World Politics in the Age of Uncertainty: The Covid-19 Pandemic, Volume 2 3031396103, 9783031396106

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World Politics in the Age of Uncertainty The Covid-19 Pandemic, Volume 2 Edited by Erman Akıllı Burak Gunes

World Politics in the Age of Uncertainty

Erman Akıllı · Burak Gunes Editors

World Politics in the Age of Uncertainty The Covid-19 Pandemic, Volume 2

Editors Erman Akıllı Department of International Relations, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli University Ankara, Türkiye

Burak Gunes Department of International Relations, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences Kır¸sehir Ahi Evran University Kirsehir, Türkiye

ISBN 978-3-031-39610-6 ISBN 978-3-031-39611-3 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39611-3 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Foreword

It is with pleasure that I write the foreword for this remarkable twovolume edited book, World Politics in the Age of Uncertainty: The Covid-19 Pandemic, Volume 2. As a Turkish academician who had the privilege of receiving the Nobel Prize, I understand the transformative power of knowledge and the importance of rigorous research in unravelling the complexities of our world. This ambitious publication, which explores the intricate intersections of global politics and the COVID-19 pandemic, stands as a testament to the intellectual acumen and dedication of the contributing authors. The COVID-19 pandemic has ushered in an era of unparalleled uncertainty, shaking the very foundations of our societies and institutions. It has illuminated the vulnerabilities and interconnectedness of our global order, exposing the complex web of challenges that confront us. In this critical juncture, it becomes imperative to undertake a comprehensive and multidimensional analysis of the pandemic’s impact on world politics. The contributors to this volume through their thought-provoking analyses, they explore the multifaceted dimensions of the pandemic’s repercussions on global governance, diplomacy, economics, security, and the dynamics of power. By examining both the immediate and long-term consequences, this book provides a comprehensive understanding of the profound transformations taking place in our uncertain world. The editors of this book deserve our gratitude for their efforts in bringing together such a diverse array of scholarly contributions. Their v

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FOREWORD

editorial guidance have ensured that the ideas presented in this book are accessible and intellectually enriching. To the contributing authors, I extend my appreciation for their invaluable contributions to this two-volume publication. Their research and analysis have advanced our understanding of the complex dynamics of world politics during the COVID-19 pandemic. Each chapter represents a step forward in unravelling the intricacies of our interconnected world and contributes to the ongoing global conversation on the challenges and opportunities we face. I would also like to express my gratitude to the team at Palgrave Macmillan for their unwavering support and commitment to academic excellence. Their professionalism and dedication throughout the publication process have been instrumental in transforming this remarkable collection of essays into a cohesive and impactful contribution to the field of international relations and social sciences. In conclusion, World Politics in the Age of Uncertainty: The Covid-19 Pandemic, Volume 2 is a testament to the collective intellectual efforts of the editors and authors who have worked diligently to illuminate the profound transformations unfolding before us. I have no doubt that this publication will serve as a resource for scholars, policymakers, and all those interested in comprehending the far-reaching implications of this unprecedented crisis. Aziz Sancar, Nobel Laureate Department of Biochemistry and Biophysics University of North Carolina Chapel Hill, USA

Preface

These two-volume book series titled World Politics in the Age of Uncertainty—The Covid-19 Pandemic, Volume 2, delves into the profound effects of the pandemic on global affairs, covering international relations, global politics, humanities studies, and social sciences. The book series serves as an invaluable resource for academics, policymakers, and individuals seeking to grasp the intricate nuances of the COVID-19 era. By bringing together experts from various disciplines, it provides a comprehensive and well-rounded outlook on the challenges and opportunities that have emerged from this worldwide crisis. Volume I focuses on the dynamic nature of global politics during the pandemic, exploring changes in power dynamics, the role of international organizations, and challenges in global governance. It offers insights into how the pandemic has shaped the international system, influenced state behaviour, and impacted global cooperation. Volume II features scholars from various disciplines examining the social, cultural, economic, and psychological dimensions of the pandemic. They critically analyse its effects on societies, communities, individuals, and various aspects of human life. Together, the two volumes provide a comprehensive understanding of the pandemic’s impact on world politics, society, and human experiences. We hope that our humble contribution to the two-volume book series, World Politics in the Age of Uncertainty—The Covid-19 Pandemic, Volume 2, will prove valuable to researchers, academics, students, and individuals

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PREFACE

interested in comprehending the profound impact of the pandemic on the international system, state affairs, social sciences, and the redefinition of international relations. These books aim to enhance the existing literature on these subjects, providing insights and understanding of the pandemic and the post-pandemic world order. Kirsehir, Türkiye 2023

Erman Akıllı Burak Gunes

Acknowledgements

As editors, these two-volume book series have been quite a journey for us. Our journey was encouraged and inspired by innumerable people, their persistence and tenacity, and their deeds of support, friendship, and generosity. We are truly privileged to have them on this journey. We want to acknowledge the following: Palgrave Macmillan—for publishing these products of international collaboration, which address the current need for an authoritative reference on COVID-19 and its intersection with International Relations and Social Sciences, • Authors—for their scholarly contributions that formed the substance and shaped the direction of these edited volumes, • Anca Pusca—for her specialist guidance and profound support that made these edited volumes become a reality, • Divya Sakkaravathi—for the technical advice in the preparation of the manuscripts, • Prof. Aziz Sancar—for showing great courtesy by writing the foreword of these edited volumes, • Sudib Sontoran and Mindy Yarta¸sı—for proofreading the manuscripts and providing insights for copyediting, • Simay Sultan Do˘gan—for providing the manuscripts’ typesetting and writing guidelines checks.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Of course, we owe our families the greatest gratitude. We want to express our deepest gratitude to our families for their unending tolerance, encouragement, and support as we worked on this edited volume. Kır¸sehir 2023

Erman Akıllı Burak Gunes

Contents

Introduction: “A Dim Light Amidst the Darkness of Despair” Erman Akıllı and Burak Gunes

1

Humanitarian Supply Chains in Covid-19 Era Dolapo Fakuade

9

Crossing Borders in the Covid-19 Lockdown Process: Vaccine Diplomacy Özlem Sim¸ ¸ sek Çelik

25

Fiscal Space and Climate Change in the Post Covid-19 Pandemic: Double Crises of Sids Fethiye Burcu Türkmen-Ceylan and Bengü Çelenk

37

The International Trade Agenda of the Pandemic: Systematic Evaluation of the Global Trade Crisis in the Post-Covid-19 Era Selçuk Efe Küçükkambak, Fatma Çakır, and Mesut Çakır Anti-immigration Rhetoric of Far-Right Movements in the Covid-19 Era Merve Önenli Güven Borders in the Post-pandemic World Order Hakan Ünay and Murat Çemrek

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65 79

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CONTENTS

The Role of Artificial Intelligence in Tackling Covid-19 Gloria Shkurti Özdemir

95

Covid-19 Pandemic in Africa: Global Uncertainty and Security Quests Tunç Demirta¸s

109

Post-pandemic Economic Development Perspective in Countries of the South Caucasus: Comparative Analysis Elshan Bagirzadeh and Turan Suleymanov

121

Covid-19 and the Political Economy of Depthening Socioeconomic Inequalities Emin Efecan Akta¸s

141

Optimistic Outlook on the Impact of Covid-19 on Higher Education Tetyana Tarnavska and Nataliia Glushanytsıa

157

Digital Diplomacy: As a Strategy of Global Crisis Management During the Time of Covid-19 Hatice Koç and Ha¸sim Koç

171

Xenophobia, Racism and Populism in the Covid-19 Era Arif Behiç Özcan Concerns About Covid-19 in the Eyes of Respondents: Example from Poland Sławomir Kalinowski and Oskar Szczygieł Branding in the Pandemic: The “Cool Japan” Strategy Machiko Sato and Erman Akıllı Impact of Covid-19 on Greenhouse Gas Emission in OECD Countries: K-Mean Method Aslı Akıllı Re-Thinking International Migration in Terms of Vulnerability: A Critical Overview of the Covid-19 Pandemic Merve Suna Özel Özcan

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199 213

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List of Contributors

Aslı Akıllı Faculty of Agriculture, Kirsehir Ahi Evran University, Kirsehir, Turkey Erman Akıllı Department of International Relations, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli University, Ankara, Türkiye Emin Efecan Akta¸s Department of Accounting and Tax Practices, Kirsehir Ahi Evran University, Kirsehir, Turkey Elshan Bagirzadeh Azerbaijan State University of Economics (UNEC), Baku, Azerbaijan Fatma Çakır Faculty of Economics, Department of Business Administration, Aydın Adnan Menderes University, Aydın, Turkey Mesut Çakır Faculty of Economics, Department of Econometrics, Aydın Adnan Menderes University, Aydın, Turkey Bengü Çelenk Department of International Relations, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Kır¸sehir Ahi Evran University, Kirsehir, Turkey Özlem Sim¸ ¸ sek Çelik Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Health, Ankara, Turkey

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LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

Murat Çemrek Department of International Relations, Necmettin Erbakan University, Konya, Turkey Tunç Demirta¸s Department of International Relations, Bursa Uluda˘g University, Bursa, Turkey Dolapo Fakuade School of Law and Social Sciences, University of Derby, Derby, UK Nataliia Glushanytsıa Department of Foreign Languages and Translation, National Aviation University, Kyiv, Ukraine Burak Gunes Department of International Relations, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Kır¸sehir, Türkiye Merve Önenli Güven Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey Sławomir Kalinowski The Institute of Rural and Agricultural Development of the Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw, Poland Hatice Koç Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Hacı Bayram Veli University, Ankara, Turkey Ha¸sim Koç Faculty of Philosophy, Göttingen Georg-August-University, Göttingen, Germany Selçuk Efe Küçükkambak Aydın, Turkey Arif Behiç Özcan Department University, Konya, Turkey

of

International

Merve Suna Özel Özcan Department Kırıkkale University, Ankara, Türkiye

of

Relations,

International

Selcuk

Relations,

Gloria Shkurti Özdemir Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University, Ankara, Turkey; SETA Foundation, Ankara, Turkey Machiko Sato School of International Relations, University of Shizuoka, Shizuoka, Japan Turan Suleymanov Azerbaijan State University of Economics (UNEC), Baku, Azerbaijan; University of Malaga, Malaga, Spain

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

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Oskar Szczygieł The Institute of Rural and Agriculture Development of the Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw, Poland Tetyana Tarnavska Department of Fireign Languages for Mathematical Faculties, Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, Kyiv, Ukraine Fethiye Burcu Türkmen-Ceylan University of East Anglia-School of International Development, Norwich, UK; Department of Finance, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Kirsehir Ahi Evran University, Kirsehir, Turkey Hakan Ünay Department of International Relations, Kırıkkale University, Ankara, Turkey

List of Figures

Fiscal Space and Climate Change in the Post Covid-19 Pandemic: Double Crises of Sids Fig. 1

Fig. 2

Fig. 3

Mean temperature and precipitation (2018–2021) (Authors’ own figure. Data from World Bank Climate Change Knowledge Portal. https://climateknowledg eportal.worldbank.org/download-data [Last Access: 05.03.2023]) Per capita CO2 emissions (2009–2021) (Source Our World in Data. Link: https://ourworldindata.org/co2/ country/comoros?country=COM~MDV~MUS~SYC [Last Access: 23.02.2023]) HDI (2018–2021) (Authors’ own figure. Data from World Bank Data Portal. https://databank.worldbank.org/ Human-development-index/id/363d401b [Last Access: 23.02.2023])

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Anti-immigration Rhetoric of Far-Right Movements in the Covid-19 Era Graph 1

Number of Tweets by Month

68

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LIST OF FIGURES

Borders in the Post-pandemic World Order Fig. 1

Descriptive data of border closure policies and new Covid-19 cases from January 2020 until April 2021 (Source [Shiraef et al., 2022])

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The Role of Artificial Intelligence in Tackling Covid-19 Graph 1

VC Investments in AI by Industry (2012–2022)

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Post-pandemic Economic Development Perspective in Countries of the South Caucasus: Comparative Analysis Fig. 1

Fig. 2

Fig. 3

Fig. 4

Fig. 5

Fig. 6

Fig. 7

Fig. 8

Investment forecast (total investment, % of GDP) in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia (Source IMF World Economic Outlook Database: October 2022) Population forecast (persons, millions) in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia (Source IMF World Economic Outlook Database: October 2022) Human flight and brain drain indicator of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia in 2015–2022 (Source Fragile States Index 2022, the Fund for Peace) Global innovation index rankings of South Caucasus countries among 132 economies in 2022 (Source Global Innovation Index 2022, WIPO) Network readiness index rankings of South Caucasus countries among 131 economies in 2022 (Source Network Readiness Index 2022, Portulans Institute) Country complexity ranking of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia in 1995–2020 (Source Atlas of Economic Complexity, Harvard University) Export structures of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia in 2020 (Source Atlas of Economic Complexity, Harvard University) Economic growth forecast (GDP, constant prices, % change) in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia (Source IMF World Economic Outlook Database: October 2022)

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LIST OF FIGURES

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Covid-19 and the Political Economy of Depthening Socioeconomic Inequalities Fig. 1

Fig. 2

Globally Extreme Poverty Rates, % (Source Moyer et al., 2022. Note The number of individuals who live on less than $1.90 per day is considered extreme poverty) Nominal Price Indexes (Estimations and Actual—2018 base year, %) (Source World Bank, 2022b, Commodity Markets Outlook)

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Optimistic Outlook on the Impact of Covid-19 on Higher Education Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig.

1 2 3 4

Negative aspects of the pandemic Digital country. Ukrainian case Mental health support Positive aspects of the pandemic

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Concerns About Covid-19 in the Eyes of Respondents: Example from Poland Fig. 1

Fig. 2 Fig. 3

Average daily number of cases during the survey, and the size of the research sample in the study “Situation of the population during the coronavirus period” (Source own research) Life in a pandemic as a “new normal” (Source own research) Share of people who have received the full dose of a Covid-19 vaccine in Poland (Source own research)

204 207 208

Impact of Covid-19 on Greenhouse Gas Emission in OECD Countries: K-Mean Method Fig. 1 Fig. 2 Fig. 3 Fig. 4

Total emissions excluding LULUCF change in OECD countries Total GHG excl. LULUCF per unit of GDP change in OECD countries The dendrogram representation of OECD countries in the pre-pandemic period K-mean results of OECD countries in the pre-pandemic period

231 232 236 237

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LIST OF FIGURES

Fig. 5 Fig. 6

K-mean results of OECD countries in pandemic periods The silhouette plot of OECD countries in preand pandemic periods

238 244

List of Tables

Fiscal Space and Climate Change in the Post Covid-19 Pandemic: Double Crises of Sids Table 1

Economic and Fiscal Indicators (2018–2021)

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Anti-immigration Rhetoric of Far-Right Movements in the Covid-19 Era Table 1

Main Words Used in FAIR Tweets

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Covid-19 Pandemic in Africa: Global Uncertainty and Security Quests Table 1

Export Revenues of Nigeria, South Africa, and Egypt (2019–2020)

113

Post-pandemic Economic Development Perspective in Countries of the South Caucasus: Comparative Analysis Table 1

Diagnostics of economic growth in South Caucasus countries based on literature review

124

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LIST OF TABLES

Impact of Covid-19 on Greenhouse Gas Emission in OECD Countries: K-Mean Method Table 1 Table 2 Table 3 Table 4

K-mean results of OECD countries in the pre-pandemic period K-mean results of OECD countries in pandemic periods K-mean clusters of OECD countries in the pre-pandemic period (mean ± SE) K-mean clusters of OECD countries in the pandemic period (mean ± SE)

237 238 239 242

Introduction: “A Dim Light Amidst the Darkness of Despair” Erman Akıllı

and Burak Gunes

The COVID-19 pandemic, which originated in China in late 2019, has emerged as a pivotal moment in world history with far-reaching implications for international relations and global politics. This unprecedented global event has deeply influenced and transformed various spheres of human life, including politics, economics, social relations, and everyday practices. Within the realm of international relations, a key area of study, COVID-19 has left an indelible mark, analogous to the mutating nature of the virus itself. “World Politics in the Age of Uncertainty—The COVID-19 Pandemic” is a comprehensive book series that comprises two distinct yet interconnected volumes. Volume I focuses on international relations and global politics, while Volume II delves into social sciences and humanities

E. Akıllı (B) Department of International Relations, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli University, Ankara, Türkiye e-mail: [email protected] B. Gunes Department of International Relations, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Kır¸sehir Ahi Evran University, Kır¸sehir, Türkiye e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Akilli and B. Gunes (eds.), World Politics in the Age of Uncertainty, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39611-3_1

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studies. Both volumes revolve around the central theme of the COVID19 pandemic era, exploring its profound impact on various aspects of the world. In Volume I, scholars, and experts in the field of international relations delve into the intricate dynamics of global politics in the context of the pandemic. They analyse the shifting power dynamics, the role of international organizations, the challenges to global governance, and the geopolitical implications of the crisis. This volume provides valuable insights into how the pandemic has shaped and transformed the international system, influencing state behaviour, diplomatic relations, and global cooperation. Volume II takes a multidisciplinary approach, examining the social, cultural, economic, and psychological dimensions of the COVID19 pandemic. Experts from the fields of social sciences and humanities contribute their research and perspectives, offering critical analyses of the pandemic’s effects on societies, communities, individuals, and various aspects of human life. Together, these two volumes provide a comprehensive exploration of the COVID-19 pandemic’s impact on world politics, society, and human experiences. By bringing together scholars from different disciplines, the book series offers a holistic understanding of the challenges and opportunities presented by this unprecedented global crisis. It serves as a valuable resource for academics, policymakers, and anyone seeking to comprehend and navigate the complexities of the COVID-19 era. One may wonder about the choice of the title, but through “A Dim Light Amidst the Darkness of Despair,” in this volume, we aim to present a profound exploration of the impact of COVID-19 on global affairs. In the midst of unprecedented challenges and uncertainty, this collection of chapters illuminates the complex dynamics and multifaceted implications that have unfolded since the onset of the pandemic. As we delve into the diverse topics authored by esteemed scholars and experts in the field of international relations, we embark on a thought-provoking journey to understand the profound transformations and search for rays of hope that have emerged amidst the darkness of despair. The COVID-19 pandemic has cast a long shadow over the world, disrupting economies, straining healthcare systems, and shaking the very foundations of global governance. Yet, even in the face of adversity, the human spirit endures, and this compilation of chapters serves as a testament to our resilience and determination to forge a brighter future. Each chapter within this book offers unique insights into the interplay between the pandemic and global affairs, shedding light on critical

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areas such as emergency response, regional integration, energy security, gender dynamics, human rights, and more. Within these pages, we navigate through a complex web of challenges and opportunities, aiming to unravel the intricacies of the pandemic’s impact on international relations. The introduction title, “A Dim Light Amidst the Darkness of Despair,” encapsulates the essence of our exploration. It symbolizes the glimmers of hope, resilience, and transformative potential that lie within the depths of this crisis. As we engage with the ideas put forth by our esteemed authors, we embark on an intellectual journey, seeking to uncover strategies, policies, and solutions that can guide us towards a more inclusive, equitable, and prosperous world. The pandemic has exposed the deficiencies in international cooperation, leading to a decline in inter-state solidarity, while the UN Secretary-General has designated the virus as the foremost security concern. Although the pandemic may seem to be waning, its enduring effects and consequences continue to occupy the world stage. Throughout the crisis, states have adopted a self-centred approach, prioritizing their own national defence mechanisms to combat the global threat. National health infrastructure and capacity have assumed a paramount role in shaping states’ security strategies, as health-related issues have become integral components of their security frameworks. The COVID-19 pandemic has necessitated significant adaptations in analytical approaches, academic papers, and university courses, as scholars grapple with the unprecedented and unfamiliar landscape. This trend is apparent in the growing focus on publications addressing the COVID19 pandemic by reputable publishers such as Palgrave MacMillan, which underscores the gravity and relevance of the topic in the field of international relations and politics. Publications addressing the COVID-19 pandemic, a selection of which is provided below: “The Post-Pandemic World and Global Politics” by A K M Ahsan Ullah and Jannatul Ferdous, published by Palgrave MacMillan in 2022, offers an analysis of the global impact of COVID-19 on economic and political processes. It sheds light on the shortcomings of scientific policy and explores the diverse reactions, resurgence of nationalism, and widening political gaps in the wake of the pandemic. The book provides insights into the long-term consequences for policies and economics in the post-pandemic world. “COVID-19 and International Development,” edited by Elissaios Papyrakis and published by Palgrave MacMillan in 2022, delves into the

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effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on international development, with a specific focus on areas such as poverty, health, education, and migration. The book highlights the negative impacts on vulnerable communities in the Global South and offers policy recommendations to mitigate these effects. “The Future of the South African Political Economy Post-COVID19,” edited by Mzukisi Qobo, Mills Soko, and Nomfundo Xenia Ngwenya, published by Palgrave MacMillan in 2022, examines the socioeconomic consequences of COVID-19 with a particular emphasis on South Africa. The book proposes interventions and policy responses to address the crisis’s effects, emphasizing the importance of innovative approaches and the development of state capabilities. “How COVID-19 Reshapes New World Order: Political Economy Perspective” by Li Sheng, published by Palgrave MacMillan in 2022, provides an in-depth exploration of the extensive impacts of COVID19 on economics, politics, and society. The book examines changes in the world order and international cooperation, considering the continued superpower status of the United States and the growing influence of China. It also highlights the constraints faced by international organizations due to prevailing unilateralism. As mentioned above, the advent of the COVID-19 pandemic in late 2019 has significantly disrupted global systems and posed unforeseen challenges worldwide. This crisis has manifested itself in myriad ways, including economic downturns, social upheavals, public health emergencies, and diplomatic complexities. Indeed, the pandemic has permeated every facet of human existence. As editors of this two-book series, our primary objective is to undertake a meticulous examination and analysis of the multifaceted dimensions of the COVID-19 pandemic, uncovering its profound implications for the fields of international relations, social sciences, political economy, and economics. The present volume is dedicated to the realm of international relations and political science, aiming to provide a comprehensive exploration of the pandemic’s impact on these areas of study. In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, the world faced unprecedented challenges and disruptions across various spheres. From healthcare systems to economies, the effects of the pandemic were far-reaching and demanded urgent attention and innovative solutions. In this book, we delve into the multifaceted impact of COVID-19 on global affairs, exploring diverse topics ranging

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from international cooperation to gender dynamics, from energy security to regional integration. ˙ This volume commences with the chapter of Irem Sengül, ¸ she examined the response of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to the COVID-19 pandemic. In her chapter titled “UNHCR and COVID-19: From Emergency Response to Revitalizing Global Compact on Refugees,” sheds light on the critical role of the UNHCR in responding to the challenges faced by refugees amidst the pandemic. It highlights the efforts made to ensure their safety and wellbeing, while also exploring how the crisis can serve as an opportunity to revitalize and strengthen the Global Compact on Refugees. Kür¸sat Kan’s chapter, “Post-Truth Period in World Politics,” delves into the phenomenon of post-truth politics during the pandemic. The author analyses the implications of misinformation and disinformation campaigns on public perception, policy decisions, and global politics. Bu˘gra Sarı’s “Problem of Cooperation in Stag Hunt Game: Great Power Politics in the COVID-19 Pandemic” delves into the intricate dynamics of international cooperation, particularly within the context of great power politics. By analysing the challenges faced in aligning interests and fostering cooperation during the pandemic, the chapter provides insights into the complexities of global governance and the potential implications for future international relations. Didem Ekinci explores the impact of the pandemic on entities in the South Caucasus in her chapter titled “The Pandemic and Entities in South Caucasus.” By examining the socio-political consequences and regional dynamics, this chapter contributes to a comprehensive understanding of the complex interplay between the pandemic and regional stability. “The Dilemma Between Carbon Neutrality and Energy Security: Understanding the Likely Impacts of COVID-19 and the Russia-Ukraine War on the EU Climate Targets,” authored by Mehmet Efe Biresselioglu, Zehra Funda Savas, and Berfu Solak, focuses on the challenges faced by the European Union in balancing its climate targets with energy security concerns during the pandemic and the ongoing Russia–Ukraine conflict. This chapter illuminates the intricate dilemmas faced by policymakers and explores potential pathways towards achieving sustainable and secure energy systems. Çi˘gdem Aydın Koyuncu’s chapter, “The Gendered Dynamics of COVID-19: International Politics and Women Leaders,” delves into the gendered dimensions of the pandemic, exploring the roles and responses

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of women leaders on the international stage. By analysing the impact of gender in crisis management and decision-making processes, this chapter highlights the importance of inclusive and gender-sensitive policies in navigating global challenges. In “Growing Importance of Regional Integration and Procurement in the Coronavirus Pandemic: The Case of RCEP and Its Hegemonic Reflections,” Mehmet Öztürk examines the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and its implications in the context of the pandemic. This chapter delves into the potential ramifications of regional integration efforts and the changing dynamics of procurement systems in the face of global disruptions. Fırat Purta¸s explores the evolving role of the Organization of Turkic States in the post-pandemic world order in their chapter titled “The Organization of Turkic States in the Post-Pandemic World Order.” By analysing the organization’s response to the crisis and its impact on regional cooperation, this chapter sheds light on the opportunities and challenges faced by the Turkic states in shaping the future international landscape. In “Latin America and the Caribbean in the Post-Pandemic World: Rethinking Inequalities,” Segâh Tekin examines the impact of the pandemic on Latin America and the Caribbean region, with a focus on reevaluating existing inequalities. This chapter highlights the urgent need for comprehensive and inclusive strategies to address socio-economic disparities and foster sustainable development in the region. Mehmet Özkan and Murat Yi˘git’s chapter, “Africa and COVID-19,” explores the unique challenges faced by African countries during the pandemic. By examining the socio-economic, political, and health dimensions of the crisis, this chapter provides valuable insights into the regional dynamics and responses to the pandemic. Levent Yi˘gittepe’s chapter, “National Security During COVID-19: Changing National Security Policies of Countries,” analyses the profound impact of the pandemic on national security policies. By examining the evolving strategies and priorities of nations, this chapter sheds light on the transformations in the security landscape and their long-term implications. “Public Diplomacy During the COVID-19 Pandemic,” authored by Erman Akıllı and Gülnihan Cihano˘glu Gülen, explores the role of public diplomacy in managing the crisis. This chapter investigates the various approaches adopted by nations to communicate and engage with

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international audiences, underscoring the importance of effective public diplomacy in building trust and fostering global cooperation. Mehmet Halil Bekta¸s’s chapter, “International Human Rights and COVID-19,” delves into the complex interplay between the pandemic and international human rights frameworks. By examining the challenges faced in upholding human rights during times of crisis, this chapter contributes to a broader understanding of the pandemic’s impact on global governance and individual freedoms. Haydar Karaman and Burak Güne¸s, in their chapter titled “From Failure to Resilience: Reimagining International Policy-Making of COVID-19 and Climate-Induced Migration in the Age of Uncertainty,” explore the intersection of the COVID-19 pandemic and climate-induced migration. By reimagining international policymaking processes, this chapter proposes strategies for building resilience and addressing the challenges posed by migration in an uncertain world. O˘guz Güner’s chapter, “From Pandemic to Infodemic: The European Union’s Fight Against Disinformation,” examines the European Union’s response to the infodemic during the COVID-19 pandemic. The chapter analyses the efforts to combat disinformation, protect public health, and promote digital literacy. Safa Uslu and Ferhat Pirinççi’s chapter, “The Impact of COVID19 on Global Energy Security and Energy Geopolitics,” investigates the far-reaching implications of the pandemic on global energy security and geopolitics. This chapter examines the disruptions faced by energy markets and explores the potential opportunities and risks in reshaping the global energy landscape. ˙ Finally, Ismail Erkam Sula and Ça˘gla Lüleci-Sula explore the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on global governance structures in their chapter, “Global Governance in Crisis? Conclusions from the COVID19 Pandemic.“ The authors assess the challenges and opportunities for international cooperation and discuss the role of multilateral institutions in effectively managing global crises. In this volume of the book series titled “World Politics in the Age of Uncertainty: The COVID-19 Pandemic,” the collection of diverse chapters provides valuable insights into the multifaceted impact of COVID-19 on global affairs. Through thought-provoking analyses and innovative approaches, the book explores the challenges posed by the pandemic. In these unprecedented times, it serves as a comprehensive resource for scholars, policymakers, and individuals interested in understanding the

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complex dynamics of the COVID-19 crisis and its implications for the world. The chapters aim to offer valuable insights and contribute to a deeper understanding of the multifaceted implications of the COVID19 pandemic on various areas such as international relations, human rights, gender dynamics, energy security, regional integration, and public diplomacy. By shedding light on the challenges, opportunities, and transformations that have emerged in the wake of this global crisis, the book contributes to the ongoing discourse on navigating the post-pandemic world. Erman Akıllı–Burak Güne¸s Kır¸sehir

Humanitarian Supply Chains in Covid-19 Era Dolapo Fakuade

1

Introduction

Due to its significance in alleviating the suffering of the affected population in the aftermath of a disaster, the importance of humanitarian aid or assistance cannot be underestimated or overestimated. It implies that with the continued occurrence of disasters and their widespread impacts in the world would make humanitarian assistance even more necessary and crucial to the safety and security of disaster-affected communities. Humanitarian assistance and its associated components are therefore not a new concept, but one that continues to generate debates and interests among social and human researchers. When done appropriately, humanitarian assistance entails the provision of food, medical supplies, water, shelter, protection and other essential services to support affected populations and alleviate their suffering from impacts of different forms of disasters. Disasters such as floods, earthquakes, tsunamis, hurricanes, cyclones, wildfires, heatwaves and landslides, to mention a few, have had major impacts and caused disruptions in developed and emerging countries alike. Humanitarian assistance scholars have therefore described it

D. Fakuade (B) School of Law and Social Sciences, University of Derby, Derby, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Akilli and B. Gunes (eds.), World Politics in the Age of Uncertainty, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39611-3_2

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as the provision of resources, be it technical, financial or material to alleviate the suffering of people affected by human-induced or natural hazard phenomena (Bursztyn et al., 2014). It is also described as providing support to help people rebuild lives and livelihoods, improve access to essential services (Ormel et al., 2020), and provision of aid to affected populations to meet their basic needs (Tan and von Schreeb, 2015). Viewed from this angle, humanitarian assistance seems to be effective when aid supply achieves the purpose of its demand. It is also pertinent to understand that the very essence and process for initiating and providing humanitarian assistance suggest that there is a need for supply to meet the demands of the affected population, as well as for goods and services to be deployed in an efficient and timely manner. Unlike conventional supply chains where goods and services are designed to meet consumer demands (Stadtler, 2015), humanitarian supply chains are peculiar given that the disaster-affected population is desperate for the relief such goods and services would provide them. The success of humanitarian supply chains may have ethical undertones to it (Abidi et al., 2013), while its sustainability is linked to the ethical behaviour of those involved in the process (Haavisto and Kovács, 2019). Such views indicate that the goals of humanitarian supply chains go beyond those of regular supply chains, which often involve competitiveness (Stadtler, 2015). Though there are competing views on how humanitarian aid is provided and by whom, the overall importance or role effective humanitarian response cannot be ignored. To this end, the humanitarian supply chains use existing supply chains process to equally achieve its goal (Day et al., 2012). This is perhaps why the disruption of the global supply chains during Covid-19 had a knock-on effect on the humanitarian supply chains. The existing humanitarian assistance process was by no means perfect before Covid-19, mostly due to the drivers of government restrictions on humanitarian supply chains (Kunz and Reiner, 2016), further made worse by the pandemic. When Covid-19 became a global pandemic, it stretched and tested a non-perfect process, causing further disruption to the restricted humanitarian supply chains. This background reveals why the impacts of government-imposed restrictions and pandemic measures around the world significantly altered the existing humanitarian supply chain dynamics. This chapter, therefore, discusses the challenges experienced because of, and as a result of the Covid-19. It further examines the impacts of the pandemic and related measures on humanitarian supply chains. It evaluates how measures taken

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during this period may have influenced preparedness and response, which are essential aspects of an effective humanitarian assistance for disasteraffected victims. Going forward, it is therefore important to incorporate lessons that may help to develop more robust humanitarian supply chains to facilitate better humanitarian responses in the future. A robust and forward-looking approach is important for the humanitarian sector given the pandemic’s continued effect in several countries and its direct impact on the workforce and supply chains. 1.1

Drivers of Covid-19 Response Challenges

The supply chain is a link between the manufacturing industry and the end user (Karuppiah et al., 2021). The Goal of the supply chain is to deliver the right goods, products or services in the right quantity to the right customer, at the right time (Wang et al., 2018). However, this was not the case, nor was the timely provision of goods, services or products possible during the Covid-19 era due to imposed restrictions across the world. Though the demand for essential goods, services, and items, such as facemasks, and hand sanitiser, was significantly higher, delivery of these items was also significantly hampered by government-imposed movement restrictions to limit the spread of the pandemic. Challenges experienced during this period exposed the supply chain network’s lack of robustness, even so, its cascading effect on humanitarian supply chains. Supply chain management is essential for achieving the goal of humanitarian aid, but only when effective (Chiappetta Jabbour et al., 2019). The effectiveness of a supply chain reflects on the coordination of aid or provision of humanitarian assistance, whether in providing food, water, shelter or intangible assistance—such as the provision of technical support to restore critical infrastructure like telecommunication. The coordination of aid between humanitarian organisations and actors can lead to a successful outcome, especially in alleviating people’s suffering. In a disaster scenario, effective supply chains are important because they allow efficient delivery of aid to those in need the most, and they also enable organisations to track, trace and monitor the flow of goods and support from the source to the destination (Baharmand et al., 2017). The effectiveness of the supply chains is also linked to the main actors that operate in the space. For instance, governments, international organisations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) provide humanitarian assistance or at the very least

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involve the government of a country due to the need to utilise the existing supply chains. Unfortunately, the prioritisation of Covid-19 risk management by governments in different countries meant that the goal of humanitarian assistance and the critical role of effective supply chains were overlooked until such prioritisation became detrimental to the pandemic response itself. This loop meant that government decisions and the approach to Covid-19 response without considering other factors were fundamental drivers of problems and challenges experienced by humanitarian supply chains Covid-19 era. Understanding the role of a government in effective supply chains and in policy that facilitates humanitarian assistance is crucial to rationalising the challenges experienced during the pandemic. One of such key challenges to humanitarian supply chains is traceable to Covid-19’s impact on health, economic, social and industrial activities (Karuppiah et al., 2021). The global pandemic affected all aspects of life and functioning of the society. It set, by default, the supply chain management on a path to major disruption, one that significantly hampered the movement of essential supplies for those in need (Karuppiah et al., 2021), including the health sector which needed medical aid to respond to the public health emergency. Findings by authors like Karuppiah et al. (2021) show that some of the challenges experienced during the pandemic include short lead times for emergency supplies. It was also discovered that the rapid emergence of new clusters was also a problem which resulted from people trying to find new ways to get essential supplies to those who urgently needed them. Studies conducted during Covid-19 reveal that dealing with disasters during a global pandemic like Covid19 should be better coordinated (Paul et al., 2021) in consideration of affected population and those who may urgently require humanitarian assistance. Disruptions and challenges to the Covid-19 response also meant that organisations and governments responsible for providing aid or assistance needed to prioritise protection of human life and ensuring human security, especially that of vulnerable groups (Ishiwatari et al., 2020). Whether or not human protection and security would be prioritised during another pandemic remains a test of lessons learned during the Covid-19 era. Another factor that drove the nature of challenges experienced during the Covid-19 era is the innovations adopted by humanitarian aid actors. The desperate attempt to explore solutions also meant that existing supply

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chain networks were abandoned, creating peculiar operational and logistics challenges (Poole et al., 2020). While innovation in itself is not a problem, it may be challenging to implement at times especially in such complex conditions surrounding the pandemic response globally. Therefore, initiating an innovative way for humanitarian supply chains during a complex period within a certain degree of uncertainty further disrupted innovative solutions adopted by some organisations during this period. It is worth noting that innovations that sprung up during this period were commendable, and aimed at solving problems that would otherwise remain unsolved. However, it had consequences for the affected population, because they were alternatives without mechanisms to manage the process, untested process in an imperfect supply chain system. The complex scenario such innovations created acted more as a barrier to the operationalisation of humanitarian supply chains (Dohale et al., 2022) deviating from the intention of the innovations. The relief intended for the affected population as well as the goal of humanitarian assistance were then not achieved for a long time but the situation differ from country to country. In India, lack of government support, skilled and experienced humanitarian aid workers, as well as lack of technology usage were identified as the most critical barriers to humanitarian supply chains during the Covid-19 era. These ‘lacks’ highlighted the government’s role in the success of humanitarian supply chains and assistance, and actor in its failure. Through this study focused only on the situation in India, it can be deduced that similar scenarios were possible elsewhere due to the government-imposed Covid-19 movement restrictions, and then its inability to ensure that the supply chain continue to operate effectively during the pandemic period. The restrictions meant that governments would limit any nonessential movement as supporting the overall Covid19 response was considered the most critical and essential. Such measure failed to consider or appreciate the role of the humanitarian supply chains in provision of goods, products and services aimed that could help to alleviate the impact of the public health emergency. A decision and oversight that drove challenges in supplying necessary kits to mitigate the impacts of Covid-19, as well as those that directly affected the humanitarian supply chains for other forms of disasters during and in the aftermath of the Covid-19 era.

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1.2

Covid-19 Impacts on Humanitarian Supply Chains

Covid-19’s impacts were openly acknowledged during and in its immediate aftermath, with level of impacts varying from country to country. However, there is concurrence over its impacts on the supply chain network and humanitarian supply chains. Effective supply chains enable organisations to deal with disaster-associated risks (Queiroz et al., 2022), a failure during the pandemic which exposed the relationship between effective supply chains and humanitarian response. The supply chains’ effectiveness may therefore be measured in terms of their ability to alleviate suffering and improve coordination between different humanitarian agencies, governments and stakeholders (Queiroz et al., 2022). However, the response to Covid-19 itself exposed the ineffectiveness of the supply chains because the risks associated with disasters were not effectively managed, and they did not immediately alleviate people’s suffering, as required in disaster response (Thompson and Anderson, 2021). Many may attribute some of the failures during the Covid-19 response to limited visibility and control due to major disruptions to the global supply chains (Dohale et al., 2022), others may be less sympathetic and consider this an outright system failure and poor government decision making. Nonetheless, the unprecedented and global disruptions during this period made it difficult to maintain visibility, and control the movement of goods, personnel and data related to supply chains and humanitarian supply chains (Flynn et al., 2021). The lack of control or difficulty controlling the movement of supply increased supply chain complexity (Karuppiah et al., 2021) and its cascading effects on humanitarian response, health system and the affected population. As the global supply chains became more complex, the more challenging it was for humanitarian organisations to adequately manage risks associated with the logistics of supply chains and its impact in the immediate and long-term (El Baz and Ruel, 2021). One apparent impact was the lack of coordination that emerged during the Covid-19 era. Coordination between governments and different actors fractured, which further exposed the direct impacts of Covid-19 on humanitarian supply chains as well as underlying issues in the imperfect system prior to the pandemic. The need for humanitarian support increased in most countries because the pandemic meant that the displaced people and those whose livelihoods were affected by Covid-19 restrictions required aid or some form of assistance (Paul et al., 2021). As a result, vulnerability increased in most

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countries, a situation that motivated the further call for resilience of humanitarian supply chains (Paul et al., 2021). The more direct impacts of Covid-19 became noticeable, the more obvious the rationale for resilience of humanitarian supply chains became. First, there was a direct impact of the pandemic on supply chains and aid logistics. Authors like Queiroz et al. (2022) noted the direct impacts of the pandemic on preparedness and response to achieve humanitarian assistance goals. The pandemic caused significant disruptions that delayed supply chains, increased costs and restricted movements, especially transportation, thereby making it difficult to provide humanitarian aid to affected population. The direct impacts of the pandemic were further noticed in the challenges that emerged from the procurement of humanitarian supplies because most factories and warehouses were not opened due to the movement restrictions (Poole et al., 2020). There were also difficulties in transporting stored goods and relief from warehouses to the affected populations because such were initially considered nonessential movements at the beginning of the pandemic. A combination of these factors frustrated humanitarian organisations, who were already operating at minimal capacity and often unable to improve access and safety challenges in the field (Queiroz et al., 2022). The disruptions Covid-19 caused on humanitarian organisations and their impacts were noticeable as well as devastating for the ability of such organisation to continue to support the disaster-affected populations across the world who needed aid. As noted by Schmid et al. (2021) the pandemic has driven humanitarian organisations to seek innovative ways to ensure continuity of operations, since one of the challenges faced were barriers to the operationalisation of humanitarian supply chains. The tools that may help maintain the operations of humanitarian organisations and ensure resilience are now considered essential to survive Volatile, Uncertain, Complex and Ambiguous (VUCA) environments (Schmid et al., 2021). For the majority of the Covid-19 responses, decisions regarding humanitarian supply chains were made in uncertain, complex and ambiguous environments. Uncertain because it was unclear when the level of disruptions in the global trade network would improve. Ambiguous most times due to the lack of coordination between governments of different countries to address the supply chain disruptions. Varied movement restrictions and the evolving description of ‘essential’ aggravated the complexity of the environment wherein humanitarian organisations needed to operate

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(Thompson and Anderson, 2021). As a result, the VUCA environment that surrounded the Covid-19 response generated unforeseen impacts and risks for the humanitarian sector with implications for public health emergency response. One of such risks is the contamination of humanitarian supplies where they were trapped at a location longer than planned due to the lack of staff or new movement restrictions (Kumar et al., 2022). The increased risk of cross-contamination meant that extra measures were needed to ensure the safety of humanitarian transportation (Lim, 2021). Likewise, the safety of those transporting and receiving the humanitarian supplies amidst the risk of spreading a communicable disease also needed to be considered as part of the humanitarian operational procedure. Extra measures at times cost humanitarian organisations more than estimated, while changes to the logistical operations to reduce infection risk resulted in more financial burdens. As a result, these organisations suffered financial loss and faced financial challenges, due to the financial difficulties caused by the pandemic since most people were prevented from working at the onset of the pandemic. The direct impact of Covid19 on economic activities highlighted the link between economics and public health (Lim, 2021). Many humanitarian organisations experienced financial constraints due to Covid-19 (Flynn et al., 2021) which forced budget cuts and decreased their capacity to respond to humanitarian needs (Dohale et al., 2022). The financial constraints and associated risks subsequently affected the victims and vulnerable populations as identified by Sokat and Altay (2021). With the paucity of studies on humanitarian supply chains focusing on the unique properties of vulnerable groups, the widespread Covid-19 impacts only exacerbated the vulnerable and affected population’s situation within a humanitarian context. For instance, the financial constraints that handicapped humanitarian organisations, preventing them from providing relief promptly, motivated refugees to become responders in their communities (Betts et al., 2021). In their capacity, refugees helped their community to cope with the pandemic, an action necessitated by overstretched resources (Betts et al., 2021). Such initiatives by the affected population to mitigate Covid-19’s ripple effect on humanitarian supply chains, may not be a problem in a complex and uncertain environment but suggest that perhaps the humanitarian supply chains context need to be revisited. The impacts of the pandemic on humanitarian supply chains discussed in this section indicate

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that there are lessons to learn from what transpired during the Covid19 era and the nature of responses to the pandemic and public health emergency. 1.3

Lessons Identified and Implications for the Future

Humanitarian assistance is often provided in a complex and chaotic environment. The focus of assistance, which has humanitarian supply at its core, often needs to adapt to a complex dynamic environment (Kovács and Sigala, 2021). It has been established in this chapter that there were challenges that evolved to direct and indirect impacts on humanitarian supply chains, further frustrating humanitarian assistance goals. This chapter discusses the relationship between the direct and indirect impacts to highlight the pandemic-exposed areas of improvements in humanitarian supply chains and the wider aid sector. By doing so, it identifies key lessons that can help address the shortcomings of the humanitarian aid sector in responding to crises and develop more robust humanitarian supply chains. One overarching lesson from the issues discussed in this chapter is the lack of preparedness for the level of disruption caused by the pandemic. The pandemic showed that it’s crucial to have a more comprehensive preparedness arrangement, involving all stakeholders like governments, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the private sector and the affected communities (Seddighi et al., 2021). Improvement of the humanitarian supply chains to be more resilient and better prepared is also important due to the significant disruption experienced during the Covid19 response (Kumar et al., 2022). It is therefore necessary to prepare for scenarios where disruption may likely cause ripple effects that frustrate humanitarian assistance goals. Revisiting the humanitarian supply chains preparedness (HSCP) may help stakeholders identify how to outsource each aspect of the supply chain that is likely to be easily overwhelmed to, determine the contingency for each stage of the supply chain. Lessons from the disruption’s knock-on effects further indicate that digitalising process within the humanitarian supply chains may be beneficial (Patil et al., 2023). In the era of rapid decision making where demands may rapidly change (Falagara Sigala et al., 2020), technology, especially digitalisation, may help humanitarian organisations to quickly identify and respond to demand fluctuations and changes in supplier delivery performance (Iqbal and Ahmad, 2022). Therefore, it is important to

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adopt proactive measures that focus on minimising the impacts of future disruptions to demonstrate that lessons have been learned, and reflect a good understanding of lessons learned from the Covid-19 response. One way this can be done is for humanitarian supply chains to consider the digitalisation of processes that may be severally affected (Patil et al., 2023). Another experience and lessons to be learned is from the barriers to the operationalisation of the humanitarian supply chains experienced during the pandemic (Dohale et al., 2022) that motivated the innovative ways to manage the supply chains amidst the chaos. As one way of solving the challenges to humanitarian supply chains during the Covid-19 era, it is perhaps now inevitable for the humanitarian sector to innovate (Kovács and Sigala, 2021). Using more technological innovations like different applications to monitor and facilitate the supply chain process is more important than ever (Argumedo-García et al., 2021). To combat, minimise or mitigate the disruptions-associated risks and prevent the spread of communicable diseases, it is key to innovate and digitalise the humanitarian supply chains’ delivery process (Patil et al., 2023). Though technology is not without its limitations, identified lessons, if adopted, may improve humanitarian practices and acknowledge that more robust humanitarian supply chains are required going forward (Thompson and Anderson, 2021). While the lessons for digitalisation may be catching on in the age of technology, the call for a more resilient humanitarian supply chain is not new. In the pre-Covid era, Wang et al. (2018) called for a holistic process resilient to humanitarian assistance’s complex and uncertain environment, a call that now pertinent to heed. Therefore, it is unsurprising that the humanitarian supply chains were unable to cope with the disruptions of the Covid-19 era. The evidence from the humanitarian assistance and supply chain studies in the Covid-19 era suggests it is pertinent to explore how best to manage supply chains beyond Covid-19 (Flynn et al., 2021). One way of doing so is through better collaboration. It must ensure the production changeover for humanitarian supply chains and humanitarian assistance lead to improved service provision (Patil et al., 2023) in order to achieve the goal of humanitarian assistance and humanitarian supply chains. This chapter has shown that the experience of the pandemic and lessons identified have implications for practice, policy and public security. In terms of practical implications, the need for humanitarian supply chains to become more resilient, adaptive and agile is already established (Kumar et al., 2022). Increased resilience would help meet the current and future

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needs of vulnerable and affected populations during and in the aftermath of major disasters or pandemics (Paul et al., 2021). This practical implication means that adopting innovative ways like digitalisation and big data may help stakeholders, including governments, develop strategies that may help mitigate the impacts of future humanitarian supply chain disruptions on actual humanitarian assistance goals. Against this backdrop is the policy implication where governments play an important role. Policymakers must focus on measures that would contribute to the efficiency and effectiveness of existing humanitarian supply chains. Simultaneously, investment in human capital and the resilience of the supply chain networks should be promoted. Such a policy would increase the capacity of existing supply chains, and by default enhance the humanitarian supply chains to facilitate humanitarian assistance. Perhaps a central impetus for considering the policy and practice implications is the public security implications of Covid-19 on the future humanitarian supply chain. Disruption experienced during the Covid-19 era has shown the potential negative impact of limited essential goods and services, which are all critical to public security and safety. Ripple effects and impact on vulnerable populations like refugees, displaced people and other disaster-affected communities, who rely on humanitarian assistance, have shown how a pandemic may further result in extreme suffering for those who already experienced some form of disaster (Hilhorst and Mena, 2021). When supply fails, the vulnerable may consider other unconventional ways such as crime to source support for themselves and family. Vulnerable and disaster-affected communities may also become succum to proposals of organised crime to solicit for support which humanitarian organisations were unable to provide due to fractured supply chains. While the plight of the vulnerable and at-risk population may have been inadvertently ignored (Ebrahim et al., 2021), it is now more vital than pre-pandemic to put measures in place to ensure public and human security in the worst-case scenario going forward. The implications highlighted in this section of the chapter, though brief, may significantly enhance how humanitarian supply chains are managed during major disruptive and complex events. They may further make the supply chain network more robust and resilient to future events.

