Why Enduring Rivalries Do—or Don’t—End 9781935049852

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WHY ENDURING RIVALRIES DO— OR DON’T—END

WHY ENDURING RIVALRIES DO— OR DON’T—END Eric W. Cox

Published in the United States of America in 2010 by FirstForumPress A division of Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 www.firstforumpress.com and in the United Kingdom by FirstForumPress A division of Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU © 2010 by FirstForumPress. All rights reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A Cataloging-in-Publication record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. ISBN: 978-1-935049-24-1 British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library. This book was produced from digital files prepared by the author using the FirstForumComposer. Printed and bound in the United States of America The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1992. 5 4 3 2 1

Dedicated to my wife and kids: Jennifer, Nolan, and Stewart

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Contents

Acknowledgments

ix

1

Understanding Rivalry

1

2

Explaining Rivalry Termination

11

3

Egypt and Israel: A Path to Peace

43

4

Syria and Israel: Obstacles to Peace

93

5

Chile and Peru: Steps Toward Peace

123

6

Peru and Ecuador: Rivalry Sustained

161

7

The Termination of Rivalry

185

Bibliography Index

201 215

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Acknowledgments

While it would be impossible to thank all of those who have helped make this work possible, I do owe several people a special word of thanks. First, at FirstForumPress, I wish to thank Lynne Rienner for providing the final guidance that made this book possible. In addition, Claire Vlcek has been amazingly helpful in navigating the process of producing this book. The intellectual path of this book began in my time as a graduate student at the University of Virginia, and I owe a special debt of gratitude to my professors there. In particular, Dale Copeland helped me to hone the theoretical argument as it evolved and to always keep the consideration of other perspectives in my thoughts. The chapters on the Middle East would not have been possible without the guidance and suggestions of William Quandt. David Waldner was instrumental in shaping my thoughts about the value of methodological plurality and the rigor necessary to design an effective qualitative study. Finally, Jeff Legro’s professional and personal mentorship contributed not only to the genesis and completion of this project, but also has helped shape me as a teacher and scholar. I also benefitted from a wonderful graduate cohort that continually challenged me to do better work. Special thanks to Kelly Erickson, Spencer Bakich, Dennis Smith, Ranjit Singh, Sophie Richardson, and Rob Martin. After leaving Virginia, Austin College in Sherman, TX, provided research support that allowed me to spend many, many enjoyable hours at the Benson Latin American Collection at the University of Texas. I also thank Shelton Williams for his mentorship there. At Texas Christian University, Barbara Herman in Student Development Services gave me the great gifts of a job, time, and funding that enabled me to continue the research that spawned this book. Barbara hired me for a year, but I’ve never left. At TCU, I have to give special thanks to Don Jackson for helping me to carve out my niche by providing constant encouragement, and, when necessary, gentle (and not so gentle) prodding. In addition, the faculty and staff of the Department of Political Science as a whole have provided me with tremendous support and opportunities over the past five years. I must also thank the students who have suffered through

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my game theory and conflict and negotiations classes. They have been frequent guinea pigs for the arguments advanced here. Finally, this book would never have happened without the love and support of my immediate and extended family and friends over the past decade. My mother, Vikki, pushed me to make the most of my education from an early age without ever making me feel pressured, and my father, Paul, continues to serve as a source of inspiration even in death. My kids, Nolan and Stewart, are not only sources of great joy, but also of profound wisdom. And then there is my amazing wife, Jennifer, who has read the words in these pages too many times to count, listened to me work out my thoughts on endless car trips, and supported me throughout. Thank you.

1 Understanding Rivalry

Why do some enduring rivalries end while others continue? This book explains the termination of enduring rivalries—disputes between states that involve repeated military confrontation over a significant period of time—by examining clusters of rivalries that began at similar points in history, but had different termination points. Rivalries are marked by the failure of two states to find bargaining space for agreement on one or more issues. The contemporary Middle East is an excellent example of this phenomenon. The Israeli rivalries with Egypt and Syria began at the same time, but have had very different outcomes. One ended with a peace treaty; the other, though less intense than it once was, has yet to be officially terminated. Likewise, the early 20th century witnessed the end of a number of major Latin American rivalries while others, over similar issues, continued. The best example of this is Peruvian attempts to end rivalries with its neighbors in the 1920s and 1930s. It succeeded in resolving major issues with Chile and Columbia, but failed to settle its border dispute with Ecuador. Its dispute with Ecuador would persist into the 1990s. I argue that the termination of rivalries can only occur when one or both states party to a rivalry experience a major failure in meeting foreign policy and domestic expectations that leads to a revised foreign policy outlook, creating bargaining space between the rivals.1 This change is likely to happen after a repeated failure of a state to achieve its foreign and domestic policy goals and will be accompanied by dramatic changes in the political leadership of a state. The mechanism through which the combined failures operate is to strengthen the role of doves in the making of foreign policy decisions and the minimization of the ability of hawks to challenge more pacific rivalry policies.2 I rely on an informal rational learning model to explain why both domestic and foreign policy failure are needed to drive change. Not every foreign or domestic failure will lead to a change in government that results in a new foreign policy that opens bargaining space; this book identifies the

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Why Enduring Rivalries Do—or Don’t—End

conditions that make such a shift likely and the conditions in the receiving state that make it amenable to negotiation. I evaluate this argument through an in-depth study of enduring rivalries in the Middle East from 1967 to 1980 and in Latin America from 1879 to 1932. Specifically, the book will compare Israeli relations with Syria and Egypt after the Six Day War in 1967 to Peruvian relations with Chile and Ecuador from 1879-1932 with emphasis on the years 1919-1930. As noted above, Israel was able to successfully sign a peace agreement with Egypt, while efforts to negotiate with Syria have not resulted in a peace treaty. Likewise, Peru was able to sign and enforce a peace agreement with Chile but not with Ecuador. The use of these studies provides a similar comparison in two different time periods in two different regions. The question of why some rivalries end while others do not is important for both normative and theoretical reasons. First, some studies indicate that more than half of all military disputes take place in the context of a rivalry situation.3 In order to better understand how to manage and end rivalries, scholars must better understand the processes that lead to rivalry termination. Second, traditional international relations literature has largely ignored the question of why enduring rivalries end in favor of studying why wars begin. The only literature that has systematically examined the question of rivalry termination is a body of quantitative work examining rivalry dynamics.4 While this literature has provided valuable insights, it has often not done so in a rigorous theoretical framework. Though some recent work in strategic interaction addresses the structure necessary for successful bargaining, the strategic interaction literature has, for the most part, ignored the questions of why a state’s preferences change allowing for bargaining space where there may have been none before. This book, by drawing on the insights from strategic interaction and quantitative studies, makes a valuable contribution to the advancement of knowledge on enduring rivalries by developing and testing a theory of why states decide to terminate their rivalries.5 Further, it contributes to a growing literature that ties foreign policy actions to the internal political dynamics of a state, particularly works that assume that the primary goal of any political leader is to remain in power.6 This explanation will also explain why not all attempts to terminate a rivalry succeed. The book also makes a methodological contribution to the study of conflict and conflict termination. When studying the origins of wars or their conclusions, most qualitative scholars fail to examine instances of

Understanding Rivalry

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not war or not peace. Admittedly, discussing an instance when peace did not occur is far more difficult than when it did, but this approach provides variation on the dependent variable and a level of control not normally seen in qualitative research. The remainder of this chapter lays out the definitions of enduring rivalry and rivalry termination and reviews the existing literature on rivalry termination. Defining Rivalry

The concept of enduring rivalry is a matter of some debate. Most scholars agree that enduring rivalries are marked by high levels of tension between two states for a long period of time; they disagree, however, on how to identify rivalries. Most rivalry definitions can be fit into one of three categories: 1) exclusive focus on number of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs);7 2) exclusive focus on actors’ perceptions and issues of disagreement;8 and 3) some combination of the two. Scholars associated with each of these definitions have developed unique sets of cases that match their definitions. Depending on the number of disputes required to be considered a rivalry, the time period under analysis, or the role of perceptions and issues, and what constitutes rivalry termination, the number of rivalries may vary from as few as 34 to as many as 290. Colaresi, Rasler and Thompson delve deeply into the issue of rivalry definition, comparing six enduring rivalry databases (two developed by Bennett, one developed by Goertz and Diehl, one developed by Klein, Goertz, and Diehl, one developed by Maoz and Mor, and their own database), and find that the level of agreement between the databases is quite low. Though the largest dataset – that of Klein, et. al., contains 290 cases, only 23 cases appear in all of the datasets, though some of the cases not considered matching do have a degree of overlap.9 The lack of agreement between datasets arises largely due to different manners of measuring the number of disputes between the parties, the number of disputes required, and the temporal connection of the disputes. The exception to this is the Colaresi, et. al., database which focuses primarily on state perceptions of one another. In their view, how states perceive other threats is more important than the number of disputes. For them, then, the United States’ occupations of Haiti did not arise because the United States considered Haiti a threat, but due to other interests in Haitian politics.10

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Why Enduring Rivalries Do—or Don’t—End

Rather than creating a new definition and a new universe of cases that would introduce further debate over an issue that has already clouded the study of enduring rivalries, this book’s focus is on why certain rivalries defy settlement. It therefore draws on the existing definitions of rivalry, but seeks out cases that are, for the most part, widely agreed upon in the rivalry literature. I argue that an enduring rivalry must exist over a period of time and have the potential for military conflict, concepts with which all of the above definitions agree. Further, rivals should not just view each other as threats, but be actual threats to one another, suggesting that military competition should play a role. In this regard, I agree with Bennett’s conception of a rivalry as: … a dyad in which two states disagree over the resolution of some issue(s) between them for an extended period of time, leading them to commit substantial resources… toward opposing each other, and in which relatively frequent diplomatic or military challenges to the disputed status quo are made by one or both of the states.11

Each of the rivalries examined in this book appear in the dataset drawn from Bennett’s 1996 work, which requires states to have engaged in five militarized disputes over a period of 25 years with a clear issue connecting the conflicts.12 Three of the rivalries, Israel-Egypt, IsraelSyria, and Peru-Ecuador, appear in every dataset Colaresi, et. al., examine. The fourth, Peru-Chile, appears in four datasets.13 Based on the widespread view of these disputes as rivalries, this book fits well in the enduring rivalries literature. Literature Review

Though the literature that may relate to rivalry termination generally is quite expansive, very few scholars have specifically addressed the question of rivalry termination. The majority of work on enduring rivalries to this point has been quantitative in nature, though an increasing number of works are using formal models to address questions of trust and the stability of agreements between rivals. Among the variables scholars have found to have significance on the end of rivalry are polity change, major wars, revolutions, democracy, domestic political factors and issue salience (the importance of the issues at stake), and the emergence of new and/or mutual threats.14 In his work integrating the various statistical models of rivalry termination, Bennett finds polity change to be one of the most significant variables affecting

Understanding Rivalry

5

termination.15 Diehl and Grieg also find that the presence of at least one democratizing state in a dyad is related to a de-escalation of a rivalry relationship.16 The primary drawbacks of the existing statistical literature are two-fold. Many of the variables identified in the rivalry literature are extremely sensitive to coding issues. For example, manipulating the time frame under analysis can lead to contradictory conclusions.17 This problem leads into the second drawback of existing literature: it often lacks a cohesive explanatory framework.18 Works by Maoz and Mor, Kydd, and Schultz have specifically addressed rivalry termination by using game theoretic approaches.19 Maoz and Mor’s work is the most comprehensive in that it examines the overall dynamics of enduring rivalries, of which rivalry termination is only a part. Their model relies on learning to explain preference change. They find that learning often does not occur in the expected direction; states often “learn” the wrong lessons.20 In contrast to Maoz and Mor’s more comprehensive approach, Kydd and Schultz both focus on the last phases of rivalry termination. Kydd develops a model to explain how costly signaling can improve trust, while Schultz models domestic politics to explain why, based on political calculations, a “moderate hawk” is the most likely leader to initiate and make a lasting peace with a rival. Both of these models suffer from a common problem: neither sufficiently explains the decision by either party in a rivalry either to send costly signals or enter into negotiation.21 Though Kydd and Schultz are not fully adequate explanations for rivalry termination, both do rely, in part, on domestic politics to explain the termination process, Schultz by giving a significant role in the electorate to shape foreign policy and Kydd by drawing on other literatures to explain signaling. One key element for Schultz at least is that before any decision to negotiate can occur, there must be an increase in costs such that the costs of continued conflict exceed the costs of negotiation.22 Why might this occur? One possibility from the literature is the concept of ripeness or a hurting stalemate. If a rivalry is, for the most part, low-cost for the participants, the chances that one side will negotiate are small. If, however, the conflict “hurts” either or both parties, they are more likely to try to extricate themselves from the conflict.23 Making the connection to domestic politics complete, Chiozza and Goemans offer some support for the idea that leaders make foreign policy decisions based at least on part on their stability in office.

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Why Enduring Rivalries Do—or Don’t—End

Contrary to the insights of the diversionary war literature, however, Chiozza and Goemans find that leaders that face a high risk of losing office are less likely to initiate war than leaders who are secure in office, regardless of regime type.24 This finding does not mean that a leader at risk of losing office will initiate peace talks, but it does suggests that violence between rivals becomes less likely as one side experiences a greater risk of losing office.25 To summarize, the existing statistical literature has shown a strong connection between domestic politics and decisions not to fight (as well as decisions to fight). Drawing on these findings, existing models of the interplay of a domestic audience and the decision to negotiate, I argue that leaders facing domestic turmoil are more likely to alter foreign policy, particularly rivalry policies, to free up internal resources to solidify their ruling coalition or to repress opposition. This argument is not deterministic; leaders facing internal strife are more likely to negotiate than those who are not, but may not do so if they can hold on to power by other means. The Plan for the Book

In order to explain rivalry termination, Chapter Two turns to a theoretical treatment of the end of enduring rivalries consistent with the criteria set out above based on the importance of developing strong domestic coalitions in the wake of both domestic and foreign policy failures. The chapter also includes an alternative explanation based on the insights of neorealism and concludes with a discussion of the methodology to be used in the case studies. The case studies were chosen to identify four rivalries, two that were successfully terminated and two that were not. To add more control to the study, I examine pairs of rivalries in which one state successfully ends one of its rivalries while failing to terminate another. To meet this design, Israeli relations with Egypt and Syria in the later 1960s and 1970s are compared to Peruvian relations with Chile and Ecuador during the 1920s. Chapter Three applies the model developed in Chapter Two to relations between Israel and Egypt from the time of the 1967 Six Day War until their peace agreement in 1979. I find that Egypt underwent a fundamental shift in its foreign policy after 1967 after the combination of domestic problems and failure in war allowed Egyptian president Nasser to eliminate his more hard-line opponents within government. His new policies eliminated many of those within his government who supported a more centralized economy and a policy of rejecting any

Understanding Rivalry

7

negotiations with Israel. Israel, on the other hand, did not reciprocate Egypt’s overtures until after the October War in 1973. Though Israel won the war, the strong showing of the Arab armies surprised Israeli officials. At the same time, 1973 marked the beginning of several years of economic problems. Israel went on to sign two disengagement agreements with Egypt before signing the Camp David Accords and a final peace treaty. Chapter Four discusses Israel and Syrian relations from the Six Day War until 1980. In this case, Syria made changes in its foreign and domestic policies after its loss in the 1967 war. The battle between Salah Jadid and Hafiz al-Asad was over both foreign and domestic policy; Jadid represented a more radical view on both fronts whereas Asad was more moderate. Interestingly, despite the eventual victory of Asad over Jadid and the subsequent moderation of Syrian policy, Israel and Syria did not find sufficient bargaining space to reach a formal peace agreement, though they did sign a disengagement agreement that continues to be in force as of 2005. Relations between Peru and Chile from 1919 until 1930 are the focus of Chapter Five. In Peru, a challenging domestic situation led to the election of Augusto B. Leguía who seized power in a coup before he was inaugurated as president. His initial foreign policy continued a Peruvian tradition of attempting to bring Peru’s dispute with Chile before an external arbiter, preferably the United States. When Peru lost in arbitration, Leguía had the freedom to change course and reach a negotiated settlement with Chile as he had successfully eliminated those opposed to peace from his government while in power. For its part, Chile suffered from both economic and foreign policy difficulties in the 1920s. Chile’s failure to join the allied forces in World War I left it diplomatically isolated, while domestically lower economic classes were pressing for inclusion in the government. Early reform efforts were defeated by the old oligarchy, and the government squandered its victory in arbitration with Peru by throwing up obstacles to a plebiscite that Chile had supported. Its subsequent embarrassment and continued domestic turmoil led to the rise of General Carlos Ibáñez who dramatically reformed Chile’s domestic political structure and signed a peace agreement with Peru. Chapter Six turns to relations between Peru and Ecuador from 19191930. In addition to Peru’s difficulties with Chile in the 1920s, it had suffered a territorial setback in its dispute with Ecuador due to a peace agreement between Ecuador and Colombia in which Ecuador ceded lands claimed by Peru to Colombia. The combined failure in foreign and

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Why Enduring Rivalries Do—or Don’t—End

domestic policy did lead to a change in Peruvian foreign policy; in this case it changed its policy toward Colombia, signing an agreement in which it received many of the lands it had previously claimed from Ecuador. In response to this setback and a major revolution in 1925, Ecuador did begin to reform its negotiating position with Peru. However, Peru had little interest in negotiating with Ecuador as it had already satisfied many of its demands. In addition, Ecuador suffered from an extremely unstable domestic environment that made any longterm diplomatic initiative difficult to sustain. Chapter Seven is the conclusion of the book and includes an examination of Israeli-Syrian relations and Peruvian-Ecuadorian relations in the 1990s. The cases examined in the book provide strong evidence that it is a combination of domestic and foreign policy difficulties that leads to changes in foreign policy. These changes in foreign policy can lead to rivalry termination if sufficient bargaining space is opened. At times, however, even if both parties to a rivalry make significant changes to their preferences, bargaining space may not be opened. In that regard, the book makes headway to establishing necessary, but not sufficient conditions for the termination of enduring rivalries. 1

See Legro, “The Transformation of Policy Ideas;” and “Whence American Internationalism,” for a discussion of epistemic shifts. 2 Doves may be a relative term. For example, in examining Egyptian/Israeli relations in the 1970s, Dayan is identified with “dovish” policies in that he was one of the first in the Israeli government to favor an interim agreement with Egypt. At the same time, he was a decorated war hero that clearly believed in maintaining a strong military position vis-à-vis Israel’s rivals. 3 Diehl “Introduction: An Overview and Some Theoretical Guidelines,” p. 7; Maoz and Mor Bound by Struggle, p. 4, and Colaresi, et. al., Strategic Rivalries, pp. 13-16. 4 The term enduring rivalry was coined by this statistical literature. 5 See Bueno de Mesquita, “Domestic Politics and International Relations” on the importance of methodological diversity within a research program. To date, little rigorous theoretical and case study research has been done on enduring rivalries. This book fills that hole. 6 David, "Explaining Third World Alignment;" Schultz, Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy, (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Schultz, "The Politics of Risking Peace;" Goemans, War and Punishment; Chiozza and Goemans, "Peace Through Insecurity;" Chiozza and Goemans, "International Conflict and the Tenure of Leaders;" Chiozza and Goemans, "Avoiding Diversionary Targets;" Bueno de Mesquita, et. al., The Logic of Political Survival; Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson, "War and the

Understanding Rivalry

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Survival of Political Leaders;" Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, War and Reason. 7 See Klein, et. al., “The New Rivalry Dataset;” Goertz and Diehl, “The Empirical Importance of Enduring Rivalries,” pp. 151-63; Goertz and Diehl , “The Initiation and Termination of Enduring Rivalries,” pp. 31-2 for an example of this approach. 8 See Thompson, “Identifying Rivals and Rivalries in World Politics;” Thompson, “Why Rivalries Matter;” Thompson, “Principle Rivalries;” and Colaresi, et. al., Strategic Rivalries for an example of this approach. Thompson has developed a quite sophisticated way of categorizing rivalries based on state perceptions. For Thompson, two states need never engage in conflict to be considered rivals. 9 Colaresi, et. al., Strategic Rivalries, pp. 56-57. 10 The Haiti / United States rivalry does not appear in their dataset, but does appear in others. It appears, for example, in Klein, et. al., “The New Rivalry Dataset.” 11 Bennett “Security, Bargaining and the End of Interstate Rivalry,” p. 160. 12 Bennett “Security, Bargaining and the End of Interstate Rivalry,” and Bennett, “Democracy, Regime Change, and Rivalry Termination” share this operationalization of rivalry. Bennett, “Measuring Rivalry Termination,” and Bennett, “Integrating and Testing,” modify this operationalization slightly by not considering two states to be in a rivalry until they have had the requisite number of disputes. 13 It appears in Bennett “Security, Bargaining and the End of Interstate Rivalry;” Colaresi, et. al., Strategic Rivalries; Klein, Et. al., “The New Rivalry Dataset;” and Maoz and Mor, Bound by Struggle. For more on the debate regarding the operationalization of rivalry, see Colaresi, et. al., Strategic Rivalries, Chapter Two. 14 Bennett, "Measuring Rivalry Termination;" Bennett, "Security, Bargaining and the End of Interstate Rivalry;" Bennett, "Democracy, Regime Change, and Rivalry Termination;" Bennett, "Integrating and Testing Models of Rivalry Duration;" Goertz and Diehl, "The Initiation and Termination of Enduring Rivalries;" Diehl and Goertz, "War and Peace in International Rivalry;" Greig and Diehl, "Softening Up: Making Conflicts More Amenable to Diplomacy;" Greig, "Moments of Opportunity." 15 Bennett, "Integrating and Testing Models of Rivalry Duration," pp. 1223-4. 16 Greig and Diehl, "Softening Up," pp. 376-7. 17 Bennett, "Integrating and Testing Models of Rivalry Duration," pp. 1224-7. 18 See ibid. for discussion of this problem in other studies of rivalry termination. He resolves this to an extent by arguing for a rational actor framework in examining rivalry termination, but the actual construction of his model does not clearly necessitate his theoretical framework. 19 Maoz and Mor, Bound by Struggle; Kydd, "Trust, Reassurance and Cooperation;" Kydd, Trust and Mistrust in International Relations; Schultz, "The Politics of Risking Peace."

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20 Maoz and Mor, "Learning, Preference Change, and the Evolution of Enduring Rivalries," p. 151; and Leng, Bargaining and Learning in Recurring Crises, p. 185, echo this concern. 21 Kydd, for example, draws on constructivist explanations for policy change in the Soviet Union. Kydd, "Trust, Reassurance and Cooperation, pp. 342, 350-1. 22 Schultz, "The Politics of Risking Peace," p. 25. 23 The concept of a “hurting stalemate” is also related to the concept of conflict ripeness which is frequently cited as a necessary condition for negotiations to proceed. See: Hancock, "To Act or Wait;" Zartman and Berman, The Practical Negotiator; Greig and Diehl, "Softening Up;" Greig, "Moments of Opportunity;" Haass, Conflicts Unending. 24 Chiozza and Goemans, "Peace Through Insecurity,"p. 453, 456. See also Chiozza and Goemans, “Avoiding Diversionary Targets;” and Chiozza and Goemans, “International Conflict and the Tenure of Leaders.” On diversionary war, see Mansfield and Snyder, “Democratization and the Danger of War;” Mercer, “Anarchy and Identity;” and Miller, “Regime Type, Strategic Interaction, and the Diversionary Use of Force.” 25 These results are similar to findings by Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson, "War and the Survival of Political Leaders," pp. 841-855.

2 Explaining Rivalry Termination

This chapter draws on past work on rivalry termination to argue that rivalry termination will most likely occur when one or both states that are part of a rivalry experience both foreign and domestic setbacks that lead to changes in the ruling coalition. Changes in the ruling coalition allow proponents of peace to enter the government, leading to a change in foreign policy. This change in foreign policy can open bargaining space with a state’s rival. The explanation provides a theoretical framework that can explain the role of third parties, side payments, and state type on rivalry termination. The explanation presented here is only intended to apply to rivalry termination, though it may provide some insight into the beginning of rivalries and the escalation of rivalries into war. Further, though the quantitative literature has developed clear operationalizations of rivalry termination, in later chapters, the book will relax the concept of rivalry termination to note cases where a state modified rivalry policies without clear termination occurring. Section One presents the primary explanation for rivalry termination through the presentation of a simple model of policy change. Section Two examines an alternate explanation based on neorealism, and Section Three presents the basic methodology for testing the theories. Section One: Domestic Realignment and Rivalry Termination

In discussing the decision to terminate a war, Thomas Schelling noted “that it usually takes at least two countries to terminate a war.”1 The same statement applies to rivalry termination; even if one state were to almost completely capitulate to another state’s demands, that second state would not necessarily be satisfied.2 Following this logic, an explanation of rivalry termination must explain both why one state would initiate termination and why a second state would accept it. I argue that preference change regarding rivalry policies in State A occurs when a combination of foreign and domestic policy failures lead to a

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change in the governing coalition of a state. The new governing coalition will follow a different policy than its predecessor on both foreign and domestic policies.3 If the change in policy represents an acceptance of State B’s demands, the rivalry will terminate. Otherwise the rivalry will continue unless State B also undergoes a change in ruling coalition following both domestic and foreign policy failure a subsequent change in policy. This argument is probabilistic; though this process is not sufficient to achieve peace in every case, a combined failure in foreign and domestic policy in at least one of the states in a rivalry is a necessary condition for rivalry termination. The argument presented here is that each state within a rivalry updates its beliefs about appropriate preferences based on the success/failure of its foreign policy interaction with its rival and on successful economic performance as a proxy for successful domestic policy. Learning can occur on both an individual and collective basis through the selection of a state’s leaders, though not all individuals will be capable of learning.4 The selection of new leaders can occur through elections, internal cabinet shifts, and/or extra-constitutional removal of a state’s leadership. I assume that three basic foreign policy orientations/constituencies exist in each rivalry state: 1) a hawkish core, 2) a dovish core, and 3) a moderate center.5 The public is assumed to be moderate. The assumption that the public is moderate does not mean that dovish and hawkish elements do not exist within the public at large; rather, it means that the public as a whole is sufficiently moderate to allow for shifts in opinion.6 Turning now to the learning process, the terms hawks, doves and moderates are used as short hand to explain a player’s preferences. Hawks always prefer to defect (continue the rivalry), doves prefer to cooperate (end the rivalry), and moderates will either cooperate or defect depending on their belief about the cost of cooperating.7 My argument is that peace cannot occur when hawks dominate foreign policy decisionmaking or when moderates prefer defection to cooperation. Peace occurs either when a moderate leader decides that cooperation is preferred to defection, or when a dove comes to power in the face of foreign policy failure. In a rivalry, it is impossible to tell the difference between a hawk and a moderate in advance. A hawk will always continue the rivalry, while a moderate will continue the rivalry as long he believes that is the proper course of action. Societal learning occurs when a state experiences both domestic and foreign policy failure – in this case the moderate public prefers a less antagonistic foreign policy. Actions after

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the combined failure inform the public what type of leader is in power. A hawk will continue the rivalry, while a moderate will now believe that cooperation is preferred to defection and will shift his/her policies to reflect societal views and domestic political concerns. The public will always attempt to replace the hawk, while its reaction to the moderate depends purely on the moderate’s ability to sufficiently alter his/her coalition to guarantee support. If the public replaces the leader, it will replace him or her with either a moderate or a dove. Consistent with Schultz’s argument, the public does not know a priori whether the leader is a moderate or a dove.8 Both types of leaders will prefer to cooperate in a state that has experienced combined foreign and domestic policy failure. The dove presents an interesting case, however. If a dove comes to power purely as a result of domestic policy failure, s/he will not have a mandate to change the state’s foreign policy. Any attempt by the dove to dramatically alter the state’s foreign policy will lead to opposition and reversal of the foreign policy change. If, however, a failure in foreign policy occurs while the dove is in power, the dove, preferring cooperation, will shift the state’s foreign policy. To further explain the central logic of the book, I now turn to an examination of what occurs in both foreign policy and domestic policy failure in isolation. Foreign Policy Failure in Isolation

A foreign policy failure is defined as an outcome that negatively diverges from expectations. The degree of failure is best viewed as a continuum from no change in the status quo based on a foreign policy action to total defeat and occupation by an enemy. In between these two extremes lie failed diplomatic initiatives, defeat in crisis, defeat in limited war, defeat in war without occupation, and defeat in war with limited occupation. This study specifically excludes cases in which an agreement is imposed by one rival on another through complete military victory and occupation of a rival state. This exclusion is based on two reasons: 1) I am particularly interested in the question of why states decide to terminate rivalries. In the case of occupation of one state by another, decision-making authority ceases to truly reside within the government of the occupied power. The actions of the Iraqi governing council under US occupation are an example of the lack of true independence in decision-making. 2) There are strong theoretical reasons to discount the staying power of agreements forced upon a state as a condition to end combat as opposed to agreements freely entered

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Why Enduring Rivalries Do—or Don’t—End

into. Agreements that are the result of pure coercion will be more difficult to enforce.9 Failure in foreign policy alone is not likely to force a change in a state’s leadership, making it likely that hawks will remain in power in a rival state. This argument is borne out empirically: Chiozza and Goemans find that though a leader who wins a war or crisis is significantly more likely to stay in power than one who loses a war or crisis, a leader who keeps her country at peace is not significantly more likely to retain power than one who loses a war or crisis.10 Though Chiozza and Goemans do not specifically test the effects of failed diplomatic initiatives, one can assume that such a failure is not significantly more likely to lead to a leader’s ouster. Why is this? Leaders are not judged solely on their performance in foreign affairs. Policy-making elites and publics hold beliefs on several topics, including appropriate rivalry policy and appropriate domestic policy, both of which impact their beliefs about the appropriate leader to implement those policies. A state’s leader has to implement policies on a wide range of domestic and foreign policy issues. A leader successfully implementing domestic policy will confirm a public’s prior beliefs about both the appropriate domestic policy and that she is the appropriate leader to implement it. A failure in foreign policy will be discounted as long as domestic success continues. Even in the event of a foreign policy failure during times of economic growth, a leader that has built up domestic confidence will have more freedom to maneuver by making tactical shifts in policy rather than a whole scale reassessment of rivalry policies. During times of economic growth, therefore, a public will be more forgiving of foreign policy failures. Even if a leader does leave power over a foreign policy mistake, a public confident in a state’s overall performance is more likely to undergo a tactical shift while maintaining the previous rivalry beliefs – a public and a coalition must see an overall failure of policy before reversing preferences that lead to rivalry. Chiozza and Goemans find support for the idea that leaders intuitively understand that they have more freedom of action when the domestic economic situation they face is relatively secure. Their data show that contrary to the diversionary war argument that leaders initiate foreign crises or wars to divert attention from domestic failures, leaders facing a risk of losing office are less likely to initiate a crisis or war than leaders who are secure in power.11 Several historical examples also support this argument. Despite John F. Kennedy’s failure in the Bay of Pigs, his presidential approval

Explaining Rivalry Termination

15

rating never dropped below fifty-six percent.12 Far from ending the rivalry with Cuba, the US continued to actively oppose the Castro regime and continues to do so as of the writing of this book. Many people opposed Ronald Reagan’s decision to send troops to Lebanon in 1982; by September 1983 fifty-eight percent of Americans favored withdrawing US troops. In the wake of the October terrorist attack in Beirut that killed 241 US Marines, support for maintaining troops gradually waned. By the time Reagan redeployed the troops offshore, eighty-one percent of Americans favored the decision.13 Likewise, many of Reagan’s proposals to oppose leftist regimes and opponents in Central America were not popular with the public.14 Despite opposition to these components of his foreign policy, he won reelection in 1984 by carrying forty-nine of fifty US states. Clearly dissatisfaction with portions of his foreign policy, including the deaths of several American servicemen, did not lead to his failure to be reelected. Later foreign policy decisions, including the Iran-Contra scandal did not negatively affect the election of Reagan’s vice president, George H. W. Bush as president in 1988. Foreign policy success also failed to help Bush win reelection. Despite a peak approval rating of eighty-nine percent following victory in the first Persian Gulf War, Bush lost his bid for re-election in 1992 largely over the economy. Likewise, Bill Clinton did not feel dramatic repercussions to the US failures in Somalia during his first term, including the shooting down of two US helicopters and the dragging through the street of a dead US soldier. Clinton was still reelected in 1996 with a very large plurality. More recently, British Prime Minister Tony Blair was reelected in May 2005 despite widespread opposition to his decision to join in the US-led invasion against Iraq in 2003. Turning to the Middle East, Egyptian President Nasser emerged from the 1956 invasion of Sinai Peninsula in stronger position than he was before the crisis in spite of the poor showing of Egyptian troops. His diplomatic victory after the fact won him widespread support. Likewise, significant losses in the War of Attrition with Egypt from 1969-1970 including the eventual involvement of Soviet pilots did not lead Israel to give significant consideration to Egyptian peace overtures in early 1971; at the time Israel’s economy was experiencing rapid growth. Foreign policy failure alone is not sufficient to lead to a change in rivalry preferences.15 Leaders who experience foreign policy failure while performing well in other aspects of their job are not likely to lose power, and even if they do, their replacements will not face widespread pressure to change policies. Historically, leaders who have had a strong

16

Why Enduring Rivalries Do—or Don’t—End

domestic economy have not faced significant pressure to change policy even in the face of foreign policy failure. Domestic Policy Failure in Isolation

Domestic policy failure in the absence of foreign policy failure may in fact lead to a change in the leadership of a state, but it does not bring with it a mandate to change a long-standing foreign policy in regard to a rival. The logic behind this argument is that a leader chosen to address a domestic shortfall does not have a mandate to abruptly change rivalry policies, nor, in the absence of a failure, does a need to do so exist. The public may update its beliefs about appropriate domestic policies in the face of economic decline, but will not update foreign policy preferences. Because it is easier for a public and coalition partners to judge the impact of domestic policy failure on their personal lives than it is to judge foreign policy failure, it is more likely that a leader will lose power over failed domestic policy than over failed foreign policy. Updating is easier when individuals directly experience divergent outcomes, which is more likely to be the case with domestic policy failure than with foreign policy failure. Nonetheless, a change in leadership over domestic issues will not lead to major overhauls in foreign policy.16 Even if one assumes that a change in leadership leading to a change in domestic policy will bring doves into office, strong empirical evidence suggests that the doves will not have a free hand to radically alter foreign policy, particularly in regard to a rival, and will suffer negative repercussions for radical changes they make.17 In Peru in 1912, President Guillermo Billinghurst, who had come into power on a wave of popular support, entered into secret negotiations with both Chile and Ecuador, both rivals of Peru. These negotiations were extremely unpopular and, combined with some of his less popular domestic acts, led to his ouster in 1914.18 Peru had not suffered major foreign policy failures in the preceding years; in fact the Spanish king had sided with Peru in its arbitration with Ecuador.19 A similar situation confronted President Augusto B. Leguía when he seized power in 1919 based on the domestic problems in Peru. He was not able to change Peru’s long-standing demand of settling its dispute with Chile through arbitration until that arbitration failed. Once the arbitration had clearly failed, he was able to successfully negotiate a treaty with Chile settling the two nations’ dispute. US President Jimmy Carter, who was elected in the wake of the Watergate scandal that besieged the Nixon administration, proposed a foreign policy based less

Explaining Rivalry Termination

17

on opposition to the Soviet Union and more on the importance of supporting human rights and democracy around the world.20 His foreign policy was often criticized by conservatives, and his handling of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian hostage crisis in 1979 was one of the factors that led to his electoral defeat by Ronald Reagan in 1980. Reagan’s foreign policy was based much more strongly in the battle against communism and the Soviet Union. Domestic failure does not lead to support for a radical change in foreign policy. Combined Foreign and Domestic Policy Failure

When a state is suffering from domestic policy failure (signaled by economic decline and/or widespread political demonstrations), a leader does not have the built-in credibility to overcome failures in foreign policy. The failure of domestic policies places the leader in danger of losing power; the failure in foreign policy legitimizes the decision to move away from the policies that marked the enduring rivalry. A skillful politician with moderate foreign policy beliefs may be able to remain in power even when the state suffers both foreign and domestic policy failure, but will only be able to do so by removing prominent officials identified with past policies. In cases in which a leader does not change domestic and foreign policy, opponents will most likely remove her from power, either through constitutional or extra-constitutional means, bringing new leaders to power who will adopt both new domestic and foreign policies. The most important effect of combined foreign policy and domestic policy failure is the marginalization of the influence of those identified with rivalry policies (hawks). In democracies this is likely to occur through the electoral process, while in authoritarian states it is likely to occur through extra-constitutional means. An alternative in both cases is significant reshuffling of the cabinet and a change in foreign policy. Such an action will signal that the leader is a moderate capable of change. Though the public may remove that leader, it is not necessary for it to do so to bring about policy change. As such, the most important signal of change will be the emergence of both new domestic policies and new foreign policies. Advocates of revised rivalry policies (doves or moderates) who were previously marginalized will adopt more influential roles. An example of a major reshuffling of cabinets occurred in Egypt after the Six Day War; Nasser removed many of those associated with the redistributive land policies previously followed by his regime as well as major figures within the military. Egypt began to

18

Why Enduring Rivalries Do—or Don’t—End

adopt a more market-oriented economy while simultaneously pursuing a new foreign policy toward Israel. The degree of foreign and domestic policy failure also plays a role. An extremely mild recession coupled with a failed diplomatic initiative is not as likely to lead to a change in policy as is an economy in a longterm recession with high unemployment coupled with a defeat in war. Combinations of severity can have an impact, however. A country facing major economic difficulty that suffers diplomatic embarrassment is more likely to pursue a diplomatic solution to their rivalry than a nation with a strong economy that loses a limited war. The depth of failure will also impact the depth of policy change; the more severe the domestic and foreign policy difficulties faced by a state, the more dramatic the changes in policy it makes will be. At times, foreign policy failure may also breed domestic policy failure or cause a domestic problem itself. A war that leads to limited occupation has clear domestic implications; the foreign policy has led to domestic repercussions. The occupation of the Sinai Peninsula after the October War is one such example, as is the economic strain brought on by the Vietnam War in the United States. More recently, the impact of suicide bombers within Israel has had a dramatic impact on domestic Israeli politics. As noted above, change in rivalry policies can also occur when a dove comes to power due to domestic policy failure and a subsequent foreign policy failure attributable to prior rivalry policies occurs. Presumably, hawks have already been marginalized during the domestic takeover; the failure of a foreign policy continued from the past gives a leader the legitimacy to revise the foreign policy, especially if the leader’s domestic policies have been successful. This chain of events is similar to what occurred in Peru under Leguía; he dramatically altered the domestic policies of Peru, but continued the efforts of previous administrations to submit Peru’s dispute with Chile to arbitration in an attempt to recover the entire disputed territory of Tacna and Arica. When that arbitration failed, he chose to negotiate a peace treaty with Chile dividing the two territories. Had the Civilista party been in power, little chance exists that such a move would have been made. The domestic crisis that brought Leguía to power combined with the later foreign policy failure made the move possible.21 This model can also explain the logic implicit in the statement “only Nixon could go to China.” The basic argument implied by that statement is that hawks may be better peacemakers than doves because they can divert the opposition of their fellow hawks.22 This same logic could be applied to Menahem Begin of Israel as well; as a member of Gahal (later

Explaining Rivalry Termination

19

part of Likud), Begin had resigned from a unity cabinet in Israel in 1970 over Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir’s acceptance of UN Security Council Resolution 242 that called for withdrawal from territories occupied in the Six Day War. Before being elected as prime minister of Israel in 1977, Begin was seen as an opponent of returning all of the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt in return peace, a move that he would later endorse. The premise of the “only Nixon could go to China” argument is correct; a hawk with moderate tendencies making peace defrays criticism from members of the hawk’s own party. That argument does not address the hawk’s motivation for making peace, however. The motivation will still rest in a clear failure of both foreign and domestic politics. At times, a failure in rivalry policies may occur while the more dovish party (relatively speaking) is in power and the domestic economy is failing. If that party was faithful to the rivalry policies, the combined failure in domestic and foreign policies may lead to the election of more hawkish leaders, both to address foreign policy failures and to address domestic policy failures. Those leaders will be expected, however, to limit the effects of rivalry. If the cost for coming to power is to endorse peace, a hawk may be willing to make peace. The fact that it is a hawk making peace limits the opposition of the party to the move. Should the hawks return to opposition, however, it is likely that they will resume advocacy of hawkish policies. For Nixon, it was the economic decline of the late 1960s coupled with the quagmire in Vietnam that made an opening to China possible. Nixon, a hawk, was also elected in part to get the United States out of Vietnam. As evidence that the Republican Party had not changed its core beliefs in regard to China, the Republican Party strongly opposed Carter’s decision to normalize relations with China. A similar circumstance occurred in Israel after the 1973 October War. That war shattered the illusion of Israeli invincibility and brought Israel’s rejection of previous Egyptian attempts to negotiate limited withdrawal agreements into question. At the same time, Israel’s economy began to go into decline, and the ruling Labor party was beset by scandals. Begin’s hawkish Likud party did win the 1977 election, but Begin made it clear during the election that he would negotiate with Egypt. To signal that point to the public, he brought Moshe Dayan, a former Labor party member who had advocated negotiating a limited withdrawal agreement with Egypt in 1970, into his government. Once peace had been established with Egypt, Begin resumed his hawkish policies, especially toward Syria and Lebanon. It is the combined failure of foreign and

20

Why Enduring Rivalries Do—or Don’t—End

domestic politics that lead a public to update its beliefs about appropriate foreign policies; whomever it elects or puts into power will be expected to resolve the conflict. In summary, combined foreign and domestic policy failure marginalizes advocates of rivalry policies (hawks) and promotes those seeking conciliation (doves). From this argument, we can deduce a straightforward hypothesis regarding the rivalry relationship between two states, State A and State B: H1: Combined domestic and foreign policy failure in A will lead to a change in A’s foreign policy goals allowing for more bargaining space with B. For this hypothesis to be true, the cases discussed below will need to establish a clear baseline foreign policy that is the basis of a rivalry between two states. In State A, the cases must then show a clear divergence in the expected outcome of the foreign policy along a continuum from a failed diplomatic initiative to defeat in war with limited occupation.23 State A must also be suffering a domestic policy failure, as indicated by economic decline, high unemployment and/or domestic political instability (such as civil war, widespread strikes or frequent extra-constitutional changes in government). I would next expect to see a major change in government, either in ruling party or a major change in the ruling coalition of the state. The change in ruling coalition will include not only different individuals, but also different societal bases of support, indicating a shift in domestic policy. Finally, there must be a change in foreign policy toward a rival that creates more room for negotiation than previously existed. As I am arguing that a combined failure in domestic policy and foreign policy is a necessary but not sufficient condition for rivalry termination, a state’s failure to change foreign policy in the wake of a combined failure does not falsify my argument. Certain regime types may be more resistant to a change in rivalry policies than others, for example. On the other hand, should a state significantly alter its rivalry policies with neither precipitating condition being present, the central argument of the book that the combined failure of foreign and domestic policies is a necessary condition would be greatly undermined. In addition to this hypothesis, the above logic also has implications for the connection between foreign and domestic policy. While it is the combined failure in foreign and domestic policy that leads a state to change its rivalry policies, a state’s foreign policies may hasten such

Explaining Rivalry Termination

21

failures. A state that is actively engaged throughout a region or the world may have more opportunities to encounter a failure. Likewise, a state engaged in multiple rivalries may find itself in the situation where it must seek rapprochement with one or more of its rivals based on failures in only one area. The effect of being engaged in multiple rivalries does not just impact the possibility of failure in foreign policy; it may also affect the ability of a state to meet the needs of its citizens. An expensive rivalry may lead to domestic shortages that can increase the likelihood of domestic political failure.24 Egypt in 1967 is a good example of this logic. A significant number of Egyptian troops were involved in the Yemeni civil war; this commitment not only required a major commitment of financial resources, it also greatly weakened the Egyptian military on the eve of the Six Day War. In this regard, being involved in multiple rivalries can have multiple negative effects. This logic leads to a second hypothesis: H2: A state that is involved in multiple rivalries or has a particularly active foreign policy is more likely to experience foreign policy failure than a less active state. The basic evidence in support of this hypothesis would be a state with significant foreign policy commitments that suffers a failure in foreign policy. To establish the strength of this argument, a direct connection between the active foreign policy and a foreign policy failure would need to be established. Evidence that a state is able to maintain an extremely active foreign policy, including troop commitments, without suffering a major foreign policy failure would undermine the argument. Interaction Between State A and State B

As noted above, it takes two states to end a rivalry. To this point, my argument only explains change in one state but does not adequately explain rivalry termination. The book now turn to an explanation of the effect of State A’s policy change on the rivalry relationship with State B. At its core, a rivalry occurs when two states have incompatible preferences expressed through their foreign policies toward one another. These incompatible preferences mean that no bargaining space exists between the rivals. For the rivalry to end, bargaining space must open between the two rivals. This bargaining space can open in one of two ways: either one state completely capitulates to the other, or both states change their policies toward their rival.

22

Why Enduring Rivalries Do—or Don’t—End

Once State A has updated its policies based on foreign and domestic political failures, State B must respond by either agreeing to negotiate a termination to the rivalry or by rejecting State A’s revised rivalry position. If State A’s new position toward State B falls within State B’s range of acceptable agreements, the rivalry will terminate. If, however, State A’s new position toward State B is still outside the of State B’s range of acceptable agreements, the rivalry will not terminate absent change in State B. This leads to hypothesis three: H3: B will respond to A’s revised policy goals if they fall within B’s range of acceptable agreements. Even if State A’s new position does not fall into State B’s preexisting range of possible agreements, rivalry termination is still possible if State B goes through a similar process of foreign policy and domestic policy failure in close proximity to State A’s failures. For example, Israel suffered setbacks during the October War of 1973 just as the state’s economy was slowing down, helping to spur a softening in the Israeli position toward Egypt. This change happened six years after the beginning of a change in Egypt’s foreign policy, allowing for the two sides to reach agreement. Similarly, both Chile and Peru suffered foreign policy setbacks as a result of their failed arbitration over Tacna and Arica. Peru’s setback was the result of the arbitration itself; Chile’s was the diplomatic embarrassment it suffered due to its undermining of the plebiscite ordered by the arbiter. This second process for rivalry termination leads to hypothesis four: H4: Combined domestic and foreign policy failure in B will lead to a change in B’s foreign policy goals allowing B to respond more favorably to A’s overtures. Routes to Termination

The path to rivalry termination is a complex one involving dramatic policy changes brought on by foreign and domestic policy failure in at least one state. The primary test of the central logic of the book comes in hypotheses one and four; both of these hypotheses are based on the necessity of combined foreign and domestic policy to bring about foreign policy change. As noted above, evidence in support of these hypotheses must establish baseline foreign and domestic policies,

Explaining Rivalry Termination

23

failures in those policies, and change in those policies that open the possibility of bargaining with a rival. This argument is probabilistic. The complexities involved in bringing about rivalry termination may indicate why it is so difficult to resolve a rivalry. Even if one state dramatically alters its position, the change may not be sufficient to allow for negotiation and rivalry termination. For example, Anwar Sadat’s February 1971 overture to Israel was a public indication of Egypt’s willingness to negotiate a limited agreement with Israel. The proposal did not fit into Israel’s range of acceptable resolutions of the rivalry at that time. Such a result does not call into question the central logic of the book, however. Rivalry termination often requires independent changes in both states party to a rivalry, changes themselves that may or may not be compatible with rivalry termination. Further, such a modification of policy – as occurred on at least two occasions in Syria (once as Asad came to power, and again after the 1973 October War) – can lead to a reduction in tensions even if it does not lead to a formal termination of the rivalry. Given the rarity with which policy change happens in both states at the same time, it is not surprising that the window of opportunity to achieve rivalry termination can close; policy change in either state is not irreversible. Much like a public can update its beliefs about the inadequacy of rivalry policies, the public can also update its beliefs about the adequacy of new, more pacific policies. Such a change is especially likely if the domestic situation in State A does not improve or begins to decline again and State B does not respond to State A’s new policies. Such a circumstance can return hardliners to positions of prominence within the government, leading to a resumption of hardline rivalry policies.25 This possibility gives us hypothesis five: H5: The prospects for rivalry termination decrease as the length of time from A’s change in policy increases and the domestic situation either continues to deteriorate or resumes deteriorating. Evidence for this hypothesis will be the backsliding of a state’s foreign policy to previous, rivalry policies after continued failure to terminate the rivalry and continued domestic difficulties. The situation in Israel in the 1990s is a strong illustration of this phenomenon. As the peace process dragged on during the 1990s, many in Israel became frustrated with the process. Twice, in response to the resumption of violence within Israel, Israel elected hardline ministers of Likud as their

24

Why Enduring Rivalries Do—or Don’t—End

prime minister. Similar pressures within Egypt may have contributed to Sadat’s decision to launch the October War in 1973. The Importance of State Type

I argue that the above processes leading to rivalry termination occur regardless of state type. The type of regime in power does impact the probability that combined failure in foreign and domestic policy will lead to foreign policy change, however. Alternative coalitions may find it easier to come to power in a democracy, meaning that the degree of failure in both domestic and foreign policy does not need to be as severe in a democracy to spur change. States with high barriers to access to government institutions may be better able to resist those pushing for peace. In particular, repressive regimes will find it easier to ignore those pushing for change than moderately repressive regimes and democracies, while moderately repressive regimes will find it easier to resist change than democracies.26 In this book, I do not specifically test this observation as the cases I am studying do not contain sufficient variation to evaluate a hypothesis based on state type.27 Theoretical Conclusions

The theoretical approach advanced here – a focus on the domestic political response to failure – combines important insights from several different theoretical traditions and explains the variables that quantitative studies have identified as significant. The central logic can also be used to explain several factors that others have argued impact rivalry termination.28 First, it explains why a “costly stalemate” may be important to bringing about a negotiated settlement. A costly stalemate undermines the regime’s ability to provide necessary benefits to domestic coalitions, leading to pressure to shift policies to free up more resources to satisfy domestic constituencies. Second, it can address the role of third parties and mediators in a way consistent with the bargaining literature by explaining the role of third parties in providing side payments and information in a manner that may bolster pro-rapprochement forces in both states party to a rivalry.29 If states can quiet opposition with side payments, their ability to do so may be increased by third parties that provide funds necessary both to prop up the domestic coalition and to provide side payments to mollify opposition. Third parties may also be able to provide information to both sides in the rivalry about the changing positions in

Explaining Rivalry Termination

25

the other state. This information may help both states to recognize that bargaining space has indeed opened even in conditions of high mistrust.30 Third it explains why regime change may be associated with rivalry termination – a regime change reflects a new domestic coalition formed in response to past policy failures.31 Fourth, it may explain why increasing levels of trade in certain, but not all, circumstances may help terminate a rivalry. If domestic coalitions are predicated on revenue derived from trade, any threat to that trade that undermines a leader’s position may help speed rivalry termination.32 Finally, it draws lessons from constructivist studies into the breakdown of old ideas and the emergence of new ones, though it does not specifically endorse a constructivist framework. Rather, it recognizes that rational policy makers can have different interpretations of appropriate foreign policy goals and strategies. Only when those goals and strategies begin to fail is room truly created to change them. This change is not contingent on a change in the collective beliefs held by leaders, but rather is contingent on a potential or real loss of power that requires the formation of new coalitions to rule a state. This approach to rivalry termination is not, however, a deterministic argument, nor does it seek to explain the bargaining process itself. Rather, it explains the circumstances under which bargaining space between two rivals is likely to emerge. Certain contingent factors may impact rapprochement. The outcome of negotiations may be affected by the negotiating styles of a particular leader, and client states whose patrons significantly control foreign policy decision-making may defy conditions that would push other states to negotiate.33 Neither are the postulated conditions sufficient to bring about rivalry termination; this book does make a strong case, however, that they are necessary. In short, this book explains when windows of opportunity to pursue rapprochement are likely to occur, but does not guarantee that a rivalry will terminate. Section Two: Alternate Explanation

To provide a stronger test of the above hypotheses, I will compare their explanatory value with a set of hypotheses derived from a structural realist standpoint dependent purely on relative power as opposed to internal political dynamics. My alternate approach draws primarily on a modified version of Stephen Walt’s explanation for alliance formation behavior. Walt argues that material power, geography, and perceived

26

Why Enduring Rivalries Do—or Don’t—End

intentions all play a role in explaining alliance behavior in the Middle East, including Egypt's decision to abandon the Soviet Union in the early 1970s and its decision to stop working with Syria and Saudi Arabia.34 As I am primarily concerned with the structural components of Walt’s approach, this book excludes Walt’s use of perception to explain state behavior, choosing instead to focus on his more traditional structural realist arguments. The essence of his argument is that states will balance against threats if suitable allies are available and will bandwagon against a threat when that threat is overwhelmingly more powerful.35 The primary problem with using Walt’s hypotheses and argument is that he applies it to alliance behavior, not rivalry termination. The basic logic of his argument and neorealism in general can be used to derive hypotheses regarding rivalry termination, however. Essentially, states should balance against other states that are geographically proximate and present a realistic threat. When internal balancing is not sufficient, states will rely on external alliance partners to balance against the threat to their security. External balancing gives one route to rivalry termination: two rivals facing a common enemy ally to balance against the threat. Several historical examples lend credence to this suggested explanation. The decision by the United States to repair its relationship with China in the 1970s was taken at least in part to improve the US position in the Cold War against the Soviet Union. China was a natural ally against the Soviet Union as the two sides had experienced diplomatic fallout and an increase in tensions after the death of Stalin in the Soviet Union. An additional Cold War example is the relative stability in the relationship between Greece and Turkey during the Cold War. Historically, the states were enemies, but both became members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The alliance against a common enemy, the Soviet Union, may be one factor that prevented the outbreak of violence between these two states. Finally, this line of reasoning provides a strong explanation for the settlement of Egypt’s conflict with Saudi Arabia over Yemen. Egypt realized that it could not continue its activist military policy in Yemen while simultaneously preparing for a future military conflict with Israel. Its agreement with Saudi Arabia not only freed up the Egyptian military, it also opened the door for financial assistance from the conservative Arab monarchies that had previously been concerned about Egyptian behavior.36 This logic gives us alternative hypothesis one:

Explaining Rivalry Termination

27

AH1: A rivalry will terminate when two states party to a rivalry ally to counter a third, more powerful state.37 Evidence in favor of this hypothesis would include both statements and actions by parties to a rivalry that indicate that they share a common enemy. To provide a stronger test for the book, a formal alliance between parties will not be required to demonstrate this argument. Rather, the two primary types of evidence that will be used to support this hypothesis will be statements from both parties to a rivalry naming a common state as an enemy and actions by both parties to a rivalry to counter a third party militarily. Actual military skirmishes between both parties to the rivalry and third party will provide strong support for this hypothesis. Walt’s argument is not simply about balancing against threats, however. He also argues that states are likely to bandwagon, or join, states that are significantly more powerful than they are when little prospect exists for successfully balancing a more powerful state either internally or externally. When a state has few military options to confront a more powerful state, the simple solution may be to join it rather than fight it. In fact, Walt argues that Egypt’s decision to align with the United States after 1975 was a decision to bandwagon based on: (1) the vulnerabilities arising from Egypt’s economic problems, its military weakness, and the prolonged diplomatic stalemate; (2) the fact that Egypt’s other potential allies (e.g., the Soviet Union) could not correct these problems; and (3) Sadat’s belief (in contrast to Nasser’s) that U.S. opposition could be reversed.38 No available alliance would have allowed Egypt to challenge Israel militarily. The act of Egypt’s switching its alliance to the United States signaled its desire and willingness to end the rivalry as it chose to bandwagon with the more powerful US/Israeli alliance. This same logic could potentially apply to the rivalry between Peru and Chile. Peru had long believed that the United States was, if not an ally, a friend that shared Peru’s position over the Tacna and Arica dispute. The United States’ decision against Peru in the arbitration decision essentially ended Peru’s long held hope that US arbitration would result in the return of all of its land. Absent the support of the United States, Peru, far weaker than Chile militarily, may have believed that its only remaining option was to negotiate with Chile.

