Whistleblowing and the Sociological Imagination 1137399716, 9781137399717

Citation preview

Whistleblowing and the Sociological Imagination Tina Uys

Whistleblowing and the Sociological Imagination “For many years Tina Uys pioneered a lonely intellectual path on whistleblowing in South Africa. Today against the background of headlines and popular books Uys brings her accumulated knowledge to bear on the subject with precision and compassion as she sensitively explores the biographies of whistleblowers. While referees in soccer matches have VAR as back-up, those who blow the whistle on corporate and state corruption have little support. By placing whistleblowing within the lens of social justice Uys makes us see the phenomenon in new ways, turning what is often isolated as private troubles into a public issue.” —Professor Ashwin Desai, University of Johannesburg, South Africa “In Whistleblowing and the Sociological Imagination Professor Tina Uys shows that men and women who courageously expose organizational misbehaviour have too often been outrageously mistreated. This brilliant clinical sociologist asks what can be done to improve matters? She argues for more ethical workplaces with open communication channels cultivating mutual trust to the benefit of all. Enjoy the skilful analysis of an accomplished practitioner at the height of her powers.” —Professor Dennis Smith, Loughborough University, UK “Professor Uys provides an amazing amount of information about whistleblowing in a number of countries, particularly focusing on cases in the United States and South Africa. The book is a ‘must read’ for whistleblowers as well as companies and governments that are looking to improve their organizational processes. The book also will be of interest to professors, graduate students, researchers and community members who are concerned about illegal, unsafe or wasteful practices in any private, public or government organization.” —Jan Marie Fritz, Ph.D., C.C.S., University of Cincinnati (USA)

Tina Uys

Whistleblowing and the Sociological Imagination

Tina Uys Department of Sociology University of Johannesburg Johannesburg, South Africa

ISBN 978-1-137-39971-7    ISBN 978-1-137-39445-3 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-39445-3 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the ­publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and ­institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: Mlenny/getty images This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature America, Inc. The registered company address is: 1 New York Plaza, New York, NY 10004, U.S.A.

Contents

1 Whistleblowing and the Sociological Imagination  1 Introduction   1 The Concept of Whistleblowing   5 How Has Whistleblowing Been Received?   5 Researching Whistleblowing  12 Whistleblowing as a Social Phenomenon  13 Plan of the Book  16 References  19 2 What Constitutes Whistleblowing? 25 Introduction  25 Disclosure of Wrongdoing  27 Who Makes the Disclosure?  29 Whether the Disclosure Was Authorized, Unauthorized, or Role-Prescribed  31 Do Whistleblowers Necessarily Suffer Retaliation?  33 Who Is the Recipient of the Disclosure? The Distinction Between Internal, External, and Public Whistleblowing  33 Should the Disclosure Be Made Openly, or Do Anonymous Disclosures Also Qualify as Whistleblowing?  35 Was the Disclosure in the Public Interest?  39 Conclusion  42 References  43

v

vi 

Contents

3 South African Whistleblowers 49 Introduction  49 Early Whistleblowers  50 Influx Control and the Pass Laws: Adam Klein  50 Exchange Control: Nico Alant  52 Alant and the Reserve Bank  52 Alant and the Financial Services Board (FSB)  54 Alant’s Career After Leaving the World of Financial Regulation  55 The Mpumalanga Driver’s License Scam: John Muller  56 The Road Accident Fund Fraud: Mark Hess  57 The Dog Training Exercise: Andries (Jakes) Jacobs  58 Whistleblowing Following the Promulgation of the Protected Disclosures Act, Nr. 26 of 2000  59 Pollution by ISCOR: Pieter Van Eeden  59 The Cape Town Street Naming Scandal: Victoria Johnson  61 Nepotism in the Department of Justice: Mike Tshishonga  63 Mpumalanga Matric (Grade 12) Examination Fraud: Vicky Breytenbach  64 Grootvlei Prison: Tatolo Setlai  65 Financial Irregularities at Denel: Keith Grieve  66 Irregular Share Trading at Andisa Securities: Allison Pedzinski  67 Travelgate: Harry Charlton  68 Limpopo Textbook Procurement Irregularities: Solomon (Solly) Tshitangano  70 The “State Capture” Whistleblowers  72 The Trillian Whistleblowers  73 The Gupta Emails: Anonymous Whistleblowers  74 Two Whistleblowers Who Paid with Their Lives  75 Mbombela FIFA World Cup Stadium: Jimmy Mohlala  75 Fraud and Corruption at a Northwest Province Municipality: Moss Phakoe  77 Conclusion  78 References  79

 Contents 

vii

4 Voice and Silence: Who Blows the Whistle and Why? 83 Introduction  83 Whistleblowing and Voice  84 The Whistleblowing Process  87 The Prosocial Organizational Behavior (POB) Model of Whistleblowing  88 Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA)  89 Background Factors and Whistleblowing Intentions  91 Recognition of Organizational Wrongdoing  93 Attitude and Behavioral Beliefs Toward Whistleblowing  96 Consequences of Whistleblowing  96 Consequences of Inaction  97 Perceived Norms and Normative Beliefs  99 Perceived Behavioral Control and Control Beliefs 104 Conclusion 106 References 107 5 Personal Troubles: The Impact on the Whistleblower113 Introduction 113 Whistleblowing as a Personal Trouble 114 The Transformative Response to Whistleblowing 115 The Reactionary Response to Whistleblowing 115 Retaliation Against Whistleblowers 116 Work-Related Retaliation 116 Social Retaliation 118 Physical Retaliation 119 The Effects of Retaliation on the Whistleblower 121 Effects on the Whistleblower’s Finances 121 Psychosocial Effects of Whistleblowing 122 Effects on Physical Health 124 Effects on Interpersonal Relations in the Workplace 124 Effect on Relationships with Family and Friends 125 The Whistleblower’s Responses to Retaliation 126 Conclusion 131 References 132

viii 

Contents

6 Public Issues: The Impact on the Organization and the Public137 Introduction 137 When Is Retaliation Most Likely to Follow a Disclosure? 138 Power Relationships 138 Whistleblower Persistence 141 Whistleblowing Channels 141 Personal Characteristics of the Whistleblower 142 Organizational Characteristics 143 Disclosure Recipients 144 Why Does Retaliation Occur? 145 Whistleblowing as a Threat to Individual Justification Motives 145 Whistleblowing as a Threat to the Organization’s Legitimacy 147 Whistleblowing as a Threat to Collegial Relationships 150 The Effectiveness of Whistleblowing 151 The Power of the Whistleblower 152 Organizational Dependence on Wrongdoers 153 Organizational Dependence on the Wrongdoing 153 Resolving the Paradox of Whistleblowing 155 An Ethics-Oriented Climate 155 Structural Provision for Ethics Management 157 Ethical Leadership and Whistleblower Support 159 Conclusion 161 References 161 7 Protecting Whistleblowers: The Effectiveness of Legislation and Organizational Support165 Introduction 165 Institutionalizing Whistleblowing 166 Anti-retaliation Legislation 169 Protection Against Victimization 169 What Can Be Disclosed? 170 Who Should Be Protected? 171 When Does a Disclosure Qualify for Protection? 172 How Should Disclosures Be Made and to Whom? 175 What Relief Should a Whistleblower Be Able to Claim, and How Do They Access Relief? 176 Effectiveness of Anti-retaliation Legislation 178

 Contents 

ix

The Structural Model of Whistleblower Protection 181 Internal Reporting Mechanisms 182 Investigation of Disclosures 184 Enforcement Mechanisms 185 Conclusion 186 References 186 8 Assisting Whistleblowers in Advancing Social Justice in the Workplace191 Introduction 191 Whistleblowing and Organizational Justice 193 Procedural Justice 195 Distributive Justice 196 Interactional Justice 197 Clinical Sociology in Pursuit of a Better World in the Workplace 200 Conceptualizing Clinical Sociology 200 Wellbeing and Resilience 201 Interventions Aimed at Promoting Organizational Justice 202 Promoting Organizational Justice 204 Advancing Organizational Justice Through the Organizational Culture 206 Conclusion 208 References 209 References213 Index247

CHAPTER 1

Whistleblowing and the Sociological Imagination

Introduction As the 2013 US spring folded into summer, the rumors of the identity of the National Security Agency (NSA) whistleblower began to seem like a daytime soap opera, with the final episode scheduled for June 9, 2013. When the central figure was unmasked as 29-year-old information technology (IT) contractor Edward Snowden, it was far from the James Bond prototype that people envisaged. But his story and the exposés that came in its wake were to have an ongoing global impact. Variously described as a Walter Mitty, Svengali, gladiator for democracy, or a betrayer of the Stars and Stripes, Snowden, in time, would become linked to WikiLeaks co-­ founder Julian Assange. Together they would begin to redefine the whole idea of whistleblowing as initial leaks turned into a flood of information and copycat acts like the revelations of the Panama Papers.1 One of the chilling issues was that they were blowing the whistle on the abuse of power by governments purportedly committed to democratic norms. Snowden‘s spectacular launch into the public arena was not a sudden Damascus turn. Instead, he had had nagging doubts about US government actions ever since he joined the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in Geneva, Switzerland, in 2007, working as a computer network 1  The Panama Papers consists of more than 11 million confidential documents detailing the tax evasion and money laundering services provided by Mossack Fonseca, an offshore law firm based in Panama. An anonymous whistleblower leaked the documents to a German newspaper.

© The Author(s) 2022 T. Uys, Whistleblowing and the Sociological Imagination, https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-39445-3_1

1

2 

T. UYS

security analyst. This position provided him with broad access to a variety of classified documents. As a result, he began seriously questioning whether what he saw the US security agencies doing was justified. His doubts strengthened when he accidentally came across a top-secret report while working as an NSA systems analyst in Japan. The report detailed the NSA’s highly secret mass surveillance program, a program whose existence was later flatly denied by James Clapper, the then Director of National Intelligence, in sworn testimony to the United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in early 2013. By this stage, Snowden’s doubts had crystallized into disillusionment. He had become convinced that the NSA’s sweeping surveillance program posed “an existential threat to democracy” (Snowden in Greenwald et al., 2013, p. 6). In May 2013, while working for a company contracted to the NSA as a network security analyst in Hawaii, Snowden started making copies of secret and incriminating documents belonging to the Agency. He told his supervisor that he needed a few weeks’ leave of absence to receive treatment for epilepsy. On May 20, 2013, he took a flight to Hong Kong, where he met with Laura Poitras, a documentary filmmaker, and Glenn Greenwald, a journalist for The Guardian, a British newspaper. Shortly afterward, Snowden’s disclosures and documents started to appear in The Guardian. In June 2014, the US government formally charged Snowden under the Espionage Act and requested his extradition from Hong Kong. When the Hong Kong government indicated their unwillingness to afford Snowden protection, he departed on an Aeroflot flight headed to Ecuador via Moscow, Havana, and Caracas, with the assistance of Sarah Harrison, journalist and editor for WikiLeaks. Upon arrival at Moscow’s Sheremetyevo airport, Russian authorities detained him, as the US government had revoked his passport and instructed airlines not to allow him to travel. He spent the next 40 days at the airport in limbo. During this time, the return flight of President Morales of Bolivia attending the annual Gas Exporting Countries Forum in Moscow was diverted to Vienna, Austria, on suspicion that Snowden was on board. This incident probably played a role in the Russian government deciding to grant him temporary asylum on August 1, 2014. In October 2020, he was granted permanent residency in Russia (Ilyushina, 2020a; MacAskill, 2019; Snowden, 2019). Snowden was not the first to disclose employer secrets in the belief that he was serving the public interest. There were many before him, in many countries. One prominent case is Daniel Ellsberg, a military analyst employed by RAND Corporation in the United States, who released a

1  WHISTLEBLOWING AND THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION 3

secret report known as the Pentagon Papers to the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1969, and to various newspapers two years later. The United States Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, had commissioned the report to document events of the Vietnam War. The Pentagon Papers revealed that successive US administrations had deceived the American public and Congress deliberately regarding the scale and nature of US actions during and even before the outbreak of the Vietnam War. These revelations further undermined public support for the war. The Nixon administration retaliated by charging Ellsberg with theft of government property, conspiracy, and espionage. These charges were dismissed when investigators of the Watergate scandal discovered that the Nixon administration had engaged in unlawful efforts to discredit Ellsberg (Santoro & Kumar, 2018, p. 13). Other well-known US whistleblowers preceding Snowden are Frank Serpico, Mark Felt (“Deep Throat”), Jeffrey Wigand, and Thomas Drake, whose revelations were immortalized in blockbuster movies. The magazine Time declared 2002 the Year of the Whistleblower when it nominated three female whistleblowers as persons of the year. Both Sherron Watkins, an Enron accounting executive, and Cynthia Cooper, a WorldCom vice president, drew attention to financial impropriety in the accounting methods employed by their respective companies. Coleen Rowley, an FBI staff attorney, sent a memo to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Director Robert Mueller, describing how the bureau disregarded her FBI field office’s requests—before the September 11 World Trade Center attacks—requesting an investigation of the activities of Zacarias Moussaoui. Moussaoui was subsequently sentenced to life without parole for his role in planning the attacks (Lipman, 2012, pp. 69–72; Semuel, 2020). Chelsea Manning, a US Army intelligence analyst, employed WikiLeaks to release a wide variety of classified documents, including videos of US airstrikes in Iraq and Afghanistan, US diplomatic cables, and army reports. Her 2013 conviction on 17 of 22 charges, including infringements of the Espionage Act and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, theft of United States government property, as well as charges related to a refusal to obey lawful commands, resulted in a 35-year sentence at a maximum-security US military prison. However, President Barack Obama commuted her sentence to seven years of confinement dating from her arrest on May 27, 2010 (Biography.com, 2020). From March 2019, Chelsea Manning spent close to another year in custody after refusing to comply with a subpoena

4 

T. UYS

to testify before a grand jury about her collaboration with WikiLeaks (Biography.com Editors, 2020). Many whistleblowers across the world raised their concerns prior to Snowden making his revelations about US intelligence’s mass surveillance program. However, globally their disclosures seemed to remain in the limelight for a relatively brief period. With Snowden, it seemed like something had finally shifted: his actions led to a new international public awareness that specific systems are so over-protected and secretive that there is a strong need for those with the courage to reveal information about perceived transgressions. Or perhaps it is a public awareness that democratic processes are not as effective as they should be? Maybe the shift also lies in a more apparent public concern about the suffering whistleblowers generally experience due to their actions. While his initial disclosures did not bring forth many “new” revelations (Berghel, 2014, p.  68), the debates they engendered created a prominence for whistleblowers worldwide that they had never experienced before. This book focuses on understanding this shift and utilizing the sociological imagination to do so. The bulk of the empirical research on whistleblowing has been conducted within the context of the relatively stable democracies of the Global North. According to William de Maria (2005), whistleblowing can only challenge wrongdoing in the workplace successfully if the basic requirements of a democratic state are in place. South Africa’s challenges as a young democracy in the Global South in establishing and building robust democratic institutions and the pressures from different constituencies to advance their particular interests, provide a compelling case study to reflect on how democratic culture, or the lack of it, enables or constrains whistleblowing. The debate around the media, freedom of speech, accountability, and transparency, both in the public and private spheres, illustrates the importance of exploring the role of democratic principles in ensuring effective disclosures of organizational wrongdoing. On the other hand, the perceived threat of international terrorism challenges the democratic process in the United States. Comparing these two countries and others in the Global North and South will demonstrate the extent to which a democratic culture is a prerequisite for successful whistleblowing.

1  WHISTLEBLOWING AND THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION 5

The Concept of Whistleblowing What is whistleblowing? A whistleblower is a present or past member of an organization who discloses suspicions about organizational wrongdoing to somebody that s/he believes could take action. When whistleblowers communicate the message within their organization (using either prescribed or non-prescribed channels), it is deemed internal whistleblowing. Approaching an agency outside the organization, such as a regulatory authority, is regarded as external whistleblowing. Public whistleblowing entails entering the pulic domain by making your disclosures to the media, as Snowden has done. Authorities generally expect that whistleblowers should exhaust internal forms of disclosure before resorting to external channels, or especially the media (if they consider such exposure permissible at all). Whistleblowers can expect to face difficulties. Regardless of whether the disclosure was internal, external, or public, or whether it was authorized, unauthorized, or role-prescribed, organizations often regard these disclosures as illegitimate. The exposure of information about organizational wrongdoing, particularly if placed in the public domain, is viewed as a form of betrayal. Such disclosures usually lead to retaliation by the organization. Acting as loyal and caring employees, whistleblowers often do not expect the severe negative responses they receive due to disclosing irregularities in their places of work.

How Has Whistleblowing Been Received? Worldwide, there is a gradual recognition that the act of whistleblowing is making an essential contribution to the fight against organizational misconduct. However, as evidenced by Edward Snowden‘s drama, a more ambivalent attitude is often displayed toward the whistleblowers as individuals. There are ongoing global debates about whether whistleblowers are heroes or traitors and the kind of protection they should receive. The United States of America is a prime example of the paradoxes and virulence characterizing this debate. While the validation by Time resulted in a generally positive perception of the whistleblowers identified, and some whistleblowers have received high financial rewards, others, especially in the intelligence community, are less fortunate. High stakes are involved in whistleblowing, as shown in the United States’ relentless campaign against WikiLeaks, a conduit for whistleblowers, and its founder, Julian Assange.

6 

T. UYS

In 2006 Julian Assange established WikiLeaks, a non-profit organization and website providing an outlet for whistleblowers to anonymously post secret information about what they perceive to be evidence of organizational (primarily governmental) wrongdoing (Lozano et  al., 2011). This unleashed a passionate debate concerning balancing the benefits of the transformative potential of public disclosures with the potentially harmful consequences of such disclosures, especially to national security, what Fenster (2012, p. 753) calls the transparency balance. The launch of a counterintelligence investigation into WikiLeaks in 2008 by US authorities highlighted the intelligence community’s concern about the threat WikiLeaks posed to its ability to secure classified information. In March 2010, WikiLeaks posted the investigation’s report on its website with the claim that US intelligence was attempting to “destroy” Wikileaks and its website (Fenster, 2012, pp. 766–767). In the context of rising tensions, WikiLeaks started posting a series of military documents2 and videos from April 2010 onwards. These posts included a video showing an airstrike in Baghdad (dubbed “Collateral Murder”), in which Iraqi civilians and two journalists were killed by a US Apache helicopter. WikiLeaks also released documents dealing with the Afghanistan war (“the Afghan War Diary”), and thousands of secret United States State Department diplomatic cables (“Cablegate”) (Berghel, 2012, p. 70). As the dispute escalated, the questioning of the legitimacy and motives of WikiLeaks and its founder, Julian Assange, increased significantly. Following the US government’s threat of legal action, various attacks undermined WikiLeaks’ financial and structural viability, such as the closure of WikiLeaks’ account at the Swiss bank PostFinance. Visa, MasterCard, and PayPal also ceased to process payments to WikiLeaks, and Amazon discontinued the hosting of WikiLeaks on its servers (Gellman & Harrell, 2010), while electronic attacks twice disabled the WikiLeaks website. In return, a group of Internet activists, calling itself Anonymous, launched distributed-denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks against the companies that suspended the WikiLeaks accounts (Mackey, 2010). Assange faced scrutiny of his personal life and legal challenges as well. In August 2010, Swedish prosecutors pursued an investigation into rape and molestation charges against Assange by two Swedish WikiLeaks volunteers. This investigation culminated in Britain’s Supreme Court

2

 Chelsea Manning provided Wikileaks with these documents.

1  WHISTLEBLOWING AND THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION 7

ordering his extradition to Sweden at the end of May 2012. Assange sought refuge at the Ecuadorian Embassy in London in mid-August 2012 and requested political asylum (Lai, 2012). The relationship between Assange and the Ecuadorean government soured after the election of Lenin Moreno as president of Ecuador in 2017, culminating in Moreno revoking Assange’s asylum status in a tweet in April 2019 and Metropolitan Police officers arresting him after his eviction from the Embassy. In May 2019, Assange received a 50-week jail sentence for breaching his bail conditions. On January 4, 2021, British district judge Vanessa Baraitser rejected a US extradition application on espionage and hacking-related charges on the grounds that Assange’s mental health problems posed a suicide risk should he be extradited to the United States to stand trial. However, she refused to grant him bail while awaiting the US government’s expected appeal. Based on his history, she considered Assange a flight risk (Agence France-Presse in Washington, 2021; BBC News, 2019; Noack & O’Grady, 2019; Quinn, 2021; Wintour, 2021). Edward Snowden’s disclosures about the extensive worldwide surveillance programs of the NSA in June 2013 unleashed a media frenzy. While he has managed to provoke a debate on the limits of the security state, surveillance, transparency, and privacy, a concurrent and somewhat more robust dispute continues to focus on whether his disclosures were justified. Snowden’s detractors include members of government agencies (Masnick, 2014) and prominent politicians across the political divide, such as former House Speaker John Boehner (Johnson, 2013) and Democratic Senator Dianne Feinstein (Herb, 2013), who both branded him a traitor very soon after his identity became known. While acknowledging the positive impact of the debate on data privacy and national security following Snowden’s disclosures, President Obama argued that he could only consider pardoning Snowden once he has subjected himself to the US legal process. President Trump’s first appointment as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from 2017 to 2018, Mike Pompeo, believed that Snowden deserved to be executed for his “traitorous activities” (Toor, 2016). In an about-turn from his earlier viewpoint that Snowden was “a spy who should be executed,” President Trump toyed with pardoning him prior to leaving office, but ultimately did not follow through (Gaurav, 2021). Some prominent business executives also have expressed reservations. Microsoft co-founder Bill Gates stopped just short of calling Snowden a traitor, in contrast to Apple co-founder Steve Wozniak, who expressed his admiration for Snowden’s willingness to make sacrifices for a principle

8 

T. UYS

(Nield, 2014). Some members of the intelligence community also weighed in. Nigel Inkster (2014), a former member of the British Secret Intelligence Service, blamed the public outcry over Snowden’s revelations on myths and misapprehensions regarding the scale and the legality of mass surveillance and the effectiveness of legal protections against unlawful, intrusive surveillance. He argued in favor of a “realist perspective that countries are entitled to use covert capabilities to secure national advantage, provided that this is subject to proper controls” (Inkster, 2014, p. 58). Snowden‘s most visible supporters come from the liberal media, NGOs, and academe, both nationally and internationally. Snowden as well as the reporters and newspapers involved have received awards for their role in the exposé (Cohen, 2014). The Pulitzer Prize for Public Service awarded to The Guardian US and Washington Post newspapers for publicizing Snowden’s revelations about the NSA’s widespread secret surveillance was hailed as an “undeniable validation of the significance of the Snowden disclosures” (Blaylock, 2014). Starting with the Whistleblower Award of the Federation of German Scientists in 2013, Snowden has won a vast array of awards, including the 2014 Ridenhour Prize for Truth-Telling, the 2014 Right Livelihood Honorary Award, the latter jointly with Guardian editor, Alan Rusbridger, and the 2016 Norsk PEN Ossietzky Prize. Since 2016 he has been serving as president of the Board of Directors of the Freedom of the Press Foundation, a non-profit focused on promoting public interest journalism. Snowden’s disclosures generated considerable debate about the constitutionality of the NSA’s surveillance programs and the necessary balance between privacy and security. Paul Bernal (2016, p. 245) argued that: Surveillance impacts not just upon individual privacy, but upon a wide range of human rights, from freedom of expression and freedom of association and assembly, to protection from discrimination—some because privacy acts as a gateway or guardian to those rights, and some independently of what is generally thought of as privacy.

Bernal also argued that the justification for internet surveillance needs to find a fitting balance “between people’s rights and liberties and the duties of states both to provide security and to protect freedoms for their citizens” (Bernal, 2016, p. 245). Other examples of authors interrogating the balance between privacy and security are Bigo (2019), Lahneman (2016), Edgar (2017), Lefebvre (2018), and Walsh and Miller (2016).

1  WHISTLEBLOWING AND THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION 9

Snowden’s revelations furthermore sparked various analyses of the impact of surveillance on journalistic practices, in particular the relationship between journalists and their sources.3 In an analysis of eight ethical dilemmas with practical consequences flowing from Snowden‘s disclosures, Michael Andregg (2016, p. 110): concludes that by far the largest issue is whether US intelligence professionals regard the US Constitution as supreme law in America or non-disclosure contracts with individual agencies or the US government. Reactions to Snowden follow this pattern, with security-cleared insiders generally considering him a traitor and ordinary people generally considering him a hero for telling the public about illegal activity with the National Security Agency directed against fundamental, and constitutionally protected civil liberties like freedom of speech.

While Snowden has arguably achieved his goal of provoking a global debate about the appropriate limits to the government’s right to conduct mass surveillance, the impact of his disclosures on legislative changes was more modest. In 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit declared the National Security Agency’s (NSA) mass collection of Americans’ telephone metadata to be a violation of the terms of the Patriot Act. Shortly afterward, the US Congress introduced the USA Freedom Act, which supposedly curbed the worst excesses of the previous regime by imposing some limits on the ability of American intelligence agencies to conduct mass surveillance on US citizens (Lepore, 2019). Ironically, in 2018 the Office of the Director of National Intelligence acknowledged that the NSA’s bulk collection of telephone data had dramatically increased after the law’s enactment (Eddington, 2019). In September 2020, the US Court of Appeals ruled that the NSA mass surveillance program that Edward Snowden exposed, violated the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, and rejected NSA claims that the program had played a critical role in fighting domestic terrorism (BBC News, 2020). After Snowden, exposures by whistleblowers seemed to become an everyday occurrence globally. What follows are just a few examples of some prominent cases. In 2014, Yuliya Stepanova, a Russian middle-­ distance runner, and her husband, Vitaly, a member of the Russian AntiDoping Agency, fled to Germany, two days before a German documentary 3  See, for example, Johnson (2017), Lashmar (2017), Ruby et al. (2017), Wahl-Jorgensen et al. (2017), and Waters (2018).

