Who was Sendero Luminoso? The Actors and Motivations Behind the Shining Path of Peru


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Loebenstein 0

Who was Sendero Luminoso? The Actors and Motivations Behind the Shining Path of Peru

By Clara Loebenstein

A Thesis Submitted to the Program of Latin American Studies Middlebury College May 4, 2012

Advisors: Professor Jeff Cason and Roberto Pareja

Loebenstein 1

I have neither given nor received unauthorized aid on this assignment.

Clara Loebenstein May 4, 2012

Loebenstein 2 Acknowledgments I would like to thank both my advisors Jeff Cason and Roberto Pareja for all their encouragement and support. This thesis would not have been possible without their guidance and patience. I also want to thank my friends, family, and especially my parents for their unwavering faith in my abilities. A special thank you goes to the Andrew W. Mellon foundation for their funding of my research, as well as my advisor for this project Enrique García, during my semester at the Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú in the Fall of 2010. I’m grateful for the opportunity to produce work that combines my passion for the study of terrorism, research done abroad, and my own national heritage.

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Table of Contents Acknowledgements

2

Peru Map

5

Abstracts

6

Introduction: How to Explain the Internal Conflict in Peru Human Motivation: Individuals and Groups

7 9

Psychological Motivation Theories

11

Self Determination Theory

12

Rational Choice Theory

16

Prospect Theory

18

Group Motivation and Collective Action

22

Subsistence Crisis and Peasant Revolutions

22

Agrarian Reform

25

Group Process Theories

27

Collective Action

28

Discontent

30

Ideological Grievances

31

Capacity to organize: Mobilization and Political Opportunity

34

Social Identity Theory

35

Political Islands: Terrorist Motivations

37

Approaches to Understanding Terrorism

38

Anger

38

Normal Psychology

39

Conclusion

41

A Country Divided: History’s Role in Peru’s System of Inequalities

41

A History of Conquests and Economic Exploitation

43

Inequality in Peru: Semi Feudal Structures and Colonial Legacies

45

Military Governments and Dictatorships

48

Loebenstein 4 Universities: Birthplace of the Peruvian Left and the PCP

50

Ideology, Terrorism and the Armed Conflict

52

The Shining Path Strategy and The Armed Conflict

58

Military Response to Social Problems: Terror on Terror

61

Conclusion

64

Actors and Motivations

66

Sendero’s Main Base and the Role of the Efficiency of Communal Power Pacts 68 Actors

71 Leadership-Abimael Guzmán and his Foothold on the UNSCH

71

The Central Committee

73

The Base of Sendero: Andean Highland Peasants

76

Sendero’s Emphasis on Youth: The Role of Education in the PCP-SL 77 A System of Double Oppression: Women in Sendero Luminoso

79

Senderistas Made in Prisons

84

Indoctrinating the Children

85

Entre la espada y la pared: The Ashánika in the Peruvian Amazon Factors of Motivation

88 93

Ideology of Social Change

94

Sendero as the Provider of a New Moral Order

97

Grievances: Exclusion, Discrimination and Abuse

98

The Role of Revenge for Senderistas in an Unequal Peru

101

Terror and Violence as a Means of Controlling the Population

104

A Slogan for Change

105

Conclusion of Actors and Motivation

108

Conclusion

110

Loebenstein 5 Bibliography

118

Loebenstein 6

Abstract This thesis presents the internal conflict in Peru from the perspective of the Peruvian peasantry in order to analyze and determine who joined, as well as the why they joined, including the various factors that may have motivated these people to join the Shining Path. Basing my analysis on a variety of individuals using the Truth and Reconciliation Committee’s documents as well as other sources, I explore specific cases to determine the relationship between individual motivations and Sendero’s group cohesion. I stress that many of the motivating reasons and problems academics describe such as socio economic disparity, colonial and feudal legacies, racism towards the indigenous, and lack of state presence are still issues present in Peru making certain kinds of citizens susceptible to terrorism under alternative leadership. The state’s process of the dehumanization of terrorists and the lack of attention paid to their testimonies parallels the lack of interest in terrorist motivations. Furthermore, this thesis warns against the dangers of this process as it propagates the faulty idea that military intervention will solve this complex issue that continues to affect Peru’s security. Resumen Esta tesis presenta la tragedia del conflicto interno en el Perú desde la perspectiva del campesinado peruano. Intento especificar quién se unió y por qué se unían, incluyendo los diversos factores que posiblemente motivaron que estas personas se afilaran a Sendero Luminoso. Mi análisis toma en consideración tanto a los individuos como los documentos de la Comisión de Verdad y Reconciliación peruana además de otras fuentes. Exploro casos específicos para determinar las relaciones entre las motivaciones individuales y la cohesión grupal de Sendero. Enfatizo que muchas de las razones motivadoras y los problemas que los académicos describen como la disparidad socioeconómica del país, la leyenda feudal, el racismo contra los indígenas y la falta de presencia del estado todavía son problemáticos en el Perú, lo cual hace que el país siga siendo susceptible al terrorismo bajo un liderazgo alternativo. El proceso de deshumanización de los terroristas por parte del estado y la poca atención prestada a sus testimonios representan la falta de interés en el entendimiento de las motivaciones de los terroristas. Además, esta tesis advierte contra el peligro de este proceso ya que esto contribuye a la propagación de la idea errónea de que la intervención militar va a resolver este problema complejo que continúa afectando la seguridad del Perú.

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Introduction: How to Explain the Internal Conflict in Peru The Communist Party of Peru (PCP-SL) also known as The Shining Path or Sendero Luminoso in Spanish, was a Maoist guerrilla organization founded in the late 1960s, whose brutal activities during the 1980s and 1990s left Peru in one of the worst political crises in the history of the country. It has been one of the most salient terrorist insurgencies of the 20th century. The Shining Path’s popularity in the central and southern highlands of Peru can be attributed to various factors including a history of violent repression, military coups and dictatorships, a social inequality consisting of a semifeudal and semi-colonial system and where the rise of the leftist groups allowed for the means of politicization and the expression of grievances towards these legacies of inequality. The Shining Path was determined to create a utopian Andean society through the destruction of the semi feudal and semi colonial systems as well as anything that represented authority or the state. This tragic period (1980s-2000), is known as the “Internal Conflict” or guerra interna, characterized by a war between the government, the Shining Path, and the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA). The Truth and Reconciliation Committee, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación (CVR) in Spanish, has concluded the total amount of casualties exceeds 69 thousand Peruvians killed or missing at the hands of the insurgencies and state actors such as the military and the police.

Loebenstein 8 In this thesis, I aim to explain the tragedy of this time in Peruvian history from the perspective of the Peruvian peasantry, in order to analyze and determine who joined, as well as the why they joined, including the various factors that may have motivated these people to join the Shining Path. My question balances the individual and society in terms of individuals and their motivation in combination with collective action. Without an organization or structure, the individual’s motivations would not have sufficed to form a rebellious group. These questions deal with explaining the transition of individual motivations to politically motivated group activity. Basing my analysis on a variety of sources such as academic works, documentaries and the Truth and Reconciliation Committee’s documents, I aim to analyze specific cases to determine the relationship between the motivations and its effects on a variety of citizens. By looking at a variety of militant profiles from this perspective, I will explore the connections between the individual motivators and how it led to the Shining Path group cohesion. The reason I ask this question, is to explore this conflict from the view of the Shining Path members, a view that is foreign to many Peruvians. This tragic time in Peru is a sensitive subject in that it encompasses racism, economic and social disparity and violence employed not only from Sendero but also from the state. Many Peruvians blame this tragedy on the military and the terrorists, although the racism and classism involved in the terrorists’ blame is generally much higher. I am specifically interested in individual motivations combined with group action to explain who and why joined Sendero, without brushing off the problem with the simple socio-economic racist explanation that many “criollos” tend to agree with. By a criollo explanation I am referring to a highly common view of Senderistas as ignorant,

Loebenstein 9 indigenous “cholos” who are easily manipulated and motivated by socio economic grievances and hatred against the rest of Peru. I want to see what kind of people joined the Shining Path and the reasons behind this choice. Finally, this thesis will argue that the reason why the majority of individuals joined the Shining Path is because the group provided the physical and psychological needs outlined by Self Determination theory in communities whose established system of justice and power was not effective. Grievances, inequality and discontent all provided for an ideal mobilization of both the intellectuals and the indigenous but it was what Sendero offered or replaced that really drove and motivated the majority of members to join.

Human Motivation: Individuals and Groups People are essentially concerned with motivation, that is, how to move themselves or how to get others to act (Ryan and Deci). Everywhere teachers, counselors, parents, managers and coaches struggle with how to motivate those they mentor, and individuals struggle to find energy or gather effort and persist at the tasks of life and work (Ryan and Deci). People are commonly motivated by external factors such as reward systems, evaluations, grades or the opinion of others. However, people can also be motivated from within by curiosity, interests, care or abiding values. Motivation is the internal process that pushes or pulls the individual, and this force relates to a specific external event (Ferguson 1). When we describe these internal forces, we describe how they initiate and direct behavior. The concept of “motivation is also used to explain differences in the intensity of behavior” as well as to indicate the direction of behavior (Petri 3). In this thesis, the exploration of individual motivation literature leads to a comprehension of

Loebenstein 10 various factors that facilitate individual as well as group actions. It also helps clarify why Shining Path members joined and how that is related to the motivation of the group as a whole. Theories on individual and group motivation will frame the Peruvian case and shed light on the actors as well as why these people joined Sendero Luminoso. First, I establish a typological distinction between the different actors that comprised Shining Path members: Andean highland peasants, intellectuals and students, Amazonian indigenous, children and women. Then, I aim to use motivation theory to help explain the motivations of the members within subgroups. The typology itself mainly distinguishes the intellectuals, including students, from the “work” or “bulk” force who have been the most hurt by the system. It is hard to determine which sub group comprises the largest proportion of Senderistas as we cannot interview the deceased. Since a majority of the first Senderistas were most likely killed during the conflict, we are only left with interviews from those who have been caught and imprisoned. Thus, one motivation theory cannot begin to explain the complexities of all the actors themselves nor can it explain all motivations. The purpose of my typology however, is to highlight the difference in motivation through the division between the intellectual “fathers” of the movement and the actual rank and file. As the rank and file includes the indigenous both Andean and Amazonian, women and children, it makes up the largest sector of Senderistas. I will thus first explore Self Determination Theory as it best describes the motivation of what I have deemed the working force, the category with the larger proportion of Senderistas. As I will explore in this chapter, this theory is the most individualized and accounts for missing components

Loebenstein 11 that other theories lack such why some joined the government forces to fight Sendero Luminoso rather than join the ranks. This chapter will explore a variety of psychological motivation theories and their applications on the Peruvian case beginning with Self Determination Theory, then Rational Choice Theory and lastly group motivation and Collective Action theories in order to attempt to explain the possible motivations of Shining Path members. This next looks beyond the individual and begins to go into the actions and identification of a group. The last section will cover terrorism on its own in terms of the approaches used to understand the term itself but also how anger, normal psychology, cause and methods such as the “staircase approach” come into play in the Peruvian case. The theories explored help create a larger picture literature available regarding human motivation in joining terrorist groups while at the same time emphasizing the individualism (found in SDT) of terrorists as humans.

Psychological Motivation Theories In psychological motivation literature three approaches stand out: biological, drive theory with incentives and learning, and lastly the cognitive. Biological theories touch on ways in which instinct and physiology drive humans. Drive Theory addresses development and direction of motivation by learning but also deals with extrinsic and intrinsic incentives. The Cognitive psychological thought explores internal mental processes and explores states such as belief, desires, ideas, knowledge and motivation. According to Deci, the shift in cognitive theories in the 1960s led to the concept of needs being replaced by goals as the dominant motivational concept (Deci 2000, 228).

Loebenstein 12 Consequently, the idea of psychological needs is considered essential for the understanding of the content and process of goal pursuits. Without the concept of needs, Richard Ryan and Edward Deci were unable to provide a meaningful interpretation in the area of intrinsic motivation, which they consider to be a basic lifelong psychological growth function and internalization. Needs are thus considered to be an essential aspect of psychological integrity and social cohesion (Ryan and Deci 2000, 232).

Self Determination Theory In terms of individual motivation, this thesis will emphasize Deci and Ryan’s Self Determination Theory (SDT) as it describes the interplay between the extrinsic forces action on persons and the intrinsic motives and needs inherent in human nature. Most importantly, SDT focuses on how the cultural and social factors that facilitate or undermine people’s sense of volition and initiative as well as their well being and the quality of their performance in daily life. Conditions that support the individual’s experience are characterized in this theory by autonomy, competence, and relatedness. These factors are argued to encourage the most human conviction, high quality forms of motivation, and engagement for activities, persistence and creativity (Ryan and Deci). Autonomy or self-regulation and self-organization convey an adaptive advantage. Autonomy also includes the tendency to work toward inner coherence as well as to juggle inner demands and goals. The development of an integrated self reflects a deep inner design of the human organism toward self-cohesion and avoids self-fragmentation (Ryan and Deci 254). Competence or being effective refers to the human tendency or nature to engage in optimal challenges and experiences in the physical and social worlds.

Loebenstein 13 Relatedness in SDT describes the need to seek attachment and experience feelings of security of belongingness and intimacy with others. (Ryan and Deci 253). It categorizes people as social organisms where individuals organize themselves with respect to the larger social entity (Ryan and Deci 253). A cohesive group provides an adaptive value of resource sharing and mutual protection (Ryan and Deci 253). The need for relatedness can at times compete or conflict with autonomy but it is the interplay between individual integration and integration of the individual into the larger social whole (Ryan and Deci 253). Furthermore, intrinsically motivated behaviors “represent the prototype of selfdetermined activities” as they are activities that people are doing naturally when they are able to follow their true personal or inner interests (Ryan and Deci 234). Research shows that when extrinsic rewards such as money are introduced for doing an intrinsically interesting activity, people begin to feel controlled by the rewards, which causes a shift in the perceived locus of causality for the behavior from internal to external. However, events such as negative feedback that promote perceived incompetence tend to undermine intrinsic motivation while positive feedback events that foster perceived competence tend to enhance intrinsic motivation (Ryan and Deci 235). Both intrinsic and extrinsic motivations play a role in explaining the actors of the Shinning Path. Furthermore, it is the intrinsic motivations related to what the Shining Path offered people that will help explain the application of this theory on the Peruvian case.

Application of SDT on the Peruvian Case

Loebenstein 14 The three psychological needs (autonomy, competence, and relatedness) proposed by SDT serve as a base for a possible interpretation of why certain Peruvians (mostly peasants and students from the southern highlands) joined the Shining Path. The application of Self Determination Theory to the Peruvian case would be to assume that the Shining Path as a group was able to fulfill the psychological needs of those who joined, which was better than the alternative of daily life. According to the CVR most of the deaths occurred in the Andean highlands, then, there is a strong correlation between Shining Path presence in this region. In this interpretation, SDT would be highlighting the fact that daily life for the Andean peasantry did not provide for autonomy, competence or relatedness. Of course this can also be applied to Amazonian indigenous tribes, women, children and many more actors, but the bulk of the movement tends to be the aggregate force recruited by the intellectuals from various regions of the highlands. The political environment of the central-southern Andes was one that prevented individuals from achieving their need for competence. Abimael Guzmán, the leader of the group, contributed to the rise of Sendero Luminoso in the specific province of Huamanga, also known as Ayacucho. Here it is necessary to explore the political atmosphere of the time as it contextualizes the turbulence associated with Peruvian Politics of the time as it relates to SDT. The tumultuous political scene in the 1960s provided conditions that lead to many radical groups where the tensions between the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China resulted in fierce debates among Peruvian communists regarding the role of the party and the nature of the revolution (Poole 30). As a result, the Peruvian Communist Party split in 1964 into pro Soviet and pro Chinese parties, which were the Peruvian Communist Party Unidad (PCP-U) and the

Loebenstein 15 Peruvian Communist Party Bandera Roja (PCP-BR). The majority of national leadership and finances went with Unidad while students joined Bandera Roja. PCP-BR, led by lawyer Saturino Paredes, shaped its Maoist inspired ideology and concentrated its grievances on the semi feudal and semi colonial nature of Peruvian society. Seen from Ayacucho or the central and southern highlands, Peru according to Carlos Degregori has much that is “semi feudal.” Degregori argues that while landowners have practically disappeared, there are still local bosses with their economic base of support-commercial capital which leaves its trail of coercion and abuses (Degregori 2010, 244-5). With this they championed a “people’s war” which would move from the countryside to the city (Poole 31). The PCP-BR did not last long and a splinter group formed into Patria Roja or PCP-PR. Three years later in 1970 Guzmán led his own splinter group out of the PCP-BR to form the PCP-SL Sendero Luminoso (Poole 31). During the 1960s Guzmán had led hundreds of political meetings and discussion attracting university students from peasant families as well as women (Crenshaw 51). In contrast to other groups, the Shining Path was “committed to intensive long-term political work in the countryside” (Crenshaw 51). Divisiveness among the left is not an uncommon theme in Latin America. In Peru, this divisiveness led to the weakening of the political left. As a result peasants who may have felt isolated and desperate for change, the Shining Path provided the ideology and means for a sense of competence. In the application of Self Determination Theory on the Peruvian case, autonomy and relatedness are equally important. According to Cynthia McClintock, Peru’s southern highlands are a place where people earn little, die young, are mostly illiterate and exist usually without basic human services (59). Southern highland peasant incomes are

Loebenstein 16 significantly lower than on the coast and somewhat lower than the northern highlands (Cajamarca) or the central highlands (Junín and Pasco) (McClintock 59). Its altitude of over 12,000 feet, as well as its arid, windy and rocky terrain characterizes the southern highlands. Poverty levels in this area increased relative to the 1950s and 1960s while food consumption fell in the 70s (McClintock 59).1 In a study conducted by the Peruvian government, daily per capita intake among lower-class people throughout the country was found to have decreased from 1,934 calories per capita in 1972 to 1,486 in 1979 (a mere 63 percent of Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations’ requirements) (McClintock 59). Furthermore in the southern highlands as of 1980, individuals were at 420 calories per day (McClintock 59). In this climate it can be argued that the Shining Path’s ideology and goals created incentives for people to rise up, as it would enable autonomy and relatedness through the group that united communities. In addition, between 1968 and 1980 the military regimes under General Velasco Alvarado (1968-1975) and then under General Morales Bermúdez (1975-1980) created agricultural reforms advantageous for the peasantry on the coast but generally not in the highlands (McClintock 64). Feeling isolated and negatively affected by both Velasco’s2 agrarian reforms and by Belaunde’s3 agricultural policies between 1968 and 1980, many Peruvians in this region turned to the Shining Path to fulfill both their psychological and material needs rather than remaining in the conditions they were in.

Rational Choice Theory 1

McClintock in Why Peasants Rebel. The Case of Peru’s Sendero Luminoso analyses the various indicators of the increase in poverty in the highlands using Word Bank data (6061). 2 President and Dictator Juan Velasco Alvarado governed from 1968 to 1975 3 President Fernando Belaúnde Terry governed from 1980 to 1985

Loebenstein 17 Rational Choice theorists would argue that the actions and motivations of an individual could not be solely explained by the concept of psychological needs. They do argue psychology plays a role but emphasize humans as rational beings who make calculated decisions. Most rational choice models argue that individuals act rationally in the pursuit of what they determine to be their best interest (McDermott 50). John Scott argues that Rational Choice Theory (RCT) adopts a methodological individualist position that attempts to explain all social phenomena in terms of these rational calculations made by self-interested individuals. Scott makes the case that motivation is modeled on economic actions, that is, people are motivated by the costs and rewards of their actions thus they are fueled by possible profit. However, he also explains how some rational choice theorists have seen rationality as a result of psychological conditioning while others assume that individuals act as if they were completely rational. If applied to the Peruvian case, the obvious explanation is that Sendero offered a unique opportunity for attaining some level of power or recognition (Poole 40). For example, Sendero offered women leadership and militancy positions rather than demeaning work such as domestic services in cities such as Lima (Poole 40). The controversial aspects of RCT leads me to its weaknesses and problems in explaining terrorists groups such as the Shining Path since it fails to explain why individuals join groups or associations. More importantly, scholars have argued against the “rationality” of terrorist actions. Jeff Victoroff cites Martha Crenshaw’s warnings that the terrorist’s goals often appears extremely unlikely to be achieved by the chosen method of action and that it is consequently difficult to support a rationalist theory of terrorism (Victoroff 15).

