Wilful Blindness: On the Relationship of Identity, Agency and Personal Data 3658326530, 9783658326531

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Estella Ferraro

Wilful Blindness On the Relationship of Identity, Agency and Personal Data

Wilful Blindness

Estella Ferraro

Wilful Blindness On the Relationship of Identity, Agency and Personal Data

Estella Ferraro Frankfurt, Germany Diese Arbeit wurde als Dissertation an der Johann Wolfgang von Goethe-Universität zu Frankfurt am Main unter dem gleichnamigen Titel “Wilful Blindness—on the relationship of identity, agency and personal data” angenommen. Siegelziffer D.30 1. Gutachter: Prof. Dr. Stefan Iske 2. Gutachterin: Prof.’in Dr. Christiane Thompson 3. Gutachter: Prof. Dr. John Potter Datum der Disputation: 16.04.2019

ISBN 978-3-658-32653-1 ISBN 978-3-658-32654-8 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-32654-8 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Responsible Editor: Stefanie Eggert This Springer VS imprint is published by the registered company Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH part of Springer Nature. The registered company address is: Abraham-Lincoln-Str. 46, 65189 Wiesbaden, Germany

for Katia & for the little person soon entering this world

Acknowledgements

While retrospectively the process of writing a PhD seems to be mainly a fight with and against oneself—I wish to thank everyone that in the moments of me loosing this fight, has come to support. A help without which this piece of work would not be the way that it is or maybe not be at all. The support on all levels of life, whether socially, academically or in moments of doubt is invaluable and I am aware I can never fully pay it back. So in no particular order, but with a heart-felt gratitude for everyone mentioned as well as those forgotten, I wish to thank: My research subjects who have offered me their perspectives and opinions and shared so much personal data about their lives. My supervisors, Stefan Iske, Christiane Thompson and John Potter for leading me back on the right track when needed while at the same time allowing me all the freedom & creativity that was necessary. My colleagues in Frankfurt and beyond for being partners for long discussions, phone calls of support, dissertation Fridays, dog walking and laughter filled breaks and for being able to share interesting thoughts: Aysel Sultan, Dan Verständig, Johannes Wahl, Julia Gasterstädt and Jann Schweitzer. All of my proofreaders for reading & giving me feedback, even on shortnotice and despite the fact that it was a very hot summer: Cyndi, Jane, Laura, Monika, Riddhi and Viresh you are the best & Linda you are the best graphic designer one could wish for! My friends for bearing with me while my head was anywhere but here and for distracting me when it was really needed. My parents and siblings (Katia, Hektor, Lissi, Victor and Amanda) for supporting me on so many levels with open ears, open minds and open hearts, a key

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to Norderney, but most of all proud hugs that would make me want to carry on. And Anthony for giving me butterflies, the certainty of exciting times to come after this and for the moments I overhear you talk about my PhD so proudly to others, they make me be proud of myself, which I sometimes forget. Finally, the readers (if there are any not mentioned in one of the categories above)—for showing an interest in this topic and these words and ideas.

Contents

1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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2 Research on Surveillance, Privacy and Personal Data . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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3 Identity and Self – From Enlightened to Fragmented . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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4 Methodological Approach and Research Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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5 Conditions of the Current Digital State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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6 Conditions of Control and Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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7 Conditions of the Self . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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8 Conditions for Consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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9 Synthesis of Thoughts: Mise en Abyme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Abbreviations

ANT BVerfG CCC CCTV EU GCHQ GDPR i.a. IT NSA PGCE SSL

Actor Network Theory Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court) Chaos Computer Club Closed-Circuit Television European Union Government Communications Headquarters General Data Protection Regulation inter alia (among others) Information Technology National Security Agency Postgraduate Certificate in Education Secure Socker Layer

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List of Figures

Figure Figure Figure Figure

4.1 4.2 5.1 5.2

Figure 5.3 Figure 5.4 Figure 5.5 Figure 6.1 Figure 6.2 Figure 6.3 Figure 6.4 Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure

7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5

Figure 7.6

Timeline of Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Preconditions, Conditions and Consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . Category 1 - Conditions of the Current Digital State . . . . . . . Core Arguments of the Dimension of Functionality in First Category . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Core Arguments of the Dimension of Datafication in the First Category . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Core Arguments of the Dimension of Temporality in the First Category . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Core Arguments of the Dimension of Religions and Illusions in the First Category . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Category 2 - Conditions of Control and Agency . . . . . . . . . . Core Arguments of the Dimension of the Collective in the Second Category . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Core Arguments of the Dimension of the Technical in the Second Category . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Core Arguments of the Dimension on the Individual in the Second Category . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Graphic on the Dialectic of Inside and Outside . . . . . . . . . . . Graphic on the Dialectic of Expression and Repression . . . . Graphic on the Dialectic of Fragments and Totality . . . . . . . Category 3 - Conditions of the Self . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Core Arguments of the Dimension on Inside and Outside in the Third Category . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Core Arguments of the Dimension on Expression and Repression in the Third Category . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

80 89 94 95 100 108 114 126 129 138 147 158 158 159 160 161 168

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Figure 7.7 Figure 8.1 Figure 8.2 Figure 8.3 Figure 8.4 Figure 8.5 Figure 8.6

List of Figures

Core Arguments of the Dimension on Fragments and Totality in the Third Category . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Category 4 - Conditions for Consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Core Arguments of the Dimension of Opinion in the Fourth Category . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Core Arguments of the Dimension of Practicality in the Fourth Category . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Core Arguments of the Dimension of Resignation in the Fourth Category . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Core Arguments of the Dimension of Voice in the Fourth Category . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Spectrum of Voice from Receptive to Productive . . . . . . . . . .

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Introduction

In 1949, Aldous Huxley, author of Brave New World (Huxley, 1955), wrote a letter to his former student George Orwell about Orwell’s book 1984 (Orwell, 2016). In this letter, he says: Within the next generation I believe that the world’s rulers will discover that infant conditioning and narco-hypnosis are more efficient, as instruments of government, than clubs and prisons, and that the lust for power can be just as completely satisfied by suggesting people into loving their servitude as by flogging and kicking them into obedience. In other words, I feel that the nightmare of Nineteen Eighty-Four is destined to modulate into the nightmare of a world having more resemblance to that which I imagined in Brave New World. The change will be brought about as a result of a felt need for increased efficiency. (King, 2012)

There are two points mentioned here, that are worth noting. First of all, what can be seen in this is a fear of a society consisting of obedient and serving citizens, leading onto systems as portrayed in Huxley’s and Orwell’s dystopic novels. Secondly, what this also shows is that this fear has been existent in various parts of society for a long time. Under the revelations brought about by Edward Snowden and other journalists in June 2013, when Glenn Greenwald published his article “NSA collecting phone records of millions of Verizon customers daily” (Greenwald, 2013) in the British Newspaper The Guardian, the debate about questions of surveillance, control, privacy and freedom, related to what Huxley writes about in 1949, have been brought back into the centre of public attention. Different areas of society have taken up this debate in their specific ways and discourses. Starting off with individuals like Edward Snowden, Glenn Greenwald and many others, who have raised an awareness for the issue, even by paying with restrictions in relation to their personal freedoms and lives, and including organisations and

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2021 E. Ferraro, Wilful Blindness, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-32654-8_1

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activists such as Wikileaks, the German Chaos Computer Club1 (CCC) or Anonymous, who come from very technologically and informatics based backgrounds, there is a history of civic engagement for critical perspectives on surveillance and privacy issues. Whereas within these circles the debate on surveillance-related topics existed even before what can be described as the National Security Agency (NSA) scandal, it was after the scandal that the discourse was extended into more mainstream areas of society. The scandal was covered by the news headlines, recurring over several months, and now even several years on still proves to be covered regularly, albeit at a much lesser extent, as new pieces of information emerge (Spiegel Online, 2020) or new laws are being introduced. Since the topic has become of general public interest an increase in different ways of dealing with the subject can be found. There are many initiatives who try to deal with the problem of surveillance and how one’s individual privacy can be enhanced. From within law studies as well as applied law, there are arguments suggesting that a better legal foundation should secure and improve privacy rights on the internet. From within the informatics sciences, there are initiatives trying to raise people’s awareness of technical solutions to prevent surveillance, for example the concept of “cryptoparties” where people interested in the topic can learn or teach how to use basic cryptography tools. Aside from that, there have been many cultural and artistic artefacts dealing with the topic such as graffiti by Banksy which depict topics of surveillance, social media and governmental control. Furthermore, there have been computer games, such as data dealer, which try to engage their players to critically reflect on the issue of private data and economics. The variety of different areas and different possibilities of dealing with the issue demonstrates the increased relevance of the topic of privacy, online data collection and digital surveillance in both politics and economics. It can be noted that the topic of surveillance has also become of interest to the educational sciences, where a more basic social approach to theorise, research and subsequently maybe even raise awareness through education about the problems relating to digital surveillance, online data tracking and their consequences, can be taken. Much of the academic research regarding this topic that has been conducted so far stems from other disciplines, such as law, informatics, economics or sociology, whereas very little research, especially empirically based, has attempted to analyse the issue from an educational perspective. It is here that there seems to be a desideratum that this book seeks to fill.

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The Chaos Computer Club is Europe’s biggest hacker association that is organised in a non-hierarchical structure.

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The impact, which the revelations made by Snowden and other journalists had, can also be seen as a cause or turning point leading to educational processes as one is confronted with problems, defined by a circumstance or situation that pose doubts, objections and confusion and demand for a “subjective novelty” by an individual or group in order to find a solution (Bönsch, 1973). The topic of online surveillance therefore also becomes of interest to the area of media pedagogy. Setting the theoretical framing of this book within the academic field of media pedagogy allows me to draw on a number of theories in relation to educational processes and educational philosophy. Education here, will be defined in the sense of Humboldt’s understanding of Bildung,2 assuming that educational processes take place when a person critically reflects on their relationship to the self, others and the world (Humboldt, 1997). Leading on from Humboldt’s approach, Marotzki and Jörissen have developed the concept of structural media education, where they define four categories of reflexive orientation that are: reference to knowledge, reference to actions, reference to transcendence and reference to biography (Jörissen & Marotzki, 2009). According to the authors these categories can be used in order to analyse educational processes. For Koller processes of Bildung are “triggered off by an experience of crisis: by being confronted with problems for the solving of which the figures of the previous world- and selfrelations are not sufficient any more” (Koller, 2011, p. 377). Assuming that the social phenomenon of online surveillance by both economic and political actors might trigger precisely this, namely an experience of crisis for the individual, thus also explains why the researched phenomenon is of particular interest for the educational and media sciences. This is also related to another observation that seems to be essential. Aside from these more general social questions, of surveillance and privacy, which yet concern the individual, another observation that can be drawn is related to questions of how the self is constructed. When talking about the collection of huge amounts of personal data, it seems obvious to also ask for the connection of how this “personal data” relates to that what constitutes the person it relates to in itself. Thus the questions of what this personal data actually is and how it is defined and estimated by the individual it belongs to seem to be of central relevance. Walter Benjamin has famously analysed the relationship between the original and the reproduction of it in his essay on The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction in which he states that: 2

I will refer to the concept of Bildung using the German term as it draws up a differentiation between Bildung und Erziehung that is not easily obvious in the English universal translation of education for both of these terms.

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One might subsume the eliminated element in the term “aura” and go on to say: that which withers in the age of mechanical reproduction is the aura of the work of art. This is a symptomatic process whose significance points beyond the realm of art. One might generalize by saying: the technique of reproduction detaches the reproduced object from the domain of tradition. By making many reproductions it substitutes a plurality of copies for a unique existence. And in permitting the reproduction to meet the beholder or listener in his own particular situation, it reactivates the object reproduced. These two processes lead to a tremendous shattering of tradition which is the obverse of the contemporary crisis and renewal of mankind. (Benjamin, 1968, p. 221)

While Benjamin focuses in his analysis predominantly on mechanical reproduction of photography and film, an equal comparison can be drawn in relation to the age of digital reproduction, in which the analysis of what “aura” is eliminated through the reproduction of a given “original” is important. Thus a connection is drawn between the original, which in the case of personal data could be analysed as the person herself,3 and the digitally reproduced data. How this connection unfolds, how it influences back onto the person herself, what it leaves out and eliminates, thus prove to be interesting questions of analysis. Benjamin’s quote here also mentions the moment of crisis that is caused by these transformations that can also be linked to the basic educational processes of Bildung. Thus, it could be argued that within contemporary society the process of data collection by political and economic actors, 1) has indeed been brought into the eyes and awareness of the general public; 2) touches on important questions of surveillance, control and freedom; 3) relates to questions of self and the transformation of self into digital data and 4) can be defined as a moment of “crisis” which might lead to processes of Bildung that is of relevance for educational research. Considering these four central arguments explains the basic social phenomena that are of interest to this book and that seem to constitute a desideratum relevant to be filled from a media educational theoretical perspective. Out of these four points also arise four research questions that are of interest and will guide the research process of this book: • How do people make sense of and deal with current trends of data collection/surveillance online? • What types of agency do they constitute for themselves within this context? 3

I would like to note at this point that I have chosen to use female pronouns for the sake of readability, however I wish to stress that I include all genders. Where it could have been carried out easily, I have always tried to refer to gender neutral terms such as one’s own, an individual, etc. or to a general plural such as them or they.

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• How can this be related to how they perceive themselves in the world in terms of their own identity? • What does this mean for broader social and educational theories and how subjects form their opinions? Looking at the questions it becomes apparent that they are placed at an interface between basic and fundamental questions of educational theory and even educational philosophy and media theories on questions of digitalisation, self in a digitalised world and media practices. The first chapter that you are reading at the moment has given a short introduction focusing on the relevance of the research topic and introducing the structure of the research. Following, the second chapter introduces a literature review on the topic of datafication, big data and online surveillance considering a range of different perspectives from the Anglophone and German discourses. The chapter is divided into a number of sub-chapters that try to consider findings from various disciplines and perspectives such as political, economic, social and judicial, in order to give a comprehensive account. While this is done mainly alongside the international discourse, a final sub-chapter introduces the particular context of the German media educational discourse, as this will be at the basis for some of the later analysis and demonstrates a central point of theoretical reference of where the book is located. The third chapter illustrates the theoretical framework that this book refers to by drawing up a line of theoretical conceptions of the self in relation to questions of agency and autonomy. Using Hall’s differentiation of three perspectives on the self as the 1) self of Enlightenment, 2) the sociological self and 3) the postmodern fragmented self (Hall, 1992), relevant theories will be illustrated in order to demonstrate historical changes of perspectives that also seem relevant for what is being discussed within this book. The focus will thus lastly and predominantly be placed on Bauman’s concept of liquidity, which is of central relevance throughout the book and Giddens’ perspective on agency. The fourth chapter will then introduce the research design. It further highlights relevant reflections on ethical questions, especially in the light of collecting data in the form of qualitative interviews to critically analyse forms of (online) data collection. Thus at first some basic arguments are given that locate the research carried out among ontological and epistemological perspectives and explain why a qualitative research approach is the best suited method. It introduces the methodological approach taken, namely a mixture of a multiple case study design with a grounded theory approach, as well as highlighting the research design in relation to data sampling techniques, data collection of interviews, transcription and data

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analysis using the grounded theory method. The chapter ends with a short introduction to the data in order to set a background for the following analysis that is structured along the four basic categories looked at in the subsequent chapters of 5) Conditions of the Current Digital State; 6) Conditions of Control and Agency; 7) Conditions of the Self; and 8) Conditions of Consequences. Thus, chapter five, which is entitled “Conditions of the Current Digital State”, analyses how the subjects define the current conditions of the “digital state”, media and its structures, giving insights into both the structures of media, as well as considerations about its qualitative values and elements. This is done alongside four basic topics which are functionality, datafication, temporality and finally, religions and illusions. The chapter gives a detailed account of the ways in which the subjects broach on the issue of media, digitalisation and datafication, how they define the purpose of media and how they define personal data. These insights thus set an interesting background in establishing the basic preconditions that are the context in which the findings of the research are located in. The sixth chapter entitled “Conditions of Control and Agency”, similar to the previous chapter, also analyses one of the preconditions in which the findings of the research are located in. Thus aside from how the subjects construct the digital state, this second precondition looks at the ways in which power is distributed within the context of the researched topic. Here it will be analysed how the individual is inextricably located in a triad between herself, others and (technical) objects. Considering the three sides of this triad, (collectives, technical and individual) it will be analysed how these sides are not separated clearly but interdependent and correlated, exposing complex conditions of power and agency that the subjects need to (constantly) negotiate and renegotiate. It is finally argued that these conditions of power relations, questions of adaptation and questions on the relationship of the subject with herself are also a fundamental prerequisite for considering questions of identity and self. The seventh chapter looks at how the subjects construct their identities and self within the conditions of the digital state and the power relations discussed in the previous chapters. The chapter entitled “Conditions of the Self” analyses how the subjects broach on the issue of self alongside three dialectical relationships. The self is referenced, both considering online and offline contexts, which are not analysed as being of a dichotomous nature, in a dialectical relationship as the self 1) in relation to questions of inside and outside or in relation to how the self originates; 2) in relation to questions of expression and repression or in relation to how the self is shown and 3) in relation to questions of the self as in fragments or totality or in relation to how the self is shaped. Examples from the data are given that show how the subjects “construct” themselves in the interviews both as being

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influenced from within and without, how forms of expression and repression of certain aspects or fragments of the self yet again impact upon the construction of the self and finally how the self is seen either shaped as something whole or as often in its many fragments. The consideration of these perspectives open up interesting insights that make it possible to relate the theoretical framework back to the data. These considerations also lead over to the final category of the research looking at the ways in which opinions are formed and reactions are made possible. Thus, the eighth chapter entitled “Conditions for Consequences” illustrates possibilities for opinions and (re)actions in relation to the context of the research of this book. It is argued that the subjects show a discursive awareness of some generally held opinions on the simultaneous construction of digital media as both a lure and a danger in relation to a complex system of invasion of personal privacy, avenues of representation, political structures and ownership of personal data. Within these opinions the subjects refer to a number of options both practically as well as theoretically, discussed alongside the four topics of opinion, practicality, resignation and voice. The analysis does not only offer insights on the placing of responsibility in relation to data protection, privacy and resulting vulnerability, but also covers an interesting differentiation between resignation and voice that seems to be especially relevant in relation to educational theory. The chapter thus offers a perspective that seems somewhat of a consequence of the preconditions and condition analysed in the previous chapters. The final topic on voice lends itself very well, especially, to relate to the previous category on self and thus demonstrates the importance of these findings for the academic field. In order to highlight this relevance more, the last chapter finally brings together the assumptions made and findings presented in the previous chapters, before a short summary is drawn in the end. Chapter nine first of all links together in more detail than done before the respective categories of the research and illustrates relations and topics that arise between them. Through this synthesis, the findings of the research are brought together alongside a number of arguments. Following this, I reflect again upon some of the limitations of the research I have carried out from a more retrospective perspective. Given the interdisciplinary and international nature of both the book and the topic in itself this chapter also will argue for the particular relevance of the educational and media sciences and through this locate this research among its academic field. Finally, I will give a short conclusion that tries to comprehensively bring together the very most central points.

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References Benjamin, W. (1968). The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction. In W. Benjamin. H. Arendt (Ed.) Illuminations. New York: Schocken Books. Bönsch, M. (1973). VerlaufsgestaIten und Aktionsstrukturen des Unterrichts. Essen: Neue Deutsche Schule Verlagsgestaltung Greenwald, G. (2013). NSA collecting phone records of millions of Verizon customers daily. The Guardian. Retrieved, August 22, 2016, from: https://www.theguardian.com/world/ 2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order Hall, S. (1992). The Question of Cultural Identity. In S. Hall; D. Held & T. McGrew (Eds.) Modernity and its Futures (pp. 273–326). Cambridge: Polity Press and The Open University. Humboldt, W. von (1997). Bildung und Sprache - 5th Edition. Paderborn: Schöningh Paderborn. Huxley, A. (1955). Brave New World. London: Penguin Books. Jörissen, B. & Marotzki, W. (2009). Medienbildung – Eine Einführung. Bad Heilbrunn: Klinkhardt UTB. King, R. (2012). In the future, I’m right: Letter from Aldous Huxley to George Orwell over 1984 novel sheds light on their different ideas. The Daily Mail Online. Retrieved August 23, 2018, from: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2111440/Aldous-Huxley-letterGeorge-Orwell-1984-sheds-light-different-ideas.html Koller, H. (2011). The Research of Transformational Education Processes: exemplary considerations on the relation of the philosophy of education and educational research. In European Educational Research Journal 10 (3) (pp. 375–382). Orwell, G. (2016). 1984. London: Penguin Books. Spiegel Online (2020) NSA Überwachung Alle Artikel und Hintergründe. Spiegel Online. Retrieved October 23, 2019, from: http://www.spiegel.de/thema/nsa_ueberwachung/

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Research on Surveillance, Privacy and Personal Data

Now it came about in those days that an order went out from Caesar Augustus that there was to be a numbering of all the world. This was the first numbering, which was made when Quirinius was ruler of Syria. And all men went to be numbered, everyone to his town. (Luke 2.1-2.3)

What can be seen in this sequence from the bible is that, despite the historical uncertainty of these events, questions of surveillance over citizens through registers and censuses have a long-lasting history. Concepts of privacy and surveillance have been discussed throughout history in various different cultural and political contexts. Whereas questions on privacy, surveillance and personal data have always been set within complex social and political structures, it seems that in recent years the structures that these topics are set in have become even more complex. Many of the structures have enhanced, grown and changed. Whereas before it was mainly in the interest of the state or other political systems to collect large sets of data on citizens, it is now also possible for and in the interest of economic companies to collect as much data as possible and use this data for economic reasons. How this may bring along social and cultural changes for society, both in possibilities as well as possible risks, will be shown in this chapter using a number of different examples and theories. The various actors, structures, processes and algorithms relating to each other also influence the economic and power structures apparent on the internet. Stemming from the fact that the topics of surveillance, privacy and personal data are undergoing constant change due to the economic and political events that are taking place, it has to be noted that these topics are constantly being redefined both within the public as well as the academic discourse. Because of this, it is interesting to look at how the topics have been theorised, described and used in relation to educational research as well as in the context of other disciplines, the news or magazines.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2021 E. Ferraro, Wilful Blindness, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-32654-8_2

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Judicial and Political Aspects

Before starting on the first of the four parts of this chapter, it has to be stated that the division of theories and aspects into the various areas of political, societal, structural and economic does not imply a strict division of content but rather a general guideline to help structure the theories to create a more ordered and straightforward overview. Seeing as, historically, a lot of research and discourse on questions of surveillance and personal data find their basis in protest of datadriven movements like the census, which can be found thousands of years ago and can be argued to be politically motivated, the first part will introduce various political theories and aspects in relation to the topic including David Lyon’s surveillance studies (Lyon, 2007), the NSA scandal as well as the concept of informational self-determination and the current judicial state of law in relation to data protection and privacy rights in the European Union (EU). The concept of informational self-determination or as it is called in German “informationelle Selbstbestimmung” is a constitutionally based right following the 1983 census in Germany which attributes the individual citizen the right to generally be in charge of how his or her personal data should be disclosed and used. The right states that: Given the context of modern data processing the protection of the individual against unlimited collection, storage, usage and distribution of his or her own personal data is comprised by the general personality right under article 2, paragraph 1 and article 1, paragraph 1. In this respect the basic right guarantees the individual’s power to principally determine the disclosure and use of his or her personal data. […] Limitations of this rights to ‘informational self-determination’ are only allowed in the case of an overriding general interest of the public [….].1 (personal translation: Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG) 15.12.1983 – Az. 1 BvR 209/83)

As can be seen the right is based on two different articles of the German constitution firstly being article 1, paragraph 1: the protection of human dignity and secondly article 2, paragraph 1: the protection of general personal liberty. Both 1

Original text: Unter den Bedingungen der modernen Datenverarbeitung wird der Schutz des Einzelnen gegen unbegrenzte Erhebung, Speicherung, Verwendung und Weitergabe seiner persönlichen Daten von dem allgemeinen Persönlichkeitsrecht des Art. 2 Abs. 1 GG in Verbindung mit Art. 1 Abs. 1 GG umfaßt. Das Grundrecht gewährleistet insoweit die Befugnis des Einzelnen, grundsätzlich selbst über die Preisgabe und Verwendung seiner persönlichen Daten zu bestimmen. […] Einschränkungen dieses Rechts auf "informationelle Selbstbestimmung" sind nur im überwiegenden Allgemeininteresse zulässig […]. (trans. by author)(BVerG 15.12.1983 – Az. 1 BvR 209/83).

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of these together form the right of personality, which should guarantee every individual the possibility to freely develop her own personality. The right to informational self-determination being referenced here, is constituted as part of the right of personality and is based both on legal as well as sociological considerations at a time when politics were faced with a feeling of resentment by citizens against a growing feeling of surveillance, against public authorities in general as well as a resentment against what would be called “computerisation” (Hornung & Schnabel, 2009). In their analysis of the right to informational self-determination, Hornung and Schnabel reference Luhmann (2009) in his works on fundamental rights and argue that rights, like the right for informational self-determination, are necessary for guarding the differentiation of a society into sub-systems, whereby especially privacy serves to protect individuality as well as consistent self-expression (Hornung & Schnabel, 2009). If this cannot be guaranteed they argue that citizens will try avoiding any “dissenting behaviour” as not to attract any form of attention or sanctioning. For this reason, the data subject should generally be in charge of her own data, which can only be circumvented if the individual’s interest is outweighed by a broader public interest. Hence, what is important in relation to the German law of informational self-determination is the fact that the individual should be in charge of the data that is collected in relation to her personality and the processing of this data. This is also where the law differs from the American law to privacy, which is often based on the 1890 written article by Warren and Brandeis titled “The Right to Privacy” (Warren & Brandeis, 1890). What was thence passed under the Fourth Amendment and what Warren and Brandeis had referred to was “the right to be left alone” especially in reference to protests against the yellow press in order to protect individuals from journalistic intrusion and constitutionally protecting “letters, personal papers and other personal effects” (Schwartz, 1989, p. 675). Schwartz argues, however, that a mere privacy right as in the American constitution might not suffice given the technical changes through the introduction of computers which enable information to be processed in new ways. Rather than basing the regulation of computational processing of personal information on a right to privacy, attention should be paid to how information processing might have an effect on human autonomy (Schwartz, 1989). This has not only been taken up in the German right, but by now under the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC also sets the basic principles of the European data protection legislation including data minimisation principles, obligations of the data controller and rights of the data subject, as well as principles of purpose specification and proportionality (Hornung & Schnabel, 2009, p. 87). In this

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context the European Union defines personal data as relating “to any personal information which can be used to identify you, directly or indirectly, such as your name, your telephone number, your email address, your place and date of birth, etc.” (European Commission, 2018). Even though the legislation is not in itself to be discussed in this book, it still is important to demonstrate the legal groundwork in order to analyse further issues in relation to the processing of personal data. Especially, the introduction of the new General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) that was introduced by the EU in 2018 has led to interesting discussions on precisely the legal groundwork that affects practices in various ways. While the focus of this book is not placed on the GDPR itself, the debate nonetheless demonstrates the intricate relationship of legal basics and economic practices. Summing up, there are two important aspects that are valuable for the discussion that will follow. First of all, the differentiation of various legal possibilities of privacy rights which can be seen in the difference between the American and the German/European rights show, that there are many different ways of theorising, analysing and legally protecting the issue at hand. The constantly changing technical and economic circumstances demand for a constant adjusting of the legal system, which because of bureaucratisation and long political processes often falls behind its actual situational necessity, which could possibly be exploited by economic interests and lobbyists. Whether or not companies and others actually adhere to the legislation and what type of sanctions or even lack of sanctions might be faced by breaking the law in return accounts for current practices of data processing, which as the legal system shows are facilitated further also by the topic’s complexity, constant change and ambiguity. The second important aspect that can be drawn from looking at especially the German right to informational self-determination is that here the act of data processing is actually by law linked to the basic right to personality and specifically to the protection of human dignity and the protection of general personal liberty. It is therefore important to consider that even under the law the collection and distribution of personal data can be seen as a threat to the individual’s personality and her personal freedom. The close relation between the broader surveillance and privacy issues with a focus on questions of “personalities” and “identities” is something that is evident throughout various contexts. Not only can it be found in the legal grounding of the right to informational self-determination, where the processing of data entails a possible threat to the possibility of freely developing ones personality, but it can also be found in political, cultural and media discourses in relation to the NSA scandal. How personality and identity are to be defined in these contexts, in how far a focus on personalities and identities is to be seen as a threat of distraction

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and how the practices might actually sanction or hinder the development of personalities or identities is something that has not been clearly defined or discussed and is often portrayed with ambiguity. One could conceive of a difference in the economic collection of data, which either applies to every person individually or in contrast applies to broader issues of surveillance which concerns society as a whole. This is not an easy theoretical distinction and different perspectives on whether this is an individual or broader social issue might require different ideas on how it should be dealt with. Yet, as also shows in the following quote by Edward Snowden made in Citizenfour (Poitras, 2014), it is worth considering the relation between surveillance, media and personality in various different ways while highlighting the problem of making it an individual issue, rather than bringing across an important point of how this might be a problem for society as a whole: Edward Snowden: I think I’ve expressed that a couple times online, is I feel the modern media has a big focus on personalities. Glenn Greenwald: Totally. Edward Snowden: And I’m a little concerned the more we focus on that, the more they’re gonna use that as a distraction. And I don’t necessarily want that to happen, which is why I’ve consistently said, you know, “I’m not the story here. (Poitras, 2014; minutes 22.50–23.12)

If Edward Snowden is not the story here, then what is? The revelations brought about by Edward Snowden, Laura Poitras, Glenn Greenwald and other journalists in June 2013, when Glenn Greenwald published his article “NSA collecting phone records of millions of Verizon customers daily” in the British Newspaper The Guardian were both ground-breaking and at the same time might have called for much more action and protest than they did (Greenwald, 2013). Through secret documents provided by Snowden the journalists revealed, as some privacy activists had been assuming for a while, a worldwide espionage system, including especially the NSA in the United States and the British Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) collecting data on various forms of electronic communication from citizens worldwide (Beuth, 2013). The magnitude of both the amount of secret data that Snowden passed onto the journalists, as well as the magnitude of the actual content of that data has been so strong that even years on, new revelations and publications can still be found within media and the public discourse. Because of the extent of information and

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therefore also publications, news coverage and public debate, it is not possible to give a full account here. However, as it will be useful for understanding the context of the research question, this paragraph will try to summarise the most relevant aspect in relation to the later analysis.2 The NSA and GCHQ worked with the secret services of Canada, Australia and New Zealand, together called the Five Eyes who are at the centre of the scandal. However the Five Eyes also collaborated with other countries exchanging information, including Germany, Sweden, France, Belgium, Japan or South Korea, to name but a few. As there has been a number of programmes who have been collecting a number of different data types about various groups of people or companies, it is only possible to mention a few examples at this point. One much focused-on programme called PRISM showed that companies such as Google, YouTube, AOL, Apple, Microsoft, Skype, Yahoo, Facebook or PalTalk passed on user data to the NSA. The NSA further was able to collect data from millions of users through mobile phone tracking, data produced through smartphone applications such as Angry Birds or Google Maps, contact information of e-mail and instant-messaging accounts as well as metadata from phone conversations and e-mail traffic. Because of the scope of data collected, not only citizens of the countries involved have been affected, such as American citizens, Germans, French or Spanish, but also certain population groups such as Anonymous, WikiLeaks, where it might have been expected, but also Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch, embassies from various countries, Muslim citizens and even various heads of government, including German chancellor Angela Merkel and Brazil’s president Dilma Rousseff. The fact that the NSA and GCHQ also specifically targeted single companies and politicians, demonstrates that it might not have been only about fighting or preventing possible terror attacks as part of National security, which would be the official justification, but also about political and economic interests (Guardian, 2020; Spiegel Online, 2020; Beuth, 2013). All of this has led to the fact that the topic is now being discussed in broader parts of society. As has been argued before, the topic has become a mainstream topic of public interest, yet there also seem to be differences in how this debate has been covered in various countries. Whereas in Germany for example, the topic has received a lot of attention from the media having been reported in great detail and having had a huge public interest, the protest movement and actual consequences have remained relatively small (Holland, 2014). In the United Kingdom on the other

2

More information can be found on the Guardian website (Guardian, 2020) or on the website of the Zeit (Beuth, 2013) or on the website of Spiegel Online (Spiegel Online, 2020).

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hand, where it could have been expected to cause an outrage due to the involvement of the GCHQ as well as the leading role in revealing the information by The Guardian and Glenn Greenwald, the topic has been discussed to a much lesser extent in mainstream British media, so much to the extent that concerns over the freedom of the UK press were raised even by other countries (Holland, 2014), after The Guardian had been attacked by British Prime Minister David Cameron. It might be speculated that the British public showed little resistance to the topic due to already being used to extreme forms of surveillance because of the closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras being in operation in many public spaces as just one example (Holland, 2014). It is worth noting this, as most of the subjects in this research are either from the United Kingdom or were living there at the moment of the research, which has to be considered when analysing their data. Whether or not the topic has been of general public interest, a lack of consequences and action following the revelations can also be observed (Holland, 2014). At the moment it can still be questioned or even negated that the importance of the issue has received the political attention that it might deserve. This argument has also been taken up by the former President of the European Parliament Martin Schulz. On February 6th 2014, Martin Schulz published an article in the German newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung titled “Why we have to fight now”3 in which he calls out for the protection of personal freedom in the information age (Schulz, 2014). Schulz draws up an interesting comparison of social and political movements in relation to the requirements of certain times. He argues that the necessity for the social democratic movement of the 19th century was based in the changing conditions of the industrial revolution in which workers had to adjust to the speed and rules of the machines resulting in a reversion of the subject-object relationship and leading to problems such as the precarity of wide parts of society, new illnesses and environmental damages. Hence a social movement calling for employment rights, the abolishment of child work, paid leave and effective labour protection measures was essential. Similarly to the social necessities of the industrialisation age, Schulz argues that we now need a new social movement brave enough to move the inviolacy of human dignity to the centre of their considerations and not letting the individual be degenerated to a mere object as well as finding a basis in a liberal, democratic and social understanding of the state. The aim of this movement should be to define clear rights in relation to data collection and distribution specifying that privacy is a basic right and sanctioning possible misuse. Schulz as President 3

Original German: Warum wir jetzt kämpfen müssen.

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of the EU, at the time of this argument, further argues that it should be essential for Europe to secure clever economic politics in order to ensure that Europe stays technologically up-to-date and therefore independent of the control of contemporary digital super powers, whether they would be nation states or global companies. The plea proposed here hence urges for a fight for a free internet, the defence of the basic rights especially in relation to a regulated data market as well as making sure that the autonomy of the human rather than an objectification of the human is an essential part of being human in itself. The debate Schulz has started in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung has been taken up by various different academics, activists, economists and others and is very worthwhile reading (Schirrmacher, 2015). The contributions edited together by Frank Schirrmacher in his book Technologischer Totalisarismus, as part of the debate in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung started by Martin Schulz’s plea show that the issue is not simply one of politics, but also raises important social and economic questions and concerns, which is what the next part of this chapter will focus on.

2.2

Social and Structural Aspects

“A relationship with a computer can influence people’s conceptions of themselves, their jobs, their relationships with other people, and their ways of thinking about social processes.” (Turkle, 2005, p. 156) As has been shown in the previous part of the chapter, political and judicial issues in relation to the storage of data and privacy prove to be a complex issue. However it can also be argued, that data collection and profiling is yet more complex in the contemporary structures also being influenced by and in turn themselves influencing social and economic aspects. All of these aspects are intertwined with each other and that no clear distinction between simply economic, political or social arguments and issues can be made. In the above quote, Sherry Turkle argues that the relationship between a person and their computer can have an impact on that person’s conception not only of themselves, but also of their relationships, jobs and wider social processes. This impact can be depicted in various different ways. On the one hand, there seems to be very technical, digital and media critical works, that focus on the negative aspects of media in general, including public anxieties of the risk of media associated for younger generations in the sense of paedophiles, cyberbullying or suicide pacts (Livingstone, 2008) and in general related to for example “digital

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dementia” (Spitzer, 2014). In contrast to this focus there are also very celebratory accounts of media, celebrating the “net generation” (Tapscott, 1998) or the concept of “digital natives” (Prensky, 2001) who view especially younger users as knowledgeable and skilful agents (Willett, 2009). Whether one might focus more on the disadvantages and risks or on the advantages and opportunities of digital media, it seems that their impact on various aspects of life is indisputable. It has been argued by plenty of academics, as the quote by Turkle also shows, that new media have had an influence on people’s conception of themselves, in other words also on their identities. It can be argued that especially social networking sites allow their users to constantly edit and re-edit their online profiles, and by this construct an “of-the-moment online identity” (Dowall, 2009, p. 80). Dowdall establishes a “linked triad” model, in which identity has to be seen in relation to inter-human dynamic and behaviours. She argues that social, cultural and personal components interplay to position a person in relation to other persons (Holland & Leander, 2004). This relationship gives rise to a triad between identity, context and communicative practices, through which texts are produced as the triad interplays. Individuals are thus seen in a patchwork identity (Keupp, 1997) of being consumers, workers, citizens and audiences (Livingstone, 2020) in changing conditions of culture “that give rise to shared meaning and personal identity” (Stalder, 2018, p. 8). Social media texts can be analysed as motivated signs (Kress, 2009) or artefacts of identity (Pahl & Roswell, 2005) and thus social networks can be seen as spaces where the social identities are both rehearsed, improvised and performed (Dowdall, 2009). The context that I am researching then is placed not only within the subjects’ constructions of their own identity, but also within the online communicative and transaction practices in order to analyse how their identities are negotiated in the light of surveillance, between the human being and the machine (Heßler & Liggieri, 2020). What needs to be considered when researching this topic empirically, is that people in general try to show characteristics that will make them desirable to others (Bortree, 2005). Whether this may be to other people within a network, both online and offline, or even in a research context, it is important to consider this bias both when analysing textual artefacts and profiles online as well as when analysing the interviews conducted as part of the research for this book. Related to this, and this is also important for the analysis of the data later on, it has been argued that people will try to “blend in with their larger peer network” (Stern 2004, p. 224) by following accepted rules for behaviour and communication within these networks including cultural and gender biases (Klein, 2008) in a reflexive manner (Bächle, 2020).

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Hogan argues that as people go through life stages in a contemporary world, they do not only leave data traces along the way, but rather than only documenting, these traces tend to mediate the parts that people play as others or they themselves are able to interact with these data traces (Hogan, 2010). Relating this to Goffman’s theory of performance of the self (Goffman, 1990), Hogan argues that social networks should not simply be analysed as a performance in Goffman’s sense, but more so like an exhibit, in which only certain ones of the produced artefacts are displayed over time and therefore reacted to. In this sense, the online site serves as the exhibition, the reproducible artefacts as read data, storehouses as databases and curators as algorithms, which have been designed by the site maintainers. Curators decide which artefacts to display and in which order to place them to construct a narrative about the selection that they made, by this process curators mediate the experience of social information through filtering, choosing only certain artefacts, ordering, placing those artefacts in a meaningful order and searching, filtering and ordering based on user input (Hogan, 2010). Hogan describes the process of social networking sites, Google searches and other online practices that demonstrates two important points. First of all, it shows the selection process on which the user often does not have any conscious influence, which relates to questions of self-determination, as well as structure and agency. Secondly, it illustrates the plenitude of information which needs to be filtered simply due to its extent, of which much is considered irrelevant. The amount of information available in today’s society might question the notion of the Enlightenment era as information having a liberating function. The attitude of information as being liberating also comes along with a notion that to have more information is always better than to have less information, which is an attitude that might have been taken up by many companies and governments, who collect any data possible in the hope it might prove valuable in the future (Morozov, 2014). The filtering process in order to be able to deal with these information quanta is what a lot of social studies criticise however, as Steffen Mau shows impressively in his work on “the metric us” (Mau, 2017) and the quantification of the social. As argued before, the selves presented in social networks, the behavioural patterns while shopping online or watching online streaming services, searches in online searching machines, can be related back to real interests or problems of human beings and therefore can be seen as artefacts of identities and subjectivities on the one hand (Bortree, 2005; Livingstone, 2008; Cheney-Lippold, 2017). On the other hand they are not more than a collection of bits (Zuboff, 2015), that often do not attribute enough attention to the individual contexts of the user and

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objectify the user into “information objects” (Mitrou et al., 2014) or “impressionable subjects” (Introna, 2019) in order to make a financial benefit. Within this contradiction, the real contexts and subjectivities are not to be forgotten. The fact that the categorisations and classifications created on data based content might bring along inequalities as well as reasons for self-reflection, raises the question of whether a more ethical, more critical and less economic handling of data might be necessary. Many companies reject any form of social responsibility in relation to the handling of data because of the objectivity and dispassion inherent in this data. In the same way former google executive Eric Schmidt and Marissa Mayer often invoked the metaphor of Google as a mirror, only reflecting the objective reality: “We are trying to build a virtual mirror of the world at all times” (Morozov, 2014, p. 144). According to Schmidt it is wrong to try and look in the mirror and try to change the mirror image, as one can only ever see the reflection of a problem in there (Morozov, 2014). But it is exactly this metaphor which is not correct given the applied filtering systems and algorithms, as a mirror is not able to prioritise, filter or personalise before reflecting “reality”. Jean-Luc Godard has claimed that “mirrors should reflect before sending the image” and in this sense one should indeed critically question the image that data produced by for example Google searches or Twitter feeds reflects, as certain population groups might not even have access to these services and therefore are not reflected at all. Schmidt and equally so Facebook portray an image of the internet as a “unified social force” in which their companies do nothing but reflect the current social norms. That through their structures, however, they not only reflect, but also shape and distort the image seems evident (Morozov, 2014). Whereas in some ways the metaphor of the mirror image does not seem applicable, the reflection process in itself seems to be a metaphor often used in the context of data sampling and personalised advertising. In this sense Joseph Turow critically reflects on the current practices of personalised advertising as a “dangerous” reflection tool on the user’s economic and social status. Turow argues that the customised advertising, discounts, entertainment, news and information that consumers receive also function as status signals reflecting their standing in society (Turow, 2008) based on “income, age, past-purchase behaviour, geographical location or other reasons” (Turow, 2011, p. 6). Advertising marketers divide possible customers into targets and wastes. The prejudicial force stemming from this alongside the distortion of advertising and editorial content, seem to diminish notions of consumer power and point at serious social problems within society in relation to inequalities. Turow argues

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that people in general need to understand the industrial forces which help in reshaping people’s identities and worth, in order to be able to decide if or not to do anything about this. Not knowing the processes in place might lead to paranoia or resignation (Draper & Turow, 2019). Currently critical voices and action against these processes are often ignored or do not even exist due to the fact that only very few people actually know how these processes work, whereas many people, even within companies, do not have the (technical) knowledge of how personalisation in advertising is done (Turow, 2011). Turow’s critical portrait of the advertising industry hence reflects on wider social issues in relation to social inequalities. The point of inequalities is also taken up by Verständig, Iske and Klein who argue that informal learning processes on the internet often take place within different forms of digital divides (Verständig et al., 2016). In addition to the first-level and second-level digital divide, which are explained by the authors and which analyse access as well as practices of users on the internet in relation to existing social divides, they propose the concept of the voice divide as well as the zero-level digital divide. The concept of the voice divide has been derived from empirical data of articulation and participation as well as distinction and exclusion processes in various online networks based on practical divides and inequalities. Similarly to the concept on digital divides and inequalities, the authors talk about voice divides and voice inequalities. Thus the authors explain how the concept of voice divide refers to a dichotomous distinction between users who articulate themselves and users who do not articulate themselves in online forums. The concept of voice inequality on the other hand focuses not only on this strict dichotomy, but rather looks at how communicative processes are constituted themselves (Verständig et al., 2016). The proposed zero-level digital divide looks at new modes of divides caused by technological and infrastructural factors of the internet, which become especially obvious in the context of regulation and prioritisation processes, as having been analysed by academics such as Lessig, Marsden or Pariser (Lessig 1999, 2010; Marsden 2010; Pariser 2011). The authors argue that the regulatory and infrastructural nature of the internet precedes questions of usage and access in relation to existing inequalities (Verständig et al., 2016). By this the authors fall in line with structural criticism of the internet as introduced by Lawrence Lessig in his theory on code. In his books from 1999 “Code and other laws of cyberspace” (Lessig, 1999) as well as “Code and other laws of cyberspace: Version 2.0” (Lessig, 2010), Lessig proposes an interesting theory about the regulation of cyberspace, which as he argues is regulated by code. Next to the four major regulators which have an influence on society and therefore should be considered, which are law, norms, market and architecture, it is the architecture of the internet, in other words the code, which

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is controlling cyberspace. This is why one needs to also look at the technologists and their work when looking at regulation principles on the internet. Rather than making a political statement, Lessig encourages his readers to understand code as a regulating force, which might be enhanced by the fact that Code Version 2.0 was written as part of a wiki and its profit has been dedicated to Creative Commons. To summarise, Lessig argues that in order to preserve liberty in cyberspace it is not sufficient to rely simply on libertarianism, as the internet will become easily regulated given the influence of commerce and government and the values this brings along. Currently, as Lessig argues, there is a mixture between code and law, which regulates the internet, and which threatens to underprotect privacy and to weaken free speech values at the same time as overprotecting intellectual property (Lessig, 2010). This criticism reflects on a number of aspects and problems that have already been mentioned before, but I would like to take up two points raised here which seem to be important and can easily be related to two important arguments of this book. The first point I would like to take up, is the point on code as regulation, which raises questions of agency among users. This question, which is of great importance for the overall argument of this research, and can also be argued in relation to a data discourse. Kennedy, Poell and van Dijck argue that by only focusing attention on the power held by companies would undermine the agency that could be ascribed to individuals and the general public. By data being fed back to users, it helps them to orient themselves in the world as well as the authors argue that it has to be recognised that data is also being collected and analysed by more “alternative actors” (Kennedy et al., 2015). In this sense the authors attach much more positive value to the current practices of data storing and argue that individual agency should not be ignored. Even though the authors argue that “alternative actors” would also collect and analyse data, it has been shown by many others that the aggregation of data can bring new inequalities along. This is the second point that is worth noting, which is of commercial values, regulatory power and resulting inequalities. In this sense, boyd4 and Crawford have written a valuable paper titled “Critical questions for big data” (boyd & Crawford, 2012) in which they critically assess cultural, technological and scholarly aspects of big data. Even though a lot of the aspects raised are worthy of a deeper inspection and consideration, it is at this point in the book only possible to give a short summary of relevant points. Boyd and Crawford point out that big 4

Note that I have used danah boyd’s name as she does only uncapitalised, except at the start of sentences.

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data research claims to be objective and accurate, which however can be misleading as just because the data samples are large does not mean they are necessarily representative. When large data sets are taken out of context they might equally lose their meaning and therefore need careful consideration and analysis equally to smaller data sets. Finally, the authors raise the question of ethics and argue that simply because the data might be accessible does not make it ethical. The question of accessibility is then also raised in relation to who has access to these large data sets, which is often regulated by high fees hence, resulting in new digital divides, which take a strong influence on academic research as well, as academia often cannot afford the fees in order to gain access to the data (boyd & Crawford, 2012). This lastly mentioned argument is not only important to consider in relation to academic research processes and ethics, but also raises further questions on economic structures in relation to data collection.

2.3

Economic and Political Aspects

Finally, even though the reasons behind a lot of the processes already described can also be related to economic and political factors, it is worth looking at theories paying attention more specifically to the economic and political structures inherent in the current practices of data storing. Even though this research is not part of the economic sciences, it is worthwhile considering research published in relation to data storage from within this discipline as it highlights the current state of research and focus on various research topics. Many of the publications from the academic field of economics focus their research on strategies of how to elicit data from users and their research aim is to benefit economic rationale. Moon for example analyses how the computer is used in order to elicit self-disclosure from consumers (Moon, 2000). What is shown is that the new trend in marketing is to enhance customer relationships and personalisation, for the success of which it is the key to gain information on the customers. “The more information that a company has about a particular customer, the more value that company will (presumably) be able to provide that customer” (Moon, 2000, p. 323). What is hence important for the company is that the information is correct, timely and complete and that they have access in order to collect this information. All this is part of marketing strategies and summarised under the customer relations management, which has become an important part of most businesses. The process which is often titled “data mining” draws up a reference to the “mining industry” which could be an interesting comparison in itself, and is also

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referred to as data warehousing (Kotler, 2002). Customer relationship management is a trend in the global customer-centric economy, which seeks to support business strategies in order to create long-term and profitable relations to “specific” customers mainly using Information Technology (IT) tools and customer data (Chau et al. 2009). It has been defined as a “strategic use of information, processes, technology and people […]” (Kincaid 2003, p. 41) as well as an “enterprise approach to understanding and influencing customer behaviour through meaningful communication in order to improve customer acquisition, customer retention, customer loyalty, and customer profitability” (Swift 2001, p. 12). Whereas the terminology used in these papers and books, might seem interesting from a social scientist’s point of view, it seems obvious that the focus is set mainly on the enterprise’s objectives rather than on the customers’. This is slightly different in Acquisti’s and Grossklags’ paper, who argue that it is often not possible for customers to take privacy-sensitive decisions due to a lack of prior information (Acquisti & Grossklags, 2005). In their study they found that there is a difference between people’s attitudes towards privacy and their actual behaviour. Often users accept long-term privacy trade-offs in exchange for short-term benefits of online services despite claiming that they consider privacy to be important. According to the authors this might also be due to the fact that any privacy violations that do not result in direct monetary or physical consequences are difficult to quantify or even notice. The study also found that the actual knowledge of users in relation to existing privacy laws is weak. The discrepancy between people’s attitudes and their actual behaviour in relation to data protection as presented by Acquisti and Grossklags is something which will also be taken up again later in the book. Studies like these are interesting to consider as they show the focus and terminology used within publications from the economic sciences, which use expressions such as “specific customers”, “strategic use of […] people” or “influencing customer behaviour” which are worth pointing out and which might indeed also point at the attitude taken on by companies in their behaviour towards customers as well as therefrom resulting inequalities and possible objectifications of people. This is where the jargon and point of view differs fundamentally with accounts from the social sciences as, for example, Stefan Selke’s account of the Lifelogging (Selke, 2014) or Zuboff’s publications (Zuboff, 2015; 2019), which will both be introduced here. The Quantified Self movement, as a prime example of self-tracking and lifelogging movements, is a collaboration of interested users and providers of self-tracking tools. Following the slogan “self-knowledge through numbers” (Quantified Self Labs, 2015), Gary Wolf and Kevin Kelly in 2007 started meet-ups for people interested in self-tracking applications which has

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since then spread to various cities around the world. Even though self-tracking is in itself a topic, which would be worthy of more research, it is only possible at this point to reference a few important factors. Selke, a German sociologists, has raised several social issues in his book on lifelogging, which are worth considering as they are related to social as well as economic processes of data collection. While the question of a pedagogic worth of applications which are supposed to help a person to improve or even enhance is interesting in itself, the notion of self-tracking raises other important questions in relation to social inequalities and economisation processes. Rather than only criticising the phenomenon of self-tracking, Selke also defines the possible advantages and uses, which for him are related to sousveillance (security through transparency), the body (physical enhancement), illness (healing), location tracking (security), memory (objective memories), immortality (not to be forgotten) (Selke, 2014). Especially when looking at theories that focus on the agency that actors have in relation to their own data, these aspects are very helpful to consider. Members of the Quantified Self movement think that there are “blind spots” (Wolf, 2010) humans have, which can be prevented by collecting and analysing data about the self. What Selke criticises, and he is not alone in this, are the consequences this might possibly bring along with it. First of all, the practice implies certain normative beliefs as to what actually can be called enhancement and what is socially expected in relation to health and body image. The body in this context seems to be an economic and utilitarian means to an end. Selke even goes one step further, if insurance companies start rewarding people who are able to present healthsupporting data, what does this mean for people who do not wish to collect the data or who simply cannot. The normative expectations related to such practices which imply certain given standards on what should be achieved and do not pay special attention to individual contexts is what Selke refers to as “rational discrimination” (Selke, 2015). He argues that this form of discrimination is rational in the sense that it is obvious discrimination, however responsibility or reflection is denied due to the supposed correctness and objectivity of the data on which the discrimination is based. There seems to be a difference however in whether self-tracking is carried out by individual people or small groups, who are doing this in their own personal interest or whether these practices are taken up by economic actors who will in turn force this behaviour upon larger population groups through possible rewarding systems. The questions of who owns the personal data collected in self-tracking applications and what these data are used for is hence an important one.

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In the light of these current and other economic practices, Shoshana Zuboff has proposed the concept of “surveillance capitalism”. Surveillance capitalism, which stands in contrast to market capitalism, is defined as a new form of capitalism, which has the purpose to predict and modify human behaviour as a means to produce revenue and market control. Surveillance capitalism has gradually constituted itself during the last decade, embodying a new social relations and politics that have not yet been well delineated or theorized. (Zuboff, 2015, pp. 75–76)

The rationale behind gathering all the information has been analysed by Google chief economist Hal Varian in the following four points: data extraction and analysis, new contractual forms because of better monitoring, further and ongoing experiments as well as personalisation and customisation (Varian, 2014). What Zuboff criticises especially about the extraction process, is what I have already touched on by referring to the jargon used in economic papers, which is that extraction implies a one-sided process rather than a reciprocal relationship between the customer and the company. Through this Zuboff argues, that subjectivities are commodified into objects (Zuboff, 2015). This is taking place within a network in which people are not being surveiled by a system in the sense of Orwell’s Big Brother, but rather a system which Zuboff label as the Big Other, of which there is no escape as it is everywhere. The danger that Zuboff sees in this, is that it is a regime which is not regulated or rules which at the same time acts to achieve monetisation and profit while recording, modifying and commodifying everyday experiences. Within this network the divisions between companies, states, customers, citizens and subjects are blurred (Constantiou & Kallinikos, 2014), which is a point that is also taken up by David Lyon as part the of surveillance studies who criticise and analyse surveillance in contemporary times with reference to political dimensions. Before going over to this aspect and David Lyon’s theories, I would like to fortify why looking at economic aspects has been important. Whether or not one might agree with Zuboff’s assumption on the change from market capitalism to what she calls information capitalism, it seems obvious that economic practices are an important part of everyday lives. “Businesses have a large influence on how we live our individual lives and also on how society is regulated. Businesses are social facts, but they are also the objects of theoretical and academic attention” (Stahl, 2008, p. 313). It is therefore important, as Marx implied in his work on capitalism of the 20th century, that it is not possible to look at a society, societal

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and power structures without also looking at the economy (Marx, 2009). Given the research context of this book, this seems particularly crucial. As the importance of the economic structures has been stressed, it goes without saying that the political contexts play an equally important role, as they also set some of the basic backgrounds that the processes of data storing and profiling take place in. In this context David Lyon’s works on surveillance as part of the surveillance studies cannot be missed. In various different publications David Lyon, and his colleagues, analyse aspects of surveillance, categorisations and the structures this takes place in. Even though some of the aspects raised by Lyon, have already been touched on in this chapter in relation to other theories, it is worth looking at Lyon’s work and especially at some not yet mentioned aspects raised in there. Similarly to Zuboff, Lyon argues that the purpose of the classifications and categorisations is to influence and manage persons, which in turn raises questions of power, policy, regulation and resistance (Lyon, 2002, 2003). The benefits that data collectors receive from their purpose, and Lyon places the focus here more on governmental agencies rather than economic companies, are “control, governance, security, safety, and profit” (Lyon, 2003, p. 26). The question is, however, under what conditions are people willing to trade of their personal data for political or economic benefits. That a proposed reason, as can be seen in much of what the NSA does, would be security is obvious. But even within a liberal system, as many companies demand the market economy of the internet to be, it should also be obvious that security should be reached through liberty, rather than at the expense of liberty (Bauman et al., 2014). Lyon and his colleagues, argue that surveillance takes place within three interlinked processes which are transnationalisation, digitisation and privatisation. The first process is linked to what has already been mentioned in the account of Zuboff’s theory, which is the blurring of political entities, which on the internet are neither national nor international (Bauman et al., 2014). Secondly, due to these processes the distinction between the state and civil society, including economic structures, is raptured, as can be seen in the collaboration of companies with the NSA or the scandal in which Apple refused to access private phones through backdoor for the secret services (Holpuch, 2016). How much of this is actually the case may not be certain, but it is out of the question that through this, certain lines between the state and civil society are being changed. This is also the case between the private and the public. As data becomes more accessible the divide between private and public seems less strict. The complex relationship between agencies of corporate nature as well as political nature supports the argument raised throughout this book that it is important to

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look at all of these aspects in relation to each other, as they are entwined in complex ways. Not enough is yet known about how people in their everyday lives deal with surveillance, whether they comply, negotiate or resist (Lyon, 2002). What seems important from the Greek polis all through the Enlightenment era up until today, is that people need to be “able to think and make judgements for themselves” (Bauman et al., 2014, p. 137). Following this assumption it seems as if one may not neglect the fact that the abstracted data of the massive amounts being stored today, are related to “embodied social persons” (Lyon, 2003, p. 27), whereby the emphasis here rests on subjectivities that are related to the data collected. In order for the analysis of the research data to be interpreted, the theoretical framework will therefore try to give an overview of relevant theories of identity and self. Before doing this however, I would like to refer to one central discourse, that has been slightly touched upon, but at the same time not yet received the attention that it deserves within the scope of this book. While the book is located within the educational and media sciences, despite a notion of interdisciplinarity, it is also located both within the German as well as a more international discourse. For this reason it seems to be particularly relevant to add, if only limited, a section on the particular context of the German discourse on Medienbildung. This part will only introduce some of the arguments and ideas within this discourse that are relevant for the topic of this book.

