Who We Are: A History of Popular Nationalism 9780691188676, 2001036272

Citation preview

WHO WE ARE

R O B E R T

P R l N C E TO

\

. :- .

i "

\

1

. •

H . W

I E B E

C O P Y R I G H T © 2 0 0 2 BY P R I N C E T O N U N I V E R S I T Y PRESS P U B L I S H E D BY P R I N C E T O N U N I V E R S I T Y PRESS, 41 W I L L I A M STREET, P R I N C E T O N , N E W JERSEY 0 8 5 4 0 I N T H E U N I T E D K I N G D O M : P R I N C E T O N U N I V E R S I T Y PRESS, 3 M A R K E T PLACE, W O O D S T O C K , O X F O R D S H I R E O X 2 0 1 SY

ALL RIGHTS

RESERVED

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS C A T A L O G I N G - I N - P U B L I C A T I O N DATA W I E B E , ROBERT H . W H O W E ARE : A HISTORY OF POPULAR N A T I O N A L I S M / ROBERT H . W I E B E . P.

CM.

I N C L U D E S B I B L I O G R A P H I C A L REFERENCES A N D I N D E X . ISBN 0 - 6 9 1 - 0 9 0 2 3 - 8 ( A L K . PAPER) 1. N A T I O N A L I S M .

2 . N A T I O N A L I S M —HISTORY.

I . TITLE.

JC31 1 . W 4 6 4 2 0 0 2

320.54'09 —DC21

2001036272

T H I S BOOK HAS BEEN C O M P O S E D I N ITC G A R A M O N D

P R I N T E D O N A C I D - F R E E PAPER, oo

WWW.PUP.PRINCETON.EDU

P R I N T E D I N T H E U N I T E D STATES OF A M E R I C A 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Contents

Foreword by Sam Bass Warner, Jr.

vii Foreword by James J. Sheehan

xi Preface X V

Acknowledgments xix CHAPTER 1

T h i n k i n g about Nationalism 1

CHAPTER 2

E u r o p e a n Origins 12

CHAPTER 3

Changing Contexts 37

CHAPTER 4

The Case o f the U n i t e d States 63

CHAPTER 5

Climax i n Europe 97

CHAPTER 6

Nationalism W o r l d w i d e 127

CHAPTER 7

Global Nationalism 182

CHAPTER 8

T h i n k i n g about the Future 211 Notes 221 Bibliographic 229 Index 269

VI

CONTENTS

Essay

Foreword

I first met B o b W i e b e i n 1972 w h e n he came to teach at Harvard University for a year. A t that time, five years after the p u b l i c a t i o n o f The Search for Order, he was the star a m o n g American historians. T h r o u g h o u t his career he was continually sought for panels and presentations. His gentle manner, attentive listening, a n d willingness to attempt large synthetic hypotheses w h e n w e all c o w e r e d w i t h i n our specialties never failed to d r a w our admiration. I n 1972 some magic d r e w us together as fast friends. F r o m this vantage p o i n t I learned o f Bob's g r o w i n g frustration that n o one was listening. A l t h o u g h B o b remained steadfast i n his core con­ cerns, w i t h each b o o k , fewer and fewer o f us p a i d attention to his ever-sustained concern for the changing fortunes o f A m e r i c a n democracy. The Search

for

Order

became the profession's best seller i n

1 9 6 7 , a n d remained so for the next 30-odd years because it con­ t i n u e d the core tradition o f American history: it examined the life and health o f the American experiment w i t h democracy. This was

Wiebe's lifetime scholarly question, the center o f his patient dis­ cussions w i t h students, the impulse b e h i n d his m a n y synthetic his­ torical lectures, articles, a n d books. W e professionals didn't listen, but w e l i k e d B o b a lot. The

Search for

Order

was everything that the series editor,

D a v i d D o n a l d , promised: "the take-off book." I n 1967 the social sciences w e r e flying h i g h as the best methods for e x p l a i n i n g c o n ­ temporary life. Historians w e r e t h e n struggling to adapt their approaches: quantitative economic, social, political and d e m o ­ graphic history; u r b a n history; detailed social studies o f i m m i ­ grants; and estimates o f social m o b i l i t y rates. Such initiatives d i ­ v i d e d the profession b e t w e e n the n e w historians a n d the o l d . I n the midst o f these aggrandizements

and w o u n d e d egos, Bob's

Search for Order appeared as a t r i u m p h a n t synthesis o f the o l d a n d the new. Prof. Wiebe was always the conscientious professor, an avid a n d thoughtful reader o f the relevant literature. H e was not an archives man. For the decades f r o m the Reconstruction t h r o u g h W o r l d War I he crafted a w o n d e r f u l synthesis o f historical events a n d 1960s social science. His history explained the w o r l d w e w e r e all t h e n living i n , and I w o u l d argue it is, even more, an explana­ t i o n o f 2001. W h a t w e professional A m e r i c a n historians d i d not d o was to attend to Bob's concern for the democratic experiment. Yet this was the question that drove all his w o r k . Few attended to his cru­ cial study o f small-scale communities i n the U n i t e d States, The Segmented

Society (1975), w h e r e he set forth his thesis that de­

mocracy was practiced inside these communities, b u t that outside their boundaries they feared strangers and manifested all manner o f intolerance for the n e w a n d the liberal. B o b never gave u p . I n effect he w r o t e a w h o l e social-political history o f the U n i t e d States f r o m the eighteenth century to the present. His last v o l u m e , Self-Rule

(1995), was an attack o n the

bankruptcy o f the media, p u b l i c relations, and corporate, bureauViii

FOREWORD

cratic, and judge-ridden contemporary America. The b o o k called for a renewal o f trust i n the competence o f local democratic deci­ sion m a k i n g . I still hear his voice, as m a n y o f his friends and stu­ dents do, w h e n I read the daily news. Sam Bass Warner, April

Jr.

2001

FOREWORD

IX

Foreword

^ / V r i t e r s o n nationalism can be d i v i d e d into t w o diverse b u t distinguishable groups. The first is composed o f the nationalists themselves, w h o v i e w nationalism as a natural, ir­ resistible force—the expression o f a deeply r o o t e d collective identity f o r m e d b y language, ethnicity, religion, history. National history, therefore, is the history o f the nation's g r o w i n g conscious­ ness o f its o w n existence and the fulfillment, often against terrible odds, o f its c o m m o n destiny, w h i c h usually means the formation o f a territorial state. The second g r o u p is made u p o f nationalism's critics a n d victims, w h o emphasize its historicity,

artificiality,

sometimes even its pathology. It is n o surprise that m a n y o f the most p r o m i n e n t members o f this g r o u p are émigrés or exiles— George Mosse, Eric H o b s b a w m , Ernest Gellner, Benedict Ander­ s o n — w h o have felt the lash o f national hatred or discrimination. A m o n g the virtues o f Robert Wiebe's approach to nationalism is that he has learned f r o m b o t h groups, b u t belongs to neither. Here is Wiebe's definition o f his subject: "Nationalism is the desire a m o n g people w h o believe they share a c o m m o n ancestry and a

c o m m o n destiny to live under their o w n government o n l a n d sacred to their history." H e has chosen his w o r d s w i t h characteris­ tic precision: a people's c o m m o n ancestry a n d c o m m o n destiny m a y be imagined or invented, they are often matters o f belief rather than fact; b u t a people's aspiration to live under their o w n government is real and must be seen as part o f a larger m o v e m e n t for self-determination. W h i l e W i e b e is at pains to s h o w h o w often national aspirations have b e e n misused, corrupted, a n d perverted, he never doubts their fundamental authenticity and legitimacy. The w o r l d , he believes, is full o f divisions and diversity; cosmo­ politanism is an idle, e m p t y dream. People, therefore, have the right to decide w h o they are and w h o they w i s h to be, a right that cannot be rejected i n the name o f an essentially bogus, often h y p ­ ocritical universalism, w h i c h he regards as just "another f o r m o f provincialism." I n a series o f extraordinarily w e l l - i n f o r m e d , w i d e ranging, and provocative chapters, W i e b e traces the origins o f na­ tionalism i n Europe and its spread t h r o u g h o u t the w o r l d . H e begins b y establishing nationalism's relationship to democ­ racy and socialism, w h i c h he sees as the other t w o emancipatory movements p r o d u c e d b y the g r o w i n g m o b i l i z a t i o n o f European society. Each m o v e m e n t builds o n immediate h u m a n experi­ ences—the family, p u b l i c life, w o r k — a n d then extends t h e m i n t o visions o f those extended

communities that a m o b i l e society

seems to require—nation, political c o m m u n i t y , a n d class. I n the end, all three are subverted b y their relationship to states, the most significant sources o f organized political p o w e r i n the m o d ­ e r n w o r l d . The state is the snake i n Wiebe's garden; it entices nationalists i n t o a "Faustian bargain" i n w h i c h , i n exchange for promises o f power, nationalists sell their democratic souls. "Wher­ ever nationalism disappeared inside state patriotism," he writes, "the m o n g r e l results bristled w i t h aggressive, coercive qualities." Nationalism for W i e b e is essentially populist a n d potentially d e m ­ ocratic; states are essentially authoritarian a n d characteristically repressive.

XÜ

FOREWORD

Wiebe's final chapters p u s h off f r o m nationalism's European sources a n d f o l l o w its often tragic history i n the second half o f the twentieth century. H e ends w i t h an extraordinary analysis o f the contemporary w o r l d and an eloquent plea for accepting h u m a n ­ ity's deep a n d indelible diversities. Does W i e b e have the answer to the n e w century's discontents? Probably not. But his final chap­ ter is a beautiful illustration o f Raymond Aron's a d m o n i t i o n that w h i l e w e may have lost o u r taste for prophecy, w e should never forget o u r d u t y to hope. Like all true believers i n democracy, W i e b e never loses the h o p e that m e n a n d w o m e n eventually w i l l find a w a y to determine for themselves w h o they w a n t to be. James J . April

Sheehan

2001

FOREWORD

Xiii

Preface

R>r

at least a century and a half, nationalism has

been one o f the most effective answers to questions o f identity and connectedness i n a fluid w o r l d : w h o (identity) w e (connect­ edness) are. This study traces nationalism's rise and decline as a p o p u l a r movement, first i n Europe and its offshoots, t h e n else­ w h e r e a r o u n d the w o r l d . Nationalism rose and fell along w i t h t w o other great movements, democracy and socialism. A history o f na­ tionalism does not make sense w i t h o u t t h e m or, for that matter, w i t h o u t p r o p e r attention to the most important alternative ways o f d i v i d i n g people i n m o d e r n times: b y languages, races, religions, and states. It scarcely needs saying that i n a study o f this length I have n o t w r i t t e n a comprehensive history o f anything. I p i c k a n d choose unashamedly. I n particular I concentrate o n p o p u l a r movements. B y p o p u l a r I d o n o t mean either democratic or spontaneous; I mean movements w i t h widespread appeal, b o t h i n space and a m o n g diverse p e o p l e i n m a n y w a l k s o f life. Elites w h o have communicated a m o n g themselves about nationalism over the past

t w o centuries d o not interest m e very m u c h . Nationalism's ability to m o b i l i z e a general p o p u l a t i o n does. H o w d o w e account for its w a x i n g and w a n i n g fortunes? W h a t has h a p p e n e d to it as it has spread a r o u n d the world? The uncontestable truth that nationalism has taken o n characteristics peculiar to each o f these sites o n l y gets us started. That fact becomes an intrinsic part o f each story w i t h o u t e x p l a i n i n g h o w any o f those stories relate to one another. H o w far can nationalism be stretched to cover these h i g h l y v a r i e d stories? O n the one hand, nationalism's adaptability has b e e n one o f its greatest assets. As w e track that variety globally, it is as i f w e w e r e discovering nationalism afresh over and over again. O n the other hand, w h e n w e try to make nationalism g o o d for every­ thing, it becomes g o o d for n o t h i n g . Hence, one o f o u r p r i m a r y challenges is to recognize what, i n an infinite universe o f events, nationalism can and cannot explain. C o m i n g full circle, h o w d o those inherent limitations h e l p us understand nationalism's re­ markable success a m o n g some p e o p l e under some circumstances, its ambiguous effect at other times a n d places, a n d its patent fail­ ure at still others? T h i n k o f w h a t follows as a grid. Chapters cut across the ac­ count, breaking it horizontally b y time a n d place; c o m m o n p r o b ­ lems integrate it vertically. Chapter 1 discusses the m e a n i n g o f nationalism and sets the terms for the chapters f o l l o w i n g . Because Europeans and their k i n abroad m o r e or less m o n o p o l i z e d nation­ alism u n t i l the First W o r l d War, chapters 2 and 3 focus exclusively o n that story. Migration was the m o t i v e force b e h i n d its origins (chapter 2). Related movements, democracy a n d socialism, a n d related d e v e l o p m e n t s — i n state b u i l d i n g , i n race theories, i n c h u r c h ambitions, and i n linguistic i n n o v a t i o n s — w e r e the shaping influences i n its history before the w a r (chapter 3). Case studies o f Irish, German, and Jewish nationalism that illustrate these trends carry us overseas to the U n i t e d States, w h e r e p e o p l e h a d remark­ able freedom to participate as they w i s h e d i n migration-inspired movements. Chapter 4 explains America's place i n this transatlan-

XVi

PREFACE

tic history, w i t h emphasis o n its liberal government, its cultural diversity, and its w h i t e racism. T w o w o r l d wars w o u n d the U n i t e d States tightly into the final phase o f nationalism's

Europe-centered

story, one that actually e n d e d o n another continent w i t h

the

f o u n d i n g o f Israel (chapter 5). M e a n w h i l e nationalism was spreading w o r l d w i d e . Chapter 6 addresses this diffusion, largely d u r i n g the first two-thirds o f the t w e n t i e t h century, t h r o u g h three o f the most significant ways nationalism

expressed

itself

outside

Western

society:

state-

d o m i n a t e d nationalism, w i t h Japan, Turkey, and M e x i c o as case studies; the p a n movements, w i t h Pan-Africanism the primary i l ­ lustration; a n d anticolonial-postcolonial nationalism, w i t h Nigeria as one example. India's history highlights the difficulty o f extract­ ing nationalism's thread from any o f these tangled skeins. Chapter 7 demonstrates h o w d u r i n g the 1960s a n d 1970s nationalism t h r o u g h o u t the w o r l d — i n c l u d i n g Europe once again—became integrated into a genuinely global process, o n l y to find itself c o m ­ peting at a disadvantage w i t h god-driven a n d gun-driven alterna­ tives that one w a y or another outbade it. A t the t u r n o f the twentyfirst century nationalism w o r l d w i d e was clearly i n decline, w i t h its greatest strength

i n Western

society's

well-established liberal

states. Canada's recent history illustrates that p r o p o s i t i o n . Finally, chapter 8 returns to the challenges o f understanding that underlie this study a n d invites a reassessment o f nationalism i n light o f its history, our history, a n d everybody's prospects. M y h o p e is n o t that y o u w i l l come to like n a t i o n a l i s m — I a m not its advocate— b u t that y o u w i l l come to see it as so t h o r o u g h l y h u m a n that n o simple judgment does it justice.

PREFACE

XVli

Acknowledgments

J\.

grant f r o m the Spencer Foundation enabled me

to b e g i n this project; four weeks at the Rockefeller Foundation's Bellagio Center encouraged me to rethink it. T h r o u g h o u t its devel­ opment, the College o f Arts and Sciences at Northwestern Univer­ sity p r o v i d e d unusually generous support, as it has t h r o u g h o u t almost all o f m y career. The Northwestern University library fed m y insatiable appetite for published materials. I a m especially grateful to James M c M a h o n , Catherine Feeney, Sharon Smith, a n d the staff o f the interlibrary loan division. I o w e an immense debt to colleagues w h o h e l p e d m e identify useful readings: James T. Campbell, Jonathon Glassman, Peter Hayes, T. W . Heyck, J o h n R. McLane, E d w a r d Muir, Carl Petry, Conrad T o t m a n , a n d Ivor Wilks. U n l i k e the skeptic w h o p r o m i s e d to b u r y me w i t h m y notes, many friends kept the faith, alternately p r o d d i n g a n d cheering me on: Margaret Lavinia Anderson, Her­ bert and Barbara

Bass, Daniel a n d N a o m i Feldman, Patricia

Albjerg Graham, Barbara Heidt, Peter Parish, Gerry Smith, and Clarence Ver Steeg. Josef Barton, the master o f the positive re-

sponse, listened patiently to m y original, ill-formulated h y p o t h ­ eses, advised me o n readings i n a breathtaking variety o f

fields,

a n d offered suggestions to the very end. A friend indeed. James J. Sheehan gave the manuscript a careful, critical reading to m y great benefit. For the settings i n w h i c h I c o u l d explore aspects o f m y w o r k , I a m particularly grateful to W i l l i Paul Adams, T o n y Badger, T o m Bender, Christopher Beneke, Ellen DuBois, Mary Furner, Robert J. Norrell, and—again—Peggy Anderson and Peter Parish. Special thanks to those critics w h o s e rejection o f m y scholarly judgments o b l i g e d me to reconsider them: Joyce A p p l e b y , J o h n A s h w o r t h , D r e w G i l p i n Faust, Daniel Walker H o w e , J o h n H . M . Laslett, D a n ­ iel T. Rodgers, and the persevering Betty W o o d , w h o has b e e n n u d g i n g me leftward for fifteen years. I n these discussions, Robin E i n h o r n made the single most arresting observation: that I h a d returned to the theme o f c o m m u n i t y unraveling that m a r k e d the start o f m y career. I still d o not k n o w w h a t to make o f that insight. I apply some ideas f r o m chapter 1 to a different e n d i n " H u ­ manizing Nationalism," World Policy Journal

13 (Winter 1996/97):

81-88; and I t u r n material f r o m Chapter 4 to a different intellectual purpose i n "Framing U n i t e d States History," i n Rethinking can History

Ameri­

in a Global Age, Thomas Bender (ed.), forthcoming.

N o t a person w h o k n o w s me w o u l d w o n d e r for a second to w h o m this b o o k is dedicated. I n this project, as i n everything else, Penny has made the difference.

XX

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

WHO WE ARE

CHAPTER

1

Thinking about Nationalism

Hi

o w d i d educated Westerners come to make ene­

mies o f an inspiration that has changed the lives o f billions? It was not always so. A t the t u r n o f the t w e n t i e t h century the philosopher W i l l i a m James j u d g e d "the attempt o f a people l o n g enslaved to attain the possession o f itself, to organize its laws and govern­ ment, to be free to f o l l o w its internal destinies, according to its o w n ideals . . . the sacredest t h i n g i n this great h u m a n w o r l d . "

1

C h a m p i o n i n g just such causes made W o o d r o w W i l s o n a global hero. But disillusionment after the First W o r l d W a r t u r n e d to re­ v u l s i o n after the Second, and at midcentury Western intellectuals d u g i n to battle the nationalist spirit. W h a t t o o k the urgency from their campaign was a widespread belief that once Europe's colonies w e r e freed nationalism w o u l d die o f its o w n accord, and i n place o f its divisiveness, a n e w trans­ national connectedness w o u l d have its day. A t least i n the United States n o generation was so t h o r o u g h l y indoctrinated i n universal­ ist values as the one c o m i n g o f age a r o u n d midcentury. Scholars and scientists b u r i e d the idea o f race. Humanities courses taught a

core o f eternal values; studies c o m p a r i n g religions declared their u n d e r l y i n g agreement. I f before the w a r educated Americans h a d routinely assumed h u m a n differences—the stairsteps f r o m barbar­ ism to civilization i n National

Geographic—after

the w a r they

routinely assumed h u m a n unity. F r o m the bipartisan statesman W e n d e l l Willkie's vision o f One World to the hugely p o p u l a r p h o ­ tographic exhibit The Family

of Man, A m e r i c a n public life cele­

brated the essential sameness o f the h u m a n c o n d i t i o n everywhere. The magic w a n d most often expected to make nationalism dis­ appear was modernization, a marvelously capacious concept that b u n d l e d Western society's major trends i n science and technol­ ogy, liberty a n d democracy, p r o d u c t i o n and distribution, organiza­ t i o n and education, into a single historical force and set it o n a path o f inevitable w o r l d w i d e dominance. Some merged m o d e r n ­ ization w i t h the t r i u m p h o f capitalism; some considered it the flowering

o f the Enlightenment; others dated it f r o m the Renais­

sance. I n all cases, however, m o d e r n i z a t i o n was the juggernaut o f progress. Whether nationalism represented a phase i n moderniza­ t i o n or a primitive o p p o s i t i o n to it, it w o u l d pass. N o one c o u l d "deny," Harvard's Rupert Emerson thought, "that the n a t i o n a n d the nation-state are anachronisms i n the atomic age." O r i n the 2

political scientist Alfred Cobban's version: "Self-determination is [now] an irrelevant conception." I f nationalism resisted, it w o u l d 3

become the raccoon o n the h i g h w a y , squared against the truck's onrushing headlights. But nationalism refused to go away. As this infuriatingly persis­ tent anomaly, it became a convenient d u m p i n g b i n for the frustra­ tions that educated Westerners felt i n a fractured w o r l d . N o t h i n g so t h o r o u g h l y affronted the universalist values that the champions o f h u m a n rights and o f l a w a n d order alike used to measure the health o f the w o r l d . It accumulated modifiers: atavistic, fanatic, x e n o p h o b i c , b l i n d , b l o o d y . . . . Nationalists never smiled; n o b o d y smiled at them. The m o r e intense the nationalism, the worse for everybody else. W h o ever heard o f a caring nationalism?

2

CHAPTER 1

Democrats a n d socialists—followers o f nationalism's t w o great competitors i n m o d e r n t i m e s — e x p l a i n nationalism to us. Even as they argue fiercely, socialists and democrats s h o w respect for one another, but almost none for nationalism. For one thing, democ­ racy a n d socialism come w i t h impressive bodies o f systematic thought, the stuff that Western intellectuals bite and chew. Nation­ alism, o n the other hand, has inspired n o theories w o r t h y o f the name. Even more significant, socialism and democracy have i m ­ pressive universalist dimensions. B o t h like the panoramic w o r l d view; b o t h h o p e to inherit the earth. Nationalism, b y contrast, is brazenly particular. I f a few people l o n g ago made gestures to­ w a r d an ideal w o r l d o f nations, contemporary nationalists have n o interest i n that k i n d o f b i g picture. They care about the cause at hand. I n the end, nationalists themselves have virtually n o voice i n Western circles. It is as i f w e read o n l y Iranian scholarship o n United States history. T o n o surprise, then, Western intellectuals seldom have any­ thing favorable to say about nationalism. First o f all, they tell us, it is flimsy. Leaders invent it a n d followers imagine it. I n one o f history's truly m o n u m e n t a l tricks, according to this line o f reason­ ing, millions u p o n millions spread over continents a n d centuries have denied w h a t was really happening to t h e m i n order to chase after fantasies. Moreover, these millions have been as desperate as they have been deluded. Nationalism feasts o n damaged psyches. A c c o r d i n g to Karl Popper, the h i g h priest o f philosophical rationalism, "Na­ tionalism appeals to our tribal instincts, to passion a n d to preju­ dice, a n d to our nostalgic desire to be relieved f r o m the strain o f individual responsibility." Escape from Freedom, 4

i n Erich Fromm's

haunting phrase. Nationalism, declares T o m Nairn, an expert o n its role i n the U n i t e d K i n g d o m , is "the pathology o f m o d e r n devel­ opmental history" w i t h a "built-in capacity for descent into de­ mentia." Desperate people are dangerous people, easy prey to 5

the peddlers o f m o d e r n society's most vicious nostrums.

For

THINKING ABOUT NATIONALISM

3

George Mosse, a specialist o n Nazi Germany, racism is n o t h i n g m o r e than "a heightened nationalism"; i n the same spirit, the jour­ nalist Michael Ignatieff equates "European racism" w i t h something he calls "white ethnic nationalism."

6

A b o v e all, nationalism is the v o o d o o d o l l that absorbs the sins o f the w o r l d ' s states—that is, those sovereignties d i v i d i n g u p most o f the earth's l a n d a n d p u r p o r t i n g to govern its people, b o u n d e d unit b y b o u n d e d unit. Thanks to a general confusion o f n a t i o n w i t h state, w e usually treat the omnipresent state a n d

nation-state

as interchangeable terms a n d w i t h that sleight o f h a n d m a k e na­ tionalism available to take the blame for sundry state actions. Pro­ ponents o f democracy a n d socialism bridle at distorted uses o f their o w n value systems: h o l l o w constitutions and rigged elections posing as democracy, secret police a n d dictatorial rule posing as socialism. W h e n it comes to the uses o f nationalism, however, anything goes. Law-abiding states seek peace a n d order; national­ ist ones w r e a k havoc. G o o d states further the general welfare; na­ tionalist ones persecute minorities a n d squander resources. The m o r e o f a b a d thing w e find i n a state, the more nationalist w e say it is. Indeed, nationalism subverts s o u n d states like Canada a n d Bel­ g i u m , then proliferates rickety ones that c r o w d each other like shacks i n a slum. Balkanization is o u r b y w o r d for w h a t national­ ism has w r o u g h t . W i t h the Balkans themselves i n m i n d Misha G l e n n y writes i n the New Yorker,

"[too m a n y people are scram­

b l i n g to establish nation-states o n t o o small a patch o f land." The 7

situation i n Africa a n d Asia is even worse. " I n the t h i r d w o r l d , " Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., a bellwether o f liberalism, declares, "na­ tionalism, having o v e r t h r o w n Western colonialism, launches horde o f n e w states, large a n d micro, often at each

a

other's

throats." It's a jungle out there. 8

Most d a m n i n g o f all, nationalism takes the blame for the state's militarism. Advocates o f democracy a n d socialism recognize that something i n their o w n value systems—democracy's 4

CHAPTER 1

or social-

ism's better self, as it w e r e — p u l l s against state aggression; b u t nationalism, w i t h scarcely an advocate, seems to have n o better self: It is state aggression. " I make n o secret o f m y belief that nationalism"—its lifelong student B o y d Shafer has c o n c l u d e d — " . . . leads to w a r a n d destruction." More succinctly, the scholar 9

Mark Beissinger writes: " I n an age o f mass politics all interstate wars are nationalist wars."

10

B y d e m o n i z i n g nationalism w e a v o i d r e c k o n i n g w i t h it. Let's step back a n d start over. Nationalism people who believe they share a common destiny to live under their own government

is the desire

ancestry and a on land sacred

among common to their

history. Nationalism expresses an aspiration w i t h a political objec­ tive. B e h i n d that aspiration lies a sense o f k i n s h i p that is simul­ taneously fictional and real—that is, culturally created, as all k i n systems are, yet based i n some measure o n an o v e r l a p p i n g o f customs, histories, a n d genealogies. I n each o f the three p r i m a r y contexts for nationalist movements d u r i n g the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—people i n migration, people i n fear o f cul­ tural disintegration, and people i n search o f f r e e d o m — k i n s h i p holds out the prospect o f a closer connection, a deeper trust, a surer protection than alternative ties seem capable o f p r o v i d i n g . There is n o t h i n g inherently violent i n a m o v e m e n t based o n kinship. The people i n one house are n o more a family i f they b l o w u p the house next door. It is simply absurd to blame nation­ alism indiscriminately for the terrorism and thuggery let loose i n the m o d e r n w o r l d , as i f it w e r e responsible for—say—China's Cultural Revolution or Argentina's military brutality. Nationalism is n o more militaristic than Frederick the Great was nationalistic. The scope o f a nationalist m o v e m e n t is determined b y the peo­ ple w h o j o i n it, wherever they may be. Its sacred land, as m u c h a beacon as a location, may or may not have fixed boundaries. Na­ tionalism gives people a w a y o f t h i n k i n g about a place. I n the THINKING ABOUT NATIONALISM

5

literal, n o t the invidious sense, it is Janus-faced, always l o o k i n g b o t h b a c k w a r d and forward. Anatole France encapsulated it nicely: "A n a t i o n is a c o m m u n i o n o f memories and hopes." Partisan na­ tionalists are n o m o r e selective about w h a t they remember t h a n professional historians, even i f they use quite different criteria. Nor are they more dreamily optimistic about the future t h a n en­ thusiasts for democracy or socialism. I n the p h i l o s o p h e r A n t h o n y Birch's useful distinction, "People are not conservative nationalists or liberal nationalists; they are nationalists w h o m a y h a p p e n also to be either conservatives or liberals."

11

I n a t o u g h e n v i r o n m e n t o f c o m p e t i n g loyalties—religious, civic, a n d occupational a m o n g others—nationalism has been strikingly versatile. Sometimes the n a t i o n acquires the attributes o f an or­ ganic b e i n g that "can be said to have a soul, spirit, a n d person­ ality."

12

I n crisis, it can be transmuted into an i m m o r t a l force, the

p h o e n i x that rises f r o m defeat over a n d over to fight again. I n fact, disaster may be construed as an essential p r e l i m i n a r y to the u l t i ­ mate t r i u m p h . Where a people's p r i m a r y need is to find a source o f integration, nationalism can p r o v i d e it; w h e r e their p r i m a r y need is to d r a w a line o f separation, nationalism can d o that, t o o . Change, change, change: Belying nationalism's o w n dogmatism, permeability and adaptability rank a m o n g its greatest strengths. Appropriately, nationalism's relations w i t h the state have been shifting a n d elusive. States, h o v e r i n g like crows over the nests that nationalists make, have also p l a y e d o n the sentiments o f ancestry, destiny, a n d sacred soil. T r y t h o u g h they might, however, they have

rarely inspired feelings o f kin-connectedness,

the

core

a r o u n d w h i c h cultures o f nationalism have developed. I f the fore­ fathers i n the Gettysburg Address are the forefathers o f its readers, it may rouse nationalist sentiments a m o n g them; but i f thoughts o f forefathers send people's m i n d s to the four w i n d s , nationalism w i l l f o l l o w after them, n o matter h o w dedicated and obedient citi­ zens o f the U n i t e d States they m a y be. The m o r e c o m m o n state role is its attempt to s w a l l o w kin-based 6

CHAPTER 1

groups inside a civic w h o l e . Aggressive states, seeking to stamp their values o n a dissident p o p u l a t i o n , trigger the nationalism o f cultural survival. Contrary to c o m m o n w i s d o m , nationalism does not shape militarism; militarism shapes nationalism. The w e a p ­ o n r y o f the m o d e r n state, spread promiscuously, has influenced cultural clashes m u c h as it has domestic conflicts: W i t h guns, peo­ ple shoot. M u c h o f w h a t passes for nationalism's intractability is better understood as a defense i n the face o f the state's capacity to k i l l . Almost all the great massacres o f m o d e r n times have been state inspired, state directed, or at least state supported. States, not nations, generate the miserable millions o f stateless people. Curiously, the state is most deadly to nationalism w h e n nation­ alism triumphs. I f a nationalist m o v e m e n t succeeds i n f o r m i n g a state, it almost always dissolves i n the process. As the a n t h r o p o l o ­ gist Richard Handler has explained it, the nationalist vision is i n ­ compatible w i t h the exercise o f state p o w e r . B y its nature, the day-to-day affairs o f organized government shatter nationalism's promise o f a harmonious w h o l e : Bureaucracy trumps

unity.

Phrased another w a y , an institutionalized nationalist m o v e m e n t is a contradiction i n terms. W h e r e "[clompeting groups all p r o c l a i m their paramount concern w i t h the 'national interest' . . . national­ ism as a specific f o r m o f politics becomes meaningless," writes the historian J o h n Breuilly. "Nationalism remains distinctive o n l y for so l o n g as it is unsuccessful."

13

I f nations w e r e the organic beings

their champions sometimes claim, w e m i g h t call this the larva's paradox. But that image misses nationalism's b l i n d l y aspiring na­ ture: h o w its very a m b i t i o n obscures the deadliness o f the goal. Instead w e w i l l call this the Icarus Effect. I n the end, nationalism and the state have innumerable overlaps and fundamental differences. States, for example, often seek to e x p a n d their domains, b u t nationalism, coveting a homogeneous c o m m u n i t y , stands at odds w i t h imperialism. H a n n a h Arendt, n o friend o f nationalism, considered the n a t i o n "least suited for u n ­ l i m i t e d g r o w t h because the genuine consent at its base cannot be

THINKING ABOUT NATIONALISM

7

stretched indefinitely."

14

As Alfred C o b b a n noted, the m o r e that

minorities w i t h i n a multiethnic state support its imperialist a m b i ­ tions, the weaker their drives for self-determination t e n d to be. I t is n o surprise, therefore, that under scrutiny the v a u n t e d nationstate practically vanishes. O n e estimate counts "1,500 nations, 150 states, and 15 n a t i o n states." W a l k e r Connor, a leading scholar i n 15

this field, considers 12 o f the 132 t w o states that he has e x a m i n e d to be full-fledged nation-states. A n o t h e r respected scholar, W i l l K y m l i c k a , qualifies o n l y 3 out o f 184. The p h i l o s o p h e r Michael Oakeshott has dismissed the entire crop: "No European state (let alone an imitation European state elsewhere i n the w o r l d ) has ever come w i t h i n measurable distance o f b e i n g a 'nation state.'"

16

Once w e disengage nationalism f r o m the crimes o f the state, the rest o f the charge against it looks quite provincial. W e like o u r o w n commitments and priorities, o u r o w n myths a n d modes o f violence, and w e h u n k e r d o w n i n defense o f w h a t the g e o p o l i t i cian Samuel H u n t i n g t o n calls our civilization. W h e n dissidents i n the hills o f Sierra Leone hack o f f the hands a n d feet o f hapless passersby, it is the w o r k o f African savages; w h e n A m e r i c a n l a n d mines b l o w far more limbs to k i n g d o m come, it is an unavoidable consequence o f military necessity. N o punishment is t o o severe for guerrilla fighters w h o b o m b civilian sites. B u t w h a t o f pilots w h o b o m b civilian refugees? The government says it is sorry. B i g p o w e r , b i g price. N o t m a n y Americans volunteer to die for the sins o f their president. Yet n o t m a n y c o m p l a i n w h e n U n i t e d States p o l i c y forces hundreds o f thousands o f Iraqi civilians to d i e — o r at least suffer m i g h t i l y — f o r Saddam Hussein's. B y c o o l Western standards nationalists care t o o m u c h , a n d they care about the w r o n g things. Ethnic p r i d e may pass, b u t ethnic passion definitely not. Nationalism i n action is just another f o r m o f h o l y war, the social theorist Benjamin Barber tells us. A m o n g c o m p e t i n g loyalties i n m o d e r n times, nationalism is as l i k e l y as any other to p r o v i d e an integrated f r a m e w o r k for everyday life. T o sophisticated members o f the wealthiest societies i n the history o f

8

CHAPTER 1

the w o r l d , people w h o wear many hats i n their m a n y lives at w o r k , at h o m e , a n d at play, the prospect o f any integrating frame­ w o r k sounds suffocating. W e seem incapable o f recognizing social a n d psychological creativity i n a reconceived sense o f k i n s h i p . O u r universalism is another f o r m o f provincialism. Even the most w i d e l y cited declarations o f h u m a n rights originate some­ where, n o t everywhere. American universalism, to n o surprise, highlights A m e r i c a n values—constitutionalism, a merit system, re­ ligious pluralism, a consumer culture's standard o f living, and the l i k e — w h i c h its advocates then declare absolute and timeless. There seems to be n o r o o m for an alternative measure o f right and w r o n g , one, for example, from the perspective o f a Peruvian peas­ ant or a Sudanese herdsman w h o m i g h t judge Americans, squan­ dering incredible quantities o f natural resources at irreversible cost to the environment, the globe's greatest violators o f h u m a n rights. I n d u l g i n g the strange conceit that w e are smarter than the rest o f the earth's p o p u l a t i o n , Western intellectuals reserve the right to decide w h a t is best for them. The logic o f m o d e r n i z a t i o n presses the case for bigger, faster, richer, smoother. A strong p u l l t o w a r d smaller units, h o w e v e r popular, seems perverse. O n the eve o f Czechoslovakia's dissolution, America's cosmopolitan press pre­ dicted the r a p i d impoverishment o f those p u r b l i n d , seceding Slovaks. I n fact, b o t h Czechs and Slovaks have profited. Even edu­ cated Westerners, w h o are sure that the w o r l d ' s ethnic hostilities flare o n l y because unscrupulous leaders manipulate impression­ able masses, routinely flunk the factual tests. N o w let me see, d i d Serbs massacre Croats d u r i n g the Second W o r l d War, or was it vice versa? W h y w o u l d H u t u hack the bodies o f all those Tutsi w h o never d i d anything to them? Answers that elude us are chis­ eled i n other people's collective memories. W h a t a w o r l d universalized according to Western standards m i g h t l o o k like is b y n o means clear. N o leader i n the West advo­ cates a w o r l d w i t h o u t boundaries w h e r e people come a n d go, live a n d w o r k , erect governments a n d institute l a w as they choose. THINKING ABOUT NATIONALISM

9

Contrary to the social philosopher Liah Greenfeld's

assertions—

"[a] nation coextensive w i t h h u m a n i t y is i n n o w a y a contradiction i n terms"—the universal nation is i n every w a y a contradiction i n terms.

17

Even as an imagining, the sociologist A n t h o n y Smith re­

minds us, a "global culture answers n o l i v i n g needs."

18

I n its vast-

ness it offers us n o w a y o f situating or identifying ourselves. W e need a fresh start. Let's b e g i n w i t h three propositions. First, the w o r l d has been, is n o w , and w i l l be into the foreseeable future crosshatched w i t h divisions. Second, nationalism has b e e n one, b u t o n l y one o f the m o d e r n w o r l d ' s major divisions. Others i n ­ clude language, religion, and race, each o f w h i c h has sometimes b e e n allied w i t h nationalism a n d sometimes b e e n at odds w i t h it. T h i r d , w i t h one o f these related divisions, the state, nationalism has repeatedly made a Faustian bargain, trading its soul for its o w n fulfillment as a state. O n these terms, comfortable Westerners have excellent reasons to dislike nationalism. It is disruptive. It has n o affinity for democ­ racy: National self-determination specifies an outcome, n o t the process that gets p e o p l e there. It shows scant tolerance for selfconscious minorities i n its midst. " I n the logic o f nationalism, a n a t i o n cannot contain w i t h i n itself another nation."

19

I n p o w e r , na­

tionalists threaten to initiate an O n i o n Effect. Peeling o f f the au­ thority that has been oppressing one ethnic g r o u p m a y free it to oppress other ethnic groups, w h o i n t u r n try to peel o f f the layer constricting them, and so o n . I n Sri Lanka, Tamil, w h o comprise 20 percent o f the p o p u l a t i o n , seek a state o f their o w n , Eelam, w h i c h i f it came into b e i n g w o u l d contain minorities constituting 20 percent o f Eelam's p o p u l a t i o n . But w e cannot understand nationalism, let alone judge it, i f w e measure it against our universalist standards. Nationalism is just one o f m a n y divisions that stand impervious to that deeply flawed West­ ern concept. Better w e set it against alternative divisions. W o u l d w e prefer separations dictated b y race? or b y religion? W i t h these cautions i n m i n d , let us proceed to the history o f 10

CHAPTER 1

nationalism, w h i c h thrusts three questions to the forefront. First, where does nationalism appear? As its cultural contexts changed, so d i d nationalism. A l t h o u g h this variable s h o u l d alert us i n partic­ ular to the dramatic differences b e t w e e n nationalism's Western va­ rieties a n d its m a n y guises elsewhere i n the w o r l d , geography was not destiny. Western-style nationalism a n d the state associated w i t h it h a d an easier passage into Japan than into Bulgaria. Sec­ o n d , when does nationalism arrive? C o p y i n g f r o m one another, nationalists developed movements that h a d specific times stamped all over them. B y the same token, the particular range o f problems and possibilities that r o u g h l y c o m m o n circumstances set before an array o f nationalist movements—the centralization o f European state p o w e r a r o u n d the t u r n o f the t w e n t i e t h century, for example, or the anticolonial prospects a r o u n d midcentury or the proliferation o f deadly weapons late i n the c e n t u r y — f i x e d t h e m just as firmly i n time. T h i r d , why nationalism? W h a t has given nationalism its p o w e r ­ ful appeal for some people sometimes? Nationalism, w h i c h looks like a major p r o b l e m to us, arrived d u r i n g the nineteenth century as the solution to an even more fundamental p r o b l e m : H o w c o u l d people sort themselves i n soci­ eties w h e r e the traditional ways n o longer worked? Rather than a gigantic fraud perpetrated time and again o n the mindless masses, nationalism thrived because it addressed basic h u m a n needs. Ex­ amining the nature o f those needs i n nationalism's original home, Europe, is the first step i n our inquiry.

THINKING ABOUT NATIONALISM

/ /

CHAPTER

2

European Origins

l^Xiring

the

long

nineteenth

century f r o m

the

French Revolution to the First W o r l d War, nationalism was a m o ­ n o p o l y o f European societies. The very few exceptions, notably Japan, o n l y h i g h l i g h t e d the rule. Otherwise, nationalism outside Europe remained the province o f t i n y elites, b o r r o w i n g heavily f r o m Western ideas, w h o c o u l d n o t or d i d not w a n t to spark p o p ­ ular interest. O n the other side o f the Great War, w h e n nationalist movements d i d spread globally, Europe generated n o n e w ones. As o l d ones revived or remade themselves, they w e r e p l a y i n g o u t stories already underway. The nineteenth century i n Europe, i n other w o r d s , m a r k e d out a distinct p e r i o d i n the history o f nation­ alism. Before the French Revolution, the o v e r w h e l m i n g majority o f Eu­ ropeans lived w i t h i n systems that the German historian Peter Blickle has called Kommunalismus:

local land- a n d town-based

hierarchies that invested their p r i m a r y energies i n self-perpetua­ t i o n . B y n o means static, they s h o w e d remarkable resilience i n the face o f one assault after another f r o m the Four Horsemen. Eu-

rope's rulers occasionally dissolved some o f those communities a n d certainly m i l k e d all o f t h e m for whatever they c o u l d get; b u t they d i d n o t u p e n d the system itself. Fundamental changes came o n l y w h e n the strains o f maintaining those communities burst manageable bounds. The primary source o f those pressures was a demographic rev­ o l u t i o n that d o u b l e d Europe's p o p u l a t i o n b e t w e e n the mid-eigh­ teenth and the late nineteenth centuries. After centuries o f erratic ups and d o w n s i n total p o p u l a t i o n , Europe's disease p o o l stabi­ lized, protecting the y o u n g i n particular against epidemic disaster. Even t h o u g h Europe's f o o d resources diversified, increasing calo­ ric intakes and thereby enabling more people to survive o n the same land, p o p u l a t i o n pressures continued to m o u n t , w i t h the overflow p o u r i n g out o f those s w o l l e n villages i n search o f w o r k , often to live a n d die i n the cities. T h e n i n a second phase o f this demographic revolution, sanitized water and i m p r o v e d sewage systems significantly lessened urban death rates. As city p o p u l a ­ tions soared, consolidated farms w i t h seasonal labor fed them, sending even m o r e villagers o n the move. Increasingly d u r i n g the nineteenth century the inertia o f European society k e p t people i n m o t i o n , not i n place. Even if, as Charles Tilly claims, "the pace o f m i g r a t i o n changed m u c h less than its character"

the consequences transformed Eu­

ropean society. Instead o f s w i n g i n g out year after year to w o r k 1

a n d return, w o r k and return, ever larger percentages k e p t going. Millions o f villagers remade themselves into city dwellers. Others— about 65 m i l l i o n between 1800 and 1914—crossed the Atlantic o n journeys that h a d n o predictable pattern or predetermined end. Migrants relocated over and over again. Millions w h o thought they w o u l d return to Europe never d i d ; m a n y others w h o thought they w o u l d never return d i d . Once cheap transportation a l l o w e d it, some shuttled back and forth. A t the peaks o f m i g r a t i o n between 1870 and 1914, the effect was "one o f a swarming or c h u r n i n g o f people back a n d forth across the Atlantic."

2

EUROPEAN ORIGINS

13

It w o u l d be a grave error to picture these basic changes as wholesale h u m a n disaster. N o t h i n g persuasive argued that the o l d system o f quasi serfdom a n d h o v e r i n g catastrophe was s o m e h o w m o r e natural, as Pierre Nora w o u l d have it, or m o r e humane, as Louis D u m o n t claims, or that m i g r a t i o n p r o d u c e d massive anomie, as intellectuals since Emile D u r k h e i m have assumed. W o r k i n g p e o p l e always h a d h a r d lives. W h i l e p o p u l a t i o n pressures drove some o f t h e m out o f their communities, others left w i l l i n g l y e n o u g h i n search o f opportunities. I n fact, w h a t stands o u t is a remarkable adaptability, particularly a m o n g families. As m o r e and more matters central to c o m m u n i t y life fell b e y o n d local control, families t o o k increasing authority u p o n themselves. W h a t D a v i d Sabean has said o f the Neckarhausen peasantry o f the early nineteenth century a p p l i e d equally i n the Irish countryside a n d the Russian ghettoes: "As a large part o f the village became dependent o n wages [from outside sources], k i n s h i p became m o r e rather than less important." Especially i n migration, chains o f k i n 3

w e r e indispensable, relaying news, j o b prospects, a n d remittances back and forth along the lines o f movement. A l o n g these same lines, p e o p l e w i t h ties to the same locality or r e g i o n stood i n as relatives, u n i t i n g the k i n o f tradition w i t h adopted k i n i n an ex­ pandable

weave o f o b l i g a t i o n a n d affection. Need

generated

hope. I t d i d not require m u c h o f a stretch for migrants t o assume w i d e r and w i d e r cirlces o f p e o p l e w h o s e cultural profile gave t h e m special attributes n o t just o f familiarity b u t m o r e important o f trust. F r o m adoptive k i n into fictive k i n , from b o n d i n g w i t h chance acquaintances to sensing bonds w i t h similar people wherever they were: That m a r k e d the path f r o m family to ethnicity a n d eventu­ ally to nationalism. History d i d its part, verifying a c o m m o n ances­ try a m o n g these culturally l i n k e d strangers and sanctifying soil that the sacrifice o f those ancestors h a d made the heritage o f all succeeding generations. Assigning a u n i q u e meaning to one set o f customs created the semblance o f a single p e o p l e w i t h a code for

14

CHAPTER 2

distinguishing insiders from outsiders a n d for connecting insiders w i t h invisible yet p o w e r f u l ties o f understanding. These fictive k i n composites, or ethnic groups, w e r e n o t like an extended family; they w e r e extended families, culturally c o n ­ structed—as all k i n systems w e r e — i n response to the challenges o f migration. Ethnicity t u r n e d into nationalism w h e n cultural con­ sciousness acquired a political objective. Ethnicity a n d national­ ism, i n other w o r d s , solved problems that m i g r a t i o n posed. I n a m o b i l e w o r l d , as families inherited the authority o f traditional communities, they passed authority along to ethnic communities, some o f w h i c h aspired to govern themselves. Eventually they spun a circle: Extended k i n sustained migration, m i g r a t i o n under­ w r o t e ethnicity a n d nationalism, ethnicity a n d nationalism glori­ fied the grand fictive family. I n b r o a d terms, the n e w ethnic consciousness a n d its expres­ sion as nationalism f o l l o w e d i n the w a k e o f a b o o m i n p o p u l a t i o n that r u m b l e d f r o m the British Isles eastward into the Germanic center o f the continent, s w u n g n o r t h into Scandanavia a n d south into the Italian peninsula, then d o u b l e d back into pockets o f Western and Central Europe that it h a d missed, a n d finally swept across Eastern Europe f r o m the far t i p o f the Baltic Sea t h r o u g h the Balkans. W h a t mattered was n o t the soaring populations themselves b u t the m i g r a t i o n they triggered. Extensive m i g r a t i o n f r o m any source was usually sufficient. England, w i t h a pre­ cocious national consciousness already congealing before

the

French Revolution, experienced an equally early swirl o f migra­ t i o n d u r i n g the eighteenth century, some to its factories a n d cities a n d some abroad. Nationalism i n Ireland, b a l l o o n i n g w i t h people w h o w e n t o n the m o v e i n search o f w o r k , f o l l o w e d soon after. I n Norway, the birthrate rose sharply a r o u n d midcentury, a n d as those c h i l d r e n w e r e reaching adulthood, a half century o f heavy emigration commenced. N o r w e g i a n nationalism tagged i m m e ­ diately b e h i n d . The bulge struck Italy first i n the n o r t h , w h e r e nationalism originated, t h e n i n stages d o w n the boot, w i t h migra-

EUROPEAN ORIGINS

15

t i o n a n d nationalism p i c k i n g u p the pace together. D o u b l i n g back, pressures i n rural Wales sent waves o f migrants into the English a n d A m e r i c a n labor pools d u r i n g the 1860s and 1870s, a n d b y the 1880s its politics resounded w i t h a n e w W e l s h

consciousness.

T h e n b e t w e e n the 1880s a n d the First W o r l d War, e x p l o d i n g p o p ­ ulations, rising outmigrations, emerging nationalisms, and harden­ i n g differences blanketed the European domains o f the AustrianHungarian, Russian, a n d O t t o m a n Empires. As impressive as the relation b e t w e e n m i g r a t i o n a n d the arrival o f nationalism was i n nineteenth-century Europe, i n the e n d it served as the b a c k d r o p for w h a t was a h i g h l y textured, case-bycase process. Migration, even o n a large scale, d i d n o t cause na­ tionalism i n the sense o f creating it. There h a d been great m i ­ grations earlier and there w o u l d be great migrations later that p r o d u c e d n o nationalist movements. N o r d i d it h e l p to picture nationalism rising out o f migration. I n a sense it d i d , b u t so d i d other movements. Migration generated the needs—the context a n d the i n c e n t i v e — a n d nationalism, w h i c h was t h e n h a m m e r e d into m a n y shapes b y the distinctive circumstances o f each setting, p r o v i d e d one p o p u l a r w a y o f addressing them. A f e w examples highlight European nationalism's variety. Basque nationalism, a latecomer i n Western Europe that flourished

first

i n the 1890s, expressed a m i x t u r e o f concerns about

b o t h o u t m i g r a t i o n a n d i m m i g r a t i o n . Spanning France and Spain b u t far stronger i n Spain, w h e r e bitterness over losing out i n the long, vicious Carlist Wars gave nationalists c o m m o n memories, the m o v e m e n t g r e w i n a climate o f anxiety over the t h i n n i n g o f Basque ranks at h o m e a n d the prospect o f their i n u n d a t i o n b y invading outsiders. Here nationalism served as a bastion o f de­ fense, relying o n Euskara, a language almost incomprehensible to outsiders, as the sine qua n o n o f the true Basque. I n line w i t h other nationalist movements built primarily o n fears, this one was deeply reactionary.

16

CHAPTER 2

A n e w sense o f jeopardy also precipitated Danish nationalism. A surge o f p o p u l a t i o n d u r i n g the second half o f the l o n g nine­ teenth century, d o u b l i n g the n u m b e r o f Danes i n their core terri­ tory a n d p r o p e l l i n g t h e m out o f traditional villages i n t o t o w n s and cities there and abroad, prepared the way; a disastrous defeat i n 1864 at the hands o f Prussia, w i t h the consequent loss o f Schle­ s w i g and Holstein, b r o u g h t it into the open. After 1871, Bismarck's n e w state set about transforming the Schleswig Danes into Ger­ mans. Indeed it l o o k e d as i f Germany m i g h t just s w a l l o w the w h o l e o f D e n m a r k i n another bite. Against this b a c k g r o u n d o f jeopardy and anger, a cultural revival and a theme o f reunion, appealing to Danes everywhere p r o v i d e d the substance for a na­ tionalist m o v e m e n t that d o m i n a t e d p u b l i c life b y the e n d o f the century. As the Danes' story illustrated, aspirations fueled the most ener­ getic nationalist movements. The contrast b e t w e e n rising and shrinking expectations was particularly revealing i n the case o f the Swedes and Norwegians, whose demographic histories w e r e strik­ ingly similar. W i t h p o p u l a t i o n pressures rising o n the same sched­ ule, the t w o Scandanavian peoples migrated i n successive waves after 1866, 1880, and 1900, totalling for b o t h o f t h e m an impres­ sive 20 percent o f the h o m e p o p u l a t i o n . For b o t h groups, the L u ­ theran church reinforced the chains o f migration; i n b o t h i n ­ stances, those chains ran primarily b e t w e e n the h o m e country a n d the U n i t e d States. Despite these almost identical elements, h o w ­ ever, the commentator w h o observed i n 1902 that "the Nor­ wegians are m o r e N o r w e g i a n than the Swedes are caught w i n d o f the critical difference.

Swedish"

4

National consciousness a m o n g Swedes was a relatively quiet matter. Perhaps its sharpest expression came just before the Great W a r w h e n Russia threatened to s w a l l o w u p those Swedes w h o l i v e d i n Finland. Norwegians, o n their part, labored m i g h t i l y to give themselves a distinctive stamp. First they wrestled their

EUROPEAN ORIGINS

/ 7

culture away f r o m their onetime rulers, the Danes. T h e n they fought a m o n g themselves over the f o r m a distinctive N o r w e g i a n language s h o u l d take. Should it be the academic Bokmàl or the vernacular-driven Landsmâl. Almost b y definition, p o p u l a r nation­ alism p r o m o t e d the latter. B y the 1870s N o r w e g i a n nationalism was i n full swing, w i t h n o abatement u n t i l the eve o f the First W o r l d War. W h a t accounted for the difference b e t w e e n the t w o p e o p l e was simple enough. The Swedes h a d a well-established state; the Norwegians d i d not. Swedes f o u n d glory i n the past, before they h a d slipped to the standing o f a m i n o r p o w e r . Nor­ wegians saw glory i n their future. Ethnicity k n e w n o bounds. A l t h o u g h its reach d i d n o t have to span great distances, n o t h i n g i n h i b i t e d it f r o m d o i n g so. I n the nineteenth century, ethnicity generated identities i n m o t i o n ,

flow­

ing across boundaries as migrants d i d . Appropriately, Swedish a n d N o r w e g i a n nationalism manifested the same characteristics

on

b o t h sides o f the Atlantic: sedate Swedes, energized Norwegians. W h e r e Swedes i n the U n i t e d States h o n o r e d the m e m o r y o f e m ­ pire b y n a m i n g institutions after Gustav A d o l p h , N o r w e g i a n Amer­ icans apotheosized the eleventh-century martyr Saint Olaf, w h o m Danes and traitors, it was said, h a d assassinated. The Sons o f Nor­ way

appeared i n 1895, t h e n the Daughters o f N o r w a y i n 1897.

The use o f N o r w e g i a n p i c k e d u p at the t u r n o f the century, c h u r c h collaboration w i t h German Lutherans weakened, a n d an A m e r i ­ can-based campaign to celebrate everybody's ancestral p r o v i n c e h a d its m o m e n t o f popularity. N o r w e g i a n flags c r o p p e d u p across Minnesota, N o r t h Dakota, a n d Wisconsin. I n 1905, as N o r w a y offi­ cially separated f r o m Sweden, cheers for independence

boomed

across the Midwest, w i t h the echoes resonating for years after­ w a r d . B y contrast, Swedish Americans, l o o k i n g o n as

another

piece o f empire disappeared, emphasized the A m e r i c a n side o f their identity. Some even suggested that the really bright future o f the Swedish nation lay i n the U n i t e d States. Wars created another set o f special cases. O n e w a y or another, 18

CHAPTER 2

w a r affected almost every nationalist m o v e m e n t i n Europe. I n a few instances, it was even possible to argue that w a r precipitated nationalism. The most persuasive cases i n p o i n t materialized dur­ i n g the First W o r l d War, w h e n the vicissitudes o f battle and the dreams o f self-determination o p e n e d a d o o r to p e o p l e w h o had given n o signs o f trying to p u s h it o p e n themselves. A m o n g Slovaks, Ukrainians, and Lithuanians, for example, there was n o nationalism that c o u l d claim a p o p u l a r base u n t i l the opportunities or vicissitudes o f w a r generated one. Yet even t h e n war's specific influence was difficult to isolate. These people, as w e l l as the Es­ tonians, Letts, a n d Romanians for w h o m a similar case m i g h t be made, h a d just recently experienced bursts i n p o p u l a t i o n and m i ­ gration. Under the circumstances, their nationalism constituted less o f an exception than a variation. Migration, i n other w o r d s , w o r k e d i n a c o m b i n a t i o n o f influ­ ences. Situation b y situation, it was migration-and-something-else that generated p o p u l a r nationalism. O n e o f the most significant o f these additional factors was the degree o f elasticity i n an ethnic group's family-kin relations: B y a n d large, the more

flexible—the

more amoebic—those structures, the more extensive the m o b i l ­ ization a n d the m o r e expansive the vision o f its nationalist m o v e ­ ment. After midcentury, an open, inclusive approach to adoptive k i n s h i p stirred a nationalism a m o n g n o r t h e r n Italians that stretched easily across the ocean. D o w n the boot, o n the other hand, m i ­ grating Sicilians, w i t h a tightly w o v e n , place-bound k i n structure that riveted loyalties to their villages o f origin, w e r e s l o w to de­ v e l o p even a Sicilian consciousness, let alone an Italian one. As another example, the D u t c h , leaving i n waves b e t w e e n the m i d d l e and the e n d o f the century, b y and large came i n family units to fixed

American destinations: m i n i m a l movement, i n t u r n i n g k i n ­

ship, n o nationalism w o r t h m e n t i o n i n g . The most important o f all the related factors shaping national­ ism was the m o d e r n state, never far f r o m the center i n any o f these movements. Long before Randolph Bourne's famous barb, EUROPEAN ORIGINS

19

w a r p r o v e d to be the health o f the state, w h i c h came bristling a n d snorting out o f Europe's b l o o d y seventeenth century. Those best geared for w a r — f i r s t Britain, t h e n Napoleonic France, t h e n Ger­ many—served as Europe's models for modernity. F r o m the b e g i n ­ n i n g the m o d e r n state bent every effort to absorb loyalties that w o u l d otherwise have gone elsewhere—to church, to locality, to occupation, to k i n . As a matter o f course, the loyalties that migra­ t i o n was inspiring became fair game. O n e o f the m o d e r n state's most notable functions was to facili­ tate the free f l o w o f p e o p l e w i t h i n its boundaries. I n fact, the es­ sence o f a full-fledged state citizenship, as distinct f r o m an earlier citizenship derived f r o m a t o w n or district, was its u n i f o r m a p p l i ­ cability throughout the state's d o m a i n . States benefited, a n d citi­ zens benefited. For those o n the m o v e , the trappings o f patriotism satisfied important o n g o i n g needs: A n official language,

official

holidays, even an official hierarchy served as a c o m m o n currency easing the transition f r o m one place a n d one j o b to the next. A c o m m o n understanding o f history, a celebration o f the state gov­ ernment, c o u l d make a critical difference i n easing transitions f r o m one place and one j o b to the next. Migrants w h o left the state's jurisdiction, however, lost standing and risked disappearing f r o m consciousness entirely. Hence w h e r e the state d o m i n a t e d na­ tionalism's development, emigrants h a d n o influence. T h e y w e r e n o w outsiders, sometimes even deserters. I n these cases, it was massive internal m i g r a t i o n that gave nationalism its p o p u l a r base. I n an early example, eighteenth-century English nationalism c o u l d incorporate those Scots w h o chose to j o i n b u t n o t the N o r t h A m e r ­ ican colonists, whose impressive reservoir o f loyalty to England was squandered after 1763 b y a government i n L o n d o n that sim­ p l y c o u l d not imagine a single i m p e r i a l b o d y o f citizens. Where nationalism e v o l v e d apart f r o m — o r i n spite

of—the

state, its scope stretched this w a y a n d that to cover fictive k i n as they m o v e d . Nationalism's remarkable plasticity reflected the fact that the migration stirring it was itself a fluid process rather t h a n a 20

CHAPTER 2

departure f r o m one p o i n t a n d relocation i n another. I t was n o t that this protean nationalism lost its sense o f home: D e e p attach­ ments to a place d i d n o t require l i v i n g there. Indeed, m a n y m i ­ grants first discovered their h o m e b y leaving it, b y m a k i n g it something other than the o n l y thing. A malleable, expansive na­ tionalism t h r i v e d best w h e r e n e w obligations i n n e w territories d i d not compete directly w i t h it. I n this regard the U n i t e d States, over­ w h e l m i n g l y the favorite destination for Europeans w h o crossed the ocean, stood o u t i n the nineteenth century as unusually per­ missive t o w a r d w h i t e immigrants. W h i l e the territory o f the U n i t e d States became a critical site for nineteenth-century

nationalism,

the government o f the U n i t e d States was rarely a critical influence i n its development. Schematically that is h o w nationalism originated. W h a t an e m ­ phasis o n its c o m m o n characteristics obscures, o f course, are the twists a n d turns it t o o k i n various settings. N o w let us see h o w patterns o f k i n s h i p , relations to the state, a n d the m e a n i n g o f a h o m e l a n d actually w o r k e d themselves o u t i n three quite differ­ ent movements: Irish nationalism, G e r m a n nationalism, Jewish nationalism. I f European nationalism h a d been a function o f modernization, the Irish, stuck early i n the nineteenth century i n the throes o f a bloated peasant economy, w o u l d have dragged i n m u c h later, perhaps near the t u r n o f the t w e n t i e t h century. O n the contrary, they pioneered i n m o b i l i z i n g and sustaining p o p u l a r support be­ h i n d a nationalist movement. Demographics set the calender for Irish nationalism. N o w h e r e i n the Western w o r l d " i n any half-century," the historian K e n n e t h Connell estimated, "has the n u m b e r o f births so vastly exceeded the n u m b e r o f deaths as i n Ireland before the Famine."

5

Women

w e r e often married b y sixteen, m e n usually b y twenty, and the children, n o longer swept away b y disease, came t u m b l i n g after. B e t w e e n 1780 a n d 1840, Ireland's p o p u l a t i o n more than d o u b l e d . Decade b y decade, m o r e people c r o w d e d into the same spaces.

EUROPEAN ORIGINS

21

A l t h o u g h potato p r o d u c t i o n i m p r o v e d the caloric return per acre, enabling m o r e people t o retain a marginal attachment t o the land, relentless p o p u l a t i o n pressures p u s h e d increasing numbers out. Quantities o f t h e m r o a m e d Ireland. A n e x p a n d i n g flow o f e m ­ igrants sought w o r k i n England, another stream sought o p p o r ­ tunities i n America. Some ranged as far as Australia. Whether the nineteenth-century Catholic Irish inherited an u n ­ usually flexible k i n s h i p system or devised one to suit necessity remains a question, b u t the o u t c o m e — a n extraordinarily success­ ful adaptation to m i g r a t i o n — i s not. T h e y forged links i n their m i ­ gration chains easily a n d used t h e m heavily. Even those w h o left h o m e individually soon reconnected w i t h groups: "[A] l o n e em­ igrant was almost u n k n o w n . " A t h o m e , k i n s h i p defined m u t u a l 6

obligations; abroad, m u t u a l obligations created k i n equivalents. A t home, "friends" actually w e r e relatives; abroad, friends virtually became relatives. B y contrast t o their Protestant Irish counterparts, Catholic emigrants also maintained strong commitments t o the k i n w h o stayed b e h i n d . A t the height o f the Famine, w h i c h k i l l e d a m i l l i o n a n d sent nearly t w o m i l l i o n to N o r t h America, three out o f four emigrants h a d their passage p a i d b y people already o n the other side o f the Atlantic. A n astonishing statistic u n d e r any cir­ cumstances,

it revealed h o w early and h o w t h o r o u g h l y these

transatlantic n e t w o r k s blanketed Ireland. O u t o f these experiences i n migration, Irish kinship, according t o Conrad Arensberg, can best be understood as "a system o f potentialities. It is expansive, rather t h a n restrictive. . . . Thus [an Irishman] embraces ever w i d e r numbers o f his contemporaries." W h a t h a p p e n e d

abroad

reverberated a m o n g k i n back home; w h a t mattered at h o m e radi­ ated out t o those abroad. "The behaviours a n d sentiments o f k i n ­ ship 'travel' w i t h them."

7

I f large-scale migration e x p l a i n e d the t i m i n g o f Irish national­ ism, the British presence e x p l a i n e d its force. D u r i n g Britain's p r o ­ l o n g e d conflict w i t h the Catholic giants o f the continent, the A c t o f U n i o n i n 1801 d r e w Ireland tighter under its rule. The systematic, 22

CHAPTER 2

dogmatic governance o f the early nineteenth century, i n c l u d i n g Britain's i m p o s i t i o n o f the English language, squeezed Ireland tighter still. A n a b i d i n g hatred o f Britain defined Irish nationalism everywhere. Charismatic D a n i e l O'Connell, w h o d o m i n a t e d Irish nationalism for approximately a quarter century, b r o u g h t these feelings into focus. I n fact, before his emergence i n the late teens, Irish nationalism scarcely existed. H e n r y Grattan a n d Robert Em­ met, w h o s e isolated, dramatic challenges to British rule a r o u n d the t u r n o f the nineteenth century made t h e m nationalist martyrs i n retrospect, h a d taken guidance f r o m the Declaration o f Inde­ pendence a n d the Rights o f Man: T h e y w e r e far more republican revolutionaries than Irish nationalists. W h a t the eloquent O'Con­ nell d i d i n league w i t h a n e t w o r k o f priests was weave the cause into the one institution large numbers o f Irish c o u l d claim as their o w n , the Catholic Church. I n the process they energized a genu­ inely p o p u l a r movement, a nationalism g r o u n d e d i n the lives o f Irish peasants before a continental m o v e m e n t h a d anything re­ sembling this k i n d o f broad-based constituency. I n 1825, w i t h the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f "Catholic rent"—a p e n n y a m o n t h to the priest for O'ConnelPs campaigns—Irish nationalism added a second i n n o v a t i o n : a c o n t r i b u t i o n o f m o n e y to clamp their hearts to the cause. For the very poor, the last p e n n y w e n t to the first love. W i t h i n a f e w years, presumably docile tenants were v o t i n g i n legions for the m a n their landlords most feared. B y em­ b e d d i n g nationalism i n the church, however, O'Connell h a d diffi­ culty k e e p i n g his constituents' eyes o n British p o w e r generally rather t h a n o n Catholic disabilities i n particular. M a n y parishioners p r o b a b l y felt n o need to try. I n any case, all his years o f cam­ paigning netted substantial benefits for the c h u r c h b u t n o t h i n g i n the w a y o f self-government. N o sooner d i d a w e a r y O'Connell, threatened b y jail,

finally

give u p than the Famine commenced. B e t w e e n 1845 a n d 1855, Ireland's p o p u l a t i o n fell from 8.5 to 6 m i l l i o n . This terrible M a l t h u sian m o m e n t transformed Irish culture. The birthrate p l u m m e t e d . EUROPEAN ORIGINS

23

I n place o f the traditional early marriage, post-Famine Irish either delayed or avoided it: B y 1900, 20 percent o f the w o m e n a n d 25 percent o f the m e n over forty w e r e single. Yet illegitimacy re­ m a i n e d "astonishingly l o w for a p e o p l e m a r r y i n g so little a n d late." The customary division o f l a n d a m o n g heirs ended. B y 8

maintaining the integrity o f each plot, families sent a regular

flow

o f y o u n g people o n the road. B e t w e e n the Famine a n d the First W o r l d War, about 3.5 m i l l i o n Irish landed i n N o r t h America. Ire­ land's p o p u l a t i o n c o n t i n u e d to decline: under 5 m i l l i o n b y the early t w e n t i e t h century; t h e n b y the 1920s half the

pre-Famine

number, c o m i n g full circle back to the level o f 1780 w h e n the surge began. Irish life, i n other w o r d s , p i v o t e d o n the Famine. Nationalism m i g h t w e l l have b e e n one o f its casualties, o b l i g i n g the Irish at some later time to start over again. W h a t sustained it w e r e their flexible

chains o f fictive k i n . W h i l e the Irish i n Ireland b u r i e d the

dead, nationalism survived b y shifting its center o f gravity across the Atlantic. I n the years o f O'ConnelPs ascendancy, the Irish i n America h a d played o n l y a m i n o r role, cheering his cause a n d contributing m o n e y to it b u t otherwise s i m p l y w a t c h i n g f r o m abroad. N o w , as they t o o k the initiative, they gave Irish national­ ism a distinctive stamp: secular, p u b l i c , a n d violent. B y and large, the Irish escaping famine d i d n o t b r i n g strong c h u r c h discipline w i t h them; " I n fact, m a n y w e r e ignorant o f basic Christian beliefs." Even t h o u g h Roman Catholic churches m u s h ­ 9

r o o m e d along w i t h i m m i g r a t i o n , they never matched their author­ ity i n Ireland. A variety o f p u b l i c figures—in the b r o a d sense, p o l i ­ ticians—seized that authority i n America. I f as some experts c l a i m the crucial fact about the m o d e r n Balkans is that they missed the Enlightenment, one o f the critical clues to m o d e r n Ireland is that the Enlightenment o n l y brushed the t o p o f its Catholic culture. I n the U n i t e d States, however, the brash liberalism o f its remarkably o p e n public sphere affected almost all institutions that came near it. Irish A m e r i c a n politicians, glad for the church's help, d i d n o t

24

CHAPTER 2

need it to survive. Political newspapers, w h i c h c r o p p e d u p w h e r ­ ever Irish Americans congregated, assumed m a n y o f the tasks o f instructing the public, and the church, to stay i n the discussion, funded periodicals o f its o w n , w i t h revealingly secular names like Freemen's

Journal,

the most important o f the lot. Organizations

ranging f r o m sports clubs to m u t u a l aid societies constituted an­ other means for m o b i l i z i n g opinions. A t least at the level o f rheto­ ric, nationalism permeated all these arenas. Wherever Irish A m e r i ­ cans gathered, calls for Irish freedom echoed off the walls. Visitor after visitor c o m m e n t e d o n it. Typically one expressed astonish­ ment at "the existence, three thousand miles away, o f a people numerous, comfortable a n d influential, animated b y a spirit o f na­ tionality b e y o n d all belief." Charles Parnell, the great nationalist 10

i c o n o f the late nineteenth century, thought they w e r e m o r e self­ consciously Irish than Ireland's Irish. A r o u n d m i d c e n t u r y they w e r e certainly more violent. For the Irish i n Ireland, w o r k i n g t h r o u g h the Famine meant setting its hor­ rors b e h i n d t h e m a n d m a k i n g n e w lives. For Irish Americans, however, the Famine was a m e m o r y to keep at w h i t e heat, a ha­ tred for the British to sear over and over again into their collective consciousness. Those feelings fueled their nationalism. Its charac­ teristic expression was Fenianism—an attempt to inspire a general uprising w i t h dramatic acts o f violence—a style that flaired for o n l y a second i n Ireland b u t c o n t i n u e d to smolder, then peri­ odically burst into flames, i n the United States. The A m e r i c a n Fen­ ians' abortive invasions o f Canada i n 1866 and 1870 w e r e cases i n point. I f i n one sense they w e r e opéra bouffe, the cheers greeting t h e m spoke to a stubborn streak o f bloodymindedness a m o n g Irish Americans. O f course it mattered that Irish A m e r i c a n violence carried almost n o penalties i n the United States, that talk was indeed cheap there, and that the sheer size o f the nationalist p o o l i n America swelled the ranks for all points o f v i e w . As the n u m b e r o f Irish declined at home, the p r o p o r t i o n abroad rose steeply. D e p e n d i n g o n the formula for calculation, b y 1920 somewhere EUROPEAN ORIGINS

25

b e t w e e n three a n d six times m o r e p e o p l e c o u l d claim to be Irish i n the U n i t e d States than o n the h o m e island. B y the time nationalism revived i n Ireland, it was a t h o r o u g h l y transatlantic movement, i n c l u d i n g noisy branches i n Canada, N e w Zealand, a n d Australia as w e l l as i n the U n i t e d States. I n 1879 after prison terms i n Britain, Michael Davitt and J o h n D e v o y , t w o m e m ­ bers o f the Irish Republican B r o t h e r h o o d (or Fenians), f o u n d e d the Irish National Land League i n America, w h e r e w i t h i n three years about fifteen h u n d r e d branches w i t h perhaps a half-million members w e r e s u p p o r t i n g rent wars t h r o u g h o u t the Irish country­ side. B y t h e n the British h o m e secretary h a d n o difficulty identify­ i n g "an Irish n a t i o n i n the U n i t e d States, equally hostile, w i t h plenty o f money, absolutely b e y o n d our reach and yet w i t h i n ten days' sail o f o u r shores."

11

D u r i n g the 1880s, Charles Parnell

funded his campaign for H o m e Rule w i t h A m e r i c a n m o n e y . M i ­ chael Davitt stayed l o n g e n o u g h to j o i n H e n r y George's 1886 may­ oral campaign i n N e w Y o r k City; J o h n D e v o y remained i n A m e r ­ ica, a n d m u c h later dickered w i t h the German ambassador to Washington over a secret alliance against the British d u r i n g the First W o r l d War. I n time, Fenian became a shining badge o f h o n o r i n Ireland, one that w o u l d be p i n n e d posthumously to the hero o f the Easter Rebellion, Patrick Pearse, himself a m e m b e r o f the IRB's Irish branch. Perhaps half o f Ireland's nationalist leaders l i v e d for a substantial p e r i o d abroad. The crucial fact was that the Irish generated nationalism w h e r e v e r they congregated. W h a t d i d it matter w h o was i n Ireland, w h o was i n America, and w h o shuttled b e t w e e n them? Leaders a n d followers l i v e d everywhere a l o n g the serpentine lines o f migration.

I f Irish nationalism f o l l o w e d people wherever they w e n t , G e r m a n nationalism stayed h o m e . N o w h e r e i n Europe d i d nationalism march m o r e closely to the beat o f the state. A l t h o u g h German writers, b e g i n n i n g w i t h Johann Gottfried v o n Herder, p i ­ oneered the idea o f nationalism, its realization i n their midst 26

CHAPTER 2

seemed remote early i n the nineteenth century. A scattering o f liberals d i d keep alive the dream o f some k i n d o f u n i t e d Ger­ many, b u t their failures b o t h o f imagination and o f strategy d u r i n g the r e v o l u t i o n o f 1848 b a n k r u p t e d their cause. Popular national­ ism was not an issue. As one historian has summarized it, u n t i l w e l l after m i d c e n t u r y "nationalism was a m i n o r i t y movement, deeply d i v i d e d and w i t h o n l y a marginal impact o n G e r m a n life."

12

T o w n s stood guard against little states and little states k e p t w a t c h o n the bigger ones, crisscrossing the German-speaking lands into a mosaic o f jurisdictions and traditions. T h o u g h Vienna was de­ caying as an imperial center, it remained the most important Ger­ m a n city, a n d the government's erratic p o l i c y t o w a r d this pieced a n d parceled n o r t h generally served the status q u o . Nevertheless, c o m b i n i n g m a n y small units into a large one was the story o f b o t h n a t i o n - b u i l d i n g a n d state-building everywhere. W i t h i n the German lands, site o f the Reformation a n d source o f the Counter-Reformation's bloodiest struggles, religion m o r e than p o l i t i c s — o r religion as politics—accounted for the special resis­ tance to unification. I n the nineteenth century, as b o t h Catholic a n d Protestant migrants infiltrated states that h a d once been en­ e m y territory a n d hence l i v e d increasingly side b y side, they iden­ tified themselves n o t b y their c o m m o n territory b u t still t h r o u g h their deep devotional differences. T h e y h a d m o v e d w i t h o u t b u d g ­ ing. German nationalism, largely a Protestant impulse, h a d to r e c k o n w i t h the consequences. I t was n o longer possible to create a Protestant Germany w i t h o u t Catholics. Was it possible to create one w i t h them? Prussia begged the question b y h a m m e r i n g o u t a state instead. I n Carl Becker's w i t t y summary, Bismarck u n i t e d Germany b y d i ­ v i d i n g it into three parts. T w o q u i c k w a r s — o n e crushing Austria i n 1866, the other humiliating France i n 1870—secured the n e w state, essentially an institutionalization o f Prussia's dominance across the heart o f German-speaking Europe. France l i c k e d its w o u n d s , a n d Austria t u r n e d its attention south a n d east. National­ ist sentiment g r e w i n the w a k e o f these victories. U r b a n m i d d l e EUROPEAN ORIGINS

27

class talk o f a u n i t e d G e r m a n y — v a g u e even b y the permissive standards o f mid-nineteenth-century n a t i o n a l i s m — p i c k e d u p w i t h the creation o f a N o r t h G e r m a n Confederation i n 1866, b u t p o p u ­ lar nationalism, i n effect, dated f r o m the French capitulation at Sedan. T r i u m p h over the o l d enemy gave a national sheen to the n e w German Empire. Hence as Bismarck set to the task o f forcing Catholic citizens into this Germany's m o l d , t w o matters besides its essentially Protestant nature became clear: The state's centrality i n the entire process m e r g e d nationalism w i t h patriotism, t h e n en­ cased the c o m b i n a t i o n inside G e r m a n territory. Statistically, Germans h a d as m u c h incentive as the Irish to stretch conceptions o f k i n s h i p to cover migrants i n Eastern Europe a n d N o r t h America. Their p o p u l a t i o n b o o m started early i n the nineteenth century. I n Prussia alone, it rose a r o u n d 70 percent b e t w e e n 1815 a n d I860. I n the south a n d west, Germans experi­ enced their version o f Ireland's great famine, initiating the

first

large w a v e o f emigrants to the U n i t e d States i n 1846. W h e n a sec­ o n d w a v e rose after the A m e r i c a n Civil War, its sources w e r e al­ ready shifting to the northeast, w h i c h d o m i n a t e d the last w a v e e n d i n g i n 1893. B y t h e n the territory contained w i t h i n the n e w German Reich had c o n t r i b u t e d to a nineteenth-century o u t f l o w o f w e l l over 4 m i l l i o n . Culture a n d politics c o m b i n e d to m i n i m i z e migration's impact o n nineteenth-century G e r m a n nationalism. N o t h i n g abroad en­ couraged Catholic and Protestant Germans to consider themselves branches o f a single family. Moreover, Lutheran emigrants w h o d i d feel d r a w n into a G e r m a n nationalist m o v e m e n t f o u n d t h e m ­ selves dismissed back h o m e . W h e r e the state c o n t r o l l e d the mak­ i n g o f the nation, emigrants c o u n t e d themselves out. T o matter, they needed to live i n Germany. For those Germans w h o s e na­ tionalism derived from language a n d culture, the Bismarckian so­ l u t i o n d i d not cover nearly e n o u g h Germans; for those w h o placed the accent o n Protestantism, it h a d t o o m a n y Germans; b u t for the large p r o p o r t i o n w h o let the state define their nation, o n l y 28

CHAPTER 2

Citizens o f the n e w Germany were truly Germans. I n fact, B i smarckian p o l i c y d i d not reach out, it drove out. Migration's rela­ t i o n to nationalism always h a d t w o sides: gathering i n dispersed k i n a n d e x c l u d i n g u n w a n t e d aliens. D u r i n g the late 1880s, Ger­ m a n y expelled tens o f thousands o f Polish speakers, pressuring others to f o l l o w . As i f they heard the doors closing b e h i n d them, emigrating Ger­ mans, w h o began arriving i n quantity a r o u n d midcentury, con­ centrated o n life i n America. Proudly German i n culture, they constructed i n t u r n i n g little societies a r o u n d church, language, cus­ toms, and celebrations. There they prospered i n groups: German families e m b e d d e d i n German communities situated once a n d for all i n America. T h e more b i n d i n g the cultural cement, the more self-sufficient their social e n v i r o n m e n t became; the more selfsufficient their environment, the more distant they g r e w from Ger­ many. Even as the initial communities eroded, p e o p l e m o v i n g o n l o o k e d back to those settlements, n o t to Germany, as the h o m e they h a d left. T h e percentage o f naturalized citizens c l i m b e d , ties across the Atlantic slipped away, return rates stayed very l o w . A l ­ t h o u g h there m i g h t be thrills i n visiting a n d i n i n d u l g i n g a m o m e n t o f German immersion, these people k n e w that they b e l o n g e d somewhere else. German Americans never lost an awareness o f events abroad, o f course. The Franco-Prussian War a n d unification w e r e certainly occasions for celebration. Especially i n America's industrial cities, w h e r e transoceanic connections tended to be considerably stron­ ger a m o n g G e r m a n Americans, debating European trends fit into everyday life. Here, however, it was socialism, n o t nationalism, that maintained the best communications and framed the hottest discussions, a n d t h r o u g h o u t the f o r m a t i o n o f imperial Germany, socialists and nationalists w e r e snapping at each other's throats. Hence w i t h the outbreak o f the First W o r l d War, w h i l e the sympa­ thies o f G e r m a n Americans w e n t w i t h the Central Powers, they w e r e little m o r e t h a n a remote cheering section. It was simply t o o EUROPEAN ORIGINS

29

late for German officialdom, w h i c h h a d dismissed nineteenth-cen­ tury emigrants as deserters, to expect any m o r e f r o m them. Per­ haps beady-eyed A m e r i c a n patriots w o u l d have gone h u n t i n g for spies a m o n g people w i t h G e r m a n backgrounds n o matter w h a t . As it was, the superpatriots misread cultural consciousness as na­ tionalist c o m m i t m e n t — a major error i n the case o f G e r m a n A m e r ­ icans, w h e r e the t w o orientations w o r k e d at odds. I n retrospect, it is obvious that the spy chasers p i c k e d the w r o n g g r o u p : There was m u c h m o r e g o i n g o n a m o n g the nationalist-driven, Britishhating Irish Americans. T h e m o v e m e n t o f people that d i d spur German nationalism was m i g r a t i o n inside the Reich itself. After a r o c k y quarter century o f internal conflict and confusion, a state-based a n d state-bounded n a t i o n began to congeal i n the 1890s, as the flow f r o m the farms a n d t o w n s into Germany's industries a n d cities p i c k e d u p a n d e m ­ igration declined to a trickle. W i t h Bismarck's K u l t u r k a m p f against Catholicism abandoned, the emphasis shifted f r o m the conflict over cultures to the definition o f citizens: w h a t w e r e their rights a n d responsibilities and h o w s h o u l d they fulfill their obligations t o the state, matters that b o n d e d Germans inside the Reich w i t h one another a n d sealed t h e m even m o r e tightly from outsiders. O n the eve o f the Great War, "few G e r m a n speakers i n the G e r m a n E m ­ pire t h o u g h t o f Germany as a n y t h i n g other than the territory o f the Empire, a n d o f themselves as a n y t h i n g other t h a n national members o f that state."

