World Politics in the Age of Uncertainty: The Covid-19 Pandemic, Volume 1 3031396065, 9783031396069

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World Politics in the Age of Uncertainty The Covid-19 Pandemic, Volume 1 Edited by Erman Akıllı Burak Gunes

World Politics in the Age of Uncertainty

Erman Akıllı · Burak Gunes Editors

World Politics in the Age of Uncertainty The Covid-19 Pandemic, Volume 1

Editors Erman Akıllı International Relations Department, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli University Ankara, Türkiye

Burak Gunes International Relations Department, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences Kır¸sehir Ahi Evran University Kır¸sehir, Türkiye

ISBN 978-3-031-39606-9 ISBN 978-3-031-39607-6 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39607-6 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Foreword

It is with pleasure that I write the foreword for this remarkable twovolume edited book, World Politics in the Age of Uncertainty: The COVID-19 Pandemic. As a Turkish academician who had the privilege of receiving the Nobel Prize, I understand the transformative power of knowledge and the importance of rigorous research in unravelling the complexities of our world. This ambitious publication, which explores the intricate intersections of global politics and the COVID-19 pandemic, stands as a testament to the intellectual acumen and dedication of the contributing authors. The COVID-19 pandemic has ushered in an era of unparalleled uncertainty, shaking the very foundations of our societies and institutions. It has illuminated the vulnerabilities and interconnectedness of our global order, exposing the complex web of challenges that confront us. In this critical juncture, it becomes imperative to undertake a comprehensive and multidimensional analysis of the pandemic’s impact on world politics. The contributors to this volume through their thought-provoking analyses, they explore the multifaceted dimensions of the pandemic’s repercussions on global governance, diplomacy, economics, security, and the dynamics of power. By examining both the immediate and long-term consequences, this book provides a comprehensive understanding of the profound transformations taking place in our uncertain world. The editors of this book deserve our gratitude for their efforts in bringing together such a diverse array of scholarly contributions. Their v

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editorial guidance has ensured that the ideas presented in this book are accessible and intellectually enriching. To the contributing authors, I extend my appreciation for their invaluable contributions to this two-volume publication. Their research and analysis have advanced our understanding of the complex dynamics of world politics during the COVID-19 pandemic. Each chapter represents a step forward in unravelling the intricacies of our interconnected world and contributes to the ongoing global conversation on the challenges and opportunities we face. I would also like to express my gratitude to the team at Palgrave MacMillan for their unwavering support and commitment to academic excellence. Their professionalism and dedication throughout the publication process have been instrumental in transforming this remarkable collection of essays into a cohesive and impactful contribution to the field of international relations and social sciences. In conclusion, World Politics in the Age of Uncertainty: The COVID-19 Pandemic is a testament to the collective intellectual efforts of the editors and authors who have worked diligently to illuminate the profound transformations unfolding before us. I have no doubt that this publication will serve as a resource for scholars, policymakers, and all those interested in comprehending the far-reaching implications of this unprecedented crisis. Prof. Aziz Sancar Nobel Laureate Department of Biochemistry and Biophysics University of North Carolina Chapel Hill, USA

Preface

These two-volume book series titled World Politics in the Age of Uncertainty: The COVID-19 Pandemic, delves into the profound effects of the pandemic on global affairs, covering international relations, global politics, humanities studies, and social sciences. The book series serves as an invaluable resource for academics, policymakers, and individuals seeking to grasp the intricate nuances of the COVID-19 era. By bringing together experts from various disciplines, it provides a comprehensive and wellrounded outlook on the challenges and opportunities that have emerged from this worldwide crisis. Volume I focuses on the dynamic nature of global politics during the pandemic, exploring changes in power dynamics, the role of international organizations, and challenges in global governance. It offers insights into how the pandemic has shaped the international system, influenced state behaviour, and impacted global cooperation. Volume II features scholars from various disciplines examining the social, cultural, economic, and psychological dimensions of the pandemic. They critically analyse its effects on societies, communities, individuals, and various aspects of human life. Together, the two volumes provide a comprehensive understanding of the pandemic’s impact on world politics, society, and human experiences. We hope that our humble contribution of two-volume book series, World Politics in the Age of Uncertainty: The COVID-19 Pandemic, will

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prove valuable to researchers, academics, students, and individuals interested in comprehending the profound impact of the pandemic on the international system, state affairs, social sciences, and the redefinition of international relations. These books aim to enhance the existing literature on these subjects, providing insights and understanding for the pandemic and the post-pandemic world order. Kır¸sehir, Türkiye 2023

Erman Akıllı Burak Gunes

Acknowledgements

As editors, these two-volume book series have been quite a journey for us. Our journey was encouraged and inspired by innumerable people, their persistence and tenacity, and their deeds of support, friendship, and generosity. We are truly privileged to have them on this journey. We want to acknowledge the following: Palgrave Macmillan—for publishing these products of international collaboration, which address the current need for an authoritative reference on COVID-19 and its intersection with International Relations and Social Sciences, ● Authors—for their scholarly contributions that formed the substance and shaped the direction of these edited volumes, ● Anca Pusca—for her specialist guidance and profound support that made these edited volumes become a reality, ● Divya Sakkaravathi—for the technical advice in the preparation of the manuscripts, ● Prof. Aziz Sancar—for showing great courtesy by writing the foreword of these edited volumes, ● Sudib Sontoran and Mindy Yarta¸sı—for proofreading the manuscripts and providing insights for copyediting, ● Simay Sultan Do˘gan—for providing the manuscripts’ typesetting and writing guidelines checks. ix

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Of course, we owe our families the greatest gratitude. We want to express our deepest gratitude to our families for their unending tolerance, encouragement, and support as we worked on this edited volume. Kır¸sehir, 2023

Erman Akıllı Burak Gunes

Contents

Introduction: “There is Hope After Despair and Many Suns After Darkness” Erman Akıllı and Burak Gunes

1

Unhcr and Covid-19: From Emergency Response to Revitalizing Global Compact on Refugees Irem Sengul

9

Post-truth Period in World Politics Kür¸sat Kan Problem of Cooperation in Stag Hunt Game: Great Power Politics in the Covid-19 Pandemic Bu˘gra Sarı The Pandemic and Entities in South Caucasus Didem Ekinci The Dilemma Between Carbon Neutrality and Energy Security: Understanding the Likely Impacts of the Covid-19 and the Russia–Ukraine War on the EU Climate Targets Mehmet Efe Biresselioglu, Zehra Funda Savas, and Berfu Solak The Gendered Dynamics of Covid-19: International Politics and Women Leaders Çi˘gdem Aydın Koyuncu

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CONTENTS

Growing Importance of Regional Integration and Procurement in the Coronavirus Pandemic: The Case of RCEP and Its Hegemonic Reflections Mehmet Öztürk

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The Organızatıon of Turkıc States in the Post-Pandemıc World Order Fırat Purta¸s

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Latin America and the Caribbean in the Post-Pandemic World: Rethinking Inequalities Segâh Tekin

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Africa and COVID-19 Mehmet Özkan and Murat Yi˘git Natıonal Securıty Durıng Covıd-19: Changıng Natıonal Securıty Polıcıes of Countrıes Levent Yi˘gittepe

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Public Diplomacy During the COVID-19 Pandemic Erman Akıllı and Gülnihan Cihano˘glu Gülen

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International Human Rights and COVID-19 Mehmet Halil Mustafa Bekta¸s

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From Failure to Resilience: Reimagining International Policy-Making of COVID-19 and Climate-Induced Migration in the Age of Uncertainty Haydar Karaman and Burak Gunes

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From Pandemic to Infodemic: The European Union’s Fight Against Disinformation O˘guz Güner

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The Impact of COVID-19 on Global Energy Security and Energy Geopolitics Safa Uslu and Ferhat Pirinççi

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Global Governance in Crisis? Conclusions from the COVID-19 Pandemic ˙ Ismail Erkam Sula and Ça˘gla Lüleci-Sula

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List of Contributors

Erman Akıllı International Relations Department, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli University, Ankara, Türkiye Mehmet Halil Mustafa Bekta¸s Department of International Relations, Bursa Uluda˘g University, Bursa, Turkey Mehmet Efe Biresselioglu Sustainable Energy Division, Izmir University of Economics, Izmir, Turkey Gülnihan Cihano˘glu Gülen International Relations Ankara Social Sciences University, Ankara, Türkiye

Department,

Didem Ekinci Department of Political Science and International Relations, Çankaya University, Ankara, Turkey O˘guz Güner Department of International Relations, Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University, Ankara, Turkey Burak Gunes International Relations Department, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Kirsehir Ahi Evran University, Kır¸sehir, Türkiye Kür¸sat Kan Department of International Relations, Selcuk University, Konya, Turkey Haydar Karaman Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Kilis 7 Aralik University, Kilis, Türkiye xiii

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LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

Çi˘gdem Aydın Koyuncu Department of International Relations, Bursa Uluda˘g University, Bursa, Turkey Ça˘gla Lüleci-Sula Department of Political Science and International Relations, TED University, Ankara, Turkey Mehmet Özkan Joint War Institute, National Defence University, Istanbul, Türkiye Mehmet Öztürk Department University, Aksaray, Turkey

of

International

Relations,

Aksaray

Ferhat Pirinççi Department of International Relations, Bursa Uluda˘g University, Bursa, Turkey Fırat Purta¸s Department of International Relations, Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli University, Ankara, Turkey Bu˘gra Sarı Department of International Relations, Mersin University, Mersin, Turkey; Department of International Relations, International Hoca Ahmet Yesevi Turkish-Kazakh University, Turkistan, Kazakhstan Zehra Funda Savas Sustainable Energy Division, Izmir University of Economics, Izmir, Turkey Irem Sengul Faculty of Law, Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University, Ankara, Turkey Berfu Solak Sustainable Energy Economics, Izmir, Turkey

Division,

Izmir

University

of

˙ Ismail Erkam Sula Department of International Relations, Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University, Ankara, Turkey Segâh Tekin Department of Political Science and International Relations, Necmettin Erbakan University, Konya, Turkey Safa Uslu Department of International Relations, Bursa Uluda˘g University, Bursa, Turkey Murat Yi˘git Air Force Academy, National Defence University, Istanbul, Türkiye Levent Yi˘gittepe Department of Political Sciences and International Relations, Karamano˘glu Mehmetbey University, Karaman, Turkey

List of Figures

From Pandemic to Infodemic: The European Union’s Fight Against Disinformation Fig. 1 Fig. 2

Types of information disorder (Wardle & Derakhshan, 2017, p. 20) The four pillars of European Union’s Action Plan against Disinformation (European Commission, 2018a)

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The Impact of COVID-19 on Global Energy Security and Energy Geopolitics Graph 1

Graph 2

Change in quarterly oil demand in 2020 and 2021 relative to 2019 levels (Source IEA, Change in quarterly oil demand in 2020 and 2021 relative to 2019 levels, IEA, Paris https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/charts/cha nge-in-quarterly-oil-demand-in-2020-and-2021-relativeto-2019-levels, IEA. Licence: CC BY 4.0) Global Energy-related Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 2000–2022 (Source IEA, Global energy-related greenhouse gas emissions, 2000–2022, IEA, Paris https: //www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/charts/global-ene rgy-related-greenhouse-gas-emissions-2000-2022, IEA. Licence: CC BY 4.0)

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Introduction: “There is Hope After Despair and Many Suns After Darkness” Erman Akıllı and Burak Gunes

The COVID-19 pandemic, which originated in China in late 2019, has emerged as a pivotal moment in world history with far-reaching implications for international relations and global politics. This unprecedented global event has deeply influenced and transformed various spheres of human life, including politics, economics, social relations, and everyday practices. Within the realm of international relations, a key area of study, COVID-19 has left an indelible mark, analogous to the mutating nature of the virus itself. “World Politics in the Age of Uncertainty—The COVID-19 Pandemic” is a comprehensive book series that comprises two distinct yet interconnected volumes. Volume I focuses on international relations and global politics, while Volume II delves into social sciences and humanities

E. Akıllı (B) International Relations Department, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli University, Ankara, Türkiye e-mail: [email protected] B. Gunes International Relations Department, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Kirsehir Ahi Evran University, Kır¸sehir, Türkiye e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Akıllı and B. Gunes (eds.), World Politics in the Age of Uncertainty, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39607-6_1

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studies. Both volumes revolve around the central theme of the COVID19 pandemic era, exploring its profound impact on various aspects of the world. In Volume I, scholars, and experts in the field of international relations delve into the intricate dynamics of global politics in the context of the pandemic. They analyse the shifting power dynamics, the role of international organizations, the challenges to global governance, and the geopolitical implications of the crisis. This volume provides valuable insights into how the pandemic has shaped and transformed the international system, influencing state behaviour, diplomatic relations, and global cooperation. Volume II takes a multidisciplinary approach, examining the social, cultural, economic, and psychological dimensions of the COVID19 pandemic. Experts from the fields of social sciences and humanities contribute their research and perspectives, offering critical analyses of the pandemic’s effects on societies, communities, individuals, and various aspects of human life. Together, these two volumes provide a comprehensive exploration of the COVID-19 pandemic’s impact on world politics, society, and human experiences. By bringing together scholars from different disciplines, the book series offers a holistic understanding of the challenges and opportunities presented by this unprecedented global crisis. It serves as a valuable resource for academics, policymakers, and anyone seeking to comprehend and navigate the complexities of the COVID-19 era. One may wonder about the choice of the title, but through Mevlana Jalaladdin Rumi’s famous words, “There is Hope After Despair and Many Suns After Darkness,” in this volume, we aim to present a profound exploration of the impact of COVID-19 on global affairs. In the midst of unprecedented challenges and uncertainty, this collection of chapters illuminates the complex dynamics and multifaceted implications that have unfolded since the onset of the pandemic. As we delve into the diverse topics authored by esteemed scholars and experts in the field of international relations, we embark on a thought-provoking journey to understand the profound transformations and search for rays of hope that have emerged amidst the darkness of despair. The COVID-19 pandemic has cast a long shadow over the world, disrupting economies, straining healthcare systems, and shaking the very foundations of global governance. Yet, even in the face of adversity, the human spirit endures, and this compilation of chapters serves as a testament to our resilience and determination to forge a brighter future.

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Each chapter within this book offers unique insights into the interplay between the pandemic and global affairs, shedding light on critical areas such as emergency response, regional integration, energy security, gender dynamics, human rights, and more. Within these pages, we navigate through a complex web of challenges and opportunities, aiming to unravel the intricacies of the pandemic’s impact on international relations. The introduction title, “There is Hope After Despair and Many Suns After Darkness,” encapsulates the essence of our exploration. It symbolizes the glimmers of hope, resilience, and transformative potential that lie within the depths of this crisis. As we engage with the ideas put forth by our esteemed authors, we embark on an intellectual journey, seeking to uncover strategies, policies, and solutions that can guide us towards a more inclusive, equitable, and prosperous world. The pandemic has exposed the deficiencies in international cooperation, leading to a decline in inter-state solidarity, while the UN Secretary-General has designated the virus as the foremost security concern. Although the pandemic may seem to be waning, its enduring effects and consequences continue to occupy the world stage. Throughout the crisis, states have adopted a self-centred approach, prioritizing their own national defence mechanisms to combat the global threat. National health infrastructure and capacity have assumed a paramount role in shaping states’ security strategies, as health-related issues have become integral components of their security frameworks. The COVID-19 pandemic has necessitated significant adaptations in analytical approaches, academic papers, and university courses, as scholars grapple with the unprecedented and unfamiliar landscape. This trend is apparent in the growing focus on publications addressing the COVID19 pandemic by reputable publishers such as Palgrave MacMillan, which underscores the gravity and relevance of the topic in the field of international relations and politics. Publications addressing the COVID-19 pandemic, a selection of which is provided below: “The Post-Pandemic World and Global Politics” by A K M Ahsan Ullah and Jannatul Ferdous, published by Palgrave MacMillan in 2022, offers an analysis of the global impact of COVID-19 on economic and political processes. It sheds light on the shortcomings of scientific policy and explores the diverse reactions, resurgence of nationalism, and widening political gaps in the wake of the pandemic. The book provides insights into the long-term consequences for policies and economics in the post-pandemic world.

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“COVID-19 and International Development,” edited by Elissaios Papyrakis and published by Palgrave MacMillan in 2022, delves into the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on international development, with a specific focus on areas such as poverty, health, education, and migration. The book highlights the negative impacts on vulnerable communities in the Global South and offers policy recommendations to mitigate these effects. “The Future of the South African Political Economy Post-COVID19,” edited by Mzukisi Qobo, Mills Soko, and Nomfundo Xenia Ngwenya, published by Palgrave MacMillan in 2022, examines the socioeconomic consequences of COVID-19 with a particular emphasis on South Africa. The book proposes interventions and policy responses to address the crisis’s effects, emphasizing the importance of innovative approaches and the development of state capabilities. “How COVID-19 Reshapes New World Order: Political Economy Perspective” by Li Sheng, published by Palgrave MacMillan in 2022, provides an in-depth exploration of the extensive impacts of COVID19 on economics, politics, and society. The book examines changes in the world order and international cooperation, considering the continued superpower status of the United States and the growing influence of China. It also highlights the constraints faced by international organizations due to prevailing unilateralism. As mentioned above, the advent of the COVID-19 pandemic in late 2019 has significantly disrupted global systems and posed unforeseen challenges worldwide. This crisis has manifested itself in myriad ways, including economic downturns, social upheavals, public health emergencies, and diplomatic complexities. Indeed, the pandemic has permeated every facet of human existence. As editors of this two-book series, our primary objective is to undertake a meticulous examination and analysis of the multifaceted dimensions of the COVID-19 pandemic, uncovering its profound implications for the fields of international relations, social sciences, political economy, and economics. The present volume is dedicated to the realm of international relations and political science, aiming to provide a comprehensive exploration of the pandemic’s impact on these areas of study. In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, the world faced unprecedented challenges and disruptions across various spheres. From healthcare systems to economies, the effects of the pandemic were far-reaching and demanded urgent attention and innovative solutions. In this book, we delve into the multifaceted

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impact of COVID-19 on global affairs, exploring diverse topics ranging from international cooperation to gender dynamics, from energy security to regional integration. ˙ This volume commences with the chapter of Irem Sengül, ¸ she examined the response of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to the COVID-19 pandemic. In her chapter titled “UNHCR and COVID-19: From Emergency Response to Revitalizing Global Compact on Refugees,” sheds light on the critical role of the UNHCR in responding to the challenges faced by refugees amidst the pandemic. It highlights the efforts made to ensure their safety and wellbeing, while also exploring how the crisis can serve as an opportunity to revitalize and strengthen the Global Compact on Refugees. Kür¸sat Kan’s chapter, “Post-Truth Period in World Politics,” delves into the phenomenon of post-truth politics during the pandemic. The author analyses the implications of misinformation and disinformation campaigns on public perception, policy decisions, and global politics. Bu˘gra Sarı’s “Problem of Cooperation in Stag Hunt Game: Great Power Politics in the COVID-19 Pandemic” delves into the intricate dynamics of international cooperation, particularly within the context of great power politics. By analysing the challenges faced in aligning interests and fostering cooperation during the pandemic, the chapter provides insights into the complexities of global governance and the potential implications for future international relations. Didem Ekinci explores the impact of the pandemic on entities in the South Caucasus in her chapter titled “The Pandemic and Entities in South Caucasus.” By examining the socio-political consequences and regional dynamics, this chapter contributes to a comprehensive understanding of the complex interplay between the pandemic and regional stability. “The Dilemma Between Carbon Neutrality and Energy Security: Understanding the Likely Impacts of COVID-19 and the Russia-Ukraine War on the EU Climate Targets,” authored by Mehmet Efe Biresselioglu, Zehra Funda Savas, and Berfu Solak, focuses on the challenges faced by the European Union in balancing its climate targets with energy security concerns during the pandemic and the ongoing Russia–Ukraine conflict. This chapter illuminates the intricate dilemmas faced by policymakers and explores potential pathways towards achieving sustainable and secure energy systems. Çi˘gdem Aydın Koyuncu’s chapter, “The Gendered Dynamics of COVID-19: International Politics and Women Leaders,” delves into the

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gendered dimensions of the pandemic, exploring the roles and responses of women leaders on the international stage. By analysing the impact of gender in crisis management and decision-making processes, this chapter highlights the importance of inclusive and gender-sensitive policies in navigating global challenges. In “Growing Importance of Regional Integration and Procurement in the Coronavirus Pandemic: The Case of RCEP and Its Hegemonic Reflections,” Mehmet Öztürk examines the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and its implications in the context of the pandemic. This chapter delves into the potential ramifications of regional integration efforts and the changing dynamics of procurement systems in the face of global disruptions. Fırat Purta¸s explores the evolving role of the Organization of Turkic States in the post-pandemic world order in their chapter titled “The Organization of Turkic States in the Post-Pandemic World Order.” By analysing the organization’s response to the crisis and its impact on regional cooperation, this chapter sheds light on the opportunities and challenges faced by the Turkic states in shaping the future international landscape. In “Latin America and the Caribbean in the Post-Pandemic World: Rethinking Inequalities,” Segâh Tekin examines the impact of the pandemic on Latin America and the Caribbean region, with a focus on reevaluating existing inequalities. This chapter highlights the urgent need for comprehensive and inclusive strategies to address socio-economic disparities and foster sustainable development in the region. Mehmet Özkan and Murat Yi˘git’s chapter, “Africa and COVID-19,” explores the unique challenges faced by African countries during the pandemic. By examining the socio-economic, political, and health dimensions of the crisis, this chapter provides valuable insights into the regional dynamics and responses to the pandemic. Levent Yi˘gittepe’s chapter, “National Security During COVID-19: Changing National Security Policies of Countries,” analyses the profound impact of the pandemic on national security policies. By examining the evolving strategies and priorities of nations, this chapter sheds light on the transformations in the security landscape and their long-term implications. “Public Diplomacy During the COVID-19 Pandemic,” authored by Erman Akıllı and Gülnihan Cihano˘glu Gülen, explores the role of public diplomacy in managing the crisis. This chapter investigates the

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various approaches adopted by nations to communicate and engage with international audiences, underscoring the importance of effective public diplomacy in building trust and fostering global cooperation. Mehmet Halil Bekta¸s’s chapter, “International Human Rights and COVID-19,” delves into the complex interplay between the pandemic and international human rights frameworks. By examining the challenges faced in upholding human rights during times of crisis, this chapter contributes to a broader understanding of the pandemic’s impact on global governance and individual freedoms. Haydar Karaman and Burak Güne¸s, in their chapter titled “From Failure to Resilience: Reimagining International Policy-Making of COVID-19 and Climate-Induced Migration in the Age of Uncertainty,” explore the intersection of the COVID-19 pandemic and climate-induced migration. By reimagining international policymaking processes, this chapter proposes strategies for building resilience and addressing the challenges posed by migration in an uncertain world. O˘guz Güner’s chapter, “From Pandemic to Infodemic: The European Union’s Fight Against Disinformation,” examines the European Union’s response to the infodemic during the COVID-19 pandemic. The chapter analyses the efforts to combat disinformation, protect public health, and promote digital literacy. Safa Uslu and Ferhat Pirinççi’s chapter, “The Impact of COVID19 on Global Energy Security and Energy Geopolitics,” investigates the far-reaching implications of the pandemic on global energy security and geopolitics. This chapter examines the disruptions faced by energy markets and explores the potential opportunities and risks in reshaping the global energy landscape. ˙ Finally, Ismail Erkam Sula and Ça˘gla Lüleci-Sula explore the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on global governance structures in their chapter, “Global Governance in Crisis? Conclusions from the COVID19 Pandemic.” The authors assess the challenges and opportunities for international cooperation and discuss the role of multilateral institutions in effectively managing global crises. In this volume of the book series titled “World Politics in the Age of Uncertainty: The COVID-19 Pandemic,” the collection of diverse chapters provides valuable insights into the multifaceted impact of COVID-19 on global affairs. Through thought-provoking analyses and innovative approaches, the book explores the challenges posed by the pandemic. In these unprecedented times, it serves as a comprehensive resource for

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scholars, policymakers, and individuals interested in understanding the complex dynamics of the COVID-19 crisis and its implications for the world. The chapters aim to offer valuable insights and contribute to a deeper understanding of the multifaceted implications of the COVID19 pandemic on various areas such as international relations, human rights, gender dynamics, energy security, regional integration, and public diplomacy. By shedding light on the challenges, opportunities, and transformations that have emerged in the wake of this global crisis, the book contributes to the ongoing discourse on navigating the post-pandemic world.

Unhcr and Covid-19: From Emergency Response to Revitalizing Global Compact on Refugees Irem Sengul

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Introduction

The Covid-19 outbreak coincided with the ‘perfect storm’ gathering around the global refugee regime (Crisp, 2020: 367). Today, there are almost 90 million forcibly displaced people1 worldwide, facing increasing challenges to safety and protection (UNHCR 2022a). In the Global North, governments are trying hard to prevent refugees from arriving in their territories. Many European countries adopted restrictive measures after increasing number of arrivals in 2015 and 2016. In the US, especially under the Trump administration, refugees were portrayed as security 1 The UNHCR statistics include refugees, internally displaced people, and asylum seekers. According to the Refugee Convention Article 1(A)(2), the term ‘refugee’ is defined as a person who: ‘owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it’. This chapter focuses on UNHCR’s Covid-19 response with a particular focus on policies regarding refugees.

I. Sengul (B) Faculty of Law, Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University, Ankara, Turkey e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Akıllı and B. Gunes (eds.), World Politics in the Age of Uncertainty, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39607-6_2

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issues, while their arrival and protection were restricted (Crawley 2021: 83). In the Global South, where the majority of the refugees come from, host countries underlined unwillingness to extend the responsibilities they already unequally bear (Gilbert 2019: 27). The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has engaged in a reform process since 2016 to deal with the shrinking refugee protection space worldwide. It brought together key actors to enhance refugee protection, ease pressure on host states, and bolster international responsibility sharing. More importantly, it drafted the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR), adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2018, and co-convened the Global Refugee Forum (GRF) in 2019. In 2020, at a time when the UNHCR was optimistic about the ongoing reforms, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared Covid-19 as a pandemic (UNGA 2020, para.3). Despite Covid-19’s initial characterization as a ‘great equalizer’, that everyone can catch the virus regardless of their socio-economic backgrounds; it is now acknowledged that the pandemic has amplified social inequalities (Crawley 2021: 85). For the refugees, alongside health repercussions, Covid-19 escalated the existing state practices of deterrence and restriction (Barnes and Makinda 2021: 1677). This chapter examines the UNHCR’s response to Covid-19, it questions to what extent the UN refugee body has effectively responded to the pandemic and how the pandemic has affected the role and policies of the Office. To this end, two parallel approaches by the UNHCR are discussed: (i) framing Covid-19 as an ‘emergency’ to rally immediate state support, implying a short-term crisis response; (ii) contextualizing the pandemic response within the ongoing reform process and GCR, adopting a long-term recovery approach.

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Emergency Responses to COVID-19

Covid-19 had disproportionate effects on vulnerable groups like refugees. The disease has heavily affected refugees, who are mostly living in crowded and unsanitary conditions with restricted access to health care. Moreover, the primary health impacts of Covid-19 are coupled with the secondary impacts of state policies on the pandemic (Easton-Calabria 2020: 10–11). First, the majority of states took national and internationallevel containment measures to prevent the spread of the coronavirus. Many declared lockdowns, closed their borders, and restricted the

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mobility of people and goods. From early 2020 to the end of 2021, 195 states fully or partially closed their borders (Taylor et al. 2022: 40). The containment measures had unequal impacts on refugees who must cross international borders to seek refuge in other states. As of December 2021, 48 border closures were still in place, preventing refugees from seeking protection (Taylor et al. 2022: 40). Second, the pandemic exacerbated the refugees’ precarity in host countries. The lack of official documents, fear of deportation, and rising xenophobia prevented them from seeking medical treatment, testing, and other healthcare services (Taylor et al. 2022: 32), while deteriorating economic conditions left them without lifesaving income. The majority of refugees worldwide do not have access to formal employment (UNHCR 2021a, p. 41) and most of the small and medium-sized businesses where they work informally closed down during the lockdowns (UNHCR 2020a, p.2). Third, the containment measures directly affected UNHCR’s operations. Mobility restrictions affected logistics, implementation of projects, and human resources (Feller 2020: 370). In response, the Office declared a ‘global level-2 emergency’ in March 2020 to mobilize financial, material, and human resources for the Covid-19 emergency. The declaration also aimed to make the crisis more visible and advocate the needs of other key actors (UNHCR 2020e: 4; UNHCR Evaluation Service 2021b: 7; UNHCR 2023c: 17–22). As Crisp (2020: 366) puts it, ‘there has never been a golden age of refugee protection’. Since its establishment in 1950, UNHCR has struggled to deal with various challenges and crises. Thus, emergency response is not an exception for UNHCR operations. As of 2023, the Covid-19 emergency is one of 15 active emergencies the Office is responding to (UNHCR 2023b). After analysing multiple UNHCR reports and documents, we find that in the case of the Covid-19 emergency, UNHCR has: (i) reminded states of their responsibilities and obligations to refugee protection, (ii) participated in the Global Humanitarian Response Plan (GHRP), and (iii) prioritized emergency health response and humanitarian assistance. The Office published ‘Key Legal Considerations’ and ‘Key Protection Messages’ in early 2020 to remind states of their ongoing obligations towards refugees during a pandemic. The documents acknowledged that states could take coronavirus containment measures by restricting the movement of people and goods, and by temporarily closing their borders

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(UNHCR 2020c, para.5; UNHCR 2020f: 1). Nevertheless, considering the principle of non-refoulment, which prohibits returning refugees to territories where their lives or freedoms are at risk (Refugee Convention 1951, Art. 33), both documents underlined that states should ensure access to territories for asylum seekers. To balance public health concerns and refugee protection, UNHCR advised precautions like health screening, testing, and quarantine of asylum seekers upon admission (UNHCR 2020c, para.6; UNHCR 2020f: 1). UNHCR also reminded emergency measures must be non-discriminatory, temporary, and per the law, while public health policies, testing, and treatment should include refugees (UNHCR 2020c, para.7, UNHCR 2020f: 2). However, the states’ compliance with UNHCR guidance is questionable. On the one hand, many countries lifted restrictions on admission after a while. Some countries adopted inclusive policies, such as Portugal’s offer of temporary citizenship to refugees, Jordan’s extension of expired refugee certificates, and the UK’s allowance for online application (Foster et al. 2021: 112). On the other hand, some states, such as the USA, India, and Brazil, continued to deny access to their territories into 2022, while some like the USA, Finland, and the UK only partially operationalized their asylum systems (UNHCR 2023a). The UNHCR Evaluation Service (2020: 3) admitted that the Office’s influence over states for providing services to refugees was also insufficient. Most host countries included refugees in their official vaccination schemes. However, since the majority of refugees live in the Global South, the inequality among states in accessing vaccines directly limited their ability to get vaccines. By mid-2022, the majority of refugee host countries could not reach 70 per cent vaccine coverage (UNHCR 2023d). Meanwhile, in countries where nationals are being vaccinated, refugees faced barriers over a lack of identity documents, information, and fear of deportation (UNHCR 2022c). The success of UNHCR policies and activities is dependent on state cooperation. Historically, UNHCR has gained a degree of autonomy and expanded its original mandate of legal advocacy. In various humanitarian settings, the Office pursued policies of material assistance, development, early warning, and so forth (Lewis 2012: 51–52). Nevertheless, despite its growing role and autonomy, UNHCR is working in a political environment. It is funded and governed by the states and its success is dependent on the collaboration and support of states (Lewis 2012: 170). To rally state support and funding for the Covid-19 emergency, UNHCR worked

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with other UN entities and took part in the GHRP, launched in April 2020 as an inter-agency response plan for humanitarian appeals (OCHA 2020a). UNHCR led one of the strategic priorities of the GHRP on the protection of refugees, internally displaced people, and migrants (Lewis 2012: 23). Nevertheless, only 38 per cent of the UNHCR appeal for funding was met, falling short of demonstrating sufficient state support (UNHCR 2020e, p.4). In allocating restricted resources, UNHCR prioritized emergency health response and humanitarian assistance for refugees. To manage Covid-19 cases, the Office provided medical supplies, personal protective equipment, and other essential supplies to hospitals (UNHCR 2020e: 9). Cash and material assistance for refugees in dire need increased. In 2020, cash assistance rose by 6.8 per cent globally and was distributed to more than 3 million displaced people (Lewis 2012: 30; UNHCR 2020h: 2). In the first half of 2022, the number of displaced people who received cash assistance rose to 5.4 million (UNHCR 2020d). The emergency responses were helpful in mobilizing limited resources and providing immediate assistance to refugees. Nevertheless, the ‘crisis model’, as Charlesworth (2002) indicates in her study of international law, has long-term flaws. When we work in a crisis mode, we concentrate on that specific crisis as a ‘single event’, rather than focusing on the larger picture and learning from earlier crises (Charlesworth 2002: 384). In other words, within the crisis discourse, short-term policies gain paramount importance while longer-term needs are ignored (Foster et al. 2021: 120). The GHRP, for instance, made it clear that the Plan will be an emergency crisis response. It delimited the boundaries of response to a short-term humanitarian intervention and ignored the long-term needs arising from economic, institutional, political, legal, and social structures (OCHA 2020b: 12). The focus on short-term responses in health care services and humanitarian assistance during Covid-19 led to the de-prioritization of longterm protection policies. The UNHCR Evaluation Services (2021a: 2–3; 2021b: 7) repeatedly criticized that the switch to emergency mode deprioritized response to gender based violence (GBV), child protection, capacity development, livelihood policies, and interrupted the implementation of ongoing reforms and the GCR. In this sense, although the gendered impacts of Covid-19 on women and girls were expected, they could not be mitigated during the pandemic. Intimate partner violence, sexual violence, child marriage, and early pregnancy sharply increased

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in the context of confinement, deterioration of socio-economic conditions, and limited access to rights (UNHCR 2020b: 1–2; UNHCR 2021b: 2). The humanitarian and cash assistance was helpful to meet the refugees’ most immediate needs but fell short of addressing longer-term socio-economic deterioration (UNHCR 2020h: 5). Thus emergencies should not be understood as single and freestanding events. Rather they should be contextualized as part of longer processes (McAdam, 2013: 10). In this sense, as Davies and Wehnam (2020: 1227– 1228) underline, a pandemic should be seen as a ‘political problem as much as it is a public health tragedy,’ requiring ‘political solutions’ that focus on long-term planning, international cooperation, and responsibility sharing. One such solution that UNHCR advocated as a policy tool is the GCR, which will be discussed in the next section.

3 Responding to Pandemic with the Global Compact on Refugees Empirical studies reveal that the emergency model of work during the pandemic temporarily impeded the advocacy and implementation of ongoing reforms in the global refugee regime (Taylor et al. 2022: 26; Easton-Calabria 2020: 20). The closure of the GHRP at the end of 2020 signalled the shift towards long-term reframing of pandemic response. The GCR was proposed as an effective framework for drafting medium to long-term policies. UN High Commissioner for Refugees Filippo Grandi highlighted that the GCR and the GRF became ‘even more critical’ during Covid-19 and its impacts on ‘low- and middle-income countries’, thus, the commitments should be ‘urgently translated into concrete outcomes’ (UNHCR 2019: 4). Beyond the assertion of traditional norms and principles of international refugee law, the GCR’s trademark is its acknowledgement of the unequal responsibility taken by the states that host large numbers of refugees. The Compact aims to bring together various actors, namely states, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, development actors, private sector, and refugees, to realize four main objectives: ‘(i) ease pressures on host countries, (ii) enhance refugee self-reliance, (iii) expand access to third-country solutions, and (iv) support conditions in countries of origin for return in safety and dignity’ (GCR 2018, para. 7). It is a non-binding document and relies on key stakeholders’ collaboration on effective implementation. To this end, the

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GRF is designed as a platform where states and stakeholders announce their commitments and pledges, in line with the Compact’s aims (GCR 2018, para. 17). The GCR principles on international cooperation and responsibility sharing are key in dealing with the impacts of Covid-19 in the health sector, social protection, and economic structures, especially in the low- and middle-income countries where most of the refugees live (UNHCR 2020g: 2; Krustiyati and Putro 2022: 304). Easton-Calabria (2020: 12) explains that the Compact is a significant advocacy tool in dealing with the pandemic simply because ‘the GCR exists’. That is, it stands out as the most recent soft-law instrument, which is heavily supported on a global scale; hence, it has the potential to influence state behaviour. In dealing with the challenges of the pandemic, the GCR provides relevant and helpful guidelines for admission to territories, protection in host countries, socio-economic challenges, and third-country solutions. The GCR (2018, para.52–53) underlines the significance of asylum systems’ preparedness for emergencies and calls for UNHCR support in necessary cases. The Compact’s call for ‘timely screening and health assessment of new arrivals’ (para.57) is highly relevant during Covid-19 for states to keep their borders open for asylum seekers and take precautions at the same time (Triggs and Wall 2020: 338). A good example of preparedness and institutional adaptability in the spirit of the GCR is the UNHCR’s introduction and support for remote techniques for asylum applications, registration, and status determination during the pandemic (Currie Roberts and Savage, 2020). For detailed guidelines, UNHCR (2020d) published the ‘Key Procedural Considerations’ on remote refugee status determination procedures as an exceptional measure. States in different regions, such as Canada, Brazil, Ghana, Armenia, and Austria adopted remote procedures in their asylum systems (Asylum Capacity Support Group 2023). For the protection of refugees in host countries and to meet their needs, the GCR promotes inclusion in national systems, services, and protection mechanisms. When refugees have access to health care, protection against GBV, child protection, and education through existing national systems, the need to establish parallel humanitarian systems could be avoided (UNHCR 2020g: 2–3). Likewise, UNHCR promoted refugees’ inclusion in local, national, and regional Covid-19 responses and worked together with the relevant governing bodies to this end (UNHCR 2020g: 2). To strengthen local authorities and facilitate the expansion of

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services to refugees, the GRF pledges on the capacity building have been operationalized. Especially the pledges on water, sanitation and hygiene services, health care, response to GBV, education, and social protection mobilized for UNHCR’s Covid-19 response (UNHCR 2019: 4). Responding to socio-economic challenges during emergencies, the GCR moves away from the short-term crisis response of delivering humanitarian assistance. Rather, it calls for enhancing refugee self-reliance and supports medium to long-term planning by bringing together humanitarian and development actors (GCR 2018, para.35). In line with the GCR understanding, UNHCR underlined that it will balance its emergency cash assistance during Covid-19 with long-term economic recovery plans and advocate refugee employment, entrepreneurship, and inclusion in national responses (UNHCR 2020e: 38–39). The participation of refugees and refugee-led organizations in response plans became particularly significant during the Covid-19 pandemic. Refugees predominantly relied on refugee-led organizations especially during the lockdowns for any kind of assistance, since restrictions on mobility prevented other actors to be present in humanitarian settings (Easton-Calabria 2022: 31). The health emergency also facilitated the employment of refugee doctors and healthcare workers, especially in Europe and South America (UNHCR 2020e: 39). To evaluate the progress of the GCR, UNHCR designed an indicator framework linked to the four main objectives of the GCR. The indicator reports showed that despite the challenges of Covid-19 and delays in the implementation of GRF pledges, significant progress was made across GCR objectives and responsibility sharing (UNHCR 2021a: 34). However, the Compact and its progress are not without criticism. Crisp (2022) finds the GCR’s success as ‘over-optimistic’ because the progress towards international responsibility sharing is not yet promising. The GCR pays great attention to third-country solutions, namely the resettlement of refugees and complementary paths such as family unification visas, education opportunities, and humanitarian admission. The UNHCR is mandated by the GCR to implement a three-year plan to increase third-country solutions, which were heavily affected by the pandemic and restrictions on mobility (UNHCR 2022b: 3). The Office had to temporarily suspend its resettlement program from March to June 2020, while many states were reluctant to resettle refugees. At the end of the three years, only 60 per cent of the target were resettled (ibid., p.7).

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Easton-Calabria (2020: 22) argues that despite the global level advocacy for the GCR in dealing with Covid-19 and its secondary impacts, there was only limited interest at the national and local levels. As discussed above, one significant aspect of the GCR on the participation of refugees in response frameworks came to the fore during the Covid-19 pandemic. However, many refugee-led organizations indicate that although their presence ‘on the ground’ has been acknowledged, they felt excluded from the discussions and decisions of the headquarters on matters directly affecting them (Easton-Calabria 2022: 35).

4

Conclusion

Covid-19 posed a threat to UNHCR’s work in many ways. It had disproportionate impacts on the lives of displaced people, for whom the Office is responsible. It directly affected the UNHCR’s presence in humanitarian settings due to restrictions on mobility and shifted the focus away from UNHCR-led reforms and implementation of the GCR. In responding to primary health repercussions and secondary impacts on admission to territories and various protection challenges, UNHCR quickly framed its Covid-19 emergency response. The Office communicated states their ongoing responsibilities towards refugees during the pandemic, took part in GHRP to collaborate with relevant stakeholders to rally support for its emergency response, and prioritized health response and humanitarian assistance to refugees to reduce the negative impacts of the pandemic. UNHCR’s emergency response policies can be considered efficient for a limited period. Although emergency discourse is helpful to make the Covid-19 crisis more visible and mobilize restricted resources, it shifts the focus away from structural challenges and ignores long-term recovery policies. As such, the initial emergency model of working deprioritized protection challenges other than the health emergency and immediate humanitarian assistance. Therefore, UNHCR’s reframing of the longterm Covid-19 recovery plan by advocating the GCR is significant. The overarching principles of the GCR, namely international cooperation and responsibility sharing, are key to alleviating the pandemic’s negative impacts on health systems, protection policies, and socio-economic structures. UNHCR effectively followed the guidance of the GCR on the admission of refugees, protection in host countries, livelihoods, thirdcountry solutions, and participation of refugees in planning its long-term pandemic response. We can conclude that despite the challenges posed by

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Covid-19, the UNHCR’s prioritization of the GCR as an advocacy tool is not only significant for responding to the pandemic in the long run but also for revitalizing the GCR and refugee protection in the post-pandemic era.

References Asylum Capacity Support Group (2023). [online]. Available at: https://acsg-por tal.org/tag/covid-19/ (Accessed 03 February 2023). Barnes J., and Makinda, S.M. (2021). ‘A Threat to Cosmopolitan Duties? How Covid-19 Has Been Used as a Tool to Undermined Refugee Rights’, International Affairs, 97(6), pp. 1671–1689. Charlesworth, H. (2002). ‘International Law: A Discipline of Crisis’, The Modern Law Review 65(3), pp. 377–392. Crawley, H. (2021). ‘The Politics of Refugee Protection in a (Post)COVID-19 World’, Social Sciences, 10(3), pp. 81–95. Crisp, J. (2020). ‘UNHCR at 70: An Uncertain Future for the International Refugee Regime’, Global Governance, 26(3), pp. 359–368. Crisp, J. (2022). ‘Protected? UNHCR’s Organizational Culture and its Implications for Refugee Advocates and Activists’, LERRN, [online]. Available at: https://carleton.ca/lerrn/2022/unhcr-organizational-culture/ (Accessed 03 February 2023). Currie-Roberts, E., and Savage, S.J. (2020). ‘Institutional Adaptability in the Time of COVID-19’, Forced Migration Review, 65, pp. 56–59. Davies, S.E., and Wenham, C. (2020). ‘Why the Covid-19 Response Needs International Relations’, International Affairs, 96(5), pp. 1227–1251. DRC, IRC and NRC. (2021). The Global Compact on Refugees Three Years On [online]. Available at: https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/89640 (Accessed 03 February 2023). Easton-Calabria, E. (2020). ‘A Restriction of Responsibility-Sharing: Exploring the impact of COVID-19 on the Global Compact on Refugees’, Danish Refugee Council. Easton-Calabria, E. (2022). ‘Localising Refugee Assistance: Examining RefugeeLed Organisations and the Localisation Agenda During the Covid-19 Pandemic’, in Allouche, J. and te Lintelo, D.J.H. (eds.), Humanitarianism and Covid-19: Structural Dilemmas, Fault Lines, and New Perspectives, IDS Bulletin 53(2), Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, pp. 27–38. Feller, E. (2020). ‘UNHCR at 70: A Personal and Retrospective Look at Making Refugee Protection Real’, Global Governance, 26(3), pp. 369–378. Foster, M., Lambert, H., and McAdam, J. (2021). ‘Refugee Protection in the Covid-19 Crisis and Beyond: The Capacity and Limits of International Law’, UNSW Law Journal, 44(1), pp. 104–125.

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GCR. (2018). Global Compact on Refugees, UNGA A/73/12 (Part II). Gilbert, G. (2019). ‘Not Bound but Committed: Operationalizing the Global Compact on Refugees’, International Migration, 57(6), pp. 27–42. Krustiyati, A., and Putro, Y.M. (2022) ‘Refugees and Covid-19: The Great Opportunity to Implement the Global Compact on Refugees’, Yuridika, 37(2), pp. 301–316. Lewis, C. (2012). UNHCR and International Refugee Law: From Treaties to Innovation, Oxon: Routledge. McAdam, J. (2013). ‘The Problem of ‘Crisis Migration’’, Australian Journal of Human Rights, 19(3), pp. 7–28. OCHA. (2020a). Global Humanitarian Response Plan Covid 19: United Nations Coordinated Appeal April-December 2020 [online]. Available at: https:// www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/Global-Humanitarian-Response-PlanCOVID-19.pdf (Accessed 03 February 2023). OCHA. (2020b). Global Humanitarian Response Plan Covid 19: United Nations Coordinated Appeal April-December 2020: July Update [online]. Available at: https://reliefweb.int/report/world/global-humanitarian-response-plancovid-19-april-december-2020-ghrp-july-update-enar (Accessed 03 February 2023). Refugee Convention. (1951). Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28.07.1951, entered into force 22.04.1954) 189 UNTS 137. Taylor, G., Gilbert, G., Hidalgo, S., Korthals Altes, M., Lewis, B., Robinson, C., Sandri, E., Stoianova V., and Ward, J. (2022). Joint Evaluation of the Protection of the Rights of Refugees during the COVID-19 Pandemic, Covid19 Global Evaluation Coalition, UNHCR [online]. Available at: www.unhcr. org/en-au/62c6ceca4.pdf (Accessed 04 February 2023). Triggs, G.D., and Wall, P.C.J. (2020) ‘‘The Makings of a Success’: The Global Compact on Refugees and the Inaugural Global Refugee Forum’, International Journal of Refugee Law, 32(2), pp. 283–339. UNGA. (2020). Note on International Protection, A/AC.96/1200. UNGA. (2021). Note on International Protection, A/AC.96/1211. UNHCR. (2019). Outcomes of the Global Refugee Forum 2019 [online]. Available at: https://www.unhcr.org/5ecd458c4.pdf (Accessed 02 January 2023). UNHCR. (2020a). COVID-19: Emerging Practices on Livelihoods and Economic Inclusion [online]. Available at: https://www.unhcr.org/publications/bro chures/5ecfacab4/covid-19-emerging-practices-livelihoods-economic-inclus ion.html (Accessed 02 January 2023). UNHCR. (2020b). Gender-Based Violence Prevention, Risk Mitigation and Response During COVID-19 [online]. Available at: https://reliefweb.int/rep ort/world/gender-based-violence-prevention-risk-mitigation-and-responseduring-covid-19 (Accessed 02 January 2023).