2.4

German Educational Discourse on Medienbildung

Within the German educational discourse there exists an interesting debate on the difference between Medienpädagogik, Medienbildung, Medienerziehung, Mediendidaktik and Mediensozialisaiton that is difficult to translate into the English language, let alone refer it to an English-speaking discourse. The respective definitions, similarities and differences on questions of media pedagogy, media education (including both concepts of Bildung and Erziehung), media didactics or media socialisation could fill books of their own. Therefore it seems obvious that the discussion and illustration of this discourse, at this point, will be kept rather in a shortly summarising manner in relation to those arguments that seem most relevant in the light of this particular book. Before summarising the central arguments, let me make clear that it has been a struggle throughout the whole research process of this piece of work to bridge a gap (that was sometimes perceived as wider and sometimes as more subliminal) between the German and the English discourse. This was not only apparent

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in relation to the theoretical framing but also in relation to methodological and methodical understandings and assumptions. While the differences between the discourses, sometimes more apparent, sometimes not, were perceived as slightly challenging, it is particularly in this chapter as well as in the final chapter bringing the findings together and relating them back to the discourses that the task of bridging this gap seemed particularly challenging. Therefore I hope that the readers of this book, whichever background or discourse they might come from, will forgive that I have tried to simplify and focus some of the relevant aspects here in order for a better sense of illustration in consideration of the different levels of pre-existing knowledge among the readers. In this sense, I will purposely mainly ignore discourses on questions of Medienerziehung, i.e. media education in a rather instructive understanding, Mediendidaktik, i.e. media didactics focusing on questions of teaching methods in relation to media, or Mediensozialisation, i.e. media socialisation focusing on questions on the internalisation of norms and ideologies in relation to media, being aware that media education is itself a heavily controversial field in the German educational sciences (Dander, 2018). Positioning this thesis in the wider context of media pedagogy, that entails the various sub-contexts of Medienbildung, media education or media didactics, I will try to clarify a discourse that I will mainly be referring to, which might predominantly be understood in the sense of Medienbildung with a leaning towards generally educational theories from educational theory (Bildungstheorie) and educational philosophy (Bildungsphilosophie). In order to highlight this perspective a little further I will relate mainly to some assumptions made by authors such as Jörissen and Marotzki, Iske and Damberger, Verständig, Dander and Niesyto as they relate in their very basic assumptions closely to the theoretical framing of this book. Thus I will firstly introduce Jörissen’s and Marotzki’s concept of Medienbildung shortly, being aware that the length of this account indeed is somewhat of a short-coming given the scope of the approach, and then highlight a few perspectives that build upon this concept in a wider understanding while illustrating some relevant and central aspects of this discourse in relation to the work of this book. Jörissen’s and Marotzki’s approach to structural media education, referred to from here on as strukturale Medienbildung, is one of the most developed technical and empirical approaches to the concept of Medienbildung (Iske, 2014). They propose a perspective on mediality (Medialität) that abstracts different media types and focuses instead on comprehensive formal and structural aspects (Jörissen & Marotzki, 2009; Fromme & Jörissen, 2010). Mediality is thus seen as a constitutive requirement for symbolicity, a structural requirement of concrete (cultural-historic) forms of articulation and finally also seen as an educational

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(bildungstheoretisch) structural requirement for the development of world and self-relations (Jörissen, 2014, p. 503). In the transformation of these world and self-relations lies what Jörissen and Marotzki understand as Bildung. They define this in relation to four basic references under conditions of three types of crises setting two distinctions. Thus they understand media as allowing opportunities for reflexive orientation (Jörissen & Marotzki, 2009). This can be analysed in relation to four dimensions, they base on Kant’s famous four questions of “What can I know? What can I do? What may I hope? and What is the human being?“ (Kant, 1977, p. 448). In relation to these questions Jörissen and Marotzki develop their heuristic for the analysis of the educational potential of media alongside the four dimensions of: • Reference to Knowledge (for a critical reflection on the conditions of the limits to knowledge) • Reference to Action (for reflecting on ethical and moral principles of one’s own actions) • Reference to transcendence and limits (in relation to that which cannot be captured by rationality, reflecting for example on the transcendence of assumed limitations by cyborgs) • Reference to the question of human kind through one’s biography (allowing for a reflection on the subject and the question of one’s own identity in the light of one’s biographical conditions) (Jörissen & Marotzki, 2009, p. 31) The possibilities for educational potentials of media through the reflection on any of these four dimensions are happening under conditions of three types of crises the authors define as 1) structural crises for society as a whole such as the transition from agricultural to industrial societies, 2) regulatory crises referring to a pluralisation of norms and values and 3) crises of cohesion in relation to those phenomena concerning social recognition, belonging and Bildung caused by the individualisation of society (Jörissen & Marotzki, 2009, p. 16-17). It is here that connections to the theories of Zygmunt Bauman and also Anthony Giddens become possible. Thus Bauman also sees the conditions of uncertainty caused by i.a. the types of crises defined by Jörissen and Marotzki as a central challenge for individuals in contemporary times. Jörissen and Marotzki define their understanding of Bildung in distinction to two arguments: first of all they establish a border between their understanding to material theories on Bildung, that understand Bildung as a result of for example a consideration of canonical

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pieces of literature as in the concept of being “educated” (gebildet) by for example Schwanitz (Schwanitz, 1999), secondly they define another border between their understanding against less reflected forms of learning (Marotzki & Jörissen, 2008). Thus while learning implies in its basic understanding the production of the knowledge one has at one’s disposal (Verfügungswissen), processes of Bildung are charcaterised by the contextualisaiton, flexibilisation, decentralisation and pluralisation of knowledge and experience patterns, implying an openness to spaces of uncertainty or indetermination (Marotzki & Jörissen, 2008, p. 51). Here again the connection to especially Bauman’s account on contemporary conditions becomes obvious. Thus it could be argued that Jörissen’s and Marotzki’s understanding of structural Bildung and structural Medienbildung already implies a notion of liquidity in itself. This perspective of structural Medienbildung allows to interpret the existing conditions of uncertainty also as potentials for individuals to transform their self- and world relations in the sense of education. In the following, I wish to very shortly illustrate a few samples of literature that have taken Jörissen’s and Marotzki’s approach to Medienbildung and apply it to a number of phenomena and therefore allow for a lose positioning of this research among this theoretical background within the German speaking discourse on the specific field of media educational sciences. I wish to highlight five phenomena that are of central relevance for this book and demonstrate literature within the German speaking discourse on media education in relation to these phenomena. These five topics are technological-informational infrastructure, personalised advertising, self-tracking, critical perspectives on processes of datafication and capitalism, almost all alongside a concept of Medienbildung. It is in relation to these five phenomena that not only a connection of this book can be drawn but that links to the wider discourse that has already been introduced can be seen. Thus to start off with, and I am aware that here again the arguments and accounts are abbreviated to some extent, Dan Verständig analyses the concept of strukturaler Medienbildung in relation to notions of publicity (Öffentlichkeit) and code infrastructure in his dissertation (Verständig, 2017). His account on the concept of strukturale Medienbildung pinpoints at the redundancies and differences of the relevant understandings of the respective terms of Bildung, structural Bildung and structural Medienbildung in great detail to emphasise the complexity of the concept within the discourse. He goes on to explicitly relate this concept to a detailed understanding of how code infrastructure functions, using examples such as the limitation of filter bubbles and echo chambers and argues that it is essential to create free space through the conquering of familiar habits by acknowledging uncertainty (Verständig, 2017). Aside from this he proposes the concept of

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the zero-level digital divide focusing on questions of technological-infrastructural divides, which are apparent through the contexts of regulation and prioritisation (Verständig et al., 2016; Verständig, 2017). Here Verständig’s theory closely relates to Lessig’s arguments on the relevance of code structures already mentioned earlier on in this book (Lessig, 1999). With reference to Lessig’s emphasis on the importance of code infrastructure Verständig argues that inequalities arise on a structural level through what he defines as being on a zero-level based on the programming-technical basics of the binary structure starting on zero as well as by clearly defining these inequalities as structurally placed before what would be commonly described as first level digital divide (questions of access) and second level digital divide (questions of differing practices) as they are concerned with upstream and basic inequalities, as argued before. The emphasis on these technological-infrastructural conditions thus becomes relevant not only in relation to information technology but also in relation to social conditions and structures. Therefore it can be seen as an essential necessity for Medienbildung to unmask the conditions so that potentials for Bildung in its process-like transformation of self- and world relations can be created (Verständig, 2017). Stefan Iske and Katrin Wilde have carried out empirical research that relates the theoretical framework of Medienbildung with the particular context of online advertising. Focusing on the perspective of adolescents they analyse the subjective relevance, estimations and convictions that the adolescents form in relation to online advertising and the resulting challenges for the concept of Medienbildung as well as more practical implications for schools (Iske et al., 2017; Wilde et al., 2017). Thus within the empirical project the focus was placed on the structural and content-related ways in which adolescents are confronted with online advertising in the context of the social web, including smartphone applications, video platforms and social networks. The authors argue that online advertising is characterised on a spectrum between being easily recognisable and clearly marked to being non-transparent and therefore difficult to recognise and discuss. Therefore in the light of the research the authors argue that because of the non-transparency of a lot of online advertising the reflected dealing with this advertising and what might be termed as “advertising literacy” (Werbungskompetenz) gains in relevance. While in this research I do not focus on adolescents, the spectrum on which advertising works can be equally difficult to reflect on for people of all ages. The resulting uncertainty in relation to personalised advertising is something that was apparent also in the data of this research. It is here that connections to the overall theoretical framework of this book relating to conditions of uncertainty can also be drawn.

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The third example of phenomena that are related to the concept of Medienbildung can be seen in Stefan Iske’s and Thomas Damberger’s account on the Quantified Self from an educational theoretical perspective (Damberger & Iske, 2017). Thus the Quantified Self movement is a movement that is part of the phenomenon of self-tracking, for which the motto is “self-knowledge through numbers” (Quantified Self Lab, 2015). Iske and Damberger give an interesting account on the phenomenon of self-tracking through the particular example of the Quantified Self movement relating their ideas to educational theoretical assumptions on the quantification of physical data and behavioural patterns as an example of the pursuit for self-awareness that can also be seen as strategies for self-optimisation and self-disciplination. Through this double perspective on a pursuit for self-knowledge alongside a pursuit for a disciplinary notion of selfoptimisation a specific ambivalence of questions of autonomy and heteronomy arises according to the authors that is of relevance for an educational theoretical perspective. It is precisely in this ambivalence as well as in the critical perspective the authors take on the commodifying nature of this phenomenon in relation to the human body and self that references to this research are seen. This phenomenon also leads onto the final three examples I want to give at this point presenting a selected part of the German media educational background. Thus self-tracking already also implies the tracking of huge amounts of data, relating to a discourse on big data for which a critical perspective might be posed as fundamentally necessary. Through the focus on processes of commodification one might also relate this topic to a wider analysis of the capitalist systems these processes take place in, which finally can also be analysed from a critical perspective. In the following paragraph I wish to shortly illustrate the critical perspectives taken by Dander and Niesyto in their accounts on media pedagogy in the light of big data analytics and digital capitalism (Dander, 2018; Niesyto, 2017). Thus Valentin Dander, whose dissertation resembles many arguments also brought forward in this book, analyses the need for decidedly social-theoretical critical perspectives within the media pedagogic discourse, at least in Germany, even though this also seems true for a more global scale acknowledging a few exceptions. Dander bridges a wide-reaching connection between determining digital data, considering subject and subjectivity theories to critically discussing questions of Bildung and critical perspectives within the media educational academic discourse. In order to establish these ties he uses big data analytics as a starting point that allows him to also critically access the lack of analysis and criticism of context conditions for society as a whole within the media educational discourse. While theoretically covering much more ground in his thesis, the focus I want to place lies precisely in this relation between the context of big data analytics in

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relation to the demand for a critical perspective. A critical perspective implies a consideration that goes beyond the research of particular perspectives on a single issue, but rather places theoretical considerations as well as empirical research within a wider consideration of the structures and conditions surrounding the researched area. According to this, Niesyto also defines a short-coming of media criticism within the media educational discourse while simultaneously defining media criticism as a pivotal task of media education (Niesyto, 2017). Niesyto thus postulates a demand for media education to catch up with the socio- and media critical analysis of media and society. He outlines the structural principles of “digital capitalism” in relation to a number of academic perspectives and from there on opens a two-fold perspective on the social responsibility of media education between being “a training and repair company of ” on the one hand and defining “itself as a critical-reflexive support to media-related educational and learning processes” (Niesyto, 2017, p. 1) on the other hand. Niesyto thus emphasises the importance of Medienbildung in an epoch in which digitalisation affects all parts of society especially also by taking under a critical scrutiny the conditions and structural principles of this “digital capitalism”. The notion of digital capitalism defined here relates also to Zuboff’s account on surveillance capitalism (Zuboff, 2019). It becomes apparent that a scrutiny of the economic conditions and structural principles also needs to be considered when analysing the conditions both in their potentials as well as from a critical perspective that are inherent in the contemporary conditions of online data tracking. The five examples referenced here, all illustrated different phenomena that yet seem to be linked together. Thus for all of them the process of data tracking seems to be a nexus that relates questions of technological-infrastructural questions, with questions of online advertising, self-tracking, big data and to the economic capitalist system they take place in. Aside from this relation the examples given here also resemble a certain theoretical perspective on the relevance these phenomena have in relation to the concept of Medienbildung and in relation to fundamental educational theories. Thus it could be argued that they all stress the relevance of analysing these phenomena in relation to a particular perspective on the conditions of uncertainty and the transformation of self- and world relations that are made possible within or rather despite the non-transparency of these conditions.

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Klein, A. (2008). Soziales Kapital Online. Soziale Unterstützung im Internet. Eine Rekonstruktion virtualisierter Formen sozialer Ungleichheit. Dissertation: Universität Bielefeld. Kotler, P. (2002). Marketing Management: Millenium Edition. Boston: Pearson Custom Publishing. Kress, G. (2009). Multimodality: A Social Semiotic Approach to Contemporary Communication: Exploring Contemporary Methods of Communication. London: Routledge. Lessig, L. (2010). Code: Version 2.0. New York: SoHo Books. Lessig, L. (1999). Code and other laws of cyberspace. New York: Basic Books. Livingstone, S. (2008). Taking Risky Opportunities in youthful content creation: teenagers’ use of social networking sites for intimacy, privacy and self-expression. New Media & Society 10(3). London: Sage Publications, Retrieved July 21, 2016, from: http://nms.sag epub.com/content/10/3/393 Livingstone, S. (2020). Identifying the interests of users as citizens, consumers, publics and workers. In Gillespie, T.; Boczkowski, P.J. & Foot, K. (ed.) Media Meets Technology: Studying Information and Communication technologies in the Digital Era (pp. 241–250). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Luhmann, N. (2009). Grundrechte als Institution: ein Beitrag zur politischen Soziologie - 5th Edition. Berlin: Duncker & Humboldt. Lyon, D. (2007). Surveillance Studies: An Overview. Hoboken: John Wiley and Sons. Lyon, D. (2003). Surveillance as Social Sorting – Privacy, Risk and Digital Discrimination. London: Routledge. Lyon, D. (2002). Everyday Surveillance - Personal Data and Social Classifications. Information, Communication and Society 5(2) (pp. 242–257). London: Routledge. Marotzki, W. & Jörissen, B. (2008) Wissen, Artikulation und Biographie: theoretische Aspekte einer Strukturalen Medienbildung. In J. Fromme & W. Sesink (Eds.) Pädagogische Medientheorie. (pp. 51–70). Wiesbaden: VS Verlag. Marsden, Christopher T. C. (2010). Net Neutrality: Towards a Co-regulatory Solution. London: Bloomsbury Academic. Marx, K. (2009). Das Kapital: Kritik der politischen Ökonomie. Köln Anaconda. Mau, S. (2017). Das Metrische Wir. Über die Quantifizierung des Sozialen. Berlin: suhrkamp. Mitrou L., Kandias M., Stavrou V. & Gritzalis, D. (2014). Social media profiling: A Panopticon or Omniopticon tool? in Proc. of the 6th Conference of the Surveillance Studies Network. Spain: 2014. Retrieved August 11, 2018, from: https://www.infosec.aueb.gr/Publications/ 2014-SSN-Privacy%20Social%20Media.pdf Moon, Y. (2000). Intimate Exchanges: Using Computers to Elicit Self-Disclosure from Consumers. Journal of Consumer Research 26 (4) (p. 323–339). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Retrieved June 10, 2015, from: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/209566 Morozov, E. (2014). To Safe Everything Click Here, London: Penguin Books. Niesyto, H. (2017). Medienpädagogik und digitaler Kapitalismus. Für die Stärkung einer gesellschafts-und medienkritischen Perspektive. MedienPädagogik: Zeitschrift für Theorie und Praxis der Medienbildung 27b(pp. 1–29). Retrieved July 31, 2018, from: https:// doi.org/10.21240/mpaed/27/2017.01.13.X Pahl, K. & Rowsell, J. (2005) Literacy and Education. London: Paul Chapman Publishing. Pariser, E. (2011). The filter bubble: What the Internet is hiding from you. New York: Penguin Press. Poitras, L. (2014). Citizenfour [Film]. New York: HBO Films

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Prensky, M. (2001) Digital Natives, Digital Immigrants. On the Horizon 9(5). Bradford: MCB University Press. Quantified Self Lab (2015). Quantified Self – self knowledge through numbers. Retrieved July 31, 2018, from: http://quantifiedself.com/ Schirrmacher, F. (Ed.) (2015) Technologischer Totalitarismus. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Schulz, M. (2014). Warum wir jetzt kämpfen müssen. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. Retrieved January 28, 2017, from: http://www.faz.net/aktuell/feuilleton/debatten/die-dig ital-debatte/politik-in-der-digitalen-welt/warum-wir-jetzt-kaempfen-muessen-martin-sch ulz-warnt-vor-technologischem-totalitarismus-12786805.html Schwanitz, D. (1999). Bildung: alles was man wissen muß. Frankfurt: Eichborn. Schwartz, P. (1989). The Computer in German and American Constitutional Law: Towards an American Right of Informational Self-Determination. The American Journal of Comparative Law 37(4) (pp. 675–701). Retrieved July 8, 2016, from: http://www.jstor.org/sta ble/840221 Selke, S. (2015). Rationale Diskriminierung. Zeitschrift Luxemburg Futuring 23 (2015). Retrieved March 22, 2018, from: https://www.zeitschrift-luxemburg.de/rationale-diskri minierung/ Selke, S. (2014). Lifelogging – Wie die digitale Selbestvermessung unsere Gesellschaft verändert. Berlin: Econ. Spiegel Online (2020) NSA Überwachung Alle Artikel und Hintergründe. Spiegel Online. Retrieved October 23, 2020, from: http://www.spiegel.de/thema/nsa_ueberwachung/ Spitzer, M. (2014). Digitale Demenz – wie wir uns und unsere Kinder um den Verstand bringen. München: Droemer Taschenbuch. Stahl, B. (2008) Ethical Issues of Information and Business. In Tavani, H. (Ed.) Handbook of Information and Computer Ethics. New Jersey: John Wiley and Sons. Stalder, F. (2018). The Digital Condition. Cambridge: Polity Press. Stern, S.R. (2004). Expressions of Identity Online: Prominent Features and Gender Differences in Adolescents’ World Wide Web Home Pages. Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media 48(2) (pp. 218–243) Retrieved July 21, 2016, from: http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1207/s15506878jobem4802_4 Swift, R. (2001). Accelerating customer relationships: Using CRM and relationship technologies. Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall PTR. Tapscott, D. (1998). Growing Up Digital: The Rise of the Net Generation. New York: McGraw Hill. Turkle, S. (2005). The Second Self: Computers and the Human Spirit. Cambridge MA: MIT Press Turow, J. (2011). The Daily You. New Haven & London: Yale University Press. Turow, J. (2008). Niche Envy: Marketing discrimination in the digital age. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. Varian, H. (2014). Beyond Big Data. Business Economics 49(1). (pp. 27–31). Verständig, D. (2017). Bildung und Öffentlichkeit: eine strukturtheoretische Perspektive auf Bildung im Horizont digitaler Medialität. Magdeburg: Universitätsbibliothek. Verständig, D.; Klein, A. & Iske, S. (2016). Zero-Level Digital Divide – neues Netz und neue Ungleichheiten. Sigen: sozial: Analysen, Berichte, Kontroversen: SI : SO – Siegen: Universität (pp. 50–55).

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Warren, S. & Brandeis, L. (1890). The Right to Privacy. In Harvard Law Review Vol. 4 (5) (15.12.1890) (pp. 193–220). Retrieved April 30, 2017, from: http://www.jstor.org/stable/ 1321160 Wilde, K.; Menzel, F.; Leik, T. & Iske, S. (2017). Online-Werbung im Wandel. Unterricht Wirtschaft + Politik 4 (pp. 51–55). Willett, R. (2009). “As soon as you get on Bebo you just go mad”: Young consumers and the discursive construction of teenagers online’. Young Comsumers 10(4) (pp. 283–296). Bigley: Emerald Group Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1108/17473610911007120 Wolf, G. (2010). The Data Driven Life. The New York Times Magazine. Retrieved August 6, 2018, from: https://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/02/magazine/02self-measurement-t.html Zuboff, S. (2019). The Age of Surveillance Capitalism. London: Public Affairs. Zuboff, S. (2015). Big other: surveillance capitalism and the prospects of an information civilization. Journal of Information Technology (30), pp. 75–89. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

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Identity and Self – From Enlightened to Fragmented

“I could tell you my adventures- beginning from this morning,” said Alice a little timidly: “but it’s no use going back to yesterday, because I was a different person then”. (Caroll, n.d., p. 42)

Throughout history questions related to subjectivity, self-awareness, selfreflexivity, the self, identity and similar expressions in their respective meanings, discourses and interpretations have shared the common interest in what constitutes the human perception of oneself and one’s reality and have time and again sparked researchers, philosophers, religious people, and many more of all ages and from all over the world to deal with these topics in various different forms. Hence considering all academic research in relation to these topics is impossible to be done by one person in their lifetime. What becomes apparent however, is that there is a number of themes that seem to be of relevance to many theorists. This chapter will give a short overview of some of the relevant theories that have had an effect on the current discourse and which will be useful to consider when setting a theoretical background for reasoning and later answering the research questions. Choosing theories that are relevant to present in the light of this book will be done on the basis of an article by Stuart Hall entitled “The Question of Cultural Identity” (Hall, 1992). In this article Hall draws up an interesting account of identity concepts over time, which can help to structure the relevant theories for this chapter and relevant aspects for some other chapters. Hall distinguishes between three concepts of identity which he defines in relation to the Enlightenment subject, the sociological subject and the postmodern subject. In addition to this he defines five reasons for the “de-centring of the Cartesian subject” which are 1) Marxist thinking, 2) the psychoanalysis of Freud, 3) the structural linguistic works of de Saussure, 4) Foucault’s work on disciplinary power and finally 5) the impact of feminism. While the impact of feminism © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2021 E. Ferraro, Wilful Blindness, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-32654-8_3

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and other political movements as well as a consideration of linguistic on the “de-centring of the Cartesian subject” do not prove to be particularly relevant in the light of this research and would simply go beyond the scope of this book, aspects on Marxist thinking, and Foucault’s theory on power bear some relevance for the considerations of this book despite not being an explicit point of focus. The relevance of Freud’s theory, however, as well as the differentiation between aspects of identity in the light of Enlightenment theories, sociological theories as well as postmodern aspects will be used as basic topics in order to structure this chapter on questions of identity and self in relation to levels of autonomy, self-determination and agency ascribed to the individual within those theories. Thus, the sub chapters of this chapter will be divided into 1) Rational: Subject, Identity and Enlightenment, 2) Psychoanalysis and Sociology: Identity, Psychoanalytic and Social Structures; and finally 3) Fragmented: Postmodern Identity Theories. The relevance of these theories as a theoretical basis for the research question will hopefully become apparent throughout the text. The theories and aspects chosen are of course only a small selection of all the possible aspects in relation to identity and the construction of the self.

3.1

Rational: Subject, Identity and Enlightenment

The thinkers of the Enlightenment era and German idealism were influenced in their reasoning especially by the events happening before and around the French revolution, which is also reflected in their theoretical construction of the self. Some of the aspects raised in various works stemming from this era are indeed very interesting and also seem worthwhile in relation to the topic which is at the basis of this book. However they won’t serve as the focus of the theory applied and therefore the scope to which they will be covered here is somewhat limited. Hence, starting with accounts on Descartes’ rational thinking, and leading onto Kant’s idealist assumptions will subserve to being illustrations both as a theoretical source for following theories as well as a contrasting agent for opposing theories and assumptions that followed. Descartes, who has been analysed as the forefather of modern, Western philosophy (Russell, 2015), represents a notion of the subject which is inherently rational, which means that his theory is based on rational reflection rather than on any form of empirical observation (Scruton, 2002). It is worth introducing Descartes’ theory at this point, because even though Descartes was still influenced by medieval conceptions in certain ways, he broke from scholastic traditions (Scruton, 2002) which also explains why he still has such a prominent position in

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philosophical thinking and history. Descartes’ famous expression “Ego cogito, ergo sum” (I think, therefore I am) (Descartes, 2008), is not only worth mentioning because of its popularity, but also because it informs on how Descartes has analysed the essence of a subject. For Descrates the assumption at the basis of “Ego cogito, ergo sum” (Descartes, 2008) is first and most certain. The essence of the self, according to Descrates, is to think, as one cannot think of oneself without thinking (Scruton, 2002). The term think or cogitare thereby includes a wide meaning covering all conscious forms of appearance of the mental life (Scruton, 2002). Because one can think, the I is discovered and subsequently defined as “a thing that thinks” (Broughton, 2008, p. 179). The I is hence, “A thinking thing […] a thing that doubts, that understands, that affirms, that denies, that wishes to do this and does not wish to do that, and also that imagines and perceives by the senses” (Descartes, 2008, 28, p. 20). What is worth noting here, is that Descartes is indeed not only referring to what might be understood as “thinking” but also to those things that one imagines and that one perceives through the senses. Once the thinking person, the meditator, has with certainty understood what he knows, he must conclude that the perception and thinking of the own mind are easier and more evident to perceive than anything else. This understanding is primary and only then can the meditator proceed to gain knowledge on other matters, such as mathematical truth, the existence of God or about the physical world. Following Descartes assumptions, self-knowledge hence has a primary role in order to “arrive at a proper understanding of the rest of reality” (Broughton, 2008, p. 179). For Descartes the proof for one’s own existence is founded precisely in self-knowledge. Once I know that I know, I must also exist: But I convinced myself that there was nothing at all in the world, no sky, no earth, no minds, no bodies. Did I therefore not also convince myself that I did not exist either? No: certainly I did exist, if I convinced myself of something. (Descartes, 2008, 25, p. 18).

Having given proof about the existence of the cogito, Descartes also analyses the way in which the cogito is organised, which is constituted in relation to three major aspects for him being dualism, individualism and the doctrine of privileged first-person access (Cassam, 2008). Each of these commitments has been questioned and criticised plenty of times by philosophers over the years. Yet, they are of relevance when looking at Descartes’ philosophy of the mind and have also influenced many philosophers that came after Descartes. Dualism refers to the

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separation of body and mind and is a concept that Rozemund argues has been introduced by Descartes (Rozemund, 2008). I am therefore a true thing, and one that truly exists; but what kind of thing? I have said it already: one that thinks. What comes next? I will imagine: I am not that framework of limbs that is called a human body; I am not some thin air infused into these limbs, or a wind, or a fire, or a vapour, or a breath, or whatever I can picture myself as: for I have supposed that these things do not exist. (Descartes, 2008, 27, pp. 19-20)

What can be seen in this quote by Descartes, which also relates to the proof of the mind’s existence, is the categorical separation of body and mind and the assumption that what constitutes a person is merely their mind and not their body. Because one can imagine oneself without a body, Descartes argues, that the body is not essential to being. Descartes has also used this argument to prove the immortality of the soul, as the mind is imaginable without the body or rather after the body has stopped living. The view that there is an actual distinction between the soul and the body dominated philosophical thinking for a long time and constitutes the basis of Cartesian thinking (Scruton, 2002). Even though this might be easily criticised, it demonstrates Descartes line of thought. The second attribute analysed by Descartes is that of individualism. Fundamentally, what is meant by individualism as Descartes understands it is that the mental state of a person can be individuated of any object, property or relation of the outside world and therefore is essentially independent from the minds or activities of other individuals (Burge, 1986). The subject as Descartes understands is therefore theorised in contrast to for example Mead’s theory (Mead, 1925; 1934) which places more emphasis on the social structures the individual is in. For Descartes the subject is autonomous in her own being, something which is also supported by the third attribute which is the doctrine of privileged access. The doctrine of privileged access adheres to the idea that a person has direct knowledge on the actions of her mind in the best possible way. All of what is thought, felt, wanted, perceived, remembered or imagined is inevitably experienced by the mind (Ryle, 1949). To assume a person has privileged access to their mind, hence, also leads to assuming that a person can never be mistaken about the mental states or processes of the own mind (Cassam, 2008). This assumption stands in contrast to Freud’s theory of the mind, in which the unconscious would present a part of an individual’s mind to which the individual would not exactly have privileged access. This already shows, as will be taken up further in the parts on sociology as well as psychoanalysis, that there are a few aspects in relation to Descartes’ theory on the mind, which have

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been criticised or would not be supported theories that came thereafter such as the attribute of dualism or the doctrine of privileged access, as well as the proof on the existence of God, which influenced Descartes. Despite possible criticism, what becomes apparent when looking at his theory is that in the light of rationalism Descartes defines the subject as self-determined, rational, essential and solid. This definition of the mind also leads over to how the mind has been defined by Kant in the light of the Enlightenment era and German Idealism. The Enlightenment era marks a break of society in relation to a number of aspects. Characterised by the discovery of new countries and the increasing progression of science, the Enlightenment era did not only change the dominance of religion or the educational canon, but also the definition of what it meant to be human. The term human was used as a discursive weapon in order to reason against the existing class structures and emphasise the importance of every individual and their equality1 (Sesink, 2007). Another important term of the time was that of utility. Utility of the human was however not understood in the light of a utilitarian or economic profit as it might be understood in following philosophical traditions, but rather directed against the uselessness of the upper two classes (Sesink, 2007). Utility in this sense was hence understood as the human’s responsibility to care for common welfare in society. A third term, used as a discursive weapon during the Enlightenment era was that of reason. The concept of reason was used especially in contrast to faith, reason in contrast to nature (being able to change nature through reason), reason in contrast to tradition and habit (life was not to be ruled by the past anymore), reason in contrast to inequality (overcoming the class structure and believing in the equality of all humans) and as reason in contrast to not being free (against a concept of different degrees of freedom) (Sesink, 2007). On the background of these events and concepts, education was attributed an important role, as can be seen in the works of Rousseau or Humboldt (Sesink, 2007). It is worth noting at this point the scientific, political and theoretical progress and background that facilitated for example Humboldt’s ideas. The human of the Enlightenment era was regarded as rational and selfdetermined, education was seen as a tool which would enable her to self-fulfil and self-develop. This sentiment was also taken up by German Idealism whose most prominent representatives are Kant and Hegel. German Idealism reflected on the problems and contradictions that were inherent in the intentions of enlightened thinking by critically pointing out the boundaries of rationalism and the 1

While thinkers of the Enlightenment were often in favour of equality, it has to be mentioned as can be seen in the exclamation of the French Revolution: “Liberté, Egalité et Fraternité” that equality was yet demanded from a very patriarchal perspective not considering other social categories and groups such as women enough.

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relation between reason and the other (the things, reality, etc.) (Sesink, 2007). A short introduction of Kant’s theory at this point can both help to illustrate the critical thinking of German Idealism and Enlightenment, which still plays a prominent role in philosophy and social theory today, as well as serve as a contrasting image and basis for theories on identity and subjectivity that will be introduced thereafter. Kant describes the I as “simple” (Kant, 2010, B 135), “naked” (Kant, 2010, A 443/B471) or a “pure imagination”, a “transcendental consciousness”, a “pure apperception” and a “consciousness of oneself” (Willaschek et al., 2015, p. 1066). The I defines an “assumption on the self” which if analysed lets one recognise “a reasonable substance” as well as a “personality”, while also including a “notion of freedom” (Willaschek et al., 2015, p. 1066). Looking at the collection of these terms that can be found in the Kant encyclopaedia when looking up Kant’s concept of I, helps to illustrate that Kant’s definitions of the human identity and the human consciousness are complex and therefore it is difficult to give a short and poignant account of them. This is further complicated by the fact that whereas in some instances Kant is very definite about his concept, in other instances one has to rely on various interpretations of Kant’s texts by posterior academics in order to give a full account of his theory. Furthermore, as some critics have argued, Kant might have distanced himself from his understanding of the I in later works, which is controversial, but yet has to be reflected on (Willaschek et al., 2015). One of the paralogism Kant criticises is that of the soul being numerically identical over time, and thus constitutes a relation to questions of personality which is why it is also referred to as the paralogism of personality. It comprises a reference to identity, which bears significance for the research question and therefore will be looked at in slightly closer detail at this point. In rationalist thinking the I of pure apperception would have to be numerically identical over time in order to combine thoughts and representations at all. The paralogism infers that “What is conscious of the numerical identity of its Self in different times, is to that extent a person. Now the soul is etc. Thus it is a person” (Kant, 2010, A 361). “The identity of the consciousness of Myself in different times is therefore only a formal condition of my thoughts and their connection […]” (Kant, 2010, A 363), as Kant phrases the rationalist claim on personality and numerical identity in time. However, he goes on to counter that the logical identity of the I could indeed undergo change which would not allow it to keep its identity, while yet there is an I which keeps in view the “thought of the previous subject” (Kant, 2010, A 363) even if it is undergoing change. This is where Kant’s perspective differs from that of rationalist psychology. For Kant identity is constituted by a transcendental synthesis (Kitcher, 1982). Kant phrases it as follows:

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Thus the original and necessary consciousness of the identity of oneself is at the same time a consciousness of an equally necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances in accordance with concepts, i.e., in accordance with rules that not only make them necessarily reproducible, but also thereby determine an object for their intuition, i.e., the concept of something in which they are necessarily connected; for the mind could not possibly think of the identity of itself in the manifoldness of its representations, and indeed think this a priori, if it did not have before its eyes the identity of its action, which subjects all synthesis of apprehension (which is empirical) to a transcendental unity, and first makes possible their connection in accordance with a priori rules. (Kant, 2010, A 108)

Kant analyses identity as “many representations under one concept” (Kant, 2010, A 262), whereby the concepts are related to each other by means of “identity and difference, of agreement and opposition, of the inner and the outer, and finally of the determinable and the determination (matter and form)” (emphasis in original, Kant, 2010, B 317). The concepts which help to form judgement through agreement, opposition or differentiation are what Kant refers to as concepts of comparison or conceptus comparationis (Kant, 2010, B 318). The subjective I cannot be divided into different matters, rather the unity of thought results from the collective unity of the various substances. It is thus identity as an intellectual substance that for Kant gives a person his or her personality (Kant, 2010, B 403). There are many aspects which can be drawn from Kant’s theories. As already stated, it is one which is still analysed and discussed and therefore even today bears a significance for philosophy as well as psychology and social sciences. Whereas criticism of Kant’s theory can easily be found and made, such as that an account on the relationship between the logical self and empirical self is clearly lacking (Thiel, 2006, p. 220), Kant’s theory sheds an interesting light on how questions of self-consciousness, self-knowledge or identity can be analysed from a critical and yet rational perspective of German Idealism. In a time of scientific progress as happened during the Enlightenment period it is interesting and important to note that there was a special emphasis placed on the autonomy and self-determination of the subject, which was supported by a philanthropist idea of education and social life. The fact that social class structures were ruptured, as was mostly evident in the happenings of the French Revolution but also elsewhere, the fact that science progressed in great steps, the fact that new countries were being explored, as well as the fact that education in the sense of Humboldt’s concept of Bildung was given utmost prominence, help to illustrate the background in front of which theoretical considerations of a rational and selfdetermined human being were being formed.

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For Descartes as well as for Kant the thinking self is evidently a priori to perception, proven by the ability to think of itself, it is rational as well as solid. If put in relation to the research question it would raise an interesting perspective on questions of surveillance and possibilities of the handling of online transactions on the side of the user in contrast to impossibilities of manipulation on the sides of companies in relation to advertising for example. Retrospectively, this assumption could be considered to place too much emphasis on the agency and self-determination of human beings while not paying enough respect to the social structures surrounding each individual as well as the possibility of mental structures inhibiting individuals from agency. This aspect is something which leads over to the next part, which focuses on Freud’s psychoanalytical theory of the unconscious and on questions of social identity and sociology as for example the theories by Mead and Goffman illustrate, by placing an emphasis on social structures rather than on individual agency.

3.2

Psychoanalysis and Sociology: Identity, Psychoanalytic and Social Structures

“What is that which has one voice and yet becomes four-footed and two-footed and three-footed?” (The riddle of the Sphinx in Apollod. 3.5.8; Frazer, 2018) As mentioned earlier Hall (1992) has analysed a number of breaking points for the decentring of the Cartesian subject as defined by Descartes and Kant in the light of the Enlightenment era. One of these was the introduction of Freud’s concept on the unconscious as part of his theory on psychoanalysis. Similarly, even though not defined by Hall, one could argue that the focus taken up in a lot of sociological theory on the structures that “form” humans by advocators such as Mead, represent another breaking point for the self-determined Cartesian subject, which might be comparable to Hall’s argument on Foucault’s works on power relationships, which will be taken up a little bit later on as well. This chapter focuses on the construction of identity considering particularly the impact of the unconscious as constituted by psychoanalytic theory and on the social structures that influence the construction of identity as constituted by certain sociological theory. Seeing as the scope of both psychoanalytical as well as sociological theory is vast and divers, it is obvious that I will have to carefully select relevant aspects that support the theoretical background of this book. In consideration of this it seems that a short introduction of Freud’s theory on personality and the unconscious, as well as some basic further psychoanalytical considerations help

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to illustrate the ways in which the unconscious may influence how a personality is constituted. In Greek mythology Oedipus wins against the Sphinx by giving the answer “man” which he has deducted rationally and which thus leads to the Sphinx killing herself. Hegel has analysed this moment as the moment in which a subjectivity that is based on human consciousness, referring to a person’s awareness of their own rationality, is founded (Mulvey, 1996, p. 145). Thus Oedipus is defined by Hegel as the prototypical philosopher whose rational answer leads to the death of the Sphinx as a metaphor for mythology and enigma in contrast to the rationality of Enlightenment (Mulvey, 1996). In a sense one could argue, as Goux does, that the Cartesian theory on the subject is in itself Oedipal by placing a focus on the autonomy of the individual subject without any tradition or teaching (Mulvey, 1996), because of this Goux ascribes Descartes with an abstract patricidal gesture in the very defining of the rational, self-determined subject as such (Goux, 1993). This means that through the person’s power of reason and self-determination, the enlightened subject, in what could be compared to a patricidal act, sweeps away fairies and creatures of mythology and the Gods of religion by assuming that all are merely imaginations created by the human mind. Goux goes on to demonstrate how the Oedipean story does not only serve as an illustration for the self-determined and ego-centred subject of Enlightenment, but also comprises a counterpart which is illustrated through patricide and incest, referring to the unconscious of Freud’s theory (Goux, 1993). Thus Oedipus seems to be a ‘Janusfaced’ figure (Mulvey, 1996, p. 147) which is able to serve both as a metaphor for the rationalist idea on the subject, aspiring to a somewhat utopian degree selfdetermined and rational knowledge, while at the same time being used as one of Freud’s basic psychoanalytic theories on the desires on the human psyche in what he terms the Oedipus complex. Here, however there are two different perspectives on the question of whether or not Freud’s theory marks a break of these rationalist aspirations or rather a continuation of their principles. As analysed before, Hall argues that Freud’s concept of the unconscious has to be seen as a disruption of the Cartesian subject (Hall, 1992). Mulvey on the contrary argues that it should indeed be understood as a continuation of Cartesian thought, as it indeed might have conceptualised the unconscious, which is not very rational, however Freud’s concept precisely allows figures of fear, of desire or hallucination to be understood as something that happens within the individual mind and Freud’s theory at the same time offers a way of analysing and thus rationalising these desires, fears or hallucinations and their meanings. Even dreams, neuroses and paranoia could be translated into meaning, interpreted and made sense of. Thus, it could be argued, that the spirits and ghosts

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were not exorcised but rather displaced into psychology and thus internalised into the human mind (Castle, 1988). Whether or not one would like to advocate for either one of these sides, taking the unconscious as a continuation or disruption of the Cartesian subject, it seems worthwhile to consider the impact Freudian theory had on considerations about the human subject and how the psyche or mind are constituted. As Freud argued, when psychoanalysis was first introduced, there was a lot of resistance towards it, by medics as it was not empirical enough and by philosophers as it did not place enough emphasis on the mind as something merely conscious (Freud, 2002). Even today psychoanalysis still seems to be very ambiguous, on the one hand very popular and on the other hand being faced with a lot of criticism in relation both theory and methodology. While Freud’s oeuvre as well as all psychoanalytical theory based on or in contrast to Freud is vast, I will focus on a very small aspect, which is relevant for this book. Freud’s theory covers a huge spectrum from the child’s psychosexual development, to dream works, to paranoia and neurosis, to jokes, to the uncanny, to desires and fears, to the Oedipus complex and of course also to his theory on personality to name but a few. After the child has had to go through various phases of the psychosexual development such as the oral and anal phase or the latency period, where it has had to deal with the drives of libido and destrudo as well as having been faced with the Oedipus complex according to Freud, much of the adult’s fears and desires, the adult’s ability for defence processes of the ego (Freud, 1978) or possible problems are based in these early life experiences for Freud (Freud, 1969). Rather than going into those concepts in more detail, it seems worth to rather focus on Freud’s concept of the personality for the case of this work. In one of his lectures entitled “Die Zerlegung der psychischen Persönlichkeit” (“The fragmentation of the mental personality”) Freud presents his theory on the structuration of the human psyche (Freud, 1978) in which he focuses his research on the ego, assuming that the ego can indeed take itself as an object and treat itself similarly to other objects, observe itself, criticise itself and do anything else of that sort (Freud, 1978, p. 51). Freud divides, and he notes that of course this division is not linear or strict as such but serves only for the purpose of illustration, the personality into three different areas which are those of the ego, the id and the super-ego. The super-ego is defined as a structure which holds the functions of self-observation, conscience and the ego-ideal. The conscience of the super-ego, which is dependent on the function of self-observation, can be overly strict, insult, punish and abuse the “poor” ego (Freud, 1978, p. 53). In the form of the ego-ideal, it represents an ideal with which the ego measures itself, which can in some cases lead to a feeling of inferiority. Freud argues that, in contrast to

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Descartes patricidal act of rationality, the super-ego constitutes ideologies of the past, of traditions, of cultures, which only slowly gives space to the influences of the present. This might also be related to Freud’s assumption that the super-ego is defined by paternal authority in the early years of a person’s life, strengthened by a fear of being deprived of the parent’s love. In later years the super-ego is influenced not only by the parents, but also by those people that have taken important positions in the person’s life such as educators, teachers and other role models. The super-ego stands in contrast to the id. The id is like chaos, a kettle boiling with desires and agitations, where no logical approaches to thinking can be found, there is no sense of neither time nor space, no judgements, no good or bad, no morals. To the ego, it is like a forceful horse, that the ego needs to conquer in order to guide the way. It is impersonal, which is why the name id suits so well, and constituted by an ego-alienation, filled with the unconscious drives of libido and destrudo. Altogether then while the psyche is divided into the three areas of the ego, super-ego and id, on top of this structure Freud defines another structure of the preconscious, the conscious and the unconscious. But while the ego is not only influenced by the super-ego and the id, not being able to access what is buried in the unconscious, it also needs to consider the outer world. The ego needs to balance out the demands and claims as it is being oppressed by three oppressors being the super-ego, the id and the outer world. The ego tries to create harmony among all three forces, however it can lead to fear, real fear of the outer world, fear of a bad conscience by the super-ego and neurotic fear of the strength of desires from the id. While one could indeed criticise some of Freud’s assumptions as well as the lack of empirical evidence for his theory, it still provides a popular framework for many theories and academic teaching. What is interesting is that in Freud’s theory one can indeed find, if not explicitly but implicitly, elements of surveillance or observation as well as structures which inhibit the agency of the individual, which is why it makes sense to consider his theory in the light of this research. First of all, the super-ego is defined as a psychological institution which observes and judges the ego to an extreme extent. Because Freud argues that the super-ego is shaped by first parents and then other important roles in the young child’s life, it becomes interesting assuming that these early forms of conscience building could also be influenced by any important role model, so if political or economic surveillance would be able to influence a super-ego, assuming that Freud’s structure of the psyche does actually apply, then these structures would be constantly judging, punishing and observing a person from within, thus also

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possibly inhibiting agency. The individual could then not freely decide, but the ego would have to fight a very strong super-ego. Korean philosopher Han (Han, 2016) has argued that contemporary society differs from being constituted, as it would have been in Freud’s times, by imperatives and prohibitions. Imperatives and prohibitions would only work in disciplinary societies with hospitals, prisons, factories, similar to what Bentham uses in his theory of the panopticon (Bentham, 1995) which represses its members. Han argues that now in contrast society can be analysed more in the sense of a meritocracy, meaning an achievement-oriented society. What Freud hence still constitutes as a “must” has now turned into a “can”, which according to Han leads to the super-ego being replaced by the ego-ideal, as the ego-ideal does not work with repression but rather with a pretence form of freedom, which yet can demoralise the ego as it may never reach the ego-ideal it has set itself (Han, 2016). Deleuze has also advocated the movement from a disciplinary society to a society of control (Deleuze, 1992). Some of these social, political and economic changes have already been discussed in the previous chapter as in Lyon’s or Zuboff’s theories on contemporary society. The question of a society of control evokes questions of self-control, which for Freud is constituted by the superego and which is formed by the influence of those around the young child as his parents, educators, teachers and so on. This assumption is also evocative of another theory for which self-control and the influence of social control by those around a person are of importance, namely that of George Herbert Mead as presented in his psychological and sociological works on i.a. the mind, the self and society, as for him: “Social control depends, then, upon the degree to which the individuals in society are able to assume the attitudes of the others who are involved with them in common endeavour” (Mead, 1925, p. 275). While Mead has published works during his lifetime, one of his most influential books “Mind, self and society: from the standpoint of a social behaviourist” was actually edited by one of his students and published only after his death. Therefore, while one might have to use the book with a certain amount of caution or criticism, I still do believe that the ideas put forward in there can be used as a reference for theoretical considerations. As noted earlier, Freud has argued that the self can indeed look at itself as it might look at an object and observe, punish or judge itself. The same point could be made about Mead’s theory, as he argues that the self “can be an object to itself” (Mead, 1934, p. 140). Because the self can be an object to itself, it means that it can also perceive itself, conceptualise itself and act towards itself (Blumer, 1966, p. 535). On the basis of this assumption Mead introduces his concept of the “I” and “me” (Mead, 1934). Whereas the “I” refers to the self as subject, the “me” refers to the self as object. Aside

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from the subject/object distinction of the “I” and “me”, the concept also refers to a distinction of social structure in relation to the “I” and the “me”. As Mead argues: “The “I” is the response of the organism to the attitudes of the others: the “me” is the organized set of attitudes of others which one himself assumes” (Mead, 1934, p. 175). Thus according to Mead both the “I” and the “me” originate within social experience and in relation to other beings. Mead argues that it would be impossible to think of a self arising outside of any form of social experience. Even if someone withdraws from any form of social experience at some point for the rest of his life, once the self has arisen, that person is bound to still have herself as a companion and think with herself in the same manner she had previously communicated with others (Mead, 1934, p. 140). The “I” thus still responds to the “me”, the assumed and organised set of attitudes, whereby it lies in the nature of the “I” to be aware of the social “me” (Mead, 1934, p. 173). Mead himself has compared the “I” to Freud’s ego, which could be described as spontaneous and creative, whereas he has compared the “me” to Freud’s superego, a set of rules, moral values derived from the attitudes the person assumes others in her surroundings to have which influence the “I” (Tejera, 1988). What becomes apparent in both Freud’s and Mead’s theory is that there are two different principles, one which is spontaneous, creative, influenced by the drives, which can be referred to as the “I” or the ego, and on the other hand one which has a monitoring function based on the assumed morals and values of society. Just like the ego is subordinate to the super-ego, being punished for misbehaviour, the “I” is constantly aware of the “me”, even to the point that in memory what used to be the “I” becomes “me”, meaning that the organised attitudes of others become internalised (Mead, 1934). Thus both Freud and Mead have analysed an authority within the self, which is based on social experiences and thus influenced by other beings around the subject herself. These internalised attitudes function as an authority which monitors and thus influences the ego or the “I”. Because of the dialectic between the ego/“I” and the super-ego/“me”, Freud’s and Mead’s theories include an element which stands in contrast to the self-determined ego of the Enlightenment era. Mead explains the social conditions under which the self arises using the example of game and play. He uses play as an illustration to show how children take on different roles during playing such as that of mother, father, doctor, etc. By taking on those roles the child is able to rehearse and learn the other people’s attitudes (towards herself). During the phase of play, the roles that the child takes on are those of the significant other, meaning that the child “plays” the role of significant others that have a controlling function on his life. The child thus “plays” with the

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attitudes and roles of one other person at a time. On the contrary, Mead argues that in game, as can be seen in a baseball game for example, the child assumes the attitudes of all others involved in that game and on the ground of this changes his own actions. “Each one of his own acts is determined by his assumptions of the action of the others who are playing the game” (Mead, 1934, p. 154). The game thus serves as a good illustration of a situation in which the organised personality can arise. Rather than reacting to a significant other as in play, in game the child reacts to a generalised other, according to Mead. The attitude of the generalised other, signifying the organised social group or community which influences the unity of the self, is influenced by the whole social group. This means that the individual must generalise the individual attitudes of various members of the social group into one attitude as a whole, while acting towards various social projects and behaving in different social processes throughout his life. This point will play a central relevance in the later analysis of the data. Mead categorises two different types of social subgroups or social classes with which the individual might be confronted or of which the individual might be a part of. One category is a concrete social class or subgroup such as a political party, of which one can officially be a member and which is categorised by concrete membership. The other category of subgroups or social classes is abstract on the other hand, referring for example to the group of creditors, the group of believers and so on (Mead, 1934, p. 157). It is through the form of the generalised other, thus again being comparable to the super-ego and closely related to the “me”, that the community has control and authority over the behaviour of its individual members. Because only by taking on the attitude of the generalised other can thinking occur. For Mead, the personality of a being is thus based on the fact that this being belongs to a community. Without the given social structures personality and thinking would not be possible. The assumption, that the social structures might take a necessary function in the constitution of the self is something which will be taken up again when talking about questions of structure, agency, power and control. I will only mention at this point, that if held true this assumption would indeed bring along important implications for a critique of the social structures apparent in contemporary society. In the process of the construction of the personality the child takes on various roles, especially of those that control her and whom she depends on. Here Mead’s theory already leads onto Goffman’s theory, which can be related to Mead’s theory in some ways. Goffman also analyses the importance of social roles in relation to the presentation of self in everyday life (Goffman, 1990). While not being able to elaborate on this point in great detail here, it

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nevertheless raises some interesting aspects in relation to the topic discussed.2 To conclude and in order to draw another important reference between Mead’s theory and more contemporary theory on the self, I wish to raise two more points in particular. The first point I would like to make is about the relation of self to others, especially in larger social structures. Mead argues that the “[…] whole history of warfare between societies and within societies shows how much more readily and with how much greater emotional thrill we realize our selves in common enemies than in collaboration with them” (Mead, 1925, p. 277). What becomes apparent here, and this can be related to Hall’s principle of the othering, is that some identifying aspects and sentiments originate in differentiation to others. Mead names the Dawes Plan and the World Court as counter examples to this. Ideas of national identity, cultural identity and othering are something worth considering in the light of this research, as will be seen in the data analysis, while at the same time this topic seems to be relevant both in relation to considerations about the internet as a global platform as well as contemporary politics as can be seen in the Brexit movement, shifts towards nationalism on the one hand and a strong support for the European Union and other uniting institutions or movements. The second point which I would like to also raise is that Mead can be interpreted to have analysed the self more as a process rather than a structure (Blumer, 1966, p. 535), in contrast to many others at that time. Analysing the self as a process, which is shaped along the way, presents a concept which stands in contrast to ideas about the self as of solid nature, which once is has been formed might not change. Thus it is in some ways evocative of more contemporary theories on identity and self in the light of modernity and post-modernity that often place more focus on the liquidity of the self (Bauman, 2005) or the self as a project (Giddens, 1991). Therefore, in the following subchapter, I would like to shift the focus away from the enlightened subject, the social self of Mead or the ego, which is tortured by the super-ego and the id, onto theories in which the self is seen in a much more fragmented, ever changing nature. 2

Goffman’s model on the presentation of self in everyday life (Goffman, 1990), which includes impression management of the social life, performed in front of an audience (metaphorically) on a front stage, having previously been rehearsed on the back stage, offers interesting reference points for a theory on self-presentation, also in relation to social media. While discussions of this relation are interesting (see Hogan, 2010), it seems to be particularly worthwhile to consider Goffman’s theory in relation to the wish to uphold the theatre performance and therefore an explanation for a disregard of disruptive events by both the audience as well as the performer. People who do not play along to a given performance setting will be excluded from the social group. This idea could easily be applicable also to questions of a status quo in relation to social and economic structures in contemporary life.

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Fragmented: Modern and Postmodern Identity Theories

“Die Geschichte des zerbrochenen Lebens kann nur in Bruchstücken erzählt werden.“3 (Rainer Maria Rilke; Müller, 2006, p. 103) In his essay on the question of cultural identity Stuart Hall, as mentioned before, identifies three very different forms of identity: the rational subject of enlightenment, the sociological subject, whose identity is formed in an interaction between the self and society, and finally the postmodern fragmented subject. While the two first parts of this chapter have respectively focused on the rational and the social subject, it might seem obvious that the third part focuses instead on the fragmented subject of post-modernity. Here, I will mainly be using the theories of Bauman and Giddens as to highlight a perspective on the postmodern and “radicalised modern” subject, with a few references to Hall. It seems that the theories of Zygmunt Bauman, Anthony Giddens and Stuart Hall have all emerged around similar times, and it could be argued that there seems to be a generational relation between the theorists to a certain extent, despite their different cultural upbringings, as their respective years of birth are set in a relatively small time span from 1925, to 1938 and 1932 and their academic careers are all bound to British academic thinking at a particular time in history. It should also be mentioned at this point, that because I will try to keep a discussion of the relevant aspects short, I will definitely not be able to cover everything these authors have written during the course of their lives and yet I will refer to aspects of their theory which go further than covering only the topic of identity. Both Bauman’s as well as Giddens’ works include aspects, aside from theories on modern and post-modern identity, which are of huge relevance in relation to the most central topics of this book such as conditions of (post-)modern life, structuration, culture, ambivalence and many more, as will be apparent in this chapter. While Bauman has commented on and referenced Giddens’ ideas on several occasions, I have yet decided to divide this chapter not by topics, and then see the respective stances and ideas of both authors, but rather present Bauman first, followed by Giddens and try to draw up similarities and differences both along the way, as well as in the end. Despite the fact that Zygmunt Bauman has covered a plenitude of topics in his lifespan, I will mainly focus on his elaborations on identity, ambivalence, and uncertainties resulting from the conditions of individualisation and postmodern

3

Translation: „The story of shattered life can be told only in bits and pieces.“ (Bauman, 1995).

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life, trying to bring together these aspects in a way that will benefit an understanding of the data, which from my point of view, relates to great extents to Bauman’s ideas. Müller argues that Bauman’s works are characterised by a dichotomy, running through his ideas, which focus on the one hand on postmodern aspects of life strategies in a time of liquidity in which nothing seems solid or fixed, on the other hand Bauman also stresses practices of reflexive self-(re)-construction, identified by a sense of continuity and a need of finding one’s own identity (Müller, 2006, p. 100). One might indeed criticise Bauman’s technique of avoiding any form of ascertainment by opening up the possibility of a dichotomy as Müller does (Müller, 2006), yet the dichotomy might also be seen rather to serve as a theoretical contrasting point in order to help explain the conditions Bauman seeks to explain. In order to do this Bauman uses the metaphor of liquidity time and again in his works. He uses the concept of liquidity in order to describe several conditions of modern life, which can be seen even by only looking at the titles of some of his books including Liquid Love, Liquid Fear, Liquid Modernity, to name a few (Bauman, 2004a; 2006; 2012). Bauman argues that before the time of liquidity there was a time of solidity, meaning that material goods were used as status symbols, implying the bigger a symbol, the better it was, as with cars, houses, televisions, etc. In contrast to this, Bauman uses the concept of liquidity to describe a time where the principle is different, where lightness or weightlessness, which allow mobility, which allow people to be less bound and therefore travel faster and easier, are sought after more than solidity. This time is also marked by an inconstancy, as fluids never stay in the same shape for a long time. What can be seen here already is a reference to both space and time brought along in relation to the metaphor of liquidity. Bauman argues that “[f]luids, so to speak, neither fix space nor bind time” (Bauman, 2012, p. 2). Solids according to the author are bound inherently to a spatial dimension, which simultaneously downgrades the significance of a temporal dimension, as they stay in the same shape irrelevantly of any passing of time. For fluids this proves to be different, the spatial dimension for fluids is hardly of any relevance as they merely stay in each shape for a moment in time, which on the other hand renders the temporal dimension to be of significant importance. While fluids are constantly “ready” to change their shape, it is the flow of time that matters, more so than the space they happen to be in, which is why Bauman compares fluids to the notion of a snapshot, which are an in the moment recording of a situation and therefore are marked with a date to which they are constantly bound. Bauman states that “[i]n a sense, solids cancel time; for liquids, on the contrary, it is mostly time that matters” (Bauman, 2012, p. 2). While it is easy to see a relation between

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Bauman’s metaphor and spatial and temporal dimensions, the author also uses this metaphor in relation to his ideas on identity. For Bauman “to identify oneself with…’ means to give hostages to an unknown fate which one cannot influence, let alone control” (Bauman & Vecci, 2004, p. 30). The way in which the author discusses the topic of identity is characterised by an ambivalence between possibilities and anxieties, which relate to a number of interesting points that can be made in relation to this research topic about how Bauman defines identity, it’s consistency, how identity relates to modern life, fears, problems, social structures and individualisation. Bauman argues that the idea of “identity” has resulted from a crisis of belonging and was forced into the “Lebenswelt” of individuals as a fiction. This leads to the assumption that Bauman does indeed view the concept of identity, not only as a difficult task for the individual, but also problematizes the concept itself, which he supports by calling it a fiction (Bauman & Vecchi, 2004). Bauman highlights his perspective on identity as a task that is yet unfulfilled, that is always unfinished and therefore results in an urge to constantly act upon these unfinished and unsatisfied feelings between the reality of what is and the constructions of the idea of what there ought to be. This is where Bauman’s theory relates also to what I have discussed earlier in relation to Freud and Han. Within the ambiguity of these feelings, it may be obvious that on the one hand the “[l]onging for identity comes from the desire for security, itself an ambiguous feeling […] On the other hand, a fixed position amidst the infinity of possibilities is not an attractive prospect either” (Bauman & Vecchi, 2004, p. 29). If these ideas are applied back to the metaphor of fluids and solids, it becomes apparent that neither of the two states are desirable objectives. While what might be termed “liquid identity” does not allow for feelings of security or belonging due to the ever changing and instantaneous nature, the concept of a “fixed, solid identity” on the other hand does not allow for any form of change, for it being too static. It is this ambivalence that results in Bauman’s perspective on identity, which might indeed be interpreted as pessimistic or negative. “In our fluid world, committing oneself to a single identity for life, or even for less than a whole life but for a very long time to come, is a risky business. Identities are for wearing and showing, not for storing and keeping” (Bauman & Vecchi, 2004, p. 89). In this sense identity is seen as a double edged sword which bears a certain amount of risk. However, Bauman does not only see identity as a double-edged sword in relation to possible risks but also in relation to how it is used. While it may be used as a war-cry by individuals, this can also be true for communities, at the same time it can be used by minorities to highlight and fight for their individual identities as well as by majorities downplaying differences and strengthening their identities

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through inclusiveness (Bauman & Vecchi, 2004). It is thus that Bauman argues that the ambivalence most people experience while trying to construct or find an answer to their own identities is genuine (Bauman & Vecchi, 2004, p. 98), it seems to be a difficult task the individual is burdened with. This task is made difficult because of the never-ending possibilities the individual is facing and the anxiety caused by the responsibility of taking the “right” decision. Bauman compares this to a “supermarket of identities” where the individual has the ability to shop around and due to the unfixity of most identities has the ability to change theirs frequently (Bauman, 2012, p. 83). Yet Bauman restricts that while changing one’s identity might be a “private affair” (Bauman, 2012, p. 90) it nevertheless influences other people’s lives who are not consulted in this or given a free choice, as bonds might be cut and obligations cancelled. It is needless to say that the individual is both placed as an agent as well as on the receiving end of this. The relationship that an individual has with others can also be related to Bauman’s argument that anyone’s identity might indeed seem different looked at from the outsider’s perspective than from the individual herself: Identities seem fixed and solid only when seen, in a flash, from outside. Whatever solidity they might have when contemplated from the inside of one’s own biographical experience appears fragile, vulnerable, and constantly torn apart by shearing forces which lay bare its fluidity and by cross-currents which threaten to rend in pieces and carry away any form they might have acquired. The experienced, lived identity could only be held together with the adhesive of fantasy, perhaps day-dreaming. (Bauman, 2012, p. 83)

What can be seen from this quote by Bauman is the endeavour of the individual to piece together her own biographical experiences into one concurrent identity, despite the notion of fragility and vulnerability that one actually feels. While one has to deal with the fragility of one’s own identity, those of others, which is seen only in a flash, seem solid and fixed. Elsewhere Bauman has used the metaphor of a piece of art, which looks immaculate and perfect from afar, but shows all the little mistakes, lines which don’t go together perfectly when look at from close up. For Bauman, identity is indeed fragmented, pieced together by varying biographical experiences and ideas, which can never make up a single totality, as Bauman states with reference to Deleuze and Guattari (Deleuze & Guattari, 1977). For Bauman, it seems that the individual has to stay in this unresolved situation, which he calls the “middle”. While the “beginning” is marked by the potentiality, meaning that all options are still open, the “end” is marked by the “actuality of being” (Bauman, 1995, p. 72). It might be needless to say that the middle is set between the beginning and the end, and described by Bauman as

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the place of ambiguity, ambivalence and equivocation – in between two opposites which can cause process as well as pain. Even though Bauman has not used the concept of the beginning, the middle, and the end in relation to a specific temporal reference as for example the life span, it seems easy to think of this ideas also in relation to the life span. This is interesting as looked at from this perspective, the subjects in this research who are neither children nor at the end of their life span, would be placed in the middle of their lives, where they - to different degrees are faced with the need for decisions and feelings of ambiguity and uncertainty. For Bauman the middle is a “place of loneliness, fear, anxiety – and moral choice. This is the place of responsibility” (Bauman, 1995, p. 73). Responsibility of one’s own fate and life is something which for Bauman is inherently bound to modern life, which to him is highly individualised commercialised and privatised. Based inter alia on the dissolution of the class system and the dissolution of gender as a binding force for life choices in many parts of the world, the responsibility for a successful identity and the prevention from failure is placed on the individual’s shoulders (Bauman, 2012, pp. 7–8). Secondly, aside from process of individualisation, the individual is seen both as a customer as well as a commodity, while at the same time always rather a consumer than a producer (Bauman, 2012; 1995). The consumer is placed in a situation similar to a buffet table with too many “mouth-watering” dishes for anyone to eat and thus she is confronted with the challenge of having to set priorities, and leaving behind options which will forever stay unexplored (Bauman, 2012, p. 63). A third point, aside from that of individualisation and commercialisation is that of privatisation. While Bauman argues that the public realm is under the danger of vanishing, critical theory, rather than as before having to defend private autonomy, needs to defend the public sphere from being overcast with private worries on screens which are projected as public images, but never cease to be private reflections of the culture we live in (Bauman, 2012, p. 39). What we perceive as culture in this sense is relativist in itself. Bauman has analysed culture as ambivalent in the sense of being both an agent of disorder and a warden for order, being both timeless and at the same time ageing and obsolete, both a normative regulator as well as a source of creativity (Bauman, 1999). Culture can be analysed as a concept, as a structure or as a praxis according to Bauman, and any researcher always needs to be aware to not take a relativist approach. The structuring nature of culture as well as society is something Bauman sees as given, yet not as negative. For Bauman there is no contradiction between dependence and liberation, one can only ensure one’s own liberation by exactly submitting to society and following its norms, freedom does not exist against society (Bauman, 2012, p. 20).

