Who was responsible? : from Marco Polo Bridge to Pearl Harbor 9784643060126, 4643060123

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From Marco Polo Bridge to Pearl Harbor

WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE? Forewordby Editor-In-Chief TSENEO WATANABE Utedby J VV1KSH. AlHR

w THE YQM IIKI SHIMBIJN Japan

From Marco Polo Bridge to Pearl Harbor: W ho was responsible? Translation from original Japanese Kensho Senso Sekinin, Yom iuri Shim bun W ar Responsibility Reexam ination Com m ittee, Tokyo: Chuokoron-Shinsha, 2006 Translation: The D aily Yom iuri Copyright © 2006 by The Yom iuri Shim bun A ll rights reserved. First Edition

For inform ation about permission to reproduce or transm it, in any form or by any m eans, selections from this book and opinion, write to Yom iuri Research Institute, The Yom iuri Shim bun, 1-7-1 O tem achi, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100-8055, Japan http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/info/book/ ISBN-13: 978-4-643-06012-6 ISBN -10:4-643-06012-3 Library o f Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data available

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For Our Neighbors

FOREWORD

F

rom M arco Polo Bridge to Pearl Harbor—The M arco Polo Bridge (Lugouqiao) In cid e n t, w h ich was preceded by the M an ch u rian Incident o f 1931, ultim ately erupted into the 1937-45 Sino-Japanese War. A series o f conflicting approaches to the war in Chin a by Japan and the W estern Powers emerged as one o f the causes o f the 1941-45 Pacific War, w hich began w ith Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor. The Yom iuri Shim bun has published a pair o f Japanese-language books and this English-language book featuring the findings of a 14-month study on the wars Japan fought for nearly 14 years. The research was undertaken b y an in -h o u se tea m , th e Y o m iu ri S h im b u n W ar R e sp o n sib ility Reexam ination Com m ittee. (See page 9 for a list o f members.) The books are based on a yearlong series o f articles heralding the com ­ m ittee's findings that appeared in the Yom iuri newspaper through August 15,2006, the 61st anniversary o f the end o f W orld War II. Considering the Yom iuri Shim bun's daily circulation o f 10 m illion copies across Japan, I am sure the series was trem endously enlightening to m any people. People w ith no experience of wartime now account for a m ajority o f the Japanese population. As such, I believe it is the Yom iuri Shim bun's oblig­ ation as the nation's largest newspaper to tell the Japanese populace, "W ho was responsible for starting the Sino-Japanese War and the Pacific W ar, w hy they did so and w hy the nation kept fighting un til m any o f its cities had been alm ost com pletely reduced to ashes." I, m yself, was drafted as one o f the Im perial Japanese Arm y's last group o f privates, the lowest rank in the m ilitary. Before being conscripted, I studied liberalism as a university student am idst the suppression by m ili­ tary police and thought police. I am now 80 years old and serve as Editorin -C h ief o f the Yom iuri Shim bun. For some tim e, I had been thinking that we, the Japanese people, should delve into the circum stances surrounding those wars and clarify on our own just w ho should be held responsible. This is one reason w hy the Yom iuri Shim bun embarked on the task of looking into war responsibility. Follow ing the end o f W orld W ar II, the International M ilitary Tribunal 7

8

for the Far East, also know n as the Tokyo T ribunal, tried a group o f Japanese governm ent and m ilitary leaders w ho had been charged as ClassA war crim inals. Subsequently, seven o f these leaders were executed by hanging, w hile 16 others were sentenced to life and two were given lesser prison terms. The proceedings and verdicts handed down by the m ilitary tribunal were not w ithout flaws. U njustifiably heavy penalties were meted out to some defendants, w hile n ot a few people w ho should have been held accountable for appalling war crimes escaped prosecution. As a part of the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, Japan accepted the ver­ dicts handed down at the Tokyo Tribunal and promised to carry out the sentences. This settled the matter under international law at that tim e. However, Japan signed the peace treaty in order to regain its independence as quickly as possible; therefore, no efforts were made in the nam e o f Japan or its people to look into where responsibility for the war rested. The Y u sh u kan (war m em orial m useum ), w ith in th e grounds o f Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo, declares the vindication o f the Class-A war crim inals on the basis o f its private m anagem ent's conviction that the wars were fought for self-preservation, self-defense and for the liberation of Asia from W estern colonial rule. The particular problem w ith the shrine is its enshrinem ent o f Class-A war crim inals together w ith the souls of those m any soldiers w ho sacrificed themselves in battle. M any Japanese continue to worship at Yasukuni Shrine. If things are left as they are, a skewed perception o f history—w ithout knowledge o f the horrors o f the war—w ill be handed down to future generations. W here does responsibility for the wars lie? The answer often has been am biguous and blurred because o f the particular nature o f Japan's past political system, w hich led to the wars. In the m ilitary, field officers such as colonels often became more in flu ­ ential than even Emperor Showa, prime m inisters, cabinet m inisters, Army generals and Navy admirals in m aking decisions to go to and to escalate conflicts; they were responsible for m any atrocities. In some cases they in i­ tiated m ajor troop deploym ents w ithout the consent o f the Emperor, the Supreme Com m ander. A handful o f generals and staff officers devised special suicide tactics (called "kamikaze" attacks in other countries) and "gyokusai" operations in w hich every soldier or sailor involved sought to die in com bat w ith no contem plation o f surrender. As a result, staggering numbers o f young in telligen t people, m ost o f w hom had been m obilized straight from university study, were forced to sacrifice them selves in suicide attacks. Some m ilitary leaders did n ot treat their subordinates as hum ans. They abused th eir troops and regarded them as n o th in g b u t expendable

Foreword / 9

w eapons. Such inhum an deeds should have been strictly punished. It should be noted that the Yom iuri Shim bun's reexam ination o f where responsibility for the war sits was launched on its com m ittee's ow n in itia­ tive, and was n ot due to pressure from C h in a and/or South Korea. The Yom iuri Shim bun's efforts were based on its belief that there can be no g e n u in ely h on est and frie n d ly d ialogu e w ith those cou n tries w hich suffered considerable dam age and casualties in the wars w ith Jap an , w ith­ out correctly understanding Jap an 's past. To that end, we, the Japanese people, should follow our consciences in exp lain in g on our ow n how barbaric the wars were and w ho should be held responsible. This approach is indispensable for Jap an to forge friendship and peace w ith its neighbors in the future. W e hope the findings o f the Yom iuri Shim bun com m ittee serve as a cue for others to exam ine and explore w hat kinds o f m iscalculation or b lin d belief could trigger wars elsewhere in the future. It goes w ithout saying that we w ould be delighted if our efforts help facilitate a solution to the Yasukuni Shrine issue, w hich has jeopardized Japan's diplom atic relations w ith C h in a and South Korea, and has sharply divided public opinion in Jap an . Tsuneo W atanabe E ditor-in-Chief, The Yom iuri Shim bun

The Yomiuri Shimbun War Responsibility Reexamination Committee writers: Nobuo Asaumi (Chief Writer, Senior Editor & Senior Research Fellow), Tetsuya Ennyu (Staff Writer, Political News Department), Tatsuya Fukumoto (Staff Writer, Political News Department), Hiroyuki Fuse (Senior Editor), Masaaki Hamada (Senior Research Fellow), Masayuki Iida (Editorial Writer), Tetsuro Ito (Senior Research Fellow), Hidemichi Katsumata (Deputy Editor, Commentary & Analysis Department), Makoto Kito (Senior Research Fellow), Riichiro Maeki (Deputy Editor, Political News Department), Futoshi Mori (Staff Writer, City News Department), Shin Nagahara (Editorial Writer), Satoshi Saeki (Staff Writer, International News Department), Haruki Sasamori (Deputy Editor, Commentary & Analysis Department), Toshiaki Suzuki (Staff Writer, City News Department), Takahiko Tennichi (Editorial Writer) and Hideyuki Tokita (Staff Writer, Culture Department).

Editor's Note

A

m ong some foreign com mentators it is fashionable to say that Japan has not dealt w ith its past, particularly when compared to Germ any w hich has apologized for its actions. I have never subscribed to that posi­ tion, first o f all, because I believe that numerous Japanese leaders, includ­ ing the current and past emperors and numerous prime m inisters, have done so repeatedly, and second, because I believe Germ any's confronting o f history has prim arily been to take responsibility and apologize for the Holocaust rather than for its invasions o f other European countries and for acts o f violence com m itted in those actions. The A llied O ccupation o f Jap an took responsibility for id en tifyin g Japan's war crim inals and the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty settled the legal issue o f Japanese responsibility for its actions in foreign countries; however, it is certainly the prerogative o f the Japanese people to study who was responsible, w hy Japan got into trouble in C hin a and w ith the United States, w hy Japan failed to surrender by some tim e in 1944 after it was strategically defeated and whether the atom ic bom bings o f Hiroshim a and Nagasaki and the Soviet Union's entry into the war could have been avoided. Indeed, it w ould seem irresponsible for Japan not to study these matters carefully in order to incorporate "lessons learned" so that Japan does not one day repeat the mistakes it made w hich resulted in such dis­ astrous consequences for itself, its neighbors and for the citizens o f Japan and other countries. The Yom iuri Shim bun assem bled a talented com m ittee o f its own employees w ho did extensive literature reviews o f Japanese and English language sources and consulted numerous experts in com piling a series of articles, two Japanese language books and this English language book in the years 2005-2006 in order to produce a definitive and specific exam i­ nation o f Japan's "W AR RESPONSIBILITY." Although this com m ittee is made up o f journalists rather than scholars, its members conscientiously pored over as m any sources as they could reasonably access during the tim e allotted. Although I do not agree w ith all o f their findings, particu­ larly concerning the United States' rationale for dropping o f the atom ic ll

12

bombs, I understand this is their (Japanese) study for which I was merely asked to provide some editing. Also the issue o f U .S. rationale for Hiroshima and Nagasaki is not central to the Yomiuri thesis of which spe­ cific Japanese were responsible for the Sino-Japanese War, the Pacific War, for the unnecessary and strategically illogical expanding of those wars and for not terminating them prior to the atomic bombings and to the Soviets' entry to Manchuria. I first met Chief Officer Akira Saito of the Yomiuri Research Institute over 25 years ago when he was a Yomiuri reporter in Washington, D .C . He has taught me lots about Japan on more occasions than I can ever count ever since our first meeting. M y imperfect efforts as an editor can in no way compensate for what he has added to my knowledge and under­ standing. I also enjoyed working closely with Yomiuri Research Institute Senior Research Fellow Makoto Kito who sent me emails multiple times per day in trying to keep me focused and on schedule, a challenge he accomplished imperfectly, not because of his failings but owing to mine. I have never met Yomiuri Editor-in-Chief Tsuneo Watanabe; however, I have been a secret Yomiuri Giants baseball fan for over 40 years, and I am deeply impressed with his desire to produce serious Japanese and English language examinations of Japan's war responsibility for the people of Japan to learn from and for peoples outside Japan to know of the Japanese people's sincere desire to acknowledge their responsibility and their deter­ mination to not repeat the mistakes of the past as they continue in the post Showa Era of the 21st century. I salute his sincerity and determination. James E. Auer Director Center for U.S.-Japan Studies and Cooperation Institute for Public Policy Studies Vanderbilt University Nashville, Tennessee USA

Introductory Notes

T

his book, From Marco Polo Bridge to Pearl Harbor: Who Was Responsible? is based on a yearlong series o f articles in the Yom iuri Shim bun h e ra ld in g th e fin d in g s b y th e n ew sp ap er's W ar R e sp o n sib ility Reexam ination Com m ittee. It appears along w ith the Japanese-language book, Kensho Senso Sekinin (WAR RESPONSIBILITY—delving into the past) Vols. I & II, Tokyo: Chuokoron-Shinsha, 2006. In this book, Part I contains the English version o f the introductory sec­ tion o f the series w hile Parts II and III comprise English translations o f the whole o f their respective parts o f the Japanese series. In the Japanese version o f this book, reference to the publications such as books and records that are cited is made as part of each relevant sen­ tence. In this book, m eanw hile, sim ilar reference is provided in Notes at the end o f each Chapter. The endnotes also contain noteworthy historical remarks quoted from literature in English w ith analysis lines as well as brief explanatory notes about traditions and customs in Japan. Japanese names in this book are presented in the given nam e-fam ily name order, instead o f the traditional Japanese order o f fam ily name fol­ lowed by given nam e. For Chinese persons, the fam ily names precede the given names in line w ith Chinese tradition. The Emperor of the Showa Era, widely known abroad by his given name H irohito, is described as Emperor Showa in this book in accordance w ith his official nam e. Each Emperor has a given name only and not a surname while alive. However, the Japanese people traditionally do not refer to the m onarch by his given nam e, except during his childhood w hen people use the name to show their affection for him . This is true even when people m ention the Emperor in w riting. Thus, the current Emperor is called or described sim ply as Tenno (the Emperor) or more respectfully as Kinjo Tenno (the Reigning Emperor) or Tenno Heika (His M ajesty the Emperor). Upon his death, a posthum ous nam e, known as okurina in Japanese, is bestowed on the late Emperor and is com m only used by the Japanese public. In the case o f H irohito, the Japanese now call him by his posthu­ mous name o f Showa Tenno (Emperor Showa). In this book, we follow the 19

20

Japanese practice and refer to him as Emperor Showa. In the early part of each Chapter, the year o f the Showa Era correspond­ ing to the relevant year o f the Christian Era is given on the first reference. W e used italics for some Japanese proper nouns, for exam ple, when we refer to organizations th at are either obscure or w ould otherw ise be unclear when translated into English.

Glossary

Tenno (The Emperor) The figure (pp. 22-23) shows the hierarchical layers of the ruling system before and during the wars in the early years o f Emperor Showa's reign (1926-89). It m ay look sim ilar to that of a dem ocratic republic. But the two systems are very different. Whereas in a republic the head of state is elected by popular vote and is, therefore, politically accountable to the people, in Japan's Tenno-sei or Emperor system, the Emperor, although a con stitu tio n al m onarch, was n o t fu n d am en tally accountable to the Japanese people. The Emperor was accountable on ly to his ancestors ow ing to the unw ritten rule o f tradition w hich transcended w ritten statutes. W hile the president o f a dem ocratic republic has authority as the chief executive to make fin al policy decisions in exchange for political accountability, the Japanese Emperor, free from such accountability, was, by the M eiji Constitution, given titular supreme authority to sanction governm ent decisions by finalizing them w ith his seal. The lack o f actual decision-m aking authority made the Emperor im m une from being held responsible for policy blunders. This is said to have stemmed from the wis­ dom o f keeping the status o f the Emperor intact as the eternal m onarch. Gekokujo ("juniors prevail over seniors") Gekokujo, w hich literally means "juniors prevail over seniors," is a word dating back to Sengoku Jidai (the Age o f C iv il Strife) in Japan in the 15th and 16th centuries when lower-ranked m en overwhelmed their superiors by force in defiance o f traditional hierarchy. In prewar Japan, all sover­ eignty rested w ith the Emperor in name only; cabinet ministers and the Army and Naval Chiefs o f General Staff, w ho were custom arily assigned to give advice to the Emperor, were politically accountable. In reality, a rigid custom was in place whereby the Emperor would not act contrary to deci­ sions made by cabinet ministers and m ilitary leaders. At the same tim e, since the Emperor was so highly honored as patriarch and as head o f state, his subjects respectfully listened to his questions and criticism s on m any occasions. M eanw hile, it was a tradition in Japan to run the governm ent and the m ilitary by collective or group-oriented leadership. During the 21

22

1930s and the first h alf o f the 1940s, this decision-m aking m ethod often resulted in gekokujo phenom ena whereby a handful of elite staff officers drafted and decided policies and strategies practically at their discretion, only having their superiors in the governm ent and m ilitary give their con­ sent. Generally speaking, culture in governm ent and sometimes even in the corporate w orld in Jap an rem ains different from that in the W est where people at the top o f each organization effectively have a final say.

Tosuiken (no) Dokuritsu (independence o f the supreme com m and from the governm ent and the Diet) Japanese society traditionally abhors seeing the concentration o f power in one person or in a sin gle e n tity . A gainst this background, althou gh supreme com m and of the armed forces in prewar Japan rested w ith the Emperor in nam e, it was in reality effectively held by the m ilitary, inde­ pendent o f the cabinet and the Im perial D iet. This was known in Japanese as Tosuiken (no) Dokuritsu (independence o f the supreme com m and). In the early stage o f Japan's m odernization, Prime M inister Hirobum i Ito (1841-1909), w ith the backing o f Emperor M eiji (1852-1912), exception­ ally controlled both the governm ent and the m ilitary. However, in the period o f Emperor Showa, no charism atic government-leaders emerged; instead leaders were often bureaucratic, legalistically abid in g b y the

Qushin)

The advisory institutions o f Emperor Showa

Glossary / 23

C on stitu tion o f the Em pire o f Jap an . Therefore, the governm ent often proved unable to halt p olicy decisions made by the m ilitary independent o f the rest o f the governm ent. Eventually, the m ilitary acted autonom ous­ ly , occasionally depriving the governm ent o f decision-m aking authority even in the area o f foreign affairs.

Genro, jushin D uring the M eiji Era (1868-1912) and the Taisho Era (1912-1926), under an oral or w ritten Im perial edict to guide the Emperor inform ally, nine elder statesm en, all o f w hom had m ade outstanding contributions to the n ation-building process in and after the M eiji Restoration, were nam ed genro (senior advisers). T hey in clu d ed Prim e M in isters H irob um i Ito , A ritom o Yam agata (1838-1922) and form er Prim e M inister K in m och i Saionji (1849-1940), w ho was the on ly one w ho carried over to the Showa Era. In the Show a Era, jushin or u n official senior advisers and the Lord Keeper o f the Privy Seal inform ally advised the Emperor, jushin members were the form er prim e m inisters and the incum bent President o f the Privy C ou n cil; b u t, despite their status as advisers to the Emperor, they were unable to give effective advice to the Emperor in em ergencies ow ing to the fact that they lacked legal authority, responsibility and protection from the M ilitary Police and terrorism .

24

[M ap 1]

© Major defeat in Battle of Midway (June 1942: 4 Japanese aircraft carriers lost, 28S carrier-based planes lost) © Withdrawal from Guadalcanal (February 1943: 20,800 Japanese troops killed, 1,000 taken prisoner) © Total defeat on Attu Island (M ay 1943: 2,600 Japanese troops killed, 29 taken prisoners) © Major defeat at Battle of Philippine Sea (June 1944: 3 Japanese aircraft carriers lost)

M ain battles o f Pacific War / 25

• Defeat in Battle of Imphal (July 1944: 60,000 Japanese troops killed, 1,000 taken prisoner) • Total defeat at Saipan (July 1944: 41,000 Japanese troops killed, 1,780 taken prisoner) • Major defeat at Battle of Leyte (October 1944: Most Japanese vessels destroyed, including 3 aircraft carriers) % Total defeat at Iwo Jima (March 1945: 20,800 Japanese troops killed, 200 taken prisoner) • U.S. forces commence battle of Okinawa (March 1945:188,000 Japanese killed, Including 94,000 civilians)

26

[Table 1] Chronological table of the Show aW ar (M , T and S denote the Japanese Eras of M eiji, Taisho and Showa, respectively)

A.D.

Japanese Era

M27 1894 M35 1902 M37 1904 M38 1905 M39 1906 M43 1910 M45 1912 1914 • „ T 3 T 4 1915 T 6 11917 T 8 1919

In and around japan 1st Sino-Japanese War between Qing Dynasty and Japan (-9 5) Anglo-Japanese Alliance Russo-Japanese War (-05) South Manchurian Railway Company set up Japan annexes Korea Republic of China founded; Qing Dynasty falls Twenty-One Demands on China by Japan Anti-Japanese May 4th Movement in China

1920 1922

T9 T il

1928

S3

Manchurian warlord Chang Tso-lin assassinated by Japanese officers

1929 1931 1932 1933

S4 S6 S7 S8

Manchurian Incident follows railway explosion at Liutiaohu Manchukuo founded by Japan

1937

S12 Sino-Japanese War (-4 5) erupts after Marco Polo Bridge Incident

1938 1939 1940 1941

SI 3 SI 4 SI 5 S16

1942 1943 1945

SI 7 SI 8 S20

Chongqing raided by Japanese bombers (-43) Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact signed (April) Japanese Navy suffers crushing defeat in Battle of Midway (June)

Atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima (Aug. 6) and Nagasaki (Aug. 9) USSR declares war on Japan in violation of Neutrality Pact (Aug. 8)

Japan signs instrument of surrender, formally ending Pacific War (Sep. 2) 1 USSR continues war to occupy Japan's Northern Territories (-Sep. 5) 1946 1947 1948

S21 S22 S23

1949

S24

1950 1951

S25 S26

1952

S27

New Constitution comes into effect (May) Hideki Tojo and six other Japanese leaders executed by hanging (Dec. 23) People's Republic of China established (October) Korean War breaks out (-53) Allied occupation of Japan ends (Apr. 28)

C h ro n o lo g ica l ta b le o f the Show a W a r

A .D . 11894 1902 1904 1905 I 1906 1 1910 1912 i 1914 ill 1915 1917 1 1919

Japanese E ra M27 M35 M37 M38 M39 M43 M45 T 3 T4 T 6 T 8

1922

T9 T11

1928

S3

1 1929 1931 |j 1932 ■933

S4 S6 S7 S8

S' 1937

SI 2

1938 1939 1940

SI 3 S14 SI 5 S16

11920

1

In t h e w o r ld Trans-Siberian Railway opened Russo-Japanese Treaty brokered by T. Roosevelt

Outbreak of World War 1 (-18) Russian Revolution Treaty of Versailles ends World War 1 League of Nations comes into existence Nine-Power Treaty guarantees China's territorial integrity Soviet Union established Kellogg-Briand Pact outlaws war Wall Street stock market crashes; Great Depression Adolf Hitler becomes German Chancellor Japan leaves League of Nations; Germany follows suit Guernica bombed by German and Italian air strikers "Quarantine Speech" by U.S. President F. Roosevelt

1

1941 1942 Ijl 1943 ■1945

Germany invades Poland, leading to World War II (-45) Germany, Italy and Japan sign Tripartite Pact Germany invades Soviet Union (June) Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor (Dec. 7); Pacific War (-45)

S17 S18 S20

Italy surrenders (September) B. Mussolini executed; A. Hitler commits suicide (April) Germany surrenders unconditionally to Allies (May) Potsdam Declaration defines terms against Japan (July) Indonesia' war against Netherlands for independence (-49)

19 4 8

S21 S22 S23

United Nations holds inaugural General Assembly session India becomes independent of U.K. Israeli War of Independence (-49) USSR begins blockade of Berlin (June)

1949

S24

North Atlantic Treaty Organization formed (April)

-150 1 '"951

S25 S26

7952

S27

j! T446 (1 9 4 7 1

European Coal and Steel Community created (April) Treaty of Peace with Japan signed by 48 countries (September)

/

27

Part i: Introduction

Chapter 1

An overview of Japan's wars in the Showa Era

M anchuria—start o f the slide into war

M

ore than 60 years have passed since Japan's surrender to the A llied Powers. The responsibility for w aging the war was dealt w ith b y the In tern atio n al M ilitary T ribunal for the Far East, know n as the Tokyo Tribunal. The m anner and circum stances in w hich the tribunal was adm inistered has lo n g attracted criticism and its verdicts were n ot those o f the Japanese people. N ow is the tim e to reexam ine the m iseries o f the war on Jap an 's own and to identify the responsibility o f the war era's p olitical and m ilitary leaders for their failure to avoid war. To address th is task, the Y om iuri Shim bun established an in-house investigative panel, the W ar Responsibility R eexam ination Com m ittee, com prised o f members o f the newspaper's Editorial Board, the Yom iuri Research Institute and senior writers from a range o f departm ents o f the Editorial Bureau. The outcom e o f this project, undertaken by the team in collaboration w ith experts from outside the Yom iuri Shim bun, was origin ally published in a 27-installm ent series in the newspaper betw een A ugust 2005 and August 2006. Looking back now at the wars o f the Show a Era (1926-89), there arise a num ber o f problem s and doubts. These can be divided in to five broad questions in connection w ith the Yom iuri Shim bun com m ittee's quest concerning war responsibility: • W h y d id Ja p a n e x te n d th e lin e s o f b a ttle fo llo w in g th e 1931 M anchurian Incident, p lu ngin g the country in to the quagm ire o f the Sino-Japanese W ar? • W hy did Jap an go to war w ith the U nited States in spite o f extrem ely slim prospects for victory? • Shortly after victories in the in itial phase o f the Pacific W ar, w hat 31

3 2 / I ntroduction

foolishness caused the Japanese m ilitary to em ploy "banzai attacks," to com m and its soldiers and sailors to die-but-never-surrender, and to resort to “kamikaze” suicide aircraft attacks after the rapid deteriora­ tion o f Japan's position? • W ere sufficient efforts made to bring the war to an end and was it pos­ sible to prevent the civilian devastation caused by the atom ic bom b­ ings o f H iroshim a and Nagasaki? • W hat were the problem s w ith the Tokyo Tribunal in w hich the A llied Powers tried Japanese p olitical and m ilitary leaders charged w ith war crim es? O n Septem ber 18, 1931, the tracks o f the South M anchurian Railway Com pany's (Mantetsu) lin e were pounded w ith bom bs at Liutiaohu in the suburbs o f M ukden (now Shenyang) in northeast C h in a. A group o f high-ranking officers o f the Kw antung Arm y, Japan's field arm y in M anchuria, in clu d in g Senior Staff O fficer Seishiro Itagaki and Operations O fficer K anji Ishihara, were responsible for p lottin g an explo­ sion th at w ould mark the b egin n in g o f the M anchurian Incident—the conquest o f M anchuria by the Kw antung Arm y. The C abinet at that tim e, headed by Prime M inister Reijiro W akatsuki, was deeply alarm ed by the incident and in itia lly adopted a p olicy o f local­ izin g the affair. The W akatsuki adm inistration, however, was unable to h old in check the in ten sificatio n o f m ilitary operations b y the Kw antung Arm y and proved to be incapable o f bringing the Arm y under control. The M anchurian Incident, coupled w ith the 1932 establishm ent o f a puppet state—M anchukuo—by the Kw antung Arm y, constituted the start o f Japan's international isolation. W hy were the governm ent and the upper echelons o f the m ilitary in Tokyo unable to halt reckless acts perpetrated by the Kw antung Arm y? It is w orth n otin g that at the tim e Jap an had an array o f rights and interests, such as M antetsu, in M anchuria, that had been acquired as the result o f Jap an 's victory in the 1904-05 Russo-Japanese W ar and other armed con flicts. Ishihara and his Arm y allies espoused the theory that Jap an m ust pre­ pare for a "fin a l war" w ith the U nited States and the Soviet U n io n by har­ nessing natural resources from M anchuria and Inner M ongolia. In D ecem b er 1931 , th e L eagu e o f N a tio n s fo rm e d th e L y tto n Com m ission to determ ine the causes o f Jap an 's m ilitary cam paigns in M anchuria follow ing the railw ay bom bing near M ukden. Rejecting Japan's claim that the incident was in self-defense, the fivem em ber co m m issio n released th e L y tto n R eport in O cto b e r 1932,

A n overview o f Japan's wars in the Showa Era

/

33

denouncing the M anchurian Incident as an act o f aggression by Japan. In M arch 1933, follow ing the adoption o f the Lytton Report by the General Assembly o f the League o f Nations in February, Japan announced its withdrawal from the world body. In an attempt to keep its interests in M anchuria intact, Japan began the North China Separation Operation, aimed at bringing part of northern China under Japanese control. The operation, however, only served to add fuel to China's armed resis­ tance. O n Ju ly 7,1937, a clash between Chinese and Japanese troops known as the M arco Polo Bridge (Lugouqiao) Incident took place on the outskirts of Beijing and triggered the full-scale phase of the Sino-Japanese war. In the early stages o f the 1937-45 war, Japanese troops occupied N anjing, giving rise to the incident known as the I Nankin Gyakusatsu" in Japanese and the "Rape o f N anking" abroad that took place between December 1937 and January 1938. There rem ain disputing views over how m any Chinese were killed in the incident. U n able to com e up w ith a p lan for peace n ego tiatio n s, the then Cabinet, headed by Prime M inister Fumimaro Konoe, kept hesitating. The Konoe Cabinet fin ally issued a statem ent declaring Japan was deter­ m ined "never to consider the N ationalist [Kuomintang] governm ent [of China] as Japan's negotiating partner."

Aim s o f war ill-defined Japan's national purposes for engaging in the war w ith C h in a were unclear. A governm ent statem ent issued in A ugust 1937 said the war was designed to "punish acts of violence com m itted by Chinese troops." In November 1938, the second Konoe Cabinet issued a statement that set the goal o f the war as establishing a "New Order in East Asia." It is w idely considered today, however, that the statement by the Konoe Cabinet was nothing but an ill-grounded cover for glossing over Japan's bid to acquire political and econom ic dom inance over Chin a. W hy was the extension o f the boundaries o f the Sino-Japanese War left unchecked? This is a question o f crucial im portance in reexam ining the processes that led to the Pacific W ar. In developments after the M anchurian Incident, the Japanese m ilitary continued to intervene in politics. In the wake o f two coup d'etat attempts by groups o f Im perial Japanese Army officers in 1931, there were a spate o f assassinations in February and M arch 1932 o f influential political and business leaders in w hat became

3 4 / I ntroduction

know n as the League o f Blood Incident. O n M ay 15,1932, a group o f Im perial Japanese N avy officers broke into the o fficial residence o f then Prime M inister Tsuyoshi Inukai and shot him to death. O f particular significance to the rise o f m ilitarism was a coup d'etat attem pt b y a group o f radical you n g officers o f the Im perial Arm y on February 26, 1936. The rebels tem porarily seized the heart o f Tokyo, killin g m ajor figures such as Lord Keeper o f the Privy Seal M akoto Saito and Finance M inister Korekiyo Takahashi. The event, know n as the February 26 (2/26) Incident, was organized by a faction o f officers called the Kodo-ha (Im perial W ay Faction), w hich was replaced after the in cid e n t b y its rival fa ctio n , the Tosei-ha (C on tro l Faction), w hich aim ed to consolidate the leadership o f the m ilitary estab­ lishm ent. Such developm ents are considered to have paved the w ay for the nefari­ ous tendency toward in flu en cin g politics by m eans o f terrorism . They resulted in an end to governm ent based on party p olitics, and m ovem ents callin g for a "one n ation , one party" system gained ground. In 1940, a totalitarian organization, Taisei Yokusan-kai (Im perial Rule Assistance Association), was founded, leaving the D iet utterly powerless. Even before com ing under m ilitary-im posed censorship, newspapers at the tim e played a key role in instigating Japan's m ove toward war in the M anchurian Incident. In this respect, the Japanese mass m edia should n ot be excluded from responsibility for helping encourage the em ergence o f m ilitarism .

Three mistakes lead to war with U.S. Jap an misread the prevailing international situation in 1941 w hen it w ent to war against the U nited States. Its first m istake was its alliance w ith Germ any and Italy th at was con­ cluded in Septem ber 1940 by Prime M inister Fum im aro Konoe's second C abinet. By this tim e, Germ any had invaded Poland, an attack that erupted into W orld W ar II, u ltim ately p ittin g the U n ited States and Britain against Germ any and Italy. However, Japanese Foreign M inister Yosuke M atsuoka insisted that if the three A xis nations joined forces w ith the Soviet U n io n , the U nited States w ould be discouraged from entering the w ar.1 N aval leaders—M itsum asa Y on ai, Isoroku Yam am oto and Shigeyoshi Inoue—in itia lly opposed the alliance, but m any other naval officials w ant­

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ed to advance in to Southeast Asia. This sentim ent prom pted the Im perial Japanese N avy to support the alliance. Som e observers argued, therefore, that the m uch-touted public perception th at the N avy opposed go in g to war w ith B ritain and the U nited States was w rong. Saying that it was the greatest m istake o f his life, M atsuoka later regretted havin g concluded the Tripartite A llian ce.2 Jap an 's second blunder was the order by Konoe's third Cabinet in Ju ly 1941 to advance in to Indochina. Japan and the U nited States were h oldin g talks to avoid war at the tim e. Jap an proposed h altin g its advance into Southeast Asian countries and p ullin g out o f som e areas in C h in a . But Germ any's invasion o f the Soviet U n ion led Jap an to continue its advance. W ashington froze Japan's assets in the U nited States as a w arning to Tokyo, but the Cabinet decided to m ove south anyw ay, an action that resulted in a U .S . ban on o il exports to Jap an . Japan's fin al m istake m ade in the lead-up to the Pacific W ar was a con­ ference held on Septem ber 16, 1941, w hich was attended by Emperor Show a. Konoe was exploring the feasibility o f talks w ith U .S . President Franklin D . Roosevelt to avert war, but at the conference, he unilaterally set a dead­ line and decided that Jap an w ould go to war against the U nited States if negotiations failed. D u rin g the Sino-Japanese W ar u n til b riefly before the P acific W ar, Konoe was at the center o f power for four years. He was popular, but he did n ot have a firm support base and was sub­ sequently criticized for populism . H ideki T ojo, w ho succeeded Konoe as Prime M inister, and the other war-tim e Prime M inisters have to be held accountable as leaders during the war. T o jo , W ar M in ister in th e K onoe C a b in e t, repeatedly refused U .S . dem ands to p u ll out o f C h in a . After Konoe stepped dow n, Foreign M inister Shigenori Togo continued negotiations w ith the U nited States. The H u ll N ote, a proposal m ade by then U .S . Secretary o f State Cordell H ull w hich Jap an regarded as an ultim atum dem anding that it w ithdraw from In dochina and C h in a , was also a significant factor. In addition to h oldin g the posts o f W ar and Hom e Affairs M inisters, T ojo also served as the C h ie f o f Arm y G eneral Staff and thus w ielded trem endous power in m obilizing the public for Japan's war efforts.

War fought w ith an 4arm chair p la n ' O nce a country engages in a war, it m ust discuss how and w hen to exit

36 / Introduction

from hostilities. How did Japan envisage it m ight end the Pacific War? A war strategy docum ent was drawn up by the Im perial HeadquartersGovernm ent Liaison Conference im m ediately before the war.3 The docum ent outlined the m ilitary's rather self-serving plan to speed up the end o f the war against Britain, Chian g Kai-shek (then leader of China), the Netherlands and the United States. The docum ent argued that the m ilitary should destroy the British, Dutch and U .S. strongholds in the Far East and establish a system o f selfsufficiency and self-defense. Second, the strategy called for areas under Japan's control to be expand­ ed to push Chian g Kai-shek to step down from power. Third, it called for Jap an to work w ith Germ any and Italy to force Britain into submission and to discourage the United States from continu­ ing w ith the war. Based on ly on such a haphazard plan, the governm ent and Japan's Im perial Headquarters w ent to war against the United States despite its overwhelm ing war fightin g capacity. Moreover, in itial successes in the war deluded Japan into overestimat­ in g its potential and to expand the front beyond Japan's geographical abil­ ity to m aintain its own strength. The Guadalcanal cam paign, w hich began in August 1942 on the south­ ernmost end o f the Solom on Islands, was nothing but a tragedy born in a war fought w ithout strategy. The Im perial Japanese N avy was building an airfield on the island as a front-line base for dividing U .S. and Australian forces when U .S. troops m ounted a full-scale offensive. But the Im perial Headquarters made the mistake o f sending sm all units of troops into battle one after another, only to have each routed by U .S. troops. The biggest factor in Japan's defeat at Guadalcanal was its inability to transport enough troops and supplies to the island. Follow ing the crushing defeat in the Battle o f M idway in Ju n e 1942, Japan gradually began losing control o f the seas in the Pacific. Cleverly severing Jap an 's supply routes one by one, the U .S . forces seized the islands that were Japan's strategic points one after another as if they were stepping stones. O f m ore th a n 20,000 Jap an ese troops w ho died in the B attle o f Guadalcanal, 15,000 are believed to have died o f starvation or illness. Despite the deteriorating war situ ation , the Im perial Headquarters failed to advise the governm ent o f the details o f the operation, shielding themselves behind the independence o f the supreme com m and. They also concealed unfavorable inform ation from the public when reporting the war.

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There had been an idea o f "an absolute defense area"—selected zones in the P acific th at m ust be protected at all costs in the dow nsized battle front—bu t the w hole idea turned out to be n o more than an arm chair plan. In M ay 1943 on A ttu, part o f the A leutian Islands, the first contingent o f troops was w iped out in a battle described as an "honorable defeat." About 2,500 troops left on the island ran out o f am m unition. Instead o f sending m ore troops in support, the Im perial Headquarters wired A ttu, "W hen it com es to the end, we hope you w ill gracefully choose honorable deaths, w ith determ ination to show the flower o f the spirit of Im perial m ilitary personnel."4 The U .S . forces appealed to the soldiers to surrender, but the Japanese soldiers charged forward to their deaths, b inding each others' legs together w ith rope so that no one could hesitate. In Ju ly 1944, troops in Saipan chose a sim ilar fate. And the governm ent and the Im perial Headquarters began ordering airm en to carry out suicide attacks w ith planes on enem y ships w ithout trying to bring about the end o f the war.

Were the atom ic bombs avoidable? Aides to Emperor Show a, in clu d in g K inm ochi Saion ji, the genro w ho guided the Emperor as a senior statesm an under an Im perial edict, and jushin senior advisers, played im portant roles as the ch ief advisers during the Showa Era's wars in clu din g W orld W ar II. But did they do an yth in g to help to end the war during its fin al stage? O n A pril 7, 1945, the adm inistration o f Prime M inister Kantaro Suzuki took over from the C abinet o f Prime M inister Kuniaki Koiso. Suzuki, w ho was 77, had been a Grand Cham berlain for eight years. He was seriously w ounded in the February 26 Incident in 1936. The Emperor had m uch confidence in Suzuki. W hen a group o f senior statesm en asked Suzuki to becom e Prime M inister and he declined, the Emperor asked him to accept the nom in ation , tellin g him he was the on ly person w ho could do the jo b .5 After Germ any surrendered on M ay 7, 1945, the Suzuki adm inistration was forced to consider how to end Japan's involvem ent in the war. But non e o f Suzuki's aides suggested entering in to n egotiation s w ith the U nited States and Britain. The m ilitary asserted th at if Jap an accepted the u n con d ition al surren­ der term s the A llies had dem anded in the Cairo D eclaration o f 1943—the first o u tlin e o f the A llie s' postw ar p lan s fo r territories o ccu p ied by Jap an —it w ould be d ifficu lt for Jap an to preserve a n ation al p o lity or

3 8 / Introduction

retain the Emperor system . Therefore, the m ilitary called for preparations for an all-ou t defense o f the hom eland. U .S . U n d e r Secretary o f S ta te Jo se p h G rew , w ho h ad b een U .S . Am bassador to Jap an for about 10 years, m aintained that the on ly w ay to get Jap an to surrender, thereby avoiding m assive U .S . casualties in an invasion o f the m ainland, w ould be to allow Jap an to keep the Emperor system . There rem ains an "if" in Japanese history—w hat if Jap an had negotiated surrender w ith the U nited States and Britain im m ediately after Germ any surrendered? The Soviet U n io n , m eanw hile, told Jap an on A pril 5, shortly before the form ation o f the Suzuki adm inistration, that it was an n u llin g the 1941 Japanese-Soviet N eutrality Pact. How ever, Japanese m ilitary leaders did not believe that the Soviet U n ion w ould in itiate war against Jap an any­ tim e soon. A t this p oin t, Jap an thought o f asking the Soviet U n io n , w hich at the tim e was n ot form ally at war w ith Jap an , to act as an interm ediary for peace w ith the U nited States and Britain. In Ju ly , Jap an decided to send form er Prime M inister Fum im aro Konoe to the Soviet U n ion as an envoy, but M oscow refused to accept h im . O n Ju ly 26, the Potsdam D eclaration was issued near Berlin in the nam es o f the U nited States, Britain and C h in a . It called on Jap an to sur­ render u n con dition ally, to rid itself o f its m ilitarist leaders and to establish a new p olitical order. The declaration d id n o t m en tion the Em peror system . The Suzuki adm inistration w hich was w aiting for a response from the Soviet U n ion , decided to adopt a w ait-and-see policy. C ou ld Jap an have accepted the Potsdam D eclaration earlier than it did? Ja p a n d id n o t know th a t Jo s e f S ta lin h ad p rom ised F ra n k lin D . Roosevelt at the Yalta Conference in the Crim ea in February 1945 that the Soviet U n ion w ould join the war against Jap an . A wire service story was transm itted overseas, reporting th at Suzuki had com m ented at a press conference that Jap an w ould "ignore the Potsdam D eclaration." A n atom ic bom b was dropped on H iroshim a on A ugust 6, and the Soviet U n io n invaded M anchuria on August 9. It is believed the Soviet U n io n m ade its last-m inute decision to participate in the war on Jap an w ith th e exp ectatio n th a t the atom ic b om b in g o f H irosh im a w ould q uickly end the war. A report on the blunders o f Japanese diplom acy, w hich Prim e M inister Shigeru Y oshida instructed the Foreign M in istry to com plete in 1951, stated th at it was hard to understand w hy Jap an asked the Soviet U n ion

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to act as an interm ediary for peace negotiations w ith the U n ited States and B ritain .6 The b om b in g o f H iroshim a ch an ged the situ atio n d rastically, and Suzuki proposed at an Im perial Supreme W ar C o u n cil m eeting o f war lead­ ers on the m orning o f August 9 that Jap an had no choice but to accept the Potsdam D eclaration. W hile the m eeting was takin g p lace, an atom ic bom b was dropped on N agasaki. Y et the n atio n 's m ilitary leaders, in clu d in g W ar M inister K orech ika A n a m i, co n tin u e d to in sist o n an a ll-o u t defense o f the hom eland. But Suzuki decided to in itiate a breakthrough b y follow ing the w ill of the Emperor. A t 11:50 a . m . on August 14, Emperor Show a attended a C abinet m eeting held in an air-raid shelter at the Im perial Palace at w hich he expressed his w ill to end the war—as if he had read Suzuki's m ind. The A llies were inform ed later in the day that Jap an w ould accept the terms o f the Potsdam D eclaration. But the Soviet U n ion did n o t stop figh tin g u n til Jap an signed the instru­ m ent o f surrender on Septem ber 2. W hen the Japanese governm ent failed to take any effective counter­ measures, m ore than 180,000 civilians fleeing M anchuria died. In addi­ tio n , abou t 570,000 Jap an ese soldiers were sent to Siberia as forced laborers; m ore than 100,000 o f them died.7

War crime trials leave unanswered questions The In tern atio n al M ilitary T ribunal for the Far East, know n as the Tokyo Tribunal, found 27 Japanese leaders gu ilty and sentenced seven of them , in clu din g Prime M inister H ideki T ojo, to death. As the Tokyo Tribunal was adm inistered b y the victors, it did n ot con­ sider actions carried out b y the victors—such as the Soviet U n ion 's deten­ tion o f Japanese prisoners o f war in Siberia after the end o f W orld W ar II, the U nited States' atom ic bom bings o f H iroshim a and Nagasaki and indis­ crim inate air raids on Japanese cities, w hich were believed egregious by Jap an . In its ruling, the Tribunal condem ned Jap an 's war activities from the 1931 M an ch u rian In cid en t to 1945 as u n law fu l aggression. H ow ever, Foreign M inister Shigenori Togo m aintained that Jap an had n o choice but to enter the war for self-defense purposes. H e testified th at, "[Because of the H u ll Note] we felt at the tim e th at Jap an was being driven either to war or suicide." Togo was referring to the "O u tlin e o f Proposed Basis for Agreem ent

40 / Introduction

[Table 2]

Defendants and sentences in the Tokyo Tribunal Death by hanging Hideki Tojo, Prime Minister Koki Hirota, Prime Minister Kenji Dohihara, Arm y General Seishiro Itagai, Arm y General Heitaro Kimura, Army General Iwane Matsui, Arm y General Akira Muto, Arm y Lieutenant General

Life imprisonment Sadao Araki, Arm y General Kingoro Hashimoto, Arm y Colonel Shunroku Hata, Arm y Field Marshal Kiichiro Hiranuma, Prime Minister Naoki Hoshino, Chief Cabinet Secretary Okinori Kaya, Finance Minister Koichi Kido, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Kuniaki Koiso, Prime Minister Jiro Minami, Arm y General Takazumi Oka, Navy Admiral Hiroshi Oshima, Arm y Lieutenant General Kenryo Sato, Arm y Lieutenant General Shigetaro Shimada, Navy Admiral Toshio Shiratori, Ambassador to Italy Teiichi Suzuki, Arm y Lieutenant General Yoshijiro Umezu, Arm y General

20-year imprisonment Shigenori Togo, Foreign Minister

7-year imprisonment Mamoru Shigemitsu, Foreign Minister

Died of r§ § j f l « Yosuke Matsuoka, Foreign Minister Osami Nagano, Navy Admiral of Fleet

Removed from trial due to nervous breakdown Shumei Okawa, nationalist activist

Showa W ar leaders who should be held mainly responsible

Hideki Tojo

Fumimaro Konoe

Prim e M in ister, W ar M in ister, G en eral; pushed Japan toward war w ith the U nited States by obstinately refusing to w ithdraw forces from C hin a; His lack o f concern about logistics and his unw illingness to tolerate surrender caused the unnecessary deaths o f m any Japanese soldiers and civilians; held him self responsible at Tokyo Tribunal and was executed by hanging.

Prim e M in ister; an aristocrat by way o f his fam ily's historical and sym bolic status as Konoe (Im perial Guard); was very popular am ong the public; lacking good judgm ent, he was drawn in to the Sino-Japanese W ar by the pro-Germ an Im perial Japanese Arm y; com m ited suicide prior to Tokyo Tribunal.

Hajime Sugiyama

Osami Nagano

Koki Hirota

Shigetaro Shimada

W ar M inister in Koiso Cabinet, C h ie f o f Arm y General Staff, Field M arshal;

C h ie f o f N aval General Staff, N avy M inister in Hirota Cabinet, Adm iral o f Fleet; died of an illness while standing trial before Tokyo Tribunal.

P r im e M in is t e r , F o r e ig n

N a v y M in is t e r i n T o jo

M in is t e r i n S a ito , O k a d a , 1 st K o n o e C a b in e ts ; s e n te n c e d to d e a th b y

C a b in e t , A d m ir a l;

T o k y o T r ib u n a l.

T r ib u n a l.

■ nm itted su icid e sh o rtly tfte r th e e n d o f th e w ar.

s e n te n c e d to life im p r is o n m e n t b y T o k y o

A-I

Yosuke Matsuoka

Yoshijiro Umezu

Korechika Anami

Kuniaki Koiso

Foreign Minister in 2nd Konoe Cabinet;

Chief of Army General Staff, General;

War Minister in Suzuki Cabinet, General;

Prime Minister, General

died o f an illness w hile standing trial before Tokyo Tribunal.

sentenced to life im prisonm ent b y Tokyo Tribunal.

commited suicide just before the Emperor's broadcast declaring an end to the war.

sentenced to life im prisonm ent b y Tokyo Tribunal.

Koshiro Oikawa

Soemu Toyoda

Chief of Naval General Staff, Admiral

Chief of Naval General Staff, Admiral

Hiroshi Oshima

Toshio Shiratori

Kanji Ishihara

Seishiro Itagaki

Ambassador to Germany, Lieutenant General;

Ambassador to Italy;

sentenced to life im prisonm ent b y Tokyo Tribunal.

sentenced to life im prisonm ent by Tokyo Tribunal.

Staff Officer of Kwantung Army, Lieutenant General

Staff Officer of Kwantung Army. I War Minister in 1st Konoe, Hiranuma Cabinets, General; sentenced to death by Tokyo Tribunal.

Kenji Dohihara

Teiichi Suzuki

Kingoro Hashimoto

Akira Muto

Chief of Special Service Agency at Mukden, General;

President of Cabinet Planning Board, Lieutenant General;

Chief of Russia Group of Army General Staff's Second Bureau, Colonel;

C h ie f of Operations Section of Army General Staff, Lieutenant General:

sentenced to death by Tokyo Tribunal.

sentenced to life imprisonment by Tokyo Tribunal.

sentenced to life imprisonment by Tokyo Tribunal.

sentenced to death by Tokyo Tribunal.

Kenryo Sato

Shinichi Tanaka

Renya Mutaguchi

Shingo Ishikawa

C h ie f o f W ar M in istry 's M ilita ry A ffa irs B ureau, Lieutenant General; sentenced to life imprisonment by Tokyo Tribunal.

C h ie f o f O p eration s at A rm y G en eral S ta ff, Lieuten ant G eneral

C o m m an d er o f F ifte e n th A rm y, Lieuten ant G eneral

C h ie f o f Secon d Sectio n o f N a v y M in istry 's N a v a l A ffa irs B ureau, Rear A d m iral

Takazumi Oka

Shigeru Fukutome

Takijiro Onishi

Tasuku Nakazawa

C h ie f o f N a v y M in istry 's N aval A ffa irs B ureau, V ice A d m iral; sentenced to life imprisonment by Tokyo Tribunal.

C h ie f o f O p eration s o f N a v a l G en eral S ta ff, V ic e A d m iral

C o m m an d er o f First N a v a l A ir Fleet in M a n ila , V ice A d m iral

C h ie f o f N aval O p eration s a t N aval G en eral S ta ff, V ice A d m iral

Kameto Kuroshima

Shigenori Togo

Kantaro Suzuki

Koichi Kido

C h ie f o f Secon d Bureau o f N a v a l G en eral S ta ff, Rear A d m iral

Foreign M in ister in T o jo , Su zu k i C ab in ets;

Prim e M in ister, A d m iral

Lord K eeper o f P rivy Seal; sentenced to life im prisonm ent b y Tokyo Tribunal.

sentenced to 20 years in prison b y Tokyo Tribunal.

Mitsumasa Yonai

Keisuke Okada

Reijiro Wakatsuki

Prim e M in ister, N a vy M in ister in H a y a sh i, 1st E on oe, H iran u m a, K oiso, Su zu k i C a b in e ts, A dm iral, ju sh in

Prim e M in ister, A d m ira l, ju s h in

Prim e M in ister, ju sh in

A-III

Those who are involved in key decision-making processes during the Showa Era

Mamoru Shigemitsu

Okinori Kaya

Naoki Hoshino

Kiichiro Hiranuma

Foreign M in ister in T o jo , K oiso C ab in ets; sentenced to seven years in prison b y Tokyo Tribunal.

F in an ce M in ister in 1st K on oe, T o jo C ab in ets; sentenced to life im prisonm ent b y Tokyo Tribunal.

C h ie f C a b in e t Secretary in T ojo C a b in e t; sentenced to life im prisonm ent b y Tokyo Tribunal.

Prim e M in ister, ju sh in aid e to E m peror Show a; sentenced to life im prisonm ent b y Tokyo Tribunal.

Iwane Matsui

Jiro Minami

Heitaro Kimura

Sadao Araki

C om m an d er o f C e n tra l C h in a A rea A rm y, G en eral; sentenced to death by Tokyo Tribunal.

G overn or-G en eral o f K orea, G en eral; sentenced to life im prisonm ent b y Tokyo Tribunal.

V ice W ar M in ister, C o m m an d er o f B urm a A rea A rm y, G en eral; sentenced to death b y Tokyo Tribunal.

W ar M in ister in In u k a i, Sa ito C a b in e ts, G en eral; sentenced to life im prisonm ent b y Tokyo Tribunal.

Shunroku Hata

Isoroku Yamamoto

Kinmochi Saionji

Nobuaki Makino

W ar M in ister in A b e, Y o n a i C a b in e ts, Field M arsh al;

G en ro sen ior adviser to E m peror Show a

Lord K eeper o f P rivy Seal

sentenced to life imprisonment by Tokyo Tribunal.

C o m m a n d e r-in -C h ie f o f C o m b in e d Fleet, A d m ira l o f Fleet; died in the Solom on Islands cam paign.

Nobuyuki Abe

Kichisaburo Nomura

Shumei Okawa

Prim e M in ister, G en eral

A m bassador to th e U .S ., A d m iral

N a tio n a list a ctiv ist exem pted from Tokyo T ribunal due to m ental illness.

A-IV

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41

between the U nited States and Jap an " dated Novem ber 26, 1941, just 12 days before the Pacific W ar started. Since the proposal, sent to Jap an by U .S . Secretary o f State C ordell H u ll, dem anded the w ithdraw al o f "a ll m il­ itary, naval, air and police forces from C h in a and from In d o ch in a," Japan regarded it as an ultim atum from W ashington. W as the war w ith the U n ited States an in vasion or an act o f selfdefense? The answer rem ains elusive. The A llied Powers picked on ly people at the top to be defendants in the trial w hile overlooking those w ho effectively held authority over the exer­ cise o f power. For exam ple, General Seishiro Itagaki was indicted and sub­ sequently executed for his role in the M anchurian In cid en t. How ever, K anji Ishihara—w ho was a staff officer for operations o f the Kw antung Arm y—was regarded as one o f the m asterm inds yet was n ot called to trial. To decipher the m echanism s o f war, scrutiny should be given to the actions o f the m ilitary top brass and front-line com m anders. The postwar Japanese governm ent was unenthusiastic about pursuing war responsibility on its ow n although an investigation com m ission was set up in Novem ber 1945 to "thoroughly look in to" the reasons for the defeat in the war and related facts. K ijuro Shidehara, w ho was Prim e M inister between O ctober 1945 and M ay 1946 and the chair o f the com ­ m ission, was reluctant to do so because he "d id n 't w ant to give the im pres­ sion that the Japanese were engaged in a blood feu d ."8 For its part, the D iet showed little interest in u n tan gling the issue o f war responsibility although it actively sought the release o f Japanese w ho were in the custody o f the A llied Powers as war crim inals. Emperor Show a was n ot prosecuted because o f p olitical considerations on the part o f the U nited States w hich oversaw the postwar occupation. Even today, the argum ent continues over w hether the Emperor should effectively be held responsible for the Show a Era's wars. Q uestions about the Japanese people's "responsibility for aggression" also rem ain unresolved. Likew ise, it should be clarified to w hat extent future generations should bear responsibility for the wars in this era. Notes_______________________________________________________________________________________ 1Y o sh ie Sa lto , Azamukareta Rekishi (A H isto ry o f D eceit: Y o su k e M atsu o k a a n d th e O th e r Side o f th e Tripartite P act), T o k y o : Y o m iu r i S h im b u n , 1955, p p . 17-18 2 Ib id ., p . 5 3 T h e M ilita r y H isto ry D e p artm e n t o f th e N a tio n a l In stitu te fo r D efen se Stu dies o f the D efen se A g e n c y (N ID S), e d ., Bei-Ei-Ran-Sho Senso Shumatsu Sokushin ni kansuru Fukm n (A P la n to Q u ic k ly C o m p le t e t h e W a r a g a in s t t h e U n it e d S ta te s , G r e a t B r ita in , th e N e th erla n d s a n d th e C h ia n g R egim e) in Daihonei Rikugun-bu: Daitoa Senso Kaisen Keii (The A rm y D ep a rtm e n t o f th e Im p erial H eadquarters— A n A c c o u n t o f th e C o m m e n c e ­ m e n t o f th e G re ater East A sia W ar) vol. S , in Senshi Sosho (A Series o f W a r H istories); T o ky o : A sag u m o S h im b u n s h a , 1973, p p . 3 4 4 -3 4 6

42 / I n t r o d u c t io n 4N IDS, ed., op. cit., vol. 6, 1973, pp. 464-465 5Hidenari Terasaki & Mariko Terasaki M iller, eds., Showa Tenno Dokuhakuroku (Emperor Showa's M onologue), Tokyo: Bungeishunju, 1991, pp. 110-111 6 M akoto K ito, ed., Nihon Gaiko no Kago wo Yomu (A Study o f the 1951 M inistry o f Foreign Affairs Report "Mistakes o f Japan's Foreign Policy"), in Choken Quarterly No. 8, Tokyo: Yom iuri Shim bun, 2003, pp. 129-130 7Yasuo W akatsuki, Shiberia Horyo Shuyojo (Siberian POW Camps), Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 1999, p. 11 and pp. 428-429 8Prime M inister Shidehara's address in the plenary session o f the House o f Representa­ tives on November 28, 1945, Tokyo: The Yomiuri-Hochi, November 29, 1945, p. 1; Senso Chosa-kai Dai-Ikkai Sokai ni okeru Shidehara Chosa-kai Sosai Aisatsu (War Investigation Com m ission Governor Shidehara's Address in the Inaugural General M eeting o f the War Investigation Com m ission) and etc., in Senso Sekinin Shiryo Tsuzuri (Binding o f Materials Pertaining to War Responsibility) o f Miyazaki Shuichi Bunsho (Documents Concerning Lt. G en. Shuichi Miyazaki) in possession o f N IDS, Tokyo: 1946, n . pag.

Part II: Japan’s wars in 1931-45

Chapter 2 The Sino-Japanese War /Part 1

Military elites' interference in politics over Manchuria and Inner Mongolia —Japan's 'bastion'

A

large number of political and military leaders in Japan made weighty and critical decisions with regard to the Manchurian Incident, the Sino-Japanese W ar of 1937—45, the Pacific W ar, which ended with Japan’s defeat and marked the end of W orld W ar II. W ho made— or had no choice but to make— these decisions? For what reasons? W ere there no other options? The Yomiuri Shimbun’s “ W A R RESPO N SIBILITY— delving into the past" series begins with the Manchurian Incident.

Japan under three kinds o f foreign pressure The M anchurian Incident happened in 1931 (the sixth year o f the Showa Era). It escalated to the Sino-Japanese W ar and fin ally led to the Pacific W ar. W hen we trace the origins o f W orld W ar II, we come across the M anchurian Incident, undertaken by the Im perial Japanese Arm y w ith the aim o f occupying M anchuria—a move in conflict w ith the then pre­ vailing international order. Japan gained an opportunity to establish a stronghold in M anchuria— now know n as northeast C h in a—follow ing its victory in the 1904-05 Russo-Japanese W ar. As a result o f that war, Japan acquired the Russian leasehold on Kwantung (Guandong) in the southern part of the Liaodong Peninsula and the Russian rights to the South M anchurian Railw ay Com pany that ran between Changchun and Port Arthur (Lushun). To pro­ tect these new interests, Japan dispatched troops to southern M anchuria. From the very beginning o f the troop deploym ent, the Im perial Japanese Army cherished an am bition—to control the whole o f M anchuria. Before looking further into developments in M anchuria, it is useful to turn the clock back to the M eiji Era (1868-1912). In 1906 (the 39th year o f M e iji), an o ffic ia l governm ent co u n cil m eeting was h eld to discuss M anchuria-related issues. During the session, Gentaro Kodama, C h ief of the Arm y General Staff, proposed that "one person be entrusted w ith sov­ ereign power in M anchuria" and, "to that end, a new governm ent should 45

46/ J apan' s wars in 1931-45 be established there to com pletely take the helm ." The chair of the coun­ cil, former Prime M inister Hirobum i Ito—one o f the genro senior statesmen who exercised collective leadership—opposed Kodama's opinion, saying, "M anchuria is by no means our territory. Purely and sim ply, M anchuria is the territory o f China under the C hin g [Qing] Dynasty." However, the im plication o f Kodama's remarks was too clear to be for­ gotten. The Army continued to cherish a desire to rule M anchuria, becom ­ ing more and more am bitious as the years went by—un til it fin ally took action in the Showa Era (1926-89). W hy did the Im perial Japanese Arm y w ant to occupy M anchuria? According to a historian specializing in the Showa Era: "The m ilitary had a sense o f unity w ith M anchuria [a belief that led to the Japan-M anchuria alliance]...because o f the fact that the Japanese Arm y w on the RussoJapanese War—the basis for its developm ent—thanks to its officers and m en w ho shed blood in the land o f M anchuria."1 The desire to advance to M anchuria, w hich was referred to as "the M anm o (M anchuria-Inner M ongolia) Issue," consistently rem ained "the supreme basic policy o f the Arm y." W hat was the international situation surrounding Japan at this tim e? D u rin g W orld W ar I (1 9 1 4 -1 8 ), Ja p a n issu ed its "T w en ty-O n e Dem ands" on Chin a in 1915 in an effort to expand its rights there. The ultim atum , seen by the Chinese as a "n ation al h u m iliation ," aroused Chinese nationalist sentim ent and gave m om entum to the cam paigns for regaining China's sovereign rights and fighting against Japan. Determ ined to realize China's national unification, Kuom intang leader Chiang Kai-shek, the successor to Sun Yat-sen (Sun Yixian) who led the 1911 revolution that ended the rule o f the Q in g Dynasty, launched the Northern Expedition in 1926. His offensive put pressure on the M anchuriaInner M ongolian region. For Japan, the success o f the Russian Revolution of 1917 could not be overlooked. W ith a strong b elief in the necessity o f securing natural resources such as iron ore and coal in M anchuria in preparation for an allout war, the Arm y thought that it w ould have to bring M anchuria under its control as early as possible to confront the Soviet U nion, w hich then became a potential enem y o f Jap an . In addition, com m unist ideology began to have an im pact on Japan's politics and society. Follow ing the end o f W orld War I, the League of N ations came into being in 1919 w ith U .S. President Woodrow W ilson as its driving force. As for East Asia, a new international order was sought under the so-called W ashington Treaty system. The Nine-Power Treaty, in particular, required countries, including Japan, w ho were signatories to the pact, to respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Chin a.

Military elites' interference in politics over Manchuria and Inner Mongolia—Japan's 'bastion' / 47

[Map 2]

Manchukuo, Inner Mongolia and China in 1930s il|

Soviet Union

LN ~ fi

H eilon gjiang Province

li

f

Manchuria Outer Mongolia (Mongolia)

— -

k Jg B B m L ia o n in k ,- - 'W jo in JH H V jh jo v in c e f Provi IChangchun Jp

Inner Mongolia Slujcclen

1 ^ ^ /_ South Manchurian Railway

r jr

9jrT'anF **■ / ' pD eiP!ng^Tanggu / (Beijing) / _p .

Port Arthur Korea1

Shanxi \ H e b e i.^ ----- i^rovincePro^ nceshandongiProvince

^ I ........[....... X/.....................................t

./.ifli

M anchukuo, established in 1932, originally comprised H eilongjiang, Jilin and Liaoning Provinces and incorporated Rehe Province into its territory in 1933.

!

....

q

Chon^qmg

Hankou (Wuhan)

Nanking OJhanghai (N a n jin g )^ :MK/HY

As a result, according to political scientist Junnosuke M asum i: "Japan was faced w ith three kinds o f foreign pressure."2 The three-way pressure was com prised o f the increased pressure on Japan under the W ashington Treaty system by W estern im perialist powers such as Britain and the United States, the pressure of the sudden rise of nationalism in Chin a and that of the Soviet U nion and com m unism . In 1923 (the 12th year o f the Taisho Era), Japan began to view the United States as a potential enem y under its revised Im perial Defense Policy, and the U .S. Congress passed the Im m igration Act of 1924 restrict­ ing further Japanese im m igration to the United States. Farming com m unities in Japan were im poverished due to the Showa Depression o f 1930-32, w ith disputes taking place between tenant-farmers

4 8 / J apan' s wars in 19 3 1 ^ 4 5

and landlords and between em ployees and com pany owners. A lthough an ti-co m m u n ist, n a tio n a list cam paigns ca llin g for "n a tio n a l reform " em erged, M arxism spread. A gain st th is b ackground , M an ch u ria was recogn ized as Ja p a n 's "b a stio n " o f n a tio n a l defense an d eco n o m ic developm ent. In those days, various local warlords m aintained individual strongholds in C h in a . In order to m ain tain its interests in M an ch u ria and Inner M ongolia, Jap an supported C h an g Tso-lin (Zhang Zuolin), a warlord in northern C h in a . The Cabinet o f Prime M inister G iich i Tanaka sent troops to Sh an dong, C h in a , in tw o waves betw een 1927 and 1928 to block C h ian g Kai-shek's N orthern E xpedition and protect Japanese residents there. After the first expedition o f Japanese troops to Shandong, the govern­ m ent held the "Toho K aigi" (the Conference on the East)—in Tokyo in 1927 to discuss Jap an 's p o licy vis-a-vis C h in a . A m ong the participants were Shigeru Y oshid a, C o n su l G eneral in M ukden (Hoten in Japanese, presently Shenyang); Eitaro H ata, V ice W ar M inister; Jiro M in am i, Vice C h ie f o f the Arm y G eneral Sta ff, N obuyuki Abe, ch ie f o f the M ilitary Affairs Bureau o f the W ar M inistry; N obuyoshi M u to, Com m ander o f the Kw antung Arm y; Iwane M atsui, ch ief o f the Second Section o f the Arm y General Staff o f the Im perial Japanese Arm y; and Kichisaburo N om ura, Vice C h ie f o f the N aval General Staff. Tsutom u M ori, Parliam entary Vice Foreign M inister, played a leading role in the conference. In closing, he summ arized the m eeting as follow s: "Sovereign ty over M an ch u ria rests w ith C h in a as p o in ted ou t b y M inister [Kijuro] Shidehara [who as Foreign M inister showed a con ciliato­ ry stance toward Britain and the U nited States], Nevertheless, it doesn't belong to C h in a alone. Jap an has the right to take p art... Jap an w ill protect M anchuria as it is our first lin e o f defense."3 D uring the conference, M ori showed his in tention to have Jap an con­ front the League o f N ations, the Treaty for the R enunciation o f W ar as an Instrum ent o f N ational Policy—better know n as the Kellogg-Briand Pact— and the Nine-Pow er Treaty. A cting in concert w ith this 1927 conference on Japan's C h in a policy, the K w an tu n g A rm y statio n ed in M a n ch u ria prepared a do cu m en t spelling out its vision for M anchuria and Inner M on golia. It specifically called for the establishm ent o f a pro-Japanese regim e that w ould govern th e th re e p ro v in c e s in e a ste rn M a n c h u r ia —L ia o n in g , J il in an d H e ilo n g jia n g —and the Rehe area. "W arlord C h a n g T so -lin co u ld be appointed as the head [of the regim ejgln the case o f refusal, [Japan] should establish an exclusive hold over M anchuria and Inner M ongolia even if it m eans resorting to m ilitary actio n ."4

Military elites' interference in politics over Manchuria and Inner Mongolia—japan’s 'bastion' / 49

Chang Tso-lin was assassinated on June 4,1928, when his train returning to Shenyang was bom bed. Two m onths before the in cid en t, C olon el Daisaku Kom oto, a senior officer of the Kwantung Army, wrote a letter to Rensuke Isogai, one of his juniors at the Osaka Army Cadet School, saying, "If Chang Tso-lin and those like him die by the roadside, that w on't be a problem. It w ill be carried out this time by any m eans."5Chang's assassina­ tion turned out to be the harbinger of the M anchurian Incident. Follow ing the assassination o f Chang Tso-lin, his son, Chang Hsuehliang (Zhang Zueliang), made known his participation in the Kuom intang regime w hich was opposing Japan. Reacting strongly to Chang Hsuehliang's m ove, the M anchurian Youth League, set up by Japanese residents in M anchuria, demanded that M anchuria become an independent state. Moves by Japanese residents thereafter prompted Japanese m ilitary action on various occasions. Another supposed consequence of the 1927 conference in Tokyo on Japan's policy toward Chin a was a docum ent called "Tanaka's M aterial for the Throne." As reported by Chinese newspapers, the docum ent gave rise to anti-Japanese sentim ent in C h in a. During the International M ilitary Tribunal for the Far East, the docum ent was produced as evidence o f Prime M inister G iich i Tanaka's report to Emperor Showa about his aggressive policy toward M anchuria and Inner M ongolia. However, the docum ent in question turned out to be false.

It begins with the Manchurian Incident The Im perial Japanese Army initiated the M anchurian Incident. Young elite officers—graduates of the Arm y General Staff College then serving as staff officers—were the instigators. Senior officers tacitly approved of the "juniors-overriding-seniors" gekokujo tactic as w ell as the juniors' interfer­ ence in politics. This section looks into those officers at the center o f the m ilitary bureaucracy w ho exerted their influence on various decision­ m aking processes. (See Glossary on gekokujo.) O n M arch 1, 1928 (the third year o f Showa), the Mokuyo-kai (Thursday Society) group o f officers o f the War M inistry and the Arm y General Staff held its fifth m eeting. In addition to its leader, Teiichi Suzuki, the group included Tetsuzan Nagata, Yasuji Okam ura, Hideki Tojo, Kanji Ishihara and Hiroshi Nem oto. The m eeting considered and discussed Nem oto's report. W inding up the m eeting, Army Lieutenant Colonel Tojo said, "W e need to establish com plete political authority in the M anchuria-Inner M ongolia region for the self-defense o f our Im perial n ation ." W hen one colleague asked if "com p lete p o litic a l au th o rity " m eant th a t Ja p a n w ould "captu re"

5 0 / J apan' s wars in 1 9 3 1 -4 5

M anchuria, Tojo answered, "That's righ t." The Mokuyo-kai ham m ered out a war p olicy o f its ow n, w hich stated in part: "W e w ill m ain tain the M anchuria-Inner M on golia region for the existence o f the Japanese people and as a solution to the population issue in Jap an . This p olicy w ill certainly clash w ith the Soviet U n ion 's south­ ward advance, leading to a war w ith the Soviet U n io n . In the event o f such a developm ent, C h in a w ill be used as our base for war supplies. W e w ill also prepare ourselves for a war w ith the U nited States."6 Before the M okuyo-kai cam e in to bein g, three graduates in the same class o f the Arm y M ilitary Academ y—N agata, Okam ura and Toshishiro Obata—took the in itiative in organizing a group o f Arm y officers, nam ed the Futaba-kai (Double Leaf Society), They were know n to have secretly concluded a so-called Baden-Baden A lliance Pledge in G erm any, where they were posted as m ajors in 1921 (the 10th year o f Taisho). Their com ­ m on goal was to oust Choshu elem ents from the Arm y leadership—the Arm y's key posts had been given to officers from Yam aguchi Prefecture, hom e o f the Choshu clan that had played a part in toppling the Tokugawa Shogunate during the M eiji Restoration. The trio also hoped to renew the Arm y system to m ake it better prepared for national m obilization. Tojo later jo in ed the trio , as did D aisaku K om oto, w ho was w ell-versed in Chinese affairs. In M ay 1929, the Futaba-kai and the Mokuyo-kai merged to form a new inform al association o f Arm y officers, nam ed the Isseki-kai (One Evening Society). Akira M uto, Shinichi Tanaka and Kyoji Tom inaga, am ong other officers, joined the new group. During its inaugural m eeting, the Isseki-kai agreed to support three generals—Sadao A raki, Jin zab u ro M asaki and Senjuro Hayashi—and to seek to resolve the M anchurian issue. (See Table 3.) T he Isseki-ka i d id n o t a ctu a lly co n co ct sp e cific p lo ts such as th e Liutiaohu Incident or the Septem ber 18,1931, Incident, in w hich a stretch o f the South M anchurian Railway was blow n up. But it is w idely believed th at there was a tacit consensus am ong Isseki-kai mem bers th at Jap an w ould have to use m ilitary force sooner or later. In his m em oirs, N em oto wrote: "[The Isseki-kal\ concluded at lon g last that 'there can be no other m eans but to eject C h an g H sueh-liang by force.' Then [we] worked to forge an atm osphere [in our favor] w ithin the m ilitary."7 In Ja n u a ry 1928, Ish ih a ra , w ho m asterm in d ed th e M a n ch u ria n In c id e n t, to ld a M oku yo-ka i m e e tin g ab o u t h is "F in a l W o rld W ar Theory"—in w hich a fin al war w ould be fought between Jap an and the U nited States.8 In October o f the same year, he left for M anchuria to serve as a staff o ffi­ cer for operations o f the Kw antung Arm y, declaring th at "Y ou w ill see [japan] seize the w hole o f M anchuria w ithout fail w hile I am there."9

M ilitary elites' interference in politics over Manchuria and Inner Mongolia—Japan's 'bastion' / 51

[Table 3]

Members of the Issek i-k a i at the time of the Manchurian Incident Th e W ar M in istry Chief, Army Affairs Section Chief, China Croup, Army Affairs Section Chief, Foreign Affairs Unit, Army Affairs Section Chief, Assignments Section Chief, Conscription & Volunteers Section Chief, Horse Administration Section

Tetsuzan Nagata (16) Teiichi Suzuki (22) Takayasu Tsuchihashi (24) Yasuji Okamura (16) Masakazu Matsumura (17) Sadakata lida (17)

__ i Chief, Organization & Mobilization Section Hideki Tojo (17) Chief, Administration Unit, Administration Section Renya Mutaguchi (22) Chief, Commissary Unit, Operations Section Akira Muto (25) Chief, American & European Section Hisao Watari (17) Chief, China Unit, China Section Hiroshi Nemoto (23) Chief, Transport Section Tatsumi Kusaba (20)

Chief, Second Section Chief, Administration Section Staff member. Office of Inspector-General

Rensuke Isogai (16) Yoshio Kudo (17) Shinichi Tanaka (25)

Th e K w antun g A rm y___________________________________ - f |jl| Senior Staff Officer Seishiro Itagaki (16) Chief, Operations, Office of the Chief of Staff Kanji Ishihara (21) Head, Special Service Agency in Mukden Kenji Dohihara (16) (Figures in parentheses denote the graduation class number of the Military Academy of the Imperial Japanese Army) Source: Showa-ki Nippon no Kozo (The Structure of Japan in the Showa Era) authored by Kiyotada Tsutsui and published by Kodansha Gakujutsu Bunko, Tokyo, 1996

W hat did the highest echelons o f the Im perial Japanese Arm y do? The central headquarters o f the Arm y made an im portant m ove in Ju n e 1931, o u tlin in g measures to solve the M anchurian issue. The outline was worked out b y Yoshitsugu Tatekawa, head o f the Second Bureau (Intelligence) o f the Arm y General Staff; Tetsuzan N agata, ch ief o f the Arm y Affairs Section o f the W ar M inistry; Yasuji Okam ura, ch ief o f the Assignm ents Section of the m inistry; M asataka Yam aw aki, ch ief o f the First Section (Organization and M obilization) o f the Arm y General Staff; H isao W atari, ch ief o f the Fifth Section (Am erican and European Affairs) o f the Arm y General Staff; and C h iaki Shigeto, ch ief o f the C h in a Section o f the Arm y General Staff.10 Essentially, the plan was that the Im perial Japanese Arm y, in cooperation w ith the Foreign M inistry, w ould try to have the C han g H sueh-liang regime

5 2 / J apan' s wars in 1 9 3 1 -4 5

ease its anti-Japanese policy on the one hand and let the Kw antung Army exercise self-restraint on the other. "A ny spread o f anti-Japanese movem ents in spite o f all our efforts could eventually lead to the inevitability o f m ilitary action ."11 Prior to the drafting o f the outline, a docum ent titled "Josei H andan" (An Analysis o f the Situation) had been prepared b y the Second Bureau o f the Arm y General Staff. It said, "The M anchurian issue m ust be dealt w ith. Should the governm ent, for its part, decline to follow the op in ion o f the m ilitary, we w ould need to take strong m easures." This passage was insert­ ed by Kingoro H ashim oto, w ho headed the Russia group in the Second Bureau and was one o f the leaders w ho plotted coup attem pts such as the M arch Incident and the October Incident o f 1931.12 W ar M in ister Jiro M in am i took n o actio n in co n n ectio n w ith the attem pted coup. O n August 4, 1931, he issued a statem ent h in tin g at the possibility o f m ilitary action being taken in M anchuria. A n Arm y state­ m ent, follow ing that o f M in am i, described a h igh level o f excitem ent in the Arm y. The Arm y version read: "As members o f the m ilitary are responsible for politics know n as m ilitary governm ent, we naturally have a duty to inter­ vene in p o litics... W e m ust n ot change our belief by being m isled by pop­ ulist opinions o f p olitician s."13 The M anchurian In ciden t was now im m in en t. The mem bers o f the Isseki-kai at that tim e included N agata, Okam ura, Itagaki and D ohihara. The four m en, classm ates o f the 16th class o f the M ilitary Academ y, were em erging as new war leaders w ithout any actual experience in the SinoJapanese W ar o f 1894-95 and/or the Russo-Japanese W ar o f 1904-05.

Ishihara and Itagaki—principal architects o f the bombing o f the South M anchurian Railw ay line and the deployment o f Arm y reinforcements from Korea Part o f th e so-called "F in a l W orld W ar T h eory" devised b y K an ji Ishihara, a clear-headed and religious m an, w ho adhered to the N ichiren sect o f Buddhism and w ho had studied the life o f N apoleon Bonaparte, stated as follow s: "The w orld w ill be integrated in to a single system after all. The crux o f such a w orld w ill be determ ined in a war between the U nited States as the leader o f the W est and Jap an as the m ain player o f the East. O ur country should q u alify as the contender representing the East as soon as possible."14 This prophetic vision o f a fin al war for m ankind served as one o f the grounds for leading Japan to war in the Asian con tin en t. Ishihara's theory asked w hat Jap an should do to q u alify for the fin al

Military elites'interference in politics over Manchuria and Inner Mongolia—Japan's ’bastion'/ 53

world war. His answer was to resolve the M anchuria-Inner M ongolia issue. To that end, it was indispensable for Japan to occupy M anchuria and Inner M ongolia. According to Ishihara: "H istorically speaking, M anchuria and Inner M ongolia m ust belong to the Japanese instead o f the Han race [Chinese]."15 In Ju ly 1929 (the fourth year of the Showa era), as a staff officer of the Kwantung Arm y, Ishihara presented his view of war to his colleagues from the Army C h ief o f Staff's office during their inspection tour o f northern M anchuria. Senior Staff Officer Seishiro Itagaki was so impressed by the presentation that he wrote down its contents in a notebook later that night. Ishihara ordered a member o f the staff to study m ethods of occupation and rule. W hen he looked at a report com piled by the staff member in December of the same year, he is said to have told him self: "This is fine. Two more years."16 How, then, was the M anchurian Incident—the prime movers o f w hich were Ishihara and Itagaki—actually plotted and staged? According to a postwar recollection by Tadashi Hanaya, a staff officer of the Kwantung Arm y, Itagaki, Ishihara and Hanaya held a study session or two every week at the initiative o f Ishihara. Shintaro Im ada, an Imperial Japanese Army captain assigned as an aide to a Japanese m ilitary advisor to Chang Hsueh-liang, also took part in the study gatherings. By the spring of 1931, a blueprint for the M anchurian Incident was com pleted—to dis­ guise an explosion o f a section o f the railway as an act o f sabotage by the Chinese side and to deploy Japanese troops under the pretext o f protect­ ing the South M anchurian Railway and Japanese residents. In his "Personal O pinion on the Manmo (M anchuria-Inner M ongolia) Issue" o f M ay 1931, Ishihara said, "It w on't necessarily be difficult for the m ilitary to create an opportunity to exert leadership and to force the nation to rally behind u s."17 He thus prepared him self for com pelling the nucleus o f the m ilitary and the governm ent to consent to the use o f force. The Kwantung Army's staff officers mapped out the elaborate plan w hile they talked Masatane Kanda, a staff officer o f the Korea Arm y branch o f the Im perial Japanese Arm y, into collaborating w ith them . A ccord in g to H anaya: "[W e revealed] 95 percent [of the plan] to Lieutenant Colonel Kingoro Hashim oto and Lieutenant Colonel Hiroshi Nem oto, 90 percent to M ajor General Yoshitsugu Tatekawa and Colonel Chiaki Shigeto, 85 percent to Colonel Tetsuzan Nagata and 50 percent to M ajo r G e n e ra l K u n ia k i K oiso an d L ie u te n a n t G e n e ra l H aru sh ige N inom iya." He added, "N othing was divulged to [the Kwantung Army's] C h ief o f Staff [Mitsuharu] M iyake and to most o f the staff officers."18

54 / J apan' s wars in 1931-45

Ishihara and his group origin ally decided to launch their plan on September 28, 1931. But they were inform ed that the Imperial Japanese Arm y's G en eral Sta ff in Tokyo had decided to send M ajor G eneral Tatekawa to M anchuria in order to talk the Ishihara group into abandon­ in g the p lo t. O n Septem ber 15, Itagaki, Ishihara, H anaya, Im ada and others m et at the M ukden (Shenyang) Special Service Agency. Itagaki is known to have said, "I'll stand a pencil on end. If it falls to the right, let's call o ff [the plot]. If it falls to the left, w e'll go ahead." The pencil fell to the right. But Im ada said, "I'll do it alone." Eventually, the group confirm ed that the plan would be carried out. Tatekawa arrived in M ukden, but, as Hanaya wined and dined him at a restaurant, the M ajor General from Tokyo did nothing to prevent the planning for the M anchurian Incident from going forward.19 O n the night of September 18, 1931, Imada as well as First Lieutenant Suemori Kom oto and some troops from the Mukden-based garrison o f the Kwantung Arm y blew up a section o f the South M anchurian Railway near Liutiaohu on the outskirts o f M ukden, initiating an aggressive operation designed to take fu ll control o f M anchuria. K yujiro H ayashi, Jap an 's Consul General in M ukden, judged that the bom bing was an act orches­ trated by the Kwantung Arm y. Itagaki said brusquely to A cting Consul G eneral M orito M orish im a, "Even after the Im perial prerogative o f supreme com m and was exercised, is the Consulate here trying to inter­ vene and interfere?"20 Hanaya, for his part, drew a sword and threatened the diplom at.

Hayashi crosses the Korean border at his own discretion Ishihara and his group, hoping the incident would spread to other parts o f M anchuria, devised a plot to send Japanese troops in M ukden to Jilin in the name o f protecting o f Japanese residents there, and asking Japanese troops in Korea to dispatch reinforcem ents to defend M ukden. The decisions made by Shigeru H onjo, Com m ander o f the Kwantung Arm y, and Senjuro Hayashi, Com m ander o f the Korea Arm y, were later subject to criticism .21 O n September 20, H onjo turned down a proposal from a group o f staff officers to send troops to Jilin where they said the sit­ uation was being destabilized. A t the tim e, the Kwantung Army's duties were lim ited to guarding the coastal area o f southern M anchuria, w hich embraced Dalian and Port Arthur (Lushun), and districts along the South M anchurian Railw ay. Jilin was outside the Kw antung Arm y's area of authority. Nevertheless, Itagaki was eventually successful in persuading H onjo to agree to the proposed troop deploym ent to Jilin . After the Second D ivision o f the Kwantung Army left for Jilin , Hayashi

Military elites’ interference in politics over Manchuria and Inner Mongolia—Japan's 'bastion' / 55

issued an order at his own discretion to his troops on September 21 to m arch beyond the border into M anchuria as reinforcem ents, as strongly insisted on by Staff O fficer Masatane Kanda o f the Korea Arm y. In his diary w hich referred to the M anchurian Incident, a Kwantung Arm y staff officer wrote: “In the event the Korean Army does not arrive, [we] w ill end up repeating virtually the Third Year o f Showa Incident [the assassination o f Chinese warlord Chang Tso-lin in 1928]. Our efforts w ill result in failure unless we get them involved."22 The public in Japan hailed Hayashi as “Ekkyo Shogun" (Border-crossing General), but such praise led to an acceptance o f disarray in the supreme com m and—nam ely the Emperor's prerogative as stipulated in Article 11 o f the Constitution o f the Empire o f Jap an . Goro M orishim a, ch ief o f the First ’D ivision o f the Asian Affairs Bureau o f the Foreign M inistry who happened to be in M ukden, recalled: “H onjo was in a position sim ilar to being confined in an in-house ja il, w hile M iyake had no power to control his staff. Itagaki, Ishihara and Hanaya were the dom inant players."23 A post-incident scenario was also drawn up by Ishihara, Itagaki and other staff officers o f the Kwantung Arm y. O n September 22, they pre­ sented their proposal to the central com m and o f the Im perial Japanese Arm y in T o k y o , c a llin g fo r the in sta lla tio n o f Puyi as Em peror o f M anchukuo. Kenji Dohihara—the head o f the M ukden Special Service Agency w ho had been secretly preparing for the return o f the last emperor of the Q in g Dynasty—told Kazue Kuwashima, Japan's Consul General in T ianjin, "It is ow ing exclusively to the work o f the m ilitary here that the M anchurian issue has been settled as m uch as it has to date. If Puyi, the Em peror o f X u a n to n g (1909-11), is in sta lle d [as head o f state o f M anchukuo], it w ill be extrem ely strange for the governm ent [in Tokyo] to stop the m ove...such a governm ent policy is out o f the question."24 How did the M anchurian Incident influence the m ilitary? According to a journalist specializing in modern Japanese war history, one consequence was an increasing tendency to regard arbitrary acts not in co n fo rm ity w ith m ilitary governance or d iscip lin e as in evitab le am ongst patriots.25 This phenom enon had a recurring im pact on Japan un til the end o f W orld W ar II. According to historian Ikuhiko Hata: "The maneuvers that took place before and during the Sino-Japanese War were all just modeled after what Itagaki and Ishihara had done. Staff officers should have borne greater responsibility, but, in reality, they were com pletely free from legal respon­ sib ility... Ishihara, Itagaki, H onjo and Hayashi would have deserved the death penalty under a code o f m artial justice."26 However, they were not taken to a court m artial. Instead they were pro­ m oted and received m ilitary decorations.

5 6 / J apan’s waks in 1 9 3 1 -4 5

Prim e M inister W akatsuki remains a coward, unable to stop the incident from spreading How did the governm ent deal w ith the M anchurian Incident triggered by the Kw antung Arm y? The C abinet o f Prime M inister Reijiro W akatsuki at one p oin t decided to try to stop the M anchurian Incident from spreading, but later approved o f the m ilitary's action. W hy did it do so? News o f the explosion at the railway section on the outskirts o f M ukden was conveyed b y telephone to W ar M inister Jiro M inam i on the m orning o f Septem ber 19, 1931—the m orning follow in g the in cid ent. A n emer­ gency C abinet m eeting was held. M inam i said, "The tim e has com e for the governm ent to m ake a deci­ sion o f vital im portance concerning the issue o f w hether to secure special interests in M an churia and Inner M o n g o lia ." Foreign M in ister K ijuro Shidehara disagreed, saying, "I w ould like to follow a p olicy aim ed at con­ tain in g the incident by all m eans to a narrow area, w hile givin g consider­ ation to our international relations."27 Shidehara had essentially been pursuing a foreign p olicy o f m aintain­ in g Japan's interests in M anchuria and Inner M ongolia w hile respecting the so-called W ashington Treaty system . He had been m ain tain in g coop­ eration w ith the U nited States and the U nited Kingdom on the one hand and refraining from interfering in the internal affairs o f C h in a , and from intervening in its civil war, on the other. The Cabinet m eeting eventually decided to h alt the spread o f the in ci­ den t. Pleased b y W akatsuki's report, the Em peror told Prim e M inister W akatsuki, "It's really good to hear that the governm ent has decided to try to keep the in cid ent from spreading. I w ant you to make due efforts." D id Prime M inister W akatsuki live up to the Emperor's wishes? T h a t sam e n ig h t, W a k a tsu k i asked K u m ao H arad a, secretary to K inm ochi Saion ji, the genro, to com e to the O fficia l Residence o f the Prime M inister. W akatsuki reportedly said: "I cannot contain the m ilitary on m y own [as to the deploym ent o f troops in Korea to M anchuria]. It is inexcus­ able to dispatch His M ajesty's troops w ithout Im perial sanction. But w hat on earth should I do in this case?"28 Saion ji, the ch ief p olitical adviser to the Emperor, instructed Harada to convey the follow ing message to Grand Cham berlain Kantaro Suzuki and Lord Keeper o f the Privy Seal N obuaki M akino: "The fact that the troops were sent w ithout the Throne's sanction should never be forgiven b y His M ajesty w hen the W ar M inister or the C h ie f o f Arm y General Staff makes a report to H is M ajesty."29 The dispatch o f troops from Korea to M anchuria naturally required an

Military elites’ interference in politics over Manchuria and Inner Mongolia—Japan's ’bastion' / 57

expenditure by the governm ent, a matter subject to Cabinet approval. During a September 21 m eeting o f the Cabinet, only W ar M inister M inam i said that reinforcem ents from the Korea Army were necessary, but, apart from Prime M inister W akatsuki, all o f the other ministers were o f the opin­ ion that the deploym ent was n ot required. The Cabinet session was adjourned w ithout reaching any conclusion. O n Septem ber 22 w hen M inam i inform ed W akatsuki o f the Korea Arm y's arbitrary decision to send its troops to M anchuria, the Prime M inister unreservedly gave his consent, saying, "W hat can we do w ith the force that has already been sent?"30 The Emperor told W akatsuki to "stick to the containm ent policy" when the Prime M inister visited him for an Im perial briefing session. W hen C h ief o f the Arm y General Staff Hanzo Kanaya petitioned the Emperor to b elatedly san ction the deploym ent o f the Korea Arm y's troops, the m onarch appeared displeased and said: "Be careful hereafter."31 After the end of W orld W ar II, W akatsuki tried to excuse him self for his 1931 decision. In his rem iniscences, W akatsuki wrote: "The troops had already been deployed. If the governm ent refused to bear the incurred expense for it, [War M inister] M inam i and [Chief o f General Staff] Kanaya would have encountered trouble and, furtherm ore, the Japanese residents [in M anchuria] would have been subjected to cruel consequences."33 W hat led m ilitary officers to becom e so presumptuous? To understand the cause of this, it is necessary to go back to 1928 and study how the assassination o f Chinese warlord C han g Tso-lin, by bombs planted by Colonel Daisaku Kom oto and his group, was handled. The Emperor reprim anded Prime M inister G iich i Tanaka for taking inadequate measures against the bom bing o f Chang's train, leading to the resignation o f Tanaka's Cabinet. But the Kwantung Army kept refusing to disclose inform ation about the incident to the public, w hile Kom oto, who was suspended from duty as a senior staff officer o f the Arm y, subsequent­ ly quit the m ilitary and becam e a director on the board o f the South M anchurian Railway Com pany. In other words, no resolute measures were taken in this case. In M arch 1931, in w hat was later nam ed the M arch In cid en t, an attem pted coup took place. W ith the involvem ent of nationalist leader Shum ei Okaw a, Kuniaki Koiso, Director General o f the Adm inistration Bureau o f the W ar M inistry, and Lieutenant Colonel Kingoro Hashim oto, masterminded the coup attem pt in order to install W ar M inister Kazushige Ugaki as prim e m inister. In October o f the same year, it was revealed that extremist members o f the Sakura-kai (Cherry Society) such as Hashim oto and M ajor General Isamu C ho had drawn up a scheme to assassinate all Cabinet members and establish a m ilitary dictatorship—a plot that was

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in

1931-45

designed to be im plem ented in concert w ith the M anchurian Incident. Both coup attem pts failed.33 As a p u n itiv e m easure, officers o f th e Arm y G en eral S ta ff such as H ashim oto and C h o w ho had been involved in the October Incident were "strictly confined to their barracks" for 20 days and were later assigned to p rovision al u n its. Such in decisive measures encouraged irresponsible behavior to prevail in the m ilitary and prom pted m ilitary officers to act recklessly. In M anchuria, the arm y o f C h an g H sueh-liang, the son o f C h an g Tsolin , put up little resistance to Japanese troops, follow ing C h ian g Kai-shek's strategy o f "first internal p acification , then external resistance"—elim inat­ in g the Com m unists before ousting the Japanese. Indeed, C h ia n g had been careful to give n o excuse to Jap an for m ilitary action against his side. O n Septem ber 21, 1931, C h in a embarked on an effort to argue in the League o f N ations that Japan's m ilitary operations were an act o f invasion. C h in a thus chose a strategy o f trying to gain the support o f the inter­ national com m unity. Notes_____________________________________________________________ 1 M asae T a k a h a sh i, Showa no Gunbatsu (M ilita ry C liq u e s o f Sh ow a), T o k y o : K o d an sh a G a k u ju ts u B u n k o , 2003, p . 134 2 Ju n n o s u k e M a s u m i, Showa Tenno to Sana fidai (Em peror Sh ow a a n d H is Era), T o ky o : Y a m aka w a S h u p p a n , 1998, p . 84 3 K a n ic h i Y a m au ra, e d ., M ori Tsutomu, T o ky o : M o r i T s u to m u D e n k i H e n sa n k a i, 1940, p p . 2 0 -2 7 4 T a k a s h i S u z u k i, N ihon Teikokushugi to M anshu (ge) (Ja p a n e s e I m p e r ia lis m a n d M a n c h u r ia , v o l. 2 , T o ky o : H a n a w a S h o b o , 1992, p p . 5 -6 5 K azu h iro K o b ay ash i, Shina-tsu— Ichi Gunjin no Hikari to Kage— Isogai Rensuke Chujo Den (The M a n W h o K n e w C h in a — T h e B rig h t a n d D ark Sides o f A M ilita r y O ffice r — L ife o f L ie u te n a n t G e n e r a l R en suke Isogai), T o k y o : K ash iw a S h o b o , 2000, p . 48 6 N ip p o n K in d a i S h iry o K en k y u k a i (Japanese M o d e m H isto rio gra p h y Stu d y G ro u p ), ed s.,

Suzuki Teiichi-shi Dartwa Sokkiroku (ge) (Ste n o gra p h ic R ecords o f R em arks b y M r . T e iich i Su zu ki v o l. 2), T o k y o : N ip p o n K in d a i Sh iry o K en k yu k a i, 1974, p p . 375-379 7 K iyo ta d a T su tsu i, Showaki Nihon no Kozo (Structure o f Ja p a n in th e S h o w a Era), T okyo: K o d an sh a G a k u ju ts u B u n k o , 1996, p p . 2 1 9 -2 2 1 8 N ip p o n K in d a i Sh iry o K en k y u k a i, ed s., op. tit., p p . 3 6 8 -3 7 2 9 K ish io S a to m i, "Jungyaku no Gunzo (G ro u p o f L o y a lty a n d T rea so n )," m o n th ly Kokutai Bunka N o . 583, M u s a s h in o , T o k y o : N ih o n K o k u ta i G a k k a i, 1971, p . 34 10 H iro h a ru Seki, Manshu Jihen Zenshi (C ircu m stan ce s L e a d in g u p to th e M a n c h u r ia n In cid e n t), in Taiheiyo Senso e no M ichi (Road to th e P acific W ar) vol. 1, Manshu Jihen Zenya (Eve o f th e M a n c h u r ia n In cid e n t), ed . N ih o n K o ku sai Se iji G a k k a i (Jap an A sso cia tio n o f I n t e r n a t io n a l R e la t io n s ) , T o k y o : A s a h i S h im b u n , 1 9 6 2 , p . 3 9 1 ; H ir o h a r u S e k i,

Manchurian Incident, 1931, tran s. M ariu s B. Ja n s e n , in Japan Erupts— the London Naval Conference and the Manchurian Incident, 1928-1932: selected tran slatio n s fro m Taiheiyo Senso e no M ichi, Kaisen-Gaiko-shi, ed . Ja m e s W . M o rle y , N e w Y ork: C o lu m b ia U n ive rsity Press, 1984, p . 153

M ilitary elites' interference in politics over M anchuria and Inner M ongolia —Japan's 'bastion' / 59

11 Tatsuo Kobayashi et a l., ed s., Gendaishi Shiryo (M odern H istory: D ocum entary Records), vol. 7, Manshu Jihen (M anchurian Incident), Tokyo: Misuzu Shobo, 1964, p. 164 12Masao Nakano, Hashimoto Taisa no Shuki (Memoirs o f C o l. Hashim oto), Tokyo, Misuzu Shobo, 1963, p. 85 13Kobayashi et al. eds., op. cit., pp. 149-150 14 Ju n Tsunoda, Ishihara K anji Shiryo: Kokubo Ronsaku-hen (A C o lle ctio n o f K anji Ishihara's Opinions on National Defense), Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1975, p.76 15Ibid., p. 40 16Seki, Manshu, p.391; Manchurian, p.153 17Tsunoda, op. cit., p. 78 18Tadashi Hanaya, "Himerareta Showa-shi (A Secret History o f Showa Era)," Bessatsu Chisei (supplement o f m onthly Chisei), Tokyo: Kawade Shobo, 1956, p. 43 19 M orito M orishim a, Inbo, Ansatsu, Gunto (Conspiracies, Assassinations and M ilitary Swords), Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1959, p. 57 20Ibid., pp. 52-53 21 The Korea Army was originally launched as an area army stationed in Korea by the Imperial Japanese Army shortly after the 1904 outbreak o f the Russo-Japanese W ar to provide rear support to Japanese troops fighting the war in M anchuria, the m ain battle­ ground. In 1909, Korea's own regular force was forced to disband by the Japanese gov­ ernm ent. The follow ing year, Japan began enforcing the annexation policy on the Korean Peninsula under the Japan-Korea Annexation Treaty o f 1910, making its Korea Army the sole defense force in the area. Throughout the wars in East Asia between the 1930s and 1945, no major conflict took place on the Korean Peninsula. As a result o f the annexation, the people o f Korea, meanwhile, were treated as subjects o f Japan and some o f them were enrolled in the Japanese Army's M ilitary Academ y. In fact, a number o f Korean officers fighting for Japan died in action. The Japanese Army began enlisting Korean volunteers in April 1938 and conscription was enforced in February 1944 (Yomiuri Shim bun 20th Century in Review Reports Team , ed ., Twentieth Century—The Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, Tokyo: Chuko Bunko, 2001, p. 58). A total o f 116,000 Koreans were drafted with­ in an 18-month period into Japanese m ilitary service, 22,000 o f whom were killed, and a further 10,000-15,000 were taken prisoner in Siberia by the Soviet U n ion , according to the same source. In 1939, Japan imposed the Kokumin Choyo-rei (National Requisition Ordinance) on Japan's hom e soil, Taiwan and Korea to m obilize the wartime workforce as required, but the order was actually applied in Korea in the fin al year o f the war—in and after September 1944. Even ahead o f the enforcement o f the ordinance, there were a large number o f Koreans working on the m ainland o f Japan or other Japanese-ruled areas, who are also often regarded as victim s o f Japan's forced labor. One Japanese historical dictionary says an estimated 1.5 m illion Koreans were in Japan as coal miners, long­ shoremen or factory workers (Kazuki Iguchi et a l., eds., Nihon Kingendai-shi Jiten [Modem Japanese History Dictionary], Tokyo: Toyo Keizai, 1978, p. 424). In a related developm ent, a cabinet order was promulgated in August 1944 to mobi­ lize teenage girls in Japan and Japanese-controlled areas as members o f Joshi Teishin-tai (W omen's Volunteer Corps), a measure that was undeniably tantam ount to forced fac­ tory labor. School textbooks in South Korea have described such women as those who were "forcibly recruited as com fort women—that is prostitutes." To date, no wartime lit­ erature proving such an allegation has been found. 22Kobayashi et a l., eds., op. cit., p. 184

60 / J a p a n ' s w a r s in 1931-45 23Hiroyuki Abe, Ishihara Kanji (jo) (Kanji Ishihara vol. 1), Tokyo: Hosei University Press, 2005, p. 210 24Masanori Ito, Gunbatsu Kobo-shi 2 (Rise and Fall o f the M ilitary Establishments vol. 2), Tokyo, Kojinsha, 1998, pp. 187-188 25Ibid. p. 177 26Interview w ith Ikuhiko Hata, September 13, 2005 27Tatsuo M itarai, ed., Minami Jiro, Tokyo: Biography o f Jiro M inam i Publishers, 1957, p. 250 28Kumao Harada, Saionji-ko to Seikyoku (Prince Saionji and the Political Situation) vol. 2, Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1950, p. 64 29Ibid. p. 69 30Toshihiro Shim ada, Manshu Jihen no Terikai (Expansion o f the M anchurian Incident), in Taiheiyo Senso e no M ichi (Road to the Pacific War) vol. 2, Manshu Jihen (Manchurian Incident), ed. N ihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai (Japan Association o f International Relations), Tokyo: A sahi Sh im bu n , 1962, p . 23; T oshihiro Shim ada, Extension o f H ostilities, 1931-1932, trans. Akira Iriye, in Japan Erupts—the London Naval Conference and the Manchurian Incident, 1928-1932: selected translations from Taiheiyo Senso e no M ichi, Kaisen Gaiko shi, ed. Jam es W . M orley, New York: Colum bia University Press, 1984, p. 251 31 Takashi Ito et a l., eds., Rikugun; Hata Shunroku N isshi (Army: Shunroku Hata's Office Diary), Tokyo: M isuzu Shobo, 1983, p. 41 32Reijiro W akatsuki, M eiji Taisho Showa Seikai H ishi: Kofuan Kaikoroku (A Secret History of P olitics in the M e iji, Taisho and Show a Eras—Rem iniscences o f K ofuan), Tokyo: Kodansha Gakujutsu Bunko, 1983, p. 336 33 Hirom ichi Yahara, Battle for Okinawa, ed. Frank B. Gibney, New York: Jo h n W iley & Sons, 1995, p. xvii fn . In "Two Views o f Battle," Gibney refers to Sakura-kai (Cherry Society) as follow s: "Resem bled various other secret cabals o f that tim e. N ationalsocialist in nature, they were strongly antibusiness, antipolitician , and against the government bureaucracy. Strongly traditionalist, they emerged partly in reaction to the parliam entary party government o f the T aisho democracy' o f the twenties; and they enjoyed the tacit support o f m any high-ranking army and, to a lesser extent, navy o ffi­ cers. They purported to establish a 'pure' governm ent under Im perial sanction and elim inate capitalist corruption. This they hoped to achieve by a cam paign o f selective violence. Such groups were behind the m om entarily successful 'young officers' revolt of February 26, 1936, w hich was suppressed only after Emperor H irohito, unexpectedly angered, ordered 'loyal' army units to fire on the rebels."

Chapter 3 The Sino-Japanese W ar/Part 2

Hirota's diplomacy: Following the military, lacking an understanding of Chinese nationalism

A

fter the Manchurian Incident of September 193 1(the sixth year of the Showa Era), Japan seceded from the League of Nations in 1933 and embarked on a path toward international isolation. Following a truce, however, Japan-China relations became calm er fo r a w hile. H ow ever, the Imperial Japanese Arm y advanced to northern China, and nationalism in China gathered steam. A t this juncture, couldn’t Japan make any diplomatic efforts to prevent the war? To what extent did political and m ilitary leaders understand Chinese nationalism?

Adherence to M anchuria, secession from the League o f Nations O n ly six m onths after the M anchurian In cid en t, M an ch u ku o, w ith A ixin ju elu o P uyi, the last Em peror o f the Q in g D ynasty as ruler, was founded. The Kw antung Arm y was stationed in M anchuria and Japanese officers took the helm o f governm ent. This puppet state was held up as an ideal country w ith the peaceful coexistence o f five races—Chinese (Han), M anchurian, Korean, M on golian and Japanese. How did other countries view the situation? Desperate to rebuild their dom estic econom ies wracked by the Great Depression, particularly early o n , the European powers and the U nited States d id n o t re a ct. T h ese co u n trie s w ere m ore co n ce rn e d ab ou t B ritain's abandonm ent o f the gold standard. B ritain itself had n o in ten ­ tio n o f suppressing Ja p a n 's action s in M an ch u ria unless th e U n ited Kingdom 's interests were adversely affected. W hen th e Sh an gh ai In cid e n t occurred in Ja n u a ry 1932, how ever, Britain changed its p olicy as nearly 80 percent o f Britain's investm ent in C h in a was concentrated in Shanghai. The Shanghai Incident was actually hatched by Assistant Arm y Attache R yukichi Tanaka o f the Japanese Legation (a diplom atic representative office lower than an embassy) in Shanghai. Tanaka had been instructed by Seishiro Itagaki, a staff officer o f the Kw antung Arm y, to carry out a p lot to 61

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direct the w orld powers' attention toward Shanghai. Tanaka testified after the war th at he planned to attack Japanese m onks in S h an g h ai.1 The Sh an gh ai In cid e n t led to a clash betw een Ja p a n 's n aval brigade and Chinese troops and the war expanded to include the Im perial Japanese Arm y. A m ong w orld powers, the U nited States showed the severest reaction to the M anchurian Incident. W hy did the U nited States, w hich hardly had a vested interest in M anchuria, take the leading role at that tim e? According to critic Kiyoshi Kiyosawa, the U nited States was trying to dem onstrate the effect o f the Kellogg-Briand (no-war) Pact o f 1928 that it had devised—in other words, it was h y in g to show its "peculiar U .S.-style peaceful ideal" in "the special district o f M an ch u ria."2 W h en h e saw th e in v a sio n b y the K w an tu n g A rm y th a t bom bed Jin zh o u from October to Novem ber 1931 and its occupation o f Q iqiha'er (the cap ital o f H e ilo n g jia n g Province), U .S . Secretary o f State H enry Stim son was convinced that "th e Japanese civ il governm ent could not o n ly n o t ch eck the Arm y's course, b u t also th a t, in som e im portan t respects, it was w illin g to profit by the Arm y's actio n ."3 In January 1932, Stim son offered a form al notice to Jap an and C h in a. The "Stim son D octrine" refused to recognize any situations, treaties and agreem ents th at violated the K ellogg-B riand Pact. The C o u n cil o f the League o f N ations supported the Stim son D octrine and dem anded that Ja p a n im p lem en t th e N ine-Pow er T reaty req u irin g Ja p a n to respect C hin a's sovereignty and its territorial integrity. The Stim son D octrine was repeatedly cited during the lead up to the Pacific W ar. The League o f N ations' fact-finding m ission—the Lytton Com m ission— com piled a report th at said the Japanese Arm y's actions could n ot be regarded as acts o f self-defense and that M anchukuo was not created by a genuine independence m ovem ent. This fin d in g was conveyed to Jap an on October 1,1932 . Im m ediately before that report was presented, Jap an had recognized M anchukuo, aim ing to create a fait accompli. The Lytton Report, how ever, did n ot one-sidedly condem n Jap an . It stated th at M anchuria should becom e an autonom ous region. If Prime M in ister T su yo shi In u k ai h ad n o t been assassinated in th e M ay 15 Incident in Tokyo, he could have carried out his policy and "there could have been a great possibility o f drawing up a com prom ise based on the report."4 H ow ever, every m in ister in the M akoto Saito C a b in e t decried the Lytton Report. W ar M in ister Sadao A raki, for in stan ce, dism issed the report in a condescending m anner, saying, "That's n oth in g but a triflin g travelogue."5 The Japanese House o f Representatives unanim ously agreed to recognize

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M anchukuo in Ju n e. Answering a question from Tsutom u M ori o f the Seiyukai (Constitutional Party o f Political Friends) at a plenary session in August, Foreign M inister Yasuya Uchida said: "W e, as a sovereign nation, w ill not give up our assertion [the recognition of M anchukuo] even if it means reducing our country to 'scorched earth.'" A recom m endation based on the Lytton Report was adopted at the General Assem bly o f the League o f N ations in February 1933. Forty-two countries voted in favor; Japan was the sole negative vote w hile Siam (Thailand) abstained. Signifyin g Japan's w ithdrawal from the League, delegation head Yosuke M atsuoka walked out. U chida, w ho uttered words o f madness, M atsuoka w ith his ostentatious act o f w alking out, and genro senior statesman K inm ochi Saionji, who approved the withdrawal from the League o f Nations as if it were unavoid­ able, proved to be politicians lacking conviction and foresight, and they failed to grasp international realities. W hy didn't the League o f N ations and other countries strongly demand that the Im perial Japanese Arm y pull back from M anchuria? Ja p a n o lo g ist H elen M ears, w ho was a m em ber o f the U .S . Labor Advisory Com m ittee o f the General Headquarters o f the A llied Powers occupying Jap an , wrote: "...Ja p a n was n ot stopped because the m ajor Powers were far from being sure o f how to handle an extrem ely com plex situation in w hich the problem , as they saw it, was not to stop Japan, but only to keep her w ithin 'reasonable' bounds, in relation to their own inter­ ests in C hin a, on the one hand; and on the other, still to use Japan as part o f the British security system; to police a chaotic area, M anchuria; to act as bu ffer betw een C h in a & Russia; to help against the p o ssib ility o f a Com m unist revolution in C h in a ..."6 W hile the General Assembly of the League of Nations was in session, the Kwantung Army invaded Rehe Province, close to the northern part of the Great W all o f C hin a. Emperor Showa opposed the Rehe Operation and consulted people including his C h ie f Aide-de-cam p Takeji N ara. Nara opposed the Emperor's idea o f resorting to his prerogative o f supreme com m and to h alt the operation. Nara said national policy should be decid­ ed by the Cabinet and it was not permissible for an outsider to intervene.7 The operation ceased on one occasion but the Kwantung Army crossed the Great W all a second tim e and advanced deep into northern C hin a. Distinguished com m entator Shichihei Yam am oto wrote that the Rehe Operation was "a turning point [in Showa history] and this became a seed of Nikka Jihen, or the Sino-Japanese W ar, w hich ultim ately developed into the Pacific W ar."8

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Fallout resulting from Japan's actions in northern China In M ay 1933, Japan and Chin a signed the Tanggu Tmce agreement end­ in g th e M an ch u rian In cid e n t. As a resu lt, Ja p a n secured n o t o n ly M anchuria but also a vast dem ilitarized zone south o f the Great W all. The Jap an ese-C hinese relation sh ip entered a period o f relative stab ility. However, the Japanese Arm y set up autonom ous governments in the five northern Chinese provinces o f H ebei, Chahar, Shandong, Shanxi and Shuiyuan, com pletely cutting the area o ff from the N ationalist Chinese governm ent. These actions led to the Sino-Japanese W ar. Kenji D ohihara, head o f the Special Service (Intelligence) Agency in M ukden, Takashi Sakai, C hief of Staff of Japan's China Garrison Army in Tianjin and Assistant Army Attache Tan Takahashi were m ainly responsible. Together w ith Takahashi and others, Sakai m et H o Y in g-ch in (He Y in g q in ), c h ie f o f th e K u o m in tan g govern m en t's M ilita ry A ffairs Departm ent and vice chairm an o f the Peiping (Beijing) branch o f the M ilitary Com m ittee, in M ay 1935 w hile Com m ander Yoshijiro Um ezu was on a business trip. They demanded that General Ho clam p down on antiJapanese m oves. In Ju n e, the Um ezu-Ho Accord that included the w ith­ drawal of Chiang Kai-shek's arm y from Hebei Province, was concluded. D o h ih ara p lo tted w ith T akahashi and urged C h in T e-ch u n (Q in Dechun), acting chairm an o f Chahar Province, to let the army o f Sung Che-yuan (Song Zheyuan) withdraw from Hebei Province. C h in accepted and signed the D ohihara-Chin Accord. W hy did the Japanese Arm y seek to divide northern China? Then chief o f the M ilitary Affairs Section o f the War M inistry, Colonel G un H ashim oto, explained later that " If we didn't separate northern C h in a, no m atter how We im proved M anchuria, we w ould have failed w ithout halting the unabated infiltration from the neighboring areas. So it was necessary for us to set up a buffer zone."9 Also, a docum ent o f the Kwantung Army's headquarters noted that tap­ ping resources such as iron ore, coal and cotton in northern China would strengthen the self-sufficiency o f Japan, M anchuria and northern C h in a.10 In September 1935, the new Com m ander o f the China Garrison Army Hayao Tada hinted at the possibility o f resorting to force to crush any m ovem ent hindering Japan's operations in northern C hin a. At a confer­ ence in D a lia n the fo llo w in g m o n th , c h ie f o f the Secon d Bureau (Intelligence) o f the Arm y General Staff Yasuji Okam ura, w ho was in Chin a on an inspection tour, Vice C h ief o f Staff o f the Kwantung Army Seishiro Itagaki and Tada agreed that "C h in a should not be unified" and thus confirm ed the separation.11 Sakai stated: "Ch in a is one society but it is not a nation. It m ight be

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more appropriate to say that China is a society of marauding hordes."12 Based on this idea, Itagaki advocated “Bunji-Gassaku-ron" (the theory of separate governance and collaboration), calling for an alliance with each of the separated, independent districts in China. Dohihara established a pro-Japanese government, the so-called East Hebei Anti-Com m unist and Self-Government Council, in eastern Hebei Province in November 1935. Under Japanese pressure, the Nationalist Chinese government set up the Hebei-Chahar Political Council led by Sung Che-yuan.

Xian Incident leads to a united anti-Japanese front After he signed the Tanggu Truce agreement, Chiang Kai-shek wrote “wo xin chang dan" in Chinese or "gashinshotan" in Japanese (perseverance for the sake of vengeance) in his diary. He was trying to avoid confronting Japan as much as possible and instead concentrated on search-and-destroy operations against the Chinese Com m unist Party. Concerning Chiang Kai-shek's tactic of not resisting Japan, -Xu Yong, professor at the Depart­ ment of History at Peking University, said: "At first, Chiang Kai-shek was thinking that, through negotiations, Japanese troops would leave north­ eastern China after occupying the area for a certain period. Moreover, as China's m ilitary power was not sufficient to confront Japan, he hoped that the matter would be solved through the intervention of the international com m unity." However, the Japanese Army advanced into northern China. According to the chief o f the W orld M ilitary History Department at the Chinese Academy of M ilitary Science, He Xincheng, the Japanese side mistakenly dismissed "Chiang Kai-shek as just another warlord." Japan's hard-line policy and m ilitary operations finally forced Chiang Kai-shek to move against Japan. W hen did Chiang Kai-shek decide to confront Japan? Professor X u Yong said that Chiang Kai-shek did so around 1935. At the Fifth Party Convention of the Kuom intang in November 1935, Chiang Kai-shek said: "W e shall not talk lightly about sacrifice until we are driven to the last brink." By using the words, "the last brink," Professor Xu said that Chiang Kai-shek expressed his belief that northern China is an impor­ tant area for Chinese civilization of which China should not be deprived. O n December 9, 1935, students demonstrated vociferously in Beijing, shouting "Down with Japanese Imperialism" and "Halt the civil war, unite in fighting against Japan." The anti-Japanese movement spread from city to city. The Com m unist Party also publicized the "8/1 Declaration" in a Chinese newspaper published in Paris on August 1, 1935, urging all

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Chinese people to figh t against Jap an to save C h in a. In Decem ber 1936, the X ian Incident occurred, prom pting C hian g Kaishek to confront Jap an m ilitarily. The Northeastern Arm y, com m anded by C h an g H sueh-liang (Zhang X u elian g) and the N orthw estern A rm y, led by Y an g H u -ch en g (Yang Hucheng) arrested C h ian g Kai-shek, w ho cam e to X ian and dem anded an end to the civ il war to create a unified front against Jap an . C han g did not trust C h ian g Kai-shek, w ho put more effort in to attacking the Com m unist Party than to resisting Jap an . In m id-1936, the Com m unist Party's policy changed drastically from "an ti-C hian g Kai-shek and anti-Japan" to urging C h ian g Kai-shek to confront Jap an . C h ian g Kai-shek m et C h an g and Com m unist Party leader Zhou Enlai and accepted Chan g's dem and to form a united front against Jap an . About two weeks later, C h ian g Kai-shek returned safely to N an jin g. The break-up o f the N ationalist governm ent was avoided and the Chinese people's sup­ port for C h ian g Kai-shek gained m om entum . The X ia n In ciden t was a high-w ater m ark for C h in a's nationalism . In con trast, Jap an 's response was slow . As Bu P in g, director o f the Institute o f M odem H istory o f the Chinese Academ y o f Social Sciences, pointed out: "Japan regarded C h in a's Com m unist Party as just one o f the powers in C h in a . Jap an dispatched [military] advisers to alm ost all war­ lords in C h in a but no one was assigned to the Com m unist Party." W ang Jian lan g, vice director o f the same institute, said: "A m ong the people also, a clear co n cep t about sovereign ty an d in d ep en d en ce h ad grad u ally becom e prevalent because o f the N ational R evolution." Obsessed w ith traditional ways o f Chinese thinkin g based on m ilitary cliq u es, n o Japanese leaders in the central com m and o f th e Im perial Japanese Arm y and Japanese forces in C h in a understood the m ighty swell of Chinese nationalism .

