure within Germany in favor of recognition had continued to mount. Opinion polls indicated that a solid majority of all Germans favored Croatian and Slovenian independence. And by November, all of the major parties had expressed strong support for recognition. 81 It would have been difficult for the government to avoid pressing the issue much longer, regardless of whatever reservations it might still have held. Thus as December 10 approached, the stage was set for a confrontation within the EC over the issue. In November, Germany, along with Italy, indicated that it would recognize Croatia and Slovenia before Christmas, a promise that was reiterated in early December. 82 Not surprisingly, these announcements triggered considerable international criticism. 83 But this time, German leaders were unfazed. Instead, they focused on winning the backing of as many EC members as possible, using a combination of lobbying and brinkmanship, as they reiterated that Germany would act alone ifnecessary. 84

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These efforts were rewarded at a special meeting of the EC foreign ministers held on December 16-17-just a week after the EC summit in Maastricht-where a compromise was struck that accorded closely with the German position. Most importantly, the ministers agreed to recognize those former Yugoslav republics that desired independence on January 15. Recognition would be contingent, however, on the fulfillment of several conditions, the most noteworthy of which concerned the protection of the rights of national minorities. Each republic's compliance with these conditions would be determined by the Arbitration Commission that had been established as part of the EC peace conference in September. 85 Prior to the EC agreement, however, Germany had declared that Slovenia and Croatia had already met all of the preconditions. Thus Genscher announced that recognition would occur automatically, regardless of the findings of the Arbitration Commission. And on December 23, Germany fulfilled its promise to extend recognition before Christmas, although it did not formally establish diplomatic relations until mid-January in deference to its EC partners. 86

German Motives and Restraint Why did Germany press so hard for the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, displaying for the first-and so far the only-time after unification an apparent willingness to disregard the views of its partners and to strike out on its own? In this case, a number of reinforcing international and domestic considerations seemingly left German leaders with no alternative. While not all of these reasons may have appeared legitimate or sufficient in the eyes of others, none can simply be equated with a yearning for national aggrandizement. 87 First, there was the understandable desire simply to put an end to the fighting, which throughout the conflict had been Germany's top priority. By December 1991, the war had left some 10,000 people dead and had displaced over half a million others from their homes. A powerful moral imperative existed to take action to stop the bloodshed and destruction. Because of its proximity, moreover, Germany was a likely destination for many of those seeking refuge from the fighting. 88 By that time, moreover, recognition seemed to represent the best-if not the only-hope for bringing a prompt end to the fighting. All other conceivable means had been clearly shown to be wanting. The EC peace conference had made little progress, largely because of Serb intransi-

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gence, and 14 EC-sponsored cease-fires had broken down. Efforts to use the UN and the CSCE had proven equally fruitless. After six months of unsuccessful attempts to work out a solution at the negotiating table, a strong case could be made for giving other options a try. 89 Nor could one easily demonstrate that diplomatic recognition of Croatia and Slovenia would be equally ineffective. In fact, such an approach offered several advantages. It could be used to deepen Serbia's isolation, and it would provide the international community with greater political leverage. Until then, the ability of international bodies, especially the EC and the CSCE, to influence the course of events had been sharply limited by the internal nature of conflict. By converting the struggle into what was indisputably an international matter, however, recognition would provide a broader legal basis for outside intervention. 90 German leaders also felt compelled to act in order to send a clear signal to the Serbs that aggression would not pay. They held the Serbs primarily responsible for the fighting and argued that continued inaction would be interpreted as international acquiescence in Serb misdeeds. The failure to extend recognition would suggest that the Serbs could change borders by brute force and would thus encourage the Yugoslav army to continue its attacks. 91 A related motivation was to prevent the spread of hostilities elsewhere in Eastern Europe. German leaders felt that an unwillingness to check Serbia would send a message to other ethnic groups that they too could use force with impunity to settle their disputes. Thus continued fighting in Yugoslavia could open the door to armed conflict throughout the region, possibly creating a tidal wave of refugees toward the West. 92 Several domestic considerations also militated against further delay. As noted above, the government was under tremendous and ever increasing popular pressure to act. Public sympathy for Croatia, and antipathy for the Serbs, extended across the political spectrum. Southern Germany has strong historical, cultural, and religious ties with the region, and the Dalmatian coast of Croatia, where Serb forces were engaged in the seemingly senseless destruction of treasures such as Dubrovnik, had been a popular vacation destination for tens of thousands of Germans each year. In addition, German media coverage of the war served up a steady stream of examples of Serb brutality. 93 Another domestic factor was the presence in Germany of a sizable population of Croatian guest workers, variously estimated at 400,000 or

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more. This group lobbied the government heavily to extend recognition. In addition, there was concern that Croatian nationalists might attempt to use Germany as a base for terrorist attacks if the fighting were not resolved.94 . Finally, German decision makers were disposed to favor recognition because of their largely unqualified support for the principle of national self-determination, even where it clashed with the goal of preserving Yugoslavia's integrity. Croatia and Slovenia had, after all, chosen the path of independence after democratic elections. Thus only months after Germans themselves had exercised the right of self-determination to achieve national unity, it would have been hypocritical if not immoral for them to deny that choice to other ethnic groups. 95 It is important to stress that, contrary to many depictions of German behavior during this episode, Germany showed considerable restraint. Throughout the summer and most of the fall of 1991, German leaders adhered uncompromisingly to a policy of multilateralism. They assiduously sought to work through all of the available international institutional channels to stop the fighting. After they had begun to employ the threat of recognition, moreover, they pressed for a joint approach by the members of the EC, rather than proceeding unilaterally. 96 Through November, their concern to maintain EC unity and consideration for Germany's partners prevailed over their interest in early recognition. 97 Thus it was only after more than four months of concerted efforts to fashion a multilateral approach had proven unsuccessful that German leaders decided recognition could wait no longer. And even then, they did not act alone. Italy and Austria, both of which shared German concerns about refugees and a possible extension of the fighting, were prepared to follow Germany's lead, as were Belgium, Denmark, and Sweden. 98 Moreover, as discussed above, a decision to establish diplomatic relations at that moment could have been said to have a firm basis in previous EC decisions. 99 Also prominently on display throughout the crisis was Germany's aversion to the use of military means. German actions during this period were strictly limited to diplomacy and economic sanctions. There was never any consideration of dispatching German forces to the region even within a multilateral framework or for the most humanitarian of purposes. In this case, the usual normative constraints and constitutional arguments were reinforced by inhibitions arising from Germany's brutal occupation

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of Yugoslavia during World War II. In the opinion of most Germans, history ruled out the presence of German soldiers in that part of the Balkans under any circumstances, a position that became commonly known as the Kohl doctrine. 100

The Out-of-Area Debate (II): Ptobing the Political Boundaries The aftermath of the Gulf War, deepening external intervention in the former Yugoslavia following the recognition episode, and disorder in several other places around the world during the early 1990s resulted in a growing number of situations in which Germany was called upon to use its armed forces to contribute to international efforts to maintain and restore peace. Members of the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition government and their parties were inclined to respond to these calls in a positive, if not enthusiastic, manner. They viewed a German contribution to such efforts both as part of Germany's increased responsibility after unification and the Cold War and as necessary to maintain the confidence of Germany's allies and partners. Because of the position of the SPD on the out-of-area issue, however, a constitutional amendment that would permit the range of Bundeswehr missions thought necessary by the coalition remained unattainable. Consequently, the government adopted a strategy of employing the Bundeswehr in ways that were not clearly at odds with the prevailing constitutional interpretation over the strenuous objections of the SPD-and in one notable instance, over those of the FDP. In addition to enabling Germany to respond in at least a limited way to external pressures and expectations, this strategy was also seen as paving the way for a broader range of German actions in the future, in two respects. First, it would gradually alter Germany's constitutional practice through a series of small steps. 101 Government officials were fairly confident that, if subject to a constitutional challenge, any operations that did not actually involve the Bundeswehr in peacekeeping or combat operations would receive a favorable ruling from the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht). Second, although not without risks, the government's strategy was intended to alter public opinion, gradually building popular tolerance of, if not support for, the use of Bundeswehr outside the NATO area and Germany's assumption of a larger role in world affairs. 102

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Nevertheless, the government proceeded cautiously and operated within fairly clear limits. Most of the out-of-area deployments engaged in by the Bundeswehr were of such a nature that they could at least be characterized as "humanitarian" missions, which had never been proscribed. The government was also careful to ensure that the military personnel involved were never put at great risk. Any significant loss of life would probably have caused a major setback to its efforts.

Testing the Waters The government initially used the Bundeswehr for out-of-area operations in ways that were likely to arouse little controyersy and might even command widespread public support. The first modest deployments were made in the Persian Gulf region, just days after the war against Iraq had ended. In early March 1991, in response to requests from the United States and the UN Security Council, Germany transferred the minesweeping detachment that had been sent to the Mediterranean the previous August to the Gulf to clear mines laid by Iraq during the war in what was described as a humanitarian mission. 103 Then beginning in April, the German air force (Luftwaffe) used transport aircraft and helicopters to distribute relief supplies in Turkey and Iran to Kurdish refugees from Iraq. 104 And in late 1991, Germany provided helicopters to ferry UN inspection teams around Iraq and to conduct reconnaissance flights over the country. 105 The following year, the Bundeswehr undertook humanitarian missions in several additional regions. In April 1992, the German government, at the request of the UN Secretary General, agreed to open a hospital in Cambodia staffed by 140 military personnel in support of the UN transitional administration there. 106 In August, the Luftwaffe began to conduct humanitarian aid flights to Somalia, well before the UN decision to send ground forces there. 107 And perhaps most notably, given the strong reservations that had previously been expressed about the dispatch of the Bundeswehr to Yugoslavia, the government, with the support of the opposition, decided to participate in the humanitarian airlift to Sarajevo in July 1992. 108 This initial contribution was followed by the government's decision, in March 1993, to join the United States in conducting air drops over the besieged Muslim enclaves in eastern Bosnia. 109 Three other steps taken by the government in the early 1990s, however, were far more controversial: the dispatch of a destroyer and several

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patrol aircraft to the Adriatic to help monitor the UN embargo on the former Yugoslavia, the participation of German aircrews in NATO AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) aircraft charged with monitoring and then enforcing the UN flight ban over Bosnia, and the deployment of a battalion to Somalia to contribute to the UN operation there.

Monitoring the UN Embargo in the Adriatic On May 30, 1992, the UN Security Council adopted (Resolution 757) comprehensive economic sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro, the two republics that constituted the rump state of Yugoslavia. In mid-July, both NATO and the WEU decided to deploy air and sea patrols in the Adriatic to monitor the UN embargo. Germany immediately came under pressure from its allies to contribute to these operations. 110 The German government quickly agreed to participate, dispatching a destroyer and several maritime patrol aircraft. 111 In defense of this action, government officials offered three arguments. 112 At first, they claimed that it was not technically an out-of-area deployment. The forces involved would operate only in or above Italian and international waters. 113 Second, the deployment did not violate the Basic Law because neither the threat nor the actual use of force was planned. Instead, German actions would be strictly confined to gathering and passing along information regarding compliance with the embargo. Government statements placed most of their emphasis, however, on a third argument: that participation was a political necessity. On the one hand, it was required in order for Germany to meet its increased international responsibility. In fact, Kinkel claimed, Germany's Nazi past had given it a special obligation to work actively for peace and human rights at the international level. On the other hand, it was expected by Germany's allies and thus necessary for maintaining Germany's reputation, especially its reliability as an alliance partner. Should Germany refuse to participate, it would isolate itself and become unable to pursue its interests.114 As Kinkel exclaimed, in a much-quoted remark, Germany could no longer behave like "an impotent dwarf." 115 The SPD was unpersuaded by these arguments and took a strong stand against the operation. 116 SPD leaders branded it as unconstitutional-it could certainly not be justified as a humanitarian mission-and argued that, in any case, the Basic Law must be clarified before Germany took

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steps that clashed with the old interpretation. The government, in their view, was attempting to work a fundamental change in German security policy without the involvement of the parliament. The SPD demanded a special session of the Bundestag to debate the decision and subsequently lodged a complaint before the Federal Constitutional Court. 117 Initially, the SPD's criticism had little effect. After debating the matter on July 22, the Bundestag passed a resolution over the opposition of the SPD that endorsed the deployment, although it also requested that the government consult the parliament if "decisions that go further" should become necessary. In November, however, when the Security Council approved the stopping and searching of ships seeking to break the embargo, most of the cabinet balked at going further. Instead, the government decided to continue to limit German participation in the enforcement operation to monitoring activities. This decision, advocated by both Kinkel and Riihe, triggered criticism both from abroad and from the Union Bundestag group, which viewed it as a lost opportunity to force a rapid clarification of the Basic Law by the Constitutional Court. 118 It would not be long, however, before another arose.

Enforcing the Bosnian Flight Ban In October 1992, the UN Security Council imposed a flight ban over Bosnia, and NATO A WACS aircraft began to monitor the no-fly zone. In December, the alliance began to draw up plans for the enforcement of the flight ban in anticipation of a further Security Council resolution authorizing actions to that effect. As the likelihood of enforcement operations increased, NATO and allied officials made it clear that they expected Germany to participate, if only because German airmen made up more than a quarter of the flight crews of the surveillance planes. In the absence of the Germans, "there would be a significant [negative] impact on the operational capability of the AWACS," which were essential for detecting violations and guiding NATO combat aircraft to their targets. 119 The question of whether to participate in NATO enforcement operations provoked a deep split within the government. Members of the CDU and CSU insisted that German personnel should remain aboard the AWACS. They reiterated their view that the Basic Law did not actually prohibit German involvement in out-of-areamilitary actions. In addition, Germany's failure to participate would impose high costs on Germany

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and NATO. It would greatly weaken Germany's position in the alliance and, Riihe warned, could even cause NATO to unravel. 120 Kinkel and the FDP were equally adamant that the German airmen would have to leave the AWACS. They recognized that the surveillance aircraft would not be directly engaged in combat operations, should the enforcement effort come to that. But because of their critical role in relaying information to fighters charged with shooting down violators, they would at least be indirectly involved, which the FDP viewed as clearly incompatible with the previous constitutional interpretation. Thus, although FDP leaders approved of German participation in principle and acknowledged the likely negative political consequences of a withdrawal, they argued that the Basic Law would first have to be amended. 121 In view of these differences, many commentators expected a major political crisis to occur, possibly resulting in the collapse of the coalition.122 Indeed, members of the Union's Bundestag group seemed eager to force a showdown. 123 But calmer heads prevailed. Kohl, Kinkel, and other cabinet members were determined to preserve the government and to spare Germany the foreign policy damage that they expected a breakup would cause. 124 Thus, as a Security Council decision loomed, they devised a clever compromise, which the cabinet endorsed in late March. In the event of a Security Council resolution authorizing enforcement of the flight ban, the cabinet would take a vote on the question of German participation. The Union majority would vote in favor of leaving German aircrews on the AWACS, while the FPD minority would oppose the measure. Simultaneously, the FDP Bundestag group would apply for a temporary injunction before the Federal Constitutional Court, forcing the Court to rule on the matter. No German soldiers would participate in combat operations until the Court had issued its opinion. 125 In effect, the government would, for the first time ever, sue itself, and the plaintiffs hoped that the Court's ruling would go against them. Although variously decried as an "utter farce," "pathological," an "embarrassment," and "a piece of unprecedented political grotesquerie," 126 the coalition's maneuver worked surprisingly well. On March 31, the Security Council voted to enforce the flight ban. Two days later, the cabinet conducted its vote, and the FDP filed suit, as planned. Less than a week after that, the Constitutional Court handed down its ruling, rejecting the FDP petition by a 5-3 vote and thus allowing the cabinet decision to stand. 127

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The Court's ruling did not dwell on the constitutionality of German participation in the AWACS operation. Rather, it focused on the likely political consequences of either upholding or denying the request for an injunction. It stressed the significant foreign policy disadvantages that would likely accrue to Germany if the government were forced to withdraw the German aircrews, only to find later that the constitution allowed German participation after all. "A loss of confidence by the allies and all European neighbors would be unavoidable, and the resulting damage irreparable." In contrast, it held, the negative consequences of allowing Germans to remain on board the AWACS, even if it turned out to be unconstitutional, would be smaller. 128 Thus the ruling did not resolve the underlying issue of what actions the Basic Law did allow. The Court made clear that its decision applied only to the AWACS dispute. This necessarily narrow focus, given the need to achieve a quick resolution, set the stage for yet another constitutional clash just days later over the deployment of German armed forces to Somalia.

The Somalia Mission In December 1992, when the UN Security Council authorized a largescale international military intervention in Somalia to put an end to the civil disorder and massive starvation that prevailed there, the German government resolved to make a contribution. The cabinet decided to offer a reinforced supply and transport battalion of approximately 1,500 soldiers to the UN for the purpose of distributing food and other relief supplies. Though modest in size, especially in comparison with the U.S. force that had just waded ashore in Mogadishu, the proposed German contingent promised to be the largest deployment of armed German soldiers outside ofthe NATO area since World War IL 129 Government officials were quick to underscore the constitutionality of the operation. In particular, they stressed, the Bundeswehr unit would have no combat role. Its mission would be strictly limited to providing humanitarian assistance, and it would only be deployed in areas that had already been pacified by other UN forces. As a precaution, however, the battalion would contain a self-defense component. In support of this decision, Kohl argued that Germany's international reputation was on the line. If Germany once again chose to stand aside, it would lose its credibility and become more and more isolated. Likewise,

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Riihe warned that Germany would be treated with contempt by the international community and expected to make huge payments to finance the participation of other countries' soldiers. 130 . Once again, however, the Social Democrats took a rather different view of the matter. They argued that the proposed deployment was unconstitutional, in part because the troops involved would be exposed to danger. Consequently, they threatened to challenge the decision before the Federal Constitutional Court, should the government decide to proceed.131 Following this initial flurry of activity, the issue disappeared for several months while the UN forces gained control of the situation on the ground in Somalia. 132 Renewed debate broke out in mid-April 1993, less than a week after the AWACS ruling, however, when UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali formally requested German participation in UNOSOM II, which was intended to be the humanitarian assistance phase of the UN Somalia operation. 133 After some initial concerns about whether the conditions set down in December would be met, the government quickly decided to accede to the UN request. 134 Government officials once again maintained that the planned deployment was entirely consistent with the constitution. It would take place in a pacified area and 135 . . serve pureIy h umamtanan purposes. These claims were somewhat undermined several weeks later by a further UN request to change the deployment area and to add logistical support for other UNOSOM II forces to the Bundeswehr unit's responsibilities, and as expected, the SPD soon appealed the government's decision to the Federal Constitutional Court. Although the Social Democrats supported German humanitarian relief efforts in Somalia, they argued that the planned deployment was unconstitutional on several grounds. First, the purpose of the mission was not purely humanitarian, since the Bundeswehr contingent would also be engaged in the transportation of fuel and arms for units engaged in peace-making operations. Second, given the continuation of fighting in parts of Somalia, the safety of the German troops could not be ensured. The very fact that the battalion would include a self-defense component revealed that the pacification of the deployment area could not be assumed. Third, such a momentous step should be taken only with the full participation of the parliament. 136 Just as predictably, government officials rejected the SPD's claims. They also stressed the negative consequences of Germany's failure to

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participate in the UN operation. Along with UN officials, they described Germany's expected contribution as indispensable and irreplaceable. Consequently, a cancellation or prolonged delay in the arrival of the promised Bundeswehr contingent would constitute a major setback for the operation as well as for the people of Somalia and would severely damage Germany's reputation. 137 The Federal Constitutional Court handed down its decision on June 23. This time, each side could take some satisfaction from the outcome. As the government had hoped, the Court allowed the Bundeswehr's participation in UNOSOM II to proceed, at least until the fundamental constitutional issues were resolved. But it also indicated that the Bundestag must be more fully involved in the decision-making process, as the SPD had demanded. Specifically, the Bundestag would have to approve a formal bill, prepared in the appropriate committees and debated in plenary session, that authorized the mission, and any future government actions would be subject to the same requirement. 138 The necessary parliamentary measure was passed on July 2, by a vote of337-185. 139

The Out-ofArea Debate (III): Efforts at Compromise During the early 1990s, the out-of-area debate was not characterized by conflict and clashing interests alone. That period also witnessed several noteworthy efforts to find a compromise agreement on a constitutional amendment that would be acceptable to all of the major parties. In addition, center-leaning members of the SDP sought to move the party from the highly restrictive position that it had adopted in May 1991. In the end, however, all of these efforts came to naught, as the differences between the parties proved too great to be reconciled.

Initial Overtures The first indications of a possible compromise appeared in the spring of 1992, after the Gulf crisis had subsided. Ruhe, first in his capacity as Secretary General of the CDU and then after assuming the position of Defense Minister at the beginning of April, suggested that the CDU might be ready to strike a bargain with the opposition. The Union was eager to establish a clear constitutional basis for German participation in UN peacekeeping operations as quickly as possible and certainly by the

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end of the year. Riihe reiterated that his party would not settle in the long term for anything less than a far-reaching constitutional amendment that would enable the armed forces to participate in all UN-authorized measures, including combat missions. But in return for SDP agreement to such an amendment, the CDU would be willing to limit Bundeswehr activities to peacekeeping operations for a number of years. Riihe acknowledged that Germany would not be materially or psychologically prepared to participate in combat operations for a decade and that even then, such missions would be the exception. They should be possible, he indicated, only "if outstanding German and European security interests are at stake." 140 In mid-June, with Riihe's backing, the deputy chairman of the CDU's Bundestag group, Karl-Heinz Hornues, proposed a constitutional amendment that would meet these conditions while hopefully addressing the concerns of the opposition. The Basic Law would be changed to authorize explicitly the use of German forces in the framework of collective security systems. In addition, provisions would be added to require Bundestag approval of peacekeeping and peace-making measures by simple and absolute majorities, respectively. 141 Several days later, the Social Democrats countered with a draft amendment of their own. The SPD proposal, however, would have limited the use of the Bundeswehr to UN peacekeeping operations. It would have explicitly incorporated into the Basic Law, moreover, the various conditions on such missions that had been agreed upon at the May 1991 party congress. 142 Consequently, CDU officials found the SPD proposal unacceptable and roundly criticized it. Riihe and Hornues reiterated that any significant modification of the Basic Law must provide for eventual Bundeswehr participation in all types of collective military operations. Germany should not be different from other countries in its readiness to work for peace. In addition, they argued, acceptance of the SPD's restrictions would hinder ratification of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union, which foresaw the creation of a common foreign and security policy .143 This initial exchange was followed by a late-August FDP proposal that fell somewhere in between those of the other parties. This formulation would have permitted Bundeswehr participation in both UN-authorized peacekeeping and peace-creating measures as well as peacekeeping measures undertaken by regional organizations, such as the CSCE, to

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which Germany belonged. In each case, the approval of a majority in the Bundestag would be required. The FDP proposal was objected to by the CDU, however, for conflicting with German involvement in the European Community, since it would preclude possible European out-of-area operations that lacked a UN mandate. 144

Efforts to Shift the SPD Position, 1992 Even as these initial attempts at compromise failed to break the political logjam, an effort was under way within the SPD to moderate the party's highly restrictive position. As noted above, some party leaders had sought to achieve a broader definition of permissible out-of-area missions at Bremen, and the events in the Balkans during the following year had only reinforced their conviction that the SPD stance would be untenable in the long term. Some saw a contradiction between the party's support for German participation in the potentially dangerous Sarajevo airlift and its opposition to the relatively risk-free monitoring action in the Adriatic. Tension also existed between the SPD's call for a permanent German seat in the Security Council and its rejection of Bundeswehr involvement in Security Council-authorized combat missions. And as yet more revelations of atrocities in Bosnia appeared, the SPD parliamentary leader, Hans-Ulrich Klose, volunteered that the Bremen platform "makes us look ridiculous." 145 Thus by mid-1992, an increasing number of party leaders, particularly members of the Bundestag group, were clamoring for a revision of the party position to allow for German participation in UN combat missions under certain conditions. 146 This movement culminated in a special meeting of SPD leaders convened by Engholm in late August on the Petersberg outside Bonn. There it was agreed that, beyond amending the Basic Law to permit the Bundeswehr to take part in peacekeeping operations, the party would create the constitutional basis for German participation in a UN-commanded force under Article 43 of the UN Charter, should the Secretary General request a German contribution and in the context of hoped-for reforms that would grant the UN a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. 147 This relatively modest and highly conditional departure from the Bremen program nevertheless caused a major split within the party. The proponents of a larger German role were frustrated by the requirement for prior UN reform, which might be an unattainable goal. Those who had

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only grudgingly acceded to Blue Helmet missions the previous year, however, felt that Engholm had gone too far. 148 In order to reestablish a consensus, the SPD held an extraordinary party congress in mid-November 1992 in Bonn. As at Bremen, a majority of those in attendance were unwilling. to support more than German involvement in Blue Helmet operations under UN command. The program adopted at the congress explicitly rejected any constitutional amendment that would enable the Bundeswehr to participate in operations that were merely authorized by the UN. At the same time, however, it recognized that the spectrum of possible Blue Helmet missions had become broader. Such missions now also included the safeguarding of humanitarian actions for the protection of civilian populations, the delivery of relief supplies, cease-fires, and UN protection zones as well as the monitoring of UN embargoes. Nevertheless, the program reiterated that even peacekeeping measures in "expanded form" would still require the agreement of the affected parties and must be careful not to cross the line between . and combat operations. . 149 peacek eepmg The SPD Bonn program represented a clear compromise agreement intended to maintain party unity. Both factions had had to make concessions. Nevertheless, SPD leaders subsequently characterized it as covering 90 to 95 percent of all possible UN missions. 150 The Union and the FDP, however, regarded the new SPD position as inadequate, since the distinction between traditional peacekeeping and other types of missions was becoming increasingly meaningless. 151 Consequently, Riihe, who had advocated compromise earlier in the year, reversed course and suggested that a constitutional amendment was not necessary. Instead, a mere "dispatch law" (Entsendegesetz), passed by a simple majority in the Bundestag, could provide a sufficient legal basis .for Bundeswehr participation in all UN tasks. Not unexpectedly, the FDP opposed this solution, and the situation remained deadlocked. 152

The Government's January 1993 Compromise Proposal Thus through 1992, even the coalition partners were unable to bridge the gap between their positions. The two sides had been able to agree, early in the year, to seek an amendment that would either clarify or supplement the Basic Law. 153 But they continued to differ on whether a UN mandate should be required for all combat missions, even those conducted by a future European defense force. The Union argued that NATO

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or the WEU should be free to act in the event that the Security Council was immobilized, while the FOP countered that, in the more cooperative post-Cold War environment, a Security Council veto was very unlikely.154 By the beginning of 1993, however, both the Union and the FOP had powerful incentives to work out a comprehensive compromise agreement. Germany was coming under ever more international pressure, as symbolized most dramatically by Boutros-Ghali's visit to Bonn on January 1112. The UN Secretary General called for full German participation in the entire range of UN peace missions. Without an unrestricted German contribution, he feared, the UN would be unable to fulfill its tasks. 155 As a result, government leaders worried increasingly about the consequences of failing to resolve the issue for Germany's international standing. Kinkel admitted that it made little sense to talk of a German seat on the Security Council, as he had first done at the UN the previous September, until the Basic Law had been amended. 156 Indeed, he warned, Germany would lose its international credibility, while Kohl described the • • as a ''d'1sgrace. nl57 sttuatton It was in this context that the coalition partners were finally able to reach an agreement on a draft constitutional amendment, which was submitted in the Bundestag on January 13, 1993. 158 The proposed amendment explicitly broadened the uses to which German forces might be put in three ways. Borrowing directly from the FOP's August proposal, it provided for Bundeswehr involvement in UN-authorized peace-making measures as well as UN or regional peacekeeping operations, subject to the agreement of a majority of the Bundestag. As a concession to the Union, the FOP also acceded to the inclusion of a clause permitting the use of German forces in joint actions by alliances and other regional organizations to which Germany belonged in exercise of the right of collective self-defense. This clause was intended to legitimize German participation in NATO or WEU out-of-area missions that lacked a UN mandate, but it also made clear that Germany would never act alone. In return, however, the Union agreed to make such missions subject to the approval of a two-thirds majority in the Bundestag. In addition, many Union leaders regarded the very fact that they had agreed to seek a constitutional amendment as a concession on their part, although they continued to describe the amendment as merely clarifying what the Basic Law already permitted. 159

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The coalition compromise was a significant achievement. But it could not serve as the basis for a cross-party consensus that would break the political logjam. SPD leaders immediately rejected the government's proposed amendment, describing it as "completely unacceptable." 160 They argued in particular that, by permitting German participation in military actions that lacked a UN mandate, it meant a step toward a policy of interventionism by the Western industrial states, which would lead to a militarization of German foreign policy. In their view, more time was needed to build both a domestic and an international consensus forGerman involvement in combat missions. Thus, they concluded, the government and opposition should initially amend the Basic Law to allow only Blue Helmet operations and then consider further steps at a later date. 161

Further Attempts to Shift the SPD Position, 1993 Ironically, the government proposal came at the very time that more centrist SPD leaders were gearing up for yet another attempt to moderate their party's position, forcing them temporarily to close ranks with their opponents in the party. 162 Despite this setback, the pragmatists, once again led by the foreign policy experts in the Bundestag group, were soon speaking out in favor of change. Within weeks, parliamentary leaders Karsten Voigt and Walter Kolbow called on the SPD to approve German participation in all UN missions, including combat operations to restore peace. If the party did not change its stand on the issue, they maintained, it would not be taken seriously and would itself risk a renationalization of German foreign policy. 163 During the summer of 1993, the internal reform movement was afforded additional impetus by the debate over the Somalia operation, which a significant percentage of the SPD Bundestag group wanted to support. Parliamentary leaders, headed by Klose, voiced their backing for an amendment that would allow Bundeswehr participation in UN-sponsored combat missions under UN command, although they explicitly rejected operations that lacked a UN mandate or were merely authorized by the Security Council, on the pattern of the Gulf War. They also insisted that such missions be subject to a two-thirds vote in the Bundestag. 164 Such a shift in policy was justified, they argued, on several grounds: the need to fulfill Germany's UN obligations, the importance of being a reliable partner, the danger of pursuing a special path, and the risk of Germany's isolation. Above all, however, they deemed it necessary to pre-

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serve the party's credibility and its ability to govern (Regierungsfiihigkeit).165 These proposals were backed by a majority of the SPD's foreign and security policy experts in the Bundestag. 166 They also seemed to have the support of the new party leader, Rudolf Scharping, who had been elected to the post in June. 167 They ran into considerable resistance elsewhere in the SPD, however. More left-leaning members, led by Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, argued that the party had already gone far enough. They had conceded that in some cases UN peacekeepers might be required to fire their weapons in order to defend their mission as well as themselves. But they were adamantly opposed to German participation in any operations that were intended from the outset to involve the threat or use of force. 168 These latter sentiments prevailed in a series of votes taken by party bodies in late August and September 1993. 169 These votes revealed that the proponents of further change still had much less support in the SPD as a whole than in the Bundestag. In addition, Scharping appears to have sided with the opposition. 170 Thus the status quo was largely reaffirmed at the subsequent SPD party congress, held in Wiesbaden in mid-November. The motion adopted by the delegates once again drew a clear distinction between Blue Helmet missions and war-fighting and rejected German participation in the latter. It reiterated the principles and criteria that should govern peacekeeping operations. The principal difference with the Bonn program was that it countenanced the enforcement of blockades, although this was portrayed primarily as a conflict prevention measure. 171

Kinkel's Final Overture to the SPD One final attempt to achieve a cross-party compromise occurred just before the debate within the SPD came to a head. In early June, Kinkel suggested that he was willing to consider modifying the government's January proposal to include the requirement that Bundeswehr participation in any ON-mandated measures beyond peacekeeping receive the support of two-thirds of the Bundestag. He indicated that he would prefer to adhere to the agreed coalition position, because the suggested revision could create serious practical problems. What would happen, for example, if a peacekeeping mission in which German troops were involved suddenly became a combat operation because of changed circumstances?

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But he was willing to live with such uncertainties if that was the price of creating a consensus and restoring Germany's ability to act. 172 What is most noteworthy about this episode is what it reveals about the enduring gulfs between the parties. Kinkel's proposal was acceptable to almost no one, including members of his own FDP. It was immediately rejected by Kohl and other Union leaders as entirely unworkable. The government, in their view, could not allow important decisions to depend on the approval of the opposition. Because peacekeeping and combat missions could not be clearly separated, such a requirement would lead to . 173 constant dtsputes. By this time, moreover, the Union preferred to wait for a definitive ruling by the Federal Constitutional Court rather than settle for a less than fully satisfactory compromise. The SPD's rejection of the coalition's January proposal had strengthened the position of those who had denied the need for an amendment in the first place. In addition, the Court's decisions in the AWACS and Somalia cases suggested that it was likely to offer a broad interpretation of the types of missions already permitted under the Basic Law. 174 The SPD's reception was no warmer. The party leadership remained bound by the program adopted in November 1992, which precluded combat missions of any type, and thus was in no position to accept Kinkel's proposal. In addition, many leaders wanted the Union to show signs of a willingness to compromise first. 175 Thus the political deadlock persisted. The only possibility for a resolution of the dispute clearly lay with the Federal Constitutional Court, to which all eyes now turned.

The Resolution of the Out-of-Area Debate The Court did eventually resolve the controversy over what military actions the Basic Law allowed, although not until another year had passed, in mid-1994. Most importantly, it found that the constitution permitted German participation in the full range of collective actions that might be mounted under UN auspices, but that the government must first obtain the approval of the Bundestag. Thus the ruling largely vindicated the position of the government, and especially that of the Union, although the opposition could also derive some satisfaction from it. Nevertheless, several enduring domestic constraints ensured that the decision was unlikely to result in any rapid shifts in German policy.

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Final Arguments As the Court prepared its decision, both the government and the opposition sought to lay out their positions one last time in hopes of influencing the outcome. Each side had the opportunity to present its case formally before the Court during two days of oral arguments in April 1994, but other public venues were exploited as well. Interestingly, the government's arguments at this stage focused much more on the reasons why the use of the Bundeswehr should not be confined to humanitarian missions or peacekeeping operations than on the question of what actions the Basic Law actually permitted. The first point made by government leaders was that with the end of the Cold War, the nature of the principal security challenges had changed, necessitating different responses. In particular, in Kinkel's words, "peace, stability, and our own security depend ever more on the management of crises outside the alliance area." Yet these dangers could not always be resolved with diplomacy and other non-military means. In some cases, the use of force would be necessary, if only as a last resort. 176 Second, they maintained that Germany bore a special responsibility for securing peace and freedom in the world. This duty grew not only out of Germany's increased weight following unification, but also out of its historical experience as a leading initiator of war in the twentieth century. They added that the international community, and especially Germany's partners and friends, expected their country to assume more responsibility, including full participation in UN peacekeeping and combat operations.177 If, however, Germany continued to lack the ability to act in foreign policy (aufienpolitische Handlungsfiihigkeit), the negative consequences would be incalculable. Germany would continue to lack influence over important multilateral decisions; in particular, it would never be granted a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Further progress toward the development of a common European foreign, security, and defense policy and thus European unity would be blocked. In fact, Germany would lose the trust and confidence of its allies, upon whom its security still ultimately depended. And in the worst case, Germany would run the risk of a renationalization of its foreign and security policy and a renewal of its isolation. 178 The opposition countered with the argument that the government's claims were exaggerated. Germany could adequately meet the new chal-

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lenges and fulfill its new responsibilities simply by being prepared to contribute to Blue Helmet operations. Neither the UN nor the United States expected Germany to participate in combat missions, and the UN itself was increasingly unlikely to engage in them. Thus the SPD position was broad enough to cover German involvement in virtually every UN military action that could be expected in the foreseeable future. Finally, SPD leaders held, a constitutional amendment was the only appropriate way to revise a long-standing bipartisan consensus on the meaning of the Basic Law, even if the old interpretation was unfounded. 179

The Court's Decision The Federal Constitutional Court finally handed down its decision on July 12, 1994. It ruled that the Basic Law did allow Germany to participate with armed forces in military operations outside of the NATO area, including those involving a mandate to use force, as long as they took place under UN auspices. It did not matter, moreover, whether the participating German troops were integrated into UN military formations or whether they formed part of an alliance force charged with implementing UN Security Council resolutions. The constitutional basis of such out-of-area operations was said to be Article 24(2), which provided for the assumption of tasks typically associated with membership in a system of mutual collective security and thus for the use of the Bundeswehr in missions that took place within the framework and under the rules of such a system. In rejecting one of the SPD arguments, the Court pointedly noted that Article 87a did not stand in the way of this application of Article 24(2). 180 The Court also held, however, that the federal government was obliged to obtain the constitutive (enabling) agreement of the Bundestag for each proposed military mission and that this agreement must in principle be obtained prior to the deployment. Nevertheless, only a simple majority would be required, and the Court appended an important qualification. In emergencies, the government would have the right to dispatch troops abroad on a temporary basis, although it would have to involve the parliament in an expeditious manner and the deployed forces would be subject to recall, should the Bundestag so decide. 181 The requirement of explicit parliamentary participation and approval was hailed by the SPD as a vindication of its position, but it had long been a demand of the FDP as well and had been agreed to by the Union in the January 1993 proposal for a constitutional amendment.

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The main issue left unresolved by the Court concerned the precise modalities of Bundestag involvement. In this case, the justices threw the ball back into the political court. They wrote that it was the duty of the parliament to pass legislation that more clearly defined the form and scope of 182 1ts parhctpatwn. 0

•

•

•

Implications ofthe Court's Ruling Despite its legal significance, the Court's ruling was unlikely to have major implications for the conduct of German security policy in at least the short to medium term. Not only did support in the international community for large-scale interventions seem to be on the decline after the 1993 debacle in Somalia, but several important domestic constraints of a nqn-legal nature remained firmly in place. First, the capacity of the Bundeswehr for out-of-area operations continued to be severely limited. Germany had recently declared itself unable to participate in even a very modest way in the UN mission in Rwanda, and the government was at that very moment deciding to make further cuts in the size of the armed forces. 183 Second, and despite some claims by government officials to the contrary, 184 little change had occurred since unification in public attitudes toward out-of-area missions. Opinion polls taken since 1990 had consistently registered a slight majority in favor of German participation in UN peacekeeping operations. Only one-quarter to one-third of all respondents, however, had approved of German involvement in international combat operations, and even fewer had been willing to sanction a German role in actions such as the Gulf War. 185 Although public opinion did not dictate German policy, the government would be anxious to secure the broadest possible popular support before sending any troops abroad. 186 At a deeper level, moreover, the attitudes of most German political leaders continued to be strongly colored by the postwar "culture of reticence." In the context of the Court's ruling, these views were perhaps best expressed by Kinkel in a speech to the Bundestag ten days later, which placed much more emphasis on what Germany would not do than what it would. Kinkel stressed that there would be no militarization of German foreign and security policy as a result of the decision. The government was not eager for combat missions, and German soldiers would not be sent wherever conflict broke out in the world. In fact, Germany would have to say "no" more often than "yes" to out-of-area military op-

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erations. Instead, Germany's contribution to international efforts to promote peace would continue to be primarily of a political and economic nature. 187 These attitudes had been reinforced by Germany's experience in Somalia the previous year, as a result of which the government's desire to participate in out-of-area missions had been considerably tempered. Drawing on the lessons of the Somalia operation, government leaders quickly formulated a series of criteria that future deployments would have to meet: 188 -There must be a clear and legitimate international mandate, usually from the UN but also possibly from the CSCE in the case of peacekeeping operations; -It must be possible to fulfill the assigned military tasks within a clearly limited time frame; -The military component of the operation must be based upon a convincing political concept for a lasting solution to the conflict; -Germany must be adequately involved in the international decisionmaking process; -Germany would participate in international peace missions only jointly with others and almost exclusively in conjunction with its NATO and WEU allies, which would allow them to draw upon pre189 . . ex1stmg common structures; -Finally, the interests of Germany, Europe, or the international community must be involved. Moreover, the greater the likelihood of combat and thus the risk to German soldiers, the more compelling the reasons for German participation must be. These criteria seemed to ensure that German involvement in military operations beyond national and alliance defense would indeed be infrequent.190 And even in those cases where they were satisfied, German participation would not be automatic. Instead, government officials insisted that all deployments would be decided on a case-by-case basis. The only question on which members of the ruling coalition seemed to hold differing opinions concerned the possible geographical scope of future out-of-area missions. Kinkel and the Foreign Ministry maintained that Germany should be willing to participate in all UN operations, wherever they might take place. In contrast, Riihe insisted that Bundeswehr deployments should be limited to Europe and adjacent areas. 191 Neverthe-

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less, the two sides agreed that old arguments about avoiding regions where the Wehrmacht had gone uninvited in the past had lost much of their force. Now, the participation of German ground forces in peacekeeping operations was imaginable just about anywhere on the continent as long as their presence was accepted by all parties. 192 The one clear exception continued to be the former Yugoslavia, and especially Bosnia, where the Kohl doctrine still held sway. There, Riihe frequently cautioned, German soldiers would only be part of the problem. 193

Back to Yugoslavia These inhibitions notwithstanding, the first destination to which German leaders were forced to consider deploying troops unhindered by constitutional constraints was the Balkans. During 1992 and most of 1993, German policy toward the region had assumed a relatively low profile, while France, Britain, the United States, and other countries took the diplomatic initiative. 194 In part, Germany's deference to its Western partners was a response to the international criticism that its efforts to secure the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia in late 1991 had provoked. 195 It also reflected the fact that Western involvement in the region was becoming increasingly military in nature. As long as Germany was unwilling to participate in military operations, its ability to shape events would necessarily remain limited. 196 In short, to the degree that the recognition process, first of Croatia and Slovenia and then of Bosnia, had both facilitated and created pressure for various forms of military intervention in the region, Germany's early assertiveness had had the paradoxical consequence of marginalizing it in subsequent years. Beginning in late 1993, however, Germany once again increased the level of its involvement in international diplomatic efforts to find a solution to the conflicts in Bosnia and Croatia. And following the Federal Constitutional Court's ruling in July 1994, Germany came under pressure from its allies to assume a greater role in Western military operations in the region. In response, the German government eventually agreed, in mid-1995, to deploy to Italy an air force detachment whose mission would involve the possibility of combat with Serb or other local forces. Late in the year, it promised to contribute support units to the NATO force that was assembled to implement the Dayton peace agreement. And at the end of 1996, German forces were assigned the full range of duties

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to be undertaken by the NATO follow-on mission in Bosnia. Despite these significant steps, however, Germany's military involvement in the former Yugoslavia remained relatively small in size and highly limited in nature, ensuring that the Bundeswehr would almost certainly never have to fire shots in anger.

Diplomatic Initiatives Germany's initial foray back into the diplomatic spotlight consisted of a multifaceted peace plan proposed jointly with France at a meeting of the European Union foreign ministers in early November 1993. 197 The most important elements of the plan, which was endorsed by the EU later in the month, called for (1) the creation of aid corridors, to be protected by force if necessary, in Bosnia and (2) the suspension of sanctions against Serbia in return for Serb agreement to relinquish a small amount of Bosnian territory as the basis for a cease-fire. 198 Beyond a general German desire to find a political solution to the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and the feeling that the time might be propitious for another diplomatic initiative, at least two other factors influenced the decision to step forward just then. First, German leaders had been increasingly irked by the failure of their partners to consult with them in advance about important actions in the region. 199 Second, and more constructively, they were eager to give substance to the EU's common foreign and security policy, which went into effect with the Treaty on European Union. 200 Germany's next noteworthy diplomatic contribution was the role that it played in the establishment of the so-called Contact Group, consisting of Germany, Britain, France, Russia, and the United States, in early 1994. This effort grew out of the deadly mortar attack on a marketplace in Sarajevo at the beginning of February, which convinced many German government officials that the use of military measures to protect civilian populations must no longer be ruled oue 01 and which prompted NATO to threaten air strikes against any heavy weapons not removed within ten days from a 20-kilometer exclusion zone established around the city. During the following days, Germany worked diligently to win Russian support for the NATO ultimatum and proposed, inter alia, a meeting of high-level U.S., Russian, and European officials in Bonn on February 22 to discuss the situation in Bosnia, out of which the Contact Group evolved. 202 Despite this new-found energy, however, German diplomacy

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continued to be hobbled by Germany's inability to act militarily. Once again, German officials lamented that their country must show restraint in ~ . adv1ce. . 203 of1enng

The Use of the Bundeswehr Nevertheless, the Federal Constitutional Court's July 1994 ruling opened the prospect that these fetters might finally be loosened. At least purported constitutional constraints would no longer stand in the way of a German military contribution to international peace efforts in the Balkans. The first opportunity to raise Germany's military profile in the region came at the end of the year. In late November, NATO military officials asked Germany to provide six to eight Tornado combat aircraft to help enforce the UN flight ban over Bosnia following the alliance's November debacle in Bihac. In fact, the mission of the German planes was to be limited to protecting allied fighters from Serb anti-aircraft missiles, which were posing an increasingly severe threat to the enforcement operation. 204 This seemingly modest request nevertheless unleashed a torrent of debate within the country. 205 And as it became clear that even the coalition partners were divided over the issue and that the government was not assured of a majority in the Bundestag, the government was forced to devise a means of side-stepping the problem by denying that it had ever received a formal request. 206 In extricating itself from this difficult position, the government was aided by the sudden emergence of a new issue: the possibility that NATO would have to cover a withdrawal of the UN peacekeepers in Bosnia. This time, when allied officials asked what contribution Germany would be prepared to make, government officials were unanimous in their insistence that Germany could not refuse to provide help, although they were equally adamant that no German ground troops should be involved. Not only was it a matter of protecting the forces of Germany's allies, which constituted the bulk of the UN presence, but the future of NATO itself was at stake. 207 On this occasion, moreover, the government could count on the support of a number of SPD leaders. 208 Consequently, in late December, the cabinet agreed to make available a force of 1,800 men, including the previously requested combat aircraft, although most of the German contingent would be limited to non-combat roles and participation would be subject to the approval of the Bundestag if and when the contingency actually materialized. 209

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Then in June 1995, Germany's allies asked it participate in the Rapid Reaction Force that was being assembled at that time for the purpose of protecting a possible redeployment of the UN forces in Bosnia. This time, government officials quickly resolved that Germany should heed the call for assistance. In their view, a German contribution was required to help prevent a complete collapse of the UN mission, which would lead only to more conflict in the area. It was also important for Germany to show solidarity with its West European allies, especially if there were to be any chance of ever creating a true European security and defense identity. And it was necessary to demonstrate Germany's willingness to shoulder more international responsibility and to protect the credibility of the UN and its ability to act. 210 Initially, the opposition once again raised objections to the proposed deployment. In particular, SPD and Green leaders rejected German participation in any military actions that could escalate the conflict, such as air strikes. 211 Nevertheless, the Bundestag ultimately passed the necessary legislation by a substantial majority (386-258) notwithstanding the coalition's slim margin of seats, as dozens of SPD members voted with the 212 ' government. This strong parliamentary support, however, owed as much to the sharp restrictions that were placed on the German deployment as it did to the strength of the arguments for participation. Once again, there was no thought of stationing German combat forces on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. Instead, the German contribution would be limited to that promised to help protect a UN withdrawal, which enabled government officials to argue that Germany could not refuse to provide for a redeployment what it was prepared to do in the event that the UN troops had to be removed from Bosnia. 213 Moreover, the use of German combat aircraft would be confined to defending the Rapid Reaction Force. Their participation in NATO's enforcement of the no-fly zone and its protection ofUN-designated safe areas in Bosnia was expressly forbidden. 214 The level of German military involvement in the Balkans increased in late 1995, when the government agreed to contribute to the NATO-led force established to implement the Dayton peace accord. The government's principal arguments for participation were all quite familiar, revolving around the importance of putting an end to the conflict, the expectations of the international community, and the need to be a reliable ally and to show solidarity. In addition, government leaders stressed that

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the purpose of the mission was to prevent war, not to wage it, in part by protecting the peace force. 215 The latter argument in particular resonated with opposition leaders, who expressed considerable support for German involvement. 216 As a result of this cross-party consensus, the Bundestag approved German participation in the implementation force (IFOR) by an overwhelming majority (543-107), with all but 50 (of 252) SPD parliamentarians and nearly half of the Green deputies voting with the govemment.217 Kinkel heralded the decision as a historical turning point.218 Germany's contribution of some 4,000 troops to IFOR would represent the largest operation abroad in the history of the Bundeswehr. Yet even this unprecedented step was marked by sharp limitations. The German contingent would consist primarily of the forces already in place in the region plus a transportation battalion and small engineering, paramedic, and army aviation units. Its mission would be largely confined to providing support for the other IFOR troops. As before, the government staunchly opposed the deployment of any ground forces apart from several hundred security troops whose role was restricted to the defense of the other units. And all German units would be based outside of Bosnia, although some would have to make trips into the country in order to carry out their functions.219 As German officials frequently warned, the stationing of German forces in Bosnia would only make the situation worse. 220 Even these self-imposed restrictions, the last vestiges of the Kohl doctrine, were lifted at the end of 1996, when the government established the parameters of Germany's contribution to the NATO follow-on stabilization force (SFOR) for Bosnia. This time, the Bundeswehr would participate as a fully equal partner. In particular, a 1,500-man German army contingent, including infantry and armored reconnaissance troops, would be stationed in Bosnia and would assume monitoring and security tasks as part of a larger Franco-German operational unit. 221 As Riihe observed, Germany would finally bear the same risks and responsibilities as did its allies. 222 Significantly, this decision enjoyed widespread support within the SPD and won easy approval (499-93) in the Bundestag. 223 Once again, however, it is important to recognize the many limitations that characterized this further step. In the first place, the size of the German SFOR contingent (up to 3,000 men) was notably smaller than that of its IFOR contribution. More importantly, although the German forces had to be prepared to engage in combat, the chances that they would have to

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fight were regarded as extremely small, if not negligible. The low level of risk was reflected in the armament of the Bundeswehr contingent, which included only relatively lightly armored, wheeled vehicles. As Rtihe had previously noted, only the mission of the German forces would change, not their equipment. 224 In fact, by December 1996, all of the German combat aircraft previously deployed to the region had returned to their bases in Germany in view of the minimal threat to NATO air operations that existed at the time. 225 Thus the lack of opposition to the government's action could be attributed far more to the modest nature of the mission than to any fundamental change in attitude. The purpose of the deployment, SPD leaders repeatedly stated, would not be to fight but to sustain the peace process in Bosnia. Their party continued to reject Bundeswehr participation in combat operations. 226 Finally, even the government's recommendation in favor of German participation in SFOR was predicated on several stringent conditions. It stressed the need for a UN mandate and a positive decision by the NATO Council as well as the approval of the Bundestag. It noted that the mission would be subject to review every six months and, in any case, limited to no more than a year and a half. And it underscored the fact that the continued presence of NATO forces in Bosnia had been approved by the parties to the Dayton agreement. Indeed, Kinkel and Rlihe pointed out, the German forces had, over the course of the year, won the confidence of all of the warring factions in Bosnia. 227 Thus the assumptions underlying previous German inhibitions and the Kohl doctrine had been invalidated by experience. The presence of German ground troops in Bosnia would no longer exacerbate the situation, as German leaders had formerly feared. Instead, they could now be part of the solution.