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According to Bauman if there were no norms, no codes of conduct that told us how to behave in certain situations the uncertainty and risks would be difficult to deal with. While not dealt with in great detail at this point, the structuring nature of society nonetheless is something which will be of interest for this research and also leads over to Giddens theory, which will be introduced in the following paragraphs and focuses on the constitution of society and its structuration to a great extent. So, in order to sum up, in Bauman’s account on identity the notion of structure and agency does not play a significant role, maybe because Bauman also does not view the structuring moments as negatively connoted. Rather it seems that Bauman, in his assumptions on identity and modern life, problematizes the individual’s responsibility caused by processes of individualisation in relation to a commercialised plenitude of options, which might result in fear and anxiety. Apart from these slightly worrying and negative assumptions, Bauman views identity as something ambivalent, fragmented and constantly changing which proves to be a contrast to Kant’s or Descartes’, as well as Freud’s or Mead’s accounts. The individual is placed in a constant dilemma of uncertainty by trying to satisfy and secure her identity and at the same time consider all options and be open for change. It is here that we can also see similarities to Giddens’ account on identity. In the following paragraphs an account on various aspects of Giddens’ theory will be elaborated on set in relation to the topic and argumentation of this book. Before doing this, it should be noted however, that Giddens’ theory on the constitution of society and his theory on self-identity are rather interpreted or referred to as a theory that offers a certain perspective on the world and society, rather than a fixed and stable set of basic assumptions. Through this perspective, Giddens’ theory is seen as more flexible and also it allows the combining of his theory to other theories used in this book to a greater extent. The elaboration will be started with a focus on Giddens’ account of self-identity and consider the special notion of reflexivity within this account. Through considering Giddens’ emphasis on reflexivity in general, the discussion will go on to introduce basic ideas on topics of structure, agency, power and adaptation. For Giddens, similar to Bauman, the making of self-identity is placed in a condition of what he terms “risk culture” (Giddens, 1991, p. 108). The individual must constantly ask herself the questions of “What to do? How to act? Who to be?” (Giddens, 1991, p. 70). Through a constant awareness on thoughts, feelings and bodily sensations the individual is living life in a reflexive manner, trying to develop a coherent sense of her own life history. In order to successfully develop a coherent sense of self-identity, Giddens introduces ten points in his book on modernity and self-identity. Summarising the most relevant aspects of these points

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gives a good indication on Giddens’ understanding of identity. Thus first of all the “self is seen as a reflexive project, for which the individual is responsible” (Giddens, 1991, p. 75). Giddens argues that we are what we make of ourselves by creating a coherent sense of identity. This is secondly done by forming a trajectory from the past to the future that the individual anticipates thus relating the self also to the “various phases of the lifespan” (Giddens, 1991, p. 75). The relevance of this trajectory and the importance of temporal dimensions within the individual’s life span is something that will be apparent throughout the analysis of the data as well. Thirdly, the “reflexivity of the self is continuous, as well as all pervasive” (Giddens, 1991, p. 76). The individual thus in every moment or at least regularly needs to critically question herself in relation to what is happening. Giddens, fourthly, states how the coherent sense of self-identity necessarily assumes a narrative. It is through this narrative that the individual develops an autobiography that written down or just constructed within, “is actually at the core of self-identity in modern social life” (Giddens, 1991, p. 76). Fifthly, Giddens relates self-identity to the temporal dimension. Here he defines the importance for self-actualisation through controlling time in the sense of the establishment of personal time zones that are not to be confused with external temporal dimensions such as universal standards of time measurements such as clocks. Rather personal time, “the durée of the day-to-day social life” (Giddens, 1991, p. 77), is defined by Giddens as a dialogue the individual holds with time. Aside from the temporal dimensions, Giddens sixthly, relates self-identity to the body. The body is positioned as a part of an action system, whereby the self can be experienced as a whole that integrates the body, rather than the body being nothing but a passive object. Seventhly, all of the conditions of self-actualisation described above are seen in an equilibrium between risk and opportunity thus relating to the notion of uncertainty and risk already referenced in relation to Bauman’s theory. In an opposition between the risk of shedding habits from the past and creating opportunities for self-development risking that what is to come might actually be better or worse than before, the individual has to negotiate these risks and chances against each other. Eighthly, Giddens assumes a sense of authenticity in relation to the self. This sense of authenticity is understood as “being true to oneself” (Giddens, 1991, p. 78–79). The coherent narrative of the self created by an individual can thus not be invented freely, but must disentangle between what is “true” and “false” in relation to the self. In this experience of creating a coherent and authentic narrative of self, the individual has to ninthly, undergo a series of passages, often institutionalised or formalised rites, that are marked by a sense of loss, that need to be mourned accordingly in order to progress further. Finally, tenthly, Giddens

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argues that the “development of the self is internally referential: the only significant connecting thread is the life trajectory as such” (Giddens, 1991, p. 80). Each new life experience must thus, according to Giddens, be integrated into the narrative of self in order to develop an authentic and coherent sense of self. The narrative of the self constructed by an individual must thus constantly be rewritten in order to be successful, bringing together experiences from the past, with those of the present and even anticipated plans of the future. This difficult task happens under conditions of a complex plurality of choices, whereby the choices present are not always open to everyone. The pluralisation of lifeworlds includes different sectors of life: “This setting of modern social life are much more diverse and segmented. Segmentation includes particularly the differentiation between the public and private domains – but each of these is also subject internally to pluralisation” (Giddens, 1991, p. 83). Giddens here speaks of the segmentation of life entities, which can be compared to be concept of fragmentation, i.e. the breaking down of something into several parts. This is where Giddens theory also proves relatable to Bauman’s concept and the overall topic of this book. Thus for Giddens, equally to Bauman, self-identity is constructed under difficult conditions of pluralisation and has to deal with a sense of segmentation of different life parts. For Giddens through being self-reflexive the individual deals with these complex difficulties by trying to nonetheless construct a coherent and authentic sense of self-identity choosing certain life styles, which are “influenced by group pressures and the visibility of role models, as well as by socioeconomic circumstances” (Giddens, 1991, p. 82). There are two points made in the last sentence that are worth picking up further. First of all it is the notion of reflexivity, which is characteristic of Giddens’ theory in general. Secondly, Giddens relates the choosing of life styles and thus also the creation of self-identity to group pressures, role models and socio economic circumstances. This arguments hence points at another important topic of Giddens’ theory, namely his structuration theory. While Giddens’ structuration theory has often been criticised, I wish to bring up some of the criticism as well as some of the arguments in favour of the theory, while also considering some of its very basic assumptions that prove to be relevant for this book. One of the main criticisms of Giddens’ theory is that while Giddens tries to theoretically struggle against the dualism of structure and agency in his attempt of structuring society, he at the very same time still falls back into that dualist notion of structure and agency. This basic problem is something that should be remembered throughout the consideration of his theory. Looking at his definitions of agency and structure he sees both of them as influencing each

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other. Looking at both definitions will highlight this relationship further. Thus, in relation to agency, Giddens states that: Agency refers not to the intentions people have in doing things but to their capability of doing those things in the first place (which is why agency implies power: cf. the Oxford English Dictionary definition of an agent as ‘one who exerts power or produces and effect’). Agency concerns events of which an individual is the perpetrator, in the sense that the individual could, at any phase in a given sequence of conduct, have acted differently. (Giddens, 1984, p. 9)

For Giddens, the relationship between structure and agency is dialectic: thus while structures are analysed as shaping and constraining human agency, human agents at the very same time are seen to act against as well as within these structures thus being able to shape them over time (Kennedy et al., 2015). The respective terms of structure and structures are defined by Giddens as follows. Structure is defined as the “[r]ules and resources, recursively implicated in the reproduction of social systems. Structure exists only as memory traces, the organic basis of human knowledgeability, and as instantiated action” (Giddens, 1984, p. 377). In addition to this structures, as in the plural, are defined as “[r]ule-resource sets, implicated in the institutional articulation of social systems. To study structures, including structural principles, is to study major aspects of the transformation/mediation relations which influenced social and system integration” (Giddens, 1984, p. 377). Thus looking at agency implies looking at ways in which people have a capability of doing things in the first place. The actions are followingly set within structures of rules and based on the resources present to them. It is here that two arguments that are central to Giddens’ theory become obvious. First of all, it is questions of power that relate to both agency and structure in respective ways. Secondly, it is the notion of reflexivity that Giddens defines as central to agency and that has been emphasised previously. For Giddens, it is important to distinguish the conditions of social constraint in which individuals are seen as having no choice in contrast to the dissolution of action all together. For him to have no choice is not to be equated with saying that action is replaced by reaction (Giddens, 1984). The intricate way in which agency and structure relate together in Giddens’ theory, also highlights the ways in which power is distributed in a system. For Giddens, power and action are thus intrinsically related to each other. Giddens constructs a dialectic of control. Thus he assumes that within contexts of social interaction power presumes necessarily regularised relations of “autonomy and dependence between actors and collectivities” (Giddens, 1984, p. 16) within social systems that are constituted by a continuity over both time and space. While power is reliant on these regularised

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relations of autonomy and dependence, there nonetheless are resources within the forms of dependence through which those subordinate can also influence activities of those superior to them. It is precisely in these forms of resources within dependence that Giddens defines the dialectic of control. It is here, where Giddens breaks with purely structuralist perspectives. It is also here, where Giddens’ approach might be said to differ to the ways in which Foucault analyses power in social systems. Where Foucault might be seen as rather focusing on the forms of power that the individual is subjected to, not ascribing a huge sense of freedom to the individual, Giddens in contrast interprets more freedom in relation to the agency of each individual (Kort & Garbhi, 2013). Foucault’s perspective on stressing the importance of an objective analysis of society analysing how society shapes subjectivities of its members (Layder, 2006) therefore bears both differences and similarities to Giddens’ approach. While power, and the analysis of power resources within a social system, are important not only for Giddens’ or Foucault’s theories of society, this question also is of relevance in relation to this what is to come in this book, as will be seen throughout the analysis. The second relevant argument that becomes apparent throughout Giddens’ theory is the focus he puts on reflexivity. This has already been highlighted in relation to how Giddens constructs his theory on self-identity, which for him is constantly self-reflexive. The notion of reflexivity also plays a role in relation to Giddens theory of agency however. The agent is thus defined as featuring a reflexive monitoring of the actions carried out both by themselves as well as by others. Actors thus not only “monitor continuously the flow of their activities and expect others to do the same for their own; they also routinely monitor aspects, social and physical, of the contexts in which they move” (Giddens, 1984, p. 5). The individual rationalises her actions and constructs a “theoretical understanding” of the grounds of her activities. Following this assumption, in the context of this book, means that the subjects continuously reflect on their actions and develop a theoretical understanding of the reasons for their actions. Giddens here differentiates between three concepts of consciousness from discursive consciousness, to practical consciousness and finally to unconscious motives and cognition. These concepts will be taken up again later in the analysis. Discursive consciousness refers to the social conditions that actors are able to express verbally especially including the conditions of their own actions, while practical consciousness refers to what actors know or believe about the social conditions of their own action but are not able to express discursively. It is important to state that Giddens sees no rigid or clear distinction between discursive and practical consciousness but assumes that the difference between them can change based on socialisation and learning experiences. While

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he sees no clear distinction between discursive and practical consciousness, i.e. that what is said and that what is done, he yet defines a barrier founded upon repression between the unconscious and discursive consciousness. It is precisely the notion of reflexivity constituted by both discursive and practical consciousness that is a constant feature of Giddens theory and proves relevant also in light of the analysis. Giddens understands reflexive monitoring to be a part of everyday actions of individuals and the conduct between individuals and others. Kort und Gharbi (2013) argue that it is precisely Giddens concept of reflexivity that renders his theory useful despite possible criticism, and base their recommendation of using Giddens partly on this concept. It is not only within everyday actions or in relation to the construction of self-identity that reflexivity may be analysed as an important factor. Giddens also refers to the importance of reflexivity in relation to the academic discourse. It is based on this assertion that a transition to the following chapter is possible. The level of reflexivity that was exhibited in relation to the empirical research and the methodological assumptions of this book will be of central relevance in the next chapter. Demonstrating a notion of discursive reflexivity will become obvious in this chapter as is lays down the basic groundwork of the ontological, epistemological and methodological approaches taken within this research. After reflecting on these important frameworks, the methodical design of this research will be introduced before leading onto the actual analysis of the data.

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Carroll, L. (n.d). Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland. Hoboken, N.J.: Generic NL Freebook Publisher. Cassam, Q. (2008). Contemporary Reactions to Descartes’s Philosophy of Mind. In In J. Broughton & J. Carriero (Eds.) A Companion to Descartes. (pp. 482–495). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. Castle, T. (1988). Phantasmagoria: Spectral Technology and the Metaphorics of Modern Reverie. Critical Inquiry 15(1) (pp. 26–61). Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. (1977). Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. New York: Viking Press. Deleuze, G. (1992). Postscript on the Societies of Control. October 59 (pp. 3-7). Retrieved March 3, 2017, from: http://www.jstor.org/stable/778828 Descartes, R. (2008). Meditations on First Philosophy. With Selections from the Objections and Replies. In M. Moriarty (trans.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Frazer, J.G.F. (2018) (Ed.) Apollodorus 3.5.8 In Apollodorus Library. Retrieved September 18, 2018, from: http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1 999.01.0022%3Atext%3DLibrary%3Abook%3D3%3Achapter%3D5%3Asection%3D8 Freud. S. (2002). Resistance to Psychoanalysis. Wild Analysis (pp. 83-92). London: Penguin. Freud, S. (1978). Neue Folgen der Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse. Frankfurt: Fischer. Freud, S. (1969). Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse Und Neue Folge Bd. I. Frankfurt: S Fischer. Giddens, A. (1991). Modernity and Self-identity: Self and society in the late modern age. Cambridge: Polity Press. Giddens, A. (1984). The Constitution of Society. Cambridge: Polity Press. Goffman, E. (1990). The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. London: Penguin Books. Goux, J.J. (1993). Oedipus, Philosopher. Stanford: Standford University Press. Hall, S. (1992). The Question of Cultural Identity. In S. Hall; D. Held & T. McGrew (Eds.) Modernity and its Futures (pp. 273-326). Cambridge: Polity Press and The Open University. Han, B.-C. (2016). Müdigkeitsgesellschaft. Berlin: Matthes und Seitz Berlin. Hogan, B. (2010). The Presentation of Self in the Age of Social Media: Distinguishing Performances and Exhibitions Online. Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society, XX(X) (pp. 1–10). Kant, I. (2010). In G. Mohr & M. Willaschek (Eds.). Immanuel Kant: Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Berlin, Boston: Akademie Verlag. Retrieved 9 Aug. 2018, from https://www. degruyter.com/view/product/225018 Kennedy, H.; Poell, T. & van Dijck, J. (2015). Data and agency. Big Data & Society. (pp. 1–7). https://doi.org/10.1177/2053951715621569 Kitcher, P. (1982) Kant on Self-Identity. The Philosophical Review 91(1) (pp. 41.72). Retrieved January 28, 2017, from: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2184668 Kort, W. & Gharbi, E. (2013). Structuration theory amid negative and positive criticism. International Journal of Business and Social Research 3(5) (pp. 92–104). Layder, D. (2006). Understanding Social Theory - 2nd Edition. Sage Publications: London. Mead, G.H. (1925). The Genesis of the Self and Social Control. International Journal of Ethics35 (3) (pp. 251–277). Mead, G.H. (1934). Mind, Self and Society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

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Mulvey, L. (1996). Netherworlds and the Unconscious: Oedipus and Blue Velvet. Fetishism and Curiosity. (pp. 137–154). London: BFI. Rozemond, M. (2008). Descartes’s Dualism. In J. Broughton & J. Carriero (Eds.) A Companion to Descartes. (pp. 372–389). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. Russell, B. (2015). The Problems of Philosophy. New Jersey: Piper Books. Ryle, G. (1949). The Concept of Mind. London: Penguin. Scruton, R. (2002). A Short History of Modern Philosophy – From Descartes to Wittgenstein. 2nd Edition. London: Routledge Sesink, W. (2007). Das Pädagogische Jahrhundert. Skript zur Vorlesung im SS. TU Darmstadt. Retrieved August 12, 2018, from: https://www.abpaed.tu-darmstadt.de/media/arbeitsbe reich_bildung_und_technik/gesammelteskripte/pjh_2007.pdf Tejera, V. (1988). Semiotics from Peirce to Barthes: A conceptual introduction to the study of communication, interpretation, and expression. Leiden: E.J. Brill. Thiel, U. (2006). The Critique of Rational Psychology. In G. Bird (Ed.) A Companion to Kant. Malden, (pp. 207-221). MA: Blackwell Publishing Willaschek, M.; Stolzenberg, J. & Mohr, G. (Eds.) et al. (2015). Kant-Lexikon. Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter. Retrieved August 9, 2018, from: https://www.degruyter.com/view/product/ 14457

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Methodological Approach and Research Design

A note on ontological, epistemological and empirical considerations It has to be noted, that the analysis will be predominantly based on a basic subjectivist/objectivist distinction as Burrell and Morgan defined in their 1979 book Sociological Paradigms and Organizational Analysis. The distinction between subjectivity and objectivity lends itself to many important research issues, however, as Morgan and Smircich (1980) argue, it is also always tied to certain ideological perspectives, which “overplay the tendency to spontaneous order and regulation in social affairs, while ignoring modes of domination, conflict, and radical change” (Morgan & Smircich, 1980, p. 492). Considerations of social ontology are basically concerned with how to define the nature of social entities and with the question of what reality is. The subjectivist/objectivist differentiation here lies in the assumption of whether these social entities should be defined as objective and external to the social actor with an external and objective reality in themselves or whether they should be seen as social constructions that derive from perceptions and actions in the consciousness of the individual social actor. Realist and anti-realist approaches can be regarded as two contrasting positions on the spectrum of ontological considerations whereby anti-realist ones are often said to present as more subjectivist and realist ones as more objectivist approaches. Anti-realist theories of an ontological kind can be defined as the philosophical assumption that in contrast to realism, there is no single objective reality in the world, but rather that reality is seen as something which is constructed by a person and therefore cannot be taken to be objectively true. The subjectivist/objectivist distinction will not be defined as two opposing poles, but rather as a continuum with various gradual and sometimes related positions.

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It is important to be aware that the various positions on the spectrum transition gradually while the transitions are often not clear cut and proponents of one position might use and include insights from other positions as well. While not only the positions transition gradually, it is often difficult to allocate scientists to one clearly defined position, as some scientists use insights of other positions or change position in the course of their career. While one could spend a lot of time trying to figure out a clear definition of the different positions and assign different researchers to these, Morgan and Smircich argue that the objective should not be to define these categories, but rather that the categories provide “a useful way for thinking about the kind of assumptions that underlie continuing research and debate within the social sciences, and the thorny problems regarding epistemological and methodological adequacy” (Morgan & Smircich, 1980, p. 493). All the various positions on ontological considerations and human nature are results of long discussions and discourses by their proponents. As they have evolved through history they have evolved in awareness of and in relation or contrast to other positions, who would often influence each other respectively. Historically, positions on the objectivist side have been more dominant. In recent years however, especially in the social sciences, the subjectivist positions have gained in significance. This book should be understood as an example for a subjectivist ontological position. Epistemological considerations define how the social world can or should be studied and what can or should be regarded as appropriate knowledge about the social world from within various disciplines. It also defines how this knowledge, in form and nature, can and should be communicated among human beings (Bryman, 2008). Here epistemology includes especially academic positions such as the basic distinction between positivism and anti-positivism, including positions such as constructivism1 or interpretivism. Looking at epistemological approaches can inform a researcher on the respective empiricist and theoretical approaches that go along with various tendencies in relation to epistemology. Positivism is an epistemological position that relies on the methods of the natural sciences for the study of social sciences assuming that science in general (both natural sciences and social sciences) can be and must be objective (Cohen et al., 2007). According to positivist thought meaning itself resides in the texts, artefacts or phenomena studied and their analysis should lead to definite and univocal knowledge, therefore knowledge can be defined as an entity that can be

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Constructivism is also referred to as constructionism by some social scientists, in this dissertation I will use the term constructivism however.

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accumulated and stored independently of an individual mind2 (Buckley & Carter, 1999). According to Crotty a valid criticism of positivism can be found with the status it assigns to its findings, describing scientific knowledge as objective and universal, sometimes therefore even as the only valid knowledge (Crotty, 1998). However, he also argues that in post-positivism the claim for objective truth has been approximated and is much more modest. Positivism has to be considered as a normative approach, whereas the distinction here lies in contrast to more interpretive anti-positivist approaches, where knowledge is not hard and tangible, but rather personal, subjective and unique (Cohen et al., 2007). In contrast to positivist epistemological assumptions, other epistemological positions on a more subjective spectrum assume that people construct their own social worlds, being active agents rather than “passive dolls of positivism” (Cohen et al., 2007, p. 20; see also Garfinkel, 1967; Becker, 1970). In this sense the world is understood as ever changing and context-dependent rather than fixed and normative. People have to interpret the social world, and their actions are thought to be based on their respective interpretations of the situations (Morrison, 1998). It is those assumptions that have led to a number of epistemological positions, such as interpretivism or constructivism. Interpretivism is fundamentally concerned with understanding how people generate their social world and cultures including cultural practices, general beliefs and attitudes, whereby the researcher needs to use his or her own interpretation in order to deepen an understanding of what he or she observes. Interpretivism is thus also fundamentally concerned with questions of how people learn and pass along these practices. Phenomenologists, as an example for an interpretivist position, believe in the importance of subjective consciousness (Berger and Luckmann, 1967) and furthermore, they assume that through reflection we can gain direct knowledge of the structures and phenomena surrounding our conscious minds and social realities. This is important as it is a basic assumption also taken within the research of this dissertation. Interpretivism is in many ways very similar to constructivism, another epistemological approach on the subjective spectrum. Constructivist thinking also assumes that social reality is constructed by the mind in an active process, which is of a socio-cultural character meaning that differing cultures also produce different kinds of knowledge (Hammersley, 2013).

2

Here one could draw an interesting connection to the phenomena of big data and machine learning. Unfortunately this aspect cannot be taken up in the dissertation as it would go far beyond the actual research question.

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The various considerations from ontological and epistemological issues have illustrated that how we define social realities and social phenomena, and thus how we define social beings, in turn influences also how we research, deal with or analyse them. Before moving on, it has to be noted that this research is leaning towards a more subjectivist position on all of the presented issues. It is important to consider, if only shortly, ontological and epistemological positions, as questions of identity or subjectivity in relation to data collection and surveillance practices, and in relation to questions of cultural influence, structure and agency from an educational perspective are concerned with fundamental questions on reality and knowledge construction. The topic and research question of this research lend themselves particularity well to certain ontological and epistemological assumptions, and this in turn influences the theoretical and methodical approaches on how these questions should be researched. The term “empiricism” is based on the Greek term “empeiria”, which translates to the Latin word “experientia”. Maybe quite obviously, the English words based on these terms are “experience” as well as the related term “experiment” (Skeat, 1888). This is why empiricist approaches are based on the idea that research and theory, or even any idea, should undergo rigorous testing before it is considered as knowledge.3 The basic division in empiricism is between qualitative and quantitative research. Quantitative research, as the name already suggests, is concerned with methods that use numerical, mathematical, statistical or any other quantifiable form of data. Qualitative research, in contrast to quantitative research, often uses words and understanding rather than quantification of data sampling and data analysis (Bryman 2008; Hammersley, 2013), which is why qualitative research often goes along better with anti-positivist epistemological assumptions. The arguments that support the need for research methods, that are not only based on quantifications are that social reality is often “complex, dynamic and context-dependent” (Mabry, 2008, p. 215). There are often multiple interpretations and perspectives on situations, which are not reducible to single numbers (Cohen et al., 2007) and therefore are in need of “thicker description” (Geertz, 1973). Often qualitative research is criticised for being not very methodical and too subjective, or even random, not really leading to “facts”. It is for this reason that in recent decades qualitative

3

Note that the whole discourse on the difference between knowledge and information and the definition of what knowledge can be understood as, is very interesting and worthwhile to consider, but a full account of the discourse would digress at this point.

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researchers have tried to develop qualitative research methods, which are reliable and valid as can be seen in the example of grounded theory, which will be analysed further in the following chapter on methods and methodologies as well.

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Methodological Approach

Despite the fact that it is not very common, I have decided to apply the methodological frame work of a multiple-case study approach in relation with a grounded theory approach. Looking at the research question and research context can help to explain why a multiple case study methodology together with the methodology of grounded theory might be the best suited choice for this research. At the basis of the research question there are two aspects that are particularly relevant. On the one hand this is the question of identity and subjectivity and on the other hand it is the context of online data collection which constitute a consequence of different online practices. A lot of research on user profiles and identity does not pay enough attention to the individual context and environment. While the users are often objectified into “objects of information” or “objects of surveillance” (Mitrou et al., 2014), not enough attention is paid to the subjective and individual context in which these practices take place in. Therefore, it seems that case studies offer a valuable approach in order to understand and research how identities in the context of online practices in relation to data collection can be constructed, performed and negotiated. “The raison d’être of case study is deep understanding of particular instances of phenomena” (Mabry, 2008, p. 214). The case study allows or even asks for a deeper understanding of the phenomena it looks at. Therefore, it is said that an attitude of openness as well as the researcher’s curiosity are both required to know more about the case and understand the case better in order to be able to research it and its meaning deeply. Through this, the researcher, the reader and the research community are able to construct meaning of the case and therefore the case is able to contribute to the academic field as well as to society in general (Mabry 2008). The case study allows, as several authors have argued, to focus one’s research on the individual context or setting of the case (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Robson, 2002), whereby context should not be seen as a constant variable, but rather is subject to change (Buckingham, 1993). The case or cases that are selected may be selected due to different reasons, whether it be the researcher’s particular interest or because of the case supposedly being informative about a phenomenon. Depending on the interest and aim of the research it might be more useful to choose typical or atypical cases, contrasting

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cases, critical cases, extreme or unique cases, representative or longitudinal cases. Some of these categorisations might be overlapping and one case might include several elements of the just mentioned categorisations, which are not to be seen as a fixed set but rather a more general rationale for choosing cases (Bryman, 2008). One of the criticisms often brought forward in relation to case studies is that of lacking validity and reliability, especially in contrast to quantitative research designs. It is often criticised that findings and outcomes from case study research cannot be generalised. Yet, the arguments that their research would lack external validity and would not be generalisable is countered by scientists using case study methods by arguing that they do not wish to generalise their findings to other groups, cases or examples but rather intensively examine the case or cases that are part of the research and from there relate the findings to theoretical considerations (Bryman, 2008). The techniques often applied in qualitative research, and therefore also in case study research, are observation, interviews or analysis of documents (Bryman, 2008; Denzin & Lincoln, 1994; Le Compte & Goetz, 1982). Semi-structured or unstructured interviews seem to work particularly well for case study research as they allow the generation of a deep understanding through their open designs. Mabry argues that case study research can lead to the production of emerging theory, despite the fact that case study rarely produces “grand theory” (Mabry, 2008, p. 218), but rather small generalisation and local theory (Erickson, 1986). It is these two aspects that Mabry relates to the method of grounded theory, as here the constant comparative methods, as well as an inductive starting point, followed by iterative processes of data analysis leads to the emergence of grounded theory. Thus, it shows that multiple case study methodologies together with a grounded theory methodology is possible. Using both a case study as well as a grounded theory methodology allows for the research to be both very context-sensitive and open, facilitating a deep understanding of individual cases and at the same time through the grounded theory methodology enhances the viability and reliability of the research design through the systematic approach and constant comparative method of grounded theory. “The grounded theory approach is a qualitative research method that uses a systematic set of procedures to develop an inductively derived grounded theory about a phenomenon” (emphasis in original, Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 24). In 1967 Glaser and Strauss published a book entitled The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research in which they introduce their proposed qualitative research method that they call grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss,

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1967). The theory emerged from their successful collaboration on a research project where they researched death and dying in hospitals (Charmaz, 2014). While Glaser brought along experience of empiricism, codified methods, emphasising emergent theory and a language which was very close to quantitative methods (Charmaz, 2014, p. 9), Strauss, who was influenced particularly by sociologists such as Mead (Mead, 1932, 1934) and Dewey (Dewey, 1948; 1960), influenced the development of grounded theory with notions of social and subjective meanings, open-ended study of action and human agency (Charmaz, 2014). When looking at the history of grounded theory one should not forget to mention that, and maybe this was also caused by Glaser’s and Strauss’ different backgrounds, the two authors further developed their theories separately over the years and not without disagreements. While Strauss and Corbin, whose development of grounded theory will be used in this research, published their theory under the title Basics of Qualitative Research – Grounded Theory Procedures and Techniques (Strauss & Corbin, 1990), Glaser strongly criticised their procedures (Glaser, 1992). The four criteria in relation to grounded theory that Glaser, Strauss and Corbin have analysed in their respective works in relation to the applicability of theory to a phenomenon are that, firstly, the theory must fit the area of the phenomenon researched, secondly it must be understandable even for laymen and non-academic people working in the field, thirdly, it must be fairly general, so that it can be applied to a number of situations within the area of the phenomenon studied and lastly it must be so flexible that it allows the user enough control to be adapted over time (see Glaser & Strauss, 1967, pp. 237; Glaser 1978; Strauss & Corbin 1990). It is therefore important to note that grounded theory, is not a linear process, but rather provides a set of basic guidelines, strategies and heuristic interpretation possibilities (Atkinson et al., 2003) that can be applied in a systematic, non-rigid but flexible manner (Charmaz, 2014). Thereby it tries to adhere to the principles for “good science” as analysed by Strauss and Corbin, which they summarise as significance, theory-observation, compatibility, generalisability, reproducibility, precision, rigor and verification (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 31). However, they argue that creativity is another aspect which is essential for the process of research and analysis, next to the ones just mentioned and should not be forgotten. Rather than merely describing the phenomenon, it is essential for grounded theory to develop theory, by using concepts and through interpretation, relating these concepts with each other through statements of relationships. There are two further aspects which are important in the process, which are theoretical sensitivity and practise. Theoretical sensitivity, implies that one needs to be

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aware of the bigger discourse through literature, personal and professional experience and analytic processes in order to generate theory from data. Meanwhile, throughout this process it is vital to take a step back from the theory and maintain an amount of scepticism towards the theoretical background as well as the data along the way. Finally, Strauss and Corbin argue that it is not enough to read information on grounded theory, but rather one should really study and even more so practice the procedures (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Throughout the whole process of the research two important elements are those of openness and flexibility. It is here that the methodology of grounded theory goes well together with that of a case study approach. Before going into an introduction of the applied methods of data sampling and data analysis, it seems important to reflect on and summarise the fundamental aspects and advantages of a shared case study and grounded theory methodology. As has been argued in the previous paragraphs, despite the fact that grounded theory generally aims at building emerging theory from the data, case study research often does not wish to follow those expectations. However, it has been shown that especially in multiple case study research this aspect can be different due to the method of constant comparative analysis, which is also applied in grounded theory. While both methodologies share the emphasis on openness, flexibility and creativity, it is the systematic approach of grounded theory that allows for more validity and reliability while at the same time the case study methodology allows for a deep understanding of the contexts studied. Therefore, it seems that the juxtaposition of the two approaches works very well as a methodological basis for this research.

4.2

Research Design: Methods of Data Sampling and Data Analysis

Interviews are an often chosen as a method of data acquisition for qualitative research. It can be said that semi-structured and unstructured interviews are more flexible and open, than structured ones and hence encourage an engagement and understanding of the subject’s perspective. They encourage themes and aspects to come up, which the researcher might not have anticipated, and by not adhering to a strict order of questions they allow the researcher to be more flexible in the interviewing process and the possibility of asking follow-up questions. Cohen et al. have analysed four types of interview, the informal conversational interview, which is comparable to the unstructured interview, the interview

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guide approach, which is comparable to a semi-structured interview, the standardised open-ended interview and the closed quantitative interview (Cohen et al., 2007). The advantages of a semi-structured interview approach are that in contrast to unstructured interviews, the guide allows for a somewhat more systematic approach and increases the comprehensiveness of data (Cohen et al., 2007), especially when multiple cases are being studied (Bryman, 2008). At the same time, the openness of the guide allows for logical gaps, emerging topics and questions during the interview to be covered and explored as well: the interview as such stays conversational and situational (Cohen et al., 2007). As I will look at a number of cases and I am interested in quite specific topics it seems that using an interview guide is more suitable for the research, rather than using unstructured interviews. Using a semi-structured approach allows first of all for relevant participants to be chosen (this will be specified more in the paragraph on theoretical sampling). Furthermore, it allows me to explore the subject’s opinions, beliefs and perspectives in-depth by asking open-ended questions generating long and detailed responses from the subjects and placing a focus on their constructions of the various topics. Through this process the interview is constructed both by the interviewer as well as the subject and opens a space for ideas and issues to be explored and raised (Charmaz, 2014). When I was preparing the interview guide, I tried to develop open-ended questions that would give possibilities for issues to be raised and not implicitly portray a bias, so that the subjects would not be influenced in their responses. I will introduce the main themes and questions of the guide after raising a few more relevant aspects. Also, I made sure, that the questions I was asking included a number of different purposes, such as asking for values, beliefs, places, emotions, stories, events, and so on (Bryman, 2008). Throughout the interviews I made sure that the aspects Woods considered important for interviewing, which are trust, curiosity and naturalness, were covered (Woods, 1986). It is important to have a trustful relationship with a participant in the qualitative research I’m conducting, and at the same time it seems essential to stay curious about the case and have a natural conversation that does not feel stiff or forced. At the start of each interview I made clear to the subjects that their perspectives could not be wrong or unnecessary. I also made sure that they were informed about the research and about the fact that their data will be anonymised and that they can withdraw from the research at any point without having to give a reason. It is essential that the participant’s comfort level is made a high priority even if it means that some topics might not be covered as in-depth as might be best for the research and especially if the topic poses levels of great distress or discomfort for the subject (Charmaz, 2014). I have designed the interview guide following three

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main topics, which are those of individual biography, media practices and surveillance. After asking about some basic information on the subject, the first part of the interview is based on the subject’s upbringing and the subject’s personality. The second part raised questions on which media they use online, which devices they use and which online content they frequent. Finally, the third part of the interview guide raised questions on their online shopping behaviour, and whether or not they have noticed personalised advertising, and in the last set of questions asked about the knowledge of the wider public discourse on surveillance. It is essential for grounded theory to sample the data. Despite often starting with an open sampling process, the overall sampling technique usually applied in grounded theory research is theoretical sampling. Theoretical sampling ensures both variation and density of data, as well as allows for but also demands a certain amount of flexibility (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Through analysis of previously collected data, from the iterative process of induction and deduction and the constant comparative analysis, all of the findings must then in turn influence future data sampling. This is going to be carried out until the data is “saturated”, which means that no more data is needed as sufficient data has been collected. Bryman argues that theoretical sampling entails the selection of interview subjects until theoretical saturation is achieved on the basis of the emerging theoretical foci (Bryman, 2008), which results in the fact that the research is often iterative, going back and forth between data collection and analysis. The sampling that has been carried out for this dissertation includes ten interviews with different people. The sampling technique used in identifying cases might best be classified as theoretical sampling. There are a number of reasons why this particular technique has been used. First of all, when looking at the research topic, it becomes obvious that in general anyone who uses the internet would be able to participate in this research as a subject. This of course makes it both easy and difficult at the same time. Therefore, I narrowed possible subjects down first of all by choice of language. Living and working in Germany at the time of the research, yet writing a qualitative dissertation in English, I decided to conduct the interviews only in English as the analysis will be in English as well. In particular, when closely looking at people’s constructions of their lives, habits or practices, there are different ways of expression and linguistic characteristics, as already mentioned, and therefore it advances cross-case comparison and reliability and validity of the research to carry out research and analysis in the same language if possible. Secondly, the generation that participated in my research are a generation who mostly grew up without internet in their younger years, started using internet during their adolescence and therefore have both experienced the advent of the internet and new technologies, but yet have still

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been introduced to it at a fairly young age. Most of the subjects have been found using personal acquaintances of the researcher. There are subjects of both genders, despite the fact that the category of gender did not seem to bear a central relevance for research findings in this case. In relation to cultural and educational background of the subjects, I have tried to make sure to cover a range. The huge differences between cultural backgrounds was something that emerged during the process of interviewing and analysis and has thus become relevant in the light of the research questions. Overall it can be said that the conducted interviews cover a range of theoretical categories in relation to the interview question, despite the fact that the research also considers their individual contexts, which results in a redundancy of theoretical sampling and classifying. As the interviews were conducted over the time of over a year and a half, transcription and analysis were also taking place throughout that time. All the interviews that have been conducted have been transcribed and during this process also been anonymised. Transcription is often analysed as an obvious but also very important stage in the research process (Hycner, 1985). While it may be carried out by many researchers, the transcription process as such is often taken for granted and not reflected upon enough (Davidson, 2009), even though it could be argued that transcription is a “powerful act of representation” (Mason et al., 2005) in itself. Mason et al. (2005) suggest that researchers should consider the transcription process and their respective decisions as to what include into a transcription and what to leave out and reflect on the impact that these decisions might have on the outcomes of the research. It is this process that I tried to follow in the transcriptions of my interviews as well. In order to enhance readability, I have refrained from noting too many details, but yet tried to include what seems relevant and particular within the recording of the interview situation. The memos taken after each interview can also help to guide the researcher by being aware of the general atmosphere of the interview and special instances that might have happened. The general rules of transcription used for this dissertation are based on guidelines by Kuckartz et al. (2008) and can shortly be summarised as follows: • The transcript will be noting exact words, however not phonetically but in correct spelling and neither in a summarising manner • No dialects will be presented in the transcript • Speech and punctuation will be smoothened in order to enhance readability • The transcript will be anonymised • Larger breaks and pauses in speech are marked by (…) • Special Emphasis will be marked by underlining

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• Acknowledging exclamations such as (hmm, aha) by the interviewer are not transcribed as long as they are not disturbing the speech flow of the interviewee. However, these exclamations are transcribed if part of the speech flow of the person actively speaking As described above, the interviews were anonymised in order to protect the subjects from possible harm, exposure or discomfort and to comply with ethical standards of academic research. Therefore, all names have been changed, data such as age has been generalised and data such as specific companies, cities or other defining information has been changed to general terms, as for example a big European city, where it has been considered to be essential so that the interview shall not be retraceable to the person who was taking part. Methods of Data Analysis – Grounded Theory After having explained and justified the applied methods for data collection from the semi-structured interview, the process of theoretical sampling, and the rules used and considerations made in relation to the transcription process, I will now give an account on the process of data analysis which is based on the grounded theory method developed by Glaser and Strauss (1967) and the later advancement of the theory by Strauss and Corbin (1990). One of the main features of the grounded theory method, is that theory emerges from data and not the other way round, where data would be used to back theory. In order to carry this out, what is essential on a basic level, is the iterative process of data collection and analysis, whereby more data is collected on the basis of what has already been analysed from previously collected data. This is done by using the constant comparative method, whereby comparisons are carried out during each step of the research process with the aim of analysing actions and processes rather than general themes or structures. Based on the data, codes and categories are generated from which the theory building takes place. During the coding process, memo-writing is an important step as is helps to elaborate on the categories, their relationships and properties. Cases are selected on the basis of theoretical sampling and do not intend to generalise or claim to represent the wider population (Charmaz, 2014). “The chief safeguard against stopping the development of one’s theory too soon is, as suggested throughout this book, the systematic use of comparative analysis. This gives a broad, rich, integrated, dense and grounded theory” (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 257). By this the grounded theory method is based fundamentally on the process of coding its data, which is done in three different ways: open coding, axial coding and selective coding.

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The first step is that of open coding, which refers to the initial process of breaking that data down, examining, labelling, comparing, conceptualising and categorising it (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Through open coding, the researcher creates a great number of code notes, which serve as a kind of memo and out of which the concepts are created. The resulting concepts are then summarised into categories. To summarise the aim of open coding, Strauss and Corbin say that: Open coding in grounded theory method is the analytic process by which concepts are identified and developed in terms of their properties and dimensions. The basic analytic procedures by which this is accomplished are: the asking of questions about data; and the making of comparisons for similarities and differences […] (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 74).

By “properties” Strauss and Corbin understand the characteristics and attributes related to a category and dimensions refer to the location of properties along a continuum. For example, if the category is reading online news then two possible properties might be how frequently and the length of time spent doing so. Therefore, the properties might be called “frequency” and “duration” and the respective dimensions would be on the spectrum from often to never for frequency and from long to short for duration. Hence open coding allows for an initial fracturing of the data, thus building basic categories, properties and dimensions form the data. The next step in the procedure is that of axial coding. While open and axial coding are two distinctive processes, they are not strictly linear when carried out, and as a result the researcher often alternates between the two modes during the course of analysis (Corbin & Strauss, 1990, p. 98). In axial coding the data that has been fractured during the open coding process are put back together by making new connections between the various categories to form several main categories. Using a coding paradigm axial coding leaves properties and dimensions behind and focuses instead on developing a number of sub-categories in relation to the following aspects: casual conditions, context, intervening conditions, action or interactional strategies and consequences. Thus, the following relation between categories and subcategories arise: a) casual conditions, which refer to the events of incidents that have led to a phenomenon, give rise to the b) phenomenon, which is set in a certain c) context, assuming a specific set of phenomenon properties such as location or context, and also set within d) intervening conditions, referring to broader structural contexts such as biographical aspects. This can lead to e) action and interaction strategies, such as purposeful and goal-oriented action and finally all of this results in f) consequences, which are the outcomes of the action (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, pp. 99–107).

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After the procedure of axial coding, the final step is selective coding. Selective coding encompasses selecting one core category and then relating other categories to the core category. These relationships must then be validated in the process and thus help to refine and develop the categories further. Once this has been done, the story of the research can emerge. The categories which were previously labelled during axial coding are integrated into a grounded theory which is presented in a narrative story line. The integration process thereby is not very different to the process in axial coding, but takes place at a more abstract level of analysis (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 117). Once the storyline, including the core category and all subsidiary categories has been developed, it is important to validate these relationships which is done by a combination of inductive and deductive procedures and by validating the theory against the data, thus systematising and solidifying the connection and grounding the theory. It is by this process that the grounded theory method allows for internal validity and reliability to be increased. Due to the systematic work with the data errors within the research, in the sense of internal validity, can be minimised and, because of the constant validating of theory and data and the mixture of inductive and deductive elements reliability is also enhanced. Given the methodological considerations, as well as the data collection technique of interviews, theoretical sampling and transcription as well as the highly systematic grounded theory approach for data analysis used in the research design of the dissertation, the internal validity and reliability of the research are given. The interviews were conducted over a 21 month period from April 2016 to December 2017. The dates for each of the interviews (1 to 10) can be found in the timeline below (Figure 4.1).

Figure 4.1 Timeline of Cases (own representation)

The extent to which the researched topic was of relevance during the interviews is dependent upon:

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1. The context of the time the interview was taken (e.g. in relation to Trump’s election campaign, the topic of data collection seemed to rise in relevance) 2. The context of the place the subject was living in during the time of the interview (e.g. those that live in the UK have been subjected to the topic to different extents than those living in Germany, this also relates to the next point to some extent) 3. Personal practices of news consumption by the subjects (e.g. different subjects in the interviews have different practices for reading and consuming the news in relation to different news providers, the amounts of news consumed, etc.) 4. The personal areas of interest of the subjects. (e.g. some of the subjects have particular personal interests in relation to the research topic and are thus better informed than others, as they not only consume news, but actively engage in the topic matter) Of the ten interviews that were taken, five interviews were given by male subjects, and five were given by female subjects. The subjects’ ages ranged from 24 years to 31 years, while there was a varying degree of educational and cultural backgrounds apparent. This included participants whose highest educational qualifications ranged from Secondary School Diploma to Masters Degrees, as well as different cultural backgrounds, including Brazil, China, Denmark, Germany, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Poland, Turkey and UK, and finally different religious backgrounds including Christian, Muslim, Jewish and Atheist. The cases prove to be very heterogeneous and contrastive, not only due to their socio-demographic variance but also in relation to how the cases are positioned in relation to the categories. It is precisely because of the high level of contrast between the cases that the sample is able to provide a level of saturation.

4.3

Further Considerations: Ethics and Research

When researching user perspectives on online practices, questions of privacy and questions of surveillance and placing this in relation to the users’ own subjectivities it seems to be inevitable that one needs to consider the ethical and moral implications of empirically doing this research with human subjects. Furthermore, I would like to look at the ethical implications of on the one hand doing research and collecting data concerning personal information about subjects in academic research and on the other hand looking at the theoretical differences of data collection processes between economic companies and academic researchers and, by

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extension, the ethical implications and critical reflections that such a comparison can expose. “Reflexivity in research is not a single or universal entity but a process—an active, ongoing process that saturates every stage of the research” (Guillemin & Gillam, 2004, p. 274). After having done a number of interviews interviewing subjects about their thoughts towards companies and governments collecting and using their personal data in order to reach the companies’ and governments’ respective goals, I might have realised more than before that the ethical considerations I need to regard as an academic researcher, especially in the context I am researching, go much further than only considering implications during the research until publication. Diener and Crandall (1978) have analysed four main issues which various ethical principles touch on, which are firstly that the participants are not harmed in any way, secondly to prevent a lack of informed consent, thirdly not to invade the participants’ privacy and lastly to prevent any form of deception of the participants. It seems, as has been indicated in the quote by Guillemin and Gillam above, that this process of doing research ethically and therefore adhering to the principles by Diener and Crandall, is an active and ongoing one especially in the light of complex and often not foreseeable structures that are part of doing research on and through the internet. Throughout this, ethically important moments arise time and again in which the researcher is confronted with situations where she needs to decide how to act and behave accordingly and maintain the ethical requirements she either has been set or set herself. That these requirements might go further than simply gaining the approval of an ethics committee and maintaining institutional or legal requirements set for the researcher from outside structures, has been argued by a range of academics (Guillemin & Gillam, 2004) and seems to be inevitable especially when confronted with situations for which none of the formal requirements might assist as a guideline. The scrutiny with which the researcher is to critically analyse their research data, should equal the scrutiny with which the researcher should critically reflect on his own role and actions in the research process (Mason, 1996). Ethical research then is to be defined as much broader than just being limited to formal requirements or standards, undergoing scrutiny, reflection and interrogation not only of the data, but also of the researcher and the participants where possible and necessary (Guillemin & Gillam 2004). In this sense doing empirical research can never be only about the data that is collected but needs to always consider the processes of how this data is collected, analysed, stored, etc. including consideration for the objectives of both the researchers as well as the participants. Through this process the research can be understood as a form of

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knowledge construction in which both the researcher as well as the participants are engaged in the production of knowledge (Guillemin & Gillam 2004). And it is by this perspective on making sure that research is carried out ethically, that it differs in parts to economic processes of data collection. Ethical Aspects in Light of Digitalisation and Economisation In light of the theoretical philosophical considerations that have just been brought forward, it is worth looking at a few more practical and contemporary aspects that these considerations can be applied to. Qualitative social research is often context specific, as has already been argued, and therefore demands a special consideration of individual backgrounds and circumstances. In my own research where I have interviewed subjects from various different cultures and backgrounds about their individual identities and internet practices, it has proven that paying special attention to these backgrounds and differences is very important. Especially in internet research, but this can also be applied to offline forms of research, the researcher is required to act in consideration of different cultural approaches to, for example, questions of privacy and how an appropriate balance of both freedom of expression and questions of personal privacy can be asked, which may vary to great extents between different cultures (Fry, 2006). The global reach of the internet challenges researchers, as well as other actors on the internet, to respect the diverging cultural differences in practices, ethical governance and legal requirements (Eynon et al., 2008). Subjects of internet research are no longer as clearly protected by national research guidelines and requirements. The lack of clarity in relation to the legal framework with regards to privacy rights and other aspects related to practices on the internet, results in a disadvantage of the individual subject, consumer, user, etc. for whom it might not be obvious in which legal framework she is moving at any certain moment in time when conducting any form of transaction or expression on the internet. As has been shown in the section on political and judicial aspects of contemporary practices, it is easy for companies, researchers and governments to use this legal ambiguity to their favour and therefore disrespect the required ethical considerations that would be needed in order to really show respect for the cultural diversity one can find on the internet.4 While it might bring a lot of advantages for researchers, companies or governments that the internet is such a diverse and global space, bringing opportunities 4

Note that the empirical data presented in this research was not collected in the internet, but rather only deal with a topic related to questions of personal data produced predominantly on the internet.

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of reaching people more easily where it would not have been possible before, the aspect of taking advantage of exactly this should not be belittled or forgotten but taken into careful consideration. These considerations go beyond formal and legal requirements but adhere to the broader considerations of acting equitable. One could ask why this form of self-obligation or reflexion of one’s own doing is important especially in the sense of going beyond the basic requirements as for example posed by an ethics committee. Earlier I have already mentioned the four main principles of doing ethical research that Diener and Crandall (1978) have analysed as being related to circumventing harm, lack of informed consent, privacy breaches and deception in relation to the subjects of the research. The question of harm might especially be one that is not as straight forward to answer as one might think. What does it exactly mean if a subject is harmed? How far does a researcher have to anticipate possible harm threats? How should harm be defined? Some of the questions are not as easy to answer: sometimes one might not know the benefit and relevance of the research outcome beforehand. And second of all, what happens if the answer to one of the question changes during the course of the research? The questions of change and foresight are considerations that I have especially been confronted with during my own research. Do researchers need to consider future risks? How far are they to go with this and how should they weigh this up against possible benefits? As I have been researching questions of privacy and power through data ownership these questions need to be considered even more so. The question of how data is stored and transmitted, given the possibility of governmental and economic agents being able to access private laptops, phone, cameras, microphones installed in phones, etc. does also pose deliberations for researchers. Harm to the subjects of research can be caused by breaches of anonymity and confidentiality through the violations of storing and using data, even if this is done unknowingly on the side of the researcher (Fox et al., 2003). It is also within the researcher’s duty to ensure the anonymity and confidentiality of the research data during the transmission and storage of this data (Nosek et al., 2002). All of this shows however, that the researcher has to consider a range of new threats to the data collection, transmission and storage process as well as exhibiting technical abilities in order to impair these threats. This aspect does not only apply to researchers of academic empirical research but also relates to the criticism brought about in relation to the companies’ and governments’ data collection processes. Each company as much as each individual is required to protect the personal data that they have been given by costumers, research subjects or citizens. Despite the fact that this has always been the case, data ownership is also related to questions of power and money more so than ever in our current

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society (boyd and Crawford, 2012). There seems to be convergence between what is defined as research data and what is defined as commercial data on the internet (Eynon et al., 2008). Data often gains an additional value next to the research purpose, where the reuse of data through third parties happens to a much greater extent than in similar offline contexts. In the light of economisation and commercialisation processes, which have also taken an influence on university and academic funding, many funding bodies now mandate the submission of data to databases and archives in order to satisfy funding requirements, which Eynon et al. have labelled as “institutional imperatives” of internet social sciences (Eynon et al., 2008, p. 38). Alongside this process, the question of social inequalities presents itself on two different layers. On the one hand, questions of access to information rich databases might pose a challenge for academic researchers who might not have the necessary financial means, in comparison to corporate researchers in order to gain access to these databases (boyd and Crawford, 2012). This whole aspect could be discussed in much greater detail, however it does outreach the scope of possible discussion at this point. Secondly, it raises questions of representational inequalities. A proportion of the population might not be represented on the internet and therefore not be able to participate in online research and therefore might be less likely to gain benefits thus resulting in the reinforcement of already existing social divisions (Mann, 2003). As part of my own research on privacy and personal data being collected, I have had to critically ask myself where my own research actually differs from the practices of companies or states. Considering the ultimate purpose of research might be difficult, for companies this quite often seems to be revenue-driven. For governments, already it seems much more complicated to grasp and even for my own research I find it difficult to say. “Is the aim to construct knowledge, advance the researcher’s career, further the specific goals of the research participants, or some more theoretically based purpose, such as “is this an ethically appropriate purpose?” (Guillemin & Gillam, 2004, p. 275). I have often reflected on my own research and wondered whether what I do differs in its purpose to the purpose of, for example, companies. Can I really say that what I am doing, I am not also doing to advance in my personal career which might one day lead to an increased salary and reputation? And if so, what would the consequences be? It seems to me that there are a few differences however. To draw a conclusion on what I have demonstrated in the last two paragraphs, there seems to be a discrepancy between personal ethical behaviour by individual people and more general principles within academic fields, industries or institutions. While every person might feel obliged to act with equity or might not feel obliged to do so,

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there are also rules and requirements set as normalised standards within various fields, industries and areas. The German law for informational self-determination for example, as has been demonstrated earlier, can only be circumvented given that the individual’s interest is outweighed by a broader public interest. A consideration for both the public interest as well as the individual interest therefore seems inevitable and sometimes the conclusion cannot be so clear. This is why a sense of equity and reflexivity are needed, alongside of more rigid, normalised ethical or justice systems. Keeping these theoretical considerations as well as the complexity of the research topic, due to the ever-changing nature of practices on the internet in mind, I will now explain how I have made sure that my own personal research is ethically justifiable. Following Diener and Crandall’s four issues of ethical principles (Diener & Crandall, 1978), I have first of all made sure that the subjects are not harmed, as well as I could. The topics touched upon in the interview guide did not necessarily refer to potentially traumatising experiences in the subjects’ past. Therefore, no extra precautions were deemed necessary in the eyes of the researcher. Secondly, I have made sure that the subjects were sufficiently informed about the research and research aims, thus preventing a lack of informed consent. As in all cases, I have made very clear to the subjects that they partake in this research voluntarily and that they may withdraw from it without giving a reason at any moment in time. Thirdly, I tried not to invade the participant’s privacy by also emphasising to them the fact that they only had to tell me what they wanted to tell me and if they didn’t want to answer a question they could do so without giving a reason. Being aware that saying no can be difficult in a situation such as the interview situation, I tried throughout to create a relaxed atmosphere in which the subjects indeed felt as if they were free to say what they wanted to say and do what they wanted to do. Finally, Diener and Crandall analyse the need to prevent subjects from any form of deception, which was not applicable in my case as I openly introduced the research topic and did not declare or distribute any deceiving information at any point before, during or after the interview process. Thus, by paying attention to the individual contexts, and the cultural and religious heterogeneity, while allowing the interview to openly flow in an almost conversational manner as well as reflecting on possible problems, storing the data correctly and anonymising the data, I feel that basic ethical standards of scientific research were met in this research. The reflexive and open attitude was something that also lasted throughout all of the stages into analysis and writing.

4.4 Introduction to Categorical Analysis and Discussion

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Introduction to Categorical Analysis and Discussion

“I think there is maybe, maybe the better way of looking at it, is there is an unlimit of wilful blindness, so I’m aware that the information I put, I am sort of telling the world, not just in terms of date of birth, but even what sites I go on. I’m telling, I’m creating a map of who I am and what I’m doing and my interests and, even if it’s like, let’s see sexy pictures of Tom Hardy, like that’s says something about me and if someone wanted to gather all that, I guess that would be quite (…) worrying. So that’s it, it is personal but I choose to ignore that, cause otherwise what can you do.” (John, l. 265-271)

The quote from one of the interviews transcribed above, highlights the relevant categories that have emerged from the data throughout the iterative process of data analysis. Looking at the quote might help to make apparent the structure of the categories that will form the basic principles of the line of argumentation developed within this research. The first category within the theoretical model is “Conditions of the Current Digital State”, which is not explicitly referenced in the short quote, but is implicitly touched upon by the practices that John describes which are taking place in certain conditions of how the internet works and is set up. The relationship between personal practices and data collection processes can be found when he says that he is giving out information about himself “not just in terms of date of birth, but even what sites I go on”. This points out the way in which the conditions of media structures relate to the practices that take place under the existing conditions. The second category which has been found, is titled “Conditions of Control and Agency” and similar to the first category, while not being mentioned explicitly in the quote above, is hinted at by notions of agency and lack of agency, as apparent in the form of expressions like “I choose to” or by indicating an action based on a lack of other options, “cause otherwise what can you do”. The conceptions that the subjects in the cases have formulated in relation to the amount of agency they perceive for themselves to varying degrees proves to be interesting in relation to both online and offline5 contexts and across a range of circumstances and areas of life, as will be shown. Thirdly, what might be regarded as the central category of the model, refers to questions of identity and how the subjects define themselves both in general as well as through references to the personal data that is available about them online. John states in the quote above: “I’m telling, I’m creating a map of who I am and what I’m doing” and thereby touches on this third category, which analyses 5

Note that the differentiation between online and offline is not understood to be conflictive or dichotomous, meaning that often online and offline contexts are interwoven and therefore cannot (always) be separated.