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UNHCR. (2020c). Key Legal Considerations on Access to Territory for Persons in Need of International Protection in the Context of the COVID-19 response [online]. Available at: https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/det ails/75349 (Accessed 02 January 2023). UNHCR. (2020d). Key Procedural Considerations on the Remote Participation of Asylum-Seekers in the Refugee Status Determination Interview [online]. Available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/5ebe73794.html (Accessed 02 January 2023). UNHCR. (2020e). Report on UNHCR’s Response to Covid-19: March-September 2020 [online]. Available at: https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/ 82660 (Accessed: 02 January 2023). UNHCR. (2020f). The COVID-19 Crisis: Key Protection Messages [online]. Available at: https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/75555 (Accessed 02 January 2023). UNHCR. (2020g). The Role of the Global Compact on Refugees in the International Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic [online]. Available at: https://glo balcompactrefugees.org/media/download-full-paper-0 (Accessed 02 January 2023). UNHCR. (2020h). UNHCR Cash Assistance and Covid-19: Main Findings from Post-Distribution Monitoring [online]. Available at: https://data.unhcr.org/ en/documents/details/79456 (Accessed: 02 January 2023). UNHCR. (2021a). Global Compact on Refugees: Indicator Report [online]. Available at: https://www.unhcr.org/global-compact-refugees-indicator-rep ort/wp-content/uploads/sites/143/2021/11/2021_GCR-Indicator-Rep ort_spread_web.pdf (Accessed 02 January 2023). UNHCR. (2021b). Protecting Forcibly Displaced Women and Girls During the Covid-19 Pandemic [online]. Available at: https://reporting.unhcr.org/ sites/default/files/Protecting%20forcibly%20displaced%20women%20and% 20girls%20during%20Covid-19%20March%202021.pdf (Accessed 02 January 2023). UNHCR. (2022a). Figures at a Glance [online]. Available at: https://www. unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html (Accessed 02 January 2023). UNHCR. (2022b). Final Report: The Three-Year Strategy (2019–2021) on Resettlement and Complementary Pathways [online]. Available at: https:// globalcompactrefugees.org/about-gcr/resources/reports/final-report-threeyear-strategy-2019-2021-resettlement-and-complementary (Accessed 02 February 2023). UNHCR. (2022c). UNHCR Highlights Great Progress on Refugee Vaccine Inclusion but Inequities Hamper Rollout [online]. Available at: https:// www.unhcr.org/news/press/2022/3/621e499f4/unhcr-highlights-great-pro gress-refugee-vaccine-inclusion-inequities-hamper.html (Accessed 02 February 2023).

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UNHCR. (2022d). UNHCR Multisectoral Monitoring: 2022 Midyear Figures [online]. Available at: https://reporting.unhcr.org/document/3339 (Accessed 02 February 2023). UNHCR. (2023a). Covid-19 Platform: Temporary Measures and Impact on Protection [online]. Available at: https://data.unhcr.org/en/dataviz/127 (Accessed 02 February 2023a). UNHCR. (2023b). Emergencies [online]. Available at: https://www.unhcr.org/ emergencies.html (Accessed 20 February 2023b). UNHCR. (2023c). Policy on Emergency Preparedness and Response [online]. Available at: https://www.unhcr.org/5f5f64f44.pdf (Accessed 02 January 2023). UNHCR. (2023d). Public Health During Covid-19 [online]. Available at: https://www.unhcr.org/health-covid-19.html (Accessed 02 January 2023). UNHCR Evaluation Service (2020). Covid-19 Response: Lessons from UNHCR’s Evaluation Evidence [online]. Available at: https://reliefweb.int/report/ world/evaluation-brief-covid-19-response-lessons-unhcr-s-evaluation-evi dence-evaluation (Accessed 02 January 2023). UNHCR Evaluation Service. (2021a). COVID-19 Evaluative Evidence Brief #1 [online]. Available at: https://www.unhcr.org/research/evalreports/61cadd 564/evaluation-service-covid-19-evaluative-evidence-brief-1.html (Accessed 02 January 2023). UNHCR Evaluation Service. (2021b). COVID-19 Evaluative Evidence Brief #2 [online]. Available at: https://www.unhcr.org/research/evalreports/61f800 b44/covid-19-evaluative-evidence-brief-2.html (Accessed 02 January 2023).

Post-truth Period in World Politics Kür¸sat Kan

1

Introduction

British author Arthur Conan Doyle once said the best way to hide something is by placing it where everyone can see it. We would not be wrong if we said that the most hidden thing today is the truth. As Doyle would suggest, some truths that are right in front of us are effectively hidden. Not just where or what truth is, but what we can do with it has become a key issue in our current era. Different eras in world history are typically named based on the pivotal moments that occurred during those periods. The birth of Jesus Christ, the Westphalia Treaty, the World Wars, and the Cold War are notable examples. The emergence of the Covid-19 pandemic in China towards the end of 2019 is a global event that can also be considered a turning point. It has impacted and transformed nearly every aspect of life, from politics and the economy to social relationships and daily habits. Our perception of reality and the concept of truth have not been immune to these changes. Three years before the Covid-19 pandemic, there were already

K. Kan (B) Department of International Relations, Selcuk University, Konya, Turkey e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Akıllı and B. Gunes (eds.), World Politics in the Age of Uncertainty, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39607-6_3

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significant challenges concerning truth on a large scale, but the pandemic has greatly exacerbated these issues. Each year, The Oxford Dictionary selects a word or phrase that reflects the prevailing mood, interests, concerns, beliefs, and thoughts occupying people’s minds during that particular year. For instance, in 2015, the word of the year was the emoji “face with tears of joy,” highlighting the increasing use of visuals in digital communication. The terms “post-truth,” “youthquake,” “toxic,” and “climate emergency” were chosen as the words of the year in 2016, 2017, 2018, and 2019 respectively. The word of the year can either be a newly coined word or an existing one, and it is determined through computer analysis of nearly 150 million words from online publications in English. The dictionary editors identify the most prominent words through a comprehensive annual evaluation, taking into account suggestions from social media and the Oxford Dictionary’s blog (Dictionaries, https://languages.oup.com/ word-of-the-year/ 2023). Serbian American playwright Steve Tesich introduced the word “posttruth” into political discourse in 1992 through his article titled “Government of Lies (1992).” He observed that a significant portion of the American public did not question the political propaganda disseminated by the Bush administration. According to the Oxford Dictionary, “posttruth” is an adjective “relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief” (Dictionaries, 2016). This definition reveals that post-truth characterizes a cultural and political climate where objective facts or truths take a backseat, and their impact is diminished or outright ignored. Despite the English prefix “post” typically meaning “after,” in this context, it conveys a sense of going beyond reality. This usage implies that post-truth can describe a cultural climate in which facts are overshadowed or deemed unnecessary (McIntyre, 2018: 5). For some researchers, there exists a meaningful connection between the selection of the post-truth as the word of the year in 2016 and the choice of the emoji in 2015. In our digitalized world, emojis play a vital role in internet-based communication. In the realm of Web 2.0, people use visual representations of meaning, such as emojis, capital letters, and unconventional characters, to amplify their messages and express their emotions during online interactions. Within this context, the usage of emojis witnessed a significant increase in 2015 compared to previous years. Simultaneously, the concept of post-truth became popular. The

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book, The Post-Truth Era by Ralph Keyes, popularized the concept (2004). Political events like the UK’s Brexit referendum and the 2016 US presidential election further intensified the concept’s prominence. Finally, the Oxford Dictionary selected post-truth as the word of the year in 2016. These developments collectively indicate that 2016 marked a period where discourses and arguments that resonate with people’s emotions, pre-existing biases, and opinions often take precedence over accurate information and analysis (Korkut, 2020: 31–35). Although the concept of post-truth has gained popularity recently, debates on truth have existed in various forms throughout history. In the past, the term “truth” was not used in the same as today, but it was addressed within a simpler framework. Within this framework, the discussion of truth has centred around its relationship with lies since Ancient Greece. The most prominent historical example of the relationship between truth and lie is seen in Socrates’ experiences during his execution. Some scholars argue that philosophical debates on the nature of truth have a remote connection to contemporary discussions about post-truth. The contemporary debate does not question the existence of truth itself but rather focuses on reshaping the existing situation according to the conditions of the time. In our post-truth era, whenever a particular view is established as truth, it is deconstructed to make way for a new perspective to claim the truth. Michael Foucault’s analysis of the interrelation between truth and power becomes relevant at this point (The Politics of Truth, 1997: 41–82). Foucault asserts that a crisis of truth emerged because of various forms of coercions exercised by the government (2011: 50–51). From this theoretical perspective, truth is constructed based on the conditions prevailing at a given time, implying its precarious nature. This perspective finds support in the close association between the concept of truth and notions such as propaganda and lies. Therefore, we can conclude that truth and lies sustain each other’s existence, engaging in an ongoing conflict (Mertek, 2020: 206).

2

The New Architect in the World Political Stage: Post-Truth

From a political standpoint, post-truth refers to a political style where anything can be portrayed as good or bad, irrespective of objective facts and evidence. In a post-truth political environment, politicians are prone to lying and justifying their falsehoods by referring to other lies,

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often without facing criticism. Ironically, politicians using the post-truth approach can convince people of their good intentions (Higgins, 2016: 9). The prevalence of post-truth policies in media contexts is exemplified by the phenomenon of “fake news,” which refers to portraying false or misleading content as genuine news. This can be seen as evidence that a post-truth condition is prevalent in our time. The significant expansion of social media and internet news, especially since the 2000s, has facilitated the circulation of opinions from people from all walks of life and educational backgrounds. However, it has also led to a rise in deliberate attempts to mislead people. These recent developments further support the notion that we live in a post-truth era. Additionally, technological advancements have enabled the use of new techniques and computer algorithms to produce fake news, exacerbating social and ideological polarization worldwide (Flaxman, 2016: 298–320). People can be presented with content specifically designed for them via algorithms that can create content based on previously collected personal information. Consequently, these algorithms—used to shape public opinion – perpetuate isolation, shielding individuals from diverse opinions and fostering introverted and self-centeredness. This isolation is, in turn, believed to result in polarization in society. Within this context, groups with political influence and media owners can create effective communication tactics based on internet technologies to further their interests (Woolley ve Guilbeault, 2017: 3–5). Especially the production of fake news is the most frequently used method to influence and shape public opinion. The term gained popularity after some critical events such as the 2016 US presidential election and Brexit (Ball, 2017). Fake news has since been defined as distorted news that lacks connection to reality (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Fake_news tarih yok). From a broader perspective, it refers to news that is proven false upon verification (Allcott ve Gentzkow, 2017: 2). In everyday language, the term broadly refers to any content with incorrect information. Within post-truth politics, fake news can refer to news containing false information deliberately produced and circulated by political groups to mislead public opinion. It can also refer to news generated and spread by hostile foreign actors to misguide and confuse society, particularly during elections. Because of the varied meanings, some argue that the term “fake news” inadequately describes all types of content with false information, suggesting the use of overreaching terms “information disorder,” or “information pollution” (Wardle, 2023). They

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propose three types of information disorders: misinformation, which involves unintentionally giving false information; disinformation or deliberately spreading incorrect information with hostile intent, and finally, malinformation, which refers to sharing accurate but private or sensitive information without consent to cause harm or embarrassment. Unlike disinformation or misinformation, malinformation is not false but can still have negative consequences for targeted individuals or groups. It can be used as a tool for political smear campaigns and is challenging to combat once widely shared online. Despite the distinct types of information disorders defined in the literature, the term “fake news” continues to be used as a useful overarching term in post-truth politics. In this context, the distortion of social reality and the loss of our sense of reality caused by fake news strengthens the perception that we live in a posttruth era, where people’s perspectives outweigh the truth, manipulating and spreading fake content and false information can easily mislead the masses (Yerlikaya ve Aslan, 2020: 181). After the 2016 US presidential election, a notable example of a post-truth scenario, allegations of election fraud regarding Donald Trump’s victory over Hilary Clinton were raised. Subsequently, the Cambridge Analytica scandal (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Facebook_ Cambridge_Analytica_data_scandal, 2023) emerged, highlighting the use of social media as a tool of manipulation. Furthermore, the allegations gained further traction with the revelation that ads published on Facebook between 2015 and 2017 were prepared and disseminated by the Russian “Internet Research Agency” (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_ Research_Agency, 2023). According to another allegation regarding election fraud, Russia manipulated social media networks such as Twitter, Instagram, and Facebook using fake accounts and news to influence the election process and outcomes (Bradshaw ve Howard, 2018). Other allegations were made regarding electoral manipulations in exchange for money by Russia’s state-sponsored news channels, third parties, and troll accounts on social media. Consequently, the US judiciary has investigated some individuals and institutions implicated in these claims (Yerlikaya ve Aslan, 2020: 185). All these developments underscore the gravity of the problem. A study examining the impact of fake news on the 2016 US Presidential elections in the post-truth period revealed its effect on individuals

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through conspiracy theories, fake news, and false information disseminated on social media three months before the election.1 Similar instances of fake news happened before in the US. For instance, fake news targeting immigrants was spread to defame Obama and weaken the Democrat Party, reaching an audience of 2.2 million people on Facebook within three months. In such cases, people are manipulated, and their perceptions are altered due to the rapid spread of news whose accuracy is doubtful. One of the most striking examples of fake news during the 2016 US elections was the fabricated story of the Pope endorsing Trump’s campaign. The false information about the Pope and Trump’s candidacy was shared on social media 961,000 times. These incidents involving fake news show us that such content, when accessed and shared by a large number of people in a short period, can affect society through social media in alignment with the interests of certain groups (Yerlikaya ve Aslan, 2020: 185). Character assassination was another manipulation tactic used during US presidential elections (Yerlikaya ve Aslan, 2020: 185). Throughout the elections, negative news about candidates like Hillary Clinton, Ted Cruz, and Marco Rubio was circulated. The news aimed to portray the other candidates unfavourably compared to Trump, eventually propelling him to the forefront as the primary candidate. In addition, the false news suggesting that Hillary Clinton was in poor health and would be unable to fulfil her presidential duties, supported by photographs shared on social media, contributed to a shift in the election atmosphere in Trump’s favour. Alongside the fake news about Clinton’s health, controversies arose over fake news that she was selling weapons to ISIS and that was connected to the Pizzagate scandal (https://en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/Pizzagate_conspiracy_theory, 2023). Similarly, fake news about Ted Cruz claimed that he had aided John F. Kennedy’s assassin (https:// www.politico.com/blogs/2016-gop-primary-live-updates-and-results/ 2016/05/trump-ted-cruz-father-222730, 2016). Consequently, Trump emerged victorious in the Indiana primaries, Cruz ended his campaign, and Trump was elected as the Republican nominee. Within this political context, there is growing support for the argument that fake news can seriously manipulate society (Yerlikaya ve Aslan, 2020: 186–187). From a broader perspective, media fosters polarization and fragmentation within society. When our main source of news on social 1 “Most popular fake election stories in the United States in 2016, by Facebook Engagement” Statista, (February 14, 2023).

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and political matters solely comes from social media, we tend to disregard the sources that do not conform to our existing beliefs and assumptions, much like how we block or delete a friend we dislike on Facebook. Our selection of news sources is no longer based on whether the content aligns with facts but rather depends on the personalized algorithms that determine which posts we are more likely to like or engage with. Paradoxically, instant access to reliable and accurate information through internet searches can also be perilous. Currently, news content is presented to us without editorial oversight, and we continue with our lives unaware of the extent to which we have been manipulated, when, where, and how (McIntyre, 2018: 94–95).

3

Conclusion

With recent developments in the internet and social media, a new parallel post-truth world has emerged. Furthermore, the changing global landscape has led to a transformation in traditional political understanding. In the past, information sources were limited, but now we can access vast amounts of information within minutes. However, the reliability of the obtained information is much lower compared to the past. The political arena already contains inherent risks, and now we must confront new dangers posed by fake news, unreliable sources that do not verify the accuracy of the information, and numerous troll accounts disseminating disinformation on social media. In this context, the internet and social media serve as facilitators of democratization while also posing a significant threat to democracy (Yerlikaya and Aslan, 2020: 193). In the post-truth era, the role of critique is perhaps the most important matter that requires further deliberation. In the realm of post-truth politics, the defence of truth has become a task for critical theory. Whether the criticism that knowledge is constructed based on power in the past remains relevant in the post-truth period as a vital contemporary discussion. Today, there is a strong tendency to assume the constructed nature of knowledge and associate knowledge with historicism (Schindler, 2020). Perhaps the most crucial challenge today is for critical theory to simultaneously confront and contend with two claims: (1) that there is only one truth and (2) that truth has many faces. By doing so, critical theorists can develop collective awareness and a capacity for action in the struggle between objectivity and subjectivity. Consequently, it may be possible to

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more effectively combat populist leaders who wield both power and the comfort of criticism. Although the concept of post-truth initially emerged in the realm of politics, its impacts have surpassed politics. The rapid dissemination of information and the unrestricted ability for individuals to express themselves on social platforms have made the efforts to combat the challenges posed by a post-truth situation more complicated. In her article titled “Truth and Politics” (1977) published in 1967, Hannah Arendt argued that truth and integrity would never be a politician’s cardinal virtues because lying was always seen as inevitable and justifiable based on their interests. George Orwell, in his book “Politics and the English Language” (2013) states that politics, by its very nature, is based on lies. In a posttruth world, appeals to rationality, reasonableness, and common sense become ineffective, while appeals to emotions and personal perspectives gain currency. Even scientists struggle to keep pace with these developments and challenges. The most damaging result of the post-truth condition is that educated individuals also believe and propagate these lies. It is not just those with lower levels of education who are more susceptible to believing lies; educated individuals also participate in this process. Jean Baudrillard argues that we now live in the age of simulation (2011). According to Baudrillard, images and discourses controlled by mass media do not present us with the truth itself. Instead, they create a hyper-reality by concealing the truth and reshaping it into a desired form (2011: 29). Baudrillard suggests that the horrors of war are removed and delivered to our homes like a game. Today, racists, flat earthers, antivaccine proponents, who deliberately lie for the construction of a new political order, and various militant groups are efficiently conveying their nonsense to millions thanks to the “freedom” that social media has given them. Conspiracy theories that emerged during the Covid-19 pandemic have exacerbated the erosion and distortion of the truth about the disease and its treatments. This state of affairs, which had a significant impact on the social climate in 2016, peaked during the Covid-19 pandemic, where even in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary, nonsense is now preferred to the truth. Many names have been given to the era we live in. However, the most prominent one is the “Information Age.” The developments and diversification in communication technologies have played a vital role in shaping the current state of communication processes. The “Information

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Age” continues to bring forth an incredible range and variety of technological developments each day. In this context, social media platforms, which have emerged as the most critical communication channel of the twenty-first century, have come to the fore and have brought about many advantages and disadvantages. Interestingly, despite these positive developments and the name itself, it is ironic that this age is also a period where knowledge and truth are most distorted. This study aims to highlight the threats posed by this irony to world politics and the world as a whole.

References Allcott Hunt and Matthew Gentzkow, “Social Media and Fake News in the 2016 Election,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, (2017). Arendt Hannah, Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought, New York: Penguin Books, (1977). Ball James, Post-Truth: How Bullshit Conquered the World, London: Biteback Publishing, (2017). Baudrillard Jean, Simülakrlar ve Simülasyon, (Çev. O˘guz Adanır), Ankara: Do˘gubatı Yayınları, (2011). Bradshaw Samantha and Philip N. Howard, “The Global Organization of Social Media Disinformation Campaigns,” Journal of International Affairs, (2018). Flaxman Seth, et al., “Filter Bubbles, Echo Chambers, and Online News Consumption,” Public Opinion Quarterly, (2016). Foucault Michel, “What is Critique?,” in The Politics of Truth, Los Angeles: Semiotext, (1997). Higgins K., “Post-truth: A Guide for the perplexed”, Nature, (2016), 540 (9). https://doi.org/10.1038/540009a https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Facebook–Cambridge_Analytica_data_scandal, accessed 10 February 2023. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fake_news, accessed 06 February 2023. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_Research_Agency, accessed 14 February 2023. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pizzagate_conspiracy_theory, accessed 01 February 2023. https://www.politico.com/blogs/2016-gop-primary-live-updates-and-results/ 2016/05/trump-ted-cruz-father-222730, accessed 04 February 2023. Keyes Ralph, The Post-Truth Era: Dishonesty and Deception in Contemporary Life. St. Martin’s Press, (2004). ˙ ˙ Korkut Rıdvan, “Post-Truth Dönemde Siyasal Içerikli Bilgi Arayı¸sı, Içerik Teyidi ve Sinizm”, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Adnan Menderes Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Aydın, (2020).

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Lee McIntyre, Post Truth. Cambridge MA: MIT Press, (2018). Mertek Sefa, “Post Truth’u Hannah Arendt ile Okumak”, Liberal Dü¸sünce Dergisi, (2020). Michel Foucault, Büyük Kapatılma. (Çeviren: I¸sık Ergüden ve Ferda Keskin). ˙ Istanbul: Ayrıntı Yayınları, (2011). Orwell George, Politics and the English Language. Penguin Modern Classics. London, England: Penguin Classics, (2013). Oxford Dictionaries, https://languagep.oup.com/word-of-the-year/2016/ accessed 03 February 2023, (2016). Oxford Dictionaries. https://languagep.oup.com/word-of-the-year/, (2019). Schindler, Sebastian, “The Task of Critique in Times of Post-Truth Politics”, Review of International Studies,46(3), (2020), doi:https://doi.org/10. 1017/S0260210520000091 accessed 01 February 2023. Tesich Steve, “A Government of Lies”, https://www.thefreelibrary.com/A+gov ernment+of+liep.-a011665982 accessed 02 February 2023. Turgay Yerlikaya ve Seca Toker Aslan, “Social Media and Fake News in the PostTruth Era”, Insight Turkey, (2020). Wardle Claire, “Fake News. It’s complicated” firstdraftnews.org, accessed 01 February 2023. Woolley P.C. and Guilbeault, D.R, “Computational Propaganda in The United States of America: Manufacturing Consensus Online”. Computational Propaganda Research Project, (2017).

Problem of Cooperation in Stag Hunt Game: Great Power Politics in the Covid-19 Pandemic Bu˘gra Sarı

1

Introduction

The Covid-19 pandemic has emerged as a global health disaster due to its consequences. It has become a security issue with economic, social, and political dimensions. The pandemic has directly threatened the lives of millions of people and forced measures that dragged national economies into recession at unprecedented speed. It has also endangered international peace and security. This situation has necessitated cooperation between the great powers in the international system, especially the United States and China, given their size and influence on the global stage. In this regard, the need for a unified strategy between the two countries has become essential to effectively address the challenges posed by the pandemic for several reasons. One significant reason for a unified strategy is the global impact of the pandemic, which transcends

B. Sarı (B) Department of International Relations, Mersin University, Mersin, Turkey e-mail: [email protected] Department of International Relations, International Hoca Ahmet Yesevi Turkish-Kazakh University, Turkistan, Kazakhstan © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Akıllı and B. Gunes (eds.), World Politics in the Age of Uncertainty, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39607-6_4

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national borders and has affected nearly every country in the world. The pandemic’s wide-ranging economic, social, and political impacts further highlight the need for a coordinated response. A unified strategy between the United States and China can contribute to a comprehensive addressing, and effective global response to the virus’s spread and various impacts. A unified strategy could also improve the sharing of information and resources. Both countries possess substantial resources and expertise in fields like medical research and technology. By cooperating and sharing information, they can facilitate the development of vaccines and treatments, accelerate the production of medical equipment, and improve global preparedness for future pandemics. The sharing of information and resources could also help address the disparities in access to medical supplies and treatment in different parts of the world. Moreover, international cooperation between the United States and China can help improve political relations between the two countries. Political relations between the United States and China have been strained in recent years, and the pandemic provides an opportunity to rebuild trust and provide a basis for future collaboration on other political, social, and economic issues. Finally, a unified strategy could improve global governance and international institutions. The pandemic has exposed the limitations and weaknesses of the current global governance system, highlighting the need for reform and improvement. The United States and China could work together to strengthen international institutions such as the World Health Organization (WHO) and improve global governance to better address future pandemics and other global challenges. However, the relationship between the United States and China has been marked by mistrust and conflict during the Covid-19 pandemic, hindering cooperation and the establishment of a unified strategy. The conflicts stemmed from a range of issues, including accusations of blame, economic tensions, and diplomatic disputes. Consequently, the initial propaganda war about the source of the pandemic has transformed the relations between the two countries into a manifestation of great power rivalry. This demonstrates that, even when faced with a common threat that represents a shared interest, the great powers prefer the option of conflict rather than cooperation, despite the potential for maximum utility. Accordingly, the relations and strategies of the United States and China during the Covid-19 period can be explained using the ‘Stag Hunt’ game, which aligns with the assumptions and arguments of the neorealist

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International Relations theory. In the ‘Stag Hunt’ game, two starving hunters collaborate to hunt a stag that represents their common interests. However, when they encounter hares, they may go choose to hunt them to satisfy their immediate hunger. From this perspective, this study will aim to analyse the challenge of cooperation in the anarchic international system by employing the ‘Stag Hunt’ model in the context of the United States and China relations during the Covid-19 pandemic.

2

The Stag Hunt Game and Neorealist International Relations Theory

The Stag Hunt Game is a classic game theoretical scenario used to illustrate the challenge of cooperation in international relations. In this game, two players must choose between cooperating to hunt a stag, which yields a higher payoff for both players or acting independently to hunt a hare, leading to a lower payoff for both players. If one player chooses cooperation while the other chooses defection, the defector gains a short-term advantage, but ultimately, both players suffer as cooperation breaks down (Skyrms, 2004: 1). In the realm of international relations, the Stag Hunt Game represents the dilemma that states face when deciding whether to cooperate or act in self-interest. According to Axelrod (1984), if both states choose cooperation, they can achieve a mutually beneficial outcome. Conversely, if one state defects while the other cooperates, the defector may achieve a short-term advantage, but both states will ultimately suffer negative consequences. Going into detail, the Stag Hunt Game has been used as a metaphor for international cooperation in areas such as arms control, trade, and climate change (Axelrod, 1984; Fearon, 1995). It highlights the importance of trust, communication, and coordination in achieving mutually beneficial outcomes in international relations. Through cooperation, states can achieve better outcomes than they could through competition or conflict (Oye, 1986: 8). Nonetheless, the Stag Hunt Game also illustrates the challenges of achieving cooperation in the absence of institutions or norms that promote it. Hence, without clear signals or mechanisms to guarantee cooperation, states may be hesitant to trust one another or commit to cooperating (Kydd, 2000: 328–330). Overall, the Stag Hunt Game

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provides a valuable framework for understanding the problem of cooperation in international relations, and the importance of trust and coordination in achieving mutually beneficial outcomes. To provide theoretical insights into the logic of the Stag Hunt Game and understand the dilemma of cooperation, both neoliberal institutionalism and neorealism offer compelling arguments. For instance, while neoliberal institutionalism underlines the role of mechanisms in achieving and sustaining cooperation among states, neorealism emphasises the reasons why states, especially great powers, often opt for the strategy defect. Neoliberal institutionalists attach importance to trust, communication, and coordination within institutional frameworks to achieve mutually beneficial results in international relations (Keohane and Nye, 1977). On the other hand, neorealists highlight the dynamics of the anarchic international system and self-help environment as inherent barriers to cooperation (Waltz, 1979). Given that this study focuses on the conflictual relationship between the United States and China during the Covid-19 pandemic, the interpretation of the Stag Hunt Game will lean towards neorealism rather than neoliberal institutionalism. Neorealism, also known as structural realism, is an international relations theory that emphasises the role of the international system on state behaviour. According to neorealists, the anarchic nature of the international system creates a self-help environment where states must prioritise their interests and security (Waltz, 1979: 103; Mearsheimer, 2001: 30). Neorealism assumes the international system is characterised by anarchy, meaning that it consists of independent and sovereign states with no overarching central authority to regulate their relations (Waltz, 1979: 103–104; Grieco, 1988: 497–498; Mearsheimer, 2001: 30–31). This implies that states exist in a milieu where there is no supervisory power to restrain them from inflicting harm, or destruction to one another (Waltz, 1979: 105, 107; Mearsheimer, 2001: 30–31). Hence, the propensity for self-help behaviour arises from the fact that in an environment of suspicion and fear, states—particularly great powers with offensive capabilities—are seen as potential threats to one another. Consequently, to ensure their survival, states opt for self-reliance over-reliance on others. In such an environment, states have a vested interest in the distribution of power within the system, in order to ensure their survival and maximise their relative power compared to other states (Grieco, 1988: 498; Mearsheimer, 2001: 3, 21 and 34). Self-help behaviour is an inclination often taken in order to achieve this aim. In doing so, states often seek

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to increase their own power, while simultaneously striving to impede the advancement of others’ capabilities (Gilpin, 1981: 87–88; Grieco, 1988: 498; Mearsheimer, 2001: 3, 35). The pursuit of power, especially for great powers, ceases only once they have achieved global hegemony, according to Mearsheimer (2001: 34–35). This is widely perceived to be the most effective method of avoiding any potential contestation from other great powers. A ‘Global Hegemon’ here can be defined as a state possessing significantly greater power and capabilities than others, enabling them to a prominent position in the international system to build and maintain an order (Gilpin, 1981: 29; Wolhforth, 1993: 12–14; Mearsheimer, 2001: 40). However, Mearsheimer (2001: 41, 84, 140–141) argues that achieving global hegemony in the contemporary era is exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, due to factors like the nuclear balance and the insuperable oceans. Therefore, the most attainable goal for great powers may be to become regional hegemons, exercising authority over a particular geographical region. Currently, the United States is recognised as the only regional hegemon in the world, having a major presence in the Western Hemisphere (Mearsheimer, 2001: 40). Building on neorealist principles regarding the international system, a regional hegemon—such as the United States in the modern era—aims to protect its security and interests by preventing other great powers from gaining regional hegemony. This is because the rise of another great power as a regional hegemon could potentially disrupt the existing balance of power, thus compromising the security of the existing regional hegemon. Hence, the United States may perceive China’s involvement in international politics as an effort to enhance its relative power and establish hegemony to counterbalance the American power in the global system. Such actions could be perceived as serving only China’s own interests, rather than contributing to a collective good and international cooperation. Conversely, from China’s perspective, the increase of the US’ influence in global politics will, above all, consolidate its hegemonic position in the international system. Therefore, based on the neorealist interpretation of the Stag Hunt Game, even in the fight against the Covid-19 pandemic, which is one of the areas where international cooperation and unified strategy are most needed, great powers tend to lean towards rivalry rather than cooperation. Accordingly, neorealists would argue that the Stag Hunt Game exemplifies the challenges of achieving cooperation in international relations. In

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an anarchic system without a central authority, where states, especially great powers, must rely on their own power and resources for security, cooperation requires trust and mutual vulnerability, which are difficult to establish. States are unlikely to prioritise cooperation with other states over their own interests and security and may opt to defect in the game rather than risk vulnerability by cooperating with the other player. In the Stag Hunt Game, neorealists posit that the pursuit of relative power and influence creates incentives for states to prioritise their own interests over cooperation with other states.

3 Great Power Rivalry Between the United States and China During the COVID-19 Pandemic Neorealists assert that the Stag Hunt Game highlights the importance of power and self-reliance in state behaviour. In an anarchic system, states must be capable of defending themselves against potential threats and may view cooperation with other states as a risk to their own security. Neorealists emphasise that states are more likely to defect in the Stag Hunt Game rather than risk vulnerability by cooperating with the other player. In fact, the course of relations between the United States and China during the Covid-19 period seems to validate the neorealist interpretation. Rather than developing a shared approach to mitigate the global effects of the Covid-19 pandemic, the United States and China have pursued policies aligned with their conflicting interests. They have also shown a tendency to blame and even display hostility towards one another. Thus, the Covid-19 pandemic has not only affected global health but has also significantly influenced international relations between countries. The relationship between the United States and China, the world’s two largest economies and political powers, has been strained in recent years. In fact, discussions about the steadily growing Chinese economy and the potential end of the unipolar system led by the United States predate the Covid-19 pandemic. Indeed, since Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms in 1978, China has consistently achieved high growth figures and has become the second-largest economy in the world after the United States (Yueh, 2007: 35; World Bank, 2021a). In terms of purchasing power parity, China is the world’s largest economy (World Bank, 2021b). As China’s economy has grown, it has increasingly challenged the United States’ hegemony in the international system. As a result, in its 2017 ‘National Security Strategy Document’, the United States emphasised

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that it is facing rising political, economic, and military competition all over the world, and declared the start of a new superpower struggle (The White House, 2017). Subsequently, the Trump administration pursued a policy of economic nationalism that targeted China, based on the belief that China was engaged in unfair trade practices that hurt American businesses. The Trump administration also accused China of intellectual property theft and cyber espionage (Sanger and Benner, 2018). The pandemic further escalated the existing tensions between the two counties as they navigated the public health crisis and its economic and social ramifications. Therefore, the relationship between the United States and China during the Covid-19 pandemic has been marked by tension and conflict. Initially, both engaged in a blame game, accusing each other of the virus’s origin and mishandling. As the pandemic spread, tensions between the two nations escalated, leading to blame games, sanctions and countersanctions, a trade war, and a general atmosphere of distrust. The Covid-19 pandemic witnessed a blame game between the United States and China, with each country blaming the other for the spread and handling of the virus (Cohen et al., 2020). The virus is believed to have originated in Wuhan, China, and the Chinese government has been accused of suppressing information about the outbreak in the early stages of the outbreak. The United States, on the other hand, has accused China of covering up the true extent of the outbreak and of being responsible for the global spread of the virus. The Chinese government has denied these allegations, stating that it has been transparent and cooperative in providing information about the virus (The Embassy of China in Bahrain, 2021). The Chinese government has also accused the United States of politicising the pandemic and using it as a means to attack China (The Embassy of China in the US, 2023). The Chinese government has stated that the virus is a global problem and that countries should work together to combat it. However, the Trump administration in the United States has been particularly vocal in blaming China for the pandemic. President Trump referred to Covid-19 as the ‘China virus’ and accused China of covering up the outbreak in its early stages (Dogantekin, 2020). The United States government also accused China of stealing intellectual property related to Covid-19 research and of engaging in cyber espionage related to vaccine research (Nakashima and Barret, 2020). In response, China has denied these allegations and criticised the Trump administration for politicising the pandemic. In contrast, there are reports in China

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that the virus may have originated in the United States and was brought to China by US soldiers (Pickrell, 2020). The accusations and blame games between the United States and China led to a breakdown in communication and cooperation between the two countries, with both sides accusing each other of not taking the pandemic seriously. This lack of cooperation was particularly evident in the early stages of the pandemic when the United States and China were slow to share information about the virus and its transmission. (Fuchs, 2020). As a result, trust between the two countries was undermined, making collaborations on issues like vaccine development and distribution more difficult. Tensions between the United States and China further escalated as the pandemic continued to spread. The economic tensions between them increased with both countries implementing policies that have significant economic implications. The Trump administration in the United States has been particularly vocal in its criticism of China’s trade policies, accusing the country of unfair trade practices and intellectual property theft (Siripurapu and Berman, 2022). China, on the other hand, has sought to increase its economic power and influence through its trade policies and the Belt and Road Initiative, which aims to increase China’s connectivity and influence in other countries (see McBride et al., 2023). The pandemic has also led to an increase in China’s exports of medical equipment and supplies, further enhancing its economic power and influence (Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 2021). One of the earliest and most significant sanctions imposed by the United States against China during the pandemic was the imposition of travel restrictions by the Trump administration. This policy, announced in January 2020, was based on concerns about the spread of the virus. Accordingly, the restrictions initially applied to foreign nationals who had been in China within the preceding 14 days and later extended to US citizens and permanent residents returning from China (Moritsugu and Miller, 2020). Alongside travel restrictions, the United States has also imposed sanctions on Chinese companies and individuals involved in technology and trade. For instance, Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. was added to the entity list in May 2020, restricting American companies from doing business with Huawei (Alper et al., 2020). Similarly, the Trump administration imposed sanctions on several Chinese officials, including the head

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of China’s top legislative body, for their role in the implementation of a controversial national security law in Hong Kong (Delaney, 2020). China has also responded to US actions by imposing its own sanctions. In response to the Trump administration’s decision to restrict travel from China, Beijing imposed its own travel restrictions on US citizens. China has also imposed sanctions on American companies and individuals involved in technology and trade. In January 2021, China’s Commerce Ministry announced sanctions on former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and 27 other American officials for ‘gravely violating China’s sovereignty’ (Cadell and Munroe, 2021). The reciprocal sanctions between the United States and China during the Covid-19 pandemic have had significant implications for both countries and the global economy. It is safe to argue that the US–China economic relationship is the world’s largest and most consequential economic relationship, and its trajectory affects many facets of the global economy. The report notes that the sanctions have led to reduced trade and investment flows between the two countries, which has had a ripple effect on global markets. The pandemic has also had negative implications for various diplomatic issues concerning the relationship between the United States and China, and their engagements with international organisations. In this respect, one of the key actions taken by the United States was to withdraw funding from the WHO, claiming it was biased towards China. The decision faced criticism as short-sighted and dangerous (Reuters, 2020). Overall, the US–China tensions during the pandemic and the consequent adversarial atmosphere have been mutually reinforcing, making the path ahead more complex. As per the neorealist interpretation of the Stag Hunt game, the United States and China could minimise the negative effects of the Covid-19 pandemic by collaborating and even creating a stable international environment by building trust in their relations. However, by turning to self-help behaviour, they preferred an environment of competition and perhaps future conflict. This preference is important in terms of demonstrating that the great powers prioritise their self-interests rather than common interests and tend to compete rather than cooperate, even in an environment such as the Covid-19 pandemic where international cooperation and unified strategy are most crucial.

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4

Conclusion

The Covid-19 pandemic has further deteriorated the already strained US–China relationship. Although the pandemic highlighted the need for global cooperation, the US–China relationship, under the effects of the anarchical international system, hindered such cooperation. In the context of the Stag Hunt Game, despite the potential for mutual benefits that could be gained from cooperating during the Covid-19 pandemic, the United States and China instead opted to ‘hunt a hare’ by defecting from each other, foregoing the greater reward of ‘hunting a stag’ that could have been achieved through collaboration. The ramifications of a lack of collaboration during the early stages of the pandemic have become evident. This is especially so due to the prevalence of great power rivalry, false information, and unsubstantiated theories, which have severely hindered global cooperation and solidarity, hampering the effective management of the virus and enabling its transmission and evolution into more concerning variants. Therefore, with the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020, it has been unsurprising to observe the rise in short-term national self-interest among states in an anarchic international system that has been caught unprepared and in disarray. The prevalence of neorealist concerns in this context is evidence of the challenges in maintaining order and stability during this challenging period. It serves as an illustration of the obstacles in front of cooperation among states in an anarchical international system.

References Alper, A. et al. (2020). ‘U.S. Blacklists Dozens of Chinese Firms Including SMIC, DJI’, Reuters, 18 December. https://www.reuters.com/world/china/ us-blacklists-dozens-chinese-firms-including-smic-dji-2020-12-18/ (Accessed: 7 March 2023). Axelrod, R. (1984). The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic books. Cadell, C. & Munroe, T. (2021). ‘China Imposes Sanctions on 28 Trump-era Officials Including Pompeo’, Reuters, 21 January. https://www.reuters.com/ article/uk-usa-china-pompeo-blinken-idUKKBN29P2XK (Accessed: 8 March 2023). Center for Strategic and International Studies (2021). China Is Exploiting the Pandemic to Advance Its Interests, with Mixed Results, 30 September, https://www.csis.org/analysis/china-exploiting-pandemic-advance-its-intere sts-mixed-results (Accessed: 5 March 2023).

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Cohen, Z. et al. (2020). ‘Blame Game Escalates between US and China over Coronavirus Disinformation’, CNN , 25 March. https://edition.cnn.com/ 2020/03/24/politics/us-china-coronavirus-disinformation-campaign/index. html (Accessed: 5 March 2023). Delaney, R. (2020). ‘US Sanctions Chinese Legislators for National security Law on Hong Kong’, South China Morning Post, 8 December. https://www. scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3112946/us-sanctions-chineselegislators-imposing-national-security (Accessed: 8 March 2023). Dogantekin, V. (2020). ‘Trump: ‘Chinese Virus’ Counter-strategy against China’, Anadolu Agency, 30 March. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/americas/ trump-chinese-virus-counter-strategy-against-china/1785215 (Accessed: 5 March 2023). Fearon, J. D. (1995). ‘Rationalist Explanations for War’. International Organization, 49(3), pp. 379-414. Fuchs, M. H. (2020). ‘The US-China Coronavirus Blame Game is Undermining Diplomacy’, The Guardian, 31 March. https://www.theguardian.com/ commentisfree/2020/mar/31/us-china-coronavirus-diplomacy (Accessed: 8 March 2023). Gilpin, R. (1981). War and Change in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Grieco, J. M. (1988). ‘Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism’. International Organization, 42(3), pp. 485–507 Keohane, R. O. & Nye, J. S. (1977). Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition. Boston, MA: Little, Brown & Co. Kydd, A. H. (2000). ‘Trust, Reassurance, and Cooperation’. International Organization, 54(2), pp. 325–357. McBride, J. et al. (2023). ‘China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative’, Council on Foreign Relations, 2 February. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinasmassive-belt-and-road-initiative (Accessed: 8 March 2023). Mearsheimer, J. J. (2001). The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W.W. Norton & Company. Moritsugu, K. & Miller, Z. (2020). ‘US Bars Foreigners Coming from China for now over Virus Fear’, Associated Press, 1 February. https://apnews.com/ article/united-nations-donald-trump-us-news-ap-top-news-virus-outbreak9e22f8aabe2f454593b9f9b4c67eb31f (Accessed: 8 March 2023). Nakashima, E. & Barret, D. (2020). ‘U.S. Accuses China of Sponsoring Criminal Hackers Targeting Coronavirus Vaccine Research’, The Washington Post, 21 July. https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/us-china-covid-19vaccine-research/2020/07/21/8b6ca0c0-cb58-11ea-91f1-28aca4d833a0_ story.html (Accessed: 7 March 2023).

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Oye, K. A. (1986). ‘Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies’. World Politics, 38(1), pp. 1–24. Pickrell, R. (2020). ‘Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman Pushes Coronavirus Conspiracy Theory that the US Army ‘Brought the Epidemic to Wuhan’’, Insider, 14 March. https://www.businessinsider.com/chinese-off icial-says-us-army-maybe-brought-coronavirus-to-wuhan-2020-3 (Accessed: 7 March 2023). Reuters (2020). ‘Global Reaction to Trump Withdrawing WHO Funding’, 15 April. https://www.reuters.com/article/health-coronavirus-trump-whoreaction-idINKCN21X1LQ (Accessed: 7 March 2023). Sanger, D. E. & Benner, K. (2018). ‘U.S. Accuses Chinese Nationals of Infiltrating Corporate and Government Technology’, The New York Times, 20 December. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/20/us/politics/us-andother-nations-to-announce-china-crackdown.html (Accessed: 5 March 2023). Siripurapu, A. & Berman, N. (2022). ‘The Contentious U.S.-China Trade Relationship’, Council on Foreign Relations, 2 December. https://www.cfr.org/ backgrounder/contentious-us-china-trade-relationship (Accessed: 9 March 2023). Skyrms, B. (2004). The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. The Embassy of China in Bahrain (2021). ‘Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian’s Regular Press Conference on July 30, 2021’, http://bh.chinaembassy.gov.cn/eng/fyrth/202107/t20210730_8903597.htm (Accessed: 6 March 2023). The Embassy of China in the USA (2023). ‘Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Mao Ning’s Regular Press Conference on March 9, 2023’, http://us.chinaembassy.gov.cn/eng/lcbt/wjbfyrbt/202303/t20230309_11038507.htm (Accessed: 10 March 2023). The White House (2017). ‘National Security Strategy of the United States of America’, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/ 2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf (Accessed: 5 March 2023). Waltz, K. N. (1979). Theory of International Politics. New York: McGraw-Hill. Wolhforth, W. C. (1993). The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. World Bank (2021a) ‘GDP (current US$)’, https://data.worldbank.org/indica tor/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD (Accessed: 8 March 2023). World Bank (2021b) ‘GDP PPP (current international $)’, https://data.wor ldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.PP.CD?most_recent_value_desc=true (Accessed: 8 March 2023). Yueh, L. Y. (2007) ‘The Rise of China’. Irish Studies in International Affairs 18, pp. 35–43.

The Pandemic and Entities in South Caucasus Didem Ekinci

1

Introduction

The Covid-19 pandemic has taken its toll on the world by causing stagnation and regress in almost all sectors and issue areas that were impacted. The multiple consequences for each and every entity, state, region, and continent were unique and inevitable. The post-2020 period was proof that even the leading actors in the world could be hit hard no matter what hard and soft power tools and capacity they possessed. Ultimately, the worst-hit areas in the world proved to be the entities with limited recognition or non-recognition. The post-Soviet entities of the South Caucasus; Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Karabakh, fit into this context quite neatly. With limited/ non-recognition, limited sources, and many more problems of their own, these entities were hit worst by the contagion in the regional context. They became further isolated during the pandemic despite expectations of immediate aid. The eruption of war in Karabakh further complicated

D. Ekinci (B) Department of Political Science and International Relations, Çankaya University, Ankara, Turkey e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Akıllı and B. Gunes (eds.), World Politics in the Age of Uncertainty, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39607-6_5

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the already subtle state of affairs and added to the deadly mix. The functions and attitudes of the parent and patron states meant that a rapid response and help were not in sight. Upon such backdrop, this chapter mainly argues that the poor background conditions in the entities related to healthcare, geopolitics, and economy inherited from the Soviet past exacerbated the plight of the entities during the pandemic. Accordingly, the present chapter is an attempt to explore and understand the repercussions of the Covid-19 pandemic in view of the South Caucasian entities. Within this context, the first part of the paper provides a descriptive account of background conditions in healthcare, geopolitics, and economy in the Soviet period. It manifests the main inadequacies in all three domains in the concerned time-frame. The second part looks at the pandemic condition in Abkhazia as the first recorded case in the entity. Part three attempts to describe the ways in which the pandemic unfolded in South Ossetia with the first recorded case. The fourth part focuses on the particular case of Karabakh, which displayed additional difficulties owing to the new flare-up in the entity in 2020. In the final analysis, it affirms the significance of the introduction of novel capacity development in the South Caucasian entities in the post-pandemic period in the three concerned domains.