28

Why Enduring Rivalries Do—or Don’t—End

In terms of rivalry termination, this line of logic leads to alternative hypothesis two: AH2: When one party to a rivalry suffers severe relative decline in respect to its rival and cannot obtain external allies to continue its rivalry behavior, the rivalry will terminate. Evidence that would support this hypothesis would include evidence of repeated defeats of one party to rivalry by another, abandonment of that same state by its allies, refusal of new states to join in an alliance, and relative economic and military decline of one state to another. Evidence that would contradict this hypothesis would include a state in relative decline refusing to terminate a rivalry even in the face of a decline in alliance partners, economic performance and military ability. These two hypotheses reflect the central logic of structural realism that states act based on the distribution of power (or threat). As their focus is purely on the international orientation of states, they are simpler explanations for rivalry termination than my argument. As such, if the available evidence strongly supports one or both of the alternative hypotheses across the cases, they will severely undermine the need for my more complex explanation even if the evidence supports it as well. This chapter now turns to an explanation of how and why the cases under review were chosen and how evidence will be evaluated. Section Three: Methods and Cases

The above hypotheses will be explored through the comparison of Israeli relations with Egypt and Syria and Peruvian relations with Ecuador and Chile. In each of these sets, two states achieved rivalry termination while the others did not. In addition, even those dyads that did achieve rivalry termination experienced failed attempts at rapprochement in the past, allowing for comparison within the cases. The basic methodology that will be used to explore the cases is a combination of process tracing and Mill’s methods. The Methods

This book does not seek to refute previous statistical work on enduring rivalries, but rather to provide a better theoretical explanation for past quantitative findings and, through in depth process tracing, to demonstrate the posited causal mechanisms at work. As noted in

Explaining Rivalry Termination

29

Chapter One, quantitative studies on enduring rivalries have identified a number of variables that are strongly correlated with both rivalry initiation and termination, including regime change, political shock, major war, revolution, and the regime type, but most of these studies have failed to do so within a theoretical framework. To some, the correlation of variables attained through strict statistical methods with well designed controls is sufficient; causation is the difference in the level of the dependent variable based on the presence or absence of the independent variable.39 To others, statistical studies may be useful in showing phenomenal regularities – the connection between certain events – but tell you little about the actual causal mechanisms.40 In addition, regression analysis only provides average effects; it can tell you about the relation between two variables in general, but can tell you little about a specific case. Outside the confines of the model, it cannot tell you why one of its cases had a certain outcome in the presence of a certain variable and another outcome in a different case. A more complete causal story requires laying out the entire process from the independent variable to the outcome, explaining why and demonstrating how the variable has its effect at each step.41 Positing the relationship is not enough; it must be demonstrated through rigorous analysis.42 In order to further explore the termination of enduring rivalries, this paper will combine Mill’s methods of difference and agreement. Mill's method of difference argues that if two objects of study are similar in every respect except for the outcome and the value of the independent variable, the strength of the causal argument is confirmed. Mill's method of agreement calls upon the researcher to find cases that differ in every respect except the outcome and the value of the explanatory variable.43 Mill's methods alone cannot prove causality, however. The methods rely only on correlation and do not purport to tell a causal story. In addition, it is probably not possible to find cases that match (or differ) as perfectly as the methods call for.44 However, the methods may be sufficient to discount certain causes. If two states are similar in almost every respect, but differ on one or two indicators and on the value of the dependent variable in question, one can plausibly discount the factors in which the two states are similar as causes. In a similar vein, if two states differ in almost every respect except the value of the dependent variable and the value of a suspected cause, one can eliminate the ways in which they differ as causes and lend credence to the one similarity as a possible cause.45 Nonetheless, Mill's methods alone are not sufficient.

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Why Enduring Rivalries Do—or Don’t—End

Stanley Lieberson argues that Mill’s methods are not, in fact, capable of eliminating or endorsing any particular variable because of the size of the N. He argues that anytime you are using a small number of cases it is possible to eliminate or endorse certain erroneous conclusions in part because the methods require a deterministic framework. Social relations are inherently probabilistic, meaning that one must measure average effects through regression in order to make any conclusions about social phenomena. To drive his point home, he uses the example of drunk driving. Were we to have two drunk drivers, one of whom had a wreck and one of whom did not, paired with two sober drivers, one of whom had a wreck and one of whom did not, under Mill’s methods we would have to eliminate drunkenness as cause. Lieberson points to the absurdity of such conclusions to drive home his point about the effectiveness of small-N analysis in general and Mill’s methods in particular.46 Though Lieberson’s criticism does have some merit, it does have certain problems. First, Lieberson assumes that all social relations are probabilistic. Many social relations may, in fact, be probabilistic, but others may either approach such a level of probabalism that they appear deterministic, or may in fact be deterministic.47 Take Lieberson’s drunk driving example. Drunk driving does not always lead to accidents, but a drunk driver approaching a tree at 60 MPH greatly increases his chances of having an accident as the distance in which he has to maneuver decreases. At a certain point, the collision is unavoidable. Second, Lieberson’s view is tied to regression analysis in that he is criticizing small N research for making arguments about correlation between variables with far too few cases – the degrees of freedom problem. However, most qualitative research does not simply seek to draw correlations between variables, but to explain the process from a set of initial conditions to the outcome. Again using the drunk driving example, we know that there are several different causes of wrecks. In fact, many causes operate through similar mechanisms. Drivers who are too tired, distracted by phone calls, children, etc., may behave in a similar manner to drunk drivers. Some drivers may simply drive in an aggressive, risky manner when completely sober. Regression analysis can only connect such activities to wrecks; it takes more in depth study of test participants to examine the effects on particular people. The qualitative researcher will not necessarily conclude that drunk driving does not cause wrecks based on one case of a drunk driver not wrecking, but the qualitative researcher will explore the other conditions leading to

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wreck (or not wreck) in great detail as well as what it is about drunk drivers that makes them prone to accidents.48 All that being said, Lieberson is correct that Mill’s method alone is purely correlative. To fill in the gaps of Mill's methods, this book will use process tracing. The domestic politics/policy change argument I present suggests a specific route to achieving rivalry termination. My argument is that the public and potential ruling coalitions will respond to failures in domestic and foreign policy by forcing supporters of hawkish policies from power or, at the very least, by forcing hawks to adopt more moderate policies to remain in power. Through process tracing, I can determine if that chain of events actually occurs. If it does not, the arguments put forward in this book will be discredited.49 Importantly, I do not argue that rational updating in response to policy failure is an individual process; rather I argue that such updating occurs on a societal level. To demonstrate my argument, then, I must show that a leader or alternate coalition responds to public and domestic policy failure by recognizing that ruling coalition must be based on new domestic and foreign policies. Second, testing multiple observable implications of my theoretical argument by process tracing limits the impact of the degrees of freedom problem -- the problem of too many variables, not enough observations.50 The research design provides a strong test in other ways as well. By testing the suggested causal pathway of my argument against the alternate balance of power argument, the case studies will provide a strong test of the logic of my proposed explanation for rivalry termination by determining whether or not a rival explanation provides an adequate causal story. A second way the book represents strong methodology is that it fits in a much larger research program on enduring rivalries. As noted above, a number of quantitative studies have demonstrated a strong correlation between domestic political variables and rivalry termination. This book provides a strong explanation for the causal mechanisms that explain the correlations discovered in quantitative research.51 Though the methodology in this book stands alone, it is also valuable in that it provides causal mechanisms and consistent explanations for the findings of several quantitative studies.52 Defining the Variables

Before moving on to the cases, it is necessary to give functional definitions of the independent, dependent and intervening variables. As

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noted above, foreign policy failure is defined as an outcome that diverges from foreign policy expectations. In the case of conflict, a negative outcome is signified by a failure to 1) achieve stated objectives; 2) suffer limited occupation by another state; or 3) suffer complete occupation. In the case of diplomatic initiatives, a failure occurs when an expected outcome fails to occur. This variable will be measured by clarifying a state’s expected outcomes and comparing them to actual outcomes. Domestic policy failure is more difficult to define. Like a foreign policy failure, domestic policy failure is most clearly a divergence between expected and actual outcomes. Measuring that difference is somewhat difficult, however. One could argue that an economic recession would be a sign of failure. At times, however, a recession may either not be deep enough to cause dislocation or not signify deeper economic difficulties. A mild recession may also not significantly impact those groups upon whose support a regime rests. On the other hand, a state’s GDP may continue to expand even while significant percentages of the workforce are either unemployed or facing declining wages. For a failure in domestic policy to be perceived by the public, it must have a visible impact. Taking these concerns together, a domestic policy failure will be signified by widespread strikes and/or demonstrations in at least one major city and/or a significant decline or loss of a sector of the state’s economy.53 The next significant indicator is a change in the ruling coalition. This change may or may not include a change in head of state. As I expect this change to impact foreign policy, however, I would expect some change in a state’s foreign policy team. Given the domestic nature of my argument, I also expect the new coalition to draw on new popular sectors for support. I argue that coalition change will include a change of head of state and/or the replacement of either the minister of foreign affairs or the head of the military combined with the inclusion of at least one previously excluded popular sector. For example, the addition of a previously excluded merchant class to a ruling coalition would signify the inclusion of a previously excluded popular sector.54 Foreign policy change is a straightforward variable that can be measured by reference to a state’s public and private statements. If a state’s policy shifts on at least one major issue at dispute in a rivalry, foreign policy change has occurred. The change must be on an issue of contention, not simply a strategy for achieving the desired outcomes. For example, one major sticking point between Egypt and Israel was the refusal of Egypt to recognize Israel’s right to exist and Egypt’s stated –

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if not actual – desire to contribute to the destruction of Israel. A change in Egypt’s position to recognize Israel’s right to exist would constitute a foreign policy change. On the other hand, a shift by Egypt from direct confrontation with Israel to confrontation by proxy or even by diplomacy would not constitute a foreign policy change for the purposes of my argument. While foreign policy change may be easy to recognize, the existence of bargaining space is more difficult to observe before negotiations occur. Bargaining space in the abstract means that there exists a possible agreement between two states. Even when space exists, however, it is possible for two states to fail to come to an agreement. The possibility also exists that two states believe an agreement is possible when, in fact, it is not. Finally, a state may adjust its previously stated final position during the negotiation process such that an agreement becomes possible where it may not have been before. In the context of a rivalry, then, how do we measure bargaining space without falling victim to the tautological definition that we know bargaining space exists when an agreement is reached and that it did not exist when an agreement was not? Much like change in foreign policy, we must rely on the public and private statements of officials in both states. Goemans argues that bargaining space opens when the “minimum demands of both sides… become compatible.”55 Outside of the negotiating process, however, it is difficult to determine the exact minimum demands of two states on issues such as borders, security arrangements, and the nature of diplomatic exchange. In the absence of this knowledge, it is still possible to determine when the opportunity to negotiate exists. As a rivalry is marked by general policy disagreement between two states, an opening occurs when that general disagreement changes. Bargaining space exists, therefore, when the independent foreign policies of two states change such that they agree on the basic principles of a final agreement. Bargaining space exists or does not exist irrespective of the final outcome of any negotiations; why states may miss opportunities to negotiate is another argument all together. In the case of Egypt and Israel’s rivalry, for example, I argue that bargaining space opened when both states acknowledged that any peace agreement would require Egypt to formally recognize Israel and for Israel to return Egyptian territory, albeit with certain security arrangements in place. Though both sides had clear points that they would not concede, such as return of the full Sinai and formal recognition of Israel, they were somewhat flexible on the nature of security arrangements and the timeframe for implementing an

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agreement. Lack of a priori knowledge on the detailed minimally acceptable positions of the two states on issues such as these does not mean that we cannot determine whether or not bargaining space exists. The Cases

The comparison of cases within regions and time periods represents Mill's method of difference: the cases are similar in every respect except the outcome of interest. The most obvious similarity in both regions is that one state was involved in two rivalries. Israel made peace with Egypt, but not Syria. This shifts the focus of the method of difference to Egypt and Syria. The rivalries of Israel with Syria and Egypt both began at the time of Israel's creation in 1948. Between 1967 and 1982, Israel fought wars with Egypt and Syria in both 1967 and 1973. The 1973 war began with a coordinated attack by Syria and Egypt on Israel. In addition to these wars, Egypt and Israel were also involved in a limited conflict from 1969-70 known as the War of Attrition. Egypt and Syria each lost major territory in the 1967 war and failed to recapture it in 1973. Both signed disengagement agreements with Israel in the wake of the 1973 war (Egypt first, then Syria). Early international efforts, led in part by the United States and the Soviet Union, included Syria and Egypt, as well as other states in the region, in peace talks with Israel. Only Egypt, however, would sign a peace treaty with Israel. The similarities between the two states extend beyond their relationship with Israel. Both states had non-democratic, fairly secular governments, and both were client states of the Soviet Union at least through the end of the 1973 war. In addition, the primary religion of the two states is Islam, and neither state had significant petroleum reserves, forcing them to depend in part on support from other Arab states in the region. Finally, neither state had significant trade with Israel; in fact, Egypt has never established a high level of trade with Israel, even in the wake of the peace treaty between the two states.56 The two states shared many traits, but only one found lasting peace with Israel. What, then, was the difference? Egypt, when it was defeated in 1967, faced massive economic problems; problems that would continue into the 1970s. Both foreign and domestic policies underwent major changes in the 1970s, culminating in peace with Israel. Though Sadat, who assumed power in 1970, did pursue peace more forcefully than had Nasser, Egyptian policy had begun to shift shortly after the 1967 defeat. Syria, though also defeated in war and facing some economic difficulties, shifted its foreign policy in the early 1970s. However, the

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Ba‘th party that came to power in 1966 had successfully defeated most of its challengers and brutally repressed opposition to the regime in the late 1960s; the government shift that occurred in 1970 did represent a change in policy, but the change was not as significant as the one that occurred in Egypt. After the 1973 war, which was neither a victory nor a defeat, the Syrian economy began a period of expansion. In addition, Asad successfully expanded his ruling coalition through the early and mid 1970s. By the time significant opposition to Asad began to grow after 1976, culminating in 1979-80, Asad’s chance for peace with Israel seemed to have passed.57 Israel entered a period of rapid economic expansion after its major victory in the 1967 war. Israel’s leaders very quickly took hard-line stances in the wake of the war, and ignored peace overtures from Egypt’s Anwar Sadat in 1970 and 1971. After the 1973 war, however, in which Israel suffered heavy losses, Israel seemed more willing to negotiate. Israel also began to suffer economic difficulty in this time period. Israel’s foreign policy failure was not so complete, however, that it was willing to accept any conditions for peace. Egypt was more accommodating; Egypt made peace with Israel. In a similar vein, Peru had strained relations with Ecuador and Chile from the time of its liberation from Spain. Skirmishes along the border with Ecuador were not uncommon; though the two rarely fought all out war. Their dispute arose from the time of colonization and dealt with a disputed border. Peru and Chile engaged in massive fighting which culminated in the War of the Pacific from 1879-83. Peru lost mineral rich territory to Chile in the War of the Pacific, and lost a number of islands that produced guano, a major Peruvian export, during various skirmishes. Peru would later sign a final peace treaty with Chile that was ratified in 1930. It also entered into negotiations with Ecuador during the 1920s, but was unable to find lasting peace until the 1990s. Ecuador and Chile were similar in many other ways as well. All Latin American states participated in regional trade and in various PanAmerican conferences. Both states were predominately Catholic and had been colonized by the Spanish. Chile is more resource rich than Ecuador, but the other similarities between the states are sufficient to claim that they fit under the guise of the method of difference. What was the difference here? There were several. First, Peru and Chile both were suffering from economic difficulties when they agreed to arbitration by the US president in 1922. The acceptance of arbitration was not a major break with past policy for either state; Peru had long wanted the situation arbitrated and Chile was prepared to ignore an

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unfavorable ruling. By the time the decision was handed down in 1925, however, Chile was facing a major political crisis while Peru was relatively stable. The arbitration decision largely reflected Chilean wishes, but made just enough concessions to Peru to upset Chile. Peru had suffered a foreign policy blow: defeat in the arbitration it wanted. Chile would also suffer a blow. When the US announced in 1926 that Chile was blocking implementation of the arbitral decision, Chile suffered internationally. At the same time, Peru began to enter a period of domestic turmoil in 1929. By the end of 1929, the two states would sign and ratify a peace agreement. Peru’s dictator would fall in 1930 due in part to opposition over the peace treaty and in part due to his failure to respond to the Great Depression. It was this same act that would deal a final blow to Peruvian negotiations with Ecuador; the two states had agreed to put their negotiations on hold until Peru’s issue with Chile was resolved. At the same time, a period of domestic instability in Ecuador made it very difficult for any government to follow a coherent policy on border relations for any significant period of time. The method of difference allows us to discount several variables immediately. Levels of trade, religion, colonial history, war (by itself) and mineral wealth all appear to be discounted. As noted, if my argument is not deterministic, Lieberson is correct in noting that I cannot dismiss these as causes based only on Mill’s methods. However, by combining Mill’s methods with detailed process tracing, the book will demonstrate a strong causal chain that is not dependent on the presence of these variables. Turning briefly to the method of agreement allows the rejection of even more variables. The method of agreement is used here in comparing the cases across regions and across time. This method even allows further grounds to reject some of the variables rejected under the method of difference. The states that successfully resolved their rivalries are similar in almost no respect. One was a stable democracy (Israel), two were unstable democracies (Peru and Chile),58 while Egypt was autocratic. In short, state type and the combination of state types are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions to achieve peace. The Cold War and great power rivalry in general, though important, is not a determining factor; rivalries began and terminated before the Cold War, and rivalries terminated after the Cold War.59 Trade would certainly not appear to be a factor in terminating a rivalry. As noted, Israel and Egypt never have had significant trade beyond oil from the Sinai, either during or after their rivalry.60 Peru and Chile, on the other hand, have participated in a great deal of regional trade. One can also reject, to a degree, the necessity of

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institutions. Peru and Chile were involved in many international conferences together; Egypt and Israel, outside of the United Nations, were not. Finally, the necessity of a third party is rejected. Peru and Chile resolved their rivalry without the help of the US – in fact, US arbitration failed to resolve their differences. It was only after the two states engaged in direct negotiations that they were able to find peace.61 In addition, Peru and Ecuador had a series of meetings in Washington, D.C., in the 1930s that accomplished nothing. It is important to note that though the methods of difference and agreement allow for the rejection of the many of the above variables as necessary causes, it does not mean that a strong explanation for rivalry termination cannot provide explanations for how some of these variables may have some effect. For example, third parties may be able to influence negotiations, but they are not a necessary condition for rivalry termination. These explanations would simply be additional observable implications of the argument presented. The methods presented here allow for the tests of four cases of rivalry, two of which ended, two of which did not. The cases, by holding one member of a pair of negotiations—one successful, one failed— constant also allow for a true examination of why one state can find peace with some rivals but not with all. In doing so, I was able to treat the cases both individually and as part of a greater whole. 1

Schelling “Internal Decision-Making,” p. 9. As an example of this not directly related to rivalry termination, Serbia capitulated almost entirely to Austria’s demands after the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand. Nonetheless, Austria was not satisfied and pushed forward with a declaration of war against Serbia. 3 See, for example, Chiozza and Goemans, “Peace Through Insecurity,” and Bueno de Mesquita, “Domestic Politics and International Relations,” for an analysis of the importance of domestic incentives facing a leader. Chiozza and Goemans find that contrary to the expectations of diversionary war theory, a leader is most likely to initiate conflict when his domestic position is strong. The importance of their findings is that the likelihood of conflict initiation is tied to the leader’s strength. David, “Explaining Third World Alignment,” also argues that leaders in the third world are likely to act internationally based at least in part on their domestic incentives. 4 The logic of my approach is similar to that in Schultz, “The Politics of Risking Peace,” and is distinct from Fearon, “Domestic Political Audiences;” Fearon “Bargaining;” and Kydd, “Trust, Reassurance and Cooperation,” who use incomplete information games within an individual decision-making framework. 5 Hawks and doves are only relative terms regarding rivalry policies. Someone who is dovish toward one rival may in fact have hawkish tendencies at other times. 2

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6 On assuming the public is moderate, see Schultz, “The Politics of Risking Peace,” pp. 9-10. Schultz considers the average voter to be moderate, or willing to choose between a dove and a hawk under the right conditions. See also Peterson, Crisis Bargaining and the State, pp. 15, 23; and Page and Shapiro, The Rational Public, 184, 281, on shifts in US public opinion on foreign policy based on major events. They find that stability is the rule in opinion on foreign policy, but that major events can cause dramatic shifts in opinion on issues. 7 See Schultz, “The Politics of Risking Peace,” pp. 7-9. Schultz uses four categories based on a two party system. A hawkish party has both hardliners who always prefer defection and moderates who will cooperate or defect. The dovish party has both pacifist and moderates. Pacifist always cooperate, moderates will cooperate or defect. Kydd, “Trust, Reassurance and Cooperation,” uses only two types, mean states and nice states. Mean states prefer defection in most cases, nice states usually prefer cooperation. 8 Ibid. 9 See Fearon, “Bargaining,” pp. 294-5; Goemans, War and Punishment, p. 34; and Jervis, Perception and Misperception, pp. 38-9. 10 Chiozza and Goemans, “International Conflict,” pp. 615-6. 11 Chiozza and Goemans, “Peace through Insecurity,” pp. 453, 458. 12 The Gallup Organization online presidential approval rating poll archive: http://www.gallup.com/poll/116677/Presidential-Approval-Ratings-GallupHistorical-Statistics-Trends.aspx (accessed February 2010). 13 Page and Shapiro, The Rational Public, pp. 259-60. 14 Ibid., 274-6. 15 In some circumstances, foreign policy failure may lead to domestic difficulties. For example, the expense of the Vietnam War helped cause economic problems in the US in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Similarly the expense of Egypt’s involvement in Yemen coupled with its defeat by Israel in 1967 further harmed an already declining economy. Barnett, Confronting the Cost of War, argues that constant preparations for war, like those that can occur in a rivalry setting, also have an impact on the domestic political situation in states. This possibility will be further discussed below. 16 The example of George H.W. Bush’s failure to be reelected in 1992 is an excellent example of this phenomenon at work. Bush’s foreign policy received strong public support, while his handling of the economy received poor marks. Bill Clinton won office by focusing his campaign around the mantra, “It’s the economy, stupid.” 17 See Page and Shapiro, The Rational Public, pp. 281-4, on the ability of the American public to make collective rational decisions on foreign policy separate from domestic politics. Though their evidence is specific to the American populace, they later argue that their work has implications for democratic theory more broadly (Chapter 10). 18 St. John, The Foreign Policy of Peru, p. 154. 19 Ecuador rejected that arbitration. Tensions were high between Ecuador and Peru, but the Spanish arbitration had vindicated Peru’s position in regard to the rivalry. 20 See Carter, Human Rights and Foreign Policy.

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21 Contrary to his actions with Chile, Leguía took a novel approach to Peru’s rivalry with Ecuador early in his presidency. In response to the 1916 Muñoz Vernaza-Suaréz treaty between Ecuador and Colombia that ceded lands claimed by Peru to Ecuador, Leguía negotiated an agreement with Colombia that returned those lands to Peru. This agreement strengthened Peru’s position with Ecuador. In essence, Leguía altered Peru’s rivalry relationship with Ecuador by resolving its problems with Colombia in response to the setback of the Muñoz Vernaza-Suaréz treaty. 22 See, for example, Schultz, “The Politics of Risking Peace.” 23 Recall that this book specifically excludes instances where one state is completely occupied by another. 24 See Barnett, Confronting the Cost of War, pp. 1-7; Bennett, “Integrating and Testing,” pp. 1230-1. 25 Colaresi, “When Doves Cry,” examines what happens to leaders who make unrequited peace overtures. 26 See Chiozza and Goemans, “International Conflict,” p. 611 on the impact of regime type on the length of a leader’s tenure. 27 Though I do not test this proposition, it is supported by statistical findings in Bennett, “Integrating and Testing,” p. 1224; and Greig, “Moments of Opportunity,” p. 693. This prediction also leads to a paradox. While it may be easier for a coalition that is seeking rapprochement to come to power in a democracy, it may also be easier for that coalition to be removed from power if it does not achieve results. This latter expectation is demonstrated in Schultz, “The Politics of Risking Peace,” and Peterson, Crisis Bargaining and the State, pp. 37-38. 28 Though these factors will not be specifically examined in the case studies. 29 As will be discussed below, this last incentive was a strong consideration for both Egypt and Chile. For further discussion of this point, see Touval, The Peace Brokers, p. 307; Zartman and Rubin, Power and Negotiation, p. 167. 30 See Princen, Intermediaries in International Conflict, pp. 3-11; Hoppman, The Negotiation Process, pp. 225-6; and Touval and Zartman, International Mediation, pp. 7-9 for more on the role of third parties. 31 Zartman and Berman, The Practical Negotiator, pp. 50-2, also discuss the importance of recognizing significant changes – such as changes in leadership – in bringing about negotiations. 32 See Solingen, Regional Order at Centuries Dawn, for a discussion of the role of internationalist versus statist coalitions in forming grand strategy. 33 Though the latter is likely to occur only if the patron provides significant side-payments or repressive measures to maintain a domestic coalition. 34 Walt, The Origin of Alliances, Chapter 1. Walt also argues that ideology can play a role in determining alliance choices, but I do not include that perspective here. Under a strict rationalist interpretation, ideology (religion, party identification, etc.) should not influence material calculations. In fact, Walt notes that ideology can make predictions both ways. It can be divisive or unifying. As it makes no definite predictions, I choose not to evaluate its role here. 35 Ibid. See also Armstrong, Breaking the Ice, pp. 23, 134. Armstrong argues that states facing deteriorating international circumstances are likely to

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push for peace if the situation is deteriorating to the degree that the state is in danger. This is only one of the conditions that Armstrong notes is necessary for achieving peace, but it is an important one for him. 36 Walt, The Origin of Alliances, pp. 111-113. 37 This hypothesis is similar to a common formulation tested in the statistical literature on rivalry termination. Goertz and Diehl, “The Initiation and Termination,” pp. 36-7, 48, test an argument similar to this to explain both rivalry initiation and termination, though they do expect it to apply more to great power rivalries. They argue that according to neorealist theory, shifts in the balance of power should affect rivalry relationships. They find that rapid changes in the distribution of power do affect major power rivalries, but have less of an effect on minor power rivalries. This hypothesis is also very similar to one tested by Bennett, “Integrating and Testing,” p. 1208. He found that major power shifts and security conditions did not have a major impact on rivalry termination (p. 1224), though this finding was sensitive to coding (p. 1227). 38 Walt, The Origin of Alliances, p. 178. 39 See King, et. al., Designing Social Inquiry, p. 85. 40 See Little, Varieties of Social Explanation, pp. 186-9, for a discussion of phenomenal regularities in the social sciences. He argues that there are a number of phenomenal regularities in social science, such as an increase in GNP is correlated with a decline in infant mortality. The increase in GNP is not the cause in a strict sense; to explain a decline in infant mortality requires an explanation of how a rising GNP changes certain conditions in a country that decrease infant mortality. It is not the GNP doing the causing; it is some cause for which the GNP, at best, serves as a proxy. 41 See Keat and Urry, Social Theory as Science, Chapter 2, for a discussion of the necessity to go beyond temporal connectedness to establish causality and the value of describing the causal processes at work. 42 See Dessler, “Beyond Correlations.” Dessler discusses adiabatic processes (atmospheric process leading to certain weather systems) to demonstrate how very different initial conditions can lead to the same effect by working through similar causal mechanisms. See also Turner, "'Net Effects' A Short History," pp. 36-44. Turner provides a cautionary tale on relying on the correlation of statistics alone. In studying cholera in the 19th century, a prominent statistician, convinced that cholera was airborne, was able to demonstrate a connection between elevation and cholera. A second researcher spent time studying regions where major cholera outbreaks occurred in an effort to understand the disease. Based on his observations, he determined that cholera was water borne. The statistical studies actually could support the water borne theory as well; in fact, even ardent opponents later accepted the water borne theory when it became clear that it was correct through further studies. Good qualitative data can provide strong support (or possibly dis-confirmation) for strong statistical associations. 43 See Mill, A System of Logic, pp. 610-12. Arend Lijphart suggests finding "comparable cases," cases that are similar in almost every respect except the outcome, first in, "Comparative Politics and The Comparative Method," pp. 687-8, and more extensively in "The Comparable-Cases Strategy in Comparative Research."

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41

Mill, A System of Logic, pp. 610-13. See Waldner, State Building and Late Development, pp. 231. Waldner argues that this perspective requires a deterministic view of causation. To accept this argument, one must be willing to accept a deterministic argument. 46 Lieberson, “Small N’s and Big Conclusions.” 47 Little, Varieties of Social Explanation, disagrees that any social phenomena approach such a level of determinism. For him, causal chains are so long and complex that they cannot be explained with reference to either covering laws or to deterministic causal processes. Each case needs explanation. 48 Sophisticated statistical models can also show that certain contributing factors matter; qualitative research can show more particularly why they matter. 49 See McKeown, “Case Studies and the Statistical Worldview,” pp. 172-3, and McKeown, “Hegemonic Stability Theory,” on the value of process tracing in testing for causal mechanisms. 50 See Lijphart, “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method,” pp. 686-7 and Campbell, “Degrees of Freedom.” 51 See McKeown, “Case Studies and the Statistical World View,” pp. 173174, and 184-185 on the value of revealing causal mechanisms, even in relation to other studies. See Lijphart, "Comparative Politics," pp. 692-693 for a brief discussion of how case studies can be taken as part of a larger whole. 52 See Bueno de Mesquita, “Domestic Politics and International Relations.” 53 In addition to these two main indicators, the case studies will discuss general domestic conditions in each of the cases being examined. 54 This last requirement may be more difficult to detect in two party or multiparty democracies. If a new party comes to power in a democracy, this last condition will be considered met as parties traditionally draw on different sectors/groups for support. 55 Goemans, War and Punishment, p. 23. 56 Arad, et. al, The Economics of Peacemaking, p. 87. 57 Asad had given interviews in 1976 indicating a willingness to recognize Israel’s right to exist. 58 Peru was a fairly stable democracy from 1896-1919; it actually made peace under a dictator. Chile was a stable democracy for most of its history, though it did experience a civil war in 1891 and a brief period of military rule from 1924-5. In addition, it was under, for all practical purposes, an elected military ruler from 1927-1930. 59 In fact, Bennett “Integrating and Testing,” p. 1228, finds that Cold War rivalries may be impacted by the political influence of the superpower rivalry in that issue salience does not have as significant an effect in post-1945 rivalries as it does in pre-1945 rivalries. He does find, however, that “Common effects appear with regime change and political shocks…” in both eras, supporting a focus on domestic politics. 60 Israel would not return the Sinai oil fields to Egypt unless Egypt guaranteed shipments to Israel. 61 Though the Peruvian president that signed the treaty tried to argue that he had been forced to do so by the United States, peace came about due to direct negotiations. As mentioned above, this is one way a third party can have an impact without directly participating in negotiations. 45

3 Egypt and Israel: A Path to Peace

In this chapter I trace the relationship between Egypt and Israel from the period immediately prior to the 1967 Six Day War through the signing of a formal peace treaty in 1979. During this time, both states made significant adjustments to their foreign policy that made a peace agreement possible. Prior to the Six Day War, Egypt refused to recognize Israel’s right to exist and made it clear that negotiation with Israel was not possible. In addition, Egypt had pursued a policy of opposition to traditional Arab monarchies in its attempt to be the progressive leader of the Arab world. Israel’s position toward Egypt hardened after the Six Day War; Israel’s capture of the Sinai Peninsula gave it a strong bargaining position. Shortly after the war, Israel made the decision that it would not return all of the Sinai. In particular, Israel wanted to maintain a presence at Sharm el-Sheikh, a strategic position on the Strait of Tiran. Egypt’s position toward Israel began to change shortly after its 1967 defeat. Despite the famous “three no’s” at Khartoum, Egyptian president Nasser began to suggest both that Egypt could have some sort of negotiation with Israel, and that Egypt would be willing to give at least de facto recognition to Israel. I argue that the primary hypotheses presented in Chapter Two provide strong explanations both for the termination of the Israeli/Egyptian rivalry and the timing of foreign policy changes in both countries. At the time of the Six Day War, Egypt was suffering economically and had a significant number of troops fighting in Yemen. The combination of over-involvement and defeat in foreign policy coupled with a poor domestic situation provides a strong explanation for the timing of Egypt’s changing foreign policy. The changes in foreign policy were accompanied by dramatic changes in domestic policy and in the sources of support for the Egyptian government. Similarly, Israel did not make significant concessions to Egypt until after its heavy losses in the October War and the economy began to slow. Much like Egypt, the

43

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final steps toward peace occurred in tandem with large changes in Israeli leadership, including the first electoral defeat for Israel’s labor coalition. The alternative hypotheses, based on a balance of power approach, also provide some explanatory power in this case. Alternative hypothesis one in particular does accurately predict Egypt’s decision to settle its dispute with Saudi Arabia in order to be better able to confront Israel. It also explains why Israel would be interested in removing Egypt from future battlefields. The alternative hypotheses are not adequate to explain certain outcomes, however, including the timing of the War of Attrition, Israel’s failure to embrace early Egyptian peace proposals, or why Egypt ultimately eschewed its Arab allies in favor of peace with Israel. This latter occurrence is particularly puzzling as Israel was not truly an ally of Egypt; in fact, Egypt’s actions left it more isolated regionally. The remainder of this chapter examines Egypt and Israel’s foreign and domestic policies from 1967-1980. The first section will concentrate on Egypt’s decision making, beginning with a discussion of Egypt’s foreign and domestic policies before the Six Day War. It will then trace the progression of Egypt’s policies under Nasser and Sadat and examine the effectiveness of hypotheses one and two at explaining changes in Egypt’s foreign policy behavior. The second section will trace Israel’s decision-making, comparing Israel’s pre and post 1973 policies and conclude with an evaluation of hypotheses three and four. The final section will discuss the timing of the opening of bargaining space between the two powers, evaluate hypothesis five, and evaluate the explanatory power of the alternative hypotheses. Section One: Egypt Egypt’s Foreign Policy Before the Six Day War

In a speech before the Egyptian people in 1965, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser stated, “The danger which menaces the Arab nation is one; it is the danger of imperialism and Zionism.”1 In the same speech, he argued for the unity of the Arab people while also condemning those Arab states which were fomenting dissent among the Arab peoples and mentioned the struggles of 50,000 Egyptian troops in Yemen that were battling the conservative elements supported by Saudi Arabia.2 He restated the Egyptian goal of liberating Palestine – by which he meant removing Israel from the land it occupied – but argued that first the Arab states had to strengthen themselves.3 Nasser’s speech was

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representative of Egyptian policy at the time: continued opposition to Israel as well as opposition to the conservative Arab monarchies.4 At the same time, Egypt had little intention at the time of engaging in a war with Israel, though its policy did advocate Israel’s eventual overthrow. The progression toward the Six Day War began in 1966. A new government came to power in Syria in February 1966 and immediately stepped up the Syrian confrontation with Israel.5 Escalating tensions between Israel and Syria did lead to a degree of reduced tensions between the Arab states, and prompted the signing of a mutual defense treaty between Egypt and Syria in November 1966.6 Cross-border disputes between Syria and Israel continued over the fall and into the spring. Tensions between Syria and Israel escalated throughout the spring, eventually drawing Egypt into the conflict. Syria began to request activation of its mutual defense treaty with Egypt over a series of disputes with Israel in early May.7 Though Egypt’s initial response was tepid, Nasser began to grow increasingly concerned based on a May 13 report from the Soviet Union that Israel had begun moving significant numbers of troops to the Syrian border. The culmination of the May tensions was the Six Day War that began on June 5. By noon on June 10, Israel controlled the Sinai Peninsula all the way to the Suez Canal; the Gaza strip which had been under Egyptian control; East Jerusalem and the West Bank, both of which Jordan had controlled; and the Golan Heights, which belonged to Syria. The situation on the ground in the Middle East had undergone a dramatic shift in barely six days of fighting. The Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian forces were completely overmatched on the battlefield; Israel had asserted itself as the most powerful state militarily in the region. The outcome of the war would profoundly shape the future of the region. Egypt’s Domestic Policy Before the Six Day War

Gamal Abdel-Nasser and the Free Officers seized power in Egypt in 1952, though Nasser did not become the official head of the government until 1954. Almost immediately, his government began to introduce measures designed to curtail the powers of the landed elites and the capitalist classes in the nation. By 1960, Egypt had entered a true state/capitalist mode – the state had eliminated competition in the market and planned production goals, prices and jobs.8 By 1961, Nasser had nationalized the banking and insurance sectors, curtailed the maximum amount of land that private landowners could possess, and

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had begun to institute a series of five-year economic plans that included the goal of reclaiming desert land for agricultural production. Though Nasser did depend on Soviet assistance for much of his tenure, he distrusted Egyptian communists. Instead, he promoted Arab socialism, economic policies that basically reflected his desire to unite Arabs states across the Middle East while developing economies that were independent of outside influences. Rather than being driven by economic ideology, many of his economic decisions that marginalized capitalists in Egypt and Egyptian communist were a sign of his belief that these two groups were most likely to bring in outside influences.9 His regime was dependent on the urban and rural middle classes, urban labor, and, to an extent, the peasantry.10 At times, the Egyptian economy grew quite rapidly; however, much of the growth was dependent on outside assistance. By the time of the Six Day War, Egypt was facing an economic crisis.11 Defense outlays were increasing rapidly both in absolute terms and as a percentage of the economy, due in large part to the ongoing war in Yemen. Many Egyptian industries were barely operating, if operating at all, due to a lack of resources and capital. Shrinking levels of financial aid from abroad compounded this problem. The United States cut food aid to Egypt in 1965 due to the increasingly radical statements from Nasser and his continued military support of radical elements in Yemen, and the Soviet Union was not providing sufficient levels of aid to offset the slowing economy.12 In 1967 Nasser was facing additional problems as well. The “coalition” that made up the Free Officers was not a coalition in the traditional sense. Though Nasser’s governments did take steps to curry favor with certain groups, the primary source of the government’s strength was Nasser’s personal popularity and the use of the military to quell opposition.13 This strategy had been quite effective in curbing opposition from outside the government, but it failed in preventing opposition from inside the regime.14 Field Marshall Abdel-Hakim Amer had succeeded in creating a base of power for himself through his control of the military and his alliance with the more left-leaning elements in the government. Though Amer did not challenge Nasser for the presidency of Egypt, Amer’s powerbase in the military essentially made him untouchable by Nasser and gave him a great deal of influence over internal politics.15 In addition, Amer and his allies in the government, especially Ali Sabri, used the Higher Committee for the Liquidation of Feudalism (HCLF), created to control land distribution, to increase their power by seizing the lands and properties of those

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opposed to them. In 1967, they vastly increased the number of lands that they were seizing.16 The situation in Egypt as the Six Day War approached can be summarized as one of domestic turmoil marked by economic decline and competing power bases in the government. Nasser’s Post-1967 Policies

In the immediate aftermath of the Six Day War, Egypt’s foreign policy and Nasser’s ruling coalition began a period of dramatic change. I argue that such a change is a result of a rapid updating process in the state on appropriate foreign and domestic policies. The updating leads to a change in the ruling coalition, including both the individuals in government and the segments of the population from which the regime draws support. This change in ruling coalition is accompanied by a change in foreign policy. Nasser’s actions closely match those expected by my argument. The poor condition of the Egyptian economy led Waterbury to argue that, “The June War of 1967 obviated any obligation on Nasser’s part to choose Egypt’s economic path. Retrenchment and austerity were the only options left,”17 the war also presented Nasser with the opportunity to settle his dispute with Amer. In the immediate wake of the war, Nasser moved to consolidate his position within the Egyptian government. His first feeling was that he should resign as head of state, but in the wake of his announced resignation, a largely spontaneous outpouring of public support caused him to withdraw his resignation. In turn, Nasser was able to move against Amer and his supporters, culminating in Amer’s “suicide” immediately prior to the Khartoum summit of Arab states.18 The state also began to revise its economic strategies and to expand, albeit moderately, its coalition. To assist in raising capital, Nasser began to favor the private economic classes that had been increasingly marginalized over the preceding fifteen years. His economic reforms included opening the economy to additional consumer goods.19 In a further effort to undermine Amer’s leftist supporters, Nasser dissolved the HCLF and reversed many of its decisions, including the return of many of the sequestered lands.20 To further his reforms, Nasser made significant changes in his cabinet, including a reshuffling in March 1968 that removed Ali Sabri, seen as the most sympathetic to the Soviet Union of Amer’s former associates.21 Student protests against Nasser and other unrest in Egypt related to the slow pace of reform led Nasser to further broaden his

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coalition by including new ministers from the universities and limiting the influence of some of the older, more powerful ministers.22 In many ways, the final symbol of Nasser’s move toward an approach that favored the right was the appointment of Sadat, seen as more friendly to the right, as Vice President in 1969. At the same time, centrists that were still closer to the Arab socialist model continued to play a major role in the government.23 Nonetheless, Nasser had started moving the Egyptian economy toward a more market driven path that relied on the formerly excluded agrarian elite and the urban bourgeoisie for support. Nasser’s foreign policy also changed rapidly. Egypt and the other Arab states were shocked by the outcome of the war. Most had believed that they could, if not defeat Israel, at least cause significant losses for the Israeli forces.24 In the wake of the massive defeat, many of the Arab states decided to hold a summit in Khartoum, Sudan, to discuss what the collective response should be.25 The primary outcome at the summit was the adoption of a resolution containing the infamous “three no’s” in regard to Israel: no peace, no negotiation, no recognition.26 Though international – and Israeli – attention focused on the three no’s, the overall tone at the conference was far more moderate than the radical Arab line. At the conference, the Arab states made the decision not to implement an oil embargo, not to demand that Arab states sever ties with the United States, and emphasized the need to find appropriate diplomatic responses to the war.27 In fact, the same clause of the Khartoum resolution that declares the three no’s also contains the wording that: The Arab Heads of State have agreed to unite their political efforts at the international and diplomatic level to eliminate the effects of the aggression and to ensure the withdrawal of the aggressive Israeli forces from the Arab lands which have been occupied since the aggression of 5 June.28 Nasser also decided that that he needed to keep the lines of communication with the United States open despite his continued suspicions of US actions in the region.29 Though he did suspend relations with the United States, he did not make the complete break in relations that Syria did.30 At Khartoum Nasser also took steps to heal the rift between Egypt and the conservative Arab monarchies. Whereas before the war Nasser had envisioned Egypt as the leader of progressive Arab regimes that

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would eventually defeat conservative Arab monarchies, after the war he realized that he needed the support of Arab regimes both for his diplomatic efforts and his military preparations. The first step in healing the rift with the conservative monarchies was the settlement of the Yemeni conflict which was symbolic of the divide between secular Arab nationalist regimes and the conservative monarchies.31 Khartoum resulted in an agreement between Saudi Arabia and Egypt that called on Egypt to withdraw its troops from Yemen in return for financial support from the oil-rich monarchies.32 Khartoum represented a new Arab solidarity that had not been present in the region.33 Nasser recognized that Egypt was unlikely to retake the lost Arab lands strictly by force. Though he certainly did not shift to supporting a separate peace agreement with Israel, he did believe that diplomacy of some sort was necessary to restore lands.34 In recognition of this fact, Egypt recognized Security Council Resolution 242 immediately after it was passed in November 1967. Resolution 242, the result of months of negotiation, called for, among other things, Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in the war, recognition of the right of every state in the region to live in peace, a need for the termination of belligerency by all in the region, and a “just settlement of the refugee issue,” referring to the Palestinian refugees who fled Israel during the 1948 war.35 Despite his realization that diplomacy would play a role in the recovery of the Sinai, Nasser did convey to his military leaders that some sort of military action would be necessary, especially as Israel had begun to solidify its position on the Sinai Peninsula. Far from appearing to be surprised at the Israeli action, Nasser commented that the Israelis were doing exactly what he would do: digging in.36 The combination of domestic economic difficulties as well as competing centers of power in the Egyptian government on the eve of the Six Day War shaped the Egyptian response to its dramatic defeat. Nasser reshaped his ruling coalition, eliminated proponents of a more radical policy, and began to court capitalist elements that the regime had previously suppressed. Egypt also reformulated its foreign policy; the elimination of Israel ceased to be an objective. Rather, Egypt’s basic policy became one of resistance to Israel’s occupation of the Sinai Peninsula through Arab solidarity, some negotiation and, possibly, the limited use of force. Nasser wanted some room to negotiate, and he was willing to work with the United States to achieve peace; however, he expected force to be required to break the stalemate.37

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The War of Attrition

As noted above, Nasser did not expect diplomacy alone to work. In 1968, Egypt fired the first shots of what would become the War of Attrition with Israel. Nasser’s intention with the War of Attrition was never to fully reclaim the Sinai through the use of force, but rather to make the occupation costly enough to Israel that a negotiated solution would be more likely.38 Egypt began firing on Israel in June 1968, and the two sides exchanged sporadic fire in the ensuing months. After an Israeli attack on an Egyptian power station, the fighting died down for a short time until on March 8, 1969, Egypt launched a massive artillery barrage against Israeli positions. By the end of April 1969, the ceasefire that had ended the Six Day War was officially dead. The battle with Israel continued to escalate, eventually leading to Israeli air raids deep inside Egypt by January of 1970. In fact, Yitzhak Rabin, then Israeli ambassador to the United States, expressed a desire to topple Nasser’s government.39 Only Soviet intervention in the War of Attrition, including putting Soviet pilots in Egyptian planes to confront Israeli aircraft, stopped the Israeli attacks inside Egypt.40 At this point, both the United States and the Soviet Union began more active efforts to bring the War of Attrition to an end. In April of 1970, the United States sent Joseph Sisco to Egypt to discuss the possibilities of ending the War of Attrition.41 In one meeting with Sisco, Nasser expressed a willingness to make peace with Israel, but that he could not accept Israeli control over Jerusalem, the West Bank or the Golan.42 Recognizing that Egypt was suffering heavy losses in the War of Attrition, Nasser called on the United States to make a new initiative to end the conflict in a public speech on May 1.43 That initiative would bear fruit on July 23 when Nasser agreed to US Secretary of State William Rogers’ ceasefire plan in spite of strong misgivings about some of its contents and strong criticism from around the Arab world.44 By agreeing to the ceasefire, Nasser accomplished two things. First, he gave Rogers the opportunity to move forward with his diplomatic initiatives. If Rogers’ initiative failed – which Nasser fully expected – Egypt could also use the period of the ceasefire to strengthen its air defense system to protect against Israeli air raids even though such actions clearly violated the ceasefire agreement.45 The decision to accept the ceasefire represented the Egyptian policy of seeking a negotiated settlement, but retaining a belief that some military action would probably be necessary to move the parties forward.