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2

Conclusion

The pandemic and its widespread effects around the world made it impossible to ignore the link between disruptive events like Covid-19, supply chains and humanitarian supply chains. It is well known that humanitarian supply chains exist to alleviate the suffering of disaster-affected and vulnerable populations. However, this was not the case in the Covid19 era, where they were not resilient enough to sustain the level of disruptions experienced across the global supply network. Overall, the global pandemic has placed a major strain on the humanitarian supply chain, and subsequently on provision of aim to those in need. This chapter has argument that humanitarian organisations, governments and stakeholders ought to invest in digital technologies and better risk management procedures to ensure that supply chains are secure and resilient. As demonstrated in this chapter, it is important to understand and advance the field of humanitarian supply chains and its link with disruptive events to explore the implications discussed in this chapter. While it is not uncommon that major disasters may cause disruptions that affect the functioning of society, the scale and level of severity of Covid-19 effects were exceptional. The pandemic in itself was a shock to the system, leading to a complex, uncertain and ambiguous environment. Amidst all these, decisions still needed to be made to provide essential services to affected populations. Unfortunately, the lessons identified exposed the flaws in the humanitarian supply chains and the overreliance on the supply chain network, which is susceptible to government policy and interventions. As a result of disruptions and impacts on the supply chain network, it is important to consider a more robust and resilient process, through which essential supplies and services may be delivered to those who need them the most to ensure humanitarian protection and public security going forward.

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Crossing Borders in the Covid-19 Lockdown Process: Vaccine Diplomacy

Özlem S¸ im¸sek Çelik

1

Introduction

In late December 2019, the coronavirus disease emerged in Wuhan Province of China and then spread to the whole world. The World Health Organization (WHO) declared it a pandemic on March 11, 2020. With the pandemic, many economic, political, and social changes have taken place around the world. Countries entered quarantine one by one, closed their borders, and imposed curfews. Since there is no proven cure for SARS-CoV-2 infection, vaccine studies have started rapidly in many countries with different methods and technologies. Many vaccines have been approved and licensed, accepted, and implemented in different parts of the world. Countries have conducted different vaccine diplomacy and only vaccines have been able to cross borders. With the pandemic, new expressions such as COVID-19 diplomacy, mask diplomacy, and vaccine diplomacy have emerged. Although vaccine diplomacy is one of the oldest types of diplomacy, it has grown in popularity again during the pandemic. In this process, countries such as China, Russia, India, the US, and the EU have come to the fore

Ö. S. ¸ Çelik (B) Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Health, Ankara, Turkey e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Akilli and B. Gunes (eds.), World Politics in the Age of Uncertainty, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39611-3_3

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(Antwi-Boasiako, 2022). Vaccine diplomacy offers great opportunities for governments to improve diplomatic relations and increase their influence. It is also a highly delicate issue, considering that a balance needs to be struck in terms of both global and national pressures (Ullah and Othman, 2021). During the COVID-19 pandemic, vaccine studies took place under intense clinical, economic, and political pressures (Avorn and Kesselheim, 2020). In addition to the medical dimension of vaccines, countries have followed different political decisions and strategies in vaccine procurement, production, and distribution. Countries such as the United StatesGermany (BioNTech), the USA (Moderna), China (CoronaVac), Russia (Sputnik V), the UK (AstraZeneca), Türkiye (Turkovac), India (Covaxin) have produced vaccines and exported them to other countries. Vaccines were put into global circulation. While the common goal of all countries is global solidarity and humanitarian aid, foreign policy objectives play a dominant role. 1.1

Actor in the Coronavirus Pandemic: Vaccine

The coronavirus disease has been named SARS-CoV-2. The clinical disease caused by the virus was named Coronavirus Disease-2019 (COVID-19) (Er and Ünal, 2020: 1). Nations have produced masks, provided medicines and medical equipment for treatment, and established pandemic hospitals with national concerns to combat the virus and reduce its impact. The priority has been to be isolated from the outside world and to be sufficient for the population of one’s own country (Balta, 2020: 216). After the first case of coronavirus disease was reported, cases and deaths increased rapidly. Wide-ranging measures have been taken to prevent the spread of the disease globally, such as nationwide isolations and strict retreats for infected people (Efuntoye et al., 2021). Many countries decided to restrict the export of medical supplies such as masks, protective clothing, respirators, and medicines (Esen, 2021). Later, countries struggled to find a permanent solution to the pandemic and found vaccines. Vaccine racism and vaccine nationalism emerged when vaccines were introduced. Rich countries and global superpowers negotiated deals with vaccine manufacturers in advance. However, a significant part of the world, which is economically and politically disadvantaged, remains at risk because they do not have sufficient resources (Basu, 2021: 106). In this

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situation, the willingness of countries and pharmaceutical companies to provide vaccines to the less fortunate has been seen as both an honorable act and a geopolitical pressure tool (Filimianova, 2021). The supply of the vaccine first in their countries and then donating it to other countries can be expressed as vaccine nationalism. Vaccine diplomacy can manifest itself against vaccine nationalism. Some wealthy countries, such as the UK, France, Germany and the US, and vaccine manufacturers have entered into pre-purchase agreements before the phase stages of vaccines have been completed or regulatory approval has expired (Lagman, 2021). Due to increasing case and mortality rates, the phase stages of the vaccines developed in the early days were shortened and the approval processes were accelerated (Yumru and Karakoç, 2021: 276). The BioNTech/Pfizer vaccine received the first approval worldwide. Later, vaccines such as AstraZeneca/Oxford, Moderna, Sinovac and Snopharm, Sputnik V started to be used (Alkanat, 2021). The genetic structure of the COVID-19 virus has constantly changed due to mutations, and new variants have emerged. Thus, different treatments and vaccine studies have been conducted. 1.2

Soft Power and Vaccine Diplomacy

In international relations, military power usually manifests itself as an element of hard power. Political and economic power is also used as an element of hard power. Today, states use not only hard power but also soft power in their international relations. The concept of soft power was first used in 1990 by an American political scientist, Joseph Nye, in his book Bound To Lead. Soft power is the ability of a state to legitimize its power in the eyes of other states and face less resistance to its global demands. The more attractive a state’s ideology and culture are, the more likely other states or actors will willingly follow it (Nye, 1990: 182). In short, soft power is the ability to achieve what is desired through attraction without pressure or coercion (Nye, 2004: 73). It can be seen that different elements of soft power have emerged over time. Many countries, especially high-income countries, use health as one of their global foreign policy objectives (Antwi-Boasiako, 2022: 2). Pandemics, infectious diseases, and bioterrorism are now seen as threats to national and global security. Health has become an integral part of human rights, domestic and foreign policy, and economic, geopolitical, security, and social justice agendas. The strategic importance of health

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is changing (WHO, 2023). Thus, through health diplomacy based on health, multi-layered, multi-actor disciplines come together and focus on negotiations that shape and manage the political environment (Kickbusch, Silberschmidt, and Buss, 2007: 230). Vaccine diplomacy which relies on the use and distribution of vaccines, is a branch of health diplomacy. Some countries see vaccines as a political tool, to establish diplomatic relations and expand their sphere of influence by providing vaccines to countries that have difficulties in accessing vaccines (Hotez, 2014). With the coronavirus pandemic, it can be said that vaccines have started to be used as a soft power tool. During the Cold War in the 1960s, the US and the Soviet Union, two hostile countries, cooperated on vaccines due to polio and smallpox cases and contributed to the end of the epidemic (Manela, 2010). A diplomatic relationship was established through smallpox vaccines between England and France, which faced each other in the Napoleonic Wars (Brands, 2021). In 1851, the first International Health Conference was organized against the spread of cholera, plague, and yellow fever (Hotez, 2014). In the Ebola and COVID-19 pandemics, scientists quickly shared genetic sequence data of the virus causing the diseases, contributing to the rapid production of vaccines (Elbe, 2021: 660). These are good examples of global vaccine diplomacy. 1.3

Vaccine Diplomacy in the Covid-19 Process

The world was caught unprepared for the COVID-19 pandemic and remained slow in vaccine production and distribution. In this process, China and Russia came to the forefront by acting quickly. They used the vaccines they developed as an element of soft power (Ho, 2020). Later, almost all global powers joined the race to find an effective vaccine. Vaccines were seen as a medical product and a political tool. Countries such as China, Russia, and Cuba, which are closed to the outside world, produced open vaccines. China, Russia, India, the US, and the European Union (EU) focused on how they could use vaccines to influence countries that could not develop and produce vaccines. France has seen this as a “war of influence over vaccines”, linking it to major geopolitical struggles (Shok, 2022). The US competed for influence through vaccine donations or loans (Ganbaatar, 2021). China was blamed and damaged when the virus was first reported to have emerged in Wuhan. It then reversed the situation and sent

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masks, health kits, tests, and vaccines to countries in need. China has donated vaccines to Ukraine, Namibia, Egypt, Vietnam, Ghana, and other countries (Ganbaatar, 2021). In December 2020, China approved the Sinopharm vaccine against COVID-19 for general use (Reuters, 2020). Later, with the approval of Coronavac, a vaccine developed by Sinovac, the number of authorized vaccines increased to two (Aydın, 2021). China initially promised to donate vaccines to strategically important countries with which it competes. These were countries such as Brazil, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Russia as well as the Philippines and Bangladesh, where the West was absent (Mahbub, 2021). China exported vaccines by also selecting low- and middle-income countries with which it has political relations and has collapsed health systems. The countries with priority access to the vaccine were the countries under China’s Belt and Road project. These are Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Serbia, United Arab Emirates, and Türkiye. Unlike organizations such as the WHO, which lost public credibility during the pandemic, China offered medical supplies, vaccines, and technology platforms as public goods (Gyu, 2021: 1–2). Asia-Pacific countries and the African region benefited the most from China’s vaccine donations. Europe has received the least amount of Chinese vaccine donations (Kobierecka, 2022: 6). A diplomatic incident that occurred in this process has benefited China. During the US President’s plan to withdraw from the WHO, China wanted to fill the gap. China signaled that it would join the WHO initiative. This appeared to be part of a broader public relations effort to counter deteriorating international perceptions of China (Financial Times, 2020). The US also attempted to acquire a German pharmaceutical company to secure vaccine production exclusively for its country (Perthes, 2020: 113). In the vaccine diplomacy arena, the US has targeted foreign audiences through vaccine donations. After President Biden took office, it re-entered the vaccine diplomacy race by producing vaccines (Antwi-Boasiako, 2022: 10). Some countries have access to vaccines while others do not. WHO emphasized vaccine inequality in January 2021. Despite this, in April 2022, much of Africa was deprived of access to vaccines. In African countries where vaccination had started, the number of doses administered per capita remained extremely low. In the pursuit of a geopolitical advantage in vaccine diplomacy, certain countries have gained profit and soft power influence by seeking to offer nationally branded products. Russia and China were the first in this process. China conducted vaccine diplomacy as a “Health Silk Road”, while Russia geopoliticized it. Unlike

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Cold War era interstate cooperation for vaccination against smallpox and polio, COVID-19 vaccines both nationalized and geopoliticized vaccine diplomacy (Sparke and Levy, 2022: 87–89). The Russian vaccine Sputnik V is the world’s first registered COVID19 vaccine. The vaccine is named after the first Soviet space satellite. Russia has supplied the vaccine to its neighboring countries in Europe due to its expansion geography (About Sputnik V, 2023). Russia delivered the vaccine to underdeveloped countries to build a sphere of influence. It has expanded its sphere of influence, particularly in Latin America and subSaharan Africa (Ullah, Kumpoh and Haji-Othman, 2021: 2). Russia has turned the pandemic into an opportunity to overcome its post-Crimea isolation and re-establish its international status. Another important issue is the implementation of the post-communist Sputnik V in the Central European country of Hungary. This is a kind of biodiplomacy. Local political elites, acting as the transmitters of Russia’s vaccine diplomacy, followed their previous foreign policy of eastern expansion (Kazharski and Makarychev, 2021: 141–1443). It can be seen that Russia has chosen the vaccine it produces as a soft power tool. Faced with Chinese competition, India wanted to expand its soft power, especially in Asia (Antwi-Boasiako, 2022: 10). In 2021, it declared its vaccine diplomacy as a priority delivery and supply of vaccines to neighbors and other countries in need. It has tried to export local, accessible, and cost-effective vaccines. Covaxin and Covishield produced by Bharat Biotech were procured from the Serum Institute of India (SII). Indian vaccines have been demanded by countries such as Brazil and South Africa, as well as Western countries such as the UK and Canada. India has also led global cooperation efforts in the circulation of vaccines. It has also provided vaccines to non-state actors such as UN Peacekeeping, UN Health and WHO’s COVAX vaccine distribution. India has countered China’s rising tide by maintaining good relations with its neighbors. However, the second wave of the pandemic in April 2021 created a shortage of both local markets and vaccine delivery in India. The process was reversed from aid provider to aid recipient (from Russia, the US, France, and other European countries). India’s slowdown in healthcare exports became an opportunity for other countries such as Russia and China to fill the gap with their own vaccines (Basu, 2021: 107). The EU has stated that it provides financial assistance to European vaccine companies, particularly Pfizer and BioNTech, for research, development, and production (Cunningham and Morris, 2021). Therefore,

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European countries have claimed priority rights in vaccines. The European Commission even increased its powers to stop the export of vaccines outside Europe (Packham, 2021). In the first days of the pandemic, the EU member states turned to their own countries for protection against the pandemic. Thus, unity and solidarity were questioned. For example, Italy had difficulties in the supply of basic protective materials such as masks, disinfectants, and respirators. Its call for help from the EU member states went unanswered. Russia and Türkiye sent medical supplies to Italy, while China and Cuba sent medical teams. This situation between the EU countries has also been experienced in vaccine procurement. While the EU Commission is responsible for vaccine procurement on behalf of the member states, it has failed to fulfill this task sufficiently and has remained slow. As a matter of fact, Hungary, one of the EU member states, took a different stance from the member states and approved the Chinese “Sinopharm” vaccine, which the European Medicines Agency (EMA) had not yet approved, and announced that it would receive the “Sputnik V” vaccine from Russia (Boyraz, 2021). After the vaccines were put on the market, it was decided to make agreements with vaccine manufacturers at the EU level (Bollyky and Bown, 2020). While some countries stand out in vaccine diplomacy, it can be said that some countries and international organizations are subjected to criticism in terms of their existence. The success of the leaders was also spoken in the COVID-19 outbreak. For example, in early August 2020, after US President Trump announced that the vaccine would be ready before election day, Russia announced that it had developed its own vaccine and that it had begun its administration (Avorn and Kesselheim, 2020). A notable example of vaccine diplomacy was seen in Israel’s political approach. In 2017, some statements regarding Jerusalem as the capital of Israel were highly debated. Following this process, Israel announced that it would provide vaccine aid in exchange for recognizing Jerusalem as the capital during the pandemic (Yanıkda˘g, 2023: 35). Another vaccine is the Soberana 2 vaccine produced for COVID-19 by Cuba, which stood out with its vaccine diplomacy in the fight against AIDS and Ebola viruses. Vicente Vérez, one of the scientists who developed the vaccine, took vaccine diplomacy to a different dimension and stated that they could give vaccines to foreigners visiting the island (Subuk¸ ¸ si, 2021). In the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic, Türkiye also donated vaccines after overcoming the problem of access to vaccines in the country. In the context of vaccine diplomacy, Türkiye broke new ground

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by sending 130,000 doses of its Turkovac vaccine to the Democratic Republic of Congo. Türkiye has assisted its friendly and brotherly countries in need with the supply of vaccines (MFA, 2023). Simultaneously with the vaccine and drug development studies initiated all over the world to fight the pandemic, studies have also started rapidly in Türkiye. Türkiye has become one of the countries producing its own vaccine. Turkey has taken into account its bilateral political relations in providing aid. Immunization rates during COVID-19 have brought the economic and political inequality between developed and less developed countries to the agenda. For this reason, a program called COVAX was developed in cooperation with WHO, the Global Alliance for Vaccines (GAVI), the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations, and UNICEF for developed countries with high income to provide vaccine assistance to less developed and developing countries (Yanıkda˘g, 2023: 32). COVAX is seen as an important program against vaccine inequality. 1.4

Current Situation for Covid-19 Pandemic and Vaccination

According to March 2023 data, pandemic-related cases and deaths have decreased significantly worldwide. Since the beginning of the pandemic, COVID-19-related deaths have reached 6.9 million (UNICEF et al., 2023). As of May 2022, WHO has approved 11 vaccines that meet safety and efficacy criteria against COVID-19. These are AstraZeneca/ Oxford, Johnson and Johnson, Moderna, Pfizer/BioNTech, Sinopharm, Sinovac, Covaxin, Covishield, Covovax, Nuvaxovid, and Convidecia (Kenny, 2022). In addition, as of May 3, 2023, 50 vaccines have been approved worldwide, 92 vaccines are in phase 3, 72 vaccines are in phase 2 and 66 vaccines are in phase 1 (COVID-19 Vaccine Tracker, 2023). As of May 23, 2023, 70% of the world’s population has received at least one dose of the COVID-19 vaccine and 13.38 billion doses have been administered. In addition, 29.9% of people in low-income countries have received at least one dose of vaccine (Our World in Data, 2023).

2

Conclusion

After a global challenge such as COVID-19, it can be concluded that one of the most important concepts related to global health diplomacy is vaccine diplomacy. When we look at the developments during the pandemic process, vaccine diplomacy seems to be very evident. It is

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possible to say that vaccine-producing countries use vaccines as a diplomatic tool. With COVID-19 vaccines, diplomatically cooperating with countries, making new openings in foreign policy, and expanding spheres of influence have become current issues. According to the information obtained after the study, the following conclusions can be drawn. China received reactions as a result of being pointed as the source of the virus and tried to regain its image through vaccine production. Russia wanted to build and develop a sphere of influence. India aimed to establish good relations with its neighbors but faced difficulties after the second wave of COVID-19. The US targeted foreign audiences through vaccine donations. Türkiye shared its limited resources with the world. The pandemic affected not only states and societies but also international organizations. When the EU remained slow and inadequate in providing vaccines, member states followed different paths. In addition to all these, a global initiative program, COVAX, was established in the context of vaccine equality. In conclusion, it can be said that vaccine diplomacy, which involved interstate cooperation during the Cold War, was replaced by geopoliticization and power acquisition with the COVID-19 pandemic.

References About Sputnik V. (2023) About Sputnik V . Available at: https://sputnikvaccine. com/aboutvaccine/ (Accessed: 23.05.2023). Alkanat, A. (2021) 5 soru: dünya genelinde a¸sı adaletsizli˘gi, SETA. Available at: https://www.setav.org/5-soru-dunya-genelinde-asi-adaletsizligi/ (Accessed: 24.05.2023). Antwi-Boasiako, I. (2022) Vaccine diplomacy game: The race for soft power, Technological University Dublin, 1–17. Avorn J., and Kesselheim A. (2020) Regulatory decision-making on COVID-19 vaccines during a public health emergency, JAMA 324(13), 1284–1285. Aydın, N. (2021) Çin’de 15 Aralık’tan bu yana yakla¸sık 32 milyon ki¸siye Kovid-19 a¸sısı yapıldı, Anadolu Ajansı. Available at: https://www.aa.com. tr/tr/dunya/cinde-15-araliktan-bu-yana-yaklasik-32-milyon-kisiye-kovid-19asisi-yapildi/2136667 (Accessed: 26.05.2023). Balta, E. (2020) Salgın, kriz ve ulus devlet. In Bayındır. D. (ed.) Salgın: tükeni¸s ˙ ça˘gında dünyayı yeniden dü¸sünmek. Istanbul: Tellekt-Can Sanat Yayınları, pp. 205–219. Basu, S. (2021) Assessing India’s vaccine diplomacy: An effective tool? International Journal of Political Science Governance, 3(2), 106–109.

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Fiscal Space and Climate Change in the Post Covid-19 Pandemic: Double Crises of Sids Fethiye Burcu Türkmen-Ceylan

1

and Bengü Çelenk

Introduction

Fiscal space, a key factor in determining state capacity, has played a significant role in facilitating rapid recovery from the pandemic. According to a report by the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP) (2020), SIDS with limited fiscal space have been particularly vulnerable to the negative impacts of the pandemic. Despite being among the countries with the lowest global emissions, SIDS are extremely vulnerable to climate-related natural disasters. Given that these countries were already facing significant challenges from climate

Both authors contributed equally. F. B. Türkmen-Ceylan (B) University of East Anglia-School of International Development, Norwich, UK e-mail: [email protected] Department of Finance, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Kirsehir Ahi Evran University, Kirsehir, Türkiye B. Çelenk Department of International Relations, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Kır¸sehir Ahi Evran University, Kirsehir, Türkiye © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Akilli and B. Gunes (eds.), World Politics in the Age of Uncertainty, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39611-3_4

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change prior to the pandemic, the limited fiscal space to provide resources to compensate for economic losses caused by the pandemic will make implementing climate change-related actions even more difficult. This study focuses on four Indian Ocean SIDS—Comoros, Maldives, Mauritius, and Seychelles—and employs basic statistical tools to demonstrate the correlation between fiscal space, climate change responses, and the interlinkages between the two in the post-Covid-19 era. Through the lens of political economy, the study aims to compare these countries and provide an appropriate framework for understanding why some SIDS outperformed others during the pandemic, and why these countries are better positioned to implement measures against climate change in the post-Covid-19 era. 1.1

General Overview of SIDS: Comoros, Maldives, Mauritius, and Seychelles

SIDS consist of 58 states, divided into two categories: United Nations (UN) members and non-UN members/Associate Members of Regional Commissions in the UN system. Geopolitically, they are divided into three regions: the Caribbean, Pacific and Atlantic, Indian Ocean, and South China Sea (UN Sustainable Development, 2023: 1). While there is no official definition for SIDS yet (Herbert, 2019), a general description in terms of its geopolitical features has been made by the UN as follows: “They must be small, they must be islands, they must be developing and they must be states. But depending on the criteria used to define SIDS by different United Nations and international and regional organisations, the number of qualifying states or economies ranges from 58 countries” (UNCTAD, 2021, cited in UN-OHRLLS criteria, no date). Although SIDS are in different geopolitical categories, they share common characteristics in terms of their locations, economies, and vulnerabilities. Their remote location and inability to integrate into important trade networks force them to form their economic structures through limited resources. This, along with their low population and remote location, makes them vulnerable to external shocks. In recent years, SIDS have experienced two major shocks at the global level: climate change and the Covid-19 pandemic. Climate change has been a long-standing threat to SIDS, with sea-level rise posing an existential threat to these countries in the long run, and the increasing frequency of extreme weather events,

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ocean acidification, and warming making these states even more fragile (IPCC, 2019: 4–5; Robinson, 2020). Comoros is a country that consists of four archipelagos, including Mayotte, Anjouan, Mohéli, and Grand-Comoro. However, Mayotte remains under French rule despite Comoros’ independence in 1975, and studies and reports specific to Comoros generally consider the other three archipelagos (UNFCCC, 2006: 12). The country has a tropical climate with two main seasons: the hot season from December to July (monthly average of 200–250 mm precipitation) and the dry season from August to November (monthly average of 50–100 mm precipitation) (Ratter et al., 2016: 116). The average temperature in Comoros is gradually increasing (Ratter et al., 2016: 114). According to Climate Watch Data in 2019, Comoros contributed 0.00 per cent to global greenhouse gas emissions but ranked 158th in the Climate Vulnerability Index in 2020 (UNDP, 2023). It is projected that a sea-level rise of 20 cm by 2050 would displace approximately 10 per cent of the population, render 734 acres of arable land dysfunctional, severely damage coastal cities, and lead to lost tourism revenues (UNFCCC, 2006: 5). Deforestation is also a pressing issue in Comoros due to the impacts of drought, sea-level rise, and poverty. Nearly half of the population earns less than $1.25 a day, and about 70 per cent of the population cuts trees for daily needs, sales, or land protection (UNEP, 2018). Maldives is an archipelago of 25 coral islands and 1190 small tropical islands, with only 358 of them being used for human settlement and economic activities (UNDP, n.d.). The country has a tropical monsoon climate and relies heavily on tourism revenues, which constitute 1/3 of its economy. It is vulnerable to storms, floods, and other extreme weather events. Among them, rising sea levels pose an existential threat to the islands, as 80 per cent of them are only about 1 meter above sea level (MHAHE, 2001, cited in UNDP, n.d.). The average temperatures in the Maldives range between 25 and 35°C. However, according to the World Bank, temperatures in the region have increased by 0.8°C over the past 40 years, and annual precipitation data shows a decrease (World Bank, 2021a, 2021b: 2). The Maldives is among the six countries (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka) that have suffered the most economic losses due to climate change, according to the 2014 economic forecasts of the Asian Development Bank (ADB, 2014).

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Mauritius is an island nation that consists mostly of coral reefs and is located within an active cyclone basin. The country is highly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, including increased frequency of extreme weather events like cyclones, sea-level rise, and drought (Ramano and Dombrowski, 2021). Tropical cyclones, for instance, have become more severe, causing significant damage to human security and socio-economic activities. A report by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) revealed that the country faced 22 extreme weather events between 1960 and 2022, each causing damages of $160–245 million (IMF, 2022). Furthermore, the Minister of Environment and Climate Change noted that the sea level has risen globally by 3.3 mm, but Mauritius has experienced a rise of an average of 5.6 mm (Ramano and Dombrowski, 2021). As per the World Risk Index 2021, Mauritius ranks 51st in terms of exposure vulnerability susceptibility, lack of coping capacities, and lack of adaptive capacities. Seychelles is an archipelago of 115 islands and is considered a highly vulnerable state due to climate change, poverty, rapid population growth, disproportionate use of natural resources, inadequate infrastructure, deforestation, and other factors (Etongo et al., 2020: 6). The country is particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, such as sea-level rise and coastal erosion, due to the majority of settlements, economic activities, and important infrastructure being located along the coastline (World Bank, 2020). A study has found that the Indian Ocean has warmed faster than other tropical climate regions, leading to an increase in average temperatures and a decrease in average precipitation in Seychelles between 1989 and 2018 (Etongo et al., 2020: 3–7). The global pandemic that emerged in 2020 caused a sudden shock effect, deeply affecting these countries with limited sources of income, particularly tourism and fisheries. This study aims to establish a correlation between fiscal space, responses to climate change, and recovery from the pandemic. By doing this, it provides a comparative analysis of Comoros, Maldives, Mauritius, and Seychelles in the Indian Ocean through stringency measures and their economic effects, including the fight against climate change and pre-and post-Covid-19 fiscal space. 1.2

Stylized Facts: Pre- and Post-Covid-19 Period

The cost of climate change for SIDS is immeasurable: the political and economic costs can ultimately mean losing sovereignty. However, as

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noted by UNCTAD (2022), climate financing is far from being sufficient for SIDS, and a prominent factor for this is the limited fiscal space. Fiscal space refers to the resilience of a government’s budget when making public spending choices and generating public revenue, reflecting the fiscal well-being of the government budget (Heller, 2005). Limited fiscal space makes countries reliant on international aid. Therefore, this part investigates the interlinkages between fiscal space (before and after the pandemic) and potential challenges faced by governments when addressing climate change during the post-Covid-19 period. We will examine mean temperature and precipitation, key macroeconomic parameters, human development index (HDI), and Covid-19 figures to provide a narrative and derive stylized facts. 1.2.1 Stylized Facts on Climate Change Climate change can be observed by monitoring variations in long-term mean temperature and mean precipitation levels. However, for our sample set of countries, the severity of climate change can be observed even over shorter time frames, in this instance for a four-year period. Figure 1 shows the mean temperature (in °C) and precipitation (in mm) for Comoros, Maldives, Mauritius, and Seychelles for the period of 2018– 2021. As seen, the mean temperature either remained stable (Maldives) or declined in 2020 and 2021 when stringency measures (e.g. border closures, decreasing international tourist flows etc.) impacted economic activity. This supports the argument that as economic activity restores its long-term upward trend, climate change will become a more serious issue for SIDS. Additionally, the graph demonstrates that countries in our sample set are affected by the rising mean temperatures, which is another manifestation of climate change. In addition, it is evident that the precipitation levels (mm) have become unpredictable in all countries except the Maldives. Comoros has experienced a sharp and consistent decline in precipitation levels, while Mauritius and Seychelles have had a more erratic pattern of precipitation, including dramatic declines. The unpredictability of precipitation as a natural hazard factor creates vulnerability for these countries. Moreover, per capita, CO2 emissions demonstrate that the increasing mean temperature, and mean fluctuation volatility are not temporary cases but rather permanent one if the current upward trend (see Fig. 2) in CO2 emissions is sustained.

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Fig. 1 Mean temperature and precipitation (2018–2021) (Authors’ own figure. Data from World Bank Climate Change Knowledge Portal. https://climateknowl edgeportal.worldbank.org/download-data [Last Access: 05.03.2023])

Fig. 2 Per capita CO2 emissions (2009–2021) (Source Our World in Data. Link: https://ourworldindata.org/co2/country/comoros?country=COM ~MDV~MUS~SYC [Last Access: 23.02.2023])

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Fig. 3 HDI (2018–2021) (Authors’ own figure. Data from World Bank Data Portal. https://databank.worldbank.org/Human-development-index/id/ 363d401b [Last Access: 23.02.2023])

Upon careful examination of Figs. 2 and 3, a correlation between the HDI and CO2 levels of the countries in the sample can be observed. The mean HDI for Comoros is the lowest, and it has the lowest per capita CO2 emission levels, while Seychelles and Maldives have the highest HDI and the highest CO2 per capita. This indicates that economic development has become a root cause of climate change in these countries. Therefore, these economies must finance green growth technologies in order to survive the climate change. This necessitates an examination of their economic and fiscal parameters to determine whether they are sufficient to fund the transition to a green economy. 1.2.2 Stylized Facts on Economic and Fiscal Parameters Table 1 below presents the key economic and fiscal indicators for Comoros, Maldives, Mauritius, and Seychelles.

2018 2019 2020 2021 Maldives 2018 2019 2020 2021 Mauritius 2018 2019 2020 2021

Comoros

3.6 1.8 −0.2 2.1 8.1 7.1 −33.5 41.7 4 2.9 −14.6 3.7

1.7 −0.1 −2.1 0.2 4.3 4 −34.8 39.8 4 2.9 −14.6 3.7

III GDP per capita growth % 8.1 8.1 9.2 9.4 5.6 5.3 6.3 6.1 6.4 6.3 7.4 7.4

IV Unemployment (%)

1.7 3.7 0.8 −0.2 −0.1 0.2 −1.4 0.5 3.2 0.4 2.6 4

−0.6 −3.4 −2.2 −2.9 −5.3 −6.7 −23.5 −16.6 −2.23 −8.43 −10.95 −6.06

V VI Inflation Budget (%) deficit (% GDP)

I Year

Country

II GDP growth

Economic and Fiscal Indicators (2018–2021)

Table 1

10.2 10.1 10.6 10.1 14.8 15.5 22.6 17.8 14.6 14.7 17.5 16.9

VII Government final consumption (% GDP) −1.35 −4.34 −0.51 −2.72 −5.27 −6.68 −23.51 −14.28 −2.23 −8.43 −10.95 −6.06 43 42 34 42 154 148 118 143 98 96 86 98

12.1 5.7 −9.3 7.7 83.7 78.4 68.4 67.8 52 52.2 46.5 53.7

12.9 12.8 5.7 10.8 70.1 69.4 49.4 75.3 46.1 44.1 39.4 44

VIII IX X XI Fiscal Trade Import Export balance (% (% (% (% GDP) GDP) GDP) GDP)

49.3 51.1 26.8 NA 85.2 84.7 78.9 NA 38.7 38.5 16.8 NA

20.7 22.6 24.5 25.5 48.7 53.1 100.5 86.8 70.7 78.6 106.1 108.7

XII XIII Tourism External (% debt (% exports) GNI)

44 F. B. TÜRKMEN-CEYLAN AND B. ÇELENK

II GDP growth

3.2 3.1 −7.7 7.9

I Year

Seychelles 2018 2019 2020 2021

2.2 2.2 −8.5 7

III GDP per capita growth % 3.5 2.4 4.3 3

IV Unemployment (%)

3.7 2.1 8.3 9.8

0.1 0.2 −19.1 −3

V VI Inflation Budget (%) deficit (% GDP)

25 33.2 38.4 36.5

VII Government final consumption (% GDP) −1.03 0.87 −16.54 −5.83 203 218 136 153

107.6 114.4 70.6 80.4

94.9 103.4 65.4 72.3

VIII IX X XI Fiscal Trade Import Export (% (% (% balance GDP) GDP) GDP) (% GDP)

Authors’ own table. Data from World Bank Data Portal. https://databank.worldbank.org/ (Last Access: 05.03.2023)

Country

28.5 29.6 18.4 NA

281 282 400 376

XII XIII Tourism External debt (% (% GNI) exports)

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It is evident that key economic indicators were severely deteriorated during the pandemic, i.e. 2020–2021 period. The GDP contracted in 2020, and the per capita growth declined more than the GDP itself. This is evidence that income distribution was negatively affected by reduced economic activity. This is further supported by the rise in unemployment rates for all economies by roughly one point. In terms of inflation, the impact of the pandemic varied among the four economies: Comoros and Maldives experienced deflation in 2021 and 2020, respectively, due to decreasing aggregate demand, while Mauritius and Seychelles had a rise in inflation. Seychelles, being the most developed economy with the highest population, had limited import of goods and services due to Covid-19 supply chain disruptions, which was the primary reason for the inflation rates. These key macroeconomic indicators suggest that the appeal for adopting a fiscal policy regime that prioritizes offsetting the impacts of climate change needed to be temporarily suspended during the pandemic and in the post-Covid-19 period. In other words, the pandemic changed the fiscal policy frameworks and required the mobilization of public resources to tackle its negative effects. The economies of SIDS share some common characteristics, as explained by the UN World Tourism Organization (UNWTO) (2014). Firstly, SIDS have limited economic activity due to their geographical remoteness from the mainland. Secondly, these countries rely heavily on tourism income to sustain economic activity. As a result, their economies are more vulnerable to shocks in international trade, as demonstrated by the Covid-19 pandemic. Therefore, it is essential to examine key trade indicators to understand the potential impact of the pandemic on climate change action. Seychelles and Maldives are two typical examples of SIDS with the aforementioned characteristics. The export composition of these countries is expected to be altered by climate change. According to the Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC, 2020), frozen and fresh fish fillets are the largest share of exports for both Seychelles and Maldives, along with tourism. However, as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2023) has noted, fish species are already threatened by global warming, and climate change funding should consider the adaptation of fisheries to climate change. While the fish trade was affected by supply chain disruptions during the pandemic, the long-term impact of climate change on the fish trade is expected to persist beyond the pandemic.

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Tourism is another crucial component of both Seychelles and Maldives’ exports. According to Table 1, Seychelles is the most international tradedependent country among all. Its export-to-import ratio has been less than one, which implies that the country has faced significant trade imbalances between 2018 and 2021. It is also evident that the share of trade in GDP remarkably decreased in 2020 and 2021, mainly due to disruptions in overseas travel. To offset decreasing international demand for goods and services, the government increased its final consumption expenditure (column VII). Similarly, Maldives, being predominantly tourism-dependent, was significantly affected by the pandemic, leading to a drop in export rates in relation to GDP due to the restrictions on international travel. To balance decreasing international demand for goods and services, the government increased its final consumption expenditure by approximately 50 per cent. In comparison, Comoros and Mauritius have a more diversified export portfolio. According to the Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC, 2020), Comoros has a significant agricultural sector exporting to the rest of the world. Both these countries still have agriculture among the main elements of the economy. Additionally, these countries have a lower Human Development Index (HDI) compared to Seychelles and Maldives, reflecting their economic structures, which have the advantage of emitting lower CO2 per capita. However, tourism remains a significant source of export for both Comoros and Mauritius, making them vulnerable to climate-induced natural disasters. Despite having a diverse export portfolio, these countries still had to use fiscal tools to maintain aggregate demand, pushing their government’s final consumption. However, the rate of increase has been remarkably lower than that of Seychelles and Maldives. The export compositions of these countries may differ, but their external debt (column XIII) has increased during the pandemic. All countries except Comoros have experienced a sharp rise in their external debt, with Seychelles seeing its external debt almost double compared to pre-pandemic levels. Additionally, all countries except Comoros have witnessed rising budget deficits (column VI). Given that these countries are short of internal funding to finance climate change adaptation, the pandemic has led to an increased dependency on international aid to tackle climate change. In other words, the pandemic has suppressed the fiscal space, making access to climate finance more difficult as available international aid has been directed towards Covid-19 related issues.

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According to Aid Atlas1 (2023), funding for climate adaptation has been replaced with financing for Covid-19. Comoros received $9.7 million in 2020 from various donors targeting Covid-19, with the largest proportion of this aid used for healthcare, followed by population-related programs and disaster prevention and preparedness. Maldives received $127 million in 2020 for Covid-19, with 40 per cent of the aid budget used for general budget services, followed by healthcare spending and social infrastructure and services. Mauritius received $618 million in international donations, with almost 60 per cent of this funding used for social protection, employment creation, and housing, among other things. Therefore, international aid is primarily focused on mitigating the aftermath of the pandemic, and as Caldwell and Alayza (2021) and Elbehri et al. (2022) explain, the pandemic has hindered the availability of international finance to address climate change.

2

Conclusion

This study highlights that the Covid-19 pandemic has exacerbated fiscal risks and intensified the climate crisis in SIDS. Our main findings suggest that Comoros, Maldives, Mauritius, and Seychelles have become more vulnerable to climate change-related risks in the post-Covid-19 period. The pandemic has constrained fiscal capacity due to its economic burden, not only for these economies but also for the global economy. This has resulted in a decrease in international aid for climate financing. Consequently, these economies face the challenge of addressing climate change-related issues under increasing fiscal stress with less international financial support available. Thus, our analysis acknowledges that unless effective measures for climate change are implemented, the impact of global warming will not be limited to economic outcomes but have political and social implications as well. As the main method of analysis, this study presents stylized facts about the impact of climate change, economic and fiscal circumstances just before and during the pandemic, for the period 2018–2021, by examining key indicators. It has been observed that the mean precipitation levels (mm) have been affected by climate change even in a four-year period. The study also reveals that key economic indicators such as external debt 1 There is not available data on Covid-19 financing for Seychelles on Aid Atlas (2023). Hence our narrative covers only the remaining three countries.

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(as a percentage of GNI) and fiscal balance (budget deficit as a percentage of GDP) have significantly deteriorated during the pandemic. Moreover, during global crises similar to the pandemic, these economies have to rely on their own government capacity, which results in an increased share of government in final consumption expenditure to maintain economic activity. Therefore, these economies need to improve their fiscal space to be able to survive another future global crisis. However, our study has some limitations that leave potential research questions for future investigations. For instance, the impact of climate change and the pandemic on social structures, such as forced displacement, job loss, or increased insecure employment, requires further analysis. Addressing these issues in future research could inform policy formulation for effective action.

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2023). IPCC. (2019) Choices made now are critical for the future of our ocean and cryosphere. Available at: https://www.ipcc.ch/2019/09/25/srocc-pressrelease/ (Accessed 13 Dec 2022). OEC – The Observatory of Economic Complexity. (2020). The Observatory of Economic Complexity | OEC. [online] Available at: https://oec.world/ (Accessed 3 Mar 2023). OECD (2023). The Economics of Adapting Fisheries to Climate Change. [online] Available at: https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/agriculture-and-food/ the-economics-of-adapting-fisheries-to-climate-change_9789264090415-en (Accessed 4 Mar 2023). Ramano, K. and Dombrowski, K. (2021). Mauritian minister warns: “It is a matter of life and death” Available at: https://www.dandc.eu/en/article/ small-island-developing-states-are-hardly-responsible-climate-change-most-aff ected (Accessed 14 Feb 2023). Ratter, B. M., Petzold, J. and Sinane, K. (2016). Considering the locals: coastal construction and destruction in times of climate change on Anjouan, Comoros. United Nations Sustainable Development Journal. 40(3), p.112126. Ritchie, H., Roser, M. and Rosado, P. (2020). CO 2 and Greenhouse Gas Emissions. [online] Our World in Data. Available at: https://ourworldindata.org/ co2/country/comoros?country=COM~MDV~MUS~SYC (Accessed 5 Mar 2023). Robinson, S. (2020) ‘Climate change adaptation in SIDS: A systematic review of the literature pre and post the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report’, WIREs Climate Change, (11)4, p1-24. UN Sustainable Development. (2023). Small Island Developing States. Available at: https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/topics/sids/list (Accessed 01 Feb 2023). UNCTAD. (2021). What Makes a SIDS a SIDS. Available at: https://dgff2021. unctad.org/unctad-and-the-sids/ (Accessed: 01 Feb 2023). UNCTAD. (2022). Climate Finance for SIDS is Shockingly Low: Why This Needs to Change. Available at: https://unctad.org/news/blog-climate-finance-sidsshockingly-low-why-needschange#:~:text=SIDS%20are%20increasingly%20v ulnerable%20to,at%20%2412.6%20billion%20per%20year (Accessed 28 Feb 2023). UNDP. (2023). Comoros. Available at: https://climatepromise.undp.org/whatwe-do/where-we-work/comoros (Accessed 03 Feb 2023). UNDP. (n.d.). Maldives. Available at: https://www.adaptation-undp.org/exp lore/maldives (Accessed 13 Feb 2023).

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UNESCAP. (2020) An assessment of fiscal space for COVID-19 response and recovery in Asia-Pacific developing countries. Available at: https://www.une scap.org/resources/mpfd-policy-brief-no-116-assessment-fiscal-space-covid19-response-and-recovery-asia (Accessed 12 Dec 2022). UNEP. (2018). “Where there used to be so much there is so little”: the challenge of climate change in the Comoros. Available at: https://www.unep.org/newsand-stories/story/where-there-used-be-so-much-there-so-little-challenge-cli mate-change-comoros (Accessed 04 Feb 2023). UNFCCC. (2006). National Action Programme of Adaptation to climate change (NAPA). Available at: https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/napa/com01e.pdf (Accessed 03 Feb 2023). WTO. (2014). Small Islands Developing States (SIDS) | UNWTO. [online] Available at: https://www.unwto.org/sustainable-development/small-islandsdeveloping-states#:~:text=They%20present%20three%20key%20characteristi cs,to%20strong%20tourism%20assets%20but (Accessed 3 Mar 2023). World Bank. (2020). World Bank Climate Change Knowledge Portal. [online] Available at: https://climateknowledgeportal.worldbank.org/ove rview (Accessed 5 Mar 2023). World Bank. (2021a) Climate Risk Profile: Maldives. Available at: https://www. adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/672361/climate-risk-country-pro file-maldives.pdf (Accessed 13 Feb 2023). World Bank. (2021b). Coastal resilience in Seychelles: charting a path forward. Available at: https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2019/ 07/18/coastal-resilience-in-seychelles-charting-a-path-forward (Accessed 13 Feb 2023). World Bank. (2023). World Bank Open Data | Data. [online] Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/ (Accessed 5 Mar 2023).

The International Trade Agenda of the Pandemic: Systematic Evaluation of the Global Trade Crisis in the Post-Covid-19 Era Selçuk Efe Küçükkambak , Fatma Çakır , and Mesut Çakır

1

Introduction

For nearly three years, the world has been relentlessly grappling with various problems brought on by the most significant health crisis of this millennium. This has not only imposed restrictions on many ordinary daily activities but has also disrupted various sectors, including the economy, sociology, politics, society, and international relations. These

S. E. Küçükkambak (B) Aydın, Turkey e-mail: [email protected] F. Çakır Faculty of Economics, Department of Business Administration, Aydın Adnan Menderes University, Aydın, Turkey e-mail: [email protected] M. Çakır Faculty of Economics, Department of Econometrics, Aydın Adnan Menderes University, Aydın, Turkey © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Akilli and B. Gunes (eds.), World Politics in the Age of Uncertainty, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39611-3_5

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disruptions caused sharp fluctuations in supply and demand, economic turmoil heterogeneously affecting different industries, severe deviations in the short-term economic policies of governments, a decrease in employment, a sharp contraction in the global trade volume, and supply problems, especially in personal health, cleaning, and food products, as well as international trade networks. The long-term impact of the crisis has caused irreversible economic losses due to the constant mutation of the virus, causing the epidemic. There has been extensive research on the economic losses caused by the pandemic and the other crises that emerged from it. These studies can generally be grouped into three categories. The first group of studies analysed the losses caused by the first wave of the pandemic using numerical records while considering potential future damages by employing estimation methods. The second group of studies focused on sectoral commercial problems within regional and economic cooperations to propose alternative solutions. The third group analysed secondary and big data using various analysis methods to provide alternative solutions based on specific countries or sectors. The in-depth literature review identified some points that the researchers may have overlooked. For example, despite advances in modern medicine, why was the global economy so unprepared for the health crisis caused by Covid-19? Could Covid-19 be the only factor responsible for the recession in the world’s 10 largest economies? These questions can be answered by preparing the commercial agenda of the Covid-19 crisis, analysing the trade and supply chain policies of countries that steered the world economy when Covid-19 emerged, as well as examining the pandemic process in-depth, not only in terms of products but also in terms of services, sectors, trade actors. Moreover, it is important to analyse the pandemic process in terms of micro and macroeconomic indicators to prepare for future crises that may arise due to factors such as war, climate crisis, cyber-attacks, extreme weather events, and fossil or hydraulic energy sources.

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2 Fluctuations in Microeconomic Indicators Caused by the Pandemic Although government incentives such as government cash advances to businesses and increasing trade finance through credit institutions and domestic banks supported the global financial crisis caused by Covid19, a significant part of the commercial products exports and exporters, especially in developed countries, benefited disproportionately from this support on a sectoral basis (Albertoni & Wise, 2021). As of 2020, the industrial production index decreased for the first time since 2015 compared to the previous year due to supply chain interruptions and tariff-induced increases in production costs in the USA (Huang & Smith, 2020). Researchers suggest that domestic enterprises in countries such as the USA, Korea, and Japan should seek different alternative countries to significantly reduce their dependence on China, especially in terms of technological products. It shows as a tragic example that the supply chain in the automotive, electronics, and pharmaceutical industries collapsed in a short time as a result of the Covid-19 closures in China, which is a high-tech production centre, in environments where it is not possible to predict the future due to uncertainty (Albertoni & Wise, 2021). It is too early to distinguish the effects of the trade war from the damage done by the pandemic now (Albertoni & Wise, 2021). World trade volume between March and April 2020, when Covid-19 was still new, decreased by 21%. In comparison, the highest monthly decrease during the 2008 global crisis was 18% between September and October 2008, although the economic context, the origins of the crisis, and the way it spread were different (Barbero et al., 2021). In 2020, the total import of products in Latin America and the Caribbean decreased by 37%, while this rate was 22.9% for capital products and 39.1% for consumer products (Cepal, 2020). The adverse effects of Covid-19 on different businesses have been more pronounced as consumption coincides with production. One of the most economically affected sectors by Covid-19 is tourism. Factors such as the decrease in consumer perceived confidence, increase risk, loss of employment, and decrease in household income have affected individual expenditures. The most significant negative impact of these expenditures has been the decrease in travel and tourism activities (Boone, 2020). The necessity of physical proximity between those who provide and consume tourism services has caused significant losses in the tourism sector’s economic

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activity under the traditional business model. The pandemic has also worn out the sector due to significant decreases in tourism mobility, especially in international mobility, severe losses in tourism revenues, disruptions in the supply chain, a decrease in tourism demand, and falling consumer confidence (Barkas et al., 2020). The restrictions and preventive measures imposed by health authorities worldwide on indoor shopping service sales, catering, entertainment, and leisure activities have changed consumer behaviour. The most apparent change is increased sales through electronic and mobile channels and this increase caused the sector to proliferate (Lestari, 2020). The technological development of these new trade channels has paved the way for the sector’s rapid growth. For example, Amazon, the world’s leading online retail store, had 5.2 billion visitors in June 2020 (Dumanska et al., 2021).