2

The Backdrop: Healthcare, Geopolitics, Economy

The Bolshevik Revolution (1917) brought with it many policies and practices. One of them was Semashko, a centralized healthcare system named after Nikolai Semashko, the first People’s Commissar of Public Health in the Soviet Union. Despite being hailed as innovative and egalitarian, the system deteriorated over time. When the Soviet Union disintegrated, unrecognized actors like Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Karabakh took their share of the imbroglio. The health system in Abkhazia collapsed after 1991. It worsened due to the war with Georgia and the ensuing trade embargo. Some hospitals were destroyed during the war and only partially restored. By 2002, there was still a lack of medication and staff. It was not possible to find a specialist outside Sohum. Better-off residents with personal connections could access healthcare services. Due to underfunding, hospital budgets were insufficient (Médecins sans Frontières, 2002: 11). Isolated from the rest of the world and with no external or domestic aid, Abkhazia needed

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special help (Médecins sans Frontières, 2002: 21). The EU drew attention to poor health services in the entity in 2007 while EC financed hospitals for public health rehabilitation (Action Fiche for Georgia, 2007: 21). After the declaration of independence in 2008, the health sector remained wanting (Altın Post Abhazya Haberleri, 2014). By 2017, Russia signed a health agreement with Abkhazia to attract Abkhaz patients away from Georgia (Jardine, 2017). In post-Soviet South Ossetia, healthcare conditions were worse. People preferred to go to Russia or even Georgia for receiving treatment (Tskhurbayev, 2007). Even in 2016, the not-so-promising healthcare conditions remained as one commentator noted: “The grave economic situation in Tskhinvali … results in the regression of … vitally important spheres. The situation is particularly important in the healthcare sphere. … Despite impressive statistical data … in official documents, there is very high corruption in healthcare …” (Chlachidze, 2016). To address this, Russia signed an agreement with South Ossetia in 2017 to encourage South Ossetians with Russian citizenship to seek medical treatment in Russia, given the high number of people going to Georgia for treatment (Jardine, 2017). The situation was similar in Abkhazia, where people also had to travel to Georgia for treatment, leading Georgia to build a hospital near the Abkhaz border in 2018 (Jardine, 2018). Karabakh’s healthcare system suffered from the outdated Semashko model and insufficient funding, which was further aggravated by the Karabakh war from 1992 to 1994 (Thompson et al., 2010: 3–4). The situation was worsened by a lack of community participation, inadequate health promotion and disease prevention activities, deficient infrastructure, insufficient supplies, dysfunctional health information, and communication systems, limited transportation systems, a shortage of health personnel, inadequate training of health personnel, and outdated protocols (Thompson et al., 2010: 4). Among these vulnerabilities, weak healthcare capacity was the most critical. The Covid-19 pandemic led to additional challenges for the region because of geopolitical problems between and within the actors concerned as protracted conflicts resurfaced. Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Karabakh are cases in point. The historical strategy of dividing, deporting, and drawing artificial borders during the Stalin era aimed to weaken nationalist sentiment (Concordiam Staff, 2012: 43). The Stalin administration reckoned that with such strategies, the state would live forever but it dissolved in 1991. Russia has since been determined to control its near abroad,

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keeping a close eye on Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Karabakh. This attitude implies that only it holds the key to the solution to these geopolitical problems. This approach became most apparent with the 2008 war. Since Abkhazia and South Ossetia are recognized by only a few countries, they depend on Russia for support. As for Karabakh, the territory was largely reclaimed by Azerbaijan in the 44-Day War. Although Russia did not participate in this war, it was brought to an end with direct Russian involvement. The existing geopolitical dynamics, on the one hand, indicate that Abkhazia and South Ossetia are likely to remain vulnerable due to weak governance capacity and dependence on Russia. In contrast, Azerbaijan is likely to rebuild Karabakh, which suggests a brighter future for the region. Although the likelihood of another war is currently low, the historical baggage inherited from the Soviet era still poses a potential vulnerability that warrants caution. Third, the post-Soviet economic condition of the actors was also bleak. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the Georgia-Abkhazia war (1992– 1993) damaged the economy of Abkhazia, causing $11 billion to $13 billion in losses (Kolossov and O’Loughlin, 2011: 634, in Blakkisrud et al., 2021: 350). Abkhazia’s economic condition between the GeorgiaAbkhazia and the 2008 wars also exposed drawbacks such as sanctions by the CIS and the Georgian embargo, as well as the establishment of trade links with certain states such as Turkey. The European Commission provided aid to Abkhazia between 2004 and 2006—when Abkhazia’s revenue almost doubled, reaching 1.200 million rubles (Waldner, 2018: 18). Russia has been the major source of Abkhazia’s foreign revenues since the end of the 2008 war. Turkey also increased its trade volume with Abkhazia (Waldner, 2018: 19–22). Still, Russian financial support did not amount to previous volumes after 2014, due to Moscow’s economic losses because of its war against Ukraine. Regardless, the country still ranks first among Abkhazia’s economic partners. The pattern of Moscowbound relationships is most visible in economic ties. By mid-2019, the Abkhaz foreign trade turnover increased 11%, of which Russia accounted for 56 and 12% was with Turkey (Altın Post Abhazya Haberleri, 2019). This helps infer that Abkhazia’s prospective economic links in respect of close ties with Russia would continue once the pandemic unfolded in 2020. The economy of South Ossetia, on the other hand, was based on mainly agriculture in the Soviet period. Between 1992 and 2004, it was

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part of the Georgian economy, in which many South Ossetians and Georgians were engaged in commerce at the Ergneti market (de Waal, 2019: 2–4). South Ossetia’s options were limited by agriculture and by being a transit route between Georgia and Russia until 2008. It still has a very small economy based on producing mineral water, fruit and meat (de Waal, 2019: 8). International sanctions on Russia decreased the amount of aid to South Ossetia (Lacroix, 2018). A 2015 deal between Russia and South Ossetia contains territorial and formal economic integration agreement rhetoric (Lacroix, 2018). Finance-wise, South Ossetia is likely to be impacted by the crisis in Russia due to the war in Ukraine (Avdaliani, 2022). While the bleak economic outlook of South Ossetia is likely to remain, a possible union with Russia could be a game-changer, which remains to be seen. Lastly, the economic situation in Karabakh by 1991 was also bleak due to the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict. After the war ended in 1994, Yerevan gained control of Karabakh and seven surrounding Azerbaijani districts. However, since Karabakh remained unrecognized and the economic blockade by Azerbaijan and Turkey began, it became economically dependent on Armenia and the Armenian diaspora. Karabakh is not rich in terms of hydrocarbon resources. Moreover, it became a place for illegal trade after 1992 (Howard and Traughber, 2009: 378). Despite funding from the Armenians and the Armenian diaspora, there was no significant prosperity. It maintained trade relations with the CIS, via Armenia (Lis, 2016: 32). This state of affairs continued until the 44day war after which Azerbaijan largely restored Karabakh by November 2020. Economic problems in Karabakh are various and restructuring by Azerbaijan might therefore take more time than estimated (International Crisis Group, 2020a) due to war and the pandemic.

3

Pandemic Period: Abkhazia

When the pandemic broke out, the entities faced a new, more acute problem. Contrary to positive expectations, a meaningful rapprochement between entities and parent states in this exceptional period did not follow (Lozka, 2021: 98). For one, Abkhazia’s healthcare system remained weak, much like in the post-Soviet period. An inadequate number of medical staff, weak healthcare infrastructure, aging population, and medical staff resulted in weak medical capacity (International Crisis Group, 2020b: 14). The declaration

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of independence in August 2008 did not bring any substantial change to the health sector, either. The challenge posed by the contagion forced Abkhazia to call for external help in early March 2020, upon which the UNDP sent more than 12,000 packages of medical equipment. Russia also sent medical equipment as well as troops for disinfection work. The international NGOs in Abkhazia offered vehicles while the officials from the WHO reviewed requirements (International Crisis Group, 2020b: 15; Abkhaz World, 2020a). The Russian Republic of Bashkortostan sent medics (Abkhaz World, 2020b). Despite the risks, people gathered in crowds, assuming they would not be affected due to the isolation of Abkhazia. For instance, the last round of presidential elections was held on 22 March 2020. However, restrictions and a state of emergency were imposed followed (Lacroix, 2020). The first case in Abkhazia was reported on 7 April 2020 (Civil.ge, 2020). Aware of the fact that Abkhazia was going through an even more exceptional period due to its isolation, foreign actors offered assistance. The EU called for dialogue within the OSCE framework. It sent medical aid to such entities via ICRC (Lozka, 2021: 102). The Federation of Abkhaz Cultural Centers of Turkey sent aid in October 2020, worth more than $250,000 (Abkhaz World, 2020c). Yet, assistance efforts were in jeopardy because international organizations and banks would need permission from Georgia (International Crisis Group, 2020b: 15). Among the entities, only Abkhazia did not refuse to occasionally cooperate with the parent state, sometimes allowing patients to receive medical treatment in Georgia (Korsten, 2020). From this perspective, the contagion ultimately raised the question of whether the entities would build closer ties with the parent (Lozka, 2021: 98) and/or patron states. In this regard, Georgian officials requested support for Abkhazia from the WHO and other international organizations. Although only three cases were reported in May 2020 in Abkhazia, the authorities did not reject communication with Georgia to fight Covid19. Meaning, Sohum viewed independence and the fight against the contagion as two different issues (International Crisis Group, 2020b: 12). In the meantime, the first pack of Sputnik V vaccines was sent by Russia in January 2021 (Ani News, 2021). As of autumn 2022, Abkhazia had 2,579 active cases (Coronavirus-control.ru, 2022).

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Pandemic Period: South Ossetia

During the pandemic, South Ossetia, the most Russia-dependent entity among the three, was more vulnerable than Abkhazia due to several factors. It had a higher rate of the elderly population, a weaker healthcare system, with hospitals lacking even basic equipment, medical staff who lacked sufficient training for years, and Russia’s export ban of medical equipment in the early stage of the contagion—(Blanc and Brown, 2020). The Ministry of Health did not provide information on Covid-19 on its website, but only a brochure on Covid-19 prepared by the Russian Ministry of Health was made available (Ministry of Health of the Russian Federation, 2020). Moreover, Maria Kotaeva, the Head of the State Committee for Information and Press, stated that the virus was “an intensified form of the flu, which was dangerous for the elderly”. South Ossetia closed its border with Georgia on 27 February 2020, after Georgia reported the first case of Covid-19 (Lacroix, 2020). Additional restrictions were imposed in South Ossetia between 27 March and 12 April 2020, leading to criticism (Yanovskaya, 2020) and lenient enforcement. Although South Ossetia’s already isolated condition was seen as an advantage at the outset, it later closed and reopened the Russian border on 15 September 2020, leading to a spike in the number of cases. The first case was reported on 6 May 2020 (Peacock, 2021). South Ossetia, however, was reluctant to collaborate with Georgia and/or international organizations because this could undermine its claim to independence, with the ICRC being the only exception. While the Russian military base in South Ossetia promptly implemented strict measures, no such measures were introduced in the rest of the entity (Blanc and Brown, 2020). In April 2020, the authorities even refused to admit the WHO staff if they did not enter through the Russian border. However, for exceptional/severe cases, residents of South Ossetia were allowed to go to Georgian hospitals for treatment in March 2020 (Caucasian Knot, 2020). South Ossetia reported a total of 10,213 cases and 192 deaths by 30 December 2021 (BBC Monitoring Trans Caucasus Unit, December 30, 2021). In general, the delivery of aid to entities proved problematic due to their unrecognized status, except the ICRC.

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5

Pandemic Period: Karabakh

The capacity to take necessary measures against the contagion in Karabakh was limited due to growing hostility between Azerbaijan and Armenia, a problem that was prioritized by the authorities at that time. In such a conjuncture, closing the Karabakh-Armenia border to prevent the spread of the virus further complicated the already delicate situation. Karabakh could only receive medical assistance with the authorization of Azerbaijan, although it had no practical authority over the entity (Lozka, 2021: 99). Meanwhile, atrocities were ongoing since at least March 2020, which prompted the Minsk Group to call on the parties to abide by a ceasefire during the pandemic (Blanc and Brown, 2020). However, war erupted again, after which the EU provided approximately EUR 900,000 in humanitarian assistance to Karabakh (Lozka, 2021: 102). The first Covid-19 case in Karabakh was reported on April 7 (Bescotti, 2020). However, the lack of other official data and statistics on Covid-19 in Karabakh was a setback. The Armenian Ministry of Health published information on mobility restrictions in Karabakh and advised residents not to travel (Bescotti, 2020). The authorities later lifted travel restrictions, reportedly due to a decline in the number of cases in Armenia (Ghazanchyan, 2020). As mentioned earlier, the healthcare infrastructure of Karabakh was already weak and had deteriorated further in recent years. Medical equipment and emergency vehicles were outdated, while the insufficiency of the local laboratory to assess test content was a drawback per se. A new laboratory was opened in July 2020 to test samples instead of sending them to Armenia (Khashe and Abdollahi, 2021: 97). According to the so-called “Constitution of Karabakh,” a state of emergency could be declared only if the constitutional order was in danger. Elections were held on 31 March and 14 April 2020, despite the lack of recognition by the international community, with the opinion that there was no significant health threat in the entity (Bescotti, 2020). However, after a surge in the number of cases, restrictions were imposed and checkpoints were established to control mobility in Karabakh (Blanc and Brown, 2020). At that time, the ICRC was the only organization providing aid to Karabakh, but their assistance and coverage were limited. As international organizations could only enter the entity with Azerbaijan’s permission, concerned parties held a meeting and decided to organise assistance for Karabakh (Blanc and Brown, 2020).

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Despite claims that the pandemic was used as an opportunity to restart the war in Karabakh, a closer look reveals Azerbaijan had previously pronounced war as an option as its statehood was strengthened the Minsk Group did not produce a concrete solution, and Russia’s traditional support for Armenia was not evident in recent hostilities (Valiyev and Valehli, 2021: 108–110). The conflict ultimately escalated into a full-scale war on 27 September 2020. By 8 October 2020, half of the population in Karabakh was displaced to Armenia and heavy fighting impaired the already weak healthcare capacity. While the number of Covid-19 cases was reportedly around 300 before the war, a spike was observed afterward. Keeping track of statistics became difficult (Kazaryan et al., 2020: 1) as the displaced people ended up at informal settlements in Yerevan (39%), Kotayk (10%), Syunik (9%), and other areas, exposing them to serious health risks (IOM, 2021). In hindsight, no one could have speculated that the conflict would be brought to an end amid the circumstances of a severe contagion. And yet, the fact on the ground is proof that the unexpected global crisis brought to pass a territorial reconfiguration in the region, one which is likely to prevail.

6

Conclusion

To sum up, the Covid-19 pandemic exacerbated the already limited healthcare, and the geopolitical and economic capacity of South Caucasian entities, with limited recognition/unrecognition making aid delivery more complicated. The case of Abkhazia, discloses an exception in the sense that it did not refuse to collaborate with the parent state, Georgia, concerning healthcare. It received aid from external actors, including the Abkhaz diaspora. As the regional entity most dependent on Russia, South Ossetia’s chances to receive external assistance directly implied Russia as the first address to be resorted to. Although Abkhazia and South Ossetia’s isolated conditions initially prompted forecasts that they would not be much affected by the virus, the opposite proved to be the case. If a comparison is to be made, the circumstances in the breakaway entities, particularly, in Karabakh displayed the worst conditions because of the eruption of war in 2020. The unrecognition of the entity complicated aid delivery and relations with the parent and patron states. As such, the deadly combination of war and pandemic hit the entity and caused the displacement of

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its residents and a spike in the number of cases, obstructing the provision of statistics. Overall, the healthcare, geopolitical and economic baggage inherited from the Soviet past suggested even less response capacity, which proved to be the case throughout the pandemic. The way the events unfolded does not leave much space for anticipating a sound and speedy recovery in relevant capacity development in the region in the short term. Still, genuine capacity development might come about in the mid- and long-term if multi-sectoral grassroots reforms are introduced aiming at permanent transition and capacitybuilding in especially healthcare, geopolitics, and economy. Particularly, the healthcare capacities of these mostly ignored areas of the world can be prioritized with the assistance of the patron/parent states and the WHO. Significantly, new ways of reconfiguring the post-pandemic political relations between the concerned actors will also need to be developed in order for the entities not to be negatively affected once again in worst-case scenarios. That, in the first place, will require preventing potential flareups in the region. Last but not least, improving the isolated economies of the entities is a necessity and that implies sound foreign assistance in the first place, to be supported by domestic economic policies. In a nutshell, being an unrecognized entity matters during a pandemic and dictates sustainable global cooperation, which remains to be seen.

References Abkhaz World (2020a) ‘UNDP delivered humanitarian aid to Gudauta Hospital’, Available at: https://abkhazworld.com/aw/current-affairs/1814-undp-delive red-humanitarian-aid-to-gudauta-hospital (Accessed: 14 August 2022). Abkhaz World (2020b) ‘A medical team from Bashkiria has arrived at the Gudauta Hospital’, Available at: https://abkhazworld.com/aw/current-aff airs/1824-a-medical-team-from-bashkiria-has-arrived-at-the-gudauta-hospital (Accessed: 14 August 2022). Abkhaz World (2020c) ‘Humanitarian cargo from Turkey’s Abkhaz diaspora delivered to Abkhazia’, Available at: https://abkhazworld.com/aw/currentaffairs/1839-humanitarian-cargo-from-turkey-s-abkhaz-diaspora-delivered-toabkhazia (Accessed: 5 August 2022). Action Fiche for Georgia (2007) Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbour hoodenlargement/system/files/2017-03/enpi_2007_c2007_5372_annual_ action_programme_for_georgia_economic_rehabilitation.pdf (Accessed: 20 May 2022).

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Altın Post Abhazya Haberleri (2014) ‘Abhazya hastaneleri bakımsızlıktan alarm veriyor’, 26 November. Available at: http://www.altinpost.org/haber-ars ivi/item/2388-abhazya-hastaneleri-bak%C4%B1ms%C4%B1zl%C4%B1ktanalarm-veriyor.html (Accessed: 3 June 2022). Altın Post Abhazya Haberleri (2019) ‘Abhazya’nın dı¸s ticaret cirosu son 6 ayda % 11 arttı’, 30 July. Available at: http://www.altinpost.org/haber-ars ivi/item/3245-abhazya-n%C4%B1n-d%C4%B1%C5%9F-ticaret-cirosu-son-6ayda-11-artt%C4%B1.html (Accessed: 14 July 2022). Ani News (2021) ‘Russia delivers 500 doses of Sputnik V vaccine to military base in Abkhazia’, Available at: https://www.aninews.in/news/world/asia/ russia-delivers-500-doses-of-sputnik-v-vaccine-to-military-base-in-abkhazia2 0210115165114/ (Accessed: 4 August 2022). Avdaliani, E. (2022) ‘For Abkhazia and South Ossetia security with Russia equals economic troubles—analysis’, Available at: https://www.eurasiareview. com/30042022-for-abkhazia-and-south-ossetia-security-with-russia-equalseconomic-troubles-analysis (Accessed: 12 July 2022). BBC Monitoring Trans Caucasus Unit (2021) ‘South Ossetia reported a total of 10,213 cases and 192 deaths on 30 December 2021’. LexisNexis Academic. Bescotti, E. (2020) ‘The coronavirus emergency in the post-Soviet breakaway regions’, Available at: https://ostblog.hypotheses.org/1534 (Accessed: 21 May 2022). Blakkisrud, H. et al. (2021) ‘Navigating de facto statehood: trade, trust, and agency in Abkhazia’s external economic relations’, Eurasian Geography and Economics, 67(3) pp. 347–371. Blanc, J. and Brown, F. Z. (2020) ‘Conflict zones in the time of coronavirus: war and war by other means’, Available at: https://carnegieendowment.org/ 2020/12/17/conflict-zones-in-time-of-coronavirus-war-and-war-by-othermeans-pub-83462 (Accessed: 30 June 2022). Caucasian Knot (2020) ‘South Ossetia allows emergency departures of its residents for medical treatment in Georgia’, Available at: https://www.eng.kav kaz-uzel.eu/articles/50193 (Accessed: 5 August 2022). Chlachidze, L. (2016) ‘Tskhinvali’s painful past, depressing present and dark future’, Available at: http://www.transconflict.com/2016/12/tskhinvalis-pai nful-past-depressing-present-and-dark-future-212/ (Accessed: 17 June 2022). Civil.ge (2020) ‘COVID-19: Abkhazia reports first case of coronavirus’, Available at: https://civil.ge/archives/345997 (Accessed: 4 August 2022). Concordiam Staff (2012) ‘Post-Soviet Frozen Conflicts’, per Concordiam: Journal of European Security Defense Issues, 3 [online] pp. 42–47. Available at: https://www.marshallcenter.org/sites/default/files/files/2020-10/ pC_V3N4_en-3_per_Concordiam_Staff.pdf (Accessed: 17 June 2022).

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Coronavirus-control.ru (2022) ‘Koponavipyc v ctpane Pecpyblika Abxaziᴙ cegodnᴙ’ (Coronavirus in the Republic of Abkhazia Today) https://cor onavirus-control.ru/coronavirus-republic-of-abkhazia/ (Accessed 5 August 2022). de Waal, T. (2019) ‘South Ossetia Today’, Available at: https://3dcftas.eu/pub lications/south-ossetia-today, pp. 1–11 (Accessed: 22 July 2022). Ghazanchyan, S. (2020) ‘Artsakh lifts all coronavirus-related entry and exit restrictions’, Available at: https://en.armradio.am/2020/09/08/artsakhlifts-all-coronavirus-related-entry-and-exit-restrictions/ (Accessed: 11 May 2022). Howard, R. D. and Traughber, C. M. (2009) ‘The “new silk road” of terrorism and organised crime: the key to countering the terror-crime nexus’, in Norwitz, J. M. (ed.) Armed groups: studies in national security, counterterrorism, and counterinsurgency. Newport: Government Printing Office, pp. 371–387. International Crisis Group (2020a) Improving prospects for peace after the Nagorno-Karabakh war. Available at: https://www.crisisgroup.org/europecentral-asia/caucasus/nagorno-karabakh-conflict/b91-improving-prospectspeace-after-nagorno-karabakh-war (Accessed: 16 July 2022). International Crisis Group (2020b) The COVID-19 challenge in post-Soviet breakaway statelets. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep 31564.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Aa69a4ac799b4ab92cce398cf7cfedb7a&ab_ segments=&origin=&acceptTC=1 (Accessed: 29 July 2022). IOM—International Organization for Migration (2021) ‘IOM South Caucasus COVID-19 strategic response and recovery plan’, Available at: https://crisis response.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl1481/files/appeal/documents/IOM% 20South%20Caucasus%20COVID-19%20Strategic%20Response%20and%20R ecovery%20Plan.pdf (Accessed: 1 June 2022). Jardine, B. (2017) ‘Russia aims to lure South Ossetian, Abkhazian patients away from Georgia’, Available at: https://eurasianet.org/russia-aims-to-lure-southossetian-abkhazian-patients-away-from-georgia (Accessed: 12 June 2022). Jardine, B. (2018) ‘New Georgian hospital aims to heal, and win, Abkhazian hearts and minds’, Available at: https://eurasianet.org/new-georgian-hos pital-aims-to-heal-and-win-abkhazian-hearts-and-minds (Accessed: 17 May 2022). Kazaryan, A. M. et al. (2020) ‘War in the time of COVID-19: humanitarian catastrophe in Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia’, The Lancet, 9, pp. e243–244 [online]. Available at: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC783 3056/pdf/main.pdf (Accessed: 13 June 2022). Khashe, J. and Abdollahi, M. (2021) ‘The impact of the coronavirus pandemic on the resumption of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh’, Humanities and

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Social Sciences Bulletin of the Financial University, 11(6), pp. 94–99. Available at: https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/the-impact-of-the-coronavirus-pan demic-on-the-resumption-of-the-conflict-in-nagorno-karabakh (Accessed: 20 June 2022). Kolossov, V., and O’Loughlin, J. (2011) ‘After the wars in the South Caucasus state of Georgia: economic insecurities and migration in the ‘de facto’ states of Abkhazia and South Ossetia’, Eurasian Geography and Economics, 52(5), pp. 631–654. Korsten, T. (2020) ‘South Ossetia—unrecognized pandemic politics’, Available at: https://www.defactoborders.org/places/south-ossetia/unrecognized-pan demic-politics (Accessed: 4 August 2022). Lacroix, R. (2018) ‘Will trade bring reunification or annexation to South Ossetia?’ Available at: https://www.fairobserver.com/politics/south-ossetiarussia-georgia-trade-caucasus-news-71881 (Accessed: 14 July 2022). Lacroix, R. (2020) ‘How is COVID-19 affecting post-Soviet de facto states?’ Available at: https://www.fairobserver.com/region/europe/rejeanne-lacroixcovid-19-post-soviet-de-facto-states-transnistria-south-ossetia-abkhazia-hea lth-news-00665/ (Accessed: 4 August 2022). Lis, M. (2016) ‘No peace in Nagorno-Karabakh: economic and political incentives for the perpetuation of the Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict’, Universiteit Leiden, https://studenttheses.universiteitleiden.nl/access/item% 3A2602804/view (Accessed: 23 July 2022). Lozka, K. (2021) ‘Closer together or further apart? The impact of the COVID19 pandemic on the conflicts in the EU’s eastern neighbourhood’, European View, 20(1), pp. 97–105. Médecins sans Frontières (2002) ‘Abkhazia: old and frail in the shadow of the embargo’, Available at: https://www.msf.fr/sites/default/files/708321 2723e4147d15960a1aa0b48d44.pdf (Accessed: 1 May 2022). Ministry of Health of the Russian Federation (2020) ‘Ppofilaktika, diagnoctika i leqenie novoЙ koponavipycnoЙ infekcii Covid-19’ (‘Prevention, diagnosis and treatment of the novel coronavirus’) Available at: https://www.minzdravruo.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/COVID19_V5_Final.pdf (Accessed: 5 August 2022). Peacock, L. (2021) ‘The effects of COVID-19 in South Ossetia’, Available at: https://borgenproject.org/covid-19-in-south-ossetia (Accessed: 5 August 2022). Thompson, M. E., Dorian, A. H., and Harutyunyan, T. L. (2010) ‘Identifying priority healthcare trainings in frozen conflict situations: the case of Nagorno Karabagh’, Conflict and Health, 4(21), pp. 1–11, Available at: https:// www.researchgate.net/publication/49669947_Identifying_priority_health care_trainings_in_frozen_conflict_situations_The_case_of_Nagorno_Karabagh (Accessed: 18 May 2022).

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The Dilemma Between Carbon Neutrality and Energy Security: Understanding the Likely Impacts of the Covid-19 and the Russia–Ukraine War on the EU Climate Targets Mehmet Efe Biresselioglu , Zehra Funda Savas , and Berfu Solak

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Introduction

The European Union (EU) is facing a complex challenge due to global climate change and the energy crisis caused by the Russia–Ukraine war (EEAS, 2023). While the EU has set a target of a 55% reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2030 and climate neutrality by 2050 (Bäckstrand, 2022), the same countries have started to reactivate their coal-fired units and reconsider the decision to phase out nuclear energy to

M. E. Biresselioglu (B) · Z. F. Savas · B. Solak Sustainable Energy Division, Izmir University of Economics, Izmir, Turkey e-mail: [email protected] Z. F. Savas e-mail: [email protected] B. Solak e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Akıllı and B. Gunes (eds.), World Politics in the Age of Uncertainty, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39607-6_6

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ensure their energy security because of the ongoing war (European Parliament, 2023). Before the war, the Covid-19 pandemic and subsequent lockdown measures had decreased energy demand and consumption, which helped the EU countries in meeting some of their climate targets. The decrease in global economic and social activities caused a 10.6% reduction in carbon dioxide (CO2 ) emissions in the 27-nation bloc and the UK between January and August 2020 (European Commission, 2020a). As lockdown restrictions began to ease and economic activities resumed, the level of CO2 emissions varied in different countries. This was related to the ambitious CO2 emission reductions of EU countries under the “EU Climate and Energy Package (CARE)” (European Energy Agency, 2020). According to the European Environment Agency Report (European Environment Agency, 2021), EU-27 achieved a 20% reduction target for CO2 emissions in 2020 within the 20-20-20 climate targets. However, some countries, such as Bulgaria, Finland, Germany, and Ireland, needed to utilise tools like purchasing emission quotas to achieve their national targets. Nonetheless, the EU countries, in general terms, also reached the mark of a 20% increase in the share of renewable energy resources (BP, 2022). As a result, the percentage of renewable energy resources in energy consumption in European countries reached 21.3% in 2020. Before the Russia–Ukraine war broke out, the EU countries were determined to decarbonise their economies, and as per the 20-20-20 targets, they set a goal for a 55% emission reduction by 2030 and climate neutrality by 2050. However, the Russia–Ukraine war has challenged the energy security of the EU countries vis-à-vis cuts in Russia’s natural gas supply. It forced most European countries to backslide towards local fossil fuels to diversify from Russian gas. This made energy security a high priority for the EU-27 governments, pushing them to reduce energy dependence. This chapter examines the dilemma facing EU countries, as they balance the harmful effects of climate change and energy insecurity. It analyses to what extent the Covid-19 measures and decrease in CO2 emissions in Europe have contributed to realising the European Climate Target Plans for 2030 and 2050 while discussing the potential impact of the Russia–Ukraine war on Europe’s targets towards becoming a carbon-neutral continent.

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The EU Climate Targets and Strategies Towards Decarbonisation by 2050

Climate change has various impacts all across Europe, causing extreme weather conditions, floods, droughts, and heat waves, among others. They have adverse effects on human well-being, economy, and social life (European Environment Agency, 2023). While all EU member states are vulnerable, some members, such as Lithuania, Finland, and Latvia, are more at risk than others are, due to the rising sea levels and changes in surface temperature (Greenmatch, 2023). Moreover, different climatic characteristics in various parts of Europe expose each country to distinct risks and challenges. The EU’s environmental policy aims to eliminate, reduce and prevent pollution, promote sustainable development by ensuring the use of natural resources, avoid environmental damage, and harmonise environmental protection with other sector-based policies such as energy and transport (European Commission, 2021). The Environmental Action Programs, designed in 1973, have been very effective in developing the EU’s environmental policy (Bosnjakovic, 2006). Based on these programs and action plans, the EU has set its targets for “reducing greenhouse gas emissions, improving energy efficiency, and increasing renewable energy sources”. (European Environment Agency, 2021). These targets demonstrate the global leadership of European countries in the energy sector. In terms of decreasing greenhouse gas emissions, the EU surpassed the 20% target in 2015 and further reduced its emissions in 2016, achieving a 22 and 23% reduction, respectively, compared to 1990 (European Environment Agency, 2022). The EU is committed to combatting climate change and transitioning into a low-carbon economy. The EU’s efforts have helped it achieve CO2 emissions at the same levels as in the 1990s. The EU has implemented a set of policy measures within the European Climate Change Program framework, including keeping the global temperature below 2 °C, decreasing GHG emissions, promoting energy efficiency, increasing the share of renewable resources, supporting the electrification of transportation, and developing carbon capture and storage technologies (Rayner and Jordan, 2016). Additionally, member countries have designed their national actions. The EU is the world’s first region to have “binding legislation” to guarantee that all targets are successfully met (European Commission, 2023a). In October 2014, the leaders of the European countries adopted the “2030 Climate and Energy Framework”,

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which strengthens their pledge to “make the EU’s economy and energy system more competitive, secure, and sustainable” (Proedrou, 2016). In the long term, the EU has also set ambitious emissions reduction targets for 2050, including complete carbon neutrality. Combating the harmful effects of climate change is one of the five pillars of the EU’s far-reaching “2020 strategy for smart, sustainable, and inclusive growth”. The strategy aimed “to reduce EU greenhouse gas emissions by 20% until 2020, generate 20% of its energy from renewable energy resources and improve energy efficiency by 20%” by 2020 (European Commission, 2020b). According to the European Environment Agency (EEA), 21 EU member states achieved their national climate targets in 2020, while the other countries, including Bulgaria, Cyprus, Finland, Germany, Ireland, and Malta, had to purchase emission quotas to meet their national targets under legal obligations (European Environment Agency, 2021). To increase the share of renewable energy resources by 20%, the EU has already achieved a 21.3% share in energy consumption (Eurostat, 2023b). However, while the use of renewable energy for heating, cooling, and electricity generation is increasing, the transportation sector still needs to catch up. In comparison, the EU’s target of reducing energy consumption by 20% appeared unlikely. However, due to COVID-19 precautions, primary and final energy consumption in the EU countries decreased to target levels (European Parliament, 2022a). On the other hand, the 20% GHG emission reduction target was achieved since the GHG emission level of the EU-27 countries was 31% lower in 2020 than in 1990 (European Environment Agency, 2021). To ensure a coordinated approach across member states and regulatory certainty for investors, an integrated climate and energy policy between 2020 and 2030 was needed (Meyer-Ohlendorf, 2015). Increasing the share of renewable energy resources in energy consumption to no less than 27% by 2030 (European Commission, 2020c) is essential for transitioning to “a competitive, secure, and sustainable energy system”. Consequently, energy efficiency is a vital element of the 2030 framework, with EU leaders endorsing a 27% energy savings target for 2030. To keep global warming below 2 °C, the EU aims to reduce its emissions by 80–95% by 2050, compared to 1990 (European Environment Agency, 2015). Decreasing emissions to such an extent requires the transformation of the EU into a low-carbon economy. In 2011, the European Commission released a “roadmap” detailing a cost-efficient way to reach

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a competitive and low-carbon economy by 2050 (European Commission, 2011). The roadmap outlines how different sectors can contribute to achieving this goal. To this end, the EU aims to generate almost all its electricity from non-carbon sources by 2050. By improving energy efficiency, the EU aims to reduce energy consumption by around 30% in 2050 (IEA, 2023). In addition, the deployment of local renewable energy sources will reduce export dependency, and transitioning to a low-carbon economy will reduce air pollution and associated health costs. Lastly, the EU Adaptation Strategy was designed by the European Commission in 2013 to increase the European countries’ resilience to the effects of climate change (European Commission, 2023b). Adaptation to climate change implies anticipating the adverse effects of climate change and taking the most appropriate actions to prevent or decrease the hazards or threats it may create. Proper adaptation measures are expected to provide an environmentally friendly lifestyle and manageable costs. The EU adaptation strategy includes elements to complement EU-wide actions with member states’ adaptation efforts, such as “providing guidance and financial assistance, promoting knowledge generation and sharing of experience, and ensuring climate change adaptation is embedded in all EU policies” (European Commission, 2023b).

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The Impact of Covid-19 on EU Climate Targets

The Covid-19 pandemic caused a global economic shock that had a profound impact on energy sector investments. These impacts varied across companies, countries and led to a general decline in energy demand worldwide. According to a report by International Energy Agency in 2020, countries under complete lockdown experienced an average reduction of 25% in energy demand compared to normal levels, while countries under partial lockdown experienced an average reduction of 18% (IEA, 2020). Oil has been the resource most affected by the pandemic because of restrictions on transportation and aviation, which account for approximately 60% of global oil demand. There has also been a decline in coal and gas demand (IEA, 2020). Additionally, many countries have experienced over a 20% drop in electricity demand during lockdowns, leading to tight supply. Furthermore, supply chain disruptions, power plant installations postponements, and financial difficulties have reduced reliance on fossil fuels. In contrast, declining demands have increased the share of

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renewables in the electricity supply, as their generation is mainly unaffected (IEA, 2020). In other words, renewables have emerged as the only energy source with increased demand due to their uninterrupted supply and relatively low operating costs. As a result, during the peak of the Covid-19 pandemic, many countries worldwide turned more towards renewable energy sources, including solar and wind power, with the anticipation that the amount of electricity generated from renewable sources would be more than fossil fuels. In 2021, the energy sector rebounded from the demand crisis and global contraction brought on by Covid-19 a year earlier. However, the surge in demand for all fuels and technologies led to a significant increase in gas, coal, and electricity prices (IEA, 2021). This resulted in an imbalance in energy markets globally and significantly affected the economies of energy-dependent countries. As an energy-dependent region, Europe adopted various political initiatives to achieve the vision of the European Green Deal in 2021, including the “Zero Pollution Action Plan”, the new “Climate Change Adaptation Strategy”, and the “Forest and Soil Strategy” (European Parliamentary Research Service, 2021). One crucial policy action taken was the “European Climate Act”, which legally binds the EU to become climate-neutral and climate resilient by 2050 and reduce GHG emissions by at least 55% by 2030 compared to the 1990 level. Achieving this 55% target requires a group of initiatives launched by the European Commission, known as the “Fit for 55” package (European Council of the European Union, 2023a). The Covid-19 pandemic, coupled with reduced economic activity and energy consumption, presented an opportunity for Europe to meet its climate targets and reduce carbon emissions (Meles et al., 2020). It led to an increase in the popularity of renewable energy resources, resulting in a decrease in carbon emissions in Europe declined from 4073.7 million tons in 2019 to 3608.3 million tons in 2020. In 2021, it reached 3793.7 million tons with the resumption of economic activities (BP, 2022). Europe needs to do more to meet the Green Deal and the Paris climate agreement targets, even with a slower economic recovery. However, a prolonged economic slowdown could make the process less costly in terms of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. As part of the Green Deal’s economic incentives, European countries could set more ambitious emissions targets for 2030 and adopt related policy measures (European Parliamentary Research Service, 2021).

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The Impact of the Russia–Ukraine War on European Energy Security

Despite the optimism brought by the EU’s climate neutrality targets and reduction of greenhouse gases due to the pandemic, the Russia–Ukraine war has adversely affected the EU’s policies towards using renewables at the expense of fossil fuels. The conflict brought international instability and threatened global energy security, particularly for energy-dependent countries. According to the IEA (2022a), Russia is a significant actor in international energy markets, one of the three largest crude oil producers, and the second-largest natural gas producer. Additionally, it possesses the most extensive gas reserves, making it the most crucial gas exporter (IEA, 2022a). As a result, the war has affected the energy security of several countries, leading to changes in their energy policies. The EU’s dependence on natural gas imported from Russia has significantly influenced the energy security of its member states, especially with the deterioration of relations between Russia and the EU following the war. Consequently, the EU has imposed various sanctions against Russia, including economic and individual sanctions, as well as visa precautions (European Council of the European Union, 2023b). They also provided economic and military support to Ukraine against Russia throughout the conflict. In response, Russia’s Gazprom has suspended and deliberately reduced gas deliveries to European customers (Euronews, 2022a; Elton, 2023). For this reason, European countries have sought to decrease their dependency on Russian natural gas to counter Russia’s continuous “weaponisation of energy supplies” (European Commission, 2022a). The European reliance on Russian natural gas has necessitated a comprehensive energy strategy to reduce dependence. In 2021, around 40% of the EU’s natural gas needs were imported from Russia (IEA, 2022a). Before the war, major EU economies like Germany, France, and Italy, relied heavily on gas imports from Russia (Buchholz, 2022). Overall, in 2021, the EU imported 83% of its natural gas, with 45% of those imports coming from Russia (IEA, 2022a; European Council, 2022a). Russia exports gas to Europe through pipelines, such as the Nord Stream, Blue Stream, and Turkstream, using transit routes through Belarus and Ukraine (IEA, 2022b).1 The EU members need natural gas for electricity, 1 Even though the Nord Stream II pipeline was finalised in 2021, Germany did not permit the certification after the outbreak of the war.

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heating, and industrial purposes with more than 30% of EU households’ consumption used for home heating (European Council, 2022a). The IEA recommended that the EU install new renewable energy power plants to reduce dependence on Russian gas (IEA, 2022d). However, Europe faces short-term “renewable capacity extension” challenges due to insufficient support mechanisms, lengthy and complicated permit processes and inadequate improvements in the “transmission and distribution network” (IEA, 2022e). In addition, logistical restrictions, supply chain problems, and higher costs of building solar and wind plants are other challenges for Europe to accelerate renewable projects compared to Russian gas (IEA, 2022e; 2022f). Given these challenges, Europe has sought to diversify its gas suppliers, resulting in a significant rise in liquified natural gas (LNG) imports, especially from the United States (European Council, 2022a). However, several EU countries need LNG terminals necessary for LNG imports, and these terminals cannot be built in the short term (European Parliament, 2022b). As a solution, Floating Storage and Regasification Units (FSRUs) have been proposed for importing LNG to Europe since they are easier and less costly to build in the short run (European Commission, 2023d; European Parliament, 2022b). The EU has increased its cooperation with countries like Canada, Norway, Azerbaijan, Israel, and Egypt to reduce dependency on natural gas imported from Russia (European Council, 2022b). Because of these efforts, the EU’s gas imports from Russia decrease to less than one-fourth of its total gas import between January 2022 and November 2022 (European Council, 2022a). In addition, energy saving was another tool to reduce EU dependence; for instance, natural gas consumption in the EU decreased by 19.3% between August 2022 and January 2023 (Eurostat, 2023a, 2023b). Due to Russia’s decision to cut off gas supplies, many European countries have been forced to suspend their carbon-neutral strategies and restart their coal power plants (Frost, 2022). As a result, several countries, including Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, Italy, the Czech Republic, and France, have reactivated their coal-fired units to fill the gap in gas supplies. For instance, in June 2022, the Austrian energy group VERBUND was authorised to produce electricity with coal instead of gas (Euronews, 2022b). Furthermore, in June 2022, the German government approved the reactivation of 27 coal-fired power units until March 2024 to fill the gap in Russian gas supplies (VOA, 2022). Likewise,

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the Netherlands agreed to remove limitations on power stations based on fossil fuel (Euronews, 2022a). Similarly, Denmark, Italy, the Czech Republic, and France reactivated their coal-fired units until alternative sources are secured (Frangoul, 2022; The Local, 2022; Euroactiv, 2022; ˙ 2022). Furthermore, the share of fossil fuels in their energy mix is RFI, still high in several EU countries, including Lithuania, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Greece, and Hungary (European Commission, 2022b; IEA, 2022c). The Russia–Ukraine war has also hurt the EU’s plans to phase out nuclear power plants. As a result, European countries have postponed their plans to phase out nuclear power plants to offset the cuts in Russian natural gas. For instance, Germany announced the termination of the phased closure of its two nuclear power plants in September 2022 (The Guardian, 2022). Similarly, Belgium temporarily suspended its nuclear power phase-out in March 2022 due to “a chaotic geopolitical environment” (Politico, 2022). In addition, the IEA’s 10-Point Plan for reducing the EU’s dependence on Russian gas recommended electricity generation from “existing dispatchable low-emission sources including bioenergy and nuclear (IEA, 2022d). In this sense, the EU countries have temporarily resorted to fossil fuels and nuclear power plants to overcome the energy crisis. The immediate energy crisis in the EU also forced members to temporarily stop installing renewable projects (McGrath, 2022).

5

Conclusion

European countries are facing a major dilemma as they attempt to balance the devastating effects of global climate change with the energy crisis triggered by the Russia–Ukraine war. The EU has set ambitious goals to achieve a 55% net emissions reduction by 2030 and climate neutrality until 2050. However, the interruption of Russian gas supplies in the wake of the Russia–Ukraine war has made it challenging for EU members to meet their energy demands while also adhering to their decarbonisation goals. Even though the lockdown helped reduce energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions, the post-Covid economic recovery has led to increased energy consumption and carbon emissions. Furthermore, the impact of the Russia–Ukraine war is likely to reverse progress towards decarbonisation in favour of fossil fuels and nuclear power plants.

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In the short term, European countries have faced challenges in maintaining their energy security, including the installation of new renewable energy power plants and LNG terminals. As a result, they have resorted to diversifying their gas suppliers and reactivating their coal-fired and nuclear units. However, this presents a challenge to the EU’s climate-neutral and nuclear phase-out strategy, given their previously announced plans. The disruption in the Russian gas supply has led several European countries to announce plans to revitalise their coal-fired and nuclear power plants to address the energy supply crisis in their countries. The significance of using indigenous renewable resources and diversifying energy suppliers to maintain energy security has been demonstrated once again by the Russia–Ukraine war (Biresselioglu, 2012). Before the war, Europe seemed to be on track to meet its climate targets due to reduced energy consumption during the Covid-19 pandemic. However, the disruption in the Russian gas supply has hurt the EU’s decarbonisation strategies and phase-out of coal and nuclear power plants. Although the European Commission’s climate targets still aim to make Europe a climate-neutral continent by 2050 (European Commission, 2023c), the immediate future will be a test of EU countries’ investment in renewable sources and their ability to achieve the 2030 and 2050 targets.

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The Gendered Dynamics of Covid-19: International Politics and Women Leaders Çi˘gdem Aydın Koyuncu

1

Introduction

The Covid-19 pandemic, potentially the most challenging global crisis since the Second World War, has deepened inequalities in a world of disparities. During the initial phase of the pandemic, nation-states used their power to bring citizens back home to safety and create an isolated environment within their closed-down borders. The power later shifted to providing masks, disinfectants, and social and economic assurances, before eventually focusing on producing and providing citizens with vaccination. Today, combating the global economic fallout of the pandemic has become part of that struggle. Although many theories and methods can be used to read and analyse these processes, it is noteworthy that Covid19 has an extremely gendered reflection on international relations when prominent discourses and policies are considered. This study will aim to analyse international relations in the Covid-19 process through feminist theory and a gendered perspective. The method will be based on several prominent titles that bring out the pandemic’s gendered nature. First of all, the gender-based discourses in the languages of leaders and politicians

Ç. A. Koyuncu (B) Department of International Relations, Bursa Uluda˘g University, Bursa, Turkey e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Akıllı and B. Gunes (eds.), World Politics in the Age of Uncertainty, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39607-6_7

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since the beginning of the pandemic, and their negative effects on international relations will be analysed. In addition, the effects of Covid-19 on women and its international spread will be discussed. Finally, the proportion of women in many foreign policy decision-making mechanisms, as well as the role of international-regional organizations will be evaluated. The study will also analyse whether increased participation of women in decision-making positions can lead to change and transformation, taking into account the women leaders at work during the pandemic.

