Women, Peace and Security in Myanmar: Between Feminism and Ethnopolitics 2019014906, 9780367250447, 9780429286605

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Women, Peace and Security in Myanmar

This book describes women’s efforts as agents for change in Myanmar and examines the potential of the peace process as an opportunity for women’s empowerment. Following decades of political turbulence, the volume describes the contributions of women in Myanmar in the midst of a difficult peace process and reflects on the significance of the Women, Peace and Security agenda in this context. The book examines how women have mobilized for peace, while also addressing women’s participation in the conflict, and investigates the perspectives and aims of women’s organizations and the challenges and aspirations of women activists in Myanmar’s ethnic areas. Contributions in the volume discuss and critically assess the argument that war and peacebuilding add momentum to the transformation of gender roles. By presenting new knowledge on women’s disempowerment and empowerment in conflict, and their participation in peacebuilding, this book adds important insights into the debate on gender and political change in societies affected by conflict. This book will be of interest to students of peace and conflict studies, gender studies and security studies in general. Åshild Kolås is a Social Anthropologist and Research Professor at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), Norway.

Women, Peace and Security in Myanmar Between Feminism and Ethnopolitics

Edited by Åshild Kolås

First published 2019 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2019 selection and editorial matter, Åshild Kolås; individual chapters, the contributors The right of Åshild Kolås to be identified as the author of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Kolas, Ashild, editor. Title: Women, peace and security in Myanmar : between feminism and ethnopolitics / edited by Åshild Kolås. Description: Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2019. | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2019014906 | ISBN 9780367250447 (hardback) | ISBN 9780429286605 (e-book) Subjects: LCSH: Women—Political activity—Burma. | Women and peace—Burma. | Burma—Politics and government—21st century. | Feminism—Burma. | United Nations. Security Council. Resolution 1325. Classification: LCC HQ1236.5.B93 W66 2020 | DDC 320.082/ 09591—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019014906 ISBN: 978-0-367-25044-7 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-429-28660-5 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by Apex CoVantage, LLC

Contents

List of tables Acknowledgments Abbreviations Notes on contributors Introduction: women, peace and security in Myanmar: the map and the terrain

vii viii ix xi

1

ÅSHILD KOLÅS

1

UNSCR 1325 in Myanmar: women’s rights, peace and security in times of transition

18

CAMILLA BUZZI

2

Women in the Myanmar peace process: the 30-percent target

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B I S H N U R A J U P R E T I , DRI S HT I UP RE T I AND DE BE ND RA PR A S A D A D H I K A RI

3

Women-to-women diplomacy and the Women’s League of Burma

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M A G D A L O R E N A CARDE NAS

4

No peace in a ceasefire: women’s agency for peace in the Kachin conflict M A RT E N I L S E N

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Contents

5

Women’s participation in peacebuilding: views from Mon rural communities

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M Y I N T M Y I N T MON

6

Women survivors’ experiences of war and perspectives on peace in Myanmar

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S . H K AW N G N AW

7

Women in Myanmar’s ethnic armed organizations: numbers and narratives

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Å S H I L D K O L Å S AND L E I TANT HE M UMAKANTA MEITEI

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Women’s ‘marginal voices’: diverse perspectives on peace and security in Myanmar

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E L E N A D I PA D OVA

Index

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Tables

2.1 Women in the Myanmar peace process, 2011–2016 7.1 Women in ethnic armed organizations 7.2 Women in central executive committees (CECs) of ethnic armed organizations

36 100 101

Acknowledgments

This volume presents findings from the project ‘Gender Equality, Peace and Security in Nepal and Myanmar: WOMENsPEACE’, funded by the Research Council of Norway under its ‘NORGLOBAL’ program and hosted by the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO). The WOMENsPEACE project studied women’s participation in peacebuilding in Nepal and Myanmar, with a focus on the gender dimension of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process in Nepal, and women’s participation in the peace process in Myanmar. Project partners were the Nepal Centre for Contemporary Research (NCCR) in Nepal and Ar Yone Oo Social Development Association (AYO) in Myanmar. The WOMENsPEACE team included Wenche Iren Hauge (PRIO) as the project leader, Bishnu Raj Upreti and Debendra Adhikari (NCCR), Cin Khan Lian and Leitanthem Umakanta Meitei (AYO) and Åshild Kolås (PRIO). WOMENsPEACE organized civil society workshops in Kathmandu and Yangon and brought together researchers on women’s agency in the Myanmar peace process for a conference in Bangkok, Thailand. The editor would like to thank all the contributors to the WOMENsPEACE project, including the Research Council of Norway, PRIO’s Centre on Gender, Peace and Security, colleagues at NCCR and AYO, contributors to our field research in Nepal and Myanmar, participants at our workshops and, especially, the authors of the chapters of this book.

Abbreviations

AA ABSDF ALP BWU CEC CEDAW CNF DKBA EAO KIO KNO KNPP KNU KPC MNDAA MP NCA NCP NDAA NDF NLD NMSP NSCN – K PNLO RCSS SSPP SWAN TNLA

Arakan Army All Burma Students’ Democratic Front Arakan Liberation Party Burmese Women’s Union Central Executive Committee Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women Chin National Front Democratic Karen Benevolent Army Ethnic Armed Organization Kachin Independence Organization Kuki National Organization – Burma Karenni National Progressive Party Karen National Union Karen Peace Council Myanmar National Democracy Alliance Army Member of Parliament Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement National Convention Process National Democratic Alliance Army – Eastern Shan National Democratic Force National League for Democracy New Mon State Party National Socialist Council of Nagaland – Khaplang Pa – Oh National Liberation Organization Restoration Council of Shan State Shan State Progress Party Shan Women’s Action Network Ta’ang National Liberation Army

x Abbreviations USDP VTA WLB WPS

Union Solidarity and Development Party Village Tract Administrator Women’s League of Burma Women, Peace and Security

Contributors

Debendra Prasad Adhikari holds a doctoral degree from the Kathmandu University School of Education (KUSoED), where he studied the reintegration of female ex-combatants in post-conflict Nepal. Before taking up his doctoral studies, Adhikari worked for more than a decade as a manager of projects on human rights, poverty alleviation, peacebuilding and conflict transformation for agencies such as the International Labour Organization (ILO), UN Women, the Department for International Development (DFID) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Nepal. Camilla Buzzi is Associate Professor at Østfold University College, Norway, and holds a PhD in in human rights and peace studies from the Institute for Human Rights and Peace Studies at Mahidol University, Thailand. She is a political scientist from the University of Oslo, where she also obtained a degree in French, political science and philosophy, as well as a teacher’s education diploma. She is a former coordinator for PD Burma and a former country program manager for Myanmar for Norwegian Church Aid. Magda Lorena Cardenas is a PhD candidate in political science at Umeå University in Sweden. She holds a master’s in post-war recovery studies from the University of York in the United Kingdom. She is a former advisor for justice and gender issues at the Presidential Program for Human Rights in Colombia, and a former lecturer in International Relations in Javeriana and Rosario University, Colombia. Åshild Kolås is a Social Anthropologist and works as a Research Professor at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO). She has carried out fieldwork in multi-ethnic communities in India and China, and has written on Tibet, Nepal, Northeast India and Myanmar with a focus on gender, peace and security, governance, identity politics, discourse

xii

Contributors and representation. Kolås is the editor of Women, Peace and Security in Northeast India (Zubaan Books) and Women, Peace and Security in Nepal: From Civil War to Post-Conflict Reconstruction (Routledge), both published in 2017. Her current research is on gender, peacebuilding and conflict management, with a particular focus on Myanmar.

Leitanthem Umakanta Meitei is Advocate (juris doctor, LMS Law College, Manipur University, India) with international experience in the fields of human rights, environmental protection, conflict transformation and indigenous peoples’ rights. He holds a master of arts in conflict transformation from the School for International Training (SIT) Graduate Institute at Brattleboro, Vermont, USA. Meitei carried out research for the WOMENsPEACE project as an associate of Ar Yone Oo Social Development Association. He is currently an Associate Attorney for the Fraternity Legal Services and Research Center (FLSRC) in Manipur, India. Myint Myint Mon is Programme Director at Jeepyah Civil Society Development Organization, which is a non-profit civil society organization based in Mawlamyine, Mon State, Myanmar. She has worked as a teacher at the Mon Government School and Mon National School. In 1992, she joined the New Mon State Party (NMSP) to fight for self-determination for the Mon ethnic nationality. In NMSP, she served as Joint-Secretary of the Mon Women’s Organization, Headmistress of Mon Post-Ten School and Mon National Education Committee Member (1992–2005). Since 2005, Mon has worked for the Human Rights Foundation of Monland and Jeepyah Civil Society Development Organization, building civil society and youth leadership capacity. S. Hkawng Naw (aka Ah Noh) is from Kachin State in northern Myanmar and has worked for women’s rights in Kachin as a Human Rights Activist, Civil Society Leader and Program Officer for several international non-governmental organizations. After graduating with a bachelor of commerce degree from Monywa Economic Institute, Myanmar, Ah Noh attended the Earth Rights International Burma School in Chiang Mai, Thailand; completed a diploma course in Political Science at the University of Yangon; and now holds an executive master of public administration (EMPA) from Syracuse University, USA. She has worked for a decade with community-based organizations in support of women’s rights in Myanmar. Marte Nilsen is Senior Researcher at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), where she specializes on Southeast Asian affairs with a focus on Thailand and Myanmar, and coordinates the PRIO Research School on

Contributors

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Peace and Conflict. After obtaining a master’s degree from the Department of Culture Studies and Oriental Languages at the University of Oslo, Nilsen completed a PhD in history of religions at the Centre for Theology and Religious Studies, Lund University, Sweden. Nilsen’s current research focuses on societal transformation in conflict settings and political movements on the social and geographical margins of the state. Elena Di Padova is Independent Researcher of security and gender issues. From 2001 to 2014, she worked in Bangkok as a training officer for a program to empower women advocates from ethnic minority groups in Myanmar. Di Padova has presented papers and published her work on gender and security-related issues, and in particular on gender-based violence against ethnic minority women in the Myanmar conflict and on the ethnic minority women’s perspectives on peace and security. In 2016, she graduated with a master’s in women’s and gender studies (Erasmus Mundus Program GEMMA) at the University of Hull (United Kingdom) and at the Universidad de Oviedo (ES). She now works as Researcher for an Italian public institution specialized on childhood policies. Bishnu Raj Upreti holds a PhD in conflict management (2001), an MSc in knowledge systems management (1998) from Wageningen University, the Netherlands, and an MA in sociology (1994) from Tribhuvan University, Nepal. He leads the Nepal Centre for Contemporary Research (NCCR), where he is engaged in research as well as administrative and policy work. Dr. Upreti has been a research fellow at the University of London and the University of Surrey, and worked with the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN). He was the South Asia Regional Coordinator of NCCR North-South (a global research network) for eight years. He also served as Adjunct Professor at the Agriculture and Forestry University, Nepal, and Senior Researcher at Kathmandu University. Drishti Upreti is a graduate in development studies from Kathmandu University and is currently working as a Research Officer at the Nepal Centre for Contemporary Research (NCCR) in Kathmandu. She specializes in qualitative methods and policy research, and has researched topics such as domestic violence and violence against women, the involvement of women in the production and marketing of cardamom, youth and migration, governance and disaster management and the impact of natural disasters in a gender perspective. She has also written on gender roles and smoking among young girls in Kathmandu.

Introduction Women, peace and security in Myanmar: the map and the terrain Åshild Kolås

After decades of political turbulence, autocratic rule and ethnopolitical conflict, Myanmar is in the midst of a thorny peace process. This volume describes the contributions of women to that peace process and reflects on the significance of the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda in the context of Myanmar. It does so by exploring the gendered nature of Burmese politics and investigating the everyday consequences of gendered policymaking, presenting research findings from Myanmar. Taking a step back from the normative perspective of the United Nations and multilateral agencies, we describe and discuss the ground realities we have found in the ‘terrain’ of Myanmar, in light of the ‘Women, Peace and Security map’. Following the landslide electoral victory of the National League for Democracy (NLD) in 2015, the human rights icon and Nobel Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi was inaugurated as the first state counselor of Myanmar, head of the President’s Office, and Myanmar’s first woman foreign minister. Against all odds, the uncompromising critic of the military junta has become the head of state. In her new role, she faces the difficult task of resolving the nearly seventy-year-old conflict between the state of Myanmar and its military, and the country’s numerous ethnic armed organizations. Since she took office, Aung San Suu Kyi has wrestled with the stabilization of a fragile economy and high expectations of her ability to usher in peace, justice and equal rights. Critics have held her accountable for the plight of the Rohingya Muslims of Rakhine State and their mass exodus to Bangladesh in 2017. The term ‘genocide’ has been applied to the violence against the Rohingyas. There have been demands for Aung San Suu Kyi’s resignation and calls for the withdrawal of honorary distinctions she once received as a human rights activist. This book is about women’s agency for peace in Myanmar. Regardless of the recent controversy, Aung San Suu Kyi is a person of obvious interest to the topic of this book. She is known far beyond the borders of Myanmar as an advocate for democracy and human rights. In 2016, Forbes listed her

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as the twenty-sixth most powerful woman in the world (Howard 2016). As the daughter of Burmese independence hero Aung San and Burma’s first woman ambassador Khin Kyi, holding a degree from Oxford University, Suu Kyi is extraordinarily privileged. And yet, she is still an example for women in her party. As expressed by one such woman: My role model is Daw [Suu Kyi]. When she first entered politics, we saw her as a daughter of General Aung San and someone who could lead our country. By working with her, I like her very much and take her as an example, but I can’t be like her. There’s no weakness in her way of answering questions and thinking. The way she thinks is different from us. It’s modernized. (Quoted in Shwe Shwe Sein Lat et al. 2017: 8) Aung San Suu Kyi has inspired her fellow party members, and as an icon of democracy and human rights, many of her supporters in the international community also expect her to advocate for women’s rights. As an elected leader, Aung San Suu Kyi must answer to her voters, although her power is limited by the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, who decides on matters of national security and controls the Ministries of Defence, Borders and Home Affairs. Moreover, as the head of government and a key actor in the ongoing peace process, Aung San Suu Kyi’s contribution to peace and women’s empowerment in Myanmar is bound to be evaluated against the global Women, Peace and Security agenda. Considering Aung San Suu Kyi’s unique political role, it is impossible to overlook her in a study of women’s agency in the Myanmar peace process. Omitting the ‘atypical’ powerful woman is not a viable research option. Rather, a look at Aung San Suu Kyi’s position as a woman leader may highlight the dilemmas women decision makers often face. As a woman who has engaged in the struggle for power in a domain dominated by men, Aung San Suu Kyi must consider her options carefully. As her moniker ‘the Lady’ suggests, she cannot expect to be judged by the same standards as her male counterparts. As a woman, some may expect her to champion feminism at any cost, while others prefer that she upholds cultural norms and values appropriate to the women of her society. Whatever she decides, her choices will be evaluated through the lens of gender. As an elected leader, her power is built on her ability to garner consensus. In a country that is deeply divided, consensus building is a difficult task. Myanmar is deeply divided, by ethnopolitics as well as struggles over democracy. Though debate about feminism has not yet developed into a new front line, the potential for divisive politics is clear. It may not be in the best interest of consensus building to take up the banner of women’s empowerment in

Introduction 3 contemporary Myanmar. Nor has Aung San Suu Kyi run for office on a women’s rights platform. A key item on the WPS agenda is to ensure women’s inclusion in peace processes. Against this backdrop, narrating ‘the story of a woman’s movement’ or ‘the experiences of women’ is never purely descriptive. Whose voices do we listen to, when we research ‘women’s agency’? Whose stories do we share, and what aspects of ‘womanhood’ do we highlight? Which experiences do we define as relevant? These are questions with normative implications, and they are also of key concern to the ongoing academic debates on the study of women’s empowerment. Women’s empowerment is a politically charged issue, and the WPS agenda should also be understood as a part of the politics of gender.

The global emergence of women, peace and security Women’s active involvement in peacemaking became a high-priority multilateral issue in 2000, when the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted its Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (UNSC 2000), calling for women’s participation and representation in all matters of peace and security. The new perspective was backed by feminist scholarship on the gendered nature of war, following the seminal work of scholars such as Cynthia Enloe (1989, 1993, 2000) and Ann Tickner (1992). Gender has hence been recognized as fundamental to international politics and inseparable from peace and security concerns (see Cohn 2012; Enloe 2007; Harris 2011; Porter 2007; Basu 2016). The Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda gained momentum with the adoption of additional UNSC resolutions, including 1674 (in 2006), 1820 (in 2008), 1882, 1888 and 1889 (all in 2009), of which several addressed conflict-related sexual violence. Meanwhile, research on gender and war shed new light on the vulnerability of women during conflict, and questioned women’s exclusion from peace processes (Anderlini 2007; Eliatamby 2011; Kaufman et al. 2013; Tripp 2005; Wood 2008; Zarkov 2008). The WPS architecture was further enhanced with the appointment of special representatives and special envoys, while WPS became a regular point on the agenda of Security Council meetings (Tryggestad 2009). Since the adoption of UNSCR 1325, multilateral agencies and international organizations have promoted gender equality and women’s empowerment in a number of conflict-affected countries. UN agencies have also published numerous studies on women’s participation in peace processes and post-conflict empowerment (e.g. Banaszak et al. 2005; Burke et al. 2001; Chinkin 2003; Klot 2007; Mayanja 2010; UNDP 2010a, 2010b; UNESCO 2006; UNFPA 2007; UNIFEM 2006; UNSC 2009; UN Women 2012, 2015).

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In a parallel move, gender researchers have turned their attention to the obstacles to women’s inclusion in peace processes, and the contributions of women peacebuilders toward a more egalitarian post-conflict gender order (Black 2009; Beckwith 2005; Kuehnast et al. 2011; Mazurana et al. 2005; Porter 2003; Pratt and Richter-Devroe 2011; Waylen 2007). Comparative qualitative research has shown that women have made substantial contributions to peacemaking, despite that their inclusion in peace talks is challenged or met with indifference by many mediators and conflict parties (Paffenholz et al. 2016: 5, see also UN Women 2015). Researchers have found that the strength of women’s influence correlates with agreements being reached and implemented (Paffenholz et al. 2016: 6), recognizing multiple modalities by which influence can be achieved. Another key finding is that women who were influential in a multi-stakeholder negotiation process often pushed for more concrete and fundamental changes, such as cessation of hostilities, ceasefires or renewed peace talks; the signing of peace agreements, enhanced women’s representation in the peace process and the political structure of the post-conflict state; or gender-sensitive political and legal reforms (e.g. new legislation on land ownership, inheritance or healthcare, transitional justice on gender-based violence and human rights violations, demands for truth and reconciliation commissions and equal access to reintegration programs) (ibid.: 10). A key question in the recent literature is how WPS initiatives can be more effectively implemented. The Global Study on Women, Peace and Security (UN Women 2015) emphasizes the need to formulate National Action Plans for the Implementation of UNSCR 1325. As of November 2018, seventynine UN Member States (40 percent of all UN Member States) have adopted UNSCR 1325 National Action Plans. Myanmar has not yet formulated a National Action Plan on the Implementation of UNSCR 1325. However, the participation of women in peace talks has been a topic of debate since 2012, when President Thein Sein presented his plans for dialogue on a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement.

Gender equality and women’s political participation in Myanmar Burmese women’s suffrage dates back to 1929, when Burma was still under British colonial rule. The first woman member of the Legislative Council, Hnin Mya, was elected the same year. In 1931, Mya Sein, the secretary of the Burmese Women’s Association, demanded equal rights for the women of Burma during discussions on the Government of Burma Act at the Burma Round Table Conference in London (Global Justice Center 2013). As stipulated by the Government of Burma Act, 1935, Burma was separated from

Introduction 5 India and granted a constitution in 1937. In the first election for Burma’s new legislative body, a woman, Dr. Saw Sa, was elected as a member of the thirty-six-seat Senate. Aung San Suu Kyi’s father, Aung San, played a prominent role in the nationalist movement in the late 1930s and early 1940s, as co-founder of the Communist Party of Burma and People’s Revolutionary Party, and an active member of the pro-independence Freedom Bloc. After a warrant was issued for his arrest, Aung San fled to China, where he received military training from the Japanese and formed the Burma Independence Army, later known as the Burma Defence Army. Japan invaded Burma in 1942 and declared Burma’s independence in 1943. The Japanese occupation became increasingly violent, and in August 1944, Aung San and other Burmese Communist leaders founded the Anti-Fascist Organisation, making the Japanese their primary enemy. In March 1945, the Burma National Army rebelled against the Japanese, and Aung San and others initiated secret negotiations with the British. After the war, Aung San negotiated with the British for Burma’s independence, and an agreement was reached on 27 January 1947. On 12 February 1947, Aung San convened a conference of leaders of the Chin, Shan and Kachin ethnic minorities at the town of Panglong in Shan State, where an agreement was reached on the creation of a unified state of Burma. In April 1947, elections were held to fill 255 seats in the Constituent Assembly. Four women were among the elected. After the assassination of Aung San and two other members of the assembly, their wives were appointed in their stead. Aung San Suu Kyi’s mother Khin Kyi thus filled in for her husband Aung San, while Khin Nyunt filled in for her husband Tha Khin Mya and Khin Khin for her husband U Razak (Global Justice Center 2013: 2). This brought the number of women parliamentarians up to seven and the share of women in the assembly to 3.1 percent. In 1952, three women were elected to the parliament (1.3 percent). One of them, Ba Maung Chein, was appointed minister for Karen Affairs in the first union government and became the first woman minister. In 1956, five women were elected to the parliament (2.2 percent). In 1962, the parliament was dissolved by General Ne Win and other military officers, who ruled Burma as a socialist one-party state until 1988. Nevertheless, under the 1974 Constitution, elections were held for the People’s Assembly every four years. In 1974, nine women were elected to the assembly (2 percent), followed by thirteen in 1978 (2.9 percent), fifteen in 1981 (3.2 percent), sixteen in 1985 (3.3 percent) and fifteen in 1990 (3 percent) (Global Justice Center 2013). Aung San Suu Kyi entered Burmese politics in 1988, just as Ne Win was losing control over the ruling Burma Socialist Programme Party. After nearly three decades in India and the United Kingdom, she returned to Yangon to

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care for her ailing mother. Caught up in a wave of mass demonstrations that culminated in the ‘8888 uprising’ of 8 August 1988, Aung San Suu Kyi cofounded the National League for Democracy (NLD) and became its general secretary. As security forces cracked down on anti-government protest, the military rulers promised to hold multi-party elections. With the founding of the State Law and Order Restoration Council (later reconstituted as the State Peace and Development Council), the military regime was reestablished. In July 1989, Aung San Suu Kyi was placed under house arrest, where she spent fifteen of the next twenty-one years, until her release in November 2010. In the 1990 election, candidates of the NLD won 81 percent of the parliamentary seats. The military rulers disregarded these results and failed to convene the new national assembly. Aung San Suu Kyi was given a unique opportunity to explain the situation when she was asked to deliver the keynote address at the non-governmental organizations (NGO) forum of the 1995 World Conference on Women in Beijing. Aung San Suu Kyi was unable to travel to the conference, but she delivered her statement on video. She used the opportunity to describe the status of women’s political participation in Myanmar: In my country at present, women have no participation in the higher levels of government and none whatsoever in the judiciary. Even within the democratic movement only 14 out of the 485 MPs elected in 1990 were women – all from my own party, the National League for Democracy. These 14 women represent less than 3 percent of the total number of successful candidates. They, like their male colleagues, have not been permitted to take office since the outcome of those elections has been totally ignored. Yet the very high performance of women in our educational system and in the management of commercial enterprises proves their enormous potential to contribute to the betterment of society in general. Meanwhile our women have yet to achieve those fundamental rights of free expression, association and security of life denied also to their menfolk. (Aung San Suu Kyi 1995) The 2010 election introduced a novel parliamentary system that allowed 75 percent of parliamentary seats to be electorally contested, although the military maintained control of the remaining 25 percent. The new bicameral parliament, the Assembly of the Union (Pyidaungsu Hluttaw), is composed of a House of Nationalities (Amyotha Hluttaw) and a House of Representatives (Pyithu Hluttaw) (Egreteau 2014). In addition, the fourteen states and regions of Myanmar each have their own parliament.

Introduction 7 Although the NLD boycotted the 2010 general election, fifty-four women were elected, constituting 3.5 percent of members of parliament (Global Justice Center 2013: 4). In 2012, a by-election was held to fill vacant seats in the parliament, and the NLD participated. As a result, Aung San Suu Kyi and forty-three other NLD contestants were elected as members of parliament, while she became the assembly’s leader of the opposition. With this, 6.0 percent of MPs in the national parliament were women, as were 3.8 percent of MPs in regional and state parliaments. As of the 2016 general election, 13.7 percent of elected MPs were women, whereas the share of women in regional and state parliaments reached 12.7 percent. However, if we include the MPs nominated by the military, the 2011 shares were 4.8 percent in the national parliament and 2.9 percent in the regional and state parliaments, while the 2016 shares were 10.5 percent in the national parliament and 9.7 percent in the regional and state parliaments (Shwe Shwe Sein Lat et al. 2017: 3, Table 1). Though the figures are still low, they represent a huge increase, moving Myanmar up to the 161st place out of 191 countries in terms of its female share of MPs as of December 2018 (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2018a). The global average was 24.1 percent female parliamentarians in nationally elected bodies, while the regional average for Asia was 19.7 percent (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2018b). If we look at the share of women in the lower-level administrations of Myanmar, the situation is far less promising. According to a recent paralegal case study of land rights in Myanmar, there is a striking lack of women in local governance, as none of the country’s 330 townships had a woman as township administrator, and there were only forty-two women out of 16,785 village tract or ward administrators (Namati 2016: 3). As the study also notes, the law in Myanmar is quite gender-neutral on issues related to land and property ownership, but when women claim their rights to land, they ‘run into a heavily male-dominated system of decision-making at each of the intra-household, community, and government institution levels’ (Namati 2016: 2–3). Since 2006, the World Economic Forum has published Global Gender Gap reports that rank countries on their performance in the closing of gender gaps. Myanmar was first indexed in 2017 when it received a score of 0.691. Myanmar was thus ranked as number 83 out of 144 countries in the Global Gender Gap Index (GGI) of 2017 (PeaceWomen.org 2018). Another genderrelated ranking is the Gender Inequality Index (GII), which is a part of the Human Development Index (HDI). In the 2017 index, Myanmar had a GII value of 0.456, ranking it as number 106 out of 160 countries. Myanmar’s overall HDI value increased between 1990 and 2017 from 0.358 to 0.578. This moved Myanmar up to an HDI medium-ranked country, placed at

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number 148 out of 189 countries and territories in 2017. With an increase of 61.5 percent, this is a very promising trend. However, with 10.5 percent women MPs, Myanmar has less than half of the average 21.8 percent share of female parliamentarians in medium-ranked countries (UNDP 2018). The 2014 Human Development Report introduced a Gender Development Index (GDI), defined as a ratio of the female to the male HDI, based on the gender-disaggregated Human Development Index. The GDI measures gender inequalities in three dimensions of human development: health (measured by female and male life expectancy at birth), education (measured by female and male expected years of schooling for children and mean years for adults aged 25 and older) and command over economic resources (measured by female and male estimated GNI per capita). The 2017 GDI value for Myanmar was 0.959, with a female HDI value of 0.563 versus a male HDI value of 0.586. This is a higher value (indicating less deviation from gender parity) than the average medium-HDI value of 0.878. Of the four basic indicators, women in Myanmar had a longer life expectancy at birth (69.1 versus 64.4 years) and scored higher on both expected years of schooling (10.3 versus 9.8) and mean years of schooling (4.9 versus 4.8). However, women had a significantly lower GNI per capita (3,860 versus 7,355). While this suggests a very inequitable command over economic resources, the female/male GNI ratio of Myanmar is actually less disparate than the average medium-ranked country, which has a female/male GNI per capita of 3,673 versus 9,906 (UNDP 2018). It is worth noting that the Burmese government ratified the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in 1997, while the country was still under military rule (WON 2016). In 2013, the Myanmar government launched a National Strategic Plan for the Advancement of Women, and in 2014, the military finally appointed two women as delegates to the national parliament.

Putting Myanmar on the WPS map During the past two decades, the gender-specific impact of conflict on women and girls has been thoroughly documented by Myanmar’s women’s organizations, primarily in the heavily conflict-affected ethnic states and border areas. Women’s organizations such as the Shan Women’s Action Network have provided disturbing evidence of intimidation and verbal, physical and sexual violence perpetrated by the armed forces against women and girls (Transnational Institute 2016). According to the Women’s League of Burma (WLB), their member organizations have continued to receive reports of sexual violence from Kachin State, Karen State, Mon State, Chin State, Shan State and Karenni State, and moreover, ‘Survivors face intimidation from

Introduction 9 authorities at every level, including from officers determined to subvert justice and ensure the culture of impunity remains intact’ (WLB 2014: 4). The Women’s League of Burma warns that ‘a number of key clauses in the 2008 constitution leave the military authorities unaccountable to civilian courts and afford them de facto freedom from prosecution for crimes committed while on official duty’ (ibid.). After a long history of ceasefire agreements between the Burmese Army and ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), formal negotiations over a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) were finally started in April 2013 (Muehlenbeck and Federer 2016: 3). As the peace process progressed, international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), donor countries and UN agencies supported women’s groups with capacity-building and other resources to promote women’s inclusion in the peace process. In 2014, an alliance was formed by the major women’s networks and organizations in Myanmar, including the Gender and Development Institute, the Gender Equality Network, Kachin State Women’s Network, Mon Women’s Network, Nyein (Shalom) Foundation, Women and Peace Action Network (Shan State), Women’s League of Burma and WON/WIN-Peace, who together formed the Alliance for Gender Inclusion in the Peace Process (AGIPP). Their stated objective was to address the low levels of women’s involvement in peace negotiations and the critical need to improve the inclusion of gendered analysis and outcomes in both the texts and implementation of ceasefire and peace agreements. With support from international organizations, several important policy briefs were produced by AGIPP as input to the NCA dialogue (e.g. AGIPP 2015, 2017). Leading up to the signing of the NCA in October 2015, two women served as officials in the fifteen-member Senior Delegation, which was the negotiation team for the EAOs. The two were Saw Mra Raza Lin, a member of the Arakan Liberation Party, and Naw Zipporah Sein, the former vice chair of the Karenni National Union, who was later appointed lead negotiator. In addition, another two women, Ja Nan Lahtaw and Nang Raw Zakhung of the Nyein (Shalom) Foundation, served as technical advisors (Warren et al. 2018: 19). In December 2015, AGIPP published their first policy brief, ‘Women, Peace and Security Policymaking in Myanmar’, providing a comprehensive background analysis and recommendations for inclusion of women in the peace process (AGIPP 2015). Their key recommendation was to mandate 30 percent women’s representation in the peace process. Reports by AGIPP and UN Women listed the number of women that would have to be appointed to reach 30 percent inclusion of women in each of the committees of the peace process, as well as Myanmar’s CEDAW commitments. When the parties to the NCA subsequently agreed on a ‘Framework for Political

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Dialogue’, it included a pledge to make efforts to reach 30 percent women’s participation in all political dialogues (Pepper 2017). A series of peace conferences have been held since the NLD’s landslide victory in 2015. Reminiscent of Aung San’s 1947 meeting with Shan, Kachin and Chin leaders at Panglong (Transnational Institute 2017), the so-called 21st Century Panglong conferences have invited large numbers of delegates. Up to 17 percent of the conference participants have been women. Despite the consensus, women’s representation in the peace process has never reached the 30-percent target, nor is there any mechanism in place to ensure that 30 percent of seats at the negotiating table are filled by women. Moreover, questions have been raised about the use of quotas to ensure women’s inclusion in peace processes. While many women stakeholders present reservations or quotas for women as an efficient mechanism, others, including Aung San Suu Kyi herself, have warned that ‘it’s not that simple’ (Michaels 2014). A key issue is the need to ensure that all candidates are well qualified. Furthermore, how does a quota impact on perceptions of gender equality? And what happens when a quota is prescribed but not filled? Advocates of women’s inclusion admit that quotas are ‘no guarantee for women’s participation’ and suggest the need for other incentives (Thin Lei Win 2016). A key challenge is to understand the deeply rooted notions about gender roles that limit women’s participation in Myanmar’s governance and politics in general, including subtle perceptions about gender that guide behavior, emotions and attitudes. As described in a discussion paper based on a series of in-depth interviews with Burmese women, underlying norms inhibit the public participation of women, despite ‘a notion in Myanmar that women enjoy an elevated status in social and political affairs’ (Paung Sie Facility 2016: 20). The paper lays out four key factors that inhibit the participation of women in the current peace process. The first of these factors is socio-cultural gender norms and expectations (ibid.: 16): Strong social norms that discriminate against women remain entrenched in all cultures and religions across Myanmar. These norms and expectations regarding the roles of women and girls sustain the view that women are inferior to men, which in turn limits the participation of women in decision-making. The second factor is women’s triple burden (ibid.: 17–18): Socio-cultural norms hold women responsible for childcare, care of parents and in-laws and household maintenance. These expected roles limit the ability of women to enter the labour force and participate in public life. Many women who participate in activities ‘outside the

Introduction 11 household’ such as in the paid labour force and/or community, face repercussions. These women effectively transgress the boundaries of their expected roles. The third factor is the negotiation of multiple intersectional identities, including ethnic, class and gender identities (ibid.: 18): In Myanmar, women across ethnic identities, including the dominant [Bamar] identity, are held responsible for matters of cultural continuity, including aspects of child-rearing, linguistic maintenance, and the upholding of traditions. When women resist these expectations in political movements, they often meet resentment from their colleagues who suggest that it is the women’s duty to uphold ethnic identity in order to advance democratic goals. Women who challenge the status quo (particularly regarding gender norms) are seen as detrimental to the advancement of the democratic movement. [. . .] The expected subordination of gender to ethnic and democracy concerns impedes the integration of gender into substantive peace negotiations. The fourth and final factor is gendered leadership cultures in Myanmar: The above three factors culminate in sustaining the view that men possess ‘natural’ leadership skills in Myanmar. Under this natural leadership of men narrative, women feel pressure to constantly prove their value and skills in order to participate in decision-making activities. Even highly skilled and confident women find few opportunities to lead as they are silenced by both subtle and overt sexist views and comments. [. . .] Women who attempt to ‘go against the grain’ by undertaking leadership positions are frequently accused of not being ‘authentic’ as a woman, wife, mother and daughter. In other words: men are culturally exempt from having to uphold standards of masculinity that relate to their public personas, whereas women must ‘choose’ between public and private life. As mentioned, narratives of women’s equal status may co-exist with painful experiences of inequality. A study carried out by the Gender Equality Network (GEN 2015) describes the lack of recognition of gender inequality in Myanmar as a key issue of concern and suggests that women’s perceived role as ‘bearers of culture’ adds to their burden: The idea of Myanmar as a country with equal opportunities for men and women emerged in colonial times and has remained the official

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Åshild Kolås rhetoric throughout military rule – a stance that is still reproduced today. Lack of data has held back the emergence of alternative discussions about gender relations. [. . . Social] and cultural norms carry ideas of different functions and worth for men and women, impacting on their life opportunities. Women, regarded as ‘bearers of culture’, are often blamed for what are seen as disappearing cultural values. (GEN 2015: 8)

Despite the obstacles and lack of equal opportunities, women in Myanmar are active agents for change. They are involved in civil society peacebuilding as well as ethnopolitical mobilization. Though largely undocumented, women play a significant role as cadres and supporters of armed groups, and some are also trained as combatants. In pan-ethnic women’s organizations, such as the Women’s League of Burma, women activists have strengthened their influence through alliance-building and contributed significantly to the peace process through campaigns and organizational work. The results are undeniable. According to a case study by the Council on Foreign Relations (2019): Despite their low participation rate in official forums, Burmese women have led mass action campaigns to address the root causes of the conflict, built public support for the process, served as honest brokers in negotiations, and documented human rights violations to promote greater rule of law. Conflict in Myanmar continues to revolve around issues of ethnic selfdetermination, human rights and democracy. Women’s agency for peace in Myanmar cannot ignore the fault-lines of democracy and territorial autonomy, and the ethnopolitics in which gender roles are embedded. Considering the deep-seated attitudes and norms at stake, advocates for change in Myanmar need patience. A pragmatic and creative outlook is required. It will be important to devise a mechanism to ensure the mandated 30 percent women’s representation in all entities of the peace talks, although women’s representation in formal peace dialogues is not the only way forward. If we shift our attention to the activities of women’s organizations and women’s civil society activism, a brighter picture comes into view. As described by Molly Pepper (2018: 61), women in Myanmar are ‘key players in peacebuilding because of their civil society activism, organized through ethnic women’s organizations, which places them around the table, if not at the table’. Women’s advocacy in Myanmar has a very significant impact on peacebuilding, although a shift in perspective may be required to recognize their contributions.