3 Contraction in Global Land, Air, Sea, and Rail Trade Covid-19 restrictions on land, air, sea, and rail transport, disrupted many operations, especially production, distribution, and supply chain. The embargoes imposed on Chinese airports by developed countries, especially before the epidemic took hold, seriously shook the Chinese economy (Shen, 2020). These restrictive measures have devastated businesses that carry out simultaneous passenger and freight transport. Companies that import various seafood and live flowers that require transportation via a cold chain or delivery to the consumer shortly after production have been hit particularly hard (Kerr, 2020). However, the crisis in air transport began to ease in the second half of 2021, with an increase in demand (Durant, 2022). Maritime trade has also been affected by Covid-19 restrictions and closures. According to Durant (2022), more than 80% of global product trade is carried out by sea. However, the World Health Organization’s declaration of the coronavirus pandemic shut down major ports around the world, causing significant disruptions in maritime trade. Although maritime trade shrunk by 3.8% in 2020, it began to recover towards the end of the second wave of the pandemic in 2021 (UNCTAD, 2021). Regardless, global port visits decreased by 6.2%, with a 12.5% decrease in small island developing states (SIDS), which are critical centres for maritime trade (Durant, 2022). Railways, which provide many advantages to businesses for markets and activities in distant countries like Russia and

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China, have been one of the most used and least affected transportation networks during the pandemic (Hilmola et al., 2020). In comparison, land transportation came to a standstill with the cessation of production activities in many sectors, tighter restrictive measures, and administrative barriers applied to prevent the spread of the epidemic. Although road transport is essential to meet the consumption demand for vital products, mobility has significantly decreased. In 2020, the annual turnover of transport companies in road transport decreased by around 20% (Cepal, 2020).

4

Crises Based on Industries and Sectors

The Covid-19 pandemic has had severe economic impacts on various sectors in the product and service markets. The tourism sector is one of them. Domestic travel restrictions and the closing down of international borders have adversely affected demand in the sector. Additionally, most tourist facilities have not been accepting visitors, and many remain closed due to the restrictions. These factors led to a decline in the sector’s revenues. Seasonal tourism businesses—accepting a limited number of customers in the visitor season—have been particularly hit hard, with a significant economic loss in the service sector in 2020 due to visitor uneasiness, according to Wolff (2020). For countries like Spain and Italy, which rely heavily on tourism revenues, the loss has been devastating. In comparison, a zero-case policy in some of the Far East countries—despite China being the epicentre of the virus—has helped the tourism sector recover faster than in many European countries and the US. The agriculture and food sectors have also been impacted by the economic destruction caused by the coronavirus pandemic (Kerr, 2020). The extended closure of accommodation, food, and beverage businesses affected individual eating and drinking habits, as well as their overall consumption patterns. However, after the initial wave, the sector started to mobilize as businesses began to accept a limited number of customers while implementing social distancing and hygiene rules. Over time, businesses returned to their pre-pandemic levels after lifting the restrictions. While some supply chains have closed due to this change, others have adapted to the demand of supermarkets. The pandemic measures to minimize health risks have affected other sectors economically, including the automotive, electrical and electronics, plastics, machinery, and equipment sectors. According to the Mexican

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National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI, 2020), automotive exports decreased by 90 per cent annually in May 2020, while electronics shipments fell by 52 per cent, plastics by 51 per cent, and the machinery-equipment sector by 42 per cent. In Latin America and the Caribbean, the machinery-equipment product dropped by 26 per cent between January and May 2020, with the manufacturing industry being the most affected in commercial activities among these regions. The automotive industry contracted by 55 per cent in the same period, followed by the textile, ready-to-wear, and footwear industries with a 35 per cent shrinkage rate (ECLAC, 2020). Although many sectors have been adversely affected by the restrictions imposed during Covid-19, the shift in consumer demands has been a turning point in electronic and mobile commerce. Due to the curfews and lockdowns, many food, cosmetics, electronics, and clothing retailers have had the opportunity to establish closer communication with their consumers online. Thanks to various Covid-19 situations, retail brands have transformed technological possibilities into opportunities, providing a unique shopping experience for consumers that includes shopping from the comfort of their homes, ease of payment at the door, contactless delivery assurance, and a store-like atmosphere. For instance, according to Statista (2022) data, the global e-commerce volume was $3.3 trillion in 2019, increased to $4.25 trillion in 2020 and $5.2 trillion in 2021. It is estimated that this figure will reach $5.7 trillion in 2022.

5 Commercial Negativities Due to Covid-19 in Terms of Developed, Developing, and Underdeveloped Economies Following the rapid spread of Covid-19 globally, many countries have been looking to keep human mobility at a minimum. However, this has disrupted the logistics, distribution, supply, and production activities of many productive economies, resulting in increased unemployment, and decreased demand for goods and services. Additionally, a decline in per capita income sent many economies into recession. Despite being the first country where Covid-19 emerged, China’s “zero-case” policy and aggressive closure practices gave rapid results. As a result, China managed to recover quickly and experienced fewer losses than many major economies. However, the US and the Caribbean have been among

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the most affected countries in terms of economy and trade among both developed and developing countries (Cepal, 2020). According to a study using PageRank, CheiRank, and a reduced Google matrix on the World Trade Network, some of the worst affected are developed countries like Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Portugal, and Spain. The list also mentions the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Venezuela, where most of their income is based on oil or natural gas, as well as countries like Trinidad or Tobago that are dependent on imports (Coquidé et al., 2022). In addition, due to the significant decline in demand for goods and services, especially oil and gas, the epidemic has had multiple social and economic impacts on countries. It has shown that to reduce the impact of Covid-19, primarily, the US and European Union countries should increase industrial production. Another important finding by Coquidé et al. (2022) is that the international trade network and flows during the crisis period varied significantly depending on the development levels of the countries. For example, generally, underdeveloped or developing countries in Africa, South Asia, and South America have increased their trade balance mainly through imports. This is in contrast to developed countries, where economic contraction has contributed to the slowdown in the global economy during the same period.

6 Commercial Negativities Due to Covid-19 for Commercial Actors (Manufacturer, Retailer, and Wholesaler) The curfews implemented to prevent the spread of the pandemic have had a significant impact on short-term consumer purchasing behaviour, leading to changes in the product and service supply policies of manufacturers, suppliers, and sellers. As a result, sectors dependent on foreign energy were hit hard while the import and export of some products came to a standstill. However, the pandemic has also led to the rapid development of new production networks in some sectors. During this period, domestic manufacturers have started to question the degree of external dependence on health equipment such as face masks, used to prevent the spread of the virus, and respirators used in hospitals (Gereffi, 2020). The increasing restrictions and prolongation of the pandemic have led to the production of medical products in the value chain of companies, in a way that can be used in the home or office environment (Brenton et al.,

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2022). For instance, the production of rapid Covid-19 antigen tests that can be done at home is one of the values produced in this research. Therefore, the actors in the product and service markets are another group affected by the process, at least as much as the consumers. On the other hand, the development of Covid-19 vaccines, one of the most effective methods of combating the pandemic, also brought up some production and supply problems (Evenett, 2021). Although the production speed, supply, and distribution insufficiency of mRNA (Messenger Ribo Nucleic Acid) vaccines, which uses a new technology that has been 30 years in the making, initially worried people, today a total of 13 billion doses of Covid-19 vaccine have been administered in 218 countries worldwide (CNN, 2023). In the post-pandemic period, retail stores were among the market actors to fall into economic difficulties. Layoffs, compensation obligations, and fixed expenses like rent and taxes have contributed to the difficulty. While some retailers have managed to complete the transition to online shopping during the pandemic, the sudden shift has been difficult for those who have struggled to adapt to the rapid changes.

7

Discussion and Conclusion

At the end of 2019, the world was hit by the Covid-19 pandemic, which not only caused a global health crisis but also triggered an economic recession that will take time to recover from. So, despite the remarkable progress in technology, the internet, informatics, health, science, medicine, and many other fields in the millennium, how did the epidemic create an economic crisis on a global scale? Could this not be prevented? In this chapter, we discussed the answers to how and why the pandemic was able to create such economic turmoil while looking at the period when the virus started to spread. The trade war between the US and China, which began during the presidency of Donald Trump, was a significant development in global politics between 2017 and 2020. Trump’s policies towards China, aimed at protecting the US’ image as a superpower, strained the countries’ strategic partnership in the region and China’s efforts towards total technological development. This complicated structure led to several crises in political, economic, military, and diplomatic fields over time. Meanwhile, the European Union also faced its own set of problems. European countries, including Britain, which was dealing with the aftermath of leaving

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the EU, formed a Western alliance with the US to counteract growing Russian influence in the region. On the other hand, Canada maintained its moderate approach in many international relations, and Japan, which started much cooperation with its neighbours, was on the rise in many respects. However, while all of this was happening, countries needed to prepare for crisis management. The world has faced various natural or unnatural disasters many times in history, resulting in hundreds of billions of dollars in material loss and hundreds of thousands in lost lives. However, the scale of the Covid-19 pandemic affected the entire world. The global system has long ignored the issue of the pandemic in its security perceptions, despite the internet and information technology being the most powerful tools of the modern age. Emergency action plans must include provisions for health investments, supply of health products, as well as contingency plans for communication and transportation disruptions. Additionally, political disagreements between countries were always on the agenda of the leaders of the great powers, even in such an extraordinary situation that threatened humanity. The pandemic also raised questions about interdependence, revealing policy changes between countries and regions. At the beginning of the pandemic, US President Donald Trump’s disbelief, and measures that he equated with policy towards China, almost fuelled the spread of the disease and its adverse effects on humanity. This process should provide some benefits to countries. Firstly, efforts should be made to establish sustainable global trade and supply chain networks. For example, precautionary measures should be taken to ensure that trade continues, even if supply chains are disrupted, particularly between neighbouring countries. Moreover, it is crucial to carry out structural reforms in countries’ trade relations and take measures to support reintegration within and between sectors. The world’s major economic regulators should take these measures as soon as possible. Furthermore, it is essential to act based on the global social contract discussed in the World Economic Forum and develop policies that consider all countries and citizens as an integral part of the entire system, making these policies sustainable.

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References Albertoni, N., & Wise, C. (2021). International trade norms in the age of Covid19 nationalism on the rise? Fudan Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences, 14(1), 41–66. Barbero, J., de Lucio, J. J., & Rodríguez-Crespo, E. (2021). Effects of Covid19 on trade flows: Measuring their impact through government policy responses. PloS one, 16(10), e0258356. Barkas, P., Honeck, D., & Rubio, E. (2020). International trade in travel and tourism services: Economic impact and policy responses during the Covid-19 crisis (No. ERSD-2020-11). WTO staff working paper. Boone, L. (2020) Tackling the fallout from Covid-19 in eds. Baldwin, R., & Di Mauro, B. W. (2020). Economics in the time of Covid-19: A new eBook. VOX CEPR Policy Portal, 2(3). Brenton, P., Ferrantino, M. J., & Maliszewska, M. (2022). Reshaping global value chains in light of Covid-19: Implications for trade and poverty reduction in developing countries. World Bank Publications. Cepal, N. (2020). The effects of the coronavirus disease (Covid-19) pandemic on international trade and logistics. Retrieved from https://repositorio.cepal. org/handle/11362/45878 on 01 Mar 2023. CNN. (2023). Tracking Covid-19 vaccinations worldwide, accessed at 03.03.2023, retrieved from: https://edition.cnn.com/interactive/2021/hea lth/global-covid-vaccinations/ Coquidé, C., Lages, J., Ermann, L., & Shepelyansky, D. L. (2022). Covid-19’s Impact on International Trade. Entropy, 24(3), 327. Dumanska, I., Hrytsyna, L., Kharun, O., & Matviiets, O. (2021). E-commerce and M-commerce as global trends of international trade caused by the covid19 pandemic. WSEAS Transactions on Environment and Development. 17, 386–397. Durant, I. (2022). Impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on trade and development: lessons learned. UN. ECLAC (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean). (2020a). Addressing the growing impact of Covid-19 with a view to reactivation with equality: new projections, Covid-19 Special Report, No. 5, Santiago, July. Evenett, S. J. (2021). Chinese whispers: Covid-19, global supply chains in essential goods, and public policy. Journal of International Business Policy, 3(4), 408–429. Gereffi, G. (2020). What does the Covid-19 pandemic teach us about global value chains? The case of medical supplies. Journal of International Business Policy, 3, 287–301. Hilmola, O. P., Lähdeaho, O., Henttu, V., & Hilletofth, P. (2020). Covid19 pandemic: Early implications for North European manufacturing and logistics. Sustainability, 12(20), 8315.

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Huang, Y. & Smith, J. (2020). In U.S.-China Trade War, New Supply Chains Rattle Markets. United States of America. Retrieved from https://policycom mons.net/artifacts/813118/in-us-china-trade-war-new-supply-chains-rattlemarkets/1686657/ on 01 Mar 2023. CID: 20.500.12592/d52520. INEGI (National Institute of Statistics and Geography). (2020). Información oportuna sobre la balanza comercial de mercancías de México durante mayo de 2020, Comunicado de Prensa, No. 286/20, 26 June [online] https://www. inegi.org.mx/contenidos/saladeprensa/boletines/2020/balcom_o/balcom_ o2020_06.pdf Kerr, W. A. (2020). The COVID-19 pandemic and agriculture: Short-and long-run implications for international trade relations. Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne d’agroeconomie, 68(2), 225–229. Lestari, D. (2020). International trade in the Covid-19 outbreak: Is the digital economy working? International journal of business & management, 8(2), 86–92. Shen, G. (2020). Impacts of the Covid-19 epidemic on China’s trade and employment and related countermeasures. Journal of Shanghai University of International Business and Economics, 27 (2), 16–25. Statista. (2023). Retail e-commerce sales worldwide from 2014 to 2026 retrieved https://www.statista.com/statistics/379046/worldwide-retail-e-com from merce-sales/#:~:text=In%202021%2C%20retail%20e%2Dcommerce,8.1%20tril lion%20dollars%20by%202026.on 3 March 2023. UNCTAD. (2021). Review of Maritime Transport 2021 (United Nations publication. Sales No. E.21. II.D.21, Geneva). Wolff, A. (2020). DDG Wolff: Time to start planning for the post-pandemic recovery, WTO News Item, accessed on 9 April 2020. Available on: https:// www.wto.org/english/news_e/news20_e/ddgaw_09apr20_e.htm

Anti-immigration Rhetoric of Far-Right Movements in the Covid-19 Era Merve Önenli Güven

1

Introduction

Due to the health problems caused by the pandemics, millions died because of Bubonic Plague in the Middle Ages and the influenza pandemic (Spanish Flu) in the early twentieth century. The COVID19 pandemic, which emerged nearly a century after the 1918 influenza pandemic, also caused the death of millions of people. Pandemics have introduced uncertainties into everyday life. As a result of uncertainty, anxiety at the individual and community levels has increased due to public health threats and job losses. In this period, it is observed that extremist, xenophobic, and racist discourses were constructed against ethnic minority groups and people from various religious groups. This paper will explore the following question in light of the emergence of extreme discourses: How do members of far-right movements construct their anti-immigration rhetoric in the COVID-19 era? To answer the research question, the 2022 Freedom Index is scrutinized and the United States (US), with a human freedom score of 8.23 (Vasquez et al., 2022: 317) is used as an example of a country with democratic standards to

M. Ö. Güven (B) Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Akilli and B. Gunes (eds.), World Politics in the Age of Uncertainty, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39611-3_6

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explore how and why anti-immigration rhetoric is constructed. Therefore, this study aims to analyze far-right constructed narratives regarding COVID-19 and through the findings, uncover what kind of a collective identity is formed through anti-immigration rhetoric. 1.1

Discourse Construction in the COVID-19 Era

In crises, the responses of individuals and groups from different sections of society vary. The era of COVID-19 is a significant period that affects the daily lives of individuals. The European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) emphasizes, “Right-wing extremists exploited COVID-19 to support their narratives of accelerationism and conspiracy theories featuring anti-Semitism, and anti-immigration and anti-Islam rhetoric” (Farinelli, 2021: 15). The conditions of the pandemic maintain a fertile ground for far-right groups to use the internet to disseminate and connect their ideas (Crawford, 2020). Cas Mudde (2004: 546) emphasizes, “The concept of the heartland helps to emphasize that the people in the populist propaganda are neither real nor all-inclusive but are in fact a mythical and constructed sub-set of the whole population.” Mudde also underlines that the notion of the heartland is vague and unclear and has been used in various forms from populus to populus, even in the same country (2004: 546). Hardy emphasizes that there has been an increase in the number of far-right hate groups in the US and Europe by underlining that there is a direct connection between real-world events and online engagement with extremist political views (2023: 1–2). Bogerts and Fielitz explain the online engagement of far-right groups by indicating that far-right groups see themselves on online platforms as part of an imaginary digital community that anonymously exchanged information (2020: 1–3). The online connection of far-right groups nourishes radical ideology through narratives affiliated with a radical network (Da Silva et al., 2023). Radical ideological narratives lead to violent extremism by identifying perceived enemies, dehumanizing them, and portraying them as immoral (Da Silva et al., 2023). Bithymitris implies that far-right groups draw attention on a cultural basis to patterns of social and political behavior by indicating how incompatible migrant behavioral norms and cultural values are with the native population (2018: 2–3). Research on one of Spain’s extreme rightwing party discourses indicates that radical ideology through narratives can impact the public view on immigration. According to the research

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on the discourse of Vox, traditional debates on immigration in Spain led to the construction of a new anti-immigration discourse that normalizes racism on social media (Olmos-Alcaraz, 2023: 2). Therefore, how an idea is formulated by far-right groups on social media is a crucial signifier for understanding what kind of in-group and out-group stances are constructed socially. For measuring the anti-immigration rhetoric in the US during the COVID-19 era, a far-right group named the Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR) serves as an accurate example. Founded in 1979, the group defines itself as comprising “concerned Americans,” composed of 1.9 million members and supporters (FAIR, 2023). They define their main concerning subject as immigration and its effects on American society. The group FAIR defines its understanding as: “Immigration policies can determine what kind of American future generations will inherit – livable or overcrowded, successful or overburdened … FAIR engages in community outreach to inform affected communities of how national immigration policies affect their own situation … FAIR evaluates policies, seeking out solutions that help reduce the negative impact of uncontrolled immigration on the nation’s security, economy, workforce, education, healthcare and environment” (FAIR, 2023). Based on this understanding, FAIR defines its objectives as reducing overall immigration to maintain a high quality of life in the US. FAIR underlines on its website that it opposes policies based on discrimination against any person based on race, color, religion, or gender (FAIR, 2023). This group defines its impact on public opinion and the political arena as the largest immigration reform group in the country, which has been existing nearly 40 years (FAIR, 2023). An examination of the group’s Twitter account, FAIRImmigration, for anti-immigration rhetoric and if this group constructs anti-immigration rhetoric in the era of COVID-19 is helpful. The research period was determined as between January 1, 2022, and January 31, 2023, because the effects of COVID-19 were still being felt within this timeframe. Furthermore, if there is an ongoing effect of COVID-19 on the rhetoric of anti-immigration, what kind of an impact COVID-19 has on the narration of anti-immigration rhetoric in the current time is aimed to be measured.

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1.2

How FAIR Frames Its Anti-Immigration Rhetoric

In this section, through the methodology of the critical discourse analysis (CDA), 4,992 tweets of FAIR under the tweeter name “FAIRImmigration” between January 1, 2022, and January 31, 2023, are analyzed. Graph 1 was prepared by the author based on data provided by Twitter. FAIR Immigration averaged 384 tweets per month throughout the 13 months analyzed. This is a crucial signifier for showing how frequently FAIR uses the platform to emphasize its ideas. According to the CDA, the themes of the tweets are determined and analyzed based on description, explanation, and interpretation. CDA is a methodology used for analyzing discursive strategies and practices in texts. The most repeated words and which words are used together in texts are examined by the techniques of CDA to understand the naming practices and discover metaphors and symbols used in discourse construction. CDA searches for how language functions as a part of social processes by attempting to reveal linkages between language and social action (McKinlay and McVittie, 2008). The purpose of using CDA is to analyze linguistic elements to emphasize if there is anti-immigration rhetoric, how this discourse is established and based on this anti-immigration rhetoric, and what kind of a collective identity is constructed discursively.

Number of Tweets by Month 700 600 500

568

562

590

480 400

400 300

334

301

200 100

133

0

Graph 1

Number of Tweets by Month

163

370

397 341

353

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Table 1

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Main Words Used in FAIR Tweets

Border

Deportation

Migrant/immigration

Tax

COVID-19 Crisis Criminal

Human-trafficking Illegal Law

Policy Population Smuggling

Terrorist Voters/Voting Wall

When the tweets are scrutinized based on how they are portrayed, it is observed that the most frequently used words are, border, migrant, immigration, illegal, and alien. The other main words in the tweets are shown in Table 1 in alphabetical order. With which phrases the main keywords in the tweets are used together is a crucial signifier to understanding what kind of meaning is constructed, which will reveal the framing characteristics of FAIR. Upon examination, “border” and “migrant/immigration” are the main words that shape the rhetoric of the FAIR’s tweets between the said dates. The words “migrant/migration/immigrant/immigration” are defined as “illegal immigrants, undocumented immigrants, immigration policy, mass migration, migrant crisis, migrant smuggling, criminal migrants, migrant children.” The main emphasis on migrants and migration is established based on their illegality, quantity, and their criminal characteristics. The identical characteristics of the migrants are defined by the words, “illegal aliens, criminals, and terrorists.” The word “illegal” is framed as “illegal aliens, illegal immigrant population, illegal immigrant crisis.” The illegality emphasis regarding the migrants composes an important character of the discourse of FAIR. This illegality is also used for the identification of the migrants’ criminal characteristics. With an emphasis on criminal aspects and illegal statuses, the immigration situation and the existence of the migrants are framed as the reason for a crisis. When the word “border” is analyzed, “border” is described as: “border crisis, border mass, border cross, border wall, open border policy, border disaster, secure border, new border, border enforcement, border security, border towers, border gridlock, border pressure, border security storms, border community, open borders.” The word “border” is a crucial narrative for establishing the discrimination between in-group and out-group. Border emphasis is linked with security. The existence of the migrants is portrayed as a threat to the security of American citizens. Therefore, the

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Biden administration’s migration policies are frequently called an “open border policy.” The existence of illegal migrants on the borders is represented as a “crisis” and “disaster.” The situation at the borders is framed by the words, “crisis, alarming situation, inhuman, disaster, total chaos, tragic, horrific, awful, catastrophic, and shocking.” When the discourse characteristics of the tweets of FAIR are analyzed, it is observed that the main concerns are shaped based on the number of migrants and how this quantity will affect the lives of Americans qualitatively. In the framing of the immigration phenomenon, how the quantitative characteristic of the immigrants is represented can be seen on FAIR’s website. On the website www.fairus.org, the current number of illegal immigrants who entered the US is announced daily. When the phrases in tweets are analyzed, it is observed that the illegality of the immigrants is stressed as a significant phenomenon. The definitions of the immigrants as “aliens” imply the perspective of FAIR and how they perceive the migrants. The position of the migrants is underlined as outsiders. The quantity of the migrants is underlined by the word “mass.” Immigration is portrayed as a “globalist attack” on their sovereignty. In-group identity, or “we,” is defined by describing the other by using the border as a metaphor. In discursive characteristics of FAIR, it is observed that there is not a special emphasis on the religion or ethnic identity of the immigrants. In the research period, Afghanistan, Mexico, Haiti, Cuba, Venezuela, Türkiye, and Ukraine are named as the places from which migrants are arriving. The existence of immigrants, especially their number and their ability to enter the country illegally, is one of the main focuses of FAIR. Another underlined issue is the criminal characteristics of the immigrants that are represented in the tweets. The ties between crime and immigration relation are constructed. The criminal activity led by immigrants is underlined frequently. Crime and immigration are framed by the words “migrant sex offender, human trafficking, drug trafficking, weapons trafficking, sexual offenses, human smuggling, fentanyl smuggling, murderers, gang members, criminal behavior, rape, murder, smuggling, human smugglers, and organized crime.” The existence of the immigrants is portrayed as a crisis and the reason for this crisis is emphasized as the politics and the inefficient immigration law of the US. The physical space of the crisis is portrayed as the border, which is identified as one of the signifiers of the in-group identity. Migrants are defined as “illegal aliens” who are portrayed as a national security risk for the US.

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When the content of FAIR’s Twitter is searched, the discourse on immigration is narrated based on anti-immigration rhetoric. The signifiers for this anti-immigration rhetoric are shaped by the existence of immigrants, the immigration policy of the US, and the existing situation on the borders of the US. The immigrants are portrayed as “external enemies” and the administration is accused of not protecting its citizens against these “external enemies.” The immigration policy of the US, especially run by the Biden administration, is defined as hypocritic and the politics on immigration is defined by the word “atrophy.” It is underlined that the alarming situation of immigrants cannot be dealt with via the existing policies. The immigration policy of the US is defined as a “broken immigration system.” Immigration activity in the US is defined as an “invasion” that has “huge costs to Americans.” The quantity of migrants is defined by the words “massive, influx, overrun, and hurricane.” Additionally, this immigrant existence is framed as the “greatest threat facing humanity,” which is claimed that will lead to a “civilizational collapse.” Against the immigrants, because of the claimed inefficient policies of the government, it is stated that they must “combat the Biden border crisis” and fight against this “dystopian nightmare.” In the discursive construction toward migrants and immigration, words defining emotions are used frequently, especially the words “anger” and “fear.” In the tweets, emotions based on anger and fear are promoted by attention-grabbing narrations. When the tweets are categorized according to their themes, it is observed that politics, social life, especially based on the emphasis on security, and the economy are the main themes that the tweets focus on. In political emphasis, the Biden administration is the main subject that the anger is projected towards. For example, it is narrated as, “Biden is turning border chaos into outright catastrophe.” Framing an “open border policy” is another crucial characteristic of FAIR’s discourse construction. The situation at the borders is framed as “chaos, catastrophe, and an invasion” because perception about the immigration issue is perceived as a security threat. Therefore, the top priority in political life is declared as securing the border. The economic concern is framed as “FAIR estimates the $20.4 billion Americans spend a year on illegal aliens could provide every homeless American veteran $50,000 per year for a decade or offer a grocery voucher of roughly $410 to every US family earning $50,000 or less.” Concerns about social life because of immigration is framed by unemployment, as well. The reason for 12 million Americans remaining

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unemployed is portrayed as uncontrolled immigration. Another interesting comparison is made between the payouts that are given to the immigrants and to the American victims of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. It is stated that “The cost of the payouts to border crossers would have been upwards of $1 billion and more than was given to the American victims of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.” The called security deficiency because of the open border policy is portrayed as the “invitation of hatred into their own backyard.” Another security concern is framed by the existence and the increasing use of fentanyl in the US borders. For instance, it is stated, “Texas congressman calls for fentanyl to be declared a weapon of mass destruction.” This narration indicates at what level this drug is perceived as a threat. In their tweets’ editorial section, the group calls “New York’s drug crisis is part of the US border fiasco.” In this way, it can clearly be observed that the drug issue and the border issue are framed together. Through immigration, security concerns on criminal issues are underlined frequently in the narratives of FAIR. In the framing of the tweets, because of immigration, it is emphasized that “human traffickers, terrorists and savage cartels bringing drugs and crime to our communities.” It is declared that, “Nothing is more important than border security, our homeland security, and everything that we do to secure Americans.” Terrorism is another significant issue that is stressed. As revealed in the economic concerns, security concerns on the immigration issue and September 11 is a noteworthy point for assessing the threat perception of FAIR. One example is one of the tweets stating, “19 terrorists were behind the 9/11 attacks. 17 people on the terror watchlist tried to cross the border in December.” This narration implies the level of threat perception toward the immigrants. The relational framing between immigration and terrorism is also constructed via the arrest rate of the immigrants who are found on the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) database. It is also claimed that unmonitored immigrants mean that “we could have the next terrorist sleeper cell in the country planning the next attack on US soil and we have no idea.” Therefore, the existence of immigrants is portrayed as a threat to national security. Immigration as a security threat is represented as a sovereignty issue, as well. It is stated, “Nothing is more critical to our present security and future sovereignty than the ongoing crisis at the border.” The main feature of the anti-immigration rhetoric based on the threat perception towards the immigrants and their entrance is backed

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by specific examples. For instance, it is emphasized that: “Since President Biden took office, 4.9 million illegal aliens have crossed our borders. That’s roughly the entire population of Ireland. Open borders by design, folks.” This open border is also labeled as the reason for the “rapid civilizational collapse of America’s cities.” Through these abovementioned examples, it is observed that the discourse construction depends on the definition of the in-group and out-group based on an enemy projection. 1.3

How FAIR’s Anti-Immigration Rhetoric is Shaped in the COVID-19 Era

This section aims to explore if COVID-19 affected the construction of anti-immigration rhetoric. Based on the research period, even though there were no lockdowns during this time and there was a significant decline in the number of infections, it is observed that in 3.18% of tweets, immigrants are still linked with COVID-19. In this period, FAIR defined “the headlines of the border” as immigration and the coronavirus pandemic. Immigrants, portrayed as outsiders, were framed by their potential to carry COVID-19 inside the country, additionally how they must be kept in migration facilities because of the positive tests was also emphasized. Entering the US unlawfully is underlined in the criticism of the Biden administration’s few COVID-19 protocols and the lack of complementary protocols in the illegal immigration processes. Deficient conditions in the immigration detention centers on the borders are stressed by the existence of COVID-19 and its potential effects on American citizens. Especially with the existence of migrants, it is indicated that the highest rates of COVID-19 are found in detention facilities. Another emphasis is on the diminishing supply chain of vaccination because of border vaccine requirements. Particularly, the immigration facilities are highlighted for their potential threat to spread infections. One example of this situation can be given from a specific tweet, which is narrated as “Coronavirus infections inside US immigration detention centers surge by 520% in 2022.” Another issue is underlined by the economic burden of illegal immigrants based on the need to supply vaccinations for the migrants. FAIR states that US immigration officials should be sued over COVID-19 infections.

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In the tweets, there is a special emphasis on Title 42,1 which is a public health provision based on pandemic restrictions that prevent other migrants from seeking asylum. Disputes over Title 42 about holding Ukrainians as an exception are underlined as turning a bad situation into a worse one. This change in the provision is framed as chaos. Lifting COVID-19 bans is another criticized situation in the tweets. Based on these criticisms, the Biden administration’s pandemic border policy is narrated as controversial, and it is stated that these developments will cause total chaos because of the massive influx of migrants. In the era of COVID-19, it is observed that the ideas of FAIR do not represent a standing based on a rally around the flag. Especially in the era of COVID19, the pandemic is used as another critical tool for the policies of the government in the formation of the anti-immigration rhetoric.

2

Conclusion

In the discourse construction of FAIR, the self is identified through the borders and used as a physical tool for identification. This physical tool is used to define an abstract conceptualization, which is the classification of the in-group and out-group. For this reason, the border is defined as the “biggest issue.” In the framing, migrants are identified as a threat. This threat perception is framed as: “Noncitizens is an incorrect, misleading term. They are citizens of other nations being used to disenfranchise Americans.” Therefore, the migration movement toward the US is framed as an “influx” and “invasion.” The existence of the migrants is underlined by their effects on the daily lives of Americans economically, socially, and politically. Regarding economic concerns, government policy on immigration is criticized over the burdened young Americans. In the framing of the immigration system as an economic issue, it is stated that this immigration policy costs US taxpayers approximately $1.8 billion a year. Security concerns are narrated with references to criminal situations such as human trafficking and drug trafficking, especially fentanyl is emphasized as a serious threat to American society and the reason for the gang violence. This situation is framed as “Biden’s open-border policy is poisoning our streets.” Another threat perception is shaped by the existence of adult 1 Title-42 is invoked by the start of the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020 to expel migrants to their home country on public health grounds (The Wall Street Journal, 2023).

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male illegal immigrants. The entrance of adult male illegal immigrants into the country is framed as “flooding.” Public health as a security issue is underlined by the existence of COVID-19. This insecurity perception is narrated as “Biden’s border is the most unsecure border we’ve seen in decades, Biden’s border crisis in 2022 will be catastrophic.” One of the remarkable narrations that imply the threat perception of FAIR is narrated as: “The debate around immigration has been poisoned so badly that there is basically no room left for realism. One party is basically screaming that migrants are here to rape and murder your children. It’s very worrying because it’s long past rational response. It’s pure emotion.” Concerns about politics are shaped based on the possibility of the migrants entering daily social life. For example, getting a driving license or allowing migrants to vote is framed as a violation of state law and an action that devalues the citizenship rights of Americans. The policy of the Biden is narrated as “Biden has released illegal aliens into the nation.” Voting is another concern that is represented in the tweets frequently. Especially the volume of immigration’s influence on elections is framed as one of the main concerns of American voters. In the narration of the immigration issue, metaphors are used frequently. Hashtags are established for the promotion of the ideas such as #BidenBorderCrisis #RestoreOrderAtTheBorder, #NoBorderNoCountry. Another characteristic of the discourse on the immigration issue is the use of slogans. It is observed that they use attention-grabbing slogans such as, “No, Mass Immigration Won’t Save the Planet,” “Biden is trafficking illegal immigrants all over America,” “No border left,” “You’re damn right, we’re under invasion,” “Every town is a border town, every state is a border state,” “Enough is enough.” Additionally, they organize polls about specific topics. For instance, in one of the polls, it is asked to rate Biden’s handling of immigration issues and the result of the poll is announced as “poor” with 50%. Another interesting question is about asking the reason for the most deaths in 2021 among 18–45-year-olds in the US. The answer is declared as fentanyl. It is claimed that this drug is delivered into the country by immigrants and the reason for the entrance of the fentanyl is revealed as open borders. Other interesting examples of the polls involve how Americans perceive immigration, which the result reveals as an “invasion” with 54% votes. The other poll asked the voters about their ideas on driver’s licenses for “illegal aliens,” in which the result is declared as most Americans are opposed to immigrants having driver’s licenses. In another

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poll, FAIR indicates that “Americans strongly support border security and immigration enforcement.” According to the CDA of the FAIR’s tweets, it is observed that the immigration issue is framed as a threat to national sovereignty. It is declared that “Like every nation, the US has a right and a duty to secure our borders and protect our people against threats.” Therefore, immigration narratives have anti-immigration rhetoric based on the threat perception of the other that is discursively constructed. A collective identity is established based on the definition of the other who is portrayed in the imagination of the enemy constituting a threat perception over the well-defined enemy. This study also aimed to measure if there is the existence of an ongoing effect of COVID-19 on the construction of the rhetoric of anti-immigration. It is found that for FAIR, COVID-19 is still a subject in their discourse, which shapes the anti-immigration rhetoric. As a far-right group, there is a pattern that draws connections with the political, economic, and social issues with the immigration issue. COVID19 is another issue that is connected with the immigration issue. FAIR aims to affect public opinion by promoting political propaganda, using victimization and oppression themes with the construction of us vs. them as tools in its narrations to raise the consciousness of the targeted public.

References Bithymitris, G. (2018). ‘Theorizing class and far-right politics through a cultural materialist framework: towards a new research agenda’. Hellenic Political Science Association, 2, 1–24. Bogerts, L. and Fielitz, M. (2020). ‘The visual culture of far-right terrorism’, (online). Available at: https://gnet-research.org (Accessed: 09.04.2023). Crawford, B. (2020). ‘Coronavirus and conspiracies: How the far right is exploiting the pandemic’, King’s College London, (online). Available at: https://www.kcl.ac.uk/coronavirus-and-conspiracies-how-the-far-right-isexploiting-the-pandemic (Accessed: 01.03.2023). Da Silva, C., Amadio, N., Domingo, B., Sarg, R., and Benbouriche, M. (2023). ‘The significance quest theory and the 3N Model: A Systemic Review’. Canadian Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1037/cap0000364. FAIR. (2023). https://www.fairus.org/about-fair (Accessed: 15.01.2023). Farinelli, F. (2021). ‘Conspiracy theories and right-wing extremism-Insights and recommendations for P/CVE’, European Commission, (online). Available at: https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2021-04/ran_conspi racy_theories_and_right-wing_2021_en.pdf (Accessed: 20.02.2023).

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Hardy, J. (2023). ‘Thematic analysis of in-group and out-group debates in an online right-wing extremist community’. Research and Politics, 1–8, https:// doi.org/10.1177/20531680231152424 McKinlay, A. and McVittie, C. (2008). Social Psychology and Discourse. UK: Wiley Blackwell. Mudde, C. (2004). ‘The populist zeitgeist’, Government and Opposition, 39 (4), 541–563. Olmos-Alcaraz, A. (2023). ‘Islamophobia and twitter: The political discourse of the extreme right in Spain and its impact on the public’. Religions 14 (506), 1–15. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14040506 The Wall Street Journal. (2023). ‘What is Title 42? What it means for immigration and U.S.-Mexico border? (online). Available at: https://www.wsj.com/ articles/what-is-title-42-border-rules-migration-11649118539 (Accessed: 06.04.2023). Vasquez, I., McMahon, F., Murphy, R., and Schneidder, G.S. (2022). ‘The human freedom index 2022’, Cato Institute, (online). Available at: https:// www.cato.org/human-freedom-index/2022 (Accessed: 20.12.2022).

Borders in the Post-pandemic World Order

Hakan Ünay

1

and Murat Çemrek

Introduction

Borders are socio-spatial criteria used to define potentially multiplying oppositions such as “us and them” and “here and there” (Novak, 2017: 850). Thus, the sociological categorization of borders highlights the border as a clear dividing line between two different entities or opposites (Newman, 2006: 176). However, this exclusionary meaning of the

The first person who, having enclosed a plot of land, took it into his head to say this is mine and found people simple enough to believe him, was the true founder of civil society. What crimes, wars, murders, what miseries and horrors would the human race have been spared, had someone pulled up the stakes or filled in the ditch and cried out to his fellow men: “Do not listen to this imposter. You are lost if you forget that the fruits of the earth belong to all and the earth to no one!” (Rousseau, 1913). H. Ünay (B) Department of International Relations, Kırıkkale University, Ankara, Turkey e-mail: [email protected] M. Çemrek Department of International Relations, Necmettin Erbakan University, Konya, Turkey © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Akilli and B. Gunes (eds.), World Politics in the Age of Uncertainty, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39611-3_7

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border is mostly characterized by its functionality entailing state control over the mobility of anyone in any territorial area (Loftus, 2015: 115). Conflicts between or among states, human movements, terrorism, illegal trade, smuggling and finally pandemics such as COVID-19 deepen the meaning and importance of borders and state controls. The escalating attention paid to borders as well as various practices and processes have brought them to light in recent academic literature. However, aside from academic literature, borders continue to be treated in a rather simplistic manner. Be it the question of immigration or the ongoing COVID19 pandemic, the closure of borders has been offered as a solution for the perceived chaos. While the actual effectiveness of such a move can be debated, it has certainly reinforced the perceived role of borders as barriers and protective frontlines against undesirable influences or threats from the insecure exterior, the outside (Wille et al., 2021: 7). Thus, the development of border studies hand in hand with the transformation of borders in the last 20 years with states’ prominence as castles of control has become especially evident during the pandemic. As a result, this chapter focuses on discussing the borders in the post-pandemic world. In the first section, the historical background of borders and border studies will be discussed with reference to 40 years of history regarding the concept of “border” and its main breaking points while revealing the change in the importance of borders. In the second part, the connection of non-traditional security approaches, forming the theoretical background of this chapter, towards the spread of COVID-19 and borders is examined. In the last section, the borders in the pandemic process and the post-pandemic world are evaluated.

2 Historical Background of Border and Border Studies The concept of “border” is closely related to many academic disciplines. For years, it has been defined as a geographical point, an element of the state, a sociological dividing line, a philosophical category, a social phenomenon and so forth. While this diversity makes the concept of the border a multidisciplinary field of study, it has complexified the meanings attributed to borders (Kolossov & Scott, 2013; Kolossov, 2005; Wilson & Donnan, 2012; Wille, Gerst, & Krämer, 2021; Johnson et al., 2011; Parker & Vaughan-Williams, 2009; Anderson & O’Dowd, 1999).

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This chapter discusses three aspects of borders: ownership, protection and prevention. Although these aspects have been adjusted and updated over time, they are still relatively intertwined. However, there have always been discussions about the borders’ meaning, function and essence. According to Newman and Paasi (1998), in an early study, a border serves two main purposes: protection from external and internal threats and territorial designation. Thus, borders are not just lines or lines passing through the land but multidimensional living spaces that pass through people’s memories (Zartman, 2019). Simultaneously borders, indepth, compose the space around a line where the state meets society and no one feels at home (Simon, 1998; Adesina, 2019). So, borders are not the source of security but anxiety in this sense. The complex structure of borders is due to their characteristics composed of not only geographical, social or political elements but also being at the intersection of the individual, society and the state. Therefore, the history of borders dates to ancient times. The defence of territories dates back to hunting communities that protected borders without materially definite limits. This ambiguity was resolved, and the hostile tribes commanded a deep respect for areas of “no man’s land.” Everyone was aware that approaching them would have dangerous and probably deadly consequences. In time, vast areas have become smaller due to the rise of the human population as well as the concomitant contact and trade contracts that turned these lands into exchange areas for neighbouring tribes (Jabeen and Sultan, 2020: 952; Bellezza, 2013). Even fighting for a piece of small land points is an example of establishing a border. In the end, the emergence of borders is essentially related to the appropriation of land. Jean Jacques Rousseau’s critique of private property highlights the “ownership” mission of the border, with the outlining of a piece of land as the earliest example of borders historically. Regarding identities, borders have also started to be established at the individual and societal levels; however, they cannot be easily separated from a state-centred perspective. Borders are often principal indicators of any state, either modern nationstates or any archaic form preceding them, as well as symbols of security and power, so, in essence, they represent sovereignty. In particular, the emergence of modern nation-states with the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia (ToW) brought forward the decisive effect of borders on a piece of land (Okhonmina, 2010; Jabeen and Sultan, 2020). This is the beginning of the process of seeing the borders of states as sacred entities.

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The ToW defines “the condition under which a state could acquire valid title to territory either by discovery, cessation and annexation.” This treaty has established the territorial state as the basic unit of the international system (Okhonmina, 2010) defining the framework of the classical meaning of sovereignty. The ToW has been credited with providing the foundation of the modern nation-state as well as the modern state system. Moreover, it enabled territorial sovereignty either by granting territories or by confirming the sovereignty of territories to several states like Sweden, France, the Netherlands, Switzerland, England, Germany, Turkey and Spain. Many authors in the disciplines of history and international relations (IR) considered the treaty as the model for the birth of the United States (US), the modern relations of European nations and the creation of the League of Nations (LoN) and the United Nations (UN) (Patton, 2019). Undoubtedly, the ToW symbolizes the birth of the nation-state in the modern sense, as cited above several times. This also brings along various debates and opinions about the meaning of borders. According to Okhonmina (2010), the creation of international borders in 1648 could assert a certain stagnation in meaning and relevance as reductionism in one sense. According to Bartlett and Mackay (1989), the meaning of borders, legally more valuable for states, came to the fore after the ToW. From a different perspective, Anderson and O’Dowd (1999) emphasize the meaning of Westphalia for borders as ambiguous and contradictory due to the development of supranational organizations and the frontier effects of most modern regional groupings. But above all, Westphalia brought borders into focus in today’s sense as well as the nation-state. As a result, the concept of “border” has become a focus of state-centred analysis as a field of study, specifically as border studies or within political science and IR. The importance of borders separating a state from others and determining its area of sovereignty increased after developments in certain periods. Especially with the effect of the nationalism brought about by the French Revolution in 1789, borders have turned into states’ honorary elements to be protected at the expense of lives. Thus, borders have captured the role of regulating the flow of people, capital, goods and services by determining the limits of legal, financial, administrative, ˙ 2015: 27). Thus, borders continued economic and political areas (Tekin, dam-like functions remarkably until the 1980s when globalization swept the floor as the new buzzword for the whole world. This process brings

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to the fore the second function imposed on the border, namely the protective function. The post-1960 world, in which globalization affected every aspect of life as a popular argument, is also a significant cornerstone in border studies with developments both in theory and also in practice. Through globalization, to be symbolized by an increase in the speed and intensity of relations worldwide, the border has become a dichotomous argument. While the borderless world has become one of the most popular arguments of hyperglobalists, paradoxically borders’ importance has increased tremendously, especially in the post-1990 world (Ohmae 1989) after the end of the Soviets and the rise of the new world order. Therefore, one could argue that the withering of borders and their sanctification were experienced simultaneously and paradoxically. Eric Hobsbawm, a well-known Marxist historian, used the term “age of extremes” for the twentieth century (1996). His statement is not an exaggeration since the world in that epoch sounded like the cult film The Gods Must Be Crazy (1980), witnessing two great world wars, a cold war and several revolutions and counterrevolutions, as a century full of extremes. However, the two decades of the twenty-first century will not be so different from the previous ones. Many events to be considered extreme such as the 9/11 attacks, the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, the 2008 global financial crisis, the Arab Spring, mass migration movements and finally the COVID-19 pandemic have already been experienced. In addition, environmental disasters such as climate change and global warming reaching a crisis level are the last annulus of the ongoing process. While all these developments constitute the last breaking point in the development of border studies, they also reveal the third function of the border: prevention. States have started to take measures at their borders against human mobility as a result of the negative developments of mass migration. Due to measures taken by the states, especially the walls they have built, the term “walled world” has come to the fore rather than “borderless world” (Ünay 2022). The specific question sought to be answered in this study is how borders were affected during the COVID-19 pandemic. Searching for an answer to this question should start from the theoretical side and non-traditional security approaches help us in this regard.

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3

Non-Traditional Security Approaches and Borders

From past to present, states have generally used their borders with a focus on ownership, protection and prevention. While designed to counter security threats, usually interstate conflicts and military threats, at least until the twenty-first century, borders are territoriality sanctified by the nation-state and the international system. Therefore, states have had to protect their borders as the starting point of their sovereignty. However, globalization has already changed perceptions of threat as well as security. The referent object of security is now no longer confined to the state and its defence from external military attacks but also includes almost any kind of human activity (Caballero-Anthony and Emmers, 2006). Over the years, there has been a significant transformation towards non-traditional security approaches based on traditional military threats (Baylis, 2016; Caballero-Anthony, 2016; Caballero-Anthony and Emmers, 2006). Thus, according to Caballero-Anthony, a phenomenon is expected to meet certain conditions to be considered a threat within the scope of nontraditional security studies. These conditions are: • Possesses a transnational character understood in terms of origin, concepts and influences, • Defined in political and socioeconomic terms, • Inspires social and political instability and pose a security threat, • Causes effects that would be difficult to reverse or repair, • Needs regional and multilateral cooperation due to the lack of national solutions, • Poses a threat to both states (their territories and sovereignty) and peoples (individuals and societies) (Caballero-Anthony, 2016: 6). Globalization security’s traditional definition is often questioned, thus becoming the object of multiple interpretations. As a result, handling the phenomena mentioned above often falls within the scope of non-traditional security approaches. For example, issues such as infectious diseases, environmental issues, illegal drug trafficking, human trafficking and migration are the foci of the non-traditional security efforts (Caballero-Anthony, 2016; Caballero-Anthony and Emmers, 2006; Cook, 2017; Masys, 2016; Muna, 2006; Upadhyaya, 2006).

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While the six conditions listed above make infectious diseases an element of non-traditional security approaches, states’ treatment of migration as a threat is especially evident at borders. The perceived threats against the security of nation-states transform the question of “What is security?” At this point, though the approach to ensuring security is not traditional, the nation-state prioritizes its sovereignty and thus, its borders. Borders serve as a barrier to threats and a protector of sovereignty (Moraczewska, 2010: 333). The importance of borders is particularly crucial in the state’s control over mobility and migration in any territorial region (Loftus, 2015: 115). In a sense, it is their borders that define nation-states; the legitimate sovereignty that determines the border crossings of foreigners and the conditions of their stay in the country, in other words, is within their power to control. This importance of borders for states raises the issue of control mechanisms against new threats such as infectious diseases, environmental problems, illicit drug trafficking, human trafficking and migration. They all are touted by states as new threats forming the focus of unconventional security approaches. In a sense, this situation indicates the state’s risk of losing its authority of control (Adamson, 2006: 174), with elements such as organized crime, human trafficking, terrorism and irregular migration as prominent examples of noteworthy security threats. Thus, Kicinger states that states can take measures to protect their sovereignty, especially at their external borders (2004: 6). Similarly, Marz˛eda-Młynarska points to border units and other measures at the border as one of the legal measures to be taken against the threat of losing control over their borders (2016: 9). Especially in the twenty-first century, borders have become roadblocks for traditional threats of illegal migration, terrorism, territorial border disputes or any illegal border crossings. As a matter of fact, these threats are employed as excuses by states to construct walls on their borders (Benedicto et al., 2020: 19). In addition to these threats, infectious diseases have also been quite decisive in undermining the effectiveness of borders in recent years, especially after the COVID-19 pandemic. Infectious diseases started to attract more attention after the 1990s and have become the number one issue with the COVID-19 pandemic. Thus, they have also become a vital threat to states’ border policies. “Disease knows no borders” is a phrase frequently used by academics, politicians and public health professionals, and it happened to be true.