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how the self is both theorised and presented by the subjects across a range of contexts. The third category, which is titled “Conditions of the Self” is closely related to both category one and two. Following the juxtaposition of these first three categories which indicate conditions rather than results, the fourth category seems to be more outcome oriented and results from the conditions of the first three. The fourth category, which is entitled “Conditions for Consequences” picks up on aspects of how the subjects develop and form their opinions and make meaning of the conditions explained before. This category is indicated in the above quote by references to feelings about the conditions such as “I guess that would be quite (…) worrying”. On top of this, the category looks at possible forms for action or reaction in dependence on as well as in contrast to the opinions that have been formed by the subjects. The tension between these considerations proves to be worthwhile exploring especially from an educational perspective. This can be seen also in the quote above, where John has analysed the condition of data tracking and the possibility of someone being able to collect all of his personal data as “worrying” and yet his choice for reacting to this circumstance is to “ignore that” (that it is personal and worrying) with what he eloquently summarises as an “unlimit of wilful blindness” due to a felt lack of other options. This raises the question of whether or not an awareness of the conditions is enough in order to feel agentic and how this in turn influences the perception that the subjects have and give of themselves. This final question demonstrates the relationship that the categories have between each other as they are all interrelated and co-dependent. The expression John uses, “wilful blindness”, serves as a metaphor which might be used to describe the majority of techniques used by the subjects in the interviews. The notion of “wilful blindness” highlights a sense of ambivalence, as of course wilful blindness as such is a contradiction in itself. The contradiction of being blind, and deciding to “be blind” by ignoring things that could be seen, indicates the complexity and ambivalence of any notion of agency in relation to the topic of the research context, which runs throughout the various categories. The ambivalent feelings that the subjects state in the interviews in relation to their opinions, their reactions, their knowledge as well as themselves open a possibility of understanding the interrelation between these categories in light of contemporary practices in a digitalised world, which in turn are relevant for a number of theoretical considerations in the social sciences. Furthermore these ambivalent feelings can be analysed as resulting from and being dependent on the following aspects: a notion of uncertainty and at the same time a juxtaposition of processes of fragmentation and synthesis. These processes of fragmentation and synthesis

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can be observed in relation to a number of topics that also are of importance for the categories, such as data, self or cultural aspects. The notion of fragmentation and synthesis hence also leads to feelings of ambivalence and uncertainty, which seem to mark all of the categories developed as part of the research and prove to be a central aspect in the analysis and for further theoretical considerations. The four categories which are of relevance for the research can be depicted as seen in figure 4.2, including the connexional element of ambivalence and uncertainty in relation to a juxtaposition of synthesis and fragmentation indicated by the arrow lying alongside the categories in the illustration. In the following chapters, the most relevant findings and dimensions of each category will be presented consecutively, before a final conclusion is drawn (Figure 4.2).

Figure 4.2 Preconditions, Conditions and Consequences (own representation)

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boyd, d. & Crawford, K. (2012). Critical Questions for Big Data. Information, Communication and Society. 15 (5) (pp. 662–679). https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118x.2012.678878 Bryman, A. (2008). Social Research Method - 3rd Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Buckingham, D. (1993). Children Talking Television – The Making of Television Literacy. London: The Falmer Press. Buckley, P.J. & Carter, M. (1999). Managing Cross Border Complementary Knowledge. International Studies of Management and Organization 29(1) (pp. 80–104). Burrell, G. & Morgan, G. (1979). Sociological Paradigms and Organizational Analysis. London: Heinemann Educational. Charmaz, K. (2014). Constructing Grounded Theory - 2nd Edition. Los Angeles/ London: SAGE. Cohen, L.; Manion, L. & Morrison, K. (2007). Research Methods in Education - 6th Edition. New York/Oxon: Routledge. Crotty, M. (1998). The Foundations of Social Science Research: Meaning and Perspective in the Research Process. New South Wales: Allen and Uwin. Davidson, C. (2009). Transcription: Imperatives for Qualitative Research. International Journal of Qualitative Research 8(2) (pp. 35–62). Retrieved March 3, 2017, from: http://ejo urnals.library.ualberta.ca/index.php/IJQM/index Denzin, N.K. & Lincoln, Y.S. (1994). Introduction: Entering the Field of Qualitative Research. In N.K. Denzin & Y.S. Lincoln (eds.) Handbook of Qualitative Research. Thousand Oaks: Sage. Dewey, J. (1960). Experience and Nature. New York: Dover Publications. Dewey, J. (1948). Reconstruction in Philosophy. Boston: Beaton Press. Diener, E. & Crandall, R. (1978). Ethics in Social and Behavioral Research. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Erickson, F. (1986). Qualitative methods in research on teaching. In M. C. Wittrock (Ed.), Handbook of Research on Teaching (pp. 119–161). New York: Macmillan. Eynon, R. Fry, J. and Schroeder, R. (2008) ‘Chapter 2: The Ethics of Internet Research’ in Fielding, N., Lee, R.M. and Blank, G. (eds) The Sage Handbook of Online Research. London: Sage. pp. 23–41. Fox, J., Murray, C. and Warm, A. (2003). ‘Conducting research using Web-based questionnaires: practical, methodological, and ethical considerations’. International Journal of Social Research Methodology. 6 (2) pp. 167–180. Fry, J. (2006). ‘Editorial: Google’s privacy responsibilities at home and abroad’. Journal of Librarianship and Information Science. 38 (3) pp. 135–139. Garfinkel, H. (1967). Studies in Ethnomethodology. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Geertz, C. (1973). The Interpretation of Culture. London: Hutchinson. Glaser, B. (1992). Basics of Grounded Theory Analysis. Mill Valley: Sociology Press. Glaser, B. (1978). Theoretical Sensitivity. Mill Valley: Sociology Press. Glaser, B. & Strauss, A. (1967). Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research. New Brunswick/ London: Aldine Transaction. Guillemin, M. and Gillam, L. (2004). Ethics, Reflexivity, and “Ethically Important Moments” in Research. Qualitative Inquiry. (10) pp. 261–280 Hammersley, M. (2013). What is Qualitative Research? London: Bloomsbury Academic. Retrieved February 15, 2017, from: http://dx.doi.org/10.5040/9781849666084

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Hycner, R. H. (1985). Some Guidelines for the Phenomenological Analysis of Interview Data. Human Studies 8. (pp. 279–303). Kuckartz, U.; Dresing, T.; Rädiker, S. & Stefer, C. (2008). Qualitative Evaluation – Der Einstieg in die Praxis. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag. LeCompte, M.D. & Goetz, J.P. (1982). Problems of Reliability and Validity in Ethnographic Research. Review of Educational Research 52 (pp. 31.60). Mabry, L. (2008). Case Study in Social Research. In P. Alasuutari; L. Brickman & J. Brannen (Eds.) The SAGE Handbook of Social Research Methods. (pp. 214–227). London: Sage. Mann, C. (2003) ‘Generating data online: ethical concerns and challenges for the C21 researcher’, in M. Thorseth (ed) Applied Ethics in Internet Research. Trondheim: NTNU Publications Series No.1. pp. 31–49. Mason, J. (1996). Qualitative researching. London: Sage. Mason, T.L.; Oliver, D. G. & Serovich, J. M. (2005). Constraints and Opportunities with Interview Transcription: Towards Reflection in Qualitative Research. Social Forces 84 (2). Mead, G. H. (1932). Philosophy of the present. LaSalle, IL: Open Court Press. Mead, G.H. (1934). Mind, Self and Society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Miles, M.B. & Huberman, A.M. (1994). Qualitative Data Analysis: An Expanded Sourcebook – 2nd Edition. Thousand Oaks: Sage. Mitrou L., Kandias M., Stavrou V. & Gritzalis, D. (2014). Social media profiling: A Panopticon or Omniopticon tool? in Proc. of the 6th Conference of the Surveillance Studies Network. Spain: 2014. Retrieved August 11, 2018, from: https://www.infosec.aueb.gr/Publications/ 2014-SSN-Privacy%20Social%20Media.pdf Morgan, G. & Smircich, L. (1980). The Case for Qualitative Research’ in Academy of Management Review 5 (4) (pp. 491–500) Retrieved December 9, 2015, from: http://www.jstor. org/stable/257453 Morrison, K.R.B. (1998). Management Theories for Educational Change. London: Paul Chapman. Nosek, B., Banaji, M. and Greenwald, A. (2002). ‘E-research: ethics, security, design and control in psychological research on the Internet’. Journal of Social Issues. 58 (1) pp. 161– 176. Robson, C. (2002). Real World Research – A Resource for Social Scientists and PractitionerResearchers – 2nd Edition. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. Skeat, W. (1888) Etymological Dictionary of the English Language. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Strauss, A. & Corbin, J. (1990). Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and Procedures for Developing Grounded Theory. Newbury Park: Sage Publications. Woods, P. (1986). Inside Schools: Ethnography in Educational Research. London: Routledge & Kegan and Paul.

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Conditions of the Current Digital State Ambivalent Structures

“Cyberspace is ambivalent. It is a circulation zone for empty signs and an arena for cynical power games, but it also entails a kingdom of possibilities.” (Søby, 2000, p. 129)

Cyberspace, virtual space, internet – all of these terms might be used and understood in a daily context without having to define their exact meanings as they have become an integral part of the daily lives of many people around the world. At the very same time, Søby’s quote also emphasises a sense of ambivalence that can be analysed in relation to cyberspace. One could on the one hand focus on the possibilities that are offered and created, or on the other hand understand cyberspace more critically as being subjected to power structures and entailing nothing but meaningless content. No matter which of these poles one might lean towards, it becomes apparent that the conditions of what cyberspace actually is have to be defined and analysed. Even as they are undergoing constant change. This is why the first category of the theory developed in this research seeks to define the conditions of the digital state as described by the subjects in their interviews. The conditions of the current digital state, that the subjects highlight and express in their interviews both explicitly as well as implicitly, are essential in order to place some of the relevant findings within the correct context. The insights that can be gained by looking at these conditions in detail are of manifold significance not only for further consideration in general, but also for being able to understand the contextual framework apparent in this research in particular. The category itself is divided into four dimensions entitled Datafication, Functionality, Temporality and Religions and Illusion. Following the structure of these four dimensions the following chapter will highlight the most interesting aspects on the quality and practices that are related to the four dimensions in this category (Figure 5.1).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2021 E. Ferraro, Wilful Blindness, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-32654-8_5

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Figure 5.1 Category 1 - Conditions of the Current Digital State (own representation)

As will be observable throughout the analysis, the notion of ambivalence and uncertainty in light of processes of synthesis and fragmentation is of central relevance to the line of argumentation of this book. These processes, which can be observed in relation to numerous topics, will be explained and illustrated as the core argument of the book evolves alongside the analysis of the data. To illustrate the processes of synthesis and fragmentation it is worthwhile to indicate an understanding of these terms and how they will be used in this analysis. As one might look at a difference between what is understood by digital and analogue, what stands out is the qualitative difference of the essence of these concepts. While the word digital is etymologically based on the Latin word digitus, meaning finger (Bailey, 1773), it highlights the binary or rather fractured structure of digital artefacts, which unlike analogue ones, are not continuous as such. Thus, one could indeed observe an understanding of the essence of digital artefacts which is fractured, while at the same time this is often not observable to the eye of the beholder, as the artefact itself might seem continuous from where the subject is looking at it. This idea then is indicative also of identity theories as postulated in postmodern thinking, where the identity of a subject is seen as fragmented, and lacking a sense of totality (Deleuze & Guattari, 1977), while from the outsider’s perspective this might indeed come across very differently (Bauman, 2012), meaning that the person looking from outside might indeed observe the illusion of a sense of totality. If it is assumed that there cannot be a totality as such, then questions of

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how parts might be fragmented and synthesised back together gain in relevance. This idea, will be brought up again in relation to questions of the self as well as questions on the nature of digital and analogue data, where of course the examples and theoretical ideas might differ extremely, yet the basic interest in processes of synthesis and fragmentation remains. Especially when analysing the dimensions of Datafication, Temporality and Religions and Illusion within this category, these processes will become relevant and help to understand one of the core arguments brought forward in this book.

5.1

Dimension 1: Functionality or How Media Practices Are Negotiated by the Subjects

The core arguments raised in the analysis of the dimension of functionality can be summarised as shown in the following figure (Figure 5.2):

Figure 5.2 Core Arguments of the Dimension of Functionality in First Category (own representation)

When looking at the current state of the art in relation to media, it becomes apparent that their functionality plays an important role. Functionality is etymologically based in the Latin term functio and describes a “performance” or an “execution” (Bailey, 1773) referring to a purpose of how a certain thing might work. The dimension of functionality hence includes the ways in which the subjects use and not use various types of media for their respective purposes, thus also referring to the subjects’ media practices and media routines. While at first these aspects will be highlighted giving insights into how the subjects use various online media and what the purposes of these uses are, this analysis will be followed by an analysis of the ambivalences in relation to these functions. Here it

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will be seen that the functions media can have not only stand in contrast to ethical considerations or considerations in relation to privacy, but also in the way in which the subjects might be used for serving a function themselves, thus to a certain extent “objectifying” them (Mitrou et al., 2014). The basic functions of media and technology are interwoven into the daily routines of the subjects in a manner that is worth noting. Patrick states that: “I wake up every day and after going to the bathroom I go to two websites and I visit these two websites […] one is the Guardian website and the other is boing boing” (Patrick, l. 473–479). What Patrick states here, can be argued to demonstrate the importance of the practice of visiting these websites in relation to his daily routine. The practice is placed directly after what might be analysed as the physical necessities of waking up and going to the bathroom. In this sense, it could be argued that the purpose of media might indeed exceed a purpose of mere functionality, i.e. of serving a certain reason, but rather is embedded in wider daily routines and practices that create the everyday lives of the subjects. In order to discuss this question, it is worth looking at other examples of how media is said to function by the subjects. Indeed accounts of playing down the meaning of this functionality aside from a mere purpose-driven use can be found in the interviews, such as in the case of Jamie, who “only post[s] certain things anyway […] (Jamie, l. 322–323) including updates on his work, funny things and charity stuff, but not much more. It also becomes explicitly obvious when John states that: “I used to be on Twitter, Tumblr, Facebook and LinkedIn. But recently, part of it is because I’m doing my masters, it distracts me quite a lot […] I sort of stopped that. I’ll probably go back to LinkedIn once I start looking for new jobs” (John, l. 137–140). What can be seen here, is a shift of priority due to the academic studies for his masters, which result in the withdrawal from social media. Further to that, what is even more interesting, is the reasoning for signing back up to LinkedIn once John starts looking for possible job opportunities. Here the purpose-driven perspective on media and especially social media becomes very apparent. Individual aspects, tools and services of media are evaluated for being used or not used on the expected profit they may bring. This can also be seen in the following two examples, which highlight interesting aspects of the purpose-driven functionality of different services. The first example focuses on the functionality of (social) media for social aspects. As Gabriela indicates, she mainly uses Instagram as a way to see “what others, what my family is up to […] a way to stay in touch somehow with them” (Gabriela, l. 365–367). Here the use of media seems to be related particularly to circumstances of globalisation and contexts in which the subjects have strong social relations across distances which do not allow for regular meetings. Aspects of how (social) media may enable the communication

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of social contacts across space and time is of course nothing new (Dimmick et al., 2010). Lukas relates to this argument in the following way using the example of WhatsApp: “It’s free communication. I can, I have friends in the States and I can talk to them for free, immediately, […] And there are no commercials […] most annoying things that are online you know” (Lukas, l. 476–480). Lukas describes WhatsApp not only as a tool to communicate to friends of his, stressing the temporal and spatial dimensions, but also highlights the fact that WhatsApp is free and without commercials. The economic dimension that he opens up here is one worth considering. Commercials stand in contrast to a mere purpose-driven notion of functionality and at the same time so often prove to be the condition for being able to use a service “for free” in the first place due to the economic structures of media services and technologies. However, it can be seen that media serve a social purpose, despite the economic structures they function in. The second example of how media seem to be used for certain purposes from the perspective of the subjects is that of a tool for inspiration and motivation and against boredom. Lukas states he uses YouTube, mainly when he is bored as one can find anything on there, and Simone uses her phone for “taking care of boredom during travel times” (Simone, l. 384–385), where she uses Twitter to follow artists as an inspiration and motivation for herself (Simone, l. 453). Gabriela also states that she uses Pinterest as an inspiration (Gabriela, l. 346– 350). It seems then that different platforms are related to specific functions for the individual subject, which is nicely illustrated by the way in which Simone describes the structuring of the apps on her phone: Simone: Cause I have folders. The stuff that I use most is at the bottom, so the browser, phone and music. And I have a folder for social stuff, for mind and body stuff, so there would be my period tracker, my ebook reader, learning apps, ehm general usefuls, that would be the camera, the play stores and there the Deutsche Bahn app, and a boredom folder, which has Netflix, Reddit and all the games and stuff. (Simone, l. 422–426)

It is interesting to note that Simone quite explicitly defines the functions of individual apps for herself and groups them together according to these definitions and thematic foci. This synthesis of certain apps into thematic groupings seems to be contextual for the particular case of Simone and her specific ways of using and structuring her media practices. Generally the functions accessed by using certain types of media are subject to change as could be seen in the case of John, who resigned from social media platforms in the process of doing his master’s degree. It can also be seen in the case of Miranda, who while in China mainly uses Chinese platforms such as Weibo

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or WeChat, however to communicate with contacts in other countries still uses Facebook. In this case it is particularly interesting, as she needs to use a VPN to change her IP address in order to even access Facebook while being in China. While certain services might undergo changes in the way they function, the internet itself has undergone changes in relation to its purpose, as also highlighted by Lukas in his interview, who describes the changes of the internet from an altruistic beginning with a focus on sharing research to the contemporary conditions focusing on its function as a market place (Lukas, l. 837–846). As was shown the functions of certain types of media or certain platforms are subject to change and dependent on individual contexts of the subjects. However, this is not the only notion that might lead to a feeling of uncertainty in relation to the state of the art of media. Another reason for this uncertainty might be seen in the ambivalence that arises through the benefits of the functions of different media contrasted against ethical considerations or considerations on questions of privacy. While this aspect will be picked up again throughout this book, it is worth highlighting how the ambivalence between the perceived benefit of a technology contrasts against other considerations. Looking at three examples will help to highlight the ways in which this phenomenon takes place. The first example deals with the ambivalent estimation the subjects hold about a company such as Amazon. In the case of Patrick this becomes particularly clear. As can be seen in the description the case of Patrick’s attitude towards the internet is overall quite negative and connoted with anxieties. Patrick describes Amazon as “a fantastic model of how the internet can be used” (Patrick, l. 983– 984), as he feels uncomfortable in crowded high streets. However, and this is exactly the point that has to be made here, he also states that: “not that I totally support the idea, but it’s yeah but it’s for it’s so handy” (Patrick, l. 954–955), indicating the predominance of handiness above the fact that “obviously there is ethical parts of how the business is run that I, I’m not such a big fan of” (Patrick, l. 984–985). It is clear that the individual, in this case Patrick, has to negotiate these ethical considerations and the attitudes they have towards certain platforms against the benefit of the functions that these platforms also serve. Laila for example mentions the way in which Amazon allows for individuals to easily have access to publishing books, with a print on demand and e-book function as something which allows for the publication and distribution of perspectives which otherwise might not be able to be shared considering regular market practices in the publishing sector. Indeed this discussion does not only relate to ethical economical questions but also to wider economic questions of market shares, as in the case of Amazon or Google, which go beyond the scope of this research.

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Yet, what stays of central relevance to this research, is the fundamental question of why and how individuals negotiate their participation or withdrawal from particular online services in the light of huge news coverage on potential ethical problems (Harrison, 2013; Angwin, 2018) as in the case of Facebook or Amazon. This question does not only relate to ethical considerations but also to the attitude that the subjects have in relation to privacy rights. The negotiation of whether to use a certain type of media despite possible problems in relation to personal data and privacy is one that the subjects need to negotiate continuously: Gabriela: I’m actually quite bad with this, because you know I have my passwords on Google for instance, […] And I mean yeah I think I store quite a lot of my passwords on Google. Ehm (…) and I […]. I mean I have things like Google docs, so I back up certain files on there. […] And yeah and I mean my Google password is stored, I think anyways, is stored on my phone […] (Gabriela, l. 506–517)

As can be seen in the case of Gabriela, despite knowing that it might be problematic to store many passwords in Google, along with other files including personal data such as documents, photos, etc., Gabriela still uses Google for all of these services. As she states she does this despite knowing that it is “quite bad”. What becomes obvious throughout the interviews is an awareness of the discourse on personal data and privacy and the possibility for an infringement in relation to these topics and yet there seems to be something missing when looking at the data that was just presented. While the subjects actually are aware of many of the processes, they at the same time often portray their media practices as function oriented and position themselves to be very agentic in relation to this. While the other categories in the research will elaborate on these questions further, it should be stated here that the intensity with which the media interfere and intrude into the subjects’ daily lives relate to a number of topics that are both data-related and time-related. As stated in the beginning of this section, Patrick describes his media routines and they are heavily intertwined with other basic daily routines such as waking up and using the bathroom. Similar, while John presents a function-oriented perspective of only using LinkedIn again once he is looking for jobs, it becomes apparent at other points in the interview, that his social media use is more ambivalent than might come across at that particular point. The interrelation between the subjects’ daily lives and new media forms is not only constituted by this ambivalence, but also by what might be considered as a process of datafication and surveillance. The subjects are indeed aware of a discourse on surveillance. In this sense the notion of a functionality of the technologies suddenly is shifted away from serving a function for the subjects

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themselves to serving a function for those that use and design the technologies to “control” (Patrick, l. 703). The functionality of media thus has to be looked at in a twofold manner, firstly in the way in which it serves a purpose for the individual, and secondly in the way in which it serves a purpose using the individual. At the same time it can be seen that the subjects need to constantly negotiate their handling with different media and how much information they are willing to share in different situations. This will be elaborated on further in the next section that deals with questions of datafication and personal data as well as in the following chapter on questions of power and agency.

5.2

Dimension 2: Datafication or How Personal Data Is Constructed and Evaluated

The core arguments raised in the analysis of the dimension of Datafication can be summarised as shown in the following figure (Figure 5.3):

Figure 5.3 Core Arguments of the Dimension of Datafication in the First Category (own representation)

An increase in levels of datafication can be found in relation to many aspects of life. Therefore, datafication can be understood as the process whereby data is collected and stored and might be used for further purposes. Because of technological advancements the collecting, storing and analysis of huge amounts of data has become possible as well as constantly easier. While some of these processes might be subsumed under the term “big data”, the term itself could be criticised for being somewhat vague (Christl & Spiekermann, 2016). Christl and Spiekermann give an interesting account on contemporary practices of big data

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and digital tracking in their piece entitled Networks of Control. They argue that personal data is used in order “to recognize patterns and relations, to profile, rate and judge people and to predict their future behaviour” (Christl & Spiekermann, 2016, p. 12–13). Alongside this, the authors observe that the processing of immense amounts of data ranges across many fields and areas, from scientific to economic to political to personal. These aspects just raised, also indicate the three dimensions often referred to in relation to big data, which are volume, velocity and variety (Ward & Barker, 2013). While volume refers to the increasing amounts of data collected, velocity refers to the increasing temporal dimension in which the data are produced and transmitted. Variety, finally, refers to the plurality of types of data and formats which can be found. Due to the fact that the term big data can be categorised as a buzzword to a certain degree, as well as when looking at the extent to which the topic of big data has been covered across a number of different media and news channels, one might be led to the supposition that not only the subjects in the research, but a majority of the general public in the countries the research took place in, are aware of the processes of data tracking that are taking place. This basic assumption should be kept in mind, while analysing how the subjects in the research actually define and negotiate their perceptions of and dealing with these processes. It has already been stated that the difference to which media and news in various countries have covered the topic of data tracking and surveillance, and shaped perceptions of how these processes should be perceived, vary significantly. The fact that the perception of data collection processes is also influenced by the coverage of that topic in media and news channels is supported by Simone, when she says that “[…] the perception of online and offline data is very much influenced by the media itself” (Simone, l. 568–569). It seems worthwhile to give a short account on how data is understood within the context of this research. Glaser has famously stated “all is data” (Glaser, 2007). As may be easy to understand, the notion of what can be defined as data is discussed in literature on empirical research that deals with the collection of data, and also in books on grounded theory, the method applied in the research for this book. While “all” could be analysed as data within the context of empirical research, it seems interesting to reflect on how the subjects of this research have negotiated their understandings of what data implies in the context of online practices and media. There are three aspects in relation to this that seem worth highlighting. The first one is how personal data is defined, the second one concerning the quality of data between analogue and digital and finally the third one on the handling of data in relation to the jobs the subjects have.

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As the first aspect stresses, the notion of data in the context of this research is bound predominantly to notions of personal data. Personal here implies that the data is related to a specific individual. Within European Union law personal data is defined as a type of information that relates to a living individual and on which ground this individual is or can be identified (European Commission, n.d.). According to the European Commission this includes information such as name, address, telephone number, passport numbers, medical data, e-mail address, location data, cookie IDs, to name but a few. It is interesting to note, that the subjects of the research also named these types of information as to which data about them they have shared online. Next to personal data such as name, address, phone number, e-mail and medical data, the subjects also suggested information such as marital status, date of birth, credit card details, job, education and personal stories as data that is shared in social media networks. Interestingly all subjects regarded the amount of personal data that they thought was online about them as worrying and too much, despite the fact that some subjects were able to name more examples of personal data that they had previously shared whereas other subjects named fewer examples. One of the subjects even describes her perception as “my whole life is online” (Laila, l. 482). Rather than being merely worried about her credit card details being online, her anxiety is based on the information that is related to her credit card, meaning every payment she carries out, which she closely relates to her daily routine. What the subject is referring to here is reminiscent also of the concept of metadata despite the fact that she does not explicitly speak of metadata. It is interesting to note that only one out of all of the ten subjects actually explicitly refers to metadata within the interviews. All of the subjects are ready to name various aspects of what they understand of personal data, and which types of personal data they have shared or are sharing online. At the same time all of them in some way or another voice a worry over the amount of data they have shared online, even though this worry is based on reasons differing between mere annoyance (Miranda), an uneasy feeling that is difficult to explain (Julie), a fear for financial exploitation (Lukas) to an actual worry in the sense of anxieties (Patrick). Despite all the different reasons for anxiety the topic of metadata is one that does not seem to be as prevalent in the subjects’ discussion on personal data and data collection as might be necessary, even though it could be argued that it is essentially the collection of metadata that allows for huge amounts of customer profiling (Lyon 2002; 2003) and also turns data that is collected from being anonymous to actual personal data, that can be easily identifiable and therefore proves to be ethically and morally problematic in relation to a discourse on privacy.

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In the definition of personal data the European Commission highlights the difference between data that is collected and anonymised irreversibly and therefore cannot be traced back to a given individual at any point and contrastingly personal data, which might have been de-identified, encrypted or pseudonymised and yet can still be used to re-identify an individual (European Commission, n.d.). This differentiation refers to the second aspect worth highlighting in relation to the dimension of datafication which is that of the quality of data. As highlighted, data can exist in different forms and sometimes the line between irreversibly anonymised data and personal data might be a difficult one to draw, as can be seen in the following example that was given in one of the interviews: “Ah embarrassing things like, I’d search on, obviously I’m losing my hair, so I searched on options about […] what treatments there are. And at work the next day, someone searched on my computer and they were like, why is this advert here? And I was like, oh no” (John, l. 276–281). The episode told by John illustrates a problem that can be found in relation to how data is categorised and stored and mirrored back at people. While personalised advertising might have its advantages, as some of the subjects in the interviews have also stated, the question of profiling also comes along with problems, as has been illustrated previously in relation to John Turow’s arguments in his book The Daily You (Turow, 2011), where Turow argues that personal advertising creates new social inequalities because of the way the advertising system functions. While the problem raised by Turow does not become obvious in the case of John’s experience, another problem is highlighted in this example. It becomes obvious that the differentiation between anonymised data and personal data depends strongly on the individual context. While the search for hair treatment might not have been stored in relation to John as an individual but only in relation to his work IP address, the context of the individual situation in which his colleague becomes aware of the advert renders the possible anonymisation by the advertising company useless to a certain degree. Of course one could argue that the danger of an “embarrassing” moment is not very huge and that John should not have researched personal issues at his work computer, but the example nonetheless stresses the importance of the individual context and the challenges that the theoretical and legal definition of personal data could be faced with. The example shows that there needs to be a reflection on how data actually relates to individual context and what this means for the handling of data. This is also true for another example given in one of the interviews, this time in relation to empirical research, as well as the transformation between analogue information and online data. Simone quotes the terms she uses on a social networking site to describe herself: “the little emoticon for my star sign, nerd, hashtag quitter, forgetful cat-lover, gamer, chocaholic, self-taught artist, singer, oddball”

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(Simone, l. 493–494). These terms have been pseudonymised so that they cannot be traced back to the subject of the research. While analysing the data, especially the relationship between personal data and how the subjects identify themselves, the description Simone gives proves to be very interesting for the analysis when looking at the third category which centres on the self. However as a researcher, it was difficult to decide whether this information could be pseudonymised and if yes then how. This emphasises the difference between analysing transcribed words that were collected in an interview situation, where the data collected was limited to the individual context of the interview and therefore allows for a sense of privacy and higher possible levels of anonymisation, in contrast to personal data which has also been shared online and therefore could not as easily be used. While it might be difficult to pseudonymise data as seen above, this example further highlights the need for reflection on the qualitative difference of data even within transcribed interviews and qualitative research. In the interview Simone goes on to state that the task she was faced with when having to choose a number of words to describe herself was “to find the absolute, you lose all the fiddly words, you find the core of what you say and how to say it in the least possible words. So all those things say something about me ehm without going into too much detail” (Simone, l. 495–497). This quote nicely describes the process that happens during datafication, namely the transformation from a given entity into a datum. It is precisely this transformation that sets an interesting ground for reflection and theoretical consideration and something which is taken up in various ways throughout the interviews. While this point will be looked at in the chapter on the third category of the self, namely how the transformation of what the self is or how the self is seen is transferred into data, I will give one more example of a transformation at this point to relate it to questions of datafication in the light of the first category analysed and discussed here. Julie describes how she has been using a self-tracking app for losing weight, where she has been tracking her food and which was shared with her personal trainer who was able to see her data and progess. Julie describes the transformation from analogue to digital as follows: “you know you say aw I will just have a piece of chocolate and it’s ok, it’s only a piece of chocolate, but then seeing the data, it really made you think, oh wow it’s actually a lot more than I thought it was” (Julie, l. 199–201). She goes on to state that she felt surveilled by her personal trainer and became slightly too obsessive about logging everything, even alcoholic drinks. She then decided to only log breakfasts and lunches and not dinners, as it got “to a point where if I had something that I knew was unhealthy, it would actually really affect my mood. And I think seeing it on the app made it worse, because it was like I can’t hide for the fact that I’ve done that” (Julie, l.

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219–222). The passage is interesting for several reasons. First of all, it highlights the transformation of a piece of chocolate to digital data of calories in the app. Secondly, it raises questions of how this data is shared and viewed by others, in this case the subject’s personal trainer, which relates to questions of social control, which will be discussed in the following chapter. Thirdly, the transformation of digital data because of its qualitative difference in the sense of a permanence that cannot be hidden from as easily, as pointed out by the subject, also takes a reverse influence back onto the subject’s mood. Therefore it can be argued that the relationship between data and what the data is referring to is essential in order to understand the context properly. At the same time, personal data might also reflect back on the context and influence it, as has been argued in literature on a number of related topics such as by Turow on questions of personalised advertising (Turow, 2011); or by Damberger and Iske or Selke on questions of self-tracking (Damberger & Iske, 2017; Selke, 2015). The question of how the technology used might influence back on actual contexts is not only evocative of theories on Bildung, as demonstrated by Iske and Damberger, which will be discussed again, but also shows why a consideration of how these processes work is essential for the social sciences. In order to be able to reflect on these processes it is irremissible to understand how they function. Julie states that because of the feeling that she became too obsessive, she found a way of handling her self-tracking practices by only logging breakfasts and lunches and in the end stopping it altogether. This refers back to the final point on personal data made by the European Commission which states that personal data is defined regardless of how it is being handled or processed whether manually or automatically (European Commission, n.d.). The focus on the handling of personal data is also one which becomes apparent in the last set of examples that will be raised in relation to this dimension. All of these examples demonstrate the diverse ways in which the subjects of the research are faced with the handling of personal data in relation to their jobs, both of their own data as well as personal data of clients or customers. It is worth looking at four examples in greater detail in order to illustrate the way in which the subjects are faced with processes of datafication in their daily lives in relation to their jobs. Two of the examples will focus on cases in which the subjects have to negotiate the handling of their own personal data, whereas the other two will focus on cases where the subjects are being faced with the negotiation of how to handle (sensitive) data entrusted to them by others. Due to the nature of Ben’s job as a blogger, he has to negotiate which personal data he wishes to share on a daily basis. Considering what he thinks his followers would like to read about and see, he states that “That’s what sells blogs, because they’re personal, they’re about me and not just about content, like a newspaper. Ehm so

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yeah, it is you need to share pictures from your private life, you need to tell stories about your private life, like to make it more personal and personable” (Ben, l. 433–436). For Ben this also includes content where he is tired, content where he can be seen in the relationship with his wife or physically intrusive content of being in the water without many clothes on. Aside from a notion of intrusion that the subject perceives, it also becomes apparent that he is facing this negotiation with a sense of ambivalence as Ben says that “Sometimes I care and sometimes I don’t care” (Ben, l. 438–439). The perceived level of intrusion and the feeling of ambivalence in relation to how this intrusion is perceived demonstrate two of the recurring topics that are related to the categories. The fact that the success of his blog actually equates to his income adds an economic dimension and a sense of dependency on sharing information to the context of this case. Ribolits has analysed constant adaption and flexibility as a necessity for the short-term demands of an economy based on rapid change in post-industrial economies (Ribolits, 2006), whereby the individual has to constantly bend to the situation. If applied to this case, it can be seen that Ben indeed tries to constantly adapt to what he thinks his followers would enjoy, and even more than this adapt his own negotiation of his attitude on what he is willing to share and thereby stay flexible. The level of intrusion felt and the need for flexibility by bending to any given situation based on the necessities of a job is also something that can be seen in the case of Lukas, who states that aside from the usual personal data he shares online, “specifically again, I’m an actor I need to post things like my eye colour, my height, my physique, ehm (…) what sports I can do” (Lukas, l. 606–608). Here again, the specific necessities of the job demonstrate a level of intrusion in having to share personal data that otherwise might not be shared. The negotiation of how to deal with this is bound to the demands of the industry and the need for income and professional success. The fact that the demands of a job can shift the perception of which levels of intrusion are acceptable is also something that can be seen in the case of Jamie. Due to the nature of his job as a youth worker at the local church he has had to agree that his line manager can see any conversation he has had with one of the young people he works with on Facebook intruding on his personal Facebook account, which he thinks is “a perfectly acceptable thing” (Jamie, l. 249). The blending of personal and private which becomes apparent here is something which has come up again and again throughout this book. While Jamie might have to share personal data with his line manager, he is also aware of the personal information he is given through the nature of his position: “I’m very sort of privileged […] to (…) people’s personal well private lives and […] you’ve got your friends and you know about their sort of private life, whereas in my role, I’m almost, well as a professional care giver in many ways, people trust a

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lot of information to me” (Jamie, l. 112–116). Aside from Jamie, Gabriela is faced with a similar situation, where her professional role gives her the possibility of access to a lot of personal information as she is managing a community of testers for different software products. For Gabriela, this also comes with the need for reflecting on how to handle this in the right manner: Gabriela: […] I have to be mindful to not share that kind of information (…) ehm (…) and I guess my parents or my family are not the best examples of this, because they were always the kind of people who were like well between us you know, don’t share this information with anybody else, […] but I mean obviously like, when it’s company data then (…) you really should be mindful of that […] like we take the responsibility seriously, like that’s the one part of my role, that maybe yes the actual communication of how we handle data. (Gabriela, l. 623–634)

Both the cases of Jamie and Gabriela illustrate ways in which the subjects have to negotiate not only personal data they would like to share, but might also be on the receiving end, having to negotiate how to handle data entrusted to them by others. Gabriela reflects on the fact, that this is not always easy for her, as her upbringing included a lot of passing of information that was not supposed to be passed. However it can be seen that she acknowledges the difference between private and professional settings, “obviously if it’s company data then (…)”. All of the four cases that were mentioned in relation to the handling of personal data in professional settings illustrate that the negotiation of how to handle personal data, i.e. how much personal data is acceptable to share and how to deal with personal data entrusted by others, strongly depends on the context. In all four cases it was obvious that the lines of what is perceived as acceptable and what is not were shifted due to professional contexts. Overall then, what can be summarised as to the second dimension within this category is that datafication is apparent in various situations of life. The definitions of personal data thereby are blurry in the sense that they seem to depend heavily on the context of the situation. While some aspects are generally regarded as personal data (address, date of birth, name, etc.) it becomes apparent that when it comes to other aspects such as metadata, personal experiences or personal data in relation to physical aspects, the negotiation of what is acceptable becomes much more complex. The argument that this negotiation is based on context emphasises the assumption that there is a level of ambivalence included in how the subjects are able to negotiate their positioning towards the topic of sharing personal data. Similar to what has been and what will be discussed on a sense of liquidity in relation to theories of identity as well as contemporary life, here too there does not seem to be a fixed position the subjects are able to obtain.

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The notion of liquidity and uncertainty is supported by the assumption that their negotiation seems but a momentous snapshot (Bauman, 2012). This is supported by the account given on the quality of personal data and the transformation of different types of data into one another, as in the example of the piece of chocolate. The subjective notion of eating a piece of chocolate in comparison with the quantified datum in the self-tracking app again gains in relevance only due to the given context. Because the subject is looking at the app, she is reminded of the quantity of calories and because of the supervision of her personal trainer seems to feel surveilled and under pressure. The process of datafication and the quality of personal data are not simply a given state of contemporary media practices, but are shaped and reshaped and therefore need to be reflected upon. Data itself can be transformed and changed, but more so the meaning attached to this data can be constantly transformed and changed. It is in this way that the question of how data is produced and positioned to other types of data becomes an interesting one. Thereby, notions of fragmentation and synthesis of data seem to also gain in relevance. Data can be fractured and put together in various ways and in the light of current events, where personal data is stolen from companies such as Facebook (Badshah, 2018), in the light of processes of datafication which are apparent in various aspects of life, the qualitative value of data needs to be reflected on also in consideration of individual contexts so that the ways in which this data relates to what it refers to can be analysed.

5.3

Dimension 3: Temporality or How Data Is Bound and Detached from Temporal Dimensions

The core arguments raised in the analysis of the dimension of Temporality can be summarised as in in the following figure (Figure 5.4):

Figure 5.4 Core Arguments of the Dimension of Temporality in the First Category (own representation)

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The dimensions of time and space are much discussed in academic research and have been the subject of consideration for many thinkers throughout time. Therefore, a discussion of the theoretical framework of concepts of time or space will be limited in this research. The theoretical references especially to time that will be of significance here therefore are in relation to the theories otherwise referred to in the book. Time for these theories is also an important category. As “[…] fluids do not keep to any shape for long and are constantly ready (and prone) to change it; and so for them it is the flow of time that counts, more than the space they happen to occupy […]” (Bauman, 2012, p. 2). Time is referred to by Bauman not only in relation to the notion of liquidity and its constant change, but also in its uniqueness in relation to certain temporal contexts such as in his book “Liquid Times” (Bauman, 2007). Similar to the perspective on time as a general category and time as an explicit context, Giddens illustrates that self-actualisation which constitutes an element of self-identity implies in itself a notion of control of time. Here Giddens differentiates between zones of personal time, that need to be established, and can only loosely be related to external temporal orders such as standard temporal measurements, as for example a clock (Giddens, 1991). Both in Bauman’s as well as Giddens’ arguments one can find different perspectives of looking at time. Time can therefore be seen as a broad and general category, as an explicit location within social histories or as a personal, subjective point of reference. These different perspectives can also be found in the data. The category of media thus entails a dimension that relates to various aspects of temporality in relation to the current condition of media, in relation to aspects of permanence, up-to-datedness, memories and a relation to personal time. The first aspect that will be looked at, is that of permanence. In a number of the cases, a level of awareness about the transformation of an event to a datum and the therewith related consequences in relation to an abidance of this data becomes apparent. What is understood by abidance of data here, is the way in which, once data is produced and stored, it often remains in this storage for an indefinite amount of time. The question of what happens with data once it might not be “useful” anymore is a question seldom asked. The objective often is to save as much as possible in case it might become relevant one day, as can be seen when looking at examples like Stephen Wolfram (Wolfram, 2012). It is this practice that might indeed be criticised as is also done by individual academics (Coy, 2016). The processes that the data undergoes often are not obvious to the subjects producing the data in the first place. To them, it might feel as if the data that they have become aware exists about themselves, is permanently stored, as can be seen in the interview with Patrick, who states that he became very aware of what he typed into Google “knowing that it’s there forever” (Patrick, l. 1120–1121). In

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this case it becomes obvious that the subject feels as if his behaviour with using a certain service is influenced by the sense of permanence related to the data he produces through his search. While it might be assumed that Patrick, who is very aware and anxious of the discourse on data tracking and surveillance anyway, proves to be an exception, this does not seem to be the case. John also is aware of at least a notion of lingering, if not permanence in relation to searches carried out, when he says that if looking for something he cannot escape advertising for this for product, service, etc. for another two weeks. So what can be observed then, is an awareness by the subjects that “what we post online and once it’s there, it’s there” (Jamie, l. 530). Not only might this lead to a change of behaviour, it also seems that the permanence of data can sometimes hinder the aim that lies behind the actual production and storage of this data due to not always being up-to-date. While the data produced is bound to the moment it is produced in, it seems that an interesting ambivalence of temporality is opened up, whereby the present seems to be perpetuated. “The instantaneous has pulled us into the gravitational field of a permanent present. We are prisoners of the immediate, trapped between past and present.” (Lyon, 2000, p. 133). What is described in this quote, relates to the data of the research in the fact that it seems the subjects are also caught between the past and the present given the nature of the data that is stored on them. A Google search following an immediate or instantaneous interest in a topic, suddenly is gravitated into a permanent datum. Chesneaux analyses the relationship between the past, the present and the future and the ways in which times are inhibited, thus relating to Lyon’s quote (Chesneaux, 1996) which can be related to emphasising the importance of temporality and therefore also context in relation to personal data. The question of updatedness is related to but can also be contrasted with questions of permanence. Miranda gives an example where this contrast becomes apparent. While she had liked a wedding app, she received calls from wedding planners years after getting married. The tracking of this data stands in contrast to the actual context. Data can therefore often be bound to specific temporal points of reference within the life span of the subjects. This assumption becomes apparent in a number of examples found in the data that relate to questions of updatedness, memories and a relation to the life span of the subjects and hence include a sense of temporality. Interestingly, it seems that despite the fact that the subjects feel as if their social media accounts might give a pretty good reflection of who they are, Miranda and Simone also reflect on the fact that they “haven’t changed it [Twitter] in a long time” (Simone, l. 487–488) and “haven’t updated [Facebook] for ages” (Miranda, l. 299). These expressions open up an interesting point, namely, while the subjects are aware of the permanent nature of data due to it being stored, there

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also is a question in relation to which data is being shared and shown at particular moments in time. This seems evocative of Giddens’ theory on self-identity. For Giddens, self-identity can only be successful if a coherent narrative is constructed. The individual is charged with the task of trying to relate together various life events into one coherent story. Retrospectively this coherence is constantly rewritten, which in the words of Giddens is explained as follows: “The individual appropriates his past by sifting through it in the light of what is anticipated for an (organized) future. The trajectory of the self has a coherence that derives from a cognitive awareness of the various phases of the lifespan” (Giddens, 1991, p. 75). If applied to social networks and the case of data shared online, the question of how various aspects are constructed into one coherent narrative becomes an interesting one. The question of what happens with photos, posts and other types of data, which might not go along with the overall narrative is relevant also for the subjects of this research, as can be seen in the case of Julie. Julie: […] It’s funny cause when I was younger, cause sometimes they do like the time hops where they post something you posted like 5 years ago and stuff. And I remember just looking all of my Facebook history, cause I was sort of deleting stuff and organising it. And I wrote so much, like a lot more frequently. And I’ve done that less and less now and I don’t know why that is […]. (Julie, l. 290–296)

Julie points out three interesting aspects in relation to the dimension of temporality that are worth highlighting. First of all, it is the function of time hops available in Facebook. “Memories” of photos or status updates that were posted on a certain day a number of years earlier are brought up as a reminder. This reminder function made Julie realise that she used to post more regularly when she was younger. The time hop function thus served as a tool that allowed Julie to reflect back on her life and previous behaviour and can be analysed as an externalised memory (Stiegler, 2009). The second aspect seen here is that of being able to delete and organise items on the profile retrospectively. Thus one can see the possibility of being able to change the data that is “shown”, whereas the time hop function also proves that the customer cannot influence the fact that individual artefacts might come up randomly. Julie, who is going through a difficult break up in her personal life at the time of the interview, thus is very aware of these functions. Her perception seems to be based mainly on the specific context of the break up. Through the situation of the break up, the data, which to Julie were subjective artefacts, changed its meaning for her. The pictures of her and her partner suddenly turned from being a nice memory to being a painful reminder. Interestingly, Julie sees Facebook as a constant within the process of breaking

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up, as “[Facebook] was like the one thing I guess I had before him as well, so I was able to look at stuff that I had before and know that ok I can do it” (Julie, l. 869–871). For Patrick a break up from a relationship was also a reason for leaving Facebook, as he was worried for his own mental health (Patrick, l. 506–519). Data stored in the social platform, as argued before, holds a subjective meaning to the subjects. This meaning may change, as shown in the cases of Julie and Patrick, over time and be looked at differently in retrospect. Similar to Giddens’ theory on the necessity for a coherent life story, social platforms on the one hand seem to offer a space where the subjects can organise and delete information as to create a coherent narrative in their profiles, that they are able to identify with, while on the other hand the structures of social platforms indeed seem to impair their use in cases of extreme circumstances such as break ups or losses (Walter et al., 2012) due to the “reminding” functions they also entail. While social platforms can be used specifically to remember dates, such as birthdays (Jamie, l. 285–286), the way in which they may “store” memories is technically not different to the way in which other types of information are stored. Yet it seems that particularly with data that has a strong emotional value for the subjects the functions of social platforms need to be considered from a different perspective. While the data might be seen as nothing more than bits (Zuboff, 2015) it should be clear, that indeed firstly they may have a different meaning to those that “produced” the data, i.e. the subjects, and secondly, this meaning may be subject to change over time. The meaning of the memories attached to data that is being stored, thus might be related to constructivist theories arguing that meaning is created subjectively by interpreting aspects of everyday life into a coherent understanding of the world, which can be understood as reality (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). The data of profiles and information stored online that may or may not be constantly updated, also asks for a consideration of what happens with old information customers might want to “delete” from their accounts, which despite not being visible anymore are not deleted from every form of storage entirely. The question of what happens with outdated information and how it can be related to or made sense of is an interesting one. This is further supported by the experiences of the subjects in relation to the history of the existence of social networks. Jamie mentions how the first social network he was on was MySpace, “but that doesn’t exist anymore” (Jamie, l. 205). And for Simone, while Facebook “at the beginning was cool and interesting” by now it “is mainly just click baits and uninteresting updates” (Simone, l. 435–436). It can be noticed that the subjects in this research have experienced certain services and changes to those services during particular times of their lives. Jamie states that he does not understand

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certain services that the young people he works with use anymore, as he is too old for this. The subjects are thus bound to the conditions of the particular times in which they are placed demonstrating the general lack of envy of any present in relation to its future (Benjamin, 1978). While the subjects are aware of the fact that the hype around certain social networks might fade as with MySpace, StudiVZ and other examples, Julie’s comment on how Facebook was the “one thing” she also had before her relationship, adhering a sense of constant to the platform, shows a contrasting perspective to that of a short temporality attached to social platforms. The subjects of this research, who have experienced the rise of social networks during their adolescence, thus serve as an interesting example as they have experienced teenage years with and without social networks as well as the rise and fall of popular platforms over time and a notion of “growing out of” certain services, such as Snapchat (Jamie, l. 303–304) by the time of their mid- to late twenties. They show an awareness of the conditions that come along with the specific time of being a teenager and the influence media and social networks might have particularly during that time of someone’s life, where “you second-guess, you triple-guess, you quadrupleguess yourself on a daily basis” (Lukas, l. 245–246). At the same time, they show an awareness of the structures of media services, and the fact that even those structures might not be “trusted” as services can go bust or change over time. To summarise the dimension of temporality, it is worth going back to what I argued at the start of this section. Bauman and Giddens have constituted time in relation to an explicit location within social histories, as a personal and subjective point of reference or a general category. The data of the research demonstrated how these assumptions were related to media structures, the storing of data and individual practices in relation to this. Thus, when related to the concept of liquidity, for which the flow of time plays an important role, a strong ambivalence in relation to data can be found. While data can often be seen as a momentous artefact relating to a specific context and time, the “storing” of this momentousness leads to a transformation. So, as could be seen, there seem to arise complexities in the handling of this ambivalence, which might best be illustrated by a function such as the “time hop” on Facebook, that places an update or a picture in front of an individual, out of the temporal point of reference into a new one, several years later. The example shows how these artefacts could actually be bound up to specific moments in the personal life span of the subjects and how their meaning might have changed over time. The reminder of the “time hop” can serve as a starting point for self-reflection in relation to a change in practices (“when I was younger […] I wrote so much”) or in relation to a change in interest (growing out of Snapchat, seeing Facebook as something uninteresting) or a change of the

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emotions attached to certain memories (such as in the examples of the break ups). The awareness of possible changes and transformations of meaning hence stands in contrast to the permanence created through the process of storing data, where data is stored in relation to a specific moment in time. This contrast opens up an interesting situation for consideration, as it highlights one of the problems of digital technology, namely a loss of ambivalence due to the rigid definition of possibilities in relation to binary structures. While one might define a loss of ambivalence in relation to digital technology, the next dimension shows how there yet seems to be a notion of illusion in relation to media and technology that the subjects are being faced with.

5.4

Dimension 4: Excursus – Religions and Illusions

The core arguments raised in the analysis of the dimension of Religions and Illusions can be summarised as in the following figure (Figure 5.5):

Figure 5.5 Core Arguments of the Dimension of Religions and Illusions in the First Category (own representation)

“All that we see or seem, is but a dream within a dream”. (from Edgar Allan Poe’s poem A Dream within a Dream; Poe, 1969, pp. 451–452) In the discourse on media, technology, simulacra and virtual realities the emphasis on illusion is not scarce. An illusion implies a “wrong” or maybe rather a “different” perception of reality; something which is perceived differently to what it is actually like. “The Magic Kingdom is all about fantasy, illusion, slippery surfaces, revised realities, multiple meanings” (Lyon, 2000, p. 11). David Lyon highlights this in his description of Disneyland, as a place full of illusions, presenting fantasies and multiple meanings, revised realities that appear to be something different than they are. Lyon’s account of religion in postmodern times, found in

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his book Jesus in Disneyland lends itself well to be referenced at this point in the analysis (Lyon, 2000). Lyon analyses the role of religion in postmodernity and relates religion to aspects of consumerism, globalisation, identity, temporality and spatiality. Rather than focusing on theories of secularisation, he focuses not on the decline of religion but more so on the transformations religion has undergone. “But I argue that the religious realm, including faith and spirituality, is far from dormant, let alone dead. Religiosity does find different modes of expression, however, and this relates to context.” (Lyon, 2000, p. ix). From a postmodern perspective Lyon gives an account of religion and its relation to different aspects and conditions of postmodernity using Disneyland and its universality as an example to elaborate his case on. Disney, according to Lyon, achieves through “tantalizingly trojan means” (Lyon, 2000, p. 148) by simplifying both truth and suffering and simulating realities, thus creating an illusion of something it is not, or rather something it is not only. Lyon thus draws up a connection between religion, which he defines in quite a general understanding as a conglomerate of faith, spirituality, as well as collective and individual practices and institutional structures. His perspective thereby does not take on the assumption that the role of religion can be described purely as diminishing in Western worlds. Indeed here, he draws up an account of religious spheres across the world, where huge differences in impact of levels of religious significance are found. Rather than focusing on these questions, however, Lyon also does not view contemporary popular culture as a substitute for religion, but rather examines the multiple ways in which religion can be related to postmodernity on a theoretical level and the ways in which the religious realm, including religious and para-religious behaviour, is flourishing by relating it to questions of cyberspace, identity and consumer culture. Accounts on the relation between technology and religion or myth have a long lasting history. Søby argues that through technology men have wanted to achieve their dreams or visions to be God-like, accounts of which can even be found in Greek mythology (Søby, 2000). Within Greek myths, Søby analyses a tension between “man’s possibility of controlling and developing technology and, on the other hand, the dangers of technology and its determining function” (Søby, 2000, p. 123). Technology hence is both “utopia and dystopia” (Søby, 2000, p. 118), an argument already apparent in the introduction in which references to Huxley’s Brave New World and Orwell’s 1984 were made, that highlight the tension between utopian and dystopian possibilities of technology. While mankind aspires to become more magnificent through the use of technology or create something that is even more magnificent than mankind itself, this discussion goes into the discourse on topics such as transhumanism, posthumanism, artificial intelligence and cyborgs, which cannot be replicated here

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unfortunately given the limited scope of the research. Yet hopefully being allowed a short reference at this point, the research and technological innovations being produced in this area are vast and illustrate the need for a theoretical elaboration of these topics as they (re-)open fundamental questions of the social sciences, on what it means to be human, on questions of learning and many more relevant topics. While the discourse on cyborgs is not replicated at this point, the perspective on technology as a prosthesis to men is taken up. Freud exclaims that “[m]an has, as it were, become a sort of prosthetic God” (Freud, 1962, p. 38). The prosthesis might turn an individual into a better version of herself, however, they can also bring along problems, as already indicated in the utopian/dystopian distinction. The prosthesis for Freud can be understood as a boundary between what is human and what is cultural, while acknowledging that the prosthesis does not belong entirely to either of them. One might ask now, how this account can in any way relate to the data of this research. During the analysis process, it was striking to observe that throughout the interviews the topic of religion in general, as well as expressions related to religion, were raised multiple times without actually being asked about in the first place. The sample of cases includes a religiously heterogeneous group, including Christian, Muslim, Jewish, Atheist and Agnostic beliefs. It is interesting to notice that indeed the topic of religion seems to be a topic of relevance to many of the subjects when asked about the ways in which they were raised, either because religion was an important factor in their upbringing or in cases where the opposite was true. It seems that in many cases ambivalent notions as to the relevance of religion in the subjects’ lives can be found, often in contrast to their parents’ generation (in the cases of Lukas, John or Laila) or to family members of the same generation who were raised in other cultures (e.g. Brazil versus UK in the case of Gabriela), thus supporting Lyon’s account on the existence of different religious spheres. In the following analysis of the data, I thus would like to open a discussion on these religious spheres according to Lyon’s broad understanding of religion and Søby’s and Freud’s accounts on the relation between technology and dreams of becoming God-like. Two differing accounts will be given: first of all, an account on the purpose of religion as a form for collectivity and stability contrasting processes of individuality and flexibility and secondly an account on the similarities between religion and technology interpreting technology itself as a form of religion. Following this discussion there will be an exploration of the illusions related to the conditions of the digital state. In order to do so, this dimension will be particularly enriched with theoretical references as well as discussing data from this research. The arguments brought forward, however, more than in other chapters,

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should not be faced too critically but rather understood as an experimental exploration of ideas that have been found both in the data as well as in the literature and therefore lend themselves for this exploration, all the while being aware that this dimension should be understood as somewhat of an thematic excursus. The first account, considers the role of religion on the backdrop of the line of argumentation brought up within this research that looks at contemporary conditions of life in relation to Bauman’s theory of liquidity. Religious practices, here, can be observed as constituting a contrasting pole of stability rather than liquidity in the lives of some of the subjects. Jamie and Simone particularly, who are both Christian, illustrate this in their interviews. Simone describes how she went to a Christian boarding school, and aside from the boarding school structures also describes the Christian foundations as allowing her to feel accepted, “spread my wings and develop my real self” (Simone, l. 103). Jamie quite explicitly summarises the notion of stability that his involvement in Church and his belief have played for him, also based on coming from a family where his parents, got divorced, remarried to other partners, who they later divorced again: Jamie: I could never be sure that it wouldn’t change again, so because of that being at church, there is always the same people, they are teaching the same thing and I know that’s never going to change, so I think that’s probably, it’s more like a thing of stability for me. And even now, it still is, it’s the same thing. My faith is a stability, something I know will always, my understanding will change and how I appreciate and access it would change, but I believe actually God won’t. (Jamie, l. 77–82)

What becomes apparent in this quote and the example raised by Simone is the emphasis on the role that their belief and the social structures related to their religious identity plays in their lives. The religious realm, including the church, the people, the practices or the belief in God, thus provides a sense of stability otherwise lacking in “the normal world” (Simone, l.135) in the perspective of the subjects. Aside from the stability provided by this, the other interpretation is that of a sense of collective that is provided by the religious realm. While not mentioned as explicitly as the significance of stability, both subjects stress the importance of the social exchange with people of all ages (Simone), who they share collective experiences and beliefs with. Following this perspective, religious identity can thus be contrasted with both concepts of liquidity and concepts of individualisation in this context. While not always necessarily functioning in the same way, in these two examples the religious realm offers an opportunity of collective experiences for the subjects that strengthens their sense of stability. This first perspective on religion hence does not really relate religion to technology in any way, but rather looks at an interpretation of the function of religion for

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the current conditions of life, all the while being aware that religion can also impair or control the lives of people, thus opening up a more negatively connoted interpretation of the significance of religion. The second account I would like to give on religion is in relation to technology, as well as linguistic considerations to a certain extent. Religious expressions might be used both consciously and subconsciously, but the following quotes struck me during the research and open the possibility of analysing a relationship between technology and religion. The first two quotes simply illustrate metaphorical expressions of religious content in relation to particular services: Lukas: Specifically WhatsApp is a godsend to me. (Lukas, l. 478) Julie: I mean some of them I use a lot more religiously than other […]. (Julie, l. 623–624)

The wording in these quotes seems particularly interesting as expressions related to religious contexts are being used. This opens up the possibility of a relation between the context of conditions of the digital state as well as the religious realm. To describe WhatsApp as a godsend, might be simply an expression in a given moment, however it can also be interpreted as highlighting the significance that the social networking service holds for the subject. Similarly, the second quote also uses the term religiously as in colloquial English without, probably, consciously drawing up a relation to any religious context. An interpretation of the quote could also shine light on the meaning that is related to religiously here, indicating a sense of continuity and stability. This of course is reminiscent of the argument brought up in the previous paragraph which analysed the importance of religion and the sense of stability constituted by religious structures for some of the subjects in the research. Interestingly, while the reference is brought up both by subjects who are Atheist and Christian, the following comparison seems particularly worth t mentioning. Jamie and Patrick both compare social media and data collection to ether: Jamie: But for what you might call a more everyday thing, it’s sad that people have to turn to the ether of their social media, there’s nothing, there’s no guarantee what’s gonna come back […]. (Jamie, l.428–429) Patrick: I know they’re in there for the ether forever, that that gives me anxiety of Jesus like, but then I try let go off ehm the shame I have over…over ehm the sexual part of me and, and so what. (Patrick, l. 757–759)

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It is striking to observe that both subjects use the term ether, which in Greek mythology is the personification of the upper part of heaven, where the Gods are based and which is also defined as the width of heaven in a religious context. Whether consciously or subconsciously the comparison therefore strikes as very interesting as it could be related to theories on data storage, cloud systems and architectural notions of the internet. Reports on companies such as Google or individuals such as Tesla’s founder Elon Musk planning on sending satellites into space to cover the globe and provide free internet globally (Gibbs, 2016; Tiwari, 2017) could actually be referred to at this point and open up the image of actually covering the width of heaven with technology. Cloud systems that draw up a reference to heaven simply by their names might be referenced in a similar manner. Thus assuming that a connection could be theoretically drawn between what is the width of heaven and the aspects of digital technologies referenced in this chapter seems to be obvious. Spinning this comparison further, it would be possible to draw up an image of technology that surrounds human beings in one way or the other, comparable to a God-like presence, in which it is difficult to hide, or to keep secrets as everything is being stored. This is comparable to the Christian concept of sin or maybe a Buddhist concept of karma. The significance of data being stored and the practices we share online then seems to rise and make the feelings of anxiety, as described by Patrick, more understandable.. It is interesting to notice that Patrick mentions the concept of ether in the same sentence as mentioning Jesus and shame, which are also related to Christian faith. Before this sentence Patrick explains feelings of worry about sending nude pictures over the internet. Mentioning shame in this example could relate to the concept of sin in a Christian context, whereby the conditions touched upon before of surveillance (e.g. someone is watching you) and the permanence of data (e.g. your sins are not just forgotten or unnoticed by the someone watching you) seem to lend themselves for further connections between Christian faith and the example given here of the current conditions of the digital state. Going back to the prosthesis theory introduced at the start of this section, thus allows for an interesting case that seems to emerge in the context of what has just been analysed: If we take for example a mobile phone to be a prosthesis to man, maybe not attached entirely to the body, however in many cases always close to the individual (as Patrick also states in his interview), we could argue that the individual is able to be more “magnificent” because of the technological possibilities a smartphone has to offer. Now this prosthesis, in the case of the mobile phone, is connected closely to the ether of what is around us and which is not subjected to the individual’s power. Thus the individual would be subjected to carrying a prosthesis, which at the same time enables him to be more powerful

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and simultaneously adds a sense of insecurity and loss of power, by sharing data on the individual to the “outside world”. The question of how the human, thus can relate to the prosthesis, being aware of being dependent on the mobile phone to a certain degree, and at the same time being aware of the fact that the prosthesis also relates to something else over which he or she has no power. It is here that the argument of this excursus also closes the circle to the topic of illusion that was mentioned in the beginning. The subjects in the research are indeed aware, that the conditions of the digital state often seem to be something they are not. Illusion may be created through “flashy, eye-catching products” (Lukas, l. 726) found online or through an „illusion of sharing stuff only with your private circle […] you may think you‘re sharing just with your friends, but if it‘s public, anybody can see” (Gabriela, l. 762–765) or finally through a perceived differentiation of being online and offline that does not exist as explicitly, and that can also be played with, as demonstrated by John, when he states „So for someone who is, I don‘t know perhaps a bit dim and not too observant, they might think oh John is not really actively on Facebook, but I am, I was always there“(John, l. 182–183). The ways in which the internet and other media structures play with illusions, whether intended or not, are worthwhile to be explored. As illustrated in the quotes referenced above, the illusion of digital artefacts, as well as the illusion of an ether of information and data, are not only metaphors than can be drawn up, but can also be seen as artefacts and conditions that influence on individuals through their existence. The illusion of an omnipotent “other” that can be constructed out of the data by the subjects and explained in the following chapter on conditions of control and agency in relation to technology can also be related to what has been argued here. Aside from a theoretical exploration of the connections between the Conditions of the Current Digital State, religion and illusions, this excursus highlights once more the significance of the structures and practices related to media. It reveals ways in which something as fundamental as the religious realm can undergo change in the same way that something as new as digital technology bears aspects of fundamental human beliefs and needs. While this discussion could be elaborated on much further than done at this point, the reason for mentioning this topic here is to illustrate the multiple ways in which an understanding of the current digital state can be constructed around a topic like religion and to highlight that a discussion of how illusions are created intendedly or not is important for revealing contemporary conditions. As Lyon argues, while social scientists may not predict the future of religion, or one might add of digital technologies, it is possible to illustrate how human beings construct postmodern conditions, the tracing

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of trends, their everyday lives and identities with the stories scientists tell and use this form of revelation as an important resource (Lyon, 2000).