Introduction 13

The chapters of this book This volume highlights the diverse ways in which women engage in the political life of Myanmar, whether in grassroots organizations, women’s associations, electoral politics, peace conferences or negotiations. In studying the gendered politics of Myanmar, we focus on the everyday contexts where it is played out. In order to better understand women’s contributions to peacebuilding, we examine the wide range of perspectives, activities and aspirations of women responding to the peace initiative. The chapters of this volume are organized as follows. The first chapter provides an overview of the discourse on women’s rights in relation to the broader political canvas of human rights and democracy discourse. The following chapters describe and discuss women’s participation in various ethnic and political movements in Myanmar. One of the chapters examines the role of women in ethnic armed organizations, while others describe women’s activism and social work in the Kachin and Mon ethnic communities, and examine their involvement in women-to-women diplomacy and their activities in the Women’s League of Burma. One chapter deals with the feasibility of targets and quotas for women’s participation in the formal peace process. Others reflect on ethnic women as survivors and marginalization of their voices, contextualizing the peacebuilding experiences of women in Myanmar within broader debates on the empowerment of women through peacebuilding. Myanmar is still deeply entrenched in conflict and peacebuilding remains immensely challenging. Nevertheless, the pace and magnitude of the transition toward democracy should also be acknowledged. Positive developments in the freedom of expression and political organization have opened up new opportunities. Myanmar has also opened up to international investment and assistance, which has made new resources and capacity-building available to a wider section of civil society. With women’s empowerment as a prioritized area, unfamiliar ideas are being promoted – not the least the notion that women should be included in the peace process. While some may approve of the empowerment of women, others may see these ideas as culturally disruptive or harmful to conventional values. Some may feel threatened by pan-ethnic women’s solidarity. Conflict depends on narratives of injustice. When such narratives are reshaped, fault-lines of conflict become unsettled, with unpredictable outcomes. With so much at stake, it is important to examine carefully how the Women, Peace and Security agenda meets the ground in Myanmar.

References AGIPP (The Alliance for Gender Inclusion in the Peace Process). 2015. ‘Women, Peace and Security Policymaking in Myanmar: Context Analysis and Recommendations’, Policy Paper No. 1, December 2015. Yangon: AGIPP.

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———. 2017. ‘International Standards Guiding Gender Inclusion in Myanmar’s Peace Process’, Policy Paper No. 3, May 2017. Yangon: AGIPP. Anderlini, S. N. 2007. Women Building Peace: What They Do, Why It Matters. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Aung San Suu Kyi. 1995. ‘Opening Keynote Address at NGO Forum on Women – Aug. 31, 1995’, Archives of Women’s Political Communication, Iowa State University [online]. Available at: https://awpc.cattcenter.iastate.edu/2017/03/21/ opening-keynote-address-at-ngo-forum-on-women-aug-31-1995/ Banaszak, K., Pampell Conaway, C., Goetz, A. M., Iiyambo, A. and Muna, M., eds. 2005. Securing the Peace: Guiding the International Community Towards Women’s Effective Participation Throughout Peace Processes. New York, NY: United Nations Development Fund for Women UNIFEM. Basu, S. 2016. ‘Gender as National Interest at the UN Security Council’, International Affairs, 92(2): 255–73. Beckwith, K. 2005. ‘The Comparative Politics of Women’s Movements’, Perspectives on Politics, 3(3): 583–96. Black, R. 2009. ‘Mainstreaming Resolution 1325? Evaluating the Impact on Security Council Resolution 1325 on Country-Specific UN Resolutions’, Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, 11(4): 1–30. Burke, E. de Silva, Klot, J. and Bunting, I. 2001. Engendering Peace: Reflections on the Burundi Peace Process. Nairobi: UNIFEM. Chinkin, C. 2003. ‘Peace Agreements as a Means for Promoting Gender Equality and Ensuring Participation of Women’, Paper Prepared for the UN Division for the Advancement of Women, Expert Group Meeting, 10–13 November, Ottawa. Cohn, C. 2012. Women and Wars: Contested Histories, Uncertain Futures. New York: Polity Press. Council on Foreign Relations. 2019. ‘Myanmar. 2019. Current Peace Effort’ [online]. Available at: www.cfr.org/interactive/womens-participation-in-peace-processes/ myanmar Egreteau, R. 2014. ‘Legislators in Myanmar’s First “Post-Junta” National Parliament (2010–2015): A Sociological Analysis’, Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 33(2): 91–124. Eliatamby, M. 2011. Women Waging War and Peace: International Perspectives of Women’s Roles in Conflict and Post-Conflict Reconstruction. New York: Bloomsbury Publishing. Enloe, C. 1989. Bananas, Bases and Beaches, Making Feminist Sense of International Politics. Berkeley: University of California Press. ———. 1993. The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War. Berkeley: University of California Press. ———. 2000. Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women’s Lives. Berkeley: University of California Press. ———. 2007. Globalization and Militarism: Feminists make the Link. Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers. GEN (The Gender Equality Network). 2015. ‘Raising the Curtain. Cultural Norms, Social Practices and Gender Equality in Myanmar’, The Gender Equality Network, November 2015.

Introduction 15 Global Justice Center. 2013. ‘The Gender Gap and Women’s Political Power in Myanmar/ Burma’, Global Justice Center, May 2013 [online]. Available at: http://globaljustice center.net/documents/Gender%20Gap%20in%20Burma%20(Timeline).pdf Harris, C. 2011. ‘What Can Applying a Gender Lens Contribute to Conflict Studies? A Review of Selected MICROCON Working Papers’, MICROCON Research Working Paper No. 41. Brighton: MICROCON. Howard, C. 2016. ‘Women Who Rule the World: The 26 Most Powerful Female Political Leaders of 2016’, Forbes, 6 June 2016 [online]. Available at: www. forbes.com/sites/carolinehoward/2016/06/06/the-women-who-rule-the-world26-most-powerful-female-political-leaders/#2fc763eb635e Inter-Parliamentary Union. 2018a. ‘Women in National Parliaments’ [online]. Available at: http://archive.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm ———. 2018b. ‘Women in National Parliaments’ [online]. Available at: http://archive. ipu.org/wmn-e/world.htm Kaufman, J. P. and Williams, K. P. 2013. Women at War, Women Building Peace. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Klot, J. F. 2007. ‘Women and Peacebuilding’, Independent Expert Paper Commissioned by UNIFEM and UN Peacebuilding Support Office, Social Science Research Council, 29 January. Kuehnast, K., de Jonge Oudraat, C. and Hernes, H., eds. 2011. Women and War: Power and Protection in the 21st Century. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press. Mazurana, D., Raven-Roberts, A. and Parpart, J., eds. 2005. Gender, Conflict and Peacekeeping. New York: Rowman and Littlefield. Michaels, S. 2014. ‘The Ladies’, The Irrawaddy, 13 January 2014 [online]. Available at: www.irrawaddy.com/specials/women/ladies.html Muehlenbeck, A. and Federer, J. P. 2016. ‘Women’s Inclusion in Myanmar’s Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement’, Swiss Peace/Inclusive Security, July 2016 [online]. Available at: www.inclusivesecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/WomensInclusion-in-Myanmars-Nationwide-Ceasefire-Agreement.pdf Namati. 2016. ‘Gendered Aspects of Land Rights in Myanmar: Evidence From Paralegal Casework’, April 2016 [online]. Available at: https://namati.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/03/Namati-Gender-policy-brief-FINAL-1.pdf Paffenholz, T., Ross, N., Dixon, S., Schluchter, A.-L. and True, J. 2016. ‘Making Women Count – Not Just Counting Women: Assessing Women’s Inclusion and Influence on Peace Negotiations’. Geneva: Inclusive Peace and Transition Initiative (The Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies) and UN Women [online]. Available at: www.inclusivepeace.org/sites/default/files/IPTIUN-Women-Report-Making-Women-Count-60-Pages.pdf Paung Sie Facility. 2016. ‘The Women Are Ready: An Opportunity to Transform Peace in Myanmar’, Discussion Paper No. 1, January 2016, Peace Support Fund. PeaceWomen.org. 2018. ‘Country/Region Profile of: Myanmar’, Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom [online]. Available at: www.peacewomen. org/profile/country-region-profile-myanmar Pepper, M. 2017. ‘Women in Myanmar’s Peace Process’, Asia Dialogue, 5 October 2017 [online]. Available at: http://theasiadialogue.com/2017/10/05/women-inmyanmars-peace-process/

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———. 2018. ‘Ethnic Minority Women, Diversity, and Informal Participation in Peacebuilding in Myanmar’, Journal of Peacebuilding & Development, 13(2): 61–75. Porter, E. 2003. ‘Women, Political Decision-Making, and Peace-Building’, Global Change, Peace & Security, 15(3): 245–62. ———. 2007. Peacebuilding: Women in International Perspective. London: Routledge. Pratt, N. and Richter-Devroe, S. 2011. ‘Critically Examining UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security’, International Feminist Journal of Politics, 13(4): 489–503. Shwe Shwe Sein Latt, Ninh, K. N. B., Mi Ki Kyaw Myint and Lee, S. 2017. ‘Women’s Political Participation in Myanmar: Experiences of Women Parliamentarians 2011–2016’, The Asia Foundation and Phan Tee Eain, April 2017 [online]. Available at: https://asiafoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Womens-PoliticalParticipation-in-Myanmar-MP-Experiences_report-1.pdf Thin Lei Win. 2016. ‘Peace Process Quota No Guarantee for Women’s Participation’, Mizzima Weekly, 12 February 2016 [online]. Available at: http://mizzima. com/latest-news-politics-news-features/peace-process-quota-no-guaranteewomen%25E2%2580%2599s-participation Tickner, J. A. 1992. Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security. New York, NY: Columbia University Press. Transnational Institute. 2016. ‘No Women, No Peace: Gender Equality, Conflict and Peace in Myanmar’, Myanmar Policy Brief, 18 January 2016 [online]. Available at: www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/myanmar_briefing_18.pdf ———. 2017. ‘Beyond Panglong: Myanmar’s National Peace and Reform Dilemma’, Myanmar Policy Brief, 21 September 2017 [online]. Available at: www.tni.org/ files/publication-downloads/beyond_panglong.pdf Tripp, A. M. 2005. ‘Empowering Women in the Great Lakes Region: Violence, Peace and Women’s Leadership’, Social and Human Science Papers in Women’s Studies/Gender Research No. 3, UNESCO, Paris. Tryggestad, T. L. 2009. ‘Trick or Treat? The UN and Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security’, Global Governance, 15: 539–57. UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). 2010a. ‘Women’s Representation in Local Government in Asia-Pacific’, Status Report 2010: Going Beyond National Targets in Monitoring Status for MDG 3 on Women’s Political Empowerment, UNDP. ———. 2010b. Power, Voice and Rights: A Turning Point for Gender Equality in Asia and the Pacific, Asia-Pacific Human Development Report. Colombo: UNDP. ———. 2018. ‘Human Development Indices and Indicators: 2018 Statistical Update, Briefing Note for Countries on the 2018 Statistical Update, Myanmar’ [online]. Available at: http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/MMR.pdf UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization). 2006. ‘Forms and Patterns of Social Discrimination in Nepal’, UNESCO Kathmandu Series of Monographs and Working Papers No. 8, UNESCO, Paris. UNFPA (United Nations Population Fund). 2007. ‘Gender Equality and Empowerment of Women in Nepal’, UNFPA [online]. Available at: un.org.np/sites/default/ files/report/tid_67/2009-03-17-Gender-equality.pdf

Introduction 17 UNIFEM (United Nations Development Fund for Women). 2006. ‘A Rapid Scan: Organizations Working on Women and Peace in Nepal’. Kathmandu: UNIFEM Programme Office, Nepal. UNSC (United Nations Security Council). 2000. ‘Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security’, UN Doc S/RES/1325(2000), 31 October 2000. ———. 2009. ‘Women and Peace and Security’, Report of the Secretary-General, 16 September. New York: United Nations Security Council. UN Women. 2012. ‘Women’s Participation in Peace Negotiations: Connections Between Presence and Influence’, Internal Study by Pablo Castillo-Diaz and Simon Tordjman. ———. 2015. Preventing Conflict. Transforming Justice. Securing the Peace. A Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325. New York, NY: UN Women. Warren, R., Applebaum, A., Fuhrman, H. and Mawby, B. 2018. Women’s Peacebuilding Strategies Amidst Conflict: Lessons From Myanmar and Ukraine. Washington, DC: Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security. Waylen, G. 2007. Engendering Transitions: Women’s Mobilization, Institutions, and Gender Outcomes. New York: Oxford University Press. WLB (Women’s League of Burma). 2014. ‘If They Had Hope, They Would Speak: The Ongoing Use of State-Sponsored Sexual Violence in Burma’s Ethnic Communities’, November 2014. Chiang Mai: Women’s League of Burma. WON (Women’s Organization Network). 2016. ‘The Voices of Myanmar Women Research Report in support of CEDAW Alternative Report (2016)’, Women’s Organization Network [online]. Available at: https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/ CEDAW/Shared%20Documents/MMR/INT_CEDAW_NGO_MMR_24237_E.pdf Wood, E. J. 2008. ‘The Social Processes of Civil War: The Wartime Transformation of Social Networks’, Annual Review of Political Science, 11: 539–61. Zarkov, D., ed. 2008. Gender, Violent Conflict and Development. New Delhi: Kali for Women.

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UNSCR 1325 in Myanmar Women’s rights, peace and security in times of transition Camilla Buzzi

The 1988 uprising that gave rise to the formation of the National League for Democracy (NLD) was also the start of a civil society movement that gradually adopted the language of human rights to advocate for political change (Buzzi 2016). The adoption of the discourse of human rights by Burmese activists after 1988 was a strategy of resistance against military rule. During the following decades, many of these activists were forced to leave the country due to repression. In refugee camps and in exile, they developed a transnational movement that drew global attention to their call for democracy, justice and the protection of human rights. Women’s organizations played an important role in this movement. By the end of the 1990s, some twenty-five women’s organizations were active along Myanmar’s borders with Thailand, India, China and Bangladesh. Organizations such as the Burmese Women’s Union, Karenni National Women’s Organization, Shan Women’s Action Network and Women’s Rights and Welfare Association started in refugee camps and exile communities (Belak 2002). A common factor for many of these organizations was the desire to promote women’s leadership through capacity-building. Most of these organizations focused strongly on women’s rights and gender equality, combined with opposition to military rule (Fink 2011; Hedstrøm 2016). The Women’s League of Burma (WLB) was established in 1999 as an alliance of mainly ethnicity-based women’s organizations operating in border areas and from exile (Fink 2011; Harriden 2012). Since 2000, these organizations have drawn on the Women, Peace and Security framework in their advocacy for women’s rights and democracy. This chapter examines the use of the discourse of women’s rights, peace and security grounded in UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (2000) in civil society advocacy for change in Myanmar. The materials analyzed in this study are reports published by human rights organizations in Myanmar and the diaspora. The chapter describes the characteristics of the discourse, how it has evolved over time and the nodal

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points at which it has changed, and examines how the international Women, Peace and Security (WPS) discourse provides new ideas that shape the discursive space for women’s rights advocacy in the organizations under study. The key question is how WPS discourse is put to use in Myanmar. The primary materials analyzed in this study are documents produced by civil society organizations working for change in Myanmar. The analysis is informed by my experiences in Myanmar and Burmese diaspora communities while working in the fields of development and humanitarian practice, and advocacy for change while Myanmar (or Burma, as it was then known) was still under military rule. These experiences have inevitably shaped the lenses I bring to my research.

Women, peace and security discourse The adoption of Resolution 1325 by the UN Security Council in October 2000 reflects how violence against women in conflict has emerged as a central human rights issue. As noted by Keck and Sikkink (1998), a provision on violence against women was not initially included in the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), nor was this an issue of major concern to transnational social movements at the time (Bunch 1990; Keck and Sikkink 1998). The issue of violence against women in conflict entered the agenda of the United Nations in the mid-1980s, and within a decade, it became one of the key human rights issues of concern to transnational women’s movements. At the 1995 Beijing Conference, violence against women was one of four major issues on the agenda, as expressed in its Platform of Action. During the late 1990s, international civil society action was mobilized on the issue of violence against women, with reports of widespread sexual violence during the breakup of Yugoslavia and the Rwanda genocide (Keck and Sikkink 1998). A new understanding of rape as a weapon of war brought violence against women to the UN Security Council (UNSC), preparing the ground for the adoption of UNSC Resolution 1325 (2000). UNSCR 1325 aims to prevent and ensure accountability for violence against women and girls during war, including sexual and gender-based violence, and to encourage women’s participation in governance related to peace and conflict. UNSCR 1325 and twelve subsequent resolutions constitute the framework of the Women, Peace and Security agenda at the UN Security Council. In adopting these resolutions, the Security Council framed violations of women’s human rights as possible threats to international peace and security. In 2013, the implications of Resolution 1325 for women’s human rights were reconfirmed by the CEDAW Committee in its Recommendation no. 30 (CEDAW Committee 2013; Swaine and O’Rourke 2015).

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When UNSCR1325 was adopted, transnational civil society activists expected that it would be transformative and that it would contribute to a subversion of the politics of militarization and the patriarchal values that were dominant in the domain of international security (Shepherd 2016). As the years went by, however, the impact of UNSCR 1325 has been subjected to critical analysis. One line of review focuses on subsequent resolutions adopted by the UNSC after 1325 and how these have failed to reiterate the fundamental purpose of the first resolution. A second line of review raises questions about internal contradictions and tensions within the discourse of the resolution itself. Indeed, Security Council resolutions are political discourses that provide justification for certain actions while proscribing others (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012). As described by Shepherd (2010: 146), policy documents related to UNSCR 1325 reflect a number of conceptual ambiguities and tensions that have come to produce specific forms of gendered identities and understandings of violence. Due to the conceptual framing of policy documents, proscriptions on policy effectiveness and other constraints, Resolution 1325 fails to deliver on its more radical promise (Shepherd 2010, see also Carpenter 2006; Puechguirbal 2010). The ongoing debate on the implementation and results of UNSCR 1325 makes it particularly interesting to examine how the WPS discourse is put to use in advocacy for change in a country in transition, such as Myanmar. How does the WPS discourse impact on the space for local action? One approach to this question is known as the boomerang or spiral model (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse et al. 1999, 2009), which seeks to describe how transnational activist networks may impact local civil society by sharing international discourses. The model assumes that when dialogue between agents of the state and civil society is blocked, local activists may seek out international allies for assistance in leveraging the state. Cooperation with transnational advocacy networks can provide physical protection, information and financial support, which helps amplify the demands of local activists. In return, these activists are incorporated into a transnational movement marked by dense exchange of information and services, with shared values, beliefs and ideas and a common discourse. The boomerang or spiral model is based on the assumption that transnational actors help local activists by asserting normative pressure on state agents in order to change their attitudes and behaviors (Risse et al. 1999). However, this is offset by evidence that the normative use of human rights by international social networks results in primarily formal adjustments, rather than actual compliance with human rights norms and practices (Risse et al. 2009). Scholarly attention has also turned to local civil society actors, and their use of human rights discourse to press for change, recognizing the partisan and political nature of human rights struggles (Moyn 2010), and the socially constructed nature

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of human rights (Khor 2013). Key questions in this regard are how and why local actors adopt international human rights discourse, and how the adoption of such discourse impacts on their efforts. In short, how do the discursive acts that connect activists and organizations in transnational networks contribute to social change?

Repertoires for change The discourse of human rights is one of several possible discourses for addressing right and wrong, justice and injustice, along with discourses grounded in religious beliefs, ethics and philosophy and cultural expressions. In Myanmar, the adoption and adaptation of an international human rights discourse in activism began in 1988, in the wake of a mass uprising against the government, which was an authoritarian, military, conservative and, essentially, masculine regime (Mills 2000). Before 1988, Burma was largely absent from discussions on the international human rights regime and ratified very few human rights conventions, declarations and resolutions. The Burmese government responded to the 1995 Platform of Action and growing international focus on gender equality by publicly highlighting government-run women’s organizations, such as the Myanmar Maternal and Child Welfare Association (MMCWA), the Myanmar Women Entrepreneur Association (MWA) and the Women’s Sports Federation (MSF). As national associations, these organizations traced their history to the founding of the first Burmese women’s organizations during the anti-colonial struggle, starting with the All Burma Women’s Organization (Konmari) in 1919. Konmari had close ties to the main anticolonial association at the time, the General Council of Buddhist Associations. Women were also among the members of other anti-colonial associations, such as Dobama Asiayone, established by the student movement in the 1930s (Steinberg 1999). Following the 1995 Beijing Conference and adoption of the Platform of Action, the Burmese military government set down a National Committee on Women’s Affairs, formed a National Working Committee and drafted a National Action Plan for the Advancement of Women (Belak 2002). A year later, the government ratified CEDAW, which required a national framework of implementation. The government-run women’s organizations were assigned key roles in the implementation of the National Action Plan for the Advancement of Women. While government-run women’s organizations represented ‘Burmese women’ on the international stage, a new wave of women’s organizations had emerged after independence, with the outbreak of civil war in areas inhabited by ethnic minorities. These organizations were ethnically based

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and associated with ethnic armed organizations, such as the Karen Women’s Organization, established in conjunction with the outbreak of the Karen uprising in 1949, and the Kachin Women’s Organization, established at the onset of the Kachin uprising in 1962. In the early years, these organizations were primarily involved in social welfare and development work, such as education and income generation for women (Belak 2002). Yet another wave of women’s organizations emerged after 1988 in the wake of the mass unrest in opposition to the military-operated Burma Socialist Programme Party. From 1988 until 2011, human rights research and documentation was primarily conducted by organizations based in the border areas of Myanmar and in neighboring countries, especially Thailand. An estimated 200 reports focusing on various human rights issues were published by local organizations based in Myanmar’s border areas from the mid-1990s to 2015 (Khin Ohmar and O’Kane 2015). A common characteristic of these reports is that they use international human rights discourse to describe the situation in Myanmar. This discourse is used to frame abuses and grievances as violations of human rights, and formulate recommendations for action. While the earliest reports make less explicit use of the language of human rights, later reports increasingly draw upon the framework of international human rights law and international humanitarian law. With the adoption of UNSCR 1325 in 2000, women’s organizations based in the border areas and the diaspora began translating the resolution, educating their members on its content, and advocating for its implementation. Resolution 1325 and subsequent resolutions also served as the framework for an extensive effort to document violations of the rights of women and girls in the conflict areas of Myanmar. According to the two organizations Forum Asia and Progressive Voice, at least thirty-three reports focusing on sexual and gender-based violence in Myanmar were published from 2005 to 2016 (Forum Asia and Progressive Voice 2016). The main aim of this effort was to hold Burmese authorities accountable internationally for the violation of women’s human rights and crimes against women and girls, though activists also wanted to challenge the male-dominated Burmese politics and push for the political inclusion of women.

Documenting violations As Burmese human rights groups began documenting and researching atrocities in various parts of the country, the reports they published used a variety of genres of non-fiction literature, including memoirs from prison and feature journalism. Initially, there was little emphasis on gender equality or women’s rights. One exception is the ‘Human Rights Yearbook’ published annually since 1994 by the Human Rights Documentation Unit

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(HRDU), an entity of Myanmar’s government-in-exile (the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma). The ‘Human Rights Yearbook’ provides a comprehensive overview of violations of human rights across Myanmar, including violations of women’s rights. Since the mid-1990s, reports that take an explicit gender perspective in their research and analysis have primarily been released by women’s organizations. After the founding of the Women’s League of Burma (WLB) in 1999, the WLB and its member organizations have been the main producers of such reports, though sometimes they have co-published with human rights organizations. Through a close reading of these reports, we can identify how the discourse of women’s rights and Women, Peace and Security has evolved in the Burmese women’s movement. Women’s organizations linked to the democracy movement began calling for gender equality and women’s rights in the mid-1990s as an integral part of the democracy struggle. Initially, the need for gender equality was linked to the question of political repression. The question of women’s rights was framed as inherent to the struggle for liberation from military rule, while the restoration of democracy was seen as a necessary condition for respecting human rights, including women’s rights. Since the early 2000s, however, international human rights law and international humanitarian law has increasingly become a central framework for documentation of sexual and gender-based violence. In 2002, the Shan Women’s Action Network (SWAN) and the Shan Human Rights Foundation (SHRF) published the report ‘License to Rape’, documenting sexual and gender-based violence in Shan State in Eastern Myanmar in connection with warfare in the mid-1990s (SWAN and SHRF 2002). The report presents one of the earliest attempts to draw upon international humanitarian law in order to make the case that abuses in Myanmar constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity, and that rape has been used as a weapon of war in a wider counter-insurgency strategy by the Myanmar military. ‘License to Rape’ was also one of the first reports to include a more extensive overview of the international human rights and humanitarian law framework. The report asserted that human rights violations in Myanmar are state-sponsored and systematic, and that sexual and gender-based violence is a weapon of war against Myanmar’s minority peoples, rather than unfortunate side effects of conflict. ‘License to Rape’ became the reference point for a series of reports focusing on sexual and gender-based violence in various regions of Myanmar. Covering extended periods of time, these reports represented an effort to document a nationwide pattern of military abuse. The reports focus in particular on certain aspects of the human rights discourse, such as violations being gross, widespread and systematic. The reports also contain extensive

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references to the legally-based human rights framework, including frequent references to UNSCR 1325 and subsequent Security Council resolutions related to Women, Peace and Security. ‘License to Rape’ also introduces the concept of ‘international crime’. Over time, this concept has become increasingly common and is used across an increasing range of issues that are documented in human rights reports from Myanmar. It is interesting to see how the authors of these reports justify their decision to adopt an international rights framework when documenting abuse against women. As expressed by the Karen Women’s Organization (KWO), and later reiterated by WLB, a human rights framework allows for an analysis that holds the state accountable for abuse. In doing so, KWO seeks to draw attention not only to Myanmar’s democracy struggle, but to violations of international human rights conventions and humanitarian law during armed conflict, emphasizing the critical need for international action (KWO 2004). KWO seeks to shift the burden of shame, guilt and culpability for sexual and gender-based crimes from the women who have experienced violations to the soldiers who have perpetrated them and ultimately to the ruling State Peace and Development Committee (SPDC). This is succinctly expressed in their report ‘Shattering Silence’ (KWO 2004: 19): Over the years, it has become apparent that women’s experiences of human rights violations need to be acknowledged and redressed. When such violations are allowed to go unchecked, the perpetrators are able to continue committing rape and other human rights violations with impunity. It is important that the silence around this issue not be seen as an acceptance of these acts but [that] women and the international community condemn these acts. Thus, it is important for the international community to realise the extent to which the SPDC is culpable for the systematic military rapes being committed on Karen women. Discursively, these reports shift the framing of violations in Myanmar from a conflict perspective, where they are understood as threats to peace and security, to the perspective of international law, where they are understood as international crimes. This is grounded in references to relevant provisions in the Geneva Convention, the Rome Statute, and decisions by the international tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The reports are also characterized by the increasing use of quantitative methodologies and new ways of documenting abuses. For instance, KWO’s report ‘State of Terror’ (2006) provides details of 959 documented cases of violations of women’s human rights committed during the period 1981– 2006. In addition, we also find reports that seek to expand on the types of abuse that women in Myanmar are subjected to.

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The women’s organizations have drawn expressly on the language of the international human rights regime to press for action in Myanmar, most notably through the drafting of shadow reports for reviews of Myanmar’s CEDAW obligations at the United Nations. Two such reports were published by the WLB (1999, 2008). These reports bring together data collected by several organizations, covering different regions of Myanmar, and were produced in collaboration with international organizations specializing in the drafting of shadow reports (Fink 2011; WLB 2009). In recent years, the drafting of shadow reports has also been taken up by women’s organizations within Myanmar. In 2016, at least three umbrella organizations submitted reports to the CEDAW Committee, for the committee’s most recent examination of the Myanmar government reports (CAM 2016; San Yamin Aung 2016; WLB 2016; WON 2016). Moreover, in 2000, the Human Rights Foundation of Monland (HURFOM) established the ‘Women and Child Rights Project’ to monitor Myanmar’s compliance with CEDAW and the Convention on Children’s Rights (CRC). Several reports have since been published by this project (e.g. HURFOM 2017, 2018). Over time, the reports of Burmese organizations have come to mirror developments in international human rights documentation, as developed in international organizations, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, and the many entities of the United Nations system. Arguably, the human rights report has developed into a genre in its own right, with its own set of standards and expectations as to what such a report should contain, and the purposes it should serve. In reports in this genre, women’s groups have been able to document not only violations but also agency – their own as well as that of the women in the local communities from which documentation is drawn. This is reflected in KWO’s report ‘Walking amongst Sharp Knives’ (2010) and WLB’s ‘Courage to Resist’ (2007), which seek to place the agency of women at the center of the reports, thus problematizing the position of victimhood in which women have often been cast (WLB 2007). Women’s agency is also emphasized in reports focusing on the responsibility of organizations as duty-bearers within a human rights framework. One example of this is a 2015 report by KWO focusing on community-based justice systems in refugee camps in Thailand and how these systems address cases of sexual and gender-based violence (KWO 2015). Finally, a report by the Women’s League of Burma and Nobel Women’s Initiative from 2010 outlines the findings of a civil society tribunal on violence against women in Myanmar, thus building on another international human rights practice (NWI and WLB 2010). An indication of the influence of reports by women’s organizations focusing on Women, Peace and Security are the references to such reports in human rights documentation by governments and multilateral institutions,

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such as the annual human rights reports of the US State Department and the reports of the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar. Another indication is the extent to which reports from Myanmar are referenced and in resolutions on Myanmar adopted by the UN General Assembly and the UN Human Rights Council (formerly the UN Commission on Human Rights). Notably, while there have been general references to violations against women in such resolutions since the early 1990s, ‘License to Rape’ (SWAN and SHRF 2002) came to play a crucial role in bringing international attention to sexual abuse in Myanmar. As noted by the Shan Women’s Action Network (SWAN) (1999), the intention behind ‘License to Rape’ was to alert members of the military and authorities to the fact that violations of women’s human rights were being noticed and documented, with the hope that this would bring an end to abuse. The organization also noted that, while international organizations, such as Amnesty International, had been reporting on rape and sexual violence in the context of armed conflict in Myanmar, there were no indications that incidences of abuse had decreased. SWAN’s strategy was thus to publish information about cases of rape in Burmese language, and to reach out to those responsible in the military, hoping that documentation and monitoring of atrocities would have a deterrence effect. The publication of ‘License to Rape’ led the Myanmar government to investigate some incidents, despite later dismissing the report. As Ferguson (2013) has observed, ‘License to Rape’ succeeded in turning what had hitherto been seen as an internal ethnic conflict into an international debate about human rights abuses, to an extent that the male-dominated Shan nationalist movement had not been able to do. ‘License to Rape’ was instrumental in ensuring that, from 2003 onwards, the issue of rape and sexual violence by members of the Burmese armed forces became a regular feature in UN resolutions addressing the human rights situation in Myanmar (Buzzi 2003). In the follow-up of ‘License to Rape’, SWAN highlighted the attention the report had received internationally, and called for international advocacy to continue. However, the organization’s newsletters (e.g. SWAN 2002) also reflect ambivalence about certain aspects of the international engagement, including problems arising from international presence in Myanmar and how the military regime made use of the international presence to create the impression that the situation was improving. In a report marking the tenth anniversary of SWAN, the organization also reflected on challenging experiences related to demands by international actors for an international investigation into rape and sexual violence in Myanmar, and concerns about the protection of victims and witnesses (SWAN 2009). Myanmar’s women’s movement in exile made a conscious decision to draw on UNSCR 1325 and other global standards for women’s rights. The

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Women’s League of Burma (WLB) translated and disseminated UNSCR 1325, and organized activities such as signature campaigns, advocating for women’s political participation and inclusion in the policymaking of the pro-democracy movement. In the early 2000s, during the drafting of alternative constitutions by border-based opposition groups, the WLB advocated successfully for the inclusion of an article stipulating 30 percent women’s representation in governance (WLB 2009: 64; ENSCC 2003). Through such campaigns, women’s organizations were able to reach out to activists, refugees and communities along the borders. The Women, Peace and Security framework spelled out the common interests of women in countries emerging from conflict and encouraged women in Myanmar to organize across ethnic and other divides (Fink 2011; WLB 2009).