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The expression captures a renewed sense of vulnerability to the microbiologic world that has arisen since the 1990s due to the emergence and resurgence of infectious diseases in an increasingly interconnected world (de Bengy Puyvallée and Kittelsen, 2018). States have already initiated their policies blocking even routine practices at their borders to eliminate or reduce at least this vulnerability. The COVID-19 pandemic is the most recent example for analysing the practices of states and borders’ roles in the spread and aftermath of infectious diseases.

4 Borders in the COVID-19 Pandemic Process and Thereafter There is still very little data on COVID-19, which surfaced in December 2019 and was labelled a pandemic in March 2020. Moreover, it is too early to declare the complete annihilation of the pandemic. However, it is still possible to discuss borders in the world during and after this pandemic. COVID-19, having started with increasing cases in Wuhan, the Chinese city of 11 million people, reached a serious point with the quarantine of the city in January 2020. The entrances and exits to the city were stopped and the city borders were under heavy observation. But as a dimension of globalization, travel and international activities within China continued. Thus, many states started to announce their first COVID-19 cases at the end of January 2020. We all quickly acknowledged that the coronavirus quickly spread all over the world. At this point, the city and state borders attracted further attention. However, the borders drawn first were the ones between the sick and the healthy (Wille and Weber, 2020). So, what do borders mean for states, especially during the pandemic? As it could be understood from the dissemination speed and spreading density of the virus, the world was facing a virus without borders. Nevertheless, as a traditional nation-state policy, most states began restricting all movements as the extension of their sovereignty. As experienced in the migration processes, states engaged in a selective and restrictive approach to their border policies (De Genova, 2017). First, the response mirrored the border policies aimed at terrorists, irregular migrants and smugglers, in short, the very unwanted. With the pandemic, the undesirable elements were the virus and anyone that was infected. Moreover, this time, instead of being selective, there was almost total prevention or complete closure of the border. States reacted quickly

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to close their borders after the World Health Organization’s (WHO) declaration of COVID-19 as a pandemic. The Covid Border Accountability Project mapped the partial or complete border closure policies of states between January 2020 and September 2021. March 2020 culminated in a rapid increase in the number of full closures followed by 154 border closures. More than 130 total shutdowns were followed between April and June. From June to the end of the year, border closures were expected to decrease. The number of partial border closures implemented also increased sharply in March 2020. However, the number of partial shutdowns decreased at a slower pace throughout the year. In December, there was a notable increase in the number of partial shutdowns. From January to April 2021, the number of partial shutdowns decreased slightly (Shiraef et al., 2022; The COVID Border Accountability Project, 2022) (Fig. 1). From the second half of 2021 until today, one can argue that states that entered the normalization process have been more flexible about their border policies. But have border closures prevented or at least slowed the spread of the virus? Based on experience and data from earlier pandemics, it is predicted that international border closures to address the COVID19 pandemic did not delay the spread of the virus unless first introduced at the time of global spread beginning (Shiraef et al., 2022). The border closures of the states, as a policy, during the pandemic have re-revealed the importance of borders for the nation-states and

Fig. 1 Descriptive data of border closure policies and new Covid-19 cases from January 2020 until April 2021 (Source [Shiraef et al., 2022])

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one of their traditional missions: protection. The pandemic has necessitated a demarcation of the safe and the unsafe, and states have ensured this requirement with their restrictive policies on their territorial borders (Wille and Weber, 2020: 363). The traditional character of this process is not just about the transformation or return to the mission of the border. Similar situations have already been experienced during several previous epidemics. Foucault’s biopolitical approach and his method of border geography clarify this situation (Vaughan-Williams, 2015: 34–38; Foucault, 1991). In the “Panopticism” chapter of his famous book Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison, he refers to an order issued at the end of the seventeenth century, referring to the measures taken in a town exposed to the plague. The first among these is important because it is still reciprocated today: “First, a strict spatial partitioning: the closing of the town and its outlying districts, a prohibition to leave the town on pain of death, the killing of all stray animals; the division of the town into distinct quarters, each governed by an intendant” (1995: 195–98). Similarly, nation-states limited their borders and even air spaces with a rather Foucaultian approach during the pandemic. Although the types of threats have changed, states’ perceptions of borders have not. The mission of the border was somewhere between protecting and blocking. So, what does this situation in the pandemic process mean for the post-pandemic world? Especially in the twenty-first century, borders have come to the fore as vital organs and sacred relics of states. Elements such as terrorism, migration, smuggling and epidemics are still the biggest threats to this trust. As threats increased and diversified, the measures taken by states began to harden. Border procedures have become more difficult to pass legally, no need to mention increasing technological measures turning borders into a place of surveillance, routine pushbacks for migrants and walled borders as some of the prominent practices. As Chandler points out, governments employ techniques to survive. These techniques, clearly seen at the borders of states, can be listed as follows: classification, normalization, totalization, surveillance, ranking, partitioning, exclusion and distribution (Murray-Chandler, 2009). Even if the type, scope and impact of threats to states vary, it is still possible to see these techniques at borders. The post-pandemic world has initiated the perception and construction of a new frontier at every point, from the individual to the society, from a personal room to the sovereign sphere of the nation-state. This also restores the sanctity of the border, while all policies and practices become “acceptable” to exclude everyone and everything perceived as

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a threat. While the world is already facing many problems such as civil wars, human rights violations, terrorism, migrations, economic crises and climate change, the COVID-19 pandemic has individually created a valid excuse to put another brick on the walls under construction.

5

Conclusion

Starting with the impulse to possess, boundaries have been drawn. From the moment the first human claimed a piece of territory, citystates, empires and nation-states not only tried to protect their territorial sovereignty but also their claim. Thus, borders have always existed. While the ToW and the French Revolution constituted the major breaking points for the transformation of the border, the emergence of the border as a field of study could only begin in the 1980s. With globalization, borders, which have a dichotomous perception, have become sacred again in the globalizing borderless world. The sanctification of borders has been influenced by unconventional threats such as migration, drug trafficking, human trafficking and epidemics rather than the classic military threats. From this point of view, the unconventional security approach was used in this study and the COVID-19 pandemic was discussed in this context. Although COVID19 is one of the unconventional security threats, the policies implemented by nation-states during the pandemic were quite traditional. The policies of most states, having closed their borders almost to everyone and everything, brought the protection and blocking functions of the border to the forefront. As a result, the borders have once again become the sacred trust of states again and in a more condensed form. In the post-pandemic world, given that migration, human trafficking, illicit drug trafficking and epidemics will continue rapidly and intensively, borders will continue to be the holy red lines of states. Moreover, states are walling their borders against migrants and illegal border crossings as if they were competing. While the first quarter of the twenty-first century prevents a positive prediction in this regard, the importance of borders is still increasing day by day. Thus, despite all the developments mentioned throughout the chapter, if states choose to abandon coercive border procedures, fences and walls and construct bridges between them, a truly borderless world is still possible in the post-pandemic world.

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The Role of Artificial Intelligence in Tackling Covid-19

Gloria Shkurti Özdemir

1

Introduction

The existing international system is being questioned as never before as it faces new developments and challenges. New emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence (AI), are driving the so-called Fourth Industrial Revolution, resulting in marked transformations in all areas, including society, economies, industry, security, politics, etc. Within this context, it is generally argued that the ongoing Industrial Revolution—by giving economic and strategic advantages to actors that adopt it first—will change the international system by changing the existing power distribution (Shkurti Özdemir, 2021: 2–3). As these developments were still ongoing, the world was hit by one of the most arduous challenges, the COVID-19 pandemic. Needless to say, both states and international organizations were unprepared for such a challenge. Soon it became clear that the pandemic would have detrimental repercussions not only for our health but for the states’ economy and international system in general as

G. S. Özdemir (B) Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University, Ankara, Türkiye e-mail: [email protected] SETA Foundation, Ankara, Türkiye © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Akilli and B. Gunes (eds.), World Politics in the Age of Uncertainty, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39611-3_8

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well. Therefore, it was imperative to act immediately to ease the outcomes of the pandemic. For this reason, while trying to find quick solutions for this uncanny threat, state leaders, experts, and academicians turned to the juxtaposition of COVID-19 and new emerging technologies, i.e. AI. As AI is at its zenith, AI was seen as a promising asset in the sense that it has the potential to transform our readiness and response. Consequently, as COVID-19 spread, it accelerated the adoption and application of AI in different sectors, including the health sector. Before going into details on the role of AI in tackling COVID-19, it is necessary to state that AI is not a specific technology but rather a generalpurpose enabling technology or a powerful force multiplier. Indeed, in some cases, its impact is compared to that of the combustion engine or electricity (Scharre, 2018: 16; Johnson, 2019). To put it in a more technical perspective, AI is a branch of computer science that comprises a variety of algorithms and models that have two main purposes (i) to mimic the cognitive thinking of humans and (ii) to perform activities that would otherwise be performed by humans (Sadiku et al., 2021). While its roots trace back to 1956 when the term was used for the first time at the Dartmouth conference, lately AI has re-emerged and flourished in the last decade due to the data surplus and increase in computer processing power. This resurgence of AI has been reflected in its far-reaching application in different areas. It soon became clear that AI—due to its capacity to act faster than humans—could indeed give an upper hand over traditional analytics and clinical decision-making techniques. This way it could prove decisive in the fight against COVID-19. Soon investments in AI in the health sector started to increase and states and international organizations started to create and implement strategies that used AI to fight COVID-19. Indeed, the World Health Organization (WHO) in June 2021 published its first global report on AI pointing out the main opportunities and challenges that come with the application of AI in the health sector, providing a road map on the AI application in the health sector. Taking into consideration the importance of AI in tackling COVID19, this chapter will analyse how AI and the health sector converge and how this was used during the pandemic. Lastly, this chapter will focus specifically on some of the strategies and projects undertaken by Turkey, one of the successful states in its fight against COVID-19.

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Artificial Intelligence and the Health Sector

AI is among the driving forces behind the Fourth Industrial Revolution, with enormous potential for changing all areas of our life, including healthcare. Taking into consideration the potential of AI, in June 2021, the World Health Organization published its first global report on AI pointing out the main opportunities and challenges that come with the application of AI in the health sector. In the report, it was stated that AI can improve diagnosis and clinical care, enhance health research and drug development, and support the deployment of various public health interventions, including disease surveillance, outbreak response, and health systems management (World Health Organization, 2021: v). Most importantly, because of this potential, AI may help all countries reach universal health coverage, especially when taking into consideration the difficulties that low and middle-income states face in the health sector. Indeed “medicine was identified early as one of the most promising application areas for AI” (Yu, Beam, and Kohane, 2018: 719). By the end of the twentieth century, by using the so-called rule-based systems of AI, it has been utilized in healthcare to diagnose diseases or indicate proper treatment, among other uses. Indeed, one of the most well-known cases of AI usage in healthcare is its application “in radiology to detect microcalcifications in mammography in 1992” (Driver et al., 2020). However, due to the increasing availability of healthcare data (Murdoch and Detsky, 2013) and developments in AI—especially in terms of machine learning, deep learning, neural network, and natural language processing—the adoption of AI in the sector of healthcare has gained more attention. Specifically, by taking advantage of machine learning methods that identify patterns from massive data with or without human intervention, it has become possible for AI systems to be used for more complex interactions (Yu, Beam, and Kohane, 2018: 719). Currently, AI can be used for basic biomedical research, translational research, and clinical practices (Yu, Beam, and Kohane, 2018). Specifically, from automated experiments to drug discovery, and from disease diagnosis and treatment to automated surgery are all areas where AI is and can be used. In terms of disease treatment, AI is predominantly used in cardiology, neurology, and cancer treatments. In line with this, these developments have resulted in a paradigm shift in healthcare (Jiang et al., 2017: 230).

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As mentioned previously, in the 1970s, several rule-based systems were developed that used AI. One of the most well-known cases is that of MYCIN. Developed at Stanford University, this system was able to diagnose blood-borne bacterial infections, including meningitis and bacteremia. Furthermore, the system was able to recommend the needed dosage of antibiotics based on the patient’s body weight. Nevertheless, despite the promises shown by the MYCIN, and systems similar to it, they were not adopted for clinical practices (Davenport and Kalakota, 2019: 95). IBM Watson, on the other hand, is seen as one of the pioneer systems of the last decade. By using both machine learning and natural language processing, Watson achieved great progress in terms of cancer diagnosis and treatment. Specifically, “99% of the treatment recommendations from Watson are coherent with the physician decisions … through analysing genetic data, Watson successfully identified the rare secondary leukaemia caused by myelodysplastic syndromes in Japan” (Jiang et al., 2017: 241). Nevertheless, IBM’s Watson system was not adopted in real-life healthcare because when applied clinically Watson gave erroneous recommendations (Driver et al., 2020). At this point, it is important to highlight the fact that while the abovementioned cases are some of the most well-known examples/studies in terms of AI application in healthcare, a lot of other initiatives have been undertaken. One can mention, among others, examples such as the US Department of Veterans Affairs’ partnership with DeepMind Health, which developed an AI system that can forecast a deadly kidney disease in advance (Office of Public and Intergovernmental Affairs, 2019); the AI symptom checker Buoy; or Chinese Baidu’s breast cancer detection algorithm. Besides these examples, it is important to state that the amount of research about the AI uses in healthcare has increased significantly in recent years, reflecting the growing importance of AI in this field. Specifically, based on a bibliometric study, approximately 63% of the publications on AI and healthcare were published in the period between 2014 and 2018 (Tran et al., 2019). Yet despite the increased interest and possibilities that come with the full application of AI in healthcare, the clinical implementation of these AI systems is still limited. The reasons behind this are thought to be related to regulations, the unfriendly healthcare ecosystems in terms of

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data exchange, and ethical implications (Jiang et al., 2017: 241; Davenport and Kalakota, 2019: 97; Tang, 2020). Yet, as will be seen in the next section, the spread of COVID-19 increased the usage of AI systems for different purposes.

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Artificial Intelligence and COVID-19

Emerging at the end of 2019 in China, COVID-19 further debilitated the existing international system, which had been challenged for a long time. International organizations, states and their governments, and the general population were all unprepared for such a pandemic and its repercussions. Especially the failure of several international organizations and states to effectively respond to the pandemic resulted in a healthcare crisis and, unfortunately, a very high death toll. Specifically, it is believed that COVID-19 has killed approximately 7 million people worldwide (Johns Hopkins Coronavirus Resource Center, 2023). Yet, an even grimmer announcement came from the WHO, which estimated that the death toll, directly or indirectly associated with COVID-19 in the period between January 1, 2020, and December 31, 2021, was approximately 14.9 million (United Nations, 2022). While we all will sadly remember the high death toll associated with COVID-19, another matter associated with the pandemic was the breakdown of the healthcare system in most states. Unprepared for such a pandemic, hospitals were overwhelmed with ill patients and were unable to offer healthcare to all the people inside the hospital or outside it. Without a doubt, this situation led to the search for new alternatives that would help the healthcare system deal with such a pandemic and be prepared for a similar situation in the future. At this point attention was diverted to the new emerging technologies, especially AI, and how it could help tackle the pandemic. Many studies focusing on how to use AI in the health sector resulted in many new applications. Nevertheless, it is important to state that not all these applications have been effective. By way of illustration, Graph 1 shows how the venture capital (VC) investments in AI in the sector of healthcare, drugs, and biotechnology has changed through the years with an upsurge after 2019. Specifically, while in the period between 2012 and 2019, VC investments did increase but hardly passed $5 billion, directly after the COVID-19 emergence, the VC investments tripled, reaching approximately $15 billion in 2019 and $27 billion in 2020 (OECD.AI, no date). Furthermore, the fact that the

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healthcare sector became the second industry receiving the most AI VC investments, after mobility and autonomous vehicles, is an indication of the great importance placed on AI in tackling the pandemic. Within this context, many companies started to develop AI algorithms to fight the pandemic. Some of the well-known early examples are that of BlueDot and HealthMap, placed in Canada and the US, respectively, which were able to predict the outbreak of COVID-19 as soon as December 2019 before any official information was released by international institutions. Specifically, these AI-based models issued an alarm to their clients on December 30 (HealthMap) and 31 (BlueDot), 2019 (Naudé, 2020). Google, as well, has been among the companies that tried to make use of AI in tackling the pandemic. Its firm, DeepMind, released the AlphaFold system, which was able to predict the structure of some understudied proteins linked to SARS-CoV-2, the virus that caused COVID-19, by using AI algorithms (DeepMind, 2020). The importance of such a system was that knowing the structure of proteins makes it easier to develop new drugs (or uncover possible existing drugs) and vaccines against the virus. For example, BenevolentAI, a British startup that has raised $292 million to apply AI to create drugs faster, by using AI was able to identify Baricitinib as a possible medicament for the people diagnosed with COVID-19. Baricitinib was used previously to treat rheumatoid arthritis and myelofibrosis (Butcher, 2020). Delving a little bit more into vaccine development, it can be said that AI played a crucial role. While under normal circumstances it would take several years to develop a vaccine, it took just a couple of months to produce the COVID-19 vaccine due to the development of technologies such as AI. The COVID-19 vaccine produced by the American company Moderna is an example of this. Specifically, “AI algorithms and robotic automation helped Moderna move from manually producing around 30 mRNAs (a molecule fundamental to the vaccine) each month, to being able to produce around 1,000 a month” (Me Myself and AI Podcast, 2021; Gast, 2022) Another example when AI was used to develop a COVID-19 vaccine is that of the Chinese company Baidu, which partnered with Sanofi, one of the world’s biggest vaccine makers (Reuters, 2021). Other uses of AI during the pandemic were to diagnose fevers by screening individuals in public spaces and as a result, helping to slow the spread of the virus. An example of this is the “Smart AI Epidemic Prevention Platform” of SenseTime, a leading global AI company with

Graph 1

VC Investments in AI by Industry (2012–2022)

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headquarters in Hong Kong (SenseTime, 2020). A similar system was also created by the Chinese firm Baidu (Liang, 2020). Nevertheless, another development that indicates the importance of AI during the pandemic is the fact that many states focused on improving their digital infrastructure and capabilities to mitigate the spread of COVID-19. Indeed, states “that have maintained low COVID-19 percapita mortality rates appear to share strategies that include early surveillance, testing, contact tracing, and strict quarantine” (Whitelaw et al., 2020). Evidently, the adoption of digital technologies, especially AI, has fostered the effective implementation of states’ strategies and policies. Within this context, the US, China, South Korea, Canada, and Turkey can be mentioned as cases where AI and digital technologies were widely used (Deloitte, 2020). China, where COVID-19 originated, has used AI for several purposes. To mention a few, the Chinese government tracked and traced patients travelling history by using facial recognition cameras, autonomous drones were used to disinfect public buildings, and robots were used to deliver food and medicine during the lockdown. The US as well has used AI to track disease activities in real-time and in clinical management (Whitelaw et al., 2020). Nevertheless, besides states, international and regional organizations such as the United Nations, the World Health Organization, and the European Union have also laid down strategies and initiatives bringing to the fore the importance of AI in tackling COVID-19 (European Commission, no date; International Telecommunication Union, 2021). As can be seen, there is a variety of uses for AI in tackling COVID-19, and it would not be possible to mention all of the cases. However, it is possible to summarize how AI was used in the world: i. Early warning and alerts, ii. Prediction and detection of the pandemic outbreak, iii. Realtime disease monitoring globally, iv. Analysis and visualization of spreading trends, v. Prediction of infection rate and trends, vi. Diagnosis and prognosis of the disease, vii. Rapid decision-making to identify effective treatments, viii. Tracing of the infected people and social control, ix. Study and analysis of the pathogens, x. Drug and vaccine discovery, xi. Managing labour shortages and telehealth, xii. Education

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Where AI Takes the Lead: The Case of Turkey

While many great powers, including here the US and several European states, failed to effectively respond to COVID-19, that was not the case for Turkey. Indeed, in one of the WHO reports on Turkey it was stated: Turkey’s response to and experience thus far with the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus-2 (SARS-CoV-2) pandemic affords the world and the region a unique opportunity for distinctive insights into combating this novel virus. On the one hand, Turkey has one of the lowest case fatality ratios (2.8%; and 52.5 infections/million population), particularly among the elderly aged 65 years and older (the high-risk group). It has also risen to the occasion and shouldered its role as a longstanding propagator of global solidarity and provider of humanitarian support (WHO, 2020: 3). First of all, it is necessary to state that Turkey’s Health Ministry had undergone several reforms starting with the arrival of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) to power in 2022. Within this framework, the ministry had been preparing for a possible pandemic for more than a decade and had made the necessary infrastructural changes accordingly. Without a doubt, the abundance of infrastructural capabilities—which most of the states lacked—made it possible for Turkey to manage and prevent the spread of the virus. Alongside this, Turkey was also among the first states to take measures against COVID-19, not only before it was accepted as a pandemic by the WHO but also before the first case was observed. For this reason, the country was able to buy some time and delay the entrance of the virus for several months (Koca, 2020). Yet, one of the most important policies that made it possible for the Turkish government to successfully fight against COVID-19 was the effective application of AI and digital applications in the management of the outbreak. The Public Health Management System (HSYS) was basically the centre of the pandemic management. Through such a system it was possible to add and control all the patients’ electronic health records, which as a result “provided critical data on disease management” (Koca, 2020). Going into detail, the Laboratory Information Management System was integrated into the HSYS so that the reports and the results of the COVID-19 tests could be accessed anytime and anywhere without loss of time and data. After this integration between the two systems, the test results of the patients could be kept together in the

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system and were ready for use and analysis. The tools for the development of propagation schemes, sources of contamination, and contact trees, which are of great importance in the process as they enable the simultaneous detection of people in contact with those who have positive tests, were also included in the HSYS. The digitalization of the data made it possible for health workers to act cautiously without losing time, which resulted in slowing down the spread of the pandemic (Birinci, 2022). Furthermore, several other applications were also integrated within the HSYS to help track and manage the pandemic. Among these we can mention, “Life Fits Home” (Hayat Eve Sı˘gar, HES), the e-Pulse Personal Health System, the e-Report System, the Teleradiology System, the Death Notification System (ÖBS), the Filiation and Insulation Tracking System ˙ (FITAS), the Central Integrated Laboratory Operating System (MELIS), the Physician Knowledge Base (DBB), and Spatial Business Intelligence ˙ (Suayıp (MIZ) ¸ Birinci, 2023). Among these applications, the Life Fits Home application became crucial in tackling COVID-19. HES was compulsory for all people living in Turkey when they wanted to enter social or public areas or use public transportation during the pandemic period. This had a great impact and importance during the pandemic period considering that the vaccination information of the citizens, the most up-to-date COVID-19 test results, and data on their health status could be obtained by scanning the HES code. In addition, the HES application allowed person-based tracing, which helped later with the filiation process. Not only that but people could also request face masks (which were delivered for free by the government), check the risk status of the areas in which they live, examine the daily coronavirus dashboard for Turkey, or even acquire a travel certificate with all the data about their vaccination (Koca, 2020). While the Turkish government was quite successful in incorporating AI in its policies and initiatives in fighting COVID-19, several research projects and initiatives were undertaken by other institutions as well. For example, the company CBOT created the “Koronabot”, a coronavirus online assistant through which citizens can reach the right information about COVID-19 quickly (CBOT, no date). Another example that can be mentioned is the AI algorithm created by the University of Health Sciences and Ankara University Technopolis. This AI algorithm was able to diagnose a coronavirus infection from a lung tomography in just a few seconds with an accuracy rate of 99.9% (NTV, 2021). One other instance would be also the AI algorithm that calculates the risk of COVID-19 by

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tracking the breathing and coughing of people via their mobile phones. The system later gives an early warning to the individuals who need to go to the hospital in case of suspected infection (Cumhuriyet, 2021). Initiatives undertaken by the government played a crucial role in the fight against COVID-19, and that was also the case in Turkey. The effective adaptation and adoption of several applications that used artificial intelligence and other digital technologies, i.e. HES, made it possible for the Turkish government to manage the pandemic quickly and successfully. As a result, the government was able to keep the number of infections and the death toll quite low relative to the other states.

5

Conclusion

At the end of 2019, the world was faced with one of the deadliest threats, the COVID-19 pandemic. Not only did the pandemic pose a great threat to each of us, but—from a political perspective—it directly challenged the existing international system and its actors. Many states, including great powers, failed to properly respond and take under control the pandemic, resulting in millions of lives lost. At a point when the human capacity to respond to the pandemic was lacking, many states and actors started to focus on the application of AI in tackling COVID-19. From the detection of the pandemic outbreak to real-time disease monitoring, and diagnosis of the disease to the discovery of new drugs and vaccines, a wide variety of areas saw the use of AI and in several cases, its role proved indispensable. Turkey was one of the few states that was able to effectively combat the spread of COVID-19 and it would not be wrong to argue that this success was mainly achieved due to the successful use of artificial intelligence and digital technologies. Several applications such as the HES or e-Pulse proved crucial in Turkey’s fight against the pandemic. Despite the importance of AI in tackling the COVID-19 pandemic, it is also important to emphasize that there has been a correlation between AI development and COVID-19 in recent years. While AI was used as a tool to directly tackle the pandemic faster and more efficiently, on the other hand, COVID-19 sped up AI development and its application and at the same time illustrated the opportunities and challenges of AI. While the challenges of AI—especially in terms of ethics—need to be addressed, the opportunities that AI brings deserve even more attention as AI has now proved to be a crucial tool in the case of another novel pandemic.

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References Birinci, S. ¸ (2022) ‘Sa˘gılıkta Milli Teknoloji Hamlesi’, in Millî Teknoloji Hamlesi: Toplumsal Yansımaları Ve Türkiye’Nin Gelece˘gi, pp. 327–352. https://doi. org/10.53478/TUBA.978-625-8352-16-0.ch17. Butcher, M. (2020) Potential new treatment for COVID-19 uncovered by BenevolentAI enters trials|TechCrunch, TechCrunch. Available at: https://techcr unch.com/2020/04/14/potential-new-treatment-for-covid-19-uncoveredby-benevolentai-enters-trials/?guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xl LmNvbS8&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAANeX6fFz-qYRD2RvqYUMY6q8EMl XcDHoeKiu8sqUGWm8aLSGzQQHXEVoo8Nf6ck7vEYRtxv5pY-iUAJwh BBv-GA00lv7SUlKJkCr3klcusRGJbEFCcfyNnbJUiuyZKLsdbC1GqFv1zD Lm66P16Mhp25qZ_llwiDaObYZmzRO6Gjh&guccounter=2 (Accessed: 11 April 2023). CBOT. (no date) Türkiye’nin Yapay Zeka Tabanlı Koronavirüs Bilgi Asistanı Koronabot. Available at: https://www.cbot.ai/tr/case-study/sosyal-soruml uluk-hikayesi-koronabot/ (Accessed: 11 April 2023). Cumhuriyet. (2021) Türk bilim insanı, cep telefonundan Covid-19 riskini hesaplayan sistem geli¸stirdi. Available at: https://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/ bilim-teknoloji/turk-bilim-insani-cep-telefonundan-covid-19-riskini-hesapl ayan-sistem-gelistirdi-1888247 (Accessed: 11 April 2023). Davenport, T. and Kalakota, R. (2019) ‘The potential for artificial intelligence in healthcare’, Future Healthcare Journal, 6(2), pp. 94–98. DeepMind. (2020) Computational predictions of protein structures associated with COVID-19. Available at: https://www.deepmind.com/open-source/comput ational-predictions-of-protein-structures-associated-with-covid-19 (Accessed: 11 April 2023). Deloitte. (2020) Yeni Nesil Teknolojilerin COVID-19 Mücadelesindeki ÖnemiÜlke Örnekleri. Driver, C.N. et al. (2020) ‘Artificial Intelligence in Radiology: A Call for Thoughtful Application’, Clinical and Translational Science, 13, pp. 216– 218. European Commission. (no date) Join the AI-ROBOTICS vs COVID-19 initiative of the European AI Alliance | FUTURIUM | European Commission. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/futurium/en/ai-robotics-vs-covid19/joinai-robotics-vs-covid-19-initiative-european-ai-alliance.html (Accessed: 11 April 2023). Gast, A. (2022) AI helped Moderna speed up Covid vaccine development. Now it can help climate too, The Print. Available at: https://theprint.in/tech/ai-hel ped-moderna-speed-up-covid-vaccine-development-now-it-can-help-climatetoo/955061/ (Accessed: 11 April 2023). International Telecommunication Union. (2021) United Nations Activities on Artificial Intelligence (AI) 2021.

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Covid-19 Pandemic in Africa: Global Uncertainty and Security Quests Tunç Demirta¸s

1

Introduction

The Covid-19 pandemic has had a profound global impact, and African countries, like others, have also struggled. However, Africa’s search for security during the pandemic has differed from other countries. Africa swiftly took measures like border closures, travel bans, and quarantine protocols at the onset of the pandemic. These measures successfully contained the virus, causing fewer infections and deaths across Africa compared to other regions (World Health Organisation, 2023a). However, African countries have continued their efforts to address security during the pandemic. The economic impact of the crisis has been particularly significant, causing high unemployment rates and contraction of economic resources in African nations. Consequently, poverty rates have increased and so have crime rates (Meyer, 2017: 178). According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), while around 478 million people were living in extreme poverty in Africa in 2019, that number is estimated to reach 490 million by 2021 (UNCTAD, 2021). Additionally, human rights violations during

T. Demirta¸s (B) Department of International Relations, Bursa Uluda˘g University, Bursa, Turkey © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Akilli and B. Gunes (eds.), World Politics in the Age of Uncertainty, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39611-3_9

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the pandemic have also increased security concerns among the general population. Therefore, some African countries have adopted different measures to address security issues. For instance, Nigeria has witnessed calls for police reform and an end to police violence (Aborisade and Ariyo, 2022). In South Africa, the police deployed additional personnel to ensure security during the curfews during the pandemic (South African Police Service, 2020). Similarly, countries with high crime rates have implemented additional security measures during the pandemic (Interpol, 2021). African nations have displayed different approaches in their pursuit of security during the pandemic. While some countries have boosted police resources to help maintain public order, others focused on human rights and police reform. However, all countries continue to seek solutions to combat pandemic-era security challenges. This study aims to analyse the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on Africa’s security landscape in the current era of global uncertainty. It also seeks to explore how the security situation in Africa will be shaped in the post-Covid pandemic period, considering how Covid-19 affects security, the progress of security measures in African countries, and the influence of international cooperation on ensuring security in Africa. It also discusses the potential opportunities or risks that may arise from the situation.

2

Covid-19 and Security in Africa

The pandemic has placed a severe burden on the region’s healthcare systems. In the initial stages of the pandemic, many African countries faced a shortage of test kits, equipment, and medical supplies needed to detect and contain the disease. Therefore, the number of Covid-19 cases and death rates are likely to surpass the official figures. In fact, as of March 22, 2023, global Covid-19 cases hit 761,071,826, of whom around 6,879,677 have died (World Health Organisation, 2023a). While struggling with the pandemic, African countries have also faced several other challenges. These challenges, compounded by existing social, economic, and security issues, have reached levels that threaten regional stability across the continent. The Covid-19 pandemic has confronted Africa’s security situation with many economic, social, health, and security challenges, forcing many African countries to take various measures to address

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them. Although the vast African continent is home to 54 different countries, each with its distinct security situation, the Covid-19 pandemic has created several issues in general. Firstly, the economic effects of the pandemic stand out as many African countries, like the rest of the world, have faced economic difficulties due to the measures taken against the Covid-19 pandemic. The loss of jobs and income pushed people into financial difficulties, leading to social unrest. While this situation threatens social stability, growing poverty and food insecurity have increased social conflicts. Moreover, the economic crisis has caused a spike in crime rates in many African countries (Holze, 2021; Lonea and Ahmad, 2020). The reduced interaction between people due to the pandemic has also led to a rise in theft, robbery, and other violent activities, pushing overall crime rates up. A majority of these crimes, as well as drug-related offences, have often taken place in lowincome areas. Projections show that the number of drug abusers in Sub-Saharan Africa could rise by almost 150 per cent in the next 30 years (Donnenfeld, 2019). Secondly, it has been observed during the Covid-19 pandemic that the measures taken by African countries to combat the virus may very well increase security risks. For example, the Republic of South Africa has one of the highest number of reported cases in the world at 4,068,224 and over 102,595 deaths (World Health Organisation, 2023b). People have lost their lives due to the virus—despite curfews and quarantine measures—in places like Nigeria, Africa’s most populous country. Some of these measures have restricted people’s daily activities, leading to increased social conflicts. Furthermore, governments have often deployed security forces to enforce the pandemic measures, which has led to instances of human rights violations (Amadasun, 2020: 1). Thirdly, the pandemic-related travel restrictions have led to significant contractions in the African tourism industry. This situation poses a serious challenge for tourism-reliant economies, leading to increased unemployment and poverty rates. For instance, in countries like South Africa and Mauritius, the unemployment rate was 24.2 per cent and 6.4 per cent in 2018, respectively. But they hit 25.5 per cent and 6.3 per cent in 2019, 24.3 per cent and 8.6 per cent in 2020, before reaching 28.8 per cent and 7.7 per cent in 2021 (The World Bank, 2023a). These figures highlight the significant impact the pandemic had on employment rates. Moreover, several African countries continue to struggle with security issues like civil war or terrorism, in addition to the health challenges

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posed by the pandemic. These issues and the Covid-19 pandemic can further exacerbate security concerns and public safety. For example, attacks carried out by the al-Shabab terrorist group in Somalia displaced many people, intensifying human mobility and with it the spread of the disease. Besides the attacks, the fact that groups like al-Shabab and Boko Haram provide essential services in certain areas undermines the state’s authority and causes instability in the region (Marsai and Tarrósy, 2022: 164). Furthermore, measures taken to curb the spread of the pandemic have contributed to the rise of authoritarian tendencies among governments. In some African countries, governments have used these measures to restrict people’s freedoms. This trend is evident in the number of authoritarian regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa, rising from 22 in 2018 (The Economist, 2019: 9) to 24 in 2020 (The Economist, 2021: 26), according to the Democracy Indices. The classification of 24 out of 49 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa as authoritarian regimes in the postCovid-19 period highlights that almost 50 per cent of the region and over 500 million people (The World Bank, 2023b) reside in a precarious region for democracy. Additionally, the measures taken to prevent the spread of the pandemic also triggered humanitarian crises. Many people have lost their jobs due to the curfews, exacerbating poverty levels. Moreover, the Covid-19 pandemic has caused a significant number of migrant workers to return home in many African countries. As a result, immigrants have faced economic hardships and reduced access to social services. In short, the Covid-19 pandemic has had profound implications for the security landscape in Africa, giving rise to a range of issues including security, economic crisis, and rising crime rates as well as social conflicts to human rights violations.

3

Seeking Security in African Countries

During the Covid-19 pandemic, Africa has faced multiple issues threatening economic, military, cyber, border, and food security. The pandemic has caused severe economic woes in African countries, much like the rest of the world. Many African countries have faced problems like job losses, falling export revenues, and contraction in the tourism industry. For instance, major African exporting economies like Nigeria, South Africa, and Egypt, all saw their export revenues drop

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Table 1 Export Revenues of Nigeria, South Africa, and Egypt (2019–2020)

Nigeria South Africa Egypt

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2019

2020

63.7 billion $ 106 billion $ 53 billion $

35 billion $ 93.1 billion $ 47.8 billion $

Source The World Bank, Exports of goods and services (current US$) – Nigeria, Ethiopia, South Africa, Egypt, Arab Rep., https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.EXP.GNFS. CD?end=2021&locations=NG-ET-ZA-EG&start=2018

during the crisis. According to the data in Table 1, Nigeria’s exports decreased by 45 per cent while South Africa and Egypt’s dropped by nearly 12 per cent and 9.8 per cent, respectively. In response, African countries have taken various measures to protect their economy during the Covid-19 pandemic. Some of them have subsidized agriculture and other industries to compensate for the losses in the tourism industry. For example, Nigeria, Tunisia, and Tanzania all provided financial support to farmers and implemented various programmes for marketing agricultural products. Morocco, on the other hand, has established financial assistance and support programmes for its agriculture and fisheries industries (OECD, 2020; Oruma, Misra and Fernandez-Sanz, 2021; The World Bank, 2021, 2022). The Covid-19 pandemic has also triggered military security problems in many African countries. Terrorist groups in the Sahel region have consolidated their power over local populations during the pandemic. Meanwhile, terrorist groups like Boko Haram and Daesh, which existed even before the pandemic, especially in Nigeria, continued to carry out attacks and pose security problems during the Covid-19 pandemic. As a result, conflicts increased further when domestic instability was combined with inadequate health services. Boko Haram also caused security threats in Cameroon, another Sahel country. Similarly, in Somalia, where AlShabaab exerted influence, the security challenges during the pandemic were compounded by economic and environmental problems, resulting in an escalation in security problems in the country (The United Nations Development Programme, 2023: 47). Finally, the humanitarian crisis in South Sudan has further deteriorated during the pandemic, with an increase in the activities of the armed groups posing threats to the country’s security and hindering the delivery of humanitarian aid (The United Nations, 2023).

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As many Africans spent more time online whether simply locked down or working from home, this increased the target areas for cybercriminals and potential cyber attacks. Many countries are trying to boost cybersecurity by updating related policies and taking stricter measures against cyberattacks. Investments in cybersecurity infrastructure and experts are increasing, in particular. For instance, South Africa which has one of the continent’s most advanced cybersecurity infrastructures, has established the National Cybersecurity Center and organizes various trainings to increase security (Cyber Security Institute, 2023). Countries like Rwanda, Nigeria, and Kenya have also made legal arrangements and organized different training programmes to raise cybersecurity awareness and take precautions (National Cyber Security Authority, 2023; NITDA, 2023). Additionally, the pandemic has also threatened the border security of African countries. Although many African countries have closed their borders during the crisis, limiting human mobility, this has increased human and drug trafficking, as well as other cross-border crimes. In order to boost border security, many countries monitor the borders with specialized equipment like unmanned vehicles and impose stricter controls at crossings. Countries in different sub-regional systems such as South Africa and Kenya, and mainly North African countries like Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya, also use various radar systems, thermal cameras, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), motion detectors, unmanned land vehicles, and observation towers to protect borders (Abdul, 2017). Finally, the Covid-19 pandemic disrupted the food supply in many African countries and heightened their food security concerns. In some of these countries, many people already needed access to food aid due to economic difficulties. Therefore, they are implementing policies to ensure food security by providing food aid, supporting local agriculture, reducing food waste, and increasing food production. Ethiopia, for instance, implemented a national agriculture strategy that includes various policies to boost local production and the farmers’ income, reduce food waste, and strengthen the food supply chain to ensure food security (Hatab et al., 2022: 6).

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4 International Cooperation and Security Against Covid-19 in Africa The African continent has become one of the critical centres in the context of the global Covid-19 pandemic. In fact, the pandemic has worsened a number of issues in Africa. Cooperation in the fight against the pandemic has also affected bilateral relations between African countries. It has also changed how the international community contributes to the search for security in Africa. The pandemic has further strained the already weak health systems across the continent, further deepening many problems in Africa. Countries in Africa, however, must cooperate in combating the Covid19 pandemic. Africa has an underdeveloped health infrastructure and far fewer resources than other continents to fight the pandemic. As a result, the importance of cooperation between countries to combat the Covid19 pandemic is considerably increasing. Organizations like the African Union (AU) and the African Economic Community (AEC) have acted to develop regional cooperation, with the former creating a $1.5 billion aid fund. This fund has helped countries fight the Covid-19 pandemic and supported measures to contain the virus. In addition, experience exchange among African countries has also taken place. Some continental countries like Senegal have had more success in tackling the pandemic and they have increased cooperation with other countries to share these achievements. Senegal has helped many countries fight the pandemic by producing Covid-19 test kits. Such instances have increased cooperation between African countries and they will be more effective in combating any future health crises post-pandemic. Cooperation among African countries to combat the pandemic has brought many benefits. While some countries provided medical equipment and supplies, others have worked together to prevent the spread of the pandemic by working together, rather than closing their borders. In this context, Southern African Development Community member states appear as examples. Countries like South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Eswatini, Namibia, and Zimbabwe have also fought against the pandemic by working together. However, more contributions from the international community are needed to help Africa recover from the pandemic. These contributions must be financial to strengthen its health systems,

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provide medical supplies and equipment, procure vaccines, and economic recovery. These contributions made by the international community will contribute to the economic recovery of African countries in the postpandemic period and the solution of security problems. However, for this aid to be sustainable and for African countries to be self-sufficient, it is essential to establish long-term development strategies. Although cooperation has taken place during the pandemic, more international support is needed to combat the effects of the pandemic. This support should be part of a long-term strategy for African development. In the process, cooperation between African countries has played an important role. However, the international community needs to contribute more to the search for security in Africa. Because Africa is not only struggling with the pandemic. Africa also faces internal conflicts, terrorism, human trafficking, and other security challenges. These security problems hinder countries’ development and threaten people’s lives. Therefore, the international community must contribute to the search for security in Africa. In this context, there are various methods for the international community to contribute to the search for security in Africa. These may include providing training and technical assistance, particularly in the fight against terrorism, strengthening the security forces of countries, making efforts to keep the peace, and supporting democracy and human rights issues. This will not only help solve security problems but also help countries develop. However, in the context of organizations, the AU has taken significant steps to increase cooperation between member countries during the pandemic. It has organized many meetings and events to ensure the sharing of knowledge and experience among countries working together in Africa during the pandemic. In addition, many aid campaigns have been launched to provide medical supplies and equipment to African countries. By doing so, the African countries supported each other and formed a more powerful union to fight the pandemic. Contribution of the International Community to Security Quests in Africa. The Covid-19 pandemic has amplified security concerns in Africa, including terrorist attacks, civil wars, border disputes, and smuggling. Since the international community has the experience and knowledge to aid the fight against Africa’s security problems, military training, medical

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aid, humanitarian aid, and education programmes contribute to the continent’s search for security in the era of global uncertainty impacted by the pandemic. Despite facing significant challenges like other regions struggling with the pandemic, Africa’s resilience and cooperation serve as an example for the international community and other continents. Cooperation between African countries has been an important factor since the onset of the pandemic. The AU has created a Covid-19 Response Fund, working together with African countries to contain the virus. This fund was established to strengthen Africa’s health systems, support countries struggling to respond to the epidemic, and provide essential resources like tests and other medical supplies. The AU also cooperates in order to boost knowledge and experience sharing among members and ensure Africa responds strongly to the pandemic. The international community also took notice of Africa’s security concerns, which are closely related to the situation and difficulties of people living in conflict zones. However, the Covid-19 pandemic has added a new dimension to the international community’s security efforts in Africa. The pandemic has not only been a health crisis but one that has had economic and social impacts as well. Therefore, the international community must consider Africa’s well-being as a whole when responding to the pandemic.

5

Conclusion

The global system has undergone a gradual transformation in recent years. A critical problem in this transformation is global leadership. In the face of the Covid-19 pandemic’s worldwide impact, responses have been slow and at one point, the need for a global leader emerged. The fact that actors like the United States, China, the EU, and the United Nations cannot solve the problem of the Covid-19 pandemic, forced states and regional organizations to act independently. In this age of global uncertainty, Africa is one of the geographies that was most affected by Covid-19. Therefore, with no global leaders, most international actors dealing with their problems and deprioritizing Africa made it possible for African actors to act individually. They have managed this crisis well by cooperating from time to time and benefiting from the positive effects of regional organizations. In this context, the AU has assumed a leadership role in the fight against the pandemic and strengthened the cooperation between member

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countries. African countries have tackled the pandemic by helping each other, restricting cross-border mobility, travel restrictions, and introducing quarantines. Thanks to the cooperation, Africa has had remarkable success in fighting the pandemic, boasting some of the lowest rates of Covid-19 cases and deaths worldwide. However, they still face significant challenges like various security issues brought on by the pandemic, forcing the countries to reshape their security policies. Therefore, African political, military, and civil organizations must rethink their security policies in the post-pandemic period. Some risks may also arise with the shaping of the security situation in post-pandemic Africa. For instance, economic instability, unemployment, poverty, discrimination, and intolerance may increase. The transformation of these factors into social unrest and conflicts can hinder the continent’s development. In addition, the Covid-19 pandemic has weakened the border security of many African countries through mobility restrictions introduced by terrorist and extremist groups. This may increase terrorist activities and cross-border attacks. Therefore, increased security risks in the post-Covid period are among the key issues that might adversely affect foreign investments. On the other hand, the search for improved security in the postpandemic period may also reveal new opportunities in an era of global uncertainty. The pandemic may force Africa to rethink and improve its health systems, with steps to expand primary health care, in particular. Furthermore, Africa, which served as a vital revenue source in the tourism sector for many countries before the pandemic, has the potential to revitalize the industry with new opportunities. Additionally, the increased interest in regional cooperation, facilitated by collective action in addressing emerging crises, presents a significant opportunity. In summary, these opportunities have the potential to enhance cooperation among African countries and foster new opportunities for regional security collaboration.

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Post-pandemic Economic Development Perspective in Countries of the South Caucasus: Comparative Analysis Elshan Bagirzadeh

1

and Turan Suleymanov

Introduction

The South Caucasus is one of the locations where major transport and communication routes connect Europe, Asia, Russia, and the Middle East, and thus has considerable geopolitical and geoeconomic significance. As a result of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the three countries comprising this region—Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia— attained independence and launched a new era of development via post-socialist reforms. The first 10 years of independence for these countries were incredibly arduous. But, the second decade following independence proved helpful for these countries’ economic progress. These economies maintained a

E. Bagirzadeh (B) · T. Suleymanov Azerbaijan State University of Economics (UNEC), Baku, Azerbaijan e-mail: [email protected] T. Suleymanov e-mail: [email protected] T. Suleymanov University of Malaga, Malaga, Spain © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Akilli and B. Gunes (eds.), World Politics in the Age of Uncertainty, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39611-3_10

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high rate of economic growth until the global financial crisis of 2008– 2009 due to a combination of good global economic conditions and the implementation of several reforms. In the third decade of independence, the economic growth rate has slowed considerably and its volatility has increased in the countries of the region. The global financial crisis of 2008–2009, the 2014–2016 collapse of the global raw materials and energy carrier markets, and the global economic recession caused by the COVID-19 pandemic that emerged in 2020, all played important roles in the emergence of such a situation (ADB, 2019; EBRD, 2019; IMF, 2021; UNECE, 2021; EIB & EBRD, 2021). As the three economies recover from the COVID-19 epidemic, they are confronted with new challenges and opportunities. The new geopolitical and geoeconomic situation in the South Caucasus as a result of the 44-day Karabakh war, the war between Russia and Ukraine and the new economic realities it created, the global food and energy crisis, the growing problem of global inflation, and the increasing probability of a global recession all increase the urgency of ensuring sustainable economic growth or economic development for these countries. From this point of view, the perspective of the South Caucasus countries’ economic development in the post-pandemic period is comparatively examined in this chapter of the book. The analysis focuses primarily on the directions of development of physical capital, human capital, and technology, which, according to the current economic growth theory, are the primary causes of economic growth (Acemoglu, 2009). The main research questions of this study, which consists of the Introduction, Literature Review, Methods and Materials, Results, and Discussion sections, are: 1. What are the key drivers of economic growth in South Caucasus countries after the pandemic? 2. What are the primary reasons that jeopardize the economic progress of these countries? 3. What further economic growth prospects do these countries have, and how may they be exploited?