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The War of Attrition had some additional effects as well. The eventual ceasefire was largely the product of an American initiative, indicating a willingness on the part of Egypt to take part in discussions with the United States over the conflict. At the same time, economic and military aid from other Arab states was slow in coming to Egypt. Nasser’s frustration at the lack of Arab assistance during the War of Attrition was well illustrated at the Rabat Conference in December 1969. Nasser presented estimates on the number of forces required to continue the War of Attrition and asked which Arab countries were willing to contribute. None of the Arab leaders responded with a realistic commitment.46 The lack of aid from Arab countries led Egypt to depend more and more on the Soviet Union for military and economic aid.47 Though this aid was definitely necessary to help the Egyptian military recover from its dramatic 1967 loss and to shore up defenses in the face of Israeli air raids, the size of the Soviet presence did create some resentment in the Egyptian military.48 Soon after agreeing to the Rogers’ ceasefire initiative, a crisis involving Jordan, Syria and the Palestinians renewed tensions in the Arab world. In the wake of a conference in Cairo to settle the crisis, Nasser fell ill and died. His successor was Anwar Sadat, a lightly regarded member of Nasser’s government who had only recently been named Vice President. Before he died, Nasser had started the process of economic reform in Egypt and broadened his sources of domestic support. In foreign policy, Nasser worked to close the divides with the conservative Arab monarchies, including the decision to settle the dispute in Yemen and to withdraw Egyptian troops. Finally, Egypt’s actions during the War of Attrition and in seeking a ceasefire demonstrated Nasser’s belief that Egypt would have to work with the United States to achieve a diplomatic solution with Israel. The use of force could play a part in the recovery of Arab lands, but diplomacy would also be necessary. Sadat continued and accelerated both Nasser’s economic reforms and his decision to pursue a diplomatic solution to the conflict with Israel. In the process, Sadat defeated supporters of Egypt’s pre-1967 domestic and foreign policies. 1970-1973: Sadat Consolidates His Power

Nasser’s death set the stage for a showdown between Sadat and a centrist/left faction led by Ali Sabri. This showdown was really a contest between continued economic privatization and diplomatic opening with Israel on the one hand and more governmental control and

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confrontational policies on the other. Sadat was considered to be more sympathetic to the west and of private ownership and had more support from conservative elements in government. He was also suspicious of the Soviet Union and supported a more diplomatic approach to Israel.49 Members of the Sabri faction, on the other hand, wanted stronger central control of the economy, a more confrontational policy toward Israel, and strongly supported the Soviet Union, though they did not advocate communism. Sabri in particular was seen as strong proponent of the Soviet Union.50 Part of the controversy over succession was that when Nasser had traveled to the Soviet Union in 1969 to seek treatment for an illness, he had left Sha’rawi Gum’a, Sami Sharaf and Amin Huweidi, allies of Sabri, in control.51 It was also suspected at the time that Nasser doubted Sadat’s ability to lead; he had long been, however, a very public and somewhat popular face for the Free Officers and, later, the Egyptian government under Nasser.52 Despite these doubts about Sadat, he did have the appropriate political pedigree and positive public image. Most of the centrists who actually controlled the major institutions of power at Nasser’s death either had political enemies or were unknown to the public. Sabri and the centrists were distrustful of Sadat’s politics, but felt that they could control him under the right circumstances. In the end, Sadat became president of the country, but all major decisions were to be made collectively by a majority of the Central Committee of the ASU’s Supreme Executive Committee. In addition, the ministers of each area of administration would have primary responsibility for decision-making in their area of concern. In essence, Sadat was only the public face of a many-headed leader of Egypt. Sadat proved to be far more politically cunning than the centrists who sought to control him. Very quickly, he began to make public pronouncements about Egyptian policy without consulting with others in the Egyptian government and initiated an effort to arrive at an interim settlement with Israel. On February 4, 1971, Sadat agreed to extend the ceasefire with Israel for another month and, to the surprise of many in the government, announced that if Israel would agree to reduce its forces in the canal zone, he would reopen the Suez Canal to international shipping. Indeed, Sadat saw this initiative as the opening move in seeking a comprehensive peace accord.53 On February 8th, UN envoy Gunnar Jarring presented both Israel and Egypt with a memorandum that called for specific actions by each state. For Egypt, this included declaring an end to belligerency and recognizing Israel’s right to exist. Though the Jarring initiative did not ultimately succeed, Sadat gave his

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full acceptance to Jarring on February 15, indicating his willingness to find a peaceful settlement to the conflict.54 As the spring progressed and little came of the Jarring mission, Sadat repeatedly expressed an interest in peace with Israel to the United States. In a March letter to US President Nixon explaining why Egypt would not renew the ceasefire with Israel, Sadat again urged the United States to move forward in pressing for a comprehensive peace accord.55 At an April 13 meeting in Cairo, Sadat surprised Michael Sterner, the Egyptian-desk officer at the State Department and Donald Bergus, the US Minister in Cairo, by speaking openly about pursuing a settlement with Israel, including a discussion of the withdrawals that would make peace possible. Sterner was impressed by Sadat’s sincerity; his primary concern was whether or not Sadat would survive as president of Egypt.56 Sterner’s concerns were not without foundation. The Sabri group was growing frustrated with Sadat’s actions. In addition to his failure to inform many in his government of his February 1971 initiative, he did not consult with many others as he began to push a plan to form a political union with Libya and Syria. His effort to exert control did not simply play out in his public policy pronouncements, however.57 Sadat also actively sought the support of probably the most important institution in Egypt for maintaining power: the military. The military had been quite displeased with Sabri and his supporters after the Six Day War for what they felt was unjustified criticism. Many officers also bristled at the heavy dependence of the military on the Soviet Union and the centrists’ – especially Sabri’s – support for the Soviets.58 Using this displeasure, Sadat sought the support of Lt. General Muhammed Sadiq, then the second in command in the military. The two were natural allies; Sadat needed the support of a high military official popular with the troops, and Sadiq wanted the command of the Egyptian military.59 The final showdown between Sadat and the Sabri-led centrists occurred in May 1971. Sabri was the first to be dismissed; Sadat removed him from his position as vice president on May 2 ostensibly for his opposition to Sadat’s efforts to create a political union with Syria and Libya. Sadat’s next move was to arrest General Muhammed Fawzi, the head of the Egyptian military, when Fawzi accused him of selling out to the Americans. In an effort to embarrass Sadat, Sabri and Fawzi’s allies in the government resigned in mass on May 13. This move played into Sadat’s hands. He quickly placed many of the centrists and their supporters under house arrest, obtained legislative support for his moves, and received the backing of several of Nasser’s former advisors and family members. The conspirators against Sadat believed that they

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would be able to receive public support for their stance against Sadat; however, public support did not materialize and those that opposed him were too suspicious of one another to act effectively against him.60 Once he had removed the major threats to his rule, Sadat made the decision to deepen the economic reforms begun by Nasser and to widen public support for his coalition through the liberalization of Egyptian policies and by reaching out to groups across the political spectrum, including conservative Islamists. In particular, Sadat began to court the bourgeoisie for support, in particular the industrial and agrarian elites.61 Sadat also realized, just as Nasser had, that he could not rely on diplomacy alone to recover the Sinai. He needed capital both to spur the economy and to rebuild the military. Despite his peace overtures, the United States would not be a willing partner, leaving the Soviet Union as the most likely source of revenue. His actions in May 1971, however, eliminated many of those officials in Egypt who were most favorably looked upon by the Soviet Union. To repair relations with the Soviet Union to help speed Soviet military assistance to Egypt, in May of 1971 Egypt entered into a Friendship Treaty with the Soviet Union, a move that the Soviets had long sought with Nasser but had never been able to accomplish. While the United States had been supplying weapons to Israel, Egypt’s difficulty in receiving needed arms shipments had begun to strain Soviet/Egyptian relations.62 In addition to improving relations with the Soviet Union, Sadat also began to meet with Hafiz al-Asad, who had seized power in Syria after the aborted Syrian intervention into the Jordanian conflict with Palestinian militants. The early stages of planning for a joint war effort began in 1971.63 Though Sadat often referred to 1971 as a year of decision, when either peace would be made or war would break out, the Egyptian military was not ready to take action, nor was Israel willing to enter into an interim agreement. The United States also appeared unwilling to pressure Israel to pull its troops back or to negotiate an interim settlement despite the fact that they were taking Egypt more seriously. 1971 ended with no major actions by Egypt. Consistent with my argument that continued failure of a peace initiative will lead to rising opposition to peace, the lack of change in the relationship with Israel coupled with the slow pace of domestic reform led to student protests against Sadat’s inaction early the next year.64 Sadat realized that foreign policy inaction would have domestic repercussions both because of rising internal opposition and the strain placed on the economy by constant war preparations.65

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Faced with this situation, Sadat began planning for war in earnest in 1972 while simultaneously pressuring the Soviet Union to increase its financial and military assistance. He took three major steps during 1972 to prepare his military for war with Israel. First, in response to growing dissatisfaction by the Egyptian military with the Soviet military advisors and the slow pace of Soviet military assistance, Sadat chose to expel the almost 15,000 Soviet troops who were present in Egypt in July of 1972. Not only did the move improve morale in the Egyptian military, but it also prompted the Soviet Union to speed up the flow of aid. It was also extremely popular with the Egyptian public. The increased support from the military and public bolstered Sadat’s position.66 Second, Sadat made it clear to his military command that he did not want to fight a war to completely remove Israel from the Sinai Peninsula, but rather to fight a limited engagement that would break the stalemate. In September, he removed his top military commanders, including Chief of Staff Muhammed Sadiq who had stood with Sadat during his earlier domestic difficulties, because of his displeasure with their war plans.67 Third, he and Asad began to work very closely to plan a coordinated attack against Israel.68 Sadat’s policy continued to follow the trajectory set by Nasser: a final settlement with Israel would require diplomacy, but the limited use of force would be necessary to spur the diplomatic process. By January 1973, Sadat was faced with increased pressure from the Egyptian public and the military to either achieve a diplomatic breakthrough with Israel or to prepare for war.69 In April, Sadat and Assad secretly met to set an October date for the beginning of their war with Israel.70 While war preparations continued, Egypt continued to press the United States to be more active in pushing Israel to negotiate.71 On October 6, Syria and Egypt began their coordinated attack of Israel.72 The two sides experienced tremendous success early in the conflict, largely attributable to their significantly improved air defense systems and a clever strategy by Egypt to cross the canal and breach Israeli defenses.73 Despite this early success, Egypt made it clear to the United States through back channel communications early in the conflict that its real goal was simply to break the stalemate on the ground as a prelude to finding a diplomatic solution.74 During the war, a policy dispute between Syria and Egypt emerged. Syria had been under the impression that the war would be a full-scale attempt to use military means to recover all the territories lost in the 1967 conflict while Sadat remained committed to a limited engagement designed to break the diplomatic stalemate.75 Only after repeated calls

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by Syria did Egypt begin moving its troops beyond the Canal Zone. By this time, Israel had begun to turn the tide of the war. Before the UN Security Council passed Resolution 338, officially ending the war with a ceasefire, Israel had recaptured the Golan and had crossed the Suez Canal to place Israeli soldiers on the Egyptian side of the canal.76 Sporadic fighting continued for the next few days until the United States and the Soviet Union succeeded in their efforts to require Israel to allow humanitarian supplies to the surrounded Egyptian Third Army. 1973-1980: Toward Camp David and Peace

The October War achieved Sadat’s goal of breaking the diplomatic stalemate with Israel and moving closer to the United States.77 Now, with the United States as an active mediator, Egypt and Israel began negotiations on an agreement to disengage their forces. The end result of negotiations was the signing of two disengagement agreements, Sinai I (January 18, 1974) and Sinai II (September 4, 1975), by Egypt and Israel.78 In the interim, Egypt opened the Suez Canal to international shipping for the first time since the 1967 Six Day War. Article I of Sinai II states, in part that: The conflict between them [Egypt and Israel] shall not be resolved by military force but by peaceful means… They are determined to reach a final and just peace settlement by means of negotiations called for by Security Council Resolution 338, this Agreement being a significant step towards that end. Article II states: The parties hereby undertake no to resort to the threat or use of force or military blockade against each other.79 Though neither of these statements is a formal renunciation of belligerency, Egypt’s intent to find a negotiated settlement to its dispute with Israel is clear from the text. In return for signing these agreements, Egypt regained significant portions of the Sinai Peninsula and a pledge from Israel to continue negotiations.80 Sinai I and II had at least one other significant meaning: Egypt relied almost exclusively on the United States as a mediator, further signifying movement away from the Soviet Union in favor of the United States.81 This move was compounded by Sadat’s decision to abrogate the 1971 Soviet-Egyptian Friendship Treaty

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in 1976, basically ending the special relationship between Egypt and the Soviet Union.82 After the October War Sadat also continued to work to broaden his coalition and deepen his economic and political reforms. Sadat’s economic plans began to take more shape under his policy of Infitah, or opening. His goal was to attract foreign capital through a liberalization of Egypt’s tax and investment policies and to encourage the private sector in Egypt.83 Sadat’s policies did lead to impressive economic growth in Egypt in the 1970s and generated a great deal of wealth among the urban elite, signaling the source of Sadat’s public support.84 The combination of Sadat’s foreign and domestic policies led to higher levels of investment and foreign aid than it had experienced under Nasser. The United States began giving significant amounts of food and economic aid in 1975. The level of assistance began to increase in subsequent years; by 1977, the “American aid program to Egypt was greater than to the rest of Africa and Latin America combined.”85 Egypt also continued limited economic exchanges with the Soviet Union despite the 1976 abrogation of the Treaty of Friendship. Egypt’s two interim agreements with Israel further contributed to the economy by restoring the revenue gained from the Suez Canal in 1975 and securing the return of oil fields in the Sinai Peninsula. Finally, Egypt’s improved relations under Sadat also meant that more Egyptian citizens were working abroad and sending money back to Egypt.86 In addition to these economic reforms, Sadat also began to liberalize the political system. Whereas the only party under Nasser was the state party, the ASU, Sadat began to allow political groups to form, culminating in the legalization of parties in 1976. Before the widespread food riots in 1977, political commentaries of the government were also allowed, though the degree to which Sadat would accept criticism often varied. While Sadat was not above arresting his opponents, he also released many political prisoners during his tenure in office.87 Finally, Sadat allowed several Islamist groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood, which had been banned under Nasser to legally organize. Though he did allow significantly more political freedom than Nasser, he was not above mass arrests and cracking down on liberties when opponents became threatening. Sadat continued to curry favor from his most important ally: the military. His push after 1970 to professionalize the military and the military’s performance in 1973 dramatically increased the prestige tied to military service.88 Sadat rewarded commanders who had been successful in the October War, though he did favor those who showed

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him loyalty. Military pay and benefits increased dramatically under Sadat, and the country paid tribute to the soldiers who had fought in the October War. Part of professionalizing the military was removing it from the political life of Egypt. Whereas military officers had occupied many posts in government under Nasser, under Sadat, military officials were largely confined to military, defense and foreign affairs roles. According to Baker, by 1978, “The police force of the preRevolutionary period has grown, for all its limitations vis-à-vis Israel, into the most powerful and modernized armed force in the Arab World.”89 Despite these economic advances and liberal reforms, Egypt did continue to face severe economic problems throughout the 1970s. Though foreign investment in Egypt did increase in the mid-1970s, many western companies were still hesitant to invest large sums of money in Egypt. Compounding this difficulty was the failure of investment from the oil-rich countries in the Gulf region to live up to expectations, especially as much of the increase in oil prices came after the October War. As a result of investments not living up to expectations, much of the economic development in Egypt relied on foreign loans, driving up the Egyptian balance of payments deficit.90 Finally, the standard of living for many in Egypt steadily declined under Sadat, a problem only made worse by a rapidly increasing population.91 The combination of Egypt’s economic problems came to a head in January 1977 in the form of massive food riots in response to the cut of subsidies for basic food commodities as part of Egypt’s obligations under an International Monetary Fund austerity policy.92 These riots reflected the growing social tensions caused by Egypt’s economic condition: the bourgeoisie was prospering while the majority of Egypt suffered.93 In addition to his domestic difficulties, Sadat also felt pressure to achieve a breakthrough with Israel. Very little progress was made toward peace in 1976 and the majority of 1977. Significant changes did occur politically in two of Egypt’s negotiating partners, however. First, the United States elected Jimmy Carter as president in 1976. When Carter assumed office in January 1977, the participation of Henry Kissinger, who had helped to negotiate the disengagement agreements between Israel and Egypt, in the peace process ended. While Carter was dedicated to achieving Mid-East peace, his administration believed that Kissinger’s step-by-step strategy had run its course and favored a comprehensive peace effort that would include all parties to the conflict. Early in 1977, Carter’s Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, began feeling

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out Arab and Israeli leaders about restarting the Geneva Process under US and Soviet leadership as a means to achieving a comprehensive peace agreement.94 The second major development was the victory of the Likud party in the 1977 Knesset elections over the Labor coalition that had ruled Israel since its independence. Likud’s leader, Menahem Begin, was a hardliner who was opposed to returning a significant amount of the territories captured in the Six Day War, even in exchange for peace and recognition.95 Sadat did, however, believe that he could negotiate with Begin and his Foreign Minister, Moshe Dayan. Dayan, as a minister in the Labor government in 1971, had wanted to embrace Sadat’s disengagement initiatives. As 1977 progressed, the United States began actively working to prepare for the Geneva Conference. While Sadat did support a comprehensive peace agreement for the region, he did not believe that the Palestinians and Syria were prepared to make the concessions necessary to achieve peace. Sadat’s primary interest was in regaining control over Egyptian territory; he feared that an attempt to bring all parties to the table would work against Egyptian interest.96 On November 9, 1977, Sadat, without the knowledge of many of his top aides, announced to the Egyptian People’s Assembly that he would even be willing to travel to Jerusalem to address the Israeli Knesset if it would help spur the peace process.97 Begin responded to the speech on November 11 by extending a public invitation to Sadat. After an exchange of letters and a week of preparation, Sadat traveled to Jerusalem on November 19 and addressed the Knesset on November 20. Progress after the visit to Jerusalem was quite slow. Despite the symbolism of Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem, neither Egypt nor Israel saw much new in the statements of its opponent.98 After repeated meetings between Israeli and Egyptian negotiators, the two sides were still quite far apart on the conditions for peace.99 In order to recapture the momentum of the Jerusalem visit, Carter invited the Egyptian and Israeli delegations, including Sadat and Begin, to Camp David, Maryland. From September 5-17, Egypt and Israel negotiated with US mediation on the terms of a framework peace agreement. Egypt and Sadat were hoping to receive not only the Sinai Peninsula, but also some arrangement to secure Palestinian autonomy. In the end, the two sides agreed in the Camp David Accords to negotiate a final peace based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Other components of the Accords invited other Arab parties to participate in the process and established a framework for Palestinian

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autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The section on a Palestinian framework called on the Kingdom of Jordan to participate in negotiations despite Jordan’s decision not to participate in peace talks. This section also offended many by noting that Palestinians were welcome to participate in negotiations as members of the Egyptian or Jordanian delegation, but it did not allow for independent representation by Palestinians,100 long a demand of other Arab states and various Palestinian groups such as the PLO. The reality was that Sadat had created a separate agreement that would provide for the return of Egyptian land without a realistic commitment by Israel to negotiate either with other Arab states or for Palestinian autonomy.101 After intense negotiations over the details of the agreement, Egypt and Israel signed a final peace treaty in March 1979. The treaty, while returning the entire Sinai Peninsula to Egypt, did place certain burdens on Egypt. It required the stationing of UN peacekeepers in several strategic positions on the Sinai and further stated that: The Parties agree not to request withdrawal of the United Nations personnel and that these personnel will not be removed unless such removal is approved by the Security Council of the United Nations, with the affirmative vote of the five Permanent Members, unless the Parties otherwise agree.102 Egypt agreed by treaty that it would limit its ability to exercise full sovereignty over the Sinai Peninsula. Though Sadat did make some attempts to bring other Arab leaders with him in making peace with Israel, he did put Egyptian interests at the fore. The Camp David Accords made reference to other Arab states and the Palestinians, but the eventual peace treaty with Israel did not include provisions for the return of any land but the Sinai Peninsula. Negotiations toward Palestinian autonomy under the Camp David Framework never made any real progress in the years following the signing of the Peace Treaty. As a result of the Camp David Accords alone, the Arab League voted to place economic sanctions on Egypt and to break diplomatic relations with it.103 At the same time, Egypt did become the second largest recipient of US foreign aid as a result of its decision to make peace. The agreements themselves, while faced with some opposition at home, did receive a great deal of popular support. In essence, Sadat and a significant percentage of the Egyptian people had decided that Egypt had to consider its own interest ahead of Arab interest and, in the

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process, secure a peace from a costly conflict. Despite a lengthy debate in the People’s Assembly on ratifying the peace treaty, it did eventually ratify it 329-15. In addition, Boutros-Ghali, despite his own misgivings about the negotiating process and the treaties themselves, noted that the crowds with which he mingled during the national referendum on the treaty on April 19, 1979, seemed quite happy with the treaty. Their general feeling was that Egypt had sacrificed enough.104 Further demonstrating support for the peace treaty, the Egyptian public returned a pro-peace majority to the Egyptian legislature in the June 1979 elections. Though these elections did have irregularities, the general sense is that the elections did reflect Egyptian sentiment on peace with Israel.105 Echoing these feelings, Boutros-Ghali writes: As I was driven home [from the debate in the People’s Assembly] I thought to myself that Egypt had sacrificed enough lives and money for the Arabs and Palestinians. The time has come for Egypt to think of itself. Sadat’s commitment to “Egypt first” is justified, I thought. I was fully convinced that rejectionists, Egyptian and non-Egyptian, would sooner or later realize that Egypt was right, that the only logical path to follow was the path of dialogue and negotiation with the Israelis.106 Opposition to Sadat did steadily increase in the later years of his rule, however. Significant numbers of Egyptians opposed his economic policies and were frustrated by the lack of meaningful improvements in their standards of living. Other Egyptians while initially supportive of peace, were outraged by Sadat’s complete embrace of Israel and the United States even in the face of continued Israeli intransigence over the question of Palestinian autonomy and Israeli actions in Lebanon. Islamist groups, the Muslim Brotherhood in particular actively opposed Sadat. Finally, some conservative groups wanted Sadat to go even further in dismantling Nasser’s legacy and opening up the economy. Despite the growing opposition to Sadat, however, no truly threatening force could coalesce against him as the various opponents could not form a coherent block to oppose him. As a sign of the widespread opposition to him, however, he was not greatly mourned by the Egyptian people when he was assassinated in 1981 by Islamic extremists who opposed the peace agreement with Israel. Even after his assassination, however, Sadat’s regime continued to exist under the leadership of Hosni Mubarek, whom had been appointed Vice President by Sadat in 1975.

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Conclusion: Egypt

Egypt’s policy toward Israel, and its foreign policy in general, shifted dramatically in the wake of the Six Day War. Though Sadat was the Egyptian leader who made peace with Israel, the policies that led to a final peace agreement actually began under Nasser. In looking at the major variables outlined in Chapter Two, Egypt suffered from both foreign policy failure and domestic policy failure, which prompted a shift in the governing coalition. The ultimate outcome of the changes in Egypt was a shift in its foreign policy that verged on the opening of bargaining space with Israel. The Six Day War represented a significant failure for Egyptian foreign policy. Consistent with the definition of foreign policy failure, Israel occupied the Sinai Peninsula, a significant defeat for Egypt. At the same time, the Egyptian economy immediately prior to the Six Day War and after was in a state of turmoil. Though the economy had expanded as a result of state driven development efforts, by 1967 the problems inherent with the Egyptian approach were apparent.107 Egypt’s economy was facing across the board difficulties, including in attracting investment, agricultural production, and industrial output.108 In addition, the Six Day War further contributed to Egypt’s domestic difficulties by removing the revenue obtained through the Suez Canal and exploitation of oil resources in the Sinai Peninsula.109 By 1968, the lack of progress of Nasser’s reforms even led to student protests. As a result of these combined failures, Nasser made significant changes to his governing coalition once it became clear that he was going to stay in power. Consistent with the definition of coalitional change, Nasser removed the head of the military, Amer, and made significant changes to his domestic policy team as well. In addition, Nasser began to court the urban bourgeoisie and the rural elite, sectors from which he had not traditionally drawn support. Finally, Nasser made significant changes to Egypt’s foreign policy. Egypt settled its disputes with Saudi Arabia and other conservative monarchies, and began to focus on the recovery of the Sinai Peninsula. He recognized that recovering the Sinai would require the use of diplomacy and some form of recognition of Israel. Each of these changes only accelerated under Sadat. Even as Egypt was experiencing success in the October War, Sadat was signaling that Egypt’s true interest was in forging peace with Israel, not in a total war. Through the Sinai I and II agreements, the Camp David Accords, and the final peace treaty, Sadat’s goal remained the recovery of the Sinai Peninsula through a combination of force and diplomacy. That the

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changes in foreign policy in Egypt followed domestic and foreign policy failures strongly supports hypothesis one: that combined domestic and foreign policy failure in A will lead to a change in A’s foreign policy goals allowing for more bargaining space with B. In addition, the widespread support in Egypt for the Camp David Accords adds confirmation to the central argument of the book that a change in foreign policy is not simply the result of learning at the top, but the result of a societal momentum in favor of a changed foreign policy. The Egyptian case also provides strong support for hypothesis two, that a state that is involved in multiple rivalries or has a particularly active foreign policy is more likely to experience foreign policy failure than a less active state. Before the Six Day War, Egypt sought preeminence among Arab states by confronting the conservative monarchies. This policy led to direct military confrontation between Egyptian forces and Saudi interests in Yemen, eventually leading to a significant commitment of Egyptian forces. As noted above, the significant number of Egyptian troops may have contributed to the Egyptian military’s poor showing in the Six Day War, as well as to the economic difficulties Egypt was facing in 1967. Finally, Egypt’s behavior is consistent with hypothesis five, that the prospects for rivalry termination decrease as the length of time from A’s change in policy increases and the domestic situation either continues to deteriorate or resumes deteriorating. Twice during his presidency, Sadat experienced domestic pressure based both on frustration with his foreign policy and his domestic policy. In 1972, various groups in Egypt protested the situation of no war and no peace with Israel. Sadat was still convinced that a negotiated settlement was the only possible route to full recovery of the Sinai, but decided to fight the October War both to break the stalemate and to mollify domestic criticism that he was doing nothing to settle the conflict. Similarly, Sadat was under increasing domestic pressure in 1977, including widespread demonstrations in January over his austerity measures. The combination of domestic difficulties and the slow pace of the peace process helped Sadat to make the decision to shake things up by visiting Jerusalem. In these two instances, a failure to achieve peace did not derail Sadat’s initiatives. Pressure as a result of inaction did, however, mount and help precipitate certain actions by Egypt to break the impasse. Despite the concessions made by Egypt after the Six Day War, they were not sufficient to bring about peace with Israel. I now turn to a discussion of Israel’s decision-making after 1967, followed by a discussion of the interaction between Egypt and Israel.110

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Section Two: Israel Israel’s Foreign Policy: 1967-1969

The most appropriate baseline for Israeli foreign policy is the period immediately after the Six Day War. Before the outbreak of war in 1967, Israel did not really believe that negotiations were possible with the Arab states, especially not the more militant states like Syria and Egypt.111 Its policy toward these states largely consisted of its reactions to attacks by Palestinian militants and confrontations with Syria over both states’ river diversion projects and the demilitarized zone of land between the two states.112 Prior to the Six Day War, Israel’s most basic demands for peace were the cessation of armed attacks within Israel by Palestinian groups and recognition by Arab states. The acquisition of land during the Six Day War dramatically altered Israel’s negotiating position. It still wanted a cessation of attacks by militant groups and recognition by Arab states, but it now had to decide what to do with the lands it captured during the war. On June 8, while the war was still being fought, Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban indicated that Israel was not looking for territorial gains, only peace, and Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol stated, “Our hand is extended in peace to all who are ready for peace.”113 The Israeli cabinet clarified this policy during meetings on June 18-19. Israel indicated a willingness to return the Sinai if it were demilitarized in return for a formal peace agreement, but felt that East Jerusalem and additional territories in the West Bank and the Golan Heights should remain in Israeli hands.114 On August 1, the Israeli Knesset voted to hold the existing ceasefire lines until peace treaties were signed with its neighbors.115 Interestingly, Israel chose not to immediately accept Resolution 242 once it passed the UN Security Council in November, indicating its position on the return of lands captured in the war. The three no’s of Khartoum decreased support for the return of territory in exchange for peace even further. Israel’s victory had been so complete that it did not need to negotiate or consider peace agreements that were not completely in line with its policies. As noted, Israel refused to accept 242 after it was passed. Later, Israel rejected the US Secretary of State Rogers’ 1969 peace initiatives in their entirety. Those initiatives would have returned the vast majority of the territory captured from Egypt and Jordan in the Six Day War in exchange for full recognition and peace, including the Egyptian guarantee to allow all international shipping in the Suez Canal.116 After the Six Day War,

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Israel was negotiating from a position of strength and did not believe that it needed to accept any document that did not conform to all of its wishes. Israel’s Domestic Situation: 1967-69

Israel was a unique case in the Middle East in 1967 in that it was a parliamentary democracy surrounded by authoritarian states. The election of the Israeli parliament, the Knesset, was entirely through a proportional representation system; political parties submitted lists of candidates before each election. Voters chose a party list, not individual names. Parties received seats in the Knesset based on the percentage of votes they received. The president of Israel, who had few actual powers, asked the head of the party that received the most votes to form a government. This system led to a proliferation of parties ranging from the far left to the far right. The number of parties meant that no one party in the history of Israel had (or has) received a majority of votes. As a result, every government of Israel has relied on a coalition of parties.117 Mapai dominated Israeli politics until 1977; though it was officially left of center, it occupied a place in the middle of the Israeli political spectrum that allowed it to form coalition governments with parties on both the right and left.118 Another unique feature of the Israeli political and economic experience was the Histadrut, a unique organization that was at one time an advocate for labor, an owner of industrial and agricultural concerns, Israel’s largest employer, and a purveyor of social services such as health insurance. This organization began before Israeli independence as a means to bring pressure to bear on others to hire Jewish labor in Palestine. It supplied employees to private businesses as well as creating businesses and banks to be run by and for its members. Its leadership was chosen through a democratic process; much like Israel itself, Mapai dominated the top ranks of the Histadrut.119 This domination of the Histadrut was particularly important for Mapai in that the Histadrut was not an organization for one particular class of workers, but rather drew its membership from all salaried workers.120 As a result, Mapai’s close association with the Histadrut allowed it to draw support from across classes and from people across the political spectrum. As the Six Day War approached in 1967, Israel was facing an economic recession that had begun in 1965.121 Mapai, and its prime minister, Levi Eshkol, were increasingly unpopular due to their handling of the economy.122 An additional threat to Mapai had begun in 1965

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when David Ben-Gurion, Mapai’s founder and Israel’s leader for much of the first two decades of its existence, created the Rafi party in a dispute with Mapai’s leadership. Two important figures in Israeli politics, Moshe Dayan and Shimon Peres had defected from Labor with Ben-Gurion.123 The final challenge to Mapai was the increasing power and public acceptance of parties on the right of the political spectrum. Herut and its leader Menachem Begin in particular had been gaining respect in Israeli politics after years of being dismissed as extremists. Ben-Gurion had worked to discredit Begin since before independence; his exit from the leadership of Labor helped open the door to the emergence of Herut.124 Herut’s electoral standing also improved when it merged with the more mainstream Liberal party. Whereas Herut was more of a nationalist party interested in further expansion of Israel, the Liberal party was known more for favoring reduced government intervention into the economy. As the crisis with Egypt over the expulsion of United Nations forces from the Sinai and the closure of the Strait of Tiran escalated, Eshkol was pressured to form a unity government that contained representatives from prominent opposition parties. He offered the post of Minister of Defense to Rafi’s Dayan and Minister without Portfolio position to Begin. Though Dayan had frequently served under Ben-Gurion as a member of the Labor party, the appointment of Begin represented the first time that the Herut leader had held a place in the government, even if he did not head any particular ministry. The position in government served to lend even more credibility to Herut and Gahal.125 This Unity government would last in its basic form until 1970. In the aftermath of the Six Day War, Israel began a dramatic economic expansion and Mapai continued its electoral domination. After the war, Israel began some economic reforms in response to some of the problems associated with the import substitution model of development it had followed for most of its existence.126 On the whole, however, the government did not make any major changes in their domestic policies.127 Despite its relative inaction, the government was able to profit from a rapidly expanding economy. The war helped to encourage investment into high tech and security sectors that helped to increase economic growth and lead to full employment.128 Whereas the economy only grew at an annual rate of 2.2% in 1967, it grew at a rate of 14.1% in 1968 and averaged 11.5% growth for the period between 1968 and 1972.129 Mapai also began to consolidate its political position by reuniting with Rafi in 1968 to form the Labor party.130 This success was followed by the creation of an electoral alignment with Mapam, a more

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left-wing party representing labor interests, in 1969. The Labor Alignment received 46.2% of the vote in 1969, compared to the 51.2% that its constituent elements had received in 1965.131 Though the percentage of voters did decline, it is important to note that Rafi was in opposition in 1965, attracting voters who were not supportive of Mapai. Labor’s primary opponent, Gahal, did not make significant gains in 1969 compared to 1965, maintaining the same 26 seats it had captured in 1965. Labor seemed poised to dominate Israeli politics just as its predecessor, Mapai, had done. All was not well for Labor, however. Prime Minister Eshkol died in February 1969, before the next round of elections. Golda Meir emerged as the next leader of Labor after some internal debates that highlighted ongoing tensions between Mapai and the Rafi group, led by Dayan and Peres. Much of this tension stemmed from the differing visions the two groups had over the handling of the occupied territories. Dayan favored integrating the territories into Israeli administration while the more traditional faction, led by Labor General Secretary Pinkas Sapir after 1968, wanted to be rid of them as quickly as possible.132 In both foreign and domestic policy after the Six Day War, Israel appeared to move from strength to strength. It was able to negotiate internationally from a position of strength, and its domestic economy began a period of dramatic expansion. Despite Israel’s strength, debate did begin in Israel on how to best handle the captured territories. That debate grew somewhat during the War of Attrition, but would not be fully settled until after the October War of 1973. The War of Attrition

While the negotiations surrounding the Rogers’ initiatives were ongoing, Egypt and Israel began exchanging fire in the War of Attrition. This conflict steadily increased in intensity toward the end of 1969 and the beginning of 1970. Losses were heavy on both sides. Even these heavy losses, however, did not markedly change the Israeli position.133 The War of Attrition also highlighted the level of disdain that many Israeli officials had for Nasser. Rabin, Ambassador to the United States at the time, even declared that one of the purposes of the deep penetration bombing of Egypt that began in January 1970 was to topple the Nasser regime.134 The deep penetration raids did not end until Soviet combat pilots began taking part in air defense missions against Israel.135 Though Israel continued to prosper economically during the War of Attrition, the cost associated with the conflict did begin to wear on

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Israel. The prosecution of the war itself began to adversely affect the economy; the construction of the Bar-Lev Line along the Suez Canal was particularly expensive.136 The increased security spending was also contributing to more income disparity and a balance of payment problem.137 At the same time, soldiers prosecuting the war began to feel abandoned by the political leadership as well as the Israeli public. The ongoing growth on the economy made it possible for many Israelis to essentially ignore that a war was in progress.138 In spite of this seeming apathy toward the war, pressure began to mount on the government to find a settlement to the War of Attrition. When the cabinet rejected Eban’s February 1970 proposal to seek a ceasefire, the public began to grow upset that Meir was not more actively pursuing peace as she promised she would.139 Israel did eventually accept a limited peace initiative in the context of a ceasefire plan put forth by Rogers. After much debate with the United States, the Israeli cabinet voted on July 31, 1970 to accept the ceasefire. During the negotiations leading to the ceasefire, Israeli Prime Minister Meir announced that Israel accepted 242 with the understanding that its interpretation was that the “right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force”140 would result in the adjustment of borders and that “[w]ithdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict”141 did not require Israeli withdrawal from all of the territories it had occupied.142 Begin, who had been a part of the Israeli unity cabinet since just before the Six Day War, and his Gahal alignment resigned in protest of Israel’s agreement to 242 and to the ceasefire terms.143 The ceasefire went into effect in early August for an initial period of three months. In that time, the conflict between Jordan and the Palestinians threatened to lead to conflicts between the Arab states themselves until Nasser stepped in to settle the dispute in a conference in Cairo.144 As the Arab summit ended and the participants left Egypt, Nasser died. Soon thereafter, Asad overthrew the more radical elements of the Ba’th party in Syria and began to more severely curtail the actions of Palestinian militants. In addition, Sadat, Nasser’s replacement, was generally seen as less threatening than Nasser if only because he did not have the inter-Arab prestige that Nasser had possessed. When the ceasefire came up for renewal in November, he agreed to a 3-month extension. Though there were still threats along the Canal Zone, for the

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most part, Israeli security seemed to have been improved as 1970 drew to a close.145 Based in part on this perceived strength in the face of Arab opposition, Israel continued to place very high conditions on any peace initiatives. Indeed, Israel believed it had won the War of Attrition and had little need to negotiate with Egypt.146 In late 1970 and early 1971, two peace initiatives were pushed by the United States and Egypt. The first, the mission of UN envoy Jarring, seemed ready to bear fruit. Egypt, on February 15, accepted Jarring’s main points, including a willingness to end its state of belligerency with Israel and to recognize Israel’s right to exist. Israel’s response was that it was pleased with the concessions that Egypt was willing to make, but that Israel would not “withdraw to the pre-June 5, 1967 lines.”147 Egypt was unwilling to pursue the Jarring mission given Israel’s precondition that a full withdrawal was not possible. Sadat had also begun another initiative – a push for an interim agreement that would allow Egyptian troops to return to the east bank of the Suez Canal while Israeli troops withdrew beyond the strategic Mitla and Giddi passes. Some in Israel, most notably Dayan, strongly pushed for an interim agreement, but it did not have widespread support.148 While negotiations were ongoing, Prime Minister Meir publicly stated on March 13 that Israel must retain Sharm al-Shaykh and an access road to it, that Sinai must be demilitarized, that the border around Eilat must be changed, that the Egyptians must not return to Gaza, that the Golan Heights would remain under Israeli control, that Jerusalem must remain united, and that border changes on the West Bank would be necessary.149 By May, the initiative was, for all practical purposes, dead. Israel was negotiating from a position of strength with little need to make concessions to Egypt and did not believe in the possibility that the Arab armies could launch a successful attack.150 Despite the cost associated with the War of Attrition and some dissatisfaction over the lack of effort to pursue a peace agreement, Labor’s position looked strong as the nation prepared for the December 1973 elections. Israel continued to be confident in its military prowess, and the economy was still growing at a rapid pace. The one change that led to a major challenge for Labor during this time period was the formation of Likud from Gahal and a number of parties on the right.151 The alignment of these parties into a single party list increased the possibility that the right of center parties could challenge Labor’s long hold on the Israeli government.

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The October War and Disengagement

The 1973 October War (Yom Kippur War) ended this belief in absolute Israeli superiority. For Israel: The Yom Kippur War was a traumatic event… both because of the extent of Israeli losses and because of the shock suffered by all those who had believed that Israel was invulnerable… The six years of euphoria – from 1967-to 1973 – were gone for ever [sic].152 Early in the conflict, both the Egyptian and Syrian forces made tremendous gains against entrenched Israeli positions; that Egypt had defeated Israel’s canal fortifications was a shock to many.153 After the 1973 war, Israelis in general were more predisposed to return land in exchange for peace.154 Work towards agreements on the disengagement of forces began shortly after the war, as did the Geneva Conference. Israel was willing to attend Geneva, but opposed not only the presence of an independent Palestinian delegation, but also any mention of the Palestinians by name. At the same time, progress toward an initial disengagement agreement with Egypt proceeded quite rapidly. On January 18, 1974, Israel signed Sinai I, in which it agreed to an Egyptian presence on the east side of the canal with limitations on Egyptian forces and armaments, a zone between Egyptian and Israeli forces to be patrolled by the United Nations, and a zone of Israeli occupation with limits on force size and number of armaments.155 After the initial disengagement agreement, Israel and Egypt began working toward a second disengagement agreement. In this agreement, Israel was not interested simply in an additional withdrawal of forces. Rather, Israel wanted a stronger commitment on the non-use of force by Egypt. The actual desire was to have a statement regarding nonbelligerency in the document without making significant territorial concessions. By eliciting a statement of non-belligerency, Israel believed that it could split Egypt and Syria, essentially removing Egypt from the future battlefield.156 Israeli intransigence on this issue and on the extent of withdrawal it was willing to make even led to tensions in the Israeli/US relationship. Nonetheless, both sides eventually came to agreement on Sinai II. As noted, the agreement returned the strategic Gidi and Mitla passes to Egypt and contained language that the dispute between the two parties would not be settled by force.

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In addition to the new sense of military vulnerability, Israel’s economy also began to suffer in the wake of the October War. Whereas Israel had experienced remarkable growth and a sense of strength after the Six Day War, the October War marked the beginning of economic problems that would not really begin to be resolved until 1985.157 Still under shock as the December 31 election day neared, the Israeli populace returned the Labor Alignment to power with 39.6% of the vote. Newly formed Likud garnered 30.2% of the vote and 39 seats in the Knesset.158 Meir initially returned as Prime Minister while Dayan stayed on as Minister of Defense. Public outcry over their perceived role in the poor performance of Israel at the outset of the war led them to resign in 1974.159 To placate the Rafi faction that Dayan had represented in government, Peres assumed the Minister of Defense role while Yitzhak Rabin, a military hero and former ambassador to the United States, became Prime Minister.160 The problems of the October War were only the beginning for Labor. The party had long had an almost oligarchic control over policy; decisions on who to include on the list for elections were made primarily at the top.161 The reputation of the party was one of exclusiveness; many new immigrants to Israel did not feel that they could truly belong to the party. This sense that the party did not include them was especially prevalent among younger Israelis of African or Eastern descent (the Sephardi). Labor and its leadership were much more popular among Israelis of European descent (the Ashkenazi).162 The problem was compounded by the growing income inequality and inequality of station in Israel; young Sephardi were much more likely to have poor education and to be of a lower socioeconomic status than the Ashkenazi. The growing disillusionment of those at lower income levels was compounded by the decline in social spending after 1973.163 The reaction against Labor actually began in 1973; whereas half of the Sephardi had previously supported Labor, in 1973 only 30 % did so in the election.164 This growing reaction against Labor was only compounded when a series of scandals hit the party in 1976-1977. Mismanagement in a variety of state-run agencies and state activities led to a growing outcry against Labor. Among the problems were corruption in the collection of fines, mismanagement in the telephone industry, and a variety of other oversight issues that led to declining government support for Labor by the time of the 1977 elections.165 Added to the general mismanagement problems was a financial scandal involving Rabin’s wife stemming from

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their time in the United States when Rabin was ambassador.166 Before the 1973 war, 35.3% of Israelis had an unfavorable view of government performance. On the even of the 1977 elections, 80% disapproved.167 One major impact of the financial scandals and economic difficulties, was the creation of the Democratic Movement for Change (DMC), a party that was largely sympathetic to the positions of the Labor party, especially on foreign affairs, but dissatisfied with its leadership and incapacity to change.168 Likud was able to benefit from all of the problems facing Labor. Though Likud did draw some votes because of its more hawkish rhetoric, Likud’s big advantage came from those alienated by Labor’s attitudes and its scandals. The Sephardi in particular shifted their support to Likud.169 This support was precipitated both in the perception that Likud would better be able to manage the economy and in the belief that there would be more opportunity for advancement in the Likud party than in Labor.170 Faced with the scandals involving his wife, Rabin chose to resign as prime minister early in 1977; his resignation led elections to be moved up several months earlier than planned. In the May 17 election, Likud gained 33.4% of the vote and 43 seats. Labor received only 24.6% of the vote and 32 seats. Interestingly, the DMC, formed as an alternative to Labor not affiliated with Likud, gained 11.6% of the vote and 15 seats. Had the DMC votes gone to Labor, Likud would not have won the election.171 The electorate was clearly divided between economic groups and ethnicity, but the actual source of support for Likud and Labor did not drastically change between 1973 and 1977. Though Labor had lost its electoral dominance in Israel, it remained the major alternative to Likud. Demonstrating its resiliency, Labor rebounded to do quite well in the Histadrut elections that occurred on June 21, 1977, barely a month after the general elections.172 This victory was significant in that the Histadrut still controlled 25% of the economy in 1977 and counted more than 100% of the labor force among its members.173 Despite Labor’s continued role as one of the two major parties in Israel, the October War marked the beginning of a period of change for Israel. In addition to the heavy initial losses suffered by Israeli troops, the Israeli economy began to slow dramatically. The difficult international situation coupled with Israel’s domestic difficulties eventually led to the electoral defeat of Labor and victory by Likud. That election, in turn, had a dramatic impact on peace negotiations with Egypt.

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Likud, Camp David and Beyond

Under Begin, Israel continued to face the two major problems that had confronted Labor: the failing economy and peace negotiations with the Arab world, especially Egypt. On the latter issue, Likud had to walk the fine line between hawkishness and allaying the fears of the Israeli public who seemed to be supportive of peace with Egypt. In the lead up to the election, Likud publicly supported negotiations with Egypt and Syria, a stance similar to Labor’s and backed by much of the public.174 In forming his cabinet, Begin brought in Dayan, a longtime Labor member, as his Minister of Foreign Affairs. This move was a signal that Begin intended to negotiate as Dayan had long been on the record as supporting an agreement with Egypt.175 In addition, Begin’s new coalition included the DMC which was a strong advocate for peace. Dayan and the DMC together also served as an impediment to further annexations of occupied territory and pushed for a decrease in settlement activity in the territories.176 Despite the inclusion of Dayan and the DMC in his coalition, some of Begin’s signals indicated that he would continue to be hawkish toward the Arab states. A firm believer in Eretz Israel (greater Israel encompassing Biblical lands), Begin expressed support for Gush Emunim, an ultra-orthodox Zionist organization that saw Israeli victories in 1967 and 1973 as furthering the new Messianic Era. This group was a strong advocate for creating Israeli settlements in all the Arab territories; members participated in both legal and illegal settlement activity from the time of the 1967 victory.177 Nonetheless, Begin’s government appeared to be willing to move forward on negotiations with Egypt. In July 1977, Israel sent a proposal to Carter that called for a significant withdrawal from the Sinai and for a withdrawal on the Golan to a negotiated border. Under this proposal, Israel would not agree to cede the West Bank to any Arab country.178 In August, Israel continued its preliminary negotiations with Carter about the format for the Geneva peace conference. At this point, Israel was primarily interested in pursuing peace with Egypt and did not believe that peace with Syria was likely.179 One of the main sticking points in preparation for Geneva was the nature of Arab representation. Egypt and Israel both favored each Arab state’s representing itself, while the Palestinians could be represented by Egypt and Jordan. Syria had argued for a joint Arab delegation, including some Palestinian participants. Eventually, Israel agreed to a form of joint delegation by the Arab states, including representation by the Palestinians.180

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The negotiations surrounding Geneva were essentially moot after Sadat’s trip to Jerusalem. Though this trip did break a psychological barrier, neither the Egyptians nor the Israeli’s were particularly pleased with the positions espoused by the other in Jerusalem; neither presented any new concessions.181 After the two sides met in December 1977, Dayan considered the possibility that Egypt’s asking price for peace would be too high and that there was a chance that no peace could be made.182 Negotiations for much of the spring were quite tense as Egypt remained steadfast in its demand for a return to the 1967 borders while Israel was hesitant to accept those borders without modification and to sacrifice the Israeli settlements.183 In the end, both Israel and Egypt made significant concessions to achieve both the Camp David Accords and the subsequent Egyptian/Israeli peace treaty.184 For Israel, the major concessions were an agreement to withdraw all troops and civilians from the Sinai back to the recognized international border (the pre-June 4, 1967, line) and, at Camp David at least, an agreement on Palestinian autonomy. A strong majority of the Knesset approved the Camp David Accords, many members of Begin’s coalition were opposed to the full return of the Sinai Peninsula and strongly disagreed with the decision to dismantle settlements. In fact, Begin depended on the support of Labor to secure a majority in the Knesset. Only two-thirds of those belonging to parties in the governing coalition supported Camp David. Many of those opposing the agreement were from Herut, Begin’s original party.185 The real fear of many of those voting against Camp David was that Begin would follow his decision to return land to Egypt with territorial concessions on the West Bank, believed by many to be part of Biblical Israel. In reality, Begin had little intention to grant anything more than a few additional rights to Palestinians while ceding little in the way of actual control over the West Bank and Gaza. Begin had always opposed Palestinian independence and/or a return of the West Bank to any Arab state, and the Egyptians would not accept the extremely limited form of autonomy he proposed.186 His intransigence actually helped to spawn the Peace Now movement in Israel and eventually led to the resignations of Dayan and Ezer Weizman, who had been considered a true hawk at one point.187 Weizman would later return to the Knesset as a member of the Labor party, demonstrating the degree of his displeasure with Begin and Likud. On the economy, Likud had only mixed success. As Shindler notes, “Begin came to power primarily as a result of Labour’s failure to manage the economy in the impossible years of huge oil-price

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increases.”188 The United States pumped $18 billion into the Israeli economy between 1974 and 1981. Despite this, the economic situation continued to worsen. Israel was burdened by a huge deficit, high inflation, high unemployment and an increasing gap between rich and poor. His policies made life more difficult for middle and low income families by increasing the cost of housing and health care.189 By 1979, the public was dissatisfied with Likud’s management of the economy and actually expressed more support for Labor. When Likud took office, inflation was approximately 30%; after its first year in office, inflation increased nearly 60%.190 As a sign of the growing frustration with Begin’s handling of the economy, the Histadrut, still controlled by Labor, mounted one of the largest demonstrations in Israeli history to protest the liberalization measures being carried out by Begin.191 Prior to the 1981 election, Begin revised his economic policies, leading to a slight improvement in the economy. In the election, Likud gained more seats than it had in 1977, receiving 37.1% of the vote and 48 seats. This improvement was a mixed result, however. Labor increased its percentage of the vote to 36.6%, giving it 47 seats.192 Likud was still able to form a government with parties on the right. Subsequent elections would confirm the pattern of an almost even split between Likud and Labor, even leading to the formation of unity governments where the two parties shared power. Conclusion: Israel

After the Six Day War, Israel adopted a hard-line policy toward Egypt, emphasizing that it would only return portions of the Sinai if Egypt renounced the use of force and recognized Israel. Israel had no intentions of returning the full Sinai Peninsula, and the portion that it did return would have to be demilitarized. Additionally, though some members of Israel’s cabinet favored an interim settlement with Egypt, the cabinet as a whole rejected this approach. Though Egypt made some peace overtures, it did not appear willing to concede all of these points to Israel, rendering hypothesis three moot.193 Even the losses it suffered during the War of Attrition and the direct participation of Soviet pilots did not dramatically alter Israel’s position. This confidence was not only a result of Israel’s wartime success; the Israeli economy expanded at an unprecedented rate between 1967 and 1973. The October War, however, was a major blow to Israel’s military confidence and marked the beginning of a period of economic difficulty in which the growth rate declined dramatically and the cost of energy

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went up dramatically.194 The combination of these two factors led to a shift both in Israeli foreign and domestic policy. Though Labor won the December election that occurred shortly after the end of the October War, Prime Minister Golda Meir and Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan resigned their positions in June 1974, though Labor continued to be in power. Between 1974 and 1975, Israel signed two disengagement agreements with Egypt designed to separate the two sides and minimize the risk of the use of force. Domestically, the Labor government elected shortly after the 1973 defeat stumbled from problem to problem, including the declining economy and a number of party scandals. Not until the election of Likud and Begin was Israel able to finalize peace with Egypt. Begin brought with him a new domestic coalition and the ability to neutralize opponents of peace as many of them were members of his party. By recognizing the political reality that he would have to support some type of peace agreement to come to power, Begin effectively completed the Israeli policy transition to one that opened bargaining space with Egypt. This chain of events does match the expectation of hypothesis four, that in the absence of capitulation by A, combined domestic and foreign policy failure in B will lead to a change in B’s foreign policy goals allowing B to respond more favorably to A’s overtures. Israel’s failure to significantly change its policies after the losses it suffered during the War of Attrition further supports the argument that domestic failure must accompany foreign policy failure for change to occur. It does provide some difficulties for the hypothesis, however. While it is true that Israel’s policy change did not occur until after the losses of the October War coupled with the declining domestic economy, the change was not accompanied by a significant domestic reordering, at least initially. Nonetheless, Dayan and Meir did resign as result of domestic pressure, lending credence to the idea that foreign policy and domestic policy failure stimulate learning among a populace. In addition, peace did not occur until significant elements that had been opposed to peace entered into the Likud-led government, in effect shielding the peace agreement from domestic opposition.195 Israel’s behavior also leads credence to hypothesis two, that a state involved in multiple rivalries is more likely to suffer foreign policy failure. Israel was beset by rivals on all sides and had to prepare militarily to face each of them. Though such preparations may not have had a determinant effect on the outcome of the October War, Israel did have to divide forces between two fronts. In addition, the high rate of

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military spending contributed to the poor performance of the Israeli economy after 1973.196 Finally, Israel’s behavior is also consistent with my argument that the degree of foreign policy failure may affect the degree of foreign policy change. Though I do not purport to test a hypothesis based on this argument, it is logically consistent with the primary hypotheses. For Israel, the October War was a failure in that it strongly demonstrated that the Arab states could both engage in war and inflict damage on Israel. At the same time, Israel was victorious in the war. At the time of the ceasefire, it was beyond the 1967 ceasefire line on the Syrian front and had crossed the Suez Canal into Egypt. Israel had less need to make concession than Egypt, and at Camp David and negotiations leading to the final peace treaty, Israel’s behavior strongly matched this prediction.197 Section Three: Interaction Between Egypt and Israel: Comparing the Primary and Alternative Hypotheses

To adequately judge between the primary and alternative hypotheses, three factors must be considered. First, how effective is the explanation in predicting the dependent variable? Second, how effective is the explanation in predicting the timing of events? Third, how closely do the purported causal mechanisms match the actual sequence of events? Judged by these three questions, the primary hypotheses do provide a stronger explanation for the outbreak of peace between Egypt and Israel, though the rival hypotheses do have some explanatory power. As noted above, the Egyptian case conforms to the logic of both hypotheses one and two. Shortly after its loss in the Six Day War and beset by a troubled economy, Egypt’s foreign policy shifted from rhetorical, if not real, opposition to Israel’s right to exist to a desire to recover the Sinai through a combination of force and diplomacy. Nasser recognized that some recognition of Israel would be necessary. This change was accompanied by the expected shifts in domestic support for the regime and changes in regime personnel. In accordance with hypothesis two, Egypt’s foreign and domestic failures may have been hastened by its participation in the Yemeni civil war. Similarly, Israel did not shift its policies to the point where bargaining space became available until after its military suffered losses in 1973 and the Israeli economy began to enter a period of decline. After the 1973 war, bargaining space between the two sides opened for the first time. Egypt still believed that it would have to recognize Israel in order to secure a

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full return of the Sinai, and Israel accepted that it would have to return most of the Sinai (eventually all) to Egypt, and that intermediate steps could be a good way to begin the process.198 Table 3.1 (below) matches the observations from the Egypt and Israel case with the predicted route to rivalry termination from Chapter Two.199 In both the Egyptian and Israeli cases, the purported cause is closely correlated with the dependent variable of rivalry termination. In addition, the expected causal mechanism occurs in both cases; changes in foreign policy and rivalry termination were accompanied by significant changes both in the personnel in government and in the sectors of society from which support was solicited. As predicted by hypothesis five, the delay in the peace process also had an impact on its decision-making in Egypt, helping to prompt both the October War and Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem. While the primary hypotheses do provide strong predictions of the changes in foreign policy that led to bargaining space between Egypt and Israel, the alternative arguments also have some explanatory power for Egyptian and Israeli behavior. Alternative hypothesis one provides a strong explanation for Egypt’s decision to terminate its dispute with Saudi Arabia in Yemen in order to concentrate their combined resources on the Israeli conflict. In addition, Egypt allied with Syria, a state with which it had frequent disagreements, in both 1967 and 1973, to confront Israel. Alternative hypothesis one does not provide a strong explanation for Egypt’s decision to seek peace with Israel, however. Egypt did not sign a formal alliance with Israel, nor did it consider Israel an ally against any threat to Egypt’s security. If anything, settling with Israel precluded potential alliances with other Arab states. From a pure power standpoint, Israel was the greatest risk to Egyptian security, and Egypt should have balanced against it, not attempted to reconcile with it in the 1970s. Alternative hypothesis one does explain Egypt’s alliances with Saudi Arabia and Syria, but does not explain the peace overtures of the early 1970s or of the eventual decision to negotiate. Israel’s overall behavior may be more consistent with alternative hypothesis one. After the October War, Israel had a strong desire to remove Egypt from the battlefield, believing Egypt to be the most powerful opponent that it faced. Settling with Egypt would allow it to concentrate on Syria and Jordan. A problem with this explanation, however, is that Israel should have seen this same logic in 1971 when Sadat responded positively to the Jarring mission and made his own peace overtures. One could argue that Israel did not believe that it needed to remove Egypt from the battlefield in 1971 and only “learned”

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through the October War that its forces could be defeated, but the logic of the balance of power should not require that type of learning. Israel also could have learned this lesson from the War of Attrition, in which it lost a significant number of soldiers and provoked the Soviet Union into intervening directly in the conflict. A second problem with this explanation for Israel is similar to the one noted for Egypt: Israel and Egypt were not a true alliance directed against a common foe. Nonetheless, one can argue that Israel should have sought rapprochement with at least one of its foes to alter the balance of power. Egypt was the most likely foe with which to do so. Table 3.1. Mapping Egypt and Israel’s Path to Termination Independent variables Foreign policy failure: Egyptian loss in Six Day War

Domestic policy failure: Economic decline in Egypt

Intervening variable

Domestic policy failure: Israel’s declining economy after the October War

Dependent variable

Change in foreign policy: Egypt accepts idea of negotiation and peace with Israel in return for Sinai

Foreign policy failure: Israel’s worse than expected performance in the October War

Intervening variable

Change in foreign policy: Israel accepts possibility of interim agreements / return of full Sinai

Bargaining space opens between states A and B: Opens after October 1973 / Two sides agree on major principles of eventual agreement as stated in SC Res 338

Rivalry termination: Official with 1979 Peace Agreement

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Alternative hypothesis two may provide more explanatory power. Walt argues that the bandwagoning behavior that contributed to the end of Egypt and Israel’s rivalry was Egypt’s decision to bandwagon with the US as result of its declining economy and the lack of suitable alternative allies.200 In short, Egypt was losing the ability to adequately confront Israel either through internal or external balancing, meaning that its only hope of continual growth was alliance with the United States. Walt’s explanation has three primary problems. First, if the logic related to relative decline was in place in 1975, when Walt argues Egypt realigned with the US, it should have dictated a similar response by Egypt after the Six Day War. Egypt’s economy was in far worse shape in the 1967-1973 period than it was afterward, and after 1975 it began to experience the benefits of revenue from the reopened Suez Canal.201 This latter decision was made even before the finalization of the Sinai II agreement. In addition, Egypt had proven in the October War that its military was far more capable than it had appeared either in 1967 or during the War of Attrition, seeming to indicate an improving, not declining, position. Second, Egypt’s choice of allies before and after the October War was quite similar. Egypt learned during the Six Day War, the War of Attrition and during the preparations for the October War that the United States was more forthcoming with weapons than was the Soviet Union, though the October War did reinforce this point. The slowness of the Soviet Union’s response to Egyptian needs helped lead to the expulsion of Soviet advisors in 1972. Why did Egypt only realign after 1973? Similarly, Syria was a willing partner in 1973; if anything, it was Egypt that abandoned Syria.202 The final piece of Walt’s explanation is that Egypt wanted realignment with the United States to help bring about peace with Israel.203 If Egypt’s decision to bandwagon was a means to an end, it must mean that something else caused Egypt’s decision to seek peace. The logic of bandwagoning was secondary to Egypt’s primary purpose. Walt’s logic may accurately describe Egypt’s final behavior, but it does not adequately explain the logic for it, nor does it sufficiently explain why Israel would agree to make peace with Egypt simply because it bandwagoned with the United States. Taken together, the alternative hypotheses do predict the final outcome of negotiations, but they do not accurately predict the timing of decision-making. Israel did want to remove Egypt from the battlefield, but should have wanted to do so before the October War. Leaving behind the point that Egypt should have balanced against its biggest

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threat, Israel, bandwagoning logic may have led Egypt to conclude that it had to join the US sphere of influence. Declining conditions that would lead to such a decision, however, were even worse before 1973. In contrast, the primary hypotheses, including hypothesis five, help to explain not only the final outcome, but also the timing of decisions. Table 3.2 (below) summarizes the extent to which each hypothesis is supported – or not – by the Egyptian-Israeli case. Conclusion

Egypt and Israel found bargaining space only after both states had experienced failures in both foreign and domestic policy. Egypt’s failures occurred after the 1967 Six Day War and led it to change its foreign policy expectations; it now believed some diplomatic agreement with Israel would be necessary to recover the Sinai Peninsula. Israel, however, was not ready to bargain until it experienced similar failures in 1973. In Egypt, the change in foreign policy was accompanied by major changes in the regime and in its sources of domestic power. In Israel, final peace only occurred when Likud won the 1977 elections. Though bargaining space existed before 1977, Likud’s rise to power meant that it had to withdraw opposition to peace with Egypt in order to gain sufficient electoral support to win. This eliminated the last obstacle to peace in Israel, and made peace between Egypt and Israel possible.