Summary on the First Category To summarise, the category of the current conditions of the digital state, media and its structures has given interesting insights into both the structures of media, as well as considerations about its qualitative values and elements in relation to the theory developed here alongside Bauman‘s sense of liquidity. It was shown that technologies and media often seem to serve certain functions and are evaluated in relation to how well these functions might be served. That there is a second layer perspective contrasting the mere functionality for the subjects on how the media are used to function in favour of third parties using the subjects is something that seems worth considering and while being apparent a lot less, it could be demonstrated at several points in the interviews that the subjects were aware of this. Secondly, it was also shown that the quality and value of personal data is subjected heavily to the contexts in which they are created. Looking at the ways in which personal data is defined by the subjects of this research as well as the ways in which aspects of temporality were closely linked to personal data and media practices, allowed for a qualitative understanding of the conditions that media practices are taking place in. Finally, the excursus on the relationship between the religious realm and digital technologies served as an interesting example on the ways in which digital technologies are not only related to media practices and everyday lives on a purely practical level, but also on a more theoretical level prove to be worthy of exploration and understanding. It is thus that I would like to summarise that what has been shown so far, while considering the first category, is an elaboration of the conditions of the current digital state of being, as referred to by the subjects in the research and broadened by relating this to contemporary theory. In the following chapter, the conditions will be expanded by considering another condition for the context of this research which is related to questions of agency, power and control.

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Badshah, N. (2018). Facebook to contact 87 million users affected by data breach. Guardian Online (28.04.2018). Retrieved May 5, 2018, from: https://www.theguardian.com/techno logy/2018/apr/08/facebook-to-contact-the-87-million-users-affected-by-data-breach Bailey, N. (1773). An universal etymological English dictionary – 23rd Edition. London: Gale. Bauman, Z. (2012). Liquid Modernity. Cambridge: Polity Press. Bauman, Z. (2007). Liquid Times – Living in an Age of Uncertainty. Cambridge: Polity Press. Benjamin, W. (1978). Über den Begriff der Geschichte. In R. Tiedemann & H. Schweppenhäuser (Eds.) Gesammelte Schriften 1.2. (pp. 691–704). Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. Berger, P. & Luckmann, T. (1967). The Social Construction of Reality: A treatise in the sociology of knowledge. New York: Anchor. Chesneaux, J. (1996). Habiter le temps. Paris: Bayard. Christl, W. & Spiekermann, S. (2016). Networks of Control – A Report on Corporate Surveillance, Digital Tracking, Big Data & Privacy. Wien: Facultas Universitätsverlag. Coy, W. (2016). “Lösch das – Gleich!” Für einen sinnvollen Umgang mit großen Datenbeständen. Presented at Big Data und Gesellschaft – zwischen Kausalität und Korrelation – Interdisziplinäre Fachtagung des Projekts Abida. Münster: 15.-16.02.2016. Damberger, T. & Iske, S. (2017). Quantified Self aus bildungstheoretischer Perspektive. In R. Biermann & D. Verständig (Eds.) Das unkämpfte Netz (pp. 17–36). Wiesbaden: Springer VS. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. (1977). Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. New York: Viking Press. Dimmick, J; Feaster, J.C. & Hoplamazian, G.J. (2010). News in the interstices: The niches of mobile media in space and time. New Media & Society 13(1). Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. Retrieved May 25, 2018, from: doi:10.1 177/1461444810363452 European Commission (n.d.). What is personal data? Retrieved May 25, 2018, from: https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/reform/what-personal-data_en# examples-of-personal-data Freud, S. (1962). Civilization and Its Discontents. New York: Norton. Gibbs, S. (2016). Elon Musk wants to cover the world with internet from space. Guardian Online. Retrieved May 25, 2018, from: https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/ nov/17/elon-musk-satellites-internet-spacex Giddens, A. (1991). Modernity and Self-identity: Self and society in the late modern age. Cambridge: Polity Press. Glaser, B. (2007). All is Data. The Grounded Theory Review 6(2) (pp. 1–22). Harrison, R. (2013). It’s time to boycott Amazon. Ethical Consumer Website. Retrieved May 25, 2018, from: http://www.ethicalconsumer.org/commentanalysis/corporatewatch/isitti metoboycottamazon.aspx Lyon, D. (2000). Jesus in Disneyland - Religion in Postmodern Times. Cambridge: Polity Press. Lyon, D. (2002). Everyday Surveillance - Personal Data and Social Classifications. Information, Communication and Society 5(2) (pp. 242–257). London: Routledge. Lyon, D. (2003). Surveillance as Social Sorting – Privacy, Risk and Digital Discrimination. London: Routledge. Mitrou L., Kandias M., Stavrou V. & Gritzalis, D. (2014). Social media profiling: A Panopticon or Omniopticon tool? in Proc. of the 6th Conference of the Surveillance Studies Network.

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Conditions of Control and Agency Technical, Collective, Individual

The theoretical exploration of theories on the self in chapter three has already highlighted the interrelation between how the self is defined in consideration of notions of structure, agency and power. Power comes to permeate knowledge, and the subject produced in this complex matrix is always already complicit, involved somehow, in its reproduction. To trace these connections, to map out not just the networks and their nodes, but these intricate imbrications of power, knowledge and subjectivities is the task of any critical intervention on cyberspace, its everyday constitution through practices and frameworks of knowledge, and its constitutive power in subjectivization. (Bauman et al. 2014, p. 139)

Bauman highlights this interrelation even further in the above quote. What can be seen here, are the ways in which power, subjectivity and cyberspace form a complex matrix of intricate connections, which are constituted through reproductions, practices and frameworks of knowledge. While the third category in this research focuses on the nodal element of the constitution of the self, this chapter will analyse conditions of control and agency and therefore consider exactly those connections Bauman refers to that analyse the constitutive power that permeates knowledge and subjectivities. The chapter will be divided into three dimensions which are individual, collective and technical. These three dimensions thus constitute a triad, which links the elements together in a reciprocal manner (Figure 6.1). The individual thus can be understood as both on the executing and the receiving end of control in relation to each of the dimensions. At the same time, as will be seen in the analysis of the data that follows, the dimensions are not separate but inextricably linked to each other. Before going into the analysis one more aspect should be mentioned here, as it seems important for locating this book within

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2021 E. Ferraro, Wilful Blindness, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-32654-8_6

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Figure 6.1 Category 2 - Conditions of Control and Agency (own representation)

the educational sciences. The three dimensions found in this category seem to be evocative also of Humboldt’s concept of Bildung (Humboldt, 1997) that places the individual in relation to herself, in relation to others in the world and finally in relation to things in the world or the world itself. The discussion of the relationship between the dimensions in this category and how it might be related to questions of Bildung in this triad of a relation with oneself, others and things will thus arise at different points throughout this chapter. As the previous category focused on the conditions of the digital state, the first dimension explored here will be focusing on power, control and agency in relation to the collectivity. This will be followed by an analysis of power, control and agency in relation to aspects of technology, while the final part of this chapter will focus on questions of power, control and agency in relation to the individual, thus allowing the line of argumentation to lead into the following chapter that will focus on questions on the self. Before going into the analysis of the data, I would like to give a brief definition of how the respective terms of power, control, structure and agency will be used and understood here. Therefore I will base the theoretical foundations of these terms mainly on Giddens’ definition of structure and agency, developing his account of agency slightly further in relation to the data of this research. Questions of power and control will be defined with reference to Foucault and Deleuze, as well as in a broader understanding of Bauman’s concept of power and control

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in contemporary societies. Thus agency quite generally “refers not to the intentions people have in doing things but to their capability of doing those things in the first place […]. Agency concerns events of which an individual is the perpetrator, in the sense that the individual could, at any phase in a given sequence of conduct, have acted differently” (Giddens, 1984, p. 9). In the following chapter, I often refer to perceived levels of agency in order to indicate that the analysis focuses on agency from the subject’s perspective and not their agency as seen from an outside perspective. Rather, what is important are the possibilities that they retrospectively and currently ascribe to or perceive for themselves. Whether or not these perspectives actually are possible and provide or impair a level of agency analysed by an outside perspective is not the focus of consideration here. Agency for Giddens is constituted in relation to structure (or social structure) understood as the rules and resources “allowing the ‘binding’ of time-space in social systems” (Giddens, 1984, p. 17). Giddens analyses a duality of structure whereby structure is at the same time “medium and outcome of the conduct it recursively organizes” (Giddens, 1984, p. 374), thus meaning that structural properties while not existing outside of action are a constant factor for its production and reproduction. Therefore in the analysis questions of structure will imply ways of looking at the rules and resources that produce and reproduce the social systems, both as medium and as outcome, that the subjects are a part of. Power for Giddens is based on a regularisation of relations of both dependence and autonomy in contexts of social interaction between individual actors and collective entities. Here we can already see the relevance of other important terms such as power, autonomy and dependence that are inextricably defined in relation to each other. Foucault in his account of Bentham’s panopticon that has already been referred to in the literature review, analyses a disciplinary power that is able to select, analyse and differentiate the individual units in order to “make” individuals; “it is the specific technique of a power that regards individuals both as objects and as instruments of its exercise. It is not triumphant power, which because of its own excess can pride itself on its omnipotence; it is a modest, suspicious power, which functions as calculated, but permanent economy” (Foucault, 1995, p. 170). In “Postscript on the Societies of Control” Deleuze analyses a shift from disciplinary societies to societies of control. “Control is short-term and of rapid rates of turnover, but also continuous and without limit, while discipline was of long duration, infinite and discontinuous” (Deleuze, 1992, p. 6). Lyon argues that it is in this definition of control that Deleuze offers, that a feeling of liquidity can also be found (Lyon, 2010). This then leads back to Bauman. For Zygmunt Bauman power is seen in relation to the social, culture and inequalities. He analyses

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contemporary society in relation to a notion of fear caused particularly by a lack of locating of control (Bauman, 2011). Because no one can know where control is coming from, this leads to a sense of fear and uncertainty. While in solid modernity, power is exercised through controlling limiting possibilities, in liquid modernity power is exercised though uncertainty and insecurity (Bauman & Haugaard, 2010; Bauman 2012). Thus as already argued at the start of this chapter, power relations and levels of agency for individuals are closely related to questions of collective rules and structures, according to Giddens. Power relations become apparent in intricate ways not always obvious and triumphant, according to Foucault. At the same time, they are based on short-term and rapid conditions, with reference to Deleuze, that result in feelings of insecurity and even fear, as Bauman would argue. It is thus that an analysis of these intricate conditions of power in relation to collectives, technologies and individuals seems necessary and promising. On the basis of the theoretical definition of the terms described above, it becomes apparent that they also play a central role in relation to the data. As has been noted before, structure is based on rules and resources constituted by the interaction of individuals with others. This already indicates a condition in which the individual is placed at the receiving end of control. The first dimension here thus focuses on social aspects of questions of control and agency and is therefore entitled “Collective: Adaptation as a Loss of Agency”.

6.1

Dimension 1: Collective or Adaptation as a Loss of Agency

The core arguments raised in the analysis of this dimension can be summarised in a figure as follows (Figure 6.2): As could already be seen in the literature review of this book social interaction is an important aspect of human life. It is not only a constituting factor for processes of identity formation and the self, but also seems to play a relevant role in the discussion on questions of structure, agency and control. “Power within social systems which enjoy some continuity over time and space presumes regularized relations of autonomy and dependence between actors or collectivities in contexts of social interaction” (Giddens, 1984, p. 16). As can be seen in the quote by Giddens, questions of agency, power and collectivity are interrelated and need to be analysed in consideration of each other. While individuals adapt to collectivities and circumstances around them, the same applies to social

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Figure 6.2 Core Arguments of the Dimension of the Collective in the Second Category (own representation)

groups as well. Adaption hence can be defined, as Rappaport does, as a process in which individuals and groups of individuals stay in homeostasis both in themselves and with each other through changes in their structures, compositions or states on the basis of short-term fluctuations and long-term changes in the structure of their environment (Rappaport, 1971). Interestingly enough this definition highlights the interrelation of both individuals and collectives of individuals in relation to the environment, as well as differentiates between short-term fluctuations and long-term changes. This differentiation between short-term and long-term changes, of course, is reminiscent of arguments on the ever-changing nature of post-modern living conditions, theorised by Bauman in his concept of liquidity. Harding defines adaptation as an interplay of culture, technology, nature and ideological components. He argues that a culture may adapt to another culture and through this process of adaption shape both ideology and society and this process consequently impacts on technology and its future course. Thus in an adaptive process the cultural whole, consisting of technology, society and ideology, is produced under the influence of both nature and outside cultures (Harding, 1988). Harding thus places an interesting focus on the correlation of technology, society and ideology. However, Giddens argues that while Rappaport’s account on adaptation is too concise, not including everything that might need to be included, Harding’s account is not definite enough as it explains both everything and nothing at once (Giddens, 1984). Either way, what we can see, is that adaptive processes are difficult to define and complex. Perspectives on adaptive processes can include aspects of technology and cultures, both from within as well as outside, and they can affect an individual as well as collectives or groups of individuals. In some cases, adaptation can also be seen as a loss of agency. In the data of the research of this book, this perspective becomes particularly apparent. The subjects, to a great extent,

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touch upon the ways in which they needed to adapt and compare themselves to others in order to experience a sense of belonging and recognition. According to Keupp, a sense of belonging and recognition are indispensable in order to construct an identity (Keupp, 1997). This already relates arguments brought up in this category to aspects important for the following category which focuses on questions of identity and self. However, before drawing up connections to the following category, the focus of this dimension should be made clear. The data offers many examples in which the subjects touch upon a felt loss of agency in relation to other individuals, collectives of individuals or cultural aspects. While many of these examples in this dimension might not explicitly touch upon questions of media or data collection, the examples given here nonetheless seem to be relevant in the wider scope of the research. This is based on the fact that they give insight into the ways in which the subjects adapt, perceive a loss of agency or a feeling of control in more general terms. “When I was young and growing up as a kid, I did all I could to conform because I was such an outsider to begin with” (Lukas, l. 135–136). Looking at all the data in the interviews conducted for the research of this book, the cultural heterogeneity of the cases becomes very apparent. As in the case of Lukas, many of the subjects have experienced different cultural influences and a change of home either in their younger years, in their more recent years, or even both. This might also be one of the reasons why the data includes many references to belonging, recognition and cultural adaptation. The quote by Lukas indicates a number of aspects relevant for the elaboration of this dimension. As already raised in the previous chapter, there seem to be many references to certain situations in the life span of the subjects, as also the case in the quote by Lukas who refers to himself as being young and a kid. In many of the interviews the temporal setting within the life span, e.g. explicitly as a kid, as a teenager or in their 20 s, is used as a clear point of reference in order to specify the context and to contrast changes against. As will be seen in the following chapter that focuses on the self and identity, changes of the self or of the subjects’ identity are often related to certain situations in the life span. A similar situation seems to be true for how the subjects in the research perceive their own levels of agency. In general, retrospectively, they regard their levels of agency in their childhood and also in their teenage years as more limited than in later years. This is not only based on a level of control by their parents or other figures of control in the settings they were placed in as children (i.e. implications and restrictions based on the fact that they are not of full age). There is a whole discourse on agency in childhood studies (Esser et al., 2016), whereby the acknowledgment of the specificities of the concept of childhood is given particular attention. Therefore, it seems easily

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understandable that children are subjected to a different level of control also based on the fact that they legally are not seen as mature persons and that because of this often do not hold the same level of agency as other members of society do. However, the subjects in the research do not really consider these arguments related to the legal concept of childhood as one of the main reasons for lower levels of agency, but rather base this on insecurities and partly a lack of knowledge in their younger years. This can be seen not only in the case of Lukas but also when Simone, who is bullied at school as the new child in class, states that there were “ensuing complications with kids, because kids are cruel” (Simone, l. 44). Simone, therefore, relates the fact that she was bullied explicitly to the age of childhood, not based on legal or structural elements of childhood in itself, but rather on the specificities of childhood and perceived social characteristics of this time span. Patrick does a similar thing in relation to his teenage years, where he refers to “the human being of wanting to belong and ehm that for me at that age from 17, 18, 19 was Indie Music and skinny jeans and big fringes” (Patrick, l. 210–211). He goes on to say that “I didn’t have the confidence at that age, as a teenager to see those things as strengths, and ehm just to see those things as my…as an identity to eh build on ehm it was only later on in my twenties I kind of more so” (Patrick, l. 255–257). What could be argued when considering all of the quotes mentioned in this paragraph is that while there are specific limitations to agency in consideration of the locating within the life span, there seems to also be a general need for a feeling of belonging, which might be more strong at different times of life based both on the context of the situation as well as the age of the individual. It is interesting to observe that the need for belonging, indeed influences the ways in which the subjects seem to adapt to their surroundings and circumstances. These adaptive processes seem to take place within very ambivalent perceptions of agency, as will be seen in the following paragraphs. It seems worthwhile to analyse contexts and cases that highlight the ways in which these ambivalent feelings develop in order to try to understand how the subjects try to regain levels of agency. There will be three thematic examples given that highlight these processes particularly well and are based on a need for belonging and recognition resulting from the fact that human beings are social beings and in need of social interaction, with the self being possible to conceive as arising only in social experience (Mead, 1934). The three examples given will focus firstly on adaptation in a general understanding as well as the ways in which the subjects learn to adapt, secondly on culture and lastly on a comparative principle. Firstly, as has already been argued, because of the heterogeneous nature of the cases in this research and the fact that many of the subjects have experienced a huge level of movement in their childhood and/or later years, the ways in which

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they have felt a need to adapt are worth highlighting. Both Laila and Lukas mention that because of the fact that they have moved several times they did all they “could to conform” (Lukas, l. 136) and therefore were “just so used to adjust” (Laila, l. 107). Lukas explains that the way in which he learnt was mainly by observing: Lukas: And how I found out was by listening, seeing people reacting together, how when a group of kids are together, it’s very very easy to fit, really, when you’re really looking for signs of for instance who is being dominant, and what are people reacting to, are people reacting to that joke that was just told, are people reacting to what people are wearing, are people looking around because they are bored […]. (Lukas, l. 152–156)

Not only does Lukas refer to listening and seeing people, but he explicitly refers to structures of power within the group of people he is observing. In the way in which he explains his adaptive process, it becomes apparent that questions of power within a social group seem to be relevant. This is not only supported by the fact that he refers to dominant members of the group, but also by the way in which he refers to people as “reacting” rather than acting. Thus it could be argued that in order to successfully adapt to a social group to achieve a sense of belonging and inclusion levels of agency are limited based on the social norms and rules of that group, as well as material attributes such as clothing (“what people are wearing”). The focus on belonging through material attributes is something also observable in the quote by Patrick illustrated above, where he places his sense of belonging in relation to “skinny jeans and big fringes”. The perspective on the adaptive process in a sense of conforming is further supported by Laila, who says that she adjusted by making mistakes. “Yes, I had to learn and I learnt from making mistakes. The best way to learn is from making mistakes. I made a lot of mistakes” (Laila, l. 141–142). Laila explains that she realised she made mistakes, through the reaction of others around herself. In the case of her travels in Japan, she explains it further, by saying that others would ignore her if she didn’t follow particular social norms and rules. This already draws up a connection to the following argument on the cultural influence exerted on the subjects. Before focusing on this point however, I wish to stress that Laila also says she “had” to learn to conform. What can be seen in this expression is the lack of options felt by Laila. It is interesting to observe that she speaks of making mistakes but does not reflect on the fact that her behaviour might have only been seen as a mistake from a certain perspective, namely from a perspective of within the social group she wants to conform to. The social norms apparent in the group are therefore taken to be governing and necessary to conform to in order to achieve a sense of belonging. Belonging then

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is a natural state of being the individual wants to achieve in many situations for which there are several techniques with which the individual tries to achieve this. The ambivalent notions with which the individuals perceive themselves to belong to certain aspects can be seen particularly well in the ways in which they mention cultural references. So secondly, it can be observed that the subjects in the research identify with and adapt to the cultures they live in. “A national culture has never been simply a point of allegiance, bonding and symbolic identification. It is also a structure of cultural power” (Hall, 1992, p. 296). The concept of culture is a much-discussed topic, which opens up a whole other discourse. While this discourse is worth exploring, it is not considered relevant at this point. Rather, the concept of culture and cultural identity will be referred to in relation to Hall’s and Bauman’s considerations on cultural identity, culture as praxis and culture as structure (Hall, 1992, 1990; Bauman 1999). Looking at Hall’s quote, it already becomes apparent that culture can be interpreted in relation to social interaction and belonging (indeed Bauman argues that there is no real distinction between the cultural and social, but rather something he refers to as socio-cultural (Bauman, 2006)), in relation to symbolic representations as well as in relation to power structures. All of the above mentioned relations are in some ways relevant, however, at this point, the focus in the analysis will lie mainly on the ways in which the subjects constitute their cultural identities and which implications of power and knowledge are subjected to these identities. In the following, I would like to focus on three examples, of the ways cultural identity seems to influence the levels of social control that the subjects feel subordinated to. The first example is given by Lukas, who refers to difference between the Danish and the Polish culture that have influenced his upbringing. He reflects on the differences, whereby he bases these mainly on the socio-political structures of the countries. Whereas the social welfare system of Denmark leads to a sense of security, he states that Polish mentality is very different given the economic and historical political situation. In Poland “You are hard-working and then you are hard playing afterwards. Life isn’t easy, that seems to be the basic message that you are told from the very beginning” (Lukas, l. 285–287). It is interesting to observe the stereotyping that Lukas presents here, which is based on a historical political construction of the Polish and the Danish system. Based on this, Lukas ascribes explicit fixed and shared personal attributes to the members of either society. Yet, it is interesting that he seems to observe these attributes without really ascribing them to himself. This is a different matter in the case of Miranda, who at different points throughout the interview bases her media practices on her cultural identity as can be seen in the following quotes:

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Miranda: Oh I use my smartphone a lot. That’s the case in China. I don’t know whether it’s the same in the West. (Miranda, l. 124–125) Miranda: Yeah, not many people have it, like Snapchat, we don’t really use it. It’s starting to getting there, but not many people are using it. (Miranda, l. 147–148) Miranda: Yeah, cause in China we don’t use Facebook. (Miranda, l. 562)

Miranda uses her sense of cultural belonging to China as the reason for why she does or does not use certain media services or devices. She draws a differentiation between China and the West, which can be compared to Hall’s notion of othering (Hall, 1992). In contrast to Lukas, here we can see a strong level of identification with Chinese culture by her use of the pronoun “we”. By saying that in China “we” don’t use Snapchat or Facebook, Miranda does not only portray a level of identification but also it could be argued that due to a shared behaviour she is denying a sense of autonomy for the individual and attributing power to the common rules shared by her culture. This opens up the questions of how much an individual as part of a culture is able to create a sense of agency that might not be the norm from a position of within this culture. In another example, Miranda even raises this problem, when she explains how upon returning to China after several years of living abroad, she was told off by her mother for not abiding by social norms, which she does not “understand” anymore after having experienced another perspective. This example indicates the relationship between power and knowledge. Ben and Miranda both give another example in which this relationship becomes obvious. Miranda states that: “At first, there was some culture shock for me. Ehm but then I just get used to it and after a while I kind of liked it. So when I first went back to China, after UK, I did face some difficulties” (Miranda, l. 87–89). Miranda explains that while it is possible to adapt to a culture, this does indeed take time and refers to the difficulties that might arise once the individual is going back to the old situation. The change that has taken place cannot simply be reversed back. This is an interesting conclusion as it opens up a reference to Bildung in the sense of a transformation between the self and the world that has taken place. This reference can also be seen in the example given by Ben, who says that: Ben: Well I think living in Europe gives you perspective about peace and racism. Israel because it’s very in the midst of like war and not now really but like fighting and like political and racist issues, I believe that in my past I was racist although I was very left wing, but I was racist […]. (Ben, l. 953–956)

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It could be argued that Ben has undergone a process of Bildung, in the sense of a change of perspective resulting in a new view of the world (Weltansicht) as argued by Humboldt in relation to the learning of a new language. Thus Humboldt argues that through the learning of a new language the individual is not only able to express herself in new ways, but also acquires a new Weltansicht (perspective on the world) and therefore is able to relate to others, things in the world and herself in a different manner, which can be understood as a transformation in the sense of Bildung (Humboldt, 1997). Hence, it could be argued that the acquirement of knowledge through leaving a given culture and experiencing something new, does not only lead to a change of power structures between an individual and the culture this individual is a part of, but it can also lead to processes of Bildung. The third example for cultural references can be seen in the way in which Patrick refers to Irish culture, where he definitely portrays a sense of ambivalence in relation to his level of identification. While Patrick, does indeed identify with Irish culture to a certain extent, as can be seen in the following sentence: “I feel like we, when I say we, I mean Irish people” (Patrick, l. 905), the following passage indicates the ambivalent feelings Patrick has in relation to his cultural identity: Patrick: because I felt it was a place where certain Irish football Gaelic football that we play there, was what young people did and I didn’t have a natural, well I had a natural ability maybe, but I didn’t I didn’t have a want or a and for that reason I would be teased for being gay, for not liking being into sport, but I liked climbing trees and ehm doing things on my own. I didn’t ehm identify with the group very well and that’s I’ve probably always felt like that actually. I’ve been uncomfortable in groups and more comfortable on my own or in smaller groups, I suppose. (Patrick, 182–188)

This section is very interesting as it particularly highlights the relationship between the individual and the group, and the ways in which being part of a collective is difficult without sharing the norms held by this collective. Patrick does not share some of the imagined common attributes of an Irish cultural identity such as an interest in Gaelic football. Here we can see the discrepancy between what Hall refers to as the two vectors of cultural identity. One vector is constituted by similarity and continuity, i.e. the shared and common fixed origin, the other one is constituted by difference and rupture, i.e. “constructed through memory, fantasy, narrative and myth” (Hall, 1990, p. 226). Aside from that which is fixed and that which is flexible, and the ambivalent feelings an individual can hold towards aspects of his culture, identifying with some and contrasting with others, there is another phenomenon that can be detected in the quote by Patrick. This phenomenon can be seen in the comparative principle apparent here. Patrick

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sees his hobbies of climbing trees in comparison to the interests he should have presumably had as part of his cultural belonging. The following third example will consider these aspects of a comparative control and a relation to the generalised other. Thirdly, looking at the way in which control can be traced in an analysis of the relationship between individuals and others, the focus will be placed on what might be termed as a comparative control. In the following paragraphs I would like to give two examples in which this relationship becomes apparent. The first one is given by Julie and in relation to her social media practices. Julie states that she opens Facebook many times “to see what other people are doing. And I hate that because […] it makes me more comparative with my life” (Julie, l. 244–246). Through seeing what other people are posting online, Julie compares herself to those others. She says that Julie: I see other people leading great lives and stuff and it’s kind of spurred me on going well I’m gonna have a great life as well […] But at the same time, when I look at it, I feel really depressed. Like I start to think, wow ok, they’re doing this and they’re doing this and it makes, it really makes me question who I am. (Julie, l. 247–255)

It can be seen that Julie compares her own life to the lives of others around her, or maybe even more so the presentation of their lives on social media. Julie relates this realisation to negative feelings such as saying that she “hates” to compare, and it makes her “depressed”. Aside from the negative feelings, she also states that the comparison makes her question who she actually is. It can thus be assumed that a comparative control does not only influence people either by motivating them to lead their lives in a certain way or by influencing their feelings, but also influences the way in which individuals look at their selves. This will be taken up again in the following chapter on questions of self and identity in more detail. At this point it is sufficient to demonstrate the profundity that the comparison to others can have for an individual. There is one more important argument that should be raised at this point. In the second example of how the subjects constantly compare themselves to others around them, Ben explains that he has only lied about his identity online, which he justifies with the fact that his wife has done the same things several times before him. Here Ben does not only use the comparison as a ground for a moral justification, but also compares his own actions to those of a specific other person. So, in the examples found in the data it has been shown that through the comparison to others, the subjects also negotiate their sense of agency and control. This can happen in relation both to individual explicit other beings, more heterogeneous groups of others such as in

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the case of Julie who compares herself to the heterogeneous group of her Facebook friends, or at times even in relation to what Mead would call a generalised other. Mead describes the generalised other as an organised community or group that constitutes the unity of self for the individual. Mead thus differentiates between individual and generalised attitudes, whereby the attitude of the generalised other is equivalent to the attitude of the whole social group. Mead further argues that “It is in the form of the generalized other that the social process influences the behaviour of the individuals involved in it and carrying it on, i.e., that the community exercises control over the conduct of its individual members” (Mead, 1934, p. 155). Thus it can be seen that the community, through being analysed as a generalised set of attitudes, exerts control over the individual members of that community. In the following dimension, this assumption will be used and developed further in relation to the subject’s assumptions on technical structures, while also considering the ways in which technology might be seen as both increasing and limiting perceived levels of agency for the subjects. So, to summarise it has been shown in the paragraphs on this dimension that the individuals of this research are subjected to control by the collectives they are a part of in ambivalent ways. Using the example of cultural belonging, these ambivalences between fixed shared and common vectors on one side versus a changing vector on the other side (Hall, 1990) were illustrated using a number of examples from the data. Overall it seems that belonging and recognition, that can be seen as important aspects for the self (Keupp, 1997), exist only within groups or collectives of individuals for which a loss of agency, forms of control and a necessity for adaptive processes seem inevitable. The constant need for adaptation thus seems to be relatable also to the notion of liquidity referred to over and over again in the theoretical considerations of this research. Following this assumption, the next dimensions will, in contrast, consider the influence of technology for questions of control and agency as well as the ways in which the individual can position herself towards these conditions and try to regain a sense of agency.

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Dimension 2: Technical or on the Ambivalence of Agency Between Technical Puppets and Consumer Power

The core arguments raised in the analysis of this dimension can be summarised in a figure as follows (Figure 6.3):

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Figure 6.3 Core Arguments of the Dimension of the Technical in the Second Category (own representation)

“Always my phone. Always my phone.” (Julie, l. 148) Digital technology plays an inextricable role in the everyday lives of many individuals, as could already be seen in the analysis of how technology is interwoven in the daily routines of getting up in the case of Patrick. The ways in which technology exerts control over the subjects is something that becomes very apparent in a number, if not all, of the interviews. In the following section, some of these examples will be discussed and analysed in greater detail. Julie exclaims: Always my phone. Always my phone […] there is sometimes when I just pick up my phone and I just go to it and I don’t even need to but it’s just like you can’t help it. And I hate that. (Julie, l. 148–151)

The feeling Julie describes here can be categorised as portraying a loss of agency, which the subject perceives as frustrating, and connotes it with a strong emotion such as hate. Whether or not, this expression might actually have to be relativised to a certain extent, it nonetheless points to an argument which can be found in a number of the interviews. There seems to be a negative feeling for several subjects in relation to a perceived dependency on their mobile phones, seen also in expressions such as “slave of my phone” (Ben, l. 365) or “it’s like a thing I have to check in with like a baby” (Patrick, l. 666). While picked up again at other points in the analysis, these comparisons nicely illustrate the intensity with which the subjects feel to be controlled by the need for checking in on their mobile phones. Interestingly enough, the terms slave and baby might be interpreted as presenting slightly different understandings of this dependency. The notion of being a slave to one’s phone would indicate a complete loss of autonomy, whereas the comparison of a phone to a baby would also include a level of dependency but rather the other way round referring to a situation in which the mobile phone is

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in need of the subject to check up on it presenting somewhat of a more reciprocal dependency. While differing slightly, both expressions, as well as Julie’s feelings quoted above, highlight a loss of agency perceived by the subjects that in all of the examples is connoted with negative feelings when being reflected on by them. While they do indeed ascribe a felt loss of agency for themselves and a dependency in relation to digital technologies such as mobile phones, the subjects nonetheless seem to attribute a rise of agency mainly to human actors at the same time. Within the interviews one can detect an ambiguous sense of agency attributed and not attributed to technology that is worth discussing in the light of existing postmodern discourses as discussed by Haraway in her Cyborg Manifesto (Haraway, 1990) or Latour in his ideas on the Actor-Network-Theory (ANT) (Latour, 2005). While the subjects indeed problematise the structure of media services in itself, they seem to create a sort of “constructed other” as the agentic counterpart that seems to gain control through the structures, rather than seeing the structures or the technology in itself as the controlling agent. This “constructed other” is worth exploring further as it sheds light on where the subjects seem to perceive control to be placed within the context of data collection, online surveillance and the design of digital technologies. The following four examples from the data will help to illustrate this in greater detail. Firstly, John states that he prefers to sometimes post controversial political opinions anonymously because of being scared of the consequences, which he sees as possibly being investigated or even arrested. Following this argument he states that “But yeah, I know it’s silly because IP address they know who you are […] (John, l. 375–376). The “generalised other” here can be seen in the form of “them” who are not explicitly defined, but seem to hold control over being capable of knowing other’s IP addresses, being able to investigate other individuals and maybe even arrest other individuals, as described by John. Secondly, Laila, who also refers to a non-explicit “they”, states that: Laila: It’s horrible. […] what you use is for payment even if I pay a coffee, I pay through my card, so they do know my daily routines, they do know what I like and what I dislike, they know my routes, whenever I take the train, cause everything is recorded […] Or always take out cash and pay with cash, do not pay with your card. But then since I live between the countries. It started already, so I said they have my ID, I’m sure they already have a code conducted for me, so there is no reason anymore. (Laila, l. 482–518)

The “constructed other” portrayed by Laila here also proves to be interesting. It seems as if this “other” has control even across nation states, has access to credit card details and information on which public transport and trains an individual

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has travelled. In addition to that, Laila constructs an “other” that stores IDs and creates codes in order to build a profile on “these are her likes, these are her dislikes, if you do this you make her nervous, if you do this you will be able to start a conversation with her” (Laila, l. 492–493). In this statement Laila clearly portrays a situation in which the individual is subjected to a loss of agency as it seems she can only react, rather than act, in becoming nervous or joining in on a conversation. The access to data on a given individual by the “constructed other” allows this “other” to manipulate a certain behaviour from the given individual, thus tracing control away from the individual to this “other”. Thirdly, this “other”, does not only have access to data but also can be constructed in relation to the design of technology. Patrick states that “impressive technologies are designed” in consideration of “how it can be used ehm to control and the second is how can it be ehm made into a consumer product ehm to manufacture the consent of people (Patrick, l. 701–704). In this quote, the other is being defined even less explicitly by using passive constructions of being designed and not mentioning an active agent at all. Through this Patrick creates the impression of an intangible “other” that consciously uses technology in order to control individuals. The objective here then is not primarily based on economically profitable goals, but on the goal attributed to the “other” of an actual “control” of the population, according to Patrick. While the “other” is able to control individuals, it at the same time seems intangible and therefore out of reach of being controlled itself. Fourthly and finally, the “other” can be constructed in relation also to explicit technical aspects, as in the example of the self-tracking app Julie uses. Julie exclaims that “they give you all these statistics and then once you completed that entry for the day, it’ll tell you afterwards ‘oh if you carry on doing this for the next month, exactly the same, you’ll be like 8 stone 5 lb’” (Julie, l. 183–186). There are two important aspects that should be mentioned at this point. The first one refers to the way in which the “other” referred to as “they” is constructed. In this example, it might indeed be critically questioned whether any statistics are given to the user of a self-tracking app, by any human agent at all. Rather, it should be assumed that an agentic other is constructed despite the fact that it might be quite obvious that there is no human agent, but only the software of an app that offers statistics to the user. This also leads to the second point which is that in the quote above by Julie, the ambivalence of what has just been analysed already becomes visible when Julie goes on to state that “it” will give the user a prognosis as to the expected weight loss or gain. What we can see here then, is a reference not to the “other” that has been argued before, but to the actual technical elements referred to as “it”, which inform the user on expected outcomes. Thus there seems to be a consideration of something which might be compared

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to a non-human agent, as in the sense of Latour, that influences a given network or situation (Latour, 2005). The fact that agency and control are assigned by the subjects within the interviews to both what has just been analysed as a “constructed other” as well as to non-human agents, justifies the necessity of analysing this aspect in detail. Now one might ask, why this is the case. It seems that because, as argued in the literature review, the processes of data collection and online surveillance are not transparent, the subjects in this research react to the uncertainty resulting from the non-transparency of the processes with constructing an “other” that seems almost omnipotent and omniscient, being able to access information and manipulate individuals to serve an unspecified goal while being intangible itself. Whether this “other” exists or not, is not the interesting question at this point. Looking at the construction it seems highly unlikely that this “other” exists in the way that it has been described by the subjects in this research, especially when relating all of the aspects together. Rather what seems to be of relevance here, is the fact that the subjects “need” to create this other, the question of how this other is constituted and what this means for further considerations. To phrase this slightly differently, the following questions seem to be relevant: 1. Why do the current practices lead to a sense of uncertainty and the creation of the “constructed other” as described above? 2. How is this “constructed other” constituted, what are the qualitative attributes of this “constructed other” and power ascribed to it? and finally 3. How does the assumption of this “other” impact on the subject’s practices as well as their felt levels of agency? To give a short answer to these questions, it can be summarised that it has been shown in the analysis that the subjects often seem to refer to this more generalised other rather than referring to a non-human agent explicitly. The subjects seem to assume an other that observes the data being collected, that designs technology being used and that tracks their everyday moves. This observation constitutes an interesting argument for the discussion of subjectivity and postmodern research and theory on non-human agents in the particular case looked at in this research. Despite the fact that the subjects do not explicitly refer to this other as being “human”, the understanding that is portrayed in their expressions is related rather to a human agent, indeed even a group of human agents seen in the use of the plural term “they”, rather than a non-human agent. So to summarise, the “other” constructed through the data by the subjects so far could be analysed as a generalised, plural group of human agents, who hold an almost omnipotent and omniscient power over individuals based on the design of technology and the collection of data. The power ascribed to the “other” is based on a level of uncertainty in relation to the actual processes and structures, which are non-transparent to the subjects and therefore lead to the way in which the

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“other” is being imagined as powerful. While this is the case, it has also become apparent, that the power ascribed to this “other” is constantly changing and ambivalent. Consequences of the control of the other range from the fear of public ridicule to investigation of personal data and even to the possibility of arrest, as stated by John. While the “other” is constituted by a certain amount of ambiguity and vagueness in relation to its definition, this allows again for a comparison to the main line of argumentation of the research, namely notions of liquidity, ambiguity and uncertainty. The way that “they” (as the “other” constructed through the data by the subjects) are referred to in the data of this research is synthesised together from assumptions that the subjects have about how the structural processes of industrial forces involved in data collection and technology design work, which are probably based on empirical knowledge of industries in general as well as on the public media coverage of these structures, also in relation to information as provided by Edward Snowden or information provided by WikiLeaks (Patrick explicitly states these two examples; Patrick, l. 1131–1133). This supports the argument made by Turow that very few (if any one may even ask) individuals actually understand the exact forces of the industrial processes (Turow, 2011). While Turow’s argument refers to the advertising industry explicitly, this argument could also be extended to other industrial and political processes, such as the examples brought up in the data of this research, be it political surveillance, self-tracking applications or credit card details. Turow argues that in the case of media advertising the actual “media-buying processes have been virtually hidden to all but a relatively few practitioners in the field […] the practitioners they present are more or less opaque to those outside the industry” (Turow, 2011, p. 8). He goes on to say that some practitioners even state that the clients, the advertisers and their bosses are not aware of the details, as they would not grasp them. The same is often said about complex code structures and algorithms when it comes to areas such as big data. The discourse on a need for an understanding of basic code structures and the institutional implementation in the educational curriculum seems to be an important aspect in relation to these arguments, which cannot be discussed here in greater detail. Nonetheless, what becomes apparent in these arguments, is that it seems as if a certain level of expertise is needed in order to deal with data. This level of expertise thus increases levels of agency. It is worth mentioning that the required level of expertise and professionalism are indeed ascribed to the “constructed other” by the subjects, whereby this other seems to gain some sort of more explicit shape, as will be seen in the following two examples. Simone states that “if someone who does that professionally would go and dig for data about me, they would find a lot” (Simone, l. 555–556). What we

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can see in this quote, is that the basic assumption for anyone to be able to use the data that Simone has shared online is that this person would have to be a “professional”, whatever that might mean in this particular circumstance. While it may not be obvious as to what Simone really understands by “someone who does that professionally”, the quote yet supports the assumption that for anyone who does not work in data analysis it would not be as easily or at all possible to carry out the same intrusion into Simone’s life by analysing “digging into her data”. Thus, the person that is professional enough to be able to do this is also perceived as being more agentic. It does not become explicitly clear if this is based either simply on questions of access to these data, and thus something more structural, or also on what has been discussed above i.e. knowledge of the actual processes. The second example, which supports the argument that the actual level of expertise also plays an important role in the subject’s assumptions on the level of agency in relation to professionalism rather than mere access to the data is given by Laila who says that: Laila: ok this is a summary of who she is and then you can just put it in calculations of code if you’re a good psychologist or analyst and then you can actually categorise the person. These are her likes, these are her dislikes, if you do this you make her nervous, if you do this you will be able to start conversation with her. And I’m very aware of that. (Laila, l. 489-493)

What we can see in the quote by Laila, of which parts were raised above already, is the focus on the level of professionalism that allows someone to manipulate an individual. Laila almost makes it sound as if there are no barriers of access to personal data: as long as someone is a “good” psychologist or analyst they would be able to exert control over the individual whose personal data they have access to. It is thus shown, that the level of expertise seems to play an important role for the power that the subjects ascribe to the “other” that has been constructed as the counter part to the consumer whose data has been collected. As mentioned at the beginning of this section, the other counterpart to the consumer is the non-human agent of technology. This was seen for example in metaphors such as being a slave to one’s own phone, or it can be seen when Patrick exclaims that because of how WhatsApp is designed he feels pressured by the sense of a need to respond as the person he is communicating with is able to see whether or not he has read the message already. Here again, the design

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that allows access to information on whether or not someone has read a message1 impacts on the perceived levels of control on the subjects in relation to social control, as already referred to in the first dimension of this category. While the examples just mentioned seem to have focused more on the ways in which the subjects perceive a loss of agency in relation to technology and the industrial structures inherent to their media practices, there also are a number of other examples given, that touch upon ways in which the subjects actually feel a level of increase in relation to their agency. Three examples will be given, followed by a discussion of how technology might increase levels of agency for the subjects. The first two examples touch on the ways in which the subjects structure their own media applications and are agentic in the sense of deciding on the level of intrusion and the ordering of favourite or much-used items. One very obvious example of this is given by Ben when he exclaims that he decided to switch off his notifications as “they were driving me nuts. So it’s good, because it means, I’m less of a slave of my phone […] (Ben, l. 364–365). Ben reclaims a perceived higher level of agency by switching off the notifications on his phone. Interestingly enough, the focus here needs to be on the notion of reclaiming, since in this example the level of agency is only increased in contrast to a previous loss of agency through the perception of being dependent on the mobile phone in the first place. The second example can be seen when Simone states her agency by saying that “If I want something at my fingertips I bookmark it, that’s how it is.” (Simone, l. 607–608). In order to navigate the internet more agentically, Simone does not want Google to suggest webpages by automatically completing possible search options or website names, but rather bookmarking pages of interest herself. This can also be related to the third example given by Patrick, who appreciates the “freedom that Tor gives you” based on that fact that “is that you can use tor gives you is that you can use your favourite you can use an application or website that’s called disconnect search which uses whichever of your favourite search engines but scrambles the things” (Patrick, l. 1125–1127) thus allowing for the possibility of searching for things without being tracked. Patrick uses this technical option in order to feel more agentic and less under surveillance when wanting to research anything on the internet. In these two examples again, it seems that agency is merely reclaimed following a previous loss of agency through functions such as optimised search results, data tracking when searching 1

In the current version of WhatsApp users can decide on whether or not they wish to share this information. They can only access this data on others as long as they are also willing to share their own. This change in the design of the app also brings along a change of agency in relation to the users.

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items, or automatically filling in information, as perceived by the subjects. Overall, it can be observed that this often seems to be the case. The subjects in the interviews often focus on the ways in which they can reclaim agency, which is something also picked up again in the following dimension as well as the final category that focuses on possibilities for (re)action. However, there are also a few examples of where the subjects seem to perceive an increased level of agency through digital technologies. This can be seen for example when Lukas exclaims that: Lukas: I am so thankful that I am in the age of smart-phones, I can have my whole business in my hand at all times, even when I’m out for dinner in town if my agent needs to contact me about an e-mail, yes or no, I need to know right now can you do this job, I can reply to him immediately. (Lukas, l. 315–318)

The immediacy of mobile phones thus can be seen both as being a factor for a perceived loss of agency for which one might feel the need of having to switch off notifications, as well as a factor for a perceived increase in agency that frees the individual from being bound to specific spaces and times for social interaction, as already argued before and also visible in the case of Lukas’s quote found above. There seems to be a slight imbalance within the data in relation to the fact that the perceived loss of agency in relation to technical aspects is higher, than the ways in which technology increased perceived levels of agency for the subjects. This might also be caused slightly by the research topic, that focuses on data collection rather than on the possibilities of digital technology, where the subjects might have indeed mentioned more examples of where technology gives them possibilities they might not previously have had, thus also allowing for an increase of agency. Nonetheless, even after considering this possible bias within the data, it has become apparent that the ways in which technology impacts on perceived levels of agency of the individuals is ambivalent in the sense that it seems to be both liberating and constraining. While this might not come as a surprise in itself, it seems important to consider the conditions under which these ambivalences seem to arise and research the ways in which a perceived loss or gain in agency impacts back on the subjects’ practices and behaviour. As demonstrated in this dimension one can conceive of the construction of an “other” that is not clearly defined, but somehow ascribed a huge amount of control over the relationship between the subject and technology. Thus “other” is somehow placed between the subject and the technological device or the technological practices in the sense that it might not consciously be there all the time, but is perceived as being able to control

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and impact on the relationship between the individual and technology through access to information and the ability to design and control the structures of this technology. Therefore, it needs to be stated that this is not the case for every particular example, but rather applicable to the general situation as referred to by the subjects in this research. The concept of this other is evocative of Zuboff’s idea of the “Big Other” (Zuboff, 2015). Zuboff also constitutes a “Big Other”, that unlike Orwell’s “Big Brother” is ubiquitous and omnipotent and ascribed a position of power through the possibility of surveillance. Zuboff’s account does not, however, qualitatively define the construction of this other more explicitly, and also does not relate it to theoretical concepts of the generalised other nor analyse in close detail what the construction of the “Big Other” implicates for individuals and societies. While she does mention an influence on the individual’s subjective reality, she does not empirically analyse the intricate ways in which this form of influence might be relevant for the individual’s perception of power and agency. While in the first and second dimension of this category it has been looked at how the individual is dependent on collective structures that might be interpreted as taking away agency from the individual as well as an ambivalent notion of perceived levels of agency when looking at the relationship between the individual and technology, the final dimension of this category will focus on the ways in which the individual can be seen in a relationship with herself by trying to reclaim agency or denying its existence altogether.

6.3

Dimension 3: Individual or Regaining Agency in Moments with Oneself

The core arguments raised in the analysis of this dimension can be summarised in a figure as follows (Figure 6.4): It has already been argued that there is an ambivalent notion of agency between the individual and technology, whereby technology is sometimes diagnosed as “predominantly heteronomizing (decreasing the autonomy of the subjects) and therefore disempowering” (Lemmens, 2015) while on the other hand “technologies can nevertheless be recruited to increase social autonomy” (Lemmens, 2015). Using the example of Quantified Self, Iske and Damberger see the relationship between autonomy and heteronomy in a continuously bipolar space gradually shaped as autonomy in the mode of heteronomy and heteronomy in the mode of autonomy (Iske & Damberger, 2017, p. 33). This means that even seemingly autonomous decisions might be heteronomised by social, economic and other

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Figure 6.4 Core Arguments of the Dimension on the Individual in the Second Category (own representation)

conditions. The following dimension will consider this thought and look at the ways in which the individual subjects position themselves within the context of the social and economic conditions that constitute their everyday decisions. The individual thus is not only placed in a relationship to others or technology, but also in a relationship with herself in which she is negotiating the bipolar space between autonomy and heteronomy. Bauman, yet again using other terms, describes this relationship as one between “fate” as “the generic name for everything we can’t prevent or even significantly alter” (Bauman & Lyon, 2013, p. 153) that sets out available and realistic options for the individual and “character” being “the generic name for what we can try to consciously control, change or cultivate” (Bauman & Lyon, 2013, p. 153) being that which chooses among the options constituted by fate. In Bauman’s discussion of this with David Lyon references to the “religious realm” which have been discussed in the previous chapter seem to become relevant again. In relation to the interplay of what might be termed “fate” and “character” a number of interesting examples found in the data show how the subjects negotiate the ways in which they are trying to reclaim a sense of agency for themselves on the one hand, on the other hand ways in which they are denying any sense of agency and finally even examples in which conflicting accounts of simultaneous denial and (re)claiming of agency seem to be visible. The following two examples focus on ways in which the individuals seem to deny a sense of agency by referring to something which might indeed be understood in Bauman’s sense of fate. Interestingly Miranda, when asked about describing herself answers: “And I think I’m a typical Gemini” (Miranda, l. 52). While in some ways referring to her character, the term which Bauman uses to contrast to that of fate, Miranda denies any sense of character as something which is consciously controlled or changeable by giving a reference to astrology. The relation between astrology and fate does not seem far-fetched and it is interesting to consider the comment made by Miranda and the implications that go along

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with it as a technique or superstition used to deny a sense of individual choice or control. A similar technique can be found when Jamie describes his Calvinist understanding of religion which is based on the assumption that God has already chosen those that will understand and believe and those that won’t. He says that while he is not totally fond of that perspective, he leans towards it “rather than it’s a total free will thing” (Jamie, l. 181–182). This is worth mentioning as Jamie also relates it to his own job within the church and says that while he can set an example through his position, he does not perceive himself as being able to influence others in their Christian faith based on his Calvinist perspective. He thus does not only deny a sense of autonomy to each individual and her choice of faith but also denies his own position a sense of control over others through his job as a Youth worker. The implications of a denial of control in these two cases seem clear as through denying autonomy and power the individual also does not have to take on any sense of responsibility. In the light of a discourse on selftracking applications (as brought up by Julie), but also in the light of other media practices this would support assumptions on a loss of agency through digital technologies as argued by Iske and Damberger (2017) or Selke (2015) in relation to the examples of self-tracking and the movement of the Quantified Self. The arguments made especially by Selke argue for de-solidarisation based on what Selke refers to as rational discrimination. On the basis of seemingly objective quantified data, decisions are taken which lead to consequences that de-solidarise aspects of life. This observation goes along with theories on the continuing individualisation of society also supported by Bauman. From this perspective the individual would not only be subjected to a loss of responsibility in relation to herself, but also in relation to others around herself. Within the uncertainties caused by these conditions the individuals thus need to negotiate ways in which they seem to be able to regain both responsibility and agency for their own situations. This negotiation can be found particularly well in the following two examples. Laila claims that: “I’ll always be, it’s in my blood, to be self-employed, to be my own boss, but to have the knowledge and power, because knowledge is power, to help others” (Laila, l. 209–211). It can be seen how ambivalently Laila negotiates questions of power and agency at this point. On the one hand, she portrays an ambiguous perspective on her wanting to help others, which she does on the basis of having knowledge and power, referring to her studies of law. Thus we can see a sense of agency developed within the context of the structure of a legal system in which a lawyer is granted more agency than someone who does not understand, is not trained and not authorised for a particular legal system. Through her studies then Laila claims this agency, which she wants to use not for herself but rather for helping others, thus taking on a sort of moral responsibility and solidarity. At the

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same time, it is interesting to observe that Laila does not wish to achieve these goals within any setting but is quite clear about being self-employed and her own boss in the situation she sees herself in in the future. She thus wants to achieve a high level of professional autonomy. While this seems to be important to her, it is interesting to observe that she justifies this want not by something out of her free will, so to say, but rather justifies this by it being “in her blood”, which yet again denies a sense of autonomy, similar to the examples given before, whether it was being chosen by God or because of a star sign as in the cases of Jamie and Miranda. What we can see in the short sentence by Laila then, is the multi-layered negotiation of power and autonomy that Laila claims for herself and her future professional situation. Another similar example is given by John in a completely different context when he explains how: John: I sort of decided to change my life a little bit when I turned 16. Ehm (laughs) it was my teacher threatened to take me to court, to take my parents to court, cause my attendance was really bad, it was like 50% and they had just introduced a law allowing the state to prosecute parents who don’t send their kids to school. And it wasn’t my mum’s fault, I just […] I would just truant and I felt really guilty. (John, l. 58–66)

John also seems to present a complex perspective on the ambivalence of agency and control. In some ways, his expressions seem to demonstrate a high level of perceived agency when he states that he decided to change his life. In this expression, it can be seen that he attributes to himself the power to be able to change his life and consciously take that decision. Giddens differentiates between discursive consciousness, practical consciousness and unconscious motives for decision taking, whereby there is no real impermeable distinction between practical and discursive consciousness, but Giddens defines barriers between discursive consciousness and the unconscious which he centres upon repression, something that will be taken up again in the following chapters (Giddens, 1984). John, in this case, seems to at first discursively position his decision as autonomous, however, we can observe constraining aspects at the very same time. John already constrains his agency by saying that he “sort of” decided to do this. In his following elaboration, it becomes obvious that he took the decision based on a feeling of guilt and because he was threatened by his teacher. It becomes apparent that he feels responsible for the possible legal consequences his mother might be faced with in case of him not attending school. Therefore again, as in the case of Laila, John negotiates his agency in relation to numerous influences and aspects in a manifold manner. Following the quote by John above, the subject states that he

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was lucky in his decision to change his life, as he is lucky not to be stupid therefore his grades improved (John, l. 67–68). Rather than understanding his good grades as an outcome of his work, he portrays a perspective which could be analysed rather in Bauman’s sense of fate, something that cannot be prevented or altered. The two examples given here demonstrate the complex ways in which questions of agency, power and structures play together. Through discursive and practical consciousness, the subjects negotiate these complex relations and thus evaluate their own positions within the circumstances they are placed in. Thereby they not only have to position themselves in relation to others, and things around them but also to themselves. The constant negotiation of their agency and the power they are subjected too in turn influences not only their ability to act but also the way in which they perceive themselves. Thus through trying to reclaim agency in multiple and sometimes subtle ways the subjects regain a sense of power that can also affect the ways in which they define their own worth within society as well as enable processes of Bildung. This becomes particularly apparent in the following examples. It was already mentioned that Patrick problematises the dependency on mobile phones by comparing them to a baby that demands attention. He criticises that he feels as if his mobile phone would often take him out of moments with himself. Once taken out of this moment through something like a notification or the signalling sound of a phone ringing or a feeling of pressure to reply to a message that has already been marked as having been read an interesting case arises. In the following (rather long) two quotes Patrick makes some very interesting observations that are worth analysing in closer detail and taking up in relation to the considerations made in this category: Patrick: if I know that someone knows that I’ve seen their message I feel the anxiety and the pressure that I need to respond it, even though they may have interrupted me in the flow of my life and what I am enjoying in that moment it pulls me out of a moment […] and mobile internet is the remove of all of our attention from being able to be bored or be able to b…enjoy things uninterrupted, because I think to be bored is a very important thing cause it’s in moments of boredom that inspiration comes, it’s in moments of boredom that ehm b..g.. ehm realisations and things come […] it’s our obsession of being distracted and we..we now have technology that will feed that all the time […] often it isn’t, often it’s a disappointment often it’s ehm yeah it’s it’s something that takes me out of moments with myself I think […] yeah I would like to move away from that from from (inhales) the..the access to the distraction and if you’re someone who isn’t very good at self-regulation or self-control ehm which lots of people aren’t ehm you’re gonna like it’s yeah er..er.. (…) you’re just gonna be like so attached. (Patrick, l. 647–677)

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I have left the quote this long and only excluded parts in between as I feel Patrick has phrased his thoughts in better ways than I could have rephrased them, despite the partly inconsistency of the expression of thoughts. Patrick raises a number of issues that not only touch upon questions of agency, dependency but also demonstrate something that goes a little further in the direction of a critical discussion of how the use of technology influences the ways in which the individual is related to herself. It raises the question of attention spans that Bernhard Stiegler also refers to in his philosophical accounts of contemporary culture. Stiegler thus argues that attention is the mental capability of concentrating on an object and at the same time is also defined as the social capability of taking care of this object – “as of another, or as the representative of another, as the object of the other” (Stiegler, n.d.). Thus, because paying attention equals taking care, Stiegler sees not only a destruction of the individual psychical apparatus through the destruction of attention but also a destruction of the social apparatus constituted by the collective. With the construction of what can be termed “attention economy”, a concept first arising in the 1990 s, there is a strong competition for the time the spectator can invest in a number of different technologies, such as “digital computers, tablets, smartphones, MP3 players, digital broadcast, television, videogames, social networking services, not to mention digital cinema” (Corgan, 2013, p. 102). Thus through the power and the notion of the attention economy in global capitalism, Stiegler argues that the capability for responsibility has been lost. One can then possibly draw up a distinction between what Hayles refers to as “hyper attention” (Hayles, 2007) in contrast to what might be termed “deep attention” (Stiegler & Tisseron, 2009). Hyper attention is characterised by a rapid change of focus on different technologies, information sources or tasks “seeking a high level of stimulation, and having a low tolerance for boredom” (Hayles, 2007, p. 187). This differentiation refers back to the quote from Patrick referenced above. Patrick also seems to refer to a change of attention in relation to media practices and daily life, which could be compared to the concept of hyper attention. At the same time, Patrick refers to a lack of tolerance for moments of boredom which, similar to Stiegler’s account, he regards as essential for moments of inspiration or, in Stiegler’s understanding the possibility of individuation. Patrick further states that: Patrick: Ehm that I could use my time on the internet better, that I could use my time on the internet to learn and be entertained and influenced by things and that would open more and more and more path situat…pathways of interest in a […] I..through leaving internet social media platforms ehm I became…I started to use the internet as the best, eh as better than I ever had, which was as a really good education tool for myself. […] me seeking it out on the internet, everything me becoming more and more

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[…] a little more centred in myself and more aware of the things I really do love and the things I want to identify with more. (Patrick, l. 563–566)

Thus it can be analysed that the change of attention through social media, is not only related to questions of attention, responsibility and power, but also to questions of identity and self. Patrick seems to regain a sense of power through withdrawing from the attention economy by explicitly denying distractions and focusing instead on his own interests, which he relates also to an imagined ideal self by referring to the things he would like to identify with more. For Stiegler hyper attention is closely linked to digital technologies, whereas deep attention is related rather to the reading of books. The quote by Patrick seen above, however, opens up the critical question of whether different forms of attention are not only related to the medium itself, but rather to the ways in which various media are used by individuals. For Stiegler in his analysis of temporal industrial objects the conditions of memory including the what of contemporary technics and the who of who we are is closely related to the technology used that constitutes the history of collective, mnemotechnic memory (Stiegler, 2009). While Stiegler closely links technical objects to the way in which memory is externalised, it also becomes apparent that he relates this to questions of individual identity as well. This is also what has been visible in the data, as demonstrated in the quote by Patrick above. It also opens up the possibility of bridging a transition to the next chapter that focuses in particular on questions of how identity and the self are constituted through the data that has been analysed in light of the conditions of the first two categories (conditions of the current digital state and conditions of control and agency) that have already been described.