10 

T. UYS

broadcast in which they revealed the involvement of Russian authorities in an extensive state-sponsored doping program for Russian athletes. Their exposé set a domino effect in motion. An investigation by the World AntiDoping Agency (WADA) followed, which found evidence of Russian authorities engaging in a systematic and widespread doping operation. This campaign included providing elite athletes with banned performanceenhancing substances and assisting them in manipulating doping tests to evade detection. The International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF) banned all Russian track and field athletes from participating in the 2016 Summer Olympics in Rio de Janeiro. After relocating to the United States in early 2016, Grigory Rodchenkov, considered the “mastermind of Russian sports doping” and head of the Moscow drug-testing laboratory (Majendie, 2020a), confessed to his role in implementing the Russian doping strategy. Fearing Russian retribution, the Stepanovas and Rodchenkov prefer to keep their locations a secret (Ash, 2016; Macur, 2019; Majendie, 2020a, 2020b). On April 3, 2016, reports on an investigation by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists hit the front pages of media outlets worldwide. The Panama Papers, as it is known, consists of more than 11 million confidential documents detailing the tax evasion and money laundering services provided by Mossack Fonseca, an offshore law firm based in Panama. The exposure of dubious financial practices by high-­ ranking individuals, including public officials from more than 200 countries, persuaded government authorities to strengthen measures aimed at ensuring transparency and financial accountability. The identity of the whistleblower who leaked the documents to the German newspaper, Süddeutsche Zeitung, remains unknown (Fitzgibbon & Hudson, 2021). Another example of whistleblowing that had ramifications across national borders is Christopher Wylie. He revealed in March 2018 that Cambridge Analytica, a British political consulting firm, had systematically harvested the personal information of more than 87 million Facebook users. Cambridge Analytica engaged in digital political profiling that enabled political campaigns, such as Donald Trump’s 2016 electoral campaign and the Brexit Vote Leave campaign, to target likely voters with great accuracy, often including misinformation and fake news (Olesen, 2020, p. 11). Donald Trump had to devote a large part of the final years of his presidency (2019–2020) to dealing with the fall-out from the so-called Ukraine whistleblower. A CIA officer made an anonymous complaint under

1  WHISTLEBLOWING AND THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION 11

provisions of the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act accusing President Trump of attempting to pressurize Ukraine’s President, Volodymyr Zelenskiy, into investigating Hunter Biden, the son of his political opponent, Joe Biden. An investigation followed, resulting in the US House of Representatives impeaching President Trump in December 2019 on charges of abuse of power and obstruction of Congress. However, the US Senate acquitted him in February 2020. President Trump and his Republican supporters engaged in a persistent intimidation campaign, attacking the whistleblower’s credibility and calling for the exposure of his identity, which undermined the protections granted to a whistleblower under the provisions of the Act (Aleem & Collins, 2019; Bakaj & Zaid, 2020; Gabbatt, 2019). The COVID-19 pandemic has provided fertile ground for a proliferation of opportunities of committing various kinds of fraud and deception that put the health and safety of the public at risk. Whistleblowers have played a crucial role in exposing these transgressions. The most famous is perhaps Dr. Li Wenliang, an ophthalmologist based in Wuhan in China. He was one of the first to warn his colleagues about patients displaying symptoms of a virus similar to SARS in December 2019. In January 2020, local police authorities reprimanded him for spreading falsehoods. He contracted the virus from a patient and died on February 7, 2020. It is believed that a quicker response to the concerns he raised would have saved millions of lives worldwide (Nie & Elliott, 2020). In October 2020, a UK whistleblowing charity, Protect, published a report with the title: “The best warning system: whistleblowing during COVID-19—An Examination of the Experiences of UK Whistleblowers during a Global Pandemic.” Whistleblowers contacted their helpline to raise concerns about workplace safety during the pandemic, particularly workplaces with shortages of personal protection equipment (PPE), failing to follow government safety guidelines, and furlough fraud. Over a period of seven months, Protect found that the employers of 41% of COVID-19 whistleblowers were indifferent to their concerns, while 20% were fired. In South Africa, Corruption Watch, a non-profit organization serving as a platform for reporting corruption, published a report in February 2021 highlighting corruption related to the implementation of the Temporary Employer/Employee Relief Scheme (TERS). The scheme was aimed at providing temporary support to employees whose income was reduced due to lockdown restrictions. An analysis of 126 whistleblower

12 

T. UYS

reports revealed widespread theft of COVID-19 unemployment benefits, bribery of inspectors to turn a blind eye, and claims for benefits for former employees or for employees who were actually working during the lockdown. These instances show the contestation and push-back from the organizations and institutions implicated in the disclosures. The events also are instructive of both organizational and institutional responses as well as personal consequences for whistleblowers. Furthermore, they demonstrate the controversy in the public domain that Olesen (2018) calls the “democratic drama of whistleblowing.” He argues that whistleblowers are field transgressors who break out of their organization’s distinct field by revealing actions that contradict “the universalizing and democratic aspirations of the civil sphere” (Olesen, 2020, p. 517). Retaliation is generally the result of a perception that whistleblowers have violated the normative and contractual obligations associated with their membership of the organization and, therefore, the field itself.

Researching Whistleblowing This book is the culmination of a journey that started about 30 years ago when I first became aware of the existence of whistleblowing and its impact on whistleblowers’ lives. I could not understand why my husband, Nico Alant, received such a frosty reception from his management when he tried to convince them to address some workplace issues he had identified. A colleague gave me an article to read, and I realized that his experiences had a name: that of a whistleblower. My first paper on whistleblowing was a joint effort with my husband, presented at the Pan-African Conference on Fraud and the African Renaissance held at Uganda Martyrs University in April 1999 (Alant & Uys, 1999). Researching whistleblowing helped me make sense of Nico’s experiences over the 12 years that his long-­ drawn-­out whistleblower journey lasted. My research on whistleblowing coincided with my development as a clinical sociologist.4 I had a ringside seat observing the processes that led to the promulgation of the South African Protected Disclosures Act nr 26 of 2000. The South African Law Reform Commission consulted me on proposed changes to the South African Protected Disclosures Act aimed at strengthening legal protection 4  Clinical sociology entails the assessment of situations with the aim to improve people’s living conditions through a combination of analysis and intervention.

1  WHISTLEBLOWING AND THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION 13

for whistleblowers. I was happy to see some of my suggestions finding their way into the Protected Disclosures Amendment Act nr 5 of 2017, probably because of widespread support. My research has enabled me to advise my university regarding implementing a whistleblowing policy and to present workshops on whistleblowing at my university. These opportunities have strengthened my belief that sociology should move beyond understanding the world to also improving it.

Whistleblowing as a Social Phenomenon Wherever you are in the world, hardly a day goes by without media reports of whistleblower exposures and the sacrifices they have made. These reports often use the whistleblower’s private life and motives as a lens when judging the legitimacy of the whistleblower’s actions. The point of departure of this book is that whistleblowing should be viewed as a social phenomenon, through employing C Wright Mills’ concept of the “sociological imagination” in developing a sociological focus on whistleblowing. Despite Mills’ untimely death at the relatively early age of 45 in 1962, he left an enduring legacy, not only for American sociology but for the social sciences globally. His book, The Sociological Imagination, first published in 1959, had an important impact on social science through its insistence that social scientists should confront the significant moral and political issues of the day. This entails practicing the politics of truth while striving to “clarify the ideal of freedom and the ideal of reason” through locating “themselves within the intellectual life and the social-­ historical structure of their times” (Mills, 1970, p. 198). As a form of critical thinking, the sociological imagination demonstrates an awareness of the relationship between individuals and wider society. It enables us to grasp the links between our immediate, personal social settings and the remote, impersonal social world that surrounds us and helps to shape us. Such an analysis involves distinguishing between “the personal troubles of milieu” and “the public issues of social structure” (Mills, 1970, p. 14) as well as considering both. Understanding whistleblowing in terms of personal troubles entails exploring the circumstances of whistleblowers and the impact that the fall-­ out from their disclosures has on their relations with others. Framing whistleblowing as a personal trouble requires that one considers the biography and the social setting of the individual whistleblower. A personal trouble is essentially a private matter where the whistleblower experiences

14 

T. UYS

organizational wrongdoing as threatening personal values. The retaliation the whistleblower suffers following the disclosures also generates private troubles for the whistleblower. The resolution of these private troubles needs to be sought within the social context of the whistleblower as well. On the other hand, whistleblowing is a public issue to the extent that it relates to “some value cherished by publics [that] is felt to be threatened” (Mills, 1970, p. 15). These publics would involve the organizations, the societal groups, and even society as a whole, in which the perceived wrongdoing is occurring and whose public interest is being served (or disadvantaged) by the disclosures. These publics generally engage in debates about the nature of the values they cherish and what actions are threatening core values. These debates reflect the public nature of the issue at hand. The disclosure of perceived wrongdoing and the retaliation that often follows could generate disputes about whether the seriousness of the wrongdoing justified the whistleblower’s actions or whether the organization’s response was commensurate with the impact of the whistleblower’s actions on the organization. As a public issue, whistleblowing impacts broader social structures and displays “a crisis in institutional arrangements” (Mills, 1970, p. 15). Therefore, taking this track requires us to move away from only focusing on the individual whistleblower and his/her social context to also exploring whistleblowing’s impact as a broader societal issue rooted in the social structure of society. As such, it requires connecting the unique biography of whistleblowers with wider historical and structural forces. In doing so, the whistleblower as an individual is, however, not removed from the equation, as the sociological imagination encompasses “the capacity to range from the most impersonal and remote transformations to the most intimate features of the human self—and to see the relations between the two” (Mills, 1970, p. 14). Employing the sociological imagination to study whistleblowing is particularly apt given Mills’ commitment to promoting what he called “the politics of truth” (Mills, 1970, p.  198). Mills exhorted intellectuals to resist being forced into a choice between becoming absorbed into positions of power and thereby losing their critical independence or rejecting access to power and becoming irrelevant as a result. Instead, the alternative is engaging in a politics of truth: “exposing the power of … leaders to manipulate the public’s understandings of social reality, and asserting the intellectual’s special responsibility to challenge that officially defined reality and to aid the formation of democratic publics” (Geary, 2009, p. 145).

1  WHISTLEBLOWING AND THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION 15

A case can be made that whistleblowers play a similar role as they are also courageous individuals who, acting on principle, “debunk commonly held notions that serve[d] the interests of those in power” (Geary, 2009, p. 69). C.  Wright Mills (1959) advocated the diffusion of the sociological imagination throughout society. This, he believed, would assist individuals in achieving a better understanding of and more control over the structural forces that shape their lives. Rather than understanding their lives in terms of the local milieu of private troubles, the sociological imagination would enable them to connect their personal biographies with greater structural and historical trends (Mills, 1959, p. 8). They would, therefore, come to understand their ostensibly private troubles as public issues that extend beyond their personal domain. In developing a sociology of whistleblowing, I analyze whistleblowing through the lens of the sociological imagination, which entails considering it in terms of the private troubles and public issues it generates. Whistleblowing raises three public issues: first, in exposing unlawful and unethical conduct in organizations, whistleblowing addresses the public issue of organizational wrongdoing. Second, the responses of organizations, governments, and the public to whistleblowers display the structural issues related to whistleblowing that points to it being a public issue in itself. Third, whistleblowing may have devastating personal consequences for the whistleblower and his/her family, friends, and colleagues. For whistleblowers, whistleblowing can bring more troubles than they had envisaged and therefore become a private trouble. The whistleblower’s actions are informed by the belief that s/he are engaging in a public issue: the recognition and exposure of perceived wrongdoing in the workplace. Whistleblowers are often under the impression that they are acting in the best interests of the organization. They believe that as loyal employees, it is part of their responsibility to disclose suspicions of wrongdoing so that the allegations can be investigated before they escalate and result in significant harm to the organization’s reputation. The ultimate goal of whistleblowers is to ensure that wrongdoing ceases. Very soon, however, they begin to realize that the public issue they are addressing has become a private trouble as a result of the retaliation they receive in response to their disclosures. This reality emerges in instances when employers view the whistleblowers’ revelations as insubordination and disloyal to the organization, especially when they reveal entrusted information that the employer does not want to be uncovered (Uys & Senekal, 2008, p. 40).

16 

T. UYS

Plan of the Book Chapter 2 explores various debates regarding the core characteristics of whistleblowing using the case of Edward Snowden as an illustration. In particular, it considers the following issues in conceptualizing whistleblowing: • the content of the disclosure, drawing a distinction between disclosures about misconduct and disclosures with regard to disagreements about policy, • who makes the disclosure, • whether the disclosure was authorized, unauthorized, or role-prescribed, • whether whistleblowers necessarily suffer retaliation, • the recipient of the disclosure, • whether the disclosure was made openly or anonymously, and lastly • whether the disclosure was in the public interest. Chapter 3 describes the experiences of several South African whistleblowers, demonstrating how acting in the public interest could create personal troubles while exposing public issues of concern. These stories show how whistleblowing can become a public issue when uncovering structural problems within organizations and the legal system. The chapter provides a foundation for the theoretical analysis of whistleblowing as personal troubles and public issues in the subsequent chapters, where I make comparisons with the experiences of whistleblowers in other contexts. I have included the stories from whistleblowers in the public and private sectors and men and women in selecting the cases. Chapter 4 deals with factors within the individual biography and the social setting of the whistleblower that would predispose him/her to blow the whistle. When confronted with what is perceived to be organizational wrongdoing, the employee has a number of choices. Employees could distance themselves from the problem by leaving (exiting) or staying and keeping quiet. Staying and keeping quiet is often considered to be the loyal option (especially by the employer). Employees could, however, confront the issue by voicing their concerns internally or externally. In considering how these choices are made, the chapter explores the influence of the personal characteristics of whistleblowers, their motives, and the role of social and organizational factors.

1  WHISTLEBLOWING AND THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION 17

Chapter 5 considers organizational responses to the whistleblower’s actions as well as the impact that this response has on the whistleblower’s relationships and circumstances, including financial pressures; the impact on relationships with colleagues, family, and friends; and the effect the response has on the whistleblower’s mental wellbeing and self-confidence. The focus is, therefore, on whistleblowing as a personal trouble. Of particular interest is how the whistleblower’s level of resilience shapes his/her willingness to blow the whistle and ability to cope with the consequences. Chapter 6 looks at whistleblowing as a public issue by exploring the impact of the whistleblower’s actions and the organizational response on the organization and the public. The act of whistleblowing generally identifies severe deficiencies in the structure of an organization. External whistleblowing potentially exposes the inadequacy of the communication channels in the organization and the failure of management to deal satisfactorily with the whistleblower’s concerns. Moreover, management and those accused of wrongdoing have to spend a lot of time doing damage control and giving explanations of what has happened. Whistleblowers who consider their actions an expression of loyalty to an organization may later feel betrayed, given the response to their disclosures. This breakdown results in distrust of the organization and them no longer recognizing the organization’s authority. This chapter also considers factors influencing the organizational reaction, including the role of loyalty, trust, and reputation. I then move to ways in which the disclosure of organizational wrongdoing could be advanced, and the public interest served while minimizing the possible adverse effects for the whistleblower, the organization, and broader society. In other words, factors that determine the effectiveness of whistleblowing. For example, if organizational commitment implies being loyal to the explicit values and norms of the organization, rather than to management, colleagues, or protecting the organization’s reputation, perceiving organizational wrongdoing would compel the loyal employee to blow the whistle. Institutionalizing the disclosure of wrongdoing requires the creation of a climate of disclosure through implementing transparent and open communication channels, a flat hierarchical structure, and the promotion of reciprocal relationships of trust. It requires a corporate environment where any disclosure will lead to a focus on the message rather than the messenger. It involves assurance of non-victimization to prospective

18 

T. UYS

whistleblowers, the implementation of whistleblowing procedures, including sanctions against perpetrators of retaliation, the investigation of the whistleblower’s claims by an independent agency, and the provision of protection and support to whistleblowers. By implementing such institutional measures effectively, the primary concern of the whistleblower, namely, that the perceived wrongdoing should be investigated and dealt with, is addressed. Institutionalizing the authorized disclosure of wrongdoing also deals with the organization’s concerns about obedience, confidentiality, accountability, and reputation. Chapter 7 analyzes the effectiveness of legislation in protecting whistleblowers against retaliation and encouraging structural measures that provide organizational support to observers of wrongdoing when making their disclosures. In addition to protecting whistleblowers against retaliation, legislation also should include measures encouraging organizational support to all those affected by the disclosure of wrongdoing. If retaliation does not follow, blowing the whistle will not incur private troubles for the whistleblower or become a public issue for the organization. Ultimately, the focus should be on addressing organizational wrongdoing as a public issue by ensuring that facilitating its exposure results in eradicating organizational misconduct. As a conclusion to this application of the sociological imagination to whistleblowing, Chap. 8 considers the role clinical sociologists and other practitioners could play in designing and/or implementing interventions that would ensure better outcomes for the whistleblower, the organization, as well as others who are involved. Clinical sociologists attempt to improve people’s quality of life by designing and/or implementing interventions based on an analysis of problem situations. In the case of whistleblowing, their role could include advising the organization concerning the implementation of confidential reporting systems that would pre-empt whistleblowing; developing support systems for whistleblowers before, during, and after the disclosure is made; mediation between the organization and the whistleblower; and advocacy to improve legal protection for whistleblowers. In this way, the efforts of clinical sociologists enhance the pursuit of the politics of truth within organizations by resolving the paradox of whistleblowing and ensuring the creation of an ethical workplace where whistleblowers’ actions are viewed in a positive light. In this environment, whistleblowers help to eradicate the public issue of wrongdoing without suffering the private troubles normally associated with their actions.

1  WHISTLEBLOWING AND THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION 19

References Agence France-Presse in Washington. (2021). US Government Appeals UK Ruling Against Julian Assange’s Extradition. Retrieved June 19, 2021, from https://www.theguardian.com/media/2021/feb/12/us-­g overnment-­ appeals-­uk-­ruling-­against-­julian-­assanges-­extradition-­joe-­biden-­wikileaks Alant, N., & Uys, T. (1999). Whistleblowing: Fighting Fraud in Organisations. Paper to be Presented at the Conference on Fraud and the African Renaissance to be Held at Uganda Martyrs University from 8–10 April. Aleem, Z., & Collins, S. (2019, December 28). Trump Is Trying to Out the Alleged Ukraine Whistleblower on Twitter. Vox. Retrieved July 02, 2020, from https://www.vox.com/policy-­a nd-­p olitics/2019/12/28/21040471/ trump-­impeachment-­whistleblower-­name-­retweet-­twitter Andregg, M. (2016). Ethical Implications of the Snowden Revelations. The International Journal of Intelligence, Security, and Public Affairs, 18(2), 110–131. Ash, L. (2016, December 30). Yuliya Stepanova: What Do Russians Think of Doping Whistleblower? BBC News. Retrieved June 21, 2021, from https:// www.bbc.com/news/magazine-­38406627 Bakaj, A. P., & Zaid, M. S. (2020, March 1). We Represented the Whistle-blower. The Law Needs Urgent Help. The New York Times. Retrieved March 04, 2020, from https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/01/opinion/whistleblower-­ intelligence-­community.html BBC News. (2019). Julian Assange: A Timeline of Wikileaks Founder’s Case. Retrieved April 16, 2020, from https://www.bbc.com/news/worldeurope-11949341 BBC News. (2020). NSA Surveillance Exposed by Snowden Ruled Unlawful. Retrieved November 17, 2020, from https://www.bbc.com/news/ technology-­54013527 Berghel, H. (2012). WikiLeaks and the Matter of Private Manning. IEEE Computer Society. University of Nevada, Las Vegas. Berghel, H. (2014). Mr Snowden’s Legacy. IEEE Computer Society. University of Nevada, Las Vegas. Bernal, P. (2016). Data Gathering, Surveillance and Human Rights: Recasting the Debate. Journal of Cyber Policy, 1(2), 243–264. https://doi.org/10.108 0/23738871.2016.1228990 Bigo, D. (2019). Shared Secrecy in a Digital Age and a Transnational World. Intelligence and National Security, 34(3), 379–394. https://doi.org/10.108 0/02684527.2019.1553703 Biography.com Editors. (2020). Chelsea Manning Biography. Retrieved August 03, 2020, from https://www.biography.com/activist/chelsea-­manning

20 

T. UYS

Blaylock, D. (2014, April 15). Pulitzer Prize A ‘Validation’ for Snowden: Daily Whistleblower News. GAP. Protecting Corporate, Government & International Whistleblowers Since 1977. http://www.whistleblower.org/blog/ 04152014-­pulitzer-­prize-­validation-­snowden-­dailywhistleblower-­news Cohen, N. (2014). Snowden to Receive Truth-Telling Prize. The New  York Times Company. De Maria, W. (2005). Whistleblower Protection: Is Africa Ready? Public Administration and Development, 25, 217–226. Eddington, P. R. (2019, June 6). The Snowden Effect, Six Years on. Commentary. Edgar, T. (2017). Beyond Snowden: Privacy, Mass Surveillance, and the Struggle to Reform the NSA. The Brookings Institution. Fenster, M. (2012). Disclosure’s Effects: WikiLeaks and Transparency. Iowa Law Review, 97, 753–807. Fitzgibbon, W., & Hudson, M. (2021, April 3). Five Years Later, Panama Papers Still Having a Big Impact. Impact. Retrieved June 06, 2020, from https:// w w w. i c i j . o r g / i n v e s t i g a t i o n s / p a n a m a -­p a p e r s / f i v e -­y e a r s -­l a t e r -­ panama-­papers-­still-­having-­a-­big-­impact/ Gabbatt, A. (2019, September 25). Why Is the Trump-Ukraine Whistleblower Scandal So Serious? The Guardian. Retrieved February 18, 2020, from https:// w w w. t h e g u a r d i a n . c o m / u s -­n e w s / 2 0 1 9 / s e p / 2 3 / b i d e n -­u k r a i n e -­ trump-­whistleblower-­scandal-­latest-­explained-­how-­serious Gaurav, K. (2021). ‘Not Disappointed’: US Whistleblower Snowden After He Goes Unpardoned by Trump. Hindustan Times. Retrieved June 19, 2021, from https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-­news/not-­disappointed-­us-­ w h i s t l e b l o w e r-­s n o w d e n -­a f t e r-­h e -­g o e s -­u n p a r d o n e d -­b y -­t r u m p -­ 101611153427190.html Geary, D. (2009). Radical Ambition: C.  Wright Mills, the Left, and American Social Thought. University of California Press. Gellman, B., & Harrell, E. (2010). 3 Julian Assange. WikiLeaks, 174(26), 90–94. Greenwald, G., MacAskill, E., & Poitras, L. (2013). Edward Snowden: The Whistleblower Behind the NSA Surveillance Revelations. The Guardian., 9(6), 2. Herb, J. (2013). NSA Leak Is Treason, Says Feinstein. The Hill. https://thehill. com/homenews/senate/304635-­nsa-­leak-­is-­treason-­says-­sen-­feinstein Ilyushina, M. (2020a). Edward Snowden gets permanent residency in Russia - lawyer. Accessed on 2020-10-22 from https://edition.cnn.com/2020/10/22/ europe/edward-snowden-russia-residency-intl/index.html Inkster, N. (2014). The Snowden Revelations: Myths and Misapprehensions. Survival, 56(1), 51–60. Johnson, L. (2013, November 06). John Boehner: Edward Snowmen Is a Traitor. The Huffington Post

1  WHISTLEBLOWING AND THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION 21

Johnson, N. C. (2017). A “Massive and Unprecedented Intrusion”. A Comparative Analysis of American Journalistic Discourses Surrounding Three Government Surveillance Scandals. Digital Journalism, 5(3), 318–333. https://doi.org/1 0.1080/21670811.2016.1251330 Lahneman, W. J. (2016). IC Data Mining in the Post-Snowden Era. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 29(4), 700–723. https://doi. org/10.1080/08850607.2016.1148488 Lai, A. (2012). Timeline: Julian Assange’s Extradition Battle. Retrieved May 04, 2013, from http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/16/world/europe/assange-­ extradition-­timeline/ Lashmar, P. (2017). No More Sources? Journalism Practice, 11(6), 665–688. Lefebvre, S. (2018). Why Are State Secrets Protected from Disclosure? The Discourse of Secret Keepers. The International Journal of Intelligence, Security, and Public Affairs, 20(3), 204–229. https://doi.org/10.1080/2380099 2.2018.1532184 Lepore, J. (2019, September 23). Edward Snowden and the Rise of Whistle-­ blower Culture in Permanent Record. The New  Yorker. Retrieved May 31, 2020, from https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/09/23/edward-­ snowden-­and-­the-­rise-­of-­whistle-­blower-­culture Lipman, F.  D. (2012). Whistleblowers: Incentives, Disincentives, and Protection Strategies. John Wiley and Sons, Inc.. Lozano, E., Joyce, A., Schiemann R., Ting, A., & Yahyavi, D. (2011). WikiLeaks and Whistleblowing: Digital Information Leakage and Its Impact on Society. Retrieved April 05, 2014, from http://cs.stanford.edu/people/eroberts/ cs181/projects/2010-­11/WikiLeaks/background.html MacAskill, E. (2019, September 13). Snowden. The Guardian. Retrieved June 23, 2020, from https://www.theguardian.com/us-­news/ng-­interactive/2019/ sep/13/edward-­s nowden-­i nterview-­w histleblowing-­r ussia-­a i-­p ermanent-­ record Mackey, R. (2010). ‘Operation Payback’ Attacks Target MasterCard and PayPal Sites to Avenge WikiLeaks. Retrieved May 04, 2014, from http://thelede. blogs.nytimes.com/2010/12/08/operation-­p ayback-­targets-­mastercard-­ and-­paypal-­sites-­to-­avenge-­wikileaks/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0 Macur, J. (2019, December 26). The Whistle-blowers Next Door. The New York Times. Retrieved June 06, 2021, from https://www.nytimes. com/2019/12/26/sports/olympics/yuliya-­stepanova-­russia-­doping.html Majendie, M. (2020a, July 31). The ‘Real’ Threat to Russia’s Former Doping Mastermind. BBC News. Retrieved August 02, 2020, from https://www.bbc. com/news/stories-­53596997 Majendie, M. (2020b, November 2). Whistleblowers Vitaly and Yuliya Stepanov Living in Fear But Have No Regrets as Doping Saga Heads to Court. Evening