Hirota ends pro-Western stance Serving as Foreign M inister and Prime M inister for m any years, Koki H irota was the diplom atic navigator during the tem pestuous period th a t led to the Sino-Japanese W ar. W ere there m istakes in H irota's diplom acy? H irota becam e Foreign M inister, replacing Yasuya U chida, in September 1933 after th e T an ggu T ru ce agreem en t w as e sta b lish e d . M am oru Sh igem itsu was A d m in istrative V ice M in ister o f Foreign A ffairs and Shigenori Togo was ch ief o f the European and Am erican Affairs Bureau of the Foreign M inistry. In a spirit o f international cooperation H irota tried to im prove the Sino-Japanese relationship. How ever, a statem ent issued by ch ief o f the Inform ation Analysis Departm ent o f the Foreign M inistry Eiji

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Am o in April 1934 became a political issue. The statement asserted: "It is natural for Japan to act independently to m aintain peace and order in East Asia. If C hin a boycotts Japan, taking advantage o f other countries, and takes steps against peace in East Asia, Japan w ill have to reject th is." This was an "Asian M onroe D octrine," so to speak, and other countries regard­ ed it as a change from Kijuro Shidehara's pro Anglo-Am erican diplom acy, w hich had been based on international cooperation. In January 1935, Hirota spoke at a plenary session o f the House of Representatives and declared that no war would happen w hile he was in his post. In M ay, he upgraded the Japanese m ission in Chin a from m inis­ terial to ambassadorial status. In September, he was approached by Britain in regard to Japan's coop­ eration in m onetary reform in C hin a—the abandonm ent o f the silver standard. H irota was n ot enthusiastic about it and the p ossibility of Japanese-B ritish-Chinese cooperation disappeared. In the same year, Japan's m ilitary authorities, who were w idening the scope o f operations in northern C h in a, opposed a British role in m onetary reform .13 In October, Hirota announced his "three principles": the de facto recog­ nition o f M anchukuo, the suppression of anti-Japanese activities in China and a Sino-Japanese front against com m unism . However, the proclam a­ tion failed to improve the bilateral relationship. Was there anything in com m on between Hirota and Shidehara whose diplom acy was based on cooperation w ith Britain and the United States? According to Shinichi Kitaoka, an expert on the history o f Japan's m odem politics and diplom acy, Hirota's "cooperative diplom acy" was lacking in substance and he often refused the involvem ent o f European countries and the U nited States. Concerning their sim ilarities, Shidehara reportedly said it was "an accidental resem blance."14

Three blunders, including the mandatory appointment o f active duty generals as war ministers A fter th e February 26 In cid e n t in 1936, genro senior statesm an K inm ochi Saionji recom m ended that Fum im aro Konoe succeed Prime M inister Keisuke Okada, but Konoe declined. The name o f Hirota then emerged. Konoe, Saionji's secretary Kumao Harada and Shigem Yoshida persuaded Hirota to becom e Prime M inister. However, Prime M inister Hirota's form ation o f a Cabinet was com pli­ cated because o f the interference by Akira M uto, a m ilitary section staff member o f the War M inistry, and others. Hirota wanted Shigem Yoshida to becom e foreign m inister but the idea was rejected on the ground that Yoshida was married to a daughter of a liberal, Nobuaki M akino. Yoshida,

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w ho becam e prim e m inister after the war, recalled this as "a fork in the road o f destiny." In M ay 1936, H irota m ade the m istake o f revivin g the practice o f appointing m ilitary m inisters on ly from the active roster o f high-ranking o fficers. The rule th a t q u a lifie d o n ly active d u ty m ilitary officers to becom e m ilitary m inisters m eant the m ilitary could topple a cabinet if they decided to w ithhold sending a m ilitary m inister. A ctually, General Kazushige U gaki, w ho was ordered to form a cabinet as a successor to H irota, could n ot do so as the Im perial Japanese Arm y did not send a m il­ itary m inister, a m ove that reflected the opposition o f staff officers, in clu d­ in g K anji Ishihara. "If a U gaki C abinet had been form ed at that tim e, the Sino-Japanese W ar m ight have been avoided." This historical "if" has been referred to ever since. Stating th at advancing to the southern seas was a n ational goal was another problem . This goal was adopted as the "Basis for N ational Policy" at a five-m inister conference held in August 1936, w hich was attended by Prim e M in ster H iro ta, Foreign M in ister H ach iro A rita, W ar M in ister H isaichi Terauchi, N avy M inister O sam i N agano and Finance M inister Eiichi Baba. A dvancing to the southern seas was m entioned for the first tim e as a national policy goal. The fundam entals o f Japan's national policy specifically envisaged "securing the position o f the Empire o f Jap an in the East Asian continent and advancing to the southern ocean." A n o th er sp ecial factor th a t sh ou ld be m en tion ed was Ja p a n 's tilt toward G erm any. In G erm any, A d olf H itler was appointed as C han cellor in Ja n u a ry 1933. Jo s e f Sta lin o f the So viet U n io n , m ean w h ile, kept expanding the C om m unist International (Com intern) m ovem ent. Under these circum stances, the H irota C ab in et signed the A nti-C om intern Pact w ith Germ any in Novem ber 1936. Arm y Attach^ at the Japanese Embassy in G erm an y M a jo r G e n e ra l H iro sh i O sh im a in itia te d c o n ta ct w ith Jo a ch im v o n R ib b en trop , w ho was resp on sible for N azi d ip lo m acy . Elbow ing in on the governm ent's diplom acy, O shim a had acted w ithout reporting to Tokyo. After the war, Prime M inister Yoshida asked the Foreign M inistry to com ­ pile docum ents, "M istakes o f Jap an 's D ip lo m acy." The Japan-G erm any agreement was evaluated therein as having "brought no merits except satis­ fying the desire to address [Japan's] international isolation ."15 After a U gaki C abinet failed to emerge, Prime M inister Senjuro H ayashi was installed in February 1937 in line w ith the aim s o f K anji Ishihara. This was a turning p oin t for Japan's diplom acy. The X ian Incident led Jap an to reconsider the p olicy toward C h in a . For exam ple, pro Anglo-Am erican Foreign M inister Naotake Sato tried to change the provocative and decep­ tive o p eratio n to separate n o rth ern C h in a from th e rest o f C h in a .

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However, the Hayashi Cabinet collapsed four m onths later as its strongarm dissolution o f the House o f Representatives caused a backlash from the political parties. O n the eve o f the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, was there any way that war could have been averted? An expert on m odem Japanese history insists that Japan could have averted the war if it had inherited the diplo­ m atic policy toward C hin a follow ed by Foreign M inister Sato.16 However, in the follow ing Cabinet formed by Konoe, Hirota became Foreign M inister again. Itaro Ish ii, w ho served as Asian Affairs Bureau chief, regarded Hirota as, w ithout any doubt, "a peace-lover from the bot­ tom o f his heart, seeking international harm ony" but also as "a m an w ith weak resistance to the m ilitary and the right w in g."17

Failing to gauge the real strength o f China Kw antung Arm y Staff O fficer Kanji Ishihara w ho m asterm inded the M anchurian Incident stated: "I doubt the Chinese can create a modern country—I believe the Han race w ill be happier to w ait for its natural developm ent under Ja p a n 's m ain ten an ce o f peace and o rd er."18 He believed the Han people would be happier under Japanese occupation. However, historically, C hin a was a civilized country and a m odel for Japan. The fact that C hin a was defeated by Britain in the First Opium War in the 1840s shocked Japan and encouraged it to shift its m odel from C hin a to the W est. M eiji Era philosopher Yukichi Fukuzawa's "datsuanyuo" (leaving Asia and entering Europe) theory was one good exam ple of this shift. In addition, the victory in the first Sino-Japanese War o f 1894-95 dam­ aged the image o f Chin a as a leading country. Politician Yukio Ozaki com ­ m ented that the Japanese people suddenly became "arrogant instead of lacking confidence as in the past. [The Japanese people] then showed little interest in China and Korea, the countries Japan used to admire as her teachers. They began to use insulting words such as yobo and chankoro." How did Chin a watchers react? Toichi Sasaki, a leading Chin a watcher in the Im perial Japanese Arm y, who sym pathized w ith the 1911 X in h ai Revolution led by Sun Yat-sen and others is one exam ple. According to an expert, Sasaki and others "expect­ ed to create a stable alliance between Japan and C hin a, if C hin a was uni­ fied through the revolution," though this turned out to be "one-sided speculation." They eventually regarded China's anti-Japanese movem ent as a "betrayal." W hat was the Foreign M inistry doing? "The C hin a service [working in C h in a ]...w a s re la tiv e ly u n im p o rta n t. T he m ainstream service was

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traditionally to be found in London, Paris, Berlin or W ashington and New York." For diplom ats, being assigned to C h in a m eant being consigned to a p olitical backw ater.19 A fter the outbreak o f the Sino-Japanese W ar, the Foreign M inistry's Asian Affairs Bureau ch ief Itaro Ish ii, one o f the C h in a w atchers, wrote in his diary on August 21, 1937: "Japan fou nd a form idable opponent in C h in a, the country it had underestim ated...Chin a, w hich it had view ed as a dog, now emerges as a w olf." The Foreign M inistry therefore can be seen to have misread the power o f C h in a after the M anchurian In ciden t.20

Unable to stand up to the m ilitary The H irota C abinet was inaugurated just after the February 26 Incident o f 1936, w hich sign ifican tly influenced the course o f Jap an 's, not to m en­ tion H irota's, diplom acy. A ccording to a historical sociologist, som e generals in the so-called K yushu fa c tio n in th e A rm y in th e 1930s such as Sadao A raki and Jin z a b u ro M asaki w ere c h a lle n g in g th e m ain stream gro u p le d b y Kazushige U gaki. The Kyushu faction was backed by a group o f staff o ffi­ cers, w ho b elo n ged to an in fo rm a l asso ciatio n —th e Isseki-ka i (O ne Evening Society). Young officers follow ed Isseki-kai members and form ed the Kodo-ha (Im perial W ay Faction). Araki becam e the W ar M inister in the Inukai and Saito Cabinets b y align in g him self w ith these people. Araki chose M asaki as V ice C h ie f o f the Arm y General Staff and carried ou t a num ber o f p artisan p erson n el ch an ges, in c lu d in g a p p o in tin g Tom oyuki Yam ashita, Toshishiro O bata and Yorim ichi Suzuki to key posts in the Arm y General Staff and the W ar M inistry. Eventually, Araki was forced to resign because o f the backlash against his aggressive personnel changes and his lack o f p olitical leadership. Senjuro H ayashi becam e the W ar M inister in place o f Araki. H ayashi appointed Tetsuzan N agata as ch ief o f the M ilitary Affairs Bureau o f the W ar M inistry. N agata led a group o f officers called the Tosei-ha (Control Faction)—w hich tried to control the radical m oves o f young officers oriented toward the Kodo-ha—together w ith H ideki T ojo, Akira M uto and K yoji Tom inaga. The tension between the two factions deepened. In addition, young officers o f the Kodo-ha, in clu din g Takaji M uranaka and A sa ich i Isobe were arrested on su sp icio n o f p la n n in g a coup in Novem ber 1934. Inspector General o f M ilitary Training Jinzaburo M asaki, an Kodo-ha faction leader, was also dism issed. Before starting the February 26 In ciden t, the Kodo-ha faction assassinated N agata in August 1935. Led by M uranaka and Isobe, about 1,400 troops attacked the Prime M inister's O fficia l Residence on February 26, 1936, and, am ongst others,

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killed Finance M inister Korekiyo Takahashi, Lord Keeper o f the Privy Seal M a k o to S a ito , an d In sp e cto r G e n e ra l o f M ilita r y T ra in in g Jo ta ro W atanabe—M asaki's successor. Then Prime M inister Keisuke O kada, w ho found refuge from the coup, said a few years later: "I th in k the February 26 Incident could have been the best opportunity to suppress p olitical inter­ feren ce...It was a good tim e but the fear o f seeing bloodshed again was stronger th an co n fro n tin g the A rm y. As a result, the m ilitary's clou t becam e even stronger."21 Political leaders were terrified by the Arm y's iron-fisted terrorism and they were at a loss as to w hat to do to stop the m ilitary. A fter the February 26 In cid en t, V ice W ar M inister Y osh ijiro Um ezu under W ar M in ister H isa ich i T erauchi becam e an in flu e n tia l figu re. Likewise, the groups respectively led by K anji Ishihara and Akira M uto, strengthened their positions. Soon, Ishihara and M uto confronted each oth er. O n e episode in particular provides an in sigh t in to the discord between them . In autum n o f 1936, M uto, an officer o f the Kw antung Arm y, triggered the Suiyuan Incident, a failed offensive in Inner M ongolia by Japanesetra in e d M o n g o lia n tro o p s. Is h ih a ra , c h ie f o f th e S e co n d S e ctio n (Operations and W ar Plans) o f the Arm y General Staff, flew to M anchuria and ordered M uto to stop the attack but M uto refused, saying "W e are m odeling this after w hat M r. Ishihara and others did in the M anchurian Incident. I d idn 't expect at all to receive a rebuke from y o u ." The leader w ho had taken power from his superiors was avenged b y his junior in m uch the same way as he had been. Notes_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 1R y u k ic h i T a n a k a, Shanhai Jihen wa Koshite Okosareta (This Is H o w th e S h a n g h a i In cid e n t O cc u rre d ), in Bessatsu Chisei 5 , Himerareta Showa-shi (Extra N u m b e r In te llig e n c e 5, H isto ry o f Sh o w a in Secret), T o k y o : K aw ade S h o b o , 1956, p p . 181-186 2 K iy o sh i K iyo saw a, Gendai Nihon Bunmeishi (M o d ern Ja p a n e se H isto ry o f C iv iliz a tio n ), T o k y o : T o y o K eizai S h in p o s h a , 1941, p . 464 3 H e n ry

L. S tim s o n , Far Eastern Crisis, N e w

Yo rk: H arper & Brothers P u blish ers, 1936, p.

55 4 H is a h ik o O k a z a k i, Shigemitsu/Togo to Sono Jidai ( S h ig e m its u , T o g o a n d T h e ir Era), T o ky o : P H P B u n k o , 2003, p . 58 5 T o ky o : The Yomiuri Shimbun, m o r n in g e d itio n , O cto b e r 5, 1932, p . 2 6 H e le n M ears, Mirror for Americans: JA P A N , B o sto n : H o u g h to n M ifflin , 1948, p . 264 7T akeji N a ra, Nara Takeji Nikki/Kaikoroku (Takeji N ara's D ia ry : M em o irs), T o ky o : K ashiw a S h o b o , 2000, p . 171 8 S h ic h ih e i Y a m a m o to , Showa Tenno no Kenkyu (Stu d y o n E m p e ro r Sh o w a), T o k y o : S h o d e n s h a , 1995, p . 330 9 K e iic h i E g u c h i, lS-n en Senso no Kaimaku ( O u tb re a k o f t h e 1 5 -Y ear W a r ) , T o k y o : Sh o g a k u k a n , 1988, p . 297 10 Ib id ., p . 298

72 / J a p a n 's w a r s in 1931-45 11Ryoichi Tobe, Nihon Rikugun to Chugoku (Japanese Arm y and C hin a), Tokyo: Kodansha, 1999, p. 188 12 Takashi Kasai (pen nam e o f Takashi Sakai), Urakaramita Shina-M inzokusei (Chinese Characteristics Seen from Behind), Tokyo: N ihon G a iji Kyokai, 1910, p. 2 13 Hirota Koki Biography Publishing Association, ed ., Hirota Koki, 1966 rp t., Fukuoka: Ashi Shobo, 1992, pp. 155-158 14Sh in ich i Kitaoka, Seito kara Gum bu e (From Political Parties to the M ilitary) 1924-1941, Tokyo: Chuokoron-Shinsha, 1999, pp. 207-208 15 Kazuo O gura, Yoshida Shigeru no Jim on (Self Q uestioning o f Shigeru Yoshida), Tokyo: Fujiwara Shoten, 2003, p. 102 16 Katsum i U sui, Shinpan Nitchu Senso (New Version Sino-Japanese W ar), Tokyo: Chuko Shinsho, 2000, p . 63 17Itaro Ish ii, Gaikokan no Issho (Life o f a D iplom at), Tokyo: Chuko Bunko, 1986, p . 293 18Ju n Tsunoda, ed ., Manmo M ondai Shiken (Personal O p in ion on M anchuria and Inner M on golia), in Ishihara K anji Shiryo, Kokuboronsaku-hen (K anji Ishihara Source Book, O p in ion o f N ational Defense), Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1971, p.77 19Shigeru Yoshida, Kaiso Junen (10-Year Recollection) vol. 4, Tokyo: Chuko Bunko, 1998, p. 107 20Takashi Ito et a l., eds., Ish ii Itaro Nikki (Itaro Ish ii Diary), Tokyo: Chuokoronsha, 1993, p . 183 21Sadahiro O kada, ed ., Okada Keisuke Kaikoroku (Keisuke Okada M em oirs), Tokyo: Chuko Bunko, 1987, p . 207

Chapter 4 The Sino-Japanese War /Part 3

Hard-line stance leads to stalemate; constitutional government succumbs to military power

T

he Marco Polo Bridge Incident, which occurred in a suburb of Beijing in 1937, developed into an all-out w ar between Japan and China. The war developed into a stalemate because of the hard-line stance adopted by the Cabinet of Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe. Questions that should be raised are: Couldn’t the country have avoided escalating the conflict? W hy did Konoe, a politician with strong public support, not show effective leadership? W hat were lawmakers and politicians doing at such a critical period?

Marco Polo Bridge Incident is exploited by expansionists O n the sultry night o f Ju ly 7, 1937 (the 12th year o f the Showa Era), a burst o f gun fire rang ou t near the M arco Polo Bridge (Lugouqiao in Chinese) on the outskirts o f B eijing.1 Japanese troops on a training exercise were using blanks; however, sev­ eral live bullets were fired from a different direction. W hen the Japanese troops prom ptly assembled, a new volley o f more than 10 shots rang out. The daw n o f Ju ly 8 saw three more shots fired at the Japanese side. Regim ental Com m ander Renya M utaguchi then ordered his troops to fight back against the Chinese troops. In the beginning, m any people did not think that the skirmish would escalate into all-out war between Japan and C hin a. But one decision after another exacerbated the situation. The unit of Japanese troops stationed in T ian jin under a treaty concluded fo llow in g the 1898-1900 Boxer Uprising held an emergency m eeting o f staff officers early on Ju ly 8. The quasi-official Japanese war history series (Senshi Sosho), said, "The m eeting showed no sign o f tension at all; it was sim ply a discussion o f how to deal w ith im m inent issues."2 How did the central com m and o f the Im perial Japanese Arm y back in Tokyo react to the incident? The central com m and was inform ed of the incident for the first tim e early on Ju ly 8. Kanji Ishihara, the head o f the First Bureau (Operations) o f the Army General Staff, told Akira M uto, the 73

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ch ief o f the Operations Section, " If we now act against C h in a , the sky w ill fall in . Let's keep the in cid ent from developing further and have the local [comm and] settle the issue."3 A n instruction to that effect was sent to the T ian jin headquarters o f the Japanese force on the evening o f the same day. H ow ever, M u to , to g eth er w ith S h in ic h i T anaka w ho h eaded th e M ilitary Affairs Section o f the W ar M inistry embarked on preparations for dispatching three Arm y divisions from Jap an . The duo, from the same class at the M ilitary Academ y, thus played a key role in escalating the in ci­ dent. In his m em oirs, Torashiro Kawabe, the head o f the W ar G uidance Section o f the Arm y General Staff w ho opposed escalating the strife in C h in a , w rote, "M ilitary Affairs Section ch ief Kaneshiro Shibayam a gave m e a c a ll, sayin g 'A troublesom e th in g h ap p en ed ,' b u t [O perations] Section ch ief M uto said, 'A pleasant th in g occurred.' There existed a dif­ ference concerning approaches to the case—one group was th in k in g o f trying to prevent the situation deteriorating w hile another group was attem pting to pour o il on the fire for fu n ."4 W hile Ishihara was seeking to prevent the dispute in C h in a from esca­ latin g, expansionists around him began pressing ahead w ith their plans. At the tim e, the C h ie f o f the Arm y General Staff was Prince K anin (Kaninno-miya Kotohito Shinno) w hile V ice C h ie f Kiyoshi Im ai was seriously ill. O n Ju ly 9, W ar M inister H ajim e Sugiyam a, an active expansionist, pre­ sented to a C abinet m eeting a proposal to send divisions from Jap an to C h in a . But the Cabin et did not reach agreem ent. For its part, the Tianjin-based com m and o f the Japanese force in C hin a continued m aking efforts to end the dispute. Consequently, the com m and m anaged to sign a ceasefire agreem ent w ith the Chinese side in Beijing at 8 p .m . on Ju ly 11. This should have provided closure follow ing an isolated incident. How ever, a few hours earlier, the m atter had taken a dram atic turn in Tokyo w hen, on the afternoon o f Ju ly 11, the Cabin et o f Prime M inister Fum im aro Konoe decided to deploy three divisions from Jap an to C h in a. The decision was follow ed by a governm ent statem ent that read: "The incident was an act o f armed aggression against Jap an . There is no ques­ tion about it. A t today's Cabinet session, grave decision to take necessary measures in connection w ith the dispatch o f troops to N orth C h in a was m ad e." W h y d id th e govern m en t decide to dep loy three d ivisio n s? Sahishige N agatsu, a hard-liner w ho was the C h ie f o f the C h in a Section o f the Arm y General Staff, said at the tim e, "The incident w ill be resolved once a Japanese vessel w ith troops aboard appears o ff the Tanggu district in T ia n jin ." He believed th at C h in a w ould back dow n if Jap an took a tough lin e.

Hard-line stance leads to stalemate; constitutional government succumbs to military power / 75

Ishihara fin ally agreed to the deploym ent o f the three divisions. W hy did he fail to control M uto and others? Ishihara had been o f the opinion that Japan should give priority to m ilitary preparedness for a war w ith the Soviet U n io n . But, upon being inform ed o f a northw ard advance by China's Centred Arm y, the core o f Chiang Kai-shek's forces, he felt that he should n ot ignore the danger facing the outnum bered Japanese troops in Chin a. As Ishihara was now preparing for troop m obilization, Kawabe said it was hard to understand the m otivations o f a colleague w ho was known to be an opponent o f an expansionist policy. Ishihara's firm response was, "Do you really believe I should do nothing and witness a crushing defeat for your elder brother's [M asakazu Kaw abe, the Com m ander o f the Infantry Brigade, North China] brigade?"5 M uto and other colleagues employed a "gekokujo" (the low -dom inatingth e-h igh ) approach adopted earlier by Ish ih ara in the M an ch u rian Incident. Sadamu Shim om ura, the head o f the Fourth Bureau (Historical Records) o f the Army General Staff, testified w ith reference to the luke­ warm attitude o f Ishihara that "[he] appeared to have conceded the issue, even though he rem ained opposed in principle [to the hard-liners]." 6 The Japanese troops stationed in China occupied Beijing and Tianjin by the end o f Ju ly 1937. During and after August that year, an Arm y Corps under the com m and o f Hideki Tojo, C h ief o f Staff o f the Kwantung Arm y, staged an incursion into Chahar Province. The war thus spread to northern C h in a. Japanese and Chinese troops also clashed in Shanghai. The Im perial Japanese Arm y deployed an expeditionary force under the com m and o f General Iwane M atsui, the Com m ander o f the Central China Area Arm y. As the Japanese forces m et strong resistance from Chinese troops, reinforcem ents were sent from Lieu ten ant G en eral H eisuke Yanagawa's Tenth Arm y, w hich belonged to the Central C hin a Area Arm y. At the end o f October the Chinese forces subsequently retreated. The Japanese troops, ignoring the front-line for troop deployments established by the central com m and back in Tokyo, pursued the retreating forces hop­ ing to have the honor o f being the first to conquer the enem y's capital. C om m ander-in-Chief M atsui led the Japanese assault on beleaguered N anjing w hich was defended by China's N anjing Defense Corps, led by General Tang Sheng-chi (Tang Shengzhi), un til it collapsed on December 13,1937, and abandoned the N ationalist Chinese governm ent's capital to the Im perial Japanese Arm y. During the capture o f N anjing and operations undertaken to m op up the rem nants o f the enem y, chaos ensued and in m any instances Japanese troops killed Chinese prisoners o f war and assaulted civilians. There are various estimates of the number o f victim s o f w hat later became known as

76 / J apan' s wabs in 1 9 3 1 -4 5

"Nankin Gyakusatsu (Rape o f N anking)." Some put the death toll at more th an 200,000 w hile others place it anyw here betw een 100,000 and 190.000. Japanese historian Ikuhiko Hata carried out research trying to focus on reliable evidence and estimated the number o f victim s at about 40.000. 7 Reports about atrocities com m itted in N anjing by the invading force reached Ja p a n , p rom ptin g the Im perial H eadquarters to dispatch a telegram to M atsui urging him to have his m en m aintain discipline. Factors contributing to the looting and violent behavior were the tenden­ cy to rely on enem y forces for the supply o f provisions as w ell as the desperate attempts by troops hoping to prove themselves in battle. There was also a great deal o f anim osity toward the Chinese troops after the clash in Shanghai. H istorian Hata wrote, "Considering the across-theboard breakdown o f m ilitary discipline, it seems the commanders o f the Arm y divisions concerned were to blam e. In particular, M atsui, as the supreme com m ander, should have been held far more responsible."8 The quagmire o f the Sino-Japanese W ar o f 1937-45 continued to deepen as the Japanese m ilitary demanded a bigger budget and more troops every tim e it invaded major Chinese cities. Each tim e the m ilitary w ould say, "This is our last opportunity." The Arm y General Staff envisaged that Japan would be able to establish its rule over China once Japanese troops conquered Hankou (Wuhan) in Hubei Province and Guangdong. In reality, such a prediction was com pletely w rong. A ltho u gh Japanese troops occupied key C h in ese cities in clu d in g B e ijin g , Sh an gh ai, N a n jin g , Xu zh ou , Hankou and Guangdong, there was no end in sight to the war. The Japanese force in Chin a swelled to 850,000 as o f fiscal 1939 and the m ilitary budget surpassed 10 billion yen in fiscal 1941. After the fall of N an jin g, the K uom intang governm ent retreated to W uhan and fin ally to Chongqing, w hich became the wartime capital of C h in a. It continued its resistance to Japan un til the end o f the Pacific War.

Failure o f peace negotiations After the M arco Polo Bridge Incident in 1937, Japan, led by the Army General Staff, embarked on peace initiatives to prevent an escalation of the Sino-Japanese W ar. Such moves came am id growing concerns that preparations for a possible war against the Soviet U nion would be neglect­ ed during a prolonged conflict in Chin a. One such peace initiative was the Trautm an Operation, nam ed after Germ an Ambassador to China Oskar Trautm an w ho Japan picked as a gobetween. Germ any was approached because o f the strong anti-British feel­ in g in the Arm y G eneral Staff. In late O ctober o f 1937, the Arm y's

Hard-line stance leads to stalemate; constitutional government succumbs to military power / 77

intentions were conveyed to Trautm an through a m ilitary attache at the Germ an Embassy in Jap an . For Germ any, the offer was welcom e as it believed that an early peace settlem ent between Japan and C h in a was desirable to stabilize the Chinese market and to restrain the Soviet U nion. O n N ovem ber 2, Foreign M inister Koki H irota presented Germ an Ambassador to Japan Herbert von Dirksen the terms for peace, w hich were in line w ith the governm ent's guidelines for handling the Sino-Japanese W ar. Trautm an then visited C h ia n g K ai-shek, the leader o f C h in a's Nationalist government, and conveyed Japan's position. The terms included such conditions as autonom y in Inner M ongolia and the establishment of dem ilitarized zones in northern China under the precondition that China recognizes M anchukuo, the M anchurian nation Japan had established. But Chian g Kai-shek rejected the conditions since he had high hopes for the Nine-Power Treaty conference in Brussels, w hich discussed Japan's m ilitary actions. The peace process was therefore suspended. But, as the Japanese forces appeared to have gathered the strength to capture N an jin g, C h ian g Kai-shek needed to change tactics and he m oved to become actively engaged in peace negotiations. Shigeharu M atsum oto, w ho was the Shanghai Bureau C h ie f of the Dom ei national news agency and an aide to Konoe, recalled: At a meeting in early December, Trautman tried to persuade Chiang Kai-shek, saying, "Unless China com plies w ith this offer, the war w ill continue, and future peace terms likely w ill be m uch less favorable than the current ones," Chiang Kai-shek replied: "I can't trust Japan. However, I believe Germ any is m ediating here, so I'd like to have negotiations based on the conditions already offered." But Chiang Kai-shek still sought a ceasefire, saying he would be w illing to have talks after a ceasefire and that talks could not be held while the fighting continued.9 After the Japanese forces captured N anjing in late December of 1937, Japan was in the m ood to celebrate a victory. This made any peace terms m uch tougher. At a liaison m eeting o f the Imperial Headquarters and the government on December 14, the day after the occupation, Hirota presented the same peace proposal that he showed to Dirksen. War M inister Hajim e Sugiyama and Hom e Affairs M inister Nobum asa Suetsugu, am ong others, voiced strong opposition to the peace plan. Konoe remained silent throughout the m eeting. The m eeting ended w ith the conclusion that Japan would dem and that C h in a accept conditions including form al recognition of M anchukuo and the establishm ent o f a special political organ in northern C hin a. These were conditions that Chin a was hardly likely to accept. As a result, the two nations lost a chance to make a peace deal. Chian g Kai-shek refused to engaged in peace talks and opted for all-out

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resistance. In his diary dated January 2, 1938, he wrote: "The conditions that Japan presented were equivalent to allow ing [Japan] to conquer and destroy our nation. It would be better for us to fight to the end rather than to surrender."10 Jap an set a Jan u ary 15 deadline for C h in a 's rep ly. The Im perial Headquarters-Governm ent Liaison Conference in Tokyo on that day was tense. According to a record written by Kazuo Horiba, who was in the war guidance unit o f the Army General Staff, only one member o f the m eeting, Vice C h ief o f the Army General Staff Hayao Tada, called for continuation o f the negotiations. Sugiyam a, on the other hand, said, "If there is no reply by the deadline, it is proof that [China] lacks sincerity in pursuing the peace process." Hirota concurred, "In light of m y long experience as a diplom at, it is obvious, judging from its handling of the m atter, that China lacks good faith for reaching a peaceful settlem ent." Hirota pressed Tada hard, asking, "Vice C h ief, don't you trust the Foreign M inister?"11 Navy M inister Mitsum asa Yonai also attem pted to forestall Tada's argu­ m ent, saying: "Distrust in the Foreign M inister shown by [a member of] the high com m and is equivalent to having no confidence in the govern­ m ent. There is no choice for the governm ent but to resign." Tada was in tears as he resisted, saying, "How can you refer to the resignation o f the governm ent at such a critical tim e for the n ation ." But he was forced out. The next day, January 16, a statement was issued, "The Im perial govern­ m ent from now on w ill not regard the N ationalist governm ent [of China] as a negotiating partner." Hirota also form ally notified Germ any to end the Trautm an Operation. Back in early November 1937, when the peace negotiations were suspend­ ed, Hirota had already said, "Even if Germ any and Italy m ediate, it w ill do no good at a ll."12 After the first Konoe peace initiative was issued, a number o f others were attem pted, such as one led by Foreign M inister Kazushige Ugaki, called the Ugaki-Kung Hsiang-hsi Operation, w hich started in June 1938, w ith Rung Hsiang-hsi (Kong Xiangxi), V ice Premier o f the Kuom intang governm ent. But the one given most attention was the W ang Chao-m ing (W ang Zhaom ing) Operation. Arm y officers such as Sadaaki Kagesa and Takeo Im ai approached W ang Chao-m ing, a Kuom intang heavyw eight. W ang Chao-m ing left Chongqing, follow ing the second Konoe statem ent, w hich called for a new order in East Asia. In M arch 1940, W ang Chao-m ing launched a new regime in N an jin g, w hich was under control o f the Japanese m ilitary. There were lim itations, however, to peace negotiations w ithout Chiang Kai-shek's presence. Professor Liu Jie at W aseda University said: "If one of China's periodic power struggles had taken place, a shift in power from

Hard-line stance leads to stalemate; constitutional government succumbs to military power / 79

Chiang Kai-shek to W ang Chao-m ing could have occurred. But, follow ing the outbreak o f all-out war between Japan and C h in a, it was inconceivable to oust Chiang Kai-shek, w ho was the driving force for anti-Japanese resis­ tance in C h in a." In C hin a, Japan's peace initiatives of this period were seen as a "plot" and expressed in two Chinese characters m eaning "guidance for surren­ der." Bu P ing, the director o f the Institute o f M odern H istory at the Chinese Academ y of Social Sciences, insisted: "[Japan] aimed at avoiding any large-scale m ilitary clash. The purpose was not to achieve real peace; it was merely a plot aimed to allow the occupation of C h in a."

Konoe lacks leadership Fumimaro Konoe first took up the premiership w ith strong popular support on Ju n e 4, 1937, a m on th before the outbreak o f the SinoJapanese W ar. He was only 45 years old and hailed from the leading one of five Sekke fam ilies, whose members were eligible for the positions of regent (sessho) and chancellor (kanpaku) to serve the throne, a system dat­ ing back to the early part o f the Kamakura Era (1192-1333). These factors generated public expectations that he m ight be able to break the deadlock in the p olitical sphere caused by the m ilitary's rising power after the M anchurian Incident. But this highly popular leader, w ho eventually led three Cabinets, failed to meet these public expectations. W hen considering Konoe, the first thing that should be discussed is his article title d , "Eibei H oni no Heiwa-shugi wo H aisu " (Rejecting A ngloAmerican Centered Quest o f Peace) published in 1918.13 In the article, Konoe divided world powers into those led by Britain and the U n ited States, w hich w anted to "m ain tain the status q u o ," and Germ any and other latecomers, w hich were eager to "overturn the status quo." Konoe expressed strong sym pathy for Germ any, w hich was defeated in W orld War I, saying: "Peace preached by Britain and the United States is a stance taken by those w ho consider the status quo to be convenient. It is not som ething based on justice and hum anity." Konoe then pointed out that it had been argued in Britain that other nations should be prevented from acquiring colonies. If that was the case, Konoe said, Japan would "be driven to a point where it needed to break the status quo" for its survival. Such logic and the idea o f "have-nots" were seen in a number o f state­ ments issued, and views expressed, by Konoe during the period in w hich the Sino-Japanese War escalated. Follow ing the M arco Polo Bridge Incident in Ju ly 1937, the Konoe Cabinet decided to send troops to C hin a. Konoe later recalled: "N ot only the Cabinet but also the Army advocated a non-expansionist policy. But,

8 0 / J apan’s wars in 1 9 3 1 -4 5

despite this desire, the nation indeed opted for exp an sion ."14 Konoe blam ed such a sh ift from non-expansion on the Arm y's Toseiha (C on trol Faction) group and believed th at the sh ift was triggered by the February 26 In cid en t, w hich resulted in the rem oval o f another Arm y faction called Kodo-ha (Im perial W ay Faction ).15 W ith in the Foreign M inistry, m eanw hile, people such as Itaro Ish ii, the East A sian A ffairs Bureau c h ie f, opposed th e d ispatch o f troop s. But Foreign M inister Koki H irota did not heed Ishii's op in ion and approved the dispatch anyw ay, saying, "It w ould be fin e if the num ber o f the troops to be sent is adequate for em ergency preparations." Konoe and H irota were thus w on over to the side o f the W ar M inistry, w hich was vocal in its sup­ port for dispatching troops. How ever, Konoe did n ot necessarily agree w ith the hard-line stance. He was considering h oldin g a sum m it w ith C h ian g Kai-shek. Follow ing the advice o f K anji Ishihara, head o f the First Bureau (Operations) o f the Arm y General Staff w ho strived to stop the escalation o f the war, Konoe planned to travel to N an jin g to hold direct talks w ith C h ian g Kai-shek. Konoe said, "I w ill go [to m eet C h ian g Kai-shek] now , even at the risk o f m y life ." But he canceled the visit out o f fears that he m ight n ot be able to control Arm y troops stationed in C h in a .16 O n August 15, the Konoe Cabinet altered its non-expansion policy and issued a governm ent statem ent seen as a de facto declaration o f war. The tone o f the statem ent was forceful. "W e w ill take firm action , b y punish­ in g the atrocities o f the Chinese forces, so that the N an jin g governm ent [of the Kuom intang] w ould feel regret." Fighting had by this tim e spread to Shanghai. W ar M inister H ajim e Sugiyam a brought up the draft o f the statem ent in a Cabinet m eeting. Railw ay M inister C hiku hei N akajim a took a hard-line stance, saying, "W e'd better com pletely beat them dow n." Com m unications M in ister R yutaro N agai con cu rred . A cco rd in g to a m em oir o f C h ie f Cabinet Secretary Akira Kazam i, Konoe "rem ained silent as usual, even at this tim e, and listened to them in a patient m an n er."17 After the statem ent was issued, the phrase o f "boshi yocho (punishing vicious C hin a)" becam e com m only used as if it were a slogan. In January 1938, the Prim e M inister m ade w hat was called the first K onoe statem en t, w h ich said th a t th e n a tio n w ould n o t regard the K uom intang governm ent as a negotiating partner. W ith this statem ent, Konoe single-handedly ceased contacts w ith C h in a . But he soon realized that the statem ent was a m istake and tried to fin d ways o f h oldin g talks w ith the K uom intang governm ent "under the belief that the m istakes in the statem ent m ust be corrected." In N ovem ber, Konoe issued a second statem ent on "b u ild in g a new

Hard-line stance leads to stalemate; constitutional government succumbs to military power / 81

order in East Asia." The second statement for the first tim e defined the purpose o f the SinoJapanese War as "to build a new order to ensure perpetual stability in East A sia." A "new order" m eant a challenge to the old one created by the W ashington Naval Treaty and the Nine-Power Treaty o f 1922. By calling for cooperation am ong Japan, M anchuria and C hin a, Konoe intended to correct the first statem ent. The concept o f a new order in East Asia thus became the basis for the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere initiative. Konoe, m eanw hile, became increasingly frustrated w ith Sugiyam a since the War M inister had neglected to inform him of the Army's operations. Konoe was also dissatisfied w ith Hirota since the Foreign M inister's han­ dling of the m ilitary appeared to be unsatisfactory. Konoe reshuffled his Cabinet in M ay 1938 in an attem pt to make a political breakthrough. He appointed Seishiro Itagaki as W ar M inister and Kazushige Ugaki as Foreign M inister. Itagaki, along w ith Ishihara, was the masterm ind o f the M anchurian Incident. Ugaki took up the post on con­ dition that Konoe's first statem ent w ould n ot be binding. Former War M inister Sadao Araki, a leading figure o f the Kodo-ha Arm y faction, was selected for the post o f Education M inister. C h ief of Staff o f the Kwantung Army Hideki Tojo, who had been a hard­ liner since the beginning of the Sino-Japanese W ar, was appointed Vice War M inister. It was obvious that the com bination o f Itagaki and Tojo would not work w ell since Itagaki was pro-Ishihara w hile Tojo was antiIsh ih ara. R egarding C h in a p o licy , Foreign M in ister U gaki and W ar M inister Itagaki held opposing positions. W hile Ugaki intended to secure a breakthrough by treating the Kuom intang governm ent as a negotiating partner, Itagaki sought the secession o f five provinces in northern China from the Kuom intang governm ent. Ugaki resigned in late Septem ber. According to a specialist on the diplom atic history o f m odern Jap an , Konoe thus "became a victim o f his personnel decisions, w hich were not insightful and rather too casual.” 18 Konoe began to feel increasingly helpless and started to indicate his intention to quit. In January 1939, he resigned.

Sharp rise in war expenditures; Diet gives tacit approval How was the Diet functioning when the Sino-Japanese War was threat­ ening to escalate? To answer this question, it is necessary to explain a set­ back in the party-based cabinet system. In 1932, one year after the M anchurian In cid en t, Prim e M inister Tsuyoshi Inukai was shot to death in the M ay 15 Incident, an attempted coup led by young officers of the Army and the Navy w ho held reformist

8 2 / J apan' s wars in 1 9 3 1 -4 5

views. After the incident, the Arm y strongly opposed the continuation of the party-based cabinet system. Retired Navy Adm iral M akoto Saito took the prime m inister's post, and the new Cabinet pursued unity am ong the m ilitary, bureaucrats, political parties and the House of Peers. This policy was follow ed by the Cabinet o f Prime M inister Keisuke Okada. But the Okada Cabinet was h it by political turm oil in February 1935 over whether the Emperor was an organ o f the state and by the February 26 Incident o f 1936. The theory o f the Emperor as a state organ had given le g itim a c y to p a rlia m e n t-ce n te re d p o litic s . B ut R ikken Seiyu ka i (Constitutional Party o f Political Friends), also called Seiyukai, opposed it in an effort to overthrow the Cabinet. This was rem iniscent o f the 1930 tactic o f Seiyukai, an opposition party at the tim e led by Inukai, to strong­ ly criticize the governm ent for infringing on the Emperor's prerogative of supreme com m and by signing the London N aval Treaty, a disarmament pact m any hotheads in the N avy had wanted to reject. Lawmakers thus themselves helped to weaken the power o f the Diet. The February 26 Incident crushed the possibility o f reviving party poli­ tics. Criticism o f the m ilitary by such political party figures as Takao Saito and Kunim atsu Hamada is w ell-know n. But the Diet could not escape changes. "Budgetary deliberations lost substance. Draft bills that the gov­ ernm ent subm itted from the 70th D iet session [that was convened in December 1936] began to pass virtually unanim ously."19 In Ju ly 1937, im m ediately after the M arco Polo Bridge Incident, the 71st special session of the Diet was convened. The governm ent subm itted a draft budget w ith 100 m illion yen added as additional expenses to handle the in cid e n t. A t the H ouse o f Representatives' Budget C om m ittee, Chairm an Naota Kumagaya proposed to om it hearings on the budget, arguing that the Diet was "facing a period o f great im portance." A ll of the Com m ittee members responded, "N o objections." The budget was passed unanimously w ith the votes of Rikken Minseito (Constitutional Dem ocratic Party), Seiyukai, Shakai Taishuto (Social Masses Party) and other parties including Daiichi Giin Kurabu, D aini Hikaeshitsu and Tohokai. The com m it­ tee session opened at 10:21 a . m . and adjourned at 10:52 a . m . A supplem entary budget for an additional 400 m illion yen, submitted after Japanese troops stationed in Chin a started full-scale attacks in north­ ern C h in a, was also passed after one day's deliberation. The D iet thus encouraged the governm ent rather than restraining it. In early September, the 72nd extraordinary Diet session was convened. Since a special account for extraordinary m ilitary spending was established, m ilitary expenditures grew at an accelerated pace. Although a huge m ilitary budget totaling about 2 billion yen was subm itted, there was little criticism from the Diet. Itaro Ishii, the head o f the Foreign M inistry's East Asian Affairs Bureau,

Hard-line stance leads to stalemate; constitutional government succumbs to military power / 83

wrote in his diary dated September 8: "The Diet session closed today. I wonder how m any people are anticipating that lawmakers w ill one day feel ashamed to face the public because they cleared the additional budget of 2 billion yen w ithout proper exam ination. Constitutional politics has succumbed to the saber [m ilitary power]."20 The 73rd Diet session is also worth rem embering. During this session, an extraordinary m ilitary budget totaling about 4.8 billion yen was passed. A N ational M obilization Law was also passed and enacted. The law enti­ tled the governm ent blanket power to control people's daily lives and overall business activities. Under the law, the Diet would be deprived o f its roles. Shakai Taishuto, a socialist leaning party in the Konoe Cabinet, actively supported the b ill. Minseito and Seiyukai in itially voiced strong opposition to the b ill, saying that it violated the Constitution. But in the end they made an about-face and supported the b ill. They did so because they feared that Konoe m ight dissolve the House o f Representatives through irritation w ith the stalemate in Diet deliberations and call a gen­ eral election launching a new reformist party.21 There were two im portant episodes concerning the process o f D iet deliberations on the key b ill. O ne is known as the "Damare [Shut up!]" incident that took place in M arch 1938. As Lieutenant Colonel Kenryo Sato o f the W ar M inistry's M ilitary Affairs Bureau was providing longwinded explanations at a Com m ittee m eeting, lawmakers hissed at him , "You'd better stop it," at w hich point Sato uttered the words "Shut up!" The in cid ent sym bolized the m ilitary's high-handed attitude and the declining power of the D iet. A colum n in the Asahi Shimbun newspaper noted: "Q uestioning at the Com m ittee w ent in circles. The Com m ittee was in a gloom y m ood. As evening approached, some clever Com m ittee m em bers le ft for ozashiki [entertainm ent]. A t this p o in t Lieutenant C olon el Sato got m ad about the hissing by Com m ittee members and shouted unexpectedly. Such a thing as a governm ent official yelling at [Diet] Com m ittee members had never before occurred in the sanctuary of the D iet."22 The other episode was a speech made by Suehiro N ishio o f Shakai Taishuto, who became Chairm an o f M inshu Shakaito (Democratic Socialist Party) in the postwar era. In his speech on M arch 16, Nishio encouraged K onoe, sayin g, "Like [Italy's fascist dictator Benito] M u sso lin i, like [Germany's N azi leader Adolf] Hitler or like [Soviet U n ion leader Josef] Stalin, the nation should boldly advance as required." Nishio was dismissed after he was called up before the Disciplinary Com m ittee. From the late 1920s, political parties became w illing to do whatever they needed to do in order to take power. There were m any pro-m ilitary lawmakers w ho compromised w ith the m ilitary and tried to win its favor.

84 / J a p a n ' s w a r s in 1931-45

After all, the Diet failed to prevent the expansion of the war although it could have done so by rejecting an extraordinary military budget. By so easily accepting government arguments that the war would be over quick­ ly, the Diet continued to allow war expenditures to grow at an increasing pace. Notes___________________________________________________________________________________________________ 1 Lugouqiao is a 235-meter, 11-arch stone bridge built in 1192. Lugou and qiao mean "black ditch" and "bridge," respectively. In Europe, the bridge has been known as the Marco Polo Bridge since the early 14th century when Italian merchant and explorer Marco Polo toured China and published a travelogue, "The M illion/ ' according to geo­ graphical dictionaries, including Concise Chimei-Jiten (Dictionary o f Names o f Places), Tokyo: Sanseido, 1985. 2 The M ilitary History Department o f the National Institute for Defense Studies o f the Defense Agency (NIDS), ed., Shina Jihen Rikugun Sakusen I (Army's Operations in the C hin a Incident, vo l. 1) in Senshi Sosho (A Series o f W ar Histories),Tokyo: Asagumo Shim bunsha, 1975, p. 150 3Shuhei Dom on, Nihon no Unmei o Kimeta Toka-kan (Those 10 Days That Determ ined the Fate o f Japan) in Ichioku-nin no Showa-shi: Nihon no Senshi in (A History o f Showa for 100 M illion People: War History o f Japan, vol. 3), Tokyo: M ainichi Newspapers, 1979, p. 98 4N IDS, ed., op. cit., p. 152 s Torashiro Kawabe, Kawabe Torashiro Kaikoroku (Reminiscences o f Torashiro Kawabe), Tokyo: M ainichi Newspapers, 1979, p. 80 6N IDS, ed., op. cit., p. 163 7 Ikuhiko Hata, Nankin liken (Nanjing Incident), Tokyo: Chuokoron-Shinsha, 2001, p. 214 8Ibid., p. 224 9Shigeharu M atsum oto, Showa-shi e no Ichi Shogen (A W itness on the History o f Showa), Tokyo: M ainichi Newspapers, 1986, pp. 70-71 10Ray Huang, Shokaiseki: Makuro Hisutori Shikan kara Yomu Shokaiseki Nikki (Chiang Kaishek: Reading Chiang Kai-shek's Diary from the Macro History Viewpoint), Tokyo: Toho Shoten, 1997, p. 182 11 Kazuo Horiba, Shina Jihen Senso Shido-shi (The History o f War Guidance in the SinoJapanese War), Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1973, pp. 129-130 12Ryoichi Tobe, Pisu Fira (Peace Feeler), Tokyo: Ronsosha, 1991, p. 113 13 Fumimaro Konoe, "Eibei Honi no Heiwa-shugi wo Haisu (Rejecting Anglo-Am erican Centered Quest o f Peace)", journal Nihon oyobi Nihonjin, 15 December 1918 14Fumimaro Konoe, Ushinawareshi Seiji (Lost Politics), Tokyo: Asahi Shim bun, 1946, p.22 15Teiji Yabe, Konoe Fumimaro, Tokyo: Yom iuri Shim bun, 1976, pp. 268-271 16 Akira Kazam i, Konoe Naikaku (The Konoe Cabinet), Tokyo: N ihon Shuppan Kyodo, 1951, pp. 68-72 17Ibid., p.46 18 K atsum i U su i, Shinpan N itchu Senso (New E d itio n : The Sin o -Jap an ese W ar), Chuokoron-Shinsha, Tokyo, 2000, p. 101 19Kentaro Awaya, Showa no Seito (Political Parties in the Showa Era), Tokyo: Shogakukan, 1983, p. 257 20Itaro Ishii, Ishii Itaro Nikki (Diary o f Itaro Ishii), Tokyo: Chuokoron-sha, 1993, p. 192 21 Takahisa Furukawa, Senji Gikai (The Diet in W artime), Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan,

H ard-line stance leads to stalem ate; constitutional governm ent succum bs to m ilitary pow er / 85

2001, pp. 51-52 22 Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, March 4,1938

Chapter 5 Road to the Pacific W ar/Part 1

Siding with Germany to face U.S., staking Japan's fate on Tripartite Pact

apan’s path from the Sino-Japanese W ar to the Pacific W ar had much to do with two major policy decisions. One was the Tripartite Pact which Japan, Germany and Italy concluded, and the other was Japan’s southward advance. W ho pushed these policies forward and on what sort of judgments and with what intentions were they based? And what went wrong in the decision-making process and how did it happen? Investigation into the start of the Pacific W ar, which followed the Sino-Japanese W ar, begins with the Tripartite Pact.

J

Army moves to fin d a breakthrough in quagmire o f Sino-Japanese War Japan concluded its alliance w ith Germ any and Italy on September 27, 1940 (the 15th year o f the Showa Era), about two m onths after the estab­ lishm ent o f the second Konoe Cabinet. To understand how the Tripartite Pact came about, it is im portant to look at preceding events. Jap an and Germ any, both o f w hich withdrew from the League o f N ations in 1933, concluded the A nti-Com intern Pact in Novem ber 1936, in preparation for m ilitary pressure from the Soviet U nion and the Bolshevik drive by the Com intern. Italy joined the pact in 1937. Then in 1938, a schem e to develop the pact into a m ilitary alliance began taking shape. W hat was Germ any thinking at this point? At the tim e it was attempt­ ing to annex Austria and Czechoslovakia. In order to fend o ff interference from Britain and the Soviet U n ion , Germ any wanted to hold them in check by using Japan. The Arm y jum ped at the Germ an proposal for concluding the pact. The Arm y, w hich prioritized the cam paign against the Soviet U n io n , was fe e lin g im p atien t w ith the prolonged Sino-Japanese W ar, w hich it viewed as a waste of am m unition and m ilitary force. The Soviet U n ion was rapidly building up its m ilitary capacity, particularly in the Far East. The Arm y hoped that Germ any w anted to keep Britain and the Soviet U n ion in check on their European fronts as a way to make up for Japan's 87

88 / J apan' s wars in 1931-45

d im in ish in g m ilitary capabilities against the Soviet U n ion ; it also hoped b oth Britain and the Soviet U n io n w ould suspend their m ilitary assis­ tance to the N atio n alist governm ent o f C h in a headed b y C h ia n g Kaishek. But the N avy objected to the Arm y's m ove. It was concerned that if Jap an m oved ahead w ith a m ilitary alliance w ith G erm any, it w ould have an adverse im pact on relations w ith Britain and the U n ited States. In 1939, officials in clu din g H ideo Iwakuro, head o f the Arm y Affairs Sectio n at th e W ar M in istry , an d Sh igek i U su i, head o f th e C o v ert O peration Section o f the Arm y General Staff, gathered alm ost daily at the official residence o f the W ar M inister, advocating an alliance. However, even w hen W ar M in ister Seishiro Itagaki veh em en tly ca lle d fo r the alliance, N avy M inister M itsum asa Yonai rem ained strongly opposed to it. V ice N avy M inister Isoroku Yam am oto, w ho was an aide to Y on ai, judged that there was no w ay for Jap an to continue a war against the U nited States or com pete in a naval build-up race. Shigeyoshi Inoue, head o f the N aval Affairs Bureau o f the N avy M inistry, also warned that "For H itler, the Japanese are inferior people w ho lack im agination. But he m ight see us as people w ho could be superficially clever and shrewd so that we could be useful as a tool for Germ any to use." W h ile the co n flict in view s betw een the N avy and W ar M inistries rem ained unresolved, the issue o f w hether Jap an should conclude the pact was carried over from the Konoe C abinet to its January 1939 successor led by Prime M inister K iichiro H iranum a. A t the m eeting o f five concerned m inisters—a de facto inner cabinet session—held on August 8, 1939, Finance M inister Sotaro Ishiw ata, fo l­ low ing a rem ark by W ar M inister Itagaki w ho said that the consensus o f the Arm y was th at the pact should be concluded im m ediately, questioned N avy M inister Y on ai by saying, "W e should take in to account the possi­ b ility o f Jap an , Germ any and Italy fig h tin g a war w ith B ritain, France, the U nited States and the Soviet U n io n . Is there any chance o f us w inning such a w ar?" Yon ai said there was no chance. Yet the antagonism betw een Itagaki and Y on ai ended abruptly on A u gu st 23, o n ly tw o w eeks after th e fiv e m in isters m e e tin g , w hen Germ any signed a nonaggression agreem ent w ith the Soviet U n io n , a country w hich was a potential enem y for both Jap an and G erm any. H itler join ed hands w ith Jo se f Stalin , the Soviet leader, over the d ivision o f Poland. A t about that same tim e in 1939, the Japanese Arm y was defeated by Soviet forces in the N om onhan Incident at the border o f M anchuria and M ongolia. In late Ju ly , Jap an was given notice from W ashington th at the U .S .Jap an Treaty o f Com m erce and N avigation had been allow ed to lapse. Prime M inister H iranum a and his Cabinet resigned en masse on August 28,

Siding with Germ any to face U .S ., staking Japan's fate on Tripartite Pact / 89

w ith H iran u m a sa y in g , "T he w orld o f Europe is co m p licated and inscrutable." W ith this, the Tripartite Pact was shelved, at least for the tim e being. In September 1939, Germ any invaded PolandT'which prom pted Britain and France to declare war on Germ any, thus ushering in W orld W ar II. The Cabinet led by Prime M inister Nobuyuki Abe made clear that Japan would not intervene in the war in Europe, forcing the Arm y, w hich aimed to fin d a breakthrough in the war against C hin a w ith Japan-Germ any cooperation, to change its policy. According to an Army staff officer's logbook, "the Army General Staff for its part...has been forced to struggle on w ith handling contingencies," w hile "the W ar M inistry appears ready to start p ullin g out the troops now ."1 The Army reportedly had independently formed a policy o f withdraw­ ing troops from C hin a, starting in 1941, unless the Sino-Japanese War was resolved w ithin the year. However, it was not only the commanders in the field who opposed a withdrawal, but some officials including Vice War M inister Korechika Anam i were reportedly opposed to it. Regardless, it was still a major turning point in the Sino-Japanese W ar.

Taking advantage o f Germany's easy advance The idea to form the Tripartite Pact, w hich had been shelved, was revived in 1940, prim arily because of Germ any's easy advances in Europe. O n June 14,1940, Paris surrendered to Germ any, w ith the Germ an forces w aiting for the right m om ent to invade B ritain . In France, the proGerm any V ichy governm ent was bom , w hile Dutch Queen W ilhelm ina and her governm ent sought asylum in London after the Germ an invasion in M ay. These dramatic changes gave Japan's leaders some new ideas, as did the m ajor upheaval in Europe. The island archipelago of the D utch East Indies (now Indonesia) was one o f the m ajor oil-producing areas at the tim e. If Japan could obtain oil in the Dutch East Indies, it would no longer be dependent on Britain and the U nited States for energy resources. Also Japanese leaders th o u gh t th at Jap an should n ot let the colonies o f European powers be placed under Germ an control, let alone allow them to fall w ithin the sphere o f influence o f the United States and Britain, both of w hich were intensifying their econom ic pressure on Japan. Jap an 's South C h in a Area Arm y's V ice C h ie f o f Staff Kenryo Sato reportedly said: "The construction o f the new w orld order w hich H itler advocated w ill proceed ra p id ly ...If Jap an is solely preoccupied w ith the Sino-Japanese W ar, Germ any w ill com e to East Asia and acquire the

90 / J apan' s wars

in

1931-45

territories o f B ritain , France and the N eth erlan d s, leavin g n o role for Jap an to p lay in the regio n . Therefore Ja p a n has to advance southw ard q u ic k ly ."2 It was not on ly the Arm y that was obsessed w ith the idea o f "southw ard advance." Tasuku Nakazaw a, head o f the Operations Section o f the N aval General Staff, wrote in a logbook on M ay 10, 1940, w hen Germ an forces invaded the N etherlands: "The Fourth Fleet is preparing for an em ergency dispatch to deal w ith Germ any's violation o f neutrality in the D utch East In dies." The follow ing day, M ay 11, the N aval General Staff began a war gam e w ith the assum ption that "the Japanese forces captured an o il pro­ ducing region o f the D utch East Indies w hile both Britain and the U nited States entered the w ar."3 At that tim e, the Yonai Cabinet was in charge, having been inaugurated in January 1940. Yonai—w ho was backed by aides to the Emperor, w ho were not in favor o f an alliance w ith Germ any—was cautious about signing the Tripartite Pact w ith Germ any and Italy. However, the Arm y m oved to overthrow the Yonai C ab in et. O n Ju n e 18, head o f the M ilitary Affairs Bureau o f the W ar M inistry Akira M uto vis­ ited the private residence o f form er Prime M inister Fum im aro Konoe and presented a docum ent th at read: "The p olicy o f non-interference in to war in Europe should be reviewed w hile at the same tim e Jap an should form an alliance w ith those states w hich side w ith our country pursuing its own p o lic y ." O n th e co n d itio n o f these ideas b ein g approved, the Arm y prom ised to extend "all-ou t cooperation" to a "new cab in et."4 In Ju ly , the Arm y had W ar M inister Shunroku H ata subm it his resignation. H ata wrote in his daybook on Ju ly 4 th at V ice C h ie f o f the Arm y General Staff Shigeru Sawada cam e to h im , show ing the affixed seal o f C h ie f o f Arm y General Staff Prince K anin (Kanin-no-m iya Kotohito), forcing him to resign. Thus the Y onai C abinet collapsed, and Konoe returned to lead another. The A rm y, at th at tim e, started draftin g a generahpIarTfor ways to address the changing global situation, w ith officials in cludin g the head o f the Arm y Affairs Section Iwakuro and Senior Staff O fficer Susum u N ishiura o f Iwakuro's section taking leadership. This docum ent, w hich was to be form ally approved by the second Konoe C abinet on Ju ly 27, stated that "A settlem ent o f the Sino-Japanese W ar should be prom oted w hile the oppor­ tun ity should be seized to solve the issues concerning the southern areas." The docum ent cited a southw ard advance, w hile on the diplom atic front, it said, "Political ties w ith Germ any and Italy should be reinforced to allow for coordination on diplom atic relations w ith the Soviet U n io n ." A background m em orandum attached to the docum ent also stated, "O n the assum ption th at war w ith the U n ited States is in evitab le, we should m ake adequate preparation for war w ith the U nited States." Yet in

Siding with Germany to face U .S., staking Japan's fate on Tripartite Pact 1 91

[Map 3]

Japan’s southward advance A dvance into O ccupation of Hainan northern Island (February 1939) French Indochina (Septem ber 1940)

1

iM f |

T M p iilip p in es A dvance into (•territory) southern iHi s ;■ French Indochina (July 19 4 1 )

>

D u t d t East In d ies

Southeast Asia in 1940-41 his memoirs, Sawada wrote that although the general plan "anticipates fighting a war against the United States, there was probably no one who seriously thought that Japan would actually fight against the United States." He then went on to write that the true intention was for Japan to invade Singapore, as a response to Germany's attack on Britain, so as not to give the United States a chance to enter the war. The general plan thus assumed that even if Japan attacked the British territory, the United States would not intervene. How was policy decision within the government made? Drafts com­ piled by sections of the War Ministry or the Army General Staff would become the War Ministry's plan only through approval at a joint meeting of bureau heads of the ministry and of the Army General Staff. After that, through forums such as joint meetings of heads of concerned bureaus and

9 2 / J apan' s w abs in 1 9 3 1 -4 5

division s o f th e N avy and th e Foreign M in istry , a consensus w ould be w orked ou t. O n ly after th at w ould a draft be subm itted to th e Im perial H eadquarters-Governm ent Liaison C on feren ce.5 (See Footnote 1.) In th e decision-m aking process led b y W ar M in istry o fficia ls, elite and m iddle-ranking staffers w ho m ade the first draft had a m ajor say. The sam e process took place for th e general p lan th at dealt w ith the current situa­ tio n , in clu d in g a p lan titled "th e opportune tim e for exercising force in the southern areas," drafted b y elite A rm y officers. The A rm y an d N avy interpreted th e report to fit their in ten tion s to con tin u e the drive tow ard an all-ou t w ar.

Pro-Germ an officers become m ainstream in both Arm y and Navy O n e o f the reasons Jap an had decided to stake the fate o f th e country on the Tripartite Pact was the pro-Germ an sentim ents o f the A rm y since the M e iji Era (1868-1912). These sentim ents stem m ed from the tim e w hen the m odel o f the Japanese m ilitary system was shifted from the French m odel to a G erm an one after G erm any defeated France in the FrancoPrussian W ar (1870-71). M an y o f those w ho graduated from the A rm y G eneral S ta ff C o lleg e, and w ho were on the elite track in the A rm y studied in G erm any. M an y m ainstream A rm y officers in the Show a Era, in clu d in g H ideki T o jo , h ad studied in G erm any. Few W ar M in istry bureaucrats had been assigned to w ork in th e U n ited States or in B ritain. Footnote 1

----

The Imperial Headquarters-Government Liaison Conference: A conference established to allow governm ent and m ilitary authorities to cooperate. The conference was attended by the Prime Minister, Foreign and War Ministers, the Chief of the Army General Staff, the Navy Minister, and the Chief of the Naval General Staff. In addition, the Chief Cabinet Secretary, and, as secretaries, the heads of the Military Affairs Bureaus of the War and Navy Ministries also attended. When an important issue was to be discussed, the Emperor would attend, and the meeting would then be called Gozertkaigi or conference held in the Imperial presence. Conferences were held as required from November 1937, and a series of deci­ sions on "national policies" were made. After the second Konoe Cabinet was inau­ gurated, the conference was at one point called a "Liaison Gathering," and was attended by the same members. It was later renamed the "Liaison Conference." W hen it reviewed the policy to go to war against the United States under the Tojo Cabinet, the conference was also attended by the Finance Minister, and Vice Chiefs of the Army and Naval General Staff.

Siding w ith Germ any to face U .S ., staking Japan's fate cm Tripartite Pact / 93

One o f those who made an im pact on the Arm y was Erich Friedrich W ilhelm Ludendorff. W hile advocating the im portance o f all-out war, Ludendorff's book asserted that "war is the supreme expression o f the w ill for the survival o f the people. Therefore, politics should serve the war leadership." O n the other hand, w ith British support since the M eiji period, the Japanese N avy had been form ed on the m odel o f the Royal N avy, the world's strongest at the tim e. The mainstream o f the Navy had long com ­ prised pro-British and pro-U.S. staffers, in itially a stark contrast w ith the Arm y. Yet after Japan was pressed hard by Britain and the United States on the lim its o f Japan's m ajor naval vessels at international forums including the arms reduction talks in W ashington (1921-22) and in London (1930), mis­ givings toward Britain and the Untied States am ong staff officers w ithin the Naval General Staff intensified. By the mid-1950s, pro-German officers gained strength am ong lower ranking naval officers. The core o f proG erm an officers w ere, as a m atter o f course, those w ho studied in Germ any. The N avy had tradition ally sent top students o f the N aval Academ y to W ashington, w hile sending high-caliber shipbuilding officers to B ritain's Royal N aval C ollege in G reenw ich. But after the A ngloJapanese Alliance was abandoned in 1922, the N avy discontinued sending students to Greenw ich. M eanw hile, the pro-Germ an sentim ent am ong certain officers only grew as they saw Germ any's technological prowess, including its subma­ rine U-boats that threatened the sea routes o f Britain and the U nited States. As o f September 1940, w orking-level officers in the N avy were m ainly pro-German staffers, including Shigenori Kam i, an officer at the First Section (Operations) o f the Naval General Staff, and Katsuo Shiba, of the N aval Affairs Bureau o f the N avy M inistry. Prince Fushim i (Fushimi-nomiya Hiroyasu) also studied in Germ any and served as head o f the Naval General Staff from February 1932 to April 1941 when Japan was leaning toward Germ any. Fushim i was so influential w ithin the N avy that there was an unspoken rule—his approval must be sought for personnel changes in the Navy's leadership.

Matsuoka diplomacy is ultimately nothing but schemes As it was Yosuke Matsuoka w ho took the leading role in Japan's diplo­ m acy in the Tripartite Alliance, it is im portant to exam ine his actions care­ fu lly. After a showy performance as a chief delegate when Japan withdrew from the League o f N ations in 1933, he becam e the president o f the Japanese-owned South M anchurian Railway in 1935. Matsuoka came under

94 / J apan' s wajrs in 1931-45

intense pressure from Fumimaro Konoe to take the post of foreign minister in Konoe's second Cabinet inaugurated on Ju ly 22,1940. K oichi Kido was one o f m any w ho were close to Konoe w ho opposed M atsuoka's appointm ent, and the Emperor repeatedly pressed Konoe to reconsider."6 Konoe is said to have insisted on appointing M atsuoka because Konoe's "vision on an international order" presented in his own essay titled "Rejecting Anglo-Am erican Centered Quest o f Peace" had points in com m on w ith M atsuoka's diplom atic p olicies and way of thinkin g. O n Ju ly 19, im m ediately after he received an Im perial m andate to form a new cabinet, Konoe invited Hideki Tojo and Zengo Yoshida, w ho were to be appointed as War M inister and N avy M inister, respectively, to his private residence Tekigaiso where they agreed that they would reinforce the Axis o f Jap an , Germ any and Italy. During a press conference on August 1, M atsuoka said he would "aim at establishing the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere," w hile m aking clear the sphere included French Indochina and the Dutch East Indies. O n the same day, he made a tentative overture to Germ an Ambassador to Japan Eugen O tt on reinforcing cooperative ties between Japan and Germ any. W hat was going through M atsuoka's m ind at this tim e? M atsuoka's p lan was n ot o n ly to "cou n ter U .S . pressure in East A sia" w ith the Tripartite Pact but also "for Japan and Germ any to m utually approve the construction o f a new order" in the East and the W est. In order to realize this idea, it was necessary to w in the approval of the Soviet U nion w hich threatened regional security. M atsuoka thought Germ any could act as a go-between in this effort.7 It was in this direction that M atsuoka took his diplom acy. According to Matsuoka's secretary Toshikazu Kase, M atsuoka told him confidently that "There is no other way but to make a breakthrough in the current phase o f the Tripartite Alliance. But the ultim ate aim is to coordi­ nate Japan-U .S. relations. See how it turns ou t."8To Yoshie Saito, a Foreign M inistry adviser and close aide, M atsuoka said, "The true partner [for Japan] for the m om ent is not Germ any but the Soviet U n ion . To shake hands w ith Germ any is only the means for Japan to shake hands w ith the Soviet U n io n ...If we could w in Germ any and the Soviet U nion to our side, there is no way for either the United States or Britain to think o f starting a war w ith Jap an ."9 M atsuoka tried to reach a breakthrough in Japan-U .S. relations by real­ izing a four-nation entente o f Japan, Germ any, Italy and the Soviet U nion squaring o ff against Britain and the United States, thus pursuing a balance o f power approach. For M atsuoka, the Tripartite Alliance was a means to bring about a reconciliation w ith the United States.

Siding with Germ any to face U .S ., staking Japan's fate on Tripartite Pact / 95

M atsuoka hastened the n ego tiatio n s over the co n clu sio n o f the alliance. O n September 27, 1940, he had Japan conclude the Tripartite Pact w ith G erm any and Ita ly . U nder the treaty, the three countries approved the notion o f Japan assuming a leading role in the construction of a new order in Greater East Asia, the same role as that o f Italy and Germ any in Europe. In addition, the treaty stipulated m utual assistance am ong the three when any of the three countries was attacked. In effect, it was a m ilitary alliance opposed to the United States. How did the Navy respond? At a m eeting of top officers o f the N avy, on the eve o f the conclusion o f the treaty, N avy M inister Koshiro Oikawa approved it on the grounds that "we cannot assume responsibility for a breakdown o f the Cabinet" w hile Prince Fushim i, as C h ief o f the Naval General Staff, said "As things stand now , there is no other ch oice."10Thus the N avy no longer opposed the conclusion of the treaty. W hen Prim e M inister Konoe visited the Im perial Palace, Emperor Showa expressed his worry about the future o f the nation by saying, "[Our nation] could be placed under a serious predicam ent and darkness. Are you prepared for that?"11W hen President o f the Privy Council Yoshim ichi Hara expressed his concerns at a September 19 m eeting attended by the Emperor as to how the United States w ould respond, M atsuoka, w hile strongly rebuffing such concerns, said, "There is a 50-50 chance—the U nited States w ill either harden its stance, thus m aking the situation worse, or it w ill undertake a level-headed self-exam ination." M atsuoka's diplom acy was bu ilt on such dangerous gam bles. As had been anticipated, on September 26 the U nited States announced a trade embargo on Japan's massive purchases o f scrap iron necessary for the production o f arms. The realization o f M atsuoka's plan now became all the more dependent on the outcome of coordination of diplom atic relations with the Soviet Union. In spring 1941, M atsuoka set out on a trip to Europe. After stopping in M oscow , he m et w ith H itler in Berlin and w ith M u ssolin i in Rom e. M atsuoka sensed that war between Germ any and the Soviet U nion was im m in en t, yet he m ade another visit to M oscow and concluded the Japanese-Soviet N eutrality Pact w ith Stalin on A pril 13. O n Ju n e 22, Germ any invaded the Soviet U nion, thus dashing hopes of cooperation am ong Japan, Germ any and the Soviet U n ion , w hich was a precondition for M atsuoka's plan. M atsuoka's scheme had collapsed. W ith this developm ent, the basis o f the conflict between Britain, the United States and the Soviet U nion on the one hand, and Japan, Germ any and Italy on the other was established. In the end, the neutrality pact marked a "great success for the Soviet U nion, w ith its grand strategy of having Japan fight against the United States and Britain, in the context of

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the ever-tougher situation in its bilateral relations w ith G erm any."12 M atsuoka becam e increasingly involved w ith the bilateral negotiations between Jap an and the U nited States in the follow ing m onths and w ith the argum ents over Japan's "southw ard and northw ard advances."

Oshima's telegrams show blind faith in Germany C o n cern in g the Tripartite P act, K onoe w rote som e years later th at Germ any's decision to go to war against the Soviet U n io n , thereby disre­ garding Jap an 's advice, constituted Berlin's second betrayal o f Japanese interests, w ith the conclusion o f the Germ an-Soviet N onaggression Pact in 1939 bein g the first betrayal. Jap an was led by the H iranum a Cabin et w hen the pact was signed.13 O n Ju ly 14, 1940, eight days before the inauguration o f the second Konoe C ab in et, V ice Arm y C h ie f o f Staff Shigeru Sawada reported on the prospects o f war in Europe to the Emperor: "G erm any's attack against Britain w ill probably start in late Ju ly or early August, that is to say, w ith­ in one or 2 \ m onths. This w ill have a profound effect on Britain's place in the w orld." Bewildered b y the Germ an blitzkrieg, or "ligh ten in g w ar," he was convinced that Britain w ould lose the war. It was a fatal m isjudgm ent. O n Ju ly 2, H itler issued a directive ordering the Germ an Air Force to destroy British air power and to launch an am phibious invasion o f Britain. But faced w ith stubborn resistance from British air forces, the am phibious assault was repeatedly postponed. The invasion was postponed indefinite­ ly just 10 days before the conclusion o f the Tripartite Pact. In fact, H itler gave up his obsession o f invading Britain in late Ju ly , thinkin g instead o f starting a war w ith the Soviet U n ion . A ccording to an expert on the diplom atic history o f N azi Germ any, H itler guessed that Britain w ould not surrender to G erm any, probably because London was w aiting for the Soviet betrayal o f Germ any despite H itler's nonaggression treaty w ith M oscow . If so, it was the Soviet U n ion that Germ any needed to beat first. Yet Jap an was slow to sense th is.14 Japanese Arm y Germ anophile H iroshi O shim a was a key figure in Berlin where he gathered inform ation on European countries. O shim a, a gifted student educated in the Germ an language from ch ildh ood, was assigned to work in Berlin as a m ilitary attach^ in 1934. W ith the support o f W ar M in ister Seish iro Ita g a k i, O sh im a was p rom oted to A m bassador to Germ any in 1938 and, disregarding instructions from the Foreign M inistry in T okyo, prom oted n ego tiatio n s for co n clu d in g the T ripartite P act. A lthough he left the Ambassador's job follow in g the conclusion o f the G e rm a n -S o v ie t N o n a g g re ssio n P a c t, O sh im a resum ed h is p o st as Am bassador to Germ any w hen M atsuoka assum ed the post o f Foreign

Siding with Germ any to face U .S ., staking Japan's fate on Tripartite Pact / 97

M inister. According to Eizo H ori, a staff officer at the Army General Staff's Intelligence Bureau, "W hen a wire came from Ambassador Oshim a saying '[Germ an Foreign M inister] Joach im von Ribbentrop explained this or that,' the message was regarded as having unquestionably high valu e."15 Nonetheless w ithin the Arm y, there were some w ho still m anaged to view the international situation more level-headedly. In mid-September, M ajor General E iichi Tatsum i and Lieutenant C olon el Yoshio Nakano sent a wire from London, saying: "W e w ould not say the invasion and occupation o f Britain by Germ an forces is im possible, but nonetheless it is deemed quite d ifficu lt." Yet in a reply wire addressed to Tatsum i, the Intelligence Bureau wrote "D o n 't send telegrams w hich are too weakm inded."16 W hen Germ any launched its war against the Soviet U n ion , Oshim a, in his telegram to Tokyo, wrote that "This cam paign w ill probably end in four weeks. This should not be reckoned as a war but rather as police action.17O n November 11, 1941, Oshim a wired: "W e should say that the fate o f M oscow has now been determined. Thus Germ any w ill deal a dev­ astating blow to the Soviet forces, as planned, before the onset o f icy cold w inter, putting the Soviet U nion in an irretrievable situ atio n ..." Yet the day w hen Moscow would fall under the control o f Germ any never cam e.18 Japan's m ilitary and diplom atic strategy had often been based on these telegrams sent by Oshim a. According to Ich iji Sugita, a staff member o f the European and A m erican A ffairs Section o f the Arm y G en eral Sta ff, "Foreign M inister M atsuoka and other pro-Germ an elements in the Arm y, Navy and the Foreign M inistry blindly believed in Germ an victory, leav­ ing the fate of Japan in the hands of H itler."19

Im perial Rule Assistance Association models itself on Nazis The advocates o f "reform s" in the nation's p olitical, econom ic and social systems and in its diplom atic policy had been sm oldering since the early phases o f the Showa Era swung fu lly into action in 1940. Yoriyasu Arim a and Akira Kazam i, both close aides to Konoe, hoped to create a "Konoe Shinto (New Konoe Party)" w hile Konoe on Ju n e 24 announced "I w ill resign the post o f President of the Privy C ou n cil in order to do what I can to establish a new system ." The Arm y, too, counted on Konoe's drive to establish a new system. Believing that Germ any's rapid advance stemmed from the one-party rule system o f the Nazi Party, the Arm y con­ cluded th at Jap an needed to have one-party rule and to establish a national m obilization system . The Shakai Taishuto (Socialist Masses Party) first disbanded and joined a

9 8 / J apan' s wars in 1 9 3 1 -4 5

drive for establishing a new system ; then parties in clu d in g the Rikken Seiyukai (Constitutional Party o f Political Friends) and the Rikken M inseito (Constitutional Dem ocratic Party) disbanded one after another. It was in O ctober 1940 w hen the T aisei Yokusan-kai (Im perial Rule A ssistance Association) was inaugurated w ith Prime M inister Konoe as president. Foreign M inistry bureaucrats also advocated "Im perial W ay diplom a­ cy ," em phasizing direct actions to achieve total national reform and m ili­ tary success over the Soviet U n io n . Toshio Shiratori, a reform ist leader w ho served as Am bassador to Italy, stressed in late 1939, before Germ any's relatively easy advances began, th at "Japan, Germ any, Italy and the Soviet U n io n , w hich are discontented w ith the international system under the Treaty o f Versailles, should im m ediately join hands and stand together, on an equal fo otin g w ith those countries w ho are in favor o f the status quo."20 Shiratori was particularly supported by youn g bureaucrats w ho joined the Foreign M in istry after the M anchurian In cid en t. A group o f these young diplom ats, in clu din g N obuhiko Ushiba (who served as ambassador to the U nited States in the postwar period), all signed a covenant, appeal­ in g for the appointm ent o f Shiratori as Foreign M inister. T he Jap an ese p eo p le also w elcom ed th e reappearance o f K o n o e. Newspapers, in an apparent bid "n ot to m iss the bus," supported the drive for a new system and called for the conclusion o f the Tripartite Pact. The Yomiuri Shim bun, for instance, said to the Konoe Cabinet, "It is useless for the Cabinet to adopt conventional, sem i-liberal, halfw ay ideas and m eth­ ods." The A sahi Shim bun, on the day the Tripartite Pact was signed, wrote that "N ow the 'oath o f history' has been m ade w ith sake cups circled and banzai cheers raging." Y on ai, whose Cabinet was forced to resign en masse, wrote back to a friend: "D evilish history has let thousands o f m irages emerge w ithin peo­ ple's b r a in ..., h avin g p olitician s o f the tim es dance in disgrace."21The politicians he was referring to were people such as Konoe and M atsuoka. Notes_________

, -

. . . . . . ______ _______________

—

1 S u k e ta k a T a n e m u r a , Daihonei Kimitsu Nisshi ( C o n fid e n t ia l D ia r y o f th e Im p e r ia l H eadquarters), T o k y o : D ia m o n d , 1952, p .1 3 2 K en n o su k e To risu , Nihon Kaigun no Shippai no Kenkyu (Stu dy o n Errors M a d e b y th e Ja p a n e se N a v y ), T o k y o : B u n g e ish u n ju , 1993, p . 208 3 S h u h e i D o m o n , Sanbo no Senso (W ar o f S ta ff O fficers), T o k y o : P H P K e n k y u jo , 1999, p p . 131 -1 3 2 4 N ih o n K o ku sai Se iji G a k k a i (Jap an A sso cia tio n o f In te rn a tio n a l R elation s), e d ., Taiheiyo

Senso e no Michi (R oad to th e P a c ific W ar) vol. 6, T o k y o : A s a h i S h im b u n , 1987, p p . 166-167 5 S u m io H a ta n o , Bakuryotachi no Shinjuwan (Pearl H arb o r fo r th e Staff), T o k y o : A sa h i Se n sh o , 1991, p p .2 3 -2 6 6 Y o sh itak e O k a , Konoe Fumimaro, T o k y o : Iw an am i S h o te n , 1994, p . 119

Sid in g w ith G erm any to face U .S ., sta kin g Ja p a n 's fate on Tripartite P a ct / 99

7Kimitada M iw a, Yosuke Matsuoka, Tokyo: Chuko Shinsho, 1971, pp. 165-166 8Toshikazu Kase, Dokyumento Senso to Gaiko (jo) (Docum ent: War and Diplom acy vol. 1), Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbun, 1975, p. 103 9M iwa, op. cit., p. 173 10Kazutoshi Hando, Dokyumento Taiheiyo Senso e no M ichi (Documents: The Roads to the Pacific War), Tokyo: PHP Bunko, 1999, pp. 229-230 11Sadahiro Okada, ed., Okada Keisuke Kaikoroku (Keisuke Okada Memoirs), Tokyo: Chuko Bunko, 1987, pp. 215-216 12Hisahiko Okazaki, Shigemitsu/Togo to Sono Jidai (Shigem itu, Togo and Their Era), Tokyo: PHP Bunko, 2003, p. 327 13 Fumimaro Konoe, Ushinawareshi Seiji (Lost Politics), Tokyo: Asahi Shim bun, 1946, p. 41 14 Personal interview w ith Prof. Nobuo Tajim a, Faculty o f Law, Seijo University, March 30, 2006 15Eizo H ori, Daihonei Sanbo no Joho Senki (Records o f Inform ation War Fought by a Staff Officer at the Im perial Headquarters), Tokyo: Bungeishunju, 1996, p. 50 16Dom on, op. cit., p. 200 17 Fusao Okum ura, Daitoa Senso no Honshitsu (Essence o f the Greater East Asia War), Tokyo: Dodai Keizai Konwakai, 2000, p. 184 18Hori, op. cit., p. 52 19Ichiji Sugita, Joho Naki Senso Shido (War Leadership w ithout Intelligence), Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1987, p. 138 20Toshio Shiratori, Oshu no Shinjosei to Nihon no Tachiba (New European Situations and Japan's Position), Tokyo: m onthly Chuokoron, December 1939, pp. 78-83 21 Taketora Ogata, Ichigunjin no Shogai (Mitsumasa Yonai: One M ilitary Officer's Life), Tokyo: Bungeishunju-Shinsha, 1955, p. 223

Chapter 6 Road to the Pacific W ar/Part 2

Japan miscalculates on oil embargo, advances south without determination

apan advanced to southern French Indochina during July 19 4 1 (the 16th year of the Showa Era). The United States, which was increasingly cautious about japan’s southward expansion policy, imposed an oil embargo on Japan. W hy did Japan advance to southern French Indochina? Could Japan predict that the southward expansion policy would invite U .S. sanctions and lead to the Pacific W ar?

J

Advancing into French Indochina There were several reasons for the decision b y Jap an to advance to southern French Indochina. They included the prolongation o f the SinoJapanese W ar, Japan's thirst for natural resources in Southeast Asia, eco­ nom ic sanctions by the U nited States and the start o f the Russo-Germ an W ar. These factors were com plicated and intertw ined. But Japan was buffeted by a rapidly changing international situation. It declared war on Britain and the U nited States about four m onths after its advance to southern French Indochina. It was G erm any's blitzkrieg, or ligh tn in g war, in Europe from M ay 1940 th at triggered Jap an 's southw ard expansion p o licy . As a result o f this ligh ten in g war, B ritain, France and the N etherlands, w hich held colonies in Southeast A sia, were facin g a crisis. It was at this poin t th at debate in Jap an intensified on w hether to advance to these colonies. The colonies were rich in such natural resources as o il, rubber and tin . Jap an thought that if it obtained these natural resources, it w ould be able to expand its self-supporting areas and no longer have to rely on Britain and the U nited States. The first step o f the southern expansion p olicy was the advancem ent to northern French Indochina. A t the tim e, B ritain, France, the Soviet U n io n , the U nited States and other countries continued to give m ilitary support to C h ian g Kai-shek's adm inistration in C h in a that had shifted its capital to

101

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C h o n g q in g . As Ja p a n ju dged th a t such lo g istica l supplies supported C h in a's a b ility to resist Ja p a n , it tried to alter the course o f the SinoJapanese W ar by cu ttin g the m ain supply route to C h ian g Kai-shek's forces that ran through French Indochina, now V ietnam , Laos and Cam bodia. In Ju n e 1940, after the fa ll o f Paris, France at last decided to shut dow n the C hin a-b ou n d supply route. Foreign M inister Yosuke M atsuoka and French Am bassador to Ja p a n Charles Arsene-H enry reached an agree­ m ent at the end o f A ugust to close dow n the route. Jap an advanced in to northern French In doch ina o n Septem ber 23, 1940. But the Japanese troops h in ted at the use o f m ilitary force and struck a coercive posture tow ard lo ca l n egotiators, w h ich resulted in m ilitary clashes. K yoji T om inaga, ch ie f o f the First Bureau (Operations) o f the Arm y G eneral Staff, actively u tilized m ilitary force in the southern expan­ sion p olicy and his tendency to exceed his authority in vited trouble. After returning to Jap an from the m ission, he was dism issed from his post. The Sino-Japanese W ar began to look like it w ould be a drawn out affair. Sh in ich i Tanaka, ch ief o f the First Bureau o f the Arm y General Staff, later wrote in his diary that in the autum n o f 1940, there was no possibility o f solving the Sino-Japanese W ar as "a local co n flict" anym ore. Jap an envisaged con tain in g the Soviet U n io n and h altin g assistance from Britain and the U nited States to C h in a by applying the pressure o f the Tripartite Pact, b y w aiting for an opportunity to advance on the Asian colonies o f Britain and France and thus by securing natural resources to prepare for a lon g war w ith C h in a . Beyond that, Jap an pictured taking control o f French Indochina. The Im perial Japanese N avy supported the Tripartite Pact on condition that the budget and resources w ould be distributed preferentially to the N avy. This was also made clear in the diary o f M atom e U gaki, ch ief o f the Operations Bureau o f the N aval General Staff. But before the Tripartite Pact was concluded, the U n ited States announced an em bargo on the export o f scrap iron to Jap an . The N avy's sense o f crisis over the U .S . stance in strengthening the embargoes on exports to Jap an resulted in an active southw ard expansion policy. The Japanese Foreign M in istry pressed the D u tch East Indies (now Indonesia) au th orities d u rin g n egotiation s to increase the supply o f im portant m aterials. But the N etherlands' governm ent was in exile in London and the negotiations w ith it floundered. As Japan becam e an ally o f G erm any, an enem y o f the N etherlands, after the conclusion o f the Tripartite Pact in Septem ber 1940, it was h ardly conceivable th at the N etherlands w ould cooperate w ith Ja p a n . In M ay 1941, there was no prospect for a com pletion o f the negotiations.1 The deadlock in the negotiations over the D utch East Indies invigorated

Japan m iscalculates on o il embargo, advances south w ithout determ ination

/

103

the Japanese m ilitary's p olicy to advance to southern French Indochina. The Japanese troops calculated that if they set up their m ilitary bases in southern French Indochina and put m ilitary pressure on these areas, the D utch East Indies w ould then supply oil to Jap an . In addition, if Britain were defeated and Jap an had a chance to advance to British M alaya and Singapore, Japan w ould be unable to cope because of the lim ited range o f the bom bers from the Japanese bases established in H ainan Island and northern French In doch ina. Japanese leaders thought that the U n ited States w ould allow Jap an to advance to southern French Indochina. Japan's leaders, therefore, w anted advance bases in southern French Indochina.

M issing overall picture H ow was the policy to advance to southern French Indochina decided? W e w ill trace the developm ents on the basis o f a series o f n ation al policy guidelines adopted at the tim e. For exam ple, a "p o licy guideline concerning French In d o ch in a and T h ailan d " decided b y the Im perial H eadquarters-G overnm ent Liaison Conference on January 30, 1941, stated that Jap an w ould carry out neces­ sary coercion and use m ilitary force against French Indochina if there were n o altern ative in order to fo llow throu gh on its dem ands on French In d o ch in a and T h ailan d . Ja p a n w anted to establish advance bases in French Indochina and strengthen m ilitary cooperation w ith Thailand in order to im plem ent the southern expansion p olicy. It is possible to see in this guideline Japanese m ilitary leaders' in tention to advance.2 N ext, a "guideline for southern expansion policy" agreed between the Arm y and N avy on April 17, stipulated that Japan w ould use m ilitary force for its survival and self-defense if threatened w ith extin ction b y embargoes on exports o f natural resources im posed by Britain, the N etherlands, the U nited States and others, or through encirclem ent if the U nited States, solely or in cooperation w ith Britain, C h in a and the N etherlands, put pres­ sure on Ja p a n .3 These phrases rem ind us that the strengthening o f embargoes against Jap an , and the econom ic blockade against Japan b y the "A B CD encircle­ m ent" (Am erican, British, Chinese and D utch), led to the start o f discus­ sions about m ilitary advancem ent to French Indochina. O n Ju n e 25, 1941, th e Im perial H eadquarters-G overnm ent Liaison Conference endorsed a "guideline concerning the prom otion o f southern expansion p o licy ." It stated that Jap an w ould dem and that France allow Jap an to bu ild or use air bases and port and harbor facilities in specified areas o f Fren ch In d o ch in a an d sta tio n troop s in so u th e rn Fren ch

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Indochina as required. Japan threatened to carry out this in itial objective through m ilitary force if France rejected its dem ands.4 W ith the guideline, the policy for advancem ent to southern French Indochina was decided. O n Jun e 22,1941, the Russo-German W ar started. The staff o f the Army and the Navy was excited at the outbreak o f the war and discussions became heated over whether Japan should launch a pincer drive on the Soviet U nion in expectation o f Germ any's victory or start advancing to colonies in Asia held by Britain, France and the Netherlands. The "national policy guideline related to the developm ent o f the situa­ tion" was established follow ing the outbreak o f the Russo-German W ar. It was discussed at a m eeting between the Im perial Headquarters and the Governm ent on June 25 and was officially endorsed at the Im perial con­ ference in the presence o f the Emperor on Ju ly 2. O n the basis o f the "guideline concerning the prom otion o f southern exp an sion p o lic y ," an order was m ade to p rioritize the southw ard advance—stren gth en in g the m ilitary posture first for the southern advance and also trying to solve the northern problem , or a possible clash w ith the Soviet U nion, through m ilitary means if the Russo-German War developed in favor o f Japan. The expression "Japan is prepared for m ilitary action against Britain and the U nited States if necessary" was in the draft o f the "guideline concerning the prom otion o f southern expansion p olicy." The expres­ sion was fin ally deleted from the guideline, but it was included in the "national p olicy guideline related to the developm ent o f the situation." W ith this, the advance to southern French Indochina was taking shape.5 M eanw hile, what were the attitudes o f leaders of the governm ent and the m ilitary during this period? Those w ho m et in the presence o f the Emperor on Ju ly 2 included Prime M inister Fum im aro Konoe, Foreign M inister Yosuke M atsuoka, W ar M inister Hideki Tojo, C h ief of Arm y General Staff Hajim e Sugiyam a, N avy M inister Koshiro O ikaw a, C h ie f o f N aval G eneral Staff O sam i N agano. O ne expert suggested, "They had no consistent prospects or objectives for m ilitary action, nor an accurate grasp o f situations and the influence given to Britain and the United States."6 It was Nagano w ho strongly reiterated the necessity o f advancing to southern French In d o ch in a . He said at an Im perial H eadquartersgovernm ent session on Jun e 11: "It's necessary to establish bases in French Indochina and Thailand. W e should resolutely attack those w ho would obstruct our objective." Sugiyam a also said at an Im perial Headquarters-government m eeting on June 16, 1941: "As the rainy season is drawing near, we need to start building bases as early as possible."

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O n the other hand, M atsuoka, w arning that the advance in to southern French Indochina could trigger a war against the U nited States, strongly opposed the action . He said the southw ard advance w ould break the agree­ m ent o f August 30, 1940, that was concluded w hen Jap an advanced into northern French Indochina, and w ould therefore be a violation o f inter­ n ational good faith . A fter the Russo-G erm an W ar b egan , M atsuoka asserted th a t Jap an should suspend the advance to southern French Indochina for six m onths and head north to fig h t the Soviet U n ion instead, w hich left other officials dum bfounded. His real in tention is said to have been m erely to stop the southern expansion. "The p olicy to dare a war against Britain and the U nited States if neces­ sary," stated in the "n ation al p olicy guideline related to the developm ent o f the situ atio n ," was endorsed at the Im perial conference in the presence o f the Emperor on Ju ly 2, and was proposed by the N avy reportedly w ith the aim o f balancing the Arm y's determ ination to advance to the north. W hen Oikaw a was asked b y V ice N avy M inister Yorio Sawam oto about the m ean in g o f the w ording o f "Jap an is prepared for m ilitary action against British and the U nited States if necessary," he answered: "M y opin­ ion is that Jap an should avoid the war. But the Arm y insists that Japan should advance to both the north and the south. W ithout m odifying the language, it w ould be quite im possible to control the Arm y's m ovem ent."7 W hat Oikaw a was saying is th at the N avy's p olicy was ju st rhetoric. According to a veteran historian, im portant national policies were decided "in the con flict, com petition and m aneuvering w ith the Arm y" w ithout real "resolution to begin a war" and w ithout objectively assessing international situations and n ation al strengths and w ithout discussing seriously the chances o f w inning.8 In that sense, the Arm y was n o t an exception and it is u n likely that m ost o f its leaders were determ ined to begin the war. K o n o e , in h is h e a rt, o p p o sed th e a d v a n ce to so u th e rn F ren ch In dochina and the war against the Soviet U n io n . O nce the Russo-Germ an W ar started and th e p la n to co n ta in th e U n ite d States w ith Ja p a n , G erm any, Italy and the Soviet U n ion broke dow n, Konoe though t that Jap an should hurriedly try to m end the relationship w ith the U n ited States, even if it sacrificed the relationship w ith Germ any to som e extent. But at an Im perial H eadquarters-governm ent m eeting on Ju n e 30, Konoe said that if the h igh com m and decided to advance in to southern French Indochina, he w ould follow it, agreeing to the southern expansion p olicy. He considered the advance in to southern French In dochina to be the price that w ould have to be paid to contain the drive for war against the Soviet U n io n .

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Im perial Headquarters Staff O fficer Shiro Hara com m ented after the war: "Konoe consistently took an attitude o f rarely discussing an ythin g in m eetings and o f deciding on n othin g even if things were discussed. This is because form er Foreign M inister H achiro Arita severely criticized Konoe as surrendering w ithout figh tin g at a ll."9 The Arm y dispatched a large num ber o f troops for the Kw antung Arm y in m id-June 1941 in the nam e o f security along the M anchurian and Inner M ongolian borders and the prevention o f Soviet aggression. It was called the “Kw antung Arm y Special Grand M aneuvers," but was considered a virtual preparation for war against the Soviet U n ion . The N avy opposed the m aneuvers, but Sh in ich i Tanaka, ch ief o f the Operations Bureau o f the Arm y General Staff, and others, w ho were sup­ porters o f the northern expansion policy, talked To jo into endorsing the m aneuvers. W hen W ar M inister Tojo and C h ie f o f Arm y General Staff Sugiyam a reported to Emperor Showa on Ju ly 7, the Emperor asked them , "D o you believe it is possible to cope w ith the war against C h in a w ith troops dispatched all over, to the north, in C h in a and French Indochina all at once?" O n Ju ly 21, France broadly accepted Ja p a n 's dem ands for m ilitary advance and the use o f bases in In d o ch in a. The U n ited States reacted strongly to Japan's m ove by criticizing it as an effort to conquer surround­ in g areas, and it decided on Ju ly 25 to freeze Japanese assets in the U nited States. (See APPENDIX F.) How ever, Japanese troops began to land on southern French Indochina and put the w hole o f French In d o ch in a under its con trol on Ju ly 28. M eanw hile, the U nited States took retaliatory measures b y p lan nin g an embargo on o il exports to Jap an on August 1. (See APPENDIX G.)

Peaceful advance? The advance in to southern French Indochina in Ju ly 1941 invited the U .S . retaliatory measure o f an o il embargo on Jap an . To w hat extent did the Japanese p olitical and m ilitary leaders at that tim e realize the danger? The U nited States apparently issued w arnings beforehand. The first was on Ju ly 21, three days after Japan sent the French Indochina authorities its ultim atum over the advance in to southern French Indochina. O n that day, U .S. Under Secretary o f State Sum ner W elles m et w ith Kanam e W akasugi, M in ister o f the Japanese Em bassy in W ashin gton and special aide to Japanese Ambassador to the U nited States Kichisaburo Nom ura, to try to stop Japan's advance. The second was on Ju ly 23, after the authorities in French Indochina accepted Japanese troops' advance in to southern French In d o ch in a. W elles m et w ith Am bassador N om ura and put pressure on

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Japan by telling Nomura that it was impossible for the United States not to conclude that Japan was advancing to the southern Pacific regions for the purpose o f m ilitary conquest.10 O n Ju ly 24, U .S. President Franklin D . Roosevelt invited Nom ura to m eet w ith him to propose that French Indochina should be treated as neutral territory w hile h in tin g, otherwise, at a possible oil embargo on Japan. Roosevelt told Nom ura that he had so far made efforts to curb the calls in his country for an oil embargo on Japan because he believed it necessary for peace in the Pacific Ocean to give oil to Japan, but he would not be able to resist these calls m uch longer considering Japan's advance into French Indochina.11 Follow ing the expansion o f the Sino-Japanese W ar, the United States strengthened econom ic pressure on Japan. In January 1940, the United States had abrogated the U .S.-Japan Treaty o f Com m erce and N avigation and laid the groundwork for the president to impose an oil embargo. U .S. magazine Newsweek carried a story w ith the headline—"U .S. Has Japan Over Barrel W ith Lapse o f Trade Treaty"—w hich read, "From now on the United States w ill be able to swing a big stick."12 In response to the Japanese m ilitary's advance to northern French Indochina in September 1940, the United States decided on an embargo on exports o f scrap iron to Japan. After that, the United States included im portant materials, such as copper and nickel, one after another onto the list o f items of embargoed shipm ents to Japan. Although U .S. hard-liners against Jap an dem anded that the U nited States should im pose an oil embargo on Japan, Roosevelt and U .S. Secretary o f State Cordell H ull were carefully m anaging the situation. They fully understood that if the United States stopped exporting oil to Japan, whose self-sufficiency ratio o f oil was less than 10 percent and w ho therefore depended on the U nited States, Japan would be driven into a corner. W hy did the U nited States react so strongly to the Japanese troops' advance into southern French Indochina? The reason is that the Dutch East Indies, M alaya and Burma under British control, and the Philippines under U .S. control, could be threatened directly by the Japanese m ilitary. O n Ju ly 23, H ull told W elles, "The invasion o f Southern Indo-China looks like Jap an 's last step before jum ping o ff for a full-scale attack in the Southwest P acific."13 Nom ura im m ediately sent a telegram to the Japanese Foreign M inistry that said the United States m ight impose an oil embargo on Japan. But the Japanese governm ent and the high com m and o f the Army and Navy were optim istic that this would not happen. The Twentieth Group (War Coordination) o f the Army General Staff wrote in its daily log on Ju ly 25, 1941, that it was convinced that if Japanese troops did no more than

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advance to French In doch ina, the U nited States w ould n ot im pose an oil embargo on Jap an . Also the diary, dated Ju ly 26, fo llow in g the U .S . announcem ent to freeze Japanese assets in the U nited States on Ju ly 25, said that as the U n ite d States was sure to im pose a to ta l b an o n exp orts to Ja p a n , L ieu ten an t C o lo n e l A rifu m i K u m o n , th e A v ia tio n G rou p c h ie f, and Lieutenant C olon el M asanobu T suji, the Logistics Group ch ief o f the Arm y General Staff's Operations Bureau, strongly believed the southern expan­ sion needed to be pushed through m ilitary m eans. The diary m entioned th at the W ar C oord in ation Group did n ot expect the U n ited States to im pose a ban on exports to Jap an for the tim e being and added that the U nited States w ould be forced to im pose a total ban eventually, though n ot in that year or the follow in g on e.14 W hy were the Japanese m ilitary leaders doing n othin g w hen faced w ith such a situation? The m ain reason was they m istakenly believed that the U nited States w ould allow Jap an to advance up to French Indochina and T hailand. They thought that, as the Japanese troops had already advanced to northern French In d o ch in a peacefully, the U nited States m ight not im pose an o il em bargo, w hich m ight directly trigger a war. Prime M inister Konoe also did n ot predict that the U nited States w ould actually take retaliatory measures such as an em bargo on oil exports. A ccord in g to a m em oir w ritten by form er Foreign M in ister K ijuro Shidehara, he understood that Konoe failed to predict the U .S . em bargo, im posed two days after ships carrying Japanese soldiers set sail for southern French Indochina. Shidehara told Konoe flatly that this w ould escalate into a large war and pleaded desperately w ith Konoe to call the ships back to Ja p a n . Konoe was very surprised at Shidehara's approach and tried to reassure him that merely stationing soldiers w ould n ot lead to war.15 K on oe p laced h ig h e xp e cta tio n s o n th e Ja p a n -U .S . n e g o tia tio n s between Nom ura and H u ll that were initiated in the spring o f 1941 by the m ediation o f tw o U .S . C ath o lic clerics. In addition, an indirect reason for Konoe's failure to foresee a strong U .S. posture toward Jap an m ight have been that he was so absorbed by a p olitical struggle w hen his C abinet resigned in order to facilitate the rem oval o f Foreign M inister Yosuke M atsuoka and replace him w ith Teijiro Toyoda. H istorian Ikuhiko H ata pointed out th at the Japanese troops' advance to southern French Indochina was to Britain and the U nited States like having a knife at their throats. He also said th at it was d ifficu lt to treat it sim ply as a result o f a vicious circle caused by an accum ulation o f errors and m utual distrust that is often seen in international p olitics.16 After th at, the h igh com m and o f the Arm y and N avy argued th at a drop o f o il is equal to a drop o f blood and urged the governm ent to start

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a war early. The Twentieth Group o f the Arm y General Staff wrote in a diary on Ju ly 26 that it did not expect a total U .S. ban on exports to Japan to happen. In the m argin o f the page of the diary, it was added in red ink that the judgm ent was w rong and the Arm y General Staff and the War M inistry were also w rong. These earlier judgm ents proved fatal.

Southward advance spearheaded by Navy It was the Im perial Japanese Army that played the leading role in the jingoism displayed from the M anchurian In ciden t through the SinoJapanese W ar to the start o f the Japanese-U.S. W ar. The Arm y con sp icu ou sly took the lead in the co n clu sio n o f the Tripartite Pact, w hich is described as a point o f no return leading up to the Japanese-U.S. W ar, and the advancem ent to northern French Indochina. But the N avy took the initiative in the advancem ent to southern French Indochina. W hat happened to the N avy, w hich had been consistently cautious about going to war w ith the United States? W hen the N avy took a firm stand against the con clu sio n o f the Tripartite Pact in the first Konoe Cabinet and the Cabinet o f Kiichiro Hiranum a, those who advocated cooperation w ith Britain and the United States were h o ld in g the im p ortan t p osts, in clu d in g N avy M in ister Mitsum asa Yonai, Vice Navy M inister Isoroku Yam am oto and the Navy M inistry's Naval Affairs Bureau chief Shigeyoshi Inoue. But the numbers in the pro-Germ an group increased am ong those under the section chiefs or lower ranks of the Navy M inistry. W hen Yonai assumed the position of Prime M inister, he also became a reserve admiral and when Yam am oto became the Com m ander-in-Chief o f the Com bined Fleet, the pro-Germ any group formed the mainstream in policy planning in the N avy M inistry. Shingo Ishikawa, w ho became the Second Section chief o f the Naval Affairs Bureau in November 1940 im m ediately after the conclusion o f the Tripartite Pact, played a central role. Ishikawa enjoyed the deep confi­ dence o f Takazumi Oka, chief o f the bureau, and had a close friendship w ith Foreign M inister M atsuoka, w ho was from the same prefecture, Yam aguchi, as Ishikawa, and former Japanese Ambassador to Italy Toshio Shiratori. In D ecem b er, th e N avy la u n ch e d th e N a tio n a l D efen se P o licy C om m ittee, under w hich each subcom m ittee was placed—the First Subcom m ittee dealing w ith n ation al defense p olicies, the Second in charge o f armaments, the Third for public guidance and the Fourth for intelligence. The com m ittee aim ed to work out policies sw iftly, and the

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First Subcom m ittee took the lead in p olicy p lan n in g. The key members o f the First Subcom m ittee were Ishikaw a, Toshitane Takada, ch ief o f the First Section o f the N aval Affairs Bureau, and Sadatoshi Tom ioka, ch ie f of, the First Section o f the N aval General Staff. In April 1941, Prince Fushim i, C h ief o f N aval General Staff, was replaced by O sam i N agano. N agano said that officers at section ch ief level were studying m ost seriously and it w ould be better to adopt their opinions. Therefore, N agano had a strong tendency to accept proposals m ade by Ishikawa and others. That laid the groundwork for the opinions o f the proGerm an group members, including Ishikaw a, Tom ioka, Shigeru Fujii, a staff officer o f the Second Section o f the N aval Affairs Bureau, and Shigenori Kam i, a staff officer o f the First Section o f the N aval General Staff, to com e to the fore in the Navy's decision-m aking process. O n Ju n e 5, w hen the negotiations between Jap an and the m ajor powers to purchase natural resources, such as oil from the D utch East Indies, came to a stan d still, the First Subcom m ittee o f the N atio n al D efense P olicy Com m ittee subm itted to the N avy leadership a w ritten op in ion titled "the position the N avy should take under the current situ ation ." The w ritten opinion said that it w ould be dangerous to m ake a decision over w hether Jap an should start a war against the U nited States on ly on the basis o f the level o f m aterials for m ilitary potential. It also said th at the First Subcom m ittee concluded th at if Jap an could obtain oil in the D utch East Indies, Jap an w ould be able to cope w ith the situation w ith great con­ fid en ce. C on cern in g the transportation cap acity from the D u tch East Indies, it believed that although Jap an w ould lose about 10 percent o f its m erchant fleet during a war, it w ould be possible to com pensate for this by b u ild in g new m erchant ships. It urged the N avy leadership to quickly im plem ent plans for the m ilitary advance in to French In d o ch in a and T hailand. C h ie f o f the N aval General Staff N agano accepted the proposals made by the First Subcom m ittee and strongly asserted the necessity o f sending troops to southern French In d o ch in a.17 N agano was a representative plenipotentiary in 1936 w hen Jap an n o ti­ fied its w ithdraw al from the London N aval Treaty that was set to restrict the num ber o f auxiliary ships. Follow ing Jap an 's w ithdraw al, the naval arm am ent o f Jap an , Britain and the U nited States had entered a period w ithout a treaty to regulate their m ovem ents and a naval race began. For Jap an , w ith a lim ited budget and resources to figh t large U .S . fleets that could traverse the Pacific O cean, it was judged more effective to build extra large battleships w ith longer artillery range. O n the basis o f this view , the battleships Yamato and M usashi were b u ilt. M eanw hile, the U .S . N avy also hurriedly pressed ahead w ith its plan to

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build warships and the Third V inson N aval A ct and the Stark A ct, w hich provided for a tw o-ocean navy, were approved in Ju n e and Ju ly 1940 w ith a view toward strengthening the U .S . N avy w hile Germ any was engaged in a series o f victories over European countries. At an Im perial H eadquarters-Governm ent conference on Ju ly 21,1941, N agano asserted that there was a chance o f victory over the U nited States, but the chance w ould dim inish as tim e w ent b y. He added th at Japan w ould be n o m atch for the U nited States in the latter h a lf o f 1942 and if the clash w ith the U n ited States was unavoidable, the prospects for a Japanese victory w ould gradually recede.18 N agano believed that Jap an w ould be at the peak o f m ilitary force com ­ pared w ith that o f the U nited States around April 1941, but that it w ould fall increasingly behind the U nited States in a w arship-building com peti­ tion due to the disparity in overall national strength. The p ro-G erm an group in th e Im perial Jap an ese N a v y , in clu d in g Ishikaw a, said th at they had confidence in a war against the U nited States if Jap an confronted the U nited States in 1941 and that it was tim e to start the w ar. In 1941, Jap an still surpassed the U nited States in naval power in the Pacific O cean. O n Ju ly 31, a day before the U nited States im posed an o il em bargo on Jap an , N agano had an audience w ith the Emperor and told the Emperor that if Jap an lost its oil supplies, its stockpile w ould last for just tw o years. He added that if war against the U nited States started, the o il stockpile w ould be consum ed in 18 m onths, so there was no choice but to wage war against the U nited States as early as possible. Notes___________________________________________________________________________________________ 1 M a to m e U g a k i, Senso-roku (W ar D ia ry ), T o ky o : H ara S h o b o , 1968, p p . 1 -2 2 T h e A rm y G e n e r a l S ta ff, e d ., Sugiyam a M e m o , T o k y o : H ara S h o b o , 1967, p p . 167-168 3 T a k u sh iro H a tto ri, D a ito a Senso Z e n sh i (The W h o le H isto ry o f th e G reater East A sia W ar), T o k y o : H a ra S h o b o , 1965, p p . 5 2 -5 3 ' T h e A r m y G e n e ra l S ta ff, e d ., op. t it ., p p . 2 2 7 -2 2 9

5 Ib id ., p p . 260-2 6 1 6 S h in ji S u d o , H u ll N o te o K a ita O toko (The M a n W h o W r o te th e H u ll N o te ), T o ky o :

B u n g e ish u n ju , 1999, p . 45 7T akeo S h in m y o , K aigun Senso K ento K aig i Kiroku (The R ecords o n C o m m itte e to Discuss W ar in th e Im p erial Ja p an ese N a v y ), T o k y o : M a in ic h i N ew spapers, 1976, p . 131 8 Sadao A sad a, Ryotaisenkan no N ich ib e i K a n kei (Ja p a n -U .S . R ela tio n sh ip b etw een W o rld W a r I a n d II), T o k y o : U n iv e rsity o f T o k y o Press, 1993, p p . 2 4 2 -2 43 9 Sh iro H ara, D aisenryaku N a k i K aisen (Starting a W a r w ith o u t G r a n d Strategy), T okyo: H ara S h o b o , 1987, p . 209 10 K en n o su k e T o risu , N ih o n K aigun Shippai no Kerikyu (Research o n th e Failure o f th e Im p erial Ja p an ese N a v y ), T o k y o : B u n g e ish u n ju , 1993, p . 248 11 Ib id ., p . 248

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12Newsweek; February 5, 1940, p. 13; Newsweek Japan's supplement, Tumultuous Days in the Showa Era (1933-1951), Tokyo: TBS Britannica, 1989, p.85 13 C o rd ell H u ll, M em oirs o f Cordell H u ll v o l.2 , New York: M a cm illa n , 1948, pp. 1,013-1,014 14 G unji-shi Gakkai (M ilitary History Society), ed., Daihonei Rikugun-bu Sensoshido-han Kim itsu Senso N isshi (Secret W ar Log o f the W ar Coordination Group, the Im perial Japanese Army o f the Imperial Headquarters) vol. 1 , Tokyo: Kinseisha, 1998, pp. 137-138 15Tatsuo Shoda, Jushintachi no Showashi (History o f Senior Statesmen in the Showa Era) vol. 1, Tokyo: Bungeishunju, 1987, pp. 261-262 Kijuro Shidehara, Gaiko 50-nen (History o f Diplom acy for 50 Years), Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1974, pp. 202-204 16Ikuhiko Hata, Futsuin-shinchu to Gun no Nanshin Seisaku (Advance to French Indochina and the Southward Expansion Policy o f the Army), 1940-41, in Taiheiyo Senso e no M ichi (Road to the Pacific War) vol.6, Nanpo Shinshutsu (Southward Advance), ed. N ihon Kokusai Seiji G akkai (Japan Association o f International R elations), Tokyo: Asahi Shim bun, 1987, p. 267 17Ju n Tsunoda, Nihon no Taibei Kaisen (Japan Goes to W ar w ith the United States), 1940-41, in Taiheiyo Senso e no M ichi (Road to the Pacific War) vol. 7 Nichi-Bei Kaisen (Entry in to Jap an -U .S. W ar), ed. N ih on Kokusai Seiji Gakkai (Japan Association o f International Relations), Tokyo: Asahi Shim bun, 1987, pp. 204-205; Jim Tsunoda, Final Confrontation, trans. David A. Titus, in Final confrontation: Japan's negotiations with the United States, 1941: selected translations from Taiheiyo Senso e no M ichi, vol. 7, ed. Jam es W . M orley, New York: Colum bia University Press, 1994, pp. 110-111 18 H iroshi Y oshii, Showa Gaikoshi (History o f D iplom acy in the Showa Era), Tokyo: Nansosha, 1990, p. 256

C h ap ter 7 Road to the Pacific W ar / Part 3

Tojo government fails in its mission, miscalculates and wages war

n Decem ber 8, 1941 (Decem ber 7 in Washington, D .C ., and Hawaii), japan started the Pacific W ar. W hy did the negotiations between Japan and the United States fail to avert the war? W as Japan’s “judgment on material national strength” proper? W hy did the government of Prime M inister Hideki To jo , whose mission was supposedly to avert the w ar by rebuilding the national policies from scratch, fail to do so? This chapter looks at how Japan began the Pacific W ar.

O

Numbers game for waging war against U.S. To decide to wage a war, the strength o f a nation m ust be logically eval­ uated. D id Jap an make a proper evaluation? The first evaluation o f n ation ­ al pow er in the process o f d ecid in g to w age the P acific W ar was the em ergen cy su p p ly m o b iliz a tio n program co m p iled b y th e C a b in e t Planning Board in August 1940 (the 15th year o f the Show a Era). The board, placed directly under the Prime M inister, was tasked to study and p lan a w artim e econom y. The study poin ted out th at if im ports from third-party countries stopped, the supply o f m ost basic m aterials w ould be cut in h a lf. Around the same tim e, the N avy also m ade an evaluation o f national strength and concluded that the supply o f strategic m aterials w ould meet the dem and o n ly for about a year if its supplies from Britain, the U nited States and their controlled areas were cut o ff. H earing such estim ates, N avy M inister Zengo Yoshida called for selfrestraint at an executive m eetin g o f the N avy M in istry, sayin g, "The Japanese N avy can fig h t against the U nited States for on ly one year. G oin g to war where battle could on ly be sustained for one year w ould be reckless —like a ferocious tiger rushing in to a snare."1 The W ar M in istry's W ar Plans Section presented its assessm ent o f national strength in M arch 1941. The assessment was com piled by M ajor H ideo Shibo w hose father-in-law was Sadao Araki w ho served as W ar 113

11 4 / J apan' s wars in 1 9 3 1 -4 5

M inister in the early 1930s. After analyzing various data, Shibo concluded it w ould be d ifficu lt to m ake a southw ard m ilitary advance. How ever, under Araki's suggestion, Shibo drafted a report claim ing Japan was capable o f w aging a war. But Kikusaburo Okada, ch ief o f the W ar Plans Section, revised the report, saying, "It should be noted that it is not certain that the m aterial national strength is adequate to carry out a lon g war against the U nited States and Britain."2 This fin al report sent shock waves through the Arm y. The Arm y General Staff's Tw entieth Group (War Coordination) wrote in its diary log, "W e have to say it's im possible to make a southw ard advance w ith m ilitary forces."3 But w hen th e Jap an ese m ilita ry ad van ced in to sou th ern French Indochina, and the U nited States im posed an oil embargo against Jap an in August 1941, the idea o f averting war sign ifican tly receded. At that tim e, Arm y C olon el H ideo Iwakuro tried to persuade various m ilitary and governm ent officials that Jap an should avoid a war, based on a report on the disparity o f n atio n al strength betw een Jap an and the U nited States. The report, com piled b y Arm y Paym aster C olon el Kenkichi Sh in jo w ho was in v o lv ed in gatherin g in tellig en ce about the U n ited States, stated: " If the ratio o f industrial strengths o f both countries could be kept at the current level, war dam age to the U nited States m ust be 100 percent w hile dam age to Jap an m ust be lim ited to less than 5 percent throughout the w ar."4 (See Table 4.) In the Ju ly 1941 personnel shuffle at the Arm y General Staff, Takushiro H attori was appointed ch ief o f the Operations Section and M asanobu Tsuji ch ief o f the Logistics U n it. The appointm ents marked the reuniting o f two key figures w ho, as staff officers in the Kw antung A rm y, triggered the N om onhan Incident th at lasted from M ay to Septem ber 1939 in defiance o f Arm y leaders in Tokyo. A t the same tim e, Sh in ich i Tanaka—w ho played a key role as the ch ief o f the W ar M inistry's M ilitary Affairs Section for the expansion o f the war fron t after the M arco Polo Bridge Incident in Ju ly 1937—was serving as head o f the Operations Bureau o f the Arm y General Staff. This m eant three hard-liners were in charge o f operations planning for the Arm y, and they advocated that Jap an should go to war w ith the U nited States. O ne o f the m ajor points in assessing n ational strength was how to esti­ m ate dam age to ships. Ships were needed to secure the transport o f sup­ plies such as oil and to secure the sea lanes for such transport. If Jap an was to m obilize ships for such a purpose, the U nited States w ould naturally start attackin g Japanese ships. Therefore, if dam age to ships exceeded Jap an 's ship bu ildin g cap ab ility, it w ould becom e d ifficu lt to continue com bat operations.

Tojo government fails in its m ission, miscalculates and wages war / 115

[Table 4]

National Strength of Japan, U.S. in c. 1940 Comparison with Japan

U.S. Steel production Oil refinery output

million tons H

■

110 million barrels

Coal production Electricity output

18 million kilowatts

Aircraft production Automobile production Vessel tonnage

||$ 5 0 ,Q 0 0 tons

i l

>•32:1 M 4.5:1

IM

120,000 units j|ri6& million units

o t

K & 0 miHion tons m —

Aluminum production

M

ttp H p l 8:1

JP$;50:1^ %

10 million tons

1.5:1

^^ir^llionHiBMH

t Jap an 's o il refinery o utput was m inuscule. ‘ Based o n report com p iled b y A rm y Paymaster C o lo n el K en kichi Sh in jo So u rce : M ich in o ri Saito, Showa-shi Hakkutsu-Kaisen Tsukoku wa N aze Okuretaka (D iggin g in to th e H istory o f the Show a Era—W h y was th e N otice o f th e Starting the W ar D elayed?), Tokyo: Sh in ch o Sh in sh o , 2004, pp . 119-120

In June 1941, Shingo Ishikawa, chief of the Navy M inistry's Second Naval Affairs Section, calculated that the loss of Japanese ships would amount to 600,000 tons per year and the nation's maximum shipbuilding capability would be 800,000 tons, concluding Japan would be able to deal with damage to ships. However, after Shigeru Fukutome, chief o f the Naval General Staff's Operations Bureau said, "The vessel damage would be 1.4 m illion tons in the first year o f the war [against the United States],” Ishikawa and his colleagues worked to negate Fukutome's remarks and told the Army that damage to Japanese vessels would be between 800,000 tons and 1 m illion tons per year on average.5 In actuality, damage to Japanese vessels in the first year was 960,000 tons. The figure increased to 1.69 m illion tons in the second year and rose to 3.92 m illion tons in the third year of the war. U .S. economist Jerome B. Cohen noted: "For every ton of shipping the Japanese were able to build, three were sunk; and, given the inadequate merchant tonnage with which Japan began the war, her merchant fleet was being whittled down to nothing."6 Cohen saw Japan's ability in calculating its war capacity as "characterized by 'initial overconfidence' and Tack of planning, poor administration and internal conflict of interests.'"7 The

1 1 6 / J apan' s wars in 1 9 3 1 -4 5

econom ist pointed out: "Japan was singularly lacking in foresight."8 T he fin a l n a tio n a l stren gth ju d g m en t was m ade b y th e C a b in e t Planning Board im m ediately after the inauguration o f the Tojo Cabinet in O ctober 1941. The President o f the board—the state m inisterial position— was Arm y General Teiichi Suzuki. In August 1941, Suzuki had reported, "If a war broke out and Jap an succeeds in taking control o f o il producing areas in the D utch East Indies, o il bases w ill be destroyed im m ediately and it w ill be d ifficu lt to obtain o il." But Suzuki later changed his view . A t an Im perial conference m eeting attended b y the Emperor on Novem ber 5, he presented a view that Japan w ould "narrow ly m aintain a self-sustaining system " given the dom estic oil reserves and o il to be obtained in the southw ard advance. "To m aintain the current situation [by not goin g to war] w ill put the n ation at a disad­ vantage, even looking at just the m aterial aspects," Suzuki added. This assessment was made based on mere num ber sh u fflin g by the Arm y and N avy, and Suzuki's view played a m ajor role in bringing Jap an in to the war.9 At a m eeting o f the Emperor and jushin—unofficial senior advisers to the Em peror, in clu d in g form er Prim e M inisters—on N ovem ber 29, form er Prime M inister Keisuke Okada said, "It is quite worrisome w hether we can be confident o f w inning the war from the view point o f our ability to supply goods." Former Prime M inister M itsum asa Yonai said, " If we go to war to avoid a gradual decline, we m ay end up w ith an even bigger decline." As such, m any were concerned about Jap an 's n ation al strength and were unable to grasp the U nites States' real power. But Jap an continued on its path to war.