13

I f the state threatened t o s w a l l o w G e r m a n national­ ism, it threatened to elude Jewish nationalism altogether. Like Irish nationalism, it g r e w o u t o f large-scale, transoceanic m i g r a t i o n a n d sought to gather i n Jews wherever they had gone, b u t u n l i k e the m o v e m e n t a m o n g the I r i s h — o r for that matter any other Euro­ p e a n m o v e m e n t — i t spent years debating w h e r e o n earth it s h o u l d come to rest. 30

CHAPTER 2

Z i o n i s m materialized i n the context o f m a n y East European na­ tionalist movements. Late i n the nineteenth century, the Jewish p o p u l a t i o n there soared along w i t h the populations o f neighbor­ i n g East European peoples, and the scramble to make l i m i t e d re­ sources cover m o r e a n d more p e o p l e resulted i n immiserization a n d neoserfdom all around. Communities everywhere cracked at the seams under these pressures, sending sundry p e o p l e t h r o u g h ­ out the entire r e g i o n o n the move. As for the Jews i n particular, b e t w e e n 1882 a n d 1914 r o u g h l y 2.5 m i l l i o n left the Pale—about one-third o f its total p o p u l a t i o n . Yet i n a sense n o t h i n g changed there. W i t h p o p u l a t i o n increasing 50 percent b e t w e e n 1882 and 1914, emigration s i m p l y siphoned o f f the surplus: There w e r e as m a n y Jews i n Russia after the mass exodus as before. I n m a n y ways, Z i o n i s m l o o k e d like the nationalism d e v e l o p i n g a r o u n d it. Early i n the 1880s, proto-Zionists gave o l d experiences n e w meanings a n d n e w experiences collective meanings w i t h a traditional ring. Migrations spurred b y specific regional causes w e r e p i c t u r e d i n the universal context o f Jews w a n d e r i n g i n exile for t w o thousand years; ritual expressions o f a return to Jerusalem conjured prospects o f an actual return. The most creative o f these voices for a n e w Jewish consciousness, Asher Ginzberg—better k n o w n b y his p s e u d o n y m A h a d H a ' a m — f o u n d e d B ' n e i Moshe i n 1889 to p r o m o t e H e b r e w as the f o u n d a t i o n for a grand spiritual a n d cultural revival. Hence w h e n T h e o d o r Herzl issued his dra­ matic w a r n i n g i n 1896 o f the Jews' false faith i n assimilation, advo­ cated a separate h o m e l a n d , and called u p the W o r l d Zionist Orga­ nization to achieve it, he c o u l d d r a w together m a n y scattered pieces awaiting a full-fledged nationalist movement. A l t h o u g h Herzl was a cosmopolitan Viennese o u t o f Paris, his primary audience d i d n o t lie i n Western Europe, w h e r e a small, stable Jewish p o p u l a t i o n contributed o n l y occasional converts to Zionism. T h e people w h o heard h i m shared Eastern

Europe's

shtetl culture, seething w i t h m o v e m e n t and sustaining chains o f migration that almost always bypassed Western Europe for the

EUROPEAN ORIGINS

31

U n i t e d States. W i t h strong c o m m u n i t y and family traditions a n d a l o n g familiarity w i t h catch-as-catch-can survival, shtetl life p r o v e d t o be excellent preparation for stretching family networks, elab­ orating systems o f m u t u a l support, and reconceiving k i n s h i p to cover countless thousands o f strangers—the essentials for an ex­ pansive, inclusive nationalism. Rising anti-Semitism gave Z i o n i s m its urgency. I n 1893, three years before Herzl published his clarion call, The Jewish

State, Karl

Lueger raised political anti-Semitism to a n e w level w i t h the for­ m a t i o n o f the Christian Social Party, based i n Herzl's Vienna. T h r o u g h o u t Zionism's emergence, anti-Semitism was heating u p across the Western w o r l d , even i n Britain, a pioneer i n Jewish emancipation. I n retrospect, Zionist myths attributed its appear­ a n c e — i n effect, the necessity o f Z i o n i s m — t o these fresh waves o f anti-Semitic violence that drove shtetl Jews i n search o f a real h o m e and frightened intellectual Jews into i m a g i n i n g one for them. Pogroms i n 1881, f o l l o w e d a year later b y draconian i m p e ­ rial restrictions, d i d pose immediate threats to Jews i n the Russian Pale. As brutal as those actions were, however, they d i d n o t set the pace o f migration. Rates o f departure f r o m s w o l l e n b u t peace­ ful Austrian Galicia, Albert L i n d e m a n n has p o i n t e d out, matched those f r o m violence-ridden Russia: "Economic factors w e r e almost certainly more important than political ones." Despite the special 14

viciousness accompanying its birth, i n other w o r d s , Z i o n i s m nicely illustrated the standard sequence: p o p u l a t i o n explosion, migra­ tion, nationalism. The extraordinary feature o f Z i o n i s m was its free-floating qual­ ity. What k i n d o f space d i d it seek for Jews? I f it o n l y w a n t e d a safe place, it was not nationalism; it was a refuge movement. The former d i d not automatically r e c o m m e n d a barren piece o f T u r k ­ ish territory. The Russian Leo Pinsker, w h o s e

Auto-Emancipation

(1882) initiated debate o n the issue, h a d safety o n his m i n d , a n d a barren piece o f T u r k i s h territory a r o u n d Jerusalem, h o w e v e r sanc­ tified, d i d not r e c o m m e n d itself. A l t h o u g h Herzl s h o w e d a greater 32

CHAPTER 2

appreciation for the uniqueness o f Palestine, he k e p t his m i n d o p e n to all kinds o f alternatives—Argentina, Mesopotamia, i n des­ peration U g a n d a — a n d after his death i n 1904, other Zionists such as the w r i t e r Israel Z a n g w i l l c o n t i n u e d to scan the globe for a Jewish haven. Under Herzl's successor, the cosmopolitan East European Chaim W e i z m a n n , Zionism's most e n d u r i n g leader, the m o v e m e n t d i d come to focus o n a Jewish h o l y land. Nevertheless, under the best o f circumstances Palestine was a peculiar base. U n l i k e other na­ tionalist homelands, it contributed n o substantial constituency o f its o w n to the movement. As late as the Second W o r l d War, less than half a m i l l i o n Jews l i v e d there. The Zionist organization was equally a d r i f t — n o w meeting i n this city and n o w i n that, n o w headquartered i n Europe a n d n o w i n the U n i t e d States, b u t never r o o t e d i n Palestine. Even i f Zionists c o u l d agree o n the boundaries o f their h o l y l a n d and the rights o f people other than Jews to live there, w h a t role w o u l d it play i n Jewish life: the ultimate haven? the s y m b o l o f freedom? the site o f pilgrimages? Contrary to the belief that Y a h w e h h a d already m a r k e d out the story o f the Jews, Z i o n i s m as m u c h as any nationalist m o v e m e n t was o b l i g e d to make it u p as it w e n t along. Vagueness at its core affected everything else about Zionism. A h a d Ha'am, w h o s e mission was to give Jewishness substance t h r o u g h a Hebrew-based culture, h a d little patience w i t h these geographical

preoccupations.

A r d o r for Palestine,

he

feared,

w o u l d drain energies from the primary objectives: Jewishness n o w , a h o m e l a n d i n all g o o d time. After all, he p o i n t e d out, Pal­ estine was already occupied. H e r z l o n his part h a d little interest i n the cultural revival a m o n g East European Jews. The Jewishness he prized was scarcely distinguishable f r o m the virtues that cultivated Westerners o f all sorts valued—cooperation, for instance, or char­ ity. H e concentrated o n a place: l a n d i n the forefront, Jewishness i n the shadows. Because the w e a l t h y Jews o n w h o m most Zionist enterprises m o r e or less relied l i n e d u p b e h i n d Herzl, W e i z m a n n ,

EUROPEAN ORIGINS

33

w h o considered a heightened Jewishness a n d a relentless pursuit o f the Palestinian h o m e l a n d t w o sides o f the same coin, h a d a devil o f a time k e e p i n g his politics a n d his appeals for m o n e y aligned w i t h his vision. The problems o f a Jewish h o m e l a n d a n d a Jewish culture, i n turn, overlapped w i t h a final source o f controversy: the p r o b l e m o f Judaism. Some Zionists anticipated reestablishing a traditional c o m m u n i t y under Judaic l a w that citizenship i n a Western Euro­ pean state h a d all b u t eliminated a m o n g emancipated Jews. M a n y m o r e Zionists w a n t e d a secular state, sometimes m o r e socialist than Jewish. Even more envisaged a spiritually elevated b u t n o t a theocratic Palestinian h o m e l a n d . A l t h o u g h these differences shot t o the t o p o f the agenda o n l y w h e n someone i n p o w e r sat h a r d o n one e n d o f the seesaw, they added another element o f diversity to a m o v e m e n t that always seemed o n the verge o f splintering. O n e puzzle i n the study o f Z i o n i s m is w h y this s p i n d l y m o v e ­ m e n t survived at all, an o u t c o m e for w h i c h the tenacious W e i z m a n n deserved special credit. A n even m o r e interesting puzzle is w h y it d i d not g r o w into a robust mass movement. T h e answer lay i n the U n i t e d States, w h i c h the great m i g r a t i o n out o f Eastern Eu­ rope made a h o m e for Jews second o n l y to the Pale. B y all odds, N e w Y o r k City i n particular—destination, w a y station, nerve cen­ ter for Jews i n m o t i o n — s h o u l d have been a flaming center o f Zionism. W h a t the Irish, 20 percent o f its p o p u l a t i o n i n I860, h a d once been to N e w Y o r k City, 1.5 m i l l i o n J e w s — m o r e than 30 percent o f its p o p u l a t i o n — w e r e b y 1920. That concentration, i n c o m b i n a t i o n w i t h the migrants' transoceanic ties, adaptable c o m ­ munities, and tenacious traditions o f uniqueness, gave Jews i n America just the resources that a t h r i v i n g nationalist m o v e m e n t — Irish nationalism, for e x a m p l e — r e q u i r e d . Despite it all, Z i o n i s m fared p o o r l y i n the U n i t e d States. Critically w e a k at the A m e r i c a n e n d o f the m i g r a t i o n chain, the m o v e m e n t never managed to c o m ­ pensate i n some other w a y . The explanation was revealed b y the light that the A m e r i c a n 34

CHAPTER 2

experience cast o n the three controversies circling Zionism: the p r o b l e m o f a Jewish home, the p r o b l e m o f Jewishness, a n d the p r o b l e m o f Judaism. Early i n the t w e n t i e t h century, Jews i n Amer­ ica broadcast the message that they h a d solved Herzl's p r o b l e m . Measured against their past, the meanness and the jeopardy they experienced i n the U n i t e d States—probably similar to w h a t the Irish h a d once met—seemed little short o f a miracle. T h e y h a d families, homes, a n d synogogues, m o n e y to spend a n d freedom to explore, an openness to life that n o one i n the Pale c o u l d have dreamed o f enjoying. I n cities w i t h m a n y cultures a n d none i n charge, Jewishness transmuted into another k i n d o f hyphenate Americanism. T o become American, i n other w o r d s , meant to re­ m a i n Jewish—that is, Jewish i n whatever ways other Jews recog­ nized. Judaism was subsumed under Jewishness: Create temples that suited this ever-fluid, remarkably safe environment. The result was a distinctively A m e r i c a n Reform Judaism: l o n g o n m o r a l re­ sponsibility a n d short o n ritual observance, a center o f service and support rather than keeper o f the ancient law, a n d a l i n k to w i d e r c o m m u n i t i e s — G e n t i l e as w e l l as Jewish—rather than a c o m m u ­ nity u n t o itself. Families, taking authority f r o m the

synogogue

into the home, increasingly decided h o w their religion w o u l d be observed. I n the tradition o f m o b i l e Jews restructuring their lives again a n d again as the context changed, this vigorous culture gave co­ hesion a n d identity to millions o f Jewish Americans w h o s e for­ tunes—as individuals, as a c o m m u n i t y — h a d b y all the standard criteria i m p r o v e d astonishingly t h r o u g h migration. W h a t c o u l d Z i ­ onism, a w a n d e r i n g minstrel o f a movement, offer them? A place o f refuge, a means o f expressing Jewishness, a w a y o f preserving Judaism w e r e s i m p l y not o n their agenda; they concentrated o n fighting

for m o r e i n America. Even at the level o f p h i l a n t h r o p y ,

the response a m o n g recent migrants to the hardships i n their c o m ­ munities o f o r i g i n was to b r i n g more people t o America. U n l i k e Irish A m e r i c a n nationalism, A m e r i c a n Z i o n i s m h a d n o real focus.

EUROPEAN ORIGINS

35

I f Jewish Americans hated Russia as m u c h as the Irish Americans hated Britain, so what? T h e y h a d n o desire whatsoever to rule the Pale. A l t h o u g h Jewish Americanness—here a n d glad o f i t ! — d i d s h o w a resemblance to G e r m a n Americanness—here a n d that's it!—the critical difference i n their larger stories was that G e r m a n nationalism cut ties w i t h emigrants whereas Z i o n i s m desperately needed to connect w i t h Jews o n the move. I n effect, Z i o n i s m dan­ gled, an East European m o v e m e n t left h o l d i n g its e n d o f the m i ­ gration chain. W h a t these Irish, German, a n d Jewish examples illustrate are the protean, transatlantic qualities that shaped European national­ ism's beginnings. Nevertheless, they leave nationalism t o o isolated w i t h i n Western society a n d t o o frozen i n time. N o w w e must p i c k u p the stories o f other p o w e r f u l movements that interacted w i t h nationalism, and the changes—in some cases p r o f o u n d ones— that all o f these movements experienced i n the course o f the l o n g nineteenth century.

36

CHAPTER 2

CHAPTER

3

Changing Contexts

In t w o fundamental ways, the company nationalism kept shaped its history. One o f these crucial contexts l i n k e d na­ tionalism w i t h the other great popular movements o f the nine­ teenth century, socialism and democracy. A second context inter­ w o v e changes i n nationalism w i t h changes i n the other major dividers i n nineteenth-century Europe: language, race, religion, and above all the state. I n b o t h cases, these interrelationships be­ came tighter and their consequences deeper i n the four decades that l e d u p to the outbreak o f the Great War i n 1914. D u r i n g those years, the course o f socialism, nationalism, and democracy, the trio o f movements that was n o w d o m i n a t i n g European p u b l i c p o l ­ icy, e n t w i n e d like vines o n a trellis. F o l l o w i n g m u c h the same chronology, Europe's primary dividers c r o w d e d a r o u n d national­ ism to f o r m increasingly c o m p l e x composites that seemed o n the verge o f d i v i d i n g the continent into exclusive compartments o f culture and territory. Together, these t w o processes tell a story o f rising expectations, accelerating competition, and hardening dif­ ferences that eventually transformed Europe.

The breakup o f c o m m u n a l i s m , sweeping west to east across Europe, inspired all three o f Europe's great nineteenth-century movements: socialism (the collective management o f c o m m o n re­ sources to ensure equitable rewards for w o r k ) ; democracy (re­ sponsible government w i t h p o p u l a r elections a n d the peaceful transfer o f offices); and nationalism (the right o f a p e o p l e claiming c o m m o n ancestry to c o n t r o l their o w n destiny o n their o w n land). Especially after 1870, the t i m i n g o f the arrival o f these movements' a n d their interaction m a p p e d European history as effectively as any alternative guidelines. The same b r o a d transformation p o w e r e d each o f the

three

movements. As populations b a l l o o n e d a n d local opportunities shrank, more villagers a n d t o w n s p e o p l e h a d to go farther i n order to find w o r k , and w h e n they d i d , they m o r e often received wages i n return. Goods made b y wage earners undercut those made b y local artisans a n d cottagers, sending still m o r e p e o p l e out to w o r k for wages. M e a n w h i l e , consolidated landholdings a n d u r b a n pres­ sures to produce more f o o d m o r e cheaply t u r n e d m o r e a n d m o r e peasants into wage earners. A l t h o u g h migrants overseas some­ times reversed the t r e n d b y f o u n d i n g n e w agricultural c o m m u ­ nities, n o t h i n g eased the pace i n Europe, w h e r e m o r e p e o p l e c o n ­ t i n u e d to c r o w d their w o r k i n g lives into the same spaces. As local cultures o f w o r k , revolving a r o u n d land, household, a n d artisanal skills, shriveled, standards o f l i v i n g d i d n o t neces­ sarily fall: Some people d i d better, some worse. Winners a n d losers alike, however, increasingly lost c o n t r o l over the terms o f their labor, w i d e n i n g the gap b e t w e e n w h a t they d i d today a n d w h a t they c o u l d p l a n for the future and sending m o r e a n d m o r e o f t h e m i n search o f an elusive security. The m o r e they m o v e d f r o m j o b to job, the more their w o r k seemed like a game rigged against t h e m . Publicists a n d officials representing the m e n w h o e m p l o y e d t h e m sought to atomize w a g e earners, use the threat o f starvation as their basic incentive, a n d restrict charity to k e e p i n g the w o r t h y p o o r alive for future labor. Even i f these m o b i l e w o r k e r s i m p r o v e d

38

CHAPTER

3

their lot, it was evident e n o u g h that they w e r e b e i n g used b y others i n ways a n d t o w a r d ends b e y o n d their control: They w e r e a class set apart b y the nature o f their w o r k . Class replaced an o u t w o r n local identity w i t h a portable one ready for the n e w w o r k i n g w o r l d . Wherever wage earners w e n t , they f o u n d others i n a similar situation, people o n the

loose

whose l i v e l i h o o d depended o n the unfathomable twists a n d turns o f a hostile system. Especially for those w h o saw n o w a y out o f the w o r k i n g class, socialism w e n t directly a n d dramatically to the heart o f their situation: I t promised an entirely n e w system built specifically a r o u n d w o r k i n g people's needs. I n none o f its m a n y variations d i d socialism offer an escape f r o m w o r k , o n l y fairness at w o r k . Socialism, i n sum, was a system o f w o r k for workers, w i t h as m u c h protection against the hazards o f chance as nine­ teenth-century radicals c o u l d imagine. Local p u b l i c life i n c o m m u n a l societies, ascribing rights a n d re­ sponsibilities i n a hierarchy o f familiars, also unraveled under the pulls o f migration. People's standing rarely m o v e d w i t h them; a society o f strangers required n e w rules. The formal solution was a n e w citizenship, a single one mandated across a state's entire j u ­ risdiction to replace m a n y varieties o f citizenship i n m y r i a d local units. I n practice, however, uniformity evolved s l o w l y a n d u n ­ evenly. Because those o f highest prestige—people o f rank a n d w e a l t h — w e r e the least likely to migrate, the emerging m o d e r n state c o n t i n u e d to d r a w its resources t h r o u g h them, a n d the tradi­ tional hierarchies they capped, as l o n g as it c o u l d . W e l l i n t o the nineteenth century the inertia o f vested rights k e p t the meaning o f citizenship m i r e d i n a confusion o f distinctions relating to p r o p ­ erty, status, birthplace, and jurisdiction. Even states otherwise re­ sponsive to m o d e r n i z i n g changes accommodated to this crazy quilt o f e m b e d d e d

localism, customary privilege, a n d favored

forms o f property, as the British Poor Laws a n d the constitutions o f the U n i t e d States and Prussia demonstrated. A l t h o u g h it t o o k time to w o r k out the effects, the

drastic

CHANGING CONTEXTS

39

changes accompanying the French Revolution a n d the Napoleonic Empire d i d channel Europe's development t o w a r d u n i f o r m state citizenship. Before the Revolutionary era, the French state itself relied o n "provincial estates, municipalities, chartered guilds, m i l i ­ tary governors w h o often h e l d their offices hereditarily, courts w h o s e judges o w n e d their offices, religious institutions that exer­ cised great independence, a n d thousands o f p r o u d nobles w h o c l u n g jealously to their o w n particular privileges," along w i t h a b e v y o f moneylenders a n d tax farmers. W h e r e Napoleon's France 1

ruled, it destroyed the legal basis for this k i n d o f hierarchical, hap­ hazard conduct o f state affairs. Attempts to patch u p the H u m p t y D u m p t y o f Europe's anciens régimes after 1815 m i g h t have t u r n e d o u t better i f the relentless flows o f p o p u l a t i o n h a d not subtly, sys­ tematically eroded every effort. F o l l o w i n g Napoléon, it n o longer made sense to hire armies; n o r w e r e either local quotas or British press gangs a reliable alternative. The state's p o o l o f y o u n g men, available wherever a n d h o w e v e r often they m o v e d w i t h i n the state, w e r e the soldiers o f the future. M u c h the same a p p l i e d to the p r o b l e m o f taxing a n d extracting labor f r o m a m o b i l e p o p u l a ­ t i o n , too elusive a target for tax farmers and local grandees b u t manageable e n o u g h o n a statewide basis. As traditional c o m m u ­ nities shrank i n significance, i n other words, the n e w citizenship b o t h facilitated migrants' adjustment a n d the state's m o b i l i z a t i o n o f resources. Lesser states t h e n m i m i c k e d larger ones: Every ruler aspired to a scientific mastery o f his d o m a i n . Systematizing citizenship d i d n o t popularize it. For the right to live somewhere under the state's laws, citizens traded the state's right to levy taxes, extract labor, a n d exact services. It was a b a d bargain: These streamlined n e w regimes consistently t o o k m o r e out o f people's hides than the cumbrous o l d ones had. But citi­ zenship also h e l d w i t h i n it the dream o f an o p e n p u b l i c life w h e r e participation affirmed each person's humanity: liberty, equality, fraternity, as the eloquent, i f gendered revolutionary slogan ex­ pressed it. I t was this thrilling prospect that democracy p r o m i s e d 40

CHAPTER 3

to achieve. People w h o r u l e d themselves w o u l d have the p o w e r to secure their o w n rights a n d guarantee the justice o f their o w n government. I n sum, three sequences m a r k e d out solutions to the fundamen­ tal problems that mass m i g r a t i o n created. O n e ran f r o m family life to ethnicity to nationalism, one from w o r k i n g life to class to so­ cialism, and one from p u b l i c life to citizenship to

democracy.

Each, i n other w o r d s , gave priority to one o f the three critical issues that c o m m u n i t y b r e a k d o w n raised. A l l three w e r e c o m p l i ­ cated processes: It was a long, w i n d i n g road f r o m families under stress to nationalism, from j o b grievances to socialism, or from overtaxed t o w n s m e n to democracy. O f course, not all expressions o f ethnicity w e r e nationalistic, n o t all class schemes socialistic, and not all forms o f citizenship democratic. Nevertheless i n the nine­ teenth century other variations increasingly orbited these dynamic centers. Democracy, socialism, and nationalism w e r e holistic visions: W e the People, W o r k i n g People, M y People. Each p u r p o r t e d to be a total solution. Nationalism, w i t h its o w n version o f political selfdetermination, also envisaged an e c o n o m y o f trust a m o n g k i n d r e d folk. Socialism, metaphorically a league o f brothers a n d sisters, also pictured honest governance emerging naturally out o f eco­ n o m i c justice. Democracy's promise to free citizens for their o w n pursuits d o u b l e d as a v i s i o n o f economic o p p o r t u n i t y a n d family independence. Each o f the three carried w i t h i n it the radical p o ­ tential o f a n e w equality—at the ballot box, a m o n g laboring c o m ­ rades, i n a conclave o f k i n — a n d the engine i n each case was migration. "Modern society is n o t m o b i l e because it is egalitar­ i a n " — i n Ernest Gellner's neat summary—"it is egalitarian because it is mobile." A l l three affirmed b o t h the personal w o r t h and col­ 2

lective p o w e r o f their members: N e w individual identities p r o ­ v i d e d n e w means for concerted action. I n each area, action itself was a t r i u m p h . The experience

o f asserting

rights generated

rights. Each o f the three addressed pressing concrete needs b y

CHANGING CONTEXTS

4/

grandly enlarging the scope w i t h i n w h i c h they c o u l d be met a n d b y t u r n i n g the very elements o f crisis i n civic, w o r k , a n d family life into solutions. A t o m i z a t i o n became freedom. A l i e n a t i o n be­ came strength. Strangers became k i n . As the three o f t h e m w e r e rendering o l d social arrangements obsolete, each claimed to be preserving the best o f the past: the spirit o f the t o w n meeting, the personal connection b e t w e e n w o r k e r s a n d tools, the m u t u a l assis­ tance o f family life. I n fact, each cultivated a fantasy o f Edenic roots: the m y t h o f the social contract, the innocence o f honest workers, the ur-connectedness o f the first k i n . Each h a d distinctive weaknesses a n d strengths. Socialism, the most abstract i n its reasoning, dealt most effectively w i t h survival issues like food, shelter, a n d health. Democracy, w i t h the thinnest provisions for m u t u a l support, compensated b y best expressing i n d i v i d u a l aspirations. Nationalism, the least articulated, issued the most o p e n invitation to membership: n o citizens' rights to w i n , n o class loyalty to prove. K i n s h i p , the c l a i m w e n t , e x p l a i n e d itself. I n the nationalist fold, there w e r e n o orphans, n o bastards, n o fami­ lies w i t h o u t heirs. As the three movements came alive i n the w a k e o f the Napo­ leonic Empire, all o f t h e m revealed a primary tension their universalistic and particularistic aspirations.

between

O n the

one

hand, leaders i n each case declared their cause the true heir o f the French Revolution's v i s i o n o f an emancipated

humanity. Their

version o f socialism or democracy or nationalism, they claimed, c o u l d encompass the entire civilized—that is, w h i t e Christian— w o r l d , and they proceeded t o act o n that belief w i t h extraordin­ ary, sometimes

suicidial o p t i m i s m . Whatever

else the era o f

French-generated t u r m o i l contributed, it smashed assumptions about the inevitability o f traditional ways and fed dreams o f fash­ i o n i n g n e w societies. Early i n the nineteenth century, socialism, nationalism, and democracy all reflected that heady faith. A t the same time, each m o v e m e n t s p a w n e d diverse, quite separate ex­ periments that i n some instances w e r e also m u t u a l l y exclusive. 42

CHAPTER 3

Before midcentury, socialism especially manifested those frag­ m e n t i n g characteristics. For sheer variety neither democracy n o r nationalism came close t o matching early nineteenth-century socialism. France was partic­ ularly fertile g r o u n d , ranging from the detailed comprehensive schemes o f H e n r i de Saint-Simon a n d Charles Fourier to the vague destructive ambitions o f Auguste Blanqui. Cooperative produc­ tion, illustrated b y Louis Blanc's w o r k s h o p s o n one side o f the English Channel a n d Robert Owen's factories o n the other, was a natural area o f e x p l o r a t i o n i n a m o v e m e n t predicated o n the alienating, unjust nature o f wage w o r k . Most famously as the Rochdale Plan, projects for the cooperative distribution o f goods also surfaced o n b o t h sides o f the Channel. Moreover, socialism tinged m a n y activities that it d i d n o t dominate. D u r i n g the 1830s and 1840s, for example, socialist visions slipped i n and out o f the w o r k i n g m e n and land-reform campaigns i n the

northeastern

cities o f the U n i t e d States. Early i n the nineteenth century some Methodist w o r k i n g people i n Britain w e r e influenced b y socialist ideas, w h i c h a r o u n d midcentury w e r e also inspiring the Anglican Charles Kingsley's Christian Socialism. Some o f these experiments, notably the O w e n i t e a n d Fourierite communities, responded directly to the failure o f traditional c o m ­ munities b y creating n e w ones. Owen's paternalistic factory v i l ­ lages functioned like surrogate k i n networks, assuming collective responsibility for the c h i l d r e n and the disabled.

Nevertheless,

these self-contained ventures, too, envisaged changing the civi­ lized w o r l d . T h e y presented themselves as "patent office models o f the g o o d society," communities designed to resolve basic issues o f w o r k and justice so persuasively that, their founders antici­ pated, they w o u l d attract an ever w i d e n i n g circle o f converts. I n a 3

fateful error, however, they w a i t e d for the w o r l d to come to them. Where people w e r e i n m o t i o n , success depended o n messages— hopes, strategies, goals—that m o v e d right along w i t h potential re­ cruits. Because early socialist communities self-consciously set out

CHANGING CONTEXTS

43

to make a fresh start f r o m first principles, a n u m b e r o f innovators t o o k the seemingly vacant spaces i n America as an ideal location to b e g i n over again. Isolation i n a vast country o f m o b i l e p e o p l e was d o u b l y disastrous. U n w i l l i n g or unable to float their ideas o n the currents o f migration, these test cases just d w i n d l e d a n d disap­ peared. I n the face o f early socialism's i m m o b i l i t y , the decision o f its challenger Karl M a r x to focus o n the propertyless

wage

earner—the quintessential w o r k e r o n the m o v e — w a s a stroke o f genius. W h a t the irresistible m o d e l was to early socialism, the dramatic gesture was to early nationalism. O n the t w i n assumptions

that

each people h a d a spirit o f its o w n a n d that each spirit c o u l d give b i r t h to a distinctive nation—assumptions that derived f r o m the innovative nationalist theory o f Johann Gottfried H e r d e r — c h a m ­ pions o f early nationalism l o o k e d for the w a y to b r i n g their peo­ ple alive. N a t i o n h o o d i n this scheme o f things was natural, a n d hence peaceful. " I a m convinced," w r o t e Alexis de Tocqueville, w i t h the price o f the French Revolution i n m i n d , "that the interests o f the h u m a n race are better served b y g i v i n g every m a n a partic­ ular fatherland than b y t r y i n g t o inflame his passions for the w h o l e o f humanity." D u r i n g the first half o f the nineteenth century, na­ 4

tionalism's inherent thrust drove it t o w a r d

freedom—freedom

f r o m the tyranny o f an i m p e r i a l p o w e r , the tyranny o f superstition, the tyranny o f an alien culture. A spark m i g h t ignite a nation. N o need to w o r r y i n advance about boundaries, even i n as ambig­ uous a case as Germany's: T h e very act o f creation w o u l d clarify the nation. I n the most famous o f early nationalism's sacrifice missions, Prince Alexander Ipsilandis i n 1821 l e d his Sacred Battalion o f ut­ terly unprepared, o u t m a n n e d y o u t h against the O t t o m a n army t o die for Greek liberty, a n d w i t h i n a decade there was an i n d e p e n ­ dent state o f Greece. Early nationalists d r e w a straight line be­ t w e e n those t w o points. A quarter century after the prince's suicidial gallantly, the martyrs o f Y o u n g Ireland stood u p to die w i t h

44

CHAPTER 3

the same hopes. Leaders s i m p l y h a d to find the lever, the crucial latch o p e n i n g the door to a nation's realization. Hence the ex­ traordinary perseverance o f some leaders w h o s e failures merely sent t h e m searching over a n d over again for the real key. I n years o f exile, Guiseppe Mazzini expected that at the right m o m e n t he w o u l d l a n d o n Italian soil, plant his flag, and precipitate the na­ t i o n . W i t h o n l y a little more attention to the logistics o f his enter­ prise, Mazzini's friend Lajos Kossuth rode the revolutionary hopes o f 1848 and 1849 i n pursuit o f r o u g h l y the same v i s i o n i n H u n ­ gary. U n l i k e early socialism, w h e r e theory clashed w i t h theory, advocates o f early nationalism cheered one another's efforts as encouragement for their o w n . " I believe [nationality] to be the r u l ­ i n g principle o f the future," w r o t e Mazzini. " I feel ready to w e l ­ come, w i t h o u t any fear, any change i n the European m a p w h i c h w i l l arise f r o m the spontaneous general manifestation o f a w h o l e people's m i n d . "

5

Early democracy s h o w e d the least variety o f the three. As a w a y o f exercising citizenship, it had the most intimate ties to a state. Nationalism m o v e d w i t h a people a n d socialism w i t h an ideology; b u t democracy

stayed h o m e to m o b i l i z e citizens. A l t h o u g h it

w o u l d be a mistake to overemphasize those differences—neither English n o r German nationalism exported w e l l , m a n y microexperiments i n socialism never b u d g e d an inch, a n d democratic as­ pirations floated freely o n the breezes o f h o p e — t h e r e w e r e far fewer models for democracy before the m i d - n i n e t e e n t h century than for either socialism or nationalism. I n fact, o n l y t w o h a d w i d e currency: French Revolutionary democracy, and the democracy i n America that t o o k its name from A n d r e w Jackson and f o u n d its publicist i n Alexis de Tocqueville. France a n d the U n i t e d States shared important characteristics. I n a century o f long-range, long-term outmigrations, neither c o u l d reasonably be defined as an emigrant country. Population g r o w t h , w h i c h never skyrocketed i n France, was already tapering off b y the 1820s, a half century before any o f its continental neighbors,

CHANGING CONTEXTS

45

a n d the expansion that d i d occur was largely absorbed i n a c o u n ­ tryside o f small-scale peasant proprietors a n d i n its m a n y centers o f small-scale manufacturing. The U n i t e d States was the great re­ cipient o f other countries' e x p l o d i n g populations. A p p r o p r i a t e l y , neither generated a major m o v e m e n t that transformed m i g r a t i n g family members i n t o the fictive k i n o f a French or an A m e r i c a n nation. I n fact, b o t h made their p r i m a r y c o n t r i b u t i o n t o national­ ism b y encouraging other people's: France b y stirring n e w na­ tional consciousness at the p o i n t o f a revolutionary bayonet, the U n i t e d States b y m a k i n g r o o m for the m o b i l e partisans o f Europe's m a n y nationalist movements. Rather than e x e m p l i f y i n g national­ ism, b o t h illustrated h o w another c o m m o n denominator, citizen­ ship, m i g h t give scattered people a sense o f unity. Revolutionary France c o u l d lay claim to i n v e n t i n g m o d e r n citi­ zenship, b y w h i c h people gave services to a n d received benefits f r o m a central administration representing all o f t h e m as an inte­ grated civic body. The democratic m e a n i n g o f this citizenship de­ r i v e d f r o m the revolutionary catchwords liberty, equality, frater­ nity: u n i f o r m standing before a code o f law, regular participation i n the selection o f governors, a n d a collective c o m m i t m e n t to the c o m m o n welfare. I f the Jacobin m o m e n t i n the early 1790s was as ambiguous as it was brief, the dreams it let loose h a d remarkable staying p o w e r . The Revolution's armies, c o n t i n u i n g a tradition o f French cultural leadership a n d carrying the authority o f actual citi­ zens i n arms, spread subversion wherever they w e n t . Even i n the reactionary years after Napoleon's exile, widespread hopes re­ m a i n e d that another French u p r i s i n g w o u l d ignite democratic rev­ olutions t h r o u g h o u t Europe. O n l y w i t h the eclipse o f France's prospects after 1815 d i d a second democratic m o d e l attract serious European attention. The events a r o u n d the A m e r i c a n Revolution, radical i n their o w n right as affronts to customary authority, p o s i t i o n e d the U n i t e d States t o claim the mantle, a half century later, o f the Western w o r l d ' s sole functioning democracy. America's source o f distinction d o u b l e d as

46

CHAPTER 3

its source o f cohesion i n t w o ways. First, it was an additive de­ mocracy i n w h i c h every vote counted as one m o r e piece o f the civic w h o l e . The f e w b r i n g o n l y their l i m i t e d w i s d o m to p u b l i c life, e x p l a i n e d George Bancroft, the troubadour o f A m e r i c a n de­ mocracy; the m a n y contribute that m u c h more, and ad infinitum: As the p o o l expanded, so d i d the people's w i s d o m . That k i n d o f democracy invited b o t h a boundless g r o w t h and an instant assimi­ lation o f n e w voters. Second, it was a m o b i l e democracy that w h i t e m e n c o u l d exercise w i t h equal ease wherever they w e n t . The incessant

politics that

filled

nineteenth-century America's

public spaces l o o k e d very similar everywhere, a n d hence the strikingly frequent elections carried m u c h the same meaning wherever they occurred: regular, repeated affirmation o f the vot­ ers' freedom, their equality, a n d their membership i n a collective governing b o d y . Nevertheless, the French ideal exercised a m u c h greater influ­ ence than the A m e r i c a n experience. T h r o u g h midcentury, democ­ racy i n Europe remained an aspiration, for w h i c h France's r e v o l u ­ tionary m o d e l — b r o a d brushed, exciting, infinitely applicable—was w o n d e r f u l l y suited. A m e r i c a n democracy, o n the contrary, was a place-bound operating system, one that virtually every early nine­ teenth-century commentator, European or American, treated as u n i q u e to that country: Outsiders c o u l d o n l y l o o k . T w o charac­ teristics i n particular—the abundance o f farmland a n d the invisi­ bility o f government—seemed

to prove the irrelevance o f the

American experience for Europe. H o w e v e r fragile France's d e m o ­ cratic legacy, France itself was quintessential^ European. It gave educated continentals a c o m m o n language and a cultural frame o f reference, it e x e m p l i f i e d systematic central government, a n d it merged patriotism w i t h military glory, attributes that Europeans readily understood. I f this country at the p i v o t o f their universe t u r n e d democratic, the rest o f Europe m i g h t w e l l f o l l o w after. The crucial partner i n the development o f democracy, national­ ism, and socialism alike was the m o d e r n state. I n fact, none o f CHANGING CONTEXTS

47

these movements made sense w i t h o u t it. Democracy, a w a y o f exercising citizenship, presupposed the existence o f a state. Na­ tionalism reached for the equivalent o f a state o f its o w n . Even socialism, ostensibly boundaryless, accommodated to the state's jurisdiction a n d eventually c o m p e t e d for its p o w e r . A t the same time, these systems o f loyalty w e r e constructed along conflicting lines. If, i n Cynthia Enloe's phrasing, the state was "a vertical creature o f authority," each o f these movements was "a horizontal creature o f identity," a w a y o f visualizing c o n ­ nections laterally, not hierarchically. I n each case, the state was its 6

natural predator, ambitious to devour all other loyalties for its o w n purposes. It set out to o v e r w h e l m democracy's suspicion o f arbi­ trary p o w e r w i t h a glorification o f itself right or w r o n g ; to replace nationalism's m u t u a l assistance a m o n g k i n w i t h patriotism's rituals o f d u t y and obedience; a n d to sacrifice the class needs o f w o r k i n g people to the state's preoccupation w i t h p r o d u c t i o n a n d warfare. Eventually champions o f the state w o u l d claim that it replicated o n a grand scale w h a t its m o b i l e citizens once derived f r o m c o m ­ munities: N o w , it was said, the state p r o v i d e d t h e m w i t h identity, welfare, and o p p o r t u n i t y . Q u i t e rightly, advocates o f democracy, socialism, and nationalism all associated the European state o f the early nineteenth century w i t h autocracy and repression; just as sensibly, the state o n its part o u t l a w e d those movements as sub­ versive. A n d i n fact each was a w i l d card, capable o f dramatic surges b e y o n d the state's c o n t r o l . A t the radical e n d o f the spec­ t r u m , each m o v e m e n t

d i d w i s h the

state away: nationalism

t h r o u g h a general w i l l , socialism t h r o u g h a classless order, democ­ racy t h r o u g h a self-regulating liberty. N o n e o f the three c o u l d live w i t h the state, none c o u l d live w i t h o u t it: That was the standing contradiction o f the n e w order.

T h e half century after 1870 was a grand era o f Euro­ pean 48

state b u i l d i n g , CHAPTER 3

when

central

governments

everywhere

amassed p o w e r , systematized administration, a n d m o b i l i z e d re­ sources. As they d i d , they fundamentally altered the terms w i t h i n w h i c h the movements for socialism, democracy, a n d nationalism pursued their objectives. I n all cases, the initiative lay w i t h the state. Democrats, nationalists, and socialists certainly w e r e not pressing central governments to expand; all three fought t h e m i n the name o f the people's freedom. Nevertheless, b y the e n d o f the nineteenth century w h e t h e r i n emulation, i n defense, or s i m p l y i n escalating ambitions, tougher, harder nationalist, socialist, and democratic movements w e r e g r o w i n g t h r o u g h o u t Europe along­ side its e x p a n d i n g states. One w a y or another, all three interlaced their future w i t h some version o f the b i g state, even t h o u g h the builders and keepers o f the state—Bismarck and Cavour w e r e ex­ e m p l a r y — h a d n o affection whatsoever for these movements. For one thing, all three n o w acquired large, sustained

fallow­

ings. Even i n Western a n d Central Europe w h e r e nationalism, so­ cialism, a n d democracy already made a significant difference before midcentury, those movements

w e r e eruptive and e p i ­

sodic—at times popular, as the t u r m o i l extending f r o m Britain to H u n g a r y demonstrated b e t w e e n 1847 and 1849, b u t even t h e n fleeting. I n Slavic Europe, there w e r e n o p o p u l a r movements at all before midcentury, just isolated elites talking a m o n g

themselves

about ideas c o m i n g f r o m the West. T h e n the greatest waves o f nineteenth-century m i g r a t i o n commenced, rising across the conti­ nent and p o u r i n g into cities o n b o t h sides o f the Atlantic. After 1870 more a n d more people listened to the great trio's messages, j o i n e d their campaigns, a n d stuck w i t h their causes. The m o m e n t u m o f these movements inspired similar policies i n all three. Whether out o f concern for the chronic d e p e n d e n c e — o r the threatening i n d e p e n d e n c e — o f their followers, leaders every­ w h e r e set about consolidating w i t h a w i l l . As they organized, they preached discipline. Where democracy, socialism, a n d nationalism h a d once b e e n o p e n a n d malleable, their counterparts at the e n d o f the century w e r e increasingly articulated, bureaucratic,

and

CHANGING CONTEXTS

49

self-protective. Continental political parties, characteristically per­ sonalized and ephemeral as late as the 1880s, systematized a r o u n d a corps o f insiders. T o be partisan was to f o l l o w the agenda. Champions o f labor, once eager to fan the sparks f r o m w o r k p l a c e grievances, instead f o r m e d trade unions to channel discontent a n d decide i n their members' behalf. Faith i n the spontaneous nation­ alist uprising w a n e d : Plotting gave w a y to planning, gesturing t o staging. The I r o n Law o f Oligarchy, Robert Michels's uncanny insight into m o d e r n organizations, captured the basic changes i n all three realms. Over and over again, p o w e r was s i p h o n e d to the t o p w h e r e small groups c o m p e t e d for the right to define goals a n d set strategy. N o t h i n g mattered m o r e t o the leadership than maintain­ i n g the organization. The nature o f the struggle left n o o p t i o n , the n e w logic insisted: Power h a d to be met w i t h p o w e r . As the stan­ dard metaphor went, generals marshaled their troops for battle, loyal soldiers m a n n e d their posts. Movements lost their v o l u n t a r y qualities. The Italian nationalist Guiseppe V e r d i caught the n e w spirit i n the scene f r o m Nabucco

(March 1842) w h e r e the Isra­

elites—not from any claims o f justice b u t strictly f r o m arguments o f necessity—banish Ishmael forever for breaking their code. The socialist c o m m a n d m e n t was n o longer to identify one's comrades; it was never to desert them. People w e r e not asked to choose loyalties, o n l y to declare t h e m . A fine line separated m o b i l i z a t i o n f r o m distrust. G i v e n the "hard, continuous, repeated, creative ideological a n d political la­ bor" these movements required, little w o n d e r their leaders fought to preserve the results. Nevertheless, discipline became an obses­ 7

sion. Socialist a n d democratic leaders expressed

deep doubts

about the ability o f the very p o o r to get i n line, let alone stay there. Marxists, n o w the p r e d o m i n a n t socialists, scorned a l u m p ­ enproletariat and its w i l d c a t initiatives; middle-class democrats, n o w party men, feared the street politics that w e r e once their great hope. Like strikes a n d elections, nationalist rallies w e r e care­ fully designed activities. The m o r e leaders thought o f themselves 50

CHAPTER 3

as the movement's experts, the less they trusted ordinary fol­ lowers. W h a t c o u l d the average m i n d k n o w o f scientific material­ ism, administrative government, or cultural purification? I n each o f the three movements, c o n t i n u i n g resistance to these trends i n the name o f a freer spirit o n l y sharpened the urge at the t o p to tighten control. B y the 1890s each m o v e m e n t h a d its distinctive l o o k . Across Europe w o r k i n g people's institutions congealed i n class frame­ w o r k s , to the consternation o f vested interests everywhere. D e m o ­ cratic movements rallied b e h i n d responsible government a n d u n i ­ versal suffrage—sometimes

just for males, sometimes

for all

adults. Nationalism, the first o f the three to abandon its universalistic rhetoric, claimed not just the superiority b u t increasingly the separateness o f each culture. T o organize the fragmentary ex­ periences o f m o b i l e people, each m o v e m e n t created its o w n nar­ rative: democracy's w h i g g i s h tale o f progressively e v o l v i n g liberty a n d law; the socialist dialectic w i t h its ultimate resolution i n favor o f the w o r k i n g class; the nationalist's drama o f a folk o n the verge o f reclaiming its culture and homeland. Necessarily the three movements interacted. W h o c o u l d say w h e r e the d i s r u p t i o n o f civic life ended and the redefinition o f w o r k life began, o r w h e r e needs at w o r k separated f r o m needs i n the family? W h e n a parent c o u l d n o longer pass profitable skills to an offspring, an entire fabric unraveled. Hence it is n o t surprising that movements sometimes collaborated. Drives for u n i o n rights a n d universal suffrage m o v e d side b y side i n Britain, Germany, and Sweden.

Democratic champions

i n Flanders

t h r e w their

w e i g h t b e h i n d Flemish autonomy, i n D e n m a r k b e h i n d Danish irredentism, a n d i n N o r w a y b e h i n d independence. Visualizing a f u ­ ture for the heterogeneous Austro-Hungarian empire, Karl Renner and Otto Bauer p r o p o s e d a socialist state w h e r e citizens w o u l d have the freedom o f a distinctive national identity w i t h o u t the need for territorial exclusiveness. I n general, a w i d e l y perceived threat to the n a t i o n rallied democrats and socialists alike. I n those prewar years o f jostling a n d maneuvering, however, it CHANGING CONTEXTS

51

was easy to mistake collaboration for c o m m u n i o n . I m p l i c i t i n m u c h o f their cooperation was the sense o f a zero-sum c o m p e t i ­ tion, one that the record often supported. I n Britain democrats d i d absorb their socialist allies, just as i n Germany socialists d i d the same to their democratic allies. I n Sweden, w i t h its m u t e d nation­ alism, socialism flourished as it d i d n o t i n N o r w a y , w h e r e a v i g ­ orous nationalism tended to veil class differences. Hence, w h e n victory seemed at a movement's

fingertips,

the urge to eliminate

the c o m p e t i t i o n h a d some basis. F o l l o w i n g different logics, they p u l l e d i n different directions. Nationalism's responsiveness to k i n interests l o o k e d like a c o r r u p t i n g nepotism to ideological socialists a n d meritocratic democrats. Neither a nation's a u t o n o m y n o r the socialists' collective o w n e r s h i p c o u l d survive o n democracy's tee­ ter-totter o f w i n n i n g a n d losing. O n the eve o f the First W o r l d War, dreams o f s i m p l y s w a l l o w i n g the alternatives ran t h r o u g h all three movements.

A m e r i c a n democrats pictured nations

and

classes dissolving i n secret-ballot elections. Nationalists i n n o r t h ­ ern Italy expected their victory to destroy socialism and erase de­ mocracy. Revolutionary socialists t h o u g h t o f nationalism a n d de­ mocracy purely as facilitators for the proletarian t r i u m p h that w o u l d render b o t h obsolete. The more intimate a movement's relations w i t h the state, the stronger the impulse t o w a r d control. B e g i n n i n g i n the 1870s, the democrats i n charge o f the T h i r d Republic used the state's schools a n d its army to indoctrinate everybody inside the boundaries o f France as citizen-patriots a n d i n the process trivialize attachments to region, ethnic c o m m u n i t y , u n i o n , a n d church alike. Shifting the basis o f citizenship f r o m b l o o d l i n e to residence u n d e r l i n e d the centrality o f the state i n crafting French unity. After 1881, w i t h the examples o f France a n d Germany before them, state-based nationalists m o u n t e d aggressive Russification campaigns

against

minorities i n the tzar's empire. Serbia's iron-fisted nationalism, w h i c h materialized i n the 1870s along w i t h the autocratic Serbian state, s i m p l y merged its ambitions w i t h those o f the state: "to . . . 52

CHAPTER 3

unite [ w i t h i n a Greater Serbia] all the Serbian people l i v i n g under O t t o m a n and Habsburg rule."

8

Phrased another w a y , c o m p e t i t i o n mattered. Where none o f the three movements c o u l d dominate the other t w o and, even m o r e important, w h e r e none o f t h e m c o u l d merge w i t h the state, a greater openness—a stronger check o n autocracy and aggression, a higher l i k e l i h o o d o f accommodation—almost always f o l l o w e d . T u r n i n g just to nationalism, this rule o f c o m p e t i t i o n a p p l i e d equally to its relations w i t h the other great dividers o f the nine­ teenth century: language, race, and religion. The more these p o w ­ erful sources o f separation crisscrossed one another, the less any one o f t h e m c o u l d dictate the terms o f division i n Europe. B y the same token, each one that coincided w i t h nationalism raised its walls and thickened its gates to the outside w o r l d . A layering o f all three atop nationalism made it a formidable fortress indeed.

Language always carried p o w e r . Skill i n Latin and French h e l p e d to define the t o p o f Europe's hierarchies w e l l into the nineteenth century. Imperial centers r u l e d i n the language o f their choice, and subjects i g n o r e d that fact at their peril. The m o r e systematically those centers tried to govern, the m o r e insistently they i m p o s e d that choice. I n the 1770s, to consolidate p o w e r at h o m e and integrate a widespread empire, the court i n Copenha­ gen insisted u p o n the use o f a standard Danish wherever it ruled. T w o decades later Jacobins i n Paris mandated one French i d i o m t h r o u g h o u t the republic. D u r i n g the m i d d l e o f the nineteenth cen­ tury, an independent Greece, w h i c h Europe's great powers had carved out o f the O t t o m a n Empire, consolidated its authority b y replacing a Babel o f dialects w i t h a standardized m o d e r n Greek. I n the second half o f the nineteenth century, as states g r e w more a n d more ambitious, this trend accelerated. The n e w l y created Italy set o u t to superimpose a single language across the m u t u a l l y incomprehensible vernaculars that its subjects s p o k e — m o r e

CHANGING CONTEXTS

or

53

less the same goal that the n e w l y energized T h i r d Republic pur­ sued i n France. After 1867, rulers i n the Hungarian p o r t i o n o f the Hapsburg Empire forced Magyar o n its diverse p o p u l a t i o n , most o f w h o m spoke a Slavic language w i t h entirely different linguistic roots. At the receiving end, nationalist movements

rose to

resist.

Macedonian nationalism—battling Serbs, Bulgarians, a n d Greeks o n several

fronts—developed

late i n the nineteenth

century

a r o u n d the right t o use its o w n language. W h e n Albanians, caught i n an even more complicated a n d b l o o d y crossfire o f Turks, Greeks, and Slavs, struggled to d o the same, they o n l y managed as late as 1908 to settle o n an alphabet. I n 1911 B r e t o n nationalism w i t h its o w n political party—Fédération

Régionaliste de Bre­

tagne—materialized i n reaction to a mandated Parisian French. Nevertheless, s i m p l y i m p o s i n g an alien language rarely triggered a full-scale nationalist movement. For centuries people r o o t e d i n their communities h a d learned just e n o u g h o f a conqueror's lan­ guage to make exchanges, evade rules, a n d get w o r k . A m o n g themselves, they used their o w n language. N o w , however, the stakes w e r e increasing as people m o v e d . W h e n perennially m o ­ bile people m i n g l e d , the question o f w h o s e language w o u l d d o m ­ inate t u r n e d into a constantly changing contest w i t h b i g w i n n e r s a n d b i g losers, one that affected merchants a n d bankers a n d clerks as m u c h as farm laborers a n d factory workers. Late i n the nineteenth century, as Catalonia industrialized inside traditionalist Spain, a cross-class m o v e m e n t w i t h Catalan at its core emerged to secure the gains for the h o m e f o l k — t h a t is, for the fictive k i n o f m o d e r n nationalism. A t about the same time, Flemish speakers, w h o h a d b e e n pushing o u t o f their s w o l l e n villages since m i d c e n ­ tury a n d m i x i n g at a disadvantage w i t h the wealthier, Frenchspeaking Walloons, m o u n t e d a campaign to make Flemish the official language i n their part o f a d i v i d e d B e l g i u m . T h o u g h a l i n ­ guistic line h a d r u n t h r o u g h Belgium's territory since medieval times, n e w pressures f r o m m i g r a t i o n d e m a n d e d n e w solutions. 54

CHAPTER 3

M a n y o f these linguistic movements h a d longer histories. A m e r i ­ can missionaries, o f all people, h a d h e l p e d a tiny b a n d o f Bulgar­ ians c o m p i l e their first dictionary i n the 1840s, decades before there was any h i n t o f a p o p u l a r nationalist movement. A t about the same time, a bilingual Flemish elite h a d tried futilely to interest their indifferent W a l l o o n superiors i n m a k i n g all B e l g i u m b i l i n ­ gual. A generation later the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f penny-press

news­

papers m a r k e d another w a y station i n these language campaigns. Flemish nationalism, for example, g r e w m u c h m o r e assertive w i t h the p u b l i c a t i o n o f the first cheap Flemish newspaper i n 1870. Still, the crucial matter was w h o p a i d attention. W h e r e elites marched to their o w n beat, n o b o d y f o l l o w e d . Establishing a learned B o k mâl a r o u n d m i d c e n t u r y d i d n o t h i n g to inspire N o r w e g i a n nation­ alism. Nationalist newspapers survived i n B e l g i u m w h e n there w e r e e n o u g h receptive Flemings loose i n the cities to b u y them. W i d e l y circulating newspapers also t o l d nationalists i n one m o v e m e n t w h a t nationalists elsewhere w e r e d o i n g . As one exam­ ple, A h a d Ha'am, the inspiration b e h i n d m o d e r n i z i n g H e b r e w as the language o f the Jews, taught himself several languages, read avidly, a n d k n e w exactly w h a t was g o i n g o n i n the nationalist movements a r o u n d h i m . B y the 1890s the passion for a distinctive language seemed to infect every nationalist movement. Douglas H y d e l e d the m o v e m e n t to e x h u m e Gaelic for Irish nationalism. Serbs a n d Croats, w h o s e leaders o n l y a f e w years earlier h a d agreed u p o n a language i n c o m m o n , n o w d i d their best to extend the linguistic distance b e t w e e n them. M u c h o f this was admittedly symbolic. A l t h o u g h Basque nationalism—also dating f r o m

the

1890s—set great store b y the distinctiveness o f Euskara, it was a language that even most o f its followers f o u n d t o o difficult to use. A similar fate befell Gaelic, w h i c h precious f e w Irish still spoke. Nevertheless, i f it played o n l y a ceremonial role, ceremonies w e r e important. Race, the second o f the great dividers r u n n i n g alongside nation­ alism, has come to have such horrific implications that it is hard CHANGING CONTEXTS

55

n o w to reclaim its nineteenth-century uses. Nevertheless, just as language c o u l d be a device either to b u i l d communities or to an­ nihilate them, so race c o u l d justify h u m a n diversity as w e l l as h u ­ m a n destruction. Like nationalism, it t o o k o n a m o d e r n m e a n i n g w i t h the Enlightenment, w h e n a deepening

awareness o f the

globe's many cultures rendered obsolete the time-honored, Chris­ tian-centered d i c h o t o m y o f civilized us a n d barbaric them. B u t u n ­ like nationalism, innovative ideas about race d i d not g r e w out o f local needs; they filled intellectual space that the s h r i n k i n g rele­ vance o f Christian explanations left vacant. Race, the n e w i d i o m for conceptualizing a varied w o r l d , was n o t itself an explanation o f anything, o n l y a vocabulary c o m m o n t o a great range o f explanations. T h r o u g h o u t the l o n g nineteenth century, n o t h i n g discouraged Europeans f r o m giving race m u l t i ­ ple, fluid meanings. D u r i n g the first half, it seldom rose above a manner o f speaking, a w a y o f r e m a r k i n g o n cultural differences w i t h i n Europe and o f restating routine beliefs about Europe's su­ periority to the rest o f the w o r l d . Once inside that Eurocentric framework, race often h a d quite optimistic connotations. A b i b l i ­ cal faith i n the single o r i g i n o f all h u m a n k i n d gave the w o r l d ' s current diversity a sense o f contingency: F r o m one, m a n y h a d come; f r o m the m a n y o f today, other outcomes always remained possible. Even theorists o f A r y a n and Anglo-Saxon superiority c o m m o n l y believed i n the inheritance o f acquired characteristics: W h a t y o u learned, y o u passed o n to the next generation. I n a progressive universe, therefore, b a c k w a r d cultures/races w e r e al­ most certainly changing for the better. The great exception covered the p o p u l a t i o n o f sub-Sahara Af­ rica. I n the discourse o f the philosophes as w e l l as the prejudices o f the marketplace, African blacks w e r e already singled o u t b y the eighteenth century as the lowest o f the l o w . T o an o l d identifica­ t i o n as natural slaves, Europeans added the curse o f science— b o t h p r e - D a r w i n i a n a n d p o s t - D a r w i n i a n — t h a t one w a y or an­ other consigned black people to the b o t t o m o f the h u m a n scale. 56

CHAPTER 3

These beliefs hardened considerably i n the second half o f the nineteenth century. M o r e a n d m o r e intellectuals attacked m o n o genesis: W h i t e a n d black, they insisted, must have b e e n different f r o m the very b e g i n n i n g . Even those w h o retained the faith i n monogenesis increasingly abandoned its egalitarian implications. So m a n y centuries o f divergence, Europeans argued, h a d made these inequalities permanent. O r perhaps black Africans w e r e not really humans after all. W h e n skeletal evidence c o u l d n o t establish an evolutionary connection b e t w e e n the gorilla and the h u m a n , for example, there was a strong tendency, i n the historian George Stocking's telling phrase, "to t h r o w l i v i n g savage races into the fossil gap."

9

A l t h o u g h color-coded racism h a d devastating consequences abroad, it h a d little influence o n the perception o f race differences at home: Black savages w e r e far away, other people w e r e here. I n Europe race remained a r o u g h s y n o n y m for culture. Intellectuals o f various persuasions—Karl Marx a n d Joseph Ernest Renan, for example—construed it that w a y . So d i d m a n y government offi­ cials. A p p a r e n t l y the Greek government c o n v i n c e d a substantial n u m b e r o f the country's ethnic minorities that assimilation w o u l d make t h e m members o f the Greek race. Sundry people w h o mar­ ried the migrating Irish w e r e w e l c o m e d into the Irish race. I n this spirit, the historian H e n r i Pirenne argued that f r o m years o f inter­ action several peoples h a d come together to f o r m a distinctive Belgian race. Even w h e r e a science o f race contributed t o the hardening o f exclusionary attitudes, it tended to reinforce predilections rather than freeze people i n preassigned categories. Hence Count de Gobineau, the mid-nineteenth-century theorist w h o has

been

called the godfather o f Europe's w o r s t racism, discarded theories o f a biologically pure race as irrelevant and considered some intermixture the best for all parties. As rigid a nationalism as the Basque variant used race t o denote its u n i q u e culture, n o t a biologically differentiated people. Eugenics, the hardest edge o f CHANGING CONTEXTS

57

biological determinism o n the eve o f the Great War, enjoyed its greatest success across the Atlantic i n the U n i t e d States. I n Europe, i n other w o r d s , the strong forces o f racism w e n t i n t o imperialism, the w e a k ones i n t o nationalism. O f the layers that other dividers placed atop European nationalism before the First W o r l d War, race was the least burdensome. Europe's Jews, c o m m o n l y called a race a n d increasingly at risk late i n the century, m i g h t w e l l have disagreed. O f course antiSemitism, g o u g i n g a channel t h r o u g h centuries o f Christian his­ tory, was n o t h i n g n e w . It may be an idle question b u t it is n o t an idle consideration w h e t h e r medieval Crusaders, p r o v i d e d the means, w o u l d have k i l l e d all the Jews i n the w o r l d . Against that b a c k g r o u n d Jews w e r e the greatest single beneficiaries o f the En­ lightenment theories o f racial variety. T h o u g h observant Jews re­ m a i n e d a strange l o t apart i n the n e w dispensation, they w e r e n o t necessarily evil or even inferior. D u r i n g m u c h o f the nineteenth century, the trends ran t o w a r d greater openness, w i t h age-old anti-Jewish restrictions falling t h r o u g h o u t Western a n d Central Eu­ rope. Indeed, one o f the rationales b e h i n d the Hebrew-based cul­ tural revival late i n the century was a fear that spreading tolerance m i g h t achieve w h a t centuries o f persecution h a d failed t o accom­ plish: the disappearance o f a distinctive Jewish people. As nationalism hardened, anti-Semitism also spread a n d deep­ ened. Intimations i n the 1870s rose i n v o l u m e d u r i n g the 1880s, n o t o n l y i n the Pale b u t also i n the heart o f cosmopolitan Europe. Karl Lueger's anti-Semitic political party i n Vienna was

soon

j o i n e d b y French conservatives w h o used the Dreyfus affair to at­ tack Jews generally. For those hostile to a m u l t i t u d e o f anony­ mous migrants, Jews—part

o f the

flow,

o f course—were

the

quintessential w a n d e r i n g strangers. A l t h o u g h the numbers w e r e scarcely significant, Jewish m i g r a t i o n i n t o London's East E n d trig­ gered the British Aliens Act o f 1905, l i m i t i n g the rights o f Jews even i f they d i d become naturalized citizens. B y then, a systematic a n d aggressive anti-Semitism was operating i n a stretch o f c o u n 58

CHAPTER 3

tries that ranged from Greece and Romania t h r o u g h Poland i n t o Finland. Nevertheless, the o l d a n d the n e w w o v e together i n c o m p l i ­ cated ways. Jews continued to find homes and hopes i n Lueger's Vienna. The brief Dreyfus affair w e n t u p i n smoke after 1900. As assimilated Hungarians, Jews participated i n the campaigns

to

Magyarize Slavic and German peasants. A l t h o u g h race was n o w c o m p e t i n g w i t h class for w o r k i n g people's loyalties, as Marx's onetime colleague Moses Hess noted, n o t h i n g k e p t Jews f r o m p l a y i n g a p r o m i n e n t role i n the socialist politics o f early twentiethcentury Europe. I n fact, it was rarely clear h o w to factor concepts o f race into this rising anti-Semitism. Christianity, its traditional source,

re­

m a i n e d dominant, a fact that u n d e r l i n e d the special significance o f religion i n changing nationalism's fortunes t h r o u g h o u t Europe. I n general, the m o r e seriously a church t o o k its role as a universal institution, the more likely it w o u l d muster p o w e r against nation­ alism. For deeply c o m m i t t e d Roman Catholic clergy i n Spain, France, and Italy, nationalism was a deadly secular enemy. Early i n twentieth century, w h e n Spanish nationalists set out to over­ come the church's repressive, antimodernist record, the Roman Catholic hierarchy bested t h e m b y channeling p o p u l a r energies back into the church. A t the e n d o f the nineteenth century, French Catholics countered the Paris-centered

civic integration o f the

T h i r d Republic w i t h a Rome-centered m o v e m e n t for m o r a l p u r i ­ fication.

A n unforgiving p o p e treated the loss o f his d o m a i n to

Italian unification as a mortal sin. A d d to that impressive record o f resistance along Europe's Mediterranean flank the collapse o f B i ­ smarck's K u l t u r k a m p f i n the n e w Germany, and the strength o f a militant Roman Catholicism as a counter to European nationalism becomes clear. Not surprisingly, w h e r e a church d i d j o i n its mission to the na­ tion's cause, it, more than any other additional influence, t o u g h ­ ened prewar nationalism. Despite the efforts o f the patriarchate i n CHANGING CONTEXTS

59

Constantinople to keep Greek O r t h o d o x y true to its universal claims and hence aloof f r o m all nationalist movements, the c h u r c h d i v i d e d against itself, w i t h the Bulgarian and Greek branches rein­ forcing rather than tempering those w a r r i n g loyalties. Eastern Or­ t h o d o x clergy i n Serbia, v i e w i n g the n e w state as the

church's

c h a m p i o n against O t t o m a n tyranny, t h r e w themselves unreser­ v e d l y b e h i n d the national cause. A t the other e n d o f the spectrum, ambivalent religious establishments

o p e n e d the w a y for other

influences. Unresolved rabbinical disputes over the m e a n i n g — indeed, the w i s d o m — o f Jewish nationalism left secular Zionists i n charge o f the movement. A l t h o u g h the pietistic, Rome-bound Irish Catholic church never repudiated Irish nationalism, its suspicions o f a secular leadership kept the church at the edges o f the m o v e ­ ment after 1870. I n early twentieth-century Poland, it required ag­ gressive Lutherans o n one side and aggressive Eastern O r t h o d o x o n the other to pressure a reluctant Roman Catholic clergy at l o n g last i n t o an alliance w i t h secular nationalists. The best w a y to highlight the changes i n European nationalism after 1870 is to l o o k first at w h a t those movements shared, then at w h a t differentiated them. O n e w a y or another, all o f t h e m parti­ cipated i n the hardening process that began i n the 1870s and i n ­ tensified i n the 1890s. As Eric H o b s b a w m has demonstrated w i t h particular clarity, the stakes o f success increased

dramatically.

Movements that had once sought a u t o n o m y n o w demanded inde­ pendence; movements that had once sought independence some­ time i n the future demanded it n o w . Movements otherwise as dif­ ferent as N o r w e g i a n and Macedonian nationalism s h o w e d

the

effects o f that acceleration. Little w o n d e r that self-determination,

a

t e r m that might have meant m a n y things, became a s y n o n y m for independence i n the 1910s. Nationalists p a i d attention to one an­ other, then proceeded to c o p y one another. Hence, when a m o v e ­ ment arrived—that is, w h a t characteristics predominated i n the nationalist causes a r o u n d i t — h a d a g o o d deal to d o w i t h the k i n d o f m o v e m e n t it w o u l d be. Basque nationalism, appearing i n the 60

CHAPTER 3

1890s, was b o r n hard. Zionism, organizing a r o u n d the t u r n o f the century, was b o r n oligarchic. The differences a m o n g Europe's movements spread t h e m across a spectrum that set nationalism i n c o m p e t i t i o n w i t h other loyalties at one e n d and surrounded it w i t h reinforcing passions at the other. I n Bohemia, for example, the presence o f a vigorous social­ ist m o v e m e n t and the absence o f b o t h a firm religious connection and an exclusionary linguistic t u r n kept Czech nationalism notably m i l d . I n Spain—where socialism and democracy reinforced re­ gionalism, the church d u g i n its heels i n opposition, a n d factions squabbled over their cultural heritage—no p o p u l a r nationalism ever appeared. I n Greece, o n the contrary, the inconsequence o f socialism a n d democracy, a fervent c o m m i t m e n t f r o m the O r t h o ­ d o x hierarchy, demands for linguistic a n d cultural homogeneity, and a dark strain o f racism heated its nationalism to a p o i n t w h e r e o n l y the state's chronic military limitations h e l d it i n check.

10

Sub­

tract some racism, add an effective army, and the same summary a p p l i e d to Serbia. As the Balkan cases illustrated, wherever nationalism disap­ peared inside state patriotism, the m o n g r e l results bristled w i t h aggressive, coercive qualities. Each o f the major dividers influenc­ i n g nationalism h a d the mark o f the state stamped o n it. It was state p o w e r that transformed the French and Hungarian drives for linguistic and cultural homogeneity into juggernauts. It was the state, i n pursuit o f its imperial dreams, that t u r n e d racism into a scientifically embellished justification for mass brutality. It was the state that gave clerical megalomania the muscle to act o u t its fan­ tasies. Because Eastern European nationalism arrived late, because it was rarely accompanied

b y strong socialist and

democratic

movements, a n d because partisan churches exercised unusually strong influence o n it, there is some truth to the customary w i s ­ d o m that as nationalism shifted f r o m Western to Eastern Europe it g r e w harsher and more rigid. Nevertheless, the larger t r u t h is that nationalism everywhere i n Europe was b e c o m i n g m o r e oligarchic, CHANGING CONTEXTS

61

m o r e exclusive, m o r e violent. A n t i p o p u l i s t trends, ambitions t o eliminate socialism a n d democracy, c o m p a n i o n movements for linguistic, racial, and religious m o n o p o l i e s , and above all militariz­ i n g states that costumed themselves as champions o f the n a t i o n characterized nationalism t h r o u g h o u t Europe o n the eve o f the Great War.

62

CHAPTER 3

CHAPTER

4

T h e C a s e of the U n i t e d States

^ V s an extension o f Europe, the settlements that be­ came the United States shared i n the transformation that accom­ panied migration. O n b o t h sides o f the Atlantic, democracy, socialism, and nationalism developed o n r o u g h l y the same sched­ ule; none h a d meaning w i t h o u t reference to the other t w o . I n America as i n Europe, the degree to w h i c h each i n the trio was absorbed into a central state—and the degree to w h i c h national­ ism especially was layered b y influences from religion, race, a n d language—best accounted for any o f the three movements' soft­ ness or hardness, its tendency t o w a r d accommodation o n one h a n d or exclusion o n the other. American society's origins as a European outpost, however, gave it a distinctive stamp. Like the rest o f the European settle­ ments i n the Western Hemisphere, the colonies i n N o r t h America w e r e places o f exploitation w h e r e overflows f r o m Europe came to better themselves. The standard fabric o f European restraints d i d not h o l d there. As a matter o f course, settlers i n the British colo­ nies from Massachusetts to Georgia expected and w e r e expected

t o ride r o u g h s h o d over anyone w h o stood i n the w a y . Slaughter­ i n g the indigenous people w h o h a d not d i e d from Europe's dis­ eases was sufficiently routine to eliminate almost all o f t h e m f r o m the N o r t h American coast b y the mid-eighteenth century. I m p o r t ­ i n g blacks to N o r t h America meant, i n effect, a shifting o f labor f r o m possible colonial locations o n the African side o f the ocean to already lucrative ones o n the western side, n o different i n k i n d f r o m the later entrepreneurial shuttling o f slaves b e t w e e n the West Indies and the N o r t h A m e r i c a n mainland. I n Europe's outposts, whites used other people as they saw fit. D u r i n g the eighteenth century European elites simultaneously c o n d o n e d and despised these activities. Almost n o one at h o m e d o u b t e d the right o f Europeans to squeeze profits out o f the hides o f colonial laborers, b u t like caste stigmas i n other cultures it dirt­ ied a n d degraded the ones w h o d i d it. W h i l e its colonies served European civilization, they w e r e n o t strictly a part o f it. H o w e v e r m u c h some whites i n N o r t h America w a n t e d to be accepted as full-fledged Englishmen, they harbored n o illusions about

the

logic o f life i n those colonies, a n d they t o o k the t o u g h - m i n d e d materialism o f Europe's colonial periphery into their r e v o l u t i o n against British rule. Southern planters never lost focus o n their interests: Prosperous colonials i n one setting, they expected to be more prosperous still i n the next. Even those N o r t h A m e r i c a n rev­ olutionaries w h o , like their European counterparts, w e r e dis­ gusted b y black e x p l o i t a t i o n as a w a y o f life o c c u p i e d shaky g r o u n d : T h e y t o o w e r e scrambling, ambitious colonials w h o gam­ b l e d that independence w o u l d benefit their enterprises. Against this b a c k g r o u n d o f ruthless colonialism, the U n i t e d States Consti­ t u t i o n was an astonishing accomplishment. Recognizing, then, that A m e r i c a n society lay simultaneously i n ­ side and outside the European experience—integral to its migra­ tory flows, off the scale o f its everyday m o r a l i t y — t w o characteris­ tics m a r k e d out the special path that the U n i t e d States w o u l d take: the weakness o f its central government a n d the importance o f a 64

CHAPTER 4

white-black axis i n defining its social boundaries. Because trans­ planted exploiters h a d largely set their o w n terms i n the m a i n l a n d colonies, revolutionary Americans inherited small

governments

and proceeded to consolidate that heritage. Heavily dependent o n black labor at the time o f the Revolution, whites b u i l t slavery into their federal government, o p e n e d appropriate n e w territory for its expansion, a n d released other whites f r o m even r o u g h l y compa­ rable dependent labor. Freedom was as clear—and as c o m p l i ­ cated—as the difference b e t w e e n black a n d w h i t e . A l o n g these b r o a d guidelines, the rest o f the American story u n f o l d e d . Democ­ racy, flooding into the spaces that small government left, m o v e d h a n d i n glove w i t h race. Nationalism i n America o n l y made sense i n the framework these characteristics dominated.

N o country i n the w o r l d was m o r e i n v i t i n g to m o b i l e w h i t e people than the nineteenth-century U n i t e d States. Land was cheap, agriculture varied, and short-term labor usually i n demand. T o take advantage o f its extraordinary opportunities, o l d settlers and newcomers alike m o v e d a n d m o v e d a n d m o v e d again. I n a country w h e r e the challenge was n o t to dismantle b u t to create a social order, these persistently migrating whites seemed forever i n the midst o f r e m a k i n g the identities that i n Europe's traditional order c o m m u n i t y life h a d once p r o v i d e d . I n this sense, nine­ teenth-century American society was a quintessential

expression

o f the Western w o r l d ' s transforming process. I n this sprawling country the three great innovations for a soci­ ety i n m o t i o n — n a t i o n a l i s m , socialism, a n d

democracy—operated

to a striking degree apart. A society w i t h o u t a core, America p r o ­ v i d e d ample r o o m for all kinds o f c o m m u n a l experiments

and

ethnic assertions that neither i n t r u d e d o n one another's space n o r i n v o l v e d themselves w i t h democratic g o v e r n m e n t — w h i c h rarely p a i d t h e m m i n d i n any case. For socialism, permissiveness i n a diffuse, opportunistic society was the kindness that k i l l e d . T o T H E CASE OF T H E U N I T E D STATES

65

b e g i n w i t h , early socialism asked people to stay p u t and f o l l o w its rules, a disastrous strategy i n fluid nineteenth-century America. N o t u n t i l the b e g i n n i n g o f the t w e n t i e t h century d i d socialists learn h o w to float their cause o n a sea o f m o b i l e people. Even m o r e crippling, the unprecedented

a n d exhilarating assumption

a m o n g w h i t e m e n that they c o u l d c o n t r o l their o w n w o r k i n g lives u n d e r m i n e d any m o v e m e n t that required t h e m to t h i n k o f t h e m ­ selves as pawns i n a capitalist game. D u r i n g the 1820s, as the s u p p l y o f l a n d and the d e m a n d for labor exploded, already teeter­ i n g schemes o f dependent labor collapsed: Servants w a l k e d a w a y f r o m their indentures, apprentices stood u p a n d negotiated the terms o f their w o r k . Wage w o r k seemed n o m o r e than a w a y station to a farm or shop o f one's o w n . A l t h o u g h it w o u l d be foolish to ignore the hardships trailing m a n y o f these laborers o n the move, it w o u l d be far worse to underestimate the r e v o l u t i o n ­ ary impact o f America's self-directed w o r k i n a transatlantic w o r l d w h e r e the o v e r w h e l m i n g majority o f adults remained dependent o n someone above them. The centuries-old connection b e t w e e n p r o p e r t y and independence snapped. N o property, n o w i l l o f one's o w n , the traditional logic w e n t . B u t m e n w h o t o o k charge o f their o w n w o r k i n g lives acquired independence as a gift o f adult­ h o o d . K e e p i n g socialism alive i n America required regular trans­ atlantic infusions o f people w h o b r o u g h t their commitments w i t h them. I n one sense, a m i x e d migrating p o p u l a t i o n h a d even m o r e devastating effects o n nationalism, a w a y o f t h i n k i n g that c o u l d n o t b e g i n to encase America's diversity. English-Americans, the closest a p p r o x i m a t i o n to a d o m i n a n t ethnic group, h a d n o ready means o f distinguishing themselves f r o m their transatlantic parent. I n any case as the century progressed, they l i v e d cheek b y j o w l w i t h more and more people m a k i n g deeper commitments to a w i d e r variety o f other loyalties. I n different settings—New Zeal­ a n d and portions o f Canada, for example—the

counterparts

to

these English Americans h a d a chance o f defining their countries 66

CHAPTER 4

as poor-relation British; i n the U n i t e d States they c o u l d o n l y b u i l d cultural bunkers for themselves. N o p o w e r f u l enemy except possi­ b l y Britain itself hovered close e n o u g h for l o n g e n o u g h to force a n e w collective identity o n America's diverse p o p u l a t i o n . A gener­ alized A m e r i c a n Protestantism never transcended the m u l t i p l e de­ nominations a n d sects into w h i c h it splintered, a n d claims other­ wise, such as the Benevolent Empire's evangelical collaboration o f the 1820s a n d 1830s, e x p i r e d w i t h f e w regrets. W h a t was left? A t h i n history o n o c c u p i e d l a n d a n d an official language that i n ­ creasing numbers o f migrants considered o p t i o n a l . Rather than treasure their past, European visitors w e r e q u i c k to notice, A m e r i ­ cans cited statistics: the extent o f their country, the size o f the harvest, the rate o f a city's g r o w t h . A m e r i c a n society p r o v i d e d n o basis, that is, for nationalism as a comprehensive, unifying m o v e ­ ment. I f George W a s h i n g t o n was the father o f his country, he h a d n o children. Uncle Sam was n o one's relative. W h a t u n d i d socialism and nationalism prepared the w a y for de­ mocracy, w h i c h swept across an e x p a n d i n g America early i n the nineteenth century. The impressive p o p u l a r energies released b y revolutionary committees i n the 1770s, public rallies i n the 1780s, a n d republican clubs i n the 1790s rattled the rafters o f America's eighteenth-century hierarchies b u t d i d n o t t o p p l e t h e m . The first political parties t o o k direction from a handful o f leaders w i t h n o taste for p o p u l a r initiatives. I n party matters i f n o t i n street m a n ­ ners, they expected and for a time got obedience f r o m ordinary citizens. T h e n after the W a r o f 1812, flourishing enterprise and accelerating m i g r a t i o n shattered those hierarchies. I n their place, w h i t e m e n assumed the right to rule themselves. N o b o d y w a i t e d for permission; everybody validated himself. N o b o d y r u l e d any­ b o d y else; everybody r u l e d together. "The great principle," the respected democratic spokesman Stephen A. Douglas t o l d the w h i t e m e n o f the Midwest, "is the right o f every c o m m u n i t y to judge and decide for itself w h e t h e r a t h i n g is right or w r o n g , w h e t h e r it w o u l d be g o o d or evil for t h e m to adopt i t . " Where 1

THE CASE OF THE UNITED STATES

67

such

standard

eighteenth-century

measures i n p u b l i c life

as

wealth, learning, a n d family n o longer applied, the A m e r i c a n democrat was an endlessly replicable type. The obverse side o f strong citizens was w e a k government. U n t i l the Civil War, the central government h a d little to do, a n d b y and large d i d it w i t h little aptitude. It collected a f e w indirect taxes and underfinanced a f e w transportation projects. It gave a w a y re­ sources. I t embarrassed itself i n the second w a r w i t h Great Britain a n d fared better against M e x i c o o n l y because there really was n o Mexican state i n 1847. A m e r i c a n federalism parceled

respon-

sibilites d o w n the line u n t i l it reached local government, w h i c h often passed t h e m o n to private groups. T w o corollaries to a w e a k government w e r e particularly signifi­ cant for America's democracy. First, it mattered p r o f o u n d l y w h a t government d i d n o t do: It d i d n o t lay heavy taxes to support a military establishment, it d i d n o t m o n i t o r dissenters or deviants, a n d it d i d not homogenize the laws a n d their administration. I n a country o f farmers—sitting ducks w h e n e v e r the state's rulers w e n t h u n t i n g for greater revenue—the l o w e r the taxes, the greater the freedom. The state police systems that guarded the establishments o f Europe h a d n o counterpart i n the U n i t e d States. A t the w o r s t moments o f war-charged persecution late i n the 1790s, the gov­ ernment b r o u g h t o n l y fourteen indictments under the Sedition Act, w h i c h q u i c k l y disappeared i n the n e w century, along w i t h the few p r i s o n sentences it h a d p r o d u c e d . Diversifying the laws state b y state, t h e n locality b y locality, was the context for a second crucial attribute o f America's democratic government: its p r o x i m i t y — i t s f a m i l i a r i t y — t o ordinary citizens. If, as Y a r o n Ezrahi argues, m o d e r n democracy relies " o n the idea that politics is transparent, that political agents, political actions, a n d political p o w e r can be v i e w e d , " t h e n early nineteenth-century America pioneered the p r i n c i p l e for the Western w o r l d .