22 

T. UYS

Standard. Retrieved June 21, 2021, from https://www.standard.co.uk/sport/ vitaly-­and-­yuliya-­stepanov-­doping-­interview-­whistleblowers-­b39669.html Masnick, M. (2014). James Clapper Giving Speeches to Students, Begging Them to Stop Thinking of Ed Snowden as a Hero. Techdirt. Mills, C. W. (1959). Sociological Imagination. Oxford University Press. Mills, C. W. (1970). The Sociological Imagination. Oxford University Press. Nie, J., & Elliott, C. (2020). Humiliating Whistle-blowers: Lie Wenliang, the Response to Covid-19, and the Call for a Decent Society. Bioethical Inquiry, 17, 543–547. Nield, D. (2014, April 21). Snowden Is No Hero, Says Bill Gates. Digital Trends. h t t p : / / w w w. d i g i t a l t r e n d s . c o m / c o m p u t i n g / s n o w d e n -­h e r o -­ says-­bill-­gates/#!E9cT3 Noack, R., & O’Grady, S. (2019, April 11). How Ecuador Soured on Assange. Washington Post. Retrieved July 28, 2020, from https://www.washingtonpost. com/world/2019/04/11/how-­ecuador-­soured-­assange/ Olesen, T. (2018). The Democratic Drama of Whistleblowing. European Journal of Social Theory, 21(4), 508–525. Olesen, T. (2020). Whistleblowing in a Time of Digital (in)visibility: Towards a Sociology of ‘grey areas’. Information, Communication & Society.https://doi. org/10.1080/1369118X.2020.1787484. Quinn, B. (2021). Julian Assange Refused Bail Despite Judge Ruling Against Extradition to US. Retrieved June 19, 2021, from https://www.theguardian. com/media/2021/jan/06/julian-­a ssange-­r efused-­b ail-­d espite-­j udge-­ ruling-­against-­extradition-­to-­us Ruby, F., Goggin, G., & Keane, J. (2017). “Comparative Silence” Still? Journalism, Academia, and the Five Eyes of Edward Snowden. Digital Journalism, 5(3), 353–367. https://doi.org/10.1080/21670811.2016.1254568 Santoro, D., & Kumar, M. (2018). Speaking Truth to Power—A Theory of Whistleblowing. Springer. Semuel, A. (2020, March 16–23). 2002 Person of the Year: The Whistleblowers. Time, 122. Snowden, E. (2019). Permanent Record. Palgrave Macmillan. Toor, A. (2016). Obama Says He Can’t Pardon Snowden, Even Though He Could. Retrieved June 19, 2021, from https://www.theverge. com/2016/11/21/13697072/obama-­snowden-­pardon-­nsa-­trump-­pompeo Uys, T., & Senekal, A. (2008). Morality of Principle versus Morality of Loyalty: The Case of Whistleblowing. African Journal of Business Ethics, 3(1), 38–44. Wahl-Jorgensen, K., Bennett, L. K., & Cable, J. (2017). Surveillance Normalization and Critique. News Coverage and Journalists’ Discourses around the Snowden Revelations. Digital Journalism, 5(3), 386–403.

1  WHISTLEBLOWING AND THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION 23

Walsh, P.  F., & Miller, S. (2016). Rethinking ‘Five Eyes’ Security Intelligence Collection Policies and Practice Post Snowden. Intelligence and National Security, 31(3), 345–368. Waters, S. (2018). The Effects of Mass Surveillance on Journalists’ Relations with Confidential Sources. A Constant Comparative Study. Digital Journalism, 6(10), 1294–1313. Wintour, P. (2021). Britain Is Damaging its Reputation by Keeping Julian Assange in Jail, Says Partner. Retrieved June 19, 2021, from https://www.theguardian. com/media/2021/apr/11/britain-­risks-­damaging-­reputation-­by-­keeping-­ julian-­assange-­in-­jail-­says-­partner-­stella-­moris

CHAPTER 2

What Constitutes Whistleblowing?

Introduction The general view of whistleblowing is that it makes a significant contribution to combating organizational misconduct. However, the public is often more ambivalent concerning its perceptions of people who blow the whistle. Globally there are debates about whether they should be considered heroes or traitors and what kind of protection they should receive. Making provision for the idea of whistleblowing in the United States dates back to the False Claims Act (FCA), promulgated in 1863—the time of the Civil War. The purpose of the Act was to encourage insiders to expose fraud against the US government. A crucial element of the Act was a so-called qui tam clause, which provided a financial reward to the whistleblower if the fraud was confirmed. This legislation was progressive, years ahead of its time. It, however, remained mostly dormant until the early 1940s, when large-scale government procurement led to its regeneration. Though there were only 28 FCA cases pending across the United States in 1943, they resulted in investigations of the most powerful corporations involved in government contracts. Alarmed by these cases, corporations successfully lobbied for amendments to the Act, resulting in numerous procedural and substantive obstacles in the way of filing a qui tam claim. Whistleblowers had to wait another 43 years for the US government’s 1986 repeal of most of the anti-whistleblower provisions of the 1943 Act, which made provision for anti-retaliation protection (Kohn, 2012, pp. 52–58). © The Author(s) 2022 T. Uys, Whistleblowing and the Sociological Imagination, https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-39445-3_2

25

26 

T. UYS

The first formal use of the term “whistleblower” to denote insiders who expose organizational wrongdoing occurred during the Conference on Professional Responsibility organized by Ralph Nader in 1971. The conference report, published as a book called Whistle Blowing, “was the first extensive treatment of how individuals of integrity reconciled their personal morality with conflicting institutional responsibilities” (Bollier, 1991, p.  46). Various efforts contributing to the institutionalization of whistleblowing followed this conference, for example, establishing the Government Accountability Project (GAP) in 1977 (Bollier, 1991, p. 4). However, some influential management experts, such as Peter Drucker (in Orr, 1989, p. 207), still tended to view whistleblowing as “simply another word for ‘informing’” with the attendant connotations of distrust and disloyalty. Since then, public perceptions of whistleblowing in the United States have changed dramatically. For example, the Time nomination of three women whistleblowers as Persons of the Year in 2002 revealed a generally positive view of whistleblowers. However, attempts by the US government to close down the WikiLeaks website after it published sensitive government information, and the prosecution of those involved with the leaks display a more adverse stance towards whistleblowing (Benkler, 2011). The furor surrounding the hunt for Edward Snowden, the former National Security Agency employee who leaked information about US government surveillance programs to the press, demonstrates the contested nature of whistleblowing. Interestingly the character of the debates on whistleblowing has shifted with Snowden. Louis Clark of the Government Accountability Project (GAP) in the United States sums up the change very well: “… it was noticeable that the argument about Edward Snowden in the US was not over whether whistleblowing is good—it was about whether he counts as a real whistleblower” (in Smith, 2014, p. 16). Whistleblowing has become sensationalized in the media, and consequently, it appears in everyday conversation in a range of ways with different connotations attached to it, depending on the attitudes and experiences of the user. Confusion is not limited to everyday life and the general public, however. Academics also offer competing conceptualizations. Clarifying what constitutes whistleblowing is more than a theoretical concern: it informs various practices and attitudes towards whistleblowing. In particular, it influences what support and protection those who disclose information about perceived organizational wrongdoing would receive.

2  WHAT CONSTITUTES WHISTLEBLOWING? 

27

This chapter explores the definitional debates on whistleblowing, using the Snowden case as an illustration. In doing so, it is vital to determine the range of activities contained in the definition correctly. If whistleblowing is defined too broadly, it becomes everything, and that explains nothing. On the other hand, if demarcated too narrowly, whistleblowing becomes trivial. As Ceva and Bocchiolo (2019, p.  21) argue, it is necessary to formulate a definition capable of being precise enough to serve the purposes of academic research and nuanced enough to encompass the many current usages of the term in the public debate.

A basic premise for scholars and the popular media is that whistleblowing, or “ethical resistance” (Glazer & Glazer, 1989, p. 4) as some authors refer to it, entails the voluntary disclosure of perceived organizational wrongdoing to those considered to be in a position to take action (Ceva & Bocchiola, 2019, p. 24; Glazer & Glazer, 1989, p. 4; Jubb, 1999, p. 83; Miceli & Near, 1992, p.  15; Miethe, 1999, pp.  17–18; Wilmot, 2000, p. 1051). This definition points to the involvement of at least three main social actors in the dynamics of whistleblowing: “… wrongdoer(s) who commit the alleged wrongdoing; whistleblower(s) who observe the wrongdoing, define it as such and report it; and recipient(s) of the report of wrongdoing” (Near & Miceli, 1996, p. 508). In the following sections, I consider various issues related to a disclosure that would justify its designation as whistleblowing. The first issue requiring clarification refers to the kind of disclosure that qualifies as whistleblowing.

Disclosure of Wrongdoing Most authors distinguish a wide variety of behaviors that constitute organizational misconduct, for example, criminal activity, the abuse of public funds and power, a miscarriage of justice, maladministration, and endangering the health or safety of any individual (Kloppers, 1997, pp. 240–241). In contrast, McLain and Keenan (1999, p. 256) identified characteristics of the behavior that qualify as wrongdoing as including: behavior which is morally wrong as well as behavior which is illegal, unethical, wasteful, inefficient, neglectful, an abuse of power, or violates organizational rules or professional standards.

28 

T. UYS

However, this does not bring us much further, primarily since the list of characteristics does not refer explicitly to the connection with an organization. This omission is remedied by Blonder (2010, p. 258), who defines organizational misconduct as “non-compliant, wasteful, or illegal Teo and Caspersz (2011, pp. 239–240) viewed wrongdoing ““as conduct falling along a spectrum of behaviour, which ranges from serious illegality to unprofessional or improper behaviour in the workplace.” The question, however, arises whether a disclosure about any transgression within an organization would qualify as whistleblowing. Some researchers distinguish between occupational and organizational wrongdoing. The former entails specific individuals in the organization engaging in questionable behavior that falls outside the explicit official corporate policy boundaries. In contrast, the latter involves suspicious workplace behavior that is widespread and institutionalized in the organization (Bjørkelo et al., 2008, p. 31). Jubb (1999, pp.  87–88) excluded disclosures about professional misconduct from the definition of whistleblowing. To qualify as whistleblowing, he argued, the disclosures should deal with illegal, immoral, or unethical activities that the organization is accountable for, which are under its control, and could result in actual or potential harm. Organizational wrongdoing could, therefore, be seen as a failure of the corporate governance of an organization, the inability to ensure that the organization is controlled and directed in a way that protects the interests of all stakeholders and, in particular, the organization’s reputation or symbolic capital (Rossouw, 2005, p. 101). The disclosure aims to prevent, impede, or end the wrongdoing so that uninformed members of the public are protected by terminating, limiting, or averting actual or potential harm. While the inclusion of disclosures about organizational misconduct in the definition of whistleblowing seems fairly clear-cut and justifiable, we need to consider those cases where whistleblowers make disclosures about disagreements with corporate policy. These disagreements could include inadequate accountability structures in the organization, or actions that comply with regulations but involve unwarranted risks or do not conform to proper standards (Blonder, 2010, p. 258). Arguably the revelations by Edward Snowden about the nature and extent of US surveillance programs implemented both domestically and internationally constituted an example of a policy disclosure. Yet, this type of exposure, which represents dissent from general organizational views, is often not considered whistleblowing. This view is the basis on which Richard Haass, president of the Council of Foreign Relations, argued that Snowden was not a

2  WHAT CONSTITUTES WHISTLEBLOWING? 

29

whistleblower as his disclosures dealt with policy issues and did not reveal evidence of corruption (Farrington, 2013). Organizations often use these kinds of tactics to discredit whistleblowers or tarnish the message they are trying to put across. However, subsequent events have demonstrated that Snowden’s disclosures did reveal organizational wrongdoing. For example, in 2015, the British Investigatory Powers Tribunal, tasked with reviewing complaints against the British security services, ruled that before Snowden’s disclosures made the policies public, the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) and the NSA’s bulk interception of electronic communications had been unlawful (Nyst, 2015). The US Court of Appeals came to a similar conclusion in 2020 (BBC News). Attempts to deny Snowden the status of being a whistleblower by arguing that his disclosures did not fall into the narrowly defined parameters of providing evidence of illegality have therefore proved to be spurious. Bushnell (2020) emphasizes the importance of considering the cultural context within which the wrongdoing occurs. Perceptions of what constitutes organizational wrongdoing are the result of a process of meaning-­ making influenced by the “cultural and societal values and the changing cultural landscape within which whistleblowers are encompassed” (Bushnell, 2020, p. 9).

Who Makes the Disclosure? Some authors cast a wide net in considering any individual who raises concerns about perceived organizational wrongdoing of a whistleblower (Martin, 2010, p. 12). This view implies that virtually anybody who discloses corporate wrongdoing would qualify as a whistleblower ranging from a member of the public reporting pollution by an organization to the police, or phoning a crime line, to the activities of an investigative journalist publishing an article about bribes accepted by government officials. However, most whistleblowing research employs a much more restricted definition. Initially, the general agreement was that a current or former employee should disclose organizational wrongdoing of the organization involved (Calland & Dehn, 2004, p. 3; Glazer & Glazer, 1989, p.  4; Miethe, 1999, p.  13; Singer et  al., 1998, p.  528; Wilmot, 2000, p.  1051). For example, De Maria (1999, p.  26) even excluded former employees from the definition of whistleblowing as he argued that they usually were not in danger of suffering from management reprisals. This

30 

T. UYS

view, of course, neglected to take into account the possible negative impact that blacklisting by the former employer could have on the whistleblower’s future career. In terms of South African labor law, an employee is someone who provides services or works for another person or entity where at least one of several factors is present. First, another person controls or directs the individual work activities or his/her hours of work. Second, the person forms part of the organization he/she is working for. A third factor is whether the average hours of work over the preceding three months exceeded 40 hours per month. The law also considers individuals as employees if they are economically dependent on another person, provide services only to one person, or are given the equipment needed to execute the work by the other person (Jackson, n.d.). However, limiting the ranks of whistleblowers to current or former employees has proved to be too restrictive. It excludes disclosures by people not employed by the organization but linked to it in other ways, such as consultants, independent contractors, volunteers, or shareholders. Blonder (2010, p. 258) argues for a broader scope by including “people in some category of labor relationship to an organization,” while several authors (e.g. Johnson, 2003, p. 4; Miceli et al., 2008, p. 6) define a whistleblower as a member or former member of an organization, rather than an employee. Therefore, a whistleblower is an insider “who has or had privileged access to data or information of an organization” (Jubb, 1999, p.  83). Anvari et  al. (2019, p.  44) go one step further by arguing that whistleblowing reports must be about ingroup wrongdoing made by someone who, to some degree, identifies with the group through a subjective definition of group membership. This broader definition allows characterizing Snowden as a whistleblower, even though he made his disclosures as a National Security Agency contractor rather than as an employee. If a reporter or politician makes disclosures about organizational misconduct happening outside of their particular work sphere, this does not qualify them as a whistleblower. This view is in line with de Maria’s (1999, p. 26) argument that a disclosure constitutes whistleblowing only if the person making the disclosure observed or experienced the wrongdoing directly. Whistleblowers are insiders who reveal information that was entrusted to them (Davis, 2003, p. 543). This position exposes them to the accusation of betrayal, someone who has violated loyalty and trust (Ben-Yehuda,

2  WHAT CONSTITUTES WHISTLEBLOWING? 

31

2001, p. 37). Issues of loyalty and trust are related to whether disclosures need to be unauthorized to qualify as whistleblowing or whether authorized or role-prescribed disclosures are also included in the definition.

Whether the Disclosure Was Authorized, Unauthorized, or Role-Prescribed While some researchers included any disclosure of organizational wrongdoing, whether sanctioned by the organization or not, in their definition of whistleblowing (Alford, 2001, p.  18; Johnson, 2003, p.  4; Miceli & Near, 1992, p.  16), others believed that whistleblowing should be restricted to the unauthorized disclosure of information (Hunt, 1998, p. 525; Glazer & Glazer, 1989, p. 4; Vinten, 1994, p. 5). Blonder (2010, p.  258) argues that whistleblowing involves disclosures where “the employee typically does not have the approval of his or her superior to report the misconduct.” This view seems to limit whistleblowing to bureaucratically unauthorized forms of disclosure. It is mostly the unofficial nature of the whistleblower’s disclosure that exposes him or her to the accusation of treachery. The question is what determines whether a disclosure is unauthorized. According to Geoffrey Hunt (1998, p.  530), three main criteria determine whether a disclosure is designated as unauthorized. The first is obviously when the employee did not follow the prescribed organizational communication channels when making the disclosure. Second, the disclosure could be considered unsanctioned if the information is particularly sensitive, especially where secrecy clauses or issues of confidentiality are involved. Third, the organization’s management might believe that the particular employee is insufficiently senior to make such a disclosure. The authorization of disclosure is mostly a result of whether the dominant organizational culture condones this behavior. Organizational culture refers to a collective framework of assumptions, beliefs, values, and behavioral norms that influences the decisions and conduct of members of the organization (Greenberg & Baron, 2003, p.  515; Werner, 2011, p. 31). Organizational culture mainly influences behavior in organizations through furnishing employees with a sense of identity, engendering a commitment to the mission of the organization, and informing and strengthening organizational norms (Greenberg & Baron, 2003, p. 518). It plays a particularly important role in distinguishing between desired and

32 

T. UYS

deviant behaviors and, therefore, in determining whether a disclosure should be perceived to be authorized or not. In Snowden’s statement to the European Parliament, he described what Werner (2011, p. 38) considers a passive-defensive culture, one that “reinforces normative beliefs associated with approval, traditional rules, dependence and avoidance”. He received two kinds of responses from his colleagues and superiors when raising his concerns about what he perceived to be an unconstitutional and illegal surveillance program conducted by the NSA.  The first warned against the retaliation that could follow from upsetting the status quo, while the second advised that the issue should be left to someone else to solve (Snowden, 2019, p. 235). Defining whistleblowing as making an unauthorized disclosure seems to exclude so-called role-prescribed whistleblowing where your job description obliges you to make disclosures about perceived wrongdoing (Miceli et  al., 2008, p.  139), as is the case with internal auditors. For Blonder (2010, p. 258), role reporting is just the standard way in which members of organizations behave, while Miethe (1999, p. 17) argues that one should distinguish between disclosures which form part of the standard requirements in such a function and those cases where the revelations occur outside the prescribed channels. Only the latter would qualify as whistleblowing as the former would not lead to the same kind of victimization experienced by those who make unauthorized disclosures. Anvari et  al. (2019, p.  45) argue that the qualifying condition is whether the reporting of problematic behavior took place voluntarily. Supervisors sometimes consider even role-prescribed disclosures where the organizational member followed the prescribed channels, to be unauthorized, and retaliate against the person making the disclosure. As the distinction between authorized and unauthorized disclosures is ambiguous, I suggest that any disclosures of organizational wrongdoing that flow from performing a particular role in an organization (including evidence given in court if the witness is under a legal duty to answer) should be viewed as whistleblowing. The previous discussion has introduced the question of whether suffering retaliation as a result of making a disclosure is a prerequisite for being considered a whistleblower.

2  WHAT CONSTITUTES WHISTLEBLOWING? 

33

Do Whistleblowers Necessarily Suffer Retaliation? De Maria (1999, p. 25) was adamant that the retaliation following a disclosure about organizational wrongdoing is an essential requirement to be considered a whistleblower. Similarly, Miethe (1999, p.  17) disqualified role reporting that follows the prescribed channels from being viewed as whistleblowing as “they do not experience the same antagonism and condemnation for reporting misconduct.” While Miceli and her colleagues (2008, pp. 11–16) extensively describe retaliation against whistleblowers, they stop short of making it a prerequisite to be considered a whistleblower. Brown & Donkin (2008, p. 13) argue that making retaliation a requirement for classifying a disclosure as a case of whistleblowing would render all attempts to provide proactive protection for whistleblowers moot. For Alford (2001, p.  18), this is a practical issue. Theoretically, anybody who raises concerns about organizational wrongdoing is a whistleblower, but in practice, only those who experience retaliation from the organization are identified as such.

Who Is the Recipient of the Disclosure? The Distinction Between Internal, External, and Public Whistleblowing To qualify as whistleblowing, the disclosure should be made to someone or some agency perceived to have the ability to effect change. Authors generally distinguish between two kinds of channels that are available to prospective whistleblowers. Disclosures could occur internally when the whistleblower communicates the message inside the organization using prescribed or non-prescribed channels. Whistleblowers also could resort to an external agency when they raise their concerns with some external authority. Some authors (such as Jubb, 1999, p. 91) restrict whistleblowing to disclosures external to the organization as “internal disclosure does not breach the organization’s confidences, nor violate its proprietary rights to the information released; and it is dubious whether the act is organizational disobedience” (Jubb, 1999, p. 91). However, some organizations victimize those who make their disclosures internally only, forcing them to escalate their exposures externally (Uys, 2008). Research has shown that there is little difference in the retaliation experienced by internal and external whistleblowers (Alford, 2001, p.  129; Miceli et  al., 2008, p. 7).

34 

T. UYS

Miceli et al. (2008, pp. 7–11) argued that rather than excluding internal disclosures of wrongdoing from the definition of whistleblowing, we should consider “internal and external whistleblowing to be two types of one broad class of behavior.” In both instances, whistleblowers make their disclosures because they are not themselves in a position to investigate or otherwise deal with the perceived wrongdoing (Miethe, 1999, p.  15). Having made an internal disclosure often compels the whistleblower to go the external route, either because of the inaction of the organization in dealing with the report or because retaliation by the organization forces them to take the matter further. Some researchers consider it essential to distinguish whistleblowing from run-of-the-mill discussions about misconduct or critical remarks that form part of regular work activity. Apart from raising the threshold for what is considered whistleblowing, Skiveness and Trygstad (2010, pp. 1077–1078) also distinguish between weak and strong whistleblowing. Weak whistleblowing refers to the initial raising of concerns about perceived wrongdoing to someone within the organization who is in a position to deal with the matter. If no response is forthcoming, which requires that the organizational member has to report the concern internally again, the disclosure becomes strong whistleblowing. Those members who engage in strong whistleblowing to someone outside the organization are called external whistleblowers. Initially, researchers distinguished only between internal and external whistleblowing. However, the extreme response to whistleblowers who raise their concerns in the media has necessitated a further distinction. Therefore, Vandekerckhove (2010, pp.  17–18) developed a three-tier model of whistleblowing. While the first tier refers to internal whistleblowing, the second tier entails external whistleblowing to a prescribed regulator. At the level of the third tier, disclosures are made publicly, particularly to the media. Generally, legislation protecting whistleblowers requires that whistleblowers exhaust internal routes before turning to ways of exposing the wrongdoing externally. As a contractor, Snowden was not protected by President Obama’s 2012 Presidential Policy Directive 19 that dealt with intelligence agency employees. He was, however, still questioned whether he felt he had exhausted all internal avenues before going public (Snowden, 2019, p. 241). With the founding of WikiLeaks in 2006, another avenue for raising concerns opened to prospective whistleblowers. While some researchers

2  WHAT CONSTITUTES WHISTLEBLOWING? 

35

(Lozano et al., 2010–2011; Madar, 2012) refer to WikiLeaks as an “external whistleblower,” it is argued here that WikiLeaks should instead be viewed as a channel for disclosure that observers of organizational wrongdoing could employ.1

Should the Disclosure Be Made Openly, or Do Anonymous Disclosures Also Qualify as Whistleblowing? Technological developments concerning the information revolution have expanded the ability of whistleblowers to remain anonymous when making disclosures. The question is whether a whistleblowing disclosure made anonymously could still be considered whistleblowing, or should a disclosure always occur openly to qualify? De Maria (1999, p.  28) insisted that suspicions of organizational wrongdoing should be exposed openly to qualify as whistleblowing as open disclosures will require protection, while anonymous reporting does not. Similarly, when comparing whistleblowing to civil disobedience, Bok (1980, p. 281) argued that they were both equally open, by stating that whistleblowing “differs from the anonymous warning as much as civil disobedience differs from covert breaches of the law.” She was especially concerned about the unfairness inherent in “the secret denunciation or the leaked rumor: the more so the more derogatory and accusatory the information. What is openly stated can more easily be checked, its source’s motives challenged, and the underlying information examined” (Bok, 1980, p. 286). Flynn (2006, p. 257) contrasts whistleblowing, where the identity of the person disclosing wrongdoing is revealed, with leaking, which refers to covert disclosures of unauthorized information placed in the public domain by a journalistic intermediary. This distinction is problematic for two main reasons. First, constructing the core distinguishing characteristic as the anonymity of the disclosers makes it inherently unstable as their identity could be revealed at any stage, transforming their status from leaker to whistleblower in an instant. The disclosure of Snowden’s identity 1  While never particularly popular in US government circles, WikiLeaks encountered its full wrath after it released more than 700,000 classified American diplomatic cables and military reports it had received from a US Army soldier, Army Pfc. Bradley Manning in November 2010 (Berghel, 2012).