Japan won't compromise on withdrawing from China Private sector level Jap an -U .S. negotiations that had begun in late 1940 becam e governm ent-level negotiations in M ay 1941, and they continued u n til the last m inute before the war started. W hy did Jap an decide to go to war at an Im perial conference m eeting in the presence o f the Emperor on Decem ber 1, 1941? A t the m eeting, it was decided that "the negotiations have failed to reach a conclusion and the Empire w ill wage war against Britain, the U nited States and the N etherlands."10 There were a num ber o f turning points in the negotiations. The first began w hen Father Jam es M . Drought and Bishop Jam es E. W alsh o f the U nited States offered to m ediate between Prime M inister Fum im aro Konoe and U .S . President Franklin D . Roosevelt in late 1940. D rought, form er Finance M inistry bureaucrat Tadao Ikawa and the W ar M inistry's Arm y

Tojo governm ent fa ils in its m ission, m iscalculates and wages war / 117

Affairs Section ch ief H ideo Iwakuro agreed to render the Tripartite Pact an effective dead letter and to con ditionally w ithdraw troops from C h in a. Based on this agreem ent, Drought com piled a draft proposal for m utual understanding between the two countries in A pril 1941. W ith D rou gh t's p rop osal, d ip lo m atic n ego tiatio n s b egan betw een Japanese Am bassador to the U nited States Kichisaburo Nom ura and U .S. Secretary o f State Cordell H u ll. H ull notified Nom ura that he w anted to use four principles as the basis o f the negotiations: • Respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty o f each and all nations. • Support o f the principle o f noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries. • Support o f the principle o f equality, in clu d in g equality o f com m ercial opportunity. • M ain ten an ce o f the status quo in the P acific except as it m ay be altered by peaceful m eans. But N om ura did n ot present H u ll's proposal to the governm ent in Tokyo. Furthermore, the governm ent m istakenly took Drought's draft pro­ posal as the official U .S . proposal. Foreign M inister Yosuke M atsuoka, after returning from an overseas trip, becam e angry because the negotiations were carried out w ithout him and changed the proposal significantly. In Ju n e 1941, as the war between Germ any and the Soviet U n ion broke o u t, the Soviet U n io n jo in ed an allian ce w ith the U n ited States and B ritain. As a result, the U nited States gained the upper hand in negotia­ tio n s. As Ja p a n 's m ilita ry co n tin u ed to advan ce in southern French In doch ina, the U nited States im posed an oil em bargo on August 1. H ull w rote, "From now on our m ajor objective w ith regard to Jap an was to give ourselves more tim e to prepare our defenses."11 Even under such circum stances, Prime M inister Fum im aro Konoe did not give up. The Prime M inister appointed the N avy's Teijiro Toyoda to replace M atsuoka as Foreign M inister. O n August 8, Konoe notified W ar M inister H ideki Tojo and N avy M inister Koshiro Oikaw a that the Prime M in ister w anted to seek a breakthrough b y h o ld in g direct talks w ith R oosevelt. W ith agreem ent from T ojo and O ikaw a, K on oe, th rou gh Am bassador N om ura, sent his idea to H u ll, bringing Tokyo-W ashington negotiations to avoid war to a second stage. Konoe secretly m et w ith Lord Keeper o f the Privy Seal K oichi Kido to discuss his plans—in the event that an agreem ent was reached in the pro­ posed sum m it, he w ould send a telegram to Tokyo and ob tain direct approval from the Emperor so as to contain opposition from the m ilitary.12

1 18 / J apan' s wars in 1 9 3 1 ^ 5

But form er Foreign M inister H achiro Arita believed that Konoe should have sought to control the m ilitary him self, w riting "Instead o f th in kin g about going to H onolulu [for a sum m it w ith Roosevelt, Konoe] should have discussed [controlling the m ilitary] directly w ith the Emperor; and a breakthrough could have been achieved."13 O n August 9, 1941, Roosevelt m et w ith British Prime M inister W inston C h u rch ill aboard a ship in the A tla n tic O cean . The tw o leaders later announced the A tlantic Charter and criticized the invasions b y the Axis countries. Roosevelt prom ised C h u rch ill that he w ould issue a w arning to Jap an . This statem ent concluded: "If the Japanese G overnm ent undertakes any fu rth er steps in pursuance o f the p o licy o f m ilitary d o m in ation through force or conquest in the Pacific region upon w hich it has appar­ en tly embarked, the U nited States Governm ent w ill be im m ediately forced to take any and all steps o f w hatsoever character it deems necessary in its ow n security notw ithstanding the possibility that such further steps on its part m ay result in co n flict between the two countries."14 After the talks w ith C h u rch ill, Roosevelt told Ambassador Nom ura that he w ould accept sum m it talks w ith K onoe. The Prim e M inister began preparations to visit the U nited States. U .S . Am bassador to Jap an Joseph Grew approached the U .S . State Departm ent to initiate the talks. However, Stanley K. Hornbeck, Special Adviser on Far Eastern Affairs at the State Departm ent, and others strongly opposed the sum m it. H u ll told Nom ura that before setting up the sum m it, the Japanese governm ent should first express its views on w hether it was ready to w ithdraw from C h in a . W hat were the intentions o f the U .S . side? A Septem ber 23, 1941, m em orandum w ritten by Joseph W . B allentine, a State Departm ent Jap an expert, stated that accepting a Jap an -U .S. sum­ m it was n ot advisable for W ashington. He wrote that although sum m it talks w ould slow down Jap an 's m ilitary activities, the U nited States w ould have to take the opinions o f Britain, C h in a and the N etherlands in to con­ sideration, and if the Soviet U n ion 's resistance stiffened against Germ any, Japan m ight com e closer to U .S . proposals.15 After Germ any invaded the Soviet U n io n , the U nited States and Britain extended support to the Soviet U n ion and tried to prevent Jap an from attacking the Soviet U n ion from the east. If the Soviet U n ion could escape attack from Jap an , it w ould be able to transfer its elite troops stationed alon g its borders w ith M an ch u ria w est for the war against G erm any. M oscow learned that Jap an decided to postpone war against the Soviet U n ion in August from Richard Sorge, a Germ an spy w orking for the Soviet Red Arm y, and passed the inform ation to the U nited States. A t a con feren ce in th e Im perial presence o n Septem ber 6, K onoe sought the possibility o f w ithdraw ing Japanese troops from C h in a as a

Tojo government fails in its m ission, m iscalculates and wages war / 119

com promise w ith the U nited States. But he stepped down as prim e m in­ ister because he faced strong opposition from W ar M inister Hideki Tojo. Under the Emperor's view for averting a war, however, the Cabinet of Tojo, w hich succeeded the Konoe governm ent, developed two plans of compromise for the United States. Japan-U .S. negotiations then entered a third phase. O n November 7, Ambassador Nomura presented one of the plans to the United States. However, know ing Japan had a second, or fin al, com pro­ mise plan from the successful reading o f Japan's codes, the United States did not respond. Japan presented the second plan on November 20. It focu sed on m o vin g Jap an ese troops statio n ed in southern French Indochina to northern French Indochina. In response to the second plan, Roosevelt considered a provisional, compromise agreement w hich sought the reduction o f Japanese troops in northern French Indochina w ith a three-m onth deadline and the start of negotiations to rebuild trade relations. The plan envisioned but did not m ention Japan's withdrawal from C hin a. Briefed on the possible agree­ m ent by Secretary H ull, China's N ationalist governm ent under Chiang Kai-shek was enraged, saying the U nited States was trying to sacrifice C h in a. Britain supported China's stance. M eanw hile, news o f a Japanese fleet heading south from Taiwan reached W ashington. The last chance for Japan and the United States to reach a breakthrough through negotiations had passed. O n November 26, H ull handed Nomura and Saburo Kurusu, a special envoy to W ashington, copies o f the U .S. basic response to the Japanese compromise plan. The response later came to be known as the H ull Note by the Japanese side. This called for Japan to "withdraw all m ilitary, naval, air and police forces from C hin a and from Indochina" and not to support the regim e o f W ang C hao-m in g. It also requested Jap an renounce its Tripartite Pact w ith Germ any and Italy. Foreign M inister Shigenori Togo later said, "I was shocked and became giddy" w hen he learned about the note. Elite Arm y officers in the field viewed it as "tenyu" or Heaven's help (for a pro-war cam paign). W hen handing Nomura copies, H ull said that the note was not meant to call for an im mediate withdrawal from C h in a .16However, Togo did not envision utilizing H ull's com m ent to rebuild a suitable environm ent for restarting negotiations. H ull told U .S. War Secretary Henry Stim son that the matter was now in his hands, along w ith N avy Secretary Frank K n o x.17 N onetheless, the United States did not at that tim e foresee Japan's surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.

120 / J apan' s waes in 1931-45

Failure to avoid war with V.S. W hile pursuing negotiations w ith the U nited States, Japanese political and m ilitary leaders were in con flict over national policy decisions. O n Septem ber 3, 1941, the Im perial H eadquarters-G overnm ent Liaison Conference developed a draft Teikoku Kokusaku Suiko Yoryo (the Principles for the Im plem entation o f the Im perial Policy) w hich in clu ded the follow ing points: • For the purpose o f self-preservation and self-defense, the Empire w ill com plete war preparations around late October w ith determ ination to wage war against the United States (as well as against Britain and the Netherlands). • It w ill use all diplom atic means to bring the United States and Britain to accept its demands. • It w ill im m ediately start a war against the United States (as well as against Britain and the Netherlands) if the prospect o f the United States and Britain accepting Jap an 's dem ands fades around early O ctober.18 As the Army and Navy worked to coordinate policy, the two sides strug­ gled over the wording o f the three points. O n September 5, surprised by a report from Prime M inister Konoe, the Emperor said, "It seems like a war is primary and diplom acy is secondary,” and called in C h ief o f the Army General Staff Hajim e Sugiyam a and C h ief o f the N aval General Staff Osam i N agano. The Emperor asked Sugiyam a how confident the Arm y was it could finish a war waged against the United States. Sugiyama replied: "W e intend to end it in about three m onths." Sugiyam a had served as W ar M inister w hen the Sino-Japanese W ar started in 1937. The Em peror responded: "I rem em ber you , as W ar M inister, told me at that tim e the incident would last about one m onth, but it is still continuing." The C h ief o f the Army General Staff explained, "Since C hin a has a vast interior, operations did not go as sm oothly as we had planned." The Emperor pressed Sugiyama: "The Pacific Ocean is m uch larger. W hat makes you so confident o f finishing a war in three m onths?"19 At a conference in the Im perial presence on September 6, the Emperor said it was deplorable that he could not hear any opinion from the Chiefs of Army and N aval General Staffs in spite o f the fact that the matter was a very serious one. Then the Emperor reached in his inside pocket and read from a poem written by Emperor M eiji:

Tojo governm ent fa ils in its m ission, m iscalculates and wages war / 121

Yom o no umi/mina harakara to/ om ou yoni, nado namikaze no/tachisawaguram u In as m u c h as all/the seas in a ll directions/ se e m s ib lin g s o f o n e b irth , W h y m u s t th e w in d s an d th e w a v e s c la s h in n o is in e ss ? 20

Then N agano said diplom acy w ould be given a higher priority than war although the nation w ould not hesitate to wage war if it becam e necessary to do so. Thus, the Principles for the Im plem entation o f the Im perial Policy were adopted.21 O n the n igh t o f October 7 at the Prime M inister's O fficia l Residence, Konoe urged W ar M inister Tojo to have Japanese troops w ithdraw from C h in a . But Tojo rejected the suggestion, saying, "I w ill never give in on the issue o f troops' being stationed [in C h in a]." " If we cast serious d o u b ts [over a d o p tin g th e P rin cip le s fo r th e Im plem entation o f the Im perial p olicy], the conference in the Im perial presence on Septem ber 6 should bear a serious responsibility," the Prime M inister added.22 Tojo believed that if Jap an agreed to w ithdraw from C h in a , it w ould lose M anchukuo and Korea.23 O n the other hand, the N avy, w hich w ould be tasked w ith leading the war against the U nited States, was in turm oil. O n October 7, w hen asked by Tojo w hether he was confident about w inning a war against the U nited States, N avy M inister Koshiro Oikaw a adm itted, "N o, I am n o t."24 Trying to take advantage o f indecisiveness in the N avy, Konoe sum ­ m oned the W ar, N avy and Foreign M inisters and the President o f the C ab in et P lan nin g Board to his private residence Tekigaiso in O gikubo, Tokyo, on October 12. As Konoe and Oikaw a agreed before the m eeting, Oikaw a started the discussions, by saying, "I w ant to leave the m atter entirely up to the Prime M inister." Konoe responded, "I w ant to continue negotiations [with the U nited States]." H ow ever, Foreign M in ister T eijiro Toyoda, w ho once served in the N avy, pressed, " If the Arm y has no in tention o f com prom ising over the issue o f troops stationed [in C h in a], there is no poin t in entering negotia­ tion s." W ar M inister Tojo was enraged and the m eeting broke dow n. Follow ing this, Akira M uto, ch ief o f the W ar M inistry's M ilitary Affairs Bureau, presented a view through C h ie f C abinet Secretary K enji Tom ita on October 14 that the Arm y w ould follow the N avy if the N avy expressed that it did n o t w ant a war. Responding to M uto, Takazum i O ka, ch ief o f

1 2 2 / J apan’s w a b s

in

1 9 3 1 -4 5

the N avy M inistry's N aval Affairs Bureau, failed to take a clear stance. He said, "W e w ant to avoid a war as m uch as possible. But the N avy cannot express such a view ."28 Two days later, the Konoe C abinet resigned en masse. The selection o f Konoe's successor was led by Lord Keeper o f the Privy Seal K oichi Kido w ho was the Emperor's aide. Kido opposed the idea o f form ing a cabinet led by an Im perial Fam ily mem ber and instead strongly recom m ended T ojo to becom e Prim e M in ister. Kido calculated th at if To jo , know n to be lo y a l to th e Em peror, understood the w ill o f the Emperor, a war against the U n ited States m ight be avoided. A t an O ctober 17 m eeting, jushin approved T ojo to succeed K onoe. C itin g a proverb, the Emperor told K ido, "It's like, 'N oth in g ventured, n oth in g gained,' isn 't it?" Kido wrote in his diary, "I was m oved [by the Emperor's rem ark]."26 Kido told Tojo the Emperor's w ill was to call o ff the p olicy to launch a war against the U nited States "w ithout being shackled by the decision at the Septem ber 6 conference in the Im perial presence."27 Shocked by Kido's words, Tojo visited M eiji and Yasukuni Shrines after leaving the Im perial Palace. The Tojo Cabin et was inaugurated on O ctober 18. Shigenori Togo, a m oderate vis-a-vis the U n ited States, was appointed foreign m inister. Prim e M in ister T ojo co n cu rren tly served as W ar an d H om e A ffairs M inisters and im m ediately started to review the p olicy o f lau n ch in g a war against the U nited States. But in itially he failed. Kido's in tention was to revise the Im perial p olicy from scratch, saying, "The banner is held by core figures o f the m iddle-class staff in the m ilitary. W e w ill return to square on e." How ever, Tojo was unable to m eaningfully reshuffle the bureaucracy. V ice C h ie f o f the Arm y General Staff Osam u T sukada, c h ie f o f th e O p eration s Bureau o f th e A rm y G en eral S ta ff Sh in ich i Tanaka and other hard-line m ilitary bureaucrats stayed in the sam e p o sitio n s, h o ld in g sw ay in p o licy m ak in g and d ecision -m akin g processes. A review o f the Im perial p olicy started at the Im perial HeadquartersGovernm ent Liaison Conference on O ctober 23, and the conference m et on a d aily basis for nearly 10 days u n til the p olicy was fin alized . The Arm y's Sugiyam a told Tsukada and others that the Arm y had n ot changed its m ind after the resignation o f the Konoe C ab in et. W ith in the Arm y, it was inform ally agreed to accept the sh iftin g o f the deadline for ending negotiations from the in itia lly decided "early O ctober" to the "end o f O ctober." The N avy com piled an Im perial N avy Operations Plan w hich included an attack on H aw aii.28 How ever, during one conference m eeting, som e participants expressed

Tojo government fa ils in its m ission, m iscalculates and wages war / 123

concerns about Germ any's ability in its fight against Britain. Togo pointed out, "Britain gained extra capabilities w hile Germ any was fighting against the Soviet U n ion . There's a 50-50 chance next year [for Britain to win over Germany] and [almost certainly that Britain] w ill win the war the year after n ext." The Navy said, "It w ill be alm ost im possible for Germ any to invade British soil given British preparedness."29 The m ain sticking point in Jap an -U .S. negotiations was the issue of Japanese troops stationed in C h in a. Sugiyam a and other Arm y officials repeated th e ir h ard -lin e stan ce. N avy M in ister Sh igetaro Shim ada approved the continued stationing o f troops. But elsewhere there was com plete turm oil w ithin the N avy. Shigeru Fukutom e, director o f the Naval General Staff's Operations Bureau, advocated waging a war against the United States on October 28. O n the other hand, Vice N avy M inister Yorio Sawamoto on October 30 urged Shim ada to rethink the war, saying, "From a broad perspective, avoiding the war is the right answer." But the Navy M inister on ly replied, "I w ill be sorry if one N avy M inister's opposi­ tion led to m issing the right m om ent."30 There were three options that the conference could choose: • Avoid war w ith the United States and struggle against any difficulties u n til things im prove. • Decide to go to war in order to settle disputes w ith the United States. • Prepare for war determ inedly w hile still m aking diplom atic efforts in parallel. At an Im perial Headquarters-government m eeting on November 1 to decide w hich option should be picked, Shim ada repeatedly said the Navy would not be ready to decide to go to war unless the N avy was provided w ith more steel. Sugiyam a said, "C an you make a decision if you get steel?" Shim ada nodded and expressed support for w aging a war against the U nited States.31 During the m eeting, Finance M inister Okinori Kaya said, "There is little possibility the United States w ill wage war against us. It's not a good idea to start a war [against the U nited States] now ." Foreign M inister Togo agreed w ith Kaya.32 But Nagano yelled, "Now [is the tim e to w in]. Otherwise, the chance for victory w on't com e." Tsukada sided w ith N agano, saying. "If we hesitate at this m om ent, we can't fu lfill our duty o f national defense." Finally, after further debate, the third option was chosen and the dead­ line for diplom atic negotiations was set for December 1. Thus, Japan's policy o f going to war w ith the United States did not change from the one decided on September 6 by the conference in the Emperor's presence. The

124 / J a p a n ' s

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p olicy o f w aging a war against the U nited States was form ally decided at th e Im p e ria l co n fere n ce o n N ovem b er 5 as th e P rin cip le s fo r th e Im plem entation o f the Im perial p olicy. Advised by Prince Takam atsu w ho had just becom e an officer o f the O p e ra tio n s S e c tio n a t th e N a v a l G e n e ra l S ta ff, th e E m p eror o n N ovem ber 30 asked N agano and Shim ada: "O n ce a war starts, it w ill be a lo n g on e. Even so, do we have to start it as p lan ned ?" Shim ada replied: "W e are adequately prepared in b oth hum an resources and supplies. W e are w aiting for an Im perial order." A t a Decem ber 1 conference in the Em peror's presence where it was decided to wage war against the U n ited States, the Em peror nodded to each exp lan atio n , w hile m aking n o m ore particular rem arks.33 O n D ecem b er 2, C o m b in e d Fleet C o m m a n d e r-in -C h ie f Isoroku Yam am oto sent a telegram to the naval task force. The telegram read: “Niitakayam a nobore [Clim b M ou n t N iitaka] 1208." The coded message m eant, "Start a war against the U nited States on Decem ber 8 (Decem ber 7 in the U nited States)."

Delayed notification to U.S. O n Decem ber 8 ,1941 , Jap an tim e, the N avy's task force m ade a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in H aw aii. A t 1 p .m . Eastern Standard Tim e on Decem ber 7—30 m inutes before the planned tim e to start the attack-** Am bassador Nom ura and special envoy Kurusu were supposed to present Japan's m em orandum to U .S . Secretary o f State H u ll. But the m em oran­ dum —w hich was m eant to be Japan's declaration o f war on the U nited States—was actually presented at 2:20 p .m ., about an hour after the attack started. W hat brought about such a blunder? The Foreign M inistry had previ­ ously transm itted three telegraph messages to the Japanese Em bassy in W ashington regarding the m em orandum .34 Message Num ber 901 instructed the Embassy to take necessary mea­ sures so that the m em orandum could be handed over at any tim e. Message Num ber 902 was the n otificatio n m em orandum itself. M essage Num ber 907 stated w hen the m em orandum was to be delivered. Due to its length­ iness, M essage 902 was sent in 14 parts. T he 14th part stated: "The Governm ent o f Jap an regrets to have to n o tify hereby the governm ent of the U nited States that in view o f the attitude o f the G overnm ent o f the U nited States o f Am erica, it cannot but consider it is im possible to reach an agreem ent through further negotiations." (See APPENDIX J.) The Foreign M inistry com pleted transm ission o f Num ber 901 and the first 13 parts o f N um ber 902 before n o o n on Saturday, Decem ber 6,

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Eastern Standard Tim e. The M inistry then sent the 14th part o f Number 902—the m ost im portant part—and Number 907 in the early hours of Sunday, December 7. Though tim e was needed for decoding and typing, the Embassy had enough tim e to prepare the mem orandum for the sched­ uled delivery tim e. The Embassy finished decoding Number 901 by noon on December 6 and the 8th and 9th parts of Number 902 by about 7 p . m . However, since the 14th part had n ot arrived by the tim e the 13th part was decoded around m idnight, First Secretary Katsuzo Okum ura allowed his subordi­ nates to go hom e at about 3 a . m . on Decem ber 7 and he slept at the Embassy. Since he was ordered not to use an American typist, Okumura had planned to type up a clean copy all by him self. But he did not im m e­ diately type them w hen the decoded messages arrived, possibly assuming that the next day would be a day off—Sunday. Telegraph com m unication officials finished decoding Number 907 at about 11 a . m . on Sunday, December 7 and the 14th part o f Number 902 at around n oon . The tim e to deliver the m em orandum , as instructed in Number 907 as 1 p . m , was approaching. But clean copies o f the messages up to the 13th part of Number 902 were still unfinished at that tim e. The clean copies were finished at about 1:50 p . m . N om ura and Kurusu, n ot know ing Pearl Harbor had already been attacked by Japan, rushed to the U .S. State Departm ent. W hen they arrived at Foggy Bottom , not only had H ull already been inform ed o f the attack, but he had also know n the details o f the Japanese m em orandum in advance through successful U .S. code-breaking. After pretending to read the m em orandum , H ull said, "In all m y fifty years o f public service I have never seen a docum ent that was more crowd­ ed w ith infam ous falsehoods and distortions—infam ous falsehoods and distortions on a scale so huge that I never im agined un til today that any governm ent on this planet was capable o f uttering them ."35 Foreign M in ister T ogo later said th a t th e Jap an ese Em bassy in W ashington com m itted an act o f "carelessness and negligence" in decod­ in g and producing the docum ent.36 Some observers have com m ented that there was a lack o f com m unica­ tion between Tokyo and the Embassy and a disparity in perception o f the gravity o f the situation.37 A year after the end o f the war, Nomura said, "I don't think the only one hour difference was the Embassy's fau lt."38 Several years later, H ull wrote: "...know ing the im portance o f a deadline set for a specific hour, Nom ura should have come to see me precisely at one o'clock, even though he had in his hand only the first few lines o f his note, leaving instructions w ith the Embassy to bring him the remainder as

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it became ready."39 It was also pointed out that the wording of the memorandum, which only notified the termination of Japan-U.S. negotiations, did not follow international law. Experts believe even if the memorandum had arrived on time, there would have been criticism of Japan.40 U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt called the attack a "treacherous attack," and the Americans were united under the phrase: "Remember Pearl Harbor." (See APPENDICES L & M.) The delay in notifying the United States of the planned attack planted stereotyped images in the minds of the Americans that the Japanese were sneaky, later providing one of the grounds for President Harry Truman to justify the use of the atomic bombs.41 Even after the war, the American public was occasionally warned nega­ tively about Japan's national character. N otes________

1Ikuhiko Hata, Futsuin-shinchu to Gun no Nanshin Seisaku (Advance to French Indochina and the Southward Expansion Policy o f the Army), 1940-41, in Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi (Road to the Pacific War) vol. 6, Nanpo Shinshutsu (Southward Advance), ed. N ihon Kokusai Seiji G akkai (Japan A ssociation o f International Relations), Tokyo: Asahi Shim bun, 1987, p. 184 2 Shinji Kondo, Kindai Nippon Senso-shi (Modem Japanese war history) vol. 4, Tokyo: Dodai Econom ic C lub, 1999, pp. 205-206 3 G unji-shi Gakkai (M ilitary History Society), ed., Daihonei Rikugun-bu Sensoshido-han Kim itsu Senso N isshi (Secret W ar Log o f the W ar C oord in ation G rou p , the Arm y Department o f the Imperial Headquarters) vol. 1, Tokyo: Kinseisha, 1998, p. 86 4 M ichinori Saito, Showa-shi Hakkutsu—Kaisen Tsukoku wa Naze Okuretaka (Digging History o f Showa—W hy was the N otice o f Starting the War Delayed?), Tokyo: Shincho Shinsho, 2004, p. 121 5 Fusao Okum ura, Taiheiyo Senso Zenya no Nichibei Kankei (Japan-U.S. Relations on the Eve o f the Pacific War), Tokyo: Fuyoshobo, 1995, p. 255 6Jerom e B. Cohen, Japan's Economy in War and Reconstruction, M inneapolis: University o f M innesota Press, 1949, p. 266 7Cohen, op. cit., p . 104 8Ibid. 9 Fusao Okum ura, Daitowa Senso no Honshitsu (Essence o f the Greater East Asian War), Tokyo: Dodai Econom ic Club, 2000, pp. 180-181 10The Army General Staff, ed., Sugiyama Memo, Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1967, p. 545 11Cordell H ull, Memories o f Cordell H ull, vol. 2, New York: M acm illan, 1948, p. 1,015 12Yoshio Tatai, Ketsudanshita Otoko: Kido Koichi no Showa (Man W ho Made a Decision: Showa Era for Koichi Kido), Tokyo: Bungeishunju, 2000, p. 217 13Hachiro Arita, Baka-Hachi to Hito wa Iu, Gaikokan no Kaiso (They C all M e, Fool Hachi: M emoir o f a Diplom at), Tokyo: Kowado, 1959, p . 186 14 Shigeo Fukuda, Amerika no Tainichi Sansen (America's Entry into War against Japan), 1941, in Taiheiyo Senso e no M ichi (Road to the Pacific War) vol.7, Nchi-Bei Kaisen (Entry into Japan-U .S. War), ed. N ihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai Jap an Association o f International Relations), Tokyo: Asahi Shim bun, 1963, p. 418

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H ull, op. c it, p. 1,018 15Fukuda, op. ext., p. 427 16 Kichisaburo Nomura, Beikoku ni Tsukai-shite (Being Ambassador to America), Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1946, p. 153 17Yuzuru Sanematsu, ed., Gendaishi Shiryo (Modem History Material) 34, Tokyo: Misuzu Shobo, 1968, p. 23 18The Army General Staff, ed., op. cit., p. 312 19 Ju n Tsunoda, Nihon no Taibei Kaisen (Japan Goes to W ar w ith the U nited States), 1940-41, in Taiheiyo Senso e no M ichi (Road to the Pacific War) vol. 7 Nichi-Bei Kaisen (Entry in to Jap an -U .S. W ar), ed. N ih on Kokusai Seiji Gakkai (Japan Association o f International Relations), Tokyo: Asahi Shim bun, 1987, pp. 252-253; Ju n Tsunoda, Final Confrontation, trans. David A. Titus, in Final confrontation: Japan's negotiations with the United States, 1941: selected translations from Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi, vol. 7, ed. Jam es W . M orley, New York: Colum bia University Press, 1994, pp. 173-174 20Ibid. 21Osamu M ichigoe, ed., Konoe Fumimaro, Rokugatsu Shusen no Shinario (Fumimaro Konoe: Scenario for Ending the War in June), Tokyo: M ainichi Ones, 2006, pp. 207-210 22 The M ilitary History Department o f the National Institute for Defense Studies o f the Defense Agency (NIDS), ed., Daihonei Rikugun-bu Daitoa Senso Kaisen Keii (the Army Department o f the Imperial Headquarters—An Account o f the Com m encem ent o f the Great East Asian W ar), vol. 5 in Senshi Sosho (A Series o f War Histories), Tokyo: Asagumo Shim bunsha, 1974, pp. 105-107 23Tsunoda, Nihon no Taibei Kaisen, op. cit., pp. 291-292; Tsunoda, Final Confrontation, op. cit., pp. 173-174 24N IDS, ed., op. cit., p. 108 25N IDS, ed., op. cit., p. 134 26 Koichi Kido, Kido Koichi Nikki (Koichi Kido's Diary) vol. 2, Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1966, p. 918 27Tsunoda, Nihon no Taibei Kaisen, op. cit., p. 302; Tsunoda, Final Confrontation, op. c it, p. 241 28N IDS, ed., op. cit., p. 187 29N IDS, ed., op. c it, p. 192 30N IDS, ed., op. c it, p. 232 31Tsunoda, Nihon no Taibei Kaisen, op. cit., p. 314; Tsunoda, Final Confrontation, op. c it, p. 257 32N IDS, ed., op. cit., p.242 33The Army General Staff, ed., op. cit., p. 543 34 Kunihiro Haraguchi, Documents Concerning the Delay o f Japanese Embassy in Delivering the Note on the Eve o f Pearl Harbor, in Gaiko Shiryo Kanpo (Journal o f the Diplom atic Record O ffice), Tokyo: Diplom atic Record O ffice, Foreign M inistry, 1995, p. 47 35H ull, op. cit., p. 1,096 36Shigenori Togo, Jidai no Ichimen (An Aspect o f the Time), Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 2005, p. 278 37 Some postwar accounts have alleged that staff members o f the Japanese Embassy in W ashington held a farewell party for a colleague at a restaurant and got extremely dm nk on the n ight o f December 6,1941, w hile a telegram was being transmitted to the diplo­ m atic mission from Tokyo. This was seen as proof o f a lack o f diligence am ong the staff o f the Japanese Embassy. However, these allegations exaggerate the facts. It is true that some Embassy staffers dined out at a Chinese restaurant on that particular night, but none o f the telegraphic com m unication section's staffers were there. Furthermore, on

128 / J a p a n ' s w a r s in 1931-45 that day, First Secretary Katsuzo O kum ura, w ho was in charge o f typing the telegram , m et w ith Ambassador Kichisaburo Nom ura and Saburo Kurusu, Japan's special envoy to W ashington to assist Nom ura, late at n igh t and was not intoxicated. Refer, for exam ple, to N araichi Fujiyam a, Ichi-Seinen-Gaikokan no Taiheiyo Senso (Pacific W ar for a Young D iplom at), Tokyo: Shinchosha, pp. 80-86, w hich provides detailed accounts o f w hat happened in the Japanese Embassy in W ashington. Fujiyam a was a staff mem ber there at that tim e and later becam e Japan's Ambassador to Britain. 38 Nom ura-taishi to Bengoshi Kaigi Kiroku, (Record o f Ambassador N om ura's conference w ith lawyers o f Tokyo Tribunal defendants,) N o. 2 , available at N ational Archives o f Jap an , Tokyo, 1946, pp. 32-33; M akoto K ito, Taibeitsukoku Chien M ondai to Senso Sekinin (Delayed N otification to the U .S . and W ar Responsibility), in Choken Quarterly N o. 20, Tokyo: Yom iuri Shim bun, 2006, p p. 112-119 39H u ll, op. cit., p . 1,097 40Interview w ith K unihiko Saito, form er adm inistrative V ice M inister for Foreign Affairs, April 20, 2006. 41 According to historian Ronald H . Spector (Eagle against the Sun [New York: Vintage Books, 1985, p . 555]), Trum an had justified his decision o f using the atom ic bom bs, writ­ in g a few days after the bom bing o f N agasaki, "W hen you deal w ith a beast you have to treat him as a beast." Spector argues that the "sneak attack" on Pearl Harbor, accounts o f Japanese atrocities in prisoner-of-war camps and in occupied Asia, the kamikazes, and the bloody last-ditch resistance on Iwo Jim a and Okinaw a had confirm ed and hardened these beliefs o f Am ericans, that the Japanese were savage fanatics w ho cared n othin g about hum an life , and ultim ately led to Trum an's decision.

C h ap ter 8 The Pacific W ar / Part 1

Personal vanity, misjudgment make war situation worse, leading to Japan's defeat in Battle of Midway apan entered the Pacific W a r in December 1941 (the 16th year o f the Showa Era), plunging into a “sea of battles” fo r three years and nine months. W hat on earth was the purpose of this war? How did Japan end up headed fo r catastrophe after an initial series of victories? This section w ill mainly examine the Battle of Midway, a decisive battle which set the course fo r Japan’s defeat

J

Am biguity in war goals Adm iral Isoroku Yam am oto was the Com m ander-in-Chief o f the Com ­ bined Fleet. (See Footnote 2.) O n Decem ber 8, 1941, Air Strike Leader o f the aircraft carrier Akagi of the Com bined Fleet, M itsuo Fuchida, radioed the follow ing coded message w hen his plane started to fly over the U .S . Pacific fleet anchored at Pearl Harbor in Hawaii: “ To to to to .... (All un its, charge)." "To" stood for totsugeki, m eaning "charge." Attack bom ber regim ents that took o ff from six air­ craft carriers dealt devastating blow s to all eight battleships belonging to the U .S . Pacific Fleet. Footnote 2

Japan's Combined Fleet T h e c o r e o f t h e Im p e r ia l J a p a n e s e N a v y c o n s is t e d o f tw o o r m o r e fle e ts . T h e C o m b i n e d F le e t w a s fo r m e d b e fo r e t h e o p e n in g o f t h e fir s t S in o -Ja p a n e s e W a r in 1 8 9 4 . B a s e d o n t h e N a v y 's t r a d it io n o f c o m m a n d e r s t a k in g t h e le a d a n d s e ttin g th e e x a m p le fo r s u b o r d in a te s , t h e F le e t C o m m a n d e r w a s b a se d a b o a r d h is fla g ­ s h ip . T h e C o m m a n d e r - in - C h ie f w a s a s s is te d b y h is C h i e f o f S t a ff a n d a la r g e n u m ­ b e r o f s t a f f o ffic e r s . T h e C o m b i n e d F le e t C o m m a n d e r - in - C h ie f r e c e iv e d o rd e rs fo r a d m in is t r a t io n a n d fo r o p e r a tio n s in c lu d in g b a t t le c a m p a ig n s fr o m t h e C h i e f o f t h e N a v a l G e n e r a l S t a ff. B u t, o n m a n y o c c a s io n s , o n c e t h e C o m b i n e d F le e t c o m ­ m a n d e r w a s e n tr u s te d w it h h is a s s ig n m e n t as t h e s u p r e m e c o m m a n d e r o f n a v a l o p e r a tio n s , h e w o u ld in c r e a s in g ly c la s h w it h t h e N a v a l G e n e r a l S ta ff.

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M eanw hile, in operations southw est o f Jap an , the Tw enty-fifth Arm y com m anded b y T om oyuki Yam ashita landed on the M alay Peninsula w hile regim ents o f Zero fighters based in Taiw an took control o f the air over the Philippines w ithin a few days. O n Decem ber 10, two days after the opening o f the Pacific W ar, more than 80 Japanese attack planes succeeded in sinking the British battleship HM S Prince o f W ales and the battle cruiser H M S Repulse just prior to the Battle o f M alaya. In February 1942, Jap an conquered and occupied the British colo n y o f Singapore. This turn in events was soon follow ed in M arch by the evacuation o f U .S . General Douglas M acArthur, Com m ander o f U .S . Forces from the Philippines to Australia. Indeed, Jap an was able to take control o f the sea and air in the W estern Pacific all at once. After a series o f victories, how ever, Jap an started on the a path to its defeat. Here, we w ould like to exam ine Jap an 's purpose in this war—w hether it w ent to war for "self-preservation and self-defense" or w hether it aim ed to create the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. Indeed, the very am biguity o f Japan's war goals led to the failure o f its war m anagem ent. O n Novem ber 2, 1941, Prime M inister H ideki Tojo had an audience w ith Emperor Showa to inform h im o f the governm ent's decision to go to war. The Emperor asked T ojo, "W hat do you th in k is the just cause o f start­ ing this war?" Tojo replied, "W e are in the process o f studying th at, and I w ill report to you on that soon, Your M ajesty."1 At the Im perial Headquarters-Governm ent Liaison Conference, Where the Im perial p olicy decision was m ade to wage war earlier, no substantial discussion was conducted on the "just cause" o f going to war. W ith in the N avy, the dom inant op in ion was that the purpose o f the war should be "self-preservation and self-defense." The N avy insisted that Jap an had no choice but to go to war because it had no o il available after the U nited States im posed an oil export em bargo. Also w ithin the Arm y, the m ajority supported the n otion that Japan w ould go to war for "self-preservation and self-defense." But T ojo, w ho also held the W ar M inister portfolio, m ade it clear that the creation o f the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere was the "basis" o f Japan's policies every tim e he was briefed on the process o f p lan nin g n ational policies. Kenryo Sato, ch ie f o f the M ilitary Affairs Section o f the W ar M in istry, co n stan tly insisted th a t Jap an 's goal was to create the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere w hile ignoring the argum ents for "self-preservation and self-defense."2 "[The Arm y is not so enthusiastic about] a war w ith the U nited States as

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the Navy and the governm ent. Nevertheless, the Arm y is w illing to fight a 100-year war if that's what it takes to com plete the Second Sino-Japanese W ar." The Army obviously was preoccupied w ith the war w ith C h in a.3 For Tojo and others, the establishm ent of the Greater East Asia Co-pros­ perity Sphere through war w ith the United States and Britain was Japan's last resort to make China surrender. The Principles for Im plem entation o f the Im perial Policy, w hich was o fficia lly approved at a m eeting in the presence o f the Em peror on November 5, 1941, stated that "the Empire o f Japan decided to wage war against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands to make a break­ through in the current crisis, realize self-preservation and self-defense and build a new order in the Greater East A sia."4 However, the outline merely put in w riting the arguments o f both the Army and N avy. Later, the phrase "Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere" developed a life of its ow n, and the Army and Navy made separate plans for operations w ithout trying to coordinate their moves. The D aikairei 1-go, N avy O p eration O rder N um ber 1, issued on November 5 in preparation for attacking the southern areas (Southeast Asia), stated the purpose o f the war was for "self-preservation and selfdefense." It was written on the assumption that the war would be short. O n the other hand, the Dairikumei 564-go, Arm y Operation Order Number 564, w hich cited both "self-preservation and self-defense" and "building a new order in the Greater East Asia" as pretexts for going to war, envisioned a long, drawn-out war toward the goal o f the reorganization o f the Asian colonies held by Britain, the Netherlands and the United States.5 The Im perial Rescript on the W ar issued on December 8, underlined th at the war was started for self-preservation and self-d efen se. O n December 10, however, the Im perial Headquarters-Governm ent Liaison Conference decided to call the war the "Greater East Asia W ar." According to the Cabinet's Inform ation Departm ent, the war was so named to indi­ cate its purpose o f building a new order in the Greater East Asia. The central concept o f "Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere" was to geopolitically divide the world into four m ajor blocs: Greater East Asia, the Americas, the Soviet U nion and Europe, w ith Japan becom ing the leader of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. Under this scenario, the Kwantung Arm y was beefed up in strength to prepare for a possible war w ith the Soviet U nion even after Japan started the war against the United States; th e A rm y also m a in ta in e d th e stre n g th o f Ja p a n 's C h in a Expeditionary Arm y. The Army intended to let the Navy engage in battle w ith the United States in the Pacific. After the war ended, Tojo said, "The m otivation behind resorting to the use of force was the desire for self-preservation and self-defense." He also

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said, "O nce the war started, however, we saw to it that the policies aimed at realizing the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere could be im ple­ m ented."6Thus the creation o f the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere became Japan's national policy w ithout due political process. M eanw hile, the final goal for Japan's southward advancement—that was launched to attain self-sufficiency—was the Dutch East Indies (presently Indonesia). The N etherlands, how ever, was excluded from the enem y countries listed by the Imperial Rescript on the W ar. The Netherlands was regarded by Japan as a "quasi-enem y," and the idea was floated to negoti­ ate w ith the Dutch East Indies once the war started so that Japan would be able to bloodlessly invade and occupy the archipelago under control o f the D utch East India Com pany. It was n ot u n til January 1942 that Japan launched attacks on the Dutch East Indies. At the tim e the war started, the United States and Britain were alarmed by the possibility o f Japan's gaining access to o il and other resources in the Dutch East Indies by controlling Southeast Asia. They feared Japan was prioritizing gaining a foothold in Asia to figh t a long drawn-out war, and avoiding direct confrontation w ith the United States and Britain and carefully w atching their war against Germ any in Europe. But Japan defied their assum ptions and chose to directly confront the U nited States and Britain w ith an attack on Pearl Harbor.

Loss o f four aircraft carriers The Japanese m ilitary's stunning victories at the b egin n in g o f the Pacific W ar fascinated Japanese political and m ilitary leaders and won the praise o f the D iet, the m edia and the Japanese public. The goal o f the first stage o f the cam paign—to destroy the core o f the U .S. fleet and provide a springboard for southw ard operations—was achieved m ore than one m onth earlier than expected. In the next stage, however, the Naval General Staff and the Com bined Fleet Com m and each launched separate and uncoordinated cam paigns. The Naval General Staff set an eye on capturing Fiji and Samoa—strategic points between Hawaii and Australia—to forestall coordinated moves by the United States and Australia. The Com bined Fleet Com m and, however, insisted that Japan should attack M idw ay Island to lure U .S. aircraft carri­ ers so that Japan's N avy w ould be able to attack and destroy the U .S. fleet. In order to contain opposition by chief o f the Naval General Staff's Operations Bureau Shigeru Fukutome and other key leaders, Senior Staff Officer o f the Com bined Fleet Kameto Kuroshima and his staff accepted the additional dem and from the Naval General Staff to attack the Aleutian Islands. Under the leadership o f Kuroshim a, Y asuji W atanabe o f the

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Com bined Fleet staff was placed in charge o f studying and w orking out strategy. The plan was designed exclusively by the Com bined Fleet. O n April 28,194 2, a study session on the successful first-stage war oper­ ations was h eld aboard the Fleet Flagship Yam ato. Yoshitake M iw a, a Com bined Fleet staff officer, wrote in his diary: "It was fun to attend a study session on battles we are w inning, but it did not have m uch sub­ stance. Everyone behaved like a brave and wise m an ."7 How ever, it was obvious that the participants in the m eeting were all overconfident. D uring a war gam e that began on M ay 1, 1942, Com bined Fleet C h ie f o f Staff M atom e U gaki, w ho was overseeing the event, ordered a repetition o f the exercise at his ow n discretion w hen Jap an 's m ock cam paign to attack M idw ay Island stalled in the face o f U .S . aircraft carriers launching attacks on Japanese aircraft carriers. As a result, the num ber o f bom bs that h it the aircraft carrier Akagi was changed from n ine in the in itial gam e to three in the second gam e. The Akagi was sunk by the enem y during the first war gam e but sustained on ly slight dam age in the second gam e.8 C h ie f o f N aval G eneral Staff O sam i N agano ordered a tw o-pronged cam paign—attacks on M idw ay Island and the A leutian Islands—on M ay 5. The First Carrier Strike Force consisting o f the Akagi, Kaga and two other aircraft carriers carrying 285 airplanes and com m anded by V ice Adm iral C h u ich i N agum o, departed H ashirajim a Island, H iroshim a Prefecture, on M ay 27 and headed for M idw ay Island. Under the com m and o f Com bined Fleet Com m ander Yam am oto, other key fleets and the battleship Yamato departed on M ay 29 and were traveling about 500 kilom eters behind the Strike Force's Ships. (See Map 1 on pp. 24-25.) Surprisingly, all leaders o f this large naval armada believed that there w ould be "n o possibility o f enem y aircraft carriers appearing to counter the Fleet's advance."9C h ie f o f the Operations Section o f the N aval General Staff Sadatoshi Tom ioka w ent as far as saying before the ships departures, "W hat we fear m ost in this operation is that the enem y w ill avoid our fleet and w ill not launch attacks."10 M oreover, on ly one o f 11 subm arines, w hich had been ordered to position them selves for reconnaissance m issions to pre­ pare for the possible appearance o f U .S . aircraft carriers, actually carried out the order to do so. The U .S . fleet, w hich passed the area where the 11 subm arines were ordered to p osition them selves several days before the lone subm arine arrived, prepared to am bush Jap an 's carrier strike force. Jap an was totally unaware th at the U .S . m ilitary had succeeded in breaking the Im perial Japanese N avy's codes and had learned o f the Japanese operation.11 O n Ju n e 5, Japan's M idw ay operation turned in to a disaster. A t 1:30 a . m . , seven reconnaissance planes were supposed to take o ff together w ith attack planes heading for M idw ay Island, but on ly three were able to do so.

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The Tone Number 4 reconnaissance plane, w hich took o ff 30 m inutes late, reported the spotting o f "10 ships believed to be those o f the enem y" at 4:28 a . m . The U .S . m ilitary, m eanw hile, had detected Japan's Carrier Strike Force at 3 a . m . W hen the inform ation about enem y ships was conveyed, the Japanese Strike Force was in the process o f replacing anti-carrier torpedoes already m ounted on airplanes w ith air-to-surface bom bs in preparation for a sec­ ond wave o f attacks on M idw ay. N agum o changed his plan and decided to launch attacks on the enem y fleet thus necessitating the reloading o f the anti-ship torpedoes on airplanes aboard all four aircraft carriers. N a g u m o 's d e c is io n im m e d ia te ly m et o p p o s itio n fro m T am o n Yam aguchi, com m ander o f the Second A viation Squadron aboard the air­ craft carrier H iryu, w ho urged Nagum o to order attack planes to take o ff im m ediately. In a carrier versus carrier battle, it is o f utm ost im portance to dam age the flig h t deck o f the enem y carrier by getting a head start. But N agum o and his staff officer M inoru G enda ignored Yam aguchi's o p in io n , h avin g m iscalculated th at it w ould be som e tim e before the enem y could strike Japan's fleet. Nagum o and G enda w anted to give pri­ ority to the recovering o f the attack planes returning from the first wave of attacks on M idw ay Island. About one hour later, the carriers Akagi, Kaga and Soryu were attacked by U .S . dive-bom bers, caught fire and were thus dead in the w ater.12 In retrospect, Japan did have chances to w in the battle but did n ot take advantage o f them . O n the eve o f the Battle o f M idw ay, the flagship Yamato intercepted signals believed to have been transm itted from an enem y aircraft carrier o ff M idw ay Island. A lthough the Com bined Fleet had banned the use o f radio com m unications to ensure the secrecy o f its operations, Yam am oto proposed that the Carrier Strike Force be inform ed. His subordinate, Kuroshim a, and another staff officer Akira Sasaki dis­ missed the idea and Yam am oto did not press the p o in t.13 In his logbook, Ugaki regretted in retrospect: "There are failings on the part o f this com ­ m and. I am really sorry."14 The H iryu, the on ly aircraft carrier that survived the first U .S . attack, fought desperately but was also lost som etim e after 2 p . m . that day after being attacked b y other enem y planes. The battle ended in h a lf a day; Jap an was able to sink on ly one U .S . aircraft carrier but lost all four o f its ow n. Chester W . N im itz, Com m ander o f the U .S . P acific Fleet, analyzed Japan's defeat in the Battle o f M idw ay as follow s: "First o f a ll, they failed to pursue a single objective. The two carriers sent to the Aleutians m ight w ell have supplied the decisive m argin in the Central P acific. Had the M idw ay operation succeeded, the Japanese could have taken the Aleutians

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at their leisure."15 W hile Japan's Com bined Fleet had six aircraft carriers, the U nited States at the tim e had on ly three. Jap an made the m istake o f dividing its carriers in to tw o groups, sending four to attack M idw ay Island and two to the A leutian Islands. In add ition , Jap an 's naval leadership had the precon­ ceived idea that enem y aircraft carriers w ould never engage the Japanese fleet d u rin g its M idw ay cam p aign . Sem i-o fficial Japanese war history accounts (Senshi Sosho) concluded as follow s: "The fact [the Navy] did not have any plans to respond to contingencies such as the em ergence o f enem y aircraft carriers show ed th at it arrogantly th o u g h t little o f its enem y."16

Fixation on fleet theory How did N avy leaders predict battles between Jap an and the U nited States w ould turn out? A nd, how did they intend to figh t the war? Before the advent o f naval aircraft, m ost navies in the w orld believed in a big fleet battle theory, w hich held that the w inner o f a battle w ould be decided by a figh t between battleships m ounted w ith large-caliber guns. Jap an was no exception, and, before the start o f the Pacific W ar, Japan's N avy developed a scenario o f intercepting and engaging a U .S . fleet sailing from the U .S. m ainland around M ariana Islands in the Central P acific. In the Pearl Harbor attack, how ever, Jap an succeeded in destroying m ost o f the U .S . Pacific Fleet's battleships w ith 350 naval aircraft launched from Japanese carriers. A lso, in run-up to the Battle o f M alaya that took place im m ediately after the Pearl Harbor attack, land-based naval aircraft sank two state-of-the-art British battleships. In b oth cases, m ost damage was achieved b y attack planes rather than by ships' guns. In fact, during these two battles Jap an put in to practice the air superiority theory, w hich held th at naval aviation was the prim ary instrum ent for delivering com bat pow er to destroy b attlesh ip s w h ich were the center o f n aval pow er. C om m ander-in-Chief o f the Com bined Fleet Yam am oto was one o f those w ho consistently supported the air superiority theory. In the Pearl Harbor and M alaya operations, battleship units—the m ain force o f the b ig fleet battle theory—did not have any chance to jo in in the offensive. The Japanese tactic used in b oth battles was a breakthrough Japanese achievem ent in global naval strategy. D esp ite these su ccessfu l o p e ra tio n s, how ever, n e ith e r th e N aval General Staff nor the C om bined Fleet replaced the b ig fleet battle theory w ith the air superiority theory. The Com bined Fleet continued to m ain­ tain the same modus operandi w ith an em phasis on battleships. The design o f the Shinano, the third Yam ato-class b attlesh ip , was n o t changed to

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m ake it an aircraft carrier. There were no steps taken to sw iftly increase the production o f aircraft carriers and airplanes. In the Battle o f M idw ay, the form ation o f the Com bined Fleet was as follow s: The First Carrier Strike Force—consisting o f the Akagi and three other aircraft carriers and led by C om m an d er-in -C h ief N agum o—was positioned at the vanguard, follow ed 500 kilom eters to the rear by the core naval force. The m ain assault force consisted o f the flagship Yamato, car­ rying Com m an der-in -C hief o f the C om bined Fleet Yam am oto, and six other battleships, three cruisers and 21 destroyers. The plan was to give fu ll support to the strike force w ith the m ain u n it in the rear. Postwar recollections by Shigeru Fukutom e, ch ie f o f the Operations Bureau o f the N aval General Staff, reflected the m ind-set o f the N avy at that tim e: "W e believed the battleships were still the prim ary force, w ith aircraft carrier units being effective naval power to aid the m ain force. W e were w aiting for a chance to capture M idw ay Island so that the Com bined Fleet's core force w ould be able to shorten the distance and intercept the enem y's m ain fo rce."17 The operation plan worked out by the Com bined Fleet for the war w ith Britain, the N etherlands and the U nited States, contained gallan t expres­ sions, such as "sm ash the U .S . fleet" and "intercept and an nihilate the enem y forces." The plan, w hich was approved b y the N avy on Novem ber 5, 1941, reflected the b ig fleet battle theory Jap an had adopted since the Japanese fleet destroyed battleships from Russia's Baltic Sea Fleet in the M ay 1905 Battle o f the Sea o f Jap an , the decisive encounter o f the RussoJapanese W ar. In the Pearl Harbor attack and the Battle o f M alaya, airplanes became the key players in naval operations, replacing battleships. A lthou gh the N avy dem onstrated this p oin t to observers in Jap an and abroad, it was n ot able to shed the traditional big fleet battle theory, partly because its lead­ ership was com prised o f gunnery or torpedo experts. There were on ly a sm all num ber o f aviation experts am ong Japanese naval leaders. Rear Adm iral Takijiro O n ish i, C h ie f o f Staff o f the Eleventh Air Fleet, visited M atom e Ugaki, C h ie f o f Staff o f the Com bined Fleet, in spring 1942 and asserted that "the core o f arm am ent was in aviation ." U gaki, whose expertise was in battleship gunnery and w ho was a follow er o f the b ig fleet battle theory, insisted, how ever, "It is d ifficu lt to use air force in the vast ocean. Aircraft carriers alone can on ly fu lfill the task o f m oving air power forw ard."18 W ith this belief, U gaki prepared the Com bined Fleet for the Battle o f M idw ay. D u rin g the Battle o f M idw ay, the m ain units—positioned about 10 hours away at fu ll speed from the strike force—were n ot able to shorten the distance to the enem y fleet in the face o f a speedy air attack launched

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b y the U .S . Fleet on the Japanese carrier strike force. Japan's m ain force did n o t have the chance to fire a single shot and sat helpless in preventing four aircraft carriers from being destroyed. If the Japanese aircraft carriers had been escorted by battleships and cruisers, like U .S . aircraft carriers were, the Japanese fleet m ight have responded to U .S. air attacks in a totally different way.

Neglected accountability Asked in Septem ber 1940 by Prime M inister Fum im aro Konoe about projections for a Jap an -U .S. war, Adm iral Yam am oto replied as follow s: "If I am ordered to do it w ith fu ll effort, I am sure I w ill be able to run w ild for the in itial six m onths or one year. But I am not confident at all if I can do that for two or three years."19 By saying so, Yam am oto urged Konoe to avert a war w ith the U nited States. Furtherm ore, Yam am oto w rote a letter to N avy M in ister Shigetaro Shim ada after th e H aw aii op eration was approved. The letter, dated O ctober 24, 1941, stated: "I do n 't have any clues as to how the operation w ill turn out if we em ploy on ly an ordinary strategy. In short, we w ill be forced to sim ultaneously figh t the Battle o f Okehazam a, the H iyodorigoe attack and the Battles o f Kaw anakajim a."20 In April 1942, after the successful Pearl Harbor attack, the N aval General S ta ff v e h e m e n tly op p o sed th e M id w ay o p e ra tio n p la n n e d b y th e Com bined Fleet. But after heated debates, Yasuji W atanabe, a Com bined Fleet staff officer said, "Yam am oto intends to quit his post if this plan is not accepted."21 It was W atanabe's words, n ot strategic debates, that prodded the N avy to go ahead w ith the M idw ay operation. C h ie f o f the Operations Bureau o f the N aval General Staff Shigeru Fukutom e said, " If the Com m ander-inC h ie f w ent as far as saying so, we w ill leave the m atter to h im ." His subor­ dinate Seiichi Ito also agreed. Yam am oto, w ho knew the national strength o f the U nited States, had only supported the idea o f a short, decisive war. He worked out plans for the Pearl Harbor attack and the M idw ay operation so that Japan could in flict trem endous dam age on the enem y fleet, thereby low ering the figh tin g morale o f Am ericans and bringing them to the negotiation table for peace. But Yam am oto did not make sufficient efforts to ensure that the leaders of the N aval General Staff and the Com bined Fleet understood his intentions. A cco rd in g to T o sh io Y o sh id a , a form er sta ff o ffice r o f th e Im perial Headquarters, Yam am oto "did not think they w ould understand his true intentions and wanted to avoid trouble caused by m isunderstandings."22 Assaults on M idw ay Island by the Japanese N avy were m eant to lure the

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enem y's strike forces. But in the actual execution o f the operation, the seizure o f the island becam e the forem ost goal. The over-confidence and over-optim ism o f Yam am oto and his staff exacerbated the inconsistencies in the goals o f the operation, w hich resulted in a devastating defeat.

Concealment, no finger-pointing The Battle o f M idw ay ended w ith trem endous sacrifices on Japan's side. But the N avy did not clarify w ho should be held responsible and did not learn any lessons from the defeat. After receiving the report on the loss o f four aircraft carriers and the cancellation o f the operation, the N aval General Staff decided n ot to let the real situation be know n to the public in case doing so m ight hurt the m orale o f the N avy and public. The Ju n e 11,1942, m orning edition o f the Yomiuri Shim bun reported on the battle based on briefings from the N avy Departm ent o f the Im perial Headquarters. According to the report, there was "dram atic, intensive figh tin g in the Eastern P acific." T otally different from w hat actually happened, the report said that "pow erful assaults on M idw ay Island resulted in the sinking o f two enem y aircraft carriers." A t the same tim e, the N aval General Staff im posed gag orders on those w ho participated in the M idw ay operation and restricted access to , and the distribution of, related reports so that the truth w ould not leak ou t.23 R ecollecting the decision, Fukutom e said, "W e were forced to make such an announcem ent because the dam age we sustained was so grave. But in retrospect, it was n o t appropriate because the way we tried to hide the truth was too extrem e."24 Those false announcem ents n ot on ly invited m isunderstanding about the war situation but also created roadblocks to people understanding the "N avy's desperate dem and to increase the production o f airplanes."25The biggest problem lay w ith the N avy's failure to clarify w hether the com ­ m and o f the Com bined Fleet should be held responsible. N o punishm ent was m eted ou t to N agu m o, h is Strike Force C h ie f o f S ta ff Ryunosuke Kusaka, or anyone else. O n Ju n e 10, 1942, Yam am oto told staff officers w ho gathered on the bridge o f the flagship Yamato: "D o n 't blam e N agum o or Kusaka. I bear the responsibility for the defeat.” Kusaka, w ho cam e to the flagship Yamato to report, begged Yam am oto for another chance saying, "Even though I m ade th at huge blunder, I returned on ly because I am driven by a soul determ ined to retaliate. Please give m e another chance to go to the front lin e ."26 Kuroshim a, Senior Staff O fficer o f the Com bined Fleet, later com m ented on w hy nobody was held responsible for the M idw ay defeat. "If we pursue

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a probe o f the m atter, we w ill fin d it fu ll o f blunders. Everybody involved has sufficiently reflected on his actions and adm itted that he was to blam e. W e thought it was unnecessary to speak ill o f the dead ."27 T eiji Nakam ura, w ho was in charge o f torpedo operations aboard the destroyer Yudachi and later becam e the postwar M aritim e Self-D efense Force C h ie f o f Staff, said the N avy should have studied lessons from the battle, particularly as it lost. "The N avy swept the problem under the rug because the blam e w ould eventually be placed on Yam am oto and staff officers o f the Com bined Fleet," Nakam ura said. This represents a sharp contrast to the actions taken by the U .S . N avy. After the Pearl Harbor attack, the U .S . N avy set up an inquiry com m ission, w hich found Adm iral H usband E. Kim m el, Com m ander o f the U .S . Pacific Fleet, to be responsible fo r the disastrous dam age sustained at Pearl Harbor. He was dism issed from his post. The Japanese N avy, after having lost four aircraft carriers and 285 shipborne airplanes, m eanw hile, was desperate trying to build aircraft carriers and airplanes. O n Ju n e 30, the N aval General Staff com piled post-defeat plans p uttin g priority on beefing up naval aviation power. A ccording to the p lan , the N avy w ould: • Im m ediately launch an epoch-m aking build-up o f its air force. • Im m ediately and drastically increase the num ber o f aircraft carriers. • Convert the Shinano, the third Yamato-class battleship, in to an aircraft carrier.28 However, as it neglected to study the factors behind the M idw ay debacle, the N avy was never able to overcom e the weakness o f its aircraft carriers w hich becam e evident in the Battle o f M idw ay. The U .S . N avy, on the other hand, form ed a fleet centered around air­ craft carriers, havin g learned lessons from the Pearl Harbor attack and the Battle o f M alaya. In the Battle o f M idw ay, the U .S . N avy m ade sure that air­ craft carriers were protected by m any cruisers and destroyers w hich circled and screened them . Furtherm ore, the U .S . N avy added six Essex-class aircraft carriers and n ine sm all aircraft carriers converted from cruisers—vessels that were con­ structed after the Pearl Harbor attack—to the Pacific Fleet in the summer o f 1943, one year after the Battle o f M idw ay.29 In 1943, the U .S . N avy began replacing older ship-borne planes w ith the state-of-the-art Grumman F6Fs and devised a defense system to protect air­ craft carriers. O n the other hand, m ost o f the aircraft carriers b u ilt by the Japanese

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N avy after the Battle o f M idw ay were sm all ones converted from m erchant ships. Three fu ll-scale aircraft carriers, in clu d in g the Unryu, were b u ilt before the war ended, but none o f them had an opportunity to engage in battle. Also in the Battle o f M idw ay, the Japanese N avy lost its m ost valuable asset—elite pilots w ho had "th e skills to h it alm ost every target." The instant loss o f superb hum an resources was indeed a decisive factor in this war. Sadatoshi Tom ioka, ch ie f o f the O perations Section o f the N aval General Staff, deeply regretted w hat happened. "It was a shattering defeat. W hat was m ore im portant than anything else was crew members—and their skills."30 The Com bined Fleet no longer had the ab ility to w in back control over the air or the sea. It ceased to be a form idable enem y for the greatly enhanced U .S . N avy and lost every tim e it fou ght. Inside the N avy, there had been grow ing calls for "tokko" (special attack) suicide tactics in the face o f the huge battle power o f the U .S . N avy. In Ju n e 1943, the Emperor's senior N aval Aide C aptain Eiichiro Jo , acting independently of his prim ary duty, proposed to C h ie f o f the General Affairs Section o f the N aval Aeronautics Departm ent Takijiro O n ish i that a special air u n it be created for attacking enem y targets w ith crashing aircraft.31 O n ish i assumed the post o f Com m ander o f the First Air Fleet in October 1944, ahead o f the Battle o f Leyte G u lf. D uring th at battle O n ish i ordered attacks b y airplanes crashing them selves in to enem y targets, a practice w hich he had originally described as a "heresy" o f com m and.32 Notes____________________________________________________________________________ _ _ _ _ _ 1 T h e M ilita r y H isto ry D ep a rtm e n t o f th e N a tio n a l In stitu te for D efen se Stu dies o f th e D e fe n se A g e n c y (N ID S ), e d ., Daihonei Rikugun-bu Daitoa Senso Kaisen Keii (The A rm y D e p a rtm e n t o f th e Im p erial H eadquarters— A n A c c o u n t o f th e C o m m e n c e m e n t o f th e G reater East A sia W ar) vol. 5, in Senshi Sosho (A Series o f W a r H istories),T okyo: A sag u m o S h im b u n s h a , 1974, p . 261 2 Ib id ., p p . 5 6 9 -5 7 0 3 G u n ji-s h i G a k k a i (M ilita ry H isto ry So ciety ), e d ., Daihonei Rikugun-bu Sensoshido-han Kimitsu Senso Nisshi (Se cret W a r L o g o f t h e W a r C o o r d in a t in g G r o u p , th e A r m y D ep a rtm e n t o f th e Im p erial H eadquarters) vol. 1, T o ky o : K in seish a, 1998, p . 170 4 T aku sh iro H a tto ri, Daitoa Senso Zenshi (The W h o le H isto ry o f th e G reater East A sia W ar), T o k y o : H a ra S h o b o , 1965, p . 163 5 F u sa o O k u m u r a , e d ., Daitoa Senso (G r e a te r E ast A s ia W a r ), T o k y o : D a id o K e iz a i K o n w a k ai, 1995, p . 309 6 S u m io H a ta n o , Taiheiyo Senso to Ajia Gaiko (Japan's A sia P o lic y D u r in g th e P a c ific W ar), T o ky o : U n iv e rsity o f T o k y o Press, 1996, p . 9 7 N I D S , e d ., Midway Kaisen ( B a ttle o f M id w a y ) in Senshi Sosho (A S e rie s o f W a r H isto ries),T o kyo : A sag u m o S h im b u n s h a , 1971, p . 87 8 Ib id ., p . 90 9 Ib id ., p . 251 10M its u o F u ch id a a n d M asatake O k u m iy a , Midway, T o k y o : A sa h i So n o ram a , 1992, p . 443

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11N IDS, ed., Midway Kaisen, op. a t , pp. 588-93 12Ibid., pp. 327-329 13Ibid., p. 249 14M atom e Ugaki, Sensoroku (War Records), Tokyo: N ippon Shuppan Kyodo, 1952, p. 112 15Chester W . N im itz, E.B. Potter, ed., Great Sea War, New York: Bramhall House, 1960, p. 224 16N IDS, ed., Midway Kaisen, op. cit., pp. 252-324 Fuchida and Okum iya, op. d t., p . 457 17Ibid., p. 586 18Ugaki, op. c it, p. 69 19Hiroyuki Agawa, Yamamoto Isoroku (jo) (Isoroku Yamamoto vol. 1), Tokyo: Shinchosha, 1973, p. 372 20 H iroyu ki A gaw a, Yam am oto Isoroku (ge) (Isoroku Y am am oto v o l. 2 ), T okyo: Shinchosha, 1987, p. 53 The Battle o f Okehazama (1560) occurred in the late Sengoku (Warring States) Period (1467-1573). In the battle, Nobunaga Oda, a powerful warlord, scored a dedsive victory after attacking the resting enemy troops who were far larger in number. A tactic called "Hiyodorigoe" was adopted in 1184, or the late Heian Period (794-1192), by Yoshitsune M inam oto o f the Genji clan whose troops were greatly outnumbered by the troops led by the H ake clan. In the tactic, Yoshitsune's troops launched a surprise attack by descend­ ing a steep slope in the Hiyodori pass. The Battles of Kawanakajima were fought between the brave troops of Shingen Takeda o f Kai (now Yamanashi Prefecture) and those of Kenshin Uesugi o f Echigo (now N iigata Prefecture) in Shinano (now Nagano Prefecture). The best known and most severe battle was fought in 1561. 21N IDS, ed., Midway Kaisen, op. cit., pp. 44-45 22 Toshio Yoshida, Yonin no Rengo Kantai Chokan (Four Com m anders-in-Chief o f the Com bined Fleet), Tokyo: Bungeishunju, p. 76 23N IDS, ed., Midway Kaisen, op. cit., pp. 602-604 24N IDS, ed., Daihonei Kaigun-bu and Rengo Kantai (the Navy Department o f the Imperial H eadquarters and th e C om b in ed Fleet) vo l. 2 in Senshi Sosho (A Series o f W ar Histories),Tokyo: Asagumo Shim bunsha, 1975, p. 450 25 N IDS, ed., Kaigun Koku Gaishi (General History o f Naval Aviation) in Senshi Sosho (A Series o f W ar Histories),Tokyo: Asagumo Shim bunsha, 1975, p. 282 26Hiroshi Kamei, Midway Senki (War Records o f Midway), Tokyo: Kojinsha, 1995, p. 635 27 Toshio Yoshida, Nihonteikoku Kaigun wa Naze Yaburetaka (W hy was the Im perial Japanese Navy defeated?), Tokyo: Bungeishunju, 1995, p. 235 28N IDS, ed., Midway Kaisen, op. cit., p. 633 29N IDS, ed., Daihonei Kaigun-bu and Rengo Kantai vol. 2 , op. cit., pp. 458-459 Ryoichi Tobe et a l., eds., Shippai no Honshitsu (Nature o f the Failure), Tokyo: Chuko Bunko, 1991, p. 294 30N IDS, ed., Midway Kaisen, op. cit., p. 462 31 N IDS, ed., Kaigun gun-senbi (M ilitary Preparations o f the Imperial Japanese Navy) vol. 2 , in Senshi Sosho (A Series o f W ar Histories), Tokyo: Asagumo Shim bunsha, 1975, p. 125 32Tadao M orim oto, Tokko (Special Attacks), Tokyo: Kojinsha NF Bunko, 2005, p. 18

Chapter 9 The Pacific War / Part 2

Rivalry grows between Army and Navy; desperate soldiers choose 'honorable death' he United States set its sights on Guadalcanal Island fo r its first wave of a counteroffensive against Japan after its victory at sea in the Battle of Midway. The Japanese forces would also lose on the ground in this battle. Japanese troops on remote islands in the Pacific Ocean became isolated as U.S. forces gained control over the air and sea. The Japanese gradually adopted “gyokusai” — death-for-honor attacks— one unit after another. W hy did the tragedy of gyokusai happen? W hat was Prime Minister Hideki Tojo thinking?

Starvation and fever in jungle The Im perial Japanese N avy landed on G uadalcanal Island, on the eastern tip of the Solom on Islands, northeast o f the Australian con ti­ n en t, in Ju ly 1942 (the 17th year o f the Showa Era). The N avy started b uilding an airfield there, w ith a 2,600-m an construction party and a 240-man garrison. The N avy's aim in taking this jungle-covered small island was to use it as a front lin e base to attack the Australian base at Port M oresby in eastern New G uinea to cut o ff the supply o f troops and goods from the U nited States to Australia. Correspondingly, the United States had a plan to attack the Imperial Navy's largest airbase o f Rabaul on New Britain Island and decided to take Guadalcanal as a starting point. The U .S. forces had been updated on the whereabouts of the Japanese troops through tips from inform ants on the island. The U .S. forces seized the island, including the airfield, im mediately in one sweep on August 7, by m obilizing the First M arine Division—an amphibious unit specially trained for landing operations—w ith well over 10,000 m en. The Japanese air unit based in Rabaul struck back in response to the sur­ prise landing o f U .S. troops but was unable to repel them from the island because Japan's Zero fighters could stay over the island for only 15 m inutes before they began to run out o f fuel for the 1,000-kilometer fligh t back to the Rabaul. That's how the six-m onth Battle o f Guadalcanal started. 143

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Im perial Arm y leaders, at the tim e, had never heard o f Guadalcanal, and didn't know that the Navy had been constructing an airfield there until they were notified by the Navy that U .S. forces had landed on the island. The Im perial Headquarters had predicted that any counteroffen­ sive from U .S. forces would not start before the m iddle o f 1943 and never im agined the United States would start a massive countercharge so early. The Army accepted the Navy's request to dispatch troops, w ithout giv­ ing it thorough consideration. The decision was partly based on mercy— the Army should not stand by and watch Navy troops go down—and also on a judgm ent that the number of U .S. troops on the island was only as great as a "reconnaissance landing" force.1 Hajim e Sugiyam a, C h ief o f the Army General Staff, ordered Colonel Kiyonao Ichiki to recapture Guadalcanal w ith his elite unit o f only 2,400 m en, m ostly from the Twenty-eighth Infantry Regim ent. O n August 18, 1942, a 900-man advance team o f the Ichiki unit landed on Guadalcanal Island armed w ith rifles and hand grenades, but was, in effect, annihilated, overwhelm ed by U .S . forces armed w ith autom atic rifles, m achine guns and tanks. About the same tim e, at the Arm y General Staff, officers were having their photograph taken in the C h ief o f the Army General Staff's room for a painting titled "The Eve o f the Greater East Asia W ar," to be painted later. There was no sense o f tension there.2 After the defeat of the Ichiki u n it, a un it led by M ajor General Kiyotake Kawaguchi landed on the island and carried out raids to recapture the air­ field on the nights o f Septem ber 12 and 13, but was repelled by U .S. troops. A fierce battle took place on Mukade H ill (Edson's Ridge) w hich overlooked the airfield, and the h ill was later called "Bloody Ridge." The Japanese troops were also losing the inform ation battle. The U .S. troops had microphones hidden everywhere in the jungle to pick up the voices of Japanese soldiers and had pretty good leads on the enemy's movements.3 The Arm y's piecemeal m obilization o f troops led to a disastrous out­ com e. O n October 24, the Second D ivision led by Lieutenant General Masao Maruyama carried out an all-out attack on the island but was again unsuccessful. That was the m om ent the m yth that the Im perial Army could never be defeated collapsed. M eanw hile, the Navy repeatedly engaged in fierce battles w ith the Allied fleet o f the U .S. and Australian navies in the Solom on Sea. The Eighth Fleet, led by Vice Adm iral G unichi Mikawa, struck back im m ediately after U .S. troops landed on Guadalcanal Island and sank four battle cruisers during a night raid in the First Battle o f the Solom on Sea, also known as the Battle of Savo Island. The Eighth Fleet, however, returned w ithout attacking the A llied transport ships anchored in a port nearby at the tim e. Had it

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destroyed the convoy then , it is perceived, "The nature o f desperate strug­ gles that follow ed the battle w ould have been totally different."4 From then on , U .S . forces successfully confronted the Im perial N avy— w hich was skilled in n igh t raids—by u tilizin g radar in sea battles for the first tim e.5 The Japanese and U .S . forces in flicted great dam age on each other's air­ craft carriers, battleships and destroyers in subsequent battles. This sea zone w ould later be called "Iron Bottom Sound." U sing the airfield on G uadalcanal, the U .S . forces took control o f the air and sank m any o f the Japanese supply ships en route to G uadalcanal in successful air raids. The Japanese could no longer deliver m unitions and food to the island after m id-Novem ber. Japanese soldiers had to com bat hunger in the jun gle, in addition to diseases such as m alaria.6 The leadership in the Im perial Headquarters was not fu lly aware o f the m isery taking place on the front lin e . The focus o f their attention was on measures to procure ships to send troop reinforcem ents and food to the island. The Arm y General Staff requested the W ar M inistry allow an increase in the m obilization o f m erchant ships, but the m inistry turned dow n the request, say in g, "A n increase in ships fo r op eration s w ould m ean a decrease in ships for private use." In other words, the m inistry officials were afraid that they w ould fa ll short o f ships to bring natural resources back to Jap an from occupied territories in the south. The Im perial Headquarters fin a lly decided to w ithdraw troops from G uadalcanal at the end o f 1942. The Arm y com pleted its retreat from the islan d in February 1943, supported by the N avy. The Im perial H ead­ quarters announced that troops operating on Guadalcanal Island "left the island in early February after accom plishing their goal and shifted their position to another." It covered up the truth o f retreat by callin g it a shift in position, w ithout accom plishing the goal o f recapturing the island. The Sum m ary Report on the Pacific W ar, com piled by the U nited States Strategic Bom bing Survey, said, "The Japanese com m itted in piecem eal fashion and lost all o f their fu lly trained N avy air units, in clu d in g those rescued at M idw ay, an d a p o rtio n o f th eir best A rm y air u n its. The Japanese never fu lly recovered from this disaster, the effects o f w hich influenced all subsequent cam paigns."7 A ccording to Japanese war docum ents (Senshi Sosho), Jap an lost 2,362 airm en in the Battle o f G uadalcanal.8 A bout 20,000 Japanese soldiers, am ong th e 30,000 plus m en w ho landed on the islan d , died. The cause o f death for about 15,000 m en— 70 percent o f the dead—is believed to have been starvation or disease, such as m alaria.

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Honorable death The expression, “gyokusai," w hich literally m eans "jew el sm ashing" but cam e to m ean "dying an honorable death," was used for the first tim e in the case o f Japanese troops on the island o f A ttu at the western tip o f the A leutian Islands in the U .S . territory. The clim ate there was severely cold. The m ountains were covered by ice and snow even during the sum m er. Japanese forces occupied the island in Ju n e 1942, as part o f its M idw ay operation, and embarked on the construction o f an airfield there. The aim o f the occupation was to m onitor U .S . forces w hich m ight attack from the north and to use the island as a base for Japan's defense. The U .S . forces started a lan d in g operation on M ay 12, 1943, to recapture the island, m obilizin g 11,000 in fan try. The Japanese troops w ho faced them were on ly 2,600 in num ber. Jap an received a report on the U .S . landing operation, but was unable to send reinforcem ents because sea transportation had becom e extrem ely d ifficu lt b y then due to bom bardm ents from U .S . ships and attacks by U .S. planes. A lso, fuel stocks were running out, and Jap an gave up on rescuing its troops. O n M ay 23, K iichiro H igu ch i, Com m ander o f the N orthern Arm y, sent a telegram to the troops on the island: "W e hope you have the determ ina­ tio n to utilize one hundred measures to destroy the enem y troops and shatter in to pieces honorably to becom e a good role m odel for show ing the spirit o f Im perial w arriors." C olon el Yasuyo Yam azaki, w ho led the g a rriso n w h ic h w as a p p a re n tly a b a n d o n e d b y th e c o m m a n d e r, telegraphed in response, "W e are determ ined n ot to subject ourselves to the h u m iliation o f captivity by rem aining alive." A nother telegram read, "As for the sick and w ounded in the field hos­ p ital, those w ith m inor w ounds have m anaged [killed] them selves on the spot, and those w ith heavy w ounds were dealt w ith by the surgeon [before the troops m ade a fin al charge on the enem y]." Japanese soldiers dashed straight at the enem y, scream ing, and chose to k ill them selves w ith their own hand grenades once they accepted the fact that resistance was useless. Emperor Showa ordered Sugiyam a, C h ie f o f the Arm y General Staff, to send a telegram message to the Yam azaki u n it on the islan d . "Send a telegram that reads, 'Y ou have persevered w ell u n til the end. I am proud of you /" the Emperor said.9 Sugiyam a told the Emperor th at the troops' com m unication tools had already been destroyed, b u t the Emperor said, "Send the telegram anyw ay, even if it w on't reach an yon e." W hy did the Japanese soldiers m ake suicidal runs at the enem y cam p instead o f becom ing prisoners o f war? O n January 8, 1941, W ar M inister

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H ideki T ojo introduced th e “Senjinkun" (Im perial Japanese Arm y Field Service Code), w hich taught the ethics o f a soldier and lessons for the battlefield. O ne o f the provisions o f the code was titled , "Value hon or." "Those w ho know a sense o f dishonor are strong. Care for the prestige of people back hom e and your fam ily at all tim es and live up to their expec­ tations by m aking strenuous efforts. Never subject yourself to the h u m ili­ ation o f capture by rem aining alive and leaving the disgrace o f a sin on your nam e after death," the code read, thereby prohibiting soldiers from becom ing prisoners o f war. The M ay 31,1943, issue o f the Yom iuri-Hochi newspaper, w hich report­ ed on the devastation o n A ttu Islan d , carried a com m ent b y Suezum i N akashiba, an Arm y reserve M ajor General and the head o f Soryokusen Gakkai (academ ic society o f all-out war), as a behind-the-scenes contribu­ tor to the drafting o f the Senjinkun code.10 "A real-life Senjinkun is shown here viv id ly . W e should have this Senjinkun live in our hearts and never let the 2,000 plus several hundred souls o f the fallen heroes o f A ttu Island die in v a in ," he said. M asayasu Hosaka, a h istorian, points out that the U nited States told sol­ diers during their training th at becom ing a prisoner o f war is acceptable because it w ould m ake the enem y expend extra labor. The exact opposite co n d u ct o f su ch a n o tio n w as gyokusai— d y in g an h on orab le d eath . A ccording to Hosaka, "U nder the self-in toxicatin g atm osphere and the social clim ate that praised an esthetic value o f a sort, such m ilitary con ­ duct o f extrem e irrationality cam e to be ju stified ."11 From then onw ard, the tide o f war turned further against Jap an , and troops were decim ated one after another on Saipan, T in ian , G uam and Iwo Jim a in the Central Pacific. The U .S . forces landed on Saipan Island, a m andated territory o f Jap an , on Ju n e 15, 1944. The Im perial Headquarters decided to abandon the island after Japanese troops were driven to the northern corner o f the island. O n Ju ly 6, N aval V ice Adm iral C h u ich i N agum o, the Com m anderin -C h ie f o f the Central Pacific Area Fleet, and Arm y Lieutenant General Yoshitsugu Saito, Com m ander o f the Forty-third D ivision , killed them ­ selves. The rem aining troops launched a fin al all-out offensive the next day and were w iped o u t.12 Soldiers were not the on ly ones w ho perished. M any Japanese residents w ho fled north for safety as the front lin e m oved northw ard, threw them ­ selves o ff a c liff at Puntan Sabaneta—now also know n as Banzai C liff—at the northern tip o f the islan d . O ne estim ate o f the num ber o f deaths am ong 20,000 Japanese residents was between 8,000 and 10,000. U lrich Straus, a form er U .S . C on su l G eneral in N aha w ho also worked for the G eneral Headquarters o f the A llied Powers in Tokyo after the war,

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wrote, "The Senjinkun dem anded unlim ited service to the state and a rom anticized and m oral n otion o f death," and "Their fate did not just happen; it was a consequence o f the policies pursued by the Japanese governm ent."13 The U .S. forces captured one island after another, as if they were walk­ ing through the area on steppingstones. They moved strategically from one island to another, located w ithin the com bat radius o f a fighter plane, thereby expanding the area o f air control. In contrast, according to a form er in telligence staff officer, "Japan placed garrisons on 25 islands, large and sm all com bined, o f w hich the U .S. forces landed on and occupied only eight; the other 17 islands were sim ply ignored. O n those eight islands, 116,000 m en fou ght to their death, w hile 160,000 were abandoned on isolated islands, where nearly 40,000 died from starvation, m alnutrition and tropical diseases, w ithout engaging in a single battle w ith U .S. troops."14

Uninformed Tojo takes action The war com m and o f the Tojo Cabinet was greatly shaken after defeats in the battles o f Midway and Guadalcanal Island. In late December 1942, when defeat at Guadalcanal Island seemed certain, staff officers o f the Im perial Army and Navy in charge of operations were engaged in a fierce argum ent. An Army officer said: "How can you win a war w ithout ammu­ nition and food? The Navy dropped its guard, letting the enem y occupy [Guadalcanal Island], and the Army fell victim to the failure. That was the beginning o f all this." A N avy officer argued back, "W asn't it the cause of failure when the Army's Second D ivision put so m any troops into that dense forest?" It was evident that a delay in withdrawing troops would lead to more deaths from starvation. But both the Army and the Navy were busy trying to blam e the other side for the im m inent defeat at G uadalcanal.15 The two sides had fundam entally different strategies—the Navy focused on fighting against the U .S. forces, w hile the Army placed emphasis on conquering the Chinese continent and beating the Chiang Kai-shek gov­ ernm ent in Chongqing. After the massive number o f deaths o f Japanese soldiers on Attu Island, Emperor Showa expressed concern to the chief aide-de-camp, saying, "I wonder if the Arm y and the Navy are able to have frank discussions."16 Confrontations between the Arm y and the N avy also occurred am ong the U .S. forces, but the chain o f com m and was simpler: the Jo in t Chiefs of Staff consisting o f the chiefs o f the Army and Navy (which became more form al and legislated for in 1947) who were clearly subordinate to the

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C om m ander-in-Chief, President Roosevelt (who directed he he called "Com m ander-in-Chief" rather than "M r. President" during the war) the ultim ate decision maker. In Japan, the Army General Staff and the Naval General Staff planned and practiced different operations. The Im perial Headquarters was sup­ posed to coordinate the plans but was often unsuccessful when the two sides opposed each other. According to a m ilitary historian, "W hen the two m ilitary sides could not reach an agreem ent, the only person who could make a decision was the Emperor. However, the Emperor never exerted his authority or made adjustments to individual problem s. In real­ ity, it was extremely difficult to have the Arm y and the Navy cooperate w ith each other and to develop an integrated operation."17 The M eiji Constitution stipulated that the supreme com m and organi­ zation in charge o f operations and troops was independent o f government organizations. As both the Army General Staff and the Naval General Staff were supreme com m and bodies, they did not let the governm ent, includ­ ing the Prime M inister, know about their weapons, troops or operation plans. The N aval General Staff did not disclose inform ation on the Battle o f M idw ay to Tojo, who was then the Prime M inister. Tojo was inform ed o f the defeat more than a m onth later.18 The independence o f the supreme com m and allowed the senior officers of the General Staff to do as they pleased. Around m idnight on December 6, 1942, chief of Operations at the Army General Staff Shinichi Tanaka came in person to Prime M inister and W ar M inister Tojo to request an increase in the number o f vessels to w in back Guadalcanal Island. W hen Tojo did not com ply, Tanaka cried out, "You id iot!"19 Tojo was frustrated w ith the war situation that put Japan on the defen­ sive w hile the U .S. forces won islands through its "stepping stone opera­ tio n s." The con cept o f the "A bsolute N a tio n al D efense Z o n e ," (See Footnote 3.) announced in September 1943, was developed to reduce the battlefront and to strengthen the troops to allow them to fig h t back. However, the Arm y and the N avy had different interpretations o f the term .20 F o o tn o t e 3

Absolute National Defense Zone A c o m m a n d p o lic y o f w ar w as fin a liz e d a t a c o n fe re n c e in th e p rese n ce o f th e

E m p e ro r in Se p te m b e r 1 9 4 3 . I t n a m e d areas a n d lo c a tio n s th a t m u s t b e d e fe n d e d fo r th e c o n t in u a t io n o f t h e w a r. T h e z o n e in c lu d e d " C h is h im a (K u ril) Is la n d s , O g a sa w a ra Is la n d s , U c h in a n y o Is la n d s (m id - a n d w e s te rn -s o u th sea is la n d s lo c a te d to th e n o r th o f t h e eq u a to r), w estern N e w G u in e a , S u n d a a n d B u rm a (p resen tly M y a n m a r ) ."

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In February 1944, Tojo replaced C h ie f o f the Arm y General Staff Hajim e Sugiyam a, announcing that he w ould take over the post. Tojo's surprise m ove reflected his pent-up distrust o f the supreme com m and organization, w hich n ot on ly failed to achieve success but also gave no inform ation to h im . Sugiyam a argued back, referring to Germ any's A dolf H itler, that w hen p olitics and the supreme com m and are m ixed, it can hinder the supreme com m and's au th ority. T ojo dism issed the claim , saying: "C h a n ce llo r H itler was a soldier. It's n ot the same for m e. I am a general. There w on't be any problem s."21 For a W ar M inister to act concurrently as the C h ie f o f the Arm y General Staff, w ho was at the helm o f the supreme com m and, was a violation o f a longstanding rule that had been in place since the Arm y was founded. Emperor Show a asked Lord Keeper o f the Privy Seal K oichi K ido, "Isn 't it against the C on stitu tion , w hich dictates the independence o f the supreme com m and?" suggesting th at T ojo should reconsider his decision. How­ ever, Tojo appointed N avy M inister Shigetaro Shim ada to be C h ie f o f the N aval General Staff as w ell.22 Tojo's efforts were unsuccessful. Takushiro H attori, then ch ief o f the Operations Section o f the Arm y General Staff, said after the war: "Letting one individual have such enorm ous power caused more harm than good— it brought suspicion, dissatisfaction, pressure, confusion o f policies and failure in carrying them o u t."23 A fter th e war en d ed , T o jo to ld form er Foreign M in ister M am oru Shigem itsu w hen reflectin g on the war leadership: "T he fundam ental reason [for Jap an 's defeat] was the lack o f con trol. The Prim e M inister, in w hose hands lied a country's future, did n ot have the authority to control the reins o f its m ilitary forces. Such a country w ould never w in a w ar."24

Japan fa r from establishing Co-prosperity Sphere The U nited States gradually started to assume control in the war w ith Jap an . C om m ander-in-Chief o f the Com bined Fleet Isoroku Yam am oto was k ille d w hen h is airplan e was sh ot dow n on A p ril 18, 1943 (the Am erican codebreakers read his flig h t itinerary). As Jap an becam e more obviously on the defensive. Prime M inister H ideki Tojo adopted a measure to n ip in the bud rebellious elem ents in the occupied areas. O n A pril 20, two days after Yam am oto's death, Tojo appointed M am oru Shigem itsu as the new Foreign M inister w ho w ould handle w artim e diplo­ m acy in providing logistical support to the m ilitary. Seven m onths earlier, in Septem ber 1942, Shigenori Togo left the post o f Foreign M inister after a clash w ith Tojo over the adm inistration o f occupied areas. W hile T ojo was trying to set up a "Greater East Asia M inistry" that w ould deal w ith the

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affairs of the occupied areas, including the Southern Areas, M anchuria and China, Togo insisted that all external affairs should be handled by the Foreign M inistry. Togo reportedly told Tojo: "The establishment o f such a ministry would hurt the pride of people in East Asian nations who w ill sus­ pect the ministry is actually the 'Colonization M inistry.'" But Tojo over­ rode his opposition.25 Immediately before becom ing Foreign Minister, Shigemitsu had been Ambassador to the Nanjing Nationalist government of W ang Chao-m ing (Wang Zhaom ing), w hich had sided w ith Japan in the war against the United States and Britain. Shigemitsu was working to revise the unfair Japan-China Basic Treaty o f 1941 with the pro-Japanese N anjing National­ ist government to give the latter a certain level of autonomy as part of new support measures to that government. As Foreign M inister, Shigemitsu emphasized the "self-determination of people" and the "decolonization of China"—an emphasis that could lead to the negation of military rule.26 W hy, then, did Tojo think highly of Shigemitsu? Shigemitsu's belief was as follows: "It is a matter of fact that Japan is the leader of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere while supporting the notion of equality and fairness. But I deem it would not be a sensible idea to make this fact known to people." His intention was to obscure Japan's superior position over other Asia nations and to give them nom inal equal status so as to win their cooperation in the creation of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere and also in the ongoing war. On this point, Shigemitsu and Tojo were in agreement. O n M ay 31, 1943, the Greater East Asia Political Leadership Principles, w hich provided the basis for granting independence to Burma (now Myanmar) and the Philippines, were approved. Also, under the principles, Japan approved the Free India governm ent in exile led by Subhash Chandra Bose and concluded a treaty to forge an alliance with the W ang regime. To promote its new policy Japan held the Greater East Asia Conference on November 5, 1943. Tojo him self instructed that the attendants should include the Republic of China's leader W ang Chao-m ing, acting Prime M inister o f Thailand Prince W an W aithayakon, M anchukuo Prime M inister Zhang Jin g h u i, President Jose Laurel o f the Japanese-backed Second Republic of the Philippines, Burmese Prime Minister Ba Maw and Subhash Chandra Bose. The preamble of the joint declaration adopted at the assembly urged those nations to cooperate with Japan's war efforts. "The U nited States and Britain have persistently been invading and exploiting Greater East Asia, which they are finally trying to destabilize at its foundations. The nations o f Greater East Asia w ill cooperate in success­ fully concluding the Greater East Asia W ar." The main text of the joint

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declaration spelled ou t five p rin cip les, such as "co-existen ce and co­ prosperity based on ethics" and "respect for autonom y." A t the tim e o f the assem bly, how ever, Jap an had sent its troops to the war front to die to the last m an in battle after battle. Two m onths earlier in Septem ber 1943, the governm ent approved the conscription o f a stu­ dent corps at a Cabinet m eeting. How did other countries view the Greater East Asia Conference hosted b y a country on the decline? Ba M aw o f Burma dem onstrated his an ti-U .S. and anti-British stance by saying in his speech that he could hear the "calls o f Asia" for the first tim e in reality and n ot in dream s.27Laurel o f the Philippines tried to warn Japan by saying the establishm ent o f the Co-prosperity Sphere should n o t be for the benefit o f Jap an alone. Thai Prime M inister Plaek Pibulsonggram did n ot attend the m eeting because he thought his attendance w ould give the im pression o f subm ission to Jap an and instead sent his deputy.28 Takao Saito, a successful dissident candidate in the April 1942 general election, criticized the Greater East Asia Conference, saying: "Japan was saying th at it w ould w in in the end because its war purposes were just, w hile those o f other nations were un just. N obody took that propaganda seriously."29 Ian N ish , a British expert on the history o f diplom acy, wrote about the Tokyo conference's declaration: "For m ost Asians, the declaration had a hollow ring as a piece o f unrealistic propaganda; to believe th at Japan w ould act as their equal partner was im possible."30

The Itnphal Operation W hen they m et in Tokyo during the Greater East A sia Conference, Subhash C han d ra Bose appealed directly to Prim e M in ister T ojo and Foreign M inister Shigem itsu for an invasion o f his own country w hich was under British control. This becam e one o f the factors that prom pted the Arm y to carry out the Im phal Operation. The Arm y m ade a decision in January 1944 on an operation to capture Im phal and the surrounding areas in northeast India. The schem e o f Renya M utaguchi, Com m ander o f the Fifteenth Arm y, however, was in itially met w ith an outburst o f opposition from the Im perial Headquarters and other quarters. The prim e concern was the supply lin e. The Indian border area did not have any decent roads and was a nest o f diseases such as m alaria. The air superiority in the area was in the hands o f the A llied Powers. Despite such obstacles, M utaguchi insisted on carrying out the operation w ith an obsessive persistence, even sending a letter o f appeal to T ojo. M u ta g u c h i, w ho w as th e C o m m an d er o f th e re gim en t th a t was involved in the M arco Polo Bridge Incident, said, "Since I'm the one w ho

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started the war b y firin g the first shot at the M arco Polo Bridge, I feel I m ust bring this war to an en d ."31 The Southern Arm y and the Im perial Headquarters approved his plan o n ly after C om m an der o f th e Burm a Area A rm y M asakazu Kaw abe, M u ta g u ch i's superior o ffice r w hen th e M arco Polo Bridge In cid e n t occurred, agreed w ith h im . Kawabe to ld Tadashi Katakura, w ho was Senior Staff O fficer o f the Burma Area Arm y, "M r. To jo has called on m e to com e up w ith a big achievem ent, in add ition to our support o f the In d ian independence m ovem ent." M utaguchi planned to rely on the enem y for food and greatly underes­ tim ated the British forces. "They w ill surrender if you fire three tim es w ith your m uzzle pointed at the sky," he said, boasting that he w ould capture Im phal in three weeks. A staff officer o f the Fifteenth Arm y in charge of logistics shocked his counterpart in the Burm a Area Arm y by tellin g h im , "W e are going to have w ild grass for fo o d ." He explained. "W e can 't do anything about it since it's the Com m ander's p o licy ."32 In M arch 1944, three divisions o f th e Fifteen th Arm y started their m arch forward but soon got bogged down as British forces intercepted and resisted their advance. A ll D ivision Com m anders w ho were reluctant to push forward were dism issed from their posts. O n e o f them , M asafum i Yam auchi, com m ander o f the Fifteenth D ivision , sent a telegram to the Air D ivision , saying, "O ur sick and starving m en on the front lin e have lost their ab ility to figh t w ithout am m unition in torrential rain and in a sea of m ud, all because o f the incom petence o f the Arm y and M u tagu ch i."33 In m id-M ay, Hikosaburo H ata, V ice C h ie f o f the Arm y General Staff w ho inspected the southern fron t, reported to C h ie f o f the Arm y General Staff Tojo th at, "The prospect o f the Im phal O peration is extrem ely d iffi­ cu lt." T ojo raised his voice at H ata and said, "Such pessim ism w on't get us anyw here," but later confessed in agony, "W e are in trouble."34 The front lin e had entered the rainy season, and soldiers fell to hunger and m alaria, one after another. Kawabe and M utaguchi just kept trying to second-guess each other, and neither m an called for a h alt o f the opera­ tio n w hen they m et in early Ju n e . The operation continued u n til a term i­ n ation order arrived from the Southern Arm y on Ju ly 3. By th at tim e about 72,500 m en had been killed or w ounded. The center o f the "Absolute N ational Defense Zone," Saipan, fell into enem y hands on Ju ly 7 o f the same year. From then on , Jap an becam e a target o f continuous air raids o f U .S . B-29 bom bers from Saipan. The Tojo C abinet collapsed on Ju ly 18.

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Notes_______________________________________________________________________________________________ 1 Ryuzo Sejim a, Ikusanga (Over M ountains and Rivers), Tokyo: Sankei Shim bun News Service, 1995, p. 133 2 Suketaka Tanem ura, D aihonei Kim itsu N isshi (C on fid ential D iary o f the Im perial Headquarters), Tokyo: Diam ond, 1952, p. 131 3Masayasu Hosaka, Showa Rikugun no Kerikyu (A Study o f the Showa Army) vol. 1, Tokyo: Asahi Bunko, p. 569 4 Kenryo Sato, Daitoa Senso Kaikoroku (Memoirs on the Greater East Asia War), Tokyo: Tokuma Shoten, 1966, p. 246 5Shigeru Hayashi, Taiheiyo Senso (Pacific War), Tokyo: Chuko Bucks, 1971, p. 287 6The M ilitary History Department o f the N ational Institute for Defense Studies o f the Defense Agency (NIDS), ed., Daihonei Rikugun-bu (The Army Department o f the Imperial Headquarters), vol. 6 in Senshi Sosho (A Series o f W ar H istories), Tokyo: Asagum o Shim bunsha, 1973, p. 67 7United States Strategic Bom bing Survey, ed., Summary Report (Pacific War): W ashington, D .C .: U .S. Governm ent Printing O ffice, 1946, p. 6 8N IDS, ed., op. ext., pp. 62-68 9Ibid. pp. 463-469 10O n August 5, 1942, the Yom iuri Shim bun merged w ith the H ochi Shim bun, a Tokyobased daily, to issue a joint newspaper, the Yomiuri-Hochi, in line w ith the government's wartime policy to realign the newspaper industry. Accordingly, regional newspapers across Japan were integrated into ohe daily for each prefecture, in principle. The Yom iuri Shim bun resumed its own publication on M ay 1,1946. 11 M asayasu Hosaka, "Shin Showa-shi Nanatsu no Nazo" (Seven M ysteries o f Showa History, updated), m onthly Bungeishunju, June 2006, p. 287 12N IDS, ed., vol. 8 ,1974, pp. 487-488 13Ulrich Straus, Anguish o f Surrender: Japanese POW s o f World War U, Seattle: University o f W ashington Press, 2003, pp. 346-347 14 Eizo H ori, Daihonei Sanbo no Johosenki (An Im perial Headquarters Staff O fficer's Account o f an Intelligence War), Tokyo: Bunshun Bunko, 1996, pp. 117-118 15Masanobu Tsuji, Guadalcanal, Tokyo: Kawade Shobo, 1967, pp. 208-212 16The Army General Staff, ed., Sugiyama Memo vol. 2, Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1967, p. 21 17Ryoichi Tobe, et a l., Shippai no Honshitsu (Nature o f the Failure), Tokyo: Chuko Bunko, 1991, p. 322 18 Mamoru Shigem itsu, Showa no Doran (Upheavals o f the Showa Era), Tokyo: Chuko Bunko, p. 152 19Tanemura, op. c it, pp. 140-141 20N IDS, ed., vol. 7 ,1973, p. 211 21The Army General Staff, ed., op. c it, pp. 27-29 22Koichi Kido, Kido Koichi Nikki (Koichi Kido's Diary), Tokyo: University o f Tokyo Press, 1966, p. 1,090 23 Takushiro Hattori, Daitoa Senso Zenshi (The W hole History o f the Greater East Asia War), Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1965, p. 571 24Shigem itsu, op. c it, pp. 151-152 25Shigenori Togo, Jidai no Ichimen (An Aspect o f the Time), Tokyo: Chuko Bunko, 1989, pp. 438-442 26Shigem itsu, op. c it, p . 187 27Yusuke Fukada, Daitoa Senso no Shinjitsu (Truth o f the Greater East Asia War), Tokyo: PHP Shinsho, 2004, p. 125

R iva lry grow s betw een A rm y a n d N a vy; desperate soldiers choose 'honorable death' /155

28Sum io Hatano, Taiheiyo Senso toA jia Gaiko (Japan's Asia Policy during the Pacific War), Tokyo: University o f Tokyo Press, 1996, pp. 175-176 29Kenichi M atsum oto, Hyoden Saito Takao (Critical Biography o f Takao Saito), Tokyo: Toyo Keizai, 2002, p . 373 30 Ian N ish, Japanese Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period, Westport, C on n , and London: Praeger, 2002, p. 173 31 Masanori Ito, et a l., eds., Jitsuroku Taiheiyo Senso (An Authentic History o f the Pacific War) vol. 3, Tokyo: Ghuokoron, 1960, p. 122 32 N ID S, e d ., Im phal Sakusen (Im phal O peration) in Senshi Sosho (A Series o f W ar Histories),Tokyo: Asagumo Shim bunsha, 1968, p. 117 33Noboru Kojim a, Taiheiyo Senso (Pacific War) vol. 2 , Tokyo: Chuokoronsha, 1988, p. 156 34N IDS, ed., op. cit., pp. 520-521

Chapter 10

The Pacific W ar/Part 3

Battle of Okinawa results in huge loss of life, island is sacrificed in attempt to delay mainland attack

W

ith the foil of Saipan in July 1944 (the 19th year of the Showa Era) came the fall of the “Absolute National Defense Zone”— the selected areas and locations which Japan had deemed necessary fo r defending the Em pire. The Pacific W a r reached a critical situation tw o years and seven months after its opening in Decem ber 1941.

Everything indicated that defeat was certain, but Japan attempted to fight a decisive battle with the United States, which led to the Battle of Okinawa. W hy did Japan force so many Okinawans to sacrifice them selves, and what w ere the mistakes the government and the Imperial Headquarters made in their strategy?

Desperation leading to battle The Arm y and N avy Departments o f the Im perial Headquarters decided in the summer o f 1944, after losing the M ariana Islands—Saipan, Tinian and Guam —and the Philippine Sea to fight a battle on Japanese soil, concluding, "There is no other tim e but now to wage a decisive battle from a warcom m anding standpoint." Follow ing the fall o f the "Absolute N ational Defense Zone," the m ilitary headquarters drew up a battle plan called "Shogo O peration," as the Chinese character “sho” means "w inning a battle." The areas designated for the operation were the Philippines, the battle plan for w hich was called Sho Num ber O n e, Taiw an and the N ansei Islands in clu d in g O kinaw a, Sho N um ber Two, and the Japanese m ainland, Sho Num ber Three. The plan was to engage U .S . forces in the three areas. W hat process was required to establish new war-leadership principles or "Senso Shido Taiko" to carry out the Shogo O peration? Prim e M inister H ideki Tojo took responsibility for the fall o f Saipan and felt forced to resign. Kuniaki Koiso succeeded h im , form ing a new Cabinet on Ju ly 22, 1944. Im m ediately after the C abinet form ation, Koiso said, "I w ill practice every measure to successfully conclude the w ar."1 W hat he had in m ind was to push back the U .S . forces for once, w hich w ould possibly lead to a peace treaty between the tw o countries. 157

15 8 / J apan' s w a b s in 1 9 3 1 -4 5

O n August 4, in an effort to strengthen his authority over the conduct of war, Koiso established the Imperial Supreme War Council w hich com ­ prised the prime m inister, foreign m inister, war m inister, navy m inister, chief o f the army general staff and chief o f the naval general staff. The new council was given a green ligh t at the conference but it was just a contin­ uation—rather than an im provem ent—o f the Im perial HeadquartersGovernm ent Liaison Conference.2 The council adopted Senso Shido Taiko (War Leadership Principles). The Army General Staffs Twentieth Group in charge of war coordina­ tion, headed by Colonel Suketaka Tanemura, was responsible for drafting the new W ar Leadership Principles to be adopted by the Im perial Supreme W ar C ouncil. The W ar Coordination Group saw the situation as extrem ely grave. According to its draft, the war situation was critical—Japan could end up in the worst possible scenario; there was no prospect o f increasing m ili­ tary capability for achieving war aims and repelling the U .S. forces. Since sustaining the livelihood o f the Japanese people would becom e difficult from the next year onward as the Group was not confident o f victory in any future battle.3 The difference in strength between Japanese and U .S. naval and air forces continued to grow. The Im perial Japanese Arm y and N avy had about 3,000 aircraft w hile U .S. industry was capable o f producing 10,000 a m onth. The U .S. and British naval strength included 17 aircraft carriers, 46 light aircraft carriers and 63 battleships and battle cruisers. M eanw hile, the Com bined Fleet had seven aircraft carriers and 15 battleships and battle cruisers. However, Koiso declared at the Imperial Supreme War Council m eeting on August 19, "W e w ill make every effort to wage a decisive battle and overcome this critical situation."4 Echoing him , C h ief o f the Arm y General Staff Yoshijiro Um ezu said: "W e'll change the war situation and show the enem y the capability o f our Arm y and N avy." Foreign M inister M am oru Shigem itsu, W ar M inister Hajim e Sugiyam a, Navy M inister Mitsum asa Yonai and C h ief o f the Naval General Staff Koshiro Oikawa were present at the m eeting. Sugiyam a and Yonai said they all should believe in victory and make an effort to finish the war. The m eeting ended after Emperor Showa said: "W e have made a good policy, but we have to make sure it w ill be carried out correctly. Make every effort to practice the principles thoroughly."5 The Arm y General Staff and the Naval General Staff had already drawn up the Shogo Operation plan. W ith the Council's approval of the new warleadership policy, the Im perial Headquarters started working on prepara­ tions for battle. However, the Arm y and N avy were defeated on Leyte

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Island in the Philippines in October 1944. U .S. forces landed on Luzon in January 1945 and retook M anila. Thus battle plan Sho Number One had failed, w hich left no other choice for the Japanese headquarters but to pur­ sue the fin al battles in Okinaw a and the m ainland. So w hat plan did the Im perial Headquarters have for the Battle o f Okinawa? The Thirty-second Arm y in charge of defending Okinaw a was formed in M arch 1944. After the fall o f the M ariana Islands in Ju ly , the Im perial Headquarters hastily called back three divisions from M anchuria and other places. Divisions 9, 24 and 62 were incorporated into the Thirtysecond Arm y. Headquarters ordered the Thirty-second Arm y to build air­ dromes. M ost o f Japan's fighters had been destroyed in the naval battle off Marianas in Ju n e, w hich greatly dim inished the strength of Japan's airpower. However, the headquarters was obsessed w ith the idea of crushing U .S. forces from the air before they landed on Okinaw a, calling Okinawa an "unsinkable aircraft carrier." The Thirty-second Arm y suspended its work on taking positions for over a m onth and instead worked on build­ ing 15 airdromes in the Nansei Islands. Then, the Im perial Headquarters tried to move the N in th D ivision to Taiwan in Novem ber.6 Com m ander o f the Thirty-second Arm y M itsuru Ushijim a strongly opposed this, saying, "If it is im perative that we defend Okinawa Island, extracting a division from the Army is not an op tion ."7 In Decem ber, Sh u ich i M iyazaki becam e ch ie f o f operations at the Im perial Headquarters' Army Departm ent. He pressed on w ith the plan to move the N in th D ivision to Taiwan, saying: "Discussing troop strength in Okinawa is nothing but a defeating attitude in giving up the Philippines. The N in th D ivision w ill be m oved by all m eans."8 At the same tim e, M iyazaki's counterpart in the headquarters' N avy Departm ent, Sadatoshi Tom ioka, insisted: "U .S. forces are likely to attack Okinaw a next. Okinawa w ill be the place for a showdown."® Indeed, the U nited States had made a decision in early October to invade Okinaw a. It considered the Okinaw a invasion the most im portant of all, as securing the com m and of the seas and the air around Japan would allow it to strike at the heart o f Japan. The Im perial Headquarters' Army D ep artm en t h ad m ade an u tte rly erroneous p re d ictio n . M iyazaki rem ained stubborn, rejecting the Thirty-second Arm y's request to add another division to Okinaw a. He said, "The Army in the field should solve the problem ." In January 1945 w hen Um ezu decided to dispatch the (m ainland) E igh ty-fou rth D ivisio n from H im eji, H yogo Prefecture, to O kinaw a, M iyazaki opposed, saying: "W e should not send too m any troops to remote islands where naval transportation is insecure. I refuse to understand why we have to watch valuable defense forces be sunk in the ocean."10

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Hearing the opposition, Um ezu said, "You do whatever you like," and reversed his decision to send the troops. M iyazaki rejected the idea o f strengthening the troops in Okinaw a because he felt preparations for defending the m ainland should be prioritized, guessing that U .S. forces would not come to the m ainland until that autum n, or later. A possible decisive battle on the m ainland was all M iyazaki had in m ind. The O utline for the N avy Operation Plan, finalized on January 20, stat­ ed that its purpose was to "secure the Im perial land, especially the Empire of Japan's m ainland," and said, "the Ogasawara Islands, Okinawa Island and the Nansei Islands located to the south o f Okinawa are the front line in accom plishing a so-called deep battle operation to defend the Imperial lan d ."11 But for the Im perial Headquarters and the governm ent, Okinawa was not recognized as part o f the m ainland o f Jap an .1? W hen interrogated by the General Headquarters of the Allied Powers after the war, Takushiro Hattori, who was chief o f the Operation Section of the Im perial Headquarters' Arm y Departm ent, adm itted the plan was to have a drawn-out battle on Okinawa to let U .S. soldiers bleed so that Japan would win a decisive battle on the m ainland.13 Thus Okinaw a was to be sacrificed to buy tim e u n til the preparations to defend the m ainland were ready.

Retreat from Shuri The U .S. troops landed on Iwo Jim a, one o f the Ogasawara Islands, on February 19,1945. A fierce battle raged between the U .S. troops and a gar­ rison detachm ent headed by Lieutenant General Tadam ichi Kuribayashi. By M arch 17, the detachm ent was defeated, w ith about 20,000 Japanese soldiers dead. N o tim e was wasted by the U .S. forces, w hich set in m otion the invasion o f Okinaw a by landing on the Kerama Islands, situated to the west of Okinawa on M arch 26, thus establishing a logistic base for the invasion o f Okinaw a proper. O n April 1, the U .S. forces started firing from 219 war­ ships, including battleships and battle cruisers, and landed on Kadena Beach in the mid-western part o f Okinawa Island. It was the largest land­ ing operation in the Pacific W ar, m obilizing 550,000 personnel including a huge landing force o f 183,000. Jap an , on the other hand, had only 86,000 Arm y troops and 10,000 land-based naval forces. The Thirtysecond Arm y decided to barricade itself into its position in Shuri, the ancient capital o f the island, in the m id-south, in the hopes o f eventually w inning a long-drawn-out war.14 More than 60,000 U .S. soldiers gained position on Okinawa Island the "same day, taking control of the Yom itanson and Kadenacho airfields. By

Battle o f Okinawa results in huge loss o f life, island is sacrificed in attempt to delay mainland attack / 161

April 3, the U .S . troops reached the eastern shore, dividing Okinaw a Island into north and south.15 Losing the two airfields shook the Im perial Headquarters. O n April 2, Um ezu visited Emperor Show a to report on the situation. The Emperor asked, "Is there an y m easure to defend the islan d in the face o f the enem y's lan ding on O kinaw a?" The next day, the Emperor asked again sternly: "If we are placed at a disadvantage in this b attle, the Im perial Japanese Arm y and N avy w ill lose the public's trust, w hich w ill raise con­ cerns about future war situations. W hy isn 't the [Thirty-second] Arm y figh tin g back?"16 C riticism against the Thirty-second Arm y's h oldin g action were heard in the Im perial Japanese Arm y. Some said the Thirty-second Arm y was being overly protective o f its force strength and dragging its feet. The Im perial Headquarters sent a telegram to the Thirty-second Arm y on April 4 dem anding it w in back the tw o airfields that had been occupied by the U .S . forces. The telegram confused the Thirty-second Arm y. Senior Staff O fficer H irom ichi Yahara, w ho cam e up w ith the plan to hold p osition , said, "It's com pletely irresponsible; they are urging us to fig h t w ithout know ­ in g an yth in g about our preparations for the p lan or the terrain o f the b a ttle fie ld ."17 As telegram s ordering the Thirty-second Arm y to figh t back kept com ­ in g, it decided to launch several attacks, all o f w hich ended in failure. By M ay 5, 1945, the strength o f the two m ainstay divisions had becom e alm ost h a lf o f their original size, and the Thirty-second Arm y concluded it had two weeks before organized figh tin g capabilities w ould be exhausted. O n M ay 16, U shijim a telegraphed the Im perial Headquarters to say that the Thirty-second Arm y was about to be destroyed The telegram read, "O ur strategic, long-draw n-out war w ill be fin ish ed." However, Yahara held the opinion that it was im portant to hold posi­ tion as lon g as possible since the Battle o f Okinaw a's sole purpose was to buy tim e for preparations for a battle on the m ainland. He recom m ended Isam u C h o , the Thirty-second Arm y's C h ie f o f Staff, retreat from the posi­ tio n in Shuri to the K yan Peninsula in the southern part o f O kinaw a Islan d. C h ie f o f Staff o f the Sixty-second D ivision Sadaom i U eno and others insisted they should n ot retreat, saying: "M ost o f the division's sol­ diers died in the Shuri battle fron t. W e have thousands o f seriously injured soldiers here. W e can 't retreat now ." Okinaw a Governor Akira Shim ada also opposed the m ove, saying, " If we give up Shuri, the war front w ill expand, w hich w ill bring more civilian casualties." O n M ay 22, U shijim a m ade a decision to retreat. He had been resolved to figh t as lon g as possible, as he said, urging Yahara n ot to be hasty in

162 / J apan' s wars in 1931-45

ordering a last suicidal charge, "Some of our fighting strength is left, and we are getting strong support from the islanders. W ith these we w ill fight to the southernmost h ill, to the last square in ch o f land, and to the last m an ."18 By Jun e 4, 1945, the Thirty-second Army gathered in a new position in M abuni on the Kyan Peninsula, but the retreat was tragic. Under an Imperial Headquarters order, those who were seriously injured were given grenades or m ilk containing potassium cyanide to kill themselves regard­ less o f status—whether soldier or civilian. About 30,000 troops withdrew to the southern part o f Okinaw a Island and hid in caves called gama w ith more than 100,000 citizens. Some sol­ diers took the caves away from citizens. The U .S. forces' attacks started around Jun e 7—they drilled holes in the tops o f the caves, poured oil into the holes and set the caves on fire w iping out the soldiers who were still alive. The Battle o f Okinaw a ended on Jun e 23 w ith Ushijim a and Cho com m itting suicide. According to the Okinaw a prefectural governm ent, 94,136 Japanese soldiers died, along w ith about 94,000 Okinawa citizens. Am ong the civilian casualties, 59,939 died after the Thirty-second Army's retreat. O n Jun e 21, U .S. newspaper The Chicago D aily News reported the fierce battle on its front page, carrying a story by the Associated Press. The head­ line read, "Okinaw a W on, 82-Day Battle for Isle Ends / 90,000 Japs Killed or Seized in Bloody Fight." In the article it said: "Narcotics-crazed Japs fought stubbornly to the last although they were running out o f am m uni­ tion , food and water." The United States suffered the loss o f 12,281 sol­ diers w hile 62,842 others were injured or suffered com bat neurosis.19 The U .S. governm ent's leaders were shocked by the huge losses and had to reconsider the plan to invade the Japanese m ainland.20

Okinawa Governor abandons his duties W hat did the central and prefectural governments and the Army do when it became increasingly likely that Okinaw a Island would be a battle­ ground in the Pacific War? It was in Ju ly 1944 after Saipan fell into U .S. hands that the central gov­ ernm ent decided to evacuate citizens from Okinaw a and nearby islands such as M iyakojim a. At the tim e, about 600,000 people lived in Okinawa Prefecture. The prefectural governm ent m ade a plan to m ove about 100,000 citizens, m ainly seniors aged 60 and older and children under 15. The prefectural governm ent also planned to carry out group evacuations o f students. O n August 22, however, the Tsushima Maru, a ship carrying residents including m any school children from Okinaw a Prefecture, sank

Battle o f Okinawa results in huge loss o f life, island is sacrificed in attempt to delay mainland attack / 163

after being h it b y a torpedo from a U .S . subm arine. M ore than 1,418 resi­ dents in cludin g at least 775 boys and girls died in the tragedy.21 (See Photo Section.) W hile the evacuation did n ot go as planned, an air raid on Okinaw a, w hich burned m ost of N aha on October 10, becam e a turning p oin t. By M arch 1945 w hen U .S. forces first m oved against Okinaw a, about 60,000 people fled to Kyushu and other areas on the m ainland; 20,000 others w ent to Taiw an. The Thirty-second Arm y and the prefectural governm ent decided in Decem ber 1944 to relocate 100,000 citizens to Kunigam i in the northern part o f the prefecture. In late M arch, w hen U .S . forces started bom bardm ents from the sea, about 50,000 citizens rushed to the m oun­ tainous area, where m any people later suffered starvation and m alaria. A ctions to secure the safety o f civilians were slow . O ne o f the reasons was that Okinaw a Governor Shuki Izum i abandoned his duties after the air raid, fleeing to Futenm a, w hich was relatively safe com pared to other areas on Okinaw a Island. In Decem ber 1944, he w ent to Tokyo on a business trip and never returned, and on January 12,1945, he was appointed as the Governor o f Kagawa Prefecture.22 For about a m o n th u n til A kira Shim ada becam e G overn or in late Jan u ary literally n o m easures were taken to assist O kinaw an civilian s. Shim ada scram bled to evacuate the area and stockpile food, b u t there was not enough tim e. About 300,000 citizens rem ained in the southern part o f the prefecture, w hich was to becom e the battleground.