Women’s rights in transition The need for a humanitarian response to the destructive impact of Cyclone Nargis in 2008 paved the way for new civil society activity, though the space remained limited to a humanitarian role, with little tolerance for political activism (HRW 2010). Nevertheless, women’s groups and other civil society organizations were able to seize the new opportunity. For instance, the Women’s Organizations Network (WON) brought together thirty women’s groups that had previously focused on women’s welfare, for collaborative advocacy for peace, justice and gender equality. Another network, the Gender Equality Network (GEN) grew out of a technical working group established by UN agencies and NGOs to integrate a gender perspective into the humanitarian response to Cyclone Nargis. In 2011, GEN shifted its focus to research and advocacy on gender, and advocacy for a law on violence against women. There is general consensus that the transition to democracy initiated in 2011 was launched for reasons other than human rights concerns. Despite that multi-party elections have been held in Myanmar since 2011, and the NLD becoming the ruling party in 2015, Myanmar remains a hybrid regime where civilian and military actors continue to battle for power and influence (Bowman 2006; Gaens 2013; Min Zin and Joseph 2012; Slater 2014). Hence, while the transition initiated in 2011 opened up public space for Women, Peace and Security discourse, the women’s movement continues to struggle to be heard (AGIPP 2018; WLB 2018). Myanmar’s transition is framed by the country’s 2008 Constitution, which gives the military a central political role. While the 2008 Constitution has provisions for formal gender equality, it lacks provisions for substantial equality (CAM 2016). Constitutional reform has been on the agenda of the NLD and other pro-democracy parties, but constitutional provisions affecting women in particular are rarely discussed.

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Elections that have been organized at national, regional and local levels since 2010, and the initiation of nationwide ceasefire talks in 2011–2012 has provided impetus to the question of women’s participation in politics and representation in decision-making bodies (WLB and WON 2013). While the number of women represented in the national and state parliaments has increased since 2010, political parties have been reluctant to apply gender quotas. There is also a continued struggle in the women’s movement to embrace the pluralism and diversity of Myanmar within its own ranks (Kamler 2019). The National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) concluded in 2015 commits the parties to end sexual violence during armed conflict but does not provide a definition for key terms in the agreement, such as sexual and genderbased violence, or refer to relevant international standards. The framework for political dialogue that has guided peace negotiations since 2015 reflect a broad commitment by the signatories to include women in negotiations, but does not provide mechanisms for how this can be secured (WLB 2018, see also Upreti et al. in this volume). Within this context, the discourse of Women, Peace and Security has come to offer a framework for advocacy by domestic and international actors (AGIPP 2018). However, space for women to substantially influence the agenda of the peace talks remains limited. The transition has resulted in changes in policymaking that suggest greater attention to how policies affect men and women differently, notably in the fields of education and health. For instance, a budget line dedicated to reproductive health and family planning has been introduced in the national budget. However, as Minoletti (2016) notes, policymaking largely remains gender-blind and, by extension, male-dominated. For instance, social welfare, including gender equality, received less than 1 percent of the budget in the 2015–2016 budget year. A National Strategic Plan for the Advancement of Women for the period 2013–2022 was adopted in 2013, but without any budget line. A central issue of concern to women’s organizations is how to ensure accountability for violations against women, notably how to end impunity for members of the military. In earlier years, member organizations of the WLB have called for justice in the wake of reports on sexual violence committed by state actors in conflict zones, including intervention by the International Criminal Court (NWI and WLB 2010; WLB 2014). Since the transition, however, issues of transitional justice have largely been put on the backburner, as the government has focused on national reconciliation. Article 445 of the 2008 Constitution, which provides for immunity for those holding higher political positions in Myanmar prior to 2011, effectively serves as an amnesty clause for the military when it comes to abuses committed before 2011. Despite that high-ranking military officials have been implicated in war crimes and crimes against humanity in Eastern Myanmar in 2005–2006 (Harvard Law School 2014), these reports have received little attention.

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Soldiers have occasionally been brought to military court for human rights violations, but such cases remain rare. Well-documented crimes in which soldiers are the suspected perpetrators, such as the rape and murder of two Kachin teachers in Northern Myanmar in 2015, remain unaddressed by authorities. Since 2013, member organizations of the Gender Equality Network and other women’s groups have been at the forefront of advocacy for the adoption of a law on the prevention of violence against women. Progress on the adoption of the bill has stalled, however, in the face of opposition by Buddhist nationalist groups. Indeed, in 2015, a package of four bills, known collectively as the Four Race and Religion Protection Laws, were adopted by the national parliament following advocacy by an alliance of Buddhist nationalist groups and political parties, and signed into law shortly before the NLD took over the government. The laws deal with issues such as interfaith marriage, population control, religious conversion and polygamy. Many of Myanmar’s women’s organizations have been opposed to these laws, which they believe violate international treaty obligations (Walton et al. 2015). A new battle ground is thus how to define the interests of women and the protection of women’s rights. The discourse of women, peace and security contains a promise of empowerment and equality, grounded in international human rights norms. The Security Council resolutions framing the Women, Peace and Security agenda were adopted with the expectation that they would usher in a new era for women in peacemaking. While this has not materialized, the use of the UNSC resolutions by women’s groups in Myanmar to create a new repertoire for action shows that they remain useful tools for advocacy and carry a potentially powerful discourse for local activists. As with the broader discourse of human rights, the discourse of women’s rights can serve several purposes. It can be a language challenging a maledominated political culture, a language of resistance toward authorities responsible for abuse and a language expressing a set of norms formally agreed upon by states. The challenge facing local activists remains how to navigate between these multiple levels. Arguably, Myanmar’s transition has enabled greater participation of women in politics, though less substantial change has taken place in policymaking. The transition has also opened up spaces for political forces for whom the control of women’s bodies represents a battleground.

References AGIPP (Alliance for Gender Inclusion in the Peace Process). 2018. ‘The “Localization” of Women, Peace and Security in Myanmar’, Policy Brief No. 5, May 2018, Alliance for Gender Inclusion in the Peace Process.

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Belak, B. 2002. Gathering Strength – Women From Burma on Their Rights. Chiang Mai: Images Asia. Bowman, V. 2006. ‘The Political Situation in Myanmar’, in M. Skidmore and T. Wilson, eds., Myanmar: The State, Community and the Environment. Canberra: Australian National University Press, pp. 1–17. Bunch, C. 1990. ‘Women’s Rights as Human Rights: Toward a Re-Vision of Human Rights’, Human Rights Quarterly, 12(4): 486–98. Buzzi, C. 2003. ‘Documenting Human Rights Abuses: Tracking International Responses to “License to Rape”’, Presented at the First International Conference on Women and Politics in Asia, Halmstad, Sweden, 6–7 June 2003. ———. 2016. ‘The Human Rights Report as Discursive Genre: Evolving Discourses in Human Rights Activism in Myanmar/Burma, 1988–2011’, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 41(4): 214–30. CAM (CEDAW Action Myanmar). 2016. ‘Myanmar CSO Shadow Report on Thematic Issues: Violence Against Women’, CEDAW Action Myanmar, 17 June 2016. Carpenter, C. 2006. “Innocent Women and Children”: Gender, Norms and the Protection of Civilians. Aldershot: Ashgate. CEDAW Committee. 2013. ‘General Recommendation No. 30 on Women in Conflict Prevention, Conflict and Post-Conflict Situations’, CEDAW/C/GC/30, 18 October 2013. ENSCC (Ethnic Nationalities Solidarity and Cooperation Committee). 2003. ‘The New Panglong Initiative: Re-building the Union of Burma’, Ethnic Nationalities Solidarity and Cooperation Committee. Fairclough, l. and Fairclough, N. 2012. Political Discourse Analysis: A Method for Advanced Students. London: Routledge. Ferguson, J. 2013. ‘Is the Pen Mightier Than the AK-47? – Tracking Shan Women’s Militancy Within and Beyond’, Intersections: Gender and Sexuality in Asia and the Pacific, December, 33. [online] Available at: http://intersections.anu.edu.au/ issue33/ferguson.htm. Fink, C. 2011. ‘The Founding and Development of Women’s League of Burma – A Herstory’. Chiang Mai: Women’s League of Burma [online]. Available at: http:// womenofburma.org/the-founding-and-development-of-the-womens-league-ofburma-a-herstory/ Forum Asia and Progressive Voice. 2016. ‘Human Rights Situation in Burma/Myanmar. Briefing Paper for the 34th session of the UN Human Rights Council’, Forum Asia and Progressive Voice. Gaens, B. 2013. ‘Political Change in Myanmar – Filtering the Murky Waters of Disciplined Democracy’, FIIA Working Paper No. 78. Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs. Harriden, J. 2012. The Authority of Influence – Women and Power in Burmese History. Nordic Institute of Asian Studies. Copenhagen: NIAS Press. Harvard Law School. 2014. ‘Legal Memorandum: Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity in Eastern Myanmar’, International Human Rights Clinic, Harvard Law School. Hedstrøm, J. 2016. ‘We Did Not Realize About the Gender Issues. So, We Thought It Was a Good Idea’, International Feminist Journal of Politics, 18(1): 61–79. HRW (Human Rights Watch). 2010. ‘I Want to Help My Own People: State Control and Civil Society in Burma After Cyclone Nargis’, Human Rights Watch.

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HURFOM (Human Rights Foundation of Monland). 2017. ‘Cracks in the Silence: Sexual Violence Against Children and Challenges to Accessing Justice in Mon State and Mon Areas of Southeast Burma’, Human Rights Foundation of Monland. ———. 2018. ‘A Girl’s Life Was Destroyed: Sexual Violence Against Children Continues to Rise in Mon State and Mon Areas of Southern Burma’, Human Rights Foundation of Monland. Kamler, E. 2019. ‘Towards a Feminist Foreign Policy in Myanmar’, Heinrich Böll Stiftung. Keck, M. E. and Sikkink, K. 1998. Activists Beyond Borders – Activist Networks in International Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Khor, L. 2013. Human Rights Discourse in a Global Network – Books Beyond Borders. Farnham: Ashgate. KWO (Karen Women’s Organization). 2004. ‘Shattering Silences – Karen Women Speak Out About the Burmese Military Regime’s Use of Rape as a Strategy of War in Karen State’. Mae Sot: Karen Women’s Organization. ———. 2006. ‘State of Terror – The Ongoing Rape, Murder, Torture and Forced Labour Suffered by Women Living Under the Burmese Military Regime in Karen State’. Mae Sot: Karen Women’s Organization. ———. 2010. Walking amongst Sharp Knives: The unsung courage of Karen women village chiefs in conflict areas of Eastern Burma. Mae Sot: Karen Women’s Organization. ———. 2015. ‘Salt in the Wounds – Justice Outcomes and SGBC Cases in Karen Refugee Camps 2011–2013’. Mae Sot: Karen Women’s Organization. Mills, J. 2000. ‘Militarism, Civil War and Women’s Status: A Burma Case Study’, in L. Edwards and M. Roces, eds., Women in Asia – Tradition, Modernity and Globalisation. St. Leonards: Allen and Unwin Press, pp. 265–90. Minoletti, P. 2016. Gender (In)equality in the Governance of Myanmar – Past, Present and Potential Strategies for Change. Yangon: Asia Foundation. Min Zin and Joseph, B. 2012. ‘The Democrats’ Opportunity’, Journal of Democracy, 23(4): 104–19. Moyn, S. 2010. The Last Utopia – Human Rights in History. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. NWI (Nobel Women’s Initiative) and WLB (Women’s League of Burma). 2010. ‘International Tribunal on International Crimes against Women of Burma’, Nobel Women’s Initiative and Women’s League of Burma. Khin Ohmar and O’Kane, M. 2015. ‘The Other Side of Political Trauma – Protest, Empowerment and Transformation’, in K. Allden and N. Murakami, eds., Trauma and Recovery on War’s Border – A Guide for Global Health Workers. Hanover, NH: Dartmouth College Press, pp. 285–310. Puechguirbal, N. 2010. ‘Discourses on Gender, Patriarchy and Resolution 1325: A Textual Analysis of UN Documents’, International Peacekeeping, 17(2): 172–87. Risse, T., Ropp, S. C. and Sikkink, K., eds. 1999. The Power of Human Rights – International Norms and Domestic Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ———. 2009. The Persistent Power of Human Rights – From Commitment to Compliance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. San Yamin Aung. 2016. ‘Burma’s Gender Issues to Take Centre Stage in Geneva’, The Irrawaddy, 10 June 2016 [online]. Available at: www.irrawaddy.com/news/ burma/burmas-gender-issues-to-take-center-stage-in-geneva.html

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Shepherd, L. 2010. ‘Women, Armed Conflict and Language – Gender, Violence and Discourse’, International Review of the Red Cross, 92(877): 143–59. ———. 2016. ‘Making War Safe for Women? National Action Plans and the Militarization of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda’, International Political Science Review, 37(3): 324–35. Slater, D. 2014. ‘The Elements of Surprise: Assessing Burma’s Double-edged Détente’, South East Asia Research, 22(2): 171–82. Steinberg, D. 1999. ‘A Void in Myanmar: Civil Society in Burma’, in Burma Centrum Netherlands and Transnational Institute, ed., Strengthening Civil Society in Burma – Possibilities and Dilemmas for International NGOs. Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, pp. 1–14. Swaine, A. and O’Rourke, C. 2015. ‘Guidebook on CEDAW General Recommendation No. 30 and the UN Security Council Resolutions on Women, Peace and Security’. New York, NY: UN Women. SWAN (Shan Women’s Action Network). 1999. ‘SWAN First Newsletter’, September 1999. ———. 2002. ‘SWAN Third Newsletter’, 2002. ———. 2009. ‘SWAN – A 10-Year Journey’. Chiang Mai: Shan Women’s Action Network. SWAN (Shan Women’s Action Network) and SHRF (Shan Human Rights Foundation). 2002. ‘License to Rape’. Chiang Mai: Shan Women’s Action Network and Shan Human Rights Foundation. UNSC ( United Nations Security Council). 2000. ‘Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security’, UN Doc S/RES/1325 (2000), 31 October 2000. Walton, M., McKay, M. and Kyi, K. M. M. 2015. ‘Women and Myanmar’s Religious Protection Laws’, The Review of Faith & International Affairs, 13(4): 36–49. WLB (Women’s League of Burma) 1999. Shadow report to the 22nd session of the CEDAW committee. Chiang Mai: Women’s League of Burma. ———. 2007. ‘Courage to Resist – Women Human Rights Defenders of Burma’. Chiang Mai: Women’s League of Burma. ———. 2008. In the Shadow of the Junta - CEDAW Shadow Report. Chiang Mai: Women’s League of Burma. ———. 2009. ‘Reflections on CEDAW 2008’. Chiang Mai: Women’s League of Burma. ———. 2014. ‘Same Impunity, Same Patterns: Report of Systematic Sexual Violence in Burma’s Ethnic Areas’. Chiang Mai: Women’s League of Burma. ———. 2016. ‘UN Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women – Shadow Report on Burma for the 64th Session of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women’. Chiang Mai: Women’s League of Burma. ———. 2018. ‘Analyzing the Principles of Gender Equality Adopted by Union Peace Conference’. Yangon: Women’s League of Burma. WLB (Women’s League of Burma) and WON (Women’s Organizations Network). 2013. ‘Myanmar Women’s Forum Declaration’. Yangon: Women’s League of Burma and Women’s Organizations Network. WON (Women’s Organizations Network). 2016. ‘CEDAW Shadow Report Submitted by Women’s Organization Network (WON)’, Women’s Organizations Network, June 2016.

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Women in the Myanmar peace process The 30-percent target Bishnu Raj Upreti, Drishti Upreti and Debendra Prasad Adhikari

This chapter describes and analyzes the target of 30-percent representation of women in the peace process in Myanmar, first recommended in the Comprehensive Union Peace and Ceasefire Agreement (Working Group for Ethnic Coordination 2013). We describe ongoing efforts to include women in the peace process, especially after the 2015 signing of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA). Signed by the Myanmar government and eight ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) in October 2015, the NCA states that there should be a ‘reasonable number of women representatives’ in the political dialogue between the government and the ethnic armed organizations (EAOs). The general objective of this study is to examine the measures for women’s participation in the political dialogue in Myanmar, as formulated in the NCA, and the institutional and policy provisions made for its implementation in practice. Myanmar has been a scene of political violence and turmoil since its independence. After the signing of the Panglong Agreement in 1947, establishing the Union of Burma, armed conflicts have persisted between ethnic armed organizations and a militarized state (Petrie and South 2013). Different versions of the Constitution were adopted in 1947, 1974 and 2008. With the adoption of the 1974 Constitution, Burma was divided into seven states: Arakan (Rakhine), Chin, Kachin, Karen (Kayin), Karenni (Kayah), Mon and Shan, and seven divisions: Yangon, Mandalay, Ayeyarwaddy, Sagaing, Magway, Bago and Tanintharyi. Whereas the divisions were inhabited predominantly by ethnic Burman, the states were demarcated on the basis of ethnic identity (Kigpen 2014: 20). The restructuring of the country into ethnic states did little to resolve the conflict between ethnic minorities and the state. In 2011, President Thein Sein pledged to make the resolution of conflict between the various ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and the government a national priority, offering dialogue with all armed groups without the earlier preconditions. The government subsequently invited representatives

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of ethnic political organizations, youth and women’s organizations, and civil society organizations to participate in an Ethnic Nationality Conference in September 2012. The conference adopted a six-point roadmap toward peace, which included a plan to convene meetings and a framework for dialogue between representatives of the union government and representatives of the EAOs. As a major milestone, the government of Myanmar and eight EAOs signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) on 15 October 2015 (Thin Lei Win 2015). The main objectives of the NCA were to secure a nationwide ceasefire to end armed conflict between EAOs and the armed forces (Tatmadaw) and to establish a new political culture of resolving conflict through dialogue rather than the use of arms. The main thrust of the NCA was to establish peace through peaceful means. The NCA also stated that no citizen would be discriminated against based on ethnicity, religion, culture or gender. While several key groups rejected the NCA, including the Kachin Independence Army, United Wa State Army, Arakan Army, All Burma Student’s Democratic Front and Taang National Liberation Army, eight major EAOs signed the agreement (Burma News International 2015; Thin Lei Win 2015). The ethnic groups were united in the belief that negotiations should be based on self-determination, federalism and ethnic equality. All parties agreed that the inclusion of women in the peace process should also be ensured.

Women’s equal rights The Myanmar government ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in July 1997. The Women’s League of Burma (WLB) was established in 1999 and has worked diligently to mobilize support for women’s rights and women’s political representation. Widespread public discourse assumes that gender inequality is not a major issue of Myanmar, but WLB and other women’s organizations have argued that discrimination against women is prevalent. Relatively few women in Myanmar are engaged in electoral politics. At the union level, only 4.6 percent of seats in parliament are held by women (Oxfam et al. 2013), while 13.6 percent of elected members of parliament (MPs) are women (Minoletti 2016). As explained by GIZ (2014), ‘The ruling political elites at the local and national levels are resistant to any change in the existing power structures, including gender relations’. Other factors affecting the participation of women are lack of education, skills and confidence, and time constraints that are commonly experienced by women (Sang Hnin Lian 2015). Though Myanmar has seen powerful leadership from Aung San Suu Kyi, the country remains socially conservative, with

Women in the Myanmar peace process 35 relatively few women in leadership roles and male domination within the powerful armed forces (Thin Lei Win 2015). In its article 4, CEDAW recommends, The government must institute Temporary Special Measures (TSM) to ensure women’s rights under CEDAW, freedom from discrimination, and unfettered ability to participate in political and social life, including a minimum 30 percent quota for women’s participation in legislative, political, judicial and administrative bodies. (WLB 2016) The United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 (2000) has also recommended women’s active contribution to peacemaking, within frameworks such as constitutional and institutional reforms, and negotiation mechanisms between parties in conflict (Nduwimana n.d). As the roadmap to peace was formulated, there was widespread agreement that Myanmar should honor its commitments to international conventions, such as CEDAW, and comply with resolutions like UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security. In the National Strategic Plan for the Advancement of Women (NSPAW) 2013–2022, the Myanmar government calls for the improvement of ‘systems, structures, and practices to ensure women’s equal participation in decision-making and leadership at all levels of society’. Along with calls for increased participation of women in the development and implementation of government policy, NSPAW suggests the application of quotas in order to ensure women’s participation in decision making in legislative, judicial and executive bodies (Brody et al. 2016). As the peace process progressed there were numerous calls for women’s inclusion and participation. Section 23 of Chapter 5 of the Union Peace Conference (Political Dialogue) of Myanmar, signed between the government of Myanmar and eight EAOs, states, ‘We shall include a reasonable number/ratio of women representatives in the political dialogue process’ (Muehlenbeck and Federer 2016). Similarly, the Framework for Political Dialogue states that efforts will be made ‘to include 30 percent of women’s participation in all political dialogue’ (Pepper 2017). Article 2 of the Framework for Political Dialogue includes three gender-friendly clauses, where article 4 states that it will ‘strive to achieve 30 percent women’s participation in political dialogue’, article 4.2.2 states that the ‘selection process of representatives [at the Union Peace Conference] shall strive to achieve 30 percent women’s participation’ and article 10.2 states that ‘efforts shall be made to achieve 30 percent women’s participation in the political dialogues’ (Warren et al. 2018). This chapter will review and analyze the participation of women so far in the peace process.

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Women’s involvement in the peace process Women have played a significant role in struggles to change the power dynamics of Burmese society. The active participation of women is also important for the country’s sustainable economic development, as recognized by the current government. For instance, Myanmar’s new Land Use Policy, Chapter 3 section 8, mentions the need to ensure equal opportunities for men and women over land resources, tenure rights and participatory decision making (Cheesman et al. 2014). However, the difficult questions are how equal opportunities are to be ensured and how gender equality is to be achieved. As the peace process has progressed, it is clear that women have not been represented equally at the negotiating table. Nor have the 30-percent targets for women’s representation been met. For instance, only two women, Naw Zipporah Sein and Saw Mra Raza Lin, served as negotiators for the EAOs on the fifteen-member Senior Delegation (Muehlenbeck and Federer 2016). Moreover, in the three committees set up in 2015 to implement the NCA, there were only three women out of ninety-six members (Thin Lei Win 2015; AGIPP 2016). Similarly, the National Reconciliation and Peace Center included two women among its eleven members, Aung San Suu Kyi as head of the National League for Democracy and Shila Nan Taung, a Kachin member of parliament (MP) in the national Upper House (Human Rights Watch 2016). In this section, we will review the participation of women in the various structures of the peace process. Table 2.1 Women in the Myanmar peace process, 2011–2016 Entity

Year

Total participants

Women participants

Union Peacemaking Central Committee Union Peacemaking Working Committee Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team Joint Implementation Coordination Meeting Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee (Union) Senior Delegation National Reconciliation and Peace Centre

2012

11

0

0

2012

52

2

3.8

2013

16

1

6.25

2015

16

0

0

2015

48

3

6.25

2015

26

0

0

2015 2016

15 11

2 2

13.3 18.2

Source: Adapted by the authors based on data from Human Rights Watch (2016)

Women (%)

Women in the Myanmar peace process 37 After the signing of the NCA, a political roadmap has been implemented that includes a Framework for Political Dialogue, a Union Peace Dialogue and Union Peace Accord and its implementation. A Joint Implementation Coordination Meeting on the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement was held in order to form two steering bodies to implement the NCA, the Joint Monitoring Committee and the Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee (Win 2017). Among the two major government committees that negotiated the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement from 2011 to 2015, the 52-member Union Peacemaking Working Committee (UPWC) and the eleven-member Union Peacemaking Central Committee (UPCC), there were no women in the UPCC and only two women (3.84 percent) in the UPWC. As Table 2.1 shows, after the signing of the NCA, only two women (13.33 percent) out of fifteen members served as Senior Delegation. In the Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee, three ethnic armed organizations included women in their negotiating teams: the Karen National Union, the New Mon State Party and the Karenni National Progressive Party (United Nations 2016). Though several women monitored the NCA implementation through the Joint Implementation Coordination Meeting, there was not a single woman in the Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee at the union level. In the National Reconciliation and Peace Center, which is a reformation of the contentious Myanmar Peace Center, there are only two women (18.18 percent) among the eleven members. Despite the limited participation of women, there have been signs of increased inclusion as women served as lead negotiator, female advisors and observers, providing women a greater space for making their voices heard (Barsa et al. 2016). The share of female participants in the Union Peace Conferences increased slightly from 2016 to 2017. The participation of women in the Union Peace Conferences increased from 8 percent of total participants in January 2016, to 13 percent in August 2016, to 20 percent in May 2017 (Warren et al. 2018: 20). Similarly, out of a total of twenty-one facilitators who participated in the Peace Conference in May 2017, nine of them (43 percent) were women. This was an increase from seven women facilitators (78 percent) in the August 2016 conference (Nyein Nyein 2017).

Efforts to meet the 30-percent target Greater participation of women in the peace process can create new avenues to address difficult issues in a transition to peace (Pepper 2017). As we have seen there is a stated goal to achieve 30 percent participation of women in the peace process. However, the question is not only about setting goals and targets for equal participation, but also about designing measures to achieve the gender equality goals and targets once they have been set. In

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the framework for the peace process in Myanmar, the measures to reach the goal of 30-percent women’s participation are not described, causing a serious problem of implementation. As explained by a respondent to this study:1 There is the framework for political dialogue for the Union Peace Conferences. I think one problem here is that although the framework states the goal of 30 percent, it does not really say how it should be achieved, and that is not simple to do. There have been very few conferences taking place so far, and the [share] of women has been very low. [. . .] One obstacle is in the way the conference is set up. According to the framework, 700 delegates should come from different sections of society, 75 from the government, 75 from the Hluttaw [parliament], 150 from the Tatmadaw, 150 from ethnic armed organizations, 150 from registered political parties, 50 from ethnic representatives and 50 from others who should participate. I do not think the government would be in a position where it could ensure a 30 percent quota applied in all of these groups. So, one would need to examine different types of quotas, different actors do and may be some different challenges too. It is also unclear whether the target of 30-percent representation of women in peace talks applies equally to each of the sectors involved in the peace process, including the government, the military and the various ethnic groups that are participating in the dialogue (Human Rights Watch 2016). It is worth noting that the November 2015 general elections saw a doubling of female representatives in the national and regional parliaments, where the National League for Democracy (NLD), the only major party to be led by a woman, Aung San Suu Kyi, won majority seats. NLD has 35-percent women’s representation in its central executive committee and has adopted an internal party policy to promote the selection of women as candidates to parliamentary elections (Brody et al. 2016). The NLD’s promotion of female candidates has already made a contribution toward greater gender equality in party politics by creating an enabling environment for women to become candidates for parliamentary elections. According to the chairwoman of the National League for Democracy (NLD) Central Women’s Committee, Dr. May Win Myint (quoted in May Sitt Paing 2017): Women lawmakers accounted for only 3.8 percent of lawmakers in the previous government. The percentage has increased under the new government, but it is still relatively low. According to CEDAW, women should have a 30 percent representation. Our party does not practice a quota system. But our policy favored woman candidates when they had the same abilities as their male counterpart’s candidates for the 2015

Women in the Myanmar peace process 39 election. As a result, the NLD has the largest female representation among political parties in parliament. The participation of women in the politics of Myanmar is still limited, and ‘female politicians regularly face ridicule, intimidation and harassment, ranging from husbands and family members who feel women do not belong in politics to smears and personal attacks by other politicians or the media’ (Thin Lei Win 2015). Under these circumstances, it is particularly important to understand the barriers to participation and how these barriers can be overcome. Despite the political commitment to political participation and representation of women by the government of Myanmar, women often face barriers to such participation. Some of these barriers include lack of experience and skills, low intra-household bargaining power, lack of confidence and lack of acceptance of female leadership (Minoletti 2014). Domestic work burdens often limit women from their participation and so do time constraints, cultural norms, threat of gender-based violence and women’s more limited mobility (Minoletti 2016). In addition to the traditional gender norms, it is worth noting that many political positions in ministries require a military background, making women ineligible. Interestingly, civil society organizations may provide an alternative avenue into women’s political participation. In recent years, a growing number of community-based civil society organizations have tangibly increased the participation of women in Myanmar in local governance. This also creates platforms to discuss women’s issues with wider audiences. Not only is the civil society participation of women high, but women often occupy senior positions in civil society organizations (CSOs), with the power of decision making (Minoletti 2014). CSOs such as the Gender Equality Network (GEN) and Women’s Organization Network (WON) are also active in advocacy for women’s political participation (Warren et al. 2018). Similarly, various women’s organizations have formed the umbrella organization Alliance for Gender Inclusion in the Peace Process (AGIPP), established in 2014. Other important women’s organizations are the Myanmar’s Women’s Affairs Federation and the Myanmar Maternal and Child Welfare Association (Minoletti 2016). The issue of women’s rights has come up strongly in the parliament, and the government is trying to incorporate it in various forms. CSOs play a crucial role in providing input to parliamentarians on draft laws on issues such as prostitution and violence against women and children. Ethnic organizations such as Chin National Front (CNF) and Karen National Union (KNU) support the goal of 30 percent women’s representation in the peace process, both in the public consultation process and in the political dialogue, despite that no structured process or protocol has been put

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in place to realize the mandate (Salai Isaac Khen and Muk Yin Haung Nyoi 2014). Interestingly, ethnic women’s groups such as Shan Women’s Action Network (SWAN) have identified alternate ways to build peace, such as the formation of the AGIPP to mobilize support for women’s participation and leverage gender quotas (Warren et al. 2018). Kachin Women’s Forum is working on coordinating efforts inside the state to incorporate women’s perspectives into the peace process, with assistance from the Women’s League of Burma (WLB) and the Women’s Initiative Network for Peace (WIN-Peace) (Hedstrom and Senarathna 2015). Meanwhile, communitydriven development and other forms of local development projects such as the Department of Rural Development’s pilot National Community Drive development project aims to promote citizen’s participation and includes the requirement for key local decision-making bodies to have 50:50 male and female representation (Brody et al. 2016). The intention is to encourage women to become more involved in the development field.

Lessons learned Though the government of Myanmar has taken the peace process forward, there remain barriers regarding inclusivity, especially due to the partial signing of the NCA and the groups left out of the process (Gasser et al. 2016). And though a handful number of women have carved out important roles in the process, there are still not enough women to be found at the negotiating table. The negotiating structures in the peace process, such as the Union Peacemaking Central Committee, the Union Peacemaking Working Committee, the Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee and the Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee have routinely failed to meet the 30-percent target (GEN 2016). The problems notwithstanding, it is also evident that there has been progress in women’s participation in peacemaking. Since the initial peace talks with the ethnic armed organizations were held in 2011, the space for women’s participation in the peace process has widened, the number of participants and the interest of women in politics have significantly increased, as has awareness about gender equality. According to Mollie Pepper (2017), Women’s participation in the national umbrella organization called Women’s League of Burma provides opportunity for them to deliver essential social services, advocate for women’s rights, and promote peace in their communities and with ethnic armed organizations, which is a fundamental basis for peace. Moreover, women’s movements and the existence of well-established women’s networks and organizations such as the Karen Women’s Organization,

Women in the Myanmar peace process 41 Kachin Women’s Association Thailand, and Shan Women’s Action Network is a hope for the future. Although there is widespread recognition of the need for women’s involvement in peacemaking, there are different views regarding quotas for women, or how to ensure the more equal participation in the peace process. According to the Chairwoman of the National League for Democracy (NLD) Central Women’s Committee, Dr. May Win Myint (quoted in May Sitt Paing 2017): When it comes to gender equality, most activists talk in international terms. I won’t say they are wrong, but different countries have different situations. International norms call for a 30 percent participation rate for women [in politics]. But I prefer that women participate not because of a quota system but because of their ability. Women have to try to improve themselves. Women account for 51 percent of the total population of our country. We’ll empower women at the ward and village levels and help enhance their capacities. Hopefully, there will be more female lawmakers in 2020. Women are still under-represented in Myanmar’s peace process. The Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement between the government of Myanmar and the EAOs was signed to establish peace and a just society, but high-level decision making is still dominated by men. Myanmar has a strong woman leader in Aung San Suu Kyi, but there should be much greater and more diverse inclusion of women in the peace process. To increase women’s involvement in peacemaking, women will need to unite around issues of common interest such as the struggle against gender-based violence. All parties to Burma’s nationwide and bilateral negotiations, including the government, military and EAOs, should pay further attention to the promotion of women’s substantive participation in peacemaking activities, acknowledging their importance as stakeholders in the peace process.