2

Ameri­

cans, Alexis de Tocqueville reported, "strip o f f as m u c h as possi­ ble all that covers [their government]; they r i d themselves o f w h a t 68

CHAPTER 4

ever separates t h e m from it, they remove whatever conceals it from sight, i n order to v i e w it more closely and i n the b r o a d light o f day." I n the 1820s and 1830s, it was the imagined dangers o f 3

secrecy above all else that justified the political attacks o n Catho­ lics a n d Masons. I n 1858 A b r a h a m Lincoln, rather than dispute the logic b e h i n d the crucial Dred Scott decision, chose to attack it as the p r o d u c t o f a conspiracy l i n k i n g Presidents Pierce and B u ­ chanan ("Franklin a n d James") and Chief Justice Taney ("Roger"). I n fact, the system w o r k e d remarkably w e l l . As visitor after visi­ tor discovered early i n the nineteenth century, constitutional fed­ eralism was the pride o f educated Americans everywhere, and as these travelers then reported i n d r y detail o n their return, master­ i n g its intricacies was the qualifying quiz for any outsider w h o w o u l d e x p l a i n America. W e a k government d i d not produce w e a k attachments. N o t h i n g indicates that the intensity o f w h i t e men's loyalties to American democracy suffered i n comparison w i t h any European alternative. Indeed, transatlantic migrants, glad to leave the b u r d e n o f Europe's governments b e h i n d them, continually reinvigorated A m e r i c a n democracy w i t h their o w n thrill at self-rule. I n general, the less their government d i d , the better most A m e r i ­ cans l i k e d it: D e n y i n g p o w e r to a distant government reaffirmed it a m o n g themselves. George Washington, a peerless hero o n t w o continents, gained fame above all for leaving office a n d returning home. U n t i l the Civil War, civil society functioned quite w e l l w i t h ­ out a clear connection o f any sort between g o o d citizenship and state service. The results m i g h t have been chaos. W i t h o u t the discipline o f a c o m m o n danger, loyalties dispersed—into the v o l u n t a r y associa­ tions that captured Tocqueville's attention, a m o n g levels o f gov­ ernment, a n d along m y r i a d channels o f cultural a n d religious identification. Political parties d i d little to compensate. Earlier, i n a spirit o f hierarchy, a political leader presumed to represent the interests o f all decent people b e l o w h i m , w h e t h e r they h a d v o t e d for h i m or even h a d the right to vote at all. "We are all RepubliTHE CASE OF THE UNITED STATES

69

cans," the i n c o m i n g president Thomas Jefferson c o u l d say i n a gesture o f inclusiveness. B y the early nineteenth century, h o w ­ ever, a n e w partisanship made each elected official the represen­ tative o n l y o f those w h o b e l o n g e d to his party, perhaps o n l y o f those w h o h a d v o t e d for h i m a n d hence h a d earned his attention. Precisely that assumption justified Southern secession w h e n N o r t h ­ ern votes for a N o r t h e r n party elected the Republican Lincoln. W h a t d i d h o l d w h i t e Americans together was their c o m m o n citi­ zenship. I f the Revolution, w h i c h after all was fought over citizen­ ship ("Liberty"), prepared the w a y , it was the Constitution that riveted a single, c o u n t r y w i d e citizenship i n place. I t w o r k e d mira­ cles. Despite the latitude that the several states still enjoyed i n setting their o w n terms, citizens m o v e d across the face o f the U n i t e d States year after year w i t h an ease that gave substance to an A m e r i c a n identity. Western territories filled u p w i t h p e o p l e w h o d i d not have to p u t their citizenship o n the line to get there, as m a n y a European expatriate was forced to do. T h e package o f rights associated w i t h citizenship lay at the heart o f the w i d e l y articulated sentiment o f Americans as a free p e o p l e i n a free c o u n ­ try. Historians w i t h a parsing sensibility w h o count out the mean­ i n g o f nineteenth-century politics i n spoonfuls o f p o w e r a n d pa­ tronage miss the critical point. Standing u p r i g h t as everybody's equal i n A m e r i c a n p u b l i c life, wherever citizens h a p p e n e d t o be, was itself a revolutionary declaration, a ringing affirmation o f per­ sonal w o r t h a n d collective identity that retained its p o w e r n o mat­ ter h o w m a n y times it was repeated. Phrased another w a y , affirming the equality o f w h i t e m e n af­ firmed

their place i n a collective process. As these g a m b l i n g ,

questing nineteenth-century whites w i t h their m u l t i p l e interests h a d n o difficulty understanding, "Democracy involves m o r e t h a n participation i n political processes: it is a w a y o f constituting p o w e r . . . . Power is not merely something to be shared,

but

something to be used collaboratively i n order to initiate, to invent, to b r i n g about." Commitments that l o o k e d helter-skelter f r o m one 4

70

CHAPTER 4

vantage p o i n t reinforced America's u n i t y from another. The very act o f m o b i l i z i n g p o w e r made w h i t e m e n colleagues i n their c o m ­ p e t i t i o n for it. Hence the force b e h i n d the theory o f an additive democracy, i n w h i c h everybody's participation always mattered. W h a t the British commentator James Bryce t h o u g h t o f as r i d i ­ c u l e — " t w o m e n are wiser than one, one h u n d r e d than ninetynine, thirty m i l l i o n than twenty-nine m i l l i o n " — d i d i n d e e d capture an essential nineteenth-century American truth. Each vote con­ 5

tributed value i n its o w n right: It gave w e i g h t to the people's au­ thority, it dignified civic life, it r o u n d e d out a p u b l i c decision. Mobility, the challenge democracy set out to meet, t u r n e d out to be one o f its greatest assets i n unifying American society. Childrearing i n a m o b i l e society prepared the y o u n g to pack a handful o f immutable truths i n their knapsacks and go out i n t o the w o r l d . T h e y left h o m e as a matter o f course, astonished European visitors reported: A d u l t h o o d automatically made w h i t e m e n everybody else's equal. Democracy's first principles slipped easily i n t o their bags. People o n the m o v e — c a r r y i n g w i t h t h e m the T e n C o m ­ mandments a n d the party platform, as it w e r e — f e l l naturally i n t o cooperation w i t h others w h o b r o u g h t along the same principles. It was as i f all w h i t e men, u p o n b e c o m i n g adults i n America, p i c k e d u p a citizen's ticket that was g o o d for admission to p u b l i c life wherever they m i g h t go. W i t h t h e m w e n t the words! words! words! o f nineteenth-century democratic discourse, m o v i n g along America's

w o r l d - r e n o w n e d transportation

network,

its

criss­

crossed lecture circuits, and its patronage-driven postal service, the most important and remarkably unobtrusive exception to the rule o f an inconsequential central state. Whatever cohesion nineteenth-century Americans enjoyed, i n other w o r d s , derived f r o m democracy: an e x p a n d i n g b o d y o f equal male citizens w h o w e r e c o m m i t t e d to g o v e r n i n g themselves inside a loose constitutional federalism. O n a c o u n t r y w i d e scale, democracy n o t o n l y s w a m p e d the alternatives, socialism and na­ tionalism; it actually replaced them. I n particular, it was the p r o x y THE CASE OF THE UNITED STATES

71

American nationalism, one that perversely seemed to thrive o n the country's ethnic heterogeneity. D u r i n g the heart o f the nineteenth century—1815 to 1875—as greater a n d greater varieties o f p e o p l e came to live i n the U n i t e d States, it remained impressively free o f ethnic repression and exclusion. That openness, moreover, was a self-conscious matter, a repeatedly debated a n d reaffirmed p u b l i c policy. I n retrospect, it m i g h t seem that citizenship was g i v e n away for a pittance, w i t h v o t i n g cheapened even further t h r o u g h the participation o f resident aliens. I n fact, before the t w e n t i e t h century, precisely these practices constituted assimilation: n o t cul­ tural h o m o g e n i z a t i o n b u t civic action. Neither p o o r immigrants n o r elite European observers h a d difficulty recognizing the aston­ ishing outcome o f America's p o p u l a t i o n m i x . A t midcentury, the Scot Alexander Mackay, an otherwise hostile critic o f democracy, t i p p e d his hat to A m e r i c a n politics: " I n one sense, truly, y o u have a congress o f nations i n this Congress o f the U n i t e d States." Inside America's governing system, he continued, y o u have an extraordi­ nary sample o f h u m a n types " w i t h all their diversified habits, pre­ dilections, histories, creeds, and traditions; y o u have the represen­ tatives o f almost every country i n Europe living together, n o t a paralytic life, b u t a life o f constant industry and active c o m p e t i ­ tion, a n d regulating their [ o w n ] political existence."

Eventually A m e r i c a n a n d European

6

commentators

alike accepted democracy as the inevitable outcome o f historical forces that c o u l d o n l y have come together i n the U n i t e d States. America, it seemed, h a d created democracy. Except as a tautol­ o g y — i t occurred w h e r e it occurred—those

claims missed the

most crucial element o f all: America's integration i n a transatlantic w o r l d . Democracy was the s o l u t i o n that whites o f European back­ g r o u n d gave to problems o f European origin, to the challenges that o v e r f l o w i n g populations carried across the Atlantic a n d into the N o r t h A m e r i c a n interior. W h a t is most impressive about the 72

CHAPTER 4

creation o f democracy i n America is that it came i n t a n d e m w i t h solutions to a second Europe-derived p r o b l e m : H o w c o u l d the benefits o f America, the colonial outpost, be translated i n t o the benefits o f the U n i t e d States, the independent country? As other whites w h o wrestled w i t h this question i n other colonial settings w e r e to discover over and over again, race was the heart o f the matter. Slavery was n o more an anomaly i n the l a n d o f democracy than democracy was an anomaly i n the l a n d o f slavery. I n post-Enlightenment Europe, race was a progressive idea. I n place o f a severe Christian ethnocentrism,

a w o r l d o f races

o p e n e d the possibility o f recognizing differences w i t h o u t con­ d e m n i n g them. B y shifting the terms o f discussion f r o m w h o should control and w h o s h o u l d obey to various people's rights, race as a concept facilitated the critical change i n Western Europe f r o m slavery's routine acceptance i n the mid-eighteenth century to its general delegitimation i n the nineteenth. I n sharp contrast to these b e n i g n uses o n the European continent, however, race justi­ fied

a b r o a d range o f rapacious, exclusionary practices at the

m a n y colonial sites that Europeans established a r o u n d the globe. There, ironically, it was Christianity that from time to time p u t a brake o n the crudest horrors o f colonial racism. The U n i t e d States inherited the colonial version o f race, w i t h o n l y a small measure o f Enlightenment leavening. I n colonial settings a r o u n d the w o r l d , race was color coded. Because basic privileges w e r e at issue, w h a t mattered was not the actual " u n b r o k e n stream o f [skin] color [ranging f r o m light cream to near black that] . . . changes w i t h changes i n light . . . clothing, and surroundings" b u t colonist w h i t e or something else. For the 7

governing whites w h o d r e w that line, skin color served quite w e l l as a sorting device i n the U n i t e d States, despite m u r k y border­ lands w h e r e o n l y arbitrary rules c o u l d settle the disputed cases. The purpose o f the line was to define issues o f life, liberty, a n d property. As at other colonial sites, Europeans a n d their progeny i n America set out to seize w h a t they c o u l d get, m u r d e r i n g indigeTHE CASE OF THE UNITED STATES

73

nous people o f color a n d destroying their habitat as they w e n t . Blacks served as replacement labor. So, i n effect, d i d w h i t e i m m i ­ grants, whose single most i m p o r t a n t task was to get to a n d stay o n the right side o f the exploiter-exploited line. A g a i n i n c o m m o n w i t h other c o l o n i a l experiences, this pattern o f b l o o d s h e d and brutalization reinforced w h i t e Americans' faith i n violence as a means o f resolving problems. Early w h i t e settle­ ments i n N o r t h America w e r e the objects as w e l l as the agents o f warfare, w i t h European

armies a n d navies battling over

a r o u n d t h e m d u r i n g the seventeenth

and eighteenth

and

centuries.

W h i t e m e n m a i m e d and m u r d e r e d one another settling personal disputes. I n cities, towns, a n d countryside alike, mobs, militia, a n d ad hoc armies t o o k it u p o n themselves to settle p u b l i c disputes. Early i n the nineteenth century abolitionists tried to bracket the horrors o f slavery as a u n i q u e k i n d o f violence p r o d u c i n g equally u n i q u e effects o n the slaveowner's character. I n fact, colonies ev­ erywhere w e r e built a r o u n d the ordinariness o f using and t a k i n g lives. A callousness about death spread generally. W o r k i n the coal mines and o n the railroads o f the U n i t e d States generated death rates about three times higher than i n Britain. European visi­ tors w e r e appalled b y the indifference. "The stabbing o f a m a n i n the streets, or the falling o f a m a n i n t o the river, even w h e n at­ tended w i t h instant death, does n o t excite so m u c h sensation . . . [as] the death o f a d o g w o u l d d o i n the streets o f any t o w n i n England," one concluded.

8

" I f [during construction] some m e n

w e r e k i l l e d , " Count Francesco Arese reported to his f e l l o w Ital­ ians, " ' N o matter!', a very c o m m o n phrase i n America."

9

Nevertheless, abolitionists grasped an essential truth: O n l y peo­ ple o f color w e r e constantly at risk against their w i l l . W h i t e A m e r i ­ cans w h o placed the sanctity o f p r o p e r t y at the heart o f their legal system counted o n that same system to ratify their seizure o f c o l ­ ored

people's property—sometimes

systematically e n

masse,

sometimes individually at r a n d o m . U n d e r m i n i n g the incentives to plan, labor, and save, whites c o n d e m n e d people o f color for their 74

CHAPTER 4

laziness, improvidence, and criminality. Shiftless people o f color, whites concluded, d i d not have the capacity to benefit f r o m selfdirected w o r k : T h e y had to be directed b y whites. I n the 1890s, Frederick Jackson Turner t o o k the essential elements i n this story and t u r n e d t h e m into the sources o f American democracy. Re­ leased f r o m European restraints, w h i t e Americans tested their met­ tle i n a rush across the continent, generating their fundamental values at the cutting edge o f the colonial encounter, then t u r n i n g their n e w f o u n d strength o f character to the process o f further ex­ ploitation. I n one sense, Turner's fable o f a democracy r e n e w e d time and again o n successive frontiers neatly met the challenge o f transforming the problems o f m o b i l i t y i n t o their o w n solution: the g o o d society always i n the m a k i n g a m o n g g o o d people always o n the move. Yet as he cleansed a multitude o f sins, he c o u l d not hide the intrinsic connection between his democracy and Amer­ ica's colonial rationale. I n Turner's scheme, where the process oc­ curred—vast spaces awaiting w h i t e enterprise—determined

what

it created. American democracy belonged exclusively i n America: Its frontiers—its colonial sites—were not for export. W h a t gave some cohesion to the many different experiences o f people o f color i n America was the axial relationship o f w h i t e to black, the contrast that to European as w e l l as A m e r i c a n whites seemed the starkest. The lighter people o f color appeared to w h i t e eyes, the l o w e r the barriers to their acceptance i n w h i t e society. Rates o f intermarriage w e r e a r o u g h gauge: highest be­ t w e e n red and w h i t e , substantial between b r o w n a n d w h i t e , tiny b e t w e e n black a n d w h i t e . W i t h e n o u g h w h i t e i n a red-white m i x , children became w h i t e , something that c o u l d rarely be said o f black-white offspring. People o f largely Spanish ancestry

from

Latin America f o u n d far easier acceptance among whites i n the U n i t e d States than d i d those o f largely indigenous descent. As the lot o f African Americans shifted, so b y and large d i d the lot o f other white-defined races. It mattered above all h o w whites institutionalized their treatment o f African Americans. Until the T H E CASE OF T H E U N I T E D STATES

75

Civil War, slavery set standards for race relations o f all kinds. T h e rights o f so-called free blacks measured u p f r o m slavery, n o t d o w n from w h i t e freedom. U n d e r President A n d r e w Jackson, at a m o m e n t w h e n slavery h a d virtually n o challengers i n the federal government, a particularly vicious r o u n d o f I n d i a n r e m o v a l drove the major tribes o f the southern U n i t e d States o u t o f their h o m e ­ lands. As the Compromise o f 1850 nestled slavery i n t o federal l a w , rampaging whites, w i t h an abandon unusual even for them, set about r o b b i n g , k i l l i n g , and enslaving the indigeneous people o f California. Civil War and Reconstruction changed

matters all

around. Ending slavery elevated all blacks; enscribing their free­ d o m i n amendments to the Constitution raised expectations o f a u n i f o r m citizenship; o p e n i n g the possibility o f federal enforce­ m e n t loosened the vice o f racism generally. As blacks acquired n e w rights i n N o r t h e r n states a n d struggled for places i n Southern states, w h i t e brutality against

California's natives

abated

and

treaties w i t h Plains tribes, especially one i n 1868 w i t h the Lakota Sioux, h i n t e d at a rising standard o f w h i t e justice. Because nineteenth century Europeans felt free to eliminate i n ­ digenous people wherever they w e n t , the reputation o f w h i t e Americans d i d not suffer particularly for d o i n g the same. Black slavery, however, d i d set the U n i t e d States apart. Eighteen thirtyo n e — t h e year o f w h i t e fright over Nat Turner's Rebellion i n South Carolina and also o f a major slave u p r i s i n g i n Jamaica—marked a fork i n the road. Whites i n the A m e r i c a n South responded

by

tightening the noose; the British government, o n its part, cut the G o r d i a n knot. W i t h the French i n their w a k e the British m o v e d expeditiously to e n d slavery i n the West Indies a n d i n the process isolated the U n i t e d States, the w o r l d ' s most thriving c o l o n i a l site, as the institution's o n l y p o w e r f u l defender. Early i n the nineteenth century, spokesmen for European states a n d nations alike claimed a uniqueness that d o u b l e d as m o r a l su­ periority. It was this patriotic self-image even more than economic self-interest that p o w e r e d the European drives for abolition. W h i t e 76

CHAPTER 4

Americans h a d n o trouble understanding that impulse. Champions o f Revolutionary America, an instant curiosity i n the late eigh­ teenth century, had pioneered this k i n d o f self-promotion at least ^ a quarter century before it became standard European practice, and black slavery handicapped t h e m from the outset. Jefferson a n d his colleagues were n o fools i n b l a m i n g their colonial masters for foisting slaves o n America's reluctant colonials. B y the 1820s, however, the debate over the institution's meaning had shifted f r o m its contamination o f whites to its abuse o f blacks. A sea change i n values had swept the Western w o r l d , investing i n d i v i d ­ uals w i t h an integrity that slavery seemed fundamentally to v i o ­ late: the right to make choices about b o t h earthly and eternal life; the right to protect the b o d y f r o m arbitrary p a i n and mutilating punishment; the right to a moral family life. W h a t became the standard antislavery imagery o f slavery—the chained legs, the scarred backs, the w o m e n and children at auction—flaunted each o f those principles. As the extraordinary success o f Uncle

Tom's

Cabin o n t w o continents attested, b y midcentury large numbers o f w h i t e Americans outside o f the slave South shared those values. M o r e than guilt b y association alienated them. Their culture o f self-directed w o r k was itself n e w enough, challenging enough, to raise serious questions about w h i c h o f the t w o labor systems, liv­ i n g side b y side, w o u l d survive. Lincoln's House D i v i d e d speech i n 1858 played o n just those anxieties: "[T]his government cannot endure permanently half slave and half free. . . . Have w e n o ten­ dency to . . . [make slavery] alike lawful i n all the States, o l d as w e l l as n e w — N o r t h as w e l l as South?"

10

Sectional crisis t h r e w u p for grabs the critical qualities setting the U n i t e d States apart. I n the Western world's premier colonial site, the t w o primary ways o f e x p l o i t i n g people o f color n o w stood at loggerheads: The staple-producing Southerners relied o n the labor o f black slaves, other whites pushing w e s t w a r d relied o n native peoples' land. Northern whites denied Southern whites the security that their slave system required; Southern whites paraTHE CASE OF THE UNITED STATES

77

lyzed the w e s t w a r d expansion that N o r t h e r n whites considered their god-given right. Secession i n I 8 6 O - 6 I

eliminated America's other distinctive

characteristic: its cohesion t h r o u g h a w h i t e man's democracy. I f the process o f democratic decisions—winners t o o k office, losers tried again, ad i n f i n i t u m — w a s America's o n l y effective cement, the country came u n g l u e d w i t h the election o f I860. I n the U n i t e d States it was majority rule or n o rule: Eleven Southern states stopped democracy's perpetual m o t i o n machine. Little w o n d e r that countless Northerners w h o despised the victorious Republi­ cans and distrusted President-Elect Lincoln d i d not hesitate to b r a n d the secessionists traitors. The u n i t y that d e p e n d e d o n citi­ zenship, u n l i k e the u n i t y o f a class or a fictive family, r e q u i r e d a definite jurisdiction w i t h i n w h i c h citizens c o u l d act collectively. B e y o n d the Constitution n o t h i n g b o u n d e d America: n o borders o f a c o m m o n language, n o history o f imperial glories, n o religious divide or military threat. B y a b a n d o n i n g the Constitution, seces­ sion dissolved a distinctive America. Reconstructing it began w i t h secession itself, and a m o n g people as violent as these, w a r was a natural w a y to start. I n f o r m i n g their o w n confederacy, some leaders i n the seceding states t h o u g h t o f themselves

as the t r i u m p h a n t champions o f

Southern nationalism, a claim just plausible e n o u g h to require closer examination. A nationalist m o v e m e n t h a d been p i c k i n g u p m o m e n t u m i n the South for three decades before the Civil War, w i t h race its crucial element. First, its advocates set about c o n ­ structing a w h i t e society. N o person o f color h a d standing i n a w h i t e court, a vote i n a w h i t e election, or a right to a w h i t e educa­ tion. Southern migrants, t y i n g Southeast to Southwest w i t h chains o f k i n , t o o k those values w i t h t h e m wherever they w e n t . Nev­ ertheless, the more Southern nationalism relied o n whiteness, the m o r e difficult it was to distinguish Southern f r o m N o r t h e r n whites, w h o almost always segregated blacks a n d w h o shared essentially the same history and political tradition. As a w h i t e enterprise, 78

CHAPTER 4

Southern nationalism sounded like a family squabble: the South w i t h f e w European immigrants was purer than the North, South­ erners w e r e the true heirs o f the Revolution, o n l y Southerners understood the Constitution, and so forth. Sometimes u n i n t e n ­ tionally, historians have exposed the flimsiness o f the case b y re­ m i n d i n g us that a k n i g h t e d Brit, Sir Walter Scott, was this national­ ism's indispensable author and that a paean to state particularism, "Maryland, M y Maryland," was its finest lyric expression. A second use o f race, the slave system, served better. Decade b y decade, slavery indeed w i d e n e d the distance b e t w e e n

the

South a n d the rest o f Western society a n d gave some w h i t e vision­ aries intimations o f a u n i q u e Southern destiny. T h r o u g h the k i n d o f transforming stroke so dear to early nationalism, they pictured independence

releasing a p u r e l y Southern, slave-based w h i t e

freedom. U n l i k e other slaveholders i n the Western Hemisphere, aspiring Southern nationalists never l o o k e d for the exit, for an ac­ ceptable escape f r o m slavery i n t o another social system. O n the contrary, they exulted i n slavery. T u r n i n g their m o r a l isolation to advantage, they sought to create a b o d y o f true believers. Blacks w e r e natural slaves, whites natural masters; free blacks w e r e an anomaly, antislavery whites an anathema. B y these lights migrants f r o m Europe, b r i n g i n g Western society's repudiation o f slavery w i t h them, actually w e r e a threat to the w h i t e South, even i f al­ most none w e n t there. G a m b l i n g everything o n slavery and losing, this venture i n na­ tionalism collapsed completely w i t h a w a r - i m p o s e d abolition. There was n o safety net, n o fallback p o s i t i o n i n case slavery failed. As the former Confederacy was d r a w n i n t o the mainstream o f Western society, slavery lost virtually all its Southern defenders, too. It w o u l d be decades before any p u b l i c figure seriously tried to glorify its m e m o r y . I n a final salvage operation, some whites r u m m a g e d for a distinctive South i n the rubble o f the Lost Cause, w h i c h y i e l d e d t h e m heroism b u t n o nationalism. W i t h neither a past nor a future the Confederate warriors c o u l d o n l y offer an THE CASE OF THE UNITED STATES

79

existential m o m e n t o f glory. B y focusing obsessively o n the

field

o f battle, it w a l l e d off the rest o f Southern society, including, o f course, its slavery. I n the end, it was a celebration o f m e n w h o h a d fought for independence b y people w h o n o longer sought independence. Robert E. Lee d o u b l e d as the great

Confederate

hero and the great Anglo-Saxon hero, the best o f the South a n d the best o f America. It was an e n d i n g appropriate to the b e g i n n i n g . As the historian D a v i d Potter explained m a n y years ago, territorial loyalties i n America's federal system tended to r u n along a line f r o m locality to state to something b e y o n d u n t i l they w e r e b l o c k e d . I n shifting a n d uncoordinated ways, m o r e and m o r e whites i n the antebel­ l u m South hit their limits short o f a u n i o n o f all the states. Before the Civil W a r the A m e r i c a n w a y p e r m i t t e d a great deal o f sliding u p a n d d o w n the federal scale. A b r u p t l y , secession forced an either-or choice. Reconstruction, i n turn, c o n t i n u e d this reliance o n force as it remade the Constitution. It was the Compromise o f 1877, closing out Reconstruction, that a l l o w e d w h i t e m e n i n the former Confederacy once again to play the accordian o f expand­ i n g a n d contracting loyalties. As they reclaimed the right to deter­ m i n e their o w n political rules, state b y state, they w e r e n o longer o b l i g e d to choose b e t w e e n clear-cut alternatives: Maybe replaced either-or.

Nor d i d hate stop o l d enemies f r o m functioning together

inside a loosely structured democracy. Southern whites' attach­ ments once again slid u p a n d d o w n the federal scale. W h a t all the b l o o d s h e d h a d settled was the issue o f secession: Southern na­ tionalism was n o longer an o p t i o n .

T h e nationalism that d i d thrive i n America derived f r o m ethnicity: an "extended analogue o f kinship" that presup­ posed a c o m m o n ancestry a n d c o m m o n cultural code a m o n g a p e o p l e sufficiently widespread to remove the possibility that they w o u l d v i e w their connection as self-evident. co

CHAPTER 4

11

M a n y other identi­

ties competed w i t h ethnicity, and m a n y times they w o n . Neverthe­ less, ethnicity p r o v e d to be an exceptionally resilient f o r m o f con­ sciousness. I n an American environment o f shifting choices and changing needs, nobody's path h a d a clear, determinate

destina­

tion; ethnicity adapted itself to all kinds o f journeys. It is always i n process; it never ossifies. Ethnicity's meaning lies as m u c h i n w h a t it is b e c o m i n g as i n w h a t it has been. It is not like a b o d y part that the analyst's X ray can spot and study. It is not something w e

find

i n other people; it is something those people find i n themselves. N o r i n a simple sense is ethnicity perishable, lost forever once it has slipped f r o m sight. Over and over again w h e n an ethnic con­ sciousness has been given u p for dead, it actually lies latent, capa­ ble o f a sudden revival. I n Walker Connor's phrasing, a m a n "can shed all o f the overt cultural manifestations customarily attributed to his ethnic g r o u p and yet maintain his fundamental identity as a member."

12

Ethnicity, Cynthia Enloe concludes, is "a m u c h

p h e n o m e n o n " than scholars have traditionally assumed.

sparer

13

A m o n g the people i n nineteenth-century America w h o traced their ancestry to Europe, ethnicity was inherently hyphenate, an o n g o i n g transatlantic negotiation a m o n g people i n the midst o f change. Appropriate to its protean nature, ethnicity b y itself left ample r o o m for many different formulations to suit m a n y different situations. However, one o f its c o m m o n expressions i n nine­ teenth-century

America, nationalism, n a r r o w e d

that range o f

choices. For one thing, nationalism named people's identities: Ital­ ian, Polish, Japanese, and so forth. For another, it w o v e those identities into a state, either the creation o f one that d i d not exist or the c o m p l e t i o n o f one that d i d . As a consequence, nationalism w e i g h t e d the scales t o w a r d the h o m e l a n d e n d o f the migration chain. Being Irish i n Boston d i d not necessarily have m u c h to d o w i t h Ireland; b e i n g an Irish nationalist there d i d . Better focused a n d less personalized, nationalism was a l i m i t e d subset o f eth­ nicity: n o nationalism w i t h o u t ethnic identifications b u t m a n y eth­ nic identifications w i t h o u t nationalism. THE CASE OF THE UNITED STATES

81

A t the same time, nationalism d i d not i n some simple sense lie at the extreme e n d o f an ethnic spectrum. The intensity o f ethnic feelings d i d not predict the l i k e l i h o o d o f an intense nationalism, or i n fact nationalism o f any k i n d . America's late

nineteenth-cen­

tury Chinatowns, t h o u g h models o f ethnic strength, gave rise to n o nationalism w o r t h m e n t i o n i n g . N o r d i d the frequency o f visits to the migrants' land o f o r i g i n or even the p r o b a b i l i t y o f resettling there. Return rates w e r e exceptionally h i g h a m o n g

nationalist

south Slavs and exceptionally l o w a m o n g nationalist Norwegians a n d Irish. Nor, finally, was deepening oppression a g o o d indicator o f w h i c h ethnicity w o u l d t u r n into nationalism. I f that h a d b e e n the case, A m e r i n d i a n nationalist movements w o u l d have r i p p e d t h r o u g h nineteenth-century America. M i r r o r i n g influences that shaped nationalism i n Europe, the ma­ jor variables affecting nationalism i n America w e r e the state a n d the family. Where a well-established state existed i n their l a n d o f origin, migrants h a d little incentive to channel ethnicity i n t o na­ tionalism, as Swedish Americans demonstrated. W h a t generated nationalism was a state's insecurity, its struggle to define itself, or best o f all its absence—that is, a people's unfulfilled desire to cre­ ate a state o f their o w n . Moreover, w h e r e the state d o m i n a t e d the process o f forging a nation, it m o r e or less b o u n d e d the n a t i o n as w e l l . England was a case i n point. B e y o n d its borders, nationalism h a d little meaning. A t best, the English abroad w e r e a cheering section; at worst, they lost membership entirely. Families underwrote nationalism b y reconceiving themselves i n migration: extending, expanding, transmuting k i n connections to suit their w o r l d i n flux. Italian Americans, as Michaela d i Leonardo describes them, illustrate the process: "While they emphasize b l o o d ties i n ideology, i n reality they use fictive k i n s h i p to sanc­ t i o n the intimate n o n k i n ties they f o r m . "

14

Appropriately, Italian

nationalism h a d a l o n g , vigorous life i n America, fading o n l y w i t h the Second W o r l d War. B y contrast, the more families migrated as units and relocated i n a close c o m m u n i t y o f comparable families, 82

CHAPTER 4

the less they needed to stretch and strain. I n the p r e w a r years, Jewish consciousness flourished i n u r b a n America b u t Jewish na­ tionalism d i d not. Family structure h e l d the crucial clue to w h y , despite their i m ­ peccable credentials, Native Americans m o u n t e d n o nationalist movements d u r i n g the nineteenth century. A t a glance it seems incredible that they d i d not. Their tribes, after all, w e r e k i n net­ w o r k s w i t h deep historical and ancestral

roots i n sacred soil

where, their chiefs insisted, they w i s h e d o n l y to g o v e r n them­ selves i n peace. B y the e n d o f the eighteenth century, a n u m b e r o f A m e r i n d i a n leaders at the Atlantic e n d o f the continent, paying attention to h o w whites d i d their business, had w o r k e d out the rudiments o f the red people's separate origins, their spiritual dis­ tinctiveness, and their right to specific areas o f land. Early i n the nineteenth century a major g r o u p o f Cherokee developed a so­ phisticated protonationalist scheme o f language, law, a n d g r o u p identity. After the fashion o f w h i t e nationalists, resourceful Lakota Sioux invented traditions w h e n they needed them. The charge that Native A m e r i c a n cultures w e r e s i m p l y too porous to sustain an exclusive nationalist consciousness h a d n o justification. A m e r i ­ ndians d r e w cultural lines as they needed them, creating outsiders w h o fell b e y o n d the protection o f m o r a l restraint a n d devastating t h e m accordingly. W h a t they d i d n o t have was an expansive sense o f fictive k i n ­ ship. K i n connections remained literal and articulated, n o t soft and amoebic. A l t h o u g h tribes adopted n e w members t h r o u g h mar­ riage, that process strengthened the h o m e base w i t h o u t extending the tribal reach o u t w a r d . Members w h o left the tribal k i n to m a r r y — a n d as the l a w a l l o w e d it, a substantial p r o p o r t i o n d i d — remained o n the outside. Hence it mattered very m u c h that nine­ teenth-century l a w b l o c k e d a reciprocal m o v e m e n t b e t w e e n w h i t e and red societies: Amerindians c o u l d abandon their tribes to be­ come U n i t e d States citizens b u t whites c o u l d n o t abandon their U n i t e d States citizenship to become tribal members. The native THE CASE OF THE UNITED STATES

83

people's o w n p u l l t o w a r d the center made it exceedingly difficult for spiritual and cultural revivals to g r o w into nationalist m o v e ­ ments. W i t h o n l y m o m e n t a r y exceptions, their efforts at revitalizat i o n t u r n e d i n w a r d rather than stretching o u t w a r d ; they w e r e p u r i ­ fying rather than m o b i l i z i n g ; they s u b d i v i d e d k i n i n t o smaller groups rather than u n i t i n g t h e m i n t o larger families. These pre­ cise, particular identities, remarkably e n d u r i n g i n the face o f monstrous w h i t e attacks, set barriers that nationalism c o u l d n o t penetrate. The state that mattered the most to nationalism's history i n nine­ teenth-century America was the U n i t e d States itself, w h o s e modest objectives a l l o w e d a great variety o f movements to flourish w i t h i n its borders. Perhaps most important, it d i d not compete w i t h hy­ phenate nationalism b y attempting to m o b i l i z e an A m e r i c a n na­ tionalism o f its o w n . Phrases such as Manifest Destiny that have sometimes h a d a nationalist r i n g to twentieth-century historians gave expression i n the nineteenth century to countless private i n i ­ tiatives b u t o n l y rarely and a w k w a r d l y to p u b l i c policy. As whites slashed t h r o u g h native territories, federal forces generally m o v e d i n their w a k e . The army's task, b y and large, was to k i l l or contain Indians w h o tried to reoccupy their land. The M e x i c a n W a r nicely illustrated the f u m b l i n g nature o f nineteenth-century federal lead­ ership, even at the height o f w h a t came to be called Manifest Destiny. A brazenly partisan war, it was never meant to m o b i l i z e an American people—reasonable e n o u g h b y the rules o f nineteenthcentury American politics b u t equally indicative o f the g o v e r n ­ ment's chronic inability to sustain an expansionist policy. Even as the Democratic party's war, w h a t was striking about it was n o t the Polk administration's g o b b l i n g o f foreign territory b u t its l i m i t e d greed. A t least twice the extent o f territory that the U n i t e d States d i d seize lay o p e n for the taking. T h e Mexican state, c l a i m i n g a large d o m a i n it had never governed, let w a r r i n g elites w i t h their sometime armies so t h o r o u g h l y exhaust civil society that a m b i 84

CHAPTER 4

tious Europeans w o u l d soon accept an invitation to rule the c o u n ­ try. The question that invading this rickety structure raised was h o w m u c h o f a fragmenting country should the U n i t e d States keep. The answer was n o t very adventurous: I n effect, fill o u t the most obvious spaces o n the w a y to the Pacific. N o t u n t i l the e n d o f the century d i d the federal government set m o r e

expansive

goals. Anti-Catholicism suggested another strategy for m o b i l i z i n g an A m e r i c a n nation. There w e r e European precedents dating at least f r o m the Treaty o f Westphalia i n 1648, and there w e r e Protestant migrants ranging from Pennsylvania Germans to Minnesota Scandanavians w h o m i g h t w e l l have p i c k e d u p o n those precedents. Nevertheless, the n e w U n i t e d States set out o n a different course. F o l l o w i n g France's indispensable aid to the American Revolution, i n w h a t one historian has called "a tremendous cultural shift," re­ strictions singling out Catholics disappeared.

15

I n fact, d u r i n g the

French Revolution, Jacobin atheists roused greater p u b l i c anger i n the U n i t e d States than France's counterrevolutionary Catholics. A r o u n d the m i d d l e o f the nineteenth century, a flood o f Catholic migrants f r o m Ireland and Germany r e n e w e d o l d hostilities o n a n e w basis. N o w the issue was American democracy's civic m o r a l ­ ity. C o u l d the alcohol-soaked minions o f the p o p e a n d his priestly hierarchy share i n the process o f self-government, anti-Catholic publicists asked? H o w e v e r widespread these prejudices and h o w ­ ever mean their day-to-day expressions, organized anti-Catholi­ cism, p e a k i n g i n the p r o h i b i t i o n a n d K n o w N o t h i n g movements o f the 1850s, p r o v e d to be so m u c h sound and fury. Its scattered, fleeting

political successes had n o lasting consequences. Attacks

o n M i d w e s t e r n parochial schools late i n the century d r e w L u ­ therans a n d Catholics together, a n d those o n Catholics as aliens rallied immigrants o f all kinds to a c o m m o n cause. Fractured and mutually suspicious Protestants never mustered the political p o w e r to persecute; Catholics free from persecution h a d at least as m u c h trouble maintaining a collective religious consciousness o f their

THE CASE OF THE UNITED STATES

85

o w n . The l o n g tradition o f equating America w i t h a vague Prot­ estantism, irritating b u t n o t threatening to other religions, was about as m u c h as these episodic outcries ever netted. Even i n civic life, the one realm that d i d h o l d promise o f u n i t i n g Americans, the U n i t e d States set a bare m i n i m u m o f requirements. N o t o n l y was an A m e r i c a n citizenship o p t i o n a l for European i m m i ­ grants, b u t those w h o o p t e d for it f o u n d themselves obligated to little more than perpetuating the frame o f government. The clearest translation o f that came w i t h the Civil War, w h e n entire groups t o o k o n a reflected legitimacy f r o m their soldiers. Civil War service, for example, d i d w o n d e r s for the reputation o f German Americans a n d a g o o d deal for Irish Americans, too, despite their p r o m i n e n c e i n the antidraft riots o f 1863. Those migrants w h o fulfilled their civic obligations to the U n i t e d States also sustained their transoceanic connections to a nation w i t h o u t any sense o f conflict. Different loyalties came out o f different pots: p u b l i c obligations f r o m one, ethnic-nationalist attachments f r o m another. "Is the Irish-American less o f an American because he gathers m o n e y to help his struggling brethren i n the Green Isle?" a Zionist asked rhetorically at the t u r n o f the century.

16

Millions o f migrating Poles created w h a t one nine­

teenth-century w i t called the "fourth partition" i n industrial Amer­ ica, "giving allegiance to the government under w h o s e jurisdiction they live, but remembering their o r i g i n a n d . . . conscientiously p a y i n g back w h a t they o w e their nation."

17

Carl Schurz, the most

w i d e l y respected German A m e r i c a n o f the nineteenth century, used m u c h the same language: "[Hlowever w a r m their affection for their native land, [German Americans] have never permitted that affec­ t i o n to interfere w i t h their duties as A m e r i c a n citizens." W h a t the 18

U n i t e d States required bore n o relationship to w h a t nationalism required. The U n i t e d States, o n the contrary, made r o o m for a multitude o f nations. I n sum, almost n o t h i n g kept ethnic groups f r o m w o r k i n g o u t their o w n version o f nationalism at their o w n pace. Extending local a n d regional attachments i n t o an Italian consciousness occurred at 86

CHAPTER 4

about the same time and rate o n b o t h sides o f the Atlantic. The Polish i n America w e r e as s l o w to mobilize a popular nationalism as the Polish i n Eastern Europe. W h e n Irish American Fenians tried to invigorate their nationalist m o v e m e n t i n the summer o f 1866 b y i n v a d i n g Canada, it t o o k the inspired incompetence o f their private army to force a response from Washington. Their ranks r i d d l e d w i t h spies, their supplies l i m i t e d to their guns a n d gear, a n d their strategy gone w i t h the w i n d , Fenian irregulars stalked the N e w Y o r k - C a n a ­ dian border u n t i l

finally

the government sent General

George

Meade, the hero o f Gettysburg, to r o u n d t h e m up, w h e r e u p o n the g o o d general, realizing that m a n y o f t h e m w e r e U n i o n veterans, bought the bedraggled outlaws railroad tickets h o m e . They h a d p a i d their dues as American citizens; the rest was more or less their business. Scarcely deterred, the Fenians recruited another ragtag army for another abortive invasion i n 1870. A final factor k e e p i n g nineteenth-century American society o p e n to all kinds o f ethnic and nationalist expressions was the geographi­ cal diffusion o f its m a n y peoples. Because Congress refused to grant large tracts o f l a n d b y immigrant nationality, none o f t h e m f o u n d e d a state or anything like it o f their o w n . W h i t e migrants collected i n ethnic settlements t h e n left them, gained control o f a city govern­ ment t h e n lost it, d o m i n a t e d a local labor market t h e n shared it, all i n fluid ways that reflected a mobile, heterogeneous society o f residential m i x i n g , marketplace competition, a n d petty capitalist bargain-and-sale w h e r e nobody's m o n o p o l y h e l d for long. W h a t seemed to outsiders like exceptions to the principle o f diffusion— Midwestern domains o f Germans and Norwegians, u r b a n enclaves o f Italians and Poles—roused some antagonism. Moreover, a scat­ tering o f peoples d i m i n i s h e d the effects o f another k i n d o f abrasion: w h i t e ethnic g r o u p facing w h i t e ethnic g r o u p at a boundary. Even i n the major cities, such face-offs w e r e almost always passing p h e n o m e n a w i t h constantly changing casts o f characters. Here, too, ethnic identities w e r e m u c h more matters o f choice than o f necessity. THE CASE OF THE UNITED STATES

87

It was the genius o f the M o r m o n s to violate all o f the basic principles governing ethnic behavior as they risked America's most curious and creative venture i n domestic nationalism, one that i n its thoroughness actually anticipated the characteristics o f late nine­ teenth-century European nationalism. Appropriately, migration a n d M o r m o n i s m w e r e practically synonyms: N e w England to N e w Y o r k t o O h i o to the Missouri-Illinois border to Utah for its e x p a n d i n g core o f converts; then the harvests that missionaries d r e w f r o m Europe a n d America into M o r m o n land. T o families separated b u t n o t shat­ tered i n migration a n d to chains o f k i n glad for additional support, M o r m o n i s m offered a great deal. N o t o n l y d i d the l i v i n g c h u r c h approximate a grand extended family, w i t h members greeting one another as brothers and sisters, fathers, mothers, sons, a n d daugh­ ters; b u t the dead, w h o m i g h t otherwise never experience the eter­ nal bliss o f such a recently revealed religion, w e r e also eligible for conversion, preparing l o n g ancestral lines to march together i n a heavenly procession. As the M o r m o n c h u r c h developed, moreover, it strove for the self-sufficiency o f an idealized farm family that grew, processed, and manufactured whatever it needed, setting aside e n o u g h to care i n hard times for all fictive k i n , y o u n g a n d o l d . Leaders strictly disciplined the M o r m o n ' s grand family-hierarchy. Faith i n the divine o r i g i n o f the tablets that the

movement's

prophet, Joseph Smith, t u r n e d f r o m m e m o r y into the Book of Mor­ mon (1829) and o f further revelations that became additional sa­ cred texts served not s i m p l y as the acid test o f b e l o n g i n g b u t also as the authoritative history that nationalist movements everywhere required. They w e r e p i c k i n g u p a thread, M o r m o n s learned, that original Christians had once carried b u t that over centuries o f complicated wanderings a n d fallings away had been lost. That history, moreover, established the M o r m o n s ' right to their sacred l a n d — r o u g h l y , the territory o f the U n i t e d States. I n the M o r m o n narrative, Native Americans p l a y e d a critical role as the surviving Lost Tribes o f Israel, a people once u n i q u e l y blessed,

now

u n i q u e l y cursed, but soon to be redeemed. As heirs to these peo88

CHAPTER 4

pie's initial grace and agents o f their ultimate salvation, M o r m o n s acquired a divine right to the soil w h e r e they alone c o u l d l i n k past to future i n God's p l a n for h u m a n k i n d . I n general, however, peo­ ple o f color d i d n o t fare w e l l i n the h o l y plan. N o t o n l y w e r e blacks headed for hell once B r i g h a m Y o u n g , Smith's successor, officially b a n n e d t h e m f r o m the church; a M o r m o n ' s price for mis­ cegenation, Y o u n g declared, was instant death. Native Americans escaped ostracism o n l y because their color, it was believed, ex­ pressed God's punishment, and r e d e m p t i o n w o u l d make t h e m w h i t e again. Together, Smith and Y o u n g fashioned a m o d e l o f adaptation. Responding to the same flow o f experiences that inspired trans­ atlantic nationalism, they resolved m u c h the same set o f chal­ lenges that nationalism addressed: reconceiving the n e t w o r k o f fictive

k i n , b o u n d i n g the grand family i n ways that reflected the

participants' c o m m u n a l values, giving t h e m a c o m m o n history and a c o m m o n destiny, a n d b i n d i n g the sacred w i t h the secular i n a single cause. C o m p l e t i n g the nationalist agenda, Smith, before his m u r d e r i n 1844, a n d Y o u n g , after the trek to Utah, unquestionably w a n t e d to establish an independent state. The fact that Smith scanned sites f r o m O r e g o n to Texas u n d e r l i n e d the marvelous flex­ ibility that a claim to m u c h o f a continent built into the M o r m o n imagination. " The whole of America the year o f his death.

19

is Zion itself" Smith declared i n

I n the end, Utah was just fine as sacred

g r o u n d . Little w o n d e r M o r m o n i s m was such an astonishing success, b o t h i n recruiting a n d cementing members to the movement. But w h y was the m o v e m e n t trailed b y a pattern o f violence unusual even for the United States? F o u n d e d b y a mere handful i n 1830, the c h u r c h was already at w a r w i t h its neighbors i n 1833, driven at g u n p o i n t f r o m Missouri i n 1838 a n d f r o m Illinois i n 1845, t h e n geared to battle federal troops o f f a n d o n i n Utah for three decades. The M o r m o n s counted their dead, i n c l u d i n g the p r o p h e t himself, the w a y another church m i g h t tally the comings a n d goings o f its temporary members. The argument that their T H E CASE OF T H E U N I T E D STATES

89

leaders consciously p r o v o k e d these attacks i n order to tighten loy­ alties inside a beleaguered c h u r c h makes n o more sense t h a n a blanket charge that c o m m i t t e d leaders o f all sorts—say, democrats i n a totalitarian state—court m a r t y r d o m b y meeting oppression w i t h a deepened resolve. Sending the bullets, n o t receiving them, requires the explanation. Resolving that p r o b l e m requires the elimination o f a second confusion, this one a flattering image o f M o r m o n i s m as the a i l American nineteenth-century religion: a d o w n - h o m e a d d i t i o n to this country's flourishing denominationalism, a quintessential ver­ sion o f intrepid pioneers m o v i n g west i n search o f freedom, an exemplification o f such basic A m e r i c a n values as initiative, h a r d w o r k , and godliness. " M o r m o n i s m , " the twentieth-century philos­ opher Ralph Barton Perry concluded, "was a sort o f Americanism i n miniature." O n the contrary, M o r m o n i s m , atypical i n all essen­ 20

tial respects, stretched an elastic A m e r i c a n tolerance for religious differences to the limit. Secretive a n d totalistic, it aspired t o be a theocracy. It remade the Bible, restructured the trinity, reconstrued death, redefined the Last Judgment, a n d reconstructed mar­ riage to accommodate plural wives. If, as some m o d e r n c o m m e n ­ tators claim, Smith a n d Y o u n g built M o r m o n i s m o n practical, commonsense principles, they certainly fooled most o f their fel­ l o w Americans. Nevertheless, other groups pushed the boundaries o f accep­ tability, i n c l u d i n g marriage mores, w i t h o u t getting shot for it. W h a t distinguished the M o r m o n challenge was its frontal assault o n the basic sources o f A m e r i c a n cohesion, a democratic process w i t h i n the sovereign U n i t e d States. V i e w e d f r o m a distance, the M o r m o n s l o o k e d like an unusually p r o m i s i n g batch o f settlers: law-abiding, church-going, industrious, and solvent. Close u p , however, it d i d n o t take l o n g to discover h o w appearances c o u l d deceive. The M o r m o n s d i d not just covet land; they claimed it as a divinely sanctioned transfer f r o m owners w h o m Smith called "your ene­ mies." T h e y d i d not just w o r k that l a n d as a unit; they v o t e d as a 90

CHAPTER 4

unit. T h e y d i d n o t just seek l a n d i n large contiguous blocks; they sought to g o v e r n themselves i n their o w n d o m a i n . A n d m o r e o f t h e m came. I n Jackson County, Missouri, outsiders q u i c k l y p i c k e d u p o n Smith's a m b i t i o n for an i m p e r i u m in imperio and, w i t h charac­ teristic nineteenth-century American problem-solving flair, w e n t after the M o r m o n s w i t h rifles. Everywhere the dialectic repeated itself. As a religious c o l o n y that h e l d promise o f r e w a r d i n g its friends at the polls, the M o r m o n s w o n a special charter f r o m I l l i ­ nois i n 1841. A m o n g their immediate neighbors, however, it was n o secret that Smith sought the closest thing he c o u l d get to an independent state: For obscure reasons, he even decided to r u n for president o f the United States. The one certain t h i n g about the colony's politics was that M o r m o n s v o t e d as they w e r e told. It certainly d i d not ease local tensions to discover that church leaders officered a militia, four thousand strong i n 1844, i n w h i c h every able-bodied m a n served—a defensive m o v e perhaps, b u t b y the same t o k e n a bristling s h o w o f M o r m o n defiance. A n d still more converts came. I n the Utah chapter o f M o r m o n resistance, the facade o f mere piety and industriousness d i d not h o l d for long. W i t h surprising deliberateness, all things considered, the postwar federal govern­ ment gradually increased pressure o n the M o r m o n s i n Utah Terri­ tory w i t h an eye fixed o n the important stakes. The horror o f p o ­ lygamy m i g h t get the headlines, b u t the struggle over sovereignty dictated the terms. The church h a d to relinquish its claims to gov­ ern: disband its army and its ruling political party, abide b y the United States courts and a sparse b a n d o f additional federal offi­ cials. Accepting these simple b u t central principles, the M o r m o n s cleared the w a y for the state o f Utah i n 1896 and simultaneously abandoned its dreams o f independence. At least i n the years after Smith's death, the M o r m o n s ' drive for statehood d i d n o t really qualify as a nationalist movement, even b y the loose standards o f the nineteenth century. I t was an authorTHE CASE OF THE UNITED STATES

91

itarian religion that used nationalist tactics w i t h o u t any intrinsic need for nationalist goals. Once assured o f their security w i t h i n the U n i t e d States, M o r m o n s not o n l y abandoned nationalist a m b i ­ tions but o u t d i d their f e l l o w citizens i n loyalty to the n e w govern­ ment. A n independent state had not been a need i n itself, o n l y a device—no matter w h o governed it or w h a t its p r i n c i p l e s — t o maintain the health o f the church.

D u r i n g the 1880s and 1890s, as nationalist m o v e ­ ments and state mobilizations w e r e hardening t h r o u g h o u t

the

Western w o r l d , some Americans d i d yearn to make a nation o f their o w n country. Contrary to later myths, the Civil War strength­ ened regional far more than comprehensive loyalties. Union

re­

ferred to a constitutional doctrine, to the w i n n i n g side i n the war, not to the w h o l e U n i t e d States. The w a r not o n l y b u r n e d a N o r t h South consciousness into American minds; it stirred and legit­ i m i z e d regionalism i n a variety o f other settings. The West ac­ q u i r e d a cowboys-and-Indians

identity. F r o m Longfellow and

Emerson back t h r o u g h their Puritan ancestors, loyalists i n the Northeast celebrated a distinctive N e w England culture. Even an amorphous M i d d l e West o f neat farms and settled small-town ways had its promoters. As America's analogue to Europe's con­ temporary nationalist literature, writers such as Joel

Chandler

Harris, Sarah Orne Jewett, and Bret Harte generated local color fiction

that separated rather than j o i n e d the particular parts o f the

U n i t e d States. Hence the spreading concern about an American patriotism after 1890 represented a self-conscious reach to another level o f loyalty. Fourth o f July festivities g r e w more regularized and commodified; flag ceremonies—some fixed b y l a w — r i t u ­ alized moments o f unity; and a romantic militarism, replete w i t h bands, uniforms, and tales o f valor, i n v o k e d the traditional d u t y that male citizens o w e d their country. A t the e n d o f the century 92

CHAPTER 4

these n e w patriots rallied along w i t h other n e w imperialists be­ h i n d a U n i t e d States w a r for empire. B y the late nineteenth century, transatlantic norms equated a successful state w i t h a unifying culture, and the prerequisite, ac­ c o r d i n g to this consensus, was a single language. I n that spirit, there were drives a r o u n d 1890 i n Wisconsin a n d Illinois to m a n ­ date English as the language o f p u b l i c education, paralleling cam­ paigns i n Europe to impose a u n i f o r m French t h r o u g h o u t France, to Magyarize the Hungarian empire, and to systematize languages i n virtually all aspiring nations. Before the t u r n o f the century, merit examinations at all levels o f government w e r e i n English. B y 1906 some k n o w l e d g e o f it was required to acquire citizenship. These so-called Americanizers w e r e n o t chasing phantoms. As the heaviest waves o f nineteenth-century European m i g r a t i o n b r o u g h t people from almost every corner o f the Western w o r l d , it was b y n o means clear w h e t h e r A m e r i c a n democracy c o u l d func­ t i o n w i t h o u t a c o m m o n language, a c o m m o n culture, and a c o m ­ m o n commitment, and it was perfectly reasonable to raise these questions as matters o f p u b l i c policy. I n America's diversified oc­ cupational marketplace, moreover, English was the language o f opportunity, especially i n managing the critical passage b e t w e e n blue-collar a n d the rapidly expanding range o f white-collar jobs. A n English-language h i g h school education, n o w standard i n m i d ­ dle-class America, m a r k e d the ladder u p w a r d . Nevertheless, w h a t stood out i n these Americanizing campaigns was n o t their ratio­ nality b u t their partisanship. The m o t i v e force b e h i n d t h e m w e r e well-placed, well-educated, and often well-heeled citizens w h o sought t o w a r d the e n d o f the nineteenth century to make an English American ethnicity d o u b l e as A m e r i c a n nationality. F r o m an elite circle o f Northeastern col­ leges a n d clubs emanated n e w truths that located the origins o f American values i n a distant Anglo-Saxon past, merged A m e r i ­ cans and English into a single race, and, contrary to the prevailing

T H E CASE OF T H E U N I T E D STATES

93

w i s d o m before the 1870s a n d after the 1920s, declared the essen­ tial u n i t y o f the British a n d A m e r i c a n constitutions, r o o t i n g b o t h i n Magna Carta. For the first time, English literature t o o k its place at the core o f the college c u r r i c u l u m , institutionalizing a particular definition o f literacy for the educated American. The source o f this aggrandizing Englishness, o f course, was the same heightening o f ethnic and nationalist consciousness that rose simultaneously all across Europe. Equally obvious, it was the u n i q u e p o s i t i o n i n g o f English Americans that a l l o w e d them, a n d n o other g r o u p i n p o l y ethnic America, to lay transcendent c l a i m to the entire culture. A l t h o u g h just e n o u g h h i g h government officials shared those En­ glish A m e r i c a n biases to give the contemporary diplomatic rap­ prochement o f Great Britain and the U n i t e d States an aura o f natu­ ralness, millions o f other Americans w e r e n o t fooled. "Americans," a Polish priest snorted. These pretenders w e r e just "English-Amer­ icans. . . . There is n o such t h i n g as an A m e r i c a n nation. . . . Poles f o r m a nation, b u t the U n i t e d States is a country, under one gov­ ernment, inhabited b y representatives o f different nations."

21

As i f

to flaunt the t r u t h o f the priest's assertion, more languages expres­ sing a w i d e r range o f intense ethnicities sounded every year i n America's cities. B y European standards, America's spotty patrio­ tism, tentative militarism, a n d splintered nationalism seemed fee­ ble indeed. W h a t d i d stand out was A m e r i c a n racism. A r o u n d 1880, a n e w r o u n d o f it struck people o f color w i t h increasing severity, this time sweeping Chinese a n d Japanese along w i t h western A m e r i n ­ dians and the b u l k o f A m e r i c a n blacks into a comprehensive pat­ tern o f institutionalized racism. O f course that story h a d a larger context: Racism f o l l o w e d r o u g h l y the same trajectory i n b o t h Eu­ rope a n d the U n i t e d States. The counterpart to America's experi­ mental years after the Civil W a r h a d b e e n the accelerating emanci­ p a t i o n o f European Jews a r o u n d midcentury. T h e n b e g i n n i n g i n the 1880s, racism hardened everywhere. Cross-class anti-Semitism spread across b o t h Europe a n d the U n i t e d States. H o w e v e r w h i t e

94

CHAPTER 4

Americans a n d Europeans h a d differed over slavery, they never w a v e r e d i n a c o m m o n c o n v i c t i o n that dark people, especially the irredeemably barbaric black Africans, w e r e inherently inferior. A p ­ propriately, racism acquired a n e w viciousness o n a similar sched­ ule t h r o u g h o u t the w h i t e w o r l d . As J i m C r o w settled i n t o the American South, colonial rulers rigidified the separation o f races t h r o u g h o u t sub-Sahara Africa. Indeed, w h i t e savagery there ex­ ceeded anything i n the U n i t e d States. A t the t u r n o f the century, not a single p r o m i n e n t European spoke u p i n behalf o f the Afri­ can's full humanity. Between 1880 a n d the First W o r l d War, i n other w o r d s , trends o n b o t h sides o f the Atlantic revealed the same components: i n ­ tensified ethnicity and nationalism, m o b i l i z e d patriotism, sharp­ ened racial-cultural division. The m i x , however, was quite differ­ ent i n the U n i t e d States. First o f all, w h a t Europe d i v i d e d , America c o m b i n e d . Europeans,

w h o integrated race differences

among

whites i n t o their lives, exported w h i t e racism thousands o f miles away. The U n i t e d States, o n the contrary, was h o m e to b o t h . Sec­ ond, the A m e r i c a n state, u n l i k e most o f its European counterparts, d i d very little to define or encourage patriotism. I n general, except i n enforcing the h a r d n e w lines o f w h i t e racism, the American state remained m u c h weaker than r o u g h l y comparable European states. T h i r d , b o t h the rationale b e h i n d w h i t e racism a n d the struc­ tures expressing it w e r e far better d e v e l o p e d — m o r e

elaborate,

more articulated—than i n Europe. As Americans institutionalized it, w h i t e racism came to cover everything f r o m education to con­ s u m p t i o n to manners. A t the same time, as i f to p r o v i d e a balance, w h i t e - o n - w h i t e racism t o o k significantly softer, vaguer forms i n the U n i t e d States. Before the war, race permeated A m e r i c a n p u b l i c discussions. Even the most innovative w h i t e reformers and scholars—Mary O v i n g t o n W h i t e o f the n e w National Association for the Advance­ ment o f Colored People, the liberal anthropologist Franz Boas— used the t e r m as a matter o f course to sort out the w o r l d ' s variety.

THE

CASE OF T H E U N I T E D STATES

95

W h e n whites a p p l i e d it to other whites, however, it merely la­ beled. T h o u g h a soft b i o l o g i c a l mist m i g h t surround those discus­ sions, race rarely added any meaning o f its o w n . Sometimes a m i x o f European prejudices a n d A m e r i c a n color-consciousness

put a

group—Sicilians, for e x a m p l e — i n l i m b o , b u t l i m b o was a w a i t i n g area, not a fixed category. A n u m b e r o f observers believed that s i m p l y l i v i n g i n America changed a group's racial characteristics. Even i n the hands o f the chauvinistic educator E l l w o o d Cubberley, the substance o f "our A m e r i c a n race" b o i l e d d o w n to "the Anglo-Saxon conception o f righteousness, l a w and order,

and

p o p u l a r government," values that i n theory anyone c o u l d learn. This A m e r i c a n take o n race—fuzzy

a n d permeable

22

among

whites, stark and hard b e t w e e n whites and people o f c o l o r — framed the arrival o f the U n i t e d States as a d o m i n a n t force i n twentieth-century w o r l d affairs. A n u m b e r o f whites, especially re­ cent immigrants, t h e n embellished this basic division w i t h s u b d i v i ­ sions o f their o w n . O n the one hand, n e w arrivals w h o b r o u g h t a European disdain for black Africans to a country w h e r e whiteness counted above everything else h a d n o trouble j o i n i n g the w h i t e racist c r o w d . O n the other hand, their ethnic identities, deepening i n the years before the Great War, simultaneously denied w h i t e unity. This was their f o r m o f double consciousness—or at least d o u b l e vision. Yes, they w e r e w h i t e , b u t they w e r e w h i t e Irish Americans, w h i t e Polish Americans, w h i t e Italian Americans, a n d n o t h i n g less. Oriented t o w a r d Europe, m a n y o f t h e m w e r e nation­ alists; oriented w h e r e they were, m a n y w e r e A m e r i c a n patriots. U n t i l the w a r scarcely anyone seriously challenged their right to l o o k i n b o t h directions at the same time.

96

CHAPTER 4

CHAPTER

5

C l i m a x in E u r o p e

B e t w e e n the 1870s and the 1940s, European states old and new, large and small, used the appeals of nationalism to mobilize power, only to unleash destructive forces on one another that crippled the continent and simultaneously released drives for freedom on a global scale. Before 1914, however, these conse­ quences would have been hard to predict. In the three decades prior to the Great War, the major European states expanded as they centralized, adding 10 million square miles to their colonial empires and sucking an ever larger proportion of the world's re­ sources into their urban-industrial systems. Where nationalist, democratic, or socialist movements had not yet materialized, they had at least made cameo appearances as far east as Russia. Com­ petition and collaboration among them intensified throughout Europe. In one sense the war changed everything. What opened in 1914 with a sense of apocalyptic anticipation ended four years later in a spirit of chaotic weariness, with only dim ideas of what winning, apart from a stop to the fighting, might mean in people's everyday

lives. I n place o f the prewar's tight interplay a m o n g socialism, de­ mocracy, a n d nationalism, one o f the three swept away the others t o establish itself as the single, o r t h o d o x t r u t h i n almost all post­ w a r states. That t r i u m p h o f democracy or nationalism or socialism became p r o x y for the m e a n i n g o f the war, sanctifying its horrors a n d even i n a n u m b e r o f cases p r o m i s i n g to t u r n battlefield defeat into ultimate victory. N o w it was w i n n e r take all, losers take the blame. B y the 1930s, the t r e n d i n Europe was r u n n i n g strongly i n favor o f the state's a p p r o p r i a t i o n o f nationalism and its e l i m i n a t i o n o f democracy and socialism. I n another sense, however, the w a r scarcely changed anything. T h e next t w o decades w e r e Europe's g o l d e n age o f state arro­ gance, m o r e flourishing than ever n o w that states h a d

spread

t h r o u g h o u t Eastern Europe. Symbols a n d rituals o f state loyalty trailed citizens f r o m their school days to their graves. I t became routine to h o u n d m i n o r i t y cultures o n the assumption that u n d e r e n o u g h pressure they w o u l d s i m p l y disappear. Because a sense o f danger p r o v e d to be the state's most effective recruiter, its patrio­ tic messages concentrated o n the military, relating the m e m o r y o f past glories to the p e r c e p t i o n o f contemporary threats. So Eu­ rope's states, stumbling to their feet after the First W o r l d War, rode the w h i r l w i n d to the Second, this one sufficiently calamitous to b r i n g an entire system o f unregulated state sovereignty d o w n a r o u n d them. Nationalism, the facade b e h i n d w h i c h a large major­ ity o f those p r o u d states h a d acted, p l u m m e t e d into disrepute, a n d the European states themselves, d i v i d e d and subordinated, fell u n ­ der the w i n g — o r t h u m b — o f a postwar superpower.

T h e most important change i n Europe's state system d u r i n g the first t w o decades o f the t w e n t i e t h century was the ar­ rival o f the U n i t e d States as a p o w e r f u l a n d integral participant. B e t w e e n 1894, w h e n Frederick Jackson Turner described A m e r i ­ can democracy as exclusively American, a n d 1917, w h e n W o o d 98

CHAPTER 5

r o w W i l s o n offered it to the w o r l d , the U n i t e d States government came out o f h i d i n g , never to return. As the w o r l d ' s most vibrant center o f capitalism, it finally shed the o l d i m a g e — n o t the heri­ tage, o f course, b u t the r e p u t a t i o n — o f colonial outpost and re­ placed it w i t h one o f commercial-industrial pacesetter. B e g i n n i n g i n the 1890s, as mobilizations o f p o w e r p i c k e d u p speed i n Eu­ rope, the U n i t e d States raced alongside. It seized its o w n empire, g o b b l e d its o w n lion's share o f global resources, and

underwent

its o w n centralizing process, b o t h i n business and i n government. B y the t u r n o f the century, socialism, democracy, and nationalism jostled one another i n America, too. It was the Great War, h o w ­ ever, that t o o k the U n i t e d States to the head o f the table o f great powers, and W o o d r o w W i l s o n l e d it there. Not m u c h prepared W i l s o n for the job. A l t h o u g h American p o l i ­ ticians h a d often s p o k e n out o n w o r l d affairs, almost n o one pic­ tured the government acting o n those sentiments. I n 1913 it was still possible for the n e w l y inaugurated president to assume that foreign affairs w o u l d be restricted largely to the Caribbean. I f they d i d range farther afield, "the m a i n task o f diplomacy" i n Wilson's eyes, his biographer tells us, "was the simple one o f translating [American] ideals into a larger p r o g r a m o f action." W h e n entan­ 1

glements i n the Great War and then America's entry into it ex­ p l o d e d those expectations, W i l s o n v o i c e d the widespread

hope

that this terrible conflict w o u l d answer once and for all certain fundamental questions about the w o r l d ' s future. Even before the war, the pressures o f c o m p e t i t i o n a m o n g so­ cialism, nationalism, and democracy had heightened anticipation i n all three movements for a final day o f reckoning: a time o f clearing the field and settling scores, a time o f ultimate fulfillment. Like rumblings before the b i g quake, revolutionary uprisings w e r e already spreading around the periphery o f the Western w o r l d : i n Russia and T u r k e y d u r i n g the first decade o f the century, i n China and M e x i c o at the beginning o f the second. Between 1912 and 1914 t w o Balkan wars kept observers edgy. Once the seriousness

CLIMAX I N EUROPE

99

o f wholesale European w a r settled into people's

consciousness,

the assumption that o l d systems c o u l d n o t survive it, that a n e w w o r l d w o u l d have to emerge f r o m it, flourished: N o w was social­ ism's—or nationalism's—or democracy's—time. A t the center o f Wilson's vision o f the n e w w o r l d stood selfdetermination, a grandly suggestive, inherently imprecise slogan that gave aspirants o f all persuasions h o p e that theirs w o u l d be the victorious cause. I f p e o p l e really d i d c o n t r o l their o w n desti­ nies, they w o u l d choose socialism, one camp believed. National­ ists construed self-determination as n o t h i n g less than the fillment

ful­

o f their movements, precisely w h a t they dreamed o f

achieving. Because W i l s o n himself c o u p l e d self-determination w i t h democracy, it was easy e n o u g h to believe that here lay the actual heart o f the matter. M a n y w h i t e Americans saw n o conflict b e t w e e n democracy a n d nationalism. After all, the U n i t e d States was the original c h a m p i o n o f the right to f o r m an independent government i n the face o f an i m p o s e d tyranny, and as i f i n echo o f that assertion, nationalists o f all kinds i n the U n i t e d States equa­ ted the American Revolution w i t h the cause o f freedom i n their country o f origin. I n liberal circles the leading opponents o f na­ tionalism i n Central and Eastern Europe w e r e already archetypal villains. The Austro-Hungarian a n d O t t o m a n Empires w e r e n o bet­ ter than "racial tyrannies," declared Theodore Roosevelt for one: "Neither democracy nor civilization is safe w h i l e these t w o states exist i n their present form."

2

T h e socialists' m o m e n t o f glory came i n 1917 w i t h the Bolshe­ v i k Revolution i n Russia, f o l l o w e d immediately after the w a r w i t h the prospect o f a revolutionary socialism r o l l i n g into the heart o f Central Europe. Nationalists l o o k e d like even bigger winners: Lat­ via, Lithuania, and Estonia along the Baltic, a resurrected Poland, n e w creations o f Czechoslovakia a n d Yugoslavia, a n d m y r i a d b o u n d a r y adjustments for Italy a n d the Balkan states. A t a glance, it was democracy that h a d the least to s h o w for its efforts. B u t appearances w e r e i n d e e d deceptive. Bolshevism's

100

CHAPTER 5

boundaries

w e r e pushed back and sealed at the Russian border. Perhaps a quarter o f the p o p u l a t i o n inside Central and Eastern Europe's reconstructed states w e r e ethnic minorities, m a n y o f t h e m frustrated nationalists. A l t h o u g h these states, under duress, p r o m i s e d to h o n o r all their citizens' rights, those guarantees covered o n l y i n d i viduals, n o t m i n o r i t y populations, a n d i n any case n o one h e l d the ruling governments to account. Moreover, b y some people's reckoning, democrats h a d reason to take h o p e f r o m the postwar settlements. For W i l s o n — a n English A m e r i c a n w i t h a deep suspicion o f America's m u l t i p l e ethnic passions a n d a political scientist w i t h a firm c o m m i t m e n t to executive leadership—state governments, not nationalist ambitions, framed the solutions to self-determination. Vague assumptions feather

flock

about cultural-racial affinities—birds o f a

together—deceived even educated observers

into

expecting a m o r e or less natural gravitation o f people into their separate national camps. I f state a n d national boundaries c o u l d n o t be made to match exactly, approximations w o u l d do. W h o got precisely w h a t territory mattered considerably less i n the W i l s o n ian scheme than h o w that territory was governed, above all w h e t h e r it operated under constitutional l a w w i t h elected governments and secure p r o p e r t y rights. Language, Wilson's favorite d i vider, was an erratic measure o f ethnicity but a sensible prerequisite for electoral politics. Scattered minorities i n Europe, like scattered minorities i n the United States, w o u l d adapt to a just government, he thought. Hence the plebiscites that W i l s o n envisaged settling w h i c h o f t w o states w o u l d c o n t r o l ethnically m i x e d territories w e r e really a citizenry's choice b e t w e e n the better o f t w o governments. Finally, self-determination's l i m i t e d scope was n o drawback. Neither W i l s o n nor his circle o f admirers gave serious t h o u g h t to the colonies o f Asia and Africa, let alone the socalled b a c k w a r d countries i n the Caribbean, j o i n i n g the selfgoverning nations. The readiness r u l e — w h e n they are ready w e w i l l give t h e m rights—already used to disfranchise American

CLIMAX I N EUROPE

ÌOÌ

blacks, a p p l i e d even m o r e forcefully t o p e o p l e o f color a r o u n d the w o r l d . For the thinness o f his democratic criteria, the thickness o f his racist hide, and above all the destructiveness o f his fragmenting vision, W i l s o n has b e e n vilified i n the best scholarly circles ever since. I n that spirit, the historian Eric H o b s b a w m accuses W i l s o n o f releasing the d e m o n o f "ethnic-linguistic n a t i o n states" a n d thereby causing "a disaster [that] can still be seen i n the Europe o f the 1990s." I n a n u m b e r o f respects, these criticisms lead t o a 3

dead end. For one thing, W i l s o n h a d little appreciation o f ethnicity a n d less o f the nationalism it inspired. Like H o b s b a w m a n d his intellectual companions, he gave priority t o states over nations, a n d he pictured a c o m m o n language a m o n g w h i t e p e o p l e under­ w r i t i n g a state's civic culture, n o t its ethnic homogeneity. Selfdetermination w o u l d make states into colleagues: There was n o useful "distinction . . . b e t w e e n nationalism a n d internationalism," he thought. The one flowed into the other, as the League o f Na­ tions w o u l d demonstrate. W i l s o n m a y have been a naive univer­ 4

salist, b u t he was n o ethnic atomizer. It is n o t clear w h a t Wilson's critics imagine as the correct alter­ native. Nostalgia for the o l d empires a n d skepticism about all peo­ ple's ability to rule themselves d o little to settle p o l i c y issues. N o t even the Metternich o f their dreams c o u l d have p u t the imperial H u m p t y - D u m p t i e s together again. W o u l d an Austrian-Hungarian confederation or German-Austrian Anschluss have i m p r o v e d the quality o f postwar Europe? It is easy to forget h o w i m p o v e r i s h e d the vision o f Europe's victors was i n 1919. Like desperately tired runners, each t h o u g h t o n l y o f itself a n d t h e n o n l y o f t a k i n g the next step. The postwar treaties w e r e n o t the m o m e n t o f original sin. T h e y w e r e a start, an effort t o inaugurate a n e w era o n the assumption that major changes w e r e imperative n o w a n d that fur­ ther changes w o u l d come later. Surrounded b y a d i n o f self-serv­ i n g demands, fearful o f revolutionary chaos, and optimistic about the inherent superiority o f liberal constitutionalism, W i l s o n made a stab at the future. The people w h o f o l l o w e d h i m d i d the rest. 102

CHAPTER 5

States b r o u g h t o n the war, and states t r i u m p h e d t h r o u g h it. As they funneled resources into the military a n d blared patriotic messages to justify the h u m a n price, democracy a n d so­ cialism d i d little more than stoke the w a r machines. Nationalism, the camp follower, stayed to p i c k the carrion. W i t h the h o l l o w i n g out o f the Austrian-Hungarian and O t t o m a n Empires, a variety o f nationalist movements—some o f t h e m the bitter victims o f recent homogenization programs—rushed to fill the spaces. Despite na­ tionalism's reputation i n liberal circles as an emancipating force, the peacemakers—champions

o f central authority to a m a n —

chose state viability over ethnic self-rule. Three o f the most i m p o r ­ tant n e w states w e r e exemplary. Not o n l y was the Yugoslav idea the product o f a f e w intellec­ tuals w h o d i d n o t even c o m m a n d m u c h support i n their o w n cir­ cles; the idea itself had served as little more than a fig leaf for Serbian or Croatian ambitions to s w a l l o w the rest o f the South Slavs. Croats w o r k e d out their identity i n a larger context o f Ger­ m a n speakers a n d f e l l o w Roman Catholics;, Serbs w o r k e d out theirs i n a context o f Balkan aspirations and Eastern O r t h o d o x y . O n the eve o f the Great War, they w e r e less competitive than irrelevant to one another. The last-minute bargaining at the e n d o f 1918 that p r o d u c e d the K i n g d o m o f the Serbs, Croats, a n d Slo­ venes (aka Yugoslavia) m a r k e d a clear victory o f o p p o r t u n i s m over n a t i o n a l i s m — i n fact, the outright frustration o f nationalism at its seeming m o m e n t o f t r i u m p h . Czech nationalism, first as a w a y o f distancing Bohemians f r o m the hated Germans a n d eventually as a p o p u l a r m o v e m e n t for independence, h a d a substantial prewar record, b u t Slovak nation­ alism h a d none at all. I n the mean h u m o r o f the time, Slovaks w e r e a people w i t h n o history, o n l y a past. Certainly n o p o p u l a r m o v e m e n t identified the Slovaks' future i n the Czech-dominated state that the U n i t e d States and t h e n its allies recognized i n 1918. As a final example, the reactionary elite a r o u n d Roman D m o w ski w h o negotiated Poland's boundaries at the peace conference s h o w e d n o t a scintilla o f concern about absorbing Germans to the CLIMAX I N EUROPE

103

west or Ukrainians, Belorussians, Jews, Russians, and Lithuanians to the east. Even after the w a r w h e n Bolshevik Russia p u s h e d back Poland's eastern boundary, a t h i r d o f the n e w state's p o p u l a ­ t i o n h a d n o identity as Polish. I n postwar Europe, these a n d other states r u l e d their domains w i t h virtually n o outside interference, one consequence o f w h i c h was

the

oppression

o f minorities. The Minorities Protection

Treaties o f 1919, one i n f o r m e d observer noted, w e r e merely "a necessary evil." Moreover, the u n d o i n g o f the o l d empires was 5

accompanied b y m a n y coerced movements o f p o p u l a t i o n ( w h a t w o u l d later be called ethnic cleansing)—some

unprecedently

large i n scale, all cruel i n f o r m u l a t i o n a n d vicious i n execution. Turks set the n e w standard b y k i l l i n g perhaps 2.5 m i l l i o n A r m e n ­ ians as the rest fled for their lives. These w e r e years, H a n n a h A r ­ endt r e m i n d e d us, that b u r i e d the Enlightenment dreams about the Rights o f M a n . O n l y states gave rights, and those w h o gaveth c o u l d taketh away. Incidences o f statelessness—people d e v o i d o f rights—increased dramatically. These apocalypic hopes a n d postapocalyptic realities funda­ mentally transformed nationalism. Like a sudden, eerie silence o n the streets, the o v e r w h e l m i n g majority o f the prewar movements dissolved, some o n l y for a time, others forever. W h e r e nationalist movements h a d succeeded, the Icarus Effect usually d o w n e d them. N o w everybody i n a n e w state claimed to be serving the nation, b y w h i c h they meant serving the state. B u t even w h e r e nationalism fared badly, failure at the critical m o m e n t drained en­ ergy f r o m almost all o f them. I n the broadest terms, it mattered crucially that the same i m p r o v i n g n e t w o r k s o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n be­ h i n d nationalism's rise h a d also been carrying n e w norms about family p l a n n i n g that sent birthrates into a sharp and seemingly irreversible decline more or less i n the w a k e o f nationalism's i n i ­ tial surges. M o v i n g west to east across Europe b e t w e e n 1870 a n d 1920, one society after another

revealed the same

sweeping

d o w n t u r n . These long-term alterations i n fertility, Susan Watkins

104

CHAPTER 5

reports, represented not a shift from g r o u p standards to i n d i v i d u a l choices b u t "a shift f r o m social control b y a smaller g r o u p [the local c o m m u n i t y ] to a larger g r o u p " — i n c l u d i n g , o f course, the na­ t i o n itself. Self-correction? Whatever else, the most likely source 6

for b r a n d n e w nationalist movements h a d d r i e d u p . I n sum, c o m b i n e d forces that o n l y a f e w years before seemed about to burst the bounds o f Europe slipped instead inside its postwar state system, g i v i n g it a temporary l o o k o f permanence. The course o f Irish nationalism was a case i n point. Under the leadership o f Charles Stewart Parnell, its central fig­ ure from the mid-1870s to the e n d o f the 1880s, Irish nationalism, like the great trio o f movements t h r o u g h o u t Europe, systematized. Parnell, a c o m p e l l i n g personality, was also a masterful manager. A t h o m e he tamed the rough, v i o l e n t Land League i n t o obedient supporters o f his political campaign: W i n H o m e Rule for Ireland b y allying w i t h Britain's Liberal party. A b r o a d he t u r n e d N o r t h America's magnificent spread o f newspapers a n d societies i n t o a n e t w o r k responsive to his leadership and ready for fund-raising. A t the peak o f his p o w e r , Parnell gave orders to a t h r i v i n g trans­ atlantic organization. Yet his campaign failed t w i c e over. First, Gladstone's Liberals c o u l d not deliver H o m e Rule. Second, the prospect o f a large Catholic majority controlling H o m e R u l e — Rome Rule, its enemies called i t — m o b i l i z e d Protestant o p p o s i t i o n i n the n o r t h e r n counties. T h o u g h Parnell was himself a Protestant, he c o u l d d o n o t h i n g to lessen the religious gap. Even before scan­ dal disgraced Parnell, his time h a d passed. W h a t d i d n o t change was the movement's increasing bureaucra­ tization. W i t h i n a f e w years after Douglas H y d e f o u n d e d the Gae­ lic League to revive Ireland's distinctive language a n d spark its cultural creativity, political nationalists w h o k n e w n o more Gaelic than Greek co-opted Hyde's m o v e m e n t to hoist as a banner i n their parade. Early i n the t w e n t i e t h century, the political campaign for Irish nationalism, w i t h its e m p t y pretensions to cultural leader­ ship and its burdensome alliance w i t h a papal-centered Catholi-

CLIMAX I N EUROPE

105

cism, was as m u c h an o r t h o d o x y as a movement. Socialism m i g h t have sharpened it t h r o u g h c o m p e t i t i o n , b u t f o l l o w i n g the disas­ trous defeat o f its strongest u n i o n i n 1913, it too fell i n line. Hence w h e n the British p r o m i s e d H o m e Rule i n 1914, Ireland's b u t t o n e d d o w n nationalist politicians t h o u g h t above all o f consolidating their p o w e r . Whatever m i g h t have happened, w a r t i m e emergency

shelved

all plans. W i t h n o fighting edge i n its political w i n g , the initiative shifted to a handful o f conspirators w h o , i n the l o n g b u t almost lost tradition o f calculated m a r t y r d o m , stood u p to the British o n Easter 1916 w i t h little m o r e than sticks a n d stones. A l t h o u g h f e w Irish s h o w e d an initial sympathy for these archaic heroics, Brit­ ain's brutal repression—beating a n d jailing a n d hanging dissidents almost at r a n d o m — c h a n g e d their minds and, simultaneously, the tone o f Irish nationalism. As threats o f a military draft i n Ireland w i p e d out the remnants o f support for H o m e Rule, yesterday's radical fringe to Irish nationalism, represented b y Sinn Fein, swept t o p o w e r b e h i n d the banner o f independence. Like nationalists everywhere, the Irish anticipated the postwar settlement, w i t h its ideally suited theme o f self-determination, as their g o l d e n moment. T h e y lost. I n the w a k e o f a demoralizing failure at the peace conference, Irish nationalist energies o n b o t h sides o f the Atlantic t u r n e d i n o n themselves. Should they fight or negotiate? For a u t o n o m y or independence? For all the island or most o f it? The dominance o f secret organizations—Clan na Gael i n the U n i t e d States and Sinn Fein i n Ireland—guaranteed

little

p o p u l a r i n p u t to these decisions. Arguments v e i l e d hatreds, w o r d s gave w a y to weapons. Even further British brutality, still i n the name o f peace, c o u l d not unite the factions. The deteriorating na­ tionalist movement's final gasp was a brief, savage civil war. W h a t materialized i n 1923 was a d i v i d e d island. The British, faced w i t h the prospects o f a Protestant m i n o r i t y i n a Catholic state or a Catholic m i n o r i t y i n a Protestant state, n o t surprisingly chose the latter: The government i n L o n d o n reserved the six 106

CHAPTER 5

n o r t h e r n counties o f Ulster as a separate dependency a n d under­ w r o t e there "a one-party [Protestant] state, structured u p o n reli­ gious apartheid." For the rest o f the island the Catholic Irish Free 7

State b r o u g h t to p o w e r a military elite w h o repressed dissenters m u c h as the British h a d done. Icarus crashed. Ulster Protestants, w i t h the authoritarian Sir E d w a r d Carson as their hero, declared themselves n o t a distinct nation b u t pure, loyal Brits. I n the Irish Free State, nationalism survived o n l y " i n fossilized form, as official symbols" that all parties routinely claimed as their o w n . I t was as 8

if the e n d defined itself: W h a t h a p p e n e d became ipso facto the fulfillment o f w h a t h a d come before.