Conclusion The central puzzle raised in this chapter concerns the mixed record of German responses to out-of-area crises and conflicts since unification. On the one hand, Germany has gradually expanded the nature and scope of its involvement in international military operations intended to preserve or restore peace. Perhaps most striking is the contrast between the tentativeness with which Germany joined the forces monitoring the UN embargo on the former Yugoslavia in 1992 and its unhesitating assumption of an equal role in the NATO stabilization force in Bosnia four years later.

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On the other hand, German participation in such missions has rarely been automatic and never unqualified. To the contrary, German military actions have continued to be circumscribed by clear criteria that are rather unusual for a country of Germany's size and overall importance in world affairs. Nor, in view of the Federal Constitutional Court's July 1994 ruling, can these persisting limits be simply attributed to the narrow constitutional interpretation of the permissible uses of the Bundeswehr that prevailed until that time. Thus the purpose of this final section is to analyze the conflicting pressures and constraints that have shaped this aspect of German security policy. Certainly, there has been no shortage of opportunities for Germany to participate in out-of-area military operations or external pressure on Germany to do so. Both Iraq's aggression in the Persian Gulf and the eruption of hostilities in the former Yugoslavia, by directly affecting German interests, provided convincing rationales for joining in the international efforts to liberate Kuwait and to halt the fighting in Croatia and Bosnia, respectively. It is clear, however, that German leaders were never seized with a simple desire to rid themselves of these problems through the use of force. Far more important for understanding Germany's growing involvement is the fact that these and other conflicts led to ever more insistent requests by the UN and the Federal Republic's allies for a German military contribution to international peace efforts. Although Germany labored under no formal obligations to provide forces, it could, increasingly, tum such requests down only at the risk of incurring considerable political costs. These external pressures and demands forced German leaders to address the question of what role their country should and could play in international affairs after the Cold War. In their absence, in contrast, the out-of-area issue might well have remained dormant. At the same time, some of the most important external constraints that had proscribed German involvement in out-of-area operations during the Cold War no longer existed or were greatly attenuated. The inhibitions produced by the division of Germany had been removed by unification, and, especially after the Gulf War, German leaders did not have to concern themselves as much about possibly adverse reactions in Moscow. Nevertheless, until at least 1996, Germans continued to be inhibited by the hostile reception that they expected German soldiers would receive in regions such as the Balkans that had been overrun by the Wehrmacht in

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World War II. In addition, many government officials felt obliged to proceed cautiously so as not to alarm Germany's neighbors, since unprecedented German military actions might, even if conducted entirely within a multilateral framework, be viewed as the first steps toward a more assertive, unilateral foreign policy. 228 Still, the most important constraints on German involvement in out-ofarea operations were to be found in the domestic arena. To some extent, Germany's generally limited and cautious responses were necessitated by the unpreparedness of the Bundeswehr for such contingencies. Through the mid-1990s, the German armed forces often lacked the equipment, training, transport, and logistical capabilities required to participate at all or to assume a larger role. 229 Likewise, public opinion has served as a brake on greater German military involvement. Although opinion polls have registered support for a German contribution to UN peacekeeping operations, solid majorities have consistently opposed participation in combat missions of any sort. Even when the German public demanded a more assertive government response to the fighting in the former Yugoslavia during the autumn of 1991, few voices advocated any form of German military intervention. At a deeper level, limited responses to out-of-area crises and conflicts have been dictated by prominent components of Germany's postwar national security culture. The thinking of many German political leaders has continued to be shaped by the so-called "culture of reticence," which has inclined them to proceed slowly and cautiously, especially on such a controversial and potentially explosive issue. In their view, Germany must avoid a repetition of its past excesses at all costs. 230 At the same time, German policy has been strongly influenced by the anti-militarist attitudes that took root in Germany after World War II. German leaders from across the political spectrum have insisted that attempts to find negotiated solutions to international conflicts must be given absolute priority, while military means should be employed only as a last resort, if at all. Likewise, they have generally been quite skeptical about the utility of military force and equally optimistic about the possibility of resolving conflicts through peaceful means. 231 Nevertheless, these inhibitions have been counteracted by other strands in German political culture, which have provided powerful motives for assuming a larger, if still qualified, military role. In particular, the inherent German reluctance to participate in out-of-area operations

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has collided with the strong German commitment to multilateralism and the concomitant rejection of ever pursuing a separate path, or Sonderweg. Similarly, it has conflicted with the imperative to be a reliable, predictable, dependable partner. Not to join with Germany's allies and partners would smack of unilateralism, harm Germany's international reputation, and risk leading to isolation. Instead, German leaders have felt strongly obliged to see that their country fulfills its international responsibilities. In short, the norms of German national security culture, which were mutually reinforcing during the Cold War, have offered contradictory prescriptions for how to respond to out-of-area crises and conflicts since unification. As a result, German political leaders have struggled to find the least unsatisfactory compromise between their opposing dictates. What consideration of German political culture tends to obscure is the divisions that have marked the attitudes of German political elites on the out-of-area question. Where the various elements of German national security culture have come into conflict with one another, different elite factions have hewn more strongly to one strand than another, resulting in what Harald Muller has described as the deepest rift on a foreign policy issue since the debate over Ostpolitik rent the Federal Republic in the early 1970s.232 As a general rule, members of the governing parties have been influenced most of all by multilateralist sentiments and have stressed the importance of showing solidarity with Germany's allies and the international community, assuming greater responsibility, being areliable partner, and avoiding Germany's isolation. Meanwhile, members of the opposition have been motivated primarily by anti-militarist convictions and thus have emphasized limiting Germany's military role. At times, however, even the governing coalition and the parties themselves have been sharply divided. Yet one should not make too much of these differences. Above all, no faction has repudiated the values held most dearly by the others. Although few if any members of the governing parties have counted themselves among Germany's many pacifists, they have by and large shared the strong postwar German aversion to reliance on the use of force. Conversely, members of the opposition have been loath to see Germany pursue a separate path. Thus German national security culture has placed distinct boundaries on the discourse employed by German political leaders, and it has clearly proscribed some theoretically possible policy responses, such as unilateral military actions.

Responding to International Crises and Conflicts

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Nevertheless, because of the existence of elite divisions on specific questions of policy, this aspect of German security policy, more than any other, has been strongly influenced by the rules and norms of the policy process, at least through mid-1994. Although the vast majority of German political leaders supported German involvement in UN peacekeeping operations and a solid majority, consisting of the government and some members of the opposition, backed participation in certain types of combat operations, several features of the process contributed to political gridlock and ensured that German military actions would remain particularly circumscribed until the Federal Constitutional Court could offer an authoritative ruling on the meaning of the Basic Law. Most obvious was the need for a two-thirds majority in the Bundestag in order to amend the Basic Law. The existence of this requirement meant that the opposition could exert veto power over any proposed constitutional changes. Reinforcing it was the norm of party discipline. In theory, enough members of the SPD were willing to endorse an amendment that permitted Bundeswehr participation in UN-authorized and commanded combat operations that such an amendment could have passed if they had been prepared to vote with the government. But these dissenters were unwilling to break ranks with the party. Obviously, for some, to do so would risk being consigned to political oblivion, but there were also strong social and psychological inhibitions against it. Instead, they focused on working within the party in order to moderate its position, although with little success. If party discipline had been weaker, the constitutional issue might have been resolved at an earlier date. 233 Other normative inhibitions operated within the coalition. With the exception of the AWACS episode, which posed a particularly stark choice between alliance loyalty and inaction, the Union was unwilling to use its dominant position in the government to engineer clear tests of what the Basic Law would allow. Instead, Kohl and other Union members in the cabinet were generally content to operate at the margins of the traditional interpretation, even if doing so risked conflict with the more confrontational Bundestag group. To be sure, they had a concrete interest in preserving the coalition, which was necessary to achieve other policy goals, but their behavior also reflected a penchant for consensus building and an aversion to confrontation that are common in German politics.

CHAPTER NINE

Conclusion [M]uch in the present seems to contradict the predictions I make. -Kenneth N. Waltz

The preceding chapters have shown that the national security policy of united Germany has been characterized by considerable restraint and a high degree of continuity with the past. Far from striking out boldly in new directions, German policy makers have been largely content to adhere to proven postwar formulas for providing for their country's security vis-a-vis external dangers even as they have faced a rather different set of challenges. To be sure, some changes have occurred since 1990, such as Germany's efforts to promote reform in the former communist states of Central and Eastern Europe, its strong advocacy of new European security institutions, and deep reductions in the size of the Bundeswehr. But these actions have nevertheless been consonant with Germany's postwar security policy traditions of multilateralism and of relying wherever possible upon non-military means. Even Germany's efforts to secure the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia in 1991 and its participation in out-ofarea military operations represent less significant departures than has often been alleged. This pattern of continuity and restraint belies many initial expectations of how a united Germany would behave. It is also inconsistent with what a narrow neorealist focus on Germany's altered relative power position in the international system might suggest, namely, that Germany would embark upon a more nationalist and assertive security policy. Rather, therecent historical record has more accurately reflected the guiding and constraining effects of a variety of factors residing in both the international and domestic settings of German security policy. In addition to international structural influences, broadly defined, of considerable importance have been the international security institutions to which Germany be-

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longs and Germany's postwar national security culture, especially as manifested in the attitudes of German political elites. This concluding chapter has four aims. First, it summarizes the main trends in German security policy after unification and defends the thesis of continuity and restraint against alternative interpretations. Second, it reviews the most important determinants of German security policy since 1990, both international and domestic, and the specific influences that they have had. Based on this analysis, the chapter then discusses the likely future course of German security policy. This third section identifies the hypothetical international developments that would have the greatest potential to alter Germany's behavior in ways that might be perceived as threatening by its neighbors and briefly considers the policy implications for Germany's Western allies, especially the United States, should they wish to forestall such a shift. A final section considers the implications of this analysis for the theoretical study of national security policy.

The Record of German Security Policy Since 1990 Trends in German Security Policy This book began with a description of some of the fears and expectations about the future of German foreign and security policy that attended German unification in 1990. Theoretically, it pointed in particular to the expectations generated by neorealism, which is arguably the single most influential approach to the study of international relations and foreign policy today. Following neorealism's emphasis on the structure of the international system, especially the distribution of power among states, as a determinant of state behavior, one could logically have expected several significant changes in German security policy to follow from the country's fundamentally altered geopolitical circumstances in the wake of unification and the end of the Cold War. 1 Germany's existing alliance ties with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Western European Union (WEU) could have weakened or even been allowed to lapse as Germany became less willing to abide by the constraints imposed on it by international institutions. 2 Simultaneously, Germany could have lost interest in the continued stationing of foreign troops on its soil and might even have actively pressed for their removal. Instead, Germany might well have sought to establish new security relations with the countries of

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Central and Eastern Europe and former Soviet republics, possibly seeking to draw them into a German-dominated sphere of influence. 3 And it might have intervened unilaterally in conflicts in the region, reflecting a more general willingness to use military force as an instrument of policy. 4 To this end, Germany might have developed a significant national conventional capability for power projection, and it could even have tried to acquire nuclear weapons. 5 Overall, German security policy might well have been characterized by increased unilateralism and assertiveness as Germany once again sought to play the role of a great power. Significantly, none of these developments has come to pass. Instead, German security policy after unification has been characterized by a high degree of continuity and restraint. In this regard, two aspects of German behavior have stood out. One has been Germany's abiding stress on cooperative approaches to security, especially its substantial reliance on and support for a variety of European security institutions. The other has been Germany's enduring, and perhaps even more pronounced, emphasis on the use of non-military means to achieve security. Despite its much greater potential freedom of action following the Cold War, Germany has continued to devise and execute its security policy almost entirely in cooperation with others and within the context of international institutions. Indeed, Germany, more than most other European countries, has vigorously sought to maintain, strengthen, and adapt wherever possible the regional security institutions that arose during the Cold War-and in some cases to develop new ones. Above all, Germany's commitment to NATO, which many doubted at the time of unification, has not wavered. Rather, German leaders from across the political spectrum have repeatedly expressed their support for the alliance and the continued presence of allied forces on German soil. German forces, including those stationed in the new eastern Lander that were temporarily under German national command while the withdrawal of former Soviet forces took place, have remained firmly integrated into the alliance's military planning and command structure. And Germany has been a leading participant in the process of adapting NATO to the new European security environment, a process that has included furthering the degree of military integration in the alliance. At the same time, Germany has been at the forefront of recent efforts to create a West European security and defense identity. Jointly with France, it proposed in 1990 that the European Community develop a

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common foreign and security policy (CFSP), provisions for which were included in the Treaty on European Union approved at Maastricht late the following year. Since unification, moreover, it has worked to increase the mandate and operational capacities of the WEU and to bring that body within the framework of the European Union, where it could implement defense-related aspects of the CFSP. And in 1992, Germany and France elaborated plans to expand the existing Franco-German brigade into an integrated Eurocorps, which other WEU members were invited to join. Finally, German policy has emphasized involving the reform states of Central and Eastern Europe in broader institutional security frameworks that include Germany's Western allies rather than establishing new bilateral security ties with the former. Germany has been a principal architect of the many initiatives intended to strengthen the pan-European Conference on (now Organization for) Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). It was Germany, along with the United States, that proposed in 1991 the creation of a North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) that would include the former Warsaw Pact states. Subsequently, German leaders have worked to strengthen further NATO and WEU links with their country's eastern neighbors and have advocated that these bodies be open to new members, although they have been quick to caution that enlargement should not be allowed to weaken the alliances or to strain unduly relations with Russia. Equally prominently on display since unification has been the importance that the Federal Republic has traditionally placed on the use of nonmilitary means, if at all possible, to achieve security. This emphasis has been evident in Germany's strong support for the achievement and observance of arms control agreements of all types, which can be viewed as an effort to demilitarize inter-state relations in Europe and world-wide to the greatest possible extent. It has also been manifested in Germany's unmatched efforts to promote reform and stability in the former communist states of Central and Eastern Europe through the provision of economic, financial, and technical assistance as well as the development of institutional ties between them and the West. In this way, Germany has sought in part to forestall the emergence of new military threats and thus to obviate the need to make military responses. Since 1990, moreover, Germany's overall military capabilities have declined substantially. Not only has the Bundeswehr been reduced in size by nearly one-third from its Cold War strength of half a million military

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personnel--even after absorbing the forces of the former German Democratic Republic-but it has been fundamentally restructured. Whereas, previously, virtually all Bundeswehr units were maintained at a high level of readiness, the majority have become heavily dependent upon mobilization. At the same time, the government has steadfastly refused to abandon conscription and move toward a professional army, and German officials have shown no interest in acquiring a nuclear capability. Finally, there have been no signs of a possible revival of German military adventurism. To be sure, Bundeswehr units have been dispatched to locations as diverse as the Persian Gulf, Cambodia, Somalia, and the former Yugoslavia since 1990. Yet on the whole, Germany's reactions to out-of-area crises and conflicts have been extremely reserved and highly constrained. Germany has not always offered to make a military contribution to international peace missions, and at other times, it has done so only reluctantly. Moreover, where German forces have deployed outside the NATO area, they have done so only in relatively small numbers, and they have been restricted almost exclusively to roles that have involved no risk of combat. Even the lifting, in mid-1994, of the alleged constitutional restraints on the participation of the Bundeswehr in out-of-area military operations has not resulted in any significant shift in German behavior. To the contrary, German involvement in such actions has remained highly circumscribed. Although Germany has had several opportunities-and come under considerable allied pressure-since then to expand its military role in the former Yugoslavia, it has done so only gradually and only to a limited extent. In particular, it steadfastly rejected the deployment of combat forces on the ground until the end of 1996, and then only agreed to contribute a small contingent to a peacekeeping mission that was seen as involving virtually no possibility of hostilities. Instead, German leaders have stressed that their country's contributions to international efforts to promote peace would continue to be primarily of a political and economic nature and that the Bundeswehr would engage in out-of-area military operations only where a clear international mandate existed and in close cooperation with Germany's allies. The principal exception to Germany's record of reserved reactions that one might cite consists of its efforts in late 1991 to secure the diplomatic recognition of Slovenia and Croatia. Yet even this episode did not represent nearly as sharp a departure in German policy as it has commonly

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been portrayed. Although the German government asserted itself more than on any previous or subsequent occasion, it faced an unusually strong combination of pressures to act, and its behavior was still marked by clear limits. German leaders went to great lengths to work through multilateral channels in order to achieve an end to the fighting in the former Yugoslavia, and German diplomacy toward the conflict was equally notable for its complete lack of military backing. Subsequent to the recognition decision, moreover, German policy assumed a much lower profile, with German leaders regularly deferring to their Western counterparts on important issues.

Dissenting Views and Responses This interpretation of German security policy after unification has not been shared by all observers and is thus not uncontroversial. Some have discerned and, in some cases warned of, a renationalization of German defense policy and a militarization of German foreign policy. 6 Others have spoken in more neutral terms of a "normalization" of German foreign and security policy. 7 These alternative characterizations, especially the more alarmist ones, however, are exaggerated and do not stand up to careful scrutiny. Those who have written of a renationalization of German defense policy have pointed to two developments in particular. One is the fact that, under the terms of the Two-plus-Four treaty, only German units can be stationed in the new eastern states and that these forces could not even be assigned to NATO prior to the completion of the withdrawal of the former Soviet forces in 1994. Thus for the first time since World War II, it would "now fall to German forces ... to defend German territory in the first instance in the event of a crisis."8 Some have also been alarmed by the German government's efforts to create national military command and planning structures, or a Fi.ihrungskommando, whereas it had previously relied entirely on NATO's integrated military structure to perform those functions above the army corps level. Both of these developments, however, are easy to understand in terms other than a renationalization of defense policy. First, the purely national status of the German forces stationed in eastern Germany was a temporary anomaly made necessary by the imperative to achieve Soviet acquiescence to German unification. Once the withdrawal of the Western Group of Forces was completed, they were quickly reassigned to NATO.

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Thus planning for the defense of eastern Germany continues to be carried out within the alliance rather than by Germany alone. The status of the forces deployed there, moreover, is now similar to that of the forces of NATO members such as Denmark and Norway, which host no allied forces or nuclear weapons in peacetime and yet can hardly be accused of pursuing purely national defense policies. As for the second source of concern, the purpose of developing national command and planning structures has been not to lay the groundwork for national interventions but to facilitate German participation in multilateral out-of-area military operations that are not under NATO command. In any event, the German government has had no intention of acquiring capabilities of this nature that would be equivalent to a fullblown General Stafr_9 More generally, one must be careful to distinguish between unavoidable developments that have been necessitated by Germany's altered international circumstances and more intentional forms of renationalization in which obvious multilateral alternatives are rejected, which have not occurred. A similar response can be made to claims that German foreign policy is being militarized. The principal evidence that has been adduced in support of this view is that Germany has broadened the purposes for which it is willing to use the armed forces. No longer restricted to the defense of German territory, the Bundeswehr has been deployed for an increasingly wide range of out-of-area missions. 10 Again, however, one must be careful to differentiate between, on the one hand, participation in military operations that is effectively imposed upon Germany by its international obligations and, on the other hand, a more willful use of force in the pursuit of national interests that is not simply dictated by the pressures generated by multilateral commitments and the expectations of Germany's partners. The argument about normalization is a more subtle and compelling one and thus more difficult to challenge. Clearly, one can point to several changes in German foreign and security policy since 1990 that suggest that Germany will increasingly behave in this realm like other powers of similar size and stature. Germany has been shedding its postwar parochialism and assuming a larger role in promoting security beyond its own borders and even outside of Europe. Likewise, Germany has been increasingly willing to use military resources to foster international stability and to achieve humanitarian goals. And Germany has shown a greater inclination to assert itself and to speak its mind on international matters.

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Yet even more noteworthy than these signs of normalization are the many ways in which German security policy has remained exceptional. One is the fact that Germany has continued to pursue an almost exclusively multilateral approach to security, notwithstanding the new opportunities-and pressures-to take unilateral action that have presented themselves, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, since 1990. Closely related is the unparalleled degree to which German leaders have sought to use and been willing to work within international institutions in order to promote their country's security. Thus far, little evidence has emerged to suggest that they are prepared even to consider the adoption of a more nationalist orientation. 11 Also exceptional have been the international restrictions that Germany has accepted on its armed forces. Germany's renunciation of the production, possession, and control of nuclear weapons is unique among the major European powers. Likewise, Germany has remained far more reliant upon NATO structures and the assistance of allies in the exercise of its military power than have its principal partners. Finally, German responses to situations calling for the deployment and possible use of military forces have been and continue.to be distinctly more cautious andrestrictive than those of other leading Western democracies such as Britain, France, and the United States.

Sources of German Security Policy After Unification The singularity of this record makes it all the more important to identify the principal determinants of German security policy since unification. Which factors have fostered the continuity and restraint that have been so characteristic of German state behavior in the security realm in the 1990s? In view of the multifaceted nature of German security policy, it would be foolhardy to attempt to attribute this record to a single cause. In fact, any fully satisfactory explanation of so complex a phenomenon must inevitably make reference to a variety of factors residing in both Germany's external environment and within Germany itself. Moreover, it is only natural to expect that the degree of influence exerted by each determinants will vary by issue area. Nevertheless, this account places particular emphasis on the roles played by international institutions and Germany's postwar national security culture.

TABLE 9.1

Determinants of German Security Policy After Unification Efforts to Shape the External Environment

European Security

High vulnerability to instability in Central and Eastern Europe; risks of weapons proliferation

Continued existence of various security concerns

Institutions

German Armed Forces

Out-of-Area Actions

INTERNATIONAL STRUCTURE

Decline in former military threat; need for some armed forces, especially a crisis reaction capability

Conflicts in the Balkans, etc.; external pressure to assume greater responsibility; possible hostility to German troops

INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

Constraints on unilateral German actions; mechanisms for facilitating burdensharing and projecting stability

Usefulness of security institutions for affording military protection, preventing and managing regional conflicts, and reassuring neighbors

Upper limits on size and armament of Bundeswehr; alliance commitments

Obligations of UN and NATO membership

NATIONAL CAPACITY

Financial constraints

Financial constraints; limited availability of manpower NATIONAL PREDISPOSITIONS

Emphasis on preventive action and demilitarization of international relations

(including political culture) Assignment of high Concerns about intrinsic value to national planning security institutions and command structures; attachment to conscription

Alleged constitutional restrictions; unpreparedness of Bundeswehr; disinclination toward bold action and use of force; importance of multilateralism and reliability

POLICY PROCESS

Rules of constitutional revision; norm of party discipline

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The Structure of the International System In an important sense, the basic premise of realist theory is unimpeachable. The security policies of all states are molded to a significant extent by the international circumstances in which they find themselves. In the external environment always reside a variety of opportunities, constraints, and pressures to which states may or must respond. Germany is no exception in this regard. Even after the Cold War, the structure of Germany's international setting, as characterized in particular by the military power and potential, proximity, and internal characteristics of nearby states, has determined the general outlines of German security policy. Defined in this broad way, the international structure has shaped German security policy in two principal ways. First, it has been the source of the main security challenges faced by Germany and to which it has had to respond. Overall, these challenges have been less severe than they were during the Cold War, allowing Germany to reduce the size and readiness of its armed forces. But actual and latent external threats have not been absent. Above all, Germany has had to contend with the dangers posed by the potential instability of its eastern neighbors, and it has been confronted with actual crises and conflicts in the region, most notably in the former Yugoslavia, as well as further afield. In addition, German security has been eroded by the increased risk of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction that has attended the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Finally, Germany has had to be cognizant of the considerable residual military power, especially the nuclear capabilities, of the Soviet Union and its successor states. Second, international structural factors have determined to some extent Germany's options for responding to those challenges. On the one hand, the Federal Republic has benefited from the availability of a large number of security partners, including several powerful ones, which has obviated the need for Germany to deal with its problems alone. On the other hand, other countries have frequently pressed Germany to assume greater responsibility for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts even in regions located far from Europe, a situation that has increased the costs to Germany of non-involvement. Simultaneously, Germany has been constrained by the lingering fears and suspicions of its neighbors, who have been victimized by German aggression in the past. Indeed, in

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some comers, such as the Balkans, the Federal Republic has at times faced outright hostility. Finally, Germany's continued economic dependence on its Western partners has placed additional limits on the approaches that it might pursue. Nevertheless, since 1990, the structure of the international system has been far less determinative of German security policy than it was during the Cold War. Germany has been hemmed in by external structural factors to a smaller extent than at any time since the Second World War. The former Soviet threat, Germany's resulting security dependence on its Western allies, and the obstacles to exercising political influence over the states of Central and Eastern Europe have all been greatly reduced. Indeed, viewed from this perspective, many aspects of united Germany's behavior, such as its strong support for international security institutions, its preservation of conscription, and its reserved responses to out-of-area crises and conflicts, seem somewhat puzzling, if not utterly inexplicable. Thus the search for the principal determinants of German security policy cannot stop here.

International Institutions One leading cause of the continuity and restraint that have characterized German security policy has been the international agreements and organizations in which Germany has voluntarily participated. These institutions have influenced German state behavior in each of the three general ways described in Chapter Two. First, they have placed constraints on some important aspects of German security policy. These restrictions have been most obvious with regard to Germany's military capabilities. The size and armament of the Bundeswehr have been regulated, often in great detail, by the rules contained in several institutions, notably the Treaty on the Final Settlement With Respect to Germany, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), and the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). At the same time, by acceding to a certain amount of role specialization and continuing to rely heavily on NATO's military planning and command organs through its participation in the alliance's integrated military structure, Germany's capacity for independent military action has been reduced. Nor has the presence of such constraints been confined to institutions with clearly security-related functions. In addition, membership in the European Union (EU) has limited Germany's ability to use trade as an

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instrument for pursuing its security interests in Central and Eastern Europe. Of course, Germany was never physically prevented from violating the rules of these institutions, but it could do so only at considerable cost in terms of the reactions by other states that such moves would likely have provoked. Second, international institutions have shaped German policy by providing Germany with valuable opportunities for addressing its security concerns. In a sense, they have created productive possibilities or avenues for state action that otherwise would not have existed. Germany has been able to enhance its security in several ways through its participation in international security institutions. 12 For example, Germany has used regional arms control agreements, such as the CFE treaty and various confidence and security-building measures, to place limits on and to obtain information about the military capabilities and activities of other European states, thereby reducing the magnitude of the threats that others could pose. Thus some of the same arrangements that have constrained Germany's security policy have simultaneously provided it with a degree of control over the military capabilities of its neighbors and greater certainty about their actions and intentions. In addition, Germany has been able to exploit existing international institutions to promote stability in the former communist states, thereby making the emergence of new threats from Central and Eastern Europe less likely. In particular, Germany has employed the EU and the G-7 to help to funnel additional amounts of financial, economic, and technical assistance into the reform states. In addition, it has championed the use of NATO, the WEU, and the CSCE to enhance their security while preventing the isolation of Moscow. Germany has also relied on European security organizations, especially NATO, to enhance its security in more traditional ways. Although Germany has probably been able defend itself against most of the imaginable dangers that could be posed by conventional weapons since the Cold War ended, its membership in NATO has afforded it a measure of nuclear insurance that it could not obtain from other sources or provide for itself without provoking fears and adverse reactions in nearby states. As during the Cold War, moreover, the opportunity to rely on NATO structures and allies has enabled Germany to maintain smaller conventional forces than might otherwise have been deemed necessary. 13 As the nature of the security challenges facing Germany has changed, moreover,

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it has sought to use, although not always successfully, the CSCE, the EU, and NATO to manage and contain regional crises and conflicts before they could spill over or escalate. And united Germany has had the opportunity to use international security institutions to dampen concerns in neighboring countries about the ways in which it might employ its new strength. Germany's adherence to arms control agreements and its entanglement in NATO and, increasingly, West European security structures have helped to reassure other countries by limiting its military capabilities to an important extent. Organizationally, Germany has continued to be prepared to wage war only as part of a Western coalition. More generally, Germany's voluntary acceptance of such restraints and its willingness to pursue its security almost entirely within international security institutions have sent comforting signals about its intentions, helping to allay fears about a possible revival of militant German nationalism, unilateralism, and assertiveness. 14 Taken together, these opportunities have provided Germany with strong incentives to maintain, strengthen, and even add to the various European security institutions. By working within them even as it has abided by the constraints they have placed on its actions, Germany has been able to obtain higher levels of security more effectively and at less cost than if it had had to rely on its own efforts. Indeed, some goals might otherwise have been unattainable. Such institutionally based opportunities and constraints need not necessarily result in continuity and restraint, however, and on at least one occasion, when Germany sought to secure the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, it arguably tried to use the mechanisms of the EC to compel unwilling partners to follow its lead. Where they have contained positive injunctions, moreover, international institutions have been important sources of pressure, the third general way in which they have shaped German security policy. Particularly significant have been the duties that Germany has assumed through its participation in the UN and NATO. These have obliged Germany to assume greater international responsibility and to show solidarity with its alliance partners, especially via participation in military operations conducted on the territory of distant allies and even outside of the NATO area. On balance, however, international institutions have had a moderating effect on German security policy. By helping to provide for Germany's security, they have enabled it to act with greater restraint overall. In those

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cases where Germany has felt compelled to take action, they have largely obviated the need for unilateral moves. Instead, international institutions have tended to channel German security policy in directions that have been less likely to alarm other countries. Even primarily German initiatives to promote reform in Central and Eastern Europe and the establishment of bilateral ties with those countries have been viewed with relative equanimity because of the density of Germany's commitments to and involvements in multilateral institutions.

Germany's National Capacity Although the international setting has clearly done much to shape German security policy since unification, the preceding chapters have convincingly demonstrated that it has not been all-controlling, even when one takes into account influences such as international institutions that realist analyses typically omit. In fact, the domestic setting has been at least as important as external factors in determining how Germany has responded to the new challenges that it has faced in its security environment. Consider first Germany's national capacity. One should acknowledge that national capacity may not have an important bearing on all aspects of national security policy. It comes into play principally in those cases when policies generate large actual or potential demands on national resources, be they material, financial, or human. Thus it has not been highly relevant to several components of German security policy, notably arms control and the further development of Europe's security institutions. In at least two areas, however, Germany's national capacity has played an important, even decisive role. In both cases, German policy has been sharply constrained by the limits on German economic and financial resources stemming from the high costs of unification and Germany's more general structural economic problems. First, German political leaders concluded long ago that their country had reached the limits of its ability to make significant financial contributions to the reform efforts being undertaken in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, even though Germany's future security was highly sensitive to the outcome of those efforts. Since 1989, Germany has provided by far the most financial assistance to those countries. Yet beginning as early as 1991, the volume of German grants and loans dropped sharply, while German leaders have placed increasing emphasis on opening Western markets, bring-

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ing Central and Eastern Europe and Russia closer to the European Union and the G-7, respectively, and imploring Germany's Western partners to provide more help. Second, the government has been repeatedly forced to slash the military budget, which declined by more than 10 percent in nominal terms (and even more in real terms) between 1991 and 1994. These cuts have hindered force modernization and restructuring, reduced operational readiness, and necessitated even further reductions in the overall size of the Bundeswehr, to a total of some 340,000 military personnel. Thus even if German leaders had wanted to establish a hegemonic sphere of influence in the east based on economic predominance or to develop a capability for unilateral military interventions, Germany's economic constraints would have posed substantial, if not insuperable, obstacles. In principle, Germany's responses to out-of-area conflicts could also have been more constrained by the problem of resource mobilization, had the international community insisted that it do more. After 1991, certainly, Germany was much less able to offer financial support for international military interventions of the magnitude of that provided during the Gulf War. Likewise, deployments of the German armed forces significantly larger than those to Turkey in 1991, Somalia in 1993, and the Balkans beginning in 1995 might well have been hampered by the unwillingness of conscripts to serve in such operations. In fact, concerns about such attitudes have strongly influenced the plans for restructuring the Bundeswehr so as to ensure that the personnel of units deployed abroad would have previously consented to participate in assignments involving the possibility of combat. Nevertheless, the German government has not been disposed to make larger military contributions, forreasons that will be discussed next.

German National Predispositions and German Political Culture Given that Germany's national capacity has not placed significant constraints on some important aspects of German security policy, a more frequently operative domestic source of continuity and restraint has been Germany's peculiar national predispositions. Some of these could be said to reside in the German constitution, which until mid-1994 was widely interpreted as prohibiting Bundeswehr participation in operations outside

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the NATO area beyond the provision of humanitarian assistance. Yet others have been institutionalized in the form of the Bundeswehr' s limited capacity for out-of-area missions. A further manifestation of German national predispositions has been German public opinion on specific questions. Yet it is difficult to attribute much influence over German security policy to mass attitudes alone. One reason is that German public opinion has been silent or has provided little practical guidance to policy makers on many significant policy issues, such as arms control, promoting stability in the east, and transforming Europe's institutional security architecture. Second, where public opinion has been specific and unified enough to provide such guidance, public sentiments and those of policy makers have usually been closely aligned. And in those relatively few instances where public opinion has differed from the preferences of political leaders, it has generally been ignored or overridden. Thus the government has disregarded at one time or another public sentiment in favor of the departure of all U.S. troops from Germany,15 the abolition of conscription, and the prompt recognition of Slovenia and Croatia as well as public opposition to specific out-of-area deployments. 16 Instead of national institutions or public opinion, then, a more fundamental and comprehensive source of the national predispositions that have shaped German security policy since unification has been Germany's postwar political culture, especially as manifested in the attitudes of German political elites. Two points bear emphasis. The first is that Germany society as a whole, and German political elites in particular, can be characterized as possessing a distinctive, widely shared, and rather elaborate set of beliefs and values of potentially great relevance to national security policy. The second is that this political culture has greatly limited Germany's potential for unilateral, assertive, and, especially, aggressive behavior, placing instead a premium on continuity, stability, and restraint, even as the powerful external constraints of the Cold War era have loosened. Several elements of Germany's national security culture have been particularly influential. One is the strong strand of anti-militarism, verging on pacifism in some circles, which has greatly colored Germany's responses to out-of-area crises and conflicts. Most Germans have continued to view military power as something to be employed only as a very last resort, once all other means have been exhausted, if at all. In addition,

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they have been much more inclined to justify German participation in military operations that go beyond territorial defense in terms of their country's international responsibilities rather than the national interest. Anti-militarist sentiments have also had a notable impact on the Bundeswehr. It has lain at the root of strong public and, to a lesser extent, elite opposition to the creation of any new military structures that could possibly be interpreted as an attempt to reconstitute a German General Staff. Consequently, the government has been forced to proceed with caution in its efforts to enhance Germany's planning and command capabilities, even though such improvements have been necessitated by Germany's multilateral commitments. Anti-militarism has also fostered a strong, if not universal, attachment to conscription, despite its disadvantages in the circumstances of the post-Cold War era and even though it has no longer been necessary to prevent a replay of the militarist excesses of the past. A second highly relevant element of German political culture has been the Germans' rejection ofunilateralism and their strong embrace ofmultilateralism as the only appropriate mode of conduct in security affairs. Closely related have been their unqualified support for international institutions of all types; the tremendous importance they have attached to ensuring that Germany is perceived as a reliable partner; and their acute reluctance to take the lead or to stand out in international security affairs, what has been termed the "culture of reticence." This complex of attitudes has influenced virtually every aspect of Germany's external relations since unification: from its attempts to promote reform in the former communist states to its efforts to strengthen and adapt Europe's security institutions to its responses to conflicts and crises outside the NATO area. On most issues, the various elements of German political culture have continued to complement or reinforce one another, as they did during the Cold War. Only on the out-of-area question have they offered contradictory prescriptions. Both German anti-militarism and the culture of reticence have inclined many German leaders to proceed cautiously, to assign absolute priority to the search for peaceful solutions to international conflicts, and to absent their country from military operations for purposes other than national defense. At the same time, however, the strong German commitment to multilateralism, the concomitant rejection of ever pursuing a separate path, and the imperative to be a dependable partner have made it especially difficult for them not to respond positively to in-

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ternational requests for German military contributions. Not to join with Germany's allies, in the minds of many, would smack of unilateralism, harm its international reputation, and risk leading to isolation. One might be tempted to conclude from the intensity of the debates on the out-of-area issue that Germany has in fact lacked a distinctive national security culture. A more apposite conclusion, however, is that different segments of German society and the German political elite have stressed anti-militarism and multilateralism to differing degrees and that they have continued to share considerable common ground. Thus most of those who have been most strongly influenced by multilateralist sentiments and by concern about Germany's reputation for reliability have nevertheless been far from eager to send German troops into combat. To the contrary, they have proceeded only with strong misgivings. Conversely, most of those who have been motivated first and foremost by anti-militarist convictions have still been loath to see Germany abandon its multilateral orientation and once again pursue a special path. In addition, it might be tempting to infer a waning of anti-militarist sentiment in Germany from the growing range of out-of-area missions in which the Bundeswehr has participated since unification. At a minimum, it has been argued, many political leaders have come to view military options as a necessary component of a responsible German policy. 17 The strength of such a trend, if it exists at all, should not be exaggerated, however. From an early stage, as amply documented in Chapter Eight, a majority of German political leaders, and certainly most of those in the governing parties, supported in principle German participation in the full range of military operations covered by the UN Charter, even as they differed over the need for a constitutional amendment. And even as the ambit of German military activities has gradually widened, moreover, German leaders have articulated numerous conditions that have imposed rather narrow limits on when, where, and how the Bundeswehr might be used.

The Policy Process In contrast to the various international and domestic factors discussed so far, the rules and norms of the German security policy-making process have rarely had a notable impact on the content of German policy. A leading reason for this state of affairs has been the existence of a high degree of consensus among German political elites on many basic aspects

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of security policy. Only where elements of German national security culture have come into conflict with one another, and thus contributed to differences of opinion among German political leaders, have the characteristics of the policy process itself been able to make their presence felt. This condition has been satisfied primarily in the case of the debate over German participation in out-of-area military operations. There, the procedural obstacles to revising the constitution, the imperatives of coalition government, and the iron grip of party discipline all conspired to inhibit a more rapid adjustment of Germany's behavior to its altered external circumstances. On other issues, these features of the policy process have rarely, if ever, exerted much influence on policy outcomes.

Policy Implications: The Future of German Security Policy It is probably still too soon after the end of the Cold War and German unification to draw conclusions about the future of German security policy with any confidence. Initially, some argued, the post-Cold War era would not really begin until the mid-1990s, after the last former Soviet troops had left German soil. Until then, German policy would be artificially constrained by the need to ensure their orderly and timely departure. Even after 1994, moreover, the need to rehabilitate eastern Germany, both politically and economically, and the resulting drain on German energy and resources have continued to have a damping effect. Only after these constraints have been lifted, perhaps no sooner than the end of the century, might the true outlines of unified Germany's policy begin to emerge. 18 Nevertheless, there are solid grounds for expecting a continuation of German security policy along existing lines, modified only by occasional adjustments that are highly circumscribed and non-threatening. Many of the other moderating influences described above, notably the international agreements by which Germany is bound, the international organizations in which it participates, and its postwar national security culture, are likely to remain in place. By the time that the costs of reconstructing the easter Lander no longer impose a heavy burden, the commitments, institutions, and traditions of unified Germany's security policy are likely to be firmly established, and a public and elite consensus will have crystallized around them. The opportunity to make significant departures will

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have passed. Thus while some further "normalization" will undoubtedly occur, German security policy will continue to be marked by a degree of multilateralism, anti-militarism, and reticence that will make it exceptional for a country of Germany's size and resources. To be sure, German security policy has not been without internal tensions and contradictions. Germany's efforts simultaneously to deepen the European Union and to open it to the reform states of Central and Eastern Europe have been viewed by others, if not by German leaders themselves, as at odds with one another. Likewise, the goals of expanding NATO to the east, maintaining friendly relations with Russia, and keeping the alliance strong may ultimately not be easily reconciled. More fundamentally, the altered external environment has brought previously complementary tendencies in German policy into conflict. Most importantly, as noted above, the Germans' strong commitment to multilateralism-and their corresponding fear of isolation-has increasingly clashed with their aversion to the use of force as the international security organizations to which Germany has belonged, and in which Germans have placed great hopes, have acquired military functions beyond the defense of the NATO area. 19 And where efforts have been made to create the national organizational capacity required to participate more effectively in international military missions, they have fallen afoul of postwar concerns about maintaining civilian control of the armed forces and, more generally, of inhibitions against the development of a nationally oriented military posture. Beyond being a source of embarrassment for many Germans, the paralysis engendered by these internal conflicts has been viewed as threatening to undermine the very security institutions on which Germany has so much relied. It may be some time before these tensions are fully worked out. In the meantime, however, they are unlikely to result in a major policy crisis. Aided by the government's strategy of involving the Bundeswehr in outof-area operations whenever doing so was not clearly ruled out by political considerations and, where the constitutionality of these actions was challenged, by favorable rulings by the Federal Constitutional Court, Germany has moved gradually but steadily in the direction of an expanded definition of the uses to which its armed forces can be legitimately put, even if German responses to future international crises and conflicts are likely to remain more cautious and limited than those of its principal allies. Likewise, the compromise measures that the government

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has adopted in lieu of establishing a fully functional national planning and command capability in order to facilitate German participation in non-NATO military missions are likely to prove adequate in most cases. One further caveat should be appended to this generally optimistic forecast. Continuity in German security policy is also partly contingent on the maintenance of a relatively benign and supportive external environment. Singularly hostile international developments could force Germany to depart from the policy directions that its political elites have preferred. Such events could trigger precautionary German reactions that Germany's neighbors would nevertheless find threatening, prompting the latter to take steps that would only increase tensions further, according to the logic of the security dilemma. 20 If sustained or severe enough, moreover, a hostile external environment that proved unamenable to traditional policy approaches could alter Germany's political culture, and eventually its political institutions and social structure, with even more profound and, quite possibly, malign implications for both German security policy and European stability. 21 Although nothing of the kind has occurred, there are several conceivable developments that could have such pernicious effects. One would be widespread instability in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, be it due to the failure of political and economic reform, ethnic strife, or territorial conflict. Instability in the region could produce a massive influx of refugees and asylum seekers, which would place a tremendous strain on German society. Under such conditions, a revival of German nationalism and xenophobia, with their attendant negative consequences for German security policy, would not be out of the question. 22 The situation would only be exacerbated by any indication that Germany's Western partners had been complacent in the face of mounting problems in the reform states and had not done their utmost to help Germany forestall them or prevent them from boiling over. 23 A similarly unfavorable tum of events might follow a breakdown of international economic cooperation and a return to economic nationalism around the world, much as occurred in the 1930s. Such a development, possibly the result of a prolonged global recession, would likely exacerbate conflicts with Germany's Western allies across a whole range of issues and undermine efforts at security cooperation as well. Just as seriously, if not more so, by worsening the economic situation and producing even higher levels of unemployment in Germany, it could create condi-

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tions favorable to a ground swell of nationalism, political extremism, and, in the worst case, the replacement of the Federal Republic by some form of authoritarian regime. 24 A third potentially dangerous development would be a revival of an overt Russian military threat in combination with a withdrawal of the security guarantees presently provided by Germany's allies. Should Germany ever feel both highly threatened and unprotected, it would inevitably experience pressure to strengthen its conventional forces and even to acquire nuclear weapons. 25 More fundamentally, such imposed security self-reliance could erode the strong multilateralist and anti-militarist tendencies currently present in German society. Barring a dramatic shift in Germany's external environment, however, one should not expect to see any major departures in German security policy, not to mention fundamental changes in Germany's political institutions, social structure, and political culture. As one observer has argued, for example, Germany's development of a nuclear capability would be possible only in the wake of a most drastic reversal of Russia's political development and only at the massive urging of Germany's neighbors. 26 And at this point, none of the above scenarios is likely. Such momentous international developments, moreover, do not happen overnight. Rather, they require months, if not years, to unfold. Consequently, their chances of occurring can be importantly influenced by the actions of other countries, especially the leading powers in the world, and their impact can be minimized. Several implications for Western policy follow from this analysis. Overall, it underscores the importance of continued U.S. engagement in European security affairs and the responsible management of the world economy. The United States should continue to be willing, as it has thus far, to extend an adequate security umbrella over Germany via NATO. In addition, the United States and the European Union should not allow their recurring commercial, and sometimes political, disputes to cause the existing global trade regime to unraveL And Germany's partners should do what they can to ensure that instability in the former Soviet bloc does not spin out of control and that political elements in Russia sympathetic toward the West are not inadvertently undermined by rash NATO actions. More generally, Western leaders should remember that the way in which Germany's security policy evolves will depend in part on how the country is treated by its friends and neighbors. As Harald Muller has argued,

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"the more Germany's partners accept Germany as a 'normal state'-with all due regard for its past and potential-and the more they join the Germans in their emphasis on multilateralism, the better the chances will be that Germany will stay on a steady course. " 27

Theoretical Implications for the Study of National Security Policy Beyond its policy implications, this analysis also has ramifications for the study of national security policy more generally. In the first place, it lends weight to a growing movement in favor of theoretical pluralism. An ever smaller number of international relations scholars are content to settle for monocausal explanations of state behavior. With the possible exception of inquiries into relatively narrow issues, little is to be gained from conducting head-to-head tests of competing theories, after which one is declared the unqualified winner. Instead, because the most important questions of international politics are too complex to lend themselves to simple answers, it is increasingly common to find scholars embracing multiple causal factors located at various levels of analysis. Likewise, the preceding pages have argued that a variety of international and domestic conditions have been important determinants of German security policy after unification. Not one of the theoretical approaches presented in the framework of analysis was found to be of no relevance whatsoever, a conclusion that reflects the multifaceted nature of the dependent variable. At the same time, this study also represents a call for greater attention to international institutions and political culture in particular as possible sources of state behavior. As noted in the Introduction, one can regard the book as a plausibility probe of the general hypothesis that these two sets of factors can be critical determinants of national security policy. Although international institutions and political culture are not necessary or sufficient to explain all aspects of German security policy since 1990, they have had a marked impact in several areas. Together, they have significantly reduced the likelihood that united Germany would engage in unilateral, assertive, and, especially, aggressive behavior, promoting instead continuity and restraint. More generally, as the German case has shown, international institutions can constitute a vital component of the international context within which states act, influencing national security policy by helping to define

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the incentives presented to states by the external environment. They can be important sources of constraints, opportunities, and pressures beyond those generated by the material structure of the international system, however broadly the latter is defined. They may establish rules for state behavior that effectively alter the costs and benefits of different courses of action. Alternatively, they may provide mechanisms that states can use to address security concerns and otherwise to promote their interests, which can serve to channel state behavior in predictable directions. Arguably, international institutions can at times be as important a determinant of state behavior as can the material structure of the international system, and sometimes even more so. This is especially true when structural imperatives are few or unclear. In those cases, institutional rules may offer more specific guidelines for state action. Even where institutions and material structure offer conflicting prescriptions, however, one should not necessarily assume that it is only those of the latter that will prevail. 28 Admittedly, the applicability of institutional explanations of national security policy is likely to be rather circumscribed. Potentially influential international institutions are a relatively recent phenomenon, having become abundant only since World War II. Even in an institution-rich environment, moreover, relevant rules of behavior and procedures may not exist for some aspects of national security policy. And in other cases, seemingly controlling rules may be vague and subject to alternative interpretations. Finally, international institutions may be disregarded. States are always at liberty to violate international rules or to act outside of institutional channels, even though in so doing they may forfeit benefits or be subjected to sanctions. Thus, like the material structure of the international system, international institutions will rarely, if ever, fully determine state action. But they will often be indispensable to comprehensive explanations of postwar strategic behavior. 29 Whenever the international setting is ambiguous or permissive, a condition that almost always obtains, domestic factors will play a role in the determination of national security policy. And of these, political culture in particular can be an important source of national predispositions. Where a distinct national security culture exists, it will consistently incline societies, policy makers, or both to favor certain policies over others. Political culture shapes how security issues are defined; it conditions the types of policy responses that are identified and considered; and it af-

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fects how those options are evaluated and thus the choices that are made among them. Because one of the distinguishing characteristics of political cultures is their relative stability in comparison with material conditions, moreover, they will tend to promote continuity in national security policy, notwithstanding changes in the external environment. Thus the concept of political culture may be especially useful for explaining otherwise puzzling cases of policy stasis. This case study also suggests how political culture can interact with international institutions to produce unique outcomes. Even in the presence of international institutions that offer relatively explicit guides to state behavior, political culture can serve as a decisive intervening variable by helping to determine whether, when, and how those institutions will have an impact on national security policy. In particular, political culture can make policy makers more or less inclined to observe the rules of international institutions, to work through institutional channels, and to support and promote international institutions more generally. This is not the only possible interpretation, however, of the relationship between political culture and environmental conditions in multivariate explanations of national security policy that seek to link what are sometimes regarded as competing domestic and international levels of analysis. An alternative and more contentious view, one with parallels in psychological theories of foreign policy decision making, would assign causal primacy to cultural factors. From this perspective, the external environment, including the material structure of the international system, has no distinct objective reality. Rather, it must be perceived before it can be acted upon. Likewise, national interests, external threats, possibilities for action, and the values of different choices are not self-evident. Instead, political culture plays a vital role in determining how decision makers interpret the external setting and thus how they respond to it. It influences, for example, whether other states are regarded as friend or foe and the nature of the dangers that they are seen to represent. By the same token, political culture helps to determine whether or not international institutions are perceived as useful and legitimate instruments of policy. Although the material world ultimately places some constraints on the forms that political cultures can take, or at least makes some more likely and sustainable than others, it does not precisely dictate their content. A range of political cultures may be compatible with a given set of environmental conditions.