Summary on the Second Category It has been shown that the individual is inextricably located in a triad between herself, others and (technical) things. Within this triad, whose sides are not clearly separated but inter-dependent and correlated, complex conditions of power and agency exist, as has been shown in the previous analysis of these aspects in relation to the three dimensions of collective, technical and individual aspects of power and agency. It was shown that individuals are in a constant negotiating process of adaptation and one might add adoption (using Stiegler’s concept of adoption as individuation that contrasts adaption as deindividuation) with the “others” - individual, collectives or generalised - around them, as well as

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with the technical objects that condition the negotiations through the individuals’ interaction with them. Identity will always have its paradoxes, however, because it is always fictional, that is, fabricated from the resources provided by exterior technical forms. Stiegler draws on Gilbert Simondon’s master concept of individuation to argue that identity is not a stable ground from which already constituted individuals encounter each other. It is better understood as a project and a projection that works to unite individual and collective in an ongoing dynamic. The collectively negotiated adoptions of the exterior technical milieu described above that condition any individual’s entry into and adoption of a particular ethnic or cultural identity are only ever meta-stable, historically and technically contingent shapings of this mutual dynamic. (Corgan, 2013, p. 114)

Corgan’s quote with reference to Stiegler’s understanding of identity demonstrates the paradox ways in which identity is fabricated and unstable. More so, it also demonstrates that the individual’s project of identity is placed under conditions of both collective influences as well as technical influences. Through the non-transparent processes of the political-economic conditions of technological devices and structures, the concept of a “constructed” other has been introduced, providing a theoretical abstraction of the localisation of power within the nontransparency of these processes. Relating what has been shown to the concept of liquidity and notions of fragmentation and synthesis, it seems relevant to stress that the ways in which the individuals negotiate their sense of agency and power against conditions in which they are subjected to a loss of agency or power are complex and subject to constant change. It might be for this reason also that these questions are not only relevant for the individual herself, but also for collective processes and questions of responsibility as has both been shown in the data as well as in considerations of theoretical ideas. Stiegler has analysed attention in relation to care, and thus I would like to present a final thought on a metaphor used in the text. Patrick compared his mobile phone to a baby that is in constant need of care: this metaphor would, therefore, support the relation of attention to that of care, while at the same time highlighting the ambivalent and intricate power relations between the technological device and the individual, who is taken out of moments with herself and her self. The question then of course is how can the self in the context of this research be understood in the first place. The following chapter will shed light on these questions.

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Lyon, D. (2010). Liquid Surveillance: The Contribution of Zymunt Bauman to Surveillance Studies. In International Political Sociology 4 (pp. 325–328). Retrieved April 27, 2018, from: doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-5687.2010.00109.x Mead, G.H. (1934). Mind, Self and Society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Rappaport, R. (1971). Ritual, Sancity and Cybernetics. American Anthropologist 73. Retrieved May 19, 2018, from: https://doi.org/10.1525/aa.1971.73.1.02a00050 Selke, S. (2015). Rationale Diskriminierung. Zeitschrift Luxemburg Futuring 23 (2015). Retrieved March 22, 2018, from: https://www.zeitschrift-luxemburg.de/rationale-diskri minierung/ Stiegler, B. & Tisseron, S. (2009). Faut-il interdire les écrans aux enfants? Beziers: Editions Mordicus. Stiegler, B. (2009). Technics and Time 2: Disorientation. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Stiegler, B. (n.d.). Within the limits of capitalism, economizing means taking care. In Ars Industrialis. Retrieved April 27, 2018, from: http://arsindustrialis.org/node/2922 Turow, J. (2011). The Daily You. New Haven & London: Yale University Press. Zuboff, S. (2015). Big other: surveillance capitalism and the prospects of an information civilization. Journal of Information Technology (30), pp. 75–89. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

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“Well, this is one standpoint. Where is the next? One should try all things and choose the best.” (Peer Gynt by Hendrik Ibsen, 1925, p. 227)

The literature review already highlighted some of the theories on questions of identity and self that prove to be of relevance in the analysis of the data as well. The foci here were placed particularly on the way in which questions of agency, autonomy and power were historically related to the way in which identity and self were understood. Tracing these considerations from the Enlightenment period through psychoanalytical and sociological considerations to (post)modern theories on the fragmentation of the self as points of reference, it was shown that the way in which we conceive of the self (as well as related questions of agency, power and autonomy) is related also to the socio-political and socio-economic conditions that these ideas were shaped in. The relevant aspects that seem to emerge when considering all of this are that perspectives on the self as autonomous as well as those on perspectives attributing restrictions to that level of autonomy through social constraints or even parts within the self that constrain autonomy such as the unconscious are all worthy of exploration. While this was done particularly in the previous chapter, this chapter rather focuses on the way that the self is constituted and expressed or revealed. The focus thus is placed on a triad between three different dialectics that reveal insights on the ways in which the self is both constituted but also presented. First of all, this includes a dialectic between aspects in relation to the self that might be perceived as coming from inside or outside of the self. This dimension seems most closely related to the second category and the ways in which individuals negotiate questions of power and agency in their construction of themselves. This dimension is therefore titled “Dialectic of Inside and Outside”, and might be visually represented as follows (Figure 7.1): © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2021 E. Ferraro, Wilful Blindness, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-32654-8_7

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Figure 7.1 Graphic on the Dialectic of Inside and Outside (own representation)

Secondly, this category includes a dimension on revelations of notions of expression and repression of the different fragments or aspects of the self. That means that the analysis will look at the ways in which various aspects of the self are either expressed and presented to the outside or on the contrary repressed and held within or even impressed, opening up a relation to the first dimension of this category by understanding impression as something coming from the outside that is manifested in the self. The dimension is therefore titled “Dialectic of Expression and Repression” and might be visually represented as follows (Figure 7.2):

Figure 7.2 Graphic on the Dialectic of Expression and Repression (own representation)

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Thirdly, this category includes the dimension of a dialectic relationship between fragmentation and totality. This might be referred back to both Comenius’ illustration of the self as many different individual dots as well as to postmodern considerations, which deny any sense of totality to the self. As discussed in the first category, this opens up the theoretical comparison to the constitution of the digital, which in itself refers to something fragmented. Arguments found in the data that accentuate either aspects of a fragmentation or on the other hand aspects of a sense of totality of the self, will thus be analysed in order to highlight the ways in which the self is perceived within this dialectic. The dimension is titled “Dialectic of Fragments and Totality” and might be visually represented as follows (Figure 7.3):

Figure 7.3 Graphic on the Dialectic of Fragments and Totality (own representation)

Thus considering the three dimensions mentioned above a triad of the following three dialectical relationships can be conceived. Similar to the previous category, the individual elements of the triad are not separate but inextricably linked to each other (Figure 7.4): Before going into the analysis of how these three dialectical relationships1 were constructed on the basis of the data of this research, there are two important 1

The dialectical relationships constructed here are not meant to imply a dichotomous differentiation but rather a conceptual framework. It should be made clear that indeed they cannot always be easily differentiated and might exist simultaneously and in complex ways.

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Figure 7.4 Category 3 - Conditions of the Self (own representation)

points that should be raised. The first one being that a loose connection between the three other categories can be made in relation to the three dimensions of this category. Thus the first category focusing on media structures and conditions of the current digital state is related to the third dimension of Fragments/Totality from the perspective of understanding the digital as fragmented, in contrast to the totality of the analogue. The second category focusing on questions of power and agency thus can be linked to the first dimension that focuses on the dialectic of Inside/Outside, as already argued above. Finally, the last category of this research, entitled “Conditions for Consequences: Opinions and (Re)Actions” that is yet to be presented in the following chapter, also considers the conditions under which opinion building and reactions to the conditions are taking place. Here the question of how individuals feel free to express themselves, and conditions under which repression is taking place, will be of relevance and thus relate to the second dimension of this category that focuses on questions of Expression/Repression. Aside from the comparison to the other categories of the research, a second level of comparison is possible namely to the three perspectives of theories on identity and self presented in the literature review. This level of comparison opens up a relationship between the three dimensions of this category with the three perspectives introduced in Chapter 2.2. Thus the first perspective introduced in the theoretical considerations presents a perspective developed in the Enlightenment period that focuses on the autonomy and rationality of the individual. It is here that a relation to the first dimension can be seen

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in the way that it broaches the issue of the self as autonomous and under little or no influence from the outside, thus opening up considerations on the dialectic between inside and outside. The second perspective presented introduced aspects that constrained the level of autonomy of the individual based on sociological and psychoanalytical assumptions. Especially Freud’s concept of the unconscious here seems to present an entity conceptualised within the self which is closely related to questions of repression. Hence it is possible to draw up a connection to the second dimension of this category focusing on questions of expression and repression. Finally, the third perspective introduced in the literature review focuses on postmodern theories of identity in which the self is often seen as fragmented and subject to constant change. It is here that the relation to the third dimension of this category that focuses on the dialectical relationship between fragmentation and totality is inevitable.

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Dimension 1: Dialectic of Inside and Outside or on How the Self Originates

The core arguments raised in the analysis of this dimension can be summarised in a figure as follows (Figure 7.5):

Figure 7.5 Core Arguments of the Dimension on Inside and Outside in the Third Category (own representation)

It could be argued that the self can only exist in social experience and in relation to other social beings (Mead, 1934). If the self is conceived as developing through the interactions with others, it allows linking this assumption to the concept of interactionism as proposed by Mead (Mead, 1934), which is also of importance for the theoretical considerations of grounded theory together with Blumer’s conceptions of symbolic interactionism (Blumer, 1962). Goffman argues

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that human nature needs to be acquired and that by “acquiring it, the person becomes a kind of construct, built up not from inner psychic propensities but from moral rules that are impressed upon him from without” (Goffman, 1967, p. 45). It can be seen here that Goffman stresses the influences that the individual is subjected to from without, that are impressed upon her. Thus this allows a reference both to this dimension between the dialectical relationship of inside and outside, as well as to the next dimension and the dialectical relationship between expression and repression. The following discussion will give examples found within the data that highlight the ways in which the subjects constitute their selves as originating on the basis of influences from both within and without. Hereby it becomes apparent that there is a strong resemblance to the arguments made in the previous chapter that have focused on questions of agency and power and looked at the ways in which for example the impact of culture might lead to processes of adaptation and a therewith related loss of agency. The focus in the analysis that follows is shifted away from questions of power and agency to a focus on questions of the self. Thus the analysis will consider relevant examples of the subjects constitute of their selves in relation to the question of how the self originates. Whether the ways in which the subjects describe and identify themselves are related to something that the subjects define as coming from within or without their selves, is one of the main foci of this chapter. “[M]y obsession with how I’m perceived, or for years I had, was very connected with how I was perceived in the world ….” (Patrick, l. 140–142). The subjects seem very concerned with the ways in which others see them. “And I did that usual sort of bi now gay later thing, so I was like I’m bisexual, I’m bisexual, I like women as well. Just to make it more acceptable” (John, l. 81–82). In their concern with how they are perceived the subjects not only adapt to their surroundings, as argued in the chapter before, in relation to interactions, but this adaptive process also impacts on the way in which the subjects perceive themselves and construct their own identities. Thus through reflecting on the way in which others reflect on them the subjects see themselves, again being evocative of Mead’s theory on the difference between the “me” and the “I”. While the “me” is defined as the organised set of attitudes of others which a person assumes, the “I” is the response of the person towards these attitudes (Mead, 1934). Mead hence also describes the “I” as the subject, and the “me” as the object. This perspective allows thinking of the self in a two-fold manner as both object and subject simultaneously even from within the perspective of a person herself. Taking this differentiation into account, the data in the research also demonstrates examples in which the subjects speak of their self in both of these senses, as object and as subject. In the following analysis, I will highlight the ways in which the subjects refer to firstly

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the assumed set of attitudes that can be related to the generalised other, secondly accounts of the self as object and thirdly as subject, and then link these examples to questions of recognition and belonging, that constitute a necessary prerequisite for a successful identity according to Keupp (Keupp, 1997) and others. When John explained his process of coming out he referred to the process as “the usual sort of bi now gay later thing” which he justifies by making “it more acceptable”. In these expressions one could already detect what Mead might refer to as the “organised set of attitudes of others which a person assumes”. It could be argued that John has taken the attitudes of the generalised other that he assumes to be present into account for the process of identifying with his sexual orientation, hence what he assumes to be socially acceptable could be said to also influence his identity and consequently his behaviour. The following passage, in which John describes how as a young child of 9 years he first realised that his sexual orientation might be different to those of others around him also highlights the way in which he might conceive of his own self in Mead’s sense of the “me”: John: […] when I was like 9. I remember like a very vivid memory of primary school and we had the Backstreet Boys at the time and yeah, it must have been like year four or year five or something like that. And they were like who is your favourite Backstreet Boy? And I was like, what’s his name, is it Bryan or something like that, the blonde one, and I was like, ah he is really cute, isn’t he and all the kids were like…(both laugh). And I was like, well you know he’s got great hair. Ehm (…) that sort of stuck with me cause I think everyone’s reactions was a bit like oh that’s weird for a boy to say. (John, l. 97–103)

It is interesting to notice that John’s sense of his sexual identity would definitely have to be analysed as originating (at least in its realisation) out of social experience. The way in which John retrospectively describes negotiating his behaviour in the above quoted situation can be used very well in order to compare to Mead’s concepts of “me” and “I”, and therefore also demonstrates ways in which the self can be conceptualised both as object and as subject in the situation explained by John. Hence the self can be analysed as an object, in Mead’s sense of “me”, through the social and moral values and attitudes illustrated in John’s situation by the other kids’ reactions. John here is aware of the social norms as well as being aware that his expression of describing a singer as “cute” breaks exactly with these norms. It is here, it could be argued that the “I” is constantly aware of the “me”. John, in the realisation of breaking with the norm, responds to the assumed attitudes of the social group by compensating through another comment about the singer’s hair style. At the same time, the self as a subject could be argued to react

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yet again not only through a process of compensation in which the organised attitudes become internalised influencing the unity of the self, but also by realising something in himself, which “sort of stuck with” him. This something that sort of stuck with John might be analysed as an aspect of the self which indeed does not originate in line with the others, but rather from within the subject himself in contrast to the others. Whether one uses Mead’s metaphor of “me” and “I” or not, what can be seen in this passage is the ways in which John’s identity and understanding of his self is bound to the social experience he is placed in and thus develops in a negotiation of both influences from within and without. Another example which highlights the two-fold perspective on the self arising both from within and without is given by Ben in his discussion of the involvement in a mainstream youth programme that he participated in as an adolescent. Ben explains how the programme is very mainstream in Israel where he grew up, especially in the North and is based on core values of socialism and the core values of Israel. Ben further states that the programme was one of the predominant activities with which he would pass his time as an adolescent aside from school as well as a space where he met and hung out with many of his friends. When given the opportunity to go and live in the programme after graduating school, however, Ben is faced with an interesting challenge: Ben: And so it was great in some aspects, because we shared everything, we worked together, but me a quite responsible, like caring person, I was always working hard whilst others didn’t. […] Yeah, so I never really liked people telling me what to do. Ehm except, like I never rebelled against it, but I also wanted to make my own decisions. And then like, it felt like that they, it wasn’t one person, but the whole organisation was leading everybody to be specific in, like a certain type of person. […] and it felt like when I had differences, and different ideas and different questions, that were kind of like being turned down quite quickly. If I brought it out, people would be like oh yeah, but this not what we do here, or this is not what we are. Or this is like, yeah but, you’re saying it because you still have these traces of like (…) ehm like thoughts of like from the modern world and you’re not thinking about, you saying because you never lived in a commune, you’re saying it because you never been, like you still have your parents’ education in you and you never like. […] I kind of didn’t, I wasn’t sure I really wanted to do it and everybody was telling me to do it, so I kind of decided no it’s not for me. (Ben, l. 163–191)

The rather long quote by Ben illustrates the struggles Ben is facing in the process of negotiating his decision about what to do after school. It can be argued that the programme constituted a site that was relevant for Ben’s identity during his adolescent years as he not only spent a huge amount of his spare time and effort there but also met many of his friends there as well as learning values of sharing,

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responsibility and so on. Within his reasoning for deciding against staying in the programme, he explains his ambivalent feelings between influences on himself both from within and without. So, on the one hand he voices influences of the programme, which he describes as being great in some aspects, but then on the other hand problematises the way in which the organisation as a whole was “leading everybody to be […] a certain type of person”. Interestingly enough, Ben explains how the programme leaders explained his not wanting to comply with their expectations by yet again other outer influences such as a lack of knowing differently or the parents’ education within him. Either way in his negotiating of outer and inner influences, Ben takes decisions which are closely related to the constitution of his self. His decision to leave the organisation is marked by a “big cut in his life” (Ben, l. 63) and followed by the time spent in the army which Ben marks as a time of change in relation to his self. “So it was very, very difficult for me and since then I’ve changed a bit, become a bit more serious and quieter and like, I was able to share less with people and yeah so that was a big change of my life” (Ben, l. 83–85). His position in the army in the information security unit alongside the transition from the youth programme he used to be a part of, can then be seen as aspects of the self that should be perceived as coming from outside of the individual. Taylor argues that we “define our identity always in dialogue with, sometimes in struggle against, the things our significant others want to see in us (Taylor, 1994, p. 33). In Ben’s account, this difference between aligning with the others’ expectations on the one hand and the struggle against these expectations on the other hand becomes very obvious. This is then further complicated when taking into account that the significant others around a given individual might not always hold the same expectations that influence that individual. Apart from the influences of other individuals or groups of individuals, the subjects broach the topic of influences also in relation to media, as will be seen in the following examples. Patrick explains that he “saw Pulp Fiction when I was eight. […] which I shouldn’t have…ehm and ehm that had a huge effect on me” (Patrick, l. 349–353) as well as listening to “North-American comedians and some people from other parts of the world […] they’ve had a huge…huge effect on me” (Ben, l. 593–597). Thus it could be argued that media also can be seen as something from the outside that impacts on an individual’s sense of identity and self as well as highlighting the global structures that media is produced and accessed in. Going back to the quote at the start of this chapter, where Patrick explains that his “obsession with how I’m perceived” (Patrick, l. 140–141) is amplified through the use of social media does not only underline the impact of media on a person’s sense of identity as something from without but also opens up

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the possibility of drawing back onto the basal necessities of a sense of recognition and belonging for a sense of identity in the first place (Keupp, 1997). Therefore, one example seems to demonstrate a sense of belonging alongside the basal need for recognition on a collective and globalised level which is influenced by the media to a great extent. Patrick speaks of a shared sense of his Irish cultural identity as follows: Patrick: we as a people have really struggled with our own sense of identity ehm personally and on the world stage. […] we my generation aren’t…have an ingrained shame over our own culture and identifying with our own culture with traditional Irish culture because of how it is being represented in the media […] and when I was growing up in the 90 s ehm in the media you had the Irish person was presented as the fool or the yeah the bricklayer who didn’t have much going on between their heads or the terrorist or ..or…or these were how we were seen on the world stage. (Patrick, l. 303–316)

Thus what can be drawn out of this account by Patrick, is that his sense of Irish identity is based also on how the Irish are represented in media, not only on a national but rather on a more global level. This representation hence influences the Irish sense of identity in a rather detrimental way. One could thus assume that the Irish culture does not receive a sense of recognition through its representation on the world stage. Taylor argues that a sense of identity is “shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the misrecognition of others, and so a person or group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves” (Taylor, 1994, p. 25). If this argument is applied to the example given by Patrick, then it could be assumed that the Irish sense of cultural identity as a group is influenced, and here one must say not only influenced but rather demeaned thus adding a qualitative assessment in the sense of recognition, through its mediatic representation on a global scale. This then seems to be particularly relevant in the scope of this book as it highlights the impact of aspects from without in relation to the constitution of the self and shows that this impact can also be related to the media as well as to the global structures that media artefacts are produced in. Taylor’s expression of the picture mirrored back to an individual or a group of individuals is furthermore evocative of Turow’s arguments of the mirroring back of personal data (Turow, 2011) and allows to draw up the conclusion that recognition should not only be seen as a constituting factor for a successful sense of identity, but that misrecognition, on the other hand, must be considered as a threatening tool for deconstructing a sense of identity at the same time. As already shown in the example of Irish culture, this does not only apply to individuals but also can be analysed in a broader social understanding as by

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Laila. “First they were very open and now they say we don’t want globalisation anymore, we’re losing ourselves” (Laila, l. 656–657). The influences of collective identities both from within and without on a global scale with complex power structures and avenues of expression is something which seems to be of huge relevance in the light of contemporary politics and social analysis. Current political movements towards nationalist leanings apparent in many societies (Wodak et al., 2013) are closely related to this argument. In Laila’s expression, the struggle of “nationalist” influences from within a society against “global” influences from outside in relation to a loss of self are visible. Aside from these aspects analysed in this chapter that looked at the self in a dialectic relationship between inside and outside, another argument seems to be subliminally evident. In the struggle between different influences, avenues of expression, i.e. spaces for the illustration and presentation of certain aspects, gain in power. That means subliminally it is of great relevance to look at the ways in which aspects of the self might be expressed or repressed and what a presentation or non-presentation of specific aspects might mean. This question will be further looked at in the following dimension. The analysis of how the self is constituted as well as the question of outer and inner influences showed how the subjects negotiate their identity in light of influences both from within and without, whereby the self can be looked at both as subject and object. The negotiation of this process in line with and against outer influences can be challenging and lead to changes of the self, whereby the recognition by others as well as a sense of belonging to groups are constitutive for the way in which identity is formed. Thereby media plays a central role, not only in itself but also through the global structures that media artefacts are produced in. The way in which individuals and groups of individuals are presented is of central relevance, which is why this aspect will be further discussed in the following subchapter.

7.2

Dimension 2: Dialectic of Expression and Repression or on How the Self Is Shown

The core arguments raised in the analysis of this dimension can be summarised in a figure as follows (Figure 7.6): There is a term that I can’t remember that exists, that exists even more so now because the internet, of people who are afraid to speak on their beliefs on social issues for the fear of the group thinking they’re mad […] and I grew up feeling like that. (Patrick, l. 393–396)

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Figure 7.6 Core Arguments of the Dimension on Expression and Repression in the Third Category (own representation)

What Patrick refers to at this point could be something of a mixture between glossophobia, a fear of speaking in public or trying to speak (Khan et al., 2015), and gelotophobia, a fear of being laughed at (Mert, 2012), or generally social anxieties which are characterised by a fear of being judged by others. While it might not strictly matter which term Patrick is exactly trying to refer to, his argument rather highlights the intricate ways in which subjects may negotiate which aspects of their self or their beliefs they choose to express. It also becomes apparent that this negotiation is taking place in relation to other people and as Patrick highlights might be altered through the changes brought about by the digital technology of the internet. “This crucial feature of human life is its fundamentally dialogical character. We become full human agents, capable of understanding ourselves, and hence of defining our identity, through our acquisition of rich human languages of expression” (Taylor, 1994, p. 32). Taylor shows that the self can only arise in a dialogical relationship by using human language as a tool for expression. The tools for expression can also be expanded not only by the use of language but by other ways of expressing aspects of the self, as will be shown in the following analysis. The first argument brought forward here is that the dialectical relationship between the ways in which aspects of the self are expressed and repressed is based on who controls the presentation of these aspects and who has access to the information that is being expressed. This argument can also be seen in a number of examples from the data as part of the research for this book. Ben exclaims that his social media profiles are a pretty good representation of himself “cause I’m actually showing exactly what I’m doing and when I’m saying things

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I well, I can choose what to show and what not to show” (Ben, l. 484–485). On a very practical level, the subjects are able to choose the ways in which they would like to represent themselves online on social media platforms. However, there are subliminal lines of limitation to this that become apparent throughout the interviews. If you were to somehow hack into my Google account, then you would probably find like, maybe you’d get a much better sense of who I am through that, because everything I need to do or things that I think about or whatever, I write a note, I have so many notes on there. (Gabriela, l. 516–519)

The first subliminal line of limitation to the expression of the self is related to access to the information that is being shown, as can be seen in the above quote by Gabriela. In referring to the situation of someone accessing all her data as hacking, this already shows the difficulty that the subjects might be facing. Gabriela assumes the data stored on her Google cloud is closely linked to her self in form of artefacts such as notes of ideas, photos, credit card details and so on (this aspect has already been discussed in closer detail in Sect. 5.2). Gabriela thus opens up a perspective, in which aspects she sees as being a representation of herself may be seen by others without being intended to, resulting in the situation of an infringement of her personal privacy through the process of hacking. In this sense, the danger of an intrusion into her privacy seems to be observable. It is in this moment that she is subjected to a bilateral position of activity and passivity. While she is active in being able to upload or not upload the data, she fears the danger of being hacked and exposed. The feeling of being exposed is even more obvious in the case of Julie, when she explains that “I think when I saw the Facebook thing I felt quite exposed, I was just thinking well what else can they see that they’ve been looking at. Not anything dodgy”. (Julie, l. 697–699). By “when I saw the Facebook thing I felt quite exposed” Julie refers to a personalised advertisement of something she had just looked at before. The use of the word exposed is interesting in this case, as it highlights the passive situation the subject is suddenly placed in. It is not an active process of exposing something oneself, but the passive process of being exposed. The way in which Julie expresses her feelings here also is interesting as it offers a perspective which demonstrates that a person or aspects of a person can actually be exposed against the person’s will. It shows that there might be aspects of the self which a person might not want to share. This is supported further by what Julie says straight after when she refers to the fact that it wouldn’t be anything “dodgy” anyway. Here what can be seen is a normatively coined perception of

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socially acceptable and non-acceptable practices a person might carry out on the internet. In denying the existence of anything “dodgy” or rather the existence in the representation of anything “dodgy” Julie tries to stay in control of the information that is presented about herself. This observation can be related to Goffman’s concept of impression management, also picked up by Bernie Hogan in relation to social media (Goffman, 1990; Hogan, 2010). Hogan, as others, argues that the concept of impression management can be used as a useful theoretical tool in order to understand the ways in which individuals behave and present themselves online (Marwick & boyd, 2010; Mendelson & Papacharissi, 2010). The term impression lends itself here to be related to the terms of expression and repression. While expression in the context of this research refers to the ways in which aspects of the self can be shown and presented to the “outside”, repression refers to the opposite namely aspects which are purposely or unconsciously held within in order to not present them to an “outside” audience. Finally impression refers to ways in which that which has been expressed by one person is taken in by another person. The assumption then is that the subjects try to be in control of the impression they might create for another person. While many authors generally assume a sense of impression management in which the individual is able to and tries to choose the way she would like to display information, Hogan also points at the ways in which this management is impaired through the structures of algorithms that personalise by filtering, ordering and searching the huge amounts of data present (Hogan, 2010). Thus the subjects cannot be sure as to which posts exactly will be shown to others or even reflected back to themselves as seen in the example on the temporal dimension of data and the time hop experiences on Facebook that Julie describes (see Sect. 5.3). This also leads to the next two arguments made in relation to the subliminal lines of limitation in relation to how the subjects may express themselves which are concerning the context as well as the imagined audience. Julie, who has undergone a recent break-up, has for the first time signed up for an online dating app. It can be seen here that the way in which she expresses herself in this context is different to the way in which she would present herself in other contexts. “Like it’s quite normal for people to put that information up and I feel like I’m a little bit behind of like the emotional data […] to like go into that kind of criticism of yourself or to sell yourself, I’m really not very good at that” (Julie, l. 374–378). In consideration of the context, Julie feels as if she has to express aspects of herself that she might not want to share. The particular context of the online dating application is impacting on the way in which Julie expresses herself in a certain light. Thus she feels as if she has to „sell“herself, which is an interesting choice of words in itself. At the same time, she explains as if she feels behind on sharing

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„emotional data“. Here again, a classification of different types of personal data is drawn up by one of the subjects. In this case the expression of emotional data seems to be something Julie is not expressing in the sense of something she feels strongly about but rather because of the needs of the context in which this form of self-expression takes place. Aside from the contextual impact on the ways in which the self is expressed, the imagined audience also plays an important role for the way in which the subjects try to negotiate the amount and quality of information they wish to share and display. Thus the subjects discuss a number of examples in which the „imagined“ audience can be seen as impacting on the way in which the self is expressed. The examples each illustrate different techniques used by the subjects in order to negotiate the existence of the imagined audiences. Thus Julie explains how she is „very selective of who I add of colleagues. You know, the job that I’ve just left recently, I’ve added like a couple of people, but there is some people there who want to add me, but I don’t want to do that because I’m still quite protective of what people see“(Julie, l. 780-783). Here Julie is aware of the impact that adding her colleagues might have on her willingness to share data and thus tries to prevent this situation in the first place. Miranda also discusses the very difficult decision for her as to which of her colleagues to add on social media. Thus she explains how adding them might restrict her willingness to share personal information but at the same time she feels obliged to add them anyway, as she feels it would be rude not to. However, rather than not adding them or creating a personal and a professional account she states that „It’s too complicated. But you can group different people and you can just block them for certain pictures” (Miranda, l. 212–213). Thus the focus is shifted from the question of adding or not adding colleagues to managing access to the personal information shared. Yet it seems that while Miranda is aware of this option, she does not really use it as a technique to ensure her possibility of free expression. The ways in which this may result in restrictions of expression and consequently a distortion of the information shared will be looked at in closer detail in the following paragraphs. Before that, however, it is worth looking at two more techniques in relation to the negotiation of how to deal with the imagined audience and the ways in which this might impact upon ways of expressing oneself. Thus Lukas explains how: „Again, it goes back to whenever you put an opinion on Facebook you are opening up that, you are opening up yourself to reaction, to any reaction, from anyone, literally anyone, you know. So there’s nothing called a private conversation online anymore“(Lukas, l. 397–400). Lukas in this case does not only negotiate whom to add as a friend, follower, etc. on social media but rather takes on a perspective in which it becomes obvious that social media is inherently bound

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to a dissolution of concepts of public and private. As has already been discussed in the first category as well as partly in the literature review the relationship between public and private is undergoing considerable transformation through the introduction and development of the internet and the therefrom originating practices. This argument will also be taken up again in the final category which looks at how the subjects negotiate the ways in which they form their opinions as well as the possibilities for reaction they see for themselves. The differentiation between definitions of public and private also relates to the final point that will be made about ways of expression of the self in relation to the construction of an imagined audience. Thus the subjects seem to deal with the possibility of lying about their identity online, especially in relation to the sharing of personal data, differently. While Julie says that „no, I’ve never actually lied on social media, because I feel too guilty, which is really weird, like I, I don’t lie because I think that’s wrong, like I shouldn’t lie“(Julie, l. 566–568). While it could be argued that one of the presumed advantages of many online services is precisely the possibility to not give correct data, Julie seems to apply those rules of conduct to this situation that she also holds throughout other contexts in her life. Gabriela instead says that if she is dealing with a website she will not be using much or on which it is […] not important for them to have my real information then I will probably not put my, I might put my surname, but I just put my initial instead of my full name or use a nickname or a username or something. (Gabriela, l. 536–539)

Gabriela already draws up a categorisation of where she feels as if it is ok to provide false information, namely websites she does not use often or where it is not necessary to post the necessary information, in contrast to websites where she needs to pay for something and therefore necessarily has to provide true information. Finally, and this is also where the relation to questions of identity and self become most obvious and relevant, John explains how being a gay Muslim himself, he anonymously signed up to a chat room where he felt as if he could openly express controversial views about Islam, which he did not feel able to express openly in relation to his own identity. When asked why he felt the need to express these views despite the feeling of not openly expressing them, he says that „Maybe that’s my ego, a little bit. Ehm my way of making a change and standing up for liberal values. (…) yeah. I think that’s probably it“(John, l. 380–381). This example opens up an interesting case for the analysis as it points out the two-fold meaning of identity and the ways in which either one or the other might

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impact on forms of expression. So John’s identity in the sense of an ID card that is able to identify him as a person ruling out any level of anonymity here can be seen as a hindering factor for a form of free expression as his views might be potentially controversial. Nonetheless, it could be argued that John’s need to express precisely these Islam-critical views are bound heavily to his own identity as a gay Muslim with liberal views. Thus what he felt as the need to express, which he described as his „ego“, can indeed be seen as being an expression of an aspect of his self he identifies with strongly. The example John gives, thus raises an interesting point in relation to the „imagined“ audience and the ways in which aspects of the self may be expressed. It also touches on another interesting point, namely that of what may not be expressed if John had not had the opportunity to post something anonymously. Thus the following examples will look at the subliminal lines of limitation to the ways in which the self may be expressed and thereby touch upon aspects of the self which are being repressed. There are a number of examples which demonstrate the ways in which the subjects deal with restrictions and repressions in relation to how they express their selves both in offline contexts as well as in online contexts. These limitations are worth exploring as they point at both personal and cultural techniques of withholding information or aspects of the self in relation to a transition from manifest to latent content, as well as in relation to an expression from within to the outside. There are a number of examples in relation to the general repression of feelings in relation to topics such as sexuality or religion that are worth looking at in closer detail. So to start off with, it is worth looking at two examples in relation to topics that are subject to repressions, both particularly for the subjects in this research as well as in relation to wider social and cultural conditions. For Lukas a positively framed repression of not showing a part of oneself is seen in relation to a sense of religious identity. “It should be something between you and that point, that you are, that one thing that you’re looking for answers from. […] So it shouldn’t be anything that you take with you into the public eye” (Lukas, l. 104– 109). Lukas states here that religion as a part of the self should be something that is repressed, as in not taken into the public eye. He explicitly states that this aspect of the self is something that should be a part of a person and her relationship with that aspect. However, this example also shows, that repression can actually be seen as something positive rather than being generally more negatively connoted. For Lukas, the repression of this aspect of his identity is one of the “cleverest things” anyone has advised him about religion altogether. Lukas does not state as much as to the reasons why he thinks that religious convictions and identities should not be taken into the public eye. Within the context of the topic at this point in the interview, it might be assumed that he bases his opinion on the controversial

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role of religion and the way that it may be instrumentalised as a tool by some people, something which Lukas connoted negatively. The second example is given by Patrick in relation to sexuality and sexual content. After explaining his fear of online surveillance, he states this to be amplified through the fact that he had previously sent data including sexual content via social media. He touches on the difference between expression and repression explicitly in relation to sexual content when he says that: Patrick: like any type of sexual expression, sexual repressions is so huge and I’m still at 28-30 I…I’m only now learning to be open about it and hoping that being open about it will have a positive change on me because I still (coughs) am massively repressed and I hate, like I realized that’s one of the biggest things for human beings like as a thing but anyway. (Patrick, l. 936–939)

Again what can be seen here is a relation that is drawn up between the self and the way in which aspects such as sexuality may be expressed or have to be repressed. Patrick states that through being able to sexually express himself, he also hopes to change himself. While the discourse on sexual identity, sexual expression and similar topics is huge, it will be sufficient at this point to stress that sexual expression is an entity which can be seen as being the expression of a part of the self, which because of social norms and conditions is often repressed. In this case, however, in contrast to the previous one, Patrick perceives this form of repression very negatively. Thus the perspective on what should or should not be expressed may indeed vary very much depending on the topic as well as the existing beliefs the subjects hold in relation to these topics. Now the important assertion as to why the subjects may feel as if they should repress certain aspects of their selves is based on a number of arguments which could almost be defined as techniques. In the following paragraphs, I will highlight two short examples in relation to the techniques that can lead to a feeling of repressing information. Firstly, one technique that may lead to aspects of the self being repressed has already been discussed in a number of contexts, namely that of surveillance. Miranda states how she negotiates the expression of her political opinion: “well for me I would be ehm quite careful if I wanna say this over the phone or online or something. Ehm but if like personal discussion or you’re talking with your friends we’re ok” (Miranda, l. 511–513). As can be seen here, the “imagined audience” as already discussed in the previous dimension, determines the perception Miranda has in relation to how freely she can express her political opinion. It can also be seen at this point, how the “imagined audience” and the condition of the permanence of online data and the technological possibilities of online

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surveillance impact on Miranda’s perception. Thus it again touches both on the arguments made in chapter five on the conditions of the current digital state as well as on questions of the difference between public and private. Secondly, another technique can be analysed in why the subjects feel the fear of expressing themselves in certain situations. Next to the fear of possible physical, emotional or monetary harm, Patrick explicitly states the “fear of being ridiculed” (Patrick, l. 747) as one of the main reasons for not speaking out, which he has “always felt” (Patrick, l. 433). Thus because of certain techniques such as surveillance or ridicule, whether applied intendedly or not, the subjects may negotiate the ways in which they choose to express or repress aspects of their selves. This may lead to the final argument in this dimension namely, that the way in which aspects may be expressed or repressed differently possibly results in a distortion of how the self is presented. The following examples will highlight the ways in which the subjects present aspects of themselves in a certain way or to a certain extent, thus leading to a distortion of the relationship between how they identify themselves and how they present themselves. Throughout the interviews, this relationship both in relation to themselves as well as in relation to others around them seems to be of relevance. The examples will make apparent how this presentation can come across as more objective, more subjective, shy or showing off. In no particular order the examples given here all support the argument that the way in which the self is presented and expressed is a central aspect also in relation to the way in which the self is perceived. For Miranda the relationship between her and the presentation of her is negotiated in light of certain personal values she holds. “I write my thoughts. Not that much opinion. I would state my experience and how I feel” (Miranda, l. 194–195). Miranda makes clear how she tries to portray herself in her social media accounts in a rather objective and neutral manner. “Because when people talk about themselves, they would normally just write about the bright side about them, like the good side. And I feel quite shy to write that about me, so I just maybe state what I’ve done and what I’m doing right now.” (Miranda, l 273–275). Miranda, who is very successful in her career and used to be a former local child celebrity, stresses that she feels shy about showing off too much information that put her in a good light, and might come across as if she is showing off. Rather than describing herself, she feels like only sharing “cold facts” about herself, as she thinks it to be “a bit weird” to describe herself online (Miranda, l. 266–268). It can be seen that she leaves certain aspects out in order not to create the impression of someone who wishes to come off in a good light. Jamie also states that social media “is just what I want or what people want to portray as their life” (Jamie, l. 223–224) while at the same time he admits that “so yes, I do, I do portray a

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version of me (…) but I think also it doesn’t, for me it’s not about making myself look good” (Jamie, l. 389–390). Similarly to Miranda, Jamie also is aware of the fact that what he presents on social media is but a version of himself, yet again he also seems to make sure that this version does not only come across, and also is not in itself, overly positive and optimistic. In the case of Ben the negotiation of how to portray himself online seems to also change throughout the case of the interview. He says that “when I do show something, I show reality. I never like try to fake it too much, and make it like look something, like it’s something different” (Ben, l. 486–487). Ben speaks against a sense of distortion by saying that when he is giving off information he does not “fake it too much”. It is interesting to observe that he does not say, however, that he does not fake it at all, but rather says that he never tries to fake it too much. This might already point to the argument that the presentation of what he shows is yet somehow distorted, despite him trying to show reality. This is supported further by what he goes on to say a little later in the interview: Ben: Ehm sometimes it’s on social media I kind of like express everything and boast it to make it look, talk about it a lot and like want people to get excited about it, but on a personal level I wouldn’t even tell my friends. Like if I’ve seen this amazing whale shark today on the tour, I’ll be very excited about it on social media and express it and talk about it, but on a personal level I would, I probably wouldn’t even open it up, because I don’t wanna like brag or show off or tell people too much. (Ben, l. 613–618)

Contrastingly to Miranda, who purposely does not wish to brag about her achievements and successes, Ben is in a different situation due to his job as a social media blogger. He has to negotiate the impression he is giving off not only in dependence on the context and imagined audience, but this impression also distorts the way in which he is able to express himself. While the feeling of excitement for what he is seeing during his travels is a part of his professional identity he wishes to portray this aspect to a greater extent also in the professional context he is in, whereas with his friends he wishes to not come across as someone that shows off, which again links back to what Miranda said about how she negotiates what information to express on social media as well. This is relevant as the way in which aspects of the self are either expressed or repressed impacts not only on the way in which others see the subjects but also on the way in which the subjects identify themselves. The subjects are aware of the fact that the personal information they share, and this applies both to offline as well as online contexts, impacts on the way in which they come across. Therefore the conditions under which the expression of personal information takes place is of great importance. Laila states how

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I know I’m out there, I know I have a profile, so let’s show myself the way I’d like to be looked at, so very retrospective in a way, just publish photos where you look good at […] it’s a wrong reality. (Laila, l. 416-420)

What we can see here is not only the way in which the subjects are aware of the exhibitory character of social media but also the question of whether this representation can be or should be interpreted as being real or not. Either way, it becomes apparent that the way in which the self is shown and expressed is related also to the question of how the self is defined and constituted. This question will be taken up in the following dimension that touches on the dialectical relationship between the self as a totality or fragmented. The analysis of the way in which the self is placed in the dialectical relationship between expression and repression creating a sense of impression thus showed how the subjects within the negotiation of this process are not only placed in a bilateral position of activity and passivity, sometimes given, sometimes denied access to information, but also how they need to negotiate which aspects to express in relation to both contexts, social norms and imagined audiences, which may lead to a distortion of or a difference in the way in which they are represented and express themselves. Especially the argument that access to information can vary, leads to the presumption that the presentation of self is in itself fragmented. The question if the same might also be suspected of not only the representation of self but the self in itself will be looked at in the following paragraphs.

7.3

Dimension 3: Dialectic of Fragments and Totality or on How the Self Is Shaped

The core arguments raised in the analysis of this dimension can be summarised in a figure as follows (Figure 7.7): [W]e’re so lost that we just grab at things either from a young age or we keep changing as we […] grow up lots of people change all the time, keep grabbing new things […] from passing trends or people they’re dating […] to fit in basically. (Patrick, l. 177–180)

Patrick’s perspective here already sheds light on a number of the central arguments made in this subchapter that focuses on how the self is shaped within the data of the research. The first point is touched upon by what Patrick expresses as “we keep changing”. It is this change that seems to be one of the central aspects of the way in which the self is shaped or rather constantly reshaped. It is also

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Figure 7.7 Core Arguments of the Dimension on Fragments and Totality in the Third Category (own representation)

this point that can be closely linked to Bauman’s concept of liquidity, which is also based on the assumption of constant change. Aside from touching on the topic of change, what also becomes apparent is the different aspects or fragments of the self that Patrick touches on. Thus he explains how a person’s identity touches on either the trends a person is following or the people they are dating, indicating already that there can be different aspects of the self that a person can identify with. The question then remains of whether or not these aspects are either interpreted as resulting in one whole or whether these aspects are understood as being incoherent and independent of each other, thus resulting in a perspective of fragmentation. Finally by referring to the passing of trends Patrick also opens up a relation to “models” that a person can choose from and identify with, which is an argument also apparent in the data that will be touched upon shortly. The notion of change that the subjects experience and have experienced in their lifetime can be analysed in relation to a number of categories. The following examples will shed light on these categories as well as at times highlight the consequences of uncertainty that result out of the changes. The examples that will be looked at relate change to the person’s life span and to themes such as relativism, getting older, the ideal self and life experiences especially including transitions. Lukas states how [t]hat’s again, that’s why I think (…) when as a kid, you are shielded from relativism because life if nothing if not relative, it’s nothing if not flexible and chaotic, and if you’re told that and taught that as a kid, you’d be scared to grow up and there’s nothing you can do about it. (Lukas, l. 205–208)

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Lukas touches on the notion of uncertainty and the need for flexibility that can affect a person‘s sense of security both within themselves as well as in relation to their everyday lives. These two aspects are closely related to two assumptions within the academic discourse. Thus Lukas‘s observation firstly is connected to Jörissen‘s and Marotzki‘s analysis of the crises of modernity (Jörissen & Marotzki, 2009) as well as Ribolits‘assumption on the need for flexibility in his criticism of contemporary conditions of capitalism (Ribolits, 2006). Jörissen and Marotzki analyse three types of crisis that affect conditions of Bildung in contemporary times (Jörissen & Marotzki, 2009). Thus they differentiate between crises of structure, referring to wider social processes as the transition from an agricultural society to an industrial society, crises of regulation, referring to the pluralisation of norms and values that may lead to the dissolution of a sense of obligation, and finally crises of cohesion, in relation to belonging and social recognition caused by increasing individualisation. The example Lukas gives is most closely relatable to a crisis of regulation, which may result in uncertainty due to a sense of pluralisation. This assumption seems to be comparable to what Lukas refers to as a sense of relativism, which he feels one needs shielding from as a child. Secondly, Lukas refers to the need for flexibility, as life to him is „nothing if not flexible and chaotic“. This assumption is evocative of Ribolits‘ account on the need for flexibility which has been referenced before (Ribolits, 2006). Ribolits criticises the need for flexibility and the constant adaptation an individual must comply with because of the economic systems individuals are positioned in. This argument can not only be related to the quote by Lukas but also draws up a relation to the previous chapter that focused i.a. on questions of adaptation. Thus it could be argued that the conditions of modern life lead to a sense of relativism that not only demands of the individual to change by being flexible but also may lead to a sense of uncertainty in the sense of a regulation crisis, but which an individual, both as child or adult, might need shielding from. Ribolits has analysed his criticism also in relation to the labour market. The individual is thus experiencing the need for change in relation to moving both jobs and home for a successful participation in the labour market. This may also impact on an individual’s sense of professional belonging and identity. Gabriela touches on the topic of professional identity when she states that “[a]nd I mean professionally I’m still, I’m still figuring out you know like what I’m passionate about” (Gabriela, l. 218–219). Gabriela shows a want for reaching a steady and stable professional identity. She demonstrates that while she liked her current professional position, she does however still feel as if being on the search for something else, as she is still “figuring” it out. At the same time, what becomes

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apparent is her desire to find a professional identity that she is “passionate” about. Thus Gabriela shows how the discrepancy between her ideal self and her actual self are strengthened by the social norm of doing a job that she not only likes but actually is “passionate” about. It could be assumed that the job in itself thus is seen as needing to be a realisation of the self, not something that earns her money and through which she passes her time, but rather something that actually signifies who she is as a person. The reason that Gabriela does not (yet) feel that this is the case, hence leads to the reason that she feels as if this needs to change, which consequently leads to notions of uncertainty in relation to her self. Through the progression of time the subjects also experience change, whether in relation to their professional identity or other aspects of the self. Julie notes how “I find as I’m getting older, I’m becoming more of a I wanna get out a bit more kind of person. But I can be very, I can be very critical of myself” (Julie, l. 31–32). Julie portrays a transformation of her self-image. In referring to the fact that she is getting older, she relates the process of ageing to the want of being different. Her self-image thus may be analysed as standing in contrast to her ideal self. At the same time as she wishes that she would be a more active person that gets out, she also argues that she is very critical of herself. Being critical of oneself as described by Julie opens the perspective on the self as an object. Thus Julie evaluates her own self-image. The change that the self seems to undergo impacts on this evaluation in leading to a sense of uncertainty as the evaluation is consequently always temporarily limited and thus devalued through this temporal limitation. If this is connected to Bauman’s concept of liquidity, one could assume that the subject in an evaluation of the self as an object is aware of the unstable condition of this evaluation which also leads to a decrease of the obligation of the relationship between self and self-image. The ideal self as a trajectory of the self-image in the future thus also has to be seen in the light of constant change and instability. The subjects struggle with trying to reach an ideal self that might both change and thus be unreachable or even if stable does not hold the desired feeling of fulfilment according to Bauman (Bauman, 2012). The discrepancy between self-image and ideal self becomes apparent when looking at the following quote: it’s fascinating because over the years I’ve always told myself I’m lazy, I’m lazy, I don’t like doing things, but whenever I’m not at my own home, I like having it clean […] So like I should be able to keep my own damn place in order. (Simone, l. 198–203)

This quote by Simone shows that while the subject may experience change both in relation to her life as well as in relation to her self, the opposite might also

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happen. Simone is experiencing a lack of change, which for years she feels as if it should have been different. The inability to transform into her ideal self is thus seen as a failure and may lead to a feeling of frustration. While it might be difficult for Simone to change her habits of being tidy or lazy, it seems that big transition in the subjects’ lives also often lead to a change of their selves and identities. This becomes particularly apparent in the following two quotes by Ben, which are both referenced as they demonstrate that this transition based on extreme life events seems to be very relevant to Ben: Ben: And also it was quite a big transition from the people I grew up with, then to suddenly meet people that are not always nice and pleasant and positive, sometimes they’re quite annoying and not very nice. So it was very, very difficult for me and since then I’ve changed a bit, become a bit more serious and quieter and like, I was able to share less with people and year so that was a big change of my life. (Ben, l. 81–85) Ben: I feel like I’ve changed a lot yeah. I think it was due to ehm the army and also due to coming to England and like I was very nervous in the beginning about the language. Cause my English, I wasn’t speaking very good English. I was nervous about not having a job, in the beginning, like Meg had to work and I couldn’t really work. (Ben, l. 251–254)

The two quotes touch on a number of relevant points. First of all, they show how transitions and important life events can lead to a change of the self, at least as seen from a retrospective perspective as in the case of Ben. The transition from his youth group to his position in the army did not only affect questions of self in relation to an influence of inside and outside as argued before but also led to a change of the self in itself. Thus Ben sees the change of his self caused by the transition into the army and the special position he held within the army. Secondly, the example also shows how Ben’s self-esteem and identity changed when he moved to the UK. This is based on his ability to speak English, which Ben sees as being deficisnt at the beginning of his move there as well as on the reason that he was not able to work due to visa issues. Therefore the quotes also touch on the change Ben is experiencing in relation to his professional identity caused by the life events also taking place such as moving to a different country. Through this argument it already becomes apparent that through the transitions and life events that took place some aspects of the self were subject to a more of a transformation or change than others. In the following paragraphs the analysis will thus focus on other examples in which different fragments of the self are touched upon.

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It has already been highlighted in the elaboration on the theoretical framework that in postmodern theories the self is often seen as fragmented rather than containing a sense of totality. On the other hand, there are also accounts that while focusing on fragments assume a sense of totality at the same time, as in the metaphor of Keupp’s patchwork identity, which consists of a number of different patches that yet create one blanket (Keupp, 1997). The following examples from the data will highlight some fragments of the subjects’ self that, while not necessarily indicating a sense of totality yet, support the assumption of fragmentation and partly conflicting aspects of the self. These can be seen in relation to the subjects’ cultural belonging, their upbringing, family and personality. Lukas explains how generally speaking the Dane in me is progressive and is inclusive and there should be help for all and so on so forth and life is ok kind of thing, we have enough in ourselves. […] The Pole in me is hard-working, hard drinking, ever partying, emotional, really emotional […]. (Lukas, l. 269–300)

Lukas describes the not necessarily conflicting but definitely diverging aspects of his cultural identity. While being half Danish and half Polish, he identifies with both of these cultures to the same extent but in different ways. His perception on which aspects of these cultures he ascribed to himself is comparable again to the two vectors Hall has analysed in relation to cultural identity. It could be analysed that what Lukas describes is the vector of the stable common sense of identity, seen in presumptions about Danish culture, such as being progressive and inclusive, as well as Polish culture, such as being hardworking and hard-drinking. These stable and common vectors stand in contrast to the second vector which is characterised by being unfixed and ever changing. This might be analysed in Lukas’s constant negotiation of positioning himself in-between both of these cultural identities. The ambiguity that is caused by this constant ever-changing negotiation as well as the possibility of diverging aspects of both Danish and Polish characteristics puts the individual, in this particular case Lukas, in a difficult position in relation to his own sense of identity. This point also becomes obvious in the following example, which does not only cover cultural identity, but rather the influences on Laila’s upbringing both due to moving around a lot as well as being influenced by two very different parents. Laila states how “I’m very ambiguous, because I cannot define my person really. But I guess this is just a result of my life […] your upbringing […] and where you grew up and where you live” (Laila, l. 231–234). Laila struggles to define herself stating that she feels very ambiguous about it, due to how she was

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brought up as well as due to the reason of where she grew up and has lived in the course of her life. In other parts of the interview, she states how she grew up between different countries and has experienced more than the average number of moves also in her early adult years up until the point of the interview being taken. Aside from moving many times, another sense of ambiguity for her comes from her upbringing, which she explains as follows: Laila: My upbringing was you could describe it as Ying and Yang, my father is a business man, self-employed, so his manners are always do everything yourself, be the best at what you do and be tough. In Kindergarten he told me, don’t go into politics and never do business with the family. I remember that, I was in Kindergarten and never forgot. My mother she is more, she is very hearty, she is a nice person who wants to embrace everyone and wants to share her love, so I guess, they are the complete opposites. She is hearty, my father is more tough. (Laila, l. 35–41)

While what Laila describes here does not directly relate to her sense of identity, it nonetheless demonstrates a conflicting fragmentation of the influences that Laila experienced in her upbringing. The fact that Laila remembers her father’s advice even while being in Kindergarten, which she also stresses as being relevant as she “was in Kindergarten and never forgot”, shows the importance her father’s attitudes had in her life. At another part of the interview, which has already been highlighted, Laila states how it is in her blood to be self-employed. This connection to her father, who is self-employed and takes the business to be very important, thus can be seen indeed as constituting an aspect of herself as well. At the same time, Laila argues that she wants to have a job, where she is indeed self-employed, but at the same time able to help others. This aspect, on the other hand might be seen rather as in relation to her mother, whom Laila describes as a “hearty” person who wants to embrace everyone and share her love. The aspect of caring for others thus can also be seen as something Laila identifies with strongly. Bringing all of this together it can be argued that Laila is indeed almost torn between the ambiguous influences of both her mother and her father, which leads to the fact that her personal and professional identity is also divided into these aspects accordingly. Finally, I will give one last example of the fragmentation of the self in relation to one of the subject’s personalities. Julie explains how “I love meeting new people, but I’m also very shy at the same time, which is quite ironic cause drama is like my specialism, so you know you think someone would be really outgoing, but I’m not (laughs) I’m really not outgoing” (Julie, l. 23–25). Julie here negotiates her academic identity of having studied drama against the fact that she feels rather shy and does not consider herself as being an outgoing person. She

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points to on this ambiguity by calling it rather ironic. At the same time, however, she also loves meeting new people, which thus poses a situation of conflicting aspects that Julie described herself as. One of the explanations Julie gives as to how she negotiates these conflicting aspects can be seen in the following quote: “So when I’m teaching, it is like I have a completely different persona, you put that front on and I don’t see it as me performing, I see it as a kind of sense of empowerment” (Julie, l. 99–101). It is in this sense that Julie not only deals with the conflicting aspects of being both shy and at the same time forced to speak in front of many people through her position as a drama teacher, but also presents an opinion on the self that is worth looking at in closer detail. She states how she has a completely different persona, which she understands not as a performance, but which to her is based on her role as a teacher and the sense of empowerment she experiences through this. Whether based on a sense of empowerment or something else, this example nonetheless illustrates the fragmentation of self in a sense of the temporal division of these fragments. Thus in the case of Julie being shy and being empowered do not rule each other out entirely, however they do rule each other out by not being able to be present simultaneously. This relates also to the second dimension that dealt with the questions of which fragments of the self were expressed under which circumstances. The fact that an online representation of self might indeed not only make the “imagined audience” more complex to define, but also create a temporal interference that contrasts with the temporal separation of certain fragments of the self will be seen in the following paragraphs. While the previous examples looked mainly at the constitution of the self in consideration of its fragments in general contexts, the focus will now be placed on particular examples of the self in online contexts. Thus as has been argued before, the focus is placed i.a. on the question of how the self can be related to and transformed into the digital artefact of the presentation or expression of self online. This in turn, however, also sheds light on how the self is conceived of in general. Thus the following examples look at the self online in relation to a sense of amalgamation, fragmentation and distortion, caused by a number of reasons. These examples are important to consider as they will highlight why it matters how the self is constructed online and the context in which this is taking place. To begin with, Lukas compares Facebook to an amalgamation: “Because Facebook tends to be an amalgamation of people’s private lives and a bit of […] business as well and it’s all kind of jumbled into one big mash” (Lukas, l. 461– 463). The presentation of self is thus placed in a context that is ambivalent in itself, that includes both private aspects and business presence and therefore seems

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to be an amalgamation or a mash of many different fragments of life being jumbled together. Lukas also states how “if you scroll through all my pictures, I have nothing but happy or clown. Happy, happy, clown, clown, clown, happy, clown, happy, clown in each and everyone of them” (Lukas, l. 584–586). He states how he normally does not post anything negative as “I am not normally a negative person” (Lukas, l. 593). While Lukas might not normally be a negative person, this does not mean that he may not have negative feelings or thoughts. In relation to the previous chapter on expression and repression, this already indicates that some fragments of the self may be portrayed while others might not. Lukas’s sense of humour and his “happy-go-lucky” personality, which are visible at different points throughout the interview both explicitly as well as implicitly are, therefore, are portrayed in the “clowny” and happy images that can be found in his social media accounts. His account thus can be interpreted as distorting the relationship between his actual self and the presentation of his self. Another example that allows for an interesting observation is given by Miranda. She says how she hasn’t lied about her identity online, however, admits that “if they don’t ask me for my real name, I would just put my English name which is Miranda” (Laila, l. 379–380). This is an interesting case as Miranda uses both her Chinese and her English name in different contexts. Within her academic studies and personal life in the UK, Miranda has used her English name in the sense of a real name, whereby many of her friends and colleagues will only know this name, as with many other people from Asia that live in other countries. It could hence be argued that the name Miranda is not just a fake name that she uses to lie about her identity on the internet, but rather actually constitutes a part of her self, which is also supported by the fact that she states Miranda when asked about her name at the beginning of the interview. Therefore it can indeed be assumed that her English name is something she also uses in a more serious context and as a means of identifying herself. However, at the same time, the quote seen above leads to the assumption that while her English name is constitutive for her, it at the same time does not seem to be equal to her Chinese name. By arguing that if they don’t ask for her “real” name it comes across as if Miranda is not actually her real name. It seems here as if Miranda actually differentiates between her identification with both of the names she uses on a general basis. While this depends on the context, which is supported by her use of the name both in general contexts as well as when asked at the start of the interview, there nonetheless also seems to be a differentiation between the actual “realness” she ascribes to her Chinese name above her English name. Hence it could be argued that while both names are in a way a part of hers that she identifies with, either one might not represent her identity in relation to

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being named in its entirety, especially not the English one. She particularly uses only one part of the names she identifies with in order to distance herself from information that she provides online. Thus the fragmentation of self can also be seen as a tool that enables a person to distance herself from something in certain contexts. The question of how fragments are used in the presentation of self and whether or not they can create a whole becomes visible in the following two quotes. John states how his presentation online, when he still had a social media account, did not: necessarily conflict with who I am. I wasn’t, it was quite ehm eh I’m not explaining it very well sorry but (…) it wouldn’t in any way capture my whole character but it was this rather very general statement of who I am, if that makes any sense. (John, l. 196–199)

John, who was also quoted in the introduction to the analysis and the categorical system as stating that he is creating a map of who he is online, here describes how his online presentation of his self does not necessarily conflict with the entirety of himself, but also does not represent this entirety of his self if it even exists. This, of course, seems obvious, as John states how it is more of a general statement of who he is. This general statement hence has to be looked at again in consideration of the conditions of the current digital state as analysed in chapter five. Here the analysis was able to show how the subjects‘ personal data was understood and defined in certain ways by the subjects, often ignoring any understanding of metadata. And at the same time, it was shown how the data’s subjective meaning for the subjects varied because of functional and temporal conditions. Thus it can be seen how John’s account on the presentation of himself being more of a general statement, not necessarily conflicting with the self becomes understandable. In relation to this, Simone states how being online you learn to look for the “absolute, you lose all the fiddly words, you find the core of what you say and how to say it in the least possible words. So all those things say something about me without going into too much detail” (Simone, 494–497). It is this core, this absolute that is comparable to John’s general statement and that proves to be interesting as it shows the assumption that there might be a core to the self which is more stable and less fragmented than all parts put together. It is also this core that Simone thinks is possible to present online and with which she identifies. For her, this is constituted for example by the words she uses to describe herself on a social networking site. Here she describes herself through emoticons that

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she identifies with, using descriptive words that define her hobbies or her character such as “nerd”, “oddball”, “gamer” or “cat-lover” (Simone, l. 493–494). The fragments she chooses to mention here illustrate what Simone defines as her core. While the subjects may identify with this core and while this core or general statement might include fragments of the self that are not affected by a notion of uncertainty to the same extent as other fragments may be, the shape of this core in its representation online is again based on the structure of the different social media services. Ben states how “It’s a little bit difficult, because I only have, I have two Facebook accounts, which is a bit weird, it’s hard to manage. Instagram I only have one (Ben, l. 386–387). Ben states how it is hard to manage various social media accounts that have partly similar and partly contrasting content. “I wanted to keep my English speaking friends, because I write in Hebrew and my blog is in Hebrew, so I wanted to keep my England world separate to the Hebrew professional world” (Ben, l. 417–420). What becomes apparent in this quote by Ben is the way in which social media services may impact on how parts of the self are both fragmented and then synthesised back together. This is based on how these services function. Thus it may be understandable that Ben has two Facebook accounts given the two different languages, as Facebook is more text based, whereas he only has one Instagram account as Instagram is more picture based so that the focus is not placed as much on the text or hashtags accompanying the pictures. The way in which aspects of his identity are synthesised together is interesting however when he speaks of his “Hebrew professional world”. Thus Ben draws a line of differentiation between his English private friends and his Hebrew professional context not considering the fact that he also has Hebrew family and friends that are not part of his professional context. Both of these contexts matter significantly to Ben as has been shown before. Through this separation he not only expresses different aspects of his self, but also manages to draw a border to the felt level of intrusion caused by his profession as a travel blogger. The separation of these aspects creates an interesting situation assuming that the online presentation also impacts back upon the way in which the subjects view themselves. This can be seen in the following quote by Julie, who explains how after her very recent break-up she was worried about looking at one of her social media profiles for fear of being painfully reminded of her ex-partner: Julie: And to be honest it’s quite weird, there wasn’t actually as many photos as I thought there would be of me and him, like there were a few but not as many, so that

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was easy cause then I just alright, that’s done with now and I can have a lot more photos for myself. (Julie, l. 870–874)

While Julie’s life over the years until the break-up was shared with another person, she also assumed that this was visible in her social media account. Actually seeing that there weren’t as many photos of the two of them together as she might have assumed, also impacted back upon her actual situation and changed her self-image at that moment in time. Interestingly she states how her social media account “was like the one thing I guess I had before him as well, so I was able to look at stuff that I had before and know that ok I can do it” (Julie, l. 896–870). These two quotes illustrate how for Julie the digital artefacts of her social media account actually impacted back upon her self-image. Whereas it could be argued that there were also many other things that she had before starting to see her ex-partner, it is precisely her social media account that she says was there even before she started seeing him. This may be based also on the fact that it is very visible to her and thus might be compared to externalised memories. Hence the fragments that may be stored and displayed can have more of an influence in shaping the self-image of an individual. So to bring together what has been shown in this dimension is that the self, whether in its individual fragments or as a whole, is subject to change in relation to a number of many different topics such as professional identity, individual identity, cultural identity and other life experiences. The perspective on the self in the condition of this change varies between looking at its individual fragments as well as looking at it as a whole. The change that affects the self in its parts or as a whole may lead to feelings of uncertainty. At the same time, the presentation of self online within the context of different media services as well as in consideration of imagined audiences and the selection of certain aspects of the self, impacts upon the ways in which the subjects identify themselves, as has been shown through the data of this research.