I n the postwar g l o r y days o f state sovereignty, the trend ran strongly t o w a r d state e m b o d i m e n t o f one o f the great trio: that is, a state's claim s i m p l y to be w h a t those movements h a d aspired to achieve—socialism, democracy, nationalism. The m o r e tightly each i n the trio became b o u n d into the fate o f its sponsors, the more it atrophied as a movement. The m o r e t h o r o u g h l y a state identified itself w i t h one i n the trio, the less tolerance it s h o w e d for the other t w o . H o w states expressed that intolerance varied w i d e l y , o f course, from little more than a rhetoric o f o r t h o d o x y at one e n d to a relentless crushing o f dissent at the other. Moreover, a n u m b e r o f states, i n c l u d i n g such major ones as France a n d Brit­ ain, remained arenas o f t o u g h c o m p e t i t i o n a m o n g the trio o f movements t h r o u g h o u t the interwar years. Nevertheless, b y the 1930s the impulse t o w a r d m o n o p o l y l o o k e d as i f it w o u l d envelop the Western w o r l d , a n d state leaders came under intensifying pressure to declare exclusive loyalties: socialist, nationalist, or democratic, a n d n o t h i n g else. Britain and France seemed the weaker for hedging their answers. E m b o d y i n g one o f the trio set states along a particular path. First, it entailed eliminating or at least neutralizing the other t w o . Second, it meant state-izing the one that it claimed to be, that is, CLIMAX I N EUROPE

107

encasing nationalism or socialism or democracy i n a government's definition, implementation, a n d protection o f it. T w o v e r y differ­ ent embodiments o n Europe's

flanks—the

U n i t e d States as de­

mocracy and the Soviet U n i o n as socialism—illustrated h o w that process m i g h t w o r k itself out. I n b o t h countries each m o v e m e n t i n the trio h a d s h o w n n e w v i g o r early i n the t w e n t i e t h century. I n cities at the European e n d o f Russia, varieties o f socialism c o m ­ peted w i t h one another i n a struggle to develop p o p u l a r f o l l o w ings. Hopes for constitutional rights, i f not f u l l - b l o w n democracy, flared

briefly after the Revolution o f 1905, then burst forth i n

March 1917 w i t h the o v e r t h r o w o f the Romanovs. State patriotism, an essentially traditionalist exaltation o f the czar and his a m b i ­ tions, d i d b o r r o w f r o m the religious a n d racial embellishments o f p r e w a r nationalism elsewhere,

a n d genuine nationalist stirrings

a m o n g the empire's minorities e x p l o d e d w i t h the M a r c h Revolu­ t i o n into a chorus o f demands for independence from,

among

others, Polish, Ukrainian, Belorussian, Armenian, Georgian, a n d Lithuanian spokesmen. I n Russia, all three movements p i t t e d themselves against czarist despotism. I n the U n i t e d States, socialism a n d nationalism wrestled a place alongside America's d o m i n a n t democracy. A t the start o f the century, the i l l effects f r o m concentrations o f capital, leagues o f employers, and large industrial cities finally p r o v i d e d e n o u g h impetus to f o u n d the Socialist Party o f America, w h i c h d u r i n g the next fifteen years j o i n e d i n the debate over the future o f democ­ racy. Dependent o n the socialist c o m m i t m e n t that migrating Euro­ peans b r o u g h t w i t h them, the m o v e m e n t was less than the s u m o f its scattered, disparate parts b u t definitely g r o w i n g . A t its A m e r i ­ can end, transatlantic nationalism—overlapping, reinforcing, c o m ­ peting w i t h these socialist segments—rode its o w n w a v e o f hopes into the war. A n e w dispensation began i n 1917, w i t h America's declaration o f w a r i n A p r i l a n d the Bolshevik Revolution i n October. As W i l s o n a n d Lenin w e r e q u i c k to realize, Bolshevik socialism for 108

CHAPTER 5

the U n i t e d States and capitalist democracy for Russia represented precisely the c o m p e t i t i o n that c o u l d not be tolerated. A l t h o u g h Lenin's government p r o m i s e d an o n g o i n g dialogue b e t w e e n its r u l i n g cadre a n d the country's m y r i a d local organizations, as a one-party state the Soviet U n i o n t u r n e d elections into mere affir­ mations o f Communist authority. Whatever illusions about Lenin's "democratic centralism" still h u n g o n at the e n d o f the 1920s w e r e completely dispelled w i t h the massive state coercion b e h i n d Sta­ lin's first Five Year Plan and its rural collectivization. B y the 1930s a vast n e t w o r k o f state police lay i n w a i t for dissenters. The parallel story i n the U n i t e d States was far less b l o o d y and systematic b u t n o less effective. Before 1920, an alliance o f courts, police, a n d vigilantes had already crushed the syndicalist social­ ism o f the Industrial Workers o f the W o r l d . Political socialism, d o u b l y exposed b y the prominence o f German Americans i n its ranks a n d b y its o p p o s i t i o n to American belligerence, also suf­ fered f r o m government persecution, but its o w n internal weak­ nesses w e r e at least as crippling. Ridden w i t h factions a n d cut off f r o m European recruits, socialism shrank to inconsequence, even d u r i n g the Great Depression. T o m o n i t o r the remnants, the federal government relied o n its o w n state police, the FBI, spindly next to Russia's b u t equally secret. T o the challenge f r o m nationalism, b o t h states gave more imag­ inative responses. D r a w i n g o n extensive

prerevolutionary

de­

bates, i n w h i c h L e n i n t o o k the lead, the Soviet U n i o n f r o m the outset gave an astonishing degree o f leeway to its m a n y cultural subgroups. Those w i t h a significant presence and geographical concentration became regional units o f the Soviet U n i o n ; those too small or scattered to constitute administrative entities still re­ ceived unprecedented support f r o m the central government: W e l l into the 1930s, 192 languages h a d official standing i n state p o l i ­ cies. O n l y t h r o u g h their o w n languages, the communist leadership believed, w o u l d it be possible to b r i n g socially b a c k w a r d peoples into the mainstream o f socialist consciousness. Even w h e n the CLIMAX I N EUROPE

109

centralizing trends o f the 1930s eliminated m a n y o f these languages f r o m the Soviet m e n u , ethnicity c o n t i n u e d t o flourish u n der party auspices. The peoples w h o retained official standing w e r e actually instructed to embellish the very ceremonies, celebrations, a n d histories that identified t h e m as unique. A l w a y s the price was obedience t o the policies o f the central state, w i t h the Communist party, Russian-dominated, the vehicle for overseeing a n d integrating the regions. As anything resembling

indepen-

dence, nationalism was out o f the question. Nevertheless, g i v e n the m o n u m e n t a l task o f r u l i n g a huge landmass w i t h m a x i m u m compliance from its disparate p o p u l a t i o n , the Soviet U n i o n c o u l d lay claim to Europe's o n l y enlightened nationality policy. I n the context o f m i n o r i t y persecutions almost everywhere o n the continent, the major ethnic components o f the Soviet U n i o n , as Ronald Suny, an expert o n these matters, summarizes it, w e r e "guaranteed . . . territorial identity, education and cultural institutions i n their o w n language, a n d the p r o m o t i o n o f native cadres i n t o positions o f [regional] power."

9

Ethnicity yes, nationalism no. Under America's very different circumstances, the U n i t e d States f o l l o w e d similar guidelines. O n t w o counts, the w a r raised serious questions about the w i s d o m o f the government's long-standing, implicit bargain w i t h the c o u n try's m a n y ethnic groups: civic loyalty to the U n i t e d States, cultural identifications as people chose. For the first time i n its history, the U n i t e d States was positioned to affect the outcome o f Europe's contests for p o w e r . A n d for the first time i n their history, transatlantic nationalists o f all sorts h a d g o o d reason to anticipate an i m m i n e n t resolution for their movements. As these curves c o n verged, demands that the A m e r i c a n government support various European objectives gave nationalism i n A m e r i c a — h y p h e n i s m — a n e w , charged meaning. The w a r t i m e drives for a u n i f o r m cultural code a n d a heightened state p a t r i o t i s m — A m e r i c a n i z a t i o n — w e r e n o t just mindless repressions. Leaders i n every m o b i l i z i n g Europ e a n state expected at least as m u c h f r o m its citizens. W h a t d i d it Ì10

CHAPTER 5

mean i f millions o f people i n America r o u t i n e l y identified t h e m ­ selves as Irish or Italian or Serbian or Hungarian a n d r o u t i n e l y argued over European, not American issues i n as m a n y languages as there w e r e groups? C o u l d American democracy even function w i t h o u t a c o m m i t m e n t to this country's interests above all others? I f the goals o f Americanization w e r e misty, so w e r e the grand pluralist visions o f J o h n D e w e y , Horace Kallen, a n d Randolph Bourne. Everybody was groping. The w i n n i n g answer began b y separating out nationalism and repudiating it. T o a striking degree, the W i l s o n i a n peace process dismissed the entire o u t p u t f r o m all the mass meetings, lobbies, resolutions, petitions, a n d delegations that pressed a r o u n d it. I n d i ­ viduals d i d stand a chance o f influencing the president. His ad­ viser Louis Brandeis p r o b a b l y affected Wilson's response to Z i o n ­ ist ambitions; the famous pianist Ignacy Paderewski, a friend o f Wilson's confidant E d w a r d House, p r o b a b l y elevated an indepen­ dent Poland i n the president's priorities; the philosopher T o m á s Masaryk p r o b a b l y hastened Wilson's recognition o f Czechoslo­ vakia. T o the noisy p u b l i c pleas for p o p u l a r nationalism, however, he t u r n e d a deaf ear. As it happened, that was the critical m o m e n t to stand fast. B y the time W i l s o n left office, nationalism was col­ lapsing everywhere, and its American reputation was fading fast. As disillusionment w i t h the entire w a r spread, English A m e r i c a n nationalism also lost favor. I n the 1920s, a self-consciously A m e r i ­ can literature, American language, and American l a w came i n vogue. Ethnicity, o n the other hand, t h r i v e d i n America. I f for a short w a r t i m e interval isolated German Americans w e r e fair game, those i n German A m e r i c a n communities never were, n o r w e r e Irish Americans inside their u r b a n political fortresses. I n the midst o f war, Czech a n d Polish language instruction f o u n d its w a y i n t o Chi­ cago p u b l i c schools; N o r w e g i a n Americans celebrated their b r a n d o f patriotism o n M a y 17, Norway's Freedom Day; a n d a parade d o w n Fifth Avenue o n the Fourth o f July 1918 brought out N e w CLIMAX I N EUROPE

/ / /

Y o r k City's cultural groups i n full ethnic regalia: "The Poles w o n first prize for the best floats, b u t the judges also c o m m e n d e d the Assyrians, the Bolivians, a n d the Americans o f German O r i g i n . "

10

So m u c h for the homogenizers, even at their w a r t i m e peak. Entering the w a r a fervent multinationalist country, the U n i t e d States emerged f r o m it a comfortable multiethnic society. The tra­ jectory o f Polish A m e r i c a n consciousness m a r k e d the change. F r o m loose cultural gatherings o f fictive k i n , Polish A m e r i c a n na­ tionalism skyrocketed w i t h the prospects o f a Polish state, t h e n subsided as q u i c k l y once it sat i n place. After the w a r some m i ­ grants returned to Poland; m o r e stayed i n the U n i t e d States w h e r e Polonia culture turned away f r o m Europe to concentrate o n tight little church-oriented communities. Similar patterns w e r e repeated elsewhere early i n the 1920s. N o sooner d i d the Supreme Court establish the right to teach i n languages other than English than reliance o n those other languages, i n c l u d i n g German, N o r w e g i a n , and Czech, d r o p p e d sharply. The restriction o f European i m m i g r a t i o n t h r o u g h the National Origins Act o f 1924, often cited as A m e r i c a n bigotry's finest m o ­ ment, c o u l d just as w e l l serve as another illustration o f postwar America's multiethnic moderation. A t a time w h e n states t h r o u g h ­ o u t Europe and Asia M i n o r w e r e b l o c k i n g voluntary migrations and forcing involuntary ones i n the name o f national unity, it w o u l d have been extraordinary to the p o i n t o f craziness for the U n i t e d States to ignore all o f that a n d s w i n g w i d e its gates. The challenge was h o w best to limit the numbers. N o one k n e w h o w to measure degrees o f h u m a n n e e d o n an intercontinental scale. First come, first serve w o u l d have triggered a heartbreaking stam­ pede. I n the 1920s, national origins h a d just the right ring. A ma­ ture America w o u l d be taking its place i n w h a t l o o k e d like a con­ gealing Western society filled w i t h states. A t the outer boundary, the act excluded people o f color, a race line m o r e or less standard everywhere i n the w h i t e w o r l d . Using postwar European states as stand-ins for the w h i t e nationalities that made u p America's p o p u 112

CHAPTER 5

lation, it established entry quotas more generous than Europe's, w i t h additional provisions for reuniting families. There w e r e re­ markably f e w complaints inside the U n i t e d States, even f r o m the nationalities that apparently got shortchanged. I n any case the n e w European states, it was w i d e l y believed, w o u l d n o w d r a w migrants home, n o t send t h e m out, an assumption that the return o f Slavic a n d Italian peoples seemed to validate. The National O r i ­ gins Act, i n other w o r d s , was racist b u t n o t a subterfuge for rac­ ism. Its purpose was aboveboard: to perpetuate a static w h i t e America, a c o m p l e t e d U n i t e d States, i n a spirit almost every Euro­ pean state c o u l d understand. As the U n i t e d States t o o k o n the task o f regulating p o p u l a t i o n flows i n the name o f its democracy, the Soviet U n i o n was control­ l i n g movements w i t h far greater force i n the name o f its socialism. Police sealed its borders to entry or exit, a n d the army shifted entire populations to serve state policy. Millions w e r e trapped i n the Ukraine to die o f starvation; millions o f Cossacks w e r e d r i v e n from their homes i n t o Asia. As its o w n ideologues proclaimed, the Soviet U n i o n was a dictatorship. Whatever ultimate goal it m i g h t be serving, into the indefinite future it was ruthless state rule o n a scale n o czar c o u l d have dreamed o f achieving. A l t h o u g h a f e w other states—Sweden and Australia, for e x a m p l e — h a d a call o f their o w n o n socialism, the Soviet U n i o n for all the w o r l d e m b o d ­ ied it: a state-run socialism that the state ran for itself. I f considerably m o r e states h a d a right to the title o f democracy, the U n i t e d States remained the w o r l d ' s preeminent example. W h a t the global resonance o f the Soviet slogan the Five Year Plan said about the Soviet Union's centrality i n socialist hopes, the w o r l d ­ w i d e appeal o f the American slogan the N e w Deal said about U n i t e d States as the expression o f democracy. A r o u n d the Great War, the U n i t e d States also b r o k e from its past to e m b o d y a n e w style democracy. The n o r m i n nineteenth-century American had been a strong c i t i z e n - w e a k government democracy. After the Civil War the w i n n i n g side h a d experimented briefly w i t h a strong CLIMAX I N EUROPE

1 13

citizen-strong government m o d e l , a n d the losing side h a d slid into a w e a k c i t i z e n - w e a k government pattern. Challenges f r o m capitalist developers a n d populist reformers unsettled b o t h o f them, however, a n d early i n the t w e n t i e t h century, A m e r i c a n de­ mocracy shifted d i r e c t i o n t o w a r d a n e w goal: w e a k citizen, strong government. Consolidated city administrations, regulatory c o m ­ missions, and short ballots distanced governments f r o m the voters. B o t h major political parties, as w e l l as the corporations, unions, a n d farm lobbies trying to influence them, developed c o m p r e h e n ­ sive organizations that c o u l d o n l y deal effectively w i t h one an­ other and w i t h a systematized government. I n Europe at the t u r n o f the century, superimposing n e w democratic politics o n o l d h i ­ erarchies h e l d out the promise o f m o r e democracy. I n the U n i t e d States, superimposing n e w hierarchies o n o l d democratic politics o n l y p r o m i s e d m o r e hierarchy. V o t i n g turnouts p l u m m e t e d . The Republican Walter L i p p m a n n , w h o s e writings i n the 1920s set the agenda for i n f o r m e d discussions about democracy, disparaged or­ dinary citizens for failing "to transcend their casual experience a n d their prejudice" and advocated instead a rule t h r o u g h experts, w i t h elections as a means for voters to approve or disapprove o f their policies—a consumers' democracy.

11

N e w Deal Democrats

i m p l e m e n t e d those basic principles i n the 1930s. I f dictatorial socialism and oligarchic democracy prevailed at Europe's flanks, authoritarian nationalism d o m i n a t e d its heartland. T h e m o r e monopolistic these versions o f socialism, democracy, a n d nationalism, the m o r e fearful—the m o r e antagonistic—each became o f the other t w o , a n d more leaders i n each case t o o k responsibility for preserving the one correct system f r o m its ene­ mies. A n t i p o p u l i s m prevailed everywhere. O r d i n a r y people, dan­ gerously susceptible, h a d to be protected against the omnipresent possibility that they w o u l d listen to a siren song, make the w r o n g decision, and simply sell o u t the truth. T o defend against that pos­ sibility, leaders for each o f the trio claimed to have a corner o n the future. O n l y their system c o u l d p r o v i d e the service, the protection, the welfare, the education, the o p p o r t u n i t y that citizens craved. 114

CHAPTER 5

Even A m e r i c a n democrats, unaccustomed to a game o f spiraling promises, j o i n e d the chorus. "The ideal democracy w o u l d , o f course, arrange a j o b for every able-bodied citizen," the N e w Dealer H e n r y A . Wallace announced.

12

It was an inherently hos­

tile, m u t u a l l y exclusive c o m p e t i t i o n that p u t more and m o r e pres­ sure o n all states, whatever their persuasions, to deliver the goods. Contrary to first impressions, nationalism d i d n o t culminate w i t h the postwar settlement. As the o l d nationalism exhausted itself, a disfigured cousin—this one the captive o f the state—roamed the continent i n its place, gathering its forces for A r m a g e d d o n . Where the state set the terms, nationalism p r o v i d e d little m o r e than a rhetoric o f justification for the uses o f force b o t h inside a n d out­ side the state's boundaries. As its interests w e r e twisted into the service o f the state, this bastardized nationalism lost any necessary relation to the visions o f ethnic self-determination that h a d given it life i n the first place. I n this latest dispensation, nationalism, w h i c h h a d always fed o n people's restless desires, manifested itself i n t w o ways. O n the w e a k side, a f e w dissenting voices accused the state o f d u l l i n g the national spirit and yearned for its renewal. Usually m o r e reaction­ ary than their r u l i n g opponents, these revivalists squandered most o f their energy lamenting the loss o f the o l d , pure truths. I f they d i d take p o w e r , they rarely d i d more than make the state a bit m o r e repressive. Far more postwar nationalists called o n the state to complete its mission. I n a Europe o f ragged boundaries and m o b i l e people, there was still w o r k to do. Once i n the hands o f the state, however, these ambitions became whatever the state's leaders said they were, as Italy's experience illustrated. The deep-seated complications o f Italy's nationalist politics set the stage. I n the m i d d l e o f the nineteenth century, w i t h the ma­ neuvers to f o r m an Italian state already under w a y , "the Italian language was perhaps spoken b y less than five per cent o f the p o p u l a t i o n i n the Italian peninsula," the historian Denis Mack Smith has estimated.

13

Small w o n d e r n o government c o u l d meet

the challenge o f creating a p o p u l a t i o n o f Italians. D i v i d e d north,

CLIMAX I N EUROPE

/

15

central, and south, secular capitalist, landed gentry, and reaction­ ary Catholic, w h i t e collar, wage earner, and peasant, Italy was riven w i t h hostilities a n d inequalities that the sudden i n t r o d u c t i o n o f universal m a n h o o d suffrage i n 1 9 1 2 s i m p l y laid bare for every­ one to see. The Italian army, once expected to be a culturally unifying force, slid into the military's familiar role o f muscling citi­ zens: "Instead o f b e i n g the nation's schoolmaster it became the [state's] policeman."

14

O n the eve o f the Great War, a radical so­

cialism and a h o m o g e n i z i n g nationalism, already at each other's throats, competed w i t h democrats for the p o w e r to eliminate one another. Some leaders, realizing h o w fractured Italy was at home, h o p e d to compensate w i t h victories abroad. The upshot was a miserable w a r record and a frustrating peace settlement. Serious economic problems a n d vicious infighting after the w a r o p e n e d the w a y for Benito Mussolini's brutal Fascist forces, w h i c h seized p o w e r i n 1 9 2 3 w i t h promises o f achieving w h a t n o other regime h a d come close to accomplishing: u n i t y at h o m e and g l o r y abroad. Eliminat­ i n g democracy and o u t l a w i n g socialism, the fascists appeared to be m o b i l i z i n g the country's resources exclusively b e h i n d Italian nationalism. Indicatively, the nationalist enthusiasm

o f Italian

Americans, u n l i k e that o f other ethnic groups i n the U n i t e d States, rose to an even higher level than it h a d reached before the war. Mussolini l o o k e d for all the w o r l d like its agent o f fulfillment. O n the contrary, Mussolini glorified the state and n o t h i n g b u t the state. "The nation does n o t exist"—fascist doctrine ". . . [until] the nation is created b y the state."

15

read—

F r o m the B o l ­

sheviks Mussolini b o r r o w e d the ideal o f the n e w fascist man, root­ less except for his absolute dedication to the state, a measure o f citizenship that made a m o c k e r y o f nationalism's ancestrally con­ nected k i n . Italian nationalism, merely a fig leaf for fascist a m b i ­ tions, meant w h a t Mussolini said it meant, n o more, a n d Italians abroad, w i l l y - n i l l y , w e r e cast i n the role o f expatriot patriots, n o t transatlantic nationalists. 116

CHAPTER 5

States fundamentally altered b y the w a r were particularly prone to the n e w b r a n d o f authoritarian nationalism. B y the 1930s the entire sweep o f Central and Eastern Europe—Czechoslovakia ex­ cepted—came under the c o n t r o l o f dictators e m p l o y i n g national­ ist rhetoric i n behalf o f state p o w e r . The war's w i n n e r s — P o l a n d , Yugoslavia, Romania—were as eligible as its losers: Austria, H u n ­ gary, Bulgaria. I n retrospect, historians find these regimes quite l i m i t e d i n the c o n t r o l they actually exercised i n their countries— significantly better at generating terror than r u n n i n g the state. A t the time, however, they seemed to be models o f total, centralized p o w e r . Germany came to e m b o d y this k i n d o f nationalism i n the same sense that the Soviet U n i o n e m b o d i e d socialism and the U n i t e d States democracy. Appropriately, it was Nazi Germany that precipitated the climax o f European nationalism, taking the entire system d o w n , once a n d for all, i n the deadly embrace o f the state. C o m i n g into the t w e n t i e t h century, German nationalism d i d not appear exceptionally dangerous. B y equating membership i n the nation w i t h citizenship i n Bismarck's Germany and b y treating emigrants as deserters, its state-dominated nationalism h a d cut it­ self o f f f r o m potentially important sources o f strength abroad. The waves o f internal m i g r a t i o n from country to city that gave German nationalism its p o p u l a r strength also invigorated its h o t competi­ tors, socialism a n d democracy, w h o s e movements p r o v e d to be better adapted than nationalism to the still-powerful regional loy­ alties crisscrossing Germany's federated state. I n the face o f these challenges f r o m socialism and democracy, some prewar conserva­ tives sharpened their weapons, exalting military m i g h t a n d excor­ iating outsiders i n w h a t Hans-Ulrich Wehler has called a "passion­ ate, x e n o p h o b i c , vulgarized nationalism."

16

Nonetheless,

these

glorifications o f German p o w e r d i d n o t h i n g to d i m i n i s h

the

strength o f socialism and democracy or to compensate for the rel­ atively w e a k

support

that

nationalism derived f r o m

related

sources: religion, language, race. A l t h o u g h Protestant-Catholic hostilities h a d subsided b y the t u r n CLIMAX I N EUROPE

/ I 7

o f the century, the results said m o r e about Protestants g i v i n g u p o n Catholics than Catholics converting to a Protestant b r a n d o f Germanness. The chasm still y a w n e d b e t w e e n them. Language c o n t i n u e d to diffuse rather t h a n focus nationalist energies. T o o m a n y German speakers d i v i d e d their loyalties a m o n g t o o m a n y jurisdictions for W i l h e l m i n e Germany to claim language as grounds for its distinctive nation. Race h a d as m a n y meanings—some hard, more s o f t — i n prewar Germany as it d i d elsewhere i n Europe. A n unusually heavy dependence o n the state was G e r m a n national­ ism's one o m i n o u s quality before the Great War. Even here, the state d i d not fly a distinctively G e r m a n flag or recruit a c o m p r e ­ hensively G e r m a n army u n t i l the 1890s. A losing w a r and a p u n i s h i n g peace scrambled these calcula­ tions. I n a contest that m i g h t have t i p p e d the other w a y , Germany was treated like a crushed a n d powerless state: its government overturned, its territory parceled a m o n g its neighbors, its econ­ o m y drained to pay tribute to the victors. First a devastating infla­ tion, t h e n a devastating depression, u n d e r m i n e d hopes that either socialism or democracy c o u l d s h o w Germans the w a y o u t o f these harsh, humiliating times. Authoritarian nationalism, b y t h e n b o t h a familiar European s o l u t i o n a n d a t h r i v i n g b r a n d o f G e r m a n p o l i ­ tics, was the alternative. I f chance played an important role i n b r i n g i n g the National Socialist party to p o w e r i n 1933, chance c o u l d n o t account for its appeal. It was the Nazi genius to gather i n those once-scattered dividers—race, religion, a n d language— a n d stack t h e m one atop the other as reinforcements for its ver­ sion o f the German state. Nazis, major contributors to the p o p u l a r i z i n g o f a hard, b i o l o g ­ ical racism, w e r e even greater beneficiaries o f it. I f it served A d o l f Hitler's regime as a w e a p o n against b o t h whites a n d p e o p l e o f color, its immediate targets w e r e Jews. I n the l o n g history a n d recent revival o f anti-Semitism t h r o u g h o u t Europe, n o t h i n g made Germans peculiarly susceptible to it, b u t t h e n n o t h i n g made t h e m particularly resistant, either. W h a t the Nazi regime demonstrated 118

CHAPTER 5

was that persistent racist messages banged h o m e w i t h m o u n t i n g force gave t h e m w i d e r currency and greater urgency. B y the e n d o f the 1930s, p u b l i c p o l i c y used Jews a n d to a lesser degree Slavs to m a r k the boundaries o f the German people. D o u b l y important, this racism t h r o u g h a c o m m o n animus t o w a r d aliens a n d outsiders could

serve as

a bridge

across Germany's

critical

Catholic-

Protestant divide. O n the eve o f the Nazi takeover, as Margaret Anderson has s h o w n , Catholic areas o f Germany w e r e the least likely to support the party. After 1933, however, w h e r e race t r u m p e d religion it meant that religion, too, fell i n line b e h i n d the state. The Vatican's b e n i g n neutrality helped. I n its initial Bismarckian version, state citizenship defined the German nation. The Nazis reformulated that principle to justify a breathtakingly expansive p o l i c y southward and eastward. N o w the state w o u l d n o t simply make the nation; it w o u l d ratify the nation. The T h i r d Reich w o u l d extend its boundaries to incorporate all those people w h o m the Nazis b y assorted cultural criteria designated Germans. The state w o u l d cover the nation; the nation w o u l d express itself t h r o u g h the state. What h a d originated as a rule to keep nationalist attention focusing i n w a r d , i n other w o r d s , n o w sent it coursing o u t w a r d . Even obvious exceptions, such as German Americans, w e r e courted: A t least they w e r e potential Germans, or perhaps Germans i n absentia. I f Hitler netted almost n o t h i n g f r o m that transatlantic appeal, it still stood as one index to his nationalist daring. As a corollary to these radical changes i n strategy, the German language, once the c o m m o n p r o p e r t y o f people i n a n d out o f the German state, became another layer atop German n a t i o n a l i s m — b o t h a n e w line o f division a n d a standing justification for conquest. Self-determination, the Nazis called it, a n d u n t i l 1938 they neutralized a g o o d m a n y foreign critics w i t h that w i d e l y respected standard. The Nazis, i n other words, c o m b i n e d every major theme i n half a century o f European nationalism: the most potent c o m b i n a t i o n o f language a n d race, overlaid w i t h a Christian endorsement; the CLIMAX I N EUROPE

ì

19

claim o f national incompleteness, c o m p o u n d e d b y the theft o f German l a n d i n the postwar settlement; a n d the need for an ag­ gressive defense against a r i n g o f enemies, italicized b y stories o f W i l s o n tricking Germans into the Armistice o f 1918. These m i l i tantly arrayed reinforcements, i n turn, always t o o k their orders f r o m the T h i r d Reich. Whatever the rhetorical merger o f the t w o , i n practice the state used the nation, never the converse. As H a n n a h Arendt emphasized, the Nazis h a d an undisguised "con­ tempt for the narrowness o f nationalism." Its leaders t u r n e d their 17

nationalist messages o n and o f f strictly as it served them. Territo­ ries they demanded b y reason o f self-determination served strictly as stepping stones: f r o m the Sudetenland across all o f Czechoslo­ vakia, from Danzig t h r o u g h the rest o f Poland. Smelling victory i n the w i n d , the T h i r d Reich d r o p p e d the issue o f self-determination entirely i n 1942. As Hitler h a d w r i t t e n years before i n Mein

Kampf

boundaries simply expressed the fruits o f conquest. B y the same token, the anti-Semitism that was once anchored to German na­ tionalism cut those moorings w h e n it became a boundless policy o f genocide. It made more sense to see Hitler himself as the cul­ m i n a t i o n o f a Napoleonic rather than a nationalist tradition. As the T h i r d Reich collapsed, it carried the authoritarian state's l a c k e y — a n utterly dependent, exclusionary n a t i o n a l i s m — w i t h it, b u t n o t w i t h o u t a final, furious s h o w o f force. Wherever German p o w e r spread, knots o f fascists materialized to i n v o k e nationalist values i n behalf o f their o w n b l o o d y vendettas. W h a t they m i g h t have m o b i l i z e d i n the l o n g r u n , n o b o d y k n o w s . I n the short r u n , however, they concentrated o n crushing o l d enemies.

Appro­

priately, these brief, vengeful regimes left a far deeper i m p r i n t o n their victims than o n their supposed beneficiaries. Croat Ustase, for example, slaughtered hundreds o f thousands o f Serbs w i t h o u t strengthening a connectedness a m o n g the Croats themselves. The V i c h y government, bent o n a Christian purge o f social impurities, made n o effort to unite, o n l y to purify the French. The 120

p r i m a r y survivor o f this fascist CHAPTER 5

cataclysm,

Francisco

Franco's regime i n Spain, h a d the weakest nationalist claims o f t h e m all. Franco, w h o precipitated a civil w a r i n 1936 o n his w a y to almost four decades as head o f state, t o o k for granted "the w e a k attraction o f Spanish, as opposed to regional or local, identity."

18

Where he made w a r o n regional groups, he was attacking

people w h o w e r e resisting his rule, not o p p o s i n g a Spanish nation. Like the dictator Primo de Rivera w h o preceded h i m i n the 1920s, Franco relied o n a Roman Catholic Church l o n g hostile to Spanish nationalism and an army indifferent to it. A r o u n d that core he c o b b l e d reactionary bits and pieces that he was able to manipulate for his o w n purposes. Opportunistic above all else, he concentrated n o t h i n g o n more exalted than personal p o w e r . Pius X I I , a p o p e for the age, gave his blessings, even as Franco was crushing Catholic Basques. A racism that h a d expanded o n the same schedule as the

final

w a v e o f European nationalism crashed precipitously w i t h it. D e spite the r e p u d i a t i o n o f race theory i n intellectual circles after the First W o r l d War, its general p o p u l a r i t y o n l y increased d u r i n g the 1920s and 1930s. Radicals w e r e certainly not i m m u n e . "Jews had played a leading part i n the early phases o f all [European] Socialist and Communist parties, but since t h e n they h a d everywhere been squeezed out. . . . The year before Hitler came to p o w e r there was not a single one a m o n g the h u n d r e d Communist deputies i n the Reichstag."

19

Nevertheless, authoritarian nationalist regimes

w e r e the p r i m a r y promoters. Some o f these uses, such as Italian Fascism's invocations o f a Latin-Mediterranean-Roman race, w e r e largely bombastic. Others, such as the claims to a single SerbianCroatian-Slovenian race at the heart o f Yugoslavia, w e r e just hopeful. Still others, however, such as the Metaxas regime's proclamation o f a Greek race, w e r e p o i n t e d l y vicious f r o m the outset. W h a t distinguished Nazi racism was more the p o w e r to act o n it than the values b e h i n d it. As German p o w e r destabilized the continent, it let loose a host o f racist demons ready to devour their prey. Sometimes singling out Gypsies, above all cooperating i n CLIMAX I N EUROPE

12Ì

the wholesale murder o f European Jewry, they blanketed the Balkans, settled into V i c h y France, a n d f o u n d as m u c h sympathy i n conquered Poland as i n collaborating Slovakia. Outside o f c o n ­ tinental Europe, c o o l responses to the millions o f desperate Jews indicated h o w widespread anti-Semitism was a n d h o w w e l l it cor­ related w i t h the heating o f the Holocaust. A c c o r d i n g to w a r t i m e o p i n i o n polls, A m e r i c a n anti-Semitism peaked i n 1943. Beginning late i n the nineteenth century, a n e w r o u n d o f colorcoded racism gathered strength i n the U n i t e d States o n the same schedule as European racism. Blacks w h o m o v e d n o r t h to escape the increasingly elaborate rules o f Southern caste faced an increas­ ingly elaborate segregation there, too. Federal p o l i c y segregated government w o r k . Migrants f r o m Asia c o u l d not become citizens; prospective

immigrants w e r e

banned

entirely. Miscegenation

laws, once peculiar to the South, came to cover most o f the U n i t e d States b e t w e e n the 1890s a n d the 1930s, stigmatizing Asian Americans and Native Americans as w e l l as African Americans a n d p u n i s h i n g violators as felons. The scientific cousin o f those laws, eugenics, w h i c h spread from Britain into Germany a n d the Scandanavian countries, h a d its widest application America, w h e r e b y the 1930s forty-one o f its forty-eight states criminalized marriage to "inferior people" a n d i n most cases authorized sterilizing t h e m — t h e fate o f over seventy thousand souls. W a r t i m e concen­ tration camps for Japanese Americans capped the era. Significant differences separated the t w o sides o f the Atlantic, however. A l t h o u g h Nazi A r y a n i s m disparaged p e o p l e o f color, it posed a m u c h greater danger to n e i g h b o r i n g Slavs t h a n to distant Africans. I n the U n i t e d States, color c o d i n g had all the advantages: Whiteness, after all, h a d been a defining element o f A m e r i c a n de­ mocracy f r o m the outset. O n the other hand, race theories that sorted whites into moral-biological hierarchies—Nordic at the t o p , A l p i n e i n the m i d d l e , Mediterranean b e l o w , for e x a m p l e — h a d o n l y a blaze o f prominence i n the U n i t e d States b e t w e e n 1915 a n d 1925, t h e n faded from p u b l i c discussion. Anti-Semitism, systematic 122

CHAPTER 5

a n d deadly i n Europe, was never more than desultory a n d nasty i n the U n i t e d States. Hence m a n y Americans w h o raised n o objec­ tions to dismantling the rights o f people o f color i n the U n i t e d States considered the dismantling o f the rights o f Jews i n Europe the w o r k o f lunatics. Nevertheless, for reasons that remain mysterious, this o d d cou­ ple that had risen together fell together. T h r o u g h o u t Western soci­ ety, kinds o f racism that h a d been n o r m a l before 1945 r a p i d l y became abnormal after that. Declarations o f universal equality w e r e e m b e d d e d i n the f o u n d i n g documents o f the n e w U n i t e d Nations organization. Racist language lost its acceptability. B y the 1960s, i g n o r i n g the Holocaust was n o longer an o p t i o n i n any Western state. B y t h e n also, the U n i t e d States r e m o v e d the last legal supports for segregation, and European powers retreated to their last outposts o f colonialism. I f for the balance o f the century a subterreanean layer o f Western racism p r o v e d remarkably dura­ ble, it never regained p u b l i c legitimacy.

O u t o f the vortex o f w a r spun one last victory for the movements that h a d accelerated d u r i n g the 1890s a n d crashed a half century later—a coda, as it were, to Europe's state national­ ism. Zionism, w h i c h i n 1939 seemed hopelessly lost, revived to see its cause succeed i n less than a decade. U n t i l that sudden recovery, Z i o n i s m l o o k e d for all the w o r l d like a m o v e m e n t that h a d irremediably missed its t u r n a generation earlier w h e n i n the w a n i n g days o f the First W o r l d War it had g l i m p s e d a glory it simply c o u l d n o t reach. I n 1917 the prospect o f r e v i e w i n g b o u n d ­ aries, governments, and systems o f authority t h r o u g h o u t the o l d O t t o m a n Empire gave Z i o n i s m an audience that its slight, dis­ putatious m o v e m e n t c o u l d never have mustered o n its o w n . A l ­ t h o u g h Arabs, n o t Jews, h a d the better claim to self-determination i n its usual sense, the assumption that the Jews w e r e one race— an assumption w i t h terrible future consequences—made t h e m

CLIMAX I N EUROPE

123

competitive for rights i n Palestine. Even m o r e significant, the t w o most important Zionist leaders, Chaim W e i z m a n n i n L o n d o n a n d Louis Brandeis i n Washington, h a d the ear o f the t w o most i m p o r ­ tant w o r l d leaders, Prime Minister A r t h u r Balfour a n d President W i l s o n . I t was those relationships, along w i t h Weizmann's persis­ tent bargaining and drafting, that secured the Balfour Declaration, an acceptance o f the idea o f a Jewish h o m e l a n d i n Palestine just as the British prepared to replace T u r k i s h p o w e r i n that territory. A second dazzling prospect appeared alongside the first. T o es­ cape contamination f r o m the European war, the headquarters o f the W o r l d Zionist Organization provisionally relocated i n the U n i t e d States, a n d as it d i d , B r a n d e i s — r e n o w n e d i n Jewish a n d Gentile circles alike as a brilliant lawyer, p o l i c y maker, a n d presi­ dential adviser—gave Z i o n i s m an immense boost b y c o m m i t t i n g to the cause. His presence immediately changed Zionism's pros­ pects and tone. The millions o f Jews i n the U n i t e d States w e r e Zionism's greatest u n t a p p e d resource; Brandeis gave the m o v e ­ ment instant American credibility. I n addition, b y focusing o n the preparation o f Palestine as a h o m e for Jews, he made t w o m o r e critical contributions. First, he n o r m a l i z e d Jewish

nationalism.

N o w like any other nationalism active i n the U n i t e d States, Z i o n ­ ism sought political c o n t r o l over a distant ancestral land, n o t h i n g less a n d n o t h i n g more. N o sooner h a d he j o i n e d the m o v e m e n t than Brandeis was d r u m m i n g o n the familiar A m e r i c a n theme o f bilevel loyalties: a people's p r i m a l tie to the homeland, a citizen's u n s w e r v i n g attachment to the U n i t e d States. A n u m b e r o f w e a l t h y American Jews, delighted w i t h the prospect o f Jews f r o m the Pale migrating to Palestine rather than to the U n i t e d States, shelved an earlier anti-Zionism to support w h a t they saw as a safe, p h i l a n ­ thropic nationalism, one that Brandeis, famous as a cost-cutting problem-solver, m i g h t just accomplish. D u r i n g the war, member­ ship i n the Zionist Organization o f America shot u p sevenfold, a n d Brandeis, like a prince i n w a i t i n g , envisaged the teams o f experts that w o u l d soon make the desert b l o o m i n Palestine. A l l Jews, he thought, c o u l d enlist i n this Z i o n i s m . 124

CHAPTER 5

Great expectations to n o avail. After the war, as the vitality drained o u t o f nationalism t h r o u g h o u t Europe, Z i o n i s m t o o w e n t flat. The vague phrasing o f the Balfour Declaration, strictly a wartime measure that the British matched i n private w i t h an equally general endorsement o f Arab interests, p r o v i d e d neither a road n o r a timetable nor even a precise destination for the Jewish cause i n Palestine. Everything depended o n a British g o o d w i l l that rapidly d w i n d l e d . Perhaps Brandeis's drive a n d o p t i m i s m c o u l d have surmounted that disappointment, b u t W e i z m a n n a n d his allies, pushing Brandeis into the shadows as they reclaimed c o n t r o l o f the movement, d i d not have that ability. The issues b e t w e e n the Brandeis and W e i z m a n n camps were real enough. Brandeis w o u l d have Americanized the m o v e m e n t — w i t h efficiency, democracy, and g r o w t h the measures o f its success i n Palestine. H e n o more p i c t u r e d himself l i v i n g i n Palestine than he anticipated any appreciable n u m b e r o f A m e r i c a n Jews m i grating there. Palestine was a h o m e l a n d for other people. I n the guise o f a foreign mission, the Americanized m o v e m e n t c o u l d accommodate anyone supporting a g o o d cause. Jews w h o feared that m o d e r n i t y was destroying the distinctiveness o f their culture h a d reason to fear this k i n d o f nationalism as their p r o b l e m , n o t its solution. Eastern Europeans,

fighting

for the soul o f their m o v e -

ment, t o o k it back f r o m alien spirits. W i t h o u t Brandeis, Z i o n i s m lost most o f its A m e r i c a n members, w h o concentrated o n the U n i t e d States as the Jews' p r o m i s e d land. Indicatively, almost the o n l y ethnic leaders w h o o p p o s e d the postwar A m e r i c a n laws restricting i m m i g r a t i o n w e r e Jewish. Contributions also d r i e d u p , and settlement i n Palestine barely i n c h e d forward. Even w h e n the Nazis intensified their anti-Semitism, W e i z m a n n was t o o preoccupied struggling for p o w e r w i t h the authoritarian V l a d i m i r Jabotinsky to rethink his strategy. As streams o f refugees, w a s h i n g against stone-cold state boundaries, gave a terrible concreteness to the meaning o f a safe place—a

home-

l a n d — f o r Jews, W e i z m a n n still clung, h o p e against hope, to his British benefactors. T h e n i n 1939, the Chamberlain government CLIMAX I N EUROPE

¡25

repudiated the Balfour Declaration, essentially sealed off Palestine t o Jewish immigration, a n d p r o m i s e d primacy there to the Arabs. Weizmann's Z i o n i s m collapsed. Wartime revelations o f the Holocaust d i d n o t so m u c h revive Z i o n i s m as s w a l l o w it i n a far larger a n d more complicated p r o ­ cess o f state-building. After 1942, anything short o f complete inde­ pendence i n Palestine became u n t h i n k a b l e to Jews o f m a n y differ­ ent persuasions w i t h m a n y previous attitudes about

Zionism.

Except perhaps for little Denmark, Jews h a d n o reliable friend i n Europe. The very countries that h a d once l e d the w a y i n emanci­ pating Jews n o w appeared as a l i n e u p o f enemies: not just Ger­ m a n y but its collaborators i n France a n d a British government that adamantly refused access to Palestine. For the most pessimistic, anti-Semitism i n the U n i t e d States was final p r o o f that, as Herzl h a d w a r n e d , o n l y Jews c o u l d secure a safe place for Jews. N e w leaders—some like D a v i d B e n - G u r i o n i n Palestine, some like Rabbi A b b a H i l l e l Silver i n America—fashioned a n e w m o v e m e n t as h a r d as the w o r l d a r o u n d it, w h e r e the first rule was: D o n ' t ask, take. T h e y w o u l d t u r n the pitiless state system that h a d b o t t l e d Jews inside the Nazi d o m a i n to their o w n advantage. High-level discussions o f carving a Jewish state out o f postwar Germany, as millions o f putative Germans w e r e b e i n g d r i v e n out o f other Euro­ pean lands, demonstrated h o w casually ethnic cleansing entered into great p o w e r calculations. W h y n o t i n Palestine? Jews o f all kinds using tactics o f all sorts m o b i l i z e d their well-situated allies a n d p r o d u c e d the state o f Israel, a final m o n u m e n t to the Euro­ pean values o f unregulated state sovereignty that i n other hands h a d come close to k i l l i n g all European Jews.

126

CHAPTER 5

CHAPTER

6

Nationalism

J\,s

Worldwide

the pulse o f nationalism q u i c k e n e d across Eu­

rope b e t w e e n 1880 and 1920, interest i n it spread globally. B y the b e g i n n i n g o f the twentieth century, nationalist aspirations h a d cur­ rency a m o n g people everywhere w h o f o u n d Europe's m i g h t b y turns intimidating, horrifying, and fascinating. W h i l e

Europeans

w a t c h e d and c o p i e d one another, handfuls o f Chinese, Filipinos, Indians, Iraqis, Palestinians, and m a n y others w a t c h e d a n d cop­ ied, too. Rather than alienated intellectuals fleeing their failed cul­ tures, as some Western scholars w o u l d have it, they w e r e b y a n d large questing individuals w h o imagined using the techniques o f European p o w e r against Europeans a n d i n the process preserving the best o f their o w n culture. Some, like the original theoreticians o f Vietnamese nationalism, w e r e strictly reactionaries trying to re­ claim the past. Some, like the pioneer Chinese nationalist Sun Yatsen, were progressive reformers w h o set out to tailor Western principles to their country's need for cohesion a n d justice. Some, like the early exponent o f Egyptian nationalism Mustafa Kemal, w e r e eclectics—in Kemal's case, an admirer simultaneously o f

French ideas and O t t o m a n rule. Whatever their orientation, all predicted future glory for their cultures. Their visions, however, rarely spread b e y o n d elite circles a n d often d i e d w i t h them. Despite an occasional m o m e n t o f g l o r y — Sun Yat-sen's i n 1911 o n the collapse o f the M a n c h u D y n a s t y — these exploratory intellectuals essentially kept their o w n c o m pany. N o n e o f the subject people they w e r e e x h o r t i n g m o u n t e d a p o p u l a r nationalist m o v e m e n t along lines they advocated. Popular nationalism came b y other routes i n other guises. I f there h a d b e e n n o Sun Yat-sen, hundreds o f millions o f Chinese still w o u l d have m o b i l i z e d as Chinese i n o p p o s i t i o n to the Japanese invasion o f the 1930s and 1940s. Appropriately, the o n l y successful transfer o f European nationalism to Africa before 1914 consolidated w h i t e p o w e r i n a colonial outpost o f Western society. O n the same schedule and b y the same logic as contemporary

Europeans,

Boers a r o u n d the t u r n o f the t w e n t i e t h century became Afrikaner, replete w i t h a n e w l y constructed language, a heightened sense o f racial distinctiveness, and a people's history o f sacrifice a n d triu m p h that laid claim to South African lands as their ancestral heritage. A m o n g the victims o f colonialism, however, p o p u l a r nationalism made little use o f European models. It appeared n o w here, n o w there, according to the special circumstances o f culturally different p e o p l e — i n a very f e w cases before the First W o r l d War, i n several more b e t w e e n w o r l d wars, then i n a great variety o f settings over the balance o f the century. Because nationalism w o r l d w i d e originated as resistance to oppression, imperialist Western societies p r o f o u n d l y influenced it, b u t rarely b y s h o w i n g it the w a y t o succeed. The marvel is that nationalism figured p r o m i n e n t l y i n such a large n u m b e r o f these efforts. B y contrast, the other t w o i n the grand trio o f Europe's movements fared m u c h worse. Democracy h a d the least success o f all. D e p e n d e n t cultures that managed to elude formal colonization w e r e almost always hierarchical i n structure. N o t h i n g i n colonialism itself argued i n democracy's fa¡28

CHAPTER 6

vor: Neither the rulers' arbitrary authority n o r their victims' traditions m o d e l e d its possibilities. I m p e r i a l governments, b y d e n y i n g their subjects essential civil rights u n t i l perhaps the eleventh hour, destroyed the preconditions for b u i l d i n g a democracy. A democracy d r i v e n u n d e r g r o u n d was a contradiction i n terms. Moreover, the process o f fighting for independence tended to eliminate democracy's indispensable m i d d l e g r o u n d w h e r e today's winners and losers c o u l d accept the prospect o f changing places tomorr o w . As Rupert Emerson p u t it, anticolonialism everywhere "is the c h a m p i o n o f self-government . . . as o p p o s e d to alien rule, but it is o n l y accidentally self-government i n the sense o f rule b y the m a n y as o p p o s e d to rule b y the few." It was the marvel o f inde1

pendent India that it survived all these hazards to give democracy a try. Socialism fared somewhat better, largely because o f its i d e o l o g i cal focus o n oppression and resistance. W h e n the armies o f Europe set about slaughtering one another i n the First W o r l d War, anticolonial elites w h o had once searched for the secret o f the imperialists' invulnerability p a i d increasing attention to their v u l nerability, a n d the explosive possibilities o f revolutionary socialism often ranked at the t o p o f the list. T a k i n g M a r x i s m back home, however, was a slippery enterprise, not o n l y because it favored industrial over agrarian societies b u t also because c o l o n i a l governance, spreading hardships and indignities indiscriminately, diffused the effects o f class. Anticolonialism d r e w p e o p l e from all w a l k s o f life into capacious resistance movements. A l t h o u g h some anticolonial leaders and some trade unions retained a distinguishably Marxist loyalty, it rarely tapped p o p u l a r energies. A t midcentury South Africa may have been an exception; r e v o l u t i o n ary China certainly was. Ethnic loyalties, o n the other hand, d i d m o b i l i z e the millions. Perhaps, as a generation o f radical scholars have argued, colonial subjects t h r o u g h o u t Asia and Africa failed to c o m p r e h e n d

their

o w n interests. Perhaps, as the Africanist J o h n Lonsdale claims for NATIONALISM WORLDWIDE

Ì29

the insurgent K i k u y u under British rule, they mismeasured real "class injustice against i m a g i n e d ethnic reciprocity." Nevertheless, 2

the social scientist D o n a l d H o r o w i t z ' s rule o f t h u m b — " t h e gener­ ally greater p o w e r . . . o f ethnic affiliations i n Asia a n d Africa t h a n i n the West"—serves as a useful p o i n t o f departure, for n o t h i n g cemented

loyalties or channeled grievances m o r e

effectively.

3

W h e r e slave trading h a d devastated the social order i n West Af­ rica, family-kin systems often h e l d a virtual m o n o p o l y i n organiz­ i n g p u b l i c life and p r o v i d i n g basic governance even before Euro­ pean colonialism arrived. I n direct c o m p e t i t i o n , ethnic attachments almost always over­ w h e l m e d class attachments. A l t h o u g h they m i g h t reinforce one another, as they d i d i n the b l o o d y conflicts b e t w e e n Tutsi a n d H u t u , their c o m b i n e d forces marched under an ethnic banner. W h e n the British i n Rhodesia grabbed land and coerced labor f r o m the indigenous Shona, black ZANLA guerrillas rallied local a n d regional groups into a c o m m o n anticolonial m o v e m e n t b y p r o m i s i n g not to redress class injustice b u t to return Shona l a n d to the Shona people. I n m o b i l i z i n g resistance to the French, the Marxist H o Chi M i n h p l a y e d u p o n the "near-religious status" o f the Vietnamese family and the "quasi-priestly functions" o f its patri­ arch to assume the national mantle o f "Uncle," w h i l e his C o m m u ­ nist colleagues spoke to their compatriots as "brothers and sisters" a n d to one another as "elder brother comrade." "Since n o one can divide the members o f one family," H o lectured the n a t i o n i n 1946, "no one can divide o u r Vietnam." Appropriately, at his death he rose to the pinnacle o f honor: "great-grandfather."

4

Sometimes Europe's p o w e r f u l generator o f nationalism, migra­ t i o n , inspired nationalism elsewhere as it stretched out an ethnic group's k i n system. A decade o f soaring landlessness and w a r d r i v e n dislocations i n V i e t n a m p r o d u c e d massive p o p u l a t i o n movements just preceding Ho's sweep to p o w e r i n 1945. Before nationalism gathered significant support o n the China mainland, Sun Yat-sen's strongest partisans came from the relocated Nan-

130

CHAPTER 6

Y a n g Chinese i n Southeast Asia. Extensive M i d d l e Eastern migra­ t i o n set the stage for Pan-Arabism. The I g b o i n Nigeria, the K i k u y u i n Kenya, a n d the Bamileke i n the Cameroon, precocious nation­ alists i n their areas, were also outstanding examples o f an "over­ p o p u l a t i o n i n the ethnic h o m e l a n d a n d the consequent diaspora." A t the time o f K e n y a n independence, away.

Farther

south,

ethnic

5

t w o o f five K i k u y u l i v e d

consciousness sharpened

where

y o u n g w o r k e r s flowed i n t o the fields o f Southern Rhodesia ( Z i m ­ b a b w e ) and the mines o f South A f r i c a — a m o n g T u m b u k a and N g o n i , for example, w h o w e r e the leading nationalists i n northern M a l a w i . O n the contrary, " i n areas f r o m w h i c h m e n d i d not e m i ­ grate i n large numbers, such as southern Zambia a n d central Mal­ a w i , the ethnic message has clearly h a d less p o p u l a r appeal." B y 6

the same token, the closest a p p r o x i m a t i o n to a p o p u l a r nationalist m o v e m e n t a m o n g Egyptians, famous for their disinclination to m i ­ grate, was loyalty to Gamal Nasser's state, never to the symbols o f fictive

kinship.

Migration's role, however, changed dramatically i n the t w e n ­ tieth century, as states increasingly herded populations to their n e w destinations or simply d u m p e d u n w a n t e d people into the w o r l d at large. The South African p o l i c y o f i m p o s i n g taxes, seizing lands, and forcing labor f r o m the dispossessed, c u l m i n a t i n g i n the creation o f impoverished Bantustan enclaves, n o d o u b t inspired countless tribal dreams o f reclaiming a homeland, as a similar plight d i d a m o n g a m i l l i o n Palestinians. Indeed, the w o r l d i n the second half o f the t w e n t i e t h century teemed w i t h people—perhaps 30 m i l l i o n refugees b y 2000—most o f w h o m w o u l d never inhabit the places they called home. Nonetheless, these forced-march horrors bore almost n o relationship to the nineteenth-century chain migra­ tions b e h i n d Europe's p o p u l a r nationalism. People d r i v e n i n t o exile w e r e migrants o n l y i n a cruelly restricted sense. Hence the essential guideline: Nationalism w o r l d w i d e d i d n o t p i c k u p Europe's story a n d give it global applications. Europeans d i d n o t pass the baton to everybody else. People a r o u n d the NATIONALISM WORLDWIDE

13 /

w o r l d changed w h a t they t o o k f r o m Europe to suit themselves. B o r r o w i n g , o f course, was always natural, w h e t h e r it was Frank L l o y d Wright's i n c o r p o r a t i o n o f Japanese design, Pablo Picasso's a p p r o p r i a t i o n o f African masks, or Béla Bartók's assimilation o f H a r l e m jazz. A l l cultures b o r r o w , a n d g i v e n the o p p o r t u n i t y , all cultures b o r r o w all the time. T h e n they give w h a t they get a n e w meaning. Rather than a European

concept

sitting a w k w a r d l y

w h e r e it d i d not belong, nationalism o p e n e d itself to protean c u l ­ tural translations, a diversity all the richer because o f the near u n i ­ versal centrality o f k i n s h i p to social structures everywhere. At the same time, nationalism's very plasticity makes its g l o b a l history devilishly h a r d to f o l l o w . Before w e examine its chame­ l e o n qualities t h r o u g h three o f its most c o m m o n guises w o r l d ­ w i d e — n a t i o n a l i s m as a state creation, as a p a n movement, a n d as an anti-imperialist response—let's l o o k briefly at the case o f India, w h i c h n o t o n l y contains elements o f all three o f these categories b u t also highlights the difficulty o f determining w h e r e w e have lost the thread o f nationalism a n d p i c k e d u p the story o f some­ t h i n g else. O u r best preparation for a global search after national­ ism is a h u m b l i n g awareness that w e can never be quite sure w h a t w e have located. The customary starting p o i n t for a history o f I n d i a n nationalism is the f o u n d i n g o f the I n d i a n National Congress m o r e t h a n a cen­ tury after Britain's East India C o m p a n y h a d first disrupted p o w e r relations o n the subcontinent. Initially i n 1885 and t h e n m o r e or less annually, a small gathering o f w i d e l y scattered elites met to address the needs o f all Indians i n the context o f i m p e r i a l rule. Perhaps, as the historian Christopher Bayly has argued, m u c h older traditions o f regional patriotism fed i n t o the Congress. Nev­ ertheless, these strands w e r e so territorially vague, so politically indeterminate, and so tactically nebulous they seem m o r e like floating

sentiments than nationalist precursors. Congress began

something new. Soberly a n d cautiously, it sought t o redress 132

CHAPTER 6

egregious injustices a n d e x p a n d I n d i a n rights i n ways that p o i n t e d t o w a r d self-rule, even t h o u g h it d i d not actually articulate that goal u n t i l w e l l into the t w e n t i e t h century. Unquestionably the Congress's greatest accomplishment was its continuity. Despite times o f eclipse and despair, it survived to i n ­ herit India's independent government i n 1947. U n t i l the Second W o r l d War, however, it was never a comfortable or consistent voice for p o p u l a r nationalism. That role fell to Mohandas K . — m o r e familiarly M a h a t m a — G a n d h i , w h o initially t a p p e d those feelings just after the First W o r l d W a r i n his dangerous, dramatic movements to purge India o f impurities: imperial a n d indigenous, b o d y a n d soul. M o d e l i n g his message o f simplicity a n d sacrifice as he spread it, he d r e w tens o f thousands o f ardent followers t h r o u g h o u t India a n d established a m o r a l beacon for millions more. N o one m o r e effectively—more creatively—adapted na­ tionalism to the culture a r o u n d h i m . The Congress d i d n o t prepare the w a y for Gandhi's p o p u l a r nationalism; G a n d h i taught a skittish Congress h o w to participate i n such a movement. A r o u n d 1930 he t u r n e d that fading f o r u m for accommodation into the center for a massive

civil disobedience

campaign that

filled

the jails a n d

t u r n e d all eyes to the Congress for anticolonial leadership. I n the process, b y b r i d g i n g the gap b e t w e e n socialist hotbloods like Ja­ waharlal N e h r u a n d traditional dignitaries like Nehru's father, he h e l p e d to sustain e n o u g h cohesion i n the m o v e m e n t to survive the war, weather partition, and set the Congress o n its w a y to decades o f independent rule. W i t h the colony's partition i n 1947 into India a n d Pakistan, w h i c h n o leader seemed to w a n t or k n o w h o w to avoid, Gandhi's Icarus h u r t l e d to earth. I n the deadly t u r m o i l that f o l l o w e d , more than 12 m i l l i o n people w e n t i n search o f n e w homes a n d w e l l over a m i l l i o n died. As i f it h a d been scripted, his assassination a year later e m b o d i e d the fate o f his movement. G a n d h i the spiritual secularist never w a v e r e d i n his goal o f a u n i t e d I n d i a n c o m m u n i t y

NATIONALISM WORLDWIDE

133

encompassing all religions, sects, a n d peoples: hence his tireless appeal for a M o s l e m - H i n d u alliance and his persistent drive for the public rights o f w o m e n and caste-defined untouchables. B u t G a n d h i the secular spiritualist s h o w e d genius o n l y i n m o b i l i z i n g resources out o f H i n d u culture: i n investing p o l l u t i o n a n d p u r i t y w i t h political meaning, i n p l a y i n g b o t h domestic and transcendent aspects o f a c o m p l e x H i n d u tradition against male dominance a n d caste rigidity. W h e n he identified w i t h c o w protection, he d r e w strength f r o m H i n d u belief at the expense o f M o s l e m practice. Except for the one occasion i n 1920 w h e n he j o i n e d I n d i a n Mos­ lems i n their o w n cause—one that p i t t e d Islamic religious author­ ity against British imperial p o w e r — h e simply h a d n o g o o d ideas about interfaith collaboration, o n l y g o o d intentions. The more talk o f independence i n c l u d e d plans for an effective central govern­ ment, w i t h the sop o f reserved legislative spaces for religious m i ­ norities, the further away the Moslems p u l l e d until, at a critical moment, the unquestioned leader o f the M o s l e m League, M . A. Jinnah, p u l l e d t h e m out entirely. Was there ever a p o p u l a r I n d i a n nationalism that was n o t a H i n d u quest i n mufti? F r o m the days w h e n officials o f the original East India Company listened to B r a h m a n dreams o f a w h o l e India, u n i t y invariably devolved into H i n d u unity. I n d e e d the w o r d Hindu

was meant to c o m p r e h e n d the entire subcontinent. N o t h ­

i n g mitigated nationalism's H i n d u character, not even a c o m m o n hostility to the British. I n a classic case o f minorities d u c k i n g for cover, Sikhs, Christians, and other smaller groups, as w e l l as m i l ­ lions o f Moslems, l o o k e d b e y o n d H i n d u India for their security, often to the British themselves. N o r was there a substitute i n India for H i n d u unity. N o t o n l y d i d the people o f the

subcontinent

speak scores o f languages and hundreds o f dialects; these be­ l o n g e d to four entirely different language groups. M y r i a d regional a n d local attachments c o n f o u n d e d G a n d h i as m u c h as they d i d lesser leaders.

Í34

CHAPTER 6

T h e glory o f m o d e r n India's history is its u n i q u e transition f r o m imperial rule to democratic independence,

despite its size a n d

heterogeneity. Several explanations come to m i n d . The remark­ able c o n t i n u i t y o f the Congress, the impressive preparation o f its leaders, and their broad, enthusiastic constituency at the m o m e n t o f independence p r o v i d e d the n e w state w i t h a g o v e r n i n g party that was e q u i p p e d for its task. Because British rule h a d left m u c h o f regional a n d village India intact a n d because i n most cases the Congress party accepted the importance o f those traditional net­ w o r k s , there was also a crucial c o n t i n u i t y i n everyday life connec­ ting c o l o n y a n d independent state. I n this regard, Indians re­ claimed w h a t they h a d never lost. Moreover, British standards and I n d i a n personnel gave the n e w state the inestimable advantages o f an army subordinate to civilian government a n d a civil service capable o f administering it. Still and all, the h o r r o r b e h i n d the w o n d e r o f that transition w e r e the herded and brutalized a n d mur­ dered millions caught i n the c o m m u n a l upheavals o f partition. I t m a y be that those heartrending h u m a n costs w e r e the price o f India's democracy. I n the half century before independence, nei­ ther M o s l e m n o r H i n d u leaders h a d s h o w n any talent i n accom­ m o d a t i o n , and precious little interest i n trying. W i t h f e w exceptions, their communities either separated sullenly or met violently. India h a d n o t accumulated the civic resources necessary to r e c k o n w i t h large territorial blocs o f m u t u a l l y distrustful Moslems a n d Hindus. As it was, the n e w government relied o n H i n d u fears o f their Mos­ l e m neighbors for a cohesion n o t h i n g else p r o m i s e d to supply. W i t h independence, the state laid claim to I n d i a n nationalism. So d i d H i n d u leaders. A n d so, o f course, d i d the self-styled heirs o f the anticolonial movement, especially those w h o appropriated the memories o f Gandhi's campaigns for freedom. B u t d i d any o f these qualify as nationalism? That pestiferous question trails us as w e examine three themes that overlap inside the I n d i a n example: state nationalism, pan-nationalism, anti-imperial nationalism. NATIONALISM WORLDWIDE

135

APPROPRIATIONS A r o u n d the t u r n o f the t w e n t i e t h century, states that w e r e vulnerable to Western p o w e r b u t n o t actually r u l e d b y it initiated preemptive nationalist movements to preserve their independence. Japan, Turkey, a n d M e x i c o w e r e cases i n point. A l l o f t h e m f o l l o w e d r o u g h l y the same sequence: the o v e r t h r o w o f an aging regime ill e q u i p p e d to w a r d off imperialism; a centralization o f state power; t h e n the restructured state's m o b i l i z a t i o n o f loyalties, i n c l u d i n g an attempt to merge people a n d state. A d e m o n stration o f military prowess—or at least a g o o d b l u f f — a d d e d a stamp o f authority to the n e w regime's claims to independence. A m o n g the earliest a n d most successful nationalist movements outside Western society, these w e r e also b y all odds the most attentive to Western models. N o w h e r e d i d the state c o n t r o l nationalism more effectively than i n Japan between the 1890s a n d the 1940s. T o the extent such feelings are measurable, Japanese nationalism enjoyed a p o p u larity, at times an enthusiasm, that n o r o u g h l y comparable venture c o u l d c o m m a n d . I n b r o a d outline, Japan l e d the w a y for those countries exposed to Western imperialism b u t not c o l o n i z e d b y it: T o p p l e an inept regime, w r e a k havoc w i t h the o l d order's symbols o f authority, modernize state resources, and muster sufficient military strength to stop routine great-power b u l l y i n g . Japan's state-building adapted the German m o d e l . I n a d d i t i o n to its p i o n e e r i n g role, w h a t distinguished the Japanese process was its speed a n d efficiency. The Meiji Restoration o f 1867-68

ousted

a

floundering

Tokugawa government—well

aware o f n e i g h b o r i n g China's h u m i l i a t i o n b y the West b u t unable to defend itself—in favor o f a purposeful, coordinated elite f r o m the exposed provinces o f Satsuma i n the south a n d Choshu i n the west, n o w operating f r o m a n e w capital i n T o k y o , w h o i n a decade swept away Japan's centuries-old regional structure, rationalized taxes, and crushed the one serious rebellion against its ¡36

CHAPTER 6

authority. B y 1895 Japan's military was itself p l a y i n g the b u l l y i n China; ten years later it stunned the w o r l d b y sinking the best o f the Russian navy and staking its country's claim to the rank o f great p o w e r . Appropriate to the age o f imperialism, Japan an­ nexed T a i w a n i n 1895, then Korea i n 1910. It was this small collaborative elite, w i t h o n l y a f e w additional recruits, w h o u n t i l the First W o r l d War presided as r u l i n g elders— genro—over

the creation o f b o t h state a n d nation. Unquestion­

ably they inherited special advantages. After centuries o f isola­ tion, ethnic h o m o g e n i t y i n Japan's core islands was exceptional b y any measure. W i t h its cities already w e l l developed, Japan d i d not suffer a sudden rural-urban rebalancing w h e n its p o p u l a t i o n b o o m e d . Even before 1868, the level o f p o p u l a r education ex­ ceeded that o f m a n y European countries. As part o f that general education, Japanese w e r e taught i n the East Asian tradition to v i e w the state as b o t h source a n d expression o f civilization. Genro t u r n e d these assets to even greater advantage. Destroy­ i n g traditional rural privilege i n one breathtaking stroke, they w o n the loyalty o f peasants w h o suddenly became landowners and o p e n e d the w a y for skill rather than family a n d p r o p e r t y to deter­ m i n e government service. A b o v e all, they h e l d the Western powers at bay d u r i n g the crucial decades w h e n they w e r e consol­ idating the n e w state. It helped, o f course, that Japan m o b i l i z e d d u r i n g a l u l l i n European conquests, w h i c h d i d not p i c k u p again u n t i l a r o u n d 1880. But it mattered even m o r e that Japan's leaders gave highest priority to m i n i m i z i n g friction. W i t h an insight rarely matched i n dependent countries, they avoided foreign loans as spiked traps for Japan's sovereignty. Well-established transporta­ t i o n networks abiding b y centralized rules kept commerce m o v i n g to the satisfaction o f almost all foreign merchants. Efficiency here hastened the elimination o f the treaty-sanctified privileges that the major powers h a d imposed o n Japan, as Western imperialists d i d wherever their influence spread. A s h o w o f military m i g h t and Japan's leaders w e r e able to slip the noose o f the u n e q u a l treaties. NATIONALISM WORLDWIDE

Î37

B y the t u r n o f the century, Japan sat at the table w i t h the great powers to negotiate its pacts. First state, t h e n nation: Everything i n its time. Japan was w e l l o n its w a y to nullifying the most obvious threats f r o m abroad b y the time its leaders set about cultivating nationalist sentiment. I n fact, those careful students o f Western society o p e n e d their campaign i n the mid-1890s precisely as nationalism was e x p a n d i n g a n d hardening t h r o u g h o u t Europe. Japan was j o i n i n g the club. T w o more advantages facilitated these efforts. O n e was the availability o f spiritual reinforcements. B y severing the state's ties t o a suspect B u d d h i s m , Japan's n e w leaders freed the space to create their o w n religious cult out o f the country's diverse, local Shinto practices. Shinto priests, o n their part, eagerly p e t i t i o n e d to fill the vacuum. A l t h o u g h the fuzziness o f its culture s l o w e d the process a bit, early i n the t w e n t i e t h century a state-sponsored a n d state-focused Shinto, w i t h systematized rites a n d consolidated l o cal shrines, entered the mainstream o f Japanese nationalism. N o w the priests lost out, as schools incorporated Shinto rituals a n d secular officials presided at w o r s h i p . Public response was v e r y positive. Citizens f r o m the far corners o f Japan, for example, v o l unteered the m o n e y and labor that b e t w e e n 1915 a n d 1920 c o n structed the grand Meiji Shrine i n T o k y o . Shinto's greatest asset was its association w i t h the emperor, apex o f the nation. I n the T o k u g a w a era local Shinto cults h a d sometimes i n v o k e d the emperor; u n d e r the n e w regime, state leaders p u t muscle o n that s p i n d l y tradition b y m e r g i n g Shinto w i t h emperor w o r s h i p . N o w the emperor e m b o d i e d state authority and spiritual p u r i t y alike. As the emperor presided over the prescribed rites at the Ise Shrine, his practices there sanctified rites at all o f Japan's Shinto shrines. W o r s h i p at those shrines, i n t u r n , glorified the emperor. The entire scheme congealed as nationalism because the e m peror also served as capstone to Japan's encompassing

family.

"The basic characteristic o f the Japanese State structure," the p u b ¡38

CHAPTER 6

lie philosopher Masao Maruyama w r o t e o f the years before the Second W o r l d War, "is that it is always considered as an extension o f the family; m o r e concretely, as a n a t i o n o f families c o m p o s e d o f the Imperial House as the m a i n family a n d o f the p e o p l e as the branch family." As state-sponsored 7

Shinto transformed a gener­

alized reverence for the emperor into the claim that he was the ultimate ancestor o f all Japanese, it articulated a v i s i o n o f the na­ tion, u n i t e d vertically f r o m hearth to throne. Because Shinto's roots lay i n a multiplicity o f family shrines and those shrines ex­ tended the bonds o f k i n s h i p b e y o n d the grave, an ur-connection b e t w e e n the emperor's timeless family a n d one's o w n d i d not re­ quire a vast imaginative leap. "The dead visit the l i v i n g [in Japa­ nese folklore] a n d the l i v i n g communicate w i t h t h e m w i t h o u t fear." It was a pattern o f belief familiar t h r o u g h countless varia­ 8

tions a r o u n d the w o r l d : Spiritual threads b o u n d the l i v i n g and the dead into a national family. I n Japan these connections ran u p a hierarchy, n o t laterally to cover those w h o h a d left the h o m e islands. A l t h o u g h m i g r a t i o n and urbanization w e r e o l d stories i n Japan, the rise i n p o p u l a t i o n d u r i n g the half century after the Meiji Restoration—an increase o f a r o u n d 50 percent—and the country's simultaneous surge o f i n ­ dustrialization created strains at a n e w level. Local ties loosened as migration b o t h w i t h i n the islands and abroad accelerated. The tra­ ditional n e t w o r k o f m u t u a l aid a m o n g extended families w i t h i n a c o m m u n i t y — d o z o k u — u n r a v e l e d , and i n its stead m o r e a n d more people migrated i n search o f wage labor. The

state-sponsored

"family illusion became an issue," the cultural historian D a i k i c h i I r o k a w a has w r i t t e n , "only [around 1900] w h e n the actual family structure h a d b e g u n to disintegrate." Indicatively, b e t w e e n the 9

1890s a n d the 1920s—years o f heavy p o p u l a t i o n g r o w t h and m i ­ gration—democratic and socialist movements also gained e n o u g h strength to compete for Japanese loyalties. Nevertheless, the nationalist campaign m o r e t h a n matched the competition. B y 1910 centrally issued textbooks taught all school NATIONALISM WORLDWIDE

139

children a single message o f the divinely descended emperor presiding over his national family. Cultural cohesion w i t h i n the islands tightened. T o n o surprise, then, the social fabric h e l d remarkably w e l l even t h r o u g h crisis times. I n their relations w i t h one another, Japan's m o b i l e u r b a n p o p u l a t i o n gave little evidence of b e i n g any o f those things attributed to their Western counterparts: "isolated, atomized, impersonal, frustrated, alienated, anomic, deprived, fatalistic, nonparticipant, violent, [or] radical." T h e belief i n nihonjinron—a

10

uniqueness that n o outsider c o u l d

h o p e to learn—remained a hallmark o f twentieth-century Japanese culture, and a h i g h l y sensitized race consciousness deepened Japanese feelings o f distinctiveness.

"Nowhere," a w i d e l y re-

spected expert, E d w i n Reischauer, has concluded, "[was race c o n sciousness] greater than i n Japan." A l t h o u g h the numbers o f i n d i 11

geneous A i n u declined rapidly w i t h the development o f the n o r t h island, H o k k a i d o , and the low-caste b u r a k u m i n never constituted m o r e than 2 percent o f the w h o l e p o p u l a t i o n , mainstream Japanese treated them, along w i t h the immigrant Koreans, as pariahs: Those not fully i n Çucbt) w e r e fully out (sotó).