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Despite its potential usefulness, the concept of political culture should not be viewed as a theoretical panacea. As noted in Chapter Two, it has several important limitations as an explanation of national security policy that must be acknowledged. First, not every society can be characterized as having a distinct political culture. And where two or more political subcultures vie for influence, the outcome will depend greatly on other domestic factors, such as the features of policy-making process. Second, even where a distinct political culture can be said to exist, it may offer little or no speCific guidance for some aspects national security policy. In these instances, the beliefs and values held by interest groups, organizations, or even a few key individuals may be more determinative. Third, given that some minor variations in attitudes are bound to be found among political elites and policy makers, political culture will be of more use for explaining broad, long-term trends and patterns in policy than it is for comprehending specific decisions. To understand the latter, it may once again be necessary to invoke other domestic-level factors. Finally, insofar as political culture is highly stable, it cannot easily account for instances of policy change. In sum, political culture will best explain all aspects of national security policy rarely, if ever, and it will sometimes not be at all useful. Notwithstanding such qualifications, these conclusions about the importance of international institutions and, especially, of political culture are not commonplace in the security literature. To the contrary, few students of security affairs have taken international institutions seriously, and political culture has received even less attention as a possible determinant of national security policy. The field of security studies has long been considered the province of realist theories, which emphasize above all the influence of the material structure of the international system and assign little significance to international institutions or domestic factors. Where scholars have turned to the domestic level of analysis for explanations of national security policy, they have primarily stressed non-cultural factors such as social structure and political institutions, bureaucratic politics and organizational behavior, and individual beliefs, images, and cognitive processes. Although the appearance in the past few years of several works employing cultural approaches has begun to remedy this traditional lacuna, the new literature has nevertheless paid little heed to the concept of political culture per se. 30 The findings presented here concerning the sources of German secu-

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rity policy suggest, however, that the neglect of international institutions and political culture has been detrimental to the cause of theoretical progress in the field of security studies. While the case of German security policy after unification may be far from typical, it is hardly unique in all respects. In fact, international institutions and political culture may be important determinants in other places and at other times as well. Consequently, they merit, at a minimum, further consideration as potential sources of national security policy and, more generally, state behavior. How might scholarship in these areas proceed? What questions need to be addressed? Given that several scholars have already put forward potentially productive research agendas for the study of international institutions,31 this brief discussion will place primary emphasis on some of the tasks to be accomplished by future inquiry into the role of political culture. A logical first step, given the limitations of the existing literature, is to conduct additional case studies. Although German security policy after unification is suggestive of the potential influence of international institutions and political culture, it provides little basis for making generalizations about their effects and their relative importance vis-a-vis other possible external and internal determinants of state behavior. As we have seen, the case of Germany since 1990 is characterized by relatively little intertemporal variation in the independent and dependent variables, which necessitated the use of the congruence method and process tracing. In addition, Germany is unlikely to be representative of a large number of states, given its size, wealth, degree of involvement in the international community, unique historical experiences, and so on. Thus there is still a compelling need for more basic evidence concerning the presence or absence of distinct political cultures, their content, and their effects, along with those of international institutions, on the policies of other states and during different historical periods. It makes no sense to engage in crossnational comparisons of political culture in particular until its existence and its impact have been established in specific instances.32 As case studies cumulate, however, scholars should increasingly seek to situate their work in an explicitly comparative framework. Such an approach is necessary to identify the range of values that different elements of political culture may hold. At a minimum, the case of postwar Germany suggests that significant departures can occur from a realpolitik strategic culture that deems the use of force an effective and legitimate

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policy instrument. 33 In addition, comparative analysis will help to establish the nature and magnitude of the effects of political culture and of international institutions, both in absolute terms and relative to other possible determinants. For example, how does behavior vary with differences in political culture? Which aspects of foreign and security policy are most subject to its influence? Which components of political culture are likely to have the most pronounced impact? This study has emphasized the consequences of the normative guidelines and causal beliefs of German political culture, but other elements may play more important roles in other cases. And under what conditions are international institutions and political cultures likely to be more or less influential? Of course, comparative research on political culture as a determinant of state behavior will not be without difficulties. One challenge involves the development of standardized schemes for relating the content of different political cultures. This task, which was noted in some of the earliest research on political culture/ 4 remains highly relevant. Alastair lain Johnston has identified three dimensions along which basic strategic assumptions, what he terms the "central paradigm" of strategic culture, may vary. 35 But these categories, which concern world views and causal beliefs, do not encompass all the potentially relevant components of political culture. Nor will the most salient elements of different political cultures lie on the same dimensions. A second issue concerns the problem of compensating for the potentially confounding effects of other factors. Ideally, research into the impact of political culture would control for the position that states occupy in the international system. In practice, however, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to hold external conditions-not to mention other possibly important domestic determinants of policy--constant across states, thus complicating the task of determining the distinct contributions of cultural variables, although this difficulty is not unique to cultural analysis. A third question is whether the universe of cases in which political culture has markedly shaped state behavior will prove sufficiently large to permit meaningful generalizations. The discordant history of the concept and the criticisms that have been leveled at it suggest that the existence of a large number of examples cannot be assumed. But the answer will not become clear until scholars have conducted a good deal of preliminary investigation, especially given the substantial empirical requirements of measuring political culture. If the recent rapid growth of interest in cul-

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tural approaches to the study of security is any indication, however, the current outlook is positive. In any event, there is no need to identify numerous instances of comprehensive political cultures. For the purposes of theory building, it may be sufficient to rely heavily on cases in which only a few specific beliefs or values are widely shared within a society or its political elite. As the parameters of the role of political culture as a determinant of state behavior become clearer, it will be increasingly important to explore the sources of political culture itself. As noted in Chapter Two, political cultures are not immutable. Although often highly stable, they can evolve over time, and they can sometimes be profoundly altered in a relatively short period, as exemplified by the changes that took place in German political culture as a result of World War II. Indeed, as suggested above, one can imagine circumstances, such as the emergence of profound new security threats in the east coupled with the unwillingness of Germany's traditional Western partners to help address them, in which German national security culture might undergo a further significant evolution. Thus, although political culture can often be treated as an independent or intervening variable in the study of state behavior, analysts must also be attentive to possible temporal variations. Ultimately, cultural explanations should be accompanied by a better understanding of the sources of culture itself, even if culture is at most times highly static, just as structural theories of international relations, such as neorealism, must answer the question of how particular distributions of power arise in the first place. This is not the place to engage in extensive speculation about the sources of political culture. That subject merits a book of its own. 36 Nevertheless, the case of twentieth-century Germany does offer some clearcut suggestions about where scholarly attention might be usefully directed. It highlights in particular the role of the external environment, or more precisely, a society's interactions with the outside world, in precipitating and shaping cultural change. Most prominent among these interactions are major shocks, such as large-scale war or sustained economic depression. Unexpected, vivid, and traumatic experiences, especially when they result in prolonged or acute human suffering, can set the stage for profound cultural transformations. A foreign policy that fails or leads to disaster can delegitimize relevant elements of the reigning political culture, discredit its most outspoken proponents, and create widespread receptiveness to alternative beliefs and values that promise to provide better

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guidance for navigating the exigencies of the international environment. 37 By the same token, foreign policy successes will tend to legitimize an emerging political culture and empower those who espouse it. Less dramatic but repeated international interactions over long time periods can help to define the content of a society's political culture. An extreme example of this was the postwar occupation of Germany, which afforded the Western powers an opportunity to influence directly attitudes in what became the Federal Republic. More subtly, Germany's subsequent intensive participation in international institutions such as NATO and the European Community on a voluntary basis created numerous channels for the transnational diffusion of beliefs and values and venues for the socialization of German elites into broader European and Western communities. Germany's involvement in these institutional structures also influenced the outcomes of internal debates among competing political subcultures that, although initially highly contingent, gradually came to be accepted as conventional wisdom. 38 This conception of the possible international sources of political culture is not entirely original. It coincides with Peter Gourevitch's discussion of the "second image reversed," although he does not explicitly consider culture in his analysis. 39 Likewise, it is consistent with recently articulated constructivist views of the nature of international politics, in which the identities and interests of states are constantly formed and reformed through international interactions. 40 In contrast to constructivism, however, which stresses the potential malleability of state identities and interests and tends to reify the state, this study emphasizes the potential stability of political culture as well as its location in society, or at least the political elite, rather than the state. Even after the Cold War, national security policy, whether defined along traditional lines or in more expansive terms, remains an important object of scholarly attention. Notwithstanding the end of the postwar East-West confrontation, states in Europe and beyond continue to face challenges and threats that contain an irreducible military dimension. Consequently, efforts to understand the sources of national security policy remain well worthwhile. Students of the subject have often placed particular emphasis on the influence of the material structure of the international system, especially the distribution of power and each state's position within that structure. As this study has shown, however, interna-

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tional institutions also merit consideration as possible determinants of national security policy. In fact, their relevance is likely to be only heightened in the post-Cold War era. Likewise, political culture should not be overlooked as a source of state preferences. Indeed, by stressing the common characteristics of societies and their political elites rather than what divides them, it is a logical starting point in the search for internal sources of national security policy and is likely to find a wider range of applications than are other domestic-level approaches

Reference Matter

Abbreviations

The following abbreviations are used in the Notes and Bibliography: ADN AFP

ARD BPA BR DDP DF DPA FAZ FBIS FR GIC IHT IISS NYT

sz SzS TWIG WP ZDF

Allgemeiner Deutscher Nachrichtendienst (Berlin) Agence France Presse (Paris) Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Offentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunkanstalten der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Hamburg) Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung Bayerischer Rundfunk (Munich) Deutscher Depeschendienst (Berlin) Deutschlandfunk (Cologne) Deutsche Presse-Agentur (Hamburg) Franlifurter Allgemeine Zeitung Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: West Europe Franlifurter Rundschau German Information Center (New York) International Herald Tribune (Paris) International Institute for Strategic Studies (London) New York Times Suddeutsche Zeitung (Munich) Stichworte zur Sicherheitspolitik The Week in Germany (New York) Washington Post Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen (Mainz)

Notes

Chapter One EPIGRAPHS: Kohl, "Unsere Verantwortung," 62; Schmidt, in Zeit, 13 Jan. 1995, 3, trans. in FBIS, 10 Feb. 1995, 14; Genscher, in Foreign Ministry of the Federal Republic of Germany, "Der Bundesminister des Auswartigen informiert: Mitteilung fiir die Presse" 1056/91 ( 13 Mar. 1991 ), cited in Clemens, "Special Kind of Superpower?" 232; Kinkel, in Berlingske Tidende (Copenhagen), 3 Feb. 1994, 15, trans. in FBIS, 14 Feb. 1994, 42; Riihe, in Spiegel, 21 Dec. 1992, 23. Unless otherwise indicated, all translations are those of the author. 1. For summaries of these concerns, see Van Evera, "Primed for Peace," 8, and Markovits and Reich, German Predicament, chap. 2. Representative news articles include Eric Pace, "Scholars Say Veneer of Nonchalance Masks Worry on German Unification," NYT, 11 Nov. 1989, 21, and Alan Riding, "Fear of Germany Is Focus at East European Meeting," NYT, 5 Feb. 1990, AlO. See also the collection of essays in James and Stone, eds., When the Wall Came Down. Hubel and May provide a brief discussion of international public opinion in Ein "normales" Deutschland? 24-25. 2. Such concerns were often couched in euphemisms and vague language. Arthur Schlesinger, however, spoke openly of the possibility that "Germany would have by far the largest army in Europe west of Russia. With its technological skills, it may even acquire nuclear weapons. Overwhelming military power would be bound to reinforce both the will and the ability to dominate Europe by diplomatic, political and economic means." Going further, he cautioned that "by the tum of the century, a unified Germany, the most powerful and dynamic state in Europe, may be demanding Lebensraum-a revision of its eastern borders, a new Anschluss with Austria, a new outreach to German-speaking minorities in neighboring countries." (Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "Germany's Fate Will Determine Europe's," Wall Street Journal, 21 Dec. 1989.) 3. See, for example, Riihe, "Bundeswehr im deutschen und europaischen EinigungsprozeB," 145; Klaus Naumann, "Nur kollektive Teilung der Risi-

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ken schiitzt das Biindnisgebiet," Welt am Sonntag, 29 Aug. 1993, reprinted in SzS, no. 9/93 (Sept. 1993), 36; Mahnke, "Wandel im Wandel," 40-41; and Joffe, "After Bipolarity," 37-38. See also the official assessment presented in Federal Ministry of Defence, White Paper 1994, 23-24. 4. Kohl, "Rede des Bundeskanzlers," 762. 5. See also Markovits and Reich, German Predicament, 4-6; Schlor, "German Security Policy," 4; and Schwarz, Zentralmacht Europas. 6. For a summary of these and other German actions that raised concerns abroad, see Horsley, "United Germany's Seven Cardinal Sins." 7. See, especially, Waltz, Theory ofinternational Politics, 67-72. 8. Two leading examples are Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine, and Walt, Origins of Alliances. See also M. F. Elman, "Foreign Policies," and C. Elman, "Horses for Courses." 9. Thus far, no one has performed a detailed neorealist analysis of the question. Nevertheless, several scholars have used neorealist theory to make inferences about future German behavior. See Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future"; Layne, "Unipolar Illusion"; and Waltz, "Emerging Structure." Neorealist assumptions are also present in Odom, "German Problem," and Mead, "Once and Future Reich." 10. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future," 36-38; Waltz, "Emerging Structure," 66-67 and 76; and Layne, "Unipolar Illusion," 37. 11. It may be argued that, quite to the contrary, the foreign policy style and substance of other European powers, notably Britain and France, have continued to be far more unilateral. See Muller, "German Foreign Policy," 161-62. 12. I develop the concept of national security culture and relate it to kindred ideational constructs, such as strategic culture, belief systems, and operational codes, in Chapter Two. 13. For valuable discussions of the different uses of case studies, see George, "Case Studies," and Eckstein, "Case Study." 14. Eckstein, "Case Study," 108-9. 15. Crucial experiments are discussed in Stinchcombe, Constructing Social Theories, 24-28. 16. In the past decade, several prominent works have employed competitive theory testing to demonstrate the superiority of neorealist approaches. See, for example, Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine; Walt, Origins of Alliances; and Grieco, Cooperation Among Nations. 17. See, especially, Mearsheimer, "False Promise."

Chapter Two Katzenstein, Cultural Norms, 17. 1. The differences between the concepts of political culture and strategic

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culture as well as the advantages of employing the former are discussed below. 2. The classic statement appears in Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration. 3. See in particular Ullman, "Redefming Security," and Mathews, "Redefming Security." 4. See, for example, the discussion in Levy, "Is the Environment a National Security Issue?" 5. Walt, "Renaissance," 213. See also the discussion in Ullman, Securing Europe, xii. 6. This definition of national security policy is closely related to the concept of grand strategy, which Barry Posen has described as "that collection of military, economic, and political means and ends with which a state attempts to achieve security." See his Sources of Military Doctrine, 7. A similar definition of grand strategy is offered in Rosecrance and Stein, eds., Domestic Bases, 4. 7. This focus nevertheless captures a wide variety of possible state activities. Consequently, it is difficult, if not impossible, to derive specific, testable hypotheses about particular types of state behavior, and this book makes no systematic attempt to do so. 8. This typology of basic political forms is borrowed from Snyder, Myths of Empire. 9. For a concise summary and critique, see Moravcsik, "Introduction," 59. 10. The most influential neorealist statement remains Waltz, Theory of International Politics. For an excellent survey of the neorealist literature, see C. Elman, "Horses for Courses." For applications to non-security issues, see Krasner, Structural Conflict, and Lake, Power, Protection, and Free Trade. 11. See, especially, Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine; Walt, Origins of Alliances; Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future"; and Glaser, "Political Consequences." 12. For variants of realism that take into account intentions, see Morgenthan, Politics Among Nations; Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration; Walt, Origins of Alliances; Glaser, "Political Consequences"; Schweller, "Tripolarity"; and Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit." Glaser usefully distinguishes between security-related and non-security motives for expansion. 13. This definition is based on Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, 8-9. 14. Leading institutional studies are Krasner, ed., International Regimes; Keohane, After Hegemony; Keohane, International Institutions; and 0. R. Young, International Cooperation. For applications to security affairs, see Duffield, Power Rules, and Duffield, "Explaining the Long Peace."

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15. For an argument that international institutions are fundamentally more important than the international distribution of power, see Kocs, "Explaining." 16. See also Fox and Fox, NATO, 1-12, and Karns and Mingst, eds., United States, 1-2, which offer similar, if less fully developed, conceptualizations. 17. The most comprehensive discussions of the sources of compliance are 0. R. Young, International Cooperation, 70-80; Keohane, After Hegemony, 98-106 and 237--40; and 0. R. Young, Compliance. A somewhat more extensive summary, based on these and other works, is provided in Duffield, "International Regimes," 836-37. 18. 0. R. Young, International Cooperation, 71. 19. As used here, the term "alliance" refers to institutionalized forms of security cooperation, which involve explicit if not formal commitments and obligations and which are to be contrasted with un-institutionalized alignments. For further discussion of this distinction, see Wallander and Keohane, "Institutional Approach." 20. For a more extended analysis, see Moravcsik, "Introduction," 5-12. 21. Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration, 13-15, and Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 68-73. 22. Recent theoretical analyses that seek to integrate the external and domestic settings include Barnett, "High Politics"; Mastanduno, Lake, and Ikenberry, "Toward a Realist Theory"; Barnett and Levy, "Domestic Sources"; and Maoz, National Choices. 23. See also Rosecrance and Stein, eds., Domestic Bases. Peter Gourevitch has made a similar argument concerning domestic political outcomes: "The world sets constraints and offers opportunities. The explanation of the variance within those limits ... requires analysis of internal politics." See his "International System," 436. 24. National preferences are regarded here as the way in which nationstates are inclined to pursue their national interests, i.e., as preferences over strategies, not preferences over outcomes. 25. See the excellent discussion of the sources of economic policy preferences in Simmons, Who Adjusts? 5-7. 26. For general discussions of this point, see Knorr, Power of Nations; Barnett, "High Politics"; Ikenberry, Reasons of State; Mastanduno, Lake, and Ikenberry, "Toward a Realist Theory"; and Lamborn, "Power." 27. For an example of the role that constitutional factors can play, see D'Lugo and Rogowski, "Anglo-German Naval Race." 28. Previous studies have exaggerated the importance of national capacity by focusing narrowly on aspects of security policy that require substantial

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material and human resources, such as preparations for war. See, for example, Barnett, "High Politics." The impact of domestic constraints on alliance choices is discussed in Barnett and Levy, "Domestic Sources." 29. It should be noted that, in some respects, national capacity and national predispositions may be closely related. As suggested above, for example, it will be easier for a state to mobilize or extract resources for purposes that society strongly supports, all other things being equal. 30. Particularly useful discussions of political culture, from which these definitions have been distilled, are Almond and Verba, Civic Culture, chap. 1; Pye, "Introduction"; Verba, "Conclusion"; Putnam, Beliefs of Politicians; Rockman, Studying Elite Political Culture; Elkins and Simeon, "Cause"; Almond and Verba, eds., Civic Culture Revisited; and Eckstein, "Culturalist Theory." 31. It is important to stress that political culture can and should be clearly distinguished from material and institutional factors. Given that the objective of this study is to explain German security policy, it also rejects definitions of political culture that contain a behavioral dimension in order to avoid tautology. In any case, purely ideational definitions are far more common. For a discussion and defense of definitions that include a behavioral component, however, see Ebel, Taras, and Cochrane, Political Culture. 32. Elkins and Simeon, "Cause," 123. 33. Unfortunately, there is no agreement, and little discussion, in the literature on the percentage of members of a social unit that must share the same beliefs and values in order for that unit to be characterized as having a single political culture. Most scholars would presumably be comfortable with a figure of 90 percent or higher, although lower supermajorities might also qualify. In any case, such assessments must necessarily be somewhat subjective. 34. See also Elkins and Simeon, "Cause," 130, and Pye, "Culture and Political Science," 73. 35. Lijphart, "Structure of Inference," 42; Eckstein, "Culturalist Theory," 792; Legro, Cooperation Under Fire, 22-25; and Berger, "Norms," 326. On the stability of belief systems more specifically, see Blum, "Soviet Foreign Policy Belief System," 377; Burgess, Elite Images, 6; George, Presidential Decisionmaking, 57; and Rosati, Carter Administration's Quest, 21. 36. Cognitive consistency is discussed in George, Presidential Decisionmaking, 19-20, 56-57, and 61-66; Jervis, Perception and Misperception, chap. 4; Nisbett and Ross, Human Inference, chap. 8; and Shimko, Images and Arms Control, 28-32. 37. Larson, "Role of Belief Systems," 25. 38. The principal exception to this generalization is the recent work of Berger, especially "Norms" and "From Sword to Chrysanthemum."

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Notes to Pages 24-25

39. Two noteworthy exceptions are Kupchan, Vulnerability of Empire, and Johnston, Cultural Realism, which escape these last two failings. The latter also provides an excellent review of the literature on strategic culture. Nevertheless, both works largely overlook the political-culture literature and focus primarily on the cognitive component of strategic culture. 40. Berger, "Norms." Berger employs the term "political-military culture," but this may be too narrow insofar as it excludes relevant non-military factors. When referring to this cluster of attitudes, I will use "national security culture" and the more familiar term "political culture" interchangeably, although the latter denotes a broader set of beliefs and values. 41. This typology, while following from the characterization of political culture described above, also incorporates concepts used by other ideational and cognitive approaches to the study of foreign and security policy, including ideology, the operational code, belief systems, image analysis, cognitive maps, and strategic culture. As noted above, however, political culture is the most encompassing of these conceptions. The others deal with more limited ranges of attitudes, typically omitting the evaluative or affective components of political culture; many are primarily concerned with the subjective beliefs of individuals rather than shared or intersubjective cognitive phenomena; and ideology, which is perhaps the most closely related concept, tends to refer to more formal, explicit, and coherent systems of beliefs and values. For useful discussions of some of these concepts, see Goldstein and Keohane, eds., Ideas and Foreign Policy; Converse, "Nature of Belief Systems"; Axelrod, ed., Structure of Decision; George, '"Operational Code"'; and Putnam, "Studying Elite Political Culture." 42. "George, '"Operational Code,"' 200. George uses the term "philosophical beliefs." 43. Burgess, Elite Images, 4 and 6. 44. George, '"Operational Code,"' 201, and Johnston, Cultural Realism, 37. 45. A substantial literature exists on such images. See, especially, Shimko, Images and Arms Control; 0. R. Holsti, "Belief System"; and Cottam, Images and Intervention. Shimko further subdivides images of other states into six categories: (1) their goals, objectives, and intentions; (2) their underlying motives; (3) their capabilities; ( 4) their decision-making processes; (5) their likely responses to one's own policies; and (6) their images of one's own state. 46. Vertzberger, World in Their Minds, 260 and 268. 47. Verba has described political identity as "perhaps the most crucial political belief." ("Conclusion," 529.) See also Vertzberger, World in Their Minds, 268.

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48. Verba, "Conclusion," 516 and 517; Elkins and Simeon, "Cause," 128 and 132; and Kupchan, Vulnerability of Empire, 27. 49. On the role of culture in defining interests, see also Kier, Imagining War, 5 and 38. 50. Much of the literature on belief systems deals primarily with causal or instrumental beliefs. See, especially, Goldstein, Ideas, 9 and 237; George, "'Operational Code,'" 205; Kupchan, Vulnerability of Empire; and Axelrod, ed., Structure ofDecision. 51. Johnston, Cultural Realism, 37. 52. Goldstein and Keohane, eds., Ideas and Foreign Policy, 9-10; Verba, "Conclusion," 517; Elkins and Simeon, "Cause," 128; and Kupchan, Vulnerability of Empire, 6, 27, and 90. A closely related concept is national role conceptions, which are policy makers' definitions of the actions that are suitable to their state and the functions that their state should perform on a continuing basis. SeeK. J. Holsti, "National Role Conceptions." 53. Converse, "Nature of Belief Systems." 54. The importance of identifying causal mechanisms in causal explanations involving ideas is stressed in Yee, "Causal Effects," 83-84. 55. Kavanagh, Political Culture, 67-68. 56. The following discussion is not intended to refer to a specific policy process. Rather, it seeks to encompass the tasks that are a logical part of all but the simplest decision-making processes, whether or not they are explicitly stated. Khong has identified a very similar set of tasks in Analogies at War, 10 and 20-22. Two other instructive discussions of the various ways in which beliefs can affect policy making, upon which this section draws, are George, "Causal Nexus," 101-4, and 0. R. Holsti, "Foreign Policy Formation," 33-35. 57. In addition to Elkins and Simeon, "Cause," 128 and 143, see Jervis, "Hypotheses on Misperception," 455; Odell, U.S. International Monetary Policy, 63-64; and Vertzberger, World in Their Minds, 271. 58. See Elkins and Simeon, "Cause," 143; Rockman, Studying Elite Political Culture, 11; George, "'Operational Code,"' 191 and 200; Blum, "Soviet Foreign Policy Belief System," 373; George, Presidential Decisionmaking, 45; and Vertzberger, World in Their Minds, 271. 59. Boulding, "National Images," 120. 60. Elkins and Simeon, "Cause," 128; Goldstein and Keohane, eds., Ideas and Foreign Policy, 8; and Kupchan, Vulnerability ofEmpire, 27, 90, and 92. 61. Blum, "Soviet Foreign Policy Belief System," 376; Elkins and Simeon, "Cause," 131 and 143; and Kupchan, Vulnerability of Empire, 22. 62. George, Presidential Decisionmaking, 45; George, "Causal Nexus," 101 and 103; Goldstein, Ideas, 250; and Vertzberger, World in Their Minds, 272.

266

Notes to Pages 27-30

63. Eckstein, "Culturalist Theory," 790; Elkins and Simeon, "Cause," 133 and 139; Rockman, Studying Elite Political Culture, 1-4; Odell, U.S. International Monetary Policy, 63-64; Johnston, Cultural Realism, 35; and Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky, Cultural Theory, 272. As George points out with regard to operational code beliefs, they rigidly prescribe and determine neither the diagnosis of situations nor the choice of action for dealing with them. (Presidential Decisionmaking, 45.) 64. See also Eckstein, "Culturalist Theory," 790, and Berger, "Norms," 329. 65. Similarly, Blum, "Soviet Foreign Policy Belief System," seeks to explain continuity in Soviet foreign policy in terms of belief systems. 66. Gaensler, "Culture and Decision," 82. See also Goldstein, Ideas, 25354, and Jacobsen, "Much Ado," 293. 67. Verba, "Conclusion," 524. 68. Ibid., 520. 69. Much of the early literature on political culture, which was primarily concerned with the question of democratic stability, assumed that most political cultures were not uniform. Rather, those studies treated political culture as the particular distribution of orientations among the members of a nation. They sought to identify the frequency with which different modal orientations were represented in the body politic. See, especially, Almond and Verba, Civic Culture, chap. 1; Kavanagh, Political Culture, 11 and 20; and Inkeles, National Character, 15-16. Even if there is no dominant and comprehensive political culture, however, those aspects of relevance to national security policy may be homogeneous. In any case, whether or not a single national security culture exists in a given society must be determined empirically and should not simply be assumed. 70. For example, Legro, in Cooperation Under Fire, argues that the organizational cultures of military bureaucracies were important determinants of decisions during World War II to violate or comply with agreements prohibiting the use of certain weapons. 71. See, especially, Goldstein, Ideas, 3, 17, and 238. Similar arguments are made in Kupchan, Vulnerability of Empire, 22, 27, and 93-94; Elkins and Simeon, "Cause," 135; and Katzenstein, Cultural Norms, 18-22. 72. Henkin, How Nations Behave, 60 and 64, and 0. R. Young, Compliance, 40-41. 73. See, for example, Berger, "From Sword to Chrysanthemum." 74. See, especially, Allison, Essence of Decision, chap. 3, and Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics, 139-44. 75. Goldstein,Ideas, 17-18.

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76. The quote is from Allison, Essence of Decision, 79. See also March and Olsen, "New Institutionalism"; Krasner, "Sovereignty"; Ikenberry, "Conclusion"; and M. F. Elman, "Foreign Policies," 182-89. 77. See, especially, Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics, chap. 3. 78. Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine; Legro, Cooperation Under Fire; Snyder, Ideology of the Offensive; and Builder, Masks of War. 79. Ikenberry, "Conclusion," 223-24, and Goldstein, Ideas, 17-18. 80. See, for example, Krasner, "Are Bureaucracies Important?" 81. The possibility of competing cultures is also noted in Kier, Imagining War, 26-27. 82. Such institutions are also a focus of the rapidly growing literature in comparative politics known as historical institutionalism. Useful overviews of this literature are provided in Thelen and Steinmo, "Historical Institutionalism," and Hall and Taylor, "Political Science." 83. See, especially, Allison, Essence of Decision, chap. 5; Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics; Hermann, Kegley, and Rosenau, eds., New Directions; Katzenstein, Policy and Politics; and Ikenberry, "Conclusion." 84. On the differences between presidential and parliamentary systems, see, for example, Kaarbo, "Power and Influence." 85. On coalition governments, see Kaarbo, "Power and Influence." 86. See also Kier, Imagining War, 36. 87. See, especially, Verba, "Germany"; Comadt, "Changing German Political Culture"; and Baker, Dalton, and Hildebrandt, Germany Transformed. 88. The danger of tautological inferences in the study ofbeliefs, attitudes, and culture is also noted in Almond and Verba, Civic Culture, 50; Kavanagh, Political Culture, 49; Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman, Bureaucrats and Politicians, 30-31; Shimko, Images and Arms Control, 43; Kupchan, Vulnerability of Empire, 26-27; Legro, Cooperation Under Fire, 30; and Berger, "Norms," 328. 89. Putnam, "Studying Elite Political Culture," 651. 90. Putnam, "Studying Elite Political Culture," 652; Putnam, Comparative Study, 87-88; and Kupchan, Vulnerability of Empire, 43. 91. Page and Shapiro, Rational Public, 172 and 283. On the German case, see Schossler and Weede, West German Elite Views, 72-73. 92. "Germany Finds Its Niche," 42. 93. Indeed, Lucian Pye has argued that "in all polities there is a fundamental distinction between the culture of the ruler or power holders and that of the masses." See his "Introduction," 15. 94. Dalton, Politics in Germany, chap. 7, provides an overview of German political elites and their attitudes. On the congruity of elite and mass opinion on security issues, see Schossler and Weede, West German Elite Views, 74.

268

Notes to Pages 34-38

95. See also Boulding, "National Images," 121-22. 96. Hoffmann-Lange, "West German Elites," and Hoffmann-Lange, Eliten. 97. Rosen, "Military Effectiveness," 14. 98. On the problem of distinguishing between instrumental and representational communications, see Shimko, Images and Arms Control, 52-53, and 0. R. Holsti, "Foreign Policy Formation," 43-44. 99. These methods are described in George, "Causal Nexus," esp. 10419, and George and McKeown, "Case Studies," esp. 29-41. A third possible method is the use of counterfactual reasoning. The application of this approach is made difficult, however, by the variety of aspects of German policy and the large number of potential explanatory variables that are considered. 100. Shimko, Images and Arms Control, 59-60, and Khong, Analogies at War, 64-68. 101. Khong, Analogies at War, 64, and Johnston, Cultural Realism, 49. Process tracing can also be viewed as a means of increasing the number of theoretically relevant observations. See King, Keohane, and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry; 226--28. 102. The best review of the emergent literature is Hellmann, "Goodbye Bismarck?" 103. For public statements, I have relied primarily upon Bulletin, which is a quasi-daily compilation of important speeches published by the Federal Press and Information Office; the occasional series of statements and speeches distributed by the German Information Center in New York; and Stichworte zur Sicherheitspolitik (SzS), a monthly publication of the Federal Press and Information Office that contains a variety of documents on security issues. 104. Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies, 41, and Foyle, "Public Opinion," 148. 105. Foyle, "Public Opinion," 149. 106. Additional interviews were conducted with 16 U.S. and NATO officials (some German) who were very knowledgeable about German policy and policy making. A breakdown is provided in Table 2.2. 107. Welch, Concept of Political Culture. 108. Almond and Verba, Civic Culture, chap. 2. 109. Almond and Verba, Civic Culture, 56--67. See also Welch, Concept of Political Culture, 43. 110. Aberbach, Chesney, and Rockman, "Exploring Elite Political Attitudes," 8. The use of open-ended interview questions and qualitative interpretation of the results in the study of elite political culture is also explained and justified in Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman, Bureaucrats and Politicians,

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33-35; Rockman, Studying Elite Political Culture; and Pye, "Political Culture Revisited," 500-502. 111. Shimko, Images and Arms Control, 51. 112. The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration (Cambridge, Eng.: Polity Press, 1984), 333, cited in Welch, Concept of Political Culture, 3. 113. Images and Arms Control, 53-54.

Chapter Three 1. This theme appears in a number of books on German foreign and security policy, including Hanrieder, West German Foreign Policy, and Haftendom, Security and Detente. 2. See also Asmus, "Future of German Strategic Thinking," 142. 3. See also the more general discussion of the distinctive features of postwar German foreign policy in Gordon, "Normalization," 225-28. 4. See also Asmus, "Future of German Strategic Thinking," 137. 5. In the short to medium term, Germany's economic strength may have actually decreased, especially if one considers indicators such as GDP per capita and the balance of payments. See Rittberger, "Nach der Vereinigung." 6. See, especially, the threat analysis in Bundesminister der Verteidigung, "Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien," 10--13. This assessment was frequently offered by Bundeswehr Generalinspekteur (Chief of Staff) Klaus Naumann. See, for example, Tagesspiegel, 13 Mar. 1993, 5, trans. in FBIS, 2 Apr. 1993, 23; Welt am Sonntag, 27 Mar. 1994, 25 and 27, trans. in FBIS, 30 Mar. 1994, 16-17; and SZ, 9 Sept. 1994, 6, trans. in FBIS, 12 Sept. 1994, 24. 7. See, for example, Kohl's remarks on DF, 4 Sept. 1994, trans. in FBIS, 6 Sept. 1994, 19. 8. See also Joffe, "After Bipolarity," 43. 9. For general discussions of the new risks, see Klaus Naumann in Welt am Sonntag, 6 Oct. 1991,25-26, trans. inFBIS, 9 Oct. 1991, 8-9; Wettig, "Developments"; Klaus Kinkel, "The Concept of Extended Security," FR, 16 Dec. 1993, 12, trans. in FBIS, 17 Dec. 1993, 14; Riihe, "Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik"; and Riihe, "Neue NATO," 340. 10. See also the discussion in Bundesminister der Verteidigung, "Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien," 11 and 13; the remarks of Klaus Kinkel in SzS, no. 12 (Dec. 1993), 51; and Riihe, "Europa und Amerika," 3. 11. FAZ, 11 Feb. 1994,12, trans. inFBIS, 14Feb. 1994,7. 12. WP, 11 July 1993, A20, and TWIG, 7 Jan. 1994, 1. 13. See, for example, Asmus, Kugler, and Larrabee, "Building a New NATO," 34. 14. Asmus, "German Unification," ix.

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Notes to Pages 46-48

15. See, for example, Stoltenberg, "Die wachsende Verantwortung," 137; Bundesminister der Verteidigung, "Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien," 14; Kohl, "European Security"; BPA, Bericht zur Rilstungskontrolle und Abrnstung 1994; and Kinkel, "Eine gerechte und dauerhafte Friedensordnung," 97. One opinion poll found that 69 percent of respondents regarded nuclear proliferation as the most critical security threat, while only 23 percent cited Russia's residual military power. See Asmus, "Germany's Geopolitical Maturation: Strategy and Public Opinion," 2. 16. See, for example, TWIG, 7 Feb. 1992, 1; TWIG, 21 Feb. 1992, 1; and FBIS, 10 Feb. 1992, 1, 12, and 16. According to one unofficial German estimate, 100-200 Russian nuclear scientists had gone to work for Third World nuclear threshold states by mid-1994. (Welt, 26 Aug. 1994, 3, trans. in FBIS, 26 Aug. 1994, 11.) 17. See FAZ, 6 Oct. 1993, 2, trans. in FBJS, 7 Oct. 1993, 29; Focus, 22 Nov. 1993, 54-56, trans. in FBIS, 23 Nov. 1993, 20; and SZ, 3 Feb. 1994, 7, trans. in FBIS, 4 Feb. 1994, 12. 18. See, for example, NYT, 12 Jan. 1993, All; Kohl, "Rede des Bundeskanzlers," 762; SZ, 4 Feb. 1994, 2, trans. in FBIS, 4 Feb. 1994, 10; Kohl, "Aufbruch in die Zukunft," 991; and Scharping, "Deutsche AuBenpolitik," 39. Former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali made several direct appeals during visits to Bonn, and in early 1994, the U.S. Senate overwhelmingly passed a resolution calling on Germany to do more. For the text of the resolution, see U.S. Congress, Congressional Record 140, no. 5 (31 Jan. 1994), S399-S400. 19. See, for example, Bundesminister der Verteidigung, "Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien," 12, and Klaus Naumann, "Bundeswehr Faced with New Challenges," Soldat und Technik (Jan. 1995), 9-16, trans. in FBIS, 26 Jan. 1995, 12. 20. Asmus, "German Unification," xi. 21. See, for example, former Minister of Defense Gerhard Stoltenberg's remarks reported in FAZ, 31 Jan. 1992,4, trans. in FBIS, 3 Feb. 1992, 17, and Naumann, "Bundeswehr," trans. in FBIS, 26 Jan. 1995, 12. 22. Asmus, "Germany After the Gulf War," 26 and 35. 23. For an extensive discussion of these attitudes, see Markovits and Reich, German Predicament, chaps. 4-9. One poll of Czech citizens found that 53 percent feared Germany, 58 percent believed that Germany was trying to make Central and Eastern Europe dependent upon it, and 50 percent saw German territorial designs. (FAZ, 17 July 1995, 8.) Of particular concern to its neighbors would be Germany's acquisition of nuclear weapons (Boutwell, German Nuclear Dilemma, 233 and 237), although the same might be said of other countries in the region as well.

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24. For evidence that German leaders are very aware of and sensitive to these attitudes, see FR, 22 Jan. 1992, 3, trans. in FBIS, 23 Jan. 1992, 16; FBIS, 13 Oct. 1993, 27; FR, 24 Jan. 1994,4, trans. inFBIS, 25 Jan. 1994, 21; SZ, 16 July 1994, 12, trans. inFBIS, 18 July 1994, 16;Zeit, 13 Jan. 1995,3, trans. inFBIS, 10 Feb. 1995, 13; and Scharping, "Deutsche Aul3enpolitik," 39. See also Gordon, "Normalization," 228; Kelleher and Fisher, "Germany," 166; and Muller, "German ForeignPolicy," 130. 25. See the remarks by Finance Minister Theodor Waigel in Welt am Sonntag, 28 June 1992, 1 and 6, trans. inFBIS, 2 July 1992,7. For additional details, see Kinkel, "Responsibility"; Kinkel, "125 Jahre Auswiirtiges Amt," 43; and FAZ, 17 Mar. 1995, trans. in FBIS, 18 Apr. 1995, 15. For further background, see Pfetsch, West Germany, 155-57, and Gowa, "Bipolarity." 26. Maull, "Germany and Japan," 104, and Guenther Nonnenmacher, "Jockeying for Position in a Changing World," FAZ, 22 Oct. 1992, trans. in German Tribune, no. 1538 (30 Oct. 1992), 5. 27. Haftendom, "West Germany." 28. See Chapter Seven. 29. Duffield, Power Rules. 30. Whereas the North Atlantic Treaty permits each party to determine what actions are necessary in the event of an armed attack on another member, the Brussels Treaty, on which the WEU is based, obliges its signatories to "afford the party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power." 31. For further details, see Yost, "Franco-German Defense Cooperation"; Feld, Future, chap. 9; and Gordon, France. 32. Similar to the SEA, the TEU calls upon member states to inform and consult one another on any matter of foreign and security policy of general interest and to ensure that their national policies conform to common positions. 33. The texts of the relevant documents are reprinted in Stares, Allied Rights. 34. Germany also established a subceiling of 345,000 in the ground and air forces. For further discussion, see Szabo, Diplomacy of German Unification. 35. The treaty-limited categories of equipment include tanks (4,166), artillery (2,705), armored combat vehicles (3,446), combat aircraft (900), and helicopters (306). It should be noted that these limits were not especially onerous for Germany, which needed to reduce its inventory in only one category (tanks) in order to meet them. It did, however, have to eliminate thousand of weapons inherited from the former German Democratic Republic. For details, see Daalder, CFE Treaty, and Guicherd, "Treaty."

Chapter Four War and Change, 54. 1. See, for example, Riihe, "Shaping Euro-Atlantic Policies," 129.

EPIGRAPH: Gilpin,

272

Notes to Pages 56-58

2. TWIG, 22 Apr. 1994,4. 3. Estimates vary, depending on the definitions used. I have drawn upon the figures reported in TWIG, 20 Mar. 1992, 4; TWIG, 13 Nov. 1992, 5; TWIG, 22 Mar. 1994, 23; and GIC, German Unification, 2. An estimated total of $700 million by the end of 1996 is reported in WP, 21 Feb. 1996, A21. 4. See, for example, Heilernann and Reinecke, Welcome to Hard Times. 5. TWIG, 17 Dec. 1993, 4. Less than half of this figure consisted of borrowing by the federal government. 6. Heilemann and Reinecke, Welcome to Hard Times, 2; TWIG, 22 Apr. 1994, 4; and TWIG, 29 Apr. 1994, 4. 7. In mid-1995, the cabinet approved a federal budget for 1996 that included a deficit ofDM 60 billion. (TWIG, 7 July 1995, 5.) 8. Between January 1991 and July 1992, the Bundesbank raised its discount rate from 6 percent to nearly 9 percent. ( WP, I7 July 1992, B3.) 9. TWIG, 14 Jan. 1994,4, and TWIG, 21 Jan. 1994,4. Following a brief rebound in 1994 and 1995, the economy experienced two further quarters of negative growth at the end of 1995 and the beginning of 1996. (TWIG, 12 Jan. 1996,4, and TWIG, 24 May 1996, 4.) 10. Stem, "Freedom," 120-21. 11. The 1994 figure represented 8.8 percent of the workforce in western Germany and I7 percent in eastern Germany. The previous postwar high in West Germany had been 8.6 percent in I983. (TWIG, I2 Nov. 1993, 4, and TWIG, II Jan. 1994, 4.) 12. As Ronald Asmus remarked in mid-1991, "Public political debate in Germany remains overshadowed, and much of the political class overwhelmed, by the enormous challenges of political and economic reconstruction in eastern Germany. Germany is increasingly preoccupied, indeed consumed, by the scope of the challenge of East German reconstruction." ("Germany After the GulfWar," 2.) 13. WP, 7 Feb. 1992, A26, and TWIG, 4 June 1993,4. 14. TWIG, 25 Aug. 1992,2. 15. According to one estimate, economic activity in Germany has grown by less than half of the industrial-economy average. (Economist, 4 May 1996, 17.) A detailed analysis is provided in Lauk, "Germany." See also E. 0. Smith, German Economy, 520; Schauble, "Germany and Europe"; and Shlaes, "Germany's Chained Economy," 118-20. 16. The average German works approximately 37 hours per week and receives a total of 40 paid vacation days and holidays. Overall, non-wage benefits equal 80-85 percent of basic wage costs. As a result, German labor costs are approximately 50 percent higher than those in the United States. See WP, 22 Feb. 1994, Al2; WP, 19 Feb. 1996, Al6; WP, 28 May 1996, All; Economist, 4

Notes to Pages 58-60

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May 1996, 11; Shlaes, "Germany's Chained Economy," 113-14; and M. Walker, "Overstretching Teutonia," 12. 17. In 1994, for example, eastern German unit wage costs were estimated to be 40--44 percent higher on average than those in the western part of the country. (TWIG, 22 Apr. 1994, 4, and Shlaes, "Germany's Chained Economy," 112) . 18. WP, 19 Feb. 1996, A16. 19. According to one study, German average productivity in certain key sectors was only 79 percent of the American average level. See FAZ, 22 Oct. 1993, 13, cited in Liibkemeier, "United Germany," 23. 20. German investment outside of the country rose from under DM 10 billion annually in the first half of the 1980s to approximately DM 30 billion per year in the early 1990s. (Lauk, "Germany at the Crossroads," 77.) The level of German foreign investment reached a record DM 48 billion ($32 billion) in 1995 and then rose another 40 percent in 1996. (TWIG, 1 Nov. 1996, 4, and WP, 8 Apr. 1997, A10.) Overall, Germans have invested approximately three times as much money abroad as foreigners have invested in Germany since unification. (WP, 19 Feb. 1996, A16.) 21. An estimated 210,000 jobs moved abroad between 1990 and 1993, while 250,000 more were expected to leave from 1994 to 1996. (TWIG, 12 Nov. 1993, 5.) In fact, by 1997, German investments had created some half a million new jobs in Eastern Europe alone, where wages and salaries were still as low as one-tenth of the levels prevailing in Germany. (WP, 21 July 1997, A16.) On German investment in Eastern Europe, see also WP, 17 Apr. 1994, A25. 22. FAZ, 7 Mar. 1995, 16, trans. inFBIS, 8 Mar. 1995, 15. 23. In 1996, the number of jobless topped out at 4.27 million, or 11.1 percent of the work force. (TWIG, 4 Feb. 1996, 4; TWIG, 8 Mar. 1996, 4; and WP, 19 Feb. 1996, A16.) According to one estimate, the true unemployment rate in eastern Germany at the time, when the effects of various government makework programs are accounted for, was closer to 24 percent. (WP, 21 Feb. 1996, A26.) And in early 1997, nearly 5 million workers, or more than 12 percent, were unemployed, the highest level since 1933. (WP, 3 Mar. 1997, A15, and WP, 8 Apr. 1997, AlO.) 24. T.-D. Young, "'Normalization,"' 13. 25. For further discussion, see Chapter Seven. 26. TWIG, 10 Sept. 1993, 1, and Truppenpraxis, no. 5 (Sept./Oct. 1993), 470--73, trans. in FBIS, 8 Oct. 1993, 32-33. See also Shlaes, "Germany's Chained Economy," 120, and M. Walker, "Overstretching Teutonia," 2 and 13, for similar figures. 27. This discussion relies on the translation of the Basic Law that is re-

274

Notes to Pages 61-63

printed in Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, Documents. 28. Only a few attempts have been made to apply the concept of culture to German security policy, most notably Szabo, Changing Politics, and Berger, "Norms." For general discussions of Germany's postwar political culture, see Verba, "Germany"; Comadt, "Changing German Political Culture"; and Schweigler, West German Foreign Policy, chap. 3. 29. See also Berger, "Norms," 329-31; Berger, "Past in the Present," 45-49; Anderson and Goodman, "Mars or Minerva?" 62; Almond, "Study of Political Culture," 21; Minkenberg, "Wall After the Wall," 56; and Schlor, "Gerinany." 30. See, for example, Wehler, German Empire, 179-81. 31. Blackwill, "Patterns of Partnership," 144, and author's confidential interview with a German Embassy official, Washington, D.C., 3 Dec. 1992. This belief is also characteristic of public opinion at large. In a rnid-1992 survey, for example, three-quarters of the respondents agreed that all conflicts between states can be resolved through negotiations, while only one-quarter agreed that war is sometimes necessary to protect a country's interests. See Juhasz and Rattinger, "German Attitudes." 32. See, especially, the efforts of then-Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, as reported in NYT, 31 Dec. 1990, 1 and 6; NYT, 5 Jan. 1991, 5; and FAZ, 3 Jan. 1991, 1-2, trans. inFB!S, 4 Jan. 1991,5-6. 33. In a public opinion poll conducted shortly after unification, nearly 70 percent of the respondents preferred that Germany model itself after either Switzerland or Sweden, both small, neutral countries. See D. B. Walker, "Germany Searches," 370. Also author's confidential interview with a U.S. Embassy official, Bonn, 27 July 1993. 34. Berger, "From Sword to Chrysanthemum," 134; Pond, "Germany Finds Its Niche," 29; and James, German Identity, 1 and 136. In the colorful words of a leading German political scientist, Germans "shun nationalism as vigorously as born-again Christians shun sinners." See Schwarz, "Germany's National and European Interests," 81. 35. See also Asmus, "Germany's Geopolitical Maturation: Strategy and Public Opinion," 4; M. Walker, "Overstretching Teutonia," 16; Minkenberg, "Wall After the Wall," 58; and the commentary of Josef Joffe in SZ, 10-11 Sept. 1994, 4, trans. in FBIS, 12 Sept. 1994, 26. At least one observer has noted the emergence of anti-Western, nationalist sentiments in German intellectual circles since unification, while acknowledging that these views had yet to acquire a wide following. (Heilbrunn, "Germany's New Right.") This article was roundly criticized, however, for greatly exaggerating the prevalence and influence of such attitudes. See the responses, especially Joffe, "Mr. Heilbrunn's Planet," in Foreign Affairs 76, no. 2 (Mar./Apr. 1997): 152-59.