Note 1 Written response received 8 May 2018.

References AGIPP (Alliance for Gender Inclusion in the Peace Process). 2016. ‘Resources on Women’s Participation and Gender Justice of Relevance to the Myanmar Peace Process’. Yangon: Alliance for Gender Inclusion in the Peace Process. Barsa, M., Holt-Ivry, O. and Muehlembeck, A. 2016. ‘Inclusive Ceasefires: Women, Gender, and a Sustainable End to Violence’, Inclusive Security. WLB.

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Brody, A., Burnley, J. and Phyu, P. E. 2016. ‘Political Gender Quotas: Key Debates and Values for Myanmar’, Discussion Paper, May 2016. Bridge, Gender Equality Network Myanmar, and Oxfam. Burma News International. 2015. ‘Deciphering Myanmar’s Peace Process: A Reference Guide 2015’. Thailand: Burma News International [online]. Available at: www.kaladanpress.org/images/document/BNIpeacemonitoring/deci-myan-peaceprocess-2015-eng.pdf Cheesman, N., Farrelly, N. and Wilson, T. 2014. ‘Debating Democratization in Myanmar’. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies-Yusof Ishak Institute. Gasser, R., Federer, J. P. and Furgler, D. 2016. ‘Perspectives on the Myanmar Peace Process 2011–2015’. Bern: Swiss Peace Foundation [online]. Available at: www.swisspeace.ch/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf/Mediation/2016_Myanmar_ swisspeace_EN.pdf GEN (Gender Equality Network). 2016. ‘Shadow Report on Myanmar for the 64th Session of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women’. Myanmar: Gender Equality Network and Global Justice Center. GIZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Internationale Zusammenarbeit). 2014. ‘Promoting Women’s Participation in Peace Negotiations and Peace Processes’. Germany: Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Internationale Zusammenarbeit. Hedstrom, J. and Senarathna, T. 2015. ‘Women in Conflict and Peace’. Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. Human Rights Watch. 2016. ‘A Gentleman’s Agreement: Women’s Participation in Burma’s Peace Negotiations and Political Transition’, Human Rights Watch, 24 August 2016 [online]. Available at: www.hrw.org/news/2016/08/25/gentlemans-agreement Kigpen, N. 2014. ‘Ethnicity in Myanmar and Its Importance to the Success of Democracy’, Ethnopolitics, 14(1): 19–31. May Sitt Paing. 2017. ‘In Person: “I Prefer Women Participate Not Because of a Quota but Because of Their Ability”’, The Irrawaddy, 20 November 2017 [online]. Available at: www.irrawaddy.com/in-person/prefer-women-participate-not-quotaability.html Minoletti, P. 2014. ‘Women’s Participation in the Subnational Governance of Myanmar’, Myanmar Development Resource Institute’s Centre for Economic and Social Development (MDRI-CESD) and The Asia Foundation. ———. 2016. ‘Gender (in) Equality in the Governance of Myanmar: Past, Present and Potential Strategies of Change’. Yangon: The Asia Foundation. Muehlenbeck, A. and Federer, J. P. 2016. ‘Women’s Inclusion in Myanmar’s Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement’. Bern: Swiss Peace Foundation and Inclusive Security. Nduwimana, F. n.d. ‘United Nations Security Council Resoluton 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security: Understanding the Implications, Fulfilling the Obligations’. New York, NY: Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women (OSAGI), Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA). Nyein Nyein. 2017. ‘Gender Alliance Reports 20 Percent Women’s Participation in Peace Conference’. The Irrawaddy, 30 May 2017 [online]. Available at: www. irrawaddy.com/news/burma/gender-alliance-reports-20-percent-womensparticipation-peace-conference.html

Women in the Myanmar peace process 43 Oxfam, Trocaire, CARE and ActionAid. 2013. ‘Women and Leadership in Myanmar’, Oxfam, Trocaire, CARE and ActionAid, September 2013. Pepper, M. 2017. ‘Building peace in Myanmar’, Asia Dialogue, 5 October 2017 [online]. Available at: http://theasiadialogue.com/2017/10/05/women-in-myanmarspeace-process/ Petrie, C. and South, A. 2013. ‘Mapping of Myanmar Peacebuilding Civil Society’, Civil Society Dialogue Network. Salai Isaac Khen and Muk Yin Haung Nyoi. 2014. ‘Looking at the Current Peace Process in Myanmar Through a Gender Lens’, Swiss Peace Foundation and Gender and Development Initiative. Sang Hnin Lian. 2015. ‘Gender Gap and Women’s Political Participation in Burma/ Myanmar’. Chiang Mai: University Academic Service Centre (UNISERV), Chiang Mai University. Thin Lei Win. 2015. ‘Where Are the Women in Myanmar’s Peace Process?’, Myanmar Now, December 2015 [online]. Available at: www.agipp.org/en/news/where-arewomen-myanmars-peace-process United Nations. 2016. ‘Gender Equality and Women’s Rights in Myanmar: A Situation Analysis’, Asian Development Bank, United Nations Development Programme, United Nations Population Fund, and the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women. Mandaluyong: Asian Development Bank. Warren, R., Applebaum, A., Fuhrman, H. and Mawby, B. 2018. ‘Women’s Peacebuilding Strategies Amidst Conflict: Lessons From Myanmar and Ukraine’, Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security [online]. Available at: https:// giwps.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Womens-PeacebuildingStrategies-Amidst-Conflict-1.pdf Win, Y. 2017. Negotiating Comprehensive Peace in Democratic Transition in Myanmar: The Current Situation and the Way Forward. Seoul: Seoul National University. WLB (Women’s League of Burma). 2016. ‘Shadow Report on Burma for the 64th Session of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women’. Myanmar: Women’s League of Burma. Working Group for Ethnic Coordination. 2013. ‘Comprehensive Union Peace and Ceasefire Agreement (draft)’, Union of Burma/Myanmar: Working Group for Ethnic Coordination.

3

Women-to-women diplomacy and the Women’s League of Burma Magda Lorena Cardenas

Can women offer particular opportunities for creating peace in Myanmar? Recent scholarship has identified the benefits of greater gender equality in peace processes for the settlement of civil wars and post-conflict stability (Olsson and Gizelis 2014). However, we know less about how women can contribute to creating momentum for dialogue in contexts where interethnic trust is low or non-existent. This is certainly the case in Myanmar, where, despite the signing of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) and the 21st Century Panglong conferences, little progress has been made toward a political settlement of the conflict. This chapter explores women’s contributions to peacebuilding in Myanmar through an investigation of the Women’s League of Burma (WLB) as a forum for women-to-women diplomacy, understood as an alternative peacebuilding strategy based on women’s interaction toward the common goal of achieving equal rights. The focus is on the multiple fronts and strategies that women-to-women diplomacy encompasses, in challenging widespread conflict narratives and fostering inter-ethnic dialogue. The case of Myanmar exemplifies the struggle of women for inclusion and meaningful participation in conflict resolution and peacemaking. Despite a vibrant civil society, women in Myanmar still have limited opportunities to participate in decision making, whether at the national level or within ethnic organizations. As Chie Ikeya (2011) argues, the participation of women in politics remains limited to auxiliary roles, while women are also keepers of religion, tradition and morality. However, in inter-ethnic interactions women have found a common field of understanding of the underpinnings of gender inequality and the gender dimension of conflict, beyond ethnic or political divides. Thus, studying the Women’s League of Burma highlights how women’s initiatives contribute to social transformation and peacebuilding in Myanmar. This chapter presents a historical analysis of women as political actors and peacemakers in Myanmar, advances the theoretical contribution of

Women-to-women diplomacy 45 women-to-women diplomacy as an alternative peacebuilding strategy and analyzes the women-to-women diplomacy of the Women’s League of Burma and their strategies for influencing the political agenda in Myanmar. The conclusion discusses the contributions of the Women’s League of Burma to the transformation of the predominant conflict narratives and the creation of a platform for inter-ethnic cooperation.

The unequal architecture of war and peacemaking Myanmar has been the scene of civil war and intrastate conflict ever since its independence in 1948. As Patricia Callahan (2003) maintains, Myanmar’s state building and governance are shaped by warfare. The disintegration of the British colonial state was followed by the emergence of non-state organizations and armed violence, ‘wherein coercion was the currency of politics and the weakened state became only one of numerous entities with claims on violence, territory, resources and people’ (Callahan 2003). After the coup in 1962, the political institutions and social dynamics of Myanmar were militarized, while the population was subjected to human rights abuses including extrajudicial killings, sexual violence and forced displacement. In response, ethnic armed organizations (EAO) intensified their armed struggle against the Burmese military. Women’s participation in EAOs has reinforced traditional gender roles by favoring women’s work in social welfare and support services for armed combatants. Likewise, within the primarily ethnic Burman democracy movement, few women have been recognized as leading political actors. While women participated actively in the massive non-violent mobilization in August 1988, most of the women in the pro-democracy movement were relegated to supporting roles (Hedström 2015). After government repression of the 1988 demonstrations forced students to flee to the border areas, women remained involved in the formation of the militant All Burma Students’ Democratic Front (ABSDF) and collaborated with EAOs as a part of the Democratic Alliance of Burma. However, with the increasing militarization of the pro-democracy opposition, the barriers to women’s political activism remained. The ABSDF and other organizations felt that ‘everyone should focus exclusively on the larger political goals, rather than divert their energies into a struggle for women’s rights’ (Fink 2011). The National League of Democracy shared this view, despite having established a women’s wing. This suggests that the promoters of democracy did not consider women’s rights as a relevant aspect of their political project. During the 1990s, the Burmese military concluded several bilateral ceasefires with different armed groups primarily to preserve existing front lines

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and limit fighting (South 2003). However, after the political reforms that led to the Thein Sein government, negotiations were sought with all active EAOs, leading to a new series of ceasefires. Yet again, few women have been involved in these ceasefire negotiations. In response to the omission of women from the formal ceasefire negotiations, women organized informal peacebuilding efforts and adopted a more politicized position within civil society associations (Pepper 2018). In this process, two multi-ethnic and multi-religious women’s peace networks – the Women’s League of Burma and the Women’s Initiative Network for Peace (WIN-Peace) – launched a demand for a quota for women’s participation in peace talks and lobbied both the non-state armed groups and the government for the inclusion of women in the peace process (Hedström 2013a). The strategy of group-by-group ceasefire negotiations did not respond to the key political and social concerns of ethnic communities (South 2012). Thus, in 2012, a framework agreement was developed as a mechanism for discussion in thematic working groups. The Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) was concluded in October 2015 and signed by eight EAOs on the principles of a ‘Federal Union in the Spirit of Panglong’, nondisintegration of the Union and a national identity based on diversity. The NCA introduced a principle of inclusivity. However, women’s inclusion in the peace process failed to materialize, despite all the lobbying and advocacy. According to AGIPP (2015), the Lawkeelar Summit of EAOs agreed to negotiate a women’s quota of at least 30 percent. During the final stage of NCA negotiation, however, this was substituted by an ambiguous phrase: ‘We shall include a reasonable number of women representatives in the political dialogue process’ (Chapter 5, Clause 23). The ‘Framework for Political Dialogue’ that was subsequently signed used similarly vague and imprecise language, promising to ‘make efforts to include 30 percent of women in all political dialogues’ (AGIPP 2015).

Theoretical framework: women-to-women diplomacy The feminist literature on women and conflict has problematized the restricted understanding of the role of women as either victims or supporters of armed combatants, and in the latter case, primarily in operative and caring tasks. The promotion of women’s participation in peacebuilding is also gendered, often assuming the existence of female qualities such as willingness to engage in dialogue and ‘women’s perceived inclination towards peace’ (Sjoberg 2014). Such narratives serve to reinforce gender stereotypes that limit women’s participation in peacebuilding to the role of caregivers and good humanitarian partners with little decision-making power (Olivius 2016). On the other hand, to capture the often unrecognized

Women-to-women diplomacy 47 informal contributions of women to peacebuilding, the analysis of women’s role as peacebuilders should not be limited to formal peace negotiations, but should include the alternative strategies developed by women to create societal change for the benefit of sustainable peace (Gizelis 2011). This chapter introduces the idea of women-to-women diplomacy as a peacebuilding strategy and describes the use of this strategy in Myanmar. Inspired by the concept of people-to-people diplomacy, the term ‘womento-women diplomacy’ denotes efforts to create platforms for dialogue and cooperation that challenge existing conflict narratives. A key strategy is to facilitate personal encounters between women, to share experiences of conflict and develop a common goal of achieving equal rights. Womento-women diplomacy upholds a broad understanding of peacebuilding that recognizes the impact of imbalanced power relations beyond ethnic, religious or political projects. This creates a sense of commonality that helps women bridge ethnic divides and builds a platform for women’s cooperation and agency, particularly at the grassroots level. As will be shown, women-to-women diplomacy engenders peacebuilding, which implies that gender equality and women’s rights are incorporated as key goals in the agenda for peace. This study aims to expand the scope of women’s contributions to peacebuilding in Myanmar by analyzing the Women’s League of Burma as a forum for women-to women diplomacy. With this, the study combines a theoretical discussion with qualitative research to explore the practical application of the strategy of ‘women-to-women diplomacy’. The research draws on literary sources including reports produced by the Women’s League of Burma and its member organizations, and empirical material collected through participant observation and interviews in Chiang Mai and Yangon from October to December 2018. The interviewees were women activists, present and former members of WLB and their member organizations. As secondary sources, representatives from international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) and scholars were also interviewed.

The Women’s League of Burma and women-to-women diplomacy Neither ethno-nationalist projects nor pro-democracy initiatives encouraged women’s leadership and influence on decision making. Hence, women in Myanmar realized the need to build their own political platform and develop alternative mechanisms to foster gender equality as a crucial component of conflict resolution. In January 1995, women members of the All Burma Students’ Democratic Front (ABSDF) from various ethnic backgrounds decided to create the Burmese Women’s Union (BWU). This was

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inspired by the women’s movement that was gaining political space internationally. In 1995, the Fourth World Conference on Women was held in Beijing, and a few women from Burma participated. Aung San Suu Kyi was invited to give the keynote speech at the NGO Forum, which she did in the form of a video recording. This raised awareness about women’s rights, not only among the women who joined the BWU, but among leaders of EAOs as well. The BWU adopted an international outlook on women’s rights, initially incorporating the UN Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and later UNSC 1325 as strategic components in the training of its member organizations. BWU was committed to empowering women to participate in the restoration of democracy and called attention to women’s rights as an important issue on the political agenda (Fink 2011). The idea of promoting an inter-ethnic dialogue on the political role of women in Myanmar was ambitious and challenging. There was consensus on the goal of women’s political empowerment, but several difficulties emerged, including tensions between the ethno-nationalist project and the promotion of women’s active role in social and political life. How was gender equality to be embraced as a political project on top of the ethnonationalist commitment? What was the unifying identity for women joining the movement? These questions were critical in the decisions of women’s organizations whether to be a part of the inter-ethnic initiative. The creation of an alliance among all independent women’s organizations interested in women’s rights was conditioned by the political dynamics within the ethno-nationalist projects. Further, cooperation with the EAOs implied that their political agendas had to be taken into consideration. The experience of the Mon Women’s Organization and the Mon Women’s Rights Organization illustrates this point. Their decision not to participate in an alliance based in exile responded to the need for a more conciliatory approach toward the military regime, given the ceasefire agreement signed in 1995 by the New Mon State Party and its armed organization (Fink 2011). By reflecting on the insurmountable barriers for meaningful participation within their own ethnic groups, women realized that the political projects of self-determination and democracy would not intrinsically bring about the social transformation that was necessary for women to enjoy full involvement in politics and social life. Therefore, the goal of gender equality offered a solid ground for cooperation and a focal point for their experiences as women, beyond ethnic and religious differences. Still, the major challenge was to build trust among the ethnicity-based women’s organizations and clear away doubts about a hidden agenda of promoting ‘Burmanization’. As the Women’s League of Burma (2011) recalls, ‘some members of other organizations thought that the BWU might be trying to pull them into a

Women-to-women diplomacy 49 Burman-dominated women’s organization or that women who participated might later come under the ABSDF’s control’. There were also considerations on the extent to which different social and cultural codes would create obstacles in the dialogue. As expressed by a representative of one of the member organizations:1 We are very far from each other, we have different traditions, backgrounds, but we share the suffering, being oppressed. Differences are challenging, but we hold together, we know that we are stronger when we are together. The initial doubts about differences were gradually reduced, as the idea of a common agenda of gender empowerment became stronger. There was also a growing realization that the ethno-nationalist projects were unwilling to embrace gender equality as a political goal:2 Some people argue that when you talk about ethnic rights that means equality, so you don’t need gender equality, just use equality [. . .] but even though you get equality in ethnic rights, you still have to struggle for women’s rights. In 1998, the BWU convened the first forum of Women from Burma, based on the idea of collective agency and affirming gender as the key criteria of association. The event was held in Chiang Mai and gathered leading members of the Chin Women’s Organization, Displaced Women’s Welfare Association, Karen Women’s Organization, Karenni National Women’s Organization and Lahu Women’s Organization, who represented the women’s wing of the National League for Democracy. The second forum took place in December 1999, while some of the ethnicity-based organizations were still hesitant. The Karen Women’s Organization (KWO) played an important role in convincing ethnic women’s organizations that it was important to form a women’s alliance (WLB 2011), sending a powerful message about the possibilities for grassroots organizations to strengthen their capacities and share experiences within the network. After internal debates and voting among BWU members, the organization formulated the project of the Women’s League of Burma, which was formally established on 9 December 1999 as the first umbrella organization for women’s groups across ethnic and political positions. The aim of the Women’s League of Burma (WLB) was empowerment and advancement of the status of women, work for the rights of women and gender equality, elimination of all forms of

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Magda Lorena Cardenas discrimination and violence against women, increased participation of women in every level of decision making in all spheres of society, and effective participation in the movement for peace, democracy and national reconciliation.

To achieve these objectives, the WLB develop a peacebuilding strategy that engaged a wide range of actors with direct or indirect influence on the peace process. As WLB defines itself, the organization is ‘uniquely positioned to advocate for women and change in Burma because it represents a nexus where grassroots, regional, and international processes meet and connections are made’ (WLB 2009). I argue that the Women’s League of Burma constitutes a forum for womento-women diplomacy where women have established important contacts across ethnic lines and created strong platforms for coalition-building. As such, the WLB employs different mechanisms to approach a wide range of political and social actors, and to create linkages between them. The various mechanisms represent three key agendas that I will describe under the headings: ‘Women in the peace process’, ‘Peace for women’ and ‘Women making peace’. Women in the peace process This agenda addresses the overarching objectives of WLB, first, to facilitate the meaningful participation of women in peace negotiations and in the Constitution-building process and, second, to put women’s rights on the political agenda. To do so, WLB has drafted and disseminated position papers, such as ‘Constituting Our Rights’ and ‘Looking through Gender Lenses’, which analyze the contribution of quotas to gender equality and present arguments on how to introduce gender equality into constitutional mechanisms. These papers were crucial in introducing gender equality as a key issue in the peace process, and the language they developed was also incorporated into the opposition’s draft constitution for Burma, which included a 30-percent quota for female representatives in the national parliament (Fink 2011). The initiatives of the WLB have contributed to increasing the participation of women in the Union and State parliaments. Moreover, the recent Union Peace Conference held in July 2018 adopted four principles on gender equality. However, the lack of gender-related policies within the political parties remains an obstacle to potential legislative progress on gender equality (Shwe Shwe Sein Latt et al. 2017). Likewise, little has been done to implement the 30-percent target for women’s participation incorporated in the National Ceasefire Agreement. Furthermore, the women members of

Women-to-women diplomacy 51 the Union Peacemaking Working Committee (UPWC) still face barriers as a result of gender stereotypes. Doi Bu Nbrang, a member of the UPWC and Kachin parliamentarian recalls, I requested Minister U Aung Min to include me as a member of the negotiation team for the talks with the KIO. But he told me the road to the place where the talks would be held is so bad and it’s not easy for women to travel [. . .] It is really nonsense that a woman responsible for her own people was not allowed to go there. (AGIPP 2015) The situation is not much better among the sixteen EAOs involved in the Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team. The case of Saw Mra Raza Lin of the Arakan Liberation Party illustrates this point. Despite being a member of the negotiation team she was ‘not consistently at the table and has also faced significant resource constraints, which means that she was not always able to travel to the talks’ (AGIPP 2015). As described in the WLB document ‘Analyzing Gender Equality’, there is a lack of affirmative action to address gender-based and intersectional discrimination (WLB 2018). In sum, WLB’s advocacy for women’s inclusion in the peace process has contributed to the development of legal and policy instruments for more equal participation, but there are many challenges with regard to implementation. Peace for women The Women’s League of Burma has promoted dialogue and cooperation based on the idea of gender equality as a goal and introduced the debate on women’s rights as human rights (Norwood and Zahau 2011). In the agenda referred to here as ‘peace for women’, the WLB has highlighted women’s experiences in Myanmar’s armed conflict and the need to apply a gender perspective to peace initiatives. Furthermore, the WLB and its member organizations have raised awareness about the gender dimension of other conflict-related problems, such as sex trafficking, drug addiction and environmental exploitation. To promote this agenda in the peace process, the WLB has employed so-called second-track diplomacy (Davies and Kaufman 2002). The international legal framework for the promotion of women’s human rights has been a stepping-stone in the work of the WLB and has contributed to a common understanding among member organizations for well-functioning cooperation on project implementation within the network. The language of women’s human rights is also a language that the WLB and its network

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share with international donors, such as the International Women’s Development Agency and the Burma Campaign UK, as well as think tanks and INGOs that work to raise awareness about the violations of human rights in Myanmar. The language of women’s human rights enables financial, technical and political cooperation between women’s organizations in Myanmar and the international community. In this way, the WLB’s women-to-women diplomacy operates through advocacy and participation in regional and international women’s forums, such as the Asia Pacific Women’s Watch and Asia Pacific Women’s Networks, and Images Asia. These networks have also helped women activists in Myanmar to gain access to government leaders and UN bodies, such as the United Nations Human Rights Commission (Fink 2011). The CEDAW shadow reports have been a key instrument for WLB to coordinate its efforts with those of its member organizations and create a permanent forum for reflection, and the analysis on the state of women’s human rights in Myanmar. As an example of such coordination, the latest CEDAW report ‘Long Way to Go. Continuing Violations of Human Rights and Discrimination against Ethnic Women in Burma’ is the result of forty-nine CEDAW awareness-raising workshops by the WLB network in twenty-six townships, in which 924 women and 351 men participated (WLB 2016). The dialogue with international actors has thus encouraged coordinated work among the WLB member organizations. Women making peace The third key agenda of the WLB aims to prepare women for effective participation in peace initiatives and alternative mechanisms of conflict transformation, by developing capacities for leadership and advocacy. To this end, the WLB works with grassroots organizations both inside Myanmar and in the border areas of neighboring countries to implement initiatives on women-to-women diplomacy based on the principle of collective agency. The WLB has implemented strategies that encompass negotiation and peacebuilding workshops gathering between 1,000 to 3,000 women and men every year. Likewise, the WLB has coordinated fifty-one yearly Peace Exchanges where women and men come together to discuss conflict and peacebuilding strategies in their communities. As women-to-women diplomacy strategies, these interactions work through trust-building measures and contribute to ‘humanize the other’ as the first step to transform conflict narratives. The Political Empowerment Program and the Emerging Leaders Political Empowerment School constitute other strategic components of the work of the WLB, aimed at increasing women’s participation in politics and decision

Women-to-women diplomacy 53 making at all levels of society. To do so, WLB has designed comprehensive training materials, including training for leadership skills, reflections on feminism in policymaking and knowledge of the main legal and political international frameworks for women’s human rights. In this setting, the WLB has held monthly Political Forums to train and empower grassroots communities in mobilization for democratic change. These events typically bring together women from different ethnic groups, forming important networks and relationships across ethnic lines. The program on ‘Women against Violence’ aims at assisting survivors of gender-based violence and is based on the idea that a restorative process must incorporate empowerment. The program encompasses a wide range of measures, from medical attention to legal counseling for survivors. The program also works on documentation and reporting, as well as raising awareness and promoting community discussions in which participants analyze the elimination of gender-based violence as a peace issue. Since 2005, about 4,000 men and women have participated in these discussions annually, exploring potential initiatives on how to end gender-based violence in their communities. This comprehensive response to gender-based violence challenges the approach of women as victims and engages the community in the understanding of structural causes and effects of gender-based violence. These activities reflect the women-to-women diplomacy aim of social transformation. By offering women the opportunity for personal development as leaders, the WLB contributes to contesting predominant gender roles within the communities in which they work. The personal experiences of women and the idea of overcoming barriers for gender equality have become an important entry point for this kind of dialogue. Inter-ethnic encounters also contribute to an understanding of conflict dynamics and how gender relations underpin them.

Achievements, challenges and remaining debates The Women’s League of Burma has gained a significant place in Myanmar politics by raising gender equality and women’s human rights as topics that need to be a part of the political agenda. However, there is still a long way to go before women can achieve meaningful participation in the formal peace process. A major challenge is that women-to-women diplomacy has limited influence on decision makers in the formal entities of the peace process. Advocacy and policy recommendations thus run the risk of establishing normative provisions that are never implemented, given the lack of political will. Furthermore, in the absence of effective participation of women in negotiations, the agreements are unlikely to include provisions for gender equality. As explained by a woman activist and representative of

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a non-governmental international organization, a quota for women’s inclusion in the peace process is just a first step and is no real guarantee for women’s participation:3 We need to go beyond the thirty-percent quota. The core of the message has been the quota. But what is the long-term strategy? We are failing to think outside the box. On the other hand, women-to-women diplomacy has reached key stakeholders who make the situation of women’s human rights in Myanmar more visible to the international community. In this way, the agendas of ‘peace for women’ and ‘women making peace’ are gaining moral as well as practical support. The ‘women making peace’ agenda is also the main vehicle for conflict transformation in local level women-to-women diplomacy. In a context of limited opportunities for women’s formal peace initiatives, this strategy is crucial for developing personal and community-based leadership and negotiation capacities that can transform the structural patterns of inequality that fuel conflict dynamics. As described by a representative of an INGO, training for peace and grassroots capacity-building is important, and yet further steps need to be taken:4 It’s been positive having so many empowerment trainings but who’s following up? [. . .] This is a stepping-stone but it cannot be the end. We need to see more from the Political Empowerment Program. How do you find a platform for them to become leaders in their communities? In contrast to the other agendas, the implementation of ‘women making peace’ does not rely on the will of political actors, but on civil society networks and coalitions. Yet its sustainability may be influenced by the financial and technical support available from international donors. According to a representative of an INGO based in Yangon, requirements in term of procedures and strict criteria in the selection of partners may also limit the agenda of donors working in Myanmar. However, women’s empowerment is still a key component of their cooperation strategy. As explained by the INGO representative:5 ‘Women’s empowerment can make the movement more cohesive. Besides, it is an agenda not directly targeted at the government, and yet [. . .] the government doesn’t see women’s empowerment as political’. The work of the WLB has faced new challenges after the WLB moved its headquarters to Yangon in 2017. This has also had spillover effects within the network. A representative of one of WLB’s member organizations

Women-to-women diplomacy 55 expressed concern about the ‘inside-outside’ division and the need to have ‘in-depth’ discussions within the network about the political objectives, and that a strong sense of belonging required that dialogues and joint activities were held outside of Yangon:6 Yangon is not the Women’s League of Burma. Most of us don’t come from Yangon. As an umbrella organization, I think we should combine our presence here [outside of Myanmar] and there [inside]. Most of the activities must be carried out in other areas than Yangon. Similarly, another representative of a WLB member organization reflected on the implications of the relocation of the WLB headquarters for the key issues on the movement’s agenda, such as human rights violations and sexual violence in the context of conflict. In contrast to organizations in exile, the ‘inside organizations’ must adopt a lower profile on politically sensitive topics:7 After the 2015 election when the Aung San Su Kyi government came to power, some women leaders wanted to move inside and they wanted to work with the government, the NLD government. For us, until now there is ongoing fighting, ongoing offensives and ongoing war crimes and crimes against humanity that are happening in our zone. So how can we feel the same as the other organizations, who are based in urban areas and non-conflict areas? These types of stands and positions are now a bit different.

Conclusion This paper has analyzed the contributions of the Women’s League of Burma in creating common ground for inter-ethnic dialogue, both at the national and local level, and leading joint peace efforts with grassroots organizations. The strategies of the WLB are examples of multi-track peacebuilding and the application of women-to-women diplomacy. At the national level, the WLB has opened up the possibility of a political platform for women, with the aim of introducing women’s human rights into constitution-building and peace negotiations. At the community level, the WLB has facilitated alliances among women’s groups based on trust-building measures, personal interactions and informal channels of cooperation and promoted leadership and women’s agency for transformation in ethnic organizations. The consolidation of the WLB as an inter-ethnic project has made a significant political statement (Fink 2011). At the earliest stages of the process, there were doubts about the collision of interest or ‘loyalties’ between the

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ethno-nationalist projects and the goal of promoting women’s agency in social life and politics. However, the ‘ethnic question’ was impacted by the ‘gender question’, as women realized that the inclusion of women’s rights and agendas in the peace process required a united women’s voice (Hedström 2015). Thus, gender equality became a focal point for the efforts of the WLB and its member organizations and a platform from which ‘women are providing a new narrative of the Burmese nation, a narrative that is inclusive of ethnic difference and that complicates supposed dichotomies between conflict and peace, combatant and victim and masculinity and femininity’ (Hedström 2013b). However, the WLB is now facing emerging tensions between member organizations based in Myanmar and those working in the diaspora. In sum, the WLB has raised awareness of women’s experiences across Myanmar and created a shared understanding among its members from many different ethnic groups. The message is that women have been part of an ‘unequal war’ and that collective efforts are required to promote women’s agency. There is also a strong consensus in the WLB and its member organizations on the importance of engendering the ongoing peace negotiations. The main objective is to prevent a post-conflict scenario marked by ‘unequal peace’.

Notes 1 Interview with the leader of a WLB member organization, Chiang Mai, 13 December 2018. 2 Ibid. 3 Interview with a representative of an INGO, 16 November 2018. 4 Ibid. 5 Interview with a representative of an INGO, Yangon, 15 November 2018. 6 Interview with leaders of a WLB member organization, Chiang Mai, 13 December 2018. 7 Interview with leaders of a WLB member organization, Chiang Mai, 11 December 2018.

References AGIPP (Alliance for Gender Inclusion in the Peace Process). 2015. ‘Women, Peace and Security Policymaking in Myanmar: Context Analysis and Recommendations’, Policy Paper No. 1, December 2015. Yangon: AGIPP. Callahan, M. P. 2003. Making Enemies: War and State Building in Burma. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Davies, J. and Kaufman, E. 2002. Second Track/Citizens’ Diplomacy: Concepts and Techniques for Conflict Transformation. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Fink, C. 2011. ‘The Founding and Development of Women’s League of Burma – A Herstory’. Chiang Mai: Women’s League of Burma.

Women-to-women diplomacy 57 Gizelis, T.-I. 2011. ‘A Country of Their Own: Women and Peacebuilding’, Conflict Management and Peace Science, 28(5): 522–42. Hedström, J. 2013a. Where Are the Women? Negotiations for Peace in Burma. Stockholm: Swedish Burma Committee. ———. 2013b. ‘Solidarity in Exile? The Influence of Gender Politics in the Prodemocracy Struggle in Myanmar’, in Journeys From Exclusion to Inclusion: Marginalized Women’s Successes in Overcoming Political Exclusion. Stockholm: IDEA. ———. 2015. ‘We Did Not Realize About the Gender Issues. So, We Thought It Was a Good Idea. Gender Roles in Burmese Oppositional Struggles’, International Feminist Journal of Politics, 18(1): 61–79. Ikeya, C. 2011. Refiguring Women, Colonialism, and Modernity in Burma. Honolulu, HI: University of Hawai’i Press. Norwood, G. and Zahau, C. 2011. ‘Fostering a Grassroots Women’s Movement Through Feminist Leadership on the Burma-India Border’, Women and Therapy, 34(3): 223–41. Olivius, E. 2016. ‘Constructing Humanitarian Selves and Refugee Others: Gender Equality and the Global Governance of Refugees’, International Feminist Journal of Politics, 18(2): 270–90. Olsson, L. and Gizelis, T.-I. 2014. ‘Advancing Gender and Peacekeeping Research’, International Peacekeeping, 21(4): 1–9. Pepper, M. 2018. ‘Ethnic Minority Women, Diversity, and Informal Participation in Peacebuilding in Myanmar’, Journal of Peacebuilding & Development, 13(2): 61–75. Shwe Shwe Sein Latt, Ninh, K. N. B., Mi Ki Kyaw Myint and Lee, S. 2017. ‘Women’s Political Participation in Myanmar: Experiences of Women Parliamentarians 2011–2016’, The Asia Foundation and Phan Tee Eain, April 2017 [online]. Available at: https://asiafoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/WomensPolitical-Participation-in-Myanmar-MP-Experiences_report-1.pdf Sjoberg, L. 2014. Gender, War and Conflict. Cambridge: Polity Press. South, A. 2003. Mon Nationalism and Civil War in Burma: The Golden Sheldrake. London: Routledge. ———. 2012. ‘Prospects for Peace in Myanmar: Opportunities and Threats’, PRIO Paper. Oslo: Peace Research Institute Oslo. WLB (Women’s League of Burma). 2009. ‘Building a Movement Within the Movement. WLB Marks Ten Years of Gender Activism’. ———. 2011. ‘Recommendations From the Myanmar Women’s Forum’. ———. 2016. ‘Long Way to Go. Continuing Violations of Human Rights and Discrimination Against Ethnic Women in Burma’, CEDAW Shadow Report, July 2016. ———. 2018. ‘Analysing the Principles of Gender Equality Adopted by Union Peace Conference’.