Loebenstein 18 In this context in order to talk about SL as a terrorist group it is necessary to point out, the difficulty in defining terrorism. As this thesis refers to Shining Path members as “terrorists” who are committing terrorist acts, it is important to define the term. A concise definition of terrorism is the threat of violence and the use of fear to coerce, persuade, and gain public attention” (Rogers 173) There is also political terrorism which can be defined as the use or threat of use of violence of an individual or group, acting in ones own interest or by an established authority, in order to create anxiety or fear for a group as well as the immediate victims with the purpose of forcing this group to cede to the political demands of the perpetrators (Rogers 2008). This definition allows for an understanding of the Shining Path and in the light of RCT, it allows us to see how terrorism could be considered irrational. Additionally Victoroff has argued that the inhumanity of civilian attacks also challenges the notion of “rational” behavior (15). Thus the application of RCT on the Peruvian case reinforces the idea that the peasants of the southern highlands, as self interested individuals were motivated by the costs and rewards of their actions even though the theories weakness is its inability to classify violent terrorist acts as “rational.” Furthermore, since rationality does not require that the decision maker to have the complete information the outcome may or may not be in the individual’s self interest (McDermott 51).

Prospect Theory

Loebenstein 19 Psychological theories of decision-making have also focused on Prospect Theory, which has proved influential and important in political science and political psychology. Developed by psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (1979) Prospect Theory “is a psychological theory of decision making under conditions of risk” as it weighs potential loss (McDermott 69). In this theory, the editing phase, frames the effects or how the decisions are presented while the second phase evaluates how choices are made (McDermott 69). In this theory “framing” refers to how options are presented, which is important since decisions can be affected by the “method, order or manner of presentation” (McDermott 70). Tversky established that people demonstrate a natural aversion to extreme situations or options, which is why by creating one more extreme option he was able to encourage a decision maker to choose the middle option that had previously seemed unacceptable without the contrast effect of the even more extreme additional option (McDermott 70). The second phase or evaluation involves a value function and a weighing function. More importantly, Prospect Theory has been applied to a variety of political science uses such as loss aversion, the status quo bias, framing issues, deterrence and bargaining negotiations, and American foreign policy (McDermott 73). The theory has however encountered many problems such as its failure to delineate some of the underlying mechanisms of framing effects, its applicability to group interactions, and it weakness in the notion of the reference point to where the status quo is. Using Prospect Theory sheds light on a particular issue of the Peruvian case, which concerns how choices seemed to be framed for many of the individuals who decided to join the Shining Path. Was it economic desperation, was it the lesser of two

Loebenstein 20 evils, was it a way to be heard politically, was it vengeance, or was it forced upon them? Did peasants and students who joined have a choice or where their choices somehow framed by the leaders of Sendero such as Guzmán and his Central Committee? This theory, even with its clearest weaknesses such as its failure to delineate the underlying mechanisms of framing effects, its inapplicability to group interactions and the difficulties in terms of defining the status quo, does shed light on the idea that perhaps the Shining Path or the government unintentionally or intentionally framed the choices available to many Peruvians. Through the “framing” of choices, this theory is helpful to understanding the notion that those susceptible to Sendero may have been manipulated through framing as choices were presented in more radical ways. If the options available to people were radicalized or reduced it is possible to see how some may have interpreted their situation as dire and acted upon their perception and or feeling of disparity. Thus, for some, joining the Shining Path may have been due to a feeling of reduced choice as Prospect theory illustrates. It may be then through this narrow frame that leans towards the PCP-SL that people found the Shining Path to achieve their psychological needs. Prospect Theory in some ways attempts to explain the radical or extreme options available to people which may hint at why some chose SL to fulfill their needs rather than remain in their then current conditions. Similarly to Prospect theory, an approach coined by professor of psychology and director of the Georgetown Conflict Resolution Program, Fathali M. Moghaddam focuses on the social and psychological processes that lead to terrorists’ acts. This theory provides for an alternative interpretation of the idea that choices or options are framed and as situations progress the choices or in this case doors seem to close for an individual. To

Loebenstein 21 explain this, Moghaddam envisions a narrowing stairway leading to a terrorist act at the top of a building (70). The stairway leads to higher floors and whether people remain on a particular door depends on the doors and spaces people perceive available to them on that floor (Moghaddam 70). The further one climbs, the fewer choices one sees until the “the only possible outcome is the destruction of others, or oneself, or both” (Moghaddam 70). The ground floor of this spatial metaphor relates to the multiple psychological interpretations of the material conditions. Moghaddam explains how poverty and lack of education are problematic explanations and that research suggests that the perception of said deprivation is even more important (70). The perception of deprivation can be individualistic or fraternal. Next is the first floor, embodying the perceived option to fight unfair treatment. Here the individual may or may not perceive possibilities for personal mobility to improve their situation as well as perceptions of procedural justice. If no doors are available they climb to the second floor, which Moghaddam labels the floor of the displacement of aggression. Moghaddam emphasizes the Freudian view that leaders play a critical role in redirecting negative emotions within a group to others outside (73). The targets of this displacement are not random, rather “dissimilar outsiders” who become a threat for the in-group cohesion (Moghaddam 73). The redirection of emotions of the individual by a group adds to the concept of the annihilation of the individual: the consumption of the individual by the group dynamics. When coupled with culture this argument could be perceived as racist as it would illustrate how terrorist groups are produced in specific cultures group dynamics and environments. Next is the third floor, also labeled as “moral engagement” as it represent the floor where recruits can be persuaded in their commitment to the morality of the terrorist organization as it would

Loebenstein 22 justify ‘the struggle’ to achieve their idealized society (Moghaddam 74). By the same token, the fourth floor creates a categorical ‘us versus them’ worldview providing the individual little opportunity to leave with their life (Moghaddam 74). Lastly, on the fifth and final floor the point of view that the organizations acts of violence against civilians are justified since civilians are part of the enemy as they do not actively oppose the enemy (Moghaddam 75). This “stairway approach” considers terrorism as a moral problem with a base in psychology and argues that the main challenge in fighting terrorism is to prevent the disaffected youth and others from becoming engaged in the morality of terrorist organizations. By defining terrorism as a moral issue, Moghaddam warns against the contemporary tendency to solve social issues with technology and the necessity to focus policy on the problems at the bottom of the staircase instead of those who have already committed terrorist acts (77). This approach is relevant to the Peruvian case in that the classification of steps towards a terrorist act may begin to explain why the Shining Path initially chose to expand their movement through education towards an isolated population who would more likely perceive closed doors. Using this kind of approach to determine why people commit a terrorist act does not necessarily explain why people join the group to begin with. Another weakness to this approach is that it rests on the subjective individual perception of closed or open doors.

Group Motivation and Collective Action i. Subsistence Crisis and Peasant Revolutions

Loebenstein 23 Theories on individual motivation are not enough to explain the motives of those who joined Sendero. The link between individual motivators whether rationally based or need based is key in understanding group actions. Since the origins of the Shining Path are established in Ayacucho and its peasantry, an analysis of group actions is necessary to understand their motivations. Literature on subsistence threat and peasant revolution by scholars such as James Scott, Samuel Popkin and Theda Skocpol also contribute to this kind of understanding. James Scott focuses on subsistence crises as the root elements in revolutionary movements while Samuel Popkin doubts the relationship between subsistence threat or decline and collective response. Popkin argues that the perception of crisis by peasants changes as the social and political contexts change. Skocpol believes that one should concentrate on the political world around the peasants and less on the socioeconomic circumstances (McClintock 58). She argues that it would be impossible to empirically document deprivation since grievances are more or less a constant of peasant life and that even when a certain group of peasants are unusually deprived, their deprivation level is subjective (Id. 58). On the other hand, in her article Why Peasants Rebel: The Case of Peru’s Sendero Luminoso, Cynthia McClintock demonstrates the high correlation between the subsistence crisis or the peasant’s perception of the crisis in Peru and rural peasant protest. Her main arguments are that (a) a subsistence crisis was very important in the Peruvian case and (b) that the type of agrarian structure that was most conductive to revolutionary activity was in this case that Ayacuchan peasants who were mobilized by the Shining Path guerillas were predominantly smallholders and relatively unintegrated into the capitalist market economy.

Loebenstein 24 Furthermore, McClintock argues that if the state plays an active role in agricultural policy making and a subsistence crisis occurs, then the peasantry is likely to blame the government’s policies. During Fernando Belaúnde Terry’s government in 1980, key agricultural policies-land tenure and terms of trade-turned against the peasantry from all geographical areas. The price of potatoes, a key produce in the highlands, also fell drastically during Belaúnde’s government (McClinktock 68). More importantly for the applicability of the peasant rebellion theory, there has been no government in Peru to favor southern highland peasants. In 1977, for example, the agrarian area that benefited the least was Ayacucho. There the value of property was 4,900 soles per family compared to 162,288 in Lima, 108,580 in Ica, 105,317 in Lambayeque, 62,171 in Puno, and 10,074 in Cuzco (McClintock 66). Furthermore, between 1970 and 1990 there was an increase of cases of chronic malnutrition from 985,700 to 5,753,600 out of a total population of 22 million (Poole 23). The southern highlands are almost exclusively agricultural in an area ill suited for it. McClintock makes sure to address additional factors that might have contributed to the peasant’s perception of the crisis such as population growth, which is directly tied to the scarcity of land, and its problems with erosion. Overall McCLintock points out that the relationship between the subsistence crisis in Peru and the rural peasant’s perception of crisis is critical in understanding the uprising by Sendero. Her view helps explain the perception of crisis in the highlands but her conclusions do not distinguish between communities that rebelled and those who did not. Additionally the separation between the work force and the intellectuals within Sendero is critical as leads us to understand differences in motivation. As the rank and file includes the indigenous both Andean and Amazonian, women and children, it makes up

Loebenstein 25 the largest sector of Senderistas. It is however, SDT that best describes this majority category as it answers why some Peruvians joined the government forces to fight Sendero Luminoso rather than join the ranks of the terrorists.

ii. Agrarian Reform In Peru, geopolitics is important to understand agrarian reform. McClintock addresses this point and emphasizes the Shining Path revolt took place after a major agrarian reform. She suggests this case adds to Scott’s argument, which focuses on subsistence crises as fundamental in revolutionary movements. The Ayacucho area is specific in that it is remote but also has a university. The University of San Cristóbal de Huamanga in Ayacucho, was re founded in 1959 after almost three hundred years and created a means for young university-educated radicals to forge a working alliance with the peasantry in Ayacucho (McClintock 50). Along with Velasco’s agrarian reform, which had a minimal effect in the southern highlands, Ayacucho’s political space was expanded allowing the peasantry to become more and more politicized. Political space or the social, economic and electoral issues within a certain time period in a country’s politics is a term that contextualizes the tumultuous atmosphere of the rising left in Peru. The key debate in peasant revolution literature question what kind of group is more disposed to insurrection. The groups include landless rural wage earners or peasant smallholders. The literature inquires which of these peasants’ lives are most disrupted by the intrusion of capitalism and are therefore most inclined to rebel (McClintock 58). Jeffery Paige has argued for landless rural wage earners while James Scott and Eric Wolf

Loebenstein 26 maintain that smallholders, more likely living in isolation or cohesive villages, retain precapitalist values making them more inclined towards resistance (McClintock 73). On the other hand, Theda Skocpol agrees with Wolff on the importance of peasant autonomy to revolutionary actions but suggests that the issue of agrarian structure is irrelevant (McClintock 74). These debates as well as McClintock’s contribution to Scott’s argument make a strong case for the correlation between the subsistence crisis and the peasant rebellion starting in Ayacucho. Although the article provides a convincing argument for the highlands, it does not address why Peruvians in other geographic areas also joined Sendero. The theory fails to address that not all Shining Path militants were peasants from the southern highlands and even though it provides evidence for the subsistence crisis throughout the country and mainly in the highlands, it does not connect the diversity of militant profiles. For this reason the typology separating the “work force” and the intellectuals helps with the applicability of a theory like this to specific subgroups to the masses, specifically the highland peasants. When discussing revolutionary actions such as McClintock’s peasant revolt theory, it is helpful to review Schwartz’s concept of revolutionary identity. He states that beyond alienation and anger, revolutionary identity involves the following: total commitment to revolutionary change, desperation, the enemy as inhumane and conspiratorial, the development of divergent or revisionist interpretations of history developed (so it appears that the enemy was inhuman, history becomes a collection of past wrongs, which the revolutionary must right), individuals are self-righteous because of the purity of ones motives and the monumental character of ones struggle, one is selfrighteous because one appeals to higher values than the law and order of the system and

Loebenstein 27 finally the enemy of the enemy becomes a friend (Schwartz 242-43). Overall, it is not just the perception of crisis and agrarian reforms that played a role in determining who decided to join the Shining Path but is was also the desperation, as Schwartz outlines in his concept of revolutionary identity.

Group process theories Theories of group process include a psychological approach that explains terrorism “as the product of group psychology within idiosyncratic subcultures that coalesce in reaction to circumstances they perceive intolerable” (Victoroff 30). Such group forces that incite violence through ideological indoctrination, repetitive training or peer pressure are hypothesized to influence individuals’ behavior within a group whether or not the members had been predisposed to violent behavior (Victoroff 30). According to Jeff Victoroff this may be because “the collective identity subsumes individual identity” (30). However, the principle debate between individual and group actions centers on whether the groups dynamics are sufficient to turn an average person into a terrorist or whether individual history or personality factors into the equation (Victoroff 30). In the case of Peru this argument hints at the fact that Sendero Luminoso in some ways subsumed the identity of the individual, allowing for a depersonalization of individuality. Terrorism is not solely a group phenomenon but rather the result of social processes, which interact with individuals and their dispositions towards these movements (Victoroff 31). Victoroff proposes three conditions: intense deprivation, ideologized group discontent, the in group as cohesive and clearly differentiated from the out group, where the individuals’ tendency for violence is a minor factor in the group’s terrorist

Loebenstein 28 turning procedure (31). If the Shining Path group identity swallowed up individuals then it would still not explain why certain people became members and others did not. Although this theory bridges the idea of individuals with group action, in order to understand the Shining Path it is necessary to examine the principles of individuals with common interest which brings us to collective action theories. These same individualistic principles are why this chapter leans towards Self Determination Theory and how the Shining Path provided missing psychological and material needs for the majority of the indigenous as well as students in Peru at the time.

Collective Action Providing insight on when individuals act collectively, in his book The Logic of Collective Action, Mancur Olson argues that if members of a specific group have a common interest or objective, and if they would all be better off it that objective was achieved, then if the individuals in this group are rational and self interested, they will act to achieve that objective (Lupia and Gisela 315). He argues that people naturally join groups but that the main problem with collective action includes incentives to “free ride4.” That is, the benefit from the efforts of others if a group is working to provide public goods5. Free riding can be avoided if the group only provides benefits to active

4

The common example to explain this concept in political science has to do with pollution. For example if each of us pollutes less by paying a bit extra for our cars then we all benefit from the reduction of harmful gasses and cleaner air. In this case we take clean air to be a collective good. However less pollution is not as important for everyone so some people may not contribute their share. Someone may be a free rider on the beneficial actions of others. This is one of the problems of collective action. 5 public goods are non-excludable goods (one person cannot prevent another from consuming the good; ie air) but also non-rivalrous (a persons consumption does not affect another’s’)

Loebenstein 29 participants. Furthermore the size of the group matters in that large groups will face high organizational costs whereas small groups will face relatively low costs. Insurgencies, social movements dissidents and guerillas serve as the major descriptors of those actors we must look at when applying collective action principles to terrorism. In his article, Explaining Terrorism: The Contribution of Collective Action Theory, Anthony Oberschall highlights four major dimensions of the theory applied to terrorism. He stresses that “terrorism is not the act of madmen or of political and religious sociopaths but of political agents who choose covert, violent means to achieve political goals, be they ethno national, religious, or ideological” (27). Oberschall considers collective action dimensions since he also proposes that one has to explain why a small group chooses to break from or differentiate from a larger political movement with similar political goals and often with less violent (sometimes nonviolent), or more conventional means (Oberschall 28). The first dimension of collective action Oberschall considers important is that of widespread discontent and dissatisfaction for which the usual means of relief are thought to be lacking. The second involves ideology or belief systems spread widely in a population, which frames discontent into legitimate grievances. The ideology holds political leaders and elites responsible, transforms discontent into grievances, legitimizes a change or reform sought as a remedy for problems, and justifies violent means. The third is the capacity to organize or in other words mobilization through recruitment, fundraising, leadership, internal communication, and decision-making. The last dimension is that of political opportunity or public opinion support, political allies, a favorable international climate, and in the case of terrorism, support and sponsorship on

Loebenstein 30 or on the contrary, the loss of such opportunities. This kind of interpretation of collective action allows us to look at the Peruvian case through each dimension; discontent, grievances, organizational capacity, and political opportunity. These lenses of collective action show the importance of deeply rooted ethnic divisions that define social and economic structures as well as the exploitation of the Indian. The grievances that stem from these legacies, combined with the historical and culturally embedded stigma against the indigenous allowed for the mobilization of collective action in the highlands. Education inspired by Senderistas working at the UNSCH may have been a way out for this discontent

i. Discontent When looking at Peru through the Oberschall’s dimension of discontent we must look first to socio economics. As defined by the World Bank, the socioeconomic structure of Peru is one of the most unequal in Latin America. At the base of Peru’s history are semi feudal structures and colonial Spanish legacies that create a vast inequality between the population on the coast and the more distant population such as the Andean highlands. The socioeconomic disparities in Peru come from these old structures and are reinforced through stigmas that cover ethnicity, language, education, and poverty. The semi feudal nature comes from the legacies of the Spanish colonizers. This semi feudality is expressed in the landlordism and slavery in which capitalism and imperialism is developed (Granados 168). José Carlos Mariátegui, a Peruvian journalist, political philosopher and activist introduced this idea in the 1930s for the PCP-SL (Granados 168). Mariátegui, the founder of the Socialist Party of Peru (1928) is known for his Seven

Loebenstein 31 Interpretive Essays on Peruvian Reality (1928) where he attempts to create a bridge from Marxism to the Peruvian reality. In his vision the peasantry carried the major weight of slavery especially during the historic exploitation of natural minerals all throughout the country. He further highlighted the importance of the “problem of the Indian” by considering it a problem with and of the land (García 89). Coined by Mariátegui, this stigma known as el problema del indio has been one of the most talked about themes in sociology, anthropology, and Peruvian politics.6 Similarly to the semifeudal structure described, a second measure of discontent could also be attributed to colonial legacies. The historical divisions of Peru in “republics” (one for Indians and another for Spaniards) as well as the system of curacas7 and repartimientos8 created social and economic divisions that persisted until colonial times (Starn 1995). The curacas were part of the indigenous nobility that the Spanish designated authority to where they controlled manual labor for workers especially in agriculture and mining. The repartimientos served to systematize forced labor where Indians would work and undetermined amount of years for the Spanish. It is critical to mention this part of Peruvian history since these structures have created deeply rooted cultural and ethnic divisions. All the colonial economic and social structures were based on the exploitation of the Indian.

ii. Ideological grievances 6

Similarily to Mariátegui, the famous Peruvian novelist, poet and anthropologist José María Arguedas was also considered part of the South American Indigenista movement. His main novels which expand on the clash between Western civilization and the indigenous way of life include the following: Yawar fiesta (1941), Los ríos profundos (1958), 1964 Todas las sangres, and El zorro de arriba y el zorro de abajo (1969). 7 Position of authority over Indians during the colonial period 8 Colonial Spanish system of forced labor that was later replaced by “encomiendas”

Loebenstein 32 It is important to mention how differences in ethnicity are described since this leads to inequality and the base for some of the ideology-feeding grievances. Theoretically ethnicity is defined through race, language, religion and place of origin (Figueroa e Barron 2005). Language is only partially representative of ethnicity in Peru given that some descendants of indigenous people only speak indigenous languages but Spanish is common even in regions that had pre-colonial civilizations (Figueroa e Barron 2005). Another insufficient indicator would be religion. Peru is about 95 percent Catholic, which includes all kinds of ethnicities (Figueroa e Barron 2005). Because of the limitations in language and religion, it is necessary to analyze ethnicity in Peru by place of origin. The division of ethnic groups, the casta system, in Peru is described by academics as unjust therefore it feeds grievances in lower economic sectors such as the indigenous. Ethnicity in Peru can be simplified into three groups; white people, mixed people also known as mestizos and indigenous people. White people are mainly found in Lima and larger cities in Provinces. Mestizos are in all parts and Indians are normally in very rural areas. Figueroa and Barron argue that to distinguish between these three categories one can highlight three natural regions. The capital Lima can be divided in two areas, central Lima where a majority of white people live and the periphery where a majority of the immigrants live. The Andean region can be divided into the southern Andes where Quechua and Aymara are spoken and the central and northern Andes where Spanish dominates Quechua. The last region is comprised of the Amazonian area (Figueroa e Barron 2005). These divides are evident not only in the socioeconomic disparity that comes with the more indigenous Peruvians but also through the stigmas

Loebenstein 33 associated with the indigenous. These historically rooted divides are now represented in these stigmas but also in the struggle found in the novels of indigenistas. As previously mentioned the serranos also known as andinos or people from the Andes in English are the most stigmatized in this hierarchal society. Those born in the Amazon are also strongly stigmatized although the indigenous people from the coast are slightly better off and called costeños.9 Those from Lima or the periphery are seen as limeños and have the highest status. These stigmas are well known across Peru but not particularly talked about. The literacy levels are lower in the Andean regions, education is worse, sanitary conditions are poor, and people suffer from extreme poverty. The tie between ethnicity and prosperity or opportunity in Peru leads to grievances that are publicly but for the most part privately expressed. The Shining Path became an opportunity to express this. Equally important to this idea of grievances stemming, the psychology of cause approach deals with the immediacy of death and how group values become stronger, the closer the threat of death is. Cultural values can include nationality, family, religion and more (McCauley19). According to McCauley, dozens of experiments have shown that thinking about death-especially their own-leads people to embrace the values of their culture more strongly. Their values do not have to be explicitly religious. Many of the terrorist groups since World War II have been radical-socialist groups with purely secular roots: the Red Brigade in Italy, the Baader-Meinhoff Gang in Germany, the Shining Path in Peru, the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka (19). Under this reasoning, the Shining Path members may have been strongly inclined towards terrorism through cultural values such a shared indigenous identity that intensified with the violence the armed forces and police used against the indigenous 9

In Spanish: people from the coast

Loebenstein 34 during the 1980s. The widespread national fear could have a direct link to the intensification of a population’s cultural values as well as the anti state sentiments stemming from the state’s responsibility for injustices in Peruvian society represented in Sendero’s ideology. The indigenous identity as a regional one could also have furthered anti state sentiments, another form of an ideological grievance. iii. Capacity to organize: Mobilization and Political Opportunity In the context of the rural city of Ayacucho, Obershall’s last two dimensions of collective action applied to terrorism are important. These include the capacity to organize and political opportunity. Political movements in the 1980s created a movement inspired first of all in education since populations wanted to recover free education that had been eliminated during Velasco’s government. They wanted a kind of democracy against the mistis10 and the local leaders, as well as to find a kind of justice and their place in the national society (Degregori 2010). For the indigenous peasantry, education served as a way out of these colonial legacies. In terms of political opportunity, the Shining Path used el problema del indio and all the associated stigmas as the base of their political arguments to mobilize the highland population.