Notes to Pages 63-64

275

36. FBIS, 19 Sept. 1991,5. See also Baring, "Germany," 8. 37. Zeit, 10 Sept. 1993, 7, trans. in FBIS, 14 Sept. 1993, 19. See also Schwarz, "Germany's National and European Interests," 85. 38. Pond, "Germany Finds Its Niche," 29, and Berger, "Norms," 324. Nevertheless, Markovits and Reich have warned that the primacy of Europeanism is now eroding in German political circles and that Germans are less inclined to replace their national identity with a European one than they were just a few years ago. (German Predicament, 204-5.) 39. Kinkel, "Germany in Europe." This fusion of German and European interests is stressed in Garton Ash, "Germany's Choice," 71, and Goetz, "Integration Policy," 40. 40. "Europas Standort," 105. 41. This theme runs through most of the literature on German security policy. See, for example, Asmus, "Germany After the Gulf War," 6-7; Asmus, "Future of German Strategic Thinking," 200-201; Berger, "Past in the Present"; Clemens, "Opportunity or Obligation?" 234-35; Clemens, "Special Kind of Superpower?" 200-202; Meiers, "Germany"; Muller, "German Foreign Policy"; Muller, "Military Intevention," 138; Peters, "Germany's Future Defense Policy," 57; Schlor, "German Security Policy," 5 and 13-14; Schweigler, West German Foreign Policy, 8-15; and the comments of Catherine Kelleher in U.S. Congress, "U.S.-German Relations," 74. 42. Muller, "German Foreign Policy," 162. 43. See, for example, the critical remarks by former Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg reported in Welt, 1 Feb. 1991, 7, trans. in FBIS, 5 Feb. 1991, 18, and FAZ, 14 Mar. 1991, 4, trans. in FBIS, 14 Mar. 1991, 25, and those of former Bundeswehr Chief of Staff Admiral Dieter Wellershoff reported in FAZ, 12 Mar. 1991, 6, trans. in FBIS, 12 Mar. 1991, 14. In this connection, one might also cite the size and scope of the postwar German peace movements. See Cooper, Paradoxes ofPeace. 44. Clemens, "Opportunity or Obligation?" 235 and 246; Kelleher, Future of European Security, 144; and the commentary by Josef Joffe in SZ, 1-2 July 1995, 4, trans. in FBIS, 6 July 1995, 15. See also Spiegel, 7 Nov. 1994, 76, trans. in FBIS, 9 Nov. 1994, 19. 45. Asmus, "Germany After the Gulf War," 9. 46. See also Asmus, "Future of German Strategic Thinking," 145, and Meiers, "Germany," 82-84. 47. Schwarz, Die geziihmten Deutschen. 48. Asmus, "Germany's Geopolitical Maturation: Strategy and Public Opinion," 3. 49. See the discussion in the introduction to Part Two. 50. Muller, "German Foreign Policy," 162.

276

Notes to Pages 64-66

51. SzS, no. 11 (Nov. 1993), 9; Kinkel, "Deutsche AuBenpolitik," 714; and Kinkel, "Bundeswehr," 864. See also Federal Ministry of Defence, White Paper 1994. 52. Asmus, "Future of German Strategic Thinking," 146 and 199; Clemens, "Special Kind of Superpower?" 199; and Herzog, "Globalisierung," 162. 53. T.-D. Young, "Trends," and Kelleher, "Defense Organization," 85-86. 54. Von Bredow, "Conscription," 291. 55. Adrian Zielcke, German Tribune, 25 Sept. 1992, 2. 56. See, for example, Kohl, "Bedeutung," 77-78; Kinkel, "Erklarung der Bundesregierung zur deutschen Mithilfe," 279; Kinkel, "Deutsche AuBenpolitik," 713; the remarks of Volker Riihe reported in FAZ, 10 Sept. 1993, 12, trans. in FBIS, 13 Sept. 1993, 19; Finance Minister Theodor Waigel, cited in FBIS, 16 Nov. 1995, 8; and Social Democratic Party leader Rudolf Scharping, cited in FBJS, 1 June 1994, 22. 57. TWIG, 1 May 1992, 1. See also Kohl, "Sicherheit," 167; Scharping, "Deutsche AuJ3enpolitik," 39; and Joffe, "Mr. Heilbrunn's Planet," 156. 58. See, for example, Kohl, "30. Jahrestag," 58. Likewise, Ruhe has argued that "the greatest challenges of our time can no longer be solved unilaterally." ("Verantwortung Deutschlands," 42.) 59. See, for example, Kohl, "Bedeutung," 77-78, and Riihe, cited in FBIS, 25 Nov. 1994, 18. The existence of a commitment to multilateral cooperation that spans the political spectrum in Germany is also stressed in Crawford, "German Foreign Policy," 38--40; Kelleher and Fisher, "Germany," 170-72; Gordon, France, 11; and Hellmann, "Goodbye Bismarck?" 21. 60. Speech at the fiftieth session of the United Nations General Assembly, 4. 61. Address to the Assembly of the American Jewish Committee. 62. Peters, "Germany's Future Defense Policy," 54-57; Muller, "German Foreign Policy," 132; and Stephen Kinzer, "Germany Is a Challenge for PostSoviet Europe," NYT, 27 Dec. 1991. See also the testimony by Daniel Hamilton and Catherine Kelleher in U.S. Congress, "U.S.-German Relations," 44 and 74. 63. See, for example, Ruhe in Das Parlament, 8 Sept. 1995, 5, trans. in FBIS, 12 Sept. 1995, 10. 64. Kohl, "Biindis- und Einsatzfahigkeit," 610. See also Kohl, "Vierzig Jahre Bundeswehr," 855; Kohl, "Aktuelle Fragen," 1015; Kinkel, "Deutsche AuBenpolitik," 714; and Linnenkamp, "Security Policy," 107. This view was expressed in numerous interviews. 65. Muller, "German Foreign Policy," 162. 66. SZ, 28 Mar. 1991,4, trans. inFBIS, 2 Apr. 1991,8. Similarly, Schlorhas written of an "instinctive multilateralism." ("German Security Policy," 6-7.) 67. Morgan, "Germany," 149; Stent, "One Germany," 69; Kelleher and Fisher, "Germany," 170-71; and Zeit, 21 Sept. 1990, 1, trans. in FBIS, 24 Sept.

Notes to Pages 66-67

277

1990, 10. Similarly, Anderson and Goodman have identified a "reflexive support for institutions." ("Mars or Minerva?" 24 and 60.) 68. Anderson and Goodman, "Mars or Minerva?" 60--61. 69. Muller, "German Foreign Policy," 162. 70. Kohl, "Biindis- und Einsatzfahigkeit," 610. See also Asmus, "German Unification," vii, and Linnenkamp, "Security Policy," 94. 71. The concern for Berechenbarkeit is discussed in Clemens, Reluctant Realists, 242-43. See also Schweigler, West German Foreign Policy, 86-88; Muller, "German Foreign Policy," 161; and Pond, "Germany Finds Its Niche," 25. 72. TWIG, 22 May 1992, 1. See also Kohl, "Erklfuung der Bundesregierung zur Sondertagung," 1102; Kohl, "Deutchlands Verantwortung," 330; and Kohl, "Sicherheit," 167. 73. SPD, "Perspektiven," 8. 74. Jim Hoagland, "Germany's New Export to Europe: Stability," WP, 20 Feb. 1992, A25. 75. Clemens, Reluctant Realists, 242-43. 76. See, for example, FAZ, 22 Oct. 1992, trans. in German Tribune, no. 1538 (30 Oct. 1992), 5; the commentary by Josef Joffe in SZ, 28 Mar. 1991, 4, trans. in FBIS, 2 Apr. 1991, 8; General-Anzeiger, 18 Feb. 1995, 3, trans. in FBIS, 23 Mar. 1995, 14; Sherwood, Allies in Crisis, 173-74; Bertram, "Visions of Leadership," 48; Markovits and Reich, German Predicament, 41; and Meiers, "Germany," 82. Also author's confidential interview with a high-level German Foreign Ministry official, Bonn, 6 June 1994. 77. Handelsblatt, 7 Feb. 1992,4, trans. inFBIS, 10 Feb. 1992, 13. 78. Schlor, "German Security Policy," 4; Garton Ash, "Germany's Choice," 79; Hellmann, "Goodbye Bismarck?" 20; and the polling results reported in SZ, 4 Jan. 1991, 1, trans. in FBIS, 4 Jan. 1991, 7, according to which some 70 percent of respondents wanted Germany to be like Sweden or Switzerland. Opinion polls have also consistently shown less than 30 percent of the public believing that Germany is best suited to lead the European Union in defense and security policy. See Asmus, German Strategy, 59-60, and Asmus, "Germany's Geopolitical Maturation: Public Opinion and Security Policy in 1994," 32. 79. See, for example, Kelleher and Fisher, "Germany," 170; Markovits, "Germany," 210; and Christoph Bertram, as cited in Heilbrunn, "Germany's New Right," 44. 80. Asmus, "German Unification," ix. 81. The term appears to have been coined by Volker Riihe in mid-1992, although it has since become common currency. For an early appearance, see Zeit, 17 July 1992, 1, trans. in FBIS, 27 July 1992, 8. 82. Asmus, "Germany in Transition," 8-24.

278

Notes to Pages 67-69

83. Asmus, "Unified Germany," 40 and 44. 84. Ronald Asmus in U.S. Congress, "U.S.-German Relations," 32. See also Stent, "One Germany," 63, and Livingston, "United Germany," 159. 85. Catherine Kelleher in U.S. Congress, "U.S.-German Relations," 36. 86. Ibid., 34. Nevertheless, Minkenberg cautions that the resocialization of the eastern Germans is likely to require considerable time. ("Wall After the Wall," 65.) 87. See also Katzenstein, Cultural Norms, 249. 88. See, for example, Kohl, "Deutschlands Verantwortung," 330, and Kohl, "Vierzig Jahre Bundeswehr," 854. See also Maull, "Germany in the Yugoslav Crisis," 11 7. 89. This argument has been made with particular frequency by Kinkel. See SzS, no. 12 (Dec. 1993), 51; Kinkel, Speech to the German Society for Defence Technology, 9; Kinkel, "Deutsche Aufien- und Sicherheitspolitik," 351; Kinkel, "Deutsche Aufienpolitik," 713; Kinkel, "Bundeswehr," 864; and his remarks to the UN General Assembly, as reported in TWIG, 27 Oct. 1995~ 1. 90. See also Asmus, "Future of German Strategic Thinking," 209-10; Clemens, "Special Kind of Superpower?" 209; and Kohl's remarks as reported in FBIS, 26 June 1995, 11. 91. See, for example, Kohl, "European Security," 4; Kinkel, "Deutsche AuBen- und Sicherheitspolitik," 350; Ruhe, "Mut zur Verantwortung," 171; Herzog, Speech to the German Society for Foreign Affairs, 3; and F AZ, 17 Mar. 1995, trans. in FBIS, 18 Apr. 1995, 14. See also the remarks of opposition leader Hans-Ulrich Klose in Spiegel, 12 Dec. 1994, 24, trans. in FBJS, 13 Dec. 1994, 24. 92. Kinkel, "Erklarung der Bundesregierung zur deutschen Mithilfe," 279; FBIS, 14 May 1993, 8; andFBIS, 14 June 1993, 11. 93. Herzog, Speech to the German Society for Foreign Affairs, 3. 94. Kinkel, "Erkliirung der Bundesregierung zur deutschen Mithilfe," 279, and SPD official Gunter Verheugen, cited in General-Anzeiger, 11 Mar. 1995, 4, trans. in FBIS, 29 Mar. 1995, 19. 95. Lewis J. Edinger has observed that distinctions between governments led by different parties have been "least pronounced in foreign and defense policy." (West German Politics, 180.) See also SchlOr, "German Security Policy," 10; Muller, "German Foreign Policy," 134; Dalton, Politics in Germany, 223; and Schossler and Weede, West German Elite Views, 72. This view was also expressed in the author's confidential interviews with an official in the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung of the Social Democratic Party, Bonn, 7 July 1993, and an official in the parliamentary offices of the Social Democratic Party, Bonn, 1 June 1994. 96. See, especially, the remarks of Social Democratic Party leader Rudolf

Notes to Pages 69-75

279

Scharping as reported in WP, 11 Apr. 1994, A10, and FBIS, 13 Apr. 1994, 12. 97. For details of this security policy consensus, see in particular Scharping, "For a New Strategy"; Scharping, "Challenges and Choices"; FAZ, 30 Apr. 1994, 6, trans. inFBIS, 2 May 1994, 12; andHandelsblatt, 2 May 1994, 2, trans. in FBIS, 3 May 1994, 12-13. 98. Kohl, "Aufgaben deutscher Politik," 446. See also Asmus, "Germany After the Gulf War," 26, and Clemens, "Opportunity or Obligation?" 241. 99. It should be briefly noted, as discussed at greater length in Chapter Six, that most German leaders would deny that any conflict exists between their respective efforts on behalf of these various institutions. Rather, they have argued that the institutions are potentially, if not actually, highly complementary. 100. It should be noted that the German security policy process was unchanged by unification. 101. The following description draws on Dalton, Politics in Germany, chap. 10; Conradt, German Polity, chap. 6; Kelleher and Fisher, "Germany"; G. Smith, "Resources"; and Mayntz, "Executive Leadership." See also Haftendom, "West Germany." 102. See also Katzenstein, Policy and Politics, 23. 103. Kelleher and Fisher, "Germany," 176. 104. Dalton, Politics in Germany, 333. 105. T.-D. Young, "German National Command Structures," 382. 106. See, especially, Wilker, "Foreign Policy," and Schafer and von Stechow, "Control of Security Policy." 107. The Bundestag is also responsible for determining when a state of war exists. (Wilker, "Foreign Policy," 396.) 108. Thirty-one amendments were approved between 1949 and 1985 alone. 109. Kommers, "Federal Constitutional Court." 110. Party discipline itself has its roots in German electoral laws and party procedures for establishing candidate lists, which make it easy for top party officials to punish insubordinate office holders. Nevertheless, party members are not formally required to vote the party line. 111. Mayntz, "Executive Leadership," 147. 112. Doring and Smith, eds., Party Government, 6, and Thaysen, "Bundesrat," 8; Risse-Kappen, "Ideas," 187 and 211; Clemens, "Opportunity or Obligation?" 240; Clemens, "Special Kind of Superpower?" 200 and 212; and Asmus, "Future of German Strategic Thinking," 212. See also the analysis in WP, 21 Mar. 1993, Cl. 113. Doring and Smith, eds., Party Government, 5, and Katzenstein, Policy and Politics, 39. The rise of the Green Party in the 1980s and 1990s has

280

Notes to Pages 75-81

forced the traditionally center-left Social Democratic Party to compete for votes on the left, but its attempts to do so have tended to weaken its electoral performance. The percentage of the vote received by the SPD in federal · elections declined steadily after 1980 and did not rise again until1994, when the party once again had a centrist leader. 114. The Christian Social Union (CSU) is the Bavarian wing of the CDU. Although the CSU maintains a separate identity, it forms a single parliamentary group with the CDU in the Bundestag. 115. Schweigler, West German Foreign Policy, 82. 116. Katzenstein, Policy and Politics, 40-41 and 81, and Asmus, "Future of German Strategic Thinking," 212. This system could face a major challenge in 1998, if the FDP fails to receive less than 5 percent of the vote in the federal elections scheduled at that time. But given the shifting positions of the SPD and Greens, both of which have moved toward the political center in recent years, the consequences of such a development might be minimal. 117. G. Smith, "Resources," 56.

Part Two 1. SPD, "Neue Perspektiven." 2. Address to the Bundestag, broadcast on ZDF, 13 Jan. 1994, trans. in FBIS, 13 Jan. 1994, 15. 3. Kohl, "Biindnis- und Einsatzfahigkeit," 609. 4. Kinkel, "NATO Requires," 9. See also Kinkel, "Das Konzept einer 'erweiterten Sicherheit,'" FR, 16 Dec. 1993, 12, reprinted in SzS, no. 1 (Jan. 1994), 15, and Welt, 30 Nov. 1994, 7, trans. in FBIS, 30 Nov. 1994, 19. 5. See, for example, Kohl, "Bedeutung," 78; Kinkel, Speech to the German Society for Defence Technology, 9; Volker Riihe, in FAZ, 10 Sept. 1993, 12, trans. in FBIS, 13 Sept. 1993, 19; and Schafer, "Perspektiven deutscher AuJ3enpolitik," 666. 6. See especially Kinkel, "Konzept einer 'erweiterten Sicherheit."' But see also Kinkel, "Deutsche AuJ3en- und Sicherheitspolitik," 350; Riihe, in FAZ, 10 Sept. 1993, 12, trans. in FBIS, 13 Sept. 1993, 19; and Herzog, Speech to the German Society for Foreign Affairs, 3. 7. See, for example, Mahnke, "Wandel irn Wandel," 40. 8. These efforts correspond to the pursuit of "milieu goals," as discussed by Wolfers in Discord and Collaboration, 74-76. 9. Kinkel, "Konzept einer 'erweiterten Sicherheit."' See also Kinkel, Speech to the Bundeswehr Leadership Academy (in German), Hamburg, 9 Nov. 1993, reprinted in SzS, no. 12 (Dec. 1993), 51, and FAZ, 4 Mar. 1994, 2, trans. in FBIS, 7 Mar. 1994, 14. 10. The principal exception involved U.S. attempts in the early 1980s to

Notes to Pages 83-86

281

obtain a German military contribution to American preparations for defending the Persian Gulf. See Kupchan, Persian Gulf

Chapter Five EPIGRAPH: Kinkel, "Bundeswehr," 862.

1. Brandt, "Berlin City Hall Speech," 44. 2. See, for example, the remarks of Klaus Kinkel, as cited in SZ, 5 Apr. 1995, 2, trans. in FBIS, 5 Apr. 1995, 8. The importance of this task has also been underscored in (and by) the federal government's detailed annual reports to the Bundestag on the status of arms control and disarmament efforts. The term "essential" was used by a German Foreign Ministry official in an interview with the author, Bonn, 7 June 1994. 3. It is often hard to identify and, especially, to quantify Germany's specific contributions, since it has often worked behind the scenes while maintaining a low profile to achieve its goals. 4. The principal determinants of this aspect of German security policy are discussed at greater length in the conclusion of the chapter. 5. See the reported remarks by Chancellor Helmut Kohl in DPA, 27 Jan. 1992, trans. in FBIS, 28 Jan. 1992, 2, and in Spiegel, 23 Jan. 1992, trans. in FBIS, 29 Jan. 1992, 5; and by former Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher in DPA, 14 Jan. 1992, trans. in FBIS, 14 Jan. 1992, 11, and in SZ, 23 Jan. 1992, 6, trans. in FBIS, 23 Jan. 1992, 13. Indeed, former Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg once warned that former Soviet nuclear experts were being recruited by Third World countries. (DPA, 8 Feb. 1992, trans. in FBIS, 10 Feb. 1992, 12.) 6. Deutscher Bundestag, "Bericht zur Rustungskontrolle und Abrustung 1992," 36. For early detailed analyses of the proliferation problems posed by the collapse of the Soviet Union, see J. Krause, "Risks of Nuclear Proliferation," and Umbach, "Control and Security." 7. See Genscher's remarks to the Bundestag on March 13, 1991, trans. in FBIS, 14 Mar. 1991, 22; FAZ, 7 Sept. 1991, 4, trans. in FBJS, 9 Sept. 1991, 8; and Kinkel, "Abriistung," 369-70. 8. Kinkel, "Abriistung," 369. 9. See, for example, Kohl's remarks in TWIG, 31 Jan. 1992, 1. 10. DF, 6 Oct. 1993, trans. in FBIS, 7 Oct. 1993, 2; Auswiirtiges Amt, "Report on Arms Control," 22; Kinkel, "Starkung der KSZE," 412; SZ, 31 Dec. 1994,6, trans. inFBIS, 4 Jan. 1995, 11; and Kinkel, "Abriistung," 36970. 11. See, for example, Kohl, "Grundsatze der Politik," 124 7; Kohl, "Regierungserklarung des Bundeskanzlers," 1406; and Kohl, "Unsere Verantwortung," 74.

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Notes to Pages 86--88

12. See, for example, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, "Six Points for Further Disarmament Following the Disintegration of the Soviet Union," Welt am Sonntag, 6 Jan. 1992, 9, trans. in FBIS, 8 Jan. 1992, 8. 13. For Kohl's views, see FR, 24 Nov. 1990, 1, trans. in FBIS, 26 Nov. 1990, 9, and Kohl, "Unsere Verantwortung," 74; for those of Genscher, see Genscher, "Vision fur das ganze Europa," 92; and for those of Stoltenberg, see FAZ, 7 Dec. 1990, 5, trans. in FBIS, 10 Dec. 1990, 18. It should be stressed that German officials never called for the elimination of all nuclear weapons in the theater. Rather, they recognized the need for the continued presence in Europe of a minimum stock of American systems, which could take the form of nuclear-capable aircraft, in order to counter the residual nuclear potential of the Soviet republics and to hedge against the risk of nuclear proliferation. See, for example, the remarks of Stoltenberg in DPA, 14 Oct. 1991, trans. in FBIS, 15 Oct. 1991, 12-13, and Welt, 16 Oct. 1991, 8, trans. inFBIS, 17 Oct. 1991,4. 14. See the remarks of Hans-Dietrich Genscher, as reported in FBIS, 3 Sept. 1991, 8, and FBIS, 5 Sept. 1991, 10. 15. Author's interview with a German Defense Ministry official, Bonn, 16 July 1993. 16. Deutscher Bundestag, "Bericht zur Riistungskontrolle und Abriistung 1992," 24; Kinkel, "German 10-Point Initiative"; BPA, Bericht zur Rustungskontrolle und Abriistung 1994, 22; and author's interview with a German Foreign Ministry official, Bonn, 7 June 1994. 17. BPA, Bericht zur Riistungskontrolle und Abriistung 1994, 24, and author's interviews with a German Defense Ministry official, Bonn, 16 July 1993, and a German Foreign Ministry official, Bonn, 7 June 1994. 18. Author's interview with a German Foreign Ministry official, Bonn, 7 June 1994. 19. See, for example, DPA, 16 Jan. 1992, trans. in FBIS, 17 Jan. 1992, 78; DPA, 10 Feb. 1992, trans. in FBIS, 10 Feb. 1992, 1; and TWIG, 31 Jan. 1992, 1. 20. TWIG, 21 Feb. 1992, 1, and Genscher, "Historische Verantwortung," 219. 21. Deutscher Bundestag, "Bericht zur Riistungskontrolle und Abriistung 1992," 37, and Auswartiges Amt, "Report on Arms Control," 59-60. 22. Muller et al., "From Black Sheep," 45. 23. See, for example, Kinkel, Statement at the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly. 24. Kinkel, "German 10-Point Initiative," 2; Kinkel, "Deutsche AuBenund Sicherheitspolitik," 351; FAZ, 12 Apr. 1995, 1-2, trans. in FBIS, 13 Apr. 1995, 17-18; Kinkel, "Verlangerung des Atomwaffenvertrages," 265-66;

Notes to Pages 88-90

283

and author's interview with a German Defense Ministry official, Bonn, 16 July 1993. 25. For details, see Auswartiges Amt, "Report on Arms Control," 38, and BPA, Bericht zur Rustungskontrolle und Abrilstung 1994, 45. Also, author's interview with a German Foreign Ministry official, Bonn, 7 June 1994. 26. Auswartiges Amt, "Report on Arms Control," 9, and Kinkel, "German 10-Point Initiative." For a summary of the initiative, see also FBIS, 16 Dec. 1993, 25. 27. FR, 15-17 Apr. 1995, 5, trans. in FBIS, 19 Apr. 1995, 6; FAZ, 12 Apr. 1995, 1-2, trans. in FBIS, 13 Apr. 1995, 17-18; SZ, 19 Apr. 1995, 4, trans. in FBIS, 20 Apr. 1995, 13; and BPA, Bericht zur Rustungskontrolle und Abrustung 1994, 10 and 27. 28. Kinkel, "VerUingerung des Atomwaffenvertrages," 266. 29. See for example, Kohl, "Regierungserklarung des Bundeskanzlers," 1406; Genscher, "Six Points for Further Disarmament," Welt am Sonntag, 6 Jan. 1~92, 9, trans. in FBIS, 8 Jan. 1992, 8; and Klaus Kinkel's remarks as reported in DPA, 4 Sept. 1992, trans. in FBIS, 8 Sept. 1992, 17. Also, author's interview with a German Foreign Ministry official, Bonn, 7 June 1994. 30. Genscher, "Historische Verantwortung," 217-20. 31. Author's interview with a German Foreign Ministry official, Bonn, 1 June 1994. 32. See, for example, Deutscher Bundestag, "Bericht zur Rustungskontrolle und Abriistung 1992," 25. The full text of the agreement is printed in Bulletin, no. 44 (26 May 1993). 33. This assistance amounted to approximately DM 5 million in both 1993 and 1994. (BPA, Bericht zur Riistungskontrolle und Abriistung 1994, 25, and author's interviews with a German Embassy official, Washington, D.C., 25 Feb. 1994, and a German Foreign Ministry official, Bonn, 7 June 1994.) 34. A comprehensive description and analysis is provided in Muller et al., "From Black Sheep." 35. Muller et al., "From Black Sheep," i. Further details of the involvement of German companies in Iraqi nuclear and chemical arms programs are provided in Zeit, 25 Jan. 1991, 31, trans. in FBIS, 4 Mar. 1991, 15-18; Welt am Sonntag, 31 Mar. 1991, 1-2, trans. in FBIS, 4 Apr. 1991, 10-11; Spiegel, 8 Apr. 1991, 28-29, trans. in FBIS, 9 Apr., 1991, 18-20; and SZ, 18-19 Jan. 1992, 1, trans. inFBIS, 21 Jan. 1992, 13-14. 36. The measures adopted through late 1990 are detailed in Handelsblatt, 14 Nov. 1990, 10, trans. in FBIS, 26 Nov. 1990, 10-13. 37. SZ, 13-14 Oct. 1990, 2, trans. in FBIS, 18 Oct. 1990, 15, and FBIS, 24 Jan. 1991, 14.

284

Notes to Pages 90--91

38. The European Community formally became the European Union in November 1993. 39. SZ, 12 Oct. 1991,6, trans. inFBIS, 16 Oct. 1991,6. 40. FAZ, 7 Mar. 1994, 15, trans. in FBIS, 8 Mar. 1994,26. 41. Handelsblatt, 1 Sept. 1994, 5, trans. in FBIS, 2 Sept. 1994, 18; FAZ, 2 Sept. 1994, 1, trans. inFBIS, 2 Sept. 1994, 19; andFAZ, 5 Sept. 1994, 15 and 17, trans. in FBIS, 9 Sept. 1994, 23. The German Association of Industry (BDI) had begun to seek a loosening of the new export regulations as early as the spring of 1992. (Spiegel, 11 May 1992, 16, trans. in FBIS, 13 May 1992, 24.) 42. See, for example, FAZ, 14 Apr. 1994, 6, trans. inFBIS, 15 Apr. 1994,

13. 43. See, for example, Kohl, "A Message of Trust from the Summit," SZ (Munich Economic Summit Supplement), 3 July 1992, 3, trans. in FBIS, 6 July 1992, 2; Genscher's remarks in the Bundestag, 22 Nov. 1990, trans. in FBIS, 23 Nov. 1990, 28, and as reported in DPA, 30 Dec. 1990, trans. in FBIS, 31 Dec. 1990, 8; Kinkel, Speech to the Council on Foreign Relations, 3; and Riihe, "Von der nationalen Verteidigung," 721. 44. See, for example, Genscher's remarks in the Bundestag, 13 Mar. 1991, trans. in FBIS, 14 Mar. 1991, 22, and those reported in FAZ, 21 May 1991, 2, trans. in FBIS, 23 May 1991, 5. 45. Kohl, "Zukunft," 247; Kohl, "Verantwortung," 513; Kohl, "Den Reformproze6," 249; Kohl, "Biindnis- und Einsatzfahigkeit," 610; and Kohl, "Fur ein gemeinsames Europa," 747. 46. Kinkel, "Politik," 201. For similar statements, see Kinkel, Statement at the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly; Kinkel, Speech to the German Society for Defence Technology; Kinkel, "Deutsche Au6en- und Sicherheitspolitik," 350; FR, 6 Dec. 1994, 5, trans. in FBIS, 7 Dec. 1994, 16; Das Parlament, 8 Sept. 1995, 2, trans. in FBIS, 14 Sept. 1995, 14; and Kinkel, Address to the Assembly of the American Jewish Committee, 3. 47. Riihe, "Verantwortung Deutschlands," 43. For similar statements, see Riihe, "Euro-Atlantic Security"; Riihe, "Zentrum," 542--43; N-TV, 15 Sept. 1993, trans. in FBIS, 16 Sept. 1993, 11; Riihe, "Mut zur Verantwortung," 169-70; and Riihe, "Neue NATO," 340--41. 48. Asmus, Kugler, and Larrabee, "Building a New NATO," 34; Garton Ash, "Germany's Choice," 76; and author's interviews with a high-level German Foreign Ministry official, Bonn, 6 June 1994, and an official in the Chancellor's Office, Bonn, 21 June 1994. 49. Riihe, "Mut zur Verantwortung," 170. 50. Author's interview with a high-level German Foreign Ministry official, Bonn, 6 June 1994.

Notes to Pages 91-93

285

51. Handelsblatt, 28 Aug. 1991, 3, trans. in FBIS, 29 Aug. 1991, 5; ARD, 20 Aug. 1993, trans. in FBIS, 23 Aug. 1993, 16; and AFP, 27 Jan. 1994, in FBIS, 28 Jan. 1994, 1. Genscher once described the threat of refugees as possibly a greater danger to stability than was the Red Army during the Cold War. (FBIS, 5 Sept. 1991, 10.) Likewise, Kohl has argued that the danger of refugee flows overshadows all previous concerns about the influx of asylum seekers from the developing world. (Kohl, "Rolle Deutschlands," 244.) 52. Mihalka, "Squaring the Circle," 8; Schwarz, "Germany's National and European Interests," 101; CDU/CSU Press Release, "Reflections on European Policy," 1 Sept. 1994, trans. in FBIS, 6 Sept. 1994, 19; and FAZ, 17 Mar. 1995, 8-9, trans. in FBIS, 18 Apr. 1995, 12. 53. See, for example, ZDF, 5 July 1992, trans. in FBIS, 6 July 1992, 7; AFP, 25 Mar. 1993, in FBIS, 25 Mar. 1993, 10; and Kohl, "Den Reformprozei3," 249. 54. Genscher interview with ZDF, 11 July 1991, trans. in FBIS, 12 July 1991, 18. 55. FAZ, 16 Dec. 1992, quoted in TWIG, 18 Dec. 1992,3. 56. See, for example, Riihe, "Europiiische Sicherheit," 254; FAZ, 13 May 1994, 1-2, trans. in FBJS, 16 May 1994, 7; and Kohl, "Aufbruch in die Zukunft," 991. 57. Handelsblatt, 24 Apr. 1995, B5, trans. in FBIS, 25 Apr. 1995, 18; Tageszeitung, 18 Oct. 1995, 14-15, trans. in FBIS, 23 Oct. 1995, 9; and Kinkel, Address to the Assembly of the American Jewish Committee, 3. 58. WP, 4 May 1992, A19. 59. GIC, "German Support." According to another estimate, German assistance to the former Soviet Union amounted to nearly DM 109 billion ($70 billion) between 1990 and late 1996. (TWIG, 11 Oct. 1996, 2.) 60. In 1990, Germany gave the Soviet Union a balance-of-payments credit of DM 5 billion, with no interest payments due for 12 years, and a DM 3 billion interest-free credit to finance the Soviet share of the costs of stationing troops in and withdrawing them from Germany. The waived interest payments were worth an estimated DM 4.2 billion. Germany also provided DM 33.2 billion to the Soviet Union and the Commonwealth of Independent States in export guarantees over the five-year period 1989-1994 and significantly eased the conditions attached to them. See NYT, 23 June 1990, 1; FAZ, 8 Nov. 1990, 17, trans. in FBIS, 14 Nov. 1990, 15; SZ, 7 Dec. 1990, 33, trans. in FBIS, 10 Dec. 1990, 17; Auswiirtiges Amt, Deutsche Aufienpolitik, 545; and GIC, "German Support," 2. 61. In December 1992, German offered Russia an eight-year moratorium on the repayment of the DM 17.6 billion transfer ruble balance, with no accrual of interest. The cost of this arrangement to Germany through 1994 was

286

Notes to Pages 93-94

estimated at DM 5.7 billion. (TWIG, 15 Dec. 1992, 2; WP, 17 Dec. 1992, A40; NYT, 17 Dec. 1992, Al4; Europa-Archiv, no. 5 [1993], D97; and GIC, "German Support.") Between 1993 and 1995, Germany signed three more bilateral rescheduling agreements that allowed Russia to defer repayment of a total of DM 17.2 billion in liabilities for 10 to 15 years. (Hoehmann and Meier, "Halifax G-7 Summit," 56; TWIG, 1 Oct. 1993, 5; and TWIG, 29 Sept. 1995, 5.) 62. Germany provided an additional DM 700 million for the support of the Soviet forces during the last part of 1990. For a complete breakdown, see Auswartiges Amt, Deutsche Auj3enpolitik, 453. See also GIC, "U.S. Troops." 63. NYT, 17 Dec. 1992, Al4, and Kohl and Yeltsin, "Gemeinsame Erklarung," 1265-66. 64. GIC, "German Support," 1. 65. For an overview, see Davis and Dombrowski, "Appetite of the Wolf," 1-22. 66. GIC, "German Support." According to another estimate, German assistance to the region totaled DM 50.4 billion ($33 billion) between 1990 and late 1996. See TWIG, 11 Oct. 1996, 2. 67. In 1990, Germany allowed Poland to repay DM 3 billion in debt, due by early 1991, over 14 years. (DPA, 30 July 1990, trans. in FBIS, 30 July 1990, 4.) And in 1992, Germany agreed to write off half of Poland's debt of DM 9.1 billion and to reschedule repayment of the balance over 18 years. (TWIG, 3 Apr. 1992, 2.) 68. According to a 1990 estimate, 1.3 million eastern German jobs depended on trade with the Soviet Union. (SZ, 7 Dec. 1990, 33, trans. in FBIS, 10 Dec. 1990, 17.) 69. Former Economics Minister Ji.irgen Mollemann once stated that a farreaching limitation of government-backed export guarantees could spell the end of many eastern German companies. (SZ, 23 Jan. 1992, 25, trans. in FBIS, 24 Jan. 1992, 9. See also DPA, 3 Dec. 1992, trans. in FBIS, 3 Dec. 1992, 13, and Welt, 10 Aug. 1993, 11, trans. in FBIS, 12 Aug. 1993, 14.) 70. According to one estimate, as of September 1991, the Commonwealth of Independent States owed German banks a total of DM 39.6 billion while other Central and East European states owed another DM 23.3 billion. (FAZ, 14 Jan. 1992, 9, trans. in FBIS, 15 Jan. 1992, 7.) 71. Kohl repeatedly stated that Germany opposed any cancellation of the Russian debt. See FAZ, 27 Mar. 1993, 1 and 2, trans. in FBIS, 29 Mar. 1993, 1,andFAZ,29Mar.l993, 12,trans.inFBIS,30Mar.l993, 15. 72. See, for example, SZ, 27 Jan. 1992, 19, trans. inFBIS, 28 Jan. 1992,3. 73. For details, see SZ, 29 July 1994, 23, trans. in FBIS, 4 Aug. 1994, 89, and Handelsblatt, 18 Oct. 1995, 8, trans. in FBIS, 20 Oct. 1995, 14.

Notes to Pages 94-96

287

Overall, 25 percent of all direct foreign investment in the region has come from Germany, second only to the share that comes from the United States (29 percent). (WP, 17 May 1994, A25.) And in at least one country, the Czech Republic, the German share (30 percent) has been the largest. (Hand!, "Germany in Central Europe," 3.) In 1995, moreover, trade with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe reached 9 percent of the German total, which exceeded the share of German trade (7 percent) conducted with the United States. (TWIG, 7 June 1996, 5.) 74. At that time, Germany had already given or promised over DM 90 billion, including more than DM 60 billion for the Soviet Union, since 1989. See WP, 23 Aug. 1991, A26, and Kohl, "ErkUirung der Bundesregierung zur Lage und Entwicklung in der Sowjetunion," 751. 75. See, for example, Kohl, "Sicherheitsinteressen Deutschlands," 101-5, and Kohl, "European Security." 76. Kohl, "Erklarung der Bundesregierung zur Lage und Entwicklung in der Sowjetunion," 751. See also Kohl in SZ (Munich Economic Summit Supplement), 3 July 1992, 3, trans. in FBIS, 6 July 1992, 3, and in FAZ, 11 Mar. 1993, 2, trans. in FBIS, 11 Mar. 1993, 10, and Genscher's remarks cited in Zeit, 30 Aug. 1991, 5-6, trans. in FBJS, 3 Sept. 1991, 10, and in FBIS, 5 Sept. 1991, 10. 77. See, for example, Kohl, "Erklarung der Bundesregierung zur Lage und Entwicklung in der Sowjetunion," 751; Kohl "European Security," 8; and the comments of Finance Minister Theodor Waigel as reported in SZ, 13-14 July 1991, 1, trans. inFBIS, 17 July 1991, 16. 78. GIC, "Stabilization." 79. See, for example, NYT, 14 Jan. 1991, AS. 80. These figures are taken or calculated from information published in GIC, "German Support." 81. FBIS, 25 May 1991, 10; FBIS, 10 July 1991, 5; and WP, 22 Aug. 1991, A20. 82. See, for example, TWIG, 8 May 1992, 1. 83. WP, 9 July 1993, A18. 84. Handelsblatt, 27 July 1992, 10, trans. in FBIS, 31 July 1992, 12. 85. TWIG, 15 Dec. 1992, 2, and NYT, 17 Dec. 1992, A14. 86. FBIS, 6 Apr. 1993, 6, and FAZ, 5 Apr. 1993, 13, trans. in FBIS, 6 Apr. 1993, 6-7. 87. FAZ, 6 June 1994, 15, and Hoehmann and Meier, "Halifax G-7 Summit," 55. 88. GIC, "German Support," 2. See also Kohl, "European Security," 8; Genscher in DPA, 9 July 1991, trans. in FBIS, 10 July 1991, 5; and author's interview with a German Embassy official, Washington, D.C., 25 Feb. 1994.

288

Notes to Pages 96-97

89. Kinkel, "Politik," 202, and the remarks of Economics Minister Gunther Rexrodt as cited in TWIG, 30 Apr. 1993, 5. 90. Kohl, "Den Reformprozefi," 250. 91. TWIG, 21 July 1995, 5, and FBIS, 18 July 1995, 3. 92. TWIG, 20 Sept. 1991, 4; Gower, "EC Relations," 288-93; FBIS, 5 June 1991, 13-14; and Garton Ash, In Europe's Name, 398. The negotiations are described in Nicolaidis, "East European Trade," 223-29. 93. North Atlantic Assembly, "Reality to EU Enlargement," 3 and 6. 94. See GIC, "Stabilization"; WP, 17 Apr. 1994, A30; and ZDF, 7 Dec. 1995, trans. inFBIS, 7 Dec. 1995, 16. 95. Author's interview with a U.S. State Department official, Washington, D.C., 10 May 1993. 96. Kinkel, "Deutsche Aufien- und Sicherheitspolitik," 351. 97. See NYT, 14 Dec. 1990, AI; TWIG, 12 July 1991, 2; TWIG, 19 July 1991, 1; Welt am Sonntag, 7 July 1991, 1-2, trans. in FBIS, 8 July 1991, 13; and SZ, 13-14 July 1991, I, trans. in FBIS, 17 July 1991, 16. 98. TWIG, 31 May 1991, 1; TWIG, 14 Feb. 1992, 1; TWIG, 13 May 1994, 1; Kinkel, "Politik," 201; FAZ, 21 Dec. 1993, 3, trans. in FBIS, 22 Dec. 1993, 11; AFP, 27 Jan. 1994, in FBIS, 28 Jan. 1994, I; Kinkel, "Deutsche Aufien- und Sicherheitspolitik," 351; FAZ, 13 May 1994, 1-2, trans. in FBIS, 16 May 1994, 7; WP, 17 May 1994, A17; WP, 18 Feb. 1996, C7; WP, 30 May 1996, A31; and Hoehmann and Meier, "Halifax G-7 Summit," 59. 99. See TWIG, 10 Jan. 1992, I, and 20 Mar. 1992, 1; Kinkel, "Deutsche Aui3en- und Sicherheitspolitik," 351; and WP, 25 June 1994, Al8. 100. FAZ, II May 1994, 1-2, trans. in FBIS, 12 May 1994, 10; FAZ, 9 July 1994, 3, trans. in FBIS, 12 July 1994, 18; and Kohl, "Fiir ein gemeinsames Europa," 746. 101. See, especially, Kohl, "Unsere Verantwortung," 73, and Kohl, "Rolle Deutschlands," 247. 102. See, for example, Kohl, "Germany's Security Interests," 9-10, and Kinkel, "Deutsche Aui3en- und Sicherheitspolitik," 350. 103. Kinkel, "Aktuelle Fragen der Europapolitik, insbesondere Vorschau," 458, and Kinkel, Address to the Assembly of the American Jewish Committee, 3. 104. See, for example, Kohl, as quoted in Mihalka, "Squaring the Circle," 9; Kinkel in Welt, 30 Nov. 1994, 7, trans. in FBIS, 30 Nov. 1994, 20; and Kinkel, "Bundeswehr," 863. 105. For Kohl's views, see Handelsblatt, 24 Apr. 1995, B4, trans. in FBIS, 25 Apr. 1995, 19. For those ofGenscher, see FBIS, 12 July 1991, 17; FBIS, 5 Sept. 1991, 10; TWIG, 22 Nov. 1991, 1, and 20 Mar. 1992, 1; and WP, 17 Apr. 1994, A30. And for those of Kinkel, see Kinkel, "New Chal-

Notes to Pages 97-99

289

lenges," 4; FR, 6 Dec. 1994, 5, trans. in FBIS, 7 Dec. 1994, 17; Das Parlament, 8 Sept. 1995, 2, trans. in FBIS, 14 Sept. 1995, 14; and Kinkel, "Eine gerechte und dauerhafte Friedensordnung," 96. 106. Das Parlament, 19 June 1994, 10, trans. in FBIS, 17 June 1994, 10. See alsoHandelsblatt, 9 June 1994,7, trans. inFBIS, 13 June 1994, 19; The European, 17-23 June 1994, 9, in FBIS, 16 June 1994, 13; and Kinkel, "Bundeswehr," 863. 107. See Kinkel, "Deutsche Prasidentschaft," 594; Kinkel, "Central Issues," 4; and FBIS, 7 Dec. 1995, 16. 108. Gower, "EC Relations," 291-92. See also TWIG, 22 Nov. 1991, I. 109. See, for example, TWIG, 21 June 1991, 2; TWIG, 7 Feb. 1992, 2; TWIG, 3 Apr. 1992, 1; Garton Ash, In Europe's Name, 398; and Anderson and Goodman, "Mars or Minerva?" 39. 110. See, for example, Kohl, "30. Jahrestag," 59. 111. Kinkel, "Das Konzept einer 'erweiterten Sicherheit, "' FR, 16 Dec. 1993, 12, reprinted in SzS, no. 1 (Jan. 1994), 15. See also Le Monde, 27 May 1994, 1 and5, trans. inFBIS, 31 May 1994,9. 112. WP, 17 Apr. 1994, A30, and Kinkel, "Germany in Europe," 3-4. 113. Le Monde, 27 May 1994, 1 and 5, trans. in FBIS, 31 May 1994, 9; Handelsblatt, 9 June 1994, 7, trans. in FBIS, 13 June 1994, 19; FAZ, 21 June 1994, 1-2, trans. in FBIS, 22 June 1994, 18; Kinkel, "Deutsche Prasidentschaft," 594; and Welt, 5 Nov. 1994, 3, trans. in FBIS, 7 Nov. 1994, 16. 114. FAZ, 1 July 1994, 12, trans. inFBIS, 5 July 1994, 17; FAZ, 6 July 1994, 4, trans. in FBIS, 7 July 1994, 18; Das Parlament, 5 Aug. 1994, 15, trans. in FBIS, 8 Aug. 1994, 5; Financial Times, 21 Sept. 1994, 2, in FBIS, 22 Sept. 1994, 3; and Kohl, "Aufbruch in die Zukunft," 991. 115. At German urging, the EC also agreed to conclude association agreements with the three Baltic states. For details, see FR, 29 Nov. 1994, 2, trans. in FBIS, 30 Nov. 1994, 6; Welt, 12 Dec. 1994, 2, trans. in FBIS, 13 Dec. 1994, 26; WP, 17 Dec. 1994, A35 and A37; and Handelsblatt, 30-31 Dec. 1994, 5, trans. in FBIS, 3 Jan. 1995, 18. 116. Kinkel, "Bilanz," 1092, and North Atlantic Assembly, "Reality to EU Enlargement," 12. 117. FBIS, 29 Nov. 1994, 4, and FR, 29 Nov. 1994, 2, trans. in FBIS, 30 Nov. 1994, 6. 118. FR, 15 June 1994, 2, trans. in FBIS, 16 June 1994, 2; The European, 17-23 June 1994, 9, in FBIS, 16 June 1994, 13; Zeit, 1 July 1994, 12, trans. in FBIS, 5 July 1994, 16; FBIS, 26 Sept. 1994, 6; FBIS, 22 Nov. 1994, 15; FR, 6 Dec. 1994,5, trans. inFBIS, 7 Dec. 1994, 17; FBIS, 12 Dec. 1994, 13 and 31; Welt, 12 Dec. 1994, 2, trans. in FBIS, 13 Dec. 1994, 26; FBIS, 15 Dec. 1994, 7; Kinkel, "Bilanz," 1092; Handelsblatt, 24 Apr. 1995, B4, trans.

290

Notes to Pages 99-101

in FBIS, 25 Apr. 1995, 19; FBIS, 26 June 1995, 13; and Kohl, "Aktuelle Fragen," 1115. 119. Ischinger, "From Extended Deterrence." Ischinger was director of the Policy Planning Staff in the German Foreign Ministry. 120. TWIG, 16 Apr. 1994, 2; DPA, 11 Nov. 1993, trans. in FBIS, 12 Nov. 1993, 22; Welt am Sonntag, 27 Mar. 1994, 25 and 27, trans. in FBIS, 29 Mar. 1994, 16; and Riihe, "Europaische Sicherheit," 255. 121. DF, 24 Mar. 1992, trans. in FBIS, 25 Mar. 1992, 17; FBIS, 26 Jan. 1993, 13; Welt am Sonntag, 7 Aug. 1994, 2, trans. in FBIS, 9 Aug. 1994, 24; FAZ, 16 Sept. 1994, 4, trans. in FBIS, 19 Sept. 1994, 14-15; Riihe, "Frieden und Stabilitat," 634; and Das Parlament, 8 Sept. 1995, 5, trans. in FBIS, 12 Sept. 1995, 11. 122. "Gemeinsame Erklarung der Verteidigungsminister von Polen, Deutschland und Frankreich," Bulletin, no. 22 (7 Mar. 1994), 208; FAZ, 13 May 1994,2, trans. inFB1S, 17 May 1994, 1; andFB/S, 18 Aug. 1995, 1. 123. FBIS, 5 June 1992, 2, and FAZ, 22 June 1992, 2, trans. in FBIS, 10 July 1992, 16. 124. FBIS, 18 Nov. 1993, 10; ARD, 24 Nov. 1993, trans. in FBIS, 26 Nov. 1993, 20; ZDF, 13 Jan. 1994, trans. in FBIS, 14 Jan. 1994, 4; FBIS, 11 May 1994, 2; and Le Monde, 27 May 1994, 1 and 5, trans. in FBIS, 31 May 1994, 9. 125. Kinkel, "Erklarung vor dem WEU-Ministerrat," 409. For Kinkel's views, see also FR, 16 Dec. 1993, 12, trans. in FBIS, 17 Dec. 1993, 17; FAZ, 21 Dec. 1993, 3, trans. in FBIS, 22 Dec. 1993, 11; and Kinkel, "Deutsche Aufien- und Sicherheitspolitik," 350. 126. Author's interview with a German Defense Ministry official, Bonn, 12 July 1993. 127. See DF, 24 Mar. 1991, trans. in FBIS, 25 Mar. 1991, 21; DF, 31 Mar. 1991, trans. in FBIS, 1 Apr. 1991, 6; and FAZ, 4 Apr. 1991, 6, trans. in FBIS, 8 Apr. 1991, 10. 128. Menon, Forster, and Wallace, "Common European Defence?" 11112. 129. Author's interviews with a German Embassy official, Washington, D.C., 3 Dec. 1992, and a U.S. State Department official, Washington, D.C., 10 May 1993. Germany was also supportive of the idea because it was seen as reviving NATO while being complementary to, rather than conflicting with, the CSCE. The new forum would be limited to NATO and former Warsaw Pact states, and it would be less political in nature, focusing on military aspects of security. 130. German Embassy, "Statement by Secretary of State James Baker and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher," 5.