*.R ecognition goes to Okinawans' C h ie f o f Staff o f the Thirty-second Arm y Isam u C h o beseeched the O kin aw an p op u lace in th e Ja n u a ry 27 issue o f the lo ca l new spaper Okinawa Shim po, saying: "A ll prefectural residents m ust be m ilitia, obeying the Arm y's instruction w ithout quibbling. The elderly and children should m ove to a safe area so that they w ill not be operational obstacles." He added, "It is not acceptable to lose in battle to save civilian lives." For the Arm y, evacuation and m ilitary m obilization were two sides of the same co in . Under the Arm y's defense draft m les, more than 20,000 m en between the age o f 17 and 45 were drafted to form a local "defense corps." They were assigned to build airdrom es and to transport m aterials. It was a backlash from the Im perial H eadquarters' previous action s— m oving the N in th D ivision o f the Thirty-second Arm y to Taiw an. Students o f norm al schools, m iddle schools and w om en's h igh schools were m o b ilized as a student corps. A ccord in g to the H im eyuri Peace M useum in Itom an, Okinaw a Prefecture, about 1,800 m ale students were m obilized as Tekketsu Kinnotai (Iron-blood forces serving the Emperor) and

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com m unications personnel, w hile 560 fem ale students were assigned to work as nurses. Am ong the fem ale students, 157 belonging to the norm al school's w om en departm ent and 65 o f the prefectural w om en's h ig h school Number O ne were called Himeyuri (Star Lily) Corps. Girls between the ages of 15 and 19 worked hard in poorly-conditioned pits, taking care o f the injured soldiers and holding the patients when they went through surgery to have their lim bs rem oved. They took over household chores—drawing water and cooking—between firing intervals o f the U .S. forces. They ran between pits as messengers and were h it by bullets. M ale students carried bom bs, drilled trenches and som etim es were ordered to storm enem y forces or make suicide runs against enem y tanks w ith bombs on their backs. According to records, 876 male and 194 fem ale students lost their lives. Okinaw a residents, whose hom eland turned into a battleground, did not only suffer from Am erican shelling and bullets. The Arm y, w hich they thought would protect them , instead forced them to give up their lives. O ne exam ple o f this was spy h u n tin g. Taking up the position o f the Thirty-second Army's Com m ander in August 1944, Ushijim a told his sub­ ordinates, "Utm ost care should be taken against counterespionage." After U .S. troops landed on Okinaw a Island, he ordered all personnel to use standard Japanese, w arning that "those speaking the Okinaw a dialect would be considered spies and dealt w ith accordingly."23 The Imperial Headquarters' Army Department issued a Battle Decree for N ational Land in April 1945. The docum ent said if the enemy held women or children in custody and tried to persuade soldiers to surrender, "we should not hesitate to destroy the enemy forces."24 The decree clearly said that it could not be helped if civilian lives were sacrificed in the destruction of enemy forces. From late June to August of 1945 when the major battles were over, the decree was put into action on Kumejima island, west of Okinawa Island. Under the forceful instruction o f U .S. troops, 20 citizens asked Japanese soldiers to surrender but were slaughtered as spy suspects. Rear Adm iral M inoru O ta, w ho com m anded about 10,000 naval land­ in g troops, sent an unusual telegram to Tokyo on Jun e 6 before he killed him self in a trench in Oroku, near the current N aha Airport. Though it was not under his authority, he "could not let the current situation go w ithout com m ent." The telegram read: "A ll the young in the prefecture were drafted for defense corps, and the rem aining old people, women and children were burned out o f their houses and lost all they had because o f the interm ittent bom bing and firin g...So m e volunteered to transport bombs and make raids on the enem y. Since the Arm y and N avy came to Okinaw a, the local citizens have been forced to volunteer labor and econ­

Battle o f Okinawa results in huge loss o f life, island is sacrificed in attempt to delay mainland attack / 165

om ize on supplies." The telegram , consisting o f more than 600 characters, told how the citizens cooperated w ith the m ilitary forces and were ravaged. It closed as follow s: "The Okinaw a residents fought w ell; I hope, in the future, they w ill be given special recogn ition."25

Pioneers o f '100 m illion special attacks' Fierce battles developed both on land and in the air dining the Battle of Okinaw a. In October 1944, N avy Vice Adm iral Takijiro O nishi led suicide crash attacks in the naval battle o ff Leyte in the Philippines. The attacks— w hich O nishi had previously called "heresy" in com mand—soon became the m ain feature o f the operation. O n April 5, 1945, the Koiso Cabinet resigned en masse. Kantaro Suzuki was prom ptly ordered to form a C ab in et. The next day, tokkotai, the special attack suicide air un it of the Army and Navy took o ff from Kanoya, Chiran and other bases in Kyushu and Taiwan, taking part in the Kikusui (Chrysanthem um and Water) Number One operation, targeting U .S. war­ ships steam ing around Okinaw a. O n that first day, 340 airmen on 222 sorties died. M any o f them were university students who had been m obi­ lized. The next day saw 140 deaths in 90 aircraft. O n April 12,193 airmen on 109 sorties died, and on April 16, 244 others on 157 sorties lost their lives. The special attack suicide m issions continued un til August, even after the Battle o f Okinaw a ended. According to the Tokkotai Com m em o­ ration Peace M em orial A ssociation, those w ho died in the special air attacks in the Okinawa area numbered 3,002 from m id-M arch to the end o f the war. The num ber accounted for alm ost 80 percent o f the total deaths in Japan's special air attacks.26 The incessant suicide air attacks caused chaos am ong U .S . forces. Damaged warships crowded the U .S. anchorage in the Kerama Islands. The flagship o f U .S. Vice Adm iral M arc A . M itscher was also dam aged.27 O n ly 26 smaller ships, including destroyers, were sunk, w hile 164 ships including some aircraft carriers were damaged. In the Kikusui O peration, hum an bom bs Oka (Cherry Blossom) and training aircraft Shiragiku (W hite Chrysanthem um ) also went on m issions. M other aircraft carrying one Oka each under their bodies became perfect victim s for U .S. Grumman fighters. Shiragiku could only fly at a speed of 220 kph, less than h alf the speed o f Zero fighters. According to Com m an­ der o f the Fifth Air Fleet M atom e Ugaki, w ho sent special attack pilots, "Tokkotai units are becom ing short o f equipm ent; we have to cover the loss w ith the training aircraft."28 Young pilots—who had been trained for only a short period of tim e,

166 / J apan' s wars in 1931-45

and could barely fly the aircraft—tried to fly the training aircraft on sui­ cide m issions to break through the lin e o f U .S. destroyers w ith radar, crashing into the enem y ships w hile dodging anti-aircraft fire. O n April 5, the Com bined Fleet ordered the Second Fleet led by the giant battleship Yamato to conduct special attacks on Okinaw a from the sea. Com m ander o f the Second Fleet Seiichi Ito was not convinced o f the plan, saying it was a reckless act rather than a com bat operation. The fo l­ lo w in g day in h is o ffic e onboard th e Yam ato, Ito 's C h ie f o f S ta ff Ryunosuke Kusaka told him , "Please carry out this plan, as we w ill be the first o f 100 m illion tokkotai to be carried ou t." Ito responded, as if his con­ cerns were gone, "In that case, I don't have anything to say. A ll right."29 The idea to have the Yamato sacrifice itself o ff Okinawa came from the Com bined Fleet's Senior Staff O fficer Shigenori Kami. Kami said, "If the Yamato survives, people w ill say it was o f no use." His statem ent was approved by the Com bined Fleet's Com m ander-in-Chief Soemu Toyoda and the Naval General Staff. Recalling the tim e, Toyoda said after the war, "I didn't think there was no chance o f success, but I concluded it w ould be a miracle if it went w ell."30 At this tim e no senior staff in the N avy could make level-headed judg­ ments as the war situation continued to deteriorate. Toyoda told the Navy: "The future o f the Empire lies in this very action. The reason for ordering you to carry out this incom parably heroic operatio n ...is to pass on the country's glory to future generations."31 The Second Fleet left the Inland Sea (Seta) on the afternoon o f April 6. The n ext day, the gian t battleship Yamato and five other ships were attacked by 386 U .S. fighters, dive-bombers and torpedo planes and were sunk in waters north o f Okinaw a. The em otional decision—to die hero­ ically—took the lives o f 3,700 naval personnel who sank in the seas south o f Japan. The special attacks around Okinaw a were just the start, as Kusaka said. W hile the tokkotai attacks took place there, the governm ent and the m ili­ tary headquarters were m aking preparations for the battle on the m ain­ land follow ing the guidelines o f the Im perial Army and Navy's Operation Plan. The U .S. forces had planned Operation O lym pic, w hich was to land on the southern part o f Kyushu in the autum n of 1945, and Operation Coronet, to invade the Kanto Plain the follow ing spring.32 After the defeat in Okinaw a, the Japanese governm ent and the m ilitary tried to consolidate the Army and N avy. However, the only countermea­ sure that was left was the desperate attem pt—"100 m illion people's tokko­ tai attacks." The Arm y drafted 1.5 m illion reservists to form 40 new divisions for the battle on the m ainland. M ost o f them were either untrained or old soldiers

Battle o f Okinawa results in huge loss o f life, island is sacrificed in attempt to delay mainland attack / 167

around 60. The N avy prepared 5,200 fighters—h a lf o f them were training aircraft, o f w hich m any were biplanes called “Aka Tombo [red dragonfly]." The fin al stronghold was m anpow er. The Koiso adm inistration decided in M arch 1945 to form N ational V olunteer Corps under the slogan "100 m il­ lio n die heroic deaths." In Ju n e , during a conference in the presence o f the Emperor, the policy for the battle on the m ainland was approved. To make the volunteer corps in to a com batant corps, new legislation—the N ational V olunteer M ilitary Service A ct, to m obilize m en aged 15 to 60 and wom en aged 17 to 40—was put in to effect. Everything was now on a m uch bigger scale—lettin g the citizens sacri­ fice th eir lives as a defense corps, w hich had previously happened in Okinaw a, now becam e a nationw ide p olicy. O ne day, weapons used b y the volunteer com batant corps were put on display at the Prime M inister's O ffice. Prime M inister Kantaro Suzuki glanced at them and said in amaze­ m ent, "This is really b ad ."33 W hat he saw were m uzzle-loading firearm s, bam boo spears, bows and tw o-pronged weapons used to snare people. Notes____________________________________________________ 1 T h e M ilita r y H isto ry D e p a rtm e n t o f th e N a tio n a l In stitu te fo r D efen se Stu dies o f th e D efen se A g e n c y (N ID S), e d ., Daihonei Rikugun-bu (the A rm y D ep a rtm e n t o f th e Im p erial H e a d q u a rte r s), vol. 9 in Senshi Sosho (A Series o f W a r H is to r ie s ) ,T o k y o : A s a g u m o S h im b u n s h a , 1975, p . 42 2 T aku sh iro H a tto ri, Daitoa Senso Zenshi (The W h o le H isto ry o f th e G re ater East A sia W ar), T o k y o : H a ra S h o b o , 1965, p p . 6 3 6 -6 3 7 3 N ID S , e d ., op. d t .,.p . 49 4 Ib id ., p . 88 s Ib id ., p . 90 6 H a tto ri, op. cit., p , 756 7 Y o s h ih iro O t a , Okinawa Sakusen no Tosui ( C o m m a n d o f th e B attle o f O k in a w a ), T okyo: Sa ga m i S h o b o , 1984, p . 187 8 S h in o b u T a k ay am a , Sanbohonbu Sakusen-ka no Daitoa Senso (Greater East A sia W a r for th e Im p erial A r m y G e n e ra l S t a ffs O p e ra tio n s S e ctio n ), T o k y o : F u y o sh o b o , 2001, p . 196 5 O ta , op. cit., p . 240 10 N ID S , e d ., Okinawa Homen Rikugun Sakusen (A rm y O p e ra tio n s in th e O k in a w a Area) in Senshi Sosho (A Series o f W ar H istories), T o ky o : A sag u m o S h im b u n sh a , 1968, p p . 167-168 11 A "d e ep o p e ra tio n ," o rig in a lly devised b y th e S o v ie t R ed A rm y , is d e sign e d to la u n c h sim u lta n e o u s o ffen sive s "d e e p " b e h in d e n e m y lin es n o t fo r a B litzkrieg-typ e v icto r y b u t for th e e n em y's d e v a sta tin g failu re in its defenses essential to ensure a n ov erall v icto ry . In th e case o f th e B attle o f O k in a w a , th e Im p erial H eadqu arters e m p lo y e d th e deep oper­ a tio n s th e o r y to d e fe n d th e m a in la n d b y d e s ig n a tin g t h e N a n s e i Isla n d s in c lu d in g O k in a w a Isla n d , w here Ja p a n e se troops en ga ged th e e n e m y . 12 H a tto ri, op. cit, p . 748 13 T aku sh iro H a tto ri, "On the Halt o f Reinforcement to Okinawa o f January 1945," d ictated o n A p r il 12 , 1 9 4 9 , in G H Q Rekishi-ka Chinjutsu Roku (ge) (R e co rd s o f S ta te m e n ts F u r n is h e d b y t h e H is t o r y S e c t io n o f t h e G e n e r a l H e a d q u a rte r s a n d t h e Ja p a n e s e

168 / J a p a n ' s

w a r s in

1 9 3 1 -4 5

Dem obilization Bureau v o l. 2), eds. M otoei Sato et a l., Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 2002, p. 789 14 N ID S, ed., Okinawa Homen Kaigun Sakusen (Naval Operations in the Okinaw a Area) in Senshi Sosho (A Series o f W ar Histories), Tokyo: Asagum o Shim bunsha, 1968, pp. 780-783 15O ta, op. cit., p . 390 16N ID S, e d ., Daihonei Rikugun-bu (the Arm y Departm ent o f the Im perial Headquarters), vol. 10 in Senshi Sosho (A Series o f W ar Histories), Tokyo: Asagum o Shim bunsha, 1975, p. 113 17 H irom ichi Yahara, Okinawa Kessen (Battle o f Okinaw a), Tokyo: Yom iuri Shim bun, 1972, p . 166 18 H irom ichi Yahara, Battle for Okinawa, ed. Frank B. G ibn ey, trans. Roger Pineau and M asatoshi U ehara, New York: Jo h n W iley & Sons, 1995, p . 41 19R. E. Applem an et a l., "Okinawa: The Last Battle" in U .S. Arm y in W orld War II: The War in the Pacific, ed. U .S . Arm y Departm ent H istorical D ivision, 1948; rpt. Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle, 1960, pp. 473-474 20Philip N obile, e d ., Judgment at the Sm ithsonian, New York: M arlowe & Com pany, 1995, p. 47 and p . 49 Chester W . N im itz and E.B. Potter, eds., Great Sea War, New York: Bram hall House, 1960, p . 455 N ID S, ed ., Okinawa-homen Kaigun-sakusen, op. cit., pp. 788-789 21According to N im itz and Potter's Great Sea W ar (op. cit., p . 423), "U .S . submarines sank 1,113 m erchant vessels o f over 500 tons" during the Pacific W ar, possibly including the Tsushima M aru. As a result, it read, "Before Japan could be invaded, before the atom ic bom bs were dropped, th e Japanese were m aking surrender overtures, starved in to defeat." 22 H irofum i H ayashi, Okinawa-sen to M inshu (People at the Battle o f Okinaw a), Tokyo: Otsuki Shoten, 2001, pp. 83-85 23Akira Fujiwara, Okinawa-sen (Okinaw a Battle), Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 2003, p. 46 24 D aih on ei Rikugun-bu (the Arm y Departm ent o f th e Im perial Headquarters), ed ., Kokudo Kessen Kyorei (Decree for the Battle on the N ational Land), Tokyo: D aihonei Rikugun-bu, pp. 5-6 25 Yozo Tam ura, Okinawa Kenm in Kaku Tatakaeri (So the Okinaw ans Fought), Tokyo: Kodansha, 1997, pp. 434-436 26 Tokkotai Senbotsu-sha Irei Heiw a Kinen Kyokai (Tokkotai Com m em oration Peace M em orial Association), ed ., Tokubetsu Kogeki-tai (Special Attack Corps), Tokyo: Tokkotai Senbotsu-sha Irei Heiwa Kinen Kyokai, 2003, p. 73 27N im itz and Potter, eds., op. cit., p. 454 28M atom e U gaki, Sensoroku (Logbook o f the W ar), Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1975, p . 519 29 N ID S, ed ., Daihonei Kaigun-bu and Rengo Kantai (The Com bined Fleet and the Navy D epartm ent o f the Im perial H eadquarters), vol. 7 in Senshi Sosho (A Series o f W ar Histories), Tokyo: Asagum o Shim bunsha, 1976, p. 275 30Y oich i H iram a, Serikan Yamato (Battleship Yam ato), Tokyo: Kodansha, 2003, p . 124 31 Ib id ., p . 134 32N obile, ed ., op. cit., p. 48 33 Su zu ki K an taro D en k i H ensan Iin k a i (K antaro Suzuki B iograph y C o m p ila tio n C om m ittee), e d ., Suzuki Kantaro D en (Biography o f Kantaro Suzuki), Tokyo: Suzuki Kantaro D enki H ensan Iinkai, 1960, p. 349

Showa W ar Illustrated by Photos

Decem ber 7, 1941: Ambassador to the U nited States Kichisaburo Nom ura (left) and Saburo Kurusu, a special envoy to W ashington, on their way to m eet Secretary of State Cordell H ull at the U .S . State Departm ent to deliver a m em orandum in w hich Japan stated that an agreem ent w ith U .S . could not be reached even if further negotiations were held. Nom ura and Kurusu did not know that Japanese forces had already attacked Pearl Harbor. Citation: LIFE, December 15,1941, p. 27 Courtesy of Reuters Sun

Decem ber 8, 1941: U .S . President Franklin D . Roosevelt signs the Declaration o f War against Jap an .

Ju n e 1928: Soldiers inspect the site where Chinese warlord C han g Tso-lin (Zhang Zoulin) was killed as the result o f a train bom bing by Japanese Arm y officers in a suburb o f M ukden (currently Shengyang), M anchuria—the first m ajor Japanese action that eventually triggered the Sino-Japanese W ar. The Arm y refused to punish the officers involved.

M arch 1932: Puyi, the last Emperor o f the C h in g (Qing) D ynasty, (seated) attends the cerem ony held to install him as the titular C h ie f Executive o f Japan's puppet state o f M anchukuo. Shigeru H on jo, Com m ander o f the Kw antung Arm y, stands at Puyi's right. Puyi appeared before the Tokyo Tribunal as a victim o f the Japanese Arm y, m uch to the surprise o f Japanese people w ho knew m uch about him .

February 1933: Yosuke M atsuoka announces Japan's rejection o f international advice to withdraw troops from M anchuria at the General Assem bly o f the League o f Nations in Geneva. For this act, M atsuoka received a hero's welcom e in Jap an . B-II

February 1936: Rebel soldiers take up position in front o f the Akasaka Sanno H otel in Tokyo during the February 26 Incident. U sing the hotel as their base, the rebels attack the Prime M inister's O fficial Residence and other residences; the uprising was suppressed three days later.

Ju n e 1937: M inisters o f the first Cabinet o f Fum im aro Konoe pose for a photograph follow ing the Cabinet's inauguration. Konoe, far right in front row, stands n ext to Foreign M inister Koki H irota. The M arco Polo Bridge Incident occurred one m onth later, and the Konoe Cabinet played a m ajor role in the con flict w ith C h in a that developed in to all-out war.

B -III

April 1941: Em peror Show a o n his horse Shirayuki (W hite Snow) inspects troops during a m ilitary parade in Y oy o gi, T o kyo , o n his 40th birth day. T h e Em peror occasion ally appeared in fro n t o f m ilitary officers, soldiers an d som etim es even before ordinary citizens.

B -IV

October 1940: Prime M inister Fumimaro Konoe leads a cheer to m ark the establishm ent o f the governm ent-controlled Taisei Yokusankai (Im perial Rule Assistance Association). Lawmakers disbanded their parties to group them selves in the association that helped put Japan on even more o f a war footin g.

Li X ian glan , a Japanese actress and singer bom in M ukden, M anchuria, in 1920, is w idely adm ired b y Japanese and Chinese during the 1930s. After the war, Li used her original Japanese nam e o f Yoshiko Yam aguchi and married a Japanese diplom at. She was elected to the House o f Councillors in 1974.

September 1941: A Japanese warship enters the Port of Saigon. Despite the econom ic sanctions im posed by the U nited States, Japan pressed ahead w ith a m ilitary advance to southern French Indochina. B -V

October 1941: Prime M inister Hideki T ojo, center, and his Cabinet are inaugurated. About 40 days later, the Cabinet decided to go to war w ith the U nited States. Com m erce and Industry M inister Nobusuke Kishi (far right in back row) later defied To jo's policy and played a leading role in the collapse o f the Cabinet in Ju ly 1944.

Undated file photo shows staff officers o f the N avy Departm ent o f the Im perial Headquarters discussing war plans over a m ap o f the Pacific. Courtesy of KINGENDAI Photo Library

A 1942 file photo shows a young m an being seen o ff by members o f his neighborhood after being drafted. B -V I

December 7, 1941: Pearl Harbor

U .S . N aval Air Station Kaneohe, O ahu, H aw aii, explodes in to flam es during Japan's surprise attack. ‘

Courtesy of the U.S. National Archives

The battleship USS Oklahoma rolls over before sinking due to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Courtesy of the U.S. National Archives

A Japanese m idget submarine that took part in the attack on Pearl Harbor lies stranded after running aground on the eastern shore o f O ahu. Courtesy of the U.S. National Archives

M ay 1942: Smoke billow s from the aircraft carrier USS Lexington during the Battle of Coral Sea o ff eastern New G uinea. The U .S. vessel sank, but the Japan's losses in the battle were even greater. Courtesy of the U.S. National Archives

August 1942: U .S . marines land on G uadalcanal. Know n as "a Stalingrad in the ju n gle," the siege o f the island after the fierce battle becam e a m ajor turning point o f the Pacific War just as the Battle o f Stalingrad did on the East European front o f W orld W ar II. Courtesy of the U.S. National Archives

Ju ly 1943: Female students at a Tokyo m usic school use m ock w ooden rifles dur­ in g a training exercise.

Novem ber 1943: Japanese leaders and other Asian countries' representatives from India (provisional governm ent), T hailand, Burma and the Philippines (Second Republic) attend the Greater East Asia Conference in Tokyo. H aving shifted its war justification from that o f "self-defense" to "colonial lib ­ eration," the To jo Governm ent used the conference to seek regional support for this new policy.

Ju n e 1944: Prime M inister Hideki To jo (center) operates a lathe during a visit to a trade fair in Tokyo. As the war situation deteriorated, Tojo tried to m aintain the public's morale w hile concealing news o f m ilitary debacles abroad. B -IX

October 21, 1943: Students m arch on an athletic field in the Outer Garden of M eiji Shrine in Tokyo before being sent to the front lin e . In itially, university students, such as those studying law at Tokyo Im perial University, were exem pted from conscription.

A flam ing airplane slams in to the aircraft carrier USS Essex in this photo taken in 1944. The num ber o f tokko suicide special attacks surged in and after April 1945 as U .S . forces edged toward the Japanese m ainland. About 3,000 pilots lost their lives in the attacks. Courtesy of the U.S. National Archives

Novem ber 1944: Arm y air un it pilots line up before taking o ff on a tokko suicide special attack m ission against U .S. warships near the Leyte G u lf as part o f the first operation o f its kind during the Pacific W ar.

October 1944: The aircraft carrier USS S t Lo bursts in to flam es after being attacked during a suicide attack in the Battle o f Leyte G u lf. A lthough suicide attacks in flicted heavy dam age on U .S. forces, Japanese forces suffered heavier losses during U .S . attacks. I

Courtesy of the U.S. National Archives

The death of the colossal battleship Y a m a to

■ April 7, 1945: The colossal battleship Yamato comes under attack by U .S. aircraft before sinking southwest o f Kyushu. Courtesy of the U.S. National Archives

B -X I

M arch 18, 1945: Emperor Showa inspects the devastation caused by the Great Tokyo Air Raid in Koto W ard, Tokyo. About 100,000 people died in the raid on M arch 10. The Im perial Headquarters perm itted newspapers to carry a photograph o f the Emperor in their M arch 19 issues. From Page 1 of the March 19, 1945, issue of the Yomiuri-Hochi

Undated photo o f the cargo ship Tsushima Maru w hich was evacuating more than 1,400 Okinaw an passengers, 775 o f w hom were prim ary school students, w hen it was sunk by an enem y torpedo in August 1944.

Ju ly 1945: British Prime M inister W inston C hu rchill (left), U .S. President Harry Trum an (center) and General Secretary o f the Com m unist Party o f the Soviet U n ion Jo sef Stalin at the Potsdam Conference near Berlin. AP-WWP

February 2, 1945: People suffering from food shortages in the closing m onths o f the Pacific W ar grow vegetables anywhere they can—even in front o f the N ational D iet building in Tokyo. B -X II

i

August 1945: A n aerial view o f the devastation around the Sum ida River in central Tokyo soon the war ended

August 15, 1945: People kneel in front o f the Im perial Palace after listening at noon to the Emperor's radio address declaring that Jap an had been defeated.

B -X III

Novem ber 12, 1948: Hideki Tojo listens as his death sentence is handed down at the International M ilitary Tribunal for the Far East. After hearing the ruling through an interpreter, T ojo bowed slightly before leaving the courtroom .

September 8, 1951: In San Francisco, representatives o f 48 countries w atch Prime M inister Shigeru Yoshida signs the Treaty o f Peace w ith Jap an . Yoshida also signed the Jap an -U .S. Security Treaty the same day. AP-WWP

B -X V I

C hap ter 11 Moves to end the w ar/Part 1

Jushin indecisive, government blind

to peace talks

T

he Pacific W ar raged fo r three years and eight months from the attack on Pearl H arbor until Japan’s surrender. A w ar should only be started after a viable e xit strategy has been thought out. How w ere Japan’s political and m ilitary leaders at the time trying to end the war? W ere they just delaying the inevitable by fighting on, thereby bringing further m isery and suffering to the people? This chapter w ill examine these leaders’ attempts to end the Pacific W ar.

M ilitary Police obstruct peace moves Before lau n ch in g the war against the U nited States in Decem ber 1941 (the 16th year o f the Show a Era), Jap an did have an exit strategy o f sorts in place— "a draft plan to prom ote the end o f the war against the U nited States, B ritain , the N eth erlan d s and C h ia n g K ai-sh ek ." The Im perial H eadquarters-G overnm ent Liaison C on feren ce approved th e p lan on Novem ber 15, 1941, a few weeks before the Pacific W ar started. This was the on ly o fficial protocol that gave a n otion o f how the Pacific W ar— in clu din g the Sino-Japanese W ar—could be concluded.1 A ccording to the p lan , "W hile quickly destroying the strongholds o f the U nited States, Britain and the N etherlands in the Far East to secure the nation's self-existence and self-defense, we should take aggressive m ea­ sures to prom ote the subm ission o f C h ian g's N ation alist governm ent, cooperate w ith Germ any and Italy to drive Britain in to subm ission and then sap the w ill o f the U nited States to continue the w ar." The Emperor w anted the governm ent to draw up an exit strategy, but this draft plan was done in haste. H istorian M asayasu Hosaka said the plan was com piled w ithout even discussing the m atter w ith Germ any and Italy. According to h im , the plan was self-serving "w ishful thinkin g" that was "based on the assum ption that Germ any w ould grind Britain in to sub­ m ission, m aking Am ericans weary o f the war and consequently lead to war's en d ."2 169

170 / J apan' s wars in 19 3 1 -4 5

Japanese leaders expected from the beginning that the enemy would eventually become dispirited fighting the Pacific War and consent to an agreement favorable to Japan to end it if Japan stood firm and kept control of a certain region.3 They never considered the possibility that Japan would have to take the first step to end the war. However, worth noting in the plan is the reference to Japan's relations w ith the Soviet U nion, with which Tokyo had signed a neutrality pact. According to the plan, Japan "must prevent going to war against the Soviet Union" and, if necessary, “must make [Germany and the Soviet Union] conclude a peace accord w ith each other and bring the Soviet Union over to the Axis side." This policy guideline concerning Moscow was initially aimed at helping Germ any focus on its war against Britain, but it would change to one intended to keep the Soviet Union neutral vis-a-vis Japan and, if circum­ stances required, to end the Pacific War through Soviet mediation if the war situation deteriorated drastically. How did Japanese leaders think the war would end? O n the day the Imperial Japanese Navy attacked Pearl Harbor in Hawaii, former Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe felt the campaign was already doomed. He told his son-in-law Morisada Hosokawa: "Japan w ill lose this war. Starting today, you should study how Japan w ill lose it. This research is the duty o f a statesman."4 Although the Japanese military won some early battles, Konoe did not waver in his prediction. According to Nobuya tJchida, one of his friends and former Railways M inister, Konoe said, "As Admiral [Isoroku] Yamamoto stated, such excellent results w ill only continue for less than a year."5 Shortly before the attack on Pearl Harbor, Yamamoto reportedly told his aides, "Japan must start making peace overtures quickly while we still hold an advantage.” Prince Higashikuni (Higashikuni-no-miya Naruhiko), a member of the Imperial Fam ily, told Prime Minister Hideki Tojo: "I think Singapore will fall soon...Japan should advance negotiations w ith Chiang Kai-shek's government and start peace overtures w ith Britain and the United States. We must end this war without further delay." However, Tojo was defiant. "I think we w ill have few problems occupy­ ing not only Java and Sumatra but also Australia if things go on like this," he said. "We shouldn't think about peace at this tim e."6/ Dazzled by the early successes on m any fronts, the nation's leaders gradually began to turn a blind eye to the notion of Yamamoto and others to start peace negotiations immediately after w inning the initial battles. Former Ambassador to Britain Shigeru Yoshida was the first senior

Ju s h in indecisive, government blind to peace talks / 171

Japanese official who sought an end to the Pacific W ar. Yoshida, w ho mar­ ried a daughter o f Nobuaki M akino, former Lord Keeper o f the Privy Seal, encouraged Foreign M inister Shigenori Togo to start pushing for peace when Singapore fell into Japanese hands on February 15, 1942. Yoshida also tried to let Konoe visit Switzerland, a neutral country, and w ait for an opportunity to reach a peace settlem ent w ith the Allied Powers. According to historian Jo h n Dower, Yoshida also extolled the virtues of reaching an early end to hostilities w ith Kumao Harada, former secretary to form er Prim e M in ister K in m o ch i S a io n ji; p o litic a l critic Tatsuo Iwabuchi; Member of the House o f Peers Aisuke Kabayama; reserve Army General Jinzaburo Masaki; retired N avy Adm iral Kantaro Suzuki; retired Arm y G en eral K azushige U gaki; and form er Prim e M in ister R eijiro W akatsuki.7 However, Yoshida's m aneuvering ruffled some feathers. According to Yoshida, Lord Keeper o f the Privy Seal Koichi Kido, who was a staunch ally o f Tojo, criticized Yoshida's plan to keep Konoe in Europe. Tojo, w ho was wary o f Konoe's moves for peace, put pressure on Kido, saying "W e have to restrain h im ."8 Leaders o f the armed forces and the M ilitary Police tried to stamp out— both covertly and openly—any h in t o f support for starting m oves for peace talks. Tojo placed Hakujiro Kato, Ryoji Shikata and others, w ho were his close aides when Tojo was Com m anding General o f the Kwantung Army Police, in key posts in the M ilitary Police to crack down on groups opposed to him . "I am determined to clam p down on any behavior that disrupts nation­ al u n ity," Tojo said at the Im perial Diet in January 1943. "I w ill not toler­ ate such actions, even if they are made by ranking officials." The Im perial Diet members responded w ith applause. In the April 1942 general election in w hich more than 80 percent o f the seats were occupied by candidates recom mended by the Im perial Rule Assistance Association, candidates elected w ithout the endorsement o f the association's p o litica l arm in clu d ed Y ukio O zak i, Ich iro H atoyam a, H itoshi Ashida and Seigo Nakano. However, the Tojo Cabinet intervened and they were eventually branded as being unsupportive o f the war effort. Nakano was arrested for trying to persuade jushin, u n official senior advisers to the Emperor, to bring down the Tojo adm inistration and con­ tributing an article on the wartim e Prime M inister. Nakano com m itted suicide after being interrogated by the M ilitary Police.9

Coalition unites against Tojo In September 1943, Italy surrendered to the Allied Powers. O n the Pacific

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front, Japan's defeat by U .S. forces in severed key battles in the Solomon Islands made Japan's defeat in the Pacific War a distinctly possible outcome. Around that tim e, former Prime M inisters Keisuke Okada, Fumimaro Konoe and Kiichiro Hiranum a planned to meet w ith Tojo to charge him w ith failures o f the war effort. After m uch stalling, Tojo eventually m et w ith them the next year. Behind-the-scene maneuvering by the jushin in this period w ould give rise to an anti-Tojo cam paign.10 Okada was in a position to know exactly how the tide o f war was flow ­ ing. His eldest son, Sadatom o, was a naval officer working at the Naval General Staff; Hisatsune Sakomizu, w ho married his daughter, worked for the Cabinet Planning Board; and Lieutenant Colonel Ryuzo Sejim a, who belonged to the Arm y General Staff, often visited him . Sejima married a daughter o f Denzo M atsuo, Okada's brother-in-law w ho was killed in the February 26 Incident o f 1936 by officers w ho m istakenly took him for Okada due to their remarkably sim ilar appearances. Okada was convinced that bringing down the Tojo adm inistration was the first step necessary for ending the Pacific W ar. In August 1943, Okada used Sakomizu to urge Lord Keeper o f the Privy Seal Koichi Kido to move Tojo from the post o f Prime M inister to that o f C h ief o f Arm y General Staff.11 In November that year, he told Kido via Rear Adm iriil SokichiTakagi to replace C h ief o f Arm y General Staff Hajim e Sugiyama and C h ief o f Naval General Staff Osam i N agano. However, Kido, w ho recommended Tojo as Prime M inister, was reluctant to do so. In February 1944, Tojo tightened his grip on power by taking on the additional post as C h ief o f Army General Staff. However, Kido was far horn pleased w ith Tojo's appointm ent and made his feelings know n to the Prime M inister. "That is not some sim ple job that involves working as C h ief o f the Arm y General Staff for one hour in the m orning and working as War M inister for the rest o f the day," Kido said.12 O n June 16, Okada, an adm iral-turned politician, demanded that Navy M inister Shigetaro Shim ada, w]ho was a Tojo yes-m an, resign. Shim ada refused to step down; Tojo also was furious at the dem and. Prince Fushim i also urged Shim ada to resign, but Shim ada instead com pelled the prince to retire into Atam i, Shizuoka Prefecture.13 O n Ju ly 7, 1944, Saipan fe ll to the A llied Powers. Members o f the Twentieth Group in charge o f war coordination in the Arm y Department o f the Im perial Headquarters then decided "the Empire should plan to end the war quickly because it has no possibility o f regaining an even footing w ith the enem y. Like Germ any, our general situation w ill slide in a grad­ ual decline."14 M any lawmakers o f the Im perial Rule Assistance Association-related

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party stern ly criticized T ojo at a Ju ly 6 m eetin g. H ow ever, T o jo was unbending. "The beauty o f the Japanese people is that they are n ot afraid to d ie," he said, as he becam e increasingly em phatic about his argum ents for in stillin g a "suicide squad spirit." O n Ju ly 13, T ojo visited Kido and said, "I request that you put aside the question o f m y responsibility for Saipan's fall for now , I have decided to work toward a successful conclusion o f the war at this juncture." How ever, Kido left no doubt o f his position toward Tojo b y m aking three dem ands: separation o f W ar and N avy M inisters from General Staff Chiefs; replacem ent o f N avy M inister Shim ada; and bringing jushin and leaders o f other sectors in to his governm ent. W ith pressure m o u n tin g , T o jo h in te d h e m ig h t resign w hen he returned to the Prime M inister's O fficia l Residence. "The conditions w ould force m e to resign ," he said. "T he Lord Keeper o f the Privy Seal has changed his attitude com pletely. His confidence in me has evaporated."15 Kenryo Sato, M ilitary Affairs Bureau ch ief o f the W ar M inistry, and oth ­ ers pushed Tojo to ask the Emperor about his true feelings on the war sit­ uation . T ojo had an audience w ith the Emperor, at w hich he reportedly advised Tojo to replace Shim ada. How ever, Tojo refused to buckle. He tried to reshuffle his Cabin et to m eet Kido's thfee conditions. H is plan to force State M inister Nobusuke K ishi, in charge o f m ilitary dem and, to resign and bring form er Prime M inister M itsum asa Y on ai in to the Cabinet failed as they b oth refused. T ojo was C h ie f o f Staff o f the Kw antung Arm y w hen K ishi was a top bureaucrat in charge o f econom ic p o licy in M an chukuo. Since taking office, T ojo had appointed Kishi to im portant posts such as Com m erce and Industry M inister and State M inister in charge o f m ilitary dem and. How ever, K ishi delivered a fatal blow to the T ojo Cabinet. Okada thought that T ojo w ould urge K ishi to resign to open up a vacan­ cy in his C ab in et. He sent H isatsune Sakom izu to K ishi in advance and lob­ bied him to refuse to step dow n, even if T ojo insisted.16 As anti-T ojo forces started en circlin g the Prim e M inister, clandestine plans to assassinate him also were brew ing. O ne such p lan was hatched by Rear Adm iral Sokichi Takagi and others in ten t on topp lin g the Tojo governm ent. O n Ju n e 22, 1944, C aptain Shigenori Kam i secretly m et form er N avy Su b -lieu ten an t Suguru M ik a m i, a m asterm ind o f th e M ay 15, 1932, Incident and discussed a plan to assassinate the Prime M inister. N otes left by Takagi detailed the plan to be carried out by seven perpe­ trators. The assassination w ould be carried out on an intersection in front o f the N avy M inistry. The assailants w ould w ait in three cars parked w ith­ in the m inistry, alongside a m oat o f the Supreme Court and alongside the

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Hom e Affairs M inistry. W hen the signal was given after Tojo's convertible cam e in to view , the three cars were to sim ultaneously ram in to his vehicle, trap it and then gun down T o jo .17 After the killin g, Takagi w ould rem ain at the scene to take responsibili­ ty w hile the six others w ould escape to Taiw an in a N avy airplane. Another assassination p lot was recorded in M orisada Hosokawa's diary. The plan was made w hile T ojo had his hands fu ll trying to satisfy Kido's three conditions. W hen Hosokawa visited the residence o f Prince Takam atsu (Takamatsuno-miya Nobuhito) on the m orning o f Ju ly 15,1944, the younger brother o f Emperor Showa said, "The Tojo Cabinet is a regim e o f terror that w ill stop at n o th in g...U n d er the current circum stances, there's no option but to kill T ojo. Is there som eone w ho can kill him ?" Hosokawa told the Prince, "You should never say such a th in g ."18 That n igh t, Hosokawa talked w ith K enji Tom ita, C h ie f C abinet Secre­ tary o f the Konoe C ab in et, and asked him for h elp. "To save the country, please sacrifice your life and len d us you r support to p u n ish T o jo ," Hosokawa pleaded. A group led by Arm y M ajor Tom oshige Tsunoda w ho was strongly influenced by K anji Ishihara, also planned to assassinate Tojo by throw ing a grenade in to his convertible on Ju ly 15.19 How ever, all these plans cam e to n oth in g. The Tojo Cabin et resigned en masse on Ju ly 18, 1944.

Process o f elim ination creates Koiso Cabinet The Tojo C abinet was succeeded by one led by retired Arm y General Kuniaki Koiso. In reality, those w ho sought to topple the T ojo adm inistration had not considered w ho w ould replace him or even w ho was qualified to lead the n ation . That becam e apparent in jushin discussions held at the Im perial Palace on Ju ly 18,1944, to usher in the Koiso Cabin et. The m eeting was attended by seven form er prim e m inisters—Reijiro W akatsuki, Keisuke O kada, Koki H irota, Fum im aro Konoe, N obuyuki Abe, M itsum asa Yonai and K iichiro Hiranum a—as w ell as President o f the Privy C o u n cil Y oshim ichi Hara and Lord Keeper o f the Privy Seal K oichi Kido. The m eeting started at 4 p . m . and lasted for four tense hours. "A t the b egin n in g, everyone rem ained silen t, n o t a word was spoken," Konoe said.20 First, W akatsuki asked Kido for his op in ion , but Kido adroitly deflected the question. "I don't have any definite op in ion . First, I w ould like to know your ideas," he said.

Ju s h in indecisive, government blind to peace talks / 175

"The N avy is the overriding factor at present," Abe said as he recom­ mended Yonai to be prime m inister. Yonai insisted a civilian official was appropriate "That's idealistic," Konoe said. "Realistically, a m ilitary officer is a bet­ ter choice at this m om ent." Kido and Hiranum a agreed. "How about asking the Emperor to give us an Im perial m andate to choose one of us to be prime m inister am ong ourselves?" Hara asked. But Kido dismissed this plan as being "too difficult" to achieve. Hirota proposed form ing a cabinet w ith Im perial Fam ily members, but K onoe, H iranum a and W akatsuki opposed it. O kada recom m ended Konoe. Konoe in turn recommended Kantaro Suzuki, Vice President of the Privy C o u n cil and form er C h ie f o f N aval G en eral S ta ff and G rand Cham berlain. His proposal, however, fell flat as Yonai refused to agree w hile Hara contended that Suzuki "w ould never accept it." Under Kido's lead and persuasion, the attendees eventually formed a consensus that the next prime m inister should be chosen from the Army. H isaichi Terauchi, Yoshijiro Um ezu and Shunroku Hata were named as candidates from the Arm y. However, Terauchi was in active com m and of the Southern Arm y and Um ezu had just been appointed C h ief of the Army General Staff. Looking at the list o f candidates, Hara com plained, "How different are they from Tojo?" Frustration was m ounting as a successor to Tojo who would be acceptable to all was proving elusive.21 Finally, because Tojo, w ho did not attend the m eeting o f the jushin, had opposed appointing Terauchi as prime m inister, they decided to call Koiso, who was GovernorGeneral o f Korea at that tim e, back to Tokyo. Konoe was unconvinced o f Koiso's political caliber and urged Kido to form a coalition cabinet w ith Yonai. This plan failed to excite Yonai, who said a coalition cabinet "would result in a m uddling of responsibilities." Kido told Koiso and Yonai they should cooperate w ith each other to form a cabinet. Yonai seemed content to take a back seat to Koiso. Yonai told Koiso: "You do whatever you feel is right because it w ill be troublesome for both o f us to discuss every detail. Please consult w ith me only w hen you're at a loss about w hat to do."22 W hat was going through Koiso's m ind at that tim e? After W orld W ar II, Koiso looked back on the inauguration o f his Cabinet and criticized the jushin for being unw illing to engage in state affairs themselves yet still recom m ending him to be prime m inister even though they considered his position so precarious he needed Yonai to share the post.23 Koiso keenly hoped the Japanese m ilitary would w in "a brilliant victory

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just once" in the Pacific W ar because he wanted to start peace talks when Japan was on the front foot. He felt that a victory in the Philippines was necessary for concluding a peace deal w ith conditions favorable to Japan.24 But w hy didn't the jushin seriously discuss moves to end the Pacific War at the m eeting? They were afraid o f relentless surveillance by the M ilitary Police and o f fallin g victim to acts o f terrorism or a coup d'etat. Less than 10 years had passed since the February 26 Incident took place, so they hoped the new K oiso C ab in et w ould m ark a departure from T ojo's m ilitary-police-style politics more than anything else. Despite his best attem pts, Koiso failed to un ify the lines o f war com ­ m and and was unable to grasp the political and war situations. Koiso later said, "I didn't know w hat was really going on inside the m ilitary." He also trumpeted the slogan "Arm the entire 100 m illion [Japanese] people," and proposed that every citizen sim ultaneously face toward Ise Grand Shrine at 1:22 p . m . on December 12, 1944, and pray for victory. C ritic Kiyoshi Kiyosawa ridiculed Koiso in his diary that day. "The Japanese Prime M inister, w ho leads us in a war w ith advanced science and technology in the m iddle o f the 20th century, is a person w ho solem nly prays for a divine w ind to blow ," he wrote.25

Kido criticized as 'Chrysanthemum Curtain' As 1945 arrived, Konoe and other members of the Im perial Court group fin ally began to get serious about trying to find a way to end the Pacific W ar. As tools, they used C h ief Secretary to the Lord Keeper o f the Privy Seal Yasumasa M atsudaira, Secretary to the Foreign M inister Toshikazu Kase, Secretary to the W ar M inister Sei M atsutani and Rear Adm iral Sokichi Takagi. Lord Keeper o f the Privy Seal Koichi Kido said, "Japan must do every­ thing it can to w in a good chance to hold peace talks w ith the United States and Britain on an equal footing." Around Jun e 1944, he had also said, "If the chance arises, the only option w ill be for the Lord Keeper o f the Privy Seal and the Foreign M inister to take all responsibility and ask for an Im perial decision to make peace."26 Kido firm ly believed the war could not be stopped in midcourse. He felt the shortest path to peace was to fight it out un til a certain stage of the war had been com pleted. After the war ended, Kido recalled that he shared the Emperor's feelings and began thinking seriously o f ending the Pacific W ar around February 1945.27

Ju s h in indecisive, government blind to peace talks /177

However, Kido was criticized as "an obstruction in the Im perial Court" for not conveying the opinions o f the jushin to the Emperor. Hiroshi Shim om ura, President o f the Cabinet Inform ation Bureau and a well-known poet who went by the name Kainan, said Kido's greatest flaw was that he "didn't ask m any people for advice or think very deeply."28 Prince Takamatsu adm onished Morisada Hosokawa, who was frustrated w ith the snail-like pace o f moves toward peace, for criticizing Kido as "the number one evil." Between February 7 and 26, 1945, seven jushin, including Kido, were in v ited to the Im perial Palace to have an Im perial audience at the Emperor's request. The Emperor questioned each o f them individually on their assessment o f the war situation and w hat measures should be taken accordingly. "The Emperor was planning to pursue an offer to make peace after lis­ tening to their opinions," Grand Cham berlain Hisanori Fujita speculated at that tim e.29 O n February 7, the Em peror m et w ith H iranum a, H irota, K onoe, W akatsuki, M akino, Okada and Tojo, in that order. Konoe had an audi­ ence w ith the Emperor on February 14. According to accounts o f Konoe's words to the Emperor, Konoe clearly said at the beginning, "It is regrettable to say but our defeat has already become certain." "From the principle of retaining the national polity, what we should be concerned about is not defeat itself, but a com m unist revolution that m ight take place after the defeat," Konoe said. Konoe saw "every condition conducive for m aking a com m unist revo­ lution successful being forged," and pointed out that "a reform movem ent by a group in the m ilitary" was his greatest concern. "If we continue this war w ith no hope of w inning, w e'll fall into the com m unists' trap," He stressed. "I am convinced that steps to end the war should be taken w ithout further delay." This address by Konoe was the first tim e the Emperor had been advised to make peace w ith the A llied Powers. However, the Emperor resisted Konoe's proposal. "I think w hat you said w ill be rather difficult to achieve unless we find a way out o f the difficult situations in another stunning m ilitary success," the Emperor reportedly said.30 T ojo was the last to have an audience w ith the Em peror. H e was unshakable in his bullish view o f the war situation and lashed out at the Japanese people in front o f the Emperor. "The latest air raid on the hom eland is just a mere precursor o f strikes that w ill follow based on m odern warfare strategy," Tojo said. "If the

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public gets exhausted by such a trivial event, we can never consider accom plishing anything great in the Greater East Asia W ar." "C o m p lain ts about war rations have com e about because people remember w hat their diet was like before," he continued. "I have not yet heard o f a single subject o f the Emperor dying of hunger."31 After the war, Kido criticized the com ments by the jushin. "I expected their addresses would be devoid o f genuine content," he said. "They just addressed topics that skirted the harsh realities. O n ly Konoe gave the Emperor a direct answer."32 W akatsuki wrote in his memoirs o f the conflict he felt at the tim e. "W hen I had the d istin ctio n o f bein g presented to speak to the Emperor, there was no way I could give any suggestion we should surren­ der," he explained.

Negotiations with China and Soviet Union derailed The Koiso Cabinet had an eye on bringing the Pacific W ar to an end. One plan aimed to make U .S. and British forces withdraw from C hin a by persuading W ang Chao-m ing N ationalist regime in N anjing and Chiang Kai-shek's N ationalist regime in Chongqing to form a unified governm ent. According to conditions for peace made by the Im perial Supreme W ar C ou n cil on September 5, 1944, Japan w ould be satisfied w ith Chin a's b en evo len t n eu trality w ith the U n ited States and B ritain ; approve establishm ent of a unified Chinese governm ent upon Chiang Kai-shek's return to N an jin g; and p u ll out its troops if U .S . and B ritish forces stationed in C hin a also withdrew. V ice W ar M in ister K aneshiro Shibayam a was sent to N a n jin g in September to tell the leaders o f the N anjing regime of these conditions. Although Chen Kung-po (Chen Gongbo) and Chou Fo-hai (Zhou Fohai), agreed to accept the conditions, the negotiations stalled and Were aborted w ith W ang Chao-m ing's death on November 1 0 ,1944.33 A long w ith this plan, the so-called M iao Pin maneuver was gearing up. If the Japanese approach to N anjing was a fastball, the M iao Pin plan could be called a political curveball. M iao Pin, Vice President o f the Kaoshi Yuan, an organ o f the N anjing governm ent in charge o f validating the qualifications o f civil servants, was also in contact w ith the C hongqing governm ent. This strategy was prom oted by Prim e M inister Koiso b u t strongly opposed by Foreign M inister M am oru Shigem itsu, who suspected M iao Pin was a spy working for the Chongqing governm ent. "Using his espionage activities against Chongqing as bait, [Miao Pin] frequently revealed internal inform ation about the N anjing government

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to m ake us th in k he was a good inform ant. He tried to topple the N an jin g governm ent and stir up disorder in the Japanese governm ent w hile com ­ m unicating w ith the C h o n gq in g side by radio," Shigem itsu said.34 Koiso regarded M iao Pin as som eone w ho could act as a go-betw een and convey Jap an 's intentions to the C ho n gq in g governm ent. Taketora O gata, State M inister w ithout p ortfolio, reported on M iao Pin to Koiso around Septem ber 1944. A ccording to a letter w ritten by M iao P in, w hich O gata handed to Koiso, C h ian g Kai-shek was deeply concerned that Japan's defeat w ould be tantam ount to C h in a losing the "lip s." By "lip s," M iao Pin obviously viewed Jap an as de facto cover for defending the "teeth" (Nationalists) from internal and external forces. The letter w ent on to say Japan's defeat w ould im m ediately harm C h in a itself and cause tur­ m oil that w ould keep his hands fu ll and prevent him from saving the country from the emergence o f com m unist C h in a , invasion by the Soviet U n io n , and being divided up b y the U nited States and B ritain.35 In M arch 1945, Koiso arranged a plane to bring M iao Pin to Jap an . How ever, Foreign M inister Shigem itsu, W ar M inister H ajim e Sugiyam a and N avy M inister M itsum asa Y on ai h eld grave reservations about the visit. To settle the confusion, the Emperor ordered Koiso to send M iao Pin hom e to C h in a in early A pril. M eanw hile, Japan also was devising a p lan to ask the Soviet U n ion to broker a peace deal between Jap an and the A llied Powers after Jap an had done likew ise between Germ any and the Soviet U n io n . Sh igem itsu issued an order for Jap an ese Am bassador to G erm any H iroshi O shim a to broker peace betw een Berlin and M oscow , but the Soviet U n ion rejected the dispatch o f Koki H irota, an envoy from Jap an , at talks between Japanese Am bassador to M oscow Naotake Sato and Soviet Foreign M inister Vyacheslav M olotov on Septem ber 1 6 ,1944.36 The Koiso C abinet frittered away precious tim e on these negotiations, w hich offered on ly the slim m est possibility o f success, and was forced to resign en masse on April 5, 1945. Motes

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1T h e F o reign M in is try o f Ja p a n , e d ., Shusen Shiroku (H isto ry o n th e P a c ific W ar's E nd) vol. 1, T o k y o : H o k u y o sh a , 1977, p . 33

2 M asayasu H o sa k a, Maboroshi no Shusen (Illu so ry E n d o f th e P a c ific W ar), T o k y o : C h u k o B u n k o , 2 0 0 1 , p . 106 3 T o rn H a giw ara, Taisen no Kaibo (A n a to m y o f W o rld W ar II), T o k y o : Y o m iu ri S h im b u n , 1950, p . 83 4 M o risad a H o so kaw a, Genro Jushin no Doko (A cts o f G e n ro e s a n d Ju s h in s ) in Kataritsugu

Showa-shi (D icta te d H isto ry o f Sh o w a Era) vol. 3, T o k y o ; A sa h i S h im b u n , 1976, p . 304 5 S h in y a U c h id a , Kaikoroku: Fusetsu Gojunen (50 years o f H a rd sh ip s), T o k y o : Jits u g y o n o N ih o n S h a , 1951, p . 297 6 N a ru h ik o H ig a s h ik u n i, Ichi-kozoku no Senso Nikki (W ar D ia ry b y A n Im p erial F am ily

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w a r s in

1931-45

Member), Tokyo: Nihon Shuhosha, 1957, p. 106 7Joh n W . Dower, Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878-1954, Cambridge, Mass.: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1979, pp. 231-234 8Shigeru Yoshida, Nippon wo Ketteishita Hyakunen (100 Years That Shaped Japan), Tokyo: Chuko Bunko, 1999, p. 196 9Masayasu Hosaka, Tojo Hideki to Tenno no Jidai (ge) (Era o f Hideki Tojo and the Emperor vol. 2), Tokyo: Chikuma Bunko, 2005, pp. 464-465 “ Ibid., p. I l l 11 Sadahiro Okada, ed., Okada Keisuke Kaikoroku (Memoirs of Keisuke Okada), Tokyo: Chuko Bunko, 1987, pp. 225-226 12Yoshio Tatai, Ketsudanshita Otoko Kido Koichi no Showa (Showa Era o f the M an W ho Made a Decision: Koichi Kido), Tokyo: Bungeishunju, 2000, p. 256 18 Okada, op. cit., pp. 231-237 14 Gunji-shi Gakkai (Military History Society), ed., Daihonei Rikugun-bu Sensoshido-han Kimitsu Senso Nisshi (Secret War Log of War Coordination Group, the Army Department of the Imperial Headquarters) vol. 2, Tokyo: Kinseisha, 1998, p. 552 15Hosaka, op. cit., pp. 169-170 16Okada, op. cit., pp. 241-242 17Shigeo Kawagoe, Kakute Taiheiyo Senso wa Owatta (And the Pacific War Ended), Tokyo: PHP Bunko, 2005, pp. 131-132 18Morisada Hosokawa, Hosokawa-ke Jushichi-daime (17th Heir to the Hosokawas), Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 1991, pp. 83-84 19Hosaka, op. cit., p. 163 20 Fumimaro Konoe, Konoe Nikki (Konoe Diary), Tokyo: Konoe Nikki Henshu Iinkai (Diary o f Konoe Editing Committee), Kyodo News, 1968, p. 89 21Koichi Kido, Kido Koichi Nikki (Diary of Koichi Kido) vol. 2, Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1966, pp. 1,122-1,127 22Taketoshi Kamikawa, Yonai Mitsumasa (Mitsumasa Yonai), Tokyo: PHP Bunko, 2001, pp. 541-544 23Kuniaki Koiso, Katsuzan Koso (Memoirs), Tokyo: Marunouchi Shuppan, 1963, p. 794 24Ibid., p. 797 25 Kiyoshi Kiyosawa, Ankoku Nikki (Diary in the Black Darkness), Tokyo: Hyoronsha, 1995, p. 496 28 Yoshitake Oka et al., eds., Kido Koichi Kankei Bunsho (Documents Related to Koichi Kido), Tokyo University of Tokyo Press, 1966, pp. 53-54 27Tatsuo Katsuta, Jushintachi no Showa-shi (History of Senior Advisers to the Emperor in the Showa Era), Tokyo: Bungeishunju, 1981, p. 349 28 Kainan Shimomura, Shusen H ishi (Secret History o f the End o f the War), Tokyo: Kodansha Gakujutsu Bunko, 1985, p. 270 29 H isanori Fujita, Jijucho no Kaiso (Memoirs by the Grand Cham berlain), Tokyo: Kodansha Gakujutsu Bunko, 1961, p. 43 30 Takam atsunom iya N ob u h ito Shin n o Biography P ublish in g C om m ittee, e d ., Takamatsunomiya Nobuhito Shinno (Prince Takamatsu), Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun, 1991, p. 389 31Ibid., p. 80 32Katsuta, op. cit., p. 358 33 Takushiro Hattori, Daitoa Senso Zenshi (The W hole History of the Greater East Asia War), Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1965, pp. 661-664 34Mamoru Shigemitsu, Shigemitsu Mamoru Shuki (Notes of Mamoru Shigemitsu), Tokyo:

Jushin indecisive , governm ent b lin d to peace talks / 181 Chuokoron-Shinsha, 1986, p . 463 35Koiso, op. cit., p. 811 36Hattori, op. cit., pp. 658-660

Chapter 12 Moves to end the w ar/Part 2

Japan fails to prevent dropping of atomic bombs, Soviet entry into war

n February 4-11, 1945 (the 20th year of the Showa Era), the leaders of the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union met in Yalta on the Crimean Peninsula and secretly decided that the Soviets would join the war against Japan a few months after Germany’s unconditional surrender. As Japan’s defeat seemed inevitable, Prime Minister Kantaro Suzuki’s Cabinet, which was inaugurated in April 1945, desperately moved to seek Moscow’s mediation to help reach a peace agreement to bring the war to a close. These hopes were dashed when the United States successfully conducted its first atomic bomb test, while the Soviet Union was seeking an opening to join the w ar against Japan. W hy could Japan not prevent the United States from dropping the atomic bombs on Japan and stop the Soviet Union from entering the war?

O

Big Three make a secret agreement O n February 4,1945, U .S. President Franklin D . Roosevelt, British Prime M inister W inston C hurchill and Soviet Premier Josef Stalin m et at Yalta on the Crim ean Peninsula in the southern Soviet U n ion , now Ukraine. Stalin chose Yalta as the venue, a distant location that forced his counterparts to make a lon g, grueling journey. Roosevelt, w ho was sick at that tim e, had to travel by ship, transfer to an airplane and then be driven by car to get to his destination. It was snow ing w hen he arrived. Roosevelt and Churchill stayed at a palace built in the days o f Tsarist Russia. The palace was h eavily bugged by the Soviet security p olice. According to records, Sarah C hurchill, w ho accom panied her father on the trip, privately told him that lem on would go nicely w ith caviar. They woke up the next day to fin d a lem on tree had been planted in an orange orchard w ithin the palace.1 At this first m eeting since the Tehran Conference in Novem ber 1943, the leaders discussed how to handle Europe's postwar reorganization. They signed the Yalta Agreem ent, w hich declared Germ any w ould be 183

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tem porarily split in to four zones o f occupation controlled by the U nited States, B ritain, France and the Soviet U n io n , settled the postwar borders o f Poland and allow ed the Soviet U n ion to occupy the B altic countries o f Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania to rem ain under the Soviet sphere o f in flu ­ ence. (See APPENDIX O.) The three leaders also secretly agreed that the Soviet U n ion w ould join the figh t against Jap an two or three m onths after Germ any fe ll, an idea agreed to by Roosevelt and Stalin beforehand. Roosevelt p ut the secret agreem ent in his private safe. C h in a was a m em ber o f the A llied Powers but was not inform ed o f the agreem ent's content. U .S . President Harry Trum an, w ho succeeded Roosevelt w ho died two m onths after the conference, wrote in his m em oir that he did not know w hat was w ritten in the docum ent u n til he opened Roosevelt's safe.2 M ade public by the U nited States after the war, the secret agreem ent stipulated three conditions for Soviet participation in the fig h t against Japan: • The status quo in Outer M ongolia (People's Republic o f M ongolia) w ill be preserved. • The form er rights o f Russia lost in the 1904-05 Russo-Japanese W ar w ill be restored, n am ely: The southern part o f Sakh alin and the islands adjacent to it w ill be returned to the Soviet U n ion ; the port of D alian w ill be internationalized, the preem inent interest o f the Soviet U n ion in this port w ill be safeguarded and the lease o f Port Arthur in Lushun as a naval base o f the Soviet U n ion w ill be restored; and C h in a and the Soviet U n io n w ill jo in tly control the Chinese Eastern and South M anchurian Railw ays, and the Soviets' preferential interest in these railways w ill be guaranteed. • The Kuril Islands w ill be turned over to the Soviet U n io n . Roosevelt accepted these conditions dem anded by Stalin concerning Jap an . Before their m eeting, Roosevelt told Stalin in a w ritten docum ent that he approved o f Jap an 's returning Sakhalin and the Kurils to the USSR. Based on these agreem ents, after the war the Soviet U n ion obtained part o f East Prussia, w hich included Konigsberg (now Kaliningrad), estab­ lished satellite states in Centred and Eastern Europe and took over all o f Sakh alin and the K urils as w ell as fou r n orth ern islands—K u n ash iri, E torofu, H abom ai and Sh ikotan located south o f the K urils. The four islands o ff eastern H okkaido are historically Japan's territories, know n as the N orthern Territories. As the C o ld W ar started to tighten its icy grip on diplom atic relations, the Y alta Agreem ent was branded by Poland and other Soviet satellite

Japan fa ils to prevent dropping o f atom ic bom bs, Soviet entry into war / 185

states in Eastern Europe as a "betrayal" th at had brought them under com m unist control ow ing to Roosevelt's concessions to Stalin . This con­ dem nation is still heard today, m ore than a decade after the Soviet-Eastern Europe bloc collapsed. "The captivity o f m illions in Central and Eastern Europe w ill be remem­ bered as one o f the greatest wrongs o f h istory," U .S . President George W . Bush said in his speech in Riga, Latvia, on M ay 7, 2005. W hy did Roosevelt m ake so m any concessions to Stalin? It has often been pointed out that Roosevelt thought at the tim e o f the Yalta Conference it was necessary to ensure the Soviets w ould jo in the war against Jap an to bring a speedy end to the figh tin g. W ith appalling casu­ alties expected during the planned lan ding on the Japanese m ainland by U .S . forces, it was essential to have the Kw antung Arm y, the Im perial Japanese Arm y's elite u n it, kept busy figh tin g in M anchuria. A c c o rd in g to U .S . A m b assad or to th e S o v ie t U n io n W . A v e re ll H arrim an, givin g M oscow the Kuril Islands was a sm all m atter to Roosevelt com pared w ith the huge advantage to be gained by Russian help in defeat­ in g Ja p a n .3 Som e observers speculate th at Roosevelt's poor h ealth im paired his judgm ent, w hile his cam araderie w ith Stalin and his adm inistration's proSoviet stance also played a part in preventing Roosevelt from detecting the true Soviet am bitions for the postw ar order. A ccording to docum ents made public recently in the U nited States on Soviet code-breaking opera­ tions before and after the war, part o f the reason for this pro-Soviet stance was that a then U .S . deputy assistant treasury secretary and others in the adm inistration \yere actually Soviet spies.4 A t the tim e o f the Y alta C o n feren ce, C h u rch ill's doctor described Roosevelt as being seriously ill and said his cognitive ab ility was w aning. At the Tehran Conference, Roosevelt called Stalin "U n cle Jo e ," and after the conference, he said his Soviet counterpart was a m an w ho "com bines a trem endous, relentless determ ination w ith stalwart good hum or." According to form er U .S . Secretary o f State H enry Kissinger, C h u rch ill w anted to reconstruct the traditional balance o f power in Europe w hile Stalin "strove to cash in on " his country's victory in expanding its in flu ­ ence in C en tral Europe. For h is part, Roosevelt "envisioned a postwar order in w hich the three victors, along w ith C h in a , w ould act as a w orld­ w ide board o f directors o f the w orld, en forcin g the peace against any potential m iscreant.”5

U.S. drops bomb despite objections A t 5:30 a .m . on Ju ly 16,1945, the U nited States successfully detonated a

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new type o f bom b w ith unprecedented destructive capability in the desert near Alam ogordo, New M exico. The U nited States started its developm ent o f atom ic bom bs in August 1942 in an effort called the M anhattan Project. Albert Einstein, w ho, along w ith other physicists in exile, w anted to pre­ vent N azi Germ any from grabbing the lead in the race to build an atom ic w eapon, w rote a letter to U .S . President R oosevelt ca llin g for greater research in the field . The U nited States spent m ore than $2 b illio n —about $14 b illio n in today's dollars—for the project, w hich was led by Secretary o f W ar H enry Stim son, w ho was responsible to the President for the pro­ ject, and General Leslie Groves, the adm inistrator o f the p roject.6 (See Footnote 4.) A fter the successful test, Brigadier General Thom as Farrell turned to Groves and said, "The war is over." Groves responded, "Yes, after we drop two bom bs on Ja p a n ."7 But those w ho were involved in the test were ordered to keep it strictly to them selves u n til the bom b was dropped. The U nited States and Britain agreed in August 1943 that "the concur­ rence o f Prime M inister C h u rch ill was necessary" before the U nited States dropped atom ic bom bs on Jap an .8 A t their m eeting in Septem ber 1944, Roosevelt and C h u rch ill con ­ firm ed that w hen an atom ic bom b was "fin a lly available...after mature consideration, [it should] be used against the Japanese, w ho should be warned that this bom bardm ent w ill be repeated u n til they surrender."9 Assigned to make a decision on the use o f the first atom ic bom b, the Interim Com m ittee on postwar nuclear p olicy, led by Stim son, decided that givin g w arning that an atom ic bom b m ight be dropped could allow

Footnote 4 Atom ic bomb A to m ic b o m b p r o d u c tio n re q u ire s c o n v e r s io n o f n a tu r a l u r a n iu m in to u r a n iu m o x id e a n d th e n in to u r a n iu m h e x a flu o r id e , fr o m w h ic h u r a n iu m 2 35 is e x tr a c te d to m a k e e n r ic h e d u r a n iu m . T h e g u n b a rre l-ty p e b o m b d ro p p e d o n H ir o s h im a w as m a d e w ith u r a n iu m 2 3 5 , w h ic h h a d n o t b e e n te s t-d e to n a te d b e fo r e h a n d . T h e w o rld le a rn e d o f its d e str u c tiv e p o w e r fo r th e fir s t tim e w h e n it w as d ro p p e d o n A u g u st 6 . T h e b o m b d ro p p e d o n N a g a s a k i th re e d a y s la te r w as m a d e w ith p lu to n iu m 2 3 9 . T h is im p lo s io n -ty p e b o m b n e e d e d th e c o n v e r s io n o f u r a n iu m 2 3 8 in to p lu to n iu m , w h ic h is h ig h ly fis s io n a b le , fr o m w h ic h p lu to n iu m 2 3 9 is c h e m ic a lly e x tr a c te d . A b a ll o f p lu to n iu m 2 3 9 , w ra p p e d w ith o r d in a r y d e to n a tin g p o w d e r, is co m p re sse d w h e n th e p o w d e r is ig n ite d a n d th e w h o le b a ll is d e to n a te d . T h e p ressu re trig g e rs n u c le a r fis s io n . A p lu to n iu m b o m b w as te s te d in A la m o g o r d o , N e w M e x ic o in J u ly 1945.

Japan fails to prevent dropping o f atomic bom bs, Soviet entry into war / 187

Japan to try to shoot down the bom b carrier. Conducting a dem onstration to show what carnage m ight await Japan if it did not lay down its arms would be difficult to arrange. The com m ittee members reached an "agree­ m ent that we could not give the Japanese any warning; that we could not concentrate on a civilian area; but that we should seek to make a profound psychological impression on as m any inhabitants as possible."10 The agreement was proposed by U .S. Secretary of State Jam es Byrnes and presented to Trum an. At the tim e, the U .S. governm ent remained o f two m inds about drop­ p in g an ato m ic bom b on Ja p a n . European T heater o f O p eration s C om m an din g G eneral D w ight Eisenhow er to ld Stim son he strongly opposed the idea o f using the bom b. Eisenhower said later he thought at the tim e Japan was already on the brink o f defeat and "I hated to see our country be the first to use such a w eapon."11 W hy did the com m ittee adopt a recom m endation to use the bomb against Japan? One o f the reasons, Byrnes later said, was that "W e did not want to urge the Russians to enter the w ar."12 After the Yalta Conference, the United States became increasingly sus­ picious o f M oscow's motives concerning the future o f Poland. The United States decided to terminate the war by dropping atom ic bombs on Japan and forcing it to surrender before the Soviet U nion had the chance to join the figh tin g.13 W ashington also wanted to gain the upper hand in the postwar inter­ national political arena by intim idating the Krem lin w ith the use of the atom ic bombs against Jap an .14 The U .S. adm inistration also predicted strong pressure from both hous­ es o f the Congress to use the bom b, w hich was developed at huge expense w ith tax m oney, to spare the lives o f U .S. soldiers. Truman asked Harry Hopkins, an adviser to Roosevelt, to visit Moscow to check the situation there. O n M ay 28, Hopkins met Stalin, w ho told him that the Soviet forces would com plete their preparations to join the war by August 8. The days on w hich Japan's fate w ould be decided—by the eventual entry o f the Soviet U n ion in the war and the dropping o f U .S. atom ic bombs—were virtually set to come on or around August 8. Truman refused to include in the Potsdam Proclam ation a direct expres­ sion suggesting Japan's Emperor system could be m aintained after it sur­ rendered. A scholar's analysis leads some people to believe that Truman knew Japan would reject a dem and for an unconditional surrender that did not guarantee the preservation o f the constitutional m onarchy.15 The directive to drop atom ic bom bs, written by Groves, was issued on

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Ju ly 25, after approval by General George M arshall, the U .S. Army C h ief of Staff. President Truman was not directly involved in the issuance o f th6 directive, but Groves hinted at the President's tacit consent in his mem­ oirs. According to Groves, Truman's decision was "basically a decision not to upset existing plan s."16 The directive read: "The 509 Com posite Group, 20th Air Force, w ill deliver its first special bom b as soon as weather w ill permit visual bom bing after about 3 August, 1945, on one o f the targets: H iroshim a, Kokura, N iigata and N agasaki."17

Japan late in atomic bomb development Japan also had been secretly conducting research on the feasibility of atom ic bombs through two channels. According to a researcher, one chan­ nel was the governm ent's Rikagaku Kenkyusho (Institute o f Physical and C h em ical Sciences), also know n as R iken. The in stitu te 's President M asatoshi O kochi was asked by Takeo Yasuda, chief o f the Arm y's Air Technical Laboratories, to look into the matter in M ay 1941. Two years later, Yasuda received a report from quantum physicist and C h ief Scientist o f Riken Yoshio N ishina that concluded producing atom ic bom bs was "technically possible." The other was Kyoto Im perial University Professor Bunsaku Arakatsu, whom the N aval Technical Department asked to "study the possibility of producing atom ic bom bs."18 However, neither of the research projects ever got o ff the ground and both ended up only as basic studies. In Ju ly 1944, before the en masse resignation o f his Cabinet, Prime M inister Hideki Tojo ordered Seiji Kan, Com m ander of the Arm y's Arma­ m ent Adm inistration Headquarters, to collect 10 kilograms o f uranium as quickly as possible.19 Tojo aimed to deter U .S. bom bardm ent of m ainland Japan by stunning the United States by dropping a uranium bom b on Saipan. The Imperial Japanese Arm y attem pted to acquire two tons o f uranium ore from Germ any for the project. However, the submarine carrying the uranium back to Japan was sunk by Allied vessels. The Im perial Japanese N avy also failed to obtain enough uranium to make a bom b. Riken was forced to give up its project after its research facility was destroyed in an air raid in April 1945. The Navy and Kyoto Im perial University were also unable to com ­ plete their research before the war ended. "Japan lacked the organization and leadership to m obilize scientists during the w ar," N ishina said."20

Japan fa ils to prevent dropping o f atom ic bom bs, Soviet entry into war /1 8 9

Japan sticks to its m ainland battle plan N avy A dm iral Kantaro Suzuki, President o f the Privy C o u n c il, was appointed to succeed Prime M inister Kuniaki Koiso. Suzuki, w ho served as G rand Cham berlain for a lon g tim e, was deeply trusted by the Emperor. How ever, he was already 77 years old and hard o f hearing. W hy was Suzuki appointed as the last wartim e Prime M inister? Koiso presented his resignation as Prime M inister on the m orning o f A pril 5, 1945..A ccording to Kido Koichi N ikki (Diary o f K oichi Kido), at an evening conference o f jushin, senior statesm en w ho served as extra constitutional advisers to the Emperor, w hich began w ith an address by Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal K oichi K ido, form er Prime M inister H ideki T ojo was the first to offer his o p in io n . T ojo stated, "It isn 't good th at Cabinets fa il and change frequently during a w ar...The next C abinet should be the last one [during the war]. The nation is divided between those w ho w ant to con­ tinue figh tin g u n til a glorious victory is w on, and those w ho favor accept­ in g dem ands for our u n co n d itio n al surrender and im m ediately m ake peace. I th in k we need to decide now w hich path to take."21 The Arm y w anted "an Arm y general on active duty" to succeed Koiso. C onsidering th is, Tojo's statem ent apparently was a w arning aim ed at people in clu d in g form er Prim e M inisters Fum im aro Konoe and Keisuke O kada, w ho were proponents o f the peace p ath . K iichiro H iranum a and Suzuki agreed w ith T ojo. How ever, O kada, Konoe and Reijiro W akatsuki, another form er Prim e M in ister, h eld th eir ground, in sistin g th a t the jushin conference's aim was m erely to choose the next Prime M inister and they had no right to "m ake any decision on n ation al p olicy now ." C onse­ quently, they agreed the n ext Prim e M inister should be som ebody w ho at least w ill "continue fig h tin g u n til the en d ," as H iranum a and Suzuki had sought. H iranum a recom m ended Suzuki to be the next Prime M inister, and Konoe and W akatsuki supported the idea. How ever, Suzuki felt he was n ot the best ch oice. "It w ould destroy the n ation if m ilitary officers interfere in p o litics...I also have poor hearing. I'd like to turn dow n the recom m endation," Suzuki said. But H iranum a was persistent and stated, "T hough M r. Suzuki is a N avy officer, he is deeply trusted b y the Emperor as he served as civ il servant for a lo n g tim e." Kido had earlier gained the approval o f O kada, Konoe, N avy M inister M itsum asa Y on ai and other C ab in et m inisters w ho could n o t atten d th e co n feren ce, to push for Suzuki to be the n e xt Prim e M inister. T ojo recom m ended Arm y G eneral Shunroku H ata be given the post. In the end, Kido urged Suzuki to stand u p , and m ost o f those in attendance agreed to support h im . "N ow that our hom eland w ill becom e a b attlefield, if you aren't very careful, the Arm y m ay turn its back on u s,"

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T ojo said, trying to drum up support for H ata. "If the Arm y turns on us, the Cabin et w ill collapse." How ever, the discussion fin ished after Okada briefly chided Tojo for speaking for the Arm y. Kido later wrote in his diary that there was a tacit agreem ent am ong the jushin about seeking peace, but they did n ot speak up at the conference because they "feared the Arm y m ay take matters into their ow n hands if they m ade remarks about their w ish to term inate the w ar." A t m idn ight on April 5, Suzuki was granted an audience w ith the Emperor, w ho ordered him to form a new C ab in et. A ccording to custom , the Emperor was sup­ posed to say, "You should abide by the C on stitu tion after form ing the C ab in et." How ever, the Emperor om itted such form alities w ith Suzuki. Grand Cham berlain H isanori Fujita later said the Emperor "ordered M r. Suzuki to form a Cabinet w ithout giving any preconditions."22 Suzuki asked the Emperor to allow h im to decline the post. However, in an extraordinary statem ent the Emperor said, "A t this critical juncture, there is nobody else. I beseech you , please accept m y order, even if it goes again st you r w ish es." The A rm y was still d istru stfu l o f Su zu k i. W ar M inister H ajim e Sugiyam a presented three conditions to Sukuki, w ho had already started form ing the Cabinet: • The Cabinet should carry through the war w ithout fa il. • The Prime M inister should form a cabinet able to integrate the Arm y and the N avy. • The Cabin et should ensure measures recom m ended by the Arm y w ill be carried out to bring victory in the fin al show dow n on the m ain­ land. Sugiyam a im plied he w ould n ot support the new W ar M inister if Suzuki did n o t accept these co n d itio n s. Despite Sugiyam a's concerns, Suzuki readily agreed to these dem ands—he picked Korechika A nam i as W ar M in ister an d Sh ig e n o ri T ogo as Foreign M in iste r. H e also retain ed M itsum asa Yonai as N avy M inister. A lthough the Arm y had w anted Y onai, w ho had refused to integrate the Arm y w ith the N avy, to go, he rem ained in his post partly because Suzuki w ished him to do so. The Arm y, w hich had its sights set on figh tin g the fin a l b a ttle o n th e m a in la n d , called fo r in te g ra tio n w ith th e N a vy . How ever, the N avy scoffed at the idea, adam ant that any such integration w ould m ean its absorption b y the Arm y. W hat m ight have happened if the forces had been integrated? If the Arm y and N avy had been integrat­ ed, "W e couldn't have accepted [the Potsdam Declaration] due to absolute opposition from the m ilitary," N avy C aptain Atsushi O i later said. "As a result, the m ainland w ould have been destined to becom e a battlefield."23

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The Suzuki Cabinet was inaugurated on April 7, the day the colossal battleship Yamato and five other ships of the Navy's Second Fleet, w hich were heading to Okinawa on a suicide m ission, were sunk by U .S. forces before they could accom plish their m ission.

Japan is naive to expect Soviet mediation O n April 5,1945, Ambassador to the Soviet U nion Naotake Sato brought a disturbing message conveying the Kremlin's decision not to extend the 1941 Jap an ese-Soviet N eu trality Pact from Soviet Foreign M in ister Vyacheslav M olotov. The news could not have come at a worse tim e: U .S. forces had come ashore on Okinaw a on April 1; and Germ any, Japan's European ally, was inching ever closer to defeat. The government feared the nation would be annihilated if the Soviet U nion joined the war. However, the pact was still valid for another year. M olotov told Sato that the Soviet U nion would honor the treaty for one more year if Japan did so.24 It was only after the war was over that Sato learned o f the secret pact agreed on by the United States, Britain and the Soviet U nion at the Yalta Conference in February regarding Soviet participation in the war. Sato reported to Tokyo that the Soviet U nion aimed to ease the friction building between itself and the United States and Britain by telling Japan that it would not extend the pact, and in ligh t o f this, the Soviet U nion did not actually intend to start hostilities, w ith Jap an for the tim e being. Bewitched by Sato's incorrect report, the governm ent put too m any o f its eggs in the Soviet Union's basket. O n April 22, Torashiro Kawabe, new V ice C h ief o f the Arm y General Staff, and Seizo Arisue, chief o f the Second Bureau (Intelligence), visited newly appointed Foreign M inister Shigenori Togo at his hom e. According to Arisue's m em oir, Kawabe told Togo, "You should do som ething dras­ tic—offer the Soviet U nion generous proposals and encourage it to stay neutral and mediate a peace settlem ent for us." He said Japan could not help but forfeit M anchuria and Sakhalin for that purpose.25 Army General Staff C h ief Yoshijiro Um ezu and Naval General Staff Vice C h ief Jisaburo Ozawa later made similar proposals. O n April 8, the Arm y issued the Guidelines o f the Final Operation Preparations to its units to reinforce m ilitary preparations in the Kanto area o f Honshu and in Kyushu for the expected fin al battles on the m ain­ land. The ground commanders wanted to in flict at least one devastating blow on the U .S. invaders to force the United States to agree to a settle­ m ent more favorable to Tokyo. Preventing Soviet participation in the war, w hich would seriously impede their fin al battle plans against the United States, was believed to be essential. Togo thought the m ilitary's request

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was a "gift from G o d ." He decided to "use the m ilitary's wishes to quickly lead the situation toward peace," n ot just to prevent Soviet participation in the w ar.26 "W e m ust term inate the war at a tim e m ost preferable to Ja p a n ," Togo, then Foreign M inister in the T ojo Cabin et, was quoted as tellin g Foreign M inistry officials on January 1, 1942.27 T ogo now m oved b eh in d th e scenes to arrange a m eetin g o f the Im perial Supreme W ar C o u n cil w ith the Prime M inister, Foreign M inister, W ar M in ister, N avy M in ister and th e C h ie fs o f the A rm y and N avy General Staffs on M ay 14, and successfully coaxed them in to deciding w hat tack to take in negotiations w ith the Soviet U n io n . The directions in cluded preventing Soviet participation in the war, ensuring the Soviet U n io n w ould stay neutral, and ensuring the Soviets w ould m ediate givin g preferential con ditions to Jap an concerning the term ination o f the war. The m ilitary leaders said n oth in g. This was the m om ent that the governm ent considered for the first tim e how to term i­ nate the war. How ever, the governm ent was n ot assured th at its plan to w in M oscow 's cooperation w ould succeed. Togo was suspicious o f the Soviet U n ion 's sincerity, but nonetheless thought the situation w ould be unsalvageable for Japan if M oscow com ­ pletely sided w ith the enem y. " If any foreign country can lead the situation to a settlem ent that does n ot include our unconditional surrender, it is the Soviet U n io n ," he was quoted as saying.28 W hile he was Am bassador to the Soviet U n ion in 1938^40, Togo had a hand in the establishm ent o f the arm istice agreem ent for the N om onhan Incident, encouraged the governm ent to reach a nonaggression pact w ith the Soviet U n ion and negotiated w ith M oscow on the Japanese-Soviet N eutrality Pact. Togo was convinced that he and Soviet Foreign M inister Vyacheslav M olotov were friends w ho "could confide an yth in g in each other." However, Im perial Supreme W ar C o u n cil members failed to agree on w hat settlem ent conditions they w ould propose at m ediation negotiations w ith the Soviets because A nam i and Togo engaged in a heated war o f words on the m atter. A nam i said, "Japan still controls vast enem y territo­ ries, yet our enem y has on ly touched part o f our territory. W e shouldn't hold negotiations [with the Soviet U nion] in the context o f proposing peace." Consequently, they decided not to ask the Soviet U n ion to m edi­ ate in the settlem ent, but to lim it the objectives o f the negotiations to pre­ v e n tin g th e So viet U n io n from jo in in g th e war and to en su rin g its neutrality on conditions preferential to Jap an . Togo set up talks w ith Soviet Am bassador Jaco v M alik, and chose for­ mer Prime M inister Koki H irota as Japan's representative. How ever, the

Japan fails to prevent dropping o f atomic bom bs, Soviet entry into war / 193

negotiations lim ped along and made little progress. O n June 22, the day the guns were finally falling silent on Okinaw a after m onths of bloody fighting, the Emperor summoned the war council members and stated, "This is not an order but sim ply part of our conversation... Regarding the term ination of the war, conduct specific studies w ithout being bound by conventional points o f view, and make efforts to realize it [term ination of the war]." At the m eeting, Yonai m entioned the plan to seek a settlem ent through m ediation by the Soviet U n ion . Togo filled in the details o f the plan. Asked by the Emperor of the m ilitary's opinion, Um ezu said, "W e don't have any objections, but we should be extrem ely careful about seeking peace negotiations." The Emperor asked, "O f course we need to be cir­ cum spect, but w ould being too careful cause us to miss our chance?" Um ezu replied, "It also needs to be done prom ptly." W hen the Emperor asked Anam i the same question, he sim ply stated, "I have nothing in par­ ticular to say." After the Emperor urged them to make efforts to terminate the war, Hirota finally offered M alik a peace plan on June 29, w hich included sign­ in g a Japanese-Soviet nonaggression pact, neutralization of M anchuria and Japan's relinquishm ent o f fishing rights in Soviet waters. Ambassador to the Soviet U nion Sato was inform ed in late Jun e o f the Hirota-M alik m eeting for the first tim e by a telegram from Togo. Sato later said, "I couldn't help but think that it was childish to naively think we could pull the Soviet U nion to our side w hile Japan was on the verge o f collapse."29 Sato's worst fears were realized w hen M olotov did not give a reply to Jap an 's offer w hen they m et on Ju ly 11. O n Ju ly 13, Sato received a telegram from Togo w hich read, "It would be appropriate to inform the Soviet U nion o f the Emperor's graceful wish concerning a term ination of the war before the m eeting o f the three nations [the United States, Britain and the Soviet U nion in Potsdam ]." In short, Togo ordered Sato to direct­ ly tell M olotov that Japan wished to send Fumimaro Konoe as a special envoy to deliver the Emperor's message. However, the Soviet U nion reject­ ed the offer on Ju ly 18, the day after the Potsdam Conference began. Notes________________________________________________________________________________ __ 1 C h risto p h er Andrew an d V a sili M itro k h in , Mitrokhin Archive—KGB in Europe and the

West, L o n d o n : P en gu in Books, 2000, p . 175 2 P h ilip N o b ile , ed ., Judgment at the Smithsonian, N ew York: M arlow e & C o m p a n y , 1995, p . 32 3 W . Averell H arrim an an d Elie A be, Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 1 9 4 1 -1 9 4 6 , N ew York: R an d o m H o u se, 1975, p . 400

4"New Documents Name American as Soviet Spy," Washington Post, M arch 6 ,1 9 9 6 , p .

1 5 H enry Kissinger, Diplomacy, N ew York: Sim o n& Schu ster, 1994, p . 395 6 M ik io H aru n a, Truman wa Nagasaki Genbaku Toka wo Shiranakatta (Trum an D id n ’t

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Know an Atom ic Bomb Was Dropped on Nagasaki), in m onthly Bungeishunju, January 2001, p. 306 7Leslie Groves, Now it Can Be Told: The Story o f the Manhattan Project, New York: Da Capo Press, 1962, p. 298 8Ibid., p. 265 9M artin J . Sherwin, A World Destroyed, New York; Vintage Books, 1987, p. 284 10N obile, ed., op. cit., p. 43 11 David Bodanis, E=mc2: A Biography o f the World's M ost Famous Equation, New York: W alker, 2005, p. 161 12Jam es F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, New York: Harper, 1947, pp. 207-208 13The United States decided to terminate the war by dropping atom ic bombs on Japan because, for one, according to Eagle Against the Sun (Ronald H . Spector, New York: Vintage Books, 1985, p. 553), the U .S. leadership believed, "Russia would march into M anchuria when she was ready, regardless o f what the U .S. did," as General Marshall pointed out to Truman. 14According to Judgment at the Smithsonian (Philip N obile, ed., op. c it, p. 41), "virtually all now agree that the bom b's usefulness for 'atom ic diplom acy' against the Soviets pro­ vided one more reason for Truman not to halt the dropping of the bom b." 15 Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, Racing the Enemy, Cam bridge, Mass.: Belknap Press o f Harvard University Press, 2005, p . 292. O n the other hand, the same author argues on the previ­ ous page, "the inclusion o f this provision (to allow the Japanese to retain the Emperor system) would have hastened Japan's surrender, though it is doubtful that Japan would have capitulated before the atom ic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima and the Soviet U nion entered the war." 16N obile, ed., op. cit., p. 54 17Groves, op. cit., p. 308 18Masayasu Hosaka, Ano Senso Kara Nani wo Manabunoka (W hat Should We Learn from That War?), Tokyo: Kodansha, 2005, p. 143 19 Masayasu Hosaka, Showa Rikugun no Kenkyu (A Study on the Showa Army) vol. 2, Tokyo: Asahi Shim bun, 1999, p. 644 20 M otoei Sato and Fumitaka Kurosawa, eds., G H Q Rekishi-ka Chinjutsu-roku: Shusen-shi Shiryo (A Record o f Postwar Interviews by the General Headquarters o f the Allied Powers w ith Japanese Politicians and M ilitary Officers) vol. 2 , Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 2002, p. 732 21Koichi Kido, Kido Koichi Nikki (Diary o f Koichi Kido) vol. 2 Tokyo: University o f Tokyo Press, 1966, p. 1,188; Kido Koichi Nikki was accepted as evidence for the prosecution at the Tokyo Tribunal. 22 H isanori Fu jita, Jijucho no Kaiso (M em oirs by the Grand Cham berlain), Tokyo: Kodansha, 1961, p. 97 23 Atsushi O i, Taiheiyo Senso H ishi (Secret History o f the Pacific W ar), Tokyo: Japan National Defense League, 1987, p. 292 24 Naotake Sato, Kaiko Hachiju-nen (Looking Back the Past 80 Years), Tokyo: Jiji Press, 1963, p. 447 25 Seizo Arisue, Arisue Kikancho no Shuki (Memoirs o f Organization C hief Arisue), Tokyo: Fuyoshobo, 1976, p. 23 26 Shigenori Togo, Jidai no Ichimen (An Aspect o f the Time), Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1989, p. 471 27Ju n Eto, Shusen Kosaku no Kiroku (the Record on the M aneuvering to End the War) vol. 1, Tokyo: Kodansha, 1986, p. 39 28Togo, op. cit., p. 332 29Sato, op. c it, p. 489

Chapter 13 Moves to end the war / Part 3

Japan agonizes over decision to surrender

W

hile Japanese cities were being reduced to ashes by U.S. air raids including the G reat Tokyo A ir Raid of March 10, 1945 (the 20th year of the Showa Era), the government finally began moving to seek an end to the war. Meanwhile, on July 26, the Allied Powers announced the Potsdam Declaration that presented the terms for Japan’s surrender. W hy couldn’t Japan accept the declaration immediately? W hy couldn’t Japan bring itself to end the fighting before it suffered the devastating losses inflicted by the U.S. atomic bombs and the Soviet Union’s entry into the war?

Firebombing devastates Tokyo A t 12:15 a . m . on M arch 10,1945, air-raid w arning sirens started w ailing in Tokyo. About 2 | hours later, 150 B-29 Superfortress strategic bombers (334 B-29s according to U .S. documents) carried out wave after wave of low -altitude carpet bom bings, som etim es fly in g alone, som etim es in groups. The bom bings set fire to houses and buildings over a wide area of the capital. Devastating, tornado-like flam es w hipped up by the w ind engulfed every wooden building in their paths and engulfed about 40 per­ cent o f Tokyo.1 The bom bing actually began seven m inutes before the sirens sounded when B-29s flew in very low from the east and firebombed the Fukagawa district in a surprise attack. The intensity of the bom bing was ferocious. According to Fire and Disaster M anagem ent Agency records, U .S. bombers dropped six 100-kilogram bom bs, 8,545 45-kilogram firebombs filled w ith jellylike gasoline, 180,305 2.8-kilogram firebombs and 740 1.7-kilogram electron bom bs. The bombers first dropped incendiaries on areas around a target that set o ff huge fires that cut o ff evacuation routes. There was no escape for thousands o f people trapped by the flam es. A ccording to M etropolitan Police Departm ent records, the air raid claim ed about 88,000 lives and affected more than one m illion others. About 267,000 houses were com pletely burned dow n. A report by the 195

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U n ited States Strategic B om bin g Survey, a research team ordered b y President Harry Trum an to investigate the im pact o f the Tokyo raid, said it "resulted in a greater degree o f death and destruction than that produced by any other single m ission in any theater during W orld W ar II."2 The first bom bings o f Tokyo b y B-29s were carried out on Novem ber 24, 1944. After taking o ff from Saipan, the B-29s pounded the M usashi facto­ ry o f N akajim a H ikoki, then the nation's top m ilitary plane m anufacturer and now Fuji H eavy Industries Ltd ., as w ell as Shinagaw a and Suginam i W ards. Since then , B-29s had m ainly targeted industrial areas, hom e to war factories. However, after the Great Tokyo Air Raid, the U .S . Air Force strategy shifted to indiscrim inate bom bings in w hich m assive num bers o f incendiaries were dropped on noncom batants and ordinary houses. The U nited States hoped the air raids w ould crush Japan's w ill to con­ tinue the war. A ccording to one Japanese Arm y docum ent, the Tokyo raid "doom ed victors and losers o f air defense operations, blew away in one swoop the people's spirit to figh t and defend the country's air space, and im pelled Jap an 's leaders to end the w ar."3 The indiscrim inate bom bings spread to N agoya, Osaka, Kobe and other cities after the Great Tokyo Air Raid before sh iftin g in m id-June to smaller citie s in c lu d in g H am am atsu , S h izu o k a P refectu re, Y o k k a ic h i, M ie Prefecture, and Kagoshim a. In late Ju ly , U .S . planes started to drop leaflets inform ing people o f planned bom bings o f specific cities. A ccording to a survey on wartim e dam age conducted by Keizai Antei Honbu (Econom ic S ta b iliza tio n Board) from 1947 to 1949, dam age from th e air raids am ounted to about ¥65.3 b illio n —a figure m ore than five tim es that o f dam age w rought by the Great Kanto Earthquake o f 1923, w hich claim ed more than 140,000 lives. How did Jap an organize its air defenses to counter the U .S . air raids? In Ju ly 1944, the governm ent form ulated the Central Air Defense Plan. For the first three m onths after the plan was drawn u p , Japanese fighters had some success in shooting dow n B-29s on bom bing m issions. How ever, their ab ility to protect the m ain lan d w ithered as the num ber, o f B-29 sorties rose, their target areas expanded and Japan's rem aining air power was steadily destroyed by U .S . forces. The U .S. Strategic Bom bing Survey's report stated, "...a lth o u g h hostile fighter and flak in flicted considerable dam age to our units on a num ber o f occasions, the over-all effectiveness of Jap defenses never constituted a serious threat to the accom plishm ent of the m ission o f strategic air w arfare."4 The governm ent started transferring ground-based air defense un its, w hich were originally deployed m ainly in large cities, to sm aller cities in Ju ly . But b y th en , it was too late. A n air defense m anual for the p ub lic drawn up by the Hom e Affairs M inistry said, "The first m inute is the m ost

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crucial for dealing with firebomb attacks." It also advised people "to throw water on flammable things near you to prevent a fire from spreading if it breaks out." However, the U .S. attacks were far more devastating than those for w hich Japan had expected and prepared. The government and the military failed to protect the people from the devastating air raids.

U.S. keeps Soviet Union out after successful atomic bomb test W hile Japan became increasingly resigned to repeated U .S. bombard­ ments on the m ainland, the Allied Powers were drawing up demands. O h Ju ly 26, 1945, they announced the Potsdam Declaration, defining the terms for Japan's surrender. The 13 clauses o f the declaration included: • Points to be designated by the Allies shall be occupied. (Clause 7) •Japanese sovereignty shall be lim ited to the islands o f H onshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine. (Clause 8) • The Japanese military forces, after being com pletely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes. (Clause 9) • Stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners. (Clause 10) • We call upon the government of Japan to proclaim now the uncondi­ tional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. (Clause 13) Regarding the Emperor system, Clause 12 only stated, "The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objec­ tives have been accomplished and there has been established in accor­ dance w ith the freely expressed w ill of the Japanese people a peacefully in clin ed and responsible governm ent,” w hile Clause 5 stated: "The follow ing are our terms. We w ill not deviate from them . There are no alternatives. We shall brook no delay." (See APPENDIX P.) U .S. President Truman, British Prime Minister W inston Churchill and General Secretary of the Com m unist Party of the Soviet Union Josef Stalin met in the suburbs of Berlin for the Potsdam Conference from Ju ly 17, 1945. The declaration w hich had been drafted by the U .S. government was signed by Trum an, C h u rch ill and C hian g Kai-shek, President o f the Republic of China, who did not attend the conference. W hy wasn't Stalin invited to join in signing the declaration? U .S. Secretary of State James Byrnes later explained that Truman and

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C h u rch ill did not w ant to inconvenience the Soviet U n ion —w hich was n ot at war against Japan—by dragging it in to the war.5 O n Ju ly 16, a day before the conference started, the U nited States suc­ cessfully tested an atom ic bom b for the first tim e. Buoyed by this develop­ m ent, Trum an felt the Soviet entry in to the war was no longer necessary to end the co n flict and decided to keep the Soviet U n ion out o f the talks on the Potsdam Declaration. For Stalin , signing the Potsdam Declaration w ith B ritain, C h in a and the U nited States could have m eant the Soviet U n ion could shirk internation­ al criticism o f declaring war on Jap an in violation o f the Japanese-Soviet N eutrality Pact. However, things did n ot pan out as Stalin hoped. A t 5 p . m . (11 p . m . Jap an tim e) on August 8, tw o days after an atom ic bom b was dropped on H iroshim a, Soviet People's Com m issar for Foreign A ffairs (Foreign M inister) V yacheslav M olotov read out a statem ent to Am bassador to the Soviet U n ion Naotake Sato in M oscow . "The Soviet U n ion w ill be at war against Japan from tom orrow , August 9 ," M olotov said. The statem ent said, "In view o f Japan's refusal to surrender, the Allies asked the Soviet governm ent to join in the war against Japanese invaders. The Soviet governm ent, w hich is faith fu l to till obligations o f its allies, accepted a proposal o f the A llied Powers and participated in the A llied Powers' declaration [Potsdam Declaration] dated Ju ly 26 this year." Sato told M olotov that he w anted to convey the message o f their talks to Japan via telegram because there was still tim e before m idnight w hen Jap an and the Soviet U n io n w ould tech n ica lly be at w ar. M o lo to v accepted the request. However, Sato's telegram did n ot reach Jap an , for reasons that rem ain unclear.6 The Soviet U n ion planned to make a surprise attack, entering the war against Jap an in M anchuria at m idnight on August 8. Sato received the statem en t at 5 p . m . o n A u gu st 8 in M oscow , w h ich w as 11 p . m . in M anchuria. O n ly one hour rem ained before the Soviet U n ion joined in the war. Ju st before noon on August 10, Foreign M inister Shigenori Togo in Tokyo officially received the statem ent on the declaration o f war from Soviet Am bassador to Jap an Ja co v M alik . By th en , the Red Arm y had already m oved deep in to M anchuria. Four m onths earlier on A pril 5, thfe Soviet governm ent notified Jap an it w ould n ot renew the Japanese-Soviet N eu trality Pact. H ow ever, the pact was b in d in g u n til A pril 1946. The Soviet entry in to the war was an obvious violation o f the pact. (See APPEN­ D IX E.) W hat lay behind the Soviet decision to jo in the war? In Decem ber 1941, righ t after Jap an 's attack on Pearl H arbor, Stalin to ld B ritish Foreign Secretary A nthony Eden, w ho was visitin g M oscow for talks on form ing an

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alliance, that the Soviet U n io n probably w ould enter the war against Japan in the future. In the m eantim e, Soviet diplom atic authorities had already begun discussions on measures to secure "an exit to the Pacific O cean ."7 In Ju ly 1944, M alik subm itted to Stalin a report titled "Issues concern­ in g Soviet-Japanese relations." The report stated dem ands to substantially expand the Soviet territories, in clu d in g n o t o n ly Southern Sakh alin , w h ich Ja p a n h ad a cq u ire d a t th e R u sso -Jap an ese n e g o tia tio n s at Portsm outh in 1905, but also the Kuril Islands and neutralizing Tsushim a or m aking it a Soviet naval base; internationalizing the straits o f Tsugaru, Kanm on and Bungo; and m aking several Japanese ports in to free ports.8 How ever, according to Keio U niversity Professor o f M odern Russian H istory Sh in fi Yokote, Soviet d ip lom atic authorities believed the war between Jap an and the U nited States w ould enable the Soviet U n ion "to reap w hat others have sow n." The authorities considered that the Soviet U n ion could or should get Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands w ithout firin g a shot, Yokote said. It was Stalin w ho decided to enter the war: He judged that it w ould be im possible for the Soviet U n ion to expand its influence in the Far East w ithout m aking som e m ilitary contribution.9

Staunch resistance from Army, Navy How did the Japanese governm ent interpret the Potsdam Declaration announced in Ju ly 1945? H ow did the governm ent respond? Foreign M inister Togo focused on the fact that the declaration dem anded "the u n co n d itio n a l surrender o f a ll Japanese fo rces," rather th an "Jap an's u n co n d itio n a l surrender" as h ad b een dem anded in th e 1943 C airo Declaration by Britain, C h in a and the U nited States. For Togo, the decla­ ration looked m oderate com pared w ith how Germ any was treated after its defeat because it appeared to leave control o f Japan's econom y and indus­ try in its own hands. (See APPENDIX N.) Togo believed Jap an could expect the Soviet U n io n , w hich did n ot sign the declaration, to hold negotiations w ith the A llies more to its favor by further clarifyin g conditions for peace based on the declaration. N aval General Staff C h ie f Soem u Toyoda and Arm y General Staff C h ie f Yoshijiro Um ezu opposed Togo's idea o f n ot rejecting the declaration but favored putting o ff an answer at least u n til M oscow responded to Japan's request that it act as a m ediator. Toyoda was in a feisty m ood at a C abinet m eeting on Ju ly 27, 1945. "The governm ent needs to m ake a public announcem ent that the declara­ tio n is not to our advantage," he said. After being persuaded by Togo, how ever, the Cabinet decided the governm ent w ould not express its posi­ tion on the declaration. Nevertheless, Prime M inister Kantaro Suzuki said

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at a press conference on Ju ly 28, “M okusatsu suru dake de aru (We w ill not pay attention to it)."10 Since Suzuki used the Japanese word "m okusatsu"—w hich is expressed in the two Chinese characters o f "k ill" and "silence" to m ean "pay no attention"—this was translated as "ignore" in English by a wire service. This "deliberately ignore" remark was taken by the A llies to m ean Japan rejected the Potsdam D eclaration and prom pted the atom ic bom bings on H iroshim a and Nagasaki by the U nited States and Soviet entry in to the war. Suzuki w ould be haunted by his rem ark. In his book, he w rote, "This com m ent was som ething that I've been regretting ever sin ce."11 Suzuki asked Togo to be Foreign M in ister w hen he was fo rm in g a Cabin et in A pril, but Togo, w ho hoped a peace deal could be reached quickly, in itially declined the offer because Suzuki told h im , "Japan could keep up the war for another two or three years." Suzuki eventually m an­ aged to persuade Togo to take the post by prom ising he w ould leave diplo­ m acy entirely to h im . How ever, Suzuki did n ot even tell N avy M inister M itsum asa Yonai w hat he was really th in k in g. Yonai was wary o f Suzuki, and once told his aides, "The Prime M inister has a tough attitu de." In a postwar book, Rear A dm iral Sokichi Takagi criticized the six leaders— Suzuki, Foreign M inister T ogo, W ar M inister Korechika A n am i, Y on ai, Um ezu and Toyoda—w ho form ed the Im perial Suprem e W ar C o u n cil, "There was no coordinator, liaison m an or m ediator."12 Suzuki's lack o f leadership disappointed Togo several tim es. A prom i­ nent exam ple was during the Im perial Supreme W ar C o u n cil m eeting on Ju n e 6. A t the cou n cil, two reports—"Current situation o f national power" and "Judgm ent on the state o f the w orld"—were presented. The reports were com piled based on research conducted by C h ie f C abinet Secretary Hisatsune Sakom izu on Suzuki's orders. They were astonishingly honest in explaining that Jap an had lost its ability to wage a war. The first contained grim findings about the country's m aritim e transportation capability, say­ in g, "A lthough we have vessels totalin g one m illion tons, the shipping tonnage w ill be reduced to alm ost n othin g by the year's en d ." N ational steel production "w ill drop to about one-quarter o f last year's production, and we do n ot expect steel ships w ill be able to be bu ilt after the m iddle of the current fiscal year." The report pulled n o punches w hen describing how the food supply "is facing its m ost serious crisis since the war started." Furtherm ore, it said, depending on circum stances such as enem y attacks and bad w eather, "sporadic starvation could em erge."13 However, the cou n cil agreed that Jap an could continue the war. Togo did raise an objection, but the m eeting adopted a war leadership directive th at said, "W ith our geographical advantages and people's u n ity , the

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country w ill by all m eans accom plish the war's aim s."14 W hile Suzuki and Togo were w aiting for an answer from the Soviet U n ion to their pleas to m ediate in peace talks, the U nited States dropped an atom ic bom b on H iroshim a on the m orning o f August 6. Before dawn on August 9, Soviet troops rolled across the border in to M anchuria. The situation became even more hopeless shortly after 11 a .m . on August 9 when the second atom ic bom b exploded over N agasaki. Jap an was defeated, beyond all shadow o f doubt. A t 11:50 a .m . on August 9, the Im perial Supreme W ar C o u n cil convened w ith Emperor Show a in attendance. Yonai and K iichiro H iranum a, the President o f the Privy C o u n cil, agreed w ith Togo's proposal th at Jap an should accept the Potsdam D eclaration w ith the sole proviso th at the national p olity, or more specifically the Im perial in stitu tion , be preserved. But A nam i, Um ezu and Toyoda dissented and insisted on four other con­ ditions for the acceptance. They w anted disarm am ent to be carried out on Japan's ow n in itiative and for Jap an to punish its ow n war crim inals.15 Yonai told Takagi around that tim e, "It m ight be inappropriate to say this, but I th in k the atom ic bom bings and the Soviet entry in to the war are, in a sense, a godsend because we don't have to say that w e'll stop the war due to the dom estic situ atio n ."16 The m eeting participants were unable to agree on w hat the n ation should do, so Suzuki took the unprecedented step o f asking the Emperor to m ake a decision. The Emperor said q u ietly Jap an should accept the terms o f the Potsdam D eclaration. The cou n cil abided by the decision on con dition that the declaration did not include a dem and for a change in the Emperor's prerogatives. Speaking after the war, Suzuki said, "I always believed a truly loyal retainer should leave judgm ent to His M ajesty, the head o f the state, if an argum ent that could greatly sway the nation's des­ tin y during an em ergency could not be resolved."17 For Suzuki, a coup had been defused at the last possible m om ent. In his rem iniscences, V ice C h ie f o f Arm y G en eral S ta ff Lieu ten an t G eneral Torashiro Kawabe wrote o f com m ents a dispirited Um ezu made w hen he cam e back from the Im perial Supreme W ar C o u n cil m eeting. "Since very lon g ago the Emperor had already lost all hope about the results o f m ili­ tary operations. He has lost all faith in the m ilitary."18 O n th e m o rn in g o f A ugust 10, the govern m en t dispatched cables through Sw itzerland and Sweden to be transm itted to Britain, C h in a , the Soviet U n ion and the U nited States in w hich Jap an agreed to accept the terms o f the Potsdam D eclaration. The A llies' form al reply on August 12 stated, "From the m om ent o f surrender, the authority o f the Emperor and the Japanese governm ent to rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme Com m ander o f the A llied Powers w ho w ill take such steps as he deems

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proper to effectuate the surrender term s." Use o f the ill-defined phrase "subject to" was W ashington's tacit approval th at the Em peror's status w ould be guaranteed even after Japan's surrender. How ever, the Im perial Suprem e W ar C o u n cil and the C ab in et were unable to settle on an interpretation o f the expression "subject to ." Suzuki opened a session o f the Im perial Supreme W ar C o u n cil on August 14 and again he cordially asked the Emperor to m ake a decision on ending the war. A t a Cabinet m eeting later that day, m inisters discussed an Im perial rescript on ending the war. Countersignatures o f all Cabin et m inisters were necessary for a rescript to be valid—if even one m inister refused to countersign, the C abinet could have resigned en masse and serious confu­ sion w ould have ensued.19 Anam i's next m oves were tellin g. He left room in the m iddle o f the dis­ cussion on the Im perial rescript and returned to the W ar M inistry, where he told his officers, "As servicem en, you m ust n o t oppose the Emperor's w ishes."20 In the early hours o f August 15, a group o f radical young Arm y officers killed Takeshi M ori, the Com m ander o f the Im perial Guards D ivision , and tem porarily took control o f the division by issuing a fake order. They searched the Im perial H ousehold M inistry for the Im perial Rescript on the Term ination o f the W ar prerecorded b y the Emperor in a bid to prevent it from being broadcast. They also w ent to A nam i's o fficial residence and tried to convince h im to rise up in revolt w ith them . How ever, Anam i rejected their request and killed him self. A coup aim ed at preventing the war from ending was barely averted.

Seeking an end to the war W hat was Emperor Show a's stance on ending the war? In the early days o f the war, Japanese were swept up by reports o f victories by the seem ing­ ly in vin cib le Japanese forces. Emperor Showa also was greatly satisfied by the battle reports. How ever, the Emperor made reference to an end to the war w hen he to ld Prim e M in ister H ideki T ojo on February 10, 1942: "Pevise measures [to enter talks for ending the war] w ithout any over­ sight, depending on [the attitude of] the other side, even though it m ight n o t be good to see the cam paign to secure natural resources in the south [Southeast Asia] end w hile still incom plete and unsuccessful."21 As defeat in the Battle o f G uadalcanal looked alm ost certain in the autum n o f 1942, the Emperor began to worry that the tide o f the war had begun to sh ift. O n M arch 30, 1943, the Emperor told Lord Keeper o f the Privy Seal K oich i K ido about his gloom y prognosis for the w ar, "O ur prospects for this war are not b righ t," the Emperor told K ido, "It w ill be

Japan agonizes over decision to surrender / 203

d ifficu lt to recover the air power we lost in the Battle o f M idw ay. W ithout air suprem acy, our troops everywhere w ill m eet defeat in b attle." Kido responded, "I thin k our on ly recourse is to in flict devastating dam age on the enem y and then use th at opportunity to push for peace." "I hope that's possible," the Emperor said.22 Since around summer 1943, jushin senior advisers, in clu din g Fum imaro Konoe and Keisuke Okada, w ho were seeking an early end to the war, an anti-T ojo group in the N avy, and the Kodo-ha (Im perial W ay Faction), w hjch was an anti-m ainstream group in the Arm y, had secretly been p lot­ tin g to overthrow the Tojo Cabinet. The Kodo-ha was a right-w ing group o f junior and field officers seeking to restore the Emperor as an absolute ruler w ith the Arm y as his m ain instrum ent o f p olicy. In itially , the Emperor trusted T ojo, saying "H e worked d iligen tly and spoke though tfu lly and in great d etail." The Emperor had three m ain reasons w hy he w anted the Tojo Cabinet to rem ain in place: • To avoid an attem pt to topple the Cabin et from being seen as a con­ spiracy brewed by the Emperor's aides. • N obody w ielded more influence than T ojo. • As Tojo had extensive contacts w ith m any leaders in the Greater East Asia area, sacking him could cause them to lose confidence in Jap an .23 Konoe, m eanw hile, was worried that inform ation such as the m ounting frustration w ith the T ojo C ab in et m ight n ot be reaching the Emperor. Konoe tried to tell the Emperor through Prince Takam atsu, a younger brother o f the Emperor, that discontent w ith the Tojo C abinet was rising. H ow ever, the Em peror objected to b ein g fed such in form ation via an inform al route and expressed his displeasure w ith Prince Takam atsu by tellin g h im , "I w on't listen to w hat an irresponsible Im perial Fam ily m em ­ ber says to m e."24 However, after hearing Japanese forces had been w iped out in Saipan in Ju ly 1944, the Emperor began h avin g second thoughts about the Tojo C ab in et. In February 1945, the Emperor asked each jushin senior adviser for his op in ion , but he did n ot im m ediately accept Konoe's beseeching him to end the war as quickly as possible to avert the possibility o f a com ­ m unist revolution in Jap an .25 It was n o t u n til Ju n e 1945 that the Emperor took steps to bring peace. Germ any had surrendered in M ay and Japan's defeat in the bloody Battle o f Okinaw a was becom ing a m atter o f w hen, n ot if. The m ainland was being clin ically bom barded b y heavy air raids alm ost daily. O n Ju n e 8, the Emperor sum m oned Kido after an Im perial Supreme

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W ar C ouncil m eeting. "It was decided that we w ill continue the war until the end/' the Emperor said pensively, referring to the council, "It seems everyone was w aiting for someone else to say som ething." Kido, disappointed and frustrated by w hat he had just heard, drafted later that n ight "a tentative plan to cope w ith the current situation" to try to end the war. The plan stated, "W e'll ask for a courageous decision from the Emperor and we believe there is no way other than striving to save the difficult situation based on the follow ing steps." The plan incorporated a policy to ask the Soviet U nion to act as a mediator through a personal let­ ter written by the Emperor and to enter peace negotiations w ith the Allied Powers. Kido m entioned the plan to the Emperor the next day, June 9. "The Emperor looked delighted [with the plan] and I was told to get start­ ed im m ediately/' Kido said.26 Around that tim e, the Emperor was given m any discouraging reports on the war from Army General Staff C hief Um ezu, who had returned from M anchuria, Navy Adm iral Kiyoshi Hasegawa, who had inspected domestic war factories, and Prince M orihiro o f H igashikuni (.Higashikuni-no-miya Morihiro), an Army officer who married the eldest daughter o f Emperor Show a. "I heard that we are m aking shovels from the iron o f bom bs dropped on us by the enem y," the Emperor said. "I'm certain it's im possi­ ble to m aintain a war footing under such circum stances."27 O n June 22, the Emperor summ oned Prime M inister Suzuki and five other key members o f the Im perial Supreme War Council and asked them to do their utm ost to end the war w ithout sticking to the decision made at the Im perial Supreme W ar Council on June 8. O n Ju ly 26, the Potsdam Declaration was announced and moves to end the war entered their fin a l phase. The Cabinet m eeting on August 9 becam e bogged dow n u n til late at n igh t as m inisters w rangled over whether to accept the declaration. An agreement had to be reached before an Im perial Supreme W ar Council m eeting could be convened. Suzuki and others were cou n tin g on settlin g the m atter w ith the Emperor's "divine decision" that they hoped would be given at an Imperial Suprem e W ar C o u n cil m eetin g. C h ie f C a b in e t Secretary H isatsune Sakom izu had already obtained the signatures o f the Arm y and N avy General Staff Chiefs in advance by tellin g them , "I'll confer w ith you before an Im perial council m eeting is convened." The m ilitary was sur­ prised at a sudden convening o f the Im perial Supreme W ar C ou n cil, but Suzuki overrode them and the m eeting went ahead. At the m eeting o f the Im perial Supreme War Council held in an air-raid shelter in the Imperial Palace at about m idnight on August 9, opinions were split over whether to accept the Potsdam Declaration. Suzuki did not express his opinion. Instead, he left the matter up to the Emperor. The

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m onarch fin ally spoke at the end o f the m eeting. "I agree w ith the opinion o f the Foreign M inister [Togo]," he said. Togo's plan was for the governm ent to accept the Potsdam Declaration under the understanding th at it did n ot com prise any dem and that preju­ diced the prerogatives o f the Emperor as a sovereign ruler. "Y ou talk about a battle on the m ain lan d , b u t the m ost im portant preparation—b u ilding the defenses at Kujukuriham a [on the Pacific coast o f Chiba^ Prefecture]—has yet to be com pleted, and divisions that w ill be involved in this battle are inadequately equipped and w ill not be ready u n til after m id-Septem ber," the Emperor said. "Increasing aircraft produc­ tion is n ot goin g as w ell as we expected. Reality does not always pan out as we p lan . G iven that, how can we w in the war? I thin k now is the tim e that we have to bear the unbearable. Rem em bering the spirit o f Emperor M eiji (1852-1912) at the tim e o f the Tripartite Intervention, I agree w ith the draft plan; h oldin g back m y tears."28 As the significance o f this decision sank in , the silence was broken by the sobs o f som e o f those in attendance. A t a C abinet m eeting that started at 3 p . m ., terms for accepting the Potsdam Declaration that were approved at the Im perial Suprem e W ar C o u n cil earlier in the day were form ally decided as the governm ent's p olicy. A t an Im perial Supreme W ar C ou n cil m eeting on August 14, A nam i, Um ezu and Toyoda objected to the accep­ tance o f the declaration but the Emperor m ade an Im perial decision after the request by Suzuki. O n August 15, 1945, the Im perial Rescript on the Term ination o f the W ar prerecorded b y the Emperor was broadcast over the radio. O n Septem ber 2, Ja p a n signed the instrum ent o f surrender aboard the USS M issouri anchored in Tokyo Bay. Three years and eight m onths had passed since the attack on Pearl Harbor on Decem ber 8,1941 . A ccording to a survey conducted by the H ealth and W elfare M inistry in 1977, th e wars o f th e Show a Era, in clu d in g th e Sino-Jap an ese W ar, claim ed the lives o f 3.1 m illio n Japanese. That included about 2.1 m illion servicem en and civilian m ilitary em ployees and about 200,000 param ili­ tary personnel w ho died in the figh tin g, in clu d in g about 50,000 people from Korea and Taiw an. The dead included an estim ated 800,000 civilians, in clu d in g about 500,000 on the m ainland and 300,000 outside Jap an in places such as in M anchuria. Notes_______-

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1 T h e T o k y o M e tr o p o lita n G o v e r n m e n t , e d ., T o kyo D a ik u sh u S e n s a ish i (R ecords o n D a m a g e in G r e a t T o k y o A ir Raid) vo l. 3 , T o ky o : T o k y o M e tro p o lita n G o v e r n m e n t, 1953, p . 331 2 U n ite d States Strategic B o m b in g Su rvey, e d ., U nited States Strategic B o m b in g Survey vol. 2 2 ( R e p o r t 5 6 ) , E f f e c t s o f A i r A t t a c k o n U r b a n C o m p le x T o k y o -K a w a s a k i-Y o k o h a m a ,

W a s h in g to n , D .C .: U .S . G o v e r n m e n t P rin tin g O ffic e , 1947; rpt. T o k y o : N ih o n T osh o

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Center, 1992, p . 6 3The M ilitary History Department o f the National Institute for Defense Studies of the Defense A gency, ed ., Daihonei Rikugun-bu (The Arm y Departm ent o f the Im perial Headquarters), vol. 10 in Senshi Sosho (A Series o f W ar Histories), Tokyo: Asagumo Shim bunsha, 1975, p. 41 4U nited States Strategic Bom bing Survey, ed., United States Strategic Bombing Survey vol. 25 (Report 66), Strategic A ir Operation o f Very Heavy Bombardment in the War Against Japan, op. cit., 1992, p. 19 5Jam es Byrnes' com m ent o f "n ot w ant to inconvenience the Soviet U n ion " was a euphem istic way o f preventing the Soviet U nion from causing any inconvenience to the British and U .S. initiatives to end the war by letting the Soviets go to war w ith Japan at the eleventh hour. 6 Naotake Sato, Kaiko Hachiju-nen (Looking Back the Past 80 years), Tokyo: Jiji Press, 1963, pp. 499-500 7Shinji Yokote, uDainiji-taisen-ki no Soren no Tainichi Seisaku, 1941-1944" (Soviet policy toward Japan in W orld War II, 1941-1944) in Hogaku Kenkyu No. 71, January 1998, p.