Table 3.2. Summary of Hypotheses Hypothesis

Egypt

Israel

H1: Combined domestic and foreign policy failure in A will lead to a change in A’s foreign policy goals…

Yes

N/A

H2: A state that is involved in multiple rivalries or has an … active foreign policy is more likely to experience foreign policy failure…

Yes

Yes

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H3: B will respond to A’s revised policy goals if they fall within B’s range of acceptable agreements.

N/A

N/A

H4: Combined domestic and foreign policy failure in B will lead to a change in B’s foreign policy goals…

N/A

Yes

H5: The prospects for rivalry termination decrease as the length of time from A’s change in policy increases

Partially

N/A

AH1: A rivalry will terminate when two states party to a rivalry ally to counter a third, more powerful state.

No

Partially

AH2: When one party to a rivalry suffers severe relative decline in respect to its rival and cannot obtain external allies, the rivalry will terminate.

Partially

No

1 Nasser, Speeches by President Gamal Abdel Nasser on the Occasion of the Thirteenth Anniversary of the Revolution, p. 25. 2 Ibid., pp. 32-34. 3 Ibid., pp. 35-37, 40-41. 4 See Kerr, The Arab Cold War, on the inter-Arab disputes between 1958 and 1970. See Bar-Siman-Tov, Linkage Politics in the Middle East, pp. 137138, on disagreements between Syria and Egypt on how to address Syria’s concerns about an Israeli water diversion project. 5 This confrontation will be discussed in depth in the next chapter. 6 Olson, The Ba’th and Syria, p. 111. 7 See Bar-Siman-Tov, Linkage Politics in the Middle East, pp. 160-161 for a discussion of the events surrounding Syria’s request for aid from Egypt. 8 Waterbury, The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat, p. 19. 9 Ibid., p. 63. 10 Hinnebusch, Egyptian politics under Sadat, p. 28-29.

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11 Ibid., pp. 34-35, discusses the extent of Egypt’s financial difficulties on the eve of war. 12 Beattie, Egypt During the Sadat Years, pp. 5-6; Baker, Egypt’s Uncertain Revolution, 136; Mufti, “The United States and Nasserist Pan-Arabism,” pp. 174-179. See also Sadat, In Search of Identity, pp. 153-154 on the importance of US food aid to the Egyptian economy from 1959-65. In January of 1967, Egypt strongly pressed for a resumption of food aid by the United States, which the United States ultimately rejected (see Memorandum of Conversation Between UAR Ambassador (Kamel) and Harold H. Saunders, January 17, 1967). 13 See Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States, pp. 185-188 for a discussion of land redistribution and the role of the military in propping up the government. See also Hinnebusch, Egyptian politics under Sadat, p. 30, on how many of Nasser’s policies actually disenfranchised the popular groups on which he depended for support. 14 See Springborg, “Approaches to the Understanding of Egypt,” pp. 144-5 on the lack of any widespread class-based challenges to Egyptian leadership and the wide latitude Egyptian rules have typically had since 1952. 15 See Sadat, In Search of Identity, pp. 165-7. 16 Ibid., pp. 168-170. Sadat quotes Nasser as saying, “… the country is being ruled by a gang of thieves… you know… and I cannot carry on like this. I cannot continue to be President… while it is Amer who actually rules the country and does precisely what he wants.” See also Baker, Egypt’s Uncertain Revolution, pp. 111-113, for a discussion of Sabri’s use of the Arab Socialist Union (ASU), the official state party, to consolidate his personal power base to the point that Nasser began to consider him a threat. 17 Waterbury, The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat, 99. 18 See Oren, Six Days of War, pp. 319-320 for a discussion of Nasser’s moves against Amer. 19 Springborg, “Approaches to the Understanding of Egypt,” pp. 143-145. Waterbury, The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat argues that the encouragement of the private sector actually began with small steps in 1966. The effects of this move began to be felt by 1968 (pp. 167-169). 20 Ansari, Egypt: The Stalled Society, p. 142. 21 Rubinstein, Red Star on the Nile, p. 50. 22 Ibid., pp. 71-72 and Ansari, Egypt: The Stalled Society, pp. 144-145. 23 Beattie, Egypt During the Sadat Years, pp. 32-33. 24 See Sadat, In Search of Identity, pp. 174-175. 25 The more militant Arab governments, including Syria, Algeria, Iraq and the Palestinian Liberation Organization, boycotted the summit because it did not represent an immediate collective militant response. 26 Resolution adopted at the Arab Summit Conference in Khartoum, 1 September 1967. 27 Gerges, “The 1967 Arab-Israeli War,” pp. 195-196. Kerr makes a similar point, noting that at Khartoum Egypt and Jordan favored taking a united stance embracing the use of diplomacy. The other Arab leaders were willing to include such an approach, but the three no’s were agreed to in order to balance the language favoring diplomacy (Kerr, The Arab Cold War, pp. 139-40). See also Barnett, Dialogues in Arab Politics, pp. 172-173.

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28 Resolution adopted at the Arab Summit Conference in Khartoum, 1 September 1967. 29 Gerges, “The 1967 Arab-Israeli War,” p. 196. 30 Gerges, “The 1967 Arab-Israeli War,” p. 196; Korn, Stalemate, p. 49 31 Kerr, The Arab Cold War, pp. 39,107-114. 32 Barnett and Levy, “Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments,” pp. 381-383; Owen and Pamuk, A History of Middle East Economies in the Twentieth Century, 133-4. 33 Sadat, In Search of Identity, p. 188. See also Barnett, Dialogues in Arab Politics, pp. 172-173 on the more conservative nature of this new solidarity. 34 In an oft cited speech before the Arab Socialist Union on March 27, 1969, Nasser made the comment “… that what has been taken by force can be regained only by force… .” He made this comment, however, within a section of his speech speaking about the diplomatic efforts Egypt had made. In his speech, he blamed the United States and Israel for their intransigence which was preventing a resolution to the conflict (in Laqueur and Rubin, The Israel-Arab Reader, 245-254). 35 United Nations S/RES/242 (1967). See also Korn, Stalemate, pp. 27-29 and Quandt, Peace Process, pp. 44-46, on the efforts to pass the resolution. 36 Heikal, The Road to Ramadan, pp. 53-54. 37 Korn, Stalemate, p. 87-89. Egyptian general Mohamed El-Gamasy agreed with this logic. He noted that Egypt could recognize Israel in return for a full withdrawal from the Sinai, but also believed that some force would be necessary to dislodge Israel from its position (El-Gamasy, The October War, p. 105). See also Rubinstein, Red Star on the Nile, p. 72. 38 Korn., Stalemate, pp. 106-109, 116. 39 Ibid., pp. 172-173, 175, and Parker, The Politics of Miscalculation in the Middle East, pp. 139-141. 40 Parker, The Politics of Miscalculation in the Middle East, pp. 146-7. 41 Quandt, Peace Process, p. 72. 42 Korn, Stalemate, p. 240. 43 Quandt, Peace Process, p. 72. 44 Korn, Stalemate, 253. 45 See Heikal, The Road to Ramadan, pp. 95-97; Korn, Stalemate, pp. 252, 266-267. 46 Kerr, The Arab Cold War, p. 146. 47 Korn, Stalemate, p. 188. 48 El-Gamasy, The October War, p. 96; Hinnebusch, Egyptian politics under Sadat, p. 43. 49 Hinnebusch, Egyptian politics under Sadat, p. 42. 50 Beattie, Egypt During the Sadat Years, pp. 9-11 and Hinnebusch, Egyptian politics under Sadat, pp. 40-42. 51 Beattie, Egypt During the Sadat Years, pp. 32-33. 52 Beattie, Egypt During the Sadat Years, p. 34. Sadat had been the face of the Free Officers when they seized power in 1952, announcing the move to the nation. He was also seen as extremely loyal to Nasser, having openly supported him against Amer after the Six Day War. 53 Heikal, The Road to Ramadan, pp. 154-155. Sadat had not informed the majority of the Egyptian leadership of his decision to include the peace

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overtures in his speech. In fact, only three of his closest advisors knew of his intentions (Beattie, Egypt During the Sadat Years, p. 57). 54 Neff, Warriors against Israel, p. 46; Quandt, Peace Process, p. 89. Egypt accepted all of Jarring’s points, but still insisted that Israel would have to withdraw to the pre-1967 lines. Israel made it clear that it had no intention of withdrawing to the 1967 borders. 55 Quandt, Peace Process, p. 90. See also Heikal, The Sphinx and the Commissar, pp. 239-240 on back channel communications that had been established between Egypt and the United States early in Sadat’s presidency. 56 Kaplan, The Arabists, p. 166. Sterner’s fears were well founded. Sadat would confront the most serious challenge to his presidency in May when he took on a faction led by Ali Sabri that was displeased by Sadat’s internal and external policies. This episode will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 57 Baker, Egypt’s Uncertain Revolution, pp. 124-125. 58 Hinnebusch, Egyptian politics under Sadat, p. 43. 59 Beattie, Egypt During the Sadat Years, pp. 46-47, 70. 60 Baker, Egypt’s Uncertain Revolution, 126; Beattie, Egypt During the Sadat Years, pp. 61-69, 71; Hinnebusch, Egyptian politics under Sadat, 40-1, discusses the widespread opposition to the Sabri group. 61 Hinnebusch, Egyptian politics under Sadat, pp. 50, 144-53, discusses the impact of the industrial and agricultural elite influence under Sadat’s regime and 108-9 for a discussion of the opportunities the elite had to increase their wealth under Sadat. 62 See Neff, Warriors against Israel, pp. 60-61, 70-71; Heikal, The Road to Ramadan, p. 138; and El-Gamasy, The October War, pp. 140-141. 63 Seale, Asad: Struggle for the Middle East, pp. 190-191. 64 Ansari, Egypt: The Stalled Society, p. 175; Beattie, Egypt During the Sadat Years, pp. 94-5. 65 Baker, Egypt’s Uncertain Revolution, p. 130; Beattie, Egypt During the Sadat Years, p. 133. 66 Neff, Warriors against Israel, pp. 86-88; El-Gamasy, The October War, pp. 140-141, 147; Seale, Asad: Struggle for the Middle East, p. 192; Heikal, The Road to Ramadan, pp. 160-161, 164, 170-173, 177-178; Heikal, The Sphinx and the Commissar, pp. 238, 243-44. El-Gamasy argues that “criticism of the Soviets by the [Egyptian] general command rose to a new level during 1972 because they were perceived to be actively hindering our desire to fight and this was affecting the troops’ morale” (146). See also Heikal, The Sphinx and the Commissar, p. 253, on the increased flow of arms from the Soviet Union in the wake of Sadat’s decision. 67 Heikal, The Road to Ramadan, pp. 180-181; Neff, Warriors against Israel, p. 101. 68 Sela, The Decline of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, pp. 133-134, 141-142; Seale, Asad: Struggle for the Middle East, pp. 190-192. Though Sadat recognized that he needed to coordinate his attacks with Syria, he knew that Syria was interested in fighting a war to remove Israel from all occupied Syrian lands, not just a limited engagement. Though he was commanding his military to plan a limited operation, he led Asad to believe that Egyptian war plans included the goal to completely take back the Sinai Peninsula.

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Neff, Warriors against Israel, p. 103. Ibid., p. 109. 71 Memorandum of conversation between Hafez Ismail and Kissinger, May 20, 1973. 72 The United States and Israel were taken by almost complete surprise. Though the two sides contemplated the possibility that Egypt and Syria would attack Israel based on their troop movements, they did not believe such an attack was likely. See Memorandum from William B. Quandt to Brent Scowcroft, "Arab-Israeli Tensions," 6 October 1973. In this memorandum prepared the day the war began, Quandt discusses evidence that Egypt and Syria were planning to attack Israel. He also notes, however, that US intelligence sources still believed the attack to be unlikely. 73 Neff, Warriors against Israel, pp. 117-118. 74 Kissinger to Egyptian Foreign Minister Al-Zayyat, 8 October 1973, enclosing "Message for Mr. Hafiz Ismail from Dr. Kissinger," 8 October 1973. Kissinger’s message sought to clarify exactly what level of withdrawal Egypt would demand in return for peace with Israel. Kissinger also referenced communications with Iran over Egypt’s willingness to negotiate with Israel. See also Heikal, The Road to Ramadan, p. 224. Heikal argues that Sadat’s memo to Kissinger included an outline of a Peace Process with Israel, including a formal end of belligerency in exchange for a full Israeli withdrawal from the territories it occupied. In addition, Egypt would guarantee freedom of the Straits of Tiran and allow a United Nations peacekeeping force in Sharm elSheikh; Kissinger’s memo supports this interpretation. 75 El-Gamasy notes that the final directive to the military to begin the war did not call for a full liberation of Sinai, rather for a progressive battle dictated by conditions. The goal was to break the existing stalemate and inflict as high a number of casualties as possible on Israel (El-Gamasy, The October War, p. 191). 76 Resolution 338 also contained reference to 242. Acceptance of S/RES/338 (1973). implied acceptance of 242. 77 During Kissinger’s diplomacy in the wake of the war, Sadat and Kissinger reached an agreement to reestablish diplomatic relations between the United States and Egypt (see Scowcroft to President, "Meeting with Sadat," 7 November 1973, with Nixon's annotated "congratulations"). 78 In addition, Syria and Israel signed a disengagement agreement in 1974 that remains in force today. More on that agreement will be discussed in the following sections on Israel and Syria. 79 Interim Agreement between Israel and Egypt, September 4, 1975. 80 Some in Egypt were not pleased with the extent of the Sinai I and II agreements, nor with the Egyptian decision to open the Suez Canal prior to signing a formal peace agreement or, for that matter, the Sinai II. See Fahmy, Negotiating for Peace in the Middle East, pp. 81, 166-167. Fahmy, Egyptian Foreign Minister while both Sinai I and II were negotiated, argues that Sinai II did not give too much to Israel, despite internal criticisms to the contrary. 81 See Baker, Egypt’s Uncertain Revolution, pp. 140-141 on the increased levels of aid that began to flow to Egypt in 1976-7, including the limited sale of military equipment. By 1977, US aid to Egypt “was greater than to the rest of Africa and Latin America combined.” 70

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82 Heikal, The Sphinx and the Commissar, pp. 269-270. See also Barnett, Dialogues in Arab Politics, p. 189, on Saudi Arabia’s defense of Egypt, representing the degree to which the two sides had resolved their pre-1967 conflicts. 83 Beattie, Egypt During the Sadat Years, pp. 136-138. 84 See Richards and Waterbury, A Political Economy of the Middle East, p. 64, for a table demonstrating economic growth in the Middle East. 85 Baker, Egypt’s Uncertain Revolution, p. 141. 86 Beattie, Egypt During the Sadat Years, p. 149. 87 Hinnebusch, Egyptian politics under Sadat, p. 50. 88 Fahmy, Negotiating for Peace in the Middle East, p. 21. 89 Baker, Egypt’s Uncertain Revolution, p. 159. 90 Ansari, Egypt: The Stalled Society, pp. 185, 187-8; Beattie, Egypt During the Sadat Years, pp. 215-216; Hinnebusch, Egyptian politics under Sadat, 58-9. According to Beattie, Egypt During the Sadat Years, this lack of assistance from other Gulf States was particularly upsetting to Egypt. Sadat felt that Egypt was asked to pay the price for war, but that it was other Arab states that were preventing peace while not substantially assisting Egypt economically. 91 Owen and Pamuk, A History of Middle East Economies in the Twentieth Century, pp. 141-144, discusses the failures in Egyptian agriculture that prevented production from keeping up with population growth. Owen and Pamuk, A History of Middle East Economies in the Twentieth Century, pp. 145146 discusses the rising percentage of Egyptians living in poverty. See also Richards and Waterbury, A Political Economy of the Middle East, Chapter 4, on the impact of rapid population growth on economic development in the Middle East. 92 Ansari, Egypt: The Stalled Society, p. 185; Beattie, Egypt During the Sadat Years, pp. 206-11. 93 One positive impact of the riots was that the Gulf States, as well as the United States, Europe and Japan, increased their levels of financial assistance to Egypt (Beattie, Egypt During the Sadat Years, p. 216). 94 Rabil, Embattled Neighbors, p. 57. The first Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East occurred from December 1973 to January 1974 but accomplished very little as Syria refused to participate due to the failure to invite Palestinian representatives to the conference. See also Quandt, Peace Process, pp. 178-180, on Carter’s initial approach to the Middle East. 95 In fact, Begin and members of his party had resigned from the Israeli cabinet in protest in August 1970 after Israel accepted the Roger’s ceasefire initiative that include acceptance of 242 (Korn, Stalemate, p. 258). Begin disagreed with agreeing to any document that specified territorial concessions. Begin had been a Minister without Portfolio in the National Unity government headed by Labor since 1967. 96 Lippman, Egypt after Nasser, p. 9. 97 This move sparked opposition even within Sadat’s government. Ismail Fahmy, then Foreign Minister and Muhammed Riyad, appointed as his replacement, both resigned in protest (Boutros-Ghali, Egypt’s Road to Jerusalem, p. 16; see also Fahmy, Negotiating for Peace in the Middle East, pp. 260-278 on the degree of his opposition to Camp David). Mohamed Kamel, who was Egyptian Foreign Minister during the Camp David negotiations,

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thought the trip to Jerusalem was unnecessary as he felt that negotiations toward Geneva were progressing. He had mixed emotions about the trip; though he recognized that the economy was hurting and there were other pressures for peace, he did not think the trip was planned well enough to make a significant impact (Kamel, The Camp David Accords, pp. 15, 17-18). 98 Ibid., p. 22; Bregman and El-Tahri, Israel and the Arabs, p. 162. Despite the lack of progress, the peace initiative did seem to have public support. See Boutros-Ghali, Egypt’s Road to Jerusalem, pp. 25-26, on the warm reception the Egyptian delegation received from the public on its return from Jerusalem in 1977. 99 See Quandt, Peace Process, pp. 191-197. At one point in a February meeting with Carter at Camp David, Sadat seemed to believe that his initiative had failed and that peace was not possible. 100 A 1 (C), “Framework,” The Camp David Accords (September 17, 1978). 101 See Boutros-Ghali, Egypt’s Road to Jerusalem, pp. 149-151, on the widespread disagreement within the Egyptian delegation on The Camp David Accords, including the resignation of Foreign Minister Kamel. Kamel resigned prior to the signing ceremony at the White House over The Camp David Accords because he felt they constituted a separate peace. In his mind, Egypt’s policy should have striven for Arab unity first which would have allowed more freedom to maneuver for a comprehensive peace (Kamel, The Camp David Accords, pp. 263-264). 102 Article IV.2, Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty (March 29, 1979). 103 Egypt’s Arab League membership was suspended from 1979 until 1989. The Leagues headquarters were moved from Cairo to Tunis until they returned in 1991. 104 Boutros-Ghali, Egypt’s Road to Jerusalem, pp. 206-210; Beattie, Egypt During the Sadat Years, pp. 232-233. See also Karawan, “Identity and Foreign Policy,” pp. 162-163, 165. Karawan argues that there was widespread public support for the peace initiative in Egypt and a disdain for other Arab states that wanted Egypt to continue fighting but did not want to contribute to the battle. Indeed, in polls taken in Egypt in the late 1980s, the vast majority of the Egyptian population still supported the decision to achieve a diplomatic settlement with Israel (Tessler and Warriner, “Gender in International Relations,” pp. 96-97). 105 Beattie, Egypt During the Sadat Years, pp. 241-242. 106 Boutros-Ghali, Egypt’s Road to Jerusalem, p. 207. 107 Owen and Pamuk, A History of Middle East Economies in the Twentieth Century, p. 132. 108 Waterbury, The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat, pp. 94-99. 109 Owen and Pamuk, A History of Middle East Economies in the Twentieth Century, 132. 110 The alternative hypotheses will be discussed in the final section of this chapter. 111 Quandt, Peace Process, p. 3. 112 Some in Israel, including government and military officials, wanted to take more dramatic action, advocating the pursuit of a war of conquest against the West Bank. For example, Ezer Wiezman, a general who would later play a

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major role in achieving peace between Egypt and Israel, in 1966 had called for taking the West Bank by force (Neff, Warriors for Jerusalem, pp. 46-47). 113 Bar-On, In Pursuit of Peace, pp. 27-29, 28. 114 Korn, Stalemate, p. 13-14. 115 Ibid. p. 30. 116 See Quandt, Peace Process, pp. 67-68. Quandt describes the Israeli reaction to Rogers’ initiative as “extremely hostile.” 117 See Peretz and Daron, The Government and Politics of Israel, Chapter Four for a discussion of the Israeli electoral system. 118 Horowitz, Trouble in Utopia, p. 165. 119 See Sternhell, The Founding Myths of Israel, Chapter Four, on the creation of the Histadrut as a means to maintaining economic and political power. Sternhell also examines the uniqueness of the Histadrut in comparison to other labor movements around the world. 120 Ibid., pp. 178-9. 121 Barnett, “Israel in the World Economy,” p. 128. 122 Bregman and El-Tahri, Israel and the Arabs, pp. 70-71. 123 Aronoff, “The Decline of the Israeli Labor Party,” p. 122. 124 Shindler, Israel, Likud and the Zionist Dream, p. 63. 125 Aronoff, Israeli Visions and Divisions, p. 7. 126 Barnett, “Israel in the World Economy,” p. 125-6. See Pack, Structural Change and Economic Policy in Israel, Chapter Four for a discussion of Israel’s import substitution policies. 127 Drezon-Tepler, Interest Groups and Political Change in Israel, p. 36. 128 Beilin, Israel: A Concise Political History, p. 56. 129 Sella and Yishai, Israel, the Peaceful Belligerent, p. 43. 130 Ahdut HaAvoda (Unity of Labor) also joined Rafi and Mapai to form the Labor party in 1968. 131 All election statistics are from the http://www.knesset.gov.il, the official website of Israel’s Knesset. 132 Korn, Stalemate, pp. 131-134, 139-141. One of the reasons Sapir worked to make Meir prime minister after Eshkol’s death was to prevent Dayan’s rising to that position. 133 See Korn, Stalemate, pp. 114-115, on the sense of abandonment felt by frontline Israeli troops both by the government and the public at large. See Korn, Stalemate, p. 275 and Parker, The Politics of Miscalculation in the Middle East, p. 137 on the level of Israeli losses. 134 Parker, The Politics of Miscalculation in the Middle East, p. 141. 135 Ibid., pp. 146-147. 136 Sella and Yishai, Israel, the Peaceful Belligerent, pp. 49-50. 137 Beilin, Israel: A Concise Political History, p. 56. 138 Korn, Stalemate, pp. 114-115, 275. 139 Ibid., pp. 217-218. 140 S/RES/242 (1967) 1.(ii). 141 Ibid., 1.(i). 142 Korn Stalemate, p. 244; Bar-On, In Pursuit of Peace, p. 59; Quandt, Peace Process, pp. 73-74. The United States, in gaining Israel’s agreement to the ceasefire, assured Israel that it would not be required to adhere to the Arab interpretation of 242.

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143 Korn, Stalemate, p. 258. See also p. 268 on Israel’s demands for limitations of US over flights to verify the ceasefire. Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan even threatened to shoot down US planes that strayed over Israeli territory. Much like Egypt, Israel used the ceasefire to strengthen its position. 144 See Quandt, Peace Process, pp. 76-83 on the Jordanian crisis and the discussions about a possible intervention by the Israeli military on behalf of Jordan to head off the Syrian troops who entered the conflict. 145 Ibid., p. 85. 146 Korn, Stalemate, 276. 147 Quoted in Quandt, Peace Process, p. 89. 148 Bregman and El-Tahri, Israel and the Arabs, pp. 130-1; Sella and Yishai, Israel, the Peaceful Belligerent, pp. 20-21; Peri, Between Battles and Bullets, p. 86; Bar-On, In Pursuit of Peace, pp. 61-62. A deputy minister from the Labor party, Gad Ya’acobi, proposed an Israeli pullback in 1970. Dayan had supported the idea then; his support only increased after Sadat’s proposals. Dayan believed that an interim agreement would make a future war less likely and would serve to isolate Syria (Ma’oz, Syria and Israel, p. 125). 149 Quandt, Peace Process, p. 90. 150 See Gross Stein, “Calculation, Miscalculation, and Conventional Deterrence II: The View from Jerusalem,” on Israeli perceptions of invulnerability. See also Ma’oz, Syria and Israel, pp. 125-126 and Parker, The Politics of Miscalculation in the Middle East, p. 151-152. 151 Torgovnik, “Likud 1977-81,” p. 9. 152 Beilin, Israel: A Concise Political History, 43. 153 According to many accounts, Dayan, Minister of Defense when war began in 1973, was so shocked by the Egyptian and Syrian advances that he initially did not believe reports and, once aware of the degree of Arab advances, was unable to effectively lead the Ministry for a brief time (Peri, Between Battles and Bullets, p. 251-253). 154 Friedland and Hecht, To Rule Jersualem, p. 167. 155 Clause B, Separation of Forces Agreement Between Israel and Egypt, January 18, 1975. 156 Quandt, Peace Process, p. 160. 157 Beilin, Israel: A Concise Political History, 56-7. 158 Some viewed this result as a watershed event for Likud, firmly establishing its legitimacy in the eyes of the public. See Shindler, Israel, Likud and the Zionist Dream, p. 75. 159 Aronoff, “The Decline of the Israeli Labor Party,” p. 137. Meir and Dayan resigned on April 11, 1974. 160 Peri, Between Battles and Bullets, p. 84. 161 Aronoff, “The Decline of the Israeli Labor Party,” pp. 123-124. Aronoff argues that even after the 1967 war, Labor was beset by a certain inertia that put policy making decisions in the hands of a few leaders rather than open to the democratic process. 162 Beilin, Israel: A Concise Political History, p. 39. The majority of the Ashkenazi support Labor while the majority of the Sephardi support Likud. 163 Shindler, Israel, Likud and the Zionist Dream, p. 81-82, Sella and Yishai, Israel, the Peaceful Belligerent, pp. 84-86. See Sprinzak, Brother against Brother, pp. 133-143 for a discussion of Israel’s Black Panthers, a

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sometimes violent movement of Sephardi citizens dissatisfied with the Israeli government and the Labor party. The group held its first demonstration in 1971. 164 Shindler, Israel, Likud and the Zionist Dream, p. 74. 165 Shindler, Israel, Likud and the Zionist Dream, pp. 77-80. 166 Aronoff, “The Decline of the Israeli Labor Party,” pp. 142-144. 167 Sella and Yishai, Israel, the Peaceful Belligerent, pp. 104-105. 168 See Aronoff, “The Decline of the Israeli Labor Party,” pp. 132-136 on the Labor party’s inability to respond effectively to public criticisms of its actions and leadership. See Torgovnik, “A Movement for Change in a Stable System,” on the DMC. 169 Arian, “The Electorate: Israel 1977,” p. 65. 170 Torgovnik, “Likud 1977-81,” p. 10. 171 Torgovnik, “A Movement for Change in a Stable System,” pp. 154-158 on the profile of the average DMC voter. These voters tended to be better educated than voters of other parties and were more concerned with domestic affairs than foreign affairs. They were also more likely to be of European or American heritage, a demographic more closely associated with Labor than with Likud. 172 Arian, “The Electorate: Israel 1977,” pp. 66-67. Arian argues that had the Histadrut election occurred before the general election as was the norm, there is a chance that voters would have taken their frustration with Labor out in the Histadrut election instead of the general election. 173 Grinberg and Shafir, “Economic Liberalization and the Breakup of Histadrut’s Domain,” p. 103. 174 Torgovnik, “Likud 1977-81,” pp. 20-22. A major difference was the far more hawkish position of Likud on the West Bank and Gaza. In addition, Likud may have been even less willing than labor to part with the Golan Heights. 175 Dayan, Breakthrough, pp. 1-5. 176 Torgovnik, “Likud 1977-81,” pp. 29-31. 177 Bar-On, In Pursuit of Peace, pp. 79-83, 93. 178 Dayan, Breakthrough, pp. 19-20, 22. 179 Ibid., p. 24. 180 Quandt, Peace Process, pp. 190-191; Dayan, Breakthrough, pp. 23-24, discusses the debate that Begin faced in the Knesset over his agreement to Palestinian representation outside of the Jordanian delegation. 181 Bregman and El-Tahri, Israel and the Arabs, p. 162; Dayan, Breakthrough, pp. 76-77; Boutros-Ghali, Egypt’s Road to Jerusalem, p. 22. 182 Dayan, Breakthrough, p. 104. 183 See Quandt, Peace Process, pp. 191-197 184 Egyptian decision-making is discussed above. 185 Shindler, Israel, Likud and the Zionist Dream, pp. 98-99; Dayan, Breakthrough, p. 198. Shindler further observes that those from Herut who voted against The Camp David Accords did not suffer any political retribution from Begin for their votes. 186 Sofer, Begin: An Anatomy of Leadership, pp. 135-137. 187 Bar-On, In Pursuit of Peace, 98-99; Dayan, Breakthrough, 303-305; Torgovnik, “Likud 1977-81,” p. 36.; Peri, Between Battles and Bullets, pp. 263264; Shindler, Israel, Likud and the Zionist Dream, p. 92; Ma’oz, Syria and

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Israel, p. 170. Shindler discusses the particular difficulties facing Begin. On the one hand, his measured approach to peace helped to ignite the Peace Process. On the other hand, any prospect of negotiation upset his base on the right. Weizman had, at one time, been considered a hawkish member of the Israeli military and, later, the Likud party. In Begin’s government, he became one of the most forceful advocates for peace. 188 Shindler, Israel, Likud and the Zionist Dream, pp. 102-103. 189 Ibid., pp. 103-104. 190 Torgovnik, “Likud 1977-81,” pp. 17-18. 191 Grinberg and Shafir, “Economic Liberalization and the Breakup of the Histadrut’s Domain,” p. 103. 192 Shindler, Israel, Likud and the Zionist Dream, pp. 106-107. 193 Hypothesis three relies on complete acceptance of State B’s position by State A. 194 Owen and Pamuk, A History of Middle East Economies in the Twentieth Century, p. 181. 195 Weizman echoes this argument, going so far as to say that had Sadat’s announcement to visit Jerusalem occurred while Labor had been in power, “it would have been rejected scornfully and out of hand.” He goes on to argue that as a hawk, Begin could take more risks for peace (Weizman, The Battle for Peace, pp. 23-24). Though Weizman may overstate the level of mistrust Labor leaders had for Sadat, his basic premise that Begin may have had more freedom of action is probably accurate. 196 Owen and Pamuk, A History of Middle East Economies in the Twentieth Century 1998, p. 182. 197 See Quandt, Peace Process, pp. 197-235. 198 Table 3.2 in the appendix to this chapter traces the evolution of bargaining space between the two rivals. 199 Note that the portrayed pathway is route two as Egypt did not completely give in to Israel’s demands. 200 Though, by the logic Walt uses to describe Jordan’s behavior in 1973 as tacit bandwagoning with Israel, the same argument could be made about Egypt’s decision to settle with Israel (Walt, The Origin of Alliances, pp. 174, 177-178). 201 Owen and Pamuk, A History of Middle East Economies in the Twentieth Century, pp. 133-136. 202 As discussed in the next chapter, Walt’s argument should have led Syria to realign. 203 Walt, The Origin of Alliances, p. 178.

4 Syria and Israel: Obstacles to Peace

This chapter analyzes the relationship between Syria and Israel from 1967 to 1980. During the time period in question, Syria and Israel were unable to find a mutually agreeable settlement to their rivalry despite foreign policy changes in both states. Both before and after the Six Day War, Syria was one of the most radical Arab states. Syrian foreign policy advocated the “liberation of Palestine,” which basically meant the destruction of Israel. To this end, Syria sponsored militant Palestinian groups that launched attacks against Israel from Syria. After Hafiz alAsad formally seized power in 1970, however, Syrian policy toward Israel began to moderate. Asad accepted Security Council Resolution 242, implying that he would recognize Israel in return for Israeli withdrawal from lands occupied in the 1967 war. After the Six Day War, Israel made the decision that it would not return all of the Golan, even in return for full peace. Part of this decision was the belief that Syria would never accept a true peace with Israel, and that the Golan Heights could serve as a strategic barrier between Syria and Israel proper. Even after the 1973 October War, Israel never seriously considered a full return of the Golan, though it did contemplate negotiations with Syria. This case presents several difficulties for my primary hypotheses, despite the fact that the causal logic does seem to work to a point. Syria did dramatically change its foreign policy under Asad, including an acceptance of the principle of land for peace. Asad also cracked down on Palestinian militants, both in Syria and later in Lebanon, in an attempt to reduce attacks against Israel. His goal was to lessen the Israeli incentive to launch attacks against positions within Syria. Finally, Asad, sought to mend Syria’s relationship with other Arab states, the conservative monarchies in particular. This change in policy came as a result of Syria’s failure in the Six Day War and in response to growing domestic unrest under the neo-Ba’thist government that came to power in 1966. After the Six Day War, Asad and Salah Jadid began to compete

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for power. Asad eventually won the showdown and worked to expand the regime’s popular base of support by reaching out to several segments of society that had been excluded under Jadid’s leadership. Despite the significant changes in its policies, Syria did not make sufficient concessions to Israel to make peace possible. My argument does predict why Syria changed its policies, but not why the change in policies was not sufficient. Israel, on the other hand, never truly believed that peace with Syria was possible and never indicated that it was willing to return the full Golan Heights to achieve peace. Though Israel did ease its policies toward Egypt after the October War, it did not significantly change its position on peace with Syria, though Israel did sign a disengagement agreement with Syria. My hypotheses do not explain Israel’s failure to make significant changes in its foreign policy toward Syria. Though I do not claim that a combination of foreign and domestic policy failure is sufficient to bring about policy change or rivalry termination, the absence of significant change in Israel does pose a challenge to my central logic. While this case presents a problem for the primary hypotheses, it also presents a problem for the alternative arguments. Alternative hypothesis one does predict some of the changes that occurred under Asad. Like Nasser and Sadat, Asad realized that to combat Israel he would need the support of other Arab powers. He also strengthened his relationship with the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, I will argue that the alternative hypotheses cannot predict both the Syrian and Egyptian cases. If balance of power logic explains why Egypt made peace with Israel, it cannot explain why Syria did not take all necessary steps to do the same even in the face of high Israeli demands. The two states faced remarkably similar incentives after the October War, yet only one state made peace with Israel. Taken in isolation, however, hypothesis one does explain some of Syria’s behavior. In Section One, I trace the evolution of Syria’s foreign and domestic policy from 1967-1980, demonstrating that failures in both foreign and domestic policy did, in fact lead to some policy change. I conclude Section One with an analysis of the explanatory power of my primary hypotheses in the Syrian case.1 Section Two will discuss Israel’s policy toward Syria during the same time period. In this section I will also seek to explain Israel’s willingness to make peace with Egypt, but not with Syria and its implications for the overall argument of this book. Section Three will compare the predictions of the primary and alternate

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hypotheses, including a discussion of the differences/similarities of the Egyptian and Syrian relationships with Israel. Section One: Syria Syria’s Foreign Policy Before the Six Day War

Syria and Israel clashed frequently before the Six Day War. Among the source of their disputes was Syria’s stated goal to eliminate the state of Israel and its subsequent support of Palestinian militant groups, Israeli cultivation of land within the demilitarized zone, and an Israeli project designed to divert portions of the headwaters of the Jordan River. In response to this latter project, Syria pressured the other Arab states to support Syrian efforts to undertake its own river diversion project. In a September 1964 Arab summit, the Arab states agreed to support Syria’s immediate efforts to divert the Banyas River that feeds into the Jordan.2 That effort, however, was doomed. Syria began its efforts to divert the river while simultaneously encouraging Palestinian attacks against Israeli targets. By May 1965, Israel was able to use Syrian support of Palestinian groups and claims of being fired on by Syrian soldiers as a pretext to destroy the Syrian diversion project prompting other Arab leaders to believe that 1) the Arab diversion project would not work, and 2) that the Arab states were not prepared for war.3 The failure of the diversion project did not stop the confrontation between the Arab states themselves nor between the Arab states and Israel. Palestinian groups continued to launch attacks against Israel not only with Syrian support, but also from Jordanian soil. Israel’s policy was one of reprisal. When an attack was launched from an Arab state with or without its knowledge, Israel would respond with a raid on that state’s soil. Israel had ample opportunity for reprisal in 1966-67. An internal party struggle brought a new Ba‘thist regime to power in Syria in February of 1966. This new regime, frustrated in part by the lack of confrontation with Israel, stepped up its attacks against Israel. Syria and Palestinians operating from Syria initiated more than 250 incursions into Israel from the time the new regime took power on February 23, 1966 and May 15, 1967.4 Israel also initiated incidents with Syria. On April 7, 1967, armored Israeli farm equipment entered the demilitarized zone between Israel and Syria and began to cultivate land. What began as an exchange of mortar and tank fire culminated with the shooting down of six Syrian aircraft in a dogfight with Israel.5 These incidents ultimately helped to prompt the

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signing of a mutual defense treaty between Syria and Egypt, and led Syria, Egypt and Israel down the path that culminated in the Six Day War.6 Syria’s Domestic Policy Before the Six Day War

The neo-Ba’thist wing of the Ba’th party that seized control of Syria in February 1966 was more radical in both foreign and domestic policy than the regime it replaced. While the pre-1966 Ba’th party, led by Michel Aflaq and Salah al-Din al-Bitar, was not sympathetic to communism, the group that came to power in 1966, led by Salah Jadid and Hafiz al-Asad, moved quickly to implement leftist reforms, including the embracing of the Syrian Communist Party.7 The members of the leadership of the neo-Ba’th wing of the party were largely from rural, minority communities.8 Their coalition appealed to the peasants, urban labor and students for support, including the arming of labor and peasant militias to help confront opposition to the party. The government instituted land reforms to appeal to the peasants while trying to weaken the bourgeoisie.9 To help pay for their economic reforms, the regime turned to Eastern Bloc nations that played a significant role in constructing agricultural and manufacturing facilities in addition to shoring up Syria’s infrastructure.10 Despite this appeal to a popular constituency, the Ba’th party primarily relied on repression with a minimal amount of accommodation of its opposition to maintain power.11 Early opposition to the regime came from both internal and external sources. The first major challenge to the regime came from internal sources. Salim Hatum had been a leader of the neo-Ba’th, but was pushed aside by Jadid after they seized power. Upset with his exclusion from the power structure after the February coup, Hatum led a failed counter-coup backed by supporters of the old Ba’th leadership in September 1966. Almost immediately, Jadid and Asad began to have different visions for the government. Jadid began to build an independent base of power in the party, while Asad used his position as defense minister and secretary of the air force to build military support for his position.12 In addition to the internal disputes, the regime also faced the challenge of limited popular support. The regime’s constituency did not make up a significant proportion of the population, leading to opposition based on both economic and religious interests. The urban middle and merchant classes opposed the regime for its left-leaning policies as the

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regime had quickly moved to nationalize a wide range of industries, ranging from banks to the manufacturing sector.13 In addition to this opposition from these economic classes, the Sunni majority of Syria opposed the regime’s secular nature and that its leadership was composed of Alawis and Druzes, two minority religious groups in Syria.14 On the eve of the Six Day War, the government in Syria had been in place for just over one year. In that time, it had taken steps to appeal to its primary constituency through a series of left-leaning economic reforms. These policies combined with the regime’s secular nature did lead to widespread opposition. This opposition, coupled with Syria’s relatively poor economic performance both before and after the neoBa’ths seized power, put the regime in a precarious position. 1967-1970: Jadid and Asad Vie for Power

The dramatic failure in the 1967 war could have been fatal to neo-Ba’th regime. In foreign policy, the regime’s radical approach toward Israel helped precipitate the war, and the regime’s domestic constituency was too narrow to provide true proper support. After the war, the most powerful opposition groups allied together to approach the regime about democratizing power through the creation of a national Progressive Front. The neo-Ba’th would still have had a role in government along with the other progressive movements, but its power would not have been as exclusive as it was before the war. The neo-Ba’th answer was quite similar to when it originally seized power in 1966: repression mixed with limited accommodation. The government arrested many of those pushing the Progressive Front while many other members of the opposition fled the country. In an attempt to divide the opposition, the government awarded positions in government to some members of the opposition, driving wedges between and even within certain groups. In the end, the opposition was crippled in its ability to confront the government both by its heterogeneity and the effectiveness of the government’s repressive mechanisms both before and after the War.15 While the neo-Ba’th regime did effectively counter opposition from outside government, the war heightened the growing rift between Jadid and Asad on both domestic and foreign policy. After the war, the civilian leadership blamed the military’s poor performance on Asad as minister of defense while Asad and the military blamed the civilian leadership for the purges of military ranks based on party loyalty.16 The two sides also began to have more severe disagreements over the role of

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the military in the country and the degree to which the country should pursue a socialist agenda. Jadid and his civilian supporters advocated strict party control over the government and a deepening of government control over the economy. This faction began to work more closely with the Syrian Communist Party. Asad and the military, on the other hand, opposed party participation in military affairs and opposed a role for the Communist Party. Asad wanted priority to be given to external security rather than the class struggle being carried out by Jadid.17 Asad and Jadid also had dramatically different views on the appropriate foreign policy; Jadid took a much more radical approach to the conflict with Israel and to relations with other Arab states, while Asad was much more pragmatic.18 In the aftermath of the war, Jadid’s view was dominant. Following Jadid’s radical approach, Syria refused to attend the Khartoum summit, both because it did not represent Syria’s call to launch an immediate counteroffensive against Israel and because Jadid believed that it would be better for Syria to continue the struggle against Israel on its own rather than enlist the support of the conservative Arab monarchies, such as Saudi Arabia.19 Continuing its radical line, Syria refused to accept Security Council Resolution 242 and called publicly for a people’s war of liberation to free Palestine, insisting that no state should engage in negotiations with Israel.20 Under Jadid, Syria continued to support Palestinian efforts to overthrow Israel. In pursuit of this goal, Syria often helped to coordinate attacks by the various Palestinian groups and even created a statesupported Palestinian militia.21 Though the violence never rose to the level of the War of Attrition on the Egyptian/Israeli front, Syria did continue to exchange fire with Israel through 1970, leading to the loss of several Syrian MiG fighters.22 At the same time, Syria’s relations with other Arab states remained strained, especially as Syria denounced the Egyptian decision to accept the terms of the Rogers ceasefire initiative in the summer of 1970 and reaffirmed its rejection of 242.23 Though Jadid initially had the upper hand in the internal power struggle, signaled by his ability to shape Syrian foreign policy, Asad was actively consolidating his position. By 1968 he had more power at his disposal due to the consolidation of his control of the military by replacing any of Jadid’s allies with officers loyal to Asad. Despite his power over the military, however, Asad had little influence on the workings of the Ba’th party. Asad’s growing power base became evident when a skirmish with Israel led to a February 1969 showdown between Jadid and Asad. Jadid criticized Asad for the army’s poor performance in the skirmishes. Both sides escalated the conflict, culminating in Asad

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working with army units under his brother Rifat’s command to seize party offices and media outlets, including radio, television and print sources.24 This crisis was not fully resolved until late March with assistance from Egyptian, Algerian and Iraqi envoys. The resolution of the crisis strengthened Asad’s position by bringing other progressive groups into the government and by creating a nine-member committee that was to have the final say on political decisions in Syria. While Asad was a member of this committee, Jadid and the civilian faction were excluded.25 Asad and Rifat also succeeded in removing Jadid supporters from the security apparatus, further strengthening their position.26 As a sign of Asad’s growing influence over policy, by the end of 1969 Syria began reaching out to other Arab regimes. Domestically, the regime passed new laws to set up free trade zones on the outskirts of two Syrian cities, Aleppo and Tarsus to encourage foreign direct investment. In December 1969, the government even began to grant small loans to encourage the establishment of small-scale industries.27 Despite having greatly undermined Jadid in 1969, Asad did not act to remove Jadid from the party and government until 1970. In September 1970 Syria became involved in a showdown between the Jordanian government and Palestinian militant groups. Syria sent troops and armor into Jordan in order to protect the Palestinian groups When Jordan began using its air force to counter the Syrian intervention, Asad ordered the military to withdraw rather than providing air support to Syrian troops and escalating the conflict.28 In the wake of the crisis, Jadid attempted to reassert himself at an emergency National Congress that began on October 30. The party congress ended on November 12; the next day Asad moved to arrest those who opposed him. The corrective movement, as Asad called it, was a bloodless coup. The media in Syria did not even report on the political intrigue until November 16 when the government made news of Asad’s seizure of power public.29 Asad, by seizing control of government, effectively ended the debate in Syrian politics over the economic nature of the regime and foreign policy toward Israel, the Palestinians and other Arab states. His more moderate faction believed that the failures of the Six Day War necessitated a more moderate foreign policy. He also believed that Jadid’s domestic policies did not provide a sufficient base of support for the regime. The foreign and domestic failures of Jadid helped make Asad’s seizure of power possible.

