Widening the World of International Relations: Homegrown Theorizing 9781138572188, 9780203702239

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Widening the World of International Relations

Current international relations (IR) theories and approaches, which are almost exclusively built in the West, are alien to the non-­Western contexts that engender the most hard-­pressing problems of the world and ultimately unhelpful in understanding or addressing the needs surrounding these issues. Our supposedly revolutionary new concepts and approaches remain largely insufficient in explaining what happens globally and in offering lessons for improvement. This deficiency can only be addressed by building more relevant theories. For theory to be relevant in accounting for contemporary international relations, we argue, it should not only apply to, but also emanate from different corners of the current political universe. In other words, diversity and dialogue can only come about when periphery scholars do not just “meta-­theorize” but also “theorize.” Aydinli and Biltekin propose a new form of theorizing through this collection of work, one that effectively blends peripheral outlooks with theory production. They call this form “homegrown theorizing,” or original theorizing in the periphery about the periphery. Arguing that disciplinary culture is oblivious to the diversity that might be achieved by theorizing based on indigenous ideas and/or practices, this book intends to highlight that potential, showing diversity in the background of the authors, because wherever one looks at the world from, paints the picture that is being seen. Therefore, we bring together scholars from Eastern Europe to South Africa, from Iran to Japan to cover the extant diversity in ideas. This work will be essential reading for all students and scholars concerned with the future of international relations theory. Ersel Aydınlı, Bilkent University, Ankara. Gonca Biltekin, Binghamton University, USA.

Worlding Beyond the West Series Editors: Arlene B. Tickner

Universidad del Rosario, Colombia

David Blaney

Macalester College, USA

and Inanna Hamati-­Ataya

Aberystwyth University, UK Historically, the International Relations (IR) discipline has established its boundaries, issues, and theories based upon Western experience and traditions of thought. This series explores the role of geocultural factors, institutions, and academic practices in creating the concepts, epistemologies, and methodologies through which IR knowledge is produced. This entails identifying alternatives for thinking about the “international” that are more in tune with local concerns and traditions outside the West. But it also implies provincializing Western IR and empirically studying the practice of producing IR knowledge at multiple sites within the so-­called ‘West’. 11 International Institutions in World History Divorcing International Relations Theory from the State and Stage Models Laust Schouenborg 12 Fairy Tales and International Relations A Folklorist Reading of IR Textbooks Kathryn Starnes 13 Against International Relations Norms Postcolonial Perspectives Edited by Charlotte Epstein 14 Assembling Exclusive Expertise Knowledge, Ignorance and Conflict Resolution in the Global South Edited by Anna Leander and Ole Wæver 15 Widening the World of International Relations Homegrown Theorizing Edited by Ersel Aydınlı and Gonca Biltekin 16 Western Dominance in International Relations? The Internationalisation of IR in Brazil and India Audrey Alejandro

Widening the World of International Relations Homegrown Theorizing

Edited by Ersel Aydınlı and Gonca Biltekin

First published 2018 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2018 selection and editorial matter, Ersel Aydınlı and Gonca Biltekin; individual chapters, the contributors The right of Ersel Aydınlı and Gonca Biltekin to be identified as the authors of the editorial matter, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record has been requested for this book ISBN: 978-1-138-57218-8 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-203-70223-9 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by Wearset Ltd, Boldon, Tyne and Wear

Contents



List of illustrations Notes on contributors Acknowledgments

  1 Introduction: widening the world of IR

vii viii xiii 1

E rse l A ydın l ı and G onca B i l tekin

PART I

Homegrown theorizing in perspective

13

  2 A typology of homegrown theorizing

15

E rse l A ydın l ı and G onca B i l tekin

  3 Would 100 global workshops on theory building make a difference?

41

K n u d E rik J ø rgensen

  4 Homegrown theorizing: knowledge, scholars, theory

59

D eni z   K u r u

PART II

Theorizing at “home”

81

  5 Iranian scholars and theorizing international relations: achievements and challenges

83

H omeira M oshir z adeh

  6 Chinese concepts and relational international politics E mi l ian K a v a l ski

104

vi   Contents   7 The genealogy of culturalist international relations in Japan and its implications for post-­Western discourse

123

K os u ke S himi z u

  8 Reshaping international relations: theoretical innovations from Africa

142

K aren  S mith

PART III

Innovative encounters

157

  9 Unpacking the “post-­Soviet”: political legacy of the Tartu semiotic school

159

A ndrey M akaryche v and A l exandra Y atsyk

10 Transcending hegemonic international relations theorization: nothingness, re-­worlding, and balance of relationship

177

C hih - ­y u   S hih

11 Conceptual cultivation and homegrown theorizing: the case of/for the concept of influence

204

E y ü p  E rsoy

12 Conclusion: toward a global discipline

226

E rse l A ydın l ı and G onca B i l tekin



Index

234

Illustrations

Figures   3.1 Variations of ‘Consensually Foundational Literature’ (CFL) over time 11.1 The nexus between Power I, Influence, and Power II 11.2 Transition mechanism from Power I to Influence to Power II

50 211 211

Tables   2.1 Number of citations to homegrown theories 10.1 The philosophy of place conditions of identity 11.1 Points of reference for Power I, Influence, and Power II

30 183 212

Contributors

Ersel Aydınlı is Professor in the Department of International Relations at Bilkent University in Ankara. He completed his Ph.D. at McGill University (Montreal), and a post-­doctorate at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government. He has taught at McGill, Middle East Technical (Ankara), and the George Washington University. His areas of research interest include International Relations (IR) theory, globalization and security, terrorism, and Turkish domestic and foreign politics. He has published in such journals as Foreign Affairs, Journal of Peace Research, Governance, Security Dialogue, Middle East Journal, International Studies Review, Review of International Studies, and International Studies Perspectives. He is the editor of Emerging Transnational (In)security Governance: A Statist Transnationalist Approach (Routledge, 2010) and the co-­editor (with James N. Rosenau) of Paradigms in Transition: Globalization, Security, and the Nation State (SUNY Press, 2005). His most recent book Violent Non-­State Actors: From Anarchists to Jihadists (2016) has been published by Routledge Studies on Challenges, Crises and Dissent in World Politics. Gonca Biltekin is Fulbright Postdoctoral Fellow at SUNY Binghamton. She received her Ph.D. from the Department of International Relations at Bilkent University in 2014. In her dissertation, she put forward a homegrown theorizing proposal based on empirical findings derived from an event dataset that she built. The dataset comprises of 22 years of Turkey’s foreign and domestic behavior by Turkey’s state and non-­state actors. After completing her studies at Bilkent, she has worked as a post-­doctoral researcher at Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research in Ankara as a Project Coordinator on Event Data Project on Quantifying Turkish Foreign Policy. Her research interests include Turkey’s foreign affairs, IR theory, civil-­military relations, homegrown theorizing, and methodology. She is the managing editor of the peer-­reviewed journal All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace, and has been published in New Perspectives on Turkey, and International Studies Perspectives. She also contributed to the Turkish language International Relations Theories (Iletisim, 2014) with a chapter titled “Homegrown Theorizing and Non-­Western International Relations Theory.”

Contributors   ix Eyüp Ersoy received his B.A., M.A., and Ph.D. from the Department of International Relations, Bilkent University in Ankara, Turkey and has studied Arabic at the University of Damascus. His research interests include power and influence in the theory and practice of IR, civil wars, and regional geopolitics, Middle Eastern politics, and Turkish foreign policy. His scholarly publications have appeared in national and international journals, including Turkish Studies and Middle East Policy. Knud Erik Jørgensen, after completing his undergraduate studies at the Faculty of Social Sciences/Aarhus University, completed M.A. and Ph.D. degrees at the same University in the Department of Political Science. He started his academic career as a Jean Monnet Fellow at the European University Institute (Florence, Italy) and continued his academic career as Assistant Professor at the University of Aarhus. In 1997 he was appointed Associate Professor and in 2007 he became a Professor at the University of Aarhus. He was a member of the Ph.D. select committee and the Student Affairs Council. He has also been a Jean Monnet Professor and a Visiting Professor at universities in Spain, Canada, and Belgium. He is currently on leave from Aarhus University and working as a full-­time Visiting Professor in the Department of International Relations, the Faculty of Human and Social Sciences at Yaşar University. Emilian Kavalski is the Li Dak Sum Chair Professor in China-­Eurasia Relations and International Studies at the University of Nottingham Ningbo (China), the Book Series Editor for Routledge’s “Rethinking Asia and International Relations” series, and Non-­Resident Research Fellow at the Center for Contemporary China Studies, National Chung Hsing University (Taiwan). He has held research positions at Aalborg University (Denmark), Academia Sinica (Taiwan), the Amer­ican Center for Indian Studies (India), the Institute for Social Justice at the Australian Catholic University (Sydney), Osaka University (Japan), the Rachel Carson Center (Germany), the Research Institute for the Humanities and Social Sciences at the National Taiwan University, Ruhr University-­Bochum (Germany), Western Sydney University (Australia), and the University of Alberta (Canada). His work explores the interconnections between the simultaneous decentring of IR by post-­Western perspectives and non-­anthropocentric approaches. He is the author of four books, most recently: The Guanxi of Relational International Theory (Routledge, 2018) and he is the editor of eleven volumes, including World Politics at the Edge of Chaos (State University of New York Press, 2016). Deniz Kuru is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the Turkish-­German University in Istanbul. His research relates to IR as a discipline, theories of IR, and different aspects of European politics. After graduating from the Faculty of Political Sciences-­Ankara, he was granted a Fulbright scholarship for Masters studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University in Washington, DC. Later, he

x   Contributors received his Ph.D. degree in Politics and International Relations from the University of Southern California in Los Angeles, completing his research on IR discipline in Europe. During this period, he was also supported by German Academic Exchange Service’s (DAAD) research grant and the Chateaubriand fellowship. He is also part of a network of young Turkish and European leaders from all sectors who come together once a year to engage in intensive dialogue and to share views and ideas about topical social issues. His work has been published in International Relations, Review of International Studies, and All Azimuth. Andrey Makarychev is Visiting Professor at the Johan Skytte Institute of Political Science, University of Tartu. He is also guest Professor at the Center for Global Politics, Free University in Berlin and Senior Associate with the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB) think tank in Barcelona. His previous institutional affiliations included George Mason University (US), the Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research (ETH Zurich), and the Danish Institute of International Studies. He teaches courses on Globalization, Regime Change in Post-­Soviet Eurasia, EU-­Russia Relations, Regionalism and Integration in the post-­Soviet Area, Media in Russia. In recent years he co-­authored two monographs—Celebrating Borderlands in a Wider Europe: Nations and Identities in Ukraine, Georgia and Estonia (Nomos, 2016), and Lotman’s Cultural Semiotics and the Political (Rowman and Littlefield, 2017). He co-­edited (all with Alexandra Yatsyk) a number of academic volumes—Mega Events in Post-­Soviet Eurasia: Shifting Borderlands of Inclusion and Exclusion (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), Vocabularies of International Relations after the Crisis in Ukraine (Routledge, 2017), and Borders in the Baltic Sea Region: Suturing the Ruptures (Palgrave Macmillan, 2017). Homeira Moshirzadeh is Associate Professor at the Department of International Relations, University of Tehran. She is currently Assistant Dean for International Affairs, Faculty of Law and Political Science, University of Tehran. Her main scholarly interests are IR theory, theories of social movements, and Women’s Studies. She has published many books in Persian, including Social Movements: A Theoretical Introduction (2001), From a Social Movement to a Social Theory: History of Feminism (Shirazeh, first edition published in 2002), An Introduction to Women’s Studies (Center for Social Planning and Cultural Studies , Ministry of Higher Education, 2004), Theoretical Developments in International Relations (Samt, first edition published in 2005), and Explaining and Analyzing Foreign Policy: Theoretical Foundations (Samt, 2018). She has edited/co-­edited the books Caspian Sea: An Overview (IICS, 2002), Dialogue of Civilizations (University of Tehran Press, 2005), and Conceptual Changes in International Relations (Strategic Studies Institute, 2010). She has translated some of the major IR texts into Persian, including Hans Morgenthau’s Politics among Nations and Alexander Wendt’s Social Theory of International Politics. Some of her articles have

Contributors   xi been published in English in Security Dialogue, International Political Sociology, and the Iranian Journal of International Affairs. Her articles on IR theories, dialogue of civilizations, cultural studies, and Women’s Studies have appeared in edited volumes in Persian and English. Chih-­yu Shih is currently teaching Anthropology of Knowledge and International Relations Theory at National Taiwan University. He is the author of many books, including most recently Post-­Western International Relations Reconsidered: The Premodern Politics of Gongsun Long (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), Harmonious Intervention: China’s Quest for Relational Security (Routledge, 2014), Sinicizing International Relations: Self, Civilization and Intellectual Politics in Subaltern East Asia (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), and Civilization, Nation and Modernity in East Asia (Routledge, 2012). Additionally he is Editor-­in-Chief of the journal Asian Ethnicity. He is MPP of Harvard University and Ph.D. of University of Denver. His current project on the intellectual history of China Studies is accessible at www.china-­studies. taipei/. Kosuke Shimizu is Professor of International Relations at the Department of Global Studies, and the Director of the Afrasian Research Centre, Ryukoku University, Kyoto. He is currently working on critical theories, and philosophy of the Kyoto School. His recent English publications include Multiculturalism and Conflict Reconciliation in the Asia Pacific: Migration, Language and Politics (co-­edited with William S. Bradley, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan) 2014, “Materialising the ‘Non-­Western’: Two Stories of Japanese Philosophers on Culture and Politics in the Inter-­war Period,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 28 (1), 2015, and “Reflection, the Public, and the Modern Machine: An Investigation of the Fukushima Disaster in Relation to the Concept of Truth and Morality,” Japanese Journal of Political Science, 18 (4), 2017. Karen Smith currently teaches in an M.A. International Relations program at the Institute for History at the University of Leiden in the Netherlands. Until January 2017, she was Associate Professor in the Political Studies Department at the University of Cape Town (UCT), and before joining UCT she worked at the Universities of Stellenbosch and the Western Cape, South Africa. She currently serves on the editorial boards of, among others, Foreign Policy Analysis and Review of International Studies. Over the past few years, she has been a Visiting Professor at Science Po Paris and the University of Vienna. Her current research focuses on South Africa’s foreign policy, and non-­Western, particularly African, contributions to IR (theory). As part of the latter, she is currently co-­editing an IR textbook for the Global South. Alexandra Yatsyk has a Ph.D. in Sociology and is currently the director for Center for Cultural Studies of Post-­Socialism Kazan Federal University (Russia). Her research interests are focused on the representations of the post-­ Soviet national identities, sporting, and cultural mega-­events, the Russian

xii   Contributors popular culture, protest art, and biopolitics. She co-­edited (all with Andrey Makarychev) a number of academic volumes—Mega Events in Post-­Soviet Eurasia: Shifting Borderlands of Inclusion and Exclusion (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), Vocabularies of International Relations after the Crisis in Ukraine (Routledge, 2017), and Borders in the Baltic Sea Region: Suturing the Ruptures (Palgrave Macmillan, 2017).

Acknowledgments

This volume is a collection of essays that originated from a 2016 international workshop held by the Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research (FPPR) in Ankara, entitled Widening the World of International Relations (IR) Theorizing. As a collaborative project involving contributors from around the world, this book is indebted to many individuals and institutions. Our gratitude goes foremost to the authors of these essays, for their diligent and innovative work and their cooperation in the preparation for this collection. A number of participants in the workshop, whose work does not appear in the volume, have also made important contributions to the project. In this regard, we owe thanks to Mustafa Aydin, Peter Marcus Kristensen, Siddharth Mallavarapu, Berk Esen, Haluk Ozdemir, Emre Baran, Ramazan Gozen, and Ching Chan Chen. This was the FPPR’s second workshop on this subject, in a series called the All Azimuth Workshops on Homegrown Theorizing. The name comes from the center’s flagship journal, All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace, whose purpose is the same as that of the workshops: to encourage independent conceptualization in the periphery and ease the wider dissemination of such scholarly efforts. As editors, we would like to extend our most sincere thanks to the Ihsan Dogramaci Peace Foundation and its FPPR, who provided the much sought-­after funding for such extensive collaborative efforts. We would be seriously remiss not to mention Ali Karaosmanoglu, the director, and affiliated researchers, Julie Mathews, Ozgur Ozdamar, Pinar Ipek, Seckin Kostem, and Gizem Kocver for their support in the organization of the conference as well as their valuable participation in the debate. Uluc Karakas and Cagla Kilic’s contributions were vital for the smooth running of the workshop. We would also like to acknowledge the assistance provided by Bilkent University, which enabled us to hold such a successful workshop. Arlene Tickner and other series editors have been very supportive of the project and instrumental in improving the quality of individual chapters. Finally, we would extend our thanks to our readers and the global community of IR scholars who seek to make IR a more inclusive and diversified discipline.

1 Introduction Widening the world of IR Ersel Aydınlı and Gonca Biltekin

There are few other disciplines that are more open to fundamental criticism, inter-­disciplinarity, and input from non-­academic sources1 than is International Relations (IR). Over the years, various debates, multiple paradigms, a number of new methods and forms of data, as well as the incorporation of input from other disciplines, have given IR a remarkable level of sophistication. This sophistication can best be seen in areas that have been studied the longest, such as inter-­ state relations, decision making processes, material capabilities, alliance patterns, democratic and capitalist peace, and war between major powers. Overall, IR scholars have become more self-­reflexive and more aware of the political implications of their work. Despite its long history of exclusively focusing on the major powers in the Western world, IR has also come quite a long way in taking non-­Western phenomena as an object of study as well. It has been ontologically “widened” as some formerly understudied—mostly non-­Western— phenomena have found their way into mainstream scholarship.2 IR’s inclusiveness, however, does not apply to International Relations Theory (IRT), which remains imperfect as a tool for understanding and explaining the newest and often more problematic parts of contemporary IR.3 Overwhelmed by an expanding ontology, IRT has failed to explain and foresee the most momentous international events of recent decades. Despite the ongoing efforts of IR scholars, one could argue that IR scholarship has never before been left this much behind the actual global affairs that it seeks to explain and is becoming increasingly irrelevant. Consider the surprise over the Iranian revolution, over the irrationality of suicide attacks after 9/11, or more recently, over ISIS’ efficiency. Being under-­theorized, such novel phenomena are approached using concepts usually alien to the context, and ultimately unhelpful in understanding or addressing the needs surrounding these issues.4 The incongruence is not limited to rationalist/positivist IRT,5 but extends to post-­positivist theories.6 Our supposedly revolutionary new concepts and approaches remain largely insufficient in explaining what happens globally and in offering lessons for improvement. This paucity cannot be attributed to lack of methodological rigor, a persistent deficiency in reflexivity, apathy toward the human condition outside the West, or a stubborn attachment to pre-­defined borders of IR as a discipline. IR has come a

2   Ersel Aydınlı and Gonca Biltekin long way in addressing all of the above issues. It is, beyond all, a “theory” problem, i.e., taking alternative meta-­theoretical positions or using more rigorous methods cannot fix the inefficiency of the theory to account for contemporary global affairs. It is a problem that can only be addressed by building more relevant theories. For theory to be relevant in accounting for contemporary IR, we argue, it should not only apply to, but also emanate from different corners of the current political universe. The main obstacle for IRT, then, is arguably the exclusion of the periphery from original theory production. A growing literature points to the conditions augmenting exclusion of the periphery from theory building processes.7 Despite the general agreement on the need and ongoing efforts to enrich IRT with periphery voices, there is a major divide in terms of how this can and should be done. There are many who suggest building directly on the richness of these periphery lands, their history, practices, and experiences.8 In International Relations Theory and the Third World, one of the earliest collection of works that deal with the incongruence between IRT and the non-­Western experience, Neuman explicitly refers to the fact that “theory has never quite been borne out by events in the Third World.”9 The authors in the volume focus on how Western theories are inadequate in accounting for the Third World events, and what alterations to these theories are needed to remedy this lack. Similarly, Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan introduce the reader to non-­Western traditions, literature and histories that might be relevant to IR in Non-­Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and beyond Asia. These works argue that a genuine attempt to widen the world of IRT requires periphery voices acquiring their theorizing agency first, and this can only be done if their experience can serve as a source for unique new theorizing efforts and perspectives. They look for knowledge and practice in non-­Western settings and assess their potential in offering alternative general frameworks of IR. Claiming the International edited by Tickner and Blaney, as well as Non-­ Western Approaches to International Relations, the fourth volume in Approaches to International Relations, edited by Chan and Moore,10 are works of this sort that usually dig deeper into local traditions and ideas. Many others, however, think otherwise and argue that the best way is to have periphery IR scholars tackle the primary questions of the core and try to modify, criticize, and improve upon existing theories. This second view is advocated by more positivist leaning scholars, since they see no fundamental difference between theorizing in the core and in the periphery, except in the social and material conditions of scholarship.11 Hence, their suggestion is to improve those conditions for the periphery scholar. While this last point has also been the concern of many others, it is, interestingly, also the route preferred by advocates of “post-­Western” theory, who share an “intuition that greater incorporation of knowledge produced by non-­Western scholars from local vantage points cannot make the discipline of IR more global or less Eurocentric.”12 They usually point to the role of underlying nationalistic ideology in bringing about distinctively “non-­Western” theories, and they argue that such endeavors only serve to recreate the relationship between the core and periphery.13 They warn against

Introduction: widening the world of IR   3 any project that is self-­admittedly “non-­Western” but emulates the dominant forms of thinking (including methodology) in the West.14 This conviction also emanates from a belief in the falseness of the West/non-­West dichotomy, hence the preference for the term “post-­western.” Social and material conditions of thinking, teaching, writing, publishing, and disseminating original ideas in the periphery are too fundamental for theoretical innovation to overlook. Yet, an exclusive focus on improving those conditions does not automatically generate veritable theories. First, submerging oneself within core concepts and debates and trying to work from within the system is not particularly viable for periphery theorists. It is extremely hard for the periphery scholar to find a spot for herself/himself within the core theory circles, requiring at minimum a fully Western post-­graduate education and training in Western methodologies and language. Socializing into this competitive environment requires imitation and utilization of those core ideas as reference points; for otherwise periphery scholars are regarded as less than competent. Therefore, for the voice of a periphery scholar to be heard in the core debates, whether to criticize or otherwise, they have be fully immersed within that community and forego any periphery perspective. Second, core theoretical debates are not generally open to empirical input from the periphery. Even when they are, the expectation for periphery-­inspired work is that it supports the core theories, rather than amends or corrects them. Thus periphery scholars become “social-­science socialized”15 producers of local data, who are expected to support mainstream theories, and operate as “native informants.”16 Becoming a “theorist” in the periphery may be seen as prestigious in the periphery, but it means risking “becoming nobody”17 in the global community. In the rare instances when a periphery scholar nevertheless attempts to “do theory,” their work is likely to be dismissed as not being “theory.”18 This attitude highlights the dichotomy between “theory” and “local” that is imposed on the periphery scholar. Under these conditions, integrating oneself with the global IRT degenerates into hiring new labor for the same task and the same purpose. Indeed, such a course of action sounds like a perfect recipe for the perpetuation of marginalization under the guise of pluralism, akin to the self-­ promotion of “ethnic food” or “world music” in contemporary Western societies. Moreover, empirical record of the integrationists is not very promising either. Attempts by a few very competent periphery scholars to take up the integrationist route have met with little success. For example, Ayoob19 actually tried to amend realist understandings of security by bringing in input from the Third World, but his ideas did not resonate globally. Similarly, Xuetong’s attempts to revise realism did not lead to substantial debate within the core.20 Such efforts have not managed to enrich “core” theory with widened perspectives. This volume has been borne out of the conviction that before trying to cram periphery feet in the core’s glass shoes, the discipline needs to see what those in the periphery themselves have to offer. Over time, we realized that refusing to wear the glass shoes, i.e., declaring that core concepts do not fit in the periphery,

4   Ersel Aydınlı and Gonca Biltekin was necessary but doing so does not itself provide a wearable, efficient pair of shoes. Diversity, dialogue, and innovation can only come about when periphery scholars do not just “meta-­theorize” but also “theorize.” Therefore, the increasing irrelevance of IRT needs to be addressed by a new form of theorizing, one which effectively blends peripheral outlooks with theory production. We call this form “homegrown theorizing,” i.e., original theorizing in the periphery about the periphery. It is with the above ideas in mind that we decided to organize a workshop on the topic of homegrown theorizing, which took place in September 23–24, 2016 at Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research (CFPPR) in Ankara. Turkey. The purpose of the workshop was to encourage independent conceptualization in the periphery and ease the wider dissemination of such scholarly efforts. In doing so, we aim to contribute to the dialogue between the “center” and the periphery, and help transcend the conventional theoretical, methodological, geographical, academic, and cultural barriers between the two. The goal of the workshop was to bring together scholars from different corners of the world to discuss:  • • •

structural factors that define the core-­periphery relationship and their effect on IR theorizing; original theorizing efforts from the periphery and their contribution to our understandings of contemporary international affairs; and ways and strategies of moving forward in overcoming the discrepancies between theorizing in the core and the periphery.

The current volume is the culmination of the above efforts and consists of ten chapters by a select group of scholars, organized into three parts. Considering the level of contestation on the subject, Part I “Homegrown theorizing in perspective” is dedicated to reviewing existing debates about the desirability and viability of non-­Western perspectives in IR. The first chapter by Aydınlı and Biltekin proposes and explicates the above definition of homegrown theorizing and offers an overall review of homegrown theorizing attempts so far. It also introduces a typology of homegrown theorizing that may prove useful in providing a guide for IR scholars on how to engage with homegrown theorizing in a more intellectually stimulating manner. The chapter concludes by highlighting a number of critical factors in opening up space for different voices in the world of IR. The second chapter by Jørgensen questions the basic assumptions about homegrown theorizing found in the literature and suggests institutionalization rather than theorizing as a move forward. It argues that a quantitative increase in the number of non-­Western theoretical perspectives may not be sufficient for overcoming the so-­called hegemonic structure of knowledge production. Hence, if a distinction between academic domestic and global markets is applied, theory building for a number of domestic or regional markets might impact “consumption” patterns in domestic or regional markets but not necessarily the world

Introduction: widening the world of IR   5 market. It also questions a second widespread assumption, i.e., that the IR theory is under Amer­ican hegemony. It argues that this assumption is severely challenged by empirical research showing that Amer­ican hegemony remains a fact in institutional terms but not in terms of theoretical fads and debates being followed in the rest of the world. Finally, it proposes that intellectual global hegemony is largely a chimera, and one should rather focus on alternative institutionalization in the discipline by way of organizing 100 workshops, specifically aimed at redefining the (contested) core of the discipline. In the third and final chapter of this part, Kuru draws lessons for homegrown theorizing relying on a review of the development of the discipline in the West, and warns against some of the traps that theorizing attempts may fall into. Acknowledging a homegrown turn that is currently taking place, Kuru deconstructs the idea of homegrown theorizing by focusing on its constitutive parts, i.e., knowledge, scholar, and theory, while also questioning the differing meanings of homegrownness. Engaging with the pitfalls of Western IR and elaborating on their reasons, the chapter not only explains the emergence of the homegrown turn, but also provides the basis for understanding how scholars doing homegrown theorizing can learn from the (past) mistakes of core scholarship. Dealing with the impact of globalization, Eurocentrism, presentism, and parochialism as main problem areas of (Western) IR, the chapter concludes by providing a list of lessons to be taken into account when doing homegrown theorizing in the periphery. The second part of the book, “Theorizing at ‘home’ ” is composed of four chapters defining the status of IR theorizing in Iran, Japan, China, and South Africa. The underlying point of departure is to reveal the challenges and potentials of the local disciplines in these countries and call for specific agendas that built on the indigenous traditions. In Chapter 4, Moshirzadeh traces the development of Iranian IR where social scientists, including IR scholars, have been called on to develop endogenous/indigenous theories to reflect Iranian/Islamic points of view ever since the emergence of the Islamic Republic in Iran. While this has led some Iranian scholars to develop ideas about international life on the basis of Islamic texts and teachings, the recent changes in core’s level of openness to non-­Western voices has rejuvenated such attempts. Based on an evaluation of the structural context, Moshirzadeh suggests that even if theorizing IR from an Iranian point of view is both possible and preferable, there are considerable structural constraints to be surmounted. In Chapter 6, Kavalski undertakes a similar interpretative journey of China’s IR concepts and looks at the notion of guanxi—one of the two terms that goes into the Chinese phrase for IR (guoji guanxi). He contends that “relationality” renders a more accurate translation of guanxi in English than “relations” and uncovers the practices of “international relationality” as an opportunity to redefine the “international” in the process. He argues that “international” is a co-­ dependent space where two or more actors (despite their divergences) can interface into a dialogical community. In doing so, he illustrates how Chinese concepts can inform a novel take on the “international.”

6   Ersel Aydınlı and Gonca Biltekin In Chapter 7, Shimizu focuses on the tradition of partly neglected culturalist methodology in Japanese IR, which might have great potential to contribute to contemporary post-­Western IRT literature by posing radical questions about the ontology of IR. The chapter starts with genealogical descriptions of the culturalist IRT and its relationship to the mainstream Japanese IR discourses. It then focuses on a particular approach to diplomatic history developed by Iriye Akira, which attempts to historicize Japanese foreign policy by concentrating on cultural relations among nations. Second, it examines the international cultural relations approach developed by Kenichiro Hirano, which is an even more radical departure from the traditional diplomatic history tradition. Finally, he introduces Takeshi Hamashita’s ideas on East Asian history. The chapter concludes by an assessment of the contribution these three perspectives might make to contemporary IRT. Finally, in Chapter 8, Smith argues that homegrown conceptualizations do not need to be radically different from existing theories to constitute advancement in terms of better understanding IR. In a vein similar to what Aydınlı and Biltekin call “alterative homegrown theories,” Smith suggests that reinterpretations or modifications of existing frameworks is an accepted practice in mainstream IR, where existing theories are constantly amended and revisited. While adaptations by Western scholars are recognized as legitimate and adopted into the canon of theory, this is not always the case with adaptations emerging from outside of the West. This chapter examines three examples of contributions by African scholars. The first scholar, Eduard Jordaan, reinterpreted the concept of “middle power,” arguing that there are specific characteristics that set emerging middle powers like South Africa apart from traditional middle powers. The second, Deon Geldenhuys, developed the concept “isolated states” and generated a novel analytical framework to categorize states based on indicators of isolation. Finally, Smith introduces Thomas Tieku, who draws on the African worldview of ubuntu in calling for the state to be reconceptualized in a collectivist, societal way. She argues that these examples illustrate that there are indeed theoretical innovations emerging from the Global South that are generalizable at the global level. The third and the final part of the volume, “Innovative encounters” brings together three attempts at original homegrown theorizing, which may potentially be applicable to cases other than they emerge from. Attempting at actual concept production, each chapter in this part, puts forward new concepts and/or novel interactions between those concepts by looking at IR in the periphery. In Chapter 9, Makarychev and Yatsyk sketch out a general approach to using cultural semiotics as a cognitive tool for analyzing IR in general and in the post-­Soviet area in particular. The authors discuss how the homegrown school of cultural semiotics, associated with the University of Tartu, can be used to discern patterns in thinking and speech, which can then be relevant to improving the extant IR theoretical platforms such as constructivism and post-­structuralism. To do so, they embark on a mission to “translate” insights from cultural semiotics into the ­language of IR. In other words, they place cultural semiotic knowledge in a

Introduction: widening the world of IR   7 multidisciplinary perspective and look for projections of its concepts into the vocabulary of foreign policy. Ultimately, they use cultural semiotic notions and approaches for problematizing the concept of the post-­Soviet with its conflictual split between reproducing archaic policies and discourses, on the one hand, and playing by the rules of the post-­modern society, on the other. In particular, they show how cultural semiotics might be helpful in explaining Putin’s discursive strategy, i.e., appropriating meaningful semiotic resources and deploying them in discursive contexts in order to delegitimize the kernel of the Western normative order. In Chapter 10, Shih compares three distinct schools of thought, the World History Standpoint promoted by the Kyoto School of Philosophy, post-­Western re-­worlding, and the Chinese balance of relationships—in their shared campaign for alternative IRT and apply their insights to explain foreign policies of Japan, Taiwan, and China with regards to contestation over Senkaku/Diaoyu/Diaoyutai islands. The World History Standpoint explains how nations influenced by major power politics judge their conditions and rely on combining existing cultural resources to make sense of their place in world politics. It specifically predicts that nations caught between different identities will experience cycles in their IR, nations with an expansive scope of IR or declining from the hegemonic status will adopt balance of relationships, and less influential nations will practically reinterpret hegemonic order to meet their otherwise inexpressible motivations. Accordingly, Japan will be focused upon as an exemplary case for World History Standpoint, Taiwan for re-­worlding, and China for balance of relationships. The chapter touches upon theoretical implications of their conflicts. In Chapter 11, Ersoy engages in what he calls “conceptual cultivation” of “influence.” Warning against an analytical tendency to link a particular set of international phenomena observable in non-­Western contexts with a particular native concept, which sometimes forges an exclusive and immutable semantic affiliation between the concept and what it signifies, he argues that such conceptual exclusivity can culminate in prohibitive semantic inflexibility potentially frustrating the progress in homegrown theorizing. Rather than relying on indigenous concepts, like Kavalski or Shih did, he focuses on influence as a ubiquitous word that is yet to be rigorously conceptualized, and a phenomenon in international politics that is yet to be extensively theorized. Finding such a gap, he puts forward a definition for influence and specifications for its different dimensions. In the concluding chapter, Aydınlı and Biltekin readdress the contested nature of homegrown theorizing and argue that such contestation can prove to be valuable compared to its alternative, a malignant silence and disinterest. Despite the doubts about homegrown theorizing, especially the misgivings related to its divisive and reactionary potential, they suggest that a true widening of IR can only happen if the peripheral subject reappropriates the authority to represent oneself openly. Removing references to “the local,” “the indigenous,” “the non-­ Western,” and “the homegrown” when describing any style of theorizing may be helpful in camouflaging and finding a place in the core, but they argue that there are a few reasons to keep those references.

8   Ersel Aydınlı and Gonca Biltekin We hope the current volume would be of help to those IR scholars, students, and practitioners who would like to have wider perspective in not only understanding but also explaining the world. It not only continues the discussion on non-­Western perspectives at the meta-­theoretical level (“do we really need homegrown theories?”), or at the very pragmatic level (“what should we do?”), but also offers new conceptual tools to apply to the cases at hand. It is not inconceivable to see, for example, a Ph.D. student writing her dissertation on Turkish foreign policy, using Makarychev and Yatskyk’s proposed framework, or explain cycles in Iranian foreign policy using Shih’s nothingness framework on societies with torn identities. This expectation is supported by an emerging interest in non-­Western conceptualizations of IR among graduate programs in universities.21 The calls for “deparochialization” of political thought has been going on for some time, and the Amer­ican Political Science Association (APSA) has offered courses and sessions on how to enrich political theory syllabi with “non-­Western” content. Similarly, International Studies Association (ISA) Annual congresses have several sessions on non-­Western IR. Combined with increasingly vibrant IR communities in Asia, Latin America, and Africa, it is only reasonable to expect the call for a more inclusive IR to gain prominence.

Notes   1 Haluk Ozdemir, “An Inter-­Subsystemic Approach in International Relations,” All Azimuth 4, no. 1 (2015): 5–26.   2 See for example; Stephanie G. Neuman, International Relations Theory and the Third World (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998); Arlene Tickner, “Seeing IR Differently: Notes from the Third World,” Millennium—Journal of International Studies 32, no. 2 (2003): 295–324; Arlene B. Tickner and Ole Wæver, International Relations Scholarship Around the World (Oxford: Routledge, 2009); Mohammed Ayoob, “Security in the Third World: The Worm About to Turn,” International Affairs 60, no. 1 (1984): 41–51; Bahgat Korany, “Strategic Studies and the Third World: A Critical Appraisal,” International Social Science Journal 38, no. 4 (1986): 547–62; Edward Azar and Chung-­in Moon, “Third World National Security: Towards a New Conceptual Framework,” International Interactions 11, no. 2 (1984): 103–35; Barry Buzan, “The Concept of National Security for Developing Countries with Special Reference to Southeast Asia” (paper presented at the Workshop on Leadership and Security in Southeast Asia, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, December, 10–12, 1987); Barry Buzan, “People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in the Third World,” in National Security in the Third World, ed. Chung-in Moon and Edward Azar (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1988), 14–43; Caroline Thomas, In Search of Security: The Third World in International Relations (Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books, 1987); Yezid Sayigh, “Confronting the 1990s: Security in the Developing Countries,” Adelphi Papers 30, no. 251 (1990): 3–7.   3 Steve Smith, “Six Wishes for a More Relevant Discipline of International Relations,” in The Oxford Handbook of International Relations, ed. Christian Reus-­Smit and Duncan Snidal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 725–32; Thomas G. Weiss and Rorden Wilkinson, “Global Governance to the Rescue: Saving International Relations?” Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations 20, no. 1 (2014): 25.   4 For example, concepts like “small wars” or “proxy wars” are inadequate in terms of representing the experiences of people who actually fought them (Barry Buzan and

Introduction: widening the world of IR   9 Richard Little, International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Tarak Barkawi, “On the Pedagogy of ‘Small Wars’,” International Affairs 80, no. 1 (2004): 19–38). “Failed states” or “rogue states” do not fare better (Mohammed Ayoob, “Defining Security: A Subaltern Realist Perspective,” in Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Strategies, ed. K. Krause and MC Williams (London: UCL Press, 1997), 121–48; Pınar Bilgin and David Morton, “Historicising Representations of ‘Failed States’: Beyond the Cold-­War Annexation of the Social Sciences?” Third World Quarterly 23, no. 1 (2002): 55–80; Pınar Bilgin and David Morton, “From ‘Rogue’ to ‘Failed’ States? The Fallacy of Short-­Termism,” Politics 24, no. 3 (2004): 169–80.   5 Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, “Why Is There No Non-­Western International Relations Theory? An Introduction,” International Relations of the Asia Pacific 7, no. 3 (August 7, 2007): 287–312, doi:https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcm012.   6 Krishina Sankaran, “The Importance of Being Ironic: A Postcolonial View on Critical International Relations Theory,” Alternatives 18, no. 3 (1993): 388; Arlene Tickner, “Seeing IR Differently: Notes from the Third World,” 324; Claire Wilkinson, “The Copenhagen School on Tour in Kyrgyzstan: Is Securitization Theory Useable Outside Europe?” Security Dialogue 38, no. 1 (2007): 5.   7 See for example Michael Wesley, “Australia’s International Relations and the (IR) relevance of Theory,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 55, no. 3 (2001): 453–67; Emilian Kavalski, “Recognizing Chinese International Relations Theory,” in Asian Thought on China’s Changing International Relations, ed. Niv Horesh and Emilian Kavalski (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 230–48; Arlene B. Tickner and David L. Blaney, Claiming the International (London and New York: Routledge, 2013); Tickner and Wæver, International Relations; Arlene B. Tickner and David L. Blaney, Thinking International Relations Differently (New York: Routledge, 2013); Peter Drulák, “Introduction to the International Relations (IR) in Central and Eastern Europe Forum,” Journal of International Relations and Development 12, no. 2 (2009): 168–73.   8 See for example the two most recent presidential speeches in ISA (T. V. Paul, “Recasting Statecraft: International Relations and Strategies of Peaceful Change,” International Studies Quarterly 61, no. 1, (2017): 1–13; Amitav Acharya, “Global International Relations (IR) and Regional Worlds: A New Agenda for International Studies,” International Studies Quarterly 58, no. 4 (2014): 647–59) which are about opening up IRT, the establishment of groups (Global IR Caucus) and journals that specifically seek to bring in more outside-­of-the-­core voices.   9 Neuman, International Relations Theory and the Third World. 10 Stephen Chan and Cerwyn Moore, eds., Approaches to International Relations. Four-­ Volume set. (London: Sage Publications, 2009). 11 Song Xinning, “Building International Relations Theory with Chinese Characteristics,” Journal of Contemporary China 10, no. 26 (2001): 61–74; Benjamin Creutzfeldt, “Theory Talk# 51: Yan Xuetong on Chinese Realism, the Tsinghua School of International Relations, and the Impossibility of Harmony,” Theory Talks, November 28, 2012, www.theory-­talks.org/2012/11/theory-­talk-51.html; David Shambaugh, “International Relations Studies in China: History, Trends, and Prospects,” International Relations of the Asia-­Pacific 11, no. 3 (2011): 365. 12 Gennaro Ascione and Deepshikha Shahi, “Rethinking the Absence of Post-­Western International Relations Theory in India: ‘Advaitic Monism’ as an Alternative Epistemological Resource,” European Journal of International Relations 22, no. 2 (2016): 313–34. 13 Young Chul Cho, “Colonialism and Imperialism in the Quest for a Universalist Korean-­Style International Relations Theory,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 28, no. 4 (2015): 680–700; Ching-­Chang Chen, “The Impossibility of Building Indigenous Theories in a Hegemonic Discipline: The Case of Japanese International

10   Ersel Aydınlı and Gonca Biltekin Relations,” Asian Perspective 36, no. 3 (2012): 463–92; Jeremy T. Paltiel, “Constructing Global Order with Chinese Characteristics: Yan Xuetong and the Pre-­Qin Response to International Anarchy,” The Chinese Journal of International Politics 4, no. 4 (2011): 375–403; Andrei P. Tsygankov and Pavel A. Tsygankov, “National Ideology and IR Theory: Three Incarnations of the ‘Russian Idea’, ” European Journal of International Relations 16, no. 4 (2010): 663–86. 14 Giorgio Shani, “Toward a Post-­Western IR: The Umma, Khalsa Panth, and Critical International Relations Theory,” International Studies Review 10, no. 4 (2008): 722–34; Bilgin, “Thinking Past ‘Western’ IR?.” 15 Bilgin, “Thinking Past ‘Western’ IR?.” 16 Peter Marcus Kristensen, “How Can Emerging Powers Speak? On Theorists, Native Informants and Quasi-­Officials in International Relations Discourse,” Third World Quarterly 36, no. 4 (2015): 637–53. 17 Julie Mathews and Ersel Aydınlı, “Are the Core and Periphery Irreconcilable? The Curious World of Publishing in Contemporary International Relations,” International Studies Perspectives 1, no. 3 (2000): 298. 18 Robert M. A. Crawford, “Where Have All the Theorists Gone—Gone to Britain? Everyone? A Story of Two Parochialisms in International Relations,” in International Relations—Still an Amer­ican Social Science? Toward Diversity in International Thought, ed. Robert M.A. Crawford and Darryl S.L. Jarvis (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001), 221–42; Pınar Bilgin and Oktay F. Tanrisever, “A Telling Story of IR in the Periphery: Telling Turkey about the World, Telling the World About Turkey,” Journal of International Relations and Development 12, no. 2 (2009): 174–9. 19 Ayoob, “Defining Security.” 20 Linsay Cunningham-­Cross, “Using the Past to (Re)Write the Future: Yan Xuetong, Pre-­Qin Thought and China’s Rise to Power,” China Information 26, no. 2 (2012): 219–33; Paltiel, “Constructing Global Xuetong.” 21 See for example, Ingo Peters and Wiebke Wemheuer-­Vogelaar’s graduate seminar on “Non-­Western Contributions to International Relations Scholarship” at the Frei Universitat Berlin (Syllabus available at www.isa-­theory.org/wp-­content/uploads/2016/11/Syllabus_NonWesternIRT_WemheuerVogelaar-­Peters_FreieUniversitaetBerlin_Winterterm 2012.pdf ), or the College of William and Mary (www.wm.edu/offices/itpir/_documents/ trip/syllabus-­ir-a-­global-discipline-­wemheuer-vogelaar.pdf ). Moreover, some scholars have begun to include a section on non-­Western theories in graduate International Relations Theory courses, such as the graduate seminar on International Public Policy at Syracuse University (http://faculty.maxwell.syr.edu/jbennett/645s09/silly645.html).

Bibliography Acharya, Amitav. “Global International Relations (IR) and Regional Worlds: A New Agenda for International Studies,” International Studies Quarterly 58, no. 4 (2014): 647–59. Acharya, Amitav, and Barry Buzan, eds. “Why Is There No Non-­Western International Relations Theory? An Introduction.” International Relations of the Asia Pacific 7, no. 3 (August 7, 2007): 287–312. doi:https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcm012. Acharya, Amitav, and Barry Buzan, eds. Non-­Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and Beyond Asia. Abingdon: Routledge, 2009. Ascione, Gennaro, and Deepshikha Shahi. “Rethinking the Absence of Post-­Western International Relations Theory in India: ‘Advaitic Monism’ as an Alternative Epistemological Resource.” European Journal of International Relations 22, no. 2 (2016): 313–34. Ayoob, Mohammed. “Security in the Third World: The Worm About to Turn.” International Affairs 60, no. 1 (1984): 41–51.

Introduction: widening the world of IR   11 Ayoob, Mohammed. “Defining Security: A Subaltern Realist Perspective.” In Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Strategies, edited by Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, 121–48. London: UCL Press, 1997. Azar, Edward, and Chung-­in Moon. “Third World National Security: Towards a New Conceptual Framework.” International Interactions 11, no. 2 (1984): 103–35. Barkawi, Tarak. “On the Pedagogy of ‘Small Wars.’ ” International Affairs 80, no. 1 (2004): 19–38. Bilgin, Pınar, and David Morton. “Historicising Representations of ‘Failed States’: Beyond the Cold-­War Annexation of the Social Sciences?” Third World Quarterly 23, no. 1 (2002): 55–80. Bilgin, Pınar, and David Morton. “From ‘Rogue’ to ‘Failed’ States? The Fallacy of Short-­ Termism.” Politics 24, no. 3 (2004): 169–80. Bilgin, Pınar, and Oktay F. Tanrisever. “A Telling Story of IR in the Periphery: Telling Turkey about the World, Telling the World About Turkey.” Journal of International Relations and Development 12, no. 2 (2009): 174–9. Buzan, Barry. “The Concept of National Security for Developing Countries with Special Reference to Southeast Asia.” Paper presented at the Workshop on Leadership and Security in Southeast Asia, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, December, 10–12, 1987. Buzan, Barry. “People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in the Third World.” In National Security in the Third World, edited by Chung-­in Moon and Edward Azar, 14–43. Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1988. Buzan, Barry, and Richard Little. International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of International Relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. Chan, Stephen, and Cerwyn Moore, eds. Approaches to International Relations. Four-­ Volume set. London: Sage Publications, 2009. Chen, Ching-­Chang. “The Impossibility of Building Indigenous Theories in a Hegemonic Discipline: The Case of Japanese International Relations.” Asian Perspective 36, no. 3 (2012): 463–92. Cho, Young Chul. “Colonialism and Imperialism in the Quest for a Universalist Korean-­ Style International Relations Theory.” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 28, no. 4 (2015): 680–700. Crawford, Robert M.A. “Where Have All the Theorists Gone—Gone to Britain? Everyone? A Story of Two Parochialisms in International Relations.” In International Relations—Still an Amer­ican Social Science? Toward Diversity in International Thought, edited by Robert M.A. Crawford and Darryl S.L. Jarvis, 221–42. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001. Creutzfeldt, Benjamin. “Theory Talk# 51: Yan Xuetong on Chinese Realism, the Tsinghua School of International Relations, and the Impossibility of Harmony,” Theory Talks, November 28, 2012. www.theory-­talks.org/2012/11/theory-­talk-51.html. Cunningham-­Cross, Linsay. “Using the Past to (Re)Write the Future: Yan Xuetong, Pre-­ Qin Thought and China’s Rise to Power.” China Information 26, no. 2 (2012): 219–33. Drulák, Peter. “Introduction to the International Relations (IR) in Central and Eastern Europe Forum.” Journal of International Relations and Development 12, no. 2 (2009): 168–73. Kavalski, Emilian. “Recognizing Chinese International Relations Theory.” In Asian Thought on China’s Changing International Relations, edited by Niv Horesh and Emilian Kavalski, 230–48. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. Korany, Bahgat. “Strategic Studies and the Third World: A Critical Appraisal.” International Social Science Journal 38, no. 4 (1986): 547–62.

12   Ersel Aydınlı and Gonca Biltekin Kristensen, Peter Marcus. “How Can Emerging Powers Speak? On Theorists, Native Informants and Quasi-­Officials in International Relations Discourse.” Third World Quarterly 36, no. 4 (2015): 637–53. Mathews, Julie, and Ersel Aydınlı. “Are the Core and Periphery Irreconcilable? The Curious World of Publishing in Contemporary International Relations.” International Studies Perspectives 1, no. 3 (2000): 289–303. Neuman, Stephanie G. International Relations Theory and the Third World. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998. Ozdemir, Haluk. “An Inter-­Subsystemic Approach in International Relations.” All Azimuth 4, no. 1 (2015): 5–26. Paltiel, Jeremy T. “Constructing Global Order with Chinese Characteristics: Yan Xuetong and the Pre-­Qin Response to International Anarchy.” The Chinese Journal of International Politics 4, no. 4 (2011): 375–403. Paul, T. V. “Recasting Statecraft: International Relations and Strategies of Peaceful Change,” International Studies Quarterly 61, no. 1, (2017): 1–13. Sankaran, Krishina. “The Importance of Being Ironic: A Postcolonial View on Critical International Relations Theory.” Alternatives 18, no. 3 (1993): 385–417. Sayigh, Yezid. “Confronting the 1990s: Security in the Developing Countries.” Adelphi Papers 30, no. 251 (1990): 3–7. Shambaugh, David. “International Relations Studies in China: History, Trends, and Prospects.” International Relations of the Asia-­Pacific 11, no. 3 (2011): 339–72. Shani, Giorgio. “Toward a Post-­Western IR: The Umma, Khalsa Panth, and Critical International Relations Theory.” International Studies Review 10, no. 4 (2008): 722–34. Smith, Steve. “Six Wishes for a More Relevant Discipline of International Relations.” In The Oxford Handbook of International Relations, edited by Christian Reus-­Smit and Duncan Snidal, 725–32. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. Thomas, Caroline. In Search of Security: The Third World in International Relations. Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books, 1987. Tickner, Arlene B. “Seeing IR Differently: Notes from the Third World.” Millennium— Journal of International Studies 32, no. 2 (2003): 295–324. Tickner, Arlene B., and David L. Blaney. Claiming the International. London and New York: Routledge, 2013. Tickner, Arlene B., and David L. Blaney. Thinking International Relations Differently. New York: Routledge, 2013. Tickner, Arlene B., and Ole Wæver. International Relations Scholarship Around the World. Oxford: Routledge, 2009. Tsygankov, Andrei P., and Pavel A. Tsygankov. “National Ideology and IR Theory: Three Incarnations of the ‘Russian Idea.’ ” European Journal of International Relations 16, no. 4 (2010): 663–86. Weiss, Thomas G., and Rorden Wilkinson. “Global Governance to the Rescue: Saving International Relations?” Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations 20, no. 1 (2014): 19–36. Wesley, Michael. “Australia’s International Relations and the (IR)relevance of Theory.” Australian Journal of International Affairs 55, no. 3 (2001): 453–67. Wilkinson, Claire. “The Copenhagen School on Tour in Kyrgyzstan: Is Securitization Theory Useable Outside Europe?” Security Dialogue 38, no. 1 (2007): 5–25. Xinning, Song. “Building International Relations Theory with Chinese Characteristics.” Journal of Contemporary China 10, no. 26 (2001): 61–74.

Part I

Homegrown theorizing in perspective

2 A typology of homegrown theorizing Ersel Aydınlı and Gonca Biltekin

Introduction It is rare that a recognized voice from the non-­Western world makes an impression in International Relations Theory (IRT). The reasons range from peripheral conditions and attitudes such as skepticism/indifference toward social sciences in general and theory in particular,1 or lack of resources and institutional support,2 to the global “hegemonic status of Western IRT that discourages theoretical formulations by others.”3 It is established that the global hegemonic structure of the discipline pushes periphery scholars to be consumers of theory, rather than producers of it.4 In addition to the structural and institutional constraints that contribute to such lack of recognition, a major part of the problem stems from the confusion and contestation around what theorizing out of the non-­ Western world actually is and/or should be. The majority of the debate on the desirability and feasibility of non-­Western theorizing consists of statements of methodological and epistemological preferences, and it seems that without clear definitions of what we mean by homegrown theory and criteria for assessing its merits, we are effectively held captive forever in a meta-­theoretical deadlock. In this chapter, we address this problem by proposing a definition of what homegrown theory consists of based on a review of studies that embody indigenous conceptualizations of international phenomena in the periphery. Then, we provide a typology of homegrown theories by elaborating on these conceptualizations’ specific ways of engaging with “the West” and “the non-­West” as well as the methods the employ in building theories. We also assess each type of home­ grown theory in terms of its potential for global acceptance and further development. We rely on a comparison of the citation counts of 18 homegrown theories to substantiate our arguments on global acceptance. In doing so, we hopefully highlight some of the most interesting theory building efforts stemming from the periphery, and provide both Western and non-­Western scholars a guide on how to engage with homegrown theorizing in a more intellectually stimulating manner. The chapter concludes by highlighting a number of critical factors in opening up space for different voices in the world of International Relations (IR). We define “homegrown theorizing,” as original theorizing in the periphery about the periphery. We deal with them in more detail in the next section, but

16   Ersel Aydınlı and Gonca Biltekin can summarize our criteria as follows. First, for any idea/approach/perspective to be considered as theory it should propose a relationship between at least two concepts. This is a methodologically neutral definition acceptable by both positivists and post-­positivists, even though they disagree on the nature of the relationship: for positivists it must be causal, for post-­positivists it is constitutive, at best. Second, for any theory to be original at least one of these concepts must be either novel or redefined. While suggestions for new methods to operationalize extant concepts are also inventive, they remain in the purview of the original theory, and as such do not warrant substantial revision. Finally, for any original theory to be homegrown, it should be based on indigenous ideas and/or practices. While IR’s disciplinary culture values scholarly work that fulfills the originality criteria, it is oblivious to the diversity that might be achieved by fulfilling the third one. Two caveats are in order. First, when labeling something as “homegrown” we are not concerned with the ethnic/national identity of the author, rather, with various aspects of how the non-­core experience is drawn on and conceptualized. Second, we prefer to use “periphery” over “non-­Western” despite the ambiguous meaning of “periphery” because it inherently evokes the subaltern agency in a hegemonic relationship. So the criteria we propose can be used with respect to theorizing anywhere that has been considered as peripheral in some respect. For example, it can be applied to IRT in Western Europe—considered peripheral in comparison with the US,5 but part of the core in comparison to elsewhere.6 Nonetheless, here in this chapter we focus on homegrown theorizing from outside of both North America or Western Europe, as that is what is generally seen as underdeveloped or even non-­existent, mostly under-­recognized, yet increasingly important. A typology of homegrown theories based on the differences in their production serves three purposes. First, it makes dealing with homegrown theories a more systematic endeavor by providing a guide for recognizing original theory building in the periphery—not necessarily an easy endeavor for a phenomenon that is considered “hidden”7 or “unrecognizable.”8 Most of the extant reviews of theorizing outside of the core currently rely on geo-­cultural categorizations, such as “Chinese”9 or “Japanese”10 IRT or independent theorizing in “emerging powers,”11 or in a specific country.12 These geo-­cultural categorizations may be helpful from a “sociology of the discipline” perspective but are inadequate in identifying the most valuable efforts to theorize IR stemming from outside the US/Europe. For example, “pure theory” in the periphery refers to discussions about mainstream theories and may not translate into original theorizing. An article on game theory and rational choice that is written by a Chinese scholar may be original but “bear no traces whatsoever of ‘local theorizing’.”13 However, by defining what is actually “homegrown” in any theory, and categorizing theories accordingly, we can explain just how original and homegrown theorizing is. Focusing on the homegrownness of the idea, rather than on the background of the theorist, we identify degrees of being original as well as identifying the elements of a theory that can be original, adapted, or borrowed. By contrast, saying

A typology of homegrown theorizing   17 only that a particular theory is “hybrid”14 tells us little about in what ways it is the same as or different from mainstream theory. The second purpose of having a typology of homegrown theories is to reveal that different forms of original theory building are not only possible,15 but have already taken place. By offering a typology, we aim to move beyond general categorizations of approaches to homegrown theorizing—such as “particularism,” “provincialization,”16 or “denationalization”17—to suggesting specific methods for building homegrown theories. Our third purpose is to identify the prospects and challenges associated with different types of homegrown theories in terms of their potential for recognition.18 To do this, we collected a sample of 18 works (six books, nine journal articles, and three book chapters) that we identified as examples of homegrown theory based on the above criteria, and obtained their citation scores through the Web of Science, Cited Reference Search to assess their level of global recognition.19 The sample was established using a form of chain-­referral technique, i.e., going through reference lists of works on the state of IR in different parts of the world20 and then checking individual studies to see whether they fit our criteria. The sample is by no means exhaustive but heuristically valuable. On average, the works in our sample are cited 12.4 times in the first 5-year period after publication. The highest record is Cardoso and Faletto’s Dependency and Development in Latin America,21 which had 91 citations in the first 5 years. Comparing this to 5-year citation scores of, for example, Alexander Wendt’s Social Theory of International Politics22 or Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of International Politics,23 it might appear that homegrown theories do not fare too badly. However, there is very wide discrepancy within our sample, since four of the homegrown theories we found were not cited at all within the first 5-year period and all but two of the others received fewer than 15 citations over 5 years. Such lack of recognition is a major impediment for theoretical enrichment of the discipline. An emergent theory should be applied, and confirmed or disconfirmed by other researchers, so that it undergoes continuous refinement and development. This makes theory building a collective exercise. Without recognition, the development of any emergent theory is hindered. The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section introduces the proposed definition of homegrown theory and puts forward a typology. The subsequent three sections assess each type’s potential for global acceptance and further development by relying on an analysis of citations they receive. We then conclude by considering a number of critical factors in opening up space for different voices in the world of IR.

What is homegrown theory? What distinguishes homegrown theories from mainstream theories is their origination from a geo-­cultural standpoint, whether this be at the stage of concept formation or at the stage of inference. This standpoint however, marks the background of the ideas, not the theorists: national conceptualizations of IR are not

18   Ersel Aydınlı and Gonca Biltekin the same as indigenous conceptualizations of IR. The national identity of a group of closely collaborating non-­Western scholars, or research by non-­Westerners, is sometimes related to, but not the same as the identity of the “theory.” Phrases such as “Chinese School,” “Indian School,” or “Russian School,” cannot constitute homegrown theories in their own right if they refer exclusively to the community of scholars who work or live in these countries or are of these nationalities. It is only if such labels refer to those works which rely on practices, customs, and phrases distinctively prevalent among the respective societies that they become homegrown theories. An example is the English School, which does not refer to English-­born scholars, but to the approach characterized by Britain’s experience and diplomatic practice, or the Copenhagen School, which does not comprise only Danish IR scholars, or those affiliated with the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, but rather is made up of those sharing a philosophical and a normative concern on limiting state monopoly on defining security. A crucial step then is to identify where to look for the identity of theory.24 There are basically two places to look for a theory’s “homegrownness”: the concepts can be homegrown, if they were specifically built by relying on a geo-­ culturally specific standpoint (whether it be a culture, civilization, religion, customs, or traditions); and/or the theory can be inferentially homegrown, if the data used in the inference come from observation of geo-­culturally specific phenomena, provided that such data are used for building or altering theories, not for testing them. Theorists either build on a local philosophical standpoint in their production of novel concepts and/or particularly draw their data from the part of the world they experience to invent new concepts or alter existing ones. From these distinctions, three groups of theories emerge. Some scholars build on works by local thinkers, writers, or scholars from different disciplines, and use their concepts with an IR outlook. Since most of them have indigenous intellectual and/or philosophical approaches as their starting point, we call them referential homegrown theories. A second group of scholars transform mainstream Western ideas or concepts in such a manner that they reflect indigenous meanings attached to them by particular societies. These can be called homegrown alterations, with the level and type of alteration differing from one theory to another. Finally, some theorists develop original concepts out of geo-­culturally specific experience and commonly used idioms of daily life, and use them in an IRT framework. Since they do not borrow from any pre-­existing conceptualization either in the core or in the periphery, we call these authentic homegrown theories. The following sections address each type of homegrown theory individually and assess their prospects for recognition by the global IR disciplinary community. Referential homegrown theory building Referential homegrown theories are what come to mind first in thinking about homegrown theories. In this type of theory building, a homegrown thinker’s

A typology of homegrown theorizing   19 ideas or concepts of an indigenous culture, religion, civilization, etc. are used as a reference point to make inferences about observed phenomena. Thinkers such as Kautilya, Xun Zi, and Ibn Khaldun, or cultures such as Hinduism, Confucianism, Buddhism, or Islam, are examples.25 Usually the observed phenomena come from within the same geo-­cultural sphere, rather than the ideas or concepts being applied to elsewhere. In other words, a non-­Western standpoint is used both in concept formation and inference. Referential homegrown theories investigate empirical implications of homegrown ideas—particular cultures and thinkers— and empirically and/or conceptually engage with these thinkers and cultures. As such, they move beyond mere suggestions of relevance of for IRT. Generally, referential homegrown theories redefine ideas of a homegrown thinker/culture in order to make homegrown ideas more accessible to a wider audience and more relevant for studying contemporary phenomena. Thus, they are instrumental in incorporating non-­core ontologies into global IR. There are a few attempts in which Xun Zi’s thought are considered as a source for understanding and explaining Chinese foreign policy behavior.26 In particular his thoughts on types of great powers and international order have inspired frameworks to explicate China’s “peaceful rise.”27 Xuetong redefines power in line with Xun Zi’s ideas to account for China’s “peaceful” rise. He particularly refers to Xun Zi’s Five Ordinance System, which is a hierarchy of power between nations that are under the rule of the emperor. The obligations of nations are based on their geographical proximity to the emperor and their individual power status. More distant and less powerful nations have fewer responsibilities, whereas closer and more powerful nations take on more responsibilities. Such redefinition of power that comes with higher responsibility, as well as Xun Zi’s renunciation of power as solely based on military strength, helps to explain why China’s accumulation of power has not led to conflictual balancing behavior. Like China, India is also very rich in sources for homegrown conceptualizations. Three Indian perspectives on world order stand out: Nehruvian internationalism, Gandhian cosmopolitanism, and political Hinduism or Hindutva.28 Bajpai argues that Nehruvian internationalism is very similar to a Westphalian conception of order, yet it is differentiated by non-­alignment. While Nehruvianism is not naïve about the use of force in IR, “Jawaharlal Nehru rejected power-­ politics and the Western concept of maintaining security and international order through balance of power.”29 Therefore, non-­alignment was both a principle of exercising autonomy in foreign affairs, and an “order-­building” instrument through which a “third” area of peace outside the two power blocs was to be created to secure the establishment of a just and equitable world order. Behera argues that aside from its policy implications, “non-­alignment was never accorded status or recognition as a ‘systemic’ IRT because it did not suit the interests of the powers that be.”30 Gandhian cosmopolitanism emphasized non-­violence (ahimsa) and presented a world order in which the rights of individuals, emancipation, and freedom are  prioritized. In Gandhian thought, nation-­state and nationalism were only

20   Ersel Aydınlı and Gonca Biltekin instruments to ensure human liberation from imperial powers, and states should be radically decentralized bodies. The international system was important to the extent that it gave way to a world order, where small, autonomous groups of people interact on the basis of non-­violence, truth power, and economic equity. The Gandhian conception of world order was ontologically original in that it placed small communities as the primary actors of world politics.31 Inspired by Gandhi’s focus on non-­violence, Galtung redefined peace as the absence of structural violence,32 and proposed a theory of conflict transformation through non-­violent means.33 Galtung’s theory of structural violence was widely recognized, as he was regarded as the founder of Peace Studies. He also established the Peace Research Institute in Oslo (PRIO) and published the Journal of Peace Research. Although his inspiration by Gandhi was evident and self-­proclaimed, it was somehow downplayed and in his later years, when Galtung focused more on peace activism, his impact in the scholarly community waned. This was partly because his wide adoption of Gandhi’s philosophy was alien to academics and researchers, as what he proposed “move[d] too far outside the usual interpretations” into what was no longer deemed peace research.34 The peace research community’s wider attitude toward Galtung’s later work is illustrative of the first major risk associated with referential homegrown theories. If homegrown ideas are used in their original form, and redefinition of concepts is either non-­existent or minimal, the resulting homegrown theory becomes insular. Although, referential homegrown theories appear to be the most common form of homegrown theorizing, (10 out of 19 in our sample are referential homegrown theories), and a few prominent scholars have in fact engaged in indigenous thinking, they do not do particularly well in terms of citation compared to other works in our sample. On average, referential homegrown theories have 7.9 citations in the first 5 years—below the overall average of 12.4. This lower citation rate may be because even if the resulting homegrown theory is original, its empirical implications may remain vague to non-­indigenous researchers, which results in a diminished understanding of the theory’s potential to be applicable elsewhere. Another explanation may be the rather exclusionary nature of some of these conceptualizations. For example, Hindu nationalism, or Hindutva, presupposes a regional hierarchy of civilizations in which Hindu civilization occupies the first place among other civilizations.35 Based on its implications, Hindutva was deemed as a form of Indian fascism.36 At other times, theories maybe evaluated on the grounds of their practical consequences, i.e., the effectiveness that they hold for determining successful policy, as opposed to their explanatory power. For example, Nehru disregarded the ideas of Gandhi, which he found dangerous to the sovereignty and security of the nascent Indian state.37 Therefore, even when including rich tradition and innovative practice, referential homegrown theorizing attempts may not realize their full potential in terms of global reception, if they remain insular and largely prescriptive. The second major risk associated with referential homegrown theories is the opposite of insularity: assimilation by mainstream theories. In these cases, homegrown concepts are redefined in a way that the resulting explanation is subsumed

A typology of homegrown theorizing   21 under a mainstream theory. When theorists fall short of assessing the empirical implications of referential homegrown ideas independently from preconceived paradigmatic lenses, homegrown concepts are “translated” in a way to correspond to one or more terms in current IR lexicon. Such “translation” by subsuming the homegrown concept usually serves as a confirmation of mainstream approaches. Assimilation with respect to homegrown philosophers/philosophies is most often done through comparing homegrown ideas to those of “fathers of political theory,” and considering them as versions of mainstream paradigms. For example, Hassan38 points out 67 thinkers ranging from Herakleitos to Sartre whose ideas have been compared with or likened to those of the fourteenth century North African scholar, Ibn Khaldun. In IR, he is alternatively depicted as a realist,39 postmodernist,40 or historical materialist.41 His ideas on group unity, asabiyah, have also been likened to constructivist accounts of identity.42 Some of the works inspired by Indian philosopher Kautilya, who was regarded as an “Indian Machiavelli,”43 are also examples of assimilation. For example, Modelski asks whether Kautilya’s state system (mandala) was one of international order, where some sort of mutual understanding prevails. He argues that Kautilya’s system of states does not resemble an international order, but an anarchy, which is remedied by relative stability in the domestic sphere.44 Uzzaman refers to Kautilya’s thinking to explain India’s contemporary foreign policy and argues that Indian strategic culture espouses a “Kautilyan brand of realism.”45 While the above examples of assimilations border on anachronism, other forms of assimilation are less direct: scholars incorporate homegrown philosophers’ inferences as empirical findings and make use of them to support their own (mainstream) conceptualizations. Gilpin, focusing on the relationship between physical environment and social life, is inspired by Khaldun’s explanation of the rise of the Islamic empire. Ibn Khaldun argued that the desert operated like the sea for Arabs and eased the empire’s expansion.46 Gilpin also uses Khaldunian insights on the relationship between internal composition of a state and its propensity to expand, as well as its decline because of corruption and luxury. Similarly, Deudney47 refers to Ibn Khaldun as one of the sources of his conceptualization of environment and its consequences on social and political life. Strange48 refers to Ibn Khaldun’s empirical findings, while Cox49 and Pasha50 refer to Khaldun as a potential source for conceptualization of change and world order in IR. Referential theories are easily identifiable as “homegrown” because they openly refer to a non-­Western source of knowledge. Their level of acceptance by the global discipline might vary, however, depending on the acceptability of their policy implications on the one hand, and the theorist’s effort to articulate the novelty it brings when understanding and explaining contemporary phenomena. Insularity is particularly likely if the homegrown theory is applied to the same geo-­cultural sphere from which it originates and can be overcome by  applying it to other geo-­cultural spheres. Assimilation is also unfruitful

22   Ersel Aydınlı and Gonca Biltekin e­ specially when it is anachronistic, e.g., treating Kautilya’s ideas as if he had written in a time where “realism” or “international order” meant the same as they do today. Anachronistic assimilation does not introduce novelty and basically fails to achieve anything more than just informing the reader that “an indigenous/non-­Western thinker has thought similar ideas before.” In our sample, examples of this type of work, i.e., work focusing on conceptual correspondences, were cited just once at most. This is not very surprising as they offer little guidance as to how those concepts would be applied to today’s affairs. The non-­ anachronistic form, i.e., introducing old works as new empirical evidence for modern IR theories, are more scientifically fruitful as they increase the traveling ability of mainstream concepts not only across places but also time. Yet it is an equally deficient strategy in terms of homegrown theory building, because the indigenous thinkers’ ideas are used to confirm or support an already existing theory, without any alteration. Cox’s two different pieces on Khaldun receive four citations each, while Pasha’s article is not cited at all. Alterative homegrown theories Alterative homegrown theories are built by restructuring mainstream theories based on evidence from indigenous experiences. It can be done in two ways: either different definitions for mainstream concepts are suggested or they are applied in a different level of analysis. Unlike referential theories, relying on local evidence is a requisite characteristic for alterative theories to be called homegrown. The resulting theory offers novel insights, but since it alters an extant mainstream theory, alterative homegrown theories are corrective, rather than innovative theories. A rather globally acknowledged example of alterative homegrown theories is world-­systems theory. Wallerstein extended Marx’s depiction of class and division of labor, and applied it on a global level.51 World-­systems theorists’ innovation consists of having world-­systems as the unit of analysis, not the states, since they argue that the agents in the world-­system are not confined to any state’s borders.52 Crucial to this innovation is their use of evidence about a wide geographical area to account for the historical rise of the West, and continuing poverty of the most non-­Western societies. Luxembourg’s earlier work on Turkey, Russia, India, China, and North Africa53 as well as Wallerstein’s own work on Africa,54 provided the multiregional empirical background. While Wallerstein’s work was mostly qualitative, other world-­system researchers also incorporated quantitative data to show worldwide patterns.55 World-­systems analysis’ reception is quite wide. Although we only included in our sample Hopkins and Wallerstein,56 a work that was cited 13 times in the first 5 years of its publication, Wallerstein and his colleagues subsequently produced a substantial number of works based on the theory, which augmented its recognition. Another factor in bolstering its reception was its institutionalization in distinguished universities and research centers in North America. Although the theory was inferentially homegrown (devised based on inferences from a

A typology of homegrown theorizing   23 non-­Western experience of capitalism) most of the theorists were Western, and were linked to an extensive network in the core. Further factors might have been the familiarity of the global discipline with Marxist concepts, and the wide use of quantitative data, at a time when positivism was popular. Lastly, world-­ systems theory has strong connections to the disciplines of history and economy, and was able therefore to generate appeal in a wide range of disciplines. Another attempt to apply mainstream concepts in other levels of analysis is Cai Tuo’s57 work on global governance. Cai defines global governance as a cooperation of official and non-­official agents over a global problem within the borders of a country, i.e., transnational cooperation on national territory. This definition is inspired by conditions prevalent in developing countries: first, civil society is usually too weak to project its influence transnationally; second, there is a general distrust toward “non-­territorial politics and globalism,”58 and finally there is a preference for dealing with global problems through established intergovernmental institutions and mechanisms. Therefore, civil society takes part in transnational networks only when the global problem in question is addressed locally with involvement of the local government. Transnational cooperation is a learning mechanism for both civil society and domestic government, where a top-­down understanding of management is slowly giving way to a more open one. Cai’s correction to the global governance literature is to apply a supposedly global level concept at the domestic level, which reveals the discrepancy between the developing societies and developed societies in terms of both attitude and ability. His analysis also offers practical guidance as to the improvement of civil society and argues that involvement of host state institutions may serve to improve global consciousness and global values. Similarly, Qin Yaqing59 finds fault in the mainstream global governance literature in explaining East Asian governance practice. Most theories of governance rely on rule-­based governance, with the underlying assumption that individuals are rational, cost-­calculating actors with exogenous self-­interests. But in East Asian communitarian societies, he argues, the essence of governance is relational, and it highlights morality, and trust, all of which are drawn from Confucian philosophy. While rule-­based governance takes tangible results as the objective, relational governance emphasizes process, i.e., maintaining a relationship that makes participation, strengthening of ties, and developing a shared understanding possible. Consequently, he argues that judging the Association of Southeast Asians Nations (ASEAN) and Asia-­Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) as ineffective in comparison to the European Union (EU) or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is misleading, since the merit of the former may not be in achieving tangible results, but in maintaining continuous dialogue and negotiation. Qin Yaqing is not the first to introduce a “relational” and “processual” ontology to the study of IR,60 but his conceptualization differs from mainstream theories in terms of his understanding of trust as a genuine social norm, rather than as another cost-­reducing mechanism. Moreover, he reconceptualizes “relational”

24   Ersel Aydınlı and Gonca Biltekin in the domain of governance. Despite his emphasis on Confucian values, he does not directly refer to Confucius in his concepts or inferences, but he highlights the distinctive experience of East Asian subjects, whose daily life is infused with Confucianism. Compared to the above, some other attempts involving a less substantive correction, i.e., homegrown improvements, redirect the application range of mainstream theories by offering alternative operationalizations. For example, late socialist and then post-­socialist Russian scholars incorporated a few Western-­ derived concepts,61 which gave way to the development of a “national liberal school” of IR in Russia. The school combines “nationalism” and “liberalism,” terms that acquire a different meaning in the Russian context than that employed by Western theorists. For example, they point to the importance of international institutions and a non-­unipolar world as a means to achieve peace,62 they emphasize the risks of globalization, while not denying the opportunities associated, and argue that the democratization process must reflect local conditions.63 In a similar vein, Kuznetsov builds on Toynbee’s and more recently Huntington’s theory of “clash of civilizations,” in his theory of “grammatological geopolitics.”64 While Huntington’s theory proposes that the potential zones of conflict run along the fault lines of nine largely denominational civilizations, Kuznetsov’s grammatological geopolitics defines civilizations in terms of the alphabets the nations use and argues that a more accurate prediction of conflicts can be attained by the resulting fault lines. In addition to Huntington’s, he identifies seven more, “smaller” subcultures: Greek, Hebrew, Armenian, Georgian, Mongolian, Korean, and Ethiopian. These subcultures are more prone to conflicts than are broader civilizations because of their rather fast developmental potential. As evidence, he particularly refers to conflicts in and around the post-­Soviet states, such as between Serbia (Cyrillic) and Croatia (Latin) in 1991–5, as well as Georgia’s (Georgian) war with Russia (Cyrillic) in 2008, South Ossetia (Cyrillic) in 1991–2, 2004, and 2008, and with Abkhazia (Cyrillic) in 1992–3, 1998 and 2008. Homegrown alterations of mainstream theories may reflect (a) interdisciplinary approaches, (b) sensitivity to changing meanings of concepts in different settings, and (c) experimentation with respect to level of analysis. Through these strategies, the resultant theorizing becomes more than a simple application of the existing theory, and acquires a certain degree of originality. Other forms of engaging with mainstream concepts are less substantial, often employing only one of the above strategies. These homegrown improvements of mainstream theories are important in advancing the “traveling ability”65 of mainstream concepts or point out their limitations in doing so. In consequence, they are valuable for expanding the application range, i.e., “globalness,” of mainstream IR. Although they are hypothetically more advantageous in terms of reception, as other scholars already have familiarity with the concepts, in actuality they are the least cited form of homegrown theorizing in our sample. On average, each alterative homegrown theory work is cited six times in the first 5 years, which is only half of the overall average. One particular reason may be their inherent position on “the fringes” of mainstream theory, rather than being “out” of mainstream

A typology of homegrown theorizing   25 theory: taking a corrective stance by pointing out the shortcomings of an established paradigm may be regarded as more threatening to hegemony than either referential or authentic homegrown theories. This also highlights the tremendous difficulty faced by periphery scholars when they attempt to challenge the core theories: they are not refuted but are simply ignored. Authentic homegrown theory building Authentic homegrown theory building essentially relies on scrutinizing available or newly collected data and focusing on the incongruencies between what has been observed and what has been expected based on extant conceptualizations. Authentic homegrown theory building begins with putting forward empirical puzzles and coming up with original concepts to explicate these puzzles. Authentic concepts are coined with little or no reference to either homegrown ideas or mainstream theories. Focusing on empirical puzzles for theory development is a common strategy among inductively oriented researchers.66 Consequently, systematic collection and/or analysis of (usually a large magnitude of ) data is tremendously important to not only homegrown, but any authentic theory building. Since authentic homegrown concepts are not redefined or refined forms of indigenous conceptualizations, what makes them homegrown is the origin of the data used while making inferences. In other words, authentic homegrown theory is not conceptually, but inferentially homegrown. One example of authentic homegrown theory building out of the periphery comes from the latest Chinese efforts to analyze China–US bilateral relations from 1950 onwards using event data. Yan Xuetong tries to explain the “sudden deteriorations followed by rapid recoveries [which] have been the norm in China–US relations since the 1990s.”67 He proposes that fluctuating relations, characterized by “short-­term improvements in China–US relations that have followed each short-­term dip”68 are neither attributable to rising nationalism in China nor to Chinese overconfidence built upon China’s fast economic growth, but rather to the discrepancy between heightened expectations of the two sides and the actual policy inclinations derived by their interests. He states that the good will by both sides actually worsens the balance in their bilateral relations because it impedes their ability to pinpoint realistic policies based on their interests.69 It actually gives way to the establishment of a “superficial friendship” in which both countries imagine they have more common interests than they actually have. The resulting inconsistency leads to instability. Xuetong extends his argumentation by building a typology of bilateral interests with respect to different sectors of China–US relations. While in security matters, US and Chinese interests are mostly “mutually unfavourable,” in economy and culture, they have more mutually favorable interests, so much so that he calls them “cultural friends.”70 Observing different fluctuation patterns in different time periods, Xuetong’s theory explains them with the (in)congruence between expectations and interests.