36 

T. UYS

soon after the first report appeared in The Guardian is a case in point. Second, and more importantly, as the public debate on the status of Edward Snowden demonstrates, “leaker” is a loaded term with derogatory connotations (see, e.g. Eyal Press, 2013; Goldman, 2013; Vingiano, 2013; Wemple, 2013; Williams, 2013). Even before Snowden’s disclosures, Sirota (2012) argued that while whistleblowers and leakers both disclose critical information about wrongdoing, leakers do so with self-­ interested political goals in mind and not to bring the wrongdoing to an end. Calling someone who discloses information about wrongdoing anonymously a leaker, therefore, disparages the action. Snowden (2019, pp.  236–237) is adamant about the distinction when he argues that leaking: should be used to describe acts of disclosure done not out of public interest but out of self-interest, or in pursuit of institutional or political aims. To be more precise, I understand a leak as something closer to a “plant,” or an incidence of “propaganda-seeding”: the selective release of protected information in order to sway popular opinion or affect the course of decision making.

Similarly, Santoro and Kumar (2018, p.  47) locate the purpose of the leaker’s disclosure in a desire “to manipulate, misguide, or influence public opinion to serve a particular interest,” whereas whistleblowers try to serve the public interest through their revelations. In contrast to the requirement for open disclosures, many researchers make provision for anonymous whistleblowing, provided that the disclosure somehow appears in the public domain (Alford, 2001, p. 36; Jubb, 1999, p.  79; Miceli et  al., 2008, p.  8; Miethe, 1999, pp.  81–82; Nan, 2011, p. 85). While acknowledging that anonymous whistleblowing tends to be less effective, Elliston (1982, pp. 170–170) furnishes several justifications for making disclosures about wrongdoing anonymously, in particular the seriousness of the wrongdoing, the likelihood of unfair retaliation, and the social distance between the whistleblower and the accused. According to Elliston (1982, p. 175), the primary consideration is the extent to which anonymous whistleblowing is required to promote public welfare and safety, as well as honesty and accountability among management. The acceptance of anonymous whistleblowing has opened the door for the implementation of anonymous hotlines and the establishment of

2  WHAT CONSTITUTES WHISTLEBLOWING? 

37

whistleblowing procedures that allow for concerns to be raised anonymously. On the other hand, making provision for anonymous whistleblowing creates the possibility of confusing the role of whistleblowers with the activities of informers. While initiatives such as South Africa’s anonymous crime tip-off line, CrimeLine; the Public Service Commission National Anti-Corruption Hotline; and the Legacy Lifestyle and 5FM initiative Blow the Whistle on Rape are laudable, marketing them as whistleblowing tends to blur the distinction between whistleblowing and informing in the eyes of the general public. Clarifying this distinction is of particular importance in countries such as South Africa, where the role of informers has strong historical connotations with betrayal and disloyalty. Disconnecting whistleblowing from informing is of particular importance where informing resonates with a political history of domination and oppression, particularly where those in power received the information to be used against a repressed general public. The role of impimpis who betrayed the struggle against the apartheid regime in South Africa by informing on their associates to the police and security structures, created a negative perception of disclosures about perceived wrongdoing. This negative perception exists regardless of the nature of the wrongdoing or the recipient of the exposure (Uys, 2010, p. 122). The term “informers” (or informants as they are sometimes known) generally refers to individuals who secretively provide privileged information about a person or organization to some state agency, usually the police, the army, the judiciary, or the security services (Dudai, 2012, p. 34). The anonymous nature of the disclosure, as well as the financial or other benefits that informers stand to gain from their actions, ensures that community perceptions of informers are generally negative. In his analysis of the role of informers in the transition in Northern Ireland, Dudai (2012) demonstrated the enduring hostility towards and resentment of informers. German history also illustrates the negative impact of equating whistleblowing with informing. The Gestapo and Stasi relied on denunciations by friends and colleagues. This memory tended to thwart discussion of protection for whistleblowers, as whistleblowers were viewed in the same light as these earlier informers (Strack, 2011, p.  109). Navasky (1980) describes the social costs of the intense feelings of betrayal engendered by the professional informers used during the McCarthy period in the United States to unmask supposed Communists. In China, the memories of the Cultural Revolution when citizens denounced their neighbors, children, their parents, and students their teachers still scupper attempts to promote

38 

T. UYS

anonymous whistleblowing hotlines (Martens & Crowell, 2006, p. 104). De Maria (1999, pp. 30–31) described the damage to cohesion and solidarity caused by “dobbing” in Australia, the practice of anonymous reporting of perceived wrongdoing to state agencies. Similarly, during the time of apartheid, the South African police and security structures made use of so-called impimpis, whose betrayal of the struggle against apartheid was often punished by “necklacing” them (a tire filled with fuel was placed around their necks and set alight) (Uys, 2010, pp. 122–123). These examples accentuate the importance of making a clear distinction between informers and whistleblowers. Haglunds (209: 47–48) equates informers with the pentiti, the Mafia defectors, who inform on the illicit organization they belong to by naming names, in contrast to whistleblowers who reveal wrongdoing in legitimate organizations. The fundamental difference lies in what Near and Miceli (1996, p. 510) call whistleblowers’ “reasonable supposition of success” of terminating the wrongdoing through their disclosures. In contrast, the covert way in which informers reveal information show little regard for the purposes for which the recipient requires the information. Another critical distinction between whistleblowing and informing relates to differences in power relations. De Maria (1999, p. 32) puts it succinctly: [Informing] is the powerless reporting to the powerful on the misdeeds of the powerless. Whistleblowing, on the other hand, is the powerless disclosing the misconduct of the powerful.

Informers, therefore, promote the interests of the powerful, often receiving a reward of some kind, while whistleblowers raise concerns about illegal, unethical, or dangerous practices of the powerful. In contrast to informers who are the, sometimes unwilling, lackeys of the powerful, whistleblowers voluntarily attempt to restrain the abuse of power. While informers disclose information to support those in power, whistleblowers make disclosures that challenge those in power. As the speakers of truth to power, whistleblowers disrupt the status quo and generally find themselves at the losing end as the playing fields are never level.

2  WHAT CONSTITUTES WHISTLEBLOWING? 

39

Was the Disclosure in the Public Interest? Whistleblowing generally refers to disclosing perceived wrongdoing in the interest of the public. Peterson and Farrell (1986, pp. 4–5) defined whistleblowing as a disclosure about organizational wrongdoing threatening the public. Brian Martin (1999b, p. 15) similarly argued: “Whistleblowing is speaking out in the public interest, typically to expose corruption or dangers to the public or environment.” Therefore, the emphasis should be on whether the disclosure benefits the public rather than serving individual interests. Exposures related to lawsuits or grievance procedures aim to address personal concerns or those of a class of people, and they fall outside the ambit of whistleblowing. It is often not possible to come up with a precise determination of whether a particular exposure is in the public interest. One could expect general agreement about the risk to the public inherent in some forms of wrongdoing, such as the dumping of toxic waste or corruption in the civil service, which necessitates disclosure. On the other hand, debates about whether revelations of organizational mismanagement, political maneuvering, or policy disagreement are in the public interest might be more open-ended. Whistleblowers and their supporters, on the one hand, and the organization accused of wrongdoing on the other, are also likely to have differences of opinion when deciding whether a particular disclosure was in the public interest. Bowden (2014, p.  25) argued that “… all commonly-­ accepted wrongs, when occurring within an organisational context, even though at the expense of the organisation…” should be regarded as against the public interest. Counterclaims of breaches of confidentiality or national security often attempt to refute the declaration that a particular disclosure is in the public interest (Hunt, 1998, p. 527). The exposés by Private First Class Manning and Edward Snowden have led to accusations that they endangered national security and aided the enemy. In other words, they were traitors (see, e.g. Epatko, 2014; Gosztola, 2013; Murphy, 2014). In an interview with the journalists (Greenwald et al., 2013) Snowden entrusted with the classified documents, he emphasized the importance of evaluating whether the public interest is served when making disclosures: I carefully evaluated every single document I disclosed to ensure that each was legitimately in the public interest… There are all sorts of documents

40 

T. UYS

that would have made a big impact that I didn’t turn over, because harming people isn’t my goal. Transparency is.

Discussions of the public interest served by disclosures and whether they, therefore, qualify to be called whistleblowing often move from the message to the messenger’s motives, mainly due to debates about the definition of whistleblowing and justifications for whistleblowing becoming conflated. Roberts (2014, p. 207) defines the motive of a whistleblower “as the driving force, which causes employees to come forward and report wrongdoing.” If the intentions of the person making the disclosure are deemed impure, the disclosure is often disqualified from being considered whistleblowing. Research identified a range of motivations for blowing the whistle, ranging from altruistic motives with the focus on serving the public and acting in terms of high moral standards (so-called pro-social whistleblowing) to much more self-serving ones (Lampert, 1985, pp.  111–116; Lewicks-Strzalecka, 2011, p.  176; Miethe, 1999, p.  14; Roberts, 2014, pp. 216–218; Vandekerckhove, 2006, p. 23). Altruistic motives refer to those instances where whistleblowers feel compelled to disclose information about actions that they believe are harmful to society without having any personal interest in the outcome of their disclosure. These disclosures flow from a strong investment in the personal morality or ethical standards that the actions violate. Snowden (2019, p. 238) expressed this view very clearly when he defined a whistleblower as: a person who through hard experience has concluded that their life inside an institution has become incompatible with the principles developed in—and the loyalty owed to—the greater society outside it, to which that institution should be accountable.

In contrast, when self-serving motives are paramount, the main incentive for blowing the whistle lies with the personal advantage the whistleblower stands to gain. The rationale is self-protection when people want to distance themselves from the immoral activity they were involved in, as the risk of exposure is becoming too high. Or they might be experiencing bullying or sexual harassment that they report in the hope that the wrongdoing will be ended. Persons who expose the inequitable distribution of rewards, or have a desire to gain notoriety, or wish to exact vengeance also act with a self-serving motive. Whistleblowing could even be antisocial if

2  WHAT CONSTITUTES WHISTLEBLOWING? 

41

the disclosure is intended to harm others or through violating procedural norms (Brinsfield et al., 2009, p. 26; Near & Miceli, 1996, p. 509). Bok (1980, p. 288) argued that self-serving motives or questionable methods do not necessarily preclude us from judging a disclosure as being in the public interest. Bringing sexual harassment to an end would be to the public good while simultaneously promoting the victim’s wellbeing who reported it. Elliston (1982, p. 174) believes that we should focus on the truthfulness of accusations rather than on the whistleblower’s motives. Benkler (2011, p. 361) argued this point very strongly: Inquiring into the political or personal motivations of speakers opens the door to the most pernicious form of censorship—the definition of some political motivations as legitimate bases for speech and others as illegitimate and not eligible for protection. The intent has to focus on the intended action: public dissemination.

Furthermore, it is not that easy to determine unambiguously what people’s motives are for any kind of behavior. Whistleblowers are often unable to untangle whether their actions are personally or socially motivated and are probably, in most instances, a little bit of both (Miethe, 1999, p. 14). Motives also sometimes change as the whistleblowing process plays itself out. As Lampert (1985, p. 112) puts it: “Personal difficulties can be closely linked to, or can develop into, a wider social concern.” People can also have mixed motives. Miceli and Near’s (2010, p. 77) research showed that whistleblowers do not act from purely altruistic motives in most cases. If there is an element of personal grievance in the act of whistleblowing, it does not preclude the whistleblower from blowing the whistle to come to the assistance of others. The critical issue here is that reporting about trivial matters is unlikely to be deemed in the public interest. The value of such disclosure can never make up for the harm it does to collegial relationships. When defining whistleblowing, we should separate its essential characteristics from the actor’s intentions or the legitimacy of the behavior. In this regard, Blonder (2010, pp.  260–262) makes a useful distinction between a politico-ethical conception and a regulatory conception of whistleblowing. The politico-ethical notion focuses on the whistleblower as a political activist who discloses information about perceived organizational wrongdoing that negatively affects the public. In this conception, the motives of whistleblowers are essential in determining whether they

42 

T. UYS

are heroes or villains. In the regulatory notion, the purposes of the whistleblower play no role, as the determination of whether someone is a legitimate whistleblower relates directly to whether he/she disclosed information about “prescribed types of misconduct or corruption to a body authorized to receive such information” (Blonder, 2010, p.  261). A regulatory conception of whistleblowing, of course, requires the institutionalization of whistleblowing. Thus, the organization needs to implement protective measures for whistleblowers who make their disclosures in a prescribed way and to prescribed recipients. An analysis of the debate about the conduct of Edward Snowden clearly shows how the arguments move between considerations whether the disclosures served the interests of the public and what Snowden’s motivations were. In conceptualizing whistleblowing, several issues have been considered. First, whistleblowing entails a disclosure of perceived organizational wrongdoing, ranging from occupational misconduct in the workplace to more systemic questionable behavior under the control of the organization. Second, a member of the organization, an insider who has access to confidential organizational information, makes the disclosure. Third, defining a disclosure about wrongdoing as whistleblowing is independent of whether it is considered authorized, unauthorized, or role-prescribed. Fourth, while retaliation is not a prerequisite for classifying a disclosure as whistleblowing, organizations often respond negatively to the disclosure. Fifth, we can identify three tiers of whistleblowing recipients. Disclosures are generally made internally first but could escalate to the second tier, where disclosures are made confidentially to a regulator or other recipients external to the organization, or the third tier, where the disclosure is made publicly, often to the media. Sixth, anonymous, confidential, and public disclosures all qualify to be called whistleblowing. Finally, to be eligible as whistleblowing, the disclosure should be in the public interest.

Conclusion In conclusion, I argue that whistleblowing occurs when an insider, someone with privileged access to an organization’s information, discloses perceived non-trivial organizational wrongdoing to someone they view as having the ability to deal with their concerns. The response to whistleblowers’ disclosures about perceived misconduct or policy disagreements could turn the public issue of addressing wrongdoing into a private trouble for the whistleblower. The next chapter tells the stories of several South

2  WHAT CONSTITUTES WHISTLEBLOWING? 

43

African whistleblowers, demonstrating how acting in the public interest could create personal troubles for the whistleblower while exposing public issues of concern. The accounts also illustrate how whistleblowing itself could be a public issue, in the sense of it uncovering structural problems within organizations and the legal system.

References Alford, F.  C. (2001). Whistleblowers: Broken Lives and Organizational Power. Cornell University Press. Anvari, F., Wenzel, M., Woodyatt, L., & Haslam, A.  S. (2019). The Social Psychology of Whistleblowing: An Integrated Model. Organizational Psychology Review, 9(1), 41–67. Benkler, Y. (2011). A Free Irresponsible Press: Wikileaks and the Battle over the Soul of the Networked Fourth Estate. Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties, 46(2), 311–397. Ben-Yehuda, N. (2001). Betrayals and Treason: Violations of Trust and Loyalty. Westview. Berghel, H. (2012). WikiLeaks and the Matter of Private Manning. IEEE Computer Society. University of Nevada, Las Vegas. Bjørkelo, B., Ryberg, W., Matthiesen, S.  B., & Einarsen, S. (2008). When You Talk and Talk and Nobody Listens: A mixed Method Case Study of Whistleblowing and its Consequences. International Journal of Organisational Behavior, 13(2), 18–40. Blonder, I. (2010). Public Interests and Private Passions: A Peculiar Case of Police Whistleblowing. Criminal Justice Ethics, 29(3), 258–277. Bok, S. (1980). Whistleblowing and Professional Responsibilities. In D. Callahan & S.  Bok (Eds.), Ethics Teaching in Higher Education (Vol. 11, pp. 277–295). Springer. Bollier, D. (1991). Citizen Action and Other Big Ideas: A History of Ralph Nader and the Modern Consumer Movement. Center for Study of Responsive Law. Retrieved April 23, 2014, from https://nader.org/biography/essential-­ nader/citizen-­action/ Bowden, P. (2014). In the Public Interest: Protecting Whistleblowers and Those Who Speak Out. Tilde Publishing and Distribution. Brinsfield, C.  T., Edwards, M., & Greenberg, J. (2009). Voice and Silence in Organizations: Historical Review and Current Conceptualizations. In J.  Greenberg & M.  S. Edwards (Eds.), Voice and Silence in Organizations. Howard House. Brown, A.J. & Donkin, M. (2008). Introduction. In A.J.  Brown (ed), Whistleblowing in the Australian Public Sector: Enhancing the Theory and

44 

T. UYS

Practice of Internal Witness Protection Management in Public Sector Organizations. ANU E-Press. Bushnell, A. M. (2020). Reframing the Whistleblower in Research: Truth-tellers as Whistleblowers in Changing Cultural Contexts. Sociology ­Compass.https://0-­doi-­org.ujlink.uj.ac.za/10.1111/soc4.12816. Calland, R., & Dehn, G. (2004). Whistleblowing Around the World: Law Culture and Practice. The Open Democracy Advice Centre (ODAC); Public Concern At Work (PCaW). Ceva, E., & Bocchiola, M. (2019). Is Whistleblowing a Duty? Polity Press. Davis, M. (2003). Whistleblowing. In H. LaFollette (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Practical Ethics (pp. 539–563). Oxford University Press. De Maria, W. (1999). Deadly Disclosures. Wakefield Press. Dudai, R. (2012). Informers and the Transition in Northern Ireland. British Journal of Criminology, 52(1), 32–54. Elliston, F.  A. (1982). Civil Disobedience and Whistleblowing: A Comparative Appraisal of Two Forms of Dissent. Journal of Business Ethics, 1, 23–28. Epatko, L. (2014). Former Defense Secretary Gates calls NSA leaker Snowden a ‘traitor’. Retrieved April 21, 2014, from https://www.pbs.org/newshour/ nation/gates-on-snowden Eyal Press (2013). Whistleblower, Leaker, Traitor, Spy. Retrieved March 12, 2014, from https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2013/08/05/whistleblower-leakertraitor-spy/ Farrington, D. (2013). What Is Meant By The Term ‘Whistle­Blower’. Retrieved April 5, 2014, from https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-­ way/2013/06/10/190380255/what-we-mean-when-we-say-whistleblower Flynn, K. (2006). Covert Disclosures: Unauthorized Leaking, Public Officials and the Public Sphere. Journalism Studies, 7(2), 256–273. Glazer, M. P., & Glazer, P. M. (1989). The Whistleblowers: Exposing Corruption in Government and Industry. Basic Books. Goldman, R. (2013). Hero. Traitor. Whistle-Blower. Spy. What to Call NSA Leaker Ed Snowden? Retrieved March 12, 2014, from http://abcnews. go.com/US/nsa-leaker-edward-snowden-whistle-blower/print?id=19374578 Gosztola, K. (2013). When Intelligence Leaders Call Snowden a ‘Traitor,’ He’s More Likely to be Granted Permanent Asylum. Retrieved April 21, 2014, from https://shadowproof.com/2013/10/30/when-intelligence-leaders-callsnowden-a-traitor-hes-more-likely-to-be-granted-permanent-asylum/ Greenberg, J., & Baron, R. A. (2003). Behavior in Organizations: Understanding and Managing the Human Side of Work (7th ed.). Prentice Hall. Greenwald, G., MacAskill, E., & Poitras, L. (2013). Edward Snowden: The Whistleblower Behind the NSA Surveillance Revelations. The Guardian., 9(6), 2. Hunt, G. (1998). Whistle-Blowing. Encyclopedia of Applied Ethics, 4, 525–534.

2  WHAT CONSTITUTES WHISTLEBLOWING? 

45

Jackson, D. (n.d.). Who is an employee? The question addressed. Retrieved May 9, 2014, from http://phpbb.labourguide.co.za/viewtopic.php?f=2&t=343 Johnson, R. A. (2003). Whistleblowing, When it Works and Why. Lynne Rienner Publishers. Jubb, P. B. (1999). Whistleblowing: A Restrictive Definition and Interpretation. Journal of Business Ethics, 21(1), 77–94. Kloppers, P. (1997). Behoort die whistle blower beskerm te word? Stellenbosch Law Review, 8(2), 237–248. Kohn, S.  M. (2012). Rewards Give Whistleblowers a Motivation to Reveal Wrongdoing. In N.  Berlatsky (Ed.), Whistleblowers: Opposing Viewpoints (pp. 50–61). Greenhaven Press. Lampert, N. (1985). Whistleblowing in the Soviet Union: Complaints and Abuses under State Socialism. Macmillan. Lewicka-Strzalecka, A. (2011). Whistleblowing at Work: The Polish Perspective. In M.  Arszulowicz & W.  W. Gasparski (Eds.), Whistleblowing: In Defense of Proper Action (pp. 171–180). Transaction Publishers. Lozano, E., Joyce, A., Schiemann, R., Ting, A., & Yahyavi, D. (2010–2011). WikiLeaks and Whistleblowing: Digital Information Leakage and Its Impact on Society. Retrieved April 05, 2014, from http://cs.stanford.edu/people/eroberts/cs181/projects/2010-­11/WikiLeaks/background.html Madar, C. (2012). Alleged WikiLeaks Whistleblower Bradley Manning Is a Hero. In N. Berlatsky (Ed.), Whistleblowers (pp. 143–151). Greenhaven Press. Martens, L.T. & Crowell, A. (2006). Whistleblowing: A Global Perspective. In C.V. Krishna Rao (ed), Whistleblowing: An Introduction. Lemag Books. Martin, P. (2010). The Status of Whistleblowing in South Africa: Taking Stock. Open Democracy Advice Centre. Mclain, D., & Keenan, J. P. (1999). Risk, Information, and the Decision about Response to Wrongdoing in an Organization. Journal of Business Ethics, 19(3), 255–271. Miceli, M.P. & Near, J.P. (1992). Blowing the Whistle – The Organizational and Legal Implications for Companies and Employees. New York: Lexington Books. Miceli, M.  P., Near, J.  P., & Dworkin, T.  M. (2008). Whistle-blowing in Organisations. Routledge. Miceli, M.P. & Near, J.P. (2010). When do Observers of Organizational Wrongdoing Step Up? Recent US Research on the Factors Associated with Whistleblowing. In D.  Lewis (ed), A Global Approach to Public Interest Disclosure: What Can We Learn from Existing Whistleblowing Legislation and Research? Edward Elgar. Miethe, T. D. (1999). Whistleblowing at Work: Tough Choices in Exposing Fraud, Waste, and Abuse on the Job. Westview Press. Murphy, K. (2014) Edward Snowden a traitor but US spy review is welcome, says Julie Bishop. Retrieved April, 21, 2014 from https://www.theguardian.

46 

T. UYS

com/world/2014/jan/23/edward-snowden-a-traitor-but-us-spy-reviewis-welcome-says-julie-bishop Nan, W. (2011). On Whistleblowing: From the View of Engineering Ethics. In M. Arszulowicz & W. W. Gasparski (Eds.), Whistleblowing: In Defense of Proper Action (pp. 83–94). Transaction Publishers. Navasky, V. (1980). Naming Names: The Social Costs of McCarthyism. Retrieved February 20, 2012, from http://www.english.illinois.edu/maps/mccarthy/ navasky.htm Near, J.P. & Miceli, M.P. (1996). Whistle-blowing: Myth and Reality. Journal of Management, 22(3), 507–526. Nyst, C. (2015). Today Is a Great Victory Against GCHQ, the NSA and the Surveillance State. The Guardian. Retrieved February 15, 2015, from http:// w w w. t h e g u a r d i a n . c o m / c o m m e n t i s f r e e / 2 0 1 5 / f e b / 0 6 / great-­victory-­against-­gchq-­nsa-­surveillance-­state Orr, L. H. (1989). Is whistleblowing the same as informing? In A. Pablo Iannone (Ed.), Contemporary Moral Controversies in Business. Oxford University Press. Peterson, J. C., & Farrell, D. (1986). Whistleblowing: Ethical and Legal Issues in Expressing Dissent. Kendall/Hunt. Roberts, P. (2014). Motivations for Whistleblowing: Personal, Private and Public Interests. In A.  J. Brown, D.  Lewis, R.  E. Moberly, & W.  Vandekerckhove (Eds.), International Handbook on Whistleblowing Research. Edward Elgar. Rossouw, G.J. (2005). Business Ethics and Corporate Governance in Africa. Business & Society, 44(1), 94–106. Santoro, D., & Kumar, M. (2018). Speaking Truth to Power—A Theory of Whistleblowing. Springer. Singer, M., Mitchell, S., & Turner, J. (1998). Consideration of Moral. Intensity in Ethicality Judgments: Its Relationship with Whistleblowing and Need-for-­ Cognition. Journal of Business Ethics, 17, 527–541. Sirota, D. (2012). Whistle-Blowers vs. Leakers. Retrieved March 12, 2014, from www.salon.com/2012/06/11/whistleblowers_v_leakers/ Skiveness, M., & Trygstad, S.  C. (2010). When Whistle-blowing Works: The Norwegian Case. Human Relations, 63(7), 1071–1097. Smith, R. (2014). Whistleblowers and Suffering. In A.  J. Brown, D.  Lewis, R.  Moberly, & W.  Vandekerckhove (Eds.), International Handbook of Whistleblowing Research. Edward Elgar. Snowden, E. (2019). Permanent Record. Palgrave Macmillan. Strack, G. (2011). Whistleblowing in Germany. In M.  Arszulowicz & W.  W. Gasparski (Eds.), Whistleblowing: In Defense of Proper Action (pp. 109–124). Transaction Publishers. Teo, H. & Caspersz, D. (2011). Dissenting discourse exploring alternatives to the whistleblowing/silence dichotomy. Journal of Business Ethics, 104(2), 237–249.