Pyschology of crisis may lead to

understanding political opportunity for the marginalized indigenous of Peruvian society. Psychology of crisis observes the apocalyptic worldview of terrorists in that the balance between good and evil hangs on their actions (McCauley 21). This kind of mentality leads to “end times” or the millenarian idea that “when it is ten minutes to midnight, there is little to lose and everything to gain” (McCauley 21). Comparatively, the psychology of the slippery slope is similar in that it discuses the sense of crisis although it differs in that it asserts that a crisis is the end of a long trajectory. Sprinzak 10

Mestizos

Loebenstein 35 (1991) has distinguished three stages in this trajectory: a confidence crisis, in which a group critically protests and demonstrates against the prevailing political system yet accepts the system’s values; a legitimacy conflict, in which the group looses confidence in reform and presses for a competing ideological and cultural system while moving to angry protest and small-scale violence; and a legitimacy crisis, in which the group embraces terrorist violence against the government (McCauley 20-21). The metaphor of the slippery slope implies the dangerous effects of a person joining an extreme group or a group that gradually turns this way since the extremity is augmented through very small steps which leads to the individual not realizing ever having made an explicit choice. In terms of the Shining Path, this could illustrate the common Latin American norm of believing that his or her actions were not at all radical rather the correct path towards justice against the oppressing and corrupt society. The dire need for a new kind of democracy was considered a crisis for the Peruvian indigenous and even leftists students at the time. These ideas highlight the political opportunity SL had using crisis as a tool for mobilizing not only the indigenous but also the intellectuals. In this sense Sendero attempted to show how by joining them, how the much needed new system of justice would be better than the present system of inequality.

Social Identity Theory Allison Smith describes Social Identity Theory, another dominant social psychological theory that addresses group behavior (Smith 58). The theory distinguishes between personal identities, which define individuals in relation to other individuals, and social identities, which define individuals in terms of their membership in significant

Loebenstein 36 categories and groups (Smith 58). In her article Smith describes how Tajfel and Turner, in their article “The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup behavior,” argue that membership in political or social groups becomes salient to individuals who experience a process of depersonalization (58). In other words, they begin to view themselves as interchangeable members of the whole group instead of as individuals (Smith 58). Similar to Victoroff’s point on group process theories, they emphasize that group membership effects group member’s behavior towards others inside and outside the group and specifically the tendency towards out-group hostility or derogation as well as favoring those within the group (Smith 58). Although different in its approach, early Freudian theory describes group behavior through the role that instincts or motives play on its behavior (Smith 58). In Civilization and Its Discontents as well as Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, Freud ‘argues that participating in a group allows members to express the two basic human instincts” (Smith 58). These instincts are that of life which aim to bind things together and that of death which tear things apart. Furthermore, Freud believed the group provided members with their need for connection to others but that the existence of external enemies also facilitated out-group aggression. In brief, both Freud’s theory of group psychology and Social Identity theory focus on the tendency of groups to privilege their own members and express out-group hostility or aggression (Smith 50). Furthermore, Smith explores terrorist dynamics through a quantitative content analysis of documents issued by 13 different terrorist groups and non-terrorist comparison groups. Her study concludes that “compared to non-terrorist counterparts, terrorist groups expressed significantly higher levels of in-group affiliation motive

Loebenstein 37 imagery in both the gull and indicator samples” (69). Furthermore, indicating that affiliation motive of terrorist groups is more focused on the creation of an ‘us’ while the comparison groups were more focused on blurring the lines between the ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Smith 69). In summary, these theories shed light on the possibility that the Shining Path group membership provided for an extremely cohesive structure, allowing for a depersonalization effect. By indoctrinating militants with a fatalist sense of their lives, Abimael Guzmán was able to perpetuate his idea of cuota de sangre11, which the population had to pay in order for the Shining Path’s struggle to triumph. This also tied into the millenarian aspect of Sendero and how this idea allows for the further radicalization of the militants. Finally, the militaristic and ideological training given to Shining Path members created extreme in-group cohesion. This allows for the application of theories regarding the hostile treatment towards out-group individuals.

Political Islands: Terrorist Motivations Having looked at the variety of theories that address individual motivations as well as collective or group action and their applications on the Peruvian case, we now turn to look at the act of terrorism itself. As individuals choose this path for specific reasons and as group dynamics come into play, we must look at the theories and scholarly work of terrorist action itself. As previously mentioned, the search for an adequate definition of terrorism is still debated among academics. Reaching a scholarly consensus is difficult considering the breadth of the definitions available. This thesis does not 11

In English: price in blood. A concept mentioned on the first take of the abbreviated Truth and Reconciliation (CVR) report (page 7).

Loebenstein 38 attempt to place Sendero Luminoso in any particular definition of terrorism but it does however intent to explore theories of terrorist motivations in order to understand the driving forces behind Sendero. The lenses through which terrorism can be viewed are useful in understanding the Peruvian case. These psychological approaches to understanding terrorism include hatred and anger, normal psychology, psychology of cause, psychology of comrades, psychology of crisis, the slippery slope approach, the staircase approach and many others.

Approaches to Understanding Terrorism i. Anger The belief that anger helps us understand terrorist behavior leads to the separation of anger into two definitions. The first defines anger as the emotional reaction to an insult or to something, which someone takes offense. The second emerges from animal experiments where anger and frustration are the emotional reactions to pain (McCauley 16). Terrorists are not necessarily angry about personal frustration but they are also perhaps irritated by the insults or frustrations the group as a whole has suffered (McCauley 17). McCauley argues that group identification is the foundation of intergroup conflict, especially for large groups, where free riding probably maximizes selfinterest (17). This approach to terrorism highlights the fact that many of the members of the Shining Path were created and recruited from the poorest areas of the country that may have felt highly discriminated against and insulted by their own government. Furthermore, the “dirty war” fought by the government forces, which include the armed

Loebenstein 39 forces, the police and the auto defense committees were responsible for 28.73% of disappearances and deaths (CVR Fascículo 1, pp3). Thus, these deaths and disappearances committed by the state against civilians could easily have sparked motives, stemming from anger, and sympathy towards Sendero’s cause. Anger in the case of the Peruvians also plays a role in why people joined even though this cannot solely explain why all members joined the Shining Path. Anger is only one element to the explanation of how Sendero provided for the realization of psychological needs according to Self Determination Theory.

ii. Normal Psychology In another vision of terrorism, McCauley argues, “terrorists emerge out of normal psychology of emotional commitment to cause and comrades” (14). In this view terrorist ideology combined with small group dynamics and solidarity for comrades allows for violent action. The trajectory by which normal people become capable of doing terrible things is gradual. Simplistically, terrorists kill for the same reasons that groups such as groups have killed other groups for centuries (McCauley 19). The cause worth dying for combines with a strong ideology and intense group dynamics is what differentiates terrorists from independence e movements and rebellions for example. The cause that is worth killing and dying for is a personal one within a world view that makes sense of life and death, linking the individual in the terrorist group to some form of immortality (McCauley18-19 in Bongar 2007). This approach to terrorism is helpful for the Peruvian case in that it embraces the ideology that Guzmán was able to indoctrinate in Shining Path members and points out

Loebenstein 40 the close relationship to the group that was necessary to reach this. It is also closely linked with the psychology of comrades’ approach, which simply clarifies the power of underground groups. Since underground cells have put the group first in their lives, they have reduced other human connections, which expands the power of the group in terms of morals and judgments (McCauley 20). The power of isolating members from a group is not as powerful since many groups like Sendero separate individuals from the rest of the group. Furthermore, violence against the enemy becomes a necessity when a group is isolated. It not only separates them from groups with competing values but it also justifies the violence for the members (McCauley 20). Not all groups are typically underground and the Shining Path did not require all members to abandon their families or communities; on the contrary, they wanted their militants to fit into the rest of society unnoticed. However, even when underground members are dispersed into society or another country, there are two arguments for how intense group dynamics are maintained. The first argues that physical dispersal is not the same as developing connections to a group outside the terrorist group and the second is that group dynamics can be less important than the underlying cause or ideologies feeding the group (McCauley 20). Viewing the Shining Path through the lens of normal psychology allows us to see the leadership’s role in making the rank and file feel like their cause was worth killing and dying for. Guzmán is central in this discussion as his ideology provides the link which allows individuals to feel that they are part of a group representing something larder than themselves (McDermott 143). This process of which normal Peruvians become capable of killing is inherently tied to how the ideology of Sendero guards their own conceptions

Loebenstein 41 of identity. It is thus that SDT further clarifies how the Shining Path provided for these people’s psychological needs such as and identity through a shared ideology in this case.

Conclusion In conclusion, the case of Sendero Luminoso in Peru highlights many of the aspects presented in the vast amount of psychological and political theories on why individuals or groups join or choose violence as a means of action. Each theory or approach presented can clarify aspects of the frame that shapes the motivation of the various subgroups the Shining Path. The division between the intellectuals and the “work force” allows us to concentrate on SDT as a more individualized theory, which encompasses the possible motivations of the majority, that is to say the bulk of the Senderistas. This thesis will argue how the Shining Path, as a group provided for these psychological needs of those who joined. Joining would provide for a better alternative to daily life. Now that we have examined theories, it will take careful assessment of the political and historical process to determine what kinds of people joined the Shining Path and why. The next chapter will attempt to explain how socio-economic reasons, historical repression, colonial legacies, and especially lack of state presence are all factors that made the Andean highland peasants and certain isolated communities susceptible to Sendero.

A Country Divided: History’s Role in Peru’s System of Inequalities

Loebenstein 42 This chapter will concentrate on the historical, political and social environment of Peru. Establishing this foundation, this chapter aims to explain the reasons behind why certain kinds of people may have been vulnerable and motivated to join the Shining Path. Socio-economic reasons, historical repression, lack of state presence, and colonial legacies are all factors that made the Andean highland peasants and certain isolated communities susceptible to Sendero. Deprivation, the dominant theme in psychology and terrorism literature is commonly used to explain why people rebel or choose terrorism. Moghaddam highlights the importance of the perception of a crisis or deprivation while McClintock talks about subsistence crises leading to revolts. However, as we have already seen in our closer look at terrorism theory, it is important to note that terrorism is not solely explained by deprivation. Since deprivation occurs in many countries it is not enough to conclude that deprivation in rural areas leads to peasant revolts or terrorism. Both Moghaddam and McClintock emphasized what Peruvian history repeats time after time. In other words the rural highlands populated by indigenous people have been marginalized not only culturally and economically but also politically throughout the history of the republic. When looking at the overall picture of a country it is also important to analyze its history, legacies and racial or cultural tensions as it clarifies grievances that people may have or perceive to have. These conditions of inequality for the highland peasants stem from the colonial legacies, semi feudal structures and inequalities that this chapter will explore to contextualize the rise of the Shining Path in specific areas as an alternative to the previous system of authority found in the highlands. To do this, first a brief review of colonial history is necessary to understand the legacies of inequality, which provided

Loebenstein 43 space for Sendero to assert a new moral order that would in theory benefit those who suffered the most.

The colonial legacies of inequality as well as the power of

dictatorships explained in this section will help in the understanding of the discontent of many Peruvians. This element of discontent will provide for a contextualization as well as an explanation of how space for Sendero came about. Furthermore, it contextualizes how rural communities were not protected by the state and therefore needed extra governmental systems of order and justice, which Sendero provided in many cases. Moreover, Self Determination Theory here provides a clear framework that explains how the Shining Path emerged as a means to fulfill the physical and psychological needs of these communities whose needs were not being addressed.

A History of Conquests and Economic Exploitation The history of Peru is typical of that of Latin American civilizations conquered by European colonizers who created vice royalties. Those in these vice royalties who wanted independence later fought for their freedom from the Spanish. This is important to understand as it contextualizes the psychical, ethnic, and economic divisions between the European descendants and the natives. It is precisely the domination of the indigenous populations that created social, economic, cultural, and racial divisions in Peruvian society. Peruvian society is characterized by national inequality on the coast, in the Amazon, in the dessert, and specifically in sierra andina. The theme of domination forms part of ancient Peruvian history, which is exemplified in the disappearances of the preColumbian (and pre Inca) Chavin culture as well as the Moche, Nazca, Chimú, Paracas and Wari cultures (Figueroa, Barrón 2005).

In the 15th century, the Inca Empire

Loebenstein 44 dominated all the territory from what would now be Ecuador all the way to Chile, an area called the Tawantinsuyu. The Spanish conquistadors such as Francisco Pizarro, attracted by the rich Inca Empire, explored the coastal regions. Pizarro arrived in Cajamarca, in the north of Peru, and captured the Inca leader Atahualpa in 1533 (Prescott 1851). Pizarro and the Spaniards took advantage of the rivalry between Atahualpa and his brother Huáscar to manipulate the political outcome and gain power. Pizarro captured the old capital of Cusco and reassigned the capital, forming the city of Lima in 1535 and eliminating all Inca resistance (Galé 2001). The influence of Spanish colonization is not only fundamental in understanding the formation of Peru as a nation but also in its social and political distribution of power planting seeds of ethnic distinctions that still present today. Taught in schools, the subjugation of the indigenous and their unsuccessful attempts of rebellion with leaders such as Manco Inca or Tupac Amaru form Peru’s history. Lima became increasingly more important politically, socially and commercially. Its commercial success was based on the labor exploitation of Indians who made up the mining and agriculture industries. This exploitation led to a short-lived revolution in 1780 by the Inca Tupac Amaru II (Brading 1991). Colonial society maintained a high level of segregation with a wide variety of racial and ethnic classifications. Later on in Peruvian history, the theme of domination continued from the Spanish until 1809 with the war of independence. Finally, with the help of revolutionaries such as Simon Bolivar and San Martín, on July 28, 1824 Peru liberated itself from Spain. With a strong past of domination and wars, Peru also demonstrated a powerful colonial legacy, which in many regions such as the Andean highlands is considered semi-

Loebenstein 45 feudal by academics. The analysis of socio economic disparities is a starting point in order to analyze Peruvian history in terms of the Shining Path. These inequalities are caused by structure imposed by the Spanish and fostered by the authorities in power, usually the criollos.12 These disparities will be analyzed in the next section in order to clarify the “discontent” associated with why some Peruvians joined the Shining Path or how this discontent motivated some to act.

Inequality in Peru: An Analysis of the Semi Feudal Structure and Colonial Legacies The Widespread discontent and need for highland peasant to fulfill their psychological needs characterizes this sector of society. The need to fulfill the psychological needs of competence, autonomy and relatedness is crucial in understanding inequality in Peru. Since the circumstances of inequality did not provide these needs, many highland peasants depending on the community power structure, joined the Shining Path. Again, it is important to remember that the division between the intellectuals and the greater mass of the Senderistas in this explanation of inequality shows how the indigenous, not the mestizo intellectuals suffered because of history’s legacies. The relationship between semi feudal structures and colonial legacies with inequality for the Andean highland peasants is immense. As defined by the World Bank, the socioeconomic structure of Peru is one of the most unequal in Latin America. At the base of Peru’s history are semi feudal structures and colonial Spanish legacies that create a vast inequality between the population on the coast and the more distant population such as the Andean highlands. The socioeconomic 12

“Criollo” in colonial times was a person with European decent, born in the Americas but is now used casually to refer to Peruvians from the coast or Lima.

Loebenstein 46 disparities in Peru come from these old structures and are reinforced through stigmas that cover ethnicity, language, education, and social class. The semi feudal nature comes from the legacies of the Spanish colonizers. This semi feudality is expressed in the landlord system as well as slavery in which capitalism and imperialism is developed (Granados 168). For the PCP-SL, José Carlos Mariátegui introduced this idea in the 1930s (Granados 168). The peasantry carried the major weight of slavery especially during the historic exploitation of natural resources throughout the country. Mariátegui highlighted the importance of the “problem of the Indian” by considering it a problem with and of the related to land (García 89). Similarly to this semifeudal structure, a second measure of discontent could also be attributed to colonial legacies. The historical divisions of Peru in “republics” (one for Indians and another for Spaniards) as well as the system of curacas13 and repartimientos14 created social and economic divisions that persisted beyond colonial times (Starn 1995). The curacas were part of the indigenous nobility that the Spanish designated authority to where they controlled manual labor for workers especially in agriculture and mining. The repartimientos served to systematize forced labor where Indians would work an undetermined amount of years for the Spanish. These historical structures have created deeply rooted cultural and ethnic divisions. All the colonial economic and social structures were based on the exploitation of the Indian. As previously mentioned in the theory discussion, ethnicity and inequality are the base for grievances that many indigenous people in Peru had. The stigma associated with the indigenous from the highlands and from the Amazon is coupled with economic 13 14

Position of authority over Indians during the colonial period Colonial Spanish system of forced labor that was later replaced by “encomiendas”

Loebenstein 47 inequality and lack of opportunity. This relationship between the inequalities associated with the “division” of Peru due to colonialism and the view of education as a means to escape these legacies is strong in Peru. Political movements in the 1980s created a movement inspired first of all in education since populations wanted to recover free education that had been eliminated during Velasco’s government. They wanted a kind of democracy against the mistis15 and the local leaders to find a kind of justice and their place in the national society (Degregori 2010). For the indigenous peasantry, education served as a way out of these colonial legacies. In terms of political opportunity, the Shining Path used el problema del indio and all the associated stigmas as the base of their political arguments to mobilize the highland population. However, it is critical to discuss why some peasants sought the Shining Path to fulfill their psychological needs and why others chose to join rondas campesinas or simply rejected the Shining Path altogether. Miguel la Serna, explains the relationship between the villages and the Peruvian State’s judicial system and how the power pacts of two small Andean villages. From his fieldwork he concludes that historically rooted and local specific power relations as well as social conflict and cultural norms play an important role in understanding the responses of the indigenous peasants toward the Shining Path. La Serna shows how in Chuschi, the power pact between the villagers and authority was broken, as they could not rely on the judicial system to provide any kind of justice. In such an environment, Sendero was able to thrive and fulfill psychological needs. On the other hand in Huaychao, the village actively opposed the Shining Path due to the fact that peasants in this village believed that their customary authority and justice system had successfully preserved the historically and culturally established power pacts, 15

Mestizos

Loebenstein 48 values and codes of conduct through the powers given to the varayoqs. This system originated in Colonial times and persisted through the republic. The Shining Path “threatened to replace what peasants viewed as an effective and just correctional system” and eventually led to these villagers creating a strong counter insurgency movement (17).