26   Ersel Aydınlı and Gonca Biltekin At the same time, he addresses the contemporary Chinese problematique: finding peaceful yet assertive ways to engage with the outside world. Accordingly, his theory can also be regarded as prescriptive; too much optimism, i.e., heightened expectations with respect to US-­Chinese relations, can actually impede rather than boost stability. Another example of authentic homegrown theory building out of the periphery is Latin Amer­ican dependency theory, which is inferred from the Latin Amer­ican experience in development and international trade in the 1950s. It also originates from an empirical puzzle: in contrast to David Ricardo’s thesis that free trade would benefit both parties because of the comparative advantage, terms of trade for underdeveloped countries relative to the developed countries had deteriorated over time. Raúl Prebisch, an Argentinian economist, argued that there were “declining terms of trade” for Third World states, because peripheral nations had to export more of their primary goods to get the same value of industrial exports. Through this system, all of the benefits of technology and international trade transfer to the core states.71 Dependency theorists integrated Prebisch’s thesis with their observations regarding global relations of production in Latin America. Contra modernization theory, they argued that looking at domestic determinants of economic growth and development is not sufficient to understand the patterns of (under)development.72 An international outlook that takes into account historical and sociological variables, along with interactions between and across domestic and international realms is also needed.73 For Latin Amer­ican structuralists Fernando H. Cardoso and Enzo Faletto,74 dependency and development were not mutually exclusive: dependency and autonomy were two ends of a political continuum, as development and underdevelopment were two ends of the economic continuum. They argued that the local political elites in peripheral states have structured their domestic rule on a coalition of internal interests favorable to the international economic structure. Therefore, international capitalist structure, by itself, does not lead to a single form of dependency; it is rather the sociological consequences and the subsequent alliances that shape the dependent status of the South.75 Although originated in Latin America, structuralist dependency theory could be applied to a wider scope of countries, from economically developed ones in East Asia to underdeveloped countries in Africa.76 The emphasis on alliances and struggles within and across national borders makes the theory more historically nuanced and more conducive to social change77 albeit at the expense of predictive power. A final example of authentic homegrown theorizing is from South Africa. Geldenhuys78 focuses on the South African experience of being an isolated state for four decades, and puts forward a descriptive theory of isolation. Analytically differentiating isolation from other forms of estrangement, such as short-­term alienation, obscurity of a state (being ignored), or armed isolation during war, he defines isolation as either a long term, voluntary and deliberate policy by a state (self-­isolation) or a deliberate policy by other states (enforced isolation) to

A typology of homegrown theorizing   27 diminish one’s level of international interaction. He gives a detailed list and description of 30 indicators of isolation and investigates questions pertaining to targets and implementers of isolation, its means, causes, objectives, and effects. His framework is original in pointing out a rather understudied phenomenon in IR, but one that dominated South African domestic and international politics for decades. On the other hand, Geldenhuys’ theory of isolation is mostly a descriptive rather than explanatory theory. Both Xuetong and the dependency theorists pointed out patterns in the data, unforeseen or under-­explained by the existing theories. Similarly, Geldenhuys’ operationalization of isolation required extensive data on several spheres of international interaction. Authentic homegrown theories seem to rely on extensive collections of data, either to reveal empirical puzzles or to describe a situation. This is probably due to the lack of a conceptual reference point to justify their arguments. While theorists in the core can write purely theoretical pieces with little or no reference to systematically collected data, a similar option appears untenable to homegrown theorists since it would jeopardize their acceptance by the global discipline. Such data collection, however, requires substantial time and effort, which might be one of the reasons authentic homegrown theories are rare to find. At the same time though, extensive data collection seems to augment their citation scores. The average citation score for the above three examples is 38, and even when Cardoso and Faletto, 197979 is removed as an outlier, the average score is 11.5.

Conclusion Homegrown theories are by definition local, i.e., attached to a particular geo-­ cultural sphere. A theory, on the other hand, is presumably universal, applicable to classes of phenomena that can be found anywhere, anytime. Accordingly, claims for homegrown theorizing are often rebuffed or downplayed on the basis of their supposed parochialism or exceptionalism.80 Despite the claim for universality however, mainstream IR theories are also parochial, a phenomenon that became increasingly evident over the years since Hoffmann’s81 declaration of IR as an Amer­ican social science.82 If all of the supposedly “universal” theories are parochial as suggested, then it would be unfair to dismiss a self-­admittedly homegrown theory on the basis of parochialism. It would rather be more accurate to state that all theorizing is homegrown, with the potential for universal recognition if not application. Such a stance can pave the way forward to a more inclusive discipline. As one scholar puts it, it might indeed be the only way for IR to be more inclusive and hence truly “international.”83 Our review suggests that despite the inequality in the social and political sphere, there is great potential in terms of periphery-­based, homegrown IRT. There are voices out of the larger world but they are not incorporated successfully into larger literature. The supposed universalism of any theory depends on its acceptance by the wider community of scholars. All the major theories of today were once a homegrown theory, and the material and discursive power of

28   Ersel Aydınlı and Gonca Biltekin these theories came from the power of the object they studied. As these theories grew into becoming universal, the discursive sphere was shut down to outsiders to keep the hegemony intact. Their monopoly on the scholarly imaginations of IR has become the major obstacle to a true globalization of IR. The power of actors (whether they are states, nations, groups, civilizations, or even theorists) is still the determining factor in identifying whose voices will be globally heard and integrated into the global scientific discipline. Structural and institutional factors, such as discrepancies in material capabilities, network structures, and publication opportunities between the core and the periphery have a huge effect on whose theory will be popular. The theories and conceptualizations of IR of an international system under Chinese, Russian, or Indian hegemony would greatly differ from the current ones in ontology and epistemology. A closer look at the types of publications suggests that there remains a major packaging, production, and marketing problem, which inhibits the contribution homegrown theorizing might make to the wider discipline. On average, from our sample, books presenting examples of some form of homegrown theorizing are cited 35 times, articles 4.8 times, and book chapters 1.3 times. Clearly, publishing books instead of articles appears to pose an advantage for homegrown theorists. The prestige of the publishing house and its range of distribution network may facilitate its recognition. Additionally, the depth of elaboration permitted by the relative length of a whole book might be instrumental in augmenting an idea’s reception. On the other hand, compared to articles, publishing books, especially by a well-­known publishing house, requires a higher level of pre-­ existing recognition by the scholar. Therefore the books may be cited more because the authors of those books are already well known and hence already have wider access—Cardoso, Galtung, and Xuetong are already well-­known figures. Nevertheless, comparing citations to specific book chapters to citations for the whole book suggests an interesting pattern. Order and Justice in International Relations is cited 29 times in total, but only one of these is to Bajpai’s chapter. Most of the citations are to chapters written either by the editors, or to the chapter that focuses on Europe.84 Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics is cited 548 times, but only 12 of them are to Cox’s piece on Ibn Khaldun. Again the most citations in this volume are directly to the editors’ chapters85 or to works on the Western international system from a critical perspective. Similarly, Innovation and Transformation in International Studies is cited 36 times, none of which is to Pasha’s chapter. The most cited chapter in the volume is that of Stephen Gill’s piece on Karl Polanyi.86 Therefore, even when the material obstacles to wider access are surmounted, or even when the articles are published by well-­known and elsewhere abundantly cited scholars, homegrown conceptualizations’ reception is relatively low. Beyond the above factors that are exogenous to the process of theory building, a few observations can be made about the substantial differences between the theories themselves, which may account for how these differences reflect on their acceptance. The foremost quality of a new theory is that it can be understood and applied by other researchers. Therefore, insularity and vagueness are

A typology of homegrown theorizing   29 both fatal to homegrown theories. Accordingly, the concepts used should be adequately defined and clarified. As Lynham points out,  an important function and characteristic of theory building is to make these explanations and understandings of how the world is and works explicit and, by so doing, to make transferable, informed knowledge for improved understanding and action in the world tacit rather than implicit.87  If theorists fall short of transmitting to the mind of the reader, how and where one can test the suggested theory, or how one can infer from the empirical observations that the proposed mechanism is at work, then the theory will not be engaged. Original concepts are good, but those whose meaning is too blurry for others to understand will remain unproductive.88 If nobody else is able to apply the concept, then the theory is doomed to isolation and its development will halt. In particular, a poor clarification of concepts used in referential homegrown theories may limit their transferability to the people cognizant of the referent culture or ideas. Limited transferability may confine such theories to discussions within communities of culturally homogenous scholars, which will deny the global IR community the fundamental benefit of referential homegrown theories, i.e., incorporation of non-­core ontologies. Insularity and policy dependence inhibit reception; assimilation and anachronism threaten originality and diversity. Comparisons across thinkers, or studies on a non-­Western thinker, may be fruitful in familiarizing the global discipline with periphery theorists’ ideas, but from a theory building purpose, assessing and testing empirical implications of their ideas independently from preconceived paradigmatic lenses, is paramount. In other words, the concepts should not simply be “translated,” a practice which usually serves as an implicit confirmation of mainstream approaches. Deriving implications out of those ideas, and testing them against the data is what makes any theory stronger. Finally, a closer look at the most cited of the theories explored here reveals that the most efficient way of building both original and recognized theories appears to be through systematic collection of data. Xuetong relied on quantitative data on US–China bilateral relations, dependency theorists based their theoretical innovation on foreign trade data, and Geldenhuys made an extensive collection of qualitative data on levels of international interaction. It is impossible to ignore the irony in this as empirical work is often considered in dichotomous terms with theory, and those who are empirically oriented, i.e., “native informants,”89 “area specialists,”90 or “historians”91 are seen as “non-­theorists.” Such a starting perspective is a major obstacle in overcoming the broader hegemonic division of labor. Better theories cannot be built out of philosophical and meta-­theoretical discussions, they can only be built through hands-­on empirical work. Still better theories can only be built through the hands-­on work of a wider, global scholarly community.

Author

Xuetong, 2011

Xuetong, 2008

Bajpai, 2003

Galtung, 1996 Kalpakian, 2008

Cox, 1992

Cox, 1995

Pasha, 1997 Boesche, 2002

Zaman, 2006

Cai, 2004

Qin, 2011

Type of homegrown theory

Referential

Referential

Referential

Referential Referential

Referential

Referential

Referential Referential

Referential

Alterative

Alterative

Article

Article

Article

Article in Book Book

Article

Article in Book

Book Article

Article in Book

Article

2011

2004

2006

1997 2002

1995

1992

1996 2008

2003

2008

9

0

1

0 0

4

4

20 1

0

9

40

Book

Ancient Chinese Thought and Modern Chinese Power “XunZi’s Thoughts on International Politics and Their Implications” “Indian Conceptions of Order and Justice: Nehruvianism, Gandhianism, Hindutva and Neo-liberal” Peace By Peaceful Means “IbnKhaldun’s Influence on Current International Relations Theory” “Towards a Post-Hegemonic Conceptualization of World Order: Reflections on the Relevancy of Ibn Khaldun” “Civilizations: Encounters and Transformations” “Ibn Khaldun and World Order” The First Great Political Realist: Kautilya and His Arthashastra “Kautilya: The Indian Strategic Thinker and Indian Strategic Culture” “Global Governance: Chinese Angle of View and Practice” “Rule, Rules, and Relations: Towards a Synthetic Approach to Governance” 2011

Type of publication Publication Five year year citation count in WOS

Title

Table 2.1  Number of citations to homegrown theories

Appendix

9

2

1

0 5

12

12

179 1

1

14

40

Total citation count

Authentic

Authentic Authentic

Alterative

Alterative

Alterative

Tsygankov and Tsygankov, 2007 Tsygankov and Tsygankov 2010 Hopkins and Wallerstein, 1982 Xuetong, 2010 Cardoso and Faletto, 1979 Geldenhuys, 1990

“The Instability of China–US Relations” Dependency and Development in Latin America Isolated States: A Comparative Analysis

“A Sociology of Dependence in International Relations Theory: A Case of Russian Liberal IR” “National Ideology and IR Theory: Three Incarnations of the ‘Russian Idea’ ” World-systems Analysis: Theory and Methodology

Book

1990

2010 1979

1982

Book Article Book

2010

2007

Article

Article

12

11 91

13

7

1

36

13 756

78

7

3

32   Ersel Aydınlı and Gonca Biltekin

Notes   1 T. V. Paul, “Integrating International Relations Studies in India to Global Scholarship,” International Studies 46, no. 1–2 (2009): 129–45.   2 Arlene B. Tickner and Ole Wæver, International Relations Scholarship Around the World (Oxford: Routledge, 2009).   3 Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, “Why Is There No Non-­Western International Relations Theory? An Introduction,” International Relations of the Asia Pacific 7, no. 3 (August 7, 2007): 287, doi:https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcm012.   4 Anna M. Agathangelou and L. H. M. Ling, “The House of IR: From Family Power Politics to the Poisies of Worldism,” International Studies Review 6, no. 4 (December 2004): 21–49; Pınar Bilgin, “Thinking Past ‘Western’ IR?” Third World Quarterly 29, no. 1 (2008): 5–23; Walter D. Mignolo, “Epistemic Disobedience, Independent Thought and Decolonial Freedom,” Theory, Culture & Society 26, no. 7–8 (2009): 159–81.   5 Steve Smith, “The Discipline of International Relations: Still an Amer­ican Social Science?” The British Journal of Politics & International Relations 2, no. 3 (2000): 374–402; Jörg Friedrichs, European Approaches to International Relations Theory: A House with Many Mansions (Oxford: Routledge, 2004).   6 Tickner includes Canada, Western Europe, and Australia as semi-­periphery. Arlene B. Tickner, “Core, Periphery and (Neo) Imperialist International Relations,” European Journal of International Relations 19, no. 3, (2013): 627–46.   7 Acharya and Buzan, “Why Is There No Non-­Western,” 295.   8 Robert M. A. Crawford and Darryl S. L. Jarvis, ed., International Relations—Still an Amer­ican Social Science? Toward Diversity in International Thought (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001), xii.   9 Ras T. Nielsen and Peter Marcus Kristensen, “Constructing a Chinese International Relations Theory: A Sociological Approach to Intellectual Innovation,” International Political Sociology 7, no. 1 (2013): 19–40; Yaqing Qin, “Why Is There No Chinese International Relations Theory?” International Relations of the Asia-­Pacific 7, no. 3 (2007): 313–40. 10 Takashi Inoguchi and Paul Bacon, “The Study of International Relations in Japan: Towards a More International Discipline,” International Relations of the Asia Pacific 1, no. 1 (2001): 1–20. 11 Peter Marcus Kristensen, “How Can Emerging Powers Speak? On Theorists, Native Informants and Quasi-­Officials in International Relations Discourse,” Third World Quarterly 36, no. 4 (2015): 637–53. 12 Jong Kun Choi, “Theorizing East Asian International Relations in Korea,” Asian Perspective 32, no. 1 (2008): 193–216. 13 Kristensen, “How Can Emerging Powers Speak?” 14 Helen Louise Turton and Lucas G. Freire, “Peripheral Possibilities: Revealing Originality and Encouraging Dialogue through a Reconsideration of ‘Marginal’ IR Scholarship,” Journal of International Relations and Development 20, no. 2 (April 18, 2014): 458, doi:10.1057/jird.2015.17. 15 For contrary views see, Ching-­Chang Chen, “The Absence of Non-­Western IR Theory in Asia Reconsidered,” International Relations of the Asia-­Pacific 11, no. 1 (2011): 1–23; Ching-­Chang Chen, “The Impossibility of Building Indigenous Theories in a Hegemonic Discipline: The Case of Japanese International Relations.” Asian Perspective 36, no. 3 (2012): 463–92. 16 Rosa Vasilaki, “Provincialising IR? Deadlocks and Prospects in Post-­Western IR Theory,” Millennium—Journal of International Studies 41, no. 1 (2012): 3–22. 17 Turton and Freire, “Peripheral Possibilities.” 18 Homegrown theories have varying degrees of acceptance and engagement, which are undoubtedly shaped by the wider social and institutional milieu. Our purpose here,

A typology of homegrown theorizing   33 however, is to discern the other factors, i.e., properties of the theories themselves, which may help to overcome barriers against their reception. 19 Tickner and Wæver, International Relations Scholarship; Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, ed., Non-­Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and Beyond Asia (Abington: Routledge, 2009). 20 Tickner and Wæver, International Relations Scholarship; Acharya and Buzan, Non-­ Western International Relations Theory. 21 Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, Dependency and Development in Latin America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979). 22 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 167. 23 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979), 57. 24 Obviously, discussing what theory is is a huge task that cannot be meaningfully confined to the limits of a single chapter. What we attempt is a simple breakdown of its most basic properties. 25 Amitav Acharya, “Dialogue and Discovery: In Search of International Relations Theories Beyond the West,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 39, no. 3 (April 27, 2011): 619–37. 26 Dawa Norbu, “Tibet in Sino-­Indian Relations: The Centrality of Marginality,” Asian Survey 37, no. 11 (1997): 1084; Yan Xuetong, Ancient Chinese Thought and Modern Chinese Power (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2011). 27 Yan Xuetong, “Xun Zi’s Thoughts on International Politics and Their Implications,” Chinese Journal of International Politics 2, no. 1 (2008): 135–65. 28 Kanti Bajpai, “Indian Conceptions of Order and Justice: Nehruvian, Gandhian, Hindutva, and Neo-­Liberal,” in Order and Justice in International Relations, ed. Rosemary Foot, John Gaddis, and Andrew Hurrell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 236–61. 29 Navnita Behera, “Re-­Imagining IR in India,” International Relations of the Asia-­ Pacific 7, no. 3 (2007): 346. 30 Behera, “Re-­Imagining IR,” 347. 31 Bajpai, “Indian Conceptions.” 32 Thomas Weber, “The Impact of Gandhi on the Development of Johan Galtung’s Peace Research,” Global Change, Peace & Security 16, no. 1 (2004): 31–43. 33 Johan Galtung, Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization (London: Sage, 1996). 34 Weber, “The Impact of Gandhi,” 42. 35 Kanti Bajpai, “Indian Grand Strategy: Six Schools of Thought,” in India’s Grand Strategy: History, Theory, Cases, ed. Kanti Bajpai, Saira Basit, and V. Krishnappa (New Delhi: Routledge, 2014), 131. 36 Prabhat Patnaik, “The Fascism of Our Times,” Social Scientist 21, no. 3–4 (1993): 69–77. 37 Hugh Tinker, “Magnificent Failure? The Gandhian Ideal in India after Sixteen Years,” International Affairs 40, no. 2 (1964): 262–76. 38 Umit Hassan, Ibn Haldun’un Metodu ve Siyaset Teorisi (Istanbul: Toplumsal Donusum, 1998), 41–46. 39 James Winston Morris, “An Arab Machiavelli? Rhetoric, Philosophy, and Politics in Ibn Khaldun’s Critique of Sufism,” Harvard Middle Eastern and Islamic Review 8 (2009): 242–91; Barbara Freyer Stowasser, “Religion and Political Development: Comparative Ideas on Ibn Khaldun and Machiavelli,” Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, 2011, accessed August 21, 2016, https://georgetown.app.box.com/s/ ufohrhyqa4phr775z9p1. 40 Jack Kalpakian, “Ibn Khaldun’s Influence on Current International Relations Theory,” The Journal of North African Studies 13, no. 3 (2008): 363–76. 41 Robert W. Cox, “Towards a Post-­Hegemonic Conceptualization of World Order: Reflections on the Relevancy of Ibn Khaldun,” in Governance without Government:

34   Ersel Aydınlı and Gonca Biltekin Order and Change in World Politics, ed. James N. Rosenau and Ernst-­Otto Czempiel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 132–59. 42 Jack Kalpakian, “Ibn Khaldun’s Influence on Current International Relations Theory,” 184. 43 Herbert H. Gowen, “ ‘The Indian Machiavelli’ or Political Theory in India Two Thousand Years Ago,” Political Science Quarterly 44, no. 2 (1929): 173–92; Roger Boesche, “Moderate Machiavelli? Contrasting the Prince with the Arthashastra of Kautilya,” Critical Horizons: A Journal of Philosophy & Social Theory 3, no. 2 (2002): 153–76. 44 George Modelski, “Kautilya: Foreign Policy and International System in the Ancient Hindu World,” The Amer­ican Political Science Review 58, no. 3 (1964): 549–60. 45 Rashed Uz Zaman, “Kautilya: The Indian Strategic Thinker and Indian Strategic Culture,” Comparative Strategy 25, no. 3 (2006): 242. 46 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). 47 Daniel Deudney, “Bringing Nature Back In: Geopolitical Theory from the Greeks to the Global Era,” in Contested Grounds: Security and Conflict in the New Environmental Politics, ed. Daniel Deudney and Richard Matthew (SUNY Press, 1999), 25–60. 48 Susan Strange, “Political Economy and International Relations,” in International Relations Theory Today, ed. Ken Booth and Steve Smith (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), 154–74. 49 Cox, “Towards a Post-­Hegemonic Conceptualization.” 50 Mustapha Kemal Pasha, “Ibn Khaldun and World Order,” in Innovation and Transformation in International Studies, ed. Stephan Gill and James H. Mittelman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 56–70. 51 Daniel Chirot and Thomas D. Hall, “World-­System Theory,” Annual Review of Sociology 8, no. 1 (1982): 81–106. 52 Terence K. Hopkins and Immanuel Maurice Wallerstein, World-­Systems Analysis: Theory and Methodology (London: Sage, 1982). 53 Chirot and Hall, “World-­System Theory.” 54 Immanuel Maurice Wallerstein and Terence K. Hopkins, The Essential Wallerstein (New York: The New Press, 2000). 55 Richard Rubinson, “The World-­Economy and the Distribution of Income within States: A Cross-­National Study,” Amer­ican Sociological Review 41, no. 4 (1976): 638–59; David Snyder and Edward Kick, “Structural Position in the World System and Economic Growth, 1955–1970: A Multiple-­Network Analysis of Transnational Interactions,” Amer­ican Journal of Sociology 84, no. 5 (1979): 1096–126. 56 Hopkins and Wallerstein, World-­Systems Analysis. 57 Tuo Cai, “Global Governance: The Chinese Angle of View and Practice,” Social Sciences in China 25, no. 2 (2004): 57–68. 58 Cai, “Global Governance,” 58. 59 Yaqing Qin, “Rule, Rules, and Relations: Towards a Synthetic Approach to Governance,” The Chinese Journal of International Politics 4, no. 2 (2011): 117–45. 60 Qin, “Why Is There No Chinese.” 61 Alexander Sergouinin, “Russia: IR at a Crossroads,” in International Relations Scholarship Around the World, ed. Arlene B. Tickner and Ole Wæver (Oxford: Routledge, 2009), 223–41. 62 Andrei P. Tsygankov and Pavel A. Tsygankov, “A Sociology of Dependence in International Relations Theory: A Case of Russian Liberal IR,” International Political Sociology 1, no. 4 (2007): 307–24. 63 Andrei P. Tsygankov and Pavel A. Tsygankov, “New Directions in Russian International Studies: Pluralization, Westernization, and Isolationism,” Communist and Post-­Communist Studies 37, no. 1 (2004): 1–17; Tsygankov and Tsygankov, “A Sociology of Dependence.”

A typology of homegrown theorizing   35 64 Artur Kusnezow, “A New Model for Traditional Civilisations,” International Affairs (Moscow) 41, no. 4–5 (1995): 95–100. 65 Giovanni Sartori, “Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics,” The Amer­ican Political Science Review 64, no. 4 (1970): 1033–53. 66 Diana A. Zinnes, “Three Puzzles in Search of a Researcher,” International Studies Quarterly 24, no. 3 (1980): 315–42. 67 Yan Xuetong, “The Instability of China–US Relations,” The Chinese Journal of International Politics 3, no. 3 (2010): 263. 68 Xuetong, “The Instability of China–US Relations.” 69 Xuetong, “The Instability of China–US Relations,” 280. 70 Xuetong, “The Instability of China–US Relations,” 274–5. 71 Joseph L. Love, “Raúl Prebisch and the Origins of the Doctrine of Unequal Exchange,” Latin Amer­ican Research Review 15, no. 3 (1980): 45–72. 72 Tony Smith, “The Underdevelopment of Development Literature: The Case of Dependency Theory,” World Politics 31, no. 2 (1979): 248. 73 Cardoso and Faletto, Dependency and Development. 74 Cardoso and Faletto, Dependency and Development. 75 Smith, “The Underdevelopment of Development,” 251. 76 Matias Vernengo, “Technology, Finance and Dependency: Latin Amer­ican Radical Political Economy in Retrospect,” Review of Radical Political Economics 38, no. 4 (2006): 551–68. 77 Arlene Tickner, “Latin Amer­ican IR and the Primacy of Lo Práctico,” International Studies Review 10, no. 4 (2008): 708. 78 Deon Geldenhuys, Isolated States: A Comparative Analysis (Cambridge: Press Syndicate, 1990). 79 Cardoso and Faletto, Dependency and Development. 80 Jack Snyder, “Some Good and Bad Reasons for a Distinctively Chinese Approach to International Relations Theory” (paper presented at the APSA 2008 Annual Meeting, Hynes Convention Center, Boston, Massachusetts, 2008); David Shambaugh, “International Relations Studies in China: History, Trends, and Prospects,” International Relations of the Asia-­Pacific 11, no. 3 (2011): 339–72. 81 Stanley Hoffmann, “An Amer­ican Social Science: International Relations,” Deadalus 106, no. 3 (1977): 41–60. 82 Robert W. Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory,” Millennium—Journal of International Studies 10, no. 2 (1981): 126–55; Howard J. Wiarda, “The Ethnocentrism of the Social Science Implications for Research and Policy,” The Review of Politics 43, no. 2 (1981): 163–97; Steve Smith, “The United States and the Discipline of International Relations: ‘Hegemonic Country, Hegemonic Discipline’, ” International Studies Review 4, no. 2 (2002): 67–85. 83 Robert M. A. Crawford, “Where Have All the Theorists Gone—Gone to Britain? Everyone? A Story of Two Parochialisms in International Relations.” In International Relations—Still an Amer­ican Social Science? Toward Diversity in International Thought, edited by Robert M. A. Crawford and Darryl S. L. Jarvis, 222–3 (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001). 84 Kalypso Nicolaidis and Justine Lacroix, “Order and Justice beyond the Nation-­State: Europe’s Competing Paradigms,” in Order and Justice in International Relations, ed. Rosemary Foot, John Gaddis, and Andrew Hurrell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 125–54.  85 These 18 works are only part of what we went through during the whole review. Some of the studies were left out of citation analysis because they were published long before 1980, and hence their first 5-year citation score cannot be obtained through WoS Cited Reference Search. We included Cardoso and Faletto (Cardoso and Faletto, Dependency and Development), however, but only citations to it from 1980 to

36   Ersel Aydınlı and Gonca Biltekin 1984. Even when the citations in year 1979 could not be added, it still was the most cited work in our sample. In within-­sample comparisons, we only considered citations made within the first 5 years of each cited works’ publication date. Since older works can naturally be expected to have a larger number of total citations, comparing their total citation score to those of relatively newer works would be misleading. 86 Stephen Thornton, “Karl Popper,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, November 13, 1997, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/popper/. 87 Susan A. Lynham, “The General Method of Theory-­Building Research in Applied Disciplines,” Advances in Developing Human Resources 4, no. 3 (August 1, 2002): 223. 88 Stephen M. Walt, “The Relationship between Policy and Theory in International Relations,” Annual Review of Political Science 8, no. 1 (2005): 23–48. 89 Agathangelou and Ling, “The House of IR”; Kristensen, “How Can Emerging Powers Speak?” 90 Robert H. Bates, “Area Studies and the Discipline: A Useful Controversy?” PS: Political Science & Politics 30, no. 2 (June 1997): 166–9. 91 Paul W. Schroeder, “History and International Relations Theory: Not Use or Abuse, but Fit or Misfit,” International Security 22, no. 1 (1997): 64–74; John Lewis Gaddis, “History, Theory, and Common Ground,” International Security 22, no. 1 (1997): 75–85.

Bibliography Acharya, Amitav. “Dialogue and Discovery: In Search of International Relations Theories Beyond the West.” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 39, no. 3 (27 April 2011): 619–37. Acharya, Amitav, and Barry Buzan, eds. “Why Is There No Non-­Western International Relations Theory? An Introduction.” International Relations of the Asia Pacific 7, no. 3 (August 7, 2007): 287–312. doi:https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcm012. Acharya, Amitav, and Barry Buzan, eds. Non-­Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and Beyond Asia. Abingdon: Routledge, 2009. Agathangelou, Anna M., and L. H. M. Ling. “The House of IR: From Family Power Politics to the Poisies of Worldism.” International Studies Review 6, no. 4 (December 2004): 21–49. Bajpai, Kanti. “Indian Conceptions of Order and Justice: Nehruvian, Gandhian, Hindutva, and Neo-­Liberal.” In Order and Justice in International Relations, edited by Rosemary Foot, John Gaddis, and Andrew Hurrell, 236–61. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. Bajpai, Kanti. “Indian Grand Strategy: Six Schools of Thought.” In India’s Grand Strategy: History, Theory, Cases, edited by Kanti Bajpai, Saira Basit and V. Krishnappa, 113–54. New Delhi: Routledge, 2014. Bates, Robert H. “Area Studies and the Discipline: A Useful Controversy?” PS: Political Science & Politics 30, no. 2 (June 1997): 166–9. Behera, Navnita. “Re-­Imagining IR in India.” International Relations of the Asia-­Pacific 7, no. 3 (2007): 341–68. Bilgin, Pınar. “Thinking Past ‘Western’ IR?” Third World Quarterly 29, no. 1 (2008): 5–23. Boesche, Roger. “Moderate Machiavelli? Contrasting the Prince with the Arthashastra of Kautilya.” Critical Horizons: A Journal of Philosophy & Social Theory 3, no. 2 (2002): 153–76.

A typology of homegrown theorizing   37 Boesche, Roger.  The First Great Political Realist: Kautilya and his Arthashastra. Lexington Books, 2002. Cai, Tuo. “Global Governance: The Chinese Angle of View and Practice.” Social Sciences in China 25, no. 2 (2004): 57–68. Cardoso, Fernando Henrique, and Enzo Faletto. Dependency and Development in Latin America. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979. Chen, Ching-­Chang. “The Absence of Non-­Western IR Theory in Asia Reconsidered.” International Relations of the Asia-­Pacific 11, no. 1 (2011): 1–23. Chen, Ching-­Chang. “The Impossibility of Building Indigenous Theories in a Hegemonic Discipline: The Case of Japanese International Relations.” Asian Perspective 36, no. 3 (2012): 463–92. Chirot, Daniel, and Thomas D. Hall. “World-­System Theory.” Annual Review of Sociology 8, no. 1 (1982): 81–106. Choi, Jong Kun. “Theorizing East Asian International Relations in Korea.” Asian Perspective 32, no. 1 (2008): 193–216. Cox, Robert W. “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory.” Millennium—Journal of International Studies 10, no. 2 (1981): 126–55. Cox, Robert W. “Towards a Post-­Hegemonic Conceptualization of World Order: Reflections on the Relevancy of Ibn Khaldun.” In Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics, edited by James N. Rosenau and Ernst-­Otto Czempiel, 132–59. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992. Cox, Robert W. “Civilizations: Encounters and Transformations.” Studies in Political Economy 47, no. 1 (1995): 7–31. Crawford, Robert M.A. “Where Have All the Theorists Gone—Gone to Britain? Everyone? A Story of Two Parochialisms in International Relations.” In International Relations—Still an Amer­ican Social Science? Toward Diversity in International Thought, edited by Robert M.A. Crawford and Darryl S.L. Jarvis, 221–42. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001. Crawford, Robert M.A., and Darryl S.L. Jarvis, eds. International Relations—Still an Amer­ican Social Science? Toward Diversity in International Thought. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001. Deudney, Daniel. “Bringing Nature Back In: Geopolitical Theory from the Greeks to the Global Era.” In Contested Grounds: Security and Conflict in the New Environmental Politics, edited by Daniel Deudney and Richard Matthew, 25–60. SUNY Press, 1999. Friedrichs, Jörg. European Approaches to International Relations Theory: A House with Many Mansions. Oxford: Routledge, 2004. Gaddis, John Lewis. “History, Theory, and Common Ground.” International Security 22, no. 1 (1997): 75–85. Galtung, Johan. Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization. London: Sage, 1996. Geldenhuys, Deon. Isolated States: A Comparative Analysis. Cambridge: Press Syndicate, 1990. Gilpin, Robert. War and Change in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983. Gowen, Herbert H. “ ‘The Indian Machiavelli’ or Political Theory in India Two Thousand Years Ago.” Political Science Quarterly 44, no. 2 (1929): 173–92. Hassan, Umit. Ibn Haldun’un Metodu ve Siyaset Teorisi. Istanbul: Toplumsal Donusum, 1998.

38   Ersel Aydınlı and Gonca Biltekin Hoffmann, Stanley. “An Amer­ican Social Science: International Relations.” Deadalus 106, no. 3 (1977): 41–60. Hopkins, Terence K., and Immanuel Maurice Wallerstein. World-­Systems Analysis: Theory and Methodology. London: Sage, 1982. Inoguchi, Takashi, and Paul Bacon. “The Study of International Relations in Japan: Towards a More International Discipline.” International Relations of the Asia Pacific 1, no. 1 (2001): 1–20. Kalpakian, Jack. “Ibn Khaldun’s Influence on Current International Relations Theory.” The Journal of North African Studies 13, no. 3 (2008): 363–76. Kristensen, Peter Marcus. “How Can Emerging Powers Speak? On Theorists, Native Informants and Quasi-­Officials in International Relations Discourse.” Third World Quarterly 36, no. 4 (2015): 637–53. Kusnezow, Artur. “A New Model for Traditional Civilisations.” International Affairs (Moscow) 41, no. 4–5 (1995): 95–100. Love, Joseph L. “Raúl Prebisch and the Origins of the Doctrine of Unequal Exchange.” Latin Amer­ican Research Review 15, no. 3 (1980): 45–72. Lynham, Susan A. “The General Method of Theory-­Building Research in Applied Disciplines.” Advances in Developing Human Resources 4, no. 3 (August 1, 2002): 221–41. Mignolo, Walter D. “Epistemic Disobedience, Independent Thought and Decolonial Freedom.” Theory, Culture & Society 26, no. 7–8 (2009): 159–81. Modelski, George. “Kautilya: Foreign Policy and International System in the Ancient Hindu World.” The Amer­ican Political Science Review 58, no. 3 (1964): 549–60. Morris, James Winston. “An Arab Machiavelli? Rhetoric, Philosophy, and Politics in Ibn Khaldun’s Critique of Sufism.” Harvard Middle Eastern and Islamic Review 8 (2009): 242–91. Nicolaidis, Kalypso, and Justine Lacroix. “Order and Justice beyond the Nation-­State: Europe’s Competing Paradigms.” In Order and Justice in International Relations, edited by Rosemary Foot, John Gaddis, and Andrew Hurrell, 125–54. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. Nielsen, Ras T., and Peter Marcus Kristensen. “Constructing a Chinese International Relations Theory: A Sociological Approach to Intellectual Innovation.” International Political Sociology 7, no. 1 (2013): 19–40. Norbu, Dawa. “Tibet in Sino-­Indian Relations: The Centrality of Marginality.” Asian Survey 37, no. 11 (1997): 1078–95. Pasha, Mustapha Kemal. “Ibn Khaldun and World Order.” In Innovation and Transformation in International Studies, edited by Stephan Gill and James H. Mittelman, 56–70. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Patnaik, Prabhat. “The Fascism of Our Times.” Social Scientist 21, no. 3–4 (1993): 69–77. Paul, T.V. “Integrating International Relations Studies in India to Global Scholarship.” International Studies 46, no. 1–2 (2009): 129–45. Qin, Yaqing. “Why Is There No Chinese International Relations Theory?” International Relations of the Asia-­Pacific 7, no. 3 (2007): 313–40. Qin, Yaqing. “Rule, Rules, and Relations: Towards a Synthetic Approach to Governance.” The Chinese Journal of International Politics 4, no. 2 (2011): 117–45. Rubinson, Richard. “The World-­Economy and the Distribution of Income within States: A Cross-­National Study.” Amer­ican Sociological Review 41, no. 4 (1976): 638–59. Sankaran, Krishina. “The Importance of Being Ironic: A Postcolonial View on Critical International Relations Theory.” Alternatives 18, no. 3 (1993): 385–417.

A typology of homegrown theorizing   39 Sartori, Giovanni. “Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics.” The Amer­ican Political Science Review 64, no. 4 (1970): 1033–53. Schroeder, Paul W. “History and International Relations Theory: Not Use or Abuse, but Fit or Misfit.” International Security 22, no. 1 (1997): 64–74. Sergouinin, Alexander. “Russia: IR at a Crossroads.” In International Relations Scholarship Around the World, edited by Arlene B. Tickner and Ole Wæver, 223–41. Oxford: Routledge, 2009. Shambaugh, David. “International Relations Studies in China: History, Trends, and Prospects.” International Relations of the Asia-­Pacific 11, no. 3 (2011): 339–72. Smith, Steve. “The Discipline of International Relations: Still an Amer­ican Social Science?” The British Journal of Politics & International Relations 2, no. 3 (2000): 374–402. Smith, Steve. “The United States and the Discipline of International Relations: ‘Hegemonic Country, Hegemonic Discipline.’ ” International Studies Review 4, no. 2 (2002): 67–85. Smith, Tony. “The Underdevelopment of Development Literature: The Case of Dependency Theory.” World Politics 31, no. 2 (1979): 247–88. Snyder, David, and Edward Kick. “Structural Position in the World System and Economic Growth, 1955–1970: A Multiple-­Network Analysis of Transnational Interactions.” Amer­ican Journal of Sociology 84, no. 5 (1979): 1096–126. Snyder, Jack. “Some Good and Bad Reasons for a Distinctively Chinese Approach to International Relations Theory.” Paper presented at the APSA 2008 Annual Meeting, Hynes Convention Center, Boston, Massachusetts, 2008. Stowasser, Barbara Freyer. “Religion and Political Development: Comparative Ideas on Ibn Khaldun and Machiavelli.” Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, 2011. Accessed August 21, 2016. https://georgetown.app.box.com/s/ufohrhyqa4phr775z9p1. Strange, Susan. “Political Economy and International Relations.” In International Relations Theory Today, edited by Ken Booth and Steve Smith, 154–74. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995. Thornton, Stephen. “Karl Popper.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, November 13, 1997. Accessed May 11, 2018. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/ popper/. Tickner, Arlene B. “Latin Amer­ican IR and the Primacy of Lo Práctico.” International Studies Review 10, no. 4 (2008): 735–48. Tickner, Arlene B. “Core, Periphery and (Neo) Imperialist International Relations.” European Journal of International Relations 19, no. 3, (2013): 627–46. Tickner, Arlene B., and Ole Wæver. International Relations Scholarship Around the World. Oxford: Routledge, 2009. Tinker, Hugh. “Magnificent Failure? The Gandhian Ideal in India after Sixteen Years.” International Affairs 40, no. 2 (1964): 262–76. Tsygankov, Andrei P., and Pavel A. Tsygankov. “New Directions in Russian International Studies: Pluralization, Westernization, and Isolationism.” Communist and Post-­ Communist Studies 37, no. 1 (2004): 1–17. Tsygankov, Andrei P., and Pavel A. Tsygankov. “A Sociology of Dependence in International Relations Theory: A Case of Russian Liberal IR.” International Political Sociology 1, no. 4 (2007): 307–24. Tsygankov, Andrei P., and Pavel A. Tsygankov. “National Ideology and IR Theory: Three Incarnations of the ‘Russian Idea.’ ” European Journal of International Relations 16, no. 4 (2010): 663–86. Turton, Helen Louise, and Lucas G Freire. “Peripheral Possibilities: Revealing Originality and Encouraging Dialogue through a Reconsideration of ‘Marginal’ IR Scholarship.”

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3 Would 100 global workshops on theory building make a difference? Knud Erik Jørgensen

This is essentially a concrete proposal to convene 100 workshops/panels during the next few years so that the 2019 commemorations of the highly symbolical 1919–2019 centenary can produce not only retrospective but also future-­oriented studies. In order to have a lasting impact the workshops should exclusively be for scholars who have an interest in building theory. The guiding idea for the chapter is that policies – for instance a policy on globalizing the discipline’s theory production – without organizational and public philosophical footings have less potential impact than policies that enjoy such underpinnings. In this sense, Marx’ 11th Feuerbach thesis – philosophers have so far only interpreted the world, the point is to change it – remains valid and relevant also for academic practices. While the suggested workshops count as organizational footings, the public philosophical dimension is constituted by the idea that the International Relations (IR) discipline would become more consolidated and globally more relevant if global theorizing were to happen in a fashion that reflect more diverse origins. Four observations make me think that the conditions for such an enterprise do exist. We are – cf. the 2013 special issue of the European Journal of International Relations (EJIR) – in an ‘end of IR theory’ situation; Theorizing in one of the main centres of the discipline, the United States, does experience significant decline;1 Theorizing in Europe is more dispersed than concerted and hegemonic; New centres of knowledge production are being established with potentials for consolidating both the discipline and its theories. In short, the timing for such a 100 workshops enterprise seems perfect. The chapter is structured in five parts. While the chapter rests on the assumption that theoretical knowledge is valuable such an assumption cannot be taken for granted. The first section therefore examines the assumption and outlines the comparative advantages of theoretical knowledge. The second section provides a brief market analysis. If 100 workshops would make a difference, what exactly would the difference be? After all, movie production is said to be dominated by Hollywood but Bollywood produces more movies than Hollywood. Nonetheless, the world market is dominated by Hollywood. Hence, if Jean Leca’s distinction between academic domestic and global markets is applied,2 theory building for a number of domestic or regional markets might impact ‘consumption’ patterns in domestic or regional markets but not necessarily the world market. The third

42   Knud Erik Jørgensen section raises some serious doubts about the widespread belief that the discipline is characterized by Amer­ican hegemony. The apparent need for 100 workshops could be legitimized by the argument that the IR discipline is under Amer­ican hegemony but this assumption is severely challenged by empirical research showing that Amer­ican hegemony is a fact in institutional terms but not in terms of theoretical fads and debates being followed in the rest of the world. In short, intellectual global hegemony is a chimera, a largely imagined state of affairs for which reason the rationale of the workshops cannot be anti-­hegemonic. In the fourth section, the chapter argues that 100 workshops might be necessary but would essentially be waste of time if focused on theorizing a bygone world. In the fifth and final section the chapter makes the argument that the 100 workshops should contribute to redefine what is perceived to be the core of the discipline, i.e. what Ted Hopf calls ‘a particular well-­known consensually foundational literature’.3 It is only if analysts begin by ignoring non-­Amer­ican, non-­European or non-­Western conceptions of foundational literature that they subsequently can construct a hegemonic global state of affairs and, in turn criticize what they have constructed.

The value of theoretical knowledge The beach at the small Cornish town Porthcurno appears as just a beach but it is not. The beach is where the sea communication cables from many corners of the British empire entered Great Britain before continuing to London, the metropole and epicentre of the empire. The beach at Porthcurno – triggering powerful connotations of empire, hierarchy, hegemony as well as centre and periphery – is a suitable image of how various critics present past and contemporary acts of theorizing within the IR discipline. They claim that theorists within the dominant power(s) theorize global affairs by means of a local language, typically English. They also claim that the knowledge that in abstract or synthesized form constitute their theories is universal and that their theories are universally applicable. In the rest of the world there are no theorists and no IR theory is being produced, indeed knowledge in the form of theory is not appreciated or cherished. Calls to globalize the discipline and its theories are meant to change this state of affairs and different approaches are employed. Some point to parochialism masquerading as universalism. Others suggest that the discipline should be dismantled.4 Still others point to the fact that the world is bigger than the main centres of theorizing. I tend to follow the latter avenue arguing that the Porthcurno image is misleading, and for two reasons. The dichotomies of the British Empire/the rest or ‘the West/the rest’ makes more harm than good and obscures the distribution of agency in the field of theory building. Moreover, theorizing is cherished throughout the world. In other words, thinking theoretically is not exclusively a feature of ‘the West’ and anti-­theoretical sentiments are not exclusively a feature of the non-­West. The following triptych of questions is crucially important for understanding both the universal yet contested value of theory and the potential value of the 100 workshops:

100 global workshops on theory building   43 • • •

What is theory? What is the theorizing process? What is the value of theoretical knowledge?

Given that defining theory is a task in itself, I have to be pragmatic so the following definition therefore works for me. According to Kenneth Waltz,  Theory is artifice. A theory is an intellectual construction by which we select facts and interpret them. The challenge is to bring theory to bear on facts in ways that permit explanation and prediction. That can only be accomplished by distinguishing between theory and fact. Only if this distinction is made can theory be used to examine and interpret facts.5  It is the feature of artifice and the distinction between theory and fact that I in the present context find useful for understanding the nature of theory. I would add, though, that there are different kinds of theory: explanatory, interpretive and normative, and each kind has its own distinct features.6 The theorizing process is a strangely under-­described activity.7 It is as if theorists, like magicians, do not want to reveal theory secrets and others do not dare to explore. Donald Puchala is an exception, suggesting that theorists do the following when they theorize, [t]he theorists are first and foremost conceptualizers, symbolizers, synthesizers, and abstract organizers … what they have been doing as theorists is painting for us in their writings bold-­stroked, broad-­brushed pictures of social reality and telling us that the real world is their pictures.8 We now have an idea about what the theorists at the workshops are supposed to produce and the key characteristics of the production process. But why is what they do valuable? What’s the value of theoretical knowledge? The short version of the story about the value of theory is, in the words of Stanley Hoffmann and Robert Keohane, that ‘attempts to avoid theory not only miss interesting questions but rely implicitly on a framework for analysis that remains unexamined precisely because it is implicit’.9 I share Keohane and Hoffmann’s take on the role of theory and believe it has profound ramifications for our global discipline that the production of theoretical knowledge is uneven and that frameworks for analysis are left unexamined. It is high time to critically examine the unexamined frameworks no matter whether they originate in the North, South, East or West. I should like to add that theory has a number of different roles: guiding empirical research, inspiring research agendas, providing a scientific alternative to ideology and conspiracy theory. It is telling that geopolitics thrives as a framework for understanding world politics especially in areas where the IR discipline is less established.10 Hence, on the pro side we will not miss interesting questions and we will get a chance to examine implicit assumptions. Such values are cherished in certain

44   Knud Erik Jørgensen segments of the scholarly community but, importantly, they are not shared throughout the community. Empiricists just want the descriptive or analytical job done without much theoretical fanfare and methodologists consider theories to be, at best, a reservoir of hypotheses.11 It seems to me that Mearsheimer and Walt are spot on with their criticism of an approach that is trending especially within international studies as cultivated in the United States. Some naively consider paradigmatic theories, the so-­called ‘isms’, to be downright ‘evil’.12 Others consider metatheory to be even worse,13 a position that unfortunately suggests an unwarranted abandonment of an entire scholarly field of enquiry.14 The above examples are all ‘Western’, deliberately selected to show that it is not the case that theoretical knowledge is cherished in ‘the West’ but not in the ‘South’ or ‘East’. It seems that the balance of power between explicit and implicit theoretical knowledge varies around the world. What matters might be the degree to which universities are autonomous vis-­à-vis political-­ideological or religious institutions. At the individual level those in the policy or media worlds who make careers on the basis of ‘knowing about international affairs’ typically do not see the value of making implicit assumptions explicit and, even worse, to have their implicit assumptions examined. The advancement of IR theory would then potentially alter the balance of power between IR scholars who believe in science and those who rely on alternative frameworks or political or religious authorities. Theorists at the workshops should be fully aware of such institutional or individual power relations.

Market analysis The second section of this chapter provides a brief market analysis and thus focuses on supply and demand or producers, the retail sector and consumers. If 100 workshops were to make a difference, what exactly would the difference be? Let us assume that the 100 workshops actually take place and that many of the participants succeed in building both paradigmatic and mid-­range theories as well as both first and second order theory.15 The 100 workshops would in terms of output be a great success but what about outcome? Would they change anything? The supply of theories would be significantly increased but what about the demand? My hunch is that not that much would be different and three reasons explain why. First, the newly built theories would not necessarily be part of the ‘consensually foundational’ literature16 but instead face an existence at the fringe of the discipline. In other words, their reception might not be as the authors intended or as the theories would deserve. The dialectics of author intent and reception is often unpredictable and some of the new theories might be capable of creating their own demand. Second, following the Hollywood/Bollywood analogy we can critically ask if the new theories would be Bollywood productions. Bollywood movies entertain millions of people so perhaps the world market should not be the only indicator of success. In turn, we can therefore ask if such an outcome necessarily would

100 global workshops on theory building   45 be so bad. Do the new theories necessarily need to conquer the world market? The twins of modernization theory and dependencia theory can serve as illustrative examples of limited reach yet nonetheless some impact. By contrast, if the theorists do aim at the world market, then what would it take to enter and become established in the world market? A third option is Pinewood, a film studio that is especially known for its signature James Bond movies, and thus represents a distinct tradition of its own. The various theoretical schools around the world – for instance Amsterdam, Copenhagen, Toronto, Stanford – could perhaps be seen as Pinewood productions. No laws of nature suggest that theoretical schools cannot emerge in Shanghai, Izmir or Cape Town. Third, authors do not always control the reception of their theories. To do so takes extraordinary effort, some luck and persistence.17 The first hurdle is the mandatory peer assessment of quality and relevance. While the quality of theories is essentially contested, a genuine take-­off requires recognition by a considerable segment of the market. Somehow theories produced in the traditional centre of knowledge production tend to be cherished more than theories built elsewhere, so an uphill battle is predictable. It is presumably the celebrity factor at play (celebrities are people who are known to be known). The second hurdle is socialization within the discipline of new generations of scholars. Hence the new theories need to be included in textbooks and be part of PhD training programmes. It will take some effort to persuade authors of textbooks and PhD programme planners to include the new theories. The cases of the English School and world systems theory illustrate the challenge as they struggle to become part of what is taught. The third hurdle is time. Theoretical dynamics tend to be characterized more by a certain slowness and inertia than rupture and quick adaptation. It took a decade, the 1990s, to cut the realist theoretical tradition to size and a similar amount of time to consolidate constructivist advances. Moreover, if textbooks were compared across time, it is clearly the case that their profile changes. Textbooks of the 1970s are very different from textbooks in 2017. Finally, while it takes considerable time to criticize existing textbooks for all their flaws, it will take a considerably longer time for the critics to write the perfect textbooks they demand. In summary, Leca’s distinction between academic domestic and global markets makes sense and can serve as a useful starting point for theorists when considering their ambitions.18 Is the aim of theory building to serve a number of domestic or regional markets or is the aim to be of consequence at the world market? In order to secure the desired outcome the three factors mentioned above need to be handled.

Global pluralism is a fact (get used to it!) The aim of homegrown theorizing outside the traditional centres is sometimes to change what is described as theoretical hegemony within the discipline. However, if at some point European or Amer­ican hegemony characterized the discipline, it no longer does. A degree of European hegemony characterized the

46   Knud Erik Jørgensen main institution for the advancement of the discipline before World War 2, i.e. the International Studies Conference (ISC), but the ISC was ‘killed’ in 1950.19 Subsequently the discipline became more institutionalized in the United States than elsewhere and the 1959 ISA secession from Amer­ican Political Science Association (APSA) is in this context a not insignificant factor. This chapter takes the position that contemporary hegemony is very limited for which reason the often limited state of homegrown theorizing outside traditional centres should not be explained primarily by means of external factors. The proposed 100 workshops simply represent one way of taking responsibility for changing the current state of affairs and in turn engage in upgrading the level of theorizing outside the current sites of production. In short, we are now in an after hegemony situation and this enables a range of opportunities but also presents several challenges. The first opportunity to change the theoretical set-­up of the discipline is based on the fact that most major cities around the world enjoy a critical mass of IR scholars with an interest in theoretical issues. They can organize workshops or symposia that focus on the different ways of engaging in theory building. The organization of such workshops is not dependent on a green light from a faraway hegemon. In contrast to workshops on large-­n research, theory workshops do not require investments in expensive research infrastructure. The workshops merely require time and space to ‘think theory thoroughly’ plus perhaps some personal predispositions, to paraphrase Rosenau and Durfee.20 The second opportunity is a result of the fact that theorizing does not necessarily need to begin from scratch, for instance by means of developing an entirely new vocabulary. The behaviouralists of the 1960s opted for this kind of approach yet the results did not exactly live up to expectations. The process of theory building can begin with more modest objectives, for instance conceptualization, reconceptualization, theory synthesis or projects of reconstruction. If our collective objective is to understand global politics and economics then we need to translate our demand for knowledge into a number of research questions or research agendas. Such questions or agendas are not necessarily global or universal but can hardly avoid being influenced by our distinct centric perspectives. We engage in theoretical thinking because we believe it can help us achieve our general objective and help us transcend our centrism of various kinds. Both theory building and theory application have instrumental functions and are not ends as such. When we engage in conceptualization we do it because we have distinct research questions and agendas in our mind. When we engage in reconceptualization we do so because we think existing concepts are inadequate vis-­àvis our questions and agendas. Likewise we engage in theory synthesis and theoretical reconstruction because the outcome provides a better match to our questions or a better guide to our analysis, i.e. the process through which we aim at finding answers to our questions. Third, theory builders could perhaps find inspiration in the approach adopted by a group of Danish film directors, Dogme 95, consisting of a number of self-­ imposed limits, the purpose being enhanced creativity in areas that are unlimited.

100 global workshops on theory building   47 In the case of movie directors, they decided to only use natural lighting. In the case of theory builders I will, for purely illustrative purposes, mention two options: perhaps 50 workshops could focus entirely on building structural theories and 50 workshops could focus on agent-­oriented theory building. Yet it would be for the workshop organizers to decide the constraints that would be imposed on the theorists. In any case, whereas homegrown theorizing is bound to begin at home it can end with a theory of home or a universal theory. Realist balance of power theory is the outcome of theorizing nineteenth century power politics in Europe (home), yet it might nonetheless have universal characteristics and thus be applicable elsewhere, for instance in studies of the Middle East, Africa or Eastern Asia. Likewise, some theoretical traditions within Japanese IR contain homegrown theories, thus originating in Japan but the theories might be applicable elsewhere. Dependencia theory mainly took off in Latin America yet also found an audience on other continents. Fourth, the production of many new first order theories carries the opportunity to strengthen the discipline of IR. After decades of endeavours to destabilize the discipline, for which reason it remains contested, it would be most helpful for both the theories and the discipline if the new theories were built within its framework thus contribute to develop it rather than dismantle it. Fifth, while the 100 workshops can be and should be seen as an example of the ‘let 100 flowers blossom’ doctrine, the workshops/panels would unquestionably have more impact if connected to or organized within major existing associations, including the World International Studies Committee (WISC), the International Studies Association (ISA) and the European International Studies Association (EISA). It does not take too much effort to organize workshops, symposia, sections or panels. In addition to the venues of the major associations, financial constraints suggest that smaller events would be necessary, not least because the workshops should be global and despite aspirations, the major association events do not have complete global reach. All these opportunities are to some extent available and are indeed in the process of being exploited, i.e. contemporary workshops do generate new theories. The existence of a dozen theory building projects indicates that the interest in theorizing is on the rise.21 Actually, one of the biggest challenges is to remain up to date on the many projects and thus realize the high degree to which the contemporary discipline is characterized by pluralism.

Theorizing the local and the bygone? Globalizing the discipline implies changing it and change depends on criticism. The 100 workshops should therefore be characterized by profound criticism, aimed at changing the profile of the discipline. However, in order to build theories, criticism should not be limited to critique. It should be an instrumental starting point, i.e. function as a platform for building theories. One example is E.H. Carr’s Twenty Years Crisis, which is partly a critique of currents within the liberal tradition but also an example of early twentieth century realist thought.

48   Knud Erik Jørgensen Moreover, criticism should have a genuinely global perspective and theorizing should be relevant for the twenty-­first century. Genuinely global perspectives do obviously not equal Global South perspectives but should be inclusive of all standpoints. In this context Kimberly Hutchings seems to believe that her best contribution to a globalized IR is to be increasingly quiet thereby leaving space to non-­Western perspective.22 It seems to me that engagement is a better option. Unfortunately, current critique is far from being global and, moreover, tends to focus on a bygone world. Criticism of the discipline and its theories is frequently characterized by conventions and a certain degree of orthodoxy. Thus, critique of Eurocentrism is conventionally a critique of Western, i.e. European or Amer­ican, instances of adopting centrist perspectives. However, Eurocentrism is only one distinct centric perspective and, globally, centric perspectives are widespread if not ubiquitous. Likewise, studies of empire are conventionally characterized by a more or less relevant critique of European or Amer­ican imperial practices,23 yet strangely overlook the role of empire in contemporary Russian, Chinese or Iranian (foreign policy) discourses.24 Studies and critique of racism in the discipline conventionally focus on Western racism yet racism seems to be a global phenomenon and should in the context of globalizing IR be analysed as such.25 Finally, studies and critique of orientalism conventionally focus on European or Amer­ican instances of orientalist practices. But orientalism is merely a concept within the wider category of mis-­representations (taking images for true representations of the other), an exercise in which Europe can hardly claim monopoly. It would be a pity if the theorists at the 100 workshops continue the present current of critical approaches turned orthodox. The frequently employed dichotomy of ‘the West’ and ‘the non-­West’ appears to be foremost an important obstacle to globalizing the discipline, yet is often presented as part of a solution to a claimed problem. The distinction clearly exaggerates similarities within and differences between the categories and thus obscures the fact that major parts of Europe can be characterized in ways that are strikingly similar to how ‘the non-­West’ tends to be characterized. Jacek Czaputowicz and Anna Woyciuk identify features of Polish IR that Siddharth Mallavarapu claims characterize Indian IR.26 Furthermore, what exactly is ‘the West’? While it might include traditions within Japanese IR that were imported (from Germany) what about the homegrown IR traditions in Japan? Finally, what to do about theorists on the move, for instance the Australians Coral Bell, John Burton and Hedley Bull who all contributed to IR in Europe? Does South African Charles Manning’s theory of international society count as ‘Western’ or ‘non-­ Western IR’? Do we, when applying the theory of orientalism,27 apply a Western (Columbia University, NYC) or non-­Western theory (built by a Palestinian, and therefore South, East, North or West)? Theorists face not only a certain degree of orthodoxy in current critical approaches but also the inclusion of non-­Western theoretical perspectives, an inclusion that is not without its problems. The employment of distinctly non-­ Western concepts is obviously a notable challenge to lazy Western minds and a highly disquieting factor in the (de-)construction of our worldviews and

100 global workshops on theory building   49 g­ lobalizing discipline. Increased employment of notions like ubuntu or tianxia (and many more) would obviously extend the discipline’s vocabulary and might thus contribute to de-­centralize the discipline.28 Yet it is an even bigger cognitive challenge to acknowledge that non-­Western theoretical reflections are frequently primed by features that critical IR aims to problematize.29 The following three challenges for a sound six continents IR discipline therefore amount to a mission nearly impossible. First, exceptionalism is not particularly exceptional but characterizes ways of thinking around the world. While the Amer­ican and European versions are exceptionally well known and occasionally assumed to be exceptional in the world, scholarship on Russia, India and China suggests otherwise and indeed demonstrates the significance of exceptionalism with Russian, Indian or Chinese characteristics.30 Actually, exceptionalist thinking is so widespread that it is somewhat hard to find exceptions to this very special local yet seemingly universal way of thinking. Moreover, ethnocentrism is as widespread as exceptionalism and both are documented and in some cases represented by scholarship. Finally, theorists in the West do not enjoy a monopoly in the market of universal ideas. Similar to Western liberalism, Confucianism is universalistic, cf. notions like tianxia and expectations about a global order with Chinese characteristics, beginning with China’s (peaceful?) rise. In a truly global six continents IR discipline it will be difficult but not impossible to acknowledge that Europe (or the West) does not enjoy a monopoly of exceptionalism, ethnocentrism and universalism, for which reason criticism of European or Western versions remains relevant but should be extended to generic ways of thinking and subsequently extended to local versions.

Towards a consensually foundational literature Theorists in the 100 workshops should aim to contribute to what Ted Hopf calls ‘a particular well-­known consensually foundational literature’.31 In other words, the target should be the core of the discipline. Otherwise the theories might experience a life at the fringes of the discipline, an existence that some might deem satisfactory but, again, if the general aim is to globalize the discipline then it is necessary to aim higher. However, aiming at a consensually foundational literature is highly controversial, not least because it implies disciplinary features such as boundaries, foundations, trajectories, traditions, inclusions and exclusions as well as processes of deliberation that are capable of producing a new consensual foundational literature. In other words, if it really is ‘the discipline’ (and its theories) we aim to globalize then conceptualizing disciplinary identity is a (pre-)condition for achieving the objective. Unfortunately pleas to globalize the discipline are frequently made without much reflection on the nature of the discipline or its uneven development and different trajectories in different parts of the world. Tracing the trajectories takes some effort and is complicated by the fact that the nature of the discipline seems foremost to be a synthesizing or fusion discipline;

50   Knud Erik Jørgensen

CFL1 CFL2 CFL3 Figure 3.1  Variations of ‘Consensually Foundational Literature’ (CFL) over time.

this in contrast to most other disciplines that are the result of fission or splintering, e.g. molecular biology splinters off from biology yet preserves affiliations with biology. The suggestion that new theories should contribute to a consensual foundational literature is meant to counter loose non-­committing references to ‘the discipline’ or, even more vague, ‘IR’. The good news is that the consensual foundational literature is not etched in stone but somewhat dynamic as Figure 3.1 illustrates. The issue of a consensual foundational literature can be approached at both macro and micro levels. At the micro level we have the individual theorist who almost necessarily will build a given theory in the context of the macro level, i.e. the institutional, disciplinary settings. It would thus probably be insufficient to just assemble the building blocks of theory in new creative fashions, even if such theorizing would be for someone or for some purpose. At the macro (institutional) level, discipline requires a foundational literature, e.g. a canon of 50, 100 or 225 foundational publications. However, what exactly does ‘consensual’ mean? Unless globalizing equals a process through which the existing foundational literature is taken on as is, the globalizing process implies redefining the foundational literature. It is a body of literature that is not etched in stone but changes over time. Thus, the foundational literature of the 1950s is different from how it looks nowadays. Moreover, it is an essentially contested body of literature left in the hands of individual scholars or departments who design courses and syllabi as in their judgement it would be the best way to teach students. Fortunately, such designs are in many places not in the hands of government or association regulatory committees but left to individual scholars or university departments. The general aim for the workshops is to reshape the core canon of the discipline, yet such a thorough reshaping would be a gradual and long-­lasting process, a continuation of an already ongoing process. It is predictable that the outcome of the 100 workshops would be a significant body of new concepts and theories, some of which would be sufficiently compelling to be adopted in syllabi and enter into the list of standard references. The process can be illustrated by the concept ‘securitization’. It started as a one-­man idea32 25 years ago, yet has generated a sizeable literature and entered numerous syllabi around the world and thus become part of a redefined foundational literature. How do scholars think the social reality of foundational literature should be changed? I will briefly examine five scholarly approaches. First, according to Meera Sabaratnam, the preferred approach is to ‘throw away’ conceptions or ‘putting down’ unwarranted literature,

100 global workshops on theory building   51 Such openings are made eminently possible – indeed necessary – by Hobson’s comprehensive critique of Eurocentrism in world politics. I would also like to say that this should also mark the opportunity also to start putting down many of the Eurocentric texts that have populated reading lists for so long, and in doing so re-­make the discipline more fit for purpose – a truly inclusive account of global interactions and politics, told from many sides, alert to multiple layers of connectivity, relationality and resonance as well as violence, dispossession and conflict. Hobson’s excellent book highlights again just how short-­sighted and parochial Eurocentric conceptions of world politics have made us. The question is, now we have recognised this, do we have the courage, imagination and ability to throw them away?33 Sabaratnam’s approach might be innocent and fully in line with how disciplinary practices have been for decades. For all sorts of reasons individuals or departments frequently decide to drop a text from a syllabus and replace it with a different text. This is one of the ways in which the English School has experienced a renaissance, simply by means of being increasingly recognized as a part of the foundational literature. Sabaratnam declares she wants to avoid being ‘short-­sighted and parochial’ yet it is unclear if she considers Eurocentrism to be the only obstacle to achieve the objective. Moreover, it seems to me that the characteristics of a ‘discipline more fit for purpose’ are accurate descriptions of the discipline that already exists. Second, in ‘Permeability of Disciplinary Boundaries in the Age of Globalization: Interdisciplinary Scholarship in International Relations’, Ehsanul Haque finds interdisciplinarity a promising approach,34 In a globalized world, we witness an entirely new, unprecedented form of knowledge production where the creation and utilization of knowledge is no longer seen as a linear process. In fact, the forces of globalization demand multiple disciplines to unravel and scientists transgress/cross disciplinary boundaries in their search for new knowledge creation and dissemination. Against this backdrop, this paper particularly reflects on the interdisciplinary character of International Relations (IR) – a successful and fascinating interdisciplinary subject having infinite boundaries. While IR is a full-­ blown, autonomous, and accomplished academic discipline, its hybrid curricula bring complementary strengths and enlarged perspectives from a diverse array of disciplines including Political Science, History, Economics, Sociology, Philosophy, and the like in order to address the ever-­increasing complexities and broader issues as well as to impart unified knowledge and produce cognitive advancement … students develop a ‘meta-­knowledge’ of multiple disciplines, methods and epistemologies, and learn how to reflectively integrate and synthesize different perspectives. Finally, the paper concludes that such interdisciplinarity promotes quality research and contributes to solving new problems which cannot be addressed within the individual disciplines alone.

52   Knud Erik Jørgensen It is the idea of IR having hybrid features that ensures that it can be understood as both a discipline and an interdisciplinary field. However, it seems to me that hybridity can be taken too far. In other words, if IR is, at the same time, both subject and discipline, and both a discipline and an interdisciplinary field, then it might accurately describe the diverse ways in which IR is perceived but conceptual overstretch also kicks in and the diagnosis becomes unhelpful for guidance for the way forward for ‘IR’. Third, whereas I suggest new theories should be built within the framework of the discipline and thus contribute to develop the discipline rather than dismantle it, Chris Brown opts for a genuinely radical approach, If we truly wish to promote diversity in international thought, it may be that a crucial first step will be to contribute to the work of dismantling ‘International Relations’ as an academic discipline.35 This suggestion is in line with Brown’s general dismissive stance concerning the disciplinary character of IR.36 In principle, Brown’s approach could be compatible with my approach, especially if Brown by ‘International Relations’ has an orthodox, set in stone perception of the discipline in mind. However, his criticism of Charles Manning’s tireless work to consolidate the discipline can be seen as an indication that Brown is dismissive of any attempt to cultivate the discipline. Fourth, Pierre Lizée suggests that the way forward is to reinvent the discipline,37 Engaging all these questions, though, means a step forward for the discipline, one that entails a re-­examination of its basic language about what is universal and what is particular in international affairs. This is the last element in the reinvention of international studies proposed in this book … the key authors and texts which have shaped the nature and evolution of international studies as a discipline must be brought in when we consider these issues. To do otherwise would leave unresolved the one issue which must be addressed by international studies at the moment: the core canon of the discipline would remain unchanged, the ‘rise of the rest’ would proceed apace, and the gap between the discipline and the world it now has to explain would grow, without ever being bridged. This is where, in the end, the most crucial challenge for international studies could lie at this time. Lizee’s approach has greatly inspired my own approach and his plea to reconsider the canon of the discipline might also be compatible with Sabaratnam and Haque. The approaches partly overlap and include contending perspectives but are not mutually exclusive. The fifth approach adds to the fabric of reflections on the way forward. Fifth, Audrey Alejando et al.’s Reappraising European IR Theoretical Traditions is based on the idea that wherever we are situated in the world, we should

100 global workshops on theory building   53 examine the trajectories of theoretical traditions.38 They are considered the backbone of the discipline for which reason it is highly worthwhile to know about their origins as well as how they have developed over time. The guiding idea for the project is that it is preferable, when setting sound future directions, that we know how we got to where we are. The authors of the book are all based in one geographical setting, Europe. When we reflect on world politics and economics, Europe provides our local coordinates. Our approach and findings, we claim, are valid for Europe but might/might not be applicable to or relevant elsewhere.

Conclusions On hundred workshops on theory building could potentially make a significant difference and could have a most welcome impact on the process of globalizing the discipline of IR. In order to maximize the impact of homegrown theorizing, the value of theoretical knowledge needs to be spelled out in the rationale of the workshops and demonstrated in each of the theories built. Moreover, the chapter takes the notion ‘discipline’ in ‘globalizing the discipline’ sufficiently seriously to reject ideas of IR being a subset of any other discipline or merely an interdisciplinary field. Instead it makes a plea to actually strengthen the discipline, not least because it is only with a strong disciplinary core and an open mind that genuinely interdisciplinary work can hope to be characterized by more analytical benefits than costs. Furthermore, theorizing should transcend orthodox critical approaches and, while having a historical dimension, it should not focus too much on bygone worlds. Instead theorizing should focus mainly on trends in the contemporary global order and its actors, structures and processes. Theories should aim to contribute to the so-­called consensual foundational literature and thus potentially become part of the core of the discipline. It is highly likely that dispersed theorizing will have less impact but, as theorizing is a creative and often individual enterprise, it might be naïve or unwarranted to aim at über-concerted action. While philosophies and theoretical frameworks external to the discipline have proven to be immensely helpful for the production of insights about global affairs, it seems to me that the workshops should primarily focus on new first order substantial theories about IR.

Notes   1 John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, ‘Leaving Theory Behind: Why Simplistic Hypothesis Testing is Bad for International Relations’, European Journal of International Relations 19, no. 3 (2013): 427–57.   2 Jean Leca, ‘La science politique dans le champ intellectuel français’, Revue française de science politique 32, no. 4 (1982): 653–77.   3 Ted Hopf, Social Construction of International Politics: Identities and Foreign Policies, Moscow, 1955 and 1999 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002). The paper draws on, synthesizes, summarizes and adds to my previous publications. In ‘Continental IR Theory: The Best Kept Secret’ (Knud Erik Jørgensen, ‘Continental IR Theory: The Best Kept Secret’, European Journal of International Relations 6, no. 1 (2000): 9–42) I intended to provoke Anglo-­Saxon minds to the idea that the (European)

54   Knud Erik Jørgensen Continental IR community produces IR theory of some significance. In ‘Towards a Six Continents Social Science: International Relations’ (Knud Erik Jørgensen, ‘Towards a Six Continents Social Science: International Relations’, Journal of International Relations and Development 6, no. 4 (2004): 330–43) the aim was to contribute to the endeavour of further globalizing the discipline. In International Relations Theory: A New Introduction (Knud Erik Jørgensen, International Relations Theory: A New Introduction (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017)), I included a chapter on DIY theorizing, hoping it would give students (and perhaps their professors) the tools, building blocks and courage to engage in building their own theories. Finally, ‘After Hegemony in International Relations’ (Knud Erik Jørgensen, ‘After Hegemony in International Relations’, European Review of International Studies 1, no. 1 (2014): 57–64) included an attempt to induce an ethics of responsibility for developing the disciplinary features that can be said to be weakly developed in major parts of the global IR community.   4 Chris Brown, Practical Judgement in International Political Theory: Selected Essays (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010).   5 Kenneth N. Waltz, ‘Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory’, Journal of International Affairs 44, no. 1 (1990): 22.   6 Scholars who are not used to think theoretically often spend considerable time either on approximating theory to facts (1:1 being the most extreme case and the most useless) or, concerned about the prevalence of contending theoretical perspectives, on erasing contention in an attempt to build a monistic theory construction.   7 I call it ‘strangely under-­described’ because on the one hand theories are cherished as the backbone of the discipline but, on the other hand, most theorists do not describe what they do when they build theories. By contrast, the procedures for application of theory are described in an abundance of textbooks on methodology.   8 Donald J. Puchala, Theory and History in International Relations (London: Routledge, 2003), 24.   9 Robert O. Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann, ‘Conclusions: Community Politics and Institutional Change’, in The Dynamics of European Integration, ed. William Wallace (London; New York: Pinter Publishers for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1990), 284. 10 Stefano Guzzini, The Return of Geopolitics in Europe? Social Mechanisms and Foreign Policy Identity Crises (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 11 Mearsheimer and Walt, ‘Leaving Theory Behind’. 12 David A. Lake, ‘Why ‘Isms’ are Evil: Theory, Epistemology, and Academic Sects as Impediments to Understanding and Progress’, International Studies Quarterly 55, no. 2 (2011): 465–80. For an eminent critique see, Henry R. Nau, ‘No Alternative to “isms” ’, International Studies Quarterly 55, no. 2 (2011): 487–91. 13 Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Is Something Rotten in the State of Denmark? Constructivism and European Integration’, Journal of European Public Policy 6, no. 4 (1999): 669–81; Joseph Jupille, James A. Caporaso and Jeffrey T. Checkel, ‘Integrating Institutions Rationalism, Constructivism, and the Study of the European Union’, Comparative Political Studies 36, no. 1–2 (2003): 7–40. 14 While Andrew Moravcsik criticized metatheory in one article, he engaged at the same time in metatheoretical analysis in another article. See, Moravcsik, ‘Is Something Rotten in the State of Denmark?’; Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Is Anybody Still a Realist?’ International Security 24, no. 2 (1999): 5–55. 15 For a concise distinction, see Alexander Wendt, ‘Constructing International Politics’, International Security 20, no. 1 (1995): 71–81. 16 cf. section ‘Toward a consensually foundational literature’ in this chapter. 17 Hans Morgenthau submitted the manuscript published as Politics among Nations to 13 different publishers before New York-­based Simon and Schuster finally accepted it. 18 Leca, ‘La science politique’.