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Literature Review

Limited research about economic development prospects focuses on the post-pandemic period and draws comparisons across South Caucasus countries. In this section, Table 1 compares the key findings from those sources under the headings of current economic growth drivers, key factors threatening the sustainability of economic growth, and some additional opportunities for economic growth. 2.1

The Current Economic Growth Drivers

According to the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) (2021) and Internation Monetary Fund (IMF) (2021), after the global financial crisis, Armenia’s economic growth model shifted slightly. Before the crisis, foreign direct investments, primarily of diaspora origin, and labour remittances from abroad were concentrated in non-tradable sectors of the economy, such as construction. After the crisis, both foreign direct investments and labour remittances decreased significantly, and as a result of various government measures, the mining (primarily copper production), agribusiness, tourism, and information technology sectors began to recover, and their contribution to exports also increased substantially (IMF, 2021: 3). Georgia’s economic growth model is comparable to Armenia’s. Georgia’s economic growth is driven by foreign direct investments, worker remittances, non-tradable industries such as tourism and construction, and private consumption or domestic demand (EBRD, 2021; EIB & EBRD, 2021; UNECE, 2021). Azerbaijan is the only oil and gas-rich country in the South Caucasus, and the development and sale of these hydrocarbon resources have long been its primary economic driver (UNECE, 2021: 127). Even though the non-oil sector has become a significant economic growth driver in recent years, the oil and gas sector continues to make a substantial contribution to economic growth (EBRD, 2021).

– Direct investment and remittances by primarily Armenian diaspora – Growing tourism, agricultural, mining, and information technology sectors

Armenia – Increasing oil prices and development of the gas industry – Non-oil sector

Azerbaijan

– Foreign investments and labour remittances from abroad – The services sector, especially tourism, and construction

Georgia

Diagnostics of economic growth in South Caucasus countries based on literature review

Current main drivers of economic growth

Table 1

124 E. BAGIRZADEH AND T. SULEYMANOV

The main factors that threaten the sustainability of economic growth

–

–

– –

– –

–

–

–

–

–

–

– – – –

Political instability Strict macroeconomic policy Low labour productivity Low and worsening economic complexity Excessive dependence of the economy on remittances from abroad A high share of the non-tradable sector in the economy Poor integration of the economy into global value chains Resource and market-seeking investment Declining population growth rate, increasing migration abroad, and high skill mismatch in the labour market Limited access to cheap financial resources Underdeveloped capital markets High level of informality in business Rising income inequality Lower research and development expenditure and innovation potential Closed borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey and high transport costs in foreign trade Economic risks caused by the war in Ukraine, especially the reduction of labour remittances from abroad

Armenia – Low labour productivity – Low complexity of the economy and its high dependence on the hydrocarbon sector – Low competitiveness of the non-oil sector – Resource and market-seeking investment – Low efficiency of investment in human capital and infrastructure – Limited access to cheap financial resources – Low resilience of the banking sector – Informality and unfair competition in business – Rising income inequality – Regional economic imbalance and the decisive economic role of Baku – Lower research and development expenditure and innovation potential – Is not a member of the WTO – Economic risks caused by the war in Ukraine, especially the decline in labour remittances from abroad

Azerbaijan

–

–

– –

– –

–

–

–

–

–

– – – –

(continued)

Political instability Low labour productivity Low complexity of the economy High dependence of the economy on labour remittances from abroad Poor integration of the economy into global value chains Resource and market- seeking investment Declining population growth rate, increased migration abroad, weak education system, and deepening skills mismatch in the labour market Limited access to cheap financial resources Poor development of the capital market High level of dollarization High level of informality in business Regional economic inequality Low research and development costs and innovation potential Poor development of infrastructure, especially transport infrastructure Economic risks caused by the war in Ukraine, especially the reduction of labour remittances from abroad

Georgia

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(continued)

– The untapped economic potential of the diaspora – Realization of export potential – New economic opportunities in the region after the Second Karabakh War

Armenia

Source Prepared by the authors based on the literature review

Some additional opportunities for economic growth

Table 1

– Oil prices to remain high – Strengthening the non-oil sector – New trade and investment opportunities to be created by the Belt and Road Initiative – New economic opportunities in the region after the Second Karabakh War – Reconstruction of Karabakh and integration into the country’s economy

Azerbaijan

– Free trade agreements signed with the European Union and China, increased foreign trade and transit potential – New trade and investment opportunities to be created by the Belt and Road Initiative

Georgia

126 E. BAGIRZADEH AND T. SULEYMANOV

POST-PANDEMIC ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT …

2.2

127

Main Factors that Threaten the Sustainability of Economic Growth

Political instability is regarded as one of the most significant obstacles to economic development in Armenia and Georgia. According to the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) (2021), political instability in Georgia is the business issue that has the greatest short and long-term impact on investment decisions and reforms. Also, the World Bank’s (2020: 10) study in Armenia revealed that “political instability” is one of the top five obstacles to business. Among regional economies, Armenia’s strict macroeconomic policy impedes economic development. According to Voskanyan (2022), the monetary, currency, and fiscal policies implemented by Armenia over the past 10 years to achieve macroeconomic stability have reduced the country’s long-term economic growth rate. Low labour productivity appears to be a characteristic of South Caucasus economies. The primary indicator of this situation is the extremely low contribution of the agricultural sector to the gross domestics product (GDP), where a significant proportion of the labour force is employed (ADB, 2019: 6, 2020: 9–10; EIB & EBRD, 2021: 17–18). In addition, according to the World Bank (2017), Armenia’s deadlock has brought the non-tradable sector and domestic demand to the fore in trade and economic growth, which has spurred productivity, innovation, technology, and product diversification at the firm level. The South Caucasus’ economies that lack diversification are highly susceptible to external shocks (IMF, 2021: 3–5; Guliyev, 2018; UNECE, 2020, 2021; Zulfigarov & Neuenkirch, 2020). The high reliance of Armenia’s economy on foreign labour remittances gives rise to occasional discussions of the Dutch disease about this economy (Khachatryan & Grigoryan, 2020). Also, discussions regarding the creation of Dutch disease in the economy by foreign labour remittances remain pertinent for Georgia (Brownbridge & Canagarajah, 2020: 16–17; Ito, 2019). One of the factors limiting economic growth in the South Caucasus’ economies is investments, especially foreign direct investments, which are more focused on market-seeking and resource-seeking than on productivity-seeking, which reveals the excessive dependence of the mentioned investments on the market conjuncture. In this regard, the

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contribution of those investments to the diversification of the economy is also low (UNECE, 2021: 72, 121, 229). The stability of economic growth is also threatened by the rise in emigration and population loss in Armenia and Georgia, as well as the difficulties in the field of human capital development in the region as a whole (Brownbridge & Canagarajah, 2020; Gomółka & Flisikowski, 2020: 160–165; UNECE, 2021: 230). Relative deprivation of households plays a significant role in the propensity to migrate from South Caucasus (Antinyan & Corazzini, 2016). Comparative studies reveal that the labour markets of all three South Caucasus countries suffer from a mismatch of skills. Thus, workforce skills are falling further behind evolving business requirements in these countries (World Bank, 2020; ADB, 2020; EIB & EBRD, 2021). Several issues stemming from the financial and banking system threaten the economic growth stability of South Caucasus countries. First, businesses have limited access to cheap financial resources in all three countries (World Bank, 2017, 2020; IMF, 2021; ADB, 2020; EIB & EBRD, 2021). According to the EIB and the EBRD (2021), Georgia’s banking system is relatively well-managed, but its traditionally high dollarization level increases its risks and maintains its sensitivity to crises. The absence of developed capital markets is one of the major obstacles to business financing in the region. According to Salnazaryan and Aramyan (2017), there is no significant correlation between the stock market and economic growth in Armenia, indicating that the two parameters do not interact. The informal economy is one of the factors that threaten the sustainability of business and economic growth in all three South Caucasus economies (ADB, 2019; EBRD, 2019; EIB & EBRD, 2021). According to the World Bank (2020), this is one of the five most significant issues facing Armenian businesses. Income inequality in the region’s countries, as well as significant regional economic inequality, are factors restricting economic progress. Although some work has been done to solve the problem of poverty and unemployment, the entire population has not been able to benefit from it to the same extent in the region’s countries (UNECE, 2021). In recent years, significant development processes have been observed in innovative activities in the region’s countries. But, low research and development (R&D) expenditures and a general lack of innovation potential are one of these economies’ primary issues (World Bank, 2018; UNECE, 2020, 2021). According to Bigos and Wach (2021), product

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innovation plays a crucial role in explaining the export trends of small and medium-sized businesses in the South Caucasus. Also, the research shows that the share of foreign capital in a company’s structure is positively correlated with export probability. While Georgia is more integrated into the global economy than the rest of the South Caucasus countries, the same cannot be said for Armenia and Azerbaijan. The fact is that Azerbaijan is not a WTO member. Although Armenia gradually opened up to foreign trade after becoming a member of the WTO in 2003, its geographical location, the closure of some of its borders (with Turkey and Azerbaijan), and the fact that it mainly trades through Georgia make it face the limitation of high transport costs (UNECE, 2021: 72, 122). In Georgia, in terms of foreign economic relations, there is a greater problem of insufficient infrastructure (EIB & EBRD, 2021: 4). Economies of the regions face new challenges and economic risks nowadays. One of the most important challenges is related to the reduction of labour remittances from abroad. According to research conducted by Ratha and Kim (2022), labour remittances from Russia to these countries are expected to decrease sharply as a result of the dual effects of the decline in economic activity in Russia and the weakening of the Russian ruble against the US dollar. 2.3

Additional Opportunities for Economic Growth

The Armenian diaspora is not only a source of remittances, but also of foreign direct investment, ideas, and connections for their respective countries. Even though Armenia’s connection with the diaspora has prompted some innovations, such as IT services, its potential is underutilized. Nonetheless, it offers additional greater opportunities for Armenia’s sustainable development (UNECE, 2021: 70–71). The high price of oil always affords Azerbaijan an opportunity for additional economic growth (EIU, 2022: 2). However, strengthening the non-oil sector, particularly agriculture, and tourism, is of greater importance in this regard (ADB, 2020: 16–18). Since the region’s small domestic market severely restricts the production of non-resource and tradable goods, the region’s transition to an export-oriented economic growth model is crucial. In this regard, despite sector risks, it is anticipated that Georgia’s foreign trade will increase due to its strategic geographical location and economic openness, particularly

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as a result of free trade agreements signed with the European Union and China (Neri et al., 2021). China’s Belt and Road Initiative generates additional trade and investment opportunities for the region. Located on the Middle Corridor, Azerbaijan, and Georgia have greater opportunities to benefit from this initiative (Gigauri & Damenia, 2019; Schuhbert & Thees, 2020). The new economic opportunities that developed in the South Caucasus following the Second Karabakh War promise to be very beneficial, particularly for Armenia and Azerbaijan. Saha et al. (2018) findings indicate that resolving the Karabakh conflict will benefit both Armenia and Azerbaijan. According to Bagirov (2021), following the Second Karabakh War Armenia has the opportunity to end the economic blockade and establish economic and transport relations with its neighbours. After the Second Karabakh War, Azerbaijan’s economic development prospects improved significantly. Because the country’s occupied territories have rejoined the national economy (Muradov & Bagirzade, 2021: 18; The Republic of Azerbaijan, 2021). Also, according to Yusifsoy and Ozsuer (2022), the vast majority of internally displaced persons temporarily residing in various regions of Azerbaijan are eager to return home.

3

Methods and Materials

This study examines, interprets, and evaluates global rankings and statistical data reflecting the economic growth trends, physical capital, human capital, and technology development in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia in post-pandemic conditions to compare their economic development prospects. This study is conducted by utilizing qualitative research and comparative analysis. Multiple techniques are used to simultaneously analyse, synthesize, and interpret the data obtained from various studies. As a source of statistical data, public sources such as the World Economic Outlook (WEO), the Economic Complexity Index (ECI), the Global Innovation Index (WIPO), the Fragile States Index (FSI), and Network Readiness Index (NRI) have been used. The selection of the aforementioned statistical sources is predicated largely on the fact that they permit a comparative analysis of the economic growth prospects and their primary drivers for the countries listed.

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POST-PANDEMIC ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT …

4

Results

As presented in Fig. 1, the proportion of investments or investments in physical capital to GDP in all three South Caucasian countries is significantly lower than the global average, as well as in emerging markets and developing economies. This indicator continued to decline in all three countries in recent years. Figure 2 demonstrates that population growth in Armenia and Georgia has nearly ceased, and International Monetary Funds (IMF) projections indicate that this trend is unlikely to change until 2027. Again, according to Fig. 3, the human flight and brain drain indicator in Armenia and Georgia is significantly higher than in Azerbaijan and continues to increase. Figures 4, 5, 6, and 7 illustrate the innovative development of human capital, technology, and the economy in South Caucasus countries. According to Fig. 4, Georgia has the highest global innovation index among the regional countries, while Azerbaijan has the lowest. Figure 5 demonstrates an assessment of the state of the network economy in the region’s countries. According to the Network Readiness Index, Armenia has the best situation, while Georgia has the worst. Globally speaking, the position of the region’s countries on these indicators is unsatisfactory.

2020

2021

2024

28.1

2026

19.9 22.8 18.8

20 21 19

28

2025

Georgia 34.3

Azerbaijan 34.3

34.3 19.3 18.6 19.2

18.9 16.9 19.4

27.8

2023

Armenia

27.9

34.2

34.2 27.8

2022

18.7 15.8 19.1

17.1 14.6 19.8

21.9

28

27.1

32.3

34.3

Emerging market and developing economies

16.6 17.3

24.2 23.9 18.5

26.5

32.6

World

2027

Fig. 1 Investment forecast (total investment, % of GDP) in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia (Source IMF World Economic Outlook Database: October 2022)

132

2023

2024

2025

3.654

10.87

2026

2.964

3.668

2.964

10.614 3.681

2.963

Georgia

3.694

2.963

10.363

2022

3.707

2.963

3.718

10.241

2021

2.963

10.119 3.729

2.962

10.067 3.717

2.962

2020

Azerbaijan

10.488

Armenia

10.741

E. BAGIRZADEH AND T. SULEYMANOV

2027

Fig. 2 Population forecast (persons, millions) in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia (Source IMF World Economic Outlook Database: October 2022)

6 5.4

5.9 5.1

4.3

4

2015

2016

6.5

6.8

5.2 4.3

6.7 5.8

4.9 4.3

5.5 4.3

4.4

2019

2020

2021

2022

6.1

6.4

4.9 4.3

4.6 4

2017

2018

6.2

Armenia

Azerbaijan

Georgia

Fig. 3 Human flight and brain drain indicator of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia in 2015–2022 (Source Fragile States Index 2022, the Fund for Peace)

The level of economic complexity can be assumed to be a result of physical capital investments, human capital, and technological development. As shown in Fig. 6, the country complexity ranking of all three South Caucasus countries has significantly deteriorated since 1995. Only Georgia, among these countries, has improved its country complexity ranking in the last 10 years. The three regional economies have a low level of complexity, as demonstrated by Fig. 7. While the vast majority of Azerbaijan’s exports consist of hydrocarbon resources and their associated products, Armenia exports mining products and services, and Georgia exports services, mining products, and food products. It appears that the exports of all three countries are dominated by products with low added value.

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POST-PANDEMIC ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT …

Human capital and research

Creative outputs

Knowledge and technology outputs

AZERBAIJAN

86

82 70

74 61

ARMENIA

75

105 87

93 79

73

71

91

82

73

80

117

Innovation inputs sub-index

Innovation outputs sub-index

110

Global Innovation Index

GEORGIA

Fig. 4 Global innovation index rankings of South Caucasus countries among 132 economies in 2022 (Source Global Innovation Index 2022, WIPO) Technology pillar

ARMENIA

68

64

64

74

75

82

Network Readiness Index

AZERBAIJAN

GEORGIA

Fig. 5 Network readiness index rankings of South Caucasus countries among 131 economies in 2022 (Source Network Readiness Index 2022, Portulans Institute)

Figure 8 demonstrates that all regional economies contracted significantly in 2020. In 2021, however, all three economies began the process of recovery, while Azerbaijan and Georgia recovered their losses in 2020. According to IMF projections, Armenia’s economy will experience aboveaverage growth of more than 4%, exceeding the global average between 2023 and 2027. During these years, Georgia is projected to experience an

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Fig. 6 Country complexity ranking of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia in 1995–2020 (Source Atlas of Economic Complexity, Harvard University)

average annual economic expansion of over 5%. It is anticipated that Azerbaijan’s economic growth rate will be lower than the corresponding world and emerging market and developing economies growth rates below 3%.

5

Discussion

Contemporary theories demonstrate that the growth of economies has three primary causes or factors, namely capital, labour, and technologies, and that the sustainability of this growth is largely dependent on the development of human capital and technologies (Acemoglu, 2009). In terms of human capital and technological development, all three countries of the South Caucasus lag significantly behind, and in recent years, we have observed a decline in their investments in the economy, including their investments in physical capital. Consequently, these countries continue to have economies based on natural resources, the production and export of low-value-added goods, and an insufficiently diversified product base (UNECE, 2021). In such an economic structure, reliance on the export of preliminary sector goods and remittances of foreign workers (primarily Armenia and Georgia) remain the primary characteristics of the regional economies, suggesting that the

POST-PANDEMIC ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT …

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Fig. 7 Export structures of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia in 2020 (Source Atlas of Economic Complexity, Harvard University)

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E. BAGIRZADEH AND T. SULEYMANOV Emerging market and developing economies

Georgia

3.183 4.262 4.4 2.515 5.2

3.355 4.327 4.5 2.484 5.2

3.341 4.298 4.5 2.48 5.2

3.248 4.296 4.5 2.501 5.2

2022

2.655 3.734 3.523 2.547 3.996

3.68

6.979

8.977

Azerbaijan

2023

2024

2025

2026

2027

-4.199

2021

Armenia

-6.76

-7.395

-2.953 -1.892

2020

3.192 3.738

6.021 6.617 5.659 5.619

10.359

World

Fig. 8 Economic growth forecast (GDP, constant prices, % change) in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia (Source IMF World Economic Outlook Database: October 2022)

region will continue to be susceptible to external shocks in the postpandemic era. From this perspective, in the medium-term economic outlook, it appears that the economic growth of these countries will be significantly impacted by changes in the prices of raw materials and the economic growth rates of their major trading partners and investors. Numerous factors, including the fact that the pandemic is not yet over, the continuation of the Russia-Ukraine war, the continuation of the global food and energy crisis, rising global inflation, and the growing likelihood of a global recession, all contribute to the likelihood that these changes will be negative. Therefore, these countries need to intensify their search for new economic growth drivers and sources. Specifically, sectors such as agricultural products processing, petrochemical, and other natural resource-based processing, transport, and logistics services, IT services, and tourism can serve as new drivers of growth in the region’s countries. Several factors have a positive impact on the South Caucasian countries’ acquisition of new economic growth drivers. In particular, the sanctions imposed on Russia have increased the economic interest in the countries of the South Caucasus. Special attention is given to the new economic cooperation and development opportunities that emerged in the region

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after the Second Karabakh War. Since the war broke out between Ukraine and Russia, the importance of the Middle Corridor, which is one of the important links of China’s Belt and Road Initiative and where the countries of the region are located, is increasing day by day. The deepening of economic cooperation relations between the European Union and the countries of the region, including free trade, is one of these important examples. To effectively take advantage of all these opportunities, however, it is crucial to apply the export-oriented economic growth model, which is the primary development requirement of small economies of these countries, and to provide a favourable business environment that encourages the growth of entrepreneurship, particularly among small and medium-sized businesses, along with well-functioning economic institutions and management systems. In this regard, the comparative examination of these issues in the countries of the region offers promising prospects for future research.

References Acemoglu, Daron (2009). Introduction to Modern Economic Growth. Princeton University Press. ADB (2019). Good Jobs for Inclusive Growth in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. Asian Development Bank, October. ADB (2020). Azerbaijan: Moving Toward More Diversified, Resilient, and Inclusive Development. Manila, August, Asian Development Bank. Antinyan, Armenak; Corazzini, Luca (2016). Relative Standing and Temporary Migration: Empirical Evidence from the South Caucasus. Liuc Papers n. 293, Serie Economia e Impresa 79, Marzo. Bagirov, Orkhan (2021). ‘Armenian Economy in Post-War Period: Economic Losses and New Development Opportunities’, Caucasus Strategic Perspectives, Volume 2, Issue 1, Summer, pp. 27–40. Bigos, Krystian; Wach, Krzysztof (2021). ‘Product Innovation as the Cause of Export Propensity in the Caucasus: Empirical Evidence for Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia’, Central Asia and the Caucasus, English Edition, Journal of Social and Political Studies, Volume 22, Issue 2, pp. 90–100. Brownbridge, Martin; Canagarajah, Sudharshan (2020). Migration and Remittances in the Former Soviet Union Countries of Central Asia and the South Caucasus: What Are the Long-Term Macroeconomic Consequences? World Bank Group Europe and Central Asia Region, Policy Research Working Paper 9111, January. EBRD (2019). Azerbaijan Diagnostic. London, March. EBRD (2021). Transition Report 2021–2022. London, November.

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EIB and EBRD (2021). Georgia Country Diagnostic. October. EIU (2022). Azerbaijan Country Report. London, April. Gigauri, Iza; Damenia, Nino (2019). ‘Economic Expectations of the Belt and Road Initiative for the South Caucasus, with Emphasis on Georgia’, Business and Economic Research, Vol. 9, Issue 1, pp. 173–199. Gomółka, K., & Flisikowski, K. (2020). ‘Changes in the structure of Armenia’s labor resources between 1993 and 2020’, Economic Annals-XXI , 185(9-10), 155-166. Guliyev, Nijat (2018). The Effects of External Shocks on Azerbaijan Economy. Central Bank of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Working Paper Series, No. 02/ 2018. IMF (2021). Republic of Armenia: Selected Issues. Country Report No. 21/274, December. Ito, Katsuya (2019). ‘Remittances and the Dutch disease: evidence from Georgia’, Post-Communist Economies, 31:4, pp. 500–506. Khachatryan, Gor A., Grigoryan, Aleksandr (2020). ‘Export Growth Dynamics and Real Exchange Rate: Evidence from Armenia’, International Economic Journal, 34:3, pp. 493-509. Muradov, Edalet; Bagirzade, Elsen (2021). Azerbaycan iqtisadiyyatı (infoqrafika). Baki: Serq-Qerb nesriyyati. Neri, Matteo; Orefice, Gianluca; Ruta, Michele (2021). The Impact of Regional Trade Agreements on Georgia’s Exporters: A Firm-Level Analysis. World Bank Group, Macroeconomics, Trade and Investment Global Practice, Policy Research Working Paper 9768, September. Ratha, Dilip; Kim, Eung Ju (2022). Russia-Ukraine Conflict: Implications for Remittance flows to Ukraine and Central Asia. KNOMAD, Policy Brief 17, March 4. Saha, David; et al. (2018). The Economic Effect of a Resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict on Armenia and Azerbaijan. 15 June, BE Berlin Economics GmbH. Salnazaryan, Ashot; Aramyan, Haykaz (2017). ‘Evolving Importance of Securities Market to Ensure Economic Growth: Evidence from Armenia’, Scientific Annals of Economics and Business Vol. 64, Issue 4, pp. 473–485. Schuhbert, Arne; Thees, Hannes (2020). ‘Of routes and corridors: Challenges and opportunities for Silk Road destinations in the southern Caucasus’, Journal of Tourism, Heritage & Services Marketing, Vol. 62, pp. 21-29. The Republic of Azerbaijan (2021). Azerbaijan 2030: National Priorities of SocioEconomic Development. 02 February, Available at: https://president.az/en/ articles/view/50474 (Accessed: 30 January 2023) UNECE (2020). Innovation for Sustainable Development: Review of Georgia. Geneva.

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UNECE (2021). Sub-regional Innovation Policy Outlook 2020: Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus. New York: United Nations. Voskanyan M. A. (2022). ‘Government policy to maintain macroeconomic stability: The case of Armenia’, Journal of New Economy, Vol. 23, Issue 1, pp. 24–42. World Bank (2017). Future Armenia: Connect, Compete, Prosper. A Systematic Country Diagnostic. Report No. 124816-AM, November. World Bank (2018). Azerbaijan: The Role of Higher Education in Innovation. World Bank. World Bank (2020). Enterprise Surveys: Armeni 2020 Country Profile. World Bank. Yusifsoy, Aytek; Ozsuer, Esra (2022). ‘Evaluation on the Return Motivation of People that Exposed to Internal Migration in Azerbaijan’ [in Turkish], Vakanuvis-Uluslararası Tarih Ara¸stırmaları Dergisi, 7 (1), pp. 467–510. Zulfigarov, Farid; Neuenkirch, Matthias (2020). ‘The Impact of Oil Price Changes on Selected Macroeconomic Indicators in Azerbaijan’, Economic Systems Vol. 44, pp. 1–13.

Covid-19 and the Political Economy of Depthening Socioeconomic Inequalities Emin Efecan Akta¸s

1

Introduction

Amid the largest global crisis discourses since the Second World War, the Covid-19 pandemic constitutes an essential intersection in which people from different parts of the world are affected by the crises in diverse ways. Considering the outcomes that emerged thus far, it is conferred that it exacerbates social troubles in both the narrow and broad senses. In particular, poverty heightened, wages declined, and income distribution deteriorated. The pandemic has significantly exacerbated an already weakened global economy. Following the outbreak, society’s priorities and expectations of the state also shifted. It implies that the order constructed around the world is confronting a fresh and challenging conflict, as national governments strive to revive by focusing on the demands for restructuring to build better economic and social foundations. The removal of doubts regarding the extent to which the demands for reform would be addressed has a substantial impact on how well this effort is accomplished. Eliminating worries about how much of

E. E. Akta¸s (B) Department of Accounting and Tax Practices, Kirsehir Ahi Evran University, Kirsehir, Turkey e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Akilli and B. Gunes (eds.), World Politics in the Age of Uncertainty, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39611-3_11

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the change requests would be satisfied may have a significant impact on whether or not this effort is victorious. Failure or success would either justify the need for a “new order” proclaimed at the start of the pandemic or restore the world’s hope and faith. Together with the pandemic and the ensuing Russia-Ukraine war, the confusion due to this quandary has engendered socioeconomic inequality the number one debate topic in the world economy. The pandemic exposed socioeconomic inequalities that everyone could sight from the get-go. Regarding encountering specific inequalities and having options for coping, some people appear to be more vulnerable. Many people lost their jobs, those who had to work risked their lives, and those who worked from home worked under isolation. The reality that individuals unable to work from home had to jeopardize their lives to preserve their employment further intensified the class divide among workers. Other inequalities include the fact that high-income people can conduct business from their homes and their children have access to distance education at home. Spatial disparities between those who stay at home and earn an income during partial and full lockdowns and those who must work outside the home due to the pandemic’s lethal impact are also manifestations of global and/or economic inequality. It may become more transparent how and in what form the distribution inequities that outcrop as a consequence of global economic activity during pandemic periods regenerate multiple inequalities. In this regard, the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic on global inequalities and aid programmes during the pandemic quarrelled in the context of neoliberalism, also known as the ideology of capitalism that surfaced after the Cold War, in this paper. The purpose of this paper is to assess developments by detecting how Covid-19 affects socioeconomic inequalities in conjunction with neoliberal economic policies.

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Globalization and Pandemic Connections

The term pandemic includes the concept of globality and is used to portray a disease circumstance that affects whole world societies. Many of today’s generations have been exposed to this concept for the first time. The discipline of public health, which has high priority due to its location in social life but whose significance and role had been somewhat neglected, has been brought back to the forefront in this phase (Çıtak, 2021: 212). The prevailing age’s enormous economic integration also

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resulted in the widespread occurrence of all illnesses globally other than Covid-19 (Keogh-Brown & Smith, 2008). Travel and commerce which are perceived as essential aspects in the improvement of interstate relations and globalization provoke the spread of infectious diseases. Globalization has augmented the contagion of diseases over the years and has led to significant economic consequences. Pandemics have a bearing on the economy in both terms of supply and demand as a result of globalization. First and foremost, consumers and investors lose faith in the pandemicaffected marketplaces, causing the demand side of the market to drop in value (Yıldırım, 2020). Second, labour force cutbacks or losses have a deleterious impact on the supply side (International Labour Organization, 2020). Finally, development policies in public health, trade, travel, health response, and international reaction to pandemics influence the world economy (Shang et al., 2021). The Covid-19 outbreak was universally recognized as a significant event. A global response was not given speedily, and nation-states attempted to cope within their national territory, so the ramifications varied according to societies and countries (Horton, 2020). Although this separation stems from the rules and practices of the countries, there had been considerable chaos. To mitigate the spread of the disease during the Covid-19 pandemic, social distancing measures were implemented worldwide, aiming to limit physical interactions between individuals. From the beginning to its spread, the wherefores that prompted different segments of society to be affected in various ways were not solely biological. In addition to biological conditions, social, economic, and cultural factors accompanied this process. The “stay at home” message was among the first global topics debated in which people could comply with it with peace of mind or perfectly fulfil the hygiene measures. Former Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke emphasized that people cannot regain confidence in the economy until health problems are resolved, and in this context, previous economic trends cannot continue (Bernanke, 2020). All the measures put into practice during the pandemic deeply affected social life all over the world in terms of both labour conditions and income distribution. For instance, the slowdown in jobs requiring physical contact resulted in a decline in the wages of the labour force. Since of higher costs, some jobs became unsustainable. Covid-19 resulted in a reduction in commerce and a rise in poverty, causing the affected countries’ economic growth to slow (Bloom et al., 2005). In the early stages of the pandemic, there were speculations that

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nation-states would fade away, along with the rhetoric of the “new world order” and the processes of globalization. Nation states, on the other hand, tend to see themselves as a unified structure that is attempting to reveal its existence amid such a crisis (Cable, 1995). The main reason that nation-states were at the forefront of this pandemic was that the pandemic threw the international system into disarray. Because international cooperation to combat the pandemic was unable to be devised. Thus, Covid-19 was of vital importance for national and international institutions (Karaka¸s, 2020; Tuncer, 2020). The potential effects the world would be exposed to after the pandemic are noteworthy in terms of the practices (income supports, unemployment payments, etc.) to be implemented by policymakers. Diagnosing socioeconomically disadvantaged groups within the framework of which ones are most impacted by the pandemic can provide insights into understanding the link between globalization and the pandemic.

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The Covid-19 Crisis in the Context of Neoliberal Rhetoric

The Cold War, which ended the capitalist and socialist poles, gave the world the definition of neoliberalism. Neoliberalism defines an economic system attributed to the background and philosophy of capitalism that could not be restrained on a global scale in the 1980s, spreading from the United States of America to the entire world. Neoliberalism, which has phrases such as privatization, regulation, deregulation, tight public finance, and austerity, serves as a reminder throughout every global negativity period such as Covid-19 (Cherkaoui, 2020; Harvey, 2007; Peck & Theodore, 2019). The pandemic triggered a public health and economic crisis on a scale not seen since World War II, and inequality exacerbated the problems. Neoliberalism’s effects became apparent right at the start of the pandemic. The pandemic exposed the lethal consequences of the sharp increase in economic inequality, the ever-increasing concentration of wealth, and the increasing insecurity of labour, and led to a global call to question the capitalist mode of production. Those earning a living did not work remotely, instead continuing to work and being exposed to the deadly virus. Employers restricted employer health insurance or other benefits with the assistance of government labour. The “white collar” class was relatively elastic or not exposed to physical contact with working from home and proceeded to generate income. As such, inequality became

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normal with the outbreak of the pandemic. Fundamental rights and freedoms issues such as democracy, social justice, and public order stayed relatively in the background (Filho, 2021; Maldonado & Moreno, 2022: 83–86). Despite the rapid implementation of anti-Covid-19 measures, these measures were unable to cure the pandemic in underdeveloped countries struggling with issues such as poverty, limited funding, inadequate infrastructure, and a fragile political structure. As a result, inequalities between low and middle-income countries and high-income countries, as well as between underdeveloped, developing, and developed countries, and between the poor and the rich, have intensified (Šumonja, 2021: 220–223). The disparity in the quality and efficiency of the surveillance and control mechanisms of countries harmed the degree of adaptation of underdeveloped countries to the pandemic and enhanced the fiscal and social costs. Developed countries provided subsidies for citizens and businesses to reduce the negative effects of lockdowns. Underdeveloped countries had to bear greater burdens (Maxmen, 2021). In summary, while neoliberalism, whose impacts differ depending on its location, represents the dominant economic system, it is not the only prevailing ideology. Regardless of its contradictions, neoliberalism promotes growing inequality, poverty, and exclusion. This means that neoliberalism is underequipped for global events like the pandemic, leading to higher inequality. Since one of the suppositions of neoliberalism is to capitalize on the crisis. Even during the pandemic, neoliberalism, which resembles an even worsened version of the profit-driven capitalist system, has tended to consolidate its subsistence and expand its absolutism, rather than providing adequate hospitals, masks, and ventilators. On the flip side, this crisis is not merely caused by neoliberalism, but by the problems of governments that need a neoliberal perspective despite their partial efforts (Peck & Theodore, 2019: 251–253; Soborski, 2020). 3.1

Covid-19 and Socio Economic Inequalities

Income inequality is increasing on a global scale, and there are differences even between countries with similar levels of development. Reducing inequalities is more than just a fiscal concern. Socioeconomic inequalities also increased as a result of the pandemic, which aggravated the imbalances created by globalization, technological developments, and changes in the labour market (Atkinson, 2015; Chancel et al., 2022).

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Decision-makers can control the socioeconomic changes that seem like a readout and direct them in a way that creates more equality (Rodrik, 2012). It should be noted that the state should play an active role. Covid-19 had severe consequences for socioeconomically disadvantaged groups in leading developed countries, particularly in Western Europe and North America, where the urban population is dense and the free market economy is pertinent. It has been reported that low-income individuals and those on temporary contracts are disproportionately affected in these areas (World Bank, 2023). The International Labour Organization (2022) Global Wage Report highlights that as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic, there is downward pressure on the level or rate of increase of average wages in two-thirds of countries. According to reports, real wages fell in Latin America, Central and East Asia, Africa, and Eastern Europe, with low-income people bearing the brunt of rising inflation and experiencing a significant loss of purchasing power. It is remarked that the pandemic would result in other structural changes not only in the short and medium term but also in the long term and that the commodity and energy crisis caused by the RussiaUkraine War would further exasperate the negative effects (International Labour Organization, 2022). Indeed, estimates crafted at the country and global levels reveal that one of the most significant effects of the pandemic is the escalation of income inequality. It appears impossible to accomplish economic development without rehabilitating the socioeconomic structure. Aside from the economic effects of the pandemic, other issues shaped social life. The pandemic ushered in a new normal in which people are compelled to consent to the restriction of their liberties. When the social and economic effects of the pandemic are attached to public health and the destruction it has caused in the healthcare system of countries, socioeconomic troubles become more severe. Because socioeconomic inequalities have a significant impact on access to healthcare and the likelihood of contracting a disease for different income groups, health expenditures of countries have soared. Whereas World Bank (2022a) alleged that states earmarked 11 trillion dollars to fund the welfare of society and the poor and vulnerable groups, this resource was primarily utilized to support corporations to maintain the existing neoliberal system. This political choice led to worsening social determinants of health and rising inequality.

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Inequities Caused and Exacerbated by the Covid-19 Pandemic

Covid-19, which had both short and long-term consequences, brought numerous issues under the spotlight. Many forms of global inequality manifested themselves, including the right to life, access to health services, spatial inequality, social inequality, access to education, poverty, disease risk, isolation inequality, and access to vaccines. One of the health-related inequalities caused by the pandemic was the rise in the rate of disease encounters. While the Covid-19 death rate per 100,000 people in Sweden was 1.3%, it reached 5.8% in Egypt, which is in the middle-low-income group, and 7.5% in Sudan, which is in the low-income group. AfricanAmericans accounted for roughly 60% of Covid-19 deaths. The Covid-19 mortality rate for African-American Chicagoans was 34.8 per 100,000, while it was 8.2 for European-American residents (Bambra et al., 2020). Covid-19 had many aspects that affected social inequalities, as well as other areas. Chronic health problems such as high blood pressure, heart disease, and becoming overweight were more frequent in socioeconomically disadvantaged communities and ethnic groups (Nolan, 2021: 104). This correlation made sense regarding inequalities, as Covid-19 had a higher incidence in those with chronic illness. The pandemic also aggravated structural inequalities in resting well, healthy nutrition, exercising regularly, strengthening their immune system against diseases, and minimizing the effects of stress. Because low-income and loweducated workers couldn’t work from home, their risk of being infected increased, and this mirrored socioeconomic disparity. Low-income people were more influenced by the pandemic’s deleterious effects because they lacked access to reliable data and health literacy. Education inequality also amplified the effects of Covid-19 on low- and high-income individuals. Low-income people diminished their financial share of education by 30% since the pandemic started, according to United Nations International Children’s Fund (2021). At the onset of the pandemic, two-thirds of low- and low-middle-income countries trimmed their public education budgets. High-income earners and their children were less affected by education inequality as they can work from home, earn income, and attend distance education. When assessing the pandemic’s impact, healthy housing conditions and access to clean water become even more pivotal. The insufficient access of the poor to clean water in urban areas exemplifies the infrastructural inequalities with serious health consequences for these groups. The social

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distance rule, which was one of the spatial constraints, was difficult to adhere to especially in densely populated, crowded neighbourhoods and houses. Similarly, the quarantine fostered both spatial and socioeconomic inequalities related to hosting viruses between high-incomes who had huge, greenery homes and people and refugees who were forced to stay at home in substandard housing conditions with no access to clean water or green space (Haase, 2020). Regions with insufficient public resources and healthcare staff became vulnerable to the effects of the pandemic. According to World Health Organization data, the African region has an average of only nine intensive care unit beds per million people. Vaccine inequity emerged as another health-related issue. When vaccines were first released publicly, 54% of purchases were undertaken by high-income countries, 18% by upper-middle-income countries, 12% by lower-middleincome countries, and only 3% by low-income countries. 29.6% of the world’s population was inoculated with one dose and 15.2% received two doses. In contrast, at the start of vaccination, only 1.1% of people in low-income countries had the opportunity to receive one dose of vaccine (World Health Organization, 2023). Covid-19 triggered a crisis in which one inequality uncovers or deepens another. As a result of socioeconomic factors that elevate the risk of contracting the virus, a series of inequalities such as access to healthcare and inadequate treatment options emerged regarding getting infected. During the pandemic, the detrimental impression of neoliberal policies on the healthcare system became more evident. The substitution of private healthcare for public healthcare exacerbated disparities. 3.3

Impact of the Covid-19 Pandemic on Global Employment and Poverty

The neoliberal structure of the labour force and employment led to an increase in inequality and poverty during the Covid-19 pandemic. The pandemic did not only result in job losses and a decline in global poverty but also generated different impacts on a regional and daily earnings basis. Informal employees and those who were unemployed as a result of neoliberal policies did not have many options to cope with Covid-19 apart from the available public assistance. The International Labour Organization (2022) proclaimed that 1.6 billion of the 2 billion informal employees lost their jobs due to Covid-19 in 2020. In low-income countries, 92% of women and 87% of men were reported to be working informally. It

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was predicted that 100 million people would face extreme poverty due to the pandemic before. It had been noted that the number of the extremely poor, which was 644.7 million in 2019, might reach 731 million in 2021, before hitting 737 million by 2022. Particularly in South Asia and SubSaharan Africa, all income groups were significantly impoverished. Per capita income in Sub-Saharan Africa dropped by 4.9% in 2020. In South Asia, per capita income fell by 6.5% in 2020, while food price inflation was reaching 30% (World Bank, 2022a) (Fig. 1). The pandemic resulted in significant job losses for women, youth, and informal and low-paid workers in Latin America and the Caribbean. This region experienced an economic downfall due to the pandemic and associated measures, leading to employment losses and pushing many individuals who were already insecure or working in daily jobs below the poverty line (United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, 2022). The pandemic affected not only low-income countries but also middle and high-income countries in terms of labour loss and poverty. For example, the basic factor for the higher number of black people among those who died from the virus in America was that poverty was imbued with race and blacks were poorer. From February 2020 to April 2020, the unemployment rate in America rose sharply to 10.3%. The unemployment rate among Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries was 6.7% in February 2021 and hovered at 1.4% above the pre-Covid-19 (Bouderherm, 2022). The global poverty rate forecasts, which were quantified to be 8.2% in 2020 before the pandemic, were re-estimated as 9.4% with the outbreak. This ratio increased from 7.8% to 9.1% for 2021. According to projections, the global poverty rate may rise from 7.9% to 9.3% by 2022.

4 Assessment of the Global Consequences and Potential Economic Overview of the Covid-19 Crisis Covid-19 and the Russia-Ukraine War have proposed several economic challenges for the agenda and raised concerns about prospects. First and foremost, many people are concerned about the possibility of new pandemics resurfacing following Covid-19. In this context, it is possible to predict that health and services may yet become an essential and fundamental goal of the states. Pandemics affect international travel and trade

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Fig. 1 Globally Extreme Poverty Rates, % (Source Moyer et al., 2022. Note The number of individuals who live on less than $1.90 per day is considered extreme poverty)

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and exhibit numerous economic consequences according to countries. SARS alone is estimated to cost the world 30–140 billion dollars (Moyer et al., 2022). Although the current pandemic’s impact on the global economy is indeterminable, the destructive effects of all pandemics are bound to influence governments and cause economic and political crises. The sharp increment in the nominal price index of food, energy, and fertilizers, as depicted in Fig. 2, justifies these concerns. Fertilizer (88– 159.8%) and energy (59.7–108.9%) prices more than doubled between 2020 and 2021. The energy, food, and commodity problems caused by the pandemic and war require the review of some policy options to minimize economic costs. The measures implemented so far are listed below: Measures for households, balance-sheet injections of treasury paper, credit deferral combined with direct cash transfers, financial sector regulations, tax exemptions, purchase of bonds and bills issued by the private sector, payments for unemployment insurance, guarantees from the treasury, food vouchers for students who are unable to attend school, use of central bank direct credit facilities, efforts to keep markets liquid, debt restructuring measures for the business world, subsidies to protect employment, easy access to liquidity, to be determined using previous period sales, direct subsidies, and credit guarantees (Yang et al., 2023: 57–62). Additionally, It is aimed to guide the decision-makers by making some policy inferences regarding these. 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 Fertilizers

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Fig. 2 Nominal Price Indexes (Estimations and Actual—2018 base year, %) (Source World Bank, 2022b, Commodity Markets Outlook)

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The fulfilment of the precautions implemented for households is still being speculated. To ensure that the effects of the measures on macroeconomic balances are not permanent, policies should be directed towards areas that correct income distribution. It is vital to be proactive about the risks that may arise following the pandemic as crises can give way to further crises and new unwanted risks. The goal of the precautions provided for the business world is to minimize production and employment losses. The main issue is that the subsidies are too slight, and this difficulty would be limited by the number of external resources available in dependent economies. The steps for the finance and banking sectors should execute under public supervision. It is critical to maintaining the financial sector’s liquidity by broadening credit opportunities for the private sector and households using public resources. Existing budget positions should be reviewed, non-urgent expenditures postponed, and cost-cutting measures instated. Saving is paramount in terms of investment budgets and guarantees. It would be beneficial to raise public awareness about how money that can be conveniently enhanced today can be withdrawn from the market tomorrow. Additional resources should be requested from the international system. However, these resources should be procured in a planned manner, especially in poor countries. Pogge (2005) argues that the right of governments in poor countries to borrow internationally and utilize national resources without limits, granted by international organizations, exacerbates the existing inequality situation, as international organizations prioritize unjust policies against poor countries.

5

Conclusion

2020, which started as a dreadful year for the world, marked the beginning of a new era in the context of capitalism in which neoliberalism left a profound impact. Covid-19 has been the greatest global tragedy since the 1930s. Parallel to neoliberal rhetoric, it has jeopardized the livelihoods of the world’s lower classes. In this context, the crisis precipitated a gradual systemic shift. The Covid-19 lockdown during the pandemic halted social life, emergency measures concentrated on the crisis, and questioning capitalism. Privatization policies and healthcare systems all over the world have harmed the public since the beginning of the crisis. Many businesses were closed, and many of the private companies went bankrupt, thus destroying the bourgeois class. On the other hand, there

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was a parallelism between the working conditions and the health problems of the employees. The pandemic, isolation, and social distance precautions have all obstructed the world economy, which is growing on shaky ground. The implementation of its harsh steps, as well as the Russia-Ukraine War that erupted in 2022, have severely impacted global value chains built over 40 years of neoliberal globalization. In addition to global warming, environmental degradation, and the ruination of biodiversity and ecosystems have contributed to this negative trajectory, while the Covid-19 pandemic spread rapidly to countries. Unless and until a global action strategy is executed, the economic and financial devastation caused by the pandemic and new crises could worsen. By experiencing Covid-19 and similar outbreaks and working together in times of crisis, humanity realizes the necessity of breathing more. Many theories and philosophies can be mentioned in this regard. The ultimate question, however, is whether the world would shift following Covid-19 and whether the capitalist order would be consolidated on neoliberal foundations or not. Further studies are needed to explore the role of capitalism during pandemics that may arise under more wicked stipulations as a result of climate change.

References Atkinson, A. B. (2015). Inequality – what can be done? Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Bambra, C., Riordan, R., Ford, J., & Matthews, F. (2020). The Covid-19 pandemic and health inequalities. Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health, 74(11), 964–968. Bernanke, B. (2020). Ben Bernanke on Covid-19 downturn. Marketplace. Retrieved February 15, 2023, from https://www.marketplace.org/2020/03/ 23/former-fed-chair-bernanke-covid19-downturn/ Bloom, E., de Wit, V., & Carangal-San Jose, M. J. (2005). Potential economic impact of an avian flu pandemic on Asia. Asian Development Bank Economics and Research Department Policy Brief Series (No. 42). Bouderherm, R. (2022). Access to Covid-19 vaccines: A new global approach. Vaccines, 10(11), 1–13. Cable, V. (1995). The diminished nation-state: A study in the loss of economic power in the loss of economic power, The MIT Press, 124(2), 23–53.

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Optimistic Outlook on the Impact of Covid-19 on Higher Education Tetyana Tarnavska

1

and Nataliia Glushanytsıa

Introduction

Covid-19 appeared as a severe shock, dramatically transforming everyday life across the globe. The pandemic caused abrupt and profound changes across all levels of the global education systems. As Afshan Khan, UNICEF Regional Director for Europe and Central Asia, pointed out, “There is no pause button. It is not an option to simply postpone children’s education and come back to it once other priorities have been addressed, without risking the future of an entire generation.” Both Turkish and Ukrainian governments, along with educational authorities, express concern over the consequences of the pandemic and are taking all necessary measures to address them. “The Council of Higher Education (CoHE) announced the signing of a cooperation protocol between the CoHE and the Turkish Standards Institute (TSE).

T. Tarnavska (B) Department of Fireign Languages for Mathematical Faculties, Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, Kyiv, Ukraine e-mail: [email protected] N. Glushanytsıa Department of Foreign Languages and Translation, National Aviation University, Kyiv, Ukraine © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Akilli and B. Gunes (eds.), World Politics in the Age of Uncertainty, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39611-3_12

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This protocol aims to establish generic standards that include measures for creating healthy and clean environments on Turkish higher education campuses, as part of the efforts to combat the Covid-19 pandemic and infectious diseases” (StudyPortalTurkey, 2020). Educational institutions play a crucial role in the sustainable development of society during crises and play a significant role in a community’s response to both the global pandemic and natural disasters (Sá & Serpa, 2020). Therefore, government policies should focus on the health and safety, well-being, and decent working conditions of learners and teachers, especially in the most affected regions. Governments are responsible for providing support to the vulnerable and ensuring safety of educational establishments. Nevertheless, there is a lack of government communication and collaboration with these institutions, which remains a key issue and demands immediate attention. The participants in the educational process have varied opinions about online studies. After conducting two surveys to assess students’ satisfaction with online learning, Maqableh and Alia concluded that more than a third of the surveyed students dislike the digital learning platforms they used. Only a few expressed satisfaction with learning materials, interactions with peers and teachers, and exams. It is worth noting that students don’t always have equal access to technology and internet connectivity to use educational resources. The survey revealed that 63% of respondents had poor connectivity. The authors emphasize the need for comprehensive training on online platforms to familiarize students and teachers with their usage. Additionally, 80% of students reported experiencing psychological and work-life balance issues. However, 80% of the respondents agreed that the shift to online learning and teaching significantly decreases the risk of severe Covid-19 illness (Maqableh & Alia, 2021). There are several issues that universities need to address. Since prolonged lockdowns affect the student’s emotional state, the focus should shift from increased control over class attendance to the actual learning outcomes and providing moral support. It is important to recognize that not everyone can overcome anxiety and stress on their own and teachers should assist students in tapping internal resources, suggest how to organize time, and think positively. Setting deadlines in such a situation can be challenging. On one hand, we need to be sensitive towards the students who are unable to complete assignments on time due to illness. On the other hand, the absence of deadlines can lead to disorganization, apathy, and depression, which can be equally detrimental.