210 8Ibid., pp. 221-223 9Ibid., p. 226 10 Kainan Shim om ura, Shusen H ishi (Secret history o f the End o f the W ar), Tokyo: Kodansha Gakujutsu Bunko, 1985, p. 84 11 Kantaro Suzuki, Kaisoki: Shusen no Hyojo (Reminiscences: Aspects o f the End o f the War), Tokyo: Rodobunkasha, 1946, pp. 31-32 12 Sokichi Takagi, Shusen Oboegaki (M em orandum o f the End o f the W ar), Tokyo: Kobundo, 1948, p. 41 13 Takushiro Hattori, Daitoa Senso Zenshi (The W hole History o f the Greater East Asia War), Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1965, pp. 896-898 14 Suketaka Tanem ura, D aihonei K im itsu N issh i (Secret Logbook o f the Im perial Headquarters), Tokyo: Diam ond, p. 239 15Shigenori Togo, Jidai no Ichimen (An Aspect o f the Time), Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 2005, p. 358 16 Sokichi Takagi, Kaigun Taisho Yonai Mitsum asa Oboegaki (M em orandum o f Navy Adm iral Mitsumasa Yonai), Tokyo: Kojinsha, 1988, p. 153 17Suzuki, op. cit., p. 46 18 Torashiro Kawabe, Kaisoroku: Ichigayadai kara Ichigayadai e (Rem iniscences: From Ichigayadai to Ichigayadai), Tokyo: Jiji Press, 2005, p. 189 19Togo, op. cit., p. 369 20Hattori, op. cit., p. 946 21 Kido K oichi N ikki Kenkyukai (Kido K oichi D iary Study Group), ed ., Kido Koichi Kankeibunsho (Documents Related to Koichi Kido), Tokyo: University o f Tokyo Press, 1966, p. 45 22Ibid., pp. 128-129 23 H idenari Terasaki and M ariko Terasaki M iller, eds., Showa Tenno Dokuhakuroku (Emperor Showa's M onologue), Tokyo: Bungeishunju, 1995, p. 104 24Osamu M ichigoe, ed., Konoe Fumimaro: Rokugatsu Shusen no Shinario (Fumimaro Konoe: Scenario for Ending the War in June), Tokyo: M ainichi Ones, 2006, p. 91 25Kido Koichi N ikki Kenkyukai, ed., op. cit., p. 493 26Ibid., pp. 75-77 27Terasaki and M iller, eds., op. cit., p. 138 28 Kido Koichi Nikki Kenkyukai, ed., op. cit., p. 87

C hap ter 14

U.S. takes helm of Tokyo Tribunal; Soviet Union detains 575,000 Japanese

A

fter the end of the Sino-Japanese W ar and the Pacific W ar, 28 senior Japanese political and m ilitary leaders w ere forced to stand trial at the International M ilitary Tribunal fo r the Far East, also known as the Tokyo Tribunal. The Soviet Union, which sent one judge to sit on the tribunal, had taken about 575,000 Japanese soldiers to its te rrito rie s, mainly Siberia, for forced labor. France and the Netherlands continued their w ars in Asia aimed at maintaining their colonies in the region. This chapter examines what happened in the years just after the guns fell silent.

Wars for re-colonization flare up in Southeast A sia Around the tim e the Tribunal opened in M ay 1946 (the 21st year o f the Show a Era), hostilities between the N ationalist Party (Kuom intang), led by C h ian g Kai-shek, and the Chinese Com m unist Party, led by M ao Zedong, intensified. That summ er, the figh tin g developed in to an all-out civ il war that eventually left M ao standing as the leader o f C h in a . Im m ediately after Jap an surrendered, C h ian g Kai-shek, in preparation for his show dow n w ith the Com m unists, was anxious to take over the vast area the Im perial Japanese Arm y had occu p ied . O n A ugust 15, 1945, C h ian g Kai-shek ordered Yasuji Okam ura, the C om m an der-in -C h ief of Japan's C h in a Expeditionary Arm y, to surrender to the N ationalist Arm y, saying, "Keep the soldiers' equipm ent and m aintain order where they were stationed."1 The order was intended to prevent the w eapons o f about one m illion Japanese soldiers from fa llin g in to the hands o f Com m unist forces. As m ight be expected, the Com m unists also hoped to utilize the Japanese fo rces' w eapons an d e q u ip m en t. L u ck ily fo r th e C o m m u n ists, th ey m anaged to Obtain a substantial portion o f the Japanese forces' weapons for them selves, enabling them to galvanize their m ilitary capacity. In Sh an xi P rovince, about 2,600 Japanese soldiers from the N orth C h in a Area Arm y's Num ber O ne Garrison fou ght fierce battles alongside 207

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N ationalist troops led b y warlord Yen H si-shan (Yan Xishan) against the Com m unists for three and a h a lf years. As the war situ atio n took an unw elcom e turn for th e N a tio n a lists, th e y started to recruit form er Im perial Japanese Arm y officers. Based on Okam ura's advice on w hich officers were the m ost accom plished, the N ationalists reportedly recruited over 100 Japanese officers. A t a tribunal convened in Shanghai, Okam ura was acquitted and released. A t that tim e, the N ationalists were on the verge o f losing the figh t against the Com m unists. "The N ationalists then came to take a more len ien t p olicy toward Japanese war crim inals for the cam paign against the C om m unists," said Professor Akira Ish ii at Tokyo University's Graduate School o f Arts and Sciences. M eanw hile, in Southeast Asia, where Japan's surrender had created a power vacuum , new fights erupted between local indigenous leaders seek­ in g independence and their form er rulers—the A llied Powers that defeated Jap an . In In doch ina, the V iet M in h , a national organization seeking indepen­ dence for V ietnam , led by H o C h i M in h , started a m ajor uprising across w hat is now V ietnam . H o declared V ietnam 's independence on September 2, 1945, in fron t o f about 500,000 people in H anoi's Ba D in h Square. France, w hich planned to take In dochina back again, started m oves to establish control over South V ietnam w ith the help o f British forces, but m et stiff resistance from the V iet M in h . In Ju ly 1946, shortly after the Tokyo Tribunal started, French and Vietnam ese representatives held talks in Paris but failed to reach an agreem ent. Relations deteriorated to the p oin t that French and Vietnam ese forces clashed in H anoi in Decem ber, setting o ff the First Indochinese W ar (1946-54). H o C h i M in h ordered all V ietnam ese n ation als to engage in to tal resistance against the French forces. In 1954, French rule o fficially cam e to an end w ith its shattering defeat at the Battle o f D ien Bien Phu. In Indonesia, Sukarno, C hairm an o f the Preparatory C om m ittee for Indonesian Independence, proclaim ed the nation's independence as the Republic o f Indonesia at a cerem ony on August 17,1945. However, British and D utch forces that landed in the latter h a lf o f Septem ber fou ght fierce battles in Surabaya in East Jav a against the Indonesian independence force. Shouting "independence or death," the Indonesian soldiers con tin ­ ued their staunch resistance against the D utch attem pt to re-colonize the co u n try. From late 1947, th e N etherlan d s started to establish "au to­ nom ous regions," de facto puppet states, in Indonesia hop in g to m ake its quest to control Indonesia irreversible. The Sukarno adm inistration was gradually reduced to a mere regional adm inistration that governed on ly parts o f Sum atra and Jav a. After the Sukarno adm inistration was weakened by a com m unist coup, the D utch forces occupied the Republic's tem porary

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capital o f Jogyakarta and arrested Sukarno and other leaders. In Decem ber 1948, after the sentences o f the Tokyo Tribunal were handed down, the Netherlands was bogged down in a war against guerrilla figh ters. A fter m uch arm -tw isting by the in tern ation al com m u n ity, including the United States, the Dutch agreed to participate in the Round Table conference in The Hague and fin ally assented to Indonesia's inde­ pendence in Decem ber 1949. In August 2005, the 60th anniversary of Indonesia's declaration o f independence, Dutch Foreign M inister Ben Bot visited Indonesia and said the larger scale deploym ent of m ilitary forces in 1947-49 had put the Netherlands "on the wrong side of history."

Hard labor In Siberia is Soviet Union's 'reprisal' In the early hours o f August 9, 1945, Soviet forces launched nearly sim ultanepus attacks on Japanese troops from southeastern M ongolia, the Soviet M aritim e Provinces and from Northern Sakhalin. That same m orn­ ing Soviet forces invaded M anchuria, present day northeastern C h in a. The Kwantung Arm y had been severely depleted due to the Im perial Japanese Army's deploym ent of M anchuria-based divisions to fronts south o f Japan. It proved little m atch for the 1.5 m illion Soviet troops, and M anchuria col­ lapsed in a short period o f tim e. O n August 14, Japan notified the Allied Powers it had accepted the Potsdam Declaration. However, the Soviet U nion did not cease its attacks. O n August 16, C h ie f o f the General Staff o f the Soviet U n ion Alexei Antonov ordered his forces to continue their offensive. He dismissed the Im perial Rescript o f Surrender, a radio speech to the public made by Emperor Showa on August 15, as a mere statement that did not yet bring the surrender o f the Japanese forces into effect. The Red Arm y continued its push un til September 5, three days after Japan signed an instrum ent of surrender on September 2. An estimated 80,000 Japanese soldiers died in the fighting against the Soviet U nion. (See APPENDIX S.) Civilians livin g in M anchuria bore the brunt o f the Soviet offensive. M any tried to flee, but up to 200,000 died after being caught up in the fig h tin g or from hunger and freezing co n d itio n s. The issue o f wardisplaced Japanese left behind in Chin a is a tragic reminder o f the postwar turm oil even today. O n August 23, 1945, Soviet leader Josef Stalin issued Order Number 9898, under the title o f Com m issar o f D efense, to transfer 500,000 Japanese soldiers as prisoners o f war to the Soviet U nion to engage in forced labor. In the order, addressed to People's Comm issar (Minister) for Internal Affairs Lavrentiy Beria, Stalin's right-hand m an, and others, Stalin

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detailed conditions for Japanese soldiers to be POW s, locations fo r their cam ps, and w ork they w ould be forced to do. The order stated: • Select up to 500,000 Japanese soldiers as POW s w ho are physically able to perform heavy labor in the Far East and Siberia; • Prior to their transfer to the Soviet U n io n , construction battalions com prising 1,000 POW s each w ill be form ed; • The Board for Prisoners o f W ar o f the People's Com m issar for Internal Affairs w ill dispatch Japanese POW s to the follow ing labor camps: (a) 150,000 POW s to construct Baikal-Am ur Railway's m ain lin e. (b) 75,000 POW s to M aritim e Provinces (coal m ines, railw ay con­ struction and construction o f soldiers' barracks and other kinds o f labor). (c) 65,000 POW s to the Khabarovsk district (forest loggin g, construc­ tio n o f factories, and other kinds o f labor).2 The transfer o f POW s to the Soviet U n ion started in early Septem ber. O fficers and soldiers disarm ed in Soviet-occupied M anchuria, N orth Korea and other places were reorganized in to construction battalions. They were then regrouped and taken aboard freight trains to labor cam ps. Police o ffi­ cers, public servants, newspaper com pany executives and other n on m ili­ tary p erson n el were d etain ed sep arately an d taken to lab or cam ps. According to testim ony o f those sent to the cam ps, m any were given the im pression that they m ight be sent back to Jap an . How ever, they were sent to Soviet territories or areas under Soviet control such as Siberia, Central Asia and M on golia. M ost were sent to concentration cam ps and forced to do heavy labor. A cco rd in g to th e H e a lth , Labor and W elfare M in istry 's sta tistics, 575,000 Japanese, in clu din g 14,000 transferred to M on golia, were sent to the labor and concentration cam ps, and were enslaved from anywhere betw een several and 14 years. O f th ese, 55,000 , in clu d in g 2,000 in M on golia, died. Organizations form ed by relatives and supported o f the forced laborers and som e Russian researchers put the num ber o f deaths between 62,000 and 92,000. M ost o f the deaths resulted from the bitter cold—som etim es as low as m inus 50 C (m inus 58 F)—lack o f food, poor w orking conditions and lack o f m edical care. W ith in the cam ps, the labor­ ers were given a com m unist education under the title o f "a dem ocratiza­ tion m ovem ent," under the surveillance o f Soviet authorities. Som e POW s snitched on the others to Soviet authorities. Stalin's w ill was reflected in the content o f Order Num ber 9898 calling for forced detention and labor in Siberia. A ccording to the sem i-official

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record Sengo Kyosei Yokuryushi (Postwar Forced D etention History) Volume 7, three p olitical factors lurked in the background for this policy: 1. "reprisal against Ja p a n ," as described in Stalin's victory speech about the war against Japan; 2. international circum stances at the tim e as the C o ld W ar structure was about to take shape; 3. hum an and m aterial dam age the Soviet U n ion suffered during W orld W ar II. In a radio address concerning Japan's surrender broadcast on September 2 ,1 9 4 5 , Stalin said the Soviet U n ion participated in W orld W ar II to wipe out a "stain ." "W e have a special score o f our own to settle w ith Ja p a n ," he said, adding: "The defeat o f the Russian troops in 1904-05 during the Russo-Japanese W ar left bitter m em ories in the m inds o f our people. It was a dark stam on our country. O ur people believed in and awaited the day w hen Jap an w ould be routed and the stain w iped clean ."3 As the C old W ar battle lines started to becom e entrenched, the Soviet U n ion began econom ic reconstruction w ithout assistance from the W est. The USSR replenished its labor force that had been ravaged during the war w ith the "forced labor" o f Japanese detainees. The policy o f forced deten­ tion and labor was devised to selfishly serve M oscow 's particular circum ­ stances at that tim e. As recorded in "Postwar Forced D etention H istory," Soviet detention o f Japanese prisoners in Siberia gave rise to hum anitarian problem s and was contrary to custom ary international law in th at the Soviet U n ion detained civilians along w ith m ilitary forces. And M oscow 's refusal to im m ediately allow Japanese officers and soldiers to return to Jap an , instead forcing them to perform back-breaking labor, violated the Potsdam D eclaration. (See APPENDIX P.) Clause 9 o f the declaration defining terms for Japan's surrender stated: The Japanese m ilitary forces, after being com pletely disarm ed, shall be per­ m itted to return to their hom es w ith the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives. As a mem ber o f the A llied Powers, the Soviet U n ion was bound b y the Potsdam D eclaration, w hich was an international agree­ m ent. Former Im perial Japanese Arm y C olon el Takushiro H attori wrote that the Siberian detention was the "m ost unbearable suffering for the Japanese race."4 Sib erian in te rn m e n t an d th e S o viet o ccu p a tio n o f th e N orth ern Territories, w h ich in clu d ed lo o tin g , v io len ce and rape, caused m any Japanese people to take a disdainful view toward the Soviet U n ion in the postwar period. Soviet forces fin ally occupied the Habom ai group o f islets, part o f the

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N orthern Territories o ff the H okkaido coast and on the south o f the Kuril Islands, on September 5,1945—three days after Jap an had form ally signed surrender docum ents. Hikosaburo H ata, C h ie f o f Staff o f the Kw antung Arm y, despaired at the Soviet troops' actions, saying, "Intolerable deeds such as lawless shootings, lootin g, rape and carjacking were frequently observed all over M anchuria."5 A ccording to an expert in Soviet internm ent o f the Japanese, "In addi­ tion to food, clothes and m edicines held by the Kw antung Arm y, Bank of Jap an banknotes, Bank o f Korea banknotes, corporate bonds, stocks, 3,705 carats o f diam onds and 2,100 kilogram s o f gold b u llio n kept in M anchuria were taken [by Soviet troops]. Entire facilities were rem oved from factories and taken to Soviet territories."6 The Soviet U n ion signed an agreem ent w ith Jap an in A pril 1991 that obligated it to hand over lists o f prisoners-of-war w ho died in the camps and also their rem ains. W hen Russian President Boris Yeltsin visited Japan in O ctober 1993, he apologized for the Siberian internm ent, describing it as a "crim e o f totalitarianism ." However, lists for 13,000 people w ho died in the cam ps have yet to be handed to Jap an and m oves to retrieve vic­ tim s' rem ains have floundered.

M ain Arm y generals slip through tribunal net O n . A ugust 30, 1945, U .S . A rm y G en eral D o u glas M acA rth u r, the Supreme Com m ander o f the A llied Powers, landed at the Im perial N avy's Atsugi airfield in Kanagawa Prefecture. That n ig h t, M acArthur instructed his subordinates to arrest H ideki T ojo, w ho was Prim e M inister w hen Jap an launched its attack on Pearl Harbor, and to im m ediately com pile a list o f war crim inal suspects. The Potsdam D eclaration Jap an accepted stipulates "Stern justice shall be m eted out to all war crim inals" as one o f the terms o f Jap an 's surrender. Tokyo's acceptance o f the declaration was finalized w ith signing an instrum ent o f surrender on Septem ber 2, 1945. T h is b e ca m e th e le g a l b a sis fo r th e A llie d P ow ers to o p e n th e International M ilitary Tribunal for the Far East to try Japanese war crim i­ nal suspects. Selection o f war crim in al suspects started w ith M acA rthur's order. Nam ed in the first list o f suspects were Tojo and m inisters o f his Cabinet, in cludin g form er Foreign M inister Shigenori Togo, form er N avy M inister Shigetaro Shim ada, form er Finance M inister O kin ori Kaya and form er Com m erce and Industry M inister Nobusuke K ishi. Their arrest orders were issued on Septem ber 11. M acArthur inform ed the U .S . governm ent o f his in tention to im m edi­ ately try the m inisters o f the T ojo C ab in et, w ho launched the war, on

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charges o f murder at a U .S.-in stitu ted m ilitary tribunal for Class-B and C lass-C war crim in al suspects. How ever, the U .S . Jo in t C h iefs o f Staff rejected M acArthur's p lan and notified him on Novem ber 10 th at the U .S . governm ent's p olicy was to try Tojo and others as Class-A war crim inal suspects at an international tribun al.7 (See Footnote 5.) O n N ovem ber 19, Decem ber 2 and 6, the second, third and fourth orders, respectively, for arrests were issued, bringing the num ber o f ClassA suspects to about 100. Tojo shot him self in the chest w ith a handgun in a suicide attem pt on Septem ber 11, but the bullet narrow ly m issed his heart and he survived. Arm y C h ie f o f General Staff H ajim e Sugiyam a, w ho was certain to be arrested, shot him self to death on Septem ber 12. Former Prime M inister Fum im aro Konoe took potassium cyanide to k ill him self in the early hours o f Decem ber 16, the deadline for turning him self in to authorities. In January 1946, an ordinance to purge war crim inal suspects from public offices was brought in to force and the suspects were autom at­ ically rem oved from public offices. How did the General Headquarters (GH Q ) set up by the O ccupational au th orities select defendants to stand trial? W ith in G H Q , the In ter­ national Prosecution Section (IPS) was established w ith Joseph Keenan as the C h ie f Coun sel. Keenan divided his staff in to several w orking groups tasked w ith id en tifyin g defendants from designated dates and categories. The work was very d ifficu lt, prim arily because m any governm ent docu­ m ents that w ould have been used in evidence in the tribunal were in cin ­ erated im m ed iately after th e w ar. In vestigators in th e IPS depended heavily on such docum ents as diaries, in clu d in g those o f form er Lord Footnote 5

Class-A, Class-B and Class-C war criminals C la s s - A w a r c r im in a ls w e re m ilit a r y a n d p o l it ic a l le a d e r s w h o c o n s p ir e d i n c r im e s in c lu d in g "c r im e s a g a in s t p e a c e ," " c o n v e n t io n a l w a r c r im e s " a n d "c r im e s a g a in s t h u m a n it y ." A t t h e T o k y o T r ib u n a l, a ll 2 5 d e fe n d a n ts w ere fo u n d g u ilty , w it h fo r m e r P r im e M in is t e r H id e k i T o jo a n d s ix o th e r s s e n te n c e d t o d e a th b y h a n g ­ in g . C la s s -B w a r c r im in a ls w e re t h o s e a c c u s e d o f c o m m it t in g " c o n v e n t io n a l w ar c r im e s ," s u c h as v io la t io n s o f t h e in t e r n a t io n a l a r m e d c o n flic t la w . T r ia l fo r C la s s B a n d C la s s - C w a r c r im in a ls w e re h e ld a t 4 9 t r ib u n a ls i n a n d o u ts id e J a p a n . A to ta l o f 5 ,7 0 0 p e o p le w ere a c c u s e d o f h a v in g v io la t e d ru le s o f w a r-re la te d la w s . I n to ta l, 9 2 0 d e fe n d a n t s w ere e x e c u t e d . T h e y in c lu d e d A r m y G e n e r a l T o m o y u k i Y a m a s h ita fo r h is r e s p o n s ib ilit y fo r t h e k il lin g o f m o r e t h a n 1 0 0 ,0 0 0 F ilip in o c iv ilia n s b y J a p a n e s e tr o o p s i n fie r c e f i g h t i n g i n M a n ila a n d L ie u t e n a n t G e n e r a l M a s a h a r u H o n m a , w h o w as h e ld r e s p o n s ib le fo r t h e a c t io n s o f so ld ie rs in th e B a ta a n D e a t h M a r c h , a fo r c ib le tr a n s fe r o f p ris o n e rs o f w a r b y Ja p a n e s e fo rce s in th e P h ilip p in e s in 1 9 4 2 d u r in g w h i c h m a n y p r is o n e r s w ere b r u t a lly a b u s e d a n d k ille d .

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Keeper o f the Privy Seal Koichi Kido, records of interrogations o f suspects and eye-witness testim onies. Thus those in itia lly om itted from the accusation lists eventu ally fou nd them selves fa cin g the p o ssib ility o f bein g defend an ts. They included former Prime M inister Keisuke Okada, former Foreign M inister H achiro A rita, form er Foreign M inister and Ambassador to the Soviet U n ion M am oru Shigem itsu and former Com m ander o f the Kw antung Arm y in M anchuria Yoshijiro Um ezu. At one stage, some consideration was given to picking at least two defendants to take responsibility for each incident out o f concern that elderly defendants could die in the course o f the tribunal process. The U .S. prosecutors got in touch w ith the Central Liaison O ffice—an ad hoc governm ent bureau set up by the Foreign M inistry in late August 1945 to liaise w ith the Allied Powers—to gauge how Japanese felt about the tribunal. Consequently, they became increasingly confident that they cou ld in d ic t, in ad d itio n to T o jo , form er Foreign M in ister Yosuke M atsuoka, Arm y General and form er Education M inister Sadao Araki, u ltranationalist philosopher Shum ei Okaw a, form er ch ief o f the W ar M inistry's M ilitary Affairs Bureau Akira M uto, and even former chief of the Navy M inistry's N aval Affairs Bureau Takazumi Oka, w ho had not been detained. The IPS executive com m ittee consisted o f prosecutors from each of the A llied Powers. They held a series o f m eetings from M arch 4, 1946, and narrowed down the number of defendants to 29. At a m eeting of pro­ secutors, three people were removed from the list o f defendants: Kanji Ishihara, Jin zaburo M asaki and H iroshi Tam ura, form er ch ie f o f the Prisoner of W ar Inform ation Bureau. As a result, 26 defendants-to-be were selected to face trial.8 Ishihara was one o f the masterminds behind the M anchurian Incident, but he was not even included in the list of people wanted for arrest due to a lack of conclusive evidence. Rather than h yin g to bring Ishihara to the dock, the Chinese prosecutor was keen to pursue the responsibilities of for­ mer Army General and Com m ander o f the Seventh Area Army Seishiro Itagaki, who was involved in the M anchurian Incident and also in some brutal in cid en ts during the Sino-Japanese W ar. M em oirs o f Tadashi Hanaya, w ho also was directly involved in these incidents, were made pub­ lic in a magazine as the entire picture o f the incidents was revealed in 1956, eight years after the Tokyo Tribunal made its rulings. M asaki, w ho was a heavyw eight in the Im perial Japanese Army's Kodoha (Imperial W ay Faction), was arrested by the M ilitary Police after the February 26 Incident of 1936 on suspicion o f being an accom plice in a coup. He was later acquitted in his trial in connection to the coup. At the Tokyo Tribunal, Masaki made such a good impression w ith his unstinting

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cooperation w ith the prosecutors' in vestigation s th at the authorities decided to spare him from being indicted. The Soviet U nion's prosecution team , w ho arrived belatedly in Japan on April 13, dem anded the num ber o f defendants be increased during an April 17 m eeting o f prosecutors. As a result, Shigem itsu and Um ezu, w ho were not detained, were added to the list although the prosecutors had earlier agreed not to in dict them . Thus, fin ally , 28 people were indicted. D uring this process, the m ost sensitive .issue was how Emperor Showa w ould be treated. O n January 9, 1946, Australia subm itted a list o f 64 war crim in al suspects, in clu d in g the Em peror, to the U n ited N ation s W ar Crim es C om m ission, headquartered in Lon d on . H ow ever, the U n ited States was steadfast in its plan to ensure the Emperor w ould n ot face the tribunal as a defendant. M acArthur warned the U .S. governm ent that if the Emperor were indicted as a war crim inal, m ilitary governm ent would have to be instituted across Jap an , and guerrilla warfare m ight break ou t.9 The Soviet U n ion and other A llied Powers did not dare express opposi­ tion to the U .S . position on this issue. O n April 3, 1946, the Far Eastern Com m ission held in W ashington exem pted Emperor Show a as a war crim ­ in al defendant.10 Daisaku Kom oto, the m asterm ind o f the C h an g Tso-lin bom bing in ci­ dent, and N avy Captain Shingo Ishikaw a, w ho prom oted the advance into southern French In doch ina, were rem oved from the list o f suspects. Also rem oved were the so-called Arm y war party trio o f Lieutenant General Sh in ich i Tanaka, C olon el Takushiro H attori and C olon el M asanobu Tsuji. Some experts argue that one reason w hy people such as Tsuji and Ishikawa were n ot included in the list is that form er Im perial Japanese Arm y M ajor General Ryukichi Tanaka, w ho often stood as a witness for the prosecu­ tio n , had scant know ledge o f the internal w orkings o f the Arm y and N aval General Staff offices. Tanaka h im self was exem pted from the prosecution although he was involved in the conspiracy that led to the First Shanghai Incident. Som e people related to the Tokyo Tribunal questioned Tanaka's exem ption from prosecution. In addition, Lieutenant General Shiro Ishii, the Com m ander o f the U n it 731 germ warfare team , also avoided being prosecuted on con dition that he w ould provide inform ation and findings on experim ents the u n it conducted on hum an subjects. The Tokyo Tribunal started on M ay 3, 1946, at a special courtroom w ithin the form er W ar M inistry build in g in Ichigayadai, Tokyo. Eleven judges were selected from each o f 11 countries in clu din g B ritain, C h in a, France, the Soviet U n ion and the U nited States. Sir W illiam W ebb, a justice o f the Australian H igh Court, was chosen as the president (chief judge) of the trib u n al. There also were 11 prosecutors, led b y ch ie f prosecutor Keenan, w ith nearly 500 staffers at the IPS. M ore than 50 defense attorneys,

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both from Jap an and the U nited States, were involved, in clu d in g ch ief defense counsels Som ei Uzawa and Ichiro Kiyose. The biggest, m ost serious problem during the trial process was the utter lack o f capable interpreters. Som etim es the interpreters available inaccu­ rately expressed the defendants' statem ents and other evidence, severely disrupting their ability to get a fair trial. Sentences were handed dow n on Novem ber 12, 1948. O n Decem ber 24, the day after seven Class-A crim i­ nals were executed, the 17 Class-A war crim inal suspects w ho had been detained from the outset, but w ho had avoided prosecution, were released. They included form er Com m erce and Industry M inister Nobusuke Kishi, form er M inister for the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Kazuo Aoki and V ice Foreign M inister and ch ief o f the Intelligence Section o f the Foreign M inistry E iji Am o. Before the sentences were handed out, the G H Q indicted form er C h ie f o f the N aval General Staff Soem u Toyoda, and form er ch ief o f Prisoner-ofW ar M anagem ent Lieutenant General H iroshi Tam ura, w ho were Class-A war crim inal suspects, as Class-B and Class-C war crim inals. Proceedings for the B and C crim inal defendants took place from October 1948 in a special court the G H Q instituted in M arunouchi, Tokyo, th at also was called the M arunouchi Tribunal. In 1949, Tam ura was sentenced to eight years o f hard labor, w hile Toyoda was acquitted.

Allied Powers employ ex post fa cto laws to punish war crim inals In Ju n e 1945, the U nited States, Britain, France and the Soviet U n ion held talks in London to open an international m ilitary tribunal to try Germ an officials involved in W orld W ar II and the H olocaust in w hat becam e the Nurem berg Trial. Justice Robert Jackson of the U .S . Supreme Court, representing the U nited States, said, "A n attack on the foundations o f international relations cannot be regarded as anything less than a crim e against the international com m unity, w hich m ay properly vindicate the integrity o f its fundam ental com pacts by punishing aggressors."11 He w anted n o t on ly Germ ans but also other peoples around the world to know th at any attack against w orld peace w ould be regarded as an in tern ation al crim e. He argued th at the start and pursuit o f a war o f aggression was a crim inal act. After discussions am ong the four nations, the concept o f "crim es against peace" cam e in to b e in g .12 The fo u r cou n tries con clu d ed an agreem ent in A ugust 1945 on a Charter o f the International M ilitary Tribunal. In Article 6, three sets of war crim es were defined:

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1. crim es against peace 2. war crimes 3. crim es against hum anity. The third category was intended to be used to punish those responsible for the H olocaust by the N azi regim e. "Crim es against peace" and "crim es against hum anity" were new ly cre­ ated after Germ any's surrender. A n ex post facto law is a law that retroac­ tively changes the legal consequences o f acts com m itted or the legal status o f facts and relationships that existed prior to the enactm ent o f the law . Otherw ise, international law typ ically prohibits the punishm ent o f activi­ ties that were not defined as crim inal acts w hen the alleged crim inal activ­ ities took place. W ithout any change this same defin ition also was used for the Charter o f the International M ilitary Tribunal for the Far East, the international pact for the Tokyo Tribunal. Another problem was the charge o f "conspiracy," a concept unique to U .S . and British law . Conspiracy is an agreem ent between two or m ore per­ sons to break the law . Even if they are strangers, the charge is applicable if facts show they participated in form in g an agreem ent. A t the Tokyo Tribunal, the A llied Powers tried to lum p together m ilitary leaders and politicians connected to the p lan nin g or execution o f m ilitary activities that began w ith the M anchurian Incident and to punish them for com ­ m ittin g crim es against peace. Defense attorneys unleashed a torrent o f stinging criticism o f the entire process. They argued: (1) A war o f aggression itself is n ot unlaw ful. A lthough the international com m unity renounced the use o f force for the settlem ent o f international disputes in the K ellogg-Briand Pact o f 1928, the treaty itse lf does n ot define a war as a crim e. (2) A war is an act o f a state and therefore individual responsibility can­ n ot be recognized. (3) "Crim es against peace" is an ex p ost facto law an d is therefore unlaw ful. Tw enty-three defendants, all the charged except for Shigem itsu and M atsui, were fou nd gu ilty o f conspiracy. A nd their sentences crossed the bounds o f w hat was reasonable. The notorious Tanaka m em orandum was supposed to be a letter—later fou nd to be false—sent to Emperor Show a by form er Prim e M inister G iich i Tanaka. It describes a path for conquer­ in g C h in a and fin a lly the w orld. H istorian Ikuhiko H ata w rote, "The con ­ spiracy theory lost its basis w hen the 'Tanaka m em orandum ' was proven alm ost certainly a fake in the m iddle o f the tribunal process...A fter great deliberation, the judges decided to leave the principle o f the conspiracy

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charge as it was, but at the same tim e applied responsibility for cruel acts to those charged except for form er Prim e M in ister K oki H irota. By so doin g, they tried to avoid criticism from the public and international society."13 The A llied Powers tried to fin d ways to punish defendants for com m it­ tin g "crim es against hum anity" but gave up on the plan since none o f the defendants' actions fit the charge. O n the contrary, statem ents m ade dur­ in g the trial accused the U nited States o f such crim es by dropping atom ic bom bs on H iroshim a and N agasaki. O n August 10, 1945, the day after the atom ic bom b obliterated N agasaki, the Japanese governm ent issued a p ro test sta te m e n t to th e U n ite d S ta te s, v ia th e Sw iss E m bassy in W ashington, saying the dropping o f atom ic bom bs and indiscrim inate aerial bom bings such as those o f Tokyo on M arch 10 and M ay 25, 1945, violated international law s. "The Am ericans have effected bom bardm ents o f tow ns in the greatest part o f Japanese territory, w ithout discrim ination m assacring a great num ber o f old people, w om en, children; destroying and b in n in g down Shinto and Buddhist tem ples, schools, hospitals, livin g quarters, etc. This fact alone m eans that they have shown com plete defi­ ance o f the essential principles o f hum anitarian law s, as w ell as inter­ n ational law . They now use this new bom b, havin g an uncontrollable and cruel effect m uch greater than any other arms or projectiles ever used to date. This constitutes a new crim e against the w hole o f hum anity and civilizatio n ." (See APPENDIX R.) D uring the Tokyo Tribunal on M arch 3, 1947, U .S . attorney Ben Bruce Blakeney, asked the prosecutor w ho argued there were no war rules that prohibited the use o f atom ic w eapons, "If m y learned friend were fam iliar w ith the preparation o f the Hague Con ven tion IV , the Laws and Custom s o f W ar on Land, he w ould know that there is law prohibiting the use of certain types o f w eapons." The Hague C on ven tion IV , w hich is an A nnex to the C on ven tion , stipulates regulations respecting the laws and customs o f war on lan d. Article 23 says, " ...it is especially forbidden: (a) to em ploy poison or poisonous w eapons; ...a n d (e) to em ploy arm s, projectiles or m aterials calculated to cause unnecessary suffering." Article 25 stipulates, "T he attack or bom bardm ent, by w hatever m eans, o f tow ns, villages, dw ellings, or buildings w hich are undefended is prohibited." G iven these definitions, the fire bom bing o f Tokyo and the u se o f atom ic bom bs could have breached in tern ation al law s. How ever, the evidence the defense counsel asked the court to adopt was turned down by a "m ajority deci­ sion" o f the judges, according to C h ie f Judge W ebb. D eliberation on the issue was never taken up. In han din g dow n the sentences in Novem ber 1948, Judge Radhabinod Pal o f India gave a dissent opinion am ong the 11 judges. In addition to

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questioning the legitimacy of the trial, he said: "If any indiscriminate destruction of civilian life and property is still illegitimate in warfare, then in the Pacific War, this decision to use the atom bomb is the only near approach to the directives of the German emperor during the First World War and of the Nazi leaders during the Second World War."14 Notes_______________________________________________________________________________________________ 1 Shinji Kojim a and Matsuyuki Maruyama, Chugoku Kin-gendaishi (M odem History of China), Tokyo: Iwanami Shinsho, 1986, p. 187 2 Postwar Forced Detention History Editorial Com m ittee, ed., Sengo Kyosei Yokuryushi (Postwar Forced Detention History) vol. 7, Tokyo: Public Foundation for Peace and Consolation, 2005, p. 206 3 Shoji Suezawa et a l., eds., Nichiro (Soren) Kihon Bunsho Shiryoshu, (Collection o f Basic Documents and Inform ation for Japan-Russia Relations), Kawasaki: Radio Press, 2003, p. 65 4 Takushiro Hattori, Daitoa Senso Zenshi (The W hole History o f the Greater East Asia War), Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1993, p. 976 5Postwar Forced Detention History Editorial Com m ittee, ed., op. c it, vol. 1, p. 218 6Yasuo W akatsuki, Shiberia Horyo Shuyojo (POW Cam ps in Siberia) vol. 1, 1979, Tokyo: Sim ul Press, p. 13 7Kentaro Awaya, “ Tokyo Saiban no Hikoku wa Koshite Erabareta (This is How Defendants o f the Tokyo Tribunal Were Selected)," m onthly Chuo-Koron, February 1984, pp. 82-83 8 Yoshinobu Higurashi, Tokyo Saiban no Kokusai Kankei (International Relations o f the Tokyo Tribunal), Tokyo: Bokutakusha, 1986, pp. 278-279 9Courtney W hitney, MacArthur—H is rendezvous with history, New York: Alfred A . Knopf, 1956, p. 284 10Higurashi, op. cit., p. 281 11 Robert H . Jackso n , Report o f Robert H . Jackson, United States Representative to the International Conference on M ilitary Trial, London, 1945, W ash in gton , D .C .: U .S . Governm ent Printing O ffice, 1949, p. 53 12 Noboru Kojim a, Tokyo Saiban (Tokyo Tribunal) vol. 1, Tokyo: Chuko Shinsho, 1971, pp. 50-53 13Ikuhiko Hata, Showashi no Nazo wo Ou (Chasing the Riddles o f Showa History), Tokyo: Bungeishunju, 1993, p.139 14 Radhabinod Pal, Dissentient Judgment o f Justice Pal, Tokyo: Kokusho-Kankokai, 1999, p. 621

Part III: Conclusion

Who's responsible for the Showa War?

W

h y d id Ja p a n 's m ilita ry an d g o v ern m en t leaders trig g er th e M anchurian In cid en t and th en lau n ch the Sino-Japanese W ar? W hy did the nation opt to go to war w ith the U n ited States and continue to fig h t recklessly? W asn't it possible to end the war before the atom ic bom bings o f H iroshim a and Nagasaki? T o fin d answ ers to th ese q u e stio n s, w e, th e W ar R e sp o n sib ility R eexam ination C om m ittee, an ad hoc in -house p anel o f th e Y om iuri Shim bun, delved thoroughly in to , com bed through and exam ined histori­ cal developm ents during the period from the early 1930s to 1945—specif­ ically the history o f wars waged by Jap an . The particular period covers the early parts o f the 1926-1989 reign o f Emperor Show a, the posthum ous nam e o f the m onarch know n as Emperor H irohito outside Jap an . The Yom iuiri Shim bun presented its readers w ith its findings in a year­ lo n g “ W ar Responsibility" series en d in g on August 15, 2006, the 61st anniversary o f the end o f W orld W ar II. In Chapter 15 o f the series, we com prehensively tou ch on Jap an 's m istakes com m itted at various key points from the M anchurian Incident to the Soviet U nion's entry in to a war w ith Jap an and nam ed those w ho should ch iefly be held responsible for each event; in Chapter 16, we elaborate upon the accountability o f those w ho were so deeply responsible; and in Chapter 17, we summ arize a host o f historical lessons that we should leave for future generations to learn. O ur careful exam ination concluded that H ideki T ojo, w ho was Prime M inister w hen Japan entered in to a war w ith the U nited States, was m ost re sp o n sib le fo r w h a t w e, th e W ar R e sp o n sib ility R e e x a m in a tio n Com m ittee o f the Yom iuri Shim bun, describe as the Showa W ar, a collec­ tive nam e for a series o f wars that involved Jap an in East Asia and the Pacific during the aforem entioned period. W e found Fum im aro Konoe, the predecessor o f Tojo as Prime M inister, was second m ost responsible for allow ing the Japanese m ilitary to act on its ow n. O n the other hand, given the fact that Emperor Showa behaved w ithin 223

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the bounds o f a constitutional m onarchy system, we reached the conclu­ sion that he was not seriously responsible. After the end o f the h ostilities, the U .S.-led A llied Powers held the International M ilitary Tribunal for the Far East, better known as the Tokyo Tribunal, but Emperor Showa was not indicted as a result o f a political decision. Should he have been prosecuted, the Emperor w ould have inevitably been found guilty owing to his statement to Supreme Allied Com m ander General D ouglas M acArthur that he was w illin g to take responsibility for the war w hich would have been regarded as a confession of guilt. O n this particular point, our judgm ent about the responsibility o f Emperor Showa, w hich is based on the rule o f law, differs significantly from the expectations o f the Allied Powers in the postwar occupation era except for those o f the United States and Britain. Our conclusions are also far different from the rulings in the Tokyo Tribunal in that we exam ined the responsibility o f m any staff officers and high-raking bureaucrats w ho supported war leaders. The Yom iuri Shim bun decided to define the wars in East Asia and the Pacific Ocean as the "Showa W ar." This series o f wars has been called the Greater East Asia W ar, the Pacific W ar, the 15-Year W ar, the Asia-Pacific War or the Second W orld W ar. Each o f these titles has some justification, but they are not necessarily appropriate when considering factors such as the sense of resistance against certain ideologies, the period o f the wars and the areas where fighting took place. These names have been used independently. Some people refer to "that war" or "the latest big w ar." As a result, no name has been universally adopted by the Japanese people, even though this year, 2006, marks the 61st year since the war ended. The Showa Era, corresponding to the reign of Emperor Showa, lasted for a relatively long period of slightly more than 62 years from December 25, 1926, to January 7, 1989. The early parts of the era were dom inated by wars, and the im pact o f the wars remained strong in the latter parts o f the era. M any Japanese already consider the war in a historical context. We decided to use the term "Showa W ar," not out o f consideration to Emperor Showa, but because its events occurred during the Showa Era.1

Chapter 15

Military, government and political leaders who are accountable for crucial moments of history

Ishihara, Itagaki mastermind Manchurian Incident Those m ain ly responsible • K an ji Ish ih ara, Staff O fficer o f the Kwantung Arm y, Lieutenant Colonel • Seishiro Itagak i, Staff O fficer of the Kwantung Arm y, Colonel • K en ji D ohihara, C h ief o f the Special Service Agency at M ukden, Colonel • K in go ro H a sh im o to , C h ie f o f the Russia G roup o f the Arm y General Staffs Second Bureau, Lieutenant Colonel The starting point o f the Showa War was the M anchurian Incident that took place in September 1931. W ho should be held responsible for having caused the incident? The m ain instigators o f the incident were Kanji Ishihara and Seishiro Itagaki, staff officers o f the Kwantung Arm y, a unit of the Im perial Japanese Arm y. Determ ined to conspire together to grab power and lead the country, they became the m asterm inds o f acts of aggression in M anchuria (currently northeastern China) and literally dragged the nation into a series o f wars. At the core o f Lieutenant Colonel Ishihara's m ilitarist thinking was the pursuit of the "Final W orld W ar Theory" to determine the "Num ber One" country in the world in a war between Japan and the United States, w hich he considered to be the greatest nations o f the Eastern and W estern civili­ zations, respectively.2 In January 1928, at a m eeting o f the Mokuyo-kai (Thursday Society) group o f elite officers w ho graduated from the Imperial Japanese Army's General Staff College, Ishihara said, "The nation could be in a state of war for even 20 years or 30 years if we have footholds all over C h in a and fu lly use th e m ."3 In Ju n e o f th at year, D aisaku K om oto, Itagaki's predecessor, assassinated C h a n g T so-lin (Zhang Z u o lin ), a Chinese warlord who had strong influence in M anchuria, by blow ing up the train in w hich he was traveling. This incident would become a model for the M anchurian Incident. 225

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The M anchurian Incident took place as members o f the Kw antung Arm y blew up a section o f the South M anchurian Railway in Liutiaohu (Lake Liutiao), outside M ukden (presently Shenyang). The Arm y then took control o f M ukden in a single day. The temporary mayor's post of M ukden was taken up by K enji D ohihara, then ch ief o f the M ukden Special Service Agency. The Kw antung Arm y began advancing into Jilin Province beyond its original garrison area. Shigeru H onjo, Com m ander of the Kw antung Arm y, in itially opposed sending troops to Jilin . But he eventually yielded to Itagaki's persistence and decided to give the goahead to the deploym ent. Senjuro H ayashi, Com m ander o f the Korea Arm y w hich were the Japanese forces in Korea, also decided to dispatch his troops to M anchuria w ithout an order. He follow ed advice from staff officers of his own forces, who had ties w ith Ishihara and Itagaki. Kingoro H ashim oto, chief o f the Russia Group o f the Arm y General Staff's Second Bureau, also had close contacts w ith them . Hashim oto formed the Sakura-kai (Cherry Society) group m ade up o f you n g reform ist officers and used the group as a foothold to lead two failed coup attem pts, the M arch Incident and the October Incident, in 1931. The M arch Incident was aimed at installing W ar M inister Kazushige Ugaki as prime m inister. Others involved in the incidents included ch ief o f the W ar M inistry's M ilitary Affairs Bureau Kuniaki Koiso. Although it was poorly planned, the October Incident was linked to the M anchurian Incident. However, it would be the forerunner for a series of coup attempts and terrorist acts, such as the M ay 15 Incident o f 1932 and the February 26 Incident o f 1936. Before the M anchurian Incident, War M inister Jiro M inam i strongly advocated taking a hard-line stance on M anchuria and Inner M ongolia. W ithout com plaint, Prime M inister Reijiro W akatsuki readily approved the dispatch of Japanese troops from Korea to M anchuria at their leaders' discretion after talking w ith M inam i. The helplessness o f politicians in preventing m ilitary officers stationed outside the country from spinning out o f control surfaced for the first tim e at this point. The establishm ent o f the state o f M anchukuo was declared on M arch 1, 1932, less than six m onths after the M anchurian In ciden t. Dohihara arranged for Aixinjueluo Puyi, the last Emperor o f the Q in g Dynasty, to serve as the sovereign head o f M anchukuo under the title o f C h ie f Executive and later Em peror. M eanw hile, the b attlefield tem porarily spread to Shanghai. This developm ent, called the First Shanghai Incident o f 1932, was plotted by Assistant Army Attache Ryukichi Tanaka at the Japanese Legation in Shanghai. Tanaka had been instructed by Itagaki to carry out a plot in Shanghai in an attempt to divert the world powers'

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attention from the establishm ent of Japan's puppet state in M anchuria. Shortly after this, Prime M inister Tsuyoshi Inukai was assassinated in the M ay |5 Incident. The Cabinet of M akoto Saito succeeded Inukai's and approved the establishm ent o f M anchukuo. Prior to this, the House of Representatives unanim ously passed a resolution to recognize M anchukuo as a nation. At a plenary session o f the Diet's House of Representatives, Foreign M inister Yasuya Uchida said Japan would not hand over its rights and interests in M anchuria even if its territory was turned into "scorched earth." U chida responded to an interpellation by Tsutom u M ori, a mem­ ber of the Rikken Sdyukai party, also known as Seiyukai. M ori was a leading figure representing the politicians who were vocal in calling for the m ain­ tenance of rights and interests in M anchuria and Inner M ongolia. A report by the Lytton Com m ission, an investigation team led by Victor A lexander George Robert (V .A .G .R .) Bulw er-Lytton appointed by the League o f N ations concerning Japan's activities in M anchuria, was sub­ m itted in October 1932. War M inister Sadao Araki harshly criticized the report and called for Jap an to w ithdraw from the League. Araki, who served as War M inister in the Cabinets o f Inukai and Saito, thus openly endorsed the actions o f the Kwantung Arm y. The Lytton Report did not condem n Japan in a one-sided m anner. Indeed, it included a proposal to establish a province-w ide, autonom ous governm ent in M anchuria. But when a recom m endation based on the Lytton Report was adopted at the General Assembly of the League o f N ations, only Japan opposed it. Yosuke M atsuoka, head o f the Japanese delegation, walked out o f the m eeting, sig­ nifyin g Japan's withdrawal from the League.4

Konoe, Hirota sit on their hands: The Sino-Japanese War Those m ain ly responsible • Fum im aro K onoe, Prime M inister • K oki H irota, Prime M inister and Foreign M inister • K en ji D oh ih ara, C h ief of the Special Service Agency at M ukden, M ajor General • H ajim e Sugiyam a, War M inister, General • A kira M u to, C h ief o f the Operations Section of the Arm y General Staff, Colonel W ho bears the responsibility for the escalation of a small incident into all-out war between Japan and China? O n June 4, 1937, Prime M inister Fum im aro Konoe launched his first C ab in et. The M arco Polo Bridge Incident—a brief unplanned battle between the Im perial Japanese Army

228 / C onclusion

and Chiang Kai-shek's Chinese N ational Revolutionary Army—occurred a m onth later on Ju ly 7. The incident was the trigger for the Sino-Japanese W ar. As the incident itself was unplanned, the slide to all-out war could have been avoided if the flare-up was handled properly. In fact, a ceasefire accord was signed in Beijing, and the matter appeared to have been settled locally. But, on the same day, the Konoe Cabinet announced it would send more troops to northern C h in a, a step that caused the escalation o f m ili­ tary involvem ent. Konoe failed to exercise political leadership at each o f the follow ing critical phases: • w hen the decision to dispatch additional troops from Jap an was made; • when a de facto shift from a non-expansionist policy in China was announced; • when peace efforts through m ediations by Germ an Ambassador to China Oskar Trautman were made; and • when the so-called first Konoe statem ent that closed channels for negotiations w ith China's N ationalist (Kuomintang) governm ent was announced. In the early days o f the Sino-Japanese W ar, Konoe indeed pursued a peaceful settlem ent by p lan n in g a sum m it w ith K uom intang leader. Chiang Kai-shek and attem pting to dispatch an emissary to the Nationalist governm ent. But he backed down when he met opposition, m ainly voiced by Arm y o fficers. Foreign M in ister K oki H irota, alon g w ith K onoe, rem ained silen t during a five-m inister conference and the follow in g Cabinet m eeting that decided to send three Arm y divisions. Hirota and Konoe also did not voice any objection during a subsequent Cabinet meet­ in g. Together w ith W ar M inister H ajim e Sugiyam a and N avy M inister M itsum asa Yonai, Hirota also called for an end to peace negotiations w ith the N ationalist governm ent. Throughout the period during w hich the Marco Polo Bridge Incident expanded into the Sino-Japanese W ar, Hirota stood at the diplom atic helm , first serving as Foreign M inister, then Prime M inister and again as Foreign M inister. After the February 26 Incident, Prime M inister Hirota made a series of decisions that sowed the seeds o f future strife. The decisions included one to restore a system under w hich m ilitary officers in active service took up the posts o f War and N avy M inisters, another on the Imperial policy prin­ ciples that set the stage for the nation's advance into Southeast Asia and still another on the signing o f the Japan-Germ any accord on defense coop­ eration that was aimed at containing the Soviet U nion.

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M aneuvers to annex northern C h in a from the N ationalist governm ent tipped Jap an and C h in a in to fu ll h ostilities. Those involved in the opera­ tio n s in clu d e d K en ji D o h ih a ra ; T akash i Sakai, C h ie f o f S ta ff o f the Japanese troops stationed in C h in a; and Tan Takahashi, an assistant m ili­ tary attache. They worked to conclude the so-called (Yoshijiro) Um ezu-He Y in g q in a cco rd an d th e D o h ih a ra -Q in D e c h u n a cco rd , b y w h ich N ationalist agencies were expelled from Hebei and Chahar provinces. In Novem ber 1935, D ohihara launched a puppet autonom ous governm ent in eastern Hebei Province. The Im perial Japanese Arm y m aintained that C h in a should n ot be regarded as a single country. V ice C h ie f o f Staff o f the Kw antung Arm y Seishiro Itagaki argued that Jap an should directly con­ clude ties w ith each region in C h in a .5 In C h in a , the X ian Incident in 1936 pushed C h in a toward the second phase o f collaboration between the N ationalists and the Com m unists. In the wake o f grow ing anti-Japanese cam paigns in C h in a , relations between Jap an and C h in a were precarious. At the beginning o f the Sino-Japanese W ar, Im perial Japanese Arm y leaders were sharply divided between those callin g for an expansion o f the war and those seeking to h alt con flict. Head o f the Operations Bureau o f the Arm y General Staff K anji Ishihara sided w ith those opposing expansion. But his subordinate, head o f the Operations Section Akira M uto, advocated the dispatch o f troops by ally­ in g h im self w ith the head o f the M ilita ry A ffairs Bureau o f the W ar M in istry S h in ic h i T an aka. H a vin g fa ile d to co n tro l h is su bordin ate, Ishihara allow ed the m obilization o f 13 Arm y divisions u n til he was trans­ ferred to the Kw antung Arm y as V ice C h ie f o f Staff. W ar M inister H ajim e Sugiyam a advocated expansion. He foiled peace efforts b y m aking the term s o f peace tougher after the fall o f N an jin g, the Chinese capital at the tim e. Com m ander o f the Central C h in a Area Arm y Iwane M atsui exhorted top m ilitary officials to capture N an jin g and direct­ ed the operation. U pon N an jin g's fa ll, a series o f massacres and violence targeting prisoners o f war and civilian s, called "Nankin Gyakusatsu" (the Rape o f N anking) or “Nankin Jiken” (the N anking Incident), took place. Such acts, w hich contravened m ilitary discipline, were com m itted partic­ u la rly b y m em bers o f th e u n its led b y L ie u te n a n t G e n e ra l K esago N akajim a, head o f the Arm y's Sixteenth D ivision .6

M atsuoka, Oshitna fa il in diplom acy with the Tripartite Pact Those m a in ly responsible • Fum im aro K onoe, Prime M inister • Yosuke M atsu oka, Foreign M inister

2 3 0 / C onclusion

• H iro sh i O sh im a, Ambassador to Germ any, Lieutenant General • T osh io Sh irato ri, Ambassador to Italy • O sam i N agan o, C h ie f o f the N aval General Staff, Adm iral • S h in g o Is h ik a w a , C h ie f o f th e Secon d S e ctio n o f th e N avy M inistry's N aval Affairs Bureau, Captain Som e conservatives argue that the war against the U nited States was a "war o f self-defense" for Jap an . They base their argum ents on the U nited States' o il em bargo and the H ull N ote o f Novem ber 26, 1941, w hich was considered a de facto ultim atum delivered to Jap an b y U .S . Secretary of State Cordell H u ll shortly before the start o f the war. How ever, the U .S. pressure on Jap an to suspend its m ilitary advance in C h in a cam e about, to a large extent, from Japan's "m isjudgm ents." Jap an in a sense drove itself over the precipice. So, w ho m ade the m isjudgm ents and w hy? First o f a ll, the m ost critical m istake was the conclusion o f the Tripartite Pact w ith Germ any and Italy in Septem ber 1940. Foreign M inister Yosuke M atsuoka, an enthusiastic proponent o f the treaty, originally planned to dem and that the U nited States m ake concessions by m eans o f form ing a four-nation entente b y adding the Soviet U n io n to the Tripartite Pact countries. How ever, the Tripartite A lliance was n othin g but a m ilitary pact against the U nited States. The U nited States, w hich by then had im posed econ om ic san ction s again st Ja p a n , had fu rth er hardened its attitu de toward Jap an . Furtherm ore, around the tim e the treaty was concluded, Germ any abandoned its p lan to invade the British hom eland and was steeling itself for war w ith the Soviet U n io n . W hen M atsuoka's plan to w in U .S . concessions collapsed due to the outbreak o f the war between Germ any and the Soviet U n io n , Jap an could have chosen to abolish the Tripartite Pact and im prove relations w ith the U nited States. However, H iroshi O shim a, Am bassador to Germ any, con­ tin u ally sent m isleading inform ation to Jap an , blin d ly believing Germ any w ould w in the war against the Soviet U n io n . He kept on sending inform a­ tio n d ep ictin g the war situ atio n as b ein g favorable for G erm any. For instance, im m ediately after the hostilities started he said, "The war w ill end in four weeks [with victory for G erm any]." Toshio Shiratori, Ambassador to Italy, proposed "innovative diplom a­ cy ." He lacked the ab ility to m ake levelheaded judgm ents on internation­ al situations due to his pro-Germ an, an ti-U .S. attitude. Consequently, he also gave the governm ent flaw ed diplom atic advice. The N avy, because o f fears o f a possible war w ith the U nited States, resisted Jap an 's jo in in g the T rip artite A llia n ce . H ow ever, N avy M in ister K oshiro O ikaw a fin a lly changed his m ind and supported the treaty. The Arm y had been prom oting the alliance plan since the first Cabinet

Military, government and political leaders who are accountable for crucial moments o f history / 231

o f Fum im aro Konoe and the C abinet o f K iichiro H iranum a. To successful­ ly overthrow the C abinet o f M itsum asa Y on ai, a leading figure in the N avy w ho was cautious about the treaty, the Arm y had W ar M inister Shunroku H ata subm it a letter o f resign atio n . The A rm y abused the system o f a p p o in tin g active-d u ty m ilita ry officers to m ilita ry m in isters' posts. A ctiv e ly m o vin g b eh in d the scenes w as, am ong oth ers, c h ie f o f the M ilitary Affairs Bureau at the W ar M inistry Akira M uto. A m istake com parable w ith the Tripartite A lliance was the advance into southern French Indochina in Ju ly 1941. The U nited States, w hich was w ary a b o u f Ja p a n 's p u sh so u th w a rd , re p e a te d ly w arn ed T o k y o . Im m ediately before Jap an 's advance in to southern French In d o ch in a, Japanese Am bassador to W ashington Kichisaburo N om ina was sending telegram s on the possibility o f an o il em bargo.7The N avy led the advance­ m ent in to southern French Indochina. C h ie f o f the N aval General Staff A dm iral O sam i N agan o stron gly advocated ad van cin g in to southern French In dochina. To take control o f o il resources in the D utch East Indies m ilitarily, it was necessary to capture British M alaya, where British bases were located. A nd, for that purpose, N agano's plan posited the im perative o f build in g bases in southern French In doch ina. How ever, it was quite evident that a war against Britain w ould develop in to a war against the U nited States because the U nited States was about to enter the European theater. N agano's judgm ent was grossly affected by m id-career naval staff officers w ho were m ostly pro-Germ an and antiAm erican. C h ie f o f the Second Section o f the N aval Affairs Bureau o f the N avy M inistry Shingo Ishikaw a said, "Even against the U nited States, we w ill be in v in cib le." H e was considered a leader o f such officers. Ishikaw a drafted a w ritten opinion to urge N agano and others to resolutely advance in to southern French In doch ina. Ishikaw a also erred in his assessment of the national strength o f the U nited States. He under-estim ated the U nited States in terms o f m aterial national strength, an im portant factor for judg­ in g w hether Jap an could go to war w ith the U nited States. As a result, he also under-estim ated the possible dam age the U .S . m ilitary could cause to Japanese cargo and o il carriers.8 The Tripartite A lliance was led by a M atsuoka group w hile the advance­ m ent to and stationing in southern French Indochina was m ainly led by N agano and others. Nevertheless, it was Prime M inister Konoe w ho made the fin al decisions to im plem ent these strategies as n ational policies and led Jap an to war w ith the U nited States.

2 3 2 / C onclusion

Tojo erases *seeds for avoiding war': Japan-U .S. War Those m a in ly responsible • H id ek i T o jo , Prime M inister and W ar M inister, General • H ajim e Su giyam a, C h ie f o f the Arm y General Staff, G eneral • O sam i N agan o , C h ie f o f the N aval General Staff, Adm iral • Sh igetaro Sh im ad a, N avy M inister, Adm iral • T akazu m i O k a , C h ie f o f the N avy M inistry's N aval Affairs Bureau, Rear Adm iral • S h in ic h i T an ak a, C h ie f o f Operations at the Arm y General Staff, M ajor General • T e iic h i S u z u k i, P re sid e n t o f th e C a b in e t P la n n in g B oard , Lieutenant General • K o ich i K id o , Lord Keeper o f the Privy Seal W hy did Jap an initiate hostilities against the U nited States w ithout ratio­ nally assessing w hether it had the m aterial capacity to figh t such a war? Senior Arm y officers w ho supported the idea o f going to war included C h ie f o f Arm y General Staff H ajim e Sugiyam a, Vice C h ie f o f Arm y General Staff Osam u Tsukada, and ch ief o f Operations at the Arm y General Staff Sh inichi Tanaka. A t the mid-career level, ch ief o f the Operations Section Takushiro H attori and ch ief o f the M ilitary Affairs Section Kenryo Sato, am ong others, supported the war. In the N avy, C h ie f o f the N aval General Staff Adm iral Osam i N agano and m id-career officers such as ch ief o f the Second Section o f the N aval Affairs Bureau Shingo Ishikawa advocated going to war w ith the U nited States. Despite havin g some qualm s about such a war, m any m ilitary and p olit­ ical leaders were persuaded b y war proponents. Asked by W ar M inister H ideki Tojo about the prospects for victory against the U nited States, N avy M inister Koshiro Oikaw a replied he was not confident the U nited States could be defeated. Shigetaro Shim ada, Oikaw a's successor, and ch ief o f the N avy M inistry's N aval Affairs Bureau Takazum i O ka did n ot clearly state where they stood. Then the ch ief o f the W ar M inistry's M ilitary Affairs Bureau Akira M uto told Oka the Arm y w ould follow the N avy if it declared "}he N avy does not w ant a w ar." But Oka rejected this proposal, and a chance to avert the war was lost.9 In Decem ber 1940, a year before the war started, the second C abinet o f Prime M inister Fum im aro Konoe started negotiations w ith the U nited States to avoid a war. However, Foreign M inister Yosuke M atsuoka, w ho gam bled that concluding the Tripartite Pact w ith Germ any and Italy in September 1940 was in Japan's interests, took a different course o f action

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from the Konoe Cabin et and concluded the Japanese-Soviet N eutrality Pact w ith Soviet leader Jo sef Stalin in A pril 1941. Jap an -U .S. negotiations in itially started as talks between figures in the private sector. However, M atsuoka strongly opposed these efforts. The negotiations becam e dead­ locked because the Arm y opposed w ithdraw ing its troops from C h in a , w hich was one con dition for peace put forward by W ashington. Konoe dism issed M atsuoka and sought to break the stalem ate through direct negotiations w ith U .S . President Franklin D . Roosevelt. Konoe, how ­ ever, faced strong resistance from W ar M inister Tojo against any m ilitary w ithdraw al from C h in a , and stepped dow n in October 1941 as he had done in January 1939. After the fall o f the second Konoe Cabin et, Lord Keeper o f the Privy Seal K oichi Kido strongly pressed for Tojo to succeed K o n o e. Sin ce th e secon d K on oe C a b in e t, K id o h ad becom e deep ly involved in choosing prim e m inisters. The T ojo adm inistration was estab­ lished, but Kido's recom m endation turned out to be an error o f judgm ent. Kido told Tojo th at he had a message from Emperor Show a to scrap the policy o f seeking war against the U nited States and, for a tim e, Tojo chart­ ed such a course.10 However, Tojo was also unable to stop the slide to war because, just as in the previous C ab in et, war advocates dom inated the opinions o f the Arm y and N avy. M eanw hile, T eiichi Suzuki, President o f the Cabinet Planning Board, w hich was tasked w ith p lan nin g the n ation's wartim e econom y, was also heavily responsible for Japan's going to war w ith the U nited States. Suzuki was in a position to object, or at least raise doubts, about Japan's capabili­ ty to conduct a war from the view point o f m ilitary-related supplies. In fact, Suzuki reportedly said at the tim e o f the Konoe C abinet that Jap an w ould becom e unable to obtain oil even if it occupied oil facilities in the D utch East Indies because the bases likely w ould be destroyed b y the enem y. How ever, he did an about-face during the fin al assessment on the nation­ al strength im m ediately before the war's start and said Jap an w ould "be able to sustain itself w ith effort" in terms o f o il supply. Saying th at he was convinced th at opening a war "w ould be advantageous for Jap an in terms o f m ain tain in g and boosting the nation's strength," Suzuki supported the pro-war forces.11 The m ain responsibility for the decision to start the war against the U nited States rested w ith the m inisters o f the T ojo C ab in et, in clu din g the Prim e M in ister h im self, Foreign M inister Shigenori Togo and Finance M in ister O k in o ri K aya, a ll o f w hom were in a p osition to advise the Em peror. It is know n th a t T ogo and Kaya a ctu ally tried to persuade C abinet m inisters to try to avoid the war. O n the other h an d, the N avy was preparing for an operation in H aw aii. Com m ander-in-C hief o f the Com bined Fleet Isoroku Yam am oto w ent ahead w ith the Pearl Harbor

23 4 / C onclusion

attack that has often been described as a "gam ble." The delayed delivery to the U .S. State Department o f a memorandum effectively declaring war on the U nited States was caused by m istakes at the Japanese Embassy in W ashington. This caused the escalation o f anti-Japan sentim ent and a growing perception in the United States o f "the sneaky Japanese."

To)o, Koiso ignore defeats: Continuation o f war Those m ain ly responsible • H id eki T ojo, Prime M inister and W ar M inister, General • K u n iaki Koiso, Prime M inister, General • O sam i N agan o, C h ief o f the Naval General Staff, Adm iral o f Fleet • H ajim e Sugiyam a, C h ief of the Army General Staff, Field M arshal • Shigetaro Shim ada, N avy M inister, Adm iral • Kenryo Sato, C h ief o f the War M inistry's M ilitary Affairs Bureau, M ajor General • T akazum i O k a, C h ief o f the Navy M inistry's Naval Affairs Bureau, V ice Adm iral • Shigeru Fukutom e, C h ief of Operations of the Naval General Staff, Vice Adm iral Japanese forces declined precipitously after in itial operations in the war w ith the United States. W hy did Japan overlook crucial turning points in the war situation? The first major turning point was the Battle of Midway in Jun e 1942. In that battle, Japan lost four m ajor aircraft carriers and m uch of its air power, resulting in the loss of both air and naval suprema­ cy in the Pacific Ocean in one sweep. Top N avy officials including Shigeru Fukutome, chief of the Operations Bureau o f the Naval General Staff, were unable to foresee the deploym ent of enemy aircraft carriers. Proud o f the victory in the attack on Pearl Harbor, the N avy obviously underestimated the strength o f the U .S. forces. Furthermore, Japan staged an operation to regain Guadalcanal Island from August 1942 through February 1943 but w rongly predicted when a m ajor U .S. counteroffensive would likely be launched. C h ief o f the Army General Staff Hajim e Sugiyam a made the mistake of sending troops in sev­ eral sm all deploym ents.12 C h ie f o f O perations at the Arm y General Staff Lieutenant General Shinichi Tanaka yelled "You idiot!" at Prime M inister Hideki Tojo when Tojo rejected his request for more vessels to be sent to ensure the opera­ tion's success.13 Deprived o f air and naval superiority in the Pacific, Japan had tremen­ dous difficulty providing supplies such as food, weapons and am m unition

Military, government and political leaders who are accountable for crucial moments o f history / 235

through sea transportation. It was becom ing obvious that Jap an could not continue the war against the U nited States. As he distrusted the central com m and; T ojo decided to concurrently serve as C h ie f o f Arm y General Staff in February 1944, breaking a longstanding rule o f the Arm y. Tojo also appointed N avy M inister Shigetaro Shim ada to the post o f C h ie f o f the N aval G eneral Staff. In Ju ly 1944, Saipan and other parts o f the M ariana Islands were taken over b y the enem y, puncturing the "Absolute N ational Defense Zone" o f Japan—areas deem ed indispensable for Japan's m ainland defense and con­ tin u ation o f the war. The governm ent had ordered that these areas be defended at all cost. News o f these defeats greatly shocked the public. The W ar C o o rd in a tio n G rou p o f th e A rm y D ep artm en t at th e Im perial Headquarters concluded: "The Empire has n o prospect o f regaining its pre­ vious strength and it w ill likely decline gradually. Thus, we should seek an end to the war im m ediately."14 Finally, the m om entum to oust the Tojo adm inistration becam e irre­ sistible and the C abinet resigned en masse later that m onth. Three years earlier, w hen asked by the Emperor about the prospects in the event o f war against the U nited States, then C h ie f o f the Arm y General Staff Sugiyam a replied that Jap an w ould "rout the enem y" in about three m on th s.15 Even after the Japanese forces had lost all prospect o f turning the tide and w hining, n o t only Sugiyam a but also C h ie f o f M ilitary Affairs Bureau at the W ar M inistry Kenryo Sato, C h ie f o f the N aval General Staff Osam i N agano and ch ief o f the N avy M inistry's N aval Affairs Bureau Takazum i O ka, w ho all had supported the Tojo regim e, favored "carrying on w ith the w ar." If the successor to the Tojo C abinet had embraced the view o f the W ar C oordination Group o f the Im perial Headquarters, it w ould have been a prim e opportunity to end the w ar. How ever, Prime M inister Kuniaki Koiso failed to in itia te earnest discussions aim ed at en d in g the w ar. Koiso believed that Jap an needed to w in a battle against the U nited States in the Philippines to gain leverage in any peace negotiations. Koiso decided to carry out operations to counter U .S . advances toward Jap an and to engage them in battles o n Japanese soil later. K oiso established the Im perial Suprem e W ar C o u n c il, w h ich superseded th e Im perial H eadquartersG ov ern m en t L ia iso n C o n fe re n ce . Its A u gu st 19, 1944, m eetin g was atten ded b y C h ie f o f th e A rm y G en eral S ta ff Y o sh ijiro U m ezu , W ar M inister H ajim e Sugiyam a and C h ie f o f the N aval General Staff Koshiro Oikaw a am ong others. The participants, undaunted by the deteriorating situ atio n , said, "W e should con tin u e to prosecute the w ar" and "W e should overcom e the serious situ atio n ."16

2 3 6 / C onclusion

In October 1944, the Japanese forces were decim ated in ground and naval battles on the Philippines' Leyte Island, losing the bulk o f their rem aining air and naval capabilities. In January 1945, the Arm y and Navy Departments of the Im perial Headquarters decided to prepare for final battles on Okinaw a and the m ainland. At this poin t, Japan spurned a chance to avert tragedy at Iwo Jim a island, where 20,800 Japanese troops died, and in the Battle o f Okinaw a, where 188,000Japanese lost their lives.

Suicide air and sea attacks gradually become systemized part o f warfare: Kam ikaze attacks Those m ain ly responsible • T akijiro O n ish i, Com m ander of the First N aval Air Fleet in M anila, Vice Adm iral • Tasuku N akazaw a, C h ief o f Naval Operations at the N aval General Staff, Rear Adm iral • K am eto K u rosh im a, C h ie f o f the Second Bureau o f the N aval General Staff, Captain • Renya M u tagu ch i, Com m ander o f the Fifteenth Arm y, Lieutenant General After suffering heavy losses due to the reckless continuation o f the war, the Japanese m ilitary launched tokko (special attack) campaigns in w hich airm en turned them selves in to hum an bom bs and crash landed into enem y targets. T he A rm y and N avy D ep artm en ts o f th e Im p erial Headquarters incorporated a policy in Ju ly 1944 that sought to "destroy enemy aircraft carriers and transport ships at any cost." In early October, C h ief o f the Naval General Staff Koshiro Oikawa m et w ith Vice C h ief of the N aval G eneral Staff Seiich i Ito, ch ie f o f O perations at the N aval General Staff Tasuku Nakazawa and w ith Takijiro O nishi, w ho was about to assume his post o f Com m ander-in-Chief o f the First N aval Air Fleet in M anila. At the m eeting, O nishi said, "Appealing to the high integrity o f front line servicemen in terms of martyrdom and self-sacrifice, we have to dare to conduct attacks by crash-diving aircraft." Oikaw a, w ho was in com ­ m and for the operations, accepted the proposal, saying, "H olding back my tears, I endorse the proposal, but I request that it be carried out based on the volu n tary w ill o f each servicem an." O n ish i to ld N avy M in ister Mitsum asa Yonai, "I w ill make the Philippines the last battleground by carrying out tokko attacks." He then left for M anila. O nishi formed the first kamikaze special attack squadron. Each kamikaze fligh t usually consisted of four planes. O n October 25, a 13-man attack

Military, government and political leaders who are accountable for crucial moments o f history / 237

squadron led by Lieutenant Yukio Seki crashed their explosives-laden air­ craft in to enem y forces. The battles in the Philippines continued u n til Jan u ary 1945, and about 700 air tokko p ilots died in the operations. A lthough suffering a m ajor defeat in the Philippines, the Arm y and N avy Departm ents o f the Im perial Headquarters decided to use all Arm y and N avy aircraft for tokko attacks.17 D atin g back to August 1943, about a year before the first kamikaze attack was carried out, Kam eto Kuroshim a, w ho had just assum ed .the post o f ch ie f o f the Second Bureau o f the N aval General Staff and was called the "G o d o f O perations," spoke to top naval com m anders about the necessity o f tokko air attacks. A t this tim e, N avy Captain Eiichiro Jo , taking advantage o f his post as aide-de-camp to the Emperor, visited a Japanese airbase in the Southwest P acific. After recognizing the overw helm ing degree o f air superiority o f the U .S . forces during the inspection tour, he requested O n ish i, head o f the Adm inistrative Section o f the N aval A viation Bureau o f the N avy M inistry, to carry out tokko attacks w ith aircraft. From that tim e, under the supervi­ sion o f Kuroshim a and N akazaw a, am ong others, the N avy developed w eapons for tokko attacks, in clu d in g the Oka (Cherry Blossom) m anned glider bom b and the Kaiten (D ivine Fate) hum an torpedo. In September 1944, the N avy fin ally established the "Tokko Departm ent" thereby system izing tokko attacks. Arm y p lan nin g for tokko air attacks also shifted in to fu ll sw ing as soon as Ju n Ushiroku assumed the post o f Inspector General o f Arm y A viation in M a rch 1944. In th e B a ttle o f O k in a w a , su icid e a tta ck s le d by Com m ander o f the Sixth Air Arm y M ich io Sugahara becam e the core tac­ tic o f operations. M ore than 9,500 Japanese m ilitary m en were killed in tokko attacks. M eanw hile, in battlefields around the South Pacific, soldiers were deci­ m ated u n it after u n it, division after division, under the nam e o f "gyokusa i," w hich literally m eans "jew el sm ashing" but actually cam e to m ean "dying an honorable d eath ." Senior officers in charge o f operations in the Im perial Headquarters steadfastly stuck to their principle o f "n o reinforce­ m ent, n o retreat and n o surrender" u n til the end o f the w ar. Garrisons were discarded on isolated P acific islands, left inevitably to be annihilated sooner or later. The prim e exam ple o f such irresponsibility and disrespect for hum an life was the Im phal O peration, w hich started in M arch 1944 in an attem pt to capture the Indian city o f Im phal. A telegram sent by leader o f the Fifteenth D ivision o f the Arm y M asafum i Yam auchi conveyed the m isery and m onstrousness o f the operation, in w hich 72,500 soldiers, out o f 100,000, died or were w ounded, "O ur m en on the front line have lost their ability to figh t due to illness and starvation, w ithout am m unition, in torrential rain and a sea o f m ud, all due to the

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/ C onclusion

incom petence o f the Arm y and M utaguchi."18 Com m ander o f the Fifteenth Arm y Renya M utaguchi, w ho bm shed o ff objections from subordinates and insisted on carrying out the operation, m ust bear grave responsibility; b u t Com m ander o f the Burm a Area Arm y M asakazu Kawabe, w ho did n ot stop M utaguchi, the Southern Arm y and the Im perial Headquarters, w hich approved the operation, m ust also be held accountable.

Anam i, Umezu press ahead with war: F in a l battle on the m ainland Those m a in ly responsible • K u n iak i K oiso, Prime M inister, General • K oshiro O ikaw a, C h ie f o f the N aval General Staff, Adm iral • Y o sh ijiro U m ezu , C h ie f o f the Arm y General Staff, General • Soem u T oyod a, C h ie f o f the N aval General Staff, Adm iral • K orech ika A n a m i, W ar M inister, General The adm inistration o f Prime M inister Kuniaki Koiso, w ho succeeded H ideki T ojo, started as a kind o f "coalition C abin et" led by Koiso and N avy M inister M itsum asa Y on ai. How ever, their lack o f leadership and ability had been exposed a num ber o f tim es, so it was alm ost im possible to expect th em to show th e stron g lead ersh ip n eeded to term in ate th e w ar. Espousing the slogan "A ll 100 m illion armed to fig h t," the C abinet sent m any soldiers to their deaths. It resigned en masse in A pril 1945, paving the w ay for Okinaw a Prefecture to becom e a battlefield. During that tim e, C h ie f o f N aval General Staff Koshiro Oikaw a approved kamikaze suicide attacks and a suicide m ission o f the battleship Yamato to Okinaw a w hile ch ief o f the Operations Section o f the N aval General Staff Sadatoshi Tom ioka also insisted that the m ilitary should send as m any sol­ diers as possible to the Okinaw a front. Japan suffered appalling casualties in the Battle o f Okinaw a. W ith the Soviet U n ion jo in in g the war and the atom ic bom bings o f Hiroshim a and Nagasaki, the nation was being devas­ tated by the A llied Powers. Despite this, some m ilitary leaders insisted that they w anted to fin d a way out o f a hopeless situation through a fin al battle on the m ainland. A t a m eeting o f the Im perial Suprem e W ar C o u n cil, also know n as gozenkaigi (a conference in the presence o f the Emperor), that started late at n igh t on August 9, Yonai agreed to Foreign M inister Shigenori Togo's proposal to accept the Potsdam Declaration on one condition—that the national p olity be m aintained. However, W ar M inister Korechika Anam i opposed th is, "I believe it is appropriate to push toward a fin a l battle on

Military, government and political leaders who are accountable for crucial moments o f history / 239

the m ainland w ith determ ination to fin d a way out o f an im possible situation."19 C h ief o f Arm y General Staff Yoshijiro Um ezu and his counterpart in the N avy, Soemu Toyoda, also voiced their resolve for a final battle on the m ainland. They said they could not determine if defeat was inevitable, though they could not be absolutely assured of victory. Vice C h ief of the Naval General Staff Takijiro O nishi, who was one o f the most hard-line officers in the N avy, called Anam i out from a m eeting. O nishi told him Yonai was unreliable because he wanted to end the fightin g. O nishi asked Anam i to make efforts to keep the nation engaged in the war. The Im perial Headquarters was planning to deploy 3.15 m illion soldiers and 1.5 m illion sailors to handle a possible invasion of the m ainland by U .S. forces. The headquarters thought it best to m obilize the entire popu­ lace to repel the Americans for as long as possible, in flict heavy casualties on the landing forces and thereby seek more favorable conditions in nego­ tiation s for peace. M asao Y osh izum i, w ho becam e ch ie f o f the W ar M inistry's M ilitary Affairs Bureau in a personnel reshuffle in preparation for the m ainland battle, asked the Army General Staff's Operations Bureau ch ie f Sh u ich i M iyazaki, "Is there any chance we can w in the war?" M iyazaki replied, "There's n one." W hile the officer responsible for war operations clearly stated there was no prospect for victory in the war, the general public was being forced to train to fight U .S. troops w ith bamboo spears’ O n August 10, when Japan decided to accept the Potsdam Declaration, Vice C h ief of the Arm y General Staff Torashiro Kawabe, who had been insisting on fighting the battle on the m ainland, wrote in his diary: "I only feel, 'I don't want to surrender. I don't want to adm it I was defeated, even if I am killed .'" The follow ing day, he wrote that such traits as "self-confi­ dence, self-adm iration, narcissism and self-satisfaction" am ong m ilitary officers had "invited today's tragedy." Anam i and Kawabe devoted them ­ selves to m ollifying m ilitary officers after Japan's decision to surrender. Anam i killed him self by ritual seppuku on August 15.

Togo unwisely seeks Moscow's help to resolve situation: Atom ic bombs, Soviet participation Those m ain ly responsible • Y osh ijiro U m ezu, C h ief o f the Army General Staff, General • Soem u T oyoda, C h ief of the Naval General Staff, Adm iral • K orechika A n am i, W ar M inister, General • K antaro Suzuki, Prime M inister, Adm iral • Shigenori T ogo, Foreign M inister

2 4 0 / C o n c l u s io n

After the outbreak o f war between Jap an and the U nited States, on the assum ption th at it w ould lead to all-ou t h ostilities, diplom atic analyst Kiyoshi Kiyosawa (1890-1945) noted: "The m ost im portant issue for the nation's future is w hether the Japanese people, w ho are brave in tim es o f war, can also dem onstrate sagacity in diplom acy to the same degree as their courage in w ar."20 How ever, n o national leaders dem onstrated b oth boldness and in telli­ gence in diplom acy during the war. Shigenori Togo, Foreign M inister in the C abinet o f Prime M inister Kantaro Suzuki, w hich was inaugurated on April 7, 1945, was resolved to bring an early end to the war since he had been in the same post during the Pearl Harbor attack. How ever, he made an extrem ely foolish decision to ask the Soviet U n io n , Jap an 's potential adversary, to act as a peace m ediator between Tokyo and W ashington. O f course, Togo did not know the Soviet U n ion had secretly agreed w ith the U nited States and Britain at the Yalta Conference in February o f the same year to join the war against Jap an . O n April 5, shortly before the inau­ guration o f the Suzuki C ab in et, the Soviet U n ion notified Jap an that it w ould n ot extend the Japanese-Soviet N eutrality Pact, w hich was scheduled to expire in April the follow ing year. W ar M inister Korechika Anam i and C h ie f o f Arm y General Staff Yoshijiro Um ezu were determ ined to land at least one strong blow against the U nited States—any m eaningful victory in any battlefield—to bring W ashington to the peace negotiations table. This concept was called "Ichigeki Kow a." However, they thought that Soviet participation in the war w ould h igh ­ ly likely result in Japan's defeat in battle w ith the U nited States on the hom eland. Um ezu and others asked Togo to prevent Soviet participation through diplom atic efforts, "It's too late n ow ," replied Togo, w ho was once ambassador to the Soviet U n io n . How ever, Togo thought it m ight not be a total waste o f tim e to seek M oscow 's m ediation. U tilizin g the m il­ itary's request as a good excuse, he presum ed he could take some tim e in the negotiations. Togo's decision is understandable, given that there was no other choice at that m om ent. How ever, he should be blam ed for wast­ ing precious tim e trying in vain to persuade the Soviet U n io n to stay out o f the war. Togo gam bled on negotiations, w hich started on Ju n e 3, between for­ mer Prime M inister Koki H irota and Soviet Am bassador to Jap an Jacov M alik . H ow ever, these n egotiation s b asically w ent now here from the beginning and achieved n othin g before the talks were suspended on Ju ly 14. After the war, Ambassador to the Soviet U n io n Naotake Sato said it was intolerable th at "one precious m on th was w asted" as the nation 's fate hung in the balance. Jap an w aited too lon g for the Soviet U n ion 's reply to its request for m ediation. M oscow never answered the request, and as a

Military, government and political leaders who are accountable for crucial moments o f history / 241

result, Jap an delayed accepting the Potsdam D eclaration, announced on Ju ly 26 resulting in a devastating outcom e: the U .S . atom ic bom bings of H iroshim a and Nagasaki and the Soviet U n ion 's participation in the war against Jap an . Prime M inister Suzuki's leadership m ust also be seriously questioned. O f the six leaders o f the Im perial Supreme W ar C o u n cil, three members— Togo, N avy M inister M itsum asa Yonai and Prime M inister Suzuki—w ant­ ed an early end to the w ar. How ever, Suzuki never expressed his position on the m atter. O n August 1, w hen Jap an was on the verge o f capitulating, Togo asked Yonai to ask Suzuki w hat was on his m ind. W hen members o f the coun cil m et on Ju n e 6, details o f the status o f n ational power were dis­ tributed to all m em bers, w ho were inform ed o f the harsh reality that Japan had already lost its capability to continue the war. However, the council adopted the "Principles o f W ar Leadership," w hich stipulated th at the nation was capable o f con tin u in g the war if measures were taken to galva­ nize the public's spirit. N obody opposed this idea at the council's gozenkaigi m eeting in the presence o f the Emperor on Ju n e 8. A t this m eeting, C h ie f o f N aval General Staff Soem u Toyoda fabricated and reported false estim ates o f casualties and dam age th at w ould be in flicted on the enem y forces during an expected invasion o f the hom e­ lan d. These figures suited the objectives o f those w ho w anted the war to con tin u e.21 A nam i made alm ost no com m ents in these m eetings. It was likely that he was leaning toward early peace, but he did n ot take any con­ crete actions. Suzuki also m ade a tellin g m istake in han dlin g the Potsdam Declara­ tio n . A t a C abinet m eeting, Um ezu and Toyoda opposed Togo's proposal not to reject the declaration b u t to postpone a form al response to it at least u n til they received a reply from the Soviet U n ion to Japan's m ediation request. In the end, the governm ent decided to make no response to the declaration. However, Suzuki, pressured by V ice C h ie f o f N aval General Staff Takijiro O n ish i and others, said at a press conference that the gov­ ernm ent w ould "o n ly ignore" (as reported by the W estern m edia) the Potsdam D eclaration, although he had actually intended to say "m ake no com m ent on " the declaration. H is statem ent gave more rationale for the U nited States to drop the atom ic bom bs and for the Soviet U n ion to join the war against Jap an . Suzuki conspired w ith Lord Keeper o f the Privy Seal K oichi Kido in ask­ ing for the Emperor to hand dow n a decision on how to handle the decla­ ration, even though the Cabinet had n ot made a decision on the m atter. After asking the Emperor tw ice to make "divine judgm ents," the Showa W ar fin ally cam e to an end.

2 4 2 / C o n c l u s io n

More than 3.1 m illion Japanese die in the Showa War According to the H ealth, Labor and W elfare M inistry, the number of Japanese killed after the Sino-Japanese W ar started in 1937 reached about 3.1 m illion . These included 2.3 m illion servicemen and civilian employees who assisted the m ilitary: 200,000 were killed on the m ainland, and 2.1 m illion were killed on O kinaw a, Iwo Jim a and overseas. C iv ilia n war deaths were estimated at 800,000: 500,000 killed in Japan and 300,000 overseas. Since 1963, a governm ent-sponsored mem orial service to honor the war dead has been held every August 15, the date in 1945 w hen the Emperor announced the nation's surrender by radio, at Tokyo's N ippon Budokan h all near the Im perial Palace. Speeches by prime m inisters and speakers o f the House o f Representatives at the services have m entioned the figure o f "more than 3 m illion " war dead. This number is based on the m inistry's figure. The dom estic war dead total o f 500,000 was originally com piled by Taiheiyosen Zenkoku Sensaitoshi Kubaku Giseisha Irei Kyokai, a foundation for consoling the souls o f air raid victim s during the Pacific W ar, based on the estimates by more than 100 cities that were bom bed in large-scale air raids. However, m any other m unicipalities were targets of smaller air raids during the war, so the actual figure is likely m uch higher. The governm ent has not carried out detailed studies o n casualties resulting from the atom ic bombs and air raids. The number o f civilian vic­ tims in M anchuria and other places abroad is not certain. People were drafted into the armed forces and as civilian personnel through a notice called akagami (red paper) because o f its color, but the governm ent has been unable to calculate the actual num ber o f Japanese war dead. The H ealth, Labor and W elfare M inistry, w hich took over clerical work from the W ar and Navy M inistries, has war dead figures by region, but only in units o f hundreds or thousands. Foreign m ilitary forces that fought against Japan in the Asia-Pacific region also suffered significant casualties. According to foreign parliam en­ tary and m ilitary governm ent research institutions, the United States suf­ fered between 92,000 and 100,000 deaths, including 2,335 during the Pearl Harbor attack, 6,821 on Iwo Jim a, 307 in the Battle o f M idway and 12,520 during the Battle o f Okinaw a. The Soviet U nion recorded a total of 22,694 deaths, including civilians, in the war against Jap an , including those in the Changkufeng Incident in 1938, the Nom onhan Incident in 1939 and in fighting after its entry into W orld W ar II against Japan. Britain puts the number o f war dead o f both soldiers and civilians in the AsiaPacific region at 29,968, and the Netherlands puts its toll at about 27,600. The Chinese governm ent puts the com bined number o f soldiers and civilians killed and wounded in the war w ith Japan at 35 m illion . China

M ilitary, governm ent and political leaders who are accountable for crucial moments o f history / 2 4 3

has not provided a breakdown for this figure. However, a number of vary­ ing figures regarding China's casualties during the war against Japan have been put forward. Figures available in Japan have not been accepted as reli­ able. According to historian Ikuhiko Hata, the original Chinese figure was based on one submitted by Defense Minister Ho Ying-chin (He Yingqin) of the Nationalist Chinese government to the Tokyo Tribunal. He put the fig­ ure of military casualties at 3,208,000 with 1,889,000 killed and 1,319,000 wounded. But this figure has grown since then. In 1985, China announced that it suffered 21.68 million casualties among soldiers and civilians, 12.21 million killed and 9.47 million wounded. In 1995, then Chinese President Jiang Zemin said the number stood at 35 million.22

Notes

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1Many people tend to believe by mistake that the Showa Era was named after the name of Emperor Showa. The truth is, however, Emperor Showa was so named only after the Showa Era. Ever since the M eiji Era (1868-1912), an emperor has become named posthu­ mously after the name o f the era relevant to the m onarch. Eor instance, Emperor Mutsuhito was named Emperor M eiji after his death. Likewise, Emperor Hirohito was posthumously called Emperor Showa after the name of his reign. In Japan, major historic accidents or incidents have often been named after the names o f each period in which they occurred. Some typical examples are the M eiji Restoration in 1868-1889, the Hoei Eruption of M t. Fuji in 1707 and the Battles of Bunei and Koan in 1274 and 1281, respectively, against the attempted invasion by Mongolia. Thus, we believe that naming those wars in the Showa Era collectively the Showa War is reasonable in a historical sense. 2Suzuki Teiichi-shi Danwa Sokkiroku (ge) (Stenographic Records of Remarks by M r. Teiichi Suzuki vol. 2), Tokyo: Nippon Kindai Shiryo Kenkyukai, 1974, pp. 368-372 3Ibid. 4 Hisahiko Okazaki, Shigemitsu, Togo to Sono Jidai (Shigemitsu, Togo and Their Era), Tokyo: PHP Bunko, 2003, pp. 57-60 5Ryoichi Tobe, Nihon Rikugun to Chugoku (Army o f Japan and China), Tokyo: Kodansha, 1999, pp. 187-188 6 Ikuhiko Hata, Nankin Jiken (Nanjing Incident), Tokyo: Chuko Shinsho, 1986, pp. 172-174 I Kichisaburo Nomura, Beikoku ni Tsukai-shite (Being Ambassador to America), Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1946, p. 78 8 Ju n Tsunoda, Nihon no Taibei Kaisen (Japan Goes to War with the United States), 1940-41, in Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi (Road to the Pacific War) vol. 7, ed. Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai (Japan Association o f International Relations), Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun, 1987, pp. 204-206 9 Kenryo Sato, Tojo Hideki to Taiheiyo Senso (Hideki Tojo and the Pacific War), Tokyo: Bungeishunju-Shinsha, 1960, pp. 209-210 10 H idenari Terasaki and M ariko Terasaki M iller eds., Showa Tenno Dokuhakuroku (Emperor Showa's Monologue), Tokyo: Bungeishunju, 1991, p. 68 II The M ilitary History Department of the National Institute for Defense Studies of the Defense Agency (NIDS), ed., Daihonei Rikugun-bu Daitoa Senso Kaisen Keii (The Army Department of the Imperial Headquarters—An Account of the Commencement of the Great East Asian War), vol. 5 in Senshi Sosho (A Series of War Histories), Tokyo: Asagumo

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Shim bunsha, 1974, p. 242, p. 286, p. 294 12 Ryuzo Sejim a, Ikusanga (Over Rivers and M ountains), Tokyo: S a n k e i Shim bun News Service, 1995, p. 133 13 Suketaka Tanem ura, Daihonei Kim itsu N isshi (Confidential D iary o f the Im perial Headquarters), Tokyo: Diam ond, 1952, pp. 140-141 14N IDS, ed., Daihonei Rikugun-bu vol. 9 , op. c it, pp. 47-50 15N IDS, ed., Daihonei Rikugun-bu vol. 4 , op. cit., p. 538 16N IDS, ed., Daihonei Rikugunbu vol. 9, op. cit., pp. 87-90 17 Yuzuru Sanematsu, Nihon Kaigun Eiketsu-shi (Heroes' History o f the Japanese Navy), Tokyo: Kojinsha NF Bunko, 1994, pp. 275-277 18Noboru Kojim a, Taiheiyo Senso (ge) (Pacific W ar, vol. 2), Tokyo: Chuko Shinsho, 2003, p. 156 19Sokichi Takagi, Shusen Oboegaki (Minutes by Rear Adm iral Takagi about the War's End), Tokyo: Kobundo, 1948, p. 53 20 Kiyoshi Kiyosawa, Nihon Gaiko-shi (ge) (History o f Japan's Diplom acy vol. 2), Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1942, p. 635 21 NHK Shuzaihan (NHK reporting team ), ed., Taiheiyo Senso Nihon no H aiin (Causes of Japanese Defeat in the Pacific War) vol. 6, Tokyo: Kadokawa Shoten, 1995, pp. 156-157 22 Ikuhiko H ata, Gendaishi no Taiketsu (Disputes in the M odern H istory), Tokyo: Bungeishunju, 2005, pp. 225-226

C hap ter 16

The persons most responsible for the Showa War

The m ain responsibility lies with Tojo

W

hat positions and roles did H ideki Tojo assume in the Show a W ar, w hich included the M anchurian In ciden t, the Sino-Japanese W ar and the Jap an -U .S. W ar? U tm ost blam e m ust be placed on Tojo w hen we look at two aspects o f war responsibility: responsibility for lau n ch in g the war and for con tin u in g the figh tin g w hen defeat was inevitable. The first refers to the escalation from the Sino-Japanese W ar to the war w ith Britain and the U nited States. The latter stem m ed from the decision to initiate hostilities w ith the U nited States w hile know ing that Jap an stood little chance o f prevailing and the failure to em ploy effective measures to bring the war to an early end. Tojo's involvem ent in the Show a W ar began in M arch 1928 (the third year o f the Show a Era). At the tim e, Lieutenant C olon el T ojo was Senior Staff O fficer—a post equivalent to that o f acting section ch ief in today's governm ent hierarchy—o f the Arm y Affairs Section o f the M ilitary Affairs Bureau o f the W ar M inistry. D uring a m eeting o f the Mokuyo-kai (Thursday Society) that included reform ist bureaucrats o f the m ilitary, T ojo declared, "W e w ill establish an absolute p o litica l force in the M anchuria-Inner M ongolia area." Mokuyo-kai members were m ilitary elites w ho form ulated and determ ined n atio n al p olicies in th e W ar M in istry and the Arm y General Staff. T ojo, along w ith Tetsuzan N agata and Yasuji Okam ura w ho had been Tojo's senior by one year at the Arm y M ilitary Academ y, aim ed to topple elem ents from w hat was the C h o sh u clan (now Y am aguchi Prefecture), w ho had dom inated the m ainstream o f the Arm y since the M eiji Restoration. They also w anted to prepare the entire nation for an allout war and establish the prerogative o f supreme com m and. As the afterm ath o f W orld W ar I showed the necessity o f n ational m obilization for an all-ou t war, M okuyo-kai mem bers believed Jap an w ould have to secure M anchuria to effect n ational m obilization. For them , the 1928 assassination o f C h an g Tso-lin (Zhang Zuolin), a warlord in northern C h in a, engineered by Kw antung Arm y staff officer 24 5

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Daisaku Kom oto heralded o f a m ajor change for the n ation . W hen the M anchurian Incident occurred in Septem ber 1931, C olon el Tojo was ch ief o f the First Section (Operations and M obilization) o f the Arm y General Staff. From 1935-38, he served as M ilitary Police Com m ander and then C h ie f o f Staff o f the Kw antung Arm y. D uring this period, the M anchurian Incident escalated in to the Sino-Japanese W ar. As the Kw antung Arm y's C h ie f o f Staff, he was involved in the colonial rule o f M anchuria form u­ lated by ch ief o f General Affairs o f M anchukuo N aoki H oshino, deputy ch ief o f Industry and Com m erce o f M anchukuo Nobusuke K ishi and by President o f the South M an churian Railw ay Yosuke M atsuoka, am ong others. After the Sino-Japanese W ar erupted in Ju ly 1937, Tojo advocated strong-arm measures against C h in a and led troops in to C hahar Province in Inner M on golia. O n that occasion, he com m anded troops in battle for the first tim e. By encouraging his m en to charge tim e and again, his forces gained control o f Inner M on golia. In the C hahar offensive, m any Chinese are said to have been executed. W hat Jap an did in the M anchurian Incident and in the Sino-Japanese W ar violated the 1922 Nine-Pow er Treaty, w hich obliged Jap an and the other parties to the pact to respect the sovereignty and independence o f C h in a and observe an open-door policy there. It has been pointed out that members o f the Im perial Japanese Arm y at that tim e, in clu d in g T ojo, start­ ed arguing that the interpretation o f the international treaty signed in W ashington was now outdated and am ended its interpretation in order to justify the invasion o f C h in a .1 The Cabinet o f Prime M inister Fum im aro Konoe approved the Arm y's p olicy toward the pact. In Novem ber 1938, Foreign M inister H achiro Arita told U .S . Am bassador to Jap an Joseph Grew o f Japan's effective disapproval o f the treaty. (See APPENDIX D.) Tojo was appointed W ar M inister in Konoe's second Cabinet in Ju ly 1940 and m ade the first governm ent com parison o f m ilitary strength between Jap an and the U n ited States. The findings indicated Jap an w ould face a form idable struggle should it engage in a prolonged war w ith the U nited States. Nevertheless, Tojo said: "Am erica, as a n ation , has no core. In Contrast, our Empire has a n ation al p olity that has been in place for 3,000 years."2 The governm ent decided in Ju n e 1941 to station troops in southern French In doch ina, but there were n o indications that Tojo gave serious credence to the risk that the U nited States w ould im pose an o il embargo on Jap an . M oreover, Tojo ruled out w ithdraw ing from C h in a as an option in negotiations w ith the U nited States. Tokyo and W ashington were at loggerheads over the U .S . dem and th at Jap an p u ll ou t o f C h in a . Tojo thought Jap an 's claim to M anchukuo and the rule o f Korea could collapse like dom inoes if Jap an conceded to the U .S . dem and.

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Tojo insisted on going to war w ith the U nited States, resulting in the fall o f the Konoe Cabinet. Tojo was picked as Konoe's successor. As the new Prime M inister, Tojo reviewed the national p olicy by considering w hat Lord Keeper o f the Privy Seal K oichi Kido described as Emperor Showa's wishes to avert a war w ith Britain and the U n ited States. C h ie f o f the M ilitary Affairs Bureau o f the Arm y General Staff Akira M uto told T ojo, "In an effort to w ithdraw [the decision to start a war w ith the U nited States], ch ief o f operations at the Arm y General Staff Sh in ich i Tanaka w ill have to be dism issed. To make this happen, I also w ill step dow n." However, T ojo refrained from changing the m ilitary leadership. But dis­ cussing m ilitary policies w ith these sam e leaders m eant changes were unlikely to be made to these policies. He thus failed to h alt the slide into war. Tojo behaved as a leader bent on securing the interests o f the Im perial Japanese Arm y, despite its havin g no strategy based on international real­ ism . After reaching the nation's top post as the star o f his group, Tojo made the fin al decision to in itiate war w ith the U nited States. Two core tenets o f Tojo's agenda were suppression through the use o f the M ilitary Police and m onopolization o f inform ation and intelligence b y the gov­ ernm ent. These moves date back to w hen Tojo served as Com m ander o f the Kw antung Arm y's M ilitary Police. Tojo investigated civilians critical of the Kw antung Arm y; his target list covered about 4,000 people, including socialists, those w ho were suspected o f taking part in the n ational reform m ovem ent and others w ho were connected w ith the Kodo-ha (Im perial W ay Faction) w ith in the Im perial Japanese A rm y. S ta ff o fficer o f the Kw antung Arm y in charge o f intelligence and strategy Ryukichi Tanaka and others engaged in secret operations for T ojo. Tojo also kept a close w atch on anti-Japanese Chinese and ruthlessly cracked dow n on them . Tojo's maneuvers also extended to targeting his p olitical adversaries. In the April 1942 H ouse o f Representatives election , Tojo was obsessed w ith ensuring all seats were filled by candidates recom m ended by the Yokusan Seiji Taisei Kyogi-kai, a p olitical arm o f the Taisei Yokusan-kai (Im perial Rule Assistance Association). Tojo ordered the M ilitary Police to put such p oliti­ cians as Yukio O zaki, Ichiro Hatoyam a and H itoshi A shida, w ho were not recom m ended by the association, under surveillance. He even had Ozaki arrested during the election cam paign. After the general election, Tojo had his subordinates work to form Yokusan Seiji-kai (Im perial Rule Assistance Political Society), w hich was joined by alm ost all lawmakers. Arm y veter­ an and form er Prime M inister N obuyuki Abe assumed the association's presidency. W ith these develop m en ts, o n ly one ru lin g party rem ained in the n a tio n 's p o litics and th e Im perial D ie t becam e an arena for rubber­

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stam ping assistance for the war effort. Troubled by such circum stances, p o liticia n Seigo N akano com m itted su icid e. The ch ie f o f the M ilitary Police in Tokyo and Tojo's form er subordinate at the Kw antung Arm y's M ilitary Police, Ryoji Shikata, reportedly w atched N akano k ill him self at his residence. As the war situation deteriorated, Tojo also sent the M ilitary Police to w atch senior statesm en such as Keisuke Okada and Fum im aro Konoe around the clock. T ojo also show ed the mass m edia n o len ien cy . Soon after the war against the U nited States started in Decem ber 1941, Tojo established a law con trollin g free speech, publications, gatherings and associations. The law allow ed h im , for instance, to stop the publication o f newspapers at his dis­ cretion. Angered by a M ain ich i Shim bun article that read, "W e cannot figh t w ith bam boo spears," T ojo drafted the article's writer Takeo Shinm yo in to the m ilitary and tried to send him to a battlefront where fierce figh t­ in g was on-going. Tojo was increasingly described as a dictator, although he denied such claim s, "Fuhrer H itler was a foot soldier, but I'm an Arm y general. D o n 't m ix m e up w ith h im ." A t an Im perial D iet session in January 1943, Tojo said: "I'm just one m an. W ithout His M ajesty the Emperor's trust, or if I'm told to resign, I w ould have n othin g le ft." He added, "I'm like the m oon: I m ig h t lo o k th a t I'm sh in in g , b u t I'm ju st re fle ctin g lig h t from the Em peror." Tojo advocated the idea that people should obey the Emperor's words. In this context, Tojo believed defying him was the same as defying the Emperor. Tojo adhered to a kind o f revolutionary ideology that held the general populace and civil servants as equal before the Emperor. M any citizens regarded Tojo as a "savior" w hen Jap an w on some battles in the early days o f the Jap an -U .S. W ar. How ever, he sacrificed the lives o f soldiers—citizens o f the country—like w orn-out shoes and crushed the people's right to pur­ sue happiness and freedom o f though t, w ithout reflecting on his conduct. W hen the Com bined Fleet was all but destroyed at the battle o f Truk Island in M icronesia in February 1944, Tojo also assumed the post o f C h ief o f the Arm y General Staff. H e intended to change policy course by inte­ grating com m and authorities to overcom e the em ergency situation. O n ly Tojo knew the direction o f the war situation and the country's rem aining national power, w hich m ade Japan's defeat alm ost certain. However, Tojo did n o t use h is absolute au th o rity to engage in responsible p o litics. Instead, he on ly exercised it to continue the war. W h ile T ojo was W ar M in ister in Jan u ary 1941, he an n ou n ced the "Senjinkun" (Field Service Code) that contained the phrase, "Live w ithout the hum iliation o f being taken prisoner and die w ithout leaving a blem ish on your nam e." The code, w hich prohibited soldiers from being taken

The persons m ost responsible for the Showa W ar / 249

prisoner, also justified deadly hum an sacrifices by prom oting "gyokusai" suicide attacks. T ojo lauded kamikaze suicide attacks in air and naval bat­ tles in Ju n e 1944, "The best th in g about Jap an is that all the people w ill risk their lives and are n ot afraid o f d y in g...M ak in g in fin ite use o f this advantage, we can destroy the enem y w ith death squads, by w hich one airplane destroys one enem y vessel or one special submersible sinks one enem y vessel."3 T ojo also said: "In Jap an , the things flyin g in the air are n ot airplanes— they are spirits. Since a sheer num ber o f spirits are flyin g, there is no way we w ill be defeated in this w ar."4 His disregard for people's lives reached its zenith after an air raid on Kitakyushu in Ju n e 1944, w hen he said, "The raid was like a m osquito lan ding on one's arm or like m ud splashed on a m uddy road."5 As the im pending fall o f Saipan drew ever closer and T ojo teetered on the brink o f being forced to resign, he m ade speeches as if he had been possessed by the supernatural, "This is a sign from heaven to us Japanese. H eaven says: 'You are n ot serious yet. W hen w ill you realize the serious­ ness o f the situation?' N ow is the tim e for us to exercise our potential strength. It w ill be troublesom e if you don't understand there is a w all u n til you h it it w ith your head so m any tim es."6 Even after stepping dow n from the prim e m inister's post, T ojo pleaded for the con tin uation o f the war through special suicide attacks and battles on the Japanese m ainland. He even directly m ade such an appeal to the Emperor. U n til the bitter end, Tojo lacked a sense o f consideration for the lives o f the people.

Konoe allows the m ilitary to dom inate The Showa W ar m ain ly refers to wars Jap an fought against two m ajor powers: C h in a and the U nited States. The war against the U nited States obviously evolved w ith the change in the n ational character o f Jap an that progressed along w ith the war against C h in a . This change m eant a chal­ lenge to the international order at that tim e and m eant the collapse o f the con stitu tion al system by w hich the governm ent had pursued so-called responsible p olitics. Furtherm ore, a policym aking process led by m ilitary bureaucrats and an intensive n ation al m obilization system were estab­ lished in this process o f change. Fum imaro Konoe was a key politician w ho was deeply involved in these developm ents. Konoe's p olitical ideology can be seen in his paper titled "E ibei-H on 'i no H eiw a-shugi o H a isu " (R ejectin g th e A n glo-A m erican Centered Quest o f Peace) w ritten in 1918. He described peace for colonialist powers such as Britain and the U nited States as being the "m aintenance of

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the status quo convenient for them ." His treatise also said, "It is justifiable for latecomers such as Japan to break the current situation, in w hich there can be no room otherwise for expansion and developm ent."7 K on oe a c tiv e ly su pp orted th e m ilita ry in th e 1931 M a n ch u ria n Incident. He advocated a hard-line view that European countries and the U nited States were not entitled to denounce Jap an based on the covenant o f the League o f N ations and the Kellogg-Briand Pact o f 1928 providing for the renunciation o f war as an instrum ent o f national p olicy. Konoe's view spurred the m ilitary and he was very popular am ong the p ublic. H elped by such support, Konoe becam e Prime M inister in Ju n e 1937. Faced w ith the M arco Polo Bridge Incident a m onth after the launch o f the first Konoe C ab in et, he approved the Arm y's request for troops to be dispatched to C h in a alth o u gh he o n ly m ade up h is m in d at the last m inute. Konoe term inated the so-called Trautm an Operation—efforts to seek peace w ith C h in a throu gh G erm an Am bassador to C h in a Oskar Trautm an as a m ediator. A governm ent statem ent issued in January 1938 declared, "W e don't deal w ith the N ationalist Party governm ent." At that tim e, m ilitary bureaucrats largely kept Konoe under their thum bs. He even told the Emperor in a self-deprecating m anner, "I am a m annequin and am n ot inform ed o f an y th in g."8 In addition to being unable to control the m ilitary, Konoe also gave legal grounds for creating a n ational system for all-out battles envisioned b y the m ilitary—the N atio n al M ob ilization Law prom ulgated in A pril 1938. The law gave unlim ited authority to the governm ent to control the Japanese people in em ergencies such as in "w artim e" or "quasi-w ar con­ tin gencies." In January 1939, the Konoe C abinet had no option but to resign en m asse, after fa ilin g to handle b oth dom estic and diplom atic affairs. Veteran p olitician K inm ochi Saion ji, Konoe's m entor and tw o-tim e Prime M inister in 1906-08 and in 1911-12, said: "W hat did Konoe do after becom ing Prime M inister? I don't understand it at a ll."9 Konoe becam e Prim e M inister again in Ju ly 1940 and form ed his second C ab in et. He form ed his third Cabin et in Ju ly 1941 but gave up his post again in O ctober 1941. His second Cabinet's m ain m ission, carried over from the previous one, was to resolve problem s stem m ing from the war against C h in a . Konoe picked Yosuke M atsuoka as Foreign M inister to have him work to bring the U nited States to the negotiation table b y establish­ in g a four-w ay entente w ith Germ any, Italy and the Soviet U n io n . Konoe sought to create the entente by expanding the Tripartite A llian ce w ith Germ any and Italy. But this idea was doom ed w hen Germ any invaded the Soviet U n ion in Ju n e 1941. Konoe also did not expect the U nited States w ould im pose an o il embar­ go in response to the Japanese m ilitary's advance in to southern French

The persons m ost responsible for the Showa W ar / 251

In d o ch in a in Ju ly 1941. Konoe later sought to avoid war against the U nited States through direct negotiations w ith U .S . President Franklin D . Roosevelt after dropping M atsuoka. But he could not settle the row w ith W ar M inister H ideki T ojo, w ho bristled at the U .S . dem and that Jap an w ithdraw its troops from C h in a as one con dition for avoiding war. Konoe stepped down in October 1941 w ithout achieving his objective. Lord Keeper o f the Privy Seal K oich i Kido had previously criticized K onoe, saying: "You led the decision [to wage war against the U nited States] at the Septem ber 6 gozenkaigi m eetin g in the presence o f the Emperor. It w ill be quite irresponsible if you resign and leave the decision in ta ct."10 But Konoe qu it the governm ent, despite Kido's adm on ition . At one tim e, Konoe sought to unite p olitical forces that could counter and control the m ilitary and the bureaucracy. He planned to launch a new p olitical party under the concept o f "one party for one n a tio n ," m odeled after Germ any's N azi Party. His idea took shape w ith the establishm ent o f the Taisei Yokusan-kai (Im perial Rule Assistance Association) in October 1940. How ever, Konoe becam e reluctant to pursue this plan after the establish­ m ent o f the association was criticized as a m ove to revive a "shogunate" feu d al govern m en t to take over the role o f the Em peror. Rum ors o f attem pts to assassinate him also emerged. In this w ay, Konoe's efforts collapsed one after another. W ith each fail­ ure, Jap an took another step toward war w ith the U nited States.

Sugiyama, Nagano, others make m ajor misjudgments D uring the Sino-Japanese W ar, Koki H irota supported Fum im aro Konoe as a pacesetter. H irota served as Foreign M inister in the Cabinet o f Prime M inister M akoto Saito and that o f Prime M inister Keisuke Okada w hile the Arm y was m oving forward w ith a plan to com pel five provinces in north­ ern C h in a to secede from the N atio n alist (K uom intang) governm ent. H irota was an arch itect, together w ith V ice Foreign M inister M am oru Shigem itsu, o f "H irota's Three Principles," w hich called on C h in a to sup­ press anti-Japanese a ctivitie s, approve M an ch u ku o—the puppet state established by Jap an in M anchuria—and to form a united front against com m unism . H irota's diplom atic stance indicated a departure from the p olicy o f pursuing cooperation w ith Britain and the U nited States. H irota becam e Prim e M inister as Konoe declined an Im perial order to take up the post in the wake o f the February 26 In ciden t o f 1936. H irota prom oted a series o f pro-m ilitary p olicies. He restored a system that made the appointm ent o f m ilitary officers in active service as war and navy m inisters a requirem ent for in stallin g a new cabinet and approved a state

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p olicy guideline in August 1936 that for the first tim e incorporated the doctrine to seek expansion in Southeast Asia and the Pacific islands. He also signed an an ti-Com intern pact w ith Germ any in Novem ber o f the same year. M eanw hile, Foreign M inister Yosuke M atsuoka's diplom atic stance was in lin e w ith Konoe's 1918 view on the international order as expressed in Konoe's m agazine article. After the Tripartite Pact was signed b y Jap an , Germ any and Italy, M atsuoka flew to M oscow . He inked the JapaneseSo viet N e u tra lity Pact in A p ril 1941. M atsu oka's p lan to w ork w ith Germ an leader A dolf H itler and Soviet leader Jo sef Stalin against Britain and the U nited States collapsed two m onths later w hen Germ any invaded the Soviet U n io n . He then insisted on advancing in to the Soviet U n ion in com pliance w ith the Tripartite Pact—a step that presented the m ilitary w ith a serious problem —and disrupted Konoe's plan for peace negotia­ tions w ith W ashington. For his part, H ajim e Sugiyam a, w ho was W ar M inister at the tim e o f the M arco Polo Bridge Incident o f 1937, pressed Konoe hard to dispatch three Arm y divisions to C h in a , Sugiyam a prepared a statem ent issued by Konoe that condem ned C h in a as a "vicious" state. Sugiyam a, w ho was C h ie f o f the Arm y G eneral Sta ff, pressured Konoe in 1941 to order a m ilitary takeover o f southern French In d o ch in a, saying, "Such an advance w ill likely restrain British and U .S . m aneuvers."11 Sugiyam a also helped w hip up a pro-war, hard-line stance against the U nited States in the Arm y General Staff. Before the outbreak o f the JapanU .S . W ar, Osam i N agano, ch ief o f the N aval General Staff, was concerned that the U .S . fleet eventually w ould cross the Pacific O cean to face the Japanese forces. He asserted, "N ow th at it's com e to this, w e've got to go to w ar." He said, "W e have a chance to w in a war now , but it w ill get more d ifficu lt if we just w ait." He insisted Jap an should m ake the first strike. N agano thus propelled the N avy forward toward w ar.14 W hen the Cabinet o f Prime M inister H ideki T ojo reexam ined the state p olicy th at did not exclude lau n ch in g a war against the U n ited States, one crucial p oin t was the stance o f N avy M inister Shigetaro Shim ada, w ho was regarded as leaning toward those opposing the w ar. O n O ctober 30, 1-941, despite opposition from V ice N avy M inister Yorio Saw am oto and others, Shim ada declared, "O n this occasion, we decided we should begin the w ar." How ever, at a liaison m eeting o f the Im perial Headquarters and the governm ent on N ovem ber 1, Shim ada vented his true feelin gs, "I have no confidence, no good ideas and I see no prospect for diplom atic n egotiations. There's n o other choice [but w ar]." The decision,to start the war was thus m ade in an atm osphere o f desperation w ithout due strategic consideration.13

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Dubbed "Tojo's adjutan t," Shim ada continued to support the adm inis­ tration o f T o jo . As T ojo doubled as C h ie f o f the Arm y G en eral Staff, Shim ada took up the post o f ch ief o f the N aval General Staff as instructed by T ojo. K uniaki Koiso, w ho succeeded Tojo as Prime M inister in Ju ly 1944, also h ailed from th e A rm y an d was d eep ly in v o lv e d in th e M an ch u rian Incident w hen he was ch ief o f the M ilitary A ffairs Bureau. Taking up the post soon after the fa ll o f Saipan, Koiso knew th at Jap an was losing the war and th at supplies o f iron , crude o il and other m aterials essential for m ain tain in g the h atio n 's a b ility to w age war were alm ost exhausted. Koiso at one p oin t m ade som e effort toward prom oting peace but later gave u p . A lth o u gh the war situation deteriorated, Koiso unreasonably continued the war. He cam e up w ith the idea to m obilize the entire pop­ ulace and m ake them pray for victory w hile facin g Ise G rand Shrines under the slogan "Ichioku Sobuso" (Arm ing all the 100 m illio n Japanese). C h ie f o f N aval General Staff Koshiro Oikaw a played a crucial role in in i­ tiating suicide attacks during the Koiso adm inistration. Under the second and third Konoe Cabinets, Oikaw a, as N avy M inister, was involved in a series o f steps that led to the war against the U nited States, such as the establishm ent o f the Tripartite A lliance by Jap an , Germ any and Italy, the takeover o f southern French Indochina and the com piling in Septem ber 1941 o f the Principles for Im plem entation o f the Im perial P olicy that expressed the governm ent's determ ination to lau n ch war against the U nited States. In Ju n e 1945, the C abinet o f Prime M inister Kantaro Suzuki decided to figh t decisive battles on Japan's m ainland. C h ie f o f Arm y General Staff Yoshijiro Um ezu, w ho attended the m eeting at w hich the decision was m ade, had been Vice W ar M inister and had supported the Sino-Japanese W ar w hen fig h tin g broke o u t. W ar M in ister K orechika A n am i o f the Suzuki C abinet was involved in the signing o f the Tripartite Pact w hen he was V ice W ar M inister. Soem u Toyoda, C h ie f o f the N aval General Staff at that tim e, used to be the C om m ander-in-Chief o f the Com bined Fleet, w hich suffered a string o f defeats in the battle o ff the M arianas, the air bat­ tle o ff Taiw an and the sea battle o ff Leyte Island. He also ordered the sui­ cide m ission o f the colossal battleship Yamato to Okinaw a. Um ezu and A nam i insisted during an Im perial Suprem e W ar C o u n cil m eeting on August 9 that the nation should figh t to the very end on the m ainland, w ith the form er saying, "W e w ill do a great w rong to the divine spirits [of our war dead] if we surrender u n co n d itio n ally," and the latter saying, "W e'll fin d a w ay to escape an im possible situation w ith gyokusai [suicide attacks w ith honor] by 100 m illion [Japanese] people." Um ezu, A nam i and Toyoda thus resisted the nation's acceptance o f the Potsdam Declaration

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o n c l u s io n

u n til the end.14

Some leaders make peace efforts D uring the Showa W ar, som e m ilitary and p olitical leaders continuous­ ly m ade efforts to end hostilities although they m ade m istakes, for w hich they are accountable, in a num ber o f instances. The Show a W ar ended w ith two "divine decisions" by Emperor Show a. The pro-peace group led by Lord Keeper o f the Privy Seal K oich i K ido, Prim e M inister Kantaro Suzuki, Foreign M inister Shigenori Togo and N avy M inister M itsum asa Y on ai, am ong others, worked together to get through this critical stage. Kido, the Emperor's closest aide, was the de facto overseer o f the selection o f prim e m inisters after the second Cabinet o f Fum im aro Konoe. After the Konoe C abinet resigned en masse, Kido opposed bringing in an Im perial Fam ily m em ber to form a cab in et, and strongly pushed W ar M inister H ideki T ojo, w ho took a hard lin e toward the U nited States, for the Prime M inister's post. Kido calculated that T ojo could prevent the nation from sliding in to war against the U nited States as he called him self a loyal sub­ ject to the Emperor. But Kido's expectations turned out to be w rong. Kido bears serious responsibility for this m istake. A lso, w hen a cam ­ paign against the T ojo Cabinet spearheaded b y form er Prime M inisters Keisuke Okada and Reijiro W akatsuki took place, Kido was reluctant to be part o f it. Kido fin ally embarked on w ar-ending efforts after an Im perial Supreme W ar C o u n cil m eeting in the presence o f the Emperor on Ju n e 8, 1945. Kido at this tim e believed, "There's no other choice b u t to end [the war] by m aking the Lord Keeper o f the Privy Seal and Foreign M inister shoulder all responsibility and ask for His M ajesty the Emperor's decision w hen the chance arises." Kido com piled overnight "a draft proposal for saving the situ ation ," w hich called for m ediation o f peace negotiations by the Soviet U n io n , and obtained the Emperor's approval. Konoe, w ho had served as Prime M inister, was nam ed as a special envoy to M oscow .18 Konoe shifted to a pro-peace stance after the Jap an -U .S. war broke out. Konoe becam e the first person to propose to the Emperor an early end to the war in February 1945, citin g fears o f a possible "red revolution" by com m unists.16 Suzuki, w ho becam e Prime M inister in April 1945, was viewed as seek­ in g an end to the war but also shared the view o f W ar M inister Korechika A nam i that in flictin g a m ajor blow to the enem y on the n ation's m ainland w ould enable Jap an to glean m ore favorable terms in peace negotiations. A lthough Suzuki gradually m oved to bring about an early end to the war, he never revealed his true feelings. Togo and Y on ai, therefore, som etim es becam e suspicious o f Suzuki, a situation th at prevented u n ity form ing

The persons m ost responsible for the Showa W ar / 255

am ong pro-peace group members. Suzuki also m ade a m istake in ign orin g the Potsdam D eclaration because o f pressure from the m ilitary. But it can be said that ending the war w ith the Emperor's "divine decisions" could not have been achieved w ithout Suzuki's seasoned judgm ent. Togo, w ho as Foreign M inister opposed goin g to war against the U n ited States, instructed Foreign M inistry officials on New Year's Day in 1942, "You m ay even abandon other duties so you can study and make preparations [for bringing an end to the w ar]." Togo joined the Suzuki C abin et on con d itio n that the governm ent would seek a peace deal at an early stage. Togo made a colos­ sal blunder by asking Moscow to mediate peace negotiations. But even this m istake was said to be aim ed at con tain in g the m ilitary by bringing negotiations w ith the Soviet U nion to a deadlock. Kijuro Shidehara, w ho had served as Foreign M inister, and Shigeru Yoshida, w ho had served as Ambassador to Britain, had proposed early on possible ways to seek peace to those close to the Emperor. W ithin the N avy, Rear Adm iral Sokichi Takagi was secretly engaged in studying how to end the war under the instructions o f Vice N avy M inister Shigeyoshi In ou e. N avy M in ister Y o n ai took a m ore h ard-lin e stance after the Shanghai Incident and urged W ar M inister Sugiyam a to capture N anjing. Yonai also holds partial responsibility for escalating the Sino-Japanese W ar. H aving served as Prime M inister, Yonai was a m an w ith a wide per­ spective. But he was unusually taciturn—a disadvantage for a statesman— and thus lacked political power. W hile seeking a peace deal, Yonai greatly depended on Takagi for inform ation and other activities. However, Yonai made tactless, yet prophetic remarks on the atom ic bom bings by the United States and on the Soviet Union's participation in the war, saying, "This m ight be the wrong expression, but it's a godsend." fushin unofficial senior advisers to the Emperor, w ho comprised former Prime M inisters and the President o f the Privy C ou n cil, were all slow to act in seeking an end to the war because they feared becom ing targets o f ter­ rorist acts and coups.