100 global workshops on theory building   55 19 David Long, ‘Who Killed the International Studies Conference?’ Review of International Studies 32, no. 4 (2006): 603–22. 20 James N. Rosenau and Mary Durfee, Thinking Theory Thoroughly: Coherent Approaches to an Incoherent World (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995). In Thinking Theory Thoroughly, Mary Durfee and James Rosenau present a comprehensive account of what it takes to think theoretically, at least concerning causal empirical theory. In terms of thoroughly examining the nature of the theorizing process the book is simply unique. 21 The projects include, Emilian Kavalski et al., ‘Encounters with the Post-­Western World Affairs of Eastphalia’ (preliminary publication title); Ingo Peters and Wiebke Wemheuer-­Vogelaar, eds., Globalizing International Relations (London: Palgrave, 2016); Pinar Bilgin, ‘How to Remedy Eurocentrism in IR? A Complement and a Challenge for The Global Transformation’, International Theory 8, no. 3 (2016): 492–501; Amitav Acharya’s project on ‘An IR for the Global South or a Global IR?’ E-­IR, 21 October 2015, accessed 28 August 2016, www.e-­ir.info/2015/10/21/an-­irfor-­the-global-­south-or-­a-global-­ir/; Imad Mansour, ‘A Global South Perspective on International Relations Theory’, International Studies Perspectives 18, no. 1 (2016): 2–3 doi: https://doi.org/10.1093/isp/ekw010; Audrey Alejandro et al., Reappraising European IR Theoretical Traditions (London: Springer, 2017). 22 Kimberly Hutchings, ‘Kimberly Hutchings on Quiet as a Research Strategy, the Essence of Critique, and the Narcissism of Minor Differences’, by Anne Sofie Bang Lindegaard and Peer Schouten, Theory Talks, 10 October 2016, accessed November 10, 2016, www.theory-­talks.org/2016/10/theory-­talk-73-kimberly-­hutchings.html. 23 Edward Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Hartmut Behr, ‘The European Union in the Legacies of Imperial Rule? EU Accession Politics Viewed From a Historical Comparative Perspective’, European Journal of International Relations 13, no. 2 (2007): 239–62; see also David A. Lake, ‘The New Amer­ican Empire?’ International Studies Perspectives 9, no. 3 (2008): 281–9. 24 Henry R. Nau and Deepa M. Ollapally, eds. Worldviews of Aspiring Powers: Domestic Foreign Policy Debates in China, India, Iran, Japan, and Russia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Dmitri Trenin, Post-­Imperium: A Eurasian Story (Washington DC: Carnegie, 2011); Marcel H. van Herpen, Putin’s Wars: The Rise of Russia’s New Imperialism (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2014). 25 In his APSA Presidential address, Peter Katzenstein addressed the issue of racism in political science. See, Peter J. Katzenstein, ‘ “Walls” Between “Those People”? Contrasting Perspectives on World Politics’, Perspectives on Politics 8, no. 1 (2010): 11–25. Robert Vitalis has provided the probably most comprehensive account of racism in Amer­ican International Relations. See, Robert Vitalis, White World Order, Black Power Politics: The Birth of Amer­ican International Relations (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015). At some point students in Ghana protested against a new statue of Mahatma Ghandi, claiming he had racist attitudes towards Africans for which reason they requested the statue removed. See, ‘ “Racist” Gandhi statue banished from Ghana university campus’, Guardian, 6 October 2016, accessed November 10, 2016, www. theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/06/ghana-­academics-petition-­removal-mahatma-­gandhistatue-­african-heroes. 26 Jacek Czaputowicz and Anna Wojciuk, The Study of International Relations in Poland (Cham: Springer, 2017); Siddharth Mallavarapu, ‘Development of International Relations Theory in India: Traditions, Contemporary Perspectives and Trajectories’, International Studies 46, no. 1–2 (2009): 165–83. 27 Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978). 28 See Karen Smith’s chapter in this volume. 29 For an early critique, see William A. Callahan, ‘China and the Globalisation of IR Theory: Discussion of “Building International Relations Theory with Chinese Characteristics” ’, Journal of Contemporary China 10, no. 26 (2001): 75–88.

56   Knud Erik Jørgensen 30 Andrei P. Tsygankov, ‘Self and Other in International Relations Theory: Learning from Russian Civilizational Debates’, International Studies Review 10, no. 4 (2008): 762–75; Alexander Dugin, ‘Theory Talk #66: Alexander Dugin on Eurasianism, the Geopolitics of Land and Sea, and a Russian Theory of Multipolarity’, by Michael Millerman, Theory Talks, 7 December 2014, accessed 2 August 2016, www.theory-­talks.org/ 2014/12/theory-­talk-66.html; Priya Chacko, Indian Foreign Policy: The Politics of Postcolonial Identity from 1947 to 2004 (Oxford: Routledge, 2013); Deepa M. Ollapally and Rajesh Rajagopalan, ‘India: Foreign Policy Perspectives of an Ambiguous Power’, in Nau and Ollapally, Worldviews of Aspiring Powers, 73–113; Lucian W. Pye, The Spirit of Chinese Politics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992). 31 Hopf, Social Construction. 32 Ole Wæver, ‘Securitization and Desecuritization’, in On Security, ed. Ronnie Lipschutz (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 46–86. 33 Meera Sabaratnam, ‘The Citadel Has Been Blown Up. Hurray! Next? A Response to Hobson’, The Disorder of Things (blog), 24 September 2012, accessed on 12 September 2016, https://thedisorderofthings.com/2012/09/24/the-­citadel-has-­been-blown-­uphurray-­next-a-­response-to-­hobson/. 34 Ehsanul Haque, ‘Permeability of Disciplinary Boundaries in the Age of Globalization: Interdisciplinary Scholarship in International Relations’, (paper presented at the Conference of Academic Demarcations: Disciplines and Interdisciplinarity, University of Oslo, 13–14 September 2012). 35 Brown, Practical Judgement, 218. 36 See e.g. Brown, Practical Judgement. 37 Pierre Lizée, A Whole New World: Reinventing International Studies for the Post-­ Western World (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2011). 38 Alejando et al., Reappraising European IR; Audrey Alejando, ‘Eurocentrism, Ethnocentrism, and Misery of Position: International Relations in Europe – A problematic oversight’, European Review of International Studies 4, no. 1 (2017), 5–20.

Bibliography Alejando, Audrey. ‘Eurocentrism, Ethnocentrism, and Misery of Position: International Relations in Europe – A Problematic Oversight’. European Review of International Studies 4, no. 1 (2017): 5–20. Alejando, Audrey, Knud Erik Jørgensen, Alexander Reichwein, Felix Rösch and Helen Turton. Reappraising European IR Theoretical Traditions. London: Palgrave, forthcoming 2017. Behr, E. Hartmut. ‘The European Union in the Legacies of Imperial Rule? EU Accession Politics Viewed From A Historical Comparative Perspective’. European Journal of International Relations 13, no. 2 (2007): 239–62. Bilgin, Pinar. ‘How to Remedy Eurocentrism in IR? A Complement and a Challenge for the Global Transformation’. International Theory 8, no. 3 (2016): 492–501. Brown, Chris. Practical Judgement in International Political Theory: Selected Essays. Abingdon: Routledge, 2010. Callahan, William A. ‘China and the Globalisation of IR Theory: Discussion of “Building International Relations Theory with Chinese Characteristics” ’. Journal of Contemporary China 10, no. 26 (2001): 75–88. Carr, E. H. The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations. London: Palgrave, 1946. Chacko, Priya. Indian Foreign Policy: The Politics of Postcolonial Identity from 1947 to 2004. Oxford: Routledge, 2013.

100 global workshops on theory building   57 Czaputowicz, Jacek and Anna Wojciuk. The Study of International Relations in Poland. Cham: Springer, 2017. Dugin, Alexander. ‘Theory Talk #66: Alexander Dugin on Eurasianism, the Geopolitics of Land and Sea, and a Russian Theory of Multipolarity’. By M. Millerman. Theory Talks, 7 December 2014. Accessed 2 August 2016. www.theory-­talks.org/2014/12/ theory-­talk-66.html. Guzzini, Stefano. The Return of Geopolitics in Europe? Social Mechanisms and Foreign Policy Identity Crises. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012. Haque, Ehsanul. ‘Permeability of Disciplinary Boundaries in the Age of Globalization: Interdisciplinary Scholarship in International Relations’. Paper presented at the Conference of Academic Demarcations: Disciplines and Interdisciplinarity, University of Oslo, 13–14 September 2012. Hopf, Ted. Social Construction of International Politics: Identities and Foreign Policies, Moscow, 1955 and 1999. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002. Hutchings, Kimberly. ‘Kimberly Hutchings on Quiet as a Research Strategy, the Essence of Critique, and the Narcissism of Minor Differences’. By A.S. Bang Lindegaard and P. Schouten, Theory Talks, 10 October 2016. Accessed 10 November 2016. www. theory-­talks.org/2016/10/theory-­talk-73-kimberly-­hutchings.html. Jørgensen, Knud Erik. ‘Continental IR Theory: The Best Kept Secret’. European Journal of International Relations 6, no. 1 (2000): 9–42. Jørgensen, Knud Erik. ‘Towards a Six Continents Social Science: International Relations’. Journal of International Relations and Development 6, no. 4 (2004): 330–43. Jørgensen, Knud Erik. ‘After Hegemony in International Relations’. European Review of International Studies 1, no. 1 (2014): 57–64. Jørgensen, Knud Erik. ‘Inter Alia’. International Studies Review 19, no. 2 (2017): 283–7. Jørgensen, Knud Erik. International Relations Theory: A New Introduction. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017. Jupille, Joseph, James A. Caporaso and Jeffrey T. Checkel. ‘Integrating Institutions Rationalism, Constructivism, and the Study of the European Union’. Comparative Political Studies 36, no. 1–2 (2003): 7–40. Kavalski, Emilian.  Encounters with Eastphalia: Post-­western World Affairs in Asia. Routledge, 2017. Katzenstein, Peter J. ‘ “Walls” between “Those People”? Contrasting Perspectives on World Politics’. Perspectives on Politics 8, no. 1 (2010): 11–25. Keene, Edward. Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism and Order In World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Keohane, Robert O. and Stanley Hoffmann. ‘Conclusions: Community Politics and Institutional Change’. In The Dynamics of European Integration, edited by William Wallace, 276–300. London; New York: Pinter Publishers for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1990. Lake, David A. ‘The New Amer­ican Empire?’ International Studies Perspectives 9, no. 3 (2008): 281–9. Lake, David A. ‘Why “Isms” are Evil: Theory, Epistemology, and Academic Sects as Impediments to Understanding and Progress’. International Studies Quarterly 55, no. 2 (2011): 465–80. Leca, Jean. ‘La science politique dans le champ intellectuel français’. Revue française de science politique 32, no. 4 (1982): 653–77. Legro, Jeffrey W. and Andrew Moravcsik. ‘Is Anybody Still a Realist?’ International Security 24, no. 2 (1999): 5–55.

58   Knud Erik Jørgensen Lizée, Pierre. A Whole New World: Reinventing International Studies for the Post-­ Western World. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2011. Long, David. ‘Who Killed the International Studies Conference?’ Review of International Studies 32, no. 4 (2006): 603–22. Mallavarapu, Siddharth. ‘Development of International Relations Theory in India: Traditions, Contemporary Perspectives and Trajectories’. International Studies 46, no. 1–2 (2009): 165–83. Mansour, Imad. ‘A Global South Perspective on International Relations Theory’. International Studies Perspectives 18, no. 1 (2016): 2–3. doi: https://doi.org/10.1093/isp/ ekw010. Mearsheimer, John J. and Stephen M. Walt. ‘Leaving Theory Behind: Why Simplistic Hypothesis Testing is Bad for International Relations’. European Journal of International Relations 19, no. 3 (2013): 427–57. Moravcsik, Andrew. ‘Is Something Rotten in the State of Denmark? Constructivism and European Integration’. Journal of European Public Policy 6, no. 4 (1999): 669–81. Nau, Henry R. ‘No Alternative to “Isms” ’. International Studies Quarterly 55, no. 2 (2011): 487–91. Nau, Henry R. and Deepa M. Ollapally, eds. Worldviews of Aspiring Powers: Domestic Foreign Policy Debates in China, India, Iran, Japan, and Russia.  Ollapally, Deepa M. and Rajesh Rajagopalan. ‘India: Foreign Policy Perspectives of an Ambiguous Power’. In Worldviews of Aspiring Powers, edited by Henry R. Nau and Deepa M. Ollapally, 73–113. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. Peters, Ingo and Wiebke Wemheuer-­Vogelaar, eds. Globalizing International Relations. London: Palgrave, 2016. Puchala, Donald J. Theory and History in International Relations. London: Routledge, 2003.  Pye, Lucian W. The Spirit of Chinese Politics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992. Rosenau, James N. and Mary Durfee. Thinking Theory Thoroughly: Coherent Approaches to an Incoherent World. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995. Smith, Karen. ‘Reshaping International Relations: Theoretical Innovations from Africa’. This volume. Trenin, Dmitri. Post-­Imperium: A Eurasian Story. Washington DC: Carnegie, 2011. Tsygankov, Andrei P. ‘Self and Other in International Relations Theory: Learning from Russian Civilizational Debates’. International Studies Review 10, no. 4 (2008): 762–75. van Herpen, Marcel H. Putin’s Wars: The Rise of Russia’s New Imperialism. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2014. Vitalis, Robert. White World Order, Black Power Politics: The Birth of Amer­ican International Relations. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015. Waltz, Kenneth N. ‘Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory’. Journal of International Affairs 44, no. 1 (1990): 21–37. Wæver, Ole. ‘Securitization and Desecuritization’. In On Security, edited by Ronnie Lipschutz, 46–86. New York: Columbia University Press, 1995. Wendt, Alexander. ‘Constructing International Politics’. International Security 20, no. 1 (1995): 71–81.

4 Homegrown theorizing Knowledge, scholars, theory Deniz Kuru

There is a new turn in International Relations (IR): the homegrown turn. This approach focuses on widening IR’s theoretical bases by turning to new (in fact, at times rather old) sources from the non-­Western world.1 This new interest can be seen as a natural consequence of IR’s broadly-­perceived failure to meet the requirements inherent in its very name, that is, to be an international, even global discipline.2 Scholars within Western academia and their counterparts from semi-­ peripheral and non-­Western parts of the globe have been engaged in a veritable attempt to theorize IR more globally. At this important juncture, this chapter will look at hurdles that should not be overlooked in IR’s homegrown turn. Learning from the many mistakes and diverse unsuccessful attempts of mainstream IR in its previous theorizing efforts is a useful means to prevent old errors from being recreated in this new era of an emerging post-­Western IR discipline.3 What were some of the most significant errors committed by an IR that was completely Western? First, the Western IR of the past and the present (to the extent of its partial continuity) was Eurocentric and Western-­centric, due to the high degree of interwovenness. Furthermore, the sources it was using were not always those that provided the most representative and most verifiable interpretations of past thinkers even within their European-­Western context. The third dimension of its problematic nature concerned the way theory was usually perceived to assume “a sense of exteriority,” that is positioning itself outside history. This thinking coincides with a search for theoretical closure, which Buzan and Lawson warn us against.4 However, by merely presenting these three major issue areas, one cannot establish a coherent framework from which to approach the future prospects of homegrown theorizing in times of a post-­ Western IR discipline. A more-­detailed approach is needed to distinguish between three separate factors: knowledge, scholars, and theory. It is only through a broader engagement with these interacting dimensions that it becomes possible to discuss the premises of homegrownness at a time when post-­Western pathways are recreating IR’s disciplinarity. How could one discuss the processes of theorizing with regard to these three distinct features? I propose to examine all these aspects as parts of homegrown theorizing. First, we need to explain what is meant by homegrown theorizing. In their treatment of this important question, Aydınlı and Biltekin give us the

60   Deniz Kuru f­ ollowing answer: “original theorizing in the periphery about the periphery.”5 Therefore, homegrown theorizing is a form of theorizing that provides insights about the periphery, which takes place in locations outside the core. Their approach is also extendable to the Western world, which is not hegemonic in IR (for instance, continental Europe). At the same time, while this approach provides an initial explanation for the meaning of homegrown, we need to take a further step and deal with the idea of theorizing. In this regard, it is useful to turn to the newly emerging distinction between theory and theorizing. Buzan and Lawson, relying on work by Swedberg and Reus-­Smit, understand theory as “a statement about the explanation of a phenomenon,” and see theorizing as “the ‘process through which theory is produced’.”6 Such an approach enables us to use theorizing as the bigger umbrella and, consequently, to perceive knowledge, scholars, and theory as different parts of theorizing. Therefore, exploring homegrown theorizing requires us to pay attention, separately and together, to the role of knowledge, scholars, and theory with regard to their own extent of home­ grownness. The variations therein will point to the connection points that, at times, effectively obliterate the boundaries between the home and the global. At this juncture, it is useful to discuss the three parts of theorizing in the context of the problem areas presented above. By emphasizing the different levels of theorizing with regard to the main issues that generate a problematic Western IR, I go beyond a brief disciplinary sociological analysis of Western IR by presenting some useful points that could serve as an early warning mechanism for the emerging post-­Western IR with its focus on homegrown theorizing. In this regard, the chapter presents the general areas in which Western IR led to multiple mistakes and failures. It begins with the general state of knowledge, continues with the role of scholars, and finishes with the theory that arises from within such a context. Based on examples from different cases, it concludes by highlighting certain aspects that could help peripheral homegrown theorizing to avoid repeating past (and, at times, present) mistakes of core IR scholarship. The opening section explains the current approaches taken by the homegrown turn to set the stage for the consequent discussion on core IR’s mistakes and the lessons thus provided for peripheral IR in the realms of knowledge, scholars, and theory.

Two concepts: “homegrown” and “theorizing” In their study of homegrown theorizing in this volume, Aydınlı and Biltekin (based on their approach that defined this form of theorizing as “original theorizing in the periphery about the periphery”) distinguish between three types: referential homegrown theorizing, homegrown alterations, and authentic homegrown theories. In the first one, IR-­related theorizing is shown to rely on non-­IR local thinkers, writers, or scholars, and the introduction of their concepts into the domain of IR. The second type relates to the ways in which core (Western) ideas or concepts are reshaped in order to coincide with indigenous meanings. The last type focuses on “original concepts” developed “out of geo-­culturally specific

Knowledge, scholars, theory   61 experience and commonly used idioms of daily life” that are consequently carried over into IR.7 A recent work by Vineet Thakur presents a not so dissimilar framework for discussing the strategies that non-­Western/peripheral IR communities can employ in overcoming certain obstacles in order to discover the scholarship in the core with their local insights that so far have been rather neglected. His focus is on three dimensions of engagement: plot, language, and characters. In Thakur’s framework, which takes its clues from Karen Smith’s earlier work,8 non-­Western theorizing is seen as a narrative with a plot shaped by the narrator’s positionality. Language, on the other hand, demonstrates how concepts, among other things, are to be used or developed throughout the emerging narrative of the story told by non-­Western theoretical newcomers. It is about engaging with Western concepts and reshaping them or about emphasizing and explaining (to outsiders, namely Western core IR scholars) existing local concepts. The last dimension, characters, focuses on the issues that take priority among all the possible areas to be studied by IR. As Thakur specifically deals with the contributions of Africa to IR theories, what emerges is a useful framework for discussing homegrown theorizing. His consequent proposal is to combine these three dimensions and provide two options for African theorizing in each case: remain at the same level, or provide different pathways in each category. This results in eight options ranging from “same plot, same language, same characters” to “same plot, different language, same characters” to “different plot, different language, different characters.”9 This eight-­options-framework can also be used with Aydınlı and Biltekin’s tripartite typology on homegrown theorizing, as they both demonstrate the different pathways that can be used in enriching Global IR with contributions by peripheral IR communities’ theorizing moves.10 While these scholars and many others attempt to expand the usual spheres of engagement of disciplinary approaches, it is important to state at the beginning that using certain concepts for explaining only a certain country’s or region’s domestic/regional politics carries the risk of being less IR and more Area Studies in its narrow versions. The following sections will elaborate on this aspect. Furthermore, as a consequence of problems that one finds in core IR and its theorizing processes, scholars engaged in IR at a time of a post-­Western turn should actively deal with certain questions before starting their own trial with homegrown theorizing. This process is covered in the following sections. In order to provide a structured analysis of homegrown theorizing, the next three sections will deal with knowledge, scholars, and theory by discussing the extent to which one can perceive these three f/actors as homegrown parts of a broader theorizing enterprise. It starts with a broad discussion of knowledge, approaching it in a wider sense and elaborating the ways in which it takes shape and is used. This first part will also provide a detailed discussion of Western IR’s failures, including Eurocentrism and problems of historical (mis)interpretation. The following section focuses on the positions and situatedness of scholars who, not infrequently, find themselves at the intersection of local and global theorizing. The possibilities of, and challenges to, homegrown theorizing will become

62   Deniz Kuru clearer with regard to scholars’ agential limits. The last part of this tripartite ­analysis will turn to the role of theory and the degree to which one can “realize” homegrown theories.

Knowledge By knowledge, I refer to the general arena of empirical and philosophical observations and sources used in this process. It also includes certain pre-­theory components such as concepts. In Western IR, these include(d) historical materials, evaluations concerning contemporary political and social developments, myths, various literary works, and even folk wisdom. Therefore, knowledge can be seen as a part of theorizing processes, although on a separate level it can also be perceived as a useful contribution to our scholarly interests even in its atheoretical or pre-­theorized stage. That does not necessarily mean that knowledge is never theory-­laden, but this starting point assumes that knowledge can also precede theories. Based on these assumptions, one could state that knowing, for instance, about the world political transformations is a significant part of our discipline even when one does not use it for theorizing purposes. Following these initial clarifications, it is useful to discuss the three problems encountered in core IR scholarship in the context of their position within the dimension of knowledge. First, there is the issue of Eurocentrism.11 It is not merely a theoretical problem; it begins at the very start of knowledge accumulation. What kinds of knowledge are prioritized and how are these connected to questions of power? IR’s predominant focus on European historical experiences is a primary example of this problematique. The expansion of European great powers with their concomitant practices of colonialism and imperialism,12 provide the major tools of core IR mainstream’s “knowledge pool.” Even when core-­periphery encounters present important sources of historical knowledge, for example, Europeans’ “discovery” of the Americas or the race relations integral to Western-­Eastern-Southern relationships, it is the perspective of Western knowledge that becomes the “standard narrative.” These assumptions signify not only the virtually total absence of non-­Western knowledge, but also the dominance of a certain version of knowledge within the West.13 The frequently mentioned example of the Cold War was the most recent case from the twentieth century. Four decades of “hot wars” in the non-­Western parts of our globe were neglected at the expense of the rather questionable balance of terror that shaped the quotidian experiences of Western/Northern societies.14 The second aspect that necessitates our attention is the way in which past Western thinkers and their ideas have been interpreted and used by scholars of the core IR communities. Recent revisionist historiographies of the discipline provide innumerable instances of early scholarship’s ideational confusion and, at times, clear errors in dealing with significant political philosophers and earlier thinkers whose ideas would impact on a gradually growing discipline.15 In this regard, the last two decades provided us with very substantive clarifications about the problematic fashion in which first and second generation IR scholars

Knowledge, scholars, theory   63 of the core (the US and the UK) have presented rather questionable, if not caricaturized, accounts of political ideas which have world political relevance.16 Obviously, some of these problems relate to the theory dimension, that is, tendencies to create reified theoretical summaries of political thinkers’ wide-­ranging studies. However, even the disciplinary choices that led to seeing in Thucydides or Hobbes the founding fathers of (realist) IR are examples of this type of rather narrow knowledge preference.17 Their problematic consequences are difficult to set aside, especially due to the repeated ways in which the earlier interpretations survive (in a path-­dependent manner) thanks to mainstream IR textbooks, again written by scholars of IR’s core in the US, and, to a lesser extent, in the UK.18 A further difficulty that lies at the foundation of mainstream core IR is its reliance on a certain category of thinkers, tending to ignore those earlier philosophers or scholars whose ideational contributions are not in line with the disciplinary expectations of mid- to late-­twentieth-century IR core scholarship. One example is the way early proponents of certain peace movements or social movements were set aside in IR’s accumulation of knowledge.19 Although the two world wars are seen as a major impetus leading to the establishment of a scientific study of world politics (mainly with the aim of finding ways to prevent such future carnage), the new discipline’s core knowledge collectors, that is Western IR’s hegemonic epistemic community did not show much interest in the earlier peace movements and thinkers. The prevalence of war, strategy, and geopolitics weighed heavily against those more idealistic approaches. The third aspect, namely exteriority toward/from history and theoretical closure, is by its very nature something that should be more directly discussed in the section on theory. However, tied to the explanations stated in the context of knowledge dimension, it is important to underline that such detachedness from history and theoretical closure could only emerge as a consequence of the Eurocentric nature of the dominant forms of knowledge aspirations as well as the rather unpluralistic way in which twentieth-­century Western orders were taken to be of a permanent character. The manner in which knowledge was pursued did not lead to a quest for wider dimensions of empirical or philosophical resources. Once generated, the ahistoricized and theoretically hermetically sealed forms of knowledge were used in a fashion that made them permanently closed to new and different ideas and interpretations. When it comes to the ideas of non-­Western thinkers or to broader concepts that are used in the regional or national contexts, we should also ask whether we find ourselves in the middle of a process of invention or of discovery. This refers to scholars who themselves become the most active agents of highlighting certain ideas, the importance of certain thinkers, or concepts. They can do this because of their local and global position, thanks to being the first one(s) to uncover ancient or more recent local knowledge. However, this also means that the researcher finds her- or himself in a place from which he or she can comment on all the possible benefits of using this knowledge from a long neglected (or even unknown) source. In Western IR, we can think of the rather sudden rediscovery of Immanuel Kant’s Perpetual Peace by Michael Doyle in the early 1980s.20 The question can always

64   Deniz Kuru be the same: Why this thinker and not another one? As we know, there were many different thinkers contemplating peace – and Kant’s version seems to be one that more easily fitted the later use of democratic peace theory by twenty-­first century core IR scholarship.21 The potential pitfalls for non-­Western homegrown theorists are even more difficult to overcome because, for the majority of these scholars, it will likely be the first time that they encounter the thinker or local concepts as the information has previously been unavailable in Western-­language summarized versions. This means the researcher of homegrown theorizing has the advantage of being able to convince her or his (still mostly Western) colleagues about the validity of these newly shared insights. However, as we know from the case of core IR in the West, earlier IR interpretations of European political thinkers and ideas have now become a hot target for sophisticated revisionist studies that are very quick to problematize the failures of these initial approaches in IR. Martin Wight’s triad-­ interpretations of Kant, Hobbes, and Grotius22 have been overturned by later critics.23 These earlier misinterpretations are examples that should caution today’s homegrown theorizers. While the first scholars to uncover the non-­Western ideas and thinkers in their local environments have the chance to do some very original research, they should be very careful to not exaggerate when interpreting their findings. This leads us to compare the difference between inventing ideas and discovering them. Kautilya, a long-­neglected thinker, is now a more famous name in IR, even though his most important work was only rediscovered in the twentieth century. However, the following question could arise in some other cases: How do we define the authentic significance of these ideas and thinkers? Does non-­ Westernness suffice as a criterion, or could we actually even find more in the ideas of those thinkers, who were at the edge of their original societies, being more prone to transnational influences? These are some rather difficult questions to fully answer because they also point us toward the issue of globalization and its influence in the realm of ideas. Scholars differ in their interpretations of globalization with regard to its timing, impact, spatial extent, and possible repetitions. While Wallerstein speaks of three waves of globalization, with late-­nineteenth- and late-­twentieth century versions following those of the sixteenth century, the late German sociologist Ulrich Beck differentiated between globalism, globality, and globalization.24 The first concept referred to the neoliberal ideology that supported a certain manner of globalization, whereas the second concept demonstrated conditions that were creating a new world political situation. It is this second concept, globality, that I want to use to approach our understanding of homegrownness, and thus to question the extent to which it could be at all possible in the narrower sense proposed by some scholarship.25 Notwithstanding the differing and at times even conflicting definitions of globalization, the aspect of trans-­border flow of ideas, individuals, and things could be said to be its major feature.26 In this regard, it is no longer possible to think of ideas as a dimension that is not affected by these globalization dynamics. The recent turn to global intellectual history (in addition to similar developments in more general areas of historical studies) points to the need for a more

Knowledge, scholars, theory   65 self-­reflexive approach when dealing with homegrown theorizing in IR.27 These studies provide us with important contributions that highlight the problematic nature of certain prevailing assumptions. For instance, today it is passé to assert the existence of unconnected local sources of knowledge (ideas, thinkers, or concepts). IR’s newly emerging community of non-­core homegrown theorists should not make suggestions about “undiscovered” new ideas because one cannot speak with great assuredness about indigenous approaches that have never been influenced by non-­indigenous ones.28 The significance of this point becomes clear when one turns to a dual option discussed by Homeira Moshirzadeh concerning the distinction between endogenous and indigenous approaches. With the first one, she refers to an approach that is about “the needs, perspectives, experiences, and history” of a country or a people. Using that approach, one does not necessarily rely on local sources in the process of theorizing.29 On the other hand, in indigenous approaches, Moshirzadeh recognizes the goal of “creat[ing] a genuine different view based on” local sources and conceptualizations.30 What one needs to engage with in a more careful fashion is this second dimension of indigeneity. In a globalized world, the individual scholar should have to convince us about the degree of his or her research topic’s (ideas or thinkers), actual indigeneity. Even when this is not exactly the case, a less strict requirement in this process would be to expect that the ideas and thinkers discussed or presented are at least able to provide us with original tools. In this context, a less parochial or more globally shaped research agenda could provide us with important benefits. Following Acharya’s International Studies Association (ISA) presidential address, the need for a Global IR is also the means for overcoming IR’s Western (as well as non-­core) parochialisms.31 In this regard, it becomes an essential task for scholars interested in homegrown theorizing to deal directly with the impact of transnational dynamics, global influences, and the processes through which ideas and thinkers are differently evaluated and perceived across the world. As Bourdieu showed, the processes that shape the intercultural transfer of ideas are complicated and relate to several contingent factors.32 Hence, even in cases of homegrown knowledge, once this is shared with a broader audience, its future paths are difficult to foresee. As well, one cannot know whether the “original” meaning remained the same during this process, independent of past history and recognition of the ideas or thinkers studied. A separate issue, which is not dissimilar from earlier developments in core Western IR, concerns the difficulty in stating where IR starts and where/when it ends. As postmodern scholarship has played a major role in widening the (philosophical) bases upon which new IR theorizing is taking place, it has become more difficult to provide an answer that would have lasting validity. However, in non-­Western contexts, if one turns to earlier thinkers and concepts, one could also suppose that due to the long absence of non-­West(ern) actors as shapers of world politics on a global scale, there is probably more to find there that relates to the domestic, local, and regional aspects, rather than to the international aspects per se. However, this suggestion should not be interpreted as a total

66   Deniz Kuru rejection of non-­Western knowledge on the international and the global, but rather as showing its relative weakness compared to the contemporary ideas in Western geographies dealing with the same beyond-­the-local spheres. If such ideas and thinkers are in turn to be investigated, their use in IR could result in a process of invention. Obviously, all scholarly works are expected to lead to differentiations between high- and low-­quality research. However, if the current interest in homegrown theorizing leads to a large number of unsubstantiated assumptions about non-­Western ideas’ and thinkers’ relevance for world political thinking, we could reach a situation where it becomes challenging to easily identify useful work on non-­Western contexts. An additional aspect that could arise as a possible problem concerns the extent of representativeness of a supposedly homegrown idea, concept, or theory. For instance, in the case of divided societies (countries that lack a substantive unifying basis for their societal structure), not only different but also conflicting ideas and theories could emerge. In such a society, a scholar who turns his or her attention to only one of these two camps runs the risk that Global IR would only become familiar with one of these two groups. Stated differently, even when one accepts the locality and/or originality (i.e., the homegrownness) of these ideas and concepts, the question is whether they provide homegrown theorizing or just lead the global scholarly community to interact with only one side of these divided societies. In Turkey, the permanent ideational divergences between the more secular-­Western and the more religious-­conservative sections in this society mean that even contributions from Turkish IR could end up reproducing these internal confrontations at the level of Global IR. For non-­Turkish scholars in various localities of the core, this possibility has at least two consequences: first, to what extent should one accept a certain idea or concept proposed or developed by one of the two sides as homegrown theorizing? Examined from the perspective of Western core IR, some could even assert that secular-­ Western IR theorizing in Turkey could at most be limited to the case of some homegrown alterations (to use the typology of Aydınlı and Biltekin). Such an interpretation could be based on the supposedly hermetic separation between Western and Islamic ideational pools,33 which is itself a questionable claim. A second point concerns the ways in which Western core IR and even Global IR can engage simultaneously with both sides of these possible homegrown contributions. An answer to this lies in the earlier debates of Western IR, mostly known to us in the form of liberalism vs realism vs Marxism. Therefore, a counter-­claim to the possibility that I refer to in this context would come from Western IR and its own internal differences that were also a natural consequence of the societal debates and political differentiations found there. It is even possible to associate various IR theories with various ideologies,34 and even geo-­ cultural settings. However, in those instances, there is a major difference that could clearly rank certain approaches at certain times, with liberalism (for instance) being the default theoretical framework of the post-­World War II world political system and IR theoretical bases.35 In the case of what I call divided societies, with their conflicting ideational and theoretical contributions, the problem

Knowledge, scholars, theory   67 lies more directly with their internal lack of coherence, that is, an unresolved fight for domestic ideational (as well as political) supremacy. The very nature of these binary-­structured societal confrontations leads us to a situation in which it becomes difficult to accept the continuous existence of both of these options. It is in this aspect that core IR as well as Global IR would need to determine how to deal with such contributions offered in the shape of peripheral homegrown theorizing.

Scholars The position of the scholar matters. In the recent debates about IR’s historical development and studies of disciplinary sociology, the role of IR scholars has not been used in a way that would offer us a comprehensive and comparative framework. The focus has been on individual members of the community, especially classical realists like Hans Morgenthau.36 While the interest in such distinguished “founding fathers” of IR needs no further justification and is explainable with regard to disciplinary dynamics of repositioning, what matters much more for us is the ongoing lack of prioritization of the role of the scholarly community itself. In the significant debates that have emerged about external-­based vs internal-­based explanations, the main focus has been on the factors and actors that were shaping the trajectory of IR and its theoretical pathways.37 One could emphasize the role of universities, governments, foundations, think tanks, wars, domestic political influences, etc. however, it is only in the last couple of years that IR has examined its own past and present scholars in a comprehensive way.38 It is useful to think of scholars of homegrown theorizing as popularizers of ideas, concepts, and theories that they share with Global IR community as distinct local and original products. In the case of scholars, one of the major problems of Western core IR is the issue of Eurocentrism, which can be interpreted today as a generational issue: the earlier scholarly community being more directly tainted by such a position due to the way Eurocentrism functioned as a permanent background condition shaping various milieux in which scholars were emerging. However, this does not mean that even in a gradually post-­Westernizing IR there is no trace of Eurocentrism left. The ongoing debates in core IR communities point to this legacy, at the same time highlighting the problematic nature of racism and imperialism as influential factors present at IR’s birth and development.39 As discussed in the section on knowledge, the decisions and preferences of individual scholars determine the way IR theorizing will take place. In this context, when thinking of the stages that homegrown theorizing involves, one should begin with this aspect in our analysis. Whereas Aydınlı and Biltekin prefer not to consider the “ethnic/national identity” of scholars, and focus instead on “various aspects of how the non-­core experience is drawn on and conceptualized,”40 I offer a different approach, which is built on the premise that the (auto) biographies of the individual scholar matter in a way that includes not only their locality, but also their live histories and educational backgrounds.41

68   Deniz Kuru When speaking of homegrown theorizing, there are two aspects that require clarification: first, the idea of homegrown, and second, the concept of theorizing. While I have already provided an explanation of what is meant by theorizing in this chapter, the other question still stands: How can one define homegrown? In the context of scholars, can one talk of homegrown theorizing only if the scholar doing it is herself or himself “homegrown”? As stated above, this question is not answered affirmatively by all scholars involved in debates regarding non-­core theorizing in IR. Important works that could be labeled as homegrown theorizing, or at least that could be interpreted as part of efforts to generate conditions favorable for such theorizing, have been presented by scholars who lacked earlier national/regional ties to their locality of theorizing. One of the most active scholars in this field, Arlene Tickner, would be among the first examples; she is a US citizen who lives in Colombia and focuses on the significance of Latin Amer­ican differences when it comes to theorizing in IR.42 Even if one insisted that there be local ties, the question arises about the educational pathways of individual scholars. In Turkey, two of the most prominent scholars with major contributions in the area of non-­Western theorizing, Pınar Bilgin and Ersel Aydınlı, have doctoral degrees from British and Amer­ican universities, respectively.43 It could be asserted that studying abroad makes scholars even more prone to be interested in their society’s potential contributions to IR, turning them into more active pursuers of local theorizing. However, as many examples from the Chinese context show, interest in homegrown theorizing could also emerge as a result of certain national feelings that aim to give a more prominent place to the national IR community on a global platform.44 Therefore, one also turns to homegrown theorizing as a means of generating more favorable conditions for the further promotion of one’s own society and state. This leads us back to the earlier distinction, suggested by Moshirzadeh, between indigenous and endogenous approaches. If homegrown theorizing goes beyond a mere interest in ideas and thinkers, becoming a means of extending the influence of one’s country by prioritizing ideas that prevail in that local context, therein lies the potential danger of another form of parochialism reproduced in the guise of a pluralistic IR. This point presents us once again with the need to face the mistakes of Western core IR and its theorizing processes, and decide not to repeat those errors (of the past). It is important to stress that, notwithstanding its more recent emergence and gradual stabilization, the latecomer status of non-­core IR does not allow it to overlook the mistakes of more established core IR. The reasoning is that, ultimately, all these scholarly communities belong to the same undertaking, that of the discipline of IR. Tempo-­spatial divergences of the past are not an excuse because twenty-­first century IR is based on shared practices and a globalized disciplinary identity. In the context of scholars, homegrown theorizing could overcome such dangers by openly acknowledging the limits of its possibilities. As a consequence, scholars of peripheral IR should not fall into the trap of any kind of centrism. The answer to Eurocentrism cannot come, for instance, in the shape of Sinocentrism.45 An IR academic’s tendency for theorizing the world in terms

Knowledge, scholars, theory   69 of her or his own national or regional framework would not lead us to a pluralistic form of Global IR if the suggested approach is itself ethnocentric. To the contrary, it would reproduce the earlier narratives in which the world was supposed to permanently turn around the West(ern societies and states), only this time in a non-­Western version. This would be the case, of course, when the participants are themselves closed to differing perspectives. Therefore, scholars engaged in IR’s homegrown turn should be clear about the consequences of differing forms of such theorizing. One of these is vernacularization (a process by which ideas from non-­ peripheral localities are reshaped and in turn used in its new localized quasi-­hybrid version).46 Other theorizing emerges from within nationalistic thought systems that would be perceived as the new trademark of non-­core IR at the periphery. Obviously, these theories overlap with the typologies of Aydınlı and Biltekin as well as Thakur at certain points. In this context, the former approach could be located in Thakur’s same-­different combinations, while Aydınlı and Biltekin’s homegrown alterations would be cases of vernacularization. On the other hand, if homegrown theorizing reifies certain nationalistic or essentializing tendencies in the locality in which it is developed, the danger of parochialism can be a permanent one. At the same time, however, this does not mean that all “authentic homegrown theories” are merely tools of nationalist forces. In this regard, setting the standards on a more general level, that is, by expecting homegrown theorizing to not always be just about the periphery, in the context of its presumed interests, it becomes possible to find a useful means to prevent such theorizing’s potential usage as a nationalistic, essentializing device. As discussed above, in times of a globalized world, the common starting point is to not assume that regions or states are hermetically sealed off from the (ideational) influence of others.

Theory One problem that the new wave of non-­core homegrown theorizing could also face regards the danger of not distinguishing between native theories and other versions. Here, the focus is on the possibility of finding supposedly untouched authentic local theories. As discussed in the preceding sections, such an assumption sees in homegrown theories locally existing or to-­be-produced theories that would consequently be connected to global IR scholarship. However, as Aydınlı and Biltekin demonstrate, alterations at the national or regional levels can also be part of homegrown theorizing without claiming complete local authenticity. Remembering the discussions above, it is possible to state that even in instances where the theorizing process meets readily extant local theories, without any further need for scholars to engage with local sources of knowledge in order to create themselves such a theory, it is questionable whether these theories are as homegrown and original as they are supposed to be. This means that accepting the idea of alterations, or, following Thakur, the same-­plot, same-­language, same-­character options,47 the very idea of homegrownness can become detached

70   Deniz Kuru from assumptions about originality and local authenticity. The novelty in certain homegrown contributions thus becomes a question of degree. In order to explain this problematique in a clear manner, it is useful to turn to an example from Turkish IR. In an article on Turkish contributions to IR theories, Aydınlı and Matthews discussed the way the concept of the “strategic middle power” was developed by Baskın Oran, a leading Turkish IR scholar.48 Starting with the concept of the middle power and using insights about Turkey’s regionally distinct position that enables it to make use of its multiple connections to the surrounding regions, Oran thus gave a new shape to the idea of middle power that has been mostly associated with some Anglo-­Saxon countries (e.g. Canada and Australia) or some certain European countries (e.g. Sweden), whose world political impact has emerged from their normative weight in world politics. Does this concept present us with a useful means for theorizing? The answer should be in the affirmative, but one should also deal with the issue of how to determine at what point a concept leads to a theory. However, in this ­specific case, there are some rather surprising aspects that highlight the ways in which concepts are globally carried, reinterpreted, and reproduced. Oran first used the concept in the introduction section of his edited volume on Turkish foreign policy.49 This volume, with contributions by a team of respected IR and foreign policy experts, mainly from the Faculty of Political Sciences at Ankara University, has later become the standard and popular work used by Turkish universities and has been translated into English. The idea of a “strategic middle power” was used by Oran to structure the later narratives of the volume on the developmental trajectories of Turkish Republican-­era foreign policy. How did he decide to pursue this concept of middle powerhood? In his own account, the concept struck him while reading the then-­recently published book by William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774–2000.50 In this book, Hale, one of the leading British scholars on Turkish politics, presented a detailed account of Turkish foreign policy’s history, which started in the eighteenth-­century and ended at the start of the twenty-­first century.51 Interestingly, he opened the book with a brief reference to middle powers, referring to a standard work on middle powers, Holbraad’s Middle Powers in International Politics.52 It was this usage by Hale that would influence Oran and lead him to shift the standard account on middle powerhood to the Turkish case by adding the adjective of “strategic,” thereby differentiating it from its previous associations with usually Anglo-­ Saxon middle powers. Making this process of academic interactions even more interesting, Hale would later suggest that he was not personally so sure whether the middle power concept was a fitting way to deal with the case of Turkey’s world political role and position.53 In the meantime, however, Oran was already providing the Turkish scholarly community with a broader understanding of middle powerhood in its new dimension, an approach that would become quite popular in the Turkish case.54 In this regard, as Aydınlı and Biltekin and Thakur show, homegrown theorizing does not need to be only about locally-­developed concepts and theories. What matters is the inclusion/addition of local ideas by scholars who put great emphasis on widening IR and its theories on the bases of

Knowledge, scholars, theory   71 non-­Western foundations, at the same time acknowledging that this also means accepting the limits of “original” and “authentic” insights. Otherwise, expecting such strictly novel aspects might prevent the development of actual homegrown theorizing by placing too much emphasis on the extent to which the contributions should be of complete local origin. In this regard, it becomes difficult to overlook the blurry lines of ideational interactions within global IR community. The above example is important because it directs our attention to the significance of academic studies’ inherently non-­locally-limitable feature. While IR discipline is under critique for its various parochialisms, it is, nevertheless, necessary to underline the constant dynamics of scholarly communication and connections that prevail even under the extant conditions. This means that if one considers the theory dimension as the third component of theorizing, then it becomes virtually impossible to insist on the idea of the “originally native” theory. To the contrary, theories and their preceding conceptual building blocks are usually the result of intercultural and intersocietal influences, underlining once again the way the globalized world enables even more intensive scholarly connections that generate fresh, but still hybrid, insights into world politics. At this juncture, there emerges a separate question, that of presentism. This relates especially to the aspects of knowledge and theory with regard to the times in which they can be first encountered. In the case of homegrown sources of knowledge, and even theories, how can we define the temporal context in which these ideas, thinkers, and theories (to be presented or even developed by scholars of homegrown theorizing) are to be located? As I discussed in the case of Wight’s interpretation of leading European political philosophers, and showed in the section on the sudden popularity of Kant’s framework on the possibilities of perpetual peace, we need to examine the ways in which ideas and thinkers, both from earlier and current temporal contexts, would fit the conditions of the twenty-­first century. At the same time, it is possible to take a different approach and to assert that there is no theory (or knowledge) that can be used in all instances, thus preferring to provide theories that only engage with a limited number of historical eras. However, this just pushes non-­core homegrown theorizing to repeat the mistakes of IR, including multiple difficulties raised in the broad critique launched earlier by Barry Buzan and Richard Little on (Western) IR’s ahistoricism, presentism, Eurocentrism, anarchophilia, and state-­centrism.55 If homegrown theorizing turns to local sources of knowledge and thinkers without considering the extent to which the presented ideas’ validity has certain temporal limits, then it would merely reproduce core IR scholarship’s problematic approaches. Therefore, we need to pay great attention to the issue of historical ontology that focuses on the differing meanings of concepts and ideas.56 In fact, the very reasons for the emergence of homegrown theorizing lie in the prevailing dissatisfaction of critical scholars in the peripheral (and their similarly concerned colleagues in the core) IR communities with the manner in which certain concepts were only thought of in their Western contexts and limits.57 Therefore, this scholarship also needs to acknowledge that using local ideas in their local settings, without turning them into more cross-­culturally usable tools,

72   Deniz Kuru would merely lead us to provide IR with many theories whose limits are more or less set in their local frameworks. While this can be in line with another recent interest, the turn to analytical eclecticism,58 it also carries the risk that instead of a pluralistic IR, the discipline takes the shape of a scholarly community that is even more divided than today’s various camp-­like structures.59

Conclusion In the face of multiple challenges and possible obstacles for the current interest in peripheral homegrown theorizing, it is important to turn our attention to ways of dealing with these questions in a manner that could succeed in providing this new area of scholarship with a more solid basis. In this regard, the following section presents some steps we could take to avoid the failures of Western core IR scholarship. The first step could be to engage in research projects that are framed in a more collaborative fashion, including not only local scholars but also Western core scholars. This is not about denying the capabilities of the former, but ensuring a more dialogic format to our research that paves the way for constant questioning and revisions, disabling the emergence of non-­Western parochialisms as an alternative to the earlier parochialisms and various centrisms (Eurocentrism, West-­centrism, etc.) of the core. As a second step, it is useful to keep in mind problems with essentially contested concepts.60 Ideas like democracy, violence, etc. have various meanings, some of them due to their lengthy journeys throughout Western history, some of them as a result of their simultaneous political existence in differing forms and understandings. When dealing with concepts from the periphery, the same level of caution should guide us, preventing perpetual reproductions of interpretations that reify a certain idea or concept. Otherwise, homegrown theorizing would repeat Western IR’s earlier ontological, epistemological as well as methodological pitfalls that had actually enabled the current sympathy for homegrown theorizing in the peripheries. As discussed above, theorizing within divided societies is prone to providing conflicting ideas that could emerge from within the same country. Therefore, core scholarship should also aim at gaining broader insights about the periphery’s background conditions. Third, it is important to understand the general conditions that shape homegrown knowledge, theories, and scholars. As with the case of Western core IR, external and internal factors are difficult to analyze separately, and a better comprehension of the contributions by homegrown theorizing necessitates familiarity with the conditions that enable this process. Homegrown theorizing is a domain that presents its scholars with multiple advantages, but also requires clarity in dealing with local ideas, concepts, and theories. It is never too early to think about peripheral disciplinary histories and sociologies, as these will be the means with which to form the future trajectories of non-­core and, increasingly, Global IR. Fourth, under globalizing dynamics, the homegrownness aspect can more easily lose its distinct features, be it the knowledge and theories or the scholars

Knowledge, scholars, theory   73 involved in this theorizing process. For a pluralistic discipline that can follow in the steps proposed by Acharya and others,61 it is important to understand the potential promises of homegrown theorizing in the context of today’s global interactions. This means that the impact of homegrown turn can be even greater if it succeeds in not repeating the above-­discussed errors of Western core IR scholarship. At the same time, such attention requires a better grasp of the possibilities provided by Global IR, which comes with a more level playing field within a gradually more post-­Western discipline. Taking these various aspects into account, it is possible to assert that the West still has much to say to the periphery. However, this time its impact could come by providing the homegrown turn with a list of the West’s past mistakes. In their quest for homegrown theorizing, scholars of the periphery need once again to engage with Western core IR. This approach will be the means of preventing non-­core IR from repeating the mistakes of the (Western) IR community. In this regard, the agenda of homegrown theorizing is (also) to learn from the past and from the West.

Notes   1 I am particularly indebted to Ersel Aydınlı and Gonca Biltekin for having invited me to the Bilkent workshop at the Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research of the İhsan Doğramacı Peace Foundation. This chapter was shaped by the discussions there, and also thanks to the careful feedback provided by Gonca Biltekin on the later manuscript. Interestingly enough, neighboring fields of IR seem to be less engaged in this quest. A comparativist’s recent call to pay more attention to China in order to develop better theories was based on the narrow recommendation to study China more closely as a possible empirical contribution to comparative theory building. There was no further specification about going to the level of Chinese knowledge or Chinese scholars. See Lily L. Tsai, “Bringing in China: Insights for Building Comparative Political Theory,” Comparative Political Studies 50, no. 3 (2016): 295–328. In the case of Political Theory, the promises of comparative political theory will play a major role in expanding our understanding of non-­Western political thought, and hence homegrown theorizing. For a recent overview, see Leigh Jenco, “Introduction: Thinking with the Past: Political Thought in and from the ‘Non-­West’,” European Journal of Political Theory 15, no. 4 (2016): 377–81.   2 For the latter, see Amitav Acharya, “Global International Relations (IR) and Regional Worlds: A New Agenda for International Studies,” International Studies Quarterly 58, no. 4 (2014): 647–59.   3 For an elaboration on post-­Western IR, see Pierre Lizée, A Whole New World: Reinventing International Studies for the Post-­Western World (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).   4 Barry Buzan and George Lawson, “Theory, History, and the Global Transformation,” International Theory 8, no. 3 (2016): 505, 508.   5 See their chapter in this volume “A typology of homegrown theorizing.”   6 Buzan and Lawson, “Theory, History,” 508; Christian Reus-­Smit, “Theory, History, and Great Transformations,” International Theory 8, no. 3 (2016): 422–35 who refers to Richard Swedberg’s The Art of Social Theory (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014) and also his “Theorizing in Sociology and Social Science,” Theory and Society 41, no. 1 (2012): 1–40.   7 Aydınlı and Biltekin, “A typology of homegrown theorizing.”

74   Deniz Kuru   8 Karen Smith, “Has Africa Got Anything to Say? African Contributions to the Theoretical Development of International Relations,” The Round Table 98, no. 402 (2009): 269–94.   9 Vineet Thakur, “Africa and the Theoretical Peace in IR,” International Political Sociology 9, no. 3 (2015): 213–29. 10 For another significant contribution on “peripheral possibilities,” see Helen Louise Turton and Lucas G. Freire, “Peripheral Possibilities: Revealing Originality and Encouraging Dialogue through a Reconsideration of ‘Marginal’ IR Scholarship,” Journal of International Relations and Development 19, no. 4 (2014): 535–57. 11 For a comprehensive overview, see John M. Hobson, The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics: Western International Theory, 1760–2010 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 12 However, it is important to state that the colonialism and imperialism dimensions of this story are often overlooked, not least by the English School. See William A. Callahan, “Nationalising International Theory: Race, Class and the English School,” Global Society 18, no. 4 (2004): 305–23. For a work regarding overcoming this dynamic in IR, see David Long and Brian C. Schmidt, eds., Imperialism and Internationalism in the Discipline of International Relations (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005). 13 In this regard, even within Europe, the histories of the Balkans or Eastern Europe tend to be evaluated only within a comparison to their Western European neighbors. See Maria Todorova, Imagining the Balkans (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); Larry Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994). 14 Heonik Kwon, The Other Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010). 15 For most recent examples, see Michael Jackson and Thomas Moore, “Machiavelli’s Walls: The Legacy of Realism in International Relations Theory,” International Politics 53, no. 4 (2016): 447–65; Nicolas Guilhot, “The First Modern Realist: Felix Gilbert’s Machiavelli and the Realist Tradition in International Thought,” Modern Intellectual History 13, no. 3 (2016): 681–711; Fayçal Falaky, “A Forsaken And Foreclosed Utopia: Rousseau and International Relations,” European Journal of Political Theory 15, no. 1 (2014): 61–76. 16 For an interesting engagement by IR scholars with philosophers and theorists, see Richard Ned Lebow et al., eds., The Return of the Theorists—Dialogues with Great Thinkers in International Relations (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016). 17 Andrew R. Novo, “Where We Get Thucydides Wrong: The Fallacies of History’s First ‘Hegemonic’ War,” Diplomacy & Statecraft 27, no. 1 (2016): 1–21. 18 Benjamin De Carvalho, Halvard Leira, and John M. Hobson, “The Big Bangs of IR: The Myths That Your Teachers Still Tell You About 1648 and 1919,” Millennium 39, no. 3 (2011): 735–58. 19 Ekkehart Krippendorff, ed., Internationale Beziehungen (Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1973). Another interpretation might point to the continuing disinterest in peace studies by mainstream IR. For a critical approach that analyzes Galtung’s work, see; Nicholas Onuf, “Center-­Periphery Relations: What Kind of Rule, and Does It Matter?” All Azimuth 6, no. 1 (2017): 5–16. 20 Michael Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 12, no. 3 (1983): 205–35; Michael Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs: Part II,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 12, no. 4 (1983): 323–53. 21 Inderjeet Parmar, “The ‘Knowledge Politics’ of Democratic Peace Theory,” International Politics 50, no. 2 (2013): 231–56. 22 Martin Wight, International Theory: The Three Traditions, ed. Gabriele Wight and Brian Porter (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1991). 23 For an early example, see Timothy Dunne, “Mythology or Methodology? Traditions in International Theory,” Review of International Studies 19, no. 3 (1993): 305–18.

Knowledge, scholars, theory   75 24 Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System I (New York: Academic Press, 1976); Ulrich Beck, What is Globalization? (London: Polity, 2000). 25 For an example, see Aydınlı and Biltekin, “A typology of homegrown theorizing.” 26 James Rosenau, Distant Proximities (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003). 27 Samuel Moyn and Andrew Sartori, eds., Global Intellectual History (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013). 28 In the case of “hybrid” ideas, meaning those that arise due to the intersection of, and interactions among, non-­core and Western ideational connections, one would also need to study their Western origins/dimensions. Otherwise, focusing only on the non-­ Western homegrown aspects would not provide a holistic understanding of the given ideas. 29 This means that while the local conditions and expectations determine the process, the answers can also come from non-­local sources. 30 Homeira Moshirzadeh, “Iranian scholars and theorizing international relations: achievements and challenges,” in this volume. 31 Acharya, “Global International Relations.” 32 For a useful discussion on these issues, see Pierre Bourdieu, “Les conditions sociales de la circulation internationale des idées,” Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales 5, no. 145 (2002): 3–8. 33 Such strict distinctions can be used both by certain Eurocentric accounts and by fundamentalist interpretations in Islam, as these dualities help them to perpetuate their claims to provide (in their opinions) the single truth. 34 Brian Rathbun, “Politics and Paradigm Preferences: The Implicit Ideology of International Relations Scholars,” International Studies Quarterly 56, no. 3 (2012): 607–22. 35 Jennifer Sterling-­Folker, “All Hail to the Chief: Liberal IR Theory in the New World Order,” International Studies Perspectives 16, no. 1 (2015): 40–9. 36 For most recent examples, see Michael C. Williams, “In the Beginning: The International Relations Enlightenment and the Ends of International Relations Theory,” European Journal of International Relations 19, no. 3 (2013): 647–65; Felix Rösch, “Realism as Social Criticism: The Thinking Partnership of Hannah Arendt and Hans Morgenthau,” International Politics 50, no. 6 (2013): 815–29; William E. Scheuerman, “The Realist Revival in Political Philosophy, or: Why New is Not Always Improved,” International Politics 50, no. 6 (2013): 798–814; Vassilios Paipais, “Between Politics and the Political: Reading Hans J. Morgenthau’s Double Critique of Depoliticisation,” Millennium 42, no. 2 (2014): 354–75. 37 For an internalist example, see Brian C. Schmidt, The Political Discourse of Anarchy: A Disciplinary History of International Relations (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998); for an externalist example, see Miles Kahler, “Investing International Relations: International Relations Theory after 1945,” in New Thinking in International Relations Theory, ed. Michael Doyle and G. John Ikenberry (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), 20–53. 38 Lebow et al., The Return of the Theorists; Naeem Inayatullah, ed., Autobiographical International Relations: I, IR (New York: Routledge, 2011). 39 See Sankaran Krishna, “Race, Amnesia and Education of International Relations,” Alternatives 26 (1993): 401–24; and most recently, Robert Vitalis, White World Order, Black Power Politics: The Birth of Amer­ican International Relations (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015). 40 Aydınlı and Biltekin, “A typology of homegrown theorizing,” 5. 41 For an approach that discusses thinkers’ connection to concepts (in their local settings) see Amado Luiz Cervo, “Conceptos en Relaciones Internacionales,” Relaciones Internacionales, no. 22 (2013): 149–66. His distinction between “thinkers of national expression,” (national) “political and diplomatic thought,” and the thought patterns of scholars working in academic and research centers is useful to the extent that it

76   Deniz Kuru enables us to better comprehend intra-­national differences among the local scholars in various national contexts. See especially pp. 156ff. 42 Arlene Tickner, “Hearing Latin Amer­ican Voices in International Relations Studies,” International Studies Perspectives 4, no. 4 (2003): 325–50; Arlene Tickner, “Seeing IR Differently: Notes from the Third World,” Millennium 32, no. 2 (2003): 295–324. 43 For some representative work, see Pınar Bilgin, “Thinking Past ‘Western’ IR?” Third World Quarterly 29, no. 1 (2008): 5–23; Ersel Aydınlı and Julie Matthews, “Periphery Theorizing for a Truly Internationalised Discipline: Spinning IR Theory of Anatolia,” Review of International Studies 34, no. 4 (2008): 693–712. 44 Yiwei Wang, “Between Science and Art: Questionable International Relations Theories,” Japanese Journal of Political Science 8, no. 2 (2007): 191–208. 45 See Wang, “Between Science.” 46 See Arjun Appadurai, Modernity at Large (Indianapolis: University of Indiana Press, 1996). 47 Thakur, “Africa and the Theoretical Peace.” 48 Aydınlı and Matthews, “Periphery Theorizing.” 49 Baskın Oran, ed. Türk Dış Politikası (İstanbul: İletişim, 2001). 50 William Hale, pers. comm., 2005. 51 William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy 1774–2000 (London: Routledge, 2000). 52 Carsten Holbraad, Middle Powers in International Politics (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1984). 53 William Hale, pers. comm., 2005. 54 Emel Parlar Dal, “On Turkey’s Trail as a ‘Rising Middle Power’ in the Network of Global Governance: Preferences, Capabilities, and Strategies,” Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs 19, no. 4 (2014): 107–36; Nükhet Ahu Sandal, “Middle Powerhood as a Legitimation Strategy in the Developing World: The Cases of Brazil and Turkey,” International Politics 51, no. 6 (2014): 693–708. 55 Barry Buzan and Richard Little, International Systems in World History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 18–22. 56 Greg Anderson, “Retrieving the Lost Worlds of the Past: The Case for an Ontological Turn,” The Amer­ican Historical Review 120, no. 3 (2015): 787–810. 57 Tarak Barkawi, “On the Pedagogy of ‘Small Wars’,” International Affairs 80, no. 1 (2004): 19–37; Tickner, “Hearing Latin Amer­ican Voices”; Tickner, “Seeing IR Differently”; Arlene Tickner and Ole Wæver, eds., International Relations Scholarship around the World (New York: Routledge, 2009). 58 Rudra Sil and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics: Reconfiguring Problems and Mechanisms across Research Traditions,” Perspectives on Politics 8, no. 2 (2010): 411–31. 59 Christine Sylvester, “Experiencing the End and Afterlives of International Relations/ Theory,” European Journal of International Relations 19, no. 3 (2013): 609–26. 60 Walter Bryce Gallie, “Essentially Contested Concepts,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society New Series 56 (1955–1965): 167–98. 61 See Acharya, “Global International Relations.”

Bibliography Acharya, Amitav. “Global International Relations (IR) and Regional Worlds: A New Agenda for International Studies.” International Studies Quarterly 58, no. 4 (2014): 647–59. Anderson, Greg. “Retrieving the Lost Worlds of the Past: The Case for an Ontological Turn.” The Amer­ican Historical Review 120, no. 3 (2015): 787–810. Appadurai, Arjun. Modernity at Large. Indianapolis: University of Indiana Press, 1996.

Knowledge, scholars, theory   77 Aydınlı, Ersel, and Gonca Biltekin. “A Typology of Homegrown Theorizing.” Widening the World of IR. London: Routledge, 2018. Aydınlı, Ersel, and Julie Matthews. “Periphery Theorizing for a Truly Internationalised Discipline: Spinning IR Theory of Anatolia.” Review of International Studies 34, no. 4 (2008): 693–712. Barkawi, Tarak. “On the Pedagogy of ‘Small Wars’.” International Affairs 80, no. 1 (2004): 19–37.  Beck, Ulrich. What is Globalization? London: Polity, 2000. Bilgin, Pınar. “Thinking Past ‘Western’ IR?” Third World Quarterly 29, no. 1 (2008): 5–23. Bourdieu, Pierre. “Les conditions sociales de la circulation internationale des idées.” Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales 5, no. 145 (2002): 3–8. Buzan, Barry, and George Lawson. “Theory, History, and the Global Transformation.” International Theory 8, no. 3 (2016): 502–22. Buzan, Barry, and Richard Little. International Systems in World History. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. Callahan, William A. “Nationalising International Theory: Race, Class and the English School.” Global Society 18, no. 4 (2004): 305–23. Cervo, Amado Luiz. “Conceptos en Relaciones Internacionales.” Relaciones Internacionales 22 (2013): 149–66. Dal, Emel Parlar. “On Turkey’s Trail as a ‘Rising Middle Power’ in the Network of Global Governance: Preferences, Capabilities, and Strategies.” Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs 19, no. 4 (2014): 107–36. De Carvalho, Benjamin, Halvard Leira, and John M. Hobson. “The Big Bangs of IR: The Myths That Your Teachers Still Tell You about 1648 and 1919.” Millennium 39, no. 3 (2011): 735–58. Doyle, Michael. “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 12, no. 3 (1983): 205–35. Doyle, Michael. “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs: Part II.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 12, no. 4 (1983): 323–53. Dunne, Timothy. “Mythology or Methodology? Traditions in International Theory.” Review of International Studies 19, no. 3 (1993): 305–18. Falaky, Fayçal. “A Forsaken And Foreclosed Utopia: Rousseau and International Relations.” European Journal of Political Theory 15, no. 1 (2014): 61–76. Gallie, W. B. “Essentially Contested Concepts.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society New Series 56 (1955–1965): 167–98. Guilhot, Nicolas. “The First Modern Realist: Felix Gilbert’s Machiavelli and the Realist Tradition in International Thought.” Modern Intellectual History 13, no. 3 (2016): 681–711. Hale, William. Turkish Foreign Policy 1774–2000. London: Routledge, 2000. Hobson, John M. The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics: Western International Theory, 1760–2010. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012. Holbraad, Carsten. Middle Powers in International Politics. New York: St Martin’s Press, 1984. Inayatullah, Naeem, ed. Autobiographical International Relations: I, IR. New York: Routledge, 2011. Jackson, Michael, and Thomas Moore. “Machiavelli’s Walls: The Legacy of Realism in International Relations Theory.” International Politics 53, no. 4 (2016): 447–65. Jenco, Leigh. “Introduction: Thinking with the Past: Political Thought in and from the ‘Non-­West’.” European Journal of Political Theory 15, no. 4 (2016): 377–81.

78   Deniz Kuru Kahler, Miles. “Investing International Relations: International Relations Theory after 1945.” In New Thinking in International Relations Theory, edited by Michael Doyle and G. John Ikenberry, 20–53. Boulder: Westview Press, 1997. Krippendorff, Ekkehart, ed. Internationale Beziehungen. Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1973. Krishna, Sankaran. “Race, Amnesia and Education of International Relations.” Alternatives 26 (1993): 401–24. Kwon, Heonik. The Other Cold War. New York: Columbia University Press, 2010. Lebow, Richard Ned, Peer Schouten, and Hidemi Suganami, eds. The Return of the Theorists—Dialogues with Great Thinkers in International Relations. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. Lizée, Pierre. A Whole New World: Reinventing International Studies for the Post-­ Western World. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. Long, David, and Brian C. Schmidt, eds. Imperialism and Internationalism in the Discipline of International Relations. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005. Moshirzadeh, Homeira. “Iranian Scholars and Theorizing International Relations: Achievements and Challenges.” Widening the World of IR. London: Routledge, 2018. Moyn, Samuel, and Andrew Sartori, eds. Global Intellectual History. New York: Columbia University Press, 2013. Novo, Andrew R. “Where We Get Thucydides Wrong: The Fallacies of History’s First ‘Hegemonic’ War.” Diplomacy & Statecraft 27, no. 1 (2016): 1–21. Onuf, Nicholas. “Center-­Periphery Relations: What Kind of Rule, and Does It Matter?” All Azimuth 6, no. 1 (2017): 5–16. Oran, Baskın, ed. Türk Dış Politikası. İstanbul: İletişim, 2001. Paipais, Vassilios. “Between Politics and the Political: Reading Hans J. Morgenthau’s Double Critique of Depoliticisation.” Millennium 42, no. 2 (2014): 354–75. Parmar, Inderjeet. “The ‘Knowledge Politics’ of Democratic Peace Theory.” International Politics 50, no. 2 (2013): 231–56. Rathbun, Brian. “Politics and Paradigm Preferences: The Implicit Ideology of International Relations Scholars.” International Studies Quarterly 56, no. 3 (2012): 607–22. Reus-­Smit, Christian. “Theory, History, and Great Transformations.” International Theory 8, no. 3 (2016): 422–35. Rösch, Felix. “Realism as Social Criticism: The Thinking Partnership of Hannah Arendt and Hans Morgenthau.” International Politics 50, no. 6 (2013): 815–29. Rosenau, James. Distant Proximities. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003. Sandal, Nükhet Ahu. “Middle Powerhood as a Legitimation Strategy in the Developing World: The cases of Brazil and Turkey.” International Politics 51, no. 6 (2014): 693–708. Scheuerman, William E. “The Realist Revival in Political Philosophy, or: Why New is Not Always Improved.” International Politics 50, no. 6 (2013): 798–814. Schmidt, Brian C. The Political Discourse of Anarchy: A Disciplinary History of International Relations. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998. Sil, Rudra, and Peter J. Katzenstein. “Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics: Reconfiguring Problems and Mechanisms across Research Traditions.” Perspectives on Politics 8, no. 2 (2010): 411–31. Smith, Karen. “Has Africa Got Anything to Say? African Contributions to the Theoretical Development of International Relations.” The Round Table 98, no. 402 (2009): 269–94. Sterling-­Folker, Jennifer. “All Hail to the Chief: Liberal IR Theory in the New World Order.” International Studies Perspectives 16, no. 1 (2015): 40–9.

Knowledge, scholars, theory   79 Swedberg, Richard. “Theorizing in Sociology and Social Science.” Theory and Society 41, no. 1 (2012): 1–40. Swedberg, Richard. The Art of Social Theory. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014. Sylvester, Christine. “Experiencing the End and Afterlives of International Relations/ Theory.” European Journal of International Relations 19, no. 3 (2013): 609–26. Thakur, Vineet. “Africa and the Theoretical Peace in IR.” International Political Sociology 9, no. 3 (2015): 213–29. Tickner, Arlene. “Hearing Latin Amer­ican Voices in International Relations Studies.” International Studies Perspectives 4, no. 4 (2003): 325–50. Tickner, Arlene. “Seeing IR Differently: Notes from the Third World.” Millennium 32, no. 2 (2003): 295–324. Tickner, Arlene, and Ole Wæver, eds. International Relations Scholarship around the World. New York: Routledge, 2009. Todorova, Maria. Imagining the Balkans. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. Tsai, Lily L. “Bringing in China: Insights for Building Comparative Political Theory.” Comparative Political Studies 50, no. 3 (2016): 295–328. doi: 10.1177/0010414016672236. Turton, Helen Louise, and Lucas G. Freire. “Peripheral Possibilities: Revealing Originality and Encouraging Dialogue through a Reconsideration of ‘Marginal’ IR Scholarship.” Journal of International Relations and Development 19, no. 4 (2014): 535–57. Wallerstein, Immanuel. The Modern World System I. New York: Academic Press, 1976. Wang, Yiwei. “Between Science and Art: Questionable International Relations Theories.” Japanese Journal of Political Science 8, no. 2 (2007): 191–208. Wight, Martin. International Theory: The Three Traditions. Edited by Gabriele Wight and Brian Porter. Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1991. Williams, Michael C. “In the Beginning: The International Relations Enlightenment and the Ends of International Relations Theory.” European Journal of International Relations 19, no. 3 (2013): 647–65. Wolff, Larry. Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994. Vitalis, Robert. White World Order, Black Power Politics: The Birth of Amer­ican International Relations. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015.

Part II

Theorizing at “home”

5 Iranian scholars and theorizing international relations Achievements and challenges1 Homeira Moshirzadeh

Introduction Since the emergence of the Islamic Republic in Iran, social scientists, including International Relations (IR) scholars, have been called to develop theories to reflect Iranian/Islamic points of view. In the first years after the Islamic Revolution, calls for the Islamization of universities were taken to mean changes in the content and curricula of social sciences and humanities courses. The Cultural Revolution of the early 1980s, which led to a temporary shutdown of university classes, sought the same idea. The curricula were changed to some degree, and Islamization led to including courses on the history of Islam, theology, and jurisprudence as requirements for all majors; adding the adjective “Islamic” to existing courses in social sciences, including political science and IR (e.g., Islamic International Law, Islamic Politics, etc.); and introducing a limited number of specifically new courses such as Political Jurisprudence. During the last decade or so, another call for change in the existing approaches to the social sciences has emerged, with an emphasis on their becoming bumi (“homegrown,”2 “native,” “indigenous,” or “endogenous”3), which is taken to mean not only Islamization but also a kind of “Iranization” of knowledge pursued and produced in academia. This shift has encouraged some Iranian scholars to develop ideas about international life on the basis of Islamic/Iranian4 texts and teachings. At the same time, thanks to calls for marginal voices to be heard as well as to the failure of existing IR theories in their predictions about the end of the Cold War, an increasing awareness and critique of the Eurocentric nature of IR theories has led the international community of IR scholars to become interested in the status of IR in other parts of the world and more open to non-­Western understandings of international relations.5 This change has made endogenous/indigenous theorizing more attractive to Iranian IR scholars, and debates about it have become more vivid. Some Iranian scholars wholeheartedly advocate such an endeavor; others find it somewhat worthwhile; and a few do not agree with it at all. A review of the work on the status of IR and IR theories in Iran shows a variety of approaches. Some of the literature has a rather descriptive approach and shows the characteristics and trends in the country.6,7 Other research, in a

84   Homeira Moshirzadeh “pathological” analysis of IR in Iran that focuses on its shortcomings and defects, emphasizes the Westernized nature of political science/IR in Iran and the need for an Iranian/Islamic perspective to replace or at least co-­exist with it.8 And some research has more of a focus on investigating new openings in the discipline for Iranian/Islamic approaches to IR.9 This chapter seeks to examine the attempts by the Iranian IR community to conceptualize and theorize international relations from homegrown points of view and to show how contextual factors have limited such attempts. The first part of the chapter reviews IR scholarship in Iran to give a portrait of its evolution and achievements regarding Iranian approaches to IR. The second part examines contextual factors that have affected homegrown theorizing in Iran, including international agency, inspiring sources, the dynamism of the IR community, the academia-­government relationship, and intellectual autonomy. An evaluation of this context suggests that even if theorizing IR from an Iranian point of view is both possible and preferable, this cannot be done unless certain constraints are overcome.

IR scholarship in Iran One of the first modern higher education institutions in Iran was the “School of Political Science,” formed in 1899 to train Iranian diplomats. IR was deemed a subfield of political science and was a part of its curriculum.10 From the beginning, political science in general and IR in particular were more legally oriented due to the influences of French tradition, especially at the University of Tehran (the first modern university established in Iran), where the departments of law, political science, and international relations co-­existed. When in the 1960s some Amer­icanization efforts took place, political science and IR became more similar to what was taught at Amer­ican universities.11 In 1966, the Center for Graduate International Studies (CGIS) was formed at the University of Tehran, with an emphasis on international law, international organizations, international economy, and peace studies. This center offered an MA program in IR.12 Another important university was Melli (National) University, which was modeled on Amer­ican universities. It was established in 1961 and began to offer political science programs in 1966. The departments of politics and economics were in the same faculty, while the law school was separate. The curricula offered an economic orientation compared to the more legal approach followed by the University of Tehran. It is argued that Melli University’s formation put an end to the “monopoly” of the University of Tehran over political science and IR.13 Iranian political scientist Homayoun Elahi believes that there was an inclination toward “de-­politicizing” political science in Iran by giving it a legal or economic orientation.14 In general, the curricula, syllabi, and material taught at these universities were mainly inspired by or translated from Western sources, first mostly French and later mostly English. The number of articles and books dealing with Iran’s foreign relations was relatively limited. In a few books,15

Iranian scholars and international relations   85 some pages were dedicated to Iran; Nazem’s work discusses Iran’s constitution, and Behzadi’s references the Shah’s nationalism and his charismatic leadership. My informal review of books published before the Revolution that were available at the University of Tehran (the oldest library of law and political science in the country) suggests that Iran’s foreign relations and its position in the world were not major concerns at the time. An example might illustrate the above: The CGIS could be considered as the most prominent center working on IR in pre-­Revolution Iran. It enjoyed wide financial and institutional support and gathered the most well-­known scholars in the field. It also had international links and a few publications in English and French. A journal published by the CGIS between 1973 and 1978, Ravabet-­e Beinolmelal (International Relations), included only a few articles dealing with Iran’s foreign policy or its regional environment.16 The 11 books it published included two on international legal issues, authored by Iranian scholars; an edited volume on the foreign policies of Iran and France, published in French; and eight translated works on European political unification, the history of IR, IR theories, US foreign policy, China, the Persian Gulf and the Suez Canal, international responsibility, and Islam and international law. The CGIS also published 13 research reports (seven bibliographies, a paper on Iran’s foreign cultural relations in French, two descriptive chronological papers on Iran-­US and Iran-­Soviet relations, two papers on Africa and Iran’s economic relations with African countries, and a paper on the Regional Cooperation for Development, RCD). According to the data in the last issue of International Relations, 14 MA theses were defended at the Center in 1977–1978, out of which only one dealt with Iran’s foreign relations. Among the courses offered, there was one MA course on Iran’s foreign policy;17 there were also some seminars, roundtables, and lectures more directly related to Iran’s foreign relations or its regional environment.18 The Islamic Revolution and the later sociopolitical developments brought about significant changes in academic life in general and IR in particular. The number of students rose rapidly both at the undergraduate and graduate levels, and the number of universities offering political science and IR increased steadily. Unlike the pre-­Revolutionary era, when most of the faculty had studied abroad for their PhDs, PhD graduates from Iranian universities became the majority of the faculty members.19 Furthermore, many PhDs and MAs in IR in Iran have been and continue to be employed as researchers in such areas as strategic studies and foreign policy. As noted earlier, the Islamic Revolution in the late 1970s and the Cultural Revolution in the early 1980s greatly affected academic life, specifically by introducing an Islamic perspective to the social sciences and humanities. For this reason, Iran might seem to be an appropriate candidate for producing a non-­ Western knowledge base of IR. Further, because of its Islamism, its anti-­ hegemonic foreign policy, and the fact that for nearly four decades, religious and political authorities have called for Islamic and/or bumi (homegrown) knowledge/theories, one might expect that non-­Western, Iranian IR theories exist. But this is not the case.