Claims that the

Japanese were a pure Yamato race, superior to other m o n g r e l peoples o f Asia, justified their b l o o d y imperialism o f the 1930s a n d 1940s. Parenthetically, Japan's y e l l o w - s k i n n e d racism taught the Vietnamese not to construe colonialism as simply a f o r m o f w h i t e racism. Loyalties extending f r o m h o m e to palace actually sharpened the division between those w h o h a d left the h o m e islands and those who

stayed. Japanese nationalism d i d not stretch at all w e l l

abroad. As early as I636 Japan's rulers h a d tried to b l o c k the ret u r n o f emigrants for fear they w o u l d contaminate their h o m e l a n d . I n the twentieth century, Japanese w h o lived for a time abroad quite literally left the nation b e h i n d . Nihonjinron

c o u l d be neither

e x p o r t e d nor copied. Nevertheless, i n the process o f migration, these consequences u n f o l d e d gradually. Practically all

first-genera-

t i o n Issei i n the U n i t e d States—97 percent i n one s t u d y — m a i n tained ties o f affection and obligation to families i n the h o m e is¡40

CHAPTER 6

lands. Fulfilling duties to an older generation, however, p r o v e d almost impossible abroad. W o r l d w i d e , a substantial majority o f these f a m i l y - b o u n d emigrants w h o left b e t w e e n 1880 and 1930 simply returned home. Nationalism reconstrued a n d reinforced w e a k e n i n g intergenerational connections there, b u t abroad n o t h ­ i n g r e w o v e these family strands, either literally or figuratively. Per­ force, those w h o stayed rerooted themselves. B y the 1930s, family ties a m o n g m o r e and m o r e Issei a n d virtually all second-genera­ t i o n Nisei b o u n d t h e m i n t o American-based networks. Proudly Japanese b u t permanently separated f r o m Japan itself, they, m u c h like their German counterparts, t h r e w their energies i n t o an Amer­ ican life. Assimilate the best i n Japanese culture, c o m m u n i t y leaders t o l d the y o u n g , a n d t u r n it to success i n the U n i t e d States. U n l i k e the Germans, however, the Japanese ran smack into America's racial barriers. Eager to learn Western ways and c o m ­ pete i n the A m e r i c a n w o r l d , they w e r e ridiculed a n d segregated. B y forcing Japanese Americans to live a m o n g themselves at the fringes o f the economy, w h i t e Americans early i n the t w e n t i e t h century validated their o w n prejudices against the Japanese as clannish, cheap-labor aliens. Because Chinese migrants f o r m e d their o w n distinctive communities, as m u c h b y choice as from per­ secution, w h i t e Americans expected all Asians to d o the same. But w h e r e remarkably similar, insular Chinatowns appeared every­ w h e r e along the Pacific Rim, comparable Japantowns, even under duress, d i d not. Japanese migrants, w i t h their elaborated webs o f American-based kinship, w e r e family, not c o m m u n i t y oriented. Chinese migrants often d i d maintain ties w i t h k i n back home. Their culture, defining t h e m as Chinese b y a set o f rituals rather than t h r o u g h a mysterious essence, enabled t h e m to reintegrate even after a l o n g absence. Hence w h i l e Japanese m e n sought "picture brides" to establish families i n America, m a n y Chinese m e n h i r e d prostitutes i n the U n i t e d States and returned to father children i n their villages o f origin. I t all l o o k e d equally i m m o r a l to mainstream w h i t e Americans. Bitter ironies abounded, especially those that tangled the fate o f NATIONALISM WORLDWIDE

/4/

Japanese Americans w i t h the prejudice against Chinese A m e r i ­ cans. The Japanese, migrating i n numbers a r o u n d the t u r n o f the century as racism was hardening everywhere, shared its basic premises: a hierarchy o f peoples that gave those above greater rights and respect than those b e l o w . B e t w e e n the 1890s a n d the 1930s m a n y o f t h e m cheered Japan's military exploits, i n c l u d i n g its savage assaults i n China, as a p r o o f o f racial superiority. B u t w h e r e the Japanese placed themselves atop an Asian p y r a m i d , w h i t e Americans rarely differentiated t h e m f r o m the rest o f a y e l ­ l o w horde, all o f w h o m w e r e p i c t u r e d as unassimilable aliens w i t h loyalties o n l y to their o w n k i n d and—most o m i n o u s for Japanese Americans—their o w n country. W h i t e Americans got w h a t they asked for. I n the 1930s, as rela­ tions b e t w e e n Japan a n d the U n i t e d States soured, Japanese Americans w e r e caught i n l i m b o , equally u n w e l c o m e i n b o t h countries. Marginalized i n the U n i t e d States as aliens i n fact (Issei) a n d fancy (Nisei), they w e r e d o u b l y vulnerable because they c o n ­ gregated i n the l i m i t e d spaces, almost all i n the Far West, w h e r e they h a d been able to find homes. M o r e than a quarter o f t h e m l i v e d i n Los Angeles County alone. A l t h o u g h n o t h i n g dictated their w a r t i m e i m p r i s o n m e n t i n concentration camps, not m u c h i n h i b ­ ited that decision early i n 1942 either. I n a stroke the U n i t e d States was made safe f r o m a people w h o posed n o threat. Perhaps n o t h ­ i n g better demonstrated the d e p t h o f their c o m m i t m e n t to America than the w i l l w i t h w h i c h almost all o f t h e m p i c k e d u p life i n the U n i t e d States after their release. It was n o t that Japanese A m e r i ­ cans w e r e peculiarly docile or enduring. After the w a r as before, they h a d n o obvious, attractive alternative. T h e y w e r e certainly n o t Japanese; w i l l y - n i l l y , they w e r e American. B y t h e n p u b l i c rac­ ism was i n retreat, and they dispersed across the country. A p p r o ­ priately, w i t h i n a quarter century after the camps closed, almost half the offspring o f Japanese Americans married outside that group. Japan's e x p a n d i n g empire t h r e w i n t o relief the question inher142

CHAPTER 6

ent i n all versions o f a state-dominated nationalism. I n that mating o f unequals, w h e r e nationalism served as agent o f the state a n d never the converse, w h a t d i d nationalism contribute that state ac­ t i o n alone c o u l d n o t explain? F o l l o w i n g the Meiji Revolution, state leaders, c o o l l y calculating state interests, t o o k the steps leading to w a r a n d imperialism. Geopolitics, not ethnic egoism, drove those decisions. Indeed, it was a familiar pattern. Japan's search be­ t w e e n the 1890s a n d the 1940s for an elusive security i n everw i d e n i n g circles t h r o u g h Asia and the Pacific h a d its counterpart i n nineteenth-century British, early twentieth-century German, and late twentieth-century U n i t e d States quests for their o w n p h a n t o m security. Hence an interpretation o f the battle o n the Asian m a i n ­ land i n 1941 as a contest b e t w e e n "Chinese a n d Japanese nation­ alism" missed the crucial difference: The very existence o f Chinese nationalism d e p e n d e d o n the Japanese invasion, b u t Japanese na­ tionalism, o n its part, was n o m o r e than a h i r e d hand.

12

Almost perversely, a distinctive nationalism materialized o n l y w h e n it sought to purify Japan's state-dominated society. Even be­ fore the Meiji Revolution the p o p u l a r slogan "Expel the foreigners, w o r s h i p the emperor" expressed that impulse, as d i d the more ethereal

aspects o f the

nineteenth-century

National Learning

m o v e m e n t to cleanse the Japanese spirit. Sometimes assassins ac­ ted i n the name o f national purification. Whatever its source, the tenacious resistance to m o d e r n i z i n g w r i t t e n Japanese derived f r o m the same general sense o f traditional purity. W h e n Japanese nationalism s h o w e d a distinctive face, i n other w o r d s , it turned i n w a r d , contemplating its o w n uniqueness and fearing violation. Its extremes ran t o w a r d x e n o p h o b i a , n o t imperialism. The state l o o k e d for global respect, nationalism for self-celebration. The devastating results o f the Second W o r l d W a r d i d far more damage to this nationalism than to the state that h a d inspired it. I f the crushing defeat i n 1945 eliminated a particular conception o f Japan's destiny, it d i d not repudiate the state itself, w h i c h re­ m a i n e d central to Japanese cohesion a n d to the setting o f n e w NATIONALISM WORLDWIDE

143

postwar goals. W i t h an important assist f r o m the A m e r i c a n occu­ p y i n g force, the state tamed strong postwar impulses t o w a r d so­ cialism a n d democracy a n d situated itself to preside over a sus­ tained economic g r o w t h . N o t all traces o f the o l d nationalism disappeared. Shinto, surprisingly resilient after the war, c o n t i n u e d to l i n k households w i t h their god-shelves to a national family, a n d its festivals still d r e w large crowds. A t the Y a s u k u n i Shrine it was even possible to h o n o r dead soldiers, w h o w e r e after all ancestors like any other i n the timeless chain into the past. I n some circles, nihonjinron

enjoyed a revival i n the prosperous 1980s, w h e n the

Japanese e c o n o m y l o o k e d as i f it w o u l d be ruling the roost. Nev­ ertheless, nationalism i n late twentieth-century Japan, as i n other h i g h l y industrialized countries, suggested an atavistic past. W h a t the state gaveth the state n o w w a n t e d to taketh away. Late i n the 1960s, leaders i n T o k y o w e r e even more eager than those i n Washington to scotch widespread Japanese protests against the U n i t e d States occupation o f O k i n a w a . B y then a decorous patrio­ tism was i n vogue: Wave the Rising Sun flag, sing the state an­ them, cheer the sports heroes. The state's appetite for social c o n ­ trol h a d not abated, but the robust nationalism that h a d once fed it, c o m b i n i n g religion, language, and race w i t h an eternity o f fic­ tive k i n o n sacred land, h a d b e e n t h i n n e d to gruel.

T u r k i s h nationalism, emerging out o f the wreckage o f the O t t o m a n Empire, f o l l o w e d the same basic pattern: t o p p l i n g the o l d regime, demonstrating military prowess, m o d e r n i z i n g soci­ ety, a n d identifying the T u r k i s h people a n d their sacred l a n d w i t h the n e w central state. B y the t u r n o f the twentieth century, the manifest failure o f Ottomanism, a political expression o f Islamic unity, and a loose system o f imperial tribute, p u t pressure o n leaders throughout the collapsing empire to find an alternative. A t the heart o f the o l d system, some elites envisaged a distinctive Turkey, built a r o u n d its o w n u n i q u e culture. I n the 1890s, pre144

CHAPTER 6

cisely w h e n national languages w e r e being constructed t h r o u g h o u t Europe, linguistic entrepreneurs e x p u n g e d "a thousand years" o f Persian a n d Arabic usage i n the name o f purifying the T u r k i s h language a n d m a k i n g it accessible to ordinary citizens. The Y o u n g 13

T u r k c o u p i n 1908 added beef to this nationalist m o v e m e n t b y attempting to Turkify people i n Asia M i n o r and the Balkans, m u c h as Hungarians w e r e trying to Magyarize the people i n their empire. Nevertheless, it t o o k the h u m i l i a t i o n o f these same rulers i n the Great W a r to prepare the w a y for a full-scale state nationalism. As the Treaty o f Sèvres formalized it i n 1920, defeat i n the w a r stripped the empire o f all territory except a core o f T u r k i s h land, left it o p e n to great p o w e r intervention, and even d e n i e d it Constantinople, w h i c h remained under military occupation. Operating f r o m the A n a t o l i a n interior, military forces a r o u n d Mustafa K e m a l rode the postwar crisis to power. His provisional government drove the Greek army i n t o the Aegean, neutralized France, Italy, a n d the Soviet U n i o n w i t h separate settlements, a n d l o o k e d just formidable e n o u g h to the British to force a n e w treaty i n 1923, w h i c h enabled T u r k e y to salvage its pride, reclaim some territory i n Asia Minor, and t h e n reoccupy Constantinople. O u t w e n t the O t t o m a n sultan and i n came the T u r k i s h republic, w i t h Mustafa Kemal as president. Under Kemal, T u r k i s h nationalism expanded along three fronts. A b a n d o n i n g the o l d empire's Balkan ambitions, T u r k e y reorganized a r o u n d its A n a t o l i a n base. Other ethnic groups w e r e either, like the Armenians a n d Greeks, eliminated w i t h a savage fury or, like the Kurds, beaten d o w n . (Where states set o u t to create nations, at best all citizens are members, b u t at w o r s t o n l y m e m bers are citizens.) The n e w Turkey's capital was lifted f r o m the cosmopolitan grandeur o f Constantinople at the fringe to an interior h i l l site; cities lost their European-style names—Istanbul for Constantinople, the n e w capital Ankara for Angora, Edirne for A d rianople, a n d so o n ; and t h r o u g h a c o m b i n a t i o n o f archaeological discoveries a n d historical adjustments, the nation's official roots NATIONALISM WORLDWIDE

1 45

w e r e sunk deep i n an A n a t o l i a n past o f Hittites, Sumerians, a n d even Trojans. As the state's base shifted east, however, its focus t u r n e d west. I n a stunning sequence f r o m the declaration o f a republic i n 1923 to the r e m o v a l o f Islam f r o m its constitution i n 1928, T u r k e y discarded the rickety O t t o m a n scaffolding, secularized education, law, a n d p h i l a n t h r o p y , and Westernized dress, calender, and alphabet. I n 1934 w o m e n received the vote a n d the right to h o l d elective office, unimaginable i n other M o s l e m c o u n tries o f the time. U n d e r l y i n g all these changes was the e m p o w e r m e n t o f the state a n d the exaltation o f its leader, Mustafa Kemal: military hero i n the teens, m o d e r n i z i n g dictator i n the twenties, finally d e m i g o d i n the thirties, w i t h the signature gargantuan statues a n d a grand n e w name, K e m a l Atatürk—appropriately, father o f the Turks. B o r r o w i n g from Italy, Germany, and the Soviet U n i o n alike, he c o u n t e d o n authority at the t o p to fix values everywhere b e l o w . W h a t he miscalculated from the start was the tenacious p o p u l a r c o m m i t ment to Islam, w h i c h Bernard Lewis estimates remained "the major element i n the collective consciousness o f a large p r o p o r t i o n o f the T u r k i s h nation," especially outside the major cities. U n w i l l 14

i n g to b r o o k Islam's c o m p e t i t i o n , K e m a l set out to constrict its influence, o n l y to attenuate his o w n base o f support i n the p r o cess. Even before Kemal's death i n 1938, state nationalism i n Turk e y relied far more o n n a k e d force, far less o n systematized persuasion, than its Japanese counterpart; a n d after his death, it came to l o o k more and more like just another military dictatorship.

M e x i c a n nationalism also f o l l o w e d the made familiar b y formally independent

sequence

b u t h i g h l y vulnerable

countries: N e w leaders seized p o w e r , m o b i l i z e d resources, a n d inspired a sense o f n a t i o n h o o d that s i m p l y h a d not existed before. I n general, Latin America, carved into postcolonial states before the appearance o f m o d e r n nationalism a n d h o m e to n o n e o f its Ì46

CHAPTER 6

distinguishing characteristics, was barren g r o u n d . It required the insertion o f a special force to trigger a nationalist m o v e m e n t o f any sort, i n Mexico's case its revolution: a b l o o d y contest f r o m 1910 to I 9 2 O , t h e n t w o decades o f consolidation. N o t o n l y d i d that transformation set M e x i c o apart f r o m the rest o f contemporary Latin America; it constituted the first and arguably the most suc­ cessful full-scale r e v o l u t i o n o f the twentieth century. The Mexican Revolution generated wholesale changes w i t h o u t state terror a n d harnessed the army to civilian authority. Perhaps most impressive o f all it resisted i n the 1930s w h a t was besetting other postrevolutionary societies, w h a t was g r i p p i n g governments t h r o u g h o u t the Caribbean a n d Latin America, and w h a t comparable state ex­ periments i n Japan and T u r k e y w e r e experiencing: police-state dictatorship. U n t i l the r e v o l u t i o n M e x i c o revealed n o significant interest i n nationalism, let alone a m o v e m e n t w o r t h y o f the name. The l o n g battle for independence, dislodging the Spanish rulers b y 1821 b u t leaving a conservative Creole elite intact, b l e d the country w i t h o u t m o b i l i z i n g it. The regional and local attachments that h a d steeled Mexicans against the Spanish h e l d firm. For at least three decades after independence, onetime officers i n the Spanish army d o m i ­ nated M e x i c a n politics, c o m p e t i n g more or less as warlords under such o p e n l y elitist labels as the Scottish Rite and the Y o r k Rite Freemasons. Independence m a r k e d out state boundaries as artifi­ cial as the ones Spanish imperialists h a d created. W h e n invading gringos t o o k away more than half that territory i n 1848, they re­ placed one arbitrarily d r a w n M e x i c o w i t h another. A persistent hostility to alien rule constituted a partial exception to this picture. Spain's attempt i n 1829 to reclaim its c o l o n y d i d stir a p o p u l a r Mexican reaction. A g a i n after 1862, w h e n conservatives invited French intervention, ill-armed but stubborn peasant guer­ rillas fought to free their country. Nevertheless, alien rule had m a n y meanings. Very possibly most o f these peasants w e r e risk­ ing their lives for a country n o larger than their village. M a n y NATIONALISM WORLDWIDE

147

others battled just as fiercely to protect those same villages f r o m equally alien Creole landlords: alone a m o n g Latin A m e r i c a n c o u n ­ tries, M e x i c o generated a century-long tradition o f such uprisings. N o t surprisingly, the w e a l t h y liberals w h o came back to p o w e r w i t h Benito Juárez i n 1867 h a d n o desire whatsoever to see that k i n d o f local ethnicity e x p a n d i n any direction, let alone t o w a r d nationalism. So it w e n t u n t i l the Revolution o f 1910: Mexico's leaders imposed their rule o f l a w and dreamed o f development b u t gave n o thought to a Mexican nation. W h a t d i d h a p p e n after 1870 was an increasing concentration o f p o w e r i n the hands o f the state and its favored economic interests. B o t h camps made money; b o t h kept the capitalist peace. D u r i n g Porfirio Diaz's uninterrupted rule b e t w e e n 1884 and 1910, M e x i c o experienced its first extended p e r i o d o f systematic,

centralized

government. O n l y after 1900, w h e n a generation that h a d never k n o w n civil w a r came o f age, d i d o p p o s i t i o n to that greedy b u t stable dictatorship gather general strength. The dating, o f course, was familiar. O n r o u g h l y the same schedule, states everywhere i n the Western w o r l d were consolidating power. So was Japan. But w h e r e the presiding genro husbanded Japan's resources to m a x i ­ mize its autonomy, the Diaz government sold one concession af­ ter another to foreign concerns that p a i d the right price to the right people. The price p a i d b y the w r o n g people—the peasan­ t r y — w a s the disappearance o f their villages inside e x p a n d i n g plantations that w i t h the government's cooperation t o o k the l a n d they needed. Eventually, the Diaz regime alienated a range o f people sufficient to b r i n g Mexico's free-handed

capitalism i n t o

bankruptcy: drifting peasants, fattening insiders, coercing soldiers, dissolving legitimacy. A l t h o u g h it required ten terrible years to make sure that r e v o l u ­ tionaries, not warlords, w o u l d rule Mexico, there w e r e also i m ­ pressive accomplishments

d u r i n g that decade: a m o n g them, a

structure for justice i n the 1917 Constitution, a reopening o f m i d ­ dle-class opportunities and peasant hopes, a c o m m i t m e n t to tam­ i n g armies, and a m o m e n t u m t o w a r d socially responsive govern148

CHAPTER 6

ment. Experimenting along these lines d u r i n g the 1920s a n d

fixing

the results i n place d u r i n g the 1930s gave the revived quest for modernization a distinctively Mexican, sometimes a distinctively populist stamp. M e a n w h i l e , the central government, w a x i n g stron­ ger each decade, d r e w its authority f r o m the revolution, w h i c h it d i d everything it c o u l d b o t h to m o n o p o l i z e and to glorify as the grand unifier o f the Mexican nation. Securing the central govern­ ment's p o w e r a n d securing the national r e v o l u t i o n w e r e t w o sides o f a single c o i n . Antiforeign passions h a d o n l y m i n o r significance i n this national mobilization. I n a w a y r o u g h l y similar to Japan's nationalism, Mexico's d i d not materialize u n t i l after the most h i g h l y charged foreign threats h a d passed. A broad desire to assert control over economic resources a n d o p p o r t u n i t i e s — t o reclaim a lost sover­ e i g n t y — d i d i n fact play an important role i n some middle-class circles, as the salience o f those issues i n the 1917 Constitution attested. Nevertheless, the U n i t e d States, the one a n d o n l y great p o w e r h o v e r i n g over Mexico, d i d not l o o m large as the r e v o l u ­ tion's villain. The iron-fisted w a r l o r d Victoriano H u e r t a — n o revo­ lutionary h e — c o u l d not make m u c h o f the U n i t e d States military's temporary occupation o f Veracruz i n 1914. I f i n 1916 a n d 1917 the marauding Pancho Villa was a r o u g h - h e w n c h a m p i o n o f M e x i c a n independence, as some historians have argued, the U n i t e d States Army's futile chase after h i m , deep into Mexican territory, still d i d not generate m u c h p o p u l a r sentiment i n favor o f Villa or against the U n i t e d States. Major American corporations w e r e

generally

w e l c o m e employers i n early twentieth-century M e x i c o . W h a t d i d matter was the ability o f Mexico's n e w regime to stand free—to reject the M o n r o e Doctrine w i t h o u t p r o m p t i n g a w a r o f w o r d s , to expropriate Mexico's o i l reserves w i t h o u t triggering American i n ­ tervention, to remain neutral i n a w o r l d w a r w i t h o u t facing A m e r i ­ can retaliation. It helped that i n each potential crisis the govern­ ments i n b o t h Washington and M e x i c o City w a n t e d to settle differences w i t h a m i n i m u m o f fuss. I n its effort to mobilize a Mexican nation, the revolutionary state NATIONALISM WORLDWIDE

149

set out to combat cultural fragmentation, n o t capitalist imperialism. I t was a bootstrap operation. M e x i c a n society offered none o f the advantages that the Japanese state h a d enjoyed. Rather than one language, the revolutionary leadership encountered

many.

Rather than a c o m p l i a n t religion, it was l o c k e d i n combat w i t h a hostile Catholic Church. Rather than an integrated country, it faced a s p r a w l i n g one. Rather than a tabula rasa o f separateness f r o m the Western w o r l d , it s h o w e d the scars o f conquest, defeat, dependence, even c o m p l i c i t y i n Mexico's civil wars. Moreover, before 1910 n o one cared to prepare the w a y . Particularly i n the t w o decades before the r e v o l u t i o n , w h i l e nationalist movements elsewhere were

fitting

linguistic, racial, historical, and ceremonial

components to their causes, Mexicans l o o k e d elsewhere. I f anyt h i n g other than a rather routine r e p u d i a t i o n o f foreign rulers u n i t e d t h e m i n the late nineteenth century, it was p r o b a b l y a M e x icanized Catholicism, one that accepted m y r i a d village lore under a b r o a d canopy o f c o m m o n ritual a n d that above all accommodated the e n d u r i n g p o p u l a r cult o f the V i r g i n o f Guadalupe. B u t that spiritual I n d i a n h a d b e e n n o Joan o f Arc, a n d the c h u r c h hierarchy that benefited f r o m her was still tarnished b y its collaborat i o n w i t h the French. Under the circumstances, revolutionary leaders

demonstrated

considerable creativity i n tackling this huge p r o b l e m d u r i n g their first quarter century o f rule. A t the heart o f their enterprise lay racial concepts that transformed Western society's

disparagement

o f b r o w n s k i n into the m a r k o f a distinctive Mexican superiority. B y establishing an inclusive racial m o d e l for the n a t i o n a n d b y presuming a neo-Lamarckian racial improvement, revolutionary ideologues envisaged the best i n their indigeneous a n d European heritages b l e n d i n g i n t o an ever m o r e advanced mestizo h o m o g e neity, simultaneously u n i t i n g a n d m o d e r n i z i n g Mexico. The cosmic race, J o s é Vasconcelos,

a leader a m o n g these advocates,

called it i n a m o m e n t o f nationalist euphoria. A m o n g c o n t e m p o rary reformers, the mestizo ideal inspired visions o f a society o f ¡50

CHAPTER 6

sober fathers, respected mothers, and healthy babies freed f r o m the curse o f poverty. For later partisans o f ethnic particularity, mestizo nationalism seemed little short o f criminal. Ostensibly h o n o r i n g indigenous cultures, it d e p l o r e d their backwardness a n d anticipated their dis­ appearance. Appropriately, Vasconcelos 's p l a n for universal edu­ cation relied o n the Spanish language alone. T h o u g h mestizo b r o w n m i g h t be cosmic, a dark I n d i a n b r o w n remained thor­ o u g h l y mundane. I n its time, however, mestizo nationalism, ap­ pearing at the crest o f Western society's w a v e o f racism, l o o k e d quite different i n a l i n e u p that i n c l u d e d Hitler's Germany, Töjö's Japan, a n d J i m Crow's America. Elsewhere i n Latin A m e r i c a — i n Guatemala, Peru, a n d Argentina, for example—race

concepts

cleaved societies. I f o n one h a n d the mestizo ideal appeared to be k i l l i n g local identities w i t h its kindness, at least it imagined all Mexicans c o n t r i b u t i n g to a cohesive a n d egalitarian outcome. I n fact, a very different and all t o o familiar racism d i d have its day i n Mexico. I n 1931 the government drove Mexico's tiny Chinese m i ­ nority out o f the country, satisfying as it d i d p o w e r f u l "anti-Chi­ nese feelings . . . [that] had genuine p o p u l a r roots." Whatever its 15

loose association w i t h m o d e r n racism, mestizo nationalism sought to tap another cluster o f values entirely. N o evidence indicates that mestizo nationalism ever enjoyed widespread popularity. W h a t d i d unify M e x i c o was the r e v o l u t i o n itself, an upheaval i n rights and privileges that gave a h i g h propor­ t i o n o f the m i d d l e a n d l o w e r classes a stake i n the n e w society, a sense o f emerging a m o n g the winners. Land reform, above all else, secured that p o p u l a r base. Informally u n d e r w a y as soon as the r e v o l u t i o n began, the redistribution o f the great estates ad­ vanced far e n o u g h under the last o f the w a r l o r d presidents, Venustiano Carranza, so that b y 1920 there c o u l d be n o return. If, as the historian A l a n K n i g h t has argued, t w o p r i m a r y urges—land o w n e r s h i p and local a u t o n o m y — i n i t i a l l y p o w e r e d the revolution, the former n o w g o b b l e d u p the latter. Especially i n the 1930s

NATIONALISM WORLDWIDE

/ 5 /

under President Lázaro Cárdenas, an expansive central govern­ ment gave its blessings to the complicated transfer o f plantations t o peasant proprietors, i n c l u d i n g local collectives—ejidos—that b y 1940 h e l d almost half o f Mexico's farmland. As the g o v e r n ­ ment's anticlericalism subsided,

the r e v o l u t i o n settled

securely

into the very definition o f Mexicanness. B y midcentury, time caught

u p w i t h the r e v o l u t i o n . W h a t

w o r k e d remarkably w e l l w h e n l a n d t o p p e d the agenda h a d little to contribute as urbanization and industrialization d o m i n a t e d p u b ­ lic policy. Mexican outmigration, always heavy a n d n o w

ap­

proaching a flood, h a d n o significant bearing o n the nationalist spirit. Once again, state nationalism d e p e n d e d o n participation f r o m w i t h i n . The r e v o l u t i o n was Mexico's nation-builder. Identify­ i n g t h r o u g h it—as an experience, as a source o f material benefits, as a matter o f civic pride—created the semblance o f one people w i t h a c o m m o n destiny. I n a paler version o f the Japanese dis­ o w n i n g those w h o settled elsewhere, Mexican nationalists scorned migrants w h o gave evidence o f relocating i n another c o u n t r y — almost always the U n i t e d States. W h e n they cut their roots, so the charge went, their culture d i e d a n d their characters softened. A p ­ propriately, as late as the 1970s n o m o r e than 6 percent o f these migrants w e r e American citizens, the lowest rate a m o n g any i m ­ migrant g r o u p i n the U n i t e d States. Mexicans h a d homes i n M e x ­ ico. W h e n chain m i g r a t i o n d i d strengthen long-distance ties, they w e r e usually parochial. Especially a m o n g native peoples, the lines ran back to the village or at most to the region. Despite invasions a n d revolutions, the social order a m o n g Mayan peoples i n the south s h o w e d little change. The loyalty that deepened w h e n la­ b o r i n g migrants left "their 'native' sierra o f Oaxaca" i n search o f jobs was a "self-conscious ethnic identity" as Mixtees, n o t as M e x i ­ cans.

16

Nationalism a m o n g M e x i c a n Americans, therefore, was d o u b l y w e a k e n e d — b y migration's irrelevance to the n a t i o n - b u i l d i n g rev­ olutionary synthesis i n M e x i c o and b y the migrants' splintering 152

CHAPTER 6

pulls back t o innumerable village homes. Regular

movements

back a n d forth across the border kept the Mexican sources o f eth­ nicity fresh w i t h o u t encouraging nationalism o f any k i n d . Little w o n d e r that the symbols o f irredentism, o f p r i m e v a l rights to the territories lost to the U n i t e d States, f o u n d almost n o takers. The revolution itself largely t u r n e d its back o n Mexican history; at least it chose not to d w e l l o n past failures. Late i n the 1960s, the M e x i ­ can American firebrand Rudolfo "Corky" Gonzales briefly d r e w a c r o w d b y d e m a n d i n g a separate Aztlan state out o f the conquered territories. "We Declare the Independence o f our Mestizo Nation," he asserted i n the rhetoric o f Mexican racial nationalism. "We are a Bronze People w i t h a Bronze Culture." But the mestizo nation, 17

like the r e v o l u t i o n itself, was something to achieve, n o t to reclaim. O n l y at rare moments d i d Mexican Americans tie their dream for the future to a loss f r o m the past. A n Aztlan m o v e m e n t never ma­ terialized.

TRANSCENDENCE As these early nationalist experiments got under w a y at the edges o f Western colonialism, another set o f movements, equally precocious b u t very different i n nature, also set out to defend subject people f r o m alien p o w e r . These w e r e the p a n movements—specifically

Pan-Asian,

Pan-Arab,

Pan-African—

w h i c h either ignored or repudiated the Western-model state a n d expected to gather i n people b y other means. Rather than b u i l d i n g regional loyalties f r o m more local ones, i n c l u d i n g those defined b y states, the p a n movements each sought an entirely different design, w i t h a logic and a history o f its o w n . T h e y enjoyed great­ est currency d u r i n g times o f greatest fluidity: w h e n European wars scrambled i m p e r i a l rights and dissolved empires, for example, or w h e n Western powers challenged their o w n state system t h r o u g h so-called international bodies. The utterly arbitrary boundaries NATIONALISM WORLDWIDE

153

that imperialism i m p o s e d o n so m a n y colonies gave additional impetus to causes that p r o m i s e d to substitute a natural wholeness for those fracturing lines. I n some nationalist movements, the geo­ graphical goal was clearer than the arguments e x h o r t i n g p e o p l e t o identify w i t h it: Italian nationalism, for example, or Z i o n i s m after the Balfour Declaration. The p a n movements reversed that order: Identities w e r e clearer t h a n geography. Pan-Asianism flared briefly at the b e g i n n i n g o f the t w e n t i e t h century w h e n some Japanese leaders and the Chinese r e v o l u t i o n ­ aries a r o u n d Sun Yat-sen p o o l e d their c o m m o n fears o f Western p o w e r and their c o m m o n hopes that a regenerated China w o u l d j o i n Japan as b u l w a r k s o f the y e l l o w race against w h i t e imperial­ ism. Japan's o w n p o w e r politics destroyed this vision's appeal. Once Japan pressed the notorious T w e n t y - O n e Demands o f 1915 o n China's ineffectual government, its b a l d l y imperialist ambitions stood exposed, revealing another Asian state, not Western colo­ nialism, as the p r i m a r y threat to China's independence. N o w a humiliated Sun l o o k e d for all the w o r l d like the enemy's p a w n . D u r i n g the 1920s, racism i n the West and chaos i n China deep­ ened Japan's isolation. A decade later, w h e n its leaders once m o r e e m p l o y e d a Pan-Asian rhetoric, they cast the Japanese as the su­ perior race and the rest o f Asia as servants to their destiny. Japan's tyrannical Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere d u r i n g the Sec­ o n d W o r l d War was a final m o c k e r y o f the Pan-Asian dream. The Pan-Arab movement, w h i c h also surfaced early i n the twentieth century, h a d a longer life a n d greater substance. O n e o f the alternatives to the collapsing O t t o m a n Empire, Arab national­ ism was originally a reactionary m o v e m e n t that i n v o k e d a purified Islam, free o f any Western taint, as the best defense against cor­ r u p t i n g outside influences. D e f i n e d initially b y a

language—the

one sanctified as God's m e d i u m o f revelation—Pan-Arabism re­ m a i n e d a rhetorical flourish u n t i l the 1930s, w h e n publicists made the first serious attempts at a systematic statement. N o w p u r i t y o f race l o o m e d as large as purity i n language. Debates i n succeeding i 54

CHAPTER 6

decades raised b u t failed to resolve three central issues. Were the true Arabs o n l y those w h o lived i n Asia M i n o r or d i d they include the Arabs o f N o r t h Africa as well? Was Pan-Arabism fundamentally a secular m o v e m e n t seeking its o w n state, or was it essentially religious, an expression o f the Islamic yearning for

umma—a

comprehensive c o m m u n i t y o f all believers? Secular or not, d i d it cover Christian as w e l l as M u s l i m Arabs? Until midcentury Arab nationalism rose and fell w i t h the for­ tunes o f the elites sponsoring it. It influenced the leadership o f the Arab Revolt o f 1916, some o f w h o m expected their British patrons to replace O t t o m a n rule w i t h a Pan-Arabic state. W h e n the B o l ­ sheviks exposed a secret agreement to carve Arab lands b e t w e e n the British and the French and the t w o powers proceeded to d o just that, one phase o f the m o v e m e n t dissolved i n humiliation. After the Great War, royal houses i n Iraq, Jordan, and Arabia i n ­ corporated a racial version o f Pan-Arabism i n various quasi-fascist ideologies they endorsed, ideologies that were part and parcel o f their preference for the Axis side i n the Second W o r l d War. T o n o one's surprise, as the British and French retired f r o m Asia Minor, the retreating imperial powers d i v i d e d it into states that gave n o quarter at all to Pan-Arab aspirations. The crucial t u r n came i n 1952 w h e n the Free Officers under Gamal Nasser drove the royal house out o f Egypt a n d o p e n e d Arab nationalism's populist era. Pan-Arabist f r o m the outset, Na­ sser clarified the movement's fuzzy issues i n ways that served h i m brilliantly, o n l y to undercut his successors' prospects. For one t h i n g he made Egypt, marginal i f n o t not outright hostile i n the movement's earlier manifestations, the nucleus o f an Arab "circle" that arced w e s t w a r d t o w a r d the Atlantic as w e l l as eastward to­ w a r d the G u l f o f Arabia. For another he gave the m o v e m e n t an unmistakably secular stamp, using states as the m o d u l a r units to b u i l d Arab u n i t y a n d relegating Islam to an honorific role. Finally, he p o p u l a r i z e d the movement. Magnetic i n a w a y n o predecessor or contemporary i n the region c o u l d match, Nasser c o m m a n d e d NATIONALISM WORLDWIDE

155

attention h i g h a n d l o w w i t h his promise o f a strong, prosperous Egypt, his independence f r o m C o l d War loyalties, a n d his v i s i o n o f an ever-expanding Pan-Arabism. T o cheers t h r o u g h o u t the Arab w o r l d , Nasser initiated the first step i n 1958, w h e n Egypt a n d Syria j o i n e d i n the U n i t e d Arab Republic. It was a m o v e m e n t w i t h fatal weaknesses, however. A PanArabism that relied o n i n d i v i d u a l states was i n the e n d an o x y ­ m o r o n . Its appeal lay i n an overarching, inclusive vision. T h e Arab nation, one o f its advocates w r o t e , "is a w i d e r c o n c e p t i o n t h a n the state, greater than the people, a n d m o r e meaningful than the fa­ therland," w i t h c o m p e l l i n g affinities that gathered i n all those w h o share Arab memories, ideals, a n d aspirations: "Such is the A r a b p o i n t o f v i e w o n the n a t i o n a n d nationalism." States o n l y under­ 18

stood other states, and i n this case p r o v e d utterly fickle to the PanArab cause. Neither the U n i t e d Arab Republic n o r its successor i n 1971, the Federation o f Arab Republics, w h i c h added Libya, lasted l o n g e n o u g h to change anything. A n o t h e r potential source o f PanArabism, the Ba'th (Rebirth) party that appeared i n Syria, Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon, never lost its state-by-state identity. Second, secular Pan-Arabism roused an enemy stronger t h a n itself: Islam remained the most popular, p o w e r f u l , and e n d u r i n g source o f Arab unity. That alone almost certainly d o o m e d Nasser's PanArabism; his crushing military defeat b y Israel i n 1967 a n d his death three years later sealed its fate. Pan-Africanism h a d its origins i n the diaspora, specifically a m o n g the descendants o f slaves i n the English-speaking lands o f N o r t h America. Far m o r e t h a n other p a n movements, it d r e w its energy f r o m the challenges o f m i g r a t i o n a n d hence shared m o r e characteristics than any o f the others w i t h contemporary European nationalism. The horrifying imperatives o f slavery prepared the w a y b y t h r o w i n g together p e o p l e o f m a n y African backgrounds, most o f w h o m b y the early nineteenth century retained o n l y splin­ tered memories o f their homelands. African-rooted customs w e r e assimilated into slave-bound cultures w i t h loose associations to 156

CHAPTER 6

a general past. The very concept o f Africa,

other than a place

for imperialist exploitation, was the creation o f N o r t h A m e r i c a n blacks. Inside slavery the tenuous h o l d that biological parents h a d o n their children t h r e w w i d e the net o f adoptive families, w h i c h c o u l d be made to cover an indeterminately e x p a n d i n g fictive fam­ ily. W h e n slave-quarter k i n b u r i e d the dead i n the expectation that their spirits w o u l d n o w return h o m e across the Atlantic, they w e r e generating the w h e r e w i t h a l for some k i n d o f transoceanic nation­ alism. F r o m ideas that were floating about everywhere i n the late nineteenth century, postemancipation leaders added the concept o f a black race, w i t h Africa its historic b u t n o longer its exclusive home. Wherever they had scattered, blacks retained membership i n their race o f origin: "an ordinance o f nature," declared the West I n d i a n E d w a r d Blyden; a divine mandate, according to the A m e r i ­ can Alexander Crummell.

19

Race made t h e m k i n : "Indeed, a race is

a family," i n CrummelPs epigram.

20

F r o m time to time d u r i n g the

nineteenth century, an occasional N o r t h American black leader tried to solidify the African e n d o f that race vision, even to the p o i n t o f claiming Liberia, w h e r e w h i t e racists f r o m the American Colonization Society h a d once d u m p e d shipments o f free blacks, as the site for his o w n attempt to reunite blacks f r o m t w o conti­ nents. Nevertheless, race consciousness b y itself was n o t national­ ism. N o r d i d the trickle o f migration f r o m N o r t h America to Africa have an inherently nationalist meaning. It m i g h t be a missionary gesture or s i m p l y an escape f r o m N o r t h America's w h i t e racism. I n any case, very f e w people anywhere cared one w a y or another about these African schemes. It required a mass migration o f American blacks f r o m south to n o r t h d u r i n g the first quarter o f the t w e n t i e t h century to create a p o p u l a r base for African nationalism. As it filled ghettoes i n major cities from the East Coast t h r o u g h the Middlewest, it b r o u g h t faceto-face more and more people w h o w e r e sharing the same m i ­ gratory experiences: Disjointed c o m m u n i t y values, stretched k i n NATIONALISM WORLDWIDE

157

lines, and a stirring o f n e w identities f o r m e d a reservoir o f nation­ alist readiness. The spark to ignite a m o v e m e n t came f r o m the West Indies, where, the sociologist O r l a n d o Patterson explains, migration was a w a y o f life, a c o m m o n culture that t u r n e d the islands into a crucible for nationalist ideas. E d w a r d Blyden, H e n r y Sylvester Williams, Marcus Garvey, George Padmore, Aimé Césaire, L e o p o l d Senghor, Frantz Fanon,

and C. L. R. James—

islanders all—constituted a Pan-Africanist h o n o r roll. Understanding

the black African experience as a

diaspora

caught o n i n the West Indies late i n the nineteenth

century.

A r o u n d the t u r n o f the twentieth, a particularly large w a v e o f blacks left the islands to hack out the Panama Canal, hire o n w i t h U n i t e d Fruit, and take other jobs i n Central America's

flourishing

export agriculture. Garvey, the genius o f popular Pan-Africanism, came out o f that milieu. A migrant himself, he left Kingston, Ja­ maica, w h e n he was i n his twenties to travel about Central Amer­ ica, try L o n d o n , and i n 1916 d o c k at N e w Y o r k City i n the midst o f the first great n o r t h w a r d flow o f Southern blacks, w h o w o u l d p r o ­ vide his primary support. F r o m there he launched the U n i t e d States branch o f his core organization, Universal Negro I m p r o v e ­ ment Association ( U N I A ) . H a r l e m was just jelling as the premier center for an emerging black urban culture, and other

black

ghettos m u s h r o o m e d i n major cities f r o m the East Coast t h r o u g h the Middlewest. I f the Caribbean culture o f m o b i l i t y gave Garvey the inspiration to talk, the challenges o f an American migration gave his audiences the incentive to listen. A n d huge audiences d i d listen. N o t o n l y d i d U N I A enroll per­ haps a m i l l i o n American blacks at its peak; t h r o u g h its grand pa­ rades, its leader's charisma, and its simple transportable messages, Garveyism reached millions more i n Africa and the West Indies as w e l l as the U n i t e d States. As harsh a critic as the Marxist scholar C.L.R. James, w h o called Garvey's m o v e m e n t "pitiable rubbish," granted that he was the one w h o "made the American Negro con­ scious o f his African o r i g i n and created for the first time a feeling 158

CHAPTER 6

o f international solidarity" i n the diaspora.

21

" I k n o w no boundary

w h e r e the Negro is concerned," Garvey declared. "The w h o l e w o r l d is m y province u n t i l Africa is free."

22

Garvey's message t u r n e d the expectations o f his time o n their ear. Where white-dictated legislation o u t l a w e d black-white mar­ riages i n most A m e r i c a n states, Garvey affirmed the same values f r o m the other e n d o f the spectrum: Coal blackness—a Caribbean p o i n t o f reference—gave

standard

p r o o f o f racial strength, he

announced. W h e r e A m e r i c a n blacks h a d been taught to measure their o w n progress b y a Western yardstick, w i t h the consoling postscript that as l o w l y as they m i g h t be i n the U n i t e d States, they stood w e l l above the jungle creatures o f Africa, Garvey s p u n his audience a r o u n d and p o i n t e d away f r o m America to Africa. F r o m B o o k e r T. Washington, Garvey said, he derived his sense o f i n ­ stant progress that swept aside the image o f blacks slowly, s l o w l y i n c h i n g f o r w a r d as apprentices to their w h i t e instructors. The Great War destroyed Western society's claim to be leading the evolutionary march; instead, the future lay w i t h the sleeping giant. Africa's day was d a w n i n g n o w . Ethiopia Awake! Africa for the Af­ ricans! Renaissance o f the Black Race! A l t h o u g h Garvey felt the closest affinity to Irish nationalism, w h i c h rose f r o m the ashes i n 1916 to press for immediate inde­ pendence, others set his m o v e m e n t next to Zionism. O f course there w e r e similarities. B o t h preached nationalism to a dispersed people. T h e y shared authoritarian characteristics. Like Herzl, Gar­ vey l o v e d p o m p and ceremony, gloried i n the role o f the great leader, and i n a disastrous s h o w o f incompetence squandered his followers' m o n e y i n a joint stock company. Like Herzl's Zionism, Garvey's U N I A offered o n l y a misty sense o f the h o m e l a n d . B u t to make Garvey peculiarly the b o r r o w e r verges o n a racist slur. A r o u n d the t u r n o f the century, m o v e m e n t styles a n d strategies o f all sorts suffused Western society: Every nationalist was a bor­ rower. I n Garvey's case, it d i d not matter w h e t h e r his preference for colorful regalia and hierarchical titles derived primarily from NATIONALISM WORLDWIDE

159

early Zionism, the Scottish Rite Masons, the K u K l u x Klan, or, most probable o f all, the widespread images o f regal dress a n d grand titles a m o n g tribal leaders t h r o u g h o u t Africa. W i t h

the

incentive, the constituency, a n d the w h e r e w i t h a l for nationalism at hand, Garveyism, like Z i o n i s m , was a m o v e m e n t w a i t i n g to happen. UNIA's bright h o p e s — a n d the savings o f m a n y hard-pressed black Americans—dissolved i n bankruptcy, the v i c t i m o f factoring far t o o m a n y dreams i n t o the company's balance sheet. I n an early victory for the federal government's racist secret police, the U n i t e d States h o u n d e d Garvey i n t o jail, t h e n o u t o f the country. The organization beneath it gone, his inspirational message m o v e d w i t h the w i n d . I n Africa, w h e r e Garveyism reappeared at unpredictable moments for decades to come, it h e l p e d immensely that it carried n o taint o f the West's Christianity. I n the U n i t e d States it was the final dramatic step i n a n e w identity. Blacks w e r e a race, the race was a family, the family h a d its homeland: A genuine

African

American nationalism was b o r n . A second very different strand o f Pan-Africanism—a "rival political ideology" to Garveyism—bore a closer resemblance t o PanArabism i n its emphasis o n an educated elite vanguard, its reliance o n periodic gatherings to refine the movement's objectives, a n d its willingness to use states as b u i l d i n g blocks to success.

23

Once

again it h a d a Caribbean p o i n t o f origin: A Trinidadian, H e n r y Sylvester Williams, called the first Pan-African Conference for 1900 i n L o n d o n . B o o k e r T. W a s h i n g t o n a n d Bishop H e n r y Turner, e m i nences o f the nineteenth century, h e l p e d give it shape; the scholarly activist W . E. B. DuBois, harbinger o f the twentieth, t o o k charge at the conference itself. W h e n n o t h i n g came o f that conference, it was D u B o i s w h o almost t w o decades later revived the idea i n the w a k e o f the w a r a n d Garvey's stunning popularity. Congresses i n 1919, 1921, 1923, a n d 1927 represented, w i t h some ups a n d downs, the D u B o i s era o f Pan-Africanism, even t h o u g h Caribbeans supplied the b u l k o f enthusiasts sustaining the cause ¡60

CHAPTER 6

o n a day-to-day basis i n L o n d o n and Paris. C o m m i t t e d to the p r o p o s i t i o n that there was indeed a black race w i t h its o w n his­ tory and culture, DuBois was equally convinced that its success i n Africa d e p e n d e d o n the stewardship o f a p r i m a r i l y American elite, a m o b i l i z a t i o n o f leaders w h o c o u l d guide the continent into free­ d o m . Inevitably it carried the taint o f w h a t the historian W i l s o n Moses has called "civilizationism," the belief a m o n g such leaders as Blyden, Crummell, and Turner that elevating blacks as a race w o u l d require Westernized Negroes to raise u p the barbarians o f Africa. "Our mission"

Crummell instructed a cadre o f West I n d i a n

blacks, is. . . to make these [Africans] civilized 11

ple"

24

and Christian

peo­

A n inherently divisive message, it had n o p o p u l a r f o l l o w i n g

among Africans, as Garveyism d i d . W h e n DuBois p u l l e d Pan-Afri­ canism to his side o f the Atlantic, it lost t o u c h w i t h its few African adherents and disappeared. Hence w h e n such p r o m i n e n t anticolonialists as J o m o Kenyatta and K w a m e N k r u m a h , w i t h crucial assistance f r o m the West I n ­ dian Padmore and blessings f r o m the great Nigerian nationalist N n a m d i A z i k i w e , reclaimed the name after an eighteen-year gap, they w e r e free to set their o w n stamp o n it. N o t o n l y d i d their PanAfrican Congress o f 1945 have the sharp political edge that D u ­ Bois h a d shunned; it left the diaspora b e h i n d to concentrate o n Africa alone. I n their formative years, these n e w

Pan-African

leaders h a d been migratory y o u n g men, detached f r o m place and suspended between cultures, w h o redefined themselves and their goals as they m o v e d . W h o w e r e they? M a l c o m [sic] I . Nurse, or alternatively M a l c o m Ivan Meredith Nurse, became George Padmore; Johnstone Kamau

became J o m o Kenyatta.

Sometimes

A z i k i w e was Ben, sometimes N k r u m a h was Francis, and some­ times not. A m a n w h o influenced b o t h A z i k i w e and N k r u m a h and w h o at a critical juncture advised South Africa's African National Congress was James K w e g y i r A g g r e y — o r perhaps he was James Emmanuel K w e g g i r Aggrey; perhaps K w e g g i r / K w e g y i r was part o f his family name, perhaps part o f his given name. Self-created, NATIONALISM WORLDWIDE

161

they created Africa, w i t h a people h e l d together b y invisible threads o f race, culture, a n d experience. If, as these m e n discov­ ered i n the diaspora, whites treated all o f t h e m alike, they needed to be alike, to j o i n together i n order to be free. Living i n the U n i t e d States added a critical dimension to their understanding as Africans. A l t h o u g h A z i k i w e , a pioneer o f sorts i n his journeys t h r o u g h America, witnessed J i m C r o w at its worst d u r i n g the 1920s and 1930s, he focused his attention not o n w h i t e racism but o n black values. O n l y those aspects o f the H a r l e m Re­ naissance that emphasized pride over protest interested h i m . F r o m his experience i n the Negro colleges, he learned about the dignity o f manual labor; f r o m his mentor Aggrey, he assimilated the m o t t o "Christianity, education

a n d agriculture"; f r o m the writings o f

B o o k e r T. Washington, the giant l o o m i n g b e h i n d his vision, he extracted a picture o f blacks laboring together i n their o w n soci­ eties for a c o m m o n g o o d . Like Garvey before h i m , A z i k i w e read a revolutionary message into the Washington legacy. Pride i n one­ self, one's land, and one's w o r k , he declared i n his famous clarion call, Renascent

Africa

(1937), w o u l d transform the mentality o f

colonial subjects and t u r n t h e m t o w a r d the N e w Africa—a phrase he probably adapted f r o m the black philosopher A l a i n Locke's N e w Negro. N k r u m a h , w h o arrived i n the U n i t e d States as A z i k i w e was leav­ ing, also spent about a decade there, fashioning a more radical creed and laying more concrete plans to implement it. H e saw the Pan-African congress m o v e m e n t not simply as a gesture o f u n i t y but, w i t h independence pending, as a stage for action. A p p r o ­ priately, it was N k r u m a h w h o shortly before the congress o f 1945 h a d presided over the symbolic transfer o f Pan-Africanism f r o m cosmopolitan America to Africa itself. Officiating at the N o r t h Car­ olina funeral o f A g g r e y — n o friend to D u B o i s — N k r u m a h em­ p l o y e d the rites o f his ancestors to capture the dead man's spirit for return to its West African home. F r o m then o n , African A m e r i ­ cans might serve as fraternal delegates, i n Nkrumah's phrase, b u t 162

CHAPTER 6

they c o u l d n o longer claim to be Africa's teachers. A t the pivotal Manchester Congress, D u B o i s was bracketed as honorary chairman. Initially,

messages that

"emphasized

Pan-African solidarity

rather than territorial identity" d r e w i n a y o u n g , educated constituency that floated a m o n g the continent's cities. W i t h the spread o f 25

independent African states, however, Pan-Africanists abruptly tail o r e d their hopes to suit w h a t they saw a r o u n d them; i n the language o f the self-fashioning George Padmore, first "the federation of self-governing states o n a regional basis, leading ultimately to the creation o f a U n i t e d States o f Africa."

26

I t fell to N k r u m a h ,

leader i n the n e w government o f Ghana, to explore ways o f realizing that idea. I n 1958, a year after taking office, he sponsored t w o Pan-African conferences, f o l l o w e d b y a loose u n i o n o f Ghana w i t h Guinea and Mali i n I96I and an official Organization o f African U n i t y t w o years later. B y then, however, leadership h a d gravitated across Africa into the aggrandizing hands o f Gamal Nasser, w h o used w h a t indicatively was renamed the Organization o f African States to sanctify the continent's postcolonial boundaries, not transcend them. Headquarters w e r e located i n A d d i s Ababa, capital o f Ethiopia's conversative and repressive empire. I n Ghana itself, first Nkrumah's adviser Padmore was isolated as a m e d d l i n g outsider, t h e n i n 1966 N k r u m a h himself was ousted, k i l l i n g a cripp l e d movement. I n Africa, as i n East Asia and the M i d d l e East, p a n movements gained m o m e n t u m o n l y at times o f fluidity: an Africa-wide challenge to colonialism, a China u p for grabs, an A r a b w o r l d d i v i d e d b y arbitrary lines i n the sand. W h e n states congealed, they either t u r n e d the p a n movements into playthings or s i m p l y crushed them. Surely the fatal error o f the p a n movements' champions was to relinquish their fate to existing states, under the delusion that these sovereignties w o u l d be w i l l i n g to transcend their o w n interests. The legatees—Japanese imperialists, for example, or authoritarian Arab rulers—were certainly n o t an enlightened lot. O n an NATIONALISM WORLDWIDE

¡63

equally dismal note, Pan-Africanist rhetoric degenerated into an excuse to expel people o f a different color and culture f r o m the postcolonial states. Rather than an expression o f connectedness, it became a rationale for exclusion. O n Zanzibar, black migrants f r o m the mainland w i t h n o special claim o n the island marched t o the slogan o f Africa for the Africans i n I 9 6 3 as they slaughtered thousands o f longtime resident Arabs.

FREEDOM By far the most c o m m o n forms o f nationalism outside o f Europe were those generated b y European colonialism and its postcolonial successors. Because so m u c h anguish came later, it has become ever more fashionable to underplay the harshness o f these colonial regimes: their brutal extraction o f labor, crude sei­ zure o f land, and violent protection o f privilege, all f r o m the fists o f alien racists. I n their o w n time they roused a hatred that made passionate, popular anticolonialism self-justifying. Liberalizing co­ lonial rule, as slaveholders h a d discovered earlier, o n l y w h e t t e d the appetite for more: Charitable tyranny w o n very few converts. If, for example, some Senegalese enjoyed some rights as

citoyens

under the French, the anticolonial leader L e o p o l d Sedar Senghor then d e m a n d e d all rights for all Senegalese t h r o u g h

indepen­

dence. A l t h o u g h not many colonial subjects o p e n l y resisted i m p e ­ rial rule, a great many w h o had been silent celebrated

indepen­

dence just as ecstatically w h e n it came. I n a mistake repeated over and over again, Western observers c o m m o n l y called all o f these resistance movements nationalism. O n the contrary, anticolonialism was the all-encompassing

mo­

bilizes nationalism just one o f its expressions. I n fact, w i t h o u t crit­ ical contributions from the imperialists themselves, nationalism m i g h t w e l l have sputtered a n d stalled. British colonial rule i n Af­ rica illustrated that reinforcing process. Encountering m a n y groups 164

CHAPTER 6

i n various states o f m u t u a l tolerance, competition, a n d warfare, the British proceeded to freeze b y l a w w h a t h a d previously b e e n fluid.

A t its worst, this British ordering "turned the simple fact o f

ethnic heterogeneity i n t o a source o f tension" a n d hostilities.

27

converting

heightened

I n J o h n Lonsdale's phrase, colonialism h a d a w a y o f "negotiable

ethnicity i n t o competitive tribalism."

28

Moreover, British w e a p o n r y dramatically escalated the costs o f i n terethnic violence. Nevertheless, British administration increased the ability o f otherwise scattered peoples to resist the very rule it was trying to impose. As the British invested their o w n language w i t h immense privilege, they also juggled the importance o f other languages, sacrificing the distinctiveness o f small tribes to such British-enforced linguistic amalgamations as the Shona,

Chaga,

a n d T u m b u k a i n eastern Africa a n d the Ashanti i n the west. B y British fiat, the Ndebele i n the southeast w e r e transformed f r o m a loose bargaining confederation i n t o an African race. Eventually these larger units p r o v i d e d some o f the toughest nationalist bases i n the battles for independence. Even a m o n g the favored, raising expectations risked highlighting h o w severely curtailed a colo­ nial's opportunities actually were. Benefits given a n d stolen away generated a special anger. After creating the Ndebele, for exam­ ple, British imperialists a r o u n d the t u r n o f the t w e n t i e t h century assigned t h e m a territory, o n l y to take it back a quarter century later. After midcentury, that British-designated territory was the h o m e l a n d Ndebele nationalists claimed as they j o i n e d i n the battle to free Z i m b a b w e . Some privileges for some frustrated others. Sons o f the w e a l t h y acquired a cosmopolitan education and, as the local agents o f economic development, access to even greater w e a l t h . T h r o u g h w h a t M a h m o o d M a m d a n i has called decentralized despotism, the British passed m u c h o f its day-to-day rule to tribal intermediaries w h o i n s u m constituted a continental n e t w o r k o f petty tyrants, each w i t h his o w n subsystem o f personal patronage. Arabs later slaughtered o n Zanzibar h a d been used i n that w a y . The U n i t e d NATIONALISM WORLDWIDE

165

States e m p l o y e d a comparable system i n the P h i l i p p i n e Islands. B y 1921, 90 percent o f the colony's administrative jobs w e r e h e l d b y Filipinos, loyal to local oligarchs o n w h o m A m e r i c a n — a n d for a f e w years Japanese—rule depended. These very advantageous a n d ostentatiously displayed benefits, c o m i n g at the hands o f co­ lonial rulers, left dark w e l l s o f interethnic hatred b e h i n d the re­ treating imperialists. As it funneled envy and a m b i t i o n , i n other w o r d s , c o l o n i a l rule created its o w n sense o f time a n d entitlement. Colonialism's radi­ cal imbalance i n p o w e r set o f f a dialectic o f cultural inventions a n d counterinventions that eventually w o r k e d i n anticolonialisme favor. The length o f a group's history d i d n o t measure the d e p t h o f its feelings: Ethnic identities m i g h t be tempered far harder b y a f e w decades o f imperial governance than b y the mere passage o f centuries. Moreover, o u t l a w i n g nationalism, as colonialism almost always d i d , increased its reliance o n mythic, essentialist beliefs and h e l p e d account for the firmer g r i p these colonially forged, half-century-old identities h a d than the softer networks o f connec­ t i o n that apparently prevailed earlier. There was n o t h i n g inher­ ently artificial about the process—invasions, impositions, w h o l e ­ sale swallowings o f one g r o u p b y another, were part o f every region's history. Moreover, all traditions i n all cultures have b e e n invented—that is, g i v e n a specific f o r m — a t some time or another. W h a t colonialism tended to d o was compress patterns o f change a n d harden their outcomes. Independence

b r o u g h t w i t h it b o u n d e d g o v e r n i n g structures

that carried an imperialist taint a n d expressed European values: "the prison-house o f the sovereign state," the Africanist A l i Mazrui has called t h e m .

29

Emancipated colonials experienced less o f an

Icarus Effect than European nationalists because anticolonialism, w h i c h d o m i n a t e d all else, contained its o w n resolution: d r i v i n g out foreign rulers. Nevertheless, w h e r e ethnic aspirations still ran strong, the arbitrary boundaries o f these n e w states offered little or n o satisfaction. A t the m o m e n t o f revolutionary victory, D a v i d Lan 166

CHAPTER 6

writes, there were t w o entirely different Zimbabwes, one

"the

spirit province . . . o w n e d b y the ancestors o f the Shona people i n w h i c h the Shona have the perpetual, inextinguishable right . . . to live a n d g o v e r n forever," the other a state "the borders o f w h i c h w e r e d r a w n b y politicians i n Britain and Portugal . . . [collecting] the Shona b u t also the Ndebele, the Shangaan, the whites, a n d the other marginal ethnic groups" i n a system alien to all o f their tradi­ tions. As Partha Chatterjee, an expert o n anticolonial nationalism, 30

has summarized it, "forcible marginalization o f m a n y w h o w e r e supposed to have shared i n the fruits o f liberation" was a standard outcome.

31

Like a relentlessly t u r n i n g w h e e l , independence

w i t h i n these

artificial state frameworks very often replicated the same g r i m story: one group's rule i m p o s e d o n others, superior force as the heart o f governance, ethnic networks as the basis for resistance, a n d nationalism as one o f its expressions. Rulers extracted w e a l t h a n d k e p t the lion's share for themselves: Under colonialism, after all, that was the meaning o f g o o d government. I n fact, the n e w leaders tended to i m p r o v e o n the lessons o f their former masters: use p o w e r even m o r e exclusively for one group's benefit, act even more ruthlessly against any o p p o s i t i o n . The m o m e n t o f inde­ pendence d i d not offer an obvious w a y out o f this vicious, d o w n ­ w a r d spiral. A l t h o u g h precolonial Africa had contained a great va­ riety o f political systems, most o f t h e m m u c h less centralized, a "careful deafricanization" o f the state had occurred l o n g before independence.

32

The institutions that imperialism h a d gutted, ei­

ther b y e m p t y i n g t h e m o f functions or b y draining t h e m o f re­ spect, c o u l d n o t be resurrected n o w . The stabilizing rivalry o f princes i n B u r u n d i , for example, or the free-standing authority o f chiefs i n Z i m b a b w e and the Transvaal was gone forever. That was postcolonialism's H u m p t y - D u m p t y Principle. B y default p o w e r passed to the local agents o f imperialism, that mediating n e t w o r k o f chiefs w h o h a d assimilated the techiques o f colonial rule as they i m p l e m e n t e d it. B u t destroying this legacy o f NATIONALISM WORLDWIDE

167

imperialism had its o w n devastating consequences. I n one o f the most important insights o f the anticolonial struggles, the activisttheorist Frantz Fanon formulated w h a t h a d the appearance o f an irrefutable guideline. T o repossess their land, he declared, a colon i z e d people h a d to take it back b y force. Otherwise, the local lackeys o f imperialism w o u l d s i m p l y remain i n charge t h r o u g h a laying o n o f hands. Yet w h e r e freedom fighters d i d w r e n c h p o w e r f r o m their imperial overlords, as i n Fanon's adopted Algeria, they almost always stayed to rule as an army: an i n t e r i m liberation perhaps, then another tyranny. A peaceful transfer maintained the o l d despotism, a v i o l e n t one established a n e w despotism: That was the Fanon D i l e m m a . Preserving their irrational state structures a n d m i m i c k i n g their rapacious former masters, suffering f r o m economic marginality a n d relying o n ethnic loyalty, postcolonial leaders governed i n a culture o f winner-take-all, loser-take-cover. I f for a short time the presence o f the B i g M e n o f their revolutions—Sukarno i n I n d o nesia, U N u i n Burma, Kenyatta i n Kenya, and their counterparts elsewhere—obscured the rootlessness o f the states they ruled, the secret was out everywhere b y the late 1960s. The t w o most likely outcomes, b y n o means m u t u a l l y exclusive ones, w e r e authoritarian ethnocracy and military dictatorship. Occasionally, as i n Ghana, the contest b e t w e e n rival ethnic groups seesawed. After d u m p i n g Ghana's B i g M a n N k r u m a h , n o w the Ashanti beat the Ewe a n d t o o k all the spoils, t h e n the Ewe b l o o d i e d the Ashanti a n d d i d the same. Usually, however, p o w e r perpetuated power. I n Kenya, for example, the K i k u y u consolidated their h o l d o n the government, assassinated T o m M b o y a , the leader o f the rival Luo, a n d laid the g r o u n d w o r k for decades o f Daniel arap Moi's iron-fisted kleptocracy. I n Guinea, the singleparty government o f Sékou Touré meant rule b y the Malinkè; i n M a l a w i , the authoritarian regime o f Hastings K a m u z u Banda e m p o w e r e d o n l y the Chewa. I n Sri Lanka, it was the majority Sinhalese drive for ethnocracy 168

CHAPTER 6

that d o m i n a t e d postcolonial history. After a decade's attempt to fashion an inclusive pluralist government

i n then-Ceylon,

S.W.R.D. Bandaranaiki—celebrated i n the West as a w o r l d states­ m a n — t o o k p o w e r i n 1956 at the head o f a n e w party determined to impose Sinhalese culture across the island and to seize eco­ n o m i c benefits for Sinhalese people. H i n d u Tamils, usually d i ­ v i d e d b e t w e e n relatively recent immigrants a n d those w i t h centu­ ries-old roots i n the island, u n i t e d at least i n defense o f their basic rights i n those provinces w h e r e Tamils predominated. Under Ban­ daranaiki, his wife, and their successors, the Sri Lankan govern­ ment came to e m b o d y Sinhalese interests, d e p o r t i n g T a m i l w o r k ­ ers, investing B u d d h i s m w i t h constitutional authority, subsidizing Sinhalese m i g r a t i o n into T a m i l regions, and d r i v i n g T a m i l f r o m public service: 60 percent o f the government's professionals a n d 40 percent o f its military i n 1956, 10 percent a n d 1 percent b y 1970. T h e n i n 1983, Sinhalese officials, out to prove they w e r e the fierciest nationalists o f all, let loose c o m m u n a l rioters w h o k i l l e d thousands o f T a m i l i n C o l o m b o and left over a quarter o f a m i l l i o n homeless. A p o p u l a t i o n e x p l o s i o n that almost d o u b l e d the n u m ­ ber o f Sri Lankans b e t w e e n 1946 and 1971 stoked the fires o f con­ flict; Sinhalese rulers spread the

flames.

Governments i n postcolonial states ranging f r o m the Philippines to Burma to Sierra Leone, w i t h virtually n o chance o f affecting affairs outside their boundaries, t u r n e d i n w a r d to take advantage o f w h a t they c o u l d reach. Armies, their p r i m a r y reliance, preyed o n their o w n people i n w h a t became a g r i m l y familiar spiral: si­ p h o n the country's w e a l t h i n t o a military whose expansion re­ q u i r e d ever m o r e w e a l t h . I f postcolonial armies often functioned initially as adjuncts to ethnic p o w e r , i n almost all cases they be­ came p o w e r sources i n their o w n right: self-perpetuating, loyaltygenerating institutions that enabled m e n w i t h virtually n o other base o f authority to rule uncontested. I n the c o u p o f 1965 that deposed Sukarno a n d massacred hundreds o f thousands t h r o u g h ­ out the islands, it was the Indonesian army that t r i u m p h e d . I n NATIONALISM WORLDWIDE

169

Uganda, a relatively small coalition i n the n o r t h i m p o s e d itself o n the more numerous and better-educated BaGanda i n the south t h r o u g h the muscle o f an army under A. M i l t o n Obote, w h o i n t u r n was deposed i n 1971 b y I d i A m i n , w i t h an even smaller civil­ ian base that A m i n proceeded to shrink even further. N a k e d force, slaughtering right and left, sustained h i m for eight years u n t i l an invasion f r o m Tanzania finally e n d e d that particular reign o f terror. Whatever m o d e l o f despotism prevailed, it laid o p e n the p u b l i c realm—the realm o f the state—to those p o w e r f u l e n o u g h to seize its rewards. Almost n o t h i n g remained there for long; almost every­ t h i n g drained into k i n and client networks loyal to their benefac­ tors. As Sara Berry has demonstrated, p u b l i c capital, rather than accumulating for development i n Africa, was recycled t h r o u g h these private fiefdoms. I n the o v e r w h e l m i n g majority o f cases, the fierce, emotional battles over office w e r e driven b y one

group's

envy o f another's advantages, not b y anybody's higher standards o f civil service. Moreover, the exceptions brought massive p r o b ­ lems o f their o w n . I n 1962, w h e n Julius Nyerere t o o k p o w e r i n Tanzania, he set out to create East Africa's o w n version o f a social­ ist state under the name o f ujamaa.

B u t there, as i n China's pre­

eminent m o d e l for postcolonial socialism, increasingly coercive policies t h r o u g h an increasingly arbitrary government set an ap­ palling h u m a n price o n such experiments. Between 1973 and 1976, perhaps 11 m i l l i o n Tanzanians w e r e corralled f r o m their hills

and

villages

into

disastrously

unsuccessful

collectives.

T h r o u g h w h a t J o h n Markakis has called garrison socialism, Ethio­ pia's fanatic Col. Mengistu Haile M a r i a m then c o p i e d the Tanzan i a n failure i n the 1980s w i t h even greater violence a n d hardship. Nationalism hovered close to these postcolonial despotisms, oc­ casionally p l a y i n g their servant, more often steeling their o p p o s i ­ tion. I n China, the Communist leadership d i d play brilliantly o n the m e m o r y o f past invasions and the fear o f future ones to m a i n ­ tain a high-pitched nationalist support. Far less successful w e r e 170

CHAPTER 6

rulers i n the Philippines, w h o h a d little l u c k using the symbols o f independence. This i n c l u d e d the nineteenth-century

hero J o s é

Rizal, and his attempt to rally a Mexican-style state nationalism/ patriotism. Emperor Haile Selassie, w h o set out like an o l d Balkan potentate to impose Coptic Christianity and the Amharic language o n resisting groups i n southern Ethiopia, triggered a m o v e m e n t for Eritrean independence that survived the military c o u p depos­ i n g h i m , t h e n contributed to the fall o f his successor Mengistu. The Ethiopian example was normative: Ethnic groups out o f p o w e r h a d to l o o k to their o w n resources. I n a f e w postcolonial states, such as Tanzania, a multiplicity o f small ethnic groups kept any one o f t h e m f r o m d o m i n a t i n g the central government. But multiethnicity was usually n o defense against death a n d devasta­ tion, as the East Timorese adjacent to Indonesia and the Pampanganos—or Hukbalahap rebels—in the Philippines so painfully learned. B o t h oppressors and oppressed tended to repeat i n postcolonial settings the dynamic their colonial predecessors h a d gen­ erated. As the imperialist governors h a d done, n e w rulers claimed a m o n o p o l y o n force, made a n d b r o k e promises to various con­ stituents at w i l l , a n d drove their protesting leaders u n d e r g r o u n d . As the anticolonial resistance h a d done, the n e w o p p o s i t i o n d i d whatever it t o o k to survive and fight o n . Postcolonial states at­ tacked ethnic outsiders far more often than the converse. I n the large majority o f cases, that is, nationalism was "not a cause b u t a consequence o f [those v i o l e n t conflicts]."

33

There was n o East

Timorese nationalism u n t i l the Indonesian army generated it, n o T a m i l nationalism u n t i l the Sinhalese government i n Sri Lanka m o ­ bilized it. D e n i e d a place i n public, resistance slid into private life. Clan­ destine movements almost b y their nature t o o k o n revolutionary import. Surfacing, disappearing, resurfacing, they survived b y cul­ tivating those special qualities—almost always ethnic qualities— that defined t h e m as a group. Oppressed people " o w e d n o alle­ giance to the state, its courts, its police, its festivals, and so all the NATIONALISM WORLDWIDE

Í 71

energies w h i c h m i g h t i n [another] society have b e e n dispersed over such w i d e areas w e r e instead invested i n the rituals o f the family" a n d its k i n culture.

34

W h e t h e r — o r at w h a t point—these

patterns o f resistance translated into nationalism c o u l d be an ex­ tremely difficult question t o answer. The v e r y qualities that made family-kin resistance so t o u g h c o u l d v e r y w e l l preclude its devel­ o p m e n t into nationalism, w h i c h required attachments sufficiently elastic t o cover w i d e r a n d w i d e r ranges o f fictive k i n . B y a n d large, the denser the local w e b s o f c o m m i t m e n t , the m o r e l i t e r a l — the less adaptive—the definitions o f family. I n sections o f Africa, even the village exceeded the limits o f loyalty: different families, parceling it into their o w n networks, h e l p e d one another o n l y i n an emergency, i f at all. Cellular social organizations, G o r a n H y d e n calls them. I n such settings, fictive k i n s h i p was a contradiction i n terms. Operating along the margins b e t w e e n p u b l i c a n d private, na­ tionalism melted a n d merged w i t h other formulations o f postcolonial resistance: spiritual/religious, class, or simply pure hatred o f the oppressor. Initially nationalism enjoyed its greatest advan­ tage w h e r e n o civic culture functioned. Ethnic connections most often d o u b l e d as civic values because they w e r e the most l i k e l y to weather the attempt c o m m o n a m o n g postcolonial governments t o destroy all independent p u b l i c organizations. As a result, k i n a n d client n e t w o r k s i n sub-Sahara Africa routinely assumed

respon­

sibility for welfare, protection, a n d taxation that i n other societies the government w o u l d have taken o n itself. Inside the shell o f the Ghanaian state i n the 1970s, K w a m e A n t h o n y A p p i a h writes, useful l a w was k i n s h i p law: "Disputes . . . w e r e likely t o e n d u p i n arbitra­ t i o n , b e t w e e n heads o f families, or i n the courts o f 'traditional' chiefs a n d q u e e n mothers." I n effect, these w e b s o f reciprocal obligation, 35

organizing everyday affairs, b e s t o w e d a surrogate citizenship o n their members. The longer they functioned like governments, the m o r e the prospect

o f b e c o m i n g governments was

likely

to

b e c k o n — t h a t is, the m o r e likely ethnic n e t w o r k s w o u l d transform themselves into full-fledged nationalist movements. /72

CHAPTER 6

Once again, states drove the story, as they h a d so often i n the w o r l d w i d e spread o f n a t i o n a l i s m — i n the ostensible successes o f Japan and T u r k e y and i n the ostensible failure o f the p a n m o v e ­ ments alike. States h o l l o w e d o f everything except military m i g h t w e r e the curse o f the postcolonial w o r l d . As they p i c k e d their citizens' pockets—and m a n y o f their carcasses as w e l l — t h e y i n ­ spired ethnic, perhaps nationalist resistance that as it slipped i n and out o f p u b l i c life eluded capture and definition alike. Nigerian history tells just such tale. There w o u l d be n o Nigeria i f there h a d b e e n n o Western i m p e ­ rialism. Shaped b y c o m p e t i n g European interests, n a m e d at the inspiration o f a British journalist, and administered as i f its parts w e r e separate countries, the m o d e r n state o f Nigeria was colonial residue. Britain, Germany, and France d r e w boundaries

around

Nigeria i n fits a n d starts after 1885, as the pressure to translate African spheres o f influence i n t o colonies m o u n t e d . W i t h i n that territory, Britain consolidated its authority. B y o c c u p y i n g the Be­ n i n K i n g d o m i n 1897, it u n i t e d the government's coastal interests; b y r e v o k i n g t w o years later the charter o f the rapacious Royal Niger Company, a trading firm, it extended the

government's

reach across a large northern realm. I n 1914 Nigeria was officially a c o l o n y w i t h quite distinct northern and southern provinces ad­ ministered under one overseeing governor-general. The p o r t o f Lagos, eventually stripped to little m o r e than its island home, re­ m a i n e d administratively distinct, and the Cameroons, taken f r o m Germany i n 1916, w e r e then appended to the eastern sides o f the t w o m a i n provinces. I n 1939, w h e n the south was split r o u g h l y b y the Niger River i n t o eastern a n d western provinces, the colony's interior boundaries c o u l d finally be said to approximate the most obvious divisions a m o n g its inhabitants: the I g b o ( I b o ) i n the east, the Y o r u b a i n the west, and the Fulani-dominated Hausa i n the north. A t every step, European specificity clashed w i t h African reality. Before c o l o n i a l rule, n o b o d y d r e w lines: Tribal territory simply expanded a n d contracted as its p o w e r w a x e d a n d w a n e d . I m p e NATIONALISM WORLDWIDE

/ 73

rial borders transformed lives, fracturing tribes and forcing the re­ construction o f indigenous trading economies. As late as the First W o r l d War, a g o o d m a p was a luxury. The original b o u n d a r y be­ t w e e n southeastern Nigeria a n d German-controlled territory was based o n a river that d i d n o t exist; the original b o u n d a r y b e t w e e n northeastern Nigeria a n d French-controlled territory d e p e n d e d o n a tree that was never f o u n d . W h e n Britain a n d France c o n q u e r e d the Cameroons, officials i n L o n d o n relied o n m e m o r y t o divide it b e t w e e n them. Administration c o u l d be just as arbitrary. T h e au­ thoritarian Fulani emirs w o r k e d so w e l l as intermediaries i n c o n ­ trolling the remote n o r t h that the architect o f British government, Sir Frederick Lugard, futilely sought t o impose a comparable struc­ ture o n the Y o r u b a and Igbo, w h o s e cultures simply w o u l d n o t sustain it. Indirect British rule saved m o n e y a n d evaded responsibility. Corrupting rather than crushing tribal chiefs gave the appearance o f a softer colonialism, seemingly untainted b y its day-to-day c o n ­ sequences. It was equally true, however, that British colonialism d i d n o t disrupt an Edenic garden. The backdrops to British rule w e r e chronic civil w a r spreading misery and generating slaves t h r o u g h o u t Y o r u b a l a n d , a n d ruthless Fulani warlords, w h o h a d already slaughtered and squeezed Hausa p e o p l e into their emirate hierarchies, perched ready to p u s h farther south i f they c o u l d . I f British penetration o f Nigerian territory forced changes i n tribal societies, so h a d trade and conflict w i t h outsiders f r o m time i m m e ­ morial. Certainly Y o r u b a slave gatherers and Fulani w a r l o r d s s h o w e d n o sensitivity to the societies they ravaged. I n any case, a mythic West Africa frozen i n isolation boggles the imagination, especially as global exchanges w e r e transforming cultures every­ where. The m i x e d results o f Britain's rule w e r e played o u t w i t h i n its tripartite administrative structure. O n the one hand, its attempt t o t u r n southern chiefs into autocrats o n l y distorted provincial p o w e r relations. O n the other, British encouragement for linguistic u n i t y 174

CHAPTER 6

and educational o p p o r t u n i t y reshaped cultural relations i n those same southern areas, w h e r e a majority o f Nigeria's tribal groups resided. T o the west, a legacy o f endemic warfare gave w a y to an increasingly cohesive Y o r u b a identity. I n the east, a synthetic I g b o language, w i t h a 1909 translation o f the Christian N e w Testament as its benchmark, served as an effective compromise a m o n g myr­ iad local dialects. First the Yoruba, then the Igbo, t o o k advantage o f the colonial schools to prepare themselves as

merchants,

clerks, a n d petty traders. A t the same time, a large p r o p o r t i o n i n b o t h groups converted to locally seasoned, relatively b e n i g n ver­ sions o f w o r l d r e l i g i o n — M u s l i m and Christian a m o n g the Yoruba, just Christian a m o n g the Igbo. Substantial numbers o f b o t h groups migrated i n search o f better jobs; migration experiences, i n turn, h e l p e d to cement those broader identities. Consolidating regions, however, accentuated divisions. B y far the most p o p u l o u s c o l o n y i n Africa, Nigeria may also have been the most heterogeneous. A l t h o u g h Y o r u b a and I g b o b o t h derived f r o m the K w a language group, those t w o variations h a d little i n c o m m o n . Hausa, i n turn, was

a Chadic language l i n k i n g its

speakers not to the Nigerian south b u t to desert peoples to their n o r t h and northeast. Many small tribes understood n o n e o f these. Next to the Yoruba, for example, the Edo spoke still another vari­ ant o f K w a , a n d i n a m i d d l e belt o f tribes the language o f the Tiv, a m o n g others, was Bantu. Imperialist English was the closest t h i n g to a c o m m o n denominator. Differences i n language w e n t h a n d i n glove w i t h entirely different ways o f life: the fervently M u s l i m Fulani emirates operating out o f their w a l l e d cities; the

eclectic

Y o r u b a cohering a r o u n d their towns; the t h o r o u g h l y decentralized I g b o diffusing a m o n g their villages. Regional hegemony, i n other w o r d s , further drained a w h o l e Nigeria o f meaning. Demands for independence focused originally i n the cosmopol­ itan port o f Lagos, w h e r e the pioneer anticolonialist w i t h the w o n ­ derfully perverse name o f Herbert Macaulay h a d already bearded the British l i o n i n the 1920s. B y the Second W o r l d War, antiNATIONALISM WORLDWIDE

/ 75

colonialism spread r a p i d l y t h r o u g h o u t the south, raising critical questions about Y o r u b a a n d I g b o loyalties. C o u l d they reach out to encompass an entire Nigeria or w o u l d they merely harden into a m u t u a l l y suspicious

regionalism?

The

preeminent

voice o f

Nigerian nationalism was A z i k i w e , an I g b o b o r n i n the n o r t h e r n province a n d raised i n I g b o l a n d w h o set out for Lagos at seven­ teen, w e n t to the U n i t e d States for an education at twenty-one, returned to the n e i g h b o r i n g G o l d Coast (Ghana) at thirty, a n d fi­ nally arrived back i n Nigeria at thirty-three to j o i n the militant Nigerian Y o u t h M o v e m e n t and edit Lagos's fieriest anticolonial newspaper. Between 1934 a n d 1949, the Africanist James Cole­ m a n concluded, n o nationalist b e l o w the Sahara was more i m p o r ­ tant. As the outstanding ideologue o f b o t h nationalism a n d PanAfricanism, A z i k i w e inspired the labor radicals w h o m o b i l i z e d u n d e r his n i c k n a m e — t h e Zikist M o v e m e n t — a n d dreamed o f an entire Africa rising i n the spirit o f the thirty thousand Nigerian workers, cheered o n b y A z i k i w e ' s newspapers, w h o struck for more than a m o n t h i n 1945. Militants i n the National (Anglican) Church also f o l l o w e d h i m . As the Second W o r l d W a r was ending, alone a m o n g the colony's b i g men, A z i k i w e , an I g b o based i n Yorubaland, called o n all Nigerians, n o r t h and south, to j o i n u n d e r a single banner, the N C N C — i n i t i a l l y the National Council o f Nigeria a n d the Cameroons, eventually the National Council o f Nigerian Citizens—"the first mass nationalist party i n Africa south o f the Sahara," one scholar has called i t .

36

Cheek b y j o w l , his leading competitor was Obefami A w o l o w o , w h o s e ethnic

organization,

Egbe O m o

Oduduwa,

helped

to

deepen a Y o r u b a consciousness i n the 1920s a n d 1930s a n d w h o s e animus t o w a r d the ambitious I g b o — a n aspiring "master race," he called t h e m — h e l p e d to t u r n Y o r u b a into a counteridentity i n the 1940s. ( I n Y o r u b a m y t h , O d u d u w a o n instruction f r o m the supreme g o d O l o r u n came to earth at He Ife, w h e r e his sixteen sons f o u n d e d the sixteen Y o r u b a kingdoms.) The fortunes o f Azikiwe's and A w o l o w o ' s very different aspirations w e r e clarified 176

CHAPTER 6

d u r i n g the relatively smooth process o f imperial divestment

be­

t w e e n 1946 and 1954, w h e n the constitutional provisions for a British-style central government resting o n Nigeria's familiar three regions

congealed.