Summary on the Third Category The chapter on questions of the self has highlighted some interesting aspects also in relation to the first and second categories looked at in chapter five and six of this research. Identities seem fixed and solid only when seen, in a flash, from outside. Whatever solidity they might have when contemplated from the inside of one’s own biographical

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experience appears fragile, vulnerable, and constantly torn apart by shearing forces which lay bare its fluidity and by cross-currents which threaten to rend in pieces and carry away any form they might have acquired. (Bauman 2012, p. 83)

Bauman’s quote draws up references to all of the dimensions analysed in this chapter. He refers to both a distinction between inside and outside. While in the quote this does not only refer to influences from inside and outside it mainly refers to the perspective on identity as seen from outside and inside. Aside from this he also touches on the distinction between identity as a whole, identity as fixed and solid, or identity as fragile, vulnerable, formless and broken into pieces. The data of the research showed how influences both from within and without impacted upon the ways in which the subjects defined themselves. It was shown how forms of expression and repression of certain aspects or fragments of the self yet again impacted upon the construction of the self. And finally, it was shown how the perspective on the shape of the self, either seen as something whole or rather often as seen in its many fragments, can also be constructed through the data in the interview. All of the categories were not only analysed in relation to various contexts within the subjects’ lives, but also in particular contexts that related to digitality in some ways. The aspects of self that are expressed are not necessarily identical with that which is perceived or defined as the self. Through the transformation of fragments of the self into digital artefacts an interesting situation arises between construction of self, reconstruction of self, presentation and representation of self. All of these processes lead to what Bauman has analysed as a notion of uncertainty in relation to a person’s identity. The self has been argued to be influenced by the data mirrored back as well as by the constitution of the “constructed other” as seen in the previous chapter on questions of power and agency. This stands alongside the process of distortion and fragmentation of the self. Because of the constant construction/reconstruction and presentation/representation between one level and another one might indeed detect a sense of infinitude of a never ending continuous flow (Bauman, 2012; Deleuze and Guattari 1977). By describing the self as being on one level and the presentation of self as being on another, subordinate level, the connection to the transmedial phenomenon of mise en abyme arises (Wolf, 2008). Mise en abyme describes a form of self-reference in a medium, such as in literature, films, paintings, photographs, whereby the subordinate level seems to be “mirroring” elements of the superior level. The subordinate level may mirror the whole or fragments of the superior level either by content or formally. This mirroring can happen once, a number of times or even an infinite number of times. Using the phenomenon of mise

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en abyme helps to better understand and illustrate the ways in which the self might indeed be seen as a superior level to the presentation of self, yet how the presentation of self mirrors fragments of the self in several ways and always in a self-referencing manner. The picture of mise en abyme shows an example in which this mirroring is infinite, thus also referring to abyme in its meaning of endlessness, groundlessness or abyss. This is where I would like to outline two final arguments before going to the next chapter. The notion of endlessness is not only reflected by the ever-changing nature of the self, but also by the architecture of social media and the internet in general that is constituted by an endlessness of information. If one looks at the way in which a social media newsfeeds are designed on for example Facebook or Instagram the two points of endlessness and self-referentiality seem to be undeniable. Therefore on a theoretical level the arguments found in this chapter are interesting as they draw up a metaphorical comparison between the self, both in its fragmentation as well as in its endlessness caused by constant change to the digital itself, both in its fragmented binary structure as well as in the infinitude of the amount of data available. On a more practical level the arguments given in this chapter give rise to the necessity of social sciences to further research and reflect upon these contemporary conditions and what they mean for both individuals as well as societies in more general. In one of the interviews Laila criticises how through data tracking, the following analysis by analysts and then personalised advertising, „it influences people nowadays you know to buy more and more and more and they‘re kind of brainwashed to believe that the products they buy will define who they are“(Laila, l. 688-690). Laila seems to be very critical throughout her interview, as also seen in the placement of the cases on a scale (see Sect. 4.1), and she stresses numerous times how important critical thinking and informing yourself is in order to be agentic within the conditions of political and economic surveillance. Despite her huge knowledge and critical stance on the topic, she yet very shortly before speaking of how people are brainwashed into consumerism speaks of her “identity of things, that make you feel at home. For me I always have Camel Milk Chocolate, because that’s what makes me feel at home, but the same way I would wear Couples. So it’s not countries anymore, it’s products from countries that would define you” (Laila, l. 668–672). Laila describes how because of the reason that she moved a lot in her lifetime, products from certain places and countries define herself as a person. The proximity within the interview and the contradiction of these two quotes by Laila are more than striking to observe and raise the question of how the subjects first of all form an opinion on the conditions they are in and

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secondly define or act out their possibilities of (re)action to the situation they are in. Thus phrased slightly more provocatively: Is it enough to be critical or does the current condition not allow certain forms of reaction as long as a subject is a part of the digital world and even beyond that? If the answer to this would be yes, then what would the consequences for educational and social sciences both within the theoretical discourse as well as practically be? These questions will be taken up in the next chapter on the fourth and final category of the research.

References Bauman, Z. (2012). Liquid Modernity. Cambridge: Polity Press. Blumer H. (1962). Society as Symbolic Interaction. In A. Rose (Ed.) Human Behavior and Social Processes: An Interactionist Approach (pp. 179–192). Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. (1977). Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. New York: Viking Press. Goffman, E. (1990). The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. London: Penguin Books. Goffman, E. (1967). Interaction Ritual. Chicago: Aldine. Hogan, B. (2010). The Presentation of Self in the Age of Social Media: Distinguishing Performances and Exhibitions Online. Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society, XX(X) (pp. 1–10). Ibsen, H. (1925). Peer Gynt – A dramatic Poem. In W. Archer & C. Archer (trans.) The Collected Works of Henrik Ibsen Vol. IV. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons. Jörissen, B. & Marotzki, W. (2009). Medienbildung – Eine Einführung. Bad Heilbrunn: Klinkhardt UTB. Keupp, H. (1997). Diskursarena Identität: Lernprozesse in der Identitätsforschung. In H. Keupp & R. Höfer (Eds.) Identitätsarbeit heute. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Khan, F.; Ismail, S.; Shafique, M.S.; Ghous, K. & Ali, A. (2015). Glossophobia among Undergraduate Students of Government Medical Colleges in Karachi. International Journal of Research 2(1). Retrieved August 6, 2018, from: https://www.researchgate.net/ profile/Arif_Ali7/publication/283719292_Glossophobia_among_Undergraduate_Stud ents_of_Government_Medical_Colleges_in_Karachi/links/56449fc508aef646e6cbc13c. pdf Marwick, A. & boyd, d. (2010). I tweet honestly, I tweet passionately: Twitter users, context collapse, and the imagined audience. New Media & Society 13(1) (pp. 114–133). Retrieved August 12, 2018, from: https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444810365313 Mead, G.H. (1934). Mind, Self and Society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Mendelson, A. & Papacharissi, Z. (2010). Look at us: Collective narcicissm in college student Facebook photo galleries. In Z. Papacharissi (Ed.) The networked self: Identity, community and culture on social network sites (pp. 251–273). London: Routledge. Mert, N. (2012). Fear Culture II. International Journal of Learning & Development 2(2). Retrieved August 6, 2018, from: http://macrothink.org/journal/index.php/ijld/article/vie wFile/1547/1260

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Ribolits, E. (2006). Flexibilität. In A. Dzierzbicka & A. Schirlnauer (Eds.) Pädagogisches Glossar der Gegenwart. Wien: Erhard Löcker. Taylor, C. (1994). The Politics of Recognition. In A. Gutmann (Ed.) Multiculturalism. Examining the Politics of Recognition. Princeton: Princeton University Press Turow, J. (2011). The Daily You. New Haven & London: Yale University Press. Wodak, R., KhosravjNik, M. & Mral, B. (2013). Right-Wing Populism in Europe: Politics and Discourse. London: Bloomsbury. Wolf, W. (2008). Mise En Abyme. In A. Nünning (ed.) Metzler-Lexikon Literatur- und Kulturtheorie. Ansätze – Personen – Grundbegriffe. Stuttgart: Metzler (pp. 502–503).

8

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Our values and beliefs are fragmented and discordant, and the novel reflects this condition. It is the most hybrid of literary forms, a space in which different voices, idioms and belief-systems continually collide. Because of this, no one of them can predominate without a struggle. (Eagleton, 2005, pp. 5–6)

While Terry Eagleton wrote the quote above in reference to the realist novel, the same could be said about another medium, namely the internet. Here as well one can find an infinity of different voices, idioms and belief-systems that continuously seem to collide while struggling for predomination thus leading to the pluralisation and fragmentation of our values and beliefs, as already argued throughout different points of this book. Within this situation it seems comprehensible that the forming of opinions and the making of meaning are equally as ambivalent as the construction of identity itself. The subject’s not only have to negotiate their agency or questions of identity, but also the opinions they hold as well as the actions they carry out in relation to the particular situation they are in. Sonia Livingstone has analysed some of these challenges as follows: “Thus they must make judgements that are difficult offline as well as online – whom to trust, what to reveal about yourself, how to establish reciprocity, when to express emotion and so on” (Livingstone, 2008, p. 6). The judgements that the subjects need to make not only relate to the points made my Livingstone but also relate to many other aspects in life. In the following category, the data will be analysed in relation to how the subjects negotiate the ways in which they form opinions and make meaning, as well as in relation to the possibilities for (re)action that are constructed throughout the interviews. Thus, both opinion making as well as possibilities for (re)actions are seen as a consequence that results out of the conditions and circumstances analysed in the previous chapters.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2021 E. Ferraro, Wilful Blindness, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-32654-8_8

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For Giddens action is seen not as a string of discrete acts, but rather a continuous process, as a flow of activity that involves an aggregate of intentions (Giddens, 1984, p. 376). Within this assumption the actors are able to give reasons for their activities, as in explaining “what they do, as they do it” (Giddens, 1984, p. 376). This interesting definition of action highlight that in Giddens’ understanding actors can both rationalise their action, which means supplying reasons for their activities, as well as reflexively monitor their action as a continuous flow of activity. The reasons discursively given by the subjects in relation to their actions (or lack of actions) are thus to be understood not as single and discrete acts but rather will be looked at as an ongoing process of how the subjects reflexively monitor their own actions. This opens the possibility of not only analysing the reason the subjects give as to why they might do what they do, but also highlight reasons as to how within the reflexive monitoring of their actions they form their opinions and beliefs. Thus, while what Giddens describes as discursive consciousness, referring to the verbal expressions the actors are able to give in relation to the conditions of their actions, and practical consciousness, meaning what the actors know and believe about the social conditions of their own actions but cannot express discursively, also become apparent at points throughout the interviews. The following category which is entitled Conditions of Consequences: Opinions and (Re)Actions will analyse the way in which the subjects both discursively as well as practically demonstrate an awareness of the reasons for the actions. For this it is also necessary to look at the conditions in which the subjects form their opinions and beliefs. These conditions are again marked by the notion of liquidity and uncertainty that are prevalent throughout this book. Therefore, the chapter is divided into four different categories that each will analyse a different topic apparent in the data relevant for this category. The four dimensions are entitled Opinion, Practicality, Resignation and Voice (Figure 8.1). The first dimension entitled Opinion will give examples of some more general opinions and topics relevant for the subjects that highlight important beliefs in a wider discourse. The second dimension entitled Practicality analyses the technical and practical solutions the subjects apply within the context of reacting to the situation of online data tracking and surveillance. The third dimension entitled Resignation looks at the techniques of wilful blindness and resignation that the subjects use in order to deal with the situation they are in. On top of this the dimension also thematises resignation in relation to a feeling uncertainty for a lack of expertise. Finally, the last dimension entitled Voice will highlight relevant findings in relation to the voicing of critical perspectives as well as the requisition for a level of expertise, in contrast to the feeling of uncertainty for a lack of expertise found in the third dimension.

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Figure 8.1 Category 4 - Conditions for Consequences (own representation)

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The core arguments raised in the analysis of this dimension can be summarised in a figure as follows (Figure 8.2): For example, we use the principles of similarity and difference to establish relationships between concepts or to distinguish them from one another. […] Meaning depends on the relationship between things in the world – people, objects and events, real or fictional – and the conceptual system, which can operate as mental representations of them. (Hall, 1997, p. 18)

The way in which individuals make meaning of the objects, people and events they encounter throughout their lives is highly complex. Hall has analysed the way in which the making of meaning results from representational systems of culture through language (Hall, 1997). Language in this case does not only include verbal language but also other forms of expression such as visual forms of expression as in the case of fashion or mimics and gestures. In what Hall describes as the “circuit of culture” the elements of representation, identity, production, consumption and regulation are inextricably interrelated with each other and result in the

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Figure 8.2 Core Arguments of the Dimension of Opinion in the Fourth Category (own representation)

making of meaning as seen from a constructivist perspective. Here media play an important part as they are a predominant means of this representational system. The way in which meaning is created both publicly as well as individually is highly complex (Schweiger, 2017). According to Schweiger the relationship between public opinion and individual opinions is based on conformism and social control. While what Hall and Schweiger refer to at this point would deserve to be elaborated and analysed to a much greater extent, it will be cut rather short at this point. However, the interesting ways in which representation takes place in the circuit of culture as well as questions of social control and power that influence the public discourse and thus are also constitutive of the individual subjects‘opinions has been touched upon throughout this research and therefore also will be considered here, if only shortly. References to Foucault’s theory on discourse and power seem to be one of the relevant theories that also stand in line with other ideas presented in some of the previous chapters on the relationship between the individual and the group as well as power relation in certain conditions and the constitution of the current conditions of digital media (Foucault 1981a, 1981b). Aside from Foucault’s theory, another perspective that seems worthwhile in the light of what is discussed here is the critical thinking of the Frankfurt School. Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s account on the culture industry (Adorno & Horkheimer, 2013), as well as Adorno’s account on resignation and the role of critical thinking (Adorno, 1998) will be relevant especially in relation to the final two dimensions.

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The first dimension that has been titled Opinion, will look at the universally valid opinions that the subjects present in the interviews that seem to shed light on some general assumptions on the discourse of surveillance and data tracking. The arguments presented here stand in line with opinions on this topic that contrast the dangers of these conditions against the convenience or lures that they entail at the same time. Juxtaposing these arguments against each other allows to see how individuals might be placed in a position of vulnerability through the conditions that exist, precisely because of the coexistence of the dangers and the lures of digital media. I would like to stress at the same time that when using the word danger in relation to digital media and the conditions that have been analysed here, this could portray an amount of hyperbolising. It is however, not intended to be connoted with that notion of exaggeration but rather much simpler and more moderate. The message that should be conveyed here does not understand digital media to be dangerous as such or try to perpetuate the image of digital media as being “bad” and something people should be protected from as they are placed in a position of vulnerability. It is rather used to precisely convey the fact that these opinions about digital media do exist in the public discourse and then analyse how they relate to other popular beliefs about digital media as well as how they influence the practices and actions that the subjects carry out accordingly. To start off, Gabriela touches on the possible dangers and the ways in which the complex structure of digital conditions, political systems and public discourse puts the individual in a possibly vulnerable position: Gabriela: […] the more vulnerable we are. I mean […] hacking into a phones webcam and microphones is not so hard, and, and when you think of about like having your phone somewhere nearby all the time that somebody could be listening or that somebody could be watching or whatever like, it’s very scary, it’s an insane invasion of your privacy because you’re, you are so connected to your phone all the time and again yeah if somebody was ill intent, you’re making it very easy and that’s (…) that’s scary. Ehm and I feel like the surveillance question as well, is so like politically charged and it’s very, again it’s very dangerous, because ehm at the moment there is s much political rhetoric about terrorism and anti-terrorist merges and that’s always a very emotional argument to put forward. (Gabriela, l. 908–918)

The quote from Gabriela’s interview highlights a number of relevant aspects that will be picked up in the discussion of this dimension. First of all, Gabriela refers to the notion of vulnerability at the start of the quote. While this term needs to be viewed with an element of precaution, the fact that Gabriela uses it here nonetheless demonstrates the discursive awareness of this possibility. Gabriela goes on to relate this vulnerability to the “danger” of being hacked and relates this

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precisely to the hacking of the mobile phone which she describes almost as an extension to a person herself through the constant connection between a person and her phone. Furthermore, Gabriela refers to the notion of invasiveness that has already been analysed in previous chapters as being constitutive of the conditions of social media practices, especially in relation to Ben, who is a professional blogger. Here this sense of intrusion is related to a person’s privacy. The final point apparent in this quote by Gabriela is the relationship between politics, political rhetoric and surveillance. She uses the word “dangerous” within this quote in relation to the way in which the fear of terrorism is used to justify surveillance by political actors through the means of a politically charged rhetoric. This means that Gabriela highlights the way in which public opinion making is taking place. Gabriela thus discursively shows an awareness of the conditions in which public opinion can be formed through a complex system of actors and representation using the example of anti-terrorism. Thus, to shortly summarise, the points made in relation to the rather long quote, Gabriela discursively touches on opinions and topics that seem to prevail in relation to the wider discourse of surveillance and the possible “dangers” that might arise for individuals accordingly. These possible dangers are first of all the positioning of the individual as being somewhat vulnerable, secondly, the invasiveness of digital technology, the influence of public media and the instrumentalisation of these avenues of representation by political actors (Castells, 1999). These aspects also become apparent in other examples within the data. Thus Gabriela touches on the topic of invasiveness in relation to the internet of things. If you have an alarm system that’s smart […] and people figure out how to hack it, they can actually physically then invade your space, […] and invading your […] space through the cyber […] realm it’s equally invasive, but maybe just you don’t notice it […]. (Gabriela, l. 946–950)

She makes explicit the possibility of invasiveness through the system. Here interesting lines of division become apparent. Thus, one line of division is the intrusion of physical boundaries. It is obvious that in the case of the alarm or light system that is being hacked into, this line of division might be transgressed. However, while it might feel like the transgression of a physical line of division into the private space of a house or even room there actually does not seem to be any physical action as such that is transgressing in itself, which is also highlighted by Gabriela’s statement that this transgression can even go unnoticed. The person being “harmed” thus might not even notice the fact that they were intruded upon

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and the fact that their privacy was being harmed in the first place. This observation adds to the non-transparency of the conditions that has already been analysed previously. Secondly, it seems that the way in which public opinion is formed is based on both the circles of representation in various media as well as there being a relation to political structures. Simone states how “a shitty Bildzeitung article influences views, influences behaviour. And the democracy then becomes a pure facade, and a ridiculous one at that. And that is something that should never ever happen” (Simone, l. 646–649). The relationship between political rhetoric and media news outlets especially in the wake of Trump’s presidency, Cambridge Analytica or political movements apparent in various countries that criticise the ways in which media report on politics (Confessore, 2018). Irrespective of the political opinion as such, it is observable that the subjects discursively are aware of the relationship between public opinion, political rhetoric and avenues of media representation. Simone further supports this observation and the discursive awareness when she states that “There should be no reason to have an online surveillance permanent 24/7 on everyone. There should never be a reason, not in a democracy. And if we’re not democratic anymore we might go play Turkey and turn the internet off” (Simone, l. 804–806). Simone’s statement can be used as an illustration for the fact that the subjects link the arguments of public opinion, media representation and politics together. Interestingly enough, this assumption might further be supported by the fact that generally those subjects living in Germany, where the coverage of the NSA scandal was more apparent than in the UK (Holland, 2014), also demonstrated a higher level of awareness of these topics than those living in countries where this coverage was not as obvious. As can be seen in the quote by Lukas “But I am absolutely sure that we are due less fear, we are due a break from the whole beating of the nationalist drum” (Lukas, l. 904–905). Just as also highlighted by Gabriela and Simone, Lukas here shows an awareness of the fact that surveillance makes use of a sense of fear that seems to be within the public realm. While there seems to be the opinion that political actors play with fear in order to push through certain agendas and the subjects are aware of this, they also seem to perceive a sense of fear in relation to the dangers, harm or just intrusion to privacy resulting from being hacked. Looking at the examples just given above, three important observations have been shown. First of all, it has been shown how public and individual opinions are formed in a complex system of media representation, public life, politics and other factors. Secondly, it was shown that the subjects have a discursive awareness of how politics, fear and emotion may be used in order to form certain opinions and

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justify certain actions. And finally, it was shown how the subjects themselves held opinions in which their fear of surveillance and data tracking became apparent. The dangers assumed in relation to surveillance and data tracking by the subjects are based on a lack of being able to know or act better in a given situation and thus are analysed as being related to a lack of agency. Before going onto the next dimension, that analyses ways through which the subjects technically and practically are able to act within and react to the conditions looked at, another generally valid opinion will be shared as it seems necessary to contrast against the perspective on dangers of data tracking and surveillance. Despite the awareness the subjects show of the fact that data tracking might be perceived as a threat to their privacy or might even harm them, there seems to also be a generally accepted opinion on the assumption that digital media lures individuals into using them for reasons of convenience. Miranda states that “at the tip of your fingers, you can just order food whenever and it’s so convenient and there is so many different apps so your number is just everywhere […]” (Miranda, l. 340–342) and thus raises the convenience of digital media against the danger of sharing personal data. The convenience that digital technology provides can also be seen in other examples, such as in relation to Patrick, who hates busy high streets and prefers shopping online, where the recommendation system also is very good. It can also be seen in relation to Lukas, who explains that in his job as an actor he can always have his business with him and therefore receive job offers more easily. But digital media not only lures its users by convenience but also by providing affirmation by others through the sharing of personal data as shown by Patrick who likes to share pictures on Instagram to affirm his believe that he is a good photographer. The opinions shared here thus place digital media both as a lure as well as a danger for the individual as well as for society in more general. Through the opinion of surveillance and data tracking as being possibly harming to an individual, the individual might be placed in a position of vulnerability. The subjects have shown a discursive awareness of this vulnerability, which in turn has been analysed as being influenced by the way in which this vulnerability has been presented by media, which is supported by the fact that those subjects from countries where more information on the dangers of surveillance was covered more extensively, also showed higher levels of awareness of these dangers, such as Gabriela and Simone, who both live in Germany in contrast to Miranda, who lived in China and also sees some positive aspects in the existence of surveillance. Why these findings are relevant on a broader scale will become more apparent when related to the following dimensions and the ways in which the subjects negotiate their actions within these conditions as well as how they might express themselves

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critically. At this point, I shortly wish to add that the sample in this research because of the heterogeneity of the cases also serves to show how the opinions, based on public representation and social control, are also subjected to a sense of liquidity and uncertainty caused by the hybridisation of culture (von Rosenberg & Geimer, 2014) and the pluralisation of norms, values and beliefs. The different backgrounds in the sample of this research make this point very obvious.

8.2

Dimension 2: Practicality

The core arguments raised in the analysis of this dimension can be summarised in a figure as follows (Figure 8.3):

Figure 8.3 Core Arguments of the Dimension of Practicality in the Fourth Category (own representation)

Gabriella Coleman entitles one of her essays “Code is Speech: Legal Tinkering, Expertise, and Protest among Free and Open Source Software Developers” (Coleman, 2009). Code as speech is thus connected also to the paradigm of freedom of speech. Aside from interesting arguments raised in this comparison of speech and code, Coleman’s essay also highlights the creative ways in which developers tinker with technology. Essential in order to be able to creatively tinker with technology, is a basic understanding of how technology and code work in the first place. The following analysis will look at the ways in which the subjects technically and practically create avenues of action within the conditions explained for themselves. Whether or not coding should be seen as an essential element of the educational canon is open to debate. The following analysis will also highlight some of the short-comings that a generation of mid to end twenty-year olds experiences due to a lack of expertise in relation to technology and coding, thus

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indeed showing a demand for this type of education whether in formal contexts or informal contexts. The first examples looked at in this sub-chapter will consider the ways in which the subjects talk about technical possibilities of subversion to surveillance and data tracking as well as how these technical abilities can be learned and acquired. Laila explains the particular situation in Iran, where she has lived some time and where she has a lot of family and friends. […] if you go to the internet you can encode it […] if you ever want to go on Facebook in Iran that’s what you use. It’s very, very normal […]. So even kids, the very young ones, they use it. And for them […] it’s just their everyday life. (Laila, l. 346–350)

Through this perspective by Laila of the situation in Iran it becomes apparent that through technical abilities individuals can find ways in order to encode data as to not share it in the sense of creatively tinkering with a situation. This is further emphasised by Laila again later in the interview, when she states that: Yes, you see in Iran for example it is very, very normal. They accept, they argue about it, but everyone accepts ok, I know we’re listened to. So what they’re just using is codes on the internet to surf online. But where you cannot track it back, that’s what they still do, everything encrypted. So they continue their life and they say we are free but they always have to be very, very creative to find new ways to be able to use the internet without being tracked. (Laila, l. 806–811)

It becomes apparent in this quote, that practices of encryption seem to be more common place in Iran than in many of the other countries that subjects from the research have lived in or live in. Thus, it can be shown that media practices can indeed be culturally specific. Due to the condition of surveillance in Iran, practices of using encryption for going on the internet vary to those apparent for a majority of internet users in the UK or Germany for example. The illustration Laila gives of the situation seems to resemble danah boyd’s illustration on how adolescents regain a level of agency in relation to their privacy through non-conventional and creative means (boyd, 2014). Thus, agency can be reclaimed in situations where subjects are subjected to a loss of control as in the case of being under surveillance. Laila explains how in Iran this level of agency is reclaimed by encrypting so that what is done and communicated online cannot be tracked. Thus, within a situation of constraint, they accept the constraint and within this constraint find technical solutions to feel “free” despite it. Culturally specific practices also become apparent in the case of Miranda, when she talks about using a VPN to access pages such as Facebook, YouTube or

8.2 Dimension 2: Practicality

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Google. While many other Chinese users don’t use a VPN “because they didn’t know how good they are” (Miranda, l. 558), Miranda uses one, because “I’m just used to knowing what’s happening abroad. Cause that’s kind of the only ways for you to get connected to people. Yeah those four websites. Ehm so yeah but it’s pretty easy to get a VPN” (Miranda, l. 552–554). For Miranda using a VPN in order to access sites that are censored in the country she lives in is normal. Miranda explains how other Chinese do not use a VPN based firstly on the reason that many do not know how to use a VPN, and secondly she states that many people don’t use the censored sites because they don’t know these sites and have no need to use them. For her, the wish to use Facebook or YouTube is based on the fact that she has previously lived abroad and thus communicates to many of her foreign friends on Facebook. Thus, this observation ties into what has been argued before about adaptation in relation to groups of individuals. Miranda also uses other services because her groups of friends and contacts abroad use these services, whereas many other people she knows in China, mainly communicate with people who are on the same Chinese media sites. Media practices can thus be said to be based on culture specific offers and conditions as well as on questions of access. Miranda uses the possibility of a VPN to gain access to sites she feels the need to visit due to having lived in a different culture to her own culture. This opens up questions of how the subjects perceive the ways in which they have learned and acquired knowledge on these technical solutions. While the above quote by Laila already highlighted that even “kids” know how to use encryption as it is normal to them, the following two quotes highlight how the subjects talk about learning how to use certain technical ways of how to use the internet securely. Gabriela: I feel like I learnt more about, about the dangers of sharing data and stuff and how people can abuse or misuse your data like way, way later than I should have really and I learnt it mostly because of my friends I guess. A lot of them have technical backgrounds so then they’re even more in the know or whatever […] for older generations for instance […] might be even more likely unless they come from a country that already is very paranoid about sharing data, ehm yeah they’d be more likely to click on, on an ad for a dodgy website, because or not install and ad blockers because I mean that’s something I hate using a browser without an ad blocker, like I, it’s the first thing I ever install, is an ad blocker […]. (Gabriela, l. 735–751)

The rather long quote raises a number of relevant topics in relation to how the subjects talk about how they learn practical and technical ways of dealing with the sharing of personal data or using tools like ad blockers. Gabriela here mentions a desideratum of her formal media education experience form a retrospective

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perspective in contrast to the informal places of learning from her tech-savvy friends. Aside from the ways of how they learn these particular techniques of dealing, Gabriela also raises a number of other aspects that are relevant in light of the discussion and line of argumentation of this research. Thus, it becomes apparent that Gabriela thinks that the learning of digital literacies is inextricably linked to the positioning of the individual in relation to their life span. This means, it is not only based on the person’s age, but also on their generational background and the types of media they have learnt to use at certain ages within their life span. Prejudices of older people not being as media literate are apparent in the public discourse and have also led to an increased interest in the research of media literacy among older generations. Learning technical ways of dealing with personal data tracking and surveillance also allows to draw up another comparison to the idea of a pluralisation. According to Bauman’s theories, but also other postmodern theories, this pluralisation also leads to uncertainty (Bauman, 2012; Jörissen & Marotzki, 2009). The individual is thus placed in a position in which she becomes herself responsible for deciding how to technically and practically use the internet. The focus on informal learning contexts within this situation thus adds another layer of responsibility on the individual. In the following quote, first of all the focus on informal learning is illustrated while an emphasis on questions of individual responsibility also becomes visible. Simone: I mean there are programmes and systems that you can install, that you can use to make yourself more anonymous and it depends on your, on how much you want that on one hand and on your willingness to dig yourself into the necessary expertise to be able to use and apply that. Ehm most people either don’t care or don’t know enough to care. Everyone should care and ehm I’m sure there is more than enough data out there that is being watched. (Simone, l. 812–817)

The quote by Simone, while being nothing more than an opinion raised by one of the subjects, yet highlights some of the relevant arguments in relation to the discussion on media education and data tracking. Throughout the interviews, it can be seen that the dealing with the conditions of massive amounts of personal data being tracked as well as how to deal with possible surveillance by political and economic actors in various contexts of life is left to each individual. Aside from cultural-specific ways of dealing with it as has been shown in the case of Iran, all of the subjects, and this may be based also on the age range of the subjects of this research, seemed to have indeed received an awareness of the conditions through public media, but the choice of how to handle it seems to be placed on each individual respectively. This perspective is taken up by Simone in the quote above, when she states that the amount of security systems and programmes

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used depend on a person’s willingness to learn the necessary level of expertise. Simone observes how most people would not care enough and postulates the claim that it should be in the responsibility of each individual to care. This perspective thus, rather than criticising the system in itself, places the responsibility on each individual, a tendency that is also observable in the discourse on self-tracking and physical data tracking in light of health insurance services (Selke, 2015). Here as well, a tendency to place the responsibility to care for oneself is placed on each individual in the sense of a rational discrimination as analysed by Selke (Selke, 2015). Thus the person who does not care for themselves, whether because they do not work out or whether because they do not know about internet security and which data not to share online, is made responsible for their own lack of care in case of a problem, such as a disease or injury or an intrusion to their privacy through the sharing of data. So, taking together some of the observations made so far, the situation that seems to arise looks as follows: the individual exhibits a discursive awareness of the discourse on data tracking and online surveillance as shown in the subchapter on the ways in which opinions are formed. In line with or rather in spite of this awareness the individual develops a number of technical and practical techniques to deal with the situation she is in. Some of these practices seem to be culturally-specific and commonly shared as in the case of using encryption in Iran. Other practices seem less obviously commonly shared and thus within a plenitude of possible programmes and techniques for constantly changing and developing technologies the individuals need to negotiate their handling in these situations with an added sense of personal responsibility amplified by conditions of pluralisation and individualisation. It is thus, that many of the subjects in this research also react with a sense of resignation in relation to conditions they find online. Before looking at the phenomenon of resignation in greater detail, I would like to discuss two more arguments in relation to a practical dealing as they relate to the overall argument of this book. Within the conditions just described the subjects negotiate their practical handling of the situation. The following quote by Ben is particularly interesting as it relates the fragmentation of self discussed in the previous chapter to practical ways of dealing with the situation. Thus, Ben states how: Ben: I know which social media does what and for what purposes and I’m trying to do it quite analytical when I use it. So ehm if I got a personal thing, I would put in on my personal account with high privacy and not many friends, only like close friends. But then if I want this to be open and wide spread I would use a different account that I know that its purpose is to be open and shared publicly. Yeah, so I’m aware of my

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privacy settings on all my accounts and I know how it works so I’m quite technical about this. (Ben, l. 657–662)

What can be observed here is Ben’s technique of analytically differentiating between his personal and his professional social media accounts. While sharing personal data on both accounts, he yet seems to both discursively as well as practically draw up a distinction between the two accounts. On the one hand this distinction can be seen in the data that he shares, as has been illustrated in the previous chapter in relation to the fragmentation of self (see Chapter 7). On the other hand, this seems to be practically supported by different privacy settings, thus also practically and technically dealing with the representation of himself personally and professionally in different ways. Finally he seems to be discursively aware of how and why he is acting this way. Aside from this technique of analytical and practical fragmentation, one final tool that seems to be almost like a last resort in relation to resigning from any other practical option is that of an abstinence of digital technology or social media. Thus John decided to altogether leave social media services for the duration of his Master thesis. “At the moment I don’t really use any social networking sites […] because I’m doing my Masters, it distracts me quite a lot” (John, l. 137– 139). Rather than regulating or changing his behaviour in relation to social media, John decided to withdraw from it all together. For Patrick this prospect is something that he wishes to achieve in the future. “Once I get rid of my smartphone, I will, I won’t have a microphone in my pocket all the time” (Patrick, l. 1129– 1130). The prospective of getting rid of his phone in the future in order to deal with a feeling of being under surveillance and listened to, seems to be a practical solution Patrick actually considers. While John admits, that leaving social media services was not at all that difficult, he also states that “maybe, sometimes I feel a bit disconnected” (John, l. 150–151). It seems to be beyond controversy that this tool of complete withdrawal or abstinence of digital technology should not be the outcome of the conditions, relating the public discourse together with the possibilities of reaction as it disables any form of (online) participation. Not given or considering the option of abstinence might explain the level of resignation that has been apparent throughout the data in several cases, and which is looked at in greater detail in the following dimension.

8.3 Dimension 3: Resignation

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Dimension 3: Resignation

The core arguments raised in the analysis of this dimension can be summarised in a figure as follows (Figure 8.4):

Figure 8.4 Core Arguments of the Dimension of Resignation in the Fourth Category (own representation)

Erleichtert wird das dem Einzelnen durch seine Kapitulation vorm Kollektiv, mit dem er sich identifiziert. Ihm wird erspart, seine Ohnmacht zu erkennen; die Wenigen werden sich zu Vielen. Dieser Akt, nicht unbeirrtes Denken ist resignativ. (Adorno, 1977, p. 798)1

Adorno sets an interesting account on resignation. Resignation here is defined alongside an opposition between praxis and theory. Adorno argues that it is thinking that is precisely not resignation by not being terrorized into an action that is nothing more than the pretence of pseudo-activity. Adorno’s thoughts thus already prove to be interesting to some of the findings brought forward in the previous dimensions of this category that focused on opinions and practicality. The following two dimensions however, seem to be even more relevant in relation to the praxis/theory differentiation that can be drawn up as well as in relation to questions of resistance and resignation. Adorno’s quote above highlights, not the differentiation between praxis and theory, but rather argues that through a capitulation to the collective, with which an individual identifies, he becomes one of many. Through the identification with others, the individual may forget 1

English translation: „This is made easier for the individual by his capitulation to the collective with which he identifies himself. He is spared from recognizing his powerlessness; the few become the many in their own eyes. This act, not unwavering thought, is resignative.” (Adorno, 1998, p. 292).

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about her powerlessness. It is precisely this act of surrender, of not-withstanding thinking that Adorno describes as an attitude of resignation. Thus, aside from a praxis/theory differentiation, the differentiation between the individual and the collective that has already been analysed previously is also constitutive of Adorno’s definition on resignation. The following two dimensions will relate to Adorno’s arguments to some extents. The data analysed here will give examples of the ways in which resignation becomes apparent both practically and theoretically. The notion of resignation is defined along and in contrast to a sense of trust as well as uncertainty. While this dimension explores the ways in which the subjects seem to resign both in their attitudes and their actions, the following dimension entitled Voice will precisely look at the ways in which the subjects position themselves critically and thus again open up the discussion of a differentiation between thinking and praxis referenced above. The utopian and opposing character analysed by Adorno in relation to critical thinking thus will be taken up again and in more detail. In the introduction to the analysis the following quote by John, which has been shortened slightly for reasons of relevance, was already used as an example to highlight the four categories that have structured the analysis of this research. The line of thought was developed alongside this structure of the four categories. In the quote by John all of the categories were visible, whether more explicitly or implicitly, however, there was one metaphor used in the quote that seem central for the dimension discussed here: John: I think there is maybe, maybe the better way of looking at it, is there is an unlimit of wilful blindness, so I’m aware that the information I put […]. So that’s it, it is personal but I choose to ignore that, cause otherwise what can you do. (John, l. 265–271)

The metaphor of wilful blindness does not only prove to be interesting in relation to questions of control and agency, but also highlights some of the ambivalent notions that seem to arise in relation to the dimension of resignation. Thus, while acknowledging a problem in the fact that he is entrusting personal data to companies, John also states that he chooses to ignore this feeling of unease due to a felt lack of possible actions. John states how he cannot do anything else and therefore consciously tries to not look at the problems he knows that are there. These problems are based in relation to the opinions and the awareness on the discourse on surveillance and data tracking raised in the first dimension of this category. Thus, an ambivalent feeling of trust in the situation becomes apparent.

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It is a trust that seems to not really be built on an actual feeling of trust, but rather on a lack of other options. There are various ways in which the subjects refer to this feeling of trust, which are worth juxtaposing against each other. Thus, Miranda refers to the situation as follows: “sometimes we order food like three times a day and then different people would know your phone number, and your name and your address. (quietly) So you never know what’s going to happen. (both laugh) Yeah, just hope for the best (both laugh)” (Miranda, l. 356–358). Miranda’s perspective illustrates how despite the feeling of unease that she is discursively aware of, both through her practices of ordering food as well as in her expression on not knowing what might happen, uncannily expressed rather quietly, she nonetheless faces the situation with a sense of hope that nothing bad will happen. The possible contradiction of these attitudes could be argued to be even more explicit by the laughter of the researcher and herself after what she says. Miranda’s case presents a sense of trust through hope, meaning that Miranda is aware of possible problematising but hopes that nothing will happen. The hope that nothing will happen is supported by the assumption of general social rules and norms and at the same time weakened by accounts of experiences. Through the comparison to others and the assumption of social norms, the subjects negotiate the level of trust or mistrust they perceive. Thus Gabriela, explains how she deals with the data of her clients as follows: Gabriela: Yeah, like I don’t directly deal with that much because I only, like I review the internal reports that we do, so actually, obviously I’m not gonna share any, like I can look into the profiles of any of the testers and if I was crazy I could export their information someplace, but I don’t do anything with that, and I don’t need to check unless a tester has asked as a specific questions that requires me to go into their profile and check something. (Gabriela, l. 613–617)

Gabriela explains how she deals with data entrusted to her by the clients of the company she works at herself, and reasons her level of trust in the fact that one would have to be “crazy” to export and abuse personal data. Thus, through reflecting on her own attitude and behaviour in relation to her profession of dealing with personal data by clients, Gabriela assumes general social norms in relation to the dealing of data. She contrasts the person that would go and abuse data as “crazy” and thus against social norms of general codes of conduct. She explains how without a given reason, she does not access the personal data despite her access to it. Thus, in addition to this, Gabriela explains her own trust in other people dealing with her own personal data through a comparison and reflection

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on how she herself deals with the data of others. Using herself as a positive example thus supports and increases the notion of trust in relation to the processes of data tracking. In contrast to this, at another point within the interview, she gives another example through which the level of trust seems to actually be decreased rather than improved. “It’s, it’s an issue because I mean, company information, government information, private like, very, very private, very sensitive or whatever information has been leaked and if that’s possible, then (…) (Gabriela, l. 933– 935). Here, contrastingly Gabriela compares her situation to those of companies. Through an awareness that even governmental and economic information has been leaked, Gabriela defines a lack of trust in the conditions. This is also supported further by Lukas, who states that: Lukas: Again, I don’t trust the internet that much, you hear, again and again and again, about online companies that should be completely protective because they are maybe a benchmark for internet security, but Apple has been hacked, Microsoft has been hacked, governments have been hacked, the CIA’s website is hacked on something like a not too rare basis. If you’re clever enough the internet is your playground and I am very, very aware of that. And I will only trust it as far as I need to. (Lukas, p. 615–621).

Similar to how Gabriela has described it, Lukas also defines a lack of trust in relation to his personal data online based on the fact that even those companies that should be a “benchmark for internet security” have been hacked and personal data entrusted to them by clients or citizens has been stolen. Lukas, here explicitly mentions a feeling of trust, or rather a feeling of a lack of trust in relation to the internet. It becomes apparent again, that while referencing companies explicitly such as Apple or Microsoft, he at the same time relates this feeling of mistrust to the internet in general. This might again be related to the non-transparent structures inherent to the way in which personal data is being shared. Thus, the subjects demonstrate a sense of resignation in relation to the felt level of options and possibilities they have to react to these conditions. The sense of resignation is amplified further by the uncertainty in the processes based on non-transparency, as visible in the following quote by John: John: I don’t know the chain and what legally, what the process would be, who has a right to see what, but I assume that what I do on the internet, can be seen by the government and agencies and things like that, so that’s the assumption I have, ehm, so I would never do anything silly on the internet, not that I would do anyway, but I think you can’t do anything on the internet without someone, if they want to, seeing you. But I don’t know exactly, who and when they will see. (John, l. 245–250)

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John states how he is not aware of the chain of processes, both practically as well as legally. Because not knowing who can see personal data, when someone can see personal data and what type of personal data someone can see, the subjects are uncertain of the information they entrust online. At the very same time John shows an awareness that anything that is done on the internet can be seen by someone. He develops an assumption on the structures that is based both on uncertainty, a level of mistrust and finally also a sense of resignation as nothing can be done about it anyway. The resignation that has been apparent in the cases can be found through expressions such as “what can you do” (John, l. 271), “just hope for the best” (Miranda, l. 358) or “you click a button and then you forget about it” (Julie, l. 557–558). It seems that the subjects react with a sense of resignation both practically as well as theoretically at times. Practically, they negotiate their participation of being online above the possible “dangers” or ethical problems they feel relate to being online. They oppress the worries or feelings of mistrust or try to convince themselves to “hope for the best”. It is interesting to discuss whether or not, they manage to convince themselves of exactly these feelings. In case of this being the fact, one could argue that at the very same time they also theoretically resign, i.e. Adorno’s definition of a act characterised by an attitude of resignation that is constituted by non-withstanding thinking. This assumption as well as contrasting cases of withstanding thought will be discussed further in the following dimension. At this point it seems to be worth noting however, that unlike Adorno’s definition, it seems as if one thing that is observable is the fact that the subjects are indeed not spared from recognising their own powerlessness. Rather, they seem to be very aware of the contradiction between their attitudes and behaviour while using digital technology on the one hand and their opinions on ethical problems and feelings of mistrust that lead to a sense of resignation on the other hand, as has been shown in the quotes above. Their powerlessness in relation to the situation is indeed something that they seem to be aware of. The level of awareness however seems to also be subjected to change, seen in the following quote by Julie: Julie: I think, it’s something you don’t actually think about, like you don’t think about, you’re agreeing to those details being sold, you don’t know who it’s gonna go to, you don’t know whether there’s gonna be repercussions of that, so that the time I think, I’m quite dismissive, it’s annoying, but I’m kinda you click a button and then you forget about it and it’s only later, you think, alright silly me. (Julie, l. 553–558)

So before summarising the most relevant points of this dimension, three arguments become apparent through Julie’s quote. The first one, is the sense of

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resignation that has been of central relevance in what has just been discussed. Through referring to the feeling of dismissal Julie highlights a perspective of not caring, of not regarding her feeling of mistrust or worry as relevant enough. At the very same time, she links this sense of dismissal to a temporal dimension, which is the second argument raised here. It seems relevant that she bases the decision of agreeing to terms and conditions to a particular moment in time, in which she does precisely not care, maybe is not even aware of possible repercussions that might arise later in time. She also states how when reflecting on this at a later moment in time, her estimation might indeed change, which is supported by her saying how later she thinks she is silly for agreeing to terms and conditions in the first place. It is not precisely clear whether or not Julie actually seems to not be aware of possible repercussions at the time of agreeing or whether or not she chooses to ignore these aspects. This leads onto the final point that I wish to make in relation to the quote, which deals with the level of awareness. It could be argued that Julie is not aware or does not want to be aware of repercussions in the moment of agreeing to something. The difference between these two perspectives is both subtle and yet important, while a lot of what the subjects have said, indicates that both arguments are equally true. There are moments in which the awareness of possible dangers prevail and there are moments in which this awareness seems muted. In the moments of a prevailing awareness the subjects seem to resign despite this awareness. However, it also seems that they value certain types of information more trustable, in other words less valuable than others. “I just don’t want to be put in that situation and I don’t trust the internet, not with my money. I trust it with other things. Entertainment, not with my finances” (Lukas, L. 621–624). It was raised by a number of subjects that they were particularly careful of sharing their credit card details. While often resigning from a resistance to the sharing of data in relation to many practices online, it seems to be different in relation to financial data, where in case of a dodgy seeming website services were more often not used for a feeling of mistrust. This may be because the awareness of the repercussions is higher and the repercussions in themselves seem much more transparent. From a capitalism critical perspective, it is precisely this argument however, that also seems criticisable. The valuing of financial personal data above personal data that relates to other aspects of the self, in addition to the reason that the repercussions are more transparent, is precisely one of the central problems that seems to arise in the analysis of all the data. It can thus be questioned if being critical only in relation to the sharing of financial data really means being critical at all. The following dimension will look into the ways in which the subjects are critical and do voice their opinions in more detail.

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Dimension 4: Voice

The core arguments raised in the analysis of this dimension can be summarised in a figure as follows (Figure 8.5):

Figure 8.5 Core Arguments of the Dimension of Voice in the Fourth Category (own representation)

The final dimension of the analysis chapter is entitled Voice. Voice here is understood and looked at in multiple ways and in relation to a number of points of reference that might partly be seen as contradicting or rather referring to different matters. Nonetheless it seems important to bear in mind these references to how voice is defined and understood here in order to illustrate the number of possible consequences that result out of what has been argued before. In order to highlight these differences, I would like to use the German word of Stimme (voice)2 and some relating terms. Stimme is defined as the ability to make sounds with the vocal chords in the first place, but also refers to developing an opinion.3 At the same time Stimme also has another meaning of the sense of voting, i.e. being able to have a choice in an election (Pfeifer, 1989). It thus relates to the term Bestimmung (determination, designation) that describes the determining, defining or naming of something through one’s voice. Interestingly enough this term relates to a discourse relevant in the social sciences between Selbstbestimmung and Fremdbestimmung (maybe best translated as autonomy 2

There is an extensive philosophical discourse on the topic of voice as well which would have gone beyond the scope of this dissertation and this point, but which nonetheless is pointed at here. 3 Quote: „Stimme f. ‚mit Hilfe der Stimmbänder erzeugte Laute, Fähigkeit zur Erzeugung solcher Laute, Meinung, Urteil‘ […] Verwandtschaft mit griech. stóma […] ‚Mund, Maul, Mündung, Front, Spitze, Scheide‘“ (Pfeifer, 1989, p. 1722).

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and heteronomy) that also is of relevance to the ideas developed in this research and bears a resemblance in some ways to the concept of structure and agency, despite some differences. Finally, stimmen as a verb, not only refers to the process of voting but also is defined as being right. The etymological connections between these verbs also could be argued to link together the respective meanings just described. Thus, through a reference to the concept of Stimme (voice), and the relating terms of Bestimmung und stimmen, the following points of relevance and interesting arguments arise: 1. Voice entails both an ability to speak in the first place as well as a sense of choice. 2. Through this voice Bestimmung, in the sense of determination, becomes possible and at the same time opens a connection to questions of autonomy and heteronomy, also relatable to the notion of choice. 3. Finally, through the reference to the verb of stimmen, the concept of choice is taken up again and related to the question of being correct. The idea that something can be correct if applied especially to the questions of this research yet again opens possible relations to concepts of normativity and therefore adaptation. Thus, voice can be seen as in relation to a two-fold perspective. While in the references described above stimmen also entailed a sense of being right (es stimmt – it is correct), there also is another perspective of precisely a voicing that is critically opposing. For this purpose, I would like to bring up the praxis/theory debate started in the previous dimension again using two example of understanding voice in this opposing function. The first example refers to Hirschman’s differentiation of exit, voice and loyalty (Hirschman, 1970). Hirschman‘s research looks at responses to decline in firms, organisations and states focusing particularly on customer reactions in case of dissatisfaction. Aside from loyalty, which could be analysed as non-opposing, Hirschman defines two alternative routes for customers: exit (i.e. customers stop buying the company’s products or leave an organisation) and voice (i.e. customers express their dissatisfaction to a level of management or authority within the company or organisation) (Hirschman, 1970). The option of voice is thus seen in contrast to accepting a condition as given and related to action because it is here defined as “an attempt at changing the practices, policies, and outputs of the firm from which one buys or of the organisation to which one belongs” (Hirschman, 1970, p. 30). Voice is thus seen as change-oriented with a certain goal. In her dissertation Alex Klein has analysed Hirschman’s concept of loyalty, exit and voice in relation to online forums, thus relating this concept to questions of voice and participation in online contexts (Klein, 2008). Aside, from understanding voice in this change oriented and expressive manner, I wish to draw up another perspective of understanding voice in relation to

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the data that closes the circle back to Adorno’s take on resignation started in the previous dimension. Thus, voice here can also be understood irrespective of this change-oriented and expressive manner, i.e. almost in a non-dialogical sense that not necessarily needs to be in relation to others. Voice here is related rather to the way in which Adorno defines the critical thinker (Adorno, 1998). It can thus be understood not only in relation to action, but one could develop an understanding of voice in the context of this research, that sees voice as the process of thinking critically in the first place. Voice is thus understood as developing a critical perspective through thinking. “By contrast the uncompromisingly critical thinker, who neither signs over his consciousness nor lets himself be terrorized into action, is in truth the one who does not give in. Thinking is not the intellectual reproduction of what already exists anyway.” (Adorno, 1998, p. 292). This perspective on voice opens an understanding in which voice is defined as precisely not a reproduction of what already exists but as a withstanding, non-resignative act of thinking that is precisely not forced into action. The following analyses will interpret the data in relation to these perspectives on voice, thus considering examples in which voice is seen, both in consent and opposition, both in thinking and action as well as examples in which voice is denied or censored. Starting off, it is worth looking at three examples of ways in which the subjects refer to a voicing/non-voicing of opinions that can be placed on a spectrum. This spectrum demonstrates various levels of participation in relation to voice reaching from reception to production. Thus, the examples found demonstrate three different approaches to the participation in the sharing of opinion online (Figure 8.6).

Figure 8.6 Spectrum of Voice from Receptive to Productive (own representation)

The first approach thus illustrates an example of a receptive consumption of other people’s opinions and posts. “I use Instagram, I would probably describe myself more as a kind of consumer as supposed to creator or whatever it is, how they distinguish like people who generate content and people who consume it” (Gabriela, l. 343–346). Gabriela states how she feels as if she receptively consumes more content on social media, rather than producing it herself. Not

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considering the fact, that metadata is also produced during this receptive consumption and possibly used for economic reasons by third actors, Gabriela is not the only one who perceives herself as being more receptive in reading or viewing other people’s posts and contents. Miranda states that “I do both. But I think I read more. I’m…I don’t post that much, maybe like once in a week on average. But I read a lot and also you can subscribe to a lot of official accounts” (Miranda, l. 175–177). Similar to Gabriela, Miranda also portrays an approach to using social media networks that is more receptive than active. That this approach actually can also be related to questions of expression and self analysed in the previous chapters becomes apparent in the following quote by Julie: Julie: I tend to read more stuff. I don’t really post that much. It’s funny cause when I was younger, […] I wrote so much, like a lot more frequently. And I’ve done that less and less now and I don’t know why that is, I don’t know whether it’s because I (…) I’m more self-conscious with myself as a person, so I don’t know whether that means I don’t want to write anything about myself, or whether I don’t think I’m interesting enough to write anything on Facebook[…]. But I am trying post stuff up a little bit more I think, because I feel that it may help me to come out of my shell a little bit. (Julie, l. 290–303)

It becomes apparent that Julie here links her change from being more productive to being more receptive also to a change in herself. This stands in line with the assumption of the German right to informational self-determination that personal data also links to the right to freely develop one’s personality. It is thus seen as essential that an individual is given the liberty to develop her own personality and this is based on being able to own and freely share one’s own data. Therefore it seems critical that individuals are given spaces in which they can freely express themselves and at the same time determine (bestimmen über) their own personal data. The tendency that individuals might refrain from sharing data and become more receptive consumers for reasons of feeling “self-conscious” thus can be seen from a slightly worrisome perspective. The second approach on the spectrum described above also sets an interesting example. Simone states how: Simone: I actually post very little, I retweet more (laughs). It’s (…) yeah it’s like ehm I follow enough people that say what I think, that it’s easier for me to retweet things than try to phrase them myself. So if I find something that I agree with, I retweet it or if there is something that I find pretty, I retweet it. Otherwise ehm it’s, it’s rarer for me to actually post singles on Reddit. I’m generally more of a lurker than an actual active poster. (Simone, l. 458–462).