86   Homeira Moshirzadeh Before turning to Iranian scholars’ achievements (or lack thereof ) in terms of homegrown theorizations, it is appropriate to see how scholars understand homegrown (endogenous and indigenous) knowledge. What do they believe bumi knowledge to be? In Autumn 2014 I conducted a research survey on IR scholars’ understanding of homegrown knowledge. The survey was based on a 30-item questionnaire, mostly related to the scholars’ understanding of IR in general and Iranian IR in particular. The questionnaire was sent to 92 IR scholars teaching at public universities in Iran. In addition to those who were already known to the author, others were identified through the websites of universities. Forty-­six scholars replied. The results of the survey suggest that Iranian IR scholars have different understandings of Iranian or homegrown knowledge. Some believe it should be extracted from Iranian and/or Islamic sources; some emphasize that if Iran’s historical and geographical context is considered, then we can talk about Iranian knowledge of IR; the majority of them consider a piece of work as being bumi when it is at the service of the national interest of the country; and finally, some believe that whatever is produced by Iranian scholars can be regarded as Iranian/ endogenous. More than 65 percent of IR scholars surveyed see the production of homegrown knowledge as dependent upon the formation of homegrown theory. In other words, without a homegrown theory, we cannot talk of having a homegrown knowledge. Perhaps that is why 76 percent of those surveyed see little or no homegrown knowledge of IR existing in Iran – because they do not see any authentic Iranian theory. When scholars were asked about possible reasons for the lack of a homegrown theory of IR in Iran, most of them cite the lack of relevant endogenous/ indigenous knowledge in other disciplines, such as sociology, psychology, and philosophy, that IR theory building can rely on. In other words, they believe that producing theories of IR in a vacuum is not possible. This question was included because when we look at the theories of IR in the West, we see that almost all of them are built upon knowledge produced in other disciplines,20 the same set of conditions may be affecting the development of Iranian IR knowledge. Iranian scholars definitely do not want to see IR knowledge in Iran limited to homegrown theorizing. In fact, more than 78 percent of respondents are very strongly or strongly against this. More than 72 percent see empirical validation necessary for statements inspired/informed by local sources. More than 67 percent of the scholars believe that any homegrown knowledge needs to be linked to existing IR achievements, and 89 percent see this as a condition for its existence. Only 21.7 percent of respondents see a possibility for producing Islamic knowledge of international life independent of existing achievements in IR. One may conclude from the results of this survey that while most Iranian scholars find theorization from an Iranian/Islamic point of view possible and even preferable, they do not accept ignoring or refuting existing IR theories. The same survey suggests that among Western theories of IR, constructivism, and realism are more popular and are found to be more helpful in explaining international life. Another survey conducted in 2010 showed almost the same result.21

Iranian scholars and international relations   87 Despite the lack of homegrown knowledge in other disciplines, the IR community in Iran has attempted to produce homegrown IR theories. Islam has been the most important source of inspiration for indigenous theorizing and conceptualizations in Iran. A body of work that may represent an Islamic approach to international relations was produced after the Islamic Revolution,22 either by Shiite clergy and or based on their work. Although some of this work looks like international law from an Islamic point of view (especially that produced by Shiite jurisprudents), one can also find some explanatory or normative content.23 There are three basic approaches to Islamic theorizing of IR in Iran:24 (1) regarding Islam as an encompassing set of ideas with a unique “true” theory applicable to every aspect of life (including IR), which should be extracted from Islamic sources on the basis of Islamic jurisprudence;25 (2) considering theorizing on the basis of Islamic jurisprudence as one way of understanding international relations;26 and (3) seeing the international system as a modern phenomenon with no precedence in Islamic sources and therefore regard it as a realm where human reason should guide our understanding of it.27 From the last point of view, only some philosophical anthropological Islamic principles, such as non-­conflict, can be used as a guide to theory building (in the same way that Western IR theories take, for example, peace or order as a basic principle).28 These scholars may consider Islamic ideals as a source of prescriptive/normative theory of IR and Islamic scripts and concepts as an inspiring source for developing hypotheses and theories. As far as theoretical ideas are concerned, concepts such as power,29 order,30 war and peace,31 security,32 terrorism,33 identity,34 and globalization35 have been explored on the basis of Iranian literature and culture or Islamic sources to show how they differ from and/or are similar to contemporary understandings in international relations. In some sources, principles are introduced that are supposed to govern international relations from an Islamic point of view. For example, Alikhani sees human dignity, diversity, freedom and equality, peaceful coexistence, refuting violence, observing ethical standards, dialogue, observing pacts and treaties, reciprocity, and military deterrence as the basic principles of international relations in Islam.36 But he does not elaborate these to introduce a theory. The most ambitious attempt at producing an Islamic theory of international relations has been made by Dehghani-­Firoozabadi, a prominent IR scholar who did his BA and MA at Imam Sadeq University37 and received his PhD in Belgium. He is the pioneer of the second approach mentioned above. He believes that an Islamic theory should be based on Islamic sources, including its meta-­ theoretical foundations. In an article38 later developed into a book,39 he presents an Islamic meta-­theory for international relations and explores the ontological and epistemological foundations of a potential IR theory in Islamic sources, in particular the work of sixteenth-­century Islamic philosopher Molla Sadra. In an article on an Islamic theory of international relations, he sets out a general framework, justifying such an endeavor, clarifying its assumptions, and giving some very broad principles, such as Islamic definitions and descriptions of phenomena

88   Homeira Moshirzadeh such as order, dominance, ethics, change, and justice. He does not provide specific statements on topics such as the nature of the modern state and the international system, the causes of war, change, and dominance, or the ways in which international justice can be actualized.40 If we consider products by Iranian scholars who work more or less within existing paradigms of IR but have developed new theoretical frameworks dealing with specific international issues to be a sort of Iranian theorization of IR, an example could be the Conceptual Systematic Schema for Foreign Policy developed by Hossein Seifzadeh. On the basis of systems theory and dialectical method, he develops a complicated schema for analyzing foreign policy, which seems to be an attempt at integrating some existing theories and concepts into a more comprehensive model, where both domestic and international influences are taken into account.41 Farhad Ghasemi, an Iranian realist scholar influenced by network analysis and chaos theory, has developed a theoretical framework to explain the balance of power in regional networks. His main argument is that an increase in systemic interactions has led to problems in the balance-­of-power theory. By synthesizing balance of power and network balancing, he proposes a new theory called “smart balance of power.”42 In these two articles we see theoretical endeavors based on existing Western theories and conceptualizations but leading to new models for explaining more specific phenomena such as foreign policy and regional orders in relation to Iran. What Acharya and Buzan see as elites’ conceptualizations of international life43 is also a source of theorization in Iran, mostly reflected in a body of work that deals with the perceptions of two leaders of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Khomeini and Ayatollah Khamenei.44 As clergy and politicians, their ideas can be seen as originating both from Islamic teachings and an Iranian experience of world affairs. Some articles about the foreign policy of various administrations deal with Iranian politicians’ perceptions of international relations.45 In addition, Khatami’s (President of Iran from 1997–2005) idea of dialogue of civilizations has been reconceptualized within the existing IR theories.46 Most Iranian scholars apply existing IR theories to issues significant from an Iranian point of view. As mentioned above, Iranian scholars are more interested in constructivism and realism. The former’s appeal rests on its relevance to non-­ material aspects of social life, which is more applicable to Iranian and Islamic culture. Furthermore, it explains the anomalies in the application of materialist/ realist theories to Iran’s foreign policy. For these reasons, a constructivist analysis of various aspects of Iran’s foreign policy constitutes the theme of many articles. Realism is also employed to explain different issues in international relations and foreign policy. Many Iranian scholars seek to explain Iran’s foreign policy from a realist point of view, while others take realism as a point of departure to criticize aspects of Iran’s foreign policy that they do not regard as realistic. Furthermore, realism is usually the preferred theoretical framework for a critical explanation of the existing international system and US foreign policy. Many articles focus on US hegemony-­seeking behaviors, especially in the Middle East,

Iranian scholars and international relations   89 and are framed in a way (as stemming from power-­seeking impulses) to delegitimize them. Since regional orders are important to a regional power such as Iran, attempts have been made to apply realist theoretical insights about the international system to regional systems47 or the implications of systemic changes for Iran.48 These pieces of work, however, have not been elaborated into an Iranian realist theory. The above Iranian reading of realism reminds us of Edward Said’s idea of traveling theories, where “the movement of ideas and theories from one place to another is both a fact of life and a usefully enabling condition of intellectual activity.”49 International relations ideas and theories are not exceptions; they too travel from situation to situation and this travel leads to new understandings and interpretations of world affairs and may nourish IR in general.

Theorizing IR in Iran: contextual factors The achievements mentioned above have not been celebrated by many scholars in Iran, who, on the whole, believe that these attempts are far from substantive theories of IR (and this is easily argued). But why have the attempts not led to a presentable theory of IR? An examination of the literature dealing with IR theorization in different countries reveals that several factors impact the status of IR in a country in general and IR theorizing in particular.50 This section addresses some of these factors,51 most of which have worked against the production of Iranian theories of IR. International agency International relations theories have mostly been developed in core countries, particularly the US. For this reason, it is sometimes asserted that IR is an Amer­ ican discipline that explains the world from a narrowly defined Amer­ican point of view.52 It may, however, be argued that great powers have the resources and capacities to encourage such endeavors. Furthermore, the more a country is involved in international affairs, the more it needs to explain and predict what is going on at the global level. A better understanding of the world makes one’s agential capacity in international interactions more meaningful, which is why academia in these powerful countries are more involved in IR theorization. Nevertheless, one cannot ignore that IR theorization has not been limited to the US or even the great powers; the plurality and diversity of the discipline has been emphasized in recent studies.53 Scandinavian academicians have proved that theorists from smaller countries can have a voice in the realm of IR theory. At the same time, the content of the Copenhagen School or Peace Research, for example, shows that these too have their roots in agential projects Nordic countries seek to follow at the global level. The foreign policies of these countries are rooted in Nordic “exceptionalism”: “peace-­loving, oriented towards peaceful conflict-­resolution and hosting ‘rational’ global ‘good citizens’.” They emphasize human rights and contributions to peace and stability through multilateralism

90   Homeira Moshirzadeh and international cooperation. Thus we may say the Nordic-­centric conception of world politics has its roots in the Nordic model of socioeconomic development and matches the foreign-­policy orientations of the Nordic states.54 The global south has traditionally faced serious impediments in its road toward agency in international life. Acharya argues that in the modern world, the agency of non-­Western societies in international affairs has been denied, even if they too have had a say in the formation of some international rules and norms.55 During the last decades, however, there have been inclinations toward new conceptualizations by IR scholars from India and China that can be related to their emerging agency in the world.56 Yet it can be argued that although a feeling of agency may influence the need for theorization, there is not necessarily a correlation between the two. Iran seems to see a high agential capacity for itself at the international level, of course more from a critical perspective. In the post-­Revolution era, the constitution of the Islamic Republic, inspired by Revolutionary Islamic ideals, has paved the way for an active role in the global scene. Iran’s support for what it regards as liberation movements all around the world; its criticism of existing international institutions for being manipulated by great powers, especially the US; its opposition to US policies in the Middle East and elsewhere; its opposition to Israel; and its active support for Palestinians are just a few examples of its agential projects at the regional and international levels. These activities and beliefs seem to be rooted in Islamic and Iranian ideals of justice.57 We might expect critical agency to lead to critical theorization, yet in Iran this has not occurred. Of course, agential projects are only one branch of an IR theory’s roots; others are expanded upon below. Sources of inspiration Due to the interdisciplinary nature of IR, it borrows concepts, models, metaphors, and theories from other disciplines,58 and thus many Western IR theories rely heavily on Western philosophy, economics, psychology, sociology, and history in building and formulating their hypotheses.59 In Iran one can find traces of such knowledge in traditional sources such as Persian literature, classic books on history, Islamic philosophy and theology; however, as noted earlier, there is little modern homegrown (Islamic/Iranian) theories in other disciplines to build on. Another important factor contributing to the generation or modification of IR theories is genuine research in the field. In Iran, empirical IR research has not led to the formation of a robust body of accumulated knowledge.60 Most of what is called “research” in Iranian journals and dissertations is not based on a rigorous method leading to reliable findings. Qasem Eftekhari, a prominent professor of methodology in IR and political science in Iran, evaluated political science and IR PhD dissertations defended at the University of Tehran.61 He applied criteria such as elaborating the objectives of the research, choosing an appropriate method, applying the method in practice, the reliability of the results of data

Iranian scholars and international relations   91 a­ nalysis, and the lucidity of findings. On a 20-item scale, the median of the scores he gave were between 12.95 and 14.1. In other words, his study showed that the research done by Iranian students of IR do not meet widely accepted methodological requirements and standards. Although the rate of publication is high, innovation in and sophistication of the works are not satisfactory, which in turn affects theorizing. Proper research contributes to good theory building because it leads to new hypotheses and conceptualizations, it acts as a test for assumptions and hypotheses, it establishes background conditions for the truth or fallacy of hypotheses, and it helps extend theories to new areas. A lack of good research leads to an unreliable context in which to generate theories and models. Nevertheless, Iran is proud of its body of traditional sources, including Islamic Shiite sources, such as hadith (sayings of the Prophet and Imams), sunna (deeds of the Prophet and Imams), theological texts, and the Quran, as well as Iranian sources (poetry and other forms of literature, traditional historiographies, statements by public figures, and texts known as the Mirror of Prince or Siasatnameh). These documents can inspire conceptualizations and theory building in many disciplines, including IR. As noted above, while some attempts have been made in this regard, the result has been speculations rather than theory. Dynamic academic community Even if a country seeks to exercise its agency at the international level and thus encourages IR scholars to conceptualize the world from that perspective, and even if there is a body of knowledge to inspire scholars, if there is no dynamic academic community and significant steady academic activity, one cannot expect much research and knowledge building, let alone theorizing. This environment takes years to develop, and requires encouraging scholars and graduate students to focus on their studies, research, and training new generations of scholars. As far as scholars are concerned, some studies suggest that Iranian academics are not highly motivated. Their relatively low income has required many of them to take second jobs. Many act as consultants or analysts for the public sector and spend much of their time producing material that is not academically valuable or publishable in academic journals. This situation has also affected the quality of their teaching: many students do not find their courses rich enough and they too become less motivated about and/or incapable of conducting good research.62 The high number of admissions to PhD programs, funding limits for PhD students, and uncertainties about finding tenure positions after graduation have led to a lack of motivation, weak academic performance,63 and thus a low quality of research. Critically reviewing scholarly works and publications is an important aspect in developing and refining new ideas. This can be done at conferences and in academic discussions, in addition to reviews and forums in academic journals. The number of review articles in Iranian journals is very limited; some studies even suggest that Iranian scholars tend to ignore their peers’ work.64 For

92   Homeira Moshirzadeh example, the major theoretical endeavors by Seifzadeh, Ghasemi, and Dehghani-­ Firoozabadi65 referred to above have not engendered serious reviews, critique, or challenges, while in China, for example, such endeavors are much more welcome.66 Academia-­government relationship The political context is also a contributing or discouraging factor in theory formation. Globally, policy making and theory building have been traditionally seen as separate and even opposing domains, leading to metaphors such as academics’ “ivory tower,” representing the distance between scholars/theorists’ imagined world and the real world politicians have to deal with.67 As Stephen Walt rightly observes, “Policy makers pay relatively little attention to the vast theoretical literature in IR, and many scholars seem uninterested in doing policy-­ relevant work.”68 Nevertheless, one cannot deny the fact that theory deals with public questions, is influenced by international and foreign relations issues, usually seeks to find appropriate answers to practical questions,69 and can be regarded as an “essential tool of statecraft.”70 In many countries, a significant part of the demand for works on IR comes directly or indirectly from the state sector. This requires an appropriate relationship between the two (state support without jeopardizing the independence of academia) as well as a more or less common definition of the world. The importance of this context is evident in Nordic countries, where despite their rather small size, the academic community is very active. In Iran, however, statesmen have traditionally (even in the pre-­Revolution era) had a pessimist view of the political science community in general,71 resulting in the establishment of research centers in different state departments72 to become self-­sufficient in meeting their research needs and hence more or less independent of universities. Sariolghalam believes that academic IR has little influence in decision making in Iran.73 According to Heshmatzadeh’s survey, 73 percent of political scientists in Iran believe there is a distance between political science and practice.74 There may be different explanations for this situation: academics’ abstract language, their lack of knowledge about government’s practical needs, the gap between the attitudes of the two sides, a suspicion of academics’ “Westernized” approaches, officials’ confidence in their own experiences rather than in academic observations, and internal divisions among scholars with various views of international politics and foreign policy. In practice, of course, many scholars do work with public institutions, yet more often in the form of consultations, debate meetings, lectures, and seminars. Yet there is little willingness on the part of state institutions to support theoretical work75 because such projects are time consuming and may not meet government needs. Here, resource limitations are more relevant than other factors. Considering that scholars need not only to be supported institutionally and financially but also to be heard, if the above gaps are not overcome, they will continue to block the path toward theory building in Iranian IR.

Iranian scholars and international relations   93 Intellectual independence and self-­confidence What might be called intellectual independence, meaning scholars’ belief in their own intellectual capacity to build theories without being swayed by existing ones, is another factor that affects the context within which theory-­building efforts can be shaped. In many Southern countries, including Iran, there is a tendency toward assuming that Western IR theories are good enough to explain what is going on at the international level. As their claim to universality is so strong, there is little motivation for developing new theories on the basis of endogenous conceptualizations.76 This situation may be the result of what some call “epistemological imperialism,”77 and it is not limited to Iran.78 A prerequisite for self-­confidence and intellectual independence is a tradition of critical thinking, which as noted above, barely exists in Iran.79 One Iranian IR scholar suggests that there are only a few people in Iran who have the expertise to adopt a genuine critical approach toward Western IR theories,80 which is why many Iranian scholars tend to uncritically accept Western theories. Critical thinking should be taught and fostered in primary school and continued throughout one’s education. Unfortunately, the educational system in Iran is based on a very large amount of reading and memorizing, and the type and amount of classwork and homework does not allow for analysis, debate, or critiques. It is perhaps for this reason that the lack of rigorous homegrown theories is a cross-­ disciplinary problem.

Conclusion The aim of this chapter is to show the conditions of Iranian IR theorizing as well as its limitations and the reasons for them. Although most IR scholars in Iran see the development of Iranian theories as favorable and possible, they do not have a fully shared understanding of it. While there have been conscious attempts at presenting homegrown theories (or at least conceptualizations) they have not been fully welcomed by the community of scholars thus far. There are contextual factors that limit such efforts and result in their marginalization by other Iranian scholars. To further complicate matters, even the limited conceptual/theoretical productions of Iranian scholars have not been published for non-­Iranian audience, partly because of linguistic barriers, but more importantly, due to differences in styles of reasoning and argument leading to non-­acceptance by editorial boards of well-­known academic journals. It is believed that the English language is more straightforward in reasoning.81 For example, in English a deductive approach is used in which a direct relationship of ideas exists: from general to particular, from abstract to concrete. This linear logic is different from the circular, lateral, or spiral logics seen in other languages such as Persian. Kaplan found that the type of reasoning dominant in one’s native language is reflected in his or her writing in English.82 Ideas are sometimes presented in a sort of ambiguity, or even when the idea is clear, it is supported by repetition and emphasis

94   Homeira Moshirzadeh and not by facts or data. This style would cause a Western reviewer to have a low opinion of an article and reject it. During the last few years there have been dozens of workshops to make Iranian scholars familiar with stylistic issues in writing articles for international journals, which may lead to more standard writing in the future. At the same time, attempts at the domestic and regional levels of non-­Englishspeaking countries to publish IR journals in English so as to attract the attention of IR scholars worldwide can be seen as a first step by non-­Western scholars toward internationalizing non-­Western theorizing. If non-­Western IR scholars’ products are presented at the international level, they should be scrutinized, criticized, and discussed so that they can be refined to the same level as Western scholars’ works. This process means they should be somehow linked to existing understandings of international life, and thus must be meaningful and comprehensible for an international audience. An important part of Iranian scholars’ work based on Islamic ideas seems to be discursively remote from the existing IR literature, which in itself likely acts as an impediment. In other words, if an Islamic theory is presented within a jurisprudential language, it will not be understandable to the international community of IR scholars. Perhaps the idea of inter-­civilizational dialogue that emerged as a principle in foreign policy in the Khatami administration could have been a good beginning to the goal of introducing Iranian IR theory to the international IR community. First, it was emphasized that the idea had its roots in Islamic thought and Iranian culture; second, it could be seen as an agential project pursued by the Khatami administration; third, IR scholars in Iran (and even some Western thinkers) welcomed the idea and were eager to theoretically invest in it; fourth, one could imagine that the government would support this theoretical investment (and it partly did by forming the Center for Dialogue of Civilizations in Tehran); fifth, since it was internationally welcomed and was somehow linked to existing critical IR theory, it could be more seriously discussed and criticized; and finally, it could be an internationally understandable intervention (both at academic and practical levels). If the international environment were friendly enough to such an idea it might have been further conceptualized by Iranian IR scholars. However, the 9/11 events and the developments afterwards marginalized the idea altogether. Nevertheless, one may hope that over time Iranian IR scholars will learn to develop their ideas more systematically, discuss them more seriously, and locate them in IR’s discursive space.

Notes   1 I am deeply grateful to my colleagues at the All Azimuth Workshop (September 2016), especially Deniz Kuru and Gonca Biltekin, whose insightful comments on the first draft of this chapter were very helpful. It should be underlined that any shortcomings are to be attributed to the author.   2 I must thank the All Azimuth Workshop for the word homegrown, which covers much of the meaning implicit in the Persian word bumi as I have used it.

Iranian scholars and international relations   95   3 I make a distinction between the last two: an endogenous approach may reflect the needs, perspectives, experiences, and history of Iran and Iranians, while it might not rely on Iranian/Islamic sources for conceptualization and/or theory building. Historical events such as the experience of wars against Iran in the modern era, including wars with Russia in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, or the Iraq war against Iran in the 1980s, may lead to specific understandings of the nature of war, and, for example, to a particular Iranian realist or constructivist theory of war that can be called endogenous. An indigenous approach seeks to create a genuinely different view of IR and IR theorizing based on Iranian and/or Islamic sources and conceptualizations.   4 In Iran, when an author calls her/his work Islamic, it usually means that it is based on Islamic teachings, which, in the case of Shiite Iranians, include the Quran; the Prophet’s sayings and practices (sunna); the statements, deeds, and teachings of 12 Shiite Imams; and Islamic/Shiite jurisprudence, mainly produced by Shiite clergy (shari’a or fiqh). Interpretations of the sources may of course differ enormously, but the sources themselves are more or less the same. Sometimes Persian literary works are not produced by experts in Islam but are either inspired by Islamic concepts and teachings (much of the poetry and works on ethics, for example) or include teachings not taken to be based on shari’a (Sufis’ work, for example) that may become inspirations for conceptualizations in IR; these can be called Islamic-­Iranian. We may also consider non-­Islamic but Iranian sources of inspiration with references to pre-­Islamic sources, such as the conduct of Iranian kings like Cyrus the Great or Zoroastrian sources; even if the conduct of post-­Islamic statesmen is taken as a source of inspiration, it can be regarded as Iranian. For these reasons, I prefer to employ the adjective Islamic/Iranian to include all these “homegrown” indigenous categories. And of course, we may imagine having any combination of these in one particular work.   5 See Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, eds., Non-­Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and Beyond Asia (London and New York: Routledge, 2010); Ole Wæver, “The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline: Amer­ican and European Developments in IR,” International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 687–727; Arlene Tickner and Ole Wæver, International Relations Scholarship around the World (London: Routledge, 2008).   6 All sources with an Iranian date of publication (hijri or royal) are in Persian. The Gregorian corresponding years are given for each source.   7 For example, Homeira Moshirzadeh, “A Hegemonic ‘Discipline’ in an ‘Anti-­ Hegemonic’ Country,” International Political Sociology 3, no. 3 (2009): 342–6; Homeira Moshirzadeh and Heidarali Masoudi, “IR Theory and Research in Iran: A Study of IR Dissertations,” Research Letter of Political Science 5, no. 2 (1389 [2010]): 163–88; Homeira Moshirzadeh and Heidarali Masoudi, “Theoretical Knowledge of Iranian Students of IR: A Pathological Study,” Politics 41, no. 3 (1390 [2011]): 265–84; Amir M. Haji-­yousefi, “Is There an Iranian Perspective on International Relations?” (paper presented at the Annual Conference of the Canadian Political Science Association, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada, May 27–29, 2009), accessed December 2, 2013, www.cpsa-­acsp.ca/papers-­2009/Haji-­Yousefi.pdf; Mahmood Sariolghalam, “Iran: Accomplishments and Limitations in IR,” in International Relations Scholarship around the World, ed. Arlene Tickner and Ole Wæver (London: Routledge, 2009), 158–71.   8 E.g., Mohammad Sotoodeh, “IR in Iran: An Evaluation,” Political Science Quarterly 8, no. 2 (1384 [2005]): 93–116.   9 For example, Moshirzadeh, “A Hegemonic ‘Discipline’.” 10 Nasrin Mosaffa, Changes in Teaching and Research in Political Science and International Relations (Tehran: Center for Cultural and Social Studies, 1386 [2007]), 152–3. 11 Mosaffa, Changes in Teaching, 162–4; Alireza Azghandi, Political Science in Iran (Tehran: Baz, 1378 [1999]), 143–5.

96   Homeira Moshirzadeh 12 In general, IR programs were offered by departments of political science. The exception was the MA program offered by the Center for Graduate International Studies. 13 Azghandi, Political Science in Iran, 56–66. 14 Mosaffa, Changes in Teaching, 187. 15 E.g., H. Behzadi, Nationalism: A Theoretical and Practical Analysis (Tehran: Hesab, 1354 [1975]); H. Nazem, Politics and International Organizations (Tehran: Etella’at Newspaper Publication, 2536 [1977]). 16 The journal published 12 issues until spring 1979. This assessment is based on the review of eight available issues. 17 The information is based on the appendix of Ravabet-­e Beinolmelal, 11 & 12 (Winter 1357 and Spring 1358 [1979]): 318–26. 18 Interview with Professor Nasrin Mosaffa (November 2016). She was an MA student at the Center before the Revolution and later became its director for more than 13 years (1997–2010). 19 An official record of the total number of the faculty in the field of IR could not be found. A list of full-­time faculty at public universities and higher education institutes holding their degrees in political science and IR was published by the Ministry of Science, Research and Technology in 2011–12, and includes 349 names. Yet because IR scholars are not limited to PhDs of IR, and because PhDs in political science work in different fields, this list cannot represent the total number of IR scholars in Iran. My own rough estimation on the basis of information gathered from websites is that about 100 scholars exist in political science and/or IR departments at public universities. Certainly, there are other IR scholars who work in other departments, such as geography, history, social science, etc., and they should be included for a comprehensive list. Furthermore, the Islamic Azad University (a non-­profit university with branches all over the country) has dozens of faculty members working in the field not included in this estimation. 20 For a few examples, we see the reliance of classical realism on philosophy, history, and sociology; structural realism on economics and philosophy of science; liberalism in IR on liberal ideas in economics and political theory; constructivism on sociology, social theory, and the philosophy of language; IR critical theory on sociology and social theory; and cognitive theories of foreign policy on psychology. The list of source disciplines can be extended when we look at particular theoretical works. 21 Moshirzadeh and Masoudi, “IR Theory and Research in Iran.” 22 In my search for such publications before the Revolution, I found just one (short) essay (Balaghi 1350), but there may be other sources. S. S. Balaghi, “International Relations in Islam,” Lessons from Islam 12, no. 5 (1350 [1971]): 33–4. 23 S. J. Dehghani-­Firoozabadi and M. Ghanbari, “Developments in Theoretical Studies of International Relations in Iran,” Research on Islamic Politics 1, no. 4 (1392 [2013]): 9–38. 24 For an almost similar categorization of approaches, see S. J. Dehghani-­Firoozabadi, “Meta-­Theoretical Foundations of Islamic Theory of International Relations,” Foreign Relations 2, no. 6 (1389a [2010]): 49–96. 25 See, for example, A. Javadi Amoli, “Principles of International Relations of Islamic State,” Islamic Government 13, no. 2 (1387 [2008]): 5–36. 26 For example, Dehghani-­Firoozabadi, “Meta-­Theoretical Foundations.” 27 Hossein Salimi, “Islamic Realism and Understanding Modern International Relations,” Research in Theoretical Politics 12 (1391 [2012]): 49–76. 28 Hossein Salimi, “Non-­Conflict: The Foundation of Islamic View of International Relations,” Foreign Relations 3, no. 3 (1390 [2011]): 75–112. 29 Mansour Mirahamadi and Hadi Ajili, “An Introduction to the Concept of Power in International Relations,” Political and International Approaches 19 (1388 [2009]): 119–45; A. M. Poshtdar and F. Shekardast, “Psychological Operations (Soft Power) in Ferdowsi’s Shahnameh,” Fiction Studies 1, no. 4 (1392 [2013]): 23–34.

Iranian scholars and international relations   97 30 S. J. Dehghani-­Firoozabadi, “The Model of World Order in Islamic Theory of International Relations,” International Relations Research 1, no. 3 (1389 [2010]): 9–47. 31 M. A. Barzanooni, “Islam: The Primacy of War or Peace?” International Legal Journal 33 (1384 [2005]): 73–158; S. A. Ghavam and S. A. Fateminezhad, “War and Anarchy: A Critique of Anarchy-­Hierarchy on the Basis of Shahnameh,” Research Letter of Political Science 4, no. 2 (1388 [2009]): 159–94; M. J. Mahallati, “Ethics of War in Persian Literary and Epic Texts,” Research on Culture and Literature, (n.d.); A. H. Mirkooshesh and S. Noorisafa, “Ontology of International Peace in the Iranian Context of Tolerance and Peace,” Strategy [Rahbord] 68 (1392 [2013]): 7–32; B. Seifoori and A. Tofighianfar, “A Sociological View of Causes and Conduct of War in Shahnameh,” Iranian Studies 12, no. 24 (1392 [2013]): 217–38; E. Soltani, “Foreign Relations of Islamic State in Quran: War or Peace?” Knowledge 143 (1388 [2009]): 69–94; Asqar Eftekhari and H. Mohammadi-­Sirat, “Peace (sulh and salm) in Quran,” Quran and Hadith Studies 12 (1392 [2013]): 53–78; Hadi Ajili and Ali Esmaeeli, “An Introduction to the Concept of Peace in International Relations,” Research in Islamic Politics 1, no. 4 (1392 [2013]): 105–34. 32 Asqar Eftekhari, “Structural Signs of ‘Islamic Security’,” Strategic Studies 26 (1383 [2004]): 641–68; Bahram Akhavan Kazemi, “Security in the Thought of Farabi and Mohaghegh Toosi,” Islamic Government 14, no. 2 (1386 [2007]): 89–110. 33 S. E. Hosseini, “International Terrorism in Islamic Perspective,” Knowledge 125 (1387 [2008]): 15–32; M. R. Hatami, “Terrorism from an Islamic Perspective,” Political and International Research 6 (1390 [2011]): 25–47. 34 Farhad Atai and Majid Behestani, “Identity and Otherness in the Formation of Iran from the Shahnameh Perspective,” Iranian Journal of Foreign Affairs 2, no. 4 (1389 [2010]): 79–109. 35 S. M. Seyedian, “Components of Islamic Globalization,” Knowledge 20, no. 10 (1390 [2011]): 13–28. 36 A. A. Alikhani, “Fundamentals and Principles of International Relations in Islam,” Research in International Relations 12 (1390 [2011]): 11–38. 37 This university was established after the Revolution as a major measure in introducing a modern Islamic university where modern knowledge is taught besides Islamic Shiite jurisprudence. It offers undergraduate and graduate programs in political science, economics, law, management, and communications. 38 Dehghani-­Firoozabadi, “Meta-­Theoretical Foundations.” 39 S. J. Dehghani-­Firoozabadi, Islamic Meta Theory of International Relations. Tehran: Allameh Tabatabai University Publication, 1394 [2015]. 40 S. J. Dehghani-­Firoozabadi, “Islamic Theory of International Relations: What and How It Is,” Research Letter of Political Science 5, no. 2 (1389b [2010]): 111–42. 41 S. H. Seifzadeh, “Conceptual Systematic Schema for Foreign Policy,” The Journal of the Faculty of Law and Political Science of the University of Tehran 26 (1370 [1991]): 153–96. 42 Farhad Ghasemi, “Theoretical Foundations of Smart Balance of Power in Regional Networks: Towards a New Theory of Regional Balance of Power,” Geopolitics 8, no. 1 (1391a [2012]): 172–213. 43 Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, “Why Is There No Non-­Western International Relations Theory? An introduction,” in Acharya and Buzan, Non-­Western International Relations Theory, 11. 44 Dehghani-­Firoozabadi and Ghanbari, “Developments in Theoretical Studies,” 15. 45 See Majid Behestani, “Religious Attitude and Foreign Policy: Operational Codes of Bazargan and Ahmadinezhad,” Iranian Journal of Foreign Affairs 5, no. 3 (1392 [2013]): 211–47; H. Masoodnia and D. Najafi, “Pillars of Iran’s Regional Policy on the Basis of Tehran Friday Prayers,” Political and International Research 6 (1390 [2011]): 77–102.

98   Homeira Moshirzadeh 46 Hossein Salimi, “Theoretical Foundations of Inter-­Civilizational Dialogue,” Discourse Quarterly 3 (1378 [1999]): 131–48; Homeira Moshirzadeh, “Dialogue of Civilizations from a Constructivist Point of View,” Journal of the Faculty of Law Political Science 63 (1383 [2004]): 169–201; Homeira Moshirzadeh, “Dialogue of Civilizations and International Theory,” The Iranian Journal of International Affairs 16, no. 1 (2004): 1–44; Homeira Moshirzadeh, “Critical International Theory and Dialogue of Civilizations,” in Civilizational Dialogue and Political Thought, ed. Fred Dalmayr and Abbas Manoochehri (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2007): 101–18. 47 For example, Farhad Ghasemi, “Conceptual Reconstruction of Regional Deterrence Theory and Designing Its Patterns on the Basis of the Theories of Power Cycles and Networks,” Defensive Strategy 38 (1391b [2012]): 103–46. 48 Farhad Ghasemi, “Cycle Theories and the Security of the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Political and International Approaches 17 (1388 [2009]): 103–46. 49 Edward Said, The World, the Text, and the Critic (US: Edward Said, 1983), 226. 50 See Acharya and Buzan, Non-­Western International Relations Theory. 51 This section is mostly based on a co-­authored published article in Persian. See Homeira Moshirzadeh and Majid Kafi, “Theorizing IR in Iran: A Structural Explanation,” Politics 45, no. 2 (1394 [2015]): 337–55. 52 See Stanley Hoffman, “An Amer­ican Social Science: International Relations,” Daedalus 106, no. 3 (1977): 41–60; Steve Smith, “The Discipline of International Relations: Still an Amer­ican Social Science?” British Journal of Politics and International Relations 2, no. 3 (2000): 374–402; Steve Smith, “The Discipline of International Relations: Hegemonic Country, Hegemonic Discipline,” International Studies Review 4, no. 2 (2003): 67–85. 53 See, for example, Helen Louise Turton, International Relations and Amer­ican Dominance: A Diverse Discipline (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2015) and Knud E. Jørgensen’s chapter, “Would 100 Global Workshops on Theory Building Make a Difference?” in this volume. 54 See Matthieu Chillaud, “Peace and Security Re-­conceptualizations in the Agenda of PRIO, SIPRI, TAPRI and COPRI since the End of the Cold War” (presented at the ECPR Conference in Charles University, Prague, December 7–10, 2016). 55 Amitav Acharya, “Norm Subsidiarity and Regional Orders: Sovereignty, Regionalism, and Rule-­Making in the Third World,” International Studies Quarterly 55, no. 1 (2011): 95–123. 56 See Siddharth Mallavarapu, “Development of International Relations Theory in India: Traditions, Contemporary Perspectives and Trajectories,” International Studies 46, 1&2: 165–83; Yiwei Wang, “Between Science and Art: Questionable International Relations Theories,” Japanese Journal of Political Science 8, no. 2 (2007): 191–208. 57 Dehghani-­Firoozabadi, “Islamic Theory of International Relations,” 132–3. 58 Ahmad Naghibzadeh, “International Relations as an Interdisciplinary Subject: Sociology and IR,” International Studies 5, no. 3 (1387 [2008]): 111–3. 59 Lucian Ashworth, “Interdisciplinary and International Relations,” European Political Science Review 8, no. 1 (2009): 8–25; Peter Kristensen, “Dividing Discipline: Structures of Communication,” International Studies Review 14, no. 1 (2012): 32–50. See also endnote 20 above. 60 See Kavoos Seyyedemami, “What Is Missed in Political Science in Iran: Empirical Research,” Research Letter of Political Science 5, no. 2 (1389 [2010]): 143–62. 61 Qasem Eftekhari, “Methodological Evaluation of PhD Dissertations in Political Science and IR at the University of Tehran,” in Teaching and Research in Political Science and International Relations in Iran, ed. H. Salimi (Tehran: Ministry of Science, Research and Technology, 1387 [2008]), 269–94. 62 A.M. Haji-­yousefi, “Teaching the Basics of IR in Iran: Problems and Solutions,” Research Letter of Political Science 5, no. 2 (1385 [2006]): 79–94; M. Ranjbar, “The

Iranian scholars and international relations   99 Crisis of Political Science in Iran,” Journal of Political Science 24, no. 4 (1382 [2003]): 95–112. 63 See Moshirzadeh and Masoudi, “IR Theory and Research in Iran”; Abolfazl Delavari, “An Evaluation of PhD Curriculum of Political Science and IR in Iran,” Research in Politics 12 (1389 [2010]): 67–110; Eftekhari, “Methodological Evaluation of PhD Dissertations.” 64 M. A. Taghavi and M. Adibi, “The Weakness of Critique in Political Science in Iran,” Research Letter of Political Science 5, no. 2 (1389 [2010]): 25. 65 Seifzadeh, “Conceptual Systematic Schema”; Ghasemi, “Theoretical Foundations”; Dehghani-­Firoozabadi, “Islamic Theory”; Dehghani-­Firoozabadi, “Meta-­Theoretical Foundations.” 66 See Yaqing Qin, “Development of International Relations Theory in China,” International Studies 46, no. 1&2 (2009): 188. 67 This has been much discussed and sometimes challenged by IR scholars. See, for example, Joseph Lepgold and Miroslav Nincic, Beyond the Ivory Tower: International Relations Theory and the Issue of Policy Relevance (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001); Bruce Jentleson and Ely Ratner, “Bridging the Beltway–Ivory Tower Gap,” International Studies Review 13 (2015): 6–11. 68 Stephen Walt, “The Relationship between Theory and Policy in International Relations,” Annual Review of Political Science 8 (2005): 23. 69 Ebadollah Molaee, “Relationship between Theory and Practice in IR,” Foreign Policy 16, no. 4 (1381 [2002]): 971. See also Hans Morgenthau, Truth and Power: Essays of Decade, 1960–1970 (New York: Praeger, 1970). 70 Walt, “The Relationship between Theory and Policy,” 23. 71 D. Gharayagh-­Zandi, Hamid Enayat: The Father of Political Science in Iran (Tehran: Bogh’e, 1381 [2002]): 324; Ranjbar, “The Crisis of Political Science,” 101. 72 M. Pourfard, “Political Science in Iran: From Re-­Knowing to Re-­Constructing,” Political Science 28 (1383 [2004]): 150; Seyyedemami, “What Is Missed,” 150. 73 Sariolghalam, “Iran.” 74 M. B. Heshmatzadeh, “The Status of Political Science in Iran,” Journal of Political Science 18 (1381 [2002]): 311. 75 This has somehow changed during the last few years by the formation of what is called “Chairs for Theorizing” at universities to financially and institutionally support theoretical endeavors. 76 A.M. Haji-­yousefi, “Teaching IR in Iran: Challenges and Perspectives,” Research Letter of Political Science 5, no. 2 (1389 [2010]): 105. 77 See Rosa Vasilaki, “Provincialising IR? Deadlocks and Prospects in Post-­Western IR Theory,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 41, no. 1 (2012): 3, 11–18; Acharya and Buzan, Non-­Western International Relations Theory: 17. 78 See Yaqing, “Development of International Relations Theory in China,” 198. 79 Taghavi and Adibi, “The Weakness of Critique,” 26. 80 N. Hadian, “Political Science in Iran,” Political Science Quarterly 2, no. 7 (1378 [1999]): 228. 81 Robert B. Kaplan, “Cultural Thought Patterns in Intercultural Education,” Language Learning 16 (1966): 13. 82 Kaplan, “Cultural Thought Patterns,” 11–7.

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6 Chinese concepts and relational international politics Emilian Kavalski

Introduction How China thinks and in what ways its history and traditions inform the idiosyncrasies of China’s international outlook have grown into a cottage industry both in International Relations (IR) and across the full spectrum of the humanities and social sciences. As Benjamin Schwartz presciently observed 50 years ago, the issue, which always seems to stump China hands is whether ‘ “the Chinese” [are] prepared to accept the nation-­state system that governs the international life of the West or are their images of the world and of China’s place in it still governed by cultural habits derived from the remote past’?1 On the one hand, such concern reflects IR’s tendency to organize around the perceived experiences, interests, and concerns of powerful (Western) nation-­states.2 On the other hand, at the heart of this query is China’s positioning in European intellectual imagination as the ultimate Other or what Michel Foucault called heterotopia – a disturbing place, whose difference ‘undermines language’.3 China becomes ‘the Other country’ not merely because of its location on the opposite end of the Eurasian landmass, but also because it represents ‘a culture entirely devoted to the ordering of space, but one that does not distribute the multiplicity of existing things into any of the categories that make it possible for us to name, speak, and think’.4 In this setting, it should not be surprising that the recent promulgation of Chinese concepts into the ratiocination of IR not only questions ‘the very “constitutional structures” that are the core of the international system’,5 but also calls on IR theory to embark on the road less travelled of encountering the multiverse of relations animating global life. It would therefore make sense to embark on this journey with a brief overview of the etymology of the term theory. In its Greek original, the term theoria meant ‘a journey or a pilgrimage’, involving a willingness to travel to foreign locales that can then simultaneously inform and transform the ‘home’ of the traveller.6 Equally significantly, by providing a potent form of social interactions, the itinerant performativity of such theoretical travels seem to have played an important role in shaping IR at the time by providing opportunities for ‘constant reframing and reconfigurations of participants towards each other’, which allowed the ancient Greeks to ‘imagine and exploit forms of inter-­polis contact’.7 By extension, theorizing becomes a relational

Chinese concepts and international politics   105 process of irruptive translation that brings in dialogue the form and substance of the languages and experiences of diverse and infinitely complex worlds.8 Yet, instead of such itinerant translation, IR theory seems to recognize ‘other’ forms of theory-­building only to the extent that they can be ‘arranged according to the English idiom’. The point here is that IR knowledge – just like any other knowledge – can neither pretend to be monological, nor does exist in isolation; rather to know one thing, IR scholars not only have to know and be curious about a lot of other things, but also be willing to engage them (and countenance others engaging) in imagining, questioning, advancing, and co-­creating the range of ‘the plausible’ practices and theories for their explanation and understanding.9 Such an endeavour should resonate with much of what the mainstream already admits theorizing in IR is about – namely, the identification, observation, explanation, and understanding of patterns by looking at the record of what happens when international actors come together in space and time. As should become apparent, this chapter draws attention to the porousness and unpredictability of global life – both Western and non-­Western – and the messy and contingent interactions that permeate and constitute both. This chapter affiliates itself with ongoing efforts to world IR.10 On the one hand, such endeavours intend to pluralize disciplinary enquiry by engaging previously excluded alternatives for thinking and doing world politics that have been forged both historically and in contemporary times by scholars, practitioners, and activists. On the other hand, such wording offers productive openings for bringing in conversation a wide range of cosmologies, power relations, and vulnerabilities than are typically accounted for by the narratives of IR. This chapter therefore intends an interpretative journey into the Chinese concepts and definitions of the international with the intention to explore whether they indeed are so heterotopic as to be unintelligible to IR. At the centre of this investigation is the Chinese term guanxi (traditional: 關係 simplified: 关系). It has to be stated at the outset that the focus on guanxi is not entirely coincidental. It is one of the words that make up the term ‘International Relations’ in Chinese – guoji guanxi (traditional: 國際關係 simplified: 国际关系). In this respect, it should appear surprising that there has been so little attention in the literature on IR on the meaning and content of the terms that go into the making of the Chinese phrase for IR. The contention is that such disinterest illustrates the Eurocentric commitments of the discipline, which has consciously discouraged students of world politics to be ‘curious about the “non­West” but has encouraged them to explain away non-­Western dynamics by superimposing Western categories’.11 What is particularly telling is that one does not have to be fluent in Chinese to encounter the complex texture of the term – for instance, the literatures on Business Administration, Organization Studies, Cross-­Cultural Communication, Psychology and Sociology offer a huge repository of information about the meaning and practices of guanxi. This chapter draws on these literatures to tease out the content and practices of this term, as well as its implications for IR theory and practice. The epistemic verso of the relational IR theory proposed by this article is that relationality is about the

106   Emilian Kavalski cultivation of attentiveness to the self-­organizing, shifting, and historically and geographically contingent realities of the global life we inhabit. The necessary caveat is that the chapter focuses on the ideal type inherent in the guanxi model of relationality rather than the actual practices of Chinese foreign policy. While such connections are clearly there (especially, in places like Central Asia and in initiatives such as the ‘One Belt, One Road’ policy), the point here is to draw attention to the epistemic and ontological relationality made possible by the encounter with guanxi. In other words, this is an chapter not about the international practices of China, but about the ways in which Chinese concepts – such as guanxi – can aid the ‘uncovery’ of alternative and, especially, relational modes of IR theorizing. The concluding section evokes these registers of worlding mutuality by elaborating the ways in which guanxi can help transcend the Western/non-­Western bifurcation that dominates so much of the literatures both on relationality and IR theory. The claim of this chapter is that the defining feature of Western/Eurocentric IR is its lack of relationality. Conversely, what makes post-­Western IR ‘post-­Western’ is its responsiveness and receptivity of perspectives that are not one’s own. It is with the intention to aid the disclosure of such ontological and epistemic relationality that this investigation enlists the Chinese concept of guanxi.

Guanxi: what’s in a name? Guanxi appears to be one of those essentially contested concepts, whose meaning and practices are anything but clear cut and universally accepted. Therefore, most commentators tend to take as their point of departure the etymology of the two characters that make guanxi: ‘guan means barriers and xi means connections’.12 More specifically, guan designated a ‘ “wooden crossbar for doors,” “strategic pass,” “toll gate” ’ or the activity of ‘closing’ or ‘connecting’, while xi used to refer to ‘tie’ or to ‘care for’.13 The literal meaning of guanxi then was ‘connection across barriers’ or ‘pass the gate and get connected’.14 Metaphorically speaking however ‘inside the door [or within the boundaries set by the barriers/toll gates] you may be “one of us”, but outside the door your existence is barely recognized’.15 This inference should not be misunderstood as a suggestion of a rigidly-­structured framework of exclusion. On the contrary, guanxi denotes openness to connections with other people and suggests a far more flexible and dynamic ‘web of relationships that functions as the set of interlocking laces which connects people of different weis [positions/status]’.16 It is also claimed that even though pragmatic, a guanxi relationship is profoundly infused with ‘a higher sense of responsibility towards others’.17 Guanxi is more often than not understood to denote the establishment and maintenance of ‘an intricate and pervasive relational network’ engendered by the practice of unlimited exchange of favours between its members and bound by reciprocal obligation, assurance and mutuality.18 Yet, many have hinted that such practices reflect a far richer meaning of the term in Chinese than in its English counterpart ‘relationship’ – namely, ‘guanxi refers to relationship in the most

Chinese concepts and international politics   107 profound sense of the term’. Owing to the dynamism of social interactions, ‘the final word on guanxi can never be concluded’ since the practices that it denotes are constantly evolving to adapt to the ever-­changing contexts and patterns of global life.20 This fluidity has permeated the English-­language literature on the topic through the multiple translations that the term has acquired – ‘relations’, ‘connections’, ‘friendship’, ‘networks of reciprocal bonds’, ‘social capital’, ‘nepotism’ and ‘corruption’. While such multiplicity of meanings should not necessarily be surprising (after all, any translation can offer only a partial impression of the ideational context within which the term originates), it still suggests the layered and contingent framing in the Chinese original as well. In this respect, there are a couple of puzzling features when it comes to the term guanxi. On the one hand, despite its indeterminacy guanxi occupies a central position in China’s worldview. It has been labelled as ‘the lifeblood of all things Chinese – business, politics and society’.21 The grandee of China Studies, Lucien Pye, referred to it as ‘one of the most fundamental aspects of Chinese political behaviour’,22 while the political philosopher Wenshan Jia23 claims that guanxi is one of the central philosophical concept that ‘reflects the Chinese way to know about reality (ontology), the Chinese way to interpret reality (phenomenology) and the Chinese values about humanity (axiology)’. On the other hand, guanxi’s significance appears to be of a very recent provenance. While in circulation a century ago, the term was not deemed to be significant enough to warrant inclusion in the two classic Chinese dictionaries – the 1915 ci yuan (‘sources of words’) and the 1936 ci hai (‘word sea’).24 In this respect, guanxi’s rise to prominence is closely associated with social, political and economic processes set in motion during the second half of the twentieth century. Some have even speculated whether there is anything particularly Chinese about guanxi or whether it is merely the Chinese stand-­in for the general social phenomenon of reliance on favours to accomplish tasks.25 It is also noteworthy that such re-­articulation of the term and practices of guanxi was occurring simultaneously across the expanse of the ‘Chinese commonwealth’26 – in mainland China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macau and Singapore, as well as the Sinophonic diaspora around the globe. Commentators have noted that the practices of guanxi have acquired positive and negative connotations both of which seem to arise from its propensity for subversion of state structures. In the case of the former, guanxi assists with ­bottom-­up and civil society empowerment by permitting ‘individuals to use their social ingenuity to build a web of personal relationships’.27 A number of commentators find the origins of this trend during the Maoist years in China, when guanxi networks provided ordinary people with opportunities to distance themselves from the oppressive state-­saturated system, carve out room to manoeuvre, and order their own lives.28 Thus, by engaging in alternative forms of solidarity, the relational power of guanxi allows those in asymmetrical relationships to subvert established hierarchies and to mitigate the dilemmas of over-­regulation and the political pressures imposed on everyday life. The negative flavour of guanxi comes from its association with graft. In this respect, the very patterns that make guanxi a ‘weapon of the weak’29 are also the 19

108   Emilian Kavalski key ingredients of its dark side. Yet, rather than essentializing it as a cultural trait associated with Asian backwardness, this aspect of guanxi can be read as an idiosyncratic encounter between the forces of transnational capitalism and the economic development of the state.30 As the late Lee Kuan Yew, the founding father of modern Singapore, has acknowledged, the Chinese use guanxi ‘to make up for the lack of rule of law and transparency in rules and regulation’.31 In this setting, phrases such as ‘crony capitalism’ and ‘Confucian nepotism’ seem to overlook the socio-­temporal contingency underpinning the bounds of obligation and networks of support that characterize the practices of guanxi.32 In fact, some have gone as far as to claim that what (Western) observers usually criticize as the corrupt side of guanxi is in fact the misunderstood ‘Confucian Ethic’ of Asian capitalism.33 As the above discussion demonstrates, both the positive and negative features of guanxi reflect an idiosyncratic coalescence between tradition and modernity – or what some have referred to as the ‘critical inheritance and critical transformation of Chinese thought’34 – in the process of achieving collective goals. In particular, guanxi reflects a commitment to act in accordance with social demands and expectations. As the eminent Chinese scholar Liang Shiming has pointed out, the Chinese worldview is ‘neither geren benwei (individual-­based) nor shehui benwei (society-­based), but guanxi benwei (relation-­based)’.35 The emphasis on relationality infers a different way of being present in the world. In Chinese scholarship such difference pivots on the contrast between relational and autonomous self. Associated with Western intellectual traditions, the latter insists on discrete subjectivities, praises individualism and values and normalizes the lack of dependence on others. The relational self, on the other hand, insists that individuals do not and cannot exist unless they are enmeshed in relations with others. It seems that the origins of this conceptualization can be traced back to Confucius, himself, for whom ‘unless there are at least two human beings there are no human beings’.36 The relational self, thereby, is ‘one which is intensely aware of the social presence of other human beings’.37 A central feature of this intersubjective identification is the claim that  the self so conceived is not a static structure but a dynamic process. It is a centre of relationships, not an enclosed world of private thoughts and feelings. It needs to reach out, to be in touch with other selves, and to communicate through an ever-­expanding network of human relatedness.38  The interdependence and reciprocity characterizing such relational self accords social relations much greater significance and relations are often seen as ends in and of themselves rather than means for realizing various individual goals.39 The key inference is that participants in a guanxi perceive each other to be ‘role occupants rather than individuals’.40 Concurring with Chih-­yu Shih’s proposition,41 the claim of this study is that the relationality of guanxi is focused on the management of hostile role-­playing in order to maintain the longevity of interactions. In particular, the proposition here is that role-­demands do not emerge in

Chinese concepts and international politics   109 the abstract, but are borne out of the process of interactions. Since roles are circumstantial, the qualitative innovation emerging from the dynamics of guanxi is that an actor can play any role on the world stage regardless of their identity. The emphasis on relationality is premised on a holistic worldview distinct from the Western dualistic opposition between self and other/self and the world.42 The ‘focus is not fixed on any particular individual, but on the particular nature of the relations between individuals who interact with each other’.43 Such construction of the relational self reveals the ‘Chinese worldview as an integrated system of subject and object: the individual is placed in the spatial-­ temporal location of the world, with her experiences, values, and expectations constantly shaping and being shaped by the world’.44 In this setting, it is the guanxi process itself (rather than the individuals involved) that has agency – namely, it is ‘the “relation that selects,” meaning that relations shape an actor’s identity and influence her behaviour’.45 Lucian Pye46 sees in this dynamic the origins of the Chinese ‘compulsive need to avoid disorder and confusion, to seek predictability and the comforts of dependency [which] makes them very anxious to seek any acceptable basis for orderly human relations’. Owing to the fluidity of the way in which these relational roles are lived, guanxi asserts that change rather than stability is an endemic feature of global life. Both through attrition or accretion and depending on the circumstances, issues and situations, the guanxi relationship has diverse and contingent iterations. Such dynamic multiplicity of interdependent conditioning factors engenders an interpersonal realm whose complexity is only partially known to the participating actors.47 This calls for a contextual attunement to the transient constellations of factors that impact on the content and trajectories of a relationship. Thus, the long-­term orientation of guanxi inserts a modicum of predictability by lowering the transaction costs. At the same time, it can be used for multiple and diverse purposes, it builds resilience in the context of recognizing and influencing emergent opportunities.48

What can we guanxi about in IR? How would IR look like if we were to imagine it from the point of view of guanxi? To begin with the outline of such an endeavour should not appear particularly outlandis (let alone heterotopic) to those attuned to the inescapable condition of mutual encounter defining global life.49 In particular, the relational pattern envisaged by the guanxi perspective supports the efforts to articulate most issues plaguing IR as ‘communication problems’.50 The critical contribution of guanxi to these conversations is that IR is not merely an outcome of communicative actions (or a solution to communicative problems), but reflects the willingness of actors to expose themselves to the fluidity of ongoing relations with others. In particular, it suggests that the complex patterns of global life resonate with relationality and dynamism, rather than the static and spatial arrangements implicit in the self-­other/centre-­periphery models.51

110   Emilian Kavalski Guanxi’s harmonius respect for the other The focus on guanxi brings out that the basic ontological condition of international actors is relational – namely, the content of their existence as actors is constituted inter-­subjectively during the very process of interaction.52 Thus, owing to prior conditions of relationality, an ‘international’ world of holistically structured meaning appears in the first place. A key feature of the guanxi outlook on the relational world that it sustains is the emphasis on harmony. The discussion of the Chinese concept of harmony has attracted significant attention in recent years. What is important for the purposes of the current investigation is that these discussions of harmony draw attention to ‘respect for the other’ as the ‘cardinal value’ of China’s strategic outlook.53 Such respect for the other articulates relationality through webs of ‘non-­wilful [and non-­domineering] actions directed to realizing the potential events and others, and is action that animates others to act on their own behalf ’.54 The mutually benevolent relationships adumbrated by such harmonious encounters advance relational agency as a dialogical process, whose effects involve the efforts of all sides of the exchange.55 The point here is that guanxi ties are volitional (and not forced upon the participants) – actors intentionally commit to the interaction. It is for this reason that guanxi relations are characterized by dedicated cultivation.56 Such guanxi dynamics can be seen at work in China’s ‘policy of “pre-­emptive participation” ’57 in relations with a wide range of other international actors not only as a reassurance strategy aimed at allaying their concerns, but primarily as an effort to foster ongoing interactions with them. Agency – especially international agency – in such a relational setting is not about the intentional projection of self-­interest, but about strategic receptivity – i.e. ‘knowing oneself insofar as one is related to others, and knowing others insofar as others are related to oneself ’.58 Such reconfiguration of agency engenders ethical obligations to strive for harmony among and between the actors involved in the transaction.59 Guanxi, thereby, presages an understanding of international action and agency – both cognitively and affectively – as simultaneously shaped and mediated by ethical obligations and commitments to others (the structure and content of which is acquired through the very relationships by which ethical obligations and commitments to others are disclosed). The currency of such relationality is not legitimacy, but reputation. The cultivation of reputation (or what IR observers tend to refer as status) is the main aim of the harmonious respect for the other. As Jack Barbalet cogently observes, reputational standing is a social and not an economic resource. Thus, guanxi is deployed not with the aim to gain access to economic or political resources, but is ‘primarily directed to acquiring and expending social resources’.60 Not only that, but such understanding of relationality demands that those engaged in interactions are ‘more aware of the relationships that constitute the objects of their concern than they are of their own interests’.61 It is in this setting that xinyong (trustworthiness) – the reputation for meetings one obligations to others – gains its significance as ‘the most valuable asset’ in

Chinese concepts and international politics   111 the transactional web of guanxi.62 Thus, rather than facilitating the legitimacy of one’s actions, the strategic aim of guanxi is to enhance the trustworthiness of actors by providing a series of situations in which they can continuously enact (as well as be evaluated on) their ‘meeting the expectations of others’.63 China’s harmonious respect for the other is nothing short of a strategic desire for status recognition.64 Motivated by the status insecurity associated with the relational constitution of international interactions, the operational beliefs of guanxi provide ongoing modalities for engendering trust by demonstrating China’s capacity and willingness to meet its obligations to others. Guanxi’s logic of relationships Guanxi implies both a propensity and a capacity for living with and in ambiguity. In this respect, it provides a ‘relational’ (as opposed to ‘rule-­based’) framework for the meaningful contextualization in the shifting patterns of global life.65 Thus, it is relations that are not only at the heart of explaining and understanding the world, but also central to its observation and encounter. As Qin Yaqing66 demonstrates, this understanding reframes power away from its association with the material possession of capacities for influence (regardless of whether they are coercive or not), but as a ‘relational practice’. On the one hand, relations (and the webs of interactions that they constitute) provide a platform for the exercise of power. On the other hand, relations themselves have power – namely, they frame future patterns of interaction.67 This then becomes the centrepiece for the ‘logic of relationships’ animating global life.68 Such logic assumes that while the future is unknown, the partners in the future are the same as in the past and present. Therefore, the significance of any specific interaction lies in how it shapes a particular relationship … The bottom line in a relationship logic is that both sides feel that they are better off if the relationship continues—this is the minimum meaning of ‘mutual benefit’. A normal relationship does not require symmetry of partners or equality of exchanges, but it does require reciprocity [i.e. respect for the other].69 It should be stated at the outset that such framing should not be misunderstood as an indication of an altruistic outlook on global life, but as an effective strategy for managing a hyper-­social environment. The logic of relationships therefore outlines a ‘context for action’ in which goals can be achieved through an active, committed, and responsible involvement in world affairs.70 Informed by the extremely situational and particularistic nature of Chinese culture, the logic of relationships infers that as the circumstances of interactions change, so too will the patterns of guanxi.71 Such framing also undermines the linear causality backstopping Western takes on relationality – namely, that if two (or more actors) interact with one another their relations will necessarily lead to greater intimacy.72

112   Emilian Kavalski Rather than focusing on the personality or identity of participating actors, the logic of relationships suggests that the conditions for interaction ‘cannot be forced’ and remain ‘largely unknown and unknowable’.73 Thus, the process of interaction facilitates the likelihood of future relations (which is the key strategic function of guanxi) rather than intimacy.74 This demands both contextual sensitivity and an ongoing commitment to the deliberate practices of relationality. What is crucial about such logic of relationships is that as the hub of social knowledge and social life, the patterns of guanxi intimate that shared understandings are not imposed as rules, rights or obligations, but emerge in the process of interaction. Such framing informs the formulation of external relations. Owing to the contextual ubiquity of guanxi, foreign policy making becomes a contingent outcome of relational interactions between actors – that is, the relational context frames the policy response, but because of its inherent fluidity, policy is expected to fluctuate.75 In an interesting move, some commentators have inferred the ‘logic of relationships’ through Beijing’s practice of ‘third culture building to improve international relations’.76 The proposition is that guanxi can beget a ‘third culture’ through the practices of deliberate and repeated interactions, which brings together elements of the cultures of the interacting actors as well as new ones which emerge in the process of doing things together. It is this dynamism that informs the ‘deeply relational’ character of Chinese foreign policy.77 Rather than impeding the policy process, such contextual attunement of the logic of relationships suggest the unexpected opportunities made possible by the ‘third culture’ of guanxi – for instance, the unintended evolution of the Shanghai-­5 into the One Belt One Road initiative via the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.78 Guanxi’s community of practice It is communities of practice that locate the ‘third culture’ engendered by guanxi’s logic of relationships. The inference here is that international agency emerges in a community not in a vacuum. As suggested, it is the relational (rather than the rule-­based) nature of guanxi that backstop the dialogical outcomes of its effects. In particular, it is guanxi’s commitment to deliberate and unconditional sociality that motivates shared meaning-­generation. The suggestion thereby is that while strategic, the relationality of guanxi is not motivated by self-­interest (i.e. it is not an instrumental means to an end). Instead, the driving force appears to be a commitment to the practice of doing things together – an aspect that can explain China’s general aversion to formal institutional arrangements and the imposition of conditionality on its partners. Such relationality is not zero-­sum – i.e. ‘the debit and credit sides of this [relational] balance sheet are never in equilibrium’ – because this would spell the end of guanxi.79,80 The accent is on the strategic value of maintaining the relationship. In fact, it is through the practice of doing things together that the normative and the ideational structure of global life gets engendered.81 The focus on guanxi suggests that by cherishing the chance of interactions (rather than

Chinese concepts and international politics   113 force/work on a relationship), the Chinese outlook is predisposed to allow for contingency to take its course.82 In this respect, the interactive dynamics of communities of practice stimulate new and contextual definitions of the ‘common good’. As Xi Jinping, the Chinese president, has himself hinted such ‘inclusive relationalism’ is founded on the affective feeling (ganqing) produced by the process of repeated interactions.83 Moreover, in such a dialogical context the possibility for constructing ‘new histories’ emerges by altering the suspicion and bias from past interactions and opening up opportunities for new avenues for interaction.84 Guanxi therefore spells a longer term horizon for relations than the short term gains espoused by mainstream IR. In this process, communities of practice reveal a new way of being present in the world through the binding power of deliberate interactions.

In lieu of a conclusion: what is ‘post-­Western’ about post-­Western IR? This chapter has demonstrated that the promise of a relational mode of IR enquiry is considerable. In this respect, the concept of guanxi shifts IR thinking away from a focus on international relations to one premised on global relationality. Thus, rather than looking at dyadic sets of relations as well as the identities and capacity of individual actors, guanxi inheres an IR as webs of figurations intertwined by a conscious and strategic search for relations with others. In this respect, actors (and their agency) have effects only to the extent that they are in relations with others. Thus, owing to the dynamic nature of such interactions, what passes for world order is not only constantly changing, but demands ongoing commitment to participating in and maintaining these relations.85 In this respect, the claim here is that the relational turn has become a defining feature of the so-­called post-­Western IR theory. It seems few today would dispute that the disciplinary enquiry of IR is indelibly marked by the ‘colonial signs’ of its Eurocentric makeup. Not only that, but the ‘apple pie’ flavour that IR acquired in the context of its Cold War transformation into an ‘Amer­ican social science’ seems to have made the discipline even more inimical towards encounters with the various non-­Western others that its outlook consciously occludes. In an attempt to trouble the juxtapositions of temporal and geographical difference that still seem to stump any IR alternative prefixed by a ‘non-­’ or a ‘post-­’, this chapter emphasizes the centrality of relationality as a distinguishing feature of all such projects. Critical/post-­colonial/non-­Western IR narratives seem to have difficulty in obviating the theoretical slippage as a result of which ‘the East’ is unquestionably equated with ‘Asia’ and is then assumed to be part of the so-­called ‘Rest’ and ‘non-­West’. Equally problematically, ‘Eurocentrism’ is invariably taken as a stand-­in for ‘West-­centrism’, ‘Sino-­centrism’ for ‘Chinese hegemony’ and ‘post’ for ‘anti’. In this setting, the relationality lens helps outline the contested terrain of post-­Western IR as a space for dialogical learning, which promises a world that is less hegemonic, more democratic, international, and equitable.

114   Emilian Kavalski In particular, such approach allows building solidarity between like-­minded projects targeting the silencing, hegemony, patriarchy, and violence of the mainstream by treating them as second order aspects deriving from a first order problematique – IR’s poignant ontological and epistemic lack of relationality. It is the very denial of relationality (first order issue) that perpetuates the imperial, patriarchal and racist attitudes (second order issues) of IR. It is in this vein that the attack on the latter that so much of critical, feminist and postcolonial theorizing undertakes, overlooks the very condition of its possibility – the lack of relationality in IR. What this means is that the IR mainstream has been dominated by an atomistic understanding of global life that prioritizes fixed units of analysis (nation-­states) and their discrete dyadic interactions (conflict/balancing in the context of anarchy). Yet, at no point is the option of a sociability infused with the contingent opportunities inherent in the encounter with the other acknowledged in this narrative; let alone the potential that the phenomena and processes animating world affairs are mutually co-­constituted in relation to one another. Instead, global life is envisioned as a domain of disconnected states, infamously imagined as billiard balls – ‘closed, impermeable, and sovereign unit[s], completely separated from all other states’.86 A relational IR – which is post-­Western in the sense that it does not treat the West and the non-­West as discrete and disconnected homogenous opposites, but intertwined and mutually constitutive webs of interactions – proposes a molecular outlook whose unit of analysis is relations (rather than actors) and their multiple triadic dynamics (which open numerous and numinous points of and possibilities for interaction). In other words, what makes post-­Western IR narratives ‘post-­Western’ is their emphasis on relationality – namely, things in global life are not merely interconnected, but that they gain meaning and significance within complex webs of entanglements and encounters with others.87 The emphasis on relationality thereby acts as a reminder that IR knowledge, just like any knowledge, is acquired and mediated relationally through diverse sets of practices. IR’s denial of ontological relationality has its epistemic effects – perhaps, most perniciously evidenced by the imposition of a cannon reproduced around the world so that students can contribute to ‘core’ debates, while the inputs of the ‘periphery’ are occluded from the ‘Anglosphere’ of Western IR journals and academia.88 Some have labelled this lack of epistemic relationality as IR’s ‘castle syndrome’ – rather than engagement with the multiverse of global life, proponents of different IR schools engage in defending and reinforcing the bulwarks of their analytical castles, while bombarding the claims of everybody else.89 Others have termed it as ‘returnism’ – IR’s predilection for traditional conceptual signposts that provide intellectual comfort zones, disconnected from current realities.90 The claim here is that both of these are instances of IR’s unrelationality – knowledge does not exist in isolation; it is not built up atomistically and discretely from scratch; rather to know one thing, you have to know a lot of other things. A post-­Western IR acts simultaneously as a reminder about the multi-­ versal world we inhabit and the composite nature of IR’s episteme. Such

Chinese concepts and international politics   115 r­ elational IR theorizing is cultivated from the convivial yet dissonant cross-­ pollination of values, narratives and practices in the study of world affairs. At the same time, it is this very receptivity of a relational IR that holds the promise for working about and working with the ‘edges of radical unusual possibilities’91 Thus, engaging with and listening curiously and provocatively to the phenomenon of guanxi invokes the complexity of possible worlds uncovered by relational IR theorizing.

Notes   1 Benjamin I. Schwartz, ‘The Maoist Image of World Order’, Journal of International Affairs 21, no. 1 (1967): 92.   2 Geeta Chowdhry and Shirin M. Rai, ‘The Geographies of Exclusion and the Politics of Exclusion: Race-­based Exclusions in the Teaching of International Relations’, International Studies Perspectives 10, no. 1 (2009): 85.   3 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (London: Routledge, 1973).   4 Foucault, The Order of Things, xix.   5 Allen Carlson, ‘Moving Beyond Sovereignty? A Brief Consideration of Recent Changes in China’s Approach to International Order and the Emergence of the Tianxia Concept’, Journal of Contemporary China 20, no. 68 (2010): 96.   6 Andrea Wilson Nightingale, Spectacles of Truth in Classical Greek Philosophy: Theoria in Its Cultural Context (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 4–9.   7 Barbara Kowalzig, ‘Performances of Theoria in Their Sacred and Political Context’, in Pilgrimage in Graeco-­Roman and Early Christian Antiquity, ed. Jas Elsner and Ian Rutherford (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 41–72.   8 Emilian Kavalski, ‘Timescapes of Security: Clocks, Clouds, and the Complexity of Security Governance’, World Futures 65, no. 7 (2009): 527–51.   9 Romand Coles, Visionary Pragmatism (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2016), 63. 10 Amitav Acharya, ‘Ethnocentrism and Emancipatory IR Theory’, in (Dis)Placing Security: Critical Re-evaluations of the Boundaries of Security Studies, ed. Samantha L. Arnold and J. Marshall Beier (Toronto: Centre for International and Security Studies, 2000), 1–18; Ching-­Chang Chen, ‘The Absence of Non-­Western IR Theory in Asia Reconsidered’, International Relations of the Asia-­Pacific 11, no. 1 (2011): 1–23; Emilian Kavalski and Young Chul Cho, ‘Governing Uncertainty in Turbulent Times’, Comparative Sociology 14, no. 3 (2015): 429–44; Lily H. M. Ling, The Dao of World Politics (London: Routledge, 2015); Kosuke Shimizu, ‘Materializing the Non-­Western’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs 28, no. 1 (2015): 3–20. 11 Pinar Bilgin, ‘Thinking Past Western IR’, Third World Quarterly 29, no. 1 (2008): 11; Emilian Kavalski, The Guanxi of Relational International Theory (London: Routledge, 2017). 12 Wenshan Jia, ‘The Wei (Positioning)–Ming (Naming)–Lianmian (Face)–Guanxi (Relationship)–Renqing (Humanized Feelings)–Complex in Contemporary Chinese Culture’, in Confucian Cultures of Authority, ed. Peter H. Hershock and Roger T. Ames (Albany: SUNY Press, 2006), 49–54; Yadong Luo, ‘Guanxi: Principles, Philosophies, and Implications’, Human Systems Management 16, no. 1 (1997): 49; Don Y. Lee and Philip L. Dawes, ‘Guanxi, Trust, and Long-­Term Orientation in Chinese Business Markets’, Journal of International Marketing 13, no. 2 (2005): 29. 13 Eike A. Langenberg, Guanxi and Business Strategy (New York: Springer, 2007), 5. 14 Jia, ‘The Wei (Positioning)’, 49–54; Luo, ‘Guanxi’, 49; Lee and Dawes, ‘Guanxi, Trust’, 29.

116   Emilian Kavalski 15 Luo, ‘Guanxi’, 44. 16 Kwang-­kuo Hwang, ‘Face and Favour: The Chinese Power Game’, Amer­ican Journal of Sociology 92, no. 4 (1987): 963; Jia, ‘The Wei (Positioning)’, 49–54. 17 Shijun Tong, ‘Chinese Thought and Dialogical Universalism’, in Europe and Asia beyond East and West, ed. Gerard Delanty (London: Routledge, 2006), 309. 18 Luo, ‘Guanxi’, 44; Jon P. Alston, ‘Wa, Guanxi, and Inhwa: Managerial Principles in Japan, China, and Korea’, Business Horizons 32, no. 2 (1989): 28; Lucian W. Pye, Chinese Commercial Negotiating Style (Cambridge, MA: Oelgeschlager, Guun, and Hain, 1982), 882. 19 Duran Bell, ‘Guanxi: A Nesting of Groups’, Current Anthropology 41, no. 1 (2000): 133. 20 Mayfair Mei-­hui Yang, ‘The Resilience of Guanxi and Its New Deployments: A ­Critique of Sone New Guanxi Scholarship’, The China Quarterly 42, no. 170 (2002): 459. 21 Luo, ‘Guanxi’, 45. 22 Lucian W. Pye, ‘Factions and the Politics of Guanxi: Paradoxes in Chinese Administrative and Political Behaviour’, The China Journal 34, no. 2 (1995): 35. 23 Jia, ‘The Wei (Positioning)’, 49–54. 24 Luo, ‘Guanxi’, 44; Langenberg, Guanxi, 4. 25 Thomas Gold, Dong Ghine and David L. Wank, Social Connections in China: Institutions, Culture, and the Nature of Guanxi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 13–14; Alena Ledeneva, ‘ “Blat” and “Guanxi”: Informal Practices in Russia and China’, Comparative Studies in Society and History 50, no. 1 (2008): 124. 26 Irene Y. M. Yeung and Rosalie L. Tung, ‘Achieving Success in Confucian Societies: The Importance of Guanxi (Connections)’, Organizational Dynamics 25, no. 2 (1996): 58. 27 Anne S. Tsui and Jiing-­Lih Larry Farh, ‘Where Guanxi Matters: Relational Demography and Guanxi in the Chinese Context’, Work and Occupations 24, no. 1 (1997): 60. 28 Yang, ‘The Resilience’, 466. 29 Ledeneva, ‘ “Blat” ’,124; Mayfair Mei-­hui Yang, Gifts, Favors, and Banquets: The Art of Social Relationships in China (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), 206. 30 Yang, ‘The Resilience’, 468. 31 Cited in Yeung and Tung, ‘Achieving Success’, 56. 32 Yang, ‘The Resilience’, 469–76. 33 Luo, ‘Guanxi’, 48. 34 Qing Liu, ‘From ‘All Under Heaven’ to Critical Cosmopolitanism: The Transformation of China’s World Consciousness’, in Shared Values in a World of Cultural Pluralism, ed. Candido Mendes (Rio de Janeiro: Academy of Latinity), 330. 35 Gold, Ghine and Wank, Social Connections, 10. 36 Henry Rosemont, ‘Two Loci of Authority: Autonomous Individuals and Related Persons’, in Confucian Cultures of Authority, ed. Peter H. Hershock and Roger T. Ames (Albany: SUNY Press, 2006), 11–17. 37 Y. F. David Ho, ‘Selfhood and Identity in Cınfucanism, Taoism, Buddhism, and Hinduism: Contrasts with the West’, Journal of the Theory of Social Behaviour 25, no. 2 (1995): 117. 38 Wei-­Ming Tu, Confucian Thought: Selfhood as Creative Transformation (Albany: SUNY Press, 1985), 133. 39 Tsui and Farh, ‘Where Guanxi Matters’, 61; Larry Farh, Jiing-­Lih, Anne S. Tsui, Katherine Xin and Bor-­Shiuan Cheng, ‘The Influence of Relational Demography and Guanxi: The Chinese Case’, Organization Science 9, no. 4 (1998): 473. 40 Hwang, ‘Face and Favour’, 945. 41 See Shih’s chapter ‘Transcending hegemonic international relations theorization: Nothingness, re-­worlding, and balance of relationship’, in this volume. 42 Yaqing, Qin ‘Why Is There No Chinese International Theory’, International Relations of the Asia-­Pacific 7, no. 3 (2007): 310.