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No peace in a ceasefire Women’s agency for peace in the Kachin conflict Marte Nilsen

At the same time as the Thein Sein government in the early stages of its reform years negotiated ceasefire agreements with more than a dozen ethnic armed groups, it saw the breakdown of seventeen years of ceasefire with the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO). The KIO, and indeed the majority of the Kachin (Jingpaw) population, associated the ceasefire years with exploitation, discrimination, disempowerment, and increased political pressure from the central government (International Crisis Group 2011: 6–8).1 When armed struggle against Myanmar’s armed forces (Tatmadaw) was resumed in 2011, the costly decision gained support from local communities, religious leaders and civil society organizations alike – from women as well as from men. The ceasefire was by no means associated with peace, and the demand for binding political negotiations rather than noncommittal ceasefires remains strong among a broad spectrum of the population. Back in the 1990s, the ceasefire agreement with the KIO enabled the Tatmadaw to launch an offensive against another armed group, the Karen National Union (KNU), which in turn led to the fall of Mannerplaw (the KNU headquarters) and the severe weakening of the KNU (Nilsen 2013: 128–129; Zaw Oo and Win Min 2007: 42–46). With the historic signing of the KNU ceasefire agreement in 2012, the Tatmadaw took the opportunity to mobilize its military strength to defeat the KIO and its armed wing, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA). When the fighting first escalated in July 2011, the Tatmadaw thought it could crush the KIA within weeks.2 Seven years later, the KIA is still able to resist, albeit at high military and civilian costs. While the Kachin conflict in 2017 and 2018 was overshadowed by the brutality by the military against the Rohingya population in Northern Rakhine state, the humanitarian situation and the human suffering in Kachin State were also of great magnitude (UN Human Rights Council 2018). Despite this suffering, the resistance among Kachin people against signing the union government’s so-called Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement has been remarkably fierce. However, while there has been sound support

No peace in a ceasefire 59 for the military strategy of the KIO among large segments of the Kachin population, this does not mean that the work for peace is neglected. Women, in particular, pursue a broad range of strategies to build sustainable peace and a more inclusive future for the people of Kachin State. This chapter explores the diversity of women’s agency for peace in the current Kachin conflict in Myanmar. While working for peace, women activists also practice resistance against a one-dimensional idea of peace as the absence of armed conflict, and they pursue a variety of humanitarian, developmental, social and political strategies to navigate through changing political dynamics. Based on a combination of semi-structured interviews and life history interviews, conducted in and around Myitkyina (Kachin State) at three separate research trips in 2013, 2018 and 2019, this paper digs into the motivations, convictions and strategies of some of the Kachin women engaged in peacebuilding and political mobilization. Some of these strategies are instrumental, in the sense that they aim for quota representation for women in the peace process, in accordance with the global Women Peace and Security agenda. Other strategies are more substantial, in the sense that they inductively capture contextual dynamics in Kachin society and attempt to transform local peace engagements in a creative and gendersensitive way. After more than fifty years of armed conflict in Kachin State, public life and politics have become militarized and dominated by masculine values. However, some women have developed effective strategies to challenge this political culture and confront the Myanmar government, its autonomous and powerful military, as well as local political, religious and military leaders. When women confront military and political leaders with concrete social issues, many men find themselves unprepared by these direct and uncompromising demands. Political demands directed toward the central government are generally not framed within the overall political grievances about the rights of the Kachin, the discrimination of ethnic communities and the demand for self-determination which dominate the discourse of the Myanmar peace process. Rather, the women address these grievances indirectly by raising concrete challenges in their communities, and they use existing political and legal structures to push the boundaries for political space. In negotiations with local leaders, these women often take a different approach. Instead of talking about women’s rights and equality, which by many would be understood as challenging local cultures and social structures, these women appeal to the Kachin national identity, to the nationalist struggle and to Christian values to reform local practices and social dynamics. These strategies add new and alternative perspectives on peace and security in conflict settings. In their work, these women combine external and internal pressure to improve the conditions for peace in their

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communities. The external pressure is directed toward the Myanmar military and the central government, and the internal pressure is directed toward local Kachin political, religious and military leaders. These strategies are effective, but by no means without risk. Many of the most outspoken women face intimidation, threats, legal charges and imprisonment. Their commitment to their communities can sometimes come at a great personal cost. However, despite robust patriarchal structures in both Myanmar and Kachin society, there are a remarkable number of strong female political activists in Kachin State that defy social constraints, based on gendered expectations, in their efforts to achieve peace and justice. This chapter presents a sample of political strategies and approaches developed by Kachin women who play a significant role in practical peacebuilding through their engagement in the civil society sector, in popular movements and in politics. I will demonstrate how these strategies of combining external and internal pressure are pursued in three central and contentious domains of political activism: land rights, women’s rights and party politics.

Taking back the land One of the most pressing issues for people in Kachin State is the confiscation of land by the military, military-controlled companies or national or international corporate interests. The confiscation of land and the forced replacement of villagers, whose livelihoods as a consequence are taken away from them, are done for a number of reasons. In some instances, the land plots are used for commercial purposes (i.e., to extract natural resources or to establish large-scale industrial farming). In others, the local population suspects that there are purely strategic motivations behind the land grabs. The conviction is that the Tatmadaw clears large forest areas for the purpose of positioning itself vis-a-vis KIA troops, thus stopping the KIA from gaining control of new areas. Land confiscations are therefore often viewed both as a sign of the lack of respect for the rights of local people and as a military offensive against the Kachin as an ethnic minority group. The strategy to counter land confiscation has been a combination of local protests and legal procedures. Women activists are central in both approaches. The most well-known protest movement in Kachin State over the past two decades is the protest against the Myitsone dam. The planned 6,000-megawatt hydroelectric power project at the source of the Irrawaddy River is owned by the China Power Investment Corporation, the Myanmar Ministry of Electric Power and one of Myanmar’s most controversial corporations, the Asia World Company. Protesters criticized the project for its negative environmental impact, as well as for the planned forced relocation of more than 11,000 villagers (Sandar Lwin 2015; Fan Li 2015). The main

No peace in a ceasefire 61 protests took place before the political reforms and in a difficult political environment of strict military control. Protesters thus ran a high personal risk in their confrontations with the government. Nonetheless, by the time of the political transition in 2011, the prestigious project became such a political burden for the reform agenda of the quasi-military government of President Thein Sein that it was suspended. The campaign against the Myitsone dam is a good example of the external pressure that local actors put on the central government and the use of the country’s highly disputed legal framework as a tool to seek justice and to challenge state policies and state domination in ethnic minority areas. One of the most contested issues in Myanmar politics is the military’s constitution of 2008. The Constitution secures continued power to the military in key strategic areas and in conflict zones. The Constitution is effectively Unitarian, despite the existence of regional parliaments. As long as the chief ministers are not locally elected but appointed by the president, and as long as these chief ministers are not accountable to the regional parliaments, there is little in the Myanmar Constitution to accommodate the longstanding demand from ethnic minorities for federalism and power sharing between the union and the state level. The 2008 Constitution is rejected by most political groups in Myanmar, not least by political parties and armed groups in ethnic minority areas. However, in the continued struggle for the displaced villagers of the Myitsone dam project and others who have been forcibly relocated around Kachin State, activists vigorously study the Constitution and the land laws to take authorities and companies to court. By trying their cases within the legal framework of the union, these activists seek to push the boundaries for political space without challenging the Constitution. This strategy enables them to voice the concern of their communities in a direct and confronting manner, while at the same time being protected by the formalities of the legal system. One of the leading figures within this land right’s movement is Bawk Ja Lum Nyoi who has spearheaded a number of high-profile lawsuits in Kachin State and was one of the driving forces in the campaigning for the suspension of the Myitsone Dam. Herself a victim of forced displacement, due to the civil war and the heavy fighting between the Tatmadaw and the KIA, Bawk Ja and her family had to flee from her village and ended up living in poverty and hardship in the urban center of Myitkyina. Her parents, both teachers educated in missionary schools, had nothing but education to offer their children and Bawk Ja studied hard from an early age, something that brought her all the way to Yangon University, where she got her degree in history. Her student years coincided with the turbulent time of the democracy uprising and student protests in 1988. When

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Bawk Ja returned to Kachin State she deliberately settled down in a remote area where she believed there were needs and where she thought she could contribute something to the community. She opened a kindergarten and a school. When the Yuzana Company in 2006 started to seize large land areas for industrial farming, she immediately started campaigning for the land rights of the local people, many of whom did not speak much Burmese. At the time of these campaigns, Myanmar was under a strict military rule, and military officials made numerous attempts to arrest and prosecute her for her activism. She spent a lot of time in hiding but continued her pressure against the military and the activities of military associated companies, like Yuzana.3 In the absence of a representative Kachin political party that was allowed to run in the 2010 general elections, Bawk Ja agreed to represent the National Democratic Force (NDF) in her constituency.4 The NDF was a splinter party from the National League for Democracy (NLD) that had decided to boycott the 2010 election. During the election campaign, she initiated a trial against Yuzana as well as her opponent in the election, a former high-ranking military official. While Yuzana responded by negotiating financial compensations for the farmers and contributions to the community in the form of a school or medical center, Bawk Ja made some powerful enemies within the military. In 2011, in the heat of the Myitsone campaign, she was apprehended and made to stay in Yangon under strict travel restrictions. She continued her work and was eventually allowed to return home, but in 2013, she was put on trial based on a five-year-old case where she had assisted a dying man in a village. The charges against her for medical negligence were dismissed, and she was released again after six months in prison.5 Bawk Ja, and others with her, continue to campaign for the land rights of local villagers in Kachin State and are not afraid to press charges against both powerful individuals and companies. This external pressure directed toward the political and military leadership in Myanmar is expressed within a legal framework that the activists themselves are highly critical of. These activists are firm believers in federalism and greater self-determination for Kachin people, and they view their struggle to reclaim land as an integrated part of the larger nationalist struggle spearheaded by the KIO. While their approach is fundamentally non-violent, they acknowledge the need for armed opposition against the Myanmar state. And while they are actively promoting peace, they are critical to the idea of KIO unconditionally signing the National Ceasefire Agreement. It is within this context that the land rights activists view the return of confiscated land and the securing of land rights for the future as fundamental preconditions for lasting and sustainable peace.6

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Building community and solidarity for peace This seemingly paradoxical support for the larger Kachin nationalist struggle against the historical and contemporary oppression from the Myanmar state is prevalent among most civil society groups engaged in peacebuilding in Kachin State. For the civil society activists, however, the nationalist struggle and the peacebuilding are not recognized as a major contradiction. They view the struggle of the KIO as a ‘just war’ (jus ad bellum), a defense against an aggressive and oppressive opponent, but they themselves have alternative or supplementary strategies to build a platform for lasting and sustainable peace. This duality of struggle and peace is not least present among Kachin women’s rights activists. One example is the organization Htoi (literally ‘bright’ or ‘shining’) Gender and Development Foundation. The director of the foundation, Nang Pu Nbau, explains how she and other women in Htoi make use of different strategies to secure both the rights of Kachin women in Myanmar and the rights of women in the Kachin community. Their approach has emerged from the recognition of women’s suffering during times of war. Women bear the burden of war in multiples ways. Sexual violence against women increases during violent conflict, in terms of assaults from soldiers, but also in terms of domestic violence. While the first category has been widely recognized for a long time, recent research supports the observations made locally by women’s groups in conflict zones that domestic violence also increases with armed conflict (Østby 2016). Moreover, as Hedström (2017) has documented, in times of civil war, women in Kachin communities are taking on a wide range of additional tasks related to trade and labor, traditionally carried out by men. By doing so, they are putting themselves, as well as their children, at risk. Women also form the majority in camps for internally displaced persons. Women right’s activists in Kachin State, therefore, insist that there cannot be peace without women’s rights and that there is a need to secure these rights at the national level as well as locally.7 To achieve this they make use of external as well as internal pressure to push for rights, recognition and a change in cultural practices. Building a community based on solidarity and respect are key aspects of this peacebuilding. By far the toughest task carried out by Kachin women activists is staging lawsuits against soldiers in the Myanmar army for rape and sexual violence against civilians. As such atrocities usually take place in conflict areas, the cases are not subject to civilian law and the victims have to pursue the lawsuits in a military court, rather than in a civilian court. The chances of winning through with the lawsuits are minuscule, at best, and the psychological strain on the victims is overwhelming. The women’s rights activists still stress the importance of raising these cases to highlight the plight of

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women during war and the absence of rule of law. To achieve justice, for the Kachin people in general and Kachin women in particular, they view it as crucial to expose the military and their human rights abuses. Through these lawsuits, they make use of national institutional structures to push for justice. This external pressure is viewed by the activists as a way to pursue justice for women affected by war, but it also forms part of the Kachin nationalist struggle for justice of the ethnic minorities. Other Kachin organizations interpret these lawsuits within the larger nationalist struggle for minority rights. Organizations like Htoi also work at the national level in alliances with other women’s rights organizations to improve gender equality in Myanmar. Both ethnic minority groups and Burman women’s groups form parts of these networks, and they work together to improve policies for better reproductive health, to prevent sexual violence and to include 30-percent representation of women in the 21st Century Panglong peace process. This networking across the country and across ethnic divides is peacebuilding in itself, but even in these networks, the Kachin women activists report some challenges in raising awareness of the vulnerability of women in conflict areas. During the work on developing a national action plan for gender equality and women’s rights in Myanmar, it was demanding to get recognition for the need for action plans specifically for conflict areas. The risk of rape and sexual violence is an overall problem for women across Myanmar. However, for the Kachin activists, it was important to get acknowledgment for the precarious risks that women in conflict areas are faced with in the form of an action plan outlining the immediate responses to these risks. Their argument is that rape cases in central parts of Myanmar are a matter of rule of law, while in conflict areas, where such cases involve the military and their constitutional prerogatives, women are faced with greater risks and little protection.8 This kind of external pressure and advocacy toward the larger Myanmar society is, therefore, a strategy, not only to secure women’s rights in Myanmar but also to achieve recognition in the women’s movement at large for the precarious and desperate situation faced by ethnic minority women affected by war. A third strategy that Kachin women’s rights activists pursue in their peace engagement, is to use internal pressure to change the mindsets on gender equality and women’s rights in their own local communities. The rationale behind this work is that without women’s rights, there will be no peace, and they challenge the thought that a peace agreement automatically will bring equality and respect to their communities. The work in their local communities is mainly manifested through civic education on issues such as improving reproductive health, tackling drug addiction and preventing domestic violence. However, some of their local campaigns are concerned with promoting positive masculinity in Kachin families and challenging patriarchal

No peace in a ceasefire 65 structures in Kachin society and culture. The approach of this work is deliberately not to lecture about women’s rights or gender equality. It is rather to appeal to ideas of Christian values and to use the church to promote a model for family life based on shared responsibilities and respect. The church has a prominent position in Kachin society and is also an important political actor. Most Kachin professionals have a background from the church and from religious education. Nang Pu in the women’s organization Htoi has herself a background as a church leader and was heavily influenced by salvation theology during her student years at Myanmar Institute of Theology in Yangon. While many Kachin women’s rights activists have close ties to the church, they do recognize the need to challenge patriarchal structures and cultures within the church, and they work together with male church leaders and their wives to include them in training programs for Kachin couples. These programs claim to promote a model for how a good, Kachin, Christian couple should live, and they aim to raise awareness of gender roles in the family, division of labor, responsibilities and respect. Similar to the perspectives of the land rights activists discussed earlier, the women’s rights activism presented here is viewed by the activists themselves as part of the larger political struggle for federalism, self-determination and equal rights for ethnic minorities in Myanmar, the Kachin specifically. However, their perception of peace and justice, and their strategic approach are quite different from that of the KIO or the Kachin political and religious leadership. They seek to change the Myanmar society, but they also see the need to reform local cultures and structures. To achieve this, they combine external as well as internal pressure in their peacebuilding efforts, and they are both principled and pragmatic in their approach. Women’s movements like Htoi Gender and Development Foundation are no doubt seen as a threat by the Tatmadaw. On 7 December 2018, Nang Pu was sentenced to six months in prison and to pay a fine of 320 USD for defaming the military, under section 500 of the Penal Code. The case was raised by Lt. Col. Myo Min Oo at the Tatmadaw’s Northern Command, for her involvement with the Kachin Youth Movement’s protests against the war in April and May 2018. The protests were drawing attention to the severe conditions for IDPs in the Tanai Township of Kachin State, and activists were demanding free passage for civilians trapped by war. Two male activists, Ko Lum Zawng and Ko Zau Jat, were also convicted (Ye Mon 2018).

Politics for peace The space for women in politics in Myanmar is limited. For Kachin women, it has been extra demanding as the Union Election Commission prior to the 2010 elections rejected the registration of a number of Kachin political

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parties. Furthermore, the by-elections in 2012 were suspended in Kachin State, allegedly due to security reasons. Kachin women have nonetheless pursued a variety of political strategies to influence the political sphere and a few of them have managed to make their way all the way up to the union level. The Kachin women involved in politics have used their political positions systematically to work for sustainable peace in Kachin State, and both principled and more pragmatic approaches have been pursued. While Bawk Ja from the land right’s movement campaigned for the NDF in 2010 and used this party as a platform to fight against power abuse from the military, and indirectly for the rights of the Kachin people, others took a more pragmatic approach, attempting to influence the political elite in Myanmar more directly. One of these women is the Kachin lawyer, Doi Bu Nbrang. Many Kachin would shy away from the Unity and Democracy Party of Kachin State as it was seen as a proxy party to the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), a party dominated by former generals and other people close to the Tatmadaw. Doi Bu did not and saw this platform as an opportunity to make concrete political changes and to influence the peace process at the top level. Clearly restricted by the alliance with the USDP that had placed former high-ranking military officials in the leadership of her party to prevent her and her party members to act too independently, she insisted to work within these elite circles to push for change. After winning her constituency, securing a seat in the Pyithu Hluttaw, the House of Representatives, she used her position as an MP to get access to and to work for better representation of women in the peace process. Doi Bu found that the military and the ethnic armed organizations alike saw the peace process purely as a matter for the security sector and for military-tomilitary negotiations. With the argument that the peace process is just as much about human security and about the victims of war, she advocated for better representation of women and for quotas to secure women’s representation. Like the women mentioned earlier in this chapter, Doi Bu also insists that women are heavily affected by war in terms of reduced human security, forced migration, loss of livelihoods, increased responsibility for other family members, reduced access to health care and education and high risks of sexual violence. The representation of women is therefore viewed as a precondition for a successful peace process. While the civil society sector has many highly competent women engaged in peacebuilding, it has been and still is a challenge to include this sector at the top level of the negotiations. The civil society is included at the working committee level, but even there the representation of women is low. As a legislator, Doi Bu acted as secretary to the Committee on National Race Affairs and Internal Peacemaking in the parliament. After her term ended, she was involved in State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi’s 21st Century

No peace in a ceasefire 67 Panglong peace process as a member of the Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee’s working committee for policies on land and environmental affairs. She was also involved in organizing the peace forum for civil society organizations. In all of these forums and committees, she has been a critical voice advocating for women’s participation in the peace process and for the rights of ethnic minorities. This has frequently resulted in her being sidelined, but she has fought back by insisting to be treated as an equal to the male representatives.9 Doi Bu’s advice to other women in politics and civil society has been to demand representation and a say at the top level of decision making. In an interview with Thin Lei Win for Myanmar Now in 2015, she asked women not to stand idly by, waiting for an invitation: ‘Please don’t wait to be called. We have to push for it ourselves’ (Thin Lei Win 2015). Her approach to peacebuilding, both under the Thein Sein and the Aung San Suu Kyi government, has been to exercise external pressure on the political elite in Myanmar. She has been uncompromising in her demands, but nonetheless pragmatic about whom she has engaged with. A certain level of internal pressure has also been applied. In her discussions and public consultations with the Kachin public, she has been clear that she has not considered it realistic to bring all demands into peace negotiations. After a seventeen-year-long ceasefire period of failed peacebuilding, followed by years of intense fighting and civil war, many Kachin people have lost faith in Myanmar as a country that can secure safety and equality for ethnic minorities. In public meetings, some people have, therefore, demanded that Kachin politicians should push for secession of ‘Kachinland’ from Myanmar. Her reply has been that these demands are unrealistic to bring into negotiations with the Myanmar political and military elite. However, if the people can settle for federalism, she has promised to fight incessantly for that. After her term in parliament, Doi Bo got more involved with the civil society level and she has been representing Nang Pu in the defamation case that she was convicted for. Doi Bo has also pushed for MPs representing Kachin State at the union parliament to raise the concerns of women affected by war with the government in Naypyidaw. As the MPs from Kachin State, most of whom were men, failed to bring forward these concerns, Doi Bu decided to take responsibility on her own. She organized a trip to Naypyidaw for civil society groups and women’s organizations, like Htoi Gender and Development Foundation, to meet with politicians and with the minister for social welfare, relief and resettlement. This is an example of how internal pressure and negotiations in combination with external pressure are used by female Kachin activists at the political arena to raise concerns about women affected by war. The trip to Naypyidaw resulted in the minister scheduling a trip to visit war-affected communities in Kachin State.

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Doi Bu’s direct style during her term as a legislature in the union parliament got her sometimes into trouble when she got at odds with powerful people. However, she also gained a lot of respect for standing up for what she believed in, and she managed to convince powerful people in the union legislative bodies to support her proposals. Using her background as a lawyer, she used existing laws and regulations to support her arguments in her attempts to protect civilians in conflict areas and to secure minority rights. On the controversial case of ethnic affairs ministers and how ethnic minorities are legally categorized in Myanmar, Doi Bu pursued the task of getting the required 100 signatures from her fellow MPs in the parliament to try a case against the president in the constitutional court. After personally convincing central members of the USDP, the president’s own political party, she appealed to the USDP congress directly and managed to secure the required signatures. Instead of founding her argument on Kachin grievances, Doi Bu argued on the basis of the legal history in Myanmar. This mobilization of MPs on the ethnic affairs minister case was a direct noconfidence move against President Thein Sein, and in the national political discourse, the case was viewed as part of the internal political power struggle between the president and the speaker of the parliament, Thura Shwe Man. However, from a Kachin perspective, this was viewed as a direct attack on discriminating policies from the Union government to undermine the position of the Kachin in Myanmar. And behind the move was an outspoken and fearless Kachin woman.10 The peace process in Myanmar has received a lot of criticism both nationally and internationally, not least since the Aung San Suu Kyi government launched the 21st Century Panglong process. The process is criticized for being too rigid and for failing to consult stakeholders between the formal meetings. The exclusion from the peace process of armed groups that have yet to sign the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement is particularly problematic for the KIO and the Kachin. The fact that that a civilian-led government of Aung San Suu Kyi has no influence on the powerful military and that the military has no interest in accommodating the civilian government, adds to the challenges. This obviously complicates the Panglong process, compared to the process led by President Thein Sein and his chief negotiator, Aung Min. The USDP led government enjoyed considerable goodwill from the military and used the peace process to gain much needed political legitimacy. However, despite the lack of progress in the 21st Century Panglong process, Doi Bu is optimistic:11 If we look back at the Thein Sein government, and the peace process, they were all from the military. The negotiators on the government side and the Hluttaw MPs, all of them were USDP representatives or

No peace in a ceasefire 69 appointed as MPs by the military. So the non-Tatmadaw side was only the EAOs [ethnic armed organizations]. But now the majority in the process are opposing the military: The NLD government; the parliamentarians, who are also from NLD; and the EAO. All of these are non-Tatmadaw. This is huge, but people don’t really see that this is a big change. Along with many others, Doi Bu views the peace process as the only way to amend the controversial Constitution of 2008. The Constitution is viewed by ethnic minorities as a major obstacle to peace, but the Constitution and the political system in Myanmar are designed to give the military veto power over any constitutional amendments. Constitutional changes require more than 75 percent majority in the union Hluttaw, where the commanderin-chief appoints 25 percent of the MPs. Earlier attempts by the NLD to amend the Constitution in the parliament have shown that the military is not interested in changing the Constitution through a parliamentarian process. However, if there are results negotiated through the peace process leading to proposed changes in the Constitution, they have a better chance to be accepted by the military appointed parliamentarians. The Tatmadaw representatives in the peace process are all directly appointed by the commanderin-chief, General Min Aung Hlaing. This means that if there are results in the peace process, the MPs from the Tatmadaw will automatically agree with these changes, because they come directly from the commander-in-chief. This is the reason why Doi Bu and many others from ethnic minorities insist on the importance of the peace process, despite its many shortcomings. Furthermore, engagement in politics at the Union Hluttaw level is a potential ticket into this process through the political party quota. Another reason for Doi Bu to remain optimistic is the new structure of the peace process with thematic issues that are supposed to be discussed and negotiated from below. This provides a platform for civil society organizations to voice their concerns and to propose solutions, and it opens up for better representation of women and of Myanmar’s ethnic minorities. Although the military enjoys solid constitutional prerogatives, Doi Bu believes that the powerful institution feels threatened by this increased influence of civilian politicians and engaged civil society actors, and she continues to seek representation and to bring local perspectives into the negotiations at the top level. To strengthen the platform for efficient political engagement from Kachin people, Doi Bu and other members of political parties representing the Kachin minority are engaged in a political process to build a common political strategy for Kachin State. In order to succeed, there is a need for ideological renewal, and women activists and politicians are central in this process as well.

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Ideological renewal Peace activism in Kachin State is not a pacifist exercise or an idealist goal. Rather, it holds compromises, pragmatism and concrete results as a guiding political strategy. Contrary to the more straightforward nationalist approaches of the KIO and the Kachin political and religious elites, these women pursue an alternative and supplementary strategy of external and internal pressure, using both principled and pragmatic approaches in their quest for lasting and sustainable peace. For these women, the larger Kachin nationalist struggle against the historical and contemporary oppression from the Myanmar state must be combined with a constructive approach for equality, justice and national reconciliation. Kachin politicians face multiple obstacles: political restraints, demographic challenges, internal divisions and rigid local political cultures. As mentioned earlier, the Union Election Commission stopped several attempts by Kachin political parties to run in 2010 general election, allegedly for being too close to the illegal organization KIO. However, the 2015 election showed that demographic factors are equally challenging for Kachin political parties. With the large Burman population, particularly in urban areas of Kachin State, and the many other ethnic minorities living there, it is unrealistic to expect that political parties, mobilizing solely on ethnic Jingpaw Kachin identities, will be able to appeal to more than the one-third of the electorate who are Jingpaw Kachin. In a first past the post electoral system, it is difficult to win through on ethnic politics alone. The merger of the three main Kachin political parties into one party in August 2018 was, therefore, a vital first step toward a possible electoral success in 2020. Equally vital is it that this party is able to involve none-Kachin minorities in its political project as well and to include these in future political strategies. Divisions between ethnic groups, religious adherence and personal loyalties are essential to overcome, and to do so there is a need to open up space for a dynamic and inclusive political culture that also involves the active participation of women, young people and people from all walks of life. This means challenging the rigid political culture in Myanmar as well as in Kachin political parties, where older, often male, patrons dictate political decisions and priorities. Kachin civil society represents some of the most vibrant political environments in Myanmar. Many of the most politically advanced organizations in the country are pioneered by Kachin women. The Nyein Foundation and the Metta Development Foundation are two examples of organizations that have fostered strong female leadership. With their experience, visionary outlook, technical training and local grounding, these women have the potential to revolutionize political thinking in their communities and make

No peace in a ceasefire 71 a significant impact at the national level. To achieve lasting and sustainable peace through long-term political engagement will be a tough row to hoe. However, the way these women engage with youth forums, women’s forums and with political parties to develop inclusive and participatory policies shows that women in Kachin State are ready to make an impact at the front stage as well as behind the scenes of politics.

Notes 1 In this chapter, ‘Kachin’ refers to the Jingpaw, the largest subgroup of the Kachin ethnic group. 2 Interview with a Burmese researcher and political analyst, Yangon, 20 February 2018. 3 Interview with Bawk Ja, 15 February 2018. 4 Interview with Bawk Ja, 26 May 2013. 5 Interview with Bawk Ja, 15 February 2018. 6 Ibid. 7 Interview with Nang Pu, 14 February 2018. 8 Ibid. 9 Interview with Doi Bu, 16 February 2018 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid.

References Fan Li. 2015. ‘Does the Suspension of the Myitsone Dam Really Fulfill the People’s Will?’, FIVAS, 20 October 2015 [online]. Available at: http://fivas.org/frontsak/ does-the-suspension-of-the-myitsone-dam-really-fulfill-the-peoples-will/ Hedström, J. 2017. ‘The Political Economy of the Kachin Revolutionary Household’, The Pacific Review, 30(4): 581–95. International Crisis Group. 2011. ‘Myanmar: A New Peace Initiative’, International Crisis Group Asia, Report No. 214, 30 November 2011. Nilsen, M. 2013. ‘Will Democracy Bring Peace to Myanmar?’, International Area Studies Review, 16(2): 115–41. Østby, G. 2016. ‘Violence Begets Violence: Armed Conflict and Domestic Sexual Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa’, Household in Conflict Network, Working Paper No. 233. Sandar Lwin. 2015. ‘CPI Calculates Cost of Myitsone Dam’, The Myanmar Times, 8 October 2015 [online]. Available at: www.mmtimes.com/business/16882-cpicalculates-cost-of-myitsone-dam.html Thin Lei Win. 2015. ‘Where Are the Women in Myanmar’s Peace Process?’, Myanmar Now, 31 December 2015 [online]. Available at: www.myanmar-now. org/news/i/?id=39992fb7-e466-4d26-9eac-1d08c44299b5 UN Human Rights Council. 2018. ‘Report of the Independent International FactFinding Mission on Myanmar’, UN Human Rights Council, 27 August 2018.

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Ye Mon. 2018. ‘Kachin Youth Activists Handed Prison Sentences for ‘Defaming’ the Tatmadaw’, Frontier Myanmar, 7 December 2018. [online] Available at: https://frontiermyanmar.net/en/kachin-youth-activists-handed-prison-sentencesfor-defaming-the-tatmadaw Zaw Oo and Win Min. 2007. ‘Assessing Burma’s Ceasefire Accords’, East-West Center Washington Policy Studies (Southeast Asia) No. 39. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

5

Women’s participation in peacebuilding Views from Mon rural communities Myint Myint Mon

Despite numerous plans and government policies to improve women’s status and access to equal rights, there is a lack of women’s participation in decision making in Myanmar. This holds true in party politics as well as the government bureaucracy, and the same is the case in the ethnic armed organizations (EAOs). The poor representation of women in Myanmar’s politics and public life is evidence of multiple forms of gender discrimination that interact to restrict women’s ability to participate (Minoletti 2014). As caregivers, women in Myanmar clearly understand the impact of conflict, especially on women, children, the elderly, the ill and disabled and the displaced. As Carla Silbert (2016) asserts, women in Myanmar have experienced the deeply adverse effects of conflict and hence know what strategies need to be put in place to address these impacts. Consequently, women can best represent their own interests in the dialogue for peace and in the talks on the implementation of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA). The meaningful participation of women in the peace process is essential if there is to be any hope of finding good strategies and solutions for a lasting peace. And yet, women’s participation in the peace process is limited. This chapter explores the perceptions of women in rural communities in Myanmar of the ongoing peace process, with a special focus on their views on women’s participation in the peace process. It presents findings from a dual-case investigation of local perceptions of the contributions of women to peace negotiations. The purpose of this study was to gain a deeper understanding of the prospects for greater participation of women in Myanmar’s peace processes and how lasting peace might be achieved. The research sites were a village in an area controlled by the Mon ethnic armed organization (EAO) the New Mon State Party (NMSP) and another village in an area that is officially controlled by the Myanmar government, but is strongly influenced by the NMSP. Both villages have a majority population of Mon Buddhists. This chapter highlights the role of women in peacemaking, assuming that the meaningful inclusion of women is vital for the peace process. While

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explaining their views on the participation of women, the rural women I interviewed also explained the root causes of armed conflict and why it is essential to understand these root causes in the effort to solve conflict and create peace. The women reasoned that a resolution of armed conflict would help reduce women’s suffering from insecurity, violence and injustice. The insights presented in this chapter are based on qualitative research in two Mon villages. The methodology is qualitative interviews, focus group discussion and participant observation. One of the villages is named Palann and is located in Kyaung Ywor village tract in Ye Township, southern Mon State. Palann is situated inside the NMSP-controlled area and is fully administered by NMSP. The other village is Wae Rate, located in Kawt Bein village tract in Karen State. Wae Rate is officially administered by the Myanmar government, but in reality, the people of this village view the NMSP as an authority. I will explore both the similarities and differences between these two sites in terms of the inclusion of women, especially in peacebuilding and security. This chapter starts out with a brief overview of the armed conflict in Monland, followed by a review of Mon women’s involvement in the peace process. This includes the experiences of two Mon women who have participated in various capacities in local governance and political work. Based on the interviews I carried out during fieldwork in the two Mon villages, I then describe the perceptions of Mon women on the peace process and their perspectives on the meaning of security.