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Margeti´c et al. (2021) conducted a study on the psychological distress caused by the pandemic and natural disasters. Having questioned nearly 3,000 adults on distress during the lockdown, they concluded that “15.9% of the respondents experienced severe to extreme depression, 10.7% experienced severe to extreme anxiety, and 26.2% experienced severe to extreme stress. Hierarchical regression analysis revealed that the variables considered accounted for a substantial percentage of the variance in depression (51.4%), anxiety (35.2%), and stress (45.5%)… The results provide information on a broad range of potentially protective or vulnerable factors that could help identify individuals at risk of developing coronavirus-related psychological distress. The findings suggest that promoting active coping styles and social interactions could have preventive and potential therapeutic benefits for the general populations” (Margeti´c et al. (2021). Teachers have to adapt lesson plans and teaching methods to accommodate online learning, resulting in an increased workload. Additionally, students report feeling overwhelmed and stressed due to the increased workload. These challenges have affected the students’ learning ability and academic performance, and it will likely take some time for them to recover from the disruptions and challenges of the past few years.

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Negative Impact of Covid-19

Learners living in poverty do not get enough technological support during the pandemic. To use digital learning platforms, they need a device and consistent internet access, which not all families can afford. It diminishes their learning opportunities, unlike those from wealthy families. The ongoing pandemic has brought attention to the issue of digital equity and the digital divide, as education transitioned to a distance format and educational achievement depends on internet availability and quality. There are significant oversights in the organization of online education for vulnerable individuals, resulting in their isolation from peers. The primary objective is to ensure equal access to educational services and digital technology for all learners. Along with the loss of lives, the closures of schools and universities have had devastating impacts on the cognitive, social, and psychological well-being of children and teachers. The first global closure of educational institutions since World War II forced a shift from face-to-face teaching to a distance format, for which most education

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systems were unprepared. Furthermore, the closure of educational institutions has increased internet addiction and binge-watching. Restrictions on outdoor activities negatively affected the physical and psychological health of learners and teachers. It is reasonable to assert that the focus of many students shifts from obsessing over academics to deeply caring about their well-being in circumstances like a pandemic or wartime. In order to ensure the safety of online learning, universities must continue to prioritize safety measures. Much has been discussed about the negative impact of Covid-19. We studied and systematized scientific research findings on the pandemic’s adverse effect on education (Fig. 1) while emphasizing the positive changes it has brought about. It is important to recognize that optimism multiplies power and inspires achievements. Positive influences are among the most powerful forces in the world. Positive changes inevitably accompany any disaster, therefore, we turned our attention to identifying positive trends in the transformation of higher education. Additionally, we aim to outline promising teaching and learning formats from the perspective of students and teachers.

Fig. 1 Negative aspects of the pandemic

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There have been noteworthy changes in the responses of educators to the Covid-19 crisis. The pandemic has prepared the education system to face various threats and challenges, including war and natural disasters. It has precipitated the development of educational platforms and learning resources. The pandemic has helped flourish IT product companies that provide different applications for distance education, as well as courses for educators and students. For example, the Genesis IT company provides a digital environment for teacher development, serving as a platform to enhance an educator’s professional competencies. The company’s interactive internship courses for Ukrainian educational institutions facilitate the exchange of experience between teachers and the IT industry. The widely attended course “KNU Teach Week” received over 1000 registrations from all across Ukraine, educating over 1000 students. Most of them joined Genesis or other Ukrainian companies to pursue a career in IT. These courses also teach how to adapt to uncertain conditions such as pandemics, war, natural disasters, or any other emergency, addressing the learning gaps caused by Covid-19. Additionally, the Academy of Digital Development offers a platform for training educators on the use and application of digital tools. The organization provides online refresher training, free webinars, and master classes on information and communication technologies for educators. These initiatives have significantly contributed to the improvement of educators’ digital literacy levels. The use of digital tools has become increasingly common, and we are quickly acquiring new skills. Social networks have fostered a closer connection between educators and students. The fact that new-generation students feel more comfortable with mobile devices than books and pens might be less irritating to “digital immigrants.” Given that teachers are typically older than their students, it is crucial for them to keep up with the learners in terms of digital development. The coronavirus has had a positive impact on the digitization processes across all aspects of our lives. Ukrainians are at the forefront, being the first to utilize digital IDs without any internal restrictions, thanks to the Ministry of Digital Transformation’s efforts to make Ukraine a global leader in digitization (Brand Ukraine NGO, n.d.). Ukraine is actively building a digital state and excelling in providing government and business services to its citizens.

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DIIA, an invisible, convenient, and humane approach to interacting with citizens, allows individuals to access their digital documents via a mobile application. Businesses, on the other hand, can access a centralized portal of online public services. Through DIIA, Ukrainians can access 21 services and 14 digital documents, including ID cards, foreign biometric passports, student cards, driving licences, vehicle registration certificates, vehicle insurance policies, tax numbers, birth certificates, Covid vaccination certificates, and IDP certificates (Digital Country, Fig. 2). The Covid-19 pandemic has caused social isolation, particularly among the elder adults. However, it has also prompted a greater emphasis on lifelong learning, an essential part of the European Commission’s strategy. It is increasingly important to ensure that vulnerable individuals are able to actively participate in society (Di Pietro & Karpinski, 2021). Trials are inevitable; without them, there will not be continuous progress. One of the positive changes is that global pandemics, disasters, and blackouts during wartime teach us time management better than ever. Non-standard situations give us new skills and qualities like optimism, resilience, leadership, decision-making, and critical thinking. It can be fairly stated that there is no concept of backbenches in online classes, and every student gets a front-row seat. A $2 million grant from Google.org will be used to support digital education programmes in Ukraine that aim to reskill the Ukrainian population and teach them digital skills (Ministry of Digital Transformation of Ukraine, 2022). The educational series “To Be There. Treating emotional burnout” launched on the DIIA (Burynska, 2023; Samus, 2022). Education platform by Ukraine’s Ministry of Digital Transformation and UNDP helps Ukrainians to fight the stress caused by the Covid-19 pandemic and the war (Fig. 3). The cancellation of state graduation and entrance exams has forced us to reconsider the assessment methods. Kozminski University (Poland) has expressed its concerns about ensuring honesty in virtual exams. While the creative use of technology contributes to the development of students’ competencies, it also presents risks of potential abuses. There are several artificial intelligence-based (AI) text generators capable of generating exam answers, and it can be difficult to verify answers generated by AI. “We are aware that such tools are available and will continue to do so, changing, among other things, the way we acquire information,” says Prof.

Fig. 2 Digital country. Ukrainian case

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Fig. 3 Mental health support

Grzegorz Mazurek, Rector of Kozminski University. “The future belongs to people who can responsibly use the achievements of technology and think critically. The recommendations developed take into account both the positive impact of technology on competence development and the need to respond to potential abuse” (Akademia, 2023).

We also agree with Jennifer (2021) regarding the advantages of a fitfor-purpose online training and assessment system that can be widely used in any format, i.e. face-to-face, blended, or distance. In addition to longterm savings, online training and assessment can contribute to delivering job-ready graduates if organized properly and meeting the requirements. Jennifer (2021) states that adopting a digital solution will increase flexibility for those who do not feel comfortable with strict scheduling and provide equity for those who face limitations such as territorial accessibility. Platforms like Cloud Assess exist, for example, to facilitate the processing of numerous students’ data.

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Enhancing academic mobility has been one of the great innovations of globalization in higher education. Students from around the world travel to obtain a higher education or explore different study methods. Through this experience full of autonomy and novelty, they develop self-awareness and open their minds to other cultures. However, student mobility has been impacted by Covid-19 as borders gradually close around the world. Students and academic staff who were mid-exchange when the pandemic hit faced a dilemma: whether to stay abroad or return home. Various obstacles hinder students, including travel and visa restrictions, campus lockdowns, and health concerns. Despite these challenges, universities have quickly adapted. Online studies offer numerous advantages, leading to an increase in virtual mobility platforms in most universities worldwide during the pandemic. Online and blended formats are becoming more common, offering students and academics greater mobility opportunities. However, online classes do not provide a life-learning experience. Students miss the opportunity to discover a new culture and experience international student life. In addition, there are challenges regarding equity and access to the necessary technologies for effective engagement in online studies (Girard et al., 2021a, 2021b, 2021c). Myers et al. (2020) and Eaton (2020) argue that the pandemic lockdowns have varying effects on scientists. Female scientists with young children and bench scientists reported spending less time on their research. They certainly did. “Scientists with at least one child 5 years old or younger experienced a 17% larger decline in research time, all else being equal. Having multiple dependents is associated with a further 3% reduction in time spent on research, and scientists with children aged 6–11 years were also affected, but to a lesser extent than those with very young children” (Myers et al., 2020: 881). However, this assertion can be questioned. Men who were involved in scientific research and were confined to their homes due to the lockdown also experienced a certain decrease in productivity, because it is much more difficult to concentrate while working from home. Nevertheless, scientists managed to find solutions to their challenges. For instance, there was a case when a scientist shipped the “most expensive piece of lab equipment to a postdoc friend who brought her beetle colony home to her basement to run experiments” (Eaton, 2020). Eaton also suggests that reducing administrative tasks and shortening meetings can create a positive mental environment, reduce stress, and

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improve lifestyles. Of course, this does not apply when your fieldwork is postponed, cancelled, or projects shut down entirely. It is reasonable to note that the pandemic has presented new opportunities for researchers. There has been a significant increase in free virtual events like online conferences, webinars, seminars, workshops, live streams, shows, classes, and online tours. These platforms allow researchers to share their findings, and engage in discussions with the community. Another point in favour of distance education is that it allows not only IT students, but all students to improve their digital skills along with getting professional knowledge. The priority now is to enhance the quality of distance education to meet the expectations of students and employers regarding the competence of graduates. Under distance education, it is crucial to ensure that teaching is delivered effectively as per the curriculum. However, shifting to different teaching formats inevitably leads to considerable changes in the curriculum. Online teaching goes beyond delivering the same content virtually. It requires adapting the content, lesson structure, pace, methods, and approaches. We should consider it a good push to rethink and significantly alter our curriculum to keep pace with the ever-changing world. Another task is to address the digital divide and provide digital equity (Rinehart, 2021a, 2021b, 2021c). Nowadays, the focus is primarily on providing equal resources and opportunities to learners. However, we have to shift our priorities towards equity. Recognizing that each person has different circumstances, equity aims to allocate the exact resources and opportunities required to reach equal results. Although Covid-19 has caused considerable disruption, insecurity, and uncertainty within the international educational community, it has also provided an opportunity to change education for the better. Despite the negative influence of the pandemic, we should keep in mind that these measures are necessary precautions to reduce the spread of the deadly virus. We need to find solutions to develop resilient education systems (Fig. 4). Although at first glance it seems that the pandemic has yielded more negatives than positives, the positives hold greater significance and carry the potential to reshape our perspectives on life and educational values. Our task now is to use the “Build Back Better” approach and maintain a high standard of education under any circumstances. While the onset

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Fig. 4 Positive aspects of the pandemic

of the pandemic raised concerns about a decline in educational quality, advancements in information technologies have provided new avenues and enabled us to teach collaboratively and effectively. Nevertheless, we hope that online education will not completely replace face-to-face communication among peers, for it is within these interactions that the special atmosphere fostered by the affection of teachers and the respect of students thrives. Otherwise, future generations will not experience the charms of student life. Each form of education has its unique advantages, and only in unity can they give the highest result, which cannot be assessed only by the amount of knowledge acquired or skills formed. Hence, we believe that blended learning should remain a permanent fixture. The greater our awareness of the magnitude of the problem, the more capable we become of striving for a better future for everyone.

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References Akademia, L. K. (2023). Kozminski University recommendations regarding the use of AI-based generators, such as ChatGPT . [Online]. Kozminski University Available from: https://www.kozminski.edu.pl/en/review/kozminski-uni versity-recommendations-regarding-use-ai-based-generators-such-chatgpt (Accessed: 22 January 2023) Brand Ukraine NGO. (n.d.). Digital Country. [Online] Ukraine.ua. Available at: https://ukraine.ua/invest-trade/digitalization/ (Accessed: 7 January 2023) Burynska, O. (2023). MoES, UNICEF and Diia.Digital Education portal launch: ‘To Be There’ – a new educational series about mental health support. [Online]. UNICEF Ukraine. Available at: https://www.unicef.org/ukraine/en/pressreleases/diia-digital-education-portal-launch (Accessed: 10 February 2023). Di Pietro, G., & Karpinski, Z. (2021). Covid-19 and online adult learning. Publications Office. [Online]. Available at: https://doi.org/10.2760/886741 (Accessed: 18 November 2022). Eaton, H. (2020). Science in Lockdown: the effects of Covid-19 on research and researchers. [Online]. The Royal Society. Available from: https://royalsociety. org/blog/2020/05/science-in-lockdown-part-one/ Girard, I., Vanston, F., & Faïd, E. (2021a). Grounded: the impact of Covid-19 on academic exchanges. [Online]. Right to Education. Available at: https://www. right-to-education.org/blog/grounded-impact-covid-19-academic-exchanges Girard, I., Vanston, F., & Faïd, E. (2021b). Grounded: the impact of Covid-19 on academic exchanges. [Online]. Available at: https://www.right-to-education. org/es/node/1368 (Accessed: 12 October 2023). Girard, I., Vanston, F., & Faïd, E. (2021c). University students in the time of covid-19: the sacrificed generation? [Online]. Right to education. Available at: https://www.right-to-education.org/blog/university-students-time-covid19-sacrificed-generation (Accessed: 17 December 2022). Jennifer. (2021). Assessment Methods in Vocational Education and Training. [Online]. Cloud Assess. Available at: https://cloudassess.co/au/blog/assess ment-methods/ (Accessed: 11 September 2022). Maqableh, M., & Alia, M. (2021). Evaluation online learning of undergraduate students under lockdown amidst Covid-19 Pandemic: The online learning experience and students’ satisfaction. [Online]. Children and Youth Services Review, 128. Available from: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.childyouth.2021. 106160 (Accessed: 20 January 2023). Margeti´c, B., Peraica, T., Stojanovi´c, K., & Ivanec, D. (2021). Predictors of emotional distress during the Covid-19 pandemic; a Croatian study. [Online]. Personality and Individual Differences, 175. Available from: https://doi.org/ 10.1016/j.paid.2021.110691 (Accessed: 21 January 2023). Ministry of Digital Transformation of Ukraine. (2022). Diia.Digital Education becomes a member of the Google.org Fellowship program and will get USD 2

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Digital Diplomacy: As a Strategy of Global Crisis Management During the Time of Covid-19 Hatice Koç

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and Ha¸sim Koç

Introduction

Humanity faces with many challenges during the twenty-first century. One of the ground-breaking among them is digitalization, which might be assumed as the main motivator behind the most rapid transformation of the world ever seen. The positive and negative effects of digitalization might be felt in all spheres of life. Diplomacy is not exempted from this new trend, and toward the mid of the second decennium of the century, a new concept emerged: digital diplomacy (Bjola & Coplen, 2023: 323). This new tool in diplomacy enabled the authorities and the executors with a vast and practical usage of technology in diplomatic affairs. This article will look upon this process during the mostly challenging period of recent years, during pandemics. How digital diplomacy gained

H. Koç (B) Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Hacı Bayram Veli University, Ankara, Turkey e-mail: [email protected] H. Koç Faculty of Philosophy, Göttingen Georg-August-University, Göttingen, Germany © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Akilli and B. Gunes (eds.), World Politics in the Age of Uncertainty, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39611-3_13

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a significant status on the management of global crisis in Türkiye will be scrutinized through the pages of this excerpt. The rise of digital technologies leads the diplomatic practice to reformulate itself and to adapt its processes to the online environment. More sub-activities may be recognized but in a well-framed analysis, authors mentioned five of them: “crisis management, international collaboration, foreign policy continuity, countering disinformation, and digital innovation” (Bjola & Coplen, 2023: 324). In the last month of 2019, the World Health Organization (WHO) country office in China reported cases of pneumonia of unknown cause in the city of Wuhan in Hubei province. These cases were identified as a new type of coronavirus (nCoV), which had not been previously detected among humans on January 7, 2020; subsequently, the name of this disease was accepted as Covid-19 (Baybars, 2020). The outbreak was classified as a “public health emergency of international scale” by WHO on January 30, 2020. Then, due to the occurrence of Covid-19 cases in 113 other countries other than China and the spread of the virus, the WHO recognized this outbreak as a pandemic (global epidemic) on March 11, 2020 (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Health, 2020: 5). Only 5 days later, on March 16, 2020, the number of countries reporting infections to WHO reached 143 (Bedford et al., 2020). The rapid spread of the pandemic has forced states to take various measures.1 In this context, lots of measures have been taken to prevent the spread of the virus, such as imposing travel restrictions and banning public areas (Hale et al., 2020: 3). This pandemic, which created a shock effect all over the world, caused the collapse of the health systems in many countries. In addition, the pandemic has created unexpected needs in terms of personnel, finance, equipment, planning, and crisis management on a global scale. Organizations can take a proactive or reactive approach to crisis situations. A proactive (active crisis management) approach means that organizations take the necessary steps in case of a crisis (before it occurs 1 There are vast amount of studies on the measurements against Covid-19 by different states. Please consult for a good analysis of usage of digital diplomacy against Covid19 the introductory article to the special issue by Ilan Manor and James Pamment, “At a crossroads: examining Covid-19’s impact on public and digital diplomacy”, Place Branding and Public Diplomacy 18 (2022), 1–3. The authors analyzes throughout the issue the relation of Covid-19 and public diplomacy in Brazil, China, France, Germany, India, Japan, Mexico, Norway, Romania, Russia, Sweden, the UK, and USA.

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and poses a threat). In the reactive approach, it is aimed to eliminate or minimize the negative effects of the crisis that emerges and threatens the vital organs and functioning of the organization (Akar, 2021: 247–248). China and South Korea began to proactively respond to the crisis. Following their examples, the world closed its borders and imposed quarantines. During all this time, social media users started to compare their nations’ efforts to fight against the crisis with other nations online (Kalsın, 2020a). The Covid-19 pandemic has digitized the behaviors and habits of groups such as users, customers, citizens, viewers, and participants (Yücel, 2020: 143). Covid-19 is not only a global health problem, but also a major threat that jeopardizes international peace and security. While the legitimacy of globalization has been questioned in this controversial environment, the interdependence of states has also increased. In order to overcome the Covid-19 pandemic, states, civil society organizations, international organizations, and companies had to act in coordination and cooperation (Manor & Pamment, 2022). The closure of borders has left thousands of citizens stranded in the places they have traveled or lived. Embassies and consulates had to use digital media to advise citizens on repatriation procedures. They also used digital channels to remain in solidarity with citizens of countries affected by the pandemic and to build joint responses to the crisis with host authorities (Kalsın, 2020b). In general terms, digital diplomacy is the use of the Internet and new information and communication technologies for diplomatic purposes (Hanson, 2012: 3). Countries hold meetings via video conferencing while conducting their bilateral relations. They have participated in the meetings of the international organizations. All of this has made international security and cooperation necessary, and has made the diplomacy carried out to implement them faster, time-saving, cheaper, and more flexible. With the digital diplomacy era, international organizations also use the internet and new media to reach large audiences. During the Covid19 pandemic, the WHO announced all its statements on social media accounts. In cooperation with Whatsapp, the WHO launched a special service that allows users to post messages in four languages (English, French, Spanish, and Arabic). Through this service, messages containing situation reports, travel advice, and information refuting misinformation were shared instantly. Taking the idea as an example, governments have used a similar system to communicate information to everyone living in their country. The Lithuanian MFA developed an AI-powered virtual

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support robot called Chatbot. This virtual robot provided Covid-19related information on topics such as health advice, travel restrictions, consular services, and conditions for entering and leaving the country during quarantine (Bjola & Manor, 2020). Due to travel bans and various quarantine measures because of the pandemic, events organized by countries, G7, G20, IMF, and the World Bank were transferred to the virtual environment and held in the form of online video conferences. In addition, bilateral meetings between state officials were held via encrypted online video conferences, and negotiations were conducted in this way. These tools also facilitated the creation of an official archive, as the entire meeting or negotiation can be recorded (Tahiro˘glu & Bozkurt, 2021). According to a study conducted in 2020, 98% of the 193 UN member states have an official account on social media. Only Laos, North Korea, Sao Tome and Principe, and Turkmenistan do not have Twitter accounts. The foreign ministers of 132 countries have their own personal accounts on Twitter. With the pandemic period moving diplomacy largely online, the effectiveness of social networks within the scope of digital diplomacy has increased significantly. In this process, Covid-19 has dominated the tweets of world leaders. With hashtags such as #StayHome, #StayAlert, and #SaveLives, masses are raised awareness, decisions taken to combat the pandemic are announced and the sacrifices of healthcare workers are appreciated (Vara et al., 2021).

2

¨ Turkiye

During the Covid-19 pandemic, Türkiye has been in close contact with the World Health Organization (WHO). In order to follow global and regional developments regarding Covid-19 and to discuss the experiences and strategies of Türkiye and other countries at the highest level, monthly meetings were held with the WHO Regional Director for Europe via video conferencing (Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye Directorate of Communications [DoC], 2022: 557). Türkiye’s use of digital diplomacy has further increased during the Covid-19 pandemic. During the pandemic, 95,000 citizens of the Republic of Türkiye, who were brought from 120 different countries, reached the MFA and relevant representations mainly through social media. A communication process was also carried out through social

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media for the repatriation of foreign citizens staying in Türkiye (www. mfa.gov.tr). As the global pandemic has forced the field of international relations and diplomacy to digitalize, as in all areas of life, the MFA of the Republic of Türkiye has tried to perform its important functions by implementing digital applications (Babacan, 2021: 128). First of all, the MFA Coordination and Support Center (DKDM) was established within the Ministry in order to follow the developments related to the pandemic and coordinate with foreign countries and foreign missions (MFA, 2020).

3

Digital Diplomacy Initiative

Shortly before the pandemic, Türkiye undertook a “Digital Diplomacy Breakthrough”, including comprehensive training for diplomats on strategic issues such as data analysis and verification processes (NTV, 2021). In 2019, digital diplomacy was one of the three priorities put forward by Minister Çavu¸so˘glu at the Ambassadors Conference. In this context, the 2020 theme of the Antalya Diplomacy Forum (ADF) has been determined as “digital diplomacy” (www.mfa.gov.tr). However, the meeting, which could not be held face-to-face due to the pandemic, was held through online conferences in accordance with the stated theme (Kaplan, 2021: 44). Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavu¸so˘glu emphasized the importance of digital diplomacy at the 11th Ambassadors Conference where the breakthrough was announced as follows: “…We see that global trends can be followed more effectively; early warning systems can prevent crises; public diplomacy can reach target audiences directly; consular services can be provided more efficiently… In the digital age, we are all ‘digital diplomats’ and we have to use these tools effectively” (MFA, 2019). The 12th Ambassadors’ meeting was also held digitally, and in his speech at the meeting, the President underlined the digitalization of consular services, the development of the IT infrastructure of diplomacy, and the success of the evacuation efforts thanks to the digital diplomacy initiative (Presidency, 2020b). Within the scope of this initiative, a training program has been established to equip diplomats with the necessary knowledge and increase the efficiency of Consular services with the help of technology, while the establishment of early warning systems to monitor developments and detect crises, especially on a global scale, has also been set as a target. In order to have a strong presence at the

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digital table in the era of digital diplomacy, the Ministry has prepared a comprehensive curriculum that includes topics such as data analysis, data visualization, public diplomacy, strategic communication, data security, and resistance to disinformation (Seyhanlıo˘ ¸ glu & Özbey, 2022: 129). The main objectives of this initiative are to utilize the transformative power of technology from consular services to public diplomacy, cyber security to foreign policy analysis. The Ministry ensures its digital transformation with the systems that ensure communication between the headquarters and representations abroad, the Consul.NET infrastructure that improves the quality of services provided to citizens, electronic visa/e-note applications, and the Consular Call Center. In addition, the website of the Ministry is available in 11 languages (MFA, 2020: 48). The Foreign Minister connected to the meeting organized by the Atlantic Council and the Turkish Heritage Foundation (THO), the NATO Foreign Ministers Meeting, and many other international meetings via video conference and met with his counterparts (Kalsın, 2020a). In this process, a video conference meeting was held with 154 embassies, consulates, and permanent missions which was organized for the first time. On the other hand, the Ministry has tried to bring together mediation and conflict resolution activities with digital diplomacy and technological initiatives in this sensitive process. It took an active stance in line with the “Digital Toolkit for Mediation” prepared by the UN with the emphasis that technology will strengthen the critically important participation dimension in mediation processes. The Ministry brought the effective use of digital diplomacy and technology in conflict resolution and mediation processes to the agenda at the Istanbul Mediation Conference organized before the pandemic, and organized the meeting of the conference that year online for the first time as of September 17, 2020, providing the first example of the Turkish Digital Diplomacy Initiative in practice (Kaplan, 2020).

4

Digital Diplomacy During Covid-19

Türkiye has pioneered, fully supported, and actively contributed to the cooperation initiatives established and launched to combat Covid-19. In this context, Türkiye has contributed to the work carried out at the UN, G7, G20, Turkic Council, MIKTA, Organization of Islamic Cooperation,

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and many international platforms, and the importance of multilateralism in the fight against the pandemic has been highlighted (DoC, 2022: 407). Increasingly, digital diplomacy activities are being institutionalized at the MFA and the Presidency to enable, record, and secure diplomatic exchanges. In the aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic, Turkish diplomatic institutions have rapidly adopted digital capabilities. And in this regard, Türkiye is among the top ten countries in the G-20 digital diplomacy index (Seyhanlıo˘ ¸ glu & Özbey, 2022: 132). In 2020, President Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan used Türkiye’s first highlevel video conferencing system. On March 17, 2020, President Erdo˘gan held a video conference with then German Chancellor Angela Merkel, British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, and French President Emmanuel Macron. Images from the meeting were shared on the President’s official Twitter account (@RTErdogan) and announced to the public. In addition, Türkiye’s views were conveyed to the international community through effective participation in meetings and negotiations of international importance with the help of technology. In this context, Türkiye participated in important international meetings such as the United Nations (UN) 75th General Assembly, G-7 Leaders Summit, G-20 Leaders Extraordinary Summit on Covid-19, Global Vaccine Summit, International Investment Summit, EIK, D-8, “Coronavirus Global Response International Commitment Event”, 6th Meeting of the Türkiye-Iran High Level Cooperation Council, Türkiye-Africa Economic and Business Forum (www.tccb.gov.tr). Furthermore, the Executive Committee of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation convened via video conference on April 22, 2020 at the level of Foreign Ministers to discuss the pandemic at the initiative of our country. According to the suggestion of Türkiye, it was decided that the Committee of Permanent Representatives would meet regularly for coordination and consultation at the intergovernmental level (DoC, 2022: 408). During the same period, President Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan had 130 telephone conversations with the leaders of other countries. President Erdo˘gan had the most phone calls with Russian President Vladimir Putin. He also had a number of video conference calls with German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev (Seyhanlıo˘ ¸ gu and Özbey, 2022: 131). In a study focusing on the efforts and competence of the MFA in digital diplomacy during the pandemic, a content analysis was

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conducted on four official Twitter accounts of the MFA (@Tc_Dısisleri, @MFATurkey, @MFATurkeyArabic, @MFATurkeyFrench) (MFA, 2021). As a result of the study, it was determined that the Ministry tried to keep up with the conjuncture through digital platforms and social media networks in terms of strategic communication management and communication with the public through its tweets (Mazıcı, 2020, 1101). In addition, the Minister connected to many international meetings such as the Atlantic Council, Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), NATO Foreign Ministers’ Meeting via video conferencing and met with his counterparts through technological means (Kalsın, 2020a). The “Diplomatic Portal”, which was established to ensure that foreign missions and more than 20,000 diplomats in Türkiye receive fast and effective service in their diplomatic transactions, provides services in nine different areas and functions as a news source and interaction tool for mission (Seyhanlıo˘ ¸ glu and Özbey, 2022: 129).

5 Initiatives on Digital Collaboration During Covid Period On April 10, 2020, the Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking States held an extraordinary meeting with the agenda item “Cooperation and Solidarity in Combating Covid-19 Pandemic” via video conference (Kalsın, 2020b: 156). In addition to measures related to food, medicine, and borders (Presidency, 2020a), the Council discussed the establishment of a joint action plan in the context of the joint fight against Covid-19, the compilation of a list of goods that can pass through the borders of countries unhindered, the establishment of a mechanism to ensure the rapid sharing of information on cargo transportation at borders among members, the establishment of an online platform to share information about infected people and cyber security issues. In his speech at the Global Health Summit on 21.05.2021 (Presidency, 2021a), President Erdo˘gan emphasized the importance of rapid detection, early warning, and information sharing to prevent the spread of infectious diseases. He called on participants to “establish a coordination mechanism between our national operation centers, which will be useful for coordinating activities such as evacuations and urgent medical needs”. In addition to coordination, he suggested establishing a database of good practices among G-20 countries to take measures against future crises.

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In addition, in his speech at the Antalya Diplomacy Forum on Digital Diplomacy on 18.06.2021, he stated that digital diplomacy has increased in importance during Covid-19. He stated that it can be used as a tool to solve injustices in times of crisis (Presidency, 2021b).

6

Evacuation

Citizens who wanted to return but were stranded in their countries of residence due to the closure of borders during the pandemic appealed to Turkish officials through social media. The intensive telephone and video conference traffic carried out by the Turkish MFA in the context of the pandemic is a unique example. Ranking 5th in the world with 246 diplomatic representations, the Turkish MFA did not only evacuate its own citizens during this sensitive and difficult process, but also contacted nearly 2,000 third-country nationals from 61 countries and helped them return home from hard-to-reach geographies (Çavu¸so˘glu, 2020: 10). After the authorities contacted the citizens, they were brought to their homeland by private planes. In addition, one-to-one communication was established with all citizens abroad through social media. Turkish citizens from 142 countries were brought to Turkey during the crisis. This was the largest evacuation operation in the history of the Republic. The countries evacuated included small islands in hard-toreach regions in very remote continents. The complexity of the evacuation operation, which was carried out at a time when there were travel bans between cities in many countries, can be better understood. Across 4 continents, from Brazil to Mauritania, from Canada to Bali, Turkish citizens were reunited with their homeland (DoC, 2022: 409). Thus, 70,000 Turkish citizens were brought to the country and quarantined. The MFA supported the evacuations of 91 countries between March 17 and June 11, and 37,682 foreigners were evacuated from Türkiye. 290,000 foreigners left Türkiye with direct or indirect support between March 17 and June 11, when pandemic-related restrictions were lifted (DoC, 2022: 433). Turkey’s support, assistance, and evacuation achievements have been covered in various foreign news sources, shared on digital media, and appreciated by the international community. As a reflection of this success, Klaus Schwab, founder and Chairman of the World Economic Forum (WEF), even stated that Türkiye, as a global and regional actor, can lead the digital transformation (MFA, 2020: 134).

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7

Conclusion

While the Covid-19 (coronavirus) pandemic, which deeply affected the international system and played a transformative role on the concepts of power and security on a global scale, is characterized as the most important global crisis that emerged after the WWII, the use of digital technologies has naturally increased rapidly and intensely, especially in this process where isolationism and protectionism have come to the fore again in international politics. Important negotiations, meetings, and international events in many educational, sporting, scientific, artistic, and commercial fields were either postponed or canceled, and many employees around the world tried to carry out their work from their homes using digital technologies. Naturally, this global crisis has also had repercussions on diplomacy and foreign policy; many summits, meetings, and negotiations on the international platform have been held via video conferencing. While world leaders started to share their foreign policy messages more frequently on social media platforms such as Twitter and Facebook during this period, digital resources, which offer a unique opportunity to use soft power elements, played an important role in reaching out to the citizens of other countries and appealing to their hearts and minds (Vara et al., 2021). From the perspective of the Turkish MFA, while digital diplomacy methods were implemented during the pandemic process by using the available data and opportunities in the most effective way, the Ministry also managed to implement important plans that can be described as a digital revolution or transformation within the Ministry. In this context, digital diplomacy trainings were launched to increase the digital competencies of Turkish diplomats. During this period, the Ministry participated in important summits and meetings around the world at the highest level via video conferencing system. The MFA also attached importance to improving the digital capacity of its diplomatic missions abroad; in fact, with the “E-Consulate” project implemented in this regard, the population, employment, and residence information of Turkish citizens living abroad were recorded. Again, during this difficult period, the Ministry responded to the requests for assistance not only from Turkish citizens abroad who wanted to return to their countries, but also from thirdcountry citizens in different parts of the world, and ensured their return to their countries. Attaching importance to the use of digital technologies in mediation and conflict resolution activities brought to the agenda by

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the UN, the Turkish Foreign Ministry exhibited the first example of this work at the Istanbul Mediation Conferences in 2020 within the scope of its own digital transformation.

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Xenophobia, Racism and Populism in the Covid-19 Era Arif Behiç Özcan

1

Introduction

This study aims to understand the effects the Covid-19 pandemic had on xenophobia, racism and populism. The unprecedented pandemic, between 2019 and 2022, has affected many aspects of human and community life. Since global actors had existential concerns during this worldwide health crisis, societies primarily expected their governments and health systems to take important and meaningful steps regarding. Governments used different methods in response to these demands. Whether governments and international actors like the World Health Organization (WHO) have made sufficient contributions to manage the crisis remains open for debate. There are actors who used common sense and prioritized cooperation in tackling pandemic-related issues. However, some actors did not hesitate to take advantage of the “othering” opportunity created by the pandemic since the first “shocking” phase of the crisis. The Covid-19 pandemic is a global health crisis that can only be tackled through global solidarity. It has also been considered a great equalizer

A. B. Özcan (B) Department of International Relations, Selcuk University, Konya, Turkey e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Akilli and B. Gunes (eds.), World Politics in the Age of Uncertainty, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39611-3_14

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(Borgman, 2021: 41). However, for some actors, this crisis ironically strengthened discriminatory/othering dynamics. In fact, otherizing political approaches like xenophobia, racism and populism have acquired new instruments with the pandemic. These actors used various issues such as the virus’s source, carriers, people who did not comply with the health measures and which patients should receive drugs and medical supplies, as tools of political discourse. In other words, some actors have transformed the pandemic crisis into an “emotional capital,” as conceptualized by Marci D. Cottingham. They defined emotional capital as a solid and dynamic resource that individuals own and use while practising emotion. According to Cottingham, the accumulation, concretization and activation of emotional capital are theorized as part of the individual’s social relations. This also includes the maintenance of privilege through the exercise of power (Cottingham, 2016: 2). Multiple findings during the pandemic suggest that uncertainties associated with Covid-19 are often perceived as “existential” threats (Vos, 2021: 133). This perception has been used to increase emotional capital for discriminatory approaches and populism. In other words, the pandemic has been a part of the social relations of political actors while some have used it to justify the use of force to maintain their privileges. There have also been suggestions that the Covid-19 vaccines, whose curative effects are yet to be determined medically, should be tested on some “races” (Wong, 2020). In some cases, actors even used the pandemic as an excuse to punish “others” in their own country. Other populist practices like international travel restrictions, some governments prioritizing the safety of their citizens abroad and mask wars made headlines. These have led to the strengthening of the othering discourses during the pandemic. In our world, where threats and dangers are becoming increasingly abstract and “invisible,” as in the case of Covid-19, there are significant obstacles in front of mechanisms working to cope with global crises. In this chapter, we try to answer the question of how xenophobia, racism and populism constitute an (irrational) obstacle to the mentioned mechanisms. The answers we give to this question are very important in order to predict what other sub-crises await humanity when other dangers can deeply affect human life and social life. Some scientists have made invaluable contributions to the literature on our subject (Aaltola, 2022; Addo, 2020; Bobba and Hubé, 2021a, b; Mair et al., 2021). The contribution of this study to the literature is to try

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to explain how discrimination and populism “make the pandemic useful” within the framework of Cottingham’s concept of emotional capital. In addition, based on what the Covid-19 pandemic has taught us, it is to provide a different perspective to predict how decision-makers will work if they face similar obstacles or global crises in future. This study is a critical qualitative research and analyses the approaches we call “othering/discriminatory” during the Covid-19 pandemic. The first sub-title of this chapter examines xenophobia and racism during the pandemic. While the second analyses populist policies during the crisis. Finally, the end of this section critically interprets the findings on how the pandemic boosted these marginalizing approaches and how it was transformed into “emotional capital” by various actors.

2

Xenophobia and Racism in the Covid-19 Era

Covid-19, which emerged in China at the end of 2019, quickly turned into a pandemic. The first images from China showed people dying tragically due to the virus. These images served in the most gruesome terms have spread all over the world. While the pandemic was primarily a physical threat to human health, it soon made possible a systematic attack on human norms (Wolf, 2022: 16). Almost all societies have had to fight xenophobia and racism while fighting Covid-19. However, the fact that many governments did not systematically record racially motivated crimes during the pandemic, prevents us from reaching clear information about the level of racism in this period (Tan, 2020). Therefore, we have to rely on cases across the world that fall into the research of some scientists and the reports of some non-governmental organisations (NGOs), especially with cases clearly identified by the media. As societies and decision-makers try to understand what they are dealing with, those who blame others for the virus have started to appear on the scene. The pandemic has exposed systemic factors leading to marginalization and exclusion at the societal and global levels. In most of the statements made, the “foreign” nature of the virus was constantly emphasized. US President Donald Trump openly called Covid-19 the “Chinese flu” and made statements calling other countries “dangerous.” Such naming and descriptions have led to strong prejudices like xenophobia and racism against both social groups and other nations, not only in the United States but also in other countries (Vos, 2021: 93). On the other hand, China’s inconsistent statements about the virus and doubts

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about being a reliable stakeholder in global relations increased the uneasiness in societies. People living under uncertainty and stress have begun to relate the virus to the “outside” more easily. So how can this be explained? The Covid-19 pandemic has begun to affect people’s lives in different ways. First, people realized that they were in existential danger. Many governments have begun to report the number of death and hospitalizations every day. The news that the health systems of developed countries were overwhelmed by this crisis was constantly on the media’s agenda. Some people thought that if they got the virus one day, they wouldn’t be able to find a bed in the hospital. Thus, thinking that “others,” especially immigrants, “occupied” the hospitals, they developed prejudices based on xenophobia and racism. The second impact of Covid-19 on human life was the lockdown. People were cut off from social life because of these prohibitions. Some people thought that the pandemic was not over because “others” did not comply with the measures and saw them as the reason for the lockdown. Thus, a new catalyst emerged for xenophobia and racism against innocent people. In fact, some studies show how uncertainties about the pandemic and lockdown lead to such discrimination, especially in the context of antimigrant rhetoric (Devakumar et al., 2020: 1194). Third, the negative effects government decisions against the pandemic had on society are often instinctive rather than scientific. Some of these decisions deviated from human rights norms (Aaltola, 2022: 158). Governments have been unable to tackle problems that caused market shortages and price hikes. They also failed to resolve supply chain issues and expanded travel restrictions (Harrington, 2022: 173). In addition, other decisions that upset the socio-economic structure, such as the closure of factories and workplaces, added economic insecurities to the biological insecurity created by the virus. As a result, the economic fragility of society increased and these economic problems constituted another justification for blaming “others” politically. Immigrants and foreigners in developing countries have been accused of spreading the disease. In developed countries, already existing anti-immigrant groups accused migrants of being more irresponsible in the spread of the disease and putting a strain on the health system (Unutulmaz, 2020: 135). The fourth impact involved problems in the distribution of medical and healthcare facilities. A section of society was dissatisfied with government decisions on medical prioritization. Debates on issues such as the distribution of ventilators, priority treatment of elderly patients and how

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to protect the incarcerated population from the virus have eventually caused discrimination (Flood et al., 2020: 19). In fact, this discrimination combined with racialization and marginalization has made the fight against Covid-19 even more difficult. Theoretically, it is accepted that each social group has its own hierarchies of hostility that it can target (Aaltola, 2022: 169). The uncertainties, doubts and disappointments of the pandemic period have made this hostility clear in many societies around the world through different definitions of “other.” While discussions about the symptoms of the disease and how the virus is transmitted continue, these debates have been used as an instrument in some societies to blame “other” groups. In this framework, xenophobia and racism have been directed towards different groups of people in different societies. The perception of some ethnic groups as being at a higher risk of carrying the virus led to the fact that ethnicity was centred on the definition of “other” and thus racial prejudices deepened (Bambra, Lynch and Smith, 2021: 41). For this reason, during the Covid19 pandemic, immigrants with Asian appearance have been particularly vulnerable to exclusion and hostility based on ethnic references (Basu and Basu, 2020: 85). The relationship between anti-Asian feelings and the various attitudes and behaviours associated with Covid-19 seems clear. For example, in a study on Canada, it was seen that the fear of “yellow peril,” a metaphor that expresses Asians as a threat to the West, was reshaped by this country’s response to the pandemic. The same study found that xenophobia, racism and violence against Asian Canadians, including Chinese, Koreans, Filipinos and Vietnamese, intensified during the Covid-19 pandemic (Liew, 2020: 394–396). Horse (2021), who thinks that racism has spread as a “parallel pandemic” in the United States, emphasizes that antiAsianism has developed on two levels, both within the American nation and against Asian societies. According to Horse, racism and xenophobia are the main causes of health inequalities in the United States and specifically for Asian Americans. It is important to understand how the “othering” aspect of the pandemic period can affect the physical, mental and social health of Asian Americans (Horse, 2021: 201–202). Therefore, it is not difficult to predict that xenophobia and racism experienced during the pandemic period will have long-term consequences. According to a study conducted during the pandemic, as of August 2020, ethnic pandemic-related discrimination has been observed in 46 different countries around the world. So, in the first months of the

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pandemic, xenophobia and racist experiences hit a broader target than in the Asian region. However, as the disease spread to more countries, ethnic minorities in those countries also faced racial discrimination and violence (Haas, 2021: 44). For instance, studies in the United Kingdom show that Covid-19 is worsening Black, Asian and ethnic minorities. This negative effect has emerged due to both the difficulties in accessing health services and the unemployment caused by the pandemic. This situation is associated with structural racism within the United Kingdom (Lupton, 2022: 50). The worsening experience of ethnic minorities in general in accessing care, protection and health services during the pandemic shows that discrimination is not individual or partial, but that there is discrimination embedded in the political and economic system (Holden et al., 2022: 10–11). The xenophobia during the pandemic was based on other characteristics that create “differences” apart from ethnic characteristics. Examples of these groups are the elderly, tourists, Muslims and Jews. Hate speech, hate crimes and discriminatory practices against these people have increased (Bonotti and Zech, 2021: 13). In India, for example, some Hindu nationalists claimed that Muslims were deliberately trying to transmit the virus to Hindus. They produced concepts such as “corona-jihad” and “coronaterrorism” to incite discrimination and violence against these innocent people (Mohammad, 2020). As can be seen from these examples, the Covid-19 pandemic has led to a crisis of hatred, harassment and violence, while dealing with health, economy and food supply problems in human and community life. Racism against Asian people has spread faster than Covid-19. For example, “this effect of the virus reached Spain before the virus itself” (Miller and Barbara, 2021: 140). Following the rapid increase in hate crimes all over the world, United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres warned the world in May 2020 about a “tsunami of hate and xenophobia, scapegoating and scaremongering around the world.” Guterres also said, “We must act now to strengthen the immunity of our societies against the virus of hate” (The United Nations, 2020). He emphasized that this problem is at least as dangerous as the pandemic. Despite these warnings, it has been observed that the hate pandemic continues. According to Martha F. Davis, there is systemic racism embedded in both institutional structures and individual decision-making processes, and the pandemic has made this clearer (Davis, 2021: 76). Elimination of systemic racism, which affects institutional and individual

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decision-making processes, has become more difficult due to the said effects of the pandemic.

3

Populism in the COVID-19 Era

Populism can be defined in different ways, but “many scholars agree on a minimal definition of populism: the juxtaposition of the ‘good people’ with a series of ‘bad elites’ and irritating outside groups” (Bobba and Hubé, 2021a, b: 2). This section analyses how the atmosphere of uncertainty and uneasiness created by the pandemic has been “made useful” by populist politicians. As we mentioned in the introduction, societies have expected their governments to take meaningful steps to tackle the pandemic. However, this situation has created a dangerous irony for governments. The first option was to apply rational measures based on the work and recommendations of scientists. However, this option was time-consuming. If this option was chosen, they could be accused of doing nothing in the face of the “urgent” public expectations. The second option was to put instinctive and irrational decisions into action immediately. If this option were chosen, governments would have responded to popular demands by “doing something” in the fight against the pandemic. The second option would also have made it easier for governments to make decisions in line with other “political” goals. Some governments around the world have chosen this second option. However, some populist politicians, particularly the anti-science, rightwing, populist movements have used racist and xenophobic rhetoric, blaming others for the crisis, to make this second option more acceptable to the public (Porta, 2021: 222). Thus, they produced responses that concealed the shortcomings of their own management systems. Over time, they went further, applying more authoritarian methods of controlling the disease (Samaddar, 2020: 21). Travel restrictions, quarantines, lockdowns and other authoritarian decisions had an insignificant impact on the spread of the disease. However, these reactions are seen as valuable in terms of populism. For example, travel restriction has a special place in terms of populism. While enforced as a legitimate consequence of states’ sovereignty (Hoffman and Fafard, 2020: 561), as the pandemic has become a global threat, “isolating” a country from the rest of the world has only brought more racism and xenophobia (To review the historical evolution of travel restrictions during the pandemic period, see: Roser et al., 2023).

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“We are all in the same boat” was frequently mentioned by many actors at the onset of the pandemic. However, the phrase soon turned into “we are not all in the same boat” in some countries under the influence of populism. The first sentence symbolized that the global health crisis is connecting all humanity in many ways. There were important responsibilities brought by this view. In particular, it suggested governments fight the crisis through solidarity, cooperation, transparent communication and without blame. However, populism became more dominant in some countries, and populist politicians preferred language that blamed others. It spread in different countries as a “political virus” (Cheong, 2020). As a matter of fact, populist approaches have become so common that we have seen leaders who claim that there is no virus, that masks are useless, that there is no need for quarantine, and that social distancing is meaningless. Thus, instead of seeing the pandemic as a health crisis, some people saw it as a factor of geopolitical and economic competition between states. One of the key examples of how populism was used during the pandemic is US President Trump at the time. By insisting on the term “Wuhan virus,” he created a discourse for the November 2020 elections. China, on the other hand, turned the pandemic into a propaganda war between the two countries, with statements that “US soldiers brought the virus to Wuhan” (Duran, 2020: 32). Racist, xenophobic and other discriminatory movements have fed on Trump’s response to the pandemic (Cosentino, 2021: 308). At that time, while people lost their lives, the world agenda followed this propaganda war. More importantly, the effects of this populist political environment have led to a long-lasting “othering” on both sides. Another well-known populist politician is the then-British Prime Minister Boris Johnson. The deviations in his statements and behaviours regarding the coronavirus and the “corona party” he participated in remained on the public agenda for a long time. Another example was former Tanzanian President John Magufuli, who ignored the pandemic and warned his people against the coronavirus vaccines produced by foreign governments (BBC, 2021a). “Coronavirus, which is a devil, cannot survive in the body of Christ … It will burn instantly,” he said (BBC, 2021b). When he died during the pandemic, his funeral did not take masks and social distancing into account. There are many examples of populist leaders influencing the public with irrational methods on every continent.