Military Governments and Dictatorships Just as in the last section, the ties between historical semi feudal structural inequalities, colonial legacies and effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the power pacts between the colonial authorities and rural villagers, this chapter also analyzes role power plays in Peru’s history. If we analyze the violent history of the conquest of the country, its primary wars and its inequality, it is also necessary to include the dichotomy between democracy and military coups. Most Peruvians see dictators and military coups as clear examples of the corrupt government structure. The history of militarisms in Peru only contributed further to this view. Subverting democracy these kinds of regimes destroyed the possibilities for democracy in Peru. Thus, it is not surprise a group such as the Shining Path used examples of corrupt leaders to propagate a need for a “new order”, especially a moral one. An analysis of the dictatorships allows for further exploration of the inequalities faced by the highland communities within an already very stratified and unequal country. Peru has had not only dictators such as Riva-Agüero and Bolívar but also Leguía, Sánchez-Cerro, Benavides, Odría, Velasco and Fujimori. These dictatorships have been impediments to the tradition of political parties (Morote 2001). Political parties are weak in Peru, partially due to their lack of tradition. The violent history between dictatorships

Loebenstein 49 and democracy forms part of what many Peruvians resent and the theme that political parties or revolutionary groups such as the Shining Path cite in order to gain more support. In his 2001 article, Herbert Morote demonstrates that half of the twenty-two democratic governments in Peru in its one hundred and eighty years of independence have been deposed by military coups.16 The average age of democratic governments is three to seven months (Morote 2001). He further argues that since 1904 there have not been more than two democratic governments that have completed their legal mandate (Morote 2001). The militarisms constitute part of what the Peruvian population has suffered but it has much more to do with the political factions that emerged in the 1980s allowing space for groups such as the PCP-SL. The left and mostly communist groups emerged with the resentment of dictatorships and began to win support with radical proposals that appealed to many citizens, especially those marginalized by previous governments. The marginalization are directly related to agriculture and affect the highlands most of all. Between 1968 and 1980, the military regimes first under General Velasco (1968-1975) and then under Genreal Morales Bermúdez (1975-1980) set agricultural policies (McClintock 64). These were advantageous for the peasants of the coast but not of the highlands. Furthermore during Fernando Belaúnde Terry’s government in 1980 agricultural policies such as land tenure and terms of trade turned against peasants all together (McClintock 64). More importantly, it is critical to note that no government in the history of Peru has ever “allocated substantial public investment to the projects 16

Examples include Agusto Bernardino Leguía’s oncenio in reference to his eleven years (1919-1930) of power, Luis Miguel Sánchez Cerro (1931-1933), Manuel A. Odría (1948-1956), Juan Velasco Alvarado (1968-1975), Francisco Morales Bermúdez (1975-1980) and finally Alberto Fujimori’s auto-coup (1992-2000) (Morote 2001).

Loebenstein 50 favored by agronomists for the southern highlands” (McClintock 64). These kinds of inequalities propagated by the corrupt governments only added to the appeal of the leftists groups, usually headed by intellectuals or students during the 1970s. The rise of these groups and especially communism are essential to understanding the origins and the formation of the Shining Path within the historical, cultural and ethnic and political environment of Peru.

Universities: Birthplace of the Peruvian Left and the PCP This section will explore the rise of these groups in terms of the communist influence in Peru and especially its role in the University system exploited by the Shining Path. Throughout the 20th century, Peru has had a variety of declared leftist groups the largest being the Communist Party of Peru (PCP) or Partido Comunista Peruano in Spanish. In this time period the leftists groups used the “PCP” symbol to mean “Partido Comunista Peruano” and each group added additional letters to distinguish themselves ideologically from one another. The first of these groups was the Socialist Party of Peru, which would later be renamed Partido Comunista Peruano, founded by José Carlos Mariátegui, one of the most influential Peruvian intellectuals of the 20 th century. The PCP remained secondary in Peruvian Politics until the 1960s with the ideological dispute between the Chinese and the Soviet Union that led to the fragmentation of communism. In Peru this global division of communism had serious consequences. The multiple factions of communism in Peru are critical to understanding the formation of PCP-SL. In the first place, it is necessary to contextualize communism in the international and Latin American spectrum. The polarized world during the cold war years had three

Loebenstein 51 main groups, which included those in favor of the United States, those in favor of the Soviet Union, and those without alliances. Countries without alliances were called “group 77” whose protective leader was China. Here is it important to reemphasize the 1964 split between the Soviet Union and China. The Peruvian Communist Party split in 1964 into pro Soviet and pro Chinese parties, the Peruvian Communist Party Unidad (PCP-U) and the Peruvian Communist Party Bandera Roja (PCP-BR). The majority of national leadership and finances went with Unidad while students joined Bandera Roja. The working class and unions dominated the Soviet party while the peasantry, students and Maoists characterized the PCP-BR. PCP-BR shaped its Maoist inspired ideology and concentrated its grievances on the semi feudal and semi colonial nature of Peruvian society. With this they championed a “people’s war” which would move from the countryside to the city (Poole 31). A splinter group then formed from PCP-BR into Patria Roja or PCP-PR. In the moment of the 1964 split, Abimael Guzmán Reynoso aligned himself with Paredes and the PCP-BR. It is important to look at Guzmán and Paredes’ profiles. Both were lawyers but Paredes was known more as a union advisor while Guzmán was viewed more as a philosopher. On the one hand Paredes focused on the construction of farmers’ associations while Guzmán worried about the political ideology and future of the party (CVR). Guzmán follows Paredes even though he had already formed his own red faction in Ayacucho (CVR). Three years later in 1970 Guzmán led his own splinter group out of the PCP-BR to form the PCP-SL Sendero Luminoso (Poole 31). The Shining Path was named after Mariátegui’s slogan locared in front of the University in Huamanga “ por el sendero luminoso de Mariátegui” (CVR).

Loebenstein 52 When Guzmán broke from Paredes, the Shining Path consisted of twelve militants (CVR tomo II). They first had the support of the Student Federation from the Universidad of Huamanga in Ayacucho where Guzmán taught philosophy. With a foothold on the University administration, the Shining Path was able to spread through the 1970s as a radical leftist party fighting for the reconstruction of the communist party and the beginning of the armed struggle. It is precisely the radical ideology that Abimael Guzmán proposed that leads to the creation of a doctrine that would be propagated from the University to initiate the terrorist practices of this organization. In order to understand how the Shining Path’s ideology and group as a whole may have been preferred over the system of authority and government already established, one has to look at the group’s goals and ideologies.

Ideology, Terrorism and the Armed Conflict The internal armed conflict (1980 to 2000) has been the longest conflict with the most impact on the country. Furthermore, it has had the highest human and economic costs in the history of the republic (CVR 2003 1.1.1. 13). The number of deaths even surpasses those of the war of independence and the war with Chile. 17 The Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Committee (CVR) estimate the number of total deaths at 69,280. The immediate and fundamental cause of this internal conflict was the Shining Path’s decision to initiate a popular war against the Peruvian state. Abimael Guzmán formed his base in the province of Ayacucho and the group’s ideology was facilitated by the social, economic and political conditions. The ideology’s success and expansion was achieved 17

Known as the War of the Pacific (1879-73). Chile fought against Peru and Bolivia in order to obtain territory rich with natural resources. This war ended with a Chilean victory and the loss of territory for Peru in the north: the desert of Atacama.

Loebenstein 53 through education, specifically through the University of San Cristóbal de Huamanga in Ayacucho where Guzmán taught philosophy. The ideology begins with a communist utopia. The Shining Path defined communism as the grand harmony’ of the society, a radical and definitive new society whose 15 billion years of history in motion, form part of what we know as the eternal history, it is necessary…unique and non substitutable in the new society, without dominated people nor dominators, without oppressed people or oppressors, without social classes, without a state, without parties, without democracy, without weapons, without wars” (Degregori 2010, 28). Thus the ideology of Pensamiento Gonzalo18 (PG) emerges as the line of thought that would indicate the Shining Path’s direction. Guzmán followed a “vertical style, characterized by his extreme authoritative personality marked by extreme autocracy” as he deemed PG a guide (García 16). In other words, Guzmán considered himself superior to Stalin, placing himself on the same level as Marx, Lenin, and Mao. He consequently names himself the quarta espada or fourth sword as he would substitute Stalin and form part of the intellectual circle of the other three Great Men. In Guzmán’s interview with the leftist newspaper El Diario, he expressed that his major contribution was adapting Marxism to the Peruvian reality (Starn 412). Furthermore, Guzmán adopts something like a “Kamikaze suicide” mentality, which would be applied to the ideological concept of cuota de sangre. This concept comes from the idea that it is necessary to pay a share of deaths for the revolution. One of the Senderista19 slogans read, “blood will not drown the revolution” (Starn 409). These kinds of slogans solidified the insignificance of human life where the terrorists that formed the Shining Path became more and more willing to kill and die for their cause. Guzmán used 18

PG is a combination of a scientific conception; Marxism with a scientific process; the armed struggle (García 73). 19 Word used to denominate participants of PCP-SL

Loebenstein 54 this strategy in order to accomplish his goal of making the bourgeoisie as the enemy and later applying the same idea against the authorities that represent the government. It is also necessary to analyze Mao Zedong’s influence in the Shining Path’s ideology and strategy. Even though Guzmán had declared himself Maoist and his actions where inspired around this, the result was different since he only applied what he deemed important for Peruvian society. As Antonio Vidal indicates in La verdad sobre Sendero Luminoso, there are some differences between Mao’s ideology and Guzmán’s but we cannot deny the clear inspirations on Guzmán. Guzmán declares that his thought, or the PG “is an adaptation of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism to the Peruvian revolution”.20 The initial acts of the Shining Path focused on symbolic acts that would publicize their goals and make their objectives clear. They were simple actions with no casualties such as an attack on the International Hotel in Ayacucho where windows were stoned. Included in these initial acts was the allegorical and yet literal hanging of dogs in Cuschi with signs that criticized the Chinese bourgeoisie, which read “Deng Xiaoping sons of bitches”. This kind of message clearly represents the link between the founders of the Shining Path and the political ideology of Mao. This idea helps in the understanding of vast the impact Maoism really was on Guzmán and to what extent he applied it to the Peruvian reality. This kind of spectacle in the Andean highlands demonstrates the importance of the ideology of the Cultural Revolution Chinese on initial militants of the PCP-SL. Guzmán, inspired by Mao’s millenarian war and revolution accentuated the idea of cuota de sangre and encouraged violence and destruction to create his Andean utopian society. The first theme of Guzmán’s thought emphasizes class struggle. Guzmán explains this hyper-classism as the trajectory of modernity (Starn 407). The Truth and 20

El Diario 24 de Julio 1988: La Entrevista del Siglo:Habla el Presidente Gonzalo

Loebenstein 55 Reconciliation Committee states that this class struggle forms part of the necessity of cultural revolutions. Mao had denominated his revolution as the grand Cultural Revolution of the proletariat in 1966 whose goal was to prevent the restructuring of imperialism. Convincing the younger generations of the Andean Highlands using red books, Guzmán starts just as Mao did, with a war against the bourgeoisies, the enemy of the rural peasant class. One of the PCP-SL poems describes the peasant as the following: Campesino hermano, así es nuestro jefe. ¡Él abarca, de una mirada, el mundo entero! avizora el futuro como ninguno y también se preocupa de los pueblitos. Por los humildes eleva su puño, traspasa los tiempos como flecha, maneja el ahora, asegura el mañana (Granados 124).21 It is no coincidence that a majority of the victims in the internal conflict were from the poorest areas of the country or that mentality of terror adopted became an instrument for political means. The necessity to combat imperialism represents the second theme in the Senderista ideology. The APRA22 political party had already presented anti imperialist and pan-latino ideas with the ideology of its founder Víctor Raúl Haya de La Torre (Starn 1995). Abimael Guzmán followed the ideology of José Carlos Mariátegui who denounced the United States as the principle agent of imperialism in Peru (Starn 1995). This theme to fight against those who not only symbolize the cause of socio economic disparity in Peru but those who have benefited from the inequality is a clear factor for discontent. Sendero stood to denounce yankee imperialists. This ideology itself is important to mention as it helps us understand how Guzmán used the already established knowledge 21

I did not translate this into English for poetic and artistic reasons. Many times called “Aprista”. APRA stands for Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana founded by Victor Haya Raúl de La Torre in 1924. 22

Loebenstein 56 of these unequal conditions to frame an ideology that would be sympathetic to the majority of the indigenous in this country. The third theme in the popular is the struggle of the masses. Situating the masses in what Guzmán called a revolution, he declared the “peasantry the biggest part of our struggle” (Starn 408). Here Guzmán and the Shining Path are providing the peasants a sense of competence and power which forms one of the needs described in Self Determination theory. Finally, the fourth theme represents the violence directly related to the previous three themes. Guzmán cites Mao when he argues, “violence is a universal law…and without revolutionary violence one class cannot be substituted by another, and the order will not be defeated by creating a new one” (Starn 409). Guzmán learned increasingly more about Maoism from his multiple trips to China during the Chinese revolution. The CVR cites Guzmán speaking about Mao’s cultural revolution as the “greatest political fact that humanity has witnessed.”23 Violence in some ways then turns into a path of redemption. 24 To conclude the themes of Guzmán’s ideologies, we can summarize that Mao’s thought clearly influenced the PCP-SL. From class struggle and the idea of cleansing through revolutionary violence, all were topics present in Mao’s thought (Starn 1995). Some of Guzmán’s inner circle even used traditional Chinese clothing and even memorized the national hymns sung for Mao (Starn 1995). Through the political and ideological orientation of communism and Maoism, the Shining Path was able to justify and promote its own cultural revolution in Peru. 23

CVR: Tomo IIPRIMERA PARTE: EL PROCESO, LOS HECHOS, LAS VÍCTIMAS Sección segunda: Los actores del conflicto 24 Idea from Starns article (pp. 409 ) to talk about the relationship between the church and PCP-SL

Loebenstein 57 The beginning of the Shining Path’s strategy, as previously mentioned, is fundamentally linked to education through the University of San Cristóbal de Huamanga which began to win over the population after weakening the stability and national security of Peru. In order to win over the students, Guzmán recruited the most talented students for extension education programs for literacy, agriculture, health and nutrition in the Ayacucho countryside (Palmer 1986). These individuals such as Luis Kawata Makabe, Osman Morote, and Julio Casanova turned into the principle members of the Shining path hierarchy (Palmer 1986). Guzmán recruited educated mestizos and Indian peasants but also emphasized the study of the language spoken by most of the highlands, Quechua (Mealy e Austad 2010). Guzmán would send the leaders of the Shining Path to the poorest areas of Ayacucho with the objective of fostering a relationship and to learn the culture in order to more effectively recruit. The militants that spoke Quechua were one of Guzmán’s strongest weapons for recruitment and since Guzmán spoke very little Quechua he placed them on the principle Shining Path missions (Mealy e Austad 2010). Furthermore, Guzmán’s wife, Agusta de la Torre was part of the strategy focused on recruiting women, something not commonly done by other parties. The specifics of recruitment will be analyzed in further detail in the following chapter.

The Shining Path Strategy and The Armed Conflict The strategy employed by the PCP-SL is useful in understanding their main objectives but also how they carried out their terrorist actions. In order to overthrow the

Loebenstein 58 current system, which stemmed from the historical and ethnic inequalities that divided Peru, the Shining Path sought the total destruction of all established order to create a “Utopian Peru.” The Shining Path’s strategy can be organized in five categories; (i) propaganda and agitation, (ii) sabotage against the socio economic system, (iii) guerilla warfare, (IV), the conquest and expansion of the bases de apoyo25 and (v) the capture of the cities in order to fully destroy the Peruvian state (Starn 1995). The start of the campaign began officially with the symbolic burnings of ballot boxes in Cuschi, in Ayacucho. After this, SL committed more than 3,000 acts, many of which were small but other involved over 150 militants with synchronized operations such as the attack of the jail in Ayacucho in 1982, and the bombings of light towers in Lima (Starn 1995). The strategy and violent action of the PCP-SL lead the government to view and treat the Shining Path as a terrorist group. It begins to be known more as the Shining Path rather than the PCP-SL, since its focus was more associated with terrorism rather than politics. A strategic campaign began with the distribution of papers and leaflets and the occupation of radio stations, which pronounced the importance of the armed struggle and forced propaganda transmissions, the occupation of schools and even speeches at funerals such as the 1982 Edith Lagos’ funeral (Starn 1995). Lagos was a member of the Shining Path and was killed by the Peruvian authorities at the age of nineteen. Her funeral and procession attracted more than 30,000 people (Strong 174). In 1982, SL transmitted a message through the radio station La Voz, in Quechua and Spanish as a response to the arrival of the Peruvian army in the highlands (Starn 1995). The message explained that SL was not afraid of fighting the army, that “they would spill the blood of soldiers” and 25

The CVR highlights that the objective of the total and radical destruction of local power and construct “bases of support”

Loebenstein 59 that “the struggle of the guerilla would triumph since they had nothing to loose, only their chains of oppression” (Taylor 26). As well as propaganda, agitation also formed part of this strategy. In 1983 they organized a strike, which was successful in recruiting support and expanding fear. They would detonate bombs to threaten stores to stay closed and to create and environment dominated by Sendero. Sabotage against the socioeconomic system is linked to the idea of dependence that SL tried to destroy. In numerous occasions, electric towers and installations were bombed. Between July 1980 and December 1981, fourteen high voltage towers were bombed which caused serious problems with equipment and communication (Starn 1995). Elite schools, as well as stores associated with international capitalism such as Sears were attacked. In Lambayeque sugar plantations were burned while in Cajamarca Nestle who provided milk was also attacked. The third strategy was the development of rural guerilla warfare, which began in 1981 and eventually became an urban phenomenon. The goal of undermining the semi feudal foundations of the state would be completed by the assassination of gamonales26 in the highlands (Taylor 1983). SL assassinated a total of sixteen gamonales, informants and government representatives between July and September 1982 (Taylor 1983). The famous attack of the farm “fundo Matará” located 93 km from the city of Ayacucho is representative of this strategy. A report describes how 150 guerillas entered the farm, killed the owners, and bombed the house and cars (Taylor 1983). 26

According to the Encyclopedia Britanica gamonalismo means “bossism” and is used in Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia. It is derived from gamonal, a word meaning a ‘large land owner’ and it refers to the exploitation of the Indian population, mainly by landowners of European descent. In the 1920s Mariátegui attacked gamonalismo as the worst abuse in the Peruvian political system; in so doing he influenced many of his contemporaries to espouse Socialism.

Loebenstein 60 The fourth step in the strategy was the conquest and expansion of the bases de apoio. The Shining Path members used dynamite to bomb public buildings, to kill government officials, and to threaten the lives of government representatives or figures of authority. The sub prefect of Ayacucho, for example was shot and killed (Taylor 1983). The threat and terrorism tactic incited such widespread fear in 1982 that many government officials renounced their positions in regions such as the provinces of Ayacucho, Apurimac and Huancavelica (Taylor 1983). The Shining Path occupied the town of Huanta (population of 80,000) for twenty-four hours and attacked the police station. The success of SL in attacking the police was so successful that the abandonment of officers facilitated that SL gain control of vast areas of Ayacucho (Taylor 1983). The fifth and last strategy was to transfer the armed struggle to the city, in other words: to Lima. In July of 1982 the prison Cerro de Pasco was attacked and thirteen prisoners were freed. The prisoners had been accused by the anti-terrorism law that had been introduced in March of 1981 (Taylor 1983). In attacking the capital SL focused on apagones or blackouts through the bombings of electric towers as well as regular bombings throughout the city. In sum, the conflict developed through a strategy that incorporated consistent terror as an instrument for ideological objectives that sought to destroy the established system. Guzmán’s ideological inspirations in combination with the bases de apoyo led him to go from being ignored by the government, to being Peru’s most wanted terrorist. SL terrorism comes to be highly dangerous for the state’s economic stability and more importantly national security. With the expansion of violence, the state sought any and all responses appropriate in order to eliminate the Shining Path.

Loebenstein 61

Military Response to social problems: Terror on Terror Confronted with the war initiated by Sendero Luminoso and other radical leftist groups such as the MRTA,27 the Peruvian state had the right and obligation to defend and restore order as well as national security. The military response to a social and historical dilemma was problematic in that it contributed to the negative sentiments against the state and in some cases the desire of vengeance, especially those of ethnic background similar (ie criollo soldiers) to those who have perpetrated against them. The violent means officially adopted by the state increased ethnic tensions between rural areas and the elite in power. It is in this light that the state’s response can be analyzed in several stages as well as through the various strategies each president implemented to solve the problem of terrorism. Government action was slow and inefficient in many aspects especially in light of the fact that SL was ignored in its initial and most fragile stages. Only when SL became an enormous threat did the government send the armed forces. They government did not seem to want to understand the problems that were causing the terrorism nor did they seem to want to address the underlying reasons behind it. The response was solely military, which would neither eliminate terrorism nor prevent resurgence. Furthermore, the forces sent by the government were not adequately prepared as they were ironically the police from the coast as well as the Marines, who did not speak Quechua. They also knew little to nothing about the highlands or its culture.