Notes to Pages 101-3

291

131. "U.S.-German Joint Statement on the Transatlantic Community," U.S. Department of State Dispatch (7 Oct. 1991), 736-37. 132. See FB!S, 6 Jan. 1992, 1; FBIS, 21 Jan. 1992, 1 and 13; TWIG, 10 Jan. 1992, 1; and Schafer, "Perspektiven deutscher AuBenpolitik." 133. DPA, 7 Jan. 1992, trans. inFBIS, 8 Jan. 1992, 7; FBIS, 21 Jan. 1992, 1 and 13; and TWIG, 13 Mar. 1992, 1. Indeed, at a March 1992 meeting of the NACC, the CIS states promised to adhere to the CFE treaty without further negotiations. (TWIG, 13 Mar. 1992, 3.) 134. Author's interviews with officials in the German Mission to NATO, Brussels, 15-16 June 1994, and Kinkel, "Politik," 202. 135. SzS, no. 12 (Dec. 1993), 38; SZ, 10 Nov. 1993, 2, trans. in FBIS, 10 Nov. 1993, 24; FR, 16 Dec. 1993, 12, trans. in FBIS, 17 Dec. 1993, 15; and ZDF, 13 Jan. 1994, trans. in FBIS, 14 Jan. 1994,4. 136. Kinkel, "NATO Requires," 9. See also DPA, 10 Sept. 1993, trans. in FBIS, 10 Sept. 1993, 30; FAZ, 28 Sept. 1993, 3, trans. in FB!S, 29 Sept. 1993, 4; SZ, 10 Nov. 1993, 2, trans. in FBIS, 10 Nov. 1993, 24; and SzS, no. 12 (Dec. 1993), 38. 137. Author's interviews with officials in the German Mission to NATO, Brussels, 15-16 June 1994. In 1997, the NACC was replaced by the EuroAtlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). 138. See also Handelsblatt, 10 Jan. 1994, 5, trans. in FBIS, 11 Jan. 1994, 25. 139. Leading SPD politician and 1990 chancellor candidate Oskar Lafontaine suggested that NATO offer security guarantees to its former adversaries, especially the Soviet successor states, if they would disarm and put their nuclear weapons under tight control. (FAZ, 16 Jan. 1992, 2, trans. in FBIS, 11 Feb. 1992, 20, and Spiegel, 20 Jan. 1992, 30-32.) In addition, members of Helmut Kohl's party were reported as no longer ruling out NATO membership for the CIS states in the long term as long as they were stable. (DP A, 17 Feb. 1992, trans. inFBIS, 18 Feb. 1992, 14.) 140. See Volker Riihe's criticism of Lafontaine's proposal in Spiegel, 3 Feb. 1992, 30-32, trans. in FBIS, 25 Feb. 1992, 5. 141. Riihe, "Euro-Atlantic Security," 12; Riihe, "Bundeswehr im deutschen und europaischen EinigungsprozeB," 147; Riihe, "Shaping EuroAtlantic Policies," 134-37; Focus, 26 Apr. 1993, 24-25, trans. in FBIS, 28 Apr. 1993, 23; and Riihe, "NATO als Fundament," 494. The quotation is from the last citation. 142. Riihe, "Shaping Euro-Atlantic Policies," 134-35; FB!S, 16 Apr. 1993, 9; and SZ, 19 Apr. 1993, 4, trans. in FBIS, 20 Apr. 1993, 20. 143. In fact, Riihe was the only prominent official to advocate enlargement. (Welt, 12 Jan. 1994, 6, trans. in FBIS, 13 Jan. 1994, 18, and author's

292

Notes to Pages 103-5

interview with an official in the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Sankt Augustin, Germany, 8 June 1994.) 144. FAZ, 8 Sept. 1993,2, trans. inFBIS, 10 Sept. 1993, 34. 145. Author's interview with an official in the parliamentary offices of the Christian Democratic Union, Bonn, 8 June 1994. 146. Kinkel's views can be found in Kinkel, "Rolle Deutschlands," 143; FAZ, 6 Mar. 1993, 5, trans. in FBIS, 9 Mar. 1993, 8-9; Kinkel, "Die transatlantische Partnerschaft," 311-13; FAZ, 11 Sept. 1993, 4, trans. in FBIS, 16 Sept. 1993, 17; Spiegel, 27 Sept. 1993, 23-24, trans. inFBIS, 28 Sept. 1993, 18; and SzS, no. 9 (Sept. 1993), 40. In September 1993, Kinkel proposed bilateral agreements on security policy cooperation with future EC members as an alternative to NATO expansion. (DP A, 10 Sept. 1993, trans. in FBIS, 10 Sept. 1993, 30.) 147. Interview in Der Tagesspiegel, 15 Sept. 1993, 4, trans. in FBIS, 5 Oct. 1993, 20. 148. FBIS, 25 Oct. 1993, 11, and author's interview with a NATO official, Brussels, 15 June 1994. Yeltsin's warning is described in SzS, no. 10 (Oct. 1993), 14, and WP, 6 Oct. 1993, A24. 149. For Kohl's views, see N-TV, 11 Jan. 1994, trans. in FBIS, 12 Jan. 1994, 5; SzS, no. 2 (Feb. 1994), 8; and Kohl, "European Security," 7. For Kinkel's views, see SzS, no. 10 (Oct. 1993), 14-15 and 18; Kinkel, "NATO Requires," 9; SzS, no. 12 (Dec. 1993), 38; Kinkel, "Starkung der Sicherheit," 1221-22; FR, 16 Dec. 1993, 12, trans. in FBIS, 17 Dec. 1993, 17; SzS, no. 1 (Jan. 1994), 23-24; and ZDF, 13 Jan. 1994, trans. in FBIS, 14 Jan. 1994, 3-4. For Rlihe's views, see SzS, no. 10 (Oct. 1993), 17-18; SzS, no. 11 (Nov. 1993), 22; and Welt am Sonntag, 13 Dec. 1993, 4, trans. in FBIS, 15 Dec. 1993, 20. The opposition SPD also endorsed a cautious approach on the issue of NATO expansion. See SPD, "Perspektiven." For the views of SPD leaders, see NYT, 15 Dec. 1993, Al8; Bild, 10 Jan. 1994, 2, trans. in FBIS, II Jan. 1994, 21; and ZDF, 13 Jan. 1994, trans. in FBIS, 13 Jan. 1994, 14. 150. See DPA, 8 Dec. 1993, trans. in FBIS, 8 Dec. 1993, 10; DPA, 8 Dec. 1993, trans. in FBIS, 9 Dec. 1993, 4; Welt am Sonntag, 13 Dec. 1993, 9, trans. in FBIS, 15 Dec. 1993, 19-20; ZDF, 9 Jan. 1994, trans. in FBIS, 10 Jan. 1994, 8-9; and ZDF, 13 Jan. 1994, trans. in FBIS, 14 Jan. 1994, 6. For Kinkel's views, see SzS, no. 10 (Oct. 1993), 14. 151. See, especially, the views of Kinkel in Kinkel, "Bundeswehr," 863; Kinkel, "New Challenges," 4; Das Parlament, 8 Sept. 1995, 2, trans. in FBIS, 14 Sept. 1995, 15; and Kinkel, "Eine gerechte und dauerhafte Friedensordnung," 96, and those of SPD leader Karsten Voigt in Das Parlament, 19 May 1995, 11; FBIS, I June 1995, 2; and Voigt, "German Interest," 111. Also,

Notes to Pages I 05-6

293

author's interviews with a German Embassy official, Washington, D.C., 25 Feb. 1994, and a NATO official, Brussels, 15 June 1994. 152. Mihalka, "Squaring the Circle," 8. 153. Kinkel in Das Parlament, 8 Sept. 1995, 2, trans. in FBJS, 14 Sept. 1995, 14, and author's interview with a German Embassy official, Washington, D.C., 25 Feb. 1994. 154. Kohl, "Sicherheit," 166; Kinkel, "New Challenges," 5-6; Kinkel, "Foreign Policy," 3; Kinkel, "Deutsche AuJ3enpolitik," 714; Kinkel, "Bundeswehr," 863; Riihe, "Neue NATO," 342; WP, 10 Feb. 1995, A28; SZ, 23 Nov. 1994, 1, trans. inFBIS, 25 Nov. 1994, 18; FAZ, 15 Nov. 1994,4, trans. inFBIS, 16 Nov. 1994, 20; Welt, 11-12 Feb. 1995, 6, trans. in FBIS, 14 Feb. 1995, 11; Kinkel article in Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung, 20 Aug. 1995, 4, trans. in FBIS, 23 Aug. 1995, 8; SZ, 12 May 1995, 2, trans. in FBIS, 15 May 1995, 13; FAZ, 17 Mar. 1995, 8-9, trans. inFBIS, 18 Apr. 1995, 12; and Economist, 27 May 1995, 42. 155. Brown, "Flawed Logic," 39. 156. Jim Hoagland, "Countdown for Kohl," WP, 3 Oct. 1996, A29. 157. FAZ, 21 Jan. 1994,3, trans. inFBIS, 24 Jan. 1994, 32; FBIS, 14 Feb. 1994, 42; Welt, 12 Feb. 1994, 3, trans. in FBIS, 14 Feb. 1994, 44; FBIS, 13 July 1994, 18; Kinkel, "Bundeswehr," 863; Welt am Sonntag, 16 Apr. 1995, 25 and 27, trans. in FBIS, 19 Apr. 1995, 8; and SZ, 26 Apr. 1995, 2, trans. in FBIS, 26 Apr. 1995, 11. Also author's interviews with a NATO official, Brussels, 15 June 1994, and an official in the German Mission to NATO, Brussels, 16 June 1994. 158. FAZ, 29 Sept. 1995, 6, trans. inFBJS, 2 Oct. 1995, 10. 159. In fact, even Rtihe, who remained the most favorably disposed toward enlargement among German political leaders, declared that membership for the Baltic states should not yet be considered. (FAZ, 7 Oct. 1994, 1-2, trans. in FBIS, 11 Oct. 1994,23, and FAZ, 29 Aug. 1995,3, trans. in FBIS, 30 Aug. 1995, 9.) 160. Kinkel, "Bundeswehr," 863; FAZ, 7 Oct. 1994, 1-2, trans. in FBIS, 11 Oct. 1994, 22; Welt, 3 Nov. 1994, 3, trans. in FBIS, 4 Nov. 1994, 11; SZ, 11-12 Feb. 1995, 1, trans. in FBJS, 14 Feb. 1995, 12; and SZ, 26 Apr. 1995, 2, trans. in FBIS, 26 Apr. 1995, 11. 161. See also WP, 17 May 1994, A17. 162. Berliner Zeitung, 31 Dec. 1994, 4, trans. in FBIS, 4 Jan. 1995, 14; Spiegel, 10 Apr. 1995, 20-22, trans. in FBIS, 11 Apr. 1995, 17; Kinkel, "NATO-Erweiterung," 24; FASZ, 7 May 1995, 4, trans. in FBIS, 10 May 1995, 12; FAZ, 12 May 1995, 1-2, trans. in FBIS, 15 May 1995, 15; Das Parlament, 19-25 May 1995, 11; FBIS, 26 June 1995, 14; Voigt, "German Interest," 111; and WP, 5 Jan. 1997, A17.

294

Notes to Pages 106-7

163. FAZ, 9 July 1994, 3, trans. in FBIS, 12 July 1994, 18; FAZ, 7 Oct. 1994, 1-2, trans. in FBIS, 11 Oct. 1994, 23; Kohl, "Aufbruch in die Zukunft," 991; FAZ, 18 Apr. 1995, 3, trans. in FBJS, 19 Apr. 1995, 7; Riihe, "Frieden und Stabilitat," 633; and FAZ, 29 Sept. 1995, 6, trans. in FBIS, 2 Oct.l995,9. 164. Spiegel, 16 Oct. 1995, 24-27, trans. in FBIS, 18 Oct. 1995, 14; FBIS, 30 Nov. 1995, 20; Kinkel, "Erklarung der Bundesregierung zur Friedensvereinbarung," 973; and Kohl, "Deutsche Beteiligung," 1010. 165. FAZ, 9 July 1994, 3, trans. in FBIS, 12 July 1994, 18. 166. Author's interviews with a NATO official, Brussels, 15 June 1994, and an official in the German Mission to NATO, Brussels, 16 June 1994. 167. WP, 12 Mar. 1994, C9; WP, 25 May 1994, A26; Riihe, "Europaische Sicherheit," 255; Welt, 20 May 1994, 3, trans. in FBIS, 23 May 1994, 7; FAZ, 25 May 1994, 1-2, trans. in FBIS, 26 May 1994, 4; FR, 28 May 1994, 2, trans. in FBIS, 31 May 1994, 29; Handelsblatt, 9 June 1994, 7, trans. in FBJS, 13 June 1994, 19; and Kinkel, "Rolle der NATO," 545. 168. FBIS, 21 Mar. 1995, 20-21; Kinkel, "NATO-Erweiterung," 24-25; Kinkel, "New Challenges," 6; Kinkel, "German-American Friendship," 5; Kinkel, "Foreign Policy," 3; and Kinkel, "Central Issues," 5. In 1996, the United States embraced the charter concept and made it the centerpiece of its own strategy for overcoming Russian objections to NATO enlargement. See WP, 7 Sept. 1996, A1 and A17. 169. NOD and Conversion, no. 39 (Dec. 1996), 5, and Welt, 14 Dec. 1996, trans. in FBIS, 18 Dec. 1996. 170. FAZ, 9 July 1994, 3, trans. in FBIS, 11 July 1994, 17; WP, 10 Sept. 1994, Al6; SZ, 13 Sept. 1994, 4, trans. in FBIS, 13 Sept. 1994, 23; Welt, 9 May 1995, I, trans. in FBIS, 10 May 1995, 10; and Riihe, "Neue NATO," 342. 171. FBIS, 14 Feb. 1994, 42; Welt, 12 Feb. 1994, 3, trans. in FBIS, 14 Feb. 1994, 44; FAZ, 11 May 1994, 1-2, trans. in FBJS, 12 May 1994, 10; FAZ, 25 May 1994, 1-2, trans. in FBIS, 26 May 1994, 4; FR, 28 May 1994, 2, trans. in FBIS, 31 May 1994, 29; Handelsblatt, 9 June 1994, 7, trans. in FBIS, 13 June 1994, 19; Kinkel, "Rolle der NATO," 545; SZ, 4-5 Feb. 1995, 10, trans. in FBIS, 6 Feb. 1995, 19; Kinkel, "Eine gerechte und dauerhafte Friedensordnung," 97; FAZ, 18 Apr. 1995,3, trans. inFBIS, 19 Apr. 1995, 7; and Riihe, "Bundeswehr und europaische Sicherheit," 859. Also, author's interviews with a NATO official, Brussels, 15 June 1994, and an official in the German Mission to NATO, Brussels, 16 June 1994. 172. Kinkel, "New Challenges," 5; FAZ, 20 Apr. 1995, 1-2, trans. in FBIS, 21 Apr. 1995, 16; and SZ, 6--7 May 1995, 6, trans. in FBIS, 9 May 1995,20.

Notes to Pages 107-10

295

173. FAZ, 25 May 1994, 1-2, trans. in FBIS, 26 May 1994, 4; FR, 28 May 1994, 2, trans. in FBIS, 31 May 1994, 29; Handelsblatt, 9 June 1994, 7, trans. in FBIS, 13 June 1994, 19; Kinkel, "Rolle der NATO," 545; FAZ, 22 June 1994, 5, trans. in FBIS, 22 June 1994, 19; and SZ, 4-5 Feb. 1995, 10, trans. inFBIS, 6 Feb. 1995, 19. 174. Rtihe, "Europaische Sicherheit," 254; Kinkel, "New Challenges," 6; Kinkel, "Foreign Policy," 4; and Kinkel, "Konzept einer kooperativen Sicherheitsstruktur," 461. 175. Kinkel, "NATO Requires," 9; FAZ, 9 July 1994, 3, trans. in FBIS, 12 July 1994, 18; Kinkel, "Bundeswehr," 863; FAZ, 7 Oct. 1994, 1-2, trans. in FBIS, 11 Oct. 1994, 23; SZ, 23 Nov. 1994, 1, trans. in FBIS, 25 Nov. 1994, 19; SZ, 25 Nov. 1994, 2, trans. in FBIS, 2 Dec. 1994, 30; Welt, 30 Nov. 1994, 7, trans. in FBIS, 30 Nov. 1994, 20; Rtihe, "Europa und Amerika," 11; Kinkel, "Eine gerechte und dauerhafte Friedensordnung," 96; and Riihe, "Frieden und Stabilitat," 633. Also author's interviews with a Germany Embassy official, Washington, D.C., 25 Feb. 1994, a German Foreign Ministry official, Bonn, 13 June 1994, an official in the national headquarters of the Free Democratic Party, Bonn, 17 June 1994, and an official in the FriedrichEbert-Stiftung, Bonn, 17 June 1994. 176. See, Kohl, "Grundakte," 454, and Volker Riihe, "Auf dem Weg zu einer neuen Sicherheitsordnung in Europa," FAZ, 27 May 1997, 16, reprinted in SzS, no. 6 (June 1997), 21. 177. One OECD study credited Germany with giving two-thirds of the $83 billion afforded by all OECD countries between 1990 and 1993. (TWIG, 28 Apr. 1995, 4.) 178. See, for example, the comments of Klaus Kinkel in FBJS, 19 Aug. 1993, 6, and the views of Helmut Kohl expressed in DPA, 10 Jan. 1992, trans. inFBIS, 10 Jan. 1992,7. 179. Author's interviews with art official in the Chancellor's Office, Bonn, 8 July 1993 and 21 June 1994. 180. See Chapter Three for details. 181. Handl, "Germany in Central Europe," 14. German officials have been particularly anxious to develop security relations with Russia within multilateral frameworks such as NATO in order to avoid accusations that Germany is seeking to construct a special bilateral relationship along the lines of the Rapallo agreement. (Author's interview with a NATO official, Brussels, 15 June 1994.) 182. As Karsten Voigt has argued, "it would be an illusion anyway to believe that the enormous task of stabilising the eastern Central European, East European and Southeast European states could be accomplished in a bilateral frame." ("German Interest," II 0.)

296

Notes to Pages II O-I3

183. German disarmament assistance to Russia totaled a mere DM 10 million in 1993 and DM 9 million in 1994, before rising to DM 13 million in 1995 and an expected DM 18 million in 1996. (BPA, Bericht zur Rustungskontrolle und Abrustung 1994,22, and TWIG, 8 Nov. 1996, 7.) 184. In early 1994, Kinkel noted that Germany was unable to provide more financial aid to Belarus, even for the purpose of disarmament. (FAZ, 4 Mar. 1994, 6, trans. in FBIS, 7 Mar. 1994, 14.) 185. Author's interview with a German Defense Ministry official, Bonn, 17 June 1993. 186. WP, 17 Apr. 1994, A30. 187. NYT, 23 Jan. 1991, AI. 188. WP, 20 Aug. 1991, A17; NYT, 20 Aug. 1991, A7; WP, 23 Aug. 1991, A26; andNYT, 30 Aug. 1991, A7. 189. See, for example, the remarks of Kohl in SzS, no. 2 (Feb. 1994), 9, and those of Kinkel in Das Par/ament, 25 Mar. 1994, 11, trans. in FBIS, 31 Mar. 1994, 16. 190. FBIS, 27 Dec. 1994, 12; FBIS, 4 Jan. 1995, 11; FAZ, 4 Jan. 1995, 3, trans. in FBIS, 4 Jan. 1995, 13; Welt am Sonntag, 8 Jan. 1995, 3, trans. in FBIS, 10 Jan. 1995, 13; ZDF, 15 Jan. 1995, trans. in FBIS, 17 Jan. 1995, 10; andFASZ, 15Jan.1995,3,trans.inFBIS, 19Jan.1995,9. 191. See TWIG, 20 Jan. 1995, 1; WP, 21 Jan. 1995, A20; TWIG, 27 Jan. 199 5, 5; Kinkel, "Erkliirung der Bundesregierung zur Lage in Tschetschenien," 33~34; Kohl, "Aussprache," 35~37; SZ, 4~5 Feb. 1995, 10, trans. in FBIS, 6 Feb. 1995, 18~19; FAZ, 8 Feb. 1995, 2, trans. in FBIS, 9 Feb. 1995, 14; Stern, 16 Feb. 1995, 142--45, trans. in FBIS, 17 Feb. 1995, 17; and FAZ, 11 May 1995, 2, trans. in FBIS, 12 May 1995, 16. For SPD criticism, see Berliner Zeitung, 7~8 Jan. 1995, 2, trans. in FBIS, 11 Jan. 1995, 14, and ARD, 19 Jan. 1995, trans. inFBIS, 20 Jan. 1995, 16-17. 192. NYT, 9 Dec. 1994, A14, and WP, 11 Dec. 1994, A35 and A37.

Chapter Six EPIGRAPH: Deutscher Bundestag, "Antwort der Bundesregierung auf eine GroBe Anfrage der Fraktion Btindnis 90/Die Grtinen zur neuen Sicherheitspolitik," 32. 1. The name of the CSCE was formally changed to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) at the beginning of 1995, as decided at the Budapest summit conference in December 1994. This chapter will use "CSCE" to refer to the institution in both of these guises except where confusion might arise. 2. On the centrality of international institutions in German foreign policy more generally, see Anderson and Goodman, "Mars or Minerva?" esp. 57.

Notes to Pages 114-15

297

3. A useful survey of the changes that have taken place in the CSCE since 1990 is Mlyn, "OSCE." The most detailed account of German policy toward the CSCE in 1990 and the first half of 1991 is Staack, "Deutschland," esp. 149-76. 4. See, for example, Kohl, "Ein geeintes Deutschland," 588; Kinkel, "Starkung der KSZE," 411; Kinkel as quoted in FAZ, 22 June 1994, 5, trans. in FBIS, 22 June 1994, 19, and in FBIS, 25 Nov. 1994, 15; and Schafer, "Perspektiven deutscher Au13enpolitik," 667. The importance of the CSCE to Germany was also emphasized by a German Foreign Ministry official in an interview with the author, Bonn, 31 May 1994. 5. See, for example, DPA, 2 July 1990, trans. in FBIS, 3 July 1990, 5, and Pond, Beyond the Wall, 190--91. 6. For a brief summary, see also Anderson and Goodman, "Mars or Minerva?" 42. 7. DF, 8 June 1990, trans. in FBIS, 12 June 1990, 9, and author's interview with a high-level German Foreign Ministry official, Bonn, 6 June 1994. Until the end of 1991, moreover, when the North Atlantic Cooperation Council was established, the CSCE also provided the only security forum that included the other former Warsaw Pact countries. 8. As reported in BR, 21 June 1990, trans. in FBIS, 22 June 1990, 9. See also FAZ, 8 June 1990, 1-2, trans. in FBIS, 11 June 1990, 1, and FBIS, 9 July 1990,4. 9. FAZ, 9 July 1994, 3, trans. in FBIS, 11 July 1994, 17; FAZ, 7 Oct. 1994, 1-2, trans. in FBIS, 11 Oct. 1994, 23; SZ, 23 Nov. 1994, 1, trans. in FBIS, 25 Nov. 1994, 19; and Kohl, "Aufbruch in die Zukunft," 991. 10. Schafer, "Perspektiven deutscher AuBenpolitik," 670. See also the remarks of Genscher in FBIS, 25 Mar. 1992, 2. 11. See, for example, Kinkel, "NATO Requires," 9; Kinkel, "Responsibility, Realism"; Kinkel in Welt, 7 Oct. 1993, 7, trans. in FBIS, 8 Oct. 1993, 24; Kinkel in FAZ, 22 June 1994, 5, trans. in FBIS, 22 June 1994, 19; Kinkel in ZDF, 15 Dec. 1994, trans. in FBIS, 15 Dec. 1994, 22; and FAZ, 17 Mar. 1995, 8-9, trans. in FBIS, 18 Apr. 1995, 14. These views were also repeated in author's interviews with a German Embassy official, Washington, D.C., 25 Feb. 1994, a high-level German Foreign Ministry official, Bonn, 6 June 1994, and an official in the German Mission to NATO, Brussels, 15 June 1994. 12. Hoynck, "CSCE," 21, and Kinkel in SzS, no. 12 (Dec. 1993), 54. 13. Author's interview with a German Embassy official, Washington, D.C., 25 Feb. 1994. 14. FAZ, 9 July 1994, 3, trans. in FBIS, 12 July 1994, 18, and Kinkel, "Eine gerechte und dauerhafte Friedensordnung," 97.

298

Notes to Pages 116-17

15. Author's interview with a German Embassy official, Washington, D.C., 25 Feb. 1994. 16. Hoynck, "CSCE," 21. Also author's interview with a German Embassy official, Washington, D.C., 25 Feb. 1994. 17. See, for example, Genscher, "Beitrag der Biindnisse," 198, and Genscher, "German Responsibility," 26-27. 18. See Kohl, "Ein geeintes Deutschland," 589. These proposals were reiterated by former Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg in "Kiinftige Perspektiven deutscher Sicherheitspolitik," 655. 19. Genscher, along with then-U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, publicly called for such a mechanism in May, and Genscher claimed credit for the agreement shortly after the CSCE meeting. See German Embassy, "Statement by Secretary of State James Baker and Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher," and ZDF, 30 June 1991, trans. in FBIS, 1 July 1991, 18. The details of the emergency mechanism are described in TWIG, 21 June 1991, 2, and Mastney, Helsinki Process, 311-12. 20. German Tribune, 24 Jan. 1992, 7; TWIG, 31 Jan. 1992, 1; and author's interview with a German Foreign Ministry official, Bonn, 20 July 1993. 21. FBIS, 25 Mar. 1992, 2-3, and TWIG, 27 Mar. 1992, 1. Consistent with this proposal, Genscher also suggested the establishment of the CSCE's own peacekeeping forces. See TWIG, 31 Jan. 1992, 1; FAZ, 31 Jan. 1992, 6, trans. in FBIS, 3 Feb. 1992, 23; FBIS, 10 Mar. 1992, 10; and FBIS, 25 Mar. 1992,2-3. 22. FBIS, 14 Jan. 1992, 10; FBIS, 30 Jan. 1992, 2; and FBIS, 25 Mar. 1992,2-3. 23. TWIG, 10 Jan. 1992, 1; FBIS, 21 Jan. 1992, 1 and 13; German Tribune, 24 Jan. 1992, 2; and Schafer, "Perspektiven deutscher AuJ3enpolitik," 670. 24. DPA, 31 Jan. 1992, trans. inFBIS, 31 Jan. 1992,7, and FBIS, 25 Mar. 1992,2-3. 25. See FAZ, 31 Jan. 1992, 6, trans. in FBIS, 3 Feb. 1992, 23; Kinkel in Welt, 7 Oct. 1993, 7, trans. in FBIS, 8 Oct. 1993, 24; and Kinkel, "Das Konzept einer 'erweiterten Sicherheit,"' FR, 16 Dec. 1993, 12, reprinted in SzS, no. 1 (Jan. 1994), 15. Genscher had originally proposed the establishment of such a body, which he hoped might eventually develop into a European security council, in early 1992. (FBIS, 30 Jan. 1992, 2; FAZ, 31 Jan. 1992,6, trans. inFBIS, 3 Feb. 1992, 23; andFBIS, 25 Mar. 1992, 2-3.) 26. Die Presse, 25 Sept. 1992, 3, trans. in FBIS, 25 Sept. 1992, 2; Ischinger, "From Extended Deterrence," 4; Kinkel and Kooijmans, "Gemeinsame deutsch-niederHindische Agenda," 414; and BPA, Bericht zur Rustungskontrolle und Abriistung 1994, 77.

Notes to Pages 117-19

299

27. Kinkel and Kooijmans, "Gemeinsame deutsch-niederHindische Agenda," 412-14, and Deutscher Bundestag, "Antwort der Bundesregierung auf eine GroBe Anfrage der Fraktion Biindnis 90/Die Griinen zur OSZE," 5-6. 28. Author's interviews with a U.S. State Department official, Washington, D.C., 10 May 1993, a German Foreign Ministry official, Bonn, 31 May 1994, and an official in the German Mission to NATO, Brussels, 16 June 1994. Even the Social Democratic Party (SPD), which had been most enthusiastic about the CSCE, has grown skeptical about its prospects. The motion adopted at the November 1993 party convention, for example, acknowledged that "the problems and conflicts in Europe have grown more rapidly than the CSCE's ability to deal with them." (SPD, "Perspektiven," 10. See also Voigt, "German Interest," 112, and author's interviews with an official in the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Bonn, 7 July 1993, and an official in the parliamentary offices of the SPD, Bonn, 1 June 1994.) 29. Kinkel, "Foreign Policy," 4. See also Kohl's remarks in ARD, 8 Dec. 1994, trans. in FB1S, 12 Dec. 1994, 267, and those of Kinkel in SzS, no. 6 (June 1993), 24, and in ZDF, 15 Dec. 1994, trans. in FBIS, 15 Dec. 1994, 22. 30. Kinkel, "Deutsche Aul3en- und Sicherheitspolitik," 351; Kinkel, "Rolle der NATO," 546; Kinkel, "NATO-Erweiterung," 25; and Franlifurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung, 30 July 1995, 4, trans. in FBIS, 4 Aug. 1995, 9. 31. See, for example, SzS, no. 12 (Dec. 1993), 54, and SzS, no. 2 (Feb. 1994),4. 32. See, for example, Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future," 6. 33. Public statements to this effect, moreover, were confirmed in numerous interviews by the author with German officials. 34. The statements and speeches in which these characterizations appear are too numerous to cite in full. For representative examples, see Kohl, "Sicherheitsinteressen Deutschlands," 101-5; Kinkel, Speech to the Annual Meeting of the German Society for Defence Technology; Kinkel, "Rolle der NATO," 545; and Riihe, "Bundeswehr im deutschen und europaischen Einigungsprozel3," 145-47. 35. Cited in TWIG, 27 Mar. 1992, 1. See also Kohl, "Sicherheitsinteressen Deutschlands," 103; Kohl, "Biindnis- und Einsatzflihigkeit," 610; Kohl, "Aufbruch in die Zukunft," 991; and Kinkel, "Vermachtnis von James Byrnes," 747. 36. See, for example, Klose, "Germany"; Scharping, "For a New Strategy"; and Voigt, "German Interest," 108. The high degree of support for NATO within the SPD was also stressed by party officials in interviews with the author. 37. SPD, "Perspektiven," and SPD, "Regierungsprogramm 94." 38. Asmus, German Strategy, 32 and 38.

300

Notes to Pages 119-21

39. See, for example, Kohl, "Rolle Deutschlands," 244-45; Kinkel, speech to the Bundestag, 23 Nov. 1994, trans. in FBIS, 25 Nov. 1994, 15; Ruhe, "Europa und Amerika"; and Schauble, "Germany and Europe," 5. See also Deutscher Bundestag, "Antwort der Bundesregierung auf eine GroBe Anfrage der Fraktion Bundnis 90/Die Grunen zur neuen Sicherheitspolitik," 32. 40. Kohl in DPA, 4 Apr. 1991, trans. in FBIS, 22 Apr. 1991, 9; Generalinspekteur Dieter Wellershoff in FAZ, 12 Mar. 1991, 6, trans. in FBIS, 12 Mar. 1991, 14; Kinkel, "Deutsche AuBen- und Sicherheitspolitik," 350; Riihe, "Europas Sicherheit," 649; and author's interviews with a German Embassy official, Washington, D.C., 3 Dec. 1992, and a German Foreign Ministry official, Bonn, 13 June 1994. See also Sperling, "German Security Policy," 85-86. 41. See the remarks of Genscher in FAZ, 21 May 1991, 2, trans. in FBIS, 23 May 1991, 5, and of Stoltenberg in DPA, 8 Feb. 1992, trans. in FBIS, 10 Feb. 1992, 12. 42. See, for example, Kohl, "Agenda of German Politics," 6; Kohl, "Sicherheit," 167; Kinkel, "NATO Requires," 9; Kinkel, "NATO-Erweiterung," 22; Riihe, "Shaping Euro-Atlantic Policies"; and Riihe in FAZ, 5 July 1994,4, trans. inFBIS, 5 July 1994,8. Also, author's interviews with a German Embassy official, Washington, D.C., 3 Dec. 1992, and a high-level NATO official, Brussels, 15 June 1994. 43. Schafer, "Perspektiven deutscher Aussenpolitik," 668. 44. Author's interviews with Gen. John Galvin, former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, Harrisonburg, Virginia, 16 Dec. 1993, and an official in the German Mission to NATO, Brussels, 15 June 1994; Riihe in Spiegel, 18 Feb. 1991, 24-27, trans. in FBIS, 27 Feb. 1991, 11; and Generalinspekteur Klaus Naumann, cited in SzS, no. 9 (Sept. 1993), 36. See also Anderson and Goodman, "Mars or Minerva?" 36-37. 45. Kinkel, "Bundeswehr," 863; Riihe, "Bundeswehr im deutschen und europaischen EinigungsprozeB"; Riihe, "Europa und Amerika," 2; Stoltenberg in Welt, 11 Apr. 1991, 10, trans. in FBIS, 12 Apr. 1991, 8; Naumann in Welt am Sonntag, 6 Oct. 1991, 25-26, trans. in FBIS, 9 Oct. 1991, 8; and author's interviews with a high-level German Foreign Ministry official, Bonn, 6 June 1994, and officials in the German Mission to NATO, Brussels, 15-16 June 1994. See also Yost, "Europe and Nuclear Deterrence," 112. 46. Author's interview with an official in the Chancellor's Office, Bonn, 21 June 1994; Kinkel in SzS, no. 12 (Dec. 1993), 54; Kinkel, Speech to the Council on Foreign Relations; and FAZ, 17 Mar. 1995, 8-9, trans. in FBIS, 18 Apr. 1995, 13-14. 47. Le Figaro, 20 May 1992, 6-7, trans. in FBIS, 22 May 1992, 18. See also FAZ, 31 Jan. 1992, 4, trans. in FBIS, 3 Feb. 1992, 17; FAZ, 9 Sept.

Notes to Pages 121-23

301

1995, 1-2, trans. in FBIS, 11 Sept. 1995, 16; and FAZ, 14 Oct. 1995,4, trans. inFBIS, 19 Oct. 1995, 11. 48. Kamp, "Germany"; Hellmann, "Goodbye Bismarck?" 21-22; Yost, "Europe and Nuclear Deterrence," 113; Atlantic Council of the United States, "Nuclear Weapons," 22; and Krieger, "Germans," 25-26. 49. Riihe in Spiegel, 8 Feb. 1991, 24-27, trans. in FBIS, 27 Feb. 1991, 11, and in ARD, 8 Sept. 1995, trans. in FB1S, 8 Sept. 1995, 19; and author's interviews with a high-level NATO official, Brussels, 15 June 1994, and an official in the Chancellor's Office, Bonn, 21 June 1994. See also Yost, "Europe and Nuclear Deterrence." 50. See the comments of Volker Riihe in Yost, "Europe and Nuclear Deterrence," 100. See also Schafer, "Perspektiven deutscher Aussenpolitik." 51. Kinkel, "Rolle Deutschlands"; Kinkel, "Die transatlantische Partnerschaft," 311; Riihe, "Shaping Euro-Atlantic Policies"; and Riihe, "Europa und Amerika," 5. Within the opposition SPD as well, there has been a growing recognition that NATO could be used to carry out UN and CSCE mandates in the European theater. (Author's interview with an official in the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Bonn, 17 June 1994.) 52. Author's interview with a high-level NATO official, Brussels, 15 June 1994. 53. Riihe in FAZ, 10 Sept. 1993, 12, trans. in FB1S, 13 Sept. 1993, 20, and author's interviews with a German Embassy official, Washington, D.C., 3 Dec. 1992, and a high-level NATO official, Brussels, 15 June 1994. 54. See the remarks of both Klaus Kinkel and Volker Riihe before the Bundestag, ZDF, 13 Dec. 1996, trans. in FB1S, 16 Dec. 1996. 55. Although the following section is based primarily on the opinions expressed by government officials, these views have also been shared by members of the SPD. (Author's interviews with an official in the Friedrich-EbertStiftung, Bonn, 7 July 1993, and 17 June 1994. See also SPD leader Oskar Lafontaine inFR, 3 Aug. 1995,5, trans. inFBIS, 4 Aug. 1995, 8.) 56. Author's interviews with a high-level German Foreign Ministry official, Bonn, 6 June 1994, and an official in the German Mission to NATO, Brussels, 15 June 1994. See also Kelleher and Fisher, "Germany," 166. 57. Author's interviews with a high-level NATO official and officials in the German Mission to NATO, Brussels, 15-16 June 1994. See also Pond, Beyond the Wall, 174, and Sperling, "German Security Policy," 82. 58. Livingston, "United Germany," 169. 59. Author's interview with an official in the German Mission to NATO, Brussels, 15 June 1994. See also Deutscher Bundestag, "Antwort der Bundesregierung auf eine GroBe Anfrage der Fraktion Biindnis 90/Die Griinen zur neuen Sicherheitspolitik," 31.

302

Notes to Pages 123-26

60. Zeit, 26 Apr. 1991, 13-14, trans. in FBIS, 8 May 1991, 13; FR, 9 Feb. 1993, 3, trans. in FBIS, 11 Feb. 1993, 23; Riihe, "Mut zur Verantwortung," 170; and Clemens, "Special Kind of Superpower?" 206 and 221. 61. Author's interviews with a German Embassy official, Washington, D.C., 3 Dec. 1992, and a high-level NATO official, Brussels, 15 June 1994. 62. Author's interview with a German Embassy official, Washington, D.C., 3 Dec. 1993. This argument for NATO has been particularly prevalent within the SPD. (Author's interview with an official in the parliamentary offices of the SPD, Bonn, 13 June 1994.) 63. Author's interview with Gen. John Galvin, Harrisonburg, Virginia, 16 Dec. 1993. 64. Author's interviews with a U.S. Embassy official, Bonn, 13 July 1993, and a German Foreign Ministry official, Bonn, 14 July 1993. 65. WP, 24 May 1990, A36; WP, 25 May 1990, A34; Spiegel, 11 June 1990, 18-22, trans. in FBIS, 12 June 1990, 7; and WP, 28 June 1990, A36. 66. The declaration is reprinted in NYT, 7 July 1990, 5. 67. Author's interview with an official in the Chancellor's Office, Bonn, 8 July 1993. 68. Spiegel, 15 Oct. 1990, 26-30, trans. in FBIS, 9 Nov. 1990, 2, and Kohl, "Unsere Verantwortung," 73. 69. "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept," Press Communique S1(91)85, 7 Nov. 1991 (Brussels: NATO Press Service). 70. For a thorough discussion, see Haftendom, Security and Detente. 71. See the press reports in NYT, 23 May 1990, A8, and WP, 23 May 1990, A36. 72. For details, see IISS, Military Balance, 1992-93,30-31. 73. Speech by Genscher to the Deutsche Gesellschaft ftir Auswartige Politik, cited in FAZ, 29 June 1990, 5, trans. in FBIS, 2 July 1990, 8; Kinkel, "Rolle Deutschlands," 143; Riihe, cited in TWIG, 19 Mar. 1993, 2; DF, 30 Mar. 1993, trans. in FBIS, 30 Mar. 1993, 5; Spiegel, 19 Dec. 1994, 18-21, trans. in FBIS, 20 Dec. 1994, 16; and author's interview with Gen. John Galvin, Harrisonburg, Virginia, 16 Dec. 1993. 74. Most notable among these is the German-Netherlands corps, established in 1994, in which the command of units from both countries alternates between German and Dutch generals even in peacetime. See SzS, no. 5 (May 1994), 50, and IISS, Military Balance, 1995-96, 36. 75. TWIG, 10 Feb. 1995, 2; NATO Review 43, no. 2 (Mar. 1995), 18; and "NATO-Assignierung der Streitkrafte in den neuen Bundeslandem," SzS, no. 2 (Feb. 1995), 36-40. 76. As one NATO official put the matter, a corps is only as ready as its

Notes to Pages 126-27

303

least available part. (Author's interview with a NATO official, Brussels, 16 June 1994.) 77. Author's interviews with an official in the U.S. Mission to NATO, Brussels, 14 June 1994, and a NATO official, Brussels, 16 June 1994. 78. The quotes are taken from Kohl, "Sicherheitsinteressen Deutschlands," 103, and Kohl, "Aufbruch in die Zukunft," 990, respectively. Similar statements by Kohl and other government officials can be found in Kohl, "Tag der Deutschen Einheit 1993," 930; Financial Times, 7 Nov. 1994, 18, in FBIS, 7 Nov. 1994, 18; and The Times, 2 Nov. 1995, 1-2, in FBIS, 3 Nov. 1995, 12. 79. SPD support for European unification figures prominently in the 1993 party platform. (SPD, "Perspektiven," 4-5.) The goal appears twice in the Constitution, in the Preamble and in Article 23, as amended in December 1992. It might also be noted that the Bundestag ratified the Treaty on European Union nearly unanimously, with 543 of the 568 members present voting for the treaty. (TWIG, 18 Dec. 1992, 2.) 80. "Europaische Gemeinschaft," 482. See also Kohl, "30. Jahrestag," 58; Kohl, "Deutsche Beteiligung," 1015; and Kohl, "Sicherheit," 166. Other officials have expressed similar views: former President Richard von Weizsacker in Zeit, 8 Feb. 1991, 3-4, trans. in FBIS, 11 Feb. 1991, 12; Genscher in DF, 31 Mar. 1991, trans. in FBIS, 1 Apr. 1991, 5; Kinkel in DPA, 20 Aug. 1993, trans. in FBIS, 23 Aug. 1993, 18, and in FR, 6 Dec. 1994, 5, trans. in FB/S, 7 Dec. 1994, 15-16; Riihe, "Verantwortung Deutschlands," 42, and "Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik," 26; CDU leader Karl Lamers in Financial Times, 7 Nov. 1994, 18, in FBIS, 7 Nov. 1994, 18; and Scharping, "Deutsche AuBenpolitik," 40. See also Anderson and Goodman, "Mars or Minerva?" 56. 81. Kohl, "European Security," 10. See also Kohl, "Fur ein gemeinsames Europa," 748; Kohl, "Deutsche Beteiligung," 1012; Kohl, "Sicherheit," 166; NYT, 12 Nov. 1993, A5; andNYT, 17 Oct. 1995, A10. 82. Kinkel speech to the Bundestag, ZDF, 9 Sept. 1992, trans. in FBIS, 10 Sept. 1992, 13. 83. Kohl, "Verleihung," 508; Kohl, "Europas Standort," 105; Kohl, "Deutsche Beteiligung," 1012; Kinkel, "Responsibility, Realism"; Kinkel in ARD, 24 Nov. 1993, trans. in FBIS, 26 Nov. 1993, 19; and Kinkel in Welt, 30 Nov. 1994, 7, trans. in FBIS, 30 Nov. 1994, 19. 84. Kohl, "European Security,'' 10; Kohl, "Europaische Gemeinschaft," 482-83; Riihe, "Von der nationalen Verteidigung,'' 721; and von Weizsacker, "Zur deutschen AuBenpolitik," 1202. See also Art, "Why Western Europe," 2. 85. Kohl, "Verleihung," 509. See also FBIS, 17 Aug. 1992, 7; NYT, 12 Nov. 1993, A5; NYT, 7 Feb. 1996, 5; and Kohl, "Sicherheit," 166.

304

Notes to Pages 127-28

86. FR, 6 Dec. 1994, 5, trans. in FBIS, 7 Dec. 1994, 16. See also Kinkel, "Central Issues," 2, and Anderson and Goodman, "Mars or Minerva?" 54. 87. Kohl in FBJS, 23 Nov. 1990, 26; Kohl, "Rolle Deutschlands," 245; Kohl, "Rede des Bundeskanzlers," 764; Genscher in Zeit, 30 Aug. 1991, 5-6, trans. in FBIS, 3 Sept. 1991, 12; and Rtihe, "Europiiische Einigung," 982. See also Sperling, "German Security Policy," 82 and 88; Clemens, "Special Kind of Superpower?" 206; and McKenzie, "Competing Conceptions," 6. 88. Author's interviews with an official in the Chancellor's Office, Bonn, 8 July 1993, and a German Foreign Ministry official, Bonn, 7 June 1994. For Kohl's views, see "Regierungserkliirung des Bundeskanzlers," 1407; FBIS, 29 Mar. 1991, 3; FAZ, 18 May 1991, 2, trans. in FBIS, 20 May 1991, 9; FAZ, 31 May 1991, 1, trans. in FBJS, 10 June 1991, 9; Le Figaro, 14 Nov. 1991,4, trans. in FBJS, 18 Nov. 1991, 13; and Kohl, "Sicherheit," 166--67. For Genscher's views, see his statement in the Bundestag, 13 Mar. 1991, trans. in FBIS, 14 Mar. 1991, 20. And for Kinkel's views, see Kinkel, "Eine gerechte und dauerhafte Friedensordnung," 97. See also Clemens, "Opportunity or Obligation?" 239, and Sperling, "German Security Policy," 88. 89. Kohl, "Regierungserklarung des Bundeskanzlers," 1407; Kohl, "Rolle Deutschlands," 244; Genscher in DPA, 15 Dec. 1990, trans. in FBIS, 17 Dec. 1990, 3; Kinkel, "Bilanz," 1092; Riihe, "Shaping Euro-Atlantic Policies," 132; Riihe, "Bundeswehr im deutschen und europaischen EinigungsprozeJ3," 146; and former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in Zeit, 13 Jan. 1995, 3, trans. in FBJS, 10 Feb. 1995, 12. 90. On the lessons drawn from the Gulf War, see Genscher in DPA, 27 Jan. 1991, trans. inFBIS, 28 Jan. 1991, 15; BR, 31 Jan. 1991, trans. inFBJS, 1 Feb. 1991, 9; and TWIG, 8 Feb. 1991,2. On those ofYugoslavia, see Kohl inFBJS, 8 Aug. 1991, 3; Le Figaro, 14 Nov. 1991,4, trans. inFBIS, 18 Nov. 1991, 13; Kohl, "Verleihung," 510; Genscher in ZDF, 11 July 1991, trans. in FBIS, 12 July 1991, 16; Kinkel, "30. Jahrestag," 60; Kinkel in DPA, 1 Feb. 1993, trans. inFBJS, 2 Feb. 1993,4, and in ZDF, 8 Sept. 1993, trans. inFBIS, 9 Sept. 1993, 27; and Interior Minister Rudolf Seiters in Welt am Sonntag, 4 Dec. 1994, 6, trans. inFBJS, 7 Dec. 1994, 18, and inFAZ, 28 Apr. 1995,8, trans. inFBIS, 12 May 1995, 6. See also Anderson and Goodman, "Mars or Minerva?" 4. 91. Author's interview with an official in the parliamentary offices of the CDU, Bonn, 8 June 1994. 92. Author's interviews with a U.S. Defense Department official, Washington, D.C., 10 May 1993, an official in the Chancellor's Office, Bonn, 8 July 1993, and an official in the parliamentary offices of the CDU, Bonn, 8 June 1994. See also the remarks by Volker Rtihe reprinted in SzS, no. 1 (Jan. 1994), 42, and Rtihe interview in Spiegel, 15 Apr. 1996, reprinted in SzS, no. 5 (May 1996), 40.