Chinese concepts and international politics   117 43 Ambrose Y. C. King, ‘The Individual and Group Confucianism: A Relational Perspective’, in Individualism and Holism: Studies in Confucian and Taoist Values, ed. Donald J. Munro (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1985), 63. 44 Jee Loo Liu, ‘Reconstructing Chinese metaphysics: A White Paper’, Journal of East-­ West Thought 1, no. 2 (2011): 4. 45 Yaqing, Qin, ‘Relationality and Processual Construction: Bringing Chinese Ideas into International Relations Theory’, Social Sciences in China 30, no. 3 (2009): 9. 46 Lucian W. Pye, The Spirit of Chinese Politics: A Psychocultural Study of the Authority Crisis in Political Development (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1968), 174. 47 Hui-­Ching Chang and G. Richard Holt, ‘The Concept of Yuan and Chinese Interpersonal Relationships’, in Cross-­Cultural Interpersonal Communication, ed. Stella Ting-­Toomey and Felipe Corzenny (London: Sage, 1991), 34. 48 Emilian Kavalski, Central Asia and the Rise of Normative Powers: Contextualizing the Security Governance of the European Union, China and India (New York: Bloomsbury, 2012), 74; and Pye, ‘Factions and the Politics of Guanxi’, 44. 49 Liu, ‘From “All Under Heaven” ’ 130. 50 Thomas Risse, ‘Let’s Argue: Communicative Action in World Politics’, International Organization 54, no. 1 (2000): 1–39. 51 Emilian Kavalski, World Politics at the Edge of Chaos: Reflections on Complexity and Global Life (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2015). 52 Emilian Kavalski, ‘The Struggle for Recognition of Normative Powers: Normative Power Europe and normative Power China in Context’, Cooperation and Conflict 48, no. 2 (2013): 247–67. 53 Brantly Womack, ‘China as a Normative Foreign Policy Actor’, in Who is a Normative Foreign Policy Actor? (Brussels: Center for European Policy Studies), 294–7. 54 Jack Barbalet, ‘Market Relations as wuwei: Traditional Concepts in the Analysis of China’s Post-­1978 Economy’, Asian Studies Review 35, no. 3 (2011), 342–7; Kavalski, The Guanxi of Relational International Theory, 87. 55 This challenge to the centrality of hegemonic monologues in the mainstream seems to resonate the inferences of the literature on communitarian IR. 56 Jack Barbalet, ‘Guanxi, Tie Strength, and Network Attributes’, Amer­ican Behavioural Scientist 59, no. 8 (2015), 1042. 57 Jeremy Paltiel, ‘China’s Regionalization Policies: Illieral Internationalism or Neo-­ Mencian Benevolence’, in Emilian Kavalski, ed., China and the Global Politics of Regionalization (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), 49. 58 Wen Haiming and Wang Hang, ‘Confucian Cultural Psychology and Its Contextually Creative Intentionality’, Culture & Psychology 19, no. 2 (2013), 192. 59 Yu Bin, ‘China and Russia: Normalizing Their Relationship’, in Power Shift: China and Asia’s New Dynamics, ed. David Shambaugh (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 247. 60 Barbalet, ‘Guanxi’, 1044. 61 Barbalet, ‘Market Relations’, 346. 62 Donald R. DeGlopper, Commerce and Community in a Chinese City (Albany: SUNY Press, 1995), 205–6. 63 David Y. F. Ho, ‘On the Concept of Face’, Amer­ican Journal of Sociology 81, no. 4 (1976): 873. 64 Kavalski, ‘The Struggle for Recognition’. 65 Yaqing, Qin, ‘Rule, Rules, and Relations: Towards a Synthetic Approach to Governance’, Chinese Journal of International Politics 3, no. 2 (2011): 129–53; Emilian Kavalski, ‘Whether Power Transition and Whither If One’, in Power Transition in Asia, ed. David Walton and Emilian Kavalski (London: Routledge, 2017), 207–21. 66 Qin, ‘Rationality and Processual Construction’. 67 Qin, ‘Rationality and Processual Construction’, 9. 68 Kavalski, ‘The Struggle for Recognition’.

118   Emilian Kavalski 69 Womack, ‘China as a Normative Foreign Policy Actor’, 295–7. 70 Roberto Russell and Juan Gabrial Tokatlian, ‘From Antagonistic Autonomy to Relational Autonomy: A Theoretical Reflection from the Southern Cone’, Latin Amer­ican Politics and Society 45, no. 1 (2003): 17. 71 Pye, ‘Factions and the Politics of Quanxi’, 46. 72 Malcolm R. Parks, ‘Ideology of Interpersonal Communication: Off the Couch and Into the New World’, in Communication Yearbook, ed. Michael Burgon (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1982), 79–107. 73 Chang and Holt, ‘The Concept of Yuan’, 54. 74 This should not however be misunderstood as an assertion that the process is not affective. The point here is that guanxi is not about the subjective qualities of the participants, but about the process of interactions that they enact. 75 Feng Zhang, ‘Confucian Foreign Policy Traditions in Chinese History’, The Chinese Journal of International Politics 8, no. 2 (2015): 211. 76 Jia, ‘The Wei (Positioning)’. 77 Wenshan Jia, ‘An Intercultural Communication Model of International Relations: The Case of China’, in Challenges to Chinese Foreign Policy: Diplomacy, Globalization and the Next World Power, ed. Yufan Hao, C. X. George Wei and Lowell Dittmer (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2009), 322–5. 78 Emilian Kavalski, ‘Shanghaied into Cooperation: Framing China’s Socialization of Central Asia’, Journal of Asian and African Studies 45, no. 2 (2010): 131–45; Emilian Kavalski, ‘More of the Same: An Unpredictable Trump Foreign Policy in an Unpredictable Central Asia’, Monde Chinois 4, no. 48 (2016): 112–17. 79 Yeung and Tung, ‘Achieving Success’, 55. 80 At the same time, the value of the personal favour rendered in the context of guanxi (called renqing in Chinese) ‘can never be calculated objectively’ – instead, its assessment is subject to an ongoing and complex ‘blend of cost and quality and relationship in which one or two elements may be interpreted, by some people at certain times, as being more valuable than the other element(s)’ (Hwang, ‘Face and Favour’, 963). 81 Kavalski, ‘The Struggle for Recognition’. 82 Chang and Holt, ‘The Concept of Yuan’, 54. 83 Zhang, ‘Confucian Foreign Policy’, 216. 84 Qin, ‘Rule, Rules, and Relations’, 129–53. 85 It has to be acknowledged that the relationality lens has important bearing on current discussions of the content and practices of normative power in global life. In particular, it suggests that what distinguishes normative powers from soft powers is their relationality. See Kavalski, ‘The Struggle for Recognition’; Kavalski, Central Asia. 86 Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1962), 19. 87 This chapter can thereby be read as a prolegomenon to a genuinely relational IR thinking and practice – one whose attention is not on reifying the bulwarks of national sovereignty and quantifying the national interest, but rather draws attention to the porousness and unpredictability of global life – Western and non-­Western (and the messy and contingent intersections that permeate and constitute both). 88 Srdjan Vucetic, The Anglosphere: A Genealogy of Racialized Identity in International Relations (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011); Emilian Kavalski, ‘Recognizing Chinese IR Theory’, in Asian Thought on China’s Changing International Relations, ed. Niv Horesh and Emilian Kavalski, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2014), 230–48. 89 J. Samuel Barkin, Realist Constructivism: Rethinking International Relations Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 90 Yee-­Kuang Heng, ‘Ghosts in the Machine: Is IR Eternally Haunted by the Spectre of Old Concepts’, International Relations 47, no. 5 (2010): 535–56. 91 Coles, Visionary Pragmatism, 53.

Chinese concepts and international politics   119

Bibliography Acharya, Amitav. ‘Ethnocentrism and Emanipatory IR Theory’. In (Dis)Placing Security: Critical Re-­evaluations of the Boundaries of Security Studies, edited by Samantha L. Arnold and J. Marshall Beier, 1–18. Toronto: Centre for International and Security Studies, 2000. Alston, Jon P. ‘Wa, Guanxi, and Inhwa: Managerial Principles in Japan, China, and Korea’. Business Horizons 32, no. 2 (1989): 26–31. Avelino, Flor and Jan Rotmans. ‘Power in Transition: An Interdisciplinary Framework to Study Power in Relation to Structural Change’. European Journal of Social Theory 12, no. 4 (2009): 543–69. Barbalet, Jack. ‘Market Relations as wuwei: Traditional Concepts in the Analysis of China’s Post-­1978 Economy’. Asian Studies Review 35, no. 3 (2011): 335–54. Barbalet, Jack. ‘Guanxi, Tie Strength, and Network Attributes’. Amer­ican Behavioural Scientist 59, no. 8 (2015): 1038–50. Barkin, J. Samuel. Realist Constructivism: Rethinking International Relations Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). Bell, Duran. ‘Guanxi: A Nesting of Groups’. Current Anthropology 41, no. 1 (2000): 132–8.  Bilgin, Pinar. ‘Thinking Past Western IR’. Third World Quarterly 29, no. 1 (2008): 5–23. Bin, Yu. ‘China and Russia: Normalizing Their Relationship’. In Power Shift: China and Asia’s New Dynamics, edited by David Shambaugh, 228–47. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005. Carlson, Allen. ‘Moving Beyond Sovereignty? A Brief Consideration of Recent Changes in China’s Approach to International Order and the Emergence of the Tianxia Concept’. Journal of Contemporary China 20, no. 68 (2010): 89–102. Chang, Hui-­Ching and G. Richard Holt. ‘The Concept of Yuan and Chinese Interpersonal Relationships’. In Cross-­Cultural Interpersonal Communication, edited by Stella Ting-­ Toomey and Felipe Corzenny, 28–57. London: Sage, 1991. Chen, Ching-­Chang. ‘The Absence of Non-­Western IR Theory in Asia Reconsidered’. International Relations of the Asia-­Pacific 11, no. 1 (2011): 1–23. Chowdhry, Geeta and Shirin M. Rai. ‘The Geographies of Exclusion and the Politics of Exclusion: Race-­based Exclusions in the Teaching of International Relations’. International Studies Perspectives 10, no. 1 (2009): 84–91. Coles, Romand. Visionary Pragmatism. Durham: Duke University Press, 2016. Contessi, Nicola P. ‘Foreign and Security Policy Diversification in Eurasia: Issue Splitting, Co-­alignment, and Relational Power’. Problems of Post-­Communism 62, no. 5 (2015): 299–315. DeGlopper, Donald R. Lukang: Commerce and Community in a Chinese City. Albany: SUNY Press, 1995. Farh, Jiing-­Lih, Anne S. Tsui, Katherine Xin and Bor-­Shiuan Cheng. ‘The Influence of Relational Demography and Guanxi: The Chinese Case’. Organization Science 9, no. 4 (1998): 471–88. Foucault, Michel. The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences. London: Routledge, 2002. Gold, Thomas, Dong Ghine and David L. Wank. Social Connections in China: Institutions, Culture, and the Nature of Guanxi. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Heng, Yee-­Kuang. ‘Ghosts in the Machine: Is IR Eternally Haunted by the Spectre of Old Concepts’. International Relations 47, no. 5 (2010): 535–56.

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Chinese concepts and international politics   121 Ling, Lily H. M. The Dao of World Politics. London: Routledge, 2015. Liu, Jee Loo. ‘Reconstructing Chinese Metaphysics: A White Paper’. Journal of East-­ West Thought 1, no. 2 (2011): 1–13. Liu, Qing. ‘From “All under Heaven” to Critical Cosmopolitanism: The Transformation of China’s World Consciousness’. In Shared Values in a World of Cultural Pluralism, edited by Candido Mendes, 119–48. Rio de Janeiro: Academy of Latinity, 2014. Luo, Yadong. ‘Guanxi: Principles, Philosophies, and Implications’. Human Systems Management 16, no. 1 (1997): 43–51. Nightingale, Andrea Wilson. Spectacles of Truth in Classical Greek Philosophy: Theoria in Its Cultural Context. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Paltiel, Jeremy. ‘China’s Regionalization Policies: Illieral Internationalism or Neo-­ Mencian Benevolence’. In China and the Global Politics of Regionalization, edited by Emilian Kavalski, 47–62. Abingdon: Routledge, 2009. Parks, Malcolm R. ‘Ideology of Interpersonal Communication: Off the Couch and Into the World’. In Communication Yearbook, edited by Michael Burgon, 79–107. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1982. Pye, Lucian W. The Spirit of Chinese Politics: A Psychocultural Study of the Authority Crisis in Political Development. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1968. Pye, Lucian W. Chinese Commercial Negotiating Style. Cambridge, MA: Oelgeschlager, Guun, and Hain, 1982. Pye, Lucian W. ‘Factions and the Politics of Guanxi: Paradoxes in Chinese Administrative and Political Behaviour’. The China Journal 34, no. 2 (1995): 35–53. Qin, Yaqing. ‘Why Is There No Chinese International Theory’. International Relations of the Asia-­Pacific 7, no. 3 (2007): 313–40. Qin, Yaqing. ‘Relationality and Processual Construction: Bringing Chinese Ideas into International Relations Theory’. Social Sciences in China 30, no. 3 (2009): 5–20. Yaqing, Qin, ‘Rule, Rules, and Relations: Towards a Synthetic Approach to Governance’, Chinese Journal of International Politics 3, no. 2 (2011): 129–53. Risse, Thomas. ‘ “Let’s Argue”: Communicative Action in World Politics’. International Organization 54, no. 1 (2000): 1–39. Rosemont, Henry. ‘Two Loci of Authority: Autonomous Individuals and Related Persons’. In Confucian Cultures of Authority, edited by Peter D. Hershock and Roger T. Ames, 1–20. Albany: SUNY Press, 2006. Russell, Roberto and Juan Gabriel Tokatlian. ‘From Antagonistic Autonomy to Relational Autonomy: A Theoretical Reflection from the Southern Cone’. Latin Amer­ican Politics and Society 45, no. 1 (2003): 1–24. Schwartz, Benjamin I. ‘The Maoist Image of World Order’. Journal of International Affairs 21, no. 1 (1967): 92–102. Shih, Chih-­yu. ‘Transcending Hegemonic International Relations Theorization: Nothingness, Re-­Worlding, and Balance of Relationship’. This volume. Shimizu, Kosuke. ‘Materializing the Non-­Western’. Cambridge Review of International Affairs 28, no. 1 (2015): 3–20. Tong, Shijun. ‘Chinese Thought and Dialogical Universalism’. In Europe and Asia beyond East and West, edited by Gerard Delanty, 305–15. London: Routledge, 2006. Tsui, Anne S. and Jiing-­Lih Larry Farh. ‘Where Guanxi Matters: Relational Demography and Guanxi in the Chinese Context’. Work and Occupations 24, no. 1 (1997): 56–79. Tu, Wei-­ming. Confucian Thought: Selfhood as Creative Transformation. Albany: SUNY Press, 1985.

122   Emilian Kavalski Vucetic, Srdjan. The Anglosphere: A Genealogy of Racialized Identity in International Relations. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011. Wen, Haiming and Wang Hang. ‘Confucian Cultural Psychology and Its Contextually Creative Intentionality’. Culture & Psychology 19, no. 2 (2013): 184–202. Wolfers, Arnold. Discord and Collaboration. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1962. Womack, Brantly. ‘China as a Normative Foreign Policy Actor’. In Who is a Normative Foreign Policy Actor?, edited by Nathalie Tocci, 265–98. Brussels: Center for European Policy Studies, 2008. Yang, Mayfair Mei-­hui. Gifts, Favors, and Banquets: The Art of Social Relationships in China. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994. Yang, Mayfair Mei-­hui. ‘The Resilience of Guanxi and Its New Deployments: A Critique of Some New Guanxi Scholarship’. The China Quarterly 42, no. 170 (2002): 459–76. Yeung, Irene Y. M. and Rosalie L. Tung. ‘Achieving Success in Confucian Societies: The Importance of Guanxi (Connections)’. Organizational Dynamics 25, no. 2 (1996): 54–65. Zhang, Feng. ‘Confucian Foreign Policy Traditions in Chinese History’. The Chinese Journal of International Politics 8, no. 2 (2015): 197–218.

7 The genealogy of culturalist international relations in Japan and its implications for post-­Western discourse Kosuke Shimizu Introduction This chapter aims to introduce a neglected methodology from Japanese international relations (IR), namely, the culturalist methodology, to Anglophone specialists in IR. Interestingly, this methodology is neglected not only by an Anglophone audience but also by Japanese IR scholars. I argue here that despite this negligence, the culturalist methodology has great potential to contribute to contemporary post-­Western international relations theory (IRT) literature by posing radical questions about the ontology of IR. Post-­Western IRT differs from non-­Western IRT in that the latter complements the established mainstream IR literature largely developed in the Anglophone world, and the former radically criticises conventional approaches by questioning their ontological assumptions.1 In this sense, the culturalist methodology I introduce is very much post-­Western; it questions not only the ontology of Western IR, but also that of the IR discourses developed in the rest of the world. It is worth noting, however, that post-­Western IR discourses are not given serious consideration even in the rest of the world.2 In this chapter, I clarify the importance of perceptions on the basis of what, in Japan, are commonly called ‘international cultural relations’ [kokusai bunka] and ‘regional history’ [chiikishi] in understanding and imagining the contemporary world. I also indicate how our perceptions of the world are limited by the Westphalian principles of state sovereignty and non-­intervention among ‘equal’ nations on the basis of state borders. While historical understanding is widely recognised as an important approach to contemporary IR, its scope is also limited by its universalised principles, and as a result, only diplomatic history has been regarded as a part of IR. Despite the introduction of culture into the IR literature by diplomatic history through the works of Akira Irie, international cultural relations by Kenichiro Hirano and regional history by Takeshi Hamashita (works introduced shortly), the importance of cultural exchange has never attracted sufficient attention from an IR audience. As a result, when we think of an alternative to the contemporary international order, it is recounted using the Westphalian mind-­set, in terms of such expressions as China’s tribute system, guanxi or tianxia, in which ‘China’ directly connotes the People’s Republic of

124   Kosuke Shimizu China, rather than seeing the method as a governing system of the world.3 Similarly, state-­makers use ‘Japan’ to confirm a political body on the basis of state sovereignty. Such is the case in Japan’s diplomacy, particularly when it comes to the issue of soft power politics. Japan is now trying to become more politically and economically influential over other Asian countries by using its culture, such as animation films and pop culture. Ironically, however, the cultural products of Japan that diplomats strive to promote sometimes appear to be based on a concept of pre-­state sovereignty rather than the culture of Japan as a nation-­state.4 There seems to be a substantial number of similar ontological deficiencies in the discourses of contemporary IR in general, and even more so when they deal with the idea of culture and cultural politics. In developing my argument on culturalist politics, I clarify why mainstream IR scholars do not give serious consideration to post-­Western IRT by focusing upon Japanese IR, as an example that has disregarded culturalist methodology, and to draw lessons for the further development of post-­Western IRT discourse. This chapter focuses on the following questions: (1) What is the culturalist methodology? (2) Why have mainstream Japanese IR scholars regarded this methodology as unimportant? (3) To what extent does the genealogical investigation of the culturalist methodology contribute to the existing post-­Western IRT literature and how? To address these questions, I start with the second one. I then focus on a particular approach to diplomatic history, developed by Akira Irie, which attempts to historicise Japanese foreign policy by concentrating on cultural relations among nations. This is the first example of a historical approach to world affairs with a specific focus on the relationship between diplomacy and culture. After this, I examine the international cultural relations approach developed by Kenichiro Hirano, which is an even more radical departure from the traditional diplomatic history tradition. This approach differs from Irie’s radical approach to diplomatic history in the sense that it takes into account intercultural relations as a whole and acts as a bridge between diplomatic history and the study of regional history, which I introduce in the following chapter. I then introduce an approach to East Asian history mainly developed by Takeshi Hamashita, which I assess in terms of the contribution it can make to contemporary IR literature. Following the explanation of Hamashita’s approach to regional history, I extract some conclusions to contribute to the progress of post-­Western IRT literature.

Genealogy of Japanese IR and the reason for its neglect There have been comprehensive surveys of Japanese IR, most prominently by Takashi Inoguchi, who has been engaged in an extensive attempt to introduce and analyse the genealogy of Japanese IR for more than 10 years.5 Of the introductory texts to Japanese IR, his works are particularly detailed, informative and comprehensive. In his articles, Inoguchi argues that Japanese IR consists of at least four distinctive traditions: the Staatslehre tradition, Marxism, Historicism and Amer­ican-­style methodology. The Staatslehre tradition refers to policy

The genealogy of culturalist IR in Japan   125 studies for the state. It is mainly composed of state policy and external strategy. Marxism was very strong until the 1960s and was associated with the conception of Oppositionswissenschaft, which literally means ‘opposition science’. Historicism, a history-­centred approach to IR, is still strong, and many IR researchers in Japan adopt it. Amer­ican-­style methodology appeared after World War II under the strong political influence of the United States. European influence over Japanese intellectuals had been evident before the war, and Inoguchi contends that the Amer­ican approach took over in the post-­war era.6 Inoguchi’s introduction of Japanese IR to an Anglophone audience is comprehensive and detailed, but he does not explain historicism in detail, particularly when it comes to the collaborative works of historical IR with area studies of Asia; that is, the study of regional history. As he explains the historical approach to IR only in terms of diplomatic history or historical studies, in collaboration with the Staatslehre tradition, his focus is rarely directed to research based on the perception from the margins, which is the methodology that many scholars of regional history use. The neglect of this methodology is not confined to Inoguchi’s explanation, however. When an introduction to Japanese IR is presented and the study of history is touched upon, it is not unusual for this ‘history’ to mean diplomatic history, not regional history, and this propensity is even more evident in the introductory texts to Japanese IR published recently.7 Like Inoguchi, they mention the historical approaches to Japanese IR in general, but their explanations focus solely on Japan’s diplomatic history or the history of Japan as a nation-­state, and stop at an introductory level when it comes to regional history or regional studies. Consequently, they do not present an adequate research results or published works related to diverse culture or history. Recent years have also seen numerous books and articles published on Japanese IR in English. Glen Hook published two volumes in 2001, titled Japan’s International Relations: Politics, Economics and Security and Japan and Okinawa: Structure and Subjectivity.8 The focus of Shogo Suzuki’s recent critique of the English School, Civilization and Empire: China and Japan’s Encounter with European International Society, also covers Japan and China.9 Chris Goto-­Jones published a single authored monograph, and an edited volume, Re-­Politicising the Kyoto School as Philosophy.10 If we include the historical understanding of Japan’s diplomacy, Alan Tansman’s The Culture of Japanese Fascism,11 Eri Hotta’s Japan 1941: Countdown to Infamy and Pan-­Asianism and Japan’s War: 1931–1945, and Louise Young’s Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism constitute good examples.12 Works published in book form abroad deal mainly with Japanese foreign relations and diplomatic history, and not many examine intellectual history or theories of Japanese IR as an academic discipline. With regard to the intellectual history of IR in Japan, we seem to see more in the way of journal articles than books. In fact, since the publication of Inoguchi’s work on the four traditions,13 there have been several successive articles about the field. Some of them present an overview of Japanese IR,14 some engage in critical reflection15 and some focus on particular Japanese intellectuals.16

126   Kosuke Shimizu However, as mentioned earlier, such works are characterised by a lack of attention when it comes to the study of a regional history of Asia. Kazuya Yamamoto has come close to recognising this lack, noting that ‘Japan’s IR studies have been characterised by their historical approaches’. As Inoguchi has suggested, Yamamoto maintains that this is why Japanese IR has been characterised by a lack of interest in theoretical development.17 Inoguchi and Yamamoto have introduced a historical methodology called historicism, which is, in their perception, characterised by its concreteness and this concreteness only emphasises the lack of development of abstract theories in Japan. When Inoguchi and Yamamoto refer to IR theory, it is a theory that must be abstract and constructed on the basis of universality, objectivity, regularity, predictability and falsifiability. In other words, it must be scientific. This was particularly salient in the case of Amer­ican IR,18 which has had an undeniable influence on Japanese IR. As a result, the importance of any new methodologies developed in Japan appears to be worth mentioning only when it has an appropriate counterpart in Western IR literature, and Amer­ican literature in particular. In other words, Western IR was, and still is, the unchangeable reference point for Japanese IR. Obviously, this definition of ‘theory’ is very much narrowly defined. Jun Tosaka, a Kyoto School philosopher of the inter-­war period, argues that theories critical of the prevailing order only emanate from concrete experiences of everyday lives.19 For Tosaka, a theory is not just to explain what it is; it must also involve what it should be. In other words, the definition of ‘theory’ Inoguchi and Yamamoto have in mind is one possible definition of theory, and certainly does not include the critical theories in the Coxian sense.20 In this way, the academic atmosphere indeed continuously ushers Japanese IR scholars towards a definition of ‘theory’ to be universalised and abstract. The historicism that Inoguchi and Yamamoto mention requires further explanation. In an article on Japanese IR published in 2007, Inoguchi discussed two different traditions within historical studies: Staatslehre and historicism. Here ‘historicism’ means the study of regional history. The Staatslehre tradition ‘greatly influenced military and colonial studies in the pre-­war period and remained strong in a metamorphosed form even after 1945’.21 This tradition’s priority was to provide sufficient historical-­institutional background and to describe events and personalities in context and their consequences in detail. Research recently conducted in this tradition has been in the form of regional studies, not regional history, on the basis of the sovereign state (e.g. Chinese studies, Thai studies, Indonesian studies, etc.) and has maintained a close relationship with the government. In fact, the bulk of research in this tradition has been conducted by government-­related think tanks.22 From a Foucauldian perspective, power/knowledge relations appear very much intact because of their close relationship with the government. One of the reasons for this intimate relationship between government and regional studies is related to the origins of IR. According to Tadashi Kawata and Saburo Ninomiya, prior to World War I, world affairs were not as important as domestic affairs as a subject of scholarly interest; rather, they were dealt with in

The genealogy of culturalist IR in Japan   127 the field of international law or diplomatic history.23 This thinking parallels E. H. Carr’s argument in The Twenty Years’ Crisis: 1919–1939 and Stanley Hoffmann’s article ‘An Amer­ican Social Science: International Relations’, published in 1977, which maintain that IR was exclusively the business of diplomats and international lawyers before World War I.24 Post-­war Japanese IR inherited this perception and, as a consequence, Staatslehre became the mainstream discourse of Japanese foreign relations. Inoguchi explains in this context that ‘the strong salience of area studies in Japan’s IR study … reflects in part the reaction of academics to the domination of the Staatslehre tradition’25 and many scholars in this tradition have adopted the regional history methodology of historicism. In a historical survey of Japanese post-­ war IRTs, Yamamoto also touches upon the historicism of area studies in explaining the diversification of Japanese IR theory. He explains that Japanese IR diversified after the end of the Cold War and that area studies constituted an aspect of this. He sees the branch of area studies, or regional history, within IR as under the profound influence of Immanuel Wallerstein’s World Systems Theory and contends that Wallerstein’s macroscopic theory based on rich historical detail fascinated many scholars who, while appreciative of the traditional emphasis on history, strove to develop general arguments about world politics, economy and society. Although these scholars did not always fully embrace the ideological bent of Wallerstein’s argument, many arguments pertaining to regional systems, particularly in Asia, were developed.26 This description of historical methodology presumably refers to the study of regional history, which I introduce shortly. Another explanation of the lack of culturalist tradition in Japan is provided by Sakai Tetsuya, a prominent diplomatic historian of contemporary Japanese IR. Tetsuya Sakai tries to situate the narratives of culturalists and regional history scholars on the margins of IR by focusing on the humanities, arguing that the reason why the voices of the scholars of regional history have been disregarded is because of IR’s two different but intertwined world orders.27 Examining a number of intellectuals from the past who could be regarded as having been situated at the margins of conventional IR literature, he notes that many of them concentrated on non-­state actors and their interactions across state boundaries. According to Sakai, the study of regional history in Japanese IR has a long history. Initially, the study of Japan’s foreign relations was divided into, on the one hand, international law and politics, and on the other, colonial policy studies. Sakai contends that the former was naturally associated closely with law, politics and economics and the latter with the humanities, including literature, ethnology and history. Sakai argues that IR literature used to be developed on the basis of the division between IR and colonial policy studies, as the disciplines researching the ‘international order’ and the ‘imperial order’, respectively. The term ‘international order’ refers here to the relationship between equal states, mostly in the European context, while ‘imperial order’ was an order

128   Kosuke Shimizu mainly forcibly placed on the areas outside of that context. The former was, and still is, more about the institutional arrangements and organisational management of politics and international law effective among relatively equal members – mainly European nation-­states – and the latter was more about blunt and bare economic and cultural power over those who were colonised.28 These two orders of the world profoundly influenced the development of intellectual society in Japan, with the former becoming the core of the discipline of IR and the latter that of regional and colonial studies, even though the two orders are inseparable in a sense that the international order was maintained practically by the suzerain states’ unceasing exploitation of the colonised areas, and thus by the imperial order. The two-­order understanding of world affairs is by no means limited to Japan, of course. Similar arguments can be found in Edward Keene’s account of the Westphalian system and colonial system and Shogo Suzuki’s criticism of British IR, in which they contend that IR only concentrates on international society and does not pay sufficient attention to the functioning of imperialism in supporting the former.29 Japanese IR has mainly developed along with the international order in this sense, and has rarely given academic attention to the imperial order simply because the latter was regarded as the subject of regional and colonial studies. By contrast, some scholars of regional studies were well aware, thanks to their empirical and ethnological research in colonised areas, of how important violent control over those areas was in maintaining the international order and of its devastating effect on the colonised. This is precisely what Hirano’s theory of international cultural relations and Hamashita’s discourse of regional history tried to point out when they emphasised the importance of looking at the world from the margins on the basis of cultural relations. Those who critically engaged in regional and colonial studies, particularly in the post-­World War II era, were thus inclined to formulate counter-­discourses to that of mainstream IR, but they were gradually pushed out by those residing in mainstream IR in Japan and into the discipline of regional studies, that is, regional studies scholars for state-­ centrism, who developed their studies to maintain the status quo of international order and so remain in the IR scholarly circle. Sakai argues that the above is one of the most important reasons for the lack of attention by Japanese IR to the studies of cultural politics or regional history. However, as we have seen, individual cultural theorists of IR are all too well aware of the power of the term ‘culture’, and in the cases of Hirano and Hamashita in particular, strive to relativise and provide counterarguments to the essentialised reading of culture mainly formulated in the West, such as Huntington’s ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis.

Diplomatic history and culture As an aspect of historical studies, the study of regional history within Japanese IR mainly developed alongside regional studies of Asia; it is often referred to as chiikishi or ‘regional history’, and focuses mostly on economic and cultural

The genealogy of culturalist IR in Japan   129 exchanges among Asian nations and their effects on diplomatic and political relations. Naturally, it contrasts sharply with the historical approach to diplomatic relations, which either separates diplomatic history from economy and culture or presumes the determinism of foreign relations over economy and culture. While diplomatic history has been generally regarded as a part of IR, the study of regional history has never been as legitimate an approach to contemporary IR as the history of diplomacy has. One of the salient characteristics of the study of regional history is its specific focus on culture. It strives to theorise world affairs in a more comprehensive manner than the traditional mainstream IR literature does. However, the introduction of culture into IR literature was done by diplomatic history. It came to be more explicit indeed when radical diplomatic historians took it up as their methodology. The most widely known of Japanese scholars to Western readers in this context is Akira Iriye, an emeritus professor of history at Harvard University, also known for his extensive writing on Japan’s external relations, particularly on ‘cultural internationalism’. He personally experienced the defeat of World War II and the chaotic social conditions of the post-­war period, which likely influenced his subsequent research. Generally speaking, the study of diplomatic history consists of research into the history of the foreign relations of one or a few countries, and the main target is either nation-­states or diplomats. While Iriye is a historian of Japanese diplomatic history in the ordinary sense, unconventionally he focuses on the cultural aspects of diplomacy. To explain the aim of his research, he says that Japanese foreign relations are not simple. If we are to understand the international order as a whole, we need at least to take into account the three dimensions of military, economy and thought (or culture). Sometimes they are complementary to each other; sometimes they are contradictory. Either way, this [approach] will provide a perspective to understand the ways in which Japan has interacted with the world by focusing upon the changes of Japan’s military, economic and cultural relations in the last 50 years.30 Although Iriye has argued that we need to focus on military, economic and cultural dimensions to understand contemporary IR, his academic inclination towards the cultural activities of the international arena has been highly salient throughout his writings. This approach was a radical departure from the conventional understanding of diplomatic history and marked the advent of a new, cultural approach to diplomacy, later to be developed fully in Joseph Nye’s soft power politics. Iriye published such culture-­oriented monographs as Power and Culture: The Japanese Amer­ican War 1941–1945 and Cultural Internationalism and World Order, both of which have an exclusive focus on culture and its relationship to diplomacy. According to Iriye, the focus on culture has great significance for IR literature because it means a move away from the state-­centric view of IR towards an academic area that previously was not focused upon. In explaining the purpose of

130   Kosuke Shimizu his book Cultural Internationalism and World Order, published in 1997, he writes, ‘I hope the book will show that it is perfectly possible to narrate the drama of international relations without giving principal roles to separate national existences’.31 Iriye maintains that while the nation-­state is undoubtedly a main focus of IR, he also believes that ‘interactions outside the (state-­centric) framework exist, for which international relations may be an inadequate term but which, whatever one calls them, constitute just as much part of the story of world development as do the activities of national entities’.32 This belief in the importance of the activities of non-­state actors in shaping world affairs is the theoretical foundation on which his argument concerning cultural politics is based. Focusing on culture not only contributes to making sense of the shaping process of world affairs but also of the changing process of the world. His book argues that [i]ndividuals and groups of people from different lands have sought to develop an alternative community of nations and peoples on the basis of their cultural interchanges and … while frequently ridiculed by practitioners of power politics and ignored by historians, their efforts have significantly altered the world community and immeasurably enriched our understanding of international affairs.33 Thus, Iriye argues, the importance of culture is undeniable or indispensable in understanding world affairs, and the importance emanates from the diversity in cultural practices. However, this task is not all that easy because the term ‘culture’ is highly problematic and has a variety of meanings. There have been numerous definitions and interpretations of the term and there seems to be no universally accepted definition on which every researcher has agreed. Conscious of the need to find his own definition, Iriye defines it as ‘structures of meaning’. In this interpretation, the main focus in the cultural dimension to world affairs is on ‘a variety of activities undertaken to link countries and peoples through the exchange of ideas and persons, through scholarly cooperation, or through efforts at facilitating cross-­national understanding’.34 This definition, in turn, directs us to a new definition of IR. Iriye writes that cross-­national cultural forces and developments, linking the societies and peoples of different countries, can never be fully understood in a framework of geopolitics, economic mobilization, security, strategy and the like. One needs an alternative definition of international relations, a definition of world affairs not as an arena of interstate power rivalries but as a field for interdependent forces and movements, not as a structure of power relations but as a social context for interchanges among individuals and groups across national boundaries. If such a cultural formulation were adopted, it would become easier to link international to domestic affairs.35

The genealogy of culturalist IR in Japan   131 For Iriye, the term ‘international relations’ does not seem adequate for the discipline. IR is from the outset inter-­national. However, as our scholarly targets include non-­state actors and exchanges among them, new names for our academic interests are definitely needed. Iriye sees that this methodology is omitted from general academic interests, mainly because of the peculiar history of Japanese intellectuals. In the period prior to the World War II, some historians and IR scholars, such as the Kyoto School of philosophy, advocated (similar arguments to Iriye’s arguments) that cultural exchange would lead to the peaceful reconciliation of contending nation-­states. Unfortunately, history tells us the tragic story that their discourses were abused by nationalists to justify the aggressive territorial expansion of Imperialist Japan.36 Thus ‘culture’ is a term which Japanese intellectuals have consciously and carefully avoided. To prevent repetition of this sad history, Iriye predicts that cultural internationalists in all countries will need to struggle against cultural chauvinists as well as geopolitical nationalists; that is, both against parochial tendencies that deny possibilities for cross-­cultural communication and against policy formulations that give primacy to military considerations.37 In this way, Iriye criticises the essentialised understanding of culture and maintains his critical stance against mainstream Western IR methodology. What effects has Iriye’s argument had? He definitely expanded the intellectual territory of IR and opened a space for the development of what diplomatic history could have become. However, not many Japanese scholars clearly grasped the meaning of his methodological case to introduce culture into IR. As a result, Japanese IR theorists did not pay sufficient attention to Iriye’s cultural methodology as an IR theory. His argument was consigned to the category of a mere variant of Japanese diplomatic history, which has nothing to do with the theorisation of IR. As a result, Iriye is still regarded as a historian, not a theorist, despite his argument’s potential to be developed into an alternative theory of IR.

International cultural relations While Iriye’s attempt to widen the scope of IR was definitely a step towards a more culture-­oriented IR theory, Kenichiro Hirano made an even more explicit attempt to construct a cultural methodology for the theorisation of IR. Born in 1937, Hirano is also a scholar in the Japanese diplomatic history tradition. He received undergraduate and master’s degrees in the liberal arts from Tokyo University and obtained his PhD from Harvard. He returned to Tokyo University after his doctorate and taught IR and intercultural relations there before moving to Waseda University in Tokyo. He has published wide-­ranging works on IR and cultural interactions in world affairs and he has been consistent in his methodology in the sense that he has specifically focused on culture in theorising world affairs.

132   Kosuke Shimizu If one is to study IR in relation to culture in Japan, Hirano’s textbook Kokusai Bunkaron [International Cultural Theory] is usually referred to as the starting point of the subject,38 and is now regarded as essential for students of cultural IR. Like Iriye, Hirano has also been concerned mainly with the term ‘culture’ and diplomatic history. However, his approach is substantially different from Iriye’s. Iriye defines culture as a separate realm of inquiry, and thus culture appears to be an object of inquiry. By contrast, Hirano contends that culture is the methodology of inquiry not an object, and thus a way of seeing world affairs. In other words, whereas Iriye’s method is to look at culture, Hirano attempts to analyse world affairs as a whole using an anthropological and cultural methodology, looking at the world through cultural lenses. Hirano argues that we should not only focus on culture but also identify the cultural influence on the theorisation process of IR. According to Hirano, theorisation is also a human activity and thus inevitably cultural; consequently, he says, ‘IR itself is cultural’.39 Hirano maintains that in order to inquire into world affairs culturally, we must focus upon peripheries. He defines culture as ‘distinctive “bodies” of a variety of individuals and groups’ that can be regarded as subjects performing important roles in shaping the world.40 In the age of globalisation, these subjects are no longer static. Instead, they are active and dynamic in terms of geography and social class. People are mobile, transcending national borders and socio-­political boundaries with ease, and continuously transforming themselves through their interactions with others. This is precisely why Hirano deliberately focuses on the margins and peripheries; because the subjectivities transforming themselves into something else are to be found where different cultures encounter each other. This encounter always resides at the margins, not at the core, of each culture. Thus, the prevailing mainstream IRT should be severely criticised for its lack of attention to the ever-­changing nature of identities, which often starts on the margins. A typical example of Hirano’s argument on international cultural relations is his stern critique of Samuel Huntington’s ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis. Hirano contends that Huntington’s theory confuses two similar but different words: civilisation and culture. Huntington unquestionably uses these two words in an interchangeable manner, and thus he confuses a clash of civilisations with cultural friction. Hirano strictly distinguishes between these two words and argues that cultural friction leads to efforts by the parties involved for reconciliation, thus becoming one of the main means of avoiding a clash of civilisations. Hirano maintains that this moment takes place mainly in individuals’ minds. Citing cases of Japanese citizens and politicians encountering the West in the nineteenth century as examples, Hirano argues that it is the hope of reconciliation, which resides in people’s minds, that makes it possible to eventually avoid a clash of civilisations. In this manner, cultural frictions are, Hirano argues, always reconciled locally. However, the possibility of local reconciliations of cultural friction has been intentionally eliminated from Huntington’s argument in order to emphasise the confrontational nature of international civilizational relations.41 Thus, to Hirano, Huntington’s exclusive focus on a clash of civilisations

The genealogy of culturalist IR in Japan   133 rather than cultural friction is a characteristic of his theorisation on the basis of a perception of sovereign actors that is very much a Western cultural product, and the concept of a clash is pre-­given and assumed prior to civilisation in the theorisation process of the post-­Cold War political environment. The concept of ‘cultural friction’ deserves a more detailed discussion here. According to Hirano, cultural friction is destined to be reconciled. As is discussed elsewhere, Huntington’s civilisation is described in an essentialist manner, while Hirano’s is more constructivist, because the reconciliation process affects the process of identity construction for the parties involved. Cultural frictions open a space for dialogue between the conflicting parties and transform their identities. It is important, again, that the transformation of identities is particularly salient on the peripheries, rather than at the core of each culture. Therefore, Hirano’s focus is naturally placed on those ‘bodies’ at the margins of cultures. In this way, Hirano’s argument about international cultural relations provides new lenses through which we can look at world affairs. By using Hirano’s methodology, we can focus on cultural relations not only among different nations but also among different individuals and communities. However, his approach has failed to capture the attention of an IR audience and has not been recognised as a legitimate approach to world affairs in the Japanese IR community; he has thus set up a new academic society to put forth his views, the Japan Society of Intercultural Studies (JSIC), of which he holds the post of founding chair.

The study of regional history Despite unceasing academic efforts with regard to culture and IR and the significant addition of a new dimension to traditional IR made by Iriye and Hirano, mainstream IR theorists still regard IR as an academic discipline constructed on the basis of an ahistorical perception of security and state sovereignty. Those working on the relationship between culture and IR have found a place within a different academic subject, namely, the study of regional history. The most notable scholar in this context is Takeshi Hamashita, a historian and regional studies scholar focusing on Asia. Hamashita was born in Shizuoka Prefecture and studied at the University of Tokyo. He has written on a wide variety of subjects, such as modern Chinese history, the tribute system, Okinawa and Japanese imperialism and critical IR. Of these, his interpretation of the China-­centred world system until the 18th century and its subsequent demise is widely known; indeed, his argument inspired Andre Gunder Frank’s Re-­Orient42 and challenges John King Fairbank’s interpretation of the tribute system as the cause of China’s failure to protect itself from Western dominance.43 The tribute system has been the central focus of the so-­called recently emerging Chinese School, which includes David Kang and Qin Yanqing.44 The scholars show how stable the world was under the tribute system; according to Kang, East Asia enjoyed peace and order from the fourteenth to the nineteenth

134   Kosuke Shimizu century until the violent arrival of Western imperialism. In contrast to the Westphalian system of interstate relations, which is defined by its formal equality and incessant interstate conflict, the East Asian tribute system was characterised by formal inequality and ‘centuries of stability among the core participants’.45 Kang’s and Qin’s arguments were developed relatively recently, but Hamashita had established his argument concerning governance and the tribute system as early as the 1980s. It is also worth noting here that Hamashita’s analysis is in some ways far more radical; he is, like Hirano, more concerned with those on the margins than in the core. Consequently, his analysis is periphery-­focused and rarely uses China or Japan as the reference point. According to Hamashita, the world before 1800 was China-­centred. The development of China in that era was indeed supported by the tribute system, which involved such tributary states as Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Ryukyu, Vietnam and the Philippines. These countries sent tributary missions to China regularly, while China sent envoys to tributary states for official recognition when they had new rulers. The merchants and traders who accompanied the envoys are important in this context. Hamashita notes that the volume of private trade increased over time, and the categories and quantities of goods traded were officially regulated. As a consequence, the main purpose of the tribute trade ‘came to be the pursuit of profits through the unofficial trade that was ancillary to the official system’.46 On the basis of his account of the tribute system, Hamashita develops his contention that the core of the world economy resided in East Asia up until 1800, and Europe was no exception. George III’s envoy Lord Macartney was dispatched to the court of the Ch’ien Lung Emperor with the title of Ambassador and Plenipotentiary Extraordinary in 1793. Macartney recorded in his journal, ‘I pretend not to notice that “English Ambassador with Tribute to the Chinese Emperor” is written on the ship’s flag, and I have not yet complained about it. Given an appropriate opportunity, I shall give them warning’.47 According to Hamashita, China lost its momentum around 1800 in terms of its transcendental power over its tribute states; the above passage was written around that time, and still shows China’s perception of its world, clearly regarding England as a tribute state. Hamashita contends that the study of regional history has the tremendous potential to change the widespread perception of IR about the world. It shows the possibility of different interpretations of world history, as the history of the tribute system shows us. It also proves that the world order has been constructed not on the basis of a universalised principle of non-­intervention or state sovereignty. It is, rather, constructed on the basis of interactions of economy and culture, at the centre of which human beings, not nation-­states, reside, regardless of their physical locations. While it is still possible to argue that the tribute system itself was hierarchical, and thus, a first glance, constructed upon a

The genealogy of culturalist IR in Japan   135 u­ niversalised principle of power politics, it was, in reality, flexible and fluid in terms of economic and cultural exchanges among peoples, and took place across blurred state borders.48 Hamashita’s account of regional history also shows us the importance of looking through the lenses of the periphery. In this context, Hamashita was particularly concerned with the history of Ryukyu. Between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, Ryukyu was under the control of two different states at the same time, China and Japan. However, these suzerain states did not interfere with each other, and practically ignored the fact that Ryukyu was at least formally under the control of the other state. What is remarkable here is that the system of blurred state boundaries made it possible in practice for a state to come under the control of two different jurisdictions. In other words, the Ryukyu Kingdom exploited the system of blurred boundaries to maintain its relative independence from both big powers. In this way, the study of regional history shows a different interpretation of state sovereignty and the construction of state identities, and proves that the autonomous state sovereignty of non-­ interventionism is merely a particular, provincial interpretation. Thus far, Hamashita’s argument against mainstream IR has been the most advanced form of IR theorisation residing, or at least regarded by most IR scholars as residing, outside the IR community of Japan.

Conclusions: some implications for post-­Western IRT What, then, can we learn from the genealogy of the Japanese IR of culture? Inoguchi, as I mentioned earlier, emphasises the differences in the four traditions of Japanese IR: the Staatslehre tradition, Marxism, Historicism and Amer­ican-­ style methodology. Each of these has its own characteristics and disadvantages, according to Inoguchi, and he emphasises the differences among them. However, researchers from other countries in the Asia-­Pacific focus on their similarities. Ching-­Chang Chen, for instance, argues that while these four traditions seem to be at first glance based on different assumptions and theoretical compositions, none of them pays sufficient attention to the narratives developed in other countries of Asia as ‘Japanese IR academics believe they can learn little from the concepts and experiences of other Asian countries, because Asia lacks Westphalia’.49 In fact, all four traditions Inoguchi discusses have their origins in the European or Amer­ican tradition and were imported to Japan over the course of its modernisation. Therefore, it can be argued that the answer to why the study of regional history has long been neglected in Japanese IR literature lies in the history of IR as an academic discipline itself, which developed as a subject to make sense of and analyse the events and occurrences taking place in the world. The world Western-­based IR sees is divided by strict and robust state boundaries, and thus studies focusing on different interpretations and explanations of the world based on a regional history remain outside Japanese IR to the extent that the latter is a self-­claimed discipline within the Western tradition and based on Westphalian subjectivity.

136   Kosuke Shimizu This situation is precisely what culturalists argue against. For them, history must be narrated from the margins if our intellectual activities are to understand the world more in terms of concrete or ‘bodily’ human interactions than of abstract concepts of nation-­states. Narrating the history of the margins has at least two important and intertwined meanings. First, it gives us a clue to aspects of world affairs that have never been revealed, complementing and reinforcing a more precise understanding of the contemporary world and thus becoming the basis of our future vision. Second, while it complements the existing knowledge of contemporary IR, it also relativises the traditional knowledge of IR. This relativisation is in some ways political; because the world has been constructed upon a particular perception, it has benefited those who share the same view and has excluded those who do not. Thus, narrating the world from the margins has the ethical result of ‘provincialising’ the mainstream narrative, and thus its action is political. What does this mean specifically for post-­Western IR discourse? There are at least three implications: First, Hirano’s and Hamashita’s analyses reveal how much our perception is biased by the Westphalian presumptions of state sovereignty and strict state borders, as well as the extent to which we look at the world on the basis of strictly demarcated borders. Hirano argues that we tend to focus more on the core units of analysis, not on the peripheries. When we make inquiries into Japanese foreign policy, for instance, this mainly denotes Tokyo’s political decisions about external relations, not Okinawa’s calls to be rid of US bases. Hamashita’s investigation of the tribute system also shows that the stable political order in existence before the arrival of European modernity was mainly supported by the enormous amount of transactions and exchanges in economic and cultural relations across boundaries, which was, in turn, guaranteed and encouraged by a system of blurred borders between the concerned states. Second, however, there is a strong and robust obstacle to such unconventional arguments as Hirano’s and Hamashita’s. It is clear that their arguments contribute to the existing IR literature by providing an opportunity to reflect upon our mind-­set in terms of state sovereignty and strict boundaries. However, the genealogy of Japanese IR, in which mainstream scholars have ignored the argument about the importance of culturalist methodology, make it clear that a different interpretation and understanding from the mainstream Westphalian perception towards world affairs has difficulty in being sufficiently recognised. Third, we need to keep in mind that perceptions based on such language as the Westphalian nation-­state and geographical division, for example, West and East, is more persistent than we can imagine. This situation is precisely why colonial studies specialists of Japan were drawn into the discourse of anti-­ Western regionalism of the Great East Asian Co-­prosperity Area before World War II. In fact, there is an irresistible temptation in every moment we talk about world affairs to use such concepts as Japan, China and the US as nation-­states in the Westphalian sense, or of West and East in terms of civilisation and modernity. This temptation appears in a variety of forms. As the case of culturalist

The genealogy of culturalist IR in Japan   137 methodology in Japan indicates, we may simply be excluded from the discipline of IR unless we use the language of the nation-­state or geographical division. Alternatively, in order to obtain the recognition of the IR community, we may be forced to make a deal by using the concept of nation-­states to formulate our theory, as the Kyoto School philosophers did before World War II.50 However, as a consequence, we may find ourselves thinking of the contemporary world and the decline of US hegemony in terms of strictly demarcated state boundaries or a dichotomised confrontation of West and East, and thus wondering uncritically which nation-­state or geographical area will be the next hegemon. This seems particularly salient in light of the recent overwhelming popularity of the ‘China Rising’ discourse. However, as Hamashita suggests, what we need to examine in making sense of contemporary world affairs is not which nation-­state in the Westphalian sense will become the next provider of universalised political principles, but how we stop using our exclusivist language, based on the Westphalian system, in a post-­Western world.

Notes   1 Kosuke Shimizu, ‘Materializing the ‘Non-­Western’: Two Stories of Japanese Philosophers on Culture and Politics in the Inter-­war Period’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs 28, no. 1 (2015): 3–20; Giorgio Shani, ‘Towards a Post-­Western IR: The Umma, Khalsa Panth, and Critical International Relations Theory’, International Studies Review 10, no. 4 (2008): 722–34.   2 Amitav Acharya, ‘International Relations Theory and the “Rise of Asia” ’ in Oxford Handbook of the International Relations of Asia, eds. Saadia Pekkanen, John Ravenhill and Rosemary Foot (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 126.   3 Yaqing Qin, ‘A Relational Theory of World Politics’, International Studies Review 18, no. 1 (2016): 33–47; Yaqing Qin, ‘Rule, Rules, and Relations: Towards a Synthetic Approach to Governance’, The Chinese Journal of International Politics 4, no. 2 (2011): 117–45; Tingyang Zhao, ‘Rethinking Empire from a Chinese Concept “All-­ under-Heaven” ’, Social Identities 12, no. 1 (2006): 29–41.   4 Kosuke Shimizu, ‘The Ambivalent Relationship of Japan’s Soft Power Diplomacy and Princess Mononoke: Tosaka Jun’s Philosophy of Culture as Moral Reflection’, Japanese Journal of Political Science 15, no. 4 (2014): 683–98.   5 Takashi Inoguchi, ‘Are There Any Theories of International Relations in Japan?’ International Relations of the Asia-­Pacific 7, no. 3 (2007): 369–90; Takashi Inoguchi and Paul Bacon, ‘The Study of International Relations in Japan: Towards a More International Discipline’, International Relations of the Asia-­Pacific 1, no. 1 (2001): 1–20.   6 Inoguchi and Bacon, ‘The Study of International Relations’, 11–12; Inoguchi, ‘Are There Any Theories’, 371–3.   7 Koji Murata, ‘The Evolution of Japanese Studies of International Relations’, Japanese Journal of Political Science 11, no. 3 (2010): 355–65; Kazuya Yamamoto, ‘International Relations Studies and Theories in Japan: A Trajectory Shaped by War, Pacifism, and Globalization’, International Relations of the Asia-­Pacific 11, no. 2 (2011): 259–78.   8 Glenn D. Hook, Julie Gilson, Christopher W. Hughes and Hugo Dobson, Japan’s International Relations: Politics, Economics and Security (London: Routledge, 2001); Glenn D. Hook and Richard Siddle, eds., Japan and Okinawa: Structure and Subjectivity (London: Routledge Curzon, 2001).

138   Kosuke Shimizu   9 Shogo Suzuki, Civilization and Empire: China and Japan’s Encounter with European International Society (London: Routledge, 2009). 10 Chris Goto-­Jones, Political Philosophy in Japan: Nishida, the Kyoto School, and Co-­ Prosperity (London: Routledge, 2005); Chris Goto-­Jones, ed., Re-­Politicising the Kyoto School as Philosophy (London: Routledge, 2008). 11 Alan Tansman, ed., The Culture of Japanese Fascism (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009). 12 Eri Hotta, Japan 1941: Countdown to Infamy, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2013); Eri Hotta, Pan-­Asianism and Japan’s War: 1931–1945 (Basingstoke: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2007); Louise Young, Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998). 13 Inoguchi, ‘Are There Any Theories’; Inoguchi and Bacon, ‘The Study of International Relations’. 14 Murata, ‘The Evolution of Japanese Studies’; Yamamoto, ‘International Relations Studies’. 15 Ching-­Chang Chen, ‘The Absence of Non-­Western IR Theory in Asia Reconsidered’, International Relations of the Asia-­Pacific 11, no. 1 (2011): 1–23; Ching-­Chang Chen, ‘The Im/Possibility of Building Indigenous Theories in a Hegemonic Discipline: The Case of Japanese International Relations’, Asian Perspective 36, no. 3 (2012): 463–92. 16 Ryoko Nakano, ‘ “Pre-­History” of International Relations in Japan: Yanaihara Tadao’s Dual Perspective of Empire’, Millennium 35, no. 2 (2007): 301–9; Kosuke Shimizu, ‘Nishida Kitaro and Japan’s Interwar Foreign Policy: War Involvement and Culturalist Political Discourse’, International Relations of the Asia-­Pacific 11, no. 1 (2011): 157–83; Kosuke Shimizu, ‘Materializing the ‘Non-­Western’: Two Stories of Japanese Philosophers on Culture and Politics in the Inter-­war Period’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs 28, no. 1 (2015): 3–20; Kuan-­Hsing Chen, ‘Takeuchi Yoshimi’s 1960 “Asia as Method” Lecture’, Inter-­Asia Cultural Studies 13, no. 2 (2012): 317–24; Seok-­Won Lee, ‘Empire and Social Science: Shinmei Masamichi and the East Asian Community in Interwar Japan’, Social Science Japan Journal 17, no. 1 (2013): 59–76. 17 Kazuya Yamamoto, ‘International Relations Studies and Theories in Japan: A Trajectory Shaped by War, Pacifism, and Globalization’, International Relations of the Asia­Pacific 11, no. 2 (2011): 260. 18 Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski, International Theory: Positivism and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1998). 19 Shimizu, ‘Materializing the “Non-­Western” ’. 20 Robert Cox, ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond international relations theory’, Millennium 10, no. 2 (1981): 126–55. 21 Inoguchi, ‘Are There Any Theories’, 372. 22 Inoguchi, ‘Are There Any Theories’, 372. 23 Tadashi Kawata and Saburo Ninomiya, ‘The Development of the Study of International Relations in Japan’, The Developing Economies 2, no. 2 (1964): 190. 24 E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis: 1919–1939 (London: Macmillan, 1946); Stanley Hoffmann, ‘An Amer­ican Social Science: International Relations’, Daedalus 106, no. 3 (1977): 41–60. 25 Inoguchi, ‘Are There Any Theories’, 372. 26 Yamamoto, ‘International Relations Studies’. 27 Tetsuya Sakai, Kindai Nihon no Kokusai Chitsujo [International Order of Modern Japan] (Tokyo: Iwanami, 2007). 28 Sakai, Kindai Nihon, 6–7. 29 Edward Keene, Beyond Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Suzuki, Civilization and Empire, 11.

The genealogy of culturalist IR in Japan   139 30 Akira Iriye, Shin Nihon no Gaiko: Chikyuka Jidai no Nihon no Sentaku [New Diplomacy of Japan: Japan’s Choice in the Global Era] (Tokyo: Chuokoron, 1991), 8, original in Japanese, author’s translation. 31 Akira Iriye, Cultural Internationalism and World Order (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 1. 32 Iriye, Cultural Internationalism, 1. 33 Iriye, Cultural Internationalism, 2. 34 Iriye, Cultural Internationalism, 3. 35 Iriye, Cultural Internationalism, 180–1. 36 Kosuke Shimizu, ‘Nishida Kitaro’, 157–83; Shimizu, ‘Materializing the “Non-­ Western” ’. 37 Irie, Cultural Internationalism. 38 Kenichiro Hirano, Kokusai Bunkaron [International Cultural Relations] (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 2000). 39 Hirano, Kokusai Bunkaron, ii. 40 Hirano, Kokusai Bunkaron, ii. 41 Hirano, Kokusai Bunkaron, 28–33. 42 Andre Gunder Frank, Re-­Orient: Global Economy in the Asian Age (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998). 43 John King Fairbank and Ta-­tuan Ch’en, eds., The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968). 44 David C. Kang, East Asia Before the West: Five Centuries of Trade and Tribute (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), Yaqing, Qin ‘International Society as a Process: Institutions, Identities, and China’s Peaceful Rise’, The Chinese Journal of International Politics 3, no. 2 (2010): 129–53. 45 Kang, East Asia, 201. 46 Takeshi Hamashita, ‘Tribute and Emigration: Japan and the Chinese Administration of Foreign Affairs’, Senri Ethnological Studies 25 (1989): 69–86; Giovanni Arrighi, ‘States, Markets, and Capitalism, East and West’, Positions 15, no. 2 (2007): 261. 47 Hamashita, ‘Tribute and Emigration’, 76–7. 48 Takeshi Hamashita, China, East Asia, and the Global Economy: Regional and Historical Perspectives (New York: Routledge, 2008). 49 Chen, ‘The Im/Possibility of Building Indigenous Theories’, 471. 50 Shimizu, ‘Materializing the “Non-­Western” ’.

Bibliography Acharya, Amitav. ‘International Relations Theory and the “Rise of Asia” ’. In Oxford Handbook of the International Relations of Asia, edited by Saadia Pekkanen, John Ravenhill and Rosemary Foot, 120–40. New York: Oxford University Press, 2015. Arrighi, Giovanni. ‘States, Markets, and Capitalism, East and West’. Positions 15, no. 2 (2007): 251–84. Carr, E. H. The Twenty Years’ Crisis: 1919–1939. London: Macmillan, 1946. Chen, Ching-­Chang. ‘The Absence of Non-­Western IR Theory in Asia Reconsidered’. International Relations of the Asia-­Pacific 11, no. 1 (2011): 1–23. Chen, Ching-­Chang. ‘The Im/Possibility of Building Indigenous Theories in a Hegemonic Discipline: The Case of Japanese International Relations’. Asian Perspective 36, no. 3 (2012): 463–92. Chen, Kuan-­Hsing. ‘Takeuchi Yoshimi’s 1960 ‘Asia as Method’ Lecture’. Inter-­Asia Cultural Studies 13, no. 2 (2012): 317–24. Cox, Robert. ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders: beyond international relations theory’. Millennium 10, no. 2 (1981): 126–55.

140   Kosuke Shimizu Fairbank, John King and Ta-­tuan Ch’en, eds. The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968. Frank, Andre Gunder. Re-­Orient: Global Economy in the Asian Age. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998. Goto-­Jones, Chris. Political Philosophy in Japan: Nishida, the Kyoto School, and Co-­ Prosperity. London: Routledge, 2005. Goto-­Jones, Chris, ed. Re-­Politicising the Kyoto School as Philosophy. London: Routledge, 2008. Hamashita, Takeshi. ‘Tribute and Emigration: Japan and the Chinese Administration of Foreign Affairs’. Senri Ethnological Studies 25 (1989): 69–86. Hamashita, Takeshi. China, East Asia, and the Global Economy: Regional and Historical Perspectives. New York: Routledge, 2008. Hirano, Kenichiro. Kokusai Bunkaron [International Cultural Relations]. Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 2000. Hoffmann, Stanley. ‘An Amer­ican Social Science: International Relations’. Daedalus 106, no. 3 (1977): 41–60. Hook, Glenn D., Julie Gilson, Christopher W. Hughes and Hugo Dobson. Japan’s International Relations: Politics, Economics and Security. London: Routledge, 2001. Hook, Glenn D. and Richard Siddle, eds. Japan and Okinawa: Structure and Subjectivity. London: Routledge Curzon, 2001. Hotta, Eri. Pan-­Asianism and Japan’s War: 1931–1945. Basingstoke: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2007. Hotta, Eri. Japan 1941: Countdown to Infamy. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2013. Inoguchi, Takashi. ‘Are There Any Theories of International Relations in Japan?’ International Relations of the Asia-­Pacific 7, no. 3 (2007): 369–90. Inoguchi, Takashi and Paul Bacon. ‘The Study of International Relations in Japan: Towards a More International Discipline’. International Relations of the Asia-­Pacific 1, no. 1 (2001): 1–20. Iriye, Akira. Cultural Internationalism and World Order. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997. Iriye, Akira. Shin Nihon no Gaiko: Chikyuka Jidai no Nihon no Sentaku [New Diplomacy of Japan: Japan’s Choice in the Global Era]. Tokyo: Chuokoron, 1991. Kang, David. East Asia before the West: Five Centuries of Trade and Tribute. New York: Columbia University Press, 2010. Kawata, Tadashi and Saburo Ninomiya. ‘The Development of the Study of International Relations in Japan’. The Developing Economies 2, no. 2 (1964): 190–204. Keene, Edward. Beyond Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Lee, Seok-­Won. ‘Empire and Social Science: Shinmei Masamichi and the East Asian Community in Interwar Japan’. Social Science Japan Journal 17, no. 1 (2013): 59–76. Murata, Koji. ‘The Evolution of Japanese Studies of International Relations’. Japanese Journal of Political Science 11, no. 3 (2010): 355–65. Nakano, Ryoko. ‘ “Pre-­History” of International Relations in Japan: Yanaihara Tadao’s Dual Perspective of Empire’. Millennium 35, no. 2 (2007): 301–20. Qin, Yaqing. ‘International Society as a Process: Institutions, Identities, and China’s Peaceful Rise’. The Chinese Journal of International Politics 3, no. 2 (2010): 129–53. Qin, Yaqing. ‘Rule, Rules, and Relations: Towards a Synthetic Approach to Governance’. The Chinese Journal of International Politics 4, no. 2 (2011): 117–45.

The genealogy of culturalist IR in Japan   141 Qin, Yaqing. ‘A Relational Theory of World Politics’. International Studies Review 18, no. 1 (2016): 33–47. Sakai, Tetsuya. Kindai Nihon no Kokusai Chitsujo [International Order of Modern Japan]. Tokyo: Iwanami, 2007. Shani, Giorgio. ‘Towards a Post-­Western IR: The Umma, Khalsa Panth, and Critical International Relations Theory’. International Studies Review 10, no. 4 (2008): 722–34. Shimizu, Kosuke. ‘Nishida Kitaro and Japan’s Interwar Foreign Policy: War Involvement and Culturalist Political Discourse’. International Relations of the Asia-­Pacific 11, no. 1 (2011): 157–83. Shimizu, Kosuke. ‘The Ambivalent Relationship of Japan’s Soft Power Diplomacy and Princess Mononoke: Tosaka Jun’s Philosophy of Culture as Moral Reflection’. Japanese Journal of Political Science 15, no. 4 (2014): 683–98. Shimizu, Kosuke. ‘Materializing the ‘Non-­Western’: Two Stories of Japanese Philosophers on Culture and Politics in the Inter-­war Period’. Cambridge Review of International Affairs 28, no. 1 (2015): 3–20. Smith, Steve, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski. International Theory: Positivism and beyond. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Suzuki, Shogo. Civilization and Empire: China and Japan’s Encounter with European International Society. London: Routledge, 2009. Tansman, Alan, ed. The Culture of Japanese Fascism. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2009. Yamamoto, Kazuya. ‘International Relations Studies and Theories in Japan: A Trajectory Shaped by War, Pacifism, and Globalization’. International Relations of the Asia-­ Pacific 11, no. 2 (2011): 259–78. Young, Louise. Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998. Zhao, Tingyang. ‘Rethinking Empire from a Chinese Concept “All-­under-Heaven” ’. Social Identities 12, no. 1 (2006): 29–41.

8 Reshaping international relations Theoretical innovations from Africa Karen Smith

Introduction Much has been written in recent years about the Western-­centric nature of existing International Relations (IR) theory, the inapplicability of ‘commonsense’ concepts to the Global South, and the need for the field of IR to engage with voices from outside the West. What started off as calls coming from the periphery of the field have now penetrated the US-­based International Studies Association (ISA), reflected in the 2015 annual convention theme: ‘Global IR and Regional Worlds’. This increased interest, no doubt, stems partly from a growing sense of anxiety in the West about changes occurring in the international system, linked to the rise of new actors whose behaviour and motivations existing theories are not able to make sense of. These criticisms have also been accompanied by calls for greater inclusion of contributions from outside of the West. Unfortunately, these calls have not been met with great success. While some journal and book editors and conference organisers are making a concerted effort to include the work of scholars from outside of the USA and Europe, many have been disillusioned by the lack of response they have received. Relatedly, scholars like Tickner and Waever and Tickner and Blaney, who set out a decade ago on a project to discover how IR is taught, researched and practised in the different parts of the world found, to their disappointment, that IR in disperse parts of the world does not seem to be all that different.1 Is Vale’s comment about the South African IR community – namely that scholars seemed to be engaged in ‘an enterprise which, generally speaking, displays little imagination and almost no conceptual adventure’2 – still applicable, also to other parts of the Global South? Nkiwane asked whether the situation can be explained on the basis that ‘Africa has little to contribute to IR, or because the power dynamics of the discipline are such that African voices are not heard?’3 I have previously argued, in line with other scholars, that the answer to this question lies in both. While external factors prevent the expansion of IR knowledge to include contributions from the developing world, internal or domestic factors inhibit the creation and dissemination of this knowledge. As these have been discussed at length elsewhere they will not be revisited here.4

Reshaping international relations   143 But is this disappointment really warranted? What is it that we are expecting to emerge from the Global South? A new theory to challenge realism? A groundbreaking new way of understanding IR that will change the way scholars and policymakers think? In making the claim that not much innovative theoretical work has come out of the Global South, and Africa in particular, one has to be clear about what exactly is meant by a theoretical contribution or innovation. This means starting with a definition of theory as it applies to IR. In his 1967 article titled ‘What is a Theory of International Relations?’ Raymond Aron contended that theory can be two meanings: first, it can be ‘contemplative knowledge … the equivalent of philosophy’.5 Second, a theory can be ‘a hypothetical, deductive system consisting of a group of hypotheses whose terms are strictly defined and whose relationships between terms (or variables) are most often given a mathematical form’.6 Mallavarapu defines theories on the basis of their expectations. According to him, theories involve a degree of abstraction, a degree of generalisation, and seek to explain.7 With regards to advancing IR theory through contributions from outside of the West, the debate continues about whether universalist IR theories are at all possible, or whether the way forward is to develop regional-­ specific approaches (for example, the development of an IR theory with Chinese characteristics). Cunningham-­Cross notes how in calls by Chinese scholars for greater innovation in Chinese approaches to IR theory, the emphasis has been on newness, with innovation meaning ‘coming up with something that is not only new but also distinctive.8 She continues that newness is measured against certain ostensibly Western markers and originality can only exist where there is evidence of a clear distinction from the so-­called Western theory that preceded it’.9 This chapter is based on the assumption that theoretical contributions from the Global South – and in this case, from Africa, do not need to be radically different from existing theories to constitute an advancement in terms of engendering a better understanding of IR. Reinterpretations or modifications of existing frameworks and the introduction of new concepts for understanding are equally important. This is an accepted practice in mainstream IR, where existing theories are constantly amended and revisited. One need only consider the various incarnations of realist thought. While adaptations and conceptual innovations by Western scholars are recognised as legitimate and adopted into the canon of theory, this is not always the case with similar contributions emerging from outside of the West. This chapter examines three examples of such contributions by African scholars.10 The first group of scholars reinterpreted the concept of ‘middle power’, arguing that there are specific characteristics that set emerging middle powers like South Africa apart from traditional middle powers. The second, Deon Geldenhuys, developed the concept ‘isolated states’ and generated a novel analytical framework to categorise states based on indicators of isolation. Finally, Thomas Tieku draws on the African worldview of ubuntu in calling for the state to be reconceptualised in a collectivist, societal way. It is hoped that these examples will illustrate that there are theoretical innovations emerging from the Global South that can assist us in

144   Karen Smith not only better understanding IR in a particular part of the world, but can in fact provide greater insights into the field as a whole.

Theoretical innovation or not? Our excitement about the possibilities that exist outside of the West should also be tempered by the realisation that groundbreaking theoretical innovations are simply not that common. If we allow ourselves to think more generally about theoretical innovation it can, in the words of Mittelman mean ‘creative imagination in the production of new knowledge’.11 There must be a recognition that there are different levels of theoretical innovation, not necessarily to the extent of developing new theory but also through theory and concept adaptation. Gill writes, ‘An innovation introduces something new – a new method, a new theory, a new perspective – in ways that have some practical effect on the way that we may think about and potentially act in the world.’ Importantly, he emphasises that ‘Often this simply involves the act of writing, synthesising, codifying or clarifying ideas current for over half a century … or else rearticulating existing Republican arguments in different political contexts.’12 Bilgin, drawing on the work of post-­colonial scholars like Homi Babha, remains tremendously insightful with regard to reminding us that we should not expect to find only difference in the non-­West. Identifying similarities and instances of mimicry with some adaptation – in other words, doing world politics in a ‘seemingly “similar” yet unexpectedly “different” way’ can be equally valuable.13 For example, adapting theory to the local context through reinterpretations or modifications of existing frameworks – what I have referred to as ‘reinterpreting old stories’ in a previous paper14 and the introduction of new concepts for understanding are equally important. This is an accepted practice in mainstream IR, where existing theories are constantly amended and revisited. One need only consider the various incarnations of realist thought. While adaptations by Western scholars are recognised as legitimate and adopted into the canon of theory, this is not always the case with adaptations emerging from outside of the West. For example, Mohammed Ayoob’s notion of what he calls ‘subaltern realism’15 has remained on the fringes of the field and has not been recognised as constituting a significant elaboration of realist thinking. Disregarding such contributions as not important or radical enough denies agency to scholars who are contributing in ways that can enrich our understanding of IR. South African scholars’ revisiting of the notion of ‘middle power’ serves as a case in point.

South African contributions to the adaptation of the middle power concept In the late 1990s and early 2000s, a number of South African scholars published articles in which they interrogated the ‘middle power’ concept that had become increasingly popular as a way to understand South Africa’s foreign policy. They based their work on the existing literature on middle powers in IR that had been

Reshaping international relations   145 developed and popularised predominantly by scholars like Andrew Cooper and Robert Cox, from another recognised middle power, Canada. As the concept – initially reserved for what ‘traditional middle powers’ like Canada, Australia, Norway and Sweden – was increasingly being applied to states from like South Africa, Brazil and Turkey, it appeared to be losing some of its analytical value. Scholars like van der Westhuizen, Nel, Taylor and van der Westhuizen, Schoeman and particularly Jordaan subsequently made an important contribution to the literature on middle powers by developing the concept through providing greater analytical clarity, and specifically making the distinction between traditional and new, emergent or emerging middle powers.16 While South Africa had been referred to in the literature as both an ‘emerging power’17 and ‘middle power’,18 van der Westhuizen first writes about ‘South Africa’s emergence as a middle power’ and Schoeman was the first to explicitly examine the meaning of the concept ‘emerging middle power’ in relation to South Africa.19 Nel, Taylor and van der Westhuizen, in exploring South Africa’s commitment to multilateralism, highlight what they refer to as a ‘deficiency in the literature to distinguish between traditional or established middle powers in the industrialized Western world and emerging middle powers in the South’.20 They set out five preliminary suggestions for distinguishing between traditional and emerging middle powers. Building directly on Cooper and Nel et al., Jordaan sets out to further refine the conceptual distinction and to develop a schematic to distinguish between emerging and traditional middle powers on the basis of their constitutive and behavioural differences.21 According to Jordaan, his motivation was to propose an analytical solution to the problems Schoeman and Nel et al. had come up against in their attempts to distinguish between traditional and emerging middle powers.22 While recognising the similarities between middle powers, namely that they ‘conform to the middle power role by their legitimising and stabilising actions that enable a smother functioning of the global order’,23 he emphasises that more differences exist than are recognised by the existing literature. Under constitutive differences he includes democratic tradition, time of emergence as middle powers, position in the world economy, domestic distribution of wealth, regional influence, and origins of perceived neutrality. Under behavioural differences, regional orientation, attitude to regional integration and cooperation, nature of actions to effect deep global change, and purpose of international identity construction are listed. For example, with regard to their position in the global economy (a constitutive difference), he contended that while traditional middle powers are located in the core, emerging middle powers are in the semi-­ periphery. This has important implications for their consequent behaviour and overall foreign policy orientation, with the former engaging in legitimising behaviour, while the latter tend towards the reform of global economic rules and structures. This reformist tendency, rather than a more fundamental transformist approach exhibited by emerging middle powers, can be explained by the fact that, as semi-­peripheral economies, these states still have a competitive advantage over states in the periphery, an advantage they do not wish to lose

146   Karen Smith through a large-­scale overhaul of the system.24 Another significant difference between traditional and emerging middle powers has to do with the regional dimension. While the former have little interest in their immediate region and regional integration initiatives, the latter have a much stronger regional orientation and are often also considered as regional powers. These are important differences in foreign policy behaviour that are obscured by reliance on the original concept of ‘middle power’ but usefully highlighted by Jordaan’s innovation of distinguishing between ‘traditional’ and ‘emerging’ middle powers. The work of these scholars, and Jordaan’s in particular, is a useful illustration of how an existing concept can be adapted in order to make it more applicable to a particular context – in his case, understanding the role that South Africa was playing in the world. Significantly, however, their modification applies to a much wider group of states that all fit the criteria of ‘emerging middle powers’. Its conceptual value is evidenced by the fact that, despite being published in the internationally unknown journal Politikon: South African Journal of Political Studies, Jordaan’s article has been cited 187 times, and remains the second most viewed and second most cited article published in the journal. This is a clear indication of the broader significance of his theoretical innovation.