Once

independence

was

certain,

Chief

A w o l o w o k n e w just w h a t he wanted: to maximize Y o r u b a p o w e r i n the n e w state. But A z i k i w e n o longer d i d . I n a fine illustration o f the Icarus Effect, the closer Azikiwe's anticolonial nationalism came to success, the more his vision blurred. H e cut his ties w i t h the Zikist militants w i t h o u t b i n d i n g n e w ones. I n stutter steps, he claimed an identity as I g b o i n 1948, reaffirmed his c o m m i t m e n t to a w h o l e Nigeria i n 1951, then accepted the provisional premier­ ship o f the Igbo-dominated eastern region i n 1954. M e a n w h i l e , i n a

critical early

round

o f elections

i n the

western

region,

A w o l o w o ' s Y o r u b a party, the A c t i o n Group, trounced Azikiwe's NCNC, w h i c h , w e a k i n the west and d o w n r i g h t feeble i n the north, became w h a t A w o l o w o ' s hostile imagination made o f it f r o m the start: the I g b o party. A z i k i w e , n o longer the quintessen­ tial Nigerian, was simply the great I g b o c h a m p i o n o f indepen­ dence w h o n o w served as decorous head o f state. The Nigerian state never w o r k e d . Initially it was Fulani emirs— nervous about independence, contemptuous o f democracy, and comfortable w i t h v i o l e n c e — w h o b e t w e e n I960 and 1965

sub­

verted the constitution b y rigging elections and census counts alike. W i t h A z i k i w e ' s NCNC standing aside, the north's allies cre­ ated a n e w mid-west region f r o m a piece o f A w o l o w o ' s h o m e base, then jailed A w o l o w o himself. W h e n A z i k i w e finally d i d re­ sist northern thuggery, chaos ensued and the army stepped i n , eliminating electoral politics altogether. The contest shifted to the army. W h e n northern interests gained control o f it, the I g b o military, responding to the murder and mass exodus o f I g b o residents i n the n o r t h and h o p i n g to trigger a gen­ eral southern resistance to Fulani aggression, declared the eastern region the independent state o f Biafra. I n 1967 it was A w o l o w o , free once more and a Y o r u b a hero, w h o t o y e d w i t h the I g b o just NATIONALISM WORLDWIDE

/ 77

as the I g b o A z i k i w e h a d left the Y o r u b a dangling a f e w years earlier. I n fact, the p r o u d I g b o chiefs seemed constitutionally u n ­ able to maintain alliances o f any k i n d . Suffering casualties several times greater than, say, the U n i t e d States h a d experienced d u r i n g the entire Second W o r l d War, the Igbo—isolated, o u t g u n n e d , b l o c k a d e d — w e r e starved into submission b y 1970. A z i k i w e , w h o h a d cut his moorings to side w i t h Biafra, drifted into irrelevance. F r o m the beginning, the rulers o f Nigeria sought structural solu­ tions to its ethnic problems. Riding o n the m o m e n t u m o f British colonial policy, Nigeria's original tripartite division consolidated m u t u a l l y exclusive Fulani-Hausa, Y o r u b a , a n d I g b o bastions. As c o m p e t i t i o n a m o n g the b i g three b r o k e out o f bounds, one alter­ native was to eliminate regions entirely i n favor o f a single inte­ grated Nigeria. The first o f the military rulers, an I g b o , tried to impose that answer i n 1966, o n l y to be k i l l e d along w i t h his p l a n i n six months. His successor, Y a k u b u G o w o n , set off i n the o p p o ­ site direction, s u b d i v i d i n g Nigeria's regions into t w e l v e states, w h i c h b y the e n d o f the century h a d m u l t i p l i e d to thirty-six. A l t h o u g h a fragmented Nigeria d i d complicate m o b i l i z a t i o n for the Y o r u b a and the I g b o , it rarely enhanced self-determination for the 250 or so smaller tribes, a r o u n d 40 percent o f the total p o p u l a ­ tion, w h o were even m o r e l i k e l y to be splintered as the n u m b e r o f states increased. Nigeria offered a particularly dramatic illustration o f the O n i o n Effect that hard, Western-style constitutional struc­ tures c o u l d set i n m o t i o n . Peeling o f f a large ethnic group's p o w e r i n order to liberate the m i n o r i t y g r o u p beneath it o n l y installed that g r o u p as the majority over another m i n o r i t y beneath it, and so o n indefinitely. The prospect o f Biafran independence p r o m i s e d n o greater leeway for the scores o f small tribes i n the southeast. Indicatively, the most c o m m i t t e d Nigerians may have b e e n leaders like G o w o n , a m e m b e r o f a small middle-belt tribe, w h o feared that w i t h a total b r e a k d o w n o f Nigeria the n o r t h e r n emirates w o u l d s w a l l o w his people w h o l e . As a w k w a r d as the constitutional structure sometimes made it 178

CHAPTER 6

for ethnic mobilizations, i n the e n d they organized Nigeria's p u b ­ lic affairs. Parties, churches, unions, a n d the like p r o v i d e d almost n o competing, cross-cutting affiliations. W h a t l o o k e d like expe­ diency i n a chief like A w o l o w o , veering n o w t o w a r d a central government, n o w t o w a r d regional autonomy, n o w t o w a r d local e m p o w e r m e n t , w e r e the tactics o f an ethnically r o o t e d self-inter­ est: serve himself, solidify his Y o r u b a constituency. I n the same spirit, Y o r u b a and Fulani-Hausa distrust o f the I g b o never slack­ ened. Thirty years after the outbreak o f civil war, n o I g b o h e l d a post o f any significance i n the military and o n l y one o c c u p i e d a managerial p o s i t i o n i n the civil service. Competing ethnic loyalties destroyed p u b l i c values. N o d o u b t British rule had set the stage. B y its nature colonialism taught its subjects to evade the state's p o w e r a n d appropriate its resources. I n addition, Nigerians carried three special burdens f r o m British imperialism: the practice o f leaving important economic decisions to private companies, a barebones infrastructure, and a desiccated interregional trade. Outsiders d o m i n a t e d the export business. W h e n major o i l discoveries w e r e made i n the transitional 1950s, the British d i d n o t h i n g to protect t h e m as a tax base for the state. As a consequence, independent Nigeria financed itself t h r o u g h concessions. N o t h i n g invited l o o t i n g quite so grandly as the ongo­ ing sale o f the country's opportunities and resources. Civilian p o l i ­ ticians routinely b o u g h t elections and stole p u b l i c funds. W h e n military rulers t o o k p o w e r from them, they stole even more freely. I n the 1970s w h e n G o w o n h e l d the reins o f government loosely and i n the 1990s w h e n Sani Abacha p u l l e d t h e m tight, c o r r u p t i o n ran rampant, just t h r o u g h different channels. Restraint was a per­ sonal matter. O n e o f the testimonials offered i n m e m o r y o f Mosh o o d K. O. Abiola, the martyred president-elect o f 1993, was that h o w e v e r d u b i o u s l y he had acquired his immense w e a l t h , he at least k e p t it i n Nigeria. Overall, the results w e r e

disastrous.

Plagued b y crime, r u l e d b y violence, and infested b y disease, Nigerians i n 1990 averaged an annual income b e l o w $300—by

NATIONALISM WORLDWIDE

1 79

contrast, for instance, to $3,170 i n Venezuela, another equatorial, oil-rich country. The biggest w i n n e r was n o t an ethnic g r o u p b u t the army, w h i c h aside f r o m the interlude o f the Second Republic, 1979 to 1983, r u l e d Nigeria u n t i l 1999. A t the m o m e n t o f independence, n o t h i n g had encouraged the army to act as a l a w u n t o itself. Early i n the 1960s, i n fact, it was modest i n size and professional i n style. Nor, despite the Biafran war, d i d the Nigerian military acquire importance t h r o u g h warfare. It evolved i n the spaces that the f e w other potentially statewide institutions w e r e t o o fragile or fragmented to occupy. Once there, the military functioned as a facsimile government, w i t h its o w n lines o f authority, mechanisms o f enforcement, and avenues o f o p p o r t u n i t y . As rule n u m b e r one, it insulated itself against outside interference. I n a d d i t i o n to the standing threat o f force, the division o f Nigeria i n t o m o r e a n d m o r e states and the removal o f its capital f r o m vibrant Lagos to isolated Abuja scattered a n d distanced its civilian opponents. Succession to leadership usually meant k i l l i n g one's predecessor. I n m a n y ways, Abaca's m a d rule f r o m 1993 to his death i n 1997 was the logical outcome. Even after the exposure o f the military government's m o n u m e n t a l c o r r u p t i o n , the army's unmatched organization assured victory for Gen. O l u s e g u n Obasanjo a n d his People's Democratic party i n the elections o f 1999. But i f the army functioned as Nigeria's shadow state, it h a d n o standing whatsoever as p r o x y for a Nigerian nation. The h i g h p o i n t o f a Nigerian identity came i n cheers for its soccer team d u r i n g the 1994 and 1998 W o r l d Cup competition. N o m y t h exp l a i n e d Nigeria's p r i m o r d i a l origins. I n the end, the state's severely l i m i t e d meaning h e l p e d it survive. The c o m p l e x w e b b i n g o f private interests and m u t u a l suspicions that b l o c k e d the integrat i o n o f Nigeria simultaneously checked

its dismantling. Like

wrestlers tangled o n the mat, w h o w o u l d dare to let go first? W h e n the I g b o d i d i n 1967, they p a i d i n b l o o d : N o other ethnic g r o u p ¡80

CHAPTER 6

risked d e m a n d i n g an independent state. Nigerians stayed together to serve themselves. Appropriately, as civil government returned at the e n d o f the century, the statesman most often l i o n i z e d i n memory

was

A w o l o w o — a f f e c t i o n a t e l y , A w o — t h e master

of

Y o r u b a loyalty a n d political expediency.

NATIONALISM WORLDWIDE

/ 81

CHAPTER

7

Global Nationalism

I n a transformation that pivoted o n the years 1967 to 1972, nationalism changed f r o m a w o r l d w i d e spread o f m a n y movements into a global p h e n o m e n o n w i t h many variations. Each nationalist movement still had its o w n story, o f course. Neverthe­ less, d u r i n g these years, the simultaneous eruptions that b r o u g h t nationalism back to Europe, spread it to N o r t h America, and kept it alive i n scores o f postcolonial settings rendered it implausible to t h i n k o f nationalism as so m a n y events that just h a p p e n e d to crop u p everywhere at the same time. T o see w h a t any explanation o f this extraordinary flourishing has to r e c k o n w i t h , let us take a tour o f nationalist outbreaks i n the late 1960s and early 1970s, starting i n N o r t h America and e n d i n g i n Asia: first French Canada, t h e n the black ghettos o f the U n i t e d States, N o r t h e r n Ireland, Wales and Scotland i n the U n i t e d K i n g d o m , Spanish Basque territory, Bel­ g i u m , Rwanda and B u r u n d i , Israel, Malaysia, and Vietnam, w i t h glances at Cuba, Brittany, Catalonia, N o r w a y ,

Czechoslovakia,

Yugoslavia, Palestine, a n d Sri Lanka. French Canadian grievances h a d been festering for at least a

century. A l t h o u g h the f o u n d i n g act o f the confederation i n 1867 built bilingualism i n t o the Canadian Parliament, the trend ran strongly t o w a r d English monolingualism, especially w i t h the addi­ t i o n o f four n e w provinces extending west o f Ontario to the Pa­ cific Ocean, all o f w h i c h conducted their affairs i n English early i n the t w e n t i e t h century. I n 1903, as nationalism t h r o u g h o u t Europe t o o k its linguistic turn, H e n r i Bourassa, the extraordinarily durable voice o f the Q u é b é c o i s cause, laid out its case. Canada, f o u n d e d as t w o equal nations, was fast falling under the c o n t r o l o f the English. O n l y a m o n o l i n g u a l Quebec c o u l d protect the French c o m m u n i t y and its superior Christian culture f r o m dissolution. A f e w years earlier, Flemish leaders h a d made almost the same case in Belgium. B e t w e e n 1870 a n d 1950, perhaps the highest birthrates i n the Western w o r l d i n c o m b i n a t i o n w i t h l i m i t e d economic o p p o r t u n i ­ ties encouraged large numbers o f Quebec's citizens, especially its y o u n g m e n , to migrate. Migration, i n turn, stretched a n d strength­ ened a sense o f Q u é b é c o i s connectedness a n d hence the urge to call it a distinctive nation. T h e n as opportunities expanded dra­ matically after 1945, births d r o p p e d abruptly, h a l v i n g the n u m b e r o f babies per adult w o m a n d u r i n g the 1960s alone and leaving the province w i t h one o f the Western w o r l d ' s lowest rates o f repro­ duction. A l t h o u g h French speakers still constituted almost 80 per­ cent o f Quebec's p o p u l a t i o n i n 1970, fears o f s l i p p i n g into a m i n o r i t y even at h o m e g r i p p e d the champions o f a Q u é b é c o i s distinctiveness. It was then that Bourassa's agenda finally trans­ lated i n t o a nationalist movement,

especially p o p u l a r

among

Quebec's y o u n g adults, w i t h belligerent demands for something b e t w e e n extensive provincial a u t o n o m y and outright indepen­ dence. B y 1970 French was the official language o f Quebec and a systematic b i l i n g u a l i s m was official Canada-wide

policy. W i t h

other ethnic groups also pressing for recognition a n d English speakers i n retreat, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau a year later de­ clared: "[T]here is n o official culture."

1

GLOBAL NATIONALISM

183

Beginning w i t h the local struggles o f m a n y Southern black groups and evolving into the campaign that Martin Luther K i n g , Jr., l e d to victory, the civil rights m o v e m e n t m o b i l i z e d a n e w black consciousness i n the U n i t e d States, o n l y to lose c o n t r o l o f its pur­ poses after the legislative victories o f 1964 and 1965. I n 1966, as calls for Black Power rang t h r o u g h the u r b a n ghettos, black na­ tionalism resurfaced—inchoate b u t very m u c h i n the m o o d o f the m o m e n t . T o the accompaniment o f riots across the cities i n the North, it played o n widespread black frustrations over the great deal that h a d not changed rather than the great deal that had. A t the forefront o f the n e w black nationalist assertions was cultural pride: a creativity i n the arts, the beauty i n blackness, a t r i u m p h over the curse o f slavery, the celebration o f an African heritage. Race, always far more salient i n the diaspora t h a n i n Africa itself, now

returned to A m e r i c a n discourse b y w a y o f the people w h o

h a d been most victimized b y the concept: appropriate the p o w e r o f the oppressor. Leading black nationalists foresaw a sequence: first cultural pride, t h e n economic leverage, finally political freedom. Enthusi­ asts, however, c o u l d n o t wait. Late i n 1966 the Black Panthers, a militant ghetto-empowering g r o u p , d e m a n d e d "a U n i t e d N a t i o n s supervised plebiscite to be h e l d t h r o u g h o u t the black c o l o n y i n w h i c h o n l y black colonial subjects w i l l be a l l o w e d to participate, for the purpose o f determining the w i l l o f black p e o p l e as to their national destiny." That colonial analogy, b r i d g i n g A m e r i c a n a n d 2

African experiences a n d expressing n e w defiance i n a postcolonial age, lay at the center o f Black Power as its original theoreti­ cians, Stokely Carmichael a n d Charles H a m i l t o n , formulated it, a n d its sweeping sense o f change caught o n especially a m o n g the y o u n g activists w h o t u r n e d nationalist rhetoric into

everyday

speech. A r o u n d I960, British administrators i n N o r t h e r n Ireland

finally

realized that the authoritarian spirit o f Ulster's f o u n d i n g hero, Sir E d w a r d Carson, h a d h a d its day, a n d for the first time since parti184

CHAPTER 7

t i o n , they o p e n e d the issue o f Protestant d o m i n a t i o n a crack for reconsideration. U n t i l then, policies h a d o n l y hardened the status q u o . Eliminating p r o p o r t i o n a l representation

i n 1929 h a d

left

Catholics w i t h a f e w pockets o f local control, n o say i n the general government, a n d chronic poverty. British officials i n the n o r t h t u r n e d a b l i n d eye to the everyday evidence o f economic discrimination; Irish officials to the south offered n o t h i n g m o r e constructive than h o l l o w rhetoric. T h e n i n 1963, moderate British governors p o k e d gingerly into this chasm separating Protestant rulers from Catholic subjects,

o n l y to fall headlong i n t o the rush o f

events. Rioting i n 1969 b r o u g h t troops from Britain; escalating v i o lence i n 1970 a n d 1971 culminated o n January 30, 1972—Bloody S u n d a y — w h e n police fired into a Catholic c r o w d . I n the w a k e o f the police riot, the British t o o k over the government,

thereby

hardening antagonisms further. The Irish Republican A r m y , marginal for decades, n o w emerged f r o m l i m b o to redefine the conflict as guerrilla warfare and reestablish its fading lines to Irish A m e r i can f u n d raisers a n d m u n i t i o n suppliers. Meanwhile, W e l s h and Scottish nationalism rose f r o m n o w h e r e i n Britain itself. Stirrings i n Wales dated f r o m the 1880s, w h e n nationalists generated a flurry o f interest b y calling for the preserv a t i o n o f a distinctively W e l s h culture t h r o u g h the Welsh language. Language was still central i n 1963, w h e n after a half century's lapse a n d a relentless decline i n W e l s h speakers, an assertive, y o u t h - d r i v e n movement to mandate its use sparked

an

even w i d e r interest i n autonomy. As W e l s h nationalism heated u p , interest i n Scottish self-government, scarcely an issue earlier, came alive i n 1968 w i t h the sudden p o p u l a r i t y o f its c h a m p i o n , the Scottish National Party, w h i c h d r e w heavily o n politically skeptical y o u n g people. Already animated b y a spirit o f modernization, Scottish nationalism received a significant boost f r o m the offshore o i l p r o d u c t i o n that c o m m e n c e d i n 1973. Basque nationalism, caught i n the crossfire o f Spanish politics, stayed alive as a f o r m o f resistance to the Franco regime, w h i c h GLOBAL NATIONALISM

¡85

d i d w h a t it c o u l d to obliterate the c o m m u n i t y . A l t h o u g h the Euskarian language remained its symbolic core, Basque nationalism shed its Catholic, royalist shell and its claims to a distinct race i n favor o f ties to the political left a n d claims to an indigenous social­ ist spirit. For the first time, non-Euskara speakers—a substantial majority o f the Basque p o p u l a t i o n , t o o — c o u l d become adopted members o f the movement. After Franco's oppression, all Basque politicians favored greater autonomy, b u t o n l y the militant ETA, rejuvenated b y the mid-sixties, demanded independence. A n i m ­ portant source o f the ETA's support came f r o m u p w a r d l y m o b i l e Basque y o u t h w h o resented the influence o f outside economic interests and the c o m p e t i t i o n f r o m newcomers i n the scramble to benefit f r o m the region's recent prosperity. I n 1968 the ETA, n o w i n Leninist hands, arranged the assassination o f a despised police chief a n d t h r e w the r e g i o n into t u r m o i l . The more zealous the ferreting out o f the killers, the deeper Basque hostility to external governance grew. W h e n o p e n politics returned i n 1975, attitudes t o w a r d the conspiratorial ETA still cleaved the c o m m u n i t y , b u t Basque nationalism u n i t e d all parties. The o r i g i n o f Belgium's postwar divisions actually dated f r o m the laws o f 1931 and 1932, w h i c h formalized the tripartite division a m o n g a m o n o l i n g u a l French Wallonia, a m o n o l i n g u a l Flemish Flanders, and a shared Brussels. Demographics eroded the ar­ rangement f r o m the start. I n 1963, w i t h the Flemish, once the p o o r relations, n o w a prospering majority and the Walloons sliding per­ manently into a minority, officials negotiated one more i n a series o f byzantine readjustments o f territory that c o m p l e x i f i e d the rules g o v e r n i n g Brussels a n d even carved its suburbs linguistically. M u ­ tual anger o n l y m o u n t e d . B y 1968 it was n o longer possible to f o r m a government, a n d a B e l g i u m beset b y d u e l i n g nationalisms fell into a p r o l o n g e d constitutional crisis. The 1960s d i d not initiate b u t d i d intensify the long, b l o o d y conflict b e t w e e n Tutsi, traditionally the rulers i n w h a t became Rwanda i n 1961 and B u r u n d i i n 1962, a n d H u t u , energized b y the 186

CHAPTER 7

prospect o f independence to assert a c o n t r o l over Rwanda that their preponderance i n the p o p u l a t i o n seemed to justify. O n the eve o f independence, w i t h crucial assistance f r o m their Belgian colonial masters, H u t u i n Rwanda drove m u c h o f the Tutsi estab­ lishment into exile a n d assumed c o n t r o l o f the government. B y 1962 it was o p e n season o n the Tutsi minority, and an abortive invasion o f Rwanda the next year b y Tutsi exiles o n l y spread the disaster: I n retaliation, over ten thousand Rwandan Tutsi w e r e massacred. B u r u n d i p o w e r t u r n e d the tables i n 1965, i m p o s i n g a Tutsi government i n Rwanda, slaughtering H u t u leaders,

and

thereby consolidating Tutsi c o n t r o l over b o t h countries. Never subtle, Tutsi celebrated their authority over Rwanda b y a ceremo­ nial display o f "the genitals o f defeated H u t u chiefs." The spiral o f 3

violence o n l y shot higher. I m p l e m e n t i n g a p l a n that h a d been dis­ cussed since 1963, the Tutsi military used an uprising i n 1972 as an excuse to m u r d e r a r o u n d 300,000 H u t u , specifically those w h o h a d any record o f education or attainment. (As a m o d e l for this "selective genocide," Tutsi c o u l d l o o k to a comparable Portuguese slaughter o f trained Africans i n A n g o l a b e t w e e n 1959 a n d I96I.) This time French helicopters a n d Belgian m u n i t i o n s backed the Tutsi. H u t u nationalism was temporarily crushed. As Israelis experienced their o w n surge o f nationalism after 1967, Jewish nationalism

flourished

even more grandly i n the

U n i t e d States. For Jews w h o h a d faced neither the Holocaust n o r the perils o f w a r t i m e Russia—who had thrived, i n other w o r d s , w h i l e millions o f others d i e d — s u p p o r t for Israel served as a k i n d o f reparation. W i t h about half the w o r l d ' s Jewish p o p u l a t i o n and a preponderance o f its wealth, A m e r i c a n Jews w e r e Israel's m a i n ­ stay f r o m the outset, c o n t r i b u t i n g sufficient private funds to cover over half o f its balance-of-payment deficit d u r i n g the 1950s a n d 1960s. I n m y r i a d other w a y s — t h e use o f H e b r e w , songs a n d dances, the l i o n i z i n g o f founders, y o u t h camps a n d adult visits— the Israeli connection p r o v i d e d critical w h e r e w i t h a l for a Jewish American identity. That alone, however, added u p to an enthusiGLOBAL NATIONALISM

187

astic partisanship, sometimes n o m o r e than a self-congratulatory ritual o f cheers and donations. W h a t transformed ethnicity into nationalism was the outcome o f t w o Israeli clashes w i t h A r a b armies: a q u i c k euphoric victory i n 1967, a sobering stalemate i n 1973. The first triggered a messianic t u r n i n Israeli politics, elevating fundamentalist religion, military glory, and irredentist ambitions to c o m m a n d i n g heights; the sec­ o n d p l u m b e d deep doubts about the state's defenses against a r i n g o f enemies. B o t h moments highlighted Israel's incomplete­ ness i n ways that defied fulfillment. Biblical boundaries stretched indeterminately o u t w a r d ; security needs m u l t i p l i e d endlessly ev­ erywhere. Here was the stuff o f nationalism. N o t yet master o f its land, not yet safe f r o m its enemies—not yet there, as it w e r e — unfinished Israel i n v o k e d the m o v e m e n t spirit, as it m o b i l i z e d p e o p l e i n the diaspora

finally,

finally,

to complete the task that

w o u l d never end. Publicity for the plight o f Jews i n the Soviet U n i o n then u n d e r l i n e d the essential message to A m e r i c a n Jews w h o , their consciences t o l d them, h a d once utterly failed their k i n : Never again! W i t h independence i n 1957, Malaya (Malaysia) inherited the su­ p e r i m p o s e d categories a n d concepts o f British imperialism: Malay, the M u s l i m majority o f the p o p u l a t i o n ; Chinese, a p p r o x i m a t e l y a t h i r d o f it; and Indian, a small minority. Chinese success as petty capitalists was b a c k g r o u n d to a rising Malay

self-consciousness,

particularly a m o n g y o u n g m e n , that expressed itself i n anger at the barriers to c o m m u n a l prosperity. Widespread anti-Chinese rioting erupted i n 1969. Violence w o r k e d . B y 1971 the g o v e r n ­ ment's n e w economic p o l i c y restricted Chinese opportunities a n d e x p a n d e d t h e m for Malays, transforming the state into b o t h an expression and a source o f ethnic differentiation. A n ageless tradition o f resistance to outside oppressors—histor­ ically the Chinese, i n the heyday o f colonialism the French,

finally

the Americans—gave a V i e t n a m constructed b y imperialism a n d crisscrossed w i t h regional, tribal, a n d religious divisions a sem188

CHAPTER 7

blance o f wholeness. The very intensity o f A m e r i c a n - w r o u g h t destructiveness tightened those loose connections. As the A m e r i c a n military extended its operations across the entire country, the o p ­ posing armies o f the V i e t m i n h i n the n o r t h and the V i e t c o n g i n the south forged links; as predatory militia and arbitrary air assaults w r e a k e d havoc i n the south, otherwise scattered peasants rallied a r o u n d the Vietcong's radical, nationalist local governments; and as the rulers i n Saigon used their p o w e r to p u n i s h dissenters o f all kinds, they b r o u g h t even Buddhists a n d Marxists into a c o m m o n anticolonial alliance. The success o f the A m e r i c a n w a r i n g i v i n g these diverse pieces a n e w cohesion was revealed i n striking fash­ i o n after 1973, w h e n all the advanced w e a p o n r y m o n e y c o u l d b u y d i d not halt the q u i c k collapse o f southern resistance to a national Vietnamese government. A second, speedier w o r l d tour, starting once again i n the West­ ern Hemisphere, suggests h o w m a n y other nationalist currents w e r e swirling a r o u n d these events. Some movements w e r e al­ ready under w a y ; some d i d not ignite u n t i l later; b u t all o f t h e m contributed to this globalizing transformation. The first flush o f the Cuban Revolution, heightened b y the abortive Bay o f Pigs inva­ sion and attempted assassinations o f Fidel Castro himself, b r o u g h t an élan o f postcolonial nationalism to the island d u r i n g the 1960s. A linguistically based Breton nationalism stirred w i t h n e w life dur­ i n g the mid-sixties. Catalonian nationalism revived i n 1969. T o the surprise o f its European neighbors, a referendum i n N o r w a y re­ jected membership i n the European U n i o n . Less expansively b u t n o less revealingly, signs appeared i n several dictatorial socialist countries: Czech assertions o f independence i n 1968; nationalist demands and decentralizing adjustments i n Yugoslavia d u r i n g the 1960s and 1970s; a g r o w i n g anti-Semitism and a deepening urge a m o n g Jews to emigrate that fed o n one another i n the Soviet U n i o n . I n 1974 Greeks and Turks, each i n v o k i n g the sacred o b l i ­ gations o f n a t i o n h o o d , faced off i n Cyprus. The w a r for Biafran independence

absorbed

Nigerian energies

between

1967 and

GLOBAL NATIONALISM

189

1970. Seemingly f r o m n o w h e r e , the Palestinian Liberation Organi­ zation, under a n e w cosmopolitan leadership, raised the banner o f nationalism i n the 1960s a n d k e p t it aloft d u r i n g the 1970s. I n 1971, w h e n Pakistan let loose its Punjabi army a m o n g aggrieved citizens i n the state's separate eastern sector, an I n d i a n invasion checked the slaughter a n d precipitated the Bengali state o f Ban­ gladesh. Early i n the 1970s, i n the face o f relentless Sinhalese ag­ gression, T a m i l nationalism congealed i n t o a d e m a n d for the sepa­ rate state o f Eelam, w i t h the Liberation Tigers o f T a m i l Eelam, f o u n d e d i n 1973, as its spearhead. Those w h o insisted o n treating this w o r l d w i d e e x p l o s i o n as an aberration c o u l d claim the w o r s t was over b y the e n d o f the 1970s. Referenda i n Wales, Scotland, a n d Quebec soundly de­ feated the nationalists there. O u t o f Belgium's crisis came consti­ tutional revisions g i v i n g W a l l o o n s a n d Flemings effective sover­ eignty i n their respective

territories. W e l l before that, B r e t o n

nationalism had dissolved a n d the Black Power m o v e m e n t i n the U n i t e d States h a d disintegrated, armies h a d c o w e d I g b o national­ ism i n Nigeria and H u t u nationalism i n Rwanda, a n d the Soviet U n i o n h a d slammed the l i d o n dissent i n Eastern Europe. Even w h e r e nationalism remained active, it seemed to have settled i n t o a rut. Endemic violence i n N o r t h e r n Ireland, the Basque r e g i o n o f Spain, a n d the Arab-Israeli borderlands,

like the interminable

stalemate i n Cyprus, b l e n d e d i n t o a landscape o f self-perpetuating bitterness. As national governments consolidated their p o w e r i n V i e t n a m and Cuba, they t o o k o n m o r e a n d more o f the charac­ teristics—and the p r o b l e m s — o f postrevolutionary authoritaria­ nism. But it was t o o late to close the gate. Support for Scottish nation­ alism d o u b l e d b e t w e e n the early seventies and nineties; Quebec nationalism e x p l o d e d w i t h greater force than ever late i n the eighties. Decentralizing compromises o n l y w h e t t e d the appetite for m o r e i n B e l g i u m a n d Yugoslavia, w h i c h was disintegrating b y the e n d o f the eighties. D u r i n g the last quarter o f the t w e n t i e t h 190

CHAPTER 7

century a kin-laden, exclusionary black-nationalist i d i o m suffused ghetto life i n the U n i t e d States. Year after year o f brutality i n Northern Ireland not o n l y hardened Catholic Irish nationalism; for the first time it hammered out a distinctively Ulster nationalism, w i t h Ian Paisley its most p r o m i n e n t spokesman and suspicion o f Britain n o w intrinsic to a n e w ethnic identity. So it w e n t everywhere. Like m e n wrestling w i t h a balloon, leaders i n M o s c o w suppressed nationalism here o n l y to have it p o p u p there: Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia again, the Baltic states, finally the c o m ponents o f the collapsing Soviet U n i o n itself. I n 1983 the Sinhalese o u t d i d themselves i n persecuting T a m i l a n d i n the process hardened their competing nationalisms into endless rounds o f guerrilla violence and government repression. W h e n Palestinian nationalism lost steam i n the 1980s, the r o c k - t h r o w i n g y o u t h o f

intifada

gave it n e w energy. A t the horrific e n d o f the spectrum, H u t u nationalists, b y n o means crushed i n the "selective genocide" o f 1972, organized the slaughter o f over half a m i l l i o n Tutsi i n 1994.

W h a t can w e make o f all that? H o w d i d the genie o f global nationalism escape w h e n it d i d , and w h y d i d it continue to w o r k its magic for years afterward? N o t o n l y was this astonishing e r u p t i o n global i n the sense o f integrally w o r l d w i d e ; it was global i n the sense o f comprehensive. A l l the diverse kinds o f nationalism w e r e represented: colonial and quasi-colonial nationalism; class-enhanced nationalism; cultural, linguistic, and religious nationalism; cheek-by-jowl feuding nationalism; a n d intrastate ren e w a l nationalism; as w e l l as b o t h secular and spiritual p a n movements and, finally, tribal protectiveness i n places as different as Zululand, the Canadian north, and Chiapas. T o the surprise o f n o one w h o has been f o l l o w i n g this account, the core o f the answer lies i n the relations between the m o d e r n state i n its great variety and m o d e r n nationalism i n its great variety. Logically i f not always historically, the explanation follows a GLOBAL NATIONALISM

Ì9Ì

three-step sequence: creating a w o r l d o f inviolable states, render­ i n g t h e m i n v a r y i n g degrees dysfunctional, a n d o p e n i n g the w a y for nationalism to challenge them. The first provides us w i t h a b r o a d setting—our outer r i n g o f explanation. The second,

by

s h o w i n g h o w such a great m i x o f states shared i n a c o m m o n d i ­ lemma, brings us a r i n g closer to o u r target; and the third, b y focusing o n the précipitants o f e x p l o s i o n i n the 1960s, justifies the dating o f globalization's arrival: bull's-eye. First the outermost circle: the rigidification o f the state system as the C o l d W a r commenced. C o m i n g out o f the Second W o r l d War, cosmopolitan leaders t h r o u g h o u t Western society read the history o f the recent past and the tea leaves o f the foreseeable future as validation o f the m o d e r n state's centrality. Indeed, failure to de­ fend legitimate states against fascist aggression, it was w i d e l y be­ lieved, h a d m a r k e d the p a t h to war: There must be n o more M a n churias, n o more Munichs. The agency charged w i t h m o n i t o r i n g a peaceful w o r l d , the U n i t e d Nations, was itself a league o f states. A l t h o u g h the U n i t e d Nations repeatedly affirmed a set o f basic h u m a n rights, it just as consistently guaranteed the territorial integ­ rity o f its member states. As the flood o f refugees demonstrated— about the same n u m b e r i n the first postwar decade alone as h a d emigrated f r o m Europe d u r i n g the entire nineteenth c e n t u r y — g i v i n g an organization o f states the responsibility to oversee the world's

unrequited

ambitions

for

self-determination

put

the

chickens i n the care o f the foxes. Those w h o h o p e d the U n i t e d Nations w o u l d transcend its o w n origins and challenge the pre­ dominance o f states w e r e q u i c k l y marginalized as idealists: Real­ ists backed states. The state system that fell i n t o place reigned supreme because the w o r l d ' s t w o superpowers d e p e n d e d o n it. I n a gargantuan extension o f the interwar p r i n c i p l e that each Western state w o u l d e m b o d y one o f the great trio—democracy, socialism, national­ i s m — t h e U n i t e d States a n d the Soviet U n i o n seemed bent o n d i ­ v i d i n g the entire w o r l d i n such terms, i n this case b e t w e e n the t w o 192

CHAPTER 7

they claimed to embody: democracy a n d socialism. A p p r o p r i a t e to its ambitions, the U n i t e d States, traditionally the very m o d e l o f b i g country/small state, vaulted near the t o p o f the b i g states, w i t h a vast centralized government, a m o b i l i z e d military, a n d a secretive apparatus for setting and i m p l e m e n t i n g w o r l d w i d e policies. The essence o f w h a t Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., has called America's i m p e ­ rial presidency was its "capture . . . o f the most vital o f national decisions, the decision to go to war." The European q u i p o f the 4

1950s—that the U n i t e d States was the o n l y country i n history to m o v e directly f r o m c h i l d h o o d to o l d age—had less to d o w i t h the oft-cited sententiousness o f Secretary o f State J o h n Foster Dulles than w i t h this bureaucratic giant's counterrevolutionary oversight o f its vast sphere. As the t w o megastates accumulated clients i n an effort to e x p a n d the range o f their influence, b o t h p l a n n e d p o l i ­ cies i n terms o f a stable state system. Neither s h o w e d m u c h inter­ est i n adding loose people to their side—an ideologically allied political party, for example, or a cluster o f dissident intellectuals. T h e y coveted determinate states covering determinate territories. A t times it seemed that the U n i t e d States never saw a state it d i d n o t like. Even such jerry-rigged ones as South Korea a n d South V i e t n a m and a hypothetical one such as K u w a i t acquired i n v i o l ­ able status. Control i n the Soviet Union's satellites, i n turn, rested o n elaborate intelligence networks a n d massive military force, b o t h extensions o f state p o w e r . B y tacit consent, i n other w o r d s , the C o l d War giants competed for space i n a filled globe. U n l i k e the years b e t w e e n w o r l d wars, w h e n a great m a n y state b o u n d ­ aries seemed experimental—tentative e n o u g h for reconsideration a n d soft e n o u g h for readjustment—the

w o r l d m a p n o w came

complete. W h o ruled, even w h a t system o f government prevailed, m i g h t remain an o p e n question, b u t the states themselves fixed

were

i n place. If, for example, it h a d made perfectly g o o d sense

for the major p o w e r s to create a K u r d i s h state after the First W o r l d War, it made none at all after the Second. B y the same t o k e n , moves t o w a r d splitting established states p r o m p t e d o n l y dire preGLOBAL NATIONALISM

/ 93

dictions: The parts o f a d i v i d e d B e l g i u m or Canada w o u l d be t o o small, t o o constricted. W h o i n the 1970s w o u l d have guessed f r o m these Cassandra cries "that Quebec is comparable to Sweden i n p o p u l a t i o n , natural resources, urbanization, a n d other i m p o r t a n t indicators"?

5

Reified states p o p u l a t e d an imaginary realm that became the o n l y reality. They w e r e the dominoes that fell one u p o n the next, the buffers against invasion, the l a n d masses that one side t o o k as the other let slip away, the votes i n the U n i t e d Nations. Millions o f people p a i d a terrible price for l i v i n g w i t h i n the most coveted o f these units. Nigeria's official government, claiming sovereignty over the most p o p u l o u s a n d potentially the most valuable o f Africa's state units, received funds f r o m the U n i t e d States a n d planes f r o m the Soviet U n i o n so that some o f the people residing there c o u l d k i l l w e l l over a m i l l i o n o f the others w h o favored a state o f their o w n . Something called V i e t n a m — n o t the ravaged

Vietnamese—was

at stake i n the l o n g A m e r i c a n w a r there. Something called Af­ ghanistan—not the brutalized Afghani tribes—was at stake i n the l o n g Soviet w a r there. Lining u p states o n the right side i n the C o l d W a r legitimated almost any action. American c o m p l i c i t y i n the wars that Central A m e r i c a n armies w a g e d against their people a n d Soviet complicity i n the mass starvation o f u p r o o t e d p e o p l e i n the H o r n o f Africa suggest the appalling range o f h u m a n costs. H o w e v e r harsh their rhetoric a n d unscrupulous their designs, that is to say, the C o l d War megastates f o u n d c o m m o n g r o u n d i n an implicit set o f rules: h o w to compete, to negotiate, to calculate w i n n i n g a n d losing. Whose states p r o m i s e d greater security to m o r e o f their citizens? Whose side p r o d u c e d more goods, b u i l t bigger rockets, tallied higher votes i n the General Assembly? Na­ tionalism b r o k e those rules. I f socialism a n d democracy w e r e n o w the behemoths g r a p p l i n g for the b i g stakes, nationalism was the shade f r o m the past that distracted f r o m the real contest. I t came o u t o f the Second W o r l d W a r the pariah, repudiated along w i t h race as an organizing p r i n c i p l e i n a civilized, settled universe. Ac194

CHAPTER 7

c o r d i n g to b o t h o r t h o d o x Marxism and liberal m o d e r n i z a t i o n the­ ory, nationalism was a w a y station, a stage t h r o u g h w h i c h soci­ eties passed as they progressed, a n d those b a c k w a r d e n o u g h to cling to it h a d every reason to expect r o u g h treatment i n the rush to progress. O r p h a n e d b y the war, nationalism had n o c h a m p i o n remotely comparable to the Soviet U n i o n a n d the U n i t e d States. T o the ex­ tent it h a d a home, it lay scattered a m o n g the anticolonial m o v e ­ ments i n Asia a n d Africa, scarcely a p o s i t i o n o f strength i n any contest. Never i n dialogue, o n l y i n tension w i t h the major powers, anticolonialism was an inconvenience that the U n i t e d States i n particular w a n t e d to h u r r y to c o m p l e t i o n — t h a t is, into states w i t h places i n a global system o f states. I n effect, wherever a nationalist m o v e m e n t appeared, it was surrounded b y the C o l d War's w o r l d ­ w i d e encounter b e t w e e n megastates. A l t h o u g h the C o l d War b y n o means h o m o g e n i z e d the m a n y nationalist movements, it d i d force a c o m m o n agenda—a f r a m e w o r k o f p o w e r a n d a set o f tactics—on them. Even w h e n a superpower posed as the sponsor o f a m o v e m e n t — t h e U n i t e d States for Israel, the Soviet U n i o n for Cuba—the relationship d e v o l v e d into p a t r o n and client, each try­ i n g to use the other to its o w n ends. I n most cases, megapowers sought to quash nationalism. Sometimes they d i d ; sometimes they o n l y made matters worse. Nationalists, already considered disrup­ ters, used tactics that w e r e standard for the w e a k against the strong: unpredictable

violence, sabotage, guerrilla

resistance.

Judged even m o r e barbaric for w h a t they d i d , nationalists faced even harsher attacks, inspiring an even more desperate determina­ tion. Postwar British coercion i n East Africa, f o l l o w e d early i n the 1950s b y w h a t Britain and the U n i t e d States made famous as the M a u M a u emergency, set off eight years o f spiraling repressionviolence-repression. W h a t made states d y s f u n c t i o n a l — n o w w e are m o v i n g a ring closer to the heart o f the m a t t e r — d i d not f o l l o w self-evidently from this p u l l i n g a n d hauling, however. It was not just the result GLOBAL NATIONALISM

/ 95

o f t o o m u c h arbitrary violence or kleptocratic rule or general de­ pravation, b u t o f a more c o m p l e x relation b e t w e e n expectations a n d behavior. The crucial fact was that almost n o postcolonial state c o u l d meet the m i n i m u m standards accompanying its cre­ ation. Some o f the difficulty was s i m p l y the deflation o f success: t o o m a n y hopes invested i n independence

alone. I n the post-

colonial w o r l d , disappointment came armed. T h e exponential g r o w t h i n the manufacture a n d distribution o f ever m o r e deadly a n d compact w e a p o n s — a legacy o f the Western w o r l d ' s obses­ sion w i t h warfare—fed n o t o n l y the n e w governments b u t also their unreconstructed opponents. Quantities o f w e a p o n s sent to shore u p the state slipped t h r o u g h official hands. Dispirited troops abandoned quantities more. T h e p r i m a r y loyalty o f soldiers to their fellow soldiers rather t h a n to the state meant that entire seg­ ments o f an army m i g h t shift sides. T h e stakes i n these contests w e r e not better or worse policies; they w e r e legitimate or illegiti­ mate governments—the state o f the state, as it were. I n fact, the expectation o f all governments rose dramatically after midcentury, w r e a k i n g damage a m o n g the o l d established states as w e l l as the n e w fragile ones. T h e basic rights o f citizens i n Western society came to include matters o f i n c o m e protection, medical services, housing subsidies, a n d expensive education that a generation earlier h a d b e e n largely shadows o n the cave w a l l : socialist promises, elite benefits. I f c o m m u n i s t governments still set the standard, capitalist governments f o l l o w e d close b e h i n d , w i t h the U n i t e d States u n d e r w r i t i n g welfare programs i n the patched-up states o f Western Europe by, a m o n g other means, covering their military costs. W h a t started as a grand expansion o f social rights came subtly to encompass higher a n d higher de­ mands for individual rights as w e l l : justice for each person, each person's equality, even each person's fulfillment. N o state, bar none, c o u l d keep the pace. Nationalism, although n o t the o n l y beneficiary o f the state's dif­ ficulties, 196

was a major one. T i m e a n d again, it offered the most

CHAPTER 7

readily available a n d least contested—in one sense o f the term, the most natural—alternative to c o w e d citizenship. I n some postcolonial states it was already activated: N o t all ethnic factions dis­ armed w i t h independence. N o one was better t h a n the fervent nationalists at using associations w i t h the past to rally those disen­ chanted w i t h the present. W h e r e states h a d lost all legitimacy, eth­ nic n e t w o r k s c o u l d even p r o v i d e a substitute government. Experi­ ences d u r i n g the Second W o r l d W a r revealed h o w applicable these general guides were to Europe as w e l l . As E. H . Carr observed i n 1945, it was Hitler's Europe m o r e than Hitler's Germany that h a d released the demons i n nationalism for all the w o r l d to see. The G e r m a n army, destabilizing as it c o n ­ quered, o p e n e d the w a y for forces once contained w i t h i n Eu­ rope's states to rise out o f the rubble and take p o w e r for t h e m ­ selves. W i t h the dismemberment o f Czechoslovakia, eager Slovak collaborators under Father Tiso anticipated an independent state w i t h i n a fascist Europe. Flemish fascists reveled i n m u c h the same a m b i t i o n . The defeat o f Yugoslavia unleashed Croatia's fascist na­ tionalists, the murderous Ustase; Serbian antifascist resistance o n its part d o u b l e d as a nationalist movement. Fascism gave n e w life to Breton a u t o n o m y and antifascism n e w life to Basque auton­ o m y . K i l l i n g Jews i n cooperation w i t h Germany a n d e x p e l l i n g Germans u n d e r the aegis o f the Soviet U n i o n transformed Poland into a genuine nation-state. Even w h e n postwar

governments

capped these destructive energies, an essential message remained: Nationalism w o u l d be w a i t i n g i n case those states weakened. N o w to the center o f our target. W h y i n the context o f the C o l d W a r as states o f all sorts experienced m o u n t i n g stress d i d national­ ism globalize at the particular time it d i d , r o u g h l y 1967 to 1973? I n one sense the answer retells the story o f the emperor's clothes. O n l y a f e w p e o p l e needed to demonstrate that the state, even a p o w e r f u l state, c o u l d be had. A m o n g the disaffected i n the postcolonial states that materialized one after another i n the 1960s, this insight lay inherent i n their previous success against a colonial GLOBAL NATIONALISM

197

p o w e r a n d hence immediately available for use against the n e w independent states. Elsewhere, however, it came literally i n a se­ ries o f news flashes, beamed a r o u n d the w o r l d incident b y inci­ dent, one atop the other. Bearding Uncle Sam—whether i n Oak­ land, Chicago, or H u e — p r o v i d e d especially electrifying moments. N o t h i n g gave a sharper edge to the message than the so-called student rebellions o f the late 1960s, i n w h i c h risk-taking y o u t h i n Europe a n d America r o c k e d state authority back o n its heels. Y o u t h talked to y o u t h . M a n y o f the nationalist movements that erupted b e t w e e n

1967 a n d 1 9 7 3 — i n Basque Spain, Malaysia,

Quebec, Scotland, Wales, and the Black Power centers o f the U n i t e d States, for e x a m p l e — d r e w their strength from contingents o f y o u n g , militant followers, m a n y o f w h o m h a d n o previous ex­ perience, and n o faith whatsoever, i n politics as usual. I n the t u m b l e o f events, b o t h tactics a n d language q u i c k l y stan­ dardized. The nationalists' use o f news media a n d vice versa de­ v e l o p e d into a m u t u a l l y refined science. Television i n particular, excellent at c o m m u n i c a t i n g a sense o f immediacy a n d involve­ ment for its global audience, m o v e d restlessly from site t o site i n search o f fresh excitement. Activists, alert t o w h a t made news, played t o the cameras. Other nationalists w a t c h e d a n d learned. I f the 1968 Tet Offensive i n V i e t n a m was the most elaborately p l a n n e d a n d courageously executed o f these events, it still be­ l o n g e d t o a w o r l d w i d e pattern o f calculated appeals t o a global audience. Nationalists also learned terrorist tactics f r o m y o u n g radicals a n d from one another. A l t h o u g h assassination was at least as o l d a nationalist tactic as the Serbian shooting o f A r c h d u k e Fer­ d i n a n d i n 1914, h i d d e n explosives and automatic w e a p o n s gave m u r d e r a n e w and far less discriminating meaning i n the late six­ ties. Terrorism, some nationalists h o p e d , w o u l d disrupt, i n t i m i ­ date, a n d recruit. Nationalists w h o w e r e i m p r i s o n e d or executed p r o v i d e d their movements w i t h martyrs. W i t h b o r r o w e d tactics w e n t rhetoric that sounded m u c h the same a r o u n d the w o r l d . I f the oppression o f Bretons a n d Q u é b é c o i s seemed remote f r o m 198

CHAPTER 7

the oppression o f I g b o and Algerians, they were still j o i n e d at the level o f a global language. I n 1990, w h e n a rebel chieftain i n Mos­ l e m K o s o v o i n v o k e d the heritage o f the French Revolution i n be­ half o f his cause, he fell into a line o f leaders m o r e than t w o decades l o n g w h o addressed a far-flung audience t h r o u g h a u n i ­ versalized nationalist i d i o m .

Just as global nationalism seemed to be gathering into an irresistible force, its fortunes t o o k a strange t u r n . I n the broadest terms, the same conjunction o f circumstances p r o d u c i n g this global surge i n nationalism also circumscribed its effective­ ness, another i n the self-correcting sequences that dotted national­ ism's history. I n this case, it was the very means o f mass c o m m u ­ nication p o w e r i n g global nationalism that then l i m i t e d its success. Media that p u b l i c i z e d nationalism also spread the w o r d about other movements—some that competed directly w i t h nationalism, some that s i m p l y distracted attention f r o m it. I n an ever more c r o w d e d field o f causes, nationalism's potential recruits dispersed. Screaming the same messages louder a n d louder tended o n l y to d u l l p u b l i c interest: After an initial splash o f attention, more was less to a w o r l d w i d e audience. I n particular, nationalism suffered from a backlash against calculated acts o f violence. Appropriately, h u m a n rights politics, t u r n i n g the same communications system to its o w n advantage, developed right alongside nationalism's global phase. A m o n g the tactics that rose out o f the n e w symbiotic relation b e t w e e n m o d e r n media and globalized challenges t o authority, guerrilla violence was the most readily copied.

Movements—

indeed mere handfuls o f p e o p l e — w i t h n o connection whatsoever to nationalism flooded the media market w i t h one b l o o d y , desta­ bilizing episode after another u n t i l p u b l i c sympathy for these acts, and for any g r o u p associated w i t h them, was completely drained. I f nationalism d i d n o t stand o u t as a perpetrator, it d i d take the GLOBAL NATIONALISM

/ 99

greatest b u r d e n o f blame. Powerful enemies, automatically l i n k i n g nationalism to b l o o d s h e d everywhere, never l o o k e d back t o cor­ rect a mistake. The same forces p r o p e l l i n g nationalism i n t o its global phase, i n other w o r d s , w e r e even m o r e effective i n d a m n ­ i n g its reputation. For all the fuss about it, nationalism h a d m u c h greater difficulty achieving m i n i m a l l y secure objectives after the mid-1960s t h a n d u r i n g its heyday b e t w e e n the 1890s a n d the 1920s. Tenacious it certainly was, b u t it left a record heavily freighted w i t h endemic, in-and-out movements rather than progressively successful ones. O n balance, the Cold War superpowers and their local-party allies d i d w e l l i n stymieing nationalism, at least outside their o w n d o ­ mains. Indeed, states o f all sorts that set their minds to i t — N i g e r i a i n Biafra, Indonesia i n East Timor, Russia i n C h e c h n y a — t u r n e d their backs o n compromise a n d exacted a terrible price for nation­ alist resistance. O n l y the wholesale disintegration o f the Soviet system p r o v e d to be a nationalist bonanza. B e t w e e n 1989 and 1991, i n an u p ­ dated version o f anticolonial nationalism, states that Soviet i m p e r i ­ alism had h e l d i n place since the e n d o f the Second W o r l d War, reasserted independence i n the name o f a nation's freedom: H u n ­ garians, Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Romanians, a n d

finally

Germans

o n their w a y to reunification, w i t h Bulgarians still perched some­ w h e r e i n l i m b o . M e a n w h i l e , the Soviet U n i o n itself dissolved i n t o fifteen parts—fundamentally, administrative units that over the de­ cades h a d shaped and cultivated even more than they h a d ex­ pressed ethnic consciousness w i t h i n the Soviet d o m a i n . Here, far m o r e than i n the so-called satellite states, the crucial event was a quick, sometimes overnight transfer o f p o w e r , jurisdictional u n i t b y jurisdictional unit. Some o f these, such as the Baltic states o f Lithuania a n d Estonia a n d the Transcaucasian states o f A r m e n i a a n d Azerbaijan c o m b i n e d a reasonable ethnic integrity w i t h na­ tionalist aspirations. Others, such as Ukraine a n d Georgia, merely set boundaries a r o u n d feuding ethnic opponents w i t h c o m p e t i n g 200

CHAPTER 7

political ambitions. Still others, such as Belorus a n d Kyrgyzstan, expressed n o nationalist sentiments o f any k i n d w o r t h m e n t i o n ­ ing. Finally, the transfer o f government powers i n units such as Uzbekistan a n d Turkmenistan simply gave n e w titles to the o l d local dictators. The e x p l o s i o n o f the Soviet system created a blaz­ i n g m o m e n t o f glory, to be sure, b u t o n l y i n a f e w cases, notably along the Baltic, d i d strong nationalist movements contribute to the outcome. Interestingly, one o f the strongest nationalist i m ­ pulses emerging out o f the o l d Soviet U n i o n appeared i n Russia itself, n o w a w o u n d e d country w h e r e past glories a n d irredentist ambitions meet w i t h especially combustible possibilities. D u r i n g the last quarter o f the t w e n t i e t h century, it was national­ ism's t w o most p r o m i n e n t c o m p e t i t o r s — b y n o w n o longer social­ ism a n d democracy—that

enjoyed the most striking success.

Where states seriously deteriorated or even disappeared, w a r l o r d ism—that is, rule b y self-sustaining armies—usually bested na­ tionalism. Power i n those settings derived from the ready avail­ ability o f weapons, their awesome destructiveness, a n d their ease o f use. The rise a n d fall o f the K h m e r Rouge h i n g e d o n w a r l o r d decisions. B y the e n d o f the 1980s, Somalia was governed b y war­ lords. W i t h the w i t h d r a w a l o f the Soviet army, so was Afghanistan. "The w a r i n Yugoslavia isn't a nationalist w a r at all," the p u b l i c philosopher André Glucksmann shrewdly observed i n 1996. "It is a w a r o f the army against civilians. N o t a w a r a m o n g armies b u t a w a r o f a single army, split i n t o groups, against civilians." Charac­ 6

terizing the Bosnian slaughter as a struggle a m o n g "warlords," the Czech statesman Vaclav H a v e l agreed. As the B a l k a n cases illus­ trated, w a r l o r d i s m m i g h t overlap w i t h nationalism, b r i n g i n g n o w one, n o w the other into sharper focus. W h o c o u l d say w h e n dur­ i n g the 1990s the armed factions o f Kurds became something other than so m a n y warlords? H u t u warlords t h r i v e d i n the bush a n d i n the refugee camps. D u r i n g the 1990s, prospects o f peace heightened the w a r l o r d qualities o f the Irish Republican A r m y . Nevertheless, nationalism always retained some version o f Ernest GLOBAL NATIONALISM

201

Renan's everyday plebiscite: a cause sustained b y the continually r e n e w e d c o m m i t m e n t o f its participants. W h e r e the choice b o i l e d d o w n to a g u n at y o u r head or a g u n i n y o u r hand, that crucial element o f volunteerism disappeared, a n d w a r l o r d i s m t r i u m p h e d . Nationalism's second a n d even m o r e potent late t w e n t i e t h century competitor, religious m o b i l i z a t i o n , t h r i v e d w h e r e states w i t h d w i n d l i n g legitimacy e m p t i e d the p u b l i c realm o f almost ev­ erything except force. Religious resources h a d already p l a y e d cru­ cial roles i n a variety o f Asian a n d African anticolonial campaigns, n o t because those cultures w e r e inherently spiritual b u t because h o l y rituals and transcendent beliefs p r o v i d e d the w e b s o f con­ nection that an imperially d o m i n a t e d civic life precluded. I n these settings, n o clear line d i v i d e d religious f r o m nationalist m o v e ­ ments. Whatever they w e r e called, they acquired formidable n e w strength w h e n the c o m b i n a t i o n l i n k e d the gods above, the ances­ tors around, and the g r o u n d beneath the l i v i n g i n a n e t w o r k o f faith, kinship, and tradition. Tibetan persistence against all the odds illustrates that k i n d o f d o g g e d endurance. After China o c c u p i e d Tibet i n 1951, its culturally distinct B u d d h ­ ism supplied the cement for a Tibetan identity; and w h e n China's Cultural Revolution made a shambles o f its Buddhist institutions, r e b u i l d i n g t h e m was

the

indispensable

step i n

reconnecting

Tibet's people. W h i l e the Dalai Llama t o o k the cause o f Tibetan independence a r o u n d the w o r l d , the purifying magic o f K h e n p o Jikphun's B u d d h i s m p r o v i d e d a magnetic center for Tibetans i n ­ side the country. China's governors, keenly aware o f religion's subversive p o w e r and severe i n repressing it, r e n e w e d their as­ sault o n Tibetan B u d d h i s m — a n d hence Tibetan nationalism—at the t u r n o f the twenty-first century. Nationalism's global surge after the mid-1960s seemed to reaf­ firm the significance o f that alliance. O n e m o v e m e n t after another fed o n religious energies: rigidified Protestant and Catholic c o m ­ mitments i n N o r t h e r n Ireland, essentialist French Catholicism i n Quebec, dogmatic B u d d h i s m i n Sri Lanka, apocalyptic Judaism i n 202

CHAPTER 7

Israel, a n d so o n . B y the 1970s, however, the differences b e t w e e n fervent religious and nationalist m o v e m e n t s — i n d e e d their m u t u a l antagonism—predominated, and at the b e g i n n i n g o f the 1990s the superior p o w e r o f the religious movements was b e i n g reaffirmed i n site after site: t r i u m p h i n Afghanistan, Islamic political victories i n Algeria a n d Tajikistan, resistance to the G u l f W a r as a h o l y cause a n d disobedience to British l a w as a h o l y commandment, surges i n H i n d u politics and Sikh violence, and m u c h more. N o t h ­ i n g h i g h l i g h t e d the transition better than the inspirational drive for a n e w freedom i n Iran. I n its origins, the Iranian Revolution was a latter-day version o f the state-dominated nationalism that Japan, Turkey, and Mexico h a d pioneered: disruptive m o d e r n i z i n g forces accelerating under an inept, arbitrary government; a revolution; and a comprehensive national m o b i l i z a t i o n under n e w leadership.

Anti-imperialism

added its influence. First Britain, t h e n the United States, gave Ira­ nians an extended education i n great p o w e r deception and sub­ v e r s i o n — w h a t the historian N i k k i Keddie has called "the inscruta­ ble ways o f Occidentals"—and the American role i n eliminating the protorevolutionary government o f M o h a m m e d Mosaddeq i n 1953 m a r k e d it decades before the successful r e v o l u t i o n o f 1979 as the p r i m a r y obstacle to an independent Iran.

7

I n the l o n g run-up f r o m the anti-British protests o f 1891 to the revolution, secular o p p o s i t i o n was as important as religious. I n the last years o f Reza Shah Pahlavi's corrupt, oppressive regime, a w i d e range o f dissident groups w i t h a host o f grievances gathered courage f r o m nationalism's global spread to organize extensive u r b a n n e t w o r k s o f resistance that i n effect t o o k the city streets away f r o m government police. I n the final crisis o f 1978-79, h o w ­ ever, religion t o o k charge. Tradesmen i n their family-rooted bazaaris,

laborers i n and a r o u n d prayers, the mosques themselves,

became beehives o f religiously stimulated subversion. Shiite Is­ lam's strict rules against p o l l u t i o n f r o m nonbelievers w e r e superb mobilizers against the Shah's Western, secular proclivities: "For GLOBAL NATIONALISM

203

many, Shi'ism a n d nationalism w e r e part o f a single blend." W i t h 8

the t o w e r i n g figure o f the Ayatollah K h o m e i n i at its center, the revolutionary government silenced its secular critics a n d i m p o s e d a Shiite theocracy. A t its m o m e n t o f victory, the Iranian Revolution r a n k e d w i t h the most impressive p o p u l a r uprisings o f the late t w e n t i e t h century. O p p o s e d b y the U n i t e d States a n d i g n o r e d b y the Soviet U n i o n , it n o t o n l y w o n against the odds; it p r o m p t l y consolidated b o t h p o w e r a n d popularity. T h r o u g h attention to the needs o f ordinary Iranians, K h o m e i n i , "a Prophet o f the outcasts, [highlighted] the failure o f yesterday's generation to take i n the poor, to b u i l d anything b e y o n d some vulnerable islands o f affluence." As a na­ 9

tionalist revolution, however, its legacy was to the say the least ambiguous. The most obvious beneficiary was Islamic fundamentalism—a congeries o f movements to make some readings o f the K o r a n the source for all life's rules a n d p u n i s h m e n t s — w h i c h rose i n the 1970s especially w h e r e shallow-rooted, kleptocratic states pre­ sided over impoverished M o s l e m populations. T o the p o o r these movements promised purification: o f corrupt government, o f v i o ­ lated custom, o f h o l y obligation. W h a t Western observers consid­ ered extremism, its constituents called justice. Impetus f r o m the Iranian Revolution h e l p e d p r o p e l Islamic fundamentalism i n t o the most significant n e w m o v e m e n t o f the late t w e n t i e t h century, challenging the elite's right to rule f r o m Algeria to Egypt a n d Tur­ key, p u s h i n g south i n t o Nigeria a n d the H o r n o f Africa, s w a l l o w ­ i n g Pan-Arabism i n the M i d d l e East, placing its stamp o n g o v e r n ­ ments

i n Afghanistan a n d Pakistan,

a n d penetrating

through

Malaysia i n t o Indonesia, a n d b y w a y o f m i g r a t i o n affecting Islamic life i n Europe and N o r t h America. B y its nature Islamic fundamentalism sought holistic answers to comprehensive questions. States w e r e sites o f convenience,

the

vehicles t h r o u g h w h i c h a sacred cause w o r k e d its w i l l b u t other­ wise mere pausing places i n the eventual merger o f godliness 204

CHAPTER 7

w i t h government. As Steven Feierman has said o f Africa and Partha Chatterjee o f India, spiritual sensibilities o f all sorts, even those religious impulses tightly b o u n d i n particular ethnic groups, never showed

patience

with

geographic

boundaries. A p p r o p r i a t e l y ,

w h e r e people h a d n o clear tradition o f state sovereignty, religious movements, n o t nationalist movements, h a d the advantage. " I n the v o i d left b y [a humiliated] Arab nationalism i n 1967," Martin Kramer writes, " t w o ideas o f c o m m u n i t y c o m p e t e d for primacy [in the M i d d l e East]. O n the one side stood those w h o argued that the inhabitants o f any one state constituted a distinct people. . . . O n the other side stood those w h o believed that all Muslims constitu­ ted a universal political c o m m u n i t y . " The absurdity o f the first 10

alternative gave a tremendous p u s h to the second. Targeting the state itself as its opponent, Islamic fundamentalism called u p o n true believers to transcend the restraints that nationalism w o u l d place o n them. I n general terms, the damage that Islam d i d to nationalism i n an arc f r o m Algeria to Indonesia paralleled the damage that Roman Catholicism had done to nationalism a cen­ tury earlier i n Mediterranean Europe. Religion also s w a l l o w e d nationalism inside a b u r g e o n i n g H i n d u m o v e m e n t that rose rapidly to p o w e r i n India d u r i n g the 1990s. Dating loosely f r o m anti-British H i n d u revivals o f the late nine­ teenth century, an organized m o v e m e n t first appeared i n 1925, to remain a m i n o r theme i n I n d i a n anticolonialism u n t i l it almost dis­ appeared

i n the

flood

o f outrage over Gandhi's

assassination.

M u c h like Islamic fundamentalism i n the 1980s, H i n d u politics, n o w pursued t h r o u g h the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), set itself as the c h a m p i o n o f the dispossessed—low-caste India—against the rule o f the elite a n d as the agent o f purification, b o t h spiritual a n d material, against the c o r r u p t i o n o f the Congress party establish­ ment. As Islamic fundamentalist parties p r o v e d i n their battles against n o t o r i o u s l y vicious regimes i n Algeria a n d Egypt, these appeals struck just the right p o p u l a r chords i n the India o f the mid-1990s a n d vaulted the BJP into statewide p o w e r . B u t the GLOBAL NATIONALISM

205

H i n d u movement's nationalist credentials w e r e exceedingly t h i n . T o the extent the BJP played party politics, it was just one aspiring g r o u p a m o n g many, all c l a i m i n g to serve India's best interests. T o the extent it set itself apart, it d i d so b y p r o m i s i n g to make the state the servant o f religion. The same a p p l i e d to the Sikh m o v e ­ m e n t for a separate religious state, Khalistan, a m o v e m e n t

de­

m a n d i n g territory f r o m b o t h India a n d Pakistan that also f o u n d n e w energy early i n the 1990s. Pakistan itself, originally a secular M u s l i m state, acquired m o r e a n d m o r e o f the characteristics o f a fundamentalist society i n the 1990s, even t h o u g h its rulers c o n t i n ­ u e d to h o p e that they, n o t the ulama, w o u l d keep c o n t r o l over a heterogeneous, multilingual p o p u l a t i o n . A l l religions w e r e eligi­ ble. I n N o r w a y , a Christian Democratic party surfaced at the e n d o f the t w e n t i e t h century d e m a n d i n g government according to its reading o f the Bible. Once nationalism h a d usually carried religion along w i t h it; n o w fundamentalism increasingly dragged national­ ism i n t o w . Whatever k e p t multiethnic I n d i a from b e i n g a n a t i o n w o u l d not be overcome b y a H i n d u theocracy, a n d

whatever

made N o r w a y a nation d i d n o t require a Christian theocracy.

I f brute force a n d religious discipline h a d the advan­ tage w h e r e

states w e r e

deteriorating, nationalism s h o w e d

its

greatest strength d u r i n g the last quarter o f the t w e n t i e t h century i n well-established ones. These states, too, experience serious p r o b ­ lems meeting their citizens' rising expectations.

F r o m a peak

somewhere a r o u n d I960, p u b l i c confidence i n central govern­ ments a n d other institutional sources o f statewide cohesion slid steadily t h r o u g h o u t the Western w o r l d . T o m Nairn, an expert o n nationalism w i t h i n the U n i t e d K i n g d o m , attributed the e n d u r i n g appeal o f separatism there to the w e a k e n i n g reputation o f the central state. I n the U n i t e d States a string o f o p i n i o n polls, b e g i n ­ n i n g approximately w i t h the assassination o f J o h n F. Kennedy, traced a l o n g decline i n citizen trust n o t just i n government b u t i n 206

CHAPTER 7

almost every overarching institution. The eminent scholar Jacques Revel reports a w e a k e n i n g o f French identity and, i n tandem, a centrifugal spread o f loyalties i n France over the last quarter o f the t w e n t i e t h century. Neither the African-born n o r the

European-

b o r n maintained their earlier faith that French culture c o u l d , or even should, assimilate former colonials as equal citizens. A t the same time, states o f this rank d i d far m o r e than s i m p l y p u s h against a rising tide o f skepticism. B y several criteria, they g r e w stronger as the century w o u n d d o w n . Even angry citizens w h o h a d p u r p o r t e d l y g i v e n u p o n politics c o n t i n u e d to press de­ mands o n their h o m e governments, w h i c h g r e w i n size and scope d u r i n g the 1980s a n d 1990s despite official claims that they w e r e contracting. W h a t w e n t b y the name o f global capitalism also shored u p the state system, especially i n the core capitalist c o u n ­ tries. Crucially dependent o n the authority and resources o f major Western powers to operate, w o r l d w i d e business interests needed those states even more than the states needed them. Their alterna­ tive—corporate

governance,

with

private

armies

and

global

rules—never rose above the level o f a grade-B fantasy. I n their internal affairs, these same Western states relied o n a politics o f negotiation a n d accommodation. H o w e v e r cynical i n spirit a n d imperfect i n execution, they p r i d e d themselves i n their w e l c o m e to a great variety o f interests, o p e n e d government to the demands f r o m those interests, and oversaw the allocation o f rights a m o n g them. These w e r e o p t i m u m circumstances for late t w e n ­ tieth-century nationalists: an unsympathetic, uninspired, u n i n t i m idating government that h a d an ideological c o m m i t m e n t a n d a re­ serve o f civic strength t o keep issues under discussion indefinitely. Appropriately, the U n i t e d States, the m o d e l o f such a liberal state, housed its version o f this late twentieth-century nationalism: the N a t i o n o f Islam, a h o m e g r o w n m o v e m e n t w i t h m u c h greater au­ thority a m o n g American blacks than its small size w o u l d suggest. A l t h o u g h also a religious movement, Black Muslims, reminis­ cent o f the nineteenth-century M o r m o n s , incorporated almost all GLOBAL NATIONALISM

207

o f nationalism's p r i m a r y characteristics. A c c o r d i n g to its founder, Elijah M u h a m m a d , the N a t i o n i n m i c r o c o s m was fulfilling the des­ t i n y o f the black race, a genetically u n i t e d p e o p l e superior i n all important respects to their implacable enemy, the w h i t e race. Black Muslims not o n l y addressed one another b u t m o r e i m p o r ­ tant treated one another as members o f a single family bent o n ensuring its collective welfare. As the family patriarch, Elijah ex­ pected to pass his autocratic p o w e r to a son, a n d the m a n w h o d i d inherit the power, Louis Farrakhan, struggled m i g h t i l y t o c l a i m that mantle, i f o n l y as the founder's adopted son. W i t h genera­ tional continuity came economic continuity: The patriarch h e l d sole control over the family's investments. As one observer sum­ marized it, the Nation's leader "combines b o t h spiritual a n d secu­ lar authority": Members "feel that they b e l o n g b o t h to a n a t i o n a n d a government o f their o w n . "

11

Indicatively, cadres o f Black Mus­

lims acted b o t h to enforce discipline w i t h i n the family a n d to screen it against dangers f r o m a corrupt society. A g a i n like the M o r m o n s before them, Black Muslims originated i n a chiliastic v i s i o n o f i m p e n d i n g apocalypse, t h e n settled d o w n to consolidating their secular p o w e r . B y the same token, Elijah's nationalist d e m a n d for five D e e p South states as the h o m e l a n d that the labor o f slaves h a d made the blacks' o w n slipped quietly f r o m the Nation's agenda. Nevertheless, u n l i k e the M o r m o n s , the N a t i o n o f Islam s h o w e d n o interest i n entering an American m a i n ­ stream. I f the M o r m o n s eventually posed as just one more Chris­ tian denomination, the Black Muslims planted themselves

firmly

o n the outside b y allying w i t h other M u s l i m s — n o t a b l y w i t h a branch o f Elijah Muhammad's great black family that h a d taken another path a n d f o l l o w e d his b i o l o g i c a l son Walter. B y all indica­ tions, the N a t i o n o f Islam represented a long-term nationalist chal­ lenge inside the U n i t e d States, vague i n its political objectives per­ haps but firm i n its separatist values. A second, more complicated example o f late twentieth-century nationalism 208

thriving

CHAPTER 7

inside

Western

society's

well-established

states developed alongside the formation o f the European U n i o n . Rather than endangering the states that j o i n e d it, the European U n i o n p r o m i s e d t h e m a n e w life b y relieving t h e m o f at least some o f the expectations they c o u l d n o t possibly meet. A t the same time, it o p e n e d the prospect for n o v e l forms o f administra­ tive a u t o n o m y that m i g h t satisfy the nationalist ambitions o f such veteran agitators as the Flemish and such newcomers as the L o m bardy League Italians. O n a global scale, states that tried to con­ struct bicultural or multicultural halfway houses o n their o w n — "consociationalism," it was c a l l e d — c o m p i l e d a bleak

record.

Almost invariably, a taste for a u t o n o m y developed i n t o an insis­ tence o n separation. Attempts at a confederation o f this sort, one scholar n o t e d some years ago, "were made i n Lebanon, Y u g o ­ slavia, Nigeria, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, India, N o r t h e r n Ireland, and South Africa," to w h i c h s h o u l d be added Cyprus, Canada, and per­ haps the final days o f the Soviet Union—scarcely a list to inspire confidence.

12

U n l i k e states one b y one, however, a successful Eu­

ropean U n i o n m i g h t w e l l accommodate a large measure o f c o m ­ m u n a l self-government w i t h o u t forcing the issue o f independence a n d r i p p i n g apart a state's c o m p l e x economic n e t w o r k . I n fact, the n e w E U m i g h t a l l o w existing de facto divisions to experiment w i t h a m o r e comfortable level o f outright a u t o n o m y — b e t w e e n Catho­ lics and Protestants i n the Netherlands, for example, w h o already maintain parallel communities covering their o w n schools, parties, newspapers, unions, clubs, charities, and m u c h more. As the his­ tory o f the U n i t e d States illustrated, a successful

confederation

does n o t require l o v i n g t h y neighbors, o n l y m a k i n g r o o m for them. That, however, is just a piece o f the picture. A quarter century ago, n o one w o u l d have predicted the global outcome: National­ ism, w h i c h still rolls off almost every western tongue as the most formidable enemy o f peace a n d order, continues its decline, w i t h n o prospects o f reversing the trend. A l t h o u g h an important force w o r l d w i d e , it increasingly struggles for a place. Better attuned to GLOBAL NATIONALISM

209

spiritual than to theological sources o f unity, it has w a t c h e d one variation after another o f religious fundamentalism m o b i l i z e peo­ p l e w h o i n another dispensation m i g h t w e l l have been national­ ists. I n each late twentieth-century rerun, it seems, the fundamen­ talist assassin again kills G a n d h i . O n e critical advantage has b e e n fundamentalism's superior ability i n using w a r l o r d techniques t o tame the warlords. I f nationalists b y a n d large still try to outmaneuver the warlords, fundamentalists a d d plans to outshoot t h e m , too, as the victorious Taliban i n Afghanistan neatly illustrate. As i f c o m i n g full circle, nationalism's brightest prospects o n the cusp o f the n e w century lie i n its original Western European h o m e . Else­ w h e r e , the odds favor its competitors.

210

CHAPTER 7

CHAPTER

8

T h i n k i n g a b o u t the F u t u r e

By democracy,

the e n d o f the t w e n t i e t h century the great t r i o —

socialism, a n d nationalism—no longer structured

public life i n any major p o r t i o n o f the w o r l d . T h e y h a d risen to­ gether; they fell together. W h a t h a d once been p r i m a r y solutions for Europeans a n d a m e n u o f alternatives for people a r o u n d the w o r l d slipped into a c r o w d o f options. Each c o n t i n u e d to have its partisans; each p o w e r e d movements here and there. B u t an era o f dominance, w h e n the three o f t h e m shaped p o p u l a r aspirations o n a global scale, h a d passed. A decade earlier, as the Cold War ended w i t h the disintegration o f the Soviet U n i o n , each h a d h a d reasons for o p t i m i s m . I n m a n y Western circles, especially i n the United States, it seemed self-evi­ dent that democracy h a d t r i u m p h e d . F r o m another vantage point, lifting the Soviet incubus promised n e w life for a liberal b r a n d o f socialism. Nationalist movements o n their part t o o k h o p e f r o m diminishing great-power support for the military dictatorships that w e r e b l o c k i n g their paths. But everybody's crystal ball p r o v e d cloudy. Democracy, always the weakest o f the trio outside West-

ern society, had o n l y spotty and ambiguous successes elsewhere i n the w o r l d . Socialists failed to realize h o w Europeanized they h a d become, and h o w dependent o n the Soviet b o g e y m a n to stretch p u b l i c backing for their comprehensive welfare programs. B y the t u r n o f the twenty-first century, liberal socialist parties i n such states as Germany, France, a n d the U n i t e d K i n g d o m w e r e still liberal b u t n o longer socialist. As for nationalism, it steadily lost g r o u n d i n c o m p e t i t i o n w i t h the clerics a n d the warlords. For people w h o pictured the e n d o f the C o l d War as w i n n e r take-all, w i n n i n g was losing. Where elected governments replaced authoritarian ones, a sudden dismantling o f o l d systems caused massive hardship, general disillusionment, a n d chronic instability. Rather than central opponents facing one another i n a familiar contest, hostilities fragmented a n d diffused. O n l y officials smitten b y superpower hubris, such as the A m e r i c a n secretary o f defense W i l l i a m Cohen, t h o u g h t it possible to amass military strength so great that one country c o u l d dictate the terms o f every battle a n d o v e r w h e l m any o p p o n e n t i n any setting. N o t even the gods ex­ pected that m u c h . As i f he h a d been lifted f r o m a James B o n d movie, Western society's quintessential foe at the t u r n o f the twenty-first century was a single, elusive Saudi, Osama b i n Laden, made immensely w e a l t h y b y the Western d e m a n d for o i l , w h o , it was said, p l o t t e d the e x p l o s i o n o f unpredictable targets o n a global scale.