2  WHAT CONSTITUTES WHISTLEBLOWING? 

47

Uys, T. (2008). Rational Loyalty and Whistleblowing: The South African Context. Current Sociology, 56(6), 907–924. Uys, T. (2010). Speaking Truth to Power: The Whistleblower as Organizational Citizen in South Africa. In D. Lewis (Ed.), A Global Approach to Public Interest Disclosure: What Can We Learn from Existing Whistleblowing Legislation and Research? (pp. 109–127). Edward Eglar. Vandekerckhove, W. (2006). Whistleblowing and Organizational Social Responsibility: A Global Assessment. Ashgate Publishing Limited. Vandekerckhove, W. (2010). European Whistleblower Protection: Tiers or Tears? In D. Lewis (Ed.), A Global Approach to Public Interest Disclosure: What Can We Learn from Existing Whistleblowing Legislation and Research? (pp. 15–35). Edward Edgar. Vinten, G. (1994). Whistle While You Work in the Health-related Professions? The Journal of the Royal Society for the Promotion of Health, 114, 256–262. Vingiano, A.G. (2013). Edward Snowden NSA: Is the CIA Employee a “Leaker” or “Whistle-blower”? Retrieved December, 3, 2014 from http:// mic.com/articles/47515/edward-snowden-nsa-is-the-cia-employee-aleaker-or-whistle-blower Wemple, E. (2013). Edward Snowden: Leaker, Source or Whistleblower? The Washington Post. Williams, P. (2013). Analysis: Why Edward Snowden Isn’t a Whistle-blower, Legally Speaking. Retrieved December 22, 2014 from https://www.nbcnews. com/news/us-news/analysis-why-edward-snowden-isnt-whistle-blowerlegally-speaking-flna6c10366884 Wilmot, S. (2000). Nurses and Whistleblowing: The ethical issues. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 32(5), 1051–1057. Werner, A. (2011). Organisational Behaviour: A Contemporary South African Perspective. Van Schaik Publishers.

CHAPTER 3

South African Whistleblowers

Introduction In contrast to the 150-year history of whistleblowing in the United States, whistleblowing is a fairly recent phenomenon in South Africa. While corruption and other forms of organizational wrongdoing were familiar phenomena during the time of apartheid, the idea of disclosing information about such wrongdoing to someone who would hopefully do something about it only started to achieve prominence at the time of South Africa’s transition to democracy during the 1990s. South Africa’s new Constitution—adopted on February 3, 1997— explicitly advocates accountability in public administration through legislation that promotes public participation, transparency, and access to information. Eager to promulgate progressive legislation within a democratic context, the legislature considered whistleblowing legislation, primarily guided by the 1981 Public Interest Disclosures Act of the United Kingdom. As a result, the Protected Disclosures Act no 26 of 2000 (PDA 2000) was passed in June 2000, aiming to protect employees who suffer occupational detriment because of disclosing perceived wrongdoing. However, the optimism about accountability and public participation that accompanied the creation of the new Constitution and the PDA faded quickly as South Africa continued to experience perceived high levels of fraud and corruption in the private and public sectors. The 20 whistleblower stories told in this chapter display how widespread organizational wrongdoing in South Africa is, from local to © The Author(s) 2022 T. Uys, Whistleblowing and the Sociological Imagination, https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-39445-3_3

49

50 

T. UYS

provincial to the national government, across the nine provinces, and including the private sector. I have grouped the stories chronologically according to the period in which the disclosures took place. I first look at disclosures that occurred during the ten years preceding the passing of the PDA. I then tell the stories of whistleblowers who made disclosures after the passing of the PDA and conclude with the most recent spate of whistleblowing dealing with so-called state capture, where a shadow state, composed of rent-seeking networks, exploits their symbiotic relationship with the constitutional state for their own enrichment (Bhorat et al., 2017, pp. 2–3). Through telling the stories of these whistleblowers, this chapter demonstrates how acting in the public interest could create personal troubles for the whistleblower while exposing societal issues of concern, such as fraud and corruption. The stories further illustrate how whistleblowing could be a public issue by uncovering structural problems within organizations and the legal system. These descriptions lay the basis for a theoretical analysis of whistleblowing as personal troubles as well as public issues in Chaps. 5 and 6, where I make comparisons with the experiences of whistleblowers in other contexts. In selecting the cases, I have included stories from whistleblowers in the public and private sectors, from men and women of different races. All these stories are in the public domain.

Early Whistleblowers Influx Control and the Pass Laws: Adam Klein One of the first documented stories of whistleblowing in South Africa began in August 1980 when Adam Klein, a Bantu Commissioner’s Court prosecutor  in his early twenties, refused on ethical grounds to proceed with the prosecution of five black men charged under the pass regulations. Under apartheid, the pass laws effected the policy of influx control by controlling the movements of black people. If they wanted to visit geographical areas designated for white people, they were required to carry a passbook (similar to an identity document) that allowed them to be in such a vicinity. Klein felt that he could no longer deal with the hardships that these prosecutions caused. Soon after Klein refused to prosecute the men, he was arrested on charges of theft of court records and forced to resign as a prosecutor. After appearing in court, he was released on bail. The authorities confiscated his

3 

SOUTH AFRICAN WHISTLEBLOWERS 51

passport, and he received death threats from white supremacist groups. Despite the withdrawal of all the charges, the security police kept him under close surveillance, in search of evidence that he was involved in underground activities (Klein, 2018). Klein approached Martin Welz, an investigative reporter at the Sunday Times at the time, about the abuses taking place at the Pretoria Bantu Commissioner’s Court. Klein reported that a black person charged with failure to show the required pass spent an average of six days in detention before the completion of their trial. That meant that the detention of black people in Pretoria had lasted for more than 35,000 days during the previous year. The Sunday Times exposé resulted in an extraordinary clean­up operation at the Pretoria Bantu Commissioner’s Court. In November 1980, Klein delivered his report on irregularities in the administration of the pass laws and its impact on blacks to the Transvaal Attorney General. He also testified before the Commission of Enquiry into the Structure and Functioning of the Courts (the Hoexter Commission) in June 1981, where he gave various examples of how inhumane the pass law dispensation was. His actions directly led to the dismantling of the pass law system. Klein applied at various law firms to become an articled clerk1 in preparation for admission as an attorney. However, he could not find any attorney prepared to face the wrath of the security policy by employing him. He eventually fled to Namibia (then South West Africa), where he practiced for a few years. Upon his return to South Africa, the security police still found it necessary to interrogate him about purported clandestine activities. Klein spent the final years of his life as a practicing advocate in Mpumalanga Province. He was elected a lifetime honorary member by the Independent Bar, now called the National Bar Council of South Africa (NBCSA). In 2004 Martin Welz, then the editor of Noseweek (an independent investigative magazine), wrote: The resulting Sunday Times exposé helped ensure the closure of that iniquitous institution [referring to the Bantu Commissioner's Courts]—a compliment to the value of Klein's speaking out. But Klein paid a steep price for his bravery: the security police continued to hound him and anyone who dared employ him, for years, effectively destroying his career. Today, more

1  In South Africa, doing your articles under the supervision of someone already in the profession is a requirement for admission to becoming a practicing attorney.

52 

T. UYS

than 20 years later, he lives unacknowledged and in poverty. That haunts me. (Welz, 2004, p. 7)

Klein passed away on July 2, 2011, after suffering a heart attack. In 2012 the NBCSA unsuccessfully applied to the Office of the South African Presidency for the posthumous conferral of the Order of Luthuli on Adam Klein. Exchange Control: Nico Alant In the 1980s South Africa’s white minority government was under severe internal and international political pressure, resulting in a flight of capital and a weakening currency. To encourage investment in South Africa, foreigners could use the so-called Financial Rand, which traded at a discount to the common currency. Shrewd operators who illegally manipulated the two-tier currency could become wealthy virtually overnight at the cost of the foreign exchange reserves. The South African Reserve Bank administered South Africa’s extensive exchange controls on behalf of the Treasury. Alant battled for well over a decade (from 1989 to 2001) to get his concerns regarding the management of exchange control investigated. The story played out in three stages, the first happening between 1989 and 1993 while he worked as a foreign exchange investigator by the Reserve Bank. The second phase relates to his employment by the Financial Services Board, another financial regulator, between 1993 and 1997. The third phase deals with events that happened after 1997, following his departure from the financial regulatory environment. Alant and the Reserve Bank A report published by Judge LTC Harms, chairman of a judicial commission of inquiry, in March 1989 harshly criticized the Reserve Bank’s approvals of specific exchange control applications, particularly regarding confusion over the functioning of the system. Despite the Commission’s report receiving much publicity at the time, and a widely held view that the exchange control system was in disarray, the Bank’s management maintained that there was nothing fundamentally wrong with the system. As an investigator of exchange control fraud at the Bank at the time, Alant became acutely aware of the shortcomings of the system. He agreed with the views of the Harms Commission. The criminal prosecution

3 

SOUTH AFRICAN WHISTLEBLOWERS 53

authorities could not cope with the high level of complex exchange control fraud, and the out-of-control system was, therefore, undermining the integrity of the justice system to the financial detriment of the country. With little chance of securing convictions in the criminal courts, Alant felt that the Bank’s investigations amounted to a waste of resources. Believing that he was doing his duty, Alant wrote an internal memorandum expressing his concerns about the Bank’s perceived lack of due diligence (a lack of reasonable care) in February 1990. The memorandum met with total silence from management. When he continued to push the issue, he received an oral warning in terms of the Bank’s disciplinary code for allegedly not following the correct communication channels. Alant eventually succeeded in obtaining the approval of the Deputy Governor for an external legal opinion (apparently to gain more clarity on the Bank’s statutory duties and the confusion to which Judge Harms had referred). After a delay of four months, the Bank’s external attorney of long standing was asked to write the required opinion. Alant was not consulted about the choice of counsel, and he was not invited to the meeting. Management was sidelining him. Despite his long relationship with the Bank, the Bank’s attorney did not address any of the examples of perceived maladministration that Alant had raised in his February 1990 memorandum, arguing that he did not have enough practical experience to advise the Bank as to what constituted reasonable care. Alant expressed written concern about the nature of the external legal opinion and the way it was obtained. He was, in turn, rewarded with a written warning for allegedly not adhering to the correct communication channels. Alant had afterward discussed the matter with senior officials of the prosecution authority, who shared his concerns. The Bank’s management considered Alant’s conduct to be reprehensible, constituting a breach of trust and a violation of the secrecy provisions of the Bank’s governing statute. They transferred him from the investigations department to another section, where there was no post for him. He lost his office and was now “working” in an open-plan environment. Alant felt compelled to continue pressing his case and informed the Governor of the Reserve Bank of his intention to discuss the legal duties of the Bank with the Minister of Finance (the person ultimately responsible for exchange control). The Governor’s view was that the Minister “had no responsibility for the internal personnel matters” of the Bank. A meeting eventually took place between Alant and the Director-General of

54 

T. UYS

Finance; the Governor declined to attend the meeting or to send a representative. His attempt to address the situation by approaching the Minister and Director-General delivered no results. After working in a stressful environment for more than four years, Alant’s position was made redundant in terms of South African Labour Law in 1993. Upon signing a secrecy undertaking, he received three months’ salary and a letter from his employer stating that he had resigned (Noseweek, 1999a, pp. 5–8, b, pp. 5 & 11). Alant and the Financial Services Board (FSB) Unaware of Alant’s history at the Reserve Bank, the FSB appointed him as an Inspector of Financial Institutions. On becoming aware of the appointment, a Deputy Governor of the Reserve Bank, who was chairman of the FSB, expressed his dismay. With the Reserve Bank ghost haunting him, Alant felt that his career at the FSB was also under threat. So, he continued his struggle for vindication while employed at the FSB. He repeated his allegations of a lack of due diligence at the Reserve Bank at a Congress on Economic Crime at the University of the Orange Free State in July 1995. He also filed a complaint with the Public Protector, a newly created post in terms of the new South African Constitution, in December 1995 after receiving written confirmation from the Public Protector that he had jurisdiction to investigate a complaint. In July 1996, Alant was summoned to testify before the Nel Commission, a judicial commission of inquiry into the Masterbond financial scandal as well as financial regulation in general. The Commission was particularly interested in Alant’s views on the functioning of the exchange control system and financial supervision (Dommisse, 1996). Two months after Alant’s evidence, a former colleague of Alant at the Reserve Bank also testified at the Commission. He said that despite Alant being a highly qualified person, Alant did not understand exchange control. Following Alant’s evidence before the Commission, he received a sudden decrease in his annual performance appraisal rating at the FSB, to half of what he had received the previous year. His manager alleged that his testimony about the FSB (the Reserve Bank was not mentioned) brought the FSB into disrepute and reflected a lack of sound judgment. He was accused of incompetence and insubordination. Alant informed the Commission about the FSB’s reaction to his testimony. The Commission wrote to the FSB, stating that they were overreacting, but this did not deter the

3 

SOUTH AFRICAN WHISTLEBLOWERS 55

FSB. When Alant disputed the performance appraisal, he was threatened with a disciplinary hearing. The FSB said that Alant would only receive his 1997 salary increase as part of an agreement for the termination of his services at the FSB. Alant entered into a retrenchment agreement containing a secrecy clause and left the employ of the FSB at the end of 1997 with nine months’ salary. When he eventually received the 1997 salary increase, it appeared that the FSB Pension Fund did not regard the salary increase as pensionable. The absence of the FSB’s contribution to the Fund meant that there was a shortfall in Alant’s pension. In September 1998, Alant lodged a complaint with the Pension Funds Adjudicator, who found in his favor in April 2000 and ordered the FSB to pay the shortfall to the FSB Pension Fund. Alant’s Career After Leaving the World of Financial Regulation In May 1998, 29 months after Alant had lodged his complaint against the Reserve Bank, the Public Protector wrote to the Bank to commence an inquiry into the Bank’s administration of the exchange control system. Soon afterward, Alant received letters from the Bank accusing him of a breach of the secrecy undertaking he had given to the Bank by providing information to the Public Protector. He was also threatened with legal action for having copies of Bank documentation in his possession. The threat of legal action did not materialize until March 1999, when Alant was subpoenaed to give evidence in a civil case in the Cape High Court on information that he had gathered as an investigator at the Bank. The Bank brought an urgent court application to stop him from continuing his evidence (de Bruin, 2001). A month later, the Public Protector notified Alant that despite his earlier undertaking, he no longer believed that he had jurisdiction to investigate Alant’s complaint as the complaint related to activities before the “coming into effect” of the new Constitution. This response was a significant blow to Alant’s effort to fight the court application brought by the Reserve Bank. In May 2001, after more than two years of legal wrangling, a settlement was reached by an order of the court. The agreement stated, among other conditions, that Alant had to return the documents to the Bank that he retained when leaving their employment. All papers, including the court file, would be confidential, and the Registrar of the Court would not allow any access to it. The application for an interdict against Alant was dropped, and each party was responsible for its own legal costs.

56 

T. UYS

The Bank’s intervention in the Cape High Court case was reported in detail by the investigative magazine Noseweek, who, for the first time, publicly labeled him a whistleblower. More publicity followed in the Sunday Independent, in magazines, and in an episode of Special Assignment, a current affairs investigate television series. After Alant departed from the FSB in December 1997, he struggled for two and a half years to build a legal practice. In June 2000, he was employed as senior legal counsel by an IT company, and he continued to do IT-related legal work until his retirement at the end of 2012. In the end, no external agency ever investigated Alant’s concerns about the functioning of the exchange control system. In 1996 the Truth and Reconciliation Commission started investigating violence and human rights abuses that had occurred during the apartheid era, but it was not mandated to investigate financial transactions. In February 1999, the Mail & Guardian wrote in an editorial: The extent of the manipulations pervading this country's financial system in the apartheid years has never been examined in any depth. It is an area of our history about which we know nearly nothing.

The Mpumalanga Driver’s License Scam: John Muller In 1997 John Muller, a junior traffic officer at the time, uncovered evidence of a fraudulent scheme to issue drivers’ licenses in the province of Mpumalanga. The Moldenhauer Commission investigated Muller’s revelations and recommended the removal of the provincial Safety and Security Member of the Executive Committee (MEC), Steve Mabona, from public office. Mabona resigned as MEC but was allowed to hold onto his position as ANC member of the provincial legislature. In 1999 he was reappointed to the more powerful position of Public Works, Roads, and Transport MEC.  At his funeral in 2012, he was praised by a provincial legislature spokeswoman as serving “… the people of Mpumalanga with great vigour and courage throughout his tenure” (Mogakane, 2012). The then Deputy Speaker of Parliament, Baleka Mbete, was one of the recipients of an illegal learner’s and driver’s license, issued within minutes from each other. Mbete was obliged to return both her fraudulent licenses to the authorities but suffered no additional penalties. She has since served in various prestigious national government positions, such as Speaker of the National Assembly of South Africa from 2004 to 2008 and from 2014 to

3 

SOUTH AFRICAN WHISTLEBLOWERS 57

2019 and Deputy President of South Africa from 2008 to 2009 under Kgalema Motlanthe. In contrast, Muller was severely penalized for his actions. When the authorities ignored his initial internal report on the fraudulent issuing of licenses, he provided documentary evidence of his allegations to the press. Mabona suspended him and accused him of being a racist counter-­ revolutionary. He was removed from active patrol duties, and his housing subsidy stopped. “It’s sickening. Mabona vilified me on national radio, branded me a racist and a liar for speaking out against corruption. Now, here he is back in power while I have to battle for every cent we need just to survive,” Muller said (City Press, 2003, p. 23). Despite the Moldenhauer Commission’s finding and despite being cleared at a disciplinary hearing, the persecution by officials in his department continued, and his health suffered. In 1998 he applied for a severance package on medical grounds. In 2002 he was diagnosed with a stress-related heart defect. He was barely able to pay for the medical treatment he required just to stay alive, let alone the pacemaker he urgently needed. He passed away quietly in 2003; as PoliticsWeb (2011) puts it, he “died in penury and obscurity.” Muller’s dying wish, unfortunately not fulfilled, was that the National Prosecution Authority would use his files of documentary evidence to investigate and prosecute the perpetrators of the scam. The Road Accident Fund Fraud: Mark Hess Mark Hess started working as an articled clerk at Hoosain Mohamed and Associates, a firm of attorneys specializing in Road Accident Fund cases, in April 1994. He felt it was a dream come true; he was having the best of both worlds, working at a prestigious law firm while serving the poorest of the poor. However, his vision soon turned into a nightmare when he realized that his firm was defrauding mostly poor and often illiterate clients on a large scale. In November 1998, he resigned from his job after having compiled a file of evidence. At his new firm, Edgar Tamboer and Associates, he agonized about what his next steps should be. In early 1999 he took his evidence to the investigative magazine Noseweek. Noseweek approached the Cape High Court and was granted a so-called Anton Piller order, which sanctioned the seizure of all Hoosain Mohamed’s files related to road accident claims settled in the previous four years. The subsequent class action brought by Noseweek on behalf of the victims of the fraudulent scheme

58 

T. UYS

resulted in the two senior partners being struck from the roll of attorneys. After a lengthy court battle of nearly five years, they received jail sentences of ten and seven years, respectively, and were suspended for four years on condition that they repay the stolen money to their victims. Hess’ actions also sparked a nationwide crackdown by prosecution authorities on alleged perpetrators of similar schemes. The fact that he resigned before blowing the whistle meant that he did not need to face those he had accused daily. Even so, he described his deep anxiety since the publication of his story in Noseweek. He had received crank calls; his car had been scratched, and the tires slashed. Some of his former colleagues avoided him, while other attorneys expressed support and admiration for his courageous actions. He has managed to keep his career on track and became director of a law firm in Cape Town. The Dog Training Exercise: Andries (Jakes) Jacobs In the early hours of January 3, 1998, six members of the North East Rand Police dog unit were videotaped while inciting their dogs to attack three illegal Mozambican immigrants near Benoni, in a so-called dog training exercise. The video shows them laughing and making racist remarks while assaulting the victims. Andries Jacobs, at the time employed as an inspector at the Gauteng Provincial Traffic Department in Benoni, provided an amateur video of the events to the Police Commissioner and the Minister for Safety and Security, as well as to the SABC (Bothma & Prins, 2000, p. 1; van Niekerk, 2000, p. 1). The six policemen were arrested on the afternoon of November 7, 2000, and suspended two days later. On the evening of the arrests, the video was broadcast nationwide as part of SABC’s Special Assignment program. This exposure of the events led to a public outcry. The six policemen were convicted of assault with the intent to do grievous bodily harm, as well as attempting to defeat the ends of justice, and received jail sentences of four to five years effectively (Mulder, 2001, p. 2, 2003, p. 2). Jacobs was initially suspended (it is unclear on what grounds) but was reinstated following intervention by the Police Commissioner and the Minister for Safety and Security. He returned to work when the court case against the first four accused started, after spending the previous year in a special witness protection program. However, he was not able to return to his previous duties as he was not given a car, his firearm was not returned, and he was not provided with a roster of duties. He was also informed that

3 

SOUTH AFRICAN WHISTLEBLOWERS 59

the authorities were investigating his involvement in the video, and the disappearance of an official video camera. He told a reporter from the Star (Gifford, 2001, p. 1): I am ruined. I have no future within the provincial government, and my wife and kids are in danger. I will never do it again. Now they can kill someone in front of me and I will just walk away. I want to start a new life somewhere else. I have no friends left here, and my family have written me off because they believe what I did was wrong.

Four years later, his life had become even worse. He had been dismissed because of using an official video camera to film the “training sessions” and could not find work anywhere. His wife was in the process of divorcing him, as she was unable to deal with the stress, the continuous death threats, and having to hide from everybody (De Bruin, 2005, p. 14).

Whistleblowing Following the Promulgation of the Protected Disclosures Act, Nr. 26 of 2000 Pollution by ISCOR: Pieter Van Eeden Dr. Pieter van Eeden, an ecologist, was employed at ISCOR VanderBijl Park from April 2000 to October 2001. At that time, ISCOR was a parastatal company involved in the production of steel. Soon after commencing his employment, Van Eeden became concerned about the limited focus of ISCOR’s environmental management system. The company was only interested in complying with the existing environmental legislation, which was weakly enforced. It showed no concern about the real effect of its operations on the environment, especially the impact of its effluent on the water systems surrounding its operations. The law only required that ISCOR test the levels of individual chemicals, rather than the combined effect that makes up the total toxicity of the effluent. What concerned van Eeden more was that ISCOR could get away with exceeding these chemical limits with the excuse that some pump had broken just before the inspector’s visit. The toxicity tests that were eventually conducted provided conclusive proof that while ISCOR’s effluent was more or less acceptable in terms of the levels of the individual chemicals, the combination of chemicals was highly toxic. ISCOR did introduce  a master plan aimed at minimizing

60 

T. UYS

existing pollution and preventing new contamination through cleaning up production processes, as well as launching remediation processes. However, Van Eeden’s initially high expectations of the master plan were soon shattered. He realized that rather than solving the problem, the implementation team was more interested in keeping ISCOR management happy by playing down the issues. He said, “…They did not say there were no problems, but that there were no big problems. ISCOR liked hearing that” (Cock & Munnik, 2006, p. 13). From this statement, he concluded that ISCOR was not serious about pollution and would not use the available data to stop it. When he submitted a report to ISCOR, which showed that water from ISCOR operations was causing life-­ threatening pollution to the water sources of the surrounding communities, he was prohibited from continuing with his research and was removed from all ISCOR committees. He then decided to leak his report and that of a colleague to the legal representative of the Steel Valley smallholding community who was involved in legal proceedings against ISCOR about contamination of their groundwater. ISCOR uncovered Van Eeden’s complicity in the disclosure when they subjected all members of his division to lie detector tests. Immediate suspension followed. Two weeks later, he received a phone call informing him that his suspension had been lifted, and the disciplinary hearing halted and that he should return to work. Upon arrival at work, his manager informed him that his post had been declared redundant in terms of ISCOR’s restructuring process, and he was given a retrenchment package. Van Eeden continued his quest for environmental justice through the founding of an NGO by the name of EcoMonitor, a company that specializes in ecological impact assessments. In collaboration with a trade union, MWU-Solidarity, he drafted a manifesto aimed at convincing industries to commit to achieving a balance between environmental protection and development. Iscor was one of the first South African industries to sign the green paper at the World Summit for Sustainable Development in Sandton, South Africa, on August 28, 2002. In 2006 ArcelorMittal Steel (formerly Iscor) announced the commissioning of a water recycling plant at their operations in VanderBijl Park as the first installment of its commitment to the rehabilitation of the environment. A year later, Van Eeden received the Habitat Award for Environmental Conservation from the Habitat Council in recognition of his efforts. Unfortunately, his fight against environmental degradation was curtailed rather abruptly. On October 28, 2017, one of his friends found his body concealed in a bedroom cupboard in his home. The murder enquiry is ongoing (Kempton Express, 2017).