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“War Against Covid-19 ”: The Masculine Language Observed in International Relations During the Pandemic Process

The ongoing Covid-19 pandemic has revealed the vulnerability of states and individuals to diseases, and emphasized the social and economic interdependence of the world. In addition to questioning the role of the states and the sufficiency of health systems, the pandemic has also challenged traditional views of International Relations, which centre on a male, strong, rational, free and independent agent. Critical theories such as feminism and gender-based analysis have shown the inability of the ideal of a healthy, masculine and independent subject that has contributed to keeping relations of domination alive, to describe and justify the experiences of the majority of the population (Felk, 2020). The Covid-19 pandemic has confronted both traditional masculine and revisionist foreign policies that protect “us” from external threats while highlighting feminist alternatives that prioritize empathy and care for citizens and non-citizens, and create a sense of global and local security (Johnson and Williams 2020; Kim and Kang, 2021). In the initial phase of the Covid-19 pandemic, countries around the world took similar steps, such as social distancing and staying at home, to prevent the spread and protect their citizens, although the specifics varied. The global pandemic response has been likened to described as “waging a war” (Serhan, 2020; Christoyannopoulos, 2020). Political leaders often appeared with security personnel and made joint statements. Health workers were frequently referred to as “soldiers fighting on the front lines.” For instance, in the US, President Trump described the situation as an attack from an invisible enemy. In the UK, Prime Minister Boris Johnson discussed the possibility of a wartime government and conscription. In France, President

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Emmanuel Macron said the whole world is at war (Chakrabortty, 2020). In China, Xi Jinping pledged to wage a “people’s war” against the coronavirus, while Italy’s coronavirus emergency special commissioner called on the country to equip itself for a “war economy” (Serhan, 2020). On the other hand, Russia’s Defence Ministry announced that it made progress in developing a Covid-19 vaccine. However, such masculine and militaristic language is not unique to the Covid-19 crisis; rather it is often used in all crisis management processes (Branicki et al., 2019). The use of wartime metaphors during the pandemic has been discussed by some linguists. According to John Baugh, politicians and health officials often use this language because “they think the public isn’t taking the problem seriously yet” (Serhan, 2020). While this may have been effective in drawing public attention to the issue initially, it may cause problems later. For instance, the wartime rhetoric can promote national harmony but can also increase fear, anxiety and panic. This was seen in panic-buying, hoarding and an increase in personal armament. While War metaphors typically imply mobilization, action and doing something, during the pandemic, governments have asked people to do the opposite—to leave normal routines, avoid going out, and actually doing nothing. The use of war metaphors can also be inherently disruptive and unhelpful, especially in a crisis that requires global cooperation. This has led to increased xenophobia, particularly towards China and those perceived as possible carriers of the virus. Mutual accusations between the US and China about responsibility for the pandemic are an example of this (Serhan, 2020). The discourses and visuals have sparked a discussion relevant to feminism. Feminist theory opposes the “inevitability of war” at the core of realism, and instead develops analyses based on cooperation, solidarity and peace, which are traditionally seen as feminine values. Feminists argue that the use of the “waging war against the pandemic” discourse is a deliberate attempt (perhaps unconscious, though not widely accepted by feminists) to perpetuate the idea of war in the international system and present it as a necessary and natural outcome (Enloe, 2020b). Institutions and leaders that promote masculine and militaristic structures tend to label all challenges as “wars,” assuming people will only work together and prioritize common goals when facing a common enemy that poses a serious threat to their existence. As such, the pandemic has been framed as a war against an invisible enemy. Therefore, governments and leaders preferred using the “war” metaphor. However, unlike human-created threats, the threat

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posed by a pandemic is uncontrollable (due to the lack of human control even if the virus was laboratory-created), since it is caused by an invisible microbe/virus that can originate from different sources like air, water and food pollution, and can cross borders. Therefore, using the language of the war on an issue that extends beyond cultural and national borders, and requires international cooperation, poses great risks and fuels nationalist and racist discourses. Eliminating Covid-19 requires a long-term and cooperative approach through scientific studies and building international social trust. The war discourse, on the other hand, implies that the solution lies in national isolationism, competition and even armament. Furthermore, framing sustainable public health as achievable through war the privileging of masculine structures. Especially, at a time when there is an opportunity to recognize care work, education, and service jobs, which are mostly associated with women in society and are crucial in the pandemic process (Enloe, 2020a). During the pandemic, however, some world leaders used a different language style unlike the masculine language mentioned above. For instance, New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern (2020) emphasized cooperation and goodness rather than enemies or war. Meanwhile, Norwegian Prime Minister Erna Solberg acknowledged fear by saying “It’s okay to be scared,” unlike male leaders. German Chancellor at the time Angela Merkel stood out for her use of simple, direct, realistic and empathetic expressions in public speeches (Hassan and O’Grady, 2020). The war discourse also led governments with militaristic tendencies to use repressive and even violent methods in the Covid-19 response. In some countries, lockdowns, mask mandates and vaccination requirements were enforced through coercive measures, often with the support of law enforcement officers. Such measures were perceived as limitations on individual freedoms, especially in Western countries and there were popular protests to oppose them. However, the war discourse on the pandemic creates an environment where those who refuse to participate in this “war effort” can be viewed as the enemy, leading to the use of violence to suppress them in many countries (Enloe, 2020a). Additionally, the war rhetoric on the pandemic resulted in imagery that reinforces the nation-state. Since the turn of the millennium, there has been an increase in populist, nationalist and xenophobic parties and structures. Many of these groups and parties, often identified as the political far-right, promote narratives that oppose globalization, diversity and immigration

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while emphasizing “people” and “nation” structures. In the populistnationalist imagination, both feminine and masculine patterns are present. Examples of such imagery include the motherland feeding its people like a mother, or the need for a strong, masculine protector to defend the homeland and nation against “fall” or “invasion.” During the pandemic, these populist and ultra-nationalist structures have used such imagery to put forward masculine policies that involve pressure, limiting and controlling borders with other nations to protect their nation from the unknown (virus) (Agius et al., 2020).

3 Gender-Based Problems Observed on a Global Scale in the Covid-19 Era With the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic, issues that have been traditionally associated with feminine roles such as care, nutrition, and social needs have become critical for the survival of many people. Contrary to the dynamics of the usual nation-state, countries like Germany took their citizens to intensive care based on social, health and economic factors, while countries like China or Turkey have sent medical supplies to help the US, where they were having problems. Therefore, at least in the initial period of the pandemic, values such as cooperation, peace and compassion have emerged instead of self-interest, competition, aggression and war, giving rise to hope for peace and common security in the international arena. Feminist theorists like Martha Fineman (2008) have argued that there has been a shift in the perception of the subject’s strength and independence, which has long dominated international relations and world politics, and that it is necessary to acknowledge and appreciate the natural fragility of the subject in this process. For years, states like the US have invested more in the economy or defence/military, traditionally considered “masculine” areas, and neglected sectors such as healthcare, education systems, caregiving, nursing and child-rearing, which are considered to be feminine (Stein and Gregg, 2019). Since being in need of care is opposed to the idea of a strong and independent man, all aspects related to care are seen as dependent, and though not always consciously, are often ignored (Hughes et al., 2005). However, the Covid-19 pandemic has highlighted the harmful effects of inadequate healthcare systems. Feminists argue that recognizing the vulnerability of individuals and ensuring their safety can better prepare us for future pandemics or any humanitarian crises.

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During the pandemic, the value of care, typically considered feminine and undervalued, has become more apparent, highlighting the interdependence between individuals, the states, and the global community. This interdependence and dependence on medical professionals are evident not only in the spread of the virus but also in the political, social and economic dimensions of the crisis on a global scale (Gillespie, 2020). Virginia Held (1990) argues that acknowledging the individual’s relational structure (the relational self) will not only prepare society for future crises but also make it easier to deal with other interdependent issues, such as environmental problems. The pandemic has also underlined the significance of unpaid jobs that are considered feminine, such as housework and care work, and their critical importance to society. It has also highlighted the importance of underpaid jobs and the industries, such as factory, field and market workers, cargo workers, municipal workers, and healthcare workers at the lowest level where racial and ethnic minorities are often employed in precarious positions. The crisis has also exposed the existence of solidarity and a shared division of labour among different social groups. Although the recognition of these issues in the initial phase of the pandemic raised hope for global change, subsequent developments did not support this trend (Enloe, 2020a). Another issue that emerged during the Covid-19 pandemic is the increase in direct and structural violence, which has disproportionately affected women. Although there may have been a decrease in the momentum of wars, terrorist activities and local conflicts during the initial phase of the pandemic, conflicts and hot wars have continued to occur, as seen in the Russia–Ukraine crisis. Despite the media’s influence creating a perception that violence has fallen into the background or stopped due to the international community’s focus on the pandemic, field data does not support this claim. In fact, a main point of focus is the significant increase in intimate partner violence or domestic violence during the pandemic. According to UN estimates, there has been a global increase of 20–30% in domestic violence (Lennard, 2020). In addition, the pandemic has made structural violence against women more prominent. Many labour markets are gender-classified, which often results in different challenges and risks for men and women in the workplace. For instance, women are generally the first to be laid off. For those who work from home during the pandemic, the unequal division of care-based work puts a lighter burden on men as

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women take on the primary responsibility of childcare, home education and housework in addition to working from home, leading to greater inequality. As many businesses closed down during the pandemic, which was followed by an economic crisis, millions of women faced an increased risk of unemployment (Mckinsey, 2021). While women lost their paid jobs, the unpaid care work taken on them also skyrocketed due to the closure of schools and the increasing needs of the sick and the elderly.

4 Women in Decision-Making Mechanisms in the Covid-19 Process Despite the protection of women’s rights and the creation of a normative framework for women based on peace and security, women have not yet achieved equal representation with men in the decision-making processes that determine their future. This gender gap in decision-making was once again highlighted during the pandemic in various dimensions. Although the pandemic is an area that is considered feminine, just like caregiving, women’s participation in policy-making related to the pandemic and in the Covid-19 mechanisms of many international and regional organizations, including the World Health Organization, remain disproportionately low. When Donald Trump established the first White House Coronavirus Task Force, it drew intense criticism as all 12 members were male. The U.S. is not an isolated incident either as women only constitute 20% of even the WHO’s Covid-19 Emergency Committee (Smith, 2020). In fact, 85.2% of the 115 Covid-19 task forces created in 87 countries, including 17 member states of the European Union, are mostly comprised of men, while only 11.4% are women, and only 3.5% are seen to have gender equality. Another area of gender-based inequality that requires attention during the Covid-19 pandemic is women’s leadership. Initially, the UN and other international organizations passed resolutions to actively support women’s leadership in planning responses to the crisis. These resolutions stressed the critical importance of an action plan in this direction, not only for designing an effective response to the current pandemic but also for ensuring peace and security in an inclusive way in the international structure after the epidemic ends (UN, General Assembly, December

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2020; UN, 2020). However, there has been no significant increase in the number of female leaders or their visibility. The UN Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, has called for an end to gender-based violence and urged governments worldwide to restore peace and put women’s safety of women first as they respond to the pandemic (Guterres, 2020). During the first phase of the pandemic, women leaders drafted a document assessing the impact of the crisis on women, highlighting gender-based inequalities and forwarded it to the President of the Security Council, José Singer Weisinger, on April 8, 2020. This letter was prepared and signed electronically by Women Leaders, Members of the Voices for Change and Participation Group. In the letter, women leaders emphasized that the pandemic is the worst crisis since the Second World War, causing unprecedented political, economic, social and humanitarian consequences. They also underlined the significant rise in cases of abuse against women, girls, and boys in almost all countries. The demand for addressing the gender-based impact of Covid-19 has led the UN Security Council to prioritize women’s basic issues to be clearly addressed (Women, Peace, Security, April, 2020). The council has highlighted key issues such as ensuring women’s full, equal and meaningful participation and leadership in decision-making processes related to the pandemic, developing plans to combat the pandemic based on age, disability and gender, and preventing gender-based violence. In its resolutions, the Security Council emphasized the critical role of leadership in effective public health management, as seen in previous outbreaks of Ebola and cholera. To mobilize women leaders, the Council also decided to provide access to the most marginalized and at-risk groups and established community networks. The relationship between leadership and gender has been challenging to examine in the past due to the limited number of female leaders for comparison with male leaders. However, as the number of female leaders has increased recently, differences in the states’ reactions and policies during the pandemic based on leadership gender have emerged (Aldrich and Lotito, 2020; Lowy Institute, 2021). According to the Lowy Institute¦s analysis of 194 countries, women-led nations had “systematic and significantly better” health and well-being outcomes, in terms of testing, cases, and deaths, than men-led countries (Garikipati and Kambhampati, 2020). During the Covid-19 pandemic, especially in its first phase, female leadership was observed to be effective. An analysis of male and female

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leaders during the crisis revealed that women could follow more ingenious policies in crisis leadership and diplomacy in some cases (Wilson, 2020). The gender gap during the pandemic can explain the “proactive and coordinated political responses adopted by female leaders” (Garikipati and Kambhampati, 2020). According to a Harvard Business Review study conducted before and during Covid-19, women were rated more positively than men on overall leadership effectiveness (Zanger and Folkman, 2020). This study found that the presence of women leaders generally led to more diverse and inclusive governance, which tends to have better outcomes (Potter and Volden, 2020). Despite these positive developments, the average rate of women represented in all decision-making processes, international and regional committee memberships during the Covid-19 pandemic is only 24% (Care International, 2020). The Covid-19 pandemic has presented unique opportunities for female leaders to demonstrate protective feminine traits, despite the low representation of women in leadership. While male leaders often rely on gender stereotypes, such as the male head of household and warrior, defender role, female leaders have succeeded in drawing on traditional understandings of women¦s roles. Women have traditionally been involved and empathetic in times of trauma (Johnson and Williams, 2020). The pandemic has undermined the traditional separation between the (feminine) private sphere of the home and the (masculine) public sphere of politics (Celis et al., 2013), allowing traditionally disadvantaged female leaders to use their roles at home to their advantage in the political arena. During the Covid-19 pandemic, several women leaders have exhibited remarkable leadership and management examples at national and international levels in areas that require care, attention and compassion, which are traditionally associated with feminity. Among these examples, Angela Merkel and Jacinda Ardern were the most popular female leaders in 2020. Additionally, some male leaders have also followed policies that emphasize feminine values. For instance, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and French President Emmanuel Macron had both announced that they would follow a feminist foreign policy before the pandemic (Aggestam and True, 2021). The former British Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, also drew attention to gender-based topics with his rhetoric. At the G7 meeting in 2021, Johnson said that political leaders should come together to “…rebuild together… better… greener and fairer and … more equal, gender-neutral… perhaps more feminine …” to end the terrible damage of Covid-19 (BBC News, 2021).

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Female leaders of Taiwan, New Zealand, Denmark, Germany, Iceland, Finland and Norway—compared to male leaders—have displayed superior crisis management skills during the pandemic, demonstrating resilience, clear communication, decisive action, pragmatism, helpfulness, trust, appreciation and humility for common sense, mutual aid and scientific knowledge (Champoux-Paillé and Croteau, 2020). In contrast to some populist leaders who sought a “return to normal,” many female leaders recognized that the “new normal” would have transformative effects on economic growth and global consumption patterns towards more sustainable production methods. However, while gender is a factor in assessing the success of female leaders during the pandemic, it should be noted that the countries led by women are mostly Northern and Western liberal democracies that are rich and have high state capacity and good governance, factors that facilitate effective pandemic responses (Piscopa, 2020).

5

Conclusion

The Covid-19 crisis, which emerged as a global health pandemic and required coordination and cooperation, has unfortunately been characterized by separation, competition and disagreement as it progressed. From a gender-based feminist perspective, if the crisis continues to be studied in terms of power, national interest, war, and competition, and if social and economic transformations based on values like relevance, care, solidarity and cooperation cannot be achieved, or structural and direct violence is not addressed, then Covid-19 cannot be seen as a turning point. The success of women leaders in handling the Covid-19 crisis requires a multifaceted analysis, as their success cannot be solely explained by gender. However, it is notable that successful women leaders are often found in developed democracies where women¦s participation in decisionmaking is higher. The challenges of the twenty-first century demand a new type of leadership that emphasizes qualities such as resilience, determination, courage, flexibility, listening, responsiveness, empathy, cooperation, and recognition of collective contribution—qualities traditionally associated with feminine management styles. Building sustainable democracies requires creating strong societies where women¦s equal participation in decision-making is considered a priority, especially in the post-pandemic period. Although women’s leadership and effective governance depend on various factors such as political system limitations,

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economic development, and cultural norms, they serve as examples of “best woman governance” at the national and international levels, reinforcing the importance of women’s leadership as a precedent for the future.

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Growing Importance of Regional Integration and Procurement in the Coronavirus Pandemic: The Case of RCEP and Its Hegemonic Reflections

Mehmet Öztürk

1

Introduction

The COVID-19 pandemic has changed the discourse and practice of political economy at all levels of society from local to global (Holden, 2020: 6) and has created instability, crisis and uncertainty in a wide range of sectors, from health to the economy (Karabag, 2020: 1). The pandemic, which emerged in China at the end of 2019 and was officially announced by the WHO on March 11, 2020, has had a very negative impact on global trade and supply chains, among many other areas. For example, “the volume of global trade in goods” decreased by 17.7% in May 2020 compared to the same month in 2019 (ECLAC, 2020: 2). Compared to the 2008 financial crisis, the pandemic crisis, which has had a larger and wider global impact in size and speed, has led governments to take radical measures such as mask requirements, social distancing, isolation and border closures, ignoring issues such as privacy

M. Öztürk (B) Department of International Relations, Aksaray University, Aksaray, Turkey e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Akıllı and B. Gunes (eds.), World Politics in the Age of Uncertainty, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39607-6_8

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violations to prevent the spread of COVID-19 and protect public health (Kang et al., 2020: 300; Karabag, 2020: 2). Such restrictions, which were initially considered reasonable with the agreement that “a crisis opens up the possibility of change even if it does not change everything” (Gaub and Boswinkel, 2020: 28), later worsened economies and trade in particular and prompted governments to reconsider their policies (OECD, 2020: 78). Governments have begun to seek answers to the question of how to find a way out at such a point. As decision-makers consider addressing the negative effects of the pandemic—particularly stimulating trade and ensuring supply chains— they have come to understand the importance of sourcing from close geographies and, in turn, regional solidarity and integration (Kimura et al., 2020: 3; Altunı¸sık, 2021: 39). This study was conducted to reveal that the importance of procurement from nearby geography and regional integration has increased during the pandemic process and to see how this has been countered in the case of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) based Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). For this purpose, first of all, how the supply from nearby geography and regional integration gained importance in the pandemic process was examined by referring to the field literature. Secondly, exactly what the RCEP agreement entails, as a symbol of the determination for regional integration under pandemic conditions, will be reviewed in particular as well as its regional role. Third, how the rise of the RCEP and its largest member, China, has been countered in an age of uncertainty and a hegemonic context will be discussed.

2 Importance of Procurement from Nearby Geography and Regional Integration in the COVID-19 Process Since the mid-1980s, a rapid rise in international trade and cross-border investments has been observed amid growing globalization. In parallel with the developments in the field of transportation and telecommunications, supply chains have become more global with the decrease in trade costs (Zhang et al., 2022: 1). However, since the 2008–2009 financial crisis, there has been a period of stagnation in global trade, and the COVID-19 pandemic has worsened this situation (ECLAC, 2020: 1).

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Therefore, the decline in globalization that started before the pandemic has been deeply wounded by the pandemic (Enderwick and Buckley, 2020: 100–101). The pandemic has had direct impacts on trade and trade logistics, as well as on production and value chains (Pitschner, 2022: 1). The conditions exposed by the pandemic have jeopardized both food security and the sustainability of food systems, including health systems, business models and lifestyles (Ozdemir et al., 2022: 1–2). The pandemic has also caused long-term disruptions in the global supply chain. These disadvantages fed the process of uncertainty in the world (Kazancoglu et al., 2022: 1). In this process, states have taken steps such as implementing protectionism policies, reducing their suppliers in non-friendly countries and lending importance to procurement from nearby countries (Khorana et al., 2022: 75). Especially during the pandemic period, some states have tried to protect their internal markets with policies such as “America First” and “Make in India”. Inward-looking economic policy strategies—the U.S. withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in 2017, the U.K.’s exit from the European Union (BREXIT), and India’s departure from the RCEP in 2019—began before the pandemic and have become stricter with the pandemic (Gaur, 2022: 270). Some states during the pandemic process have begun to reconsider their dependence on China, the main supplier of the global automotive and electronics industry and the production site of many brands, and the supply chains of their strategic goods (Kazancoglu et al., 2022: 2; Gaub and Boswinkel, 2020: 30). China, the world’s “leading exporter” of parts and components, accounting for 15% of global shipments as of 2018, gradually reopened its economy in March 2020, so its economic contraction due to the pandemic has remained below the global average (ECLAC, 2020: 2–3). On the other hand, some states, especially in East Asia, have moved to reduce their dependence on Western markets and meet their increasing demands from China in response to the protectionist policies of the United States. Such a policy shift is seen as related to the search for selfsufficiency and close regional integration (Enderwick and Buckley, 2020: 104). In light of these developments, although it is premature to argue that the era of globalization is over (Yaya, Otu and Labonté, 2020: 2), some claim that globalization has faded, regionalization has started to rise and

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economic globalization has begun to fill its vacuum (Zhang et al., 2022: 1). Trade agreements, especially between nearby countries, can open the door to both cooperation between these countries and regional economic integration1 (Garnier, 2020: 2; Bishop and Roberts, 2020: 21). At this stage, while the world economy is shrinking globally, intraregional trade and procurement from nearby geography (nearshoring) have gained great importance. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the proportion of intra-regional trade in the foreign trade realized by Asian countries was 16%, 32% in 2010 and 60% in 2020. In 2020, the proportion of intra-regional trade in Europe was 70%, in Latin America 18%, in Africa 25% and in North America 30%. When these indicators are considered together with the foreign dependency in global trade for Africa and America regions and the risks caused by the pandemic (such as the increase in freight prices), it is seen that the supply from nearby geography is even more prioritized, while Europe and Asia have made significant progress in terms of regionalization. The signing of the RCEP, the world’s largest mega-regional trade agreement in Asia, is also commensurate with the desire for regionalization in Asia (Alkin, 2022).

3 Regional Integration Under Pandemic Conditions: The Case of RCEP The RCEP was established as a result of the initiative (a free trade agreement, FTA) of ASEAN. It is ASEAN that initiates, hosts and chairs activities and meetings at the RCEP. ASEAN celebrated its 21st anniversary in Cambodia in November 2012. At the ASEAN summit, the framework for a new regional free trade agreement, the RCEP, was laid and the proposal was supported by all 16 states (ASEAN, 2016) but signed by only 15 in 2020.

1 Regional economic integration involves more than regional cooperation. Thus, regional integration refers to “states eliminating the elements that prevent the interaction between countries and creating a special regional area subject to common rules specific to the region”. Although regional economic integration can take place at different levels and deeper levels in the form of customs unions, common markets, and economic and monetary unions, its application at a wider and basic level is a free trade area (Best and Christiansen, 2011: 430). For example, in the Asia Pacific, the US-led TPP in 2010 and the ASEAN-led RCEP in 2012 were born as mega-regional trade agreements after negotiating a number of FTAs (Wilson, 2015: 345).

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The RCEP is an FTA between the 10 member states of ASEAN (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines and Vietnam) and its five FTA partners (China, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and the Republic of Korea). Australia, Japan, Vietnam, New Zealand, Brunei, Malaysia and Singapore are simultaneously members2 of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), which has been compared with the RCEP in different contexts in the literature (Petri and Plummer, 2020). Leaders who came together virtually on the occasion of the 4th RCEP summit on November 15, 2020, stated: “They were pleased to witness the signing of the RCEP Agreement under pandemic conditions, that this agreement is critical to its response to the COVID-19 pandemic, and that it will play an important role in building the region’s resilience through an inclusive and sustainable post-pandemic economic recovery process” (Joint Leaders’ Statement on RCEP, 2020). Effective as of January 1, 2022, the RCEP contributes to the post-COVID-19 economic recovery efforts (Li, 2022: 1–2). The RCEP is based on four features of regional integration: “Rulesbased trade and investment, economic cooperation, market access, and ASEAN centrality” (Thangavelu, Urata and Narjoko, 2022: 10). One of the most important reasons for the launch of the RCEP negotiations is to harmonize the existing “ASEAN+1” FTAs3 with regional partners (Cimino-Isaacs and Sutherland, 2020: 2). The aim of the RCEP agreement is to “establish a modern, comprehensive, high-quality and mutually beneficial economic partnership” that will facilitate the spread of investment and regional trade and contribute to global development and economic growth. This part of the agreement includes Chapter 1, namely “initial provisions and general definitions”. Chapter 2 of the agreement contains “trade in goods”; Chapter 3 contains “rules of origin/ROO”; Chapter 4 includes “customs procedures and trade facilitation/CPTF” (ASEAN, 2020: 1–4). 2 The other four members of the CPTPP: Chile, Peru, Canada and Mexico. 3 ASEAN, established in 1967 by Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore and

Thailand, has also played an important role in the development of ASEAN+1 FTAs such as the ACFTA (with China in 2005), the AJCEP (with Japan in 2008), the AANZFTA (with Australia and New Zealand in 2010), the AIFTA (with India in 2010) and the AKFTA (with the Republic of Korea in 2010) (ASEAN, 2016).

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Although RCEP Agreement is not as strict as the CPTPP and does not focus as much on labour, environment or state-owned enterprises as the CPTPP, the RCEP agreement also addresses political sensitivities in that it contributes very little to intellectual property rights (Petri and Plummer, 2020). The RCEP Agreement, which aims to reduce tariffs and bureaucracy in trade in goods between member states over the next 20 years and prohibits non-tariff barriers by introducing common rules of origin, also has the potential to increase flexibility, diversity, attractiveness and efficiency in regional supply chains (Agarwal and Rolfe, 2021: 3; Perez, 2020: 2). The 20-chapter RCEP agreement contains many areas not previously in ASEAN+1 FTAs. In terms of market access, the RCEP agreement provides for the liberalization of trade in goods and services, expands the scope of investment, and seeks to increase competition in a sustainable, responsible and constructive manner that increases productivity. In addition, the RCEP agreement aims to facilitate the expansion and development of regional supply chains between the parties (ASEAN, 2020: 1–10). In the RCEP preamble on supply chains, the following statements are given: “seeking to establish clear and mutually advantageous rules to facilitate trade and investment, including participation in regional and global supply chains” and “considering the need to facilitate … participation in regional and global supply chains”. In addition, Chapter 4 mentions “a strengthened environment for global and regional supply chains and supply chain security” (RCEP, 2020: 1, 216, 225). The RCEP is an unprecedented “mega-regional trade arrangement” that includes a diverse mix of the region’s least developed, developing and developed economies. According to 2019 data, the RCEP is the world’s largest free trade regulation, with 30% of the world’s population (2.2 billion), 30% of the global GDP ($26.2 trillion) and 28% of global trade ($5.3 trillion) (Joint Leaders’ Statement on RCEP, 2020; Agarwal and Rolfe, 2021: 3). The world’s largest mega FTA in terms of population and trade, the RCEP was larger with the presence of India, which has been involved in the RCEP negotiations since 2012 but withdrew in November 2019 (due to dumping of goods made in China and dairy and agricultural products from Australia and New Zealand, and concerns that this could potentially affect its local industrial and agricultural sectors). In 2018, for example,

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the 16 negotiating parties accounted for about 50% of the world’s population and 39% of the world’s GDP (Breuss, 2022: 664; Cimino-Isaacs and Sutherland, 2020: 2). India’s participation in the RCEP is kept open due to its long-standing involvement in the negotiation process and its strategic importance as a regional partner in building deeper and expanded regional value chains (Joint Leaders’ Statement on RCEP, 2020). First of all, the RCEP mainly reinforces the existing FTAs between ASEAN and its partners. Each country will receive different benefits from the RCEP. However, bilateral relations between China–Japan and Japan– South Korea are accelerating cooperation in Northeast Asia, as they were not previously subject to free trade agreements. This agreement constitutes the first free trade agreement between China and Japan and the Republic of Korea (Perez, 2020: 2). Southeast Asia will benefit significantly from the RCEP ($19 billion annually by 2030) (Petri and Plummer, 2020). Malaysia and Vietnam, for example, are considered to be the countries that would benefit the most from this agreement (Estrades et al., 2022: 10). This is mainly because it will help it access large consumer markets that are twice the size of those included in the CPTPP, including China, Japan and South Korea (Keckarovska, 2022, cited in Transport Intelligence, 2021). The RCEP is also expected to increase total trade between the 15 member countries by $428 billion by 2030 (Li, 2022: 2). According to Chang et al. (2020: 143), “For RCEP, the effect created by intra-regional trade is better than the EU”. Although it is also seen as “less comprehensive” than the CPTPP, its market size is about five times larger than that of the CPTPP, another advantage of the RCEP is that it is “the only multilateral trade pact covering China”. China’s trade with the other member states of the trade agreement increased by 6.9% year-on-year in the first quarter of 2022, reaching about $448.6 billion (Keckarovska, 2022, cited in Transport Intelligence, 2021). With the potential to attract foreign investment through favourable rules of origin, the RCEP can facilitate access to Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) funds by increasing gains from market access by simultaneously strengthening transport, communications and energy links (Petri and Plummer, 2020).

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4

Hegemonic Reflections of the RCEP and the Chinese Experience

The RCEP played a key role in countering the negative impact of pandemic shocks on trade in East Asia. In the current uncertainty caused by the pandemic and the US-China trade war, the RCEP has been a development that shows the determination of the states of the region to conclude the initiative initiated earlier (Thangavelu, Urata and Narjoko, 2022: 10). With the cumulative effects of the pandemic, the world is facing a stagnant economic recovery, fluctuating international trade and investment, and severely impacted global supply chains, and China and countries in the region have given a good test within the RCEP. The RCEP, which will strengthen the unity of China and ASEAN member countries, has made a name for itself with regional integration and solutions offered to business, investment and supply markets in an age of uncertainty (Zhiqiang, 2022). Although the RCEP is an ASEAN-led initiative, it is seen as an economic and geopolitical gain for its most dominant member, China. The RCEP agreement, which accelerates China’s integration with the countries of the region on the one hand and is seen as a building block of Pax Sinica to a certain extent on the other, is also seen as important in the connection of the Chinese-led region to the global system (Perez, 2020: 3). The RCEP, which represents a formation that tightens ties between Asian economies and opposes US attempts to remove supply chains from China, also has an aspect that increases China’s rise and thus great power competition (Gao and Shaffer, 2021: 2). While China’s rise has been much faster than predicted and it has taken initiatives such as the BRI, the United States has started to act as a reluctant hegemon when the U.S. cannot maintain its old hegemonic claims, especially since 2008. This is a development that damages the global prestige of the United States, forcing the U.S. administration to go on the defensive with confrontational initiatives such as trade wars and containment against China. When considered together with the RCEP agreement that has entered into force, it can be predicted that the competition between the US and China will increase even more. It can also bring Washington closer to Delhi (Unay, 2020). The rise of China and the position of US leadership have been the subject of many studies and debates. These discussions, in particular, have observed that concepts such as non-hegemonic, counter-hegemonic and

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post-hegemonic can be diversified to be used to explain the rise of China. For example, in his study, Acharya (2008: 7–8) states that the concept of counter-hegemonic means conscious and active resistance against hegemonic power(s). The researcher says that a non-hegemonic international order can develop without being consciously anti-hegemonic, or that it can emerge even before or without any relation to a hegemonic order. He states that the concept of post-hegemonic refers to a situation “after hegemony”, that is, it is based on the assumption that hegemony exists. Acharya (2008: 3) suggests that the time may have come to consider a non-hegemonic international order; however, though no other hegemonic power seems to see American power in decline or that the unipolar era seems to be over, a new order is likely to replace the United States in the foreseeable future. Suggesting that there is little reason to say that there is a transition period between the end of American hegemony and its emergence as another global hegemon like China, Acharya opposes the definition of a multipolar world by many analysts and considers the world order of the future as a non-hegemonic world. According to Arrighi (2007), the West, which is worried about whether China’s rise will be peaceful (as defensive and aggressive realists argue) on the one hand, tries to maintain its dominance and dominant position on the other hand, bringing with it the possibility that the world will be dragged into violence and chaos. Again, according to Arrighi, China, emerging as the leader of the East Asian economic renaissance, is likely to become the non-capitalist market economy described by Adam Smith. Wallerstein (2018), on the other hand, thinks that China has too much advantage at this juncture when the current capitalist system is coming to an end and the uncertainty of the future is being experienced. However, it finds it too ambitious for China to control neighbouring countries and to become the new hegemonic power by replacing the US with the support of distant countries. Wallerstein, who thinks that China cannot stop the disintegration of capitalism, which is experiencing a chaotic structural crisis, says that China’s role consists only of trying to secure its place in the world system to come.

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5

Conclusion

The COVID-19 pandemic has worsened world trade and access to supply chains, where the 2008 world e-economic crisis had already begun to stagnate and increased uncertainties around the world. In particular, in resolving the problem based on supply chains and in stimulating trade between states, the importance of procurement from close geography and regional integration has increased. In this study, it was seen that the importance of procurement from nearby geography and regional integration increased during the pandemic process, and this was confirmed by the sample examination conducted through the RCEP. With this kind of research, while examining the impact of the pandemic on international trade by focusing on supply chains, it was seen that procurement from nearby sources, regional solidarity and integration were very important for the states of the region. The RCEP, which has continued during the pandemic and has shown the determination of the states of the region in this direction, has positively reflected on the supply chains, trade and economies of the member states and is expected to be more. The ASEAN-based RCEP is the world’s largest mega FTA, which has also had the effect of strengthening its member China’s leadership in the region and its position in the race for global hegemony. Although there are doubts about whether China will create a new hegemony in the hegemonic sense, it is also seen that it has gained significant advantages in shaping the international system with the BRI and RCEP moves. Such discussions, which can be carried out through hegemony in the age of uncertainty, are of a kind that may be the subject of different studies in the future through regionalization and regionalism.

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The Organızatıon of Turkıc States in the Post-Pandemıc World Order Fırat Purta¸s

1

Introduction

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the states’ attempt at nationalization of the vaccine and the failure of international organizations, especially the United Nations (UN), to face the pandemic led to discussions on the liberal international system. Many predict that the world will be different after the COVID-19 pandemic eases: globalization will be replaced by protectionism, international and supranational organizations will be replaced by nation-states, and strong state structures that can overcome the crisis will have a more effective position in the post-crisis system. COVID-19 has also strengthened the arguments that the United States (US) will lose its global hegemon status. It is estimated that countries advocating multi-polarity, especially China and Russia, will have a more prominent place in the post-COVID-19 world order. The turbulence and uncertainty that occurred in the international system during the COVID19 period were described as tectonic breaks, and many theses were put forward on the new world order.

F. Purta¸s (B) Department of International Relations, Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli University, Ankara, Turkey e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Akıllı and B. Gunes (eds.), World Politics in the Age of Uncertainty, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39607-6_9

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Between the years 2020–2022, the peak of the pandemic, the OTS held three summit meetings at the level of heads of state. The first extraordinary summit in the history of the organization was held due to the COVID-19 pandemic. This extraordinary summit, which was held online on April 10, 2020, was attended by WHO Director Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus. On the agenda of this summit, topics such as sharing knowledge and experience in all areas of health, especially combating the coronavirus epidemic, necessities such as medicine, medical equipment, medical devices, health tourism and hospital management—which are of great importance in the fight against the pandemic were discussed with the aim of cooperation. All of OTS’s efforts to combat the pandemic were carried out in coordination with WHO. One of the most important summits, which was a turning point in the development of the OTS, was held in Istanbul on November 9, 2021, amid the pandemic. At this summit meeting, the 2040 Turkic World Vision Document was accepted and it was aimed that the organization would become an active actor of Eurasia in the new world order as a strong solidarity platform among member states. In a process in which even regional organizations with strong institutionalization such as the EU had difficulty in developing a common policy, the moral and material solidarity among the Turkic states played an important role in the organization emerging from the global crisis stronger. The pandemic has led to the contraction of world trade and the spread of protectionist economic policies. In a process where trade protectionism is on the rise all over the world, Turkic states have displayed a determined attitude towards facilitating trade among themselves. In the 2040 Vision, under the title of economic and sectoral cooperation, transportation and customs, information and communication technologies, energy, tourism, environment, and health were included as sub-titles (Türk Dünyası 2040 Vizyonu, https://turkicstates.org/assets/pdf/hab erler/turk-dunyasi-2040-vizyonu-2396-98.pdf). Considering its 30-year history and 2040 Vision Document, it can be claimed that the Organization of Turkic States has progressed as a rising energy and trade belt between China and Europe along the Silk Road route. The common attitude of the OTS member countries during and after the Second Karabakh War, which took place during the COVID19 pandemic, also strengthened the political cooperation dimension in the organization. In this study, the attempts of the OTS to adapt to the transformation in the international political and financial system that

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accelerated with COVID-19 and to become an independent actor in the new world order will be analysed. The OTS is a platform for its member countries to fight together against new uncertainties and challenges such as the ongoing conventional and hybrid wars around the Caspian Sea, the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, as well as the increasingly acute mass migrations, climate change and food crises. The main thesis of the study is that the Organization of Turkic States facilitates regional cooperation in which the interests of all members harmonize based on sovereignty and equality in a process where the sovereignty of the states is discussed and the main actor of the system is changing beyond the axis shift in the international system.

2

Turkic World Integration Concept

The Organization of Turkic States is accepted by political and academic circles as the integration attempt of the Turkic world. Five state founders (Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan) and three state observers (Hungary, Turkmenistan and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus) are members of the OTS.1 On the other hand, the Turkic world is not only composed of OTS member countries. Countries such as Russia, China, Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Bulgaria, Greece, Macedonia and Kosovo, where Turkic culture thrives, are also considered part of the Turkic world. On the other hand, it is possible to associate many Middle Eastern and North African countries such as Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Algeria with the Turkic world, culturally and on the axis of shared history. Determining a narrow or wide border for the Turkic world is a matter beyond an 1 The date of October 3, 2009, is a turning point in the development process of the Organization of Turkic States, whose establishment process started with the summit of the heads of state of the Turkic-speaking countries held in Ankara in 1992. At this summit, four countries (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkey) decided to establish the Turkic Speaking Countries Cooperation Council, whose short name was the Turkic Council. The first enlargement of the organization took place in 2018 when Hungary became an observer member. In 2019, Uzbekistan became a founding member of the Turkic Council. The next significant enlargement continued with Turkmenistan’s membership in the organization with observer status in Istanbul in October 2021. At the Istanbul summit, the name of the organization was changed to the Organization of Turkic States. At the Samarkand Summit held in 2022, the TRNC became the new observer member of the organization. The enlargement is expected to continue with looser statuses such as dialogue partnerships, not new memberships.

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academic discussion. Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev, in his speech at the OTS’s ninth summit held in Samarkand, stated that the Turkic world is not composed of independent Turkic states and that the geopolitical borders are much wider, emphasizing the importance of the protection of the security, national identity and rights of the Turkic organization’s cognates located beyond the borders for historical reasons and the prevention of assimilation pressuring them (Speech by Ilham Aliyev at the 9th Summit of Organization of Turkic States, https://president.az/en/art icles/view/57856). The “Turkic world” is a concept that started to be used as a result of the geopolitical change that took place in the 1990s. Prior to this, the cognates who remained outside of Turkey as a result of the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire were called “external Turks”. When external Turks are mentioned, Turks living in regions such as Western Thrace, Bulgaria, Mosul, Kirkuk and Aleppo, which are seen as part of the National Pact, come to mind, and cognate and related communities in Azerbaijan or Kyrgyzstan are not considered in this context. Turkic and Muslim peoples living under the rule of the Soviet Union were described as “captive Turks”. After the disintegration of the Eastern Bloc in the early 1990s, the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the USSR created a concept of the Turkic world that included both the Ottoman remnant “external Turks” and the “captive Turks” living in the Soviet empire. In the early 1990s, the phrase “The Turkic world stretches from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China” was frequently repeated. Although it is not possible to draw a clear border to the Turkic world, which is defined through language, history and cultural partnership, the developing cooperation between independent Turkic states has been evaluated as the integration of the Turkic world since the 2010s. In addition to cultural cooperation, the expanding and diversifying cooperation in many fields from education to sports, from trade to transportation also accelerated the political rapprochement in the Turkic world. After the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic, there have been many developments that support the consolidation of the Organization of Turkic States in the field of political cooperation and the strengthening of the concept of the Turkic world. Azerbaijan’s military action to liberate its occupied lands began at a time when COVID-19 was at its most severe. During the pandemic period, the presidents of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan held an online signing ceremony for the determination of the maritime borders in the Caspian Sea, which is a chronic problem between

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the two countries. The OTS and the Turkey-Azerbaijan-Turkmenistan tripartite platform, which was carried out at the level of foreign ministers, contributed significantly to the agreement reached on this problem, which led to the freezing of diplomatic relations between the two countries. The progress made in the middle corridor (the Caspian energy and transportation lines) carried out within the Organization of Turkic States, alleviating this problem and the discussions between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, called the energy resources in the border region “Friendship” and paved the way for them to operate together. Similarly, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, which have problems in border demarcation and sharing of water resources, have made significant progress in solving these problems. The common political approach between the member states of the Organization of Turkic States continued with the normalization of Azerbaijan–Armenia relations, the establishment of a lasting peace between the two countries, the diversification of the transport lines that will pass through Armenia and the routes on the middle corridor. One of the developments that makes political cooperation more visible in the Organization of Turkic States is the acceptance of the TRNC as a member of the organization with observer status. Turkish Cypriots, who have been isolated by the international community, will thus be able to benefit from the opportunities created by the cooperation of the Turkic world. The membership of the TRNC makes landlocked geography like Central Asia a part of the Eastern Mediterranean. Although the examples listed have a symbolic meaning, the concept of the “Turkic world” was strengthened further when the organization, which was previously called the Cooperation of Turkic Speaking States, was changed to the Organization of Turkic States in line with the decision taken at the Istanbul summit in October 2021.

3

Post-Pandemic World Order Discussions and the Organization of Turkic States

In the first paragraph of the Turkic World 2040 Vision document, the phenomenon of “rapid change worldwide” is emphasized, and it is stated that this vision document was prepared with the aim of “adapting to emerging realities”. Preparedness for emerging challenges, resilience, adaptability and capacity to transform are key concepts in the document. The spirit of the document is to contribute, as a regional organization, to the formation of an international system dominated by universal values,

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contributing to the security and welfare of all countries. After the USled Western alliance emerged victorious from the Cold War, the liberal political and economic system became dominant all over the world, and a liberal international system based on the open door principle and free trade understanding began to institutionalize (Mearsheimer, 2019). In this process, developments in communication and transportation have intensified the mobility of goods, people and information more than ever and strengthened the phenomenon of globalization. Increasing globalization has taken the dimensions of interdependence further and started to limit the sovereignty areas of states. Since the 1990s, it has been claimed that globalization has eroded national identities and the jurisdiction of the nation-state has narrowed. From the first days of the COVID-19 pandemic, discussions that the international system will radically change after the pandemic have flared up. In addition to the fact that this change will be systemic, like the Paris Order established after the First World War and the Yalta Order established after the Second World War, ideas have been put forward that it will accelerate the change of the system as it was after the September 11 attacks and the 2008/2009 global financial crisis (Uluta¸s, 2020: 10). The parties, who evaluate globalization as the spread of US hegemony and liberal values, claimed that after the pandemic, the global leadership of the US will end and a multipolar international system will emerge (Bordachev, 2020). Liberal circles, on the other hand, described such views as a threat to the rule-based international system. The COVID-19 pandemic has resulted in a global economic recession, a strengthening of authoritarianism, widespread use of remote work and artificial intelligence, and a narrowing of private life. These trends have revealed two contradictory theses about the liberal international system, which is defined as the rule-based international system. On one hand, there is a new dimension of globalization embodied by the metaverse universe; on the other hand, there is the return to the Westphalian order based on national sovereignty. While the ineffectiveness of international organizations such as the UN and European Union (EU) in the fight against the crisis brought the strong state phenomenon to the fore, developments such as the closures, closure of borders, and slowdown in international trade during the pandemic also formed the basis for antiglobalization views. A new world order, in which states are less open and not physically interacting with each other, has been accepted as the new reality.

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While the pandemic required the cooperation of the international community, US President Donald Trump’s identification of COVID-19 as the “Chinese virus” and the WHO as China’s secret partner and thus cutting financial support to the organization, dealt a serious blow to the fight against the pandemic. Similarly, although the EU is a supranational organization, member states have adopted policies independent of each other and anti-unity political currents have risen within the EU. Another organization that remained ineffective in the fight against COVID-19 was the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). NATO was caught unprepared in the face of such a serious global security problem, as the alliance’s areas of duty and responsibility do not include combating an epidemic. Similarly, the measures taken by structures such as the Group of Seven (G-7) and Group of 20 (G-20) were ineffective in overcoming the economic problems caused by the pandemic (Akgün, 2020: 18). The helplessness of the US, which claims to be a global hegemonic power, during the pandemic has been another factor that accelerated the international system discussions. It is predicted that China will emerge stronger from the crisis and the competition between the US and China for global leadership in the political sense will escalate. On the other hand, Russian experts have defended the thesis that a pluralistic and more democratic international system will emerge after the pandemic. Since the summer of 2021, Russia’s preparations for the invasion of Ukraine effectively boosted the US efforts to support the recovery of the Western bloc, especially the EU and NATO, and the Western alliance has become even stronger after the invasion that started in February 2022. China’s approach towards Russia in the face of the consolidation of the Western alliance and the development of US–China relations will be decisive in shaping the new world order.