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Asad Consolidates Power

Asad moved quickly to consolidate power by expanding his coalition to include several segments of society that had been excluded by Jadid. Though he did arrest and imprison Jadid and some of his immediate supporters, most of those who had supported Jadid were offered the opportunity to cooperate rather than being jailed. To reassure the Syrian people, Asad began touring the country, including visiting villages all over Syria in order to dispel the view of Syrian leaders as anonymous faces unconcerned with the people. Asad made a clear break with Jadid and the neo-Ba’th reforms instituted after 1966 by allowing a degree of liberalization, purging the security services, cutting food prices and encouraging the private sector. In particular, he reached out to the middle class, shop keepers and artisans as well as those citizens who had fled Syria to escape the Ba’th and neo-Ba’th regimes.30 His reforms were intended to maintain support among the peasants and workers through his reduction of food prices and an expansion of the public sector while simultaneously appealing to the private sector that was interested in more liberal economic policies.31 Economic liberalization included making it easier for private industry to import the necessary materials and reducing restrictions on food imports.32 At the same time, the growth of the public sector provided additional opportunities for the regime to provide jobs.33 Finally, realizing that the majority Sunni population had always been somewhat suspicious of the neo-Ba’th movement due to its domination by minority groups, he took steps to allay their fears both by making it clear that he was a Muslim and by appointing Sunnis to prominent positions.34 In a final break with Jadid, Asad dispensed with the Ba’thist practice of appointing a figurehead leader over the government and assumed the presidency in March of 1971. Syrian foreign policy also changed dramatically under Asad. Asad worked to improve relations in the Arab world, reaching out to Sadat in spite of his peace overtures to Israel and repairing relations with many of the conservative Arab monarchies.35 He also sought a closer relationship with the Soviet Union by offering the Soviet Union a steady ally, participation in any peace process that began, and access to air and naval bases.36 A more subtle, but extremely important aspect of Asad’s foreign policy shift was the change in the tone and substance of Syrian policy toward Israel. Syria stopped calling for the “liberation of Palestine,” and instead began to call for the realization of Palestinian rights and liberation of the occupied territories, a much less forceful

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claim.37 In addition to this rhetorical shift, Asad began to more actively limit the freedom to maneuver of the various Palestinian groups that had been launching attacks from Syrian soil.38 In some ways, the new Syrian policy began to resemble that of Egypt between 1967 and 1970, though with a more militaristic edge: [Asad] was convinced that Israel had won the Six Day War by ruse, catching the Arabs napping, but that it was not inherently unbeatable. He longed to wipe away the stain of defeat… restore the confidence of his troops, recover the land, and show the world that… the Arabs could acquit themselves honourably [sic]. Without first redressing the balance with Israel, he saw no hope of a negotiated settlement.39

In accordance with this view, Asad reaffirmed the Syrian rejection of 242 shortly after coming to power. As evidence of his growing pragmatism, however, he later accepted 242 with the understanding that it meant a full Israeli withdrawal and a realization of Palestinian rights. The irreconcilable demands of Syria ended with Jadid, even if Syria’s stance still made a diplomatic solution unlikely.40 While Syria was moderating its stance toward Israel in 1971 and 1972, Asad was also in the midst of preparing for a two-front war with Egypt as Syria’s ally. Unlike Sadat, however, Asad was not planning for an exclusively limited war to break a diplomatic stalemate; his intention was to fight a war with the intention of winning back the Golan. Diplomatic negotiations would have to follow, but the war itself was not a diplomatic maneuver to Asad as it was to Sadat.41 Sadat knew that to convince Asad to fight, he would have to hide his true objectives; Egypt even fed false war plans to the Syrians indicating a much more extensive military operation than they had actually planned.42 Asad, on the other hand, had little choice but to use Egypt as a partner if it hoped to prevail in the war. Syria did not have the capability to fight Israel alone, and Syria’s relations with Jordan, though better than they had been in 1970, were still too strained for Syria to depend on Jordan as an ally. In the course of the war, Syria’s troops had a great deal of initial success. Very quickly, however, Israel was able to mount an effective counterstrike on land and began strategic bombing deep inside Syria. Though the Syrian troops performed far better than they had in the Six Day War, the Israeli counteroffensive eventually claimed even more territory than had been occupied in 1967. Asad eventually agreed to UN Security Council Resolution 338 on October 23 after consulting with several other Arab states. During the course of the war, Asad was

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continually disappointed by Egypt’s failure to press on the attack after initial gains; it was not until after the war that he learned the extent of Sadat’s diplomatic maneuvers during the war and his pre-war deception. Though Syria had lost the October War from an objective military standpoint, Syrian troops had fought extremely well during the battle and opened the door for limited negotiations with Israel after the war. The October War in many ways served as a microcosm of the differences between the neo-Ba’th regime in 1967 and Asad’s regime in 1973. The neo-Ba’th had been strong supporters of Palestinian militants, encouraging them to attack Israel. That support had helped escalate tensions between Syria and Israel. Syria had also been highly critical of Egypt and other Arab states, in some ways leading to Nasser’s grandstanding moves in the Sinai Peninsula that helped lead to the war. When war began in 1967, Syria was not prepared to fight. In contrast, Asad’s Syria by 1973 had begun to rein in the Palestinian militants out of a desire to prevent unnecessary provocations of Israel. The war itself was carefully planned in coordination with Sadat and the Egyptian high command.43 Whereas the Six Day War was in many ways a war that none of the parties really wanted, Syria and Egypt chose the war in 1973. The final contrast with 1967 was the performance of Syria’s troops. They performed so well that during the war itself, Asad broke with past tradition and allowed Syrian radio to report the war factually, even when Israel began to gain the upper hand.44 Asad’s seizure of power and the changes he implemented were the result of perceived failures in Syria at the time of the Six Day War. He was able to build up support by opposing the domestic reforms that Jadid had implemented and by following a much more pragmatic foreign policy. Under Asad, Syria stopped calling for the complete destruction of the Israeli state and stopped supporting attacks by Palestinian militants. These changes were a dramatic shift from Syrian foreign policy under Jadid. 1973-1975: Disengagement with Israel

After the October War, Asad continued his domestic reforms geared to increasing his base of support through selected economic liberalization while meeting the needs of organized labor and Syrian peasants. He based his foreign policy on strenuous opposition to the Israeli occupation of lands captured in the Six Day War and support for Palestinian rights. Asad’s postwar diplomacy was marked by his incredible patience and willingness to hold out until his conditions were

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met. While Asad was willing to discuss disengagement agreements with Israel, his opening position was that Israel should withdraw from the entire Golan. Syria also refused to attend the December 1973 peace conference at Geneva as Asad felt that a disengagement agreement should be reached before discussing the peace conference. In refusing to attend Geneva, however, he did indicate that he would possibly attend future negotiating sessions.45 Despite this seeming intransigence, he was willing to meet with Henry Kissinger, US Secretary of State and National Security Advisor during Kissinger’s “shuttle diplomacy.” Asad’s initial intransigence toward negotiations with Israel began to soften after Egypt’s first disengagement agreement with Israel in late January 1974. Asad was furious that Egypt had negotiated and signed a disengagement of forces agreement so quickly, believing that Egypt had undermined the negotiating position of the Arab states.46 Nonetheless, Syria began to negotiate with Israel in earnest through the diplomacy of Kissinger. In early February, Asad agreed to send a list of captured Israeli soldiers to Kissinger. Upon receiving the list, Israel would respond with its disengagement proposal. At this point, Asad had already communicated to Kissinger that he could not accept a proposal that did not involve the return of some of the lands occupied by Israel in the Six Day War. His basic approach was based on the gains Sadat had made in the Egyptian/Israeli disengagement agreement that had resulted in the return of land Israel had held prior to the October War. After several months of intense negotiations with Kissinger serving as the intermediary, on May 31, 1974, Asad signed a disengagement agreement with Israel that included the return of the town Qunaytra, which had been occupied in 1967.47 Following the Egyptian/Israeli model, the eventual agreement included zones of occupation for Israel and Syria separated by a buffer zone containing UN peacekeepers.48 During the course of negotiations, however, Asad continued to demonstrate that he believed in using the military in coordination with diplomatic maneuvers. Syria and Israel engaged in a fairly serious war of attrition while they were negotiating the disengagement agreement.49 After the disengagement agreement, Syrian policy focused on the need for a comprehensive settlement to the Arab/Israeli conflict – Asad opposed the continuation of the step-by-step diplomacy signified by the disengagement agreements and subsequent efforts by Kissinger.50 Asad indicated that he would be willing to sign a treaty with Israel if Israel withdrew to the pre-1967 lines on all fronts and agreed to the establishment of Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza.51 His position was somewhat different than that of Egypt, however. Asad did

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not believe that the peace treaty would include the return of Arab land; rather, he wanted Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories, at which point he would sign a peace treaty with Israel.52 The key for Asad in confronting Israel, either militarily or diplomatically, however, remained Arab unity. Egypt’s continued negotiations with Israel gravely concerned Asad. Asad’s worst fears were realized when Egypt signed the Sinai II disengagement agreement with Israel in 1975. Asad believed that by agreeing to renounce the use of force, Egypt had taken the first step to completing a separate peace agreement with Israel and had effectively limited Arab bargaining power by removing the military option. Seale argues that: Much of Syrian history since 1975, the date of the second Sinai disengagement agreement which effectively removed Egypt from the battlefield, had been dominated by a search for the means to contain Israel without the benefit of Egyptian help.53

As a result of this military isolation, Syria after 1975 began to develop a closer relationship with the Soviet Union. This relationship was desirable from the Syrian perspective as Asad believed that any future military confrontation with Israel would have to be fought without Egyptian or Jordanian help. It was desirable for the Soviet Union as Sadat was clearly moving to develop a closer relationship with the United States, meaning that a continued Soviet presence in the region and in the peace process required a relationship with Syria. The two began to focus their Middle East policy on preventing a separate peace between Egypt and Israel.54 In contrast to his external concerns, Asad’s domestic policies were successful in improving the Syrian economy and Asad’s base of support. Whereas many of Sadat’s policies in Egypt clearly favored the bourgeoisie and private capital, Asad continued with his cross-class approach. Reforms in 1974 made it easier for foreign companies and individuals to invest in Syria. By 1975, even some America petroleum and hotel companies were invited to enter joint ventures with government-backed companies.55 In addition, both Syria’s cotton and oil industries thrived after 1973. Oil, in particular, proved to be a great help to the Syrian economy. First, Syrian domestic production began to have higher returns. Second, Syria received revenue from refining oil flowing from the Gulf States and royalties for allowing the oil to flow through Syrian pipelines. Third, Arab states, flush with oil money due to the

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rising price of oil, gave significant amounts of aid to Syria in the mid1970s. The benefits of oil, combined with rising cotton prices, led the Syrian economy to grow at an annual rate of 13 percent in 1974 and 1975.56 There were some underlying difficulties in Syria, however. As Yorke states: Between 1970 and 1976, Asad’s regime had appeared to move from strength to strength as a result of his liberal policies. Most Syrians were economically better off than they had been under his predecessor. There was no significant poverty. Education was widely available and the infrastructure of roads, water and electricity had been improved. But Asad had not succeeded in winning the whole-hearted support of the majority of Syrians – only their acquiescence in his rule.57 1976-1980: Lebanon

While Asad still held out hope for a unified Arab bargaining position, after 1975 he increasingly began to pursue a strategy that would allow him to balance Israel militarily. Syria did abide by the disengagement agreement with Israel and did not plan a military attack in the near future, but Asad believed that not having a strong military would hurt Syria in any future negotiations with Israel. As the 1970s progressed, Asad found himself confronted with an enemy against which he had no true military ally.58 At the same time, a growing civil war in Lebanon would further exacerbate tensions between Israel and Syria, though both would continue to abide by the 1974 disengagement agreement. Domestically, Asad began to face additional difficulties as well. After several years of success, the economy began to decline in 1976. The cotton industry had been a major part of the economy in north central and north eastern parts of Syria, employing many small scale producers. Asad’s liberalization policies, however, pushed many of these small-scale producers out of production by encouraging large, capital intensive producers to move into the region. Furthermore, the value of cotton exports was on the decline. These two problems coupled to increase unemployment in the cotton regions in 1976.59 The oil industry also began to face problems in 1976 as the price of oil began to decline, cutting revenue. A secondary effect of the decline in oil prices was the reduction of aid from the oil-rich Gulf states. Finally, Iraq, the primary source of oil flowing through Syrian pipelines and into one of Syria’s major refineries, cut all oil transfers into Syria.60 Economic

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growth peaked in 1975; by 1976 industrial production was in decline, inflation was up to 30% and the Syrian trade deficit began to grow.61 These domestic conditions grew worse after Asad made the decision to intervene in the Lebanese civil war to prevent Palestinian provocation of Israel. Though Asad continued to be a strong supporter of Palestinian rights, he had long viewed Palestinian actions against Israel to be counterproductive and destabilizing. The actions of several Palestinian groups had almost led to the fall of the Hussein regime in Jordan, and Palestinian resistance groups had caused Israeli retaliation against Syria on many occasions. After the conflict in Jordan and continued efforts by Syria to limit Palestinian actions, several Palestinian resistance groups, including the PLO and its leader Yasser Arafat, fled to Lebanon. In Lebanon, the Palestinians began to clash with various Lebanese groups and threatened to overthrow the government which, at the time, was headed by a Lebanese Christian.62 As tensions escalated, Asad decided that he would have to do something to restrain the Palestinians for fear that Israel would use continued Palestinian victories in Lebanon as a reason to intervene in the conflict itself or, even worse, that the Lebanese government would invite Israel in to the country. Asad decided that he needed to intervene against the Palestinians in order “to teach the Palestinians sense and the keep the Christians Arab.”63 Asad was quite aware that intervening in Lebanon, even against the Palestinians, would be viewed negatively by Israel. In order to inform Israel of his intentions, Asad approached the United States about his planned intervention. The United States was quite concerned about the deteriorating situation in Lebanon and welcomed the Syrian plan. In accordance, the United States convinced the Israelis that a Syrian intervention in Lebanon would be a positive move, both to stabilize the country and, seemingly, to pit an Arab state against the Palestinians. Reluctantly, Israel agreed not to oppose the move under certain conditions that became known as the “Red Line Agreement.”64 The most important part of the agreement was that Syria would not move beyond a certain line in southern Lebanon. With Israel and the United States’ approval and an invitation from Lebanon’s Christian president, also negotiated by the United States, Syria moved its forces into Lebanon in May 1976.65 The image of one Arab country intervening in another in order to suppress Palestinian resistance damaged Syria’s relationship with other Arab states who were quick to criticize the move.66 Despite this opposition, however, the other Arab states did eventually endorse a Syrian presence in Lebanon as a “peacekeeping” force under a peace plan for Lebanon put forth by Saudi

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Arabia.67 Asad also took steps to achieve a rapprochement with Arafat and the various Lebanese Muslim groups after Syrian forces defeated the most radical Palestinian and Muslim elements.68 Nonetheless, this move sparked domestic opposition as many in Syria were opposed to Asad’s decision to intervene against the Palestinians. The Lebanese policy failed in other respects as well. By 1977 and 1978, the Christian forces on whose behalf Asad had intervened had begun to oppose the Syrian presence. Israel began to offer more and more support to those forces. In turn, the Christian forces actively worked to provoke Syria into moving against them, hoping to entice Israel into intervening more formally.69 Israel also undertook a largescale military operation in Southern Lebanon in 1978 in order to punish the PLO for attacks against Israel.70 Asad’s goal had been to prevent Israeli intervention in Syria, yet in the end Israel still intervened in and occupied significant portions of Lebanon. Syria’s efforts to prevent a separate peace between Egypt and Israel also failed. Asad, after meeting Carter in May 1977, was fairly confident about the possibilities of working with Carter and the Americans.71 He continued to express a willingness to consider peace with Israel, though he did not see peace as necessitating full economic and cultural relations; a simple agreement that ended the state of war was sufficient for Asad. Nonetheless, Asad seemed willing to contemplate joining the Geneva process.72 The biggest obstacle for Syria was Israel’s demand that neither Syria nor the PLO participate in negotiations regarding the West Bank; Asad did not believe the participation of Jordan and Egypt alone was sufficient.73 Asad favored a unified Arab delegation which would include representatives from Egypt, Jordan, Syria and the PLO. Such a design would also prevent Sadat from making a separate agreement with Israel.74 Sadat’s surprise visit to Jerusalem in November 1977 ended all hope that Asad had of preventing a separate peace between Egypt and Israel. In response to the move, Asad called Sadat a traitor and declared a national day of mourning.75 After Camp David, Asad’s policy focused even more on maintaining unity with the other Arab states. The oil rich states offered Syria and Egypt billions of dollars in aid not to make peace with Israel; Syria accepted while Egypt went on to negotiate its formal peace treaty with Israel.76 After the peace treaty between Egypt and Syria was signed and ratified, Asad realized that forceful recapture of lost territory was not possible. He believed that any future peace with Israel would be achieved through a mixture of deterrence and, in time,

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negotiation. In 1979, he broke off negotiations with Israel and began a massive military buildup.77 As a result of Asad’s intervention in Lebanon, the decline in economic growth, and Egypt’s separate peace with Israel, internal opposition to Asad increased. Not only did the regime have to deal with unemployed oil and cotton workers, but state workers were also beginning to feel the effects of the troubled economy. Many of their wages were not keeping pace with the high inflation.78 Economic difficulties were compounded in the late 1970s as aid from the Arab states that was promised after Egypt signed the Camp David Accords failed to meet expectations. The lack of aid forced Syria to pay much of the cost of its military build up by itself.79 Support for Nasserist and Communist parties, alternatives to the Ba’th rose throughout the late 1970s, even leading to the loss of some trade union and professional association elections by the Ba’th party.80 The Asad regime’s answer to the protests and the growing opposition was again a mixture of repression and accommodation.81 As a sign of accommodation, Asad had earlier created the National Progressive Front to provide a forum for opposition groups to interact with the ruling Ba’th, in essence robbing opposition of the independent need to organize.82 Asad also led a crackdown on corruption in 1977 in an effort to answer public criticism.83 To counter the economic difficulties, Asad instituted widespread fuel and food subsidies and began to use public enterprises to invest in regions that were hit particularly hard by unemployment in order to improve job opportunities.84 Policies of accommodation alone were not sufficient, however. Asad grew increasingly autocratic after 1976.85 He used the military to crack down heavily on those participating in violent demonstrations and strikes, including a special force of the army commanded by his brother designed to counter internal opposition.86 He was unable to completely defeat the opposition, but neither was the opposition able to mount a successful campaign against him.87 In external relations, Syria was now isolated in its battle with Israel, which began to take an even more confrontational stance toward Syria, including extending Israeli laws to the Golan Heights in 1981 and undertaking a full-scale invasion of Lebanon in 1982.88

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Conclusion: Syria

Before 1967, Syria’s policy toward Israel was predicated on the rejection of Israel’s right to exist. Syria called for the “liberation of Palestine,” by which it meant the overthrow of the Israeli state. The two states had numerous disputes, including Israeli cultivation of land in the demilitarized zone, competing water diversion projects, and Syrian support for Palestinian militants. These disputes led to frequent exchanges of fire and, eventually, helped lead to the Six Day War. After the Six Day War, Syria’s policy did not initially change from its pre-war basis. Syria still publicly called for the destruction of Israel, and it denounced Arab states that were not willing to immediately join in the fight. This rhetoric only changed after Asad seized power from Jadid in 1970. Asad accepted the principle of negotiation with Israel, and accepted resolution 242. He also reached out to other Arab states, including the conservative monarchies, and began to restrain Palestinian militants. For Asad, peace with Israel did require a full return of all occupied territories – including the West Bank and Gaza – but the fact that he accepted the principle of Israel’s right to exist was a significant break with Syria’s past policy. The change under Asad is best explained by Syria’s failure in the 1967 war coupled with the ongoing domestic difficulties facing the neoBa’thist regime. The domestic difficulties were caused by the neoBa’thist regime’s attempt to impose a leftist, secular regime that was opposed to the interest of upper class urban and rural elites, merchants, and religious groups. By the spring of 1967, a collection of these groups took to the streets to protest the new regime.89 Asad was able to rally support for his more moderate foreign policy and his desire to have a broad-based domestic coalition. Asad believed that a more pragmatic approach toward Israel would prevent unnecessary military clashes and improve the likelihood of the return of the Golan Heights. At the same time, the expansion of his domestic coalition to include small businessmen and merchants, industrialist, labor, peasants and an expanding public sector, greatly insulated him from domestic opposition. This causal chain – the twin failure of domestic and foreign policy followed by a change in leadership and the public basis of support – is consistent with hypothesis one. As it became clear in the latter half of the 1970s that Syria and Israel had still not found bargaining space, Asad realized that peace at that time was not possible. In response, he began building his military capacity in an attempt to reach strategic parity with Israel. He did not revert to Syria’s old policy of supporting widespread militant attacks on

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Israel, at least not from Syrian soil, but neither did he actively seek peace with Israel. Consistent with hypothesis five, the failure to find peace with Israel did lead to an adjustment process within Syria toward a more hawkish policy. The question remains of why Syria could not find peace with Israel. Like Egypt, Syria suffered from both foreign and domestic policy failure. And like Egypt, Syria significantly adjusted its foreign policy. To explain the absence of bargaining space between Syria and Israel, I now turn to a discussion of Israeli policy toward Syria. Section Two: Israel

Israeli foreign policy toward Syria from 1967-1980 contains little of the nuance of Israeli policy toward Egypt during the same time period. Before the Six Day War, Israel considered Syria to be its most radical foe, though it did consider Egypt to be a greater military threat. Most interactions between Syria and Israel took one of two forms. Either Israel initiated a Syrian response by using armored farm equipment in the demilitarized zone between the two states, followed by a skirmish with Syrian forces, or Israel carried out reprisal attacks against Syria in response to actions taken by Palestinian militants within Israel. After the Six Day War, Israel continued to believe that Syria was a radical foe with whom peace was not possible. In late June, the Israeli cabinet decided that it would not return the full Golan Heights, even in return for peace. The cabinet decided that it needed to retain strategic positions on the Golan to protect against future Syrian attack. As any return of land was predicated on a full peace agreement anyway, the amount of land Israel was willing to return in June 1967 was a moot point as Syria was still advocating a policy that rejected Israel’s right to exist.90 Israel’s policy toward Syria remained constant until the October War. During the Jordanian/Palestinian crisis of 1970, Israel was prepared to intervene against Syrian forces if they threatened the rule of Jordan’s King Hussein.91 Even after Asad deposed Jadid, Israel did not believe that the actual outlook of Syria had greatly evolved. Asad may have been more cautious than Jadid, but he was not a symbol of a radically changed relationship between Syria and Israel. The October War did bring some change in Israel’s policy toward Syria. After signing an initial disengagement agreement with Egypt in January 1974, Israel began negotiating with Syria through the United States, though it was not as optimistic about prospects for peace with

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Syria as it had been with Egypt. Initially, Israel remained adamant that it would not return any land beyond what it had captured in the October War. In fact, Israel’s original offer would have maintained an Israeli presence beyond the ceasefire line that existed before the October War. Asad was equally adamant that any agreement he signed with Israel must include the return of some lands captured in the Six Day War. The two sides finally reached agreement by the end of May 1974.92 In the agreement Israel agreed to hand over some of the land occupied in the Six Day War, including the city of Qunaytra, both sides agreed to some limitations of forces within a portion of the area under their control, and the United Nations placed an observation force between the two sides to observe the truce.93 The interim agreement with Syria was the last official agreement between the two sides regarding the status of lands occupied in the Six Day War. Israel did not believe that Asad was serious about peace. Even if they had taken him seriously, Israel would never have agreed to Asad’s position that Israel should first withdraw from the Golan Heights, and then Syria would sign a peace agreement. Shortly after becoming Prime Minister in 1974, Yitzhak Rabin declared that no further interim agreement with Syria was possible, and that even with peace, he would not support a full withdrawal to the June 4, 1967 lines. Rabin still considered Syria to be Israel’s most radical foe and would only allow cosmetic changes to the existing lines between the two sides.94 Though not the official government position, Ma’oz’s conclusions on Asad’s foreign policies in 1975 are reflective of Israel’s overall opinion of Syria: [If] Israel were to give up the Golan, Syria would not agree to a peace agreement and would continue to fight alongside the Palestinian people. Syria has demonstrated that it is willing to suffer heavy losses in the confrontation with Israel as seen by the 1973 war and the continued fighting after the ceasefire.95

Israel fundamentally saw Syria as wanting to continue the struggle against Israel and that Syria would see any return of land diplomatically as a prelude to its final goal of destroying Israel.96 This view of Syria continued under the Begin administration. Despite serious efforts by the United States to restart the Geneva process and Syria’s inclusion in it, it is highly unlikely that an agreement at Geneva could have been reached. All of the parties – including Israel – did eventually agree in principle to the Syrian demand that the Arab

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states would be represented by a single delegation, but the makeup of that delegation was never settled. The two sides were probably still too far apart to reach agreement, however. While Israel was willing to return a portion of the Golan, it was not prepared to offer full withdrawal.97 Dayan made his view on peace with Syria clear during private negotiations with the US over the content of the Geneva Conference. He pushed the US to support a separate peace with Egypt, arguing that peace with Egypt would make war in the Middle East impossible.98 After Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem, Israel no longer seriously contemplated peace with Syria. In fact, Begin was growing increasingly frustrated with the presence of Syrian troops in Lebanon, a presence that had been approved by the Rabin administration. Syria, by not leaving Lebanon once the civil war had been calmed, invited the ire of the Christian groups on whose behalf it had originally intervened. Under Begin, these groups received increasing amounts of support from Israel. Though not directly related to Syria’s presence, Israel did decide to intervene militarily in Lebanon in 1978, largely in response to the Palestinian attacks that were being launched from Southern Lebanon. Once the peace treaty with Egypt had been signed and Dayan and Weizman had resigned from the cabinet, Begin felt more freedom in dealing with the Syrian presence in Lebanon.99 He also made it clear that he had no intentions of returning the Golan; in 1981, Begin extended Israeli law over the Golan, a prelude to formal annexation. The following year, Begin authorized a full scale invasion of Lebanon which led to a two-decade Israeli occupation in southern Lebanon. This conflict led to heavy military engagements between Syrian and Israeli troops at times, but never led to a full-scale war. Conclusion: Israel

Israel’s views toward Syria changed only slightly between 1967 and 1980. The only significant movement between Israel and Syria was the May 1974 disengagement agreement, though that agreement did not lead to any further progress in the 1970s. As this case is paired with the Israeli / Egyptian rivalry, one would expect Israel to make concessions to Syria similar to those it made to Egypt. That it did not do so does undermine the central hypotheses of this book in spite of the fact that the argument is probabilistic. Israel’s behavior suggests three explanations consistent with the book’s central argument. First, Israel did not consider rivalries in isolation. Its rivalries with Egypt and Syria were intimately connected; Israel’s primary concern

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was maintaining security. Before 1973, it believed the best way to maintain security was through retention of all the lands occupied in the 1967 war until the Arab states were willing to enter into formal peace agreements. After the 1973 war, support for a peace process within Israel grew, to the point that Begin endorsed pursuit of a peace process with Arab states during the 1977 Israeli campaign. The perception of failure in 1973 coupled with the economic difficulties in Israel after 1973 did prompt a change in Israeli policy; Israel’s new policy was predicated on the idea that peace with Egypt would eliminate the potential for war. As noted above, Dayan made this point clear to the United States in private negotiations related to the Geneva process. Peace with Egypt satisfied Israel’s need for policy change. Second, the evidence does indicate that Israel may have been willing to negotiate with Syria if it had been able to make progress similar to that made with Egypt. Israel did not seem willing to return all of the Golan, but had Syria been more forthcoming, Israel may very well have entered into more serious negotiations. In the 1977 negotiations surrounding the Geneva process, Israel did suggest that it could make some concessions on the Syrian front. Israel did not, however, see sufficient bargaining space in Syria’s position to press forward with any diligence. Syria’s stated positions included: 1) that any settlement should be comprehensive, including the West Bank and Gaza; 2) that Israel should first withdraw from the territories, then Syria would sign a peace treaty (consistent with Syria’s interpretation of Resolutions 242 and 338); and 3) that peace did not require a normal relationship. Compared to Syria, Egypt was a more appealing negotiating partner both because of its perceived flexibility and greater strategic significance. Finally, the October War was not as significant a failure on the Syrian front as it had been on the Egyptian front. Israel was able to recover the territory it initially lost in the October War much more rapidly on the Syrian front. After the war, Syria did not occupy any territory it had lost in 1967. In contrast, defeat of Egypt took more time. In spite of Israel’s gains, especially its crossing of the Suez Canal and landing in Egypt, Egypt had managed to maintain a foothold in the Sinai Peninsula. In Chapter Two, I argue that the degree of failure impacts the degree of change. For Israel, Egypt represented both a bigger threat and, after the October War, a bigger failure. Even with these explanations, this case does present a challenge to my central argument. I now turn to a comparison of the primary and alternative hypotheses, as well as a discussion of the Egyptian case.

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Section Three: Interaction Between Syria and Israel: Comparing the Primary and Alternative Hypotheses

Neither the primary nor the alternative hypotheses provide a perfect prediction of the evolution of Syria and Israel’s rivalry from 1967-1980. The primary hypotheses, however, do a much better job of explaining foreign policy changes, the timing of the changes, and the process through which they occurred than the alternative hypotheses. In the isolation of the Syrian case, the alternative hypotheses provide some explanatory power, but when considered in relationship to the Egyptian case, their ability to explain events diminishes significantly. As discussed above, hypothesis one, that combined domestic and foreign policy failure in A will lead to a change in A’s foreign policy goals allowing for more bargaining space with B, holds up well in the Syrian case. Syria’s policy initially remained constant after the failure of the Six Day War. Beneath the surface, however, Asad and Jadid were competing for power. Asad was motivated both by the failure of 1967 and ongoing domestic difficulties. Upon coming to power, he significantly changed his ruling coalition and, in turn, adopted a more moderate foreign policy. Similarly, consistent with hypothesis five, as the peace efforts after the October War continued to stall, Asad grew increasingly less optimistic about their prospects. The primary hypotheses correctly predict that change in Syria would only occur after a change in government brought on by combined foreign and domestic policy failure. For peace to have occurred between Syria and Israel, Israel would have had to significantly alter its foreign policy as well. In Israel’s eyes, however, Syria’s position had only moved from one in which no compromise was possible to one in which no compromise was likely. While Israel believed that Asad was more moderate than Jadid, they still believed that he was far more willing to use force than Egypt.100 Israel was more willing to negotiate after the October War and as its economy began to slow, but it chose to focus those negotiations on Egypt rather than Syria out of a belief that success was more likely with Egypt. The alternative hypotheses would seem to offer an explanation of why Israel and Syria did not find peace. If we take the null version of alternative hypothesis one, that in the absence of a common enemy, two states will not settle their rivalry, we have a compelling reason why Syria and Israel did not find peace: they had no incentive to do so. Digging a little deeper, however, this hypothesis does not explain the clear change in Syrian behavior under Asad. The hypothesis would predict that Syria should settle with potential Arab allies to aid in the

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battle against Israel, as Syria did under Asad, but as the hypothesis is based on structural realism, those changes should have occurred under Jadid as well. A structural realist could claim that some “lag” occurred, but such a claim would compel an explanation of when to expect a lag in events. Structural realism does not give us such an explanation. My argument offers a better explanation for the timing of events: the combined failures of foreign and domestic policy initiated a power struggle that was only settled once Asad defeated Jadid. Alternative hypothesis two is even less compelling. The logic of this hypothesis is that a state faced with few potential external allies and a decline in relative power should bandwagon with its former enemy. Based on this logic, Walt argues that Egypt chose to bandwagon with the United States because of the lack of support it could received from the Soviet Union and other Arab states to help stem its domestic slide.101 Given this logic, Syria should have made a similar decision in the late 1970s, particularly after the only state that had allied with it in every war against Israel, Egypt, essentially dropped out of the battle. Much like Egypt, Syria’s economy took a turn for the worse in the late 1970s, including massive demonstrations against Asad’s regime. Syria also lost several allies; in addition to the disappearance of Egypt as an ally, the relationship between Iraq and Syria greatly deteriorated in the late 1970s and the Soviet Union was a reluctant ally at best.102 As noted in the previous chapter, balance of power logic may better explain Israel’s behavior. After 1973, Israel realized that it was not impervious to attack by the Arab states. It made the strategic decision to remove Egypt from the battlefield, thereby isolating Syria and removing the threat of war in the future. The major problem with this argument is that states should not make peace with other states that represent objective threats to their interest. Had Israel and Egypt formed a formal alliance against Syria, this explanation would make sense. The explanation does not, however, explain the presence of a peace treaty without a related alliance. In addition, Israel should have sought to balance against the greatest power that confronted it, in this case Egypt, not Syria. Israel’s decision to negotiate with Egypt must have been driven by more than a simple balance of power logic.103 Adjudicating between the alternative and primary hypotheses in this case is a matter of determining which, on balance, does a better job of explaining state behavior. Table 4.1 compares the predictive power of the various hypotheses. As the alternative hypotheses fail to predict the timing and substance of Syria’s changes under Asad, they have little explanatory power. The hypothesis that provides the most explanatory

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power is hypothesis one: it correctly predicts that Syrian foreign policy change would occur after the Six Day War and that a major shift in the ruling coalition would accompany the change. In the isolation of this case, hypothesis four fails in that Israel’s position toward Syria did not dramatically change in the wake of the October War. If, however, I consider Israel’s behavior as a whole in the wake of 1973, it did make significant changes in its overall foreign policy, just not in its foreign policy toward Syria. Rather than leading to a complete dismissal of my argument, it does suggest future research should consider how much foreign policy change will satisfy the need for change in the wake of foreign and domestic policy failure. Table 4.1. Summary of Hypotheses Hypothesis

Syria

Israel

H1: Combined domestic and foreign policy failure in A will lead to a change in A’s foreign policy goals…

Yes

N/A

H2: A state that is involved in multiple rivalries or has an … active foreign policy is more likely to experience foreign policy failure…

N/A

Yes

H3: B will respond to A’s revised policy goals if they fall within B’s range of acceptable agreements.

N/A

N/A

H4: Combined domestic and foreign policy failure in B will lead to a change in B’s foreign policy goals…

N/A

No

Syria and Israel: Obstacles to Peace

H5: The prospects for rivalry termination decrease as the length of time from A’s change in policy increases

Yes

N/A

AH1: A rivalry will terminate when two states party to a rivalry ally to counter a third, more powerful state.

Partially

Partially

AH2: When one party to a rivalry suffers severe relative decline in respect to its rival and cannot obtain external allies, the rivalry will terminate.

No

No

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Conclusion

Syria and Israel never found sufficient bargaining space to reach a peace agreement. Looking at their positions after the October War, it was clear that a much larger gulf existed between these two states than the one separating Egypt and Israel. Syria’s position did accept recognition of Israel, but in return demanded full Israeli withdrawal from all territories occupied in the Six Day War, including the West Bank and Gaza. In addition, Syria’s view was that enforcement of the Security Council resolutions passed in the wake of the Six Day War and the October War required first that Israel withdraw, and second that the states sign a peace treaty. Israel did not believe that this position was sufficiently close to its own demands to warrant negotiation. It differed significantly from Egypt’s position, which focused on return of the Sinai and left open the prospect of a separate peace agreement. Faced with the option of two negotiating partners, Israel chose to find peace with Egypt, believing that a much narrower gap separated the two. 1 Though I do not include discussion of hypothesis two as Syria was not engaged in multiple rivalries at the time of the Six Day War. 2 Ma’oz, Syria and Israel, p. 82. Ma‘oz argues that, “The major cause for the Syrian-Israeli escalation into war was the diversion of the Jordan River, which Israel was determined to pursue and Syria to arrest,” (p. 79).

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3

Ibid., pp. 87-88. Ibid., p. 89. 5 Ma’oz, Syria and Israel, p. 93. 6 See Olson, The Ba’th and Syria, p. 111. See the previous chapter for additional information on the events that led to the Six Day War. 7 Al-Akhrass, Revolutionary Change and Modernization in the Arab World, pp. 174-175. Though Asad and Jadid had de facto control of the government, they did appoint a series of figureheads as the public head of the government. 8 Petran, Syria, pp. 182-183. 9 Hinnebusch, Peasant and Bureaucracy in Ba’thist Syria, pp. 22-25; Lawson, Why Syria Goes to War, pp. 22-24. 10 Lawson, Why Syria Goes to War, p. 49, Al-Akhrass, Revolutionary Change and Modernization in the Arab World, p. 190. 11 Olson, The Ba’th and Syria, p. 108. 12 Bar-Siman-Tov, Linkage Politics in the Middle East, p. 149; Ma’oz, Asad: The Sphinx of Damascus, p. 35. 13 Al-Akhrass, Revolutionary Change and Modernization in the Arab World, p. 180-185. 14 Bar-Siman-Tov, Linkage Politics in the Middle East, p. 148. 15 Petran, Syria, p. 203; Olson, The Ba’th and Syria, pp. 108, 115. 16 Bar-Siman-Tov, Linkage Politics in the Middle East, p. 162; Ma’oz, Asad: The Sphinx of Damascus, p. 36; Drysdale and Hinnebusch, Syria and the Middle East Peace Process, 22. 17 Bar-Siman-Tov, Linkage Politics in the Middle East, p. 162; Seale, Asad: Struggle for the Middle East, p. 145. 18 Bar-Siman-Tov, Linkage Politics in the Middle East, pp. 161-162. 19 One of the results of Syria’s refusal to attend the Khartoum summit was that it missed out on the massive economic aid that the oil rich regimes promised to Egypt and Jordan. Though Syria did receive a small amount of money from Kuwait, it did not receive the level of funds that the other frontline Arab states did until after the 1973 October War (Seale, Asad: Struggle for the Middle East, p. 144; Talhami, Syria and the Palestinians, p. 90). 20 Rabil, Embattled Neighbors, p. 21; Talhami, Syria and the Palestinians, p. 78. 21 Talhami, Syria and the Palestinians, p. 91. 22 Ma’oz, Syria and Israel, p. 117. 23 Seale, Asad: Struggle for the Middle East, p. 155. Interestingly, before this occurred, Asad had begun to speak publicly about the need to further cooperation with the Arab world. In one speech before the Ba’th congress in March 1969, he stated that, “I have repeatedly stressed the importance of Arab military coordination – notable among the Arab states which border with Israel – regardless of the differences and the contradictions in their political positions… the defensive capability of the Syrian front is closely tied with the capability of other Arab fronts…” (cited in Maoz, Asad: The Sphinx of Damascus, p. 38). This statement came only a few months prior to Syria’s reaffirmation of its rejection of 242. 24 Ma’oz, Asad: The Sphinx of Damascus, pp. 36-37; Seale, Asad: Struggle for the Middle East, pp. 149-151; Rabil, Embattled Neighbors, p. 21. Asad 4

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seized the outlets the day after two Israeli planes had attacked Palestinian guerilla camps within Syria. 25 Bar-Siman-Tov, Linkage Politics in the Middle East, pp. 163-164. 26 Seale, Asad: Struggle for the Middle East, p. 151. 27 Lawson, Why Syria Goes to War, pp. 57, 59; Seale, Asad: Struggle for the Middle East, p. 153. 28 Seale, Asad: Struggle for the Middle East, pp. 158-159. Seale argues that traditional accounts of this decision are not accurate. Some argue that Asad used this crisis to embarrass Jadid by denying air support to the Syrian armor that he had sent to Jordan (see, for example, Ma’oz, The Sphinx of Damascus, p. 39). Realistically, however, Asad had such a tight grip on the military by this point that the armor could not have been sent in without his approval. In an interview with Seale, Asad says that he did not offer air support only because he did not want to escalate the crisis and endanger King Hussein of Jordan, though he did want to protect the Palestinians from annihilation. 29 Seale, Asad: Struggle for the Middle East, pp. 163-164. 30 Ibid., pp. 170-171; Ma’oz, Syria under Hafiz al-Asad, p. 10. 31 Yorke, Domestic Politics and Regional Security, pp. 111-112. 32 Lawson, Why Syria Goes to War, pp. 77-78; Longuenesse, “The Class Nature of the State in Syria,” pp. 7-8. 33 See Longuenesse, “The Class Nature of the State in Syria,” pp. 5-7 on the growth of the public sector. The growth of the public sector in some ways became a welfare program. Many of those employed in the Syrian bureaucracy did little actual work; they did provide, however, a valuable source of support for the government. 34 Olson, The Ba’th and Syria, p. 127; Ma’oz, Asad: The Sphinx of Damascus, p. 75. 35 Seale, Asad: Struggle for the Middle East, p. 186; Drysdale and Hinnebusch, Syria and the Middle East Peace Process, p. 63; Hinnebusch, Syria: Revolution from Above, p. 65; Talhami, Syria and the Palestinians, p. 90. 36 Seale, Asad: Struggle for the Middle East pp. 186-188. Sadat announced the decision to expel the Soviet advisors from Egypt while Asad was in Moscow. In response to Sadat’s actions, the Soviet Union increased arms sales to both Egypt and Syria, though Egypt continued to receive more advanced equipment before Syria did in spite of the fact that Syria had not done anything to undermine its relationship with the Soviet Union (Seale, Asad: Struggle for the Middle East, 192-3 and Heikal, The Sphinx and the Commissar, p. 253). 37 Drysdale and Hinnebusch, Syria and the Middle East Peace Process, p. 103. The first demand implied destruction of Israel, while the second indicated some willingness to accept Israel’s existence. 38 Ma’oz, Syria and Israel, p. 123. 39 Seale, Asad: Struggle for the Middle East, p. 185. See also Kessler, Syria: Fragile Mosaic of Power, p. 66. Kessler argues that Syria, though deeply upset by the losses in 1967, considered them to be caused in part by Israel’s violation of the ceasefire. Syria considered itself to already be preparing for the ceasefire when Israel attacked and captured the Golan Heights. 40 Ma’oz, Syria and Israel, p. 120; Ma’oz, Syria under Hafiz al-Asad, p. 15; Drysdale and Hinnebusch, Syria and the Middle East Peace Process, pp. 105106; McLaurin, et. al., Foreign Policy Making in the Middle East, p. 253.

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41

Seale, Asad: Struggle for the Middle East, pp. 196-197. Ibid., p. 197. 43 Though Asad was not aware that Egypt had far more limited aims than Syria in the war. 44 Seale, Asad: Struggle for the Middle East, p. 211. 45 Quandt, Peace Process, p. 140. 46 Seale, Asad: Struggle for the Middle East, p. 239. 47 Though before returning the city, Israel expelled many of the inhabitants and destroyed much of the city (Talhami, Syria and the Palestinians, p. 104). 48 Drysdale and Hinnebusch, Syria and the Middle East Peace Process, pp. 110-111. 49 Ibid., pp. 109-110; Ma’oz, Syria and Israel, pp. 132-133; McLaurin, et. al., Foreign Policy Making in the Middle East, p. 254. 50 Seale, Asad: Struggle for the Middle East, p. 257. 51 Ibid., pp. 250, 256; Drysdale and Hinnebusch, Syria and the Middle East Peace Process, pp. 110-111. 52 Seale, Asad: Struggle for the Middle East, p. 256. Early on, Nasser had taken a similar view of peace with Israel – it could occur if Israel made a prior commitment to withdraw from Arab territory (McLaurin, et. al., Foreign Policy Making in the Middle East, p. 59). Some do not believe that Asad was serious about peace at this point and point out that much of his language indicated that he still believed in the complete destruction of Israel. Ma’oz, for example, argues that any peace that Asad would have agreed to in 1974 or 1975 would merely have been a tactical move to encircle Israel and to put a PLO regime in place in the West Bank (Ma’oz, Syria under Hafiz al-Asad, pp. 16-7; Ma’oz, Syria and Israel, pp. 143-144, 146). 53 Seale, The Struggle for Syria, pp. xvii-xviii. 54 Ma’oz, Syria under Hafiz al-Asad, p. 26. 55 Lawson, Why Syria Goes to War, pp. 79-81. 56 Drysdale, “The Asad Regime and Its Troubles,” p. 5. 57 Yorke, Domestic Politics and Regional Security, p. 113. 58 See Ibid., p. 117. 59 Lawson, Why Syria Goes to War, pp. 82-84. 60 Drysdale, “The Asad Regime and Its Troubles,” pp. 5-6; Lawson, Why Syria Goes to War, pp. 85, 88. 61 Drysdale, “The Asad Regime and Its Troubles,” p. 5; Lawson, Why Syria Goes to War, pp. 86-87. 62 See Friedman, From Beirut to Jerusalem, on the internal situation in Lebanon. 63 Quoted in Seale, Asad: Struggle for the Middle East, pp. 282-183; See also Rabil, Embattled Neighbors, p. 51. Asad also feared that a PLO dominated government in Lebanon would be closer to Iraq than to Syria in addition to sparking an Israeli intervention. His hope in intervening was to keep the Lebanese government weak, but under Syrian influence (Ma’oz, Syria and Israel pp. 164-165). 64 See Ma’oz, Syria and Israel, pp. 166-167 and Rabil, Embattled Neighbors, p. 52. 65 Rabil, Embattled Neighbors, pp. 52-53, 42

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66 The intervention also led a great deal of internal opposition (Kessler, Syria: Fragile Mosaic of Power, pp. 35-36). 67 Rabil, Embattled Neighbors, p. 54. 68 Ma’oz, Syria and Israel, p. 166. 69 Ibid., pp. 168-169; Rabil, Embattled Neighbors, pp. 61-62. 70 Rabil, Embattled Neighbors, p. 59. 71 Seale, Asad: Struggle for the Middle East, p. 297. 72 Ma’oz, Syria and Israel, pp. 150-151. 73 Drysdale and Hinnebusch, Syria and the Middle East Peace Process, p. 116. 74 Quandt, Peace Process, p. 185. In an interview with Seale, Talcott Seelye, one time US ambassador to Syria, expressed the view that even if Syria had been more forthcoming in its negotiating stance, it probably would not have received an acceptable deal from Israel (Seale, Asad: Struggle for the Middle East, p. 302). 75 Ma’oz, Syria and Israel, pp. 146-147. 76 Ibid., p. 153. 77 Drysdale and Hinnebusch, Syria and the Middle East Peace Process, pp. 117-118. 78 Drysdale, “The Asad Regime and Its Troubles,” p. 6. 79 Drysdale, “The Asad Regime and Its Troubles,” p. 7. 80 Yorke, Domestic Politics and Regional Security, pp. 114-115, Quilliam, Syria and the New World Order, pp. 96-97. 81 Kessler, Syria: Fragile Mosaic of Power, p. 38; Hinnebusch, Peasant and Bureaucracy in Ba’thist Syria, p. 29. 82 Quilliam, Syria and the New World Order, p. 75. 83 Ibid., p. 83. 84 Drysdale, “The Asad Regime and Its Troubles,” 6; Lawson, Why Syria Goes to War, p. 92. 85 Kessler, Syria: Fragile Mosaic of Power, p. 36. 86 Lawson, Why Syria Goes to War, pp. 90-91; Olson, The Ba’th and Syria, p. 125; Drysdale, “The Asad Regime and Its Troubles,” 8. Though outside of the years of concern in this book, one confrontation in Hammah led to the death of 10,000 or more civilians. 87 Quilliam, Syria and the New World Order, pp. 81-82; Hinnebusch, Peasant and Bureaucracy in Ba’thist Syria, p. 29. 88 Rabil, Embattled Neighbors, p. 37; Ma’oz, Syria and Israel, pp. 171-173. More on this decision will be discussed in the next section. 89 Hinnebusch, Syria: Revolution from Above, pp. 53-54. 90 Korn, Stalemate, pp. 13-14, 30. 91 See Quandt, Peace Process, 80-4. 92 Ibid. 144-54. 93 Separation of Forces Between Israel and Syria, May 31, 1974. Available online from http://www.israel-mfa.gov.il/mfa/. 94 Ma’oz, Syria and Israel, pp. 140-141. This statement came before the interim agreement in May 1974, but did indicate Rabin’s position that the Golan would not be returned in full. 95 Ma’oz, Syria under Hafiz al-Asad, 13.

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96 Ma’oz, Syria under Hafiz al-Asad, pp. 12-13, 15-17; Ma’oz, Syria and Israel, p. 144. 97 Dayan, Breakthrough, pp. 19-20. 98 Quandt, Peace Process, p. 190. 99 Ma’oz, Syria and Israel, p. 170. 100 See Ma’oz, Syria and Israel, pp. 120-122; Ma’oz, Syria under Hafiz alAsad, pp. 12-13. 101 Walt, The Origen of Alliances, pp. 174, 177-178. 102 See Seale, Asad: Struggle for the Middle East, pp. 310-311 on Syria’s virtual international isolation after Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem. 103 In his memoir, Ezer Weizman notes the mixed emotions he felt as he prepared to meet Sadat in Egypt in December 1977. He notes that Egypt was Israel’s largest and most dangerous enemy, indicating that at the time of negotiations with Egypt, Israel still recognized that Egypt was a relatively larger threat than Syria (Weizman, The Battle for Peace, p. 17.)

5 Chile and Peru: Steps Toward Peace

In this chapter I trace Chile and Peru’s rivalry over the disputed territories of Tacna and Arica that Chile with particular focus on the time period between 1919 and 1930. Chile seized the provinces of Tacna, Arica, and Tarapacá during the 1879-83 War of the Pacific. While Peru ceded Tarapacá to Chile, the Treaty of Ancón, which officially ended the war, called for a plebiscite to be held ten years after the treaty’s entry into force to settle the future of the territories. That plebiscite was never held. Peru’s policy toward the territories evolved gradually; never was it willing to accept their cession to Chile. When Augusto B. Leguía seized power in Peru in 1919, Peru had come to reject the holding of a plebiscite. Instead, Peru placed its hopes in binding arbitration, preferably by the United States. Chile had historically rejected arbitration over the dispute, claiming that the Treaty of Ancón made it clear that a plebiscite must be held to determine the ultimate fate. In 1919, however, Chile’s international reputation was severely damaged by its tacit support for Germany in World War I, and Chile’s domestic economy was faltering. This combination of factors led to the election of Arturo Allesandri, a member of the Liberal Alliance, over the traditionally dominant political parties. Allesandri agreed to US arbitration. The United States found in favor of Chile by ordering a plebiscite to be held in Tacna and Arica to determine their futures. Only after the plebiscite’s failure did the two sides agree to negotiate a settlement to their dispute. I argue that the primary hypotheses provide a strong explanation for the settlement of this rivalry. The two states went through two rounds of negotiation, the first leading to arbitration, and the second to a final settlement. Both rounds were preceded by a combination of domestic and foreign policy failure in at least one of the two states. In the first round, Chile was the initiating state (State A) as it agreed to the Peruvian demand for arbitration with the United States, breaking with Chile’s past policy. In the second round of negotiations, Peru made the

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more serious break with its past policy. As Leguía initiated negotiations, Peru acted as State A in the later rounds.1 Peruvian policy is best explained by examining the behavior of Leguía. He came to power in Peru during a time of domestic turmoil, pledging to settle Peru’s territorial disputes, marking him as a relative dove compared to most of the preceding leaders of Peru.2 The domestic crisis that brought Leguía to power did not, however, give him free reign in foreign policy. He supported the traditional Peruvian position requesting arbitration until that arbitration ultimately proved incapable of achieving Peruvian aims. Upon the failure of the arbitration and subsequent plebiscite, Leguía negotiated a secret settlement with Chile, dividing the territories between the two states. Leguía was able to negotiate the agreement because his seizure of power had removed the most powerful opponents to such an agreement from power. The public generally supported him after the agreement was reached; the failure in arbitration had left them little option. In Chile, on the other hand, Allesandri faced dramatic opposition from old-guard politicians for having agreed to arbitration. The stalemate between Allesandri and the Chilean Congress on both domestic and foreign matters led to Allesandri’s ouster in 1924. Though he briefly returned to power in 1925, hard-line Chilean elements effectively undermined the plebiscite for Tacna and Arica, leading the US to accuse Chile of having made a fair plebiscite impossible. As Chile continued to be wracked by domestic turmoil and the embarrassment of the plebiscite’s failure, Colonel Carlos Ibañez del Campo staged a coup that removed the last of the hard-line opponents from power. He negotiated the final agreement over Tacna and Arica. The alternative hypotheses offer some explanation of Chile’s behavior, but cannot adequately explain the nature or the timing of Peru’s decision. Chile was interested in achieving additional influence in South America and to unite the region to resist growing US influence in the region.3 The dispute with Peru, and the blame placed on Chile by the US in wake of the plebiscite’s failure, made it difficult for Chile to take a leadership role in the region. By settling the dispute, Chile could more effectively lay claim to a regional leadership mantle. In contrast, Peru was not interested in balancing the United States. One could argue that Peru bandwagoned with Chile after realizing it had no other option, but that argument does not sufficiently explain why Peru would have waited forty years to do so. Not only that, Peru was more powerful relative to Chile in the 1920s than it had been at the time of the War of the Pacific,

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and the United States had taken its side after the failed plebiscite. The conditions do not match the bandwagoning argument. The first section of the chapter traces the relationship between Peru and Chile from the War of the Pacific until 1919, including a discussion of why earlier efforts to negotiate failed. Section two examines Peru’s foreign and domestic policies during Leguía’s rule: 1919-1930. That section concludes with an evaluation of the explanatory power of the primary hypotheses. The third section examines Chilean foreign and domestic politics from 1919-1930, while the fourth compares the explanatory power of the primary and alternative hypotheses. Section One: The War of the Pacific and its Afermath

The conflict between Peru and Chile centered on the value of nitrates and guano in the Atacama desert in the southern Peruvian territory of Tarapacá and Northern Chile.4 Both of these resources had helped to fuel economic growth in Peru, and much of Peru’s foreign debt was secured by future sales of nitrate and guano. The conflict that would lead to the War of the Pacific began when Chile began encroachments onto Bolivian territory, including the seizure of Bolivia’s only ports, Antofagasta, Cobija and Tocapilla, in 1878. Peru offered to mediate the agreement in accordance with a mutual defense treaty it had concluded with Bolivia in 1873. This treaty had been negotiated in secret, but had been made public in subsequent years. Nonetheless, Chile formally complained about the secret nature of the treaty. In addition, Chile complained that Peru’s handling of the nitrate fields was detrimental to Chilean interests. As a prelude to war, Chile made three demands of Peru: that it “cease all defensive preparations, … abrogate the treaty of 1873, and to declare her neutrality.”5 Peru’s refusal to do so made war inevitable. The Chilean government officially declared war on Peru on April 5, 1879.6 Peru was very poorly prepared for war and was beset by internal difficulties. Almost immediately, Peru lost control of the seas to Chile. Peruvian policy in the early phases of the war was dependent on outside mediation, preferably with the United States serving as the primary mediator. Unfortunately for Peru, the United States followed a strict policy of non-intervention, meaning that it was not willing to offer to serve as a mediator unless all parties agreed in advance.7 Though US policy would evolve during the war, it was often confused, offering little assistance to the sides in achieving peace.8 The Peruvian military was no match for Chile; by January 1881, the Peruvian capital of Lima was

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occupied and Peru’s president had fled to the mountains and later to Europe.9 With Peru’s president in the mountains, Chile attempted to install another regime in Lima with whom it could negotiate. Chile later arrested that president, Francisco García Calderón. Upon his arrest, Admiral Lizardo Montero assumed the functions of the chief executive, though García Calderón remained the titular head of state. Little progress was made in achieving a peace agreement with Chile as García Calderón and Montero opposed signing an agreement that ceded territory to Chile. Peruvian resistance to the occupation continued, but the Peruvian military could not stand up to the Chileans. Eventually, General Miguel Iglesias called for a Congress in northern Peru that elected him president in January 1883. He began to negotiate with Chile despite the existence of others in Peru who also claimed the presidency and the failure of most nations to recognize him as the leader of Peru.10 Chile formally recognized his government in October 1883 and signed the Treaty of Ancón with his representatives two days later. After securing peace, Iglesias entered Lima as president of Peru.11 As evidence that the war was primarily about the nitrate fields in Tarapacá, the second clause of the treaty ceded, “to the Republic of Chile in perpetuity and unconditionally the territory of the littoral province of Tarapacá… .”12 In addition, the majority of the remaining clauses deal with the guano or nitrate industry, including the continued possession of the valuable Guano-producing Lobos Islands until one million tons of guano had been extracted by Chile.13 Other clauses of the treaty also made provisions for Chile to pay a portion of the proceeds of the guano it extracted to Peruvian creditors. By far the most important clause in the treaty was Article 3. This article contains provisions that allowed Chile to retain possession of the provinces of Tacna and Arica for a period of ten years after which a plebiscite was to be held in the provinces. This plebiscite would allow the residents of Tacna and Arica to determine whether or not they wanted to remain a part of Chile or return to Peru. The country that gained possession of the territories as a result of the plebiscite would pay the other the equivalent of ten million Chilean pesos. The final component of this article called for an additional protocol to be negotiated on the specific manner in which the plebiscite would be held. As the treaty was not ratified in Chile until 1884, the plebiscite itself was due to be held in 1894. Shortly after the end of the war, however, Chile began to push to retain permanent control over Tacna and Arica, even offering to pay Peru ten million Chilean pesos in 1888 to retain

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control of the territories.14 Peru refused these overtures and continued to insist that either Tacna and Arica be returned, or that the plebiscite be held. As the date of the protocol approached, Chile and Peru began to engage in serious discussions on how it should be held. These negotiations did lead to some agreement in early 1894, including the principle that both sides should have equal representation in the supervisory board for the plebiscite.15 Events intervened to end this progress as President Morales Bermúdez of Peru died and Chile underwent an internal crisis that led to a new government taking power. This government was less interested in moving forward with the plebiscite and was not sympathetic to giving Peru equal representation in running the plebiscite.16 In 1898, Peru and Chile reopened negotiations. Peruvian Vice President Guillermo Billinghurst negotiated with Chile, coming to agreement on the Billinghurst-LaTorre Protocol in April 1898. This protocol was designed to carry out Article 3 of the Treaty of Ancón by calling for a plebiscite that would be run by a commission composed of a Peruvian, a Chilean, and a neutral party appointed by Spain. The protocol contained a very detailed plan for the implementation of the plebiscite, including a decision by the Spanish crown on who would be allowed to vote.17 The Peruvian Congress and Chilean Senate both approved the pact in short order, but the Chilean House rejected the pact. The intervening event that may have prevented the Chilean House from approving the plebiscite was a settlement that was reached between Chile and Argentina to submit a boundary dispute that had brought them to the brink of war to arbitration. This agreement was reached after the Chilean Senate had ratified the document; one of the reasons Chile had agreed to negotiate was out of fear that Peru could exploit any conflict between Argentina and Chile for its own gain.18 In fact, Peru was in a much stronger economic and military position by 1898 than it had been at the time of the War of the Pacific, giving it more bargaining power than it had held in 1883.19 Peru and Chile would make no more significant progress toward a peace agreement until the attempted arbitration by the United States in the 1920s. In the interim, several other events strained Peruvian-Chilean relations. First, Chile reorganized the administration of Tacna and Arica as one unit: Tacna. At the same time, Chile began a process of “Chileanization” of the territories by building new schools and factories, expelling Peruvian priests, and making it difficult for native Peruvians to attend schools. These actions, coupled with the Chilean House’s official burial of the Billinghurst-LaTorre protocol in March 1901, led Peru to

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break diplomatic relations with Chile.20 Chile made its intensions to retain at least part of the territories clear the next year when it proposed to Peru that Chile would take Arica while Peru would receive Tacna; neither party would receive any money in the agreement. Peru rejected this offer.21 Tensions were further increased by the peace treaty signed between Bolivia and Chile in 1904. The treaty granted portions of Tacna and Arica to Bolivia despite their disputed status with Peru and called for a railroad to be built through La Paz, Bolivia, to the Port of Arica in order to facilitate Bolivian commerce; Peru protested Chile’s actions in ceding territory that Peru still considered to be in dispute.22 Diplomatic relations were restored in 1905, but broken again in 1910 after a renewal of Chilean efforts to expel Peruvian laborers and priests from Tacna and Arica. By this time, Chile had adopted a new position: that Tacna and Arica were not disputed territories and that they belonged to Chile. In this interpretation, the ten year period mentioned in the Treaty of Ancón was only the minimum amount of time that Chile would possess the territories. Chile was also working with Ecuador, another rival of Peru’s, even providing arms to Ecuador, should a conflict with Peru break out.23 In 1912, the new Peruvian president Guillermo E. Billinghurst, attempted to reach an agreement with Chile. He initiated a series of cable exchanges with the Chilean government, resulting in the HuneeusValera protocol. This protocol called for the postponement of the plebiscite until 1933. His negotiations were extremely unpopular in Peru, however, and were rejected by the Peruvian Congress.24 In 1914, a military golpe removed Billinghurst from power, due in part to his negotiations not only with Chile, but also with other Peruvian neighbors.25 A few months after his removal, World War I began. Peru followed a policy of neutrality in the early stages of the war, though it did decide to break diplomatic relations with Germany in 1917, aligning its policies with the United States. During this time period Peruvian commerce greatly expanded, as did trade with the United States, as European goods became more and more scarce. Peruvian relations with Chile did not significantly change during the war years; no real negotiations moved forward. On the eve of Augusto B. Leguía’s seizure of power in July 1919, relations with Chile continued to be tense, including the very real possibility that war could break out.26 Enrique Castro y Oyanguren summarized the feelings of Peru at large in 1919, “From outrage to outrage, from coercion to coercion, Chile has been erasing one by one the clauses of a pact that it dictated to us one day by iron a fire.”27 His

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contention was that the Treaty of Ancón was null and that Chile should be required to return Tacna and Arica to Peru, a position that the Peruvian government would adopt in a subsequent arbitration with Chile. The Chilean opinion of Peru was no less harsh; Juan Ignacio Galvez, also writing in 1919, paints Peru as an aggressor that was the source of conflicts with Chile, Bolivia, Ecuador and Columbia. According to Galvez, Peru was the instigator of wars in the region, not other states.28 Analyzing Relations: 1894-1919

Between the end of the War of the Pacific and 1919, the two states attempted to come to an agreement over Tacna and Arica at least three times. The first effort, 1893-1894, did not require a change in policy for either state; the plebiscite under negotiation was an integral part of the treaty signed by the two parties. Its failure was not really attributable to malice by either side. Peru’s president died before the agreement could be implemented, and Chile plunged into a civil war. Indeed, in its arbitration decision, the United States even noted this fact when it absolved Chile of intentionally refusing to hold the 1894 plebiscite.29 The next effort occurred from 1897-1898. Peru’s policy was a simple continuation of its early demands: that the two sides sponsor a plebiscite to determine the future of the territories. Chile had agreed to negotiate for two reasons. First, it was experiencing difficulties in its relations with Argentina at the time. Second, it was still recovering from the effects of its civil war. This behavior by Chile is actually consistent with both the primary and alternative explanations. It negotiated only after experiencing domestic policy failure and foreign policy setbacks. In addition, it negotiated in part from fear that its multiple rivalries could create problems for it. Consistent with the prediction that the severity of failure would impact the degree to which the opposition to peace is weakened, Chile was on the road to domestic recovery and its foreign policy had not resulted in defeat in war. The opponents of peace were not removed from government entirely, allowing them to vote against the agreement in the Chilean House. The alternative hypotheses on balance of power logic also work well. Consistent with alternative hypothesis two concerning bandwagoning, Chile was fearful that a resurgent Peru would take advantage of dispute between Chile and Argentina by attacking Chile. Negotiating with Peru forestalled this possibility. When the crisis passed, Chile ended its bandwagoning behavior.