Reimagining of armed conflict in Myanmar In its modern form, the demand for the creation of an independent sovereign state of Monland dates back to 1948, when Burma gained its independence from British colonial rule. However, Mon groups have been struggling for sovereignty in one form or another since 1752, when the last Mon kingdom fell to the Burmese Kings (see South 2005). Among my forty interviewees, 75 percent stated that the root cause of the Mon armed conflict was a hunger for self-determination, which is seen as a fundamental right of ethnic minorities. They stated that in their view, the Mon armed conflict was not primarily about human rights violations, arbitrary violence and destruction of belongings, nor was it about discrimination or inequality, lack of opportunities for minorities, Burmanization or unwillingness to acknowledge and respect local people. The real issue was self-rule. In the words of one interviewee: ‘We really want selfdetermination, federalism. I am sure this would bring nation-wide peace’. The long history of conflict has created a deep-rooted lack of trust, as another interviewee explained, ‘Mon people cannot believe in the Bamar [Burmese], although the government has tried to persuade them many times’. This was illustrated by the failed attempt to resolve the conflict

Women’s participation in peacebuilding 75 in the 1958 ‘Exchange of Arms for Peace’, when the Mon People’s Front handed over a number of weapons in exchange for government recognition as a legal political party, and the bulk of Mon insurgents thus ‘exchanged arms for peace’ and ‘returned to the legal fold’ (South 2005: 115). The New Mon State Party (NMSP) was subsequently formed, but armed conflict continued. In June 1995, a ceasefire agreement was signed between NMSP and the government of Myanmar, but armed conflict again continued, and the ceasefire agreement was finally broken in 2010 due to disagreements between NMSP and the Myanmar Border Guard Force (HURFOM 2011). Interviewees acknowledged that the long history of conflict is a source of serious trouble for the entire population. As stated by one woman interviewee: ‘We worry that the present peace talks are similar to the 1958 peace talks, and we are really hungry for a genuine and quintessential peace, not a quasipeace’. The lack of trust is also evident in the repeated signing and breaking of ceasefire agreements between NMSP and the government of Myanmar. This has raised doubts about the signing of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) and whether it will result in a meaningful political dialogue as a step toward lasting peace. Nevertheless, in 2012, NMSP signed a new ceasefire agreement with the Myanmar government, and on 13 February 2018, NMSP signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), despite that several of the largest armed groups in Myanmar refused to sign. With the NMSP signature, the number of EAOs to have signed the NCA reached ten. The nationwide peace process, underway since 2011, has been heavily gender-biased. Among the sixteen EAOs that comprised the Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team, only one woman was involved in a leading role. During the final round of NCA negotiation in 2015, the fifteen-member Peace Process Steering Team Special Delegation included two women (13 percent), including a key female leader from the Karen National Union. The Union Peacemaking Working Committee was another male-dominated entity, with only two women out of fifty-two members (4 percent). The chief negotiator of the government of Myanmar and the chair of the Myanmar Peace Centre have both called for attention to the near total absence of women in the process (AGIPP 2015: 12). However, the eleven members of the Union Peace Central Committee were all men, and so were the members of the Joint Implementation Coordination Meeting and the nationwide Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee. The Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee included three women (6 percent), while the state-level Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee in Mon State had two women among its fourteen members (14 percent). In both villages where I carried out fieldwork, nearly all of the forty interviewees stated that peace is essential and vitally important for the opportunity to travel, do business and be able to receive education and for well-being in general. Due to the armed conflict between the NMSP and the

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government of Myanmar, and among the EAOs, men and women, boys and girls alike have traumatic experiences of arbitrary arrest, detention, torture, extrajudicial killings, forced disappearances, rape and other forms of sexual violence, and violations of land, property and housing rights. They stated that, due to armed fighting, they had to flee from their houses and villages, had their house burned down, lost belongings, lost loved ones, sustained injuries, were forced to stay in the jungle, lost access to education, lost their business and were traumatized due to fear. In the words of one interviewee, ‘We really want peace. If we had peace, we could live joyfully, have access to education, travel and do business freely, and live without fear’. A villager from Wae Rate explained, I am still afraid of the dog barking at night. One night, when the dogs discovered soldiers, they barked. Then the soldiers took my husband out of the house and questioned him. I was really afraid to see this. From then on, I have always worried when I heard dogs barking. This shows how much armed conflict and human rights abuses have broken down the social order and caused fear and insecurity. Consequently, the people I interviewed were clear about their views on the need for peace. They were tired of armed conflict and hungry for peace.

Women’s participation in peacemaking In the Mon State government, there is only one female minister out of a total of eleven (9 percent), and she is the minister of ethnic affairs. In the present Mon State parliament (2015–2020) there are six female members of parliament (MPs) (19 percent) out of thirty-two. In the previous parliamentary period, there were no female MPs in the Mon State Parliament. In the New Mon State Party (NMSP), there is only one woman out of thirty-five central committee members. The share of women in the party leadership (central level) is thus only 3 percent. There are no women among the district-level party leaders, but in the administrative function at the township level, there are four women (3 percent) out of 120 township-level committee members. In the Mon National Education Department, there are forty-nine women (90 percent) out of fifty-four staff members. In the Mon National Education Committee, there are twenty-seven women (75 percent) out of thirty-six committee members. This shows that women are already appointed to leading roles in the Mon Ethnic Armed Organization, especially in development and social affairs. However, the numbers are inadequate for women to be well represented or included in peace talks and political dialogue.

Women’s participation in peacebuilding 77 With the help of focus group discussions and key informant interviews, I investigated local perceptions about the participation of women in the peace process and women leadership and decision making, by asking the participants to share their thoughts freely. I did not give participants a list of responses to choose from. In Palann village, out of twenty interviewees, 75 percent maintained that women should play a leading role in the peace process and at the negotiation table. They thought that it would be easier for women to express their feelings, difficulties, problems and needs if there was a woman in a leading role. They would be more willing to speak out about their problems and needs, as they would feel more comfortable, and they would be able to talk directly and in detail about issues among women without shame, worry or fear. The reason for this was that women are able to empathize and understand the feelings, situation, needs and difficulties of other women. Most interviewees stated that, as women have a motherly spirit, they would be patient, hospitable, respectful and sympathetic while analyzing and investigating cases, and they would go into more detail than men. Therefore, they wanted women to be included meaningfully in the peace process and at the negotiating table in order to broker on behalf of them and bring up concerns relevant to women. This point of view is directly in line with the evidence suggesting that women’s groups are more likely to raise concerns that are distinct from belligerents’ priorities or specifically relevant to women (O’Reilly et al. 2015: 2). The remaining 20 percent of the interviewees stated that, as women have inadequate education, experience and knowledge, women should take care of their families and engage in domestic work rather than being involved in politics and decision making. At Wae Rate village, out of twenty women interviewed, only 35 percent of interviewees expressed the view that women leaders would make it easier for other women to express their feelings, difficulties, problems and needs in a friendly and direct manner, without shame, worry or fear. Another 45 percent of women in Wae Rate village held the opposite view with regard to women’s participation in peace processes and women in leadership roles. They disagreed that women should play a leading role in the peace process and at the negotiating table, citing security as the main reason. They maintained that women are physically not strong enough to sort out intent and furious quarrel, and that it was inappropriate for them to be a leader, considering that there are a lot of addicts (both alcohol and drugs) in the village at present. This demonstrates the main limitations to women’s participation in peace processes, as well as their active involvement in politics and leadership roles. Another reason stated by the Wae Rate villagers was that women are less interested in being leaders and that they lack the courage, capacity, experience and knowledge to be leaders. Because of their lack of capacity,

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women would face hardship and suffering if they got involved in peace negotiations. Moreover, they maintained that most women are disinterested in politics. This corresponds to the key finding of a study on the ‘Perception of Community Members on Women’s Participation in Politics’ (Mon Women’s Organization 2016), which concluded that culture is the main barrier to women’s involvement in politics and leadership. Lack of involvement was also attributed to women’s limited interest in politics and lack of experience in politics and leadership roles. Other research suggests that low levels of education and poor quality of education inhibit confidence and capacity. According to one observer, social and cultural pressure, along with years of exclusion, is impacting Myanmar men and women’s attitudes towards the current transition in their country. The lack of confidence in their skills and knowledge, the lack of financial and political support and the feeling of being powerless are also important factors restraining women from playing a meaningful role in the current context. (Gasser 2014: 20) The remaining 20 percent of interviewees in Wae Rate agreed that leadership, whether by women or men, depends on qualification, education, experience and knowledge. It also depends on the individual’s interpersonal skills, capacity, willingness and accountability. It is important to note that Wae Rate village had started electing women as ten-household leaders, hundred-household leaders and village administrators, as they believed that women can do as well in governance and decision making as men. This reveals that most Wae Rate villagers actually have an accepting or positive attitude toward women’s involvement in decision making. A female ten-household leader Wae Rate village is situated in the Kawt Bein village tract, Karen State, very close to NMSP’s Thaton District Administrative Office. It only has about 100 households and a population of about 500. Among the ten-household leaders, three were women, comprising one-third of the elected leaders. Khin Mya is over fifty years old and illiterate. Myint War is forty-two and has primary school education. Mi Cho Khaing is thirty-four years old and has achieved seventh-standard education. I interviewed Mi Cho Khaing and members of her constituency for this study. When I interviewed her, she had been serving as a ten-household leader for about one month. Mi Cho Khaing is a volunteer, and the only woman among six members of the village philanthropic association, which helps poor and sick people

Women’s participation in peacebuilding 79 in her village to get medical care. Most villagers appreciate Mi Cho Khaing, not only because she is patient, generous, considerate, dynamic and young but also because they believe she can carry out her responsibilities better than others, as she is more knowledgeable and experienced than others in the village. According to members of her constituency, the villagers were keen to elect her for the position of Village Tract Administrator (VTA), but she refused to run for that post. She said that she had to refuse because she has three children who are attending high school, middle school and primary school, and her husband, a driver, is unable to earn enough for their living costs and their children’s school charges. Since the cost of schooling is high, and it is important to afford the children’s school fees as well as the family’s living costs, both of the parents need to work. If she chose to be a VTA, she would have earned less than 100,000 Kyat per month, which would be insufficient for their family to survive. Her situation is different from that of a male VTA, who might also have a low-income job, but would be able to earn an additional income from extra work, such as farm labor or business. This is because men have no housework to do and are not required to prepare the children for school, cook or clean the house. Men can find time to work as a VTA, while women must spend any extra time on housework and caring for the family. Mi Cho Khaing chose not to be a VTA, which means that her time is divided between selling groceries to make money, taking care of her children and doing housework. In addition to the financial issues, Mi Cho Khaing felt disadvantaged because she had failed to complete high school. Her self-confidence was low because of her inadequate education. She felt that it would be difficult for her to communicate with other VTAs and with the Township Administrator due to her lack of qualifications. She was also afraid of taking on the VTA position as she felt she was not old enough for the post. Mi Cho Khaing’s story highlights the real perceptions of local women about taking on a leadership role in their local community. It also substantiates the report on the ‘Perception of Community Members on Women’s Participation in Politics’ (Mon Women’s Organization 2016), which pointed out culture, limited interest in politics and lack of experience as the main barriers for women’s participation in politics and leadership roles. Another obstacle cited in the report was the low level of education and poor quality of education in village schools, which also inhibits confidence among women and raises doubts about the capacity of women to be involved in politics and decision making. A woman at the peace table Only one woman, Mi Sar Dar, has participated in the NMSP negotiation team during state-level peace talks. Mi Sar Dar is also the only woman among thirty-five central committee members of the NMSP. As the only

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women in the committee, Mi Sar Dar lacked the confidence to participate in discussions when she started as a committee member. She faced many obstacles in her role, with regard to participation in meetings, in discussions, when she presented her perspective, and when she made decisions. Due to cultural norms and expectations, she was worried about making a mistake in choosing the appropriate words to express herself, choosing the right issues to raise and the right time to present them. She felt that is was especially hard to express women’s issues at the beginning of her committee membership. However, thanks to her education, knowledge, experience and efficient performance of her tasks, she was soon accepted and esteemed by the male members of the NMSP central committee. This also impacted on their acceptance of women’s participation in every sector and in diverse political and governance roles. Most of the men in the Mon armed organization came to realize the benefits of the inclusion of women and recognized that women were capable of filling such positions. Mi Sar Dar participated at the ceasefire negotiation table in 2012, when NMSP signed the ceasefire agreement with the Mon State government. Since she was the only woman among the Mon EAO delegates, she was permitted to invite another woman to accompany her. There were no women in the delegation on the government side. Therefore, there were only two women at the negotiating table. One was an official delegate in a front chair, and another was an assistant in an EAO back chair. Mi Sar Dar’s responsibility was only to discuss education issues, as she was in charge of the Education Department. At first, the ceasefire negotiating table was quiet, because delegates from both sides were silent, except the chief minister of Mon State. Mi Sar Dar felt awkward about the silence and took the initiative to talk with the chief minister. The two of them had an exchange of views on education, gender and other issues. This highlighted the skills and capabilities of a woman to create an effective and functional meeting, and illustrated the importance of meaningful participation of women at the negotiating table. As explained by an observer to the talks, Mi Sar Dar impressed the government side with her strength and eloquence.

The meaning of security as understood by local communities Out of the forty interviewees in my study, 95 percent of women from both villages stated that their territories are quite safe, as there has been no theft, robbery, rape or political violence since the first ceasefire agreement was signed between NMSP and the government of Myanmar in 1995, although they have to pay some taxes such as farm tax to the EAOs. Currently, drug abuse has become the most serious issue. As young people are using drugs

Women’s participation in peacebuilding 81 and getting intoxicated from alcohol, the community feels more insecure. Villagers were seriously concerned about this issue and felt that it had a great impact on women’s security. When drug addicts were in need of drugs, and when youth got drunk, harassment, sexual abuse, violence and murder might occur in the villages. Myanmar has developed into a country where drugs and alcohol are available everywhere and at any time. Due to the extreme rate of drug abuse among youths as young as sixteen or seventeen, most villagers felt insecure about leaving the house after 9–10 pm at night. As stated by one interviewee, ‘Almost all youths are using drugs. It is terribly bad, but there is nothing we can do about this. It is not only our village, but every village, every boy’. There was a feeling that life in the rural community was hopeless and without a future, and that their happiness was lost. To tackle this situation, they saw a need for better law enforcement and rule of law. Another perspective on peace concerns the inner peace that every individual is responsible for, which requires the individual to dismiss cupidity, anger, ignorance and attachment. Due to the evil of attachment, people would commit various violations against each other. There was a view that human beings are full of greed and attachment, and will do everything their mind is directed toward. Mindfulness is a way to guide people to prevent them from doing evil, speaking evil words and thinking evil thoughts, in accordance with the Law of the Buddha (Buddha Dharma). The morality, mental capacity and intellect of every human being should be refined to avoid the effects of bad karma. The best way to promote this mentality is love (mitta). Doing good deeds, speaking politely, sweetly and sincerely, thinking good thoughts, and respecting others are examples of good personal qualities. By dismissing cupidity, anger, ignorance and attachment, a person can gain inner peace and freedom from fear. In addition to the problem of drug abuse, human rights violations are still happening in Mon State. Between 1995 and 2017, there were 108 recorded incidents of arbitrary arrest, detention or torture, affecting well over 330,000 individuals. Government soldiers would typically use sexual violence as a weapon of war, as an effective way of frightening the local population. Moreover, there were fifty-seven recorded incidents of extrajudicial killings, sixty-seven separate incidents of sexual violence affecting 106 women, children and men, and more than 100,000 acres of land confiscated by soldiers of the government of Myanmar and EAOs (HURFOM 2017: 8). Due to these atrocities, there is persistent fear and distrust of the government for their unwillingness or inability to acknowledge the voice of the Mon ethnic population (HURFOM 2017: 22). As explained by the interviewees, lack of mutual respect among ethnic minorities and the majority population is the main circumstance that could provoke fighting among the parties.

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Conclusion The study presented here has explored the perspectives of Mon women regarding peace and security in their local areas, and how they view security and insecurity, the conditions for lasting peace, and the local realities of conflict and peace. The purpose of this study is to present the voices of women in conflict-affected areas, with a view to inform decision making on women’s participation in a more inclusive peace process. My study shows that personal safety and security in the rural community is an important concern, especially for women and girls. As highlighted by the interviewees, efficient law enforcement is crucial for them to feel safe and secure. Women’s priorities for peace are a result of different experiences of conflict. Peace has different meanings among both individuals and constituencies, but women’s participation in peace processes is important, as it will likely encourage women to get more involved in politics, leadership, education, employment, financial affairs and matters of justice and security. Women’s active participation in the leadership of EAOs is an important avenue for women to be able to present their perspectives at the negotiating table. My research supports the assertion that women tend to broaden the set of issues discussed at the negotiating table, to address development and human rights and the causes and effects of conflict (O’Reilly et al. 2015: 5). Constraints to women’s participation in the peace process include the prevalence of strong traditional gender stereotypes and cultural norms that create ‘double burdens’. On the one hand, Mon women feel that they have suffered from oppression and discrimination by the majority Burmese, after losing their kingdom and self-rule. On the other hand, Mon women face an individual double burden because they are responsible for raising the children and taking care of domestic work as well as working outside the home to provide income for their family, where they also face male unwillingness to accept women’s participation. Lack of interest in politics and lack of knowledge and experience are additional factors that prevent women from taking on leading positions. Higher levels of education and better-quality education will help women take on leadership, and this would also make their participation in peacemaking more meaningful. Moreover, financial support and political backing could help increase women’s inclusion in decision making. To promote women’s participation in the peace process, it is important to empower and inspire women’s involvement in various diverse roles, such as negotiation, facilitation, mediation, technical assistance, observation and monitoring. The Myanmar government should take responsibility for the participation of women in peace processes at all levels and in diverse roles. On the other hand, armed organizations should also contribute, as should

Women’s participation in peacebuilding 83 civil society organizations. Participation in a peace process is a window of opportunity to empower women, to help them gain knowledge and experience. The inclusion of women at the negotiating table may also have a positive effect on the durability of peace. This makes it not only reasonable but also essential for women to be included in peacemaking in Myanmar.

References AGIPP (Alliance for Gender Inclusion in the Peace Process). 2015. ‘Women, Peace and Security Policymaking in Myanmar, Context Analysis and Recommendations’, 1/2015, December 2015. Yangon: Alliance for Gender Inclusion in the Peace Process. Gasser, R. 2014. ‘Supporting women’s voices in the current peace process’, in S. Bachtold, R. Gasser, J. Palmiano, R. M. Alluri and S. Stein, eds, Working in and on Myanmar: Reflections on a ‘light footprint’ approach, Working paper. Bern: Swisspeace, pp. 14–22. HURFOM (Human Rights Foundation of Monland). 2011. ‘Burma’s Democratic Façade: Human Right Abuses Continued’, Series of the Mon Forum, November– December 2011, 19 January 2012. Mon State: Human Rights Foundation of Monland. ———. 2017. ‘“I Still Remember”: Desires for Acknowledgement and Justice for Past and Ongoing Human Rights Violations in Mon Areas of Southern Burma’, December 2017. Mon State: Human Rights Foundation of Monland. Minoletti, P. 2014. ‘Women’s Participation in the Subnational Governance of Myanmar’, Discussion Paper No. 3, June 2014, Myanmar Development Resource Institute’s Centre for Economic and Social Development (MDRI-CESD) and The Asia Foundation [online]. Available at: https://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/ WomensParticipationintheSubnationalGovernanceofMyanmar.pdf Mon Women’s Organization. 2016. ‘Perceptions of Community Members on Women’s Participation in Politics’, March 2016. Mon State: Mon Women’s Organization. O’Reilly, M., Ó Súilleabháin, A. and Paffenholz, T. 2015. ‘Reimaging Peacemaking: Women’s Roles in Peace Processes’, June 2015. New York, NY: International Peace Institute. Silbert, C. 2016. ‘Landmarks in Myanmar’s Post-2011 Peace Process, The Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement in Myanmar: A Gender Equality and Women’s Rights Analysis’, UN Women Myanmar. South, A. 2005. Mon Nationalism and Civil War in Burma. London: Routledge.

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Women survivors’ experiences of war and perspectives on peace in Myanmar S. Hkawng Naw

Myanmar’s peace process is complex, and a large number of actors are involved. The main stakeholders in the process are the government, the Burmese Army (Tatmadaw), ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and ethnic militia groups aligned with the Tatmadaw. Moreover, peace talks and ceasefire agreements are monitored by experts from the international community, community-based organizations and civil society organizations (CSOs). However, the peace process takes a top-down approach and remains lacking in transparency and inclusiveness. Myanmar ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in 1997. The government is thus responsible for implementing CEDAW’s General Recommendation no. 30, which obliges state parties to guarantee women’s participation in peace and reconciliation processes. Moreover, foreign governments supporting the peace process insist that women should participate in the process. However, women are still not well represented in the peace process. Despite having experienced much oppression and violence during six decades of civil war and armed conflict, their voices have largely been ignored in the past eight years of peace talks. This chapter presents findings from a qualitative study on women’s perspectives on the peace process in Myanmar, with a focus on the views of women survivors and women leaders involved in the promotion of women’s rights. The study investigates what the women leaders and survivors want, in terms of women’s engagement in the peace process, and main outcomes of the process. Before presenting the findings of the study, the following sections provide a brief history of the conflict and an overview of the current peace process.

A long history of conflict Armed conflict has been ongoing in Myanmar for more than sixty years. While Myanmar is multi-ethnic, it has a highly centralized government that

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is controlled by the Burmese majority. Ethnic groups were organized since before Burma’s independence, and some of them lobbied the British for their own independent nation states. When Burma became independent, it had a constitution that protected the rights of all ethnic nationalities. This governance system ended in 1962, when the military under General Ne Win took power. A new constitution was adopted in 1974, granting power to the military and leaving the ethnic nationalities disenfranchised. The discriminatory policies of the early governments and dictatorships led ethnic groups to form their own armies. Since the 1950s, these groups have been fighting for their equal political rights, autonomy, and control of their abundant natural resources under a federal state. The military rulers held elections in 1990, in an attempt to appease antigovernment sentiments after a widespread pro-democracy uprising in 1988. The pro-democracy National League for Democracy (NLD) party won the 1990 election, but the military refused to hand over power. The military regime renamed itself and began a policy of engaging ethnic opposition groups. Between 1989 and 1995, the military regime negotiated ceasefire agreements with several powerful ethnic armed groups, including the United Wa State Party, Shan State Army and Kachin Independence Army (KIA). The military gained significant control in the areas occupied by groups that did not sign a ceasefire, especially in Karen areas along the Thai border. The Karen National Union, one of the largest armed groups, faced aggressive Tatmadaw offensives and loss of territory. Thousands of Karen communities were destroyed under the Burmese military’s counter-insurgency operations, which aimed to cut off food, finances, intelligence and recruitment to the Karen army. As described by the Karen Women’s Organization: The population in Karen State [. . .] faces systematic human rights violations. Men, women and children face arbitrary arrest and execution, torture, murder, forced displacement and appropriation of land, and conscription of child soldiers and civilians into army support roles. Women and children are raped and sexually abused. Systematic attacks by the Burmese Army are designed to terrorize and subjugate Karen civilians. (Karen Women’s Organization 2012) As a result, hundreds of thousands of Karen have become refugees and asylum seekers living in refugee camps in Thailand. As a new approach to maintain power, and in response to international pressure, the military government started the National Convention Process (NCP) in 1993, with the aim of drafting a new constitution. However, several ceasefire organizations demanded guarantees of political control, such

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as decentralization of power and increased power to state governments. Ethnic political actors and the pro-democracy opposition party NLD were dissatisfied with the Tatmadaw objective of a ceasefire process without political dialogue and called for national reconciliation through a tripartite dialogue between the Tatmadaw, the ethnic nationalities and the democratic forces led by Aung San Suu Kyi. The NCP concluded in 2007 and the military government adopted a new constitution in 2008, which came into effect in 2011. The 2008 Constitution gave the outward appearance of moving toward democracy, while the Tatmadaw secured its control of the parliament and key ministries. In 2010, an election paved the way for a promilitary government controlled by the Union Solidarity and Development Party. The election was widely criticized by the international community as being neither free nor fair. After the 2010 election, Thein Sein, a retired general, became the president of Myanmar. President Thein Sein’s quasi-civilian government called for armed opposition groups to convert to Border Guard Forces and submit to Tatmadaw command. Only a few groups agreed, while many groups that had previously signed ceasefires with the government refused, including the Kachin Independence Army, one of the largest ethnic armed groups. As a result, the Burmese military renewed its operations against these groups, particularly in Kachin State and Northern Shan State. The Tatmadaw attacked the KIA in 2011, breaking a seventeen-year-long ceasefire agreement and igniting heated conflict. The fighting caused serious human rights abuses and displaced more than 120,000 people.

A road map to peace The aim of the first phase of the Thein Sein government’s road map to peace was to sign bilateral ceasefires with armed groups in order to stop the fighting. The aim of the second phase was to sign a nationwide agreement with all the EAOs. The government put forward an eight-point peace plan that prohibited secession, called for cooperation for development, invited ethnic armed organizations to set up political parties and asserted that a single national army was to be formed, in accordance with the Constitution. Ethnic armed groups subsequently set up the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC), including six organizations that signed ceasefires (Karen National Union, Karenni National Progress Party, Shan State Army-North, Chin National Front, New Mon State Party and Pa-Oh National Liberation Organization), and five members that did not sign a ceasefire (Kachin Independence Army, National United Front of Arakan, Wa National Organization, Lahu Democratic Union and Palaung State Liberation Front/Ta’ang National Liberation Army) (Myanmar Peace Monitor 2018a). In 2013,

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these groups formed the Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team to represent the ethnic armed organizations at the formal talks with the government and take up a facilitation and technical role in the peace process. The UNFC presented eleven points for the ceasefire agreement. The first point was to conduct political talks according to the 2008 federal Constitution drawn up by ethnic and democratic opposition groups. Second, the UNFC called for a nationwide accord on power sharing and resource sharing through an amendment of the 2008 Constitution, to be approved by the parliament (Myanmar Peace Monitor 2018b). In 2014, while the peace process was in progress, clashes between the Burmese Army and the KIA continued. In early 2015, there were also clashes in the Kokang region and Northern Shan State, between the Tatmadaw and three armed groups: the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army and the Arakan Army. These three-armed groups were not invited to participate in the ceasefire negotiations, although inclusiveness was supposed to be a principle throughout the process. Moreover, the Tatmadaw violated earlier ceasefires by launching attacks in Kachin and Northern Shan states, clashing with the Karen National Liberation Army and occupying a New Mon State Party outpost (Chit Min Tun 2018). Despite the complexity of the political dynamics, on 15 October 2015, a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) was signed by eight out of sixteen ethnic armed groups, including the two largest armed groups, the Shan State Army-South and the Karen National Union. General elections followed on 8 November 2015, and the National League for Democracy (NLD) won a landslide victory. In March 2016, the NLD government headed by Aung San Suu Kyi was inaugurated. The new government made peace and national reconciliation its top priority. It presented a seven-step road map for peace, which included the following steps: (1) Review the ‘Framework for political dialogue’. (2) Amend the ‘Framework for political dialogue’. (3) Continue convening Union Peace Conferences based on the framework. (4) Sign the 21st Century Panglong Conference Agreement based on the outcomes of the 21st Century Panglong Conference. (5) Approve the constitutional amendment in accordance with the Union Agreement. (6) Hold multi-party democratic elections in accordance with the amended Constitution. (7) Build a democratic federal union based on the results of the election (Myanmar Peace Monitor 2018b). The state counselor, Aung San Suu Kyi, continues to lead the peace process. The new government has been holding several peace talks over the past two years. On 13 February 2018, the New Mon State Party (NMSP) and the Lahu Democratic Union (LDU) signed the NCA, bringing the total number of signatories to eight (Ye Mon 2018). Although there has been

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some progress, there is still no agreement between the Tatmadaw and EAOs regarding democracy, equality and autonomy. First, there are different opinions on how to build a federal army. The Tatmadaw insists on a single federal army under its control, while the EAOs want a federal army in which they have a constitutional guarantee for a degree of autonomy. Second, the issue of the secession and self-administration policies are contentious. The government side objects to the use of the term ‘secession’ in agreements. The Tatmadaw wants signatory EAOs to agree to a nondisintegration policy, which means that the ethnic groups cannot demand independence or self-determination. The EAOs are willing to agree to the non-disintegration principle to build a federal state, but they want guarantees that they can secede if they feel the federal state is failing, or if it does not become fully established. The peace process is complex and involves many different ethnic groups. There are also international entities involved, including the Myanmar Peace Support Initiative headed by Norway, the Peace Donor Support Group, the International Peace Support Group, the Nippon Foundation (Japan) and other countries, including Finland, China, India, the USA, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. A number of civil society organizations and NGOs have been monitoring the process, and women’s organizations, including the Women’s League of Burma (WLB) and its thirteen member organizations, have been engaged in policy and peace advocacy, as they have done for decades. The main role of the CSOs is to assist in the monitoring of the ceasefire agreement and educate the general public about the peace process. Some civil society leaders have also been involved in the Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team in a technical capacity, advising on processual issues. This includes carrying out research as needed, drafting policy papers and the like. CSOs are also caring for civilians displaced by conflict, building capacity, conducting research, analyzing the peace process, providing recommendations to policymakers and conducting advocacy campaigns. While the CSOs do a lot of work related to the peace process, women’s groups and other CSOs have only been invited to peace dialogues as observers and have had little opportunity to present their views to decision makers. This leaves them with limited power to influence policy. After the 2016 peace meetings, one analyst noted, ‘CSOs are allowed to carry out a political dialogue that runs parallel to and potentially feeds into the formal process, but [. . .] CSOs are not allowed to contribute to a discussion of crucial political and security matters’ (Johanson 2017: 3). Moreover, Women make up only 18 percent of the government’s top peace negotiating team; with respect to the cease-fire monitoring structures, no women at all are in the union-level Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC).