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There has been some research on the relationship between the pandemic and populism. These studies have failed to establish a direct causal relationship between populism and deaths from Covid-19. However, some studies have found a clear overlap between countries led by populists and Covid-19-related death rates (Ringe, Rennó and Kaltwasser, 2023: 286). During the pandemic, populist attitudes have reduced trust in political institutions and scientific research (Eberl, Huber and Greussing, 2021: 280). According to Bayerlein et al., populist governments generally do not prefer long-term, unpopular policies because they want short-term results. It is clear that when they do not take the pandemic seriously and have an anti-scientific approach, the public will also have difficulties in complying with various health and safety measures (Bayerlein et al., 2021: 28). The most important finding from these studies is that the populist response to the pandemic is a major obstacle to scientifically combating the crisis. While politicians are at the root of populism, their thoughts and discourses have also been backed by some powerful media outlets. Some television channels and newspapers have become highly politicized during the pandemic and conveyed populist discourses to the public. Although their devastating and dangerous effects on society were partially balanced by social media, they managed to provide significant support to the pandemic-era populism (Campbell, 2021: 151). However, many people’s comments on social media, promoting racial discrimination against noncitizens and people of “different” ethnicity, have also shown populism’s impact on people (Addo, 2020: 3). Another less noticeable but important aspect of populism is some governments’ decision to evacuate their citizens living abroad. While the health systems in their own countries are facing enough problems, some “xenophobic” governments have increased forced returns and closed their borders to refugees (Porta, 2021: 219). Thus, a clear discrimination between citizens and non-citizens has opened up a space for populism.

4

Conclusion

The Covid-19 pandemic has been one of the most important tests facing the global community. The pandemic has brought many risks and uncertainties. The shock experienced in the early stages of the pandemic has shown how unprepared humanity is for emergencies. By looking at how

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societies and political actors behave in such a period, signs can be obtained on how to deal with any future crises. The problems created by globalization can only be fought with a global perspective. Under the current conditions of the world, “no one is safe until everyone is safe.” It is the most urgent need for humans to redesign their relationships with other humans, other living species and the planet in accordance with this perspective. Global risks become even more dangerous when the opposite happens, that is, where discrimination, right-wing populism and economic nationalism predominate. It has been seen that xenophobia, racism and especially right-wing populism can easily transform the global crisis that threatens all societies into “emotional capital” to strengthen their own existence. The consequence of this has been, to say the least, hindering the rational fight against the crisis for people. The importance of acting based on scientific knowledge became more evident during this period. We have witnessed the outcomes that arise when societies and politics are expected to rely on clear and accurate information produced by science but fall victim to conspiracy theories. States, international organizations, media, NGOs, scientists, politicians and societies have important responsibilities in making the world more livable without further delay. There is a need for political systems to become more open, transparent and strong democracies, while societies should become more tolerant and patient. With the revision of education systems, generations should be raised who see differences as a valuable diversity, not as a marginalization. The awareness of people against all kinds of xenophobia, which sees differences as a “problem,” will ensure that the understanding of “we are all in the same boat” will be strongly rebuilt. If the actors of global relations act as a part of global governance, they will be able to support not just themselves, but all humanity by taking an active role in similar global crises. With the pandemic, we understood how long-term actors with advanced crisis governance capabilities are needed instead of short-term, temporary, and populist policies. The pandemic, which started as a health crisis, quickly turned into a pandemic of hatred, racism and violence. It also helped political decision-makers realize how possible crises caused by globalization could trigger other sub-crises. In light of this experience, both national and international legal frameworks should be strengthened to prevent all kinds of discrimination. However,

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it will be possible to eradicate this “hate virus” permanently only by transforming respect for differences into a global culture.

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Concerns About Covid-19 in the Eyes of Respondents: Example from Poland Sławomir Kalinowski

1

and Oskar Szczygieł

Introduction

Anxiety is felt because of uncertainties beyond the individual’s control. Its intensity can range from high to low, shaping a person’s attitudes and future responses to new experiences (Halamska et al., 2021). Fear itself has a mobilisation and survival function, playing an important role in this context. The appearance of uncertain events can trigger reactions that become less rational, and normal functioning changes. One of the worries in recent years has been Covid-19, causing many people to re-evaluate their behaviour and force them to change their current coping strategies. This paper attempts to show the changes taking place in society’s behaviour as a result of changes in the perception of the risk associated with the coronavirus. These changes have been demonstrated in the background of research on the socio-economic situation of the Polish

S. Kalinowski (B) The Institute of Rural and Agricultural Development of the Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw, Poland e-mail: [email protected] O. Szczygieł The Institute of Rural and Agriculture Development of the Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw, Poland © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Akilli and B. Gunes (eds.), World Politics in the Age of Uncertainty, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39611-3_15

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population conducted at the Institute of Rural Development and Agriculture of the Polish Academy of Sciences. The diverse range of respondents in each stage of the research became the foundation for the following questions: • How does a change in the perception of the coronavirus affect the feeling of anxiety and denial of threat as well as how it changes the structure of the research group? • How did Covid-19 affect the sense of job security? There has already been considerable research on human behaviour and adaptation to the Covid reality, as well as negating the denial of Covid as a threat to health and life. This paper aims to search for regularities and actions describing the current situation. Employees of the institute developed the research methodology in the course of conceptual work. Data about the group surveyed was obtained using a standardised research survey. Questions were both quantitative and qualitative; some were open-ended. This approach allowed for a more in-depth analysis of the processes taking place in households during the pandemic. 1.1

Panic—Denial—“New Normal”

Anxiety can be defined as concern over the future consequences of phenomena. Its intensity influences the behaviour of the population. Too low a level of fear may result in underestimating the threat and, as a result, trigger dangerous behaviour (exposing oneself and the environment to harm). On the other hand, too high a level of fear, not commensurate with the severity of the threat, may lead to mental issues such as phobias or social anxiety (Deacon & Maack, 2008; Kalinowski, 2020; Kalinowski et al., 2022). Both types of reactions may have consequences for the social and economic situations of the population. Anxiety itself is a multiaspect phenomenon due to its complexity and context. It arises from the assessment of risks and the estimation of the probability of vulnerability to unexpected events. In the analysis of anxiety, the behavioural 1999), which can itself be found both element is important (Warneryd, ¨ in flight and fight reactions. The choice of path depends on the guidance that allows individuals to assess the level of threat, based on which they adjust their behaviour. The impact of behavioural features of anxiety may

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be responsible for individuals who feel panic rationalising and changing their attitudes throughout the pandemic or otherwise denying its very existence. Using psychological and behavioural theories to explain the behaviour of individuals during a pandemic allows for a wider context of reality. It also helps explain which individuals want to participate in the research and the extent of their participation. In Europe, the disease was first diagnosed in Italy (mid-February). The illnesses in Lombardy led to a slight increase in anxiety levels among the inhabitants of Poland, but there was still a feeling that this situation did not apply to the country. Poland’s distance from Italy contributed to the sense of security. The epidemiological situation varied across European countries between different stages of the Covid-19 pandemic (Łuczak & Kalinowski, 2021). However, the appearance of the disease in Europe, associated with an increase in deaths, heightened the concern. This was due to the greater cultural similarity between Poland and Italy (which eventually included Spain, Germany and France as well). The high level of uncertainty about the mechanism of the spread of the virus also impacted the rise in concern. Neither the government nor the municipalities had 2020). any experience in dealing with the pandemic (Zw˛eglinska-Gałecka, ´ There were no clear messages on how to prevent the spread of the disease, and the knowledge implemented resulted mainly from experience with other types of coronavirus. The fear intensified among Poles with the first cases in the country reported on 4 March 2020. The increase in fear was caused by psychological uncertainty resulting from the lack of information related to both the causes and effects of the disease. The feeling of increasing panic overlapped with the relatively low number of tests carried out for the coronavirus. On 6 March, the worldwide number of infections exceeded 100,000, further escalating insecurity. Several factors caused the increase in the sense of panic. One was the introduction of health restrictions and their impact on the economy, as well as the possibility of job loss for a sizeable section of society. Unpaid leave, changes in employment contracts, working hours or salaries led to a growing feeling of uncertainty (Kalinowski & Wyduba, 2020). It is also worth noting that pandemics influence the human perception of individual and social well-being, thus making the occurrence of anxiety predictable. All this overlapped with a factor related to social security in

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the individual dimension—i.e., the ability to manage in a potentially difficult situation (including the sense of job security, the level of savings, the degree of threat to the health of one’s family and oneself), and the global—the possibility of state authorities’ reaction to events.

2 The Paths of Transition to Denial and Adaptation Building a stressful atmosphere in the media has a twofold impact on the audience. On one hand, there is a group of people among whom there is growing concern and the feeling of being in danger from Covid. These people most often turn to professionals for answers to lingering questions related to the disease. People who have a sense of being in danger are in constant contact with relatives and friends of people who may be infected. On the other hand, some groups feel that measures preventing the spread of Covid are overdone. These tend to deny expert opinion, pointing out that out of a million Covid-related deaths (compared to nearly 100 million during the Spanish flu), most of those infected died of comorbidities. They treat attacks on doctors as a rationalisation of their behaviour. In these groups, panic is mocked and the problem is underestimated. This can be compared to the phenomena described in the 1947 novel The Plague by Albert Camus, in which there is also a denial and tendency to regard the disease as a conspiracy theory. This is confirmed by research by Italian scientists, who looked at two of the most popular conspiracy theories—the purposefulness of the Covid-19 outbreak, and the existence of a scapegoat for the pandemic (for example the words of President Donald Trump calling Covid-19 “the Chinese virus,” or the portrayal of Asian citizens as the main disease carriers [Yang et al., 2020]). Of the varied groups of people—those who are afraid of the virus and people who deny its existence—the perception of inadequate or extreme action by the authorities increased. In the first group, those activities were regarded as insufficient, while in the second they were considered unnecessary. Emotional patterns changed over time. The overload of Covid information in media led to both growing anxiety and a sense of disinformation. The range of perceptions of the threat, as well as the number of people at constant risk of infection, acted on the principle of the “halo effect” or “Golem effect,” strengthening or reducing the level of anxiety. The feeling of disinformation, having different opinions on measures

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taken, and the normalisation of the virus due to its widespread presence led to the feeling of denial of the phenomenon for some people, while in others living with the coronavirus became “the new normal.” On one hand, this new normal results from fears, and on the other, it is the result of getting used to and adjusting habits (frequent washing of hands, wearing masks and using disinfectants). Positive beliefs about safety measures predicted greater adherence to them, even when controlling for the severity of anxiety (Kirk et al., 2019). It is worth pointing out that the constant stimulation of anxiety has become an important factor in the process of adaptation to a new reality in everyday life. Along with those for whom the pandemic became the “new normal,” there were those for whom the feeling of denial increased. The second group included people who were mainly or exclusively affected by the pandemic economically, which, combined with the lack of disease present in their environment, strengthened the feeling of the pandemic being exaggerated. Among these people, anxiety was relatively quickly replaced by growing frustration. Drop in income, the need to suspend one’s own company, along with social distancing, self-isolation, the inability to meet friends, restrictions in various fields and re-evaluation of the current lifestyle, fostered denial.

3 Covid-19 and Changes in the Structure of the Research Group The pandemic has demanded research into the Polish citizens’ situation, and to that end, an online survey was used to gauge the related factors. The research used the CAWI method. Based on the results, it is possible to conclude that over time the coronavirus has become regarded as common. This manifested in a lower interest in participating in surveys and greater difficulties in recruiting respondents between the first two stages. There was a visible drop in the number of respondents between the first and the second stages of the study—from 3081 to 1368 people. In the first stage, from nine to 15 April 2020, a rapid increase in survey response was observed, as almost 700 respondents took part in the survey on the first day. In the second stage, from 16 to 24 June, both the number of people taking part and the daily growth in completed surveys dropped significantly. This was caused by acclimation to the coronavirus and the gradual return to everyday life. Lockdown ending in most areas of personal and

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professional life also led to lower levels of insecurity. The return to work, the opportunity to participate in cultural events and the further reduction of restrictions resulted in a lower interest in participating in the survey. Despite promoting the research, the overall response was lower. Interestingly, in the third stage of the study, from 21 to 30 September, despite a significant increase in Covid-19 cases, the respondents’ interest practically did not change. In the first days, the increase in responses was low, even among people offering to participate in the research again by sharing their e-mail addresses. A significant increase in a number of respondents occurred in the last three days, which can be associated with a sudden increase in infections, to as many as 1500 new cases a day. The fourth stage of the research was conducted from 18 March to 12 April 2021. Participant interest increased compared to the previous stages—1499 surveys were completed. Similar to the previous stage, the respondents’ initial interest was low. Peak interest was recorded in the second week of the study. It is worth mentioning that in the fourth stage, there was a significant increase in Covid-19 cases, which overlapped with the growth of interest in the study (Fig. 1).

Fig. 1 Average daily number of cases during the survey, and the size of the research sample in the study “Situation of the population during the coronavirus period” (Source own research)

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It should be noted that when designing the first stage of the research, the CAWI method was one of the few opportunities to learn about the respondents’ situation. Lacking resources for wider research, this was the only available form of observation for researchers to study changes in population behaviour to reach a wide group of respondents. The changing reality due to the lockdown challenged scientists to react quickly and start observations using available research methods. Although it is not a representative sample method, as by definition it does not cover everyone (even people without Internet access), it nevertheless made it possible to observe dependencies and changes in population behaviour. At individual stages of the research, the results were calibrated so that the sample better reflected the demographic features of the whole society. The uncertain situation in the initial period of the pandemic had an impact on respondents’ security, not only financially, but also in the context of holding a job. Although the respondents were not afraid of the loss of employment as much as the general increase in unemployment, one in five were not sure whether they would keep their job. It is worth mentioning that the fear of job loss is similar in rural areas and cities. However, excluding people who were unable to determine changes in their employment, then the analysis shows that in the first stage, the assessment was almost identical between rural areas and cities. In the second stage, it was better in the cities by only 4%, and in the third by 7%. The relatively low unemployment rate, which in April 2021 was 6.3%, contributes to feeling relatively secure in keeping a job (positive opinions outweigh negative ones). It is worth remembering that Poland was struggling with significant unemployment almost two decades ago, so the current unemployment percentage is considered relatively low. In addition, the pessimistic forecasts for a significant increase in unemployment have not materialised, and many companies have adapted to the new working conditions. Despite some turbulence in the labour market, by June 2020 unemployment growth was lower than expected by many analysts (it reached 6% in June 2020 and 5.6% in September 2020). It is important to keep in mind the changes to professional life that happened with the onset of the pandemic and the introduction of health restrictions and social distancing. The largest group of respondents—more than 40%—started working remotely. Analysing the feelings of this group about the possibility of losing their jobs reveals that

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they are less afraid of termination than people working in a rotational system, or on idle time pay. In the first stage of the study, only 5% of people working remotely were afraid of losing their jobs. In the second stage, a significant portion—21.8%—still worked remotely, but the largest segment—26.8%—returned to work with health and safety restrictions. One in four respondents pointed out that they were working in the same conditions as before the pandemic. In the third stage, almost 40% of participants reported that they were working the same way as in the prepandemic period, 34.4% returned to work in compliance with the sanitary regulations, only 7.5% were still working remotely, and 4.7% worked in a rotation system. Comparing the responses of participants from the four stages of the study, it can be seen how the coronavirus has become “the new normal” (Fig. 2). In the initial stages, panic and fear of infection were noticeable, which caused employers to apply changes in a labour organisation. Most employees started working remotely, others were furloughed or received downtime benefits. In June 2020, as people got used to the new situation, they started returning to work, but there was some concern over having such a large number of employees still working remotely. In September 2020, the use of remote and hybrid working dropped significantly. With the new variant of Covid-19 and new restrictions in October 2020, the group of people working in forms providing health safety increased. A decrease in the sense of security in employment initially concerned occupations not requiring particularly high education and/or qualifications. Employees in lower-skilled jobs mostly had a sense of the possibility of being replaced by other workers. Along with the defrosting of the economy, it turned out that the group most at risk of losing a job was mid-level workers. They were afraid that some of the tasks they had performed thus far would be considered unnecessary, for example by transferring a large number of services online. These concerns may only be reflected in the future, even as many businesses have returned to the normal workflow, and mid-level employees have currently returned to pre-pandemic working conditions. It seemed that remote working would review the usefulness of some employees. At the start of the pandemic, anxiety about losing a job or being replaced did not occur. The research also shows that at each stage of the study, respondents employed in fixedterm employment form expressed greater fear of losing their jobs than

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Fig. 2 Life in a pandemic as a “new normal” (Source own research)

those on permanent contracts. The lesser concern among those on this form of job contract was mainly due to the notice period (from two weeks to three months), which does not apply to short-term contracts, typical of the lowest-level work. A milestone in entering the “new normal” was the introduction of the coronavirus vaccines. An important element of the newly prevailing sense of security is undoubtedly the Covid-19 vaccination programme. Part of society reacted positively. Initial interest in vaccinations was high enough for there to be a major healthcare crisis for a short time. However, anxiety and frequency of conspiracy theories increased. There is a strong negative correlation between fear of side effects and the will to get vaccinated (Turan et al., 2022). Fear of coronavirus infection is indicated as an important predictor of willingness to get vaccinated; however, fear of side effects also has a significant impact on the vaccination rate (Mertens et al., 2020). It is worth noting that the fear of family members getting sick was closely associated with the will to get vaccinated; while aversion to getting jabbed is, for instance, associated with conspiracy thinking (Bertin et al., 2020). The variety of motives influencing the decision to vaccinate or not is very wide and related to both the attitude of the individual as well as

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the group. Vaccine hesitancy is positively associated with a decline in the fear of infection (Willis et al., 2021). Concerns related to vaccination may include distrust of other government health programmes, distrust of authorities, as well as the emergence of conspiracy theories (Yu et al., 2021). At the same time, the greater the level of fear of Covid-19, the less frequently the vaccine is refused (Troiano & Nardi, 2021). The highest percentage of a fully vaccinated community can be observed in the metropolitan areas and their surroundings (Fig. 3). A divergence between the western and eastern parts of the country is evident in the data from 2 March 2022. The northwest macro-region has a high density of areas with the highest percentage of vaccinations (70–80%). In the municipalities of the eastern macro-region, this value is most often at a critically low level, not exceeding 30% in most areas. In the eighth week of 2022, the cumulative uptake of a booster dose in the European Union was 62.1% and 51.8% in Poland.

Fig. 3 Share of people who have received the full dose of a Covid-19 vaccine in Poland (Source own research)

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Conclusions

The Covid-19 pandemic has been recognised as a global emergency in terms of both health and the economy. The growing number of cases and deaths has fuelled panic, which was especially visible in the initial period of the outbreak. Combined with sanitary restrictions, the passing of time and the spread of the virus, as well as the excess of media fostering the atmosphere, caused panic to give way to a state of negation. The range between panic and denial shows that people can quickly modify their behaviour. The changes in behaviour are interesting not just for economists and sociologists, but for anthropologists as well. We started washing our hands more often, we wore masks, we greeted using our elbows and restricted handshaking (not to mention hugging and kissing). We conducted business meetings on Zoom and other platforms and even organised social gatherings and happy hours online. Uncertainty has triggered a series of changes in habits not only in professional contexts but also in health, shopping and food. We are moving towards a different “new normality.” A return to the pre-pandemic era seems less obvious, even though we are reverting to the old way of working. However, even this return to our workplaces is taking place under altered conditions. At the same time, while the pandemic may become commonplace and part of everyday life among some groups of people, among others it finds fertile ground for conspiracy theories and is a breeding ground for the proliferation of pseudoscientific theories. While the long-term effects of Covid-19 are not yet known, the transition from fear-related behaviour to denial or acceptance of the phenomenon is already an important lesson for the authorities and scientists. Without a doubt, a further in-depth research is required to show the mechanism of changes in population behaviour, which in future may contribute to the development of mechanisms that would not only prevent panic but also reduce possible social, economic and political losses. Disclosure Statement authors.

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the

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References Bertin P., Nera K., Delouvée S. (2020). Conspiracy beliefs, rejection of vaccination, and support for hydroxychloroquine: A conceptual replication-extension in the covid-19 pandemic context. Frontiers in Psychology, 11, 565128. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.565128 Deacon B., Maack D.J. (2008). The effects of safety behaviors on the fear of contamination: An experimental investigation. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 46(4), 537–547. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.brat.2008.01.010 Halamska M., Burdyka K., Kalinowski S., Kubicki P., Michalska S., Ptak A., Sadłon´ W., Zw˛eglinska-Gałecka ´ D. (2021). Wiejskie okruchy pandemii – rok drugi przed czwart˛a fal˛a. Wie´s i Rolnictwo, 3(192), 11–48. https://doi.org/ 10.53098/wir032021/01 Kalinowski S. (2020): Od paniki do negacji: Zmiana postaw wobec Covid-19. Wie´s i Rolnictwo, 3(188), 45–65. https://doi.org/10.7366/wir032020/03 Kalinowski S., Wyduba W. (2020). Moja sytuacja w okresie koronawirusa. Raport z badan, ´ cz˛es´c´ II. Warszawa: IRWiR PAN. Kalinowski S., Łuczak A., Koziolek A. (2022). The social dimension of security: The dichotomy of respondents’ perceptions during the covid-19 pandemic. Sustainability, 14(3), 1363. Kirk A., Meyer J.M., Whisman M.A., Deacon B.J., Arch J.J. (2019). Safety behaviors, experiential avoidance, and anxiety: A path analysis approach. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 64, 9–15. Łuczak A., Kalinowski S. (2021). Fuzzy clustering methods to identify the epidemiological situation and its changes in european countries during covid-19. Entropy, 24(1), 14. Mertens G., Gerritsen L., Duijndam S., Salemink E., Engelhard I. M. (2020). Fear of the coronavirus (Covid-19): Predictors in an online study conducted in March 2020. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 102258. https://doi.org/10. 1016/j.janxdis.2020.102258 Troiano G., Nardi A. (2021). Vaccine hesitancy in the era of Covid-19. Public Health, 194, 245–251. Turan G.B., Aksoy M., Özer Z., Demir C. (2022). The association between coronaphobia and attitude towards Covid-19 Vaccine: A sample in the east of Turkey. L’encephale, 48(1), 38–42. Willis D.E., Andersen J.A., Bryant-Moore K., Selig J.P., Long C.R., Felix H.C., ... McElfish P.A. (2021). Covid-19 vaccine hesitancy: Race/ethnicity, trust, and fear. Clinical and Translational Science, 14(6), 2200–2207. Warneryd ¨ K.E. (1999). The psychology of saving: A study on economic psychology. Cheltencham: Edward Elgar Publishing. Yang C.C., Tsai J.Y., Pan S. (2020). Discrimination and well-being among Asians/Asian Americans during Covid-19: The role of social media. Cyberpsychology, Behavior, and Social Networking, 23(12), 865–870.

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Yu V.G., Lasco G., David C.C. (2021). Fear, mistrust, and vaccine hesitancy: Narratives of the dengue vaccine controversy in the Philippines. Vaccine, 39(35), 4964–4972. Zw˛eglinska-Gałecka ´ D. (2020). Koronakryzys. Lokalne zróznicowanie ˙ globalnej pandemii. Wie´s I Rolnictwo, 3 (188), 67–90. https://doi.org/10.53098/wir 032020/04

Branding in the Pandemic: The “Cool Japan” Strategy Machiko Sato

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and Erman Akıllı

Introduction

On June 10, 2022, Japan reopened its door to foreign tourists for the first time in two years after it was suspended due to the Covid-19 pandemic. About a week later, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida appeared at the Contemporary Manga Library in Tokyo, discussing manga and anime with six leading manga artists. He noted that “soft power,” not hard power, is the source of Japan’s growth. In his words, manga is important content and politics needs to encourage diplomacy using manga to help create an atmosphere of peace and friendship in the world. Kishida said he would promote manga sales to overseas markets (The Nikkei,

This work was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number JP20K01523. M. Sato (B) School of International Relations, University of Shizuoka, Shizuoka, Japan e-mail: [email protected] E. Akıllı Department of International Relations, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli University, Ankara, Türkiye © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Akilli and B. Gunes (eds.), World Politics in the Age of Uncertainty, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39611-3_16

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2022b). Under Kishida, Japan (Kantei, 2022; The Nikkei, 2022a) reaffirmed “reactivating” the Cool Japan policy for post-COVID growth strategies as one of the priorities. In addition, members of the Diet, MANGA (Manga Animation Game), and the Parliamentary Association for Manga, Animation, and Game have once again begun actively working on bipartisan efforts for the archival preservation of materials related to Japanese manga, anime, and games, as well as their use in human resource development. Cool Japan-related sectors like manga, anime, entertainment, food and beverage, tourism, culture and arts, as well as events have been hit hard by Covid-19, while some of them have been in jeopardy. However, the government (Kantei, 2022) viewed that the Tokyo 2020 Olympic Games provided an opportunity for Japanese people to “rediscover” the country’s attractiveness, and the content business and media content industry has reached a new turning point to utilise digital technology for promoting the Cool Japan strategy. Unsurprisingly at the same time, some arguments and criticism have warned against these government moves (Kodachi, 2020; The Nikkei, 2022c). The failure of Cool Japan, Inc. as a national project under the former administration’s growth strategy is well known, and the recent issues revealed in media such as unfair or unhealthy working conditions and harassment in the entertainment industries, have also been fresh in people’s minds. However, despite its initial failures, the government believes Cool Japan is an effective policy for diplomacy. That may be why, interestingly enough, the government frequently uses identical words, such as “reactivate,” “restructure,” “rebuild,” “recover,” “restart,” or “reorganise” to promote its Cool Japan strategy (Kantei, 2022). In this context, the challenge would be how and what to re-distribute or re-communicate Japan’s cool content to the world. This chapter will review and analyse Japan’s construction of the Cool Japan narrative or definition before, during, and after the pandemic. It will examine how the country’s approach to Cool Japan has evolved and explore its implications in the post-pandemic era.

2

Pop Culture as Tools of Japanese Soft Power

Japan started referring to “soft power” in Diplomatic Bluebook in 2004. It is defined as the ability to attract another country by promoting Japan’s attractiveness that can directly affect public opinion in other countries, as

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based on the concept defined by Joseph S. Nye, Jr (Nye, 1990). However, not only was it used in the diplomatic sense, it also had domestic implications. At the time, Japan recognised the need to strengthen public diplomacy by using its soft power for two particular reasons. It was part of its efforts to regain the lost public confidence in Japan’s diplomacy after a series of scandals involving the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) since 2001, and in response to the 9/11 situation to strengthen mutual understanding and dialogue with the Arab world (MOFA, 2004: 210; MOFA 2003: 11). An aim to improve Japan’s image was to engage with both the domestic and international public in a broader sense. A policy speech on cultural diplomacy followed this in April 2006 by then-Foreign Minister Taro Aso. He praised the Japanese cultural heritage of the intangibles of skills and techniques as a “tremendous contribution to the world.“ He also admired the people in the content industry as the new era’s promoters of modern Japanese culture to the world. For the Japan “brand,” he asked the private sector to use the MOFA better and build good public–private partnerships for a true win–win relationship (MOFA, 2006). The more world has become democratised, the more public opinion has enjoyed significant influence on diplomacy. Moreover, with the development of the internet, mass media and the advance of democratic institutions worldwide, it can now directly approach the public overseas. Accordingly, the MOFA (2006, 2007: 24–25) determined pop culture as an effective force for global penetration. By defining pop culture as a diplomacy tool, the government could also encourage the Japanese people to have more confidence in their own culture (Kondo, 2010: 18). As a tool of Japanese soft power, pop culture was set to lead its diplomacy, as well as energise and empower the Japanese people by rediscovering the country’s potential. It was a turning point in Japanese industry and diplomacy that content business or pop culture was set as a driving force to boost the country’s competitiveness.

3

“Cool Japan” as a Nation Branding Strategy

Following the lead of Cool Britannia and Korea’s Hallyu under political leadership, the Japanese government embarked on Cool Japan in 2003. Nation branding is used to enhance a nation’s international standing or reputation worldwide. Japan recognised that responsible governments must develop a country’s competitive identity for their economic, political, and social aims because that is the electorate’s most valuable asset

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(Anholt, 2013: 8–9). In Foreign Policy, McGray (2002, 54) calls Japan’s global cultural influence “Japan’s Gross National Cool” and portrays how Japanese culture, particularly mass culture, transcended US demand. His argument reminded Japan of its cultural reach as a superpower already in place. Japan started using pop culture to pursue new cultural diplomacy effectively in the new era of the increasingly democratised world (Kantei, 2003; MOFA, 2006), through examples including the World Cosplay Summit, the International Manga Award, and the pop culture festival. MOFA and other ministries and agencies promoted campaigns related to pop culture diplomacy. These attempts seemed highly valued in other countries. However, they have yet to effectively contribute to developing the Japanese industry. Therefore, the government aimed to designate industries related to content creation, food, fashion, design, and other soft power-creating sectors to lead the Japanese economy (Kantei, 2009). Japan would not only win out in the competition in overseas markets but also be able to activate domestic markets for substantial economic growth if Japan could fully make the most of its cultural strength and technological power. Accordingly, a government-led project and its institutionalisation began in 2010. Japan established the Cool Japan Promotion Office under the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) in 2010 and expanded it as the Creative Industries Division in 2011. Then-Prime Minister Shinzo Abe created a Minister in charge of the Cool Japan Strategy in 2012 to shift the organisational function from METI to the Cabinet Office to drive the Cool Japan policy. In 2013, Cool Japan Fund, Inc. was established as a public–private fund to commercialise “Cool Japan” and increase overseas demand. Around that time, Abe strengthened the initiative to boost Cool Japan through top-level sales. Indeed, Abe suddenly popped up on stage dressed as Super Mario, the Nintendo video game character for the Olympic handover to Tokyo, at the closing ceremony of the 2016 Rio de Janeiro Olympics. His appearance created the best opportunity to leverage Cool Japan. For a series of meetings to discuss and review the concept of Cool Japan and its integration for economic growth (Kantei, 2010a), their mission was to formulate a globally competitive business that generates excellent economic value and creates human resources in international standardisation and commercialisation. Furthermore, in the Intellectual

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Property Strategic Program 2010 (Kantei, 2010b), industrial policies, sciences and technology policies, and information communications technologies policies were integrated into the Cool Japan strategy. Again, Cool Japan was defined as a driving force for Japan’s economic growth and revitalisation by effectively combining content, fashion, and tourism promotion with various other sectors (Kantei, 2011a; 2011b; 2011c). Because of this, however, perceptions of what was Cool remained unclear and varied. It seemed convenient to keep it vague to embrace broad, undefined perspectives (Tamaki, 2019: 115–116). The Action Plan for Promoting Cool Japan of May 27, 2011 (Kantei, 2011e), confesses that “rather than defining Cool Japan, it is essential to delineate Cool Japan through trials and errors while searching for what is Cool Japan.“ As Tamaki (2019: 115–116) argues, the vagueness of Cool Japan culminated in the Intellectual Property Strategic Program 2011. Cool Japan was seemingly synonymous with pop culture but different in its contents and ideas.

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The Impact of the Great East Japan Earthquake on Cool Japan Strategy

When the Great East Japan Earthquake—measured at a massive 9.0–9.1 on the Richter scale—hit in 2011, people worldwide became increasingly concerned about Japan’s risks of natural disasters. An unprecedented national crisis since World War II caused extensive damage to Japan’s image, especially the reliability of food from Japan and tourism in Japan due to the Fukushima nuclear disaster. However, the disaster suggested an opportunity to think of a new outlook in Japan from a fresh perspective. There was admiration for Japan’s resilience and orderly response to the disasters, which resulted in neither riots nor looting. The government deemed it an opportunity for significant reform to move on whenever Japan faced severe crises, such as the Meiji Restoration and post-war reconstruction in the past (Kantei, 2011f).“ Furthermore, it recognised the promotion of Cool Japan as necessary for accelerating Japan’s recovery. In particular, pop culture and content like festivals have the power to break through the self-restraint mood and negative atmosphere covering Japan as a whole and get up in good spirits both in and outside Japan. A survey about changes in Japan’s value after the 3/11 Earthquake showed that pursuing spiritual fulfilment by 65% exceeded seeking

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economic satisfaction by 33% to a question about the direction Japan should take (Japan Management Association, 2012: 90). The survey results implied that Japan could develop a different kind of soft power or a national brand, and regain the world’s trust. The Japanese mindset had an energy-saving concept called “mottainai,” which was well-suited to the Japanese consciousness and action after the 3/11 Earthquake (Tsuji, 2013: 214–216). These attitudes and minds appeared as “an accurate manifestation of Cool Japan” (Kantei, 2011f) since many countries face common issues like green and life innovations. There were many areas where Japan could assume leadership in new business models and pop culture. Therefore, the Intellectual Property Strategic Program 2011 extended the concept of Cool Japan to high-tech products such as robots and environmental technologies. The concept of Cool Japan seemed more for abstraction that everything was allowed (Kantei, 2011d; 2011e; 2011f). In the Intellectual Property Strategic Program 2012 (Kantei, 2012), the term Cool Japan was replaced by “smart power,” in which Cool Japan would be advanced by combining goods and services. Japan seemingly intended to project itself as a “content creation nation” (Kantei, 2013). Nevertheless, again, the term Cool Japan remained undefined and instead rather a convenient catchphrase to stay this way.

5 The Tokyo 2020 Olympics and the Pandemic Breakout When Japan won the bid to host the 2020 Olympics in Tokyo, the country could hope for an increase in tourists during and around the time of the Games and take full advantage of the global exposure of the Tokyo Olympics for public diplomacy. However, the Covid-19 pandemic restricted social and economic activities, as well as human mobility. The phenomenon was called the “Great Lockdown” or “Great Shutdown” (Wolf, 2020). Soon after the World Health Organization (WHO) designated Covid-19 as a global pandemic on March 11, 2020, Abe and the IOC President Thomas Bach agreed to postpone the Tokyo 2020 Olympics. This postponement once again suggested another opportunity for Japan to reformulate Japan’s stance on the Cool Japan strategy. The pandemic became a significant catalyst for reassuring Japan of its strength and resilience in hardship and that the Japanese people and industry

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are more substantial than anticipated. Moreover, Japan had experiences and the fresh memory of overcoming two economic crises; the Lehman Shock of 2008, called “the once-in-a-century international financial crisis, and the 3/11 Earthquake, also called a once-in-a-thousand-year natural disaster. Therefore, Japan could consider the Covid-19 crisis a competitive advantage for Japan. When Abe declared a state of emergency and local governors called on businesses to remain closed, it did not mean enforcing the shutdown or lockdown because Japanese leaders, unlike the government elsewhere, have no legal power. However, the people in Japan behaved in voluntary quarantine. When foreign media began to admire the Japanese attitude, Japan became aware of its advantages, values, and culture of Japan. Griffin (2020) highlights that consumers do not choose to consume Japanese products simply because Japan is considered “cool,” but rather due to the products and trends crafted by Japanese creators and consumers. These individuals have grappled with social, political, and personal challenges following the burst of the economic bubble in the early 1990s. Interestingly, the resulting products and trends coincided with the issues faced by Westerners following the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Therefore, Griffin sees the popularity of anime overseas as not a result of the government’s Cool Japan strategy or business development by anime companies, but rather a complete coincidence. From his perspective, people overseas have become attracted to Japanese pop culture or something “cool” because of resembling the post-bubble mentality of the Japanese people since the Lehman Shock. Thus, the Japanese government derived the concept of communicating that new lifestyles are “cool” after Covid-19 (CAO, 2022b). It is a rural lifestyle where people live away from the city because they can use technology to take advantage of remote work. In 2021, playing a part in the Cool Japan Strategy, the Cool Japan Public–Private Partnership Platform (CJPF) was set forth as an immediate new policy. It was for leveraging the strengths of Japanese culture and traditions, particularly Japanese food and food culture, in individual communities’ locality. That also aimed to gain recognition as a travel destination with inbound tourism in mind.

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6

Cool Japan in the Era of Society 5.0 and a Value Design Society

Society 5.0 is a proposed society for Japan’s future that follows the hunting society (Society 1.0), agricultural society (Society 2.0), industrial society (Society 3.0), and information society (Society 4.0). It is a “human-centred society that balances economic advancement with the resolution of social problems by a system that highly integrates cyberspace and physical space.” The Intellectual Property Strategic Program 2016 (Kantei, 2016) recognised a significant potential to expand the market of the content distribution business in Society 5.0, by combining creative content such as manga, anime, and games with other sectors, including manufacturing, food, sightseeing, and science technology, under the demand for “stay-home” and remote work or service during Covid19. The Japanese government (CAO, 2022a) initiated to accelerate the development of Society 5.0 to turn the pandemic crisis into an opportunity. For that potential, the government underscored two points. One is the need to expand creative reach overseas by delivering more diverse content, and the other is combating counterfeits and piracy globally (Kantei, 2016, 2017). Diverse content seemingly helped expand the market for Cool Japan, but at the same time, it was also considered negatively for vagueness or being all-inclusive. Therefore, the Intellectual Property Strategy Vision 2018 (Kantei, 2019) changed the word from “diversity” to “empathy.” Furthermore, the government emphasised redesigning the Cool Japan strategy based on “empathy from around the world.” In an era of dramatic digitalisation, the creation of new values becomes democratised, and each entity proactively envisions new ideas, question society, and gain empathy. That is the essence of the value design society. Therefore, national branding was intended to achieve a “value design” with sympathy worldwide and such efforts were included as a part of the Cool Japan initiative (Kantei, 2019). The Cool Japan strategy focused on what and where people worldwide find empathy in Japan. The government considered it related to “the digital garden city state initiative, aimed at boosting the use of digital technologies in rural areas to narrow the gap between city and nonurban areas” (Kantei, 2021b). Prime Minister Kishida initiated this initiative to revitalise the regional economy into a new normal society for the postCovid-19 age. The Intellectual Property Strategic Program 2021 (Kantei,

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2021a) underlines consideration for nature, ecology, and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), an indispensable element in all initiatives for the Cool Japan strategy. Japan reflected people’s changing values by incorporating these elements as Cool Japan’s priorities at every stage. Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi emphasised that Japan would contribute to making rules and standards for the digital economy. For instance, “Data Free Flow with Trust” (DFFT) is one of the efforts that Japan has taken the leadership in rulemaking and led the global efforts in the area to make free, fair rules and standards in the two areas of green and digital economies (MOFA, 2021).

7

How is Japanese Soft Power Seen in the World?

Let us look at four indices, Anholt-Ipsos Nation Brands Index, Future Brand Country Index, the Soft Power 30 Index, and the Good Country Index, and see how Japan’s position fares. Anholt-Ipsos Nation Brands and Future Brand Country provide an overall index based on the countryof-origin image, tourism, cultural traditions, and reputation as a business investment destination. The Soft Power 30 and The Good Country provide an overall index based on market openness, international order, and contribution to the international community in the areas of education, environment, health, cultural technology, as well as innovation vitality. It is correct to say that the former measures the attractiveness of a country’s content, products, and services, while the latter measures its ability to respond to international challenges. In Anholt-Ipsos Nation Brands (2021, 2022), Japan ranked 2nd in 2022, 3rd in 2021, 4th in 2020, 5th in 2019, and 2nd in 2018 out of 50. In the Future Brand Country Index (2019, 2020), Japan was 1st out of 75 countries in 2020 and 2019. In the Soft Power 30 (2017, 2018, 2019), Japan ranked 8th in 2019, 5th in 2018, and 6th in 2017, out of 30 countries. In the Good Country version 1.5 (2020), Japan rated 34th out of 169 based on mostly 2020 data. In addition, Brand Finance (2020, 2021, 2022) also explores Global Soft Power Index by nation brand strength based on business and trade, governance, international relations, culture and heritage, media and communications, education and science, and people and people and values. Japan ranks 4th in 2023, up from 5th in 2022, 2nd in 2021, and 4th in 2020, out of 121 national brands. Brand Finance states that Japan, in 2021, with a strong reputation for being well-run, emerged strongly in

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crisis management. Japan has emerged as relatively successful with lower Covid-19 cases and deaths and with its economy faring better. Japan is at the top regarding which nation has the most significant potential for future growth.

8

Conclusion

As per these index rankings, Japan’s national branding and Cool Japan strategy have certainly generated good results before and after the Covid19 pandemic. The Japanese government has consistently defined Cool Japan as the soft power of its diplomacy. Prime Minister Kishida (The Nikkei, 2022b) has also praised the immense popularity of Japanese manga abroad, arguing that “when considering Japan’s future, the source of Japan’s growth is not hard power but soft power, and manga plays a vital role.” At the same time, however, the Japanese government has been asking itself what the definition of Cool Japan should be to convince the Japanese people of its appeal and potential. It is undeniable that manga and anime have been viewed ambivalently and lost their way as a means, or content of Cool Japan. Having experienced the 3/11 earthquake and the recovery from the Covid-19 crisis, Japan has been attempting to relate its resilience to the Cool Japan concept. The Japanese government defines “empathy” as finding commonalities between these Japanese experiences and the rest of the world that can be shared domestically and internationally through digital technology. The government views empathy as something universally understood by people worldwide and the key to Japan’s expanding soft power.

References Anholt, S. (2013) ‘Beyond the nation brand: The role of image and identity in international relations,’ Exchange: The Journal of Public Diplomacy, 2(1). Available at: https://surface.syr.edu/exchange/vol2/iss1/1 (Accessed: 20 February 2023). Brand Finance (2020) Global soft power index 2020. Available at: https://brandi rectory-live-public.s3.eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/reports_free/brand-financeglobal-soft-power-index-2020.pdf (Accessed: 22 February 2023).

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Brand Finance (2021) Global soft power index 2021. Available at: https://brandi rectory-live-public.s3.eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/reports_free/brand-financeglobal-soft-power-index-2021.pdf (Accessed: 22 February 2023). Brand Finance (2022) Global soft power index 2022. Available at: https://brandi rectory-live-public.s3.eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/reports_free/brand-financesoft-power-index-2022.pdf (Accessed: 22 February 2023). CAO (2022a), Society 5.0., n.d. Available at: https://www8.cao.go.jp/cstp/eng lish/society5_0/index.html (Accessed: 22 August 2022). CAO (2022b) Cool Japan kanmin renkei puratto foramu 2022b nendo no katsudo hoshin [Action policies of the Cool Japan Public-Private Partnership Platform 2022], 14 July. Available at: https://www.cao.go.jp/cool_japan/platform/ activity/pdf/20220901_siryou.pdf (Accessed: 22 August 2022). FutureBrand (2019) The future brand country index 2019. Available at: https:// www.futurebrand.com/futurebrand-country-index (Accessed: 20 February 2023). FutureBrand (2020) The future brand country index 2020, November. Available at: https://www.futurebrand.com/uploads/FBCi-2020-Assets/FutureBrandCountry-Index-2020.pdf (Accessed: 20 February 2023). Griffin, A. (2020) ‘Coronavirus: World Health Organisation tells people to stay at home and play games’, Independent, 31 March. Available at: https://www.independent.co.uk/tech/coronavirus-world-health-organisat ion-play-games-covid-19-advice-a9438916.html (Accessed: 22 August 2022). Ipsos (2021) Anholt-Ipsos nation brands index, 19 October. Available at: https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/ct/news/documents/2021-10/ NBI-2021-ipsos.pdf (Accessed: 20 February 2023). Ipsos (2022) Anholt-Ipsos nation brands index, 22 November. Available at: https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/ct/news/documents/ 2022-11/NBI%202022%20-%20Full%20Report.pdf (Accessed: 20 February 2023). Japan Management Association [Nihon Noritsu Ky¯ okai] (2012). 2012 nendo shinnyu shain ishiki ch¯ osa houkokusho [Conscious survey on new employees 2012], https://www.jma.or.jp/img/pdf-report/new_employees_ 2012.pdf (Accessed: 20 August 2022). Kantei (2003) Dai 1-kai chiteki zaisan senryaku honbu gijiroku [The minutes of the intellectual property strategy headquarters 1st meeting], 19 March. Available at: https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/titeki2/dai1/01giji roku.html (Accessed: 22 August 2022). Kantei (2009) Intellectual property strategic plan 2009, 24 June. Available at: https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/titeki2/keikaku2009_e.pdf (Accessed: 20 February 2023). Kantei (2010a) Kontentsu ky¯ oka senmon ch¯ osakai dai1-kai gijiroku [The minutes of the content enhancement special research group 1st meeting], 19 February.

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Available at: https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/titeki2/tyousakai/contents_ kyouka/dai1/gijiroku.html (Accessed: 20 February 2023). Kantei (2010b) Intellectual property strategic program 2010, 21 May. Available at: https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/titeki2/ipsp2010.pdf (Accessed: 22 August 2022). Kantei (2011a) Kontetsu ky¯ oka senmon ch¯ osakai dai6-kai gijiroku [The minutes of the content enhancement special research group 6th meeting], 10 February. Available at: https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/titeki2/tyousakai/contents_ kyouka/2011/dai6/gijiroku.html (Accessed: 22 August 2022). Kantei (2011b) Kontetsu ky¯ oka senmon ch¯ osakai dai7-kai gijiroku [The minutes of the content enhancement special research group 7th meeting], 25 February. Available at: https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/titeki2/tyousakai/contents_ kyouka/2011/dai7/gijiroku.html (Accessed: 22 August 2022). Kantei (2011c) Kontetsu ky¯ oka senmon ch¯ osakai dai8-kai gijiroku [The minutes of the content enhancement special research group 8th meeting], 10 March. Available at: https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/titeki2/tyousakai/contents_ kyouka/2011/dai8/gijiroku.html (Accessed: 22 August 2022). Kantei (2011d) Kontetsu ky¯ oka senmon ch¯ osakai dai9-kai gijiroku [The minutes of the content enhancement special research group 9th meeting], 26 April. Available at: https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/titeki2/tyousakai/contents_ kyouka/2011/dai9/gijiroku.html (Accessed: 22 August 2022). Kantei (2011e) Cool Japan suishin ni kansuru akushon puran [Action Plan for promoting Cool Japan], 27 May. Available at: https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/ singi/titeki2/kettei/cjap.pdf (Accessed: 22 August 2022). Kantei (2011f) Intellectual property strategic program 2011, 3 June. Available at: https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/titeki2/ipsp2011.pdf (Accessed: 22 August 2022). Kantei (2012) Intellectual property strategic program 2012, 29 May. Available at: https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/titeki2/ipsp2012.pdf (Accessed: 22 August 2022). Kantei (2013) Intellectual property strategic program 2013, 25 June. Available at: https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/titeki2/kettei/chizaikeikak u2013_e.pdf (Accessed: 22 August 2022). Kantei (2016) Intellectual property strategic program 2016, May. Available at: https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/titeki2/kettei/chizaikeikaku20 160509_e.pdf (Accessed: 22 August 2022). Kantei (2017) Intellectual property strategic program 2017 , May Available at: https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/titeki2/kettei/chizaikeikaku20 170516_e.pdf (Accessed: 22 August 2022). Kantei (2019) Intellectual property promotion plan 2019, 21 June. Available at: https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/titeki2/kettei/chizaikeikaku20 190808_e.pdf (Accessed: 22 August 2022).

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Kantei (2021a) Intellectual property strategic program 2021, 13 July. Available at: https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/titeki2/kettei/chizaikeikaku20 210713_e.pdf, accessed 20 August 2022. Kantei (2021b) ‘Council for the realization of the vision for a Digital Garden City Nation’, 11 November. Available at: https://japan.kantei.go.jp/101_kis hida/actions/2021b11/_00006.html (Accessed: 22 August 2022). Kantei (2022) Intellectual property strategy program 2022, 3 June. Available at: https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/titeki2/kettei/chizaikeikaku20 221114_e.pdf (Accessed: 20 February 2023). Kodachi, H. (2020) Cool Japan and other state-backed funds hit by huge loses, Nikkei Asia, 12 October. Available at: https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/ Business-trends/Cool-Japan-and-other-state-backed-funds-hit-by-huge-losses (Accessed: 20 February 2023). Kondo, S. (2010) ‘Bunka no chikara de Nihon to gaiko wo motto genki ni shiyou’ [Let’s empower Japan and its diplomacy by the power of culture], Diplomacy, 3, 30 November, pp. 16–23. Available at: https://www.mofa. go.jp/mofaj/press/pr/gaikou/vol3/pdfs/gaikou_vol3_08.pdf (Accessed: 22 August 2022). McGray, D. (2002) ‘Japan’s gross national cool’, Foreign Policy, 130, May/June 2002. Available at: https://web.mit.edu/condry/Public/cooljapan/Feb232006/McGray-02-GNCool.pdf (Accessed: 20 August 2022). MOFA (2003) ‘Overview: the International Situation and Japanese Diplomacy in 2002’ in Diplomatic Bluebook 2003, April. Available at: https://www.mofa. go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2003/chap1.pdf (Accessed: 22 August 2022). MOFA (2004) ‘Japan’s Foreign Policy in Major Diplomatic Fields’ in Diplomatic Bluebook 2004, April. Available at: https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/blu ebook/2004/chap3-e.pdf (Accessed: 22 August 2022). MOFA (2006) ‘A new look at cultural diplomacy: A call to Japan’s cultural practitioners’, Speech by Minister for Foreign Affairs Taro Aso at Digital Hollywood University, 28 April. Available at: https://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm/ aso/speech0604-2.html (Accessed: 22 August 2022). MOFA (2007) ‘Japan’s foreign policy in major diplomatic fields’, Diplomatic Bluebook 2007 . Available at: https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/ bluebook/2007/chapter3.pdf (Accessed: 22 August 2022). MOFA (2021) ‘Keynote speech by foreign minister MOTEGI at the 2ND TOKYO GLOBAL DIALOGUE “Japan’s foreign policy towards the postCOVID-19 world”’, 25 February. Available at: https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/ pp/page3e_001109.html (Accessed: 2 February 2023). Nye Jr., J. S. (1990) Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power. New York: Basic Books.