4

Organization of Turkic States: An Anti-Polar Regional Cooperation Organization

Most of the OTS member countries are neighbours of Russia and China and at the same time support close partnerships with the US. C5+1 meetings have been held regularly every year at the level of foreign ministers between Central Asian countries, namely Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, and the US since 2015. Each of these countries, which has a Soviet past, has deep bilateral and multilateral cooperation with Russia. China, on the other hand,

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makes an effort to expand its influence to the West through Central Asia with both the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the Belt and Road Initiative. Central Asian states follow a multi-faceted foreign policy to consolidate their independence and sovereignty. On the other hand, the fierce competition between the US and China on a global scale continues to evolve into a new polarization and forces most countries to make a choice. In this context, the speeches made by US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo during his visit to Central Asia in February 2020 in the first phase of COVID-19 are striking. Pompeo, who met with the foreign ministers of the five Central Asian countries and held bilateral meetings at the C5+1 meeting held in Tashkent, criticized China’s credit practices and trade method and asked the Central Asian republics to pay attention to their dependence on China to protect their independence and sovereignty. In Tashkent and Nursultan, Pompeo condemned the inhuman treatment of Uighur and Kazakh Muslims in China and invited Central Asian countries to open their doors to those who took refuge in their countries from China (Imamova, 2020). Similarly, the next United States Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, emphasized the US support to Central Asian countries, based on the example of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, at the C5+1 summit held in Astana in February 2023 (Imamova, 2023). In her speech at the Munich Security Conference held on February 18, 2023, US Vice President Kamala Harris said that Iran and North Korea supported this bloody war by giving arms to Russia and that China’s weapon support to Russia would be a violation of the rule-based order (Remarks by Vice President Harris at the Munich Security Conference, 2023). In documents such as the US National Strategy, the NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, and the EU’s Strategic Compass for Security and Defense, which were announced in 2022 after COVID-19, China was declared the number one enemy threatening the rule-based international system. The Democracy Summit, which was started in December 2021 with the initiative of US President Joe Biden to “revive democracy at home and fight autocracies abroad” and held in March 2023, with the participation of 120 states, also shows that a new polarization policy in the world through democracy and authoritarianism is gaining prominence. The US, which has made geopolitical moves towards China with initiatives such as Open and Free Indo-Pacific, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), and the Australia-United Kingdom-United States

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pact AUKUS, is shifting to a polarizing line to maintain its global leadership. In this context, it is noteworthy that Xi Jinping, who was elected as the General Secretary for the third time at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of China, made his first official visit abroad to Moscow. Regarding this visit, Putin stated in a television program that there is no military alliance between Russia and China but that there is cooperation in military fields, including joint exercises.

5

Conclusion

The establishment process of the Organization of Turkic States started in the 1990s when the bipolar world order came to an end and the international system was restructured. At a time when the world order is being reshaped after COVID-19, the Organization of Turkic States is taking steps towards stronger regional cooperation. In this context, at the Samarkand Summit held on November 11, 2022, the “2022–2026 OTS Strategy” was put into effect for the implementation of the “Turkic World 2040 Vision” (Türk Devletleri Te¸skilatı Dokuzuncu Zirvesi Semerkant Bildirisi, 2022). The transformation in the global political and financial system has accelerated due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the subsequent Russia-Ukraine war. It is stated that the rule-based international system is under threat, liberal democracies are threatened by revisionist autocracies, and the competition over the system between democratic countries and autocratic regimes has increased (Re:vision, Munich Security Report, 2023). In such a period of increasing turbulence in the international system, the Organization of Turkic States has kept its distance from a new polarization policy and adopted an understanding that is open to the outside and to increase its partnerships. At the Samarkand Summit on November 11, 2022, hosted by Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, who declared 2023 as the “Year of the Rise of Turkic Civilization”, he emphasized in his speech that the OTS is a cooperative structure that has grown with transportation, energy and trade projects that opened Central Asia to the world by reviving the historical Silk Road (Address by President of the Republic of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev at the meeting of the Council of Heads of State of the Organization of Turkic States, 2022). The Organization of Turkic States, which progressed on a realistic basis, with small steps on the axis of mutual interests and reached its current level as a result of a 30-year sustainable partnership, has become

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an important mechanism for the stability and welfare of the Turkic regions, including the Mediterranean, the Black Sea, the Balkans, the Caucasus and Central Asia. Turkic states, each of which is a strong nationstate, aim to strengthen their partnership with their political structures and economic policies compatible with the liberal international system with an understanding that is free from conflicts and polarizations. The absence of a serious political problem among the member states in a region where security risks are intense can be considered the success of the Organization of Turkic States. Because, in the region where there are many sources of conflict such as border problems, problems arising from water sharing, extremism and religious radicalism, and security problems of Afghanistan, Turkic states have managed to prevent these problems from turning into crises by establishing a continuous and sustainable dialogue and cooperation mechanism among themselves. From the very beginning, OTS member countries have argued that the pandemic and its problems can only be overcome with international cooperation, and they have followed a line far from a protective understanding. Turkic states have tried to handle the crises caused by the pandemic by increasing coordination among themselves through projects like the health board, joint vaccination studies, and medical aid. These efforts made the OTS more visible on international platforms and enabled it to diversify and deepen the areas of cooperation. With this understanding, the OTS aims to be an attractive actor of cooperation in the international system in the post-COVID-19 world.

References Address by President of the Republic of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev at the meeting of the Council of Heads of State of the Organization of Turkic States, Samarkand (11 Kasım 2022). https://president.uz/en/lists/view/ 5687. Eri¸sim Tarihi: 6 Mart 2023. Akgün, B. (Mayıs 2020). Uluslararası Yöneti¸sim Krizi, Kriter, S.46. https://kri terdergi.com/dis-politika/uluslararasi-yonetisim-krizi. Eri¸sim Tarihi: 6 Ocak 2023. Bordachev, T. (1 Mart 2020). Bipolarnoe Rasstroistvo, Profil. https://profile.ru/ columnist/bipolyarnoe-rasstrojstvo-271423/. Eri¸sim Tarihi: 6 Ocak 2023. Imamova, N. (3 Ocak 2020). Pompeo, in Central Aisa, Seeks to Counter China, VoA. https://www.voanews.com/south-central-asia/pompeo-centralasia-seeks-counter-china. Eri¸sim Tarihi: 24 Aralık 2023.

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Imamova, N. (2 Mart 2023). Blinken’s Central Asia Visit Raises Questions on US Role, Assistance, VoA. https://www.voanews.com/a/blinken-s-centralasia-visit-raises-questions-on-us-role-assistance-/6987471.html. Eri¸sim Tarihi: 6 Mart 2023. Mearsheimer, J. J. (Spring 2019). Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order, International Security, Vol. 43, No. 4, pp. 7–50. https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00342. Remarks by Vice President Harris at the Munich Security Conference (18 Subat ¸ 2023). https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-rem arks/2023/02/18/remarks-by-vice-president-harris-at-the-munich-securityconference-2/. Eri¸sim Tarihi: 2 Mart 2023. Re:vision, Munich Security Report 2023 (Subat ¸ 2023). https://d3mbhodo1 l6ikf.cloudfront.net/2023/Munich%20Security%20Report%202023/Munich SecurityReport2023_Re_vision.pdf. Eri¸sim Tarihi: 6 Mart 2023. Speech by Ilham Aliyev at the 9th Summit of Organization of Turkic States (11 Kasım 2022). Available at: https://president.az/en/articles/view/57856. Eri¸sim Tarihi: 5 Ocak 2023. Türk Devletleri Te¸skilatı Dokuzuncu Zirvesi Semerkant Bildirisi (11 Kasım https://turkicstates.org/assets/pdf/haberler/semerkant-bildirisi2022). 2679-164.pdf. Eri¸sim Tarihi: 2 Mart 2023. Türk Dünyası 2040 Vizyonu. Available at: https://turkicstates.org/assets/ pdf/haberler/turk-dunyasi-2040-vizyonu-2396-98.pdf. Eri¸sim Tarihi: 4 Ocak 2023. Uluta¸s, U. (Nisan 2020). Korovavirüs Sonrası Küresel Trendler, Covıd-19 Sonrası Küresel Sistem: Eski Sorunlar, Yeni Trendler, SAM , pp. 5–143.

Latin America and the Caribbean in the Post-Pandemic World: Rethinking Inequalities Segâh Tekin

1

Introduction

The pandemic started in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), with the confirmation of the first cases in the region in the last week of February 2020. LAC governments responded to the dissemination of COVID-19 determinately and started to announce lockdowns around March 2020, earlier than many of their European counterparts (Laineza et al., 2021: 941; OECD, 2020: 2). Aside from the lockdowns in Brazil and Mexico, most of the LAC countries adopted measures according to the advice of the World Health Organization (WHO) (Gideon, 2020: 4). Even before the emergence of the first patients diagnosed with COVID-19 in their respective countries, LAC governments started to declare national emergencies. They established coordination committees to govern the healthcare crises. However, deficiencies in the healthcare infrastructure and the low living standards of the millions of people, such as members of crowded households or the people who had to go to work

S. Tekin (B) Department of Political Science and International Relations, Necmettin Erbakan University, Konya, Turkey e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Akıllı and B. Gunes (eds.), World Politics in the Age of Uncertainty, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39607-6_10

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daily to survive and consequently were not able to stick to the quarantine measures, accelerated the spread of the COVID-19 in the region. Therefore, LAC had already become the epicenter of the pandemic as early as May 2020 (OECD, 2020: 2). The overall LAC has been the most affected region globally by the pandemic when all negative impacts are considered. By the year 2020, in LAC, around one-fifth of the population lived in shanty towns or informal settlements, and on varying rations. A considerable number of people lived without access to sanitary services, which necessitates simultaneous availability of electricity, water, and sewage treatment in their respective households. This reality meant that approximately 230 million people living in the region were vulnerable to the pandemic or unable to follow the measures to protect themselves from COVID-19 (OECD, 2020: 3). This chapter deals with the pandemic, not as a temporary shock to the people’s lives in the region, but as a revealing factor of the underlying structural deficiencies on the regional and state level.

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State, Society, and Governance

As a group of middle-income states with high levels of economic inequality, insufficient public services, and high rates of urban violence, governing the state became a more challenging task for the LAC governments during the pandemic. At the same time, the level of response to the pandemic served as a test to assess the progress of the LAC countries in eliminating inequality and building more resistant societies during the last two decades (Jaramillo, 2022). Nevertheless, the adequacy of the statelevel responses and accessibility of public services to meet the needs that arose during the pandemic were questioned by the populations triggering dissent, protests, and political polarization. The initial steps aiming to prevent the further dissemination of the disease and save the population’s lives were soon followed by measures to protect the citizens’ economic well-being and secure the sustainability of education, production, and service provision, despite lockdowns. State-level responses to the pandemic differed in the vast LAC region, comprising giants like Brazil and Mexico, and the small Caribbean and Central American states. In geographically large and relatively crowded LAC countries, populations are distributed unequally in the national territories. Thus, during the pandemic, the necessities of the people living in overcrowded large metropolitan areas like Sao Paulo, Lima, or Mexico

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City differed from the needs of the inhabitants of small or isolated cities and the indigenous communities living in mountainous or remote rural areas. Even though the COVID-19 pandemic provided an opportunity for national healthcare systems to assess their level of preparedness (PAHO & WHO, 2021: 95) and a dataset for the whole region for benchmarking among national responses, the success level of the responses cannot be solely based on the evaluation of the public health sector’s efforts. The government’s approach to the pandemic, besides the availability and accessibility of testing sets, medicines, machinery used in the treatment and testing, and of course, the vaccines themselves, were determining factors in the evaluation of the performance of the healthcare sector in the region. Lockdowns were declared quite early in many LAC countries but the discussions on whether, when, or how to close and, in some cases, the ineffective implementation of quarantine and lockdown measures under inadequate conditions resulted in political polarization, sometimes chaos, and raised questions on governability. In many cases, at the local level, the problems in the implementation of the national policies revealed not only the weakness of local institutions but also the weakness of national governments in their planning and allocation of resources, besides the overall need for increasing institutional capacity to coordinate the actions of different government levels. In LAC, most of the civil servants at the local level are not career workers but are appointed by politicians. The pandemic also scrutinized their job competency and trustworthiness (Cáceres Cabana et al., 2021: 2–7). Federalism contributed to the delay in implementing the decisions the federal government took at the local level due to multi-level decisionmaking mechanisms (OECD, 2020: 6). On the other hand, tensions arose in the cases where local and federal responses to the pandemic differed. In Peru, the tension between the national and regional governments reduced the response capacity of the local institutions in their fight against the pandemic. While the national government found it difficult to cooperate with local governments, harsh measures designed by the central government for crowded cities did not have enough chance to be fully implemented, considering the differences between the urban and rural areas (Cáceres Cabana et al., 2021: 5). The controversial opinions of President Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil (Gideon, 2020: 5) on lockdowns and the handling of the health crises resulted in numerous health ministers

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taking and leaving office at quick intervals and verbal clashes with local governors who preferred to implement stricter lockdown measures. The announcement of measures to combat the pandemic or its social and economic effects neither guarantees the effective implementation of the measures nor the availability of the necessary resources in the hands of the governments or the people. For example, in Peru, due to the fear of being locked in crowded households in Lima and other cities under the threat of hunger and lack of income, during the lockdowns, tens of thousands of Peruvians left their houses. They returned to their rural homelands, sometimes on foot. Besides showing the incapacity of the Peruvian state to develop an adequate response to the pandemic, the movement of the people accelerated the dissemination of the disease. It caused an extra burden on the already insufficient healthcare facilities of the small towns. Nevertheless, life was challenging even for the ones who remained in the cities. In Peru, the country so far with the highest mortality rate in the world due to COVID-19, around one-third of the households own refrigerators and one-fifth of the households do not have access to clean drinking water; thus, people were not able to live under long lockdown conditions since they cannot store food and have to leave their houses for shopping for food and water or for collecting water (Laineza et al., 2021: 941). Regarding the treatment of hospitalized patients and vaccination, smaller countries of the region, like the Caribbean countries, needed more prior capacity to manufacture the medicines and healthcare equipment at home (PAHO & WHO, 2022: 10). With their large internal markets and existing technological and industrial capacity, technologically advanced countries like Argentina and Brazil focused on technology transfer and increasing their vaccine production capacities (PAHO & WHO, 2022: 20), albeit with delays. Many LAC countries are experienced in fighting contagious tropical diseases, and some, like Brazil, are distinguished vaccine developers. Nevertheless, the Bolsonaro government’s controversial attitude toward vaccination reduced Brazil’s chances to use this capacity. Countries of the LAC import pharmaceuticals 10 times more than they export (PAHO & WHO, 2022: 21), revealing their dependency on external markets for acquiring such products and vulnerability to external shocks like COVID-19. The pandemic increased the demand for certain medicines and medical products and reduced the production and distribution capacity in the remaining ones due to the lockdowns.

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Unfortunately, since international support arrangements targeted mainly low-income countries to overcome pandemic-related economic problems, the LAC had relatively fewer opportunities for international cooperation even though the region has faced similar problems encountered by the low-income countries (ECLAC, 2021: 2). Varying from country to country, receiving vaccines via the network of the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), which worked in cooperation with the COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access (COVAX) system (PAHO, 2021, 2022), collaborating with generous vaccine donors China and Russia, and trying to buy from global manufacturers were the options for LAC countries. The PAHO played an essential role in helping LAC countries by gathering all the countries in the Americas, enabling the vertical transfer of resources and expertise from the U.S. and Canada toward the LAC and horizontal cooperation among the LAC countries. Through the COVAX mechanism and with the resources of PAHO vaccines, technical and financial support was distributed to LAC countries (PAHO & WHO, 2022: 9). According to the data of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), by September 2022, the share of the population fully vaccinated against COVID-19 was highest in Chile (90%), followed by Costa Rica (81%), Uruguay (84%), Peru (82%), Brazil (79%), Argentina (83%) Ecuador (78%), Panama (71%), and Colombia (70%). While the lack of data on the situation in some countries limits the possibility of generalizing, existing data reveals that the ones with the lowest rate of vaccination despite their small populations are the Caribbean and some of the Central American states like Jamaica (25%) and Guatemala (36%) (ECLAC, 2022a). However, the vaccination campaigns for the public, when the prioritized groups like the healthcare workers and the elderly are set aside, started relatively late, and the pace and level of vaccination continued to put the unvaccinated masses at risk (Laineza et al., 2021: 942; PAHO & WHO, 2022: 1). Since the region has been historically marked by “very high levels of poverty and inequality” (ECLAC, 2022b: 137), the pandemic has emerged as an exacerbating factor for deficits in public services and their accessibility for the masses. Undeniably but not surprisingly, in the LAC, people with higher incomes could receive better healthcare, reach vaccines easier at home or abroad, and receive treatment in better conditions in case of infection during the pandemic.

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3

The Economic Dimension

The LAC region succeeded in a significant achievement during the early 2000s in eradicating hunger and extreme poverty and elevating a significant number of people from low-income status to middle-income. Nevertheless, this success did not necessarily last. The vulnerability and the lack of resilience of the middle class have been tested by the impacts of the financial crises on the regional scale in addition to the fragility of the economic growth trends and political, economic, and social problems of the individual countries. According to the ECLAC, the region has been fighting the effects of the global financial crises since 2009, and the emergence of the pandemic exacerbated the situation (ECLAC, 2022b: 130–131). Within this context, while the scope of the economic response of the LAC governments to the pandemic varied from country to country, almost all of them announced emergency aid plans, including the freezing or easing of the conditions of debts to the state or the banks, nonconditional cash transfers, distribution of financial aid and food, and the extension of the beneficiaries of the social programs to reach the unemployed and the informal workers (OECD, 2020: 10; Cimini et al., 2020: 57–59). According to the surveys conducted by the World Bank and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the number of households receiving income support before the pandemic (approximately 25%) doubled (approximately 50%) during the pandemic in the overall LAC region. The primary beneficiaries were the poorest segments of the region’s countries. Indeed, there exist differences among the countries. This ratio did not change in Mexico before and during the pandemic, increasing almost six times in Guatemala (Jaramillo, 2022). The fragile success history of fighting poverty has provided lessons to the region’s governments, mainly on the benefits of social programs. Thus, when the first lockdowns were announced, many governments did not hesitate to declare emergency aid packages. However, their implementation and the extent of success have been open to discussion. Ambiguities related to the target groups, unfamiliarity, or inaccessibility of the low-income classes to digital technologies to apply for aid, and delays and reductions in payments have proven that the intended results and the actual outcomes differed (Tebet Marins et al., 2021: 688). For example, in Brazil—the country that declared the most extensive package

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to boost the national economy (Rojas-Suarez and Fiorito, 2022: 2)— the emergency aid (auxílio emergency) announced by the government in early 2020 was designed to provide a minimum income to the “most vulnerable Brazilians”, including the existing beneficiaries of the country’s famous Bolsa Familia program (Ministério da Cidadania, 2021). The emergency aid package proved significant for society’s low-income segment. In contrast with the overall LAC region, poverty decreased in Brazil from 2019 to 2020 (World Bank, 2022: 5). On the other hand, the Brazilian government’s approach to the poor and the difficulties encountered during the application and payment phases by the beneficiaries proved that neither the initial plan nor its implementation was exempt from problems and controversy (Tebet Marins et al., 2021: 683–685). Governments focused on the economic sustainability of households during the lockdowns in the pandemic and used various tools to support differing social groups but mainly with positive discrimination toward the most vulnerable, like the poor or single-parent families headed by women (Jaramillo, 2022). Unfortunately, despite the governments’ efforts and the support of the informal networks, the pandemic has stalled the efforts of overcoming malnutrition in LAC countries (Manzano Chura and Li, 2022). Ensuring food security is a complex issue. Considering the economic effects of the pandemic, an unusual situation for LAC countries was the availability of food without significant price increases in the early months. LAC countries also successfully targeted alleviating food insecurity through cash transfers during the pandemic (Goldberg, 2020). However, the situation has changed since due to global political and economic problems besides regional issues (Manzano Chura and Li, 2022). For example, in Brazil, the number of households running out of money or resources to buy food at least once a month increased two times (from 9.4% before the pandemic to 18.1%) (World Bank, 2022: 7). Nevertheless, in the post-pandemic period, due to cuts or lowered financial support by the governments and increasing prices of food, gas, and petroleum, people are struggling with new economic challenges, which have affected their nutrition and lifestyle. They can afford less food, and since some cannot afford to buy gas for cooking, they have returned to traditional methods of cooking (Manzano Chura and Li, 2022). These facts are compatible with the ECLAC’s opinion explaining that developing countries like the LAC countries are expected to be affected more heavily by the medium- and long-term consequences of the social and economic crises caused by the pandemic (2021: 1).

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Economic production and the labor market were adversely affected, but some sectors and some groups were impacted harder than others. While there has been considerable revenue loss in all sectors, some industries based on oil, gas, and mine extraction, besides agricultural and food production, recovered fully by the end of 2021. Sectors mainly based on human interaction, such as retail and wholesale trade, education, and tourism, have yet to recover or reach revenue levels seen before the pandemic (Powell and Rojas-Suarez, 2022: 9). The pandemic immensely affected the labor market due to the restrictions on the mobility of workers, lockdowns, and physical distancing measures, decreasing the capacity of the factories and warehouses specifically (ECLAC, 2022b: 137). Employment rates fell sharply, and small businesses were hit harder than the larger firms, which have the leverage to tackle the crisis by reducing investment and costs, by unfortunately contributing to the increasing levels of unemployment (Powell and RojasSuarez, 2022: 7). As the pandemic triggered unemployment, its social and economic dimensions hit groups such as women and the informal workers—more than half of the total workers in the region—harder as well as the indigenous communities, the migrants, school-age children, and the young people (Gideon, 2020: 4; OECD, 2020: 9; World Bank, 2022: 3–6; Zapata and Prieto, 2020: 16). According to Gideon (2020: 4), the pandemic highlighted the “gendered and racialized nature of poverty and inequality” in the LAC. Studies on the spread of the disease in the highly urbanized LAC region showed that there even exists a correlation between poverty and the infection rate of COVID-19 (Bolaño-Ortiz, 2020: 10). Gender inequalities in the labor market was one of the areas in which already existing problems were exacerbated during the pandemic (ECLAC, 2022b: 137). Moreover, whether having lost their jobs or not, many women had to assume additional responsibilities in their homes, such as taking care of the children during the lockdowns, helping the elderly and sick family members, and keeping the house clean according to the new hygiene standards (Gideon, 2020: 5). Developments in the labor market during the pandemic with ongoing effects in the post-pandemic period showed the socio-economic fragility of LAC countries and the importance of building resilience through combatting inequalities.

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Conclusion

The LAC is among the regions hardest hit globally by the COVID-19 pandemic. In LAC countries, the pandemic has become a test for the alleged national and regional achievements of the last decades when challenged by an unexpected hardship with effects on all members of the society. However, unfortunately, the pandemic has not only highlighted the incapacities of the public healthcare systems in most of the countries of the LAC but also resulted in ongoing political, economic, and social consequences. Extended closure of the schools caused an increasing number of dropouts, while the pandemic caused the loss of many jobs and left the people with insufficient state subsidies. In some cases, members of various indigenous communities lost their lives leading to a threat of cultural extinction, and people in the favelas organized to take care of themselves. Besides the efforts of the OAS through the PAHO, a response from regional organizations was lacking. The state-level responses to coping with the crises varied among states and local governments, raising questions about the effectiveness of the region’s governmental systems. Under these conditions, the human cost and the economic crises caused by the pandemic in the LAC are expected to decrease growth in the upcoming years, leaving the region with the lowest growth rate on the global scale (COA, 2022). To prevent the region from going through another lost decade (ECLAC, 2021: 2), governments need to implement post-pandemic recovery measures in this resource-rich region of the world. Nevertheless, the short-term economic recovery does not seem a reliable option due to the uncertainties at a global scale due to the War in Ukraine, besides ongoing financial volatility and the possibility of stagflation having already been revealed in the lowering growth rates and increasing prices in LAC countries (Powell and Rojas-Suarez, 2022: 7). Moreover, trying to cover the losses brought on by the pandemic in the short term may harm the region’s environmental sustainability prospects (Mentel and Monaldi, 2021). The COVID-19 pandemic showed that the era of the nation-state is not over, and what role the state should perform for society’s physical, mental, and economic well-being triggered discussions worldwide. Overcoming the challenges of preventing the dissemination of the disease, providing adequate healthcare to citizens, supporting the society to overcome the economic challenges caused by the lockdowns and decreasing global production, and orchestrating all these efforts by using the state

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apparatus have been the task of all governments worldwide during the pandemic. Although no country in the world was adequately prepared for such a massive pandemic, the insufficiency of preparedness was more visible in the LAC and resulted in exacerbating the existing distrust of governments and public services.

References Bolaño-Ortiz, T.R. (2020), ‘Spread of SARS-CoV-2 Through Latin America and the Caribbean Region: A Look from Its Economic Conditions, Climate and Air Pollution Indicators’, Environmental Research, 191(109938), pp. 1–12. Cáceres Cabana, Y.D., Malone, A., Zeballos, E.Z., Huamani Huaranca, N.O., Tinta, M.T., Gonzales Beltrán, S.A., Arosquipa, A.A. and Pinedo, D. (2021), ‘Pandemic Response in Rural Peru: Multi-scale Institutional Analysis of the COVID-19 Crisis’, Applied Geography, 134(102519), pp. 1–9. Cimini, F., Julião, N., de Souza, A. and Cabral, N. (2020), ‘Covid-19 Pandemic, Social Mitigation and Taxation: The Open Veins of Inequality in Latin America’, Bulletin of Latin American Research, 39(1), pp. 56–61. COA Trade Advisory Group Statement (2022), ‘Trade and Investment Belong at the Center of the IX Summit of the Americas’, 21 March, Available at: https://www.as-coa.org/articles/trade-and-investment-belongcenter-ix-summit-americas (Accessed: 21 October 2022). ECLAC (2021), An Innovative Financing for Development Agenda for the Recovery in Latin America and the Caribbean, ECLAC COVID-19 Special Report, No: 12, Available at: https://repositorio.cepal.org/bitstream/han dle/11362/47490/3/S2100627_en.pdf. ECLAC (2022a), “COVID-19 Observatory in Latin America and the Caribbean: Measures by Country”, 4 September, Available at: https://www.cepal.org/ en/subtopics/covid-19 (Accessed: 12 September 2022a). ECLAC (2022b), Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean, Santiago: ECLAC, Available at: https://repositorio.cepal.org/bitstream/han dle/11362/48078/S2200606_en.pdf?sequence=4&isAllowed=y Gideon, J. (2020), ‘Introduction to COVID-19 in Latin America and the Caribbean’, Bulletin of Latin American Research, 39(1), pp. 4–6. Goldberg, P.K. (2020), ‘Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg Says More…’, Project Syndicate, 15 December, Available at: https://www.project-syndicate.org/ onpoint/an-interview-with-pinelopi-koujianou-goldberg-2020-12?barrier=acc esspaylog (Accessed: 5 April 2022).

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Jaramillo, C.F. (2022), ‘Social Protection and COVID-19 in Latin America: Building on Achievements’, World Bank Blogs, March 15, https://blogs. worldbank.org/latinamerica/social-protection-and-covid-19-latin-america-bui lding-achievements (Accessed: 31 August 2022). Laineza, R.H., Salcedob, R.M. and Madariaga, M.G. (2021), ‘COVID-19 Infection in the Developing World: The Peruvian Perspective’, Transactions of the Royal Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene, 115, pp. 941–943. Manzano Chura, H.B. and Li, F. (2022), Rising Food Insecurity in the Andes, NACLA, 17 September, Available at: https://nacla.org/rising-food-insecu rity-andes-peru?eType=EmailBlastContent&eId=5fecdb6b-eacd-4f57-8a8081f59cb4bb33 (Accessed: 24 September 2022). Mentel, G. and Monaldi, F. (2021), ‘A Global Americans Interview with Francisco J. Monaldi’, Global Americans, 30 June, Available at: https://theglobalamericans.org/2021/06/a-global-americans-interviewwith-francisco-j-monaldi/. Ministério da Cidadania, Brasil (2021), Auxílio Emergencial 2021, Available at: https://www.gov.br/cidadania/pt-br/servicos/auxilio-emergencial (Accessed: 8 September 2022). OECD (2020), ‘COVID-19 in Latin America and the Caribbean: An Overview of Government Responses to the Crisis’, OECD Policy Responses to Coronavirus (COVID-19), Paris: OECD Publishing, Available at: https://doi.org/ 10.1787/0a2dee41-en. PAHO (2021), ‘The Bahamas Receives COVID-19 Vaccines Through a Collaboration Between PAHO/WHO, Canada and Colombia’, 28 December, Available at: https://www.paho.org/en/news/28-12-2021-bahamas-rec eives-covid-19-vaccines-through-collaboration-between-pahowho-canada-and (Accessed: 19 August 2022). PAHO (2022), ‘Government of Canada, Through PAHO, Donates Vaccine Refrigerators to Dominican Republic’, 3 March, Available at: https://www. paho.org/en/news/3-3-2022-government-canada-through-paho-donates-vac cine-refrigerators-dominican-republic (Accessed: 19 August 2022). PAHO & WHO (2021), Regulatory System Strengthening in the Americas. Lessons Learned from the National Regulatory Authorities of Regional Reference. Washington, DC: Pan American Health Organization. PAHO & WHO (2022), Pan American Health Organization Response to COVID-19, January–June 2022. Summary Mid-year Report, Key Indicators and Selected Highlights. Washington, DC: Pan American Health Organization. Powell, A. and Rojas-Suarez L. (chairs) (2022), ‘Healthier Firms for a Stronger Recovery: Policies to Support Business and Jobs in Latin America and the Caribbean’, Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)—Center for Global Development (CGD)Working Group Report, Available at: https://www.cgdev. org/sites/default/files/healthier-firms-stronger-recovery-ENG.pdf (Accessed: 18 September 2022).

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Rojas-Suarez, L. and Fiorito, A. (2022), ‘Growing Smaller: COVID-19’s Impact on Firm Size in Latin America, Center for Global Development’, CGD Note, Available at: https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/growing-sma ller-covid-impact-firm-size-latin-america.pdf (Accessed: 21 October 2022). Tebet Marins, M., Nogueira Rodrigues, M., Maldonado Lago da Silva, J., Cristina Martins da Silva, K. and Loureiro Carvalho, P. (2021), ‘Auxílio Emergencial em tempos de pandemia’, Sociedade e Estado, 36(2), pp. 669–692. World Bank (2022), Brazil Poverty and Equity Assessment: Looking Ahead of Two Crises, Washington, DC: World Bank. Zapata, G.P. and Prieto, V.R. (2020), ‘Structural and Contingent Inequalities: The Impact of COVID-19 on Migrant and Refugee Populations in South America’, Bulletin of Latin American Research, 39(1), pp. 16–22.

Africa and COVID-19 Mehmet Özkan

1

and Murat Yi˘git

Introduction

Although 55 countries on the continent have different levels of development, COVID-19 has drawn the world’s attention to Africa. The fact that most of the least developed countries (LDCs) are in Africa, the pandemic’s devastating impact has been felt very strongly in the continent (UN 2020). The effects of the pandemic on global politics and trade were quite evident. In this process, two aspects of the threat posed by the epidemic dominate: humanitarian and economic. Only states with strong health infrastructure and healthcare capacity have been able to respond to the humanitarian threat. The escalation of the humanitarian crisis has often led states to act nationalistically, resulting in exclusionary attitudes (Sidiropoulos 2020). Countries with strong financial instruments and significant financial size have responded to the economic challenge. The

M. Özkan (B) Joint War Institute, National Defence University, Istanbul, Türkiye e-mail: [email protected] M. Yi˘git Air Force Academy, National Defence University, Istanbul, Türkiye e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Akıllı and B. Gunes (eds.), World Politics in the Age of Uncertainty, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39607-6_11

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pandemic period, in which the production and supply chain was interrupted, has led to a breakdown and depression in many sectors (Shurkin et al. 2021). The pandemic caused a noteworthy shock in other health services in the continent as Africa’s health systems were inadequately structured to handle it. The response to COVID-19 showed the systemic underrepresentation of African voices and institutions in positions of authority and decision-making, as well as the fundamental power imbalances in the global health ecosystem. The unequal availability of vaccines in African nations was among the most glaring examples of how this has been proven. In general, state reaction to COVID-19 was belated and insufficient to address the issue’s gravity. However, UNICEF reports that the African response to the pandemic has, for the most part, surpassed expectations despite current research and studies suggesting that the reported impact of COVID-19 in Africa is an underestimate of the reality (Soy 2020). The African Union’s (AU) health agency, the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention, has taken the lead in this response at the continental level, and organizations like the West African Health Organization (WAHO), the South African Development Community (SADC), and the Nigeria Centre for Disease Control (NCDC) have taken the lead at the regional and national levels. The impact of scarce resources has been maximized thanks to quick and well-coordinated responses by visionary leaders. The African experience in relation to COVID-19 is a relative success, despite the fact that the effectiveness of any reaction to a health problem depends on close cooperation between public health officials and political decision-makers. This study aims to discuss the African reaction to COVID-19 as well as the global assistance provided to several African nations throughout the pandemic.

2

Health Care in Africa: A General Overview

Dealing with health issues in Africa is typically made more difficult by a lack of tools and resources, limited testing capabilities, and inadequate surge capacity. Access to necessary health care is still a challenge across the continent. The limited available facilities are understocked with necessary medications and are too pricey for the residents considering their precarious financial situation. In many countries, homes, established systems, and religious institutions provide the majority of the care.

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Before the COVID-19 outbreak, pandemics and other events, such as the HIV epidemic in the early 1990s and the Ebola outbreak in the middle of the 2010s, posed serious difficulties for the African health systems. The COVID-19 epidemic has put preparedness and response capacities at the local, national, regional, and international levels to the test. Numerous African nations have implemented civil and public service reforms, as well as reforms in the health industry, over the last 10 years. The majority of initiatives include restructuring the sector and creating new approaches, procedures, and operations aimed at boosting responsiveness and effectiveness. However, there are significant weaknesses in the stakeholder organizations’ ability to properly consult their internal constituents on the reform’s procedures and win their support for the selected actions. The private and unofficial sectors’ contributions to public health in Africa need to be better coordinated and improved. According to some research, Africa’s basic human development indices declined during the early 2000s (Dan et al. 2005). Conflicts, the decimation and/or diversion of the productive force brought on by AIDS and other diseases made the decline in labour force participation worse, which was brought on by a growing population to feed. School dropout rates were rising, and many countries were experiencing both internal and external brain drain as people moved away in search of a better life. Temporary nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and projects did not significantly contribute to the general development of a nation despite their visible and significant activity. Inappropriate human resource use was another issue. However, there are improvements on all these fronts, and a United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2019) report says, “African countries have made significant strides in advancing human development, gaining ground on primary education and health.” While this is a fact, economic underdevelopment and political instabilities still create complications for states to effectively develop critical infrastructure in clinics, hospitals, and care centres. In addition to political reasons, other issues also complicate the health response in Africa. The continent has experienced ongoing conflicts, recurrent famines, and droughts that have destroyed settled life and essential infrastructure. Their effects on general health are increasingly surfacing in frightening ways. Africa has 10 of the world’s 20 countries with the highest under-5 mortality rates, according to the Global Hunger Index (2018). Seven of them are fragile states, whose governments are

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unable to operate due to ongoing hostilities. Chronic hunger greatly increases one’s susceptibility to illness. Africans are more susceptible to it than residents of any other continent. Demand for government medical assistance has increased as the burden of disease has increased. But even during medical emergencies, it is denied to women and children. Funding for this vital part of human development is not typically used in African nations. A sizable portion is used to combat extreme weather and support humanitarian efforts. Over half of the anticipated worldwide population expansion between 2015 and 2050 will occur in Africa (UN 2017), showing the significance of addressing population health in this region for enhancing global public health. Two unique characteristics can be used to describe this increase in population growth in the continent. First off, despite being the least urbanized continent in the world right now, Africa is anticipated to have 56% of its inhabitants residing in urban areas by the year 2050, making it the continent with the fastest rate of urbanization. Second, the demographic youth bulge that will account for 35–40% of children and adolescents worldwide by 2050 is a feature of this population rise. These characteristics present a chance and a pressing need for urban health improvement (Vearey et al. 2019). However, the future of health care in Africa depends on innovation and human capital—particularly the young. But to translate the enormous potential of Africa’s young people into concrete results for the New Public Health Order (Mburu and Ebere 2022), Africa’s youth must move quickly from backend support systems to more frontend leadership roles. In a macroeconomic environment that can be detrimental to the growth of health, there is a significant need for assistance from international development organizations in the form of technical assistance, lobbying, and political support. The most vital and significant requirement is probably the need for assistance in developing local experiences that can be shared across nations. The international network of collaborators may also have an impact on decisions that don’t advance the continent’s health. The majority of the drugs, vaccines, and diagnostics used in Africa are not produced there. Less than 1% of Africa’s vaccine needs are satisfied by locally produced vaccines, despite the continent having the greatest rate of infectious disease mortality. Between 70 and 90% of medicines are imported as well, and before COVID-19, no African nations had made investments in the domestic production of diagnostics. Africa will need to enhance domestic manufacturing and

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production of medications, vaccines, and diagnostics to achieve its health priorities and guarantee continental health security if it is to effectively address the continent’s global health concerns. To ensure that governments can distribute these items to the populations who need them, it will also be crucial to tighten the supply-chain management of vaccines and medicines. In a nutshell, sub-Saharan Africa continues to need a satisfactory health structure, and only a handful of nations could afford to pay the $34 to $40 per person per year that the World Health Organization considers the minimum for basic health care. And despite the region’s pervasive poverty, an astounding 50% of the health spending is covered by private contributions from individuals. HIV/AIDS is a significant problem, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, which accounts for 95% of all HIV/AIDS orphans worldwide and 70% of the global burden (UN 2022). The HIV/AIDS epidemic has flooded sub-Saharan African health systems with patients, starting to deprioritize pre-existing illnesses like malaria and greater demand for a wider range of services and competencies than the health sectors could previously satisfy. The region as a whole lacks the infrastructure to provide health care and suffers a serious shortage of qualified medical workers, despite the extraordinary progress made in the battle against HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria thanks to donor attention (Anderson and Patterson 2016). With Africa’s economies growing, increasing demand for high-quality medical care will only increase further in the future. The private sector already provides around half of Africa’s health services and products. It pushes for changes to the regulatory oversight of private healthcare providers and calls for close cooperation between the public and private sectors. In many rural communities and impoverished urban slums in Africa today, the private sector provides health care, not just for the wealthy but occasionally as the only choice. Poor local women are just as likely to take their ill children to a private facility as they are to a public one. Today, Africa needs to develop its health capacity, and this is becoming an urgent requirement as economic and social dynamics are changing very fast in the continent. Over 500,000 more hospital beds will be required in the next 10 years as the continent’s population grows. In the near future, it’s expected that having better manufacturing facilities and retail and distribution systems for pharmaceuticals and medical supplies would

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be vital. Of course, human capital is a must. As Africa is losing its qualified medical human capital with brain drain, it is estimated that in the next decade, the continent needs many physicians, nurses, and community health workers. The African health system is ripe for development, including making a profit for companies.

3

Consequences of COVID-19 on Africa

COVID-19 has reopened the question about Africa’s place in international politics, enabling us to focus on structural issues as well. The continent has been the first resort to meet the needs of Western states since the colonial period. But when it comes to the needs of African countries, these countries find themselves at the bottom of the hierarchy. This order, which is the legacy of colonialism, becomes even clearer in times of crisis. This issue also takes place in the discussions about the postCOVID-19 period in Africa. One of the most important problems of African countries during the twentieth century was the inability to diversify their partners, that is, to act autonomously, due to colonial legacy dependencies. After the COVID-19 experience, international cooperation has opened possibilities to break away from its traditional patterns. The COVID-19 pandemic has witnessed, above all, a period in which inequalities deepen for the African continent. The first layer of inequality is experienced in developed countries and least developed countries. The deprivation of the LDCs, which deepened during the epidemic crisis, was neglected by world public opinion. The second layer of inequality manifests itself at the intra-societal level. The crisis in areas such as access to water, hygiene and health services, food security, investment, sustainability of production and trade, price stability, social security and welfare became more evident with the pandemic (Lakemann et al. 2020). The COVID-19 pandemic emerged primarily as a public health problem. African countries have been exposed to many epidemics for decades, including AIDS, Lassa, Zika, Ebola, and cholera. The coronavirus pandemic was only the last link in this chain (Elmi and Hersi 2020: 51–56). The number of cases seen from the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic to date is around 12.7 million. The death toll from COVID-19 was recorded as 258,000 people in the continent. South Africa is one of the countries most affected by coronavirus deaths with 102,000 deaths (Statista 2022). Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco, Ethiopia, and Algeria followed, respectively. Many experts agree that

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COVID-19 cases in Africa are likely underreported, meaning that the real numbers are likely higher, particularly in countries with weak institutions, as in Central Africa. The fact that the number of cases and deaths in Africa is low compared to the global COVID-19 figures has been the subject of discussion. The fact that the population of the African continent is younger than the European population is one of the first arguments put forward. Infected young people are known to survive the disease more successfully. The second argument is based on climate differences. It has been claimed that cases of infection triggered by cold weather are less common in Africa, which has a hot and tropical climate. Another issue is the low urbanization rates in the African continent. As a factor reducing human mobility, low urbanization has affected the spread of the pandemic. While it is more difficult to manage the distance between people in Western metropolises, it seems much more possible to maintain social distance in Africa, where most of the people live in villages far away from each other. Although the number of cases and deaths is low, it has been observed in many African countries that the public health system is not sufficient. Due to its weak health systems, extensive poverty, food shortage, and other health risks, Africa has been particularly vulnerable to this pandemic. The pandemic has also had a devastating impact on historically vulnerable populations, including refugees, internally displaced people and mining communities who live in unsanitary and congested conditions. The lack of testing capacity, medical expertise, resources, and finance to contain the pandemic provide challenges for continental operations. During the epidemic, social security shortcomings harmed public health. In Africa, there will be lengthy discussions over the social security system (PERC 2021). Socially, the pandemic restricted the vital human contact found in many African societies, which resulted in restrictions on interpersonal relationships. Countries like Nigeria banned interstate travel and imposed curfews. Schools were shuttered and public gatherings were forbidden in Kenya. International travel was also forbidden, and there were restrictions on religious, social, and sporting events. A rise in gender-based violence has also been observed as a result of closures, mobility restrictions, and financial difficulties. It will not be difficult to guess that all this leads to frustration, depression, and dissatisfaction (Ettang 2021). Access to vaccines was one of the most important issues for public health management during the COVID-19 pandemic. Access to the vaccine has become an ongoing problem for Africa due to the limited

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country-wide development of the COVID-19 vaccine and the nationalist and non-solidarity attitudes of the states. Vaccination could not be carried out in many African countries until the end of 2021. As of December 2021, they had reached 79% vaccination rates in Seychelles, 38% in Botswana, 23% in South Africa and 12% in Algeria; Eritrea, Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi have yet to vaccinate. It is noted that countries such as Mauritius and Zimbabwe have less difficulty in accessing vaccines than their African neighbours (Statista 2022). The bearing of the pandemic on the economy in Africa has been significant. In many African countries, it is estimated that there will be a decline in growth or an economic contraction. In the process that started with the pandemic, factors such as the food and energy crisis, the Ukraine– Russia war, and rising inflation deepen Africa’s economic crisis. Global growth figures were estimated to be 3% in 2022 and 1.9% in 2023. These figures show that the lowest rates of the last 30 years have been reached. It is estimated that the growth rate of 4.1% in 2022 in Africa will decrease to 3.8% in 2023 (DESA 2023). We are far from average growth rates that have not fallen below 6% in the past decades. Current figures are very close to Africa’s first recession in 25 years, according to World Bank officials. Considering factors such as the pandemic, food and energy crises, and high inflation, various predictions can be mentioned: the deterioration of mutual foreign trade with countries such as China, which is seen as the source of epidemics such as COVID-19, contraction in countries such as Algeria, Nigeria, and Angola due to the decrease in oil consumption, and the negative impact of the crises on tourism, the shifting of resources to the health sector, and the decrease in foreign aid and foreign direct investments. Many issues such as the shrinkage of the labour market and employment losses, interruptions in the supply chain and halts in industrial production have made the economy even more fragile. The crises ignited by the pandemic will put the African economy, which is suffering from inequalities, in a difficult position. Shrinking welfare and falling purchasing power will have negative consequences for human development and human security. 3.1

International Solidarity and Africa

The harmful effects of COVID-19 and subsequent crises in Africa are not limited to the economy and health. At the same time, political and social developments have emerged in this context. First, the increasing need

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for state authority allows autocracies to become stronger. This period, in which the oppressive nature of the regimes will become evident, also means that good governance will be shelved. In this context, violations of human rights are expected to increase. As the pandemic increases security concerns, it is predicted that there will be an increase in security expenditures and the borrowing will also increase. It is not a coincidence that 13 military coup attempts, seven of which were successful, have taken place in the African continent since the outbreak of the pandemic. Africa’s international position in the global system has also become open to changes in this process. During the pandemic, we witnessed the rise of two phenomena in cooperation with Africa: regionalism, which manifests itself in partnership with new global actors, and regional solidarity. The rise of both trends stems from the lack of support for African countries from their Western partners. The pandemic has opened a new page in the continent, which is seen as the field of global strategic competition. Countries such as China, Russia, the Gulf countries, Iran, Israel, and Türkiye, which competed with traditional powers in Africa, have gained more influence against the West (Shurkin et al. 2021: 6). The Chinese government chose two methods to increase its influence in Africa during the epidemic. The first was the use of epidemic-related aid. In the first period, Chinese authorities and nongovernmental organizations made test kits, masks, hygiene materials and other personal protective equipment available to African countries. Chinese medical teams were dispatched to the area. Later, it increased its efforts on vaccination. The Extraordinary China-Africa Summit in June 2020 was held online to ensure coordination in this area. The Chinese government promised millions of vaccines for Africa at the China–Africa Cooperation Forum (FOCAC) summit. The second method was financial means. Many African countries have borrowed substantial amounts from China and paying off debts emerging amid the recession is becoming a heavier burden than ever before. At the same time, cash-strapped African countries may be more prone to making disadvantageous deals with Chinese firms or the Chinese government and may feel less free to stand against Chinese activities. As a result, China gained stronger influence though its influence in Africa was expected to decrease due to the pandemic. Russia, on the other hand, provided serious support to the continent, though not as much as China, during the COVID-19 pandemic. It provided humanitarian aid as well as medical support, especially test kits and vaccines (Sindle 2021). Although the effectiveness of the Sputnik

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vaccine has been questioned around the world, African societies accepted it as a sign of goodwill. It is observed that Russia has increased its political and military influence in Africa in the post-pandemic period. Military cooperation agreements have been signed with countries such as Mali and the Central African Republic. Currently, military training and consultancy services are provided by the Wagner mercenary group. Russia is also Africa’s most important arms supplier. Another country that took on a new role in Africa after the pandemic was Türkiye. Türkiye, which has made a name for itself with its humanitarian aid activities, has sent many medical and emergency aid materials, especially masks, test kits, and vaccines, to African countries during the pandemic. In addition, Turkish companies in the region started to produce masks and protective materials in their own production facilities. Türkiye’s activities in the African continent such as health screening, drug supply, and hospital construction and repairs were coordinated by the ˙ Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) (Ogurlu 2021). The Türkiye-Africa Summit, which was held in Istanbul in 2021, was realized with very intense participation. The positive atmosphere at the summit documents that Türkiye has further increased its influence on African countries. One of the most concrete results of this has been the rising defence industry cooperation between Türkiye and African countries. It is foreseen that relations will develop further in this area.