I n the face o f challenges that n o one can anticipate f r o m a b e w i l d e r i n g array o f culturally different people, Western society, w i t h the U n i t e d States i n the forefront, has four readily available strategies i n response. Three o f these come immediately to m i n d : strengthening the state system against a Pandora's b o x o f rogue rulers, terrorists, fanatics, a n d nationalists; c o u n t i n g o n the universal solvent o f global capitalism to eliminate parochial bar­ riers a n d senseless wars; a n d p r o m o t i n g h u m a n rights against v i o 212

CHAPTER 8

lators w o r l d w i d e . The f o u r t h — w e l c o m i n g diversity o n a global s c a l e — w i l l require more o f an explanation. Reliance o n states has all the advantages o f inertia. They are there, they are familiar, they h o l d immense p o w e r , and—some believe—they change i n response to the changing needs o f their citizens. Outside the w a l l o f states, the argument goes, there is o n l y chaos: the w o r l d as Bosnia and the Congo. For the n e w cen­ tury, interstate c o o p e r a t i o n — t h r o u g h such agencies as the Euro­ pean U n i o n , the N o r t h Atlantic Free Trade Agreement, G-8 meet­ ings, a n d o f course the U n i t e d Nations organization—promises to p o o l state resources as it tames state egos. There is some truth to the claim that as democracy, socialism, and nationalism have slipped i n significance, an expansive w o r l d ­ w i d e capitalism has emerged the real victor. G l o b a l capitalism functions as the great beekeeper: People s w a r m a n d w o r k , t h e n from time to time get shaken o u t o f the hives i n return for w a r d i n g off predators, k e e p i n g the field full o f flowers, and marketing the honey. A c c o r d i n g to its advocates, l i k i n g or disliking the system is not the point. W h a t matters is that o n its o w n terms it w o r k s re­ markably w e l l a n d acts simultaneously as a p o w e r f u l integrator. Ideologues w h o believe they are witnessing Late Capitalism stand as monuments to the lure o f wishful t h i n k i n g . Nevertheless, global capitalism is o n l y a supplementary force, n o t an independent one. W i t h o u t the n e t w o r k o f states sustaining it, it w o u l d disintegrate, b u t w i t h o u t capitalism the states w o u l d not. Hence the second strategy is really a b i g state variation o n the first. M u c h the same is true o f the t h i r d stategy, universalizing a west­ ern standard o f i n d i v i d u a l rights, w h i c h w i t h o u t b a c k i n g from the major powers w o u l d have m i n i m a l influence elsewhere i n the w o r l d . Indeed, the d e m a n d for individual rights has g r o w n along w i t h those states. The more p o w e r f u l states grew, the greater their effect for g o o d or ill o n individual citizens, w h o sought protection i n a stronger state w i t h even greater effect for g o o d or ill o n i n d i ­ v i d u a l citizens, w h o sought protection. . . . T o break the cycle, THINKING ABOUT THE FUTURE

213

activists try t o freeze more a n d m o r e i n d i v i d u a l rights i n place, as if b y fiat they c o u l d e n d the struggle to secure t h e m . For an i m ­ pressive n u m b e r o f educated westerners, some liberal a n d some conservative, those rights constitute n o t just the heart a n d soul o f their o w n society b u t equally the measure o f the g o o d society everywhere. T h e U n i t e d States has w e i g h e d i n heavily o n the side o f all three strategies. Charges that Americans, obsessed w i t h stable states, have n o appreciation for the suffering o f subject peoples elicit indignant reminders that the U n i t e d States itself originated i n a w a r against colonial oppression a n d that i n the t w e n t i e t h century n o Western p o w e r has m o r e consistently c h a m p i o n e d a n t i c o l o n i ­ alism. W h a t these apologists conflate is the crucial difference be­ t w e e n colonialism as distant rule a n d colonialism as local subjuga­ t i o n . W h i t e Americans fought their r e v o l u t i o n as subjects i n the first sense and masters i n the second. Colonialism as distant rule was fundamentally an issue o f just government, a n d its s o l u t i o n was the independent U n i t e d States; colonialism as local subjuga­ t i o n was fundamentally an issue o f extracting wealth, a n d its solu­ t i o n was the social upheaval that never happened. B o r r o w i n g Carl Becker's famous distinction, it was the difference b e t w e e n h o m e rule a n d w h o s h o u l d rule at h o m e . F r o m the beginning, the A m e r ­ ican state was dedicated to the rule o f w h i t e m e n i n b o t h capaci­ ties. B y and large, Americans have stayed true to their heritage. O n the one hand, they have favored dismantling European e m ­ pires ( h o m e rule); o n the other, their government has bent every effort to h u r r y the former colonies into conservative, law-andorder states ( w h o s h o u l d rule at h o m e ) . Postcolonial resistance to that state structure has been c o n d e m n e d as mere tribalism. As a corollary to a w o r l d ordered b y inviolable states, A m e r i ­ cans have been p r o m o t i n g global capitalism w i t h ever greater zeal. Indeed, the recent Clinton administration f o l l o w e d the purest version o f global capitalist logic i n A m e r i c a n history. A t the receiv­ i n g e n d o f this juggernaut, g l o b a l capitalism got hopelessly en2/4

CHAPTER 8

t w i n e d w i t h Western-style democracy. I n those sections o f Europe w h e r e socialist empires once ruled, for example, democracy plus capitalism has equaled the most severe and least mitigated eco­ n o m i c disaster since the Second W o r l d War. I n a p o o r country free elections rarely come free: Letting a Western m o d e l o f de­ mocracy i n the front d o o r almost always means letting Western corporate favors i n the back. The same billions w h o have reason to d o u b t Western sympathy for their political aspirations, i n other w o r d s , have at least as much—perhaps

identical—reason t o

d o u b t Western sympathy for their economic plight. At a glance, the U n i t e d States has h a d its greatest success w i t h the t h i r d strategy, the p r o m o t i o n o f i n d i v i d u a l rights. A r o u n d m i d ­ century the rising importance o f individualism i n A m e r i c a n de­ mocracy c o i n c i d e d w i t h its p o w e r f u l appeal as an export. D u r i n g the C o l d W a r the level o f personal risks and restraints w e r e far higher i n China a n d the Soviet empire than i n the major states allied w i t h the U n i t e d States. Even a m o n g the l e g i o n o f authori­ tarian states i n the so-called Free W o r l d , democracy as individual­ ism, especially individualized consumerism, c o u l d be stretched to hide a m u l t i t u d e o f crimes. I f o n a global scale the U n i t e d States defined democracy, t h e n democracy equaled individualism. A t the b e g i n n i n g o f the twenty-first century, however, yester­ day's prospect looks more and more like t o m o r r o w ' s dead end. As a universe o f limitless consumer choices, individualism mocks p e o p l e i n p o v e r t y everywhere. I n these settings it completes the trinity: democracy, capitalism, individualism, three aspects o f a single b u r d e n . As a scheme o f mandated rights, individualism pits the privileges o f people one b y one against the g r o u p values b y w h i c h a large majority o f the w o r l d ' s p o p u l a t i o n lives—the very majority Westerners have h a d the greatest difficulty reaching or even understanding. A d d i n g insult t o ignorance, educated West­ erners have treat the most p o p u l a r confrontations w i t h individual­ ism as evidences o f a collective insanity. Even as i n f o r m e d an o b ­ server as Mark Juergensmeyer cannot resist the tired o l d saw that THINKING ABOUT T H E F U T U R E

2/5

has trailed nationalism a n d n o w fundamentalism t h r o u g h the late twentieth century: "It is n o mystery w h y religious nationalism has become so p o p u l a r [at the e n d o f the t w e n t i e t h century]. I n times o f social turbulence a n d political confusion . . . n e w panaceas abound." W h o w o u l d guess that Islamic a n d H i n d u fundamental­ 1

ism appeal particularly to educated y o u n g people? As ways o f g i v i n g coherence to a w o r l d o f splintered loyalties a n d fragmented conflicts, strategies relying o n fixed states, global capitalism, a n d i n d i v i d u a l rights d o n o t l o o k promising. States, l y i n g a w k w a r d l y across the m u l t i p l e attachments o f everyday life a n d accentuating w o r l d w i d e differences i n privilege a n d p o w e r , institutionalize these problems w i t h o u t p r o v i d i n g solutions for them. W e a k e n the state, goes the w a r n i n g , a n d y o u enter a jungle o f terrors. B u t strengthen the state, it is w o r t h emphasizing, a n d y o u repeat the familiar horrors. Actions justified i n the name o f serving the state have taken a t o l l o f innocents to make the angels weep. Capitalism k n o w s n o authority higher than the

transactions

comprising it. O n a global scale, w i t h o n l y a tiny m i n o r i t y situated to benefit from the results, that self-contained morality scarcely augurs a n e w harmony. R o b b i n g an i n d i v i d u a l at g u n p o i n t , w e all k n o w , is a felony. But as the social philosopher Z y g m u n t B a u m a n notes: "Robbing w h o l e nations o f their resources is called ' p r o m o ­ t i o n o f free trade'; r o b b i n g w h o l e families a n d communities o f their l i v e l i h o o d is called 'downsizing.'" W h o polices that? A t the 2

p o i n t w h e r e i n d i v i d u a l i s m intersects w i t h capitalism, the effects are even less manageable. A l t h o u g h individualism as an idea has a l o n g history, capitalist i n d i v i d u a l i s m as an orientation has n o past a n d little future. The transactions p e o p l e make d o not b i n d t h e m b e y o n d those transactions. W h a t matters is w h a t happens n o w , a n d a n o w culture, as Christopher Lasch famously labeled it, is a culture o f narcissism. W h e r e people's relations are n o m o r e than the s u m o f their market decisions, the best simple summary is 216

CHAPTER 8

Margaret Thatcher's: "There is no society." Projected globally, that is the real jungle. I n d i v i d u a l i s m as a mandated right s i m p l y restates the issue o f atomization: f r o m each i n d i v i d u a l alone to all individuals together. W h a t has placed strains o n social cooperation i n every rich state i n the West w o u l d shatter c o m m u n i t y life elsewhere. I n the face o f charges that they really w a n t to destroy other cultures, some h u ­ m a n rights advocates emphasize h o w l i m i t e d their objectives are. They have n o desire to change everything, they say, o n l y to em­ p o w e r or protect the oppressed, often w o m e n a n d children. A simple incision, i n a n d out. B u t n o culture survives this k i n d o f surgery: Change the family, change everything else. Universally mandated rights m a y l i n k an individual to another individual, b u t they set culture against culture i n a battle o f survival.

T h e fourth strategy—the encouragement

o f diver­

sity—has the advantage o f t a k i n g as its p o i n t o f departure the w o r l d as it is today. Moreover, it can d r a w an impressive b o d y o f supporting evidence from the past century and a half o f the w o r l d ' s history. Indeed, the benefits f r o m diversity lie at the heart o f this book's findings. H o w e v e r large or small the focus, the availability o f alternative ideologies, religions, and economies— aspirations and opportunities o f all sorts—has i m p r o v e d the pros­ pects o f social health over and over again; and m o n o p o l y , either the passion to achieve one or the p o w e r to impose it, has spread terrible blight. As socialists, democrats, or nationalists, as capital­ ists, communists, or god's annointed agents, true believers w i t h sufficient weapons at their disposal have cut vast, b l o o d y swaths across history. A l t h o u g h the analogy may be a b i t o v e r b l o w n , the salutary effects o f social and cultural diversity o n h u m a n welfare suggest a comparison to those o f species diversity o n planetary life i n general. The g o o d news: Diversity seems to be o n the rise. THINKING ABOUT THE FUTURE

2/7

As the political analyst G i d o n Gottlieb has said o f the grand at­ tempts at global management, the past favorites—"domination a n d e q u i l i b r i u m — a r e equally b e y o n d us."

3

Diversity starts w i t h the p r o p o s i t i o n that people make decisions for themselves and that initially all o f those decisions have equal standing. Economic motivations are n o t inherently rational a n d village identities are not inherently b a c k w a r d . Ethnic p r i d e is n o t the m a r k o f a first-class grudge, a second-class citizen, or a t h i r d class m i n d ; it is simply a choice. Voluntary organizations are a diverse w o r l d ' s lifeblood. Whatever p e o p l e want, i n c l u d i n g i n d i ­ vidualism, they must organize t o get. Successful relations i n a d i ­ verse w o r l d d o not require people to love or even speak civilly t o one another. O n l y i n a weapon-saturated

environment w o u l d

someone assume that angry w o r d s automatically escalate into v i o ­ lence. The sequence is w r o n g : Violence, not anger, is the critical issue. A m o n g the concomitants o f diversity is bearing witness against deeply offensive behavior, even screaming t o the h i g h heavens i n protest. Absolutely n o t h i n g argues that w e s h o u l d smile b e n i g n l y i n the face o f actions w e consider cruel, destruc­ tive, a n d unjust. Diversity does not mean that a n y t h i n g goes. Groups o f p e o p l e f o r m i n g a c o m m o n p o l i t y require rules i n c o m m o n , a n d quite nat­ urally, polities give priority to their perpetuation. A p o l i t y relying o n democratic procedures, for example, has reason t o protect those procedures against groups that w o u l d like t o destroy t h e m . B y the same token, polities control entry and membership, a n d they set rules about a civic language, that is, the language o f edu­ cation, politics, and governance. N o t o n l y d o polities have the right t o defend themselves; their members have every right to p r o ­ test to the h i g h heavens against actions anywhere that they c o n ­ sider fundamentally unjust a n d to m o b i l i z e as w i d e l y as possible i n behalf o f their outrage. A genuinely diverse w o r l d takes clash­ i n g values as a matter o f course. I n the face o f this ceaseless p u l l ­ i n g a n d hauling, Samuel Huntington's rule o f t h u m b is b o t h s o u n d 218

CHAPTER 8

a n d succinct: "Renounce universalism, accept diversity, a n d seek commonalities. "

4

Forty years ago the historian D a v i d Potter w a r n e d us about the dangers o f privileging loyalty to the state over other loyalties. A t the b e g i n n i n g o f the twenty-first century m u c h o f the w o r l d ' s p o p ­ ulation agrees w i t h h i m . M u l t i p l e crisscrossing attachments that sometimes stop short o f the state and sometimes transcend it, ex­ press w h a t people actually feel and h o w they actually live. The state has o n l y one o f the m a n y stalls i n this global marketplace, and its wares have not been m o v i n g all that w e l l i n recent times. Diversity certainly contains its share o f contradictions and co­ nundrums. A t one e n d o f the spectrum, the units o f diversity can become t o o small to sustain any polity. A n i n d i v i d u a l i z e d diversity is a self-defeating absurdity. A t the other end, systems that contrib­ ute to diversity o n a global scale may eliminate it entirely w i t h i n their o w n domains and i n the process d i m i n i s h the w o r l d ' s diver­ sity. W e have n o perfect m o d e l , n o unambiguous p r i n c i p l e o f d i ­ versity available to us. A c o m m i t m e n t to diversity is an orientation, an inclination that w e o n l y apply as best w e can situation b y situa­ tion. Perhaps it is appropriate to diversity that n o single rule en­ capsulates it. Favoring diversity, moreover, gives n o g r o u p the right o f acting as its guarantor. One b r a n d o f diversity i m p o s e d b y the strong o n the w e a k w o u l d be its ultimate contradiction. B y the same t o k e n , small-group identities p r o v i d e n o panaceas. There is n o promise they w i l l mitigate the abuse o f w o m e n a n d the prostitution o f children. Communities as w e l l as countries per­ secute Gypsies. Fascist cells p l o t violence against their enemies t h r o u g h o u t the Western w o r l d . It pays to heed the w a r n i n g o f D a v i d M o r l e y a n d K e v i n Robbins about an uncritical "celebration o f small nationalism and regionalism, a utopianism o f the under­ dog." N o one s h o u l d ignore the authoritarianism deeply embed­ 5

d e d i n Ireland's paramilitary groups or the Basque ETA or the Liberation Tigers o f T a m i l Eelam, all o f w h o m have scorned their squeamish

constituents and k i l l e d according to the Menshevik THINKING ABOUT THE FUTURE

2/9

rule: First murder the people closest to y o u . B l a m i n g colonialism or capitalism for all the w o r l d ' s small-group cruelty a n d violence insults the m o r a l capacities o f people everywhere. Despite

its problems,

small-scale

diversity constitutes

the

w o r l d ' s best hope. Diversity means chaos o n l y i f w e call it that; it can function just as w e l l as a solution to chaos: a messy order. T h e p r i m a r y enemies o f a healthy, adaptive society are n o t c o m p e t i n g small groups but the state itself. It is s i m p l y n o t true that a deep skepticism about the state's beneficence inhibits service to its citi­ zens. I f n o b o d y s h o u l d w i s h to destroy the entire system o f states, n o b o d y s h o u l d trust a one o f them. W h o still believes i n the h o n ­ esty o f a government statement? Worst o f all are the military a n d religious legions that covet the state's authority. It is w o r t h empha­ sizing that Islam, H i n d u i s m , and Christianity, each w i t h its o w n rich tradition o f diversity, suffer as m u c h as any victims w h e n their fundamentalist branches use state p o w e r to choke o f f difference. Appropriately, the great trio o f democracy, socialism, a n d nation­ alism, n o longer at the center o f affairs, live o n as resistance movements, channeling aspirations that the current universe o f states has frustrated. Shades o f the nineteenth century. B y the same token, the most a d m i r e d humanitarian agencies o f o u r time tackle issues o f health, poverty, and e m p o w e r m e n t not b y w a y o f state policies b u t t h r o u g h small-group initiatives: They help some people take the next step. Imagine a w o r l d freed f r o m the tyranny o f guns a n d gods w h e r e diversity wrestles w i t h diversity i n a match o f w i t s a n d dreams, not life and death.

220

CHAPTER 8

Notes

CHAPTER

1

Thinking about Nationalism 1. Quoted in Deborah J. Coon, "'One Moment in the World's Salvation': Anar­ chism and the Radicalization of William James," Journal of American History 83 (June 1996): 77. 2. Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation (Cambridge I960), 378. 3. Alfred Cobban, The Nation State and National Self-Determination, rev. ed. (London 1969 [1945]), 280. 4. Karl R. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, 2 vols. (Princeton 1963), 11:49. 5. Tom Nairn, The Break-up of Britain, rev. ed. (London 1981 [1977]), 359. 6. George Mosse, Nationalism and Sexuality (New York 1985), 133; Michael Ignatieff, Blood and Belonging (New York 1994), 8. 7. New Yorker, 71 (May 8, 1995): 45. 8. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Disuniting of America (New York 1992), 48. 9. Boyd C. Shafer, Faces of Nationalism (New York 1972 [1955D, xiii. 10. Mark Beissinger, "Nationalisms That Bark and Nationalisms That Bite: Er­ nest Gelmer and the Substantiation of Nations," in John A. Hall, ed., The State of the Nation (Cambridge, Eng., 1998), 176.

11. Anthony Birch, Nationalism and National Integration (London 1989), 7. 12. Richard Handler, Nationalism and the Politics of Culture in Quebec (Mad­ ison 1988), 41. 13. John Breuilly, Nationalism

and the State, rev. ed. (Manchester 1993

[1982]), 255, 390. 14. Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York 1958), 126. 15. Hakan Wibert, "Self-Determination As an International Issue," in I. M. Lewis, ed., Nationalism and Self-Determination in the Horn of Africa (London 1983), 43. 16. Michael Oakeshott, On Human Conduct (Oxford 1975), 188. 17. Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism (Cambridge, Mass., 1992), 5. 18. Anthony D. Smith, "Toward a Global Culture?" in Mike Featherstone, ed., Global Culture (London 1990), 180. 19. Handler, Nationalism, 126.

CHAPTER

2

European Origins 1. Charles Tilly, "Migration in Modern European History," in William H. McNeill and Ruth S. Adams, eds., Human Migration (Bloomington 1978), 57. Italics in original. William McNeill and Charles Tilly are major influences in my thinking on population and migration. 2. Walter Nugent, Crossings: The Great Transatlantic Migrations

1870-1914

(Bloomington 1992), 3. 3. David Warren Sabean, Property, Production, and Family in Neckarhausen, 1700-1870

(New York 1990), 37.

4. Quoted in H. Arnold Barton, A Folk Divided (Chapel Hill 1979), 124. 5. K. H. Connell, The Population of Ireland, 1750-1845

(Oxford 1950), 121.

6. Patrick J. Blessing, "Irish Emigration to the United States, 1800-1920: An Overview," in P. J. Drudy, ed., The Irish in America (Cambridge, Eng., 1985), 16. 7. Conrad M. Arensberg, The Irish Countryman (New York 1937), 82, 84. 8. Connell, Population of Ireland, 1199. Jay Dolan, The Immigrant Church (Baltimore 1979), 7-8. 10. Philip H. Bagenal, The American Irish and Their Influence on Irish Politics (London 1882), 107. 11. Sir William Harcourt, quoted by John A. Murphy, in David Noel Doyle and Owen Dudley Edwards, eds., America and Ireland, 1980), 110.

222

NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

1776-1976

(Westport

12. Michael Hughes, Nationalism and Society: Germany 1800-1945

(London

1988), 2. 13. John Breuilly, "The National Idea in Modern German History," in Breuilly, ed., The State of Germany (London 1992), 14. 14. Albert S. Lindemann, Esau's Tears (New York 1997), 69.

CHAPTER

3

Changing Contexts 1. Charles Tilly, "The Emergence of Citizenship in France and Elsewhere," in Tilly, ed., Citizenship, Identity and Social History (Cambridge, Eng., 1995), 229. 2. Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (London 1983), 24-25. 3. Arthur E. Bestor, Jr., "Patent-Office Models of the Good Society: Some Rela­ tionships between Social Reform and Westward Expansion," American Historical Review 58 (April 1953): 505-26. 4. Alexis de Tocqueville, "The European Revolution" and

Correspondence

with Gobineau, trans, and ed. John Lukacs (Garden City 1959), 170. 5. Quoted in Denis Mack Smith, Mazzini (New Haven 1994), 154. 6. Cynthia H. Enloe, Bananas, Beaches, and Bases (Berkeley 1990), 46. 7. Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny, eds., Becoming National (New York 1996), 23. 8. Charles Jelavich, South Slav Nationalisms (Columbus 1990), 263. 9. George W. Stocking, Jr., Victorian Anthropology (New York 1987), 148. 10. Greece, the initial site for romantic nationalist gestures, did not develop a genuinely popular movement until around 1900, as Michael Herzfeld shows in his Ours Once More (Austin 1982). Earlier, authoritarian elites mapped grand imperial plans without rousing any significant popular interest.

CHAPTER

4

The Case of the United States 1. Speech of July 9, 1958, Chicago, quoted in H. M. Flint, ed., Life and Speeches of Stephen A. Douglas (Philadelphia 1865), 106. 2. Yaron Ezrahi, The Descent of Icarus (Cambridge 1990), 69. 3. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. Henry Reeve and Francis Bowen, ed. Phillips Bradley, 2 vols. (New York 1945 [1835, 1840]), II, 4. 4. Sheldon S. Wolin, The Presence of the Past (Baltimore 1989), 153-54.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 4

223

5. James Bryce, The American Commonwealth, ed. Louis M. Hacker, 2 vols. (New York 1959 [1888]), II, 398. 6. Alexander Mackay, The Western World, or, Travels in the United States in 1846-47, 2 ed., 3 vols. (London 1850), I, 285-86. d

7. Jack D. Forbes, Africans and Native Americans, 2

d

ed. (Urbana 1993

[1988]), 96-97. 8. James Silk Buckingham, The Eastern and Western States of America, 3 vols. (London 1842), III, 38-399. Count Francesco Arese, A Trip to the Prairies and in the Interior of North America [1837-38], trans. Andrew Evans (New York 1934), 9-10. 10. "Speech of . . . June 16, 1858," in The Lincoln-Douglas Debates of 1858, ed. Robert W. Johannsen (New York 1965), 14. I have taken some liberties with word order. 11. Brian M. Barry, Democracy, Power, and Justice (Oxford 1989), 168. 12. Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism (Princeton 1994), 46. 13. Cynthia H. Enloe, Ethnic Conflict and Political Development (Boston 1973), 269. Italics in original. 14. Michaela di Leonardo, The Varieties of Ethnic Experience (Ithaca 1984), 119. 15. Francis D. Cogliano, No King, No Popery (Westport 1995), 60. 16. Richard Gottheil, quoted in Melvin I. Urofsky, American Zionism from Herzl to the Holocaust (Garden City 1975), 90. 17. Matthew Frye Jacobson, Special Sorrows (Cambridge, Mass., 1995), 15; Ed­ ward R. Kantowicz, Polish American Politics in Chicago, 1880-1940

(Chicago

1975), 169. 18. Quoted in Hans Kohn, American Nationalism (New York 1957), 156. 19. Quoted in Robert Bruce Flanders, Nauvoo (Urbana 1965), 298. 20. Quoted with approval by the dean of modern Mormon historians, Leonard J. Arrington, in Great Basin Kingdom (Salt Lake City 1993), viii. 21. Quoted in Emily Greene Balch, Our Slavic Fellow Citizens (New York 1969 [1910]), 398. 22. Ellwood P. Cubberley, Changing Conceptions of Education (Boston: Riverdale, 1909), 15-16.

CHAPTER

5

Climax in Europe 1. Arthur S. Link, Wilson the Diplomatist (Baltimore 1957), 10. 2. December 9, 1917, quoted in Victor Mamatey, The United States and East Central Europe, 1914-1918 224

(Princeton 1957), 162.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 5

3. E. J. Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes (New York 1994), 31. 4. Speech of September 5, 1919, St. Louis, in The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson, ed. Ray Stannard Baker and William E. Dodd, 6 vols. (New York 192527), V, 62. 5. C . A . Macartney, National States and National Minorities (London 1934), 490. 6. Susan Watkins, From Provinces into Nations (Princeton 1991), 178. 7. Declan Kiberd, Inventing Ireland (Cambridge, Mass., 1996), 195. 8. Tom Garvin, "The Anatomy of a Nationalist Revolution: Ireland, 18581928," Comparative Studies in Society and History 28 (July 1986): 468. 9. Ronald Grigor Suny, The Revenge of the Past (Stanford 1993), 101. 10. John Higham, "The Mobilization of Immigrants in Urban America," Nor­ wegian-American

Studies 31 (1986): 22.

11. Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York 1922), 365. 12. Henry A. Wallace, New Frontier(New York 1934), 263, 20. 13. Smith, Mazzini, 13. 14. John Gooch, "Nationalism and the Italian Army, 1850-1914," in Claus Björn et al., eds., Nations, Nationalism, and Patriotism in the European Past (Copenhagen 1994), 210. 15. Quoted in Cobban, The Nation State, 134. 16. Hans-Ulrich Wehler, The German Empire, 1871-1918, trans. Kim Traynor (Leamington Spa 1985 [1973D, 105. 17. Arendt, Origins, 4. 18. Carolyn P. Boyd, Historia Patria (Princeton 1997), xviii. 19. Walter Laqueur, A History of Zionism (London 1972), 421.

CHAPTER

6

Nationalism Worldwide 1. Emerson, From Empire, 213. 2. John Lonsdale, in Bruce Berman and Lonsdale, Unhappy Valley (London 1992), 463. 3. Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley 1985), 61. 4. David G. Marr, Vietnamese Tradition on Trial, 1920-1945(Berkeley

1981),

191, 173, 132-33. 5. James S. Coleman, Nationalism and Development in Africa, ed. Richard L. Sklar (Berkeley 1994), 138. See also Horowitz, Ethnic, 153. 6. Leroy Vail, "Introduction," in Vail, ed., The Creation of Tribalism in South­ ern Africa (London 1989), 16. NOTES TO CHAPTER 6

225

7. Masao Maruyama, Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics, rev. ed., ed. Ivan Morris (New York 1969), 36. 8. Kunio Yanagita, About Our Ancestors, trans. Fanny Hagin Mayer and Ishiwara Yasuyo (New York 1988 [1970]), 15. 9. Daikichi Irokawa, The Culture of the Meiji Period, ed. Marius B. Jansen (Princeton 1985 [1969D, 287. 10. James W. White, Political Implications of Cityward Migration (Beverly Hills 1973), 47. 11. Edwin O. Reischauer, The Japanese Today (Cambridge, Mass., 1988), 396. 12. Gordon Berger, "Politics and Mobilization in Japan, 1931-1945," in Peter Duus, ed., The Cambridge History of Japan. Volume 6: The Twentieth Century (Cambridge, Eng., 1988), 134. 13. Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, 2 ed. (London 1968 d

[196l]),10. 14. Lewis, Emergence, 11. 15. Alan Knight, "Racism, Revolution, and Indigenismo: Mexico, 1910-1940," in Richard Graham, ed., The Idea of Race in Latin America, 1870-1940 (Austin 1990), 96. 16. David Nugent, "Introduction," in Nugent, ed., Rural Revolt in Mexico and U. S. Intervention (Durham 1998), 11. 17. From "El Plan Espiritual de Aztlán" (1967), quoted in Armando Navarro, Mexican American Youth Organization (Austin 1995), 67, 39. 18. Abd al-Latif Sharara, quoted in Sylvia G. Haim, Arab Nationalism (Berke­ ley 1974), 228. 19. Quoted in George M. Fredrickson, Black Liberation (New York 1995), 6920. Alexander Crummell, Africa and America (Miami, Fla., 1969 [1891D, 46. 21. C. L. R. James, A History of Pan-African Revolt, 2 ed. (Washington, D. C , d

1969 [1938D, 79, 82. 22. Quoted in Imanuel Geiss, The Pan-African Movement, trans. Ann Keep (London 1974 [1968]), 264. 23. George Padmore, Pan-Africanism or Communism?(London

1956), 89.

24. Crummell, Africa, 422. See also Wilson Jeremiah Moses, The Golden Age of Black Nationalism, 1820-1925 (New York 1988 [1978]). 25. James Mayall, "Self-Determination and the OAU," in Lewis, Nationalism and Self-Determination, 81. 26. Padmore, Pan-Africanism, 22. 27. Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject (Princeton 1996), 292. 28. Lonsdale, in Berman and Lonsdale, Unhappy Valley, 329. 29. Ali Mazrui, "African Entrapped: Between the Protestant Ethic and the Leg-

226

NOTES TO CHAPTER 6

acy of Westphalia," in Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, eds., Expansion of Inter­ national Society (Oxford 1984), 28930. David Lan, Guns and Rain (London 1985), 222. 31. Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments (Dehli 1994), 156. 32. Crawford Young, "Ethnicity and the Colonial and Post-Colonial State in Africa," in Paul Brass, ed., Ethnic Groups and the State (Totowa, N.J., 1985), 68. 33. John Markakis, National and Class Conflict in the Horn of Africa (Cam­ bridge, Eng., 1987), xvi. 34. Kiberd, Inventing Ireland, 101. 35. Kwame Anthony Appiah, In My Father's House (New York 1992), 168-69. 36. Geiss, Pan-African Movement, 227.

CHAPTER

7

Global Nationalism 1. Handler, Nationalism and the Politics of Culture, 125. 2. Quoted in Alphonso Pinkney, Red, Black and Green (New York 1976), 105. 3. LeoKuper, The Pity of It All (Minneapolis 1977), 125. 4. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Imperial Presidency (Boston 1973), ix. 5. Joseph Rothschild, Ethnopolitics (New York 1981), 48. 6. Adam Gopnik, "A Paris Journal," New Yorker (Feb.

5, 1996): 36.

7. Nikki R. Keddie and Yann Richard, Roots of Revolution (New Haven 1981), 41. 8. Keddie, "The Iranian Revolution in Comparative Perspective," American Historical Review 88 (June 1983): 585. 9. Fouad Ajami, in Tawfic E. Farah, ed., Pan-Arahism and Arab Nationalism (Boulder 1987), 200. 10. Martin Kramer, "Arab Nationalism: Mistaken Identity," Daedalus 122 (Sum­ mer 1993): 194. 11. Essien Udosen Essien-Udom, Black Nationalism (Chicago 1962), 270. 12. James Kellas, The Politics of Ethnicity and Nationalism rev. ed. (New York 1998), 77.

CHAPTER

8

Thinking about the Future 1. Mark Juergensmeyer, The New Cold War? (Berkeley 1993), 194. 2. Zygmunt Bauman, Globalization (New York 1998), 123.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 8

227

3. Gidon Gottlieb, Nation against State (New York 1993), 7. 4. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order (New York 1996), 318. 5. David Morley and Kevin Robbins, "No Place Like Heimat: Images of Home(land) in European Culture," in Eley and Suny, Becoming National, 459.

228

NOTES TO CHAPTER 8

Bibliographical Essay

M

y preparation has been one p r o l o n g e d lesson at

the hands o f scholars w h o s e evidence underlies this b o o k and w h o s e interpretations o f it have stimulated me to formulate m y o w n . I f i n the e n d I d i d not learn enough, it was certainly not the fault o f m y teachers. B y n o means d o all o f their names appear here, w h e r e m y primary purpose is to invite further reading. T o those missing mentors, I can o n l y offer a general heartfelt thanks, w i t h apologies for the need to be selective.

GENERAL The contemporary study o f nationalism dates f r o m Karl W . Deutsch, Nationalism

and Social

Communication

bridge, Mass., 1953) and i n summary f o r m Nationalism Alternatives

(Cam­ and

Its

( N e w Y o r k 1969), w h i c h l i n k its emergence to a soci­

ety's development o f a sufficiently dense and b i n d i n g n e t w o r k o f communication. A m o n g the many scholars w h o expanded

Deutsch's ideas into a full-scale correlation o f nationalism w i t h modernization, Ernest Gellner attracted the most attention w i t h Nations

and

Nationalism

( O x f o r d 1983), w h i c h assigns special

w e i g h t to m o d e r n education. See also his final w o r d o n the sub­ ject i n Nationalism

( N e w Y o r k 1997) and helpful appraisals o f his

w o r k i n John A Hall, ed., The State of the Nation

(New York

1998). The t w o most influential ideas i n recent studies o f nationalism come f r o m Benedict Anderson's Imagined (London

1991

rev. ed.

Communities,

[1983D and Eric Hobsbawm's

contributions

H o b s b a w m and Terence O. Ranger, eds., The Invention

of

to

Tradi­

tion (Cambridge, Eng., 1983), b o t h o f w h i c h stress the state's abil­ ity to deceive and manipulate. T w o important counters to these state-based interpretations o f nationalism are Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism nic

(Princeton 1994), a n d A n t h o n y D . Smith, The

Origins of Nations

Eth­

( O x f o r d 1986). For updated summaries o f

Smith's views and useful bibliographies, i n c l u d i n g a list o f his o w n extensive writings, see his Nations

and Nationalism

Era (Cambridge, Eng., 1995) and his Nationalism ( L o n d o n 1998). J o h n Breuilly's Nationalism (Manchester Politics

in a

and

Modernism

and the State, rev. ed.

1993) and Richard Handler's Nationalism

of Culture

Global

and

the

in Quebec (Madison 1988) contain valuable i n ­

sights into the interplay o f nationalist movements and state p o w e r . Scholars w h o make other interesting distinctions b e t w e e n nation­ alism and the loyalties and impulses a r o u n d it are: James Kellas, The

Politics

of Ethnicity

and

Nationalism,

rev. ed. ( N e w Y o r k

1998); D a v i d M . Potter, "The Historian's Use o f Nationalism a n d Vice Versa," i n Potter, The South and the Sectional

Conflict (Baton

Rouge 1968), 34-83; D o v Ronen, The Quest for

Self-Determination

(New

Haven 1979); Maurizio V i r o l i , For Love of Country

Y o r k 1995). A t the other extreme, Margaret Canovan, and

Political

tionalism

Nationhood

Theory (Cheltenham 1996), and Liah Greenfeld,

Na­

(Cambridge, Mass., 1992), merge the subject w i t h the

essential characteristics o f the societies they study. 230

(New

BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY

Some scholars, resisting the widespread impulse to c o n d e m n nationalism out o f hand, defend it as a right to self-determination: Harry Beran, The Consent

Theory of Political

1987); W i l l Kymlicka, Multicultural

(London

Obligation

( O x f o r d 1995) and

Citizenship

his Politics

in the Vernacular

Nationality

( N e w Y o r k 1995); and Michael Walzer, "Nation and

Universe," i n Tanner

( N e w Y o r k 2000); D a v i d Miller, On

Lectures

on Human

Values,

v o l . 11, ed.

Grethe B. Peterson (Salt Lake City 1990), 507-56. Julia Kristeva, Nations Liberal

without

Nationalism

Nationalism

( N e w Y o r k 1993), and Yael Tamir,

(Princeton 1993), favor sanitized versions o f

nationalist sentiment. Overviews o f nationalism have m u l t i p l i e d d u r i n g the last de­ cade. See, for example, Craig Calhoun, Nationalism 1997); Montserrat Guibernau,

Nationalisms

1996); Ernst B. Haas, Nationalism,

Liberalism

(Minneapolis

(Cambridge, and

Eng.,

Progress,

vols., (Ithaca 1997-2000); and J o h n Hutchinson, Modern

2

Nation­

alism ( L o n d o n 1994). Compare any o f these to their early t w e n ­ tieth-century counterpart, Nationalism: of Members

of the Royal Institute

A Report by a Study

of International

Group

Affairs ( L o n d o n

1939). Three fine collections o f short pieces supplement these sur­ veys: J o h n H u t c h i n s o n and A n t h o n y D . Smith, eds.,

Nationalism

( O x f o r d 1994), w h i c h draws largely f r o m mainstream scholarship, and the same editors' Nationalism

( N e w Y o r k 2000), w h i c h sur­

veys the w h o l e field; and Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny, eds., Becoming

National

( N e w Y o r k 1996), w h i c h ranges more

w i d e l y a m o n g disciplines and points o f v i e w . It is harder to ex­ tract information specifically about nationalism f r o m t w o other collections: H o m i K. Bhabha, ed. Nation 199O),

(London

and Narration

and A n d r e w Parker et al., eds., Nationalisms

and

Sexu-

alities ( N e w Y o r k 1992). Histories o f nationalism are i n shorter supply. Carlton J. H . Hayes, Essays

on Nationalism

cal Evolution

of Modern

( N e w Y o r k 1926) a n d The

Nationalism

Histori­

( N e w Y o r k 1931) are p i ­

oneer w o r k s that trace its European history t h r o u g h stages from BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY

231

the French Revolution to twentieth-century fascism. Shafer, Faces of Nationalism

B o y d C.

( N e w Y o r k 1972), the b u l k o f w h i c h

was published i n 1955, relies o n social psychology—the dismal science at m i d c e n t u r y — f o r his interpretations. B y far the most useful history is E. J. H o b s b a w m , Nations 1780,

and Nationalism

since

2d ed. (Cambridge, Eng., 1992 [1990]), just as hostile as

Shafer's account but richly g r o u n d e d a n d always attentive to chro­ nology. J o h n A. Armstrong's Nations

(Chapel

before Nationalism

H i l l 1982), w i t h a particularly interesting analysis o f the different roots for nationalism i n Islamic and Christian cultures, stands out for the depth o f its historical probe, b u t it is not itself a history. Other useful studies o f a general nature are: Peter Alter, Nationalism,

trans. Stuart McKinnon-Evans, 2d ed.

( L o n d o n 1994 [19891). H a n n a h Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism

( N e w Y o r k 1951).

Isaiah Berlin, "Nationalism: Past Neglect and Present Power," i n Against

the Current ( N e w Y o r k 1979), 333-55.

Michael Billig, Banal

( L o n d o n 1995).

Nationalism

E d w a r d Hallett Carr, Nationalism Alfred Cobban, The Nation

and After ( L o n d o n 1945).

State and National

Self-Determination,

rev. ed. ( L o n d o n l 9 6 9 [1945]). Terry Eagleton, Fredric Jameson, E d w a r d W . Said, Colonialism,

and Literature

Nationalism,

(Minneapolis 1990), especially the

introduction b y Seamus Deane. Thomas H y l l a n d Eriksen, Ethnicity

and

Nationalism

(Boulder,

C o l o , 1993). Joshua A. Fishman, Language

and Nationalism

(Rowley, Mass,

1972). Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics i n the N e w States," i n Geertz, The

Interpreta­

tion of Cultures ( N e w Y o r k 1973), 255-310. R. D . Grillo, Introduction, i n Grillo, e d , "Nation" Europe

"State"

in

( L o n d o n 1980), 1-30.

J o h n A. Hall and I . C. Jarvie, e d s . Transition bridge, Eng., 1992). 232

and

BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY

to Modernity

(Cam­

J o h n Hutchinson, Modern Elie Kedourie, Nationalism,

( L o n d o n 1994).

Nationalism

4th ed. ( O x f o r d 1993 [I960]).

Hans K o h n , The Idea of Nationalism W i l l i a m H . McNeill, Polyethnicity

( N e w Y o r k 1944). and

National

Unity in

World

History ( T o r o n t o 1986). K. R. Minogue, Nationalism

( N e w Y o r k 1967).

J o h n Plamenatz, " T w o Types o f Nationalism," i n Eugene Kamenka, ed., Nationalism Peter Scott, Knowledge

(Canberra 1973), 3-20.

and Nation

(Edinburgh 1990).

I m m a n u e l Wallerstein, "The Construction o f Peoplehood: Racism, Nationalism, Ethnicity," i n Etienne Balibar and Wallerstein, eds., Race, Nation,

Class ( L o n d o n 199D, 71-85.

For a different w a y o f addressing these general issues, see m y "Imagined Historical

Communities,

Nationalist Experiences," fournal

of the

Society 1 (Spring 2000): 33-63. (Please ignore its open­

i n g paragraph, w h i c h was w r i t t e n b y an anonymous editor.)

EUROPEAN PEOPLE T w o essays i n W i l l i a m H . McNeill and Ruth S. Adams, eds., Human

Migration

( B l o o m i n g t o n 1978), are crucial to the o r i ­

gins o f nationalism: McNeill, "Hum a n Migration: A Historical Overview," 3-19; and Charles Tilly, "Migration i n M o d e r n Euro­ pean History," 48-72. Also helpful are: Nicholas Canny, ed., Europeans

on the Move ( N e w Y o r k 1994).

Philip D . Curtin, "Migration i n the Tropical W o r l d , " i n Virginia Yans-McLaughlin, ed., Immigration

Reconsidered

(New York

1990). A n t h o n y Pagden, "The Effacement o f Difference: Colonialism and the Origins o f Nationalism i n Diderot and Herder," i n G y a n Prakash, ed., After Colonialism

(Princeton 1995), 129-52.

Frank Thistlethwaite, "Migration f r o m Europe Overseas i n the Nineteenth and T w e n t i e t h Centuries," i n Herbert Moller, ed., BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY

233

Population

Movements

in Modern

History ( N e w Y o r k

European

1964), 7 3 - 9 2 . Charles Tilly, ed., The Formation

of National

States in

Western

(Princeton 1975).

Europe

Basic Statements about the hardening o f nationalism after 1870 appear i n : Eric H o b s b a w m , "Mass-Producing Traditions: Europe, 1870-1914," i n H o b s b a w m and Ranger, eds., Invention tion, 263-307; and H u g h Seton-Watson, Nations

of

Tradi­

and States ( B o u l ­

der 1977). See also Ralph Gibson, "The Intensification o f National Consciousness i n M o d e r n Europe," i n Claus Björn et al., eds., tions, Nationalism,

and

Patriotism

National

Revival in Europe,

Past (Cop­

in the European

enhagen 1994), 177-97; Miroslav H r o c h , Social

Na­

Preconditions

of

trans. B e n Fowkes (Cambridge, Eng.,

1985); and Wolfgang J. M o m m s e n , "The Varieties o f the N a t i o n State i n M o d e r n History: Liberal, Imperialist, Fascist a n d Contem­ porary Notions o f Nation a n d Nationality," i n Michael M a n n , ed., The Rise and Decline

of the Nation

State ( O x f o r d 1990), 210-26.

Special efforts to understand the Marxist collision w i t h national­ ism include Erica Benner, Really Existing 1995); Walker Connor, The National

(Oxford

Nationalisms

Question

in

Marxist-Leninist

Theory and Strategy (Princeton 1984); Roman Szporluk, nism

and Nationalism

Commu­

( N e w Y o r k 1988); and Pierre Vilar, " O n

Nations and Nationalism," trans. Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, Perspectives

Marxist

2 (Spring 1979): 8-30. O n the rise o f racism, see D a n ­

iel J. Kevles, In the Name of Eugenics Sophia Quine, Population

Politics

( N e w Y o r k 1985); Maria

in Twentieth-Century

( L o n d o n 1996); and George W . Stocking, Victorian ( N e w Y o r k 1987). Stuart Mews, ed., Religion

Europe Anthropology

and National

Iden­

tity ( O x f o r d 1982)—particularly Bernard A s p i n w a l l o n the Scots, Frances Lannon o n Spain, Stella Alexander o n Yugoslavia, and R. F. G. Holmes o n the Ulster Irish—also illuminates post-1870 Euro­ pean nationalism. O n matters that came to a head b e t w e e n w o r l d wars, see C. A. Macartney, 234

National

States

BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY

and

National

Minorities

(London

1934), and Catheryn Seckler-Hudson, Statelessness D.C.,

(Washington,

1934). Relevant histories are included i n these collections:

Hans Rogger and Eugen Weber, eds., The European

Right (Berke­

ley 1965), especially Weber o n France and Romania and Stanley Payne o n Spain; Peter F. Sugar, ed. Native

Fascism

in the

Suc­

(Santa Barbara 1971); and Sugar and I v o

cessor States 1918-1945 Lederer, eds., Nationalism

in Eastern Europe (Seattle 1969), espe­

cially Stephen G. Xydis o n Greece, George Barany o n Hungary, and Peter B r o c k o n Poland. The f o l l o w i n g are important studies o f particular movements, alphabetically

arranged

Skendi, The Albanian ton

b y the

National

territories they

Awakening,

cover.

Stavro (Prince­

1878-1912

1967). O n Belgium, Shepard B. Clough, A History

Flemish

Movement

in Belgium

of

the

( N e w Y o r k 1930); Maureen Covell,

"Ethnic Conflict, Representation and the State i n Belgium," i n Paul Brass, ed., Ethnic

Groups and the State (Totowa, N.J., 1985), 2 2 8 -

6 l ; and Aristide R. Zolberg, "Transformation o f Linguistic Ideo­ logies: The Belgian Case," i n Jean-Guy Savard a n d Richard V i gneault, eds., Les États Multilingues

( Q u é b e c 1975), 445-72. O n

Britain and its offshoots, A n t h o n y Birch, Nationalism

and

Na­

tional Integration

( L o n d o n 1989); Jack Brand, The National

ment in Scotland

( L o n d o n 1978); Linda Colley, Britons ( N e w Ha­

v e n 1992); Christopher Harvie, Scotland

Colonialism

1975); Kenneth O. Morgan, Rebirth of a Nation, Y o r k 1981); T o m Nairn, The Break-up

3d ed.

and Nationalism,

( L o n d o n 1998); Michael Hechter, Internal

(Berkeley

1880-1980

of Britain,

1981); and Gerald N e w m a n , The Rise of English

Move­

(New

rev. ed. ( L o n d o n Nationalism,

rev.

ed. ( N e w Y o r k 1997). O n the D u t c h , Rod Kuiper, " O r t h o d o x Pro­ testantism, Nationalism and Foreign Affairs," i n A n n e m i e k a Gal­ erna et al., eds., Images

of the Nation

(Amsterdam 1993), 39-58.

O n France, Stanley Hoffmann, "The Nation, Nationalism, and Af­ ter: The Case o f France," Tanner

Lectures

on Human

Values,

Grethe B. Peterson, ed. (Salt Lake City 1994), X V , 215-82; Brian Jenkins,

Nationalism

in France

(Savage, M d . , 1990); M a r y o n BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY

235

M c D o n a l d , "We Are Not French!" Weber, Peasants

( N e w Y o r k 1989); and Eugen (Stanford 1976). O n Greece, see

into Frenchmen

Michael Herzfeld's important Ours Once More (Austin 1982), as w e l l as the useful volumes o f Martin B l i n k h o r n and Thanos Veremis, e d s . Modern ed.

Greece (Athens 1990), and o f Richard Clogg,

The Greek Diaspora

in theTwentieth

(Houndmills

Century

1999), esp. Clogg's and Renée Hirschon's contributions. O n Italy, Alexander DeGrand, Italian The Italian

Nationalist

3d ed. (Lincoln 2000) and

Fascism,

Association

c o l n 1978); J o h n Gooch, Army,

(Lin­

and the Rise of Fascism

State, and Society in Italy,

1915 (Basingstoke 1989); Denis Mack Smith, Mazzini

1870-

( N e w Ha­

v e n 1994). O n Scandinavia, particularly N o r w a y , Denmark, a n d Finland, Rosalind Mitchison, e d . The Roots of Nationalism

(Edin­

b u r g h 1980). O n the Soviet U n i o n , Y u r i Slezkine, "The USSR As a C o m m u n a l Apartment, or H o w a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularism," Slavic Review

53 (Summer 1994): 414-52; Ronald

Grigor Suny and Michael D . Kennedy, e d s . Intellectuals Articulation

of the Nation

and

( A n n A r b o r 1999), esp. the essays b y

Y u r i Slezkine and Andrzej Walicki; and Ronald Grigor Suny, Revenge

the The

of the Past (Stanford 1993). O n the South Slavs, see Lor-

i n g M . Danforth,

The Macedonian

Charles Jelavich, South Slav Nationalisms A n d r e w Wachtel, Making

a Nation,

(Princeton

Conflict

1995);

(Columbus 1990); and

Breaking

a Nation

(Stanford

1998). O n Spain and its much-studied regional movements, Car­ o l y n P. B o y d , Historia

Patria

(Princeton 1997); Martin B l i n k h o r n ,

"Euskadi: Basque Nationalism i n the T w e n t i e t h Century," i n Bjorn et a l , e d s . Nations,

Nationalism,

Conversi, The Basques,

and Patriotism,

the Catalans,

and

Spain

Juan Diez Medrano, Divided

Nations

Douglass, e d , Basque

and Nationalism

Millennium

Politics

213-29; Daniele (Reno 1997);

(Ithaca 1995); W i l l i a m A on the Eve of the

(Reno 1999), esp. the pieces b y I n a k i Zabaleta a n d

Douglass; Marianne Heiberg, The Making

of the Basque

Nation

(Cambridge, Eng., 1989); Josep Llobera, "Catalan National Identity: The Dialectics o f Past and Present," i n Elizabeth T o n k i n et a l .

236

BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY

eds.,

History

and

( L o n d o n 1989), 2 4 7 - 6 1 ; and K e n

Ethnicity

Medhurst, The Basques

and Catalans,

3d rev. ed. ( L o n d o n 1987).

IRISH N A T I O N A L I S M The best introductions to the subject are D . George Boyce, Nationalism

in Ireland,

3 d ed. ( L o n d o n 1995); Robert Kee,

The Green Flag ( N e w Y o r k 1972); and K i r b y A. Miller, and

Exiles

( N e w Y o r k 1985), w h i c h is a genuinely

Emigrants transatlantic

study. The same is true o f Eric Foner's valuable article, "Class, Ethnicity, and Radicalism i n the G i l d e d Age: The Land League and Irish-America," Marxist Cronin's Irish

1 (Summer 1978): 6-55. Sean

Perspectives

Nationalism

( N e w Y o r k 1981), another survey, is

particularly useful for its treatment o f Northern Ireland i n the 1960s and 1970s. Declan Kiberd, Inventing

(Cambridge,

Ireland

Mass., 1995) discusses the elusiveness o f the nationalist vision. O n the origins o f Irish nationalism, see especially Conrad M . Arensberg, The Irish Countryman

( N e w Y o r k 1937); an expansion

o f that study, Arensberg and Solon T. Kimball, Family munity

in Ireland,

and

Com­

2d ed. (Cambridge, Mass., 1968); and K. H .

Connell, The Population

of Ireland,

( O x f o r d 1950).

1750-1845

The path to partition is illuminated b y J o h n Hutchinson, The Dy­ namics tionalist

of Cultural

Nationalism

Revolutionaries

( L o n d o n 1987); T o m Garvin, Na­

in Ireland

1858-1928

( O x f o r d 1987), or

its condensation i n Garvin, "The A n a t o m y o f a Nationalist Revolu­ tion: Ireland, 1858-1928," Comparative

Studies in Society and

tory 28 (July 1986): 4 6 8 - 5 0 1 ; and Thomas Hennessey, Ireland

His­

Dividing

( L o n d o n 1998). Another set o f studies traces a parallel

story across the Atlantic: Jay P. Dolan, The Immigrant

Church

(Baltimore 1979); Thomas N . B r o w n , "The Origins and Character o f Irish-American Nationalism," Review

of Politics

327-58, o n the 1850s; W i l l i a m D'Arcy, The Fenian

18 (July 1956): Movement

BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY

in 237

the United

States:

(Washington, D.C., 1947); T. N .

1858-1886

B r o w n , Irish-American

Nationalism,

1966); Lawrence J. McCaffrey,

(Philadelphia

1870-1890

The Irish

Diaspora

in

America

( B l o o m i n g t o n 1976), especially o n the Parnell era; Francis M . Car­ roll, "America and Irish Political Independence, 1910-33," i n P. J. D r u d y , ed., The Irish in America

(Cambridge, Eng., 1985), 271-93;

a n d D a v i d Montgomery, "The Irish i n the American Labor M o v e ­ ment," i n D a v i d N o e l D o y l e and O w e n D u d l e y Edwards, America

and Ireland,

eds.,

(Westport 1980), 205-18.

1776-1976

Further information is available i n : J. C. Beckett, A Short History

of Ireland,

6th ed. ( L o n d o n 1979).

Dennis J. Clark, Irish Blood (Port Washington 1977). K. H . Connell, Irish Peasant

Society ( O x f o r d 1968).

Richard P. Davis, Irish Issues in New Zealand

Politics,

1868-1922

( D u n e d i n 1974). D . N . D o y l e , Irish Americans,

Native Rights and National

Empires

( N e w Y o r k 1976). Steven P. Erie, Rainbow's Michael F. Funchion,

End (Berkeley 1988). Chicago's

Irish

Nationalists,

1881-1890

( N e w Y o r k 1976 [1973D. H e n r y H . Glassie, Passing

(Philadelphia

the Time in Ballymenone

1982). Maurice Goldring, Faith of Our Fathers ( D u b l i n 1987 [1982]). Michael A. G o r d o n , The Orange Riots (Ithaca 1993). Arthur Gribben, ed., The Great Famine America

and the Irish Diaspora

in

(Amherst 1999).

Thomas E. Hachey and L. J. McCaffrey, eds., Perspectives Nationalism

on

Irish

(Lexington 1989), especially the essays b y Hachey

a n d R. V . Comerford. Oscar H a n d l i n , Boston's

Immigrants,

rev. ed.

(Cambridge,

Mass., 1959). T. Hennessey, A History of Northern

Ireland

1920-1996(London

1997). N o e l Ignatiev, How the Irish Became L y n n H o l l e n Lees, Exiles 238

BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY

White ( N e w Y o r k 1995).

of Erin (Ithaca 1979).

E d w a r d M . Levine, The Irish

and

Irish

Politicians

(Notre D a m e

1966). L. J. McCaffrey, "Irish Nationalism and Irish Catholicism: A Study i n Cultural Identity," Church History Al (December 1973): 1 - 1 1 . T i m o t h y J. Meagher, " W h y Should W e Care for a Little Trouble or a W a l k t h r o u g h the M u d ' : St. Patrick's and Columbus D a y Pa­ rades i n Worcester, Massachusetts, 1845-1915," New Quarterly

England

58 (March 1985): 5-26.

Brian P. M u r p h y , Patrick

Pearse

and

the Lost Republican

Ideal

( D u b l i n 1991). Thomas H . O'Connor, The Boston Irish (Boston 1995). A l a n O'Day, ed., Reactions

to Irish Nationalism

(Lon­

1865-1914

d o n 1987). Patrick O'Farrell, The Irish in Australia

(Kensington, NSW, 1986).

Joseph P. O'Grady, How the Irish Became

Americans

(New York

1973). C. H . E. Philpin, ed., Nationalism

and Popular

Protest in

Ireland

and the Fight for Irish Freedom

1866-

(Cambridge, Eng., 1987). Charles C. Tansill, America 1922 ( N e w Y o r k 1957). Robert J. T h o m p s o n and Joseph R. Rudolph, Jr., "Irish-Americans i n the American Foreign-Policy-Making Process," i n M o h a m m e d E. Ahrari, ed., Ethnic

Groups

and

U. S. Foreign

Policy

(New

Y o r k 1987), 135-53. T i m o t h y Walch, ed., Immigrant

( N e w Y o r k 1994), espe­

America

cially the essay b y D a v i d L. Salvaterra. James B. Walsh, The Irish ( N e w Y o r k 1976). A l a n J. W a r d , Ireland

and Anglo-American

Relations,

1899-1921

(Toronto 1969).

G E R M A N NATIONALISM The intimate role o f the state i n b l o c k i n g and creating German nationalism makes it difficult to extract the history o f naBIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY

239

tionalism f r o m the history o f state policies generally. The p r o b ­ lems that this mating caused i n defining the nation are e x p l o r e d i n James J. Sheehan, "What Is German History? Reflections o n the Role o f the Nation nal of Modern

i n German History and Historiography,"

Jour­

History 53 (March 1981): 1-23; and J. Breuilly, "The

National Idea i n M o d e r n German History," i n Breuilly, ed., State of Germany

The

( L o n d o n 1992), 1-28. See also Diana Forsythe,

"German Identity and the Problems o f History," i n T o n k i n et al., eds., History and Ethnicity,

137-56; and Pieter M . Judson,

Exclu­

( A n n A r b o r 1996).

sive Revolutionaries

The starting p o i n t for a study o f the struggles to give shape to a German nation is Sheehan's German 1989). Brueilly's The Formation 1800-1871

History

1770-1866(Oxford

of the First German

Nation-State,

( N e w Y o r k 1996) is a superior brief survey. Mack

Walker, German

Home

Towns (Ithaca 1971) deepens our under­

standing o f particularism. Michael Hughes, Nationalism

and

Soci­

ety ( L o n d o n 1988), underlines the weakness o f p o p u l a r national­ ism d u r i n g most o f the nineteenth century; the essays b y Dieter Düding and A d o l f M . Birke i n Hagen Schulze, ed.,

Nation-Build­

ing in Central Europe (Leamington Spa 1987) add insight into its formlessness. Margaret Lavinia Anderson, Practicing

Democracy

(Princeton 2000), and H e l m u t Walser Smith, German

Nationalism

and Religious

Conflict (Princeton 1995), trace c o n t i n u i n g sources

o f d i v i s i o n into the early t w e n t i e t h century. Several studies highlight the importance o f the 1890s i n articu­ lating and hardening German nationalism. See especially Geoff Eley's Reshaping

the German

Ulrich Wehler's

The German

Right ( N e w H a v e n 1980) and HansEmpire,

1871-1918,

trans. K i m

Traynor (Leamington Spa 1985 [1973]). Rogers Brubaker, ship and Nationhood 1992), a n d Eley, From

in France

and Germany

Unification

to Nazism

Citizen­

(Cambridge, Mass., (Boston 1986), sup­

plement that story. German history f r o m 1919 to 1945 virtually merges the study o f nationalism w i t h the contests over state p o w e r and policy. Attempts to give specificity to German national­ ism include Alexander J. D e Grand, Fascist 240

B I B L I O G R A P H I C ESSAY

Italy and Nazi

Ger-

many ( L o n d o n 1995); G u n t r a m H e n r i k Herb, Under the Map ( N e w Y o r k 1997); W o o d r u f f D . Smith, The

Germany Origins

of Nazi Imperialism

of

Ideological

( N e w Y o r k 1986); J. P. Stern,

(Berkeley 1975); and George L. Mosse, The Nationalization

Hitler of the

Masses ( N e w Y o r k 1975). The experience o f Germans i n the Western Hemisphere begins w i t h changes i n their c o m m u n i t y life at home. D a v i d Warren Sabean, Property, Production,

and Family

in Neckarhausen,

1700-

1870 (New Y o r k 1990), is invaluable. See also Gerhard W i l k e and Kurt Wagner, "Family and Household: Social Structure i n a German Village between the T w o W o r l d Wars," i n Richard J. Evans and W . R. Lee, eds.,

The German

Family

( L o n d o n 1981), 120-47. D i r k

Hoerder and J ö r g Nagler, eds., People in Transit (Cambridge, Eng., 1995), addresses the demographics o f German migration. O n the separateness o f these migrants' lives i n the U n i t e d States, see for example: Kathleen Neils Conzen, "Ethnicity As Festive Culture: Nineteenth-Century German America o n Parade," i n Werner Sollors, ed., The Invention

of Ethnicity

( N e w Y o r k 1989), 44-76; Con­

zen, "German-Americans and the I n v e n t i o n o f Ethnicity," i n Frank T r o m m l e r and Joseph McVeigh, eds., America

and the Germans,

vols. (Philadelphia 1985), I , 131-47; Frederick Luebke, The of Loyalty among

( D e K a l b 1974); Linda Schelbitzki Pickle,

2

Bonds

Contented

(Urbana 1996). O n socialist and w o r k e r rather

Strangers

than nationalist identities i n the cities, see Stuart Bruce Kaufman, Samuel

Gompers

Labor,

1848-1896

and the Promise

and the Origins of the American

Federation

(Westport 1973); Sally M . Miller, Victor of Constructive

Socialism,

1973); Stanley Nadel, Little Germany(Urbana Schneider, Trade Unionsand

1910-1920

of

Berger

(Westport

1990); and Dorothée

Community(Urbana

1994).

ZIONISM D a v i d Vital's authoritative three-volume Origins

of Zionism

( O x f o r d 1980 [1975D, Zionism:

The

study—The Formative

BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY

241

Years ( O x f o r d 1982), and Zionism:

Years ( O x f o r d

The Crucial

1987)—is fair, w e l l w r i t t e n , and teleological. Walter Laqueur, A History

of Zionism

( L o n d o n 1972), is also an intelligent account.

B e n Halpern, The Idea

of the fewish

State, 2d ed. (Cambridge,

Mass, 1969), is particularly useful o n differences w i t h i n the m o v e ment. George L. Mosse, Confronting

(Hanover 1993),

the Nation

singles out Jewish nationalism as the o n l y g o o d one. Albert S. Lindemann, Esau's T a l m o n , Myth of the Nation

Tears ( N e w Y o r k 1997), a n d Jacob and

(Berkeley

Vision of Revolution

1981), examine sources for Zionism, and Shmuel A l m o g ,

Zionism

History, trans. Ina Friedman ( N e w Y o r k 1987), explores the

and

movement's fragmented beginnings. O n A h a d Ha'am, see Steven J. Zipperstein's Elusive of

Heroes

(New

Prophet (Berkeley 1993). Halpern, A Clash

York

1987),

details

the

struggle

between

W e i z m a n n and Brandeis and i n the process takes us to the U n i t e d States. American

Zionism

from

Herzl

(Garden City

to the Holocaust

1975) b y M e l v i n I . Urofsky, an expert o n Brandeis, surveys the field

effectively. Y o n a t h a n Shapiro, Leadership

Zionist

Organization

1897-1930

of the

American

(Urbana 1971), is m u c h harsher

o n the Brandeis circle. Essays b y Sarah Schmidt and Carol Bosw o r t h Kutscher i n Urofsky, e d . Essays in American

Zionism

(New

Y o r k 1978) illuminate aspects o f the p i v o t a l years a r o u n d the First W o r l d War. See also "Democracy versus the Melting Pot," i n Horace Kallen, Culture and Democracy Y o r k 1924), 67-125. Peter Grose, Israel (New

in the United States ( N e w in the Mind

of

Ameñca

Y o r k 1983), also sides w i t h Weizmann, this time against his

hard-line opponents d u r i n g the Second W o r l d War. I n its contrast to European experiences, the American anti-Semitism that John H i g h a m reviews i n Send These to Me, rev. ed. (Baltimore 1984), especially p p . 153-74, serves as backdrop to Jewish culture i n the U n i t e d States. The anecdotes i n Leonard Dinnerstein, Antisemitism

in America

( N e w Y o r k 1994), d o not substan-

tially alter the comparative mildness o f that picture. Jenna Weiss242

BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY

m a n Joselit, The Wonders

( N e w Y o r k 1994), empha­

of America

sizes the centrality o f family life i n a consumer culture, and Steven M . Cohen, American

Modernity

and fewish

Identity

(New York

1983), traces the effect o f such adaptations into the 1970s. D a v i d A. Hollinger, "Jewish Intellectuals and the De-Christianization o f American Public Culture i n the T w e n t i e t h Century," i n Hollinger, Science,

fetus,

and

Secular

Culture

(Princeton 1996), 1 7 - 4 1 , an­

alyzes one t r i u m p h i n that process. See also D a v i d Soyer, Immigrant

Associations

and

1880-1939

(Cambridge, Mass., 1997).

Charles D . Smith, Palestine

American

Identity

and the Arab-Israeli

in New

fewish York,

Conflict, 3 d ed.

( N e w Y o r k 1996), includes a clear account o f the f o u n d i n g o f Is­ rael. Erskine B. Childers, "The Wordless Wish: F r o m Citizens to Refugees," i n I b r a h i m Abu-Lughod, ed., The Transformation Palestine

of

(Evanston 1971), 165-202, describes the systematic re­

m o v a l o f Palestinians from their homes. See also Benny Morris, ed.,The Birth

of the Palestinian

Refugee

Problem,

1947-1949

(Cambridge, Eng., 1987), and his 1948 and Afier (Oxford b o t h m u c h milder critiques; and A v i Shlaim, The Iron Y o r k 2000). Inis L. Claude, National

Minorities

1990),

Wall ( N e w

(Cambridge, Mass.,

1955), provides a postwar context o f B i g Power callousness to­ w a r d ethnic cleansing. For other Jewish concerns about Palestin­ ians, see Nira Yuval-Davis, "National Reproduction and 'the De­ mographic Race' i n Israel," i n Yuval-Davis and Floya Anthias, eds., Woman-Nation-State

( N e w Y o r k 1989), 92-109.

The effects o f Israel o n Jewish American consciousness, espe­ cially after 1967, are revealed i n Gabriel Sheffer, "Political Aspects o f Jewish Fund-Raising for Israel," i n Sheffer, ed., Modern poras

in International

Svonkin, fews

against

Politics Prejudice

Dias­

( N e w Y o r k 1986), 258-93; Stuart ( N e w Y o r k 1997); a n d Urofsky,

We Are One! (Garden City 1978), the second v o l u m e i n his history o f American Z i o n i s m and itself a document o n the subject. For the parallel collapse o f institutional anti-Semitism i n the U n i t e d States, see D a n A. Oren, foining

the Club ( N e w Haven 1985). BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY

243

T H E U N I T E D STATES W i t h o n l y a few exceptions I have not duplicated m y extensive bibliographical essay o n the many subjects relating to American democracy i n Self Rule (Chicago 1995). Several scholars have used citizenship and ethnicity as ways o f talking about the distinctive characteristics o f American society. Richard D . B r o w n , The Strength

of a People (Chapel H i l l 1996),

emphasizes major changes i n citizenship early i n the

nineteenth

century. Linda K. Kerber, "The Meaning o f Citizenship," fournal American

History

of

84 (December 1997): 833-54, and Rogers M .

Smith, Civic Ideals ( N e w H a v e n 1997), analyze limitations a n d b i ­ ases. J o h n H i g h a m has devoted a distinguished career to the place o f ethnicity i n American history. His Strangers

in the Land, 2d ed.

( N e w B r u n s w i c k 1988) remains indispensable; his essay, "From Process to Structure: Formulations o f American I m m i g r a t i o n His­ tory," i n Peter Rivisto and D a g Blanck, e d s , American grants

and

Their Generations

Immi­

(Urbana 1990), 1 1 - 4 1 , is a recent

reconsideration g i v i n g special attention to the relations b e t w e e n class and ethnicity. Other broad views include J o h n Bodnar, Transplanted

The

( B l o o m i n g t o n 1985); K. N . Conzen et a l , "The I n ­

v e n t i o n o f Ethnicity: A Perspective f r o m the U.S.A.," fournal

of

American

Ethnic History 12 (Fall 1992): 3 - 4 1 ; Oscar H a n d l i n , The

Uprooted

(Boston 1952); D o n a l d L. H o r o w i t z , "Immigration and

G r o u p Relations i n France and America," i n H o r o w i t z a n d Gérard Noiriel, e d s . Immigrants

in Two Democracies

( N e w Y o r k 1992),

3-35; and Walter Nugent, Crossings ( B l o o m i n g t o n 1992). George M . Fredrickson, "America's Diversity i n Comparative Perspective," fournal

of American

History 85 (December 1998): 859-75, places

the accent o n race. I n Whiteness

of a Different

Color (Cambridge,

Mass, 1998), Matthew Jacobson combines race, ethnicity, a n d citi­ zenship i n a single synthesis. Efforts to deal w i t h these factors w i t h o u t losing track o f w h a t has h e l d American society together include H i g h a m , "Multiculturalism and Universalism: A History 244

BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY

and Critique," American

D a v i d A . Hollinger, Postethnic chael Walzer,

45 (June 1993):

Quarterly

( N e w Y o r k 1995), and M i ­

America

What It Means

195-219;

to Be an American

(New York

1992). The f o l l o w i n g studies illuminate the c o m p l e x interplay b e t w e e n America and Europe i n the m a k i n g and remaking o f ethnic identi­ ties. For the experience o f N o r w e g i a n migrants, see Carl Chrislock, Ethnicity Cultural

Challenged

Pluralism

versus

Marie Pederson, Between

(Northfield 1981); O d d S. Lovell, ed., (Northfield 1977); Jane

Assimilation Memory

and A p r i l R. Schultz, Ethnicity

and

Reality

on Parade

(Madison 1992);

(Amherst 1994). Ac­

counts o f other people's experiences include Dag Blanck,

(Uppsala 1997); Stanislaus A. Blejwas, "Po­

ing Swedish-American

lonia and Politics," i n J o h n J. B u k o w c z y k , ed., Polish and

Their History to America,

Gabaccia's Militants

Americans

(Pittsburgh 1996), 1 2 1 - 5 1 ; D i n o Cinel,

Italy to San Francisco Frisians

Becom­

(Stanford 1982); and A n n e m i e k e

From

Galerna,

1880-1914

(Groningen 1996). D o n n a R.

and Migrants

( N e w B r u n s w i c k 1988) traces

Sicilians, and Robert P. Swierenga's Faith and Family ( N e w Y o r k 2000) follows the waves o f D u t c h migrants. O n the transoceanic conflicts b e t w e e n and among groups, for example, Ronald H . Bayor, Neighbors 1978); Francis D . Cogliano, No King,

in Conflict

see

(Baltimore

No Popery (Westport 1995);

Keith P. D r y u d , The Quest for the Rusyn Soul (Philadelphia 1992); and Victor Greene, For God and

Country

(Madison 1975). The

f o l l o w i n g are particularly sensitive studies o f h o w immigrants and their offspring w o r k e d out their destinies inside the U n i t e d States: Michaela D i Leonardo, The Varieties of Ethnic

Experience

(Ithaca

1984); Suzanne M o d e l , "The Ethnic Niche and the Structure o f O p ­ portunity: Immigrants and Minorities i n N e w Y o r k City," i n M i ­ chael B. Katz, ed., The "Underclass" 161-93; J o h n T. McGreevy, Parish and Judith E. Smith, Family

Debate

Boundaries

Connections

(Princeton

1993),

(Chicago 1996);

(Albany 1985). See also

M . Jacobson, Special Sorrow (Cambridge, Mass., 1995). BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY

245

Whether ethnicity has value i n understanding

contemporary

America has stirred hot debate. Stephen Steinberg,

The

Ethnic

Myth, rev. ed. (Boston 1989), a n d Brackette Williams, "A Class Act: A n t h r o p o l o g y and the Race to N a t i o n across Ethnic Terrain," An­ nual Review of Anthropology Richard D . Alba, Ethnic

18 (1989): 401-44, c o n d e m n its use.

Identity

( N e w H a v e n 1990), a n d Herbert

Gans, "Symbolic Ethnicity: The Future o f Ethnic Groups a n d Cul­ tures i n America," Ethnic

and Racial

Studies 2 (January 1979): 1 -

20, emphasize its weaknesses. Werner Sollors, Beyond

Ethnicity

( N e w Y o r k 1986), offers the concept qualified support; J. Fishman et al., Ethnicity

in America

( B i n g h a m t o n 1985); Nathan Glazer

a n d Daniel Patrick M o y n i h a n , Beyond

the Melting

Pot, 2d ed.

(Cambridge, Mass., 1970); and R u d o l p h J. Vecoli, "Ethnicity a n d Immigration," i n Stanley I . Kutler, ed., Encyclopedia States in the Twentieth

Century,

of the

United

4 vols. ( N e w Y o r k 1996), I : l 6 l —

93, are impressed b y ethnicity's strength. V e c o l i and Russell A. Kazal, "Revisiting Assimilation: The Rise, Fall, and Reappraisal o f a Concept i n American Ethnic History," American

Historical

Review

100 ( A p r i l 1995): 4 3 7 - 7 1 , p r o v i d e overviews. Like ethnicity, w i t h w h i c h it is sometimes paired, race i n A m e r i ­ can history has been exceedingly difficult to grasp w h o l e . A t ­ tempts to orient us include Michael Banton, The Idea

of

Race

(Boulder 1977); Barbara J. Fields, "Ideology and Race i n A m e r i c a n History," i n j . M o r g a n Kousser and James M . McPherson, eds., Re­ gion,

Race,

and Reconstruction

( N e w Y o r k 1982), 143-77; and

Thomas F. Gossett, Race ( N e w Y o r k 1963). James Campbell a n d James Oakes, "The I n v e n t i o n o f Race: Rereading Black"

Reviews

in American

History

White

over

21 (March 1993), 172-83,

r e m i n d us o f the importance W i n t h r o p Jordan's pioneering b o o k placed o n Thomas Jefferson's ideas. Comparisons across space of­ fer another broad v i e w . G. M . Fredrickson's study o f America a n d South Africa, White Supremacy A n t h o n y W . Marx, Making

( N e w Y o r k 1981), is exemplary.

Race and Nation

( N e w Y o r k 1998),

adds Brazil to his account o f racism as rational self-interest.

246

B I B L I O G R A P H I C ESSAY

Another o v e r v i e w moves across color lines. The theme o f Carey McWilliams, Brothers

the Skin (Boston 1943)—that racism

under

has l o o k e d m u c h the same everywhere i n American h i s t o r y — c o n ­ tinues to dominate scholarly studies. See, for example, J o h n W . D o w e r , War without Making icy,

and Remaking

The

Invasion

Asian America

through

Immigration

(Stanford 1993); Michael H . H u n t , Ideology

1850-1990

U S. Foreign

( N e w Y o r k 1986); B i l l O n g H i n g ,

Mercy

Pol­ and

Policy ( N e w Haven 1987), ch. 3; Francis Jennings, (Chapel H i l l 1975); and

of America

Ronald Takaki, A Different

especially

(Boston 1993). Studies o f the

Mirror

first half o f the twentieth century provide strong evidence for this p o i n t o f v i e w . See, for example, h o w the evidence accumulates f r o m Roger Daniels, Asian Fowler, Northern

Attitudes

toward

Y o r k 1987); M a r k Haller, Eugenics D e s m o n d King, Separate

(Seattle 1988); D a v i d H .

Americans

and

Interracial

Marriage

(New

( N e w B r u n s w i c k 1984 [1963D;

Unequal

( O x f o r d 1995); Elizabeth

Lasch-Quinn, Black Neighbors (Chapel H i l l 1993); Walter B e n n M i ­ chaels, Our America

( D u r h a m 1995); Peggy Pascoe, "Miscegena­

t i o n Law, Court Cases, and Ideologies o f 'Race' i n Twentieth-Cen­ tury America," fournal

of American

History

and V e r n o n J. Williams, Jr., Rethinking Paul R. Spickard, Mixed

Blood

(June 1996): 44-69; Race (Lexington 1996).

(Madison 1989), however, tells a

more complicated story, as d o t w o interesting articles o n the am­ biguities o f color and race: James R. Barrett and D a v i d Roediger, "In Between Peoples: Race, Nationality and the ' N e w Immigrant' W o r k i n g Class," fournal

of American

Ethnic History 16 (1997): 3 -

44; and Robert Orsi, "Religious Boundaries o f an In-Between Peo­ ple: Street Feste and the Problem o f the Dark-Skinned 'Other' i n Italian Harlem," American

Quarterly

44 (September 1992): 3 1 3 -

47. Histories o f race as a w a y o f understanding differences a m o n g European migrants have yet to be w r i t t e n . D a v i d Folkmar,

Dictio­

nary of Races or Peoples (Washington, D.C., 1911), offers a peek. It is scarcely possible to overemphasize the significance o f slav­ ery t o the history o f race i n the U n i t e d States before the First BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY

247

W o r l d War. D a v i d B r i o n Davis's Slavery

and

Human

Progress

( N e w Y o r k 1984) helps to orient us, and W i l l i a m Dusinberre's Them Dark Days ( N e w Y o r k 1996) a n d James Oakes's The

Ruling

Race ( N e w Y o r k 1982) r e m i n d us about the institution's operation. Ira Berlin, Many

Gone (Cambridge, Mass., 1998), p r o ­

Thousands

vides an overview o f slavery i n N o r t h America; Leon F. Litwack, Trouble

in Mind ( N e w Y o r k 1998), traces its aftermath into the p i t

o f J i m Crow. See also Peter Kolchin's comparison o f slavery w i t h serfdom, Unfree Labor (Cambridge, Mass., 1987). Nationalism has served scholars less w e l l as a p o i n t o f depar­ ture. Hans Kohn's American

Nationalism

( N e w Y o r k 1957) sought

an American spirit, m u c h as his contemporaries d i d : M a x Lerner's America

( N e w Y o r k 1957) and Daniel J. Boor-

As a Civilization

stin's The Americans,

3 vols. ( N e w Y o r k 1958-73), for example. L.

Greenfeld, Nationalism,

(Cambridge, Mass. 1992) picks u p i n that

tradition. Stuart McConnell, "Nationalism," i n Kutler, ed., pedia

Encyclo­

of the United States, I : 2 5 1 - 7 1 , shows an admirable c o m ­

m a n d o f the literature o n the subject. Several recent studies ex­ plore the rites and rituals o f patriotism under the rubric o f nationalism.

See,

for

example,

Bodnar,

(Princeton 1992); McConnell, Glorious 1992); Simon P. N e w m a n , Parades

Remaking

Contentment

and

the Politics

America (Chapel H i l l

of the

Streets

(Philadelphia 1997); Cecilia Elizabeth O'Leary, To Die for (Prince­ t o n 1999); Len Travers, Celebrating

the Fourth

(Amherst 1997);

and D a v i d Waldstreicher, In the Midst of Perpetual

Fetes (Chapel

H i l l 1997). D a v i d R. Shumway's interesting study o f American liter­ ature as a nationalist artifact—Creating American (Minneapolis 1994)—belongs

Civilization

i n this category. J o h n R. Gillis, A

World of Their Own ( N e w Y o r k 1996), explains h o w this public culture o f celebration t h i n n e d out i n the twentieth century. The scholarship o n celebration has p a i d particular attention to a gen­ eral American consciousness late i n the eighteenth century, a phe­ n o m e n o n that these studies also treat as nationalism: T. H . Breen, "Ideology and Nationalism o n the Eve o f the American Revolution: 248

BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY

Revisions Once More i n Need o f Revising," Journal History

of

American

84 (June 1997): 13-39; Richard L. Merritt, Symbols

American

Community,

1735-1775

of

( N e w Haven 1966); and M a x

Savelle, "Nationalism and Other Loyalties i n the American Revolu­ tion," American

Historical

Review 67 (July 1962): 901-23. Another

familiar w a y o f construing nationalism is to equate it w i t h compre­ hensive state policies. See, for example, Gary Gerstle, "Theodore Roosevelt and the D i v i d e d Character o f American Nationalism," Journal

History 86 (December 1999): 1280-1307, and

of American

Michael Lind, The Next American

Nation ( N e w Y o r k 1995). I m p e ­

rialism as nationalism is also a c o m m o n approach. Anders Stephanson's Manifest

Destiny ( N e w Y o r k 1995) is a recent example.

Southern nationalism has been just as difficult to b r i n g into focus. A sample o f approaches includes Avery O. Craven, Growth

of Southern

Nationalism,

1848-1861

1953); D r e w G i l p i n Faust, The Creation

(Baton

of Confederate

The

Rouge National­

ism (Baton Rouge 1988); Eugene Genovese, The World the

Slav­

eholders Made ( N e w Y o r k 1965); J o h n McCardell, The Idea of the Southern Patriarchal Cavalier

Nation

( N e w Y o r k 1979); Michael P. Johnson, Toward

Republic and

Yankee

( N e w Y o r k 1961). Books that expose the

limitations o f Southern nationalism include Eric Foner, struction

( N e w Y o r k 1988); Gaines M . Foster, Ghosts of the

federacy

( N e w Y o r k 1987); H a r o l d M . H y m a n , A More

Recon­ Con­ Perfect

Union ( N e w Y o r k 1973); Charles R. Lee, Jr., The Confederate stitutions

a

(Baton Route 1977); and W i l l i a m R. Taylor,

(Chapel H i l l 1963); and Mitchell Snay, Gospel of

Con­ Disu­

nion ( N e w Y o r k 1993). The literature o n the M o r m o n s is more straightforward. A m o n g contributors to the picture o f M o r m o n i s m as mainstream American are Leonard A r r i n g t o n and D a v i d Bitton, The Mormon 2d ed. (Urbana American

1992); Klaus J. Hansen, Mormonism

Experience

(Chicago 1981); Jan Shipps,

(Urbana 1985); and Grant U n d e r w o o d , The Millenarian Early Mormonism

Experience, and

the

Mormonism World of

(Urbana 1993). Studies that emphasize the clash BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY

249

b e t w e e n M o r m o n i s m and prevailing American values include Robert Bruce Flanders, Nauvoo The

Viper on the Hearth

(Urbana 1965); Terryl L. Givens,

( N e w Y o r k 1997); " H o w to Become a

People: The M o r m o n Scenario," i n R. Laurence Moore, Outsiders

and the Making

( N e w Y o r k 1986), 25-47;

of Americans

and Kenneth H . W i n n , Exiles

Religious

of Liberty (Chapel H i l l

in a Land

1989). Arthur S. Link, Wilson the Diplomatist

(Baltimore 1957), for the

defense, and N . G o r d o n Levin, Jr., Woodrow Politics

Wilson

and

World

( N e w Y o r k 1968), for the prosecution, set the agenda o f

debate over the c h a m p i o n o f self-determination years ago. I n Modernity

and Power (Chicago

1994), Frank A. N i n k o v i c h , a m o r e

appreciative critic, assigns great historical importance to W i l s o n . For a recent account o f the much-studied intervention i n revolu­ tionary Russia, see D a v i d S. Foglesong, against

America's

Secret

(Chapel H i l l 1995). Derek Heater,

Bolshevism

War

National

Self-Determination

( N e w Y o r k 1994), and Victory Mamatey,

United

East

States and

Central

Europe,

1914-1918

The

(Princeton

1957), guide us f r o m o l d empires to n e w states. See also Lawrence E. Gelfand, The Inquiry E. Ahrari, ed., Ethnic

( N e w H a v e n 1963). Together, M o h a m m e d Groups and

1987); Louis L. Gerson, The Hyphenate tics and Diplomacy Immigrants' 1967);

Policy ( N e w Y o r k

U S. Foreign

in Recent American

Poli­

(Lawrence 1964); Joseph P. O'Grady, ed., The

Influence

on

Wilson's

Peace

and A b d u l Aziz Said, ed., Ethnicity

Policies

and

(Lexington

U S. Foreign

Pol­

icy, rev. ed. ( N e w Y o r k 1981), are eloquent o n the ineffectuality— the sound and f u r y — o f ethnic pressures o n the peace process. The effects o f w a r and peace o n ethnic groups varied consider­ able. J. Higham, "The M o b i l i z a t i o n o f Immigrants i n U r b a n Amer­ ica," Norwegian-American Shpak Lissak, Pluralism

Studies

31

and Progressives

(1986):

3-33, and Rivka

(Chicago 1990), discuss

a strengthened ethnicity i n cities; Jon Gjerde, The Minds West (Chapel H i l l

1997),

of the

describes a dismantling i n the rural M i d ­

west. O n different conceptions and assessments o f Americaniza250

BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY

tion, see Gary Gerstle, "Liberty, Coercion, and the M a k i n g o f Americans," Journal

of American

History

84 (September 1997):

524-58; Dietrich Herrmann, "Be an American!"

(Frankfurt 1996);

and J o h n F. McClymer, "The Americanization M o v e m e n t and the Education o f Foreign-Born Adults, 1914-25," i n Bernard J. Weiss, ed., Ameñcan

Education

and

the European

Immigrant:

1849-

1940 (Urbana 1982), 96-116.