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The ethnic armed groups do even worse on this score: the signatories’ and non-signatories’ negotiating teams (the Peace Process Steering Team and the Delegation for Political Negotiation, respectively) include zero women. (Johanson 2017: 2)

Women’s views While there is a lack of women’s participation in the Myanmar peace process, the views and perspectives of women have also been ignored. In order to gain a better understanding of women’s perspectives on the peace process, I conducted a series of interviews with women survivors, as well as women leaders who are actively involved in the peace process. The objective of the study was to identify the objectives of women participants in the peace process and document the strategies they are using to achieve these objectives. I used interviews to present the perspectives of women survivors as well as women leaders who are engaged in the peace process and in promoting women’s rights in Myanmar. My strategy was to interview women survivors of conflict and women leaders to get the perspectives of both the women who are actively engaged in advocacy and politics, and those who are not as engaged. I took this approach to make sure that the voices of a diverse variety of women were represented in my study and not just those who are relatively powerful. To protect the identity of the interviewees, all the names cited in this chapter are fictitious. Most of the interviews were conducted in Burmese and Kachin (Jinghpaw) languages, though interviews with Ta’ang women survivors were done in Ta’ang language and translated into Burmese by a female native Ta’ang speaker, before translation into English. Data were analyzed using a content analysis approach. This approach enabled the identification of common themes in responses from different interviewees. The analysis looked for specific themes under broad topic areas, including women’s attitudes toward the Myanmar peace process, the goals of women leaders and survivors, what the women want to get out of the peace process, their strategies to reach those goals, barriers – real or anticipated – to reaching those goals and what women need to be able to participate effectively in the peace process. I interviewed eight women with first-hand experiences of the conflict in Myanmar and the peace process: five women survivors from ongoing armed conflicts in Kachin and Ta’ang areas, and three women leaders who are currently involved in the peace process. I discovered several common themes in the women’s responses. First, they think the peace talks are neglecting major issues that need to be resolved. Second, they think the government is failing its responsibility to protect citizens. Third, the women survivors want justice and reparations

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and, fourth, Myanmar needs an implementation mechanism to achieve the agreed target of 30-percent participation of women in political sessions. Peace talks are neglecting major issues that need to be resolved All the women that were interviewed stated either that it will take time to achieve peace or that the peace process will not result in genuine peace. Many noted that there has been ongoing fighting in Kachin and Northern Shan states, between the Tatmadaw and armed groups such as the Kachin Independence Organization and Ta’ang National Liberation Army. This happened while peace talks were being held in Myanmar’s capital, Naypidaw. Many women survivors of conflict expressed negative views of the peace process, pointing out that there is continued fighting and human rights violations including sexual violence against women in their areas (see also ND-Burma 2018). Indeed, it seems that few positive effects of the peace talks were felt on the ground. Given the long history of horrific violations against women committed by the Tatmadaw, women survivors continued to harbor mistrust of the government and felt that it was not serious about ending the conflict. In the words of a Ta’ang woman survivor, Lway Kyi:1 I don’t think [the peace process] will succeed. [The government] said that they are working on peace and had a meeting but three or four days later we heard about fighting. Seng Seng, another Ta’ang woman survivor, stated, ‘to be able to get peace, first [the government] needs to stop making war’.2 Likewise, women leaders doubt that the peace process will lead to sustainable peace. Shawng Nan, a woman leader, stated,3 There are many armed groups, more than 120, and even this number does not include militias. There was no mediator in the process. EAOs want the international community to be a mediator but the Burmese military do not want the international community as a mediator, only as observers. There was no deal and [the EAOs and Tatmadaw] could not agree on the ceasefire process. [. . .] The NLD is a new government and it is starting everything from the beginning, even the identification of key actors. As described by Awng, a Kachin woman leader,4 During the ceasefire [in Kachin, 1994–2011] the government said it was a peace process, but it was just a ceasefire. Now again they are

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talking about the peace process, though some groups signed a ceasefire and others did not, and they are still stuck in ceasefires. The military has control over several aspects of the civilian government, and this prevents the civilian government from negotiating on its own, without influence from the Tatmadaw. The 2008 Constitution, which was written by the military, gave the Tatmadaw control of 25 percent of the seats in parliament, as well as several government ministries. The peace process is being implemented under the 2008 Constitution. Ethnic groups feel that this constitution favors a centralized, militarized government that yields little power to the local governance of the ethnic states, and this is a long-standing grievance. Any peace treaty approved by parliament must have military support in order to be passed in the parliament. Amending the 2008 Constitution is not on the agenda of the peace negotiations. Thus, there is no question of the balance of power, as the Tatmadaw has the advantage and control the process both politically and militarily. Shwe, a woman leader and politician, stated,5 Although the NLD government said they are giving priority to the peace process, they do not know much about how to handle it. So, the Tatmadaw is always influencing the process [, even] small things like agenda-setting and choice of locations. Many of the interviewees were worried that there will be a continued cycle of conflict if there is no power balance in the peace process, or if the process does not address the key grievances of the ethnic groups. According to Awng,6 After fighting broke out in Kachin in 2011, many Kachin women as well as men think that military action is the only way to achieve peace. They have faced much abuse and suffered so much frustration. Now they want retribution. A prevalent view was that the peace process will be damaged, and the government will fail to gain trust from the affected communities or EAOs unless the Tatmadaw stops the fighting and allows independent, impartial mediators into the negotiation process and includes the amendment of the 2008 Constitution in the agenda. The government is failing its responsibility to protect citizens The government’s lack of action in punishing perpetrators of human rights violations and war crimes worsens the situation in conflict-affected areas,

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and is a major obstacle to peace. Although rule of law and justice are priorities for the new government, there has been no discussion about justice for the victims of conflict in the peace process. This damages people’s trust in the government. Ji Ji, a Kachin woman leader and peace mission team member of the Women’s League of Burma, maintained,7 In the past, Aung San Suu Kyi mentioned justice when she talked about peace, but now, she has stopped mentioning justice and only mentions peace. Villagers rarely see justice for violence at the hands of the Tatmadaw. A Ta’ang woman survivor, Lway Si Si said, ‘I want to stop war and human rights violations so there will be no land mines, and we can work for our livelihood’.8 A Kachin woman survivor, Tawng, maintained,9 In our country, peace is still distant. There are still many human rights violations happening, and there is no safety. People who have [government] authority do not take action against those who violate human rights. If [the government] takes action against perpetrators, they will hesitate to carry out abuses in the future, and people will feel safer. In many parts of Myanmar, there are still restrictions on movement. Lway Kyi, a Ta’ang woman survivor, explained,10 It is very difficult now because they man every check point and we do not feel safe. Even to go to buy rice, we have to report and get signatures from the head of the village and the officer. As long as the Tatmadaw continues to create fear among Myanmar citizens, and as long as the government does nothing about Tatmadaw abuses, there will be a lack of trust in any peace agreements. Women want justice and reparation Women survivors of conflict said that their top priorities were to see an end to war and human rights violations, particularly those affecting women in conflict-affected areas, to be able to live safely and freely in their areas. Women survivors and leaders share these priorities and have used different strategies in their work toward reaching these goals. They have been reaching out to the leadership and the candidates for election in various political parties and asked them directly about the party’s policies on addressing human rights violations committed by the Tatmadaw. Some women survivors are participating in informal peace processes, like attending meetings

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with authorities to raise the concerns of displaced women, attending meetings and workshops related to peace, human rights and transitional justice organized by CSOs, NGOs and INGOs. A key challenge is the lack of women representatives from conflictaffected ethnic areas in the peace process. It is difficult for survivors to effectively organize and lobby for better representation in the peace talks. Moreover, it is difficult for survivors from different areas to meet each other, due to language barriers and transportation challenges. However, the general public, particularly from urban areas, are increasingly aware of the military’s actions and ethnic people’s struggles. They gain knowledge from the activities of women’s groups and CSOs, such as truth-telling events, campaigns to stop war and awareness-raising about peace. Some women’s organizations and human rights organizations have been working on reparations through the human rights advocacy network. Ji Ji, a Kachin woman leader, explained,11 Reparation is beneficial for survivors. We have released a report on reparation for the purpose of not repeating human rights violations in the future. The purpose of this report (ND-Burma 2018) is to recognize the victims of human rights violations and call for accountability and justice. However, the government refuses to acknowledge victims or provide rehabilitation and reparation to survivors of conflict. As expressed by Bawk, a Kachin woman survivor: ‘At least I want the government to provide rehabilitation and reparation to displaced women and children whose rights were violated by the Tatmadaw’. Many women’s groups are documenting human rights violations and holding truth-telling events. Some women’s organizations and grassroots organizations are also advocating for international accountability and justice for the victims through the International Criminal Court and other international mechanisms. Myanmar needs an implementation mechanism for women’s inclusion in political sessions For decades, the military and armed forces who carried out the war have also occupied the peacemaking table, making decisions that affect all men, women and children. However, there has been no recognition of women’s role, whether in the prevention or resolution of conflict. Women’s groups in Myanmar have been working hard to be able to participate in peace discussions, share their experiences of conflict and influence policymaking on protection, prevention and recovery. One of their strategies to enable this is

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to demand 30 percent women’s participation in all entities engaged in the peace talks. Ji Ji, a Kachin woman leader and peace mission team member of the Women’s League of Burma stated,12 Thirty percent women’s participation is a good strategy. To be able to talk about our demands and positions, and to have sustainable peace, women need to be at the discussion table. The Burmese military use rape as a policy, and we have to terminate this. [. . .] Women must be at the peace table and talk about this to give evidence. The Women’s League of Burma (WLB) is a federation of thirteen ethnic women’s organizations that have been advocating, lobbying and educating policymakers and local communities about women’s rights and women’s political participation for more than a decade. As a result of lobbying by WLB and other women’s organizations, fourteen points were raised during the third session of the 21st Century Panglong Conference and among them was an agreement on a minimum of 30 percent women’s participation in future peace talks, as well as capacity-building for women. However, there was no followup or implementation mechanism to ensure action on what was agreed. Moreover, the special rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar mentioned in her report that the goal of women’s representation in the peace process had been dropped. As argued by Shwe, a woman leader and politician,13 There is already agreement on thirty percent women’s participation in the political process. So, all we need is implementation. However, the government, the Tatmadaw and the EAOs are not achieving this goal. First, they need to strengthen women’s participation within their [own ranks]. It is worth noting that inclusion is well established as an indicator of the sincerity and willingness of negotiating parties to achieve peace. Inclusion, or the involvement of women and civil society actors in peace processes, is understood as involvement by ‘the “good society” that is reliably propeace and pro-democracy and, therefore, an essential supporting component within peace processes’ (Paffenholz et al. 2015).

Concluding remarks For decades, ethnic women’s groups have advocated for human rights and peace, and carried out peacebuilding at the grassroots level. Nevertheless, women’s groups and CSOs have been excluded from most formal peace negotiations in Myanmar, especially early in the negotiations, when there was immense international pressure to reach a deal. While the Tatmadaw has continued to make arbitrary arrests, blocked delivery of aid to Kachin

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State and committed atrocities throughout the peace process, the peace process has had little focus on transitional justice and no women survivors have been included. It is well established that a peace process must be inclusive in order to bring constructive change and sustainable peace. Moreover, for a peace process to be truly inclusive, women survivors’ unique experiences must be taken into consideration, in negotiations as well as discussions. In short, meaningful peace can only be built by including the voices and demands of women survivors. Transitional justice and acknowledgment of the needs of survivors are important indicators of sustainable peacemaking, but they are also keys to peacemaking success. In support of transitional justice, women in Myanmar should build a movement that can raise the issues that women survivors want and ensure that survivors are not neglected or excluded from peace negotiations. All parties should recognize that the peace process must be built on popular trust in the government. As my study shows, trust-building would require transitional justice mechanisms such as recognition of past abuses, reparations for survivors and assurances that abuses will not continue. An agreement on basic trust-building measures would help strengthen the peace process and build further trust between the parties to negotiations. Women survivors and women leaders can help push for these activities, not only to address the concerns of survivors but also to advance the overall peacebuilding process and help increase the chances of reaching a real peace in Myanmar.

Notes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

Interview, Chiang Mai, Thailand, 6 September 2018. Ibid. Interview, Yangon, 8 December 2018. Interview, Mandalay, 6 December 2018. Interview, Yangon, 4 January 2019. Interview, Mandalay, 6 December 2018. Interview, Chiang Mai, Thailand, 3 January 2019. Interview, Chiang Mai, Thailand, 6 September 2018. Ibid. Ibid. Interview, Chiang Mai, Thailand, 3 January 2019. Ibid. Interview, Yangon, 8 December 2018.

References Chit Min Tun. 2018. ‘Tatmadaw Occupies NMSP Outpost’, The Irrawaddy, 26 June 2018 [online]. Available at: www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/tatmadaw-occupiesnmsp-outpost.html

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Johanson, V. 2017. ‘Creating an Inclusive Burmese Peace Process’, 8 May 2017 [online]. Available at: www.usip.org/publications/2017/05/creating-inclusiveburmese-peace-process Karen Women’s Organization. 2012. ‘Background of Karen People’, 5 March 2012 [online]. Available at: https://karenwomen.org/background/ Myanmar Peace Monitor. 2018a. ‘Peace Process Overview’, BNI [online]. Available at: www.mmpeacemonitor.org/mpm/peace-process-overview ———. 2018b. ‘Government Peace Plan’, BNI [online]. Available at: www.mmpeace monitor.org/mpm/government-peace-plan ND-Burma (Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma). 2018. ‘You Cannot Ignore Us: Victims of Human Rights Violations in Burma From 1970–2017 Outline Their Desires for Justice’, Network for Human Rights DocumentationBurma [online]. Available at: https://nd-burma.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/ reportupdateOct.pdf Paffenholz, T. and Ross, N. 2015. ‘Inclusive Peace Processes – An Introduction’, Development Dialogue, 2015(1): 28–37. Ye Mon. 2018. ‘Two Steps Closer to Peace? Mon, Lahu Ethnic Armed Groups Sign NCA’, Democratic Voice of Burma, 13 February 2018 [online]. Available at: www. dvb.no/news/two-steps-closer-peace-mon-lahu-ethnic-armed-groups-signnca/79705

7

Women in Myanmar’s ethnic armed organizations Numbers and narratives Åshild Kolås and Leitanthem Umakanta Meitei

Armed conflict between non-state ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and the Burmese armed forces (Tatmadaw) has continued recurrently for nearly seventy years. Over several decades, the Burmese military has negotiated numerous ceasefires, usually bilaterally between the Tatmadaw and individual EAOs. The Burmese military has a history of relating only to armed organizations in their peacemaking efforts, focusing heavily on ceasefire agreements. In 2013, the military finally started to negotiate a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA). As of 2015, a fifteen-member Senior Delegation negotiated on behalf of the EAOs. The delegation had two women members: Saw Mra Raza Lin from the Arakan Liberation Party and Naw Zipporah Sein from the Karenni National Union. Naw Zipporah Sein was later appointed as the lead negotiator. Another two women, Ja Nan Lahtaw and Nang Raw Zakhung (Shalom Foundation), served as technical advisors to the NCA negotiators (Warren et al. 2018: 19). With this, four out of sixty-seven NCA participants were women (6 percent), all associated with the EAO team. In October 2015, the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement was signed by the government and eight of the EAOs. The agreement stipulated that a ‘reasonable’ number of women were to be included in the peace process. Heeding to the demands of women’s organizations to include more women in the peace talks, the NCA signatories later adopted a ‘Framework for Political Dialogue’ that included a pledge to make efforts to reach 30 percent women’s participation in future dialogues (Pepper 2017). However, the framework did not put in place any mechanism to meet this target. In January 2016, the government convened a Union Peace Conference where non-signatories of the NCA were allowed to attend, though only as observers. The conference involved 700 delegates, of which only 8 percent were women (San Yamin Aung 2017). After the NLD government was sworn in, the new government convened a ‘21st-century Panglong Conference’ in August 2016. The name ‘Panglong Conference’ refers to the

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February 1947 conference in the town of Panglong in Shan State, where Aung San and ethnic Chin, Kachin and Shan leaders decided to establish the Union of Burma in the ‘Panglong Agreement’ (Transnational Institute 2017). The first ‘21st Century Panglong conference’ was held in Myanmar’s capital, Naypyidaw. A total of 663 delegates were invited, of which 13 percent were women (San Yamin Aung 2017). The subsequent conference was held in May 2017 and had 910 attendees, of which 17 percent were women (Joint Peace Fund 2018). While the peace conferences engaged numerous stakeholders in the process, the important decisions were made by the members of the negotiation teams and committees. In these entities, the share of women was lower than in the conferences. As of 2016, the National Ceasefire Coordination Team included one woman out of sixteen (6 percent), while the EAO Senior Delegation included two women out of fifteen (16 percent). None of the eleven members of the Union Peace Dialogue Central Committee were women (Muehlenbeck and Federer 2016: 4, see also UN Women Myanmar 2016: 19–20). As of 2018, the negotiators of the National Ceasefire Coordination Team included four women out of seventy-eight (5 percent), while the Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee had eight women members out of seventy-five (11 percent). The recently established Civil Society Forum included ten women out of forty-three (23 percent) (Joint Peace Fund 2018). The committees of the Union Peace Dialogue are thematic, and critics have pointed out that there is a gender bias in these committees, in that male members have consistently been assigned to discuss political affairs, whereas women have been assigned to social affairs. Many of the states have their own peace processes, with a similar committee structure. Naw Susana Hla Hla Soe, an MP and prominent women’s rights activist, was permitted to participate as a government representative in the social affairs discussions in the political dialogue in Karen State, although she wanted to join the political discussions. In her view, women should be included in all parts of the peace process, but, ‘there is an idea that women are only concerned with social affairs’ (quoted in San Yamin Aung 2017). Speaking at the same event, Zaceu Lian, liaison officer of the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, maintained that EAOs had to choose delegates who could ‘debate well with the military’, stating, [Peace negotiations] are not a place to train [women], but a place to debate with the military and other groups. When they see a woman, they think they are not ready, which is why no women were included in discussions on security. (quoted in San Yamin Aung 2017)

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While there is consensus on the need to ensure women’s representation in peace talks, the effort to include 30 percent women delegates has been agreed only in principle. There is no agreement on how to meet the prescribed target. Some advocates of women’s inclusion in the peace process demand quotas for women, while others prefer gender-sensitive policies and procedures that ‘support women and their needs while they participate in the peace process’ (Thin Lei Win 2016): This could range from providing childcare support for mothers attending conferences and peace negotiations, to actively identifying and encouraging more women to participate, or for Myanmar to honour the international conventions and agreements to women’s rights, peace and security it signed. Such steps could ensure their participation is meaningful, and that women and their words receive the same respect as their male counterparts. Incentives and support structures are important, but the organization of peace talks may have greater implications for the inclusion of women. A key issue in the case of the Myanmar peace process is whether women’s more active participation is feasible as long as the military and armed organizations dominate the negotiating table, and the parties are free to choose their own delegates. The Burmese military is male-dominated. Women were not accepted into its ranks until a military draft was adopted in 2011, allowing women between eighteen and twenty-seven years of age to be drafted in times of national emergency (Hodal 2013). The first batch of female soldiers was recruited in 2013. On the other hand, most EAOs have a long history of recruiting women as cadres and many have also trained women as combatants. Little is known about the number of women cadres in the various ethnic armed organizations in Myanmar, the kind of work women carry out in these organizations and whether they participate in decision making as members of the central executive committee of their respective organization. In an attempt to gather comprehensive information about women’s participation in EAOs across Myanmar, we carried out a mapping exercise in Myanmar, which involved carrying out semi-structured interviews in multiple locations, including Shan State, Sagaing Region, Rakhine State, Chin State, Kayin State, Yangon and Mae Sot, Thailand. The primary aim of this research was to gather basic data on the share of women among the cadres of each EAO and the share of women in each group’s central executive committee (CEC). This chapter presents the findings of our research, in the form of numbers and narratives on women’s participation in EAOs.1

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Numbers Out of the twenty-one EAOs that have been engaged in the nationwide ceasefire negotiations in some shape or form, we were able to collect primary data on all but three. These were the Lahu Democratic Union, the United Wa State Army and the Wa National Organization. We gathered data on the number of cadres in each of the remaining eighteen EAOs, though we only obtained information on the number of women cadres in six of them. Out of these six, the share of woman cadres varied widely, from 3 percent (Karen Peace Council) to 37 percent (New Mon State Party). Table 7.1 shows the cadre membership of each group and the female share of the membership, where available. We collected data from more than one source for each EAO whenever possible, and we found wide variations in the information about cadre numbers. The numbers listed here are those provided by the sources we deemed the most reliable. These were not necessarily EAO sources, as the armed organizations tend to exaggerate their membership and cadre strength.

Table 7.1 Women in ethnic armed organizations Ethnic Armed Organization

Total cadres

AA (Arakan Army) ABSDF (All Burma Students’ Democratic Front) ALP (Arakan Liberation Party) CNF (Chin National Front) DKBA (Democratic Karen Benevolent Army) KIO (Kachin Independence Organization) KNO (Kuki National Organization – Burma) KNPP (Karenni National Progressive Party) KNU (Karen National Union) KPC (Karen Peace Council) MNDAA (Myanmar National Democracy Alliance Army) NDAA (National Democratic Alliance Army – Eastern Shan) NMSP (New Mon State Party) NSCN – K (National Socialist Council of Nagaland – Khaplang) PNLO (Pa – Oh National Liberation Organization) RCSS (Restoration Council of Shan State) SSPP (Shan State Progress Party) TNLA (Ta’ang National Liberation Army)

1,000 400 500 200 1,500 9,000 200 600 5,000 4,000 3,000

Source: Data compiled by authors

Women cadres

Women (%)

60 60

15% 12%

900

10%

100

3%

800 500

300

37%

800 8,000 8,000 4,500

160

20%

4,500

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Note that the figures in Table 7.1 should be taken as rough estimates only. We regard the numbers of cadres we obtained as uncertain, not only because interviewees were hesitant to provide details about EAO cadre strength but also because they were uncertain about who to include as active members of the organization in question. The interviewees expressed far less uncertainty about the membership of organizations’ executive committees. We were able to gather such information on all but two EAOs – namely, the Kachin Independence Organization and the Shan State Progress Party. In most cases, sources were able to tell us the name of each woman CEC member, and this information was usually consistent from one interviewee to another. Table 7.2 provides the figures we collected and shows the female share of the members of each central executive committee (CEC). According to our data, six EAOs had no women in their CEC and two made no information available. The highest female share in any CEC was 20 percent (Kuki National Organization – Burma). Table 7.2 Women in central executive committees (CECs) of ethnic armed organizations Ethnic Armed Organization

Total CEC members

Women CEC members

Women (%)

AA (Arakan Army) ABSDF (All Burma Students’ Democratic Front) ALP (Arakan Liberation Party) CNF (Chin National Front) DKBA (Democratic Karen Benevolent Army) KIO (Kachin Independence Organization) KNO (Kuki National Organization – Burma) KNPP (Karenni National Progressive Party) KNU (Karen National Union) KPC (Karen Peace Council) MNDAA (Myanmar National Democracy Alliance Army) NDAA (National Democratic Alliance Army – Eastern Shan) NMSP (New Mon State Party) NSCN – K (National Socialist Council of Nagaland – Khaplang) PNLO (Pa – Oh National Liberation Organization) RCSS (Restoration Council of Shan State) SSPP (Shan State Progress Party) TNLA (Ta’ang National Liberation Army)

3 21 13 45 8 7 10 16 11 5 5

0 2 1 3 0

0% 10% 8% 7% 0%

2 1 1 1 0

20% 6% 9% 20% 0%

5

0

0%

31 4

2 0

6% 0%

15

2

13%

11 31 23

0

0%

1

4%

Source: Data compiled by authors

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If we compare the share of women cadres in a group with the share of women CEC members in the same group, we see that, except for the New Mon State Party, the shares are roughly equivalent, though women’s CEC membership is consistently slightly lower than rank and file women’s membership as cadres. If we include only the EAOs we have complete information on, the overall share of women in the CECs is 7 percent. It is interesting to find that this share is very close to the share of women in the NCA negotiation team as described earlier (6 percent). As noted, as of 2015, all women negotiators were delegates of an EAO, while the total number of negotiators includes the all-male delegates of the Burmese military as well. As compared to the 7 percent share of women in the CECs of armed organizations, the 6 percent female share of negotiators among both parties to the talks suggests that, among the CEC members of ethnic armed organizations, women were more likely to be involved in the nationwide peace talks than men. Since 2015, the government and the Burmese military have included women delegates in some of the NCA negotiating teams. However, Myanmar’s armed forces are more male-dominated than most of the EAOs. Women from the ethnic groups thus seem to have a relatively better chance of being included in the nationwide peace talks. There are also more women occupying high positions in the ranks of EAOs, as compared to the status of women in the Burmese military.

Narratives While gathering the quantitative data for this study, we also collected qualitative material during interviews with members of EAOs, civil society organizations (CSOs) and women’s groups, including men as well as women. Here we give examples of the perspectives offered by some of the women we interviewed, as well as their own experiences as a member of an EAO. The selected interview quotes aim to cover a variety of personal experiences of women’s participation and work in ethnic armed organizations, perceptions of the role of women in these organizations and views on the potential contributions of women in the peace process. Women members of central executive committees A woman executive committee member of the All Burma Students’ Democratic Front (ABSDF) provided the following details about the participation of women in her organization:2 Women cadres in the ABSDF receive basic military training on how to march, and how to use weapons, so as to be able to fight just like

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male comrades on the frontline. After basic military training, they are not permitted to take rigorous training. They are just told to obey the orders of the men. Sometimes they are sent to the frontline, not to fight, but to encourage male comrades and provide them with ammunition. Most women in the ABSDF work in non-political committees like the finance committee, or they do medical work, or work as cooks. Some are engaged in the Information Department, where they are in charge of administrative activities. On the aspirations of the women who are actively involved in her organization, the same interviewee had this to say: Before they join, women are usually determined to participate in the political struggle. They don’t join to become a cook in a camp. Many women are committed to fight for the dignity of our society. In the camps, they have to follow the orders of the leadership, who are mainly men, but most women are hoping to be promoted to a higher position. They want to have more responsibility. [. . .] A majority of women cadres have problems after they get married. Once women are married, their workload doubles. Many of them move to family-line camps, rather than staying at headquarters. There was a woman in the executive committee of the Karenni National Progressive Party, and her husband was also in the executive committee. They were equal in the party hierarchy. After their marriage, she disappeared from party politics and shifted her priorities to family affairs. A member of the central executive committee (CEC) of the Arakan Liberation Party offered her views on the role of women in her organization and what women can contribute to the peace process:3 Most women in the Arakan Liberation Party work in offices, clinics and schools, and spend their time on concerns about education. [. . .] There are very few women who would like to continue with armed struggle. They have very bad experiences of war. Children and women are the worst-affected victims of armed conflict. Most of the women in this country want peace. Women civil society leaders When we interviewed leaders of the Karen National Union (KNU) in Mae Sot, Thailand, they explained that Karen women participate actively in CSOs that organize workshops for peace, of which some organizations are associated with the KNU. However, they could not tell us how many

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women members the KNU has, or what positions they work in. We later interviewed a woman Karen CSO leader in Kayin State, and this is what she had to say,4 In the KNU military units, women are employed mainly in civil police, health care, communications, and general administration. After completing basic military training, they are put to work as cashiers, accounting staff, office assistants and clerks. They are program secretaries but not coordinators. They are not trained as commandos, even if they want that training. In most functions or meetings of KNU and other organizations, women are invited to serve food, clean, and entertain, not to share their ideas. [. . .] There is no role for women in the KNU decisionmaking processes. Some women are in the KNU steering committee. They speak in the meetings of the executive committee. But few of their ideas are reflected in the decision-making. A Yangon-based Kachin civil society leader shared her knowledge regarding the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO):5 In KIO-controlled areas they have schools and health care centers with women doctors and nurses. In schools, most head teachers are women. At least 15 percent of KIO members are women, but there are very few women in the KIO leadership. There is a condition in KIO-controlled areas that in every house with more than one boy, one boy should enroll as a member of the KIO as an obligatory national service. In Chin State, we interviewed a woman who was the head of a local CSO. She was very frank about women’s lot in the Chin community, in its major EAO and in the peace process in general:6 Women have traditionally been treated as second-class citizens in Chin society. They do not have inheritance rights. Many women are leaders in kindergartens and Sunday schools, but they are barred from becoming religious leaders. The majority of decision-makers in the civil society organizations are men, and even more so in the armed organizations. [. . .] Few women participate in the Chin National Front. The current peace process is running with very high-level politics. The share of women involved is very low. Due to the limited participation of women in the peace process of this country, the dreams of women of getting basic rights are not going to be fulfilled. In the western border region of Sagaing, another woman civil society leader was even more outspoken about her views on gender inequality:7

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Men make most of the rules in Myanmar society. Women are treated as a kind of creature, not as a full human being. Men dominate with the stereotypes of culture. They create problems, not only at home, but in all of society. Reflecting on women’s participation in the peace process, the same civil society leader in Sagaing made the following comment: The government perceives the [issues of relevance to the] peace process and the concerns of women as different. The peace process is for men, for armies, for the armed organizations, for those who are fighting with guns. In the town of Taunggyi in Shan State, a Pa – Oh civil society leader offered a strikingly similar explanation for the lack of women’s involvement in the peace process:8 The majority of women think the peace process is only about killing and fighting. They are not involved in that kind of business. These remarks highlight the need to consider a range of questions of significance to women’s inclusion in peace talks, including how women have actually participated in the conflict, what issues are on the table, whether these are issues in which women tend to be involved and how relevant stakeholders in peace negotiations are defined.

Conclusions Our research suggests that women’s potential to contribute to the peace process is under-valued. Male leaders of EAOs and CSOs tend to ignore the ideas of women in their organization and disregard their contributions. Women are not well represented in the EAOs, nor do women feel that their work and contributions to the organization are highly valued. Nevertheless, women do seem to be fairly well represented in the executive committees of EAOs, if we consider the lower number of women cadres. Important factors for women’s involvement in peacemaking are the limited range of issues on the negotiating table and the limited involvement of actors other than armed groups and the military. When women have played a less active role in an armed conflict and have been less involved in armed organizations than men, it should not come as a surprise that women are also less actively involved in peacemaking. When male-dominated armed organizations occupy the negotiating table it is unrealistic to expect that women will be equally included. Armed actors dominate Myanmar’s

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negotiating tables. Hence, women have not been well represented. If civil society stakeholders are allowed to participate in peace talks, women will likely be far better represented in the future.

Notes 1 This chapter is based on a Gender, Peace and Security Policy Brief published by the PRIO Centre on Gender, Peace and Security in January 2019. The fieldwork for this study was carried out under the PRIO project on Gender Equality, Peace and Security in Nepal and Myanmar: WOMENsPEACE (2016–2019). Leitanthem Umakanta Meitei gathered the primary data for this study as a researcher for Ar Yone Oo Social Development Association. 2 Interview in Yangon, 17 October 2017. 3 Interview in Yangon, 10 December 2017. 4 Interview in Kayin State, 11 November 2016. 5 Interview in Yangon, 15 June 2017. 6 Interview in Chin State, 27 April 2017. 7 Interview in Sagaing Region, 30 June 2017. 8 Interview in Shan State, 7 August 2016.

References Hodal, K. 2013. ‘Burmese Army Recruits Female Soldiers as It Struggles to Tackle Rebel Groups’, The Guardian, 16 October. [online] Available at: www.theguardian. com/world/2013/oct/16/burmese-army-recruits-female-soliders-rebels. Joint Peace Fund. 2018. ‘Women’s Participation in the Peace Process: The Central Role of Women’s Leadership’, 8 March [online]. Available at: www.jointpeacefund.org/ en/blog/womens-participation-peace-process-central-role-womens-leadership Muehlenbeck, A. and Federer, J. P. 2016. ‘Women’s Inclusion in Myanmar’s Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement’, Swiss Peace/Inclusive Security, July 2016 [online]. Available at: www.inclusivesecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/WomensInclusion-in-Myanmars-Nationwide-Ceasefire-Agreement.pdf Pepper, M. 2017. ‘Women in Myanmar’s Peace Process’, Asia Dialogue, 5 October 2017 [online]. Available at: http://theasiadialogue.com/2017/10/05/women-inmyanmars-peace-process/ San Yamin Aung. 2017. ‘Female Participation in Peace Process Improving, But More to be Done’, The Irrawaddy, 13 October 2017 [online]. Available at: www. irrawaddy.com/news/burma/female-participation-peace-process-improvingdone.html Thin Lei Win. 2016. ‘Peace Process Quota No Guarantee for Women’s Participation’, Mizzima Weekly, 12 February 2016 [online]. Available at: http://mizzima. com/latest-news-politics-news-features/peace-process-quota-no-guaranteewomen%25E2%2580%2599s-participation Transnational Institute. 2017. ‘Beyond Panglong: Myanmar’s National Peace and Reform Dilemma’, Myanmar Policy Brief, 21 September 2017 [online]. Available at: www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/beyond_panglong.pdf

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UN Women Myanmar. 2016. ‘Landmarks in Myanmar’s Post-2011 Peace Process. The Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement in Myanmar: A Gender Equality and Women’s Rights Analysis’, UN Women Myanmar. Warren, R., Applebaum, A., Fuhrman, H. and Mawby, B. 2018. ‘Women’s Peacebuilding Strategies Amidst Conflict: Lessons From Myanmar and Ukraine’. Washington DC: Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security.

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Women’s ‘marginal voices’ Diverse perspectives on peace and security in Myanmar Elena Di Padova

When we hear the phrase ‘women from Myanmar’, the first image to spring to mind will probably be that of the Nobel Peace Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi. As the daughter of the independence hero Aung San, she has been able to exercise leadership and successfully mobilize for a more democratic Myanmar. The image of this powerful woman, however, contradicts the marginalization from the country’s political life of the majority of women, especially those who belong to ethnic and religious minorities and those who work in civil society organizations. This also applies to the negotiations to end the seventy-year-old conflict between the Burmese Army (Tatmadaw) and ethnic armed organizations, in which few women have been included. Rather, the strategies and narratives of peace and security purported by Myanmar state institutions have ostracized ethnic and religious minorities and identified them as threats to national security. Women in Myanmar have been dismissed, spoken for and ‘colonized’ by the male-dominated and militarized elites. Colonization is here understood in Mohanty’s terms as ‘a relation of structural domination, and suppression – often violent – of the heterogeneity of the subject(s) in question’ (Mohanty 1984: 336). Colonization happens when women are sidelined, and consequently, policies are imposed on women without their say. Decolonization of women’s voices would uncover the fallacies of national security policies and pave the way for sustainable pacification that is not based on the Tatmadaw’s use of force, but on the transformation of power relations. In a decolonizing move, this chapter explores what the ‘marginal voices’ of Myanmar’s women can tell us about the meaning of ‘security’ and ‘peace’, and how ‘marginal’ women perceive peacebuilding. The term ‘marginal voices’ is deployed in this study not only to signify that women in Myanmar are marginalized but also that the position of women living in the margins allows us, as suggested by hooks (1984), to understand both the margin and the center. The ‘margin’ can thus provide a privileged standpoint to explain complex dynamics. I argue that marginal voices, represented by women

Women’s ‘marginal voices’ 109 belonging to ethnic and religious minorities, and civil society organizations, bring a more holistic vision to security – a vision that aims for social justice and gender equality as a foundation for sustainable and lasting peace. Those who are engaged in the formal peace process might also learn something from the capacity of these women to overcome ethnic differences and find compromise solutions based on principles of equality and respect. If women’s voices are taken into consideration, they might enrich and significantly inform the current debate on conflict resolution in Myanmar.