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The final attempt to make peace prior to 1919 occurred under Peruvian president Billinghurst in 1913. He was elected largely for his domestic policies, though he did represent a break with the dominant oligarchic power of the time.30 As noted, he initiated negotiations with Chile and made significant concessions. He had exceeded his mandate, however. No clear foreign policy failure had led to his negotiations, and a military coup removed him from power. Not only did these negotiations not succeed, there is no clear example of a massive foreign policy failure coupled with a domestic policy failure that would have prompted either state to negotiate. The closest that either state came to a clear failure in its relationship with the other was the signing of a peace agreement between Chile and Bolivia that included provisions related to lands claimed by Peru. At the time, however, Peru’s economy was sufficiently strong that its reaction did not lead it to make significant concessions to Chile.31 Quite the contrary, Peru broke diplomatic relations with Chile. By 1919, little hope for progress existed. Both states were using harsh rhetoric about the other, and neither state appeared willing to make serious concessions. Peru favored submitting the dispute to US arbitration, while Chile opposed anything other than negotiations leading to a plebiscite.32 Nonetheless, the two sides succeeded in negotiating a direct settlement before the next decade ended. Section Two: Peru Peru’s Foreign Policy in 1919

The change in Peruvian foreign policy that eventually made peace with Chile possible occurred under different circumstances than those that led to changes in Egypt, Syria and Israel. In Peru, domestic circumstances brought Leguía to power. Leguía had a long demonstrated commitment to achieve settlements with Peru’s neighbors. In fact, during his first administration, 1908-1912, he had tackled disagreements with Bolivia and Brazil. Though these disagreements did not meet the definition of enduring rivalry, Leguía’s commitment to settling them demonstrated a desire to settle regional differences. At the time that he came to power, however, Peru had not truly suffered a foreign policy failure with Chile. Circumstances were difficult, but not sufficient to constitute a failure. Leguía had no initial mandate to change Peruvian foreign policy. During the campaign and in the first two years of his presidency, Leguía largely followed status quo policy toward Chile. The basis of his

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policy with Chile was that any settlement with Chile should include the return of Tacna and Arica as well as Tarapacá, which had been ceded to Chile in the Treaty of Ancón.33 Peru argued that the Treaty of Ancón was no longer legitimate; Chile’s failure to hold a plebiscite ten years after the Treaty’s entry into force invalidated it in the eyes of Peru. As relations steadily deteriorated between Chile and Peru, Peru became an ever-stronger advocate for the use of international law. Peru’s decision to break diplomatic relations with Germany prior to the end of World War I allowed Peru to participate in the Paris Peace Conference and to participate in the creation of the League of Nations. In an effort to gain international support for its cause against Chile, several Peruvian officials and citizens acting in a private capacity pressed Peru’s case both in Washington and in Europe.34 Peru’s primary goal was to submit the dispute to arbitration with the hope that the arbiter would rule that Chile had violated the Treaty of Ancón and reward Peru with Tacna and Arica. Furthering its international efforts, Peru attempted to place the Tacna, Arica and Tarapacá dispute before the League of Nations in 1920, a request that was refused (and later withdrawn) because it was made too late.35 Its commitment to an international settlement or arbitration by the United States was so great that Peru refused direct negotiations with Chile early in the Leguía administration. Chile sent a former foreign minister, Federico Puga Borne, to Peru in August 1920 to open negotiations; Peru would not receive him. As a sign of the continued tensions between the two states, Chile refused to attend the centennial celebrations in Peru in 1921 celebrating one hundred years of independence.36 In fact, Chile published an official book condemning Peru for its harsh stance toward Chile, claiming that Chile played a vital role in its independence.37 Early in Leguía’s presidency, a settlement with Chile seemed unlikely. Peru’s Domestic Policy in 1919

Though Peru had not suffered a foreign policy failure in its relationship with Chile in 1919, it was suffering a domestic crisis. Peru’s political leadership between 1895 and 1919 was drawn primarily from the oligarchic classes with interests limited to agriculture, mineral extraction, and wealthy professionals. This period, known as the Aristocratic Republic, did mark an end of nineteenth century militarism, but did not represent a broad base of support for the government.38 This leadership had not been very responsive to the desires of the working classes, either in urban or rural areas. Unrest first began to show itself

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early in World War I as the initial effects of the war hurt Peruvian trade.39 As the war went on, however, the Peruvian economy began to do a little better as demand for copper, petroleum, sugar, and cotton increased. One result of the increased value of Peru’s export crops was a rise in the cost of food as landowners shifted production to export crops.40 This rise in the cost of food, coupled with the lack of enforcement of workplace regulations, led to rising worker unrest in 1918 and 1919. The unrest culminated in the first general strike in Peru’s history in 1919. This strike was significant not only because of its widespread nature, but also because it drew support from university students. The university students were a radical force that began to question the social underpinnings of Peru’s ruling elite.41 President José Pardo did make some concessions to the workers, including enforcing an eight-hour workday for those employed in the manufacturing and mining sectors.42 For the most part, however, the political elite would not meet the demands of middle and lower classes.43 Worker unrest intensified as the economy continued its decline at the end of World War I due to decreased demand for Peruvian goods.44 In addition to the political troubles it faced, the oligarchy as a social class was reducing in numbers and strengths, in part due to the decline in value of the sectors over which it had control and in part due to the changing patterns of foreign investment.45 All of these factors combined to provide a political opening to a politician with broader appeal. In the 1919 presidential election, Augusto Leguía decided to challenge the oligarch’s chosen candidate, Antero Aspíllaga, drawing on a broad base of support, including the upper and middle classes, workers and students. He attracted the upper and middle classes by arguing that he could stave off a revolution, a real fear given the widespread unrest as the election approached. Students and workers supported him based on his social reform promises.46 With widespread support, Leguía won the May 1919 election in an apparent landslide. Despite winning the election, Leguía decided to seize power before he was formally inaugurated; he and his military supporters seized the national palace on July 4, 1919. Leguía claimed that any delay in his coming to power would only be to the further detriment of Peru, especially in the face of the refusal of Aspíllaga to concede defeat and the increasingly heavyhanded policies of Prado in the face of labor unrest.47 Leguía’s rise to power symbolized the strength of a broad, cross-class coalition, and the weakening of the traditional oligarchic power structure. The defeat of

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the oligarchy gave Leguía the opening he needed to enact domestic reforms, but he did not yet have the mandate to dramatically alter Peru’s policy toward Chile. 1920-1925: Leguía Cements his Position and an Opening with Chile

Though he was democratically elected, Leguía did seize power extraconstitutionally before he was inaugurated. At the time of his election, elements of the oligarchy still dominated the Peruvian legislature. He moved quickly to cement his position. In short order, he dissolved Congress and called for new elections, wrote a new Constitution, and began to crack down on critics in the press. Widespread support for his new policies coupled with national disillusionment with the oligarchy gave him virtual free-reign in carrying out these reforms. In addition, he curried favor with the military through promotion of supporters and increased budgets.48 By satisfying his various constituencies, especially the military, Leguía was able to gain significant power in a short time. To solidify his rule, he began to initiate a number of reforms and, simultaneously, to crack down on those who opposed him. Early in his presidency he did a great deal to enact labor reforms, but he also was adamantly capitalist and repressive of labor elements that opposed him.49 This period can best be broken down into pre and post 1922; before 1922 he created new labor laws, created a commission to settle labor disputes, improved healthcare, and established (and enforced) a minimum wage.50 The oligarchy was slowly being dismantled. After 1922, however, he increased his support for the industrial bourgeoisie and became friendlier to foreign capital, particularly the United States. The foreign debt increased ten times under Leguía, and the portion of the economy under foreign control experienced a dramatic increase as well.51 As his presidency progressed, he became increasingly authoritarian. Leguía began cracking down on organized labor elements that opposed some of his policies early in his rule. By 1923, he had begun to exile significant numbers of his political opponents from both the right and the left. His primary goal was to stay in power.52 Despite his authoritarianism, Peru did make significant progress under Leguía. The increase in public debt helped fund massive increases in public spending on all manner of improvements.53 Lima became more of a true urban center that attracted many migrants, both from other parts of Peru and from other countries.54 Manufacturing jobs expanded, as did opportunities for the growing middle class. Leguía facilitated the growth of the middle class by dramatically expanding the public sector as well

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as facilitating the growth in professional classes, such as lawyers, engineers, physicians, and journalists.55 Education was greatly improved as Leguía undertook a massive school building project and brought in North American educators to assist in the expansion of the educational system.56 The 1920 Constitution established a progressive income tax and recognized that the indigenous community had rights that should be respected. Leguía’s agrarian policies, though not overly friendly to peasants, did help modernize Peruvian agriculture.57 The military also made significant advances under Leguía, including the establishment in 1919 of schools for both civil and military aviation.58 The old oligarchy fell, though a new oligarchy began to form that included elements of the newly expanded public sector and the rising bourgeoisie as well as some surviving elements from the old ruling class.59 At the same time that he was consolidating his power, he scored what appeared to be a major diplomatic victory. Chile initiated a brief exchange of cables with Peru in December 1921, using the 1913 Billinghurst cables as a starting point. Though these negotiations resolved little, Chile broke with tradition and agreed to the possibility of arbitration by the United States. The two sides agreed to open negotiations in Washington with the understanding that if they were unable to resolve the dispute through negotiations, they would request arbitration by the United States.60 The United States agreed to arbitrate the dispute after two months of fruitless negotiations in the summer of 1922 in Washington. The US president would serve as arbiter on the question of the unfulfilled provisions Article 3 of the Treaty of Ancón. If the arbiter determined that the plebiscite referred to in Article 3 should be held, he would then decide the conditions of the plebiscite.61 By November 1922, both sides had ratified the arbitration protocol. The Washington Protocol was seen as somewhat of a victory by the Leguía administration as it fulfilled Peru’s longstanding desire to have the dispute with Chile arbitrated. At the same time, his critics pointed out that the terms of arbitration meant that there was no hope of securing the return of Tarapacá.62 In addition, the decision to use the US president as arbiter was criticized as placing a legal question under the review of a politician. Those opposed to this provision worried that the Harding administration would allow politics to enter into the case rather than focusing on the legal merits of Peru’s case.63 Peru’s legal case before the arbiter rested on the argument that Chile’s failure to hold a plebiscite in a timely fashion and its further efforts to “Chileanize” Tacna and Arica had invalidated the Treaty of

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Ancón and that Tacna and Arica should be returned to Peru.64 In advancing its argument on the necessity to return Tacna and Arica to Peru, Peru played on the anti-aggression sentiment rising out of World War I. Peru argued that to not return Tacna and Arica would “create in Latin America the conviction that might makes right,”65 and noted that the War of the Pacific was only the latest in a series of Chilean acts of aggression to seize territory beginning as early as 1842.66 As further evidence that both provinces should be returned to Peru, the Peruvians argued that the Treaty of Ancón recognized that they were a part of Peru and Chile was only a temporary occupying power.67 Finally, Peru argued that it should not have to pay Chile any sum of money in return for the territories as specified in the Treaty of Ancón as the ceded territory of Tarapacá had more than paid off Chile’s war cost stemming from the War of the Pacific.68 Unfortunately for Leguía, the decision of the arbiter rejected almost all of Peru’s arguments, stating that: From examining the history of the Negotiations, the arbiter is not able to deduce a positive basis to arrive at the conclusion that Chile has proceeded in bad faith. The writs have not proven that Chile has not arbitrarily declined to negotiate with Peru the conditions of a plebiscite protocol. On the contrary, the documents demonstrate affirmatively that Chile not only accepted the invitations of Peru to continue negotiations, but also initiated some itself.69

In fact, much of the decision leading to that point focuses on the negotiations between Peru and Chile in 1894, 1897-8, and 1912-3. The arbiter argues that it was not unwillingness on the part of Chile to negotiate in good faith, but rather the various political crises in both countries that forestalled negotiation.70 Finally, all of Peru’s arguments about “Chileanization” were rejected, with the arbiter noting that, he was: … far from approving of the conduct of the Chilean administration and from excusing acts committed against Peruvians that have been referenced, but he finds no reason to arrive at the conclusion that in the actual circumstances, it is impossible to realize a just and impartial plebiscite, in adequate conditions, or that the plebiscite should not be realized.71

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After finding against Peru’s arguments for not holding the plebiscite, the arbiter then laid out the rules and procedures for moving forward. It created a plebiscitary commission, headed by an American and containing a Peruvian and a Chilean. The commission would be responsible for overseeing the preparations for the plebiscite and the plebiscite itself. Peru had rested its hope for full recovery of Tacna and Arica on US arbitration; that hope was dashed by a decision that rejected basically every argument Peru had made. 1925-1930: The Failed Plebiscite

For Leguía, the outcome of the plebiscite was nothing short of an embarrassment. The award was roundly criticized in Peru, leading to massive protests both against the Leguía administration and against the United States, including statements by some that the award proved that the United States was not interested in justice.72 The primary saving grace for Peru was that the plebiscitary commission would be headed by the United States and would include a Peruvian.73 The attempt to hold a plebiscite turned out to be a complete failure. The plebiscitary commissions, headed by General John J. Pershing of the United States, met for the first time in August 1925. The differing views of the Chileans and Peruvians on how to best carry out the plebiscite made it difficult to establish clear procedures for who could vote and how the vote would occur. General Pershing was especially critical of the Chilean side. In one report he and his staff noted that the arguments of Peru regarding the impossibility of holding a plebiscite may have been rejected by the arbiter, but appeared to be more and more justified as the work of the commission went on.74 By January 1926, Pershing had grown increasingly pessimistic on the possibilities of holding a fair plebiscite and was replaced by General William Lassiter, also from the United States. Lassiter observed the same problems as Pershing and introduced a resolution before the commission on June 14, 1926, to terminate the plebiscitary proceedings.75 The failure of the plebiscite served as a vindication of sorts for the Leguía administration. Though the US arbitration had rejected Peru’s claims, the criticisms of Chile by two separate heads of the plebiscitary commission demonstrated not only that Peru had been correct, but that the United States now recognized its arguments. Leguía called the decision to end the plebiscite “a triumph tantamount to the recovery of the lost provinces of Tacna and Arica.”76 Peru saw the US in a more positive light after the failure of the plebiscite, but most Peruvians did

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believe that any future settlement would have to come without the involvement of the United States.77 The failure of the arbitration led Peru down the path to negotiation. Despite the failure of the plebiscite, some advances were made in 1926. Almost from the first meeting of the plebiscitary committee in the August 1925, the United States and its agents appeared to favor a negotiated solution to the conflict.78 Through Secretary of State Frank Kellogg, the United States made an official offer to use its good offices to help resolve the conflict in February 1926. By the end of March, both Peru and Chile accepted the offer with the understanding that preparations for the plebiscite would move forward. The first meeting under the good offices of the United States was held on April 6, 1926.79 Little actual progress was made during the negotiations held under the auspices of the US proposal, though meetings did continue off and on for two years. The negotiations did make the various available options clear to the parties. Both Tacna and Arica could remain in Chilean hands while relations between Peru and Chile continued to be tense; the lands could be split between the two states; it could be neutralized as an autonomous zone; or it could be sold or ceded to a third state, most likely Bolivia.80 Neither party was happy with the latter two options, making option one or two the most likely. The final push for a settlement began with the Sixth Pan-American Conference in 1928 in Havana, Cuba. The Chilean and Peruvian delegations traveled together, leading to an informal exchange of ideas. The United States proposed in July 1928 that the two states establish diplomatic relations, which they agreed to do.81 In September 1928, Leguía began a series of secret negotiations with Chile’s ambassador to Peru, don Emiliano Figueroa.82 Over the course of the following eight months, the two sides worked out an agreement that returned Tacna to Peru while Chile would retain Arica. In addition, Peru received a wharf, customhouse and railroad station on Arica bay, and Chile agreed to pay Peru six million pesos. Certain provisions were also made so that Peruvians in Arica and Chileans in Tacna could choose either Peruvian or Chilean citizenship.83 Leguía was aware that his opponents would not be happy with the settlement, especially as he had come to office demanding a return of Tacna, Arica and Tarapacá. To forestall criticism, Peru and Chile asked US Secretary of State Kellogg to present the final document agreed upon by the two states as a US initiative that the two states would accept.84 Despite this attempt, his opponents were still critical of his decision to turn Arica over to Chile, going so far as to accuse him of being subject

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to the dictates of Washington.85 Nonetheless, the Peruvian Congress ratified the agreement by a large majority and it entered into effect in July 1929. Though the two states would have minor disputes over fulfilling the treaty, the basic dispute came to an end with the signing and ratification of the 1929 peace treaty. The implementation of the peace treaty with Chile was to be Leguía’s final major victory. Peru had begun to suffer economic difficulties in advance of the depression, brought on in part by Peru’s massive foreign debt.86 The Great Depression only worsened things for Leguía. The groups that suffered the most from the depression were those that Leguía had used as a base for support.87 The surviving elements of the oligarchy, working with the military, saw the economic decline as an opportunity to seize power. A military coup led by Luis M. Sánchez Cerro ousted Leguía on 22 August 1930. Leguía’s repressive policies coupled with some of his more unpopular foreign policy decisions meant that very few people came to his support in the face of the massive economic downturn experienced by Peru.88 Many of those who took part in the military junta were unsatisfied with several elements of Leguía’s foreign policy; during his time in office he had also signed a treaty with Chile and initiated discussions with Ecuador. Despite this dissatisfaction, the new government made no attempt to renounce the agreement. The two sides failed to implement some portions of the agreement, but they carried out all of the major provisions.89 Conclusion: Peru

In 1926-1327, Peru changed its foreign policy toward Chile. Before that time, Peru had given up on direct negotiations with Chile, focusing instead on the need for international arbitration. Peru refused Chile’s attempts at negotiation in the early 1920s. Only once Chile agreed to arbitration should negotiations fail did Peru agree to negotiate. After Peru lost in arbitration and the subsequent plebiscite failed, Leguía determined that the only possible way to settle the dispute was through direct negotiation. The source of this foreign policy change was a failed domestic policy that brought a dove into power, followed by the failure in the state’s dominant foreign policy that allowed the leader to engage in direct negotiations. This pathway is not exactly as predicted by hypothesis one, but it does follow closely from it. Recall that the causal mechanism through which foreign and domestic policy failure lead to

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policy change is through the marginalization of hawks, usually through their removal from power and their replacement by relative doves. When elected in a time of domestic crisis, a dove cannot make changes to foreign policy in the absence of foreign policy failure. Should the traditional foreign policy fail while the dove is in power, s/he will legitimately be able to change foreign policy. In contrast, if failed arbitration had occurred when a relative hawk was in power and the economy was strong, the chances that the hawk would have negotiated are quite slim. This argument begs the question of whether or not Leguía can be classified as a dove. In the absence of direct evidence from Leguía himself, we can infer from his actions before entering power that he was, in fact a dove. During his first administration, Leguía settled Peruvian border disputes with Brazil and Bolivia. Though these were not as intense as the rivalry with Chile, it did indicate a willingness to negotiate and, when necessary, to use outside arbiters. In addition to these efforts, Leguía also tried to engage both Ecuador and Colombia in direct negotiations, though both efforts failed.90 Though these actions do not firmly establish that Leguía was a dove, it does demonstrate that he was willing to negotiate and compromise in order to reach agreements with Peru’s neighbors. As further evidence of this tendency, Leguía also sought an end to Peru’s other rivalries while he was in power, as will be discussed in the next chapter. In his first administration (1908-1912) he was blocked from taking several domestic actions, and some foreign initiatives, by a Congress that was not prepared to move as rapidly as he. At one point, a small opposition group, representing a former president of Peru, kidnapped Leguía in an attempt to overthrow him. He survived this attack, but it demonstrated that the traditional oligarchy did not accept him.91 When Leguía came to power in 1919, he faced no such constraints. The manner in which he came to power and the level of opposition to the existing state of affairs allowed him to eliminate virtually all opposition from government. Consistent with my argument that a change in policy will be accompanied by a changing coalition, Leguía dramatically changed the face of both those who governed and the source of popular support by appealing to a much broader audience than previous administrations. This power did not, however, give him a mandate to abandon Peru’s claims to Tacna and Arica. Leguía’s initial Tacna and Arica policy was consistent with previous administrations, and focused on the need for arbitration. In that regard, in the initial phase of negotiation, Peru played the role of State B. Chile

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accepted Peruvian conditions for negotiation – arbitration by the United States. This behavior is consistent with hypothesis three, that B will respond to A’s revised policy goals if they fall within B’s range of acceptable agreements. The outcome of the arbitration represented a dramatic failure to achieve foreign policy objectives. That failure, combined with the events that brought Leguía to power, allowed him to engage in direct negotiations with Chile. This behavior supports hypothesis one; after 1925 Peru became State A, interested in initiating negotiations with Chile because of its combined failure in foreign and domestic policy. Consistent with hypothesis five, Leguía did face a domestic backlash over his policies when they did not meet expectations. Though he did successfully negotiate with Chile, the domestic opposition to peace was not satisfied with the final outcome. The impact of the Great Depression combined with the outcome of the peace treaty with Chile and a separate, somewhat unpopular treaty with Colombia, led to the overthrow of Leguía in 1930. The new government did not undermine the Chilean agreement, but consistent with the expectations of hypothesis five, it did throw up obstacles to planned negotiations with Ecuador.92 The Peruvian case does not really support hypothesis two, however. Despite the fact that Peru was involved in multiple rivalries in the 1920s, little evidence suggests that this factor contributed to the failure with Chile. Unlike Egypt, Peru’s involvement in multiple rivalries had not led to an overly burdensome military cost, and the rivalry itself did not contribute to the failure in foreign policy. One could argue that the multitude of rivalries and corresponding uncertainty in Peru helped contribute to domestic difficulties, but the net effect of the rivalries in this regard does not appear to be overly significant. Peru’s behavior provides strong support for the central hypotheses of the book. A failure in domestic policy brought Leguía to power, and a failure in foreign policy freed him to negotiate. At the same time, the failure that led to Peru’s change in foreign policy would not have been possible without an earlier shift in Chilean foreign policy that allowed it to accept arbitration with Peru. I turn now to a discussion of Chilean foreign policy.

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Section Three: Chile Chilean Foreign Policy in 1919

Chile’s foreign policy on the eve of the election of Arturo Allesandri was straightforward: any agreement with Peru would come through direct negotiations. In response to a letter from US President Woodrow Wilson in 1919 requesting that Chile and Peru settle their differences, Chilean president Juan Luis Sanfuentes said, “Chile has been at peace with all countries for thirty-five years, and has been capable during that time of resolving with justice all disputes with its neighbors.”93 Sanfuentes went on to argue that the Treaty of Ancón provided the only acceptable solution to the Tacna and Arica dispute, and that Chile was capable of ensuring peace according to the treaty.94 Despite its strong words, Chile was not in a position of pure strength. Unlike Peru, Chile had not renounced neutrality and allied itself with the United States during World War I. On the contrary, Chile had a long relationship with Germany, and its neutrality seemed tilted against the United States. Chile was extremely fearful of a potential backlash from the United States and, potentially, the League of Nations, and began a serious propaganda campaign both in Europe and the in the Untied States defending its position.95 Chile’s foreign policy with Peru was not failing, but its foreign policy in general had put it in a precarious position. Chile’s Domestic Policy in 1919

Political life in Chile prior to the 1920s was largely the domain of the entrenched oligarchy composed of landowners, those made wealthy through extractive industry, especially nitrates, and the urban elite.96 Even though all literate males over the age of twenty-five were eligible to vote, a combination of literacy requirements, strange electoral regulations and the unusual parliamentary system led to a very low turnout among eligible voters in most elections. Political elites were effectively able to control the political process in spite of its seeming openness to all social classes.97 In 1914, changes to electoral laws actually led to a dramatic decline in voter turnout. By 1924, only five percent of the population was voting in elections.98 A result of the lack of participation in the political process meant that prior to 1920, most political parties in Chile were based on political favor and connections rather than on strict partisan beliefs. Parties were more likely to be the

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result of intra-elite struggles than class-based support. More important than class interests, for example, were the relative levels of support for the Catholic Church (the clerical vs. anti-clerical divide).99 Chilean political parties exercised their control over the state through the Chilean Congress; the presidency in Chile was actually relatively weak. This relationship between the executive and Congress, quite rare in Latin America at the time, was the result of a violent civil war in 1891 between President José Manuel Balmaceda and Congressional forces. The outcome of the war led to a quasiparliamentary system in which Congress had significant influence over the composition of the cabinet and the political process.100 Chile’s party system and the traditional preeminence of Congress in the political life of the state began to break down in the prelude to the 1920 election. Labor groups had begun to expand in the early twentieth century as discontent with working conditions in both the extractive industries and the urban setting began to grow.101 The government killed over 2000 nitrate workers and their families during labor unrest in 1907, for example.102 The Radical Party, the only significant party advocating socio-economic reform, also expanded gradually from the turn of the century until the 1920s, representing dissatisfaction with the status quo by many.103 Adding to the labor unrest in Chile was the decline in the Chilean economy in the mid to late teens. Since the War of the Pacific, the nitrate industry had been a major source of Chile’s economic growth. During World War I, however, the nitrate industry began to go in to decline in large part because of the development of inexpensive, synthetic nitrates. In 1919, the market for nitrates completely collapsed.104 The 1920 election was held in a climate marked by “widespread unemployment, labor agitation, and economic depression.”105 1920-1925: The Presidency of Arturo Allesandri

Arturo Allesandri was able to take advantage of the growing importance of socio-economic factors as well as the declining economy in the election of 1920. He was the chosen representative of the Liberal Alliance, which included the Radical Party. His opponent in the election was Luis Barros Borgoño, who drew his support from the political elites and landed aristocracy. Allesandri won the election by one electoral vote; the election itself was considered to be have been remarkably free and fair and to have had strong participation by the middle and labor classes.106 Allesandri:

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had attracted popular support by his program of social and political reform. On its political side, it embraced the old Balmacedist objectives: abolition of the parliamentary system, election of the president by direct, popular vote, and greater autonomy for the provinces. His social program included an income tax or higher land taxes to permit the balancing of the budget, labor insurance, separation of church and state, extension of the free public school system, and national control of banks and insurance companies.107

Once elected, however, Allesandri faced significant opposition to his policies in the Chilean Senate which, unlike the House, continued to be dominated by old-guard political parties. 108 During his tenure, the Congress forced eighteen different cabinet changes on his administration.109 In the ensuing gridlock, the Congress repeatedly failed to pass important legislation, including annual budgets. Allesandri also faced strong opposition in the Chilean Senate to his new foreign policy which was designed to alleviate tensions with the United States and with Peru. As noted above, tensions were high between Peru and Chile in 1920. The two sides had no official diplomatic relations and had recently terminated consular relations. Pike argues that: Allesandri perceived clearly that the tide of internationalism was rising in the world…. This very fact rendered Chile’s traditional foreign policy untenable. Prior to 1920, largely because of its desire to settle the Tacna-Arica issue… entirely free of outside pressures, Chile had maintained an isolationist orientation…. By the time of Allesandri’s first inauguration, there were grounds to fear that the new League of Nations might bring irresistible pressure upon Chile to resolve… a dispute that had been a source of hemisphere ill-will since 1884….110

Chile was also afraid that the United States would insert itself into the conflict and attempt to force an undesirable solution to the dispute. Settling the dispute would remove the specter of US intervention and pave the way for a more unified South American continent that could better confront US strength.111 Though Leguía had refused to receive Federico Puga Borne, who had been sent to Lima by the Chilean government to open negotiations in August 1920, Allesandri was still interested in pursuing some sort of settlement with Peru.112 Chile initiated an exchange of cables with Peru in December 1921, using the 1913 Billinghurst cables as a starting point. When that initiative failed, both sides accepted the invitation of the

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United States to continue the negotiations in Washington and to submit any remaining points of disagreement to arbitration. Throughout the negotiations from May to July 1922, Chile maintained that “the habitants of the territory [Tacna and Arica] should define their future nationality” in accordance with Article Three of the Treaty of Ancón.113 When Peru refused to agree to any plebiscite, Chile agreed to submit the question of whether or not the plebiscite should go forward and, if so, under what conditions it should be held to US arbitration. Many traditionalists in Chile, including a significant number of Senators, were appalled at the arbitration agreement because of its departure from Chile’s longstanding belief that any agreement should involve only Peru and Chile.114 Though the arbitration protocol did win ratification, the opponents of the protocol did censure Chilean Foreign Minister Barros Jarpa, leading to his resignation.115 In submitting its case before the arbiter, Chile focused on its good faith efforts to carry out the plebiscite in the past and the need for the arbiter to decide only the conditions under which the plebiscite would be held.116 Before the arbiter reached his decision, Allesandri was both removed from and restored to the presidency. The steps leading to the initial removal seemed to actually be favorable for Allesandri. Having been faced with four years of opposition in the Senate, members of Allesandri’s party gained control of both houses in the 1924 elections. Despite the initial hope that Allesandri could now enact many of his reforms, the new Congress quickly resumed the previous gridlock. In August and September 1924, Congress began considering a pay raise for itself even while wages of other government employees had been cut and, at times, not paid. This bill, though not the only cause, served as a triggering event for a military coup in September that led to Allesandri’s asking for a “leave of absence” from office and leaving the country.117 The ruling junta came to be identified with more conservative elements; many believed that those appointed by the military to cabinet posts were close allies of the old aristocracy in spite of a major labor reform bill that the military pushed through Congress.118 The labor bill was not truly an effort to reform the country; it was more about bringing the growing labor movement under government control than winning its electoral support.119 In December, the new government called for presidential and congressional elections in May of 1925; the conservative National Union coalition announced the candidacy of an individual with strong ties to the oligarchic interest in the country.120 Frustrated with the direction of the new government, a group led by junior officers in the capital garrison of the army moved against the

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government in late January 1925. The countercoup initially brought Colonel Carlos Ibañez del Campo to power in Chile before restoring Allesandri to power on March 23, 1925. Even before he assumed power at the end of March, Allesandri’s decision to submit Chile’s dispute with Peru to US arbitration was vindicated. As noted above, the March 4, 1925, decision accepted the Chilean case almost in its entirety. Conrado Rios Gallardo, who would become Chilean foreign minister in the latter half of the 1920s, describes the decision in glowing terms thirty years after it occurred, stating: His [Calvin Coolidge’s] decision constitutes a document of unquestionable juridical, historical and moral value…. It included in a concise and penetrating form each one of the diverse matters that made up the arguments of the parties. It was, moreover, a perfect and impartial narration, austere and truthful, beginning in 1884, of ChileanPeruvian relations.121

Upon his return to power, Allesandri quickly called for the writing of a new constitution that would increase presidential powers. A new constitution was quickly drafted, but there was disagreement on how it should be ratified. Allesandri and his supporters wanted a national referendum while representatives of the old parties wanted a national convention. In the end, Chile held a national referendum on August 30, though the old parties tried to push for a boycott. The new constitution passed overwhelmingly.122 Among the reforms included in the new constitution was increased presidential power over the appointment of cabinet officials, the separation of church and state, and electoral reform. Allesandri also succeeded in the creation of a national bank for Chile.123 Allesandri’s success was not to last, however. Ibañez, now serving as Allesandri’s Minister of War, believed himself to be the true source of Allesandri’s power and wasted little time in maneuvering himself into the presidency. 1925-1930: Chile Under Ibañez

Ibañez initially planned to assume the presidency through constitutional means. Presidential elections were scheduled for October 1925; Ibañez announced himself as a candidate in late September. Upon his announcement, Allesandri asked Ibañez to resign from the cabinet, a protocol that Ibañez had previously supported. When Ibañez refused, the remainder of the cabinet resigned at which point Ibañez requested that

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he, as the sole remaining cabinet official, countersign any official acts coming from Allesandri. Allesandri would not accept this arrangement and resigned on October 1 after appointing Luis Borgoño as Minister of the Interior. According to the new Chilean constitution, as interior minister Borgoño effectively became acting head of state in Allesandri’s absence. Many in Chile asked Ibañez to resign as a sign of good faith; his response was to issue a challenge to the political parties of Chile. If they could unite behind a single candidate within a week, Ibañez would withdraw from the race for president. Much to his surprise, the parties were able to agree on the candidacy of Emiliano Figueroa Larrain within a few days. Ibañez and his military allies allowed the election to go forward on October 25, and Figueroa Larrain was elected over José Salas, the preferred candidate of labor. For the first year of the Figueroa administration, Ibañez continued as Minister of War.124 The conservative elements in government that had never been satisfied with Allesandri and had opposed the 1925 constitution saw the election of Figueroa as an opportunity. Under conservative leadership, the Chamber of Deputies refused to approve a budget in 1926 and began to undertake efforts to replace the 1925 constitution with the goal of returning to the system of parliamentary control.125 The new government also succeeded in scuttling the plebiscite that had been ordered in the arbitration decision. The Chilean government and public were unhappy with the conditions being insisted upon by the United States for the holding of the plebiscite almost from the beginning. Chile was worried that US agents working for the committee were more willing to accept claims of long-term residence in the area advanced by Peruvians than those by Chileans. In addition, both Chilean officials and newspaper editorials accused Pershing, the head of the committee, for being far too sympathetic to arguments of abuse being advanced by the Peruvian delegation. The same accusations would be made of Lassiter when he replaced Pershing.126 The new Chilean government appeared to prefer a negotiated solution to a potential loss of all of Tacna and Arica through a plebiscite. As noted above, Chile accepted the US offer of good offices in early 1926. The negotiations held under the good offices of the United States were not particularly fruitful, however. Chile was unhappy with the final proposal of the United States in November 1926 to turn all of Tacna and Arica over to Bolivia, but still blamed Peruvian intransigence for the failure of both the plebiscite and the negotiations.127 In the eyes of the world and the United States, however, the failure of the plebiscite and of

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the negotiations lay at the feet of Chile. The final resolution of the plebiscitary committee had accused Chile of making it impossible to hold a free and fair plebiscite. In its efforts to resolve the Tacna and Arica dispute, Chile had harmed its relations with other states and allowed Peru to gain the diplomatic upper hand. The combination of domestic gridlock and the embarrassment of the failed plebiscite led Ibañez to assert more and more power in the government. Fearing a return to the conservative politics and gridlock that marked pre-1920 politics and Allesandri’s first years in office, Ibañez succeeded in being named Minister of the Interior, the most powerful cabinet position. In short order, Figueroa resigned the presidency. In May, 1927, Ibañez ran unopposed for president, cementing his control over the country.128 Ibañez’s policies favored neither labor nor the old political elite. As president, he reasserted executive authority over the legislature, further weakening Chilean political parties. To prevent the kind of opposition that had hampered Allesandri, he arrested and/or exiled numerous political party leaders from across the political spectrum. Prior to national elections, political parties had to submit lists of candidates to Ibañez for his approval. His goal was to eliminate the power of political parties in the Chilean political system.129 Ibañez basically abolished an independent, organized labor movement, and most leaders of major unions were either arrested or fled the country. In 1929, Ibañez formed a state controlled organization to replace both labor and party organizations, cementing his desire to control the entire political process.130 Ibañez’s policy toward the Tacna and Arica dispute walked the line between Allesandri and the policy of previous administrations. With the failure of the plebiscite, he returned to the belief that direct negotiations were the best avenue to peace. At the same time, Chile was somewhat embarrassed by the negative international opinion of its actions leading to the plebiscite’s failure. Nonetheless, Ibáñez’s initial action on Tacna and Arica was to order an official policy of nationalization to include the teaching of Chilean history and patriotism as well the celebration of all major Chilean ceremonies.131 In this policy, Ibáñez seemed to be making concessions to the long-standing opponents of Allesandri’s efforts to settle the Tacna and Arica dispute. Despite this seemingly hardline approach to the dispute, Ibañez’s policies did reflect Allesandri’s pragmatism as well. Ibañez wanted to strengthen Chile’s diplomatic standing, and felt that settling the Tacna and Arica dispute would help to do so. When the Peruvian and Chilean

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delegations ended up on the same ship traveling to a conference in Havana in 1928, the two sides developed a friendly relationship that led to the restoration of official diplomatic ties between the two states.132 Chile’s decision to accept the US suggestion to restore diplomatic relations was in part designed to repair its relationship with the United States. Had Peru refused the invitation, Chile would regain a position of strength in its relationship, “erasing from the American conscience the Lassiter motion” that had placed the blame for the failure of the plebiscite on Chile.133 Secret, direct negotiations led to an agreement returning Tacna to Peru and retaining Arica by the summer of 1929. Despite limited opposition, the final treaty was ratified by a large majority of both houses of the Chilean Congress.134 Ibañez had succeeded in erasing the stain of the failed plebiscite from Chile’s diplomatic record.135 Conclusion: Chile

Chile’s actions from 1919-1924 strongly conform to the predictions of hypothesis one, that combined domestic and foreign policy failure in A will lead to a change in A’s foreign policy goals allowing for more bargaining space with B. Chile’s foreign policy during World War I had put it in a precarious diplomatic position in 1919, and Chile was beset by labor unrest and economic decline. Allesandri won the 1920 election, and immediately set Chile on the path to negotiation with Peru by dropping Chile’s longstanding opposition to outside arbitration of the Tacna and Arica dispute. Allesandri’s ruling coalition was drawn from classes that had previously been excluded from politics, and he attempted to enact widespread reforms. Consistent with expectations the relatively moderate nature of Chile’s diplomatic failure before 1920 did not give Allesandri a blank check; his new policy was opposed by many. By 1924, Allesandri had not really succeeded in passing major reform legislation, and the arbitration with Peru had not been decided. As predicted by hypothesis five, frustration with inaction under Allesandri combined with continued domestic stagnation led to his ouster in 1925. Though a counter-coup returned him to power in 1925, his stint in office was short lived. Once Chile had won the arbitration and it was time to implement the plebiscite, conservatives were able to scuttle the process. Chile’s subsequent behavior is consistent with both hypotheses three and four. In accordance with hypothesis four, that combined domestic and foreign policy failure in B will lead to a change in B’s

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foreign policy goals allowing B to respond more favorably to A’s overtures, the diplomatic fallout from the failed arbitration combined with the domestic turmoil that led to Ibañez’s seizure of power helped push Chile to negotiate again with Peru. Though Chile did have to agree to negotiate, the results of this negotiation conformed very closely to Chile’s previous stance that the two parties should settle their disagreement without outside interference. In addition, the result of the negotiation was very similar to earlier Chilean proposals. The close alignment of the outcome with Chile’s desired position offers support for hypothesis three, that B will respond to A’s revised policy goals if they fall within B’s range of acceptable agreements. Section Three: Interaction Between Peru and Chile: Comparing the Primary and Alternative Hypotheses

As in previous chapters, the best explanation of rivalry termination between Peru and Chile should explain not only the outcome (termination or no termination), but also the timing of change and the causal mechanism. In both cases, the primary explanation does a superior job explaining all three points, though Chile may have also been motivated by a desire to counteract the increasingly influential role played by the United States in Latin America. In this case, two separate rounds of negotiation and changed strategies deserve scrutiny. The first is the decision to enter into arbitration, while the second is the decision to enter into a final agreement. In the first round, Chile accepted Peru’s position that the two states should submit their claim to arbitration. Bargaining space was clearly available early in Allesandri’s term when he realized that Chile’s old foreign policy was no longer tenable in the post World War I world.136 At this stage, Peru did not have to modify its position significantly; arbitration was its desired outcome. Consistent with expectations, Chile’s shift was accompanied by a change in ruling coalition and the appeal to new societal sources of support. Before the arbitration decision was announced, more conservative elements took over the government due to their frustration with Allesandri’s domestic and foreign policies. Once Chile had won the arbitration, it was conservative elements that enacted policies before the arbitration commission that led to the failure of the plebiscite. These groups successfully thwarted the attempts at peace.137 Table 5.1 traces the causal path of this initial decision.

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Table 5.1. Chile’s Initial (failed) Move to Terminate Independent variables (working together) Foreign policy failure: Chile’s proGerman neutrality in WWI Domestic policy failure:

Intervening variable

Change in foreign policy: Chile decides to accept binding arbitration by the United States

Intervening variable

State B accepts state A’s revised policy position: Peru accepts the Washington Protocol, defining the arbitration procedure

Widespread labor unrest, declining economy in 1919 *Consistent with hypothesis five

Intervening variable

Retrenchment in state A:* Chilean action leads to plebiscite’s failure

Dependent variable

Failed rivalry termination: Plebiscite ordered by arbitration fails to produce peace.

After the failure of the plebiscite, Leguía shifted Peruvian foreign policy to accept the principle of compromise with Chile. The policy of depending on the United States had proven to be a failure, and the only recourse was direct negotiations with Chile. Had the failed arbitration and plebiscite occurred under a leader from the days of the Aristocratic Republic in Peru, a decision to moderate Peru’s position would have been less likely. The social disruptions of 1919 had brought Leguía, a leader with aspirations to settle disputes with Peru’s neighbors, however. Once the old foreign policy had failed, he reacted to the failure in Peru’s foreign policy by determining that Peru would have to find the ultimate solution to its problem with Chile on its own.138 This change allowed Peru to move forward with direct negotiations with Chile. In Chile, peace became possible as Ibañez seized control of the country and eliminated the traditionalist elements that had obstructed Allesandri. The domestic turmoil and embarrassment of being accused of causing the plebiscite to fail allowed Ibañez a great deal of freedom as president of Chile. This freedom was enough to allow him to push Chile toward peace. Ibañez did not have to move far, however, as the final agreement was close to Chile’s earlier expectations. Table 5.2 illustrates the final steps toward peace.

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Table 5.2. Chile and Peru’s Steps toward Peace Independent variables Foreign policy failure (Peru): Arbitration finds in favor of Chile Domestic policy failure: Widespread strikes / social unrest lead contribute to Leguía’s seizure of power Foreign policy failure (Chile): Diplomatic embarrassment of US accusations of undermining plebiscite Domestic policy failure: Government unable to pass budgets, economic decline, widespread opposition to government

Intervening variable

Intervening variable

Dependent variable

Change in foreign policy: Accepts principle of direct negotiations and division of Tacna and Arica

Change in foreign policy: Accepts idea of division of Tacna and Arica and of a cash payment to Peru

Bargaining space opens between states A and B: Acceptance of direct negotiations over a final agreement and acceptance of principle of separation

Rivalry termination: Final peace treaty signed and ratified in 1929

The alternative hypotheses do not fair as well. For Peru, neither hypothesis explains Peru’s behavior. Peru was not engaging in balancing behavior; it did not join in a strategic alliance with Chile against a third state, nor did the settlement significantly alter its strategic situation. One could argue that the settlement strengthened Peru by cutting off Chilean aid to Ecuador, but no evidence suggests Peru was concerned about Ecuador as a military threat. Quite the opposite, Peru had never experienced difficulty in defeating Ecuador militarily. The bandwagoning hypothesis is equally insufficient to explain Peruvian behavior. Peru was remarkably stable throughout the 1920s while Chile experienced domestic turmoil from 1924-1927. Peru was not frightened of an impending Chilean attack, and the settlement of the dispute did not

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gain Peru additional allies. Most states had supported Peru in the conflict before the settlement was reached. The balancing hypothesis has some merit when examining Chile’s behavior. Chile was not concerned with gaining Peru’s support to counter a regional threat, but it did see the ongoing diplomatic problem as an obstacle to Chile’s taking a more dominant regional role. Allesandri recognized this in 1920, just as Ibañez did in 1927. Ibañez was particularly concerned with gaining the support of other Latin American states – especially Argentina – in countering the growing US influence in the region. Until Chile settled its dispute with Peru, it could not act as a diplomatic leader in a new era based on international law and the rejection of the use of force.139 This hypothesis fails to explain the timing of Chile’s actions under Allesandri or the interlude between Allesandri and Ibañez, however. If the logic of settling Tacna and Arica was evident to a rational leader, Allesandri’s immediate predecessor should not have so vehemently rejected Woodrow Wilson’s suggestion to settle the dispute. Nor should conservative elements in the Chilean Senate have opposed Allesandri or worked to undermine the plebiscite. While the balance of power argument may predict the final outcome, it does not explain the timing of events or the actual process of change in Chile as well as the primary hypotheses. Finally, the bandwagoning hypothesis has no explanatory power in this case. Chile was not frightened of Peruvian intervention, and it was not seeking to ally itself with a powerful United States. Though Chile did suffer domestic difficulties in the 1920s, it never expressed concern that the military balance was shifting in favor of Peru. If neorealism explains Chilean behavior at all, it is through Chile’s desire to balance growing US influence. Table 5.3 summarizes the results for each of the hypotheses. Table 5.3. Summary of Hypotheses Hypothesis

Peru*

Chile*

H1: Combined domestic and foreign policy failure in A will lead to a change in A’s foreign policy goals…

Yes

Yes

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H2: A state that is involved in multiple rivalries or has an … active foreign policy is more likely to experience foreign policy failure…

No

N/A

H3: B will respond to A’s revised policy goals if they fall within B’s range of acceptable agreements.

Yes

Partially

H4: Combined domestic and foreign policy failure in B will lead to a change in B’s foreign policy goals…

N/A

Yes

H5: The prospects for rivalry termination decrease as the length of time from A’s change in policy increases

Partially

Yes

AH1: A rivalry will terminate when two states party to a rivalry ally to counter a third, more powerful state.

No

Yes

AH2: When one party to a rivalry suffers severe relative decline in respect to its rival and cannot obtain external allies, the rivalry will terminate.

No

No

153

*Chile is State A when considering the prelude to Arbitration; Peru is State A after the failure of the plebiscite

Conclusion

The relationship between Peru and Chile presents compelling evidence in support of the argument that an enduring rivalry can only end when

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one or both states experience a combination of domestic and foreign policy failures that leads to the exclusion of policy-makers who cling to a hawkish foreign policy. At the same time, the case does point to a potential problem in unstable regimes: the ease of reentry of opposition politicians. The failures in foreign policy were not severe enough in Chile to give an overwhelming mandate to the state’s leaders to change foreign policy. This lack of mandate coupled with the unstable political climate in Chile in the 1920s made it relatively easier for the opposition to put up roadblocks to peace with Peru. Though Chile did make peace with Peru, a similar set of domestic circumstances in Ecuador made it very difficult for any government to establish a consistent foreign policy. I turn now to a discussion of the rivalry between Peru and Ecuador. 1

The distinction between State A and State B is important when evaluating the hypotheses. 2 Peru had major territorial disputes with five of its neighbors after achieving independence in 1821. Leguía was particularly interested in addressing the conflict with Chile, as well as disputes with Chile and Ecuador (García, “Relaciones del Peru con Ecuador,” p. 35). 3 Pike, Chile and the United States, pp. 224-233. 4 Dennis, Tacna and Arica, p. xvii. 5 Markham, A History of Peru, pp. 384-385. 6 Ibid., p. 386; St. John, The Foreign Policy of Peru, p. 109. 7 St. John, The Foreign Policy of Peru, pp. 112-113. 8 Ibid., pp. 118-123. 9 Markham, A History of Peru, p. 417. Peru’s president at the beginning of the war had already been replaced. 10 See Forment, Democracy in Latin America 1760-1900, pp. 379-382, on the degree of factionalism among the Peruvian elite at this time. No leader could legitimately claim to have the support of all of the Peruvian people. 11 See St. John, The Foreign Policy of Peru, pp. 117-125; Markham, A History of Peru, pp. 420-423. 12 Article 2, The Treaty of Ancón (1883). The text of the Treaty can be found in Dennis, Documentary History of the Tacna-Arica Dispute, pp. 221224. 13 Article 9, The Treaty of Ancón (1883); St. John, The Foreign Policy of Peru, pp. 123; Dennis, Tacna and Arica, p. 192. 14 St. John, The Foreign Policy of Peru, p. 133. 15 Ibid., p. 134. 16 Ibid.; Calderón, El Tratado de 1929, p. 56; Documentos Relativos al Plebiscito, pp. 24-25. 17 Pike, The Modern History of Peru, p. 172; Dennis, Documentary History of the Tacna-Arica Dispute, p. 228. A full text of the Billinghurst-LaTorre Protocol can be found in Dennis, Documentary History of the Tacna-Arica Dispute, pp. 228-232.

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Pike, The Modern History of Peru, p. 172; Dennis, Tacna and Arica, p.