27

In Spanish El Movimento Revolucionário Tupac Amaru (MRTA) or Tupac Amaru’s Revolutionary Movement enters the armed struggle in 1984. It sought to differentiate itself from PCP-SL through its traditional Latin American guerilla (they used uniforms). Their strategy was to combine armed urban agitation and military struggle in the countryside (CVR).

Loebenstein 62 The government’s inefficiency was characterized by multiple factors, although it is essential to highlight that each president treated the SL problem differently. President Fernando Belaúnde Terry (1980-1985), had just emerged out of a military dictatorship and did not want to seem too repressive. Thus, he neglected to act against the Shining Path in its initial and weak stages where they could have been easily crushed and completely eliminated. This attitude contrasts with Alan García’s first government (19851990) as well as with Alberto Fujimori’s (1990-2000). Moreover, poorly trained armed forces, lack of equipment especially in intelligence, the rivalry between the army and the Guardia Civil, and the low salaries all contributed to the government’s inefficient response to the terrorism (Taylor 1983). In 1985 García’s government began creating organizations against SL such as a special operation unit called “la direción de operaciones especiales” (DOES) and a unit for preventative intelligence called “la direción de inteligencia del ministério del interior” (DIGIMIN) (CVR). The other institution created was “la direción contra el terrorismo” (DIRCOTE) (CVR). During both García and Fujimori’s governments, the state also organized rondas campesinas or peasantry organized groups which recruited locals who were against SL, armed them and used them as principle combatants since they spoke the language and knew the land. Fujimori is also famous for his paramilitary death squad known as Grupo Colina, which was responsible for the massacres at Barrios Altos, La Cantuta and Santa. Fujimori and the head of the National Intelligence Service of Peru Vladimiro Montesinos were responsible for a plethora of human rights violations. They were later charged, tired, and imprisoned for these violations some of which were recorded on tape by Montesinos himself.

Loebenstein 63 The Peruvian state’s complicated response resulted in grave consequences for human rights and national security. The ex-Minister of War, General Luis Cisneros in 1983 describes the government’s response as the following: the police force do not know who the senderistas are, nor how many there are, nor when they are going to attack. For the police force to have any success they would have to begin to kill senderistas and non-senderistas, because this is the only way they could ensure success. They kill sixty people and at most there are three senderistas among them ... and for sure the police will say that the sixty were senderistas (Taylor 1983, pp. 43). Later on, Cisneros reiterated the point more graphically, when he declared that: “If to kill two or three senderistas it is necessary to kill 80 innocents, then it does not matter... The peasants have to decide where they wish to die: with Sendero or the armed forces” (Taylor 1983, pp. 43). This was exactly the violent strategy imposed by the armed forces on the highland population. The Peruvian CVR confirmed that the methods employed by the armed forces were detention, torture, assassinations, and arbitrary executions. In June of 1991, a military document was discovered that determined that the armed forces operated with a “point and shoot” mentality (Taylor 1998). This facilitated the country’s loss of respect for the government. Polls “often showed widespread disapproval of many of the government’s policies, especially of the military, human rights and constitutional or legal issues” (Conaghan 5). Even though the Shining Path was considered a terrorist group by Peru, the United States and many other countries, the response of the armed forces was equally or perhaps even worse than the acts committed by the terrorists. The level of human rights violations carried out by the government had no legal justification. The state’s actions during this internal conflict have been considered by many academics as state terrorism. Terror used to fight terror is exemplified in the murders, tortures, rapes and other methods

Loebenstein 64 used by the armed forces. These methods actually delegitimized the state’s authority and created an even more complex situation in an already historically, socially and ethnically divided country. Peru’s internal war with Sendero’s terrorism and the violent state response was a difficult time for many Peruvians. SL was a group whose actions had major impact on the countries recent history of human rights violation by its own government. The government that finally captured Guzmán was Fujimori who took all credit and added to his reputation. Fujimori is popularly recognized as the man who eradicated terrorism. In sum, the Shining Path’s revolution used violence as the principle instrument in order to obtain the total insecurity of the country. This struggle turned into a war of vengeance and counter vengeance until the capture of Guzmán in 1992. The development of this group can be considered terrorism as well as revolutionary but it had more to do with the larger state of Peru characterized by education, social and economic inequality. Terrorism in Peru from 1980 to 1992 shows Peru in its most violent and insecure time in history.

Conclusion In looking at the colonial legacies, semi feudal structures, inequalities, and the Shining Path’s terror it is not difficult to conclude Peru was divided during the internal conflict. The next chapter, through case studies, concentrates on the variety of people who joined the Shining path and why. The exclusively military government response to a socially and economically fragmented country failed to address the underlying issues causing the terrorism and more importantly why people continued to join. By employing

Loebenstein 65 military violence onto populations that already suffered the most only created more divisions within the country, adding to the distrust of the government who was supposedly there to protect them. For citizens the line between good and evil was blurred in the sense that they didn’t know who was worse, the government or the terrorists. Moreover, the Peruvian government and many Latin American governments should be aware of the fact that solely military responses to social issues will not eradicate the kinds of ideas perpetuated by Abimael Guzmán and the Shining Path nor will they eliminate terrorists. The Peruvian government was not, and is still currently not representative. Until these social realities are understood and addressed, political and institutional change will take longer and cost more than sending the armed forces to “clean up”. Finally the inequalities explained in this chapter help us understand how discontent, deprivation, and grievances motivated Peruvians to join the Shining Path. Sendero provided a way to fulfill unsatisfied needs for the communities that did not have communal power structures that maintained stability that the state failed to achieve in rural areas. Guzmán’s ideology and strategy drew on the feelings of discontent as well as a multitude of grievances that both stemmed from Peru’s inequalities. He constructed the Sendero machine to fight what the majority of indigenous deemed to be Peru’s injustices. In terms of the typology that separates the intellectuals from the majority of indigenous, the intellectuals were targeted more in terms of ideology while the work force of Sendero by common grievances. It is thus that the lack of physical and psychological needs in SDT, as seen in the Peruvian case stem from the inequalities described, the colonial legacies, the economic exploitation and the ineffective state responses.

Loebenstein 66 Actors and Motivations This section deals specifically with identifying a profile or series of observations of the various people who became senderistas as well as their array of motivations. An analysis of a variety of sources including Peru’s Truth and Reconciliation Committee documents as well as selections of Peruvian citizens’ testimonies, led me to understand the peoples that joined the Shining Path and why. The testimonies provide a closer look and perhaps a reconstruction of fragments of the militant’s and leader’s biographies which may trace to they way they got involved with PCP-SL, why the ideology appealed to them and the kinds of relationships or positions they sought while participating in the organization. The case studies are critical in understanding the profile of women, children, students, peasants, Indians and a variety of Peruvians who decided to join the struggle that started in the countryside and slowly encircled the Peruvian government as they moved to the city. The limitations in these case studies are that the Truth and Reconciliation Committee did not make the actual terrorists testimonies available, since they do not contribute to the idea of Reconciliation. In other words documenting the storys of terrorists does not settle or resolve the horrors of the internal conflict. It does not bring justice to the victims nor does it lead to any kind of reparation or legal action since the terrorists are already jailed. Even though they are not readily available as its own section of the CVR report, there are of course fragments of full testimonies within the final report as well as in other literature, documentaries and interviews. Overall it seems that the lack of terrorism testimonies could be attributed to a variety of factors such as lack of elite or government interest, the fact that it does not contribute to reconciliation and perhaps has

Loebenstein 67 no place with victim testimonies and finally because perhaps by not telling their stories the government aimed to dehumanize the terrorists. In contrast to the vast victim and state agent testimonies of the CVR, the voices of the actual terrorists are in some ways silenced and only visible to those who search for them. These are the testimonies available for our analysis. As the government portrayed and continues to portray Shinning Path members as a “bunch of vicious terrorists,” they have “remained behind a curtain of secrecy” (The People of the Shining Path, 1992). Journalists in interviews with Senderistas, such as in the 1992 BBC sponsored Dispatches Television documentary “The People of the Shining Path” attempt to illustrate their humanity and to rebuttal their image as maniacs. Although they occasionally demonstrate a cult devotion to Guzmán, they are guided by the principles and desire to change their socio economic conditions and overthrow the system, which they believe is the cause of their suffering (Palmer). Perhaps the depiction by the government of members as vicious, ignorant machines may hint to why, even with the compilation of testimonies, the voice of the Senderistas themselves is not heard as loudly as those who they affected. The idea that the voices of terrorists are silenced by the Peruvian state is directly related to the discourse the government propagated with the intension of “discouraging” and or eliminating terrorism. Again, the failure to address social problems led to an exclusively military response, which attempted to justify its own violent and inhumane excesses. In her book “El factor asco: basurización simbólica y discursos autoritarios en el Perú contemporáneo”, Rocío Silva Santisteban addresses this idea of silencing through a term she coins as “basurización simbólica.”28 She explains the ways in which humans keep others in a plane that is radically different, an unheard of plain. In terms of silencing 28

The symbolic process of “trashing” or degradation

Loebenstein 68 this time of Peruvian history she connects authoritarian discourse propagated by the state with their practices of sexism, racism, exclusion, discrimination and imposition of different forms of violence such as tortures and sexual violations (93). Sanitesteban accurately portrays the ways in which through the discourse of national security, racism, sexual violations, tortures and other forms of violence were employed in the name of Peru’s collective good. Overall, the possibilities as to why there is a lack of terrorists testimonies leads this chapter in the direction of understand the main base of Senderistas as well as the literature that divides the intellectuals from the main Andean base.

Sendero’s Main Base and the Role of the Efficiency of Communal Power Pacts In academia when it comes to explaining the main base of the Shining Path the two prevalent views are: one which sees the PCP-SL as a liberation movement with an important and an easily manipulated Andean base and a second which sees them as a confluence of an intellectual elite emphasizing its student base (Portugal 12). The Andean base argument, previously addressed in chapter two, follows the logic of relative deprivation, societal stigmas on the Indian and socio economic inequality as well as presence of the state contributed to why the rural populations were susceptible to Sendero’s ideology. However, this chapter will highlight the added complexity that Miguel La Serna’s approach provides in the deeper understanding of peasant “manipulation.” Through an analysis of power pacts between the Peruvian state’s judicial system and Andean peasant in two villages he concludes that historically rooted and local specific power relations, social conflict and cultural norms of understanding directly related to the responses of the

Loebenstein 69 indigenous peasants toward the Shining path insurgency. This allows us to distinguish between rural Andean peasant communities that joined Sendero versus other rural communities who actively resisted them. La Serna shows how in Chuschi, the power pact between the villagers and authority was broken, as they could not rely on the judicial system to provide any kind of justice. The overall barriers of time, money, and language made it difficult for the Chuschi villagers to gain anything from denouncing thefts or other infractions. In such an environment, Sendero was able to thrive and fulfill psychological needs. He also concludes that the village of Huaychao actively opposed the Shining Path due to the fact that peasants in this village believed that their customary authority and justice system had successfully preserved the historically and culturally established power pacts, values and codes of conduct through the powers given to the varayoqs. The varayoqs were able to retain historically established power by through the respect they already had of villagers and the ways in which they contributed to the preservation of values considered essential by the people such as order, justice, matrimonial fidelity and more. In this kind of environment, The Shining Path “threatened to replace what peasants viewed as an effective and just correctional system” and eventually led to these villagers creating a strong counter insurgency movement. On the other hand, the student base view argues that frustrations among the middle class in the 1970s provided Sendero with the bulk of recruits from university students, professors and the administrative staff from Ayacucho and its provinces. This view is further explained by the failure of education to bring social mobility for many. Many students came from poor peasant families with the hope that once graduated they could move beyond the social and economic status of their parents (Palmer 51). However,

Loebenstein 70 they were finding that the only jobs available to them were badly paid teaching positions and many times they ended up in the same village they came from. Thus, they were “returning to the same poverty they hoped to escape by means of their university education” (Palmer 51). In this chapter I will argue for the idea that the majority of Senderistas are from the peasant base even though data from Andrea Portugal’s article “Voices from the War: Exploring the Motivation of Sendero Luminoso Militants” contends otherwise. To make my point, even Portugal argues that her own data may be problematic in the light that most Sendero members, sympathizers and militants were probably killed in combat or disappeared in the initial years of the conflict. This possibly reduces the pool of militant testimonies (Portugal 14). However, I do make a distinction between the power dynamics of authority in Andean villages based on La Serna’s research, which contributes to understanding why not all Andean peasants joined the Shining Path. Furthermore, the fact that according to the CVR 47% of the victims in the armed conflict were murdered or disappeared in Ayacucho also adds to the explanation of this problem. Of the diverse range of militant profiles described in academia this chapter explores the difference between Sendero’s leaders such as Guzmán and his central Committee versus its rank and file. The larger rank and file is composed of the rural peasants, students, inmates, women, children, Amazonian indigenas groups and domestic workers.

1. ACTORS The following section explains Sendero’s leadership, the central committee, Andean peasants, students, women, children, and the Ashánika indians in order to

Loebenstein 71 understand Sendero’s actors. When looking at these actors, I utilized Andrea Portugal’s comprehensive study of 700 testimonies of prisoners identified as members of the Shining Path. She concludes that a “Young catholic male with a good educational level, a student, peasant or merchant, predominately Spanish speaking and who lived in the city” is a representative profile of the SL militant. However after presenting her data she does admit that this characterization does not necessarily reflect the actual profile of the militant of the PCP-SL, since a large number of the party members, in particular Quechua speaking indigenous peasants died or disappeared during the armed conflict (Portugal 27). Thus the available Senderista testimonies we have now may not be representative of what the Shining Path was at its height, since those militants are deceased. Portugal’s article and testimonies serve as a base for this chapter.

i .The Leadership of Abimael Guzmán and his Foothold on the UNSCH Before trying to sketch the profile of the senderista militant, one must consider leadership from the head of the organization and also of the Central Committee. With a charismatic personality, education and rhetoric the party founder and top leader Abimael Guzmán gained the nickname “shampoo” for the fact that he was said to have the ability to “brain wash” (State of Fear). Obtaining degrees in Law and Philosophy he then arrived at the Universidad Nacional San Cristóbal de Huamanga (UNSCH) in 1962 and by 1964 he had been appointed Director of General Studies (Roncagliolo). He also became one of the main promoters of the Frente Estudiantil Revolucionario (FER) and the Peruvian Communist Party in the UNSCH as well as in Ayacucho (Roncagliolo). Furthermore, he gained influence in the Faculty of education (Portugal 16). In 1971, Guzmán was named

Loebenstein 72 personnel director which enabled him to hire and appoint teachers of his choosing, making sure only ideologically compatible faculty were hired which would contribute to the indoctrination and recruitment of student followers (McCormick 1987, 3). Having already explored Guzmán’s Marxist and Leninist interpretation of Peruvian reality as well as his own faction from the PCP-BR, we emphasize his leadership in his own party, the Partido Comunista del Perú- Por el luminoso sendero de Mariátegui. Guzmán based his ideology on Mao and used violence as the means to destroy the old, unequal and decadent order. Through this destruction he promised a new and brighter future; a new structural as well as moral order. A combination of strategic timing in the tumulus political atmosphere and the combined use of anti elitist sentiments in the highlands allowed Guzmán to perpetuate a deeply rooted grievance against the capitalist society and structure which he deemed infirm (El Diario “entrevista del siglo” 24 de Julio de 1988). Guzman’s ability to inspire and motivate people through ideology seems to be the driving force behind many of the militants. This quality has to do with his oratory skills as a professor and lawyer as well as his ability to clearly communicate an intellectual vision that appealed to his constituents. Viewed as a heroic figure by his followers, they assume the role of his disciples creating a relationship whose nature results in a high degree of group unity (McCormick 1987, 6). There was something more than the professor student relationship that Guzmán evoked and his followers were in some ways religiously obsessed with him as the father that would lead them spiritually. Catchy, yet truly inspiring phrases such as “Ustedes son la vanguardia de 15 mil millones de años de historia en movimiento” (State of fear) characterize Guzmán’s ability to make the

Loebenstein 73 proletariat identify with his cause but also allow peasants to feel included in the process of change. Many scholars stress his personality cult and the fact that “no other group in the Marxist tradition has placed such emphasis on the intellectual status of its leader” (Palmer 43). As explored in later sections, the Shining Path ideology propagated by Guzmán appealed to a range of citizens.

ii The Central Committee The following section emphasizes the structure of Sendero, which helps differentiate the intellectuals that formed the Central Committee from the Andean peasant majority. The Central Committee, also known as the cúpula, named Abimael Guzmán “Jefe del Partido y la Revolución.” Other members of the group also had code names, a popuar practice to increase the feelings of the familial structure, which Sendero provided to increase ingroup cohesion. Augusta La Torre (his wife) was “camarada Nora” and his future wife Elena Iparraguirre was called “camarada Miriam” (Manrique 2007, 31). As the organization grew in power and influence, it became more messianic in nature around the charisma of Guzmán. The ideology perpetuated by Guzmán adds to this idea of Sendero Luminoso having a messianic nature. Gustavo Gorriti’s explains how for many Shining Path members, the idea of dying took on the intense interaction of both a mystical and a sensual experience (105). A Shining Path militant from the Upper Hualaga Valley anonymously wrote the following ballad in 1984: On the way out of Aucayacu there’s a body, who could it be surely it’s a peasant who gave his life for the struggle …Today the quota must be filled If we have to give our blood for revolution, how good will it be (Gorriti 1999, 106).

Loebenstein 74 This idea of cuota de sangre29 perpetuated an attitude of suicidal confrontation giving Guzmán the weapon of radicalized, almost blind and devoted followers until the end (106). Thus, President Gonzalo and his mythical image demanded loyalty from his followers to the revolution over affective ties, traditional family relations, and daily life (Stern, 1998). Furthermore, the PCP-SL operated under a secretive cell structure run by middle class educated intellectuals (Stern 1998). Developing their own cultures, this facilitated the indoctrination of other members into the principles and ideology (Stern 1998). The party leadership, stemming from the origins of the PCP-BR initially received information about the southern highland’s geographic and topographic reality, the internal structure of the communities, peasant goals and above all, the local authority networks of power, which would be removed with the armed struggle (Palmer 47). Marisa Mealy and Carol Shaw Austad argue that at the core of this leadership's revolutionary ideology was “benevolent prejudice" in the sense that the prejudice was associated with superficial positive emotions as well as a perception of the “other” as generally incompetent and inferior. They state that “many members of the PCP-SL stereotyped the indigenous peoples as innately passive and helpless” and that the Central Committee “saw themselves as the protectors of a primitive and uncivilized indigenous peasantry” (9-10). Key documents clearly stated that it was incumbent upon them to organize and lead the indigenous peasantry indicating a type of paternalism between Sendero Luminoso and the indigenous peoples that would result in a systemic hierarchy. According to Mealy, the Committee advised that it was the obligation of the mestizo 29

quota. This concept comes from the idea that it is necessary to pay a share of deaths for the revolution.

Loebenstein 75 proletariat, as they represented the “leading class of all revolutions.” They further stated they were the most conscious and best-organized section of the masses of society and where thus fit to lead the indigenous peasantry toward rebellion through the armed struggle. As Mealy suggests, it may very well be that the party leadership thought the peasantry was incapable of mobilizing without the help of the mestizo middle class. The difference between the intellectual composition of Guzmán and his Central Committee versus the actual rank and file of the movement is significant. Those who propagate ideas were already established intellectuals and politically active individuals. Augusta La Torre’s familial history as the daughter of a Communist Party militant and the granddaughter of a prominent political figure demonstrates the importance of the familial type connections in the formation of the PCP-SL. In her case, parents and children were united in their support of Sendero. Even though she was second in command and an essential part of the Central Committee, many have questioned her revolutionary credentials, diminishing her role to Guzmán’s wife. On the other side, the majority of the Shining Path members, the rank and file, were composed of highland peasants, students, women, inmates, children, and indigenous populations.

iii . The Base of Sendero: Andean Highland Peasants Whether one chooses to accept the vision that the Shining Path was mainly composed of peasants or that it was in fact the intellectual student youth, one cannot deny the significant role peasants played within the Shinning Path. The overwhelming amount of literature and research points to the rural highland peasantry as the base of the movement. The CVR, in the section titled El PCP-SL en el Campo Ayacuchano describes

Loebenstein 76 how the Shining Path capitalized the sentiments of marginalization, isolation and inequality that existed in the southern highland region. This dominant view is one that is represented not only throughout most of Shining Path literature but also in many of the documentaries and interviews available. Lucanamarca, the documentary film by Carlos Cárdenas and Héctor Gálvez also highlights the lack of information available to Peruvians in many rural poor areas. Ignorance from this lack of information in the Andean highlands supports the idea that the Peruvian state was absent in these regions. The fact that many peasants were not aware of who the actual political leaders of the country were is one that may lead to the understanding of why some peasants initially saw Sendero as the ultimate authority and perhaps Gonzalo as their actual president. The documentary includes the interview of a man explains his own ignorance and susceptibility: Juntaba a los niños. Les enseñaban, aprovechándose de los jóvenes. Tenía 13 años, nos obligaban a participar. Nos llevaban a los salones de la escuela. Nos enseñaban cosas como matar, como atacar a un pueblo, con que armas defendernos. Nos enseñaban a expresarnos. Primeramene saludos al camarada Abimael Guzmán. No sabíamos si el estado mandaba o quien mandaba el Sendero Luminoso. Yo mismo pensaba que el representante de este país o de este pueblo o el jefe máximo que nos dirige será [sic] pues Abimael Guzmán. Así yo pensaba no, yo no sabía quién era Alan García, Belaúnde toda esa [sic] cosa. Pensaba que ellos venían porque sentían poco mas [sic] que cualquier otra cosa no. The case of this man exemplifies the true isolation of some of the peasantry in terms of education but more importantly their susceptibility. Another case is of the brother of the famous Olegario Curitomay, associated with the Lucanamarca massacre in which the Shining Path brutally murdered 69 people in and around the Lucanamarca area in 1983.