Notes to Pages 128-31

305

93. Kohl, "Rolle Deutschlands," 244; Kohl, "German-American Relations," 3; Genscher in Handelsblatt, 1 Mar. 1991, 4, trans. in FBIS, 4 Mar. 1991, 12, and his statement in the Bundestag, 13 Mar. 1991, trans. in FBIS, 14 Mar. 1991, 20; Stoltenberg in Welt, 1 Feb. 1991, 7, trans. in FBIS, 5 Feb. 1991, 19-20, and in FAZ, 31 Jan. 1992, 4, trans. in FBIS, 3 Feb. 1992, 17; Riihe, "Von der nationalen Verteidigung," 721; Riihe, "Frieden und Stabilitat," 634; Riihe, "Neue NATO," 341 and 344; Riihe in Welt am Sonntag, 27 Mar. 1994, 25 and 27, trans. in FBIS, 29 Mar. 1994, 15; Finance Minister Theodor Waigel in FBIS, 16 Nov. 1995, 9-1 0; Seiters in Welt am Sonntag, 4 Dec. 1994, 6, trans. in FBIS, 7 Dec. 1994, 18, and in FAZ, 28 Apr. 1995, 8, trans. in FBIS, 12 May 1995, 6; and author's interview with an official in the parliamentary offices of the SPD, Bonn, 8 June 1994. See also SZ, 25 Aug. 1993, 2, trans. in FB/S, 26 Aug. 1993, II; SZ, 21 Jan. 1994, 10, trans. in FBIS, 24 Jan. 1994, 36; and Art, "Why Western Europe," 25. 94. Riihe, "Europaische Einigung," 983. 95. WP, 20 Apr. 1990, Al9, and Guicherd, "European Defense Identity," 12. 96. The letter is reprinted in Bulletin, no. 144 (11 Dec. 1990), 1513-14. See also Guicherd, "European Defense Identity," 12-13; NYT, 8 Dec. 1990, 3; and WP, 8 Dec. 1990, A14. 97. Auswartiges Amt, "Gemeinsames deutsch-franzosisches Papier." See also TWIG, 8 Feb. 1991, 1-2. Some reports suggest that Germany advocated the absorption of the WEU by the EC in the second half of the 1990s, although the Franco-German proposals are ambiguous on this point. See WP, 19 Feb. 1991, A6; Binnendijk, "Emerging European Security Order," 73-74; andAFP,27Mar.1991,inFBIS,27Mar.1991, 1. 98. Kohl and Mitterand, "Botschaft." See also DPA, 16 Oct. 1991, trans. inFBIS, 16 Oct. 1991, 1, and TWIG, 18 Oct. 1991, 1. 99. Council of the European Communities and Commission of the European Communities, Treaty on European Union, 123-29 and 242-46. 100. Author's interviews with German Foreign Ministry officials, Bonn, 15 July 1993 and 21 June 1994. 101. The Petersberg Declaration is reprinted in Bulletin, no. 68 (23 June 1992), 649-54. 102. Author's interview with an official in the Komad-AdenauerStiftung, Sankt Augustin, Germany, 5 July 1993. 103. FAZ, 13 Sept. 1995, 2, trans. in FBIS, 13 Sept. 1995, 6-7, and FDP leader Werner Hoyer in SzS, no. 4 (Apr. 1996), 12. 104. Riihe, "Neue NATO," 344. 105. Kinkel in ZDF, 7 Dec. 1995, trans. in FBIS, 7 Dec. 1995, 16; CDU/CSU Bundestag Group Press Release, 13 June 1995, trans. in FB/S, 23

306

Notes to Pages 132-33

June 1995, 21-22; Hoyer in SzS, no. 4 (Apr. 1996), 12; Kinkel and van Mierlo, "Mehr Mut," 1043; and Kohl and Chirac, "Gemeinsame Botschaft," 1107. 106. Kinkel, "Konzept einer kooperativen Sicherheitsstruktur," 461-62; Riihe, "Europas Sicherheit," 650; and CDU/CSU Bundestag Group Press Release, 13 June 1995, trans. inFBIS, 23 June 1995,21-22. 107. Kinkel, "Bilanz," 1092; Kinkel in FAZ, 14 June 1995, 2, trans. in FBIS, 15 June 1995, 12; Economist, 17 June 1995, 56; Kinkel, "Aktuelle Fragen der Europapolitik, insbesondere Vorschau," 459; Handelsblatt, 11 Aug. 1995, 6, trans. in FBIS, 14 Aug. 1995, 10-11; Kinkel in FAZ, 1 Sept. 1995, 12, trans. in FBIS, 5 Sept. 1995, 5; Kinkel in FAZ, 13 Sept. 1995, 2, trans. in FBIS, 13 Sept. 1995, 6-7; FBIS, 16 Nov. 1995, 9; CDU/CSU Bundestag Group Press Release, 13 June 1995, trans. in FBIS, 23 June 1995, 21-22; Hoyer in SzS, no. 4 (Apr. 1996), 12; Kinkel and van Mierlo, "Mehr Mut," 1043; and Kohl and Chirac, "Gemeinsame Botschaft," 1107. 108. Kohl, "Sicherheit," 166-67; Kinkel in Zeit, 10 Mar. 1995, 11, trans. in FBIS, 14 Mar. 1995, 16-17; and Riihe, "Europas Sicherheit," 650. 109. Kohl, "Sicherheit," 166-67; Kinkel in FAZ, 14 June 1995, 2, trans. in FBIS, 15 June 1995, 12; Kinkel, "Aktuelle Fragen der Europapolitik, insbesondere Vorschau," 459; Kinkel, "Konzept einer kooperativen Sicherheitsstruktur," 461-62; CDU/CSU Bundestag Group Press Release, 13 June 1995, trans. in FBIS, 23 June 1995, 21-22; Hoyer in SzS, no. 4 (Apr. 1996), 12; Kinkel and van Mierlo, "Mehr Mut," 1043--44; and Kohl and Chirac, "Gemeinsame Botschaft," 1107-8. 110. Kohl, "Grundsatze der Politik," 1246. Ill. Kohl, "Rede des Bundeskanzlers," 763; Kohl in FAZ, 27 Oct. 1995, 2, trans. in FBIS, 27 Oct. 1995, 12; Genscher in SZ, 30 Mar. 1990, 10, trans. in FBIS, 2 Apr. 1990, 13; Kinkel in FR, 21 Mar. 1994, 5, trans. in FBIS, 21 Mar. 1994, 14-15; Bundestag President Rita Siissmuth in Woche, 28 July 1995, 5, trans. in FBIS, 31 July 1995, 13; Scharping, "Deutsche AuJ3enpolitik," 41; and Voigt, "German Interest," 109. The sensitivity of German leaders on the issue was perhaps most evident during the controversy over the French nuclear tests conducted in 1995. In contrast to the sharp international outcry that the French actions provoked, German officials were extremely circumspect in their criticism for fear of undermining the relationship. See, for example, SZ, 12 July 1995; SZ, 14 July 1995; N-TV, 2 Oct. 1995, trans. in FBIS, 3 Oct. 1995, 14; and Le Figaro, 7-8 Oct. 1995, 3, trans. in FBIS, 11 Oct. 1995, 13. 112. Kohl and Mitterand, "Botschaft," 931. See also FBIS, 16 Oct. 1991; WP, 17 Oct. 1991, Al; andNYT, 17 Oct. 1991, 1. 113. Jim Hoagland, "The Case for European Self-Defense," WP, 19 Mar.

Notes to Page 134

307

1992, A27; WP, 17 May 1992, A31; WP, 23 May 1992, A15; Ischebeck, "30 Jahren," 45; and Wehrtechnik (Nov. 1994), 8-12, trans. in FBIS, 13 Feb. 1995, 18. For further background information on the Eurocorps, see BPA, "Die deutsch-franzosische Zusammenarbeit." 114. Kohl in Le Figaro, 14 Nov. 1991, 4, trans. in FBIS, 18 Nov. 1991, 13, and author's interviews with a German Defense Ministry official, Bonn, 12 July 1993, and a U.S. Embassy official, Bonn, 13 July 1993. See also Gordon, France, 41. 115. Author's interviews with a U.S. Defense Department official, Washington, D.C., 10 May 1993, an official in the Chancellor's Office, Bonn, 8 July 1993, and a U.S. Embassy official, Bonn, 27 July 1993. 116. Another explanation that has been offered for German support of the Eurocorps is that German officials resented the fact that command of the NATO Rapid Reaction Corps had been given to Britain rather than Germany. See, for example, Menon, Forster, and Wallace, "Common European Defence?" 107-8 and 115. This motive was roundly disputed, however, in author's interviews with a U.S. Defense Department official, Washington, D.C., 10 May 1993, and an official in the Chancellor's Office, Bonn, 8 July 1993. 117. FAZ, 30 Aug. 1990, 1-2, trans. in FBIS, 31 Aug. 1990, 6, and Menon, Forster, and Wallace, "Common European Defence?" 104. Subsequently, the French government injected some ambiguity into its position by stating that France would reduce its forces by half in a first stage. (Kohl and Mitterand, "Gemeinsame ErkHirung," 1170. See also DPA, 18 Sept. 1990, trans. in FBIS, 18 Sept. 1990, 3, and TWIG, 21 Sept. 1990, 2.) 118. DPA, 10 Sept. 1990, trans. in FBJS, 10 Sept. 1990, 8, and Kohl and Mitterand, "Gemeinsame Erkllirung," 1170. 119. Menon, Forster, and Wallace, "Common European Defence?" 110. See also FAZ, 1 Dec. 1992, 3, trans. in FBIS, 2 Dec. 1992, 19, and Le Monde, 12 Mar. 1993, I and 6, trans. in FBIS, 26 Mar. 1993, 2. 120. Le Monde, 13 Sept. 1994, 13, trans. in FBIS, 15 Sept. 1994, 4; FAZ, 1 Dec. 1994, 2, trans. in FBIS, 1 Dec. 1994, 26; and Kelleher, Future of European Security, 62. In fact, in late 1996, Britain and Italy joined Germany and France in agreeing in principle to establish a European armaments agency under the auspices of the WEU, which would be based on the preexisting Franco-German arrangement. See SzS, no. 12 (Dec. 1996), 8-9. 121. SZ, 22-23 Oct. 1994, 1, trans. in FBIS, 24 Oct. 1994, 18; Welt, 30 Nov. 1994,2, trans. in FBIS, 1 Dec. 1994, 25-26; FAZ, 1 Dec. 1994, 2, trans. in FBIS, 1 Dec. 1994, 26-27; FBIS, 2 May 1995, 13; FAZ, 13 Dec. 1995, 4, trans. in FBIS, 13 Dec. 1995, 9; and Jim Hoagland, "Cold-Shoulder Diplomacy," WP, 17 Oct. 1996, A23. . 122. "Gemeinsames deutsch-franzosisches Sicherheits- und Verteidi-

308

Notes to Pages 135-37

gungskonzept," Bulletin, no. 12 (5 Feb. 1997), 117-20. See also WP, 26 Jan. 1997, A26. 123. See, for example, Menon, Forster, and Wallace, "Common European Defence?" 112. 124. On U.S. concerns, see Guicherd, "European Defense Identity," 5759, and Binnendijk, "Emerging European Security Order," 74-75. The concerns of European allies are noted in WP, 19 Feb. 1991, A6. 125. WP, 8 Nov. 1991, Al. 126. WP, 17 Oct. 1991, A40; WP, 18 Oct. 1991, A28; WP, 19 Oct. 1991, A20; NYT, 7 Nov. 1991, A45; Jim Hoagland, "The Case for European SelfDefense," WP, 19 Mar. 1992, A27; WP, 17 May 1992, A31; WP, 23 May 1992, A15; and Stephen Rosenfeld, "Lighten Up!" WP, 29 May 1992, A23. See also Honig, '"Renationalization,"' 132, and Gordon, France, 42. 127. Author's interviews with a U.S. Defense Department official, Washington, D.C., 10 May 1993, a U.S. State Department official, Washington, D.C., 10 May 1993, and a German Defense Ministry official, Bonn, 12 July 1993. See also Rheinischer Merkur, 25 Oct. 1991, 4, trans. in FBIS, 26 Nov. 1991, 11; FAZ, 8 Nov. 1991, 7, trans. in FBIS, 26 Nov. 1991, 12; Menon, Forster, and Wallace, "Common European Defence?" 110; Honig, "'Renationalization,'" 131; Art, "Why Western Europe," 26; and Gordon, France, 41. 128. WP, 18 Oct. 1991, A28; WP, 19 Oct. 1991, A20; and Horsley, "United Germany's Seven Deadly Sins," 234-35. 129. Ischinger, "From Extended Deterrence," 8; Riihe speech to the Bundestag, ZDF, 9 Sept. 1992, trans. in FBIS, 10 Sept. 1992, 16; and Riihe inDPA, 29 Sept. 1992, trans. in FBIS, 2 Oct. 1992, 12. See also Anderson and Goodman, "Mars or Minerva?" 41, and Sperling, "German Security Policy," 92. 130. See, for example, Kohl, "Ein geeintes Deutschland," 589; Kinkel, Speech to the German Society for Defence Technology, 11; Kinkel, "Foreign Policy," 3; and Voigt, "German Interest," 112. 131. Sperling, "German Security Policy," 85, and Schafer, "Perspektiven deutscher AuBenpolitik," 668. 132. Author's interviews with German Foreign Ministry officials, Bonn, 31 May 1994 and 6 June 1994. See also Chapter Five. 133. See, for example, Kohl in Le Figaro, 14 Nov. 1991, 4, trans. in FBIS, 18 Nov. 1991, 13; Kohl in TWIG, 8 May 1992, 1; Kohl inN-TV, 11 Jan. 1994, trans. in FBIS, 12 Jan. 1994, 6; Kohl, "European Security," 11; Genscher in TWIG, 21 Dec. 1990, 1; Kinkel, Speech to the Council on Foreign Relations, 2; Kinkel, "New NATO," 4; Kinkel, "Vermachtnis von James Byrnes," 747; and Riihe in DPA, 29 Sept. 1992, trans. in FBIS, 2 Oct. 1992, 12. See also Sperling, "German Security Policy," 88.

Notes to Pages 137-39

309

134. Kohl, "Rolle Deutschlands," 244; Kohl, "German-American Relations," 3; Kohl, "Sicherheit," 167; Kinkel, "New NATO," 4; Kinkel, "Konzept einer kooperativen Sicherheitsstruktur," 461; and Riihe in Handelsblatt, 26 Aug. 1994, 5, trans. in FBIS, 30 Aug. 1994, 12. 135. Author's interviews with a German Embassy official, Washington, D.C., 3 Dec. 1992, an official in the Chancellor's Office, Bonn, 8 July 1993, and a German Defense Ministry official, Bonn, 12 July 1993. 136. Kinkel, "30. Jahrestag," 60. 137. See, for example, Kohl, "Sicherheitsinteressen Deutschlands," 104; Kohl in NYT, 7 Nov. 1991, A45; Kohl in TWIG, 29 May 1992, 2; Kohl in Liberation, 6 June 1994, 4-5, trans. in FBIS, 7 June 1994, 2; Genscher in TWIG, 18 Oct. 1991, 1; Kinkel, "30. Jahrestag," 60-61; Kinkel, "Rolle Deutschlands," 143; and Riihe in Zeit, 9 Oct. 1992, 3-4, trans. in FBIS, 14 Oct.l992, 12,andinARD,5Nov.1993,trans.inFBIS, 10Nov.l993,34. 138. WP, 18 Oct. 1991, A28; Jim Hoagland, "The Case for European Self-Defense," WP, 19 Mar. 1992, A27; and Le Monde, 12 Mar. 1993, I and 6, trans. in FBIS, 26 Mar. 1993, 2. See also Art, "Why Western Europe," 26, and Gordon, France, 44. 139. FAZ, 9 Sept. 1995, 1 and 2; FAZ, 15 Sept. 1995, 1; The Times, 3 Oct. 1995,20, inFBIS, 3 Oct. 1995, 14; FAZ, 14 Oct. 1995,4, trans. inFBIS, 19 Oct. 1995, 11; and Welt, 16 Oct. 1995,2, trans. inFBIS, 19 Oct. 1995, 11. 140. On Germany's role in shaping this language, see Guicherd "European Defense Identity," 13, and WP, 8 Dec. 1990, A24. 141. Genscher's contribution is noted in WP, 19 Feb. 1991, A6. 142. German Embassy, "Statement by Secretary of State James Baker and Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher," 4. 143. Kohl, "Agenda of German Politics." 144. WP, 18 Oct. 1991, A28; Kohl in FAZ, 7 Nov. 1991, 2, trans. in FBIS, 21 Nov. 1991, 9; Riihe in WP, 17 May 1992, A31; and Menon, Forster, and Wallace, "Common European Defence?" 111 and 115. See also Kohl, "ErkHirung der Bundesregierung zum Gipfeltreffen." 145. See WP, 23 May 1992, AIS: 146. Hoagland, "The Case for European Self-Defense," WP, 19 Mar. 1992, A27; WP, 17 May 1992, A31; and Riihe in Handelsblatt, 27 May 1992, 1, trans. in FBIS, 1 June 1992, 15, and in DPA, 1 July 1992, trans. in FBIS, 2 July 1992, 6. Also, author's interview with an official in the U.S. Mission to NATO, Brussels, 14 June 1994. 147. DPA, 4 Dec. 1992, trans. in FBIS, 4 Dec. 1992, 17; FAZ, 5 Dec. 1992, 2, trans. in FBIS, 7 Dec. 1992, 19-20; NYT, 1 Dec. 1992, A8; Le Monde, 12 Mar. 1993, 1 and 6, trans. in FBIS, 26 Mar. 1993, 2; Wehrtechnik (Nov. 1994), 8-12, trans. in FBIS, 13 Feb. 1995, 18; Art, "Why Western

310

Notes to Pages 139-43

Europe," 29; and Gordon, France, 43-44. The text of the Franco-German memorandum is printed in Bulletin, no. 133 (9 Dec. 1992), 1218. 148. See, for example, Kinkel in SzS, no. 12 (Dec. 1993), 55; Kinkel, "NATO-Erweiterung," 23; Waigel in FBIS, 2 July 1995, 7; and author's interviews with German Foreign Ministry officials, Bonn, 15 July 1993 and 7 June 1994. 149. Kinkel, "New NATO," 4; Rlihe in FBIS, 31 Jan. 1994, 8; and author's interviews with an official in the Chancellor's Office, Bonn, 8 July 1993 and 21 June 1994, and a German Defense Ministry official, Bonn, 12 July 1993. 150. Kohl, "Sicherheit," 166; Riihe, "Neue NATO," 342 and 345; Kinkel, "Konzept einer kooperativen Sicherheitsstruktur," 461-62; Kinkel, "New NATO," 3; SzS, no. 7 (July 1996), 29; and TWIG, 18 Oct. 1996,2. 151. Deutscher Bundestag, "Antwort der Bundesregierung auf eine GroBe Anfrage der Fraktion Biindnis 90/Die Griinen zur neuen Sicherheitspolitik," 33. 152. See also Anderson and Goodman, "Mars or Minerva?" 41. 153. See Klose in FBIS, 22 July 1992, 11; FR, 27 Aug. 1992, 16, trans. in FBIS, 9 Sept. 1992, 25; ZDF, 13 Jan. 1994, trans. in FBIS, 13 Jan. 1994, 16; SPD, "Perspektiven," 11-12; and author's interviews with an official in the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Bonn, 7 July 1993 and 17 June 1994, and officials in the parliamentary offices of the SPD, Bonn, 1 June 1994 and 13 June 1994. See also Clemens, "Special Kind of Superpower?" 225, and Gordon, France, 42. 154. WP, 24 Mar. 1990, A21; FBIS, 10 Aug. 1990, 27; and author's interview with SPD parliamentarian Karsten Voigt, Bonn, 13 June 1994. 155. SzS, no. 10 (Oct. 1993), 7; FBIS, 14 Apr. 1994, 16; and author's interview with SPD parliamentarian Karsten Voigt, Bonn, 13 June 1994. 156. See also Anderson and Goodman, "Mars or Minerva?" 25. 157. Kinkel, "Responsibility, Realism"; Riihe in TWIG, 19 Mar. 1993, and in FBIS, 19 Aug. 1993, 7-8; Voigt in Das Parlament, 19-26 May 1995, 11, trans. in FBIS, 24 May 1995, 6; and Naumann in Welt am Sonntag, 29 Aug. 1993, 4, trans. in FBIS, 31 Aug. 1993, 12, and in SzS, no. 9 (Sept. 1993), 36. 158. See also Sperling, "German Security Policy," 81; Clemens, "Special Kind of Superpower?" 206; Hellmann, "Goodbye Bismarck?" 26; and Art, "Why Western Europe," 22-25. 159. Of course, the contrast with German policies prior to 1945 is even more striking. 160. See also Anderson and Goodman, "Mars or Minerva?" 41.

Notes to Pages 144-47

311

Chapter Seven EPIGRAPH: Federal Ministry of Defence, White Paper 1994, 83. This is the official English translation ofBundesrninisterium der Verteidigung, Weij3buch 1994: Weij3buch zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Lage und Zukunft der Bundeswehr (Bonn: Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Apr. 1994). l. Deutscher Bundestag, "Antwort der Bundesregierung auf eine GroBe Anfrage der Fraktion Biindnis 90/Die Griinen zur neuen Sicherheitspolitik," 32. 2. T.-D. Young, '"Normalization,"' 8 and 27. 3. T.-D. Young, "'Normalization,"' 17 and 28, and Asmus, "Future of German Strategic Thought," 151-52. 4. See, for example, Federal Ministry of Defence, White Paper 1994, 84. For an elaboration, see Federal Minister of Defence, White Paper 1985, 7178. 5. Asmus, "Future of German Strategic Thought," 144; Kaiser and Becher, "Germany," 40; Schlor, "German Security Policy," 6; and Asmus, "Germany's Contribution," 1. 6. SZ, 28 Feb. 1994, 1, trans. in FBIS, 1 Mar. 1994, 28, and WP, 11 Apr. 1994, A10. 7. Likewise, 85 percent of the respondents to a public opinion survey conducted by the Ministry of Defense agreed that Germany needed to maintain armed forces. (US. News and World Report, 20 Mar. 1995, 51.) 8. The most important of these are Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, "Militarpolitische und militarstrategische Grundlagen"; Der Bundesminister der Verteidigung, "Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien"; and Federal Ministry of Defence, White Paper 1994. Also instructive is Defense Minister Volker Riihe' s statement before the Defense Committee of the Bundestag on 24 Sept. 1993, which appears in SzS, no. 10 (Oct. 1993), 54-55. 9. An early version of Bundeswehr's new mandate was approved by the cabinet on February 19, 1992. 10. See, for example, Federal Ministry of Defence, White Paper 1994, 84; the remarks of Volker Riihe at the February 1994 Munich Conference on Security Policy as reported in Welt am Sonntag, 6 Feb. 1994, 6-7, trans. in FBIS, 8 Feb. 1994, 24; and Riihe's presentation of "Bundeswehrplan 1997" in SzS, no. 3 (Mar. 1996), 57 11. See, for example, Zeit, 27 Mar. 1992, 7-8, trans. in FBIS, 1 Apr. 1992, 16; FR, 3 July 1992, 7, trans. in FBIS, 14 July 1992, 17; Welt am Sonntag, 23 May 1993, 29, trans. in FBIS, 26 May 1993, 11; and Welt am Sonntag, 27 Mar. 1994, 25, trans. in FBIS, 30 Mar. 1994, 17. 12. ZDF, 9 Sept. 1992, trans. inFBIS, 10 Sept. 1992, 16-17.

312

Notes to Pages 147-49

13. Welt am Sonntag, 6 Feb. 1994, 6-7, trans. in FBIS, 8 Feb. 1994, 24. 14. Federal Ministry of Defence, White Paper 1994, 85. The relevant portion of the February 1992 cabinet decision on the tasks of the Bundeswehr is detailed in Fuchs, "Mit deutschen Soldaten," 43. 15. See, for example, the views of former German Army Chief of Staff Henning von Ondarza in Europliische Wehrkunde, July 1990, 406-11, trans. in FBIS, 19 Sept. 1990, 11. 16. See the remarks of former Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg in DF, 8 July 1990, trans. in FBIS, 9 July 1990, 6; those of Riihe in ZDF, 13 Jan. 1994, trans. in FBIS, 14 Jan. 1994, 8; and Deutscher Bundestag, "Antwort der Bundesregierung auf eine GroBe Anfrage der Fraktion Biindnis 90/ Die Griinen zur neuen Sicherheitspolitik," 29. 17. ZDF, 13 Jan. 1994, trans. in FBIS, 14 Jan. 1994, 7-8, and Welt am Sonntag, 27 Mar. 1994, 27, trans. in FBIS, 29 Mar. 1994, 17. 18. Federal Ministry of Defence, White Paper 1994, 84 and 90. 19. Generalinspekteur Klaus Naumann, as cited in Woche, 17 Mar. 1994, 88, trans. in FBIS, 22 Mar. 1994, 23, and Deutscher Bundestag, "Antwort der Bundesregierung auf eine GroBe Anfrage der Fraktion Biindnis 90/Die Griinen zur neuen Sicherheitspolitik," 28. See also Chapter Five. 20. Stoltenberg, "Bundeswehr," 1193, and Welt am Sonntag, 1 July 1990, 2, trans. in FBIS, 3 July 1990, 6. 21. DF, 8 July 1990, trans. in FBIS, 9 July 1990, 7. 22. The government later set the sizes of the three services at approximately 255,000 men for the army, 83,000 for the air force, and 26,000 for the navy. See Welt am Sonntag, 10 Feb. 1991, 11, trans. in FBIS, 12 Feb. 1991, 10; C. Krause, "Wehrpflicht," 9; and T.-D. Young, "'Normalization,"' 1316. The navy figure may later have been increased to 29,000. (Welt, 22 Sept. 1993, 6, trans. in FBIS, 5 Oct. 1993, 32.) 23. DPA, 17 Sept. 1992, trans. in FBIS, 21 Sept. 1992, 26, and Federal Ministry of Defence, White Paper 1994, 93. 24. The relevant treaty limits for Germany were 4,166 battle tanks, 3,446 armored combat vehicles (ACV), 2,705 artillery pieces, 900 combat aircraft, and 306 combat helicopters. When the treaty was signed in November 1990, the Federal Republic possessed 4,799 tanks, 3,129 ACVs, 2,428 artillery pieces, 656 combat aircraft, and 306 helicopters, not including equipment inherited from East Germany. See Arms Control Today 21, no. 1 (Jan./Feb. 1991), 29. 25. An excellent account of the subject is SchOnbohm, Zwei Armeen. 26. Federal Ministry of Defence, White Paper 1994, 138. Other sources suggest a combined figure of as high as 540,000 men. See, for example, Van Orden, "Bundeswehr," 363.

Notes to Pages 149-51

313

27. For details, see "Fiinf Jahre Armee der Einheit," Informationen zur Sicherheitspolitik (Bonn: Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 3 Oct. 1995). 28. FAZ, 14 Mar. 1991, 4, trans. in FBIS, 14 Mar. 1991, 24; Welt, 9 Sept. 1991, 6, trans. in FBIS, 19 Sept. 1991, 10; FAZ, 8 June 1995, 5, trans. in FBIS, 9 June 1995, 19; and T.-D. Young, "'Normalization,"' 9-10. 29. WP, 12 May 1994, A17. 30. According to one estimate, defense spending declined 25 percent in real terms between 1990 and 1995. See Asmus, "Germany's Contribution," 38. 31. TWIG, 10 July 1992, 4; TWIG, 4 Dec. 1992, 4; and FAZ, 14 Nov. 1992, 2, trans. in FBIS, 20 Nov. 1992,22-23. 32. FAZ, 3 Feb. 1993, 1, trans. in FBIS, 3 Feb. 1993, 27; ARD, 3 Feb. 1993, trans. in FBIS, 8 Feb. 1993, 18; FAZ, 28 Apr. 1993, 4, trans. in FBIS, 29 Apr. 1993, 18; and SzS, no. 2 (Feb. 1994), 58. 33. DPA, 30 June 1993, trans. in FBIS, 2 July 1993, 22; Welt am Sonntag, 4 July 1993, 4, trans. in FBIS, 6 July 1993, 17; TWIG, 16 July 1993, 4; and SzS, no. 8 (Aug. 1993), 50. 34. FAZ, 24 Nov. 1993, 2, trans. in FBIS, 24 Nov. 1993, 23; DDP, 24 Nov. 1993, trans. in FBIS, 26 Nov. 1993, 28; FAZ, 29 Nov., 1993, 2, trans. in FBIS, 30 Nov. 1993, 24; SzS, no. 12 (Dec. 1993), 49-50; and SzS, no. 2 (Feb. 1994), 58. 35. See, for example, the remarks ofGeneralinspekteur Klaus Naumann in Welt am Sonntag, 6 Oct. 1991, 25, trans. in FBIS, 9 Oct. 1991, 7, and FAZ, 6 Oct. 1993, 2, trans. in FBIS, 7 Oct. 1993, 29. 36. FAZ, 14 Nov. 1992, 2, trans. in FBIS, 20 Nov. 1992, 22-23; SzS, no. 8 (Aug. 1993), 50; Welt am Sonntag, 16 Jan. 1994, 6, trans. in FBIS, 19 Jan. 1994, 18; Focus, 2 May 1994, 86-92, trans. in FBIS, 5 May 1994, 17; FAZ, 22 May 1995, 14, trans. in FBIS, 6 June 1995, 11; Soldat und Technik, Mar. 1996, reprinted in SzS, no. 4 (Apr. 1996), 42; and Federal Ministry of Defence, White Paper 1994, 94. 37. Jorg SchOnbohm, cited in FAZ, 14 Apr. 1994, 6, trans. in FBIS, 15 Apr. 1994, 14. 38. Following the economy measures taken in early 1993, according to one report, the 1993 defense budget contained only DM 200 million in unallocated investment funds and another unallocated DM 500 million for infrastructure. (Welt, 15 Feb. 1993, 3, trans. in FBIS, 16 Feb. 1993, 20. See also Van Orden, "Bundeswehr," 365.) 39. For detailed descriptions, see FAZ, 9 Mar. 1994, 1-2, trans. in FBIS, 10 Mar. 1994, 19-20; FAZ, 7 Apr. 1994, 4, trans. in FBIS, 8 Apr. 1994, 2427; and Welt, 27 Aug. 1994,3, trans. inFBIS, 29 Aug. 1994, 19. 40. Flight training was reportedly limited to 180 hours per year per pilot,

314

Notes to Pages 151-53

the NATO minimum. See Welt am Sonntag, 16 Jan. 1994, 6, trans. in FBIS, 19 Jan. 1994, 18-19; Welt am Sonntag, 6 Feb. 1994, 7, trans. in FBIS, 10 Feb. 1994, 26; SzS, no. 3 (Mar. 1994), 46; and Focus, 13 June 1994, 72-73, trans. in FBIS, 16 June 1994, 14. 41. See, for example, FAZ, 16 Feb. 1993, 1-2, trans. in FBJS, 17 Feb. 1993, 9; Bundeswehr Aktuell, 4 Mar. 1993, 3, trans. in FBIS, 18 Mar. 1993, 24; Spiegel, 22 Mar. 1993, 84-93, trans. in FBIS, 5 Apr. 1993, 29-31; Welt, 24 Mar. 1993, 6, trans. in FBIS, 5 Apr. 1993, 31-32; FAZ, 24 Mar. 1993, 12, trans. in FBIS, 8 Apr. 1993, 18-19; and Welt am Sonntag, 16 Jan. 1994, trans. in FBIS, 19 Jan. 1994, 19. The Defense Ministry's admission is reported in Welt, 27 Aug. 1994,3, trans. inFBIS, 29 Aug. 1994, 19. 42. Kohl, "Sicherheitsinteressen Deutschlands," 103. 43. See, for example, WP, 7 Feb. 1993, A26; SZ, 8 Feb. 1993, 1, trans. in FBIS, 9 Feb. 1993, 5; and Welt, 15 Feb. 1993, 3, trans. in FBIS, 16 Feb. 1993,20. 44. See, for example, SzS, no. 10 (Oct. 1993), 55. 45. See DDP, 3 Feb. 1993, trans. in FBIS, 4 Feb. 1993, 17, and the excellent discussion by Christoph Bertram in Zeit, 12 Feb. 1993, 6, trans. in FBIS, 24 Feb. 1993, 14. 46. Welt am Sonntag, 12 Aug. 1990, 7, trans. in FBIS, 15 Aug. 1990, 5, and Welt, 5 Oct. 1991, 4, trans. in FBIS, 7 Oct. 1991, 12. 47. Welt am Sonntag, trans. in FBIS, 2 Mar. 1993, 24; FAZ, 28 Apr. 1993, 4, trans. in FBIS, 29 Apr. 1993, 18; Welt, 26 Sept. 1993, 8, trans. in FBIS, 30 Sept. 1993, 22; and Clemens, "Special Kind of Superpower?" 219. 48. Welt, 6 Feb. 1993, 4, trans. in FBIS, 11 Feb. 1993, 22. 49. FR, 9 Feb. 1993,3, trans. in FBIS, 11 Feb. 1993, 23. 50. DDP, 16 Dec. 1993, trans. in FBJS, 16 Dec. 1993, 28; Welt, 17 Dec. 1993, 2, trans. in FBIS, 20 Dec. 1993, 26; Welt am Sonntag, 16 Jan. 1994, 6, trans. inFBIS, 19 Jan. 1994, 19; andSzS, no. 2 (Feb. 1994), 59. 51. The details of Riihe 's proposal were first spelled out in Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, "Rahmenbedingungen und Eckwerte," an unpublished Ministry document that appeared in Aprill994. It was later published in FR, 5 May 1994, 12, trans. in FBIS, 6 May 1994, 18-21. See also Welt am Sonntag, 10 Apr. 1994, 23, trans. inFBIS, 12 Apr. 1994, 28; FR, 14 Apr. 1994, 4, trans. in FBIS, 18 Apr. 1994, 17; Bild, 23 Apr. 1994, 2, trans. in FBIS, 25 Apr., 1994, 17; SZ, 23-24 Apr. 1994, 1, trans. inFBIS, 25 Apr. 1994, 17-18; and Welt am Sonntag, 1 May 1994,5, trans. inFBIS, 4 May 1994, 13-14. 52. FR, 2 Aug. 1994, 5, trans. in FBIS, 3 Aug. 1994, 11; Handelsblatt, 26 Aug. 1994, 5, trans. in FBIS, 30 Aug. 1994, 12; Riihe's presentation of "Bundeswehrp1an 1997" in SzS, no. 3 (Mar. 1996), 56; and Soldat und Technik, Mar. 1996, reprinted in SzS, no. 4 (Apr. 1996), 42.

Notes to Pages 154-55

315

53. Bild, 18 Apr. 1994, 2, trans. in FBIS, 19 Apr. 1994, 7; FAZ, 21 Apr. 1994, 1-2, trans. in FBIS, 22 Apr. 1994, 16; ZDF, 24 Apr. 1994, trans. in FBIS, 25 Apr. 1994, 18; SZ, 26 Apr. 1994, 1, trans. in FBIS, 26 Apr. 1994, 20; Welt am Sonntag, 1 May 1994, 5, trans. in FBIS, 3 May 1994, 16; and author's interview with a German Defense Ministry official, Bonn, 9 June 1994. The FDP opposition may also have been motivated by tactical considerations. The Free Democrats felt that they had not been adequately consulted by Riihe and wanted to demonstrate publicly that defense issues could not be decided without them. (Author's interview with an official in the Chancellor's Office, Bonn, 17 June 1994.) 54. The fmal version of the "Konzeptionelle Leitlinie" is reprinted in SzS, no. 9 (Sept. 1994), 44-47. See also Welt, 12 June 1994, 2, and FAZ, 17 June 1994,2. 55. A further elaboration of the "Konzeptionelle Leitlinie" is "Anpassung der Streitkraftestrukturen, der Territorialen Verwa1tung und der Stationierung der Bundeswehr," which is reprinted in SzS, no. 7 (July 1995), 30-46. It provides the following breakdown for the sizes of the three services: army233,400, a reduction of 24,400; air force-77,400, a reduction of 5,800; and navy-27,200, a reduction of 1,800. The total of 340,000 consisted of 38,000 officers, 122,000 non-commissioned officers, 40,000 volunteers, 135,000 conscripts, and 3,000 reservists. For the latter figures, see Riihe's presentation of"Bundeswehrplan 1997" in SzS, no. 3 (Mar. 1996), 57. 56. The wartime strength was later fixed at 680,000 and apportioned among the services as follows: army-505,000; air force-125,000; navy37,400; and other central military organs-12,200. See SzS, no. 6 (June 1996), 43-45. 57. Handelsblatt, 14 July 1994, 4, trans. in FBIS, 14 July 1994, 27; Handelsblatt, 26 Aug. 1994, 5, trans. in FBIS, 30 Aug. 1994, 12; and FAZ, 22 May 1995, 14, trans. in FBIS, 6 June 1995, 11. 58. SzS, no. 8 (Aug. 1995), 46; SzS, no. 10 (Oct. 1995), 44; and Soldat und Technik, Mar. 1996, reprinted in SzS, no. 4 (Apr. 1996), 42. 59. SzS, no. 6 (June 1996), 46; SzS, no. 8 (Aug. 1996), 40; WP, 29 July 1996, A15; Jane's Defense Weekly, 29 May 1996, 3, cited in NOD and Conversion, no. 38 (Aug. 1996), 9-10; and FAZ, 27 Sept. 1996. The fmal budget figure for 1997 was an even lower DM 46.3 billion. See TWIG, 15 Nov. 1996, 1; Welt, 16 Nov. 1996, trans. inFBIS, 20 Nov. 1996; and Riihe interview in Welt am Sonntag, 24 Nov. 1996, 35, trans. in FBIS, 27 Nov. 1996. 60. Riihe interview in Spiegel, 15 Apr. 1996, reprinted in SzS, no. 5 (May 1996), 39, and Welt, 7 Nov. 1996, trans. in FBIS, 8 Nov. 1996. 61. SzS, no. 6 (June 1996), 46; Jane's Defense Weekly, 29 May 1996, 3, cited in NOD and Conversion, no. 38 (Aug. 1996), 9; Riihe interview in

316

Notes to Pages 155-57

Spiegel, 15 Apr. 1996, reprinted in SzS, no. 5 (May 1996), 40; Berliner Zeitung, 1 June 1996, reprinted in SzS, no. 7 (July 1996), 9; and FR, 19 Dec. 1996,5, trans. inFBIS, 20 Dec. 1996. 62. Welt, 7 Nov. 1996, trans. in FBIS, 8 Nov. 1996, and Welt, 16 Nov. 1996, trans. inFBIS, 20Nov. 1996. 63. The distinction is clearly made in Bundesrninisterium der Verteidigung, "Militarpolitische und militarstrategische Grundlagen." This differentiation was particularly stressed beginning with Federal Ministry of Defence, White Paper 1994. See also FR, 3 July 1992, 7, trans. in FBIS, 14 July 1992, 18. 64. See, for example, Federal Minister of Defence, White Paper 1985, 191-96. 65. Riihe, "Deutsche Sicherheitspo1itik," 28. See also his remarks at the February 1994 Munich Conference on Security Policy, as reported in Welt am Sonntag, 6 Feb. 1994, 6-7, trans. in FB!S, 8 Feb. 1994, 24. 66. Bundesministerium der Verleidigung, "Militarpolitische und militarstrategische Grundlagen," 509; Federal Ministry of Defence, White Paper 1994, 90; and Riihe, "Europaische Sicherheit," 255. 67. Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, "Militiirpolitische und militiirstrategische Grundlagen," 509; Der Bundesrninister der Verteidigung, "Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien," 25 and 30-31; Federal Ministry of Defence, White Paper 1994, 88; Mahnke, "Wandel im Wandel," 43; and Asmus, "Germany's Contribution," 31. 68. The cabinet decision is reported in DF, 19 Feb. 1992, and DPA, 19 Feb. 1992, both trans. in FB1S, 20 Feb. 1992, 8-9. 69. A third component, the basic military organization, would conduct training, exercise command and control, support the operation of the armed forces, and support allied forces stationed in Germany. For overviews, see Van Orden, "Bundeswehr," 366, and Federal Ministry of Defence, White Paper 1994, 89. 70. On this fmal point, see Handelsb/att, 14-15 Aug. 1992, 3, trans. in FBIS, 18 Aug. 1992, 6;Bild, 5 Feb. 1993,2, trans. inFB1S, 11 Feb. 1993, 21; Riihe's presentation of "Bundeswehrplan 1997" in SzS, no. 3 (Mar. 1996), 57; and FAZ, 27 Sept. 1996, reprinted in SzS, no. 10 (Oct. 1996), 49. 71. "Konzeptionelle Leitlinie," SzS, no. 9 (Sept. 1994), and Asmus, "Germany's Contribution," 32-34. 72. Van Orden, "Bundeswehr," 367; T.-D. Young, "'Normalization,"' 14; Wehrtechnik, no. 12 (Dec. 1990), 13-19, trans. in FBIS, 29 Jan. 1991, at 13; Welt am Sonntag, 10 Feb. 1991, 11, trans. in FBIS, 12 Feb. 1991, 10; FAZ, 27 Feb. 1991, 5, trans. in FB1S, 1 Mar. 1991, 14; Soldat und Technik, Mar. 1991, 159-62, trans. in FBIS, 29 Apr. 1991, 27; and Wehrtechnik, no. 2 (Feb. 1993), 21-28, trans. in FBIS, 23 Mar. 1992, at 16.

Notes to Pages 157-58

317

73. Van Orden, "Bundeswehr," 367, and Spiegel, 15 July 1991, 26-28, trans. inFBIS, 13 Aug. 1991,4. 74. DPA, 12 July 1992, trans. in FBIS, 13 July 1992, 22; DPA, 17 Sept. 1992, trans. in FBIS, 21 Sept. 1992, 26; and "VorUiufige Eckwerte zur Bundeswehr Plannung" (Provisional Basis for Bundeswehr Planning), 15 Dec. 1992, in BPA, "Europaische Sicherheitsstruktur," 44. 75. Soldat und Technik, Mar. 1991, 159-62, trans. in FBIS, 29 Apr. 1991, 27, and Welt am Sonntag, 14 June 1992, 27, trans. in FBIS, 23 June 1992, 23-24. In 1991, the size of the German air force stood at 638 combat aircraft in approximately 29 squadrons, including 20 MiG-29s in one squadron that had been inherited from the NVA. By 1995, these numbers had dropped to 488 and 19, respectively. See IISS, Military Balance, for those years. 76. Welt am Sonntag, 10 Feb. 1991, 11, trans. in FBIS, 12 Feb. 1991, 10; FAZ, 27 Feb. 1991, 5, trans. in FBIS, 1 Mar. 1991, 14; Van Orden, "Bundeswehr," 367; T.-D. Young, '"Normalization,"' 16; and DPA, 19 Feb. 1992, trans. in FBIS, 20 Feb. 1992, 9. In 1989, the German navy included approximately 180 ships. By 1995, this figure had declined to approximately 140. See IISS, Military Balance, 1989-1990, and IISS, Military Balance, 1995-1996. 77. "VorHiufige Eckwerte," inBPA, "Europaische Sicherheitsstruktur," 45. 78. Instead, the Bundeswehr would maintain a large number of suitable companies in various larger formations that could be assembled for UN missions on an ad hoc basis as required. (Spiegel, 14 Mar. 1994, 23-24, trans. in FBIS, 15 Mar. 1994, 13, and author's interview with a German Defense Ministry official, Bonn, 9 June 1994.) 79. "Anpassung der Streitkraftestrukturen," SzS, no. 7 (July 1995), 37. Also assigned to the crisis reaction forces would be six squadrons of combat aircraft, two air defense squadrons, and three airlift squadrons. The total number of personnel in the crisis reaction forces would now be 53,600, including 37,000 from the army, 12,300 from the air force, and 4,300 from the navy. See ibid., 36-37 and 40, and "Konzeptionelle Leitlinie," SzS, no. 9 (Sept. 1994), 46. 80. "Anpassung der Streitkraftestrukturen," SzS, no. 7 (July 1995), 3738, and IISS, Military Balance, 1995-1996, 36. 81. See, for example, Europiiische Wehrkunde, July 1990, 406-11, trans. in FBIS, 19 Sept. 1990, at 9; Spiegel, 13 Aug. 1991, 5; Rheinischer Merkur, 25 Sept. 1992, 8, trans. in FBIS, 13 Oct. 1992, 14; FAZ, 30 Sept. 1993, 5, trans. in FBIS, 1 Oct. 1993, 20; and author's interview with a U.S. Embassy official, Bonn, 13 July 1993. 82. For details, see Chapter Eight. 83. Kaiser and Becher, "Germany," 63, and Spiegel, 20 Sept. 1993, 32, trans. in FBIS, 5 Oct. 1993, 31.

318

Notes to Pages 159-60

84. T.-D. Young, "Trends," 3; FR, 28 July 1994, 5, trans. in FBIS, 29 July 1994, 22; and author's interview with high-level German Defense Ministry officials, Bonn, 22 June 1994. 85. FAZ, 14 Jan. 1995,8, trans. inFBIS, 2 Mar. 1995, 17; 86. ZDF, 9 Sept. 1992, trans. in FBIS, 10 Sept. 1992, 17; Der Bundesminister der Verteidigung, "Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien," 32; "Vorliiufige Eckwerte," in BPA, "Europaische Sicherheitsstruktur," 45; Riihe, "Verantwortung Deutschlands," 43; Mahnke, "Wandel im Wandel," 44-45; and Riihe's presentation of "Bundeswehrplan 1997" in SzS, no. 3 (Mar. 1996), 58. 87. DPA, 11 Jan. 1992, trans. in FBIS, 13 Jan. 1992, 12; FAZ, 13 Jan. 1992, 1-2, trans. in FBIS, 14 Jan. 1992, 13-14; Welt am Sonntag, 12 Jan. 1992, 1-2, trans. in FBIS, 14 Jan. 1992, 13; Armed Forces Journal International, Mar. 1992, 20; and Clemens, "Special Kind of Superpower?" 217. Even cuts of this magnitude were regarded by many as insufficient, since Stoltenberg assumed that the defense budget would not fall below DM 50 billion. See, for example, SZ, 17 Jan. 1992, 2, trans. in FBIS, 4 Feb. 1992, 14-15, and SZ, 18 Jan. 1992,4, trans. in FBIS, 5 Feb. 1992, 15-16. 88. "Vorlaufige Eckwerte," in BPA, "Europaische Sicherheitsstruktur," 45. See also Handelsblatt, 4 Feb. 1993, 2, trans. in FBIS, II Feb. 1993, 25, and FAZ, 28 Apr. 1993,4, trans. in FBIS, 29 Apr. 1993, 18. 89. FAZ, 3 Feb. 1993, 1, trans. in FBIS, 3 Feb. 1993, 27, and SzS, no. 2 (Feb. 1994), 58. 90. See, for example, FAZ, 22 May 1995, 14, trans. in FBIS, 6 June 1995, 11. 91. Rheinischer Merkur, 25 Sept. 1992, 8, trans. in FBIS, 13 Oct. 1992, 14, and Rheinischer Merkur, 18 Dec. 1992, 3, trans. in FBIS, 21 Jan. 1993, 44. 92. Wehrtechnik, June I99I, 20-25, trans. inFBIS, 10 July 1991, 16. 93. FAZ, 14 Apr. 1994, 6, trans. in FBJS, 15 Apr. 1994, 14. A 1995 estimate measured a less substantial, although still significant, decline, from 270,000 to 180,000 positions, although another 40,000 were expected to be lost that year. See Berliner Zeitung, 4 May 1995, 2, trans. in FBIS, 6 June 1995, 12. 94. Rheinischer Merkur, 18 Dec. 1992,3, trans. inFBIS, 21 Jan. 1993,44. 95. Welt, 9 Sept. 1991,6, trans. inFBIS, 10 Sept. 1991, IO; FAZ, 10 Mar. 1992, 3, trans. in FBIS, 11 Mar. 1992, 23; and Zeit, 27 Nov. 1992, 5, trans. in FBIS, 10 Dec. 1992,31-32. 96. Zeit, 27 Nov. 1992, 5, trans. in FBIS, 10 Dec. 1992, 32. Similar cost estimates appear in FAZ, IO Mar. 1992, 3, trans. in FBIS, 11 Mar. 1992, 24, and Zeit, 19 Mar. 1993,27, trans. inFBIS, 2 Apr. 1993,22.