Geldenhuys’ conceptual refinement In a similar vein, South African scholar Deon Geldenhuys’ work on what he calls ‘isolated states’ addresses a gap in the existing IR literature by providing us with analytical tools to study states that have been ostracised by the international community. As he notes, the notion of isolated states is a peculiar phenomenon in an increasingly interconnected international system. In his 1990 book, Geldenhuys emphasises why his work on isolated states is not just of importance to an isolated state like South Africa when argues ‘While South Africa may indeed be the world’s foremost ostracised state today, it is not alone in this league. Notwithstanding the many unique features of South Africa’s isolation, it is part of a wide international problem.’25 He distinguishes between pariah or ostracised states, and those that voluntarily withdraw from IR, in other words externally enforced versus self-­imposed isolation. He defines isolation as  either a deliberate policy, voluntarily and unilaterally pursued by a state over a period of time, of restricting its international interactions and thereby withdrawing to a greater or lesser degree from ‘normal’ international relations (self-­isolation or isolationism) or a deliberate policy pursued by two or more states against another, over a period of time, aimed at severing or curtailing the latter’s international interactions against its will (enforced isolation).26 He goes on to develop an analytical framework to measure the extent of a state’s isolation, involving a set of 30 indicators that he groups into four areas of

Reshaping international relations   147 isolation, namely: political-­diplomatic, economic, military and socio-­cultural. He also cautions that not all 30 indicators are of equal importance, and that they should be employed together with various other structural and functional considerations. These include the specific target, means, origins, objectives, time and results of isolation. He then applies his framework in a comparative study focusing on four main case studies, namely China, Israel, Chile and South Africa. The notion of ostracism or isolation of states remains a highly topical issue. Some states who, historically, were the target of ostracism by the Western international society but were subsequently integrated to a certain extent, find themselves in a familiar situation. Geldenhuys notes the examples of Russia in Turkey as historical examples of ostracism which, at the time of publication in 1990, ‘either no longer exists or their current level of isolation is generally well below that of Israel, Taiwan, Chile and South Africa’. Twenty-­seven years later, it seems Russia and Turkey would again make for interesting case studies of isolated states. Geldenhuys notes how Russia has long been the target of ostracist thinking by Europeans, citing the seventeenth century internationalist theories of the duc de Sully and William Penn, which expressed reservations about including Russia in an international organisation.27 Similarly, he notes how throughout history, the Ottoman Empire was regarded as a threat to Europe and various plans were continuously develop to exclude it from European integration efforts. Although his work is largely descriptive, Geldenhuys makes an important contribution with regard to refining the conceptual differentiation between terms like isolation, alienation, obscurity, seclusion and isolationism. More significantly, however, he provides students of IR with an analytical framework by which to measure the international isolation of states. Although Geldenhuys did not comment on this directly, it is clear that the phenomenon of isolation, exclusion, ostracism he studies has direct bearing on recent debates about the marginalisation of the non-­West in the field of IR. In almost all cases, states are isolated as a result of not meeting particular criteria – decided by Western states – that allow for inclusion, acceptance and participation in international society. In 2004, Geldenhuys published another book on states that are regarded as outcasts by the international community. This time, his focus was on ‘deviant states’. In a similar vein to his book on isolated states, his starting point is that the existing terms used in the mainstream literature to refer to these states who ‘behave[d] badly’28 – such as pariah, outcast or rogue – were analytically weak as they did not have ‘a fixed meaning nor any standing in international law’ and therefore failed to offer ‘a structure for studying the full spectrum of offensive behaviour by states and non-­state actors’.29 He then goes on to develop an analytical framework of deviance, drawing on sociological theories of deviance to outline three basic elements of deviant behaviour, namely social codes, rule breakers and rule defenders. As was the case with his isolated states book, he  subjects his framework to rigorous empirical testing. While Geldenhuys’ theoretical work on isolated states and deviant conduct has been cited 148 and

148   Karen Smith 33 times respectively (according to Google Scholar) his seminal book on South African foreign policy, The Diplomacy of Isolation: South African Foreign Policy Making (1984) has been cited 240 times.30 There are numerous possible explanations – one being that the latter was published 6 and 20 years before his other work. It could also be explained by the point made by scholars like Bajpai that in the global distribution of academic labour,31 scholars in the Global South are often relegated to regional experts whose value lies in their capacity to provide empirical data for the application of existing (Western) frameworks. It is also interesting to note that, when one disaggregates the citations for Isolated States, the book is cited mainly by South African scholars or international scholars working on South Africa. Perhaps, had Geldenhuys been an Amer­ican scholar based at a prestigious Amer­ican institution, his work would have had a much greater impact.

The collectivist worldview: an ubuntu alternative to international relations Another scholar who makes a significant theoretical contribution in shedding light on the foreign policy of African states, Thomas Tieku, not only refines existing frameworks or refines concepts, but also incorporates indigenous worldviews into this analysis.32 In an attempt to develop an alternative explanation for the behaviour of African states, Tieku draws on the idea of African societies as collectivist to develop understandings of, among others, the African solidarity norm. The notion of an African solidarity norm, which discourages African leaders from disagreeing with each other in public and from defying continental consensus on issues was referred to by scholars such as Mazrui and Clapham.33 In an effort to explain the motivations for this behaviour, Tieku, a Ghanaian scholar, bases his argument on the notion that the predominantly individualist ontology employed by scholars of IR fails to incorporate practices based on a more collectivist understanding, such as consensual decision-­making.34 He highlights some of the problems with an individualist approach, one of which is that it neglects group identity. This is in contrast to collectivist societies, where group membership and obligations are paramount.35 When these assumptions are transferred to the state, we can only understand the state as an independent, egotistical actor that, he argues, results in a limited understanding of state behaviour. Specifically, he argues that the individualist ontology prevalent in Western IR ‘has undermined our understanding of the international politics of collectivist social entities such as those in Africa’.36 A collectivist understanding of Africa’s IR is manifested in the perspective of ubuntu. It can be regarded as an indigenous worldview, common to Southern African societies, and found in different forms across the rest of the African continent. While the term ubuntu comes from the Nguni language family, variants of it exist in many sub-­Saharan African languages. It is difficult to translate into English, with ‘collective personhood’ being the most direct translation. It refers to the idea that

Reshaping international relations   149 [The individual] owes his existence to other people … He is simply part of the whole … Whatever happens to the individual happens to the whole group, and whatever happens to the whole group happens to the individual […].37 While much has been written about ubuntu, particularly with reference to conflict resolution, peacebuilding and human rights,38 it remains on the fringes of scholarly analysis in IR. Scholars of South Africa’s foreign policy have had to take note of it after the term appeared in the title of the country’s 2011 foreign policy white paper: ‘Building a better world: the diplomacy of ubuntu’.39 As discussed in previous work,40 the concept of ubuntu may help us to understand how both states and non-­state actors in Southern African relate to one another. It is important to point out an important caveat in employing this term as representative of African communities: in light of the apparent disconnect between this concept and much of what is currently occurring on the African continent, it is often dismissed as utopian and not reflective of reality. However, while the principles underlying ubuntu are undoubtedly under tremendous pressure throughout Africa, as a result of urbanisation, conflict, and so forth, this does not invalidate its potential to contribute to our understanding of IR. In applying a collectivist understanding to Africa’s IR, Tieku argues that this has important implications for thinking about concepts like national interest. If the state does not primarily see itself as an independent actor pursuing its own narrow interests, seemingly irrational behaviour by African states can more easily be understood. He describes three features arising from a more collectivist approach, namely consensual decision-­making, group-­think and the Pan-­African solidarity norm.41 Consensus-­based decision-­making is encapsulated in former Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere’s statement, ‘We talk until we agree’.42 In practice, this means that decisions by the African Union’s Peace and Security Council about whether or not to intervene in a conflict on the continent has to be reached through consensus. Tieku regards the latter as ‘a widespread belief among African ruling elites that the proper and ethically acceptable behaviour of Africa’s political elites is to demonstrated a feeling of oneness and support towards other African leaders, at least in public’.43 He highlights the practical implications of continued adherence to this norm, which include that decisions to intervene are made on the basis of consensus, there is a strong preference for soft tools, and that African Union members are not allowed to criticise offending states in public.44 This sheds light on African states’ show of solidarity with Sudanese President al-­Bashir – which involves their refusal to arrest him despite calls by the International Criminal Court (ICC). Attempts by the African Union to engage Muammar Gaddafi in a negotiated solution before the UN decision to authorise North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) airstrikes is another illustration. Former South African President Thabo Mbeki’s handling of the crisis in Zimbabwe also remains a relevant case in point. He consistently deployed so-­called ‘quiet diplomacy’, and – despite significant international pressure to the contrary – remained unwilling to

150   Karen Smith publicly criticise the Mugabe regime’s human rights abuses. While, from a Western, individualist understanding, these public displays of solidarity by African states seem somewhat irrational, if approached from a collectivist worldview, they make much more sense. The preference for negotiated solutions to conflict and refusal to condemn human rights abuses by other African states is very much in line with notions of African collectivism. Tieku contends that understanding this can assist the rest of the international community in responding appropriately to African states. Importantly, however, he also emphasises that the collectivist ideas and practices he outlines are not only found in Africa.45 This is significant, in that what he calls ‘[t]heir omission from the analytical tools of IR’ has not only impoverished our understanding of the behaviour of African states, but of IR in general.46 The incorporation of the concept ubuntu could also potentially offer an alternative explanation for why multilateralism seems to be African states’ preferred strategy. Usually explained on the basis of pragmatic considerations of strength in numbers, it may also be partly due to an inherent adherence to collectivist principles and an acceptance of the inevitable need to cooperate with other, and to find solutions through collective practices. This is evident in traditional conflict resolution practices from Southern Africa, as outlined by Murithi, who argues that incorporating ubuntu into our understanding of human rights places ‘more of an emphasis on the obligations that we have towards the ‘other’ because of our ‘interconnectedness’.47 While his work on the African Union is frequently cited, his chapter on a collectivist worldview (published in 2012) has only been cited six times. This could partly be due to the fact that it was published as a book chapter, but may also tell us something about the interest in such alternative understandings of IR. In addition, besides its potential explanatory value, the concept of ubuntu can also help refocus attention in IR towards important principles such as shared humanity, given that it places emphasis on cooperation, mutual understanding and a greater sense of responsibility towards a collective well-­being.48 This is arguably one of the major shortcomings of the field of IR as it is currently practised: that it has become virtually devoid of all concern with humanity, and that the apparent gulf between what scholars are spending their time researching and challenge faced by the majority of the world’s people are increasingly further removed.

Conclusion This chapter has tried to move beyond the now widely accepted criticism that existing IR theories are inadequate in understanding the full diversity of IR, and fail in particular when trying to explain dynamics in the Global South. In exploring potential theoretical contributions from Africa, it has also tried to avoid being hamstrung by grand ambitions of innovative theorising and a perpetual search for difference. Instead, the contention is that even seemingly minor adaptations of existing concepts or frameworks constitute significant contributions to the development of the field of IR. Despite the obvious value of these

Reshaping international relations   151 contributions, the issue of recognition remains a challenge. Ironically, it is not just gatekeepers in the core that do not recognise adaptations as making significant contributions. Commentators in the Global South, too, disregard adaptation as an inferior practice as it still uses existing knowledge as its foundation, thus legitimising what is regarded by many as illegitimate forms of knowledge imposed on the developing world through colonialism. In addition, drawing on indigenous concepts like ubuntu can help to explain not only the behaviour of African states, but in shifting our focus from an individualist to a collectivist ontology, can illuminate the dynamics at play in global governance more broadly. After all, an important motivation for exploring African and other non-­Western readings of existing IR concepts is to gain new insights that can enrich our understanding of IR in general. Having considered some of the advantages of non-­Western theorising, it is only appropriate to also point out the potential pitfalls. Perhaps the most dangerous is the tendency towards nativism, the assumption that what is, for example, African or Asian or from the Global South, is necessarily superior, different, closer to the truth, or more radical than Western knowledge. Recent calls for decolonising knowledge – while founded on legitimate concerns about what are perceived as continuing reliance on Western or colonial authors and ways of thinking about the world – have in some cases also been accompanied by a call for the rejection of all existing Western knowledge. Such demands are in stark contrast the argument made in this chapter, namely that knowledge creation can and should not be an isolated endeavour but that building on existing knowledge is essential to the broader project. By rejecting these calls, the claim is not that the Western canon does not suffer from severe shortcomings. It also does not imply that much of Western scholarship is not biased, shortsighted and simply illegitimate in its assumptions of universality. We cannot claim this, however, if we do not engage with it, in all its plurality, and draw our own conclusions. This approach is also reflected in renewed calls by some South African students to ‘decolonise’ or ‘Africanise’ the knowledge that they are exposed to at universities. The insistence on Africanist approaches is itself founded on dangerous notions of nativism and exclusivity that assume that African knowledge is necessarily superior, different, or more radical than Western knowledge. These calls for a radical purging of colonial/Western influence are arguably impossible to achieve in practice, given the interconnected nature of knowledge in a globalised world. Bilgin and others have highlighted the ways in which knowledge sharing has always been an interactive process, and the difficulties in determining what is Western, colonial, imported knowledge versus what is truly autochtonous.49 Acknowledging the influence that colonial practices have had in imposing certain forms of knowledge does not mean that we should not also acknowledge the fact that knowledge has never travelled exclusively in a uni-­ directional manner. Knowledge creation and dissemination has occurred through imposition, but also through mutual exchange – whether deliberate or not, in parallel, in contestation, and in mimicry.

152   Karen Smith One of the leading figures of African postcolonialist thinking, Frantz Fanon, was heavily influenced by a diversity of thinkers – most of them Western. This, of course, does not mean that Fanon uncritically internalised these ideas and made them his own. Instead, he used them to develop his own thoughts, adopting, adapting, criticising and discarding them as he saw fit. While entirely novel theoretical innovations from the Global South should of course be encouraged, that should not be the sole focus of those looking beyond the West for new ways to understand IR. Such a narrow focus would run the risk of overlooking much of the important work that is being, and has already been, done. The work of scholars such as those introduced in this chapter clearly constitute and should be recognised as valuable theoretical contributions, and serve to disprove the claim that little innovative theoretical work is being done outside of Europe and North America.

Notes   1 Arlene B. Tickner and Ole Wæver, eds., International Relations Scholarship around the World (London and New York: Routledge, 2009); Arlene Tickner and David Blaney, eds., Thinking International Relations Differently (London: Routledge, 2012).   2 Peter Vale, ‘International Relations in Post-­apartheid South Africa: Some Anniversary Questions’, Politikon 31, no. 2 (1 November 2004): 240, doi:10.1080/025893404 2000280751.   3 Tandeka Nkiwane, ‘Africa and International Relations: Regional Lessons for a Global Discourse’, International Political Science Review 22, no. 3 (2001): 280.   4 See, for example, Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, ‘Why is There No Non-­Western IR Theory? An Introduction’, International Relations of the Asia-­Pacific 7, no. 3 (2007): 287–312; Karen Smith, ‘Obstacles to the Development of IR Theory in the Developing World: The Case of South Africa’, Africa Review 2, no. 1 (2010): 65–80.   5 Raymond Aron, ‘What Is a Theory of International Relations?’ Journal of International Affairs 21, no. 2 (1967): 186.   6 Aron, ‘What Is a Theory’, 186.   7 Siddharth Mallavarapu, ‘Theories of International Relations’, in International Relations: Perspectives for the Global South, ed. Bhupinder Chimni and Siddharth Mallavarapu (New Delhi: Dorling Kindersley, 2012), 5.   8 Linsay Cunningham-­Cross, ‘The Innovation Imperative: Chinese International Relations Research and the Search for a “Chinese School” ’, (unpublished paper, n.d.), 2.   9 Cunningham-­Cross, ‘The Innovation Imperative’, 3. 10 Deon Geldenhuys and the first group of scholars (van der Westhuizen, Nel, Schoeman and Jordaan) are South African, or in the case of Taylor, were based in South Africa, while Thomas Tieku is Ghanaian. The choice of scholars is not deliberately skewed towards South African scholars, but is based on the work of African scholars with whom I am most familiar. I intend to build on this initial attempt at identifying African theoretical contributions by identifying similar work from other parts of Africa. 11 James H. Mittelman, ‘Rethinking Innovation in International Studies: Global Transformation at the Turn of the Millennium’, in Innovation and Transformation in International Studies, ed. Stephen Gill and James H. Mittelman (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 249. 12 Stephen Gill, ‘Transformation and Innovation in the Study of World Order’, in Innovation and Transformation in International Studies, ed. Stephen Gill and James H. Mittelman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 9.

Reshaping international relations   153 13 Pinar Bilgin, ‘Thinking Past “Western” IR?’ Third World Quarterly 29, no. 1 (2008): 6, doi:10.1080/01436590701726392. 14 Karen Smith, ‘Has Africa Got Anything to Say? African Contributions to the Theoretical Development of International Relations’, The Round Table 98, no. 402 (2009): 269–84. 15 Mohamed Ayoob, ‘Subaltern Realism: International Relations Theory Meets the Third World’, in International Relations Theory and the Third World, ed. Stephanie G. Neuman (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998), 31–54. 16 Janis van der Westhuizen, ‘South Africa’s Emergence as a Middle Power’, Third World Quarterly 19, no. 3 (1998): 435–55; Philip Nel, Ian Taylor and Janis van der Westhuizen, ‘Multilateralism in South Africa’s Foreign Policy: The Search for a Critical Rationale’, Global Governance 6, no. 1 (2000): 43–60; Maxi Schoeman, ‘South Africa as an Emerging Middle Power’, African Security Review 9, no. 3 (2000): 47–58; Eduard Jordaan, ‘The Concept of a Middle Power in International Relations: Distinguishing Between Emerging and Traditional Middle Powers’, Politikon 30, no. 1 (2003): 165–81. 17 See, for example, Garth Le Pere, ‘South Africa – an ‘Emerging Power’?’ Global Dialogue 3, no. 1 (1998): 1–2. 18 Hussein Solomon, ‘South African Foreign Policy and Middle Power Leadership’, in Fairy Godmother, Hegemon or Partner? In Search of a South African Foreign Policy, ed. Hussein Solomon (Halfway House: Institute for Security Studies Monograph Series, 1997). 19 van der Westhuizen, ‘South Africa’s Emergence’; Schoeman, ‘South Africa’. 20 Nel, Taylor and van der Westhuizen, ‘Multilateralism in South Africa’s Foreign Policy’, 46. (emphasis in original). 21 Jordaan, ‘The Concept of a Middle Power’, 168; Cooper, Andrew, ed. Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers after the Cold War (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997). 22 Eduard Jordaan, phone interview by the author, 15 March 2017. 23 Jordaan, ‘The Concept of a Middle Power’, 178. 24 Jordaan, ‘The Concept of a Middle Power’, 176. 25 Deon Geldenhuys, Isolated States: A Comparative Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 2. 26 Geldenhuys, Isolated States, 6 (emphasis in original). 27 Geldenhuys, Isolated States, 29. 28 Deon Geldenhuys, Deviant Conduct in World Politics (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 11. 29 Geldenhuys, Deviant Conduct, 12. 30 Deon Geldenhuys, The Diplomacy of Isolation: South African Foreign Policy Making (Johannesburg: Macmillan South Africa, 1984). 31 Kanti Bajpai, ‘Obstacles to Good Work in Indian International Relations’, International Studies 46, no. 1–2 (2009): 109–28. 32 Thomas Kwasi Tieku, ‘Collectivist Worldview: Its Challenge to International Relations’, in Africa and International Relations in the Twenty-­First Century, ed. Fantu Cheru, Timothy Shaw and Scarlett Cornelissen (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 36–50. 33 Ali A. Mazrui, ‘On the Concept of “We are all Africans” ’, Amer­ican Political Science Review 57, no. 1 (1963): 88–97; Ali Mazrui, Towards a Pax Africana: A Study of Ideology and Ambition (London: Wakefield & Nicolson, 1967); Christopher Clapham, Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 34 Tieku, ‘Collectivist Worldview’, 37. 35 Tieku, ‘Collectivist Worldview’, 41. 36 Tieku, ‘Collectivist Worldview’, 41. 37 Mbiti, 108–9, quoted in Rob Gaylard, ‘ “Welcome to the World of Our Humanity”: (African) Humanism, ubuntu and Black South African Writing’, Journal of Literary Studies 20, no. 3–4 (2004): 268–9.

154   Karen Smith 38 See, for example, Tim Murithi, ‘A Local Response to the Global Human Rights Standard: The ‘Ubuntu’ Perspective on Human Dignity’, Globalization, Societies and Education 5, no. 3 (2007): 277–86. 39 While the term appears in the title of the foreign policy document, nowhere in the text is a definition provided of what exactly is meant by it. 40 Karen Smith, ‘Contrived Boundaries, Kinship and Ubuntu: A (South) African View of the “International” ’, in Thinking International Relations Differently, ed. Arlene Tickner and David Blaney (London: Routledge, 2012), 301–21. 41 The notion of the Pan-­African solidarity norms builds on work by Clapham (1996) and Mazrui (1963, 1967). 42 Quoted in Heinz Kimmerle, ‘Ubuntu and Communalism in African Philosophy and Art’, Rozenberg Quarterly, September 2011, accessed 10 August 2016, http://rozen bergquarterly.com/ubuntu-­and-communalism-­in-african-­philosophy-and-­art/, 3. 43 Thomas Kwasi Tieku, ‘Solidarity Intervention: Emerging Trends in AU’s Interventions in African Crisis’ (speaking notes for the workshop on Africa International: Agency and Interdependency in a Changing World, Chatham House, London, UK, 9 October 2009), 3. 44 Tieku, ‘Solidarity Intervention’, 4. 45 Tieku, ‘Collectivist Worldview’, 49. 46 Tieku, ‘Collectivist Worldview’, 49. 47 Murithi, ‘A Local Response’, 284. 48 Dalene M. Swanson, ‘Ubuntu: An African Contribution to (Re)search for/with a “Humble Togetherness” ’, Journal of Contemporary Issues in Education 2, no. 2 (2007): 65. 49 Bilgin, ‘Thinking Past “Western” IR?’

Bibliography Acharya, Amitav and Barry Buzan. ‘Why is There No Non-­Western IR Theory? An Introduction’. International Relations of the Asia-­Pacific 7, no. 3 (2007): 287–312. Aron, Raymond. ‘What is a Theory of International Relations?’ Journal of International Affairs 21, no. 2 (1967): 185–206. Ayoob, Mohamed. ‘Subaltern Realism: International Relations Theory Meets the Third World’. In International Relations Theory and the Third World, edited by Stephanie G. Neuman, 31–54. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998. Bajpai, Kanti. ‘Obstacles to Good Work in Indian International Relations’. International Studies 46, no. 1–2 (2009): 109–28. Bilgin, Pinar. ‘Thinking Past “Western” IR?’ Third World Quarterly 29, no. 1 (2008): 5–23. doi:10.1080/01436590701726392. Clapham, Christopher. Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Cooper, Andrew, ed. Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers after the Cold War. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997. Cunningham-­Cross, Linsay. ‘The Innovation Imperative: Chinese International Relations Research and the Search for a “Chinese School” ’. Unpublished paper, n.d. Gaylard, Rob. ‘ “Welcome to the World of Our Humanity”: (African) Humanism, ubuntu and Black South African Writing’. Journal of Literary Studies 20, no. 3–4 (2004): 268–82. Geldenhuys, Deon. The Diplomacy of Isolation: South African Foreign Policy Making. Johannesburg: Macmillan South Africa, 1984. Geldenhuys, Deon. Isolated States: A Comparative Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

Reshaping international relations   155 Geldenhuys, Deon. Deviant Conduct in World Politics. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. Gill, Stephen. ‘Transformation and Innovation in the Study of World Order’. In Innovation and Transformation in International Studies, edited by Stephen Gill and James H. Mittelman, 5–24. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Jordaan, Eduard. ‘The Concept of a Middle Power in International Relations: Distinguishing Between Emerging and Traditional Middle Powers’. Politikon 30, no. 1 (2003): 165–81. Kimmerle, Heinz. ‘Ubuntu and Communalism in African Philosophy and Art’. Rozenberg Quarterly, September 2011. Accessed 10 August 2016. http://rozenbergquarterly.com/ ubuntu-­and-communalism-­in-african-­philosophy-and-­art/. Le Pere, Garth. ‘South Africa – an “Emerging Power”?’ Global Dialogue 3, no. 1 (1998): 1–2. Mazrui, Ali. ‘On the Concept of “We are all Africans” ’. Amer­ican Political Science Review 57, no. 1 (1963): 88–97. Mazrui, Ali. Towards a Pax Africana: A Study of Ideology and Ambition. London: Wakefield & Nicolson, 1967. Mallavarapu, Siddharth. ‘Theories of International Relations’. In International Relations: Perspectives for the Global South, edited by Bhupinder Chimni and Siddharth Mallavarapu. New Delhi: Dorling Kindersley, 2012. Mittelman, James H. ‘Rethinking Innovation in International Studies: Global Transformation at the Turn of the Millennium’. In Innovation and Transformation in International Studies, edited by Stephen Gill and James H. Mittelman, 248–63. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Murithi, Tim. ‘A Local Response to the Global Human Rights Standard: The ‘Ubuntu’ Perspective on Human Dignity’. Globalization, Societies and Education 5, no. 3 (2007): 277–86. Nel, Philip, Ian Taylor and Janis van der Westhuizen. ‘Multilateralism in South Africa’s Foreign Policy: The Search for a Critical Rationale’. Global Governance 6, no. 1 (2000): 43–60. Neuman, Stephanie, ed. International Relations Theory and the Third World. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998. Nkiwane, Tandeka. ‘Africa and International Relations: Regional Lessons for a Global Discourse’. International Political Science Review 22, no. 3 (2001): 279–90. Schoeman, Maxi. ‘South Africa as an Emerging Middle Power’. African Security Review 9, no. 3 (2000): 47–58. Smith, Karen. ‘Has Africa Got Anything to Say? African Contributions to the Theoretical Development of International Relations’. The Round Table 98, no. 402 (2009): 269–84. Smith, Karen. ‘Obstacles to the Development of IR Theory in the Developing World: The Case of South Africa’. Africa Review 2, no. 1 (2010): 65–80. Smith, Karen. ‘Contrived Boundaries, Kinship and Ubuntu: A (South) African View of the “International” ’. In Thinking International Relations Differently. edited by A. Tickner and D. Blaney, 301–21. London: Routledge, 2012. Solomon, Hussein. ‘South African Foreign Policy and Middle Power Leadership’. In Fairy Godmother, Hegemon or Partner? In Search of a South African Foreign Policy, edited by Hussein Solomon. Halfway House: Institute for Security Studies Monograph Series, 1997. South African Government. ‘White Paper on South African Foreign Policy-­Building a Better World: The Diplomacy of Ubuntu’. Accessed September 1, 2016. www.gov.za/

156   Karen Smith documents/white-­paper-south-­african-foreign-­policy-building-­better-world-­diplomacyubuntu. Swanson, Dalene M. ‘Ubuntu: An African Contribution to (Re)search for/with a “Humble Togetherness” ’. Journal of Contemporary Issues in Education 2, no. 2 (2007): 53–67. Tickner, Arlene and David Blaney, eds. Thinking International Relations Differently. London: Routledge, 2012. Tickner, Arlene and Ole Wæver, eds. International Relations Scholarship around the World. London and New York: Routledge, 2009. Tieku, Thomas Kwasi. ‘Solidarity Intervention: Emerging Trends in AU’s Interventions in African Crisis’. Speaking notes for the workshop on Africa International: Agency and Interdependency in a Changing World, Chatham House, London, UK, 9 October 2009. Tieku, Thomas Kwasi. ‘Collectivist Worldview: Its Challenge to International Relations’. In Africa and International Relations in the Twenty-­First Century, edited by Fantu Cheru, Timothy Shaw and Scarlett Cornelissen, 36–50. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. Vale, Peter. ‘International Relations in Post-­apartheid South Africa: Some Anniversary Questions’. Politikon 31, no. 2 (1 November 2004): 239–49. doi:10.1080/02589340420 00280751. van der Westhuizen, Janis. ‘South Africa’s Emergence as a Middle Power’. Third World Quarterly 19, no. 3 (1998): 435–55.

Part III

Innovative encounters

9 Unpacking the “post-­Soviet” Political legacy of the Tartu semiotic school Andrey Makarychev and Alexandra Yatsyk

Introduction The discipline of cultural semiotics is peripheral for International Relations (IR) theorizing. Yet it is this peripherality that might bring up new insights in analysis of foreign policies of individual countries and world politics in general, since many political categories (power, borders, security, and even politics itself ) can be immensely enriched by meanings derived from a plethora of disciplines that were not in the limelight for IR and its major schools. This is particularly true for the Tartu school of cultural semiotics that was born in the Soviet Estonia, a borderland country that even under the Soviet occupation became a home to world-­class research in this field of social sciences. Semiosphere as a space of multiple meaning-­makings is a central concept to this school. Importantly, the cultural semiotic scholarship has grown up at the crossroads of Russia and Europe, which explains its sensitivity to issues of boundaries, communication, identity, inclusion/exclusion, and inside/outside dynamics. This vocabulary remains topical for today’s Estonia that in many respects might be regarded as a frontline country – not only according to Huntingtonian lines of civilizational distinction, but also in the framework of a new Cold War between Russia and the West. The Tartu school might be treated as a source of semiotic knowledge and simultaneously a semiotic object itself. It was conceived and matured since the 1950s in Estonia, the most liberal of all Soviet republics. The concepts and ideas developed by the Tartu school are Europe-­compatible and even Europe-­centric, to which attests a remarkable absence of conceptualizations of the Orient by Yurii Lotman, the founding father of the school, along with other seminal thinkers. In fact, Lotman saw Europe as Russia’s key identity maker, thus offering a reverse version of Iver Neumann’s vision of Russia – along with Turkey – playing a constitutive role for Europe’s identity building in a long historical run. However, cultural gravitation to – and suture in – Europe is paralleled in Lotman’s works with well-­pronounced critical attitudes to – and cultural distance from – Europe. This might be explained by the fact that the Tartu school promoters and protagonists stayed in a relative – and sometimes voluntary – isolation from European schools of semiotic analysis, including its French tradition that

160   Andrey Makarychev and Alexandra Yatsyk has significantly enriched IR theorizing through approaching texts as domains of resistance to power, rather than accommodation with it. In this chapter we dwell upon a number of core points. We start with a general discussion on how the homegrown school of cultural semiotics associated with the University of Tartu can be used as a tool offering certain optics for IR studies. In this respect we place cultural semiotic knowledge in a multidisciplinary perspective and look for projections of its concepts into the vocabulary of foreign policy. Then we intend to discuss the Tartu school from a political perspective, thus claiming that its premium put on cultural issues renders strong politicizing effects. Ultimately, we use cultural semiotic notions and approaches for problematizing the concept of the post-­Soviet with its conflictual split between reproducing archaic policies and discourses, on the one hand, and playing by the rules of the post-­modern society, with entertainment, hybridity, and the spirit of deconstruction as its pivots.

The Tartu school: a brief guide for political analysis The Tartu tradition of cultural semiotics belongs to what two Estonian scholars dub “Estonian theory as a local episteme – a territorialized web of epistemological associations and rules for making sense of the world” based on academic resources of the University of Tartu.1 The Tartu school theorizing is grounded in the idea of semiosphere that is understood as a cultural space where essential meanings are produced, formulated, articulated, and communicated. Semiotic studies are interested in finding out who defines relations of inclusion in and exclusion from the semiosphere and how, how its boundaries are socially constructed and shaped, and what exactly they delineate? Can cultural borderlands generate their own identities? For Lotman, centers are self-­regulated and relatively well-­organized entities, and tend to impose their semiotic cores (systems of meanings and norms) to the periphery that often treats these impositions as alien and inappropriate. Boundaries as symbolic and communicative constructs translate foreign cultural narratives into local ones, and thus can be viewed as “membranes” that transform/ reprocess the outside into the inside, filter out external cultural impacts, and domesticate them. It is due to the existence of cultural boundaries that external spaces get semiotically structured through constructing the outside and ascribing to outsiders certain characteristics that can often be mythical, since what lies on the opposite side of the boundary can easily be culturally marked as “chaotic,” “unfriendly,” or even “infernal.” Cultural othering (the articulation of self-­other distinctions) is thus a central element of cultural semiotics. It is through cultural boundaries that we construct the outer spaces and ascribe to outsiders certain characteristics. Borderlands therefore define the discursively constructed distinctions between “the secure” and “the insecure,” “the ordered” and “the disordered,” “the allowed,” and “the disallowed,” which leads to the self-­reproduction of a binary type of thinking. Ultimately, the binary structure of discourse leads to “explosion” – a dramatic

Unpacking the “post-Soviet”   161 “collision of misunderstandings” grounded in a conflictual encounter of mutually incompatible and irreconcilable logics. Many of these semiotic arguments are highly relevant for IR studies. In particular, it would be fully consistent with Lotman’s theorizing to argue that Russia and Europe, two political communities-­in-the-­making, discursively construct each other’s role identities, and are in the process of a painful of bargaining over their boundaries and adjusting to policies of each other. The binary logic often prevails in this process: in spite of all attempts to get rid of the Cold War legacy, the structure of EU–Russia communication reproduces and reinforces the logic of binary oppositions. Besides, this process of mutual/reciprocal construction leaves both Russia and Europe undetermined as to properly defining their (common) neighborhood(s), of which Ukraine seems to be the most dramatic example.

Cultural semiotic school as a homegrown theory There might be different approaches to tackle homegrown theories and engage with them in theorizing IR. In this section we discuss how the Tartu school is relevant to improving the extant IR theoretical platforms such as constructivism and post-­structuralism. The cultural semiotic reading of IR inspired by the Tartu school raises a couple of particular issues that we would like to touch upon in this section, namely related to the multidisciplinary potential of the school and a problem of translating its key terms into other conceptual languages. From the Tartu school to social constructivism and post-­structuralism Multidisciplinarity: The indispensability of interdisciplinary analysis for IR can be well illustrated by tracing intellectual trajectories of basic political concepts, such as power, security, borders, etc. At a certain point of maturation all of them have became open to various readings that infused into these concepts cultural, sociological, anthropological, and other interpretations and vistas. Due to this interdisciplinary cross-­fertilization many traditional concepts were deployed in denser cultural and discursive contexts. Thus, the idea of security became problematized from the viewpoint of discursive practices of securitization and desecuritization, politics is discussed in terms of the interconnected processes of politicization and depoliticization, boundaries, and frontiers are viewed through the prism of bordering and debordering as social and cultural phenomena, etc. Today’s academic discourse in many IR domains is replete with interdisciplinary language – security cultures, biopower, identity, otherness, and so forth. We may start integrating the cultural semiotics into various IR theories and schools while finding some similarities between them. There are indeed many overlapping approaches and interpretations that form a vast area for cross-­ theoretical discussions. Semiotics in many respects is close to social constructivism with its self-­other dynamics and emphasis on collective identity making. The constructivist social

162   Andrey Makarychev and Alexandra Yatsyk ontology claims that ideational structures trump material ones. Therefore, analysis of actors’ policies should start not with the allegedly pre-­existing interests (as realists would do), but with social roles chosen by actors within a certain cultural milieu. “It is through communication – usually discursive, but also ritual and symbolic – that ideational structures condition actors’ identities and interests,”2 both constructivists and semioticians would consent. They would also agree that norms are a structural phenomenon, or “a means to maintain social order.”3 In other words, norms are not simply instruments that states utilize at their liking; they foster changes in behavior, identities, and then interests of international actors. Thus, in constructivist reasoning, structures have prior causal power over agents.4 Semioticians would definitely second this claim, explaining that it is deep mechanisms of culture that in each society are foundational for its semiosphere and thus play a systemic role in its maturing. The structural approach espoused by constructivism implies that social reality represents a network of invisible connections that compose a variety of social fields. Alexander Wendt has cogently captured this point by arguing that structures not only constrain but, more importantly, construct agents. What should be added to this point is the characterization of structures as “containers” of hegemonic relations. As Jonathan Joseph rightly presumed,  hegemony acts as a crucial mediating moment in the relation between structure and agency … [Hegemony thus] reaches down to the structural issue of the reproduction of the social formation and the various structural ensembles … Hegemony comes to represent the political moment in the structure-­ agency relation.5 In the meantime, some elements of cultural semiotics might be compatible with the post-­structuralist theorizing. Cultural semioticians might find a particularly rich common language with the school of critical discourse analysis when it comes to language games, imitation, mimicking, and other discursive strategies widely applied by international actors in communicating with each other. By the same token, cultural semiotic input might be quite substantial for studies of regionalism and, in particular, for the conception of boundaries as generators of important social, cultural, and political dynamics. Yurii Lotman is known for his keen interest in semiotic analysis of boundaries in many cultural contexts. Post-­positivists regionalist scholars would argue “borders are moving apart – as exemplified by the history of Europe over the centuries.”6 Therefore, political and legal borders of nation-­states coincide less and less with the complex patterns of social life, they believe. More specifically, a meeting point of semioticians and regional scholars could be a discussion on typology of boundaries that might include: • •

Borders as geographical lines/zones that separate two territorial entities. Frontiers requiring a certain policy toward something what lies beyond them.7

Unpacking the “post-Soviet”   163 •

•

Edges and peripheries, synonymous with underdevelopment, instability, and exposure to external dangers. Political and cultural geographers describe peripheries as remote outskirts, or outlying – and usually fragmented – territories with obliterated features, and areas heavily dependent upon policies of pivotal powers. Margins that are not only products of core powers, but exist in two-­way relations with these powers.8 Margins usually have room to maneuver and a meaningful degree of freedom in exploiting the advantages of their location. Politically, margins might be reluctant to accept that the core speaks for them; moreover, they may define the nature of the core itself. Culturally, regional identities are believed to be dependent upon interrelations between central and marginal entities.

According to post-­structuralist regional scholars, state boundaries cannot bind or limit these new types of activities (in political, ecological, economic, religious, cultural, ethnic, or professional domains). The world is thus undergoing a transition from territorial communities (including nation-­states) to “networks” that are independent of specifically defined territorial foundations and national identities. Networks blur distinctions between “insiders” and “outsiders,” as described by the concept of “open geography” (as opposed to the idea of “inescapable geography”).9 Open geography posits that “geographical cardinal points are relative,”10 and that there are no strict dividing lines between regions that are understood as mobile social and cultural constructs that might “encounter,” “clash,” “inject their own stories,” etc.11 This seems to be very much in line with Yurii Lotman’s and Vladimir Toropov’s12 approaches to St. Petersburg as a particular type of text that is constitutive for Russian historical and cultural narratives. The “Petersburg text” is structurally close to what is currently known as “popular geopolitics” – a type of vernacular knowledge about geographical interpretations of political issues based on people’s narratives, myth, performances, spectacles, rumors, and even anecdotes. The “Petersburg text,” as seen from the cultural semiotic perspective, is composed of a multitude of literary representations of this city that belongs to the cultural spaces of Russia and Europe simultaneously, is included in and excluded from Europe, and within Russia balances between two reputations – as representing Russian identity and as being culturally exceptional, if not alien to Russian cultural mainstream. This is an important point that can be extended further on by arguing that there can be no single mode of spatial representation or articulation of spaces, and all spatial arrangements can be opposed by alternatives.13 Geography cannot lock up regions in a “steel cage,” and geographical affiliations are subject to re-­ writing and reinterpretation.14 Therefore, both cultural semiotics and post-­ structuralism offer a decentralized, network-­oriented model of the world, which leaves space open for creativity, inspiration, and the force of imagination, which is harmonious with approaches developed by cultural semiotics. There might also be a strong semiotic contribution to security studies, especially when it comes to the concept of securitization. Neither Lotman nor his

164   Andrey Makarychev and Alexandra Yatsyk disciples directly touched upon issues of risks, threats, and dangers, yet the contemporary debates on ontological (in)security, as related to the vulnerabilities of collective identities, appear open to semiotic inputs. It is semiotic approach that can be helpful for elucidating a number of important aspects of the debate in this academic domain. First, the debate on the discursive nature of security construction initiated by the Copenhagen school has been extended to the sphere of imageries and visuals. This trajectory fully corresponds to the evolution of the Tartu school that initially was exclusively text- and language-­centric, yet ultimately matured into a more comprehensive field of studies to incorporate films, fashion, music, and performative arts. Second, a semiotic gaze might be productive for identifying voices of (in) security beyond the group of power holders. Opening up the sphere of politics to a variety of cultural phenomena, semioticians can be instrumental in explaining the roles of cultural actors (managers, producers, performers, authors, artists, etc.) in shaping the public agenda that defines perceptions of security. Third, the centrality of communication for semiotic relations might lead the contemporary followers of the Tartu school to a conceptually important rejection of taking the audience of security discourses as a pre-­established and well-­ structured social group. In its stead, Lotman’s legacy might be interpreted in the sense that it is through the process of verbal interaction between “producers” and “consumers” of security narratives that both groups discursively construct their identities and subjectivities.15 However, given the linguistic (speech act-­based) nature of the process of securitization, security-­making can presumably be a self­referential practice, as opposed to an inter-­subjective one.16 In other words, when it comes to existential security and survival, the space for dialogic communication tends to shrink, and the dominant discourse is usually bent on self-­assertion and, as semioticians would say, auto-­communication, rather than on dialogue. Fourth, there are some meaningful parallels between conceptualizing boundaries of the security sphere and boundaries of the semiosphere. Some security experts raised an important question of whether “security can mean everything,”17 and tend to answer it affirmatively, implying that each element of social and physical reality can be securitized, from water supply to language. A similar discussion takes place within the community of cultural semioticians as well: many of them claim that the semiosphere can embrace everything; yet in the meantime certain elements of material and ideational reality can be deprived of semiotic characteristics and thus relegated to the a-­semiotic domain. The question is thus what exists beyond the semiosphere, and what segments of reality can be discursively excluded, discarded, ignored, rejected, denied, or bracketed out as allegedly semiotically irrelevant and even non-­existent, only because they disturb the seeming cohesiveness of the dominant discourse? Is there something for which we don’t have a language of conceptualization, and which therefore stays beyond representation? In particular, cultural semiotics and security studies can find a common language in exploring perceptions and remembrances of traumatic experiences (wars,

Unpacking the “post-Soviet”   165 ethnic cleansings, cases of genocide, etc.) as an important element of the discursive making of security. Translation: We may continue incorporating cultural semiotics into the terrain of international studies with an operation known from Lotman’s works as translation, or projecting the established semiotic concepts into the languages pertinent to other disciplines, such as IR. One example would be the projection of the concepts of the sign and the image onto the domain of soft power, which opens interesting research perspectives. In fact, soft power is a deeply semiotic concept, since it can’t be operational beyond the semiosphere as the space where meanings are produced and communicated. The focus on the semiotic core of soft power allows seeing that  words alone often cannot carry the power that they often have – the force of affect is needed to explain how words resonate with audiences and have political effects beyond their mere verbal utterance … There is no “natural” link between words and the objects, identities, and so on that they purport to express … The attachment of signifiers to signified … is dependent upon an affective push prompting the construction of this linkage.18  This approach is of particular importance for soft power studies since it allows treating attraction as a largely performative and cultural construct that exists only under the condition of symbolic and emotional investment in it. Another example is the reconceptualization of a rather traditional notion of cultural interdependence (for example, between Russia and Europe) into the post-­structuralist idea of the suture that denotes the phenomenon of impossibility to break away from someone/something that you might wish to distance from. The suture is an intricate metaphor that describes the complexities of the inside – outside interrelations and dynamics. To quote Slavoj Zizek, the suture means “self-­enclosure is a priory impossible, that the excluded externality always leaves its traces within.”19 The suture denotes “a mode in which the exterior is inscribed in the interior” to the point of erasing substantial differences and forming “a consistent, naturalised, organic whole.” However, the suturing of external reality is always incomplete, and “external difference is always an internal one,”20 which demonstrates an inherent impossibility for the sutured political subject “to fully become itself.”21 This is exactly what can be used for comprehending a key controversy of the various region-­making projects aimed at creating a coherent and prosperous regional society, distinct from the insecure outside; yet it is the irreducible and inassimilable otherness that leaves “the decentred traces” inside the regional societies-­in-the-­making. In particular, Lotman’s analysis of the precarious status of Russia as a European actor and its Other that needs to be domesticated nicely reflects the duality of the suturing process.

166   Andrey Makarychev and Alexandra Yatsyk Political dimensions of cultural semiotics Our next step would be to discover the wider political utility of approaching IR from a cultural semiotic perspective. The question to be discussed is how the Tartu Schools can offer more novel approaches to IR studies. Hereby the concept of the sign – as consisted of the signifier and the signified – seem to be crucial. It is the arbitrary linkage between the two elements that creates the space for political interventions, impositions, and manipulations. In other words, without investments in producing and interpreting signs, that is to say relating signifiers with signifieds, politics can’t properly function. In the meantime, the discipline of cultural semiotics offers good academic lens for exploring the process of re-­signification, or redeployment of terms in previously unexplored or even “unauthorized” contexts. Re-­signification is mostly used by agents located at the margins of political structures who wish to change previous meanings by either expanding the scope of concepts or by including other meanings into them.22 Re-­signification is closely related to language games. Following the logic of Wittgenstein, language has neither ontological stability nor unity; consequently, there is no authoritative, determinate collective “we” that would appeal to a mental or metaphysical source of identity or authority, or unveil “literal, uninterpreted truth.”23 The language games approach claims that, under a closer scrutiny, each concept decomposes into a series of “pictures” of reality with their “playful and fluid”24 contexts. We shall come back to this while discussing the post-­modernist reading of the post-­Soviet Russia. One should also pay attention to cultural semiotics as a helpful tool in discovering different languages of (international) politics. For example, instead of binary distinction between democracy and autocracy, the discipline of cultural semiotics prefers to speak about different types of discourses, with a key distinction between dialogue (inter-­subjective communication) and auto-­ communication (or self-­referential communication), requiring no external other for legitimizing its speaking positions. In this sense the semiotic approach can be instrumental in avoiding absolutization and universalization of inter-­subjectivity as one of pillars of constructivist theorizing; from a semiotic perspective inter-­subjective construction of each other’s identities might be challenged or reversed by more unilateral and even unidimensional discourses grounded in the radiation of meanings from one center to multiple peripheries. Very close to that we may find the semiotic concept of autopoiesis.  If the human mind is an autopoietic system, i.e., one that permanently constructs its own world, then representation can only be self-­referential in nature. Self-­reference has, furthermore, been declared to be a characteristic feature of postmodern culture. If postmodernity is confronted with a loss of the referent of the signs … the remains of these signs thus deprived of their function of representation can only become self-­referential.25

Unpacking the “post-Soviet”   167 The most important political conclusion from the semiotic approach to culture is that value-­based discourses increase the chances for auto-­communication, both in democracies and non-­democracies. Semiospheres can be playgrounds for totalizing practices, which explains the dangers of self-­description and self-­ referentiality: the semiosphere can become “a self-­identical homogenous structural whole” with “a consequent effacement of internal differences and multiplicity”26 through discursive practices of totalization, internalization, centring and structural unity that are manifested in a universalized language with a “single finite truth” that “occupies the core of the semiotic space” and “functions as the basis of what Lotman defines as the transcendental unity of self-­ consciousness.”27 It is exactly at this point that  a central codifying mechanism appears as a kind of generator of transcendental signifiers which are imposed as universal expression forms into the different contents circulating within the semiotic space, and which transforms the latter into an ordered and hierarchical totality.28 From a policy perspective, it is exactly this semiotic frame that might be used for understanding the unexpected upsurge of far-­right, conservative, nationalist, nostalgic, and global-­sceptical discourses all across the West, especially against the backdrop of the refugee crisis. These discourses that struggle for hegemony, not only within specific countries (France, Germany, Austria, Poland, etc.) but also within the West, can be qualified as self-­referential, auto-­communicative, and autopoietic in the sense that its bearers do not seek recognition or legitimation through constructively and interactively engaging with alternative or opposing discourses; rather they stabilize themselves through grounding in the idea of self-­sufficiency of national forms of identification and reinterpretation of traditional Western concepts of democracy and freedom.

A cultural semiotic perspective on the post-­Soviet space The theoretical observations given above might be used for purposes of political analysis in the sphere of post-­Soviet studies, with Russia as the key player in this respect. In this section we focus on a range of possible interpretations of the post-­Soviet space from a cultural semiotic perspective, which might be enriching for understanding the logic of turbulent transition in this part of the world. In the extant literature much has been said about archaic and retrospective – if not retrograde – nature of many of post-­Soviet regimes. This is particularly the case of Russia whose post-­Soviet identity is largely rooted in practices vectored to the bygone past – great power management (otherwise known as a concert of great powers), spheres of influence, balance of power, etc. There are many voices in Russian academic community describing Russia as an archaic type of society that challenged rationality in decision-­making and accumulates potential for coercion and violence.29 The rehabilitation of the Soviet model plays a ­particularly salient role in the archaic shift. What has started as basically a

168   Andrey Makarychev and Alexandra Yatsyk c­ ommodification and commercialization of nostalgia30 in a matter of years became a powerful source of politicization. According to Sergey Naryshkin, the head of the External Intelligence Service, Russia should not apologize for its history whatsoever.31 Elements of the Soviet semiotics gradually came back,32 including, for instance, the restoration of Leonid Brezhnev’s commemorative plaque in Moscow.33 The Minister of Culture claimed that the society should praise the Soviet heroes as the Church venerates its saints;34 in its turn the head of the Russian Orthodox Church declared that one should not belittle achievements of Stalin.35 This nostalgic trend definitely stretches far beyond Russia. The case in point is not only Russia’s increasingly obvious penchant for recycling Soviet practices; what is more, intellectual departures and recipes from the Cold War times (from the Kennan “long telegram” to Henry Kissinger’s advices to today’s Russian leaders) still keep their vitality and validity as explanatory tools applicable to a new reality of Russia’s confrontation with the West that obviously challenges ideas of globalization, trans-­nationalization, and de-­territorialization constituted at the core of the post-­Cold War international normative order. It is not only that the Cold War mentality is easily revivable under this semiotic frame, but also the legacy of the Second World War can be recycled, as illustrated by the projection of the anti-­fascist discourse of the time of the Great Patriotic War onto the situation in today’s Ukraine. These domestic trends have their foreign policy implications, since they can explain why Russian political establishment seriously considers “to play the same game as before [with the West], but to play it smarter.”36 The semiotic dimension is crucial for duly comprehending this dominant tendency of building today’s Russian foreign policy on the highly symbolized and glorified triumphalist models excavated from the collective memory. It would be fair to assume that with the generation of wartime veterans almost completely passed away, the pro-­Stalinist sentiments of certain social groups are based on the desire to identify themselves with a demonstration of force as such.37 The repetitive emotional rereading of the Great Patriotic War and the emotional projection of its meanings to contemporaneity are key elements of Russian security discourses under Putin’s presidency, especially in the aftermath of the annexation of Crimea.38 The fight against fascism during the Second World War became a major reference point not only in the Russian mainstream discourse justifying the land grab by protecting ethnically Russian people from the so called “Kyiv’s junta,” but also in Russian performative propaganda that is an interesting object of semiotic research. One of the most illustrative examples is a bike show staged by the explicitly pro-­Kremlin group “Night Wolves” near Sebastopol after the annexation: its plot visually represents the Maidan revolution as a neo-­Nazi coup masterminded by the West and aimed against both Ukraine and Russia, which justifies Russia’s interference paralleled with the Soviet mission in the 1941–45 war with fascism.39 From a semiotic viewpoint, the recycling of Soviet experiences might be seen as a major boost for a binary type of thinking, particularly salient in times of

Unpacking the “post-Soviet”   169 security crises, which leaves at the limelight of discourse “only overt contrasts, only direct meanings, no metaphors.”40 This semiotic reading leaves much space for drawing some – perhaps unexpected – parallels between Lotman and Carl Schmitt. Lotman’s interpretation of the deep structures of Russian culture as grounded in polarizing binaries is coterminous with Schmitt’s understanding of the structure of the political as firmly engrained in the friend–foe dichotomy.41 Andreas Schonle and Jeremy Shine42 rightly claim that binary oppositions can be helpful for solidifying the hegemonic discourses and preventing them from fragmentation and dissipation, and it is exactly this political function that seems to be dominant in the case of Russian foreign policy’s resemblance – if not continuity – with Soviet practices and experiences. Yet there is a different – and much less studied – dimension of the Putin regime, namely its ability to engage with more complex foreign policy models. To a large extent, Putin’s hegemonic discourse displayed a great deal of agility in deeply engaging with the manipulative potential of discourses and imageries grounded in the cultural industry producing signs and symbols, as exemplified by speech acts and images used for both consolidating the regime from inside and conveying a set of essential messages for external audiences. It might thus be argued that one of the explanations of Putin’s regime is its appropriation of meaningful semiotic resources that it deploys in discursive contexts that delegitimize the kernel of the Western normative order. It is in this sense that this strategy can be considered as part of post-­modernist paradigm that celebrates “the liberation of signs from dependency on well-­defined signifieds … [and] from the strict confines of normative, foundationalist doctrines,”43 and it is this semiotic reality that Putin’s hegemonic discourse uses for the sake of stabilizing itself. This reality also includes the exhaustion and fading away of grand narratives. The strategy of the Kremlin foreign propaganda is exactly grounded in taking advantage of the “end of ideology” that is instrumentalized and pragmatically, if not cynically, turned against the core normative commitments of the West. Russia’s foreign policy messages are packed not as a consistent discourse, but as clusters of “catchphrases,” “codes without referents” that simulate “a reality where even the original turns out to be a mere copy.”44 The blurred boundaries between fact and fiction, and the de-­facto substitution of politics with performative acts of “post-­truth” indicate a much greater problem stretching beyond Russia, since they might be seen as symptoms of a new worldview that excludes predictability, negates rationality, and downplays the attempts to judge the present from the standpoint of historical experience accumulated since the collapse of communism. Putin’s project, therefore, can be seen as a part of post-­modern deconstructions: unlike the Soviet project, it does not need to emanate the ultimate truth, in its discursive milieu everything is potentially constructed and deconstructed, with blurred lines between the fake and the real. At this juncture, cultural semiotics might offer a particularly interesting research outlook from a post-­structuralist perspective of “society of the spectacle” (authored by Guy Debord) and simulacrum (developed by Jean Baudillard), concepts with strong semiotic backgrounds. Today governments and corporate

170   Andrey Makarychev and Alexandra Yatsyk actors invest huge budgets in creating systems of signifiers (nation branding, place promotion, high-­profile performances and shows, cultural and sportive mega-­events, etc.) that not only embellish undemocratic rule, but also often distort and misrepresent the situation on the ground. This is especially the case of authoritarian governments looking to legitimize their policies through investing in symbolic capital and using propagandistic imageries and visuals aimed for domestic and external consumption. Non-­Western regimes are quite successful in promoting their semantically loaded messages and signs, however detached from reality they might be. Their discourses and imageries can be quite adaptable to the post-­industrial information society of the twenty-­first century. Some of these regimes in the post-­Soviet area, Russia included, use the whole global infrastructure of media entertainment and advertisement for legitimizing their rule through cultural association with Europe that otherwise is lambasted as a source of morally inacceptable and socially detrimental practices. In the same way as many authoritarian regimes, Russia invests in promoting and legitimizing itself through what might be called a political economy of performances, images, and regimes of signification. Like many other countries, it is eager to spend lots of resources for the sake of advertising itself and embellishing its image for global audiences. Sportive mega-­events are a particular form of cultural production of entertainment, a series of exorbitantly expensive mega signifiers for nation branding and advertisement. The Sochi Olympics was an important element of politically legitimizing the Putin regime through self-­assertive discourses of national pride, respect, and admiration.

Conclusions One of major conclusions to be drawn from this analysis is a huge – and still unexplored – emancipatory potential of semiotic expertise as a contributor to IR (re)theorizing. We have seen that many of well-­established IR concepts can be treated as semiotic constructs (such as soft power), and in the meantime many semiotic terms (representations, signs, and meanings, etc.) can be read from the vantage point of IR scholarship. This intellectual cross-­fertilization might open up the discipline of cultural semiotics to wider inter- and multidisciplinary exposures, and by the same token discover cultural underpinnings in the professional lexicon of IR specialists. An important element of our analysis concerns the culture–politics debate. Pace Lotman’s initial insistence on the autonomy of culture as inherently apolitical (or extra-­political) sphere, many of the post-­Lotman scholars specifically focus on political dimensions of cultural practices. As we have argued here, the fundamental political aspect of semiotic (and thus sign-­based) representations, both textual and visual, boils down to the arbitrary and changeable nature of relations between the signifier and the signified; in other words, in the possibility to always reconsider and remold the meanings we attach to concepts as cornerstones of our language. (Re)signification therefore is pivotal for the everlasting process of (re)producing the political momentum, which from a practical

Unpacking the “post-Soviet”   171 p­ erspective is a powerful tool for any politically meaningful action – socialization, mobilization, manipulation, and so forth. One more facet of semiotic analysis relates to its contribution to elucidating the structure of political discourses. Of particular relevance is Lotman’s acceptance of deep dependence of our thinking on dichotomies, followed by his anticipation of the transformation of the dominant binary logic into a more complex ternary one. Indeed, many primordial political and academic conceptualizations are formulated in the language of binary distinctions – such as friends versus enemies, “false Europe” and “true Europe” (Iver Neumann’s conception of two dominant paradigms of Russia’s Western policies), bordering and debordering, securitization and desecuritization, etc. A good example at this point would be a binary soft–hard security distinction that primarily reflected the dominant Western attitudes and anticipations in the immediate aftermath of the end of the Cold War, when other dichotomies were in a wide use as well (democracy versus autocracy, or freedom versus non-­freedom). One of the problems at this point is that many of these binaries have lost their cognitive potential and political appeal, since the structure of IR has gradually become more complex and less susceptible to simplistic divisions and partitions. In a post-­modern type of discourse binaries can be viewed as largely irrelevant and lacking in explanatory force; however many of them appear quite resilient and still keep playing their structuring roles in many political discourses, especially those positively retrospective (including the neo-­Soviet nostalgia in the post-­Soviet Russia addressed above, or the European right-­wing sympathies with “old good times” of the nation-­state). The debate on the power of binaries and their endurance can be extended to the analysis of the internal nature of the polarized structures. In particular, a distinction can be drawn between inter-­subjective dialogue between the two opposing poles (for example, proponents of hard versus soft security), and the auto-­communicative and self-­referential mode of articulation within each of the poles. The latter is conducive to the appearance and proliferation of concepts that position themselves as relatively self-­sufficient and disinterested in legitimizing their discursive power through constant referring to and engaging with alternative or competing sources of conceptualization. In the sphere of IR – as in other social sciences – this leads to the dominance of rather closed schools of thought with their specific language of communication and circle of devoted adherents. This is why breaking invisible barriers between schools and theories and reaching out to other disciplinary fields is one of the most topical issues for interdisciplinary academic research. From a semiotic perspective it would be also expedient to pay attention not only at the divisive momentum inherent in binary concepts, but also in their roles as building blocks in constructing relations of equivalence, with potential political consequences. For example, discourses that equate – or, at least, place at the same grounding – Communism and fascism as two forms of totalitarian dictatorships trigger ardent protest from the official Moscow that insists on treating them as historical mortal enemies fighting against each other. A similar political mechanism of equalization is manifested in a vision of Russian propaganda

172   Andrey Makarychev and Alexandra Yatsyk r­ epresenting a challenge as strong to the European Union (EU) as that of ISIS.45 Obviously, from the Russian perspective, Islamic terrorist groups are a common enemy of both Russia and the West, which means to create a completely different relation of equivalence and difference. These examples attest to an intricate nature of self-­other (or “us”-versus’“them”) distinctions indispensable for any identity making. The cultural and semiotic production of relations of otherness and alterity necessarily implies both polarization (along with distinction and partition) and construction of equivalence (or relations of solidarity and positive association). This symbiotic intermingling exposes one of the pivotal elements of politicization as a series of speech acts grounded in cultural and semiotic identification and dissociation, alignment and disengagement. Semiotic analysis can be immensely helpful in scrutinizing cultural underpinnings of political momenta and their interpretations in categories stretching far beyond approaches traditional to political science and IR. The cultural semiotic toolkit, leaving aside simplistic binaries, looks at cultural contexts of political actions and practices through focusing on their performative, aesthetic, and artistic dimensions not as peripheral, but rather as central elements of the political. It is in this capacity that the discipline of cultural semiotics might find its niche in bringing new creative insights in analysis of foreign policy and IR.

Notes   1 Marek Tamm and Kalevi Kull, “Toward a Reterritorialization of Cultural Theory: Estonian Theory from Baer and Uexkull to Lotman,” History of the Human Sciences 29, no. 1 (2016): 75–98.   2 Christian Reus-­Smit, “Reading History through Constructivist Eyes,” Millennium: Journal of International Relations 37, no. 2 (2008): 406.   3 Antje Wiener, “Constructivism: The Limits of Bridging Gaps,” Journal of International Relations and Development 6, no. 3 (2003): 253.   4 Petr Drulak, “The Problem of Structural Change in Alexander Wendt’s Social Theory of International Politics,” Journal of International Relations and Development 4, no. 4 (2001): 307.   5 Jonathan Joseph, “Hegemony and the Structure-­Agency Problem in International Relations: A Scientific Realist Contribution,” Review of International Studies 34, no. 1 (2008): 130.   6 Zdravko Mlinar, ed., Globalization and Territorial Identities (Brookfield, Vermont: Avebury, 1992), 26.   7 Noel Parker, “Integrated Europe and Its ‘Margins’: Action and Reaction,” in Margins in European Integration, ed. Noel Parker and Bill Armstrong (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press and St. Martin Press, 2000), 4–7.   8 Christopher Browning and Pertti Joenniemi, “Contending Discourses on Marginality: the Case of Kaliningrad” (working paper, Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen, 2003).   9 Colin Gray, “Inescapable Geography,” The Journal of Strategic Studies 22, no. 2/3 (1999): 161. 10 Carl-­Einar Stalvant, “The Northern Dimension: A Policy in Need of an Institution?” (BaltSeaNet working papers 1, Nordeuropa-­Institut der Humboldt-­Universität, Berlin, 2001), 5.

Unpacking the “post-Soviet”   173 11 Pertti Joenniemi and Marko Lehti, “On the Encounter between the Nordic and the Northern: Torn Apart but Meeting Again?” (working paper 36, Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, Copenhagen, Denmark, 2001), 32–3. 12 Vladimir N. Toropov, “Peterburg i ‘Peterburgskiy tekst’ russkoi literatury (vvedenie v temu),” in Mif. Ritual. Simvol. Obraz: Issledovania v oblasti mifopoeticheskogo. Izbrannoe, ed. V. N. Toropv (Moscow: “Progress” Publishers, 1995), 259–367. 13 Mathias Albert, “From Territorial to Functional Space: Germany and the Baltic Sea Area” (working paper 39, Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, Copenhagen, Denmark, 2000), 10–3. 14 Evaldas Nekrasas, “Is Lithuania a Northern or Central European Country?” Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review 1 (1998): 22–3. 15 Matt McDonald, “Securitization and the Construction of Security,” European Journal of International Relations 14, no. 4 (2008): 563–87. 16 Thierry Balzacq, “The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context,” European Journal of International Relations 11, no. 2 (2005): 177. 17 Felix Ciuta, “Security and the Problem of Context: A Hermeneutical Critique of Securitization Theory,” Review of International Studies 35 (2009): 301–26. 18 Ty Solomon, “The Affective Underpinnings of Soft Power,” European Journal of International Relations 20, no. 3 (2014):720–30. 19 Slavoi Zizek, The Fright for Real Tears: Krzysztof Kieslowski between Theory and Post-­Theory (London: BFI Publishing, 2001), 58. 20 Zizek, The Fright for Real Tears, 57. 21 Zizek, The Fright for Real Tears, 58. 22 Birgit Schippers and Judith Butler, “Radical Democracy and Micro-­politics,” in The Politics of Radical Democracy, ed. Adrian Little and Moya Lloyd (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), 80–91. 23 Christopher Robinson, Wittgenstein and Political Theory: The View from Somewhere (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), 12–13. 24 Robinson, Wittgenstein, 49. 25 Winfred Noth, “Crisis of Representation?” Semiotica 143, no. 1/4 (2003): 13. 26 Daniele Monticelli, Wholeness and Its Remainders: Theoretical Procedures of Totalization and Detotalization in Semiotics, Philosophy and Politics (Tartu: Tartu University Press, 2008), 194. 27 Monticelli, Wholeness and Its Remainders, 195. 28 Monticelli, Wholeness and Its Remainders, 194. 29 Uliana Nikolaeva, “Grozit li Rossii novoe srednevekovie,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, October 25, 2016, www.ng.ru/stsenarii/2016-10-25/9_6843_middleages.html. 30 Karen Gazarian, “SSSR v obiortke ot konfety,” Gazeta.ru, September 12, 2015, www. gazeta.ru/comments/2015/09/06_a_7742285.shtm. 31 “Naryshkin: Rossiya ne dolzhna kayatsa za svoyu istoriyu,” RIA-­Novosti, June 17, 2013, http://ria.ru/interview/20130617/943689762.html#ixzz2WT51eWWG. 32 “Sovetskaya antichnost v datakh i kartinkakh,” Profil, November 13, 2015, www. profile.ru/politika/item/101253-sovetskaya-­antichnost-v-­datakh-i-­kartinkakh. 33 Pavel Chernomorsky, “V Moskve vosstanovyat memorial’nuyu dosku na dome Brezhneva,” Slon, May 27, 2013, http://slon.ru/fast/russia/v-­moskve-vosstanovyat-­memorial nuyu-dosku-na-dome-­brezhneva-946056.xhtml. 34 Vladimir Medinsky, “Iz vsekh iskusstv vazhneishim dlia nas yavliaetsa istoriya,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, August 26, 2015, https://rg.ru/2015/08/26/pravda.html. 35 Andrey Arkhangel’skiy, “Primirenie so zlodeistvom. Pochemu Patriarkh govorit ob uspekhakh pri Stalinizme,” Slon, November 9, 2015, https://republic.ru/posts/59277. 36 Maxim Trudolyubov, “Putin: a Soviet Leaders for the 21 Century,” The Moscow Times, March 18, 2015, www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/putin-­a-soviet-­ leader-for-­the-21st-century/517646.html.

174   Andrey Makarychev and Alexandra Yatsyk 37 Lev Gudkov, “Derealizatsiya proshlogo: funktsii stalinskogo mifa,” Pro et Contra, November – December 2012, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/ProEtContra_ 57_108-135.pdf. 38 Irina Kosterina and Sergei Ushakin, “My u proshlogo ne uchimsia, my im zhiviom,” Neprikosnovenniy zapas 4, no. 102 (2015): 161–81. 39 “Bike Show – 2014. Sevastopol. Culmination,” YouTube video, 35:31, from a performance recorded on August 9, 2014, published by “wolf nomad,” June 15, 2015, www.youtube.com/watch?v=8K3ApJ2MeP8. 40 Andrey Pertsev, “Nichego smeshnogo. Kak patrioticheskiy renessans stior granitsy parodii i real’nosti,” Slon, February 12, 2015, https://slon.ru/russia/nichego_smeshnogo_kak_patrioticheskiy_renessans_ster_granitsy_parodii_i_realnosti-­1214827. xhtml. 41 Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2007). 42 Andreas Schonle and Jeremy Shine, “Introduction,” in Lotman and Cultural Studies: Encounters and Extensions, ed. Andreas Schonle and Jeremy Shine (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2006), 10. 43 Mark Gottdiener, Postmodern Semiotics: Material Culture and the Forms of Postmodern Life (Oxford and Cambridge: Blackwell, 1995), 233. 44 Noth, “Crisis of Representation?,” 9–15. 45 “MEPs sound alarm on anti-­EU propaganda from Russia and Islamist terrorist groups,” European Parliament News, November 23, 2016, www.europarl.europa.eu/ news/en/news-­room/20161118IPR51718/meps-­sound-alarm-­on-anti-­eu-propaganda-­ from-russia-­and-islamist-­terrorist-groups.

Bibliography Albert, Mathias. “From Territorial to Functional Space: Germany and the Baltic Sea Area.” Working Paper 39, Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, Copenhagen, Denmark, 2000. Arkhangel’skiy, Andrey. “Primirenie so zlodeistvom. Pochemu Patriarkh govorit ob uspekhakh pri Stalinizme.” Slon, November 9, 2015. https://republic.ru/posts/59277. Balzacq, Thierry. “The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context.” European Journal of International Relations 11, no. 2 (2005): 171–201. Browning, Christopher, and Pertti Joenniemi. “Contending Discourses on Marginality: the Case of Kaliningrad.” Working Paper, Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen, 2003. Chernomorsky, Pavel. “V Moskve vosstanovyat memorial’nuyu dosku na dome Brezhneva.” Slon, May 27, 2013. http://slon.ru/fast/russia/v-­moskve-vosstanovyat-­ memorialnuyu-dosku-­na-dome-­brezhneva-946056.xhtml. Ciuta, Felix. “Security and the Problem of Context: A Hermeneutical Critique of Securitization Theory.” Review of International Studies 35 (2009): 301–26. Drulak, Petr. “The Problem of Structural Change in Alexander Wendt’s Social Theory of International Politics.” Journal of International Relations and Development 4, no. 4 (2001): 363–79. Gazarian, Karen. “SSSR v obiortke ot konfety.” Gazeta.ru, September 12, 2015. www. gazeta.ru/comments/2015/09/06_a_7742285.shtm. Gottdiener, Mark. Postmodern Semiotics: Material Culture and the Forms of Postmodern Life. Oxford and Cambridge: Blackwell, 1995. Gray, Colin. “Inescapable Geography.” The Journal of Strategic Studies 22, no. 2/3 (1999): 161–77.

Unpacking the “post-Soviet”   175 Gudkov, Lev. “Derealizatsiya proshlogo: funktsii stalinskogo mifa.” Pro et Contra, November – December 2012. http://carnegieendowment.org/files/ProEtContra_ 57_108-135.pdf. Joenniemi, Pertti, and Marko Lehti. “On the Encounter between the Nordic and the Northern: Torn Apart but Meeting Again?” Working Paper 36, Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, Copenhagen, Denmark, 2001. Joseph, Jonathan. “Hegemony and the Structure-­Agency Problem in International Relations: A Scientific Realist Contribution.” Review of International Studies 34, no. 1 (2008): 109–28. Kosterina, Irina, and Sergei Ushakin. “My u proshlogo ne uchimsia, my im zhiviom.” Neprikosnovenniy zapas 4, no. 102 (2015): 161–81. McDonald, Matt. “Securitization and the Construction of Security.” European Journal of International Relations 14, no. 4 (2008): 563–87. Medinsky, Vladimir. “Iz vsekh iskusstv vazhneishim dlia nas yavliaetsa istoriya.” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, August 26, 2015. https://rg.ru/2015/08/26/pravda.html. Mlinar, Zdravko, ed. Globalization and Territorial Identities. Brookfield, Vermont: Avebury, 1992. Monticelli, Daniele. Wholeness and Its Remainders: Theoretical Procedures of Totalization and Detotalization in Semiotics, Philosophy and Politics. Tartu: Tartu University Press, 2008. Nekrasas, Evaldas. “Is Lithuania a Northern or Central European Country?” Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review 1 (1998): 19–45. Nikolaeva, Uliana. “Grozit li Rossii novoe srednevekovie.” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, October 25, 2016. www.ng.ru/stsenarii/2016-10-25/9_6843_middleages.html. Noth, Winfred. “Crisis of Representation?” Semiotica 143, no. 1/4 (2003): 9–15. Parker, Noel. “Integrated Europe and its ‘Margins’: Action and Reaction.” In Margins in European Integration, edited by Noel Parker and Bill Armstrong, 3–27. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press and St. Martin Press, 2000. Pertsev, Andrey. “Nichego smeshnogo. Kak patrioticheskiy renessans stior granitsy parodii i real’nosti.” Slon, February 12, 2015. https://slon.ru/russia/nichego_smeshnogo_ kak_patrioticheskiy_renessans_ ster_granitsy_ parodii_i_realnosti-­1214827. xhtml. Reus-­Smit, Christian. “Reading History through Constructivist Eyes.” Millennium: Journal of International Relations 37, no. 2 (2008): 395–414. Robinson, Christopher. Wittgenstein and Political Theory: The View from Somewhere. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009. Schippers, Birgit, and Judith Butler. “Radical Democracy and Micro-­politics.” In The Politics of Radical Democracy, edited by Adrian Little and Moya Lloyd, 73–91. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009. Schmitt, Carl. The Concept of the Political. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2007. Schonle, Andreas, and Jeremy Shine. “Introduction.” In Lotman and Cultural Studies: Encounters and Extensions, edited by Andreas Schonle and Jeremy Shine, 3–35. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2006. Solomon, Ty. “The Affective Underpinnings of Soft Power.” European Journal of International Relations 20, no. 3 (2014): 720–41. Stalvant, Carl-­Einar. “The Northern Dimension: A Policy in Need of an Institution?” BaltSeaNet Working Papers 1, Nordeuropa-­Institut der Humboldt-­Universität, Berlin, 2001.

176   Andrey Makarychev and Alexandra Yatsyk Tamm, Marek, and Kalevi Kull. “Toward a Reterritorialization of Cultural Theory: Estonian Theory from Baer and Uexkull to Lotman.” History of the Human Sciences 29, no. 1 (2016): 75–98. Toropov, Vladimir N. “Peterburg i ‘Peterburgskiy tekst’ russkoi literatury (vvedenie v temu).” In Mif. Ritual. Simvol. Obraz: Issledovania v oblasti mifopoeticheskogo. Izbrannoe, edited by V. N. Toropv, 259–367. Moscow: “Progress” Publishers, 1995. Trudolyubov, Maxim. “Putin: a Soviet Leaders for the 21 Century.” The Moscow Times, March 18, 2015. www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/putin-­a-soviet-­leader-for-­ the-21st-century/517646.html. Wiener, Antje. “Constructivism: The Limits of Bridging Gaps.” Journal of International Relations and Development 6, no. 3 (2003): 252–75. Zizek, Slavoi. The Fright for Real Tears: Krzysztof Kieslowski between Theory and Post-­ Theory. London: BFI Publishing, 2001.

10 Transcending hegemonic international relations theorization Nothingness, re-­worlding, and balance of relationship Chih-­yu Shih Introduction The Kyoto School of Philosophy (KSP), which originated in Taisho, Japan (1912–26) and obtained its name during the early Showa period (1926–89), has received atavistic attention in the past two decades. The founding father of the KSP was Nishida Kitaro, a philosopher who specifically stimulated curiosity on new possibilities of arranging alternative International Relations (IR) for the twenty-­first century primarily through his so-­called Philosophy of Place (PoP). Nishida sought to overcome the Europeanization and Amer­icanization of the world prior to World War II (WWII) through developing cultural sensitivity and anti-­hegemonic thought. As such, the Kyoto School meets the current normative call for multiple voices in contemporary studies of IR. Even though most revisits to Nishida exclusively perceive the PoP as a normative theory on improving world politics,1 Nishida himself was explicit about his ontological appeal to pure experience. Together with his epistemological quest for universality, the two indicate a potential for scientific inquiry. Therefore, the literature owes him a scientific, rather than a normative, appreciation. Other theoretical attempts to counter the perceived hegemony of Anglo-­Saxon International Relations Theory (IRT) are typically both scientific and normative. An example of this is the emerging trend of re-­Worlding subaltern subjectivities. This takes place through demonstrating that actual world politics differs from the understanding presented in mainstream IR literature.2 Scholarships on re-/ Worlding thus explore normative versus actual world politics. Reflecting on the widely shared perception of China as a rising country, an additional nascent struggle against the mainstream arises from the anxious efforts to establish a Chinese School of IR.3 IR scholars propagating the Chinese School draw from Chinese cultural resources in an attempt to present a different ideal view of world politics.4 Scientific endeavors to explain the different manners of interaction of nation-­states in comparison with those explained in mainstream IRT, such as the practices of mutual relationships, can potentially lead to a Chinese perspective with universal implications.5 In brief, the current normative

178   Chih-yu Shih c­ hallenges to mainstream IRT typically offer scientific explanations of world politics, which render the revisit of Nishida incomplete without the simultaneous exploration of scientific implications of the PoP. The succeeding discussion compares Nishida with two other competitors, namely, post-­Western re-­Worlding and the Chinese balance of relationships, (BoR) in their shared campaign for alternative IRTs, and does this within the epistemological frame provided by Nishida. For convenience, the country of historical practice for each alternative IRT is used to illustrate the plausibility of different IR theorizations. Accordingly, Japan provides a suitable example for PoP, Taiwan for re-­Worlding, and China for the BoR. The remainder of the chapter argues that the three alternatives complement each other within Nishida’s epistemological scheme and are illustrative of universal IRT of East Asian origin. In addition, the chapter particularly focuses on the scientific principles derived from PoP.