4

Conclusion

A double burden of infectious and chronic diseases affects many African nations. Deaths from chronic diseases are on the rise in the African area, but infectious diseases still cause the majority of fatalities. The most recent one is that on March 21, 2023, when reports of cases and deaths were reported in the Kagera district, an outbreak that was confirmed as Tanzania’s first case of the Marburg virus disease (MVD). According to the World Health Organization, Marburg “is highly virulent and causes haemorrhagic fever” and comes from “the same family as the virus that causes Ebola virus disease” (WHO 2023a). As a result, African health systems will continue to deal with fresh regional and international problems like conflict, a potential new infectious disease, climate change, and the rising burden of non-communicable diseases. Nations with inadequate health systems are likely to be overwhelmed by the complexity of case identification, the need to create and maintain communication methods,

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and the challenges of providing safe care for an inflow of critically ill patients. During COVID-19, African countries have tried their best to respond and asked for international help. Lack of health facilities, vaccines and poor infrastructure have come to the surface as the main challenges during this time as well as political instabilities, civil wars, and military takeovers complicating the response to the pandemic. Since 2022, African nations have increased their efforts to boost vaccination rates, and as of January 2023, only 29% of the continent’s population had finished the primary round of vaccinations. In the same vein, according to the WHO, the percentage of adults who were vaccinated increased from 13 to 47% between January 2022 to January 2023. Only four African nations have immunized more than 70% of their citizens, compared to 27 that have immunized between 10 and 39% and 11 that have immunized between 40 and 70%. The WHO reports that vaccination among high-risk populations has made modest progress, with 41% of medical personnel fully immunized in 28 reporting countries and 38% of senior citizens in 23 reporting countries (WHO 2023b). The pandemic showed that global health cooperation is extremely important for timely response to public needs and, wherever possible, to develop better health infrastructure and increase readiness to be selfsustaining. In the period of COVID-19, Africa and other countries have understood that during any pandemic, international solidarity may arrive late and be too little. As a result, they must expand health insurance and factor potential pandemics into ordinary medical services that cater to the needs of the most vulnerable. Nations can prepare for and effectively handle shocks and disruptions to the health system as a result of unanticipated community health dangers when they have a well-established and robust health system. This is one of the primary lessons that many African countries have learned from COVID-19. The health systems could eventually provide a sustainable response to reduce morbidity and mortality caused by pandemics like COVID-19 and preserve critical healthcare services while supporting healthcare professionals to respond successfully to succeeding pandemics. To reach this, there is a long way to go for many African countries, however, COVID-19 brought an awareness that its impact is there to stay for quite some time, pushing politicians to invest in a better health infrastructure both in urban and rural areas of the continent.

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Natıonal Securıty Durıng Covıd-19: Changıng Natıonal Securıty Polıcıes of Countrıes Levent Yi˘gittepe

1

Introduction

It is possible to say that the most important strategy that allows countries to exist in the international system is to protect their national security policies and to update these policies according to the conditions of the day. National security is seen as an important issue for the continuation of a country’s power. From this point of view, in order to maintain their political dominance in their countries, governments first determine their national security policies and then aim to impose their own people on them in order to ensure their legitimacy. In this study, it has focused on the conditions under which national security can be changed by countries and how it has changed, especially during the COVID-19 process. COVID-19, which first appeared in Wuhan, China at the end of 2019 and then spread all over the world in a short time, has led to significant changes in the security policies of

L. Yi˘gittepe (B) Department of Political Sciences and International Relations, Karamano˘glu Mehmetbey University, Karaman, Turkey e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Akıllı and B. Gunes (eds.), World Politics in the Age of Uncertainty, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39607-6_12

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countries. Countries have been delayed in reacting and taking precautions against COVID-19 for the first time. Immediately afterward, many measures were implemented within the scope of national security. In this study, the changes in the national security policies of the countries during the COVID-19 process were focused on, and these changes were analyzed through multidimensional parameters. In particular, examples are given over the countries that are considered to be hegemon power in the global system. The differences between these countries have been revealed by going through the changes in their national security policies during the COVID-19 process. Afterward, the national security approaches and practices of Türkiye, which has passed the COVID-19 process more smoothly than other countries, are included. In essence, the study focuses on how national security is affected in this process and the reflections of new practices on societies. The COVID-19 process has had a significant impact on redefining the parameters of the national security of countries. Especially with the closure of the borders, the cessation of trade has put the countries in a very difficult situation in the field of economy. This situation has caused great problems in countries whose economy depends on foreign countries. In this context, the debate on whether countries have the capacity to self-help has come to the fore. For this reason, countries have seen economic security as the most important part of national security. In the COVID-19 process, it is seen that countries prioritize not only economic security but also political and social security within the scope of their national security policies. The COVID-19 process has also caused significant changes in the behavior and policies of countries in the international arena. For example, in the COVID-19 process, even in an economic-based organization such as the EU, member countries have ignored some of the decisions taken by the organization by prioritizing their national interests. In this study, it has been tried to explain the differences between national security policies between countries through the COVID-19 process and how it can turn into permanent national security policies afterward. In the first part of the study, the conceptual framework and definitions of national security are given. In the second part, the national security tendencies of the countries that stand out in the global system during the COVID-19 process will be analyzed through the given case studies. In the third part, how can the COVID-19 pandemic lead to a future transformation in National Security Policies? will be answered. The study was

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concluded with the conclusion section, which includes all the positive/ negative effects of COVID-19 on both the international system and the countries, and the conclusions and findings obtained.

2

The Conceptual Framework on National Security

We can say that the idea of national security gained special vitality, especially at the end of the Second World War. The first event to reveal this tendency was the Truman Doctrine. The idea of “taking control” has been expressed while directly linking national security and democracy (Romano, 2011: 161). In this context, national security is a concept used by the USA during the Second World War to explain its relationship with other states in the world. This concept has been put at the center of US security policies. Likewise, national security has also been used as a means of legitimation for rulers to arm themselves, including nuclear weapons (Brauch, 2008: 4). National security policies have started to reform around the new security threats of the post-Cold War. National security strategies have also been seen to differ significantly from previous strategies. These new national security strategies tackle all kinds of security concerns, including synthetic. It also has an adaptive security approach against all threats (Caudle and Spiegeleire, 2010: 1). Among the newly defined national security strategies here, the fight against epidemic diseases that directly threaten human health, such as COVID-19, is also included. Countries claim that their national security is for the security of their citizens. However, in some cases, national security itself can often become a more or less direct source of threat to the security of individuals. (Victoria, 2018: 1–2). Traditionally, a threat was defined as a combination of national security strategies focused on threats that could be dealt with militarily and/or diplomatically, with the capability and intent of a rival actor. Today, in an era of unprecedented global interdependence, national security is viewed in a broader context as the potential negative impact of an event or actors on a nation’s position or perception is a better measure of threat than the traditional model (Boyce, 2020: 2). The last and most vital threat that must be positioned as the driving force in a modern model of national security is widespread infectious

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diseases. Most of the global deaths in the modern era have been caused by infectious diseases. With the effect of globalization, people are more interconnected than any other time in history. In addition, the continuous urbanization and transportation of people, animals, and food products from one side of the world to the other within hours offer countless opportunities for rapid contamination (Boyce, 2020: 5). In this context, national security is to protect the borders of a state and its citizens against all kinds of threats, including political, economic, military, ideological, legal, internal, and external social factors. National security is also affected by many issues, including human rights, human well-being, and environmental security (Yi˘gittepe, 2022: 14). It is a necessity for countries to develop their national security approaches by spreading them to all areas in question. The COVID-19 process shows that national security, especially health security and, accordingly, human security is essential. COVID-19 has brought human security, which has been forgotten in recent years, back on the agenda. All societies, without distinction between rich and poor, have been affected by this pandemic. Although countries imposed restrictions on the circulation of people during the COVID-19 process, the number of cases and deaths continued to increase. This pandemic, which can spread very quickly and leave many deaths behind, has been a great threat to national security. In the next part of the study, we try to explain the changes and practices in their national security policies in this process by giving examples from countries that play a dominant role in the global system. Türkiye, which has applied national security policies that are less questioned compared to other countries during the COVID-19 process, is also included.

3 National Security Tendencies of Countries During the Covid-19 Process In this section, an analysis of how COVID-19 has created a change in the national security policies of countries such as the USA, Russia, and China, which play a dominant role in the global system, and its effects are presented within the framework of examples. Finally, the effects on national security were discussed by giving case studies of Türkiye, which is thought to be more successful than other countries in the COVID-19

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process. It is considered that these examples will play an important role in revealing their reflections on future national security policies in the world. The COVID-19 pandemic has made it mandatory for countries around the world to reshape their national security priorities. In this section the changes and practices of the USA in the understanding of national security during the COVID-19 process will be discussed. Measures taken to control the spread of the epidemic, protect public health, and ensure socioeconomic stability will be examined. The COVID-19 pandemic has become a top priority issue on the US national security agenda. Solid cooperation and coordination between federal, state, and local governments has been an important element in the fight against the epidemic. Documents such as the National Health Security Strategy and the National Emergency Action Plan have formed the basis of pandemic planning. Health institutions, security units, and emergency management agencies have aimed to control the spread of the epidemic by working in a joint effort (Reıch and Dombrowski, 2020: 1254–1255). The USA has implemented border controls and travel restrictions to limit the spread of the epidemic. Travel bans or restrictions have been introduced for travelers from certain countries. In addition, measures such as testing requirements and quarantine measures have been taken for people entering or leaving the country. These practices have been implemented to limit the entry of the virus into the country from outside and to control its spread (The White House, 2023). During the pandemic, the emergency management and resource allocation capacity of the USA has been strengthened. The capacities of hospitals and health institutions have been increased, and the stocks of medical supplies and equipment have been updated. Test capacity has been expanded and vaccine distribution has been accelerated. Organizations such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) have played an active role in emergency management and resource allocation. These measures strengthened the health infrastructure and provided a fast and effective response in the case of emergency (FEMA, 2023). Combating the economic effects of the epidemic has also become important for the national security of the USA. The federal government has taken steps to support businesses and workers through economic support measures. Measures such as unemployment benefits, loans to small businesses, and economic incentive payments were aimed at maintaining economic security. It aims to ensure economic stability, protect

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internal stability, and prevent potential social and political instability (Tellis, 2020: 4). Remote work and digital communication have gained importance during the epidemic period. This situation has directly increased information security and cyber security risks. The USA has strengthened its measures against cyber attacks and has become more sensitive to cyber threats. The security of studies, especially in the health sector and vaccine research, has become one of the national security priorities. Various measures have been taken to prevent cyberattacks, ensure information security, and protect critical infrastructure (Homeland Security, 2023). The COVID-19 pandemic has profoundly affected the US understanding and practices of national security. It has made significant changes and applications in areas such as pandemic management, border controls, emergency management, economic support, information security, and cyber security. Unity and coordination at the national level has been crucial to control the spread of the epidemic, protect public health, and ensure socioeconomic stability. In this context, the COVID-19 process is an important example that should be considered in terms of preparations for future similar crises and the development of national security strategies. The COVID-19 epidemic has affected the socioeconomic structures of nation-states and their health systems. It has been observed that Russia, one of the dominant powers in the international system, has also been adversely affected by the COVID-19 epidemic. Russia saw that this process would harm its federal structure and its dominant power status (Dhawan et al., 2022). For example, it has been observed that there are differences between the measures taken by the Moscow administration and those taken by other federal structures. This situation made it difficult for Russia to fight the epidemic. In the COVID-19 epidemic, additional aid was provided to prevent economic problems in Russia, as in every nation-state. These aids covered all private or public companies. Country defense, which ranked first in 2015 in the National Security Strategy document, one of the most important strategic documents of Russia in the hierarchy of documents, moved to the second place in the document signed in 2021 due to the pandemic caused by the COVID-19 virus in the world (Cooper, 2021). With the declaration of the epidemic as a pandemic, a committee to combat COVID-19 was established, border security was increased, and

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attempts were made to strengthen the health infrastructure. Apart from these, new strategies have been developed to take precautions against the decrease in oil prices, since there is an economic recession throughout the world (Hasano˘glu, 2020: 6). During the pandemic process, digital threats such as misinformation spread and cyber attacks have increased. Russia’s national security strategy has taken measures to prevent cyberattacks and protect the national information infrastructure, with a greater focus on information security and cyber defense (Johansson, 2022). Russia has tried to increase the status of the Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia) in this process. The Kremlin Ministry of Defense has established an operational-level headquarters with jurisdiction in all existing military districts of Russia to combat the virus. The new operational structures of the Department of Defense provide the basis for engaging in social control activities. For example, in the pandemic response, stay-athome orders were used in conjunction with the facial recognition system. More than thirty information such as passport data, marital status, and taxpayer identity check is stored in this database (Barros, 2020). An independent Russia has been emphasized in recent strategy documents. Russia has turned to its strategic interests in the Arctic and Antarctic, which have an important place in international cooperation, more than before. Because of these reasons, it has caused Moscow to rely more on its inalienable majority stake in the Arctic, which is also emphasized in the National Security Strategy. In addition, the last national security strategy document included the China-Russian alliance. In the last arrangement, Russia, like China, gave direct reference to India, emphasizing the privileged partnership between the two countries (Buchanan, 2021). Russia has spent the budget allocated for COVID-19 on military equipment for Ukraine and efforts for pandemic purposes (Barros, 2020). The consolidation of Russia’s alliances toward China and India has aimed to strengthen Russia’s borders for the Ukraine War during the pandemic process (Buchanan, 2021). On the other hand, as in the pandemic process, international production networks have faced uncertainties after COVID-19. The budget allocated due to the pandemic caused a contraction in the defense economies. Therefore, while military cooperation has become more essential, it has become more difficult to maintain large-scale production networks (Kasapo˘glu, 2020: 84).

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The COVID-19 epidemic has also caused problems in energy security in the international system. Because of the COVID-19 epidemic, the demand for energy resources has decreased because of the introversion of nation-states. Despite this situation, nation-states that generate income from energy sources have had economic problems. The cessation of the activities of the sectors that operate with intense energy consumption has reduced the need for energy resources (Kurban, 2021). In this context, there has been a decrease in the energy import rate of nation-states. One of the countries most affected by this situation was Russia. The fact that Russia had problems with energy during the COVID-19 period caused its economic wear. Low oil prices also triggered competition between Russia and Saudi Arabia (Aybar, 2020: 105). The fact that its economy is highly dependent on oil and natural gas prices has led Russia to be more interested in regional issues after the pandemic (Rakov, 2020: 113). It has been seen that Russia, which does not want to lose its dominant power status after the search for a vaccine by the USA and EU countries, has allocated funds from its own budget to produce a vaccine as a solution to the COVID-19 epidemic. Russia, which aims to maintain the balance of power with vaccine production, also wanted to strengthen its economy, which was adversely affected by the epidemic because of the income it would gain from the vaccine. It has been seen that Russia, which has been worn out by the effects of the COVID-19 epidemic, has taken action to occupy the territory of Ukraine because of being disturbed by the rapprochement between Western countries and Ukraine. In the post-COVID-19 period, it has been seen that Russia exhibited attitudes that did not comply with international law because of not wanting to protect its national security and to lose its authority over Ukraine within the framework of its “near environment policy” (Dhawan et al., 2022). Since the beginning of the epidemic, China has made significant changes in its national security practices. China, which was seen as the only culprit by nation-states as a result of the COVID-19 epidemic, has risen economically and politically because of its policies against the epidemic, and has become the focus of attention in the international system (Aras, 2022: 51). Within the scope of combating the COVID19 epidemic, China has rapidly implemented measures such as border controls and travel restrictions. Some regions, especially in Wuhan, where the epidemic started, were quarantined, borders were closed, and strict

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entry controls were applied for people coming from abroad. These measures have been taken to contain the spread of the virus and to ensure China’s internal security (Düzel, 2021: 427). China has taken important steps in emergency management and resource allocation in the fight against the COVID-19 epidemic. At the beginning of the epidemic, hospital capacities were intensively increased in Wuhan, and the stocks of medical supplies and equipment were strengthened. These measures were implemented to protect public health and prevent the spread of the epidemic (Sarıyıldız et al., 2021: 319). During the COVID-19 process, the Chinese government strictly implemented community surveillance and social control measures. In addition, the control of social media and communication channels was increased, the information flow about the epidemic was brought under control, and an information management strategy based on official statements was followed. Pressure was also exerted on independent media companies by the government. Keeping the news and information about the epidemic under control shows that the government is following an information management strategy based on official statements (Aras, 2022: 61). China has claimed that other countries engage in espionage activities to steal their own technology for vaccine studies. This situation reveals the impact of epidemics on national security and cyber security during the pandemic period. Access to vital information such as vaccination studies has become a part of international competition and espionage (Alıcı and Atar, 2021). The system that has changed with the COVID-19 epidemic has affected China as well as other nation-states in the economic and political fields and has caused a change in its national security. The income obtained because of Chinese vaccine production and the sale of vaccines to nation-states has also been a factor in the recovery of the worn-out economy. However, the epidemics that China has experienced many times in its history have shown us that it is more ready for the COVID-19 epidemic when compared to other nation-states (Xing and Zhang, 2021). China, which was reacted by the world public opinion with the COVID-19 epidemic, entered into discussions with the USA, and started to rise economically after the epidemic, and cooperated with Russia, unlike Western countries that imposed an embargo on Russia after the start of the Russia–Ukraine war (Beyaz, 2023). In this context, China,

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which does not openly show its hostility to the West, has shown that it stands against Western countries with its good relations with Russia. Since China is a foreign-dependent country in terms of energy resources, it has made good relations with Russia while at the same time not being hostile to the USA (Beyaz, 2023). For this reason, China has established good relations with each country by avoiding the problems between the countries in its own interests. In this way, it met the energy needs of both Russia and the Middle East, where the US influence is high, without any problems. When the COVID-19 epidemic period and the post-COVID-19 period are examined, it is based on the concept of “common future community for humanity” while performing policies within the framework of soft power within the scope of China’s own interests. It has been seen that with the start of the Russia–Ukraine war, it has maintained its national security by remaining neutral, establishing good relations with all nation-states, and applying subsidies to ensure welfare within the country (Gebska and Krukowska, 2022: 57). During the COVID-19 process, China has been successful in combating the epidemic by taking measures such as border controls, emergency management, intelligence and early warning systems, community control and information control within the scope of national security practices. However, some measures taken have also led to international discussions and criticism. The COVID-19 pandemic has created a serious national security threat to the world and forced countries to take measures. Türkiye, which has successfully managed this process compared to other countries, has made some important changes in its national security understanding and practices since the beginning of the epidemic. Türkiye has taken measures such as border controls and travel restrictions to limit the spread of the epidemic. Measures such as travel bans, testing requirements, and quarantine measures have been implemented for travelers from foreign countries. These measures were carried out to control the entry of the virus into the country and prevent its spread (Erciyes and Genç, 2020: 7). Türkiye has made a great effort in emergency management and resource allocation in the fight against the COVID-19 epidemic. Hospital capacities were increased, medical supplies and equipment stocks were updated, and testing capacity was expanded. In addition, a national strategy for vaccine supply and distribution has been established. These

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measures have been taken to protect public health and minimize the effects of the epidemic (Karaman and Yi˘gittepe, 2022: 35). Türkiye has attached great importance to the preservation of internal stability during the COVID-19 process. The measures taken for public health during the epidemic were also important in terms of maintaining social and political stability. It aims to ensure public safety, public order, and keep social mobility under control (Pantucci, 2020). With the COVID-19 epidemic, digital communication and remote work have gained importance. This situation required Türkiye to strengthen its information security and cyber security measures. Türkiye has increased its precautions against cyber attacks, carried out studies to ensure the security of health data, protect the telecommunication infrastructure, and to prevent cyber attacks (Zarifo˘glu, 2020: 110). The COVID-19 pandemic has led to various changes in Türkiye’s understanding and practices of national security. Türkiye has successfully provided coordination between the government and relevant institutions to effectively combat national security threats to the epidemic process. These changes were made to minimize the effects of the epidemic and to ensure the safety of the public.

4

How Can the Covid-19 Pandemic Lead to a Future Transformation In National Security Policies?

In this context, when an analysis is conducted on the sample countries given, the COVID-19 pandemic has played an important role in redetermining national security policies. Countries have had the chance to observe their economic proficiency While the countries that have taken measures against all kinds of crises have survived the COVID-19 process with the least damage, other countries have unfortunately suffered great losses. COVID-19 has caused rapid changes in the national security policies of countries. What is important here is whether it will leave permanent traces on national security policies. In this context, it is possible to say that the national security policies adopted by the countries during the COVID-19 process will have lasting effects not only on themselves but also on the global security dimension. First infectious diseases such as COVID-19 were included in the national security documents of the countries.

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Today, although the traces of COVID-19 have been erased, it is seen that countries continue to strengthen their health infrastructure. Again, security measures continue to be taken in many sectoral areas. It can be said that the COVID-19 pandemic has caused a significant transformation in both national security policies and social life behaviors in all countries.

5

Conclusions

In the study, the change in national security policies experienced in countries during the COVID-19 process was emphasized. COVID-19 and national security relations with sample countries were analyzed. The similarities or differences in the national security policies implemented in the countries have been tried to be explained with the given case studies. Because of this analysis, it has been seen that the health infrastructures of countries are insufficient regardless of whether they are developed or underdeveloped. Within the scope of the security measures taken, it has been revealed that countries show the same tendencies in issues such as the restriction of individual rights and freedoms. The COVID-19 pandemic has deeply affected countries and has been instrumental in seeing the shortcomings in their national security. During this period, countries remained in a dilemma of freedom and security. Countries that use their preferences for security have implemented new policies, especially for their national security. In the future, countries may face more global challenges that cross borders. Therefore, establishing an institutional framework and making plans in advance on all issues that require cooperation will be beneficial in preventing future crises. In addition, governments should act in harmony with their citizens. National security policies should be determined by considering the demands of its citizens. As a result, the COVID-19 pandemic has also shown that dealing with global crises alone will not yield any results. Therefore, fighting in every sector of security and achieving final global security can only be possible with the strong cooperation of states.

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Public Diplomacy During the COVID-19 Pandemic Erman Akıllı

and Gülnihan Cihano˘glu Gülen

1

Introduction

The United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) identifies the Covid-19 pandemic as more than just a health crisis, regarding it as a human, economic, and social crisis. The UN DESA underlines that the social crisis created by the pandemic triggered inequality, exclusion, discrimination, and global unemployment in the medium and long term (UN DESA, 2023). Moreover, the Covid19 pandemic led to disorder in the existing international system and altered relations, due to distrust between states and mandatory measures to prevent the communication of the virus. States had to adopt a protectionist approach by closing their borders or imposing travel restrictions. Furthermore, new rules and norms for travelling emerged such as quarantine, vaccine requirements, and Covid-19 tests. The World Openness

E. Akıllı (B) International Relations Department, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli University, Ankara, Türkiye e-mail: [email protected] G. Cihano˘glu Gülen International Relations Department, Ankara Social Sciences University, Ankara, Türkiye © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Akıllı and B. Gunes (eds.), World Politics in the Age of Uncertainty, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39607-6_13

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Score, a real-time barometer showing global mobility, dropped by 65% to the lowest level ever in May 2020 due to the Covid-19 pandemic (World Openness Trend, Passport Index, 2023a). Prior to the incident, the score was increasing at a stable annual rate of 4% (World Openness Score, Passport Index, 2023b). In fact, the Covid-19 pandemic not only restrained travelling, but it also hindered globalization in all four dimensions— economic, political, cultural, and ideological—as identified by Manfred Steger (2023). As a result, any expectation that public diplomacy would continue as business as usual would be unrealistic. This chapter argues that the Covid-19 pandemic has had an impact on public diplomacy and aims to present a comprehensive view of the transformation of public diplomacy worldwide by analysing prominent actors and cases.

2

Challenges and Opportunities for Public Diplomacy During the Covid-19 Pandemic

The most profound changes in public diplomacy during the pandemic were its methods and instruments. Due to the Covid-19 measures such as social distancing and cancellation of meetings and mass gatherings, public institutions and politicians were obliged to use information and communication technologies (ICT) and social media. Although ICT was available long before the pandemic, traditional diplomatic methods continued to be used and the digitalization of diplomacy was rather slow. With the onset of the pandemic, governments accelerated the digital transformation in diplomacy and transformed their usual activities into digital-friendly ones, even international meetings were held virtually. Just like digital commerce, digital diplomacy also showed an increase during the pandemic. Apart from the change in the way of conducting public diplomacy, its dynamics and environment changed as well. Governments faced several challenges during the pandemic that were also influential on their conduct of public diplomacy. While some governments were overwhelmed with those challenges, others welcomed them as opportunities. The first challenge was disinformation. Before the pandemic, ordinary people were busy with their life routines, which only allowed them to follow the developments in their own countries. Apart from this, news on exceptional cases such as wars, conflicts, or natural disasters abroad only drew their attention. After the announcement of the global pandemic in March 2020, people suddenly became interested in all the

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countries wanting to find out how other countries are coping with the virus, the Covid-19 cases, and mortality statistics. In order to eliminate the spread of the virus, people were isolated in their homes during quarantines and lockdowns. During that time, media and social media became very influential on the people. The growing use of media and social media created an opportunity for states to easily reach foreign audiences and the public, for the very reason they became interested by themselves. However, the extended use of social media allowed the spread of information much faster. Unfortunately, misinformation spread similarly. Thus, governments had to fight the “infodemic,” alongside the Covid-19 pandemic. World Health Organization (WHO) defines an infodemic as too much information, including false or misleading information in digital and physical environments during a disease outbreak (WHO, 2023a). Infodemic required immediate state action since it could lead to mistrust in authorities and could intensify or lengthen outbreaks when people are unsure about what they should do to protect their health The use of social media as a public diplomacy tool began in the twenty-first century, but with the pandemic, it was used more frequently and became even more crucial to manage the infodemic. The WHO became more influential than ever and has been regarded as a competent authority since the beginning of the pandemic. Therefore, it held a series of Infodemic Management Conferences to fight disinformation. Other international organizations also contributed to WHO’s efforts. For instance, the OECD published analysis reports and working papers for combatting Covid-19 disinformation (OECD, 2020). The European Union (EU) also deployed all available tools and funded research to fight disinformation (European Commission, 2023). Moreover, every country had its policies to counter disinformation and cope with coronavirus sceptics. Besides the infodemic, countries tried their best to control information flow and protect their reputation by combatting unfounded news. However, the control of information flow while remaining transparent is also a challenge. Since the reflex of protecting reputation can also have bitter fruits, countries had to make extra efforts. For instance, China was accused of delaying reporting the virus to WHO. Moreover, it has been accused of withholding information many times also after the announcement of the pandemic. Therefore, WHO has advised Chinese health officials to regularly share detailed information on the outbreak and state media in China was accused of having played down the severity of a surge of Covid-19 infections (Tian et al., 2023). The freedom of the press and

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the statistics regarding Covid-19 cases raised doubts in many countries because governments did not want to lose prestige and take a risk over tourism revenues. For instance, Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi was accused of downplaying the coronavirus threat for weeks, to avoid harming the country’s tourist industry (Roth, 2021). The 2022 Edelman Trust Barometer Special Report showed that the Covid-19 pandemic has decreased people’s confidence in the healthcare system of their countries in all countries surveyed. Although the survey only included 10 countries (Japan, Mexico, France, Canada, Nigeria, Germany, South Korea, the UK, the US, and China), the results give an important glimpse into the rest of the world (Edelman, 2022). An online survey conducted by Eurofound also showed similar results. According to the data, trust in institutions has decreased profoundly especially trust in national governments across all EU Member States dropped below levels recorded at the start of the pandemic (Eurofound, 2023). Another research showed that trust in scientific experts also declined during the Covid-19 pandemic in the 138 countries surveyed, especially among the young (Aksoy et al., 2022). Without trust, governments struggled to convince their own people to follow their instructions, because trust is an important component of effective public diplomacy. Countries that could not even impress the domestic public had no chance of convincing others. Nevertheless, this situation changed over time according to the findings of a new Pew Research Center survey conducted in 2022, which compared the results with 2021. All answered more positively than the last year except for people in Singapore, South Korea, and Australia (Pew Research Center, 2022). The second challenge was the personal protective and other medical equipment supply. Although face-to-face interactions were minimized due to quarantine days, lockdowns and remote working options vast amount of personal protective equipment (PPE) and other medical equipment were needed urgently. Since global trade was hindered the disruption of supply chains left states in a difficult situation, especially those with inadequate production capacities. The sudden and high need for equipment constituted a challenge even for the most developed industrialized states because most of them could not even meet the demand in their own countries. Therefore, countries exporting medical equipment and PPE suffered a lot. The citizens of those countries showed insurgence and felt failed by their own countries. During these difficult times, some states saw new opportunities for showing solidarity and improving their national

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image by sending help. They used public diplomacy to illustrate the fact that their country can be regarded as a reliable partner even in those difficult times. While most countries provided help for their neighbouring countries and key partners, others came to the forefront such as Türkiye, which has provided aid to 160 countries and 12 international organizations or their affiliated organizations during the Covid-19 pandemic either as food, vaccines, medical equipment, PPE and respiratory devices produced in Türkiye (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2022). This support during difficult times was an influential way to win the hearts and minds of the foreign public, because solidarity regarding a matter of life and death always receives much appreciation. However, not every aid sent generated positive outcomes. For instance, Russia has been criticized for helping Central Asian countries during the pandemic but for having other motivations besides humanitarian reasons. It was argued that Russia was motivated by epidemiological, geopolitical, and economic reasons (Varpahovskis, 2020). Thus, it can be argued that while some countries were disgraced in the eyes of their local and foreign public, other countries turned this challenge into an opportunity to increase their soft power. The third challenge was the management of public health measures and the provision of healthcare services. Public health measures had to be taken to reduce the number of infections and provide decent healthcare services until the spread of the virus was brought under control. However, measures like lockdowns, or even partial lockdowns had a negative impact on the economy. Especially blue-collar workers, who were not able to work from home, were affected the most. The economic consequences of public health measures placed a heavy burden on the economy of all countries but mostly affected low-income countries. Therefore, the management of lockdowns became particularly difficult in low-income countries. Some countries faced great difficulties keeping their citizens at home. While many launched public awareness campaigns on media and digital platforms, using slogans about the importance of staying at home, others chose to use force to control their citizens. For instance, in India, police officers beat people for violating lockdowns and leaving their homes (Outlook India, 2020). In the end, economic problems and being isolated for some time negatively affected people’s mental health and well-being. Although there were anti-lockdown activists and violent protests in many countries, developed European countries faced comparatively more riots. In Germany (Jones, 2021), France (Anadolu Agency,

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2020), the UK (Bryant, 2021), Austria, Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, and Croatia many people were arrested or injured due to police intervention during violent protests (BBC News, 2021a). On one hand, such turmoil in developed and democratic European countries received a lot of criticism and hurt prestige. However, despite the protests and many businesses being shuttered, there were accusations of having delayed in ordering the lockdowns. For instance, UK citizens blamed their governments for a spike in cases due to delayed lockdowns (Froud et al., 2020). Moreover, despite numerous public health measures and precautions, hospitals were overcrowded while healthcare providers and workers were overburdened. During the pandemic, the situation deteriorated with a shortage of PPE, medical equipment, and respiratory devices. It was made worse by a shortage of healthcare workers and inadequate healthcare facilities. In many countries, hospital intensive care units were full and many people died waiting for medical attention. In China, for instance, patients were treated in the corridors of overcrowded hospitals due to a spike in Covid-19 cases. Surprisingly, this situation took place in 2022, not at the beginning of the pandemic when the healthcare facilities were respectively inexperienced to cope with the virus. In the images and videos shared on social media, long queues were seen inside and outside the emergency wards of hospitals (Euronews, 2022). The US was among the most criticized countries regarding healthcare services. Several studies revealed that the Covid-19 pandemic exposed how broken the US healthcare system actually was. A 2021 study criticized the US healthcare system and concluded that many other countries managed healthcare better with a different system of public financing, a more direct and responsive role of the government, universal healthcare coverage, and a stronger public health infrastructure. The study argued that it was especially disturbing for US citizens to observe that other countries had better healthcare systems (Geyman, 2021). At the peak of the Covid-19 pandemic, healthcare providers in some countries could not even meet the needs of non-Covid patients. In this situation, countries usually seen as welfare states or the land of dreams were, in fact, only great disappointments. Thus, countries like the US lost prestige, which is crucial for effective public diplomacy and accumulating soft power in the long run. The fourth challenge was the process of repatriation and consular protection. Since the beginning of the pandemic, countries have been repatriating their citizens stranded in other countries due to closed

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borders and reduced flights. Furthermore, the organization of repatriation was very problematic since there were many countries involved and citizens even in the most remote areas like small islands. In addition, the quarantine requirement of the repatriated citizens became another concern due to limited quarantine facilities. Not all states had the necessary resources to successfully organize the repatriation of their citizens. Even some developed and industrialized countries in the EU had to request help. For instance, France, which has the world’s third largest diplomatic network according to the Global Diplomacy Index (2021), also requested the activation of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism to repatriate citizens located in China. Because when the pandemic hit, an estimated 600,000 EU citizens were stranded abroad (Sgro, 2020). In the end, the EU had to intervene to repatriate 4,382 EU citizens up to 30 March, first from China and subsequently from other countries (Prpic, 2020). The repatriation process also faced many difficulties, some of which were later revealed by the media and on social media. At the time, the EU Commission’s Vice-President Joseph Borell, in charge of coordinating the bloc’s external actions, made statements about a global battle of narratives, being worried about the attempts to discredit the EU and on some occasions even the stigmatization of Europeans as if all were carriers of the virus (The European External Action Service, 2020). The fifth challenge was related to Covid-19 vaccines. The research for developing a vaccine, its clinical trials, and production require time, extensive public funds, and investment. Besides, not every country possesses the required technology and qualified researchers. Thus, apart from a handful of countries, most had to rely on others for a cure. Countries that had the necessary resources competed to find a vaccine both for the sake of humanity and strategic advantage. Reputational hopes motivated the countries to find a successful vaccine. Eventually, vaccines developed by private companies and research groups in China, Germany, India, Russia, Sweden, the UK, and the US received approvals for use (Klobucista, 2022). Soon after, countries began to advocate the use of their own vaccines by discrediting others. This confused people worldwide, and in the end more and more people were less confident and doubtful about vaccines. While the real motivation behind the promotion of domestic vaccines may be related to strategic or economic goals, media coverage questioning the safety of other vaccines was sometimes related to propaganda or smear campaigns. The first registered Covid-19 vaccine was Sputnik V, developed by the Russian Federation. However,

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the name and the logo of the vaccine triggered some anxiety in the West, as it reminded them of the Soviet past. Therefore, the vaccine Sputnik V was dismissed and regarded as a propaganda tool (Budnitsky, 2020). On the other hand, Chinese media was accused of exaggerating the effects of the US–German Pfizer vaccine. It raised doubts about whether this could be correlated with the insidious aim to influence people to prefer Chinese-origin vaccines. At some point, vaccines became such a contested issue abroad that the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s Spokesperson had to hold a press conference on January 20, 2021, to address some of those allegations (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2021). On the other hand, most European countries do not recognize Chinese-origin vaccines like the Sinovac. During the G20 summit in 2021, China’s President Xi Jinping called for the mutual recognition of Covid-19 vaccines (The Guardian, 2021a), however, no progress was achieved on this issue. Despite the fact that 69.7% of the world population has received at least one dose of a Covid19 jab as of March 2023 (Mathieu et al., 2023), vaccine development studies for the coronavirus are still on the agenda today. As of March 2023, WHO data shows that there are 180 vaccines in clinical development and 199 vaccines in the pre-clinical phase (WHO, 2023b). Apart from the competing vaccine development studies and narratives, the transportation and storage requirements of the approved vaccines were also a challenge in their distribution (Yarlagadda et al., 2022). Ensuring access to all citizens was therefore an important issue for even the most developed countries. Some citizens, such as elders and persons with chronic illnesses, had to be given priority. At this stage, some segments of society felt neglected. In general, there was inequity in the global distribution of the vaccines. This was perceived as a moral failure and even the WHO Director-General Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus said it was not fair for younger, healthy people in richer countries to be vaccinated before vulnerable people in poorer countries (BBC News, 2021b). Consequently, the mismanagement of the pandemic and the failure to overcome those challenges, made some countries vulnerable in the eyes of the global public. Thus, their national images were profoundly influenced by the Covid-19 pandemic. Since the beginning of the pandemic, China has maintained that the virus was identified and reported in Wuhan but may have originated elsewhere. The US intelligence report on Covid origins was rejected by the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s spokesperson Wang Wenbin on the ground that the report is “political and false” (The

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Guardian, 2021b). China’s Foreign Ministry has published an article on Covid-19 to address all allegations regarding the virus (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2020). Moreover, an investigation by WHO could not tie the origin of the virus to China and concluded that it needs further investigation. Upon the announcement of this report, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian said that the lab-leak theory was a lie fabricated by anti-China forces for political purposes (The Guardian, 2022). Nevertheless, and despite all of China’s efforts, research elaborating on the effects of the pandemic on the soft power and public diplomacy of states showed that the country’s national image had suffered over the course of the pandemic (McClory, 2021). While it would be expected that the negative effect on a country’s image would only influence the related country’s soft power, it also had direct impacts on the daily life of its people. For instance, Chinese people in particular faced xenophobia due to the fear of spreading Covid19. A study on discrimination against Chinese migrants globally found how traditional media coverage, especially in their host countries, on antiChinese discrimination caused anger among Chinese migrants worldwide during Covid-19 (Li et al., 2021). Moreover, political rhetoric such as “the China virus” or “Chinese virus” used by politicians like former US President Donald Trump was often associated with the growing discrimination in most studies (Huang et al., 2023). A Pew Research Center survey in 2020 found that 73% of US adults have an unfavourable view of China, nearly 26 percentage points higher compared to 2018. Moreover, around three-quarters of Americans surveyed said the Chinese government’s initial response to the coronavirus outbreak contributed either a great deal (51%) or a fair amount (27%) to the global spread of the virus (Silver et al., 2020). In fact, not only the Chinese, people of Asian origin, in general, were exposed to discrimination and prejudice. For instance, a study showed that there was consumer discrimination against businesses associated with Asian Americans during the Covid-19 pandemic and Asian restaurants were particularly avoided during the pandemic. This resulted in a considerable decrease in revenues for Asian Americans, both of Chinese and non-Chinese origins (Huang et al., 2023). Therefore, it can be concluded that the Covid-19 pandemic resulted in the rise of anti-Asian racism in general. The US was also among the countries that lost its national reputation due to its healthcare system and poor infrastructure. According to Dr Tom Frieden, a former director of the US Centers for Disease Control

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and Prevention (CDC), the lack of accurate and real-time information was one of the greatest failures of the US response during the Covid19 pandemic (McPhillips, 2022). A 2020 Pew Research Center poll on the response to Covid-19 showed that the US’s reputation has declined among many key allies and partners, across 13 nations included in the survey.1 A median of 37% had a favourable view of China’s response while a median of only 15% had a favourable view of the US response. Although relatively few answered that China has handled the pandemic well, even China received noticeably better reviews than the US (Wike et al., 2021).

3

Conclusion

The pandemic became a catalyser for the digitalization of public diplomacy. It is beyond doubt that the digital transformation of diplomatic practices will prove to be valuable for the future. However, the environment in which public diplomacy was conducted has also transformed. During the pandemic, despite all efforts, both the virus and disinformation spread at an unprecedented speed. The pandemic also underlined the importance of gaining legitimacy and fighting disinformation for successful public diplomacy. In addition, maintaining a positive image and the conduct of effective public diplomacy became more significant during the Covid-19 pandemic. Governments were judged and drawn criticism for their behaviour towards their own citizens, either over mismanagement of the crisis or lack of coordination. Therefore, countries suffered material as well as moral damages. Some countries such as China and the US have lost both public trust and international reputation. On the other hand, some countries such as Türkiye increased their popularity and soft power during the pandemic by providing emergency aid to numerous countries and international organizations. Moreover, actors involved in public diplomacy diversified during the pandemic. For instance, non-state actors like WHO became very influential by addressing critical issues of common concern. Thus, the scope of public diplomacy expanded from being just a source of soft power.

1 The survey includes Spain, Italy, Canada, UK, Sweden, France, Japan, Australia, Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, and South Korea.

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The study elaborated on challenges and opportunities faced by governments during the pandemic. Research proved that the pandemic not only affected the way public diplomacy is conducted but also countries’ images in general, depending on how they managed the challenges of the pandemic.

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International Human Rights and COVID-19 Mehmet Halil Mustafa Bekta¸s

1

Introduction

In his famous book Risk Society, Ulrich Beck wrote that “poverty is hierarchical, but smog is democratic” (Beck, 1992: 36). Three decades ago, Beck noted that a global risk could affect everyone, “rich and poor, black and white, north and south or east and west” (Beck, 1992: 38). That is precisely what the world has experienced with the coronavirus known as Covid-19, which provoked worldwide alarm after fewer than a thousand deaths. The World Health Organization (WHO) soon recognized Covid-19’s ubiquity, declaring its outbreak a pandemic on March 11, 2020. The impact of any global risk on any given nation varies depending on the resources available and the measures it employs accordingly. States of emergency or siege make the implementation of emergency rules inevitable, whether in the case of natural disasters, wars, riots, or pandemics. COVID-19 is not the first cross-border epidemic that has caused states to introduce such measures (Villarreal, 2020: 218). In all these cases, the stresses inherent in crises usually lead authorities to make knee-jerk decisions (Flood et al., 2020: 891). States consequently adopt

M. H. M. Bekta¸s (B) Department of International Relations, Bursa Uluda˘g University, Bursa, Turkey e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Akıllı and B. Gunes (eds.), World Politics in the Age of Uncertainty, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39607-6_14

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absolute powers without defining their limits to preserve public order and security (Bantekas and Oette, 2020: 80). Considering that human rights have been facing the challenge of effective monitoring and implementation even in normal times, a state of emergency could be a perfect pretext for the derogation from fundamental human rights. In this regard, a report from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe states that in a situation where uncertainty is coupled with risks for human health and lives…it should be recognized that there is a danger that policy makers are forced to make choices not dictated by the search for the optimal solution but rather a solution that would protect them from accusations. (Flynn, 2010: 9)

The protection and promotion of human rights thus become more difficult during states of emergency. COVID-19 has made global health one of the central issues of international law and international relations. Many describe the current pandemic as the defining global health crisis, comparing its impact with the Second World War. Although the experience of Covid has varied significantly between countries at different times, its outbreak has an unprecedented impact on people’s lives and livelihoods worldwide. The crisis has also become a defining moment for human rights, since countries have introduced emergency laws that entail the suspension or derogation of various civil and political rights following emergency measures. The epidemic itself, together with the measures enacted to mitigate it, has given rise to numerous challenges to human rights and human rights law globally (Human Rights Watch, 2020). After countries began to enact intrusive and punitive public health measures, scholars and institutions have sounded warnings about losing sight of the necessity to protect human rights in public health law and 2021: 1030). policies (D˛abrowska-Kłosinska, ´ Human rights are usually most vulnerable at times of intense difficulty or danger. Therefore, there is a high risk of significant violations of human rights in this pandemic. States resort to derogation from rules as a legal umbrella (Fisher, 2001: 321) to avoid criticism. A strong monitoring body that scrutinizes states’ compliance with requirements for valid derogation is an essential ingredient for protecting human rights. Individuals who claim that their human rights have been violated might first pursue

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satisfactory remedies at the national level. If such remedies are not satisfactory, their concerns could be taken to international bodies. However, the availability of international mechanisms for individuals at the international level could vary significantly from one country to another. International law is deficient in international human rights courts, except for those United Nations committees that function in a quasi-judicial manner but without binding decision-making authority (Smith, 2012: 154). There are nonetheless four key treaties that have their own monitoring mechanisms. These treaties are the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter). These human regimes offer different access rights for individuals. The capacity of each to protect human rights must be examined independently. The primary question is how effectively these human right mechanisms can work in the case of human right violations that occur during COVID-19. The particular emphasis is on the importance of individual access to a court that operates beyond national borders. This chapter proceeds as follows. The first part briefly outlines the conditions for a valid restriction on human rights during a state of emergency, as well as gauging the impact of COVID-19 on human rights. The next section examines the major human right regimes and discusses how their implementation might function during the current pandemic. Given that the purpose of the study is to assess the existing bodies protecting human rights and their possible capacity to deal with human rights violations during the pandemic, the present study limits itself to indicating their relevant salient features in addition to a generic overview.

2

Human Rights and COVID-19

The implementation of most rules in both national and international law depends on the circumstances in which an individual’s rights and freedoms may have to be compromised for those of others (Smith, 2012: 185). Both the nature of these circumstances and illegal actions could legitimize each other. The major rules in particular usually come with explicit exceptions. The United Nations Charter, for example, stipulates certain requirements if the use of force is to be legitimized. International human rights law is not immune from such exceptions, which are called

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derogation rules that allow a state to legally suspend human rights guarantees in response to certain extraordinary circumstances that threaten the nation (Burchill, 2005: 95). The applicability of the derogation rules, however, could be moot, since they require states to meet certain criteria before exercising their right to derogate. These rules expressly affirm the ability of states to ignore their explicit treaty obligations. Yet, in acting to protect society, a state may suspend particular human rights within defined confines (Burchill, 2005: 96). Since exercising the derogation rules results in undesirable restrictions on human rights, it is characterized as a “necessary evil” (Joseph and Castan, 2013: 910). There are different categories of human rights. The types of rights can be defined vis-à-vis its basis. Some are absolute rights with which states are not allowed to interfere even in emergencies. Few rights enjoy this privilege; the majority are liable to limitations or qualifications. Some rights are nonderogable but permit limitations in their application, while some are qualified, allowing interferences subject to various conditions (Bantekas and Oette, 2020: e1). Qualified rights thus seem to be the main subject of derogation during COVID-19. Considering the relevant provisions of Article 4 of the ICCPR, Article 15 of the ECHR and Article 27 of the ACHR, a legitimate restriction must meet defined preconditions: the existence of a public emergency that threatens the life of the nation, the respecting of fully nonderogable rights that are strictly required by the exigencies of the situation (proportionality, necessity, being limited in time and non-discriminatory) in such emergencies, consistency with its other obligations under international law, and notification. Ensuring compliance with these requirements is subject to judicial scrutiny (Bantekas and Oette, 2020: 82). Each case must be examined in its context by taking that state’s law into account. Because COVID-19 is of very recent origin, it is somewhat early to precisely ascertain the extent to which states adhere to these requirements. There have been limitations on several human rights during the pandemic. States have introduced traditional public health measures including lockdowns, curfews, quarantines, isolation, and containment 2021: that purport to regulate normal activities (D˛abrowska-Kłosinska, ´ 1032; Markel, 2007). Although some international and regional human rights institutions have provided guidance for the protection of human rights during the pandemic (OHCHR, UNDP and UNSDG, 2020), there are concerns about the compatibility of these restrictions with the

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requirements of a valid derogation at the national level (D˛abrowska2021: 1033). Some recent academic work and reports by instiKłosinska, ´ tutions emphasize the risk of excessive derogation relating to Covid-19, and are thus critical of governmental responses (D˛abrowska-Kłosinska, ´ 2021; Nyamutata, 2020; Villarreal, 2020; Flood et al., 2020; Lebret, 2020; Forman and Kohler, 2020; Human Rights Watch, 2020). Since traditionally democratic western states embrace a semi-autocratic model (Nyamutata, 2020: 98), it is likely that governmental responses have mostly failed to demonstrate that “the overall value of the measure is greater than the cost of the rights infringement” during the pandemic (Flood et al., 2020: 891).