Loebenstein 77 Olegario Curitomay’s brother, although he had lost his brother to the conflict, seemed to identify with Sendero’s ideas and stated, “what they said sounded marvelous. 30” He also asks why we cannot all be equal 31. The cases of peasants such as the Curitomay brothers and the villager who did not even know who the president of his country was exemplify the situation suffered by the typical peasant. The Shining Path was offering Curitomay an alternate system of justice, which would reverse the ineffective established power structure that oppressed him. iv. Sendero’s Emphasis on Youth: The Role of Education in the PCP-SL The focus and emphasis on youth, and especially students in terms of Shinning Path member recruitment is a clear indicator of why such a high percentage of Senderistas were students. Guzmán himself used the education system and connections to teachers to gain followers and propagate his ideology throughout the highlands. Historically, universities have been the breeding ground for Marxist and communist thought even though Marxists have not been able to successfully maintain student involvement after ending their studies (Palmer 1992, 161). Guzmán attempted to retain students by strengthening the relationship between the Student Revolutionary Front, by insisting that a substantial portion of the leadership also be engaged in teaching, and finally by gaining administrative control of university daily student activities which would also allow the harassment of opposition students and teachers (Palmer 1992, 162). Simon Strong argues that for the young the Shining Path offered not only an escape but also a chance for change and most importantly a challenge to their own elders and a stab at ethnic revenge (74). The PCP-SL also “attracts those who have acquired 30 31

“Lo que decían sonaba maravilloso” “¿Porqué no podemos ser iguales?”

Loebenstein 78 education and have fought to learn Spanish in an attempt to escape their linguistic and economic domination” (Strong 74). The idea of fighting deception with education can be seen by a statement given by a university leader of the Shining Path: “The University is waking us up, we are learning something new, something objective, which [the powerful] do not like; it doesn’t suit them at all because they want us to remain deceived” (Palmer 1992, 42). Unfortunately for those from the highlands, the democratization feeling provided by education lasts only on the educational level but it does not necessarily transfer over into the social, cultural, or political planes in Peru. In a society in which most want to learn but are not afforded this privilege, those from the lower classes who do manage to obtain an education are faced with the hard and sad fact that the official Peru has no place for them and will continue to discriminate against them via institutional and non institutional racism as well as through the bureaucracy. The seduction of that comes from the power that arms provide not only gave power to the young but also perhaps for the first time forced adults to listen to them (Palmer 42). Overall the historical ethnic cleavages and cultural alienation of indigenous people in Peru repeat itself in the shoes of students allowing for the seeds of Sendero Luminoso to be planted as seeds of hope to change this reality. v. A System of Double Oppression: Women in Sendero Luminoso Without question, the Shining Path gained strength with the presence of female members. Although Peruvian women do pursue higher education, traditional society, the machista society, in general regulates them to secondary roles such as home keeping and child rearing (Palmer 1992, 180). Most women are restricted in traditional home keeping roles and women who do venture into business tend to largely hold secondary roles

Loebenstein 79 relative to their male counterparts (Palmer 1992, 180). The lower the socioeconomic class, the more hardships Peruvians face. According to Gabriela Tarazonaa-Sevillano, “for women, Sendero offers an escape, a promise to treat both its male and females members equally” (Palmer 1992, 180). Women thus fought for more than just political and economic justice as fighting in Sendero’s ranks allowed them to do so for equality (Palmer 1992, 180). The PCP-SL thus offered women the promise of an escape from this actuality towards a reality in which women’s participation is critical and wanted. Lenin, Mao and Mariátegui had all talked about the importance of women in revolutions and Guzmán adapted this to the Peruvian situation (Palmer 1992, 180). Teachers in the Shining Path’s schools emphasized that women needed to be aware of the double exploitation they faced, those of class and gender and the importance of fighting for the emancipation of both (Palmer 1992, 181). Furthermore, women held key positions within the ranks of the PCP-SL and were often assigned the most ruthless terrorist assignments (Palmer 1992, 181). These tasks given to women, they believed would provide an opportunity to prove themselves in their capacity as leaders but also a way to strike back at the society, which restrained them (Palmer 1992, 181). In some ways, they were able to gain equality with men since in theory it is class, not gender that matters to the Shining Path. Within the ideology the condition of being biologically feminine was equivalent to being a mineworker or an intellectual (Kirk 43). Sendero actively recruited women and allowed them in positions of power (Kirk 35). In fact, eight out of the 19 members of the PCP-SL’s Central Committee were women, and out of the five members of the Political Bureau, two were women (Portugal 19). Guzmán even made the second and third in command of the PCP-SL hierarchy women.

Loebenstein 80 Furthermore, Robin Kirks 1993 study of women found that women’s participation was crucial to the party’s expansion as they commanded squads in charge of military operations and intelligence. Through a series of interviews Kirk argues that women in Sendero joined for a variety of reasons, such as fighting for a cause, because Sendero represented a family, fighting against the system that oppressed them, and for the Pensamiento Gonzalo ideology. Kirk observes how the Peruvian government tended to portray all Senderista women as radical and completely crazy. For the newspapers, he says, “sólo hay dos tipos de mujer senderista: la autómata asexuada, fría como el metal de un instrumento bélico; o la diosa de lujuria, una ninfómana sedienta de sangre” (Kirk 17). This is an example of how the press focused on the cruelty, beauty and sexual appetite of these women, demonizing them to an inhuman level, enabling the state to continue to unrealistically portray the terrorists, focusing on fiction. Throughout the entire internal conflict, women are depicted as inhumane or even dangerous monsters. These kinds of narratives depicting the cruelty of women are common and the story of a women called “La Chata32” is just one popular example. In November of 1990, “ La Chata” led an attack on the farm of prominent man from Lima in 1990. Forcing the owner of the farm, Javier Puiggrós to kneel, the stories explain how she made hum kneel for the juicio popular a euphemism for public execution (Kirk 17). She called him “la mala yerba” and that he had to be “[arrancado] desde a raíz” (Kirk 17). According to the press she ruthlessly executed men and when she was shot and found with two other Shining Path members, the press called them her lovers (Kirk 17).

32

“Chata” in Peruvian slang is the feminine version of the word “chato,” meaning short. It is a common nickname for short Peruvians.

Loebenstein 81 The idea of women as object as sexual desire links the treatment of terrorist women and the authoritarian practices employed by the state with the idea of “symbolic trashing” evident in Rocío Silva Santisteteban’s book. This idea of “trashing” or degradation the bodies of women is compared to the trophies of war by the Peruvian military (Santisteban107). An example of this is the case of a woman nicknamed “La Gringa” who taught at a school in Aucayacu in Huánuco. Accused of being a terrorist, she is taken prisoner and interrogated. At first she accepts prostitution for the possibility of freedom (and life) but when the commander gets “confirmation” that she is in fact a terrorist, her body becomes an object of disgust. Now that she has been deemed a terrorist in their eyes, the captain states that they should not do anything to her “porque es una terrucaza. A ella no le hagan nada” (Santisteban 110). As a terrorist, as a Senderista, her body becomes a sexual taboo and her life is consequently worth nothing as they proceeded to torture her. The grotesque methods of torture and humiliation involved rape even after her death. The depictions of women as inhumane or cruel helped authorities disregard the lives of terrorists and especially of women. These stories explain the narrative of violence initiated by Sendero and the state’s strategy and violent backlash. The violent reaction from the state is increased, as Senderista women were no longer seen as equal to other women. These women were deemed indigenous monsters and alienated from society. This plays into the concept of revenge and vengeance that motivated some individuals to join Sendero. The testimony of Giorgina Gamboa also contributes to this process violence in that it tells the story of how seven policemen raped her in custody and her inhumane treatment throughout her incarceration and consequent pregnancy. Many other

Loebenstein 82 “terrorists” in custody were stereotyped not only for the purpose of torture but also perhaps so that the men committing the torture could in some sense justify their own actions against the prisoners. “El estereotipo del senderista es también un producto directo de la busurización pues organiza a un sujeto desde pocos elementos fundamentales básicos y niega toda posibilidad de humanidad” (Santisteban 82). At the same time, this stereotype construction differs slightly for women in that women were viewed as cruel, harsh and cold-blooded (Santisteban 82). This plays on a militarization of Senderista women on the basis that they were charged with difficult tasks in order to prove their equality to men (Santisteban 82). The forceful brutality employed in the rape of Gamboa reflects the idea of a strong connection between racial insults and the women who were tortured and or raped during the internal conflict. Racist insults such as “chola asquerosa, chola de mierda, india bruta” were commonly reported in the CVR victim’s testimonies (Santisteban 84). The dehumanization process of women was institutionalized to explain the radical terrorist behavior of women were normally seen as passive and incapable of making any kind of social or political noise. A police-training manual in 1990 explains the personality traits of the “mujeres subversives.” In other words Senderista women are described as follows. Son más determinadas y peligrosas que los hombres, tienen conductas absolutistas, y se consideran capaces de desempeñar cualquier misión, poseen la dicotomía de la debilidad y la dureza, son indulgentes, sumamente severas…explotan y manipulan al prójimo, son impulsivas y arriesgadas (Kirk 18). Here Kirk demonstrates the terminology and an idea propagated by the state but also alludes to the ineffective conduct of the police. As in most cases where government fights

Loebenstein 83 terror, the state profits from showing off their detained suspects of terrorism in press conferences as well as in the media as a whole (Kirk). They want to demonstrate their capacities to capture and control terrorists in order to in some ways reassure the public and by denominating these women as monsters, they are able to overturn the traditional view of women as weak and or passive. This seemed to work only because of the initial negative reactions that many Peruvians, especially men, had towards the idea as women as terrorists. Women having the capacity to murder, kill and defy the state in aggressive and violent ways seemed to be unnatural from the Latin woman as a caretaker, stereotype. Although the participation of women in the Shining Path was critical, it is important to note that the percentage of women militants by no means outnumbers those of men. In her study of 700 testimonies of PCP-SL militants, Andrea Portugal determines that only 18.3 percent of these militants were women. Even though there were women in the leadership and the rank in file, these findings are consistent with the CVR reports determining that this was mostly male lead organization. In the 1970s while universities became seedbeds for the Shining Path, “prisons became the main centers for ideological training” (Tulchin and Bland 91). The massive and permanent cadre schools in the prisons allowed for the ideological conversion of men and women. The pro Shining Path newspaper, El Diario argued that detainees were prisoners of war, combatants of the People’s Guerilla Army led by the PCP and that even as prisoners, they maintained the task of combatants (Strong 153). Visitors of prisons like El Frontón and Lurigancho have been impressed by The rebel inmates’ orderliness and cleanliness; how no prison guard ventured into their cell blocks, how slogans were chanted while they were in military squares or as they marched up and down below portraits of Marx, Lenin and Mao. They cooked their own food.

Loebenstein 84 Revolutionary songs were sung. There were indoctrination classes. The Library at Lurigancho was stocked with just communist classics but also with philosophical works and novels (Strong 153). This description of the Shining Path influence in the jails of Peru explains why “the government believed that the jails were being used as command centers for attacks in Lima” as they did not lack organization (Strong 153).

vii. Senderistas Made in Prisons People would enter prison and even if they were not Shining Path to begin with, they would come out converted. There could be a multitude of reasons why innocent people are converted in jails including pressure to fit in, threats, grievances, sympathy towards the cause, social and political mobility within the prison and when released, torture, rape and much more. Magdalena Monteza, in the documentary State of Fear explains how “las cárceles se llenaron de inocentes.” Magdalena, a student who showed up to the university every other day was arrested and interrogated. In those interrogations she was beaten, raped and tortured. As a result of the rapes she becomes pregnant and says “lo que me dolía más es lo que me habían hecho, no quería vivir” (State of Fear). Another example in State of Fear is of José Vizcardo who becomes a Shining Path lieutenant in prison even though when he entered prison as a student, he was not. He says that “se vivía una cierta camadería” in prison, which helped him join, and when he was released, he was able to practice what he had learned (State of Fear). Another interviewee from prison stated that “si tienes que morir por una causa pues a morir se ha dicho porque es una causa noble que vale más que tu propia vida” (State of Fear). Clearly this militant woman was more devoted to cause than the idea of a comrade community.

Loebenstein 85 Nevertheless, her ideological convictions were strengthened and not weakened during her time in the Sendero controlled prison. In summary, we see that even in prison Sendero was able to fulfill the needs of prisoners psychologically and physically. Relating La Serna’s argument which hangs on established justice and power pacts, the prisoners who needed a system of order and justice within prison, perhaps even a system of protection joined Sendero. Those who did not need this are perhaps the rest that did not join Sendero in prison. viii. Indoctrinating the Children It is not surprising then that from its inception in the early 1970s, the Shining Path emphasized youth in order to influence the upcoming generations. Cadres that left Huamanga would return to the countryside to become primary and secondary school instructors (McCormick 1990, 13). Children, according to a PCP-SL document “must be encouraged to participate in the popular war. They are the future [and] must change their ideology and adopt that of the proletariat” (McCormick 1990, 13). If the young had little or no political past, they would be more open to the Pensamiento Gonzalo and therefore they only had to be educated, not completely reeducated (McCormick 1990, 13). Ideally Sendero stated this reeducation but did not provide their members with a choice or the completion of any professional degrees. This was simply a cover up for what was essential pure indoctrination. The Shining Path also concentrated its work in rural areas through the education systems. Militants who worked as rural teachers surveyed their communities for their party and would raise class-consciousness in the children under their instruction (Palmer 47). Accompanied but their teacher, Palmer quotes children

Loebenstein 86 singing in Quechua: “the right? no no no; the left? no no no; the armed struggle? yes yes yes!” (47). The documentary State of Fear, as well as other news reports, has shown how child soldiers formed part of the PCP-SL’s strategy. In State of Fear, Bernavides Cuevas, a child solider kidnapped by the Shining Path at age six tells his story. Militants told him “me sigues o te matamos” and that by age 11 he directed a town with others who had captured him. He explained the psychological hardships of killing remembering that “después de matar por la primera vez se volvió un vicio” that it was “like giving candy to a child, that was how the guerilla worked.” Cuevas also talks about how his brother, who was also a militant, wanted to leave Sendero and live with his girlfriend. When the brother did this, they were both murdered by Sendero, which angered and hurt Cuevas so much that he decided to run away and eventually escaped. The Cuevas indoctrination narrative is exemplary in that it demonstrates the Senderista effort to recruit children and offer them an opportunity for power and importance, which they may have not had in their previous conditions. Furthermore, the threat of death and violence is also a motivational factor for any human being. Cuevas lived in an Amazonian village, which perhaps did not have an effective justice or power structure. As La Serna suggests this could cause villagers to feel inadequate, allowing for Sendero to insert a grip in the village. Once Cuevas realized he no longer agreed with the system of justice and power the Shining Path imposed, he left. This kind type of attitude change, or change of heart was not uncommon. Many Senderistas actually ended up joinig the rondas campesinas or citizen defense groups.

Loebenstein 87 The CVR has state that the most common way to recruit children was done through schools, and in the highlands this persisted until 1987 (CVR 2003 V:615 in Portugal 56). The PCP-SL would enter schools looking for the strongest, tallest and brightest students. Representative testimonies state: A los mayorcitos, entre 10 a 12 años, se los llevaron al monte. Al professor le dijeron que después de 3 mese los devolvían, Se opuso y por eso lo mataron (CVR testimony 302135) venía los terroristas, de noche nomás, a pedir apoyo, y se llevaban a nuestro alumnos, entre ellos tenemos dos alumnos mayorcitos de 10 y 9 años…se imaginan ustedes cómo le iban adiestrando a esas criaturas con armamentos (CVR testimony 100483) Although not all were forced, most did so because of pressure or fear of retaliation as when some communities refused to give a certain quota of their children voluntarily, the Senderistas would retaliate with violence. Furthermore, there have been television reports showing images of the Shining Path’s subversive training camps in the jungle in which small children are shown indoctrinated and trained in armed combat with heavy weaponry. The transmitted images come from the journalistic report from Final del Canal 2, which ultimately confirms how Sendero Luminoso recruited children in order to indoctrinate and train them. The young children form lines with their fist in the air shouting “viva el marxismo, leninismo, maoísmo.” According to the account, the reporters contacted the rebel group located in the zone called VRAE or “zona del Valle del Río Apurímac-Ene,” approximately 350 kilometers southeast of Lima were the last registered attacks against the state occurred but also the zone were the remnants of Sendero Luminoso joined the drug traffickers (Reportaje Canal 2). These kinds of training camps demonstrate that these children will not only be motivated to remain with Sendero because of their ideological indoctrinations

Loebenstein 88 but also because they are being provided for by an organization which is producing a system of justice and order as well as completing their psychological needs. If these individuals thought about leaving the PCP-SL then they would be faced with the reality of poverty and inequality for people of their ethnicity in the Peru of today. By feeding grievances and providing for a system of justice that also complements the psychological needs of members, the Shining Path not only motivated people but will most likely retain people, and especially those captured as children. ix. Entre la espada y la pared: The Ashánika in the Peruvian Amazon A correlation between ethnicity and likelihood of violence existed as 75 percent of the victims in the internal conflict spoke Quechua. In addition to the Quechua speaking indígenas one must also pay special attention to other ethnicities beyond persons of the highlands such as those found in the Amazon. The Selva Central del Perú has been traditionally occupied by the Asháninka, the Yánesha and the Nomatsiguenga (CVR 2003, 2.8, 241). These indigenous people, and particularly the Asháninka have been the most hit by the internal conflict in Peru. The armed conflict in this area started in the 80s when the Shining Path militants sought refuge from the counter offensives occurring in Ayacucho (CVR 2003, 2.8.2, 244). At the beginning, this jungle area was transitional for the Senderistas until they were able to secure the zone. The CVR estimates that out of 55 thousand Asháninka, about 10 thousand the Asháninka were forcefully displaced in the valleys of Ene, Tambo and Perené, 6 thousand were killed and approximately 5 thousand were captured by the PCP-SL, and that throughout the entirety of the conflict between 30 to 40 the Asháninka were disappeared (CVR, 2003, 2.8, 241).