Three anti-­hegemonic attempts The concept of “hegemonic IR” is used to refer to the nature of world politics as it is explained by a dominant single discourse. The current hegemonic view of the nature of world politics is that it is essentially state-­centric, that it is undergirded by one superpower and other major powers, mainly the US and Western European countries, and that the interaction in between the states consists either of peace or war. The current hegemonic IR contradicts with and transforms non-­ Western world orders elsewhere, including the relevant cases of Japan, Taiwan, and China, resulting in ambivalence toward their pasts. The PoP provides epistemological clarity on the identity puzzle of Japan and of other nations with a similar problem. It does so through providing the possibility of a nation to represent both East and West at the same time, leading to a non-­Western, non-­ territorial, or non-­centrist position, though homed arguably exclusively by Japan in practice. The puzzle emphasizes the aim of Japan for normalcy of in-­ betweenness,6 which is a statement of alienation from hegemonic IR. In contrast to hegemonic IR, Nishida perceived the idea of universalism as one of becoming others. Universalism according to the Nishida is constantly enhanced through accommodating or acquiring additional thoughts and identities into one’s own self-­imagination. It sees conversion and synthesis as a bridge between civilizations as redundant, if not harmful.7 Whereas Western modernity demonstrates a strong need to convert others from a differing trajectory to a common, that is, universal, destiny, the KSP exhibits a strong need for self-­ conversion. Western modernity, regardless of being prolonged at any given time, is adopted and integrated in the permanent collection through self-­conversion while the process of Japan’s universalism increased. Compared to Japan, Turkey, which is likewise in between almost all the dichotomized perspectives, could be another certain, albeit involuntary, site of world history. Nevertheless, the deliberate, abrupt, massive, and yet thorough learning and simulating required of Japanese consciousness by PoP presumably empowers Japan exclusively into world

Transcending hegemonic IR theorization   179 history. Under such a self-­concept, Japan remains as the sole nation that is capable of constantly becoming others, through entering and withdrawing in accordance with the current identity’s success or failure, to eventually encompass all. In fact, the Pacific War that the Japanese military launched against the US proceeded exactly in the name of the universalist “World History Standpoint (WHS),” with the aim of exposing the partial nature of Western modernity. The mission provided by the WHS was allegedly “to overcome modernity.” This mission was not to deny modernity in its entirety, but to transcend the provinciality of Western modernity. The other side of the coin was to modernize the rest of “the Greater East Asia Sphere,” which the Japanese military considered as the entirety of the Japanese self. The double missions were therefore to defeat the partial West and to convert the backward portions of East Asia itself. Accordingly, Japan’s in-­between place is presumably a place of nothingness or a non-­place where Nishida wished that differing nations could meet without mutual naming or judgment. Idealistically, Japan exemplifies a civilizational origin and bridge that enables the East to meet the West and vice versa. The assumption of the WHS is that neither the East nor the West should expand or conquer the other. Their commonality must not lie in teleological historiography because preservation of their difference is the spirit that guarantees their inclusion in a universal world, resulting in the multi-­directionality of the WHS. The multi-­directionality of the WHS implies the coexistence of East and West while they each flourish on their own conditions. To be able to move in between the two requires one to go deeper than merely being conscious of their differences. This leads one to the place of nothingness. The WHS therefore does not propagate the same self-­other concept as the one mentioned in the literature on identity.8 According to the WHS, both the self and its others are non-­synthesized identities that are to be gathered in an ultimate being in nothingness without substituting one another.9 The formulation of the WHS, as a container of all possibilities in the past, present, and future, can thus easily be connected with the imagined origin of the universe and is therefore practically coupled with Japanese Shinto, which likewise provides a metaphor of the origin and the evolution of Japan that is presumably all encompassing. The difficulty that Japan encountered with the “backward” East Asia, particularly China, was its perceived incapacity for effective learning. From the past dynastic China to Communist China and then to the rise of capitalist China, the Chinese people have always practically accepted the coexistence of Western values, identities, and institutions in their political life. However, China has suffered (or perhaps enjoyed) false, insincere, and incompatible learning. For the Japanese, this suggests China’s incapacity for true learning. According to the classic Japanese explanation,10 which remains popular after the still ongoing reforms in China, China’s over-­reliance on rituals to harmonize relationships with superior invaders has hindered the country from achieving authentic modernity. In this formulation, even though China appears to have the capability to accommodate differing values and identities by ritually relating them, China, however, does not learn at a level deeper than the

180   Chih-yu Shih instrumental use of the alien civilization. Therefore, according to the classic Japanese explanation, despite China’s similar capability to facilitate the coexistence of Western modernity and Chinese culture, the Chinese claim to universality is nominal, spurious, and lacks curiosity. As a result, Chinese learning is at best partial and eventually reduced to the harmonizing and stabilization of a relationship, which makes China, in the WHS perspective, unable to resist the West or engage in serious reform by itself. To become more genuinely universal, Japan executes both entry into and withdrawal from any provincial identities that are not to be synthesized. Japan should exemplify for the West and East Asia the process of withdrawing from the site of their existential experiences to exercise re-­entry elsewhere. One has to consider “place” as a metaphor of identity, along with the notion of “site” that is adopted in the post-­Western literature. For Japan, in contrast to Western modernity, the exercise of withdrawing from a specific “place” to a “no place” allows the imagination of freedom from either one’s own past or Western modernity. This withdrawal, called self-­denial, also allows further imagination of re-­entry from nothingness into many potentially differing sites, including that of the intruder. Therefore, the metaphor of nothingness exclusively provides Japan with the capability to see the limitation of all sites, including the alleged hegemony and all strings of universalism, achieving the emergence of a world history that accommodates and transcends all sites. Framing Western modernity, East Asian resistance, and Chinese management of relationships, along with Japan’s WHS, PoP categorizes “place” into four different types.11 First, a place of being/identity is an absolute place trapped in false rationalism and universalism, such as Western modernity. This place constitutes contemporary hegemonic thought. Second, a place of relative being/identity is a relative place that resists hegemony. Examples are the East Asian quests for indigenous identities in Taiwan, Korea, Vietnam, and so on. This is where post-­ Western re-­Worlding belongs. A typical formulation of relative being/identity is post-­colonial hybridity. Imagined nationalities, as well as aboriginality, are stronger versions of a relative identity. Third, a place of relative nothingness is a transcendental place that connects or permeates absolute places as well as relative places, such as the Chinese scheme of relating to each other in specific contexts, which includes the BoR. One example is Chinese Confucianism, while another can be non-­alignment thought by Jawaharlal Nehru. Finally, a place of absolute nothingness is where time and space meet to render the other three places thinkable and seeable. Cultivating an archetypal subjectivity to transcend any mundane conditions, the WHS demonstrates this perspective. Below, the second, third, and last places are explained in more detail. Relative identity: The place of relative identity uses the non-­Western or post-­ Western IR concept of “worldliness.” Creating worldliness in a site is done through essentially “Worlding” it. In the past, Worlding was a geo-­cultural project of global capitalism/hegemony to monopolize meanings.12 Resisting this project is known as re-­Worlding, a form of self-­Worlding that emerges from a

Transcending hegemonic IR theorization   181 supposedly subaltern site for and by the self. Re-­Worlding is a discursive reclaim of the lost soul by excavating, retrieving, reviving, and rejuvenating a narrative of the past. Sited re-­Worlding results in a declaration that hegemonic power cannot monopolize either ontological or epistemological resources and critically assesses any hegemonic attempt to reproduce dominance over subalterns. Sited re-­Worlding resists, undermines, or revises a hegemonic division of work through uncontrollable fluidity caused by the incongruent schemata of the subalterns, their ideological inconsistency, opportunism, self-­denial, and self-­ assertion.13 The methods of re-­Worlding must be multiplied and improvised on as they recast memories of various forms. Through re-­Worlding testimonies to differences are achieved, which are aimed at thinking back on hegemonic arrangements of lives at subaltern sites as well as writing back to provincialize hegemonic order. In other words, re-­Worlding incurs site-­centric methodology and aims to cultivate a counter perspective in the face of an overwhelming hegemony. In particular, re-­Worlding seeks to identify alternatives for thinking about the “international” that are more in tune with local concerns and traditions outside the West.14 In this view, victimized people can reincarnate by looking back through an imagined subjectivity belonging exclusively to a particular site, which is not subject to false universalism. Relative nothingness: The place of relative nothingness also has a parallel in the nascent IR literature, that is, in the Chinese School. A number of Chinese schools invest in Chinese cultural resources that formulate general theories of IR; hence, Daoism, Confucianism, and Legalism are employed to examine the coexistence of differences,15 relational reciprocity,16 and hierarchical stability.17 Together, they indicate a shared longing for an order that can transcend the self-­ interests of individual nations. As a result, the quest for a relational order subscribes to no specific institution or value. Examples can be found in the arrangements between the Chinese dynastic court and its neighbors or between the late Qing court and various imperial powers, which were flexibly designed to meet the differing conditions of each tributary state or imperialist power.18 Aside from the distinctiveness of each bilateral relationship, the rules that have governed China over the generations are hardly ever the same. Thus, the Chinese consider an imagined cycle of “governability” (zhi) and “chaos” (luan) as typical. Indeed, it is so typical that it is still officially narrated in the present.19 If the spontaneity of cycles discontinues because of rationalist intervention, governability will lose its trajectory and may never resume, leaving brutal force as the only viable solution to anarchy. Therefore, the BoR in general, as well as in China specifically, pragmatically and patiently adopts a laissez-­faire approach in handling the domestic chaos of a partner country. According to the aforementioned Japanese criticism of the Chinese over-­reliance on ritual and relationship, Chinese intellectual history is not particularly keen on the adoption of Western institutions or values. Chinese international relationships are therefore highly independent from values or institutional considerations. The Chinese international relationship is likewise not particularly strong in ensuring defense

182   Chih-yu Shih against invaders. Both local gentries and the dynastic courts look for ways to coexist with invading powers. Achieving a balanced relationship is the quintessential philosophy of life that seeks to transcend the power difference by establishing reciprocal relationships. Specifically, BoR is the process of reciprocating in order to reproduce relationality that constitutes the actors. To maintain a balanced relationship, China should yield to the other side as long as the challenge to the existing relationship is not judged as malicious. By yielding, China exhibits sincerity toward the relationship. In addition, China must resist vehemently if the violation is anticipated to be detrimental to a long-­term relationship, despite China’s relative weakness in power. This resistance shows China’s determination to restore the correct relationship.20 These two principles of a balanced relationship, namely, yielding and resistance to the perceived degree of challenge to a relationship, are essentially subversive to hegemonic IR that is founded on the concepts of power, interest, and value. From the WHS perspective though, both principles are inconsequential. According to the BoR, both domestic cycles and the balance of power are dispensable considerations. Any multi-­lateral arrangement to channel intervention or universal values to transform a so-­called failing state would be redundant. If IR can be reduced to a combination of bilateral relations, other universal learning is no longer necessary both because the order is already existent in the process of reciprocating and because, after all, the source of good governance introduced at present may become the source of chaos in the next cycle and vice versa. What would be the excitement of forcing a conversion in a subaltern site when one knows that nothing will remain the same in the long run? Anything that fades at the present can return to consciousness given the right cue, which leads to a situation where, ultimately, only reciprocal relationships are practical and stable.21 If China cultivates positive long-­term relationships, others will presumably reciprocate. Values and ideologies become dispensable once the relationship is stabilized, and domestic problems are subsequently not the duty of others to resolve. When given sufficient time, solutions can be obtained domestically. Patience, instead of forced transformation, is the main characteristic of the BoR in Chinese IRT and is known as the “Great Way” in Chinese discourse, upon which all strangers supposedly walk together harmoniously alongside the self-­cultivating prince.22 Absolute nothingness: According to a KSP scholar, under the condition of nothingness, transcendence replaces resistance.23 The place of absolute nothingness is composed of pure experience, according to Nishida, prior to any acquisition of meaning. All of the encounters in the past, as well as those in the future, coexist in nothingness where one transcends one’s sited limitations. The place of absolute nothingness calms all conflicts, with or without justice. It contains all possibilities before they acquire any meaning, but they guarantee no single result or success. The lack of duty is even greater than in the place of relative nothingness because, while relative nothingness cultivates a small sense of duty toward a related other, one can do without the sense of duty toward one’s own life and or that of others in insensible and insensitive nothingness.24

Transcending hegemonic IR theorization   183 Practically, the freedom to act beyond the physical limit testifies the fearless spirit that is expected of a Japan possessing the WHS. This fearlessness manifests in self-­becoming and self-­disciplining on one hand and in overcoming the physical restraint imposed by the materialistic civilization of the West on the other hand. The constant self-­becoming indicates the spirit of continuous self-­ denial required of Japan and East Asia to exercise withdrawal from one’s own limited place of relative identity. The place of absolute nothingness is most properly represented by the arrival of an international society centering on the principle of in-­betweenness. To achieve this kind of international society, self-­denial is the essential characteristic to show because Japan has to display to the rest of the world its transcendent capacity for being anyone else. Without extensive self-­denial from its East Asian qualities, Japan would not be able to become as good as or better than other civilizations by the standard of the latter. Thus, Japan would not be free or universal. Each entry into a place is highly extreme in the sense that Japan endeavors to become more modern than the West or become more practiced in Sinology than China. Becoming Western or Chinese would request a withdrawal to nothingness first. Learning after entering a place does not stop until one is physically or socially exhausted and unable to reach further perfection. This quality is unavailable in the place of relative nothingness where learning is insincere and relational coupling is more important than learning. In fact, pre-­WWII Japan considered itself as the best pupil of Sinology and as the genuine successor of the Chinese culture to sustain and improve its modern fate.25 Given the country’s Sinological spirit, Japan’s acquisition of modernity proceeded at a level much deeper than the materialistic civilization of the West, and provides the identity of in-­betweenness that fully describes the international society. Table 10.1 lists the categories of places of the PoP: (1) the place of absolute identity, (2) the place of relative identity, (3) the place of relative nothingness, and (4) the place of absolute nothingness. Synchronization should be considered to be an enactment of the place of absolute identity; synchronicity is defined as the derivative of rationalism and universalism and informs most general theories in IR. Synchronization refers to the simultaneous execution or promoted diffusion of a pattern of rational thinking embedded in an idea, an institution, a collective identity, or a perceived arrangement of material force. Synchronization is presumably a process in which unrelated national actors conjunctionally fulfill their self-­assigned functions to interact rationally. Institutionally, synchronization Table 10.1  The philosophy of place conditions of identity Synchronic/multi-sited

Yes

No

Yes

World History Standpoint as Absolute Nothingness Hegemonic Order as Absolute Identity

Re-Worlding as Relative Identity Balance of Relationships as Relative Nothingness

No

184   Chih-yu Shih under the hegemonic order, which requires conversion, is the exact opposite of absolute nothingness, which foregoes any duty of converting others. A spatial sensibility runs through the conditions of relative identity and absolute nothingness and thus keeps the danger of being conquered as well as ­conquering alive. Regarding the conditions of relative identity, spatial multi-­ sitedness, Worldliness, place, sovereignty, agency, subjectivity, Asia, and China­centrism are popular yet estranging concepts that celebrate their sited subjectivities. These concepts defeated the WHS’s quest for nothingness before WWII, treating the role of local/national differences so seriously that their subscribers could not help but engage in expansion and colonialism.26 The claim of “otherness” by a local subaltern is potentially dangerous because sited identity of this sort provides a clearly demarcated scope to carry out internal cleansing or launch external expansion, as well as invited conquest. The more clearly demarcated the site of resistance, the more strongly motivated the hegemonic power to enforce intervention. While re-­Worlding is a path for the self-­perceived subaltern to reclaim subjectivity, nothingness uses self-­perceived in-­betweenness to transcend the false universalism of hegemony and then to reach allegedly true universalism. The epistemological caveat lies in the shared spatial anxiety of the loss of sitedness under the sensed hegemonic intrusion. The notions of “post-­White” order of the WHS and the “post-­Western” claim of many post-­Western projects coincide with the identification of an imagined self-­site. Note that WHS disciples try thawing sensibilities toward space by claiming themselves to be all encompassing. Nevertheless, Sun Ge, a Chinese admirer of Japanese modern thoughts, traces a string of obsessive adherence to a certain inexpressible, but invincible, sense of space that is similar to a shelter or an identity.27 This spatial sensibility reproduces the imagined and re-­imagined possibility of being controlled, monopolized, brainwashed, invaded, intruded, suppressed, exploited, and so on. The claim of difference in an exclusive self-­ontological site would lead to the desire to overtake and transform it.28 After all, only those who possess a different site can be the target of intervention.

From normative failures to scientific inquiries If sitedness and identity are two sides of the same coin, thorough invasion of the site can only take place by annihilating the identity of the people. At these hegemonic moments, each invasion symbolizes the collection of another fresh trophy of universalism. Hence, the effort to construct sitedness embedded in its own historical, religious, and cultural trajectory may dangerously incur the label of fundamentalism. A worst case is multi-­sitedness that challenges the hegemonic instinct to conquer as many as possible, while at the same time discourages united resistance because of consciously cherished differences. Therefore, the normative appeal of the re-­Worlding project may practically backfire. A late veteran Sinologist thus called for a methodology in Sinology that stops the treatment of China as Japan’s object of study. Instead, Sinology should be the

Transcending hegemonic IR theorization   185 method for Japan to withdraw from the Japanese condition and become universal.29 Could nothingness, as a substitute, have any empirical relevance except its normative claim of transcendence? Normative failures of re-­Worlding can be proven or disproven by empirical research, which may contribute to the improvement of the re-­Worlding project. Both re-­Worlding and the BoR have scientific potentials. Re-­Worlding is a method of tracing how empirical learning and practice of hegemonic role assignments in the world political economy proceed at a particular site. Simply describing the enactment of the roles and their meaning to the subaltern site is a normative challenge to the hegemonic discourse. Despite the absence of a conscious attempt or capacity to resist, the sited understanding, which is rooted in sited knowledge, suggests how hegemonic order suffers revision, and hence subversion. The literature has noted abundant examples of this kind of resistance.30 Similarly, BoR can enlighten scientific research of IR by explaining how nations transcend power politics and maintain long-­term, reciprocal stability. The literature on China’s relationships with Southeast Asian countries provides ample examples.31 The BoR does not have to be normatively preferred to be effective because it parallels the balance of power and influences IR where the balance of power is ambiguous or impossible to formulate. Also, balancing strategies alone are rarely successful. I contend that the WHS can be scientific, similar to re-­Worlding and the BoR, but a scientific mode of the WHS is rarely attempted. By generating scientifically hypothesized processes of transcendence, the WHS, along with BoR and re-­ Worlding, explains the capacity of a society to store suppressed or unwanted identities in a subconscious state of nothingness, which are awakened by the conditions ripened for their revival. This process also includes the capacity to acquire new perspectives in the future. The place of absolute nothingness is theoretically a site where all those alternatives are temporarily stored in oblivion. Amnesia is a plausible contingency in the aftermath of ideological, institutional, and identity conflicts, transforming societies of in-­between civilizations into practiced adaptors to conditions—a threat of failure or an opportunity of success. As a result, no value, ideology, institution, or identity can be permanent. Cyclical and inconsistent self-­ understandings are the archetypical pattern in the long run in both re-­Worlding and BoR research. They are able to partially predict cycles scientifically on the basis of the following three propositions: The Nothingness Proposition: There is a high possibility for aborted identities to return in the future, and no identity can be permanent. IR based on existing identities between nations are inherently unstable. This proposition is derived from the PoP ontology of the WHS that disregards space and temporality to accommodate various possibilities and to formulate a repertoire of identity strategies. Identities coexist instead of undergoing synthesis. Identities aborted due to exhaustion of further improvements are not consciously accessible, but the thorough dominance of the current identity will eventually exhaust the country. The limit of the pursuit on the current track, once reached, will trigger the emergence of an alternative principle of IR. However, the systemic level does not determine exactly which one will return. Usually, this is determined by idiosyncratic

186   Chih-yu Shih factors such as family traditions, factional politics, and economic decline, etc. This proposition makes possible drastic turns to different IR principles by nations torn between incongruent identities. Their seeming incapacity to establish a compromise with rivaling identities is in line with their readiness for a drastic turn. Cooperation of the domestic constituency in support of such turns, once achieved, indirectly testifies the inexpressibility of absolute nothingness. The Re-­Worlding Proposition: Identities that can provide evaluative perspectives on dominant identities are more likely to stay or return over the course of time. IR cannot proceed with one dominant identity in the long run. Derived from the re-­Worlding epistemology, the re-­Worlding proposition suggests that the recollection of an identity from the subconscious condition has a better chance as long as the present hegemonic circumstance can be critically assessed. This proposition is particularly germane to weak nations engrossed in an encountered hegemonic influence. Such nations reify the condition of relative identity by excavating and appropriating cultural resources not currently in use. The PoP epistemologically explains the possibility of these nations to resort to memories or utopia’s not shared by the encountered hegemony. The BoR Proposition: To the extent that role-­identity is contingent upon the context, identity switching would be easy and the synchronic rules of international society would be difficult to prevail. This proposition is derived from the BoR epistemology, which argues that nations live together more easily if they can settle on a way that disregards their differences in identities or values. Therefore, all cultural resources should be ready any time to comfort a particular target. Conscious transcendence over encountered differences reifies the condition of relative nothingness. The BoR can be more likely attained by bilateral rather than multi-­lateral negotiations. As a result, relative nothingness is particularly germane to nations that face an extensive and expanding scope of encounter that disallows enforcement of any synchronized value or institution. Likewise, a declining hegemony should engage in relative nothingness by jettisoning the extant synchronic values to appease allies. The condition of relative nothingness is illustrated by countries consciously avoiding specific positions in a multi-­lateral setting or relying on different identity strategies in a variety of bilateral settings.

An empirical PoP pertaining to Senkaku/Diaoyu/Diaoyutai islands The three cases and the three propositions The case of Senkaku/Diaoyu/Diaoyutai Islands illustrates the empirical relevance of the PoP. In this case, hegemonic order may appear inapplicable because hegemonic power is ambivalent. In the twenty-­first century, for example, with the US refusing to take a clear and consistent stand, all anti-­hegemonic schemes in East Asia are competing over the Senkaku/Diaoyu/Diaoyutai Islands. The sources of confrontation and their resolutions emerge from both the implicit and

Transcending hegemonic IR theorization   187 powerful pressure of hegemony in synchronizing the mutually excluding sovereign order and the in/capacity to improvise of all the three nations. The dispute occurred between Japan, Taiwan, and China. Provided that they conform to the sovereign order, the three countries may not meet a resolution because the disputed island is intrinsic to their individual claim of sitedness. If they stick with the principle of nothingness, a resolution may eventually emerge under some version of Asianism, but may also disintegrate in the following cycle. Under the BoR, peace could be obtained through rituals allowing all to pretend ownership or war, but such pretentious rituals should be restored first. Each contender historically used a particular discursive weapon. Japan derived the WHS from the PoP. Taiwan applied the double-­re-Worlding scheme. China adopted the balance of relationship. Nevertheless, these schemes were performed in cycles. The scientists adhering to the PoP can specifically predict policy predisposition that has systemic consequences. In the first place, none of the three schemes is a direct respondent to power politics, nor to immediate or apparent national interest considerations. Rather, each scheme involves a cyclical drive to obtain the in-­betweenness caused by co-­existing yet non-­synthesized identities. Japan’s return to the WHS Asianism, after experiencing exhaustion at having been the pupil of the West since 1950, shows the country’s indifference toward Chinese values or feelings and cultivates a degree of readiness to move beyond the US occupation. Meanwhile, Taiwan’s return to post-­colonial aversion to China tolerates Japan’s nationalization of the Diaoyutai, thus achieving Taiwan’s independence from China, with the support of the post-­colonial identity left by its former colonizer Japan. China’s return to an ambiguous, pre-­modern condition of sovereignty that relies on the ritual of joint venture or on a deliberately ambiguous rhetoric stabilizes bilateral relationships in a preferable state of no solution. According to the three propositions, Japan’s return is irrevocable until it is completely exhausted. Taiwan’s return is bifurcated into anti-­China and pro-­China. China’s return is to deliberately avoid positioning. The place of absolute nothingness is expected to provide endless retrieval, recombination, and creativity that ensures the unstable nature of IR for any self-­ searching country caught between incongruent identities, such as Japan. Being positioned on the territorial dispute reveals the impossibility of being simultaneously Western, Asian, and Japanese. Once submerged in a particular identity, the nothingness proposition predicts that Japan will not yield until the continuation is no longer feasible physically (i.e., economically or militarily), and then yield quickly and thoroughly. The place of relative identity remains based on the epistemological necessity of re-­Worlding by a self-­perceived subaltern nation in a rediscovered site, such as Taiwan. The desire for re-­Worlding, in opposition to the hegemonic conquest, exposes Taiwan’s multiple subaltern positions regarding China, the US, and Japan, only to bring forth the impossibility of self-­becoming. In contrast to seeking independence from China, Taiwan cannot refuse any form of coalition with the hegemonic US. This coalition further leads to the inevitability of Taiwan allowing Japan’s unilateral nationalization of the disputed island. The

188   Chih-yu Shih re-­Worlding proposition predicts that Taiwan will alternate between the three candidates of hegemony existing in its layered history as the target of resistance. The place of relative nothingness mediates relative identity and absolute nothingness for a country experiencing a decline such as the late nineteenth century Qing court or a rise such as the early twenty-­first century China. The resulting undecidable roles for China to play pragmatically dissuade, accommodate, or urge its emerging identity to engage in various kinds of relationships. Territorial interests are inessential for China in stabilizing relationships under a changing IR framework. A stabilized relationship should nevertheless include sovereign integrity if the opponent intends to deny China’s. The BoR proposition predicts that the Chinese pursuit of harmony and peaceful coexistence would be satisfied by Japan’s acknowledgement of the existence of a dispute and not by Chinese exclusive ownership of the disputed island. However, ambiguity is preferred to clarity in this case where a mutually agreed proper relationship is unlikely. Japan and the nothingness principle The Japanese modern history has been full of cycles. Each cycle has appeared irrevocable in the beginning. Consistently, the cycles were aborted upon the forced realization of exhaustion, but replaced with another seemingly irrevocable agenda. The key question is on the manner of coping with Japan’s Asian identity. Asia has alternatively exhibited its backward otherness under modernity, the base of world revolution under socialism, its backward self under the WHS, and a method of self-­becoming under the pressure of modernity. The disciples of each theme always appear uncompromising but their causes necessarily come and go relative to whether the physical conditions of their continuous pursuit are obtainable or expiring. The complete involvement in a particular version of Asianism and the sudden subsequent switch strike the prototype of the nothingness proposition. Aborted pre-­WWII ideas of Asianism have returned to contemporary Japanese IR thinking in various versions. East Asia once had a crystal notion in support of Japan’s quest for worldliness before the war. As the place of absolute nothingness, Asia inspired a philosophy looking to overcome the compulsive Western modernity or the inevitable Asian backwardness. This perceived superior Western modernity returned after WWII with the arrival of Amer­ican occupation forces in Japan. In addition, the image of a backward Asia lingered on in China’s estranging socialist identity. For some time, the Fukuzawa solution of “Leaving Asia, Joining Europe,” which was rendered politically incorrect by the Pacific War, reappeared, overshadowing Asianism. The literature has noted various other interpretations of Japan’s proper identity, such as liberal democracy, peacemaker, profitmaker, and development aider, which have arisen alongside nascent Asianism.32 In the aftermath of the Maoist Cultural Revolution in China, the silenced socialist and left-­wing perspectives during the war once again lost their appeal, despite being revived in academic circles after the war. Each politically incorrect view had its turn in history and waited for another opportunity after being silenced by conditions. Cycles of political (in)correctness,

Transcending hegemonic IR theorization   189 which are frequent in subaltern societies,33 attest to the place of absolute nothingness as a depot of subconscious identities. The message for any hegemonic discourse of the time is that non-­synthetic identities can never be quelled at the subconscious level. The left wing yielded to suppressive authorities during the early Showa period, thus socialism was politically silenced. A significant portion of the ­left-­wing supporters left Japan but their spirit remained in the remote but hopeful land of Manchukuo, the origin of civilization for Shiratori Kurakichi (1865 to 1942), a Shinto absolutist who founded the Tokyo School of Sinology. Manchukuo was tantamount to the place of nothingness in Shiratori’s narrative,34 being the common root of all civilizations, and was designed as the princely land of all nationalities. Therefore, Manchukuo is a reification of the place of absolute nothingness.35 Socialist intellectuals, after “giving in” their political correctness to Shinto under the Fascist condition, gathered at the Research Department of the Southern Manchurian Railway Company and embedded a left discourse in their class-­related research on land property and conventions of village life in Northern China. Living under imperialism disallowed socialist intellectuals to engage in conscious politics of the subaltern. However, their anti-­imperialist activism resumed atavistically after the Amer­ican occupying troops liberated them from political incorrectness, which culminated in the 1960 mass demonstration against Japan’s signing of the Security Pact with the US. The views of these intellectuals on Socialist China were sanguine and hopeful, but the end of the Cultural Revolution silenced them again. While their place has always been opposite of that of the right wing, both left- and right-­wing supporters share a career style of vicissitudes.36 The same career style has a wider scope of practice than Japan. A parallel vicissitude submerges Euro-­Asianism in Russia, which first appeared in the 1920s and then acquiesced under the Communist Party rule for 70 years before finally re-­emerging in the 1990s to assist in the pursuit of an integrated statehood of Russia.37 Similarly, the pursuit of statehood in twenty-­first century Japan by the right wing, as supported by Premier Abe, was an attempt to move Japan beyond being an occupied territory of the US or the West.38 To embark on a journey toward statehood, Japan cannot directly challenge US leadership but must instead demonstrate its ability to face and overcome the rising China that disturbed the hegemonic order under the leadership of the US. As the US fails to provide a civilizational model for neighboring China to emulate, a normalized Japan that is no longer under the US protective umbrella would make a contemporary pledge to the WHS. The nationalization of the Senkaku Islands of Japan in 2012 and the demonstration of Japanese military strength against China from 2013 onward have won the support of the Japanese general public, particularly the right-­wing supporters. The pursuit of statehood, justified by the need to protect Japan’s claimed territory of the Senkaku Islands, parallels similar attempts to overcome modernity, which is prescribed for Japan by the lessons obtained from Europe since the Meiji Restoration. The Hegelian designation of the Orient as backward must be  addressed. Japan used to believe that it could transcend its own Oriental

190   Chih-yu Shih b­ ackwardness by confronting China, and the return of the Senkaku Islands dispute has been the single and most significant confrontation between China and Japan in the twenty-­first century. The struggle began in 1876 when Japan kidnapped the king of Ryukyu, a Chinese protectorate that owned Senkaku. This incident is similar to the nationalization of the Senkaku Islands by Japan in 2012. In the first initiative, former US President Ulysses Grant served as a mediator in 1875 between Japan and China to ensure peace. However, Japan was reluctant and did not accept the compromise indicated in Grant’s proposal to preserve Ryukyu as a Chinese protectorate. Japan defeated China 20 years later in 1895 and then Russia 30 years later in 1905, resulting in a successful Westernization of Japan that placed Japan on the world’s radar. However, Japan felt restrained by the West and decided, half a century after the Ryukyu kidnap, to exercise the WHS by grouping the entire East Asia together as a bloc to challenge the West. Japan’s dilemma of being indebted to both China and the West in its quest for national identity occurred in the Meiji period and in the twenty-­first century. Modern statehood means that a state does not live under the protection or shadow of any Western country. In the 1920s, this independence to any Western country led to the refusal of Japan to succumb to the Washington Treaty system that downgraded Japan’s status to a secondary power in East Asia. As a result, in the twenty-­first century, Japan should also display dissatisfaction as an occupied nation where US troops are stationed. With the demonstration of Japan as the only actor capable of modernizing Asia in the mid-­twentieth century, transcendence of Western civilization was first enacted. In the twenty-­first century, Japan is similarly exhibiting its exclusive capability to curb and transform China. Transforming China into a civilized nation is a task Japan feels confident it can accomplish. Hence, Japan must not represent the West or China, but both China and the West. This statement is true for Japan in the 2010s and the 1920s and embodies the spirit of the WHS rooted in the PoP and emerging from the KSP.39 Absolute nothingness is sufficiently embracive to the extent that other similar forms of Asianism in stock cannot remain idle in the long term. They will return to service after a long interlude. The metaphor of Manchukuo inspires different versions of Asianism to become a single method of self-­denial40 and a method to transcend sovereign order.41 China, in general, additionally inspires a different form of Asianism in the Japanese intellectual circle, which is an Asianism that advocates peace, as exemplified by the liberal Asianist Akira Iriye.42 Once into the cycle, the then incumbent Abe administration submerged completely into the revival of the same WHS spirit. The roadmap for Japan cannot be clearer. It has the goal of becoming a normal state in mind. The Senkaku Islands policy exemplifies Japan’s need and capacity to determine the use of a piece of Asian land. This policy does not reflect useful power politics because it ironically exposes Japan’s vulnerability, or a calculated national interest as China has already provided consent to the joint access to natural gas. Politically inadvertent, the escalation of the issue requires not only the resolve to discipline China but also the promise of US support. Ironically, the US is the

Transcending hegemonic IR theorization   191 last hurdle before Japan can normalize its statehood. Rising above both China and the West was exactly the goal of Abe’s grandfather Nobusuke Kishi (1896 to 1987) during the war. Both Nobusuke and Abe’s granduncle Sato Eisaka (1901 to 1975) were right-­wing prime ministers. The atavism of the Great East Asian Sphere reveals the aversion to China’s estrangement and anti-­Japan sentiment, a parallel to the situation 150 years ago, as well as the present disapproval of Japan on Chinese nationalism. The rise of Japan in the early period was launched by a dispute over Korea’s jurisdiction. This dispute was much greater and more significant than that over Senkaku. Nevertheless, Senkaku symbolizes revival and hope for success in the twenty-­first century. The ideal state that Japan pursues for itself through the Senkaku Islands dispute is a Japan that possesses its own national defense troops. This militarily independent Japan would then deprive the Amer­ican troops of any legitimacy to stay and Japan’s sovereign right to engage in war would then be legalized. The Senkaku Islands dispute thus registers an irrevocable agenda and a renewal of the WHS. Hence, the agenda Japan pursues through the Senkaku Islands is neither Chinese nor Western. The pursuit will not end until it succeeds or fails. This determination is illustrated by the fact that right-­wing politicians have visited the Yasukuni Shrine where war criminals are honored. These and other incessant series of morale boosting campaigns virtually constrain the Abe government from any sign of retreat. A revoking move now would require very strong pressure from the US or China. However, ironically, such pressure, especially from China, is probably exactly what constitutes the origin of Japan’s desire to restore its national defense. If either the current rise of China or the lingering US dominance can defeat the use of the metaphor of the initial rise of Japan in the beginning of the twentieth century over the Korean issue to explain the Senkaku Islands dispute, opposite versions of Asianism will emerge in due time. Taiwan and the adoption of a double-­re-worlding strategy Taiwan is a representative site to practice the philosophy of nothingness because of the country’s uncertain and layered political history. Taiwan’s political regimes have constantly changed along with a population composed of generations of immigrants. Each regime has built upon the basis of another high-­performing regime that was established originally outside of the island. As a result, where historical Japan consciously floats between having European and Chinese characteristics, contemporary Taiwan floats consciously between having Chinese, Japanese, and, after WWII, Amer­ican characteristics. Early suspicions that Taiwan was in a position of in-­betweenness arose during the conflict between China and Japan in the 1930s and the 1940s. To resolve such an inner confrontation, Confucian and colonial Taiwanese intellectual Tsai Peihuo adopted the notion of East Asia from Japan’s imperialism. In actuality, Taiwan in those days was a devout and sincere practitioner of KSP, more than Japan. Proclaimed as the “son of East Asia,” Tsai, still remaining loyal to the Japanese Emperor, imagined Taiwan belonging to neither just Japan nor just China. Tsai’s East Asian stance was by all means a

192   Chih-yu Shih mimicry of the WHS.43 Tsai was imprisoned by the Japanese authorities for the potential harm his thought could do to the combative morale of the Japanese military, with his self-­surrender to an identity of a nobody. The political powerlessness of Tsai during WWII and the shaky regime in Taiwan that followed the war ironically confirmed the principles that a faithful following of the KSP is possible for the subaltern only. Subaltern people usually suffer from incapacity to change the world around them, but this incapacity can also stimulate deeper reflections that motivate learning. This motivation first requires withdrawal from one’s own condition and then entry into another condition to acquire different experiences or self-­knowledge. By contrast, developing a stronger power such as Japan, which practices the WHS, would be similar to constructing a civilizational bridge. When a strong disciple of the WHS preaches lessons to different parts of the world urging mutual learning, this may become a burden of nothingness. Both the partial West and backward China are legitimate targets of the transformation of the WHS. Japan undertook this imagined burden of teaching both sides during the war but did not find success in learning from different sides having already emerged in subaltern Taiwan, which first became a Japanese colony and later as an asylum for the defeated Chinese Civil War regime of the Kuomintang. Nevertheless, the intellectual capacity to deposit the inexpressible feeling of in-­betweenness in the subconscious condition for the time being and then launch an atavistic revival many decades later validates the power of nothingness as a mode of self-­ identification. The unavailing appeal to epistemological tranquility and ontological equality of Tsai’s East Asian childhood continued during the Kuomintang takeover after WWII and then was furthered by Amer­ican intervention in East Asia where the containment of a Communist China imposed a strategic and ideological role for the Kuomintang regime. However, the Kuomintang had its own Civil War agenda/legacy, and, as a result, Taiwan did not become just another Vietnam or another base of containment. Chiang Ching-­kuo, the last Civil War leader, struggled to establish his own platform on which the Cold War mentality and the preparation for a post-­Civil War Taiwan could coexist. The Cold War mentality consisted of the idea of containing China under US leadership, while the preparation for a post-­Civil War Taiwan existed by reconnection with China in opposition to US interests. Similarly, post-­colonial Taiwan had its own independent agenda that was different from the one of the ruling Kuomintang. Although the colonial worldview may have been suppressed under Kuomintang rule, in reality Lee Tenghui was able to capitalize on the decline of the Kuomintang in accordance with a retrieved colonial platform.44 Lee was ready to revive the colonial legacy when conditions matured to the appropriate point. His alienation from China awaited its turn to replace his Chinese qualities influenced by the Kuomintang. While the first hidden agenda was the attempt by Chiang Ching-­kuo to bypass the hegemonic Cold War, the second agenda that carried post-­colonial alienation from the Kuomintang was hidden from the ruling Kuomintang. The second agenda

Transcending hegemonic IR theorization   193 was self-­suppressed by Lee for four decades because of the strategic silencing of the anti-­Chinese identity, which was powerfully bred by Japanese colonialism. The unique double hidden agenda displayed compromises of hiding between the Kuomintang’s post-­Civil War and the US Cold War, and between the post-­ colonials of Taiwan and Kuomintang’s Civil War. These double hidden agendas empirically demonstrated the philosophy of nothingness. Re-­Worlding is the proper method to excavate these hidden agendas to recognize the agency that resists the consecutive rising powers of the ruling regimes that have arrived in Taiwan. The first hidden agenda utilized US Cold War resources for the purposes of Chiang Ching-­kuo to reconnect with China, in addition to the role assigned by the US to contain China. The second hidden agenda was no more than an affective memory, completely unattended and without utterance, ensuring no indication of alienation from China. Therefore, in post-­colonial Taiwan, becoming related to the incumbent power is always more imminent than any platform of rationalism. Each hidden agenda empowers the subaltern in question with a ready subjectivity to act incompatibly with the hegemonic expectation, regardless of a positive judgment toward their hegemonic leader, such as in the case of the Kuomintang toward the US, or a negative judgment, such as in the case of post-­colonial Taiwan toward the Kuomintang. By critically reflecting on the hegemonic discourse, the hidden agenda is ultimately impacting the world agenda, hence worldliness. Taiwan’s uncertain and layered political history prepares its residents efficiently to accept incoming regimes. Thus, the society does not intend to recollect politically incorrect history for its present time. Double-­re-Worlding serves two different generations of PoP, namely, one that arrived before the Japanese colonial rule and the other after the end of it. The self-­suppressed conditions of each of the two generations can usually persevere in the sub-­consciousness and can be retrieved only when the condition has matured for re-­emergence. PoP articulates the condition of layered sub-­consciousness in a consistent rationality of hidden resistance. Taiwan’s condition of double re-­Worlding also provides a more sophisticated case of re-­Worlding. The post-­colonial agenda, which came to power suddenly upon the demise of the Civil War generation, thrives on a pro-­Taiwan independence discourse. Re-­Worlding is no longer a mere resistance to hegemony. Instead, re-­Worlding comprises cycles of hidden agendas, recalled to service from a long-­term, albeit subconscious, memory to resist a substituting, albeit imagined, hegemony. Taiwan’s bifurcated populations, each in support of a particular scheme of re-­Worlding, are conscious of the existence of each other. The decision is about whether or not China is the hegemony to resist. The double-­re-Worlding strategy is contingent upon the identity that is more functional in providing Taiwan’s global representation. This case is different from Japan where the population is not constantly divided. The coexistence of contradicting positions toward the Diaoyutai Islands should not be surprising under this layered circumstance. The Kuomintang changed its position from being the true representative of China that would regain the islands to a non-­Chinese nation that only cares for a peaceful resolution.

194   Chih-yu Shih The pro-­independence force supports Japan’s claim of sovereignty. Partially plagued by the Chinese image of Chiang Ching-­kuo, the US is continuously worried that a pro-­independent Taiwan would desire cooperation with China. With China’s expectations to support Taiwan’s position on the Diaoyutai Islands, Taiwan’s quiet attitude toward the nationalization issue is apparently most serviceable to the acquisition of negative evaluation on China. Likewise, as Sino-­ Japanese relations become extremely weak, Taiwan’s post-­colonial link with Japan contributes best to the representation of a non-­Chinese Taiwan. This re-­Worlding strategy is effectively revealed in Taiwan’s agenda focusing exclusive on fishing rights. The agenda dissolved the political demand for action to confront Japan’s unilateral nationalization of the Diaoyutai Islands and crashed any lingering speculation of Taiwan-­China cooperation for the time being. China and BoR proposition: relationship as a conscious place When the self-­perception of China was at the center of the world during the dynastic period, the application of its tributary system was hardly synchronic. The Qing court, for example, arranged tributary relationships with its neighbors, each according to their own conditions. The Qing followed no single formula, and exemption from a rigid model was the only formula that was applicable in all cases. This arrangement explained why the kidnapping of the king of Ryukyu did not immediately incur a military reaction from the presumably stronger China at that time. For the Qing court, examining President Grant’s proposal was far more rational if the purpose was no more than saving China’s nominal suzerainty over Ryukyu. Subsequent abortion of Grant’s mediation only led to the Qing court’s decision not to take any action with the hope that such inaction would, first, avoid the embarrassment of the Chinese fighting with a small neighbor over a much smaller land and, second, camouflage the embarrassment that China was completely uninterested in its own suzerainty. The relative negligence of the BoR toward principles or values is in contrast with re-­Worlding in the sense that the re-­Worlding philosophy seeks to overcome the heavy dependence of the subaltern on hegemonic sanctioning of economic, political, and ideological partnerships that enforce hegemonic principles or values. By presenting Taiwan’s maneuvering of the US partnership in its own battle with China, a re-­Worlding method for Taiwan brings to the surface the subaltern’s agency hidden in its mimicry of hegemonic discourse. Re-­Worlding is not in China’s favor. Rather, the BoR is the rationality for China to bypass the containment of a rising China contrived by the hegemonic forces. By stabilizing reciprocal relationships on a bilateral basis, with as many neighboring countries as possible, China can offset the challenge of containment. This means that China has to disregard the domestic institutional, ideological, and religious characteristics of its neighboring countries. The BoR is valuable for any newly emerging nation, any rising power in the face of an increasingly expanding and complicated encounter of the world, and any declining hegemony with a relaxed synchronizing imposition to appease allies. The declining hegemonies can

Transcending hegemonic IR theorization   195 include both the late nineteenth century Chinese dynasty and the twenty-­first century US. All of them face an IR full of contradictions. To survive or to proceed, the nation should manage its uncertain environment by avoiding synchronizing relationships that proliferate in its expanding or shrinking scope of negotiation. As China rises, the country precisely faces the challenge of proliferated relationships. The influence of these relationships expands to exert a strong presence in all its neighbors and reaches far into Africa and Latin America. As a result, the existing hegemonic US and its allies sense the threat of the newcomer in being able to transcend boundaries that previously restrained the sphere of influence. Defending the rise in world politics from the rebalance of power by the hegemonic US and soothing anxious neighbors are apparently very different tasks. In addition, a watching Europe that is composed of the self-­regarded moral superpower in West Europe, a post- but anti-­communist East Europe, and a competitive and yet occasionally conveniently allied Russia requires soothing as well. These tasks are not the most complicated, however, when compared with those in anti-­unification Taiwan, recalcitrant North Korea, and assertive right-­ wing Japan, not to mention potentially rebellious Hong Kong. Exemplifying relative nothingness, China’s difficulty in handing very complicated relationships does not arise from its own confused identity, but from the various incongruent roles expected by countries worldwide to be performed by China. In the case of Japan, its international environment has not undergone significant change except during the rise of China that resulted in an identity puzzle forcing Japan to choose aligning either to the West or to the East. This idiosyncratic, internal puzzle compels the Abe government into the conservative side that may send the less conservative sides of national identity into acquiescence, thus repeating a familiar cycle. In comparison, the rise of China proceeds with the art of relationship. In East Asia, relationship management means that China has to cope simultaneously with a Taiwan that intensively asserts its worldliness, a US that anxiously applies some synchronic values/institutions to co-­opt China, and a Japan that ambivalently switches from being a member of Asia, to a junior ally of the US, and to a normal state in the world. The cycles of right-­wing identity in Japan are drawn from the depot of all historical identities. The cycles likewise come from the re-­Worlding strategy of Taiwan to distance itself from Chinese identification and to answer primarily to the call for a clear self-­identity under globalization that is embedded in the hegemonic order and has multicultural sensibilities. This quest for difference brings Taiwan and Japan closer in portraying an estranging China that rises on illiberal politics, which the two former countries oppose. Taiwan’s quest for independence requires no more than a statement of difference, while Japan’s adherence to Western synchronic values imposes a duty to transform China. In line with its relational sensibilities, China has to concede to Taiwan’s liberal arrangement, demonstrating that Taiwan’s return to China would not cause any serious adaptive problems. However, China would resist any liberalization proposed by either Japan or the US. The BoR is alienated from such an interventionary

196   Chih-yu Shih policy. Therefore, BoR requires China to treat liberalism inconsistently, depending on who promotes it. BoR serves as a bridge between the WHS and re-­Worlding because the purpose of BoR in relating strives to bypass sited identities and pushes for alternative sited identities to be recollected from memory. Confronting China’s BoR, for example, Taiwan recollects a dormant colonial identity to support re-­ Worlding of an exclusively non-­Chinese Taiwan. Nevertheless, China’s BoR can also support a pro-­China identity in Taiwan. For example, China can concur to the sovereignty of Diaoyutai Islands with Taiwan’s pledge, given that Taiwan willingly continues to represent China and bypass the colonial identity. To distinguish China’s intended, albeit unsuccessful, compromise to Taiwan and Japan, China has to avoid providing the impression to the US or to other potential parties of territorial conflict, such as Vietnam, the Philippines, and India, that China is ready to yield in the latter cases. China resorts to relationship management. Basically, China proposes joint ventures over disputed territorial seas or islands, with other parties of conflict being able to make their own claim internally. As long as the internal claim is not brought to the bilateral relationship, the claim should not cause concerns from other parties. Before any consensus can be achieved, China resorts to symbolic as well as mixed sanctions to simultaneously show the country’s determination to defend sovereign rights and its willingness to compromise. In the case of the Diaoyudao Islands, China has engaged Japan’s nationalization by patrolling the air and the sea around the islands, by announcing an air defense zone, and by occasional approaching without landing on the islands as if the dispute requires no immediate resolution. China actually demands no more than a statement from Japan that nationalization does not affect the disputed status of the island. The rationale behind the mix of unilateral compromise and the subsequent demand of the other side to yield is to cut cross-­positions. Along with China’s proposal of conflict resolution is the unfailing reiteration that the dispute is bilateral. Hence, any hegemonic intervention can be considered as ill intended and counter-­productive. In short, the Senkaku/Diaoyutai/Diaoyu Islands has limited national interest implications regarding natural gas, which no one has actualized yet. In avoiding the reoccurrence of disputes, joint ventures have been attempted and agreed upon. Therefore, no significant national interests are involved in the dispute. Consider that China has not shown any interest in obtaining the islands from the current occupier Japan. Maneuvering for more power on the islands can be considered disadvantageous to Japan. Strategically, no one is ready or can force a solution. In brief, Japan’s nationalization is apparently premature from the balance of power perspective. However, Japan’s nationalization reflects the desire to recount the rise of the country at the turn of the twentieth century. The ability to determine the fate of the islands is critical to the transcendence of IR, which is dominated by China and the US. Taiwan’s acquiescence over the process of nationalization reflects the quest for the independent representation of an anti-­China identity, which was ironically initially planted by Japanese colonialism. Finally, China’s resort to ambiguity reflects the substitution of relationship for territorial sovereignty.

Transcending hegemonic IR theorization   197 A note on the role of the US as a representative example of “absolute being,” along with the plausible routes of retreat currently unrecognized, can implicate upon the scope of applicability of scientific PoP. To begin, the US’ reiteration of its adherence to freedom of navigation concerning the dispute attests to its ­subscription of synchronizing IR. With that said, the US could support, or restrain, both Japan and Taiwan depending on the bilateral “BoR,” which could demand the two allies to compromise in order to please the US, or alternatively oblige to the US for it to back them up in the struggle against China indiscriminately despite the effect on the freedom of navigation. This BoR consideration could likewise apply to the US-­China relationship so that the two allies serve primarily as strategic dependents to help facilitate China’s proper response expected by the US. Moreover, given China’s continuous rise, it is likely that the US would reduce the freedom of navigation to a peculiar kind of Monroe Doctrine on behalf of Japan to assert the “re-­Worlding” of the islands. All the incidents might play into effect for fast rising China to potentially switch to the place of “absolute being” in the presently unlikely case where the tributary system could re-­emerge with prescribed rules and procedures for other nations to follow.

Conclusion: systemic transcendence over interest and power The PoP propositions do not predict the actual foreign policy or the necessity of nations to behave in certain patterns, given the context of the international structure. The PoP propositions also do not even formulate predictions on how nations will generally behave. However, all three PoP propositions do make predictions about how the system behaves in the long run as well as how asymmetric relationships proceed. Other similar theoretical attempts that are familiar to IR disciples all focus on major power behavior. One noticeable realist example includes the prediction of John Mearsheimer on confrontation during hegemonic transitions,45 as one of the most discussed systemic theories that anticipate the inevitability of confrontation between existing and rising powers. Liberal IR scholar Robert Keohane theorized on institutional functionalism that continuously supports the hegemonic order after the hegemonic power loses the capacity to cover the free-­riders of its order.46 A similar string of constructivist IR exists, as presented by Alexander Wendt who predicts that the system will move toward a world government from where major powers learn rationally together.47 In comparison, the PoP theorization examines the stability of the system. PoP theorization has three specific features that are different from mainstream IR theorization. First, PoP theorization is not a study on how the order between major powers can be established or explained, but instead, the study cares about how nations adapt to major power politics by joining, resisting, appropriating, reconciling, avoiding, transcending, or even defeating them. PoP theorization predicts that the order is never orderly. Second, PoP theorization specifically allows nations to make judgments that will affect systemic behavior. Unlike the majority of IR theories with a structural argument, PoP theorization demonstrates how the structural explanation can accommodate judgmental factors and

198   Chih-yu Shih how nations are capable of thinking and choosing under undecidable circumstances. Third, PoP theorization confronts both purposes and their systemic consequences for all varied nations, while other theories focus primarily on major powers. In summary, the IR theorization, in accordance with PoP, relativizes major power politics and their quest for order that is composed of synchronic values or institutions. By contrast, PoP is premised on non-­synthetic identities in layered or multi-­layered histories. There is no pretension of either a destiny or a destined fate. PoP IRT explains how nations under the influence of major power politics judge their conditions and rely on combined existing cultural resources to determine their place in world politics. PoP predicts that IR’s systemic stability cannot be maintained over a set of congruent identities because history’s longevity allows for previous politically incorrect identities to either return in due time with proper clues or emerge from creative recombinations of old and extant cultural resources. The PoP specifically predicts that nations caught between different identities will experience cycles in their IR, while those with an expansive scope of IR or experiencing a decline from the hegemonic status will adopt the BoR. Less influential nations will practically reinterpret hegemonic order to meet their otherwise inexpressible motivations.

Notes   1 Bret Davis, Brian Schroeder, and Jason M. Wirth, Japanese Continental Philosophy: Conversations with the Kyoto School (Bloomington: Indian University Press, 2011); Robert Wilkinson, Nishida and Western Philosophy (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009); Christopher Goto-­Jones, Re-­Politicising the Kyoto School as Philosophy (London: Routledge, 2007).   2 Arlene Tickner and David L. Blaney, Thinking International Relations Differently (London: Routledge, 2012).   3 Nele Noesselt, “Is There a ‘Chinese School’ of IR?” (Working Paper no. 188, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg, March 2012); Hung-­jen Wang, The Rise of China and Chinese International Relations (IR) Scholarship (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2013).   4 Lily H. M. Ling, The Dao of World Politics: Toward Post-­Westphalian, Wordlist International Relations (Oxford: Routledge, 2014); Tingyang Zhao, “A Political World Philosophy in Terms of All-­under-heaven (Tian-­xia),” Diogenes 56, no. 1 (2009): 5–18.   5 Yaqing Qin, “Guanxi Benwei yu Guocheng Jiangou: Jiang Zhongguo Linian Zhiru Guoji Guuanxi Lilun” [Relationality and processual construction: bring Chinese ideas into IRT], Social Sciences in China 3 (2009): 69–86; Xuetong Yan, Ancient Chinese Thought and Modern Chinese Power, ed. Daniel Belland Zhe Sun, trans. Edmund Ryden (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011).   6 Kosuke Shimizu, “Materializing the ‘Non-­Western’: Two Stories of Japanese Philosophers on Culture and Politics in the Inter-­War Period,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 28, no. 1 (2014): 1–18, doi: 10.1080/09557571.2014.889083; Josuke Ikeda, “Japanese Vision of International Society: A Historical Exploration,” in Is There a Japanese IR? Seeking an Academic Bridge through Japan’s History of International Relations, ed. Kosuke Shimizu, et al. (Ryukoku: Afrasian Centre for Peace and Development Studies, Ryukoku University, 2008), 5–28.

Transcending hegemonic IR theorization   199   7 Kosuke Shimizu, “Nishida Kitaro and Japan’s Interwar Foreign Policy: War Involvement and Culturalist Political Discourse” (Working Paper Series 44, Arasian Centre for Peace and Development Studies, Kyoto, 2009).   8 William Connolly, Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002).   9 Chih-­yu Shih and Josuke Ikeda, “International Relations of Post-­hybridity: Dangers and Potentials in Non-­synthetic Cycles,” Globalizations 13, no. 4 (2016): 454–68. 10 Stephen Tanaka, Japan’s Orient: Rendering the Past into the Future (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). 11 Yu-­kwan Ng, “Juedui wu yu zhexue guannian de dianfan” [Absolute nothingness and the paradigms of philosophical concepts], Zhengguan 56 (2011): 5–28; Wen-­hong Huang, “Xitian jiduolang changsuo luoji de neizai zhuanxiang” [The internal turn in  Nishida Kitaro’s logic of place], National Chengchi University Journal 23 (2010): 1–31. 12 Jan Jindy Pettman, Worlding Women: A Feminist International Politics (London: Routledge, 1996); Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Three Women’s Texts and A Critique of Imperialism,” Critique Inquiry 12, no. 1 (1985): 243–61. 13 Pinar Bilgin, “Thinking Past ‘Western’ IR?” Third World Quarterly 29, no. 1 (2008): 5–23; Albert J. Paolini, Anthony Elliott, and Anthony Moran. Navigating Modernity: Postcolonialism, Identity, and International Relations (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1999). 14 Pinar Bilgin, The International in Security, Security in the International (Oxford: Routledge, 2016); Ling, The Dao of World Politics; Arlene Tickner and Ole Waever, International Relations Scholarship Around the World (London: Routledge, 2009). 15 Zhao, “A Political World Philosophy,” 5–18. 16 Qin, “Guanxi Benwei,” 69–86. 17 Yan, Ancient Chinese Thought. 18 Minshu Liao, “Qingdai zhongguo de waizheng zhisu” [Diplomatic order of Qing China], in Jindai zhongguo: wenhua yu waijiao [Modern China: culture and diplomacy], ed. Luan Jing He (Beijing: Social Science Literature Press, 2012), 130–53. 19 See, for example, Zeming Jiang, “Gaodu zhongshi zhonghua minzu fazhan shi” [Highly stress Chinese national history of development], in Jianming zhongguo lishi duben [Easy readers for Chinese history] (Beijing: Chinese Social Science Press, 2012). 20 Chia-­ning Huang and Chih-­yu Shih, “China’s Quest for Grand Strategy: Power, National Interest, or Relational Security?” The Chinese Journal of International Politics 8, no. 1 (2014): 1–26. 21 Kwang-­kuo Hwang, Foundations of Chinese Psychology: Confucian Social Relations (New York: Springer, 2012). 22 Roger Ames and David Hall, Laozi, Dao De Jing: A Philosophical Translation (New York: Ballantine Books, 2003). 23 Keiji Nishitani, Religion and Nothingness (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983). 24 James W. Heisig and John C. Maraldo, eds., Rude Awakenings: Zen, the Kyoto School, and The Question of Nationalism (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1995); James Hubbard and Paul Swanson, eds., Pruning the Bodhi Tree: The Storm over Critical Buddhism (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1997). 25 Tanaka, Japan’s Orient. 26 David Williams, Defending Japan’s Pacific War: The Kyoto School Philosophers and Post-­White Power (London: Routledge, 2004). 27 Ge Sun, Zhuti misan de kongjian [The space with pervasive subjectivities] (Nanchang: Jiangxi Education Press, 2003). 28 Lily H. M. Ling, Postcolonial International Relations: Conquest and Desire between Asia and the West (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002).

200   Chih-yu Shih 29 Yuzo Mizoguchi, Zhongguo zuowei fangfa [China as method], trans. Lin You-­chong (Taipei: National Institute for Compilation and Translation, 1999). 30 Alan Chong, “An Unfinished ‘Diplomacy of Encounter’: Asia and the West 1500–2015,” Japanese Journal of Political Science 17, no. 2 (2016): 208–31; James Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1990); Arlene B. Tickner and David Blaney, Claiming the International (Oxford: Routledge, 2014). 31 Brantly Womack, China and Vietnam: The Politics of Asymmetry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Chiung-­chiu Huang, “Balance of Relationship: Myanmar’s China Policy,” Pacific Review 28, no. 2 (2015): 189–210. 32 Guizhi Li, Jindia riben de dong yang gai nian: yi zhongguo yu ou mei wei jingwei [The concept of toyo in modern Japan: the two dimensions of China and Euro-­ America] (Taipei: The Research and Educational Center for China Studies and Cross Taiwan-­Strait Relations, National Taiwan University, 2008); Chia-­ning Huang and Chih-­yu Shih, No Longer Oriental: Self and European Characteristics in Japan’s Views on China (Taipei: The Research and Educational Center for China Studies and Cross Taiwan-­Strait Relations, National Taiwan University, 2009). 33 Thomas, A. Parham, “Cycles of Psychological Nigrescence,” The Counseling Psychologist 17, no. 2 (1989): 187–226. 34 Tanaka, Japan’s Orient. 35 Chih-­yu Shih and Chiung-­chiu Huang, “Bridging Civilizations through Nothingness: Manchuria as Nishida Kitaro’s ‘Place’,” Comparative Civilizations Review 65, no. 2 (2011): 4–17. 36 Hsuan-­lei Shao, Zhan hou riben zhi zhongguo yanjiu xipu [Post-­war genealogy of China Studies in Japan] (Taipei: The Research and Educational Center for China Studies and Cross Taiwan-­Strait Relations, National Taiwan University, 2009). 37 Marlène Laruelle, Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008). 38 Shinzo Abe, “Prime Minister of Japan Shinzo Abe ‘Japan is Back’,” CSIS Statesmen’s Forum, accessed March 20, 2013, http://csis.org/press/press-­release/csis-­ statesmens-forum-­prime-minister-­japan-shinzo-­abe-japan-­back. 39 Goto-­Jones, Re-­Politicising the Kyoto School. 40 Yoshimi Takeuchi, “Yoakeno Kuni” [Country of the dawn], vol. 4 of Takeuchi Yoshimi zenshū [Takeuchi Yoshimi complete works] (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1967), 424. 41 See a student of John K. Fairbank, Kenichiro Hirano, The Japanese in Manchuria 1906–1931: A Study of the Historical Background of Manchukuo (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982). 42 See another disciple of Fairbank, Akira Iriye, “Asia and America,” in The World of Asia, ed. Akira Iriye and William J. Miller (St Louis: Forum Press, 1979), 1–11. 43 Chih-­yu Shih, “Taiwan as East Asia in Formation: The Subaltern Appropriation of the Colonial Narrative,” in Taiwanese Identity in the 21st Century: Domestic, Regional, and Global Perspective, eds. Gunter Schubert and Jens Damm (London: Routledge, 2011), 237–57.  44 Yu-­chun Huang, Zai Taiwan yu zhongguo zhi jian—li denthui de sixiang mailuo yu zhongguo renshi [Trajectory of Lee Teng-­hui’s thought and his views on China] (Taipei: The Research and Educational Center for China Studies and Cross Taiwan-­ Strait Relations, National Taiwan University, 2013). 45 John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001). 46 Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). 47 Alexander Wendt, “Why a World State Is Inevitable?” European Journal of International Relations 9, no. 4 (2003): 491–542.

Transcending hegemonic IR theorization   201

Bibliography Abe, Shinzo. “Prime Minister of Japan ShinzoAbe’Japanis Back’.” CSIS Statesmen’s Forum. Accessed March 20, 2013. http://csis.org/press/press-­release/csis-­statesmensforum-­prime-minister-­japan-shinzo-­abe-japan-­back. Ames, Roger, and David Hall. Laozi, Dao De Jing: A Philosophical Translation. New York: Ballantine Books, 2003. Bilgin, Pinar. “Thinking Past ‘Western’ IR?” Third World Quarterly 29, no. 1 (2008): 5–23. Bilgin, Pinar. The International in Security, Security in the International. Oxford: Routledge, 2016. Chong, Alan. “An Unfinished ‘Diplomacy of Encounter’: Asia and the West 1500–2015.” Japanese Journal of Political Science 17, no. 2 (2016): 208–31. Connolly, William. Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002. Davis, Bret, Brian Schroeder, and Jason M. Wirth. Japanese Continental Philosophy: Conversations with the Kyoto School. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011. Goto-­Jones, Christopher. Re-­Politicising the Kyoto School as Philosophy. London: Routledge, 2007. Heisig, James W., and John C. Maraldo, eds. Rude Awakenings: Zen, the Kyoto School, and The Question of Nationalism. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1995. Hirano, Kenichiro. The Japanese in Manchuria 1906–1931: A Study of the Historical Background of Manchukuo. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982. Huang, Chiung-­chiu. “Balance of Relationship: Myanmar’s China Policy.” Pacific Review 28, no. 2 (2015): 189–210. Huang, Chia-­ning, and Chih-­yu Shih. No Longer Oriental: Self and European Characteristics in Japan’s Views on China. Taipei: The Research and Educational Center for China Studies and Cross Taiwan-­Strait Relations, National Taiwan University, 2009. Huang, Chia-­ning, and Chih-­yu Shih. “China’s Quest for Grand Strategy: Power, National Interest, or Relational Security?” The Chinese Journal of International Politics 8, no. 1 (2014): 1–26. Huang, Wen-­hong. “Xitian jiduolang changsuo luoji de neizai zhuanxiang” [The internal turn in Nishida Kitaro’s logic of place]. National Chengchi University Journal 23 (2010): 1–31. Huang, Yu-­chun. Zai Taiwan yu zhongguo zhi jian—li denthui de sixiang mailuo yu zhongguo renshi [Trajectory of Lee Teng-­hui’s thought and his views on China]. Taipei: The Research and Educational Center for China Studies and Cross Taiwan-­ Strait Relations, National Taiwan University, 2013. Hubbard, James, and Paul Swanson, eds. Pruning the Bodhi Tree: The Storm over Critical Buddhism. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1997. Hwang, Kwang-­kuo. Foundations of Chinese Psychology: Confucian Social Relations. New York: Springer, 2012. Ikeda, Josuke. “Japanese Vision of International Society: A Historical Exploration.” In Is There a Japanese IR? Seeking an Academic Bridge through Japan’s History of International Relations, edited by Kosuke Shimizu, Josuke Ikeda, Tomoya Kamino, and Shiro Sato, 5–28. Ryukoku: Afrasian Centre for Peace and Development Studies, Ryukoku University, 2008. Iriye, Akira. “Asia and America.” In The World of Asia, edited by Akira Iriye and William J. Miller, 1–11. St Louis: Forum Press, 1979.

202   Chih-yu Shih Jiang, Zeming. “Gaodu zhongshi zhonghua minzu fazhan shi” [Highly stress Chinese national history of development]. In Jianming zhongguo lishi duben [Easy Readers for Chinese History]. Beijing: Chinese Social Science Press, 2012. Keohane, Robert. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984. Laruelle, Marlène. Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008. Li, Guizhi. Jindia riben de dong yang gai nian: yi zhongguo yu ou mei wei jingwei [The concept of toyo in modern Japan: the two dimensions of China and Euro-­America]. Taipei: The Research and Educational Center for China Studies and Cross Taiwan-­ Strait Relations, National Taiwan University, 2008. Liao, Minshu. “Qingdai zhongguo de waizheng zhisu” [Diplomatic order of Qing China]. In Jindai zhongguo: wenhua yu waijiao [Modern China: culture and diplomacy], edited by Luan Jing He, 130–53. Beijing: Social Science Literature Press, 2012. Ling, Lily H. M. Postcolonial International Relations: Conquest and Desire between Asia and the West. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. Ling, Lily H. M. The Dao of World Politics: Toward Post-­Westphalian, Wordlist International Relations. Oxford: Routledge, 2014. Mearsheimer, John. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001. Mizoguchi, Yuzo. Zhongguo zuowei fangfa [China as method]. Translated by Lin You-­ chong. Taipei: National Institute for Compilation and Translation, 1999. Ng, Yu-­kwan. “Juedui wu yu zhexue guannian de dianfan” [Absolute nothingness and the paradigms of philosophical concepts]. Zhengguan 56 (2011): 5–28. Nishitani, Keiji. Religion and Nothingness. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983. Noesselt, Nele. “Is There a ‘Chinese School’ of IR?” Working Paper No. 188, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg, March 2012. Paolini, Albert J., Anthony Elliott, and Anthony Moran. Navigating Modernity: Postcolonialism, Identity, and International Relations. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1999. Parham, Thomas, A. “Cycles of Psychological Nigrescence.” The Counseling Psychologist 17, no. 2 (1989): 187–226. Pettman, Jan Jindy. Worlding Women: A Feminist International Politics. London: Routledge, 1996. Qin, Yaqing. “Guanxi Benwei yu Guocheng Jiangou: Jiang Zhongguo Linian Zhiru Guoji Guuanxi Lilun” [Relationality and processual construction: bring Chinese ideas into IRT]. Social Sciences in China 3 (2009): 69–86. Scott, James. Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1990. Shao, Hsuan-­lei. Zhan hou riben zhi zhongguo yanjiu xipu [Post-­war genealogy of China Studies in Japan]. Taipei: The Research and Educational Center for China Studies and Cross Taiwan-­Strait Relations, National Taiwan University, 2009. Shih, Chih-­yu. “Taiwan as East Asia in Formation: The Subaltern Appropriation of the Colonial Narrative.” In Taiwanese Identity in the 21st Century: Domestic, Regional, and Global Perspective, edited by Gunter Schubert and Jens Damm, 237–57. London: Routledge, 2011. Shih, Chih-­yu and Chiung-­chiu Huang. “Bridging Civilizations through Nothingness: Manchuria as Nishida Kitaro’s ‘Place’.” Comparative Civilizations Review 65, no. 21 (2011): 4–17.

Transcending hegemonic IR theorization   203 Shih, Chih-­yu and Chiung-­chiu Huang. “Preaching Self-­responsibility: The Chinese Style of Global Governance.” The Journal of Contemporary China 22, no. 80 (2013): 351–65. Shih, Chih-­yu and Josuke Ikeda. “International Relations of Post-­hybridity: Dangers and Potentials in Non-­synthetic Cycles.” Globalizations 13, no. 4 (2016): 454–68. Shimizu, Kosuke. “Nishida Kitaro and Japan’s Interwar Foreign Policy: War Involvement and Culturalist Political Discourse.” Working Paper Series 44, Arasian Centre for Peace and Development Studies, Kyoto, 2009. Shimizu, Kosuke. “Materializing the ‘Non-­Western’: Two Stories of Japanese Philosophers on Culture and Politics in the Inter-­War Period.” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 28, no. 1 (2014): 1–18. doi: 10.1080/09557571.2014.889083. Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. “Three Women’s Texts and A Critique of Imperialism.” Critique Inquiry 12, no. 1 (1985): 243–61. Sun, Ge. Zhuti misan de kongjian [The space with pervasive subjectivities]. Nanchang: Jiangxi Education Press, 2003. Takeuchi, Yoshimi. “Yoakeno Kuni” [Country of the dawn]. Vol. 4 of Takeuchi Yoshimi zenshū [Takeuchi Yoshimi complete works]. Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1967. Tanaka, Stephen. Japan’s Orient: Rendering the Past into the Future. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993. Tickner, Arlene, and David L. Blaney. Thinking International Relations Differently. London: Routledge, 2012. Tickner, Arlene, and David L. Blaney. Claiming the International. Oxford: Routledge, 2014. Tickner, Arlene, and Ole Waever. International Relations Scholarship around the World. London: Routledge, 2009. Wang, Hung-­jen. The Rise of China and Chinese International Relations (IR) Scholarship. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2013. Wendt, Alexander. “Why A World State Is Inevitable?” European Journal of International Relations 9, no. 4 (2003): 491–542.  Wilkinson, Robert. Nishida and Western Philosophy. Farnham: Ashgate, 2009. Williams, David. Defending Japan’s Pacific War: The Kyoto School Philosophers and Post-­White Power. London: Routledge, 2004. Womack, Brantly. China and Vietnam: The Politics of Asymmetry. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Yan, Xuetong. Ancient Chinese Thought and Modern Chinese Power. Edited by Daniel Belland Zhe Sun. Translated by Edmund Ryden. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011. Zhao, Tingyang. “A Political World Philosophy in Terms of All-­under-heaven (Tian-­ xia).” Diogenes 56, no. 1 (2009): 5–18.

11 Conceptual cultivation and homegrown theorizing The case of/for the concept of influence Eyüp Ersoy Introduction Homegrown theorizing in international relations (IR) has recently gained more salience in disciplinary debates thanks to persistent calls for theoretical pluralism in international relations. The fundamental rationale underlying such disciplinary appeals is the consequential absence of theoretical perspectives originating in the worldviews and experiences of human geographies outside the West. Peoples of rich diversity in their historical and contemporary practices in IR are generally relegated to secondary, and even subordinate, analytical categories, such as “the periphery,” in relation to “the West,” despite the unmistakable fact that their dispositions, preferences, and actions have been equally significant in the ultimate outcomes of global processes. The majority of the world, called “the non-­West,”1 who are constitutive of the reality that is called IR are not interpretative of that reality, and are only deemed illustrative for Western theory. Although a corpus of non-­Western theoretical approaches equivalent to that of Western theoretical approaches, in composition, sophistication, and progression has yet to emerge in the discipline, a formative recognition of the necessity and feasibility of constructing indigenous perspectives to understand, explain, and predict international phenomena based on local intellectual sensibilities has incrementally suffused disciplinary discussions. Since the initial step in any social theorizing is pertinent to concepts, studies on homegrown theorizing have necessarily encountered the exigency of engaging conceptual inquiries. Here, first, the essential role of concepts in homegrown theorizing is discussed, and the varieties of native conceptual resources on which homegrown attempts of conceptual cultivation draw are introduced. In addition, the ways through which conceptual cultivation in homegrown theorizing can be performed are presented. Second, a novel definition of the concept of influence is propounded since a rigorous and systematic conceptual cultivation of influence is still lacking in IR literature despite its perfunctory extensive usage. Besides, a special analytical emphasis is given to the relationship between influence and power. In the final section, conceptual exclusivity in homegrown theorizing and the analytical shortcomings it creates are critically discussed, and the explanatory potential of the concept of influence in homegrown theorizing is assessed, and affirmed.