Notes to Pages 160-61

319

97. Welt, 21 Feb. 1992,5, trans. inFBIS, 24 Feb. 1992, 19. 98. Welt, 1 July 1992, 5, trans. in FBIS, 2 July 1992, 8; WP, 1 July 1992, A25; FR, 3 July 1992, 7, trans. in FBIS, 14 July 1992, 17; and Handelsblatt, 14-15 Aug. 1992,3, trans. inFBIS, 18 Aug. 1992,7. 99. ZDF, 9 Sept. 1992, trans. in FBIS, 10 Sept. 1992, 17. 100. Welt am Sonntag, 19 July 1992, 6, trans. in FBIS, 21 July 1992, 14; Bild am Sonntag, 15 Nov. 1992, 2, trans. in FBIS, 19 Nov. 1992, 7; Zeit, 27 Nov. 1992, 5, trans. in FBIS, 10 Dec. 1992, 31; and Clemens, "Special Kind of Superpower?" 218. 101. AFP, 10 Dec. 1992, in FBIS, 10 Dec. 1992, 3; "VorHiufige Eckwerte," in BPA, "Europaische Sicherheitsstruktur," 45; Welt am Sonntag, 7 Aug. 1994, 2, trans. in FBIS, 9 Aug. 1994, 24; and Handelsblatt, 26 Aug. 1994, 5, trans. in FBIS, 30 Aug. 1994, 13. In addition, Ruhe subsequently indicated that Germany would reduce the size of its planned purchase, possibly to as few as 140 aircraft. 102. Zeit, 27 Nov. 1992, 5, trans. in FBIS, 10 Dec. 1992, 33, and Zeit, 19 Mar. 1993, 27, trans. in FBIS, 2 Apr. 1993, 22. 103. Spiegel, 1 Aug. 1994, 22-23, trans. in FBIS, 2 Aug. 1994, 19, and FAZ, 11 Aug. 1994,3, trans. inFBIS, 11 Aug. 1994, 1. 104. As 1996 came to an end, Germany continued to postpone action on the project. Although prototypes of the modified Eurofighter had now been successfully tested, the government was unwilling or unable to provide DM 390 million in necessary preproduction costs. See Welt, 25 Oct. 1996, trans. in FBIS, 28 Oct. 1996; Welt, 7 Nov. 1996, trans. in FBIS, 8 Nov. 1996; and Welt, 16 Nov. 1996, trans. in FBIS, 20 Nov. 1996. 105. See, for example, Rheinischer Merkur, 25 Sept. 1992, 8, trans. in FBIS, 13 Oct. 1992, 14; Bundeswehr Aktuel/, 4 July 1996, reprinted in SzS, no. 8 (Aug. 1996), 37; FAZ, 27 Sept. 1996, reprinted in SzS, no. 10 (Oct. 1996), 49; and FR, 19 Dec. 1996, 5, trans. in FBIS, 20 Dec. 1996. 106. In early 1996, Ruhe suggested that the crisis reaction forces would not be completely outfitted with modem equipment until 2009. See TWIG, 1 Mar. 1996, 1, and SzS, no. 3 (Mar. 1996), 59-60. 107. Rheinischer Merkur, 18 Dec. 1992, 3, trans. in FBIS, 21 Jan. 1993, 44, and Spiegel, 20 Sept. 1993, 32, trans. in FBIS, 5 Oct. 1993, 32. 108. FAZ, 3 Feb. 1993, 1, trans. in FBIS, 3 Feb. 1993, 27, and Focus, 16 Aug. 1993, 32-33, trans. in FBIS, 18 Aug. 1993, 8-9. 109. Spiegel, 22 Sept. 1994, 20-22, trans. in FBIS, 30 Sept. 1994, 22-23; Welt am Sonntag, 4 Dec. 1994, 26, trans. in FBIS, 9 Dec. 1994, 20; and FAZ, 14 Jan. 1995, 8, trans. in FBIS, 2 Mar. 1995, 17. 110. SZ, 3 May 1995, 1, trans. in FBIS, 5 May 1995, 16; Berliner Zeitung, 4 May 1995, 2, trans. in FBIS, 6 June 1995, 13; and FAZ, 22 May

320

Notes to Pages 162-64

1995, 14, trans. in FB/S, 6 June 1995, 12. Another alleged reason for Riihe's stance was his desire to limit the use of the Bundeswehr to Europe and nearby areas. Consequently, in his view, such a ship would be superfluous, while its construction would make it more difficult for Germany to refuse to participate in more distant operations. The debate between Riihe and Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel over the proper geographical scope of German deployments is noted in Chapter Eight. Ill. Berliner Zeitung, 1 June 1996, reprinted in SzS, no. 7 (July 1996), 9; Jane's Defense Weekly, 26 June 1996, 11, cited in NOD and Conversion, no. 38 (Aug. 1996), 10; and WP, 29 July 1996, A15. In fact, Germany was forced to delay its participation in the French reconnaissance satellite program. See "Gemeinsame Erkllirung des Deutsch-Franzosischen Verteidigungs- und Sicherheitsrats," Bulletin, no. 103 (16 Dec. 1996), 1118. 112. T.-D. Young, "Trends," 11-17; T.-D. Young, "'Normalization,"' 19-20; Kelleher, "Defense Organization," 82-83; and FAZ, 17 July 1993, 2, trans. inFBIS, 5 Aug. 1993,6--7. 113. Van Orden, "Bundeswehr," 356; Kelleher, "Defense Organization," 83; T.-D. Young, "'Normalization,'" 20; Kaiser and Becher, "Germany," 40; and Asmus, "Future of Geiman Strategic Thinking," 144. 114. Van Orden, "Bundeswehr," 356--57; T.-D. Young, "'Normalization,"' 20-21; and T.-D. Young, "Reforming NATO's Command and Control Structures," 32. 115. Welt am Sonntag, 1 Mar. 1992, 27, trans. in FBIS, 5 Mar. 1992, 9, and T.-D. Young, "Trends," 14. 116. See Fuchs, "Mit deutschen Soldaten," 41; Asmus, "Future of German Strategic Thinking," 166; Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, "Militlirpolitische und militlirstrategische Grundlagen," 3; and Asmus, "Germany's Contribution," 35-36. 117. See, for example, Kelleher, "Defense Organization," 84; FAZ, 3 Jan. 1995, 3; and T.-D. Young, "German National Command Structures," 383. 118. T.-D. Young, "Trends," 12 and 16; Kelleher, "Defense Organization," 85-86; and FAZ, 3 Jan. 1995, 3. 119. FAZ, 26 Oct. 1993, 1, trans. in FBIS, 28 Oct. 1993, 19; FAZ, 3 Jan. 1995, 3; and author's interview with a U.S. Embassy official, Bonn, 13 July 1993. 120. T.-D. Young, "Trends," 17. 121. In addition, a new army subcommand for air mobile forces (Kommando Luftbewegliche Krlifte or KLK), which would be able to control two brigades, was set up. See Welt, 22 Mar. 1994, 2, trans. in FBIS, 23 Mar. 1994, 15-16; SzS, no. 11 (Nov. 1994), 44; T.-D. Young, "Trends," 17-18; and T.-D. Young, "German National Command Structures," 385 and 389.

Notes to Pages 164-66

321

122. T.-D. Young, "Reforming NATO's Command and Control Structures," 33; T.-D. Young, "'Normalization,"' 21-26; and Schlor, "German Security Policy," 56. A staff of only 80--100 personnel was envisaged. In a later publication, Thomas-Durell Young argues that the senior Bundeswehr leadership had chosen not to endorse the concept. See his "German National Command Structures," 384-85. 123. Der Bundesminister der Verteidigung, "Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien," which appeared in November 1992, called for (p. 31) a permanent joint planning and command capability that transcended the individual services. 124. T.-D. Young, "Trends," 19-21, and T.-D. Young, "German National Command Structures," 390-91. 125. SZ, 2 July 1993, 1, trans. in FBIS, 9 July 1993, 33; Spiegel, 2 Aug. 1993, 16, trans. in FBIS, 3 Aug. 1993, 20; and Welt am Sonntag, 28 Aug. 1993,44, trans. in FBIS, 31 Aug. 1993, 23-24. Also author's interviews with a German Embassy official, Washington, D.C., 25 Feb. 1994, and a German Defense Ministry official, Bonn, 9 June 1994. 126. "Anpassung der Streitkraftestrukturen," SzS, no. 7 (July 1995), 33; FAZ, 3 Jan. 1995, 3; Riihe, "Europas Sicherheit," 651; Asmus, "Germany's Contribution," 38; and T.-D. Young, "German National Command Structures," 394. 127. See, for example, Deutscher Bundestag, "Antwort der Bundesregierung auf eine GroJ3e Anfrage der Fraktion Biindnis 90/Die Griinen zur neuen Sicherheitspolitik," 38. 128. T.-D. Young, "Trends," 2 and 14; Asmus, "Future of German Strategic Thinking," 166; T.-D. Young, "German National Command Structures"; and author's interview with high-level German Defense Ministry officials, Bonn, 22 June 1994. 129. See also T.-D. Young, "Trends," 10, and von Bredow, "Conscription," 291. 130. Federal Minister of Defence, White Paper 1985, 235-38. 131. Federal Ministry of Defence, White Paper 1994, 93. 132. The support of politicians in the governing parties for abolishing conscription is reported in Bild am Sonntag, 19 Sept. 1993, 2-3, trans. in FBIS, 21 Sept. 1993, 35, and FAZ, 29 Nov. 1993, 2, trans. in FBIS, 30 Nov. 1993, 24. The official position of the opposition Social Democratic Party (SPD) was that conscription should be maintained as long as possible, but that its presen:ation should not be allowed to stand in the way of deep cuts in the size of the Bundeswehr. (SPD, "Perspektiven," 12.) A 1993 public opinion poll found that 66 percent of the respondents favored replacing conscription with a professional army. (SZ, 11-12 July 1993.)

322

Notes to Pages 166--68

133. Jacobsen and Rautenberg, eds., Bundeswehr und europiiische Sicherheitsordnung, 39-14; Federal Ministry of Defence, White Paper 1994, 93; and "Jahresbericht 1993 des Wehrbeauftragten des Deutschen Bundestages: Zusammenfassung," reprinted in SzS, no. 4 (Apr. 1994), 33. Other sources placed the percentage of those performing military service at only 38 percent. (FAZ, 18 July 1994, and FAZ, 8 Mar. 1995, 4, trans. in FBIS, 14 Apr. 1995, 15-16.) . 134. Welt, 12 Feb. 1991, 10, trans. in FBIS, 14 Feb. 1991, 9; FAZ, 27 Jan. 1993, 1, trans. in FBIS, 9 Feb. 1993, 7; and C. Krause, "Wehrpflicht," 30 and 35. 135. The figures for 1992-94 were 134,000, 131,000, and 126,000, respectively. See BPA, "Wehrdienst-Kriegsdienstverweigerung-Zivildienst," 26, and TWIG, 10 Mar. 1995, 2. In other words, some 40 percent of all physically fit, draft-eligible young men were applying for conscientious objector status. (SzS, no. 5 [May 1994], 47.) 136. Interview with Generalinspekteur Klaus Naumann in Tagesspiegel, 23 Mar. 1993,5, trans. inFBIS, 2 Apr. 1993,23. 137. "Jahresbericht 1993," SzS, no. 4 (Apr. 1994), 34, and SzS, no. 5 (May 1994), 47. 138. Welt, 16 Aug. 1993, 5, trans. in FBIS, 20 Sept. 1993, 27. 139. SZ, 17 July 1992, 4, trans. in FBIS, 21 July 1992, 14. See also FBIS, 14 Feb. 1991, 8; SZ, 18-19 July 1992, I, trans. in FBIS, 20 July 1992, 11; and Welt, 11 Mar. 1993, 7, trans. in FBIS, 23 Mar. 1993, 20. 140. Tagesspiegel, 24 Jan. 1993, 6, trans. in FBIS, 17 Feb. 1993, 11. 141. Ekkehard Lippert, "Peacekeeping as a Mission of the Bundeswehr," Europiiische Sicherheit, no. 11 (Nov. 1992), 606-12, trans. in FBIS, 16 Dec. 1992, 5. 142. Of the 160,00 men who joined the Bundeswehr in 1994, for example, only 7 percent indicated a willingness to serve in every capacity, including missions outside of Germany. See TWIG, 10 Mar. 1994, 2. 143. SZ, 17 July 1992, 4, trans. in FBIS, 21 July 1992, 14. 144. See, for example, Kohl, "European Security," 5. 145. Federal Ministry of Defence, White Paper 1994, 85-86. See also Clemens, "Special Kind of Superpower?" 220. 146. For Kohl's views, see BR, 30 Jan. 1991, trans. in FBIS, 31 Jan. 1991, 20, and Kohl, "Rolle Deutschlands," 245. For those of then-Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, see BR, 13 Mar. 1991, trans. in FBIS, 14 Mar. 1991, 23. For those of Kinkel, see SzS, no. 12 (Dec. 1993), 56, and Kinkel, "Bundeswehr," 862. And for those of Riihe, see Handelsblatt, 26 Aug. 1994, 5, trans. in FBIS, 30 Aug. 1994, 13; interview in Spiegel, 15 Apr. 1996, reprinted in SzS, no. 5 (May 1996), 40; and SzS, no. 8 (Aug. 1996), 39.

Notes to Pages 168-69

323

Similar expressions by SPD leaders Hans-Ulrich Klose and Rudolf Scharping can be found inSZ, 18-19 July 1992, 1, trans. inFBIS, 20 July 1992, 10, and ZDF, 6 Feb. 1994, trans. in FBIS, 7 Feb. 1994, 17, respectively. See also Van Orden, "Bundeswehr," 363; von Bredow, "Conscription," 292 and 298; and FAZ, 30 July 1996, reprinted in SzS, no. 8 (Aug. 1996), 44. 147. This argument was made most frequently by Kohl. See, for example, Kohl, "Sicherheitsinteressen Deutschlands," 103; Kohl, "European Security," 5; and Kohl, "Vierzig Jahre Bundeswehr," 862. See also Federal Ministry of Defence, White Paper 1994, 86; Van Orden, "Bundeswehr," 363; and author's interviews with a German Defense Ministry official, Bonn, 16 July 1993, and an official in the Chancellor's Office, Bonn, 17 June 1994. Riihe also described military service in Germany as a valuable model for the military reforms being undertaken in many Central and East European states. See SzS, no. 4 (Apr. 1996), 54, and SzS, no. 8 (Aug. 1996), 39. 148. See, for example, Riihe's presentation of"Bundeswehrplan 1997" in SzS, no. 3 (Mar. 1996), 58; SzS, no. 4 (Apr. 1996), 54; SzS, no. 6 (June 1996), 40; and Riihe, "Deutschlands Rolle," 998. 149. Breuer, "Wehrpflicht," 287; Soldat und Technik (Jan. 1995), 9-16, trans. in FBIS, 26 Jan. 1995, 16; Deutscher Bundestag, "Antwort der Bundesregierung auf eine GroBe Anfrage der Fraktion Biindnis 90/Die Griinen zur neuen Sicherheitspolitik," 39; Riihe, "Deutschlands Rolle," 998; and author's interviews with an official in the national headquarters of the FDP, Bonn, 17 June 1994 and 21 June 1994, and an official in the Chancellor's Office, Bonn, 17 June 1994. 150. C. Krause, "Wehrpflicht," 30; Spiegel, 29 July 1991, 24, trans. in FBJS, 20 Aug. 1991, 18; SZ, 30 July 1992, 2, trans. in FBIS, 20 Aug. 1992, 11; and author's interview with an official in the national headquarters of the FDP, Bonn, 21 June 1994. 151. Riihe in SzS, no. 6 (June 1996), 40; Deutscher Bundestag, "Antwort der Bundesregierung auf eine GroBe Anfrage der Fraktion Biindnis 90/Die Griinen zur neuen Sicherheitspolitik," 39; and FAZ, 30 July 1996, reprinted in SzS, no. 8 (Aug. 1996), 44. 152. Author's interviews with a German Defense Ministry official, Bonn, 16 July 1993, and an official in the national headquarters of the FDP, Bonn, 21 June 1994. This argument was made most frequently by Riihe. See his remarks in SzS, no. 10 (Oct. 1993), 55; Handelsblatt, 26 Aug. 1994, 5, trans. in FBIS, 30 Aug. 1994, 13; and Riihe, "Deutschlands Rolle," 998. 153. FR, 28 July 1994, 5, trans. in FBIS, 29 July 1994,23. 154. FBIS, 9 Apr. 1991, 21; Spiegel, 29 July 1991, 24, trans. in FBIS, 20 Aug. 1991, 18; Tagesspiegel, 24 Jan. 1993,6, trans. inFBIS, 17 Feb. 1993, 11; Zeit, 12 Feb. 1993,6, trans. inFBIS, 24 Feb. 1993, 15; Sch1or, "German Secu-

324

Notes to Pages 169-72

rity Policy," 19; von Bredow, "Conscription," 299-300; and author's interview with an official in the national headquarters of the SPD, Bonn, 15 July 1993. 155. On the commitment to preserve conscription, see Kohl, "Sicherheitsinteressen Deutschlands," 103; SZ, 10 Feb. 1993, 1, trans. in FBIS, 10 Feb. 1993, 17; and SZ, 29 Apr. 1994, 3, trans. in FBIS, 28 Apr. 1994, 22. 156. The government also moved to broaden the fitness criteria in order to reduce the number of men declared unfit for military service. As a result, an estimated 20,000-30,000 additional young men would be eligible for conscription each year. See Federal Ministry of Defence, White Paper 1994, 94; FAZ, 25 Feb. 1994, reprinted in SzS, no. 3 (Mar. 1994), 55; Welt am Sonntag, 1 May 1994, 5, trans. in FBIS, 4 May 1994, 13-14; and author's interview with an official in the Chancellor's Office, Bonn, 17 June 1994. 157. Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, "Rahrnenbedingungen und Eckwerte," 5. 158. Initially, the FDP had proposed a term of service as short as six months. This desire for greater flexibility grew out of the FDP's liberal philosophy regarding individual freedom. (Welt am Sonntag, 20 May 1994, 1, trans. in FBIS, 23 May 1994, 14, and author's interviews with an official in the national headquarters of the FDP, Bonn, 17 June 1994 and 21 June 1994.) 159. Welt, 15 June 1994, 1, trans. in FBIS, 16 June 1994, 13, and "Konzeptionelle Leitlinie," SzS, no. 9 (Sept. 1994), 44--47. 160. See, for example, Soldat und Technik (Jan. 1995), 9-16, trans. in FBIS, 26 Jan. 1995, 16. 161. See SzS, no. 6 (June 1995), 49-50, which provides a detailed summary of the legislation, and TWIG, 3 Nov. 1995, 1. 162. See, for example, the viewpoints reprinted in SzS, no. 2 (Feb. 1997), 72-79. 163. Welt am Sonntag, 4 June 1995, 26, trans. in FBIS, 6 June 1995, 16; TWIG, 26 Feb. 1996, 2; and FAZ, 30 July 1996, reprinted in SzS, no. 8 (Aug. 1996), 44. 164. TWIG, 22 Mar. 1996, 1, and Deutscher Bundestag, "Antwort der Bundesregierung auf eine GroBe Anfrage der Fraktion Biindnis 90/Die Griinen zur neuen Sicherheitspolitik," 39. 165. A mid-1996 poll showed 54 percent opposing and 41 percent supporting a professional Bundeswehr. See SzS, no. 8 (Aug. 1996), 42--43. 166. SzS, no. 4 (Apr. 1996), 54. 167. T.-D. Young, '"Normalization,"' 8. 168. See, for example, Deutsches Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt, 15 Feb. 1991,3, trans. inFBIS, 9 Apr. 1991, 21; Tagesspiegel, 24 Jan. 1993,6, trans. inFBIS, 17 Feb. 1993, 11; Zeit, 19 Feb. 1993,5, trans. inFBIS, 3 Mar. 1993, 15-16; and Clemens, "Special Kind of Superpower?" 219.

Notes to Pages 173-78

325

Chapter Eight Kohl, "Biindnis- und Einsatzf!ihigkeit," 611. 1. Asmus, "Germany's Contribution," 2. 2. All translations are taken from Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, Documents. 3. See also Kaiser and Becher, "Germany," 60; Kamp, "Future Role," 605-6; and Muller, "Military Intervention," 128-29. 4. See also Kaiser and Becher, "Germany," 41; Kamp, "Future Role," 603-4; Asmus, "Germany's Contribution," 15; and Asmus, "Future of German Strategic Thinking," 144. 5. At the time, both German governments were anxious to sidestep U.S. requests for military contributions to the defense of the Persian Gulf. Previously, Germany had declined to participate in out-of-area operations on military and political rather than on constitutional grounds. For further discussion, see Kaiser and Becher, "Germany," 61; SZ, 9 Dec. 1992, 4, trans. in FBIS, 9 Dec. 1992, 11; FAZ, 4 Apr. 1991, 11, trans. in FBIS, 29 Apr. 1991, 35; and Spiegel, 12 Apr. 1993,22-25, trans. inFBIS, 21 Apr.1993, 17. 6. FAZ, 4 Apr. 1991, 11, trans. in FBJS, 29 Apr. 1991, 35, and Welt am Sonntag, 3 Feb. 1991, 9, trans. in FBIS, 5 Feb. 1991, 16. Particular attention has been paid to a letter that Genscher wrote in August 1988 to Horst Ehmke, then the deputy leader of the SPD Bundestag group. See ARD, 22 July 1992, trans. in FBIS, 22 July 1992, 9; Zeit, 24 July 1992, 3, trans. in FBIS, 10 Aug. 1992, 9; FAZ, 23 July 1992, 3, trans. in FBIS, 6 Aug. 1992, 6; and Zeit, 22 Jan.1993,4,trans.inFB/S,4Feb.1993, 15. 7. See, for example, Zeit, 24 July 1992, 3, trans. in FBIS, 10 Aug. 1992, 10; Kaiser and Becher, "Germany," 40; and Asmus, "Germany's Contribution," 11. See also Chapter Seven. 8. Kaiser and Becher, "Germany," 42 and 53; WP, 15 Aug. 1990, A8; Genscher, "Bericht der Bundesregierung," 858; DPA, 9 Aug. 1990, trans. in FBIS, 10 Aug. 1990, 6; DPA, 10 Aug. 1990, trans. in FBIS, 10 Aug. 1990, 6; and DPA, 10 Aug. 1990, trans. in FBIS, 13 Aug. 1990, 2. 9. See WP, 15 Aug. 1990, A18; WP, 17 Aug. 1990, A9; DPA, 16 Aug. 1990, trans. in FBIS, 17 Aug. 1990, 10-11; Welt, 18-19 Aug. 1990, 1, trans. in FBIS, 20 Aug. 1990, 16; and Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger, "Burdensharing," 69. 10. DPA, 9 Aug. 1990, trans. in FBJS, 10 Aug. 1990, 6; DPA, 15 Aug. 1990, trans. in FBIS, 15 Aug. 1990, 11; FAZ, 16 Aug. 1990, 2, trans. in FBIS, 17 Aug. 1990, 10-11; and WP, 17 Aug. 1990, A 16. 11. Kaiser and Becher, "Germany," 42 and 61. One report suggests that the FDP threatened to leave the government if the CDU persisted in sending naval units to the Gulf. See ADN, 16 Aug. 1990, trans. in FBIS, 16 Aug. 1990, 1. EPIGRAPHS:

326

Notes to Pages 178-80

12. See DF, 20 Aug. 1990, and DPA, 20 Aug. 1990, both trans. in FBIS, 20 Aug. 1990, 17; DPA, 20 Aug. 1990, trans. in FBIS, 21 Aug. 1990, 15; and Genscher, "Bericht der Bundesregierung," 858. 13. Kaiser and Becher, "Germany," 39 and 44, and Muller, "German Foreign Policy," 135. 14. See DF, 9 Sept. 1990, trans. in FBIS, 10 Sept. 1990, 6; DPA, 15 Sept. 1990, trans. in FBIS, 17 Sept. 1990, 9; DPA, 10 Oct. 1990, trans. in FBIS, 11 Oct. 1990, 4; TWIG, 14 Sept. 1990, 2; TWIG, 21 Sept. 1990, 2; NYT, 14 Sept. 1990, All; and WP, 16 Sept. 1990, AI. 15. On Senate criticism, see NYT, 12 Sept. 1990, A21; NYT, 14 Sept. 1990, All; and SZ, 12 Sept. 1990,4, trans. in FBIS, 13 Sept. 1990, 7. 16. DPA, 15 Sept. 1990, trans. inFBIS, 17 Sept. 1990, 8; TWIG, 21 Sept. 1990, 2; and Kaiser and Becher, "Germany," 44. 17. Transport of the U.S. VII Corps and the British 7th Armored Brigade involved nearly 900 German trains. For details, see Kaiser and Becher, "Germany," 54-55, and FAZ, 5 June 1991, 5, trans. in FBJS, 8 July 1991,45. 18. See, in particular, Genscher's statement in the Bundestag on November 15, BR, 15 Nov. 1990, trans. in FBIS, 16 Nov. 1990, 11-13, and Kohl's interview on DF, 18 Nov. 1990, trans. in FBIS, 19 Nov. 1990, 12-14. See also NYT, 19 Nov. 1990, Al2; BR, 22 Nov. 1990, trans. in FBIS, 23 Nov. 1990, 26; and Muller, "Military Intervention," 127. 19. As many as 80 percent of respondents expressed disapproval of military action in polls. See DPA, 10 Jan. 1991, trans. in FBIS, 11 Jan. 1991, 11, andDPA, 15Jan.199l,trans.inFBIS, 16Jan.1991, 13. 20. It also caused a few to regard the American military buildup in the Gulf as (;Vidence that the United States was eager for war. See Horsley, "United Germany's Seven Cardinal Sins," 232-33; Kaiser and Becher, "Germany," 46; Muller, "German Foreign Policy," 136; and author's interviews with a German Embassy official, Washington, D.C., 3 Dec. 1992, and a U.S. State Department official, Washington, D.C., 10 May 1993. 21. See NYT, 31 Dec. 1990, 1 and 6; NYT, 1 Jan. 1991, 5; NYT, 5 Jan. 1991, 5; DPA, 29 Dec. 1990, trans. in FBIS, 31 Dec. 1990, 9; DPA, 2 Jan. 1990, trans. in FBIS, 2 Jan. 1991, 6; FAZ, 3 Jan. 1991, 1-2, trans. in FBIS, 4 Jan. 1991, 5; and DPA, 3 Jan. 1991, trans. in FBIS, 4 Jan. 1991, 6. An additional German concern expressed at this time was that further fighting in the Gulf, by causing a sharp increase in oil prices, could have dire consequences for the economies of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, which were just beginning the difficult process of reform. 22. See, for example, Welt am Sonntag, 6 Jan. 1991, 1-2, trans. in FBIS, 7 Jan. 1991, 15; DPA, 8 Jan. 1991, trans. in FBIS, 9 Jan. 1991, 13; DPA, 9

Notes to Pages 180-82

327

Jan. 1991, and DPA, 10 Jan. 1991, both trans. in FBIS, 10 Jan. 1991, 14-15; and TWIG, 11 Jan. 1991, 1. 23. For details, see FAZ, 11 Jan. 1991,4, trans. in FBIS, 14 Jan. 1991, 25; TWIG, 18 Jan. 1991, 1; TWIG, 1 Feb. 1991, 1; DPA, 26 Jan. 1991, trans. in FBIS, 28 Jan. 1991, 16; FR, 20 Jan. 1991, 3, trans. in FBIS, 29 Jan. 1991, 9; D. Walker, "Germany Searches," 371; and Cooper, Paradoxes of Peace, 251-52. 24. See also Kaiser and Becher, "Germany," 53-54. 25. The principal exception was Kohl's January 17 declaration in the Bundestag, "Erkliirung der Bundesregierung zur Krieg am Golf," 35-36. 26. WP, 29 Dec. 1990, A20; NYT, 3 Jan. 1991, A1 and A18; NYT, 4 Jan. 1991, A10; DPA, 2 Jan. 1991, trans. in FBIS, 3 Jan. 1991, 12; ADN, 4 Jan. 1991, trans. in FBIS, 4 Jan. 1991, 5; and TWIG, 11 Jan. 1991, 1. Kohl also justified the action in his declaration on January 14 to the Bundestag, "Erkliirung der Bundesregierung zur Lage in der Golfregion," 22. 27. See WP, 22 Jan. 1991; ADN, 19 Jan. 1991, trans. in FBIS, 22 Jan. 1991, 21; DPA, 22 Jan. 1991, trans. in FBIS, 23 Jan. 1991, 15; Kaiser and Becher, "Germany," 49; and Horsley, "United Germany's Seven Cardinal Sins," 232-33. Kaiser and Becher also suggest ("Germany," 48) that the government's silence following the outbreak of hostilities in January was influenced by the fact that elections were scheduled to be held in the state of Ressen several days later. 28. See, for example, NYT, 26 Jan. 1991, 8, and Garten, Cold Peace, 162-67. 29. See SZ, 24 Jan. 1991, 4, trans. in FBIS, 24 Jan. 1991, 13, and Welt, 28 Jan. 1991, I, trans. in FBIS, 29 Jan. 1991, 8. 30. See, especially, Kohl's January 30 speech in the Bundestag, "Unsere Verantwortung," 61-63. For the remarks of other high officials, see DPA, 28 Jan. 1991, and Welt am Sonntag, 27 Jan. 1991,9, both trans. in FBIS, 28 Jan. 1991, 15, and ADN, 29 Jan. 1991, trans. in FBIS, 30 Jan. 1991, 8. 31. ADN, 29 Jan. 1991, trans. in FBIS, 30 Jan. 1991, 9; TWIG, 1 Feb. 1991, 1; and Kaiser and Becher, "Germany," 53. 32. Kaiser and Becher, "Germany," 55; Kaiser and Becher, Deutschland; and GIC, "Germany's Contribution." 33. Interview in Spiegel, 18 Feb. 1991, 24-27, trans. in FBIS, 27 Feb. 1991, 10. See also Kohl, "Rolle Deutchlands," 242. 34. Kaiser and Becher, "Germany," 57 and 60, and Muller, "German Foreign Policy," 139. 35. The following discussion is confined to the positions of the governing parties and the SPD. In the early 1990s, the western German Green Party (Die Griinen) was absent from the Bundestag, while its sister party in the new

328

Notes to Pages 182-83

eastern states, Alliance 90 (Biindnis 90), held only eight parliamentary seats. Nevertheless, it bears mention that the Greens took a strong stance against Bundeswehr participation in any out-of-area military missions, including UN peacekeeping operations, at their April 1991 party congress. See Muller, "Military Intervention," 136, and TWIG, 14 June 1991,2. 36. The position adopted by the CDU executive committee at its meeting on May 31 is described in DPA, 31 May 1991, trans. in FBIS, 3 June 1991, 13. For Kohl's views, see Kohl, "Rolle Deutschlands," 243. For those of thenDefense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg, see Welt, 25 Feb. 1991, 8, trans. in FB/S,26Feb.1991, 1;FAZ, 14Mar.1991,4,trans.inFB/S, 14Mar.1991,25; and DPA, 13 Mar. 1991, trans. in FBIS, 13 Mar. 1991, 9. For those of CDU Bundestag group leader Karl Lamers, see ADN, 9 Mar. 1991, trans. in FBIS, 11 Mar. 1991, 7, and FAZ, 27 Aug. 1992, 5, trans. in FBIS, 28 Aug. 1992, 6. 37. See Kohl in FAZ, 21 May 1991, 1-2, trans. in FBIS, 22 May 1991, 9; Lamers in ADN, 9 Mar. 1991, trans. in FBIS, 11 Mar. 1991, 7; and FAZ, 27 Aug. 1992, 5, trans. in FBIS, 28 Aug. 1992, 6. 38. For Kohl's views, see Kohl, "Unsere Verantwortung," 61-63, and Kohl, "Rolle Deutschlands," 242. See also TWIG, 31 May 1991,2, andZDF, 6 June 1991, trans. in FBIS, 7 June 1991, 13. 39. For Kohl's concerns, see DF, 9 Sept. 1990, trans. in FBIS, 10 Sept. 1990, 6; FBIS, 17 Aug. 1992, 4; and FAZ, 18 Dec. 1992, 1-2, trans. in FBIS, 21 Dec. 1992, 15. For those of other Union leaders, see DPA, 1 June 1991, trans. in FBIS, 3 June 1991, 14; Handelsblatt, 19 Aug. 1991, 3, trans. in FBIS, 20 Aug. 1991, 15; Welt am Sonntag, 6 Oct. 1991, 25-26, trans. in FBIS, 9 Oct. 1991, 9; FAZ, 3 Mar. 1992, 4, trans. in FBIS, 3 Mar. 1992, 11; ADN, 9 June 1992, trans. in FBIS, 12 June 1992, 11; Rheinischer Merkur, 25 Dec. 1992,4, trans. in FBIS, 29 Dec. 1992, 7; Asmus, "Germany's Contribution," 13; and Diehl, "UN-Einsatze." 40. Riihe, "Verantwortung Deutschlands," 42. See also Der Morgen, 2324 Mar. 1991, 4, trans. in FBIS, 27 Mar. 1991, 5; SZ, 16 May 1991; FAZ, 3 Mar. 1992, 4, trans. in FBIS, 3 Mar. 1992, 11; and ZDF, 9 Sept. 1992, trans. in FBIS, 10 Sept. 1992, 16. 41. For Kohl's views, see Kohl, "Rolle Deutschlands," 243, and ZDF, 6 June 1991, trans. in FBIS, 7 June 1991, 13. For those of Stoltenberg, see FAZ, 14 Mar. 1991,4, trans. inFBIS, 14 Mar. 1991,25. For those of Lamers, see ADN, 9 Mar. 1991, trans. in FBIS, 11 Mar. 1991, 7; Der Morgen, 23-24 Mar. 1991, 4, trans. in FBIS, 27 Mar. 1991, 5; Welt, 27 Sept. 1991, 8, trans. in FBIS, 27 Sept. 1991, 4; Spiegel, 16 Mar. 1992, 22-23, trans. in FBIS, 17 Mar. 1992, 5; and FAZ, 23 Mar. 1992, 6, trans. in FBIS, 25 Mar. 1992, 15. And for those of Riihe, see Asmus, "Germany's Contribution," 20. See also Anderson and Goodman, "Mars or Minerva?" 47-48.

Notes to Pages 183-84

329

42. See, for example, Kohl in WP, 12 Jan. 1993, A14; Lamers in Welt, 27 Sept. 1991, 8, trans. in FBIS, 27 Sept. 1991, 4; Finance Minister Theodor Waigel in ADN, 28 Sept. 1991, trans. in FBIS, 30 Sept. 1991, 11; Willy Wimmer, State Secretary in the Defense Ministry, in Welt, 5 Feb. 1991, 4, trans. in FBIS, 5 Feb. 1991, 20; and Der Morgen, 2-3 Mar. 1991, 18, trans. in FBIS, 5 Mar. 1991, 17. 43. FAZ, 4 Apr. 1991, 11, trans. inFBIS, 29 Apr. 1991, 30; Zeit, 31 May 1991, 1, trans. in FBIS, 2 July 1991, 30; and Miiller, "Military Intervention," 128. 44. See Welt, 30 Aug. 1990, 6, trans. in FBIS, 31 Aug. 1990, 8; ADN, 27 Oct. 1990, trans. in FBIS, 29 Oct. 1990, 17; ADN, 18 Mar. 1991, trans. in FBIS, 19 Mar. 1991, 7; SZ, 16 May 1991; and DPA, 15 May 1991, trans. in FBIS, 17 May 1991, 9. Stoltenberg had called for such an amendment as early as August 1990. 45. For Kohl's concerns, see FBIS, 29 Mar. 1991, 5; DPA, 17 May 1991, trans. in FBIS, 17 May 1991, 8; DPA, 13 June 1991, trans. in FBIS, 14 June 1991, 17; and Hanielsblatt, 7 Feb. 1992, 4, trans. in FBIS, 10 Feb. 1992, 13. For those of Lamers, seeDer Morgen, 23-24 Mar. 1991,4, trans. in FBIS, 27 Mar. 1991, 4, and Welt, 27 Sept. 1991, 8, trans. in FBIS, 27 Sept. 1991, 4. Also, author's interview with an official in the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Sankt Augustin, 8 June 1994. 46. For the FPD position, see the resolution adopted by the national executive committee (BundeshauptausschuB) of the FDP in Hamburg on May 25, 1991, which is reprinted in Koch, ed., Blauhelme, 248--49, and described in FAZ, 24 May 1991,4, trans. in FBIS, 28 May 1991, 15, and in FAZ, 1 Feb. 1993,3, trans. inFBIS, 19 Feb. 1993, 17. 47. See DPA, 15 Aug. 1990, trans. in FBIS, 15 Aug. 1990, 11, and FAZ, 16 Aug. 1990, 2, trans. in FBIS, 17 Aug. 1990, 10-11. 48. See FAZ, 7 Feb. 1991, 1-2, trans. in FBIS, 8 Feb. 1991, 16; Handelsblatt, 1 Mar. 1991, 4, trans. in FBIS, 4 Mar. 1991, 11; Berliner Zeitung, 27 Feb. 1991, 3, trans. in FBIS, 4 Mar. 1991, 14; BR, 13 Mar. 1991, trans. in FBIS, 14 Mar. 1991, 23; Spiegel, 13 May 1991, 32-33, trans. in FBIS, 20 May 1991, 15; FAZ, 24 May 1991, 4, trans. in FBIS, 28 May 1991, 7; and TWIG, 7 June 1991, 2. 49. Author's interview with an official in the national headquarters of the FDP, Bonn, 17 June 1994. 50. See BR, 31 Jan. 1991, trans. in FBIS, 1 Feb. 1991, 8; Spiegel, 4 Feb. 1991, 22-25, trans. in FBIS, 5 Feb. 1991, 14; and TWIG, 7 June 1991, 2. 51. Author's interviews with an official in the offices of the FDP parliamentary group, Bonn, 10 June 1994, and an official in the national headquarters ofthe FDP, Bonn, 17 June 1994.

330

Notes to Pages 184-87

52. Author's interviews with a German Defense Ministry official, Bonn, 12 July 1993, and an official in the offices of the FDP parliamentary group, Bonn, 10 June 1994. 53. Author's interviews with a U.S. State Department official, Washington, D.C., l 0 May 1993, and an official in the offices of the FDP parliamentary group, Bonn, 10 June 1994. 54. Author's interviews with an official in the national headquarters of the FDP, Bonn, 14 July 1993 and 17 June 1994, and Kinkel, "Erkliirung der Bundesregierung zur deutschen Mithilfe," 279. 55. This view had been affirmed most recently at the 1988 party congress in Munster. See Welt, 18-19 Aug. 1990, 1, trans. in FBIS, 20 Aug. 1990, 16; Welt, 4 Mar. 1991, 4, trans. in FBIS, 7 Mar. 1991, 9; and Kern, "Blauhelrne," 18-19. 56. See, forexample,FR, 29May 1991,37, trans. inFBIS, 6 June 1991,24. 57. Welt, 4 Mar. 1991, 4, trans. in FBIS, 7 Mar. 1991, 9; BR, 13 Mar. 1991, trans. in FBIS, l3 Mar. 1991, 6; and TWIG, 22 Mar. 1991,2. 58. Former Chancellor Willy Brandt, party leader Bjorn Engholm, former party leader Hans-Jochen Vogel, and parliamentary leaders Hans-Ulrich Klose, Norbert Gansel, and Karsten Voigt had all reportedly opposed the limitation to Blue Helmet operations. See Welt am Sonntag, 3 Mar. 1991, 1 and 3, trans. in FBIS, 5 Mar. 1991, 10; Welt, 4 Mar. 1991, 4, trans. in FBIS, 7 Mar. 1991, 9; FAZ, 23 July 1992, 3, trans. in FBIS, 8 Aug. 1992, 7; and Muller, "Military Intervention," 134. Brandt, who had presided over Germany's admission to the UN, argued with a high degree of authority that Germany had expressed no reservations when it joined the world body and thus should accept all the obligations of membership. (Spiegel, 13 May 1991, 32-33, trans. in FBIS, 20 May 1991, 15.) On Brandt's views, see also Thies, "German Outsider," 67-69. 59. TWIG, 31 May 1991, 1, and DPA, 31 May 1991, trans. in FBIS, 31 May 1991, 2. Also, author's interviews with a U.S. Defense Department official, Washington, D.C., 10 May 1993; an SPD member of the Bundestag, Bonn, l3 June 1994; and an official in the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Bonn, 17 June 1994. 60. SPD, "AuBen-, Freidens- und Sicherheitspolitik," l-2. See also DPA, 27 May 1991, trans. in FBIS, 28 May 1991, 8; DPA, 31 May 1991, trans. in FBIS, 31 May 1991, 2; and TWIG, 7 June 1991,2. 61. Muller, "German Foreign Policy," 140. 62. The most detailed accounts are Crawford, "German Foreign Policy"; Crawford, "Explaining Defection"; and Maull, "Germany in the Yugoslav Crisis." For the personal perspective of Hans-Dietrich Genscher, see his Erinnerungen, chap. 19.

Notes to Pages 187-88

331

63. See, for example, NYT, 22 Dec. 1991, Ell; NYT, 27 Dec. 1991; and NYT, 7 Jan. 1992. 64. Livingston, "United Germany," 171; Stuth, "Germany's Role," 29; and Muller, "German Foreign Policy," 150. 65. FAZ, 27 June 1991, 2, trans. in FBIS, 28 June 1991, 11; FAZ, 2 July 1991, 1-2, trans. in FBIS, 2 July 1991, 18; ADN, 3 July 1991, trans. in FBIS, 5 July 1991, 14; FAZ, 5 July 1991, 6, trans. in FBIS, 8 July 1991, 14; ADN, 13 July 1991, trans. in FBIS, 15 July 1991, 15; and author's interview with an official in the offices of the FDP parliamentary group, Bonn, 10 June 1994. See also Livingston, "United Germany," 171; Stuth, "Germany's Role," 29; Crawford, "German Foreign Policy," 17; Crawford, "Explaining Defection," 492; and Maull, "Germany in the Yugoslav Crisis," 102-3 and 122. 66. FAZ, 27 June 1991, 2, trans. in FBIS, 28 June 1991, 11; FAZ, 2 July 1991, 1-2, trans. in FBIS, 2 July 1991, 18; DPA, 3 July 1991, trans. in FBIS, 5 July 1991, 12; DPA, 18 July 1991, trans. in FBIS, 19 July 1991, 15; and TWIG, 5 July 1991, 1. When asked about the issue of recognition in interviews, Koh1 and Genscher would typically change the subject. See, for example, ZDF, 5 Aug. 1991, trans. in FBIS, 6 Aug. 1991, 11, and FBIS, 8 Aug. 1991, 3. 67. AFP, 5 July 1991, in FBIS, 5 July 1991, 1; ADN, 5 July 1991, trans. in FBIS, 5 July 1991, 13; FAZ, 5 July 1991, 6, trans. in FBIS, 8 July 1991, 14; Crawford, "German Foreign Policy," 20; and Maull, "Germany in the Yugoslav Crisis," 102-3. 68. DPA, 27 June 1991, trans. in FBIS, 28 June 1991, 11; SZ, 29-30 June 1991, 2, trans. in FBIS, 1 July 1991, 18; DF, 30 June 1991, trans. in FBIS, 1 July 1991, 17; ADN, 10 Aug. 1991, trans. in FBIS, 12 Aug. 1991, 9; TWIG, 5 July 1991, 1; Crawford, "German Foreign Policy," 19; and Antsis, "CSCE Mark II," 19. 69. DPA, 30 June 1991, trans. in FBIS, 1 July 1991, 21; ADN, 24 July 1991, trans. in FBIS, 24 July 1991, 7; and DPA, 29 July 1991, trans. in FBIS, 29 July 1991, 15. 70. AFP, 3 Sept. 1991, in FBIS, 3 Sept. 1991, 2, and AFP, 3 Sept. 1991, in FBIS, 4 Sept. 1991, I. 71.. AFP, 17 Sept. 1991, in FBIS, 18 Sept. 1991, 2; FBIS, 20 Sept. 1991, 2 and 8; WP, 20 Sept. 1991, 19; TWIG, 20 Sept. 1991, 1; and Menon, Forster, and Wallace, "Common European Defence?" 109. 72. DF, 20 Sept. 1991, trans. in FBIS, 20 Sept. 1991, 8; DPA, 21 Sept. 1991, andFAZ, 21 Sept. 1991, 1 and2, both trans. inFBIS, 23 Sept. 1991, 8; ADN, 23 Sept. 1991, trans. in FBIS, 24 Sept. 1991, 7; and TWIG, 27 Sept. 1991, 1.

332

Notes to Pages 188-90

73. ADN, 7 Oct. 1991, trans. in FBIS, 7 Oct. 1991, 11, and FAZ, 8 Oct. 1991, 2, trans. in FBIS, 8 Oct. 1991, 4. 74. FBIS, 7 Aug. 1991, 4; FBIS, 8 Aug. 1991, 2; FAZ, 7 Aug. 1991, 2, trans. in FBIS, 8 Aug. 1991, 7; and Crawford, "German Foreign Policy," 22 and 26. 75. DPA, 24 Aug. 1991, trans. in FBIS, 26 Aug. 1991, 18; DPA, 4 Sept. 1991, trans. in FBIS, 4 Sept. 1991, 1; DPA, 4 Sept. 1991, trans. in FBIS, 4 Sept. 1991, 3-4; DPA, 4 Sept. 1991, trans. in FBIS, 5 Sept. 1991, 1; FBIS, 5 Sept. 1991, 11; ADN, 5 Sept. 1991, trans. in FBIS, 6 Sept. 1991, 13; ADN, 6 Sept. 1991, trans. in FBIS, 9 Sept. 1991, 1; WP, 25 Aug. 1991; WP, 27 Aug. 1991; and TWIG, 6 Sept. 1991, 1. 76. Zeit, 30 Aug. 1991, 5-6, trans. in FBIS, 3 Sept. 1991, 12-13. 77. On British opposition, see FBIS, 4 Sept. 1991, 1, and FBIS, 9 Sept. 1991, 4. 78. ADN, 18 Sept. 1991, trans. inFBIS, 18 Sept. 1991, 13. 79. See FAZ, 21 Sept. 1991, 1 and 2, trans. in FBIS, 23 Sept. 1991, 9, and FAZ, 5 Oct. 1991, 2, and DPA, 7 Oct. 1991, both trans. in FBJS, 7 Oct. 1991, 11. 80. AFP, 4 Oct. 1991, in FBIS, 7 Oct. 1991, 1; DPA, 7 Oct. 1991, trans. in FBIS, 7 Oct. 1991, 11; FAZ, 8 Oct. 1991, 2, trans. in FBIS, 8 Oct. 1991, 4; Welt, 18 Oct. 1991, 7, trans. in FBIS, 22 Oct. 1991, 2; DF, 15 Dec. 1991, trans. in FBIS, 16 Dec. 1991, 5; Crawford, "German Foreign Policy," 25; Crawford, "Explaining Defection," 495; and GIC, "Recognition," 2-3. See also Genscher, Erinnerungen, 953-55. 81. See, for example, FAZ, 8 Oct. 1991, 2 trans. in FBIS, 8 Oct. 1991, 4; DPA, 8 Oct. 1991, trans. in FBIS, 8 Oct. 1991, 5; ADN, 3 Nov. 1991, trans. in FBIS, 4 Nov. 1991, 11; Crawford, "German Foreign Policy," 26; and Genscher, Erinnerungen, 958. 82. FBIS, 4 Dec. 1991, 8; ADN, 5 Dec. 1991, trans. in FBIS, 6 Dec. 1991, 14; WP, 5 Dec. 1991; "Gesprach des Bundeskanzlers mit dem Prasidenten von K.roatien," Bulletin, no. 140 (10 Dec. 1991), 1144; Crawford, "German Foreign Policy," 26; and Maull, "Germany in the Yugoslav Crisis," 104. 83. For summaries, see Crawford, "German Foreign Policy," 26-28, and NYT, 14 Dec. 1991, 3. 84. Crawford, "Explaining Defection," 495. 85. Crawford, "German Foreign Policy," 29-30; Crawford, "Explaining Defection"; and NYT, 17 Dec. 1991. 86. DPA, 13 Dec. 1991, trans. in FBIS, 13 Dec. 1991, 6; WP, 20 Dec. 1991, A39; NYT, 24 Dec. 1991; Crawford, "German Foreign Policy," 31; and Maull, "Germany in the Yugoslav Crisis," 104. 87. The official German position is presented in GIC, "Recognition."