NATIONALISM WORLDWIDE Modernization

theory

has

construed

nationalism

w o r l d w i d e as the outcome o f European influences—sometimes

a

direct b o r r o w i n g , sometimes an indirect consequence o f econ o m i c penetration. I n either case, European-rooted concepts and practices generally apply w i t h little variation. Anderson, Gellner, and H o b s b a w m have been the leading influences. Paul Brass's overview, Ethnicity

and Nationalism

( N e w D e h l i 1991), for exam-

ple, b o r r o w s f r o m all three. The exceptions usually t u r n the story o n its head and treat postcolonial nationalism i n Africa and Asia as an embittered reaction, evidence o f a failure to keep pace i n a m o d e r n i z i n g w o r l d . S. N . Eisenstadt's Revolution

and

the

Trans-

of Societies ( N e w Y o r k 1978) is a leading example.

formation

E d w a r d Said's immensely influential Orientalism

(New York

1978) is the most c o m m o n p o i n t o f departure i n challenging this approach. Some have attacked the leading

European-grounded

modernizers frontally. See, for example, James M . Blaut, The National Thought

Question and

( L o n d o n 1987); Partha Chatterjee,

the Colonial

Nationalist

World ( L o n d o n 1986); and Sally Falk

Moore, "The Production o f Cultural Pluralism As a Process," Public Culture Studies

1 (1989): 26-49. A series o f articles i n

Comparative

in Society and History nicely illustrates the spirit and sub-

stance o f these clashing approaches: Gyan Prakash, "Writing PostOrientalist Histories o f the T h i r d W o r l d : Perspectives from I n d i a n BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY

25/

Historiography," 32 ( A p r i l 1990): 383-408; Rosalind O ' H a n l o n and D a v i d Washbrook, "After Orientalism: Culture, Criticism, a n d Poli­ tics i n the T h i r d W o r l d , " 34 (January 1992): 141-67; and Prakash, "Can the 'Subaltern' Ride? A Reply to O ' H a n l o n and Washbrook," i b i d , 168-84. Daniel A. Segal and R. Handler, " H o w European Is Nationalism? Social Analysis

32 (December 1992): 1-15, and H a n ­

dler, "Is 'Identity' a Useful Cross-Cultural Concept?" i n J. R. Gillis, e d . Commemorations

(Princeton 1994), 27-40, raise fundamental

questions less polemically. However, as penetrating as these criti­ cisms o f exported European concepts have been, they have not articulated an alternative w a y o f generalizing about nationalism outside o f the Western w o r l d . Perhaps b y design, particularism triumphs. T w o excellent examinations o f that particularism are D o n a l d L. H o r o w i t z , Ethnic

Groups in Conflict (Berkeley 1985), and Joseph

Rothschild, Ethnopolitics

( N e w Y o r k 1981), b o t h directly relevant

to a study o f nationalism. See also P. C. Emmer and Mörner, e d s ,

European

Expansion

and

1992), and Jumari Jayawardena, Feminism Third

Migration

Magnus

(New York

and Nationalism

in the

World ( L o n d o n 1986).

S O U T H ASIANS Judith M . B r o w n , Modern

India,

2d ed. ( O x f o r d

1994), is an excellent survey u p to independence. See Brown's one-volume biography, Gandhi Richard G. Fox's Gandhian

also

( N e w H a v e n 1989), and

Utopia (Boston 1989) for the limita­

tions o f this extraordinary man's v i s i o n and tactics. Partha Chatterjee's The Nation

and Its Fragments

(Princeton 1993) is an imag­

inative re-creation o f I n d i a n nationalism's private sources. C. A. Bayly, Origins of Nationality R. McLane, Indian

Nationalism

in South Asia ( D e h l i 1998), a n d J o h n and the Early Congress (Princeton

1977), examine the roots o f nationalism, and Joan M . Jensen, Pas­ sage from 252

India

( N e w H a v e n 1988), notes its early appearance

BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY

a m o n g migrants i n N o r t h America. P. R. Brass, Language, and Politics Bengal:

in North India

The Nationalist

Religion

( L o n d o n 1974); Leonard A. G o r d o n ,

Movement

and Francis Robinson, Separatism

( N e w Y o r k 1974);

1876-1940 among

Indian

(Lon­

Muslims

d o n 1974) set the stage for partition. Also see the interesting ex­ change b e t w e e n Brass and Robinson i n D a v i d Taylor and M a l ­ c o l m Y a p p , eds., Political

Identity

in South Asia ( L o n d o n 1979),

35-77, w h e r e religion provides the key i n b o t h accounts. Stephen P. Cohen, "State B u i l d i n g i n Pakistan," i n A l i Banuazizi and M y r o n Weiner, eds.,

The State, Religion

and

Ethnic

Politics

(Syracuse

1986), 299-332, deals w i t h the ambiguities o f a secular Islamic state. Harry Goulbourne, Ethnicity rial Britain

and Nationalism

in

Post-Impe­

(Cambridge, Eng., 1991), and Peter v a n der Veer, Reli­ (Berkeley 1994), extend the story o f c o m m u n a l

gious Nationalism

division into the 1990s. O n India's island neighbor Sri Lanka, the essays b y Robert I . Rotberg, Chris Smith, and D a v i d Little i n Rotberg, ed., Peace

Creating

(Washington, D . C , 1999), 1-56, provide an

in Sri Lanka

excellent introduction, b e l y i n g the book's hopeful title. Robert N . Kearney and Barbara Diane Miller, Internal Lanka

and Its Social

Consequences

Migration

in

portant b a c k g r o u n d information, and K. M . De Silva, Religion, tionalism,

and

the State in Modern

Sri

(Boulder 1987), includes i m ­ Sri Lanka

Na­

(Tampa 1986) fo­

cuses o n the political origins o f conflict. Bruce Kapferer,

Legends

of People, Myths of State (Washington, D . C , 1988), judges nation­ alism i n Sri Lanka b y western standards, and Michael Roberts, "Na­ tionalism, the Past and the Present: The Case o f Sri Lanka," and Racial

Studies

Ethnic

16 (January 1993): 133-66, warns against just

that.

JAPANESE V o l u m e 5 (1989, ed. Marius B. Jansen) and V o l u m e 6 (1988, ed. Peter Duus) o f The Cambridge

History

of Japan

BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY

are 253

basic resources for the nineteenth and t w e n t i e t h centuries, espe­ cially politics. Delmer B r o w n , Nationalism

(Berkeley

in Japan

1955), applies a modernization m o d e l . M i c h i o Umegaki, "Epi­ logue: National Identity, National Past, National Isms," i n James W. White, ed., The Ambivalence

of Nationalism

1990), 251-64; White, Migration

in Metropolitan

1982); and K u n i o Yanagita, About Family

Japan

(Berkeley

Our Ancestors—The

Japanese

trans. Fanny H a g i n Mayer and Ishiwara Yasuyo

System,

(New

(Lantham, M d . ,

Y o r k 1988 [1970]), c o m b i n e t o f o r m a context for Japanese

nationalism. The crucial importance o f elite policies b e t w e e n the 1880s and the 1910s emerges clearly f r o m Carol Gluck, Modern State,

Myths (Princeton 1985); H e l e n Hardacre, Shinto 1868-1988

Culture

Japan's and

the

(Princeton 1985); a n d D a i k i c h i Irokawa,

The

of the Meiji

ed. M . B . Jansen (Princeton

Period,

1985

[19691). K e v i n M . Doak, "What Is a N a t i o n and W h o Belongs? Na­ tional Narratives and the Ethnic Imagination i n Twentieth-Century Japan," American

Historical

Review

102 ( A p r i l 1997): 283-309;

a n d Fred C. Notehelfer, " K t o k u Shsui a n d Nationalism," Journal

of

Studies 31 (November 1971): 31-39, discuss an early t w e n ­

Asian

tieth-century nationalism i n tension w i t h the state. See also K o saku Yoshino, Cultural Nationalism don

1992). Akira Iriye, After

in Contemporary

Imperialism

(Cambridge,

1965); Masao Maruyama, Though and Behaviour nese Politics,

(Lon­

Japan

Mass.,

in Modern

Japa­

ed. Ivan Morris, rev. ed. ( N e w Y o r k 1969); and Rich­

ard J. Smethurst, "Japan's First Experiment w i t h Democracy, 1 8 6 8 1940," i n George Reid A n d r e w s and Herrick Chapman, eds., Social Construction

of Democracy

( N e w Y o r k 1995), 7 1 - 8 9 , guide

us into the Second W o r l d War; and J o h n D o w e r , Embracing feat

( N e w Y o r k 1999); I . I . Morris, Nationalism

Wing in Japan panese

The

and

the

De­ Right

( L o n d o n I 9 6 0 ) ; and E d w i n O. Reischauer, The Ja­

Today (Cambridge, Mass., 1988), tell different stories o f

postwar changes and continuities. Peter Duus, "Nagai Ryotar and the 'White Peril,' 1905-1944," Journal 254

of Asian

Studies 31 (November 1971): 41-48; M . B. Jan-

BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY

sen, The Japanese

and Sun Yat-sen (Cambridge, Mass., 1954); a n d

Mark R. Peattie, "Japanese Attitudes t o w a r d Colonialism, 1 8 9 5 I945," i n Ramon H . Myers a n d Peattie, eds., The Japanese nial Empire,

1985-1945

Colo­

(Princeton 1984), are helpful o n Pan-

Asianism, its variants a n d corruptions. I n Chinatown

and Little Tokyo ( M i l l w o o d , N.Y., 1986), Stanford

Morris Lyman highlights Japanese American adaptability. O n the c o m p l e x story o f Issei attachment to Japan a n d isolation f r o m it, as w e l l as the Nisei leadership i n fixing a Japanese American identity, see Brian Masaru Hayashi, "For the Sake of Our Japanese ren"

Breth­

(Stanford 1995); J o h n Modell, "The Japanese American Fam­

ily: A Perspective for Future Investigation," Pacific

Historical

Re­

view 37 (February 1968): 67-82, a n d "Tradition a n d Opportunity: The Japanese Immigrant i n America," i b i d . ( M a y 1971): 163-82; and Sylvia J u n k o Yanagisako,

Transforming

1985). R. Daniels, Concentration

Camps

the Past

(Stanford

USA ( N e w Y o r k 1971),

w i t h its p i n p o i n t i n g title, remains the standard account o f Japa­ nese American imprisonment. Despite its title, Charlotte Brooks, "In the T w i l i g h t Zone b e t w e e n Black a n d White: Japanese A m e r i ­ can Resettlement a n d C o m m u n i t y i n Chicago, 1942-1945," nal

of American

Jour­

History 86 (March 2000): 1655-87, describes a

strikingly smooth reentry into American society, even d u r i n g war­ time. See also L o n Kurashige, "The Problem o f Biculturalism: Japa­ nese American Identity a n d Festival before W o r l d W a r I I , " ibid., 1632-54.

MEXICANS The strength throughout the nineteenth century o f b o t h regionalism a n d localism a n d the consequent weakness o f a separate Mexican identity emerge f r o m T i m o t h y E. Anna, Mexico Mexican

1821-1835 Nationalism

Forging

(Lincoln 1998); D . A . Brading, The Origins of (Cambridge, Eng., 1985 [1973]), a n d "Liberal BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY

255

Patriotism and the M e x i c a n Reforma," Journal

of Latin

American

20 (May 1988): 27-48; D a n i e l Cosío Villegas, The

Studies

States Versus Porifio

United

Diaz, trans. Nettie Lee Benson (Lincoln 1963

[1956]); and Jaime E. Rodriguez O., The Independence

of

Spanish

( N e w Y o r k 1998).

America

The starting p o i n t for a study o f the r e v o l u t i o n is A l a n Knight, The Mexican

2 vols. (Cambridge, Eng., 1986), i n c o m ­

Revolution,

b i n a t i o n w i t h his "The Peculiarities o f Mexican History: M e x i c o Compared to Latin America, 1821-1992," Journal

of Latin

Ameri­

can Studies 24 (supplement 1992): 99-144; and "The Rise and Fall o f Cardenismo, C.1930-C.1946," i n Leslie Bethel, ed., Mexico Independence

since

(Cambridge, Eng., 1991), 241-320. For an alterna­

tive reading, see J o h n W o m a c k , Jr., "The Mexican Revolution, 1910-1920," i n ibid., 125-200, w h i c h should be compared w i t h his m u c h more sanguine Zapata

and

the Mexican

( N e w Y o r k 1969). See also Douglas W . Richmond, Carranza's

Nationalist

Struggle,

Revolution Venustiano

(Lincoln 1983). D i ­

1893-1920

ane E. Davis, " U n c o m m o n Democracy i n Mexico: M i d d l e Classes and the Military i n the Consolidation o f One-Party Rule, 1 9 3 6 1946," i n Andrews and Chapman, eds., Social mocracy,

Construction

of De­

161-92, ends Mexico's revolutionary phase o n a positive

note. Specifically o n the shaping influence o f the U n i t e d States, see D . Cosío Villegas, American

Extremes,

(Austin 1964); Friedrich Katz, The Secret

trans. J o h n P. Harrison War in Mexico,

trans.

Loren Goldner (Chicago 1981); A . Knight, "The U n i t e d States and the Mexican Peasantry, circa 1880-1940," i n Daniel Nugent, ed., Rural

Revolt

in Mexico

and

U S. Intervention

( D u r h a m , N.C.,

1998), 25-63; and Robert Freeman Smith, The United States Revolutionary

Nationalism

in

Mexico,

1916-1932

and

(Chicago

1972). For aspects o f Mexico's brief ethnonationalist project, see Shir­ ley Brice Heath, Telling

Tongues

( N e w Y o r k 1972), A . Knight,

"Racism, Revolution, and Indigenismo:

Mexico, 1910-1940," i n

Richard Graham, ed., The Idea of Race in Latin America, 256

BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY

1870-

1940 (Austin 1990), 71-113; Florencia E. Mallon, Peasant

and

tion (Berkeley 1995); and Nancy Leys Stepan, The Hour

Na­

of Eu­

genics (Ithaca 1991). Regional, local, and cultural resistance is dis­ cussed i n A. Knight, "Peasants into Patriots: Thoughts o n the M a k i n g o f the Mexican Nation," Mexican

Studies 10 (Winter 1994):

1 3 5 - 6 1 , and "Popular Culture and the Revolutionary State i n Mex­ ico, 1910-40," Hispanic

American

Historical

74 (August

Review

1994): 393-444; and Claudio Lomnitz-Adler, Exits from

the

Laby­

rinth (Berkeley 1992). For the persistence o f that resistance, see for example, Roger Bartra, The Cage of Melancholy,

trans. Christo­

pher J. H a l l ( N e w Brunswick 1992); Michael Kearney, "Mixtee Po­ litical Consciousness: F r o m Passive to Active Resistance," i n Nugent, e d . Rural Revolt, 134-46, and the section o n Mayan peo­ ples i n M a n n i n g Nash, The Cauldron

of Ethnicity

in the

Modern

World (Chicago 1989). Ronald P. Dore's brief i n Japan's behalf, "Latin America and Japan Compared," i n J o h n J. Johnson, e d . Continuity

and

Change

in Latin America

(Stanford 1967), 2 2 7 -

49, addresses issues relevant to the Mexican case. The best guide to the experiences o f Mexican Americans i n t o w n s and the countryside is Anglos and Mexicans of Texas, 1836-1986

in the

Making

(Austin 1987); the best guide to their urban

experiences is George J. Sánchez, Becoming

Mexican

American

( N e w Y o r k 1993). See also Josef J. Barton's forthcoming study o f Mexican peoples i n m o t i o n , The Edge of Endurance.

Andrés Re-

séndez, "National Identity o n a Shifting Border: Texas and N e w M e x i c o i n the Age o f Transition, 1821-1848, "Journal History

of

American

(September 1999): 668-88, shows the limitations o f the

conqueror-conquered model; Robert F. Heizer and A l a n J. A l m quist, The Other Californians

(Berkeley 1971), demonstrates that

model's applicability. Walker Connor, e d , Mexican-Americans Comparative

Perspective

iérrez, Walls and Mirrors Mexican

American

in

(Washington, D . C , 1985); D a v i d G. Gut­ (Berkeley 1995); and A r m a n d o Navarro,

Youth

Organization

(Austin 1995),

make

sense out o f the historical inconsequence o f Mexican American BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY

257

nationalism. I n "The N e w Era o f Mexican Migration to the U n i t e d States," Journal

of American

History

86 (September 1999): 5 1 8 -

36, Jorge D u r a n d , Douglas S. Massey, and Emilio A. Parrado sug­ gest the hardening o f a Mexican American identity.

PAN-ARABISM C. Ernest Dawn's From Ottomanism

(Ur­

to Arabism

bana 1973) and his reconsideration, "The Origins o f Arab Nation­ alism," i n Rashid Khalidi et al., eds., The Origins of Arab

National­

ism ( N e w Y o r k 1991), 3-30, construe Pan-Arabism as a response to western imperialism. Zeine N . Zeine, The Emergence Nationalism,

Arab

3d ed. (Delmar, N . Y . , 1973), examines its indigenous

sources, and M u n i f al-Razzaz, The Evolution Nationalism,

of

of the Meaning

of

trans. I . A b u - L u g h o d (Garden City, N.Y., 1963), illus­

trates that spirit. See also Sylvia G. H a i m , ed., Arab

Nationalism

(Berkeley 1974 [1962]). Janet A b u - L u g h o d , "Recent Migrations i n the Arab W o r l d , " i n W . McNeill and R. S. Adams, eds., 225-38,

Migration,

Kramer's Islam

has

Assembled

useful

contextual

Human

information. M a r t i n

( N e w Y o r k 1986), reveals h o w little

support the early twentieth-century versions enjoyed,

and

"Arab Nationalism: Mistaken Identity," Daedalus

(Summer

122

his

1993): 171-206, explores its weaknesses generally. The battle over its legacy continues. See for example, Tawfic E. Farah, ed., Arabism Arab

and Arab Nationalism

Nationalism,

Pan-

(Boulder 1987), and Bassam T i b i ,

trans. M a r i o n Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Slug-

lett, 3d ed. ( L o n d o n 1997). Rashid Khalidi, Palestinian

Identity

( N e w Y o r k 1997), traces the Arab-based nationalist m o v e m e n t that d i d catch fire. O n T u r k i s h nationalism, see D a v i d Kushner, The Rise of Nationalism

Lewis, The Emergence

Turkish

( L o n d o n 1977), and especially Bernard

1876-1908

of Modern

Turkey,

2d ed. ( L o n d o n 1 9 6 8

[I96I]). O n Iranian nationalism, see N i k k i R. Keddie, "The Iranian 258

BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY

Revolution i n Comparative Perspective," American

Historical

Re­

view 88 (June 1983): 579-98, and Keddie and Y a n n Richard, Roots of Revolution

( N e w H a v e n 1981).

P A N - A F R I C A N I S M AND BLACK NATIONALISM The best guides to w h a t may or may not have been precursers to black nationalism and Pan-Africanism i n the U n i t e d States are F l o y d J. Miller, The Search for a Black

Nationality

bana 1975); W i l s o n Jeremiah Moses, The Golden Age of Black tionalism,

(New York

1820-1925

Stuckey, Slave Culture Africa

and America

1988 [1978]); and

(Ur­ Na­

Sterling

( N e w Y o r k 1987). Alexander CrummelPs

( M i a m i 1969 [1891]), expresses the spirit o f

these ventures. For the Caribbean sources o f twentieth-century movements, see W i n s t o n James, Holding

Aloft the Banner

of

Ethi­

opia ( L o n d o n 1998), and especially Orlando Patterson, "Migration i n Caribbean Societies: Socioeconomic and Symbolic Resource," i n W. McNeill and R. S. Adams ed., Human

Migration,

106-45.

The Garveyite branch o f Pan-Africanism has yet to find its histo­ rian. E. D a v i d Cronon, Black Moses (Madison 1969 [1955]), is still a useful narrative. Judith Stein's The World of Marcus

Garvey (Baton

Rouge 1986) is more wide-ranging and more hostile. J o h n H e n r i k Clarke, ed., Marcus

Garvey

and

Vision ( N e w Y o r k

the African

1974), stresses the later, futile years; Robert A. H i l l and Barbara Bair, eds., Marcus

Garvey, Life and Lessons (Berkeley 1987), em­

phasizes his lessons, not his life. George M . Fredrickson,

Black

( N e w Y o r k 1995), provides a transcontinental

over­

Liberation

v i e w . See also H i l l and Gregory A. Pirio, "'Africa for the Africans': The Garvey Movement i n South Africa, 1920-1940," i n Shula Marks and Stanley Trapido, eds., The Politics Nationalism

in Twentieth-Century

of Race, Class

South Africa

209-53. Emory J. Tolbert, The UNIA and Black

and

( L o n d o n 1987), Los Angeles

BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY

(Los 259

Angeles 1980), illustrates h o w contentious everything about Gar­ vey was. For the migration feeding Garveyism, see James R. Grossman, Land The

Promised

(New

of Hope (Chicago 1989), and Nicholas Lemann,

Land

( N e w Y o r k 1991). Carol Stack's All Our

Kin

Y o r k 1974) and her Call to Home ( N e w Y o r k 1996) describe

h o w blacks reconstructed k i n s h i p i n the course o f migrating. I m a n u e l Geiss, The Pan-African

trans. A n n Keep

Movement,

( L o n d o n 1974 [1968]), is a solid chronicle o f the branch that ran f r o m W . E. B. DuBois to K w a m e N k r u m a h . See also Colin Legun, Pan-Africanism,

rev. ed. ( N e w Y o r k 1965), a document f r o m the

m o v e m e n t w i t h valuable i n f o r m a t i o n o n its arrival i n postcolonial Africa. A further sample o f Pan-Africanism writings N n a m d i A z i k i w e , Renascent Africa

Africa

includes

( L o n d o n 1968 [1937]); DuBois,

( M i l l w o o d , N . Y . , 1977 [1930]); the final chapter i n C. L. R.

James, A History of Pan-African

Revolt, 2d ed. (Washington, D.C.,

1969 [1938]), a revealingly retitled revison o f his A History of Revolt (1938); and George Padmore, Pan-Africanism

or

Negro Commu­

nism? ( L o n d o n 1956). O n Padmore, see also James R. Hooker's Black

Revolutionary

(1967). O n the collapse o f this Pan-Africa­

nism, see James Mayall, "Self-Determination and the O A U , " i n I . M . Lewis, ed., Nationalism Africa

and Self-Determination

in the Horn

of

( L o n d o n 1983), 77-92.

The thinness o f an American black audience for African affairs before the 1960s is revealed i n Joseph E. Harris, can

Reactions

to War

in Ethiopia,

African-Ameri­ (Baton Rouge

1936-1941

1994); Brenda Gayle Plummer, Rising

Wind (Chapel H i l l 1996);

W i l l i a m R. Scott, The Sons of Sheba's

Race ( B l o o m i n g t o n 1993);

a n d Penny M . V o n Eschen, Race against James T. Campbell's Songs

of Zion

Empire

(Ithaca 1997).

( N e w Y o r k 1995) traces a

deeper Christian level o f involvement. For the explosion o f A m e r i ­ can interest i n black nationalism d u r i n g the 1960s, see Stokely Carmichael and Charles V . H a m i l t o n , Black 1967), H a r o l d Cruse, The Crisis

BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY

(New York

of the Negro Intellectual

Y o r k 1967), and A l p h o n s o Pinkney, Red, Black 260

Power

(New

and Green ( N e w

Y o r k 1976). More recent expressions that emphasize a diasporic nationalism include Molefi Kete Asante, Afrocentricity 1988 [1980]), and Josephine Moraa M o i k o b u , Blood

(Trenton and

Flesh

(Westport 1981). The most useful studies o f the N a t i o n o f Islam are Claude A n d r e w Clegg I I I , An Original Man ( N e w Y o r k 1997); Essien Udosen Essien-Udom, Black Nationalism and Mattias Gardell, In the Name of Elijah 1996). See also Joe W o o d , e d , Malcolm

(Chicago 1962); (Durham

Muhammad

X in Our Own

Image

( N e w Y o r k 1992).

NIGERIANS Despite its incredible optimism, H a r o l d D . Nelson, e d , Nigeria,

Study, 4th ed. (Washington, D . C , 1982),

A Country

contains a w e a l t h o f basic information. Michael Crowder, West Af­ rica ( L o n d o n 1968), remains a sound introduction. So is J o h n E. Flint, "Nigeria: The Colonial Experience f r o m 1880 to 1914," i n Lewis H . Gann and Peter Guignan, e d s . 1870-1960,

Colonialism

in

Africa

5 vols. (Cambridge, Eng., 1969-75), I : 220-60. Robert

Heussler's The British

in Northern

Nigeria

( L o n d o n I968) is that

rarity, a brief i n behalf o f British rule. J. R. V. Prescott's The

Evolu­

tion

(Van­

of Nigeria 's International

and

Regional

Boundaries

couver 1971) is a fascinating factual study i n imperial geography. Larry D i a m o n d , Class,

Ethnicity

and

Democracy

in

Nigeria

(Syracuse 1988), traces the fall o f the original republic. See also Richard L. Sklar, Nigerian

Political

Parties (Princeton 1963). Rob­

ert Melson and H o w a r d Wölpe, e d s , Nigeria (East Lansing 1971), and S. K. Panter-Brick, Soldiers and Oil ( L o n d o n 1978), mark the path into civil war. Different aspects o f Nigerian segmentation are examined i n Michael S. O. Olisa and Odinchezo M . Ikejiani Clark, e d s , Azikiwe

and

J. D . Y . Peel, Aladura

the African

Revolution

(Onitsha 1989), and

( L o n d o n I968) and his "The Cultural W o r k

of Y o r u b a Ethnogenesis," i n T o n k i n et a l , e d s . History

and

BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY

Eth261

nicity,

198-215. Richard A. Joseph, Democracy

Politics

in Nigeria (Cambridge, Eng., 1987), discusses the i m p o v ­

and

Prebendal

erished civic life o f the short-lived Second Republic; A. A. Ujo, Citizenship

in Nigeria

(Kaduna 1994), lays a foundation o f h o p e

for the T h i r d . O k w u d i b a N n o l i , Ethnic

Politics

in Nigeria

(Enugu

1978), attacks Nigerian particularism f r o m the left; Joseph A. U m oren, Democracy

and Ethnic

Diversity

in Nigeria (Lantham, M d . ,

1 9 9 6 ) , attacks it f r o m an Afrocentric perspective. Setting aside its misleading title, Karl Maier, This House

Has Fallen

(New York

2000), provides useful b a c k g r o u n d o n contemporary problems i n Nigeria.

AFRICANS Three standard accounts identify nationalism i n Africa w i t h its colonial boundaries and its postcolonial states: James S. Coleman, "Tradition and Nationalism i n Tropical Africa," i n Cole­ man, Nationalism

and

Development

in Africa,

ed. R. L. Sklar

(Berkeley 1994), 117-52; Basil Davidson, The Black Man's ( N e w Y o r k 1992); and Thomas H o d g k i n , Nationalism

in

Burden Colonial

( N e w Y o r k 1965 [1956]). T w o others emphasize the distort­

Africa

i n g effects o f that colonial legacy: M a h m o o d Mamdani,

Citizen

and Subject (Princeton 1996), and A l i Mazrui, "Africa Entrapped: Between the Protestant Ethic and the Legacy o f Westphalia," i n Hedley B u l l and A d a m Watson, eds., Expansion

of

International

( O x f o r d 1984), 289-308. H o w colonialism distorted cul­

Society

tural differences is the subject o f Peter Ekeh's valuable essay, "So­ cial A n t h r o p o l o g y and T w o Contrasting Uses o f Tribalism i n Af­ rica," Comparative

Studies

in Society

and

History

32 (October

I99O): 660-700, and Crawford Young's informed summary, "Eth­ nicity and the Colonial and Post-Colonial State i n Africa," i n P. Brass, ed., Ethnic Cultural 262

Pluralism

Groups, 57-93. See also Young's The Politics

of

(Madison 1976) and his valuable b i b l i o g r a p h i -

BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY

cal essay, "Nationalism, Ethnicity, and Class i n Africa: A Retro­ spect," Cahiers d'Études

africaines

26 (1986): 421-95. Leo Kuper,

The Pity of It All (Minneapolis 1977), and B e n y a m i n Neuberger, National

Self-Determination

in

Postcolonial

(Boulder

Africa

1986) , report o n the g r i m consequences i n various settings. Attempts to reconsider the relationship b e t w e e n European con­ cepts and African realities include Frederick Cooper, "Conflict and Connection: Rethinking Colonial African History," American

His­

torical Review 99 (December 1994): 1516-45; J o h n Markakis, Na­ tional and Class Conflict

in the Horn of Africa

(Cambridge, Eng.,

1987) ; and T. Ranger, "The I n v e n t i o n o f Tradition Revisited: The Case o f Colonial Africa," i n Ranger and O l u f e m i Vaughan, Legitimacy

and

the State in Twentieth-Century

eds.,

(London

Africa

1993), 6 2 - 1 1 1 . I . M . Lewis and other contributors to Lewis, ed., Nationalism

and

Self-Determination,

are clear about the sharp

separation o f state and nation i n the H o r n o f Africa. P. F. D e Moraes Farias and K a r i n Barber, as editors o f Self-Assertion Brokerage

and

(Birmingham, Eng., 1990), explore the possibility o f

l i m i n a l figures mediating the creation o f an indigenous national­ ism i n Africa, an approach that i n very different ways Jean Marie Allman's The Quills

of the Procupine

Asanti nationalism, D a v i d Lan's Guns

(Madison 1993) applies to and

Rain

( L o n d o n 1985)

applies to Shona nationalism, and J o h n Lonsdale's chapters 11 and 12 o f Bruce Berman and Lonsdale,

Unhappy

(London

Valley

1992), apply to K i k u y u nationalism. More or less i n the alphabetical order o f their African settings, here are other useful w o r k s : Richard A. Joseph, Radical ism in Cameroun Father's

House

National­

( O x f o r d 1977); K w a m e A n t h o n y A p p i a h , In My (New York

1992),

especially

chapter

Ghanaian life inside a c r u m b l i n g state; Sharon Stichter, Labour

in Kenya

8

on

Migrant

( L o n d o n 1985); and also o n people i n Kenya,

Susan Pederson, "National Bodies, Unspeakable Acts: The Sexual Politics o f Colonial Policy Making," Journal

of Modern

History

63

(December 1991): 647-80. O n a related subject, see H e l e n CallaBIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY

263

way, "Purity and Exotica i n Legitimating the Empire: Cultural Con­ structions o f Gender, Sexuality a n d Race," i n Ranger a n d O l u f e m i , eds.,

Legitimacy

Rwanda

and

the

3 1 - 6 1 ; Gérard

State,

Prunier,

The

Crisis, 2d ed. ( L o n d o n 1998). I n South Africa, t w o studies

help understand Afrikaner nationalism: T. D u n b a r M o o d i e , (Berkeley 1975), and D . J. Kotzé,

Rise of Afrikanerdom

National­

ism (Cape T o w n 1981). O n black African nationalism there, the i n t r o d u c t i o n to Marks and Trapido, eds., Politics 1-70; Peter Delius, A Lion

and Nationalism,

of Race,

amongst

The see Class

the

Cattle

(Johannesburg 1996); and the excellent essay b y Leroy Vail a n d Landeg White, "Tribalism i n the Political History o f Malawi," i n Vail, ed., The Creation

of Tribalism

in Southern

(London

Africa

1989) , w h i c h deals w i t h it tangentially. O n Tanzania, see t w o su­ perior studies: Steven Feierman, Peasant

Intellectuals

(Madison

1990) , and Goran H y d e n , Beyond

in Tanzania

(Berkeley

Ujamaa

1980). Also see, T. Ranger, The Invention babwe ( G w e r u 1985), and Peasant War in Zimbabwe

of Tribalism

Consciousness

and

in

Zim­

Guerrilla

(Berkeley 1985). Finally o n French colonialism,

a subject underrepresented i n m y study, t w o books help to fill the gap: W i l l i a m B. Cohen,

The French

Encounter

with

Africans

( B l o o m i n g t o n 1980), and G w e n d o l y n Wright, The Politics sign in French

Colonial

Urbanism

of De­

(Chicago 1991).

ASIANS Chalmers Communist

A. Johnson,

Peasant

Nationalism

and

Power (Stanford 1962), is still a basic o n Chinese na­

tionalism. See also Prasenjit Duara, Rescuing

History from

the Na­

tion (Chicago 1995), Germaine A. Hoston, The State, Identity, the National

Question

in China and Japan

and

(Princeton 1994), and

especially James L. Watson, "Rites or Beliefs? The Construction o f a Unified Culture i n Late I m p e r i a l China," i n L o w e l l D i t t m e r a n d Samuel S. K i m , eds., China's 264

BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY

Quest for National

Identity

(Ithaca

1993) , 80-103. O n Chinese i n migration, see Clarence E. Glick, Sojourners

and Settlers ( H o n o l u l u 1980); U n g - H o Chin and M i n o r -

ity Rights Group, The Chinese of South-East

Asia, 3d ed. ( L o n d o n

2000); Edgar Wickberg, "The Chinese As Overseas Migrants," i n Judith M . B r o w n and Rosemary Foot, e d s . Migration 1994) , 12-37; and Judy Y u n g , Unbound

(New York

Feet (Berkeley 1995).

Elsewhere i n Asia, Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation bridge, Mass, Prophets

I960), is still helpful. See

of Rebellion

(Cam-

also Michael Adas,

(Chapel H i l l 1979); Benedict Anderson, "Cac-

ique Democracy i n the Philippines: Origins and Dreams," i n V i n cente L. Rafael, e d . Discrepant

(Philadelphia 1995), 3 -

Histories

50; D a v i d B r o w n , The State and Ethnic Politics

in Southeast

Asia

( L o n d o n 1994); M e l v y n C. Goldstein and Matthew T. Kapstein, e d s . Buddhism Marr, Vietnamese and Vietnamese

in Contemporary

Tibet (Berkeley 1998); D a v i d G.

Anticolonialism Tradition

on Trial,

1885-1925 1920-1945

and Thongchai W i n i c h a k u l , Siam Mapped

(Berkeley 1971), (Berkeley 1981);

( H o n o l u l u 1994). Ro-

l a n d L. Guyotte and Barbara M . Posadas, "Celebrating Rizal Day: The Emergence o f a Filipino Tradition i n Twentieth-Century Chicago," i n Ramón A. Gutiérrez and Geneviève Fabre, e d s . and

Celebrations

in North American

Ethnic

Communities

Feasts (Albu-

querque 1995), 111-27, describes an event shared across the Pacific; and Linda Bäsch, Nina Glick Schiller, and Cristina Szanton Blanc, Nations

Unbound

(Langhorne, P a , 1994), examines loy-

alties a m o n g migratory people o f color w i t h dual homes.

RECENT TRENDS Echoing the 1690s, the 1790s, and the 1890s, the 1990s were filled w i t h end-of-the-century intimations o f i m p e n d i n g catastrophe. Three w i t h special relevance to the study o f nationalism are Benjamin R. Barber's relentlessly pessimistic versus McWorld

Jihad

( N e w Y o r k 1995), an account o f people everyBIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY

265

w h e r e complicit i n their o w n disempowerment; Samuel P. H u n t ­ ington's Spenglerian The Clash of Civilizations

and the

Remaking

of the World Order ( N e w Y o r k 1996), a thoughtful examination o f the globe's deep divisions w i t h a Ridley Scott epilogue; and Rob­ ert Kaplan's enthusiastically g l o o m y trilogy, Balkan Y o r k 1993), The Ends

of the Earth

Ghosts ( N e w

( N e w Y o r k 1996), and

The

Coming Anarchy ( N e w Y o r k 2000). I n "Peoples against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing W o r l d System," tional Studies Quarterly

Interna­

38 (September 1994): 347-77, T e d Robert

Gurr counters the catastrophism o f H u n t i n g t o n and Kaplan, o n l y to add evidence o f his o w n i n Gurr and Barbara Harff,

Ethnic

in World Politics (Boulder 1994). Stephen Holmes, "Liber­

Conflict

alism for a W o r l d o f Ethnic Passions a n d Decaying States,"

Social

61 (Fall 1994): 599-610, and Michael Ignatieff,

Blood

Research and

Belonging

( N e w Y o r k 1994) and his The Warrior's

Honor

( N e w Y o r k 1998), are equally g r i m o n the state o f the w o r l d . Sometimes the worst news is i n the title: W i l l i a m Pfaff, The of Nations

Wrath

( N e w Y o r k 1993), and Michael Walzer, "The N e w T r i b ­

alism: Notes o n a Difficult Problem," Dissent

39 (Spring 1992):

164—72, are b y n o means eye-rolling condemnations.

Crawford

Y o u n g , "The Dialectics o f Cultural Pluralism: Concept and Real­ ity," i n Y o u n g , ed., The Rising

Tide of Cultural

Pluralism

(Mad­

ison 1993), 3-35, is a useful o v e r v i e w o f w h a t others deplore. Religious fundamentalism u n d e r one label or another has elic­ ited particular concerns. See M a r k Juergensmeyer, The New War? (Berkeley 1993), and Bassam T i b i , The Challenge mentalism

of

Cold Funda­

(Berkeley 1998). Dale E. Eickelman, "From Here t o

Modernity: Ernest Gellner o n Nationalism and Islamic Fundamen­ talism," i n J o h n A. Hall, ed., The State of the Nation

(New York

1998), 2 5 8 - 7 1 , is a cooler account. M a k i n g sense out o f globalization has preoccupied scholars a n d pundits o f various persuasions. Thomas Friedman's The Lexus

and

the Olive Tree ( N e w Y o r k 1999) gives a cheery account o f an American-led globalization. B y contrast, Z y g m u n t Bauman's 266

BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY

Glob-

alization

( N e w Y o r k 1998) pictures an amoral f e w d o m i n a t i n g the

rest. Between the t w o , Saskia Sassen, Losing

Control? ( N e w Y o r k

1996), inventories some o f the basic unanswered questions i n a globalized future. I n a v o l u m e that I d i d not encounter u n t i l after I had drafted m y text, Carole Fink, P h i l i p p Gassert, and Detlef Junker, eds., 1968 ( N e w Y o r k 1998), interpret all the uprisings o f that year as aspects o f a global fight for freedom. Philip Schle­ singer, Media, State and Nation ( L o n d o n 199D, especially chapter 8, explores the meaning o f contemporary c o m m u n i c a t i o n to p o p ­ ular movements, and Kenneth Cmiel, "The Emergence o f H u m a n Rights Politics i n the U n i t e d States," Journal

of American

History

86 (December 1999): 1231-50, analyzes the w a y a cause gets pro­ m o t e d t h r o u g h m o d e r n media. Stuart Hall, " O l d and N e w Identi­ ties, O l d and N e w Ethnicities," i n A n t h o n y D . King, ed., Globalization

and

Culture,

(Minneapolis 1997), 41-68,

the World-System

and A n t h o n y D . Smith, "Toward a Global Culture?" i n M i k e Featherstone, ed., Global Culture ( L o n d o n 1990), 171-92, p u t their fin­ gers o n the other e n d o f the scale, emphasizing rootedness and adaptability i n h u m a n culture. A sample o f studies o n nationalism i n the realm o f the Euro­ pean U n i o n , b e y o n d those already cited under country names, includes Michael Keating's challenge to the o l d Marxist cliché, "Do the Workers Really Have N o Country?" i n J o h n Coakley, ed., The Social

Origins of Nationalist

Movements

( L o n d o n 1991); exempl­

ary essays o n a much-discussed alternative to nationalism b y Val L o r w i n and A r e n d Lijphart, i n Kenneth D . McRae, ed., tional

Democracy

(Toronto

1974);

Rogowsky, eds., New Nationalisms

Consocia-

E. A. Tiryakian and

of the Developed

R.

West (Boston

1985); and Patrick Weil's prediction o f a x e n o p h o b i c reaction to the n e w u n i o n , "Nationalities and Citizenships: The Lessons o f the French Experience for Germany and Europe," i n D a v i d Cesarani and Mary Fulbrook, eds., Citizenship, in Europe (London ism and Nationalities

Nationality,

and

1996), 74-87. Charles Kupchan, ed.,

Migration National­

in the New Europe (Ithaca 1995), and Robert BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY

267

Pynsent, Questions

of Identity

( L o n d o n 1994), illustrate the confu­

sion the issue generates. I n addition to the studies b y W i l l K y m l i c k a , D a v i d Miller, a n d Michael Walzer already cited, general cautions about state central­ ization and encouragements to ethnic diversity include G i d o n Gottlieb, Nation

against

State ( N e w Y o r k 1993); J o h n Gray, "After

the N e w Liberalism," Social Research cia Mayo, The Roots of Identity

61 (Fall 1994): 720-35; Patri­

( L o n d o n 1974); and James C. Scott,

Seeing Like a State ( N e w H a v e n 1998). I n the American context, Lawrence

H . Fuchs, American

Kaleidoscope

(Hanover,

N.H,

1990), describes assertions o f diversity; M . Elaine Burgess, "The Resurgence o f Ethnicity: M y t h or Reality?" Ethnic

and

Racial

1 (July 1978): 265-85, vouches for their authenticity; a n d

Studies

Philip Gleason, Speaking

of Diversity

(Baltimore 1992), explains

h o w cultural diversity became incorporated i n an American selfunderstanding. Where multiculturalism is used as a code w o r d for race, Richard Bernstein,

The Dictatorship

of Virtue ( N e w Y o r k

1994), and Arthur M . Schlesinger, J r , The Disuniting

of

America

( N e w Y o r k 1991), deplore it; w h i l e Lawrence W . Levine, Opening

of the American

Mind

The

(Boston 1996), and George Lip­

sitz, "The Possessive Investment i n Whiteness: Racialized Social Democracy and the 'White' Problem i n American Studies," can Quarterly

Ameri­

47 (September 1995): 369-87, deplore the sources

o f resistance to it. Like J o h n Higham's essays already cited, D . A . Hollinger's Postethnic

America

( N e w Y o r k 1995) seeks a m i d d l e

g r o u n d that accepts diversity w i t h i n unity; and W e n d y K a t k i n et a l , e d s . Beyond

Pluralism

Hollinger's approach.

268

BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY

(Urbana 1998), reflects the influence o f

Index

Abacha, Sani, 179, 180 Abiola, Moshood K. O., 179 abolition movement, 75-77 Act of Union (1801) [Britain], 22 Action Group, 177 Adolph, Gustav, 18 Afghanistan Taliban, 210 Afghanistan War, 194, 201 Africa: Hutu-Tutsi conflict in, 186-87, 191, 201; nationalism generated by colonialism of, 164, 170-71, 17273; Nigerian nationalism experience in, 173, 174-81; slavery experience of, 95, 156-57; tribal territory of, 173-74. See also black Africans; Eu­ ropean colonialism African American nationalism, 160 African Americans: migration from south to north by, 157-58; mis­ cegenation laws and, 122; race consciousness/nationalism of, 157, 184, 190, 191, 198, 207-8 African ethnic loyalties, 129-30 African forced patterns, 131 African nationalism, 131, 156-64, 173-81

African tribes: British colonialism im­ pact on, 174-75; conflict of HutuTutsi, 186-87, 191, 201; impact of European colonialism on territory of, 173-74 Aggrey, James Kwegyir, l 6 l Algeria, 168 American anti-Semitism: of late 1880s, 94; W.W. II, 122-23 American citizenship: combination of constitutional federalism and, 67—70; limited obligations of nineteenth cen­ tury, 86; social cohesion through, 6972. See also state citizenship American Colonization Society, 157 American democracy: changes of nineteenth century, 113-14; devel­ opment of early, 67-71; as interna­ tional model, 46-48; public policy issues of nineteenth century, 93-94; race problem and, 72-80; social co­ hesion through, 69-71; Southern se­ cession (1860-61) as threat to, 7879; strong citizenship/constitutional federalism and, 67-70, 71. See also democracy

American Jews: Jewish consciousness of, 83; support for Palestine home­ land by, 124, 187 American nationalism: Americanizing campaigns of, 93-96; democracy development vs., 67-68; derived from kinship relations, 80-84; eth­ nicity vs., 110-14; mirroring nation­ alism in Europe, 82; mixed migrating population impact on, 66-67, 72; Mormonism version of, 88-92 American patriotism, 92-93, 110-11 American political parties, 69-70 American race problem: Civil War/ Reconstruction and, 76-80; colonial racism element of, 73-74; sanctity of property value and, 74-75; white to black axial relationship, slavery and, 75-76 American racism: colonial element of, 73-74; during late nineteenth cen­ tury, 94-96; slavery as institu­ tionalized, 75-76 American Reform Judaism, 35 American Revolution model, 46-47 American society: citizenship at heart of, 69-72; comparing European and, 63-65; division over slavery in, 76-80; ethnic/nationalist expres­ sions of nineteenth century, 87; na­ tionalism, socialism, and democracy elements of, 65-68; patriotism ral­ lied within, 92-93; racism of, 9496; religious civility within, 85-86; two unique characteristics of, 6465. See also United States American universalism, 9 American Zionism, 34-36 Anderson, Margaret, 119 anti-Catholicism, 85 anti-Semitism: across Europe and United States (1880s), 94; compari­ son of American and European, 122-23; early twentieth century Eu­ ropean, 58-59; impact on Zionism

270

INDEX

by, 32; Nazi transformation of Ger­ man, 118-19 anticolonialism: ethnic consciousness mobilization and, 129-30; national­ ism expression of, 164-65, 166-81; U.S. support of, 214 Appiah, Kwame Anthony, 172 Arendt, Hannah, 7, 104, 120 Arensberg, Conrad M., 22 Arese, Francesco, 74 Argentina, 5 Armenian genocide, 104 Asian Americans, 122 Atatürk, Kemal, 146 Australian socialism, 113 authoritarian nationalism (Nazi Ger­ many), 117-20, 121-23 Auto-Emancipation (Pinsker), 32 Awolowo, Obefami, 176, 177, 179, 181 Azikiwe, Nnamdi, l6l, 162, 176, 177, 178 Balfour, Arthur, 124 Balfour Declaration, 124, 125-26 Balkanization, 4, 61 Baltic states, 103, 189, 197, 201. See also Serbia Bandaranaiki, S.W.R.D., 169 Bangladesh, 190 Barber, Benjamin, 8 Basque nationalism, 16, 55, 60-61, 185-86 Ba'th (Rebirth) party, 156 Bauer, Otto, 51 Bauman, Zygmunt, 2l6 Bayly, Christopher, 132 Becker, Carl, 27 Belgium linguistic movements, 54-55, 186 Ben-Gurion, David, 126 Benevolent Empire (1820s/1830s), 67 Benin Kingdom, 173 Berry, Sara, 170 Biafra, 177, 189-90 Big Man system, 168

Birch, Anthony, 6 Bismarck, Otto von, 17, 27, 28, 59 BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party), 205-6 black Africans: experience as dias­ pora, 158-59; race consciousness of, 157; slavery experience of, 95, 156-57. See also Africa Black Muslims, 207-8 Black Panthers, 184 Black Power movement, 184, 190, 198 Blanqui, Louis, 43 Blickle, Peter, 12 Bloody Sunday (Ireland, 1972), 185 Blyden, Edward, 157, 158, 161 B'nei Moshe, 31 Boas, Franz, 95 Bolshevik Revolution (1917), 100-101 Bolshevik socialism, 108-9 Book of Mormon, 88 Bourassa, Henri, 183 Bourne, Randolph, 19, H I Brandeis, Louis, 111, 124, 125 Breton nationalism, 54, 189, 190 Breuilly, John, 7 Britain: Balfour Declaration repudi­ ated by, 125-26; colonial slavery ended by, 76; competition of great trio in, 107; Indian nationalism and independence from, 132-35; influ­ ence on early American society by, 63-64; Irish home rule campaign and, 105-7; Magna Carta of, 94; Nigerian colonialism/independence from, 173, 174-81; separatism ap­ peal in, 206. See also European colonialism British Aliens Act (1905), 58 British East India Company, 132, 134 Bryce, James, 71 Buchanan, James, 69 Burundi, 186-87 Cameroons, 173, 174 Cárdenas, Lázaro, 152 Carmichael, Stokely, 184

Carr, E. H., 197 Carranza, Venustiano, 151 Carson, Sir Edward, 107, 184 Castro, Fidel, 189 Catalan movement, 54 Catalonian nationalism, 189 "Catholic rent" (1825) [Ireland], 23 Césaire, Aimé, 158 Chatterjee, Partha, 167 Cherokee tribe, 83 China: Cultural Revolution of, 5, 202; Japanese threat (early twentieth century) to, 154; nationalism of, 143, 170; postcolonial socialism model in, 170; Tibet occupation (1951) by, 202 Chinese Americans, 142 Christian Social Party, 32 Christian Socialism, 43 citizenship. See American citizenship; state citizenship Civil War (U.S.): overview of, 76-80; regional loyalties strengthened by, 92 Clan na Gael (U.S.), 106 Cobban, Alfred, 2, 8 Cohen, William, 212 Cold War: fate of socialism, democ­ racy, and nationalism after, 211-12; ideological struggle, 192-93; inviol­ able states created during, 192-95; movement toward nationalism dur­ ing, 197-99; state dysfunction dur­ ing, 195-97 Coleman, James, 176 colonial racism, 73-74 colonialism. See European colonialism communalism, 12-13, 38 Compromise of 1850 (U.S.), 76 Compromise of 1877 (U.S.), 80 Connell, Kenneth, 21 Connor, Walker, 8, 81 Croatia: linguistic movement of, 55; post-Great War creation of, 103; post-W.W. II violence in, 120, 197 Crummell, Alexander, 157, l 6 l

INDEX

271

Cuba, 189, 195 Cubberley, Ellwood, 96 Cyprus, 189 Czech nationalism, 61, 103, 197

DuBois, W.E.B., 160, 161, 162, 163 Dulles, John Foster, 193 Dumont, Louis, 14 Durkheim, Emile, 14

Dalai Llama, 202 Danish nationalism, 17 Daughters of Norway (1897), 18 Davitt, Michael, 26 democracy: citizenship exercised through, 45; Cold War ideological struggle between socialism and, 192-97; collaboration between na­ tionalism, socialism and, 51-53; dif­ ficulties of global attempts at, 12829; French and American models of, 46-48; global capitalism en­ twined with, 214-15; impact on Eu­ ropean history by, 38; impact on transformation of nineteenth cen­ tury Europe, 38-48; mobilization of late nineteenth century, 49-53; na­ tionalism in context of, 3; postCold War fate of, 211-12; promise held by, 40-41; state identification/ path toward, 107-8; state vision un­ der, 48-49; strengths and weak­ nesses of, 42. See also American democracy; nationalism; socialism Devoy, John, 26 Dewey, John, 111 Diaz, Portifiro, 148 diversity: basic assumptions regarding, 218; contradictions/conundrums of, 219; limitations of, 218-19; salutary effects of social and cultural, 21718, 220; small-group violence and, 219-20. See also global diversity stabilization strategies; racial divisions/racism Dmowski, Roman, 103 Douglas, Stephen A., 67 dozoku kinship network (Japan), 139 Dred Scott decision (U.S. Supreme Court), 69 Dreyfus affair (France), 58, 59

East India Company (Britain), 132, 134 East Timorese nationalism, 171 Easter Rebellion (Ireland), 26 Eastern European Jewish migration, 34-36 Egyptian nationalism, 155-56 Emerson, Rupert, 2 Emmet, Robert, 23 Enlightenment, 24, 104 Enloe, Cynthia, 48, 81 Escape from Freedom (Fromm), 3 ETA (Basque militant organization), 186, 219 Ethiopia, 171 ethnic consciousness: of American ethnic groups, 86-87; anticolonial­ ismi mobilization of, 129-30; comparing Swede and Norwegian, 17-18; as element of nationalism, 15-16 ethnicity: American nationalism de­ rived from, 80-84; American na­ tionalism vs., 110-14; growing importance of fictive kin or, 14-15; nineteenth-century America view of, 81 eugenics, 57-58 Europe: American society compared to, 63-65; cultural dividers of, 3738; early interactions between Ja­ pan and, 137-38; impact of migra­ tion on, 13-14; impact of Wilson world view on states of, 98-102; in­ fluence of French ideal on, 46-47; post-Great War struggle of great trio in, 114-17; racial divides of nineteenth century, 55-58, 95; ris­ ing anti-Semitism of nineteenth cen­ tury, 32; state reconstruction during early twentieth century, 100-101;

272

INDEX

transformation of citizenship notion in, 39-41; transformation of three great movements of, 38-41 European colonialism: anticolonalism resistance against, 164-65, 171-72; British impact on tribalism during, 165; despotism model following end of, 167-71; Humpty-Dumpty Principle following, 167; impact on Nigeria, 173, 174-81; impact on tribal territory by, 173-74; as local subjugation vs. distant rule, 214; nationalism generated by, 164, 17071, 172-73; patronage system un­ der, 165-66. See also Africa; postcolonial states European nationalism movements: au­ thoritarian nature of post-Great War, 117-23; collaboration between socialism, democracy and, 51-53; factors determining scope of, 5-6; French and U.S. exported, 46; as function of modernization, 6-8, 1921; global spread of (1880-1920), 127-35; impact of religious involve­ ment on, 59-60; impact of social­ ism, democracy and, 38-48; impact of war on European, 18-19; kinship/political objectives of, 5; mobilization of late nineteenth cen­ tury, 49-53; nation-state birth through, 44-45; Nazi Germany, 117-20, 121-23; post-Great War transformation of, 104-7, 114-17; racial elements of, 55-58; sim­ ilarities of American and, 82; similarities/differences of, 60-62; socialism and democracy contexts of, 3; state language agendas and, 53-55; state militarism and, 4-5, 7, 52-53, 61-62; state vision under, 48-49; strength of kinship ties and, 19; strengths and weaknesses of, 42; varieties of, 44-45. See also de­ mocracy; nationalism; socialism European Union (EU), 209

Euskara language, 55 Ezrahi, Yaron, 68 The Family of Man (photographic ex­ hibit), 2 Fanon, Frantz, 158, 168 Farrakhan, Louis, 208 Federation of Arab Republics, 156 Fédération Régionaliste de Bretagne (Breton nationalism), 54 Feierman, Steven, 205 Fenianism, 25-26. See also Irish na­ tionalism Flemish nationalism, 54-55 Fourier, Charles, 43 Fourierite communities, 43 France: citizen-patriot indoctrination in, 52; colonial slavery ended by, 76; competition of great trio in, 107; Jacobin language mandate in, 53; lack of transforming migration of, 45-46; nationalism exported by, 45-46; nationalism feelings in late twentieth century, 207; W.W. II Vichy government in, 120 Franco, Francisco, 120-21, 186-87 Freemen's Journal, 25 French Canadian separatists, 182-83, 190 French Revolution: Jacobin language mandate following, 53; modern citi­ zenship invented during, 46; nation­ alism following, 40, 44; nationalism prior to, 12-13 Fromm, Erich, 3 Fulani-Hausa (Nigeria), 177, 178, 179 Gaelic language, 55 Gaelic League (Ireland), 105 Gandhi, Mahatma, 133-34, 135, 205, 210 Garvey, Marcus, 158, 159, 160, 162 Garveyism, 158-61 Gellner, Ernest, 41 genro (Japanese ruling elders), 137, 148

INDEX

2 73

George, Henry, 26 German Americans: Civil War service of, 86; during Great War, 111; mi­ gration of, 28-30 German nationalism: authoritarian na­ ture of Nazi, 117-20, 121-23; com­ pared to Irish and Jewish, 36; connections between state and, 26, 27-28; inclusion of Catholics and Protestants in, 27, 28; migration and, 27, 28-29; origins and devel­ opment of, 26-27 Germany: migration to United States from, 28-30; nationalism and mi­ gration patterns of, 27, 28-29; Nazi, 117-20, 121-23; ProtestantCatholic chasm in early twentieth century, 118; state-based national­ ists of, 52 Ghana, 163, 168, 172, 176 Ginzberg, Asher (Ahad Ha'am), 31, 33, 55 Glenny, Misha, 4 global capitalism: culture of narcissism and, 216-17; as global stabilization strategy, 212, 213; U.S. promotion of, 214-15 global diversity stabilization strategies: encouragement of diversity as, 21720; global capitalism as solvent for, 212, 213, 216-17; individual and human rights standards as, 213-14, 215; listing of four, 212-13; reliance on strong state system, 213 global nationalism (1880-1920), 12735 global nationalism (1967-1972): lan­ guage of, 198-99; media tactics used in, 198, 199-200; overview of, 182-91; rigidification of Cold War state system and, 192-97; role of religion in, 202-6; Soviet system disintegration and, 200-201; strate­ gies used during, 197-99; W.W. II impact on, 197 Glucksmann, André, 201

274

INDEX

Gobineau, Count de, 57 Gonzales, Rudolfo "Corky," 153 Gottfried von herder, Johann, 26, 44 Gottlieb, Gidon, 218 Gowon, Yakubu, 178, 179 Grattan, Henry, 23 Great Britain. See Britain great trio. See democracy; nationalism; socialism Great War: Americanization during, 110-12; creation of new states fol­ lowing, 103-4; cultural dividers/ nationalism leading to, 37-38; ex­ pansion of European states prior to, 97; German American sympathies during, 29-30; orthodox truth per­ spective following, 97-98; U.S. new world version following, 98-100 Greek standard language, 53 Greenfeld, Liah, 10 Gypsies, 121, 219 Ha'am, Ahad (Asher Ginzberg), 31, 33, 55 Hamilton, Charles, 184 Handler, Richard, 7 Harlem Renaissance (U.S.), 162 Harris, Joel Chandler, 92 Harte, Bret, 92 Hausa language, 175 Havel, Vaclav, 201 Herzl, Theodor, 31-32, 33, 35 Hess, Moses, 59 Hindu culture, 134 Hindu nationalism (1990s), 205-6 Hindu Tamils, 169 Hitler, Adolf, 118, 119, 120 Ho Chi Minh, 130 Hobsbawm, Eric, 60, 102 Holocaust (W.W. II), 122, 123, 126, 187 Home Rule campaign (Ireland), 26, 105-7 Horowitz, Donald, 130 House, Edward, 111 Huerta, Victoriano, 149

human rights: global stabilization strategy of, 213-14; U.S. promotion of, 215-16; values originating, 9 Huntington, Samuel, 218 Hussein, Saddam, 8 Hutu-Tutsi conflict (Africa), 186-87, 191, 201 Hyde, Douglas, 55, 105 Hyden, Goran, 172 hyphenism, 110. See also American nationalism Icarus Effect, 7, 104, 177 Igbo (Ibo) [Nigeria], 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 180 Ignatieff, Michael, 4 Indian Moslems, 134, 135 Indian National Congress, 132 Indian nationalism, 132-35 indigenous people of color: exploita­ tion of, 73-74; readiness rule ap­ plied to, 101-2. See also Native Americans individual responsibility, 3-4 individual rights: global stabilization strategy of, 213-14; U.S. promotion of, 215-16 Indonesia, 169 Ipsilandis, Prince Alexander, 44 IRA (Irish Republican Army), 185, 201 Iranian Revolution, 203-5 Irish American Fenian Canadian inva­ sions (1866, 1870), 87 Irish Americans: Civil War service of, 86; during Great War, 111; Irish freedom promoted by, 24-25; mi­ gration of, 22, 24 Irish Home Rule campaign, 26, 105-7 Irish National Land League, 26 Irish nationalism: British rule impact on, 22-23, 184-85; "Catholic rent" (1825) funding, 23; compared to German and Jewish, 36; demo­ graphics and, 15, 21-22, 24; Famine (1845-55) impact on, 21, 22, 23-24; Fenianism expression of, 25-26, 87;

Gaelic language and, 55; kinship adaptation to migration and, 22; post-Great War transformation of, 105-7; transatlantic nature of, 26 Irish Republican Brotherhood (or Fe­ nians), 26, 87 Irokawa, Daikichi, 139 Iron Law of Oligarchy, 50 Islamic fundamentalism, 204-5 Israel, 187-88, 195 Italian Americans, 82 Italy: nationalism transformed by Mus­ solini, 116; nationalist politics of nineteenth century, 115-16 Jabotinsky, Vladimir, 125 Jackson, Andrew, 45 James, C.L.R., 158 Japanese Americans: kinship relations of, 141-42; miscegenation laws and, 122; W.W. II internment of, 142 Japanese Meiji Revolution (1867-68), 136-37, 139, 143 Japanese nationalism: compared to Chinese nationalism, 143; early de­ velopment of, 136-41; genro rulers and, 137, 148; nihonjinron belief and, 140-41, 144; post-W.W. II, 143-44; role of Shinto cults/ emperor in, 138-39, 144 Japanese Twenty-One Demands of 1915, 154 Jefferson, Thomas, 70, 77 Jewett, Sarah Orne, 92 Jewish homeland, 33-34, 186-87. See also Zionism Jewish nationalism, 187-88 Jewish people: anti-Semitism against, 32, 58-59, 94, 118-19, 122-23; Jew­ ish consciousness of American, 83; post-W.W. II Palestine homeland for, 124-26 The Jewish State (Lueger), 32 Jim Crow laws (U.S.), 95, 162 Jinnah, M. A., 134 INDEX

2 75

Juárez, Benito, 148 Juergensmeyer, Mark, 215 Kallen, Horace, 111 Kamau, Johnstone, l6l Keddie, Nikki, 203 Kemal, Mustafa, 127-28, 145 Kennedy, John F., 206 Kenya, l68 Kenyan independence, 130 Kenyatta, Jomo, l6l Khalistan movement, 206 Khmer Rouge, 201 King, Martin Luther, Jr., 184 Kingsley, Charles, 43 kinship relations: American national­ ism derived from, 80-84; increasing importance of, 14; Irish migration adaptation of, 22; Japanese dozoku network of, 139; of Japanese mi­ grants in United States, 141-42; na­ tionalism shaped by strength of, 19; nationalist movements born of subSahara African, 172; Native Ameri­ can, 83-84; reconceived in migra­ tion to Unites States, 82-83; transformed into fictive ethnic groups, 14-15 Knight, Alan, 151 Know Nothing movements (1850s), 85 Kommunalismus, 12-13, 38 Kossuth, Lajos, 45 Kramer, Martin, 205 Kurds, 201 Kwa language group, 175 Kymlicka, Michael, 8 labor force: American demand (1820s) for, 66; mobilization of late nine­ teenth century, 50; Polish Ameri­ cans as part of, 86; socialism movement and, 39; transformation of nineteenth century Europe, 38-39 Laden, Osama bin, 212 Lakota Sioux, 76, 83 276

INDEX

Lan, David, 166 Land League (Ireland), 105 language: British colonialism and Afri­ can, 174-75; as electoral politics prerequisite, 101; European nation­ alism agendas regarding, 53-55; French Canadian separatists on bilingualism issue, 183; global nation­ alism, 198-99; Nazi nationalism and German, 119; Soviet Union treat­ ment of subculture, 109-10; Turkish nationalism and "purification" of, 145; U.S. movements (1890) to sys­ tematize state, 93; U.S. school in­ struction of multiple, 111, 112; Welsh nationalism issue over, 185 Lasch, Christopher, 216 League of Nations, 102 Lee, Robert E., 80 Lenin, V., 108, 109 Leonardo, Michaela di, 82 Liberia, 157 Libya, 156 Lincoln, Abraham, 69, 70, 78 Lindemann, Albert, 32 linguistic movements, 53-55 Lippmann, Walter, 114 Locke, Alain, 162 Lonsdale, John, 129, 165 Lueger, Karl, 32, 58, 59 Macaulay, Herbert, 175 Macedonian nationalism, 54, 60 Magna Carta (England), 94 Magyar language, 54 Malaysian nationalism, 188 Mamdani, Mahmood, 165 Manchu dynasty collapse (1911), 128 Manifest Destiny (U.S.), 84 Mariam, Mengistu Haile, 170 Markakis, John, 170 Maruyama, Masao, 139 Marx, Karl, 44, 57, 59 "Maryland, My Maryland" (Scott), 79 Masaryk, Tomás, 111 Mazrui, Ali, 166

Mazzini, Guiseppe, 45 Mboya, Tom, 168 Meade, George, 87 Meiji Restoration of 1867-68 (Japan), 136-37, 139, 143 Mein Kampf (Hitler), 120 mestizo nationalism (Mexico), 151-52 Mexican Constitution (1917), 148-49 Mexico: land reform issues, 151-52; nationalism of, 146-53; outmigration from, 152-53; war between United States (nineteenth century) and, 84-85 Michels, Robert, 50 Middle Eastern migration, 131 migration: of African Americans to north, 157-58; between Mexico and United States, 152-53; Eastern Euro­ pean Jewish, 34-36; forced African, 131; from Germany to U.S., 28-30; German nationalism and, 27, 28-29; impact on European society by, 1314; impact of nihonjinron belief on Japanese, 140-41; Irish Famine and Irish, 24; Irish successful adaptation to, 22; of Jews from Russia, 31; kinship relations reconceived in U.S., 82-83; of mixed population to U.S., 66-67, 72; Mormonism, 88; National Origins Act of 1924 and U.S., 112-13; Pan-Arabism from Middle Eastern, 130; relation be­ tween nationalism and, 16-22; So­ viet Union control over population, 113; triggered by soaring popula­ tions, 15-16 Minorities Protection Treaties of 1919, 104 miscegenation laws (U.S.), 122 modernization/nationalism connec­ tion, 6-8, 19-21 Monroe Doctrine (U.S.), 149 Morley, David, 219 Mormonism nationalism, 88-92, 208 Mosaddeq, Mohammed, 203 Moses, Wilson, l 6 l

Mosse, George, 4 Muhammad, Elijah, 208 Muhammad, Walter, 208 Mussolini, Benito, 116 Nabucco (Verdi), 50 Nairn, Tom, 3, 206 Napoleonic Empire, 40, 42 Nasser, Gamal, 155-56, 163 Nat Turner's Rebellion (South Caro­ lina), 76 Nation of Islam, 207-8 nation-state: ethnic-linguistic, 101, 102; illusive nature of, 8; linguistic movements of, 53-55; nationalism as origins of, 44-45. See also states National (Anglican Church), 176 National Association for the Advance­ ment of Colored People (NAACP), 95 National Geographic, 2 National Origins Act of 1924 (U.S.), 112-13 National Socialist party (Nazi Ger­ many), 118 nationalism: declining appeal of mod­ ern, 209-10; defining, 5; early his­ tory of, 12-18; global spread of (1880-1920), 127-35; global spread of (1967-1972), 182-210; impact of war on, 18—19; new ethnic con­ sciousness element of, 15-16; pan movements of, 153-64; post-Cold War fate of, 211-12; power mo­ bilized by appeals to, 97; relation between migration and, 16-22; shaped by modern state, 6-8, 1921; state identification/path toward, 107-8; three propositions regarding, 10; value of examining history of, 10-11; weaknesses and strengths of, 42; Western intellectual demonizing of, 1-5. See also democracy; socialism nationalism movements: African, 131, 156-64, 173-81; African American

INDEX

277

nationalism movements (continued) race consciousness and, 157, 184, 190, 191; Basque, 16, 55, 60-61, 185-86; Belgium linguistic, 54-55, 186; Breton, 54, 189, 190; Catalonian, 189; Chinese, 143, 170; Czech, 61, 103, 197; Danish, 17; Egyptian, 155-56; Flemish, 54-55; German, 26-30, 36, 117-20, 121-23; Hindu (1990s), 205-6; Indian, 132-35; Ira­ nian Revolution, 203-5; Irish, 15, 21-24, 36, 55, 105-7, 184-85; Japa­ nese, 136-44, 148; Khalistan, 206; Malaysian, 188; mestizo (Mexico), 151-52; Mexican, 146-53; Mormon, 88-92, 208; Nigerian, 173, 174-81; Norwegian, 15, 18, 60, 206; Quebec, 182-83, 190; Serbian, 5253, 197; Swedish, 18; Tibetan, 202; transoceanic, 157; Turkish, 144-46; Tutsi-Hutu conflict and Hutu, 18687, 191; Vietnamese, 127, 130-31, 188-89; in well-established states (late twentieth century), 206-10; Welsh and Scottish, 16, 185, 190. See also American nationalism; European nationalism movements; Zionism Native Americans: exploitation/ brutality against, 73-74, 76; kinship connections among, 83-84; mis­ cegenation laws and, 122; Mormon narrative on, 88-89 Nazi German nationalism, 117-20, 121-23 NCNC (National Council of Nigerian Citizens), 176, 177 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 133 New Deal (U.S.), 113, 114 New York City's Fourth of July parade (1918), 111-12 New Yorker, 4 Nigerian nationalism, 173, 174-81 Nigerian soccer team (1994, 1998), 180 Nigerian Youth Movement, 176 2 78

INDEX

nihonjinron belief (Japan), 140-41, 144 Nkrumah, Kwame, l 6 l , 162, 163 Nora, Pierre, 14 North German Confederation (1866), 28 Norwegian Americans, 111 Norwegian nationalism, 15,18, 60, 206 Nurse, Malcom I., l 6 l Nyerere, Julius, 170 Oakeshott, Michael, 8 Obasanjo, Olusegun, 180 Obote, A. Milton, 170 O'Connell, Daniel, 23, 24 Oduduwa, Egbe Omo, 176 Olaf, Saint, 18 One World (Willkie), 2 Onion Effect, 10, 178 Organization of African Unity, 163 Owen, Robert, 43 Owenite communities, 43 Paderewski, Ignacy, 111 Padmore, George, 158, 161, 163 Pahlavi, Reza Shah, 203 Pakistan, 190, 206 Palestine Jewish homeland, 124-26, 186-87 Palestinian homeland, 33-34 Palestinian Liberation Organization, 190 pan movements, 153-64 Pan-African Conference (1990), l60 Pan-African conference movement,

162, 163 Pan-African Congress (1945), l 6 l Pan-Africanism, 156-64 Pan-Arabism, 130, 153, 154-56 Pan-Asianism, 153, 154 Parnell, Charles Stewart, 25, 26, 105 patriotism (American), 92-93, 110-11 Patterson, Orlando, 158 Pearse, Patrick, 26 Perry, Ralph Barton, 90 Philippines, 165-66, 171

Pierce, Franklin, 69 Pinsker, Leo, 32 Pirenne, Henri, 57 Pius XII, Pope, 121 Poland, 60 Polish Americans, 86, 87, 112 Polk, James Knox, 84 Popper, Karl, 3 population density: comparing French and U.S., 45-46; European migra­ tion triggered by, 15-16; Irish Fam­ ine and nationalism links to, 15, 21-22, 23-24 postcolonial states: despotism of, 16771; expectations-behavior gap and nationalism of, 196-97. See also Eu­ ropean colonialism Potter, David, 80, 219 power: American democracy as distri­ bution of, 70-71; nationalism ap­ peals to mobilize, 97 Prussia, 17, 27, 28, 39 Quebec nationalism, 182-83, 190 race consciousness: African American, 157, 184, 190, 191, 198, 207-8; Ja­ panese nihonjinron belief and, 140-41, 144 racial divisions/racism: American, 9496, 122; American democracy and, 73-80; colonial, 73-74; European, 55-58, 95; of Germany (1880s Nazi regime), 117-23; of U.S. National Origins Act of 1924, 112-13; W.W. II/post-W.W. II, 119-23 "readiness rule," 101-2 Reischauer, Edwin, 140 religion: American cultural tolerance of plural, 85-86; impact on nation­ alism movements by, 59-60; Irish nationalism relation to, 24-25; Ro­ man Catholic, 24-25, 59-60, 85-86, 121, 150 religious nationalism: global national­ ism (1967-1972) role by, 202-6;

modern appeal of, 215-16; Mor­ mon, 88-92, 208 Renan, Joseph Ernest, 57, 201-2 Renascent Africa (Azikiwe), 162 Renner, Karl, 51 Revel, Jacques, 207 Revolution of 1905 (Russia), 108 Revolution of 1910 (Mexico), 148 Revolution of 1917 (Russia), 108 Rivera, Primo de, 121 Robbins, Kevin, 219 Rochdale Plan, 43 Roman Catholic Church: American tol­ erance toward, 85-86; anti-Semitism role played by, 59-60; Irish nation­ alism relations to, 24-25; Mexicanized, 150; Spanish nationalism and, 121 Roosevelt, Theodore, 100 Royal Niger Company, 173 Russia: anti-Semitism of, 32, 58; Jew­ ish migration from, 31; revolutions (1905, 1917) of, 108; triumph of so­ cialism over democracy/nationalism in, 108-9- See also Soviet Union Rwanda, 186-87 Sabean, David, 14 Saint-Simon, Henri de, 43 Scandanavians: migration of, 17; national consciousness among, 17-18 Schlesinger, Arthur, Jr., 4, 193 Schurz, Carl, 86 Scott, Sir Walter, 79 Scottish National Party, 185 Scottish nationalism, 185, 190 Second Republic (1979-1983) [Nigeria], 180 Sedition Act (U.S.), 68 Selassie, Emperor Haile, 171 self-determination: disruptive out­ comes of, 10; growing nationalism role of, 60-61; Irish Home Rule campaign for, 26, 105-7; Nazi Ger­ many rhetoric of, 119, 120; Nigerian

INDEX

279

self-determination {continued) experience in, 178; Wilson's world view on, 100, 101-2. See also states Senghor, Leopold Sedar, 158, 164 Serbia: Eastern Orthodox clergy na­ tionalism role in, 60; linguistic movement of, 55; post-Great War creation of, 103; state-based nation­ alism of, 52-53, 197 Shinto state-focused cults (Japan), 138, 144 Silver, Rabbi Abba Hillel, 125 Sinn Fein (Ireland), 106 slavery: abolition movement to end U.S., 75-77; American institutionalism of, 75-76; American society di­ vision over, 76-80; sub-Sahara African, 95, 156-57 Slovak nationalism, 103 Smith, Anthony, 10 Smith, Denis Mack, 115 Smith, Joseph, 88, 89, 90, 91 social class, 39 social contract myth, 42 socialism: Cold War ideological strug­ gle between democracy and, 19297; collaboration between national­ ism, democracy and, 51-53; failure to establish American, 65-66; global attempts at, 129; impact on Euro­ pean history by, 38-48; labor force and, 39; mobilization of late nine­ teenth century, 49-53; nationalism in context of, 3; post-Cold War fate of, 211-12; state identification/path toward, 107-8; state vision under, 48-49; strengths and weaknesses of, 42; triumph in Russia of, 108-9; twentieth century revolutionary, 100-101; varieties of nineteenth century, 43. See also democracy; nationalism Somalia, 201 Sons of Norway (1895), 18 South Africa, 129-30, 131 Southern Confederacy, 78-80

280

INDEX

Southern Rhodesia, 131 Soviet Union: global nationalism and Cold War role by, 192-97; global nationalism and disintegration of, 200-201; migration movements controlled in, 113; nationality policy within, 109-10; socialism of, 108-9. See also Russia Spain: Franco regime of, 120-21, 18586; Mexico's independence from, 147-48 Sri Lanka, 168-69, 171 Stalin's Five Year Plan, 109, 113 state citizenship: exercised through democracy, 45; Revolutionary France creation of modern, 46; transformation of European notion of, 39-41. See also American citizenship state-based nationalists, 52-53 states: African postcolonial despotism model of, 167-71; authoritarian na­ tionalism movements of post-Great War, 117-23; Big Man system mim­ icking, 168; comparing democratic, socialism, nationalism ideals of, 48; controlling chaos by strengthening, 212-13; difficulties of establishing Mexican, 150; expectations-behavior gap of postcolonial, 196-97; Ger­ man nationalism related to, 26, 27-28; global nationalism and rigidification of Cold War, 192-95; Ho­ locaust as unregulated sovereignty of, 126; identification with/path to­ ward one of great trio by, 107-8; Islamic fundamentalism vision of, 204-5; Japanese nationalism and Ja­ panese, 137-40; late nineteenth century norms for successful, 93; Mussolini's glorified vision of, 116; nationalism and militarism of, 4-5, 7, 52-53, 61-62; nationalism open­ ing through dysfunction of, 195-99; nationalism shaped by modern, 6 8, 19-21; nationalism in well-

established late twentieth century, 206-10; post-W.W. II pursuit of Palestine Jewish, 124-26; Wilson world view of, 98-102; Zionists vision of Jewish, 34. See also nationstate; self-determination Stocking, George, 57 Sukarno, 169 Sun Yat-sen, 127, 128, 130, 154 Suny, Ronald, 110 Swedish Americans, 18 Swedish nationalism, 18 Swedish socialism, 52, 113 Syria, 156 Tamil Eelam, 190, 191, 219 Taney, Roger, 69 Tanzania, 170, 171 terrorism tactics, 198-99 Tet Offensive (Vietnam, 1968), 198 Thatcher, Margaret, 217 Third Reich nationalism, 117-20, 12123 Tibet occupation (1951), 202 Tibetan Buddhism/nationalism, 202 Tilly, Charles, 13 Tocqueville, Alexis de, 44, 45, 68, 69 transoceanic nationalism, 157 Treaty of Sèvres (1920), 145 Treaty of Westphalia (1648), 85 trio movements. See democracy; nationalism; socialism Trudeau, Pierre, 183 Turkish nationalism, 144-46 Turner, Bishop Henry, l60, l 6 l Turner, Frederick Jackson, 75, 98 Turner, Nat, 76 Tutsi-Hutu conflict (Africa), 186-87, 191, 201 Twenty-One Demands of 1915 (Japan), 154 Uganda, 170 Uncle Tom's Cabin (Stowe), 77 UNIA (Universal Negro Improvement Association), 158-60

United Arab Republic, 156 United Kingdom. See Britain United Nations, 192, 194 United States: Civil War and Reconstruction of, 76-80, 92; Eastern European Jewish migration to, 34-36; embodiment of democracy in, 108; ethnicity vs. nationalism in, 110-14; European origins of, 63-64; German migration to, 29-30; global diversity stability strategies used by, 214-17; global nationalism and Cold War role by, 192-97; Irish migration to, 22, 24; Jim Crow laws of, 95, 162; lack of transforming migration of, 45-46; Manifest Destiny of, 84; Mexican migration into, 152-53; mixed population migrating to, 6667, 72; Monroe Doctrine of, 149; movements (1890) to systematize language, 93; National Origins Act (1924) of, 112-13; nationalism of late twentieth century, 207-8; Philippine patronage system by, 16566; socialism crushed in, 109; strong citizenship/federalism (nineteenth century) of, 67-70, 71; treatment of Japanese Americans in, 141-42; treatment of people of color in, 75-76; Vietnam War and, 188-89, 194, 198; war between Mexico and, 84-85; Wilson's world view and political agenda of, 98-100. See also American society universalism, 9 Vasconcelos, José, 150, 151 Verdi, Guiseppe, 50 Vichy government (France), 120 Vietnam War, 188-89, 194, 198 Vietnamese nationalism, 127, 130-31, 188-89 Villa, Pancho, 149 violence: small-group, 219-20; terrorism, 198-99 INDEX

281

Virgin of Guadalupe cult (Mexico), 150 Washington, Booker T., 159, 160, 162 Washington, George, 67, 69 Watkins, Susan, 104 Wehler, Hans-Ulrich, 117 Weizmann, Chaim, 33-34, 124, 125, 126 Welsh language, 185 Welsh nationalism, 16, 185 Western intellectuals: modernization promoted by, 9-10; nationalism demonized by, 1-5 "white ethnic nationalism," 4 White, Mary Ovington, 95 Williams, Henry Sylvester, 158, 16061 Willkie, Wendell, 2 Wilson, Woodrow, 1, 98-99, 101, 102, 108, 111, 120, 124 Win Home Rule for Ireland campaign, 105 World War I. See Great War World War II: global nationalism fol­ lowing, 197; Holocaust during, 122, 123, 126, 187; impact on Japanese nationalism by, 143-44; Japanese

282

INDEX

Americans during, 142; Nazi Ger­ man nationalism during, 117-20, 121-23; racial divisions/racism dur­ ing and after, 119-23; Zionism fol­ lowing, 123-26 World Zionist Organization, 31, 124 Yoruba (Nigeria), 173, 174, 175, 176, 179 Young, Brigham, 89, 90 Young Turk coup (1908), 145 Yugoslavia, 103, 189, 197, 201 Zambia, 131 Zangwill, Israel, 33 Zanzibar, 164, 165 Zikist Movement, 176 Zimbabwe, 165, 167 Zionism: American experience and, 34-36; compared to Irish and Ger­ man nationalism, 36; Jewish home­ land search and, 33-34; origins of, 30-31; post-W.W. II, 123-26; as refuge movement, 32-33; rising anti-Semitism impact on, 32; secular leadership of, 60. See also Jewish nationalism Zionist Organization of America, 124