Conceptual premises and methods Feminist academics have argued that dominant security narratives impose their vision as the only valid and exclude alternatives as ‘threats’ (Wibben 2011; Delehanty and Steele 2009). In order to disrupt the meaning of how security is traditionally conceived, Wibben (2011) proposes to challenge the way knowledge is produced and create new narratives of security. Feminist scholars have suggested a shift in focus in the study of security, from states to the individual (Ackerly et al. 2006; Tickner 2006). This research pursues a ‘feminist curiosity’ as suggested by Cynthia Enloe (2004: 3), which implies listening to women attentively and taking them seriously. This ‘curiosity’ has guided the research focus toward the tools that women themselves have chosen to conceptualize ‘security’ and ‘peace’. Human rights reports and political statements were the key primary sources in this study.1 These documents were produced by ethnicity-based and multi-ethnic community-based women’s organizations, of which most are members of the Women’s League of Burma, established in 1999 as an umbrella organization for Myanmar’s women’s groups. The reports and statements are predominantly produced for advocacy purposes at the national and international levels. Few of these documents discuss conflict resolution explicitly. Most focus mainly on denouncing human rights violations. However, these documents contain important information that can help read the perspectives of women’s groups on peace and security. From this reading, the study draws out the arguments of women’s groups on solutions and strategies to attain peace and security, and the deployment of the concepts of ‘peace’ and ‘security’, to understand how these subjects are framed. To inquire further into issues that were not exhaustively or explicitly discussed in the reports and statements, and corroborate insights on women’s theorizing on peace and security, semi-structured interviews were conducted with thirty-four female peace activists based in Myanmar, Thailand and London.2 The study uses an intersectional approach to analyze women’s experiences and perspectives, in an effort to see women in their specificity and

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in the rich diversity of their lives (Papart and Marchand 1995). It is also necessary to look at power relations at different structural levels, which create forms of discrimination experienced by women due to their gender (Clisby and Holdsworth 2014), as well as their identity at the intersection of various kinds of difference, such as ethnicity, religion, economic status, political beliefs, sexual orientation and physical ability, among others (Davis 2008). The study has examined different forms of vulnerability among Myanmar women, in relation to their identity, attempting to take women’s diverse experiences into account while elucidating their approaches to security and peace. The reports and statements of the women’s organizations I have analyzed contain three underlying and recurrent themes that are useful to identify to better understand the perspectives of women in Myanmar on security and peace. The first theme, which is the most prevalent, highlights the absence of security and the pervasive insecurities that are caused by the government’s pursuit of national security policies. The second theme revolves around the women’s organizations’ understanding of security as the absence of violence and peace as positive peace, and the strategies they identify to achieve such peace. The third theme concerns the widely held belief among women activists that peace cannot be achieved without a substantial inclusion of women in the negotiations.

Women’s insecurities versus national security Ever since the militarization of the struggle for an independent Burma, military institutions have defined national security. These institutions are comprised almost exclusively of men of the majority Bamar ethnicity, of which the vast majority follow Buddhism. Over the decades, they have sought to impress their ethnic and religious superiority on other groups. While restricting the ethno-cultural, religious and linguistic traditions of minority groups (Rogers 2012), Bamar-Buddhist elites have perpetuated their power by deploying the military to defend the nation and control the country’s entire territory. The Burmese Army (Tatmadaw) has taken on the task of ‘saving the country’ from disintegration and disunity due to the threatening autonomy demands of ethnic minorities (Maung Aung Myoe 2009). The military, which justifies its actions by referring to Buddhist principles (Houtman 1999), has created a security narrative characterized by a ‘political paranoia’ (Gravers 1993: 49), separating ‘us’, the Tatmadaw and those who share its objectives, from the ‘enemies’, anyone who ‘threatens’ the unity of the country and exposes the nation to ‘alien’ influences. Identified as threats to national security, the Tatmadaw has persecuted ethnic and religious minorities (Gravers 1993; Alamgir 1997), and has engaged for

Women’s ‘marginal voices’ 111 decades in an armed struggle over authority in areas controlled by ethnic armed organizations (Min Zoo Oo 2014; Wilson 2016). In reading the perspectives of women’s organizations in Myanmar on security, what emerges is an almost complete lack of a conventional sense of security. Women’s organizations’ reports often describe various forms of direct and structural violence that are caused by the pursuit of national security policies. These are grouped under the label ‘insecurities’, which is a term used to highlight the paradox of a threatening ‘security’ as advanced by the Myanmar government. Feminist theorists have argued that state agencies that protect their own interests and priorities at the cost of ordinary citizens tend to cause insecurities by subjecting people, and especially women, to violence (Tickner 1997; Blanchard 2003). Through their reports, women’s organizations have explained the harmful effects of the Myanmar government’s security agenda, which is pursued at the expense of the people of Myanmar. Women’s organizations have denounced attacks by the Tatmadaw, not only on armed groups but also on civilian populations who are allegedly supporting them ‘on the pretext of threats to national sovereignty’ (WLB 2017: 1). As a consequence, ethnic minorities are vulnerable to various abuses, including forcible relocation of entire villages, forced labor, extrajudicial killing, extortion, destruction of buildings and property, torture and recruitment of child soldiers. The reports portray in great detail how ethnic minority women have been systematically targeted by sexual violence and how this has happened in different parts of the country for an extended period of time. In various reports, women’s organizations have dedicated much attention to intersectional analysis, often demonstrating how the intersection of different axes of difference – in particular, gender, ethnicity and political affiliation – make some categories of women more vulnerable to human rights violations. In addition to ethnicity and political affiliation, religion is yet another component of women’s identity that increases the risk of discrimination. For instance, women belonging to the Muslim Rohingya minority are subject to discrimination due to their lack of legal status and restrictions imposed on their freedom of movement, making access to health services, education and economic opportunities even more difficult for Rohingya women (WPNA 2015, 2016). As the most threatening act of direct violence against ethnic minority women, sexual violence is a serious source of insecurity. This is demonstrated by the prevalence of reports by women’s organizations that document particular cases of rape perpetrated by Tatmadaw soldiers. These reports identify rape as a weapon of war against ethnic minorities. Rape is presented as an instrument to reaffirm the supremacy of the Tatmadaw

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and to instill terror and demoralize women. Drawing on Nira Yuval-Davis’ Gender and Nation (1997), the Women’s League of Burma explains how sexual violence perpetrated by the Tatmadaw is a consequence of gender discrimination in a militarized society and points out how two nationalistic discourses are at work in the military regime’s rhetoric: First is the myth that nations are founded on organic, blood/gene bonds and on women’s roles as producers and reproducers of the ‘nation’. Second is the construction of women as the symbolic protectors and promoters of cultural traditions. These two nationalist discourses [. . .] construct women as the symbolic ‘border guards’ of cultural and genetic integrity. Control over women therefore signifies control over the boundaries of membership into the collectivity. Hence ethnic minority women become the targets of attack in the [. . .] fight for political and cultural hegemony. (WLB 2002: 8) In some reports, rape is described as a form of torture or a way of punishing women for alleged support to ethnic armed organizations. The reports also show that the risk of sexual violence is aggravated by the economic logic surrounding militarization. To retain their power and finance their military operations, the military has resorted to various economic activities, including development projects, drug production and drug trade. Women who live in the vicinity of development projects are more vulnerable to sexual violence by troops responsible for providing security for workers at project sites. Moreover, poverty and displacement caused by the confiscation of land for development projects have forced women to migrate. This makes them vulnerable to trafficking and bonded labor. In addition, levels of domestic violence are high in areas where the military runs opium cultivation and trade due to the high frequency of drug addiction. What emerges from the narratives of insecurities offered by women’s organizations is that women are exposed to various forms of structural violence. There is also a culture of shame and victim-blaming that discourages women to report rape, and a judiciary system that deprives victims of justice and reparation while perpetrators are offered impunity. Structural violence is also apparent in the government’s neglect of important services, such as health and education. Women suffer the consequences of this neglect as lack of clean water, sanitation and health facilities expose them to a high risk of maternal death. The reports of the women’s organizations demonstrate how a narrow understanding of ‘security’ can result in serious insecurities in the lives of those seen as ‘other’, in particular, ethnic and religious minorities. Moreover, the reports reveal that women in conflict areas experience a high degree of insecurity, especially if poverty forces them to migrate, or if they belong to an ethnic minority.

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Visions of security and peace After decades of failed ceasefires, an effort to reach a nationwide ceasefire agreement was initiated in 2012 under President Thein Sein (Ja Nan Lahtaw and Nang Raw 2012). Since 2015, the new government led by Aung San Suu Kyi has continued to work toward a political dialogue with ethnic organizations under the framework of the 21st Century Panglong peace conferences. Despite the pressing demands of women’s organizations, the formal peacemaking entities included only a few well-positioned women from ethnic armed organizations. No civil society representatives were included in the negotiation teams, although a few women from civil society organizations (CSOs) were eventually allowed to attend meetings as observers or advisors. In these capacities, civil society women have worked hard to advance women’s interests, especially recourse to justice for victims of sexual violence and women’s greater political participation (Hedström 2015b). During the decades of failed negotiations and ceasefires, women’s organizations formulated their own understandings of ‘peace’. Many of their reports mention the concept of genuine peace, without elaborating further on its meaning, beyond that it entails the absence of violence or threats of violence. The discussions about ‘peace’ in the reports of women’s organizations rather suggest the illusory and precarious dimensions of this concept. After decades of conflict, there is a deep awareness of the risks of militarization and the instability of peace agreements. From the perspective of the women’s organizations, it is difficult to draw a fine line between peace and war. Their reports often highlight the blurry definition of ‘conflict area’. In fact, the areas controlled by the Tatmadaw and the ethnic armies are not always clearly bounded. Front lines continuously change, and military action can flare up unexpectedly. Ceasefires have not led to peaceful relations. Rather, the cessation of hostilities allows the military to resume business activities, which often leads to more abuse and violations against the local population due to an increased presence of troops. Moreover, a stable ceasefire in one area allows the Tatmadaw to free up economic and human resources in order to redeploy and escalate military operations in other areas. Women’s organizations often highlight the illusory nature of ceasefires and peace negotiations, and have also expressed a lack of trust in the recent negotiations and Peace Conferences. A report written by the Palaung Women’s Organization (PWO 2011) provides a thoughtful explanation of the effects of what feminist scholars have called ‘war as a continuum’ (Cockburn 2010: 148, see also Thomas et al. 2013; Ramisetty and Muriu 2013). Titled ‘Voices for Change: Domestic Violence and Gender Discrimination in Palaung Area’, the report focuses on the implications of militarization for gender-based violence and discusses

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the pervasiveness of the ‘national culture of violence’ (PWO 2011: 27) and their continuous subjection to extreme violence: As a result of their perpetual exposure to state violence, the Palaung people have normalized violent attacks and come to accept them as an inevitable part of life. Violence is seen as a necessary means of asserting authority over a perceived lesser entity; the state uses violence to assert its authority over Burma’s ethnic nationalities, and men use violence to assert their authority over women. (PWO 2011: 28) The definition of ‘peace and security’ by women’s organizations resembles what feminist scholars have described as ‘multidimensional and multilevel’, entailing the ‘diminution of all forms of violence, including physical, structural and ecological’ (Tickner 1997: 624). In women’s narratives, ‘peace and security’ is commonly understood as the elimination of all forms of violence that women experience across multiple dimensions of life, pertaining to physical integrity, economic and social opportunities and gender equality. It also entails the fulfillment of basic needs such as food, education, health, livelihood and economic opportunities and enjoyment of community rights, such as the right to practice ethnic culture, language and traditions. In most definitions of ‘peace’, it is characterized by the elimination of insecurities. Women’s organizations often describe it as attainment of security understood as the absence of violence in all spheres of private and public life. This reading is corroborated by a few definitions found in the reports of women’s organizations and interviews with female activists. The following quote from a report by the Women’s League of Burma and the Swedish Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) highlights the interconnectedness of peace and security: The definition of peace for WLB is beyond the notion of peace being the equivalent to an absence of war. WLB seeks a peace where there is no violence in the country or in the home. (WLB and IDEA 2003: 4) The civil society activist Zoya Phan elaborates on similar reflections about the meaning of ‘peace’.3 I think the most important principle of peace is where you have security. Because, even if we have ceasefire, [and even] if we have peace in our society in Burma, unless women feel safe and secure, we wouldn’t have real peace. Soldiers and men might stop fighting each other, they

Women’s ‘marginal voices’ 115 might stop opening fire, but if women are still being raped, if women are still being tortured and arrested, and if women still face discrimination, then we won’t have real peace. A Kachin activist made the following comments about the meaning of ‘peace’, similar to the earlier statement:4 From our women’s organization and women inside Burma, the peace we believe in is security for women, including freedom from human rights violations and rape, food security, and [provision of the] very basic needs of women. These statements suggest that, despite the atrocities committed in the name of ‘national security’, the realization of ‘peace’ still rests on ‘security’ as an important precondition. Women’s organizations also maintain that a preliminary condition for peacemaking is the cessation of armed conflict, demilitarization by the withdrawal of troops and putting an end to human rights abuses including sexual violence. However, peace will not automatically be achieved through a simple positive reversal of insecurities and the cessation of violence. Contrary to what government officials seem to believe, peace is achievable only through an inclusive political dialogue. The political dialogue should involve not only the government and ethnic armed organizations, but civil society representatives and women’s groups as well. As an alternative to the military use of force, the political dialogue should address the root causes of the conflict and restore balance to current power relations. In particular, it should provide a forum to discuss ethnic tensions and how to guarantee the full enjoyment of civil, social, cultural and economic rights of ethnic minorities, as well as their self-determination. It should also eliminate structural barriers to gender equality and ensure that women are treated as equal to men, and are able to fulfill their potential. By and large, the strategies to achieve positive peace that have been identified by women’s groups aim to correct the imbalance in current power relations, as described in the following statement: In order to achieve our goal for long lasting peace, as an initial step, the Tatmadaw must end its offensive military operations in ethnic areas, particularly in Kachin State and Shan State, as well as withdraw its troops and battalions from ethnic areas. In addition, participation in the peace process must be all-inclusive, including women’s participation as a top priority for all future political dialogues. The government must fully respect and promote the norms and values of peace as defined by the United Nations, this includes; human rights and fundamental

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Multiple strategies have been devised by women’s groups to achieve peace, according to their members’ different priorities and perspectives. For example, Kachin women have particularly emphasized a transitional justice system that could guarantee accountability for perpetrators of sexual violence and recourse to justice for survivors. Rohingya women call instead for recognition of their legal status, which could allow them protection and enjoyment of basic services and rights as citizens. As identified in various reports (WLB and WON 2013; AGIPP 2015; WPNA 2015), other elements of a road map to positive peace include constitutional reform, federalism, civilian oversight of the military, protection from human rights abuses, equitable management of economic and natural resources, demobilization and reintegration of child soldiers and female soldiers, security sector reform and a secure, voluntary resettlement of refugees and the internally displaced. The diverse visions of women of what ‘peace’ entails reflect the broad range of experiences, interests and strategies of women of different ethnicities who strive for the construction of a more equitable society.

‘No women, no peace’: why women’s participation is important for sustainable peace ‘No Women, No Peace’ is the popular slogan that was launched by women’s groups in Myanmar on the International Day of Peace. It symbolizes their call for the ‘meaningful participation of women as a prerequisite of sustainable peace’ (WLB and WON 2014: 1). Besides the elements elucidated in the previous section, women’s groups agree on the inclusion of women in the peace process as an important milestone for peace in Myanmar. The coalitions Alliance for Gender Inclusion in the Peace Process (AGIPP) and the Women’s League of Burma (WLB) are at the forefront of demands for women’s inclusion in the peace process. These NGOs highlight the fact that women’s substantial participation increases the chances for peace agreements to be signed, to be implemented and to last and, therefore, to be more sustainable (AGIPP 2015; WLB 2014a, 2014b, 2016b). They argue that women should have the right to participate in the peace process, not only because they represent more than 50 percent of Myanmar’s population but also because they bring different issues and interests to the negotiating table. Moreover, men and women are affected differently by war, burdening women as caregivers and providers, and as victims. Women’s groups further argue that issues such as sexual violence and gender discrimination in play during the conflict can only be effectively addressed if those affected are represented at the peace table.

Women’s ‘marginal voices’ 117 The Women’s League of Burma (2016b) has emphasized the active role played by women’s groups during times of conflict, stating, ‘The expertise of these women should be recognized and included in the peace process’ (WLB 2016b: 1). Numerous women’s organizations have in fact provided humanitarian assistance and health services to affected communities, and psycho-social support to survivors of sexual and gender-based violence. Women’s organizations have sometimes managed to protect civilian populations, persuading armies not to fight in residential areas, warning communities about possible clashes and guiding people into hiding in safe areas (Ja Nan Lahtaw and Nang Raw 2012; UN Women 2015). Networks like the Women’s Initiative for Peace (WIN – Peace) and Women’s Peace Network Arakan have promoted dialogue between Muslims and other communities, and prevented clashes between them (Reuters 2014). Moreover, for several decades, women’s organizations have organized meetings and workshops with thousands of people from different ethnic groups, providing venues to share views and experiences, and communicate needs (Hedström 2013, 2015a). Women’s organizations have also carried out vital advocacy work and exerted pressure on the government by bringing the attention of the international community to human rights violations in ethnic areas (Laungaramsri 2006; Salai Isaak Khen and Muk Yin Haung Nyo 2014; Hedström 2015c). Women activists have often demanded recognition for their significant efforts in conflict prevention, mediation, monitoring and international advocacy. Women’s organizations emphasize the contributions of these activists and their importance for peacebuilding and its outcomes. Only a handful of women from civil society have been invited to attend formal peace talks. To overcome the barriers to women’s participation and to ensure that women’s leadership capabilities are recognized, AGIPP and WLB call for affirmative action, with a focus on a minimum of 30 percent representation of women in all phases of the peace process and in all peacemaking bodies. This is not only meant to guarantee a more equitable participation of women in the peace process. Through access to positions where women can influence decision making, AGIPP and WLB envision that women’s issues and interests could be properly addressed in the peace talks, with positive longterm effects, such as the reduction of gender-based discrimination. Women’s inclusion in the peace process would thus address women’s insecurities and help them reach their goal of a more inclusive peace for women.

Conclusion Despite that Myanmar’s women’s organizations have expressed multiple and not always compatible views, diversity has not stopped them from working together and reaching important achievements through coordinated efforts. When the Women’s League of Burma was established, it originated from the

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idea that women would have to overcome ethnic divides and create a common front based on women’s solidarity to advance women’s rights in Myanmar (Fink 2011). The members of WLB have worked effectively together in international advocacy, mobilized transnational women’s coalitions and managed to bring the attention of the international community to human rights violations, and especially to the use of rape as a weapon of war (Bachtold et al. 2014; Hedström 2015b; Laungaramsri 2006). Moreover, they have coordinated national campaigns on gender-based violence in different ethnic areas and have succeeded to raise awareness among the communities in which they work, as demonstrated by the willingness of women in these communities to report and speak out. Alliances between women of different ethnic and religious backgrounds are not exempted from nationalistic tensions, which have also prevented them from bringing a united perspective on all issues. For instance, not all women’s groups have agreed to voice criticism against the persecution of the Rohingya minority, either because they do not consider the Rohingyas as nationals of Myanmar, or for fear of being harassed by other political groups. Nevertheless, the Women’s League of Burma and other women’s inter-ethnic networks have demonstrated the commitment and ability of Myanmar’s women’s groups to work across borders, promote and respect ethnic diversity, overcome ethnic differences and divisions, and work effectively together for a common cause. Their ‘marginal voices’ have thus shown that it is possible to build a multi-ethnic nation where every voice can be heard and where diversity and different perspectives are not only acknowledged, but respected, promoted and encouraged. Our journey among the ‘marginal voices’ of Myanmar’s women is nearing its end. The reports of numerous women’s groups have uncovered the harmful effects of national security policies on ethnic minorities and especially on women. As a consequence, the emerging discourse on peace as expressed by women’s groups and civil society organizations focuses on the elimination of insecurities, from the public sphere to the household. The elimination of all forms of violence is considered a fundamental step toward positive peace. Peace entails a rebalancing of power relations and a restoration of the rights and dignity of women and ethnic minorities. The strategies identified by women’s organizations have emerged out of a variety of different interests and needs, reflecting the diverse positionalities of women within the conflict. Nevertheless, they raise a common demand for recognition of women’s contributions to peacebuilding and the importance of women’s inclusion in the peace process. Decolonization of women’s voices provides a plethora of perspectives, rather than a homogeneous narrative. Women’s organizations present diverse views and priorities for the peace process because ‘security’ and ‘peace’ are understood in many different ways, informed by their different experiences

Women’s ‘marginal voices’ 119 of insecurity related to their ethnicity, religion, social status and living condition. This is a reminder of the diverse nature of ‘peace’ and ‘security’, contrary to the homogenizing power of state institutions, which advances an indisputable and monolithic narrative of ‘security and peace’.

Notes 1 Primary sources for this study include forty-five reports and twenty-one statements, all in English. 2 Three interviews were carried out by telephone in May-June 2016, one was conducted in person in London in June 2016 and the remaining twenty-nine were carried out during fieldwork in Yangon, Myitkyina, Lashio and Taunggyi in August 2017. 3 Interview with Zoya Phan, 16 June 2016. 4 Interview with a Kachin Activist, 24 May 2016.

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Index

21st Century Panglong conferences 10, 44, 64, 66–8, 87, 94, 97–8, 113 30 percent women’s participation 9–10, 12, 27, 33, 35, 36–41, 46, 50 64, 90, 94, 99, 117 All Burma Student’s Democratic Front (ABSDF) 34, 45, 47, 49, 102–3 All Burma Women’s Organization (Konmari) 21 Alliance for Gender Inclusion in the Peace Process (AGIPP) 9, 39–40, 46, 116–7 Amnesty International 25–6 ‘Analyzing Gender Equality’ (document) 51 Anti-Fascist Organisation 5 Arakan Army 34, 87 Arakan Liberation Party 9, 51, 97, 103 armed forces (Tatmadaw) 2, 8, 26, 34–5, 38, 58, 60–1, 65–6, 69, 84–95, 97, 102, 108, 110–15 Asia Pacific Women’s Networks 52 Asia Pacific Women’s Watch 52 Asia World Company 60 Association of Southeast Asian Nations 88 Aung San 2, 5, 10, 98 Aung San Suu Kyi 1–3, 5–7, 10, 34–6, 38, 41, 48, 66–8, 86–7, 92, 108 Ba Maung Chein 5 Bangladesh 1, 18 barriers 39–40, 45, 48, 51, 53, 79, 89, 115, 117 Bawk Ja Lum Nyoi 61–2, 66 Buddhism 21, 29, 110

Burma Campaign UK 52 Burma Defence Army 5 Burma Round Table Conference 4 Burma Socialist Programme Party 5, 22 Burmese Women’s Association 4 Burmese Women’s Union (BWU) 18, 47–9 central executive committees (CECs) 38, 99, 101–3 Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue 98 China Power Investment Corporation 60 Chin National Front (CNF) 39, 100–1 Chin State 8, 99, 104 Civil Society Forum 98 civil society organizations (CSOs) 39, 46, 84, 88, 93–4, 102–5, 113 class identity 11 colonization 4, 11, 21, 45, 74, 108 Communist Party of Burma 5 ‘Constituting Our Rights’ (position paper) 50 Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Burma (1947) 33, 85 Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Burma (1974) 5, 33, 85 Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (2008) 9, 28, 33, 61, 69, 86–7, 91 Convention on Children’s Rights (CRC); see United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW); see United Nations Council on Foreign Relations 12

Index ‘Courage to Resist’ (report) 25 crimes against humanity 23–4, 28 Cyclone Nargis 27 democracy 1–2, 11–3, 18, 23–4, 27, 45, 47–8, 50, 61, 85–8, 94 discrimination 34–5, 50–2, 58–9, 73–4, 82, 110–12, 115–7 Dobama Asiayone 21 Doi Bu Nbrang 51, 66–9 drug abuse 51, 64, 80–1, 112 Emerging Leaders Political Empowerment School 52 Enloe, Cynthia 109 equal rights 1, 4, 34–6, 44, 47, 65, 73 ethnic armed organizations (EAOs): ceasefire agreements between Burmese Army and 9, 45–6, 86–7, 91, 97, 113; Lawkeelar Summit of 46; in Mon State 73–6, 80–2; Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement 9, 33–4, 46, 73, 75, 86, 97; non-disintegration policy 88; women cadres in 12, 99–106, 116; women civil society leaders 103–5; women members of central executive committees 101–3 ethnic identity 11, 18, 33–4, 48–9, 70, 109–11, 119 Ethnic Nationality Conference 34 ethnic self-determination 12, 34, 48, 59, 62, 65, 74, 88, 115 ethnic states 8, 33–4, 91 female soldiers (in Burmese army) 99 Four Race and Religion Protection Laws 29 Framework for Political Dialogue 9–10, 28, 34–5, 37–8, 46, 87, 97 Gender and Development Institute 9 Gender and Nation (Yuval-Davis) 112 gender-based violence 3–4, 8, 19, 22–3, 25–9, 39, 41, 45, 50, 53, 55, 63–4, 66, 76, 81, 90, 118 Gender Development Index (GDI) 8 gender equality/inequality 4–8, 10–12, 18, 21–3, 27–8, 36–41, 44, 47–53, 56, 64–5, 109, 114–16 Gender Equality Network (GEN) 9, 11–12, 27, 29, 39

123

gender gap 7 Gender Inequality Index (GII) 7 gender norms (in political culture) 10–11 General Council of Buddhist Associations 21 Geneva Convention 24 Global Gender Gap Index (GGI) 7 Government of Burma Act 4–5 Hnin Mya 4 Htoi Gender and Development Foundation 63–5 Human Development Index (HDI) 7–8 human rights: as a key issue for WLB 51–5; norms 1–2, 4, 12–3, 18–27, 29, 45, 51, 86, 93, 111, 117–8; reports 22–4, 109; violations in Kachin communities 64, 86, 90, 92–4, 115; violations in Karen communities 85; violations in Mon communities 74, 76, 81–2; violations in Ta’ang communities 92 Human Rights Documentation Unit (HRDU) 21–2 Human Rights Foundation of Monland (HURFOM) 25 ‘Human Rights Yearbook’ 21–2 insecurity 74, 76, 82, 110–12, 114–18 internally displaced persons (IDP) 65 International Criminal Court 28, 93 International Day of Peace 116 international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) 9, 47, 52, 54, 93 International Peace Support Group 88 International Women’s Development Agency 52 intersectionality 11, 51, 109, 111 Ja Nan Lahtaw 9, 97 Ji Ji 91, 94 Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee 37, 40, 75 Joint Implementation Coordination Meeting 75 Kachin Independence Army (KIA) 34, 58, 85–7 Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) 58–9, 68, 70, 90, 101, 104

124

Index

Kachin State: armed conflict in 59–60, 86–7, 90, 115–16; land rights movement in 60–2, 65; reports of sexual violence from 8; women’s engagement in electoral politics in 65–9; women’s participation in peacemaking in 58–71; women’s rights activists in 63–5 Kachin State Women’s Network 9 Kachin Women’s Association Thailand 41 Kachin Women’s Forum 40 Kachin Youth Movement 65 Karen National Liberation Army 87 Karen National Union (KNU) 39, 58, 75, 85, 87, 103–5 Karenni National Union 9, 97 Karenni National Women’s Organization 18 Karenni State 8 Karen State 8 Karen Women’s Organization (KWO) 22, 24–5, 85 Kayin State 99 Khin Khin 5 Khin Kyi 2, 5 Khin Mya 78 Khin Nyunt 5 Ko Lum Zawng 65 Ko Zau Jat 65 Lahu Democratic Union (LDU) 87 land rights movement 61–2, 65 Land Use Policy 36 Lawkeelar Summit of EAOs 46 Law of the Buddha (Buddha Dharma) 81 ‘License to Rape’ (report) 23–4, 26 ‘Long Way to Go’ (report) 52 ‘Looking through Gender Lenses’ (position paper) 50 Lway Kyi 90 Lway Si Si 91 ‘marginal voices’ 108–9, 118 May Win Myint 38–9, 41 Metta Development Foundation 70 Mi Cho Khaing 78–9 Min Aung Hlaing 69 Mi Sar Dar 79–80

Mon Ethnic Armed Organization 76 Mon National Education Committee 76 Mon National Education Department 76 Mon State: armed conflict in 74–6; reports of sexual violence from 8; security as understood by local communities in 80–2; tenhousehold leaders 78–9; women’s engagement in electoral politics in 79–80; women’s participation in peacemaking in 73, 76–83 Mon Women’s Network 9 Mon Women’s Organization 48 Mon Women’s Rights Organization 48 Myanmar Maternal and Child Welfare Association (MMCWA) 21 Myanmar Ministry of Electric Power 60 Myanmar Peace Centre 75 Myanmar Peace Support Initiative 88 Myanmar Women Entrepreneur Association (MWA) 21 Mya Sein 4 Myitsone dam protests 60–1 Myo Min Oo 65 Nang Pu Nbau 63, 65, 67 Nang Raw Zakhung (Shalom Foundation) 9, 97 National Action Plan for the Advancement of Women 21 National Ceasefire Coordination Team 98 National Community Drive development project 40 National Convention Process (NCP) 85–6 National Democratic Force (NDF) 62, 66 National League for Democracy (NLD) 1, 6–7, 18, 27, 29, 36, 38–40, 85–7, 97 National Reconciliation and Peace Center 36, 37 national security: visions of peace and 113–16; women’s insecurities versus 110–12 National Strategic Plan for the Advancement of Women (NSPAW) 28, 35 Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) 9, 28, 33–4, 36–7, 40, 44, 46, 58, 68, 73, 75, 87, 97, 102

Index Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team 75, 87 Naw Susana Hla Hla Soe 98 Naw Zipporah Sein 36, 97 Ne Win 5, 85 New Mon State Party (NMSP) 48, 73–5, 79–80, 87 Nippon Foundation 88 non-disintegration policy 88 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 6, 88, 93, 116 ‘No Women, No Peace’ (slogan) 116 Nyein Foundation 9, 70 Palaung Women’s Organization 113 Panglong Agreement 33, 98 Peace Donor Support Group 88 peace process 1–4, 9–10, 12–3, 33–41, 44, 46, 50–1, 53–6, 59, 64, 66–9, 73–5, 77, 82–3, 84, 87–95, 97–9, 102–5, 109, 113–18 Peace Process Steering Team Special Delegation 75 People’s Revolutionary Party 5 Pepper, Molly 12 Phan, Zoya 114–15 Political Empowerment Program 52 Rakhine State 1, 99 rape 23– 4, 26, 28–9, 64, 111–12, 115, 118 reparation 92–3 Rohingya 1, 58, 111, 118 Rome Statute 24 Saw Mra Raza Lin 9, 36, 97 Saw Sa 5 second-track diplomacy 51–2 sexual violence; see gender-based violence or rape Shan Human Rights Foundation (SHRF) 23 Shan State 5, 8, 23, 86–7, 90, 98, 99, 105, 115 Shan State Army 85 Shan State Army-South 87 Shan State Progress Party 101 Shan Women’s Action Network (SWAN) 18, 23, 26, 40–1 ‘Shattering Silence’ (report) 24 Silbert, Carla 73

125

State Law and Order Restoration Council 6 State Peace and Development Committee (SPDC) 24 Ta’ang National Liberation Army 34, 90 ten-household leaders 78–9 Tha Khin Mya 5 Thein Sein 4, 33, 67, 68, 86, 113 Thin Lei Win 67 triple burden 10–11 Union Election Commission 65, 70 Union Peace Conference (Political Dialogue) of Myanmar 35, 37, 38 Union Peace Dialogue 98 Union Peace Dialogue Central Committee 98 Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee 37, 40, 67, 75, 98 Union Peacemaking Central Committee (UPCC) 37, 40 Union Peacemaking Working Committee (UPWC) 37, 51, 75 Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) 66, 68, 86 United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC) 86–7 United Nations: Convention on Children’s Rights (CRC) 25; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 8, 9, 19, 21, 25, 34–5, 38, 48, 52, 84; Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar 26; support of women’s groups 9 United Nations Human Rights Commission 52 United Nations Security Council (UNSC): Resolution 1325 3–4, 18–22, 24, 26–7, 35; Resolution 1674 3; Resolution 1820 3; Resolution 1882 3; Resolution 1888 3; Resolution 1889 3 United Wa State Army 34 United Wa State Party 85 Unity and Democracy Party of Kachin State 66 U Razak 5

126

Index

Village Tract Administrator (VTA) 79 ‘Voices for Change’ (report) 113–14 ‘Walking amongst Sharp Knives’ (report) 25 war crimes 23–4, 28–9, 92 ‘Women against Violence’ program 53 Women and Peace Action Network (Shan State) 9 Women from Burma forum 49 Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda 1, 3–4, 19–20 Women’s Initiative for Peace (WIN – Peace) 40, 46, 117 Women’s League of Burma (WLB): agenda of 50–6; aim of 49–50; establishment of 18, 109; human rights reports by 23–5; influence through alliance-building 12; role in women’s inclusion in peace process 88, 94, 116–18; sexual violence reports by 8–9, 112; and dissemination of UNSCR 1325 in Myanmar 27 Women’s Organization Network (WON) 27, 39 women’s participation in peacemaking: 30 percent target for 9–10, 27, 33, 35, 36–41; and

engagement in electoral politics 34–5, 65–9, 79–80, 93–4; ethnic armed organizations and 12, 45, 99–106; in Kachin conflict 58–71; in Mon conflict 73, 76–83; and role in sustainable peace 116–17; and role of WLB 50–6; and women-towomen diplomacy 46–56 women’s rights 2–3, 13, 18–9, 22–3, 26–9, 34–5, 39–40, 45, 47–51, 56, 59–60, 63–5, 84, 89, 94, 98–9, 118 Women’s Rights and Welfare Association 18 Women’s Sports Federation (MSF) 21 women survivors: and armed conflict 84–6; and failure of government to punish perpetrators 8–9, 91–2; justice and reparation for 92–3; and negative views of peace process 90–1; and women’s engagement in electoral politics 93–4; and women’s participation in peacemaking 87–95 WON/WIN-Peace 9 World Conference on Women of 1995 6, 19, 48 Yuval-Davis, Nira 112 Zaceu Lian 98