Notes to Pages 190--92

333

Also useful is John Newhouse's interview-based account, "Dodging the Problem." 88. Muller, "Military Intervention," 125. In fact, Germany eventually accepted as many war refugees--over 400,000-as all the other European countries combined, although not as many on a per capita basis as either Austria or Switzerland. See WP, 14 July 1993, A15. 89. Newhouse, "Dodging the Problem," 63-64; WP, 5 Dec. 1991, A40; NYT, 7 Dec. 1991, 1; NYT, 17 Dec. 1991, A3; and WP, 17 Dec. 1991, A15. 90. GIC, "Recognition," 2; WP, 25 Aug. 1991, A23; NYT, 18 Dec. 1991; NYT, 29 Dec. 1991; Linnenkamp, "Security Policy," 119; Crawford, "German Foreign Policy," 22; Muller, "Military Intervention," 126; and author's interview with a U.S. Embassy official, Bonn, 27 July 1993. 91. In addition to Crawford, "German Foreign Policy," 22 and 27; Newhouse, "Dodging the Problem," 63; and GIC, "Recognition," 2, see WP, 5 Dec. 1991, A40; NYT, 16 Dec. 1991, A1; NYT, 16 Dec. 1991, A12; and NYT, 18 Dec. 1991. See also the text ofGenscher's December 13 letter to UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, which is reprinted in Weller, "International Response," 587. 92. Newhouse, "Dodging the Problem," 63; WP, 5 Dec. 1991, A40; NYT, 15 Dec. 1991, 14; NYT, 16 Dec. 1991, A12; Maull, "Germany in the Yugoslav Crisis," 116; and Muller, "German Foreign Policy," 153. 93. WP, 2 July 1991, A16; WP, 17 Dec. 1991, A15; WP, 18 Dec. 1991, A25; NYT, 16 Dec. 1991, A12; NYT, 18 Dec. 1991; Maull, "Germany in the Yugoslav Crisis," 121; Muller, "Military Intervention," 125; and Muller, "German Foreign Policy," 153. 94. Newhouse, "Dodging the Problem," 61; NYT, 16 Dec. 1991, A1 and A12; WP, 17 Dec. 1991, A15; Crawford, "German Foreign Policy," 27; and Crawford, "Introduction," 25. 95. WP, 2 July 1991, Al6; DPA, 3 July 1991, trans. in FBIS, 5 July 1991, 12; FBIS, 15 July 1991, 15; NYT, 14 Dec. 1991, 3; Edwards, "European Responses," 181 ; and Maull, "Germany in the Yugoslav Crisis," 11 7. For a dissenting view, see Crawford, "German Foreign Policy," 11. 96. For summaries see, Welt am Sonntag, 1 Dec. 1991, 9, trans. in FBIS, 2 Dec. 1991, 12, and Muller, "German Foreign Policy," 154. On the initial unwillingness of German leaders to act alone on recognition, see ADN, 6 Sept. 1991, trans. in FBIS, 9 Sept. 1991, 1; ADN, 18 Sept. 1991, trans. in FBIS, 18 Sept. 1991, 13; FAZ, 21 Sept. 1991, 1 and 2, trans. in FBIS, 23 Sept. 1991, 9; FBIS, 30 Sept. 1991, 13; FAZ, 5 Oct. 1991, 2, trans. in FBIS, 7 Oct. 1991, 10; DPA, 7 Oct. 1991, trans. in FBJS, 7 Oct. 1991, 11; and FAZ, 8 Oct. 1991, 2, trans. in FBIS, 8 Oct. 1991, 4. 97. Stuth, "Germany's Role," 31; Crawford, "German Foreign Policy,"

334

Notes to Pages 192-95

22; Crawford, "Explaining Defection," 495; and Maull, "Germany in the Yugoslav Crisis," 115. As late as mid-November, Kohl and French President Fran9ois Mitterand agreed that their countries would not recognize the Yugoslav republics without the other EC members. See DPA, 14 Nov. 1991, trans. inFBIS, 15 Nov. 1991, 6. 98. Muller, "German Foreign Policy," 152; Crawford, "Explaining Defection," 496; NYT, 15 Dec. 1991, 14; NYT, 16 Dec. 1991, A1; and WP, 17 Dec. 1991, A15. 99. See also Ramet, "Yugoslavia," 328. 100. See DPA, 2 Aug. 1991, trans. in FBIS, 2 Aug. 1991, 1; AFP, 17 Sept. 1991, inFBIS, 18 Sept. 1991, 2; DPA, 18 Sept. 1991, trans. inFBIS; 19 Sept. 1991, 4; DPA, 20 Sept. 1991, trans. in FBJS, 20 Sept. 1991, 8; TWIG, 20 Sept. 1991, 1; WP, 18 Sept. 1991, A27; Muller, "Military Intervention," 127; and Maull, "Germany in the Yugoslav Crisis," 112. 101. See Spiegel, 13 May 1991, 32-33, trans. in FBIS, 20 May 1991, 1415, and the comments of SDP leader Hans-Ulrich Klose on ARD, 22 July 1992, trans. in FBIS, 22 July 1992, 8-11. 102. See Zeit, 17 July 1992, 1, trans. in FBJS, 27 July 1992, 8; Spiegel, 20 July 1992, 22-29, trans. in FBJS, 31 July 1992, 9; Spiegel, 26 Apr. 1993, 1827, trans. in FBIS, 6 May 1993, esp. 12 and 14; FAZ, 22 Dec. 1993, 1, trans. in FBIS, 23 Dec. 1993, 38; Horsley, "United Germany's Seven Cardinal Sins," 234; and Asmus, "Germany's Contribution," 5 and 24. Defense Minister Ruhe offered a frank acknowledgment of this purpose in "Euro-Atlantic Security." 103. DPA, 6 Mar. 1991, trans. in FBIS, 6 Mar. 1991, 4; TWIG, 8 Mar. 1991, 2; and Kaiser and Becher, "Germany," 53-54. 104. ADN, 11Apr.1991,trans.inFBIS, 12Apr.1991, lO;ADN, 12Apr. 1991, and ADN, 14 Apr. 1991, both trans. in FBIS, 15 Apr. 1991, 13; DF, 17 Apr. 1991, trans. in FBIS, 18 Apr. 1991, 9; DPA, 22 Apr. 1991, trans. in FBIS, 23 Apr. 1991, 11; and TWIG, 19 Apr. 1991, 1. 105. DPA, 2 Sept. 1991, trans. in FBIS, 3 Sept. 1991, 18; ARD, 3 July 1992, trans. inFBIS, 7 July 1992, 14; andDPA, 19 Feb. 1993, trans. inFBIS, 22 Feb. 1993, 1. 106. For details, see SzS, no. 6 (June 1993), 37-38. 107. DPA, 1 Sept. 1992, trans. in FBIS, 2 Sept. 1992, 6; ARD, 11 Dec. 1992, trans. inFBIS, 15 Dec. 1992, 24; and TWIG, 18 Dec. 1992, 1. 108. ARD, 3 July 1992, trans. in FBIS, 7 July 1992, 14; TWIG, 10 July 1992, 2; and ARD, 22 July 1992, trans. in FBIS, 22 July 1992, 8. 109. DDP, 24 Mar. 1993, trans. in FBIS, 24 Mar. 1993, 15; DDP, 29 Mar. 1993, trans. inFBIS, 31 Mar. 1993, 19; and TWIG, 26 Mar. 1993,2. 110. See, for example, WP, 16 July 1992, A18, and the remarks ofNATO

Notes to Pages 195-97

335

Secretary General Manfred Womer in ADN, 11 July 1992, trans. in FBIS, 13 July 1992, 5. 111. "PresseerkHirung des deutschen Verteidigungsministers," EuropaArchiv, no. 19 (1992), D581, and TWIG, 17 July 1992, 1 and 3. 112. The fullest statements of the government's position were offered by Klaus Kinkel and Volker Riihe in the Bundestag on July 22. See ARD, 22 July 1992, trans. in FBIS, 22 July 1992, U--17. Kinkel's statement was also printed as Kinkel, "Erklarung der Bundesregierung zur Lage und Entwicklung." 113. DPA, 15 July 1992, trans. in FBIS, 15 July 1992, 15. 114. See also Riihe, as cited in DPA, 16 July 1992, trans. in FBIS, 17 July 1992, 10; Spiegel, 20 July 1992, 32-35, trans. in FBIS, 21 July 1992, 7; and ZDF, 9 Sept. 1992, trans. in FBIS, 10 Sept. 1992, 16. 115. DPA, 15 July 1992, trans. in FBIS, 15 July 1992, 15, and Zeit, 17 July 1992, 1, trans. in FBIS, 27 July 1992, 8. 116. On the SPD position, see WP, 16 July 1992, A18; ADN, 10 July 1992, trans. in FBIS, 13 July 1992, 22; SZ, 14 July 1992, 1, trans. in FBIS, 15 July 1992, 15; SZ, 20 July 1992, 6, trans. in FBIS, 22 July 1992, 7; and, especially, the July 22 statement by Hans-Ulrich Klose in the Bundestag in ARD, 22 July 1992, trans. in FBIS, 22 July 1992, 8-11. 117. The text of the SPD complaint is reprinted in Sicherheit und Frieden (S+F) 10, no. 4 (1992), 218-21. 118. DPA, 17 Nov. 1992, trans. in FBIS, 18 Nov. 1992, 9; SZ, 21 Nov. 1992, 2, trans. in FBIS, 23 Nov. 1992, 7-8; and Welt, 25 Nov. 1992, 6, trans. in FBIS, 1 Dec. 1992, 12-13. 119: WP, 13 Feb. 1993, A27. See also DDP, 24 Jan. 1993, trans. in FBIS, 25 Jan. 1993, 16; TWIG, 19 Feb. 1993, 16; and Maull, "Germany in the Yugos.lav Crisis," 110. 120. For Riihe's concerns, see DPA, 20 Jan. 1993, trans. in FBIS, 21 Jan. 1993, 31; WP, 13 Feb. 1993, A27; and TWIG, 19 Feb. 1993, 1. For additional Union views, see DDP, 25 Jan. 1993, trans. in FBIS, 26 Jan. 1993, 13; DDP, 21 Mar. 1993, trans. in FBIS, 22 Mar. 1993, 6; DDP, 21 Mar. 1993, trans. in FBIS, 23 Mar. 1993, 11; andFB/S, 5 Apr. 1993,23. 121. DPA, 25 Jan. 1993, trans. in FBIS, 26 Jan. 1993, 13; FAZ, 21 Jan. 1993, 1, trans. in FBIS, 12 Feb. 1993, 29-30; and DPA, 20 Mar. 1993, trans. in FBIS, 22 Mar. 1993, 5-6. 122. See, for example, FAZ, 21 Jan. 1993, 1, trans. in FBIS, 12 Feb. 1993,29-30, and DPA, 18 Feb. 1993, trans. in FBIS, 18 Feb. 1993, 19. 123. See, for example, Welt, 22 Jan. 1993, 1, trans. in FBIS, 25 Jan. 1993, 15; FR, 24 Mar. 1993, 1, trans. in FBIS, 24 Mar. 1993, 17; and Spiegel, 12 Apr. 1993,22-25, trans. inFBIS, 21 Apr. 1993, 18.

336

Notes to Pages 197-99

124. FAZ, 27 Jan. 1993, 1-2, trans. in FBIS, 27 Jan. 1993, 7; FAZ, 23 Mar. 1993, 4, trans. in FBIS, 24 Mar. 1993, 15; and FR, 24 Mar. 1993, 1, trans. inFBIS, 24 Mar. 1993, 16-17. 125. DDP, 24 Mar. 1993, trans. in FBIS, 25 Mar. 1993, 9; TWIG, 26 Mar. 1993, 2; and TWIG, 2 Apr. 1993, 1-2. 126. DPA, 25 Mar. 1993, trans. in FBIS, 25 Mar. 1993, 9, and WP, 3 Apr. 1993, A19. 127. TWIG, 2 Apr. 1993, 1-2; DPA, 2 Apr. 1993, trans. in FBIS, 2 Apr. 1993, 20; WP, 3 Apr. 1993, A19; and WP, 9 Apr. 1993, A19. The cabinet decision is printed as "Oberwachung des Flugverbots iiber BosnienHerzegowina unter deutscher Beteiligung," Bulletin, no. 29 (7 Apr. 1993), 253-54. The principal deviation from the script was that the SDP also filed for an injunction, but this action did not alter the outcome. 128. Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2 BvE 5/93 and 2 BvQ 11193, 8 Apr. 1993. Summaries are printed in FAZ, 10 Apr. 1993, and Auswartiges Amt, Auj3enpolitik. For news reports see, TWIG, 9 Apr. 1993, 1, and 16 Apr. 1993, 1; WP, 9 Apr. 1993, A19; and NYT, 9 Apr. 1993, A5. The Court's decision appears to have been strongly influenced by the arguments presented to the Court by government and NATO officials. See WP, 8 Apr. 1993, A39; FAZ, 10 Apr. 1993; FBIS, 9 Apr. 1993, 16; and Spiegel, 12 Apr. 1993, 22-25, trans. in FBIS, 21 Apr. 1993, 15-18. 129. NYT, 18 Dec. 1992, A3; WP, 18 Dec. 1992, A42; DDP, 17 Dec. 1992, trans. in FBIS, 17 Dec. 1992, 13; FAZ, 18 Dec. 1992, 1-2, trans. in FBIS, 21 Dec. 1992, 15; and TWIG, 18 Dec. 1992, 1. The cabinet decision is printedinBulletin,no.141 (29Dec.1992), 1315. 130. In addition to the citations in the previous note, see DPA, 15 Dec. 1992, trans. inFBIS, 16 Dec. 1992,3. 131. Prior to the cabinet decision, some Social Democrats had suggested they would support Bundeswehr involvement in Somalia provided that the Basic Law were first amended. See DPA, 9 Dec. 1992, trans. in FBIS, 9 Dec. 1992, 11; ADN, 13 Dec. 1992, trans. inFBIS, 14 Dec. 1992, 25; SZ, 11 Dec. 1992, 2, trans. in FBIS, 15 Dec. 1992, 24; and Bild, 17 Dec. 1992, 2, trans. in FBIS, 18 Dec. 1992, 18. 132. In late December, the German government had decided to delay the deployment of even an advance party until the UN Secretary General had reported on the conclusion of the pacification phase. 133. A German translation ofBoutros-Ghali's letter is printed in SzS, no. 5 (May 1993), 9-10. 134. The government's decision is printed as "BeschluJ3 der Bundesregierung zur Unterstiitzung von UNOSOM II in Somalia," Bulletin, no. 32 (23 Apr. 1993), 280-81. For further details, see Riihe, "Erklarung des Bun-

Notes to Pages 199-202

337

desverteidungsministers," 347, and SzS, no. 6 (June 1993), 6-10. On initial concerns within the cabinet about the constitutionality of the deployment, see SZ, 15 Apr. 1993, 1, trans. in FBIS, 16 Apr. 1993, 10, and Zeit, 23 Apr. 1993, 4, trans. in FBIS, 6 May 1993, 17. 135. In addition to the previously cited government statements, see Kinkel's April21 remarks in the Bundestag, "Erklarung der Bundesregierung zur deutschen Mithilfe," 279. 136. SZ, 21 Apr. 1993, 1, trans. in FBIS, 22 Apr. 1993, 14; ZDF, 21 Apr. 1993, trans. in FBIS, 22 Apr. 1993, 23; FAZ, 27 Apr. 1993, 5, trans. in FBIS, 28 Apr. 1993, 17; SZ, 8 June 1993, 1, trans. in FBIS, 9 June 1993, 9; DPA, 14 June 1993, trans. in FBIS, 14 June 1993, 11; FAZ, 18 June 1993, 2, trans. in FBIS, 21 June 1993, 4; and DPA, 22 June 1993, trans. in FBIS, 23 June 1993, 10. 137. DDP, 15 June 1993, trans. inFBIS, 16 June 1993, 3; N-TV, 17 June 1993, trans. in FBIS, 18 June 1993, 7 and 9; DDP, 23 June 1993, trans. in FBIS, 23 June 1993, 9; ADN, 22 June 1993, and DDP, 22 June 1993, both trans. in FBIS, 23 June 1993, 10; and TWIG, 25 June 1993, 2. 138. Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2 BvQ 17/93, 23 June 1993. Excerpts are reprinted in Auswartiges Amt, Auj3enpolitik, 948-53. 139. DDP, 2 July 1992, trans. in FBIS, 6 July 1993, 1. 140. FAZ, 6 Mar. 1992, 4, trans. in FBJS, 6 Mar. 1992, 6; Spiegel, 16 Mar. 1992, 18-21, trans. in FBIS, 17 Mar. 1992, 4; Spiegel, 20 Apr. 1992, 91 and 93, trans. in FBIS, 4 May 1992, 21-22; DPA, 14 May 1992, trans. in FBIS, 14 May 1992, 6-7; SZ, 8 May 1992, 9, trans. in FBIS, 20 May 1992, 19; Bild am Sonntag, 21 June 1992, 4, trans. in FBIS, 24 June 1992, 12; DF, 12 July 1992, trans. in FBJS, 14 July 1992, 19; Spiegel, 20 July 1992, 32-35, trans. in FBIS, 21 July 1992, 6; and SZ, 17 July 1992, 4, trans. in FBJS, 21 July 1992, 14. The quote appears in SZ, 25 Aug. 1992, 1, trans. in FBIS, 26 Aug. 1992. 141. The text is reprinted in BPA, "Freiheit und Verantwortung gehoren zusammen," Part II, 2-3. See also FAZ, 22 June 1992, 2, trans. in FBIS, 10 July 1992, 15-16. 142. BPA, "Freiheit und Verantwortung gehOren zusammen," Part II, 810. See also SZ, 12 June 1992, 2, trans. in FBIS, 15 June 1992, 13, and DPA, 23 June 1992, trans. inFBIS, 24 June 1992, 12. 143. FAZ, 17 June 1992, 5, trans. in FBIS, 19 June 1992, 12; FR, 3 July 1992, 7, trans. in FBIS, 14 July 1992, 17; SZ, 11-12 July 1992, 1, trans. in FBIS, 14 July 1992, 19; and SZ, 15 July 1992, 4, trans. in FB/S, 17 July 1992, 11. 144. The FDP proposal is printed in BPA, "Freiheit und Verantwortung gehOren zusammen," Part II, 4-5. For CDU criticism, see FAZ, 27 Aug.

338

Notes to Pages 202-4

1992, 5, trans. in FBIS, 28 Aug. 1992, 5-6. Some reports suggest that Kinkel favored requiring a two-thirds majority for peace-making operations in order to win the support of the SPD. See FAZ, 16 Sept. 1992, trans. in FBIS, 16 Oct. 1992, 9; Bild am Sonntag, 6 Dec. 1992, 4-5, trans. in FBIS, 8 Dec. 1992, 21; and ARD, 23 Dec. 1992, trans. in FBIS, 24 Dec. 1992, 12. 145. FAZ, 23 July 1992, 1-2, trans. in FBIS, 10 Aug. 1992, 8; DPA, 6 Aug. 1992, trans. in FBIS, 7 Aug. 1992, 7; and Zeit, 11 Sept. 1992, 4, trans. in FBIS, 25 Sept. 1992, 26. Also, author's interview with an official in the offices of the SPD parliamentary group, Borin; 1 June 1994. 146. See, for example, FAZ, 11 June 1992, 1.:..2, trans. in F:BIS, 12 June 1992, 12; SZ, 11...:12 July 1992, 1, trans. inFBIS, 14 July 1992, 19; FAZ, 17 July 1992, l-2, trans. in FBIS, 29 July 1992, 6; FAZ, 11 Aug. 1992, 1-2, trans. in FBIS, 12 Aug. 1992, 5; FAZ, 14 Aug. 1992, 2, trans. in FB/S, 18 Aug. 1992, 6; and SZ, 25 July 1992, 6, trans. in FBIS, 20 Aug. 1992, 9. 147. FAZ, 24 Aug. 1992, 1-2, trans. in FBIS, 25 Aug. 1992, 7, and FAZ, 25 Aug. 1992, 3, trans. in FBIS, 9 Sept. 1992, 20-21. The proposed program is printed in FR, 27 Aug. 1992, 16, trans. in FBIS, 9 Sept. 1992,21-26. 148. Author's interviews with an official in the national headquarters of the SPD, Bonn, 15 July 1993, and an official in the' offices of the SPD parliamentary group, Bonn, 1 June 1994, and Zeit, 11 Sept. 1992, 4, trans. in FBIS, 25 Sept. 1992,25. See also Riihe's criticism ofthe.proposal in SZ, 25 Aug.1992, 1, trans. inFBIS, 26 Aug. 1992, 10. 149. SPD, "SPD-Sofortprogramm." 150. DPA, 13 Jan. 1993, trans. in FBIS, 14 Jan. 1993, 23, and Klose, "Germany," 24. 151. See, for example, Kinkel, "ErkHirung der Bundesregierung zur deutschen Mithi1fe," 279. 152. SZ, 23 Nov. 1992, 2, trans. in FBIS, 27 Nov. 1992, 20; DPA, 2 Dec. 1992, trans. in FBIS, 3 Dec. 1992, 13; Bild am Sonntag, 6 Dec. 1992, 4-5, trans. in FBIS, 8 Dec. 1992, 20; Handelsblatt, 11-12 Dec. 1992, 2, trans. in FBIS, 15 Dec. 1992, 26; Rheinischer Merkur, 25 Dec. 1992, 4, trans. in FBIS, 29 Dec. 1992, 6; and Zeit, 23 Jan. 1993, 4, trans. in FBIS, 4 Feb. 1993, 15. In making this suggestion, Riihe may also have been responding to criticism from the CDU Bundestag group for his resistance to joining the enforcement action in the Adriatic. 153. DP~, 19 Feb. 1992, trans. in FBIS, 20 Feb. 1992, 9. 154. DDP, 8 Jan. 1993, trans. in FBIS, 11 Jan. 1993, 7; DF, 10 Jan. 1993, trans. in FBIS, 11 Jan. 1993, 10; SZ, 8 Jan. 1993, 2, trans. in FBIS, 11 Jan. 1993, 13; andHandelsblatt, 12 Jan. 1993,2, trans. inFBIS, 13 Jan. 1993, 13. A secondary point of contention was whether Article 24 or Article 87 should serve as the constitutional basis for such operations.

Notes to Pages 204-6

339

155. ADN, 11 Jan. 1993, trans. in FBIS, 11 Jan. 1993, 6; FAZ, 12 Jan. 1993, 1-2, trans. in FBIS, 12 Jan. 1993, 6-7; Handelsblatt, 12 Jan. 1993, 2, trans. in FBIS, 13 Jan. 1993, 13; and NYT, 12 Jan. 1993, All. Additional pr.essure was being exerted by NATO Secretary General Manfred Worner. See DDP, 8 Jan. 1993, trans. inFBIS, 11 Jan. 1993, 10, and SZ, 11 Jan. 1993, 2, trans. inFBIS, 13 Jan. 1993, 15. 156. DF, 10 Jan. 1993, trans. inFBIS, 11 Jan. 1993, 10, andHandelsblatt, 12 Jan. 1993,2, trans. in FBIS, 13 Jan. 1993, 13. 157. WP, 12 Jan. 1993, A14, and NYT, 12 Jan. 1993, All. Kohl is quoted in ZDF, 21 Jan. 1993, trans. in FBIS, 25 Jan. 1993, 19. As during the AWACS dispute, which was unfolding concurrently, both the Union and the FDP were also eager to preserve the coalition. (Zeit, 22 Jan. 1993, 4, trans. in FBIS, 4 Feb. 1993, 15, and author's interview with an official in the KomadAdenauer-Stiftung, Sankt Augustin, 8 June 1994.) 158. The draft amendment is reprinted in BPA, "Freiheit und Verantwortung gehoren zusarmnen," Part III, 2. For additional cormnentary and analysis, see the statements made during the January 15 Bundestag debate, which are reprinted in ibid., 12-24, and FAZ, 14 Jan. 1993, 1-2, trans. inFBIS, 15 Jan. 1993, 15-16. 159. FAZ, 28 Jan. 1993, 3, trans. in FBIS, 29 Jan. 1993, 12. Because of ambiguous wording in the draft amendment, which implied that even the fulfillment of Germany's alliance obligations might require the support of two-thirds of the Bundestag, the government subsequently offered a revised version that clarified the matter. See DPA, 4 Mar. 1993, trans. in FBIS, 4 Mar. 1993, 12, andSZ, 5 Mar. 1993,6, trans. inFBIS, 5 Mar. 1993,29. 160. TWIG, 15 Jan. 1993, 1. 161. For SPD reactions, see, especially, Karsten Voigt's January 15 speech in the Bundestag, reprinted in BPA, "Freiheit und Verantwortung gehoren zusarmnen," Part III, 15-16. See also Fuchs, "Mit deutschen Soldaten," 43; SZ, 5 Feb. 1993, 9, trans. in FBIS, 8 Feb. 1993, 20; ZDF, 31 Mar. 1993, trans. in FBIS, 1 Apr. 1993, 22; and FAZ, 27 Apr. 1993, 5, trans. inFBIS, 28 Apr. 1993, 17. 162. Zeit, 22 Jan. 1993,4, trans. inFB/S, 4 Feb. 1993, 15. 163. SZ, 4 Feb. 1993, 6, trans. in FBIS, 11 Feb. 1993, 28-29. For other proposals for change, see DDP, 13 Dec. 1992, trans. in FBIS, 14 Dec. 1992, 25, and Klose, "Germany," 24. 164. FAZ, 10 Aug. 1993, 1, trans. in FBIS, 11 Aug. 1993, 7; FAZ, 23 Aug. 1993, 1-2, trans. in FBIS, 24 Aug. 1993, 12-13; FAZ, 23 Aug. 1993, 10, trans. in FBIS, 16 Sept. 1993, 12-13; SzS, no. 9 (Sept. 1993), 21; and Spiegel, 6 Sept. 1993,22-24, trans. inFBIS, 22 Sept. 1993,26-29. 165. FAZ, 23 Aug. 1993, 10, trans. in FBIS, 16 Sept. 1993, 12-13; FAZ,

340

Notes to Pages 206--8

30 Aug. 1993, 2, trans. in FBIS, 1 Sept. 1993, 8-9; SzS, no. 9 (Sept. 1993), 22-24; and Spiegel, 6 Sept. 1993, 22.:...24, trans. in FBIS, 22 Sept. 1993, 2728. 166. FAZ, 23 Aug. 1993, 10, trans. inFBIS, 16 Sept. 1993, 12-13. 167. FAZ, 1 Sept. 1993, 1, trans. in FBIS, 16 Sept. 1993, 21-22, and Muller, "Military Intervention," 134-35. For some of Scharping's earliest statements on the issue, see DDP, 8 July 1993, trans. in FBIS, 9 July 1993, 26, and SZ, 9 July 1993, 8, trans. in FBIS, 12 July 1993, 15. 168. Wieczorek-Zeul, "Wenn aus den 'blauen Engeln"'; FAZ, 23 Aug. 1993, 10, trans. in FBIS, 16 Sept. 1993, 12-13; and FAZ, 23 Aug. 1993, 1-2, trans. in FBIS, 24 Aug. 1993, 13. 169. Votes were held by the party's presidium, its ad hoc international relations commission, and the party executive. See DDP, 24 Aug. 1993, trans. in FBIS, 24 Aug. 1993, 12; DPA, 27 Aug. 1993, trans. in FBIS, 30 Aug. 1993, 5; FAZ, 31 Aug. 1993, 2, trans. in FBIS, 1 Sept. 1993, 8; FAZ, 1 Sept. 1993, 1, trans. in FBIS, 16 Sept. 1993, 22; and FAZ, 15 Sept. 1993, trans. in FBIS, 16 Sept. 1993, 21. 170. FAZ, 1 Sept. 1993, 1, trans. inFBIS, 16 Sept. 1993,22. 171. SPD, "Perspektiven," 14-15. For additional descriptions, see ADN, 18 Nov. 1993, trans. in FBIS, 19 Nov. 1993, 20; Welt, 19 Nov. 1993, 8, trans. in FBIS, 22 Nov. 1993, 19; and TWIG, 19 Nov. 1993, 1. 172. ARD, 18 June 1993, trans. in FBIS, 21 June 1993, 5; Welt, 19 July 1993, 7, trans. in FBIS, 20 July 1993, 27; ZDF, 25 July 1993, trans. in FBIS, 26 July 1993, 11; and SzS, no. 9 (Sept. 1993), 13-14. See also Kinkel, "ErkHirung der Bundesregierung zur deutschen Mithilfe," 277-80. 173. FAZ, 29 June 1993,5, trans. inFBIS, 30 June 1993, 2; FAZ, 10 July 1993, 1, trans. in FBIS, 12 July 1993, 14; Spiegel, 2 Aug. 1993, 21-23, trans. in FBIS, 3 Aug. 1993, 19-20; and Muller, "Military Intervention," 132. 174. Zeit, 22 Jan. 1993,4, trans .. in FBIS, 4 Feb. 1993, 15; Zeit, 16 Apr. 1993, 5, trans. in FBJS, 27 Apr. 1993, 25; Spiegel, 26 Apr. 1993, 18-27, trans. in FBIS, 6 May 1993, 16; and SzS, no. 9 (Sept. 1993), 20. 175. SZ, 22 June 1993, 2, trans. in FBIS, 23 June 1993, 9; ARD, 24 July 1993, trans. in FBIS, 26 July 1993, 14; and Berliner Zeitung, 27 July 1993, 4, trans. in FBIS, 2 Aug. 1993, 19. 176. Kinkel in "Anhorung vor dem Bundesverfassungsgericht zum Auslandseinsatz der Bundeswehr," Bulletin, no. 35 (22 Apr. 1994), 310-11. See also Kinkel, Speech to the Annual Meeting of the German Society for Defence Technology, 9, and Kinkel, "Konsequenzen," 657-58. 177. Kohl, "European Security," 3; Kohl, "Deutschlands Verantwortung," 330; Kinkel in "Anhorung," Bulletin, no. 35 (22 Apr. 1994), 311; and Kinkel, "Konsequenzen," 657-58. Early in 1994, the U.S. Senate had passed a reso-

Notes to Pages 208-10

341

lution calling on Germany to participate without restriction in future UN military missions. See SZ, 4 Feb. 1994, 2, trans. in FBIS, 4 Feb. 1994, 10, and SZ, 4 Feb. 1994, 4, trans. in FBIS, 7 Feb. 1994, 22. 178. Kinkel and Ruhe in "Anhorung," Bulletin, no. 35 (22 Apr. 1994), 311; Kinkel, "Konsequenzen," 658; ZDF, 21 Apr. 1993, trans. in FBJS, 22 Apr. 1993, 17; ZDF, 2 July 1993, trans. inFBIS, 6 July 1993, 3-4; ZDF, 13 Jan. 1994, trans. in FBIS, 14 Jan. 1994,4 and 6-7; DF, 18 Dec. 1994, trans. in FBJS, 18 Apr. 1994, 16; FBIS, 20 Apr. 1994, 20; DDP/ADN, 7 June 1994, trans. inFBIS, 8 June 1994, 23; andDDP/ADN, 19 June 1994, trans. inFBIS, 20 June 1994, 12. 179. Focus, 11 Apr. 1994, 38, trans. in FBIS, 14 Apr. 1994, 16; FAZ, 16 Apr. 1994, 3, trans. in FBJS, 18 Apr. 1994, 23; Berliner Zeitung, 16-17 Apr. 1994, 5, trans. in FBJS, 22 Apr. 1994, 15-16; FR, 26 Apr. 1994, 5, trans. in FBJS, 28 Apr. 1994, 24; SZ, 10 Feb. 1994,4, trans. inFBIS, 10 Feb. 1994, 24; and author's interview with an SPD member of the Bundestag, Bonn, 13 June 1994. 180. GIC, "Ruling," and Verlautbarung der Pressestelle des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, no. 29/94 (Karlsruhe, 12 July 1994). For press reports, see FAZ, 13 July 1994, 1-2, trans. in FBIS, 22 July 1994, 13-14, and WP, 13 July 1994, A20. This outcome was not unexpected. Much of the oral hearings before the Court had concerned the role of the Bundestag in decision making, suggesting that the Court's ruling on the substantive issues would parallel its 1993 decisions permitting German participation in the AWACS and Somalia operations. (Author's interview with an official in the Chancellor's Office, Bonn, 17 June 1994.) 181. Verlautbarung der Pressestelle des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, no. 29/94, andFAZ, 13 July 1994, 1-2, trans. inFBJS, 22 July 1994, 13. 182. Verlautbarung der Pressestelle des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, no. 29/94, and FAZ, 13 July 1994, 1-2, trans. in FBJS, 22 July 1994, 13-14. The judges also deadlocked over the subsidiary question of whether the changes that had taken place in NATO and the WEU since the end of the Cold War required that the respective alliance treaties be subject anew to parliamentary review and approval. 183. On Rwanda, see SZ, 21 Oct. 1993, I, trans. in FBIS, 22 Oct. 1993, 37; SZ, 19 May 1994, 1, trans. in FBIS, 19 May 1994, 7; and SZ, 20 May 1994, 1, trans. in FBJS, 24 May 1994, 4. For further discussion of the Bundeswehr's shortcomings, see Chapter Seven. 184. See, for example, the remarks of Riihe in "Euro-Atlantic Security" and in DDP/ADN, 23 Mar. 1994, trans. in FBIS, 24 Mar. 1994, 7. 185. See, especially, Asmus, German Strategy, 60-67, which is based on a longitudinal series of three annual polls. Similar numbers are given in NYT, 21 Apr. 1993, A17; FAZ, 11 Feb. 1993, 5, trans. in FBIS, 17 Feb. 1993, 14;

342

Notes to Pages 210-12

Zeit, 7 May 1993, 6, trans. in FBIS, 19 May 1993, 8; and Diehl, "UNEinslitze," 17. 186. Asmus, "Germany's Contribution," 44. 187. Kinkel, "Konsequenzen," 657-58. See, also, Kohl, "Aufbruch in die Zukunft," 991; Kinkel in "Anhorung," Bulletin, no. 35 (22 Apr. 1994), 311; Kinkel, "Bundeswehr," 864; WP, 13 July 1994, A20; NYT, 13 July 1994, A13; andFAZ, 14 July 1994,3, trans. inFBIS, 15 July 1994,11. 188. Kohl, "Aufbruch in die Zukunft," 991; Kinkel, "Konsequenzen," 658; Kinkel, "Bundeswehr," 864; Riihe, "Europa und Amerika," 16-17; FAZ, 14 July 1994, 3, trans. in FBIS, 15 July 1994, 11; Focus, 18 July 1994, 22-23, trans. in FBIS, 19 July 1994, 14; Handelsblatt, 26 Aug. 1994, 5, trans. in FBJS, 30 Aug. 1994, 11; FAZ, 7 Oct. 1994, 1-2, trans. in FBJS, 11 Oct. 1994, 23; Welt am Sonntag, 27 Nov. 1994, 3, trans. in FBIS, 29 Nov. 1994, 21;FAZ, 16Feb.l995, 7,trans.inFB/S, 17Feb.1995, 18;andFAZ, 17Mar. . 1995, 8-9, trans. in FBIS, 18 Apr. 1995, 14. See also Asmus, "Germany's Contribution," 42, and Meiers, "Germany," 92. 189. On the opposition that Somalia engendered to the use of ad hoc military arrangements, see WP, 25 Feb. 1994, A27, and SzS, no. 3 (Mar. 1994), 47. . 190. Indeed, one member of the SPD criticized the government for placing impossible conditions on the use of the Bundeswehr in UN missions. See DDP/ADN, 4 Feb. 1995, trans. in FBIS, 6 Feb. 1995, 22. 191. Welt am Sonntag, 27 Nov. 1994, 3, trans. in FBJS, 28 Nov. 1994, 20; Spiegel, 8 Jan. 1995, 23-25, trans. in FBIS, 9 Jan. 1995, 19; Welt, 23 Jan. 1995, 2, trans. in FBIS, 25 Jan. 1995, 19; FAZ, 16 Feb. 1995, 7, trans. in FBIS, 17 Feb. 1995, 18; Welt, 19 Feb. 1995,34, trans. inFBIS, 21 Feb. 1995, .20; and Riihe, "Europa und Amerika," 16. See also Asmus, "Germany's Contribution," 43, and Meiers, "Germany," 93. 192. FAZ, 14 July 1994, 3, trans. in FBIS, 15 July 1994, 11; Focus, 18 July 1994, 22-23, trans. in FBIS, 19 July 1994, 14; Handelsblatt, 26 Aug. 1994, 5, trans. in FBJS, 30 Aug. 1994, 11; FAZ, 17 Mar. 1995, 8-9, trans. in FBJS, 18 Apr. 1995, 14; and Riihe, "Europa und Amerika," 17. 193. Bild, 13 July 1994, 2, trans. in FBIS, 13 July 1994, 21; Focus, 18 July 1994, 22-23, trans. in FBIS, 19 July 1994, 14; FAZ, 30 Nov. 1994, 2, trans. in FBIS, 30 Nov. 1994, 19; and ARD, 1 Dec. 1994, trans. in FBIS, 2 Dec. 1994, 21. 194. Areas in which Germany was most active included pressing for an EC trade embargo on Serbia, establishing an international war crimes tribunal, and supporting the unsuccessful 1993 U.S. proposal to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia in addition to its participation in the Sarajevo airlift and the air drops in eastern Bosnia.

Notes to Pages 212-14

343

195. See also Maull, "Germany in the Yugoslav Crisis," 105, and Muller, "Military Intervention," 126. 196. German leaders frequently cautioned that their country must be reserved about offering advice on military actions. See, for example, ARD, 3 Aug. 1992, trans. in FBIS, 4 Aug. 1992, 4; DDP, 10 Aug. 1992, trans. in FBIS, 13 Aug. 1992, 4; DDP, 18 Apr. 1993, trans. in FBJS, 19 Apr. 1993, 16; and SzS, no. 6 (June 1993), 20. 197. The name of the European Community was formally changed to the European Union (EU) on November 1, 1993, when the Treaty on European Union went into effect. 198. AFP, 8 Nov. 1993, in FBJS, 9 Nov. 1993, 9-10; FAZ, 10 Nov. 1993, 7, trans. in FBJS, 10 Nov. 1993, 6; AFP, 15 Nov. 1993, in FBIS, 16 Nov. 1993, 3; AFP, 21 Nov, 1993, in FBIS, 22 Nov. 1993, 1; DF, 22 Nov. 1993, trans. inFBIS, 22 Nov. 1993, 11-12; FBIS, 23 Nov. 1993, 1; and TWIG, 26 Nov. 1993, l. 199. This had happened in May 1993, for example, when the United States, Britain, France, Russia, and Spain developed a plan to create safe havens in Bosnia for the Muslim population. See NYT, 27 May 1993, A12. 200. Author's interview with an official in the Chancellor's Office, Bonn, 21 June 1994. 201. For German reactions, see FBIS, 7 Feb. 1994, 5-8. 202. DDP/ADN, 17 Feb. 1994, trans. in FBIS, 18 Feb. 1994, 28; ZDF, 20 Feb. 1994, trans. in FBJS, 22 Feb. 1994, 1; N-TV, 21 Feb. 1994, trans. in FBIS, 22 Feb. 1994, 2; Welt am Sonntag, 20 Feb. 1994, 2, trans. in FBIS, 22 Feb. 1994, 22; and Maull, "Germany in the Yugoslav Crisis," 107. Kinkel described these actions, undoubtedly with some exaggeration, as "the biggest and most important initiative of German foreign policy in many years." (Spiegel, 28 Feb. 1994, 18-20, trans. in FBIS, 1 Mar. 1994, 17.) 203. DF, 7 Feb. 1994, trans. in FBIS, 7 Feb. 1994, 6-7; ZDF, 20 Feb. 1994, trans. in FBIS, 22 Feb. 1994, 1; FAZ, 29 Nov. 1994, 2, trans. in FBIS, 29 Nov. 1994, 21; and WP, 1 Dec. 1994, A49. 204. ARD, I Dec. 1994, trans. in FBIS, 2 Dec. 1994, 20-21; FAZ, 3 Dec. 1994, 14, trans. in FBIS, 5 Dec. 1994, 23; WP, 3 Dec. 1994, A26; and Welt am Sonntag, 11 Dec. 1994, 25-26, trans. in FBIS, 13 Dec. 1994, 22. 205. Opinion polls showed a majority opposing the proposed deployment. See Meiers, "Germany," 85, and Rubel and May, Ein "normales" Deutschland? 53. 206. SZ, 6 Dec. 1994,4, trans. in FBIS, 7 Dec. 1994, 13; SZ, 8 Dec. 1994, 4, trans. in FBIS, 12 Dec. 1994, 34; Welt, 9 Dec. 1994, 6, trans. in FBIS, 12 Dec. 1994, 34; NYT, 8 Dec. 1994, AS; WP, 9 Dec. 1994, A41; and Meiers, "Germany," 85-86. There is some evidence that the government, underesti-

344

Notes to Pages 214-15

mating the negative reaction that would follow, had actually solicited the NATO request. The importance of maintaining solidarity within the government had been heightened by the October 1994 federal elections, which had reduced the coalition's previously substantial majority in the Bundestag to a mere ten seats. 207. SZ, 14 Dec. 1994,4, trans. in FBJS, 14 Dec. 1994, 10; ZDF, 15 Dec. 1994, trans. in FBIS, 15 Dec. 1994, 23; SZ, 15 Dec. 1994, 2, trans. in FBIS, 16 Dec. 1994, 11; ZDF, 15 Dec. 1994, trans. in FBIS, 16 Dec. 1994, 13; Bild, 19 Dec. 1994, 2, trans. in FBIS, 19 Dec. 1994, 14; Spiegel, 19 Dec. 1994, 18-21, trans. inFBIS, 20 Dec. 1994, 15; and TWIG, 10 Dec. 1995,2. 208. Spiegel, 12 Dec. 1994, 24, trans. in FBIS, 13 Dec. 1994, 24; Welt am Sonntag, 18 Dec. 1994, 2, trans. in FBIS, 20 Dec. 1994, 16; and FAZ, 23 Dec. 1994, 2, trans. in FBJS, 27 Dec. 1994, 13. See also Asmus, "Germany's Contribution," 44, and Meiers, "Germany," 90. 209. NYT, 18 Dec. 1994, 25; SZ, 17-18 Dec. 1994, 1, trans. in FBIS, 20 Dec. 1994, 14; FAZ, 21 Dec. 1994; and SzS, no. 1 (Jan. 1995), 30-31. For a detailed breakdown of the planned German contribution, see SzS, no. 3 (Mar. 1995), 44. 210. SZ, 1 June 1995, 1, trans. in FBIS, 2 June 1995, 11; N-TV, 27 June 1995, trans. in FBIS, 28 June 1995, 16; and the speeches by Kinkel and Riihe in the Bundestag, printed in Deutscher Bundestag, Stenographischer Bericht, Plenarprotokol 13/48, 3956-58 and 3998-4000, respectively. See also NYT, 27 June 1995, A3; WP, 1 July 1995, Al; and TWIG, 7 July 1995, 1-2. 211. FBJS, 2 June 1995, 11; Spiegel, 5 June 1995,30-31, trans. in FBIS, 8 June 1995, 16-17; and Scharping's speech in the Bundestag, printed in Deutscher Bundestag, Stenographischer Bericht, Plenarprotokol13148, 396364. See also Meiers, "Germany," 91. 212. NYT, 27 June 1995, A3; TWIG, 30 June 1995, 1-2, and 7 July 1995, 1-2; WP, 1 July 1995, AI; and German Embassy, "Germany Commits Troops." 213. FAZ, 3 June 1995, 1, trans. in FBJS, 5 June 1995, 18; SZ, 3-5 June 1995, 7, trans. in FBIS, 6 June 1995, 3; AFP, 1 June 1995, in FBIS, 2 June 1994, 11; SZ, 1 June 1995, 1, trans. in FBIS, 2 June 1995, 11; and FAZ, 8 June 1995, 5, trans. in FBIS, 9 June 1995, 18. See also Meiers, "Germany," 88. In addition to 14 combat and reconnaissance aircraft, the deployment would include several other small air force detachments and 500 military medical personnel, who would operate a field hospital jointly with French troops in Croatia. A total of 1,500 Bundeswehr troops would be involved. 214. Deutscher Bundestag, Stenographischer Bericht, Plenarprotokol 13/48, 3958 and 4000; WP, 1 July 1995, A1; and WP, 19 Aug. 1995, A15. In fact, less than 20 percent (160 of 922) of the missions flown by the German

Notes to Pages 216-19

345

air force in the region between July and December 1995 involved penetrating Bosnian air space. See SzS, no. 12 (Dec. 1996), 40. 215. Kinkel, "Erklarung der Bundesregierung zur Friedensvereinbarung," 973-76; Kinkel, Statement to the Bundestag, 4; Kohl, "Deutsche Beteiligung," 1009-10; and ZDF, 30 Nov. 1995, trans. in FBIS, 30 Nov. 1995, 20-21. 216. DF, 17 Nov. 1995, trans. in FBIS, 20 Nov. 1995, 14, and TWIG, 8 Dec. 1995, 1-2. 217. TWIG, 8 Dec. 1995, 1, and Cooper, "When Just Causes." 218. Kinkel, "Erklarung der Bundesregierung zur Friedensvereinbarung," 976. 219. For details of the size and nature of the German contribution, see Welt am Sonntag, 22 Oct. 1995, 2, trans. in FBIS, 24 Oct. 1995, 13, and TWIG, 27 Oct. 1995, 2. For a description of its activities, see SzS, no. 9 (Sept. 1996), 23-25. 220. FBIS, 8 Sept. 1995, 21; European, 5-11 Oct. 1995, in FBIS, 5 Oct. 1995, 9; Spiegel, 16 Oct. 1995, 24-27, trans. in FBIS, 18 Oct. 1995, 13-14; and Zeit, I Dec. 1995, 9, trans. in FBIS, 4 Dec. 1995, 16. See also NYT, 27 June 1995, A3. 221. "Antrag der Bundesregierung zur weiteren deutschen Beteiligung an der Friedenssicherung im friiheren Jugoslawien," Bulletin, no. 103 (16 Dec. 1996), 1119-20; SzS, no. 11 (Nov. 1996), 54; Welt am Sonntag, 15 Sept. 1996, 6, trans. in FBIS, 18 Sept. 1996; and Welt, 10 Oct. 1996, trans. in FBIS, 11 Oct. 1996. 222. Welt, 5 Oct. 1996, trans. in FBIS, 9 Oct. 1996, and Welt am Sonntag, 24 Nov. 1996, 35, trans. in FBIS, 27 Nov. 1996. 223. Most Greens and some 40 Social Democracts voted against the measure on the grounds that the peacekeeping operation should be conducted directly by the UN rather than by NATO, not because they objected in principle to the participation of the Bundeswehr. See FAZ, 14 Dec. 1996, 1-2; SZ, 14-15 Dec. 1996, 2; andDas Parlament, 20-27 Dec. 1996, 1 and 3-6. 224. Spiegel, 23 Sept. 1996, reprinted in SzS, no. 10 (Oct. 1996), 32, and SZ, 11 Dec. 1996, 2, trans. in FBIS, 13 Dec. 1996. 225. SzS, no. 12 (Dec. 1996), 39. 226. See the comments of Scharping in TWIG, 27 Sept. 1996, 1, and SZ, 25 Nov. 1996, 10, trans. in FBIS, 27 Nov. 1996, and those of SDP foreign policy expert Gunter Verheugen in DF, 17 Sept. 1996, trans. in FBIS, 18 Sept. 1996. 227. SzS, no. 10 (Oct. 1996), 7, and SZ, 30 Aug. 1996, 4, trans. in FB1S, 3 Sept. 1996. 228. Author's interview with an official in the Komad-Adenauer-Stif-

346

Notes to Pages 219-34

tung, Sankt Augustin, 8 June 1994. See also Kinkel's remarks in Asmus, "Germany's Contribution," 45. 229. These limitations can be viewed as resulting from the institutionalization of Cold War conceptions ofhow the Bundeswehr could and should be used. 230. Author's interview with a U.S. Defense Department official, Washington, D.C., 31 Mar. 1993. 231. For corresponding public opinion data, see Juhasz and Rattinger, "German Attitudes," table 2. 232. Muller, "Military Intervention," 131. 233. Author's interview with an official in the Konrad-AdenauerStiftung, Sankt Augustin, 8 June 1994. Lewis Edinger has written that the sense of party loyalty and discipline is strongest within the SPD. See his West German Politics, 250.

Chapter Nine Waltz, "Correspondence," 198. 1. See also the surnrnary in Berger, "Past in the Present," 40. 2. John Mearsheimer's controversial but influential argument about the future of Europe is predicated on this assumption. ("Back to the Future," 556. See also Waltz, "Emerging Structure," 76.) 3. O'Brien, "Future of'the West,"' 9. 4. This possibility is suggested in Schwarz, "Germany's National and European Interests," 89. 5. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future," 36-38; Waltz, "Emerging Structure," 66-67; and Layne, "Unipolar Illusion," 37. Actual French fears of possible German nuclear ambitions are noted in WP, 17 Mar. 1990, A22. 6. Van Orden, "Bundeswehr"; Honig, "'Renationalization"'; Peters, "Germany's Future Defense Policy"; and Wolfram Wette, "The Desire for World Power," Zeit, 30 July 1993, 4, trans. in FBIS, 16 Aug. 1993, 20-22. 7. Gordon, "Normalization." 8. Van Orden, "Bundeswehr," 365. 9. See T.-D. Young, "Reforming NATO's Command and Control Structures," 32-33, and Schlor, "German Security Policy," 56-57. 10. Wette ("The Desire for World Power") has also placed considerable emphasis on what he has viewed as efforts by the German military to promote a new foreign policy of world-wide military interventionism. 11. T.-D. Young, "Introduction," 5. 12. Similarly, Daniel Hamilton has argued that Germany advances its interests more effectively through institutions than it ever could on its own. See his remarks in U.S. Congress, "U.S.-German Relations," 75-76. EPIGRAPH:

Notes to Pages 234-43

347

13. See also Schweigler, West German Foreign Policy, 12. 14. As Ronald Asmus has argued, "Multilateral institutions also hold promise of allowing Germany to assume a greater role in Europe while simultaneously binding itself with its neighbors in ways that would mitigate residual fears concerning increased German power." See his "German Unification," vii-viii. Also of note in this regard has been Germany's close security cooperation with France, which is conducted through a dense network of bilateral bodies. For further discussion of Franco-German security cooperation, see Haglund, Alliance, and Gordon, France. 15. One annual series of polls found slim majorities supporting a withdrawal of the American military presence in 1990, 1991, and 1993. See Asmus, German Strategy, 37-38. 16. For example, a July 1995 poll showed that a solid majority initially opposed the June 30 Bundestag decision to use combat aircraft to protect the newly constituted UN Reaction Force in Bosnia. See SzS no. 8 (Aug. 1995), 2. 17. McKenzie, "Competing Conceptions," 12. 18. In fairness to neorealists such as Kenneth Waltz, a quote from whom begins this chapter, moreover, it may be premature to conclude that their early predictions about the future course of German policy were erroneous. Waltz has suggested that at least a decade must pass before a defmitive judgment can be rendered. ("Correspondence," 199.) At a minimum, however, a theory that can sketch out only long-term trends in world politics, however accurately, is of limited utility. Neorealism's appeal is further diminished by its suggestion of the inevitability of certain outcomes and the highly circumscribed, if not entirely inconsequential, role that it assigns to human agency. Many scholars, and most policy makers, are concerned primarily with short- to medium-term developments and how these might be influenced precisely in order to shape the long-term evolution of international relations. 19. See also Schli:ir, "German Security Policy," 4 and 65, and Clemens, "Special Kind of Superpower?" 210. 20. For further discussion of this dynamic, see Jervis, "Cooperation," and Jervis, Perception and Misperception, chap. 3. 21. The seminal conceptual analysis of the impact of international developments on domestic politics remains Gourevitch, "Second Image Reversed." As an analog, one might cite here the considerable strengthening of the central institutions of government-what some have termed the "national security state"-that took place in the United States during, and largely as a result of, World War II and the Cold War. 22. See also Muller, "German Foreign Policy," 164. 23. See also Gordon, France, 53.

348

Notes to Pages 244-52

24. Ullman, Securing Europe, 35. 25. Ullman, Securing Europe, 105-6. 26. Krieger, "Germans," 28. 27. Muller, "German Foreign Policy," 164. 28. Krasner, "Regimes," 357-58. 29. See also Duffield, Power Rules, epilogue. 30. See especially Kupchan, Vulnerability of Empire; Johnston, Cultural Realism; Legro, Cooperation Under Fire; Katzenstein, Cultural Norms; Katzenstein, ed., Culture ofNational Security; and Kier, Imagining War. 31. See especially Mayer, Rittberger, and Zum, "Regime Theory," and Levy, Young, and Ziirn, "Study oflnternational Regimes." 32. See also Johnston, "Thinking About Strategic Culture," 54. 33. Johnston has argued that a realpolitik strategic culture may be quite prevalent because it should be a natural result of the process of state formation. See his "Thinking About Strategic Culture," 62. 34. See Almond and Verba, Civic Culture, chap. 2. 35. Johnston, "Thinking About Strategic Culture," 46--47. 36. For a suggestive framework of analysis, see Kowert and Legro, "Norms." Although Kowert and Legro focus on the sources of norms, their framework is applicable to the study of political culture as a whole. 37. For similar conceptions of the sources of change in beliefs and images, see Kupchan, Vulnerability of Empire; Reiter, Crucible of Beliefs; Blum, "Soviet Foreign Policy Belief System"; and Boulding, "National Images." 38. See the discussion of the development of Germany's postwar political-military culture in Berger, "Past in the Present," 47-49. 39. Gourevitch, "Second Image Reversed." 40. See, especially, Wendt, "Anarchy."

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