3 Major International Human Right Regimes During States of Emergency “Whenever you can, act as a liberator” is a quote from the sixth century BCE “Cylinder of Cyrus”, considered one of the earliest expressions of the concept of human rights (UN Archives, 1965). The protection of human rights during peacetime or times of crisis was a matter of municipal law, as no interference was permitted. That is, states were indeed in the absolute position of acting as liberators whenever they wished until the advent of modern international law. Although the concept of human rights has its roots in ancient times, the development of modern international human rights regimes is of relatively recent origin (Moyn, 2010). The latest affirmation of universal human rights is the establishment by nation states of the United Nations. Since then, states have introduced many international human rights charters that deepen and expand our understanding of what human rights are and more importantly how to better protect them (Moyn, 2010). Despite the progressive development of international human right law, effective protection of human rights remains predominantly national rather than international matter. Though states may not be absolutely free from any external interference, they still have the final say. Any international judicial scrutiny of a breach of human rights depends on the consent of the states. The verdict of an international judicial body can easily be challenged by the accused state. The only body that could turn a national human rights issue into an international matter without the consent of the accused state is the UN Security Council (UNSC). Yet the Council can do so only if the situation threatens international peace

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and security and (more importantly) only if it obtains affirmative votes from the veto powers. Because they lack an effective central authority, states do not usually hesitate to introduce restrictive measures during an emergency. The centralization of problems common across the international community and the establishment of a collective response have posed a particular challenge to international law. Centralization is just a step toward developing common standards for best solutions, but without consensus, a desired result cannot usually be attained. This reflects the fact that international law works differently from national legal jurisdictions. States have developed transnational or quasi-transnational bodies in certain fields such as the law of the sea (International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea), international peace and security (the UNSC), dispute resolution (the International Court of Justice), and war crimes (the International Criminal Court). For human rights, despite some remarkable developments, full centralization is still very much an aspirational project that is under development. Although several regional human rights courts exist, a worldwide judicial body to adjudicate human rights remains to be established (Smith, 2012: 154). Four key treaties nevertheless stipulate social, political, and civil human rights and encourage states to respect them. These treaties are the ICCPR, the ECHR, the ACHR, and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the African Charter). We can also allude to a nonbinding document, the Siracusa Principles, that has been developed by non-governmental organizations and adopted by the United Nations Economic and Social Council in 1984. The ICCPR, ECHR, and ACHR allow states to derogate from some human rights during a public emergency. However, they limit the absolute power of states by requiring some requirements for a valid derogation of human rights. Unlike these instruments, as discussed below, the African Charter’s position regarding derogative rules is vague, as it does not contain a derogation clause. Notwithstanding these agreements, arbitrary derogation can still occur anytime anywhere in the world. During Covid 19, Europe’s image as the locus and protector of human rights has been tarnished, as even central states like Germany, Spain, France, and the UK have failed to develop measures that would strike a balance between protecting public health and human rights.

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The ICCPR and Its Implementation Mechanism

The major international human right regimes mentioned above offer various monitoring mechanisms. The ICCPR is a human right document ratified by 173 states but complied with only by a few. The United Nations Human Rights Committee is the key body responsible for monitoring compliance with the ICCPR. There are three principal ways in which the Committee determines whether states comply with the Convention, the first two being reports and individual complaint mechanisms. The state parties to the ICCPR are required to submit regular reports regarding how rights are being respected to the Secretary-General of the UN, who transmits them to the Committee for assessment of how rights are being respected (ICCPR, Article 40). The First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR allows individuals to make complaints about breaches of the rights bestowed on them by the ICCPR. State parties to the Protocol agree to recognize the authority of the Committee to consider the complaints of individuals who claim their rights under the Convention have been violated (The First Optional Protocol to ICCPR, Article 1). The Committee can bring complaints to the attention of the states alleged to be violating particular provisions of the Covenant (The First Optional Protocol to ICCPR, Article 4). Once the Committee makes its assessments, it presents them to the relevant states and individuals (The First Optional Protocol to ICCPR, Article 5). The third way in which the Committee monitors state adherence to the Convention is a declaration made under Article 41 of the ICCPR. One state party can bring before the Committee a claim against another on the condition that it declares under this Article that it recognizes the Committee’s competence “to receive and consider communications to the effect that a State Party claims that another State Party is not fulfilling its obligations under the Covenant” (ICCPR, Article 41(1)). COVID-19 in particular has tested Article 4 of the ICCPR, the provision that specifies the requirements for a valid derogation. Because each country operates in its own context, requirements such as respecting fully nonderogable rights, proportionality, necessity, time limitations, nondiscrimination, and consistency with other obligations under international law must be examined in each case by considering the circumstances unique to that country. It is nevertheless possible to draw general conclusions regarding the requirements for the existence of public emergencies that threaten the life of the nation and for the necessity to notify the

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UN Secretary-General. The pronouncements of the WHO on COVID19 and the data it has about how countries are affected by the disease should be sufficient to justify states’ declarations of emergencies. Article 4(3) does not, however, specify when states should notify. The Committee calls upon all state parties that have not yet submitted notifications regarding their states of emergency to comply immediately with their duty to notify the Secretary-General (Human Rights Committee, 2020). Although almost all countries have declared states of emergency, as of July 21, 2022, it appears that only 28 have notified the UN Secretary-General of derogation to the ICCPR (UN Treaty Collection). If the monitoring mechanism of the ICCPR had worked efficiently, it could have provided effective protection of human rights during the pandemic. Some difficulties may, however, impede the implementation of these mechanisms. The main purpose of the reporting system is to encourage states to adhere to the Convention (Smith, 2012: 155), but the degree of compliance with the Committee’s recommendations is very low (Denman, 2020). Late submissions and the reluctance of states to submit their reports also hamper the monitoring system’s efficiency. The reporting system is also weak at the regional level. For example, the African Charter has monitored its implementation through a Commission for more than two decades before the establishment of the African Court in 2004. The working mode of the Commission bears some resemblance to the Committee of the ICCPR. The Commission has competence to receive communications (African Charter, Article 47) and reports (African Charter, Article 62). However, state parties are reluctant to report: two-thirds of members’ reports are overdue (The ACHPR Statistics). There are shortcomings in the individual complaint mechanism. Reservations expressed by some parties prevent the Committee from hearing complaints regarding the full range of rights set out by the ICCPR, such as those regarding the death penalty. The Committee considers anonymous complaints inadmissible, which might discourage some individuals from making applications if they have concerns about their safety or security. This could be the case for underdeveloped countries in particular. The Obligations of States Parties under the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR may well affirm that state parties must prevent any retaliatory measures against any individual who resorts to the complaint system, but it remains entirely at the discretion of individual states whether or not they take such action. The procedure defined under Article 41 has

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been recognized by only 35 states (UN Treaty Collection) and may not be meaningfully applied for two reasons. The first is that many of these states are European, which means that they have already implemented more effective human rights regimes, so it is unlikely that their citizens would need to initiate such a procedure. The second is the consideration that, had more state parties made declarations under this provision, states would typically remain reluctant to bring claims against other states regarding human rights (Smith, 2012: 156). This provision has therefore had little effect in improving the monitoring system. The mechanisms offered by the ICCPR and its first optional protocol are important instruments to which most states are parties. As a body of the ICCPR, the Committee has played a considerable role in the development of human rights. Despite the promising development of human rights, however, ICCPR’s oversight is inadequate to provide satisfactory responses to human right violations during the pandemic. The diverse cultures, economic resources, and systems of governance and law lead to difficulties in implementing the treaty for common purposes. This heterogeneity makes it difficult to establish precise standards of human right experiences during the Covid outbreak. As the system mostly relies on self-reporting and individual petitions that may be inhibited, monitoring is mostly subject to the consent of state parties. States can use COVID19 as the perfect pretext to disguise their human right violations. Systems that operate in a quasi-judicial manner with no legally binding rules are not sufficient to encourage states to comply with the rights promulgated by the ICCPR, and are thus not competent to properly deal with violations occurring during a crisis like COVID-19. 3.2

Regional Human Rights Treaties and Their Implementation

There are three major regional human right instruments: the treaties establishing the ECHR, the ACHR, and the African Charter. These three treaties comprise almost identical structures for the protection of human rights: a commission on human rights and a court of human rights for those states that accept its jurisdiction. The Commissions of these treaties have working charters similar to the ICCPR monitoring body, operating in a similarly quasi-judicial manner that depends mostly on reports and complaints submitted to them. The courts of these treaties, however, reveal some differences, in particular regarding their jurisdiction. The

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Table 1

International courts and judgments

Regional Courts

Access for subjects other than state actors

The number of states Judgements recognizing the delivered court’s jurisdiction

ECtHR

Any person, NGO, company or group of individuals The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights African Intergovernmental Organizations, The African Commission on humans and Peoples’ Rights, Individuals and NGOs

46

IACtHR African Court

20 33 for the Protocol and 8 Declarations under Article 34(6)

24,511 since 1959 430 since 1981 311 since 2008

Source The table is created by the author taking necessary info from official websites of the courts

courts are the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), and the African Court. Their salient features are shown in Table 1. For many, the ECtHR is the most effective and advanced body in the world for protecting human rights (Helfer, 2008: 150). The primary underlying the Court’s success is the high profile of its members and the authority vested in them. European Union (EU) members are also parties to the ECHR. The EU itself provides an advanced system by which to monitor human right violations (Reçber and Aydın, 2004). The majority of state parties already have attained high standards of life, strong rule of law, and advanced economies. The competence conferred on the ECtHR is considerable. Alongside state parties, any person, NGO, company, or group of individuals are eligible to apply. NGOs can also be entitled to lodge applications on behalf of vulnerable persons if the requirements for admissibility are met (Hembach, 2020). The number of applications is very high: 44,257 in 2021 alone (The ECHR in Facts and Figures 2021, 2022). Although concerns have been expressed regarding the execution of the Court’s judgments (Fikfak, 2018), it remains the only transnational body that offers the greatest promise of effectively handling human rights violations during the Covid pandemic. Unlike the ECtHR and the African Court, the IACtHR is not authorized to entertain applications from individuals, as Article 61 of the IACHR stipulates that cases can only be referred to the Court by state

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parties and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. Individuals must apply to the Commission, which then exhausts all possible means to reach a settlement (IACHR, Articles 48 and 50). If this proves unavailing, the Commission can as a last resort refer the case to the IACtHR (GARN Communications, 2014). National courts apparently present the greatest obstacle to compliance with IACtHR judgments (Huneeus, 2011). Given that they and other branches of government can also ignore IACtHR rulings, the likelihood that states will comply with such rulings is low. The African Court can receive applications from African Intergovernmental Organizations and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), as well as from individuals and NGOs granted observer status in the ACHPR (Protocol to the African Charter, Article 5).1 Subjects other than individuals and NGOs can submit applications against state parties who have ratified the Charter’s Protocol. 33 states have so far ratified the Protocol. Direct applications from individuals and NGOs are contingent on the relevant states having declared their acceptance of the Court’s competence under Article 36(4) of the Protocol. Mere eight states have hitherto deposited such declarations, so citizens of 46 parties to the African Charter do not have direct access to the African Court. Most applications would therefore be made to the ACHPR. The African Charter does not explicitly allow individual complainants to communicate with the Commission (Article 55), but NGOs have often been active in liaising with the Commission on behalf of individuals (The ACHPR Network). The absence of a derogation clause means that it is not obvious exactly how the African Court will handle the restrictions on human rights introduced by African countries during the pandemic. When the African Charter was adopted, South Africa expressed the need to clarify the criteria by which the rights enshrined in the Charter could be restricted. In the opinion of the ACHPR, the absence of a derogation clause means that derogation is not permissible under the African Charter, so the rights and freedoms enshrined in it cannot be justified by states of emergency (ACHPR, 1995). However, neither consistent practice nor explicit judicial precedents regarding derogation have been developed by the African 1 NGOs could be from different regions as 18 of the 145 NGOs that currently enjoy observer status are from the UK (4), USA (4), France (4), Sweden (1), Canada (1), and Switzerland (6).

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Court and the ACHPR (Kombo, 2020; Sermet, 2007). Whether or not the African Charter allows derogation is thus a moot point. This is another challenge to possible claims of human right violations that may have been made during the Covid outbreak. Apart from the African Court, there have also been some subregional developments on the continent regarding the protection of human rights at cross-border courts. Some scholars acknowledge the role of certain subregional judicial bodies in the protection and promotion of human rights in Africa (Taye, 2019; Alter et al., 2013; Viljoen, 2013; Murungi and Gallinetti, 2010). The courts concerned are the Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS Court), the Tribunal of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC Tribunal), and the East African Court of Justice (EACJ). The ECOWAS Court is the only subregional body since 2005 that is officially entitled to receive individual applications regarding human rights violations without the need to exhaust local remedies (Alter et al., 2013; Viljoen, 2013). The SADC Tribunal received individual applications until 2012, when its competency was confined to interpreting the SADC Treaty and Protocols relating to disputes between member states (Viljoen, 2013). Despite the lack of an official human rights jurisdiction, the EACJ has by itself developed the practice of receiving individual applications regarding human rights violations (Taye, 2019). Considering the SADC experience, it is absolutely not certain that a smaller regional body could be a better human rights guarantor (Viljoen, 2013: 465). Compared to the other two regional mechanisms, citizens of state parties to the ECHR are mostly in an advantageous position to avail themselves of an effective regional mechanism. The state parties to the ECHR have all approved the ECtHR’s direct access system for individuals. The Court receives tens of thousands of applications and delivers thousands of judgments every year. The ECHR stipulates explicit requirements for valid derogation during times of emergency, which can help the Court examine applications that may stem from the implementation of restrictive COVID-19 measures. Although concerns about compliance with the orders issued by the Court have been expressed, it is for individuals the only mechanism that promises to function more effectively than other regional human rights regimes. On the other hand, the cumbersome individual access to the IACtHR and the African Court baffling rather than satisfying. These courts are not well equipped to monitor human right violations. The locus standi for individuals to appear before

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them involves a complicated procedure. Although they are part of the treaties that protect and promote individual human rights, both courts have largely remained within an artificial interstate mechanism. Given the absence of a quick and efficient procedure and binding judgments, they are susceptible to failure in providing effective protection for human rights violations, especially during states of emergency. Be that as it may, their presence may pave the way for a progressive, if slow, development of effective human rights monitoring mechanisms. Finally, it is worth noting that two regional entities, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Arab League, lack a human rights regime states in the Asian region, which contains more than half of the world’s population (Worldometer, 2022), have not yet adopted a human rights convention at a regional level. Only a few western Asian countries are parties to regional human right regimes that operate in another region. With a few major exceptions like China, Malaysia, Myanmar, and Singapore, the other Asian countries are only parties to the ICCPR. ASEAN has recently attempted to establish a regional human rights body. The intention expressed to this end by ASEAN members at the UN World Conference on Human Rights in 1993 was reflected in the ASEAN Charter signed in 2007, which refers to human rights in the preamble, Article 1(7) and Article 2(2) as one of ASEAN’s purposes and principles, and Article 14, which explicitly affirms the need to establish a body to promote and protect human rights. The establishment of the Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) followed in 2009. However, this Commission is not empowered to receive complaints or conduct investigations to ensure that human rights are protected because it does not offer any monitoring mechanism (Bangun, 2018). The protection of human rights through the AICHR remains a project in progress. With its current structure and functions, it has lagged far behind other regional regimes in its protection of human rights. Like ASEAN, the Arab League has yet to establish a human right body that acts in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity (Rishmawi, 2013: 491).

4

Conclusion

Considering the complaints procedures they characteristically offer individuals, the implementation mechanisms established under the aforementioned major human rights treaties are unsatisfactory. As the only

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international mechanism, the ICCPR relies on self-reporting and individual complaints made to the Committee. Its monitoring system is simply inadequate to curb noncompliance. It is thus not plausible to expect it to play a pivotal role in encouraging states to comply with derogation requirements during the current pandemic. Unlike the ICCPR, the regional regimes discussed above do provide courts, but these could hardly fill the vacuum left by the absence of an international human rights court. All three regional human rights treaties share common principles regarding fundamental rights, but their implementation bodies function differently. These differences, which seem relatively minor at first glance, are actually quite marked, most evidently in the access procedure provided for individuals. To a large extent, the negligible impact of the African Court and the IACtHR can be ascribed to the reluctance of state parties to support direct application procedures for individuals, which remains a fundamental problem common to both Courts—and one that they have yet to solve. The number of judgments delivered by the three courts is illustrative of their utility. Although it is buckling under more than 70,000 pending cases, the ECtHR appears to be the most effective body considering its function in implementing the ECHR. Systems with different implementation mechanisms do not facilitate common standards for human rights in international law. The access procedure for individuals should be improved. Additional strategies must be developed to curb noncompliance. In the short term, given that most available international mechanisms have a limited capacity to become involved in national human rights issues, the protection of human rights during states of emergency such as COVID-19 is likely to remain a national issue for most states. While some limitations have been put on national power regarding their internal violation of human rights, they are still typically in a position to act as liberators as and when they wish, without constraint. States will no doubt learn some lessons from the current emergency, but the roles these will play in their future policymaking are not clear. They can either improve the existing mechanisms to better protect human rights or they can further the scope of derogative measures. Institutional weaknesses, protracted procedures, nonbinding recommendations of commissions, and frustratingly cumbersome individual access to courts render the available mechanisms at the international level inadequate to protect human rights. Most states are reluctant to confer competence on cross-border courts as regards this issue, so the

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number of countries that have recognized the jurisdiction of courts for individual applications is negligible. Consequently, more than two-thirds of the world’s population does not have direct access to a human rights court that operates beyond national borders. State parties’ individual preferences seem to play a substantial role in the effectiveness of these monitoring mechanisms. This raises the question of what reasons underlie their reluctance. States that consistently resist independent scrutiny probably intend to conceal the scope of their human right violations, confining any oversight to weak domestic institutions. As long as most states, predominantly those in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, continue to pay only lip service to the protection and promotion of human rights, international monitoring mechanisms are unlikely to improve in the foreseeable future.

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From Failure to Resilience: Reimagining International Policy-Making of COVID-19 and Climate-Induced Migration in the Age of Uncertainty Haydar Karaman

and Burak Gunes

Uncertainty is the only certainty there is, and knowing how to live with insecurity is the only security—John Allen Paulos

1

Introduction

The current age is typically referred to as the “Age of Uncertainty” because it is characterized by scholars due to rapid and multiple changes in different fields. The social, environmental, economic, political, and technological fields are the main subjects of these changes. However, our

H. Karaman (B) Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Kilis 7 Aralik University, Kilis, Türkiye e-mail: [email protected] B. Gunes International Relations Department, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Kır¸sehir Ahi Evran University, Kır¸sehir, Türkiye e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Akıllı and B. Gunes (eds.), World Politics in the Age of Uncertainty, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39607-6_15

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understanding and comprehension of these situations are restricted which brings failure in forecasts and projections for the subject. While certainty implies a clear knowledge of reality, doubt suggests a surreal grasp of reality. The problem of uncertainty indicates not only the limits of an individual’s knowledge but also the limits of knowledge in general (Wakeham, 2015, p. 716). It stems from various political, social, economic, and environmental factors and reflects the dynamic and complex nature of global society. It may have profound effects on individuals, communities, and even nations. Because of these developments, which have created a climate of volatility and unpredictability, governments, organizations, and people are all facing significant challenges. “The Age of Uncertainty” is driven by a range of complicated, interdependent, and ever-changing variables. According to some scholars, investment, macroeconomic and microeconomic factors, stock market volatility, and income inequality generate economic uncertainty (Al-Thaqeb & Algharabali, 2019, pp. 3–8). The growth of polarization, nationalism, populism, and unstable regimes produce political unpredictability in the interim. Globalization, technological development, geopolitical volatility, and environmental issues all contribute to the unpredictability and instability of the contemporary world. These factors have disrupted conventional industries, eliminated employment, and exacerbated political conflict. Environmental issues, particularly climate change, which threaten the future of humanity and the natural world are one of the contributing elements to “the age of uncertainty.” Climate change threatens infrastructure, biodiversity, economic stability, and human health. Extreme weather events, such as floods, heat waves, storms, and droughts, cause economic losses and infrastructural damage. Moreover, climate change can lead to water and food instability, spread of disease, and population displacement. To avoid catastrophic repercussions, international society should act fast to limit global warming to 1.5 °C (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2019, p. 15). One thing is clear in this “Age of Uncertainty”: climate-induced migration will grow significantly in the next decades due to rising global temperatures and an increase in the frequency of catastrophic weather events. Emerging evidence points that environmental degradation is already playing a significant role in global population displacement, which can lead to social and economic instability, particularly in vulnerable nations such as sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, where food and water insecurity are already major concerns (Connolly-Boutin & Smit, 2016, pp. 390–393). As a result, as in the past, many people will be forced

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to leave their homes in search of better living conditions and economic possibilities owing to environmental concerns. As a result of the COVID19 pandemic, the subject of climate change and migration has assumed an even higher degree of urgency. The pandemic has put extra challenges on communities across the globe, such as economic disruptions, major health repercussions, and migration limitations. The contemporary age of uncertainty forces individuals into a sphere of unpredictability. Thus, the article begins with a theoretical analysis of the Age of Uncertainty. The second part will analyse environmental uncertainty, focusing specifically on climate change and its impact on human migration. The third part examines the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on climatedriven migration and the government’s reaction to this issue. The fourth part examines the problems that policymakers confront in addressing these issues. The fifth part will present strategies for enhancing resilience and modifying policymaking to face the problems of the age of uncertainty more effectively. The conclusion will argue that reinventing our relationship with uncertainty and change is essential for designing a fairer and more sustainable future.

2

“The Age of Uncertainty: Reimagining Our Relationship with Change and Ambiguity”

The “Age of Uncertainty” is a period characterized by tremendous social, economic, and political turmoil and uncertainty. In his 1977 documentary series, John Kenneth Galbraith described the twentieth century as the “Age of Uncertainty.” He tried to explain this age of uncertainty concerning economic history and the rise of free markets in line with the development of neoliberalism. In his work, Galbraith challenges the idea that free markets are the solution to economic problems and criticizes the theory and its effects on inequality and economic growth. His work is considered a classic of economics and revitalizes the debate on the function of the state in the economy. The term “Age of Uncertainty” has been used by subsequent scholars to describe a period of rapid change and unpredictability with different references in many areas of life. In defining this period, scholars emphasize increasing income inequality, decreasing social mobility, and deepening political polarization. Even many concepts new to our daily lives, such as climate change, are tried to be explained in terms of rapid change and unpredictability.

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According to David Harvey (1990, pp. 105–106), the effect of capitalism and continuous innovation is to devalue, if not destroy, labor skills and past investments. This devaluation is embedded in the circulation of capital itself as a kind of creative destruction; it increases insecurity and eventually becomes the force of capital, triggering periodic crises. But not only does the life of modern industry consist of periods of recession and crisis but also the instability and uncertainty to which machines expose employment and thus the conditions of existence of workers are normalized. This forces fragmentation, which is both a social and a technical process. It is precisely at this point that new technologies and modes of production have had a profound impact on the nature of communication and culture and have contributed to this transformation. These changes have resulted in the standardization of cultural forms and the homogenization of everyday life in an age of uncertainty. In Elaine Graham’s (2002, pp. 13–38) views, in the “age of uncertainty” characterized by the complexity and fragmentation of contemporary society, dialectical and creative thinking must deal with the contradictions and ambiguities of the present moment. As Graham argues that the expansion of transnational capitalism and the increasing dominance of neoliberalism, which create a state of constant change and instability, are partly responsible for the current “age of uncertainty.” The main criticisms against the notion of the Age of Uncertainty are mostly led by Marxists. Marxist critics assert that the series does not address the inherent structural inequality and exploitation of capitalist systems. While capitalist exploitation provides wealth for capitalists at the expense of the working class, it also causes income and wealth disparity, which is a serious problem in capitalist societies (Milanovic, 1998). In addition, Obeng-Odoom points suggest that colonialism, postcolonial, and capitalist imperialism have produced “the Age of Uncertainty” (Obeng-Odoom, 2020). Thus, “The Age of Uncertainty” fails to adequately address the inherent systemic problems of capitalist systems. The pursuit of economic gain under a capitalist system exacerbates global inequities and is the root cause of numerous difficulties in the current era, which can be described as the Age of Uncertainty. Currently, the concept of uncertainty linked with capitalism itself has been put to the test concerning two crucial concerns that have been extensively addressed in recent times. COVID-19 and climate-induced migration are examples. But in an Age of Uncertainty, it will be evident that disadvantaged people

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are disproportionately harmed by COVID-19 and climate-driven migratory issues. From this perspective, the following section of the paper will focus on the associated issues.

3 Environmental Uncertainty: Climate Change and Climate-Induced Migration in the Age of Uncertainty The exploitation and deterioration of the natural environment are the results of capitalism’s emphasis on profit and growth. Climate change and pollution have resulted from the prioritization of short-term economic benefits over long-term ecological sustainability by capitalism. These environmental difficulties are considered systemic problems inside capitalist institutions, where overproduction, growth, and profit-seeking are the primary causes of environmental devastation. Current policies prioritize the needs of transnational corporations, as evidenced by carbon market capitalism (Urry, 2015, p. 47). Fundamental adjustments to economic structures are necessary to overcome environmental crises (Foster, 2009). Ignoring the underlying causes of climate change may perpetuate inequality and the structures that contribute to it. Changes in temperature and precipitation patterns brought on by climate change can also result in crop failures, food shortages, and water scarcity, which can increase poverty and push people to migrate in pursuit of better living conditions. Thus, climate-induced migration is a major worldwide concern. For this reason, climate change is a pressing global issue that brings migration and other concerns to the political agenda. According to the IDMC’s assessment from 2022, climate-related disasters displaced an estimated 23.7 million people, with that number expected to rise to 140 million by 2050, predominantly in developing nations (Clement et al., 2021). This potential migrant population will present governments with social, economic, and political uncertainties. Nonetheless, policy discussions often centre on adaptation and mitigation. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change adopted the Paris Agreement in 2015 (United Nation, 2015); nevertheless, the text does not directly address climate-induced migration. It acknowledges the significance of addressing the effects of climate change on vulnerable communities and urges the development of adaptation

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and mitigation measures. Similar steps were taken by several other international bodies, programmes, and agreements in addition to Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM, 2013). The international response to climate-induced migration confronts obstacles such as a lack of a defined legal framework and limited financing, and resources. Faber and Schlegel (2017, p. 8) view climate-induced migration as a manifestation of ecological and social injustice resulting from the exploitation of natural resources by capitalist development. Thus, additional systems and policies will adopt a structure that only conceals the actual issue.

4 The COVID-19 Pandemic and Climate-Induced Migration The COVID-19 pandemic is the most recent illustration of the era of uncertainty. The advent of the virus in late 2019 caught the world by surprise, and the following global spread and severity of the disease engendered a profound sense of apprehension. The pandemic has exposed the vulnerabilities of our systems and institutions, highlighting the fragility and interdependence of our world. Individuals, organizations, and governments are facing unprecedented problems because of uncertainties about the duration and severity of the pandemic as well as its economic and societal repercussions. The virus has affected all aspects of daily life. In addition, while the COVID-19 pandemic has caused unprecedented levels of uncertainty and instability throughout the world, this crisis has intersected with another ongoing crisis (Dhungana, 2020, p. 3)—that of climate-induced migration, which is driven by a variety of factors including environmental degradation, resource scarcity, and conflict. The COVID-19 pandemic has had substantial effects on migration caused by climate change, aggravating the vulnerabilities that contribute to displacement. These crises are frequently associated with capitalist production and consumption patterns. Climate change and its affiliated side effects, such as climate-induced migration, strongly link with the pandemic. As Pinner et al. put profoundly, there are several similarities, commonalities, and differences between the pandemic and climate change (Pinner et al., 2020, p. 2). In the first place, pandemics and climate change have substantial impacts that ultimately cause socioeconomic outcomes. Physical or concrete shocks should be addressed with physical or tangible ways and means to reach

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a remedy. The pandemic and climate change are two physical phenomena that must be tackled with concrete instruments to address the underlying physical causes. Additionally, they are both systemic, the effects of which rapidly and comprehensively appear on the international stage. The most impacted parts of the world constitute the most vulnerable ones with little access to health care and suffer to get by, dreaming of migrating to more developed countries to survive. Returning to analysing the effects of COVID-19 on migration, there are some important aspects that consider. The economic effects of the pandemic have exacerbated the difficulties of climate-induced migration as vulnerable communities struggle to meet their basic necessities (Ahmed et al., 2020, p. 1). Second, the pandemic has highlighted the significance of access to healthcare and basic services for migrants, such as climateinduced migration, which is crucial for displaced populations that are more susceptible to disease exposure (Guadagno, 2020, pp. 4–5). Third, the pandemic has revealed flaws in current social safety nets, which are crucial for climate-driven migrants. As job losses and income drops grow, vulnerable populations struggle to access crucial support services. These difficulties have underlined the significance of international cooperation and coordinated action to solve global challenges such as climate-induced migration, highlighting the need for more robust global governance structures (United Nations, 2020, p. 27). The COVID-19 pandemic and climate change are two interrelated issues requiring immediate and coordinated action from worldwide policies and management techniques (Van der Ven & Sun, 2021, p.19). These problems have far-reaching effects on vulnerable people, especially climate-driven migrants (IPCC, 2018). Due to travel restrictions and border closures, the COVID-19 outbreak has added another degree of complexity to this issue, making it more difficult for migrants to reach their destinations (IOM, 2020). To address these difficulties, worldwide policy must prioritize the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions to reduce the effects of climate change and reduce the likelihood of future pandemics associated with environmental degradation and biodiversity loss. One method for tackling these issues is to increase financing for organizations that assist migrants, such as the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) (IOM, 2020). These organizations can offer migrants basic services while also striving to preserve their rights. To limit the number of people who are compelled to

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migrate in the first place, another solution is to invest in sustainable development in climate-vulnerable regions (IPCC, 2018). This may involve funding renewable energy initiatives, providing resources for farmers to adapt to changing climate conditions, and developing employment possibilities in regions less susceptible to climate change. Comprehensive policy and management solutions are required to combat the twin crises of the COVID-19 pandemic and climate change. International policies can aid in mitigating the effects of both crises by adopting a holistic strategy that simultaneously addresses the needs of climate-induced migrants and the challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic (Van der Ven & Sun, 2021, p.18). Immediate action is required to address these problems and prevent their escalation into a vicious cycle of environmental degradation and public health concerns.

5

Challenges, Critics, and Recommendations

In what we call the age of uncertainty, it is necessary to build coalitions and solidarity across communities to challenge dominant capitalist discourses and ideology and to advance social and ecological justice. The age of uncertainty opens up possibilities for social and economic organizing, change, and resistance that will allow us to reassess political and cultural agendas. Haraway stresses the significance of acknowledging the interdependence of all species and creating a more just and sustainable future through collective action and “sympoiesis” (Haraway, 2016, 2018). Nonetheless, addressing climate-induced migration presents some obstacles, including a dearth of trustworthy data and information, a lack of a clear legislative framework, and a lack of funds and resources dedicated to aiding vulnerable communities (Adger et al., 2018; Biermann et al., 2017). It is criticized that international organizations do not provide adequate financing to aid countries and communities affected by climate change, including those experiencing migration. In addition, these organizations do not prioritize preventing slow-onset climate change migration to mitigate the severity of climate change’s effects on communities and prevent migration (Piguet, 2022, pp. 3–4). Effectively addressing this complicated issue requires collaboration and coordination across several levels of government and key stakeholders. Prioritizing mitigation and adaptation measures, developing early warning systems

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and disaster preparedness, building resilience among vulnerable communities, providing legal protection and support, addressing the root causes of migration, and promoting international cooperation are examples of potential solutions (IOM, 2020; IPCC, 2018). Concerns have been raised over the provision of vaccines and other medical resources in the Ovid case, as many low-income countries struggle to gain access to the resources required to combat the virus successfully. This has resulted in substantial differences in COVID-19 outcomes between countries and regions (Nhamo et al., 2021, pp. 329– 330). Another criticism is that international organizations have not sufficiently invested in public health infrastructure and have failed to provide nations with poorer health systems with essential support (Morawska & Cao, 2020, pp. 1–3). Also, there have been issues surrounding the communication and message of international organizations regarding COVID-19, with some suggesting that the messaging has been inconsistent and ambiguous, resulting in public uncertainty and scepticism. This uncertainty can lead to individuals neglecting to take safeguards and participating in risky conduct, thus accelerating the virus transmission. To build upon the ideas of Harvey and Haraway, a comprehensive and coordinated strategy must address climate-induced migration while challenging existing power structures and discourses. By understanding the interdependence of various crises and pursuing social and ecological justice, we can imagine new opportunities for a more just and sustainable future.

6

Conclusion

Both the COVID-19 pandemic and climate-induced migration have exposed the limitations and failings of strategies implemented by numerous governments throughout the world. These disasters have shown flaws in healthcare systems and infrastructure and a lack of preparedness and resiliency to face global problems. Ineffective responses to the COVID-19 pandemic have caused the death of countless lives and the destruction of global economies. Countries that did not emphasize public health measures such as testing, tracing, and isolation have suffered the most severe consequences, including high infection and fatality rates. Similarly, failing policies in response to climate-induced migration have caused the displacement and suffering of millions of people across the globe. Governments have failed

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to invest in sustainable infrastructure, prepare for the impacts of climate change, and aid climate migrants. The age of uncertainty requires a new approach to policymaking, one that emphasizes proactive and effective methods for addressing global challenges. Governments must recognize the interconnectivity of these issues and invest in resilient healthcare systems and infrastructure. In addition, governments must prioritize climate change adaptation and mitigation while considering the impact of climate change on human migration and displacement. Finally, inadequate responses to the COVID-19 pandemic and climatedriven migration have highlighted the urgent need for more resilient and effective legislation. Governments must prioritize public health, climate change mitigation, and adaptation in this era of uncertainty because of the interconnection of these global issues. Governments must prioritize all citizens’ security and well-being, especially vulnerable populations, despite ongoing global issues. The international community must create policies that reflect the urgency and gravity of these crises because it is now or never.

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From Pandemic to Infodemic: The European Union’s Fight Against Disinformation O˘guz Güner

1

Introduction

The Covid-19 outbreak, which was characterized as a global pandemic as of March 1, 2020 (WHO, 2021) has presented a unique example indicating the significance of managing communications during challenging times and navigating an information environment defined by uncertainties. From the early stages of the pandemic, many non-scientific information began to spread rapidly (Salali & Uysal, 2020). Thus, filling the information gap and building resilience against disinformation have become an urgent need for international actors. During the Covid-19 pandemic, the rapid spread of health-related information in the society, which was usually referred to as infodemic, was notable. As people’s mobility was restrained and they were obliged to stay at home, they were exposed to too much information as a result of the widespread use of the Internet and new media technologies (Yegen & Harmatiy, 2023). Disinformation about Covid-19, according to many academics (Brennen et al., 2020) who have examined the topic, is widely

O. Güner (B) Department of International Relations, Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University, Ankara, Turkey e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Akıllı and B. Gunes (eds.), World Politics in the Age of Uncertainty, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39607-6_16

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disseminated online, particularly on social media platforms. There is no doubt that the false information created and spread via the internet and social media poses a threat to the public’s perception of reality and to their health. It would not be wrong to assert that the Covid-19 pandemic will go down in history as the pandemic with the highest rate of disinformation. As sharing content is low-cost, disinformation and false narratives were easily diffused. The most notable cases to date have involved written articles, but out-of-context images and audio-visual contents were also shared. Various factors provide a convenient ground for the online dissemination of disinformation. This dissemination serves three functions. First, the criteria used by software algorithms on digital platforms focuses on the platforms’ operation models and this model’s priority for personalized and sensational content that would attract attention among the users. Algorithms indirectly increase polarization and amplify the effects of disinformation and perception by enabling the sharing of personalized content among users with similar viewpoints. The second is advertising-oriented activities. Today’s digital advertising model is often click-driven. This is reinforced by high-profile and viral content. This model is based on advertising networks managed by agencies, which ensure the positioning of advertisements in real time based on algorithmic decision-making. Advertising aims to direct and control perceptions with the images it creates. It attempts to accomplish this by influencing the emotions of the users. It enables the placement of advertisements, including disinformation, on websites that publish sensational content that appeals to users’ emotions. The final is that digital technologies like automated services called “Bots” artificially accelerate the spread of disinformation. These mechanisms operate with fictitious profiles (fake accounts) that do not actually belong to anyone and are sometimes even organized on very large scales, known as troll factories. Users’ propensity to distribute content without first verifying it contributes to the quick spread of disinformation (European Commission, 2019). Covid-19 has been the subject of a great deal of disinformation, including claims that the pandemic is not real, the virus is created in the lab, and vaccinations would alter human genetics Salali & Uysal, 2020). In truth, success in the fight against conspiracy theories developed by professionals and spread by ordinary people from various countries requires strategic conduct.

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The abundance of unverified data suffocates knowledge and research. The greatest challenge is determining the accuracy of online content because the factors that produce accuracy and reliability in the digital sphere have yet to mature to the same degree as in traditional media tools. The users struggle to tell accurate information apart from fake because the designs are eye-catching and the authors are anonymous (Arriagada, 2013). This study attempts to address the European Union’s general policy regarding the fight against disinformation, specifically focusing on the steps aimed at building resilience against disinformation during the Covid-19 pandemic. That Brennen et al. (2020) revealed that treatment recommendations unrelated to Covid-19, as well as conspiracy theories circulating on the Internet (theories claiming that the virus was a biological weapon or that there were hidden forces behind the virus, for example), make it understandable that the EU has developed a strategy for combating disinformation, specifically digital-based disinformation.

2 The European Union’s Perspectives on Infodemic The statement of the World Health Organization (WHO), “We are not only fighting an epidemic, we are fighting an infodemic,” emphasizes that Covid-19 is not only a pandemic in medical terms but also a “pandemic of information,” or an infodemic (World Health Organization, 2020a). Eysenbach (2002) states in his article titled “Infodemiology: The Epidemiology of (Mis)Information” that the infodemic is the fast spread of both correct and incorrect information. In some ways, it is a problem that limits access to reliable sources by exposing an excess of both verified and questionable material (World Health Organization, 2020b). The demand for fake news and information disorder produced online, particularly on social media, leads to the establishment of an infodemic. Vosoughi et al. (2018) concluded that false information travels/spreads faster, deeper, and wider than the truth. A report titled “Information Disorder Toward an interdisciplinary framework for research and policymaking ” by the Council of Europe (CoE) examined three forms of information disorder: misinformation, disinformation, and mal-information (Wardle & Derakhshan, 2017). According to the Report, these three forms of information are defined as follows:

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● Misinformation occurs when inaccurate information is spread yet no harm is intended. ● Disinformation occurs when misleading information is intentionally spread in order to do harm. ● Mal-information occurs when legitimate information is given with the intent of causing harm, frequently by shifting information intended to remain private into the public arena (Fig. 1). The European Commission’s action plan on disinformation (Action Plan on disinformation: Commission contribution to the European Council ) classifies the EU’s perspectives on fake news and its types (European Commission, 2018a). The Action Plan against Disinformation highlights that freedom of expression is one of the fundamental values of the European Union (EU), as established in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and in the constitutions of Member States. As the Action Plan puts it, “the open democratic societies of European Union countries depend on the ability of citizens to access a variety of verifiable information so that they can form an opinion on different political issues” allowing them to take part in public debates with knowledge Information Disorder

Mis-Information

Dis-Information

Mal-Information

False Connection

False Context

Leaks

Misleading Content

Imposter Content

Harassment

Manipulated Content

Hate speech

Fabricated Content

Fig. 1 Types of information disorder (Wardle & Derakhshan, 2017, p. 20)

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and express their will through free and fair political processes. However, there is a growing threat to these democratic processes from the deliberate, widespread, and systematic transmission of disinformation. The Union defines disinformation as “distinctly false or misleading information created, presented, and disseminated to deceive the public intentionally (and potentially cause public harm) or for economic gain.” The intent, in this context, is the most crucial aspect. For instance, there is a difference between the ambition of other states and insider groups to purposefully disrupt political processes and the blunders of journalists and citizens without malicious intent. We can better understand the difference using this illustration. A person spreading false information about the Covid19 vaccine to their Facebook friends out of genuine worry is part of the problem. The false information they obtained on a WhatsApp group came from a malevolent group. Disinformation is defined as information that is identical to that which was originally disseminated (European Commission, 2018a). The EU’s definition of disinformation has been a preliminary definition for conspiracy theories that emerged during the pandemic period. As a matter of fact, the conspiracy theories that emerged during the pandemic period spread rapidly on social media and caused the public to be guided with wrong/malicious intentions. From the first moment of the pandemic, many non-scientific information started spreading rapidly. One of the first infodemic element involved the claims about the origin of the virus (Erçelik, 2022). Covid-19 Conspiracy Theory Examples (van Mulukom et al., 2020): ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●

The pandemic is a hoax, meaning there is no virus. Covid-19 is no worse than the flu. The virus was created artificially. Countries have designed it as a biological weapon to kill people. The virus is a secret military experiment. China spread the virus deliberately. A new world order will be established. 5G exacerbates the virus spread. Bill Gates intends to control people with microchips. The deep state is behind the virus. Companies or powerful people seek to make money through drugs and vaccines.

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Numerous countries, particularly the EU members, have released official statements to dispel false information and stop deception during the pandemic. The WHO has released a list of “myth busters” on new but false information about the virus in an effort to battle the infodemic scientifically. Aiming to fill the information gap, the WHO released the following statements; “Disease is not transmitted by flies” according to this list on COVID-19. “Alcohol use, pepper addition, and garlic consumption do not provide disease protection,” “COVID-19 is not spread through 5G networks,” “drinking methanol, ethanol, or bleach is harmful,” “cleaning the nose with saline does not protect against the virus,” “antibiotics do not cure the virus” (WHO, 2020c).

3 The European Union’s Fight Against Disinformation Access to trustworthy sources has become more difficult as a result of the rise in the number of social media users and information overload. According to the EU this unreliable atmosphere “discredits democratic institutions and harms member states.” To prevent a deterioration in relations between the member states, it develops strategies against disinformation campaigns, particularly those from Russia and China (Bayraklı & Filiz, 2020). Several key dates will be useful for understanding the EU’s fight against disinformation. The decision by the European Union Council in March 2015 is critical for the course of this fight: “The European Council stressed the need to challenge Russia’s ongoing disinformation campaigns and invited the High Representative, in cooperation with Member States and EU institutions, to prepare by June an action plan on strategic communication. The establishment of a communication team is a first step in this regard” (European Council, 2015). The EU institutionalized the fight against fake news and disinformation in 2015 by establishing the StratCom Task Force under the auspices of the EU External Action Service (EEAS). The Strategic Communications and Information Analysis Division under EEAS focuses on emerging threats, data analysis, policy development, and international cooperation, as well as the EU’s Rapid Alert System on Disinformation (European Union External Action, 2015). The EU engaged in three major actions in 2018:

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1. Tackling online disinformation in April 2018: a European approach (European Commission, 2018b), 2. The EU Code of Practice on Disinformation in September 2018 (European Commission, 2018c), 3. The Action Plan against Disinformation in December 2018 (European Commission, 2018a). Additionally, the EU has taken the following actions to address the disinformation and infodemic; ● Communication—Tackling online disinformation: A European approach ● Action plan against disinformation ● Factsheet: Action Plan against disinformation ● European Democracy Action Plan ● The 2018 Code of Practice on Disinformation ● Covid-19 disinformation monitoring program ● Guidance on Strengthening the Code of Practice on Disinformation ● Press Release 26/05/2021: Guidance to Strengthen the Code of Practice ● Read the 2022 Strengthened Code of Practice on Disinformation ● Factsheet: The 2022 Strengthened Code of Practice on Disinformation In the Communication (European Commission, 2018b) document, a special emphasis is given to social networks, and the features of the disinformation ecosystem in these networks are analyzed in three aspects: (1) the production of disinformation in the context of social networks is effective, easy and economically profitable; (2) disinformation is likely to increase due to the characteristics of social and other types of media, and (3) users spreading disinformation. In order to combat disinformation, this report calls for transparency of the source of information, promoting the diversity of information by balancing the relationships between producers and disseminators of information, high-quality journalism, and media literacy, increasing the credibility of information through the traceability of information with the help of trusted flaggers, and putting forward long-term inclusive solutions that require increased awareness, and the cooperation of public authorities, online

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platforms, advertisers, trusted flaggers, journalists and media groups. The 2018 Code of Practice on disinformation is the first time that the industry has agreed, on a voluntary basis, to self-regulatory standards to fight disinformation (European Commission, 2018c). As a result of these developments, the document Action Plan against Disinformation emerged (European Commission, 2018a), seeking to form a coordinated response to disinformation which is based on four pillars (Fig. 2).