196. 19 St. John, The Foreign Policy of Peru, pp. 141-142; Pike, The Modern History of Peru, p. 174. 20 Dennis, Documentary History of the Tacna-Arica Dispute, p. 232; Dennis, Tacna and Arica, p. 200-201; Castro y Oyanguren, Entre el Perú y Chile, pp. 58-59; St. John, The Foreign Policy of Peru, p. 142. 21 St. John, The Foreign Policy of Peru, p. 142. Peru was facing other problems at this time. Many in Peru felt that all of its neighbors were trying to take advantage of it in the early 20th century. See for example Osambela, La Supremcía inmediata y perpetual del Perú en el Pacífico y el Amazonas, p. 5. 22 Calderón, El Tratado de 1929, 45. A partial text of the treaty can be found in Dennis, Documentary History of the Tacna-Arica Dispute, pp. 232234. 23 St. John, The Foreign Policy of Peru, p. 154. 24 Ibid., p. 15. 25 His domestic policies also played a role in the decision to overthrow him. 26 Pike, The Modern History of Peru, p. 231. 27 Castro y Oyanguren, Entre el Perú y Chile, p. 4. Castro y Oyanguren would later negotiate the Ponce-Castro Oyanguren Protocol with Ecuador that established a basis for negotiations between the two states. 28 Galvez, International Conflicts: Peru against Columbia, Ecuador and Chile, p. 8. 29 Documentos Relativos al Plebiscito pp. 24-25, 30. 30 Marett, Peru, p. 132; Pease, Breve Historia Contemporánea del Perú, pp. 156-158. 31 See Marett, Peru, pp. 124-125, 129-130. 32 Pike, Chile and the United States, p. 158. 33 St. John, The Foreign Policy of Peru, p. 158. 34 Castro y Oyanguren, for example, wrote, “For us Americans, [Woodrow] Wilson has said, right is more precious than peace… . The Peruvian cause – that is the cause of justice – does not need to be a triumph of the noise and shouting of force. It is going to be a bloodless triumph, asked for and reclaimed by universal conscience” (Entre el Perú y Chile, p. 5). 35 St. John, The Foreign Policy of Peru, p. 160. 36 Dennis, Tacna and Arica, p. 203. Ecuador was the only other Latin American state to skip the ceremonies. 37 The book, entitled Chile y La Indepencía del Perú 1821-1921: Documentos históricos oficiales, states in its forward that, “Today Peru is about to celebrate its first centenary of its independence… but in the middle of these celebrations the name of Chile has appeared only to be ungraciously attacked. It will not be, then, inopportune to exhume from the depths of the archives the testimony that Peruvian rulers have given us recognizing on behalf of their country the efficacious and decisive help from Chile for the success of independence” (no page numbers). The remainder of the book is copies of letters from Peruvian leaders and elites. 38 Burga and Galindo, Apogeo y Crisis de la Republica Aristocratica, pp. 7 and 88. 39 Pease, Breve Historia Contemporánea del Perú, pp. 160-161.

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40

Pike, The Modern History of Peru, p. 210. Marett, Peru, p. 126. 42 Ibid., pp. 210-211; Pease, Breve Historia Contemporánea del Perú, p. 161; Collier and Collier, Shaping the Political Arena, p. 133. 43 Palmer, “Overcoming the Weight of History,” p. 205. 44 Burga and Galindo, Apogeo y Crisis de la Republica Aristocratica, p. 131. 45 Ibid., pp. 70, 88, 94. 46 Pike, The Modern History of Peru, p. 213-214. 47 Collier and Collier, Shaping the Political Arena, p. 137. Leguía may also have been afraid that his opponents would thwart him both in the Supreme Court and in Congress. Before seizing power, the Supreme Court invalidated a significant number of the votes cast for Leguía (Chirinos, Historia de la Republica, p. 413). 48 Pike, The United States and the Andean Republics, pp. 215, 218-224; Masterson, Militarism and Politics in Latin America, p. 30. 49 See Collier and Collier, Shaping the Political Arena, pp. 142-143; Aniceto, Leticia o La Felonía del Civilismo Peruano, pp. 12-13. 50 Marett, Peru, p. 141. 51 Burga and Galindo, Apogeo y Crisis de la Republica Aristocratica, pp. 12-15, 133-134; Chirinos, Historia de la Republica, p. 426. 52 Gilbert, La oligarquía peruana, p. 59; Marett, Peru, pp. 140-141. See also Luna, Contribución a la Verdadera Historia del Apra 1923-1988, pp. 15-26 for a discussion of the Víctor Raúl haya de la Torre’s efforts to develop a meaningful socialist-oriented opposition to Leguía even after he was exiled in 1923. 53 Chirinos, Historia de la Republica, p. 426. 54 Chirinos, Historia de la Republica, p. 439; Burga and Galindo, Apogeo y Crisis de la Republica Aristocratica, pp. 14-15; Pike, The United States and the Andean Republics, p. 181; Marett, Peru, pp. 138-139. 55 Klarén, Peru: Society and Nationhood in the Andes, p. 242. 56 Ibid.; Pike, The United States and the Andean Republics, pp. 181-182; Pease, Breve Historia Contemporánea del Perú, p. 169. 57 Marett, Peru, p. 138. 58 Chirinos, Historia de la Republica, p. 441. 59 Chirinos, Historia de la Republica, p. 429; Gilbert, La oligarquía peruana, pp. 60-61. 60 Rios, Chile y Peru: Los pactos de 1929, p. 73. 61 St. John, The Foreign Policy of Peru, pp. 160-161. 62 See Ugarteche, La Politica Internacional Peruana Durante la Dictadura de Leguía, pp. 74-75 for one such criticism of Leguía’s foreign policy. 63 Dennis, Tacna and Arica, p. 205. Some, including Ugarteche, La Politica Internacional Peruana Durante la Dictadura de Leguía, accused Leguía of being to friendly with the US and argued that the reliance on a US arbitration was a mistake from the beginning (p. 75). 64 Arbitration Between Peru and Chile: The Case of Peru 1923, pp. 22-25; The Counter Case of Peru, 1924, p. 32. 65 Arbitration Between Peru and Chile: The Case of Peru 1923, p. 22. 66 Ibid., p. 29. 41

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Ibid., p. 25. The Counter Case of Peru, 1924, p. 38. 69 Documentos Relativos al Plebiscito, p. 30. 70 Ibid., pp. 24-25, 28-29, 30. 71 Ibid., p. 51. 72 Pike, The Modern History of Peru, p. 231. 73 Dennis, Tacna and Arica, p. 214-215. 74 Rios, Chile y Peru: Los pactos de 1929, p. 85. 75 St. John, The Foreign Policy of Peru, p. 163; Pike, The Modern History of Peru, pp. 218-219; Rios, Chile y Peru: Los pactos de 1929, p. 95. See Rios, Chile y Peru: Los pactos de 1929, pp. 76-96, and Dennis, Tacna and Arica, pp. 227-259, for a discussion of the works of and the difficulties faced by the plebiscitary commission. 76 Quoted in Dennis, Tacna and Arica, p. 261. 77 St. John, The Foreign Policy of Peru, p. 163. 78 Rios, Chile y Peru: Los pactos de 1929, p. 97. 79 Dennis, Tacna and Arica, p. 265. 80 Ibid., p. 267. 81 St. John, The Foreign Policy of Peru, pp. 163-164. 82 Novak, Las Conversaciones entre Perú y Chile para la Ejecución del Tratado de 1929, pp. 27-28. 83 Dennis, Tacna and Arica, p. 282. 84 Novak, Las Conversaciones entre Perú y Chile para la Ejecución del Tratado de 1929, p. 32. The subterfuge did fool many people. Dennis, Tacna and Arica, does not discuss the secret negotiations; rather, he refers to US President Hoover “announc[ing] a final settlement of the dispute” (p. 282). 85 Pike, The Modern History of Peru, p. 232. Among scholars, there is some disagreement as to how popular the Tacna and Arica Treaty was with the public. Pike refers to opposition only by extreme nationalists. Dennis, Tacna and Arica, reports that the majority of the people in Peru supported the document, as did the major presses in Peru and around the world. Dennis argues that the only opponents in Peru were Leguía’s critics and some small student groups (pp. 282-283). St. John, The Foreign Policy of Peru says the “treaty was well received by a majority of citizens in both Peru and Chile” (p. 164). Masterson, Militarism and Politics in Latin America says that Leguía’s move to cede Arica was extremely unpopular nationally and helped lead to his eventual overthrow (p. 33). Finally, Ugarteche, La Politica Internacional Peruana Durante la Dictadura de Leguía, is a lengthy indictment of Leguía’s foreign policy, the central criticism being his subservience to the United States. 86 By 1932, the value of Peruvian exports had fallen thirty-five percent compared to 1927-28. This had both direct and secondary impacts. First, it slowed Peruvian growth and increased unemployment. The secondary impact was the lost revenue that made repaying foreign debt more difficult (Gilbert, La oligarquía peruana, pp. 61-62). 87 Burga and Galindo, Apogeo y Crisis de la Republica Aristocratica, pp. 199-200. 88 Masterson, Militarism and Politics in Latin America, pp. 33-34; Pike, The Modern History of Peru, pp. 247-249; Burga and Galindo, Apogeo y Crisis 68

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de la Republica Aristocratica, p. 198; Pease, Breve Historia Contemporánea del Perú, pp. 170-171. 89 Rios, Chile y Peru: Los pactos de 1929, p. 408. 90 St. John, The Foreign Policy of Peru, pp. 151-153. Leguía was not prepared to make major concessions to Ecuador and Colombia, though he was interested in negotiating. 91 Marett, Peru, pp. 130-131. Marett also notes that unlike most presidents of Peru during the Aristocratic Republic, Leguía had middle-class origins and rose through the ranks based largely on merit. 92 This set of negotiations will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 93 Quoted in Pike, Chile and the United States, p. 158. 94 Pike, Chile and the United States, p. 158. 95 Ibid., pp. 155-159. 96 Pike, “Aspects of Class Relations in Chile,” pp. 20-21. 97 Remmer, “The Timing, Pace and Sequence of Political Change in Chile, 1891-1925,” p. 225. 98 Scully, Rethinking the Center, pp. 64-66. 99 Remmer, Party Competition in Argentina and Chile, p. 81; Valenzuela, “The Origins and Transformation of the Chilean Party System,” pp. 27-29; Scully, Rethinking the Center, p. 77. 100 León, Evolución Histórica de los Partidos Políticos Chilenos, pp. 66-68, 81-82. 101 Remmer, Party Competition in Argentina and Chile, p. 41. 102 Sigmund, “Chile,” p. 148. 103 Valenzuela, “The Origins and Transformation of the Chilean Party System,” pp. 27-29; Remmer, “The Timing, Pace and Sequence of Political Change in Chile, 1891-1925,” pp. 209-210. 104 Sigmund, “Chile,” pp. 149-150; Remmer, Party Competition in Argentina and Chile, p. 36. 105 Remmer, Party Competition in Argentina and Chile, p. 85. 106 Haring, “Chilean Politics, 1920-1928,” pp. 2-3. 107 Ibid., p. 3. 108 Ibid., p. 3 109 Scully, Rethinking the Center, p. 82. 110 Pike, Chile and the United States, p. 214. 111 Ibid., pp. 214-215. 112 St. John, The Foreign Policy of Peru, p. 160; Dennis, Tacna and Arica, p. 205. 113 Rios, Chile y Peru: Los pactos de 1929, pp. 74-75. 114 Pike, Chile and the United States, pp. 216-217. 115 Ibid., p. 217. 116 Arbitration Between Peru and Chile: The Counter-case of the Republic of Chile 1924. 117 He only received a leave of absence because the Senate refused his resignation. See Haring, “Chilean Politics, 1920-1928,” pp. 7-9; Scully, Rethinking the Center, pp. 83-84; Valenzuela, “The Origins and Transformation of the Chilean Party System,” p. 24. 118 Haring, “Chilean Politics, 1920-1928,” p. 10.

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Scully, Rethinking the Center, p. 84. Haring, “Chilean Politics, 1920-1928,” p. 11. 121 Rios, Chile y Peru: Los pactos de 1929, p. 76. 122 Haring, “Chilean Politics, 1920-1928,” pp. 13-14. 123 Collier and Collier, Shaping the Political Arena, p. 177. 124 Haring, “Chilean Politics, 1920-1928,” pp. 19-21. 125 Pike, Chile and the United States, pp. 186-187. 126 Ibid., pp. 216-217; Rios, Chile y Peru: Los pactos de 1929, pp. 76-96. Rios insisted that Chile was only interested in carrying out the plebiscite according to the decision reached by the arbiter and accused Peru of working to insure the failure of the plebiscite from the beginning. He argues that the Chilean delegation’s only goal was to “pursue through all possible means, according to the instructions imparted by its government, the realization of public opinion” through the plebiscite (pp. 77-78). 127 Rios, Chile y Peru: Los pactos de 1929, pp. 101-103. 128 Pike, Chile and the United States, pp. 186-187; Collier and Collier, Shaping the Political Arena, p. 177. 129 Scully, Rethinking the Center, p. 85. 130 Ibid., Collier and Collier, Shaping the Political Arena, p. 191. 131 Dennis, Tacna and Arica, pp. 276-277. 132 Pike, Chile and the United States, p. 229. 133 Rios, Chile y Peru: Los pactos de 1929, p. 195. 134 Dennis, Tacna and Arica, pp. 282-283. 135 Pike, Chile and the United States, pp. 224-232. Rios devotes six pages of his account of the 1929 treaty to quotations from dignitaries and newspaper editorials around the Americas and the world celebrating the restoration of diplomatic relations (pp. 201-206). Thirteen pages are devoted to a review of world opinion in response to the settlement of the Tacna and Arica dispute (pp. 373-385). The emphasis placed on the positive diplomatic reception of the agreement, coupled with his other statements, demonstrates that restoring Chilean prestige was a strong motivating factor to settle the dispute with Peru. 136 Pike, Chile and the United States, p. 214. 137 Ibid., pp. 218-219. 138 See St. John, The Foreign Policy of Peru, p. 163; Dennis, Tacna and Arica, pp. 229-31. 139 Pike, Chile and the United States, p. 231-235. 120

6 Peru and Ecuador: Rivalry Sustained

The rivalry between Peru and Ecuador was one of the longest rivalries between in the modern-state system. The boundary dispute in the territory of the Amazonian headwaters that underlay the rivalry between the two states pre-dates the existence of Ecuador. When Peru gained its independence in 1821, Ecuador was still part of Gran Colombia. Ecuador gained its independence in 1830 and inherited the border dispute with Peru. Despite several attempts to solve the dispute, Ecuador and Peru fought a war over the region as recently as 1995. Following that conflict, the two sides finally demarcated the remaining portion of their border, bringing to a close more than a century and a half of rivalry. This chapter focuses on the relationship between Ecuador and Peru from 1919-1930. As noted in the previous chapter, Peru settled its rivalry with Chile during this time period, but failed in its attempt to find an agreement with Ecuador. The failure to find an agreement in the 1920s was the result of two factors. First, Peru was able to redress many of its concerns over the border with Ecuador through negotiations with Colombia. In 1916, Colombia and Ecuador agreed to the Muñoz Vernaza-Suaréz Treaty in which Ecuador ceded territories claimed by Peru to Ecuador. Peru protested that Ecuador had no authority to cede the territory, but did little to actually address the situation initially. Domestic unrest in Peru then led to the rise of Leguía. The combination of the diplomatic failure of 1916 and the domestic policy crisis that brought Leguía to power did lead to a change in Peruvian policy, but in this case it led Peru to negotiate with Colombia. Through the Salomón-Lozano Treaty with Colombia, Peru recovered the territory that had been ceded to Ecuador. Peru did not demonstrate a strong commitment to negotiations with Ecuador; in 1924 the two states signed the Ponce-Castro Oyanguran Protocol that called for the states to begin negotiations once Peru had settled its dispute with Chile.

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Ecuador did want to negotiate with Peru under the Leguía administration, but it was originally willing to give little in return. After Ecuador became aware of the negotiations leading to the SalomónLozano Treaty, it began to push harder for negotiations, eventually agreeing to the Ponce-Castro Oyanguran Protocol. Shortly after agreeing to the protocol, presidential elections in Ecuador led to a change in policy. In short order, a coup overthrew that president, followed by a second, corrective coup. The rapid changes in government made establishing any foreign policy difficult, but once it became more stable, Ecuador began to push hard for new negotiations with Peru. The domestic turmoil combined with Peru’s success in improving its position along the border through the treaty with Colombia led Ecuador to begin softening its position. Despite Ecuador’s willingness to move ahead, Peru still insisted on waiting until negotiations with Chile were complete before it would negotiate with Ecuador. Leguía’s ouster and subsequent instability in both Ecuador and Peru basically ended any immediate chance for agreement. The alternative hypotheses also provide strong predictions in this case. Peru exhibited classic balancing behavior in its relationship with Ecuador by pursuing agreements with states that had previously supported Ecuador. Its agreements with Colombia and Chile essentially left Ecuador isolated. Once those agreements had been reached, Peru had little reason to seriously negotiate with Ecuador. Ecuador, on the other hand, was completely isolated by Peru’s diplomatic successes. It no longer had any allies in its relationship with Peru and, due to Peru’s close relationship with the United States, had little opportunity to use a relationship with an outside power to bring pressure to bear on Peru. As expected, Ecuador did seek rapprochement with Peru once conditions seemed to call for it. The one drawback of a structural realist argument is that Ecuador should have taken almost any step necessary to make agreement happen regardless of who was in power. Subsequent governments in Ecuador resumed the rivalry relationship, even entering into war with Peru in 1941. The remainder of this chapter analyzes the evolution of relations between Peru and Ecuador. Section one summarizes the relationship from 1821-1919, ending with a discussion of why earlier peace efforts failed. The second section traces Peruvian decision-making toward Ecuador in this period, ending with an evaluation of the ability of the primary hypotheses to explain Peruvian actions.1 Section three examines the interplay between Ecuador’s domestic and foreign policies, paying particular attention to Ecuador’s difficulty in putting forward a

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consistent foreign policy in the 1920s. The final section compares the predictions of the primary and secondary hypotheses and discusses the role Peru’s conflict with Chile played in this rivalry. Section One: Peru and Ecuador from 1821-1919

The dispute between Ecuador and Peru emerged because of the difficulty in determining the borders of administrative units under the Spanish crown. As Latin American states began to gain their independence, the question of borders naturally arose. In most cases in Latin America, the application of the legal principle uti possidetis juris meant that the borders were fixed according to colonial administrative lines. Significant confusion over the border between Peru and Ecuador made the principle almost impossible to apply.2 The source of confusion was due both to the rugged nature of the terrain and due to conflicting colonial administrative units. In Spanish controlled colonies, the colonial administrative units often coincided with administrative units of the Church. In the case of Ecuador and Peru, however, the units did not always overlap. The confusion surrounding the administrative units was made more complex by statements and actions of both the King of Spain and the Roman Catholic Church that seemed to contradict one another.3 The first real attempt to settle the border came in the Treaty of Guayaquil (1829) between Gran Columbia and Peru. This treaty made peace between the two states after a brief war and, on its face, seemed to cede much of the territory that would later be claimed by Ecuador to Colombia by returning to the boundaries of the pre-independence colonial units.4 The treaty called for the two states to form a commission to settle any disputes in the boundary.5 This commission never fulfilled its duties.6 In order to settle the boundary, the two states agreed to an additional protocol. This protocol, the Pedemonte-Mosquera Protocol, would serve as a primary legal basis for Ecuador’s territorial claims against Peru. The protocol was never ratified, however. In fact, General Tomás Cipriano Mosquera, who negotiated the protocol for Colombia, did not present a copy to the Colombian government until 1870. Ecuador did not receive a certified copy until 1904.7 In 1830, Ecuador declared its independence from Gran Colombia and inherited the disputed border with Peru. The border conflict led to periods of tensions between Ecuador and Peru several times in the coming decades, including a military dispute that led to the Peruvian occupation of some Ecuadorian territory in 1859.8 Ecuador also tried to take advantage of Peru’s losses in the War

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of the Pacific, but was unable to fully take control over the disputed territories.9 The two parties did make some effort to solve their conflict, however. The 1887 Espinosa-Bonifaz Convention agreed to submit the boundary dispute to Spanish arbitration. That arbitration was briefly suspended during a period of direct negotiations in the late 1880s that led to the Herrera-García Treaty (1890), settling most outstanding border disputes. Ecuador quickly ratified the treaty; Peru did not.10 The Spanish arbitration moved forward, interrupted briefly in 1894 when Peru, Ecuador and Colombia agreed to expand the arbitration to include questions involving disputed borders with Colombia. Ecuador never ratified this additional convention, and Peru rescinded its ratification in 1895.11 The following decade was one of strained relations between the two states. The 1904 Valverde-Corenjo Protocol seemed to be a step forward by outlining the parameters of the Spanish arbitration. When news of the King of Spain’s final decision became available, however, Ecuador quickly denounced the arbitration.12 The King’s decision was largely supportive of Peru’s position; due to the strong opposition in Ecuador, Spain withdrew its arbitration before ever officially announcing the decision. In December 1910, the United States, Brazil and Argentina recommended that the two parties submit the dispute to arbitration, but Ecuador refused; the Ecuadorian government strongly favored direct negotiation to arbitration.13 The next opportunity to settle the dispute came in 1913 when Peruvian president Billinghurst proposed a mixed formula to settle the dispute. The two parties would draw the border through direct negotiations where they could agree; areas of dispute would be settled via arbitration. Ecuador rejected the arbitration component of the proposal, and a military coup removed Billinghurst from power a short time later.14 Tensions between the two states rose again in 1916 as Ecuador signed a border agreement with Colombia that ceded some of the lands that were under dispute with Peru. The Muñoz Vernaza-Suaréz Treaty settled relations between Colombia and Ecuador, but highlighted the ongoing tensions between Peru and Ecuador on the eve of Leguía’s rise to power in 1919.15 Analyzing Relations: 1819-1919

The failure of Peru and Ecuador to successfully negotiate an end to their rivalry in this time period is as much a result of domestic intrigue in both states as it is their foreign policy ineptitude. The primary hypotheses would not have predicted a successful settlement of their

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dispute at any of these points, with the possible exception of the immediate aftermath of the War of the Pacific. Peru’s resounding military defeat of Ecuador in 1859 could have resulted in a final settlement, but Ecuador’s domestic situation was so disorganized that the Peruvian president was unable to find a party in Ecuador with whom to negotiate.16 Though a domestic failure may be a necessary condition to bring about peace, the absence of a functioning government makes the negotiation of such a peace difficult. The first true attempt by the two sides to rectify the border situation was the Espinoza-Bonifaz Convention (1887) submitting the dispute to Spanish arbitration. Consistent with expectations, this agreement occurred during a time of difficulty for both states. Peru had just suffered humiliation during the War of the Pacific, and the war itself had led to an uncertain domestic situation in Peru from which it was gradually emerging by 1887. Though this agreement was an advance in the relationship, it really did not settle anything other than the decision to arbitrate the dispute. The two sides did not even fully agree on what was to be arbitrated.17 The subsequent decision to negotiate the HerreraGarcía Treaty (1890) can also be seen in this light – it came after a time of profound embarrassment for Peru. Ecuador was suffering its own domestic crisis in the 1880s as several conflicting elements representing conservative and liberal factions as well as competing regional interests engaged in almost perpetual combat for control of Peru.18 That the agreement did not hold is not terribly surprising – though Peru had suffered a foreign policy failure, it was not related to Ecuador. Given the lack of a true incentive to enact dramatic changes in its border with Ecuador, the Peruvian representative, Arturo Garcia, was constrained in how much he could give Ecuador. In addition, Peru had embarked on a remarkable recovery after the War of the Pacific and was returning to domestic stability.19 The Peruvian Congress felt the agreement went too far; it refused to approve the agreement without major changes that basically reflected Peru’s prior position.20 In the face of the Peruvian Congress’s demands, Ecuador decided that no agreement was possible. Finally, the cluster of circumstances in 1910 was also not conducive to peace. At long last, the Spanish arbitration was due to be announced. Peru at this time was in relatively strong shape economically, and was not experiencing any difficulties along the border with Ecuador. The arbitration itself was remarkably favorable for Peru, meaning that it would not be willing to make any concessions. When Billinghurst later tried to make concessions in 1913, his opponents removed him from

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power. Conditions in Ecuador were no more positive. Though the Ecuadorian president was facing domestic opposition at the time,21 the failure that the potential Spanish Arbitration represented was that of a failed peace initiative. Ecuador had always favored direct negotiations (unlike Peru). The failure of arbitration simply reinforced this view and may have contributed to the failure to embrace Billinghurst’s mixed formula of negotiations and arbitration.22 Section Two: Peru

Prior to 1919, Peru’s policy toward Ecuador had been predicated on submitting their dispute to arbitration. The Spanish arbitration decision of 1910 had basically confirmed Peru’s position, though it was never officially announced. Though Peru was interested in settling its dispute with Ecuador, the results of the arbitration coupled with Peru’s strong military position compared to Ecuador meant that it was in no hurry to give concessions to Ecuador. Ecuador’s decision to negotiate and sign the 1916 Muñoz Vernaza-Suaréz Treaty with Colombia soon prompted Peruvian action.23 As noted in the previous chapter, social unrest began to appear in Peru during World War I and came to a head in 1919 with the election of Leguía and his subsequent seizure of power. Given the diplomatic setback that the 1916 Ecuador-Colombia agreement represented coupled with social unrest that brought Leguía to power, Peru should have initiated some sort of conversation with Ecuador on borders. In 1919 Peru informally agreed that Ecuador and Peru should submit a map to each other that contained boundary lines representing each sides’ maximal concession.24 Though Leguía submitted Peru’s proposal in April 1920, Ecuador never gave an official reply to the Peruvian position. Instead, Ecuador pushed Peru to negotiate the outstanding border issues in Washington. Peru was hesitant to do this at the time, especially as many of its diplomatic resources were tied to its attempt to settle its dispute with Chile.25 Peru was also hesitant to push forward with direct negotiations with Ecuador because Leguía had devised a strategy to rectify the loss of land along the northern border as a result of the Muñoz Vernaza-Suaréz Treaty: negotiation with Colombia, another of Peru’s rivals. In his campaign for the presidency in 1919, Leguía expressed a desire to fix Peru’s northern borders; the 1916 agreement between Ecuador and Colombia had threatened Peru’s upper hand in negotiations with Ecuador. Thankfully for Peru, elements in Colombia were equally ready

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to settle the border dispute between the two states.26 Early in his presidency, Leguía initiated secret negotiations with the Colombian ambassador to Peru, Fabio Lozano y Torrijos. Their negotiations, which occurred while Peru was also discussing the format of negotiations with Ecuador, led to the Salomón-Lozano Treaty. Through this treaty, Peru gave Colombia direct access to the Amazon River while Colombia gave Peru territory that had been ceded to it in the 1916 treaty with Ecuador south of the Putumayo River.27 Though many in Peru opposed the treaty as they felt that it gave far too much to the Colombians, the territory it acquired from Colombia was in the center of the territories under dispute between Peru and Ecuador. This acquisition by Peru greatly undermined Ecuadorian claims to the area and strengthened the Peruvian negotiating position with Ecuador. It also split the tacit alliance between Colombia and Ecuador that had threatened to undermine Peru’s position.28 Even with the Colombian concessions, opposition to the treaty within Peru was so strong that it was not ratified until December 1927.29 Once it had obtained its arbitration with Chile and signed a treaty with Colombia, Peru was prepared to respond to Ecuador’s request to undertake negotiations in Washington. Ecuadorian Foreign Minister N. Clemente Ponce and Peruvian representative Enrique Castro y Oyanguran negotiated the Ponce-Castro Oyanguran Protocol, completed in June 1924, that called for Peru and Ecuador to directly negotiate over the territories under dispute and to submit any areas that remained under dispute to US arbitration.30 Negotiations would begin in Washington, D.C., as soon as Peru’s dispute with Chile was settled.31 The settlement reflected Peru’s goal of having an arbiter decide the final border with Ecuador based on principles of law that had been thwarted when Ecuador rejected the results of the Spanish arbitration in 1910.32 At the same time, it did give Ecuador concession of having direct negotiations before submitting any remaining matters to the arbiter. In this way, it resembled the negotiations with Chile that led to the submission of that dispute to the United States for arbitration. Chile and Peru exchanged ratifications of their agreement on Tacna and Arica in July 1929. With that agreement settled, Peru approached Ecuador about beginning negotiations in accordance with the PonceCastro Oyanguran Protocol; the two sides agreed in December 1929 to proceed with negotiations. Unfortunately, both states would undergo changes in government before any fruitful discussions could be held. A military junta led by Lieutenant-Colonel Luis Sánchez Cerro deposed Leguía on 22 August 1930.33 Leguiá’s removal from power led to a four-year period of unrest in Peru that included Sánchez Cerro’s

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resignation from the ruling junta, his election as president, and his assassination. Negotiations with Ecuador during this time period were an afterthought. The major foreign policy problem that would haunt Sánchez Cerro was the outbreak of violence between Peru and Colombia over Leticia, a city populated primarily by Peruvians that had been handed over to Colombia in the Salomón-Lozano treaty. Peru’s next president, appointed by the Congress after Sánchez Cerro’s assassination, resolved that dispute with the help of the League of Nations.34 The new government began talks with Ecuador in 1934, but could not come to agreement on whether any arbitration would be based on principles of law or on principles of equity (Peru favored law).35 Negotiations began in earnest in 1936 based on the conditions that: 1) Any arbitration would be based on principles of law; 2) The parties would meet in Washington, D.C., on September 30, 1936; 3) The two states would maintain the status quo border until the end of negotiations, though this did not constitute recognition of the existing border.36 These talks also failed and were suspended in September 1938.37 Conclusion: Peru

Peru’s policy toward Ecuador had long been that the dispute should be settled in arbitration. The one president who had suggested direct negotiations with arbitration to settle any outstanding concerns was ousted, partially as a result of his foreign policy. Events in both foreign and domestic policy soon led to a shift in Peruvian foreign policy; a treaty between Ecuador and Colombia granting land claimed by Peru to Colombia represented a challenge to Peru’s policy on its northern border. This challenge was accompanied by a domestic crisis. The end result was a reevaluation of Peru’s policy toward both Ecuador and Colombia. While it reached an agreement to enter into a mixed formula of negotiation and arbitration with Ecuador similar to the one Billinghurst had proposed in 1913, it negotiated in secret with Colombia to recover territories it had long claimed in its dispute with Ecuador. Foreign policy failure combined with domestic failure had allowed the shift in policy, in accordance with hypothesis one.

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At the same time, Peru did make a limited effort to engage Ecuador in a manner that they had not in the past. Though Peru subverted early negotiations with Ecuador, Leguía did intend to carry out negotiations at a later date; the negotiations were simply not his priority. Indicative of Peru’s changed mood toward Ecuador in the 1920s, Leguía followed through on his commitment in the Ponce-Castro Oyanguran Protocol by approaching Ecuador for a resumption of negotiations once Peru ratified the peace treaty with Chile. Subsequent governments thwarted that peace effort. This case also provides some evidence in support of hypothesis two, that states engaged in multiple rivalries are more likely to experience foreign policy failure. Peru was engaged in rivalries with Peru and Colombia; the settlement between Ecuador and Colombia presented a challenge to Peru’s relationship with both. At the same time, the involvement in multiple rivalries also gave Peru multiple options. Rather than entering into direct negotiations with Ecuador, it was able to choose negotiating partners; in this case Colombia. In this regard, Peru’s situation was similar to that of Israel in the 1970s in that both had a choice of how to rectify their failure. Finally, Peru provides strong confirmation for hypothesis five. Peruvians in general were supportive of Leguía until late in his presidency when the economy began to turn. At the same time, the degree of concessions to Colombia had inflamed those who already opposed Leguía and led to a delay in ratification of the agreement. Opposition to the agreement was especially intense among members of the Civilista party that Leguía had removed from power. Together with Peruvian rubber interests, who were also negatively effected by the agreement, they inflamed opposition.38 Once the economy began to decline, a coalition representing the old elite ousted Leguía and returned power. They attempted to reverse some of Leguía’s foreign policy steps and succeeded in blocking agreement with Ecuador, but were ultimately unable to reverse peace with Chile or with Colombia. Domestic crises brought Leguía to power and led to his removal. In both cases, those who led the opposition were most likely to thwart peace. Under the new administrations, Peru returned to its hard line position toward Ecuador.

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Section Three: Ecuador Ecuador’s Foreign Policy: 1919-1920

Before Leguía came to power, Ecuador’s foreign policy was predicated on the desire for direct negotiations with Peru. If arbitration were to occur, Ecuador demanded that it include principles of equity in place of, or at least in addition to, principles of law. Such a demand would require the arbiter to consider not only the parties’ legal claims, but also the equitable distribution of disputed territories. In 1919, Ecuador seemed to be in a strong position. The Muñoz Vernaza-Suaréz Treaty strengthened its position with Peru by creating another ally in its border dispute and providing recognition by another state of some of its border claims.39 Immediately prior to Leguía’s seizure of power in July, Ecuador accused Peru of military incursions into the disputed territory and filed a protest with the government.40 This incident did not escalate dramatically, but did cause some anger in Ecuador. Nonetheless, Ecuador was not overly dissatisfied with its negotiating position as of 1920. Ecuador’s Domestic Policy in 1919

Ecuador’s economy was quite successful in the first part of the twentieth century, largely due to the export-oriented cacao industry.41 In 1904, cacao represented between sixty and seventy percent of all Ecuadorian exports, and Ecuador was the world’s largest producer of cacao.42 As cacao production was centered along the coast and major rivers, economic growth was not uniform around the country. In fact, the agroexport industry further intensified the regionalization of Ecuador. Lack of infrastructure meant that the wealth being generated along the coast did not lead to significant advances in the rest of Ecuador.43 The growth and development of Guayaquil, the central port for the cacao sector, made it easier for people in the cacao region to engage in external trade than in trade with other parts of Ecuador, especially the northern regions. Likewise, northern Ecuador had more trade with Colombia in certain sectors than with the cacao region.44 Closely tied to the powerful agri-businesses was the Ecuadorian banking sector, the primary holder of Ecuadorian debt.45 This cluster of interest, including the wealthy landed elite and the banking sector, used the strength of cacao to cement control over the country.46 In the teens and early twenties, two major trends began to challenge the dominance of cacao in Ecuador. First, the development of rail

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transportation in Ecuador finally began to decrease the regionalization of the country and helped lead to investment in industries that were not directly tied to agri-business.47 Second, a variety of factors led to a dramatic decline in the cacao industry. Global demand for cacao, which at the time was considered a luxury item, dropped dramatically as World War I gripped Europe. While demand was decreasing, Ecuador also began to face greater competition in production from Brazil and Africa. Finally, an agricultural disease devastated cacao producing regions in Ecuador in the early 1920s. Exports peaked in 1916 and steadily declined thereafter.48 The decline in cacao exports only reinforced the increasing diversification in industry and agricultural exports.49 As the agriculture industry declined and industry began to grow, many agricultural workers began to migrate to the cities, adding to a growing urban working class.50 The Second National Congress of Workers in 1920 and the growth of labor and artisan unions signaled a change in Ecuadorian politics. Though still small, organizations representing the middle class and labor were growing.51 These factors working together would undermine the ability of the agricultural elite to control politics in the 1920s.52 Nonetheless, in 1920 the Liberal Party, a coalition of powerful export-oriented landowners, the more conservative traditional landed aristocracy in central Ecuador, some industrialist, and the banking sector, had political control over the country. In 1920, the last regular election of the cacao era in Ecuador brought José Luis Tamayo to power. Ecuador: 1920-1930

Far from making concessions to the growing middle and worker classes when he came to power, Tamayo further increased the power of the banking sector by giving Commercial and Agricultural Bank of Guayaquil monopolistic control over production, sale and transport of sugar, tobacco and alcohol. One result of this action was an increase in prices for these commodities within Ecuador.53 The rising prices coupled with rising unemployment due to the failing cacao sector led to great dissatisfaction among Ecuador’s workers. A general strike in 1922 signaled the growing organizational power and unrest of the working classes with the government; the government resorted to violence to end the strike.54 According to Pareja, “what is truly important to notice [about the strike] is that, beginning in 1922, the man in the street participated actively in public life.”55

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Tamayo also held the line on Ecuadorian relations with Peru for the most part. Tamayo’s Minister of Foreign Relations, N. Clemente Ponce was “preoccupied with how to approach the problem that had absorbed the attention of all Ecuadorian Foreign Ministers… the border dispute with Peru.”56 The relationship with Peru became more strained in 1921 when Ecuador failed to send an official representative to Peru’s centennial celebration.57 Perez maintains that this act was not an intentional affront by Ecuador, but rather was a simple mix-up by the government.58 Despite this increase in tensions, Ecuador was somewhat optimistic about the moves made by Peru in 1921 to restart negotiations, believing that this was a good opportunity to resolve their differences. Ponce soon articulated Ecuadorian acceptance of a mixed formula that would include direct negotiations followed by arbitration of any remaining disagreements. The acceptance of arbitration was a small break with the past, but one that Ponce defended as necessary to bring about direct negotiations with Peru.59 As Ecuador moved forward in its attempts to negotiate with Peru, it was unaware that Peru was simultaneously negotiating with Colombia. Before it realized the full content of the Salomón-Lozano Treaty, Ecuador continued to push the “mixed formula” of direct negotiations coupled with arbitration on continued areas of dispute. This formula was very similar to that agreed to by Chile and Peru in their dispute. Ponce grew frustrated with Peru’s delays and was not satisfied with Leguía’s response that he did not have the resources necessary to carry on simultaneous negotiations with Chile and Ecuador.60 Once it became aware of the Salomón-Lozano Treaty, Ecuador was quite upset that Peru had “feigned” interest in a settlement while simultaneously pursuing negotiations with Colombia.61 Despite its dissatisfaction with Peru, Ecuador continued pursuing the mixed formula. Eventually, Ponce succeeded in gaining a formal agreement binding the two states to negotiate their border dispute and to submit any outstanding issues to arbitration. The 1924 Ponce-Castro Oyanguren protocol caused widespread opposition in selected portions of Ecuador based on three main points. First, it gave priority to Peru’s relationship with Chile, cementing Ecuador’s inferior status. Second, it did not specify whether the arbitration would be based on law, equity or both. Finally, the document did not contain a clear acknowledgement of Ecuadorian rights.62 Gonzalo S. Córdova, the Liberal Party candidate for president in the 1924 elections, spoke out publicly against the protocol. In the ensuing election, Córdova defeated Juan Miguel Lasso, a widely popular

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candidate. The election was marked by widespread fraud and repression.63 Córdova came to power on September 1, 1924. After he was elected and assumed the presidency in 1924, he moved quickly to change the protocol. His government immediately proposed amending the protocol to tie direct negotiations with Peru to the timing of the arbiter’s decision in the Tacna and Arica dispute rather than to the ultimate settlement of the question and wanted more specification on the nature of the arbitration.64 The Córdova government also was left to address the aftermath of the Salomón-Lozano Treaty as it moved toward ratification in 1925. Instead of enjoying an upper hand in negotiations over the Amazon region and having the support of Colombia, the new treaty allowed Peru to gain an upper hand in the region under dispute and eliminated Colombia’s support for Ecuador.65 Córdova worked to prevent the ratification of the treaty, but had to be careful in its efforts in part because of the strong US support for ratification. If Ecuador still wanted the favor of the United States in its relationship with Peru, it had to be careful in its diplomatic efforts related to the Salomón-Lozano Treaty.66 Córdova’s presidency was short lived, however. On July 10, 1925, less than a year after Córdova took office, the League of Young Military Officers staged a bloodless coup that removed him from office. The Julian Revolution was an attempt to displace the old ruling elite with a progressive government that would reflect the will of the people. The military leaders of the coup decided that the government would be run by civilian heads of the various ministries with a presidency that rotated among the members on a weekly basis.67 Early on, the junta was determined to decrease the traditional sources of power in the country and to remove the Liberal party from politics. One of the first targets, for example, was the banking industry. The ruling junta was not able to firmly establish itself, however. It was able to implement limited reforms, but in the end was forced to make alliances with some members of the old ruling elite, particularly large landowners from the central part of Ecuador who had not been involved in the cacao industry.68 The ruling junta underwent numerous changes in the ensuing months, including a completely new set of leaders in January 1926.69 The complicated structure of the junta and its internal struggles made the conducting of foreign policy nearly impossible. The one step the junta made was to break diplomatic relations with Colombia after its October 1925 ratification of the Salomón Lozano Treaty.70

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After several months of casting about with no true leadership, the military named Isidro Ayora president on April 1, 1926.71 The government under Ayora implemented further reforms, working to better incorporate the middle classes and labor both through the granting of social benefits and better incorporation into the political system. Most importantly, Ayora sought to limit the power of the agri-export sector centered in Guayaquil.72 One important step to undercut the old sources of political power was the creation of a Central Bank. In addition, the government eliminated private monopolies and created a pension fund for public employees. New laws were passed to limit workers’ hours, regulate female and child labor, and govern workers’ hiring and dismissal. Finally, Ayora oversaw the creation of a new constitution in 1929 – Ecuador’s thirteenth constitution – that established habeus corpus and addressed the rights of political minorities.73 Once he had established his domestic authority, Ayora did take an interest in foreign affairs. His government attempted to engage Peru in negotiations in the wake of the failure of the Tacna and Arica plebiscite, but Peru rebuffed Ayora’s overtures. After the Ecuadorian government began moving toward constitutional rule in 1928, it again made an effort restart negotiations, including the appointment of a commission to study how Ecuador should proceed. This commission determined that negotiations should begin with the Herrera-García Treaty lines from 1890 and that any arbitration should include not only the United States, but also Argentina and Brazil as arbiters.74 The establishment of this commission did signal a break with the past in that Ecuador was using as a starting point a border that it had previously defined as its fallback position. In addition, Ecuador made it clear that it was serious about arbitration by including Argentina and Brazil as potential arbiters.75 After the final settlement of the Tacna and Arica dispute, Ecuador had mixed feelings. On the one hand, negotiations with Peru could now move forward. On the other, “Ecuador had lost the traditional friendship of Chile” in its dispute with Peru.76 As noted above, Leguía did contact Ecuador about opening negotiations in December 1929. Leguía’s removal from power in 1930 signaled the end of any realistic opportunity to negotiate, as the new government in Peru had little interest in peace with Ecuador.77 The Ayora government itself only lasted until August 24, 1931 when a military coup removed itfrom power. As the depression spread around the world, demand for cacao declined as did demand for other Ecuadorian exports. In 1932, the total value of Ecuador’s exports was only one-third of what it had been in

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1928.78 This decline had a devastating effect on Ecuador’s stability. Between Ayora’s fall from power and 1940, only one leader held power for more than one year.79 No political group was able to gain sufficient support to dominate the political system. The working and middle classes, though much better organized than they had been in 1920, were still primarily regionally based rather than being part of a national movement.80 The original landed aristocracy did not have wide enough support to maintain effective control over the entire country; while those who gained wealth through agro-exports had seen their power and influence fall with cacao exports.81 Political chaos reigned throughout the 1930s. This political situation made any substantive talks between Ecuador and Peru essentially meaningless. Though Ecuador and Peru did initiate some conversations during the 1930s, none of them bore any fruit. Even when Peru faced a major crisis in its relationship with Colombia over an uprising in the city of Leticia, handed over to Colombia in the SalomónLozano Treaty, Ecuador was not able to take advantage of the situation. Ecuador attempted to intervene in the diplomatic efforts of Brazil, the United States and the League of Nations to resolve the Colombia/Peru dispute, but was not able to do so effectively.82 Conclusion: Ecuador

Ecuador’s instability in the latter half of the 1920s and into the 1930s makes it difficult to judge its foreign policy. Nonetheless, Ecuador did shift its policy in the latter part of the 1920s. What led to this change? When Leguía came to power, Ecuador was in a strong international position, believing that the Muñoz Vernaza-Suaréz Treaty with Colombia had left it in a relatively strong position in its negotiations with Peru. Though it made minor concessions initially, the cornerstone of its policy was direct negotiations. Once the Tamayo government learned of the Salomón-Lozano Treaty, it gave more concessions to Peru in the Ponce-Castro Oyanguren Protocol. Importantly, this agreement generated significant opposition, especially among members of the dominant Liberal party. When Córdova took office, he attempted to amend the agreement to more closely reflect traditional policies. At this time, despite the failure represented by Salomón-Lozano and a general strike in 1922, a new coalition had not managed to come to power. The old guard politicians who maintained power objected to changes in Ecuador’s foreign policies. This series of events strongly supports the causal logic of

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hypotheses three and four, which together state that State B will only respond positively to State A if State A has accepted State B’s demands or if State B suffers a combined failure in foreign and domestic policy. Peru did not accede to all of Ecuador’s demands, and the few concessions Ecuador did make generated opposition among political elites. The intervening step of coalition change had not happened yet, and neither had true foreign policy change. Córdova’s was unable to enact changes in the protocol because of his July 1925 removal. His removal, a result of growing domestic dissatisfaction symbolized by the 1922 general strikes, brought a new coalition to power that worked to embrace organized labor and peasants while undercutting the power of banks and the landed aristocracy. Along with the coalition shift, the true impact of Salomón-Lozano began to be felt after Colombia’s October 1925 ratification of the agreement. After the ratification, Ecuador was “brusquely confronted by a three hundred mile boundary with their enemy, Peru, instead of the same line with Colombia, a country they had formerly regarded as a friend.”83 Once the new regime stabilized under Ayora, it undertook a review of foreign policy that resulted in new concessions for its upcoming negotiations with Peru. Widespread domestic upheaval that led to a new regime, coupled with foreign policy failure, led to a change in Ecuador’s foreign policy. Similar to Peru, that foreign policy was again reversed after it failed to achieve any substantive agreement with Peru and the country continued to suffer economic decline. The 1930s was a chaotic time in Ecuador; no leader was able to gain sufficient power to set a clear foreign policy course. Consistent with hypothesis five, continued domestic difficulties combined with a failure to achieve desired outcomes led to retrenchment in Ecuador. Section Four: Interaction Between Peru and Ecuador: Comparing the Primary and Alternative Hypotheses

Though this case provides strong support for all five primary hypotheses, it is also consistent with both alternative hypotheses. As in earlier chapters, adjudicating between the two strands of argument requires an analysis of the outcome and timing of the dependent variable as well as observance of the expected causal mechanism. Taking this into account, the primary hypotheses are a better fit to the evidence. The Muñoz Vernaza-Suaréz Treaty presented a direct challenge to some of Peru’s territorial claims with Ecuador in the form of a legally

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recognized government. Initially, Peru did not react with negotiation to this change. Only after domestic unrest brought Leguía to power did Peru begin a two-pronged approach to the crisis. First, it sought negotiations with Colombia in an effort to recover the “lost” territory. Second, it decided to pursue the mixed formula of negotiation and arbitration with Ecuador, an arrangement that previous governments had deemed unacceptable. This evidence supports both hypotheses one and two. Peru’s multiple rivalries made the failure possible, but, much like Israel, they also afforded it an opportunity to choose its negotiating partner. When the Tamayo regime attempted to negotiate with Peru, it faced opposition from its traditional supporters; it had not been given a mandate to change. Only the combination of a chaotic domestic situation and public realization of the implications of Salomón-Lozano allowed a coalition based on new sources of popular support to begin making changes in Ecuadorian foreign policy. Unfortunately, the Great Depression helped speed the ouster of both regimes before negotiations could really begin. Particularly in Peru, the new regime was hostile to Leguía’s foreign policies and had no intention of making peace. As evidence that something positive may have happened if Leguía and Ayora had stayed in power, the two sides did engage in preliminary negotiations before Leguía’s ouster. Table 6.1 depicts a shortened version of these events. Though this causal chain is compelling, a strong case can be made for the alternative hypotheses. Alternative hypothesis one predicts that a rivalry will end when the two parties ally against a third state. Though this hypothesis does not perfectly describe Peru’s behavior, it does approximate it. Ecuador had traditionally received support from Chile, and its 1916 treaty with Colombia led to friendly relations with another of Peru’s rivals. Rather than dealing directly with Ecuador, Peru made peace with these two sources of Ecuador’s support. That these states did not join Peru in an alliance against Ecuador does undercut the hypothesis to a degree, but the behavior is still consistent with balance of power logic.84 The primary problem with this approach in this case is that Peru should have initiated the agreements with Chile and Colombia much earlier than it did. Instead, no movement occurred until Leguía came to power and undermined the traditional power structure. Though both sets of hypotheses explain outcomes, the primary hypotheses better explain the timing and appearance of change in Chile.

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Table 6.1. Peru and Ecuador’s Failure to Terminate Independent variables Foreign policy failure (Peru): 1916 Agreement cedes land claimed by Peru to Colombia Domestic policy failure: Widespread strikes / social unrest lead contribute to Leguía’s seizure of power Foreign policy failure (Ecuador): Columbia cedes disputed territory to Peru Domestic policy failure:

Intervening variable

Intervening variable

Change in foreign policy: Accepts mixed formula with Ecuador, provides major concessions to Colombia

Change in foreign policy: Lessens territorial claims, agrees to arbitration

Intervening variable

Dependent variable

Retrenchment in State A:

Bargaining space opens between states A and B: Both states agree on principles of the mixed formula of direct negotiations and arbitration

Leguía’s ouster leads to hard line polices Rivalry termination: Negotiations ended by new governments

Retrenchment in State B: Ayora’s ouster leads to hard line policies

General strikes, worker unrest

Ecuador’s behavior is also consistent with the alternative hypotheses. Its behavior in signing a treaty with Colombia in 1916 was a case of balancing against its rival. Though not an explicit hypothesis

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under examination here, this behavior does lend credence to a balance of power approach. Once its two primary supporters in its rivalry with Peru, Chile and Colombia, had made their own peace with Peru, Ecuador revised its policies toward Peru, making an agreement more likely. This behavior is expected by the bandwagoning hypothesis, alternative hypothesis two. Once a state is devoid of allies and is suffering internal decline, it is likely to bandwagon with more powerful states that threaten it. The two primary criticisms of this approach are the nature of the change in Ecuador and Ecuador’s subsequent behavior. First, when confronted with bandwagoning logic, Ecuador should have taken greater strides in its pursuit of peace with Peru. Though Ecuador did modify its policies, it did not aggressively pursue peace. Second, subsequent governments of Ecuador should have continued their bandwagoning attempt, yet they did not do so. In 1941, despite a negative military balance, Ecuador engaged in a war with Peru. The alternative hypotheses predict the initial change in Ecuador’s policy, but they cannot explain subsequent reversals in that policy. Table 6.2 summarizes the predictive power of each hypothesis. Table 6.2. Summarizing the Hypotheses Hypothesis

Peru

Ecuador

H1: Combined domestic and foreign policy failure in A will lead to a change in A’s foreign policy goals…

Yes

N/A

H2: A state that is involved in multiple rivalries or has an … active foreign policy is more likely to experience foreign policy failure…

Yes

N/A

H3: B will respond to A’s revised policy goals if they fall within B’s range of acceptable agreements.

Yes

Partially*

H4: Combined domestic and foreign policy failure in B will lead to a change in B’s foreign policy goals…

N/A

Yes

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H5: The prospects for rivalry termination decrease as the length of time from A’s change in policy increases

Yes

Yes

AH1: A rivalry will terminate when two states party to a rivalry ally to counter a third, more powerful state.

Partially

Yes

AH2: When one party to a rivalry suffers severe relative decline in respect to its rival and cannot obtain external allies, the rivalry will terminate.

N/A

Partially

*I argue that the opposition to Tamayo and subsequent policy shift under Córdova demonstrates the converse of this hypothesis, lending credence to it.

Conclusion

The relationship between Peru and Ecuador strongly supports the central arguments of this book. Despite the fact that they were not able to find peace, the two states acted as expected in almost every circumstance. The one leader, Tamayo, who did not conform to the logic of the central argument faced criticism and attempts to reverse his policies. The primary obstacle to peace was timing. By the time both states were ready to negotiate, they were victims of difficult domestic circumstances and critiques of their foreign policies. This case also lends additional credence to my argument in Chapter Five that Leguía, as a dove, was predisposed to make peace with rivals but could not until conditions warranted it. The foreign policy failure with Ecuador and, to an extent, Colombia, allowed him to pursue peace with these two states almost as soon as he entered office. In contrast, he abided by longstanding Peruvian policies calling for arbitration with Chile until the failure of arbitration allowed him to negotiate directly. In a vacuum, the case of Peru and Chile does not provide the level of support for the central hypotheses as it does when considered together with Peru’s overall behavior.

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1 I discuss Peru before Ecuador because much of what Ecuador did from 1919-1930 was a reaction to an earlier Peruvian action. 2 Herz and Pontes, Ecuador vs. Peru, p. 26. 3 Ayala, Breve Historia del Conflicto Ecuador Peru, pp. 12-13. See also Tobar and Luna, Derecho Territorial Ecuatoriano, pp. 1-45, for a discussion of the administrative units in the Colonial period from the Ecuadorian perspective. This book was actually intended to serve as a text for Ecuadorian universities on Ecuador’s legal rights to the disputed territories. 4 Herz and Pontes, Ecuador vs. Peru, p. 25; Marett, Peru, pp. 86-87. Krieg, Ecuadorian-Peruvian Rivalry in the Upper Amazon, pp. 16-18; The Question of Boundaries 1936, pp. 8-9. 5 See Tobar and Luna, Derecho Territorial Ecuatoriano, pp. 75, 79. 6 Ibid., p. 88. 7 Krieg, Ecuadorian-Peruvian Rivalry in the Upper Amazon, pp. 18-20; Tobar and Luna, Derecho Territorial Ecuatoriano, pp. 83-96. 8 Krieg, Ecuadorian-Peruvian Rivalry in the Upper Amazon, pp. 30-31. 9 Denegri, Perú y Ecuador, p. 204. 10 Ayala, Breve Historia del Conflicto Ecuador Peru, p. 22. Ecuador rescinded its ratification in 1894. 11 Krieg, Ecuadorian-Peruvian Rivalry in the Upper Amazon, p. 36. 12 Ayala, Breve Historia del Conflicto Ecuador Peru, p. 23. 13 Ibid., pp. 38, 43-44, 48-49. St. John, The Foreign Policy of Peru, p. 153. The two states came quite close to war during the dispute over the Spanish arbitration; mediation by the US, Brazil and Argentina helped defuse the crisis. 14 The Question of Boundaries 1936, p.49. As noted above, Billinghurst’s foreign policy led to widespread opposition in Peru, indicating that the domestic conditions were not favorable to a negotiated settlement of Peru’s disputes (St. John, The Foreign Policy of Peru, p. 156). 15 Ayala, Breve Historia del Conflicto Ecuador Peru, p. 26. 16 Pike, The United States and the Andean Republics, p. 125. 17 Tobar and Luna, Derecho Territorial Ecuatoriano, p. 150-152. 18 Pareja, Historia del Ecuador, pp. 196-207. 19 Pike, The United States and the Andean Republics, p. 137. 20 Tobar and Luna, Derecho Territorial Ecuatoriano, p. 155. 21 Pike, The United States and the Andean Republics, pp. 166-167. 22 St. John, The Foreign Policy of Peru, pp. 155-156. 23 Ayala, Breve Historia del Conflicto Ecuador Peru, p. 26. 24 St. John, The Foreign Policy of Peru, p. 166. 25 Ibid.; Krieg, Ecuadorian-Peruvian Rivalry in the Upper Amazon, p. 57; Perez, Ensayo Historico-Critico de las Relaciones Diplomaticas del Ecuador con los Estados Limitofres, pp. 80-81. 26 St. John, The Foreign Policy of Peru, p. 165. Though I do not discuss the Colombian position in this paper, the treaty with Colombia required few concessions compared to those given by Peru. Colombia did not have the attachment to the lands that had been ceded to it by Ecuador that Peru did. 27 Ayala, Breve Historia del Conflicto Ecuador Peru, p. 26. A mixed commission was charged with drawing the exact border between the two states. 28 St. John, The Foreign Policy of Peru, p. 165; Chirinos, Historia de la Republica, p. 437.