3 

SOUTH AFRICAN WHISTLEBLOWERS 61

The Cape Town Street Naming Scandal: Victoria Johnson In early 2001 Victoria Johnson was employed as a senior legal advisor working for the newly restructured and expanded City of Cape Town. The Democratic Alliance (formed through a strategic alliance between the Democratic Party and the New National Party) had just taken control of the City Council after narrowly defeating the African National Congress (ANC) in the local elections held in December 2000. The newly elected mayor, Peter Marais, proposed to rename the historic Adderley and Wale Streets in the city center as Nelson Mandela and FW de Klerk Avenues. Johnson was put in charge of the required public participation process, and all comments from the public were directed to her office. It was soon apparent that the general public was vehemently opposed to changing the names of these particular streets. When the newspapers reported Marais as saying there was overwhelming support for his proposal, and her immediate boss handed her a batch of nearly 500 seemingly fraudulent letters and petitions endorsing the name changes, she felt that she had to take action. On the recommendation of her attorney, she contacted the acting city manager at home. Without providing any details or implicating anyone, she informed him that she had concerns about the street renaming process. He undertook to investigate potential wrongdoing in the public participation process, using an anonymous note she would send him, as justification. A report a week later in the Mail and Guardian weekly newspaper, alleging fraud in the street renaming process, led to the appointment of a senior advocate to investigate the “integrity” of the public participation process and, specifically, to find out who leaked information to the press (Johnson, 2004, p. 47). Johnson soon came to realize that the investigation was not focusing on possible fraud in the public participation process; the inquiry aimed to cover up and to put a particular spin on the objections that would enable the mayor to neutralize the objections. She decided to take the matter further and handed a detailed affidavit to the deputy mayor, who asked whether she could show the document to the leader of the Democratic Alliance (DA), one of the parties governing the Western Cape in an alliance at the time, in confidence. To her shock, she received a call the next morning informing her that the DA intended to publish her affidavit at a press conference later that day, with or without her consent. The press conference resulted in the formal withdrawal of the renaming proposal and the suspension of Johnson’s two bosses, who were in charge

62 

T. UYS

of promoting the mayor’s plan. Johnson was placed on special leave. Former High Court Judge, Willem Heath, was charged with conducting a formal investigation into the matter. Initially, Johnson was told that the city would not cover her legal costs, but this decision was later reversed. During her testimony at the hearings, the mayor and her two managers subjected her to vicious professional and personal attacks and attempts at intimidation. Interestingly, their behavior somewhat lessened her feelings of guilt about what she perceived to be a betrayal of trust. The Heath inquiry recommended that disciplinary action should be taken against the three accused on a charge of maladministration and that the South African Police Service should investigate evidence of fraud. This seemingly banal matter exposed a deficiency in the structural measures required to hold the center when an alliance between two parties with very different political orientations faced a political crisis. It became one of the precipitating factors leading to the breakaway of the NNP from the DA to ally with the ANC.  A closed disciplinary hearing cleared the mayor of all wrongdoing, while the other two disciplinary hearings became moot when the one manager resigned, and the other’s contract expired before the completion of the hearings. A positive outcome was the demonstration to politicians and public servants that there was no toleration of deceiving the public. For Victoria Johnson, the outcome was mixed. On the one hand, she received overwhelming support from the public and some colleagues; on the other, criticism, rumors, and soul-searching still dogged her more than three years later. Despite the malicious treatment that Vicky experienced at the hands of her employer and colleagues, she still feels remorse about how she handled the situation: I feel a deep sense of ambiguity over what I did—whatever one may say about doing the right thing, it does not change the fact that I broke a fundamental social rule by betraying someone I worked closely with and who trusted me. No matter which way I think about it, or try to rationalise it, that fact will never go away and so my memory of the time is always tinged with an underlying sense of discomfort and shame. (Johnson, 2004, p. 52)

Johnson is currently the managing partner of a South African law firm, Victoria Johnson and Associates.

3 

SOUTH AFRICAN WHISTLEBLOWERS 63

Nepotism in the Department of Justice: Mike Tshishonga As Deputy Director-General at the Master’s Office in the Department of Justice, one of Mike Tshishonga’s responsibilities was to oversee the appointment of liquidators. The Minister, Penuell Maduna, wanted to have his friend, Enver Motala, appointed as liquidator in what promised to be the highly profitable liquidation of the Retail Apparel Group (RAG). When Tshishonga refused to comply with what he considered an illegitimate instruction, the Minister forced the appointment through by dubious means and removed Tshishonga from his position. After waiting in vain for the then Director-General, Vusi Pikoli, to respond to two reports dealing with corruption and irregularities in the Department, Tshishonga decided to turn to various entities for assistance: he approached the Auditor-General, the Public Protector, and the Minister in the Presidency. When these attempts also proved unsuccessful, and Tshishonga started receiving telephonic death threats, he held a press conference on October 8, 2003. At the press conference, he alleged that Motala and Penuell Maduna had a nepotistic relationship. This led to his suspension and a disciplinary hearing. In July 2004, the presiding officer at the hearing found in his favor, but the Director-General, claiming an irretrievable breakdown of trust, refused to reinstate him. In March 2005, Tshishonga brought a defamation lawsuit amounting to R2  million (then US $292,000) against Maduna, alleging that Maduna had called him a “dunderhead” and “a relic from the Bantustans” in a televised statement in October 2004. After years of negotiation, they reached a settlement resulting in the termination of Tshishonga’s employment. Tshishonga received full payment of his salary during his suspension and, in terms of the settlement, would receive remuneration until age 65. However, he felt justified in bringing a Labor Court action against the Department of Justice in terms of the PDA. In his judgment (December 26, 2006), Judge Pillay found that the terms of the settlement did not mean that Tshishonga had not suffered occupational detriment as he had been denied “the dignity of employment.” The judge ordered the Department of Justice to pay Tshishonga an additional 12 months’ salary at the current level for Director-Generals, as well as his legal costs (McGregor, 2007). Maduna announced in October 2003 that he would not be available for election as a Member of Parliament during the 2004 General Election. Two years after leaving the cabinet, he clinched a multi-million-rand BEE deal with SASOL, a South African petrochemical company. He is also

64 

T. UYS

deputy chairman of the South African law firm, Bowman Gilfillan (Rashid, 2021; Terreblanche, 2003). In 2011 Tshishonga authored a book portraying his experiences in collaboration with Lesedi Kuenda. He decided to enter politics; during the 2014 General Election, he became one of two Members of Parliament representing Agang SA. Mpumalanga Matric (Grade 12) Examination Fraud: Vicky Breytenbach There were suspicions of widespread irregularities during the writing of the October 2004 final Matric exam in Mpumalanga, a province in the Eastern part of South Africa. At the time, Vicky Breytenbach had been teaching Afrikaans and typing at KaMhola Secondary School in Barberton for eight years. She was supervising pupils writing their final examinations, when she witnessed a co-teacher assisting candidates by orally providing them with answers to the questions in the exam paper. She reported the matter to the Mpumulanga Department of Education. The co-teacher and the principal initially denied any wrongdoing. In the subsequent investigation, she was the only witness at her school to give evidence about the irregularities. She encountered hostility from some fellow teachers, and death threats, threatening phone calls, and the visible monitoring of her house and the movements of her teenage son took place. By the end of January 2005, the trauma had taken its toll. Her medical practitioner placed her on sick leave and referred her to a psychologist (Rademeyer, 2005a). At the end of April 2005, the Department of Education froze her salary, saying that she had “absconded” or had exhausted her sick leave. At the beginning of June 2005, she received a telephone call from the Director-General of Education, informing her that she had been dismissed, but another official later denied this. The department said that she had not followed proper procedures with her sick leave, which she denied. In the meantime, another teacher was appointed to her position (Rademeyer, 2005b). When Helen Zille, the leader of the Democratic Alliance (the official opposition in Parliament), took up her case, the Department of Education became even more intransigent, accusing Zille of playing politics. The Department threatened to take disciplinary action against Breytenbach. It was only after an intervention by the Public Servants Association (PSA)

3 

SOUTH AFRICAN WHISTLEBLOWERS 65

that they reached a resolution. It was agreed that no disciplinary action would be taken against her, that she should report to the offices of the Department of Education in Barberton who would organize a transfer to a vacant teaching post, and her salary would be rectified. The Department never acknowledged any wrongdoing on their part and insisted that the Department of Education has never engaged in victimization of whistleblowers (Makhode, 2005). Eventually, 61 teachers were charged. In August 2005, the first 19 teachers were found guilty of corruption and were fined R3000 (less than $300 then); they were also given a written warning and were banned from marking examination scripts for the following two years. Zille commented in the press that the punishment was totally inadequate (Rademeyer, 2005c). Grootvlei Prison: Tatolo Setlai The Jali Commission of Inquiry into corruption in the South African Department of Correctional Services (DCS) was established in August 2001 on request of the then Minister of Correctional Services, Ben Skosana. This Commission was the result of various investigations that showed rampant corruption and mismanagement of South Africa’s prisons. At the time, Tatolo Setlai was the Head of Grootvlei Prison in Bloemfontein, the capital of Free State Province (located in the center of South Africa). Over several months he allowed four medium-security inmates to film prison officials at Grootvlei engaging in corrupt and other illegal activities. In June 2002, the video was shown to the Jali Commission, and on the same day, it was also broadcast on South African national television. The disturbing scenes, which included warders selling a loaded firearm, drugs, alcohol, and a juvenile sex slave to inmates, caused a public outcry over the state of the nation’s prisons (Banda et al., 2002). Rather than immediately focusing attention on rooting out the problems at the prison, the Department of Correctional Services subjected Setlai to various forms of victimization and intimidation, including demotion, suspension, transfer, and disciplinary action. Criminal charges brought in January 2003 alleged that Setlai had accepted bribes from prisoners in return for preferential treatment. The criminal process dragged on for 18 months until July 2004, when five State witnesses testified that they had been coerced into making false claims against Setlai, and he was acquitted. A year later, he was acquitted in a disciplinary hearing on charges that related to the alleged unauthorized use of government

66 

T. UYS

vehicles. Another six months later (January 2006), a disciplinary hearing dismissed him in absentia after he was found guilty of misconduct. The alleged offenses included speaking to the media without permission, calling senior management “the mafia,” and being absent without leave (Molefe, 2006). The Jali Commission’s final report, released in October 2006, noted that the concerted effort of DCS officials to victimize Setlai “… did a great deal of damage to the image of the department as an institution that seeks to uphold the government’s vision to fight against corruption” (van der Berg, 2007, p.  927). The department’s continued harassment of Setlai even after the release of the Commission’s final report is an indication of the department’s vindictiveness. Early in 2007, an arbiter appointed by the South African Public Service Bargaining Council declared Setlai’s dismissal unfair and ordered his reinstatement as well as payment of a year’s salary. When he tried to return to work at the DCS in Bloemfontein at the end of March, he was told that the department was considering applying for a review of the arbiter’s ruling. Another attempt to return to work two weeks later resulted in the police being called to remove him from the premises. In March 2008, Labor Court Judge Annali Basson rejected the DCS application for a review and confirmed the arbiter’s ruling of the previous year. Setlai was reinstated on June 2, 2008 (van Rooyen, 2008). Setlai retired in 2013. On December 4, 2013, he approached the South African Public Protector alleging that the Department of Correctional Services calculated his pension benefits from the date of his dismissal in 2006, instead of from his first appointment in 1972. On April 11, 2019, the Public Protector issued a report instructing the National Commissioner of Correctional Services to take the necessary steps to remedy the situation, as well as issue an apology to Setlai for the prejudice he had suffered. By November 2019 the remedial action had still not been implemented (Public Protector Facebook page, 2019). Financial Irregularities at Denel: Keith Grieve In 2001 Keith Grieve and a group of senior employees at arms manufacturer Denel collected evidence of  suspected financial irregularities and nepotism by a General Manager at the company’s Swartklip Products division. The General Manager became aware of the allegations. He asked Grieve who the informants were, but Grieve declined to name them.

3 

SOUTH AFRICAN WHISTLEBLOWERS 67

Grieve was the Safety and Security Manager at the time. Shortly after that, on November 19, 2002, Grieve submitted a report to Denel’s board of directors alleging misconduct on the part of the General Manager. The following day Grieve was suspended on full pay. In early December, he was informed that he would be called before a disciplinary inquiry, among other things on charges of visiting pornographic sites on his work computer, racism, and instigating a conspiracy to ensure the dismissal of the General Manager. Grieve applied for an urgent interdict at the South African Labor Court to stop Denel from forcing him to appear before a company disciplinary hearing until a determination had been made whether Denel had committed an unfair labor practice in terms of the PDA 2000 when suspending him (Grieve v. Denel (Pty) Ltd. 2003 4 BLLR 366). The court found that Grieve had made a protected disclosure and that the disciplinary action could constitute an “occupational detriment” (unfair treatment) in terms of the PDA. The interdict, which constituted the first reported decision dealing with the provisions of the PDA, was granted, and Grieve was reinstated. In a later development, Denel called in consultants to investigate all Grieve’s work. The disciplinary hearing that followed found him guilty of insolence and insubordination. The chairman concluded that there was an irretrievable breakdown of trust, and he was dismissed (Lewis & Uys, 2007, pp. 83–84). Irregular Share Trading at Andisa Securities: Allison Pedzinski In April 2000, Allison Pedzinski was transferred from the internal audit division of Standard Corporate Merchant Bank (SCMB) to Andisa Securities, a subsidiary of SCMB.  As compliance officer, her primary responsibility was to monitor the statutory, regulatory, and supervisory compliance of her employer regarding its financial trading business. When she resigned from her post because of recurring back problems that made a full-time commitment impossible, she accepted a half-day appointment at 66% of her regular remuneration package (Morris, 2005). Two years later, she uncovered that some senior managers were involved in the irregular trading of shares. She reported the matter to her immediate supervisor as well as to other persons in the SCMB Compliance Structures. Her manager was agitated that she had reported to others within the group’s compliance structures, without first allowing him to

68 

T. UYS

decide how to deal with the matter, and relations between them became strained (Morris, 2005). When Pedzinski returned from two days’ leave on December 4, 2002, she requested her manager to provide her with a copy of the findings of the investigation into the irregular share trading, as well as the actions taken against the guilty parties, without success. Well aware that she would be unable to comply, management gave her a letter on December 31, 2002, informing her that she would be required to work full-time as the workload associated with her position supposedly needed somebody who could work a full day. Pedzinski’s counterproposals to attempt to save her part-time job were rejected by her employers. When token efforts to provide her with an alternative position within the Standard Bank Group failed, her employer declared her position redundant for operational reasons, and her services were terminated at the beginning of April 2004 (Pedzinski v. Andisa Securities, 2005). After the South African Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) process had been exhausted, Pedzinski approached the Labor Court. The court found that she had suffered occupational detriment under the Protected Disclosures Act of 2000 and that her dismissal was substantively and procedurally unfair. The judge considered the decision to retrench Pedzinski unreasonable and a sham. Her former employer was ordered to pay two years’ salary (the maximum compensation provided for in the PDA) as well as her legal costs. The outcome of the case was lauded as the first unequivocal victory of a whistleblower in the South African courts (Sherry, 2006). After her dismissal, she was unemployed for more than two years. She was unable to find a job in the field of compliance, and at the beginning of March 2005, she had no choice but to accept a position at SOS Children’s Village, a charity organization, at a lower salary. In contrast to the guilty employees, whose share dealings were reversed and who were given written warnings, the senior manager involved was not disciplined. He has since been promoted to chief operating officer at the brokerage (Lewis & Uys, 2007, p. 84; Pedzinski v. Andisa Securities, 2005; Schroeder, 2005; Sherry, 2006). Travelgate: Harry Charlton In early 2003, Harry Charlton, the South African Parliament’s Chief Financial Officer, exposed large-scale fraud concerning the abuse of travel

3 

SOUTH AFRICAN WHISTLEBLOWERS 69

vouchers by Members of Parliament. He reported the fraud to the Speaker and Secretary of Parliament at the time. The Commercial Crime Unit of the South African Police Service was called in to investigate. In 2004 the National Directorate of Prosecutions initiated legal action against several travel agents. The first parliamentarians who were prosecuted in 2005 were controversially allowed to enter into plea agreements, to pay admissions of guilt fines, and received suspended sentences. This outcome meant that they were not legally disqualified from staying on as Members of Parliament, although some of them were eventually forced to resign. At the end of November 2005, Charlton was summarily suspended during a meeting with the Secretary of Parliament, Zingile Dingani. He was immediately escorted off the premises, without being allowed to return to his office. A disciplinary hearing followed, which found him guilty on 12 counts of misconduct relating to exceeding his authority in the procurement of software and the appointment of consultants. On January 10, 2006, he was dismissed from his post. After initial attempts to fight his dismissal through the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) failed, Charlton approached the Labor Court. He argued that his dismissal was a direct result of the protected disclosures he had made concerning the Travelgate scandal and that the dismissal was, therefore, automatically unfair in terms of the PDA. In his affidavit, he claimed that, in the months prior to being fired, he was blocked from investigating suspicions that some high-­ranking politicians were implicated in a further Travelgate fraud totaling about R19  million. Parliament opposed his application on the grounds that Members of Parliament cannot be considered employees or employers, which is a requirement for protection under the PDA. The Labor Court found in his favor on March 23, 2007, but Parliament appealed to the Labor Appeal Court of South Africa. The latter court overturned the Labor Court’s decision on July 21, 2010, on the basis that Members of Parliament were not employers, and Charlton’s disclosures were therefore not protected by the PDA. More than a year later, the Supreme Court of Appeal reinstated the Labor Court decision, which paved the way for an eventual Labor Court hearing on the merits of the dismissal (Smit & Botha, 2011). In September 2010, the last of the 37 Travelgate accused pled guilty, and the plea agreements were made orders of the court. None of the cases of 31 Members of Parliament and six travel agents came to trial as they were all dealt with through plea agreements. In 2012  Charlton  was appointed as  the Managing Director and Chief Financial Officer of a

70 

T. UYS

publicly listed international funds management firm  in Australia (ABN Newswire, 2012). Limpopo Textbook Procurement Irregularities: Solomon (Solly) Tshitangano In April 2010, the Limpopo Education Department decided to outsource the procurement of school textbooks. Previously, the department had procured the books directly from publishers, negotiating a 30% discount on bulk orders. As Acting Chief Financial Officer of the Department, Solly Tshitangano was responsible for overseeing the functioning of the book unit. He was not, however, consulted about the decision to outsource the procurement of textbooks, or involved in the development of the specifications of the tender notice. At the end of July, he was handed a two-page document setting out the decision of the bid adjudication committee, for his consideration. The adjudication committee had awarded the bid to EduSolutions, a company with strong top government connections. An accompanying note indicated that EduSolutions was the only one of the 23 service providers that complied with the relevant criteria (Hlongwane, 2012). Apart from the lack of clarity concerning the basis for awarding the tender to EduSolutions, the company’s appointment also made the procurement of textbooks more expensive. The company retained 70% of the negotiated discount while still billing the department for management fees. The service-level agreement between the company and the Limpopo government also extended the work period to 2014, which was one year longer than advertised in the tender notice. Furthermore, towards the end of 2010, the head of supply management arranged the cancellation of other advertised tenders and redirected them to EduSolutions (Hlongwane, 2012). When multiple attempts to raise the matter internally proved futile, Tshitangano approached the Member of the Executive Council (MEC) for Education and the Premier of Limpopo, as well as the Public Protector and the Auditor General. He eventually escalated his disclosures to the national Minister of Basic Education, Angie Motshekga, and the South African Presidency, all to no avail. When he arrived at work on April 13, 2011, his offices were locked, and the locks changed. He was not allowed access again and had to work from home. On May 6, 2011, he received a letter of suspension that did not supply any reasons. Forensic investigations conducted by forensic audit company, Neo Africa, on request of the

3 

SOUTH AFRICAN WHISTLEBLOWERS 71

Limpopo Education Department during July 2011 cleared the department of any wrongdoing regarding the EduSolutions contract (Corruption Watch, 2012). In contrast, they found Tshitangano guilty of a failure to follow tender procedures and to abide by financial regulations. In December 2011, he was dismissed from his post. At the same time, the National Treasury took over administration of Limpopo Province, when it was revealed that the province’s expenditure was already well over its limit. Meanwhile, Tshitangano was applying to the Labor Court for full reinstatement and compensation for the distress he has experienced. In April 2012, Education Minister Angie Motshekga was forced to cancel the EduSolutions tender, when a legal opinion sought by the department declared the contract invalid. In an ironic twist, the department relied on Tshitangano’s allegations in justifying their cancelation of the contract while fighting his efforts for full reinstatement and compensation. Despite being vindicated by subsequent events, Tshitangano felt that he had been sacrificed. He remained unemployed and had not received his pension. Various civil society organizations, such as Section 27 and the Council for the Advancement of the South African Constitution (CASAC), called for his immediate reinstatement, but to no avail (Corruption Watch, 2012; Hlongwane, 2012; Nkosi, 2012). Tshitangano joined the Office of the Chief Procurement Officer (OCPO), which was established in 2013 at the National Treasury to ensure compliance with procurement policies. At Treasury, he “was disliked by politicians and civil servants alike for his unbending approach” and his tenacious enforcement of compliance. In early 2019, after a relentless campaign against him by a senior Treasury official, he left National Treasury to join Eskom as the head of procurement (City Press 2019). In May 2021 Eskom fired him with immediate effect following a disciplinary committee finding that he was guilty of misconduct for his role in the awarding of contracts to Econ Oil, committed common law breaches of misconduct including contravening provisions of the Public Finance Management Act and was found guilty of breaching Eskom's internal grievance procedure code for addressing complaints in letters to outside parties, instead of dealing with his complaints internally. (Cowan et al., 2021)

72 

T. UYS

The chair of the disciplinary committee also dismissed his claims of being a whistleblower.

The “State Capture” Whistleblowers Since 2016, reports of whistleblowing have centered mainly around what came to be called “state capture” in South Africa. The Platform to Protect Whistleblowers in Africa (PPLAAF) defines state capture as more than simple corruption. It is the pillage of national companies and institutions, corrupting the people of power, as well as changing the country’s laws, so they would all work in the private interest's interest. (PPLAAF, circa, 2019)

Allegations of “state capture” plagued the Jacob Zuma presidency (May 9, 2009–February 14, 2018), mainly flowing from its involvement with the Gupta family. The Gupta brothers came to South Africa from India in the 1990s. Within a relatively short period of time, they managed to turn their computer company, Sahara Computers, into a conglomerate with holdings in mining, the media, and professional services. Their tentacles reached into many state-owned enterprises, in particular Eskom, South Africa’s power utility. Three of President Jacob Zuma’s family members had business dealings with the Guptas: Bongi Ngema-Zuma, one of the president’s four wives; Duduzile Zuma, one of his daughters; and Duduzane Zuma, one of his sons (Gqubule, 2017, p.  148; PPLAAF, circa, 2019). In March and April 2016, Thuli Madonsela, the then Public Protector, whose office is granted independence by the South African Constitution, received three complaints from members of the public about alleged interference by the Guptas in state appointments and preferential treatment given to the Guptas in the awarding of state contracts. She launched an investigation that culminated in the State of Capture report that was released on November 2, 2016, two weeks after the end of her non-­ renewable term of office. The delay was the result of an urgent interdict brought by Zuma to prevent the release of the report (Gqubule, 2017, pp. 156–158). Two whistleblowers, employed by Trillion Capital subsidiaries, where Gupta associate Salim Aziz Essa is a majority shareholder, provided valuable input into the report.