Conceptual cultivation of influence   205

Conceptual cultivation and homegrown theorizing The indispensability of concepts in theorizing in social sciences arises from the simple methodological necessity that concepts “are some of the main building blocks for constructing theoretical propositions.”2 Concept formation is ontologically crucial in identifying the phenomena and defining their attributes to be theorized. Accordingly, concepts determine the ontological contours of theory construction and the ensuing theoretical analysis by signifying certain phenomena with preconceived properties in social reality by simultaneously excluding some other phenomena or by excluding some other properties of the same phenomena from the process of theory construction. The construction of concepts, on the other hand, is a dynamic process that is subject to innovations, revisions, disputations, and contestations, more often than not susceptible to analytical confusion.3 In this study, I prefer “conceptual cultivation” instead of the more mechanical term of “concept construction” inasmuch as concepts are like living things embedded in the systems of meaning they are “planted,” to which they acclimate in constantly transmuting varieties with outcomes ranging from sprouting to flourishing and sometimes to withering, semantically speaking. As a case of conceptual cultivation in international studies, a passionate theoretical debate on the nature and extent of security persists. Security is an “essentially contested concept,”4 argues Barry Buzan, whereas for David A. Baldwin, “security is more appropriately described as a confused or inadequately explicated concept than as an essentially contested one.”5 Essentially complicated or not, security is a cultivated concept in IR. Depending on the referent object of security, or the unit of analysis, the scope of security research has been explored from “rice security” to “space security.” It has also been “cultivated” at different levels of analysis: encompassing human/individual security, societal security, state/national security, regional security, international security, and global/world security.6 Among the conceptual derivations of security eliciting extensive analytical interest is ontological security, which refers “to the need to experience oneself as a whole, continuous person in time-­as being rather than constantly changing-­in order to realize a sense of agency.”7 Another derivative concept constituting the basis of an influential school in security studies, i.e., the Copenhagen School, is securitization.8 In brief, conceptual cultivation of security has proved to constitute a fertile research agenda in IR. Conceptual cultivation in theoretical studies in pursuit of devising indigenous analytical frames of reference is preceded, as it seems, by a self-­reflexive process of exploring and exploiting native conceptual resources.9 Among conceptual resources, first, the notions and convictions of classical thinkers in non-­Western contexts are revisited, reinterpreted, and reconfigured to develop indigenous approaches to IR. This reflects a similar formative trajectory in the emergence of Western IR theory, which claims to represent an intellectual pedigree originating in the works of historical figures from Thucydides onwards. In the Chinese context, for example, the ideas of Sun Tzu and Confucius are recurrent themes

206   Eyüp Ersoy of studies on homegrown approaches, while in the Indian context, the views of Kautilya, also called Chanakya, are habitually drawn upon.10 Second, historical traditions of thought, beliefs, and conventions are invoked instead of particular sages or scholars. Accordingly, for instance, Confucianism instead of Confucius, and Islamic thought instead of Ibn Khaldun are appropriated as conceptual resources.11 Historical experiences of non-­Western peoples and polities are reflected upon to reveal authentic modes of thought and action in IR.12 There can be other conceptual resources of equal analytical import in homegrown theorizing, such as foundational civilizational/cultural texts, foreign policy doctrines of political leaders, and contemporary state of affairs in IR.13 In conceptual cultivation, what is of consequence is not the morphology of a concept but its semantics. For instance, referring to the concept of influence as nufūḏ/nofooz (transliterations of the same word ‫ ذوفن‬in Arabic and Persian respectively) in an Arabic, Iranian, or in general, Islamic context does not spontaneously impart indigeneity to the concept. The semantic criteria for the indigeneity of influence in these contexts is its peculiar meanings with authentic connotations. Drawing on local conceptual resources, conceptual cultivation for homegrown theorizing can be performed in five distinct ways.14 First, a researcher can engage in novel conceptualization by appropriating a common linguistic unit, be it a word or a phrase, and attributing idiosyncratic properties to it, effectively rendering the word or phrase into a concept. Security is a common word employed in everyday language, and yet with the ascription of unique qualities, it is translated into a concept in international studies through a myriad of conceptualizations. These qualities, nonetheless, may not be necessarily derived from already existing indigenous conceptual resources inasmuch as these qualities constitute indigenous qualities in and of themselves as parts of the novel conceptualization. Second, a researcher can redefine a concept already in use in Western theorizing by virtue of imparting indigenous properties to it. For example, one can reconceptualize human security by reconfiguring its referents as belief/religion, life, wealth/property, procreation/offspring, and mind/intellect from an Islamic perspective, the protection and preservation of which is considered the ultimate purpose of Islamic jurisprudence. Third, a researcher can take a non-­conceptual derivative of a concept, which is again already in use in Western theorizing, usually in its adjectival form or phrasal alteration, and attribute indigenous characteristics to it. In Western theorizing, securitization and human security are two foremost examples, and the same approach is equally valid, at least in theory, for non-­Western theorizing. Fourth, a researcher can opt for an indigenous concept, and apply it to theoretical undertaking in its authentic sense or senses (a concept in a sophisticated tradition of thought can acquire multiple meanings in the process of intellectual speculation). Harmony is a cultivated concept in Chinese political philosophy, and its referral in its original sense(s) in studies of China’s IR is, for the most part, a preference to establish a coherent conceptual framework for indigenous theoretical approaches. Fifth, on the other hand, revising its authentic sense(s), a researcher can redefine an indigenous concept for analytical

Conceptual cultivation of influence   207 purposes, such as its application in a different level of analysis or its application to a different unit of analysis.

Conceptual cultivation of influence In the lexicon of the discipline of IR, influence is a ubiquitous word that is yet to be rigorously conceptualized, and it is a phenomenon in international politics that is yet to be extensively theorized. This is a curious disciplinary case for some reasons. First, “sphere of influence” as a phrase has been in use in the academic literature since it was first coined at the Berlin Conference (1884–85), which divided the African continent into the “spheres of influences” of European colonial powers.15 In other words, it is not a novel conceptual innovation nor is it recently incorporated into the discipline of IR from other disciplines. Second, concepts similarly in use in the IR literature like power and security have been excessively studied in the discipline both theoretically and empirically to the extent that these studies have constituted separate literatures of their own.16 Third, influence as an uncultivated concept has been extensively employed in academic as well as non-­academic studies becoming an inseparable part of the IR literature. In most of these studies, however, there appears to be no attempt to formulate and clarify the concept of influence, that is, no attempt for conceptualization, and the meaning of influence is just assumed as self-­evident, or the author’s understanding of the concept of influence is implicit within the text and can only be inferred indirectly from the text. Therefore, with regard to influence, there seems to be a conceptual and theoretical underdevelopment in IR literature, which requires, above all, a systematic and yet lucid conceptual cultivation of influence. On the other hand, influence, as a phenomenon, is inherently related to power in IR, and is frequently confused with it. Accordingly, introducing a distinct definition of influence necessitates differentiating the two concepts. Hence, power needs to be clarified first. “Power, like love, is easier to experience than to define or measure,” Joseph S. Nye, Jr. poetically acknowledges.17 Nonetheless, the enticing challenge of defining or measuring power, like love, has been embraced by scholars of IR with ardor. Scholars of IR have depended on divergent conceptions of power in their analyses, and there has yet to be a consensus on a common definition. These diverse conceptions of power frequently challenged, contradicted, complemented, and overlapped each other. It is no surprise that the simple linguistic characteristics that two ontologically distinct entities can be signified by the same concept is lost in the exhaustive conceptual debates on power. Power is a polysemous word essentially signifying two ontologically discrete phenomena, and thus having two distinct meanings. There have been attempts to define these two discrete phenomena with two different concepts. One early attempt came from Raymond Aron, who pointed out that “French, English and German all distinguish between two notions, power and force (strength), puissance et force, Macht und Kraft,” analogous to the Turkish notions of kudret and kuvvet.18 To Aron, it did not seem “contrary to the spirit of these languages to reserve the first

208   Eyüp Ersoy term for the human relationship, the action itself, and the second for the means, the individual’s muscles or the state’s weapons.”19 A similar dichotomy has recently emerged distinguishing between the action itself and the means with the concepts of “power-­over” and “power-­to,” though the precise and unanimous definitions of “power-­over” and “power-­to” have yet to be agreed upon among scholars.20 Even so, two conceptions of power, one pertinent to the means of interaction, and the other pertinent to the outcome of interaction, are discernable. The first conception of power, which can be called “power as capacity” (Power I), refers to the material and non-­material, tangible and intangible, resources possessed, and employed if need be, by an actor to have an effect on the outcome of a process of interaction. This conception of power is espoused, for instance, by John J. Mearsheimer. According to Mearsheimer, while others “define power in terms of the outcomes of the interactions between states,” by asserting that power “is all about control or influence over other states,” for him power “represents nothing more than specific assets or material resources that are available to a state.”21 The second conception of power, on the other hand, which can be called “power as capability” (Power II), refers to the ability of an actor to have an effect on the behavioral outcome of a process of interaction. Accordingly, while power as capacity can be ascertained at any point, in and before a process of interaction, power as capability can only be ascertained at the end of a process of interaction. Although most conceptions of power appraise power as a capability, they differ on the causal mechanism through which certain resources possessed by a state are translated into the ability of state to have an effect on the behavioral outcome of an interaction. I argue that the nexus translating “power as capacity” (Power I) into “power as capability” (Power II) is influence. In the scholarly literature of IR, influence is in widespread circulation, employed to denote various international phenomena ranging from the international “influence of potato” to “influence warfare” between terrorists and governments.22 It may refer to policy behaviors of various actors ranging from single personalities to international organizations.23 In most of the research, influence is employed in the basic senses of effect or control, in a similar fashion Kenneth N. Waltz observes regarding the concept of “reification.” He argues that such “loose use of language or the employment of metaphor” serves limited purpose other than “to make one’s prose more pleasing.”24 In some other research, however the author’s understanding of influence is implicit within the text, and can only be inferred indirectly from the text. The word “influence,” coming from Latin means “flowing into,” akin to its Turkish translation nüfuz, which, coming from Arabic, means “penetration.” There are tentative definitions, or at least definitional attempts, for influence in IR literature. An ambiguous definition, for example, was introduced by Frederick H. Hartmann according to whom influence was simply “unconscious power.”25 To Hartmann, “in a more formal sense, power is the strength or capacity that a sovereign nation-­state can use to achieve its national interests,” and “the very existence of power has an effect,” meaning that “no state can ignore

Conceptual cultivation of influence   209 the possibility that the power of another state will be used.”26 Accordingly, he clarifies, “the power of that other state is in effect used, and plays some part both in the initial formulation of policies and in the subsequent relations of the states concerned, even where it is not intentionally put to use.”27 In short, influence, as unconscious power, ensues. Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, on the other hand, provide a circular definition of influence. They argue  a state’s influence (or capacity to influence or coerce) is not only determined by its capabilities (or relative capabilities) but also by (1) its willingness (and perceptions by other states of its willingness) to use these capabilities and (2) its control or influence over other states.28  This oblique definition of influence, it seems, confuses more than it clarifies.29 A study on regional security strategies in Southeast Asia introduces a novel concept, “balance of influence,” based on a conception of influence as encapsulating  a range of other modes and means [than military and economic resources] by which states with relatively less preponderance of power may still wield the resources and capacity to shape their strategic circumstances by virtue of status, membership, normative standing, or other persuasive abilities.30  According to Evelyn Goh, the conception of “balance of influence” permits researchers “to expand the number of key reference points from which they may compare resources, and highlights that a state’s influence and power may come as much from ideational sources as from material sources.”31 Goh’s conceptualization treats influence as a derivative of non-­material instruments and sources of interstate diplomacy. Another study defines influence in a footnote as “power as control over actors,”32 and then refers to Jeffrey Hart’s definition of control over actors, i.e., “the ability of A to get B to do something which he would otherwise not do.”33 This definition of power was originally Dahl’s definition of power.34 The author acknowledges this definition as the standard definition of power, as evident in the works of David A. Baldwin35 and Nye, Jr.36 Although these scholars regard it as a definition of power, not influence or control, he argues that “this [definition] lumps together two related but distinct elements.”37 Ironically, in his attempt to define influence as a distinct element, he concludes by subsuming influence with power under the same definition. As a final example, in his entry of Influence to the Encyclopedia of Power, Keith Dowding indicates two different definitions of influence. In the first definition, influence “is usually considered a form of verbal persuasion,” in the sense that “information given by A to B will change B’s decision. That information influences B’s decision.”38 Here, influence is considered a subset of power. In the second, influence is defined as “the socially induced modification of behavior” and thus, distinct from power, i.e., “structurally determined abilities to change behavior,”39 According to Dowding, “such a demarcation between power and influence is only definitional,” and “whether influence is a subset of power

210   Eyüp Ersoy or a different category altogether is only of any interest if the difference has any effect on the manner in which we examine and explain society.”40 This rather equivocal and evasive evaluation of the distinction between two concepts is unfortunate since it fails to deliver any conceptual clarity between influence and power. Despite its extensive usage in scholarly studies in IR, a systematic conceptualization of influence presenting a perspicuous definition of influence and a coherent exposition of its relationship with power is arguably still underdeveloped in the literature.41 Here I propose that influence can be defined as the effect of actor A (henceforth A) over the decision of actor B (henceforth B) through A’s involvement in the decision-­making process of B. Therefore, influence is not a cause; it is an effect. In addition, it is not a potentiality; it is an actuality. A has influence over B insofar as the decision of B reflects the preference of A that would otherwise not been reflected. This definition of influence depends on a basic assumption that a state’s foreign policy behavior is not a necessary outcome of a state’s automatic response to external stimuli. More importantly, a state’s foreign policy is assumed to be invariably a contingent outcome of a decision-­making process that is susceptible to involvement of other states and actors in different degrees, ways, and forms. The pervasive confusion in understanding and explaining power, influence, and the relationship between the two originates in the conflation of their points of reference. While power can be about both decision and behavior depending on its type (Power I or Power II); influence is exclusively about decision. This conceptual ambiguity can be noticed, for example, in Thomas C. Schelling’s discussion of forcible action. According to Schelling, “the only purpose [of inflicting suffering], unless sport or revenge, must be to influence somebody’s behavior, to coerce his decision or choice.”42 For Schelling, as it seems, altering the behavior of somebody and altering the decision of somebody are identical. However, the act of taking a decision and the act of taking an action, even when it is based on that decision, are two ontologically distinct acts despite being temporally sequential. Taking a decision, let’s say, to drink water and taking an action of drinking water are two separate personal acts. By the same token, taking a decision to invade a country and taking an action of invading a country are two separate international acts.43 Simply, deciding to do something is one thing while doing that thing is another. Since there is always a processual mechanism through which a decision is or is not translated into an action, the underlying assumption of most conceptions of power that there is a spontaneous translation of decision into behavior is empirically erroneous. Needless to say, enacting a decision, and thereby translating it into behavior is contingent upon a multitude of factors.44 Nevertheless, the concurrent use of the concepts of influence and power in a great many studies evinces the general understanding of the inherent association between them. Most of the studies use power and influence conjointly,45 some talk of “power without influence,”46 some talk of “influence without power,”47 and some talk of “influence of power.”48 This inherent association in the form of

Conceptual cultivation of influence   211 Power I

Influence Intervening Factors

Power II Intervening Factors

Figure 11.1  The nexus between Power I, Influence, and Power II.

a process connecting power as capacity (Power I), influence, and power as capability (Power II) can be formulated in a simple fashion. Power I, as mentioned before, refers to the material and non-­material, tangible and intangible, resources possessed and employed by A to have an effect on the behavioral outcome of a process of interaction with B by means of having an effect on the decision of B. While the ultimate objective of A exercising Power I is to have an effect on the behavior of B, the proximate objective of A exercising Power I is to have an effect on the decision of B. The mere act of exercising Power I does not necessarily culminate in producing an effect on the decision of B due to intervening factors that condition the translation of Power I into an effect on the decision of B. Influence, as mentioned before, is the effect of A over the decision of B through A’s involvement in the decision-­making process of B by virtue of exercising Power I. Accordingly, in verbal form, to influence means to have an effect on the decision of B by virtue of exercising Power I. In adjectival form, being influential means having an effect on the decision of B by virtue of exercising Power I. It is imperative to distinguish between influence act and influential act here. Influence act is a volitional act with whose exercise an effect on the decision of B is intended. On the other hand, influential act is a volitional act with whose exercise an effect on the decision of B is achieved. Another significant point to stress here is that both A and B are willful agents in possession of the essential attribute of agency, that is, the capacity of making a decision. Accordingly, in this sense, non-­willful, that is, non-­self-conscious, entities cannot be a party to an influence relationship, neither as a subject nor as an object. Both A and B are necessarily willful agents. Power II, as mentioned before, refers to the ability of A to have an effect on the behavioral outcome of a process of interaction with B by means of having an effect on the decision of B. There are two highly significant points that need articulation. The first is the relationship between influence and Power II. Influence as the effect Capacity of A

Decision of B

(Power I)

Behavior of B/Capability of A

(Influence) Intervening Factors

(Power II) Intervening Factors

Figure 11.2  Transition mechanism from Power I to Influence to Power II.

212   Eyüp Ersoy of A on the decision of B is not the cause of Power II as the ability of A to have an effect on the behavior of B. There is not a causal relationship between the two as Figure 11.1 would suggest. Influence and Power II are ontologically distinct and yet require each other to exist; they are like the two sides of the coin. Only with influence, can Power II come into existence, and Power II exists as long as influence exists. The second is that influence is a necessary condition for Power II, but not a sufficient condition. For Power II to exist, influence must exist in advance; still, the prior existence of influence does not necessarily lead to Power II. In other words, the effect on the decision of B (influence) does not necessarily lead to an effect on the behavior of B (Power II) due to intervening factors that condition the translation of decisional effect (influence) into behavioral effect (Power II). The respective points of reference for Power I, influence, and Power II are shown below.

Influence and homegrown theorizing An empowered disciplinary unanimity has emerged in IR on the West-­centric, and specifically Eurocentric, disposition of prevailing theorizing. It is argued, for example, that “the bald fact of Western dominance” is beyond controversy in the established IR theory that manifests itself in “two obvious, and partly reciprocal, ways.”49 Implicitly relating to the questions of epistemology and ontology in theorizing, the first, the scholars continue, “is the origin of most mainstream IRT in Western philosophy, political theory and/or history. The second is the Eurocentric framing of world history, which weaves through and around much of this theory.”50 Epistemological privileging of Western modes of knowledge production entrenches cognitive patterns postulating Western superiority in both the theory and practice of IR. This privilege treatment is trenchantly criticized from several viewpoints. Mohammed Ayoob, for instance, contends that in the discipline “power translates into domination in the sphere of the manufacturing and reproduction of knowledge. Domination in the arena of knowledge further legitimatizes inequality in the international system.”51 In terms of the ontological foundations of West-­centrism/Eurocentrism of IR theory, the defiant conviction is that “theories about the structures, processes, and events that define and recur within the international realm are based to a large extent on the history of the European states system and its role in world affairs since the sixteenth century.”52 As a result of this exclusive entitlement of Western epistemology and ontology for “conceivable” theorizing in IR, the discipline is now considered predominantly hegemonic.53 Table 11.1  Points of reference for Power I, Influence, and Power II Power I Influence Power II

Resources Decision Behavior

Conceptual cultivation of influence   213 In order to challenge, transform, and transcend the hegemony of the West in IR theorizing, persistent calls with numerous propositions are put forward. It is suggested, for example, that greater attention be paid “to the genealogy of international systems, the diversity of regionalisms and regional worlds, the integration of area studies with IR, people-­centric approaches to IR, security and development, and the agency role of non-­Western ideas and actors in building global order.”54 In a similar vein, arguing that the discipline of IR is “dominated by Western modernity that is premised upon a self-­other binary in which the other’s identity must be negated and agency be denied,” another scholar calls for the decolonization of IR theory for a “democratic ontology.”55 Another strand of research with an avowed interest in promoting homegrown theorizing has concomitantly focused on the state of the discipline periodically reviewing theoretical developments in non-­Western contexts, as well as in the West for purposes of comparison.56 Indeed, a diverse array of studies advancing homegrown theoretical perspectives that are predicated on conceptual cultivations appropriating indigenous conceptual resources have been proffered. Most of these studies, nonetheless, have evinced an analytical proclivity to expound a particular set of international phenomena observable in non-­Western contexts with a particular native concept or a set of native concepts, forging an exclusive and immutable semantic affiliation between the concept and what it signifies. For example, in the Chinese context, two indigenous concepts, tianxia and harmony, have been cultivated by Chinese scholars in a quite elaborate manner to exclusively explain China’s understanding and associated practice of IR.57 Transmuting conceptual indigeneity into conceptional idiosyncrasy, this insular practice of homegrown theorizing, called conceptual exclusivity here, can incur manifold degenerative shortcomings. First, it can readily reproduce the intellectual tendency of formulating analytical propositions only to constitute seemingly neutral and objective theoretical foundations for the promotion of parochial and subjective interests, both ideational and material, of the agents of theorizing, effectively retrogressing to problem-­solving theorizing. It is argued, for example, that demonstrating “how non-­Western alternatives [to the Westphalian system] can be even more state-­centric,” the reconceptualization of tianxia by Chinese scholars “presents a popular example of a new hegemony where imperial China’s hierarchical governance is up-­dated for the twenty-­first century.”58 Second, in the pursuit of theoretical pluralism, conceptual exclusivity would culminate in theoretical particularism, which, in turn, would stimulate theoretical exceptionalism, treating each non-­Western context singularly. As an example, one of the three components of contemporary Chinese exceptionalism, according to Feng Zhang, is harmonious inclusionism, which  can be most effectively examined by tracing three recent discourses in China’s intellectual circles: the application of the ancient idea of “harmony with difference” (he er butong), the ongoing official discourse on the “harmonious world” (hexie shijie), and the popular “neo-­Tianxiaism” (xin tianxia zhuyi).59 

214   Eyüp Ersoy The irony here is that the indigenous concepts of harmony and tianxia are cultivated by Chinese scholars only to postulate the exceptional character of China’s vision, and thus practice, of IR. Theoretical particularism predicated on the exclusive semantic association of certain indigenous concepts with certain indigenous practices is liable to theoretical, and practical, exceptionalism. Furthermore, exceptionalism predicated on conceptual exclusivity is bound to constrain the receptivity of homegrown theoretical perspectives in other non-­Western contexts in both theoretical premises and practical implications. Third, in the quest to transcend West-­centrism of IR theorizing, indigenous conceptual exclusivity becomes susceptible to duplicating the elemental dichotomous reasoning arguably underlying Western theorizing, albeit in native forms of dichotomies. As an example, again from the Chinese context, it is asserted “if modern Western cosmopolitanism is an important ideological source of Western IR, traditional Chinese cosmopolitanism embodied in the tianxia system is a vital force shaping the way Chinese people think about IR.”60 As opposed to Western cosmopolitanism whose “simple and abstract assumptions” conceal “selfish national interests under the slogan of ‘universal good’,” the advocates of Chinese cosmopolitanism argue that Chinese cosmopolitanism  takes “tianxia” (the whole world) as an indivisible public domain and considers the world’s problems in the context of the whole world, enabling Chinese thinking to go past national interests for the interest, value and responsibilities of this world as a whole in the long-­term.61  Accordingly, they claim that Chinese cosmopolitanism “is inclusive, and favors culture over force, and free-­choice over coercion.”62 The irony here is that one of the most universal concepts of IR theorizing, that is, cosmopolitanism, is redefined with indigenous attributes only to advance a dichotomy comprised of two cosmopolitanisms with ethnocentric connotations. To avoid the above shortcomings, indigenous theoretical approaches in IR can be propounded in congruence with different ways of conceptual cultivation. In this research, the second way of conceptual cultivation is adopted, which refers to redefining a concept already in use in Western theorizing by virtue of imparting indigenous properties to it. On the other hand, temporal and spatial embeddedness of theorizing in IR is in fact compellingly argued. The proverbial articulation of this position is perhaps Robert W. Cox’s assertion that “theory is always for someone and for some purpose.”63 Nonetheless, such embeddedness is not antithetical to the temporal and spatial omnipresence of the phenomena that is being theorized. Even though concepts and their attributes are fashioned indigenously, and display temporal and spatial subjectivity, the phenomena they signify can be in objective existence in a broad temporal and spatial spectrum, such as conflict and cooperation. The seeming discrepancy between objective phenomena and subjective concept delivers an analytical space, which is imperative to surmount the prohibitive semantic inflexibility of conceptual exclusivity in homegrown theorizing. For example, influence acts are not confined to certain

Conceptual cultivation of influence   215 temporal and spatial domains. Insofar as there are actors trying to affect the decisions of others, there are influence acts, and if they succeed, influence. Furthermore, influence acts can still reveal temporal and spatial variations with reference to different criteria, such as the actors involved, and the means employed, which enables the indigenous theorizing of influence with authentic attributes in discrete non-­Western contexts.

Conclusion The analytical departure point for homegrown theorizing is conceptual inquiries. Drawing on different indigenous conceptual resources, conceptual cultivation for homegrown theorizing can be performed in a number of ways. Indeed, incipient studies advancing homegrown theoretical perspectives predicated on authentic conceptual cultivations have been put forth for various non-­Western contexts. Notwithstanding, in most of these studies, an analytical proclivity to expound a particular set of international phenomena observable in non-­Western contexts with a particular native concept, forging an exclusive and immutable semantic affiliation between the concept and what it signifies, is noticeable. Conceptual exclusivity, as it is called here, can culminate in prohibitive semantic inflexibility potentially frustrating the progress in homegrown theorizing. A conceptual cultivation of influence is articulated here to provide further homegrown theoretical approaches a framework, which is potentially less prone to such exclusivity. Conceptual cultivation of influence transcends conceptual exclusivity by way of establishing an analytical framework, which can be local in conceptual view and, at the same time, universal in theoretical purview. By virtue of a variety of parameters transforming global governance structures in contemporary IR, peoples and states of the non-­West are no longer just quiescent objects of influence acts, and are incrementally evolving into assertive subjects of influence acts. Most IR theorists, it was once argued, “believe that studying the Western experience alone is empirically sufficient to establish general laws of individual, group, or state behavior irrespective of the point in time or the geographical location,” and “few look to the Third World to seek evidence for their arguments.”64 The conviction seems to persist. However, challenging this conviction on theoretical grounds has implications beyond theory inasmuch as influence is existentially consequential for non-­Western societies and states. Conceptual cultivation of influence in non-­Western contexts with authentic qualities is of critical analytical utility to inquire into the varying dynamics, forms, and outcomes of influence acts for specific non-­Western contexts. It has equal analytical value to investigate asymmetrical influence structures in IR repeatedly proved to be eviscerating for non-­Western societies and states. Besides, influence acts are equally operational in interactions among non-­ Western contexts, which expands the scope of the relational variations of influence acts, simultaneously requiring and enabling indigenous conceptual cultivations of influence.

216   Eyüp Ersoy

Notes   1 There are indeed several analytical categories employed in the discipline to identify and differentiate human geographies in IR with distinct and usually incongruent empirical scopes and normative connotations. One overarching classificatory template is the binary division of the world into two, one category being assigned to what is called “the West,” and the other category being assigned to “what-­is-not-­the-West.” The second category has been called the third world, the global south, the rest, and the developing world, among others. Abiding by the denomination that seems to have achieved widespread recognition in studies of and on homegrown theorizing, in this study “the non-­West” is preferred.   2 Gary Goertz, Social Science Concepts: A User’s Guide (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2006), 1. Concurring with Goertz, another scholar adds that “concepts are the building-­blocks of all inferences, and the formation of many concepts is clearly, and legitimately, theory-­driven.” John Gerring, “What Makes a Concept Good? A Critical Framework for Understanding Concept Formation in the Social Sciences,” Polity 31, no. 3 (1999): 364. Emphasis in original.   3 See, for example, Leonidas Tsilipakos, Clarity and Confusion in Social Theory: Taking Concepts Seriously (Farnham: Ashgate , 2015). For example, in different theoretical fields of IR, the concept of structure is attributed distinct meanings. Even in the sub-­fields of the same theory, structure would have come to assume very different meanings. Accordingly, in the absence of sedulous assessment, analytical confusion is bound to ensue.   4 Barry Buzan, People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Problems (Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books, 1983), 6.   5 David A. Baldwin, “The Concept of Security,” Review of International Studies 23, no. 1 (1997): 12. Also see, Benjamin Miller, “The Concept of Security: Should it be Redefined?” Journal of Strategic Studies 24, no. 2 (2001): 13–42.   6 For some examples, see, Amy Freedman, “Rice Security in Southeast Asia: Beggar Thy Neighbor or Cooperation,” The Pacific Review 26, no. 5 (2013): 433–54; Kai-­ Uwe Schrogl et al., eds., Handbook of Space Security: Policies, Applications and Programs (New York: Springer, 2015); Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh and Anuradha Chenoy, Human Security: Concepts and Implications (Oxford: Routledge, 2007); Paul Roe, Ethnic Violence and the Societal Security Dilemma (Oxford: Routledge, 2005); Norrin M. Ripsman and T. V. Paul, Globalization and the National Security State (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010); Thomas G. Mahnken and Dan Blumenthal, eds., Strategy in Asia: The Past, Present, and Future of Regional Security (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014); Karin M. Fierke, Critical Approaches to International Security (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015); Ken Booth, Theory of World Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).   7 Jennifer Mitzen, “Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma.” European Journal of International Relations 12, no. 3 (2006): 342. It is asserted, for example, that  while physical security is (obviously) important to states, ontological security is more important because its fulfillment affirms a state’s self-­identity (i.e., it affirms not only its physical existence but primarily how a state sees itself and secondarily how it wants to be seen by others). And furthermore, “nation-­states seek ontological security because they want to maintain consistent self-­concepts, and the ‘Self ’ of states is constituted and maintained through a narrative which gives life to routinized foreign policy actions.” Brent J. Steele, Ontological Security in International Relations: Self-­Identity and the IR State (Oxford: Routledge, 2008), 2–3. For an application of ontological security in a non-­ Western context see, Catarina Kinnvall, Globalization and Religious Nationalism in India: The Search for Ontological Security (Oxford: Routledge, 2006).

Conceptual cultivation of influence   217   8 For a recent application of securitization in a non-­Western context see, Mely Caballero-­Anthony, Ralf Emmers and Amitav Acharya, eds., Non-­Traditional Security in Asia: Dilemmas in Securitisation (Oxford: Routledge, 2016).   9 For example, Aydınlı and Mathews suggest that homegrown theorizing “address an existing body of literature, but [find] a gap or inconsistency in that literature and then [add] to that existing literature with concepts derived out of the local context and case.” Ersel Aydınlı and Julie Mathews, “Periphery Theorising for a Truly Internationalised Discipline: Spinning IR Theory out of Anatolia,” Review of International Studies 34, no. 4 (2008): 702. 10 For some examples, see, Yan Xuetong, “Xun Zi’s [Sun Tzu] Thoughts on International Politics and Their Implications,” Chinese Journal of International Politics 2, no. 1 (2008): 135–65; Yan Xuetong, Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2011); P. K. Gautam, “Relevance of Kautilya’s Arhasastra,” Strategic Analysis 37, no. 1 (2013): 21–8. 11 See, among others, Cho-­yun Yuan-­Kang Wang, Harmony and War: Confucian Culture and Chinese Power Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011); Feng Zhang, “Confucian Foreign Policy Traditions in Chinese History,” The Chinese Journal of International Politics 8, no. 2 (2015): 197–218; Deina Abdelkader, Nassef Manabilang Adiong and Raffaele Mauriello, eds., Islam and International Relations: Contributions to Theory and Practice (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016); Jack Kalpakian, “Ibn Khaldun’s Influence on Current International Relations Theory,” The Journal of North African Studies 13, no. 3 (2008): 363–76. 12 See, for example, Victoria Tin-­bor Hui, War and State Formation in Ancient China and Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); David C. Kang, “Hierarchy and Legitimacy in International Systems: The Tribute System in Early Modern East Asia,” Security Studies 19, no. 4 (2010): 591–622. 13 In terms of homegrown theorizing in India, see, for example, Kautilya, The Arthashastra (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 1992); Aspy P. Rana, The Imperatives of Nonalignment: A Conceptual Study of India’s Foreign Policy Strategy in the Nehru Period (Delhi: Macmillan, 1976); Sreeram S. Chaulia, “BJP, India’s Foreign Policy and the ‘Realist Alternative’ to the Nehruvian Tradition,” International Politics 39, no. 2 (2002): 215–34. 14 The following discussion draws, in part, on Gonca Biltekin, “Özgün teori inşası ve batı-dışı uluslararası ilişkiler teorileri [Homegrown theorizing and non-­western international relations theories],” in Uluslararası ilişkiler teorileri [International relations theories], ed. Ramazan Gözen (İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık, 2014), 517–64. 15 Asa Briggs and Patricia Clavin, Modern Europe, 1789-Present (Oxford: Routledge, 2013), 129. Also see, Lloyd C. Gardner, Spheres of Influence: The Great Powers Partition Europe, from Munich to Yalta (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1993); Susanna Hast, Spheres of Influence in International Relations: History, Theory and Politics (Farnham: Ashgate, 2014). 16 There is now “security studies” as a sub-­discipline in IR, involving conceptual and substantial analyses of security. See, for example, Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen, The Evolution of International Security Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Paul D. Williams, ed., Security Studies: An Introduction (Oxford: Routledge, 2013); Alan Collins, ed., Contemporary Security Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Peter Hough, Shahin Malik, Andrew Moran, and Bruce Pilbeam, eds., International Security Studies: Theory and Practice (Oxford: Routledge, 2015). 17 Joseph S. Nye Jr., Power in the Global Information Age: From Realism to Globalization (Oxford: Routledge, 2004), 53. 18 Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), 48. Emphasis in original. 19 Aron, Peace and War, 48.

218   Eyüp Ersoy 20 Keith Dowding, ed., Encyclopedia of Power (California: SAGE, 2011), 521–4. Also see, Pamela Pansardi, “Power to and Power over: Two Distinct Concepts of Power,” Journal of Political Power 5, no. 1 (2012): 73–89. 21 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001), 57. 22 Redcliffe Salaman, The History and Social Influence of the Potato (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); James J. F. Forest, ed., Influence Warfare: How Terrorists and Governments Fight to Shape Perceptions in a War of Ideas (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2009). 23 See, for example, Joas Wagemakers, A Quietist Jihadi: The Ideology and Influence of Abu Muhammad al-­Maqdisi (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Jeffrey H. Norwitz, ed., Pirates, Terrorists, and Warlords: The History, Influence, and Future of Armed Groups around the World (New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2009); Robert I. Rotberg, ed., China into Africa: Trade, Aid, and Influence (Baltimore: Brookings Institution Press, 2008); Alex Warleigh and Jenny Fairbrass, eds., Influence and Interests in the European Union: The New Politics of Persuasion and Advocacy (London: Europa Publications, 2002); Astrid Boening, Jan-­Frederik Kremer, and Aukje Van Loon, eds., Global Power Europe-­Vol. 2: Policies, Actions, and Influence of the EU’s External Relations (Heidelberg: Springer, 2013); James Raymond Vreeland and Axel Dreher, The Political Economy of the United Nations Security Council: Money and Influence (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 24 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Long Grove: Waveland Press, 2010), 120. 25 Frederick H. Hartmann, The Relations of Nations (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1969), 43. 26 Hartmann, The Relations of Nations, 41. 27 Hartmann, The Relations of Nations, 41. 28 Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism, and Beyond (Needham Heights: Allyn & Bacon, 1999), 64. Italics added. 29 The confusion here is the authors’ circular assertion that a state’s influence is determined by its influence! 30 Evelyn Goh, “Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing Regional Security Strategies,” International Security 32, no. 3 (2007–8): 147. This is an example of the third way of conceptual cultivation, that is, taking a non-­conceptual derivative of a concept in use in Western theorizing, and attribute indigenous characteristics to it in phrasal alteration. 31 Goh, “Great Powers.” 32 Jeremy Pressman, “Power without Influence: The Bush Administration’s Foreign Policy Failure in the Middle East,” International Security 33, no. 4 (2009): 149–79. 33 Jeffrey Hart, “Three Approaches to the Measurement of Power in International Relations,” International Organization 30, no. 2 (1976): 291. 34 Dahl, “The Concept of Power,” 202–3. 35 David A. Baldwin, “Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends versus Old Tendencies,” World Politics 31, no. 2 (1979): 161–94. 36 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Paradox of Amer­ican Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go it Alone (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). 37 Jeremy Pressman, “Power without Influence: The Bush Administration’s Foreign Policy Failure in the Middle East,” 150. The quotation is from the footnote. 38 Dowding, Encyclopedia of Power, 342. 39 Dowding, Encyclopedia of Power, 342. 40 Dowding, Encyclopedia of Power, 342. 41 As a matter of fact, some noteworthy attempts to that end have been made from the perspective of sociology and political science. For a detailed presentation of these

Conceptual cultivation of influence   219 studies, see Ruth Zimmerling, Influence and Power: Variations on a Messy Theme (Dordrecht: Springer, 2005). 42 Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 2. 43 See, for example, Michael J. Sullivan III, Amer­ican Adventurism Abroad: 30 Invasions, Interventions, and Regime Changes since World War II (Westport: Praeger, 2004); Bradley F. Podliska, Acting Alone: A Scientific Study of Amer­ican Hegemony and Unilateral Use-­of-Force Decision Making (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2010); Ahmed Ijaz Malik, US Foreign Policy and the Gulf Wars: Decision Making and International Relations (London: I. B. Tauris, 2015). 44 In terms of underbalancing, see, for example, Randall L. Schweller, Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2008). 45 See, for example, Dimitrios G. Kousoulas, Power and Influence: An Introduction to International Relations (Monterey: Wadsworth Publishing, 1985); John M. Rothgeb, Defining Power: Influence & Force in the Contemporary International System (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993); Juliet Kaarbo, “Power and Influence in Foreign Policy Decision Making: The Role of Junior Coalition Partners in German and Israeli Foreign Policy,” International Studies Quarterly 40, no. 4 (1996): 501–30; Ann L. Phillips, Power and Influence after the Cold War: Germany in East Central Europe (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000); Robert E. Hunter, Integrating Instruments of Power and Influence: Lessons Learned and Best Practices (Santa Monica: RAND, 2008); Deborah E. de Lange, Power and Influence: The Embeddedness of Nations (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Tore T. Petersen, Anglo-­Amer­ican Policy toward the Persian Gulf, 1978–1985: Power, Influence, and Restraint (Eastbourne: Sussex University Press, 2015); Lorenzo Kamel, Imperial Perceptions of Palestine: British Influence and Power in Late Ottoman Times (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2015). 46 See, for example, Tuomas Forsberg and Antti Seppo, “Power without Influence? The EU and Trade Disputed with Russia,” Europe-­Asia Studies 61, no. 10 (2009): 1805–23. 47 See, for example, Donald M. Mckale, “Influence without Power: The Last Khedive of Egypt and the Great Powers, 1914–1918,” Middle Eastern Studies 33, no. 1 (1997): 20–39; Carr Ungerer, “Influence without Power: Middle Powers and Arms Control Diplomacy during the Cold War,” Diplomacy and Statecraft 18, no. 2 (2007): 393–414. 48 See, for example, Alfred Thayer Mahan, Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783 (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1918); Rick Fawn, “Alliance Behavior, the Absentee Liberator and the Influence of Soft Power: Post-­communist State Positions over the Iraq War in 2003,” Cambridge Review of International Relations 19, no. 3 (2006): 465–80; Alice V. Monroe, ed., China’s Foreign Policy and Soft Power Influence (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2010). 49 Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, “Why is There No Non-­Western International Relations Theory? An Introduction,” in Non-­Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and beyond Asia, ed. Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan (Oxford: Routledge, 2010), 6. Nonetheless, there are some studies contending that the discipline of international relations is not wholly dominated by the US, if not by the West. See, for example, Helen Louise Turton, International Relations and Amer­ican Dominance: A Diverse Discipline (Oxford: Routledge, 2016). 50 Acharya and Buzan, “Why is There No Non-­Western International Relations Theory?,” 6. 51 Muhammed Ayoob, “Inequality and Theorizing in International Relations: The Case for Subaltern Realism,” International Studies Review 4, no. 3 (2002): 27. Also see, Navid Pourmokhtari, “A Postcolonial Critique of State Sovereignty in IR: The Contradictory Legacy of a ‘West-­centric’ Discipline,” Third World Quarterly 34, no. 10

220   Eyüp Ersoy (2013): 1767–93. It is further asserted that even several critical IR theorists, despite being so much critical of the West, ascribe to West-­centrism in a form of “subliminal Eurocentrism” as “their analyses are for the White West and for Western Imperialism in various senses.” John M. Hobson, “Is Critical Theory Always for the White West and for Western Imperialism? Beyond Westphalian towards a Post-­racist Critical IR,” Review of International Studies 33 (2007): 93. Emphasis in original. 52 Sandra Halperin, “International Relations Theory and the Hegemony of Western Conceptions of Modernity,” in Decolonizing International Relations, ed. Branwen Gruffydd Jones (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006), 43. Also see, Turan Kayaoglu, “Westphalian Eurocentrism in International Relations Theory,” International Studies Review 12, no. 2 (2010): 193–217. 53 For one example, Arlene B. Tickner calls the discipline as having a (neo)imperialist structure. See, Arlene B. Tickner, “Core, Periphery and (Neo)Imperialist International Relations,” European Journal of International Relations 19, no. 3 (2013): 627–46. For a more condemning study, see, Errol A. Henderson, “Hidden in Plain Sight: Racism in International Relations Theory,” Cambridge Review of International Relations 26, no. 1 (2013): 71–92. 54 Amitav Acharya, “Dialogue and Discovery: In Search of International Relations Theories beyond the West,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 39, no. 3 (2011): 619. 55 Ching-­Chang Chen, “The Absence of Non-­Western IR Theory in Asia Reconsidered,” International Relations of the Asia-­Pacific 11, no. 1 (2011): 16. 56 See, for example, Arlene B. Tickner and Ole Waever, eds., International Relations Scholarship around the World (Oxford: Routledge, 2009); Rosa Vasilaki, “Provincialising IR? Deadlocks and Prospects in Post-­Western IR Theory,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 41, no. 1 (2012): 3–22. 57 For examples of the conceptual cultivations of tianxia and harmony by Chinese scholars, and their critique from different perspectives, see, William A. Callahan, “Chinese Visions of World Order: Post-­Hegemonic or a New Hegemony?” International Studies Review 10, no. 4 (2008): 749–61; Allen Carlson, “Moving Beyond Sovereignty? A Brief Consideration of Recent Changes in China’s Approach to International Order and the Emergence of the Tianxia Concept,” Journal of Contemporary China 20, no. 68 (2011): 89–102; Feng Zhang, “The Rise of Chinese Exceptionalism in International Relations,” European Journal of International Relations 19, no. 2 (2011): 305–28; Chih-­yu Shih, Sinicizing International Relations: Self, Civilization, Intellectual Politics in Subaltern East Asia (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); Nele Noesselt, “Mapping the World from a Chinese Perspective? The Debate on Constructing an IR Theory with Chinese Characteristics,” in Constructing a Chinese School of International Relations: Ongoing Debates and Sociological Realities, ed. Yongjin Zhang and Teng-­chi Chang (Oxford: Routledge, 2016), 98–112. For the concept of guanxi, see, for example, Emilian Kavalski, “Guanxi and Relational International Relations,” (paper presented at the 2nd All Azimuth Widening The World of IR Theorizing Workshop, Ankara, Turkey, September 23–24, 2016). In another study, Chih-­yu Shih discusses the concepts of nothingness, worlding, and BoR to explain the foreign policy outlooks of Japan, Taiwan, and China respectively. Chih-­yu Shih, “Transforming Hegemonic International Relations Theorization: Nothingness, Worlding, and Balance of Relationships,” (paper presented at the 2nd All Azimuth Widening The World of IR Theorizing Workshop, Ankara, Turkey, September 23–24, 2016). 58 Callahan, “Chinese Visions,” 759. 59 Zhang, “The Rise of Chinese,” 312. The other two components are great power reformism and benevolent pacifism. See, Zhang, “The Rise of Chinese,” 310. Emphasis in original.

Conceptual cultivation of influence   221 60 Wang Yiwei and Han Xueqing, “Why is There No Chinese IR Theory? A Cultural Perspective,” in Constructing a Chinese School of International Relations: Ongoing Debates and Sociological Realities, ed. Yongjin Zhang and Teng-­chi Chang (Oxford: Routledge, 2016), 62. 61 Yiwei and Xueqing, “Why is There No Chinese IR Theory?,” 62. 62 Yiwei and Xueqing, “Why is There No Chinese IR Theory?,” 62. Emphasis in original. 63 Robert W. Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 10, no. 2 (1981): 128. Emphasis in original. To Cox, “all theories have a perspective,” and “perspectives derive from a position in time and space, specifically social and political time and space.” See, Cox, “Social Forces.” 64 Stephanie G. Neuman, “International Relations Theory and the Third World: An Oxymoron?” in International Relations Theory and the Third World, ed. Stephanie G. Neuman (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), 2. In addition, to Neuman, “even central concepts [in IR theory] such as anarchy, the state, sovereignty, rational choice, alliance, and the international system are troublesome when applied to the Third World.” Neuman, “International Relations Theory.”

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12 Conclusion Toward a global discipline Ersel Aydınlı and Gonca Biltekin

This volume and the workshop from which it originally emerged began its exploration of “homegrown” theorizing by posing a number of initial questions. Among the most fundamental of these were, is there truly a need for post-­ Western theory and, if there is, can there in fact be such a thing as a post-­ Western “homegrown” theory? Contributors to this volume as well as participants to the workshop mostly agreed with our assessment of mainstream international relations (IR) theory as deficient in accurately reflecting, let alone, predicting, global political events or trends. As echoed in the preceding chapters, they also considered the optimal way of addressing that crisis is by “widening” the world of IR, and that such a widening is most feasible through a de-­ monopolizing of IR theorizing. As editors of this volume, we proposed “homegrown theorizing” as the best way to achieve this de-­monopolization, as it may help generate the needed global level knowledge accumulation that would naturally be more reflective of actual global affairs. Beyond the points above however, the chapters in this volume and the discussions in the workshop focus on a wide array of issues and took various positions. The term “homegrown” itself and the definition we proposed for “homegrown” theorizing—theorizing in the periphery out of peripheral experiences and perspectives—was an issue of contention. Since readers might also doubt the appropriateness of this definition, in this conclusion chapter, before presenting some thoughts on the main questions discussed throughout this volume and on some of the issues that continue to warrant discussion, we would like to revisit this definition and its appropriateness. One major question was how to locate “the periphery.” Normally, within any scholarly discipline, the “periphery” could arguably be defined widely as whomever or whatever issue is deemed to be systematically marginalized or excluded from the core. For example, this could include scholars geographically located at the epicenter of the core, but who nevertheless feel that they, or the research interest they would like to prioritize, are not treated with equal importance, and thus their scholarly inquiries do not receive equal access to the core IR discipline’s attention and resources. Concerns and elaborations about European IR show how many who appear to comfortably reside in the core can still feel and be marginalized. Therefore, although in our own chapter we narrowed down our sample to works from outside the US and

Conclusion: toward a global discipline   227 Europe, the volume as a whole does not equate “periphery” to any geographical/ ideological or epistemological “location.” Another related concern about the definition was how to differentiate theories out of periphery experiences/ideas versus core experiences/ideas. We understand that theories and paradigms have always had diversified intellectual sources, and that every idea is hybrid. Our use of tentative binary categories such as Western/ non-­Western or periphery/core were intended to point out the differences so that we can start redressing inequalities rather than denying similarities and establishing hierarchies. Therefore even “the most core” or “the most periphery” idea should not be assigned “purity.” Nevertheless, even though all ideas are hybrid, they are not hybrid in the same way. In other words, all ideas travel to some extent, but they do not visit the same places, not in the same order, hence are not equal in terms of their evolution and composition. We can try and find out about just how mixed they are by attempting a genealogy. Our typology presented in this volume is a guide to doing that. The third point of contention is about the meaning of theorizing. We think of “theorizing the periphery” as a distinct intellectual activity, that is different from “thinking” about the periphery or “speaking” from the periphery. We define “theorizing the periphery” as periphery being the empirical or intellectual foundation upon which a theoretical construct has been based. This is distinct from thinking/writing about the periphery, because one can still think about periphery without making it one’s standpoint while thinking. It is in this last sense that the periphery has not truly been theorized (yet) even though people (from the periphery or the core) may think and write about the periphery, and some of them may even claim to have represented the periphery by doing so. In other words, is there any theory emanating from the periphery that is comparable to the realist/liberal theories based on the European state system or Amer­ican hegemony? Or any such periphery-­based theories comparable to the Frankfurt School, which is inspired by the existential angst of leftist academics over the WWII experience? Our definition of “theorizing the periphery” as theorizing in and about the periphery helps guide us toward searching for this specific form of “thinking” or “speaking,” because it is what is genuinely lacking in the IR scholarship. The periphery is already a legitimate object of study (if you do it with a core perspective) and the peripheral scholar has already acquired some agency (even when she or he writes about the periphery, as long as she or he uses a core perspective). What we do not have is reception and respect toward a peripheral perspective, whether it studies the core or the periphery.

Case for homegrown theorizing The above points bring us to the question of why we think homegrown theorizing constitutes the most efficient method to “widen” the world of IR. First, simply, we think it is the most conducive to innovation. Theorizing in the periphery is not limited to homegrown theorizing—periphery scholars are interested

228   Ersel Aydınlı and Gonca Biltekin in all forms of contemporary IR theories and they may use them to understand and/or explain any phenomena, but we believe innovation is more likely to happen while doing homegrown theorizing because studying one’s direct circumstances is more practical. We have observed that most periphery scholars are interested in understanding what is going on within their geography more than anything else. Our recent study showed how much Turkish IR scholars are immersed in the study of Turkish foreign policy, and similarly, Chinese scholars study China’s rise more than anything else. In this heightened atmosphere of debate and interaction it seems more likely that something original will emerge. It is hard to imagine that if Morgenthau and Waltz had been encouraged to think not about the US and its power, that they would have produced anything innovative. Second, we believe that both the empirical material derived from such a practice as well as the intellectual/affective environment of the periphery itself will give rise to distinct conceptualizations. Even the most critical of perspectives have an underlying standpoint that shapes the scholar using it to understand and explain the social and political dynamics at play. We think homegrown theories will generate new standpoints and therefore provide some intellectual maneuverability to scholars all over the world. Having said that, these practicalities should not be understood as an excuse to limit the work of any periphery scholar to the study of the periphery. The very act of theorizing itself involves expanding the implications of one’s own thinking to other cases. A theory cannot be a theory if it does not apply to any other case. Despite its European origin, balance of power explains some of what has been going on the Middle East or elsewhere, otherwise it wouldn’t be called a theory. So homegrown theories would certainly have to have relevance to other parts of the world. What we highlight by defining homegrown theorizing in the way we do, is its intellectual and empirical origin, rather than the limits of its applicability, hence the label homegrown: it is cultivated at home, but can be planted and eaten anywhere. So “thinking about the world” is not dichotomous to “theorizing the periphery.” We think focusing on the periphery as the theoretical origin rather than the world has the most fruitful potential. Beyond the fundamental questions of whether we need a homegrown theory and, if so, how should we define it, the chapters in this volume and the discussions in the workshop focus on a wide array of issues and took various positions. Some of these additional questions explore issues of relevance and contribution, such as, if there is to be something known as “homegrown” IR theorizing, what are the best ways of making homegrown theory relevant? Is it by emphasizing predictive capacity? Or drawing on evidence-­based knowledge? Should it aim to redefine existing concepts? Ask entirely new questions? Or perhaps present new ontologies? Moreover, assuming the goal of “homegrown” theorists is to have global alternative voices recognized and respected within the core IR community, further questions emerged about what has really been stopping home­ grown theories from moving into and becoming a respectable part of the core IR theory. To what extent have the problems stemmed from core practices and to

Conclusion: toward a global discipline   229 what extent from problems and issues within the “local” IR communities themselves? Essentially, how can local IR communities best engage with IR theory and thus seek to overcome the traditional negligence by the core IR community? Questions such as these naturally sparked discussion on the potential risks of engaging in “homegrown” theorizing and led to still further questions on the possible pitfalls, for example, by promoting homegrown theorizing are we neglecting what already exists? What exactly does originality mean in homegrown theorizing? In the name of “homegrown” theorizing are we simply being thrown into an anti-­Western approach? Is there a risk of misrepresenting local concepts? In addition to such conceptual or philosophical risks, practical ones were also raised. For example, in the name of homegrown theorizing, might local IR communities make themselves vulnerable to local governmental use and abuse—as some see as having occurred in Turkey when an apparent “home­ grown theory” became the basis for Turkish foreign policy in the 2000s and is now considered by many to have been a disaster politically. Or even within IR communities themselves, might homegrown theorizing be divisive? Again in Turkey, the very question of whether homegrown theorizing is the right thing to do has its own potential divisive impact, as some scholars push back with calls for integrative efforts—contributing by studying what has been studied in the core. Clearly questions abound, both fundamental and more pragmatic. The chapters in the volume all address these questions in one way or another—either directly, or indirectly by example. While definite “answers” to these questions are not easy to agree on, the following sections provide a general overview of the conclusions drawn here, grouped into three main categories: ways of proceeding with homegrown theorizing; pitfalls to homegrown theorizing; and practical recommendations for addressing the inherent challenges.

Ways of proceeding Assuming that most people can agree on the value of having some form of homegrown theorizing, the definitions of what that means and, consequently, the understandings of how to proceed with doing it, are varied. It should be first recognized perhaps, that any decisions about how to proceed when engaging (or not) in homegrown theorizing—which audience to address, what to focus on—can be seen as reflecting not only broader local disciplinary pressures, but individual issues of identity. Those who prioritize theorizing, whether through application or through efforts at original conceptualizing, may at some level also be identifying themselves within their local IR disciplinary community as “Western” or even Amer­ican. In some areas, for example, in a post-­colonial society like Taiwan, whose national identity is increasingly about trying to make a distinction between Chinese and Taiwanese, such an Amer­ican product may serve as a useful reference point to demonstrate that Taiwan is not Chinese. This example illustrates again the need to consider the purpose of theory building when then trying to suggest which way to do it, and leads to asking new,

230   Ersel Aydınlı and Gonca Biltekin c­ oncrete questions such as: does the researcher want to uphold his or her own culture against a colonial background or does she or he want to contribute to ongoing debates by adding new authentic ideas and concepts? Three main ways of proceeding can be defined: homegrown theorizing can be useful for a particular function (theorizing about the periphery alone, but useful to all); it can be useful for a particular people (theorizing by people from the periphery alone, but applied to anything they choose); or it can be useful for all (stemming from the periphery but open for use by whoever chooses), and for whatever purposes they deem relevant. The last of these is obviously the widest understanding and reflects the belief of some that more limited interpretations, such as theorizing only about the periphery, constitute a self-­imposed limitation. Such a broader view argues that homegrown theorizing should also be able to say something about the core and about the relationship between the core and periphery. At the same time, the overwhelming sense that emerged from discussions at the workshop was one of moderating expectations about whether this “ideal,” broad view of homegrown theorizing is feasible. As one scholar somberly asked, “are we attaching ourselves to traditional or non-­traditional theories and enlarging them or do we have grand ambitions to develop a theory that everybody will just jump in and follow?” To which he himself responded, “That is not going to happen.” Reflecting this pessimism, there is a widespread tendency to assume a more moderate approach to homegrown theorizing, particularly with respect to goals of seeking true “originality.” The manifestation of this moderate approach to “originality” is basically a call to not cut oneself off entirely from what has been already done, in other words, to not isolate periphery “homegrown theorizing” from mainstream theories, debates, and agendas. At the most cautious edge is the position that trying to make original, completely new, non-­Western theories is an overly ambitious goal, and that the most realistic route is to aim for better integration with the main traditional theories by asking new questions that contribute to existing theoretical debates. This cautious perspective also warns against an overly dichotomous depiction of West and non-­West, and a subsequent competitive desire to win out over the other side. Instead of tearing down the very thing that the periphery seeks to be a part of, the argument goes, periphery IR theorists should focus on how best to contribute to core/Western theorizing in order to help overcome its shortcomings. At the same time, it’s worth noting that at least some alternative voices call for a less cautious approach, and emphasize the need to contest mainstream claims. Referencing Albert Hirschman’s piece titled “paradigms as a hindrance to understanding,” these voices warn of the imprisoning impact of paradigms, and instead encourage the “global south” to “do its own thing.”

Pitfalls The discussion of originality serves as an appropriate segue to the issue of pitfalls that might strike homegrown theorizing efforts, as a commonly mentioned

Conclusion: toward a global discipline   231 pitfall is that of repetitiveness. In other words, while striving to produce something original, one may inadvertently repeat something that has already been said elsewhere. This is of course not a pitfall that only homegrown theorists out of the periphery might face, however one particular risk for the homegrown theorists focused on here is that of overlapping with critical voices within the Western theoretical tradition. While some may see this as a possible risk, one should also admit that critical approaches themselves are not immune from the core’s monopolizing and exclusive instincts. At this time, many of the most immediate challenging issues in IR are emerging from within the periphery, and have not been adequately conceptualized yet by the critical voices any more than they have been by traditional core IR theorists. Through socialization and geography, most critical voices are still the product of distinct core communities, and are therefore just as limited as is traditional core scholarship in terms of a lack of deep familiarity with the periphery, linguistic, and cultural limitations, and proneness to careerism. There is no immediate reason therefore to expect something significantly different out of this paradigm simply because it is labeled “critical.” Two other potential pitfalls may be mentioned here, the first of which is fragmentation. Is there a need for a kind of theory or theorizing to match each and every identity? Should there be one for every nation state or every region? While there appears no doubt that opening up IR theorizing to multiple voices would be positive for the discipline and for conceptualizing efforts, does one run the risk of creating a race for everyone to “have a theory” of their own? In what may already be seen as a fragmented field, this could be seen as posing a potential for still further fragmentation. However, while some people may see this as a risk, it is arguably one worth taking in order to see the global potential of homegrown theorizing. Indeed, one might even say that it is unscholarly to worry about such a “chaos of ideas.” We must first live through such a chaos; experience a free competition among those ideas, and then see which ones stick and which ones do not. Moreover, the fear of such fragmentation seems to also assume a clear relevance of IR theory to real IR issues—as if during such a period of theoretic overabundance, the real world will suffer. This is unlikely. The presence or lack or excessiveness of IR theories is not the primary factor behind world events, and the world will not become problem-­free if we avoid a fragmentation of theories. We have the time therefore, to work through a period of chaotic theory production at the global level. Finally, homegrown theorizing efforts may run a risk of politicization, as political elites seek to hijack academic knowledge and theories for their own purposes. First it is worth noting that it is not only periphery IR theorists who need to remain vigilant against such a potential risk—if indeed there is one. More importantly though, it is not a proven assumption that IR theorizing is the problem here. In cases like the Turkish one cited above, or that of US administrations drawing on neo-­conservative IR theories or realist theories to support various foreign policy initiatives, the fault, if there is one, lies not in the existence of those theories, but in the intentions of the practitioners. Such risks in

232   Ersel Aydınlı and Gonca Biltekin practice should not therefore be used as cautionary or preventative excuses against scholarly production.

Practical recommendations Turning to the responses to meeting the many challenges to homegrown theorizing in the periphery, many begin at the pedagogical level. Among the ideas raised at the workshop was the concrete recommendation to first begin preparing students for theorizing by starting with the basics, such as “how do you ask questions? What is a research question? How do you make arguments and hypotheses?” other recommendations began with more philosophical questioning of pedagogical practices in IR theory in the periphery, such as the extent to which Western IR is allowed to remain hegemonic in undergraduate and graduate teaching practices. From this discussion stemmed suggestions to consider producing new textbooks designed from a specifically non-­Western point of view. As one scholar pointed out, this would help bypass the “tiring process of teaching Western IR theories first and then deconstructing them.” Still other participants advised that periphery IR theorists draw on the experiences of IR theorists from the United States and Europe. Given that the emphasis even in the core IR discipline only shifted in the 1950s and 1960s to creating a theory of international politics, the experience is a recent enough one that scholars in the periphery might take inspiration from looking at how these earlier colleagues discussed and created theories. Of course, such modeling need not be one of blind acceptance, as other participants pointed out the value of challenging authority and hierarchy as a means for moving homegrown theorizing ahead. One cannot ignore the fact that IR is not a neutral discipline, and that “particular modes of socialization, the effacement of colonialism, Eurocentrism, the silences of race, gender and class, all need to be accounted for.” The challenge, they pointed out, is not that theoretical work does not exist in the periphery, but that there is a need to identify the many different strands of such work being done, and “bring them into a serious conversation with other existing strands.” An example of how the challenging of authority has taken place in the past was presented with the case of the German IR journal, Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen. It was pointed out how, by launching the journal and by introducing with it the practice of double-­blind peer review, young German IR scholars were able to revolutionize the IR discipline in their country. The peer review process took away the existing authority and power of the established disciplinary elite, and opened the door for a new, more just manner of judging quality scholarship in the field. Finally, broad consensus among the participants was able to be found in the idea that even without firm, unanimous agreement on the above issues of how to theorize, from where or for whom, to what degree of abstractness, or what level of “homegrownness” one should aspire, there is undoubtedly a need for organizing. Without organization among periphery IR theorists, there will be limited chance of materializing into a collective enterprise.

Conclusion: toward a global discipline   233 All of these recommendations seek to create a context in which homegrown theorizing can take place and, ultimately, contribute to global IR scholarship. While it may seem like the emphasis in this volume has been on the creation of new theories, in fact what would be the most important benefit of homegrown theorizing is that it might serve to free our minds from existing exclusive perspectives, existing exclusive circles, and existing monopolizing questions, definitions, and terminologies. Homegrown theorizing may help us move from a world of franchised IR theorizing along the lines of McDonalds or Starbucks, to one of Michelin-­level IR theorizing—wherein the former seek standardization while the latter are open to cultivating local products, tastes, and perspectives. If we are ever sincere with the idea of widening the world of IR to pull IR theory out of its current crisis, the core must not only listen to the voices of others, but also must actively seek those voices and provide them with opportunities to be heard. At the same time, periphery scholars must undergo critical self-­ reflection to try and overcome the many quality problems that do exist. They must work to combat methodological poverty in the periphery, and synchronize with the core on the “art” of doing IR theory—not the ideas—so that the core can be deprived of the argument that nothing of quality comes out of the periphery. Then, and only then, will we begin to see a true widening of IR.

Index

Page numbers in bold denote tables. absolute identity 183 absolute nothingness 180, 182–90 Acharya, Amitav 2, 88, 90 African collectivism 150 African scholars 6, 143, 144, 148 African solidarity norm 148 African Union, the 149–50 Africanist 151 Agency 110 ahimsa 19; see also non-violence ahistoricism 71 alterative homegrown theories 6, 22 American hegemony 5, 42, 45, 227 American Political Science Association (APSA) 8, 46 Americanization 84, 177 American–style methodology 124–5, 135 Anarchophilia 71 asabiyah 21 Asianism 187–8 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 23 Association of Southeast Asians Nations (ASEAN) 23 authentic homegrown theories 18, 25, 27, 60, 69 auto-communication 164, 166–7 autopoiesis 166 balance of influence 209 balance of power 19, 88, 167, 182, 185, 196, 228 behaviouralists 46 BoR 178, 180–2, 185, 196; BoR Proposition 186, 188, 194 Buddhism 19 Bumi 83, 85–6, 94n2

Buzan, Barry 2, 59, 88, 205 Center for Graduate International Studies (CGIS) 84 chiikishi 123; see also regional history China 90, 92, 104, 106–7, 110–12, 123–4, 125, 133–5 –137, 147, 177–85, 187–97 Chinese balance of relationships 7, 178; see also BoR Chinese cosmopolitanism 214 Chinese hegemony 113 Chinese international relationship 181 Chinese School 18, 133, 177, 181 ci hai 107 ci yuan 107 clash of civilizations 24 colonialism 62, 151, 184, 193; Japanese 196 concept of influence 204, 206–7 concept of theorizing, the 68 conceptual cultivation 204–7, 213 –215; of influence 204, 207, 215 conceptual exclusivity 7, 204, 213–15 Conceptual Systematic Schema for Foreign Policy 88 Confucianism 19, 24, 49, 181, 206; Chinese Confucianism 180 Confucius 24, 108, 205, 206 constructivism 6, 86, 88, 161–2 Copenhagen Peace Research Institute 18 Copenhagen School, the 18, 89, 164, 205 core, the 2, 3, 4, 7, 16, 18, 23, 27–8, 60–1, 63, 66, 71–2, 134, 145, 151, 163, 226–7, 229–31, 233; countries 89; IR community 62, 67, 228–9; IR discipline 226, 232; IR theory 228; theory 3, 25 critical discourse analysis 162

Index   235 cultural friction 132–3 cultural interdependence 165 cultural internationalism 129–30 cultural othering 160 cultural politics 124, 128, 130 cultural relations 6, 82, 124, 128–9, 133, 136; international 124, 128, 131–3 (see also kokusai bunka) Cultural Revolution 83, 85, 189; Maoist 188 cultural semiotics 6–7, 159–66, 169–70, 172 culturalist 127, 136; culturalist IRT 6; culturalist methodology 6, 123–4, 136 Daoism 181 denationalization 17 deparochialization 8 dependencia theory see dependency theory dependency theory 26, 45, 47; Latin American 26 deviant states 147 Diaoyutai Islands 7, 193–4 diplomatic history 6, 123–5, 127–9, 131–2 East Asia 6, 23–4, 26, 124, 133–4, 178–80, 183, 186, 188, 190–2, 195 English School 18, 45, 51, 125 Estonia 159 Eurocentrism 5, 48, 51, 61, 62, 67–8, 71–2, 113, 212, 232 European hegemony 45 European Union 23, 172 exceptionalism 27, 49, 213–14; Nordic 89 Fanon, Frantz 152 Five Ordinance System 19 foreign policy 7, 48, 88, 90, 92, 94, 112, 145, 160, 197, 210; anti–hegemonic 85; behavior 146, 210; Chinese 19, 106, 112; doctrines of political leaders 206; Iranian 8, 85; Japanese 6, 124, 136; Russian 168–9; South African 148–9; Turkish 8, 70, 228–9 Foucault, Michel 104 foundational literature 42, 44; consensual foundational literature 49–50, 53 Galtung, Johan 20, 28 Gandhi 20 Gandhian cosmopolitanism 19 Geldenhuys, Deon 26, 27–9, 143, 146–8, 153n25–153n30 geo–cultural categorization 16

geo–cultural standpoint 17 geren benwei 108 global governance 8n3, 23, 34n57, 151, 215 global hegemony 5, 42 Global IR 61, 65–7, 69, 72–3, 142; disciplinary community 18; scholarship 69, 233 global IRT 3 Global South 6, 48, 90, 142–3, 148, 150–2, 216n1, 230; perspectives 48 global theorizing 41, 61 globalism 23, 64 globalization 5, 24, 51, 64, 87, 168, 195; of IR 28 globalness 24 grammatological geopolitics 24 Great East Asian Co–prosperity Area 136 Great Way 182 Greater East Asia Sphere 179 guanxi 5, 105–13, 115; benwei 108; guoji 5, 105; see also relationality hadith 91 Hamashita, Takeshi 6, 123–4, 128, 133– 137 heterotopia 104 Hinduism 19; political see Hindutva Hindutva 19 Hirano, Kenichiro 6, 123–4, 128, 131–4, 136 historicism 124–7, 135 Hoffmann, Stanley 27, 43, 127 homegrown 7; alterations 18, 24, 60, 66, 69; concept 21; conceptualization 6, 19, 28; idea of 5, 68; IR traditions 48; IRT 27; knowledge 65, 72, 86–87; philosophers 21; school of cultural semiotics 6, 160; theory 17, 21; theorists 231; thinker 18–19; turn 5, 59–60, 73 homegrownness 16, 66, 69, 72 Huntington, Samuel 24, 128, 132–3, 159 imperial order 127–8 inclusive relationalism 113 India 19, 22, 49, 90, 196, 217n13 Indian Machiavelli see Kautilya indigenous, the 7; concepts 214; theorizing of influence 21; thinkers 22; traditions 5 Inoguchi, Takashi 124–7, 135 institutionalization 4–5, 22 integrationist 3 inter–civilizational dialogue 94, 98n46 international agency 84, 89, 110, 112

236   Index international cultural relations 6, 123–4, 131–3; theory of 128; see also kokusai bunka International Cultural Theory see Kokusai Bunkaron international order 19, 21–2, 127–9; contemporary 123 international relationality 5 International Relations Theory (IRT) 1, 15; Anglo–Saxon 177; contemporary 6; in Iran 83; non–Western 123; post– Western 6, 123–4, 135; relational 105; rationalist/positivist 1; Western 15 International Relations (IR) 15, 41, 51, 59, 84, 87, 104, 112–13, 130–1; alternative 148, 177; in Chinese 105; discipline 41–3, 49, 71, 226, 232 (the core 232; post– Western 59); hegemonic 178, 182; homegrown theorizing in 204; ideas and theories 89; in Islam 87; Iranian 86; Islamic approach 87; Islamic theory 87; Japanese 47, 123, 126–8, 135; non– Western understandings of 83; ‘pathological’ analysis of 84; peripheral 60–1; post–Western 6, 60, 73n3, 106, 113–14, 123, 136; theory 89, 142–3, 177, 226; Western 5, 59–63, 65–6, 72, 126, 214, 232 International Studies Association (ISA) 8, 47, 65, 142 IR community 73, 84, 84, 137; continental 54; the core 228–9; global 29, 54n3, 67, 71; Iranian 84; Japanese 133, 135; national 68; peripheral 61; South African 142 Iran 15, 88–93; IR scholarship 84–5; see also Islamic Republic in Iran Iranization 83 Iriye, Akira 6, 129–33, 190 Islam 19, 83, 85, 87 Islamic Republic in Iran 5, 83 Islamic Revolution, the 83, 85, 87 Islamism 85 Islamization 83 isolated states 6, 143, 146–7 isolation 6, 105, 114, 143, 147; indicators of 27; self–imposed 146; South Africa’s 146; theory of 26–7; see also ostracism Japan 47–8, 123–5, 128, 132, 134–7, 178–80, 183–5, 187, 193–7; IR studies 126–7; nothingness principle 188–91 Japan Society of Intercultural Studies (JSIC) 133

Japanese Shinto 179 Jinping, Xi 113 Jordaan, Eduard 6, 145–6 Kautilya 19, 21, 22, 64, 206 Kautilya’s state system see mandala Keohane, Robert 43, 197 Khaldun, Ibn 19, 21–2, 28, 206 Khaldunian 21 Khamenei, Ayatollah 88 Khatami 88; administration 94 Khomeini, Ayatollah 88 Kitaro, Nishida 177 knowledge, the 42, 72, 151 kokusai bunka 123; see also international cultural relations Kokusai Bunkaron 132 Kuan Yew, Lee 108 Kuznetsov 24 Kyoto School of philosophy (KSP) 7, 131, 177 Latin America 8, 26, 47, 195 Legalism 181 liberalism 24, 66; Western 49 Lotman, Yurii 159 –165, 167 Manchukuo 189; metaphor of 190 mandala 21 Marxism 66, 124–5, 135 Mearsheimer, John 44, 197, 208 Melli University 84 metatheory 44, 54n14 middle power(s) 70, 145; Anglo–Saxon 70; concept of 6, 143–4, 146; emerging 6, 143, 145–6; notion of 144; strategic 70; traditional 6, 145–6 middle powerhood 70 mid–range theory(ies) 44 modernization theory 45; contra 26 Morgenthau, Hans 67, 228 national liberal school 24 nativism 151 Nehru, Jawaharlal 19–20, 180 Nehruvian internationalism 19 Nehruvianism 19 Neuman, Iver 159, 171 non–alignment 19, 180 non–core, the: homegrown theorizing 69, 71; IR 68–9, 73 non–violence 20; see also ahimsa non–Western: conceptualization of IR 8; IR 8, 48, 113; IR scholars 94; IRT 123;

Index   237 parochialism(s) 72; perspective(s) 4, 8, 48; phenomena 1; scholars 2, 15, 18, 94; theorizing 15, 61, 68, 94, 206; theory 48; traditions 2; world 15, 59, 178 North Africa 22 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 23, 149 nothingness 8, 177, 179–80, 183–5; philosophy of 191, 193; place of 179, 189; power of 192; principle of 187–8; Proposition 185, 187–8 ontology 1, 23, 28, 107, 212; collectivist 151; constructivist social 162; democratic 213; historical 71; individualist 148; of IR 6, 123; PoP 185; in theorizing 212; of Western IR 123 open geography 163 Oran, Baskın 70 orientalism 48 originality 16, 24, 29, 66, 70, 143, 229–30 ostracism 147; see also isolation Pan–African solidarity norm 149, 154n41 parochialism 5, 27, 42, 65, 68, 71–2; danger of 69 particularism 17; theoretical 213–14 Peace Research Institute in Oslo (PRIO) 20 peripheral homegrown theorizing 60, 67, 72 periphery, the 2–4, 25–6, 28, 60, 69, 73, 135, 142, 160, 204, 226–8, 230–2; concepts 72; environment of 228; exclusion of 2; homegrown theorizing in 5; international phenomena in 15; periphery IR scholar(s) 2; IR theory in 232; methodological poverty in 233; original theorizing in 60; pure theory in 16; scholar(s) 2–4, 15, 25, 73, 227–8, 233; states in 145; theorizing 4, 15, 227; theory building in 16; periphery theorist(s) 3, 29 Petersburg text, the 163 Philosophy of Place (PoP) 177–8, 180, 183, 186–7, 190, 193, 197–8; IRT 198; theorization 197–8 pluralism 3, 47, 204, 213; global 45 pluralistic IR 68, 72 positivist(s) 2, 16; IRT 1 post–positivist(s) 16, 162; theory(ies) 1 post–Soviet 159, 166–7, 171; area 6, 170; concept of 7, 160; states 24 post–structuralism 6, 161, 163

post–structuralist 162–3, 165, 169 post–Western theory 2, 226 power 87, 89, 111, 113, 126, 159–61, 182, 208–9; as capability (Power II) 208, 211–12; as capacity (Power I) 208, 211–12; causal 162; colonial 207; conceptions of 207–8, 210; core 163; cultural 128; definition 209; dynamics 142; great 19, 89–90, 167; hegemonic 181, 184, 186, 197; imperial 20, 181; invading 182; In IR 207; major 1, 7, 178, 197–8; pivotal 163; politics 130, 135, 185, 187, 190, 197; rebalance of 195; regional 146; relational power 107; relations 105, 130; relationship between influence 204; rising 193–4, 197; soft 124, 129, 165, 170 Prebisch, Raul 26 presentism 5, 71 provincialization 17 pure theory 16 Putin 168–70 Quran 91, 95n4 Ravabet–e Beinolmelal 85 Realism 3, 22, 66, 86, 88–9, 96n20, 143; Kautilyan brand of 21; subaltern realism 144 referential homegrown theories 18–20, 29 regional history 124–8; in Japanese IR 127; the study of 127, 129, 133–5; see also chiikishi regionalism 162; anti–Western 136; diversity of 213 relationality 5, 51, 105–6, 108–11, 118n85, 182; global 113; lack of 114; practices of 112 relative identity 180, 183–4, 186–8, 190 relative nothingness 180–3, 186, 188, 195 re–signification 166 returnism 114 re–Worlding 7, 181, 184–5, 193–5, 197 double– 187, 191, 193; post–Western re–Worlding 7, 178, 180; Re–Worlding Proposition 186, 188; subaltern subjectivities 177 Russia 22, 24, 49, 147, 159, 161, 163, 165, 167–72, 190, 195; Euro–Asianism in 189 Russian School 18 Sadra, Molla 87 Schoeman, Maxi 145

238   Index Schwartz, Benjamin 104 securitization 50, 161, 163–4, 171, 206 self–referential communication see auto–communication semiosphere 160, 162, 164– 165, 167 semiotician 162, 164 semi–periphery 145 Senkaku Islands 189–91 shehui benwei 108 sino–centrism (sinocentrism) 68, 113 social constructivism 161 South Africa 5–6, 26, 143, 145–8 Soviet semiotics 168 Staatslehre 124–7, 135 state–centrism 71, 128 sunna 91, 95n4 suture 159, 165 synchronization 183 Taiwan 7, 107, 134, 147, 187–8, 191–7, 229 Tartu school, the 159–61, 164, 166 theoretical knowledge 41–4, 53 theoria 104 theory builder(s) 46–7 third culture 112 Third World 2–3, 26, 215, 216n1 tianxia 49, 115n5, 123, 213–14 Tickner, Arlene 2, 68, 142 Tieku, Thomas 6, 143, 148–50 tribute system 123, 133–4, 136 Tuo, Cai 23 Turkey 22, 66, 68, 145, 147, 159, 178, 229

ubuntu 6, 49, 143, 148–9, 151 United States 41, 44, 46, 125, 232 universalism 27, 42, 49, 178, 180–1, 183–4 University of Tartu 6, 160 University of Tehran 84– 85, 90 vernacularization 69 Wallerstein, Immanuel 22, 64, 127 Walt, Stephen 44, 92 Waltz, Kenneth 17, 43, 208 Wendt, Alexander 17, 162, 197 West–centrism 72, 113, 212, 214 Western: Europe 16, 178; methodologies 3; theory 143, 204; IR theory(ies) 87, 90, 93, 205, 214, 232; world 1, 60, 145 Western–centric 59, 142 World History Standpoint (WHS) 7, 179, 180, 182–5, 183, 187–92, 196 World War II 125, 129, 131, 136–7, 177; post– 66, 128 Worlding 180; mutuality 106; re– 7, 177–8, 180–1, 183, 184–8, 191, 193–7 worldliness 180, 184, 188, 193, 195 world–systems theory 22–3 xinyong 110 Xuetong, Yan 3, 19, 25, 27–9, 30–1 Yamamoto, Kazuya 126–7 Yaqing, Qin 23, 111 Zi, Xun 19