Loebenstein 89 Known as fighters in the Amazon, the Asháninka people suffered “near genocide” during the time of the Shining Path influence according to Anthropologist and CVR Commissioner Carlos Ivan Degregori. In the middle of the 1980s, before the Shining Path infiltrated this region some of the Asháninkas managed to flee deeper to the Amazon basin (Springerová 89). Those who could not or did not manage to flee suffered frequent kidnappings, child recruitment for military use and many were used by rebel forces (Springerová 89). At the beginning of the 1990s, the government became involved sending troops to the region but also distributing guns. The leader of the Asháninkas, Luzmila Chiricente, interviewed in the documentary State of Fear, talks about how her people were simultaneously threatened by both sides, the government and the Senderistas, that they were “entre la espada y la pared.” Beginning in 1988 the PCP-SL initiated an intensive war campaign in the zone, increasing their presence with regular visits to the native communities and by 1989 their presence was prominent (CVR 2003, 2.8.3, 246). At first they expelled the colonos or people who were seen as invaders of the land and who had brought bad living such as drug trafficking, prostitution, and other abuses of customs (CVR 2003 2.8.3, 246). The promise of utopia was an important strategy used to recruit from the Asháninkas. According to many of the testimonies, the PCP-SL would offer everything from cars, money and all kinds unimaginable of goods. The Asháninkas were susceptible to the Shining Path not only because of the material goods offered but more so because of threats Sendero would make. Although the government did the same, the strong presence of the Shining Path, and their geographical encirclement of the Asháninkas provided them with little options. The Asháninkas could

Loebenstein 90 not escape from the PCP-SL as they had total control of the areas entries and exits, they had nowhere to go, and because traditionally the Asháninkas prefer to find refuge in el monte or the tropical forests of the region, before going to cities (CVR 2003, 2.8.3, 248). In the case of the Asháninkas, the main method of recruitment was the use of threats while constant surveillance caused internal paranoia within the communities. Meanwhile Sendero sympathizers acted as the mil ojos y mil oídos del partido (CVR 2003, 2.8.3, 248). The CVR cites a 45-year-old man from Puerto Ocopa: Las gentes que iban infiltrando en los grupos que tomaban, lo que escuchaban iban a informarle. Mientras que el pueblo no sabía ya estaban contactados. A veces decían, no vas a hablar porque hay mil ojos, mil oidos. Mentira. Ese palo, ese arból era mil ojos, mil oídos. Era mentira, ese no era, eran personas.”33 The Shining Path also managed to convince the Asháninkas that the military was trying to kill them or violate them. In this way, the PCP-SL was able to not only turn the communities against the government, but also militarize them. The CVR cites an informant from Quempiri: (PCP-SL) ha hecho trincheras para que estén cuidando de los militares… Te ha dicho que no te vayas, te (va a) matar, te va a quitar a tu señora o te va a vilar (los militares) y pore so se ha asustado…Ha dibujado PCP-SL (a) una persona que estaba ahí en papel, una persona que estaba violando…PCP-SL le ha enseñado y le ha dicho, si sales, si vas con militares, así le van a violar a tu mujer y a ti mismo.”34 Similar threats from the PCP-SL and pressure from the military left many Asháninkas with a hard choice to make and allowed for further control from the Senderistas. Many testimonies comment on the idea of being forced into action. A testimony from a 48-yearold woman from Puerto Ocopa states the following about learning through force and threats: 33 34

CVR testimony from 2000. 45 year old man from Puerto Ocopa. CVR testimony from an interview. Man from Quempiri.

Loebenstein 91 Aprendimos a la fuerza. Hacía saludar a su presidente, hacer sujeción única al presidente Gonzalo…. SI no cumples (las tareas o normas dictadas por el PCP-Sl), hablas de lo que piensas y sientes, uno mismo se critica: soy vago, ocioso, ¡qué diablos a veces pienso!. . Tres veces nomás puedes hacerlo, la tercera aplican violencia (asesinato). 35 The Shining path managed the Asháninkas physically and psychologically through the control of borders and transportation. For example the PCP-SL started kidnapping children in order to indoctrinate and train them militarily. The schools used to indoctrinate the children were called Escuelas Populares where children of ages approximately 8 to 10 attended daily classes. According to one of the testimonies in the CVR, “los niños no jugaaban, les decián que tenían que cuidar porque van a venir los militares y les van a matar” (CVR 2003, 2.8.3, 254). The Escuela Popular also taught respect for President Gonzalo and rigorous disciplinary military training. As mentioned in the previous section, people like Benavides Cuevas formed part of the Shining Path militancy as a child soldier. A teenager interviewed by the CVR explains how the Shining Path enseñaba cómo matar, saquear, cómo traumar a la gente, asustar para que huyan y quedarse con las cosas. Nos llevaban para saquear, mataban a las gentes (Asháninkas). A las mujeres les enseñaban a trabajar. Una mujer era comando. Mataban a la gente que flojeaba, (que) estban pensativa, o por traición a tu patria” (CVR 2003, 2.8.3, 255). Thus many families attempted to hide their children in order to avoid kidnapping. In Otica some families hid their children in the monte despite the great risk implied for parents and children. Some of the punishments for those who were caught were limb amputation and death. The Fuerza Principal of the Senderistas denominated all traitors individualistas and carried out assassinations (CVR 2003, 2.8.3, 256).

35

Testimony from 1995, a 48-year-old woman from Puerto Ocopa

Loebenstein 92 Further violence, another part of the scheme to control the population, included selective assassinations because of “disobedience” but also led to deaths from anemia, malnutrition and diseases (CVR 2003, 2.8.3, 256). Children suffered the most from this violence and especially malnutrition: Dice, que cuando ya no había que comer, los niños ya era…con anemia, ya comían tierra, ya no comían ni sal, iba a sacar su…de palmera, su… chonta (…) A veces comían tierra los niños y bastantes morían” (CVR 2003, 2.8.3, 256). 36 Between the pressures from the Shining Path and the military that also began forming rondas de defensa in the 90s, the Asháninkas lost their human identities. The CVR reports that the Shining Path and that enslaved 44 Asháninka communities bajo su control; la imposición intencional de condiciones de vida y existencia inhumana que acarrearon numerosas muertes por desnutrición, hambre y agotamiento físico, abusos sexuales, secuestro de niños para indoctrinarlos según su ideología, esclavización, desplazamiento forzado y la privación grave de derechos en razón de la identidad del grupo étnico asháninka (CVR 2003, Fascículo 3, pp 33). The destruction of ethnicities and communal order in certain highland villages as well as in the central jungle, by the PCP-SL formed part of their strategy in the creation of the “new state.” This is related to the idea that Sendero provided for a new system of order and justice. Through physical and psychological control the Shining Path forced the Asháninka to join them, become their slaves, give up their children and if they refuseddeath was assured. In other words, the control over the Ashánika was not only psychological but also physical. From the CVR report and testimonies it seems that the Ashánika were not able to create much community action against the Shining Path. If we follow La Serna’s logic of communities needing effective justice systems, then perhaps

36

Male informant, 40 years old from Quempiri interviewed September 2002.

Loebenstein 93 the Ashánika’s did not have this established system suggesting that Sendero actually provided this for them.

2. Factors of Motivation Now that we have looked at the actors of Sendero and those susceptible to the PCP-SL, we will look at a more condensed vision of the variety of motivations to join. In terms of “gender, class, ethnicity, age, area of residence and occupation” there is a very diverse group of militants (Portugal 27). This section will argue for the idea that Sendero provided communities that did not have effective systems of justice and order a new and better alternative that would fulfill their psychological needs. The various motivational factors such as; an ideology of ideology of social change, the new system of moral or judicial order, grievances, revenge, and terror (through coercion, murder, intimidation and rape) all help explain this idea that the Shining Path was replacing their then current situations for the better. However, one must first ask what could have attracted people to join a radically violent group that sought to destroy the system in order to re create a new society? Using testimonies in Andrea Portugal’s article “Voices From the War: Exploring the Motivation of Sendero Luminoso Militants” helps clarify this question.

a. Ideology of Social Change Sendero Luminoso, which through its ideology managed to swallow the individual, was also able to propagate violence from its discourse of social justice. The idea of social change fits in context of widespread socioeconomic and ethnic inequalities and injustices. The idea of change was seen not only by those who suffered the

Loebenstein 94 inequalities but also by many students who were sympathetic. The biography of Isabel taken from Andrea Portugal’s research was a woman imprisoned in the Penitenciaría de Máxima Seguridad de Mujeres in Chorrillos is an example. Born in Lima in 1962, she lost her parents but managed to enter Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos UNMSM to Study Law in 1979. She talks about being moved by the death of Edith Lagos and identifying with her. She states that this event marked her life and put her in a dilemma “lograr el título, como decíamos, ensamblarnos al sistema o atrevernos a coger las armas como en el campo” (CVR testimony 700057 in Portugal 29). Typical for young people, this kind of mindset perceived their role in the future as either submissive or brave. Isabel’s brother, Harold, experienced a similar situation and together they joined the Universities PCP-SL group. In 1983, she was arrested for her participation in an attack on a bank. She was tortured in jail and declares that: “como combatiente tenía que ponerme en las peores situaciones, y una de ellas era que me violen…en el interior del estabelecimiento de la Penitenciaría, el Partido Comunista del Perú- Sendero Luminoso tenía una vida organizada” (CVR testimony 700057 in Portugal 29). She began to gradually stop participating in the group in jail but when released at age 27, she was unable to reintegrate into society. However, she joined again and had a child with another militant. She states that la situación era cada vez más grave debido a que ahora tenía un niño a quien mantener. Por otro lado, aún me interesaba la política del Partido Comunista- Sendero Luminoso pese a que todo lo que me había sucedido era diferente a lo que me dijo el Partido (CVR testimony 700057 in Portugal 29). Consequently in 1994, she was captured and sentenced to life imprisonment. Elizabeth, (testimony 700041 in the CVR) was born in Ayacucho in 1963. She had worked as domestic servant in Lima and then traveled to Huancayo in 1986 selling clothing.

Loebenstein 95 Elizabeth met a group of Senderistas who asked her to join and she claims she accepted because she had been witness to so many injustices that she “sympathized with their discourse for fighting for social justice” (Portugal 30). Another example of the power of ideology is the case of Rosa, CVR testimony 700054. Rosa was born in Lima in 1970 and migrated to the district of Villa El Salvador with her brothers. In 1988, Rosa started her nursing degree and UNMSM where she “worked in poor areas and participated in debated about the national situation” (Portugal 30). Her participation in the debated and critical view of what was going on in the country led her to decide to join Sendero. In her own words, she states that “llega un momento en que tienes que decir que si no estás de este lado, lo estás del otro” (CVR testimony 700054 in Portugal 30). Similarly, Pilar (CVR testimony 700059) went by herself to study Education of UNSCH in Ayacucho. She was the student delegate from her faculty and of the Women’s wing. In Huamanga, she states that “she opened her eyes before such a cruel political and social reality that her country lived” (CVR testimony 700059 in Portugal 30). In her testimony she refers to the state response as genocide, vocabulary often used by the Shining Path militants (Portugal 30). As an education student, Pilar saw the injustices of the Peruvian system and was clearly motivated by the idea of social change. The testimonies analyzed by Andera Portugal make little reference to the militant’s personal lives, which makes it difficult to completely reconstruct their pasts in order to find common elements between the militants. Of course one cannot generalize that all students who sympathized with the Shining Path actually went to war or joined the group. There were those who sympathized with the ideas of social change and did not

Loebenstein 96 end up joining the ranks of the Shining Path. CVR testimonies such as that of a student of UNE in 1990 states that había demasiadas injusticias…se hablaba de tanta opresión, de tanta miseria y que la participación, de que el estudiante debía, tenía que tener esa Guerra interna, pero como parte del movimiento revolucionario o sea la Guerra popular de esa época. Entonces, no todos, como yo, han ido a la Guerra. Sin embargo, simpatizábamos mucho con todas las posiciones históricas y otra cosa la situación hubiera sido muy buena para las grandes mayorías (CVR 2003, V: 616). However, Portugal does make several connections that are also reaffirmed by the CVRs final report. First, many of the militants were young students from public universities studying in Faculties of Social Sciences, Education and Nursing. These kinds of students had to make sacrifices to pursue their studies such as migrations into cities, working to pay for their studies and, in most cases they left their families behind. Secondly, most were born or lived in the peripheries of Lima in the poorest districts. Finally, they had a strong sense of duty and concern for others, a kind of “personal mandate” of doing something to change the unequal and unjust situation in which they and a majority of Peruvians lived (Portugal 31). This unequal system of justice is perpetuated by the inefficacy of the Peruvian judicial system and lack of presence in rural areas of the highlands or Amazon. In villages where there was no established community system of order, the Shining Path’s influence was greater (La Serna). The PCP-SL offered not only a structured system of order but also the promise of social change. It is in this light that the socialist and radical political atmosphere of the time, especially Marxism, was directly tied with adolescence and heavily influenced certain communities.

b. Sendero as the Provider of a New Moral Order

Loebenstein 97 The Shining Path in its initial actions strategically eliminated those people most of the communities viewed as exhibiting immoral behaviors. To legitimize itself and attract new members in both rural and urban areas, Sendero attempted to reestablish order through the “public punishment of peasants who flouted the communities’ norms” (Portugal 33). This idea relates to La Serna’s argument, which differentiates between communities who had effective historically established systems of order and those who did not. These systems of order were necessary since the state’s judicial system was ineffective for both. The communities whose own systems of order established through landlord power structures were effective did not need or want Sendero whereas the communities whose systems of justice and order were not established or were disrupted, were more prone to accepting them. These susceptible villages incorporated the Shining Path as they established a system of justice and order as well as the fact that they fulfilled many other psychological needs. Within the universities as mentioned previously, the PCP-SL earned its initial support because of the ideology but also because they encouraged the dismissal of the teachers who the majority thought were incompetent, corrupt, immoral and even the professors who had sexual intercourse with students (Portugal 33). The CVR testimonies, especially student testimonies reveal how unhappy students were with the bureaucratic inefficacy and corruption of authorities and teachers (Portugal 33). By eradicating this kind of corruption, Sendero attracted many students. The CVR testimony of a former Universidad Nacional del Centro del Perú (UNCP) student recalls how the sexual blackmail Desapareció, y fue muy positivo dentro de la Universidad, el chantaje sexual de los profesores, desapareció el cobro para aprobar a un alumno,

Loebenstein 98 había cierto temor, cierto respeto porque estos grupos en las incursiones señalaban que estas acciones negativas no tenían por qué estar sucediendo y que los castigarían (CVR 2003, V: 669). This kind of “cleansing” provided by the Shining Path formed part of the construction of the new moral order in universities but also moved in its attempt to restructure Peruvian society as a whole. The wide spread conceptions of Peru as a corrupt, unjust, and hungry capitalist elite society that oppresses its Poor was seen throughout society. By constructing an idea of a new moral order that would benefit those in need, the Shining Path played on the needs and desires of the poor sectors of society. Finally, it is important to note that the established system of order was clearly viewed as immoral and ineffective. Thus it is in this environment that Sendero was able to provide a new system of moral justice which aimed to eradicate the corruption and indecency of the established order.

c. Grievances: Exclusion, Discrimination and Abuse The common recurring traits within most of the available CVR testimonies (students and those from poor or rural backgrounds) are direct and or indirect exclusion, as well as discrimination and abuse. These “feelings seem to become exasperated over time as they try to fit into the system and move upwards through education” (Portugal 35). The testimonies as well as Shining Path literature has illustrated how those who became militants were discriminated against because of issues like social class, place of origin, gender and their ethnicities all of which are associated with the stigma of Indians in Peru. The following two excerpts of CVR testimony illustrate and hint at the profoundness of these grievances:

Loebenstein 99 En Huamanga, jóvenes de ciudades intermedias y pueblos pequeños llegaron a la Universidad con grandes expectativas, pero a la larga iban comprendiendo que eran muy pocas las posibilidades de movilidad social por la estructura centralista y desigual del país. Las incertidumbres generadas en estos jóvenes fueron llenadas por una propuesta política basada en el fundamentalismo político, la cultura del enfrentamiento y una lectura ideologizada de los procesos sociales que experimentaba el Perú (CVR 2003,V:600). El PCP-SL apelaba a rabias…no sé si ocultas, rabias directas, abiertas y creo que ese fue un poco el mensaje que fue jalando a muchos estudiantes cantuteños a Sendero Luminoso. Ese odio de clase, esa gran diferencia social que había: gente con tanto dinero y gente que no tiene, porque todos estábamos en esa misma situación (CVR 2003, V: 619). The grievances described in the above quotations highlight the unequal structure of Peruvian society that did not allow for the poor to better their conditions. Providing mobility out of these structures, Sendero also appealed to the rage and discontent that come with the inequality. As examples of this appeal towards grievances, these testimonies show that how the marginalized and stigmatized sectors of the population were motivated. Furthermore, grievances or anger as the last testimony explains, increased during the economic and social crisis of 1987 and 1988. This crisis forced many students to abandon their studies (Palmer 180). Resentment from the younger generation created yet another motive to join Sendero in this case as the crisis prevented student from entering the Peruvian University System. According to Palmer, “of 217,679 students applying to public universities in 1987, 36,469 (16.7 percent) were accepted; of 95,131 students applying to private universities, 28,651 (30.2 percent) were accepted” (180). Thus 247,670 applicants failed to enter the Peruvian university system in 1987, which is close to 80 percent (Palmer 180). These students lacked the opportunity for advancement which

Loebenstein 100 decreased their possibilities of a better future. For them, finding employment would also be impossible. It is here that the Shining Path “offers an outlet for the resulting hostility these young men and women feel toward the system” (Palmer 1992, 180). Like the previous testimonies, Andrea Portugal quotes Narda Henriquez as she expands on the testimony. This account presents an imprisoned middle-rank militant’s experiences with poverty but also how she found the path that she needed to take. lo que a mí me ha llevado son las causas de opresión, miseria, porque yo en carne propia he vivido…Entonces llegado el momento uno decía: basta ya. Había una guerra interna en el Perú. El pueblo, la gente pobre, se vió en la disyuntiva de qué hacer: o apoyas la revolución o apoyas la contrarrevolución. Ya cada quién se definía qué camino tomar (Portugal 36). Consequently, the political situation of Peru during the internal war was a breeding ground for action against grievances and the idea of revenge resulting in a change of then current economic and social conditions. The CVR states that PCP-SL was able to capitalize sentiments of marginalization, a sense of abandonment by the government and inequality, which existed in the poor regions of the country, especially the highlands (CVR 2003, 2.1, 17). Grievances are also tied to the idea that the government had abandoned these sectors of the population. Since the government did not provide a system of justice many joined Sendero. However those who felt victimized by Sendero as they already had a communal system of justice, joined CAD or Comités de Autodefensa. Armed by the Fujimori government, rondas were initiated in 1991 (CVR 2003 2.1.5.2, 42). In other words, the population assumed the role of the state in areas that did not have previously established systems of justice and order. Consequently, in some cases the CADs are created to fend of the abuses of the Senderistas while others are created to fend of the military itself. The irony of some testimonies describing the rondas were that

Loebenstein 101 initially it was ex-senderistas who joined the rondas because of regret or personal resentments and regret for what they had done (CVR 2003 2.1.5.2, 42). The CVR does, however, acknowledge the complexity of the situation, stating that it was not only grievances which motivated people to join but that it was also passive submission, curiosity, and the state of fear which most Peruvians, especially students and indigenous populations lived in those times (CVR 2003, V, 2.1, 17).

d. The Role of Revenge for Senderistas in an Unequal Peru Another additional motivator mentioned by Andrea Portugal and other academics is a deep desire for revenge, especially ethnic revenge 37 that many poor people and indigenous populations felt. In her article, Portugal explains how government repression, including a multitude of massacres in the Andean and other indigenous communities led many peasants, artisans and students to join the party to avenge the death of family members (38). One testimony states, “It’s been 160 years of government by the rich. Now it’s our turn,” (Koppel 16). This statement made by one of shantytown residents who supported the guerillas desire for revenge and especially the desire to govern. Likewise, the testimony of Andrés reveals how is strong desire for revenge led him to join the Shining Path to compensate for his hatred and his losses (CVR testimony 720036 in Portugal 38). Born in Ayacucho, Andres eventually became the Chief of Security of the Shining Path and was eventually imprisoned at the Penal de Yanamilla in Ayacucho (Portugal 38). Andrés reveals how before he joined the movement, in 1983, terrorists arrived and began 37

“Ethnic revenge” concept taken from page 74 of: Strong, Simon. Shining Path: The World's Deadliest Revolutionary Force. Hammersmith, London: HarperCollins Publisher, 1992. Print.