3 

SOUTH AFRICAN WHISTLEBLOWERS 73

The Trillian Whistleblowers Mosilo Mothepu was the former Chief Executive Officer at Trillian Financial Advisory when she decided to blow the whistle on the dealings occurring at Trillian. She had resigned from Trillian in June of 2016 when she realized that hers was a token appointment and that she had no real power to make decisions. On holiday in Egypt in September of 2016, she read about Thuli Madonsela not receiving sufficient funding to investigate complaints about “state capture.” The realization that the investigation into “state capture” was being derailed prompted Mothepu to approach Thuli Madonsela with information about fraudulent dealings at Trillion such as that Trillian was receiving funds from state-owned enterprises without rendering any services. Her testimony resulted in Trillian having to pay back almost R600 million (about $44.2 million in June 2021) to Eskom (Nicolson, 2020). An unknown source leaked Mothepu’s statement to Madonsela to the Sunday Times in October 2016. Without confirming that Mothepu was the source of the leak, the Sunday Times published an article demonstrating the links between President Zuma and the Guptas. Trillian responded viciously. They: filed criminal charges against her, claiming she had stolen and shared confidential information, and corruptly benefited from it. The company accused her of extortion, fraud, conspiracy and cyber crime. (Nicolson, 2020)

After spending 16 months defending herself in court, R1.3 million (about $96,000) in legal fees, and 24 months in unemployment, MTN (one of Africa’s foremost telecommunications companies) decided to hire her. In 2021 she published a book describing her experiences with the title Uncaptured: The true account of the Nenegate/Trillion whistleblower (Mothepu, 2021). When asked whether her sacrifices were worth it, Mothepu responded: Integrity isn't about the right thing if it costs nothing. My decision to go public has cost me financially, emotionally. But it's a small price, for as of now, South Africans know about Trillian's involvement in State Capture … My loyalty is to South Africa and they messed with the wrong black woman. (Bezuidenhout & Davis, 2017)

74 

T. UYS

In April 2016, after only a few months in her post as CEO of Trillian Management Consulting, another Trillian Capital subsidiary, Bianca Goodson, resigned. She could not continue to be associated with a company that was involved in all sorts of underhanded dealings connected to the fraudulent handling of government contracts. The final straw was a request for the opening of a Bank of Baroda account with a R300-million overdraft and signing powers assigned to an unknown person. Fearing that she would receive the same retaliation that Trillian was meting out to Mothepu, she was initially hesitant to raise her concerns, but she also knew that she possessed information that would “corroborate Trillian’s dealings with State-owned Enterprises.” In September 2016, she made a formal statement to the public protector about her experiences at Trillian (Bezuidenhout & Davis, 2017; Nicolson, 2018). A year after leaving Trillian, Goodson found a position as a Presales Analyst Director at the multinational payroll software company, Sage. Six months into her employment, she informed Sage South Africa managing director, Pieter Bensch, of her intention to release her whistleblower statement on Trillian through PPLAAF (the Platform to Protect Whistleblowers in Africa). She offered to resign if her actions should cause reputational damage to Sage. Rather than retaining her services, Sage processed her exit from the company as soon as her Trillian statement became public. She was then offered a job with Sygnia Limited, a financial services company (Bezuidenhout & Davis, 2017; le Roux, 2017). The Gupta Emails: Anonymous Whistleblowers Two anonymous whistleblowers were the catalyst that eventually led to the Zondo Commission of Inquiry into State Capture. In early 2017, “Stan” and “John” had indicated to prominent lawyer Brian Currin that they had acquired hard drives that belonged to Gupta-owned company Sahara Computers. These hard drives contained 300,000 emails detailing a malevolent relationship between the Gupta family and Jacob Zuma’s son Duduzane, as well as associations of a corrupt nature with various cabinet ministers and CEOs of some state-owned enterprises. The original hard drive was cloned by “Stan,” password protected and stored in a safe location. These whistleblowers had, then, decided to make the information public. Currin, together with “Stan” and “John,” decided to publicize the information via the media. They had opted not to surrender the information to law enforcement authorities due to the degree of corruption in the

3 

SOUTH AFRICAN WHISTLEBLOWERS 75

country at the time. With the assistance of Section 27’s Mark Heywood and Daily Maverick editor Branko Brkic, a plan was put in motion to relocate the whistleblowers before the information was made public. However, the Sunday Times newspaper released the story before the whistleblowers could leave South Africa, causing them to fear for their lives. They were, eventually, successfully relocated sometime between June and July of 2017. Branko Brkic and Mail & Guardian’s amaBhungane spent an extended period filtering through these emails to detail “state capture” to the broader public. With the help of lawyer Brian Currin, the whistleblowers’ stories were turned into affidavits filed with Norton Rose Fulbright Attorneys. These emails would eventually become known as the #Guptaleaks and ultimately contributed to the establishment of the Zondo Commission of Inquiry into State Capture, whose public hearings commenced on August 20, 2018. The hard drives on which the controversial #GuptaLeaks emails resided were admitted into evidence in September 2018. The #GuptaLeaks whistleblowers remain in exile and are building a new life outside South Africa (Bezuidenhout & Davis, 2017; Davis, 2018; Dlamini, 2018).

Two Whistleblowers Who Paid with Their Lives The final two cases deal with whistleblowers who had paid with their lives for attempting to root out corruption. They disclosed their suspicions to high-ranking officials in government, and both died in 2009. The first is Jimmy Mohlala, then Speaker of the Nelspruit municipality, who was gunned down by masked men at his home in Kanyamazane, Mpumalanga, after exposing tender corruption regarding the construction of the Mbombela 2010 World Cup stadium. The second, Moss Phakoe, a trade unionist and councilor, was similarly shot and killed, after divulging information about various acts of corruption in the Bojanala Platinum District Municipality in North West Province, formerly known as Rustenburg. Mbombela FIFA World Cup Stadium: Jimmy Mohlala As early as March 2007, signs began to surface that all was not well with the arrangements for the construction of the Mbombela stadium, one of ten stadiums to be built in Nelspruit, Mpumalanga, in preparation for South Africa’s hosting of the 2010 FIFA World Cup. The Mbombela municipality ordered a full investigation into alleged unauthorized

76 

T. UYS

disbursements by its former 2010 coordinator, Differ Mogale. These payments were discovered only after his appointment at the council was declared irregular, and his subsequent dismissal. Another controversy that cast a shadow over the proposed stadium was the alleged conspiracy by provincial and municipal officials to remove the local Matsafeni community from the land on which the stadium was being built. The Matsafeni community had won their ancestral land back in 2003, having been forcibly removed from it under apartheid. In 2007 they lost it again through a forced sale to the Mbombela municipality. Jimmy Mohlala, the Speaker of Mbombela municipality, had been fighting an ongoing battle since 2006, attempting to root out corruption in the municipality with regard to the construction of the stadium. His revelations of alleged tender irregularities by several top ANC officials in Mbombela, especially municipal manager Jacob Dladla, led to their suspension. However, in a surprise move in February 2008, the ANC demanded the resignation of Mohlala as Speaker, and the Mbombela municipality was placed under administration by the Mpumalanga Department of Local Government and Housing. They also reinstated Dladla, despite the call by an independent audit for legal action against him, as well as Lefika Emerging Equity, the stadium project management company, and Basil Read, the main stadium contractor (Brkic, 2010). Mohlala resisted the pressure from the ANC and refused to resign. A campaign to ruin his reputation through charging him with rape, assault, and drunk driving followed, but he was acquitted every time. A few days before he intended to testify in a case related to the alleged Mbombela World Cup stadium tender corruption, on January 4, 2009, he was shot and killed at the gate of his home, in front of his 19-year-old son, Tshepiso, who was shot in the leg. The Mpumalanga Government Audit report for the 2010–2011 financial year revealed that irregularities regarding tenders in Mpumalanga were rife. Most government contracts in departments were awarded to civil servants, who had not declared their interest. In most cases tender procurement and supply chain management procedures were flouted, with unauthorized expenditure amounting to R84 million. In 2012 four suspects arrested for his murder were released due to a lack of evidence. The search for Mohlala’s killers is still ongoing (Hlatshwayo, 2012).

3 

SOUTH AFRICAN WHISTLEBLOWERS 77

Fraud and Corruption at a Northwest Province Municipality: Moss Phakoe Moss Phakoe, a former National Union of Metalworkers organizer and ANC municipal councilor from 2002 until his death, and Alfred Motsi, his colleague and friend, became so concerned about what they believed to be evidence of corruption at the Bojanala Municipality that they started compiling a dossier of incriminating evidence. They soon had evidence of numerous politicians involved in acts of corruption in the municipality, as well as fraud in Northwest Province drought-relief projects. As far as they could see, none of the R33 million (just under $2.5 million) allocated for drought relief reached the needy communities but was redirected to fill the coffers of companies instead. Almost a year before Phakoe’s death in 2009, the two approached the ANC regional leadership, the provincial leadership of the Northwest Province, and two ANC national executive committee members to discuss their concerns. They also gave their dossier to ANC secretary-general Gwede Mantashe after which they went to the Office of the President, then run by Kgalema Motlanthe (Basson, 2012). When no action was forthcoming, they provided the dossier to former Co-operative Governance and Traditional Affairs Minister Sicelo Shiceka. Also present at the meeting with Shiceka was Mathews Wolmarans, the former mayor of Bojanala, who had stepped down as mayor during that year after a motion of no confidence was passed against him. The relationship between Phakoe and Wolmarans was turbulent, to say the least. As mayor, Wolmarans had stripped Phakoe from his membership of the mayoral committee on three occasions. Wolmarans was also heavily implicated in Phakoe’s report on multimillion-rand fraud in the Northwest province. At the meeting, Phakoe allegedly said to Wolmarans: “Hate me, but don’t hurt me” (Tilley, 2014). On March 14, 2009, Moss Phakoe was gunned down in the driveway of his home, when arriving home after putting up ANC posters for the general election. Nothing was stolen, which indicates that this was no robbery. Three years later, in July 2012, Wolmarans and his former bodyguard, Enoch Matshaba, were found guilty of the murder of Phakoe and were given jail sentences of 20 years and life imprisonment, respectively. When some of the state witnesses retracted their testimony implicating the two accused, they were granted leave to appeal by the Supreme Court of Appeal. In June 2014, the NorthWest High Court set aside the convictions of Wolmarans and Matshaba. Wolmarans has threatened to sue the

78 

T. UYS

state for wrongful arrest, malicious prosecution, loss of income, and injury to social standing. The murderers of Moss Phakoe are still at large. Phakoe’s children expressed their agony and misery in the following words: “Do people get their life cut short for being too loyal to the ANC or was my father’s honesty, which cost him his life, all in vain?” (Basson, 2012).

Conclusion I selected the 20 whistleblower stories told in this chapter to cover the spectrum of corruption across the public and private sectors, and from local to provincial to national. There are of course many more stories and new cases are added by the day. It is important to keep in mind that corruption in the public sector often requires collusion from the private sector, as is evident from the state capture saga. The stories also show the wide range of public issues exposed to the glare of public scrutiny through the actions of whistleblowers. The whistleblowers who have the courage of their convictions compelling them to disclose privileged information in an attempt to right wrongs, despite the private troubles that usually accompany their actions, come from all walks of life: young and old, white and black, men and women. Sadly, even where they are vindicated, and the public issue they exposed addressed, they often are still subjected to persecution and hardship. It is also clear that the Protected Disclosures Act (PDA), although technically available in some of the cases, was seldom utilized. This trend implies that the PDA is often considered to be inappropriate or inadequate. Whistleblowing disputes that are settled outside of the ambit of the PDA may not be recognized as such and could be hidden behind civil claims, labor disputes, or criminal prosecution. Whistleblowing is often concealed behind settlement agreements with secrecy clauses. We can rightfully wonder whether whistleblowing is not an even more widespread occurrence in South Africa than is visible on the surface. The fact that whistleblowing is not always recognized as such should perhaps be a wider public issue and reason to revisit the efficacy of the PDA and our approach to the investigation in general. We need to consider whether the creation of a body focused on investigating whistleblowing disclosures could not assist in identifying whistleblowing where it is hidden, thereby making the whistleblowing a public issue. It could also create conditions conducive to addressing the wrongdoing, thus ensuring effective whistleblowing.

3 

SOUTH AFRICAN WHISTLEBLOWERS 79

In the face of the possible negative consequences that may follow an act of whistleblowing, a question arises: what factors in the biography and social context of potential whistleblowers may lead them to voice their concerns in any event? Why do they do this, while others remain silent? The next chapter searches for answers to this question.

References ABN Newswire (2012, May 23). Millhouse, Inc. Plc (FRA:M77) Appoints Harry Charlton as Managing Director. Retrieved December 22, 2014 from https:// www.abnnewswire.net/press/en/72705/Millhouse-Inc-plc-(FRA-M77)Appoints-Harry-Charlton-as-Managing-Director.html Banda, C., Sepotokele, T. W., Matsena, D., Warby, V., & Zondi, M. (2002, June 19). The Two Big Questions after Video Exposé of Prison Scandal. The Star. Basson, A. (2012, May 2012). “Papa lived and died ANC’. City Press. Retrieved June 3, 2015, from https://www.news24.com/news24/Archives/City-Press/ Papa-lived-and-died-ANC-20150429 Bezuidenhout, J, & Davis, R. (2017). 2017 Daily Maverick South African Persons of the Year: The Whistle-blowers. Retrieved August 08, 2020, from https:// www.dailymaverick.co.za/ar ticle/2017-­1 2-­2 1-­2 017-­d aily-­m averick-­ south-­african-­persons-­of-­the-­year-­the-­whistle-­blowers/ Bhorat, H., Buthelezi, M., Chipkin, I., Duma, S., Mondi, L., Peter, C., Qobo, M., Swilling, M., & Friedenstein, H. (2017). Betrayal of the promise: How South Africa Is Being Stolen. State Capacity Research Project, 1–72. Bothma, P., & Prins, J. (2000, November 8). Polisiehonde Oefen op Mense, wys Skokvideo. Beeld. Retrieved December 24, 2014, from http://152.111.1.88/ argief/berigte/beeld/2000/11/08/1/14.html Brkic, B. (2010, January 15). Mail & Guardian journalist on hit list over stadium corruption reporting. Retrieved August 26, 2014, from https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2010-01-15-mail-guardian-journaliston-the-hit-list-over-nelspruits-stadium-corruption-reporting/ Cock, J., & Munnik, V. (2006). The Poisoner and the Poisoned: An Account of the Struggle of the Steel Valley Community against Pollution from the Vanderbijlpark Steel Works. Centre for Civil Society at the University of Kwazulu-Natal. Corruption Watch (2012, July 6). Diary of a Whistleblower. Retrieved April 27, 2014, from https://www.corruptionwatch.org.za/diary-of-a-whistleblower/ Cowan, K., Masondo, S., Karrim, A., & du Toit, P. (2021). IN FULL | Axed Eskom boss Solly Tshitangano was ‘Intent on Promoting the Interests of Econ Oil. Retrieved June 09, 2021, from https://www.news24.com/news24/ southafrica/investigations/eskomfiles/in-­f ull-­a xed-­e skom-­b oss-­s olly-­ tshitangano-­was-­intent-­on-­promoting-­the-­interests-­of-­econ-­oil-­20210529

80 

T. UYS

Davis, R. (2018, August 15). #GuptaLeaks Whistle-Blowers Speak Out For The First Time. Retrieved August 8, 2020, from https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/ article/2018-08-15-guptaleaks-whistle-blowers-speak-out-for-the-first-time/ de Bruin, P. (2001, May 22). Reserwebank Veg in Hof Oor Geheime. Die Burger. Retrieved January 22, 2021, from http://m24arg02.naspers.com/argief/ berigte/dieburger/2001/05/22/7/4.html de Bruin, P. (2005, July 18). Kyk weg as jy korrupsie sien. Beeld, 14. Dlamini, P. (2018). SA Owes Gupta Leaks Whistleblowers Living in Hiding a Huge Debt: Currin. South Africa. Retrieved August 12, 2021 from https:// www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2018-09-27-sa-owes-gupta-leakswhistleblowers-living-in-hiding-a-huge-debt-currin/ Dommisse, J. (1996, August 7). Regulering in SA Skiet Ver te Kort. Die Burger Laaste. Retrieved January 22, 2015, from http://152.111.1.87/argief/ berigte/dieburger/1996/08/07/15/5.html Gifford, G. (2001, November 21). Dogged by shadow of retaliation. The Star. Retrieved December 24, 2014, from https://0-reference-sabinet-co-za.ujlink. uj.ac.za/webx/access/samedia/IMAGE2/200111/35/15200116141.pdf Gifford, G. (2018, August 27). Another Whistleblower is Humiliated. Daily Maverick. Retrieved August 29, 2018, from https://www.dailymaverick.co. za/article/2018-08-27-another-whistle-blower-is-humiliated/ Gqubule, T. (2017). No Longer Whispering to Power: The Tenure of Thuli Madonsela. Jonathan Ball. Hlatshwayo, R. (2012, February 1). Who killed Jimmy Mohala? Sowetan Live. Retrieved August 26, 2014, from https://www.sowetanlive.co.za/ news/2012-02-01-who-killed-jimmy-mohlala/ Hlongwane, S. (2012, July 19). Limpopo Textbook Crisis: Whistleblower Out in the Cold. Daily Maverick. Retrieved December 21, 2014, from https://www. dailymaverick.co.za/ar ticle/2012-07-19-limpopo-textbook-crisiswhistleblower-out-in-the-cold/ Johnson, V. (2004). Public Deception in Cape Town: Story of an Insider Witness. In R.  Calland & G.  Dehn (Eds.), Whistleblowing Around the World: Law, Culture and Practice, pp. 42–52. The Open Democracy Advice Centre/Public Concern at Work. Kempton Express. (2017, October 31). Body of Murdered Van Riebeeck Park Environmentalist Found in Cupboard. Retrieved July 06, 2021, from https:// kemptonexpress.co.za/160097/gruesome-­murder-­shocks-­community/ Klein, M. (2018). Unsung Hero. Retrieved July 08, 2020, from https://nationalbarcouncil.co.za/2018/06/03/unsung-­hero/ Kuenda, L. (2011). Whistleblower: The Mike Tshishonga Story. Abunda Publishing Services. Le Roux, K. (2017, October 3). Sygnia Offers Gupta whistle-blower Bianca Goodson a Job. Retrieved August 8, 2020, from https://www.capetalk.co.za/ articles/274922/sygnia-offers-gupta-whistle-blower-bianca-goodson-a-job

3 

SOUTH AFRICAN WHISTLEBLOWERS 81

Lewis, D., & Uys, T. (2007). Protecting Whistleblowers at Work: A Comparison of the Impact of British and South African Legislation. Managerial Law, 49(3), 76–92. Makhode, T. (2005). Reinstatement of Mrs Vicky Breytenbach. Media Release. Retrieved June 08, 2021, from https://www.education.gov.za/Newsroom/ MediaReleases/MediaReleases/2005/tabid/183/ctl/Details/mid/583/ ItemID/2665/Default.aspx Mogakane, T. (2012). Mabona Served the People, Says Legislature … But, Did He Really? Ziwaphi, 6(20). Retrieved December 22, 2014, from http://www. ziwaphi.com/ziwaphi/Mabona_served_the_people,_says _legislature.htmI Molefe, T. (2006, 27 January). Exposé Prison Head Finally Gets the Chop. Sowetan. Morris, R. (2005, June 3). Whistle-blower Takes on Andisa Securities. Retrieved June 3, 2013, from https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/economy/whistleblower-takes-on-andisa-securities-752233 Mothepu, M. (2021). Uncaptured: The True Account of the Nenegate/Trillian Whistleblower. Cape Town: Penguin Books. Mulder, N. (2001). Honde-lede kry tot 7 jaar Tshwete en Selebi Selebi sê geregtigheid seëvier. Beeld Retrieved December 24, 2014 from https://0-reference-­ sabinet-co-za.ujlink.uj.ac.za/document/SAM15200118218 Mulder, N. (2003). 2 van honde-eenheid skuldig Regter verwerp hul weergawe na immigrante-aanranding. Beeld. Retrieved December 24, 2014 from https://0-­ reference-­s abinet-co-za.ujlink.uj.ac.za/webx/access/samedia/IMAGE2/ 200302/36/1520032608.pdf Nicolson, G. (2018, August 15). The cost of truth – whistle-blowers speak. Daily Maverick. Retrieved August 8, 2020, from https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/ article/2018-08-15-the-cost-of-truth-whistle-blowers-speak/ Nicolson, G. (2020, March 6). Diary of a Whistle-blower: Mosilo Mothepu’s Courageous Fight against State Capture. Daily Maverick. Retrieved August 8, 2020, from https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-03-06-diary-ofa-whistle-blower-mosilo-mothepus-courageous-fight-against-state-capture/ Nkosi, B. (2012, September 13). Section 27 Challenges Department to Stop ‘Lying’ about Textbooks. Retrieved December, 21, 2014 from https://mg. co.za/article/2012-09-13-section27-challenges-department-to-stoplying-about-textbooks/ Noseweek. (1999a). Reserve Bank Rushes to Silence its Whistle-blower. Noseweek, 26: 5–8. Noseweek. (1999b). What the Reserve Bank Doesn’t Want You to Know About David Jenkins and the Murder of Simon Law. Noseweek, 27 (5), 11. Pedzinski v Andisa Securities (Pty) Ltd [Pro Dis, Unfair redundancy] Case No. JS 396 / 04 Judgment Date 30 November 2005 Jurisdiction Labour Court, Johannesburg Judge Leeuw AJ. Public Protector Facebook Page Post. (2019, November 22). Retrieved June 09, 2021, from https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=561211564448560

82 

T. UYS

Rademeyer, A. (2005a, April 20). Onnie wat verklik oor gekul se salaris bevries. Beeld. Retrieved December 20, 2014, from http://152.111.1.88/argief/ berigte/beeld/2005/04/20/B3/11/02.html Rademeyer, A. (2005b, June 6). Onnie wat klik oor matrieks afgedank. Beeld. Retrieved December 20, 2014, from http://152.111.1.88/argief/berigte/ beeld/2005/06/06/B1/02/05.html Rademeyer, A. (2005c). Korrupte onnies kry ‘lawwe’ straf ná Mpu’langa-bedrog. Beeld, 16 August 2005. Rashid, S. (2021, February 18). Penuell Maduna bio: age, wife, qualifications, salary, books, net worth. Retrieved July, 15, 2021 from https://briefly.co. za/94678-penuell-maduna-bio-age-wife-qualifications-salary-books-networth.html Schroeder, F. (2005, December 2). Landmark Court Ruling Favours Whistleblower. Retrieved June, 3, 2013 from https://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/ landmark-court-ruling-favours-whistleblower-260358 Sherry, S. (2006). Counterblow. Retrieved April 29, 2014, from http://www. lyonsbriviklaw.com/cases_counterblow.html Smit, N. & Botha, N.M. 2011. Is the Protected Disclosures Act 26 of 2000 Applicable to Members of Parliament? Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg, 5, 815–829. Terreblanche, C. (2003, October 2012). Penuell Maduna Throws in the Towel, Retrieved December, 20, 2014 from https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/ penuell-maduna-throws-in-the-towel-114463 Tilley, A. (2014, April 17). Of (silver) bullets and whistleblowers. Daily Maverick. Retrieved November 19, 2014, from https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/ opinionista/2014-04-17-of-silver-bullets-and-whistleblowers/ van der Berg, A. (2007). Summary and comment on the Final Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of Corruption, Maladministration and Violence in the Department of Correctional Services— “the Jali Commission”. Commissioned by the Civil Society Prison Reform Initiative A project of the Community Law Centre, University of the Western Cape CSPRI Research Report No. 13. van Niekerk, S. (2000). Nog hondbytvoorvalle teen Gautengse eenheid bekyk. Beeld. Retrieved December 24, 2014, from http://152.111.1.88/argief/ berigte/beeld/2000/11/09/1/12.html van Rooyen, M. (2008, March 12). Hof sê Stelai moet weer aangestel word. Volksblad. Welz, M. (2004). Protecting Whistleblowers. Noseweek, 60(7), 7.

CHAPTER 4

Voice and Silence: Who Blows the Whistle and Why?

Introduction As is demonstrated in the accounts of the South African whistleblowers in the previous chapter and in  media reports and whistleblowing research, the decision to blow the whistle is not a simple matter. The common-sense notion would be that organizations would welcome such disclosures and respond positively, but the experiences of most whistleblowers paint a different picture. Instead of being appreciated by their employers, whistleblowers are often exposed to various forms of retaliation that severely impact their lives. In 1970 Albert Hirschman published Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States, which is generally considered the first attempt to explore responses to organizational dissatisfaction through the notions of exit, voice, and loyalty. Exit entails terminating the relationship with the organization. Voice, on the other hand, refers to expressing “their dissatisfaction directly to management or to some other authority to which management is subordinate or through general protest addressed to anyone who cares to listen” (Hirschman, 1970, p.  4) in attempting to change the questionable practices, policies, or outputs of the organization. As a point of departure, I explore the links between whistleblowing and Hirschman’s concept of voice, followed by a description of the whistleblowing process. A study of the literature reveals a large variety of factors within their biography and social setting that influence employees’ decisions regarding © The Author(s) 2022 T. Uys, Whistleblowing and the Sociological Imagination, https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-39445-3_4

83

84 

T. UYS

which option to exercise when confronted by some problem in the workplace. Rather than trying to unpack each of these factors separately, it would be helpful to employ some models that provide a framework for investigating the antecedents of whistleblowing behavior. For example, the Prosocial Organizational Behavior (POB) model, developed by Miceli et al. (2008), provides a valuable entry point for grasping the decision-­ making process that follows when some dubious act occurs within the workplace. However, this model tends to neglect the significant role that the social context plays in facilitating or impeding whistleblowing behavior. Various researchers have employed the Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) (or its precursor, Azjen’s theory of planned behavior) for this purpose (see, e.g. Chiu, 2003; Ghani et al. 2011; Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005; Park & Blenkinsopp, 2009; Richardson et  al., 2012; Trongmateerut & Sweeney, 2013; Winardi, 2013; Zakaria et al., 2016; Zhang et al., 2009). The TRA, developed by Fishbein and Azjen (2010), explains the impact of people’s attitudes, perceived norms, and perceptions of control on their intentions to engage in particular social behavior. This chapter employs both the TRA and POB models in providing an integrated account of the literature explaining the factors that would predispose an organizational member to blow the whistle or keep quiet. After explaining the central tenets of the POB and the TRA models, the chapter utilizes the two models to analyze the impact of individual biography and social context on determining an individual’s whistleblowing intentions.

Whistleblowing and Voice Hirschman explored the conditions that play a role in promoting exit over voice or voice over exit. He assigned a pivotal role to organizational loyalty, defined as a “strong attachment to an organization” (Hirschman, 1970, p.  81), to determine whether to engage in voice or exit. Loyal members of an organization are more likely to raise their concerns (voice), whereas disloyal members would tend to leave the organization (exit). When confronted with what is perceived to be organizational wrongdoing, the employee has several choices. First, employees could distance themselves from the problem by leaving (exiting) or staying and keeping

4 

VOICE AND SILENCE: WHO BLOWS THE WHISTLE AND WHY?  