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29 Krieg, Ecuadorian-Peruvian Rivalry in the Upper Amazon, p. 63. In addition, the treaty involved some lands that were in dispute between Brazil and Peru. Brazil, Colombia and Peru were able to negotiate a solution to the problem. Colombia ratified the treaty in 1925 (p. 61). 30 Negotiations had occurred between the two states since 1921, but those negotiations were of little consequence. When difficulties arose with the Salomón-Lozano Treaty due to Brazilian objections, the Peruvian assigned to negotiate with Ecuador left that post to address the Brazilian concerns. The priority was clearly not the Ecuadorian border. 31 The Question of Boundaries 1936, pp. 52-53. 32 Ecuador had long preferred that arbitration be based on principles of equity as opposed to principles of law, indicating that Ecuador did not believe its legal case to be particularly strong (The Question of Boundaries 1936, pp. 53-54). 33 Marett, Peru, p. 146. 34 Pike, The United States and the Andean Republics, pp. 244-245. 35 The Question of Boundaries 1936, pp. 53-54, 57-58. 36 Krieg, Ecuadorian-Peruvian Rivalry in the Upper Amazon, pp. 69-70. 37 Ibid., p. 73. 38 Pike, The United States and the Andean Republics, p. 204. 39 Interestingly, this treaty was negotiated and signed during a small scale civil war in Ecuador (Denegri, Perú y Ecuador, p. 248. 40 Perez, Ensayo Historico-Critico de las Relaciones Diplomaticas del Ecuador con los Estados Limitofres, pp. 31-32. 41 Striffler, In the Shadows of State and Capital, p. 21. 42 Ibid. 43 Ibid., p. 22; Cordero, Los Orígenes de la Izquierda Ecuatoriana, pp. 2527. 44 Cordero, Los Orígenes de la Izquierda Ecuatoriana, pp. 27, 29. Regionalization continued to be a problem in the country, but improved infrastructure did enable better communication and transportation between regions. 45 Cueva, The Process of Political Domination in Ecuador, p. 8. 46 Cordero, Los Orígenes de la Izquierda Ecuatoriana, p. 26. 47 Ibid., pp. 28-29. 48 Striffler, In the Shadows of State and Capital, p. 23; Pike, The United States and the Andean Republics, p. 188. 49 Maiguasha and North, “Orígenes y Significado del Velasquismo,” pp. 95-7. Between 1900 and 1920, only 53 new industries formed in Ecuador. From 1920-1930, 66 formed. At the same time, cacao represented an increasingly smaller percentage of Ecuadorian exports (Cordero, Los Orígenes de la Izquierda Ecuatoriana, p. 30). 50 Maiguasha and North, “Orígenes y Significado del Velasquismo,” p. 99. 51 Cueva, The Process of Political Domination in Ecuador, p. 12. 52 Maiguasha and North, “Orígenes y Significado del Velasquismo,” p. 100. 53 Pike, The United States and the Andean Republics, pp. 187-188. 54 Pareja, Historia del Ecuador, pp. 368-70; Salvador, Breve Historia contemporánea del Ecuador, p. 447. 55 Pareja, Historia del Ecuador, p. 371.

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56 Perez, Ensayo Historico-Critico de las Relaciones Diplomaticas del Ecuador con los Estados Limitofres, p. 52. 57 The only other government not to send a representative was Chile. 58 Perez, Ensayo Historico-Critico de las Relaciones Diplomaticas del Ecuador con los Estados Limitofres, pp. 54-56. 59 Tobar and Luna, Derecho Territorial Ecuatoriano, p. 180. 60 Perez, Ensayo Historico-Critico de las Relaciones Diplomaticas del Ecuador con los Estados Limitofres, pp. 80-82. 61 Ibid., pp. 64-65; Denegri, Perú y Ecuador, p. 254. 62 Perez, Ensayo Historico-Critico de las Relaciones Diplomaticas del Ecuador con los Estados Limitofres, pp. 83-86, 89. 63 Pike, The United States and the Andean Republics, p. 190. 64 Tobar and Luna, Derecho Territorial Ecuatoriano, p. 182. 65 St. John, The Foreign Policy of Peru, p. 166. 66 Perez, Ensayo Historico-Critico de las Relaciones Diplomaticas del Ecuador con los Estados Limitofres, pp. 111-112; Denegri, Perú y Ecuador, pp. 254-255. 67 Pareja, Historia del Ecuador, pp. 375-376. 68 Cueva, The Process of Political Domination in Ecuador, p. 15. 69 Pareja, Historia del Ecuador, pp. 384-385; Salvador, Breve Historia contemporánea del Ecuador, p. 450. 70 Krieg, Ecuadorian-Peruvian Rivalry in the Upper Amazon, 61; Perez, Ensayo Historico-Critico de las Relaciones Diplomaticas del Ecuador con los Estados Limitofres, pp. 113-116. Relations were not restored until 1931. 71 Pareja, Historia del Ecuador, pp. 384-385; Salvador, Breve Historia contemporánea del Ecuador, p. 450. 72 Pike, The United States and the Andean Republics, p. 192. 73 Cueva, The Process of Political Domination in Ecuador, p. 18; Salvador, Breve Historia contemporánea del Ecuador, 450-2; “Ecuador Reform, Chaos, Debacle” 2005. 74 Perez, Ensayo Historico-Critico de las Relaciones Diplomaticas del Ecuador con los Estados Limitofres, pp. 136-137. 75 These three states later brokered an armistice and the Rio Protocol after a brief 1941 war between Peru and Ecuador. The three states also served as guarantors of the agreement. 76 Perez, Ensayo Historico-Critico de las Relaciones Diplomaticas del Ecuador con los Estados Limitofres, p. 139. 77 Krieg, Ecuadorian-Peruvian Rivalry in the Upper Amazon, p. 62. 78 Ibid., p. 19. 79 Blanksten, Ecuador: Constitutions and Caudillos, pp. 10-11; Martz, “Ecuador: The Fragility of Dependent Democracy,” p. 328. 80 Cordero, Los Orígenes de la Izquierda Ecuatoriana, p. 38. 81 Cueva, The Process of Political Domination in Ecuador, pp. 20-21. 82 Krieg, Ecuadorian-Peruvian Rivalry in the Upper Amazon, p. 63; Denegri, Perú y Ecuador, pp. 256-257. 83 Wood 1966, cited in Pike, The United States and the Andean Republics, p. 204. 84 This is similar to the case of Israel’s removing Egypt from the battlefield so that it could concentrate on Syria.

7 The Termination of Rivalry

The fundamental question driving this book is why enduring rivalries end. In each of the cases I have examined, it was the combination of foreign and domestic policy failures in one or both states (usually both) that led to foreign policy change. In Chapter Two, I suggested that this combination of independent variables works through the mechanism of a coalition change brought on by domestic pressure. The coalition change results in doves or moderates replacing hawks in major foreign policy decision-making positions. In each state that changed its foreign policy, this mechanism was in effect, though not every state underwent a complete government turnover. At the same time, the cases did expose some difficulties for the primary argument. Several of the suggested operationalizations were difficult to measure. The measurement of bargaining space without reference to the outcomes was particularly difficult, especially in the Latin American cases. Second, the predictive power of the alternative hypotheses suggests that there is room to explore the relationship between alliances and the purported causal mechanism. Finally, I was surprised to find that even in cases where rivalries did not terminate, the states did experience significant changes in foreign policy. The cases demonstrated both the importance of the degree of foreign policy change and the importance of timing. In the remainder of this chapter, I explore each of these questions, followed by an epilogue of the rivalries between Syria and Israel and between Peru and Ecuador. I conclude with the greater theoretical and policy implications of the book. Section One: Areas for Further Exploration Measuring Outcomes

Of the working definitions proposed in Chapter Two, most proved to be easy to measure qualitatively. Foreign policy failures were evident in

185

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each case; each change in foreign policy was preceded by either higher than expected losses in war or a diplomatic failure. Even the most minor foreign policy failure explored in the book, Peru’s loss of territory through Ecuador’s 1916 agreement with Colombia, contained several elements of failure. Peru lost land that it claimed, and the decision upset the diplomatic balance in the region. Likewise, domestic policy failure was evident in each case. Widespread demonstrations and/or declines in significant economic sectors preceded coalition changes in each country. In each country, no foreign policy change occurred without significant changes in government. Even in those countries where one leader remained in power after the combined failure in policies, several members of the leader’s foreign policy team changed along with their foreign policy. Each regime also reached out to new segments of society for support. The two terms that were more difficult to measure were foreign policy change and bargaining space. In most cases, foreign policy change was apparent without reference to outcomes. For example, Egypt under Nasser and even more so under Sadat made frequent statements that it would offer some sort of recognition to Israel in return for the Sinai. The acceptance of this principle was a clear break with the past. Though not as apparent, both Nasser and Sadat also suggested that they would not be held back in achieving their objectives by other Arab states. Two cases stand out as particularly difficult to measure, however. First, the degree of secrecy in Leguía’s foreign policy made it difficult to actually find concrete statements on what he would give up in exchange for peace. It was clear, however, that he was committed to achieving border demarcation with Peru’s neighbors. The level of commitment he demonstrated both in his campaign and in his first years as president was a clear break with past presidents. Second, Ecuador’s shift under Ayora was not as significant as changes adopted by other states. The further challenge in the case of Ecuador is that domestic concerns during this time period trumped foreign policy concerns; though Salomón-Lozano was a failure for Ecuador, regimes after 1925 were more concerned with solidifying domestic control than with negotiating. That the regime had time at all to reconsider its positions speaks to the logic of the book. Bargaining space was easily the most difficult concept to measure without reference to the outcomes of negotiations. In most cases, bargaining space could be determined only by general philosophical compatibility. If we were to take the public pronouncements of states on specific issues as their final fallback position, we would never see

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bargaining space. When states agreed on basic philosophies, however, negotiation at least became possible. Once the Arab states accepted the principle of the negotiated return of land for a full peace, and Israel shifted its beliefs to accept the possibility of interim agreements and full return, peace became possible. Egypt accepted the first principle, while Syria stuck to the idea that Israel should first withdraw, then peace would be made. Bargaining space opened with Egypt, but not Syria. In Latin America, bargaining space opened between Peru and Chile when Chile accepted arbitration. After the plebiscite failed, Peru accepted the principle of direct negotiation with Chile. Likewise, first Peru’s then Ecuador’s acceptance of a mixed formula represented a compatibility of preferences for the first time. Despite finding philosophical compatibility in these cases, it was impossible to determine in advance the two states’ final fallback positions on peace; indeed those positions did not come out in any of the cases until negotiations were complete. At this time I do not have a solution to this difficulty other than paying strict attention to which conditions reflect compatible philosophies. The alternative hypotheses

In many cases, the alternative hypotheses successfully predicted certain aspects of a state’s policy and only failed in explaining the ultimate nature and timing of events. For example, Egypt settled its dispute with Saudi Arabia so it could concentrate its resources on Israel. Likewise, Israel settled with Egypt to concentrate its efforts on Syria, while Peru used negotiations with Colombia to gain leverage with Ecuador. These behaviors do support balance of power logic, but have difficulty explaining changing perceptions of balance of power. In each case, the state only realized a need to adjust its alliances after a failure in foreign policy. In both the Israeli and Peruvian cases, a change in leadership was also necessary. Rather than dismissing the alternative hypotheses in their entirety, however, my argument may provide the micro-level mechanism for explaining changes in alliance behavior. That a state would need to suffer a foreign policy failure before shifting alliance behavior is consistent with several current formal modeling arguments that war reveals hidden and/or previously unknown information.1 That domestic failure is also necessary brings in portions of the arguments of Telhami and Copeland.2 Telhami’s argument for rivalry termination rests in part on decline relative to a rival; my argument would suggest that such decline is revealed to a state through foreign and domestic policy failure. Copeland’s argument is that a

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state’s expectations of future trade with a rival will lead to a reduction in tensions. The question this argument begs is why the state views trade as more beneficial than continued rivalry. Such a perception is most likely when a state has experienced domestic policy failure. A final insight my model may give to a neorealist approach is based on learning models and assumptions about hawks, doves and moderates presented in Chapter Two. Not all leaders will learn appropriate lessons; leaders who do not select appropriate strategies are punished by their publics with removal from office. My model explains the timing of that change. Finally, the inclusion of balance of power logic may provide better logic for hypothesis two, that states engaged in multiple rivalries are more likely to experience failure. Using balance of power logic may change this hypothesis to suggest that a state engaged in multiple rivalries has multiple options to redress failures in foreign policy. For example, the October War and Israel’s declining economy forced it to make some change to its policy. Being involved in multiple rivalries allowed it to choose with which state it would make peace; it chose to make peace with the state that was the more willing partner and was strategically more important. Peru faced a similar situation in 1919 when Leguía came to power. Further research is needed to specify how a state involved in multiple rivalries chooses which rival will be the focus of peacemaking efforts, but combination of these two approaches does suggest that individual rivalries cannot be studied in a vacuum. Timing is everything

Perhaps the most surprising outcome of this book is that all of the states changed their foreign policies, even those who did not make peace. This finding suggests at least two conclusions. First, involvement in multiple rivalries may actually make it more likely that some rivalries will continue. This outcome may be a result of a state’s ability to play rivals against one another, as Peru did with Ecuador and Colombia. It may also be a simple matter of diplomatic resources. Peru did not have the resources necessary to simultaneously engage Ecuador, Colombia and Chile in negotiations. Similarly, as will be argued below in my discussion of Israeli/Syrian negotiations in the 1990s, Israeli decisionmakers were often fearful of moving too far on multiple tracks at one time.3 Engagement with one state proved easier, and in each case a state chose to engage the state with which it believed agreement was most likely first and, interestingly, was strategically more important.

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A second point flows from the first. I argue that a state may only have a limited time in which to make peace. In the face of domestic problems and a continual failure to make peace, hawks may be able to return to power and thwart future peace agreements. For Peru and Ecuador, this logic meant that once the two states were prepared to negotiate, domestic pressures and growing opposition to foreign policies had begun to challenge the political leadership in both countries. Coups in Peru and Ecuador ended the potential for peace. Similarly, once Israel had made peace with Egypt, Begin’s government was not interested in further concessions to Arab states. In the face of continued failure to make headway with Israel, Asad’s position hardened. He no longer believed that a peace agreement was possible.4 Importantly, however, Asad did continue to abide by the previously negotiated disengagement agreement. Section Two: Epilogue to Two Rivalries

Two of the rivalries in this study continued well beyond the periods on which I focused. Syria and Israel have yet to settle their rivalry, while Peru and Ecuador signed an initial agreement in 1941 (The Rio Protocol) and settled their outstanding differences in 1998 after fighting a brief war in early 1995. The central argument of this book can both contribute to an explanation of why peace between Syria and Israel have had difficulty settling their rivalry as well as to why Peru and Ecuador succeeded in making peace. The following sections examine the efforts to make peace between Israel and Syria in the 1990s and the settlement of the border dispute between Peru and Ecuador. Israel and Syria

The early 1990s brought three significant changes to the Middle East. First, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait led to an unusual set of alliances that saw Syria join Saudi Arabia in the US-led coalition against Iraq. Jordan, a state that had been on far friendlier terms with the United States, supported Sadam Hussein. Second, the Soviet Union’s power and influence went into dramatic decline before it subsequently ceased to exist at the end of 1991. The collapse of the Soviet Union meant that countries that had been clients of Soviet aid had to look elsewhere for support of defense expenditures and foreign aid. Third, the Intifidah in the Palestinian territories began to shake Israeli control over the West Bank and Gaza, spurring many within the country to call for efforts to

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find an agreement with the Palestinians. These compelling changes seemed to create an environment where new negotiations were possible, even between long-term adversaries Israel and Syria. Both states did make concessions early in the 1990s that opened up bargaining space. Israel accepted full withdrawal from the Golan Heights, while Syria accepted the principle of full diplomatic relations with Israel.5 By the end of the decade, the process ended with the two sides painfully close to an agreement, but unable to overcome the domestic pressures standing in the way of peace. An examination of the foreign and domestic situation of both states during the 1990s reveals that the absence of a pure failure in foreign policy in either state in regard to its rival may have prevented them from feeling the pressure to make necessary concessions. This same factor also made it easier for domestic opposition to peace to intervene and slow the process. At the time of the Persian Gulf War, Israel was suffering from the Intifadah, an uprising of Palestinians. The violence both within the occupied territories and Israel proper eventually spurred a domestic and foreign policy crisis and led to increased calls for a negotiated solution.6 A combination of factors in Israel, including frustration that Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir was moving so slowly in the peace process that the United States began pressing after the Persian Gulf War, led to a resounding victory for Labor and gains for several pro-peace parties in the June 1992 Israeli election.7 Rabin quickly moved forward in talks with Palestinian representatives from the West Bank while his government was engaged in multiple back-channel negotiations with representatives of the PLO, including a set of talks that produced the Oslo Accords. Syria was facing a minor crisis with domestic and international implications of its own in 1990-1. Its major patron of the last two decades, the Soviet Union, was in decline and soon collapsed entirely. The Soviet collapse had domestic ramifications for Syria; declining Soviet aid and decreased oil revenue both contributed to Syrian economic difficulty in the late 1980s.8 This limited failure in foreign policy (decline of Soviet aid) and domestic policy (decline of economy) did generate a Syrian response, but not toward Israel. Syria began to reach out to Egypt, a state with which it had strained relations. This process of mending fences included a 1989 trip by Asad to Cairo, his first since Egypt had made peace with Israel.9 He also began to reach out to the United States in limited fashion, including the decision to back the US-led coalition in the Persian Gulf War. Asad realized that an improved relationship with the United States required some dialogue

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with Israel, which may be why Syria was the first state to accept the United States’ invitation to attend the Madrid conference.10 Domestically, Syria made a number of significant changes as well, including new policies to open the economy to foreign investment and bringing more representatives of increasingly prosperous merchants and industrialists into the government.11 As a result of the economic and political changes introduced by Asad and increased oil revenues, Syria’s economy experienced robust growth in the early 1990s.12 After the election of Rabin, Syria and Israel appeared to be on the fast track to agreement. Shortly after Bill Clinton took office in the United States, Rabin approved US envoy Dennis Ross’s suggestion to approach Asad with a statement implying that Israel recognized Syria’s territorial needs in any agreement and hoped that Syria would recognize Israel’s security needs. Rabin had basically endorsed a full return of the Golan Heights. After receiving Asad’s response – that full withdrawal meant full peace – Rabin approved what would become known as “the pocket.” Rabin made a commitment to the United States that he would agree to full withdrawal if Syria did not link an agreement to progress on any other front (Palestinians, Lebanon or Jordan), would agree to full diplomatic relations, and provide security guarantees, including on water. Israel would not officially make the concession in negotiations, and Israeli negotiators would be unaware of the agreement, but the United States could inform Asad. Israel would only give the final concession of full withdrawal once agreement had been reached on the other points. Though Asad did not offer significant concessions in return for the pocket, he did agree to the principle of a separate peace for the first time.13 By my definition, this agreement of principles did constitute bargaining space. Hope for an early agreement proved premature. Though Israel had agreed to the principle of full withdrawal, it quickly became clear that what Israel meant by full withdrawal was quite different than what Syria meant. Israel based its concession on the official international border of 1923, while Syria believed full withdrawal meant return of all land up to the June 4, 1967 lines.14 The two sides were also quite far apart on the nature of security arrangements on the Golan.15 Domestic politics also intervened. Rabin made the decision to delay progress on the Syrian negotiations after signing the Oslo Accords with Yasir Arafat; he believed his domestic situation required him to focus on one peace track at a time.16 Asad was not pleased with Syrian negotiations being placed on the backburner; he feared that Rabin had not been serious about his pocket

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commitment to full withdrawal.17 Rabin’s decision that any agreement with Syria would have to be approved by a public referendum further compounded Asad’s doubt.18 Several subsequent events led to a breakdown in negotiations, not the least of which was Rabin’s assassination. First, in a joint appearance with Clinton in 1994, Asad failed to abide by an agreement with the United States to condemn a terrorist attack that had occurred in Israel. Second, Asad’s frustration with what he saw as a lack of concrete Israeli concessions led him to become more obstinate toward the summer of 1995. Finally, a wave of terrorism in Israel in February-March 1996 doomed the negotiations. Asad would not publicly condemn the attacks, nor would he attend a hastily called summit on terrorism in Cairo.19 Asad’s public intransigence contributed to growing Israeli fears about the peace process; the wave of suicide bombings only cemented their fears about the lack of security. The bombings helped lead to the May 1996, election of Likud’s Benjamin Netanyahu, a hardliner opposed to major concessions to either Syria or the Palestinians, as its new Prime Minister.20 Despite what seemed to be major concession by both parties, Rabinovich argues that, “At no time during this period (August 1992March 1996) were Israel and Syria on the verge of a breakthrough.”21 What explains the opening of bargaining space between the two sides and the later failure to reach agreement? In the early 1990s, both sides experienced a degree of foreign and domestic policy failure. For Israel, its long-term occupation of lands seized in 1967 was beginning to have serious consequences in the form of the Intifadah. The Intifadah had implications for both foreign and domestic policy, and helped lead to the election of Rabin. Rabin was interested in seizing the moment to pursue peace. Likewise, Syria had lost its major ally with the collapse of the Soviet Union, helping lead to domestic difficulty at home. Consistent with expectations, both states instituted domestic reforms and alterations in government that coincided with the shifts in foreign policy.22 The moment was right for bargaining space to open. The negotiations failed for two reasons. First, neither side had actually experienced a foreign policy failure that directly affected their relationship with the other state. Unlike 1967 and 1973, the states were not engaged in military conflict. Quite the contrary, both had abided by the 1974 disengagement agreement. The limited failure in foreign policy led to limited practical concessions despite an agreement in principle. Neither side actually needed the agreement to redress the failure in foreign policy. Related to this point was the limited domestic mandate that Rabin felt he had to pursue peace. He was continually afraid that the

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Israeli public would not accept rapid progress with both Syria and the Palestinians. This slow progress and the renewal of terrorist attacks led the Israeli public to replace Rabin’s successor, Shimon Peres, with the hawkish Barak who had no intention of making concessions to Syria. Hope was briefly restored after the election of Ehud Barak in Israel in June 1999; the Israeli public appeared to be embracing the peace process again after the perceived failures of the Netanyahu administration. Barak expressed a commitment to peace with Syria, and Asad, speaking to Patrick Seale, expressed great admiration for Barak and recognized the opportunity for peace.23 In December of 1999, Asad demonstrated remarkable flexibility compared to his past positions. When Ross asked what was different this time, he responded “Barak is serious; he wants to reach agreement quickly and so do I.”24 At the first serious round of negotiations in Shepherdstown, West Virginia, in January 2000, the Syrians gave significant concessions to Israel on all fronts, including water, security, and full diplomatic relations. The Israelis were not as forthcoming. In the draft agreement presented by the US, Israel’s most important clauses, the principles of peace, reflected agreement by both parties. Syria’s primary concerns, the border, were bracketed, reflecting disagreement.25 Furthermore, Barak, despite pressing for the summit style negotiation, was unwilling to discuss the shape of the final border, even in the face of Syrian concessions.26 The fate of negotiations was sealed after Shepherdstown. At the conclusion of the meetings, a draft of the US negotiating text leaked in the Israeli press, including the portion indicating that Syria had accepted Israel’s position on peaceful relations while Israel had not accepted the June 4, 1967 lines. In an unusual event for a state as repressive as Syria, the Syrian Writers Union criticized the Syrian team for making concessions while gaining nothing. This public criticism would not have been possible if not approved by powerful members of the government. In essence, it was a challenge to Asad.27 From that point, Syria gave no more concessions and even backpedaled significantly from earlier concessions, probably as a result of the internal criticisms and Asad’s view that Barak had significantly reneged on Israel’s earlier concessions. The death of Asad on June 10, 2000 and the outbreak of the Second Intifidah in fall 2000 marked the end of negotiations. The resumption of negotiations in 1999 can be attributed both to the election of Barak in Israel and to a renewed Syrian desire for peace. The Israeli public had expressed dissatisfaction with Netanyahu’s hardline policies, while Asad of Syria had a renewed passion for peace, probably brought on by his poor health. For a dictator like Asad, the question of

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succession was very important. He wanted to do everything he could to insure a smooth transition for his son, Bashar Asad. In the late 1990s, this meant a sweeping overhaul of his cabinet and economic reforms in response to corruption and structural economic problems that had become a drag on the Syrian economy.28 In addition, frustrated by the failure to reach agreement in 1995-6, Asad probably wanted to insure that peace with Israel happened before his death so that his son would not be faced with the problem. The collapse of negotiations again had its root in domestic politics. Barak, fearful of tenuous domestic support, probably took a hard line in Shepherdstown to forestall domestic criticism that he was being too soft with Syria. Like Rabin, the absence of a clear failure on the Syrian border robbed him of a mandate to make too many significant concessions. His stance, combined with the leaking of the draft peace treaty, led to domestic criticism of Syria’s negotiating stance. Ross speculates that Asad, not wanting to jeopardize succession for his son, reversed many of Syria’s concessions to Israel, effectively ending the chance for peace.29 As of this writing, Syria and Israel are not actively engaged in peace talks. Tensions rose between Syria and Israel over several incidents in recent years, including the Israeli conflict in southern Lebanon in 2006, Israel’s bombing of Syria in retaliation for a suicide bomber in 2003 and its bombing of an alleged nuclear site in 2007, and ongoing Syrian support for Hamas. Though some hope has been expressed that negotiations could resume under the Obama administration, as of early 2010, no talks have been announced.30 Peru and Ecuador

Peru and Ecuador’s rivalry experienced many failed attempts to arrive at a final settlement before they signed an agreement in 1998 that appears to have ended their rivalry. The first clear opportunity to settle the rivalry occurred in 1941-2. The two states fought a limited conflict in the disputed area in July 1941 after Peru accused Ecuador of moving across the border. Peru won a rapid victory and occupied positions across the previously agreed to status quo line. The other states of Latin America and the United States were not pleased with the timing of the conflict; it occurred as the United States was increasingly preoccupied with World War II. After the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor, the foreign ministers of the Americas held a conference in Rio de Janeiro to discuss World War II, Argentina, Brazil, Chile and the United States

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helped secure an agreement between Ecuador and Peru, known as the Rio Protocol.31 The Protocol called for the demarcation of the border between the two states in a manner that clearly favored the Peruvian position. In fact, the territorial settlement was more generous to Peru than the failed Herrera-Garcia Treaty of 1890. The Protocol also named Argentina, Brazil, Chile and the United States as guarantors of the agreement that would intervene as mediators in the event of renewed conflict. For Peru, the Protocol represented almost a complete acceptance of its position, though the country was somewhat upset that it had not been able to pursue an even more aggressive negotiating stance due to the outbreak of World War II.32 For Ecuador, it had to sign the agreement both because of its defeat by Peru and the continued threat of Peruvian military action. In addition, Ecuador’s domestic political situation was marked by a troubled economy and political turmoil. During the conflict with Peru, Ecuadorian president Carlos Alberto Arroyo del Rio had redeployed some of his troops to the capital because of fears of a domestic uprising against him. Throughout his time in office, he maintained power through widespread repression and was eventually deposed.33 Despite widespread opposition in Ecuador, the protocol was initially successful. The Ecuador-Peru Boundary Commission effectively demarcated ninety-five percent of the border between 1942 and 1948, with help from the four guarantors at several points.34 Disagreement over the remaining five percent could not be settled, however, due to an aerial survey conducted by the United States that demonstrated that a portion of the terrain to be demarcated did not correspond to the description of it in the Protocol. Ecuador’s president Galo Plaza Lasso ordered Ecuador’s demarcation team to stop its work.35 President Velazco Ibarra of Ecuador formally renounced the Protocol in 1960.36 Peru and Ecuador experienced subsequent outbreaks of violence in 1980 and 1991 before fighting a limited war in 1995 in the region that had not been demarcated by the Ecuador-Peru Boundary Commission.37 This war was the first conflict in which Ecuador’s forces outperformed Peru’s; though Ecuador did not make significant gains, its forces did outperform Peru’s. Nonetheless, both Peru and Ecuador quickly invoked the Rio Protocol, calling on the Guarantors to help settle the dispute. A ceasefire was quickly reached and peacekeeping forces were put in place.38 Ecuador now embraced the Rio Protocol, arguing that it had only truly rejected certain flawed portions of the mechanism. The two sides

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began peace negotiations to settle remaining differences, but found an agreement difficult to reach. The two sides finally signed the final agreement, already approved by both legislatures, on October 26, 1998. That the two sides finally reached an agreement can be attributed to significant domestic political problems in both states as well as failure (and fear of failure) in foreign policy. Peru’s internal difficulties with domestic terrorist / rebel organizations such as Tupac Amaru and Shining Path meant that significant military resources had been diverted away from the Ecuadorian border, contributing to its poor showing in 1995. These domestic difficulties also reflected a major domestic problem facing president Alberto Fujimori. Fujimori was also still trying to resolve Peru’s economic difficulties inherited from the previous administration.39 During the negotiations themselves, Peru suffered a hostage crisis caused by members of Tupac Amaru in Lima that included the capture of the Peruvian foreign minister.40 These incentives combined to help Fujimori make concessions to Ecuador. After the 1991 crisis in which the Ecuadorian military was again defeated, Ecuador began making the shift to accepting that peace with Peru was a necessity. Ecuadorian president Rodrigo Borja Cevallos had strongly desired to sign an agreement with Peru.41 Peace did not occur, however. Ecuador performed well militarily in 1995; the actual war itself did not represent a failure of foreign policy. Ecuador knew that Peru was a much stronger state and would quickly be able to shift the balance of power in the region to its favor. The expectation that Peru would soon defeat it – as it had in all previous conflicts – helped lead the Ecuadorian government to pursue peace.42 In this case, a fear of failure helped drive Ecuadorian decision-making. In this regard, the 1995 conflict may have been similar to Egypt’s actions in 1973 to break the stalemate with a limited military performance. At the same time that Ecuador could celebrate a small success, it was undergoing domestic turmoil. During the negotiations, Ecuador had five different presidents, including two interim presidents. President Jamil Mahuad, elected in 1998 to replace Abdalá Bucaram Ortiz, deposed by the Ecuadorian Congress for mental incapacity, made the final agreement with Peru. In the end, Peru seemed to gain more from the agreement. The concessions made to Ecuador were significant, however, and addressed many of Ecuador’s historic claims. Ecuador did gain some land that had previously belonged to Peru, though it did concede many of its historical claims. Both Peru and Ecuador also faced significant opposition to the accords by their political opponents.43 Though both Mahuad and

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Fujimori were subsequently deposed, Peru and Ecuador have, to date, abided by the agreements. Both sides had experienced domestic policy failures, and Peru had failed militarily for the first time. Ecuador, though successful in 1995, had begun to shift its policy after 1991. Interestingly, it also did not believe that its success in 1995 would translate into continued success; Ecuador expected to fail. This combination of factors allowed bargaining space to open between the parties, making agreement possible. Both the ongoing failure of Syria and Israel and the success of Ecuador and Peru in finding peace can be explained within the context of the book. Neither Israel nor Syria experienced a foreign policy failure that directly affected their relationship; that alone is enough to prevent resolution of their rivalry. Both Peru and Ecuador, however, experienced a degree of both foreign and domestic policy failure. Though the behavior of Ecuador may seem anomalous in that it was actually successful in 1995, it had previously suffered yet another failure in its confrontation with Peru in 1991. It used the 1995 battle to break a political stalemate. Despite its gains in 1995, it did not expect to retain a significant advantage in the region, fearing that Peru would defeat it in the future. As evidence of this fact, Ecuador gave up almost all that it had gained early in the conflict. In addition, it did receive concessions from Peru on its historical demands of access to the Amazon and control over at least some territory formerly controlled by Peru. Section Three: Implications for theory and policy

This book has several implications for international relations theory. First, the book has tackled an issue that has received very little attention by international relations scholars: the decision by states to enter into agreements with rivals. Rather than focusing on studies of why states fight, it is a study of why states make peace. Second, it has the potential to reshape some current work on formal models that include a role for domestic politics by including a component that many of these models ignore: domestic politics. Foreign policy is not often the deciding factor in presidential elections, and failures in foreign policy by themselves do not significantly impact a leader’s tenure.44 My work demonstrates a way to include the domestic component. Though I have not yet formalized the argument, the basic structure of preferences and decisions of the actors is consistent with current work by scholars such as Goemans, Kydd and Schultz.45

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Third, it provides a mechanism for change from a rationalist framework. Most rational choice models either begin with assumed preferences of the actors or have a theory of preference change that is not part of model itself. For example, in using his model to explain costly signaling at the end of the Cold War, Kydd relies on an array of arguments, including ones drawn from constructivism, to explain why Gorbachev made the decision to send costly signals in the first place.46 Schultz relies on the argument that leaders will initiate cooperation when the benefits of cooperation exceed those of defection, but admits that this may be difficult to measure.47 My model, on the other hand, provides a simple method of explaining the process through which a public determines that the cost of conflict is too high that is consistent with the model offered: combined failure of domestic and foreign policy. Finally, the book leaves some role for human agency. Failure in domestic and foreign policy creates the incentive to form a new domestic coalition and pursue peace. Much like Waltz’s logic in Theory of International Politics, it is not always the case that leaders will steadfastly follow these incentives. Failure to do so, however, may cause the leader to be selected out of the system, or deposed. Such may have been the case in Ecuador in the 1920s and 1930s. Finally, such incentives can work the other way. When the incentive structure does not favor peace, a leader making significant concessions may very well be overthrown, as happened to Peruvian president Billinghurst in 1913. In this book, I have shown evidence that it is the combination of foreign and domestic incentives that lead to the potential to open bargaining space between two states. No state in this study made significant changes in its foreign policy without a major change in its domestic coalition. The only state that made peace after not also experiencing a dramatic foreign policy failure – Ecuador – fully expected to face such a failure if it did not act soon and had faced a foreign policy failure in recent history. I have also demonstrated the value of studying the case of not-peace. By examining cases where peace did not occur, I have shown that failure in war or a declining regional position is not sufficient to lead to foreign policy change. The argument may be further refined to explain slight differences in process in democracies and non-democracies, as well as escalation to war. The evidence is, however, compelling, that peace will not occur without some combination of failure in domestic and foreign policy.

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1 See Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War;” Fearon, “Bargaining, Enforcement and International Cooperation;” Goemans, War and Punishment. 2 Telhami, Power and Leadership in International Bargaining; Copeland, “Trade Expectations and the Outbreak of Peace.” 3 See Cobban, The Israeli-Syrian Peace Talks, p. 186 for a possible explanation as to why Rabin felt the Syrian track was competing with the Palestinian track in the early 1990s. 4 As will be argued below, a similar dynamic transpired in the 1990s. 5 Ross, The Missing Peace, p. 109. 6 Rabinovich, The Brink of Peace, pp. 37-38. 7 Cobban, The Israeli-Syrian Peace Talks, p. 42. 8 Melhem, “Syria between Two Transitions,” p. 3. 9 Rabinovich, The Brink of Peace, pp. 36-37. 10 Ibid. 11 Lawson, “Private Capital and the State in Contemporary Syria,” p. 9; Melhem, “Syria between Two Transitions,” p. 3. 12 Melhem, “Syria between Two Transitions,” p. 3. 13 Ross, The Missing Peace, pp. 108-113. 14 Ibid., p. 114; Rabinovich, The Brink of Peace, 236-237. 15 Ross, The Missing Peace, 145-146. 16 Cobban, The Israeli-Syrian Peace Talks, pp. 60-61. 17 Ross, The Missing Peace, p. 140. At this time, Ross expressed doubts of his own about Israel’s commitment to the pocket. 18 Ibid., p. 140. 19 Ibid., pp. 150-151, 161-163, 243-244, 247-248. 20 Quandt, Peace Process, p. 338. 21 Rabinovich, The Brink of Peace, p. 235. 22 Though the shifts in Syria were not as significant as the election of a new government in Syria. 23 Cobban, The Israeli-Syrian Peace Talks, p. 6. 24 Quoted in Ross, The Brink of Peace, p. 537. 25 Ross, The Brink of Peace, pp. 558-559. 26 Ibid., pp. 560-561. 27 Ibid., pp. 565-566. 28 Haddad, “Change and Stasis in Syria,” pp. 23-25. 29 Ross, The Missing Peace, pp. 588-589. 30 See Hersh, “Syria Calling,” for an analysis of the potential for IsraeliSyrian peace. 31 Salvador, Breve Historia contemporánea del Ecuador, pp. 462-464; Herz and Pontes, Ecuador vs. Peru, pp. 33-34; Maier, “The Boundary Dispute between Peru and Ecuador,” p. 43. 32 Herz and Pontes, Ecuador vs. Peru, p. 35. 33 Ibid., p. 33; Salvador, Breve Historia contemporánea del Ecuador, p. 462. 34 Palmer, “Peru-Ecuador Border Conflict,” p. 112. 35 Ibid., p. 113. 36 Herz and Pontes, Ecuador vs. Peru, p. 35; Ibarra’s foreign minister, Wilson Vela H., argued that Ecuador had only signed the agreement as a sign of solidarity in World War II with other Latin American states. He argues that the

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Protocol justified the acquisition of territory by force, illegal by international law and several inter-American treaties and resolutions (Vela, “Exposicion con que el Dr. Wilson Vela H.,” pp. XXV-XXVI). Note that Ecuador’s dissatisfaction with the Rio Protocol is consistent with the argument in Chapter Two that agreements forced upon one state to end hostilities are often difficult to enforce. 37 A series of negotiations took place after the 1991 crisis, including a visit by Peruvian president Fujimori to Ecuador, the first such visit in the history of the two countries, but domestic politics intervened in Ecuador to end hopes of a settlement (Herz and Pontes, Ecuador vs. Peru, pp. 42-43). 38 Palmer, “Peru-Ecuador Border Conflict,” p. 121. 39 Ibid., p. 115. 40 Palmer, “Overcoming the Weight of History,” p. 36. 41 Herz and Pontes, Ecuador vs. Peru, pp. 42-3. 42 Palmer, “Peru-Ecuador Border Conflict,”, p. 121; Herz and Pontes, Ecuador vs. Peru, pp. 50-51. 43 Palmer, “Overcoming the Weight of History,” p. 41; “Peace in the Andes,” p. 35. 44 Chiozza and Goemans, “International Conflict and the Tenure of Leaders,” pp. 615-616. 45 Goemans, War and Punishment; Kydd, “Trust, Reasurance and Cooperation;” Kydd, Trust and Mistrust in International Relations; Schultz, “The Politics of Risking Peace.” 46 Kydd, “Trust, Reassurance and Cooperation,” pp. 342, 350-351. 47 Schultz, “The Politics of Risking Peace,” pp. 21-22.

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Index president, 128, 130, 143, 198; negotiations with Ecuador, 164, 166; removal from office, 130, 198 Billinghurst-LaTorre Protocol, 127 al-Bitar, Salah al-Din, 96 Blair, Tony, 15 Bolivia: agreement with Chile, 128, 130; and War of the Pacific, 125; See also War of the Pacific Borgoño, Luis Barros, 142, 146 Borja Cevallos, Rodrigo , 196 Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 61 Bucaram Ortiz, Abdalá , 196 Bush, George H.W., 15 Cacao: importance to Ecuador of, 170-171 Calderón, Francisco Garcia, 126 Camp David Accords, 7, 59, 60, 62, 77; Syrian response, 107 Carter, Jimmy, 16, 58, 73 Castro y Oyanguren, Enrique, 128, 167 Central America, 15 Civilista party (Peru), 18, 169 Clinton, Bill, 15, 191, 192 Cobija, 125 Colombia, 7-8; treaty with Ecuador, See Muñoz Vernaza-Suaréz Treaty; treaty with Peru, 139, See also Salomón-Lozano Treaty Córdova, Gonzalo S., 172-173, 175176 Costly stalemate, 5, 24 Cuba, 14-15 Dayan, Moshe, 19, 67, 69; negotiations with Egypt, 73-74; and Rafi, 66, See also Rafi; 1973 resignation, 71,76; view of Syria, 112 Democratic Movement for Change (DMC), 72, 73 East Jerusalem, 45 Eban, Abba, 64

Aflaq, Michel, 96 Allesandri, Arturo, 123; dispute with Chilean Senate, 144; election of, 141-142; loss of power, 146 Amazon River, 167 Amer, Abdel-Hakim, 46, 47 Antofagasta, 125 Arab Socialist Union (ASU), 52 Arafat, Yasser, 106, 191 Arroyo del Rio, Carlos Alberto, 195 al-Asad, Hafiz, 7, 23, 34, 68, 114; seizure of power, 93, 99; conflict with Salah Jadid, 96, 97-99, see also Jadid, Salah; domestic criticism of, 193; economic reforms, 100; foreign policy after 1967, 99-101; frustration with peace process, 192; relationship with Sadat, 100-101; rising opposition to (1970s), 108; reaching out to Egypt, 190. al-Asad, Bashar, 193 al-Asad, Rifat, 98-99 Aspillaga, Antero, 132 Atacama desert, 125 Ayora , Isidro, 174, 186 Balmaceda, Jose Manuel, 142 Banyas River, 95 Barak, Ehud, 193 Bar-Lev Line, 68 Ba'th Party, 35, 68, 93-94, 100; 1966 neo-Ba’th coup, 96 Begin, Menahem, 18-19, 59; domestic policies of, 74-75; and Herut, 66; and Lebanon, 112; peace negotiations with Egypt; 72; view of Syria, 111. Ben-Gurion, David , 66 Bergus, Donald, 53 Bermudez, Morales, 127 Billinghurst, Guillermo, 16; election of, 128; negotiations with Chile as vice president, 127; negotiations with Chile as

215

216

Index

Ecuador-Peru Boundary Commission, 195 Eshkol, Levi, 64, 65, 67 Espinosa-Bonifaz Convention , 164, 165 Fawzi, Muhammed, 53 Figueroa Larrain, Emiliano, 137, 146-147 Food Riots, Egypt, 58 Free Officers, 45, 46, 51 Fujimori, Alberto, 196 Gahal, 18-19, 66; 1970 resignation, 68 Gallardo, Conrado Rios, 145 Garcia, Arturo, 165 Gaza Strip, 45, 60 Geneva Process, 59, 70, 111 Germany, 141 Golan Heights, 45, 56, 69, 93, 103, 108, 109, 110, 190 Gran Colombia, 163 Great Depression, 138, 177 Guano, 35, 124, 125-126; role in War of the Pacific, 125-126 Guayaquil, 170, 174 Gum'a, Sh'rawi, 52 Gush Emunim, 73 Haiti, 3 Hamas, 194 Hatum, Salim, 96 Herrera-García Treaty , 164, 165, 174, 195 Herut, 66; opposition to Camp David Accords, 74 Higher Committee for the Liquidation of Feudalism (HCLF), 46-47 Histadrut, 65; and 1977 election, 72; demonstration against Begin, 75 Huneeus-Valera Protocol, 128 Huweidi, Amin, 52 Ibañez del Campo, Carlos, 7, 124; comparison to Allesandri, 147; seizure of power, 145-147 Ibarra, Velazco, 195 Iglesias, Miguel, 126 Infitah, 57 International Monetary Fund: Egyptian austerity program, 58 Intifadah, 190; Second Intifadah, 193

Iraq: disagreements with Syria, 105 Israeli Water Diversion Project, 95 Jadid, Salah, 7, 93-94, 110; conflict with al-Asad, Hafiz, 96, 97-99, 114 Jarpa, Barros, 144 Jarring, Gunnar, 52, 69, 78 Jordanian conflict with Palestinians, 51; Egyptian involvement in, 51; Israeli involvement in, 51, 110; Syrian involvement in, 99. Julian Revolution, 173 Kellogg, Frank, 137 Kennedy, John F., 14-15 Khartoum 1967 Arab Summit, 48-49; Syria’s refusal to attend, 98; Three No’s, 43, 48; Israeli response, 64 Kissinger, Henry, 103 Knesset , 65; Camp David Accords vote, 74 La Paz, 128 Labor Party (Israel), 19, 59, 66-67, 69; and 1973 election, 71; and corruption scandals, 71-72 Lassiter, William, 136, 148 Lasso, Juan Miguel, 172 League of Nations: Involvement in Chilean/Peruvian dispute, 131, 141; and Leticia conflict 175 League of Young Military Officers, 173 Lebanon, 15; Israeli invasion of, 108; Syrian involvement in, 105-108 Leguia, Augusto B., 7, 16, 18, 123, 124; 1919 election and coup, 132; domestic reforms of, 133-134; Ecuador negotiations of, 162, 164, 166; first administration of, 130, 138-139; removal from office, 138, 167; secret negotiations with Chile, 138; secret negotiations with Colombia, 167; and the United States, 134 Leticia conflict, 168, 175; See also League of Nations Liberal Alliance (Chile), 123, 142 Liberal Party (Ecuador), 171, 172, 173, 175

Index 217

Liberal Party (Israel), 66 Likud, 19, 24; 1977 election of, 59, 72; formation, 69 Lobos Islands, 126 Lozano y Torrijos, Fabio, 166 Madrid Conference, 191 Mahuad, Jamil, 196 Mapai, 65 Mapam, 66-67 Meir, Golda, 19, 69, 76; election of, 67; resignation of, 71 Militarized interstate disputes, 3 Mitla and Giddi passes, 69, 70 Montero, Lizardo, 126 Mosquera, Tomás Cipriano, 163 Mubarek, Hosni, 61 Muñoz Vernaza-Suaréz Treaty , 161, 164, 170, 175; Peruvian reaction to, 166, 176, 186 Muslim Brotherhood, 57, 61 Nasser, 6, 15, 24, 43, 62, 186; acceptance of Rogers’ ceasefire initiative, 50; death of, 51, 68; domestic policy of, 45-46, 47; foreign policy of, 44-45, 47; reforms by, 47-48; and Six Day War, 17, 47-49 National Union (Chile), 144 Netanyahu, Benjamin, 192 Nitrate industry, Chile, 142 October War , 18, 19, 22, 23, 34, 43; Egyptian perspective of, 55-56; Israeli perspective of, 70-72, 76, 111, 113; Syrian perspective of, 101-102 Oslo Accords, 190 Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), 106 Palestinian Refugees, 49 Pan-American Conference (1929), 137 Pardo, Jose, 132 Pedemonte-Mosquera Protocol, 163 Peres, Shimon, 67, 71; and peace talks (1990s), 193; and Rafi, 66, See also Rafi Pershing, John J., 136, 146 Persian Gulf War, 190 Plaza Lasso, Galo, 195 Ponce, N. Clemente, 167, 172

Ponce-Castro Oyanguran Protocol, 161-162, 167, 169, 175 Progressive Front (Syria), 97 Puga Borne, Federico, 131, 143 Putamayo River, 167 Qunaytra, 103, 111 Rabat Conference, 51 Rabin, Yitzhak: becomes prime minister, 71; and peace talks (1990s), 190, 191; “pocket” commitment, 191; resignation of, 71-72; and Syrian disengagement, 111; view of War of Attrition, 50 Radical Party (Chile), 142 Rafi, 66 Reagan, Ronald, 15, 17 Red Line Agreement, 106 Rio Protocol, 189, 194-195 Ripeness see costly stalemate, Rogers, William: ceasefire initiative of, 50; Israeli response to ceasefire initiative of, 64, 68 Roman Catholic Church: influence on Latin American borders of, 163 Ross, Dennis, 191, 194 Sabri, Ali, 46, 47; conflict with Sadat, 51-52, See also Sadat; relations with the military, 53 Sadat, Anwar, 23, 34, 35, 186; and al-Asad, Hafiz, 54, 55-56; assassination of, 61; becomes president, 51-52, 68; ceasefire extension by, 52; conflict with Sabri, Ali, 51-52; defeat of Sabri, Ali, 53; domestic reforms of, 57; planning October War, 24, 54; trip to Jerusalem, 59, 63, 74 Sadiq, Muhammed, 53, 55 Salas, José, 146 Salomón-Lozano Treaty , 161-162, 167, 168, 172; Ecuador’s response to, 172-173, 175-176, 186 Sanchez-Cerro, Luis M., 138, 167, 168 Sanfuentes, Juan Luis, 141 Sapir, Pinkas, 67 Saudi Arabia and Egypt, 25, 43, 49 Sendero Luminoso, See Shining Path

218

Index

Shamir, Yitzhak, 190 Sharaf, Sami, 52 Sharm el-Sheikh, 43, 69 Shepherdstown Summit, 193 Shining Path, 196 Sinai I, 56, 70; Syrian response to, 103 Sinai II, 56, 70; Syrian response to, 104 Sinai Peninsula, 18, 19, 33, 43, 62; Israeli occupation of, 45, 49; return to Egypt, 59 Sisco, Joseph, 50 Six Day War, 2, 6, 7, 17, 19, 21, 34, 43, 44, 109; Egyptian perspective of, 47-48; Israeli perspective of, 64; prelude to, 44-45, 46, 95-96 Soviet Union, 17; declining aid to Syria of, 190; and Egypt 25, 45, 47; expulsion by Sadat of, 55; military support of Egypt by, 50, 54; Syria, 94, 100-101, 104, 114; and War of Attrition, 67 Soviet Union-Egyptian Friendship Treaty, 54, 56-57 Spain: Ecuador-Peru Arbitration, 16, 164, 165-166 Sterner, Michael, 53 Suez Canal, 51, 62, 69; Israeli crossing, 56, 77; re-opening, 57 Syria-Israel Disengagement Agreement, 103, 111 Tacna and Arica, 18, 22, 129; 1894 plebiscite, 126, 129; Chilean seizure of, 123 Chilean view of plebiscite, 143; Chileanization of, 127-128; failed plebiscite in, 136137, 146-147; final disposition of, 137; Leguía’s demands regarding, 131; plebiscite commission in , 136; and Treaty of Ancón, 123, 124 See also Treaty of Ancón; and US arbitration, 134-135, See also United States Chile-Peru Arbitration Tamayo, José Luis, 171-172, 175; and Peru, 172, 177 Tarapacá, 125; ceded to Chile, 126, 134; Chilean seizure of, 123; Leguía’s demands regarding, 131

The Second National Congress of Workers (Ecuador), 171 Tocapilla, 125 Treaty of Ancon, 123, 126, 129; Chilean ratification of, 126; Peruvian denunciation of, 131 Treaty of Guayaquil , 163 Tupac Amaru, 196 United Nations peacekeeping, 60, 70 United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, 19, 49; Egyptian acceptance of, 49; Israeli acceptance of, 68; Israeli rejection of, 64; Syrian acceptance of, 101, 109; Syrian rejection of, 93, 98 United Nations, Security Council Resolution 338, 56, 101 United States: and Chile, 124, 128, 141, 146; and Ecuador, 173; and Egypt, 46, 48, 49, 50, 56, 60 8081; good offices of with Chile and Peru, 137, 146; and Haiti, 3; and Peru, 7, 25, 128; restoration of aid to Egypt by, 57; and Syria, 106, 114; and War of the Pacific, 125 United States Chile-Peru Arbitration, 7, 18, 35, 37, 123, 124, 129; Chilean case before, 144; Chilean referendum regarding, 145; conditions of, 134; findings of, 135-136; Peruvian case before, 134-135 United States Ecuador-Peru Arbitration, 37, 167, 174 uti possidetis juris , 163 Valverde-Corenjo Protocol , 164 Vance, Cyrus, 58-59 War of Attrition, 15, 34, 44; Egyptian perspective of 50-51; Israeli perspective of, 67-69, 75-76 War of the Pacific, 35, 125-126; impact on Ecuador of; 163, 165; role of guano and nitrates in, 125, 126; Washington Protocol, 134, See also United States Chile-Peru Arbitration Weizman, Ezer, 74

Index 219

West Bank, 45, 60, 69 Wilson, Woodrow, 141, 152 World War I: and Chile, 141, impact of Peru’s economy, 131-132; and Peru, 128 Yemeni Civil War, 21; and Egypt, 25, 43, 46, 48-49, 63, 77 Yom Kippur War See October War

About the Book

Why do some enduring, violent rivalries between states end peacefully, while others drag on interminably or cease only with the complete collapse or defeat of one of the states? Eric Cox provides extensive evidence to support his explanation of how these disputes end, comparing successful and failed attempts to terminate rivalries in Latin America and the Middle East. Eric W. Cox is assistant professor of political science at Texas Christian University. He is at present working on a study of US diplomatic behavior in the United Nations.

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