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The concept of retweeting or reposting thus places on the spectrum between a mere reception of content and the actual phrasing and producing of content. The sharing of a digital artefact, whether a picture or an opinion or anything else, can be seen as an interesting example in relation to the question of voice. Should these retweets or re-postings be interpreted as a form of self-expression, because the sharing of a particular type of artefact also is a form of a presenting of the self, or on the other hand should they be merely seen as avenues for information that is spreading irrespective of who is retweeting or why that someone is retweeting. The concept of re-posting or retweeting something also becomes evocative of the concept of mise en abyme, which has already been discussed before. Thus, through the re-sharing of information a digital artefact is presented on several levels that are subjected to different orders and mirror each other. As this mirroring can equally happen once or an infinite number of times, this second approach of re-posting poses an interesting situation for analysing the spaces that voice can be found in. Thus, critically one could say that through this approach avenues of expression and individual creativity are decreased, as “it’s easier […] to retweet things than try to phrase them” oneself. Thus, the second approach analysed here places on the spectrum in an ambivalent position between reception and production, being both at the same time. The third example then, finally and maybe obviously, is the voicing of selfproduced content or opinion, both critically as well as consentingly. Ben explains how “I don’t read much of others people’s blogs or blogs they share on Facebook and on social media. Ehm I read once in a while, I like, I mainly post stuff or join in discussions with other people” (Ben, l. 342–344). The final approach thus sees the voicing of opinion through self-produced content. The ways in which this voicing takes places are worth exploring in slightly greater detail. The voicing of opinions can be found both in relation to a critical as well as a consenting sense of voice. Generally, the subjects, and this has already been discussed also in chapter six on questions of adaption to collectives, struggled with the voicing of opposing opinions, while they at the very same time supported perspectives on the fact that it is important for their selves that they feel able to voice especially opposing opinions freely, particularly when these opinions are about something they actively care about. Following, I would like to make two more arguments based on the data that seem relevant in the discussion of this category and illustrate conditions under which this voicing seems to take place. First of all, it seems that especially for an opposing expression of voice the level of expertise or knowledge on the subject is defined as an important requirement in order to render possible the expression in the first place. Thus, both in their demands to others as well as to themselves the subjects claim a level of

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expertise or refrain from comments and opinions in case the expert status is not given. Throughout the interviews this can be seen when the subjects do not wish to give opinions on certain questions or topics because they “don’t really know on technical terms” (Miranda, l. 471) or feel as if they are “not really qualified” (John, l. 489). Hence voice is impaired due to a lack of expertise on a certain topic. It seems that this is particularly true for opposing opinions or critical perspectives to a much greater extent than for the cases in which the subjects express consenting opinions. This also becomes obvious through the following quote by Patrick: Patrick: and felt ehm kind of trapped in…in what I believed in and not being able to be that person. Ehm ..ehm so yeah probably a fear of being ridiculed, I think is…is what that is. And eh I think I’ve always, I’ve always felt that. Ehm ehm and it’s only very recently that I feel more confident in saying what I belief and not worrying or trying…like allowing people to disagree with me and not […] seeing it as me being wrong if somebody disagrees with me. […] owing my own opinions ehm and not needing affirmation from other people […] As long as I know that I’m not being completely mad like but if I’m …if I feel like I’m (inhales) I studied something enough and I…I not that I have the moral high ground but that…that what I…like yeah I strongly belief things I believe into do, it’s those types of social issues and things like that, but ehm yeah I don’t know. (Patrick, l. 430–448)

The rather long quote raises a number of relevant arguments in relation to the demands of expertise in relation to the voicing of opinion. Thus, Patrick demonstrates how it has been more difficult for him to raise opinions that were conflicting with those of the majority of people around him. This is based on his upbringing in the South of Ireland despite the fact that his parents and most other members of the family come from Northern Ireland. He argues how it took a while to accept that opinions of different people may differ and that disagreement is fine. At the same time Patrick states how it also is essential for him to study topics that he strongly cares about in order to be sure his opinions are not “mad”. This is interesting as again his own opinion is seen and expressed in contrast to those of others. Patrick states that the need for expression as well as expertise is based especially on “those types of social issues” that he “strongly” beliefs in. Research, studying and informing yourself on a topic is thus seen as a necessary pre-requisite but also as a tool in order to allow a space for voice. Posing this tool as a necessary pre-requisite results in the fact that voicing a well-researched opinion is placed in the personal responsibility of the individual. Through this personal responsibility an interesting condition in relation to voice in the sense of thinking arises as seen in Lukas’s take on the matter:

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Lukas: And as an adult, it suddenly becomes your own responsibility to weed out these, these, these not self-taught, but these institutionalised ideas about things, because suddenly if you, suddenly you go online, you have a look at what’s going on in the news and suddenly you’re given so much information that you had no idea about before, it’s your duty, as a, since you have all this information, to take it all on board. To not just go you know, this person was wrong, that person was right, that side of the argument is the devil, my side of the argument is always right, no matter what they do. You know. (Lukas, l. 171–178)

What can be seen in this quote is not only the placing of responsibility or duty in the hand of the individual. Lukas also points at the flow of information that is available to many in today’s society. It is thus in the responsibility of the individual to “weed out […] these institutionalised ideas”. Lukas states how the individual should take all of this information on board and develop an own sense of voice not despite and precisely within the plenitude of this information. Referring to the demand of Lukas that even institutionalised ideas need to be weeded out, opens the reference back to Adorno’s definition of critical thinking. Thus, critical thinking is defined as thinking that has not pre-defined who is wrong or who is right, whole results are precisely not stipulated (Adorno, 1998). It is through this term that Adorno states that thinking “should analyse the reasons and subsequently draw the conclusion. It is up to thought not to accept the situation as final. The situation can be changed, if at all, by undiminished insight” (Adorno, 1998, p. 290). This assumption, the demand of openness to thinking, is also relatable to the concept of liquidity so apparent throughout this research. Thus, it is thinking itself that both needs to be and can be liquid, i.e. subjected to constant change and of a temporal dimension. It became obvious in the interviews that voice, in all of the definitions given above, is difficult precisely because of this distinction of change. Both general public opinion and personal opinion are, and also need to necessarily be questioned and verified again from time to time. At the very same time, it was also argued here that it is precisely in thinking that is withstanding, that does not change because of adapting to the collective but change because of itself only and otherwise stay put, that thinking actually can be a force of resistance. Through becoming aware of the situation and thus creating a sense of voice, the subjects could be analysed as opposing some of the conditions analysed here despite and in line with the insecurities and changed caused by the liquid state of affairs. Laila: Well, you’re never completely free, because even subconsciously you are influenced. What you have to do is to train awareness. You have to really train awareness

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and contact to people because this is the only way you can (…) you can use your critical thinking (Laila, l. 581–584).

Looking at the ways in which the subjects oppose rather than resign to the conditions analysed before thus showed that resistance is in itself ambivalent. In some ways, there was data that hinted more to the fact that the subjects resigned both theoretically and practically to the conditions they found themselves in. On the other hand, there was also data that hinted at subtle ways in which the subjects both practically and theoretically, both in relation to the forming of critical opinions and awareness as well as in relation to practical technical solutions found ways of subversion to these conditions. It seems that these subtle ways of subversion were also forced to as well as needed to be ever changing, non-lasting and contradicting in themselves, which is maybe precisely why they are so hard to observe. It is thus that I would like to argue especially that it is important to analyse and look for the spaces in which the forming and expression of voice can be found, as it seems that this is essential both for the construction of self as well as for questions of regaining agency.

Summary on the Fourth Category The chapter on the conditions for the consequences analysing possibilities for opinions and (re)actions has highlighted some interesting arguments in relation to the overall topic of the dissertation. Thus, it was shown how the subjects showed a discursive awareness of some generally held opinions on the simultaneous construction of digital media as both a lure and a danger. The subjects showed this discursive awareness in relation to the possibility of a complex system of invasion of personal privacy, avenues of representation, political structures and ownership of personal data. The conditions that arise out of this complex juxtaposition, may place individuals in a positon of vulnerability. In order to decrease this level of vulnerability the subjects may resort to practical solutions. These can be found both in relation to technical solutions, such as encryption as well as more practically based solutions, such as in the example of an analytical distancing or the complete abstinence of social media. For all of these options, the responsibility is seen as being placed on the individual. While there are a few perspectives on the shortcoming of educational curricula which place an extent of responsibility in non-individual structures, the subjects nonetheless also support the need of each individual to be personally responsible for informing themselves on these topics and safe-guarding their privacy where possible.

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Because of limitations to the possibilities of safe-guarding, in the sense of not being able to completely withdraw from the sharing of data or keep personal data protected, the subjects often seem to revert to a feeling of resignation. This feeling of resignation stands in contrast to possibilities of voicing critical perspectives. The contrast between the dimension of resignation and voice can not only be found on a practical but also on a theoretical level. Thus theoretically, two conflicting perspectives can be developed that either focus on a lack of action and opposition and analyse the current conditions as leading to a sense of resignation. On the other hand, a second perspective focuses on the ways in which, sometimes subtler, sometimes more obvious, critical perspectives both practically and theoretically may indeed be interpreted in the sense of a rebellion or opposition to the conditions apparent. It seems that especially these perspectives, and the spaces in which they can be created and expressed, are essential also for the connection to questions of self and questions on the perceived level of agency the subjects touch upon. These little acts of rebellion can be seen for example in the purposive acting against what the subjects perceive as being expected of them as well as in the forming of attitudes and opinions that critically question conditions and practices apparent. It seems important that this critical questioning is made possible despite the notion of uncertainty and ambivalence that were so prevalent throughout all of the categories discussed in this book. The non-transparency, the conflicting opinions and fragments have to be unmasked in order for them to be accepted and critical opinions formed despite and alongside the feelings of uncertainty and ambivalence. This may be done precisely by accepting the conditions as being subjected to a sense of liquidity. Thus, the notion of liquidity can be turned into an eventuality through unmasking its very conditions. Precisely by accepting that nothing is stable or fixed, happiness can be found in the analysis and thinking about these conditions in the first place. Through this, maybe the feeling of unease with the conditions, as well as non-transparent structures that lead to a loss of power, and finally even uncertainties in relation to how the self in constructed may be enunciated and through this enunciation opposed. Adorno, sees precisely in this, the possibility of thought to be more opposing than pseudo-activity could ever be: For thinking has the element of the universal. What once was thought cogently must be thought elsewhere, by others: this confidence accompanies even the most solitary and powerless thought. Whoever thinks is not enraged in all his critique: thinking has sublimated the rage. Because the thinking person does not need to inflict rage upon himself, he does not wish to inflict in others. The happiness that dawns in the eye of the thinking person is the happiness of humanity. The universal tendency of oppression is opposed to thought as such. Thought is happiness, even where it defines unhappiness:

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by enunciating it. By this alone happiness reaches into the universal unhappiness. Whoever does not let it atrophy has not resigned. (Adorno, 1998; p. 293)

References Adorno, T. (1998). Resignation. In H. Pickford (trans.) Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords (pp. 289–294). New York: Columbia University Press. Adorno, T.W. (1977). Kulturkritik und Gesellschaft II. Eingriffe. Neun kritische Modelle – Stichworte. Kritische Modelle 2 – Kritische Modelle 3. In R. Tiedemann (ed.) Gesammelte Schriften 20 Bände. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp (pp. 794–799). Adorno, T. & Horkheimer, M. (2013). Kulturindustrie. Aufklärung als Massenbetrug. In Dialektik der Aufklärung – 21st Edition (pp. 141–191). Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp. Bauman, Z. (2012). Liquid Modernity. Cambridge: Polity Press. boyd, d. (2014) It’s complicated: The social lives of networked teens. New Haven & London: Yale University Press. Castells, M. (1999). Flows, Networks, and Identities: A Critical Theory of the Informational Society. In M. Castells; R. Flecha; P. Freire; H.A. Giroux.; D. Macedo, & A. Willis (Eds.). Critical Education in the New Information Age (pp. 37–64). Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers. Coleman, G. (2009). Code is Speech: Legal Tinkering, Expertise, and Protest among Free and Open Source Software Developers. Cultural Anthropology 24(3) (pp. 420–454). Confessore, N. (2018). Cambridge Analytica and Facebook: The Scandal and the Fallout So Far. New York Times (24.04.2018). Retrieved September 23, 2018, from: https://www.nyt imes.com/2018/04/04/us/politics/cambridge-analytica-scandal-fallout.html Eagleton, T. (2005). The English Novel – An Introduction. Malden/ Oxford/ Carlton: Blackwell Publishing. Foucault, M. (1981a). The History of Sexuality Vol. 1. London: Penguin. Foucault, M. (1981b). The Order of Discourse. In R. Young (ed.) Untying the Text: A PostStructuralist Reader. London: Routledge (pp. 48–78). Giddens, A. (1984). The Constitution of Society. Cambridge: Polity Press. Hall, S. (1997). The Work of Representation. In S. Hall (Ed.) Representation: Cultural Representation and Signifying Practices (pp. 13–74). Milton Keynes: The Open University. Hirschman, A.O. (1970). Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations and States. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Holland, M. (2014). NSA-Skandal in Europa: Zwischen Fassungslosigkeit, Desinteresse und Resignation. CT Magazin für Computer und Technik. Retrieved January 28, 2016, from: https://www.heise.de/ct/artikel/NSA-Skandal-in-Europa-Zwischen-Fas sungslosigkeit-Desinteresse-und-Resignation-2123804.html Jörissen, B. & Marotzki, W. (2009). Medienbildung – Eine Einführung. Bad Heilbrunn: Klinkhardt UTB. Klein, A. (2008). Soziales Kapital Online. Soziale Unterstützung im Internet. Eine Rekonstruktion virtualisierter Formen sozialer Ungleichheit. Dissertation: Universität Bielefeld.

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Livingstone, S. (2008). Taking Risky Opportunities in youthful content creation: teenagers’ use of social networking sites for intimacy, privacy and self-expression. New Media & Society 10(3). London: Sage Publications, Retrieved July 21, 2016, from: http://nms.sag epub.com/content/10/3/393 Pfeifer, W. (1989). Etymologisches Wörterbuch des Deutschen. München: dtv. Schweiger, W. (2017). Der (des)informierte Bürger im Netz: Wie soziale Medien die Meinungsbildung verändern. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien. Selke, S. (2015). Rationale Diskriminierung. Zeitschrift Luxemburg Futuring 23 (2015). Retrieved March 22, 2018, from: https://www.zeitschrift-luxemburg.de/rationale-diskri minierung/ Von Rosenberg, F. & Geimer, A. (2014). Einleitung: Bildung unter Bedingungen kultureller Pluralität. In F. von Rosenberg & A. Geimer (Eds.). Bildung unter Bedingungen kultureller Pluralität (pp. 1–8). Wiesbaden: Springer VS.

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Synthesis of Thoughts: Mise en Abyme

„Zwei Seelen wohnen, ach, in mir zur Miete Zwei Seelen von konträrem Appetite.“1 Mascha Kaléko (2013, p. 101).

One of the consistent arguments throughout this book has been the referring to ambivalences and contradictions in the light of conditions of plurality and liquidity. The negotiation of contradicting entities, behaviours, and expectations has been analysed as a central challenge for individuals living under contemporary conditions in a digitized world and has been placed in relation to the phenomenon of digital data tracking. In conditions of collapsed context, the individual thus often needs to negotiate the “contrary appetites” of the different fragments that constitute her self. The context of online data tracking in relation to this sets an interesting situation for analysis. Throughout the discussion of the findings, the many ideas and arguments might have at points seemed scattered or maybe even unrelated, similarly inhabiting the research with different “appetites”. I hope that throughout the research the links between them however became clear at various points. In order to make this yet more apparent the following chapter will summarise and present the most central relations, arguments and findings of this book. The first part will synthesise (and this word is used on purpose in relation to theories on fragmentation and the sense of synthesis explained earlier on in the research) the different categories together and show the ways in which they interrelate and link, which has already been done partly throughout but is worth highlighting in particular again at this point. Secondly, the second part will reflect 1

personal translation into English: Two souls, alas, are renting my body’s site -Two souls of contrary appetite (Mascha Kaléko).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2021 E. Ferraro, Wilful Blindness, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-32654-8_9

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on limitations both practically as well as theoretically that have become apparent throughout the research and analysis of the data. The reflection on these limitations seems particularly important for adding a sense of reflexivity to the personal research process. By being aware of some of the short-comings both methodically and theoretically and addressing them, can help to overcome these short-comings in future research. Furthermore, the third part will emphasise the relevance of the research topic for the educational sciences. While the research locates itself within the educational sciences predominantly, it nonetheless shows to have somewhat of an inter-disciplinary perspective, thus this part will summarise once again the reasons as to why despite the inter-disciplinary perspective taken, the research yet proves to give valuable insight for the educational sciences in particular. Finally, the fourth part will shortly highlight some interesting ideas and findings as well as point at questions and ideas beyond the scope of this research in the sense of giving an outlook for future research and ideas.

9.1

Synthesising the Categories

I am aware that what has been argued throughout the discussion of the different categories and chapters illustrated a vast variety of ideas, arguments and theoretical references. It is thus the aim of this chapter to link together the most central arguments brought forward in a manner that makes clear the overall arguments of the research and shows how the individual categories can be brought together. In doing this, I will refrain from long elaborations and discussions, which can be found in the respective chapters and keep the arguments here rather short and precise. The synthesis will be done along six arguments that are brought forward and relate various categories and theoretical references together. The arguments will respectively touch upon topics of liquidity, perspective, the concept of the other, critical thinking, responsibility and the self. The first argument which has been brought forward throughout, both in relation to the theoretical framework as well as in relation to all of the categories, was the linking to Bauman’s concept of liquidity. In the following I wish to make clear how through the use of this concept particularly the categories one, three and four are related to each other. Thus, it has been shown in category one, on the conditions of the current digital state how the meaning of personal data was subjected to the possibility of change in reference also to the temporal dimension. Personal data was thus placed in a contradicting opposition of permanence and change, which opened the possibility of a relation to Bauman’s concept of liquidity, focusing on the notion of change that can lead to uncertainties. This

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same assumption was not only shown in relation to the meaning attached to personal data, but also in relation to the ways in which the subjects constructed their identity in the third category and finally also to the ways in which they formed their opinions in the fourth and final category. Thus, in a contradicting opposition between permanence and change, the subjects negotiated their sense of self against a backdrop of changing and collapsing contexts. This was often analysed also in relation to a particular positioning within the life span of the subjects, thus highlighting a reference to the temporal dimension that seems to be so important for the concept of liquidity, as argued by Bauman by comparing it to a snapshot and thus resulting in a binding of any certain sense of self, meaning attached to personal data or opinion being formed to the particular time of a given moment. Thus, it was also in relation to the ways in which the subjects formed their opinions and the ground on which they took their decision to act in certain ways, that uncertainty was analysed precisely because of the concept of liquidity. Due to an overflow of information as well as a pluralisation of life choices and opinions the fourth category showed how the subjects had to position their opinions and actions within these conditions, thus either finding stable and constant grounds both for their opinions and actions or accepting the fact that because of these conditions they need to overcome a feeling of uncertainty by accepting the everchanging nature based on the perspective that post-modern life is inherently liquid. Looking at political movements, this basic distinction between either adhering to an extreme search for constant and stable variables or an acceptance of constant change, which seems difficult because of the uncertainty that goes along with it, seems to be something evident in a lot of spheres of contemporary Western life and is a finding that also aligns this research to other research as for example Jörissen and Marotzki’s take on Medienbildung (Jörissen & Marotzki, 2009) and Bauman’s theory on liquidity (Bauman, 2012). The second argument relating together some of the categories highlights a contradiction in the findings, but at the same time opens the possibility of turning this contradiction into an interesting observation. This contradiction relates to the first argument on liquidity, as it highlights the shifting perspective that the subjects took up throughout their interviews. Thus, it was argued in the first category in chapter five that the subjects adhered a sense of functionality towards the use of various digital media technologies. It was shown how the topic of functionality was referred to shifting between two differing perspectives. While the first perspective showed the ways in which the subjects used digital media for the purpose of certain functions, the second (and not very explicit nor predominant) perspective highlighted ways in which the subjects were seen as serving a certain function for companies through the collection of meta-data on the basis of their

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online practices. This two-fold perspective again was taken up in the second category in which the second perspective became more apparent through the focus on questions of agency. The subjects, while not necessarily referring to meta-data in itself, indeed proved to be aware of a perspective that saw them at the receptive end of being controlled. It is interesting to note that the findings indeed present contradicting results on perspectives that focus on the functionality of media, that individuals make use of to reach certain aims, in contrast to perspectives that focus on the ways in which the subjects themselves are seen to serve a certain function or are subjected to control by other entities or individuals through the use of digital media. It is interesting to observe further that these contradicting perspectives seem to coexist simultaneously, yet emerge at different times according to the topic that is being spoken about. Thus, it seems how the subjects think of digital media as serving certain functions for themselves, but when asked about questions of control are indeed aware of the second more subliminal perspective nonetheless. This observation does not only link the first and second categories together but also shows how discursive consciousness may shift according to the topic at present. This leads to the next argument that touches on the topic of an awareness of discourses and the concept of the “constructed other” developed in chapter six. The third argument thus relates to the discussion of the concept of the “constructed other” that showed how because of a prevalent non-transparency of the structures of data tracking, the subjects constituted of another that was defined as holding an almost all-mighty and omnipresent power in relation to the tracking of and access to personal data. It was argued that this other, despite being ascribed almost non-human powers, was constructed more so as an anthropomorphic entity, rather than showing an awareness of possible interpretations in the sense of the actor network theory that would also ascribe agency and power to non-human agents. Thus, rather than showing an awareness of this discourse, the subjects seemed to constitute this other against the imagination of their own realms of experience and theoretical core assumptions. While the construction of this other that was deduced in chapter six can be connected to other research in the field such as Zuboff’s account on the “Big Other” (Zuboff, 2015), it might also support the assumption that the discourse on actor network theory has yet been limited to an academic discourse and even within this academic discourse seems to be novel. It shows that a perspective on non-human agents might not yet have actually entered into the public awareness. The popularisation of transhumanism and the technological advancements of cyborgs and similar new possibilities might however over time change this situation. The observation made in chapter six yet relates to some of the assumptions on the forming of public opinion brought forward in

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chapter eight. This emphasises the importance of questions of power in relation to avenues of (re)presentation, even on a global scale. It shows that it does indeed matter which topics are brought forward and expressed and which topics are kept silent and censored. Academic discourse thus holds the central position but also the necessity to enable critical debate and constantly reassess the conditions for these avenues of (re)presentation. The eighth chapter highlighted this necessity of academic discourse and critical thinking by referring to Adorno’s assumption on universal happiness possible through theoretical consideration. It is here that a relation between this argument in chapter eight and the overall book, but particularly the excursus on religions and illusions can be made, which is the fourth argument brought forward in the synthesis of the categories. Thus in relating the arguments of chapter eight with the non-resignative act of critical thinking lies the possibility to argue for a creative theoretical consideration that can be postulated as the aim of research. Bauman with reference to Adorno defines the dilemma of vita contemplativa versus vita activa as in a quandary “between two similarly unappetizing prospects” (Bauman, 2012, p. 44). Here Bauman analyses the value preserved in thought in an opposition between serving those who they are meant to serve and a protection of precisely the pollution of these thoughts through an effectiveness that renders them obsolete at the same time. Thus it could be argued that while it is important to critically highlight conditions and thereby shape discourse, this may be the aim of any research. The relevance in highlighting these conditions was also emphasised in relation to David Lyon’s account on the religious realm referred to in the excursus on religions and illusions. The excursus demonstrated an attempt at the creative thought that highlights theoretical analysis albeit not necessarily serving a certain purpose within the line of argumentation other than for the sake of creative thinking. The more of an effect contemplative thinking has on the conditions of its focus, the more obsolete it renders itself. This opens the possibility of relating critical thinking or vita contemplativa to the concept of liquidity in itself. Suddenly, thought becomes nothing but a snapshot bound to a specific temporal dimension in itself, losing all sense of meaning in the moment the conditions change. This interesting observation pinpoints equally and conflictingly both at the importance and the uncertainty due to its liquidity of critical thinking itself. The fifth argument brought forward relating arguments from various categories together will be done in relation to the topic of responsibility. Thus, both in chapter six and chapter eight that deal with questions of control and agency as well as with questions on the forming of opinions and possible reactions the topic of individual responsibility was brought up. In chapter six these arguments

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can be found in relation to a denial of responsibility and in relation to a denial of agency, as in the example of reasoning for personality traits because of star signs. In contrast to this, the last chapter touched on the topic of responsibility in relation to being technically agentic. The subjects thus referred to a discussion on questions of a shift of responsibility through the process of individualisation. While the subjects negotiated this in relation to for example the protection of personal data through installing ad blockers or knowing who to trust online, this topic can further be related to a wider discourse on shifts of responsibility through processes of individualisation as for example problematised by Stefan Selke in a discussion on self-tracking and health insurances (Selke, 2015). The negotiation of responsibility between individuals and general public interests in relation to a number of topics that have undergone transformations because of digitalisation thus proves to be a central point of relevance for academic discourse that relates the analysis of this research to already existing discourses as well as linking two categories within this research with each other. Finally, the sixth argument relating the categories together is merely a repetition of what has been argued before. It is worth stressing however, as it relates the category of self on a theoretical level to the other categories as well as to the division of three concepts of the self-introduced in the theoretical framework. Thus, it was argued beforehand that the dimensions in the third category described in chapter seven were comparable to the other three categories in themselves. So it was already argued that the dialectic between inner and outer influences on the self was comparable to the second category that more closely dealt with questions of power, structure and agency. The dialectic between questions of expression and repression thus was able to draw up links to the final category that also analysed ways in which voice, in its very diverse understandings, was either expressed or repressed. Finally, the dialectic between a perspective on the self either as fragmented or in the sense of a totality bore interesting connections to the first category on conditions of the digital state by comparing the binary and therefore fragmented structure of the digital to a perspective focusing on fragments and the continuous structure of the analogue to a sense of totality. Thus, by relating arguments within the dimensions of the category on the self respectively to all the other categories shows that the very fundamental assumptions and questions of interest brought forward in this research are integrated and universal among themselves. Alongside these six arguments some relations between the categories as well as relations of findings from the research to other theories within the discourse were demonstrated. I would like to highlight that there are many more subliminal and slightly more extensive relations that could have been referenced here. However,

9.2 Reflections on the Limitations of This Research

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it seems that focusing on these most relevant six points allows for more clarity and precision considering readability and argumentation. Being aware that more could always be said and found, I wish to lead onto the following subchapter that will reflect on some of the limitations of this research that I have become aware of throughout the process of research, analysis and writing.

9.2

Reflections on the Limitations of This Research

By revealing some of the limitations and problems of this research, I hope to accommodate some of the possible criticisms against this research. The discussion of the limitations will be done along two topics, firstly looking at methodical and methodological limitations and secondly looking at limitations in relation to the theoretical framework and the core theoretical assumptions. Helsper, Kelle and Koller have defined quality criteria for the assessment of qualitative research in the educational sciences (Helsper et al., 2016). It becomes apparent in their definition of these quality criteria that qualitative research is heterogeneous and diverse. The research not only in its basic assumptions on qualitative data but also in its theoretical framing focused particularly on the subjective perception of the conditions by the subjects thus purposely contradicting practices of data collection being interpreted as obtaining a level of truth purely on people’s behaviour. It was coherently shown that the subjective meanings attached to behaviours and estimations are of central relevance for understanding the ways in which subjects construct their selves, their opinions and the grounds on which they base their actions. By placing a particular focus on the subjective perceptions in the analysis, one limitation apparent in this research is the fact that this is of course done form the perspective of the researcher herself. Analysing the data in the way that it has been done necessarily presumes certain constructions of the world both on the side of the subjects and equally on the side of the researcher. While the heterogeneous sample can be interpreted as a strength of this research for allowing many different perspectives, it at the very same time poses a problem in the sense that all of the culturally and religiously diverse accounts of the subjects were interpreted predominantly by one researcher with her pre-existing and biased construction of reality. The second argument relates directly to the same point. Thus, while the sample was very heterogeneous, it nonetheless was biased in the sense that it did exclude many perspectives at the same time because it focused mainly on samples all predominantly in or at least familiar with Western culture. This seems to be particularly important as the analysis emphasised the importance of cultural

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differences and perspectives. As a researcher I need to acknowledge that through the cultural contexts of the samples chosen here, some contexts and culturally specific behaviours become more obvious while others are not being considered. Secondly, I would like to reflect on some limitations of this research in relation to the theoretical assumptions applied and referred to throughout it. Sometimes, as normal within the process of writing a thesis of academic research, one is lost in the uncertainty of one’s own work. Do my ideas make any sense? Are my arguments coherent? Was there a blind spot in my research of something important? Have I understood the theories I’m using correctly? Is there a basic misunderstanding or even contradictions within my research? More explicitly for example, while having considered different perspectives on identity, the perspective that identity itself might not exist was not considered, maybe this could be seen as a blind spot of my research. At the same time, the constant advancement of technology endangers this book of being outdated quickly and becoming obsolete in itself. Within the informational overflow also apparent in an academic discourse in which so many publications exist on an individual topic that there is no chance in considering everything, uncertainties, as caused by the questions above, seem prevalent and maybe even necessary. It seems impossible to be reflective without getting insecure in the light of the conditions that this research has been carried out in. Thus, a connection can be drawn between this assumption and the theoretical framing. This book itself can therefore be analysed as a momentous perspective within my own academic biography. It might thus be seen in itself as subjected to the notion of liquidity so prevalent throughout the research. Valentin Dander has nicely phrased these ideas as follows: Instead the experimentation with expressions, threats of thoughts and fragments gains in relevance. By connecting them together, translating them into each other and thus resulting in new combinations new cracks, fractions and fragmentations develop, that cannot be defined away, but on the contrary allow the text to emerge precisely in its contrariness. They are supposed to make the text open to criticism, rather than undertaking the hopeless attempt at safeguarding against possible criticism.2 (translated from Dander, 2018, p. 102)

2

Original: Stattdessen erlangt das Experimentieren mit Aussagen, Fäden, Fragmenten Bedeutung. Indem diese in Kontakt miteinander geraten, ineinander übersetzt werden und neue Kombinationen daraus hervorgehen, entstehen neue Risse, Brüche, Friktionen, die nicht weg zu definieren sein werden, sondern die im Gegenteil den Text in seiner Wi-dersprüchlichkeit hervortreten lassen. Sie sollen ihn für Kritik empfänglich machen, anstatt den hoffnungslosen Versuch zu wagen, ihn dagegen zu imprägnieren. (Dander, 2018, p. 102).

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Thus, both in reflecting on the own limitations of this research as well as being open to criticism the theoretical framing of this book also relates to the reflective awareness tried for at this point. The book feels both as one coherent piece of work, equally consistent of fragments written under varying conditions and levels of insight that might at times result in small contradictions which I hope can be forgiven.

9.3

Relevance for the Educational Sciences

I have traced the particular context of the German educational discourse in the literature review alongside Jörissen’s and Marotzki’s concept of Medienbildung and in relation to the five topics of technological-informational infrastructure, personalised advertising, self-tracking and critical perspectives on big data analytics and digital capitalism. This will be done alongside five basic arguments that also make the positioning of this theory both among an international discourse as well as within the particular context of the German educational sciences clear. 1. The research stresses the importance of a critical consideration of the analysed phenomena related to the wider topic of digitalisation from an educational theoretical and media critical perspective. Throughout the research a critical perspective on the topic has become visible sometimes more explicitly, sometimes more implicitly. The need for an in-depth analysis of the conditions has been demonstrated along the line of argumentation time and again. It is here that a relation to Niesyto’s and Dander’s demand for more media critical perspectives can be drawn (Niesyto, 2017; Dander, 2018). Thus it was argued in chapter two that both Niesyto and Dander have claimed a deficit of media critical perspective within the media educational discourse while at the same time highlighting the relevance for a need of media critical perspectives. From here it is possible to draw a connection to the fundamental relationship of pedagogy and criticism as in the works of German educational philosophist Alfred Schäfer. Schäfer’s account on criticism and the subject bears an interesting theoretical background on many levels for the findings within this research (Schäfer 2004). The data allows for a discussion of a contestation of a critical perspective in the first place, as seen in the example of Laila, who stresses the need for a critical perspective by problematising a brainwashing into an identity of commodities and at the same time constitutes her “identity of things” (Laila,

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l. 668), of products that define her. This paradox can be linked to Schäfer’s discussion on the relationship of a subject critical against her own conditions in which he reflects on the contestation of the conception of an autonomous critical subject in the first place. By referring to the decentration of the autonomous subject, through turning the perspective of a critical subject into a social disciplinary technique as done by Marx, the early critical theory of Adorno and Horkheimer or Foucault, Schäfer shows that criticism loses its reference point assuming that the “autonomous subject” cannot be understood as a place outside of social intervention, and therefore cannot be seen as the reference point for criticism (Schäfer, 2004). Alongside Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s perspective in the “Dialectic of Enlightenment” (Adorno & Horkheimer, 2013) Schäfer illustrates their assumption that through the determining power of terming, the subject experiences a disillusionment from reality by making concrete items comparable through the reduction to a term and identifying thinking. Through the definition of terms, reality seems controllable, but only if the individual also subjects herself to the logic of this determination, only if she controls herself by defining herself (Schäfer, 2004). Thus, Adorno and Horkheimer speak of a compulsion of identity (Identitätszwang) in which the subject is herself reduced in relation to existing structures of domination. The individual thus always is placed in a tension-loaded relation between herself and society. The reduction of self in relation to the determining function of identifying thinking thus can also be related and compared on a structural level to the even further reduction of self into personal data saved in binary structures. It is thus that the context apparent through data tracking, and the questions that have been brought up in this research, especially also in contrast to economic and cognitive psychological assumptions on individuals, as seen in recent elections and advertising techniques, offers an interesting ground and context for discussion of this paradox of criticism and the contesting conception of an autonomous subject from a fundamentally educational perspective point. 2. On a very general level, the structure of analysis and the basic topics of the chapters touch on fundamental themes relevant for the educational sciences with regards to questions of agency, power, self and the forming of opinions and possible actions within these conditions. The research thus opens possible connections to a number of topics fundamental to the educational and media educational sciences. As a result of this connection the consideration of the particular context of digital technology is an essential task of the educational sciences and the particular branch of media education (Hebert,

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2017). In this the research clearly distances itself from a tendency within educational theory that takes on a defending positioning against technology. Even in the media educational discourse positions that might be defined as “bewahrpädagogisch”, i.e. preventing the individual, especially the child, from a dealing with technology by marking it as dangerous, can be found (Hüther and Podehl 2005). Neither taking on a one-sidedly negative nor an one-sidedly celebratory perspective on the use of (digital) technology, the research rather tries to analyse the transformations of the fundamental topics in the context of digitalisation and by this offering a more nuanced perspective that goes beyond looking at technology through the simplified dichotomies of virtuality/reality or online/offline. The research thus argues for an open consideration of concepts and ideas in order to try and understand the transformation of fundamental concepts, conditions and theories in relation to a wide-ranging number of topics considering for example social, cultural and economic aspects (Stalder, 2016). 3. The media-critical focus also implies a consideration of the economic conditions of commodification and economisation that mark the context in which the collection of personal data takes place in. It seems virtually impossible to critically discuss and analyse the conditions of the current digital state without paying attention to the economic context and structures they take place in. This assumption has become obvious at various points throughout the research and allows for a relation to a number of existing literature within the discourse. Thus, I will open the relation to three examples that make apparent the consideration of this topic from both interdisciplinary and international perspectives. Throughout the research I have referred to three authors that have dealt with questions of economisation and capitalism in their respective focuses on the “attention economy” (Corgan, 2013), “digital capitalism” (Niesyto, 2017) or “surveillance capitalism” (Zuboff, 2015, 2019). While the focus in each of these concepts is slightly shifted, they all point at the interrelation of the economic system with digital technology. Thus, a focus on the “attention economy” (Davenport & Beck, 2001; Corgan, 2013) implies a resource-oriented perspective on the attention of individuals that becomes even more relevant, in relation to avenues of representation, an overflow of media offers and information as well as in relation to Stiegler’s assumption on the relation between attention and care, as argued before (Stiegler, n.d.). The economic and resource-based perspective on an attention economy also opens interesting connections to educational theories. Secondly, Niesyto’s detailed account on the structures of “digital capitalism” informs of the problems that come along with this form of capitalism as well

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as informs on different literature and perspectives that can be found on digital capitalism. He defines digital capitalism as an inherently paradox situation precisely through the double existence of on the one hand a systematic exploitation of digital data that sell processes of data dispossession to great parts of society as advantages despite this obviously not being the case and on the other hand possibilities for sharing economies, cooperation and decentralisation (Niesyto, 2017). He marks the coming to terms with and defining of this paradox as an essential task of education. Finally, Zuboff’s account on “surveillance capitalism” contrasted against market capitalism, defines an economic system based on the prediction and modification of human behaviour in order to control revenue and markets (Zuboff, 2015; 2019). Zuboff here also marks a lack of theorisation in relation to new social relations and politics that have resulted out of this form of capitalism. By arguing that through surveillance capitalism subjectivities are commodified into objects, Zuboff’s account despite not being from the educational sciences, nonetheless bears strong resemblances and possibilities for connection to for example Niesyto’s perspective or even the previous accounts on a detestation of an autonomous subject as discussed by Schäfer (Schäfer, 2004). Thus, it can be shown that through the consideration of the economic structures an interesting juxtaposition of economic and educational perspectives becomes possible, even necessary. 4. Through processes of individualisation and pluralisation a shift of responsibility onto the individual could be traced in the data. This shift also has implications for educational considerations. One similarity between most of the theories used at least from the social sciences, whether Giddens, Bauman or Jörissen and Marotzki is the diagnosis of tendencies for individualisation and pluralisation processes that lead to a heightened sense of uncertainty which in turn can lead to space for tentativity and indetermination. On the other hand this uncertainty may also lead to a heightened longing for security. On top of this, as not only apparent in the data but also in a number of theories used, the positioning of responsibility in relation to a number of aspects of life is shifted. Thus, alongside processes of individualisation and a transformation of the relationship between the public and private (Bauman, 2012), responsibility also seems to be shifted into the individual’s realm. This shift has been noted in relation to a) a loss of capability for responsibility in light of the attention economy (Stiegler, n.d.). Stiegler’s account is interesting as it also relates to questions of individualisation and his concept of individuation. However, I feel that his perspective on technics and current times falls slightly short of a

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nuanced perspective by viewing technics rather critical in a negative sense. Yet, his account on shifts in attention and shifts in the capability for responsibility also offer interesting arguments for discussion. The shift also has been noted in relation to b) a need to be technically agentic as shown in the analysis of the data. Thus, the subjects demonstrated a perspective which placed the responsibility of safe-guarding personal data onto the individual. Bauman places the question of responsibility (famously phrased as the question on whether we take responsibility for our own responsibility (Bauman, 2004b)) also in relation to c) moral questions on a personal, political and global level. He argues that ambivalence and insecurity are also increased through the fact that the individual is alone with her actions (Bauman, 1988). This assumption can be related to Selke’s critical account on rational discrimination, which points at a possible loss of collective and social principles of for example the health insurance system by placing success and a lack of success of staying healthy through the necessary preventions onto the individual’s responsibility (Selke, 2015). The fundamental problem with this assumption is obvious. The same worry might be raised in relation to adaptive learning systems and learning analytics, which individualise the educational system but equally might imply a de-collectivisation that makes each individual responsible for her own success or failures (Williamson, 2017a, 2017b; Hartong, 2019). It is this condition that Giddens analyses in relation also to d) a successful creation of self-identity and lifestyle (Giddens, 1991). Thus, he differentiates between life choices and life chances, while under pluralised conditions life choices have become equally pluralised, resulting also in the individual’s responsibility to choose the best option, life chances have not necessarily been as equally distributed. This paradox in relation to questions of responsibility also points at social inequalities relevant to the educational sciences and the particular field of social pedagogy. 5. There are a number of similarities between the concept of Medienbildung and Bauman’s concept of liquidity that allow for a juxtaposition of these two theoretical frameworks. Jörissen’s and Marotzki’s concept of Medienbildung and Bauman’s concept of liquidity, that he has posed in relation to a number of aspects in life apparent through the titles of many of his books such as “Liquid Love” (Bauman, 2004a), “Liquid Modernity” (Bauman, 2012), “Liquid Fear” (Bauman, 2006) or “Liquid Surveillance” (Bauman & Lyon, 2013) bear a few basic resemblances that make their juxtaposition worthwhile. While their respective foci do indeed differ not only because of very different topics they cover and disciplines they are located

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in, they both assume conditions of uncertainty and crises in relation to structure, regulation and cohesion (Jörissen & Marotzki, 2009). Thus, in relating their basic assumption together this would open a perspective on the transformation of the relationship between self and world, that views transformation also as momentous and subjected to a notion of liquidity. The four dimensions of a reference to knowledge, a reference to action, a reference to transcendence and limits and reference to one’s own biography (Jörissen & Marotzki, 2009) can thus also be looked at under Bauman’s concept of liquidity. Maybe, in relating their assumptions together lies a perspective that allows for a more positive turning of Bauman’s slightly negative assumption on uncertainty by focusing rather on the potentials that indetermination can bring along. While applying Bauman’s concept to the concept of Medienbildung might open a new perspective on the ways in which subjectivisation and orientation processes are taking place in a complex system of different media and technology formats. This is supported by the assumption that Jörissen and Marotzki constitute a need for focusing on the process-like nature of Bildung as such (Verständig, 2017) which implies constant change, equal to the concept of liquidity. Considering both of these frameworks thus allows to develop an understanding that, as argued all along, opens a two-fold perspective on the conditions, of the digital state, of questions of power, of the self, that can either be understood as enabling or restraining.

9.4

Interesting Ideas and Beyond

The research has highlighted or problematised some of the current conditions in relation to a number of arguments. I have illustrated how the categories relate to each other, reflected on the limitations of this research and related the research to the academic discourse that it is located in. What is there left to say, being aware that one could lose oneself in the groundlessness of always discussing another argument or relating to another idea? Finally, it is precisely this groundlessness I wish to bring up one more time on a formal level, maybe as somewhat of an afterthought, that does not directly relate to the educational sciences. Before doing this, I would like to make note of the fact that I have refrained from trying to come up with practical solutions to the problems that I have posed in this research, and I will refrain from doing so in the further course of the conclusive parts despite being under the impression that the findings I have presented could be of relevance both to theory and praxis. I wish to stress the necessity and importance of trying to find spaces of expression in which subjects are able to critically voice their opinions. I think that a complete withdrawal from digital technology in opposition

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to the conditions should not be perceived as the only option to regain agency in the light of the conditions the individuals find themselves in. The problems, the perspectives, the related literature presented in this research seem true on a global scale, yet they are limited to particular conditions that are not universal as they leave out a consideration of many perspectives at the same time. Conditions of cultural pluralisation can thus be seen as a key problem of the educational sciences (von Rosenberg & Geimer, 2014), that has also become apparent in this particular research. Rather than focusing on the mere identification of power relations in a dichotomous manner, I have tried to highlight the transformations that these relations are going through. It is precisely in questioning the dichotomous binaries (for example virtuality/reality; the other against one’s own) that allow going beyond what might seem possible within the self-understanding in the medium of the cultural (Thompson & Jergus, 2014). Mecheril, Probadnick und Scherschel (2008) argue: We assume that this disturbing and straining moment of debinarisation is not the Other of binarisation, but rather an increasingly virtual characteristic inherent to the binary scheme itself. Debinarisation is always referring to binarity and thus a shift and a displacement, an irritation and a tantalisation that is related to the binary scheme, invoking it, taunting it, challenging it.3 (translated from Mecheril et al., 2008, pp. 399– 400)

The authors thus stress the challenging of binary schemes and it is precisely this thought I would like to take up and apply to the context of my own research. Thus, in relation to this quote it becomes possible to understand a binarisation also in relation to the collecting of personal data that gets fixed permanently in a binary computational datum. The determining factor inherent in this process fixes something as a date of birth, personal height or even just a verbal expression within a database and thus binds these two items together often not allowing for change, at least not within the agency of the individual this personal data refers to. The problem that arises is the level of “truth”, as discussed previously, that also seems inherent to this quantified item. Thus, debinarisation might be compared to the challenging of the binding between these two items, the taunting of its self-acclaimed level of “truth”. Personal data thus does not only represent one 3

Original: „Wir gehen davon aus, dass dieses beunruhigende und anspannende Moment der Debinarisierung nicht das Andere der Binarisierung, sondern eine zunehmend virtuelle Eigenschaft ist, die dem binären Schema selbst eingelagert ist. Debinarisierung ist immer auf Binarität bezogen und somit die Verschiebung und Verrückung, die Irritation und Reizung, die auf das binäre Schema, es anrufend, es verhöhnend es herausfordernd, es thematisierend bezogen ist.“ (Mecheril et al. 2008, pp. 399-400).

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meaning, one universal truth. It is missing, it hides more than it discloses, equally to what Susan Sontag has analysed for the photograph (Sontag, 2002). Sontag’s account could equally be used in relation to the collection of personal data: Photography (personal data E.F.) implies that we know about the world if we accept it as the camera (digital world E.F.) records it. But this is the opposite of understanding, which starts from not accepting the world as it looks. All possibility of understanding is rooted in the ability to say no. […] By furnishing this already crowded world with a duplicate one of images (and personal data E.F.), photography (data tracking E.F.) makes us feel that the world is more available than it really is. Needing to have reality confirmed and experience enhanced by photographs (personal data E.F.) is an aesthetic consumerism to which everyone is now addicted. Industrial societies turn their citizens into image-junkies; it is the most irresistible form of mental pollution. […] It would not be wrong to speak of people having a compulsion to photograph (track data E.F.): to turn experience itself into a way of seeing. Ultimately, having an experience becomes identical with taking a photograph of it (recording it E.F.), and participating in a public event comes more and more to be equivalent to looking at it in photographed form. That most logical of nineteenth-century aesthetes, Mallarmé, said that everything in the world exists in order to end in a book. Today everything exists to end in a photograph. (Sontag, 2002, p. 23-24).

Or to add: Today everything exists to end in the form of digitalised data. This raises a number of last points I wish to make. It refers to the ability to say no, i.e. an ability of negation important also in light of Bildungstheory. Furthermore it references a compulsion to photograph, to record data turning citizens into junkies. Sontag’s account, despite being from 1977, still holds a lot of truth. Experience might be changed because of the necessity to photograph. The same could be said about the conditions I have analysed in relation to the production of personal data, which also includes photographs equally. We are furnishing the already crowded – too crowded considering information overflows and big data – world with duplicates of everything. This finally leads onto the last point on groundlessness I wanted to raise as argued at the start of this sub-chapter. Keupp with reference to Bauman speaks of an “ontological groundlessness” of postmodern living conditions that cannot be healed, but that also leads to the longing for immovable fundaments (Keupp, 1997). A notion of groundlessness also relates to the duplication of photographs or data of items in an already crowded world, as referenced by Sontag. Finally, it relates also to the concept of mise en abyme that I have introduced in the analysis of this research. Abyme meaning groundlessness in itself thus also opens up a connection to Sontag’s and Bauman’s accounts. Mise en abyme is described as a form of self-reference in a medium whereby different levels “mirror” elements

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of a level superior to them, either in its whole or in particular fragments. This mirroring can happen once, a couple of times or an infinite number of times. Using this formal concept allows not only to draw a line between different medial forms, such as literature, photography or as in this case the context of digital data, but also brings up a number of interesting observations. On a formal level the notion of self-referentiality and endlessness inherent to some digital practices, i.e. through forms of re-tweeting or in the sense of an ongoing collection of big data that seems endless, opens the possibility for critical questions on which items are referenced or mirrored at which level. Considering this, it is worth looking at whether or not what is mirrored is mirrored in its total or just in parts. As Sontag argues, the photograph is lacking, it never shows the whole. It is, therefore, necessary to critically reflect one’s attention back onto that which might be missing from being represented in these forms. While things might from an outer perspective come across as being total (Bauman, 2012), Bauman has argued that this depends precisely on the perspective and might feel different for the person it concerns. Similarly, a digital photograph looks coherent and whole while at the same time we can be aware that zooming in more and more we can on one level make out individual bits, i.e. fragments that create a whole while not being whole as such. It is here that the contradiction of liquidity and fragmentation also seems to dissolve as even liquids may always be broken down into their individual molecules and thus also offer a double perspective of being looked at both in its totality as well as in relation to its fragments. I feel it is the task of social science to highlight this double perspective both by considering a total, as well as by looking at the relevant fragments and asking, as representation might never be complete, for precisely that what is missing in any representation. The “acclaimed” level of truth inherent to personal data can thus be unmasked and this might allow also for an ability in which the subject does not subject herself into surveillance, knowing that what is seen is always an extraction – a detail – a fragment – that can be changed and can be contradicted.

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Conclusion to the Research Questions

To conclude, it might make sense to finish where the book started off – namely by considering the research questions and the title. Thus summarising the most central points will be done considering the four central research questions and trying to summarise the answers as short and comprehensive as possible:

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1) How do people make sense of and deal with current trends of data collection/surveillance online? It was shown how the subjects of this research described their media practices and the conditions of the digital state they located these practices within. Looking at how the subjects referred to these current conditions of the digital state, media and its structures gave insights into both the structures of media, as well as considerations about its qualitative values and elements in relation to the theory developed here alongside Bauman‘s sense of liquidity. It could be shown that technologies and media often seem to serve certain functions and are evaluated in relation to how well these functions might be served while being inextricably interwoven into the daily life and routines of the subjects and wider economic structures. That there is a second layer perspective contrasting the mere functionality for the subjects on how media are used to function in favour of third parties using the subjects is something while being apparent a lot less could also be analysed at several points in the interviews. It was also shown that the quality and value of personal data is subjected heavily to the contexts in which they are created. The definitions of personal data and their meaning as constructed by the subjects proved to be complex and blurry. It could be shown how the transformation of analogue data or that what Benjamin might have called “aura” into digital data, that is into a reproducible digital artefact and the relation that exists between the actor and this artefact are important to be reflected upon, not taken for granted. This is due to the fact that data itself as well as the meaning attached to it can be changed and therefore need to also be constantly (re)negotiated, as for example seen in the case of Julie looking at photos with her ex-boyfriend at different stages of their relationship and the following break-up. One central argument resulting out of these findings is that it is therefore important to be aware of how data is produced and positioned to other types of data. Looking at the ways in which personal data are defined by the subjects of this research as well as the ways in which aspects of temporality were closely linked to personal data and media practices, allowed for a qualitative understanding of the conditions that media practices are taking place in. Thus data was often seen as in an almost contradicting understanding of permanence versus being up to date. The datum was thus bound to a fixed moment in time in which it was collected. In contrast to this, when analysed and used, personal data’s requirement for productivity and usefulness often lies precisely in the claim to truth which can only be sustained given the data is correct and not outdated. This seems to be an interesting observation that is complicated by the findings that the temporality of

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data was often closely related to subjective points of reference in the subjects’ life spans. Again, the photos looked at by Julie before and after her break-up serve as an example in which the subjective memories attached to digital artefacts were subject to change over time. Finally, aside from illustrating these accounts of how the subjects made sense of and dealt with the current trends of the digital state in relation to data collection and online surveillance, the excursus on religions and illusions served as an interesting example on the ways in which digital technologies are not only related to media practices and everyday lives on a purely practical level, but also on a more theoretical level. Thus it was argued that the phenomenon looked at in this research on a theoretical structural level allowed for interesting comparisons to the religious realm caused by expressions which placed personal data in the “ether forever” (Patrick, l. 757) which gave one subject anxiety over the shame of sexuality amplified immensely through the fear of being surveilled. The unmasking and analysis of these comparisons and conditions are an important tool of social sciences. 2) What types of agency do they constitute for themselves within this context? It has been shown that the individual’s agency is inextricably located in a triad between herself, others and (technical) things. Within this triad, which sides are not clearly separated but interdependent and correlated, complex conditions of power and agency exist, through which individuals are in a constant negotiating process of adaptation with the “others” - individual, collectives or generalised around them, as well as with the technical objects that condition the negotiations through the individuals’ interaction with them. The individuals are subjected to control by the collectives they are a part of in ambivalent ways, which holds true for both online and offline contexts. Especially the cultural heterogeneity of the cases showed that cultural belonging could be analysed as one of the central contexts that shows these ambivalences on a spectrum between fixed and shared influences on the one side and influences of change on the other side. Through the need for adaptation the subjects experienced a loss of agency. On top of this, they were subjected to a comparative control by comparing themselves to explicit individual others, groups of others or even the “generalized” other. The comparison to others was also impacted on by the interaction with digital technologies. Thus, it was shown how digital technology impacts on perceived levels of agency in the sense that it is both liberating and constraining at the same time. Digital technology was constructed as a non-human agent impacting

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on the subjects and influencing their perceived levels of agency rarely but nonetheless. Yet it was interesting to observe that overall, the subjects rather referred to an other, that has been theorised as a “constructed” other, which was described as more human than non-human. While this constructed other was not seen as technical, it was referenced mainly in relation to human professionals such as NSA employees, data analysts, secret agents, etc., while at the same time ascribed a sense of power and almightiness because of the non-transparency inherent to the structures. These findings not only opened interesting assumptions of questions of agency and power but also on the relationship between the academic discourses, in which ANT is better known than it currently seems to be in the public discourse. Finally, the ways in which the subjects broached the issue of agency was ambivalent also through the fact that at times they seemed to deny a sense of agency for themselves in order to not take on responsibility. Expressions such as “it’s in my blood” (Laila, l. 209) or “I’m a typical gemini” (Miranda, l. 52) illustrated just two examples of this. On the other hand, it was also observed how the subjects reclaimed a sense of agency in order to feel more powerful as when John explains how he decided to change his life, which nonetheless gave an ambivalent account in relation to his power in this situation. Thus, it can be argued that there were very conflicting examples in which the subjects simultaneously denied and reclaimed their agency. Interestingly, the reclaiming of agency was also related to questions of attention and care, which is a finding relevant as it poses further questions on how attention and care should be spent. Patrick’s case of needing boredom and moments with oneself in which no mobile technology interrupts the flow of things serves as an interesting example in this case. 3) How can this be related to how they perceive themselves in the world in terms of their own identity? The data of the research showed how influences both from within and outside impact upon the ways in which the subjects defined themselves. It was also shown how forms of expression and repression of certain aspects or fragments of the self impact upon the construction of the self. And finally, it was shown how the perspective on the shape of the self, either seen as something whole or rather often as seen in its many fragments, can also be constructed through the data in the interviews. All of the findings were not only analysed in relation to various contexts within the subjects’ lives, but also in particular contexts that related to digitality. The aspects of self that are expressed are not necessarily identical with

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that what is perceived or defined as the self. Through the transformation of fragments of the self into digital artefacts an interesting situation arises between the construction of self, reconstruction of self, presentation and representation of self. All of these processes can lead to a notion of uncertainty in relation to a person’s identity. The self has been argued to be influenced by the data mirrored back as well as by the constitution of the “constructed other”. This stands alongside the process of distortion and fragmentation of the self. If describing the self as being on one level and the presentation of self as being on another subordinate level the connection to the concept of mise en abyme becomes possible. Mise en abyme describes a form of self-reference in a medium whereby the subordinate level is “mirroring” elements of the superior level. Using the concept of mise en abyme can help to better understand and illustrate the ways in which the self might indeed be seen as a superior level to the presentation of self. The notion of endlessness is not only reflected by the ever-changing nature of the self, but also by the architecture of social media and the internet in general that is constituted by an endlessness of information. Therefore, on a theoretical level the findings presented are interesting as they draw up a metaphorical comparison between the self, both in its fragmentation as well as in its endlessness caused by the constant change to the digital itself, both in its fragmented binary structure as well as in the infinitude of the amount of data available. It was found that questions of recognition and belonging were of central relevance to the forming of a person’s identity and reliant on outer influences, which were constituted not only by individuals or groups of individuals but also by media and the global structures media artefacts are produced in as seen by the way in which Patrick describes the Irish identity on a world stage. Therefore, an analysis of these conditions seems essential as they also influence negotiations on which aspects of self should be expressed and which aspects of self should be repressed in consideration of the “imagined” audience. These processes may lead to a distortion of the presentation of self and the juxtaposition of several perspectives on the self. This is further enhanced by changing perspectives on the self as a whole and in its fragments. All of these conditions may lead to a notion of uncertainty and liquidity that open possible connections to Bauman’s theory. 4) What does this mean for broader social and educational theories and how subjects form their opinions? The chapter on the conditions for the consequences analysing possibilities for opinions and (re)actions has highlighted some interesting arguments in relation to the overall topic and broader social and educational theories. The discursive

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awareness the subjects had on some generally held opinions on the simultaneous construction of digital media as both a lure and a danger was shown in relation to the possibility of a complex system of invasion of personal privacy, avenues of representation, political structures and ownership of personal data. The conditions that arise out of this complex juxtaposition, may place individuals in a positon of vulnerability for which the subjects may resort to practical solutions to prevent this notion of vulnerability. These are constituted by both technical solutions, such as encryption, as well as more practically based solutions, such as in the example of an analytical distancing or the complete abstinence of social media. For all of these options, responsibility is mainly seen as being placed on the individual, with only a few perspectives and accounts on the shortcoming of educational curricula which place an extent of responsibility in non-individual structures for safe-guarding citizens’ privacies where possible. Due to limitations of the possibilities of safe-guarding their personal data the subjects at times seem to revert to a feeling of resignation. This feeling of resignation stands in contrast to possibilities of voicing critical perspectives. Thus, two contradicting perspectives can be developed that either focus on a lack of opposition and analyse the current conditions as leading to a sense of resignation. On the other hand, is a second perspective that focuses on the ways in which critical perspectives can be seen in the sense of a rebellion or opposition to the conditions apparent, sometimes subtler, sometimes more obvious. It is precisely these perspectives, and the spaces in which they can be created and expressed, that are essential for the connection to questions of self and questions on the perceived level of agency constituted by the subjects. It is important to stress that this critical questioning is made possible despite the notion of uncertainty and ambivalence that has been analysed throughout this research. This may be done precisely by accepting the conditions as being subjected to a sense of liquidity, as being non-transparent and entailing conflicting opinions and fragments. Thus, the notion of liquidity can be turned into a possibility through revealing its very conditions. 5) Title: “Wilful Blindness – on the relationship of identity, agency and personal data” I finally want to consider one last point, which has been stressed throughout this book and allows me to end right at the start. The title of the book “wilful blindness” which was one of the in vivo codes of the research can be understood in a two-fold manner as it shows two fundamental challenges. It has already been argued that questions of identity, agency and personal data have been of

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relevance throughout the research. The metaphor of wilful blindness – even in its contradiction – has served as an interesting way of looking at the ambivalent ways in which the dealing with personal data in online contexts is touched upon by the subjects. Thus, in relation to their (re)actions towards it, I argued that wilful blindness indicates both agency as well as a lack of agency. It seems that the notion of resignation often detected in the cases was closely linked to this ambivalent sense of power and lack of power in relation to personal data. As the subjects problematised the conditions and yet wanted to participate, resignation to the conditions was often seen as the only way of dealing with it. Because of this quandary, I argued that creating spaces for critical voicing was essential. The second essential point was not only the creation of spaces for critical perspectives but also the unmasking of the claimed level of truth inherent to this data. It is thus that the metaphor of wilful blindness may also be understood in a second manner, namely in relation to the data itself. Thus, using Susan Sontag’s arguments on photography, I argued that personal data, equal to photography, always eliminate, leave out, show only a fraction and thus need to be understood to be subject to change, i.e. be liquid themselves. Wilful blindness then might also be referred to the way in which personal data is attached to certain meanings, bound to specific contexts and times, inheriting a sense of permanence, which is also blind to other interpretations and contexts. While this is not a problem as such, it becomes a problem once it pretends to give a universally true and complete perspective and does not reflect on the aspects it leaves out especially in relation to personal data, which is mirrored back at the individuals they once belonged to, who might look at the data and accordingly shape and reshape their identities.

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