4 European Union’s Strategy to Combat Covid-19 Disinformation The EU has developed a strategy to counter disinformation about Covid-19 through transparent, timely, and factual communication. On the 10th of June 2020 European Commission (European Commission, 2020a) responded to the crisis with a joint communication, named Tackling Covid-19 disinformation - Getting the facts right. The document underlines that “Combatting the flow of disinformation, misinformation and foreign influence operations, including through proactive and positive communication, calls for action through the EU’s existing tools.” The Commission and High Representative are charged with acting in accordance with the Action Plan against Disinformation and enhancing collaboration and coordination with Member States by bolstering their strategic communication capacities. Three EU organizations’, mechanisms’, and tools’ efforts stand out in this context. The first is what the EEAS department does. Although EEAS is a diplomatic entity that handles foreign affairs, its involvement is acceptable considering the global scope of the Covid-19 outbreak. In this regard, the EEAS’s East StratCom Task Force developed the website euvsdisinfo.eu as a flagship project. The second is the European Commission’s efforts on fighting disinformation webpage which seeks to update general public with information coming from trustworthy and authoritative sources as in European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and WHO. The third is the Covid-19 Disinformation Monitoring Programme webpage. Its main goals are to combat misinformation and make sure that people have access to correct information regarding viruses and vaccines. The program is basically based on the document titled “Tackling Covid-19 disinformation - Getting the facts right” calling the signatories to the Code of Practice on Disinformation whose basis was formed by the report titled “Assessment of the implementation of the

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IMPROVE DETECTION, ANALYSIS AND EXPOSURE OF DISINFORMATION

Invest in digital tools, data analysis skills and specialised staff within the EU institutions and in Member States

Assess reach and impact of disinformation

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STRONGER COOPERATION AND JOINT RESPONSES TO DISINFORMATION

Rapid Alert System consisting of EU institutions and EU Member States set up

Rapid Alert System to provide alerts on disinformation campaigns, share insights and facilitate coordinated response

RAISE AWARENESS AND IMPROVE SOCIETAL RESILIENCE

Implementation of EU-wide Code of practice on disinformation

Targeted campaigns in Europe and beyond

Major internet companies such as Google, Facebook, Twitter and Mozilla have signed up

Active participation of çivil society in identifying and exposing disinformation

Regular reporting since January 2019 and possible regulatory action in case of unsatisfactory results

Supporting independent and factcheckers

Fig. 2 The four pillars of European Union’s Action Plan against Disinformation (European Commission, 2018a)

Code of Practice on Disinformation” (Plasilova et al., 2020), to report regularly: 1. Studies conducted to increase the visibility of calls, statements and warnings of official institutions such as WHO and national

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health organizations for the dissemination of reliable information for promoting public health; 2. Studies conducted for removing or reducing the impact of fake or misleading content to prevent harm to people or public health 3. Studies conducted to ban actions (especially advertisements) that convert the current crisis into an opportunity 4. Studies about the data on advertisement streams related to Covid19 disinformation in the internal functioning of the platforms and on third-party websites 5. Studies for the dissemination of accurate knowledge about vaccines 6. Studies to increase the awareness level of users (tools especially developed) 7. Studies on the compilation of information on misleading actions within the platforms (European Commission, 2020b). This supervision and reporting program is basically divided into two stages. In the first stage, the report contains basic information about relevant policies and procedures. In this context, the August reports are baseline reports (these reports cover the period from the onset of Covid19 crisis to July 31st). The next stage after baseline reports are monthly reports (bi-monthly reports after a certain period). This period covering August 2020 to March/April 2022, includes monthly reports on the efficacy of works conducted by the platforms and industrial associations to prevent Covid-19-based disinformation (European Commission, 2020c). In August 2020, the Report on Fighting Covid-19 Disinformation (Baseline Reports) states that Facebook (later renamed as Meta), Google, Microsoft, TikTok, Twitter, and Mozilla platforms (signatories) prioritized the information revealed by WHO and national health organizations about Covid-19. Doing this, the platforms provide the opportunity to access reliable information by developing new tools and services depending on the nature of their services. The work performed by Google is compliant with the strategy of the EU about increasing the visibility of the explanations made by official institutions (such as WHO). The reports also mention the steps taken by signatories to address false and misleading information. Steps to remove the content and demote the impact occur in situations that could cause physical and political harm to public health, and where the policies of the relevant platforms are violated. This is an important step for strengthening official information. YouTube declares that it will not allow content that does not coincide

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with the views of official institutions and the Covid-19 medical misinformation Policy (YouTube, 2020). Google Search (Google, 2020) states that they reserve the right to remove or correct opinions that are outside the general scientific consensus. These works of Google and YouTube which is affiliated to Google, are in line with the strategy of EU to remove or demote the impact of fake and misleading content (in case of harming human health and public health). Advertising issue is also discussed in the baseline report presented by Google (Google, 2020). Google Adsense (Google, 2023) states that it will not allow content that contains harmful claims about health under Unreliable and Harmful Claims within its Dangerous or derogatory content policy, and adds the claims that may be harmful about Covid-19 to this statement. In Google’s report (Google, 2020), it is clearly stated that such content cannot be monetized through Adsense and that the advertisements broadcasted cannot contain harmful claims about health. These Google practices also contain the prohibition of actions of those who want to turn the EU’s Covid-19 crisis (especially through advertisements) into an opportunity. Although there isn’t a specific section in the report about the data on advertising flows related to Covid-19 disinformation, there are statements that access to data will be increased, as promised. Although not in the baseline report, the latest report of Google (Google, 2022) covering the months of March and April 2022 includes the efforts to disseminate accurate information about vaccines. These studies range from removing misinformation about vaccines and demoting their impact to providing the list of places for the users where they can get vaccinated. The relevant policy of YouTube (YouTube, 2020) on vaccination has also been updated. Google (Google, 2022) claims that it is working to increase the awareness level of users not only in search and YouTube, but also in other affiliates (Google Play and Maps). Google also explains that it goes beyond the works of compiling information about misleading actions within the platforms, and when such a situation is detected which is called coordinated influence operations, the content is removed, the accounts are deleted and precautions are taken against the steps these actors may take at this point. In that sense, Google says that information is not only shared with the EU, but also with other actors in the industry.

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5

Conclusion

Disinformation, in the eyes of the EU, poses a threat to both the continuity of the Union as a whole and to the ability of its members to maintain a democratic society. At this point, the Union has made a number of choices, created a code of practice and an action plan. The Code of Practice mandates that the digital media fully develop into a position of self-regulation. This relates to how digital media works. In these networks, spreading false information is simple and rewarding. It is vital to develop tactics particular to this field due to the design of these platforms’ algorithms, which already favor sensational content, the click-based digital advertising model, which rewards sensational and viral material, and the propensity of bots and individuals to disseminate misinformation. In order to do this, the EU builds the capacity of internal Union structures to identify, examine, and expose disinformation. It also proposes a collective response to disinformation, involves the commercial sector, and educates the public. In its battle against Covid-19 disinformation, the EU has made use of its institutions, such as the EEAS, to strengthen its capacity for identifying, analyzing, and exposing disinformation within the Union. It has also developed a new page on its website devoted to combating disinformation, which plays a significant role in raising public awareness. A basic strategy adopted by the EU, coming up with a coordinated response to disinformation has shown up in all governmental and practical actions taken to combat COVID-19 (European Commission, n.d,). The last mechanism to be handled, the Covid-19 disinformation monitoring program, is not only the above type of mechanism, but also the way of revealing the strategy of engaging the private sector. The Covid-19 disinformation monitoring program is the mechanism that is extensively covered in this study’s analysis of the EU’s disinformation strategy. The program’s concept, in which digital platforms pledge self-control as signatories, is predicated on describing the degree to which signature platforms honor their pledges on a monthly basis. The commitments mentioned at this point are increasing the visibility of the statements of official institutions, removing content that harms public health, demoting its impact, etc. In the review made on Google, it has been determined that the company has put forth efforts toward all relevant commitments. It should

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be underlined that rather than evaluating the effectiveness of these techniques, the goal of this study is to uncover them and determine whether the commitments made in the relevant reports are upheld.

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The Impact of COVID-19 on Global Energy Security and Energy Geopolitics Safa Uslu

1

and Ferhat Pirinççi

Introduction

The deadly COVID-19 virus that originated in China’s Wuhan in December 2019 quickly spread to 197 countries worldwide within a span of four months. The World Health Organization (WHO) declared it a global pandemic after its initial outbreak in Iran and Italy, prompting countries to implement travel restrictions gradually (Mueller, 2022). By the spring of 2020, the global economy had ground to a halt. This unprecedented global health crisis marked an unparalleled event in the twenty-first century and the digital age. Alongside the loss of millions of lives, the implementation of global quarantines resulted in a profound economic crisis due to reduced demand, subsequently leading to a global energy crisis. The abrupt cessation of activities in sectors such as production, construction, education, healthcare, transportation, logistics, and others caused a significant surplus in the global energy industry, particularly impacting oil and gas producers.

S. Uslu (B) · F. Pirinççi Department of International Relations, Bursa Uluda˘g University, Bursa, Turkey e-mail: [email protected] F. Pirinççi e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Akıllı and B. Gunes (eds.), World Politics in the Age of Uncertainty, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39607-6_17

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Numerous studies have been conducted in the literature to analyze the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the global economy. However, few studies specifically explore the potential effects on energy supply security and energy geopolitics, taking into consideration global challenges like the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war and climate change. In this regard, this study asserts that the significance of energy geopolitics will persist worldwide in the future, irrespective of the green energy transition. While energy supply security conventionally remains a paramount concern for countries, whether they are producers or reliant on energy imports, the study also posits that the transition to green energy is shaping its own geopolitical importance. Put differently, it predicts that the relevance of fossil fuels will endure due to their continued use for ensuring energy supply security as the impact of COVID-19 subsides. Furthermore, in the long term, the study anticipates that the COVID-19 crisis presents favorable conditions for the adoption of green technologies, while also amplifying the geopolitical importance of minerals used in these technologies and underscoring the significance of secure supply chains. Understanding the impact of COVID-19 on energy supply security, a major challenge that brought the world to a standstill, necessitates a comprehensive grasp of how energy markets have been affected. Examining the repercussions of the pandemic on energy-exporting and energy-importing nations will shed light on the dimensions of short-term adverse effects. Subsequently, the study will delve into the influence on energy supply chains and investments to provide insights into their longterm consequences. Analyzing renewable energy policies and their impact on achieving net-zero objectives will guide readers in understanding the future trajectory of energy transition. Lastly, after scrutinizing the effects on energy supply chains and investments, the study will evaluate the implications for energy geopolitics.

2

The Impact of COVID-19 on the Energy Market

China was undoubtedly the first country to be significantly impacted by COVID-19. The consequences of the virus swiftly spread from China’s economy, which came to a sudden halt, to the global economy. In fact, the contraction in global energy demand surpassed that of the 2009 global financial crisis by more than sevenfold (Business Monitor, 2020). The rapid decline in demand brought all commercial activities worldwide to a standstill within a remarkably short span of three months. Global oil

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demand experienced a reduction of over 20%, while electricity demand witnessed a 5% decrease. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), global energy demand contracted by 3.8% in the first quarter of 2020 compared to the previous year. Subsequently, in 2020, there was an approximate 6% decline (Lu et al., 2021: 943). This notable drop in energy production marked the most significant decrease observed since the World War II. On the other hand, the complete halt of land, air, and sea transportation, along with the slowdown of all supply chains, has exposed the risk of a severe food crisis in cities. The retail sector has had to continue operating to meet essential needs, enabling the global economy to persist, albeit at a minimal level. Despite the economy functioning at a minimum capacity, the need to keep supply chains operational to meet basic requirements has resulted in an excess of energy supply (Business Monitor, 2020). The standstill of land and air transportation has particularly affected traditional oil producers, leading to a major crisis. The United States, once a significant energy consumer, has found itself in the role of a producer and has been compelled to slow down oil and gas production due to the pandemic. This situation presented the oil market with a challenging decision: either production would continue, driving prices to historic lows, or they would compromise on production and risk losing market share in the medium term. Furthermore, a one-time reduction in production carried the risk of incurring higher operational costs for technical operations. The petroleum economy, which has played a pioneering role in the economic, political, strategic, military, and social aspects of the past century, continued to be shaken by the decisions of Russia and Saudi Arabia, who lead the OPEC+ countries, to maintain production during the pandemic. The post-pandemic decline in oil demand has caused a daily decrease of 8.5 million barrels, leading to a reduction in daily oil production from around 100 million barrels to approximately 90 million barrels (IEA, 2021b). The imbalance in the oil markets has presented an opportunity for producers to increase their market share in the medium term, resulting in intense negotiations between those who reduced production and those who did not. While the United States appeared to be affected by this process in the face of Russia and Saudi Arabia, it entered a state of significant diplomatic inaction, creating an impression that it was unable to intervene in the situation. On the other hand, some former bureaucrats in the U.S. Department of Energy expressed a tendency to appreciate

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OPEC’s market management only when it served the interests of the United States, indicating a lack of clear stance from the U.S. administration on this matter. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia’s attempts to persuade Russia to cut production and raise oil prices were unsuccessful, leading to an oversupply of cheap oil in the market. Analysts pointed out that the main goal of Saudi Arabia was to decrease Russia’s market share and convince Russian President Vladimir Putin to rejoin the negotiations (Exxon Mobil, 2020). However, as a result, these dynamics created a challenging situation for the U.S. industry. For instance, in March 2020, U.S. producers were paying approximately $26,80 per barrel of oil, while European prices stood at $30.41. Subsequently, the price of Brent crude oil experienced an unprecedented drop to −40.32 USD per barrel. Despite the persistence of oil supply for some time, countries’ oil inventories reached maximum levels (Lu et al., 2021: 945). ExxonMobil became the first major company to respond to the surplus supply and weak demand resulting from the pandemic by implementing a 25% production cut in response to low commodity prices. This decision resulted in a 30% reduction in the company’s 2020 capital expenditures and a 15% reduction in cash operating expenses (Exxon Mobil, 2020) (Graph 1). In the natural gas sector, although industrial production and electricity demand experienced partial slowdowns, the increase in residential usage helped partially offset the decline in natural gas demand (Oil & Gas News, 2020). Assessing from the perspective of natural gas, global gas demand contracted by 75 billion cubic meters, marking a 2% decrease compared to the previous year due to the pandemic (IEA, 2021b). However, in the liquefied natural gas (LNG) sector, the demand plummeted significantly, resulting in remarkably low prices. It is worth noting that the absence of a player like OPEC in global LNG management contributed to the persistence of these exceptionally low price levels. Furthermore, the outbreak also had adverse effects on energy distribution companies in the electricity and natural gas sectors, making it challenging for them to collect payments and exacerbating the spread of the crisis. Countries worldwide, including China and the United States, implemented measures such as providing discounts on energy tariffs and deferring bills for industrial, commercial, and residential customers in an attempt to mitigate the impact of the crisis and prevent its further propagation (KSLA, 2020).

Graph 1 Change in quarterly oil demand in 2020 and 2021 relative to 2019 levels (Source IEA, Change in quarterly oil demand in 2020 and 2021 relative to 2019 levels, IEA, Paris https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/charts/cha nge-in-quarterly-oil-demand-in-2020-and-2021-relative-to-2019-levels, IEA. Licence: CC BY 4.0)

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3 The Impact of COVID-19 on the Energy Investments Before the pandemic, the IEA predicted an annual growth rate of 2% for global energy investments. However, in 2020, these investments experienced a significant decline of 20%, plummeting to $1.5 trillion. Specifically, investments for production in the oil and gas sector dropped from $483 billion in 2019 to $347 billion. Major energy companies implemented severe budget cuts across all planned expenditures. Consequently, the energy sector witnessed a staggering revenue decrease of $1 trillion. The IEA emphasized that the impact of this investment contraction would lead to short-term market shrinkage and potentially trigger significant policy changes in the long run. Surprisingly, investments in coal did not decrease as expected. The stability in global coal demand can be attributed to China and India, where coal accounts for one-third of their energy security. In 2020, China was the only country to experience a surge in coal demand (Durden, 2020). Moreover, due to the Russia-Ukraine war and the subsequent energy crisis in Europe in 2022, coal consumption reached an unprecedented level. Despite the global goal of reducing coal usage in alignment with the Paris Agreement’s carbon emissions reduction targets, it is noteworthy that coal consumption has consistently and steadily increased, except during the pandemic period (IEA, 2021a).

4 Is the Transition to Renewable Energy a Dream After the Pandemic? The sudden surge in energy demand following the pandemic has created uncertainty and imbalance in ensuring short-term supply security. However, in the medium and long run, considering the global climate change factor, it has been recognized as an opportunity for energy transformation toward green energy. The utilization of oil, coal, and natural gas to manage energy supply security has witnessed a temporary increase, while also paving the way for significant opportunities to boost investments in new energy production technologies such as renewable energy and hydrogen in the long term. Throughout the pandemic, electricity demand was primarily met through renewable energy sources, driven by their favorable operational costs compared to fossil fuels.

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Nevertheless, starting from 2021, energy demand has rebounded rapidly, prompting the mobilization of all energy resources, including fossil fuels, to ensure energy supply security. Another contributing factor to the extensive use of fossil fuels is the decline in investments in renewable energy sources and smart grids during the pandemic. Renewable energy investments decreased from $311 billion in 2019 to $281 billion in 2020. The IEA underscored the need for additional annual investments of $700 billion to facilitate the transition to low-carbon energy sources and meet the escalating energy demand resulting from the pandemic by 2035. Undoubtedly, the decrease in investments in green energy has presented a significant challenge in terms of carbon emissions targets. While global emissions appeared to have been completely erased in 2020, offsetting the emissions increase of the past decade, the resumption of economic activity has resulted in a resurgence of emissions at even higher levels (Business Monitor, 2020). According to the IEA, as the first reflection on the energy supply security, the robust recovery of the global economy from the COVID-19 crisis has led to a resurgence in coal usage as various sectors, including air, land, and sea transportation, returned to pre-pandemic levels. This has had a substantial impact on carbon emissions. In 2021, carbon emissions increased by 6%, reaching an all-time high of 36.3 billion tons (Contify Energy News, 2022). Of this increase, 40% (15.3 billion tons) can be attributed to the rise in coal consumption, while 10.7 billion tons came from oil consumption and 7.5 billion tons from natural gas usage (Contify Energy News, 2022) (Graph 2). However, in 2021, the limited pace of global economic recovery due to issues in the global supply chain just before the Russia-Ukraine war partially slowed down the increase in carbon emissions. During this period, it is noteworthy that emissions did not rise as much as expected, particularly in some advanced countries. For instance, in 2021, carbon emissions in the United States were 4% below the 2019 level, while in the European Union, they were 2.4% lower, and in Japan, they were 3.7% lower in 2020. Considering that the global economy is gradually recovering, starting with advanced economies, it indicates a significant effort toward structural energy transformation in developed nations. Another crucial aspect is that the necessary global financing for emission reduction has not been appropriately allocated as intended. The executive director of the IEA, Fatih Birol, emphasized the need for advanced countries to increase their investments in green energy. Despite

Graph 2 Global Energy-related Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 2000–2022 (Source IEA, Global energy-related greenhouse gas emissions, 2000–2022, IEA, Paris https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/charts/global-energy-related-greenhousegas-emissions-2000-2022, IEA. Licence: CC BY 4.0)

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the $16 trillion government funds allocated globally for transitioning to green energy after the pandemic, a mere $380 billion was devoted to promoting green energy, while the majority was utilized for healthcare measures, economic support to businesses and families (CE Noticias Financieras English, 2021). Consequently, while managing energy security post the COVID-19 crisis presents its challenges, the obligation to address climate change, which is a more persistent problem than the pandemic, and the necessity to transition to clean energy can be considered as an opportunity stemming from the crisis. The IEA, which was established to curb the fallouts of the 1973–1974 oil crises and, which is historically known as the central institution for oil lobbies, made a groundbreaking statement in 2023, expressing that the world’s energy demand could be met without further reliance on fossil fuels (Energy Intelligence, 2021). Therefore, facilitating an energy transformation toward climate change, which is a more ancient crisis than COVID-19, has become a compelling task for countries, encompassing environmental management, as well as economic, foreign, and domestic policy governance. The utilization of renewable energy sources for diversification1 and the imperative to ensure energy supply security with sustainable, affordable, and efficient energy resources pose a significant global challenge for all nations. U.S. Energy Secretary Jennifer Granholm views this situation as an opportunity. Both crises need addressing now. This is not an either-or. It is a both-and. It is not a binary choice. We must both increase reliable supply right now and accelerate our efforts for clean energy. The future of energy security… the future of economic security… the future of national security… the future of climate security… These are all inextricably bound together. And they are all demanding an accelerated clean energy transition, she said (ENP Newswire, 2022).

While it is undoubtedly a challenging goal for energy technologies to swiftly mobilize all the required green energy sources, countries can accelerate energy transformation and diversify global energy supply security with clean technologies through close collaboration and emphasizing

1 Meeting the energy demand from the available most efficient energy sources in appropriate proportions.

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their strengths in the supply chain for the development of green energy technologies.

5

The Impact of the Pandemic on Energy Geopolitics

In the field of international relations, the issue of energy security has always been a dynamic topic for analyzing regions where conflicts of interest arise. When considering energy geopolitics in terms of fossil fuels, the distinct roles of producers, transmitters, and distributors create a highly dynamic process in managing relationships among actors and regions involved in these sub-sectors. The relationships between energyproducing countries and consumer countries, especially in the context of international natural gas and oil pipeline projects, exhibit a complex structure that involves politicians, bureaucrats, technicians, and economists, requiring the resolution of multiple intricate knots. For the successful implementation of a regional energy project, it is crucial to consider not only political feasibility but also technical and economic feasibility. In our modern digitalized lives, the demand for energy continues to grow each day. In light of this, countries should prioritize ensuring access to affordable, sustainable, and reliable energy sources and subsequently diversify their energy mix through careful blending. In a post-COVID-19 world where the impacts of climate change are rapidly becoming evident, the significance of conventional energy geopolitics with its intricate network of relationships remains unchanged. It is unrealistic to discuss green energy transformation without first ensuring energy supply security in energy strategies. Therefore, the vitality of regional oil and natural gas projects for achieving energy supply security continues to be of utmost importance. The significance of organizing side events in many African countries to showcase exploration activities in offshore oil and natural gas projects, while carbon emissions reduction strategies were being deliberated at the COP 27 meeting in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt, serves as a testament to the seriousness of the matter (Financial Times, 2022). The second important parameter/factor that will shape the future of energy geopolitics is the mandatory transition to green energy within the scope of combating climate change. The COVID-19 pandemic revealed how easily humanity could transition to the digital world. However, the digital world also brings increased electricity consumption. Particularly

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as per capita electricity consumption rises, managing the challenge of diversifying energy sources through green technologies becomes evident. Hence, the new state of the energy ecosystem also entails the development of corresponding strategies. In the new world order, where greater electricity demand exists, the position of oil and natural gas in terms of energy geopolitics is being overshadowed by minerals such as lithium, cobalt, nickel, and others. Especially as the need for energy storage grows, the geopolitics between the geographic regions hosting these necessary minerals and the producer countries gain significance as new areas/frontiers within the discipline of international relations. In this regard, the importance of the African continent will increasingly rise due to its abundant mineral resources. The production capacity, market prices, and geopolitical importance of minerals such as lithium, cobalt, nickel, and manganese, which are critical for renewable energy and battery production, have significantly increased in recent years. These minerals play a crucial role in clean energy production. In comparison to a power plant operating on fossil fuels with the same capacity, a wind power plant that generates green energy requires eight times more minerals (raw materials) (Kim and Karpinski, 2020). The evolving paradigm of energy geopolitics is leading to the emergence of new fronts in countries’ security policies to ensure a sustainable energy transition. The disruptions in the supply chain during the pandemic have also affected the availability of raw materials for battery production, resulting in production halts. For instance, in Peru, a country with a vital role in global copper mining operations, production declined in 2020 due to the pandemic (Lu et al., 2021: 951). Furthermore, ongoing challenges in chip production and delays in the supply chain have caused difficulties in the manufacturing of electric vehicles. During the pandemic, the global decline in demand for minerals/raw materials led to a decrease in their prices. However, post-pandemic, the increased demand and prices have reached historical highs in the mineral market. Therefore, global crises like the COVID-19 pandemic have also hindered the pace of energy transformation.

6

Conclusion

The COVID-19 and climate change crises have revealed not only humanity’s limited capacity to cope but also the exponential nature of their shared characteristics and impacts (Sawin, 2020). As the virus rapidly infects and

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cripples the healthcare system, it is accompanied by climate change, which triggers other natural crises like droughts, floods, and forest fires through increased emissions. The overlapping of these processes highlights the constraints on mankind’s ability to manage them effectively. Therefore, it is once again emphasized that countries must learn from the lessons of combating the COVID-19 pandemic and utilize digital technologies to act more swiftly, decisively, and preemptively in order to ensure both energy supply security and navigate the emerging green energy geopolitics. Similarly, the COVID-19 crisis has had profoundly critical effects on energy security. In brief, the COVID-19 pandemic can be considered a milestone and catalyst for a paradigm shift toward a renewable energy-based structure, disrupting the global energy economy and ecosystem reliant on fossil fuels. While the development of new green energy production technologies necessary for energy transformation is still ongoing, there has been a notable potential for cost-effective solar and wind energy as their costs decline. Efforts made by countries to ensure post-pandemic energy supply security have resulted in increased carbon emissions. Moreover, the European energy sanctions imposed on Russia in response to the Ukraine war have led to a significant rise in global coal demand. The increase in the use of natural gas, oil, and coal indicates that regional dynamics driven by fossil fuels will persist for a while longer. Another significant finding is the increasing importance of supply security for minerals such as lithium, cobalt, nickel, and manganese, which are necessary for battery production in energy transformation. Additionally, the supply chain of chip production, seen as the most critical raw material for digital technologies, is another crucial issue. The topic of electricity generation and storage emerges as a new area in energy geopolitics, being a fundamental requirement of the global digital economy. Energy storage not only ensures the balance between supply and demand but also becomes a focal point in international relations between countries and regions. In terms of new investment opportunities that will foster mutual interdependence or new conflicts of interest that will fuel competition, the energy issue will continue to maintain its importance in the coming years. The third important aspect is the need for the implementation of an intelligent energy transition strategy for the shift to green energy, such as renewable energy and hydrogen. Considering carbon emission targets,

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it is believed that the use of renewable energy sources (green energy sources) provides an opportunity for countries to increase energy supply security and diversify energy sources. However, managing intermittent renewable energy sources2 that provide discontinuous production in a country’s energy transmission infrastructure in a way that can balance the sudden changes in demand can only be achieved through the implementation of energy transition using smart policies. This can only be achieved by ensuring energy demand is secured from cheap, sustainable, and reliable sources. Therefore, it is necessary to integrate digital technologies further, particularly in the implementation of smart grid solutions, after the pandemic. Establishing a reliable, clean, sustainable, efficient, affordable, and predictable energy transition is essential. The fourth point is that during globally turbulent times like the COVID-19 pandemic, it is clearly observed that energy supply security continues to be the most significant driving force of the economy. Accordingly, it supports the argument that the importance of geography and geopolitics in the discipline of international relations has not diminished but rather increased. The role of natural gas pipelines can be exemplified as being crucial during this process. The fifth point is that while the importance of energy geopolitics continues in a conventional sense, green energy also supports the significance of energy geopolitics. The importance of green energy in energy geopolitics does not decrease but rather changes the actors involved. As the scope and scale of green energy transformation increase vertically and horizontally, new parameters such as the location of mineral resources used in battery production and which countries have control over them, as well as the centrality of industries such as wind and solar energy, will come into play when discussing energy geopolitics in international relations, replacing the position of natural gas and oil. The control over geographic areas that contain minerals such as lithium, copper, nickel, and zinc, which are highly important for green technologies, also gains significance. In short, energy security will continue to be important in all circumstances. In an international order where energy security is achieved either 2 An intermittent energy source is any source of energy that is not continuously available for conversion into electricity and outside direct control because the used primary energy cannot be stored. Intermittent energy sources may be predictable but cannot be dispatched to meet the demand of an electric power system.

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through fossil fuels or new and green technologies, it is understood that energy remains a subject of potential opportunities and crises between regions as a security issue. The competition among countries to ensure energy supply security during times of crisis becomes a more important issue than the widespread adoption of green energy, which still provides limited contributions. The COVID-19 pandemic followed by the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war has created such a ground for the whole world.

Bibliography Business Monitor Online. (2020). “Q&A: Covid-19 Implications for The Global LNG Sector & Impact on Prices, Investments”, https://advance. lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:6097-CF81JD33-J1M0-00000-00&context=1519360, Accessed April 30, 2023. CE Noticias Financieras English. (2021). “IEA: CO2 Emissions to Record in 2023 for Insufficient Clean Energy Development”, https://advance. lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:6366-1N31DY1R-B3H3-00000-00&context=1519360, Accessed May 17, 2023. Contify Energy News. (2022). “IEA: Global CO2 Emissions Rebounded to Their Highest Level in History in 2021”, https://advance.lexis.com/api/ document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:64Y8-Y4W1-DXMP-K26000000-00&context=1519360, Accessed May 9, 2023. Durden, Tylor. (2020). “IEA: The Energy Sector will Never be the Same Again”, Newstex Blogs Phil’s Stock World, https://www.zerohedge.com/energy/ieaenergy-sector-will-never-be-same-again, Accessed May 18, 2023. Energy Intelligence. (2021). “The Big Picture: The IEA’s New Politics”, https://www.energyintel.com/0000017b-a7dd-de4c-a17b-e7df72f80000, Accessed May 17, 2023. ENP Newswire. (2022). “Department of Energy—Secretary Granholm Remarks as Delivered at the 2022 IEA Ministerial Welcome and Official Opening”, https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:conten tItem:653Y-N471-F0K1-N113-00000-00&context=1519360, Accessed April 30, 2023. Exxon Mobil. (2020). “Company Snap Shot”, https://advance.lexis.com/api/ document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:650J-6X71-DYYM-R1X200000-00&context=1519360, Accessed May 16, 2023. Financial Times. (2022). “COP27 delegates rubbed shoulders with energy executives ready to cut deals”, https://www.ft.com/content/3fe55c62-9e51-40fc9b26-77b14d741fae, Accessed May 9, 2023.

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IEA, (2021a). “Coal Consumption by Region, 2000 to 2021”, https:// www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/charts/coal-consumption-by-region-2000to-2021a, Accessed May 14, 2023. IEA. (2021b). “Global Energy Review”, https://www.iea.org/reports/globalenergy-review-2021/oil Kim, T. Y., and Karpinski, M. (2020). “Clean Energy Progress After the Covid19 Crisis Will Need Reliable Supplies of Critical Minerals”. International Energy Agency, http://www.iea.org/articles/clean-energy-progress-after-thecovid-19-crisis-will-need-reliable-supplies-of-critical-minerals, Accessed May 9, 2023. KSLA. (2020). “Utility Customers Won’t Lose Service During COVID-19 Coronavirus Emergency”, KSLA News, http://www.ksla.com/2020/03/ 16/utility-customers-wont-lose-service-during-covid-coronavirus-emerge ncy/, Accessed May 12, 2023. Lu Hong-fang, Ma, Xin and Ma, Min-da. (2021). “Impacts of the Covid-19 Pandemic on the Energy Sector.” Journal of Zhejiang University-Science A: Applied Physics & Engineering, pp. 941–56. https://doi.org/10.1631/jzus. A2100205. Mueller, Milton. (2022). “Verification and Polarization: The Politics of the Twitter Acquisition”, Newstex Blogs Internet Governance Project, https:// www.internetgovernance.org/2022/11/14/verification-and-polarization-thepolitics-of-the-twitter-acquisition/, Accessed May 4, 2023. Oil & Gas News. (2020). “Natural Gas at a Turning Point”, https://advance. lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:60KY-6CV1JDJN-61TC-00000-00&context=1519360, Accessed May 13, 2023. Sawin, Elizabeth. (2020). “Coronavirus and Climate Change”, https://counci lontheuncertainhumanfuture.org/coronavirus-and-climate-change/, Accessed May 11, 2023.

Global Governance in Crisis? Conclusions from the COVID-19 Pandemic ˙ Ismail Erkam Sula

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and Ça˘gla Lüleci-Sula

Introduction

The world is witnessing various global challenges as listed in the annual risk assessment reports of certain IGOs (UN, World Bank, World Economic Forum, etc.) and NGOs (Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Global Challenges Foundation, etc.). One can group these challenges under multiple categories such as development, economy, health, energy, nuclear power, artificial intelligence (AI), and environment.1 However, as the 1 This chapter partly utilizes research data collected for the GRADEU (Global Risk Assessment & the EU’s Role in the Governance of Global Risks) Jean Monnet Module ˙ Project 2022–2025 Coordinated by Ismail Erkam Sula at Ankara Yildirim Beyazit University and funded by the European Union Erasmus 2027 Programme Project No: Erasmus-JMO-2022-Module 101085659.

˙ E. Sula (B) I. Department of International Relations, Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University, Ankara, Turkey e-mail: [email protected] Ç. Lüleci-Sula Department of Political Science and International Relations, TED University, Ankara, Turkey e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 E. Akıllı and B. Gunes (eds.), World Politics in the Age of Uncertainty, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39607-6_18

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recent COVID-19 Pandemic indicated, international actors were unable to get prepared for these risks before they brought catastrophic results. The pandemic showed that nation-states still maintain their reflexes of seeking local solutions to global threats. The world is in need to develop stronger global governance mechanisms to deal with the evolving and intensifying nature of the global catastrophic risks. The world has been undergoing a rapid transformation whereas the definition and referent object of security has relatively remained constant. Despite the arguments of critical approaches that challenge a state-centric conception of security, security in world politics continues to be widely understood in terms of the security of the state. The pandemic demonstrated that states tend to seek local and/or inter-state solutions to global threats. Yet state-centric and local responses have not been efficient in dealing with these global threats. The COVID-19 crisis indicated that world politics need effective global governance mechanisms. This chapter presents an assessment of the capacity of global governance mechanisms in dealing with transforming global challenges and suggestions on the need for their improvement. Today we live in a globalized world. In the last fifty years, humanity witnessed rapid transformations in politics, economy, technology, transportation, and communications. Parallel to these transformations, globalization has become a key concept in defining world politics. The process of globalization changed the traditional perception of state sovereignty and boundaries. Closing state borders and developing local measures are no longer efficient in providing security to citizens. The need for cooperation on a global scale has become evident. Increasing interconnectivity in multiple sectors strongly encouraged states to cooperate. Together with other international actors, states established global governance mechanisms to administer international cooperation in key issue areas such as transportation, technology, economy, development, environment, health, nuclear proliferation, and mobility. The security of states and their citizens get increasingly dependent on the effectiveness of these global governance mechanisms. The inability or ineffectiveness of these mechanisms in administering international cooperation makes humanity more vulnerable to the catastrophic impact of global challenges. Globalization has brought consequences that will continue to affect both international relations and domestic policies of states. As world societies are increasingly interconnected, it gets challenging for states to find solutions to their problems and to develop functioning policies. How the

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consequence of globalization affects a particular state depends on how well that state adapts itself to the changing world order. Today, even the most powerful states are vulnerable to global security challenges. These challenges are not always political or in human form (for instance, terrorist organizations), but also non-human threats such as bird flu, swine flu, Covid-19, natural disasters caused by climate change, and cyber-attacks that threaten economic and financial systems. Because of these challenges, not only underdeveloped countries but also developed countries suffer great damage (Kirton 2015: 15–16). When these challenges are not local or regional but global, states must seek the solution in global governance. The COVID-19 Pandemic has become a showcase for the abovementioned crisis of global governance. It illustrated that increasing interconnectedness has brought uncertainties for the future of world politics. This chapter analyzes the uncertainties caused by the globalization process, the changing nature of global challenges, and the ineffectiveness of global governance mechanisms. The first section analyzes the increasing interconnectedness resulting from globalizing world politics and the transforming nature of state sovereignty. The second section defines security and global governance and discusses the need for and ineffectiveness of global governance mechanisms in response to a global crisis like COVID-19. Finally, the conclusion discusses potential lessons to be learned from the recent COVID-19 Pandemic and makes a case for the need for more effective global governance mechanisms.

2

Globalization and the Transformation of State Sovereignty

Together with the transformation in the structure of world politics in the post-Cold War era, the concept of globalization has become the keyword of ‘the new order.’ Over time, scholars have developed various approaches to define globalization and discuss its impact on world politics. For instance, Burton (1997) observes that states started to live in a networked world order and that with the establishment of the internet (the World Wide Web) states have taken a step further in the transformation from regionalism to globalism. This transformation, he claims, reduced states’ capacity to manage world politics. Keohane and Nye (2000) state that the concept of complex interdependence in International Relations, which they put forward in the 1970s, reflected the feeling that world politics was changing, although it was not very clear at that time. They argue

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that world politics are shaped by surprising historical events, and in the twenty-first century, such events will be caused by globalization. Hirst and Thompson (2002) define globalization as processes that increase international interconnectedness. They claim that these processes have already been effective for fifty years. They define international interconnectedness as an increase in international travel, media, and financial exchanges that have become easier and more frequent resulting from the development of new technologies, and an increase in trade, investment, and communication. They predict that governments and economies will face significant challenges because of increasing interconnectedness as it will gradually become difficult to manage both national and global governance of issues. Observing such difficulty, Cha (2000) argues that globalization transforms and limits the sovereignty of states with transformations in the conceptions of security. Globalization transforms states’ conception of security by changing their understanding of the limits of state sovereignty and borders (Cha 2000: 392–393; Rosenau 1996: 251). As the conception of sovereignty and thereby security has transformed the need for further global cooperation has also intensified.2 In their analysis of the impact of globalization on world politics, Smith et al. (2014: 11–12) summarized the claims of those who think that globalization is effective (globalists) and those who think that globalization is not very effective. Those who argue that globalization is effective in world politics claim that: (1) The economic transformation is happening fast enough to radically affect world politics. (2) Electronic communication has transformed fundamentally by transforming the world we live in and communicate with. (3) Today, there is a common ‘global culture’ more evident than ever before, (4) The differences of people living in different parts of the world have decreased and become similar. (5) The concept of time and space has lost its meaning thanks to modern communication and media tools. (6) We can talk about global governance mechanisms that are established through social and political connections among transnational and international movements. (7) A cosmopolitan culture has emerged where people start to think globally. (8) A risk culture has emerged in which people are aware that the risks they face are global threats (such as 2 While some scholars claim that globalization will limit the sovereignty of states, some scholars argue the opposite. Similarly, while some scholars argue that globalization is a positive process, other scholars doubt it (See Scholte 2005: 17–18, McGrew 2014: 16, Ohmae 1995, 1994, and Krasner 1994 among others).

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epidemics, and environmental pollution) and that states will be unable to fight these threats alone (Smith et al. 2014: 11–12). In line with these claims, globalists have argued that globalization will fundamentally change world politics. Disagreeing with these claims, Hirst et al. (2009: 27–28) argued that globalization was exaggerated, that the work of globalists lacked historical depth, and that the concept of globalization was constantly expanded to include almost everything. Skeptics’ arguments aside, as the impact of globalization intensifies, it has become clearer that transnational and global problems such as climate change, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and international trade require global regulation. As states get aware of this need, they establish transnational initiatives such as G20 summits, climate change conferences, and international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank (WB), and World Trade Organization (WTO) to administer the processes. Moreover, many nonformal and/or non-state actors and transnational networks have been established to manage the impact of increasing interconnectedness. As global problems and global interconnectedness increase, the world has understood how much the security and welfare of world societies are also interconnected (McGrew 2014: 17). Issues such as the 9/11 attacks, the 2007 subprime mortgage crisis, and the COVID-19 Pandemic have shown that what is happening in elsewhere can have consequences that affect the individual and collective safety and well-being of people in another part of the world. These crises have the potential to turn rapidly into global catastrophes. In a globalized world, states cannot overcome the challenges they face in many areas such as economy, development, trade, transportation, technology, health, environment, and security only through local or regional policies, which is an important indicator of the need for effective global cooperation and governance mechanisms. Increasing interconnectedness leads nation-states to cooperate with other states and non-state actors and seek global solutions to global problems (Keohane 1984; Kegley and Raymond 2014; Rosenau 1992).

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3 Catastrophic Risks, Global Governance, and the COVID-19 Pandemic The concept of risk refers to a situation in which the referent object is exposed to danger. Global risk means a threat that is relevant to all living things on Earth. Modern societies have for a long time aimed to develop institutions and governance mechanisms to cope with the risks. Global threats, however, have usually been unpredictable and this unpredictable nature decreases the effectiveness of the initiatives that are designed to face them. As realized during the COVID-19 Pandemic, existing global governance tools had limited effectiveness in managing the health crisis. In a period that requires effective global governance mechanisms, states have tended to rely on local methods and solutions to face a global health crisis. Measures taken against the consequences of a potential global disaster are related to actors’ conceptions of security. What determines the framework of a security risk is closely related to how that risk is understood and examined by the actor(s) involved (Campbell 1992). Furthermore, the definition of security depends on the ‘referent object’ to be secured. Although the state-centric understanding of security dominated the field for long, this started to change in the post-Cold War era with the integration of ‘human’ as a referent object of security. UNDP’s Human Development Report of 1994 introduced the concept of human security and addressed ‘economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security as significant categories of threats to human security’ (UNDP Human Development Report 1994). However, the broadening and deepening of the security agenda does not necessarily mean a complete shift from the state-centric understanding. Threats against humanity can only be put on the security agenda and be subject to serious action if they pose a risk to the security of states. Global risk assessment reports indicate that states’ considerations of risks may not always comply with ‘reality’; that contemporary threats have a ‘global’ character. In an age of global interconnectedness, threats from terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, the environment, economy, and health do not remain inside state borders. Yet, a state-centric understanding of security is one of the reasons why the current mechanisms of global governance cannot provide effective solutions to the global security risks that threaten humanity. This argument came to be widely

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accepted with the COVID-19 Pandemic period which made it clear that institutions and mechanisms of global governance could not produce the expected results in terms of dealing with global risks. This insufficiency demonstrates that there is a need for states to stop turning to state-based solutions and to invest more in global governance mechanisms to cope with global problems. Global problems require global solutions. World politics is constituted by the policies and practices of multiple actors. World politics as interconnected processes contain risks on a global scale, and these actors seek solutions through the establishment of complex and intertwined global governance mechanisms. Global governance refers to these political mechanisms that are established to administer the international cooperation of multiple state and non-state actors in response to the pressures of the international interconnectedness and globalization process. Most scholarly studies on global governance stress the impact of globalization on state sovereignty. For instance, Rosenau and Czempiel (1992) claimed that a world government that could control nation-states was never established, and they defined the concept of global governance as ‘governance without government.’ Adopting the concept of complex interdependence developed by Keohane and Nye (1972), they defined the relations between states as establishing a new world order under the influence of increasingly complex global interconnectedness (Rosenau and Czempiel 1992: 1–8). Barnett and Sikkink (2008: 63) stated that international relations studies have historically focused on the effect of the anarchic structure of the system on foreign policy behaviors of states, their relations with each other and with non-state actors, and the functioning of world politics. They claim that, because of the developments in the discipline and world politics in the last few years, the state-centric understanding of international relations and the approach of focusing on the anarchic structure of the system has begun to lose its attraction. Accordingly, one can talk of a transformation from ‘international relations’ to ‘world society’ (Barnett and Sikkink 2008: 64). Ruggie (2004: 499–500) similarly claimed that transnationalization has transformed world politics which made statebased approaches lose their influence, and international relations have turned into a global public domain. From this point of view, it would be appropriate to define global governance as the management processes arising from the search for cooperation for the solution of common global problems that all international actors, not only states, face because of their increasing interdependence in the transforming world order. Now

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global rules and norms are formed by not only nation-state authority, but also global companies, financial auditing firms, transnational actors representing social movements or cultural identities, non-governmental organizations such as ‘Doctors Without Borders’ or ‘Greenpeace,’ and the global or regional international organizations such as UN, NATO, and the EU (Barnett and Sikkink 2008: 77–78). This multi-actor structure is the reason why this process is called ‘governance’ rather than ‘government/management.’ Put differently, because of increasing interconnectedness, global politics or world order has become too serious a business to be left to the administration of nation-states alone. Kirton (2015: 15–16) summarizes the transformation in global governance under four main categories: increase in the capabilities of rising powers; global interconnectedness; complexity and uncertainty; and vulnerability to non-state threats. Today, even the ‘most developed’ and powerful states can be vulnerable to non-state threats that can cause great destruction. For example, as the COVID-19 crisis has shown, developed countries may be the ones whose economy is highly affected or places where the highest number of losses of life is experienced. Global governance mechanisms may prove to be ineffective in the management of epidemics, preventing climate change and environmental pollution, ensuring global financial stability, regulating global trade, and/or solving problems such as food security. From this point of view, one may argue that humanity is passing through a period in which globalization progresses faster than global governance capabilities. There are also critiques of global governance for not being able to solve the problems of developing or underdeveloped countries, not having democratic mechanisms, and not being able to provide multilateralism (Pabst 2020: 15). However, even if the global governance mechanisms are sometimes cumbersome or not always successful, they will continue to be an important part of ‘the new world order’ that is argued to be established in the future of humanity. Actors’ reactions to the COVID19 Pandemic have shown that nation-states have not yet forgotten their reflexes to solve global problems with local methods, which is at odds with the increasing interconnectedness obliging global governance. The need for global cooperation of world societies will continue to increase in a multi-layered and challenging direction.

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Conclusion: Lessons Learned from the COVID-19 Crisis?

COVID-19 as a global health crisis did not come as a surprise in the sense that it has been on the agenda of global risk assessment reports for decades. Shortly before the pandemic, the Bulletin of Atomic Scientist3 declared that the world was now very close to what they symbolically call ‘doomsday’ (Spinazze 2020). The same researchers also published a bulletin in 2015 warning the world about the threat of Ebola in West Africa (Mecklin 2015). The report emphasized that scientists working in the field of medicine had significant experience and knowledge in preventing lethal viruses from turning into epidemics, yet this alone would not be enough. The researchers stated that social and political institutions stagger under this global threat, which was an obstacle to the rapid and effective response that could prevent a pandemic from happening. Similarly, the Global Catastrophic Risks report prepared by Oxford University’s Future of Human Institute and the Global Challenges Foundation has been pointing to the impending risks of natural epidemics since 2016 (Global Challenges Foundation 2016). The report stated that the increase in international mobility, interaction, and urbanization rates with the impact of globalization triggered the risk of the pandemic and made significant warnings that the World Health Organization, nation-states, and other international actors should have enhanced their planning and policy frameworks (Sula 2020). In short, the COVID-19 Pandemic had come in plain sight, but the world was unprepared to deal with it. There are a few points that need to be considered drawn from this state of unpreparedness. First, these warnings on global warming, armaments, epidemics, and other risks that are brought by modern technology and changes in societies are not sufficiently considered by policymakers and academics. There is a need for more research on global risks and threats, as well as more efficient capacity-building initiatives based on such research. Second, the pandemic demonstrated that it would not be enough to respond to global security challenges only with local policies (Sula 2020). There is a need to overcome the obsession with national security and to work 3 The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists evaluates how close the world is to a possible human-made global disaster that particular year, with the symbolic Doomsday Clock they publish.

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on the development of global governance mechanisms and the strengthening of existing frameworks. While the criticisms directed at the idea of global governance are significant and need to be considered, the most powerful tool currently available to solve the urgent issues brought by global threats seems to be the mechanisms of global governance. Thus, while conducting critical academic research on the concept and application of global governance, there is also a need to have a problem-solving approach to deal with urgent global risks and threats.

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