Loebenstein 102 organizing his village and telling them they needed to abandon the village because the military was coming to kill them. Many, thinking this was true, hid in the mountains with their families, following the Senderistas. He lived hidden in the mountains with his family until 1984, when they were captured by ronderos and taken to an abandoned house. He recalls: pude escuchar fuertes gritos y pedidos de piedad de muchas mujeres… como 18 personas eran, todas mujeres, allí concentraron en una casita, y yo estaba mirando del frente; los militares entraban y salían de esa casa y al día siguiente, metieron una ráfaga del patio; eran casi 40 soldados… desde ese momento, atravecé una situación crítica y no tuve a nadie a mi lado, pues con mi hermana Chiquita, juntos andábamos y dormíamos juntos (CVR 2003 testimony 720036 in Portugal 39). When captured, Andrés stated that he did not join Sendero because of conviction, rather for fear of dying and because he was resentful against the soldiers who killed his mother. Testimonies such as these are insightful but they do not guarantee that subjects are entirely truthful. Alternative motives such as maintaining the same story reacted during torture sessions in captivity is only one of many reasons prisoners could and might easily lie or alter the truth in the CVR testimonies. Clearly it is impossible to evaluate the degree to which testimonies from either side are truthful and or accurate. Considering the amount of individuals who have been interviewed and or questioned throughout the entirety of the conflict, there are some clear patterns. The fact that testimonies lack 100 percent accuracy in terms of details or exaggerations does not render them useless for our purposes. As most terrorist testimonies come from already imprisoned individuals, it is safe to assume that their testimonies are accurate enough considering that they have no reason to lie as it will not improve their prison sentence. The fact that motivations seem

Loebenstein 103 to be rather similar across testimonies also supports the overall accuracy and usefulness of these accounts. Finally it is important to note that for sectors of Peruvian society such as those who had sacrificed everything to send their children to universities, the desire to revenge was strong since the system prevented their now educated children to integrate into society as the professionals they were because of ethnic stigmas. The “frustration on discovering that the official Peru has no place for them” and the fact that they would continue to be discriminated against via racism and impenetrable bureaucracy, makes them easy recruits for the Shining Path. For the disillusioned and racially and culturally alienated, the movement offers hope, identity and self-advancement as well as a chance to unleash historic ethnic and social vengeance” (Palmer 74). The idea of a yearning for revenge from the system that was clearly oppressing this population tied into this paper’s argument that Sendero provided for an alternative to the very same frustrations and system of order that were vengeance desires. In communities that felt that there was no system of authority, no power structure that would change present circumstances, people sought Sendero as an alternative as which would not only fulfill their psychical psychological needs but also their desire of vengeance. e. Terror and Violence as a Means of Controlling the Population According to many of the testimonies available in the CVR, documentaries and Shining Path literature motivations to join the Shining Path also included fear. By fear we must understand that Sendero Luminoso strategically applied terror, coercion, massacres, or individual murders, torture, intimidation through threats and in some cases even rape. Although many Senderistas joined on their own accords, the CVR also shows testimonies

Loebenstein 104 in which people were forced against their own will. A 2002 CVR interview with a villager from Pujas in Vilcashuamán stated how the PCP-SL “valiéndose en armas, obligaron a la comunidad contra su voluntad” (CVR 2003 2.1.3.6.2, 33). According to the CVR’s final report, the Shining Path was responsible for 1,543 cases of disappeared people, and the deaths of approximately 12, 564 people. This data represents 54% of the total deaths during the internal conflict. Furthermore, the amount of actual victims killed by the Shining Path exceeds 1.7 times the number of dead and disappeared that the state was responsible for (CVR 2003, 1.1.2, 15). 50 percent of the murders attributed to Sendero were reported by the CVR to have occurred in the department of Ayacucho. Ayacucho suffered almost four times the victims that Junín suffered, followed by Huáncuco, Huancavelica and Apurímac (CVR 2003, 1.1.2, 16). Attacking, coercing and threatening with purpose, the terrorist actions of Sendero Luminoso, especially those of the juicios populares, allowed them to impose control over specific areas of the country. Control was key for the Shining Path and perhaps why 24 percent of the assassinations on their part were of local authority figures or social directors. In that way, they were able to fill the authority gap not provided by the state. By also controlling the population with more ease they represented the only and all authority in many areas. The CVR distinguishes between selective assassinations in urban areas versus the rural highlands. They state that the first had the objective of terrorizing the population to take advantage of the urban zone, which would make their political objectives resonate. The second had the objective of generating power vacuums that would replace the old structure with the “new power” through comisarios in various zones. By replacing these old ineffective structures Sendero sough control of the

Loebenstein 105 populations to convince them that they were now the new power in control, It is thus through fear and violence as well as because Sendero replaced what they may have deemed ineffective structures, that many Peruvians rural or urban militants were motivated to join the ranks.

3. A Slogan for Change The Shining Path utilized a variety of methods of recruitment, depending on the year, area and conditions encountered. Recruitment is directly tied to many of the previous observations in the earlier motivation section, although it is important to note that these were done intentionally. The PCP-SL did no solely rule by terror, but attempted to present an alternative to the country’s political and social conditions. According to Koppel the “Shining Path does not recruit from the most politically experienced and confident working-class fighters, or even seasoned peasant activists” but rather from rural villagers and peasantry “most likely isolated and underdeveloped areas of the country, as well as shantytown dwellers, particularly unemployed youth” (16). Perhaps this is due to the fact that seasoned peasant activists had other ideas or examples for means to overturn the system that oppressed most indigenous and did not necessarily turn to Sendero as the way out to establish a new system of order. The Shining Path was consequently left with intellectuals on one side and on the other with their main base of support. This main base, the indigenous communities, saw the Sendero as the only way to overturn the system. According to Kirk, to lay the foundations of a successful struggle the Shining Path needed to organize and recruit a critical mass of supporters which was accomplished using highly evolved propaganda campaigns (quoted in Mealy 11). Propaganda targeted

Loebenstein 106 indigenous peasants who were viewed as the principal combatants and with its slogan for change and promises of a better future; the Shining Path above all offered a promise of order (Koppel 17). Also known as the discurso de igualdad, the Shining Path announced these political ideas in plazas such as in Vilcashuamán but also in their teachings (CVR 2003 2.1.3.1, 19). One of the testimonies of a PCP-SL leader in the CVR reveals that the PCP-SL would say that “nosotros estamos luchando para la gente pobre, para que seamos iguales, para que no tengamos diferencia con ricos y pobre y así vamos a luchar” (CVR 2003 2.1.3.1, 19). These discourses of equality and the promises for change are what would allow the Shining Path to be seen as the beacon a new order. Similarly, Sendero Luminoso provided a means of revenge for the oppressed, but also an attempt to escape linguistic and or economic domination (Strong 74). In her article, Andrea Portugal argues that recruitment methods include: indoctrination and seduction in those vulnerable to the ideology found Pensamiento Gonzalo, the breakdown of family relationships in which militants were forced to abandon their families and the party replaced any and all notions of family, paternalism and clientelism in which teachers and others would build opportunist relationships with Sendero, and lastly terror and coercion as a means of cooption. Her article touches on almost all the themes covered in Sendero recruitment literature, particularly those that involve terror. “a la mayoria los sometía, la mayoría tenía mucho miedo, había mucho pánico” (CVR 2003 V:668) said a teacher of Sociology at UNCP. “Se planteó un Nuevo plan y ahí vinieron los famosos volantes, hasta incendiaron mi departamento mi escritorio, todo…y apareció un cartelón amenazando que si no me iba me mataban. Sin embargo, yo me quedé en la facultad porque yo pensaba que no estaba haciendo nada malo, nada fuera de lo que era favorable para la carrera” (CVR 2003, V:672) said the Dean of the Economics Faculty at the UNCP

Loebenstein 107 “El temor no había vencido, el temor era generalizado” (CVR 2003, V: 671) As the CVR testimony excerpts illustrate, the Shining Path reined and recruited mainly with terror. These quotes illustrate a University administration perspective, which show the impact of Sendero’s use of fear within educational institutions that were completely infiltrated with Shining Path members. Pressure to join or be ousted in the universities was widespread and Sendero was seen as not only a way of creating social change in Peru but also as a means to teach and initiate change through students. Fear in the large sense back many people into corners and forced them to decide if Sendero fulfilled the needs they desired or if it did not. In essence fear was the figurative gun held to many heads that led people to decide whether to join or not. This decision lied on effectiveness of the individual’s community justice system. The following two short excerpts reveal the sentiments of fear commonly found in many of the victims’ stories: Mi vida no vale de anda. Viene uno te mata. Viene el otro, te pega (CVR 2003 2.1.5, 35). Acaso éramos como gente allí estábamos como en nuestros sueños…los de Sendero nos mataban, los militares no mataban, quien ya pues nos miraría” (CVR 2003 2.1.5, 35). While Sendero Luminoso symbolized fear and selective terror, the Peruvian armed forces formed a constant threat and danger, especially for the female population since they were the most prone to sexual violence (CVR 2003 2.1.5, 35). Fear propagated through terrorist acts is also reflected in the idea that the Peruvian people, especially the indigenous populations in the highlands and the jungle were caught between two fires, or in Spanish entre la espada y la pared.

Loebenstein 108

Conclusion of Actors and Motivations The purpose of looking at who joined the Shining Path and what motivated them to do so is to further the understanding of why how individual motivations whether for personal gain or from fear or coercion relate to group actions, and in this case terrorist actions. This chapter has argued that Sendero’s main base was the indigenous peasantry of the highlands even though Amazonian indigenous and students were also a part of the movement. Also that the main motivators to join the Shining Path had to do with whether an individual’s community power and justice structure was effective or not. These structures stemming from colonial legacies and semi feudalism for some provided adequate systems of justice and allowed for physical and psychological needs to be met. Those areas in which this did not occur, are the areas where individuals were most vulnerable towards Sendero’s ideology for change. Sendero appealed towards grievances suffered by the indigenous and looked to provide a better alternative. By combining testimonies, literature and film into an exploration of the Shining Path militants’ motivations the profiles and testimonies here help create a more accurate panorama of those involved in the Shining Path. Furthermore, by default, this chapter points out the major flaw in the study of Sendero Luminoso and the ramifications this has for preventing this or a similar terrorist group from rising now that terrorists and terrorist leaders from the internal conflict are being released from prison. If the socio economic and political problems that caused this movement have still not been addressed, then there is little stopping these leaders from taking action yet again. The major flaw in the study of Sendero Luminoso was brought to light in research for this thesis since Peruvian government glossed and continues to gloss

Loebenstein 109 over terrorist testimonies. The few testimonies available can be found in the CVR report, which for the most part only concentrates on the victims, rather than the terrorists. By glossing over the terrorists Peru and the government replicate the strategy applied during the conflict itself; that is a dehumanization of the terrorist. This dehumanization is linked not only to the trashing of the woman’s body but also towards racism. Santisteban’s account brings to light the theme of racism tied with dehumanization through the recounting of Gina Gamboa’s testimony. The themes of racism tied to authoritarian violence that attempted to make the Senderistas invisible are found even in Peruvian cinema. For example Francisco Lombardi’s film represented this same invisibility of the Senderistas in the sense that mainstream criollo culture ignores them or does not seek to portray them as anything other than savage terrorists without faces. This depiction contributes to the racist idea that they, the terrorists, are all the same between themselves. Only by understanding the political and socioeconomic as was as ethnic divide in Peru can we see the need for communities to find a new moral and judicial order. Only then can we understand militant motivations and how the Shining Path became a symbol for changing this unequal system for many Peruvians.

Conclusion This thesis combines an analysis of the historical, political, social and economic environment of Peru with a compilation of Sendero militant profiles, motivations and their susceptibility. I attempt understand why SL militants did what they did through a more human and more realistic perspective than the monstrous image portrayed by the government, the press, and almost all other sources. The compilation of sources and

Loebenstein 110 especially interviews from the various sections of the Truth and Reconciliation Committee Final Report create a more unified and comprehensive study of the actors within the Shining Path as well as their motivations for joining. By bringing together academic works, interviews, documentaries, and more in order to create a more accurate picture of the motivations that lead individuals to join this group, this thesis attempts to show the hidden reality and complexity of who and why joined the Shining Path. It can in this way, also attempt to predict the behavior of isolated Peruvian communities whose susceptibility towards ideologies or grievances against the state is increased by socio economic disparity and that may turn to group cohesion for terrorist action. As previously mentioned, profiles and explanations of militants are not widely available to the public. For various reasons neither the government, the CVR, the press nor academics have sought to create a report which would attempt to understand individual militants and why they chose to join a group whose actions would change the course of Peruvian history. There are many possibilities that could explain this such as lack of government and or elite interest in these sectors of the population, the fact that studying and giving senderistas a voice does not contribute to the VCR’s “reconciliation” agenda, and perhaps it also served as a government strategy. If the government, the press and even citizens view and continue to view members of the Shining Path as “monsters,” then the critical and most important issues having to do with why this group formed are not being addressed. In the past, the armed forces, to dehumanize the guerillas in the eyes of the local populations, distributed pamphlets throughout the countryside “warning of the dangers of the subversives” (Mealy 37). Some portrayed SL members as foreign criminals intent on destroying the

Loebenstein 111 indigenous people; others portrayed them as evil otherworldly monsters (Mealy 37). One depiction in particular illustrates this by showing peasants cowering and running from an enormous creature with sharp claws while behind him was a Peruvian soldier who hurried to rescue the peasants. In order to further dehumanize the militants, they were also often described as not fully physically human, that is physiologically different (Theidon 549). By being depicted as monsters with three bellybuttons or genitals on unusual places on the body, this procedure continued. Furthermore, the conceptions of the terrorists drew on negative psychocultural themes, extra local discourses and militant Christianity (Theidon 548). Terms used to describe the Senderistas include; terrucos which was borrowed from the armed forces, malafekuna or people of bad faith or conscience which adds to the idea that they were born to kill, anticristos or antichrists, tuta puriq or those who walk at night, puriqkuna meaning those out of place or without belonging, gringos suggesting that the Senderistas came from other countries which relates to the idea and image of them as otherworldly, de dos caras or two-faced, and finally piojosos or covered in lice adding to the theme of their physical impurity (Theidon 548). It is important to note that it was not only the government who participated in this process, but also the peasants themselves (Theidon). In extracting the human, caring and neighborly nature out of the militants, the peasants themselves used this as a strategy to facilitate the slaughter of members of their own community, the senderistas within. These were of course communities in which the established system of order functioned and was providing the community justice and order.

Loebenstein 112 I have mentioned the failure of the Peruvian government to address the problems that “caused” and or motivated people to join the PCP-SL as one of the risks and dangers within the prevention of terrorism. The Peruvian government, and many Latin American governments should be aware of the fact that exclusively military responses in a socially and economically fragmented country will not eradicate the kinds of ideas perpetuated by Abimael Guzmán and the Shining Path, nor will they eliminate terrorists. In this sense, Peru continues to fail to address the underlying issues causing terrorism. By employing military violence onto populations that already suffered the most only created more divisions within the country. This blurred the lines between good and evil from the citizens’ perspective and added to the distrust of the government who was supposedly there to protect them. The theory of relative deprivation as well as explorations of grievances and motivators base most of their theoretical legitimacy on the socio economic disparities within Peru. Of course the deeply rooted grievances stemming from colonial legacies to semi feudal structures to the stigma of the Indian and inequalities, contribute to interplay between those who actually ideologically sympathized with the Shining Path cause and desired similar outcomes versus those Peruvians who through terror and coercion joined the ranks. The causes and motivations for Sendero Luminoso are vast but they lie in the socio economic disparities of the country and especially its deeply rooted ethnical divide and power dynamics. In fact, the power structures and systems of order within the communities are essential in understanding why some people from rural indigenous background joined Sendero and others did not. The answer lies in whether Sendero provided for physical and psychological needs of these communities or whether these

Loebenstein 113 needs were already being met. To understand the inequalities that Sendero aimed to combat facts are in order. In the first place, the World Bank’s Peru Poverty Report confirms that Peru still faces high levels of poverty and inequality. Moreover, poverty levels are significantly higher in rural areas, while urban areas most notably the metropolitan city of Lima are the most unequal (World Bank). Even with the economic recovery since 2001, after the crisis in the late 1990s, progress on poverty rates has been limited. The report focuses on the explanation of why economic growth in Peru has not translated into more rapid poverty reduction. As previously described the socio economic inferiority status suffered by the Indians in of Peru continues the colonial legacies, which have and still lead to the stigmatization of Indians by the ruling elite of Peru. In a country where the majority of people are Amerindian (45%) and the rest are either mestizo (37%), white (15%) or of Asian decent (3%), Peru maintains high ethnic tensions. Furthermore, the absence of a strong presence of the Peruvian state-other than in military presence38- in the provinces where the Shining Path gained followers such as the Andean highlands and the Amazon is still a major problem. This had lead to an increased feeling of abandonment by the populations who are still seeking reparations for their wartime suffering. The connection between these grievances and the remnants of Sendero are strong. The recent Shining Path attacks documented by DIRCOTE 39 suggests that the number of terrorist actions carried out by PCP-SL in its “three areas of operation, the

38

In my visit to Ayacucho and especially the smaller towns surrounding the city such as Huanta, I saw the overwhelming presence of the armed forces. Men were stationed and armed with heavy machinery in Ayacucho and mainly on the highways on the way out of the city but also near smaller towns that I visited such as Huanta. 39

Dirección Contra el Terrorism

Loebenstein 114 VRAE40, Upper Huallaga and Lima show 175 attacks in 2006, 72 in 2007, 76 in 2008, 102 in 2009 and 136 in 2010” (Palmer and Bolivar 6). Despite the fact that most of the organization’s leaders are imprisoned, Sendero continues and evolves through three different branches (Palmer and Bolivar), which is also known as the Shining Path’s resurgence. The first is the Lima based Shining Path supporters led by their chief spokesperson Alfredo Crespo, Abimael Guzman’s lawyer, as well as Manuel Fajardo associated with the Movement for Amnesty and Fundamental Rights known as MOVADEF. This group engages in efforts to free jailed militants, a general amnesty campaign and expands its networks to unions and universities (Palmer and Bolivar 9). In an attempt to find peaceful means for change, MOVADEF has organized marches and protests in favor of granting general amnesty to those involved in the internal conflict ironically including Alberto Fujimori and the military offenders as well (Palmer and Bolivar 11). MOVADEF has been making attempts to enter the legitimate political scene in Peru and attempted to participate in the April 2011 elections, but failed. The fact that they received 150,000 signatures indicated they are making traction through non-violence (Palmer and Bolivar 11). The second is in the Upper Huallaga Valley region led by Florindo Eleuterio Flores Hala, also known as Comrade Artemio. Artemio continued to follow the Pensamiento Gonzalo until his capture in 2012. Until recently in 2012, the head of the rebel group, known as Comrade Artemio, was the only high-profile Shining Path leader who had not been caught or killed. On March 25, 2008, Shining Path members led by Artemio working with drug traffickers killed a police officer and wounded eleven on an anti-drug patrol (Council of Foreign Relations). Artemio has stated that even though the 40

Apurímac-Ene

Loebenstein 115 Shining Path hasn't been very active since the 1992 capture of Guzmán, they are rising again and intend to grow and work in secrecy (Council of Foreign Relations). The third is the VRAE organization led by José, Orlando Alejandro Borda Casafranca, Jorge Quespe Palomino and Rolando Cabezas Figueroa (Palmer and Bolivar 10). The first two support and continue to accept Guzman’s leadership and guidance while the third, those in the VRAE reject him and prefer a military solution in the context of their own ongoing armed struggle (Palmer and Bolivar 10). President Humala has commented that the “la derrota de Sendero en el Huallaga es absoluta” after the capture of Artemio and the more recent capture of Freddy Arenanas Caviedes aka Comrade Braulio. Praising the collaboration between the Peruvian National Police and the armed forces, the officials who made the Artemio capture were promoted. This shows the state is working together to be more effective but it does not necessarily mean that the causes of the terrorism are being addressed. If the problems are neglected but the captures are celebrated as if they signified total success, then the government taking a step backwards in its prevention of terrorism. The importance of the Artemio capture also lies in the regional ties with drug trafficking and cocaine production. As the second largest coca leaf producer in the world, the cultivation of coca in Peru was an estimated 40,000 hectares in 2009 producing an estimated 225 metric tons of pure cocaine (CIA World Factbook). The fact that the Internal Conflict did not fix or address any of these underlying issues demonstrates the relevance of studying the motivations behind each kind of person recruited for the Shining Path in order for the Peruvian state to prevent another group or even to prevent Sendero Luminoso from reforming through alternative leadership. As

Loebenstein 116 former Shining Path leaders and MRTA leaders are released in the years to come, it will be critical for the Peruvian government to take into account which citizens are susceptible to choosing the path of terrorism and why. Since the year 2000, the concern voiced over the almost 4,000 convicted insurgents who have completed their sentences without and follow-up tracking policy has increased (Palmer and Bolivar 8). In sum, it is essential to understand the Shining Path militants, as human beings who in many cases were coerced or actually identified with an ideology or movements, which, unlike the state had ever attempted to do, actually seemed to guard their best interests. We have to understand why they did what they did. If we fall into the racist and classist trap of deeming the senderistas what the Peruvian state deemed them throughout the internal conflict, then we are propagating the same stereotypes and problems, which caused the PCP-SL to form in the first place. In humanizing the senderistas and compiling theories and motivations to explain their actions as individuals but also as part of a cohesive group unit, my ultimate goal is certainly not to justify their actions nor terrorists actions. Rather, I aim to represent them and their motivations as well as their complexity as citizens. Furthermore, I am not advocating for or against PCP-SL ideology. My objective as an undergraduate liberal arts student studying International Studies, politics and Latin America, is to bring to light a missing viewpoint in the study of terrorism, which may clarify the motivations and humanize militants in order to add to a field of analysis, which may help to more successfully prevent any type of violent resurgence. After all, understanding the terrorists thus may help in terrorism prevention. It may help the Peruvian government understand that what it needs is a fair system of

Loebenstein 117 justice and governance, which will take an active role in all currently isolated communities currently. The idea is to provide the needs that the terrorists were assuming and actually guarding, protecting and defending their citizens no matter the geographic location or ethnicity. With the modern evolvement of SL into a drug trafficking funded organization in rural areas of Peru, addressing the motivations of the original Senderistas may not be enough. However, understanding the new forms of alternative leadership coupled with the understanding of the majority of the Senderistas alive today is a stepping stone in the right direction.

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