Middle-ranked officers also to blame Top-ranking political and m ilitary leaders were not necessarily solely responsible for the Showa W ar. Army and N aval General Staff officers, whose duty was to draw up plans for various m ilitary operations in sup­ port o f the m ilitary leadership, were n ot en titled to have com m and authority. But arbitrary, unbridled actions and m isjudgm ent by staff offi­ cers and bureaucrats seriously affected the nation's direction. Kanji Ishihara, a Kwantung Army staff officer, was the first staff officer

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in the Japanese forces to m anipulate his com m ander and carry out m ili­ tary operations at w ill. At the tim e o f the M anchurian Incident in 1931, Ishihara was o n ly a lieutenant colo n el, but he forced Kw antung Arm y Com m ander Shigem H onjo to behave subm issively toward him and his cohorts. The Cabinet o f Prime M inister Reijiro W akatsuki rubber-stamped a dispatch o f m ilitary forces to M anchuria after the Japanese troops sta­ tioned in Korea had arbitrarily crossed the border in to M anchuria. The Cabinet apparently could n ot resist the lure o f going along w ith w hat had becom e a fa it accompli after considering the benefits that could be gained. Ishihara gave Jap an a large footh old from w hich to invade other countries and established w hat should be called the "Ishihara m odel"—a m ilitaryled p olitical m odel under w hich m ilitary staff officers gain control o f state power to effect their policies. Akira M uto and Sh in ich i Tanaka, staff officers o f the Kw antung Arm y, follow ed suit. Seishiro Itagaki, another staff officer o f the Kw antung Arm y, was Ishihara's closest ally. They worked closely w ith K enji D ohihara, ch ief o f the M ukden Special Service A gency, and fin ally established M anchukuo as Jap an 's puppet state in M an ch u ria. Ish ih ara, Itagaki and D ohihara becam e "heroes," although in reality they were rebels w ho violated the Im perial Japanese Arm y's penal code by arbitrarily m oving un its. Itagaki and D ohihara m oved forward w ith plots to put northern C h in a under Japanese control through additional, suspect actions. Itagaki, later as W ar M inister in the Cabinet o f Prime M inister K iichiro H iranum a, also sup­ ported signing the Tripartite A lliance w ith Germ any and Italy. Lieu ten ant C o lo n e l T eiich i Suzuki, w orking for the W ar M inistry's M ilitary A ffairs Bureau, played a central role in M okuyo-kai (Thursday Society), an association o f general staff officers such as Ishihara and Hideki T ojo. Suzuki becam e a mem ber o f the C abinet Research Board. He later led the P olitical Affairs Section o f the Asia Developm ent Board before becom ­ ing President o f the C abinet Planning Board. Suzuki n ot on ly worked in m ilitary-related offices, but got him self constantly involved in a diverse array o f general and econom ic p olicies. A t the Im perial HeadquartersGovernm ent Liaison Conference, he presented fabricated data in an analy­ sis o f n ational power concerning prospects for the m anagem ent o f the war, w hich paved the w ay to open the war. Som e reform ist officers ranked lieutenant colonel or lower set up a club nam ed Sakura-kai (Cherry Society), led b y Lieutenant C o lo n el Kingoro H ash im oto, w ho m asterm inded two coup d'etat attem pts—the M arch Incident and the October Incident—in collaboration w ith leading n ation ­ alist Shum ei Okaw a. H ashim oto continued his unsanctioned actions dur­ in g the Sino-Japanese W ar. As ch ief o f the Thirteenth H eavy Field Artillery Regim ent, he shelled the British vessel H M S Ladybird on the Yangtze in

The persons m ost responsible for the Showa W ar / 257

Decem ber 1937. W hen Jap an was about to em bark on the war against the U nited States, Akira M uto was ch ief o f the W ar M inistry's M ilitary Affairs Bureau and Takazum i O ka was his counterpart at the N avy M inistry. They played a central role in draw ing up national policies and sign ifican tly influenced the selection o f prim e m inisters and cabinet m inisters. M uto engaged in all kinds o f p olitical m aneuvers. He forced Shunroku Hata to resign as W ar M inister in the overthrow o f the C abinet o f Prime M inister M itsum asa Y on ai, w ho h ad served in the N avy. M uto had the second C ab in et of Prime M inister Fum im aro Konoe, w hich follow ed that o f Y onai, decide the "Basic N ation al Policy O u tlin e," w hich stipulated the establishm ent of a "new order in Greater East Asia" and form ed a p olicy to prepare the entire populace to defending the n ation . Kenryo Sato, Tojo's close aide w ho replaced M uto, played a crucial role am ong those w ho supported Tojo's leadership—nam ely V ice W ar M inister Heitaro Kim ura and Jo ich iro Sanada, ch ief o f the Operations Section o f the A ttn y G e n e ra l S ta ff. Sato h ad a scu ffle an d e xch an g ed blow s w ith Operations Bureau ch ief Sh in ich i Tanaka, w ho opposed Tojo's plans for G uadalcanal operations. A t the tim e o f the Battle o f Leyte, Sato even inter­ fered w ith the N avy's operation. "W e should take heed o f lessons learned from the death o f Com bined Fleet seamen and utilize these lessons for our future war m anagem ent," he said, show ing support for future operations w ithout prospects for success.17 O ka belonged to a pro-Tripartite A lliance cam p w ithin the N avy. After he assumed the post in the N aval Affairs Bureau in O ctober 1940, the N avy's hard-line stance toward the U nited States stiffened further. Oka created the Second Section in the bureau, aim ing to give the N avy more influence than the Arm y in leading the n ation's p olicy. C aptain Shingo Ishikaw a was singled out to head the im portant section because he was "fond o f p olitics," having a broad netw ork o f p olitical allies. W ith in the N avy, Ishikaw a, along w ith Toshitane Takada, ch ief o f the First Section of the N aval Affairs Bureau, and Sadatoshi Tom ioka, ch ief o f the Operations Section, continued to advocate their hard-line ideas. They cracked the w hip at superiors w ho h e sita te d to ad van ce in to so u th ern Fren ch In d o ch in a , and stron gly in sisted Ja p a n sh ou ld w age war again st the U nited States.18 "It's lik e a cap tain is g u id in g th e N a v y ," grum bled V ice A dm iral Shigeyoshi In ou e.19 After the war broke out, Ishikaw a said, "I'm the one w ho brought Japan in to the w ar."20 Before the war started, the N aval General Staff argued for an orthodox strategy o f en surin g stable supplies o f resources in preparation for a

2 5 8 / C onclusion

lengthy battle by placing Southeast Asia under Japan's in flu ence. How ever, Com bined Fleet C om m an d er-in -C h ief Isoroku Yam am oto insisted on m aking a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. C aptain Kam eto Kuroshim a, Senior Staff O fficer o f the C om bined Fleet, persuaded the N aval General Staff to approve Yam am oto's p lan , but the surprise attack enraged the U nited States and provoked a relentless full-blow n response. After Yam am oto's death, Kuroshim a becam e director o f the Second Bureau (W eapons and M obilization) o f the N aval General Staff. He was involved in the developm ent o f special suicide attack w eapons, believing it w ould be im possible to w in the war using conventional tactics. A fter a Japanese fleet was crushed in the Battle o f M idw ay, Shigeru Fukutom e, ch ief o f the N aval General Staff's First Bureau (Operations), said to his subordinates, "The losses were m assive." How ever, he instructed them to conceal the extent o f the losses suffered in the battle from p oliti­ cal leaders.21 H e did not change his behavior even after he was appointed C h ie f o f Staff o f the Com bined Fleet. M in eich i Koga, C om m ander-in-Chief o f the fleet, was n ot inform ed o f operations and war situations and, therefore, he som etim es had to ask young officers, "H ow is the war situation now ?"22 In M arch 1944, F u k u to m e's p la n e crash ed o n C e b u Isla n d , th e Philippines, as he fled from an air raid in Palau. C on fid en tial docum ents he was carrying were taken by local guerrillas and passed to U .S . forces. Tasuku Nakazaw a, w ho replaced Fukutom e as Operations Bureau direc­ tor in Ju n e 1943, fin ally approved the start o f kamikaze suicide operations after Japanese forces suffered a succession o f losses in sea battles, in cludin g those o ff the M ariana Islands and Leyte Islan d , and T akijiro O n ish i, Com m ander o f the First N aval Air Fleet in M an ila, ordered the first attack by a kamikaze special attack force in O ctober 1944. C o lo n el Sh in ich i Tanaka, w hen he was ch ie f o f the W ar M inistry's M ilita ry Service S e ctio n , co n trib u ted to th e exp an sion o f th e Sin o Japanese W ar. Tanaka becam e O p eration s Bureau c h ie f o f th e A rm y General Staff in October 1940. After Germ any invaded the Soviet U n ion in Ju n e 1941, Tanaka initiated preparations for war against the Soviet U n io n . The Kw antung Arm y m obilized 700,000 soldiers to prevent a Soviet in va­ sion. A t the sam e tim e, Tanaka cham pioned the conquest o f southern French In d o ch in a . A ty p ica l A rm y G en eral S ta ff o ffice r, Tanaka was extrem ely vocal w ith his haw kish ideas, especially in em ergency situa­ tion s. Renya M utaguchi, the Fifteenth Arm y Com m ander, was another officer w ho tenaciously stuck to reckless hard-line theories. M utaguchi, w ho was trained by T ojo, com m anded operations in the Battle o f Im phal, in w hich 72,500 troops were killed or w ounded. H iroshi O shim a was a form er Arm y officer w ho becam e Am bassador to

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Germ any. His pro-Germ an attitude was extrem e. W hen O shim a was a M ilitary Attache at the Japanese Embassy in 1936, he started negotiations over the A nti-Com intern Pact w ith Germ an Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Joachim V on Ribbentrop—w ithout reporting to the Foreign M inistry—and concluded the bilateral pact. Around the start of the Japan-U .S. W ar, he failed to forecast that Germ any would attack the Soviet U n ion , and he also kept sending reports to Japan that mirrored his blind belief that Germ any was assured o f victory. Ambassador to Italy Toshio Shiratori, as a leader o f the Foreign M inistry's pro-reform group, substantially influenced young bureaucrats. He eagerly supported signing the Tripartite Alliance w ith Germ any and Italy. "It's natural that Japan, Germ any, Italy and the Soviet U nion im m ediately stand up together and place them selves as equals to those who want to m aintain the status quo," he said.23

Keeping some distance from the Tokyo Tribunal W hen the International M ilitary Tribunal for the Far East, com m only known as the Tokyo Tribunal, convened after the end o f W orld W ar II, a total o f 28 people including former Prime M inister Hideki Tojo were tried as Class-A war crim inals. However, two died during the trial and one was dismissed after being found m entally incom petent. Setting aside the find­ in g s o f th e trib u n a l, th e Y o m iu ri S h im b u n 's W ar R e sp o n sib ility Reexam ination Com m ittee has em pirically exam ined the responsibility of political and m ilitary leaders before and during the war. The list o f Japanese authorities that the Yom iuri Shim bun com mittee deemed as being "m ain­ ly responsible" shows some similarities—and some differences—from those identified by the tribunal as being Class-A war crim inals. Prime M inister Fumimaro Konoe, C h ief o f Arm y General Staff Hajim e Sugiyam a and W ar M inister Korechika Anam i opted to com m it suicide shortly before or after Japan's surrender and were not defendants at the Tokyo Tribunal. Also Foreign M inister Yosuke M atsuoka and C h ie f of Naval General Staff Osam i Nagano died from natural causes during the trial and thus were not sentenced. M eanw hile, the Yom iuri Shim bun com ­ m ittee identified staff officers in clu din g K anji Ishihara, a m asterm ind behind the M anchurian Incident; N avy Captain Shingo Ishikawa, who pushed for the advance into southern French Indochina; and m ilitary bureaucrats including Shin ichi Tanaka o f the Arm y General Staff, who insisted on w aging a war against the U nited States, as bearing heavy responsibility; but they were not even suspects in the Tokyo Tribunal. However, m ilitary officers and bureaucrats pointed to by the Yom iuri Shim bun com m ittee as being responsible were "representatives"—others

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were just as responsible for the war as these representatives were. The Yom iuri Shim bun com m ittee focused n ot on ly on the "responsibility for starting the war" but also on the "responsibility for con tin u in g the w ar." Koshiro Oikaw a and Soem u Toyoda, C hiefs o f the N aval General Staff, sur­ faced as officers w ho bear som e responsibility for their roles. The newspa­ per's com m ittee decided that Prime M inister Kuniaki Koiso and C h ie f o f the Arm y General Staff Yoshijiro Um ezu, w ho received life sentences from the Tokyo T ribunal, were heavily responsible for the war as they had insisted on a fin al battle on the m ainland. Heitaro Kim ura, a pro-Tojo group mem ber and Vice W ar M inister, and Arm y General Iwane M atsui, the com m ander responsible for "Nanking Jiken" (the Rape o f N anking), also were responsible for the war but did not play m ajor roles in directing the war, according to the fin din gs o f the Yom iuri Shim bun com m ittee. Kim ura and M atsui were sentenced to death by hanging.

Emperor Showa stays w ithin framework for constitutional head o f state Article 3 o f the C on stitu tion o f the G reat Empire o f Jap an (the M eiji C on stitu tion ) stipulates: "The Em peror is sacred and in v io lab le;" This m eans the Emperor does n ot bear any responsibility over decisions on national policies. Article 55 gives p olitical responsibility to state m inisters: "The respective M inisters o f State shall give advice to the Emperor and be responsible for it." It also stipulates: "A ll Laws, Im perial O rdinances, and Im perial Rescripts o f w hatever kind, that relate to the affairs o f the state, require the countersignature o f a M inister o f State." Legally, therefore, Emperor Show a was n ot responsible for the affairs o f the state. The post­ war governm ent has the same view . Based on the articles o f the M eiji C o n stitu tio n , O sam u M im u ra, th en C h ie f o f the C ab in et Legislation Bureau, said at a m eeting o f the House o f Councillors C abinet Com m ittee on February 14, 1989, "In terms o f dom estic law s, Emperor Show a does not have legal responsibility for the w ar." In terms o f his responsibility under international law , M im ura told the same com m ittee, "The problem has already been settled" because the A llied Powers did n ot in d ict the Emperor at the International M ilitary Tribunal for the Far East, or the Tokyo Tribunal. But, aside from the legal responsibility, was Emperor Show a responsible for the war in a m uch broader sense? In actual fact, he was deeply involved in p olitical decisions in three critical phases. They were: • w hen the C abinet o f G iich i Tanaka resigned en masse;

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• w hen an order to subdue rebels involved in the February 26 Incident was given; and • w hen he m ade "divin e decisions" to end the war. Em peror Show a later recalled th a t th e re sign atio n o f th e Tanaka C abinet was a "very bitter lesson." Tanaka did n ot fu lfill his prom ise to h arsh ly p u n ish C o lo n e l D aisaku K om oto , w ho was th e m asterm ind behind warlord C han g Tso-lin's (Zhang Zuolin's) assassination. Emperor Showa faulted Tanaka in the m atter. The Tanaka Cabinet later resigned en masse in Ju ly 1929. (See APPENDIX U.) The Emperor's criticism was the first such incident in the history o f Japanese constitutional p olitics. Hard-liners in the Arm y and N avy as w ell as nationalists were infuriated, describing it as an "intrigue in the Im perial H ousehold."24 K inm ochi Saion ji, a genro elder statesm an and senior Im perial adviser w ho regarded a lim ited m onarchy as an ideal system , also rem onstrated w ith the Emperor w ho recalled, "After this in cid ent, I decided to approve all things reported by the cabinet, even if I held a dissenting o p in io n ."25 If the Emperor freely dism issed m inisters—w ho were obliged to fu lfill constitutional obligations—for their actions or intervened in such m at­ ters, the state m inisters w ould be unable to assume their o fficial duties in com pliance w ith the C on stitu tion . "For an autocratic country it m ay be possible, but as the head o f a constitutional state, I can't do such a th in g ," Emperor Show a also said.26 The order to subdue rebels involved in the February 26 Incident was issu ed b ecau se Prim e M in iste r K eisuke O k ad a's w hereab ou ts w ere unknow n and the W ar M inistry was too soft on the rebels.27 The "d iv in e decision s" aim ed at en d in g th e war cam e after Prim e M inister Kantaro Suzuki broke w ith all tradition and took the unprece­ dented step o f asking the Emperor to give his op in ion at the Im perial Supreme W ar C ou n cil w hen leaders were split on w hether to surrender or continue the w ar. A review o f the three cases in w hich the Emperor was deeply involved suggests he was peace-loving in nature and that the cases were som ewhat exceptional. Nevertheless, the constitutional power to appoint a prim e m inister was accorded to th e Em peror. The custom ary procedure o f selectin g and recom m ending a candidate, in itia lly by the genro senior statesm an w ho acted as adviser to the Emperor and in later days by the Lord Keeper o f the Privy Seal, was established before and during the w ar. However, som etim es the Emperor m ade prior requests. W hen the Cabinet o f M akoto Saito was form ed after the M ay 15 In cid en t, the Emperor requested that anyone connected to fascist forces should not be chosen .28

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After the February 26 Incident, he laid out three conditions to successive prim e m inisters: • respect the Constitution; > • fo llo w the basic p o licy o f in tern atio n al frien dsh ip ; undertake no unnecessary conflicts w ith foreign countries; and • do not make sudden changes in the business w orld.29 In addition, the Emperor expressed his opinions, asked questions and tried to persuade State M inisters and C hiefs o f Arm y and N aval General Staffs. W hen the M anchurian Incident occurred, he warned W ar M inister Jiro M in am i, saying, "There w ill be n o sm ooth solution to the problem if you insist all the blam e lies w ith the op ponen t."30 Three weeks after the Sino-Japanese W ar erupted, he said to Prim e M inister Fum im aro Konoe: "It m ight be a good tim e now . How about solv­ in g the problem through diplom atic negotiations?" Before the conclusion o f the Tripartite Pact w ith Germ any and Italy, he expressed m isgivings that the U nited States w ould h alt o il exports to Ja p a n .31 W hen m ilitary and p olitical leaders were debating w hether to advance southw ard or northw ard, he questioned W ar M inister H ideki T ojo and C h ie f o f Arm y General Staff H ajim e Sugiyam a: "You say y o u 'll put troops in northern M an ch u ria, C h in a and even French In d o ch in a . Y ou w ill stretch your forces in all directions, but do you really believe you can han­ dle the Shina [China] In ciden t?"32 A t a Sep tem ber 6 , 1941 m e e tin g o f th e Im p e ria l H ead q u artersG o v e rn m e n t L ia is o n C o n fe re n c e th a t set th e P rin c ip le s fo r th e Im plem entation o f the Im perial Policy, expressing the nation's readiness for war w ith the U nited States, the Emperor recited a poem w ritten by Emperor M eiji, his grandfather, to express his feelings about peace. Yom o no umi/mina harakara to/ om ou yon i, nado namikaze no/tachisawaguram u In as m u c h as all/the seas in a ll directions/ se e m s ib lin g s o f o n e b irth , W h y m u st th e w in d s an d th e w a v e s c la s h in n o is in e ss ? 33

D uring a gozenkaigi m eeting on Decem ber 1, w hich form alized the deci­ sion to go to war against the U nited States, the Emperor rem ained silen t.34 How ever, up u n til that stage, the Emperor had tried to prevent the war

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w ithin the framework as a constitutional head o f state. Some historians say Emperor Showa should bear responsibility as the Supreme Com m an­ der o f Japanese forces, w ho was aware o f the war situation and guided the war from the M anchurian Incident to the end o f W orld W ar II in 1945. In some cases, how ever, the Emperor's requests for details on operations were not com plied w ith by Arm y and N aval General Staff m em bers. D uring the closing days o f the war he did not receive correct in form ation.33 Article 11 o f the M eiji C on stitu tion stipulates: "The Emperor has the supreme com m and o f the Arm y and N avy." Thus state m inisters could not interfere in this field. This is the so-called independence o f the supreme com m and. U nlike for state m inisters, there were n o w ritten regulations on advice to the Emperor and countersignatures. In actuality, how ever, orders on m ilitary operations were drafted by the Chiefs o f the Arm y and N aval General Staffs and other top m ilitary officers and countersigned by the Emperor. Thus, the Emperor did not have substantial supreme com m and authority.36 A fte r th e w ar, Em peror Show a re p o rte d ly to ld G e n e ra l D o u glas M acA rthur, the head o f the G eneral H eadquarters o f the O ccu p ation authorities, that he w ould take all responsibility for the w ar.37 A t setae p oin t, he told his aides that he w ould step down from the throne, It seemed that the Emperor tried to take responsibility through abdication.38 How ever, the Yom iuri Shim bun com m ittee concluded that actual responsibility rests w ith the Prime M inisters, State M inisters and the C h ie fs o f A rm y an d N a v a l G en eral S ta ff w ho w ere in v o lv e d in the decision-m aking process for the Showa W ar.

Responsibility o fU .S . and Soviet Union W ar responsibility o f the U nited States and the Soviet U n io n in the Showa W ar has barely been discussed. The G reat Tokyo Air Raid o f M arch 10, 1945, killed about 88,000 civilians and others and there were other sim ilar raids across Ja p a n . In ad d ition , the U n ited States dropped two atom ic bom bs, k illin g about 140,000 in H iroshim a and about 74,000 in N agasaki. Before those attacks, the U .S . forces exam ined how m any incen­ diaries were necessary to incinerate Japanese cities through air raids by B29 bom bers. Som e evid en ce in d icates U .S . President H arry T rum an considered lim itin g the atom ic bom bs' targets to m ilitary facilities and concentrations o f soldiers. In reality, how ever, he ordered the atom ic bom bs to be dropped on cities w ithout an o fficia l w arning. W ere the incendiary attacks ta d atom ic bom bings necessary even though Japan's ability to keep figh tin g was on the verge o f collapse? H elen M ears, a Ja p a n expert and form er m em ber o f th e A dvisory

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C om m ittee for the Labor Bureau o f the G en eral H eadquarters o f the O ccupation forces, pointed out that the U .S . authorities made p olicy deci­ sions based on an exaggerated im age that portrayed the Japanese people as the "w orld's m ost m ilitaristic nation " and m ost "fanatic warlike people"— in spite o f the fact that Japan's defeat was inevitab le.39 U .S . Air Force General Curtis LeM ay, w ho ordered the m assive incendi­ ary attack on Tokyo, said after W orld W ar II: "I suppose if I had lost the war, I w ould have been tried as a war crim inal. Fortunately, we were on the w inning sid e."40 M eanw hile, the Soviet U n ion declared war against Jap an on August 8, 1945, and attacked the Kw antung Arm y in M anchuria (now northeastern China) on August 9, the day the U nited States dropped an atom ic bom b on N agasaki. Since the Japanese-Soviet N eutrality Pact was b in din g u n til April 1946, the Soviet entry in to the war was an obvious violation o f the pact. O n August 14, Jap an accepted the Potsdam Declaration and notified its acceptance to the A llied Powers. How ever, the Soviet forces continued figh tin g. They perpetrated all kinds o f atrocities n ot on ly against Japanese m ilitary forces but also against Japanese and Chinese citizens. The Soviet U n ion failed in its plan to occupy H okkaido in the face of U .S. opposition, but it occupied Japan's Northern Territories—the islands o f Etorofu, Kunashiri and Shikotan and the Habom ai group o f islets— between August 28 and September 5, despite the fact that Jap an signed surrender docum ents on Septem ber 2. After giving up on taking H okkaido, Soviet leader Jo sef Stalin on August 23 ordered Japanese soldiers and civilians to be sent as prisoners o f war to Siberian in tern m en t cam ps, m ain ly for forced lab or. A bou t 575,000 Japanese soldiers and civilian s were detained there and forced to work under brutal conditions. Records show that at least 55,000 people died during their forced detention. Notes_______________________________________________________________________________________ 1T e s tim o n y b y d e fe n d a n t H id e k i T o jo in th e In te rn a tio n a l M ilita r y T rib u n a l fo r th e Far East in th e a ftern o o n o f Ja n u a r y 6 ,1 9 4 8 : "T h e e ffe ct o f th e N in e-P ow er T reaty o n Ja p a n is s o m e th in g lik e th is: a ten -y ea r-o ld c h ild h a v in g b e e n g iv e n clo th e s to fit its age, n o w h a v in g reach ed th e age o f e ig h te e n years fin d s th a t th e clo th e s are b e c o m in g som ew h at t o m . Ja p a n w as try in g a n d tr y in g to m e n d th o se tears, b u t sin ce h er b o d y h a d grow n th a t w as im p o ss ib le ... In regard to th is N in e-P o w er P act, th e Sov ie t U n io n w as n o t a sig­ n a to ry o f th is p a ct. T h is cam e to h a v e a grave b e arin g , b o th o n th e p o s itio n o f Ja p a n an d th a t o f C h in a . T h e C h in a In cid e n t [the Sin o -Jap an ese W ar] broke o u t, a n d th is ag ain ch a n g e d th e situ atio n co n sid era b ly . T h e w o rld e c o n o m ic situ atio n c h a n g e d fro m th a t o f free trade to o n e o f a b lo c e c o n o m y . T h u s, ev en i f o n ly th e m o st im p o rta n t p o in ts are tak en u p , w e c a n see th a t th e situ a tio n h as c h a n g e d co n sid era b ly sin ce th e s ig n in g o f th e N in e-P o w er P act. W e c a n see th a t th e N in e-P o w er P act its e lf h as c h a n g e d ." 2 M asa ya su H o sa k a, Tojo H id e k i to Tenno no Jid a i (Era o f H id e k i T o jo a n d th e Em peror),

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/ 265

Tokyo: Chikum a Shobo, 2005, p. 220 3Takashi Ito et a l., eds, Tojo Naikaku Sori Daijin Kimitsu Kiroku (Classified Files o f Prime M inister Tojo), Tokyo: University o f Tokyo Press, 1990, p. 553 4Ibid., p. 492 5Ibid., p. 548 6Hosaka, op. cit., p. 514 7 Teiji Yabe, Konoe Fumimaro (Fumimaro Konoe), Tokyo: Yom iuri Shim bun, 1976, pp. 84-85 8Yoshitake Oka, Konoe Fumimaro (Fumimaro Konoe), Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1972, p. 85 9Ibid., p. 101 10Ibid., p . 182 11 Shinichi Tanaka, Taisen Totsunyu no Shinso (Truth o f the Entry into the War). Tokyo: Gengensha, 1955, p. 65 12Ibid., p. 87 13 Ikuhiko Hata, Showashi no Gunjintachi (Servicemen in the History o f Showa), Tokyo: Bungeishunju, 1982, p. 155 14U .S. General Staff o f the Arm y, ed., Reports o f General MacArthur, vol. 2, Japanese oper­ ations in the southwest Pacific area, com piled from Japanese Dem obilization Bureau records, W ashington, D .C .: U .S. Governm ent Printing O ffice, 1966, p . 713, fn . 160, p. 725; M otoei Sato et a l., eds., G H Q Rekishi-ka Chinjutsu Roku (jo) (Records o f Statements fu rn ish ed b y th e H isto ry S e ctio n o f G en eral H eadquarters and th e Jap an ese Dem obilization Bureau vol. 1), Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 2002, p . 252 15 Koichi Kido, Kido Koichi Nikki (Koichi Kido Diary), Tokyo: University o f Tokyo Press, 1966, pp. 1,208-1,209 16 Morisada Hosokawa, Hosokawa Nikki (ge) (Hosokawa Diary, vol. 2), Tokyo: Chuko Bunko, 1979, pp. 359-364 17 Kenryo Sato, D ai Toa Senso Kaikoroku (Memoirs o f the Greater East Asia W ar), Tokyo: Tokuma Shoten, 1966, p. 276 18Ju n Tsunoda, Nihon no Taibei Kaisen, 1940-41, trans. David A. Titus, in Final Con­ frontation: Japan's Negotiations with the United States, 1941: selected translations from Taiheiyo Senso e no M ichi, Kaisen Gaikoshi, ed. Jam es W . M orley, New York: Colum bia University Press, 1994, p. I l l 19Toshio Yoshida, Kaigun Sanbo (A Naval Staff O fficer), Tokyo: Bungeishunju, 1989, p. 292 20Ibid., p. 244 21 Ibid., p. 294 22Ibid., p. 295 23 Kimitada Miwa and Ryoichi Tobe, eds., Nihon no Kiro to Matsuoka Gaiko (A Crossroads o f Japan and Matsuoka's Diplom acy), Tokyo: Nansosha, 1993, p. 124 24Miwa and Tobe, eds., op. cit., p. 124 25 It is said that Emperor Showa's strong intention to intervene in politics in the early years o f his reign stemmed from Lord Keeper o f the Privy Seal Nobuaki M akino's advice, w hich was based on his belief that Emperor M eiji (1852-1912) had exerted political lead­ ership. Follow ing the resignation o f the Tanaka Cabinet, Emperor Showa became partic­ ularly conscious o f his role as a constitutional m onarch, acting too prudently on some occasions. In 1931 when the M anchurian Incident broke out, Japanese troops stationed in Korea advanced into northeastern China w ithout the approval o f the Emperor, the Supreme Com m ander, a developm ent that broke w ith the tradition o f deploying troops on

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Imperial orders. Nonetheless, the Cabinet o f Prime M inister Reijiro W akatsuki gave ex post facto consent to the advancem ent o f troops in to M anchuria from Korea. The Emperor for his part approved o f the Cabinet's decision and took no punitive action. 26 Hidenari Terasaki and M ariko T. M iller, eds, Showa Tenno Dokuhakuroku (Emperor Showa's M onologue), Tokyo: Bungeishunju, 1991, p. 136; Emperor Showa's Monologue of APPENDIX U comprises excerpts o f Dokuhakuroku written in Japanese. The original ver­ sion in Japanese refers to the installation of the Cabinet o f Hideki Tojo and the prelude to the war w ith the United States am ong other major events. m Peter W etzler dissents from the widely accepted view that Emperor Showa exception­ ally exercised his constitutional prerogative o f supreme com mand in suppressing the rebels in the February 26 Incident. According to W etzler's book (Hirohito and War, Honolulu: University o f Hawaii Press, 1998, pp. 189-190), the Emperor "took a firm action," but, "Despite his position, the emperor did not act independently." Wetzler argues, "He and those around him ordered, argued, prodded, and persuaded. They built a consensus." In the end, according to W etzler, "the Control factions (Tosei-ha) of the army and navy moved to oppose them w ith force." The author's opinion is that the Emperor's reaction, w hich was not at all discreet, was a good example o f how decisions were made and put into effect in prewar Japan. He argues, "Precisely this sort o f prod­ ding and persuading, to form a consensus, is the essence o f what decision m aking in Japan is all about." 28Kumao Harada, Saionji Ko to Seikyoku, 2 (Prince Saionji and the Political Situation, vol. 2), Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1950, p. 288 29Harada, Saionji Ko to Seikyoku,5, op. cit., 1951, pp. 20-21 30Masayasu Hosaka, Showa Tenno (Emperor Showa), Tokyo: Chuokoron-Shinsha, 2005, p. 134 31Ibid., p. 172 32The M ilitary History Department o f the National Institute for Defense Studiesnof the Defense Agency, ed., Daihonei Rikugun-bu Daitoa Senso Kaisen Keii (The Army Depart­ ment o f the Im perial Headquarters—An Account o f the Com m encem ent o f the Great East Asian W ar), vol. 4, in Senshi Sosho (A Series o f W ar Histories), Tokyo: Asagumo Shim bunsha, 1974, p. 280 33Emperor Showa's use o f tanka—a short Japanese poem o f 31 syllables arranged in lines of five, seven, five, seven and seven syllables—was modeled on the technique used by his grandfather, Emperor M eiji, to have his subjects, who actually held power, under­ stand his w ill. In other words, as the Emperor did not in reality have absolute authority to issue orders, tanka poems were a m ethod o f last resort to indirectly express his wish to amend or withdraw those policies he felt unable to agree to. Herbert P. Bix writes in his book (Hirohito and the Making o f Modem Japan, New York: HarperCollins, 2000. p. 414) that Emperor Showa's recitation o f Emperor M eiji's poem indicated "anxiety about the chances o f victory." This interpretation has astonished m any Japanese intellectuals including the literati. In Japan, those who share Bix's interpretation are typically antiEmperor commentators who believe that Emperor Showa was "a m ilitarist." 34 In his postwar m onologue, Emperor Showa's Monologue (Tokyo: Bungeishunju, 1991, pp. 71-72 and APPENDIX U), Emperor Showa refers to difficulty turning down the deci­ sion to go to war. "[M y opposition] would definitely lead to a major rebellion, and peo­ ple around me whom I had confidence in would be killed—a situation in w hich m y own life would not be guaranteed. I did not m ind that eventuality, but a frenzied war would have eventually follow ed, causing tragedy and catastrophe to the extent that would have been a few times as m uch as the actual war. Consequently, the war would have hardly been brought to an end w ith Japan eventually ruined."

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35 H iroyuki Agaw a, a senior Japanese historical novelist, taking part in a Yom iuri Shim bun-sponsored roundtable discussion in Decem ber 1998, said: "I th in k [the Emperor] declined to halt the move to embark on the war with the United States, given his status as the constitutional m onarch. It m ay be understandable to blam e [the Emperor for the war] because o f that developm ent. Even though I understand such an argument, [the Emperor] him self said 'Saying I should have stopped [the war] by virtue o f the power o f the Emperor is tantam ount to tellin g [me] to becom e a despotic m onarch/" 36 As for Emperor Showa's accountability in connection w ith the matter o f supreme com m and, some people contend that the Emperor should bear the ultim ate responsi­ bility for the matter because there is no article in the Constitution o f the Empire o f Japan stipulating that the Army and Naval Chiefs o f General Staff should take respon­ sibility in lieu o f the Emperor. However, this kind o f argum ent is not sufficient in that this contention ignores the fact that Japan's legal system is based on both express pro­ visions and customary or com m on law. In fact, the prerogative o f supreme com mand had been exercised in accordance w ith customary law and a governm ent ordinance based on custom ary law for more than 10 years before the prom ulgation o f the C on stitu tion o f the Empire o f Jap an in 1889. Even after the enforcem ent o f the Constitution, the governm ent ordinance remained in place since it did not contradict the con stitu tion al provisions. View ed from the standpoint o f custom ary law , the Emperor was not in a position to bear responsibility—unless he issued orders in con­ tradiction to the advice o f m ilitary leaders. 37 Emperor Showa, showing his sense o f noblesse oblige, expressed his intention to take war responsibility as the head o f state o f Japan. General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Comm ander o f the Allied Powers, w ho talked directly w ith the Emperor, referred to the Emperor's relevant words in his book, Reminiscences, London: Heinem ann, 1964, p. 288. In a report to the U .S. State Department, George Atcheson, Jr ., a political advisor to M acArthur, also m entioned the Emperor's intention as inform ed by SCAP (See APPENDIX T). In Japan, The Yomiuri Shimbun ran a scoop in its evening edition o f September 3 and the m orning edition o f September 14, 1955—three years after Japan regained its sover­ eignty—about MacArthur's remarks concerning the Emperor's postwar expression o f his readiness to assume war responsibility—w hich were made to Foreign M inister Mamoru Shigem itsu during Shigem itsu's courtesy call on M acArthur in New York. The Emperor's statement regarding his own responsibility for the Showa War—w hich should have rekindled international debate about the status o f the Emperor—had never been made public during the Allied Power's occupation. 38 In reference to Emperor Showa's oft-quoted remark that "Every year, m y heart aches on August 15, com mentator Shichihei Yamamoto wrote in his book, Showa Tenno no Kenkyu (A Study o f Emperor Showa), Tokyo: Shodensha, 1989, p. 306, "If I was allowed to put it in an extreme way, I would say if [the Emperor] was not responsible for [the war] at all, he could have not said, 'I feel pains in m y heart.'" 39Helen Mears, Mirror for Americans: Japan, Boston: Houghton M ifflin , 1948, p. 63 40Docum entary film "Fog o f W ar" (2003), in w hich Robert McNamara quoted LeMay.

Chapter 17

What we should learn from the Showa War

any people who experienced the Showa W a r have died in the 6 1 years since the curtain came down on the fighting. T o younger generations, the w ar is a distant event. The Yom iuri Shimbun’s W ar Responsibility Reexamination Com mittee attempted to determine the truth behind the hostilities, examined the facts and found many lessons that can be learned. To close the committee’s yearlong reexamination process, we summarize Japan’s mistakes made by the political and m ilitary leaders:

M

The international situation: Japan fa ils to accurately grasp global trends A nation's future w ill teeter on a knife-edge if it cannot accurately read global trends and the balance o f power am ong nations. After W orld W ar I, Japan found itself in such a situation. Escalating the M anchurian Incident was Japan's first m istake. A t the W ashington N aval Conference held in W ashington, D .C ., from late 1921 to 1922, the Nine-Pow er Treaty, whose signatories agreed to respect C h in a 's sovereignty, and the Five-Pow er Treaty, w hich lim ited tonnage o f aircraft carriers and cap ital ships by B ritain, France, Italy, Jap an and the U nited States, were concluded. The Kw antung Arm y's activities in M anchuria challenged these treaties, w hich form ed the backbone o f the international order at the tim e. The Im perial Japanese Arm y's activities in M anchuria provoked a fierce response from the U nited States, w hich advocated com pliance w ith inter­ n ational agreem ents, nonintervention in dom estic politics o f other coun­ tries, m arket liberalization and equal opportunities. The reaction led to the Stim son D octrine o f Jan u ary 1932, nam ed after U .S . Secretary o f State H enry Stim son. The doctrine said the U nited States w ould n ot recognize any territorial or adm inistrative changes im posed on C h in a by Jap an through the use o f m ilitary force. (See APPENDIX B.) Japan's grow ing isolation from the international com m unity was h igh ­ lighted by its w ithdraw al from the League o f N ations in M arch 1933. Less 269

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than seven m onths later, A dolf Hitler's Germ any also withdrew. Japan's plan to seek closer ties w ith Germ any exacerbated this isola­ tionism . The idea o f entering Tripartite Alliance w ith Germ any and Italy was once dropped due to circumstances in Europe described as "com pli­ cated and m ysterious" by th en Prim e M in ister K iich iro H iranum a. However, dazzled by Germ any's string of m ilitary victories, Japan finally concluded the Tripartite Pact in September 1940. Signing the pact allied Japan w ith the nation bom bing London. This was a fatal choice. The Japanese m ilitary, whose leaders m ostly were pro-Germ an at that tim e, was unaware o f the repercussions the treaty w ould have on the SinoJapanese W ar. Britain had further clarified its stance o f assisting Chiang Kai-shek, and the U nited States also promised substantial assistance to C h in a. Japan had, naively, internationalized the Sino-Japanese W ar. Japanese m ilitary and governm ent leaders at that tim e failed to accu­ rately grasp the international situation. They did not understand the rise of nationalism in Chin a that set the foundations for the country's unifica­ tion after the Chinese Revolution of 1911. At the heart o f the problem was the com m on perception in Japan in those days that "Shina [China] isn't a country." Japan justified its invasion o f Chin a by claim ing that Chin a was a "society o f m arauding bandits." The prevailing view in Japan at that tim e was that Chinese people lacked the ability to establish a modern state.1 O f course, a few politicians, such as Prime M inister Tsuyoshi Inukai who was assassinated in the M ay 15 Incident of 1932, clearly understood nationalism in Chin a. However, such people were shunted from the polit­ ical stage early on during the Showa War by acts of terrorism by the m ili­ tary, m aking it im possible for them to influence Japan's policy toward C hin a. Furthermore, some Army officers w ho should have played im por­ tant roles in policy toward Chin a instead became "an advanced group" to lay the groundwork for invading C hin a. Dubbed "C h in a specialists in the Arm y," they included Kenji Dohihara, chief o f the M ukden Special Service Agency, and Takashi Sakai, C h ief of Staff o f the China Garrison Army in T ianjin. As m ilitary advisers to warlords possessing territories in C hin a, they used conspiracies and various tactics as if they were real-life charac­ ters from the "Three Kingdom Saga." They ignored moves by Chiang Kai-shek and other leaders o f the C h i­ nese N ationalist Party (Kuomintang) and the rapidly rising Com m unist Party led by M ao Zedong. They failed to study the two parties that would later determine China's destiny. The leaders lost a balanced perspective of the international situation because Japan analyzed only one-sided data collected from Germ any as to the situation in Europe and from Chinese warlords concerning C hin a.

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In the Im perial Rescript on the declaration o f war against the U nited States and B ritain, Emperor Show a said the war was for "self-preservation and self-defense." How ever, Jap an changed the purpose o f the war to cre­ ate the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere after the war started. This was based on the concept o f divid in g the w orld geop olitically in to four spheres—East A sia, the Am ericas, Europe and the Soviet U n ion —in w hich Tokyo p lan ned to create a self-sufficient b loc o f A sian n ations free o f W estern powers led by Ja p a n . T his con cept ignored the existence o f C h in a and focused too m uch on ideology. Consequently, it opened the door to an alm ost lim itless expansion o f battle although Foreign M inister M am oru Shigem itsu, w ho played an im portant role in w artim e diplom a­ cy , to o k steps such as h o ld in g th e G reater East A sia C o n feren ce in Novem ber 1943. As Jap an sought to bring an end to the war, it asked the Soviet U n io n , w hich had rem ained a virtual enem y o f Jap an , to serve as a m ediator in peace negotiations. Japan's leaders were totally unaware o f the fact that th e S o v ie t U n io n h ad p led g ed in a secret agreem en t at th e Y a lta Conference to enter the war against Jap an w ithin two to three m onths o f Germ any's defeat. Likewise, they had n o inform ation about the U .S . suc­ cess in developing atom ic w eapons and the U .S.-Soviet tug o f war for post­ war global p o litical leadership. In the end, Jap an suffered tw o atom ic bom b attacks and was attacked b y the Soviet U n ion in the fin al days o f the Showa W ar, w hich led to the incarceration o f m any Japanese in Siberian detention cam ps after the war.

Elite officers in politics: Rise o f reckless officers and a bureaucratized m ilitary The course follow ed b y Jap an during the Showa W ar was decided m ain­ ly b y e lite officers in th e Im perial Jap an ese A rm y an d th e Im perial Japanese N avy. How did they acquire such power? After graduating from the Arm y M ilitary Academ y and the Arm y's General Staff C ollege, elite Arm y officers were appointed as staff officers at organizations such as the Arm y General Staff. They were characterized by their sense o f elitism and closed m indedness. O n the strength o f the power o f the supreme com ­ m and, they gained a grip on m ilitary personnel decisions, budget alloca­ tions and policym aking. The C o n stitu tio n o f the Em pire o f Ja p a n , also know n as the M e iji C on stitu tion , stipulated that the Emperor had supreme com m and o f the Arm y and the N avy. This becam e grounds for m ilitary officers to refuse to allow the C abinet and the D iet to control n ational p olicy. Elite officers seized the reins o f state policies, basking in a sense o f superiority inside the

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m ilitary w hile staying independent o f governm ent organs. Personnel deci­ sions about officers responsible for m ilitary operations were m ainly in the hands o f the C h ief of the Army General Staff. Even Prime M inister Hideki Tojo did not have the final say in such decisions. W hen Emperor Showa expressed his wishes regarding operational plan­ ning and policy matters, m ilitary officers ignored or refused them . After the August 1942 decision to capture Port Moresby was made, follow ing the setback in the Battle o f Guadalcanal, the Emperor favored a dispatch of the Army's air force units. But the Army refused such a deploym ent. Arifum i Kum on, head o f air warfare at the Operations Bureau o f the Army General Staff, said, "I'll never sign [the plan] as long as I'm in office." The air units were fin ally dispatched only after Kum on w ent m issing in an airplane crash in October 1942 near the island o f Etorofu in w hat is now part of Japan's Northern Territories.2 H e a d in g th e A rm y's o p eratio n s p la n n in g d u rin g th e B attle o f G uadalcanal were C o lo n el Takushiro H attori and Lieutenant C olon el M asanobu Tsuji, the duo tarred w ith the defeat by Soviet forces in the Nom onhan region on the M anchurian-M ongolian border in 1939. Such m ilitary officers holding unit-leader or section-chief level posts wielded considerable sway regarding matters over w hich they had jurisdiction. However, they were never called to account for distorting the nation's policies in a system dom inated by general staff officers who hated being exam ined by third parties. Lawmaker Takao Saito reportedly warned in the early years o f the Taisho Era (1912-26)—ahead o f a political wrangle over interference in the power o f the supreme com m and—that abuse of the M eiji Constitution could lead to an autocratic governm ent. But this issue was never exam ined under the C on stitu tion , w hich was seen as untouchable. After the M anchurian Incident, fighting broke out sporadically. During this period, the m ilitary organs and personnel swelled and became increas­ in gly bureaucratic. The Arm y regarded the Soviet U nion as a potential adversary, whereas the Navy was more concerned about the United States. They vied over budgets. Unfortunately for the nation, both forces had extrem ely outdated m ilitary capabilities. Education at the Army's General Staff College and Naval General Staff College was dom inated by memories o f victory in the Russo-Japanese W ar. Rather than strategy, im portance was attached solely to m ilitary tactics, such as hand-to-hand com bat by infantry, surrounding enem y targets by sm all units o f soldiers and decisive surface battles by fleets o f big ships w ith powerful guns—all factors in the 1904-1905 victory. The m ilitary believed its authority w ould be preserved by follow ing a precedent as a golden rule. They were unw illing to acknowledge that reality on the battlefield did

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not m atch their expectations. They were confused by the Chinese m ili­ tary's tactics o f retreat, and they suffered crushing defeats by mechanized Soviet forces and aircraft carrier naval task forces of the United States in battles in the Pacific. Navy M inister Gonbei Yam am oto in the M eiji Era (1868-1912) had ousted senior m inistry officials w ho were unable to adapt themselves to m odem warfare and replaced the Com m ander-in-Chief o f the Com bined Fleet before the outbreak o f the Russo-Japanese W ar. After Japan's surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, the U .S. m ilitary dismissed the Com m ander o f the Pacific Fleet and picked Adm iral Chester W . N im itz to replace him . The U .S. forces also im plem ented a shift in strategy to use aircraft and aircraft carriers. W hat about the Japanese m ilitary in the Showa Era? The N avy, w hich was unable to let go o f the traditional doctrine o f having decisive battles fought by surface fleets, failed to work out a long-term strategy and had its aircraft carriers destroyed as it expanded its battle fronts too quickly. Neither C h ief o f N avy General Staff Osam i Nagano nor N avy M inister Shigetaro Shim ada exercised leadership. Even after the devastating defeat in the B attle o f M idw ay, no top o ffic ia l, in clu d in g C om bined Fleet Com m ander-in-Chief Isoroku Yam am oto, C h ie f o f N avy General Staff M atom e U gaki or Com m ander o f the First N aval A ir Fleet C h u ich i Nagum o, was summoned to take responsibility. Even as the hopes for vic­ tory faded, elite officers such as Shigeru Fukutome, Ryunosuke Kusaka and Sadatoshi Tom ioka m aintained the confidence o f their superiors and were promoted to higher ranks. Sidestepping responsibility for actions and decisions, uncoordinated strategies, rhetorical state policy guidelines and sectionalist disputes over scarce resources between the Army and the Navy were typical bureaucrat­ ic characteristics. These gaping deficiencies were uncovered during the war, the very tim e o f em ergency. Before his execution after being sen­ tenced to death by the Tokyo Tribunal, Hideki Tojo said: "The system of supreme com m and up to that tim e was flawed. Under that system, Army and Navy forces could never integrate their actions."3 Kenryo Sato, a close ally o f Tojo since his tim e at the Army's General Staff College, who later rose to chief o f the War M inistry's M ilitary Affairs Section as w ell as the M ilitary A ffairs Bureau w hen T ojo was Prime M inister, described the period in w hich he saw a series of wars—w hich we now call the Showa War—as a tim e o f "revolution." He concluded that m ilitary-led p olitics, under w hich policym aking and decision-m aking processes were dom inated by elite m ilitary officers, was the root cause of the nation's failure in the war.

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Imperial Diet: Diet rubber-stamps m ilitary operations During the Showa War period, the Im perial Diet was transformed into an organization that sim ply gave approval to war. As representatives o f the people, the job o f politicians who were members of the D iet was to control the bureaucrats and prevent the m ilitary from acting recklessly. However, they closed their eyes to these heavy responsibilities. Some lawmakers did attem pt to keep a leash on the m ilitary. Examples included speeches by Takao Saito on his antim ilitary ideology and his call for enforcem ent o f discipline on the m ilitary, as well as criticism o f the m ilitary by Kunim atsu H am ada. Lawmakers belonging to the Yokusan Seiji-kai (Imperial Rule Assistance Association Political Society) adopted a resolution against the Cabinet of Prime M inister Hideki Tojo, leading to the fall o f the Cabinet. However, the Im perial Diet made a number o f mistakes, in part because lawmakers feared becom ing targets o f terrorist attacks. The Diet failed to rein in the rampant behavior o f the m ilitary w hile lawmakers were caught up in a political tug o f war. It also mbber-stamped war budgets w ithout criticism and forewent elections that would have been chances to gauge public opinion during wartim e. After the Sino-Japanese War started in 1937, the Im perial D iet scarcely deliberated w ar-related budgets and approved the governm ent's budget proposals one after another. G ivin g up the right to deliberations practically became the norm during the Pacific War period. In M ay 1938, the N ational M obilization Law was established to give the governm ent absolute power to control the public. Initially, lawmakers had opposed passing the b ill into law, but they fin ally caved in to pressure from the m ilitary and allowed the law's enactm ent. Earlier, in 1930, politi­ cians such as Tsuyoshi Inukai and Ichiro Hatoyam a, both from the oppo­ sition Seiyukai party, together w ith senior officers of the Naval General Staff, berated the Cabinet o f Prime M inister Osachi Ham aguchi over its decision to conclude the London Naval Treaty. They said the arms control decision interfered w ith the Emperor's supreme com m and authority to control the m ilitary. But this criticism o f the H am aguchi governm ent based on political rivalries led to an expansion of the scope o f the supreme com m and. In the 1935 row, House o f Peers (upper house o f the Im perial Diet) mem ber Takeo K ikuchi and others spoke against the theory that the Emperor was an organ o f the state. Helped by the m ilitary, Kikuchi criti­ cized Tatsukichi M inobe, a scholar and advocate o f the theory, an attack that successfully elim inated the influence o f the theory as a lese-majeste attem pt. Around this period, and com pounded by the M ay 15, 1932 and

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the February 26, 1936, Incidents, the clim ate in w hich society was afraid to criticize the m ilitary and the governm ent gradually took hold. In the February 26 Incident, Finance M inister Korekiyo Takahashi, who had resisted requests from the m ilitary for bigger budgets, was assassinated. The Finance M inistry's history reads, "The principle o f gradually decreasing the issuance of government bonds that had been staunchly protected by Finance M inister Takahashi was abandoned at this poin t."4 In fiscal 1936, the m ilitary budget was 1.07 b illion yen. But in fiscal 1937 when the Sino-Japanese War started, the budget tripled to 3.27 b il­ lion yen. The figure alm ost doubled each year after that to 6.47 b illion yen in fiscal 1939, 12.5 billion yen in fiscal 1941 and 29.82 b illion yen in fis­ cal 1943. The figure reached 73.49 billion yen in fiscal 1944. The Imperial Diet blindly approved these budgets.5 In the early years o f the Show a Era—the late 1920s and 1930s— election-related corruption, including bribes and buying voters, was rou­ tine. These acts am plified voters' distrust in political parties and created room for the governm ent to interfere in elections. In M ay 1935, the gov­ ernm ent issued an ordinance ostensibly to establish governm ent com m it­ tees to prom ote clean election s. H ow ever, the governm ent used the committees to increasingly interfere in elections. In February 1936, the 19th House o f Representatives election was held, followed in April 1937 by the 20th general election. In the former, Kanju Kato won a seat w ith the most votes throughout the country after appealing to voters w ith his anti­ fascist platform . However, after the outbreak o f the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, no elections were held for some tim e and political parties were dis­ banded amid the New Order M ovem ent, a political m ovem ent to seek a fascist governm ent, and the ideal of seeking one-party control o f the nation. After Ju ly 1940 a number of political parties, including Shakai Taishuto, Seiyukai and Minseito, were dissolved, m arking the end of party politics in reality and in nam e. As the end o f the term for lower house m em bers, A pril 1941, was approaching, the Cabinet o f Prime M inister Fumimaro Konoe submitted a b ill to the ordinary Im perial Diet session convened in December 1940 to extend the terms of lower house of the Diet and local assembly members by one year. The b ill was passed into law. Konoe's m otive for the extension reportedly came from his concern that public frustration am id the SinoJapanese W ar would be unleashed in elections. Lawmakers passed the b ill, effectively com prom ising the election process. P r i m e M inister T ojo, w ho took over from Konoe in October 1941, decided to hold a general election as lower house lawmakers' term was to expire in April 1942 to ride the public confidence in his governm ent borne by victories in the early stages o f the Pacific W ar. Tojo's Cabinet intro­

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duced an infam ous system under w hich only government-recomm ended candidates were allowed to run in a governm ent-led general election. The election under the system was held on April 30 o f the same year. O f 464 seats up for election, 381 were won by candidates recommended by the governm ent. Some w ell-intentioned Diet members critical of such an elec­ tion system resisted, but the Im perial Diet was unable to control and stop the Showa W ar.

The media's role: Japan's media help fan support for war As it was for the Japanese governm ent and m ilitary, the M anchurian Incident o f September 1931 was also a m ajor turning point for the media. After the incident, each newspaper sent m any correspondents to Chin a and reported each action by the m ilitary in detail. The reports inflam ed the Japanese people, w ho subsequently becam e increasingly haw kish. Public opinion that M anchuria and Inner M ongolia should be protected by all means because they were the Empire o f Japan's lifelin e became entrenched thanks to m edia coverage. Each newspaper follow ed developments such as the concept o f estab­ lishin g M anchukuo as an independent nation , the Lytton Report pro­ duced by a League o f N ations com m ission to resolve the M anchurian Incident and Japan's withdrawal from the League o f N ations. Reports on war-related matters sent newspaper circulations soaring. For newspapers, the pursuit o f profit gradually became a higher priority than the media's m ission as organizations for press freedom . It was also true that the Kwantung Army spared no effort to utilize the newspapers to gain the pub­ lic's support for M anchukuo. However, the m ilitary leadership was not so powerful around the tim e o f the M anchurian Incident. If m edia organiza­ tions had universally chided the m ove, m ilitary operations could have been restrained. After the Sino-Japanese W ar started after the February 26 Incident, the governm ent quickly tightened its m edia controls. After the M arco Polo Bridge Incident, the Konoe Cabinet, w hich by then had decided to dis­ patch troops to northern C h in a , sum m oned representatives o f m edia organizations and asked them to cooperate for the sake o f national un ity. Thus, the governm ent focused on a strategy to publicize its propaganda, and newspapers in principle went along w ith the plan. Each newspaper devoted most pages to coverage gushing w ith praise for events such as the conclusion o f the Tripartite A llian ce and the m ilitary's advance into southern French Indochina w hich led to the Jap an -U .S. W ar. Despite resistance from some journalists, newspapers fanned pro-war sentim ent

W hat we should learn from the Showa W ar / 277

and influenced the people to accept Jap an 's foolhardy war against the U nited States and Britain. A t the tim e, Soho Tokutom i, a leading journalist and chairm an o f the Dainippon Genron Hokoku-kai, an organization form ed to gag press free­ dom , "supported control o f the m edia and supported the governm ent's conduct o f the w ar."6 A m ajor rally ca llin g for the an n ih ila tio n o f the U n ited States and Britain, jo in tly sponsored by various newspaper organizations, was held two days after the attack on Pearl Harbor. "The Greater East Asia W ar is a just w ar," Tokutom i said during a lecture at the gathering.7 W hen the war against the U nited States started, the C abinet Inform a­ tion Bureau notified the m edia that reports other than announcem ents by the Im perial Headquarters were prohibited from being published. Even if they had m isgivings about the o fficial announcem ents, newspaper firm s had to be prepared to be closed dow n if they w anted to carry independent reports. T hey steadily reported the Im perial H eadquarters' an n ou n ce­ m ents w ith sensational headlines to w hip up war sentim ent although they knew m ost o f the stories were n ot true. As such, they totally abandoned and betrayed their m ission as free speech and press organizations.

Hum an rights dism issed: Disregard for life leads to huge damage; tragedy a t home, abroad D uring the Show a W ar, in dividual lives and hum an rights were given scant regard in Jap an , and this was particularly so am ong m ilitary per­ sonnel. This apparently led to battlefield tragedies characterized by the never-surrender com bat tactic know n as "gyokusai" for dying an honor­ able death and the "tokko" suicide attacks. The n ation's disregard for lives and hum an rights during w artim e in the Show a Era took h old as a tradi­ tion al tactic o f hand-to-hand fig h tin g w ith swords and bayonets. In the Battle o f G u ad alcan al, w h ich con tin u ed for six m onths from A ugust 1942, the Im perial Japanese Arm y repeatedly used the tactic against over­ w helm ing U .S . firepower and m anpow er. As a result, Jap an suffered a m assive defeat. The use o f hand-to-hand com bat style was origin ally ou t­ lined in the Hohei-Soten (Infantry M anual) introduced in 1940 that stipu­ lated w hat a ctio n s soldiers sh ou ld take. Focu sing on h an d -to -h an d com bat, the m anual stated, "The hallm ark o f in fantry troops is to wage battle and an n ihilate enem ies regardless o f the terrain and tim e factors."8 The second factor th at led the n ation to disregard lives and hum an rights was a m indset that placed priority on m ental toughness, a trait peculiar to the Im perial Japanese Arm y. U nlike the m anual for ordinary soldiers, the Tosui Koryo (Principles o f H igh Com m and) or instruction

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guidelines and com m and codes for officers and chiefs o f staff, w hich was revised in 1928, pointed out that "w inning or losing largely depends on psychological factors—this has not changed since ancient tim es."9 This idea o f m ind over matter apparently led General Staff officers to misread their enemies' situation and dow nplay inform ation about the enemies. "Gyokusai," w hich referred to a patriotic act o f fighting to the death right down to the last m an, in essence m eant the self-annihilation of entire m ilitary units. The "gyokusai" tactic was used from the tim e o f the battle on the island o f Attu at the western end o f the Aleutian Islands in M ay 1943 forward but resulted only in needless piles o f bodies. "Tokko" attacks in w hich aircraft or m anned torpedoes were crashed into enem y warships were regarded as "system atic suicides/' and the mis­ sions were carried out on the assum ption that the soldiers w ould die. W eapons used for such suicide missions—such as Oka (Cherry Blossom) m anned glider bombs and Kaiten (Divine Fate) hum an torpedoes, both of w hich were developed and used by Jap an 's m ilitary during the war, embodied the m ilitary's inhum ane treatm ent o f soldiers. Oppression o f hum an rights also intensified dom estically. Backed by fears o f terrorism and coups that grew am ong the public after the February 26 Incident in 1936, politics buttressed by the M ilitary Police dom inated the nation. People who criticized the war or did not actively cooperate w ith the governm ent and m ilitary were quickly suppressed by the M ilitary Police. In addition to politicians, liberal theorists, social critics and schol­ ars were targeted. Writers were not allowed to publish their works unless they demonstrated that they believed the war w ould be won and that they were w illing to cooperate w ith the government and m ilitary. The national m obilization system introduced by the Cabinet o f Prime M in ister K onoe in 1938 was rein forced by the C ab in et o f K iich iro Hiranum a in 1939 as a national m ovem ent in w hich the public was com ­ pelled to work w ith the governm ent and m ilitary as a w hole to ensure vic­ tory in the war. W hen it was decided that the nation should eventually fight on the m ainland in the fin al m onths o f the war, "Kokumin Giyutai" (N ational Volunteer Corps) were organized at com m unities and work­ places to get ready for the battle against the U .S. forces. Pamphlets were produced to encourage people to use bam boo spears, hatchets and kitchen knives as weapons. The pam phlets ch illingly urged the people, "Each per­ son should kill one enemy com batant." N o te s_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 1R y o ich i To be, N ih o n Rikugun to Chugoku (Japanese A rm y a n d C h in a ), T okyo: K odansha, 1999, p p . 175-177

W h a t we sh ou ld learn from the Show a W ar / 279

2 The M ilitary History Department o f the National Institute for Defense Studies o f the Defense A gency, e d ., D aihonei Rikugun-bu (The Arm y Departm ent o f the Im perial Headquarters War), vol. 5, in Senshi Sosho (A Series o f W ar Histories), Tokyo: Asagumo Shim bunsha, 1973, pp. 350-351 3 Sugamo Isho Hensan-kai (Sugamo Prison Editing Com m ittee o f the Prisoners' W ills), ed, Seiki no Isho (Testaments o f the Century), Tokyo: Kodansha, 1984, p. 685 4 Okurasho Zaisei Kinyu Kenkyujo (Finance M inistry Finance Research Institute), ed., Okurasho-shi (History o f the Finance M inistry), Tokyo: Okura Zaimu Kyokai, 1998, p. 101 5Ibid., p. 391 6Ken Yonehara, Tokutomi Soho: Nihon Nashonarizumu no Kiseki (Soho Tokutomi: History o f Japanese Nationalism ), Tokyo: Chuko Shinsho, 2003, p. 221 7Ibid., p. 226 8 The M inistry o f W ar, ed ., Hohei Soten (Infantry M anual), 1940; rpt. Tokyo: Ikeda Shoten, 1970, p. 6 9 Takeo O hashi, ed ., Tosui Koryo (Principles o f H igh Com m and), 1962; rpt. Tokyo: Kenpakusha, 1972, p. 356

AFTERWORD

I

t was in the summer o f 2005—the 60th anniversary o f the end o f W orld W ar II—that the Yom iuri Shim bun established an in-house investiga­ tive panel, the W ar Responsibility Reexam ination Com m ittee. W h at h app en ed in th e w orld in th e year 2005? In Ja n u a ry , U .S . President George W . Bush began his second term at the helm o f the W hite House. In Ju ly , an international terrorist group staged concerted bom bing attacks on the London mass transit system w hile leaders o f the Group o f Eight were h old in g an annual sum m it in G leneagles, Scotland. In that year, both the U nited States and Britain were forced to continue figh tin g a fierce war on terrorism w hile there was no end in sight yet to the Iraq W ar, w hich stem m ed from the 9/11 attacks on the U n ited States. In A sia, C hin a—where the population surpassed 1.3 b illio n people and its second m anned space flig h t was su ccessfu lly lau n ch ed —kept con sp icu ou sly strengthening its econom ic m uscle. In April o f the year, dem onstrations took place in the Chinese capital o f Beijing to denounce Jap an 's bid to gain a perm anent seat on the U n ited N ation s Security C o u n cil. A n tiJapanese cam paigns spread to other parts o f C h in a , in clu din g Shanghai. In the same year, Jap an , for its part, took measures to patently enhance its alliance w ith the U nited States. The m ost typical o f them was the exten­ sion o f the presence o f Self-Defense Forces troops in Iraq—the first batch was dispatched in 2004—on hum anitarian and reconstruction m issions. O n the other hand, Japan's relations w ith its neighbor countries became strained in 2005. The m on th after leading the Liberal Dem ocratic Party to a landslide victory in the House o f Representatives election on September 11, Prime M inister Ju n ich iro K oizum i paid hom age at Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo for the fifth tim e since he was inaugurated as Prime M inister in 2001. H is October visit to Yasukuni, where Japan's war dead are enshrined, worsened Jap an -C h in a relations to the extent that no bilateral sum m its were h eld. O n August 15, 2006, the anniversary o f the war's end, Prime M inister K oizum i—w ho was set to step dow n one and a h a lf m onths later—visited the shrine again. O bviously, his repeated visits to the shrine caused harm to Japan's diplom acy toward Asia as they triggered serious 281

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diplom atic friction w ith C h in a and South Korea.

Yasukuni Shrine and Class-A war crim inals W hy did the Prime M inister's visits to Yasukuni Shrine becom e such a thorny issue? It is because such visits have a lo t to do w ith the issue of Japan's perception o f its ow n past. The Yasukuni issue dates back to 1978 w hen Y asu k u n i Sh rin e en sh rin ed fo u rteen o f th e so -called C lass-A Japanese war crim inals. Seven were executed by hanging in 1948 follow ­ in g death sentence handed down by the International M ilitary Tribunal for the Far East, know n in short as the Tokyo Tribunal. Five others died in prison and two passed away w hile the trial was in session. To begin w ith, it should be pointed out that Yasukuni Shrine is not a cem etery. In Jap an , each fam ily places the rem ains o f its deceased members in a grave or at a tem ple. Yasukuni Shrine is a facility w hich enshrines and offer rituals to the "souls" o f servicem en and civilians in the m ilitary service w ho have died in Japan's wars dating back to the M eiji Era (1868-1912)— w hen the country began m odernizing. W ith the "souls" o f 2.46 m illion enshrined to date, Yasukuni exists as the sole facility to enshrine war dead from every part o f the country. About five m illion people go to the shrine annually for traditional New Year visits or seasonal rituals. The shrine's m anagem ent added the Class-A war crim inals to the list o f the "souls" enshrined there. C h in a and South Korea reacted bitterly to Japanese leaders' visits to Yasukuni Shrine—since the Class-A war crim inals were enshrined—saying the visits hurt the hearts o f peoples in Asia terribly dam aged by Jap an . Since 1972 w hen Jap an and C h in a norm alized their diplom atic relations, the Chinese leadership, in particular, had been tellin g the Chinese people that "a handful o f m ilitarists were to blam e for Japan's invasion o f C h in a" and that "th e ordinary people o f Jap an , too, were victim ized." Therefore, Japanese prim e m inisters' visits to the shrine embarrassed the Chinese leadership as the grounds for its explanation to the Chinese people were lost. M eantim e, the Chinese side had been repeatedly m aking p olitical capital o f Japan's perception o f history to underm ine Jap an . The Chinese leadership had also intensified anti-Japanese education as a way o f turning the Chinese people's eyes away from dom estic woes. Prim e M in ister K oizum i's visits d atin g back to 2001 rekindled the Yasukuni issue, n ot on ly provoking bitter criticism s from C h in a and South Korea bu t also d ivid in g the Japanese p u b lic. For in stan ce, a Yom iuri Shim bun op in ion p o ll conducted in October 2005 found that 51 percent of the respondents were in favor o f the Prime M inister's visits to the shrine w hile 43 percent opposed. Prime M inister Koizum i said, "I d o n 't go to

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Yasukuni Shrine to pray for the Class-A war crim inals. I visit there to pay my respects to so m any people who died for the n ation." He m eant that he has no intention to protect either the Shinto religion or the Class-A-war crim inals. Therefore, he insisted that "foreign countries should not inter­ fere in m y efforts—w hich are true to m y creed—to express m y condo­ lences to the victim s." Some o f those who have supported Prime M inister Koizum i's visits to Yasukuni Shrine have com m ented as follow s: "It is a matter o f course for the governm ent's leader to mourn the war dead;" "Japan has com pensat­ ed Asian countries for war damage and has apologized enough for the problems o f the past;" and "I cannot tolerate the use o f the issue by China and South Koreas as a diplom atic card." Some opinions against Yasukuni visits by the Prime M inister have stated: "The pain of war is still vivid in the victim s' mem ories;" "Considering opposition from neighboring coun­ tries, the Prime M inister should refrain from visiting Yasukuni Shrine"; and "As the Japanese governm ent accepted the verdicts o f the Tokyo Tribunal, governm ent leaders should not pay homage at the place where Class-A war crim inals are also enshrined." The intensification o f debate over the pros and cons of the Yasukuni issue has encouraged com m entators and scholars who argue that "the Tokyo Tribunal must be criticized;" "D o away w ith the self-derogating view of history"; and "Class-A war crim inals are not 'crim inals.'" Opinions critical or hateful o f C hin a have also gathered strength. Am idst this right­ leaning tendency, some people, including politicians, advocated hard-line diplom acy toward C h in a. These stiffened feelings reflect anxiety about China's econom ic developm ent and its m ilitary build-up dating back to the 1990s as well as concerns about the possibility of Asia's new regional order being forged under the leadership of C hin a. Furthermore, national­ istic sentim ent favoring a dauntless stance toward China and North Korea have added fuel to the toughening o f the country's posture. The worsen­ ing political friction w ith C h in a, in contrast to the deepening bilateral econom ic relations, has worried the Japanese business com m unity. Even though argum ents w ith in Jap an over C h in a have in ten sified , it has become increasingly difficult for Japan to build national consensus on the particularly im portant matters o f what to do w ith Yasukuni Shrine and how to break the impasse over the relations w ith its neighbors.

The Japanese public is divided about Yasukuni Shrine W hat is the cause for the division o f the Japanese public? The above m entioned opinion poll provides a possible answer. According to the findings o f the survey, people's war experiences and memories had faded

284

considerably 60 years after the war's end—60 percent o f Japanese voters say they know n othin g about any detail o f the Tokyo Tribunal in w hich Japan's p olitical and m ilitary leaders were tried. The Yasukuni issue has m uch to do w ith the Japanese people's view o f the past wars o f Jap an . N onetheless, the opinion poll's findings clearly showed that m any peo­ ple have only vague know ledge o f the wars whereas sufficient knowledge should be a prerequisite to thinkin g about the Yasukuni issue. The scarcity of knowledge and awareness of the past wars can be attrib­ uted to postwar history education at schools, w hich, generally speaking, has been indifferent to modern history. But it can be pointed out at the same tim e that Japanese people both in the public and private sectors think the issue o f war responsibility was dealt w ith by the Tokyo Tribunal, and have neglected to squarely exam ine the whole picture o f the past wars and determine where responsibility lies. Im m ediately after Japan's surrender, there were some m oves, o f course, in the N ational Diet and by the governm ent to pursue war responsibility or exam ine the wars' causes. In the D iet, for exam ple, Takao Saito—who had been known before the Pacific War as an anti-m ilitary, party politics advocate—questioned Prime M inister Kijuro Shidehara on November 29, 1945. A diplom at advocating cooperative relationships w ith Britain and the United States and no-interference policy toward C h in a, Shidehara had been in obscurity since 1931 when he resigned as Foreign M inister. Saito said em phatically, "There can be no possible objection at all to declare now that General [Hideki] Tojo and Prince [Fumimaro] Konoe are the two persons w ho must bear primary responsibility for the war." Saito questioned the governm ent's view on war responsibility, saying, "It is inappropriate for the governm ent to not say whether or not certain politicians are to blam e for the w ar." Prime M inister Shidehara responded, "It is not desirable to pursue war responsibility by a means that m ay devel­ op into an affair o f bloodshed am ong our people." At the tim e, Shidehara unveiled his intention of setting up an investigative panel, the Greater East Asia War Exam ination Com m ission, w ithin his Cabinet to look into "the reasons for the defeat in the Greater East Asia War and the real state o f affairs." However, his statement before the Diet indicated that the pro­ posed com m ission was not aimed at identifying those w ho should shoul­ der war responsibility. The com m ission was launched but disbanded shortly after because o f the opening o f the Tokyo Tribunal and pressure from the General Headquarters o f the Allied Powers' Occupation forces. After the Tokyo Tribunal convened, the Japanese government and the Diet did not involve themselves anymore in the task o f exam ining who should be held responsible for the war. In those days, the Japanese people were doing their utmost to rise from the ashes and rehabilitate their country.

Afterw ord / 285

The ensuing rapid econom ic recovery enabled them to overcom e m any war-caused hardships. Eventually, Jap an avoided a self-exam ination o f responsibility o f the war's leaders—w hich m ight turn out to be "an affair o f bloodshed"—by either putting the tragic past aside or forgetting it. Asked in a Yom iuri Shim bun opin ion p o ll o f O ctober 2005 w hether they thought that the issue o f war responsibility o f past p olitical and m il­ itary leaders had been discussed in Jap an , 58 percent o f the respondents replied, "I th in k so." G iven the fact that this answer was in response to one o f the survey's questions, the result can be interpreted to m ean th at few people have actually thought o f the war responsibility issue.

Why the Yomiuri panel reexamined the Showa War The on ly case in w hich Japan's war leaders stood trial was the Tokyo Tribunal. Even today, Japan continues seeing pros and cons as regards the m ilitary trib u n a l. There is deeply established criticism o f th e Tokyo Tribunal as a trial by the victors w ho applied ex post facto rules such as "crim e against peace" and "crim e against hum an rights" and whose selec­ tion o f defendants lacked transparency. However, the Japanese govern­ m ent accepted the Tokyo Tribunal's verdicts in 1951 w hen it signed the Treaty o f Peace w ith Ja p a n , better know n as the San Francisco Peace Treaty, w hich restored Jap an to fu ll sovereignty. This is an unsw erving international pledge, and com m ents that deny this can cause a m isunder­ standing on the part o f the international com m unity. The Yom iuri Shim bun W ar Responsibility Reexam ination Com m ittee's m ission to exam ine the past wars as a w hole was n ot m eant to review the Tokyo Tribunal. Likewise, its efforts had n oth in g to do w ith the Chinese and South Korean criticism s o f Jap an 's view o f the past. W hat the com ­ m ittee had in m ind was to m ake a thorough review o f the past wars by Japanese them selves in order to self-identify war responsibility. W e on the com m ittee decided to provide till the details o f the process and o f the fin d ­ ings o f each stage o f an elaborate exam ination conducted b y Japanese cit­ izens in order to iden tify those w ho were responsible for the war and to judge the gravity o f responsibility o f each o f those iden tified. As such, we believed that the inform ation to be released by the com m ittee w ould serve as an appropriate set o f m aterials for our Japanese readers to refer to w hen they thought o f the war history. W e also looked forward to seeing a series o f reports to be com piled b y the com m ittee to give m om entum for build­ in g a n ation al consensus about w hat the past wars were all about. W e thought that national consensus to be attained this way w ill help Jap an as a m atter o f course to fin d a clear solution to the issue o f visits by prim e m inisters to Yasukuni Shrine and to its diplom atic approaches to Asia.

286

Five specific items on the Yomiuri committee's agenda The Yom iuri Shim bun W ar Responsibility Reexam ination Com m ittee thus embarked on its far-reaching, self-assigned task to find answers to a number o f questions such as: • W hy did Japan go to war? • W hy was it im possible to halt the war even after the tide o f the war turned against Japan? • W hy did the Japanese leadership fail to m ove quickly enough to end the war and avert the atom ic bom bings o f Hiroshim a and Nagasaki and the Soviet U nion's entry into the war? The com m ittee specifically chose the follow ing five themes to pursue: • W h y d id Ja p a n exten d th e lin e s o f b a ttle fo llo w in g th e 1931 M anchurian Incident, plunging the country into the quagmire o f the Sino-Japanese War? • W hy did Japan go to war w ith the United States in spite o f extremely slim prospects for victory? • W hat prom pted the Japanese m ilitary to em ploy "gyokusai" and "tokko" suicide attacks? • Was it possible to prevent the U .S. atom ic bom bings and the lastm inute Soviet entry into the war? • W hat were the problems w ith the Tokyo Tribunal? The com m ittee cited these them es in the b e g in n in g o f th e W ar Responsibility series o f investigative articles that originally appeared in the Yomiuri Shimbun and the D aily Yomiuri in August 2005, heralding the start o f its exam ination efforts. The articles began w ith a com prehensive overview spanning from the 1931 M anchurian Incident to Japan's surren­ der in 1945, focusing on problems unique to each stage such as the Army General Staff, the quest o f stable supplies o f energy resources and terror­ ism . In the second phase o f the exam ination, the fin d in gs o f w hich appeared in the Yomiuri Shimbun beginning in M arch 2006, the com m ittee, in pursuit o f its five-them e agenda, delved into what wartime political and m ilitary leaders did and said at each crucial turning point. The years subject to exam ination were divided into four phases—the Sino-Japanese W ar, the entry into the war w ith the U nited States, the Pacific W ar and the war's end. W ho were involved in decision-m aking processes and who were instrum ental in m aking political or strategic deci­ sions at each stage? Were there other options? The com m ittee proceeded

Afterword / 287

w ith its exam ination by com bing through as m uch relevant bibliography and historical literature as possible. Its findings in the second phase of exam ination were released in the Yomiuri Shimbun between M arch and Ju ly 2006. Based on the fin d in gs o f the yearlon g exam in atio n , the W ar Responsibility Reexam ination Com m ittee released a fin al report h igh ­ lighting the past wars as a whole in the m orning editions o f the Yomiuri Shimbun and in the D aily Yomiuri on August 13 and 15, 2006. The most noteworthy point o f the final report was that it specifically referred to the names o f individuals w ho the com m ittee believed had war responsibility. The August 13 part of the final report nam ed those who should be held "m ainly responsible" for eight key developm ents, in clu din g the SinoJapanese W ar. O n August 15, the final report named Prime M inister Hideki Tojo as the leader who was the most responsible. It also listed the names o f politicians and m ilitary leaders as well as high-ranking m ilitary bureau­ crats and staff officers o f the Arm y and Navy—w ho supported those lead­ ers in the m ilitary—w ho should shoulder heavy responsibility. This book comprises the series o f articles exam ining the Sino-Japanese W ar and the four key ensuing phases that appeared in the Yomiuri Shimbun between M arch and Ju ly 2006 and the final report. Near the end o f the war, the United States staged the Great Tokyo Air Raid, conducted other indiscrim inate bom bings that killed a great number o f civilians and dropped massively destructive atom ic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The Soviet U nion also declared war on Japan in the closing days o f W orld War II in violation o f the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact, occupied Japan's Northern Territories and took Japanese prisoners of wars as forced laborers to Siberia where m any of them lost their lives in deten­ tion. This book partially touches upon those matters, but the com mittee decided to go no further into them in its exam ination as it prioritized its efforts to identify the responsibility of Japan's war leaders.

The first-ever war responsibility examination by Japanese As m entioned above, this exam ination by the W ar Responsibility Reexam ination Com m ittee was carried out w ith the notion that it would be the first of its kind taken up by Japanese them selves. As part o f journal­ ism in Japan, the com m ittee took its own approach to war responsibility and its gravity depending on the individuals involved. Those political and m ilitary leaders whom the com m ittee concluded had m ain responsibility did not exactly m atch the convicted Class-A war criminals o f the Tokyo Tribunal as the com m ittee pursued responsibility o f some who were not prosecuted in the Tokyo Tribunal.

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Although it is true that the Japanese people traditionally refrain from criticizing the deceased and there were cases in w hich we could not help feeling sym pathy w ith those who chose to com m it suicide, suicide does not lead to the evasion o f war responsibility. From the perspective o f edu­ cation and history we at the com m ittee thought that political and m ilitary leaders m ust bear responsibility for the future generations. U nlike the Tokyo Tribunal, the com m ittee pursued the war responsibility of Army and N avy staff officers and high-ranking bureaucrats who were not prose­ cuted in the m ilitary court. It should be noted that those who are referred to in the book were leading members o f this particular group and that there were others w ho also bear their share of responsibility. The definition o f war responsibility varies. O ne o f its aspects is "legal responsibility" in cases o f violating domestic or international law. Leaders w ho decide to go to war and cause fatal casualties and property damage to those w ithin and outside their country ought to be subject to "political responsibility." Even if leaders are free from political responsibility, they m ay have to face "m oral responsibility." Furthermore, war responsibility can be divided into three parts—responsibility for going to war, that for failing to end the war and that for leading a nation to defeat. It can be said that the Tokyo Tribunal sought political accountability from a legal stan d p o in t. The Y om iu ri Shim bun W ar R espon sib ility Reexam ination Com m ittee was not in a position to try m ilitary leaders in judicial terms as the panel was an ad hoc group affiliated w ith a news media organization, not a court o f law. By way o f contrast, the Tokyo Tribunal, a trial by the victors, pursued the enem y's responsibility for launching war while responsibility for continuing and losing the war was not questioned. The com m ittee detailed all the developments that preceded the out­ break o f the Sino-Japanese W ar and the Japan-U .S. W ar. It looked into who were responsible for the introduction o f the inhum ane tactics o f "tokko" and "gyokusai” suicides. Likewise, the com m ittee gave im portance to iden­ tifying who should account for starting or prolonging wars. It particularly pursued wartime political and m ilitary leaders' accountability for the con­ sequences—the failure o f their policies that betrayed the Japanese people and cost the populace w ithin and outside Japan greater sacrifices o f life and property. In its final report (Part III), the Yom iuri com m ittee began using the term "Showa W ar." This is because the Japanese people as yet have no com m on term to refer collectively to the fourteen years o f war between the outbreak of the M anchurian Incident and the end o f W orld War II. After the war w ith the United States broke out, the Japanese governm ent called it "the Greater East Asia W ar." W hen Japan was defeated, it became known as

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"the P acific W ar" due largely to the influence o f the U nited States. There are other nam es such as " the Asia-Pacific W ar" or " the Fifteen Year W ar." As all o f these titles have shortcom ings w hen referring com prehensive­ ly and collectively to the past wars in question, som e Japanese people also have been u sin g description s such as "th a t w ar" or "th e past w ar." Therefore, the Yom iuri com m ittee decided to refer to the wars as "the Showa W ar," considering the fact that the fourteen years o f war account­ ed for nearly a quarter o f the Show a Era from l926 to 1989. As the nam e indicates, it has no geographical or historical con n otation . Needless to say, it has n othin g to do w ith Emperor Showa—the com m ittee did not take the throne in to consideration.

Lessons o f the Showa War for future generations The Showa W ar studied by the Yom iuri Shim bun W ar Responsibility Reexam ination Com m ittee offers m any lessons in terms o f learning from history. The path from the M anchurian Incident to the Sino-Japanese W ar is a typical case in w hich a n ation can be throw n in to crisis ow ing to national leaders' m isjudgm ent o f the trends prevailing in the internation­ al com m unity. In those days, revolutions were in progress in Russia and C h in a w hile a new w orld order was being established follow ing W orld W ar I under the leadership o f Britain and the U n ited States. The warrenouncing Kellogg-Briand Pact o f 1928 was signed. The follow ing year, the Great Depression began. Japan invaded C hin a w ithout foresight concerning those new develop­ m ents in the w orld. C o n tin u in g m iscalculations o f its actual n ation al strength and m isjudgm ents o f the real intention o f U .S. diplom acy, Japan entered into the quagmire o f war w ith C hin a and the U nited States. We studied a m ountainous ch ain o f m istakes com m itted b y Prime M inister Fum im aroiConoe and other leaders. W e did not overlook that staff officers— bureaucrats in the m ilitary—behaved irresponsibly and led the nation in the wrong direction. Tanzan Ishibashi, a journalist-turned politician w ho served as Prime M inister from 1956 to 1957, criticized the lack o f governance and accountability in the governm ent in Ju ly 1941 or shortly before the out­ break o f the Japan-U .S. W ar. He said, "The first prerequisite o f those w ho are involved in the m anagem ent [of either business or politics] is to assume responsibility. [But w ithin the government] nobody is reprimanded for mis­ takes w hen they are transferred to other posts." The organizational system w hich allow ed the evasion o f responsibility was particularly conspicuous in the Im perial Japanese Arm y. Elite staff officers had in their hands the Im perial supreme com m and under the now -defunct M eiji C o n stitu tio n . The Im perial supreme com m and was

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unique to Japan in that it could be exercised solely through the Army or Naval Chiefs o f General Staff. Against the background o f the Im perial supreme com m and, staff officers held dom inant sway in determ ining governm ent personnel reshuffles and budget allocations. U sing bluffing and other scare tactics, bureaucrat-staff officers in the m ilitary ignored their superiors, who acquiesced, allow ing their juniors to becom e influen­ tial enough to seriously affect national m anagem ent. As a result, Tanzan Ishibashi's warning—people in the reins o f govern­ m ent m ust be held m eticulously responsible in the event o f misrule—was not heeded. The mass m edia lost the spirit of upholding the principle of freedom o f speech w hile the Diet stopped functioning on behalf o f the cit­ izenry. For their part, the Japanese people overlooked the fact that the life, hum an rights and freedom o f their neighbors were lost just like waste paper. Yukichi Fukuzawa, one o f the greatest Enlightenm ent philosophers in m odern Jap an , said in his 17-volum e series, "Gakumon no Susum e" (Encouragem ent o f Learning), th at the people are the m aster o f the governm ent, w hich represents the people. Therefore, he wrote, "W hen the governm ent fails to attain the purpose o f the national law and inflicts damage on the people, it m ust com pensate w ithout fail" regardless o f the am ount of m oney and the lapse of tim e after the incident. However, he added the people have to keep an eye on w hat the governm ent does since they have to eventually pay the b ill for the com pensation even for a despi­ cable blunder by a governm ent official. Nevertheless, both the press and the ordinary people of Japan did not learn from Fukuzawa, who published the first volum e in the series in 1872. Fukuzawa wrote that the people should cope w ith tyrannical govern­ m ent rule by adhering to reason w ith self-sacrifice. He m eant that the peo­ ple should deal squarely w ith the governm ent by determ inedly upholding right reason to the last w ithout resorting to the use o f weapons. W hat the great philosopher depicted clearly shows the w eighty duty o f journalists through all ages. N obuo Asaumi C h ief W riter Yom iuri Shim bun War Responsibility Reexam ination Com m ittee

APPENDICES

A Im migration A ct o f 1924 and com m ents by Tosh M inohara (May 26, 1924)

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B 'Stim son Doctrine' by U .S. Secretary o f State Henry L. Stim son (January 7, 1932)

296

C 'Quarantine Speech' in Chicago by U .S. President F. D . Roosevelt (October 5, 1937)

296

D Japanese response to the U .S ., denouncing the Nine-Power Treaty (excerpt) by Japanese Foreign M inister Hachiro Arita (November 18, 1938) 300 E The Japanese-Soviet N eutrality Pact

(April 13, 1941)

300

F Executive Order N o. 8832 (Freezing Japanese and Chinese Assets in the United States) by U .S. President F. D . Roosevelt (July 26, 1941) 302 G Press release by the W hite House (Prohibition of exportation of petroleum to Japan) (August 1, 1941)

303

H U nited States Note to Japan ('H ull Note') by U .S. Secretary of State Cordell H ull (November 26, 1941)

304

I Personal telegram from U .S. President Roosevelt to the Emperor of Japan (December 6, 1941) 308 J M emorandum: from Ambassador o f Japan Kichisaburo Nom ura to the U .S. governm ent (December 7, 1941) 310 K Response from the Emperor o f Japan to the U .S. President (December 8, 1941) 291

315

292

L Address delivered by U .S. President Roosevelt to the Congress requesting a declaration o f war (December 8, 1941)

316

M Fireside chat by U .S. President Roosevelt

317

(December 9, 1941)

N Cairo Declaration (Declaration of the Three Powers—U .K ., U .S. and China regarding Japan) (November 27, 1943) 323 O Agreement regarding Japan at Yalta Conference concluded by the leaders o f U .S.S .R ., U .S. and U .K . (February 11,1945)

324

P The Potsdam Proclam ation (Defining terms for Japanese surrender agreed upon by the leaders o f U .S ., China and U .K .) Quly 26, 1945)

325

Q Statem ent by U .S. President Truman (Announcing the use of A-bomb on Hiroshima) (August 6, 1945)

326

R Mem orandum (Accusation o f using an A-bomb on Hiroshima) apprised by Japan to the U .S. (August 10, 1945)

329

S Instrum ent o f surrender signed by Japan and Allied Powers

330

(September 2,1945)

T M em orandum of conversation between M acArthur and Atcheson (October 27, 1945)

332

U Emperor Showa's m onologue

(c. April 23, 1946)

333

V Verdicts and sentences at the International M ilitary Tribunal for the Far East (excerpt) (November 12, 1948)

340

W Treaty o f Peace w ith Japan (excerpt) signed by 48 countries and Japan

371

X The Yomiuri Shimbun editorial

(September 8, 1951) (August 15, 2006)

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Appendices / 293

A PPEN D IX A

Im m igration A ct o f 1924

(Art a ct to lim it the im m igration o f aliens in to the U nited States, a n d for other purposes ) (excerpt) (May 26, 1924)

Be it enacted by the Senate and House o f Representatives o f the United States o f America in Congress assembled, That this Act m ay be cited as the "Im m igration Act o f 1924.” D EFIN ITIO N O F "IM M IG R A N T ." SEC. 3. W hen used in this Act the term "im m igrant" means an alien departing from any place outside the U nited States destined for the United States, except (1) a governm ent official, his fam ily, attendants, servants, and em ployees, (2) an alien visiting the U nited States tem porarily as a tourist or tem porarily for business or pleasure, (3) an alien in continuous transit through the United States, (4) an alien law fully adm itted to the United States w ho later goes in transit from one part o f the United States to another through foreign contigu­ ous territory, (5) a bona fide alien seaman serving as such on a vessel arriving at a port o f the U nited States and seeking to enter tem porarily the United States solely in the pursuit o f his calling as a seaman, and (6) an alien entitled to enter the U nited States solely to carry on trade under and in pursuance of the provisions o f a present existing treaty o f commerce and navigation. N O N -Q U O T A IM M IG R A N TS. SE C . 4. W hen used in this Act the term "non-quota im m igrant" means(b) An im m igrant previously law fully adm itted to the United States, who is returning from a tem porary visit abroad; (d) An im m igrant w ho continuously for at least two years im m ediately pre­ ceding the tim e o f his application for adm ission to the United States has been, and w ho seeks to enter the U nited States solely for the purpose of, carrying on the vocation o f m inister o f any religious denom ination, or professor of a col­ lege, academ y, seminary, or university; and his w ife, and his unmarried ch il­ dren under 18 years o f age, if accom panying or follow ing to join him ; or (e) An im m igrant who is a bona fide student at least 15 years o f age and who seeks to enter the United States solely for the purpose o f study at an accredit­ ed school, college, academ y, sem inary, or university, particularly designated by him and approved by the Secretary o f labor, w hich shall have agreed to report to the Secretary o f Labor the term ination o f attendance o f each im m i­ grant student, and if any such institution o f learning fails to make such reports prom ptly the approval shall be w ithdrawn. E X C L U SIO N FROM U N ITED STATES. SE C . 13. (c) N o alien in eligible to citizenship shall be adm itted to the United States unless such alien (1) is adm issible as a non-quota im m igrant under the provisions of subdivision (b), (d), or (e) o f section 4, or (2) is the w ife, or the unmarried child under 18 years o f age, o f an im m igrant adm issible

2 94

under such subdivision (d), and is accom panying or follow ing to jo in him , or (3) is not an im m igrant as defined in section 3. *Annexes to Summary o f the Course o f Negotiations between Japan and the United States concerning the Problems o f Japanese Immigration in the United States, Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy, ed. M inistry o f Foreign Affairs, Tokyo: M inistry o f Foreign Affairs, 1973.

Comments on Immigration Act of 1924 (aka: Japanese exclusion act) Tosh Minohara Associate Professor, Kobe University C o m in g at the heels o f the im m ensely successful W ashin gton N aval Conference o f 1921-22, this untim ely im m igration legislation by Congress sealed the fate o f Japanese im m igration to the United States. A lthough the actual num ber o f Japanese im m igrants w ho were adversely affected was slight, the m anner in w hich the b ill was enacted led to profound repercussions in American-Japanese relations. The Im m igration Act o f 1924 (1924 Act) itself was a com prehensive im m igration b ill that dealt w ith m uch more than the issue of Japanese im m igration. Foremost, it was an act that replaced the Quota Act o f 1921, w hich had been extended for a year as an emergency measure in 1923. The 1924 Act was a m uch awaited piece o f legislation since the Quota Act had been merely a stop-gap measure w hich failed to adequately halt the in flu x o f im m igrants from a war ravaged Europe. The h ighlight o f the 1924 Act was that it made the hitherto experim ental quota system an integral part of Am erican im m igration restriction. However, the m ost controversial aspect was that it stipulated that quotas for each nation were to be established based on the 1890 census rather than on the 1910 census. By applying the earlier date, the act heavily discrim inated against the "new im m igrants" from Eastern Europe. The reason w hy the 1924 Act is com m only know n in Japan as the "Japanese exclusion act (Hainichi-Imin-ho)" is due to the existence of Section 13c w hich sought to exclude the Japanese w ithout specifically nam ing them as a nation­ ality. As a way to avoid infringing upon the 1911 US-Japan Com m erce and N avigation Treaty, the legal jargon "alien ineligible to citizenship" was used; a term w hich was effectively utilized in the 1913 and 1920 A lien Land Laws of California to prevent Japanese ownership of agricultural property. Although the term itself hinged on a narrow interpretation o f the N aturalization Act of 1870 (amended in 1906), the courts o f California upheld the view that all "yel­ low " races did not possess the right to be naturalized and hence were an "alien ineligible to citizenship." In 1922, this was fin ally affirm ed in the landm ark Supreme Court case o f Takao Ozawa v . United States (260 U .S. 178). Ostensibly, "alien ineligible to citizenship" did not just apply to Japanese im m igrants. However, like the case in C alifornia, for all means and purposes,

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the term was merely a th in ly veiled attem pt to target the Japanese. Moreover, considering that the Chinese had been excluded in 1882, follow ed by other non-Japanese Asians in 1917, the inclusion o f this phrase in the 1924 Act was unm istakably m eant to single out the Japanese. Therefore there is justification in referring to the legislation as the "Japanese exclusion act," particularly if it is used in the context o f Japan and the Japanese. The events leading to the inclusion o f Section 13c in the b ill has a long his­ tory spanning nearly 20 years. In sum , however, it was the culm ination o f the anti-Japanese m ovem ent w hich had its roots in California. O ne of the chief proponents o f Japanese exclusion was Senator Hiram Johnson (R .-Calif.), who had been governor o f California during the heyday o f anti-Japanese legislation in that state. Through various political m aneuverings and w ith the support of fellow Senator Henry Cabot Lodge (R.-M ass.), Johnson was able to overturn the in itial reluctance o f his party and force the Japanese exclusion clause into the pending b ill. Since the House, being traditionally aloof to foreign relations, had no reservations whatsoever, the issue o f Japanese exclusion was decisively settled by the action o f the Senate. O n the other hand, fearing a needless strain on US-Japan relations, the adm inistration led by Secretary o f State Charles Evans Hughes had strenu­ ously opposed Japanese exclusion from the begin n in g. This was a pragm atic p olicy w hich favored m ain tain in g healthy diplom atic and trade relations w ith Jap an . M oreover, im m igration from Japan was already lim ited to 500 persons annually by the 1908 G entlem en's Agreem ent. By providing a quota to Jap an like other nations—an idea to w hich Jap an was am enable—im m i­ gration w ould have been further reduced to a token 146 persons a year. Yet for various reasons, such as H ughes being an arch nemesis o f Joh n son , the Senate in the end acted to disregard this sensible measure and opted instead for com plete exclusion. The consequence o f this w ould be severe. Pro-American internationalists in Japan lost their m oral credibility to convince the Japanese o f the merits of em bracing W ilsonianism . In their place, the m ilitary and rightw ing elements w ithin Japan began to strike a powerful chord w ith the public w ho became increasingly disillusioned w ith Am erica. M oreover, the elites also were affect­ ed as a strong sense of betrayal permeated am ongst the future generation of Japanese political leaders and diplom ats, prom pting them to seek a new path away from the W est; one w hich w ould establish a new world order in Asia. These Pan-Asianists w ould begin to influence Japanese p olicy during the "dark valley" of the 1930s. As can be seen all too often in history, dom estic political concerns of the tim e had outweighed the im portance o f international relations. And by using race—w hich cannot be overcom e by m odernization or industrialization—as the criterion for exclusion, the 1924 Act had unw ittingly created a powerful sense of resentment in Japan that w ould eventually lead to the collapse of the W ashington Treaty System.

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A PPE N D IX B

Note ('Stim son Doctrine') by Secretary o f State Henry L. Stim son W ashington, January 7,1932 W ith the recent m ilitary operations about Chinchow , the last rem aining adm inistrative authority o f the Governm ent o f the Chinese Republic in South M anchuria, as it existed prior to September 18th, 1931, has been destroyed. The Am erican Governm ent continues confident that the work o f the neutral com m ission recently authorized by the C oun cil o f the League o f Nations w ill facilitate an ultim ate solution of the difficulties sow existing between China and Jap an . But in view of the present situation and o f its own rights and oblig­ ations therein, the Am erican Governm ent deems it to be its duty to notify both the Im perial Japanese Governm ent and the Governm ent o f the Chinese Republic that it cannot adm it the legality o f any situation de facto nor does it in tend to recognize any treaty or agreem ent entered in to betw een those Governm ents, or agents thereof, w hich m ay im pair the treaty rights o f the United States or its citizens in C hin a, including those w hich relate to the sov­ ereignty, the independence, or the territorial and adm inistrative integrity of the Republic o f C hin a, or to the international policy relative to C h in a, com ­ m only know n as the open door policy; and that it does not intend to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement w hich m ay be brought about by means con­ trary to the covenants and obligations o f the Pact o f Paris o f August 27, 1928, to w hich Treaty both C h in a and Japan, as well as the United States, are parties.

A PP E N D IX C

4Q uarantine Speech' in Chicago by U .S. President Franklin D . Roosevelt October 5, 1937 I am glad to come once again to Chicago and especially to have the oppor­ tunity o f taking part in the dedication o f this im portant project o f civic bet­ term ent. O n m y trip across the continent and back I have been shown m any evi­ dences o f the result o f com m on sense cooperation between m unicipalities and the Federal Governm ent, and I have been greeted by tens o f thousands of Am ericans who have told me in every look and word that their m aterial and spiritual w ell-being has made great strides forward in the past few years. And yet, as I have seen w ith m y own eyes, the prosperous farm s, the thriv­ in g factories and the busy railroads, as I have seen the happiness and security

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and peace w hich covers our wide land, alm ost inevitably I have been com ­ pelled to contrast our peace w ith very different scenes being enacted in other parts o f the world. It is because the people of the U nited States under modern conditions m ust, for the sake o f their own future, give thought to the rest of the world, that I, as the responsible executive head o f the N ation, have chosen this great inland city and this gala occasion to speak to you on a subject of definite national im portance. The political situation in the world, w hich o f late has been growing pro­ gressively worse, is such as to cause grave concern and anxiety to all the peo­ ples and nations who wish to live in peace and am ity w ith their neighbors. Some fifteen years ago the hopes o f m ankind for a continuing era of inter­ national peace were raised to great heights w hen more than sixty nations solem nly pledged them selves not to resort to arms in furtherance o f their national aim s and policies. The h igh aspirations expressed in the BriandKellogg Peace Pact and the hopes for peace thus raised have o f late given way to a haunting fear o f calam ity. The present reign o f terror and international lawlessness began a few years ago. It began through unjustified interference in the internal affairs o f other nations or the invasion o f alien territory in violation o f treaties; and has now reached a stage Where the very foundations of civilization are seriously threat­ ened. The landmarks and traditions w hich have marked the progress o f civi­ lization toward a condition o f law, order and justice are being wiped away. W ithout a declaration o f war and w ithout w arning or justification o f any kind, civilians, including vast numbers o f women and children, are being ruth­ lessly murdered w ith bom bs from the air. In tim es o f so-called peace, ships are being attacked and sunk by submarines w ithout cause or notice. N ations are fom enting and taking sides in civil warfare in nations that have never done them any harm . Nations claim ing freedom for them selves deny it to others. Innocent peoples, innocent nations, are being cruelly sacrificed to a greed for power and supremacy w hich is devoid o f all sense o f justice and hum ane considerations. To paraphrase a recent author "perhaps we foresee a tim e w hen m en, exul­ tant in the technique o f hom icide, w ill rage so h otly over the world that every precious thing w ill be in danger, every book and picture and harm ony, every treasure garnered through tw o m illen n iu m s, the sm all, the delicate, the defenseless-all w ill be lost or wrecked or utterly destroyed." If those things come to pass in other parts o f the w orld, let no one im agine that America w ill escape, that America m ay expect m ercy, that this W estern Hem isphere w ill not be attacked and that it w ill continue tran qu illy and peacefully to carry on the ethics and the arts o f civilization. If those days come "there w ill be no safety by arms, no help from authori­ ty, no answer in science. The storm w ill rage till every flower o f culture is tram­ pled and all hum an beings are leveled in a vast chaos."

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If those days are not to com e to pass—if we are to have a world in w hich we can breathe freely and live in am ity w ithout fear—the peace-loving nations m ust make a concerted effort to uphold laws and principles on w hich alone peace caq rest secure. The peace-loving nations m ust make a concerted effort in opposition to those violations o f treaties and those ignorings o f hum ane instincts w hich today are creating a state o f international anarchy and instability from w hich there is no escape through mere isolation or neutrality. Those w ho cherish their freedom and recognize and respect the equal right o f their neighbors to be free and live in peace, m ust work together for the tri­ um ph of law and moral principles in order that peace, justice and confidence m ay prevail in the world. There m ust be a return to a belief in the pledged word, in the value o f a signed treaty. There m ust be recognition o f the fact that national m orality is as vital as private m orality. A bishop wrote m e the other day: "It seems to me that som ething greatly needs to be said in behalf o f ordinary hum anity against the present practice of carrying the horrors o f war to helpless civilians, especially women and ch il­ dren. It m ay be that such a protest m ight be regarded by m any, w ho claim to be realists, as futile, but m ay it not be that the heart o f m ankind is so filled w ith horror at the present needless suffering that that force could be m obilized in sufficient volum e to lessen such cruelty in the days ahead. Even though it m ay take tw enty years, w hich G od forbid, for civilization to make effective its corporate protest against this barbarism, surely strong voices m ay hasten the day." There is a solidarity and interdependence about the m odem world, both technically and m orally, w hich makes it im possible for any nation com pletely to isolate itself from econom ic and political upheavals in the rest o f the world, especially w hen such upheavals appear to be spreading and not declining. There can be no stability or peace either w ithin nations or between nations except under laws and m oral standards adhered to by all International anarchy destroys every foundation for peace. It jeopardizes either the im m ediate or the future security o f every nation, large or sm all. It is, therefore, a matter o f vital interest and concern to the people o f the U nited States that the sanctity of in tern ation al treaties and the m aintenance o f in tern ation al m orality be restored. The overw helm ing m ajority o f the peoples and nations o f the world today want to live in peace. They seek the rem oval o f barriers against trade. They want to exert them selves in industry, in agriculture and in business, that they m ay increase their w ealth through the production o f w ealth-producing goods rather than striving to produce m ilitary planes and bombs and m achine guns and cannon for the destruction o f hum an lives and useful property. In those nations o f the world w hich seem to be p iling arm ament on arma­ m ent for purposes o f aggression, and those other nations w hich fear acts of aggression against them and their security, a very high proportion o f their

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national incom e is being spent directly for arm aments. It runs from thirty to as h igh as fifty percent. W e are fortunate. The proportion that we in the United States spend is far less—eleven or twelve percent. How happy we are that the circum stances o f the m om ent perm it us to put our m oney into bridges and boulevards, dams and reforestation, the conserva­ tion o f our soil and m any other kinds o f useful works rather than in to huge standing armies and vast supplies o f im plem ents o f war. I am com pelled and you are com pelled, nevertheless, to look ahead. The peace, the freedom and the security o f ninety percent o f the population of the world is being jeopardized by the rem aining ten percent, who are threatening a breakdown of all international order and law. Surely the ninety percent who want to live in peace under law and in accordance w ith moral standards that have received alm ost universal acceptance through the centuries, can and must find some way to make their w ill prevail. The situation is definitely o f universal concern. The questions involved relate not m erely to violations o f specific provisions o f particular treaties; they are questions o f war and o f peace, o f international law and especially o f prin­ ciples o f hum anity. It is true that they involve definite violations o f agree­ m en ts, an d esp ecia lly o f th e C o v en a n t o f th e League o f N a tio n s, the Briand-Kellogg Pact and the N ine Power Treaty. But they also involve prob­ lems o f world econom y, world security and world hum anity. It is true that the m oral consciousness o f the world m ust recognize the im portance o f rem oving injustices and w ell-founded grievances; but at the same tim e it m ust be aroused to the cardinal necessity o f honoring sanctity of treaties, o f respecting the rights and liberties o f others and o f putting an end to acts o f international aggression. It seems to be unfortunately true that the epidem ic of world lawlessness is spreading. W hen an epidem ic o f physical disease starts to spread, the com m unity approves and joins in a quarantine o f the patients in order to protect the health o f the com m unity against the spread o f the disease. It is m y determ ination to pursue a policy of peace. It is m y determ ination to adopt every practicable measure to avoid involvem ent in war. It ought to be inconceivable that in this m odern era, and in the face o f experience, any nation could be so foolish and ruthless as to run the risk of plunging the whole world into war by invading and violating, in contravention o f solem n treaties, the territory o f other nations that have done them no real harm and are too weak to protect them selves adequately. Yet the peace o f the world and the wel­ fare and security o f every nation, including our ow n, is today being threatened by that very thing. N o nation w hich refuses to exercise forbearance and to respect the free­ dom and rights o f others can long rem ain strong and retain the confidence and respect o f other nations. N o nation ever loses its dignity or its good standing by conciliating its differences, and by exercising great patience w ith,

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and consideration for, the rights o f other nations. W ar is a contagion, w hether it be declared or undeclared. It can engulf states and peoples remote from the original scene o f hostilities. W e are deter­ m ined to keep out o f war, yet we cannot insure ourselves against the disastrous effects o f war and the dangers o f involvem ent. W e are adopting such measures as w ill m inim ize our risk o f involvem ent, but we cannot have com plete pro­ tection in a world o f disorder in w hich confidence and security have broken down. If civilization is to survive the principles o f the Prince o f Peace m ust be restored. Trust between nations must be revived. M ost im portant o f all, the w ill for peace on the part o f peace-loving nations m ust express itself to the end that nations that m ay be tem pted to violate their agreements and the rights o f others w ill desist from such a course. There must be positive endeavors to preserve peace. America hates war. America hopes for peace. Therefore, America actively engages in the search for peace.

A PPE N D IX D

Japanese response to the U .S., denouncing the NinePower Treaty (excerpt) by Japanese Foreign M inister Hachiro Arita Novem ber 18,1938 It is the firm conviction o f the Japanese Governm ent that now , at a tim e o f the continuing developm ent o f new conditions in East Asia, an attem pt to apply to present and future conditions w ithout any change concepts and principles w hich were applicable to conditions prevailing before the present incident does not in any way contribute to the solution o f im m ediate issues and further does not in the least prom ote the firm establishm ent o f enduring peace in East Asia.

A PPE N D IX E

The Japanese-Soviet N eutrality P a ct The Empire o f Japan and the U nion o f Soviet Socialist Republics, guided by a desire to strengthen peaceful and friendly relations between the two coun­ tries, have decided to conclude a treaty o f neutrality as follow s: A rticle I. Both contracting parties proclaim their m utual respect for territo­

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rial integrity and inviolability and their desire for the m aintenance o f peaceful and friendly relations. A rticle II. In the event o f m ilitary activity by any other power or powers against either o f the contracting parties, the other contracting party shall m aintain neutrality throughout the duration o f the con flict. A rticle III. This treaty w ill becom e effective on the day of ratification by the two contracting parties and w ill rem ain in effect for five years. This treaty shall be autom atically extended for another five years if neither contracting party gives notice o f abrogation by the end o f the fourth year. A rticle IV . This treaty w ill be ratified as soon as possible. Instrum ents o f rat­ ification shall be exchanged in Tokyo as soon as possible. Done in M oscow , April 13th, 1941, corresponding to April 13th day o f the 16th year o f Showa. V . M olotov Iosuke M atsuoka Yoshitsugu Tatekawa

The Declaration In conform ity w ith the spirit o f the Treaty o f N eutrality concluded on April 13th, 1941, between the Empire o f Japan and the U nion o f Soviet Socialist Republics, the governm ent o f the Empire o f Japan and the governm ent o f the U nion o f Soviet Socialist Republics, in order to insure peaceful and friendly relations between the two countries, solem nly declare that the Empire o f Japan pledges to respect the territorial integrity and inviolability o f the M ongolian People's Republic, and the U n ion o f Soviet Socialist Republics pledges to respect the territorial integrity and inviolability o f M anchukuo.

Matsuoka''s Letter to Molotov April 13th, 1941 Excellency: W ith reference to the Treaty o f Neutrality signed today, I have the honor to state that I expect and hope that a com m ercial agreement and a fisheries con­ vention w ill soon be concluded and that at the earliest opportunity we, Your Excellency and m yself, shall endeavor, in the spirit o f conciliation and m utu­ al accom m odation, to solve in a few m onths the question o f the liquidation of the concessions in northern Sakhalin under the contracts signed at M oscow on December 14th, 1925, w ith a view to rem oving the various questions not con­ ducive to the m aintenance o f cordial relations between our two countries. In the same spirit I should like to point out that it w ill be w ell for our two countries, as w ell as M anchukuo and Outer M ongolia, if we fin d at the earli­ est possible date a means o f instituting join t or m ixed com m issions o f the countries concerned, w ith the object of settling the boundary questions and

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of handling disputes and incidents along the borders. Yours very sincerely, M atsuoka.

Reply from Molotov to Matsuoka M oscow, April 13th, 1941. M y dear M r. M atsuoka, I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note o f April 13th, 1941, w hich contains the follow ing: In reference to the Pact o f N eutrality signed to-day, I have the honour to state that I expect and hope that the Com m ercial Agreem ent and the Fishery Convention w ill be concluded very soon and that at the earliest opportunity, we, Your Excellency and m yself, shall make endeavours, in the spirit o f con­ ciliation and m utual accom m odation, to solve in a few m onths the question relating to liquidation o f the concessions in Northern Saghalien (Sakhalin) under the contracts signed at Moscow on December 14th, 1925, w ith a view to remove any and all questions w hich are not conducive to the m aintenance of cordial relations between the two countries. In the same spirit, I should also like to point out that it is w ell for our two countries as w ell as M anchoukou (M anchukuo) and Outer M ongolia to find at the earliest date a way to instituting join t and/or m ixed com m issions o f the countries concerned w ith the object of settling the boundary questions and of handling disputes and incidents along the borders. I take note o f the above w ith satisfaction w ith w hich I am in agreem ent. Yours very sincerely, V . M O LO TO V *Fatefiil Choice: Japan's Advance into Southeast A sia, 1939-1941, ed. Jam es W . M orley, trans. Peter A . Berton, New York: Colum bia University Press, 1980, pp. 78-79; Avalon Project o f Yale University Law School (www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/sl.htm)

APPENDIX F

Executive Order N o. 8832 (Freezing Japanese and Chinese Assets in the United States) Statement: In view o f the unlim ited national emergency declared by the President, he

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has today issued an Executive Order freezing Japanese assets in the United States in the same m anner in w hich assets o f various European countries were frozen on Ju n e 14, 1941. This m easure, in effect, brings all fin an cial and im port and export trade transactions in w hich Japanese interests are involved under the control of the Governm ent, and imposes crim inal penalties for vio­ lation o f the Order. This Executive Order, just as the Order o f Jun e 14,1941, is designed am ong other things to prevent the use o f the financial facilities o f the United States and trade between Japan and the U nited States, in ways harm ful to national defense and Am erican interests, to prevent the liquidation in the U nited States o f assets obtained by duress or conquest, and to curb subversive activities in the U nited States. A t the specific request o f Generalissim o Chian g Kai-shek, and for the pur­ pose o f helping the Chinese Governm ent, the President has, at the same tim e, extended the freezing control to Chinese assets in the U nited States. The adm inistration o f the licensing system w ith respect to Chinese assets w ill be conducted w ith a view to strengthening the foreign trade and exchange posi­ tion o f the Chinese Governm ent. The inclusion o f C hin a in the Executive Order, in accordance w ith the wishes of the Chinese Governm ent, is a contin­ uation o f this Governm ent's policy o f assisting C h in a.

Executive Order No. 8832 By virtue o f the authority vested in me by section 5 (b) o f the Act o f October 6,1917 (40 Stat. 415), as amended, and by virtue o f all other authority vested in m e, I, Franklin D . Roosevelt, President of the United States o f Am erica, do hereby am end Executive Order N o. 8389 of April 10, 1940, as am ended, by changing the period at the end of subdivision (j) o f Section 3 o f such Order to a sem icolon and adding the follow ing new subdivision thereafter: (k) Jun e 14,1941— C h in a, and Japan. Franklin D . Roosevelt The W hite House, Ju ly 26, 1941.