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Impact of Covid-19 on Greenhouse Gas Emission in OECD Countries: K-Mean Method Aslı Akıllı

1

Introduction

The COVID-19 outbreak has resulted in significant economic and environmental impacts on industries worldwide. Throughout the pandemic, numerous companies have ceased operations and closed down, leading to severe disruptions in most industry sectors. In addition to the challenges faced in consumer demand, which is a crucial aspect of the economy, various short-term difficulties have emerged in sectors such as health and safety, supply chain management, workforce management, cash flow, sales, and marketing. Sectors such as tourism, accommodation, aviation, textiles, agriculture, construction, and gemstones play a vital role in the economy and generate employment. However, they have reported billions of losses during the COVID-19 pandemic (Seetharaman, 2020). In this process, there were layoffs in various sectors, particularly in micro-, small-, and medium-sized enterprises, due to economic losses, lack of funds, and resources, as well as a decrease in demand and logistical challenges caused by quarantines. One of the sectors significantly

A. Akıllı (B) Faculty of Agriculture, Kirsehir Ahi Evran University, Kirsehir, Turkey e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Akilli and B. Gunes (eds.), World Politics in the Age of Uncertainty, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39611-3_17

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affected by the COVID-19 pandemic is agriculture. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO, 2020) reports that COVID-19 has impacted the agricultural sector in two crucial aspects: food supply and demand (Siche, 2020). The agricultural sector plays a vital role in meeting people’s food needs, and it is essential to maintain agricultural activities healthily within this context. While there has been an increased demand for wheat, vegetables, and other crops during the pandemic, some difficulties such as delivery problems to consumers, disruptions in the supply chain due to logistics challenges, labor shortages for harvesting activities, sales to large consumer masses (e.g., hotels, restaurants), and raw material supply have been identified (Debata et al., 2020). In addition to the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, environmental effects have been observed. Short-term reductions in greenhouse gas emissions during the pandemic primarily resulted from the slowdown in economic activities, production cuts, and decreased transportation, including airline travel. A decline in energy demand was observed during the peak period of the COVID-19 pandemic. Emissions of CO2 and other air pollutants are directly linked to energy demand and human activities. Consequently, global greenhouse gas emissions have decreased due to reduced industrial production activities and regional land and air transportation (Nguyen et al., 2021). Greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) contribute to global warming and climate change, primarily influenced by industrialization and urbanization (Talaei et al., 2020). In 2018, the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) issued recommendations stating that global greenhouse gas emissions should be reduced by at least 25% of the 2017 levels by 2030 in order to meet the targets set by the Paris Agreement (Sun et al., 2022). The countries belonging to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) hold significant importance and wield substantial influence within the global economy. Over the past two decades, OECD countries have amassed valuable experience in emissions reduction through sustainable energy transitions, development of environmentally friendly technologies, and various policy reforms aimed at promoting green growth (Sun et al., 2022; Wang et al., 2019). Examining changes in greenhouse gas emissions among OECD countries has been the focus of various studies. Çemrek et al. (2010) conducted a study using fuzzy cluster analysis to classify OECD countries based on CO2 emission indicators resulting from fossil fuel use. They used emission amounts from different sectors as input variables and identified four distinct clusters through fuzzy clustering analysis. Sel (2020)

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employed data mining methods and two-stage clustering analysis to classify OECD countries based on CO2 emissions related to sector-specific emissions and various fuel types. The research incorporated an SOMtype artificial neural network and categorized OECD countries into four clusters. The primary objective of this article was to analyze the distribution of agricultural emissions among OECD countries using cluster analysis. The analysis employed two methods: K-means and HDBSCAN algorithms. Another study conducted by Andrzejuk (2018) examined agricultural emissions in OECD countries using various clustering algorithms. The analysis resulted in the researcher evaluating OECD countries across three different clusters. Kocabıyık et al. (2022) conducted a cluster analysis using data on inflation rates, unemployment rates, dollar rates, interest rates, stock market indices, and export–import coverage ratios of OECD countries. The study considered the period from 2017 to 2019 as the pre-pandemic period and the first eight months of 2020, encompassing the initial phase of the pandemic, as the epidemic period. The Expectation Maximization Algorithm was used in the cluster analysis, leading to the formation of four clusters during the pre-COVID-19 and pandemic periods. Kolasa-Wi˛ecek (2013) employed cluster analysis to classify members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) into homogeneous sub-clusters based on agricultural variables affecting greenhouse gas emissions. The findings revealed the formation of four distinct clusters. Bashir et al. (2023) evaluated 29 OECD countries from 1990 to 2018 to analyze the impact of economic and environmental indicators (export diversity, institutional quality, and macroeconomic variables) on carbon dioxide and greenhouse gas emissions. The analyses used quantile regression and the generalized method of moment approach. The researchers, who took an econometric approach in their studies, reported that export diversification had a negative effect on carbon emissions but promoted greenhouse gas emissions. This study investigates the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on greenhouse gas emissions in OECD countries using the K-Means clustering technique. It analyzes various variables associated with total greenhouse gas emissions, emission intensities, temperature changes, and the agriculture sector within the context of climate change parameters. Specifically, variables related to the agricultural sector were compiled and categorized under separate headings, considering areas where NO2, CH4, and CO2 emissions exhibit the highest concentrations. The variables

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used are summarized as follows: Total Emission Excl. Land Use, Land Use Change, and Forestry (LULUCF) Total Emission Excl. LULUCF, Total GHG excl. LULUCF per capita, Total GHG excl. LULUCF per unit of GDP, Temperature Change on Land, Emission Intensity, Crop Residues, On Farm Energy Use, Synthetic Fertilizer, Energy, IPPU, Manure Left on Pasture, Manure Applied Soil, Manure Management, Enteric Fermentation, Waste, Agri-Food System Waste Disposal, Rice Cultivation, Food Consumption, Food Process, Food Transportation, Net Forest Conversion.

2

Data Source and Methodology

In the study, greenhouse gas emission values of 35 OECD countries and climate change parameter data related to these values were used in the years representing the pre- and post-pandemic periods. The data were obtained by compiling information from the database of The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO, 2023) and The Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD, 2023)’s climate change indicators. In the study, information about 2018 and 2019 representing the pre-pandemic period and 2020 representing the pandemic process are included. To perform the clustering, the total values indicating greenhouse gas emissions and up-to-date information on agricultural emission values could be obtained as a whole until 2020. Figure 1 includes total emissions excluding LULUCF changes in OECD countries. It can be seen that among OECD countries, countries with developed economies have high Total Emissions Excluding LULUCF values for pre- and pandemic processes. In the evaluations made annually within the countries, it was observed that the pre-pandemic values in the numerical results for 2020 decreased compared to the previous years. Figure 2 includes total GHG excluding LULUCF per unit of gross domestic product (GDP) change in OECD countries. Data compiled from the OECD database present trends in man-made and gas emissions of major greenhouse gases. The content of the data includes total emissions of CO2 (emissions from energy use and industrial processes, e.g., cement production), CH4 (methane emissions from solid waste, livestock, mining of hard coal and lignite, rice paddies, agriculture and leaks from natural gas pipelines), nitrous oxide (N2 O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), sulphur hexafluoride (SF6), and nitrogen trifluoride (NF3) (OECD, 2023). Variables representing

Fig. 1 Total emissions excluding LULUCF change in OECD countries

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Fig. 2 Total GHG excl. LULUCF per unit of GDP change in OECD countries

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agricultural emissions are summarized as follows: Crop Remnants consist of the return of what is considered a residual portion of agricultural produce to managed lands. Greenhouse gas emissions from rice cultivation come from methane gas from the anaerobic decomposition of organic matter in paddy fields. Greenhouse gas emissions from crop residues burned in the field are methane and nitrous oxide gases. Greenhouse gas emissions from the digestive process, called enteric fermentation, in which carbohydrates are broken down into simple molecules by microorganisms for absorption into an animal’s bloodstream, consist of methane gas. Greenhouse gas emissions from manure management release methane and nitrous oxide gases from aerobic and anaerobic manure separation processes. Manure left on pasture Greenhouse gas emissions from animal waste left on managed lands due to grazing by farm animals consist of nitrous oxide gas. Greenhouse gas emissions from inorganic materials of synthetic origin added to the soil to provide one or more of the plant nutrients required for plant growth consist of the addition of nitrous oxide gas to the managed soils (FAO, 2023).

3

K-Mean Clustering Techniques

The K-Means clustering method is a nonhierarchical clustering approach widely used in applied sciences. K-Means is among the most widely used clustering algorithms. It is an unsupervised technique that is simple and robust. However, the K-Mean algorithm needs to fix the number of clusters and their initial centroids before setting the input data (Canetta, et al., 2005; Mostafa, 2010). The K-Mean algorithm identifies k centroids representing the resulting clusters and minimizes the objective function based on squared error. This process determines the cluster centers and their associated elements (Alpar 2011; Tatlıdil, 1996) as possible and assigns each data point to its nearest cluster center (Ding & He, 2004; Faraoun & Boukelif, 2007). The Euclidean distance is employed for dissimilarity measurement. The mathematical representation of the objective function J is provided in Eq. 1 (Orhan et al., 2011). K   J= ( xk − ci 2 ) i=1

k

(1)

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where; K is the number of clusters, ci is the center of clusters, xk is kth data point in ith cluster. where is the xk − ci 2 distance measure between the centers of clusters ci and kth data point xk . With the implementation of the objective function, clusters are represented by the binary membership matrix U. The elements of matrix U are given in Eq. 2 (Orhan et al., 2011).  1 if  xk − ci 2 ≤ xk − ct 2 , ∀t = i ui j = (2) otherwise 0 where u i j shows that jth data point belongs to ith cluster or not. The centroid of the cluster ci is given in Eq. 3 (Ding & He, 2004; Faraoun & Boukelif, 2007; Orhan et al., 2011). N j=1 u i j x j (3) ci =  N j=1 u i j The algorithm can be summarized as follows: 1. Data components are assigned a cluster number between 1 and k, this phase is known as the initial phase. where k is the number of clusters chosen by the researcher. 2. Cluster centers are calculated. Here data items are assigned to the group with the nearest centroid. 3. Objective function J operations are calculated. 4. The locations of the cluster centers are updated. 5. The process that works after the second step continues until the cluster centers no longer move (Ahmad & Dey, 2007).

4

Cluster Analysis Results

A two-stage clustering approach was used to ensure that clusters were properly obtained. In the first step, a hierarchical clustering method structured with the Euclidean distance and the Ward method is included. The graphical representation of the hierarchy of nested cluster solutions (dendrogram) in Ward’s technique was used to determine the optimal number of clusters. In the K-Means method, the initial values were determined as cluster numbers obtained from the Ward method. Kruskal– Wallis was conducted to examine the differences between clusters and

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to determine how variables would affect cluster structures. In addition, nonparametric multiple comparison tests are included. The analysis of the study was carried out with the SPSS 26 statistical package program and MATLAB R2016 (Fig. 3). The dendrogram representation of hierarchical cluster analysis shows that three clusters can be studied. In this framework, the number of clusters was determined to be three in the K-Mean technique. Clustering results obtained using the K-Mean technique in the Pre-Pandemic Period of OECD countries are given in Table 1. The results of the analysis show that there are 11 countries in the first cluster, one country in the second cluster, and 23 countries in the third cluster. Figure 4 depicts graphical representations of clusters formed by OECD countries during the pre-pandemic period. It is notable that the United States of America is situated alone in the second cluster. The United States stands as one of the world’s largest economies due to its intensive industrial and commercial activities. It ranks as the third most populous country and possesses high values in terms of energy production and consumption compared to other nations. The country’s air transportation sector, in particular, contributes to the emergence of high levels of greenhouse gas emissions. Figure 4 shows graphical representations of clusters formed by OECD countries during the pre-pandemic period. Based on this, it can be inferred that various factors influence the distribution of these cluster representations. These factors include the magnitude of the observation values that represent climate change parameters, the geographical locations of the countries, the socio-economic characteristics of their societies, and of course the greenhouse gas emission values, which are the focus of this research (Table 2). Figure 5 depicts graphical representations of clusters formed by OECD countries during the pandemic period. Similar to the pre-pandemic period, the United States of America is situated alone in the second cluster. The economic and environmental changes experienced during the pandemic caused some OECD countries to be distributed differently across clusters compared to the pre-pandemic period. In this process, positive developments, albeit short-term, can be observed in terms of climate change, specifically in the cluster structures of countries that implement a common policy on green growth. During the Pandemic period, different variation clusters have been observed in France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and Poland. Countries with similar economic structures and located in close proximity can be included in the same clusters.

Fig. 3 The dendrogram representation of OECD countries in the pre-pandemic period

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Table 1

237

K-mean results of OECD countries in the pre-pandemic period

Cluster 1 Austria

Finland

Latvia

Belgium Chile Czech Republic Denmark

Greece Hungary Iceland

Luxembourg Netherlands New Zealand

Slovak Republic Slovenia Spain Sweden

Ireland

Norway

Switzerland

Estonia

Israel

Portugal

Cluster 2

Cluster 3

United States

Australia

Korea

Canada France Germany

Mexico Poland Türkiye

Italy

United Kingdom

Japan

Fig. 4 K-mean results of OECD countries in the pre-pandemic period

In order to test the hypothesis about whether the differences between the medians of the three clusters obtained by the K-Mean technique are significant or not, the Kruskal–Wallis test was applied since the assumptions of normal distribution and homogeneity of variances were not provided. The test results are shown in Table 3 for the pre-pandemic period. Accordingly, a statistically significant difference was found in terms of other variables other than total GHG excluding LULUCF per capita, total GHG excluding LULUCF per unit of GDP, temperature change on

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Table 2

K-mean results of OECD countries in pandemic periods

Cluster 1 Austria Belgium Chile Czech Republic Denmark Estonia

Cluster Cluster 3 2 Finland France Greece Hungary

Israel Italy Latvia Luxembourg

Iceland Ireland

Netherlands New Zealand

Norway Poland Portugal Slovak Republic Slovenia Spain

Sweden United Australia Korea Switzerland States Canada Mexico United Germany Türkiye Kingdom Japan

Fig. 5 K-mean results of OECD countries in pandemic periods

land, emission intensity, and net forest conversion (p < 0.01). This situation states that before the pandemic, countries exhibited heterogeneous structures within themselves in terms of greenhouse gas emissions. The test results are shown in Table 4 for the pandemic period. Accordingly, a statistically significant difference was found in terms of variables other than “total GHG excluding LULUCF per capita, temperature change on land, emission intensity, manure applied to soil, and net forest conversion” (p < 0.05). A statistically significant difference was detected in the pandemic period in terms of the total GHG excluding LULUCF per unit of GDP variable, which was compared with the pre-pandemic

1496.62± 11,050± 6074.56± 5035± 1570.67± 381.5123±

3.88 ± 2.391

1.155± 0.1724± 97.3472± 10.2256± 242.5641± 197.5± 70.9± 130.6558± 55.328±

46.703 ± 14.768 118.21 ± 29.865 177.10 ± 47.977 161.35 ± 34.187 64.00 ± 19.071

0.123 0.200 0.235 0.100 0.958 0.367 0.974 1.502 0.559

0.3395±

0.212 ± 0.016 ± ± ± ± ± ± ± ± ±

20.4115±

9.331 ± 0.738

1.844 0.414 0.874 0.382 4.226 1.882 3.459 3.458 2.218

6,686,374.2±

Cluster 2 (n = 1)

72,979.6 ± 14,112.648

Cluster 1 (n = 23)

± ± ± ± ±

28.957 212.823 211.617 226.126 169.503 57.016 ± 29.372

141.377 757.363 979.606 883.090 464.941

1.614 ± 0.172 0.205 ± 0.020 7.172 ± 1.33 2.838 ± 0.360 25.832 ± 4.532 13.69 ± 1.460 34.706 ± 20.982 25.694 ± 8.833 8.5665 ± 1.716

0.273 ± 0.032

10.748 ± 1.663

639,783.08 ± 73,671.6

Cluster 3 (n = 11)

K-mean clusters of OECD countries in the pre-pandemic period (mean ± SE)

NO2 Total emission excl. LULUCF Total GHG excl. LULUCF per capita Total GHG excl. LULUCF per unit of GDP Temperature change on land Emission intensity Crop residues On farm energy use Synthetic fertilizer Energy IPPU Manure left on pasture Manure applied soil CH4 Manure management Energy Enteric fermentation Waste Agri-food system Waste disposal Rice cultivation CO2

Table 3

9.794

13.316 19.321 18.179 19.907 20.083

2.098 0.389 20.806 22.04 19.321 23.314 12.921 17.079 16.019

3.726

2.7

23.314

0.007**

0.001** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000**

0.35 0.823 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.002** 0.000** 0.000**

0.155

0.259

0.000**

Sig

(continued)

Kruskal–Wallis H

IMPACT OF COVID-19 ON GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSION …

239

(continued) Cluster 2 (n = 1) 5,030,000± 167,000± 128,703± 85,266.3± 59,039.7± 44,269.4± 59,727.2±

Cluster 1 (n = 23) 56,654.5 ± 11,479.005 4453.32 ± 920.627 2715.47 ± 537.431 1419.68 ± 352.943 1483.84 ± 284.943 1416.70 ± 400.674 1419.12 ± 1027.611

* Statistically significant p < 0.05, ** Statistically significant p < 0.01

Energy IPPU Food consumption Food process Food transportation On farm energy use Net forest conversion

Table 3

491,272.7 ± 71,392.429 30,436.3 ± 4369.340 20,815.5 ± 2699.579 14,340.8 ± 3445.449 11,804.2 ± 1477.421 9101.5 ± 1380.138 10,610.07 ± 8650.923

Cluster 3 (n = 11) 23.314 22.04 23.314 21.727 22.992 20.504 2.951

Kruskal–Wallis H

0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.229

Sig

240 A. AKILLI

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241

period (p < 0.05). This result may be a reflection of the economic stagnation and production constraints that occurred during the pandemic period. There was no significant difference between country groups in terms of temperature change and emission intensity variables, which represent variation at global levels (p > 0.05). The silhouette plot of OECD Countries in Pre- and Pandemic Periods is located in Fig. 6. The silhouette plot shows that most points in cluster 1 have a large silhouette value (greater than 0.6), indicating that the cluster is somewhat separated from clusters 2 and 3. The silhouette value was calculated as 0.7342 for the pre-pandemic period and 0.6593 for the pandemic period, respectively.

5

Conclusion

This study examines the values of greenhouse gas emissions of OECD countries between 2018 and 2020 to perform cluster analysis both before and during the pandemic. Accordingly, the presence of countries whose values decreased in terms of total greenhouse gas emissions and related variables, according to OECD database indicators, was determined during the pandemic. Short-term value decreases were observed according to the emission values in the NO2, CH4, and CO2 categories from agricultural emissions obtained from the FAO database. OECD countries were examined in three clusters. The United States of America was positioned in the same cluster alone in terms of greenhouse gas emission values of different types before and during the pandemic period. However, there are countries that differ in terms of greenhouse gas emission assessments during the pandemic period. Individual measures to be taken by countries in line with common policies and strategies to be developed within the framework of green growth, sustainable economy, and environmental understanding will support the emergence of positive developments at the global level. The current study utilizes the projection feature of the K-Means methodology to uncover global similarities among OECD countries in terms of total greenhouse gas emission values and agricultural activities. It is believed that this study will significantly contribute to policy design and strategy development for a sustainable future, specifically regarding the evaluation of pre- and post-pandemic periods in relation to climate change indicators and their impacts on the economy and environment.

6,025,973.61± 18.178± 0.311± 1.324± 0.1709± 98.6854± 9.9223± 241.9719± 174± 70.3± 129.7192± 55.0689± 1499.7605± 10,500± 6032.6004± 4910± 1561.2911± 423.0835±

8.134 ± 0.558 0.195 ± 0.013 2.171 ± 0.148 0.318 ± 0.123 2.198 ± 0.549 0.639 ± 0.214 8.874 ± 2.022 3.756 ± 0.809 13.180 ± 9.306 7.052 ± 2.821 4.239 ± 0.945 67.8011 ± 15.99989 263.3936 ± 76.7137 363.4185 ± 99.72282 307.3322 ± 98.06782 172.8199 ± 70.89539 8.0322 ± 4.56859

Cluster 2 (n = 1)

114,162.83 ± 24,908.75

Cluster 1 (n = 27)

± ± ± ± ±

39.178 225.240 237.515 237.436 115.237 70.45 ± 44.224

127.76 611.14 759.02 745.71 306.55

0.23 ± 0.029 6.46 ± 2.106 2.50 ± 0.582 25.36 ± 8.465 13.55 ± 2.349 17.67 ± 8.687 24.393 ± 11.483 5.652 ± 1.796

1.65 ± 0.167

0.30 ± 0.036

11.73 ± 2.17

722,956.7 ± 78,281.8

Cluster 3 (n = 7)

K-mean clusters of OECD countries in the pandemic period (mean ± SE)

NO2 Total emission Excl. LULUCF Total GHG excl. LULUCF per capita Total GHG excl. LULUCF per unit of GDP Temperature change on land Emission intensity Crop residues On farm energy use Synthetic fertilizer Energy IPPU Manure left on pasture Manure applied soil CH4 Manure management Energy Enteric fermentation Waste Agri-food system waste disposal Rice cultivation

Table 4

6.249

6.538 8.303 7.922 10.184 6.844

0.999 7.737 9.743 7.377 13.528 8.332 9.104 5.243

3.828

8.845

4.644

18.133

0.044*

0.038* 0.016* 0.019* 0.006** 0.033*

0.607 0.021* 0.008** 0.025* 0.001** 0.016* 0.011* 0.073

0.147

0.012*

0.098

0.000**

Kruskal–Wallis H Sig

242 A. AKILLI

100,802.963 ± 21,492.979 7432.037 ± 1457.518 2966.269 ± 844.590 4547.581 ± 1708.307 2630.150 ± 564.064 2354.548 ± 801.147 1756.103 ± 1010.666

* Statistically significant p < 0.05, ** Statistically significant p < 0.01

CO2 Energy IPPU Food consumption Food process Food transportation On farm energy use Net forest conversion

Cluster 1 (n = 27) 4,390,000± 161,000± 87,033.35± 85,406.13± 50,905.60± 37,879.08± 59,727.28±

Cluster 2 (n = 1) 495,285.71 ± 99,225.74 34,300 ± 6390.096 11,654.33 ± 2782.873 10,319.49 ± 2038.777 11,116.82 ± 2102.168 8638.81 ± 1774.098 14,562.29 ± 13,598.362

Cluster 3 (n = 7) 15.358 13.938 12.089 10.639 14.494 11.839 4.873

0.000** 0.001** 0.002** 0.005** 0.001** 0.003** 0.087

Kruskal–Wallis H Sig

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243

Fig. 6 The silhouette plot of OECD countries in pre- and pandemic periods

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References Ahmad, A., & Dey, L. (2007). A k-mean clustering algorithm for mixed numeric and categorical data. Data & Knowledge Engineering, 63(2), 503–527. ˙ Alpar, R. (2011). Çok De˘gi¸skenli Istatistiksel Yöntemler. Detay Yayıncılık. Andrzejuk, A. (2018). Classification of agricultural emissions among OECD countries with unsupervised techniques. Zeszyty Naukowe SGGW w ´ Warszawie-Problemy Rolnictwa Swiatowego, 18(4), 80–91. Bashir, M. A., Dengfeng, Z., Bashir, M. F., Rahim, S., & Xi, Z. (2023). Exploring the role of economic and institutional indicators for carbon and GHG emissions: policy-based analysis for OECD countries. Environmental Science and Pollution Research, 30(12), 32722–32736. Canetta, L., Cheikhrouhou, N., & Glardon, R. (2005). Applying two-stage SOM-based clustering approaches to industrial data analysis. Production Planning & Control, 16(8), 774–784. Çemrek, F., Sentürk, ¸ S., & Terlemez, L. (2010). Bulanık Kümeleme Analizi ˙ Physical ile OECD ülkelerinin CO2 Emisyonları Bakımından Incelenmesi. Sciences, 5(3), 52–69. Debata, B., Patnaik, P., & Mishra, A. (2020). COVID-19 pandemic! It’s impact on people, economy, and environment. Journal of Public Affairs, 20(4), e2372. Ding C., & He, X. (2004). K-means clustering via principal component analysis. In Proceedings of the twenty-first international conference on Machine learning (p. 29). FAO. (2023). Food and Agriculture Organization, https://www.fao.org/hom e/en FAO—Food and Agriculture Organization. (2020). Q&A: COVID-19 pandemic—impact on food and agriculture. Available in: https://www.fao. org/2019-ncov/q-and-a/impact-on-food-and-agriculture/en/ Faraoun, K. M., & Boukelif, A. (2007). Neural networks learning improvement using the k-means clustering algorithm to detect network intrusions. International Journal of Computer and Information Engineering, 1(10), 3151–3158. Kocabıyık, T., Karatlı, M., & Bolat, A. B. (2022). OECD Ülkelerinin Makroekonomik De˘gi¸skenler Açısından Kümelenmesi: Pandemi Dönemi ve Pandemi Öncesi Dönem Kar¸sıla¸stırması. International Journal of Business, Economics and Management Perspectives, 6(1), 195–204. Kolasa-Wi˛ecek, A. (2013). The use of cluster analysis in the classification of similarities in variables associated with agricultural greenhouse gases emissions in OECD countries. Wie´s i Rolnictwo, 158(1), 59–66. Mostafa, M. M. (2010). Clustering the ecological footprint of nations using Kohonen’s self-organizing maps. Expert Systems with Applications, 37(4), 2747–2755.

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Nguyen, X. P., Hoang, A. T., Ölçer, A. I., & Huynh, T. T. (2021). Record decline in global CO2 emissions prompted by COVID-19 pandemic and its implications on future climate change policies. Energy Sources, Part A: Recovery, Utilization, and Environmental Effects, 1–4. OECD. (2023). Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development. https://www.oecd.org Orhan, U., Hekim, M., & Ozer, M. (2011). EEG signals classification using the K-means clustering and a multilayer perceptron neural network model. Expert Systems with Applications, 38(10), 13475–13481. Seetharaman, G. (2020). How different sectors of the economy are bearing the brunt of the coronavirus outbreak. Retrieved from economictimes.com: https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/how-differ ent-sectors-of-the-economy-arebearing-the-brunt-of-the-CoronaVirus-out break/articleshow/74630297.cms Sel, A. (2020). Veri Madencili˘gi Kümeleme Yöntemleri Kullanarak Karbon Emisyonu Göstergeleri Açisindan OECD Ülkelerinin Siniflandirilmasi. Karadeniz Uluslararası Bilimsel Dergi, 1(46), 169–187 Siche, R. (2020). What is the impact of COVID-19 disease on agriculture? Scientia Agropecuaria, 11(1), 3–6. Sun, X., Dong, Y., Wang, Y., & Ren, J. (2022). Sources of greenhouse gas emission reductions in OECD countries: Composition or technique effects. Ecological Economics, 193, 107288. Talaei, A., Gemechu, E., Kumar, A., 2020. Key factors affecting greenhouse gas emissions in the Canadian industrial sector: a decomposition analysis. Journal of Cleaner Production, 246 (Feb.10), 119026.1–119026.17. Tatlıdil, H. (1996). Uygulamalı Çok De˘gi¸skenli Istatistiksel Analiz. Cem web ofset, Ankara. Wang, Y., Sun, X., Guo, X. (2019). Environmental regulation and green productivity growth: empirical evidence on the porter hypothesis from OECD industrial sectors. Energy Policy 132 (SEP.), 611–619.

Re-Thinking International Migration in Terms of Vulnerability: A Critical Overview of the Covid-19 Pandemic Merve Suna Özel Özcan

1

Introduction

Various international issues can lead to consequences that trigger mass migrations. The century-old phenomenon of migration mobility leads to global population movements, particularly in the search for better welfare situations depending on living conditions. Throughout history, people have frequently moved for various reasons, with economic, social, and political variables all playing a role. Therefore, the history of migration is the history of human beings. Nevertheless, the migration policies of many countries have come under fire for being open to abuse, exploitation, and prejudice. Therefore, the issue of immigration and by extension immigrants dominate the international arena through states that give different statuses to individuals. Many countries globally have experienced an increase in the number of people entering or leaving their borders, significantly affecting both sending and receiving communities. Considering the contemporary-era migratory waves, both the source

M. S. Ö. Özcan (B) Department of International Relations, Kırıkkale University, Ankara, Türkiye e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Akilli and B. Gunes (eds.), World Politics in the Age of Uncertainty, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39611-3_18

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and the destination countries experience various repercussions of international migration. Depending on immigration and integration regulations in the target nation, this circumstance can have beneficial or destructive consequences. Therefore, immigration and immigrant issues continue to prompt international discussions, often through the host states. However, this does not mean that every individual is endowed with rights under international law. A fundamental right that an individual has, in terms of human rights, namely the right to life, is restricted in some cases. From this perspective, the issue of immigration and immigrants has become different during the Covid-19 pandemic. Therefore, what needs to be questioned here is why the international structure, which recognizes and protects the individual as a subject of law, simultaneously puts individuals in the position of the “other” and jeopardizes their vulnerable and fragile existence. The notion of “vulnerability” has no common definition, but at the same time, it refers to “an internal risk factor of the subject (Paul, 2014).” The reason for choosing vulnerability as a concept in the study is that the individual is ahead in every field in the international system. This issue reminds us of the fact that human beings are in the position of the most vulnerable and aggressive entity in case of migration, pandemic, or war. Therefore, I can briefly say that migration is closely linked to human vulnerability. Moreover, migration can foster or even worsen vulnerability, especially for individuals forced to leave their homes due to conflict or other abuse. This study will discuss the migration issue in the context of “vulnerability.” The concept of “vulnerability” appears in the context of humanitarian debates, especially in a diary about immigration and asylum. This paper aims to examine global migration’s changing or unchanging nature during the Covid-19 pandemic. Therefore, the paper will shine a light on the relationship between the migration phenomenon and the concept of vulnerability during Covid-19, and the use of the idea will be realized in literature.

2

Conceptual Framework of Vulnerability

A person’s rights and because they are human make them valuable. It is essential to recognize that vulnerability is not solely an individual characteristic, but rather a social and political phenomenon shaped by broader societal structures and power relations. The term “vulnerability” is often

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used in the literature of the social sciences as a type of sociological abbreviation or designation for worthiness, which is typically considered as something intrinsic, physical, and related to the life course which are pregnancy, older age, childhood periods (Brown et al., 2017). Marginalized groups and communities experience vulnerability because they are often excluded from access to resources and social protections. In this respect, protecting human’s physical and spiritual integrity is within the logic of a specific class distinction, rather than certain rights in the historical process. To what extent did enslaved people have the right to live in the medieval world’s slave-lord distinction or how was the aristocrat-slave distinction in Ancient Greece? The answer to this question begins in the eighteenth century on the axis of natural rights, which John Locke put forward in “the state of Nature and the Law of Nature.“ According to Locke, every human being has rights because he is human, and these rights do not derive from the government or the law. The reason for this is hidden in the existence of the state, which has to protect life, liberty, and property 2004). before the individual (Cited in Senel, ¸ The concept of vulnerability contains a central paradox in that it is universal and particular. This paradox originates from our embodiment as human beings. Our physical embodiment makes us all vulnerable somehow, but we experience this vulnerability in distinct ways through our bodies. Therefore, vulnerability is universal in that it affects all humans but is also particular to each person’s embodiment (Peroni, 2012). Every human being is inherently fragile and invulnerable. Many variables, such as gender identity, age, race/ethnicity, and socioeconomic status, might make someone more vulnerable (UNHRC, n.d.). Is not the problem at the point of immigration also caused by this: Others who oppose us? Therefore, the issue of ontological vulnerability that exists here simultaneously gives rise to the epistemological questioning of the subject. Therefore, what is questioned here should be the moral stance of the state or the international arena against individuals’ bodily and mental harm. Vulnerability refers to the degree to which an individual or group is exposed to risks and uncertainties due to poverty, social exclusion, discrimination, and lack of legal status or protection. The body is not a standalone entity but a relation to its environment and infrastructure. When we are unsupported or in a state of precarity, this dependency on infrastructure exposes our vulnerability. According to Butler (2014), vulnerability is a universal condition not solely determined by individual subjective disposition but distributed unequally in society. Vulnerability

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is not just about being susceptible to harm or injury but also about being exposed to the social structures that affect us, including discourse, institutional power, and infrastructure. This vulnerability is further compounded by the fact that migrants often face various structural, systemic, and institutional barriers that limit their access to fundamental rights and services, such as healthcare, education, housing, and employment. This essay will analyse the various ways in which human vulnerability manifests itself in the context of international migration and how it affects the experiences of migrants. In an overview of vulnerability, scholars and policymakers have identified several dimensions. Three main conceptualizations of vulnerability have emerged in the literature: Innate vulnerability (Brown et al., 2017), situational vulnerability, and structural vulnerability. Inherent vulnerability is believed to be a product of innate or natural characteristics, such as age or disability. On the other hand, situational vulnerability refers to a vulnerability that is a product of past, present, or future situations and experiences, such as being a victim of violence or living in poverty. Moreover, the migration process is a vulnerability-causing circumstance in the context of migration. Lastly, structural vulnerability arises from structural characteristics and dynamics, such as economic or political systems that create or perpetuate inequalities (Gilodi et al., 2022). Postmodern ideas assert that social problems, including vulnerability, are not solely determined by natural or inherent characteristics but are constructed through social norms and influenced by political, social, and economic factors. These normative accounts of the human condition are not fixed but rather vary across time and space, reflecting and reinforcing social norms that are structured by political, social, and economic factors rather than “natural” ones. Therefore, “innate” explanations of vulnerability, which have often influenced policy, are frequently challenged (Brown et al., 2017). As a result, policies based on innate accounts of vulnerability may need to be revised to address the underlying social, political, and economic factors that contribute to it. Finally, we have to check legal vulnerability because human rights law is designed to protect the most vulnerable. According to Peroni and Timmer (2013), while the law aims to protect vulnerable individuals, it is only sometimes successful. As argued by Grear, the subject of human rights law is not an embodied vulnerable subject and may not fully capture the experiences of highly vulnerable individuals. Although we may hope that the Court considers vulnerability when reasoning about human rights

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cases, its reliance on the concept is more complex than simply recognizing vulnerability. Therefore, while human rights law aims to protect vulnerable individuals its application is only sometimes straightforward or effective in protecting the most vulnerable (Peroni & Timmer, 2013).

3

Vulnerability in the Covid-19 Pandemic

Migration is a prominent and comprehensive topic in current literature, and understanding the concepts related to migration is crucial for further research in the field. International migration is the temporary or permanent resettlement of people from one country to another. Everett S. Lee (1966) was commonly referred to as a permanent or semi-permanent residence, which makes immigration more uncertain. Because migration is a movement that creates a mass mobilization and channels the human population of certain regions towards places where welfare is. If the host country grants the status conferred to an immigrant under immigration laws, then the person’s immigrant status is officially defined. In connection with the immigration situation, the concepts of asylum-seekers and refugees appear in external migration. Emigration is a recurring, common experience presented as a phenomenon in human history, where it lives together with a geographical phenomenon (Bartram et al., 2014). In addition, the neoliberal restructuring of humanitarianism has led to changes in the roles and responsibilities of humanitarian actors. Governments now position themselves as humanitarian actors alongside nongovernment organizations (NGOs), which have become more specialized. The focus on project-based humanitarianism has resulted in a need for long-term strategies. Financing and the number of beneficiaries rather than the actual impact on people’s lives often measure success. The aim is to empower recipients, which may shift accountability for any failures to them (Sözer, 2019). On the other hand, international migration, according to the IOM, is the movement of individuals away from their place of residence over an international boundary. With this definition, it becomes crucial to interpret and examine the international conjunctural developments at the point of the effect of migration. This situation is dire regarding the changes in the Central Asian region after the collapse of the USSR. At this point, we can see that migration movement has no specific geographies. Nevertheless, Castles and Miller (2014) suggest that complex population movements affect the Middle East and North Africa a vast

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area stretching from Morocco to Iran. Refugee Statics 2022 data shows that 103 million people were forcibly displaced worldwide (UNHCR, 2022). This situation is also critical to seeing a crucial global migration crisis picture. In this respect, the issue of migration becomes a reality, not only for a country but also for the people and the international system. Several humanitarian agencies disagreed on whether or not asylum-seekers had a collective vulnerability after the 1990s, as humanitarian concerns expanded to include them. A striking change in how humanitarian organizations use vulnerability occurred in the early 2010s. The previous humanitarian concern about the vulnerability of all refugees, asylum-seekers, and undocumented immigrants began to give way to the humanitarian concern with just those deemed vulnerable (Sözer, 2019). So, how can we create a close relationship between vulnerability and migration? There are two sides to the relationship between individuals: Physical and emotional. Physical results have measurable data that everyone can observe, but the emotional impact permeates the mental world of societies and individuals, often leading to trauma. I will propose a new category for their relationship to account for both the physical and emotional outcomes of international migration and vulnerability. During the pandemic, states have implemented introverted policies. There are several reasons immigrants are more likely to contract the disease, like (i) living in poorer, overcrowded housing conditions, (ii) relying more on public transportation, (iii) living at locations with a greater density of people, and (iv) having fewer opportunities for teleworking and a greater likelihood of frontline jobs (OECD, 2020a). These reasons underline the concept of “vulnerable migrants.” The Covid-19 outbreak has profoundly affected all aspects of life, including economic activity and social interactions. However, “vulnerable migrants” refer to those at risk of harm or exploitation due to their migration status, lack of legal protection, as well as social and economic marginalization. They often encounter significant obstacles when accessing essential services and may face discrimination, violence, and abuse. “Vulnerable migrants” typically reside in overcrowded and unsanitary conditions, which increase their susceptibility to Covid-19 infection. Additionally, many of them work in low-paying jobs that do not provide health insurance or sick leave, making it difficult to receive medical attention. Firstly, migration can cause feelings of otherness and a loss of social and economic support networks. Migrants forced to flee their homes and communities due to conflict or other sources of instability may experience

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displacement and the loss of their social support networks. At this point, the situation creates a strict hierarchy formed by separating “them and us” in constructing identity. I say hierarchy because individuals see the groups they perceive as the “other” as inferior or prejudiced compared to their own identity. The East and West dichotomy and civilizational differentiation have been crucial throughout history. For instance, between 1700 and 1850, the West was considered superior to the East, while European minds divided the world into two opposing groups called the West and the East (or the West and the Rest). This dichotomy is especially true in the perception of international migration. We have to ask who the “other” is here. Fromm (1985) poses an important question about human nature: if people differ from each other in their basic spiritual and mental structures, how can we speak of humanity beyond its physiological and anatomical meaning? As Walzer (2006) points out, although a common morality has a measure that can change indifferently, morality contains its values. As a result, tears are shed depending on who died in the war and from that perspective, the main point of confronting individuals, societies, or states is the position of “being the other/enemy.“ In general, the issue of migration has been a phenomenon affecting the most striking social, cultural, economic, and security areas, especially in the modern era. Secondly, there is the issue of facing racist attacks and discrimination. Migrants may experience marginalization and discrimination due to their country of origin, race, or religion. This can increase vulnerabilities associated with social exclusion, economic hardship, and political disenfranchisement. For example, in 2023, Human Rights Watch criticized President Kais Saied’s efforts to address the harm caused by his speech on 21 February 2023, to Black African migrants, asylum-seekers, and refugees in Tunisia. The HRW documented the accounts of 16 individuals abused since the speech, including migrant workers, students, and asylum-seekers. Tunisian police carried out indiscriminate arrests, seemingly targeting Black Africans, with at least 850 reportedly arrested based on racial profiling. According to UNHCR, there are approximately 21,000 foreigners from non-Maghreb African countries in Tunisia, including 7,200 students and 9,000 refugees and asylum-seekers (Human Right Watch, 2023). Elsewhere, there is a growing threat from the far-right movement in Europe. The result is a shift towards right-wing politics and the normalization of racism and discrimination. Even the European Union

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had shown signs of this trend, as seen when Vice President of the European Commission Margaritis Schinas met with Spain’s far-right Vox party, breaking the “cordon sanitaire” policy designed to limit farright influence. Despite this, efforts are being made to combat racism and discrimination, such as the EU Anti-racism Action Plan and the appointment of Michaela Moua as the first EU Anti-Racism Coordinator (Pascoët & Sanaullah, 2022). During the pandemic, various countries have responded differently to this problem. The New York City (NYC) Commission on Human Rights has started a public awareness campaign to combat pandemic-related discrimination and harassment, both of which are prohibited by the NYC Human Rights Law. The goal of the campaign is to uphold the rights and protections of New Yorkers who are the targets of harassment and discrimination due to their colour, ethnicity, age, or disability, including having Covid-19 or another serious disease (NYC, n.d.). Thirdly, migrants are often vulnerable to exploitation and abuse by employers or other actors in the migration process. Especially if a person comes to the country illegally, this abuse can include forced labour, human trafficking, sexual exploitation, and other forms of violence. The first side of this problem is related to illegal events. According to UNODC (2016), recruitment, transportation, or harbouring of individuals for exploitation, can take various forms, including sexual exploitation, forced labour, slavery, or organ harvesting. Unfortunately, children are the most vulnerable. According to a UNICEF report, in 2018, there were 36.1 million children migrants globally and many were compelled to leave their families behind. Migrant children are more likely to experience violence, including sexual abuse, exploitation, and human trafficking,especially if travelling alone (UNICEF, 2020; UN, 2020). In addition, to address the vulnerabilities faced by migrants, it is crucial to adopt a human rightsbased approach to migration governance. Such an approach should prioritize protecting and promoting the migrants’ human rights, including their right to work, health, education, and freedom from discrimination and violence. The other side of this issue is that vulnerability in migration policies refers to situations where migrants risk harm due to inadequate policies, lack of legal protection, as well as insufficient social and economic support. This effect relates to the context of internal security and individuals’ sociocultural and economic life. Migration movements in terms of the outcomes bring about short- and long-term changes. Local labour

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markets may experience short-term challenges because of international migration as immigrants look for work. The security issue raised here is vital for state social institutions as well as on a national and global level. While demographic degradation threatens national security (Heisbourg, 1991), integration and employment as partners also face challenges. Governments must regulate their international migration policies and practices to safeguard a wider variety of national interests, including the population, labour markets, human capital, as well as racial, cultural, and religious diversity (Hollifield, 1992). Moreover, with the Covid-19 pandemic’s effects, the migrant economy also got worse. Diasporas or individuals who have migrated from their country of origin to other countries, play a crucial role in developing their countries of origin by facilitating foreign investment, trade, access to technology, and financial inclusion. According to a 2020 UN report, the Covid-19 pandemic has significantly impacted the volume of remittances—money sent by migrants to their families back home—decreased from $548 billion in 2019 to $470 billion in 2021. This decrease of $78 billion, or 14%, could have severe consequences for the livelihoods of millions of migrants and their families. In addition, migrants have become the most vulnerable communities in terms of health. Thus, beginning with the pandemic, most of the 25.9 million refugees and 41.3 internally displaced persons (IDPs) were in developing countries, starting to be affected by the pandemic. The Covid-19 pandemic has significantly affected mobility and migration as governments implement measures such as travel restrictions, border closures, and suspension of labour migration, to control the spread of the virus. Processing of migration and assistance to asylum-seekers have also been slowed down. These measures have forced the IOM and the UNHCR to suspend resettlement travels for refugees due to concerns over exposure to the virus (IOM, 2020). During the first year of the pandemic, immigrants and their native-born children in Norway, Sweden, and Denmark had Covid-19 case rates between two and three times higher than the natives did. Similarly, in Canada, France, Spain, and Portugal, the reported infection rates of foreign-born individuals exceeded those of native-born individuals during the first wave of the pandemic. Infection rates, however, may not be a reliable indicator, as they depend heavily on the countries’ testing capabilities. Covid-19 is more likely to go undetected among immigrants, as their access to testing has often been restricted, particularly at the start of the pandemic

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(OECD, 2022). Immigrants are often over-represented in the incidence of Covid-19, according to the limited data available. In Norway, for instance, 31% of confirmed cases are foreign-born, despite representing a smaller share of the population. Similar trends were seen in Sweden, where 32% of cases during the peak of the pandemic were immigrants, compared to just 19% of the population. In Denmark, immigrants from lower-income countries and their native-born children accounted for 18% of cases, nearly double their share in the population. In Portugal, a study found that immigrants, mainly from Africa, comprised 24% of Covid-19 infections in Lisbon, despite representing only 11% of the population in the Capital City Metropolitan area (OECD, 2020b). At the last point, the humanitarian interest in vulnerable migrants is more complex than it appears, revealing a neoliberal humanitarian morality, which involves providing partial assistance only to specific subsets of forced migrant communities. Sözer (2019) argues that neoliberalism has transformed the diagnosis and humanitarian response to forced migration, particularly in the case of Syria. She asserts that the concept of refugees’ vulnerability has shifted to focus only on specific groups deemed “vulnerable” among the larger refugee population. Butler (2014), in the meanwhile, argues that vulnerability is a connection to a field of things, forces, and emotions that impact or otherwise affect us rather than a subjective disposition. Vulnerability is a method of relating to things that are not entirely under our control or grasp. It comes under a grey area where receptivity and responsiveness are challenging to separate. Therefore, the moral concerns of humanitarianism regarding vulnerable migrants are intertwined with political economy concerns. Rather than attributing partial assistance to limited resources or operational constraints, neoliberal humanitarianism justifies it by affirming and pursuing neoliberal ideals such as quantifiable notions of equity (Sözer et al., 2019).

4

Conclusion

Migrant vulnerability is a complex and multifaceted issue that requires comprehensive solutions. It’s crucial that governments and international organizations swiftly take effective action to tackle the underlying reasons for migration, such as poverty, conflict, and political instability. They should also adopt a human rights-based approach to migration governance that prioritizes the protection and promotion of the migrants’

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human rights. The issues facing migrants can be summarized into three categories: lack of legal status and protection, facing racist attacks and discrimination, and vulnerability to exploitation and abuse by employers or other actors in the migration process. Migrants may experience social exclusion, economic hardship, and political disenfranchisement due to their country, race, or religion. They may also be vulnerable to human trafficking, forced labour, sexual exploitation, and other forms of violence. Vulnerability in migration policies refers to situations where migrants risk harm due to inadequate policies, lack of legal protection, and insufficient social and economic support. Additionally, the Covid-19 pandemic has had a significant impact on the volume of remittances, which could have serious consequences for the livelihoods of millions of migrants and their families. To mitigate these effects, national strategies and international cooperation will be necessary, and a human rights-based approach to migration governance will be crucial. Moreover, amid the pandemic, individuals may need to migrate due to their vulnerability caused by poverty, violence, or other vulnerabilities. In conclusion, addressing the vulnerability’s underlying causes also aids in lessening the initial requirement for migration. The importance of vulnerability is not just in the context of migration or migration policies for countries but also bound to broader development and global humanitarian efforts. Because vulnerability is closely linked to migration policies, as migrants are often among the most vulnerable populations facing economic and social exclusion, discrimination, exploitation, violence, and health risks. It is vital to consider vulnerability in developing migration policies, as policies that do not account for the vulnerability of migrants may worsen their situation. Policies designed to address the migrants’ vulnerability may include measures to protect their rights, promote their integration into society, and support their economic and social well-being.

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