APPENDIX G

Press release by the W hite House (Prohibition of exportation of petroleum to Japan) W ASH IN GTO N , August 1,1941 It was announced today that the President has directed the Adm inistrator

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o f Export Control to initiate further regulation in respect to the export of petroleum products in the interest o f the national defense. The action w ill have two im m ediate effects. It w ill prohibit the exportation of m otor fuels and oils suitable for use in aircraft and o f certain raw stocks from w hich such products are derived to destinations other than the W estern Hemisphere, the British Empire and the unoccupied territories o f other coun­ tries engaged in resisting aggression. It w ill also lim it the exportation o f other petroleum products, except to the destinations referred to above, to usual or pre-war quantities and provide for the pro rata issuance o f licenses on that basis. W hite House

APPENDIX H

United States Note to Ja p a n ('Hull Note') by Secretary of State Cordell Hull Oral Strictly confidential November 26,1941 The representatives o f the Governm ent o f the U nited States and o f the Governm ent o f Japan have been carrying on during the past several m onths inform al and exploratory conversations for the purpose o f arriving at a settle­ m ent if possible o f questions relating to the entire Pacific area based upon the principles o f peace, law and order and fair dealing am ong nations. These prin­ ciples include the principle o f inviolability o f territorial integrity and sover­ eignty o f each and all nations; the principle o f non-interference in the internal affairs o f other countries; the principle o f equality, including equality o f com ­ mercial opportunity and treatm ent; and the principle o f reliance upon inter­ n a tio n a l coop eration and c o n c ilia tio n fo r th e p reven tio n and p a cific settlem ent of controversies and for im provem ent o f international conditions by peaceful m ethods and processes. It is believed that in our discussions some progress has been made in refer­ ence to the general principles w hich constitute the basis o f a peaceful settle­ m ent covering the entire Pacific area. Recently the Japanese Ambassador has stated that the Japanese Governm ent is desirous o f continuing the conversa­ tions directed toward a com prehensive and peaceful settlem ent of the Pacific area; that it w ould be helpful toward creating an atmosphere favorable to the successful outcom e of the conversations if a temporary modus vivendi could be agreed upon to be in effect w hile the conversations looking to peaceful settlem ent in the Pacific were co n tin u in g. O n Novem ber 20 the Japanese

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Ambassador com m unicated to the Secretary o f State proposals in regard to temporary measure to be taken respectively by the Governm ent o f Japan and by the Governm ent o f the U nited States, w hich measures are understood to have been designed to accom plish the purposes above indicated. The Governm ent o f the U nited States m ost earnestly desires to contribute to the prom otion and m aintenance o f peace and stability in the Pacific area, and to afford every opportunity for the continuance o f discussion w ith the Japanese Governm ent directed toward working out a broad-gauge program of peace throughout the Pacific area. The proposals w hich were presented by the Japanese Ambassador on Novem ber 20 contain some features w hich, in the opinion o f this Governm ent, con flict w ith the fundam ental principles w hich form a part o f the general settlem ent under consideration and to w hich each Governm ent has declared that it is com m itted. The Governm ent of the United States believes that the adoption of such proposals w ould not be likely to con­ tribute to the ultim ate objectives o f ensuring peace under law, order and jus­ tice in the Pacific area, and it suggests that further effort be made to resolve our divergences o f view in regard to the practical application o f the fundam ental principles already m entioned. W ith this object in view the Governm ent o f the United States offers for the consideration o f the Japanese Governm ent a plan o f a broad but sim ple settle­ m ent covering the entire Pacific area as one practical exem plification o f a pro­ gram w hich this Governm ent envisages as som ething to be worked out during our further conversations. The plan therein suggested represents an effort to bridge the gap between our draft o f Jun e 21,1941 and the Japanese draft of September 25 by m aking a new approach to the essential problems underlying a com prehensive Pacific settlem ent. This plan contains provisions dealing w ith the practical applica­ tion o f the fundam ental principles w hich we have agreed in our conversations constitute the on ly sound basis for w orthwhile international relations. We hope that in this way progress toward reaching a m eeting of m inds between our two Governm ents m ay be expedited.

Strictly confidential. Tentative and w ithout com m itm ent November 26,1941.

Outline of proposed basis for agreement between the United States and Japan. Section 1. Draft M utual Declaration o f Policy. The Governm ent o f the U nited States and the Governm ent o f Japan both being solicitous for the peace o f the Pacific affirm that their national policies

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are directed toward lasting and extensive peace throughout the Pacific area, that they have no territorial designs in that area, that they have no intention o f threatening other countries or of using m ilitary force aggressively against any neighboring nation, and that, accordingly, in their national policies they w ill actively support and give practical application to the follow ing funda­ m ental principles upon w hich their relations w ith each other and w ith all other governments are based: 1. The principle o f inviolability o f territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations. 2. The principle o f non-interference in the internal affairs o f other coun­ tries. 3. The principle o f equality, including equality o f com m ercial opportunity and treatm ent. 4. The principle o f reliance upon international cooperation and concilia­ tion for the prevention and pacific settlem ent of controversies and for im provem ent o f in tern ation al con ditions by peaceful m ethods and processes. The Governm ent of Japan and the Governm ent o f the U nited States have agreed that toward elim inating chronic political instability, preventing recur­ rent econom ic collapse, and providing a basis for peace, they w ill actively sup­ port and practically apply the follow ing principles in their econom ic relations w ith each other and w ith other nations and peoples: 1. The principle o f non-discrim ination in international com m ercial rela­ tions. 2. The principle o f international econom ic cooperation and abolition of extreme nationalism as expressed in excessive trade restrictions. 3. The principle o f non-discrim inatory access by all nations to raw material supplies. 4. The principle o f fu ll protection o f the interests o f consum ing countries and populations as regards the operation o f international com m odity agreements. 5. The principle o f establishm ent o f such institutions and arrangements of international finance as m ay lend aid to the essential enterprises and the continuous developm ent o f all countries and m ay perm it paym ents through processes of trade consonant w ith the welfare o f all countries. Section 2. Steps to be Taken by the Governm ent of the United States and by the Governm ent o f Japan. The Governm ent of the U nited States and the Governm ent o f Japan pro-

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pose to take steps as follow s: 1. The Governm ent of the U nited States and the Governm ent of Japan w ill endeavor to conclude a m ultilateral non-aggression pact am ong the B ritish Em pire, C h in a , Ja p a n , the N eth erlan d s, the So viet U n io n , Thailand and the U nited States. 2. Both Governm ents w ill endeavor to conclude am ong the Am erican, British, Chinese, Japanese, the Netherland and Thai Governm ents would pledge itself to respect the territorial integrity o f French Indochina and, in the event that there should develop a threat to the territorial integrity o f Indochina, to enter into im m ediate consultation w ith a view to taking such measures as m ay be deemed necessary and advisable to m eet the threat in question. Such agreement w ould provide also that each of the Governm ents party to the agreement w ould not seek or accept preferen­ tial treatm ent in its trade or econom ic relations w ith Indochina and w ould use its influence to obtain for each of the signatories equality of treatm ent in trade and commerce w ith French Indochina. 3. The Governm ent o f Japan w ill withdraw all m ilitary, naval, air and police forces from C hin a and from Indochina. 4. The Governm ent o f the U nited States and the Governm ent o f Japan w ill not support - m ilitarily, p olitically, econom ically - any governm ent or regime in C h in a other than the N ational Governm ent o f the Republic of C hin a w ith capital tem porarily at Chungking. 5. Both Governm ents w ill endeavor to obtain the agreement o f the British and other governments to give up extraterritorial rights in C hin a, includ­ ing right in'international settlem ents and in concessions and under the Boxer Protocol o f 1901. 6. The Governm ent o f the U nited States and the Governm ent o f Japan w ill enter into negotiations for the conclusion between the U nited States and Japan o f a trade agreem ent, based upon reciprocal m ost favored-nation treatm ent and reduction o f trade barriers by both countries, including an undertaking by the U nited States to bind raw silk on the free list. 7. The Governm ent o f the U nited States and the Governm ent o f Japan w ill, respectively, remove the freezing restrictions on Japanese funds in the U nited States and on Am erican funds in Japan. 8. Both Governm ents w ill agree upon a plan for the stabilization o f the dollar-yen rate, w ith the allocation of funds adequate for this purpose, half to be supplied by Japan and h alf by the U nited States. 9. Both Governm ents w ill agree that no agreement w hich either has con­ cluded w ith any third power or powers shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict w ith the fundam ental purpose o f this agreem ent, the establishm ent and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area. 10. Both Governm ents w ill use their influence to cause other governments to adhere to and to give practical application to the basic p olitical and

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econom ic principles set forth in this agreem ent.

APPENDIX I

Personal telegram from U .S. President Roosevelt to the Em peror o f Ja p a n His Im perial M ajesty The Emperor of Japan. Alm ost a century ago the President o f the U nited States addressed to the Emperor o f Japan a message extending an offer o f friendship o f the people o f the U nited States to the people o f Jap an . That offer was accepted, and in the long period o f unbroken peace and friendship w hich has follow ed, our respec­ tive nations, through the virtues o f their peoples and the wisdom o f their rulers have prospered and have substantially helped hum anity. O n ly in situations o f extraordinary im portance to our two countries need I address to Your M ajesty messages on matters o f state. I feel I should now so address you because o f the deep and far-reaching emergency w hich appears to be in form ation. Developm ents are occurring in the Pacific area w hich threaten to deprive each o f our nations and all hum anity o f the beneficial influence o f the long peace between our two countries. These developm ents contain tragic possibil­ ities. The people of the United States, believing in peace and in the right of nations to live and let lives have eagerly watched the conversations between our two Governm ents during these past m onths. W e have hoped for a term i­ nation o f the present conflict between Japan and C hin a. W e have hoped that a peace o f the Pacific could be consum m ated in such a way that nationalities o f m any diverse peoples could exist side by side w ithout fear o f invasion; that unbearable burdens o f armaments could be lifted for them all; and that all peo­ ples w ould resume com merce w ithout discrim ination against or in favor of any nation. I am certain that it w ill be clear to Your M ajesty, as it is to m e, that in seek­ ing these great objectives both Japan and the U nited States should agree to elim inate any form o f m ilitary threat. This seemed essential to the attainm ent o f the high objectives. M ore than a year ago Your M ajesty's Governm ent concluded an agreement w ith the V ich y Governm ent by w hich five or six thousand Japanese troops were perm itted to enter into Northern French Indochina for the protection o f Japanese troops w hich were operating against C h in a further north. And this Spring and Summer the V ich y Governm ent perm itted further Japanese m ili­

Appendices / 309

tary forces to enter into Southern French Indochina for the com m on defense o f French Indochina. I think I am correct in saying that no attack has been made upon Indochina, nor that any has been contem plated. During the past few weeks it has becom e clear to the world that Japanese m ilitary, naval and air forces have been sent to Southern Indo-China in such large numbers as to create a reasonable doubt on the part of other nations that this continuing concentration in Indochina is not defensive in its character. Because these continuing concentrations in Indo-China have reached such large proportions and because they extend now to the southeast and the southwest com ers o f that Peninsula, it is on ly reasonable that the people o f the Philippines, o f the hundreds o f Islands o f the East Indies, o f M alaya and of Thailand itself are asking them selves whether these forces o f Japan are prepar­ ing or intending to make attack in one or more o f these m any directions. I am sure that Your M ajesty w ill understand that the fear o f all these peo­ ples is a legitim ate fear in as m uch as it involves their peace and their nation­ al existence. I am sure that Your M ajesty w ill understand w hy the people o f the United States in such large numbers look askance at the establishm ent o f m il­ itary, naval and air bases m anned and equipped so greatly as to constitute armed forces capable o f measures o f offense. It is clear that a continuance o f such a situation is unthinkable. N one of the peoples w hom have spoken of above can sit either indefinitely or perm anently on a keg o f dynam ite. There is absolutely no thought on the part o f the United States o f invading Indo-China if every Japanese soldier or sailor were to be withdrawn therefrom . I think that we can obtain the same assurance from the Governm ents o f the East Indies, the Governm ents o f M alaya and. the Governm ent o f Thailand. I w ould even undertake to ask fo r the same assurance on the part o f the Governm ent of C h in a. Thus a withdrawal o f the Japanese forces from IndoC hin a w ould result in the assurance of peace throughout the w hole o f the South Pacific area. I address m yself to Your M ajesty at this m om ent in the fervent hope that Your M ajesty m ay, as I am doing, give thought in this definite em ergency to ways o f dispelling the dark clouds. I am confident that both o f us, for the sake o f the peoples not only o f our own great countries but for the sake o f hum an­ ity in neighboring territories, have a sacred duty to restore traditional am ity and prevent further death and destruction in the world. Franklin D . Roosevelt. W ashington, December 6, 1941.

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APPENDIX J

M em orandum (from Ambassador of Japan Kichisaburo Nomura to the U.S. government) (December 7, 1941) I. The governm ent o f Japan, prom pted by a genuine desire to com e to an am i­ cable understanding w ith the Governm ent o f the United States in order that the two countries by their join t efforts m ay secure the peace of the Pacific Area and thereby contribute toward the realization o f world peace, has continued negotiations w ith the utm ost sincerity since April last w ith the Governm ent of the U nited States regarding the adjustm ent and advancem ent o f JapaneseAm erican relations and the stabilization o f the Pacific Area. The Japanese Governm ent has the honor to state frankly its views concern­ ing the claim s the Am erican Governm ent has persistently m aintained as well as the measures the U nited States and Great Britain have taken toward Japan during these eight m onths.

II. It is the im m utable p olicy o f the Japanese Governm ent to insure the stabil­ ity of East Asia and to prom ote world peace and thereby to enable all nations to find each its proper place in the world. Ever since the C h in a Affair broke out ow ing to the failure on the part of C h in a to com prehend Japan's true intentions, the Japanese Governm ent has striven for the restoration of peace and it has consistently exerted its best efforts to prevent the extension o f war-like disturbances., It was also to that end that in Septem ber last year Jap an concluded the Tripartite Pact w ith Germ any and Italy. However, both the United States and Great Britain have resorted to every possible measure to assist the Chungking regime so as to obstruct the estab­ lishm ent o f a general peace between Japan and C h in a, interfering w ith Japan's constructive endeavors toward the stabilization o f East Asia. Exerting pressure on the Netherlands East Indies, or m enacing French Indo-China, they have attem pted to frustrate Japan's aspiration to the ideal o f com m on prosperity in cooperation w ith these regimes. Furthermore, w hen Japan in accordance w ith its protocol w ith France took measures o f join t defense o f French Indo-China, both Am erican and British Governm ents, w illfu lly m isinterpreting it as a threat to their own possessions, and inducing the Netherlands Governm ent to follow suit, they enforced the assets freezing order, thus severing econom ic relations w ith Jap an . W hile m anifesting thus an obviously hostile attitude, these countries have strengthened their m ilitary preparations perfecting an encirclem ent o f Japan, and have brought about a situation w hich endangers the very existence o f the Empire. Nevertheless, to facilitate a speedy settlem ent, the Premier o f Japan pro­ posed, in August last, to meet the President of the United States for a discussion

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of im portant problems between the two countries covering the entire Pacific area. However, the American Governm ent, w hile accepting in principle the Japanese proposal, insisted that the m eeting should take place after an agree­ m ent o f view had been reached on fundam ental and essential questions. H I. Subsequently, on September 25th the Japanese Governm ent submitted a proposal based on the form ula proposed by the Am erican Governm ent, taking fully into consideration past Am erican claim s and also incorporating Japanese views. Repeated discussions proved o f no avail in producing readily an agree­ m ent o f view . The present cabinet, therefore, subm itted a revised proposal, m oderating still further the Japanese claim s regarding the principal points of difficulty in the negotiation and endeavored strenuously to reach a settlem ent. But the Am erican Governm ent, adhering steadfastly to its original assertions, failed to display in the slightest degree a spirit of conciliation. The negotiation made no progress. Therefore, the Japanese Governm ent, w ith a view to doing its utm ost for averting a crisis in Japanese-Am erican relations, submitted on November 20th still another proposal in order to arrive at an equitable solution o f the more essential and urgent questions w hich, sim plifying its previous proposal, stipu­ lated the follow ing points: 1. The Governm ent o f Japan and the U nited States undertake not to dis­ patch armed forces into any o f the regions, excepting French Indo­ c h in a , in the Southeastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area. 2. Both Governm ents shall cooperate w ith the view to securing the acquisition in the Netherlands East Indies of those goods and com ­ m odities o f w hich the two countries are in need. 3 . Both Governm ents m utually undertake to restore com m ercial rela­ tions to those prevailing prior to the freezing o f assets. The Governm ent of the U nited States shall supply Japan the required quantity o f o il. 4 . The Governm ent o f the United States undertakes not to resort to mea­ sures and actions prejudicial to the endeavours for the restoration of general peace between Japan and C h in a. 5 . The Japanese Governm ent undertakes to withdraw troops now sta­ tioned in French In do-C hin a upon either the restoration o f peace between Japan and C h in a or establishm ent o f an equitable peace in the Pacific Area; and it is prepared to remove the Japanese troops in the southern part o f French Indo-China to the northern part upon the conclusion o f the present agreem ent. As regards C hin a, the Japanese Governm ent, w hile expressing its readiness to accept the offer of the President of the U nited States to act as 'introducer' of peace between Japan and C h in a as was previously suggested, asked for an

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undertaking on the part o f the U nited States to do nothing prejudicial to the restoration o f Sino-Japanese peace when the two parties have com m enced direct negotiations. The Am erican Governm ent not only rejected the above-m entioned new proposal, but made know n its intention to continue its aid to Chian g Kai-shek; and in spite o f its suggestion m entioned above, withdrew the offer o f the President to act as so-called 'introducer' o f peace between Japan and C hin a, pleading that tim e was not yet ripe for it. Finally on November 26th, in an atti­ tude to impose upon the Japanese Governm ent those principles it has persis­ ten tly m ain tain ed , the A m erican G overn m en t m ade a proposal to ta lly ignoring Japanese claim s, w hich is a source o f profound regret to the Japanese Governm ent. IV . From the beginning of the present negotiation the Japanese Governm ent has always m aintained an attitude o f fairness and m oderation, and did its best to reach a settlem ent, for w hich it made all possible concessions often in spite o f great difficulties. As for the C h in a question w hich constitutes an im portant subject o f the negotiation, the Japanese Governm ent showed a m ost concilia­ tory attitude. As for the principle o f non-discrim ination in international com ­ merce, advocated by the Am erican Governm ent, the Japanese Governm ent expressed its desire to see the said principle applied throughout the world, and declared that along w ith the actual practice o f this principle in the world, the Japanese Governm ent w ould endeavor to apply the same in the Pacific area including C h in a, and made it clear that Japan had no intention o f excluding from C hin a econom ic activities o f third powers pursued on an equitable basis. Furthermore, as regards the question of w ithdrawing troops from French Indo­ c h in a , the Japanese Governm ent even volunteered, as m entioned above, to carry out an im m ediate evacuation of troops from Southern French Indo­ ch in a as a measure o f easing the situation. It is presumed that the spirit o f conciliation exhibited to the utm ost degree by the Japanese Governm ent in all these matters is fully appreciated by the Am erican Governm ent. O n the other hand, the Am erican Governm ent, always holding fast to the­ ories in disregard of realities, and refusing to yield an in ch on its im practical principles, causes undue delay in the negotiation. It is difficult to understand this attitude o f the Am erican Governm ent and the Japanese Governm ent desires to call the attention o f the Am erican Governm ent especially to the fo l­ low ing points: l.T h e Am erican Governm ent advocates in the name o f world peace th o se p rin cip le s fav o rab le to it an d urges u p o n th e Jap an ese Governm ent the acceptance thereof. The peace o f the world m ay be brought about on ly by discovering a m utually acceptable form ula through recognition o f the reality of the situation and m utual appre-

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ciation o f one another's position. An attitude such as ignores realities and impose (sic) one's selfish views upon others w ill scarcely serve the purpose o f facilitating the consum m ation o f negotiations. O f the various principles put forward by the Am erican Governm ent as a basis o f the Japanese-Am erican Agreem ent, there are some w hich the Japanese Governm ent is ready to accept in principle, but in view o f the world's actual condition it seems on ly a utopian ideal on the part o f the American Governm ent to attem pt to force their im m edi­ ate adoption. A gain, the proposal to conclude a m ultilateral non-aggression pact between Japan, U nited States, Great Britain, C h in a, the Soviet U nion, the Netherlands and Thailand, w hich is patterned after the old con­ cept o f collective security, is far rem oved from the realities o f East Asia. 2. The Am erican proposal contained a stipulation w hich states—'Both Governm ents w ill agree that no agreem ent, w hich either has con­ cluded w ith any third power or powers, shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to con flict w ith the fundam ental purpose o f this agree­ m ent, the establishm ent and preservation o f peace throughout the Pacific area.' It is presumed that the above provision has been pro­ posed w ith a view to restrain Japan from fu lfillin g its obligations under the Tripartite Pact when the U nited States participates in the war in Europe, and, as such, it cannot be accepted by the Japanese Governm ent. The Am erican Governm ent, obsessed w ith its own views and opin­ ions, m ay be said to be schem ing for the extension o f the war. W hile it seeks, on the one hand, to secure its rear by stabilizing the Pacific Area, it is engaged, on the other hand, in aiding Great Britain and preparing to attack, in the name o f self-defense, Germ any and Italy two Powers that are striving to establish a new order in Europe. Such a policy is totally at variance w ith the m any principles upon w hich the Am erican G overnm ent proposes to found the stability o f the Pacific Area through peaceful m eans. 3. Whereas the Am erican Governm ent, under the principles it rigidly upholds, objects to settle international issues through m ilitary pres­ sure, it is exercising in con ju n ction w ith Great Britain and other nations pressure by econom ic power. Recourse to such pressure as a means o f dealing w ith international relations should be condem ned as it is at tim e more inhum ane than m ilitary pressure. 4. It is im possible n o t to reach the con clu sio n th at the A m erican Governm ent desires to m aintain and strengthen, in coalition w ith Great Britain and other Powers, its dom inant position it has hitherto occupied not only in C hin a but in other areas o f East Asia. It is a fact of history that the countries of East Asia have for the past two hundred

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years or more have been com pelled to observe the status quo under the A n glo-A m erican p o licy o f im p erialistic exp lo itatio n and to sacrifice themselves to he prosperity of the two nations. The Japanese Governm ent cannot tolerate the perpetuation of such a situation since it directly runs counter to Japan's fundam ental policy to enable all nations to enjoy each its proper place in the world. The stipulation proposed by th e Am erican Governm ent relative to French Indo-China is a good exem plification of the above-m entioned Am erican policy. Thus the six countries—Japan, the U nited States, G reat B ritain , the N etherlands, C h in a , and T hailand—excepting France, should undertake am ong them selves to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty o f French Indo-China and equality o f treat­ m ent in trade and commerce w ould be tantam ount to placing that territory under the join t guarantee of the Governm ents o f those six countries. Apart from the fact that such a proposal totally ignores the position o f France, it is unacceptable to the Japanese Governm ent in that such an arrangement cannot but be considered as an extension to French Indo-China o f a system sim ilar to the N ine Power Treaty structure w hich is the ch ief factor responsible for the present predica­ m ent o f East Asia. 5. A ll the item s dem anded o f Jap an by the Am erican G overnm ent regarding C h in a such as wholesale evacuation o f troops or uncondi­ tion al application o f the principle o f non-discrim ination in interna­ tion al com m erce ignored the actual conditions o f C h in a, and are calculated to destroy Japan's position as the stabilizing factor o f East Asia. The attitude o f the Am erican Governm ent in dem anding Japan not to support m ilitarily, politically or econom ically any regime other than the regim e at Chungking, disregarding thereby the existence of the N anking Governm ent, shatters the very basis o f the present nego­ tiations. This dem and of the Am erican Governm ent fallin g, as it does, in line w ith its above-m entioned refusal to cease from aiding the C h u n g k in g regim e, dem onstrates cle a rly th e in te n tio n o f th e Am erican Governm ent to obstruct the restoration o f norm al relations between Japan and C hin a and the return o f peace to East Asia. V . In brief, the Am erican proposal contains certain acceptable item s such as those concerning com m erce, including the conclusion o f a trade agreement, m utual rem oval of the freezing restrictions, and stabilization o f yen and dollar exchange, or the abolition o f extra-territorial rights in C h in a. O n the other hand, however, the proposal in question ignores Japan's sacrifices in the four years of the C h in a Affair, menaces the Empire's existence itself and disparages its h on or and prestige. T herefore, view ed in its en tirety , the Jap an ese Governm ent regrets it cannot accept the proposal as a basis o f negotiation.

A ppendices / 315

V I. The Japanese G overnm ent, in its desire for an early conclusion o f the nego­ tia tio n , proposed sim u lta n e o u sly w ith th e co n clu sio n o f th e Jap an eseAm erican n egotiation , agreem ents to be signed w ith Great Britain and other interested countries. The proposal was accepted by the Am erican G overnm ent. H ow ever, sin ce th e A m e rica n G o v e rn m e n t h as m ade th e p ro p o sa l o f N ovem ber 26th as a resu lt o f freq u en t co n su lta tio n w ith G reat B ritain , Australia, the N etherlands and C h u n gkin g, and presum ably by catering to me wishes o f the C h u n gkin g regim e in the questions o f C h in a, it m ust be con ­ cluded th at all these countries are at one w ith the U nited States in ignoring Japan's p osition. V II. O bviously it is the in ten tio n o f the Am erican G overnm ent to conspire w ith G reat B ritain and other countries to obstruct Jap an 's effort toward the establishm ent o f peace through the creation o f a new order in East Asia, and especially to preserve A nglo-A m erican rights and interest by keeping Jap an and C h in a at w ar. This in ten tio n has been revealed clearly during the course o f the present negotiation. Thus th e earnest hope o f th e Japanese G overnm ent to adjust JapaneseA m erican relation s and to preserve and prom ote th e peace o f the P acific through cooperation w ith the Am erican G overnm ent has fin a lly been lost. The Japanese G overn m en t regrets to have to n o tify hereby the A m erican G overnm ent that in view o f the attitude o f the Am erican G overnm ent it can­ not bu t consider that it is im possible to reach an agreem ent through further negotiations.

A P P E N D IX K

Response from the Em peror o f Ja p a n to the U .S. Presiden t (Decem ber 8, 1941) H is M ajesty has expressed his gratefulness and appreciation for the cordial message o f the President. (See A p p e n d ix I.) He has graciously let know n his wishes to the Foreign M inister to convey the follow ing to the President as a reply to the latter's m essage. "Som e days ago, the President m ade inquiries regarding the circum stances o f the augm entation o f Japanese forces in French In d o -C h in a, to w hich His M ajesty has directed the G overnm ent to reply. W ithdraw al o f Japanese forces from Fren ch In d o -C h in a co n stitu te s on e o f th e su b je ct m atters o f th e Japanese-Am erican n egotiation . H is M ajesty has com m anded the G overnm ent to state its views to the Am erican G overnm ent also on this question. It is,

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therefore, desired that the President w ill kindly refer to this reply. Establishm ent of peace in the Pacific and consequently o f the world has been the cherished desire o f His M ajesty, for the realization o f w hich He has hitherto made the Governm ent continue its earnest endeavors. His M ajesty trusts that the President is fu lly aware o f this fact."

APPENDIX L

Address by U .S. President Roosevelt to the Congress requesting a declaration o f w ar December 8,1941 M r. Vice President, and M r. Speaker, and Members o f the Senate and House o f Representatives: Yesterday, December 7,1941—a date w hich w ill live in infam y—the United States o f America was suddenly and deliberately attacked by naval and air forces o f the Empire o f Japan. The United States was at peace w ith that N ation and, at the solicitation of Japan, was still in conversation w ith its Governm ent and its Emperor looking tow ard the m aintenance o f peace in the P a cific. Indeed, one hour after Japanese air squadrons had com m enced bom bing in the Am erican Island of O ahu, the Japanese Ambassador to the U nited States and his colleague deliv­ ered to our Secretary o f State a form al reply to a recent Am erican message. And w hile this reply stated that it seemed useless to continue the existing diplo­ m atic negotiations, it contained no threat or h in t o f war or o f armed attack. It w ill be recorded that the distance of Hawaii from Japan makes it obvious that the attack was deliberately planned m any days or even weeks ago. During the intervening tim e the Japanese Governm ent has deliberately sought to deceive the U nited States by false statements and expressions o f hope for con­ tinued peace. The attack yesterday on the Hawaiian Islands has caused severe damage to A m erican naval and m ilitary forces. I regret to tell you th at very m any American lives have been lost. In addition Am erican ships have been reported torpedoed on the high seas between San Francisco and H onolulu. Yesterday the Japanese G overn m en t also lau n ch ed an attack against M alaya. Last night Japanese forces attacked H ong Kong. Last n igh t Japanese forces attacked Guam . Last n igh t Japanese forces attacked the Philippine Islands. Last n ig h t the Japanese attacked W ake Islan d . A nd th is m orning the Japanese attacked M idway Island. Japan has, therefore, undertaken a surprise offensive extending throughout

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the Pacific area. The facts o f yesterday and today speak for them selves. The people o f the U nited States have already form ed their opinions and w ell understand the im plications to the very life and safety o f our N ation. As Com m ander in C h ie f o f the Arm y and N avy I have directed that all mea­ sures be taken for our defense. But always w ill our w hole N ation remember the character o f the onslaught against us. N o matter how long it m ay take us to overcom e this premeditated invasion, the Am erican people in their righteous m ight w ill w in through to absolute vic­ tory. I believe that I interpret the w ill o f the Congress and o f the people when I assert that we w ill not on ly defend ourselves to the utterm ost but w ill make it very certain that this form o f treachery shall never again endanger us. H ostilities exist. There is no blinking at the fact that our people, our territo­ ry, and our interests are in grave danger. W ith confidence in our armed forces—w ith the unbounded determ ination o f our people—we w ill gain the inevitable trium ph—so help us G od. I ask that the Congress declare that since the unprovoked and dastardly attack by Jap an on Sunday, Decem ber 7, 1941, a state o f war has existed between the U nited States and the Japanese Empire.

APPENDIX M

Fireside ch at by U .S. President Roosevelt on the war w ith Ja p a n (December 9,1941) M y fellow Am ericans: The sudden crim inal attacks perpetrated by the Japanese in the P acific provide th e clim ax o f a decade o f in tern ation al im m orality. Powerful and resourceful gangsters have banded together to make war upon the w hole hum an race. Their challenge has now been flun g at the United States o f Am erica. The Japanese have treacherously violated the longstanding peace between us. M any Am erican soldiers and sailors have been killed by enem y action. Am erican ships have been sunk; Am erican airplanes have been destroyed. The Congress and the people o f the U nited States have accepted that chal­ lenge. Together w ith other free peoples, we are now fightin g to m aintain our right to live am ong our world neighbors in freedom , in com m on decency, w ithout fear o f assault. I have prepared the fu ll record o f our past relations w ith Japan, and it w ill be subm itted to the Congress. It begins w ith the visit of Com m odore Parry to Japan eighty-eight years ago. It ends w ith the visit o f two Japanese emissaries

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to the Secretary o f State last Sunday, an hour after Japanese forces had loosed their bom bs and m achine guns against our flag, our forces and our citizens. I can say w ith utm ost confidence that no Americans today or a thousand years hence, need feel anything but pride in our patience and in our efforts through all the years toward achieving a peace in the Pacific w hich w ould be fair and honorable to every nation, large or sm all. And no honest person, today or a thousand years hence, w ill be able to suppress a sense o f indignation and horror at the treachery com m itted by the m ilitary dictators o f Jap an , under the very shadow o f the flag of peace borne by their special envoys in our m idst. The course that Japan has follow ed for the past ten years in Asia has paral­ leled the course o f Hitler and M ussolini in Europe and in Africa. Today, it has become far more than a parallel. It is actual collaboration so w ell calculated that all the continents o f the world, and all the oceans, are now considered by the Axis strategists as one gigantic battlefield. In 1931, ten years ago, Japan invaded M anchukuo—w ithout w arning. In 1935, Italy invaded Ethiopia—w ithout w arning. In 1938, H itler occupied Austria—w ithout w arning. In 1939, Hitler invaded Czechoslovakia—w ithout w arning. Later in '39, Hitler invaded Poland—w ithout w arning. In 1940, Hitler invaded Norw ay, Denm ark, the N etherlands, Belgium and Luxem bourg— w ithout w arning. In 1940, Italy attacked France and later Greece—w ithout w arning. And this year, in 1941, the Axis Powers attacked Yugoslavia and Greece and they dom inated the Balkans—w ithout w arning. In 1941, also, H itler invaded Russia—w ithout w arning. And now Japan has attacked M alaya and Thailand— and the U nited States—w ithout w arning. It is all o f one pattern. W e are now in this war. W e are all in it—all the way. Every single m an, woman and child is a partner in the m ost tremendous undertaking o f our Am erican history. W e m ust share together the bad news and the good news, the defeats and the victories—the changing fortunes o f war. So far, the news has been all bad. W e have suffered a serious setback in Hawaii. O ur forces in the Philippines, w hich include the brave people o f that Com m onw ealth, are taking punishm ent, but are defending them selves vigor­ ously. The reports from Guam and Wake and M idway Islands are still con­ fused, but we must be prepared for the announcem ent that all these three outposts have been seized. The casualty lists o f these first few days w ill undoubtedly be large. I deeply feel the anxiety o f all o f the fam ilies of the m en in our armed forces and the relatives o f people in cities w hich have been bom bed. I can only give them my solem n promise that they w ill get news just as quickly as possible. This Governm ent w ill put its trust in the stam ina of the Am erican people, and w ill give the facts to the public just as soon as two conditions have been fu lfille d : first, th at th e in fo rm a tio n has been d e fin ite ly an d o ffic ia lly

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confirm ed; and, second, that the release o f the inform ation at the tim e it is received w ill not prove valuable to the enem y directly or indirectly. M ost earnestly I urge m y countrym en to reject all rumors. These ugly little hints of com plete disaster fly thick and fast in wartime. They have to be exam ­ ined and appraised. As an exam ple, I can tell you frankly that u n til further surveys are m ade, I have not sufficient inform ation to state the exact damage w hich has been done to our naval vessels at Pearl Harbor. Adm ittedly the damage is serious. But no one can say how serious, u n til we know how m uch o f this damage can be repaired and how quickly the necessary repairs can be m ade. I cite as another exam ple a statement made on Sunday night that a Japanese carrier had been located and sunk o ff the Canal Zone. And when you hear statements that are attributed to w hat they call "an authoritative source," you can be reasonably sure from now on that under these war circum stances the “authoritative source" is not any person in authority. M any rumors and reports w hich we now hear originate, o f course, w ith enemy sources. For instance, today the Japanese are claim ing that as a result of their one action against Haw aii they hare gained naval suprem acy in the Pacific. This is an old trick o f propaganda w hich has been used innum erable tim es b y the Nazis. The purposes o f such fantastic claim s are, o f course, to spread fear and confusion am ong us, and to goad us into revealing m ilitary inform ation w hich our enemies are desperately anxious to obtain. Our Governm ent w ill not be caught in this obvious trap—and neither w ill the people of the United States. It must be remembered by each and every one o f us that our free and rapid com m unication these days m ust be greatly restricted in wartime. It is not pos­ sible to receive fu ll and speedy and accurate reports front distant areas o f com ­ bat. This is particularly true where naval operations are concerned. For in these days of the marvels of the radio it is often im possible for the Com m anders of various units to report their activities by radio at all, for the very sim ple reason that this inform ation w ould becom e available to the enem y and w ould dis­ close their position and their plan o f defense or attack. O f necessity there w ill be delays in officially confirm ing or denying reports o f operations, but we w ill n ot hide facts from the country if we know the facts and if the enem y w ill not be aided by their disclosure. To all newspapers and radio stations—all those w ho reach the eyes and ears o f the American people—I say this: You have a m ost grave responsibility to the nation now and for the duration o f this war. If you feel that your Governm ent is not disclosing enough o f the truth, you have every right to say so. But in the absence o f all the facts, as revealed by offi­ cial sources, you have no right in the ethics o f patriotism to deal out uncon­ firm ed reports in such a way as to make people believe that they are gospel truth. Every citizen, in every walk of life, shares this same responsibility. The lives

3 20

o f our soldiers and sailors—the whole future o f this nation—depend upon the m anner in w hich each and every one o f us fulfills his obligation to our country. Now a word about the recent past and the future. A year and a h alf has elapsed since the fall o f France, w hen the w hole world first realized the m echanized m ight w hich the Axis nations had been building up for so m any years. America has used that year and a h alf to great advantage. Know ing that the attack m ight reach us in all too short a tim e, we im m ediately began greatly to increase our industrial strength and our capacity to meet the demands o f m od­ em warfare. Precious m onths were gained by sending vast quantities o f our war materi­ al to the nations o f the world still able to resist Axis aggression. Our policy rest­ ed on the fundam ental tm th that the defense o f any country resisting Hitler or Japan was in the long run the defense o f our own country. That policy has been justified. It has given us tim e, invaluable tim e, to build our Am erican assembly lines o f production. Assembly lines are now in operation. Others are being m shed to com ple­ tion . A steady stream o f tanks and planes, o f guns and ships and shells and equipm ent—that is w hat these eighteen m onths have given us. But it is all on ly a beginning o f w hat still has to be done. W e m ust be set to face a long war against crafty and powerful bandits. The attack at Pearl Harbor can be repeated at any one o f m any points, points in both oceans and along both our coast lines and against all the rest o f the Hemisphere. It w ill not only be a long war, it w ill be a hard war. That is the basis on w hich we now lay all our plans. That is the yardstick by w hich we measure what we shall need and dem and; m oney, m aterials, doubled and quadm pled production—ever-increasing. The production m ust be not only for our own Arm y and N avy and air forces. It must reinforce the other armies and navies and air forces fightin g the Nazis and the war lords of Japan throughout the Americas and throughout the world. I have been working today on the subject o f production. Your Governm ent has decided on two broad policies. The first is to speed up all existing production by w orking on a seven day week basis in every war industry, including the production o f essential raw materials. The second policy, now being put into form , is to rush additions to the capacity of production by building more new plants, by adding to old plants, and by using the m any smaller plants for war needs. Over the hard road o f the past m onths, we have at times m et obstacles and difficulties, divisions and disputes, indifference and callousness. That is now all past—and, I am sure, forgotten. The fact is that the country now has an organization in W ashington built around m en and women w ho are recognized experts in their own fields. I ,think the country knows that the people who are actually responsible in each and every one o f these m any fields are pulling together w ith a teamwork that

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has never before been excelled. O n the road ahead there lies hard work—grueling work—day and night, every hour and every m inute. I was about to add that ahead there lies sacrifice for all o f us. But it is not correct to use that word. The U nited States does not consider it a sacrifice to do all one can, to give one's best to our nation, w hen the nation is fightin g for its existence and its future life. It is not a sacrifice for any m an, old or young, to be in the Arm y or the N avy o f the U nited States. Rather it is a privilege. It is not a sacrifice for the industrialist or the wage earner, the farmer or the shopkeeper, the trainm en or the doctor, to pay more taxes, to buy more bonds, to forego extra profits, to work longer or harder at the task for w hich he is best fitted. Rather it is a privilege. It is not a sacrifice to do w ithout m any things to w hich we are accustomed if the national defense calls for doing w ithout it. A review this m orning leads me to the conclusion that at present we shall not have to curtail the norm al use of articles o f food. There is enough food today for all o f us and enough left over to send to those who are fightin g on the same side w ith us. But there w ill be a clear and definite shortage o f metals for m any kinds of civilian use, for the very good reason that in our increased program we shall need for war purposes more than h alf o f that portion o f the principal metals w hich during the past year have gone into articles for civilian use. Yes, we shall have to give up m any things entirely. And I am sure that the people in every part o f the nation are prepared in their individual livin g to w in this war. I am sure that they w ill cheerfully help to pay a large part o f its financial cost w hile it goes on. I am srue they w ill cheerfully give up those m aterial things that they are asked to give up. And I am sure that they w ill retain all those great spiritual things w ithout w hich we cannot w in through. I repeat that the United States can accept no result save victory, fin al and com plete. N ot only must the shame of Japanese treachery be wiped out, but the sources of international brutality, wherever they exist, m ust be absolutely and fin ally broken. In m y message to the Congress yesterday I said that we "w ill make very cer­ tain that this form o f treachery shall never endanger us again." In order to achieve that certainty, we m ust begin the great task that is before us by aban­ doning once and for all the illusion that we can ever again isolate ourselves from the rest o f hum anity. In these past few years—and, m ost violently, in the past three days—we have learned a terrible lesson. It is our obligation to our dead—it is our sacred obligation to their children and to our children—that we m ust never forget what we have learned. And w hat we have learned is this:

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There is no such thing as security for any nation—or any individual—in a world ruled by the principles o f gangsterism . There is no such thing as im pregnable defense against powerful aggressors w ho sneak up in the dark and strike w ithout w arning. W e have learned that our ocean-girt hemisphere is not im m une from severe attack—that we cannot measure our safety in terms o f m iles on any map any more. W e m ay acknowledge that our enemies have performed a brilliant feat o f deception, perfectly tim ed and executed w ith great skill. It was a thoroughly dishonorable deed, but we m ust face the fact that m odem warfare as conduct­ ed in the N azi m anner is a dirty business. W e don't like it—we didn't w ant to get in it—but we are in it and we're going to fight it w ith everything we've got. I do not think any Am erican has any doubt o f our ability to adm inister proper punishm ent to the perpetrators o f these crimes. Your Governm ent knows that for weeks Germ any has been tellin g Japan that if Japan did not attack the United States, Japan w ould not share in divid­ ing the spoils w ith Germ any when peace cam e. She was promised by Germ any that if she came in she would receive the com plete and perpetual control of the whole o f the Pacific area—and that means not only the Ear East, but also all o f the Islands in the Pacific, and also a stranglehold on the west coast of N orth, Central and South Am erica. W e know also that Germ any and Japan are conducting their m ilitary and naval operations in accordance w ith a join t plan. That plan considers all peo­ ples and nations w hich are not helping the Axis powers as com m on enemies of each and every one o f the Axis powers. T hat is their sim ple and obvious grand strategy. A nd th at is w hy the American people m ust realize that it can be m atched only w ith sim ilar grand strategy. W e m ust realize for exam ple that Japanese successes against the United States in the Pacific are helpful to Germ an operations in Libya; that any Germ an success against the Caucasus is inevitably an assistance to Japan in her operations against the D utch East Indies; that a Germ an attack against Algiers or M orocco opens the way to a Germ an attack against South America and the Canal. O n the other side o f the picture, we m ust learn also to know that guerilla warfare against the Germ ans in , let us say Serbia or Norway, helps us; that a successful Russian offensive against the Germ ans helps us; and that British suc­ cesses on land or sea in any part o f the world strengthen our hands. Remember always that Germ any and Italy, regardless o f any form al decla­ ration o f w ar, consider them selves at war w ith the U n ited States at this m om ent just as m uch as they consider them selves at war w ith Britain or Russia. And Germ any puts all the other Republics o f the Americas in to the sam e catego ry o f en em ies. T he p eo p le o f our sister R ep u b lics o f th is Hemisphere can be honored by that fact. The true goal we seek is far above and beyond the ugly field o f battle. W hen

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we resort to force, as now we m ust, we are determined that this force shall be directed toward ultim ate good as w ell as against im m ediate evil. W e Americans are not destroyers—we are builders. W e are now in the m idst o f a war, not for conquest, not for vengeance, but for a world in w hich this nation, and all that this nation represents, w ill be safe for our children. W e expect to elim inate the danger from Japan, but it would serve us ill if we accom plished that and found that the rest o f the world was dom inated by H itler and M ussolini. So we are going to w in the war and we are going to w in the peace that follows. And in the difficult hours o f this day—through dark days that m ay be yet to come—we w ill know that the vast m ajority o f the members o f the hum an race are on our side. M any o f them are fightin g w ith us. A ll o f them are praying for us. But, in representing our cause, we represent theirs as well—our hope and their hope for liberty under G od.

APPENDIX N

Cairo D eclaration (Declaration o f the Three Powers—U .K ., U .S. and C hin a regarding Japan) Signed in Cairo, November 27, 1943 President Roosevelt, Generalissim o Chian g Kai-shek and Prime M inister M r. C h u rch ill, together w ith their respective m ilitary and diplom atic advisers, have com pleted a conference in N orth Africa. The follow ing general statem ent was issued : "The several m ilitary missions have agreed upon future m ilitary operations against Japan. The Three Great Allies expressed their resolve to bring unrelent­ ing pressure against their brutal enemies by sea, land, and air. This pressure is already rising. "The Three Great Allies are fightin g this war to restrain and punish the aggression o f Japan. They covet no gain for them selves and have no thought o f territorial expansion. i t is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped o f all the islands in the Pacific w hich she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first W orld W ar in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the C h in ese, such as M an ch u ria, Form osa, and the Pescadores, sh all be restored to the Republic o f C h in a. Japan w ill also be expelled from all other ter­ ritories w hich she has taken by violence and greed. The aforesaid three great powers, m indful o f the enslavem ent o f the people o f Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall becom e free and independent. "W ith these objectives in view the three Allies, in harmony with those of the United Nations at war with Japan, w ill continue to persevere in the serious and prolonged operations necessary to procure the unconditional surrender of Japan."

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A P P E N D IX O

Agreem ent regarding Ja p a n a t Yalta Conference The leaders o f the three great powers—the Soviet U nion, the U nited States of America and Great Britain—have agreed that in two or three m onths after Germ any has surrendered and the war in Europe is term inated, the Soviet U nion shall enter into war against Japan on the side of the Allies on condition that: 1. The status quo in Outer M ongolia (the M ongolian People's Republic) shall be preserved. 2 . The former rights o f Russia violated by the treacherous attack o f Japan in 1904 shall be restored, viz.: (a) The southern part o f Sakhalin as w ell as the islands adjacent to it shall be returned to the Soviet U nion; (b) The com m ercial port o f Dairen shall be internationalized, the pre­ em inent interests o f the Soviet U nion in this port being safeguard­ ed, and the lease o f Port Arthur as a naval base o f the U .S.S.R . restored; (c) The Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South M anchurian Railroad, w hich provide an outlet to Dairen, shall be join tly operated by the establishm ent of a join t Soviet-Chinese com pany, it being under­ stood that the pre-em inent interests o f the Soviet U n ion shall be safeguarded and that C hin a shall retain sovereignty in M anchuria; 3 . The Kuril Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet U nion. It is understood that the agreement concerning Outer M ongolia and the ports and railroads referred to above w ill require concurrence o f Generalissim o Chiang Kai-shek. The President w ill take measures in order to m aintain this concurrence on advice from M arshal Stalin. The heads o f the three great powers have agreed that these claim s o f the Soviet U n ion shall be unquestionably fu lfilled after Japan has been defeated. For its part, the Soviet U n ion expresses it readiness to conclude w ith the N ational Governm ent o f C hin a a pact o f friendship and alliance between the U .S.S.R . and C h in a in order to render assistance to C hin a w ith its armed forces for the purpose o f liberating C h in a from the Japanese yoke. February 11, 1945. Josef Stalin Franklin D . Roosevelt W inston S. Churchill

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A P P E N D IX P

The Potsdam Proclam ation Ju ly 26, 1945 1. We—the President of the United States, the President of the National Government o f the Republic of China, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, representing the hundreds of m illions of our countrym en, have conferred and agreed that Japan shall be given an opportunity to end this war. 2. The prodigious land, sea and air forces of the United States, the British Empire and of China, many times reinforced by their armies and air fleets from the W est, are poised to strike the final blows upon Japan. This m ilitary power is sustained and inspired by the determination of all the Allied Nations to pros­ ecute the war against Japan until she ceases to exist. 3. The result o f the futile and senseless resistance to the m ight of the aroused free peoples of the world stands forth in awful clarity as an example to the people o f Japan. The m ight that now converges upon Japan is im mea­ surably greater than that w hich, when applied to the resisting Nazis, neces­ sarily laid waste to the lands, the industry and the m ethod of life of the whole German people. The fu ll application of our m ilitary power, backed by our resolve, w ill mean the inevitable and complete destruction of the Japanese armed forces and just as inevitably the utter devastation of the Japanese hom eland. 4. The time has come for Japan to decide whether she w ill continue to be controlled by those self-willed m ilitaristic advisors whose unintelligent calcu­ lations have brought the Empire of Japan to the threshold of annihilation, or whether she w ill follow the path of reason. 5. Following are our terms. We w ill not deviate from them . There are no alternatives. We shall brook no delay. 6. There must be elim inated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and mislead the people of Japan into embarking on a world conquest. We insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible m ilitarism is driven from the world. 7. U n til such a new order is established and until there is convincing proof that Japan's war-making power is destroyed, points in Japanese territory to be designated by the Allies shall be occupied to secure the achievement of the basic objectives we are here setting forth. 8. The terms of the Cairo declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sov­ ereignty shall be lim ited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such m inor islands as we determine. 9. The Japanese m ilitary forces, after being com pletely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes w ith the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives. 10. W e do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or

326

destroyed as a nation, but stem justice shall be meted out to all war crim inals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners. The Japanese governm ent shall rem ove till obstacles to the revival and strengthening of dem ocratic tendencies am ong the Japanese people. Freedom o f speech, o f reli­ gion and o f thought as well as respect for the fundam ental hum an rights shall be established. 11. Japan shall be perm itted to m aintain such industries as w ill sustain her econom y and perm it the exaction o f just reparations in kind, but not those w hich w ould enable her to rearm for war. To this end, access to, as distin­ guished from control of, raw materials shall be perm itted. Eventual Japanese participation in world trade relations shall be perm itted. 12. The occupying forces o f the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as those objectives have been accom plished and there has been estab­ lished in accordance w ith the freely expressed w ill o f the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible governm ent. 13. W e call upon the governm ent o f Japan to proclaim now the uncondi­ tional surrender o f all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and ade­ quate assurances o f their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prom pt and utter destruction.

A PP E N D IX Q

Statem ent by U .S. President Trum an (Announcing the use of A-bomb on Hiroshima) August 6, 1945 Sixteen hours ago an Am erican airplane dropped one bom b on Hiroshim a and destroyed its usefulness to the enem y. That bom b had more power than 20,000 tons o f T .N .T . It had more than two thousand times the blast power of the British "Grand Slam " w hich is the largest bom b ever yet used in the histo­ ry o f warfare. The Japanese began the war from the air at Pearl Harbor. They have been repaid m any fold. And the end is not yet. W ith this bom b we have now added a new and revolutionary increase in destruction to supplem ent the growing power o f our armed forces. In their present form these bombs are now in pro­ duction and even more powerful forms are in developm ent. It is an atom ic bom b. It is a harnessing o f the basic power o f the universe. The force from w hich the sun draws its power has been loosed against those who brought war to the Far East. Before 1939, it was the accepted belief o f scientists that it was theoretically possible to release atom ic energy. But no one knew any practical m ethod of doing it. By 1942, however, we knew that the Germ ans were w orking feverish­

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ly to find a way to add atom ic energy to the other engines o f war w ith w hich they hoped to enslave the w orld. But they failed . W e m ay be grateful to Providence that the Germ ans got the V -l's and V-2's late and in lim ited quan­ tities and even more grateful that they did not get the atom ic bom b at all. The battle o f the laboratories held fateful risks for us as w ell as the battles of the air, land, and sea, and we have now w on the battle o f the laboratories as we have won the other battles. Beginning in 1940, before Pearl Harbor, scientific knowledge useful in was pooled between the U nited States and Great Britain, and m any priceless helps to our victories have com e from that arrangem ent. Under that general policy the research on the atom ic bom b was begun. W ith Am erican and British sci­ entists w orking together we entered the race o f discovery against the Germ ans. The U nited States had available the large num ber o f scientists o f distinction in the m any needed areas o f knowledge. It had the tremendous industrial and financial resources necessary for the project and they could be devoted to it w ithout undue im pairm ent o f other vital war work. In the United States the laboratory work and the production plants, on w hich a substantial start had already been made, w ould be out o f reach o f enem y bom bing, w hile at that tim e Britain was exposed to constant air attack and was still threatened w ith the possibility of invasion. For these reasons Prime M inister C hu rchill and President Roosevelt agreed that it was wise to carry on the project here. We now have two great plants and m any lesser works devoted to the production of atom ic power. Em ploym ent during peak construction numbered 125,000 and over 65,000 individuals are even now engaged in operating the plants. M any have worked there for two and a h a lf years. Few know w hat they have been producing. They see great quantities o f m aterial going in and they see n othin g com ing out o f these plants, for the physical size o f the explosive charge is exceedingly sm all. W e have spent two b illion dollars on the greatest scientific gam ble in history—and w on. But the greatest marvel is not the size o f the enterprise, its secrecy, nor its cost, but the achievem ent o f scientific brains in putting together infinitely com plex pieces o f knowledge held by m any m en in different fields o f science into a workable plan. And hardly less m arvelous has been the capacity of industry to design and o f labor to operate, the m achines and m ethods to do things never done before so that the brainchild o f m any m inds came forth in physical shape and performed as it was supposed to do. Both science and industry w orked under the d irection o f the U n ited States A rm y, w hich achieved a unique success in m anaging so diverse a problem in the advance­ m ent o f knowledge in an am azingly short tim e. It is doubtful if such another com bination could be got together in the w orld. W hat has been done is the greatest achievem ent o f organized science in history. It was done under pres­ sure and w ithout failure. W e are now prepared to obliterate more rapidly and com pletely every pro­ ductive enterprise the Japanese have above ground in any city . W e shall

3 28

destroy their docks, their factories, and their com m unications. Let there be no mistake; we shall com pletely destroy Japan's power to make war. It was to spare the Japanese people from utter destruction that the ultim a­ tum o f Ju ly 26 was issued at Potsdam. Their leaders prom ptly rejected that u lti­ m atum . If they do not now accept our terms they m ay expect a rain o f ruin from the air, the like o f w hich has never been seen on this earth. Behind this air attack w ill follow sea and land forces in such num ber that and power as they have not yet seen and w ith the fightin g skill o f w hich they are already well aware. The Secretary o f W ar, w ho has kept in personal touch w ith all phases o f the project, w ill im m ediately make public a statem ent giving further details. H is statem ent w ill give facts con cern in g the sites at O ak Ridge near K noxville, Tennessee, and at Richland, near Pasco, W ashington, and an instal­ lation near Santa Fe, New M exico. A lthough the workers at the sites have been m aking materials to be used producing the greatest destructive force in histo­ ry they have not them selves been in danger beyond that o f m any other occu­ pations, for the utm ost care has been taken o f their safety. The fact that we can release atom ic energy ushers in a new era in m an's understanding o f nature's forces. Atom ic energy m ay in the future supplem ent the power that now comes from coal, o il, and fallin g water, but at present it cannot be produced on a bases to com pete w ith them com m ercially. Before that comes there must be a long period o f intensive research. It has never been the habit o f the scientists o f this country or the policy of this governm ent to w ithhold from the world scientific know ledge. Norm ally, therefore, everything about the work w ith atom ic energy w ould be made pub­ lic. But under the present circum stances it is not intended to divulge the tech­ nical processes o f production or all the m ilitary applications. Pending further exam ination o f possible m ethods o f protecting us and the rest o f the world from the danger of sudden destruction. I shall recom mend that the Congress of the United States consider prom pt­ ly the establishm ent o f an appropriate com m ission to control the production and use o f atom ic power w ithin the United States. I shall give further consid­ eration and make further recom m endations to the Congress as to how atom ic power can becom e a powerful and forceful influence towards the m aintenance of world peace.

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A P P E N D IX R

M em orandum (Accusation of using an A-bomb on Hiroshima) apprised by Japan to the U.S. (August 10,1945) The Legation o f Switzerland in charge o f Japanese interests has received an urgent cable from the authorities abroad, requesting that the Departm ent of State be im m ediately apprised o f the follow in g com m unication from the Japanese Governm ent, reading, in translation, as follows: "O n August 6, 1945, Am erican airplanes released on the residential district of the tow n o f Hiroshim a bom bs o f a new type, killin g and injuring in one sec­ ond a larger num ber o f civilians and destroying a great part o f the tow n. Not only is the city o f Hiroshim a a provincial tow n w ithout any protection or spe­ cial m ilitary installations o f any kind, but also none o f the neighboring region of this tow n constitutes a m ilitary objective. "In a declaration President Truman has asserted that he w ould use these bombs for the destruction o f docks, factories, and installations o f transporta­ tion. However, this bom b, provided w ith a parachute, in fallin g has a destruc­ tive force o f a great scope as a result of its explosion in the air. It is evident, therefore, that it is technically im possible to lim it the effect o f its use to special objectives such as designated by President Trum an, and the Am erican author­ ities are perfectly aware o f this. In fact, it has been established on the scene that the damage extends over a great area and that com batant and non-com ­ batant m en and wom en, old and young, are massacred w ithout discrim ination by the atm ospheric pressure of the explosion, as w ell as by the radiating heat w hich results therefrom . Consequently there is involved a bom b having the m ost cruel effects hum anity has ever know n, not on ly as far as the extensive and im m ense damage is concerned, but also for reasons of suffering endured by each victim . "It is an elem entary principle o f international public law that in tim e of war the belligerents do not have unlim ited right in the choice o f the means of attack and that they cannot resort to projectile arms or any other means capa­ ble o f causing the enem y needless suffering. These principles are stipulated in the Convention respecting the laws and customs o f war on land and in Article 22, as w ell as under letter (E) o f Article 23 o f the rules concerning the laws and customs o f war on land. Since the beginning o f the present war, the American Governm ent has declared on various occasions that the use o f gas o f other inhum an means o f com bat were considered illegal in the public opinion of civilized hum an society and that it w ould not avail itself o f these means before enem y countries resorted to them . The bom bs in question , used by the Am ericans, by their cruelty and by their terrorizing effects, surpass by far gas or any other arm the use o f w hich is prohibited by the treaties for reasons o f their

3 30

characteristics. "The Americans have effected bom bardm ents of towns in the greatest part o f Japanese territory, w ithout discrim ination massacring a great number of old people, w om en, children; destroying and burning down Shinto and Buddhist tem ples, schools, hospitals, livin g quarters, etc. This fact alone means that they have shown com plete defiance o f the essential principles o f hum anitari­ an laws, as w ell as international law. They now use this new bom b, having an uncontrollable and cruel effect m uch greater than any other arms or projec­ tiles ever used to date. This constitutes a new crime against hum anity and civ­ ilization. The Governm ent o f Japan, in its own name and at the same tim e in the name of all hum anity and civilization, accuses the Am erican Governm ent w ith the present note o f the use of an inhum an weapon of this nature and demands energetically abstinence from its use." Reference: 1-10 W ASH IN GTO N , August 11, 1945

A PP E N D IX S

Instrum ent o f surrender signed by Japan and Allied Powers (September 2,1945) W e, acting by com m and o f and on behalf o f the Emperor of Japan, the Japanese Governm ent and the Japanese Im perial General Headquarters, here­ by accept the provisions set forth in the declaration issued by the Heads of the Governm ents o f the U nited States, C hin a, and Great Britain on 26 Ju ly 1945 at Potsdam , and subsequently adhered to b y the U n io n o f Soviet Socialist Republics, w hich four powers are hereafter referred to as the A llied Powers. W e hereby proclaim the unconditional surrender to the A llied Powers of the Japanese Im perial General Headquarters and o f all Japanese armed forces and all armed forces under the Japanese control wherever situated. W e hereby com m and all Japanese forces wherever situated and the Japanese people to cease hostilities forthw ith, to preserve and save from damage all ships, aircraft, and m ilitary and civil property and to com ply w ith all require­ m ents w hich m ay be im posed by the Supreme Com m ander for the Allied Powers or by agencies o f the Japanese Governm ent at his direction. W e hereby com m and the Japanese Im perial Headquarters to issue at once orders to the Com m anders o f all Japanese forces and all forces under Japanese control wherever situated to surrender unconditionally them selves and all forces under their control. W e hereby com m and a ll civ il, m ilitary and naval officials to obey and

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enforce all proclam ations, and orders and directives deemed by the Supreme Com m ander for the Allied Powers to be proper to effectuate this surrender and issued by him or under his authority and we direct all such officials to remain at their posts and to continue to perform their non-com batant duties unless specifically relieved by him or under his authority. W e hereby undertake for the Emperor, the Japanese Governm ent and their successors to carry out the provisions o f the Potsdam Declaration in good faith, and to issue whatever orders and take whatever actions m ay be required by the Supreme Com m ander for the Allied Powers or by any other designated representative o f the A llied Powers for the purpose o f giving effect to that Declaration. W e hereby com m and the Japanese Im perial Governm ent and the Japanese Im perial General Headquarters at once to liberate all allied prisoners o f war and civilian internees now under Japanese control and to provide for their pro­ tection, care, m aintenance and im m ediate transportation to places as directed. The authority o f the Emperor and the Japanese Governm ent to rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme C om mander for the Allied Powers who w ill take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate these terms o f surrender. Signed at Tokyo Bay, Japan at 0904 on the Second day of September, 1945. M (Mamoru Shigem itsu) By Com m and and on behalf o f the Emperor of Japan and the Japanese Governm ent, f t # H'/ni® (Yoshijiro Um izu) By Com m and and on behalf o f the Japanese Im perial General Headquarters. Accepted at Tokyo Bay, Japan at 0908 on the Second day of September, 1945, for the U nited States, Republic o f C h in a, United Kingdom and the U n ion of Soviet Socialist Republics, and in the interests o f the other U nited Nations at war w ith Japan. Douglas M acArthur Supreme Com m ander for the A llied Powers. C . W . N im itz United States Representative ^ 7k H (Hsu Yung-ch'ang) Republic o f C h in a Representative Bruce Fraser United Kingdom Representative Lieutenant-General Kuzm a Derevyanko U nion o f Soviet Socialist Republics Representative Thomas A. Blarney

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Com m onw ealth o f Australia Representative L. M oore Cosgrave D om inion o f Canada Representative Jacques Le Clerc Provisional Governm ent of the French Republic Representative S. H elfrich Kingdom o f the Netherlands Representative S. M . Isitt D om inion o f New Zealand Representative

A PP E N D IX T

M em orandum o f conversation between M acArthur and Atcheson October 27, 1945 M EM O R A N D U M OF CO N V ERSA TIO N Emperor's statem ent that Tojo tricked him in regard to tim ing of declaration o f war against the U nited States. General M acArthur M r. Atcheson G eneral M acA rthur told m e today th at w hen H iroh ito called on him (Septem ber 27, 1945 ) the Em peror cam e in to the draw ing room at the Embassy where M acArthur awaited him , and bowed to the w aist. After they shook hands and sat dow n, the Emperor said that he had not intended that the attack on Pearl Harbor take place before receipt by the U .S. Governm ent of the Japanese declaration o f war on the U nited States; but Tojo had tricked him . The Emperor said that he did not m ention this to escape responsibility; he was the leader o f the Japanese people and he was responsible for the actions o f the Japanese people. George Atcheson, Jr. *In the possession o f U .S . N ational Archives Courtesy o f Ikuhiko Hata

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A P P E N D IX U

Em peror Showa's monologue (c. April 23, 1946) By Hidenari Terasaki (H id en ari T erasaki w as First Secretary at th e Jap an ese Em bassy in W ashington at the tim e o f the outbreak o f the Pacific W ar. W hen he com piled this docum ent, he was serving as Emperor Showa's interpreter. It should be noted th at the m onologue con tain s n o t o n ly Em peror's words bu t also Terasaki's own words, depending on sentences.) The question arises—if the Emperor possessed the power to stop the war 15 August 1945, before lapan was invaded, w hy did he perm it the war to start in the first place? To throw ligh t on this question, it is necessary to go back to 1927 and to let the Emperor him self trace his position in relation to the m ilitarists. It w ill be recalled that in 1927 Chang Tso Lin, W ar Lord o f M anchuria, was killed in a railw ay accident w hen the train on w hich he was ridin g was wrecked by an explosion. C o lo n el D aisaku Kom oto was the Japanese com m ander o f the railw ay guards along the track where the wreck occurred. Gossip went around that the Japanese were responsible for the wreck w hich killed Chang and that Colonel Kom oto personally was to blam e. In Tokyo, Prime M inister Tanaka told me that the train wreck w hich killed Chang Tso Lin was most regretful; that Kom oto was to blam e and w ould be punished m ost severely; that the Japanese Governm ent w ould apologize to the Chinese Governm ent provided the Emperor approved. Tanaka also related this version o f the killin g to Count M akino, then Lord Keeper o f the Privy Seal, Prince Saionji, Elder Statesm an, and M r. Suzuki, then Grand Cham berlain in the Palace and assured them that Kom oto w ould be court-m artialed and that he and others w ho were im plicated w ould be severe­ ly punished. But w hen it appeared to C olonel Kom oto that he faced court-m artial, he said if this were done he w ould reveal all he knew about the entire plot for the im pending rape o f M anchuria; that he was merely the cat's paw, doing what he had been ordered to do as com m ander o f the Railway Guard. Consequently, when Premier Tanaka disclosed these facts to the cabinet he met w ith strong opposition. The cabinet realized that if they punished Colonel Kom oto and others, Japan's position in international affairs w ould be very dif­ ficu lt. Therefore, the cabinet decided the case should be hushed up somehow. The strongest opposition to the court-m artial came from the then Railroad M inister, H eikichi Ogawa. Then Tanaka came again to me and explained that in view o f Kom oto's atti­

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tude this case should be hushed up som ehow. I replied "W hat you say now is entirely different from what you had told me before. D on 't you think you ought to tender resignation?" Then Tanaka resigned. There was no court-mar­ tial for C olonel Kom oto. Later M r. Fusanosuke Kuhara (now in Sugam o Prison) spread the rumor that the Tanaka cabinet failed ow ing to intrigue in the Im perial H ousehold. Kuhara was a protege o f Tanaka w ho spread the rumor to save face for Tanaka, and to attack the Im perial H ousehold, for he dare not directly attack the Emperor, for interfering in governm ent affairs. As Emperor, I deeply resented Kuhara's act. N aturally this was a very bitter lesson and I made up m y m ind to ratify what the Cabinet decided to do. Since the Cabinet had persuaded Premier Tanaka to reverse h im self on the C h a n g Tso L in in cid e n t and since th e Im perial Household had been blam ed for causing the reversal o f the Cabinet, it was clear I had no control anyway. I decided that henceforth in affairs of this nature all matters w ould have to be left entirely in the hands o f the Cabinet. There was another in cid ent w hich strengthened this decision to leave everything to the Cabinet, and this was the Lytton Report. That was about 19 3 2 .1 sincerely wished to swallow the Lytton Report just as it was presented and confided this resolution to C ou n t M akino and Prince Saionji. M akino agreed but Saionji differed, and advised adherence to the Cabinet decision, w hich was to reject the Lytton Report. This was the second incident where I was unable to follow m y own desire and was obliged to yield to the Cabinet. From 1932 on , the Emperor follow ed the Cabinet decision all the tim e except two incidents. The first was at the tim e of February 26 (1936) incident. The Arm y M inistry did not know what to do w ith those assassins and was rather weak toward them , but fortunately the then Finance M inister, C h u ji M achida, told me if the Governm ent did not take strong measures, there would be financial chaos in Jap an . At that tim e there could be no Cabinet m eeting, as Prime M inister Okada was hiding in the closet o f the m aid's room o f his official residence. Then, because there was no Cabinet in being at the m om ent, I stepped in and issued the com m and to attack the insurgents and the Arm y follow ed those orders and the insurrection was put down. The other incident was in the summer o f 1945 at the tim e o f the closing events o f W orld W ar II. Then Cabinet was divided, unable to function, and Prime M inister Suzuki requested me to break the deadlock. I then com m anded acceptance o f the Potsdam Declaration. Shanghai Incident: During the Shanghai incident in 1932 I told General Shirakawa to localize the battle as m uch as possible and in any event to stop it before it reached N anking. These instructions were not know n by the General Staff. However, General Shirakawa obeyed m y personal com m and and stopped the war on M arch 3. For com pliance w ith these instructions General Shirakawa was

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reprim anded by the General Staff. Later w hen General Shirakawa died o f w ounds suffered in the Honkuw bom bing incident, I wrote and sent a poem to the General's widow in appre­ ciation of her husband's loyalty in stopping the Shanghai battle. This poem goes like this: "I can't help recalling the General who stopped the war on the day of G irls', D olls, Festival."* It happens the battle was stopped on M arch 3, the G irls' D olls' Festival. Nobody knows about this poem except the General's fam ily because the then Aide-de-Cam p to the Emperor asked me and the General's fam ily to keep this poem an utter secret. It is obvious that the Aide-de-Cam p spoke for the m ili­ tarists w ho did not want the people to know the Emperor's attitude. The m ili­ tarists, in effect, right then were giving me orders. *OTOM E RA N O H IN A M ATSURU H IN IIK U SA OBA TO D O M ESH IISA O O M O ID E NIKERI Abe Cabinet: The Hiranum a Cabinet fell in 1939. Japan had made an Anti-Com intern Pact w ith Germ any and w hen Germ any made a N eutrality Agreem ent w ith Russia in August 1939 the Japanese people were stunned. As a consequence, the Hiranum a Cabinet fell and the Abe Cabinet came in . For this new Cabinet the m ost difficult and largest problem was how to select a M inister o f W ar. The newspapers m entioned two nam es, one o f w hom was Lt. G en . Isogai (who is now in Sugam o), and the other I cannot now recall. I was determined not to have any General w ho m ight m ove toward an alliance between Japan and Germ any and proposed two nam es. General Hata and General Um ezu. I was sure both these officers were opposed to an alliance w ith Germ any. (Before Hata had been made m y Aide-de-Cam p, I had instructed the then Im perial Household M inister Matsudaira to find out whether or not Hata was against the alliance between Jap an and Germ any, and after fin d in g out Hata was against it, I had selected him as Senior Aide-de-Cam p.) Abe did not know what to do, and consulted General Itagaki who opposed Um ezu; there was then no alternative for Abe except to select Hata, w ho at that tim e was m y Senior Aidede-Cam p. Yonai Cabinet: As for Yonai I had considered him because he was against an alliance w ith Germ any. But before appointing Yonai I consulted Prince Fushim i, w ho was C h ief o f the N aval General Staff. He was against this alliance too and agreed w ith me on Yonai. Then the Yonai Cabinet came in . W hen Yonai was made Prime M inister I had called upon General Hata to

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assist, in the anticipation that he w ould be made M inister o f W ar. Hata's posi­ tion against the alliance w ith Germ any was w ell know n and the Arm y opposed his appointm ent violently. This opposition, aided by others who were for an alliance between Japan and Germ any, increased and fin ally forced the Yonai Cabinet to fall. Second Konove Cabinet: A lliance between Japan and Germ any. The second Konoye C ab in et was fo rm e d .... The N avy M in ister, Zengo Yoshida, agreed finally to the alliance between Japan and Germ any after being persuaded by Foreign M inister Matsuoka that, because o f the alliance between Japan and Germ any, the U nited States w ould not enter the war. Somehow M atsuoka also thought that the United States w ould stay out o f the war because there are so m any people o f Germ an extraction in the United States—about h alf o f the America population, he explained. Yoshida believed it, but right after the Japanese-Germ an alliance the United States began openly to prepare for war. Yoshida was astounded and became so worried that he suffered from a terrible nervous breakdown, attempted suicide, and then resigned. "M atsuoka had gone to Germ any at the end o f February 1941 and returned in April. After this visit he was an entirely different person. M aybe he was bought o ff by H itler. W hen he came back he told me he was treated like a king in Europe, and in Berlin was given the best reception in his life. But he would not report details about Germ any. He reported about M oscow, but he made no m en tion in h is report o f B erlin. It is very d iffic u lt to understand w hat M atsuoka did do. He is a strange character, in that he w ould always oppose any plan started by others. If others started a plan M atsuoka w ould have none of it. If it were his project, all right, but even then he m ust do it him self. If anybody else does it he doesn't like it. M atsuoka m et Ambassador Steinhart in M oscow and after that he im agined the talk between him and M r. Steinhart was the beginning o f negotiations between Japan and the U nited States. But w hen he came back to Japan he found that the discussions between Steinhart and him self were u n official, not in line w ith w hat was going on in W ashington. Then his concern over the talk was cooled o ff and he became unconcerned and made everything about the negotiation very hard. In M atsuoka's conference w ith me on his return from Berlin he talked loquaciously for two hours, m entioning everything except w hat happened in Berlin. I pressed him for the answer, but was tired after listening to his digres­ sions for two hours, and did not push his questions further. Subsequent to this two-hour session, I talked w ith M atsuoka tim e after tim e, but was never able to learn w hat he did in Berlin. There is little doubt in m y m ind that Matsuoka made a m ilitary com m itm ent w ith Hitler. A t any rate, M atsuoka was exceedingly pro-Germ an. In M ay he had urged m e to break the neutrality pact w ith USSR, tellin g me that there w ould soon be war w ith Germ any and the Soviet U n ion . In order for Japan to attack the

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Soviet U n io n , he insisted that we m ust refrain from further m ovem ent in to the south. The N avy had been against war w ith the Soviet U n ion all the tim e, and the Arm y was against it also, but rather for the reason that the Arm y was not ready. Therefore, both the Arm y and the N avy opposed M atsuoka's recom ­ m endation to m e. I was very m uch surprised w ith M atsuoka's attitude, since he him self had made the neutrality pact w ith the Soviet U n io n in A pril, and a m on th later urged m e to break it. I was flabbergasted and asked "D id you talk the m atter over w ith Premier Konoye?" M atsuoka said "N o" w hich flabbergasted m e still m ore. A fter this conference w ith M atsuoka, I told Konoye to perm it h im to resign and if he refused, to fire h im , but Konoye, w ho was really weak, did n ot w ant to fire h im , and in Ju ly resigned h im self in order to get M atsuoka out o f the cabinet. I im m ediately reappointed Konoye Prim e M inister for the third tim e. U pon reappointm ent, Konoye m ade Toyoda his new Foreign M inister. The war betw een G erm any and the Soviet U n io n started on 22 Ju n e . At the Im perial C on feren ce o f Ju ly 2 th e con feren ce succeeded in stopp in g war against the Soviet U n io n , b u t decided to invade South French In d o -C h in a. Som e tim e in August w hen Japanese troops were in H ainan Tao (South o f H ong Kong) the Emperor to ld the new Prim e M inister T ojo, through General H asunum a, Senior A ide-de-Cam p, to call back those troops from H ainan Tao to Jap an , tellin g that the dom estic rice crop was very poor and that if rice were not im ported from the South the Japanese people w ould starve. Therefore, that occupation in In d o -C hin a should be stopped as it w ould undoubtedly lead to serious international com plications w hich w ould cut o ff the rice lin e from the South. Tojo did n ot listen to the Em peror. The Emperor did n o th in g m ore and he felt h im self helpless. Japanese occupation o f South French In d o -C h in a w hich was announced Ju ly 26, brought forth im m ediate freezing o f Japanese assets in Am erica. As for the freezing, the then Financial M inister Retsu Kawada, knew that occupation w ould cause freezing, but he as Finance M inister was n ot perm itted to attend the Liaison Conference where the occupation o f In d o -C h in a had been dis­ cussed and decided u pon . Liaison Conferences betw een the G eneral Staff and the C ab in et were very im portant; on ly the m ore im portant people attended, but the Finance M inister, Kawada, w ho was n ot a m ilitarist, was n ot perm itted to sit in the sessions, and Konoye was n ot versed in fin an cial m atters. I as Emperor could learn o f fin an cial m atters on ly from Arm y and N avy people, never an yth in g o f consequence from m y Finance M inister because he knew n oth in g o f the m ilitarists' plans Kawada lam ented and regretted that things w ent on like th is, but had n o chance to listen to the Arm y and N avy people and never knew their plans. A ssassin ation o f Fin an ce M in ister K orekiyo T akahashi was m u ch m ore m ean in g fu l th a n th e assassin ation o f Prim e M in ister Saito because it was T akahashi w ho coped w ith th e m ilita rists. N eith er A raki n or an y other

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m ilitarist could cope w ith th is grand old m an , hope o f civ ilia n statesm en w ho opposed the m ilitarists. Takahashi m ade babies o f the m ilitarists. His assassination m eant the death o f civ ilia n op position to the m ilitarists. Im perial Conference: The Im perial Conference is funny stuff. The Emperor has no right to vote. The only civilian w ho has the right o f voting is the President o f the Privy C ou n cil, but strangely, he is allowed to attend neither the Cabinet m eetings or Liaison Conferences. He does not know m uch about states o f affairs. The Im perial Conference consists of the Arm y and Navy M inisters and staff sitting before the Emperor. Everything presented is voted through by unani­ mous opinion except the President of the Privy C ou n cil, but he hasn't enough knowledge o f state affairs. As for the Emperor he sits there, listens to the unan­ im ous vote, has his picture taken w ith the members; it is all very impressive. It is all show, mere eyewash for the public. If I as Emperor w ould have exercised veto around November or December 1941 there m ight have been terrible disorder. The trusted m en around me w ould have been k ille d , I m yself m ight have been killed or kidnapped. Actually I was virtually a prisoner and powerless. M y opposition w ould never have been know n outside the Palace. It m ight have gone to m ost barbaric war, and it w ould have been im possible to stop the war at all, no m atter w hat I did. Under the Constitution, the Emperor has to listen to the decision o f the Cabinet, and if I ratified w hat I liked and vetoed w hat I did not like maybe I would be equivalent to the despotic king. To me it seemed a violation o f m y constitutional governm ent unless there was a disagreement am ong cabinet members. O n November 26, 1941 the Japanese Embassy, W ashington, received the so-called November 26 note from the State Departm ent in W ashington. The Japanese Embassy thought that it was an ultim atum . O n that n igh t Kurusu called me to a private room and told me that if it were going to go on like this that there w ould be war between the two nations. He said, "W e are desperate. We have no choice trying to stop the war and I am thinking to have M r. Roosevelt send a wire to the Emperor. That m ight stop the w ar." He told me, "C a n 't you som ehow m anage to achieve it?" A nd both M r. Kurusu and I recalled a past in cid en t in w hich at the tim e o f the Panay In cid en t M r. Roosevelt sent a telegram , a personal telegram to the Em peror, but that telegram was addressed through the then Foreign M inister and that telegram was never handed over to the Emperor. Both M r. Kurusu and I recalled that at the tim e o f the Panay Incident that M r. Roosevelt's telegram to the Emperor, c/o the Foreign M inister, was never handed over to the Emperor, hence no reply whatsoever. Therefore it is not an easy job at all to have M r. Roosevelt send a wire to the Emperor. M r. Kurusu sent a telegram , addressing it to Togo and Kido around the 27th, tellin g th a t, "I am tryin g to have M r. Roosevelt send a telegram to the

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Em peror. D o you th in k th at w ould help the situation? This war m ight endan­ ger the life o f the Em peror. W e have got to stop it." T hat is w hat he sent to Togo. A t th at same tim e he wired K ido, "I sent a very im portant telegram to Togo. D o n 't fail to see it." Those telegram s were never show n to the Emperor. I asked the Emperor if he saw them . He said he did n o t. Both Togo and Kido failed to show them . W hen M r. Kurusu asked m e to do som ething about it, his secretary was present, and n o t on ly Kurusu and I, bu t his secretary knew it. That secretary and I were n ot on good term s. If that fellow had spilled the beans during the war, after I returned to Jap an th at w ould have been the end o f m e. It was obvious that M r. Roosevelt still rem em bered his unpleasant experi­ ence in the past. M r. Kurusu did n ot tell m e how to do it. Then I tho ugh t o f M r. Stanley Jo n es, a M ethodist m issionary w hom I understood could see the President w hen he w anted. N ext day, on the 27th, I m et M r. Jon es and told that idea to M r. Jon es, tellin g that that should be quite secret from the eyes o f Japanese m ilitarists, especially because an yth in g connected w ith the Emperor was fatal. A n y action w hich I m ight take related to the Emperor m ight result in violence against me should I be caught. M r. Jon es understood the w hole situation, and he did w hat is printed in the N IPPO N TIM ES, Jan u ary 7, in big headlines. There it is clear w hat he did, except he does n o t m ention m y nam e. He writes o n ly , "a Japanese— ". I th in k he tried to protect m e. He d id n 't m ention m y nam e, Terasaki, but m entioned tw o nam es, Kurusu and N om ura. M r. Jo n es did n o t m eet w ith Kurusu or N om ura. Therefore, in that respect that article is m istaken, but the rest is all correct. He states to defend Kurusu and N om in a, b u t actually he did n ot m eet them . W hen M r. Jon es saw M r. Roosevelt, M r. Roosevelt told M r. Jo n es, "I was th in k in g the same th in g , th at is, to send a wire to the Em peror. I talked to m y advisers and all agreed, therefore, I am goin g to send a wire o f m y ow n in itia­ tive. A nd please tell the Japanese patriot to feel relieved because I am sending it on m y ow n in itiativ e." That m eans he knew a Japanese connected w ith any­ th in g Im perial w ould be in danger. Therefore, I though t M r. Roosevelt was quite nice about it. He sent the wire but it was a little too late. M r. Grew heard over the radio that the telegram was sent, on the n ig h t o f the 7th, but still the telegram was n ot delivered. M y suspicion is th is, that the telegram was held at the Post O ffice for som e tim e, w hich was under con trol o f the m ilitarists. Around 7 o 'clock M r. Grew heard over the radio that Roosevelt sent the telegram and he was w aitin g, bu t n o delivery. D elivery was m ade around m id n igh t. D o n 't you th in k it was on purpose? M r. Grew w ent to M r. Togo and asked for audience because instructions from M r. Roosevelt was to deliver the telegram directly to the Em peror. T hat p o in t I to ld M r. Jo n es to m ake it quite clear to M r. Roosevelt to address the wire to the Em peror through M r. Grew for personal delivery, qu otin g the last bitter experience. Therefore, M r. Grew did follow

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the instruction to the letter, but it was m idnight already and Togo said, "It is too late to tell the Em peror." He told M r. Grew , "G ive m e that telegram m yself. It is too late to have audience w ith the Em peror." And Togo got that telegram around 3 o'clock in the m orning. ‘ Bonner F. Fellers Papers, in the possession o f M acArthur M em orial

A PP E N D IX V

Verdicts an d sentences a t the In tern ation al M ilita ry Tribunal for the F a r E a st (excerpt) (The reading of the verdicts in the Tribunal began at Court House o f the Tribunal in the W ar M inistry Building, currently the Defense Agency Building, Tokyo, on the afternoon o f November 4,1948 , and continued on November 5, 8, 9, 10,11 and 12. Finally, on the after­ noon o f November 12, the sentences were handed down.) (November 12,1948) VERDICTS The Tribunal w ill now proceed to render its verdict in the case o f each o f the accused. Article 17 of the Charter requires that the judgm ent shall give the reasons on w hich it is based. Those reasons are stated in the recital of facts and the statem ent of fin dings the reading of w hich has just been com pleted. Therein the Tribunal has exam ined m inutely the activities o f each o f the accused con­ cerned in relation to the matters in issue. Consequently, the Tribunal does not propose in the verdicts now to be read to repeat the m any particular findings on w hich the verdicts are based. It w ill give its reasons in general terms for its findings in respect of each accused, such general reasons being based on the particular statements and findings in the recital already referred to. A R AK I, Sadao The defendant Araki, Sadao is charged under Count 1 w ith conspiracy to wage aggressive wars and wars in violation o f international law , treaties, agree­ ments and assurances. He is charged also under Counts 27, 29, 31, 32, 33, 35 and 36 w ith w aging such wars. Under Counts 54 and 55, he is charged w ith responsibility for war crimes com m itted in C h in a. A t all m aterial tim es he was a M ilitary O fficer of high rank. He became a Lieutenant-General in 1927 and a General in 1933. Throughout, he was prom inent in the hierarchy o f the Arm y. He was an energetic proponent of the Arm y policy of political dom ination at hom e and o f m ilitary aggression abroad. He was in fact, and was recognized

Appendices / 341

as being, one o f the prom inent leaders o f that Arm y m ovem ent. As a member o f different Cabinets, he advanced the Arm y p olicy to prepare for wars of aggression by stim ulating the warlike spirit o f the young m en o f Jap an , by m obilizing Japan's m aterial resources for war, and by speeches and by control o f the press in citin g and preparing the Japanese people for war. Both in and out o f political office, he helped to form ulate and was a vigorous advocate of the policy o f the m ilitary party to enrich Japan at the expense o f her neigh­ bors. He both approved and actively supported the policies undertaken by the Japanese Arm y in M anchuria and Jeh ol to separate that territory politically from C h in a, to create a Japanese-controlled governm ent, and to place its econ­ om y under the dom ination o f Jap an . The Tribunal finds him to have been one o f the leaders o f the conspiracy set out in Count 1 and he is adjudged guilty under that C ou n t. Araki assumed office as M inister o f W ar in December 1931, after the aggres­ sive war against the Republic o f C h in a in M anchuria had com m enced. He con­ tinued as M inister o f W ar u n til January 1934. Throughout that period, he took a prom inent part in the developm ent and the carrying out of the m ilitary and political policies pursued in M anchuria and Je h o l. He gave all possible support to the successive m ilitary steps taken for the occupation of that portion o f the territories o f C h in a. Araki, from M ay 1938 u n til August 1939, was M inister of Education, in w hich capacity he approved and collaborated in m ilitary opera­ tions in other parts o f C h in a. W e have found that the war in C h in a was, from 1931 onwards, a war o f aggression, and we find that this defendant participat­ ed in the w aging o f that war. Accordingly, we find him guilty under Count 27. There is no evidence that he took any active part in the wars referred to in Counts 29, 31, 32, 33, 35 and 36, on al o f w hich we find him not gu ilty. As to war crim es, there is no evidence of his responsibility for such crimes and we fin d him not guilty under Counts 54 and 55. D O H IH A R A , K en ji The defendant Dohihara, Kenji is charged under Counts 1, 27, 29, 31, 32, 33, 35, 36, 54 and 55. A t the com m encem ent o f the period under review, Dohihara was a Colonel in the Japanese Arm y, and by April 1941, had attained the rank o f General. Before the M anchurian Affair, he had been in C hin a for about eighteen years and had com e to be regarded in the Arm y as a specialist on C h in a. He was in ti­ m ately involved in the in itiation and developm ent o f the war o f aggression waged against C hin a in M anchuria and in the subsequent establishm ent o f the Japanese-dom inated state o f M anchukuo. As the aggressive p olicy o f the Japanese m ilitary party was pursued in other areas in C hin a, Dohihara took a prom inent part in its developm ent by political intrigue, by threat o f force and by the use o f force. Dohihara acted in close association w ith other leaders o f the m ilitary fac­ tion in the developm ent, preparation and execution of their plans to bring

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East and South East Asia under Japanese dom ination. W hen his special knowledge o f C hin a and his capacity for intrigue there were no longer required, he was em ployed as a General O fficer in the field in pursuit o f the aims for w hich he had conspired. He took part in the w aging of aggressive war not only against C h in a, but also against the U .S.S.R . and against those countries against w hom also Japan waged aggressive war from 1941 until 1945, excepting the Republic o f France. As to the wars waged against the U .S.S.R . in 1938 and 1939, Dohihara was a Lieutenant General on the General S ta ff, w h ich had overh ead co n tro l o f th e Lake K h assan fig h tin g . A t N om onhan, elements o f the Arm y he com m anded took part in that fightin g. As to the w aging o f war against the Republic o f France (Count 33), the deci­ sion to wage this war was made by the Supreme C oun cil for the Direction of W ar in February 1945. The accused was not a party to that decision, and the evidence does not establish that he took part in the w aging o f that war. W e fin d him to be guilty o f conspiracy to wage aggressive war under Count 1 and o f w aging aggressive wars as charged under Counts 2 7 ,2 9 , 31 32, 35 and 36. He is not guilty under C ou n t 33. Dohihara com m anded the 7th Area Arm y from April 1944 u n til April 1945. This com m and included M alaya, Sum atra, Java and for a tim e Borneo. The evidence as to the extent o f his responsibility for protecting prisoners o f war w ithin the area o f his com m and from murder and torture is con flictin g. At least, he was responsible for their supplies o f food and m edicine. The evidence is clear that they were grossly ill-treated in respect o f these supplies. Prisoners were starved and deaths from m alnu trition and food d eficien cy diseases occurred at an appalling rate. These conditions applied on ly to prisoners o f war and did n ot occur am ong their captors. It was urged in defense that the deterioration o f Japan's war position in these areas and the severance o f com ­ m unications made it im possible to m aintain better supplies for prisoners. The evidence shows that food and m edicine was available w hich could have been used to relive the terrible conditions o f the prisoners. These supplies were w ithheld upon a policy for w hich Dohihara was responsible. U pon these find­ ings o f fact, Dohihara's offence falls rather w ithin Count 54 than Count 55. A ccordingly, he is found gu ilty under C ou n t 54, and we make no finding under C ou n t 55. H A SH IM O T O , K ingoro Hashim oto is indicted under Counts 1, 27, 29, 31, 32, 54 and 55. He was an Arm y officer, and early joined the conspiracy. He thereafter fur­ thered the achievem ent o f its objects by all the means in his power. None of the conspirators held more extreme views that he did; none was more outspo­ ken in his statement o f these views. In the beginning, he advocated the expan­ sion o f Japan through the seizure o f M anchuria by force o f arms. As tim e went on, he advocated the use o f force against all Japan's neighbors for the accom ­ plishm ent of the aims of the conspirators.

Appendices / 343

He was an ardent adm irer o f governm ent b y m ilitary dictatorship. He detested the political parties, w hich played some part in the governm ent of Japan and opposed the schemes o f conquest w hich the conspirators were determined to effect. He was a principal in m any of the activities by w hich the conspirators came ultim ately to suppress the opposition o f the dem ocratic ele­ ments in Japan and to control the governm ent. W ithout this control, their aggressive schemes could not have been accom plished. Thus, for exam ple, he was one of the principles in the plots of M arch and October 1931 w hich were designed to overthrow the existing cabinets and to establish cabinets in their place w hich w ould support the conspirators. He was also a party to the plot of M ay 1932, o f w hich the object and result was the assassination o f Premier Inukai, who had cham pioned dem ocracy and opposed the policies o f the con­ spirators. his publications and the activities o f the societies he founded or sup­ ported were largely devoted to the d estru ction o f dem ocracy and the establishm ent o f a form of governm ent more favorable to the use of war for achieving the expansion of Japan. He played some part in planning the occurrence o f the M ukden Incident so as to give the Arm y a pretext for seizing M anchuria. He claim ed some of the credit for the seizure o f M anchuria and for Jap an leavin g the League o f N ations. After its early years, it was m ainly as a propagandist that he figured in the execution o f the conspiracy. He was a prolific publicist and contributed to the success o f the conspiracy by in citin g the appetite o f the Japanese people for the possessions o f Japan's neighbors, by inflam ing Japanese opinion for war to secure these possessions, by his advocacy o f an alliance w ith Germ any and Italy w hich were bent on sim ilar schemes o f expansion, by his denunciation of treaties by w hich Japan had bound herself to refrain from the schemes of aggrandisement w hich were the aims o f the conspiracy, and by his fervent support o f the agitation for a great increase in the armaments o f Japan so that she m ight secure these aims by force or the threat o f force. He was a principal in the form ation o f the conspiracy and contributed largely to its execution. Ads to Count 27, having first plotted the seizure o f M anchuria by force of arms, he thereafter played some part in the planning o f the M ukden Incident so that it m ight serve as a pretext for the seizure o f M anchuria. Being thus fully apprised that the war against C h in a was a war o f aggression, and being one of those w ho had conspired to bring about that war, he did everything w ithin his power to secure its success. For a tim e he was, in fact, a m ilitary com m ander in the field. He thereby waged a war o f aggression against C hin a as charged in C ou n t 27. There is no evidence directly connecting Hashim oto w ith any o f the crimes charged in Counts 29, 31, 32, 54 or 55. The Tribunal finds him not guilty on these Counts. The Tribunal finds Hashim oto guilty on Counts 1 and 27.

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H A TA , Shunroku Hata is charged under Counts 1, 27, 29, 31 32, 35, 36, 54 and 55. O n the form ation o f the Abe Cabinet in August 1939, Hata assumed the post o f W ar M inister, w hich he held continuously u n til Ju ly 1940 then the Yonai Cabinet fell. Though holding Cabinet rank for less that one year, Hata contributed substantially to the form ulation and execution o f the aggressive plans. As W ar M inister, he exerted considerable influence on Governm ent pol­ icy. The war in C h in was waged w ith renewed vigor; the W ang Ching-w ei Governm ent was established at Nanking; the plans for control o f French Indo­ c h in a were developed, and the negotiations w ith the Netherlands in relation to matters concerning the Netherlands East Indies were conducted. Hata favored Japanese dom ination o East Asia and the areas to the South. To achieve this object he, for exam ple, approved the abolition o f political par­ ties to be replaced by the Im perial Rule Assistance Association, and in collabo­ ra tio n w ith an d after c o n su ltin g o th er h ig h m ilita ry a u th o ritie s, he precipitated the fall of the Yonai Cabinet, thereby m aking way for the fu ll alliance w ith Germ any and the establishm ent o f a virtual totalitarian state in Japan. Thereafter, from M arch 1941, as Com m ander-in-Chief o f the expeditionary forces in C h in a, he continued to wage war in that country u n til November 1944. H e con tin u ed to w age war against C h in a and the W estern Powers as Inspector General o f M ilitary Education, one o f the highest active m ilitary posts in the Japanese Arm y. W hen the Lake Khassan hostilities occurred, Hata was in Central C hin a, and at the tim e o f the N om onhan Incident, he was Aide-de-Cam p to the Emperor, becom ing W ar M inister a little more than a week before the conclu­ sion o f that Incident. The Tribunal is o f the opinion that Hata did not partici­ pate in the w aging o f either o f these wars. W ar Crim es In 1938 and again from 1941 to 1944, w hen Hata was in com m and o f expe­ ditionary forces in C h in a, atrocities were com m itted on a large scale by the troops under his com m and and were spread over a long period o f tim e. Either Hata knew o f these things and took no steps to prevent their occurrence, or he was indifferent and made no provision for learning w hether orders for the hum ane treatm ent o f prisoners o f war and civilians were obeyed. In either case, he was in breach o f his duty as charged under Count 55. The Tribunal finds Hata guilty under Counts 1, 27, 29, 31, 32, and 55. He is not guilty under Counts 35, 36, and 54. H IR A N U M A , K iich iro Hiranum a is indicted under Counts 1, 27, 29, 31, 32, 33, 35, 36, 54 and 55. He became a member o f the conspiracy, if not at the beginning, shortly after­ wards. he was a member, and from 1936, President o f the Privy C ou n cil until

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1939, w hen he becam e Prim e M inister; later he served in succession as M inister W ith ou t P ortfolio and H om e M inister in the second and third Konoye Cabinets. During the period w hen he was a member o f the Privy C ou n cil, he sup­ ported the various measures com ing before that body w hich involved the car­ rying out o f the aggressive plans o f the m ilitarists. As Prime M inister and as M inister, he continued to support these plans. From 17 October 1941 u n til 19 April 1945, the accused was one o f the Senior Statesm en. A t the m eeting o f Senior Statesmen held on 29 November 1941 to advise the Emperor on the question o f peace or war w ith the W estern Powers, the accused accepted the opinion that war was inevitable and advised the strengthening o f public opinion against the possibility o f a long war. A t the m eeting o f the Senior Statesmen held on 5 April 1945, the accused strongly opposed any overtures for peace and advocated that Japan should fight to the end. At all tim es covered by the Indictm ent, H iranum a was not only a supporter o f the policy o f the dom ination o f Japan in East Asia and the South Seas by force w hen necessary, but he was one o f the leaders o f the conspiracy and an active participant in furthering its policy. In carrying out that policy, he waged war against C h in a, the U nited States of Am erica, the British Com m onw ealth o f N ations, the Netherlands, and in 1939 against the U .S.S.R . The Tribunal finds the accused Hiranum a guilty on Counts 1, 27, 29, 31, 32 and 36. There is no evidence directly connecting him w ith the crimes charged in Counts 33, 35, 54 and 55. W e, therefore, find him not guilty on these counts. H IR O T A , K oki Hirota is indicted under Counts 1, 27, 29, 31, 32, 33, 35, 54 and 55. Hirota was Foreign M inister from 1933 u n til M arch 1936, when he became Prime M inister. From the fall o f his Cabinet in February 1937, for four m onths he held no public office. He was Foreign M inister again in the first Konoye Cabinet u n til M ay 1938. From that tim e forward, his relation w ith public affairs was lim ited to attending m eetings o f the Senior Statesmen (Jushin) from tim e to tim e, to advise on the appointm ent o f Prime M inisters and on other im portant questions subm itted. From 1933 to 1938, w hen Hirota held these h igh offices, the Japanese gains in M anchuria were being consolidated and turned to the advantage o f Japan, and the political and econom ic life o f N orth C h in a was being "guided" in order to separate it from the rest o f C hin a in preparation for the dom ination by Japan o f the Chinese political and econom ic life. IN 1936, his Cabinet for­ m ulated and adopted the national policy o f expansion in East Asia and the Southern Areas. This policy o f far-reaching effect was eventually to lead to the war betw een Ja p a n and the W estern Powers in 1941. A lso in 1936, the Japanese aggressive p olicy w ith regard to the U .S .S .R . was reiterated and

3 46

advanced, culm inating in the Anti-Com intern Pact. From the 7th of Ju ly 1937, when the war in C h in a was received, through­ out Hirota's tenure o f office, the m ilitary operations in C hin a received the fu ll support o f the Cabinet. Early in 1938, also, the real policy towards C hin a was clarified and every effort made to subjugate C hin a and abolish the Chinese N ational Governm ent and to replace it w ith a governm ent dom inated by Japan. In early 1938, the plan and legislation for m obilization o f m anpow er, industrial potential, and natural resources was adopted. This plan, w ith little change in essentials, was the basis on w hich the preparations to continue the C h in a W ar and for w aging further aggressive wars were carried out during the succeeding years. A ll these plans and activities were fu lly know n to and sup­ ported by Hirota. Thus, during his tenure of office, H irota, apparently a very able m an and a forceful leader, was at tim es the originator and at other times a supporter of the aggressive plans adopted and executed by the m ilitary and the various Cabinets. O n his behalf, Counsel in fin al argum ent urged the Tribunal to consider Hirota's consistent advocacy o f peace and peaceful or diplom atic negotiation of disputed questions, it is true that Hirota, faithful to his diplom atic training, consistently advocated attem pting firstly to settle disputes through diplom at­ ic channels. However, it is abundantly clear that in so doing he was never w ill­ ing to sacrifice any o f the gains or expected gains made or expected to be made at the expense of Japan's neighbors and he consistently agreed to the use of force if diplom atic negotiations failed to obtain fulfillm ent o f the Japanese dem ands. The Tribunal therefore cannot accept as exculpating this accused the defense offered on this point. The Tribunal consequently finds that at least from 1933, Hirota participat­ ed in the com m on plan or conspiracy to wage aggressive wars. As Foreign M inister, he also participated in the w aging o f war against C h in a. As to Counts 92, 31 and 32, Hirota's attitude and advice as one o f the Senior Statesmen in 1941 is quite consistent w ith his being opposed to the opening o f hostilities against the W estern Powers. He held no public office after 1938, and played no part in the direction o f the wars referred to in these Counts. The Tribunal holds that the evidence offered does not establish his guilt on these Counts. As to Counts 33 and 35, there is no proof o f Hirota's participation in or sup­ port of the m ilitary operations at Lake Khassan, or in French Indo-China in 1945. W ith regard to W ar Crim es, there is no evidence o f Hirota's having ordered, authorized, or perm itted the com m ission of the crimes as alleged in Count 54. As to Count 55, the on ly evidence relating him to such crimes deals w ith the atrocities at N anking in December 1937 and January and February 1938. As Foreign M inister, he received reports o f these atrocities im m ediately after the

Appendices / 347

entry o f the Japanese forces into N anking, according to the Defense, evidence credence was given to these reports and the matter was taken up w ith the War M inistry. Assurances were accepted from the W ar M inistry that the atrocities would be stopped. After these assurances had been given, reports o f atrocities continued to com e in for at least a m onth. The Tribunal is o f opinion that Hirota was derelict in his duty in not insisting before the Cabinet that im me­ diate action be taken to put an end to the atrocities, failin g any other action open to him to bring about the same result. He was content to rely on assur­ ances w hich he knew were not being im plem ented w hile hundreds o f mur­ ders, violations o f wom en, and other atrocities were being com m itted daily. His inaction am ounted to crim inal negligence. The Tribunal finds Hirota guilty under Counts 1,27 and 55. He is not guilty under Counts 29, 31, 32, 33, 35 and 54. H O SH IN O , N aoki H oshino is charged under Counts 1, 27, 29, 31, 32, 33, 35, 54 and 55. U n til the accused H oshino went to M anchuria in 1932, he was em ployed in the Japanese Departm ent o f Finance. He was sent to M anchuria by his govern­ m ent to becom e a Senior O fficial o f the M anchukuo Finance M inistry and of the M anchukuo General Affairs Bureau. By 1936, he had becom e Vice C h ief of the Finance M inistry o f M anchukuo and C h ief o f the General Affairs Section of the N ational Affairs Board o f M anchukuo. In these positions he was able to exercise a profound influence upon the econom y o f M anchukuo and did exert that influence towards Japanese dom ination o f the com m ercial and industrial developm ent o f that country. H e operated in close cooperation w ith the Com m ander o f the Kwantung Arm y, the virtual ruler of M anchukuo. In effect, if not in nam e he was a functionary o f that Arm y, whose econom ic policy was directed to m aking the resources o f M anchukuo serve the warlike purposes of Japan. Although he was nom inally a servant o f the Governm ent of M anchukuo, and had been so for eight years, he was recalled to Japan in 1940 to becom e a M inister w ithout Portfolio and President o f the Planning Board. In this posi­ tion he was the leader in the special steps then being taken to equip Japan for the continuation of the aggressive war then being waged in C h in a, and for wars o f aggression then contem plated against other countries w ith possessions in East Asia. From April 1941, when he left the Cabinet, his official functions in connec­ tion w ith warlike preparations were reduced but n ot entirely abandoned. U pon the accession of the accused Tojo as Prime M inister in October 1941, H oshino became the C h ief Secretary of the Cabinet and soon after a Councilor of the Planning Board. From this tim e, he was in close association w ith all the preparations for the aggressive war already determined upon and now shortly to be waged against those countries attacked by Japan in December 1941. Throughout all the period from 1932 to 1941, he was an energetic member

348

of the conspiracy alleged in C ou n t 1 o f the Indictm ent, and is accordingly adjudged guilty under that C oun t. N ot only did he conspire to wage aggressive war, but in his successive o ffi­ cial positions, he took a direct part in the w aging o f aggressive wars as set out in Counts 27, 29, 31 and 32, under all o f w hich also he is adjudged guilty. He has not bee proved to have participated in the wars charged in Counts 33 and 35, and o f those is found not guilty. There is no evidence connecting him w ith the crimes charged in Counts 54 and 55, and o f those also he is found not guilty. IT A G A K I, Seishiro The accused is charged under Counts 1, 2 7 ,2 9 , 31, 32, 33, 35 36, 54 and 55. By the year 1931, Itagaki, then a C olonel on the Staff o f the Kwantung Arm y, had joined the conspiracy, the im m ediate object o f w hich then was that Japan should seize M anchuria by force o f arms, he fanned the agitation in sup­ port o f this aim : he helped to engineer the so-called "M ukden Incident" as a pretext for m ilitary action; he suppressed several attempts to prevent that m il­ itary action; he authorized and directed that m ilitary action. He next played a principal part in the intrigues w hich fostered the sham m ovem ent for the independence o f M anchuria and w hich resulted in the establishm ent o f the puppet state o f M anchukuo. He became V ice-C h ief o f Staff o f the Kw antung Arm y in December 1934, and thereafter was active in setting up puppet regimes in Inner M ongolia and N orth C h in a. He wished to extend Japan's m ilitary occupation in to Outer M ongolia to serve as a threat to the territories o f the U .S.S.R . He was one o f the coiners o f the phrase "Anti-Com m unism " to serve as a pretext for Japanese aggression in N orth C hin a. W hen fightin g broke out at M arco Polo Bridge in Ju ly 1937, he was sent from Jap an to C h in a , where he took part in the fig h tin g as a D ivision al Com m ander. He favored the expansion o f the area of aggression there. He became M inister o f W ar in the Konoye Cabinet in M ay 1938. Under him , the attacks on C h in a were intensified and extended. He was a party to the im portant m inisterial conferences w hich decided to attem pt to destroy the N ational Governm ent o f C hin a and to set up a puppet regime in its stead. He then was largely responsible for the prelim inary arrangements w hich resulted in the setting up o f the puppet regime of W ang Ching-w ei. He took part in the arrangements for the exploitation o f the occupied areas of C h in a for the ben­ efit o fJap an . As M inister o f War in the Hiranum a Cabinet, he was again responsible for the prosecution of the war against C hin a, and for the expansion o f Japan's arm aments, in the Cabinet, he was a strong advocate o f an unrestricted m ili­ tary alliance am ong Japan, Germ any and Italy. As W ar M inister, he tried by a trick to obtain the consent o f the Emperor to the use o f force against the U .S.S.R . at Lake Khassan. Subsequently at a Five

Appendices / 349

M inisters Conference, he obtained authority to use such force. He was still War M inister during the fightin g at N om onhan. He was a strong supporter o f the declaration o f Japan's so-called "New Order" in East Asia and the South Seas. He recognized that the attem pt to set up the New Order m ust lead to war w ith the U .S.S .R ., France and Great Britain, who w ould defend their possessions in these areas. From September 1939 to Ju ly 1941, he carried on the war against C hin a as C h ief of Staff o f the C hin a Expeditionary Arm y. From Ju ly 1941 to April 1945, he was Com m ander-in-Chief o f the Arm y in Korea. From April 1945 to the date o f the Surrender, he com m anded the 7th Area Army w ith Headquarters in Singapore. His subordinate armies defended Java, Sum atra, M alaya, and Andam an and Nicobar Islands, and Borneo. H aving conspired to wage wars o f aggression against C h in a, the United Stats o f A m erica, the B ritish C om m on w ealth, the N etherlands, and the U .S.S .R ., he took an active and im portant part in w aging these wars, w hich he knew were war o f aggression. The Tribunal finds Itagaki guilty on Counts 1, 27, 29, 31, 32, 35 and 36. He is not guilty under Count 33. W ar Crim es The area w hich Itagaki com m anded from A pril 1945 to the Surrender included Ja v a , Sum atra, M alaya, the Andam an and N icobar Islands, and Borneo. M any thousands o f prisoners o f war and internees were held in camps in these areas during the above period. According to the evidence w hich he adduced, these cam ps, save those in Singapore, were not under his direct com m and, but he was responsible for the supply o f food, m edicines and hospital facilities to them . During this period, the conditions in these camps were unspeakably bad. The supply o f food, m edicines and hospital facilities was grossly inadequate. Deficiency diseases were ram pant, and as a result, m any person died every day. Those who survived to the date o f the Surrender were in a pitiable condition. W hen the camps were visited after the Surrender, no such conditions prevailed am ong the guards. Itagaki's excuse for this atrocious treatm ent o f the prisoners and internees is that the attacks o f the Allies on Japanese shipping had made the transporta­ tion o f supplies to these areas very difficu lt and that he did the best he could w ith the supplies he had. After the Surrender, however, supplies of food and m edicine were made available by Itagaki's Arm y to the camps in Singapore, Borneo, Java and Sum atra. The explanation tendered in evidence and argu­ m ent for Itagaki is that the Japanese were expecting a long war and were con­ serving supplies. This am ounts to a contention that Itagaki was justified under the prevailing circum stances in treating the prisoners and internees w ith gross inhum anity. The Tribunal has no hesitation in rejecting the defense. If Itagaki, being responsible for supplies to m any thousands o f prisoners and internees,

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found him self unable to m aintain them for the future, his duty under the Laws of W ar was to distribute such supplies as he had and m eantim e to inform his superiors that arrangements m ust be m ade, if necessary w ith the A llies, for the support o f the prisoners and internees in the future. By the policy w hich he adopted, he is responsible for the deaths or sufferings of thousands o f people whose adequate m aintenance was his duty. The Tribunal finds Itagaki guilty on C ou n t 54. As in the case o f Dohihara, the Tribunal makes no finding on Count 55. K A YA , O kin o ri The accused Kaya is charged under Counts 1, 27, 29, 31, 32, 54 and 55. Kaya was a civilian. In 1936, he was appointed a Councilor o f the M anchurian Affairs Bureau; and in February 1937, he became Vice M inister o f Finance. In Ju n e 1937, he was appointed Finance M inister in the first Konoye Cabinet, w hich position he held u n til M ay 1938. In Ju ly 1938, he becam e Adviser to the Finance M inistry. In Ju ly 1939, he was appointed a member o f the Asia Developm ent C om m ittee; and in A ugust o f th a t year, President o f th e N o rth C h in a Developm ent Com pany, in w hich position he rem ained u n til October 1941, when he became Finance M inister in the Tojo Cabinet. He resigned as Finance M inister in February 1944, but again became Adviser to the Finance M inistry. In these positions, he took part in the form ulation o f the aggressive policies of Japan, and in the fin ancial, econom ic and industrial preparation o f Japan for the execution o f those policies. Throughout this period, particularly as Finance M inister in the first Konoye and T ojo C ab in ets, and as President o f the N orth C h in a D evelopm ent Com pany, he was actively engage din the preparation for and the carrying out of aggressive wars in C hin a and against the W estern Powers. He was an active member o f the conspiracy alleged in Count 1 and is adjudged guilty under that C ou n t. In the various positions held by him , Kaya took a principal part in the wag­ ing o f aggressive wars as alleged in Counts 27 ,2 9 , 31 and 32 o f the Indictm ent. He is, therefore, adjudged guilty under those Counts. The evidence does not disclose Kaya's responsibility for war crim es, and accordingly he is found not guilty under Counts 54 and 55. K ID O , K oich i The accused Kido, Koichi is charged under Counts 1, 26, 29, 31, 32 33, 35, 36, 54 and 55. From 1930 until 1936, Kido was a member o f the Emperor's household in the position of C h ief Secretary to the Lord Keeper o f the Privy Seal. During this period, he was aware o f the true nature o f the m ilitary and political ventures in M anchuria. At this tim e, however, he was not associated w ith the conspira­ cy w hich had been instituted by the m ilitary and their supporters.

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In 1937, Kido joined the first Konoye Cabinet as Education M inister, and for a period was W elfare M inister. O n the accession o f Hiranum a as Prime m in­ ister in 1939, Kido continued as a member o f the Cabinet u n til August 1939 w ith the portfolio o f Hom e Affairs. In this period form 1937 to 1939, Kido adopted the views of the conspirators and devoted him self w holeheartedly to their policy. The war in C hin a had entered in to its second phase. Kido was zealous in the pursuit o f that war, even resisting the efforts of the General Staff to shorten the war by m aking terms w ith C h in a, he was intent on the com ­ plete m ilitary and political dom ination o f C hin a. N ot only did Kido thus support the plans o f the conspirators in C h in a, but as Education M inister, he applied him self to the developm ent o f a strong war­ like spirit in Japan. Between August 1939 and Ju n e 1940, w hen he became Lord Keeper o f the Privy Seal, Kido was active w ith Konoye in the developm ent o f a scheme to replace the existing political parties by a single party, o f w hich Konoye was to be President and Kido V ice President. This one party system was expected to give Japan a totalitarian system and thus remove political resistance to the plans of the conspirators. As Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, Kido was in a specially advantageous posi­ tion to advance the conspiracy. His principal duty was to advise the Emperor. He kept in close touch w ith political events and was on terms o f intim ate polit­ ical and personal relationship w ith those m ost concerned. His position was one o f great influence. He used that influence, not on ly w ith the Emperor, but also by political intrigue, so as to further the aims o f the conspiracy. He shared those aims w hich involved the dom ination o f C hin a and the w hole o f East Asia, as w ell as the areas to the South. As the tim e approached for the com m encem ent o f war against the W estern Powers, Kido displayed some degree o f hesitation because doubts o f com plete success were entertained w ithin the N avy. Even in this state o f tim idity, Kido was determ ined to pursue the aggressive war against C hin a, and lent him self, although now w ith less confidence, to the projected war against Great Britain and the N etherlands, an d, in case o f need, against the U n ited States o f Am erica. W hen the doubts o f the navy had been overcom e, Kido's doubts seem also to have been rem oved. He resumed his pursuit o f the fu ll purposes of the conspiracy. He was largely instrum ental in securing the office of Prime M inister for T ojo, w ho u n til now had been as determined advocate o f im m e­ diate war w ith the W estern Powers. In other ways, he used his position in sup­ port o f such a war, or purposely refrained from action w hich m ight have prevented it. He refrained form advising the Emperor to take any stand against war, either at the last or earlier w hen it m ight have been more effective. The Prosecution has tendered no evidence pointing to guilt in Kido for the wars referred to in Counts 33, 35 and 36. As to war crimes, Kido was a member o f the Cabinet when the atrocities were com m itted at N anking. The evidence is not sufficient to attach him w ith

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responsibility for failure to prevent them . During the war against the Western Powers in 1941 and thereafter, Kido's position was such that he cannot be held responsible for the atrocities com mitted. Kido is found guilty of the charges in Counts 1, 27, 29, 31 and 32, and not guilty under Counts 33, 35, 36, 54 and 55. KIM URA, H eitaro Kimura is indicted under Counts 1, 27, 29, 31, 32, 54 and 55. Kimura, an Army officer during the greater part of the period under consid­ eration, was engaged in administrative work in the War M inistry, culm inating in his becom ing Vice Minister of War in April 1941. Later, he was appointed Councilor of the Planning Board and Councilor of the Total War Research Institute. In March 1943, he was relieved of the post of Vice War M inister, and in August 1944, he became Com m ander-in-Chief of the Burma Area Army, which post he held until the surrender of Japan in 1945. During his service as Vice War Minister in almost daily contact w ith the War Minister and other Ministers, Vice Ministers, and Bureau Chiefs, he was in a position to learn and was kept fully inform ed of all government decisions and action during the crucial negotiations w ith the U .S.A . He had full knowl­ edge of the plans and preparations for the Pacific War and the hostilities in China. Throughout, he collaborated and cooperated with the War Minister and the other M inistries, from time to time giving advice based on his wide experience, wholeheartedly supporting the aggressive plans. Though not a leader, he took part in the form ulation and development of policies which were either initiated by him self or proposed by the General Staff or other bodies and approved and supported by him . In this way he was a valuable collaborator or accom plice in the conspiracy to wage aggressive wars. Concurrently w ith his activities as one of the conspirators, as Commander of a division in 1939 and 1940, then as C hief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, and later as Vice War M inister, he played a prominent part in the conduct of the war in China and in the Pacific War. Possessed w ith full knowledge o f the illegality o f the Pacific War, in August 1944 he took command of the Burma Area Army, and so continued until the Surrender. In a positive way he was a party to breaches o f the Rules o f War in that he approved the employment of prisoners in many instances in work prohibited by the Rules and in work under conditions resulting in the greatest hardship and the deaths of thousands o f prisoners. An example of the latter case is the employment of prisoners in the construction of the Burma-Siam Railway, the orders for which were approved and passed on by Kimura. Furthermore, w ith knowledge of the extent of the atrocities com mitted by Japanese troops in all theaters o f war, in August 1944, Kimura took over com­ mand o f the Burma Area Army. From the date o f his arrival at his Rangoon Headquarters, and later when his headquarters was moved to M oulm ein, the

Appendices 1 353

atrocities continued to be com m itted on an undim inished scale. He took no disciplinary measures or other steps to prevent the com m ission o f atrocities by the troops under his com m and. It has been urged in Kim ura's defense that when he arrived in Burma he issued orders to his troops to conduct them selves in a proper soldierly m anner, and to refrain from ill-treating prisoners. In view o f the nature and extent of the ill-treatm ent o f prisoners, in m any cases on a large scale w ithin a few miles o f his headquarters, the Tribunal finds that Kim ura was negligent in his duty to enforce the rules o f war. The duty o f an arm y com mander in such circum ­ stances is not discharged by the mere issue o f routine orders, if indeed such orders were issued. His duty is to take such steps and issue such orders as w ill prevent thereafter the com m ission o f war crimes and to satisfy him self that such orders are being carried out. This he did not do. Thus, he deliberately dis­ regarded his legal duty to take adequate steps to prevent breaches o f the laws o f war. The Tribunal finds Kimura guilty under Counts 1, 27 ,2 9 , 31, 32, 54 and 55. K O ISO , K u n iaki Koiso is charged under Counts 1, 27, 29, 31, 32, 36, 54 and 55. He joined the conspiracy in 1931 by participating as one o f the leaders of the M arch Incident, the purpose of w hich was to overthrow the Ham aguchi Governm ent and put in office a governm ent favorable to the occupation of M anchuria. Thereafter, he played a leading role in the developm ent o f the Japanese plans for expansion from August 1932 w hen he was appointed Chiefof-Staff of the Kwantung Arm y. As C hief-of-Staff o f the Kw antung Arm y from August 1932 to M arch 1934, he prepared or concurred in proposals and plans submitted to the Governm ent through the W ar M inistry for the p olitical and econom ic organization of M anchukuo according to the p olicy o f the conspirators as adopted by the Japanese Governm ent. It is urged in his defense that, in forwarding proposals and plans to Tokyo, he did so merely as C hief-of-Staff, and that such action did not im port his personal approval. In view o f his knowledge o f the aggressive plans o f Japan, the tribunal cannot accept this plea. He went beyond the scope of the norm al duties of a'Chief-of-Staff in advising on political and econom ic matters to further these plans. W hile he was Chief-of-Staff there also occurred the m ilitary invasion o f Jeh ol and renewed fightin g in M anchuria. Later, as Overseas M inister in the Hiranum a and Yonai Cabinets, Koiso sup­ ported and took part in the direction o f the war in C h in a, the beginning o f the occupation o f French Indo-China, and the negotiations intended to obtain concessions from and eventual econom ic dom ination o f the Netherlands East Indies. During the same period, he advocated the plan for Japan to advance "in all directions".

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In Ju ly 1944, Koiso was recalled form his post o f Governor o f Korea to becom e Prime M inister. In that capacity he urged and directed the w aging of the war against the W estern Powers. He retried as Prime M inister to make way for the Suzuki Cabinet in April 1945, when it becam e clear that the war was lost for Japan. There is no evidence that he played any part in the hostilities at N om onhan either by organizing or directing them . W ar Crim es W hen Koiso became Prime M inister in 1944, atrocities and other war crimes being com m itted by the Japanese troops in every theater of war had becom e so notorious that it is im probable that a m an in Koiso's position w ould not have been w ell-inform ed, either by reason of their notoriety or form inter-depart­ m ental com m unications. The matter is put beyond doubt by the fact that in O ctober 1944 the Foreign M inister reported to a m eeting of the Supreme C ou n cil for the direction o f W ar, w hich Koiso attended, that according to recent inform ation from enem y sources, it was reported that the Japanese treatm ent o f prisoners of war "left m uch to be desired". He further stated that this was a matter o f im portance from the point o f view of Japan's internation­ al reputation and future relations. He asked that directions be issued to the com petent authorities so that the matters m ight be fully discussed. Thereafter, Koiso rem ained Prime M inister for six m onths, during w hich the Japanese treatm ent o f prisoners and internees showed no im provem ent w hatever. This am ounted to a deliberate disregard o f his duty. The Tribunal finds Koiso guilty under Counts 1, 27, 29, 31, 32 and 55. He is not guilty under Counts 36 and 54. M ATSU I, Iw ane The accused M atsui is charged under Counts 1 ,2 7 , 2 9 ,3 1 ,3 2 ,3 5 ,3 6 , 54 and 55. M atsui was a senior O fficer in the Japanese Arm y and attained the rank of General in 1933. He had a wide experience in the Arm y, including service in the Kwantung Arm y and in the General Staff. A lthough his close association w ith those w ho conceived and carried out the conspiracy suggests that he must have been aware o f the purposes and policies o f the conspirators, the evi­ dence before the Tribunal does n ot justify a fin din g that he was a conspirator. His m ilitary service in C h in a in 1937 and 1938 cannot be regarded, o f itself, as the w aging o f an aggressive war. To justify a convictiom inder C ou n t 27, it was the duty o f the prosecution to tender evidence w hich w ould justify an inference that he had knowledge of the crim inal character o f that war. This has not been done. In 1935, M atsui was placed on the retired list, but in 1937, he was recalled to active duty to com m and the Shanghai expeditionary force. He was then appointed C om m an der-in -C h ief o f the C entral C h in a Area Arm y, w hich included the Shanghai Expeditionary Force and the Tenth Arm y. W ith these

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troops, he captured the city o f N anking on 13th December 1937. Before the fall o f N anking, the Chinese forces withdrew and the occupation was o f a defenseless city. Then follow ed a long succession o f m ost horrible atrocities com m itted b y the Japanese Arm y u pon the h elpless citizen s. W holesale massacres, individual murders, rape, looting and arson were com ­ m itted by Japanese soldiers. Although the extent o f the atrocities was denied by Japanese witnesses, the contrary evidence o f neutral witnesses o f different n ationalities and undoubted responsibility is overw helm ing. This orgy of crim e started w ith the capture o f the C ity on the 13th December 1937 and did not cease u n til early in February 1938. In this period o f six or seven weeks, thousands o f women were raped, upwards o f 100,000 people were killed, and untold property was stolen and burned. At the height o f these dreadful hap­ penings, on 17th Decem ber, M atsui made a trium phal entry into the C ity and rem ained there from five to seven days. From his own observations and form the reports o f his staff, he m ust have been aware o f w hat was happening. He adm its h e was told o f some degree o f m isbehavior o f his Arm y by the Kempeitai (M ilitary Police) and by Consular O fficials. D aily reports o f these atrocities were made to Japanese diplom atic representatives in N anking, who in turn reported them to Tokyo. The Tribunal is satisfied that M atsui knew w hat was happening. He did nothing, or nothing effective, to abate these horrors. He did issue orders before the capture of the C ity enjoining propriety o f conduct upon his troops, and later he issued further orders to the same purport. These orders were o f no effect, as is no know n, and as he m ust have know n. It was pleaded in his behalf that at this tim e he was ill. His illness was not sufficient to prevent his conducting the m ilitary operations o f his com m and nor to pre­ vent his visiting the C ity for days w hile these atrocities were occurring. He was in com m and o f the Arm y responsible for these happenings. He knew o f them . He had the power as he had the duty to control his troops and to protect the unfortunate citizens o f N anking. He m ust be held crim inally responsible for his failure to discharge this duty. The Tribunal holds the accused M atsui gu ilty under C ou n t 55 and not guilty under Counts 1, 27, 29, 31, 32, 35, 36 and 54. M IN A M I, Jir o M inam i is charged under Counts 1, 27, 29, 31 32, 54 and 55. In the year 1931, M inam i was a general, and from April to December he was M inister o f W ar. Prior to the M ukden Incident, he had already associated him ­ self w ith the conspirators in their advocacy o f m ilitarism , of the expansion of Japan, and of M anchuria as "the lifeline o f Jap an ". He was forewarned o f the likelihood of the incident occurring. He was ordered to prevent it. He took no adequate steps to prevent it. W hen the incident happened, he described the action o f the Army as "righteous self-defense". The Cabinet at once decided that the incident must not be expanded, and M inam i agreed to put the policy of the Cabinet into effect, but day after day, the area o f the operations expanded and

3 56

M inam i took no adequate steps to restrain the Army. In the Cabinet he supported the steps taken by the Arm y. He early advocated Japan's withdrawal from the League o f Nations, if that body should oppose the actions Japan had taken in C hin a. The Cabinet decided that there should be no occupation o f Manchuria and no m ilitary adm inistration. M inam i knew that the Army was taking steps to carry both those measures into effect but did nothing to stop it. His failure to support the Premier and Foreign M inister by taking steps to control the Army led to the downfall of the Cabinet. Thereafter, he advocated that Japan should take over the defense of M anchuria and M ongolia. He had already advocated that a new state must be founded in M anchuria. From December 1934 to M arch 1936, he was Com m ander-in-OChief of the Kw antung Arm y, com pleted the conquest o f M anchuria, and aided in the exploitation o f that part o f C h in a for the benefit o f Japan. He was responsible for setting up puppet governm ents in N orth C hin a and Inner M ongolia under the threat o f m ilitary action. He was in part responsible for the developm ent o f M anchuria as a base for an attack on the U .S.S .R ., and for plans for such an attack. He becam e Governor-General of Korea in 1936, and in 1938 supported the prosecution o f the war against C h in a, w hich he called "the H oly W ar", and the destruction o f the N ational Governm ent o f C hin a. The Tribunal finds M inam i guilty on Counts 1 and 27. He is not guilty of the charges contained in Counts 29, 31, 32, 54 and 55. M U i O , Akira The accused is indicted under Counts 1, 27, 29, 31, 32, 33, 36, 54 and 55. He was a soldier, and prior to holding the im portant post o f C h ief o f the M ilitary Affairs Bureau o f the M inistry o f W ar, he held no appointm ent w hich involved the m aking of h igh policy. Further, there is no evidence that in this earlier period he, alone or w ith others, tried to affect the m aking o f high policy. W hen he became C h ief of the M ilitary Affairs Bureau, he joined the con­ spiracy. Concurrently w ith this post, he held a m ultiplicity of other posts from September 1939 to April 1942. During this period, planning, preparing and w aging wars o f aggression on the part o f the conspirators was at its height. He played the part of a principal in all these activities. W hen he becam e C h ie f o f the M ilitary Affairs Bureau, the fig h tin g at N om onhan was over. He had no part in the w aging of this war. He was C hief-of-Staff in the Philippines w hen Japan attacked France in French Indo-China in M arch 1945. He had no part in the w aging o f this war. The Tribunal finds M uto guilty on Counts 1, 27, 29, 31 and 32. He is not guilty on Counts 33 and 36. W ar Crimes M uto was an officer on the Staff of M atsui from November 1937 to Ju ly 1938. It was during this period that shocking atrocities were com m itted by the Arm y of M atsui in and about N anking. W e have no doubt that M uto knew, as

Appendices / 357

M atsui knew , that these atrocities were being com m itted over a period of m any weeks. His superior took no adequate steps to stop them . In our opinion M uto, in his subordinate position, could take no steps to stop them . M uto is not responsible for this dreadful affair. From April 1942 to October 1944, M uto com m anded the Second Im perial Guards D ivision in Northern Sum atra. During this period, in the area occupied by his troops, widespread atrocities were com m itted, for w hich M uto shares responsibility. Prisoners o f war and civilian internees were starved, neglected, tortured and murdered, and civilians were massacred. In O cto b er 1944, M u to becam e C h ie f-o f-S ta ff to Y am ash ita in the Philippines. He held that post u n til the Surrender. His position was now very different from that w hich he held during the so-called "Rape o f N anking. He was now in a position to influence policy. During his tenure o f office as such Chief-of-Staff, a cam paign o f massacre, torture and other atrocities was waged by the Japanese troops on the civilian population, and prisoners o f war and civilian internees were starved, tortured and murdered. M uto shares responsi­ b ility for these gross breaches o f the Laws o f W ar. W e reject his defense that he knew nothing o f these occurrences. It is w holly incredible. The Tribunal finds M UTO guilty on Counts 54 and 55.

OKA, Takazumi Oka is charged in Counts 1, 27, 29, 31, 32, 54 and 55 of the Indictm ent. Oka was an officer in the Japanese N avy. In October 1940, he was prom ot­ ed to Rear Adm iral and became C h ief o f the N aval Affairs Bureau o f the Navy M inistry. Oka was an active member o f the conspiracy during his tenure o f office as C h ief of the N aval Affairs Bureau from October 1940 to Ju ly 1944. In this office, he was an influential member of the Liaison Conference at w hich the policy o f Japan was largely decided. He participated in the form ation and exe­ cution o f the policy to wage aggressive war against C hin a and the Western Powers. W ar Crim es There is some evidence tending to show that Oka knew or ought to have known that war crimes were being com m itted by naval personnel against pris­ oners o f war w ith whose welfare his department was concerned, but it falls short o f the standard o f proof w hich justifies a conviction in crim inal cases. The Tribunal finds Oka not gu ilty on Counts 54 and 55, and gu ilty on Counts 1, 27, 29, 31 and 32.

OSHIMA, Hiroshi Oshim a is indicted under Counts 1, 27, 29, 31, 32 54 and 55. Oshim a, an Army officer, was engaged during the period under review in the diplom atic field . He was first M ilitary Attache o f the Japanese Embassy in Berlin, later being prom oted to the post o f Ambassador. H olding no diplom atic

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post for about one year from 1939, he returned to Berlin as Ambassador, where he remained till the Surrender of Japan. A believer in the success of the Hitler Regime, from his first appointment in Berlin, Oshim a exerted his full efforts to advance the plans of the Japanese m il­ itary. At times, going over the head of the Ambassador, he dealt directly with Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, in an endeavor to involve Japan in a full m ilitary alliance w ith Germ any. Upon his appointment as Ambassador, he continued his efforts to force the acceptance by Japan of a treaty which would align Japan with Germ any and Italy against the Western Powers and thus open the way for putting into execution the Hirota policy. In furtherance of the aggressive pol­ icy o f the Army faction, he repeatedly pursued a policy of opposition to and in defiance of that o f his Foreign Minister. The Soviet-German Neutrality Pact temporarily blocked his schemes. He then returned to Tokyo and there supported the proponents of war by articles in newspapers and magazines and by closely cooperating w ith the German Ambassador. Oshim a was one of the principal conspirators and consistently supported and promoted the aims of the m ain conspiracy. He took no part in the direction of the war in China or the Pacific War, and at no time held any post involving duties or responsibility in respect of pris­ oners. O shim a's special defense is th at, in connection w ith his activities in Germ any, he is protected by diplom atic im m unity and is exempt from prose­ cution. Diplom atic privilege does not import im m unity from legal liability, but o n ly exem ption from trial by the C ou rt o f the State to w hich an Ambassador is accredited, in any event, this im m unity has no relation to crimes against international law charged before a tribunal having jurisdiction. The Tribunal rejects this special defense. The Tribunal finds Oshim a guilty under Count 1. He is not guilty under Counts 27, 29, 31, 32, 54 and 55. SATO, Kenryo The accused Sato, Kenryo, is charged under Counts 1,27, 29, 31, 32, 54 and 55. In 1937, Sato, then a member o f the M ilitary Affairs Bureau, was promoted to the rank o f Lieutenant C o lo n e l. In th at year, he was appointed an Investigator of the Planning Board. Thereafter, in addition to his duties in the M ilitary Affairs Bureau, he had other duties, not only w ith the Planning Board, of w hich for a time he was Secretary, but also w ith other bodies in greater or less degree connected w ith Japan’s war in China and its contemplated wars w ith other countries. The Konoye Cabinet presented the General M obilization Law to the-Diet in February 1938. Sato was employed as an "explainer" and made a speech before the Diet in support of the measure.

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In February 1941, Sato was appointed C h ief o f the M ilitary Affairs Section of the M ilitary Affairs Bureau. He was prom oted to M ajor general in October 1941. In April 1942, he became C h ief of the M ilitary Affairs Bureau, a position o f considerable im portance in the Japanese Arm y. This position he held until 1944. Concurrently, he held a variety o f other appointm ents, m ostly con­ cerned w ith other departments of state whose activities he linked w ith the M inistry o f W ar. It was thus not u n til 1941 that Sato attained a position w hich, by itself, enabled him to influence the m aking o f policy, and no evidence has been adduced that prior to that date he had indulged in plotting to influence the m aking o f policy. The crucial question is w hether by that date he had become aware that Japan's designs were crim inal, for thereafter he furthered the devel­ opm ent and execution of these designs so far as he was able. The matter is put beyond reasonable doubt by a speech w hich Sato deliv­ ered in August 1938. He states the Arm y point o f view on the war in C h in a. He shows com plete fam iliarity w ith the detailed terms, never revealed to C hin a, upon w hich Japan was prepared to settle the war against C h in a. These, on the face of them , plainly involved the abolition o f the legitim ate governm ent of C hin a, recognition of the puppet state o f M anchukuo, whose resources had been by this tim e largely exploited for Japan's benefit, regim entation of the econom y of C h in a for Japan's benefit, and the stationing of Japanese troops in C hin a to ensure that these illicit gains w ould not be lost. He states that North C hin a w ould be put com pletely under Japan's control and its resources devel­ oped for national defense, i.e . to aid in Japan's m ilitary preparations, he pre­ dicts that Japan w ill go to war w ith the U .S .S .R ., but says she w ill select a chance when her armaments and production have been expanded. This speech shows that Sato did not believe that Japan's actions in C hina had been dictated by the wish to secure protection for Japan's legitim ate inter­ ests in C h in a as the Defense w ould have us believe. O n the contrary, he knew that the m otive for her attacks on C hin a was to seize the wealth o f her neigh­ bor. W e are o f opinion that Sato, having that guilty knowledge, was clearly a member o f the conspiracy from 1941 onwards. T h ereafter, in im p o rtan t posts in th e G overn m en t and as an Arm y Com m ander, he waged wars o f aggression as charged in Counts 27 ,2 9 , 31, and 32. W ar Crim es There is no doubt that Sato knew o f the m any protests against the behavior o f Japan's troops, for these protests came to his Bureau and they were discussed at the bi-weekly m eetings o f Bureau Chiefs in the W ar M inistry. Tojo presided at these m eetings, and he it was w ho decided that action or inaction should be taken in regard to the protests. Sato, his subordinate, could not initiate pre­ ventive action against the decision o f his chief. The Tribunal finds Sato guilty on Counts 1, 27, 29, 31, and 32. He is not guilty on Counts 54 and 55.

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SHIGEMITSU, Mamoru The accused in charged under Counts 1, 27, 29, 31, 32, 33, 35, 54, and 55. As to C ou n t 1, his actions are challenged when he was M inister to C h in a in 19031 and 1932; w hen he was Councilor o f the Board of M anchurian Affairs; when he was Ambassador to the U .S.S.R . from 1936 to 1938; when he was Ambassador to Great Britain from 1938 to 1941; and when he was Ambassador to C h in a during the years 1942 and 1943. There is no evidence that he played any part in the m aking of policy as Councilor o f the Board o f M anchurian Affairs. For the rest, we find that Shigem itsu, as M inister and Ambassador, never exceeded the functions proper to these offices. During the years above m entioned, he was not one o f the conspirators. Indeed, he repeatedly gave advice to the Foreign O ffice w hich was opposed to the policies o f the conspir­ ators. By the year 1943, when he becam e Foreign M inister, the p olicy o f the con­ spirators to wage certain wars o f aggression had been settled and was in course of execution. Thereafter, there was no further form ulation nor developm ent of that policy. The Tribunal finds Shigem itsu not guilty on C ou n t 1. In 1943, his country was engaged in the war in the Pacific. He was fu lly aware that so far as Japan was concerned, that war was a war o f aggression, for he knew o f the policies o f the conspirators w hich had caused the war, and indeed had often advised that they should not be put into effect. Nevertheless, he now played a principal part in w aging that war u n til he resigned on 13th April 1945. The Tribunal finds Shigem itsu guilty on Counts 27, 29, 31, 32, and 33. He is not guilty on Count 35. W ar Crim es During the period from April 1943 to April 1945, when Shigem itsu was Foreign M inister, the Protecting Powers transm itted to the Japanese Foreign O ffice protest after protest w hich it had received form the A llies, these were grave protests forwarded to the Protecting Powers by responsible agencies of state and in m any cases accom panied by a w ealth o f detail. The matters o f protest were (1) inhum ane treatm ent o f prisoners, (2) refusal to perm it the Protecting Powers to inspect all save a few prisoners' cam ps, (3) refusal to per­ m it the representatives o f the Protecting Powers to interview prisoners w ithout th e presence o f a Japanese witness, and (4) failure to provide inform ation as to the nam es and location o f prisoners, the protests were dealt w ith in the Foreign M inistry in the first place. W here necessary, they were passed to other m inistries w ith requests for inform ation to enable the Foreign M inister to reply to them . O ne cannot read the long correspondence between the Japanese Foreign O ffice and the Protecting Powers w ithout suspecting that there was a sinister reason for the failure o f the Japanese m ilitary to supply their Foreign O ffice w ith satisfactory answers to these protest, or at the least that there was a case

Appendices I 361

for an independent inquiry by an agency other than the m ilitary, whose con­ duct was in question. Protest after protest w ent unanswered or was on ly answered after m onths o f unexplained delay. Reminder after reminder by the Protecting Powers went unnoticed. Those protest w hich were answered were m et w ithout exception by a denial that there was anything to com plain of. Now it was the highest degree unlikely that every one o f the com plaints made hy responsible people and accom panied by circum stance and detail was com pletely unjustified. M oreover, a refusal o f the m ilitary to perm it inspec­ tion o f cam ps, their refusal to perm it the representatives o f the Protecting Powers to interview prisoners w ithout the presence o f a Japanese witness, and their failure to provide details o f the prisoners in their hands gave rise to the suspicion that they had som ething to hide. W e do no injustice to Shigem itsu when we hold that the circum stances, as he knew them , made him suspicious that the treatm ent o f the prisoners was not as it should have been. Indeed, a witness gave evidence for him to that effect. Thereupon, he took no adequate steps to have the matter investigated, although he, as a member o f the governm ent, bore overhead responsibility for the welfare o f the prisoners. He should have pressed the m atter, if necessary to the point o f resigning, in order to quit him self o f a responsibility w hich he sus­ pected was not being discharged. There is no evidence that Shigem itsu ordered, authorized, or perm itted the com m ission o f war crimes or crim es against hum anity. The Tribunal finds Shigem itsu not guilty on Count 54. The Tribunal finds Shigem itsu guilty on Count 55. In m itigation o f sentence, we take into account that Shigem itsu was in no way involved in the fotm ulation o f the conspiracy; that he waged no war of aggression u n til he became Foreign M inister in April 1943, by w hich tim e his country was deeply involved in a war w hich w ould vitally affect its future; and in the m atter o f war crim es, that the m ilitary com pletely controlled Japan w hile he was Foreign M inister, so that it w ould have required great resolution for any Japanese to condem n them .

SHIMADA, Shigetaro The accused is charged under Counts 1, 27, 29, 31, 32, 54 and 55. U n til October 1941, Shim ada played nothing but the role o f a naval officer carrying out his duties as such and until that date had no part in the conspir­ acy. In October 1941, he was a Senior Naval O fficer eligible for the post o f Navy M inister. He became N avy M inister in the Tojo Cabinet, and held that office u n til August 1944. For a period o f six m onths, from February to August 1944, he was also C h ief o f the N avy General Staff. From the form ation o f the Tojo Cabinet u n til the W estern Powers were attacked by Japan on 7th December 1941, he took part in all the decisions made by the conspirators in planning and launching that attack. He gave as

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his reason for adopting this course of conduct, that the freezing orders were strangling Japan and would gradually reduce her ability to fight; that there was economic and military "encirclement" of Japan'; that the United States of America was unsympathetic and unyielding in the negotiations; and that the aid given by the Allies to China had raised bitter feeling in Japan. This defense leaves out of account the fact that the gains to retain which he was determined to fight were, to his knowledge, gains Japan had acquired in years of aggressive war. The Tribunal has already fully examined this defense and rejected it. After war was declared, he played a principal part in waging it. The Tribunal finds Shimada guilty on Counts 1, 27, 29, 31 and 32. War Crimes Some most disgraceful massacres and murders of prisoners were committed by members of the Japanese Navy in the islands of the Pacific Ocean and on the survivors of torpedoed ships. Those immediately responsible ranged in rank form Admirals downwards. The evidence, however, is insufficient to justify a finding that Shimada is responsible for these matters, that he ordered, authorized or permitted the commission of war crimes, or that he knew they were being committed and failed to take adequate steps to prevent their commission in the future. The Tribunal finds Shimada not guilty on Counts 54 and 55. SHIRATORI, Toshio The accused in indicted under Counts 1, 27, 29, 31, and 32. He entered the Japanese diplomatic service in 1914. He first comes into prominence as Chief of the Information Bureau of the Foreign Office, which post he held from October 1930 to June 1933. In that position he justified Japan's seizure of Manchuria to the Press of the world. No doubt it was dictat­ ed to him that he should do so, but it is characteristic of the accused's activi­ ties then and thereafter that he was not content to perform whatever might be his duties at the moment. Thus early he was expressing views on matters of policy, views which received consideration in high quarters. He early advocat­ ed that Japan should withdraw form the League of Nations. He supported the setting-up of a puppet government in Manchuria. From this period dates his support of the aims of the conspiracy, a support which he continued to afford for many years and by all the means in his power. He was Minister to Sweden from June 1933 to April 1937. Certain letters of his show his views at this time, in his opinion, Russian influence should be expelled from the Far East by force, if necessary, and before she became too strong to be attacked. He was further of opinion that such foreign influences as might be thought to be harmful to Japanese interests should be excluded form China, and that Japanese diplomats should support the policy of the mil­ itarists. He showed himself a whole-hearted believer in aggressive war. Returning to Japan, he published articles advocating a totalitarian form of government for Japan and an expansionist policy for Japan, Germany and

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Italy. W hen the negotiations for an alliance am ong Japan, Germ any and Italy had com m enced, he was appointed Ambassador to Rome in September 1938. In these n e g o tia tio n s, he collab orated w ith th e accused O sh im a, then Ambassador to Berlin, in support o f the conspirators, who insisted on a gener­ al m ilitary alliance am ong these countries. He went so far as to refuse to com ­ ply w ith the instructions o f the Foreign M inister, who wished a more lim ited alliance only. He and Oshim a threatened to resign if the wishes of the con­ spirators were not m et. W hen Japan delayed too long, and Germ any signed a non-aggression pact w ith the U .S.S .R ., the negotiations broke down, for Japanese opinion com­ m only regarded this as a breach o f the Anti-Com intern Pact. Shiratori returned to Jap an , where he carried on propaganda designed to excuse Germ any's action and to prepare the way for the general m ilitary alliance w ith Germ any and Italy w hich he still thought necessary to support Japanese expansionist aim s. In his propaganda, at one tim e or another he advocated all the objects of the conspirators: that Japan should attack C h in a, that Japan should attack Russia, that Japan should ally herself w ith Germ any and Italy, that she should take determined action against the W estern Powers, that she should establish the "New Order", that she should seize the chance offered by the European W ar to advance to the South, that she should attack Singapore, and so on. This propaganda was continued w hile he was advisor to the Foreign O ffice from August 1940 to Ju ly 1941. He became ill in April 1941, and resigned the position o f advisor to the Foreign O ffice in Ju ly o f that year. Thereafter, he plays no im portant part in events. The Tribunal finds Shiratori guilty on Count 1. He never occupied such a position as w ould justify a finding that he waged any war o f aggression. The Tribunal finds Shiratori not guilty on Counts 27, 29, 31 and 32.

SUZUKI, Teiichi Suzuki, T eiichi, is charged in Counts % 27, 29, 31, 32, 35, 36, 54 and 55 of the Indictm ent. Suzuki was a solder. As a Lieutenant C olonel and Member o f the M ilitary Affairs Bureau in 1932, he was an active member o f the conspiracy. After the assassination o f Premier Inukai in M ay 1932, he said that sim ilar acts o f vio­ lence w ould occur is new Cabinets were organized under political leadership, and he favored the form ation o f a coalition governm ent. The object was to secure a governm ent w hich w ould support the schemes o f the conspirators against C hin a. During his service w ith the Bureau, he insisted that the U .S.S.R . was the absolute enem y o f Japan and assisted in the preparations then being made to wage aggressive war against that Power. There is no evidence that Suzuki participated in w aging war against the

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U .S.S.R . at Lake Khassan, and there is no evidence that he participated in wag­ ing war against the U .S.S.R . or the M ongolian Peoples' Republic at N om onhan. In November 1937, Suzuki became a M ajor-General. He was one o f the orga­ nizers and head o f the p o litica l and adm inistrative division o f the Asia Developm ent Board. As such, he actively furthered the exploitation o f the parts o f C h in a occupied by Japan. W hen the Second Konoye Cabinet was form ed to com plete the m ilitary dom ination o f Japan, and to prosecute the m ove to the South, Suzuki became M in ister W ith ou t P ortfolio and one o f the C ou n cilors o f the T otal W ar Research Institute. Konoye replaced H oshino by Suzuki as President o f the Planning Board. Suzuki continued in that position u n til the fall of the Tojo Cabinet on 19 Ju ly 1944. As President o f the Planning Board and M inister W ithout Portfolio, Suzuki regularly attended the m eetings of the Liaison Conference, the virtual policy m aking body for Japan. Suzuki was present at m ost of the im portant confer­ ences leading to the in itiation and w aging o f aggressive wars against the Allied Powers. A t these conferences he actively supported the conspiracy. There is no evidence that the accused was responsible for the com m ission of atrocities. W e fin d Suzuki guilty as charged in Counts 1, 27, 29, 31, and 32, and not guilty o f Counts 35, 36, 43 and 55.

TOGO, Shigenori The accused Togo is indicted under Counts 1, 27, 29, 31, 32, 36, 54 and 55. Togo's principal association w ith the crimes charged against him was as Foreign M inister in the Tojo Cabinet from October 1941 u n til September 1942 when he resigned, and later in the Suzuki Cabinet o f 1945, in w hich he also acted as Foreign M inister. During the interval between his resignation and reappointm ent, he played no part in public life. From the date of his first appointm ent u n til the outbreak of the Pacific W ar, he participate d in the p lan n in g and preparing for the w ar. He attended Cabinet m eetings and conferences and concurred in all decisions adopted. As Foreign M inister, he played a leading role in the negotiations w ith the U nited States im m ediately preceding the outbreak o f the war and lend him self to the plans o f the proponents o f war. The duplicity em ployed in these nego­ tiations has been dealt w ith earlier. After the outbreak o f the Pacific W ar, he collaborated w ith other members o f the Cabinet in its conduct, as w ell as in the w aging o f the war in C h in a. In addition to the defense com m on to all the accused o f encirclem ent and econom ic strangulation o f Japan, w hich has been dealt w ith elsewhere, Togo pleads specially that he joined the Tojo Cabinet on the assurance that every effort w ould be made to bring the negotiations w ith the United States to a suc­ cessful conclusion. He states further that form the date of his taking office he opposed the Arm y and was successful in obtaining form them concessions

Appendices / 365

w hich enabled him to keep the negotiations alive. However, w hen the negoti­ ations failed and war became inevitable, rather than resign in protest, he con­ tinued in office and supported the war. To do anything else, he said, would have been cow ardly. However, his later action com pletely nullifies this plea. In September 1942, he resigned over a dispute in the Cabinet as to the treatm ent o f occupied countries. W e are disposed to judge his action and sincerity in the one case by the same considerations as in the other. There is no proof of any crim inal act on Togo's part as alleged in C ou n t 36. His only part in relation to that count was to sign the post war agreement between the U .S.S.R . and Japan settling the boundary between M anchuria and Outer M ongolia. W ar Crim es U p to his resignation in 1942, Togo appears to have endeavored to see to the observance o f the Rules o f W ar. He passed on such protests as came to him for investigation, and in several instances rem edial measures were taken. At the tim e o f his resignation, atrocities com m itted by the Japanese troops had not becom e so notorious as to perm it knowledge to be im puted to him . In the spring o f 1945, w hen he returned as Foreign M inister, there was then an accum ulation o f protests w hich he passed on to the proper authorities. The Tribunal is o f opinion that there is not sufficient proof of Togo's neglect of duty in connection w ith war crim es. The Tribuhal finds Togo guilty on Counts 1, 27, 29, 31, and 32. He is not guilty on Counts 36, 54 and 55.

TOJO, Hideki The accused is charged under Counts 1, 27, 29, 31, 32, 33, 36, 54 and 55. Tojo became C hief-of-Staff o f the Kwantung Arm y in Jun e 1937, and there­ after was associated w ith the conspirators as a principal in alm ost all o f their activities. He planned and prepared for an attack on the U .S.S.R .; he recom mended a further onset on C hin a in order to free the Japanese Army from anxiety about its rear in the p rojected attack on the U .S .S .R .; he h elped to organize M anchuria as a base for that attack; never at any tim e thereafter did he aban­ don the intention to launch such an attack if a favorable chance should occur. In M ay 1938, he was recalled form the field to becom e Vice-M inister of W ar. In addition to that office, he held a great num ber o f appointm ents so that he played an im portant part in alm ost all aspects o f the m obilization o f the Japanese people and econom y for war. At this tim e he opposed suggestions for a peace o f com promise w ith C hin a. He became M inister o f W ar in Ju ly 1940, and thereafter his history is large­ ly the history o f the successive steps by w hich the conspirators planned and waged wars o f aggression against Japan's neighbors, for he was a principal in the m aking o f the plans and in the w aging o f the wars. He advocated and fur­ thered the aims o f the conspiracy w ith ability, resolution and persistency.

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He became Prime M inister in October 1941, and continued in that office u n til Ju ly 1944. As W ar M inister and Premier he consistently supported the policy o f con­ quering the N ational Governm ent o f C h in a, o f developing the resources of C hin a in Japan's behalf, and o f retaining Japanese troops in C hin a to safe­ guard for Japan the results o f the war against C hin a. In the negotiations w hich preceded the attacks o f 7th December 1941, his resolute attitude was that Japan m ust secure terms w hich would preserve for her the fruits o f her aggression against C hin a, and w hich w ould conduce to the establishm ent o f Japan's dom ination o f East Asia and the Southern Areas. A ll his great influence was throw n into the support o f that policy. The im por­ tance o f the leading part he played in securing the decision to go to war in sup­ port o f that policy cannot be overestimated. He bears m ajor responsibility for Japan's crim inal attacks on her neighbors. In this trial he defended all these attacks w ith hardihood, alleging that they were legitim ate measures o f self-defense. W e have already dealt fu lly w ith that plea. It is w holly unfounded. As to Count 36, there is no evidence that Tojo occupied any official posi­ tion w hich w ould render him responsible for the war in 1939 as charged in Count 36. The Tribunal finds Tojo guilty on Counts 1, 27, 39, 31, 32 and 33, and not guilty on C ou n t 36. W ar Crim es Tojo was head o f the W ar M inistry w hich was charged w ith the care o f pris­ oners o f war and of civilian internees in the theater o f war and w ith the sup­ ply of billets, food, m edicines and hospital facilities to them . He was head of the Home M inistry, w hich was charged w ith a sim ilar duty towards civilian internees in Jap an . Above a ll, he was head o f the Governm ent w hich was charged w ith continuing responsibility for the care o f prisoners and civilian internees. The barbarous treatm ent o f prisoners and internees was w ell know n to Tojo. He took no adequate steps to punish offenders and to prevent the com ­ m ission o f sim ilar offences in the future. His attitude towards the Bataan Death M arch gives the key to his conduct towards these captives. He knew in 1942 som ething o f the conditions o f that march and that m any prisoners had died as a result o f these conditions. He did not call for a report on the in ci­ dent.. W hen in the Philippines in 1943, he made perfunctory inquiries about the march but took no action. N o one was punished. His explanation is that a com mander o f a Japanese Arm y in the field is given a m ission, in the perfor­ mance of w hich he is not subject to specific orders from Tokyo. Thus, the head of the Governm ent o f Japan know ingly and w illfully refused to perform the duty w hich lay upon that Governm ent o f enforcing performance o f the Laws o f W ar. To cite another outstanding exam ple, he advised that prisoners o f war

Appendices / 367

should be used in the construction of the Burma-Siam Railway, designed for strategic purposes. He made no proper arrangements for b illeting and feeding the prisoners, or for caring for those w ho became sick in that trying clim ate. He learned o f the poor condition o f the prisoners em ployed on the project, and sent an officer to investigate. W e know the dreadful conditions that inves­ tigator m ust have found in the m any camps along the railway. The only step taken as a result of that investigation was the trial of one com pany com m an­ der for ill-treatm ent o f prisoners. N othing was done to im prove conditions. Deficiency diseases and starvation continued to kill o ff the prisoners u n til the end o f the project. Statistics relative to the high death rate from m alnutrition and other causes in prisoner o f war cam ps were discussed at conferences over w hich Tojo presided. The shocking con d itio n o f the prisoners in 1944, w hen Tojo's Cabinet fell, and the enormous num ber o f prisoners who had died from lack of food and m edicine is conclusive proof that Tojo took no proper steps to care for them . W e have referred to the attitude of the Japanese Arm y towards Chinese pris­ oners o f war. Since the Japanese Governm ent did not recognize the "Incident" as a war, it was argued that the Rules of W ar did not apply to the fightin g, and that Chinese captives were not entitled to the status and rights o f prisoners of war. Tojo knew and did n ot disapprove o f that shocking attitude. He bears responsibility for the instruction that prisoners w ho did not work should not eat. W e have no doubt that his repeated insistence on this instruc­ tion conduced in large measure to the sick and wounded being driven to work and to the suffering and deaths w hich resulted. W e have fu lly referred to the measures w hich were taken to prevent know l­ edge o f the ill-treatm ent o f prisoners reaching the outside w orld. Tojo bears responsibility for these measures. The Tribunal finds Tojo guilty under Count 54. W e make no fin din g under C ou n t 55.

UMEZU, Yoshijiro The accused Um ezu is charged under Counts 1, 27, 29, 31, 32, 36, 54 and 55. Um ezu was an Arm y officer. W hile he was in com m and o f Japanese troops in N orth C hin a from 1934 to 1936, he continued the Japanese aggression in that country against the northern provinces, he set up a pro-Japanese local governm ent, and under threat o f force com pelled the Chinese to enter in to the Ho-Um ezu Agreement o f Ju n e 1935. This, for a tim e, lim ited the power of legitim ate governm ent o f C hin a. Um ezu was Vice-M inister o f W ar form M arch 1936 to M ay 1938, w hile the N ational Policy Plans o f 1936 and the Plan for Im portant Industries o f 1937 were decided upon. These were Arm y plans and were one o f the prime causes o f the Pacific W ar.

368 In January 1937, when the Im perial M andate to form a new Cabinet was given to General Ugaki, Um ezu played an im portant part in the Arm y's refusal to countenance Ugaki as Hirota's successor. Because o f this opposition, Ugaki was unable to form a Cabinet. W hen the fightin g in C h in a broke out anew in Ju ly 1937 at M arco Polo Bridge, this accused knew and approved o f the plans o f the conspirators to carry on the war. Um ezu was a member of the Cabinet Planning Board, as well as o f m any other boards and com m issions w hich largely contributed to the form ulation of the aggressive plans o f conspirators and to preparations neces­ sary for the execution o f these plans. In December 1937, Tojo, as C hief-of-Staff o f the Kwantung Arm y, sent to Um ezu plans for preparation for the attack on the U .S.S .R ., and later plans for the strengthening of the Kw antung Arm y, and plans for installations in Inner M ongolia, w hich Tojo stated were o f vital im portance both in the preparation for war w ith the U .S.S.R . and in connection w ith the war w ith C h in a. W hile Um ezu was Com m ander o f the Kw antung Army form 1939 to 1944, he continued the direction o f the econom y o f M anchukuo so as to serve the purposes o f Japan; plans were made for the occupation o f Soviet territories, and plans were also made for the m ilitary adm inistration of the Soviet areas to be occupied, and officers were sent to the occupied areas in the south to study the m ilitary adm inistration there w ith a view to using the inform ation thus obtained in the Soviet territories. The evidence is overw helm ing that the accused was a member o f the con­ spiracy. W ith reference to Count 36, the fightin g at N om onhan had begun before he took com m and of the Kw antung Arm y. He was in com m and on ly a very few days before the fightin g ceased. Um ezu served as C h ie f o f the Arm y General Staff from Ju ly 1944 u n til the Surrender. He thereby played a principle part in the w aging o f the war against C hina and the W estern Powers. W ar Crim es There is not sufficient evidence that Um ezu was responsible for the com ­ m ission o f atrocities. The Tribunal finds Um ezu guilty on Counts 1, 27, 29, 31, and 32. He is not guilty on Counts 36, 54, and 55. U nder the C harter the Ju d gm en t I have read is the Ju d gm en t o f the Tribunal. The member for India dissents from the m ajority Judgm ent and has filed a statem ent o f his reasons for such dissent. The members for France and the Netherlands dissent as to part on ly from the m ajority Judgm ent and have filed statem ents o f their reasons for such dissents. The M ember for the Philippines has filed a separate opinion concurring

Appendices / 369

w ith the m ajority. Generally, I share the view o f the m ajority as to the facts, but w ithout recording any dissent, I have filed a brief statem ent o f m y reasons for uphold­ ing the Charter and the jurisdiction o f the Tribunal and o f some general con­ siderations that influenced me in deciding on the sentences. These docum ents w ill be part o f the Record and w ill be available to the Supreme Com m ander, to Defense Counsel and to others w ho m ay be con­ cerned. Defense Counsel have applied for a reading in court o f these separate opinions, but the Tribunal had already considered this matter and decided that they w ould not be so read. The Tribunal adheres to this decision. The accused w ill be rem oved from the dock and then returned singly for sentence in th e order in w h ich th e ir nam es appear in th e title o f the Indictm ent. The three accused w ho are too ill to attend the trial today w ill be sentenced in their absence after those accused w ho are present have been sentenced. To enable the accused w ho are present to be presented for sentence in the order started, we w ill adjourn for fifteen m inutes. (W hereupon, at 15:30, a recess was taken u n til 15:55, after w hich the proceedings were resumed as follows:) SENTENCES M A RSH A L O F TH E CO U R T : The International M ilitary Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed. TH E PRESID EN T: In accordance w ith Article 15-h o f the Charter, the International M ilitary Tribunal for the Far East w ill now pronounce the sen­ tences on the accused convicted on this Indictm ent. Accused Araki, Sadao, on the Counts o f the Indictm ent on w hich you have been convicted, the International M ilitary Tribunal for the Far East sentences you to im prisonm ent for life. Accused D ohihara, K enji, on the Counts o f the Indictm ent on w hich you have been convicted, the International M ilitary Tribunal for the Far East sen­ tences you to death by hanging. Accused Hashim oto, Kingoro, on the Counts o f the Indictm ent on w hich you have been convicted, the International M ilitary Tribunal for the Far East sentences you to im prisonm ent for life. Accused H ata, Shunroku, on the Counts o f the Indictm ent on w hich you have been convicted, the International M ilitary Tribunal for the Far East sen­ tences you to im prisonm ent for life. Accused Hiranum a, Kiichiro, on the Counts o f the Indictm ent on w hich you have been convicted, the International M ilitary Tribunal for the Far East sentences you to im prisonm ent for life. Accused Hirota, Koki, on the Counts o f the Indictm ent on w hich you have

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been convicted, the International M ilitary Tribunal for the Far East sentences you to death by hanging. Accused H oshino, N aoki, on the Counts o f the Indictm ent on w hich you have been convicted, the International M ilitary Tribunal for the Far East sen­ tences you to im prisonm ent for life. Accused Itagaki, Seishiro, on the Counts o f the Indictm ent on w hich you have been convicted, the International M ilitary Tribunal for the Far East sen­ tences you to death by hanging. Accused Kido, K oichi, on the Counts o f the Indictm ent on w hich you have been convicted, the International M ilitary Tribunal for the Far East sentences you to im prisonm ent for life. Accused Kim ura, Heitaro, on the Counts o f the Indictm ent on w hich you have been convicted, the International M ilitary Tribunal for the Far East sen­ tences you to death by hanging. Accused Koiso, Kuniaki, on the Counts of the Indictm ent on w hich you have been convicted, the International M ilitary Tribunal for the Far East sen­ tences you to im prisonm ent for life. Accused M atsui, Iwane, on the Counts o f the Indictm ent on w hich you have been convicted, the International M ilitary Tribunal for the Far East sen­ tences you to death by hanging. Accused M inam i, Jiro, on the Counts o f the Indictm ent on w hich you have been convicted, the International M ilitary Tribunal for the Far East sentences you to im prisonm ent for life. Accused M uto, Akira, on the Counts of the Indictm ent on w hich you have been convicted, the International M ilitary Tribunal for the Far East sentences you to death by hanging. Accused Oka, Takazum i, on the Counts o f the Indictm ent on w hich you have been convicted, the International M ilitary Tribunal for the Far East sen­ tences you to im prisonm ent for life. Accused O shim a, H iroshi, on the Counts o f the Indictm ent on w hich you have been convicted, the International M ilitary Tribunal for the Far East sen­ tences you to im prisonm ent for life. Accused Sato, Kenryo, on the Counts o f the Indictm ent on w hich you have been convicted, the International M ilitary Tribunal for the Far East sentences you to im prisonm ent for life. Accused Shigem itsu, M am oru, on the Counts of the Indictm ent on w hich you have been convicted, the International M ilitary Tribunal for the Far East sentences you to im prisonm ent for seven years as from the date o f arraignment. Accused Shim ada, Shigetaro, on the Counts o f the Indictm ent on w hich you have been convicted, the International M ilitary Tribunal for the Far East sentences you to im prisonm ent for life. Accused Suzuki, T eiichi, on the Counts of the Indictm ent on w hich you have been convicted, the International M ilitary Tribunal for the Far East sen­ tences you to im prisonm ent for life.

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Accused Togo, Shigenori, on the Counts o f the Indictm ent on w hich you have been convicted, the International M ilitary Tribunal for the Far East sen­ tences you to im prisonm ent for twenty years as from the date o f arraignm ent. Accused Tojo, H ideki, on the Counts o f the Indictm ent on w hich you have been convicted, the International M ilitary Tribunal for the Far East sentences you to death by hanging. The Tribunal sentences the accused Kay a, Shiratori and Um ezu on the Counts on w hich they have been convicted to im prisonm ent for life in each case. The Tribunal adjourns. (W hereupon, at 16:12, 12 Novem ber, 1948, the tribunal adjourned.)

*Record o f Proceedings o f the International M ilitary Tribunal for the Far East, trans­ ferred from the M inistry o f Justice to Kokushikan University Library, Tokyo, in 1970. Available at the N ational Diet Library.

A PP E N D IX W

Treaty o f Peace w ith Ja p a n

(excerpt) signed on September 8, 1951: effected on April 28,1952

Whereas the Allied Powers and Japan are resolved that henceforth their relations shall be those o f nations w hich, as sovereign equals, cooperate in friendly association to prom ote their com m on welfare and to m aintain inter­ national peace and security, and are therefore desirous o f concluding a Treaty o f Peace w hich w ill settle questions still outstanding as a result o f the existence o f a state o f war between them ; Whereas Japan for its part declares its intention to apply for mem bership in the U nited N ations and in all circum stances to conform to the principles of the Charter o f the United Nations; to strive to realize the objectives o f the Universal Declaration of Hum an Rights; to seek to create w ithin Japan condi­ tions o f stability and w ell-being as defined in Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter o f the U nited N ations and already initiated by post-surrender Japanese legisla­ tion; and in public and private trade and commerce to conform to interna­ tionally accepted fair practices; W hereas the A llied Powers welcome the intentions of Japan set out in the foregoing paragraph; The A llied Powers and Japan have therefore determined to conclude the present Treaty o f Peace, and have accordingly appointed the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, w ho, after presentation o f their fu ll powers, found in good

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and due form , have agreed on the follow ing provisions: CHAPTER I PEACE Article 1 (a) The state o f war between Japan and each o f the Allied Powers is term i­ nated as from the date on w hich the present Treaty comes into force between Japan and the A llied Power concerned as provided for in Article 23. (b) The Allied Powers recognize the fu ll sovereignty of the Japanese people over Japan and its territorial waters. CHAPTER II TERRITORY Article 2 (a) Japan recognizing the independence o f Korea, renounces all right, title and claim to Korea, in clu din g the islands o f Q uelpart, Port H am ilton and Dagelet. (b) Japan renounces all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores. (c) Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Kurile Islands, and to that portion o f Sakhalin and the islands adjacent to it over w hich Japan acquired sovereignty as a consequence o f the Treaty o f Portsm outh o f 5 September 1905. (d) Japan renounces all right, title and claim in connection w ith the League of N ations M andate System , and accepts the action o f the U nited Nations Security C ou n cil o f 2 April 1947, extending the trusteeship system to the Pacific Islands form erly under mandate to Japan. (e) Japan renounces all claim to any right or title to or interest in connec­ tion w ith any part of the Antarctic area, w hether deriving from the activities of Japanese nationals or otherwise. (f) Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Spratly Islands and to the Paracel Islands. Article 3 Jap an w ill concur in any proposal o f the U n ited States to the U nited N ations to place under its trusteeship system, w ith the U nited States as the sole adm inistering authority, Nansei Shoto south o f 29deg. north latitude (includ­ ing the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands), N anpo Shoto south o f Sofu Gan (including the Bonin Islands, Rosario Island and the Volcano Islands) and Parece Vela and Marcus Island. Pending the m aking o f such a proposal and affirm ative action thereon, the U nited States w ill have the right to exercise all and any powers o f adm inistration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territo­ ry and inhabitants of these islands, including their territorial waters. Article 4 (omitted)

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CHAPTER III SECURITY Article 5 (a) Japan accepts the obligations set forth in Article 2 o f the Charter o f the U nited N ations, and in particular the obligations. (i) to settle its international disputes by peaceful means in such a m an­ ner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered; (ii) to refrain in its international relations from the threat or use o f force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in any other m anner inconsistent w ith the Purposes o f the United Nations; (iii) to give the U nited N ations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance w ith the Charter and to refrain from giving assistance to any State against w hich the U nited Nations m ay take preventive or enforcem ent action. (b) The A llied Powers confirm that they w ill be guided by the principles of Article 2 o f the Charter o f the U nited N ations in their relations w ith Japan. (c) The A llied Powers for their part recognize that Japan as a sovereign nation possesses the inherent right o f individual or collective self-defense referred to in Article 51 o f the Charter o f the U nited N ations and that Japan m ay voluntarily enter in to collective security arrangements. Article 6 (omitted) CHAPTER IV Article 7-10 (omitted) POLITICAL AN D E CO N O M IC CLAUSES Article 11 Japan accepts the judgm ents o f the International M ilitary Tribunal for the Far East and o f other Allied W ar Crim es Courts both w ithin and outside Japan, and w ill carry out the sentences im posed thereby upon Japanese nationals im prisoned in Japan. The power to grant clem ency, to reduce sentences and to parole w ith respect to such prisoners m ay n ot be exercised except on the deci­ sion o f the Governm ent or Governm ents w hich im posed the sentence in each instance, and on recom m endation o f Japan. In the case of persons sentenced by the International M ilitary Tribunal for the Far East, such power m ay not be exercised except on the decision o f a m ajority o f the Governm ents represent­ ed on the Tribunal, and on the recom m endation o f Japan. Article 12, 13 (omitted) CHAPTER V CLAIM S AN D PROPERTY Article 14 (a) It is recognized that Japan should pay reparations to the A llied Powers for the damage and suffering caused by it during the war. Nevertheless it is also recognized that the resources o f Japan are not presently sufficient, if it is to m aintain a viable econom y, to make com plete reparation for all such damage

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and suffering and at the same tim e meet its other obligations. Therefore, L Japan w ill prom ptly enter into negotiations w ith A llied Powers so desiring, whose present territories were occupied by Japanese forces and dam­ aged by Japan, w ith a view to assisting to com pensate those countries for the cost of repairing the dam age done, by m aking available the services o f the Japanese people in production, salvaging and other work for the A llied Powers in question. Such arrangements shall avoid the im position o f additional liabil­ ities on other Allied Powers, and, where the m anufacturing o f raw materials is called for, they shall be supplied by the A llied Powers in question, so as not to throw any foreign exchange burden upon Japan. 2. (omitted) (b) (omitted) Article 15 (omitted) Article 16 As an expression o f its desire to indem nify those members o f the armed forces o f the Allied Powers who suffered undue hardships w hile prisoners of war o f Jap an , Japan w ill transfer its assets and those o f its nationals in coun­ tries w hich were neutral during the war, or w hich were at war w ith any o f the A llie d Pow ers, or, at its o p tio n , th e e q u iv a le n t o f su ch assets, to the International Com m ittee o f the Red Cross w hich shall liquidate such assets and distribute the resultant fund to appropriate national agencies, for the ben­ efit o f former prisoners of war and their fam ilies on such basis as it m ay deter­ m ine to be equitable. The categories o f assets described in Article 14(a)2(II)(ii) through (v) o f the present Treaty shall be excepted from transfer, as well as assets o f Japanese natural persons not residents o f Japan on the first com ing into force o f the Treaty. It is equally understood that the transfer provision of th is A rticle has n o a p p lic a tio n to th e 19,770 shares in th e B ank fo r International Settlem ents presently owned by Japanese financial institutions. Article 17-21 (omitted) CHAPTER V I SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES Article 22 (omitted) CHAPTER V II FINAL CLAUSES Article 23-26 (omitted) Article 27 The present Treaty shall be deposited in the archives o f the Governm ent o f the U nited States o f America w hich shall furnish each signatory State w ith a certified copy thereof. IN FAITH W HEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty. D O N E at the city o f San Francisco this eighth day of September 1951; in the

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English, French, and Spanish languages, all being equally authentic, and in the Japanese language. (signature om itted) For A rgen tin a, A ustralia, B elgium , B olivia, B razil, C a m b o d ia , C a n a d a , C e y lo n , C h ile , C o lo m b ia , C o sta R ica , C u b a , th e D om inican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatem ala, H aiti, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, the G ran d D u ch y o f Luxem bourg, M e xico , the N eth erlan d s, New Zealan d , Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panam a, Peru, the Republic o f the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, the U nion of South Africa, the U nited Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the U nited States o f Am erica, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet-Nam , and Japan.

APPENDIX X

The Y o m iu ri Sh im b u n editorial, August IS , 2006 (Translated by The D aily Yomiuri, August 15, 2006)

Responsibilities for 'Showa War' assessed This year again. On this particular day A t Yasukuni Shrine, The annual event is held while I'm in deep sorrow. This poem was com posed by Emperor Show a in 1987 for the A ug. 15 anniversary o f the end o f the war. This year, the "particular day" falls on Tuesday and a national cerem ony w ill be held at N ippon Budokan h all at Kudan, Tokyo, in mem ory o f the war dead. The cerem ony w ill be attended by th e Em peror and Em press, Prim e M inister Junichiro Koizum i, the speaker o f the House o f Representatives, the president o f the House o f Councillors, and the ch ief justice o f the Supreme Court. This is an event o f the utm ost m agnitude for Japan. So-called Class-A war crim inals are not excluded as subjects for the memor­ ial service. N otw ithstanding this fact, opinions rem ain divided over the issue o f enshrinem ent o f the Class-A war crim inals at Yasukuni Shrine. W hy is this? One possible factor is that the term "Class-A war crim inals" lum ped together various figures into a single category by the victorious countries of the war at the International M ilitary Tribunal for the Far East, also called the Tokyo Tribunal. In addition, where responsibility for the war resides has not been verified by Japan itself. Im m ediately after the war, there were actually moves w ithin the government

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to exam ine how war responsibility should be allocated, including a war crimi­ nals court plan drawn up by the Cabinet o f Prince Higashikuni and a war inves­ tigation com mission plan drafted by the Cabinet o f Kijuro Shidehara. These plans, however, were aborted by the General Headquarters of the Occupation Forces due to various reasons.

Defining the war Since summer of last year, The Yom iuri Shim bun has worked to clarify what degree of responsibility wartime political and m ilitary leaders should bear. We have steered clear of follow ing the Tokyo Tribunal's designation o f w ho were "war crim inals." Our criteria included responsibility for steering the country toward war, responsibility for being unable to prevent the war from starting and responsibility for not ending the war sooner. The Yom iuri Shim bun exam ined the period from the M anchurian Incident of 1931 that preceded the Sino-Japanese W ar u n til the end o f the war against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands. N o single term adequately encapsulates the series o f wars fought in this period. Names such as the Greater East Asia W ar, Pacific W ar, Asia-Pacific War or 15-Year W ar evoke historical em otions or fail to sate geographical deficien­ cies. The Y om iuri Shim bun has decided to co llectiv ely ca ll these wars the "Showa W ar" because we feel this name—chosen because o f the period when the con flict took place—is unrestrained by geographical lim its or historical views. O ur fin d in g s have been reported from tim e to tim e in T he Y om iuri Shim bun over the past year. Coupled w ith the report in Sunday's issue, today's report is a grand summary of the yearlong process. M any Class-A war crim inals at the Tokyo Tribunal overlapped w ith the fig­ ures judged "m ainly responsible" by the com m ittee. However, the lineups are considerably different.

Reassigning blame For instance, G en. Heitaro Kim ura, w ho was sentenced to death by hanging as a Class-A war crim inal, did not play any specific roles in im portant phases before and during the Showa W ar that warranted his being accused. Sim ilarly, we, did not fin d any good reason for assigning war responsibility to Finance M inister O kinori Kaya, a Class-A crim inal sentenced to life im prisonm ent—he sim ply was a state m inister w hen Japan started hostilities against the United States. M oreover, he opposed the Jap an -U .S. war. O n the other side o f the co in , we found responsibility lay w ith Prime M inister Kantaro Suzuki for failin g to prevent the U .S. atom ic bom bings of Hiroshim a and Nagasaki and the Soviet U nion's entry into the war by delaying the tim ing for ending the hostilities. This contrasts w ith his often-reported achievem ent o f bringing the war to an end.

Appendices / 377

The deaths o f some leaders allowed them to avoid being tried as Class-A war crim inals, although they bore great responsibility for the war. Perhaps the m ost prom inent exam ple is Prime M inister Fumimaro Konoe, w ho com m itted suicide in December 1945. He bears extrem ely heavy respon­ sibility for being indecisive at critical m om ents, m aking a string of m iscalcula­ tions and w rong judgm ents and being easily swayed by opinions o f the m ilitary. Foreign M inister Yosuke M atsuoka also misread the international situation by prom oting and signing the Tripartite Treaty w ith Germ any and Italy, w hich was a key step in the slide to war against the U nited States. A lthough Matsuoka was indicted as a Class-A war crim inal, no sentence was given because he died o f natural causes before the ruling was handed down. In addition, some m ilitary bureaucrats—nam ely Army and Naval General Staff officers—were not indicted although they could be considered to be more substantively responsible for the war than Class-A war crim inals. M any o f those staff officers escaped scot-free from being held responsible for the deaths o f more than 3 m illion Japanese soldiers and civilians by con­ tinuing to push their leaders and exceeding their authority as they sought to expand m ilitary operations, wage the war and continue to fight even as hopes for victory faded. These officers died peacefully after the war. Needless to say, we should not forget that Japanese were not the only vic­ tim s o f the Showa W ar.

International situation misread The path toward the war and its un foldin g afterward was closely inter­ twined w ith the international situation that tim e, as world powers attem pted to read the global shifts and envisioned their own strategies and power games. In the Sino-Japanese W ar, for exam ple, the U nited States had backed—even before th e Ja p a n -U .S . war broke ou t—th e govern m en t o f th e C h in ese N ationalist Party (Kuomintang) led by Chian g Kai-shek by providing m ilitary supplies through the so-called "Aid Chian g Route." M eanw hile, Britain and France decided to dispatch expedition troops to support Finland after the Soviet U nion invaded the Nordic country in 1939. But because Finland capitulated to M oscow, Britain and France did not cross swords w ith the Soviet U n ion . The Soviet entry into the war against Japan was a clear violation o f the Japanese-Soviet N eutrality Pact. The Soviet U n ion had secretly agreed to a request by Britain and the U nited States at the Yalta Conference to join the war against Japan after the defeat of Germ any. Even so, hedging about the responsibility o f political and m ilitary leaders who made blunders in dealing w ith the international situation and brought unspeakable suffering to Japan and neighboring countries by starting the reck­ less war cannot be justified. It is difficu lt to consider the war responsibility and wartime crimes o f victor

378

countries unless the responsibilities o f Japanese leaders have been clarified and summarized on our own. W e believe only by doing so can a ray o f ligh t be shone onto the prospects for settling problems over interpretation o f history.

Elsewhere in the research, we also referred to the follow ing sources: Nihon Gaiko Shuyo Bunsho (Basic Docum ents on Japanese Foreign Relations), ed. Kajim a Institute o f International Peace, Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1983; Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations o f the United States, Japan: 1931-1941, ed. Departm ent o f State, W ashington, D .C .: U .S . Governm ent Printing O ffice, 1943; Turbulent Era, vol. 2 , ed. Joseph C . Grew, New York: H oughton M ifflin , 1952; Foreign R ela tio n s o f the U n ited States 1945 v o l. V I: The B ritish Commonwealth, The Far East, eds. Herbert A . Fine et a l., W ashington, D .C .: U .S. Governm ent Printing O ffice, 1969; Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy 1931-1941, ed. Departm ent o f State, W ashington, D .C .: U .S . Governm ent Printing O ffice, 1942; Truman Library hom e page (www.trumanlibrary.org/); Toshikazu Kase, Nippon Gaiko-shi 23: Nichibei Kosho (A History o f Japanese D iplom acy v o l. 23: Ja p a n -U .S . N egotiations), Tokyo: K ajim a In stitu te o f International Peace, 1970. *The release dates o f undated literature are given in parentheses.

Select Bibliography

T

here are only a sm all number o f English-language academ ic books about Japan's war history covering the first h alf o f the 20th century up un til W orld War II. One o f them is Japan's Road to the Pacific War, ed. Jam es W . M orley, New York: Colum bia University Press, 1976-94. This five-volum e series focuses on what the Japanese governm ent and m ilitary did from the 1920s to 1941, w hen the Pacific W ar started. The series is an English translation of excerpts from the eight-volum e series, Taiheiyo Senso e no M ichi (Road to the P a cific W ar), a co lle ctio n o f papers w ritten by Ja p a n 's lead in g researchers. Ruth Benedict's Chrysanthem um and the Sword: Patterns o f Japanese Culture, Tokyo: Charles T. Tuttle, 1946, is acclaim ed as a classic book, shedding ligh t on the background o f the wars—Japan's history and cul­ ture. However, there has been criticism in Japan that Benedict depicted the Japanese in images that fitted those she had thought o f arbitrarily. N ow ad ays, H elen M ears' M irror fo r A m erica n s: JA P A N , B oston : H oughton, M ifflin , 1948, is being praised as a book insightful o f Japan's culture and circumstances surrounding the wars. For the readers who want to get a first-hand account of Japan and China, American diplom at Jo h n Van Antwerp MacMurray's How the Peace Was la st: The 1935 Memorandum: Developments Affecting American Policy in the Far East (ed. Arthur W aldron, Stanford, C a lif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1992) is one o f the best starting points. The book offers a penetrative insight into the behavioral patterns o f Chinese and Japanese ways o f think­ in g . M acM urray (1881-1960) prepared the papers for the U .S . State Department based on his first-hand observations of China and Japan in the 1930s. Therein M acMurray, he hinted strongly—as early as 1935—at the possibility o f Japan invading China and confronting the United States. The Pacific W ar fought between Japan and the United States is detailed in the U .S. Arm y's report, Japanese Operations in the Southwest Pacific Areas, 379

380

R eports o f G en era l M a cA rth u r v o l. 2 , e d ., C h a rle s A . W illo u g h b y , W ashington, D .C .: U .S . G overnm ent Printing O ffice , 1967. It touches on the issue o f Emperor Show a's war responsibility in the Appendix: Japanese Emperor and the War, pp. 763-771. H irom ichi Yahara, The Battle for Okinawa, New York: J . W iley & Sons, 1995. This is an English translation, edited by journalist Frank G ibney, based on the recollections on the Battle o f Okinaw a o f Yahara, a Japanese Arm y colonel and senior staff officer. The book provides detailed accounts o f som e o f th e experiences o f the senior o ffice r w ho surrendered in Okinaw a—and also offers lessons from one o f the bloodiest battles in the Pacific W ar, w hich claim ed the lives o f about 200,000 people on both sides. Pulitzer Prize-w inning journalist Herbert P. B ix, Hirohito and the Making o f M odem Japan, New York, Harper C o llin s Publishers, 2000, is w ell know n for h ig h lig h tin g Emperor Show a's war responsibility. But the book has been w idely criticized as lackin g grounds for h o ld in g Em peror Show a responsible and for a biased in terpretation o f related m aterials. Peter W etzler—w ho said Bix's book is n ot a history book—authored Hirohito and W ar: Im perial Tradition and M ilitary D ecision M aking in Prewar Japan, H o n o lu lu : U n iversity o f H aw aii Press, 1998. W etzler's book con tain s scathing com m ents on Emperor Showa yet it is evidence-based. P u b licatio n s q u oted in th is b ook are m o stly w ritten in Jap an ese. Therefore, the tentative English translations are put in parentheses im m e­ diately after the introduction o f each title in Rom an letters. Alm ost all publications cited in this book are available at the N ational D iet Library in Tokyo. Internet-enabled access to English publications is possible, but no Rom an-letter search for Japanese-language publications on the W eb is available at the tim e o f w riting despite strong dem and for such a success, (m )

Novem ber 2006

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

T

his book is a collection o f English pieces carefully translated from a yearlong series o f Japanese-language investigative, in-depth articles, entitled, "W AR RESPONSIBILITY—delving into the p a st," w hich appeared in the Yomiuri Shimbun between August 2005 and August 2006. The Yom iuri Shim bun, a 132-year-old newspaper in Jap an , has not only published daily Japanese-language editions w ith a nationw ide circulation but has also issued m agazines and books in Japanese that cover cultural, diplom atic, econom ic, educational, p olitical and scientific fields, am ong others. Before this book, the Yom iuri Shim bun had never published a fu ll book in E n glish . Fortu n ately, Y om iu ri Shim bun also publishes an E nglishlanguage newspaper, the D a ily Yomiuri, w hich marked its 50th anniversary in April 2005. The D aily Yomiuri boasts a team o f com petent, experienced Japanese-to-English translators. The project to publish an English-language version o f the Japanese arti­ cle series was originally proposed by Yom iuri Shim bun Executive Editor Takuo T akih an a. T his was an unprecedented ch allen ge for the D a ily Yom iuri, b u t it proved to be a golden opportunity to dem onstrate the skills o f the D a ily Yomiuri staff. I am d eep ly gratefu l to M an agin g E ditor K ojiro Sh iraish i and the Editorial Bureau o f the Yom iuri Shim bun for their fu ll support, w ithout w hich this project w ould n o t have m aterialized. I thank Deputy M anaging Editor Tsutom u Yam aguchi o f the Yom iuri Shim bun for h elpin g this pro­ ject forge ahead by actin g as a key coordinator and M an agin g Editor Shigeyuki Okada o f the D aily Yom iuri for enabling this project to m ove forward by choosing an ad hoc team o f translators from his staff. M y deep thanks go to the team 's m em bers— Ikuo A n a i, K azuhiko O m oya, H iroshi H irai, Yosuke Sakurai, Yum iko M iyai, Yoko M izu i, Rieko M ohara, K iyom i A rai, M am i Tsukahara, H ideyuki A oki, Kakuya Ishida, Koya O zeki and Shigefum i Takasuka—for their all-out contributions to the project. I am equally than kfu l to Cam eron M cLauchlan, Jason M iks and C h ristin a K untz for rew riting the tran slatio n team 's w orks as n ative 391

392

English speakers and to H itoshi Yoshida and Akiko Shizuno o f the Design Section o f the Yom iuri Shim bun for w orking on m aps and tables in this book. I extend m y special thanks to D r. Jam es E. Auer, Director o f the Center for U .S.-Japan Studies and Cooperation o f V anderbilt U niversity, w ho was a genuine p illar o f strength on this project, serving as Editor o f this book. O vercom in g th e 14-hour tim e difference from T okyo, th e N a sh ville, Tennessee-based professor w holeheartedly devoted him self to thoroughly checking every word in every lin e o f the translations sent from Tokyo. D r. Auer m ade n o com prom ise w hen he found questionable descriptions and erroneous or incom prehensible translations. G iv en the fact th a t th is A m erican security expert earlier studied at Japan's M aritim e Self-Defense Force Staff C ollege and served as Director for Jap an (the Jap an Desk) at the Pentagon, I believe we m ade the right decision in asking h im to serve as Editor o f the book. I sincerely and respectfully salute D r. A uer, a lon g-stan d in g frien d , for h is particular efforts in this Yom iuri Shim bun project. I also am indebted to International News Editor K iichiro Harano and the W ash in gto n , N ew York and Los A ngeles Bureaus o f th e Y om iu ri Shim bun for their advice and support on public relations and in m arket­ ing o f this book. I am particularly grateful to New York Bureau General Counsel Jacob M argolies for his vital role in m oving this book project for­ ward w ith a variety o f PR and m arketing ideas. From Britain, Tosh M inohara, Assistant Professor at Kobe U niversity, w ho was a V isitin g Fellow at O xford U niversity at the tim e o f this w riting, presented a concise sum m ary on the U .S . Im m igration A ct o f 1924, w hich appears in A ppendix A . For space reasons, this book hardly touches on this act, but it should be noted that the act was one o f the om inous, littlepublicized harbingers o f the deterioration o f Japanese-U .S. relations in the 1930s. The Yom iuri Research Institute supervised the project to publish both a pair o f books in Japanese under the title o f "W AR RESPONSIBILITY—delv­ ing into the past" and this English book. I appreciate the Institute's Deputy C h ie f O ffic e r T ak ash i Y o k o y a m a , M an ager o f th e A d m in istra tio n D epartm ent M asashi Iiyam a, Senior Research Fellow Itsuki Iw ata and Deputy Editor o f the Book-M agazine Departm ent Chikao Suzuki for play­ in g their respective key roles, especially in regard to this English book. Suzuki drew the original design o f this book's jacket. I am particularly obliged to express m y profound thanks to Senior Research Fellow M akoto K ito o f the Yom iuri Research Institute for his enduring devotion day after day from early to late hours—sacrificing his summer holidays—to check every single word concerning the tim eline

Acknowledgem ent / 393

and events covered by this book and liaise w ith D r. Auer. Needless to say, the Yom iuri Shim bun W ar Responsibility Reexam ina­ tio n C om m ittee, an ad hoc in-house p anel, did extensive research and produced the yearlong series o f articles in Japanese, on w hich this English book is based. The list o f members o f the team , headed by C h ie f W riter N obuo Asaum i, appears at the end o f the Foreword. It has been said th at Jap an is a m ajor net im porter o f inform ation—a phenom enon unparalleled elsewhere in the w orld. W hile being keenly sensitive to news and in form ation from every corner o f the w orld, Jap an is not good at dissem inating a sufficient am ount o f accurate inform ation to the rest o f the w orld for the country and its people to be understood correctly. Some cases in w hich Japan's history and culture are persistently m isun­ derstood can be attributed to the obvious lack o f sufficient efforts in the area o f inform ation dissem ination. O ne o f the worst exam ples based on m isinform ation is: "Japan is paving the w ay to restore m ilitarism w ithout show ing remorse on its w artim e past and assum ing responsibility for its wars." It is m y sincere w ish that the publication o f this book w ill enable m any people, n ot o n ly in the U nited States, but also in C h in a , South Korea and Southeast Asian countries—w ho m ay not speak or read Japanese—to gain a proper understanding and awareness o f today's Jap an . Last but not least, I w ant to em phasize th at this English book w ould never have got o ff the ground w ithout the understanding and support o f E ditor-in-C hief Tsuneo W atanabe w ho has been w riting discerning and foresighted analyses and com m entaries for m ore than h a lf a century. It was E ditor-in -C hief W atanabe w ho initiated the newspaper's project to rem ind the Japanese o f the im portance o f lookin g back at the history of the Show a Era. It was also E ditor-in-C hief W atanabe w ho was the m ost sym pathetic w ith, and supportive of, the members o f the W ar Responsi­ b ility R eexam in ation C o m m ittee w ho stro n gly w anted to share the findings o f their yearlong research w ith the rest o f the w orld. Akira Saito C h ie f O fficer Yom iuri Research Institute Tokyo, Japan

Index

A

Army General Staff College 49, 92 Army M ilitary Academy 50 Arsene-Henry, Charles (French Ambassador to Japan) 102 Asahi Shim bun 98 Ashida, H itoshi 171, 247 Asian M onroe Doctrine (1934) 67 Atcheson, George 267, 332 Atlantic Charter 118 atom ic bomb: 37,183-185,186,187, 188,195 directive to drop, 187 Eisenhower, Dw ight, 187 Farrell, Thomas, 186 Groves, Leslie, 186 Hague Convention IV , 218 Interim Com m ittee, 186 Japanese accusation, 329 Japan's research, 188 justifying use of, 126,128 Kokura, 188 M anhattan Project, 186 N iigata, 188 N ishina, Yoshio, 188 o f Hiroshim a and Nagasaki, 200, 218, 238, 241, 287, 376 on Hiroshim a, 38,186, 188,198, 263 on Nagasaki, 39,128 ,1 86, 188, 201, 263 pressure from Congress, 187 Rikagaku Kenkyusho (Institute of Physical and Chem ical Sciences), 188 Roosevelt and Churchill, 186 test, 197-198 Truman statement, 326 two minds about dropping, 187 upper hand, 187

ABCD encirclem ent 103 Abe, Nobuyuki 48, 89, 174, 247, 335, A-IV absolute defense area 37 Absolute N ational Defense Zone 149, 157, 235 advance to southern French Indochina: 101-103, 108, 114, 117, B-V national goal, 68 (ground-based) air defense units 196 air superiority theory 135 Aka Tombo (biplane) 167 akagami (draft paper) 242 Akagi (aircraft carrier) 133,134 Alamogordo (New M exico) 186 Aleutian Islands 37,132 All 100 m illion armed to fight 238 Am o, Eiji 66-67, 216 Anam i, Korechika (General) 39, 89,190, 238, 239, 253, 254, A-H Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1902-22) 93 Anti-Com intern Pact (1936) 68, 87 anti-Japanese movem ent 52, 65 Aoki, Kazuo 216 Arakatsu, Bunsaku 188 Araki, Sadao: 50, 62, 70, 81,113, 214, 227, 340, A-IV suggestion of, 114 Arim a, Yoriyasu 97 Arisue, Seizo 191 Arita, Hachiro (Foreign Minister): 68, 214, 246 denouncing Nine-Power Treaty, 300 Army and Navy: different strategies, 148,149 separate plans, 131

N ote: Num bers preceded b y A or B refer to th e first or second p h o to gallery, respectively.

395

396 Attu (1943): 24-25,^37, 146-148, 278 Yamazaki, Yasuyo, 146 Australia: 170 Emperor, 215 U .S ., 132, 143 Webb (Tokyo Tribunal), 215 Axis nations 34 B B-29: 263 from Saipan, 153, 196 Superfortress strategic bombers, 195 BaM aw 151 Baba, Eiichi (Finance Minister) 68 Baden-Baden Alliance Pledge (1921) 50 Banzai C liff (Saipan) 147 Basis for N ational Policy 68 Battle Decree for National Land (1945) 164 Battle o f Midway (1942): 24-25, 36, 129, 134 arrogant thought, 135 First Carrier Strike Force, 133 Japan's chances to w in, 134 Kaga (aircraft carrier), 133,134 mistake o f dividing carriers, 135 Tojo, 149 Battle o f Okinawa: 24-25, 157,159, 236, 238 casualties, 162 evacuations o f students, 162 fight to the last m an, 162 Governor Shuki Izum i's abandonm ent o f his duties, 163 Himeyuri (Star Lily) Corps, 164 Imperial Headquarters order, 159,162 Kerama Islands, 160 Kum ejim a, 164 Kyan Peninsula, 161 local defense corps, 163 long-drawn-out war, 160 M abuni, 162 recognition, 160 sacrifice, 160 Shuri, 160 special recognition to Okinawa, 165 Taiwan, 157 Tekketsu Kinnotai, 163

Battle o f the Sea o f Japan (1905) 136 big fleet battle theory 135-136 bom bings o f Tokyo (March 10 and M ay 25, 1945), see Tokyo Air Raid boshi yocho (punishing China) 80 Boxer Protocol (1901) 307 Boxer Uprising (1898-1900) 73 Britain: Churchill, W inston, 118,183, 185, 186,197, 198 forces in Indonesia, 208 monetary reform in C hin a, 67 Prince o f Wales (HMS), 130 Repulse (HMS), 130 Royal Naval College in Greenw ich, 93 war dead, 242 Bu Ping 66 Burma (Myanmar): 107 BaM aw , 152 independence of, 151 Bush, George W . 185 C Cabinet Inform ation Bureau 277 Cabinet Planning Board 113,116 Cairo Declaration (1943) 37, 323 Central Liaison O ffice (1945) 214 Chang Hsueh-liang (Zhang Xueliang) 58, 66 Changchun (China) 45 Chen Kung-po (Chen Gongbo) 178 Chiang Kai-shek 36, 46, 65, 77,119, 178, 197, 228, 270 C h in Te-chun (Qin Dechun) 64 China Expeditionary Army 23,131 China: Central Arm y, 75, Chang Tso-lin (Zhang Zuolin) (warlord), 48, 57, 225, B-II casualties, 242-243 C hin g (Qing) Dynasty, 46 Com m unist Party, 65 Fifth Party Convention o f the Kuom intang (1935), 65 gashinshotan (wo xin chang dan), 65 Hebei-Chahar Political Council (1935), 65 Jian g Zem in, 243

In d ex

China—continued Kung Hsiang-hsi (Kong Xiangxi), 78 Kuom intang, 33, 46, 64, 76, 81, 207 League o f N ations, 58 M ao Zedong, 207, 270 nationalism , 61, 66 N ationalist [Kuomintang] government, see China: Kuom intang recruitment o f former Japanese officers, 208 student dem onstration (1935), 65 Sun Yat-sen (Sim Yixian), 46 Sung Che-yuan (Song Zheyuan), 64, 65 supply route to Chiang Kai-shek's forces, 102 W ang Chao-m ing, 78, 119, 151, 178 X ian Incident (1936), 66, 68, 229 Yang Hu-cheng (Yang Hucheng), 66 Yen Hsi-shan (Yan Xishan) (warlord), 208 Zhou Enlai, 66 Chiran (Kagoshima Prefecture) 165 C ho, Isamu 57,161,163 Chongqing (China) 76, 102 Choshu (Yamaguchi Prefecuture) 50 Chou Fo-hai (Zhou Fohai) 178 Chronological table 26-27 Churchill, Sarah 183 Class-A war crim inals 8, 213 Class-B war crim inals 213 Class-C war crim inals 213 Com bined Fleet 129,166, 273 Coral Sea: Battle of, B-VIII Crim ea 38

D Dalian (China) 54 defense system o f aircraft carriers 139 Dien Bien Phu: Battle of, 208 Dohihara, Kenji: 55, 64, 225, 227, 256, 341, A-II Dohihara-Qin Dechun accord, 229 Dower, Jo h n 171 Dutch East Indies 89, 94,102,132

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East Hebei Anti-Com m unist and SelfGovernm ent Council 65 Eden, Anthony 198 Eibei Honi no Heiwa-shugi wo Haisu 79 8/1 Declaration (1935) 65 Einstein, Albert 186 emergency supply m obilization program 113 Emperor M eiji 205 Emperor Showa: 19-20, 35, 37, 39, 41, 56, 57, 63, 82, 90, 95, 106, 111, 116, 120, 124, 130, 150, 158, 161, 169, 179, 190, 202, 243, 247, 254, 260, 272, B-IV advice to, 177 advisory institutions, 22-23 Australia, 215 com m unist revolution, 177 divine decision, 204 divine judgm ents, 241 Emperor system, 21, 38 Far Eastern Com m ission, 215 higher priority on diplom acy, 121 Im perial Court group, 176 MacArthur, Douglas, 267, B-XIV M inobe, Tatsukichi, 274 M onologue, 266, 333 opposition to Rehe Operation, 63 organ o f the state (1935), 82, 274 peace plan, 177 poem by Emperor M eiji, 120, 262 Potsdam Clause on Emperor system, 197 resisted Konoe proposal, 177 response to Roosevelt, 315 responsibility, 223, 224, 332 responsibility as Supreme Com m ander, 260-263, 267 steps to peace, 203 Sugiyam a, 120 summons to terminate war, 193 Suzuki, 190 Tojo's refusal, 173 w ill on war, 122 (search for an) end to the war: 176 averted coup, 202 com munists trap, 177

398 (search for an) end to the war—continued draft plan, 169 Emperor's asking to jushin (1945), 177, 203 false announcem ents, 138 Imperial Supreme War Council, 39, 158, 235 Japanese-Soviet nonaggression pact, 193 jushin discussions (1944), 174 plan to ask the Soviet U n ion , 179 policy o f withdrawing troops from China, 89 unconditional surrender, 37 w ill o f the Emperor, 39 w ishful thinking, 169 Yoshida, Shigeru, 170 F Far Eastern Com m ission (April 3, 1946) 215 February 26 Incident (1936) 34, 70, 82, 226, B-III five-m inister conference 68 Foreign M inistry: 69 Embassy in W ashington, 234 Imperial W ay diplom acy, 98 lack o f com m unication, 125 memorandum delayed, 124-126 Mistakes o f Japan's Diplom acy, 68 France: 207, 208 French Indochina, 94 northern French Indochina, 102 surrender (1940) of, 89 Vichy governm ent, 89 Franco-Prussian W ar (1870-71) 92 Free India government in exile 151 Fuchida, M itsuo 129 Fujii, Shigeru 110 Fujita, Hisanori (Grand Cham berlain) 177,190 Fukutome, Shigeru 115, 123, 132, 136, 137, 138, 234, 258, A-III Fukuzawa, Yukichi 69, 290 Futaba-kai (Double Leaf Society) 50

G gekokujo (the low -dom inating-the-high): 21, 49, 75 Suiyuan Incident (1936), 71 Genda, M inoru 134 general election (April 1942) 171 General Headquarters (GHQ) 213 genro (senior statesman) 23, 46 Germ any: annexation o f Austria and Czechoslovakia, 87 blitzkrieg lightning war, 101 invasion o f Poland, 34, 89 invasion o f the Soviet U n ion , 34, 95 nonaggression agreement w ith the Soviet U nion (1939), 88 O tt, Eugen (Ambassador to Japan), 94 surrender of, 37 Trautm an, Oskar (Ambassador to China), 76, 228 von Dirksen, Herbert (Ambassador to Japan), 77 von Ribbentrop, Joachim (Foreign M inister), 68,97 gozenkaigi, see Japan Great Depression 61 Greater East Asia Conference (1943) 151, B-IX Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere: 94, 131, 271 Kenryo Sato, 130 Greater East Asia M inistry 150 Greater East Asia Political Leadership Principles 151 Greater East Asia War: nam ing of, 131 Guadalcanal cam paign (1942): 24-25, 36, 143, B-VIII Eighth Fleet, 144 m icrophones, 144 Mukade H ill (Edson's Ridge), 144 Guam 147,157 Guangdong (China) 76 guideline concerning the prom otion o f southern expansion policy 103 guideline for southern expansion policy 103

In d ex

gyokusai (death-for-honor) 8 ,1 4 3 ,1 4 6 , 237, 277

H Hainan Island (China) 103 Hamada, Kunimatsu 82, 274 Ham aguchi, Osachi 274 Hamamatsu (Shizuoka Prefecture) 196 Hanaya, Tadashi 53 Hankou (Wuhan) (China) 76 Hara, Yoshim ichi 95, 174 Harada, Kumao (secretary to Kinm ochi Saionji) 56, 67, 171 Hashim oto, G un (Colonel) 64 Hashim oto, Kingoro (Colonel) 52, 53, 57, 225, 256, 342, A-II Hata, Eitaro 48 Hata, Hikosaburo 153, 212 Hata, Ikuhiko 55, 76, 243 Hata, Shunroku (Field Marshal) 90,175, 231, 257, 344, A-IV Hatoyam a, Ichiro 171, 247, 274 Hattori, Takushiro 114, 215, 232, 272 Hayashi, Kyujiro 54 Hayashi, Senjuro: 50, 68, 70 Comm ander o f the Korea Arm y, 54, 226 heresy o f com mand 140 H iguchi, Kiichiro 146 Hiranuma, Kiichiro: 172, 174,189, 344, A-IV resignation en masse, 88 Hirohito, see Emperor Showa 19 Hiroshima, see atom ic bomb Hirota, Koki: 66, 67, 68, 77, 78, 80,174, 192, 218, 227, 240, 251, 345, A-I, B-III advance into Southeast Asia, 228 Cabinet, 70 cooperative diplom acy, 67 Imperial policy principles, 228 national goal (1936), 68 practice o f appointing m ilitary ministers, 68 Hiryu (aircraft carrier) 134 Hitler, A dolf 68, 83, 88, 95, 96, 150, 248 Hiyodorigoe 137, 141 Ho Ying-chin (He Yingqin) 64, 243

/ 399

H onjo, Shigeru 54, 226, B-II Hori, Eizo 96 Horiba, Kazuo 78 H oshino, Naoki 246, 347, A-IV Hosokawa, Morisada 170,174, 177

Ichigeki Kowa (any m eaningful victory) 240 Ikawa, Tadao 116 Im ada, Shintaro 53 Im ai, Kiyoshi 74 Im ai, Takeo 78 Im perial Diet: 34, 81, 82,171 Budgetary deliberations (1936-37), 82 criticism to Tojo, 173 D aiichi Giin Kurabu, 82 Daini Hikaeshitsu, 82 extraordinary budget, 83 House o f Representatives, 62, 82 Kumagaya, Naota, 82 Minseito, see Rikken Minseito M ori, Tsutom u, 48, 63, 227 party politics, 34 pro-m ilitary lawmakers, 83 Rikken Minseito (Constitutional Dem ocratic Party), 82, 83, 98, 275 Rikken Seiyukai (Constitutional Party of Political Friends), 63, 82, 83, 98, 275 Seiyukai, see Rikken Seiyukai Shakai Taishuto (Social Masses Party), 82, 83, 97, 275 shame 83 succumbed Constitutional politics, 83 Tohokai, 82 Yokusan Seiji-kai (Imperial Rule Assistance Association Political Society), 274 Im perial Headquarters-Government Liaison Conference 36, 77, 78, 92, 102, 103, 123, 130 Im perial Navy Operations Plan (1941) 122 Imperial Rule Assistance Association (Taisei Yokusan-kai) 34, 98,171, 247, 251, B-V

400

Imphal Operation: 24-25, 237 Bose, Subhash Chandra, 152 Kawabe, Masakazu, 75,153, 238 termination order, 153 Yamauchi, Masafumi, 153, 237 Indonesia: 208, 209 independence, 208 Sukarno, 208 Inoue, Shigeyoshi 34, 88,109, 255, 257 instrument of surrender 39, 205, 330, B-XV International Military Tibunal for Far East (Tokyo Tribunal): 39, 207, 259 atomic weapons, 218 Blakeney, Ben Bruce (attorney), 218 charge of "conspiracy", 217 Charter of, 216, 217 Crimes against peace, 217 ex post facto law, 217 exemption o f Emperor Showa, 215 International Prosecution Section (IPS), 213 Jackson, Robert (U.S. Supreme Court Justice), 216 Keenan, Joseph (Chief Counsel), 213 London conference on international military tribunal, 216 Pal, Radhabinod, 218 removed defendants, 214 Selection of war criminal, 212 Sentences (1948), 40, 216, 369, B-XVI start, 215 war of aggression, 217 Webb, W illiam (President of Tokyo Tribunal), 215,218 Inukai, Tsuyoshi (Prime Minister) 34, 62, 81, 227, 270, 274 Ishihara, Kanji: 32, 41, 49, 50, 52, 68, 69, 71, 73, 74, 80,174, 214, 225, 229, 255, A-II Final World War Theory, 50, 52 Ishii, Itaro 69, 70, 80, 82 Ishii, Shiro (Unit 731 team) 215 Ishikawa, Shingo (Captain) 109,115, 215, 230, 232, 257, A-III Ishiwata, Sotaro (Finance Minister) 88 Isobe, Asaichi 70 Isogai, Rensuke 49

Isseki-kai (One Evening Society) 50, 51, 70 Itagaki, Seishiro 32, 41, 53, 61, 64, 81, 88, 225, 229, 256, 348, A-II Italy: 87 Mussolini, 95 surrender (1943), 171 Ito, Hirobumi 46 Ito, Seiichi 137, 166, 236 Iwabuchi, Tatsuo 171 Iwakuro, Hideo 88, 90, 114, 117 Iwo Jim a 24-25, 147, 160, 236, 242

Japan: chance to hold peace, 176 claimed lives of 3.1 m illion, 205 conference to wage war, 124 conscription of a student corps (1943), 152, B-X consideration of surrender, 192 coup planning (1934), 70 covering up of retreat, 145 death notion, 148 elite military officers domination, 273 Embassy in W ashington, 234 emotional decision, 166 exit strategy, 35-36,169 expedition to Shandong (1927-28), 48 five ministers meeting, 88 gozenkaigi (conference in the presence o f the Emperor), 116, 238, 338 grounds for the atomic bombs, 126 guidelines of the Imperial Army and Navy's Operation Plan, 166 hard-line military bureaucrats, 122 have-nots, 79 Hohei-Soten (Infantry Manual), 111 hum iliation o f captivity, 146 hunger in the jungle, 145 Imperial Defense Policy (1923), 47 Imperial Rescript on the Termination of the War, 205 Imperial Rescript on the War (1941), 131 international law, 126 jingoism of the Army, 109 lack of control, 150

In d ex

Japan—continued Maneuvers to annex northern China, 229 moves for peace talks, 171 national polity, 177 Navy in turm oil, 121 Navy Operation Plan, 160 no confidence, 121 No punishm ent, 138 northern expansion policy (1941), 106 over-confidence and over-optimism, 133,138 plans for the Pearl Harbor, the Midway operation, 137 policy guideline concerning French Indochina and Thailand, 103 Principles for the Im plem entation of the Imperial policy (Teikoku Kokusaku Suiko Yoryo), 120 Principles o f War Leadership, 241 pro-German group, 92, 109, 111, 231 self-preservation and self-defense, 32, 39, 120, 130 "Shina (China) isn't a country", 270 southward advance, 50, 87, 90, 91, 96, 101, 102, 104, 105, 109, 114, 116, 132, 231, 262 terrorism, 71 three hard-liners, 114 Three mistakes led to war, 34 Toho Kaigi (1927), 48 transportation capacity (1941), 110 two reports o f national power (1945),

200 uncoordinated campaigns, 132 university students m obilized, 165 War Coordination Group, 235 war goals, 130 War Leadership Principles (Senso Shido Taiko), 157-158 J apanese-Soviet: Changkufeng Incident (1938), 242 Moscow's m ediation, 183, 240 Nom onhan Incident (1939), 88,114, 242 nonaggression pact, 193 Northern Territories, 184,211-212, 264, 287

/ 401

Japanese-Soviet—continued Red Army push, 209 Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact: 95, 233, 264, 300 annulm ent of, 38 no extension of, 191 Japan's bastion 45-48 Japan-U .S. negotiations: 108, 116 Catholic clerics, 108 delayed notification, 124, B-I Drought, Father Jam es M ., 116 four principles o f U .S ., 117 proposal o f neutral territory, 107 Roosevelt's compromise agreement, 119 turning points, 116 W alsh, Bishop Jam es E ., 116 warning to Japan, 118 Jilin (China) 54 Jinzhou (China), bom bing o f 62 jushin: 23, 37, 116, 122,169, 171, 172, 175,190, 255 M ilitary Police, terrorism, 23,176 K

Kabayama, Aisuke 171 Kagesa, Sadaaki 78 Kaiten (Divine Fate) hum an torpedo 237, 278 Kam i, Shigenori 93, 110, 166, 173 kamikaze 8, 32, 236-238, 249, 258 Kan, Seiji 188 Kanaya, Hanzo 57 Kanda, Masatane 53, 55 Kanoya (Kagoshima Prefecture) 165 Kase, Toshikazu 94, 176 Katakura, Tadashi 153 Kato, Hakujiro 171 Kato, Kanju 275 Kawabe, Torashiro 74, 191, 239 Kawaguchi, Kiyotake 144 Kawanakajima 137, 141 Kaya, Okinori (Finance Minister) 123, 212, 233, 350, A-IV Kazam i, Akira 80, 97 Kellogg-Briand (no-war) Pact (1928) 62, 217

402 Kido, Koichi (Lord Keeper o f Privy Seal): 94, 117, 122, 171, 172,174, 202, 214, 232, 241, 247, 251, 254, 350, A-III Chrysanthem um Curtain, 176 number one evil, 177 Shim omura, Hiroshi (Kainan Shimomura), 177 Kikuchi, Takeo 274 Kimura, Heitaro 257, 260, 352, A-IV Kishi, Nobusuke 173,212,216,246, B-VI Kissinger, Henry 185 Kiyosawa, Kiyoshi 62, 176, 240 Kiyose, Ichiro (chief defense counsel) 216 Kobe 196 Kodama, Gentaro 45 Kodo-ha (Imperial W ay Faction) 34, 70, 80, 203, 214, 247 Koga, M ineichi 258 Koiso, Kuniaki (Cabinet): 37, 53, 57, 157, 158, 167, 174, 175,176, 226, 234, 235, 238, 253, 353, A-II broker peace between Berlin and Moscow, 179 conditions for peace, 178 Ise Grand Shrine, 176 M iao Pin plan, 178 National Volunteer Corps, 167 National Volunteer M ilitary Service A ct, 167 necessary victory in the Philippines, 176 resignation, 165,179 Kokumin Giyutai (National Volunteer Corps) 278 Kokura, see atom ic bomb 188 Kom oto, Daisaku (Colonel) 49, 50, 57, 215, 225 Konoe, Fumimaro (Cabinet): 33, 38, 67, 73, 74, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 83, 88, 90, 97, 104, 105, 108,115-118, 120, 122, 137,171, 172, 174, 177,189, 203, 223, 227, 229, 246, 249, 254, 275, A-I, B-III first Konoe statement, 80, 228 January 16 statement, 78

Konoe, Fumimaro (Cabinet)—continued national policy guideline related to the development of the situation (1941), 104 New Konoe Party, 97 new order, 33, 80-81 prediction, 170 removal o f Matsuoka, 108,117 second Cabinet, 33, 34, 87, 232, 336 second statement, 80 Sekke fam ilies, 79 special envoy, 193 suicide, 213 summ it w ith Chiang Kai-shek (1937), 80, 228 Tekigaiso, 94,121 Tojo, 121 Toyoda, Teijiro (Foreign Minister), 108, 117,121 Kum on, Arifum i 108, 272 Kuribayashi, Tadam ichi 160 Kuril Islands: 184,199, see also Japanese-Soviet: Northern Territories sm all matter to Roosevelt, 185 Kuroshima, Kameto (Captain): 134,138, 132, 236, 258, A-III kamikaze special attack squadron, 236 Kurusu, Saburo 119,124, B-I Kusaka, Ryunosuke 138,166 Kuwashima, Kazue 55 Kwantung Army: 32, 45, 48, 61, 63, 131 Special Grand Maneuvers, 106

L Laurel, Jose 151 League o f Blood Incident (1932) 33-34 League o f Nations: 32, 46, 227, B-II secession (1933), 61 Thailand (Siam), 63 Lexington (USS) B-VIII Leyte, Battle o f 24-25, B-X Li Xianglan B-V Liaodong Peninsula (China) 45 Liutiaohu (Lake Liutiao) (China) 32, 50, 226 London Naval Treaty (1930): 82 withdrawal from , 110 Ludendorff, Erich Friedrich W ilhelm 93

In d ex

Lugouqiao (China) 7, 33, 47, 73, 84 Lytton Com m ission: 32, 62, 227 aggression b y Jap an , 33 M M akino, N obuaki 56, 67, 171, A -IV M alaya: Battle o f, 130 M anchukuo: 32, 61 establishm ent o f, 226 puppet state, 32, 61 Puyi, 55 recognition o f, 62 Zhang Jin g h u i, 151 M anchurian Incident: 7, 31-33, 45, 49-56 H anaya, Tadashi, 214 Itagaki, Seishiro, 214 Kom oto, Suem ori, 54 Tatekawa, Yoshitsugu, 51 M arch Incident (1931) 52, 57, 226 M arco Polo Bridge (Lugouqiao) Incident 73, 79, 82, 114, 227, 228, 250, 252 M ariana Islands 157,159, 235, 258 M aruyam a, M asao 144 M asaki, Jinzaburo 50, 70,171, 214 M atsudaira,Yasum asa 176 M atsui, Iwane (Central C h in a Area Army) 48, 75-76, 229, 260, 354, A -IV M atsum oto, Shigeharu 77 M atsuo, Denzo 172 M atsuoka,Yosuke: 34, 63, 93, 95,102 , 104, 105, 117, 214, 229, 232, 250, 252, A -II, B-II head o f the Japanese delegation, 227 South M anchurian Railw ay, 246 M atsutani, Sei 176 M ay 15 Incident (1932) 62, 81, 226 M ears, H elen 63, 263, 379 m edia: support for war o f, 276 M eiji Era (1868-1912) 26, 45 M idw ay, see Battle o f M idw ay M ikam i, Suguru 173 M ikaw a, G u n ich i 144 M ilitary Police 171,248 M im ura, Osam u 260

/ 403

M inam i, Jiro: 48, 52, 56, 226, 355, A-IV "duty to intervene in p olitics", 52 M inisters in active m ilitary service 228 M issouri (USS) 205, B -XV M iw a, Yoshitake 133 M iyake, M itsuharu 53 M iyazaki, Shuichi 159, 160, 239 Mokuyo-kai (Thursday Society) 49, 225 M orishim a, M orito 54 M orishim a, G oro 55 M ukden (H oten, Shenyang) (China) 32, 48 M ukden Special Service Agency 54 M uranaka, Takaji 70 M utaguchi, Renya 73, 152, 236, 258, A-III M uto, Akira 50, 67, 70, 71, 73, 90, 121, 214, 227, 231, 232, 247, 256, 257, 356, A-n M u to, N obuyoshi 48 N N agai, Ryutaro 80 N agano, O sam i (Adm iral o f Fleet): 68, 104,110, 111, 1 2 0 ,1 2 1 ,1 3 3 ,1 7 2 , 230, 231, 234, 252, 273, A-I chance o f victory over U .S ., 111 "N ow ", 123 N agasaki, see atom ic bom b N agata, Tetsuzan: 49, 51, 53, 70 assassination o f, 70 N agatsu, Sahishige 74 N agoya 196 N agum o, C h u ich i (First N aval Air Fleet) 133, 134, 138,147, 273 N akajim a, Kesago 229 Nakam ura, T eiji 139 N akano, Seigo 171, 248 N akano, Yoshio 97 N akashiba, Suezum i 147 Nakazawa, Tasuku 90, 236, 258, A-III N an jin g Incident (Nankin Gyakusatsu): 33, 75-77 Tang Sheng-chi (Tang Shengzhi), 75 N ansei Islands 157 N ara, Takeji 63 N ational M obilization (Law) 83, 250, 274, 278

404 national m obilization system 97 national strength (1940) 113-116 (global) naval strategy: breakthrough of, 135 Navy Department: 23, B-VI press briefings by, 138 Nem oto, Hiroshi 49, 50, 53 the Netherlands: 102, 207, 242 asylum in London, 89 Bot, Ben (Foreign M inister), 209 Dutch re-colonization, 208 quasi-enemy, 132 Round Table conference in The Hague, 209 N iigata, see atom ic bomb 188 "Niitakayama nobore [Clim b M ount Niitaka]" 124 Nine-Power Treaty (1922) 46, 48, 62, 77, 81 N inom iya, Harushige 53 N ish, Ian 152 N ishio, Suehiro 83 Nishiura, Susumu 90 Nomura, Kichisaburo 48,106, 107,117, 119, 124, 125, 231, A -IV , B-I number o f war dead 242 O Obata, Toshishiro 50, 70 October Incident (1931) 52, 226 Ogata, Taketora 179 O i, Atsushi 190 Oikawa, Koshiro (Admiral) 95,104, 105, 117,121, 158, 230, 235, 236, 238, 253, A-II Oka (human bombs) 165 Oka, Takazumi 109, 121, 214, 232, 234, 257, 357, A-III Okada, Keisuke 67, 71, 82,116 ,1 72, 174, 189, 203, 214, 248, 254, 261, A-III Okada, Kikusaburo 114 Okamura, Yasuji 49, 51, 64, 207, 208 Okawa, Shum ei 57, 214, 256, A-IV Okehazama 137, 141 Okinawa, see Battle of Okinawa O kochi, M asatoshi 188 Okum ura, Katsuzo 125

okurina (posthumous name) 19 100 (one hundred) m illion tokkotai attacks 166 O nishi, Takijiro 136, 140, 165, 236, 239, 241, 258, A-III Opium War (First) (1840s) 69 ordinance to purge war crim inal suspects 213 organ o f the state, see Emperor Showa Osaka 196 Oshim a, Hiroshi (Ambassador to Germ any): 68, 96, 179, 229-230, 258, 357, A-II blind faith in Germ any of, 96 O ta, M inoru 164 Ozaki, Yukio 69, 171, 247 Ozawa, Jisaburo 191 P Pacific War: 24-25, 45, 120 atom ic bom b, see p. 395 estimate damage to ships, 114 50-50 chance, 95 Guadalcanal, see Guadalcanal campaign Im phal, see Im phal Operation Iw ojim a, see U .S. largest landing operation, 160 loss in the inform ation battle, 144 loss o f control in the Pacific (1942), 36 loss o f hum an resources, 140 loss o f M ariana Islands, 157 M idway, see Battle o f Midway M usashi (battleship), 110 Okinawa, see Battle o f Okinawa peace efforts, 171,177, 254 Philippine Sea, Battle of, see the Philippines piecemeal m obilization o f Japanese troops, 144 projections for war, 137 Saipan, see p. 405 Sho Number O ne, 157,159 Solom on, see Solom on Islands Tinian, 147, 157 Zero fighters, 130 party-based cabinet system 82

Index / 405

Peace Treaty with Japan 8, 371, B-XVI Pearl Harbor attack: 24r-25, 119, 124, 233-234, 242, B-VII carelessness and negligence, 125 the Philippines: 157 Philippine Sea, Battle of, 24-25,157 Port Arthur (Lushun) (China) 45, 54 Port Moresby (New Guinea) 143 postwar turmoil 209 Potsdam Declaration: 38,195, 197, 212, 238, 325, B-XII violation of, 211 Prince Fushimi (Fushimi-no-miya Hiroyasu) 93, 95, 172 Prince Higashikuni (Higashikuni-no-miya Naruhiko) 170 Prince Kanin (Kanin-no-miya Kotohito Shinno) 74, 90 Prince Morihiro of Higashikuni 204 Prince Takamatsu (Takamatsu-no-miya Nobuhito) 124, 174, 203 prisoner of war J28, 147 Puyi, Aixinjueluo: C hief Executive and later Emperor, 226, B-n the last Emperor of the Qing Dynasty, 61 Q Qiqiha'er (China) 62 Quarantine Speech (1937) 296, 299

R Rabaul (New Britain Island) 143 Rape of Nanking, see Nanjing incident Rehe (Manchuria) 63 "Remember Pearl Harbor” 126 responsibility for launching the war, for continuing the fighting 245 Roosevelt, Franklin D .: 38, 116,183, 233 Declaration of War, B-I oil embargo, 107 Quarantine Speech, 296 summit talks with Konoe, 118 telegram to Emperor, 308, 338-339 Russo-German War (1941) 104-105 Russo-Japanese War (1904-05) 45,211

S Saionji, Kinmochi (genro) 37, 56, 63, 67, 171, 250, 261, A-IV Saipan: 24-25, 37,147, 153, 157, 172 Japanese residents, 147 Puntan Sabaneta (Banzai C liff), 147 Saito,Yoshitsugu, 147 Saito, Makoto 34, 62, 71, 82, 227, 251, 261 Saito, Takao (member of House of Representatives) 82, 152, 272, 274 Saito, Yoshie 94 Sakai, Takashi 64, 229, 270 Sakhalin (Southern) 199 Sakomizu, Hisatsune 172, 204 Sakura-kai (Cherry Society) 57, 60, 226, 256 Sanada, Joichiro 257 Sasaki, Akira 134 Sato, Kenryo 83, 89,130, 232, 234, 257, 273, 358, A-III Sato, Naotake (Ambassador to U.S.S.R.) 68, 179, 191, 198, 240 Savo Island, Battle of 144 Sawada, Shigeru 90, 96 Sawamoto, Yorio 105, 123 Sejima, Ryuzo 172 Senjinkun 147-148, 248 Senshi Sosho (A Series o f War Histories) 41, 73, 385 seppuku (harakiri) 239 Shanghai 76 Shanghai Incident (First) (1932) 61, 226, 334 Shiba, Katsuo 93 Shibayama, Kaneshiro 74,178 Shibo, Hideo 113, 114 Shidehara, Kijuro 41, 48, 56, 67,108, 255 Shigemitsu, Mamoru (Foreign Minister) 66, 150, 158, 178, 214, 251, 271, 360, A-IV, B-XV Shigeto, Chiaki 51, 53 Shikata, Ryoji 171, 248 Shimada, Akira 161, 163 Shimada, Shigetaro (admiral) 123, 124, 137, 172, 212, 232, 234, 252, 273, 361, A-I

406 Shim omura, Sadamu 75 Shinano (battleship) 135 Shinjo, Kenkichi 114-115 Shinm yo, Takeo 248 Shiratori, Toshio (Ambassador to Italy) 230, 259, 362, A-II Shogo Operation 157 Showa Depression (1930-32) 47 Showa Era (1926-89) 19, 224, 243 Showa War: 223-224,243 casualties, 242 "Shut up!" incident 83 Siberian internm ent: 39, 207, 264 apology, 212 deaths between 62,000 and 92,000, 210 575,000 Japanese, 210 Order Number 9898, 209 Stalin's reprisal, 211 Singapore 130 Sino-Japanese War (first) (1894-95) 52, 69 Sino-Japanese War: 45, 228 North C hina Separation Operation, 33 peace initiatives, 76 Tanggu Truce (1933), 64-66 Trautman Operation, 76 Twenty-One Demands (1915), 46 U nit 731 germ warfare team , 215 Solomon Islands: 36 Bloody Ridge, 144 First Battle, 144 Iron Bottom Sound, 145 Sorge, Richard 118 Soryu (aircraft carrier) 134 South M anchurian Railway Com pany (Mantetsu) 32, 45, 50 southern French Indochina: landing on 106 Soviet Union: 38, 242 Antonov, Alexei (Chief o f the General Staff) 209 Baltic Sea Fleet, 136 Com intern, 87 concentration camps, 210 entry into war, 195 internationalizing of the Japanese straits, 199 invasion o f M anchuria, 201, 209

Soviet Union—continued M alik, Jacov (Ambassador to Japan), 192, 198, 199, 240 M olotov, Vyacheslav (Foreign M inister), 179,191,198 occupation o f Northern Territories (Sep. 5, 45), 211-212 rejection o f Koki Hirota, 179 rejection o f m ediation, 193 "rights o f Russia", 184, 324 Russian Revolution (1917), 46 Sato report (1945), 191 surprise attack, 198 200,000 deaths of Japanese civilians, 209 Stalin, Josef: 38, 68, 83, 88, 187, 209, 233, 264 entry into war, 198 starvation or disease 36,145 Stim son Doctrine 62, 269, 296 strength o f a nation 113 Suetsugu, Nobumasa (Home Affairs M inister) 77 Sugahara, M ichio 237 Sugita, Ichiji 97 Sugiyam a, Hajim e (Field Marshal): 74, 77, 78, 80, 104, 106,120, 122, 123, 144, 158, 172, 190, 227, 232, 234, 252, 262, A-I end in three m onths, 120 suicide, 213 suicide attacks: 37,164,165 chaos am ong U .S. forces, 165 supreme com mand: 63,149, 272 Constitution o f the Empire o f Japan, 271 independence of, 22, 36 Suzuki, Kantaro: 37, 56,165, 167, 171, 175,183, 189, 199-200, 201, 239, 240, 253, 254, 261, A-III Emperor Showa, 202 "mokusatsu", 199-200 Suzuki, Teiichi 49,116, 232, 256, 363, A-II Suzuki, Yorim ichi 70 Switzerland: Fumimaro Konoe, 171

In d ex / 407

T Tada, Hayao 64, 78 Taisei Yokusan-kai, see Imperial Rule Assistance Association Takada, Toshitane 110, 257 Takagi, Sokichi 172, 176, 255 Takahashi, Korekiyo (Finance Minister) 34, 71, 275 Takahashi, Tan 64, 229 Tamura, Hiroshi 214, 216 Tanaka, Ryukichi 61, 215, 226, 247 Tanaka, G iich i: 48, 57 Tanaka memorandum (Tanaka's M aterial), 49, 217 Tanaka, Shinichi (Army General Staff): 50, 74, 106, 114, 122, 215, 229, 232, 234, 247, 256, 258, A-III "You idiot!", 149 Tatekawa, Yoshitsugu 51, 53 Tatsum i, Eiichi 97 Tehran Conference (1943): 183 conditions for Soviet participation, 184 Tenno (Emperor) 19, 21 "tenyu" 119 Terauchi, H isaichi (War Minister) 68, 71, 175 Thailand (Siam): League o f N ations, 63 W aithayakon,W an (Prince), 151 Togo, Shigenori (Foreign Minister): 35, 39, 66, 119,122, 123, 125,171, 190, 191, 199-201, 212, 233, 238, 239, 254, 364, A-III concerns about Germ any, 123 leaving of, 150 war term ination, 192 Tojo, Hideki (Cabinet): 35, 39, 49, 70, 94, 106, 117,119, 122, 130, 150, 172, 173, 188,189, 202, 212, 232, 234, 245, 254, 273, 365, A-I, B-VI a m onth-long news blackout, 149 anti-Tojo cam paign, 172 Cabinet, 116 C hief o f Army General Staff, 172 Coalition against Tojo, 171 collapse o f, 153 confidence evaporated, 173

Tojo, Hideki (Cabinet)—continued Constitution, 150 defiance of, 170 disregard for people's lives, 249 fatal blow , 173 hunger, 178 Kwantung Arm y, 75 loyalty of, 122 plans to assassinate (1944), 173 rage of, 121 "raid like a m osquito", 249 resignation of, 174 responsibility, 223 Senjinkun, 147 stamping out o f peace moves, 171 starvation, m alnutrition, 148 suicide squad spirit, 173 uranium bomb on Saipan, 188 Vice War M inister, 81 violation o f a longstanding rule, 150 tokko (special attack): 140, 236, 237, 277, B-X Jo , Eiichiro, 140, 237 Oka (Cherry Blossom), 237, 278 Seki, Yukio, 237 Shiragiku (training aircraft), 165 tokkotai 165 Tokutom i, Soho 277 Tokyo Air Raid: 195, 218, B -XII, B-XIII Fukagawa district, 195 Tokyo music school B-IX Tokyo Tribunal, see International M ilitary Tribunal for Far East Tom inaga, Kyoji 50, 70,102 Tom ioka, Sadatoshi 110,133,140,159, 257 Tom ita, Kenji 121,174 Tone Number 4 (plane) 134 Tosei-ha (Control Faction) 34, 70, 80 Tosui Koryo (Principles o f H igh Com m and) 277 Tosuiken (supreme command) 22 Toyoda, Soemu (Admiral) 166, 199, 216, 238, 239, 253, A-II Toyoda, Teijiro, see Konoe, Fumimaro (Cabinet) "treacherous attack" 126 Treaty for the Renunciation o f War: 48, see also Kellogg-Briand Pact

408 Tripartite Alliance (Pact): 34, 35, 87, 90, 230 Yonai, Yam am oto, 34 Tsuji, Masanobu 108,114, 215, 272 Tsukada, Osam u 122,123, 232 Tsunoda, Tomoshige 174 Tsushima Maru 162-163, 168, B-XII Tsushima: neutralizing plan of, 199

U U .S.: Ballentine, Joseph W ., 118 Byrnes, Jam es (Secretary o f State), 187 code-breaking, 119,125,133 concessions to Stalin, 185 copper and nickel, 107 embargo on oil exports, 35,106 ,1 14, 117, 230, 303 embargo on scrap iron, 102,107 Executive Order No.8832, 302 Grew, Joseph (Under Secretary of State), 38, 118, 246 Grumman, 139, 165 Harriman, W . Averell (Ambassador to Soviet U nion), 185 Hopkins, Harry, 187 Hornbeck, Stanley K ., 118 H ull Note, 35, 39, 119, 230, 304 H ull, Cordell (Secretary o f State), 35, 107, 117, 118, 124, 125, 230, 304 Im m igration Act (1924), 47, 293 Iw ojim a, 24-25, 160, 236, 242 Knox, Frank (Navy Secretary), 119 LeM ay, Air Force General Curtis, 264 lessons from the Pearl Harbor, 139 M acArthur, Army General Douglas, 130, 212, 263, 267 M arshall, George (Army C h ief o f Staff), 188 m ilitary support to Chiang Kai-shek, 101 M itscher, Marc A ., 165 N im itz, Adm iral Chester W ., 134, 273 Operation Coronet, 166 Operation O lym pic, 166 Pacific Fleet, 139

U .S.—continued plan to invade the Japanese m ainland, 162 pro-Soviet spies, 185 protected aircraft carriers, 139 radar, 145 Roosevelt, Franklin D ., 35, 251 Roosevelt's postwar order, 185 Stark A ct, 111 stepping stone operations, 149 Stim son, Henry (Secretary o f State), 62, 119, 186, 269, 296 Third Vinson Naval A ct, 111 threatening by Japanese, 107 Truman, Harry, 184, 197, 263 warnings o f embargo, 106 W elles, Sumner, 106 U.S.-Japan negotiations, see Japan-U .S. negotiations U.S.-Japan Treaty o f Commerce and Navigation 88, 107 Uchida, Yasuya 63, 66, 227 Ueno, Sadaomi 161 Ugaki, Kazushige: 57, 68, 78, 81, 171, 226 failed Ugaki Cabinet, 68, Ugaki-Kung Hsiang-hsi Operation, 78 Ugaki, M atom e 133,165, 273 Um ezu, Yoshijiro (General): 158,160, 175, 191, 199, 204, 214, 235, 238, 239, 253, 367, A -II, B-XV Umezu-He Yingqin accord, 229 Um ezu-Ho Accord, 64 Unryu (aircraft carrier) 140 Ushiba, Nobuhiko 98 Ushijim a, Mitsuru 159,161 U shiroku,Jun 237 Usui, Shigeki 88 Uzawa, Somei 216

V Vietnam : First Indochinese War (1946-54), 208 H o C h iM in h , 208 independence (1945), 208

In d ex

W W akasugi, Kaname 106 W akatsuki, Reijiro 32, 56, 57, 171, 174, 178, 189, 226, 254, A-III war responsibility: 31, 245 Anam i, Korechika, 238, 239, 253 Dohihara, Kenji, 225, 227, 256 Emperor Showa, 260-263 failure to clarify, 138 Fukutome, Shigeru, 234, 258 gag orders, 138 Hashim oto, Kingoro, 225, 256 Hirota, Koki, 227, 251 Inoue, Shigeyoshi, 255, 257 investigation com m ission, 41 Ishihara, Kanji, 225, 255 Ishikawa, Shingo, 230, 257 Itagaki, Seishiro, 225, 256 Kido, Koichi, 232, 254 Kimura, Heitaro, 257, 260 Koiso, Kuniaki, 234, 238, 253, 260 Konoe, Fumimaro, 227, 229, 249, 254 Kuroshima, Kameto, 236, 258 launching a war, 122 M atsui, Iwane, 260 Matsuoka, Yosuke, 229, 252 M utaguchi, Renya, 236, 258 M uto, Akira, 227, 256, 257 Nagano, Osam i, 230, 232, 234, 252 Nakazawa, Tasuku, 236, 258 Oikawa, Koshiro, 238, 253, 260 Oka, Takazum i, 232, 234, 257 Okawa, Shum ei, 256 O nishi, Takijiro, 236, 258 Oshim a, Hiroshi, 230, 258 Sanada, Joichiro, 257 Sato, Kenryo, 234, 257 Shidehara, Kijuro, 255 Shim ada, Shigetaro, 232, 234, 252 Shiratori, Toshio, 230, 259 Soviet U nion, 263 Sugiyam a, Hajim e, 227, 232, 234, 252 Suzuki, Kantaro, 239, 254 Suzuki, Teiichi, 232, 256 Takada, Toshitane, 110, 257 Takagi, Sokichi, 255 Tanaka, Shinichi, 232, 256-258 Togo, Shigenori, 239, 254, 255

/ 409

war responsibility—continued Tojo, Hideki, 232, 234, 245 Tom ioka, Sadatoshi, 257 Toyoda, Soemu, 238, 239, 253, 260 Um ezu, Yoshijiro, 238, 239, 253, 260 United States, 263 W akatsuki, Reijiro, 256 War Responsibility Reexamination Com m ittee, 223 Yam am oto, Isoroku, 258 Yonai, Mitsumasa, 254, 255 Yoshida, Shigeru, 255 W ashington Treaty (1921-22) system 46, 56 W atanabe, Jotaro 71 W atanabe, Tsuneo 9 W atanabe, Yasuji 132,137 W atari, Hisao 51 W ilson, Woodrow 46 wo xin chang dan (gashinshotan) 65 W orld War I 46 W orld W ar II 89 X Xuzhou (China) 76

Y Yahara, Hirom ichi 161 Yalta Agreement 38, 183, 240, 271, 324 Yam aguchi, Tam on 134 Yam am oto, Isoroku (Admiral o f Fleet): 88, 109, 124, 129,133-135, 137, 138, 170, 233, A-IV bearing responsibility, 138 Okehazam a, Hiyodorigoe, Kawanakajima, 137,141 shooting down of, 150 short, war, 137 Yam am oto, Shichihei 63 Yam ashita, Tomoyuki 70,130 Yamato (battleship): 110, 133, 134, 166 sink, 191, B-XI Yamawaki, Masataka 51 Yanagawa, Heisuke 75 Yasuda, Takeo 188 Yasukuni Shrine: 8 Yushukan (war memorial museum), 8

410 Yeltsin, Boris: apology for the Siberian internm ent, 212 Yokkaichi (Mie Prefecture) 196 Yom iuri Shim bun 98 Yonai, Mitsumasa (Cabinet) 88, 90,109, 158, 174, 190, 228, 236, 238, 241, 254, 255, 257, 335, A-III Yoshida, Shigeru: 38, 67, 170, B-XVI Ambassador to Britain, 255 blunders report o f Japanese diplom acy, 38 Consul General in M ukden, 48 Yoshida, Zengo 94, 113 Yoshizum i, Masao 239

About The Yomiuri Shitnbun The Yomiuri Shimbun was founded in Tokyo on November 2,1874. It began publishing evening editions in 1931 in addition to m orning editions; set up Japan's first professional baseball club, now the Yomiuri Giants, in 1934; began publishing the Osaka edition in 1952; launched an English-lan­ guage newspaper, now The D aily Yomiuri, in 1955; established the Yomiuri Nippon Symphony Orchestra, the world's first newspaper-run orchestra, in 1962; inaugurated the Seibu (Kyushu) edition in 1964; and created the Yomiuri Light and Humanity Association in 1971, extending helping hands to the disabled. The Guinness Book o f Records recognized The Yomiuri Shimbun as the world's largest daily newspaper in 1994—its m orning cir­ culation stood at 10,028,538 across Japan as o f Ju ly 2006. O n top of an extensive dom estic news coverage network, it has 34 overseas bureaus in Bangkok, Beijing, Berlin, Cairo, Jerusalem , London, Moscow, New D elhi, Paris, New York, Rio de Janeiro, Sydney, Taipei, Tehran and W ashington, D .C . am ong others. V isit http://www.yom iuri.co.jp

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