85

quiet. Second, employees could confront the issue by raising their concerns (voice) internally or externally. Finally, staying on and keeping quiet is often considered the loyal option (especially by the employer). While it seems self-evident that the act of whistleblowing is a type of voice, some researchers view voice and whistleblowing as distinctly different types of extra-role behavior. For example, Van Dyne’s typology of extra-role behavior characterized voice as an example of challenging promotive behavior and whistleblowing as challenging prohibitive behavior (Van Dyne & LePine, 1998, p. 108). While both types challenge existing ideas and issues, they argued that voice is proactive by promoting positive change, and therefore constructive, in contrast to whistleblowing aiming to expose and foil organizational wrongdoing, which is consequently critical or negative. This argument seems to view whistleblowing as an event rather than a process. The previous chapter’s conceptualization of whistleblowing demonstrated that  whistleblowers attempt to facilitate promotive behavior by raising concerns so that the organization investigates and addresses the matters. Therefore, their challenges are often simultaneously aimed at improving the functioning of the organization (promotive) and at tackling inappropriate behavior at work by speaking out (prohibitive). Miceli and Near (2013, pp. 183–190) identified some key differences between whistleblowing and voice that demonstrated that while the two constructs are distinct in some respects, there is also evidence of some conceptual overlap. Whistleblowing and voice are both about employees conveying their views concerning work-related matters. However, in whistleblowing, these views are restricted to raising concerns about perceived organizational wrongdoing. In contrast, voice could entail making suggestions aimed at improving the organization’s functioning, regardless of whether misconduct is involved or not. In their view, whistleblowing, therefore, has a narrower focus than expressing voice. However, this restriction seems to imply that members of an organization have a consensus about what constitutes organizational wrongdoing. It also excludes disclosures about failures in implementing organizational policy or concerns raised about the legitimacy of corporate policies within the broader societal context, so-called policy whistleblowing (Blonder, 2010, p. 258). This caveat implies that different factors might play a role in the decision to express voice about possible improvements in organizational operations compared to raising concerns about organizational wrongdoing and especially initiating a debate about the validity of the provisions or the

86 

T. UYS

implementation of organizational policies. However, organizations might respond more positively if they perceive whistleblowers as attempting to improve the overall resilience of the organization through their disclosures. A second distinction between whistleblowing and voice relates to the channels employed to raise concerns or make suggestions. While employees express voice internally to their immediate supervisor or at most upper-­level managers, whistleblowers have a much more extensive range of channels at their disposal. They typically begin the process by raising their concerns internally. If the desired response is not forthcoming, they might take matters further by making disclosures to organizational members outside their immediate chain of command, or regulators outside the organization, or, in extreme cases, make public disclosures in the media. Making disclosures externally to the organization clearly falls outside the scope of voice, which points to the importance of identifying the particular factors that would encourage external whistleblowing. The risk of external disclosures impacting organizational reputation negatively makes it likely that organizations would prefer voice to whistleblowing. In the third place, as the expression of voice aims to improve the organization’s functioning, it is generally considered constructive. In contrast, whistleblowing is critical of the organization, particularly its management, and aims to end some form of organizational misconduct (LePine & Van Dyne, 1998, p. 854). The vantage point of the beholder, of course, influences whether a particular action is viewed as constructive, especially if the focus is on protecting organizational reputation rather than the interests of the wider community. In this regard, whistleblowing is sometimes considered constructive deviance (Appelbaum et  al., 2007, pp.  589–590; Miceli et al., 2008, pp. 93–94; Senekal & Uys, 2013; Vadera et al., 2013, p. 1225) where the disclosure complies with “hyper” norms, that is, those norms that are beneficial to essential institutions while deviating from more explicit organizational norms (Vadera et  al., 2009, pp.  569–570). Rothschild and Miethe (1994, p. 259) attributed this to the whistleblower’s tendency to “hold a greater allegiance to extra-organizational principles than to strictly organizational norms.” Lastly, whistleblowing is broader than voice in the sense that only current employees can engage in expressing voice, while any current or former insider to the organization can raise concerns about perceived

4 

VOICE AND SILENCE: WHO BLOWS THE WHISTLE AND WHY?  

87

organizational wrongdoing or policy disagreements. Management, therefore, needs to consider how effective it would be to try and silence a whistleblower by banishing them from the organization. Despite these differences, voice and some forms of whistleblowing intersect in significant ways. Voice literature, therefore, enhances our understanding of the dynamics of whistleblowing.

The Whistleblowing Process Soeken (in Bjørkelo et al., 2008, pp. 19–20) developed a helpful model of the stages that whistleblowers who suffered retaliation due to exposing workplace wrongdoing go through. The first stage is discovery, where the potential whistleblower becomes aware of the wrongdoing and confronts the decision of whether to respond. Then follows reflection, where the observer of the wrongdoing weighs up different options of how to respond, including whether to report their observations or not. The third stage entails confrontation, where one decides to make a disclosure. The whistleblower enters the fourth phase when retaliation from the employer, superiors, co-workers, or a combination of those occurs. The fifth stage is called the long haul, which refers to the often many months or years between blowing the whistle and reaching the end of the road. In stage six, whistleblowers achieve closure with the end of the judicial process or when they decide to call it quits and walk away. Ideally, whistleblowers should reach stage seven, resolution, when they come to terms with what has happened and can move on. This model seems to imply that whistleblowing entails a continuous process, starting with the discovery of the wrongdoing, and develops from the disclosure of the wrongdoing through various phases until a resolution ensues. In reality, the disclosure of wrongdoing is often more than a single event, where whistleblowers engage in multiple combinations of internal, external, and public disclosure. In return, the organization’s response frequently entails engaging in a range of acts of ill-treatment in an attempt to either discredit the disclosures or the whistleblower, or compel the whistleblower to withdraw the complaints. In its relentless humiliation, intimidation, and punishment of the whistleblower and the vindictiveness of the actions, the retaliation comes to resemble workplace bullying (Bjørkelo et al., 2008, p. 20).

88 

T. UYS

The Prosocial Organizational Behavior (POB) Model of Whistleblowing The POB model of whistleblowing (Miceli, et al., 2008, pp. 36–43) views many whistleblowing acts as examples of prosocial organizational behaviors. Prosocial organizational behavior refers to actions organizational members execute while involved in their organizational role, aiming to improve the wellbeing of others. To qualify as prosocial behavior does not mean that the whistleblower derives no benefit from his or her action, though. The POB model identifies three phases of decision-making about how to respond when witnessing a suspect act. During the first phase, the observer must decide whether the particular questionable act is wrongful, and if so, whether it is the responsibility of someone to address the wrongdoing. If the activity is not considered illicit, the decision-making process stops there. If the observer believes that wrongdoing is occurring that has not been reported or is not being corrected, he or she enters the second phase. Phase two focuses on two processes that could influence how observers of wrongdoing, regardless of whether they perceive the wrongdoing as being addressed, are likely to respond during phase three. The first process is signaling, where the observer considers what an organization’s possible response would be toward reports of wrongdoing, in other words, its responsiveness to wrongdoing. The second process relates to the demoralization that often follows upon recognizing that wrongdoing is occurring within the organization. The POB model states that observers of wrongdoing who experience organizational unresponsiveness and demoralization during phase 2 are more likely to decide to do nothing during phase 3. During the third phase, observers of wrongdoing need to decide whether it is their responsibility to respond to the misconduct and the options open to them. Those observers who believe that they have the responsibility to act and that potentially beneficial responses to deal with the wrongdoing are available to them, would weigh up the comparative costs and benefits of these responses, particularly regarding blowing the whistle. If the benefits accruing from whistleblowing surpass the relative costs for observers of wrongdoing, they would be more likely to report their concerns to someone who is in a position to take action.

4 

VOICE AND SILENCE: WHO BLOWS THE WHISTLE AND WHY?  

89

While the POB model of whistleblowing provides a sound point of departure for our grasp of which organizational members are likely to blow the whistle when coming across organizational wrongdoing, it seems to focus mainly on the individual decision-making process. It also conforms to what Teo and Caspersz (2011, p. 240) called the whistleblowing/silence dichotomy. They argued that this dichotomy is a social construction that enforces a particular discursive regime that prevents employees from exercising alternative options when attempting to prevent or resolve organizational wrongdoing. This discourse entails the communication of implicit understandings of expected behavior  among co-­ workers. An expansion of the POB model by incorporating Fishbein and Azjen’s Theory of Reasoned Action could perhaps assist in providing a more comprehensive explanation of the influence of behavioral beliefs and collective norms on whistleblowing behavior.

Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) Fishbein and Azjen’s (2010, pp.  20–23) Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) argues that three types of conceptually independent underlying beliefs determine the intention to behave in a particular way. First, behavioral beliefs relate to actors’ views about the possible positive or negative outcomes should they engage in this behavior. By weighing up the costs and benefits that could flow from the action, behavioral beliefs produce a favorable or unfavorable attitude toward personally performing this behavior. Observers of wrongdoing in an organization would, therefore, evaluate the possible consequences of making a disclosure or not making a disclosure, on the basis of which they would form a favorable or unfavorable attitude toward engaging in whistleblowing. This belief corresponds to the final consideration that observers of wrongdoing engage in when deciding whether to blow the whistle during phase three of the POB model. Second, individuals develop perceptions with regard to how their significant others would respond, should they engage in this behavior, and whether these significant others are likely to participate in the practice themselves. Through these injunctive and descriptive normative beliefs, actors develop a perceived norm (previously called a subjective norm) regarding the behavior, which refers to the social pressure experienced to act in a particular way and the individual’s motivation to conform to the expectations of significant others. Therefore, observers of organizational wrongdoing would be more likely to form an intention to blow the

90 

T. UYS

whistle if they feel that people whose opinions they value would approve of them doing so. Finally, the individual’s assessment of how easy it would be to perform the particular action would inform their intention to do so. This assessment entails weighing up the availability of the resources and opportunities needed to perform certain behaviors as well as the constraints and risks associated with those behaviors. Control beliefs result in the individual developing a sense of perceived behavioral control. In the case of whistleblowing, organizational obstacles such as management intentionally ignoring or frustrating the reporting of wrongdoing, the belief that it is impossible to correct the wrongdoing through reporting, and concerns about the possibility of retaliation could all act as control factors that discourage potential whistleblowers. The TRA’s reflection on the impact of organizational obstacles seems to mirror the processes of signaling and demoralization according to phase two of the POB model. Perceived behavioral control also appears to be associated with the observer of wrongdoing’s perceived responsibility to act during stage three of the POB model. A combination of people’s attitudes, perceived norms, and perceived behavioral control concerning a particular action inform their intention to engage in the behavior. For example, people with favorable attitudes toward whistleblowing, who view the organizational norms to be supportive, and who believe that they are in control of the situation, are therefore more likely to have a firm intention to blow the whistle on organizational wrongdoing. According to Fishbein and Azjen (2010, p. 21), the strength of the intention directly influences the likelihood that the behavior will be executed. However, the actual control that people have over carrying out their intentions, particularly whether they have the required skills and abilities, or whether environmental constraints are preventing them from performing the actions, should be taken into account when attempting to predict whether their intentions would translate into actions. Similar to the POB model, they also stress the critical impact of individual and social background factors on the intention of observers of wrongdoing to engage in whistleblowing, in particular the influence on their behavioral, normative, and control beliefs toward whistleblowing. It is therefore vital to consider the impact of these background factors, in particular demographic variables and personal dispositions, on the formation of the behavioral, normative, and control beliefs that determine the intention to engage in whistleblowing.

4 

VOICE AND SILENCE: WHO BLOWS THE WHISTLE AND WHY?  

91

Background Factors and Whistleblowing Intentions The research on the relationship between demographic factors and whistleblowing propensity provides a somewhat confusing picture. In a meta-­analysis of 21 (mostly American) studies exploring predictors of whistleblowing intent and actual whistleblowing, Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran (2005, p. 289) found that older employees and those at higher job levels were more likely to display high whistleblowing intentions. Similarly, Liyanarachchi and Adler’s (2010, p. 17; 22) study of Australian accountants found a relationship between age and whistleblowing propensity, with older accountants being more likely to do so than younger ones. Male accountants were also more likely to blow the whistle than female accountants. Interestingly, an analysis of the interaction effect between age and gender showed that male accountants displayed a higher propensity toward whistleblowing than female accountants when they were at an early stage of their career. Sims and Keenan’s (1998, p. 418) study also found that women were less likely to blow the whistle, but there was not relationship between whistleblowing intentions and age, organizational tenure, or educational level.  Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran’s (2005, p.  289) study showed that women and more tenured employees were slightly more likely to engage in actual whistleblowing. Vadera et  al. (2009, pp.  556–559) identified a relationship between whistleblowing intention and proficient job performance, high levels of education, and higher-level supervisory positions, while the findings concerning gender, age, and tenure seemed to be inconsistent. In Miceli et al.’s (2012, p. 941) study, removing non-observers of wrongdoing from the analysis eliminated the effect of all demographic variables, except for gender. In particular, when witnessing unattended wrongdoing,  women were marginally, but significantly, more likely to blow the whistle than men (Miceli et al., 2012, pp.  945–946). Cassematis and Wortley (2013, p.  627) found no relationship with gender, age, or tenure. A likely explanation for these inconsistent findings lies in the mediating influence of other factors, such as culture, on the relationship between demographic factors and whistleblowing intention. In a study conducted in Pakistan, Bashir et  al. (2010, p.  7) found that whistleblowers were mostly male and likely to be younger, with postgraduate degrees. They maintained that “the silence of female respondents is indicative of a culture where few women dare to demand their legal rights, let alone reporting any wrongdoings through whistleblowing.”

92 

T. UYS

Alford (2003, pp.  68–69) argued that it is impossible to determine whether women are more likely to blow the whistle than men. He also considered it impossible to determine whether more women than men are actually blowing the whistle. He attributed this to the underrepresentation of women in traditionally male professions, and the low visibility afforded many whistleblowing cases not considered sufficiently exciting. In a study of the whistleblowing intentions of South Korean government officials, Chang et al. (2017, pp. 693–694) found that female public officials demonstrated a lower intention to blow the whistle. They attributed this finding to “women’s relative lack of power in the Korean workplace.” Colvin (2002) suggests that women might be better candidates for whistleblowing because of being an insider “who knows where the bodies are buried yet isn’t tied deeply to the established powers.” Janusz (2013, p. 19) quotes a women whistleblower who supports this argument: “You can’t be a whistleblower if you are integrated into that collegial, male-­ dominated professional network.” On the other hand, it would be surprising if a senior woman, who ascended to the top of the corporate ladder based on hard work and perseverance, rather than access to the old boys’ network support, would be prepared to jeopardize that, by blowing the whistle. This issue perhaps explains Kaplan et al.’s (2009, p. 27) finding that women are more like than men to report financial wrongdoing to an independently administered hotline, where the personal costs are perceived to be lower. In an analysis of Time magazine’s portrayal of three female whistleblowers when announcing the 2002 Persons of the Year, Simon (2013) shows how, despite their successful navigation of the practices of hegemony in their organizations, the three whistleblowers were still considered relative outsiders, and how being “gendered others” provided them with the tools and insights to take a stand against corporate fraud. The conflicting results concerning the influence of demographic factors on whistleblowing intentions could be resolved by following Vadera et al.’s (2009, p. 569) suggestion of adopting an identity lens when trying to understand why individuals participate in whistleblowing. This approach entails taking account of the content, as well as the hierarchical ordering of individuals’ multiple identities, and also how people connect to their diverse identities through various affinities. Anvari et al. (2019) developed a social identity model of whistleblowing. They argue that the relative strength of people’s identification with an offending group

4 

VOICE AND SILENCE: WHO BLOWS THE WHISTLE AND WHY?  

93

compared to their identification with the superordinate group whose values are violated by the wrongdoing, determines the likelihood of blowing the whistle. The superordinate group could be their organization, their profession, or the wider community. They explain the relationship as follows: [W]histleblowing would be most likely when there is strong identification with the superordinate group and weak identification with the offending ingroup. Conversely, being loyal or strongly identified with the offending ingroup, members should be protective of the group’s moral image and less inclined to whistleblow, but this might be attenuated and members might still be willing to blow the whistle when they are strongly identified with the superordinate group whose values have been violated—so that superordinate values trump ingroup loyalty. In this case, whistleblowing would be least likely when there is strong identification with the offending ingroup and weak identification with the superordinate group. (Anvari et  al. 2019, p. 53)

Identifying the reasons why observers of wrongdoing would blow the whistle or remain silent, therefore, requires moving our focus away from the potential whistleblower’s demographic characteristics. A good starting point could be to consider factors that influence whether organizational members recognize particular behavior as wrongful.

Recognition of Organizational Wrongdoing For any whistleblowing to occur, there should first be an awareness that some questionable behavior has occurred or that some policy is problematic. This awareness requires that some members of the organization should be exposed to information about wrongful activities (McLain & Keenan, 1999, pp. 259–260) and should display the necessary ethical sensitivity that enables him/her to identify a particular act as unacceptable or harmful (Ponemon, 1994, p. 121). Realizing that an activity is wrongful usually flows from the realization that the observed behavior conflicts with one’s values or expectations about what should happen in an organization (Henik, 2008, p. 113; Near & Miceli, 1985, p.  4). Research also has shown that participants were significantly more likely to blow the whistle when they felt that they were personally victimized (Cassematis & Wortley, 2013, p.  628). Physical

94 

T. UYS

proximity to the wrongdoer could furthermore make it more likely that someone would become aware of something going awry in the workplace (Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005, p. 291). According to Blenkinsopp and Edwards (2008, pp. 183–184), researchers often tend to treat individuals’ perceptions of what constitutes wrongdoing as clear-cut and unambiguous, while, in reality, immense variations could occur. They identified a number of explanations for these differences of interpretation. First, observers of the questionable act often have only partial or ambiguous information on which to base their judgment at their disposal. McLain and Keenan (1999, p. 261) stressed the importance of quality information in strengthening observers’ confidence that their conclusions about the wrongfulness of actions are valid. Second, cultural variations play a role in what is viewed as wrongdoing, as well as what the appropriate response should be, should the act be considered wrong. In a cross-cultural comparison of whistleblowing as an internal control mechanism, Patel (2003), for example, contrasted the many standards of morality evident in Chinese culture, with the  ethical standards being decided collectively in Indian culture, depending on the people and the context, and the Australian emphasis on individuality, independence, equality, and egalitarianism. Third, wrongdoing is sometimes not recognized as such because of the processes of normalizing and rationalizing that socialize people into believing that morally dubious practices are the correct and proper way to carry out the business of the organization. Various researchers have pointed out that co-workers in the immediate work group play an important role in influencing the perceptions of their peers with regard to the wrongfulness of particular behavior (Blenkinsopp & Edwards, 2008, p. 200; Greenberger et al., 1987, p. 531; Miceli et al., 2012, p. 938). The views of the group will be especially influential if the majority agrees that the particular activity is acceptable, and the group is perceived to be a credible source of information. A strong commitment to the group also could lead to some form of legitimization or rationalization of the decision not to take the matter further. This justification for keeping quiet is of course less likely to occur if the organizational member identifies more strongly with the superordinate group than with the offending ingroup (Anvari et al., 2019, p. 50; Greenberger et al., 1987, pp. 528–531; Henik, 2008, p. 112). However, if there is strong evidence that some activity is questionable and this evidence corresponds with the observer’s values, the group’s

4 

VOICE AND SILENCE: WHO BLOWS THE WHISTLE AND WHY?  

95

influence on the interpretation of wrongfulness is reduced (Greenberger et al., 1987, p. 534). Similarly, Reiss and Mitra (1998, p. 1588) found that individuals demonstrating an internal locus of control were more likely to consider organizational behaviors “of an uncertain ethical nature as generally unacceptable.” Furthermore, researchers also have found that the more severe the consequences of the objectionable behavior are perceived to be, for example, the extent of the damages or losses incurred as a result of the practice, the more likely it is that the act will be viewed as wrongful. This is especially the case when it is clear who the victims are, which explains why physically harmful acts are generally regarded in a more harsh light than financial wrongdoing (Ayers & Kaplan, 2005, p.  123; Greenberger et  al., 1987, p. 534; Vadera et al., 2009, p. 564; Winardi, 2013, p. 373). According to the POB model, if organizational members believe that no organizational wrongdoing is occurring, they have reached the end of the road as far as the whistleblowing process is concerned. Observers of wrongdoing have to consider what possible responses are available to them. McLain and Keenan (1999, p.  257) identified five such alternatives as well as the potential gains and losses associated with each. Observers could, in the first instance, decide to join in the wrongdoing or to overlook it. In both cases, the wrongdoing, as well as the harm following from the wrongdoing, continues. The third alternative, where observers attempt to stop the wrongdoing directly, requires the most involvement from the observer and would probably incur the highest potential costs. Then there are two options to report the wrongdoing to someone else who could deal with it, either through following prescribed formal or informal procedures when making the disclosure or through bypassing the specified channels and reporting to someone who is believed to be in a position to do something about the wrongdoing. The TRA focuses on explaining the intention to engage in a particular course of action. It identifies three major factors that influence how observers of wrongdoing decide what action they should take when confronted with evidence of wrongdoing. The likelihood that observers of wrongdoing would engage in whistleblowing is, in the first instance, determined by their attitude toward whistleblowing, in particular the extent to which they approve or disapprove of this behavior. Their behavioral beliefs shape this attitude about the positive or negative consequences that might follow if they engage in the alternative responses open to them.

96 

T. UYS

Attitude and Behavioral Beliefs Toward Whistleblowing The observer’s attitude toward whistleblowing is a product of his or her evaluation of the possible consequences of blowing the whistle through weighing the advantages and disadvantages of various possible alternative responses to the wrongdoing. Fishbein and Azjen (2010, p. 20) argue that we tend to favor behavior if we believe the consequences as being generally desirable and avoid those behaviors that seem to have mainly undesirable effects. This cost/benefit analysis is also the final stage of the POB model of whistleblowing decision-making. The observer of the wrongdoing needs to make a judgment whether a particular course of action is in line with their accessible beliefs by considering the anticipated positive and negative consequences of engaging in whistleblowing (its perceived instrumentality) as well as the positive and negative experiences associated with the behavior. Consequences of Whistleblowing Various researchers have identified fear of retaliation or punishment for raising concerns about perceived organizational wrongdoing to be an important consideration in how to respond to the observation. In particular, the fear of reprisals significantly reduces the likelihood that an observer would blow the whistle (Arnold & Ponemon, 1991, p. 12; Bashir et al., 2010, p.  7; Cassematis & Wortley, 2013, p.  628; Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005, p. 290; Milliken et al., 2003, p. 1464). Edwards et al. (2009, pp.  94–95) attributed a reluctance to blow the whistle to the “anticipatory fear of retaliation or of being labeled or viewed negatively by others” that results from the decision-making process initiated by the observation of wrongdoing. Attree’s (2007, p. 397) research showed that raising concerns was perceived as “a high-risk: low-benefit act.” Her respondents described fears of adverse personal and professional outcomes, such as backlash, backing off, backstabbing, isolation, alienation, and withdrawal of peer support. They perceived whistleblowing to be difficult and risky. According to Caillier’s (2013, p. 45) model, employees with supervisory backing, organizational commitment, and what he calls “power-dependency factors,” such as workgroup performance, pay grade, managerial status, Caucasian status, and male gender, would be less likely to fear reprisal if they disclosed

4 

VOICE AND SILENCE: WHO BLOWS THE WHISTLE AND WHY?  

97

wrongdoing. In contrast, senior-level employees were more likely to think that reporting wrongdoing would lead to retaliation. According to Robinson et al. (2012, pp. 224–225), the fear of reprisal is exacerbated if the wrongdoer knows that the observer is aware of the wrongdoing. For Teo and Caspersz (2011, p. 243), the fear of retaliation is a manifestation of a fear of unknown consequences. Their participants were also anxious that their report could lead to unduly punitive or unjust punishment for the perpetrator. The inherent tension between wanting to belong and be part of the work ‘family’, on the one hand, and uncertainty about the reactions of the powerful recipient of the whistleblower’s report, act as a compelling disincentive for whistleblowers to come forward. The strength of the observer’s sense of integration and belonging could arouse another fear of whistleblowing: the fear of disclosure. Various studies have demonstrated the fear of being labeled a traitor or backstabber or not being a team player (Attree, 2007, p.  397; Milliken et  al., 2003, p. 1463; Teo and Caspersz, 2011, p. 243). In a study of civil servants in Indonesia, Winardi (2013, p. 373) found that their intention to blow the whistle would increase if they believed that their disclosure would make a difference; that something would happen to ensure a positive outcome. Another fear of whistleblowing that could discourage observers from blowing the whistle is, therefore, the fear of futility. This fear arises if observers believe reporting the wrongdoing would not make a difference (Milliken et al., 2003, p. 1464). They do not see a sufficiently positive response by the organization to be forthcoming that would offset the potential risks to their image or credibility, rendering their sacrifices futile (Attree, 2007, p. 398; Milliken et al., 2003, p. 1463). On the other hand, observers of wrongdoing also need to consider the potential gains and losses of inaction. Consequences of Inaction Potential whistleblowers need to consider what the possible outcome would be if they do nothing (or worse—participate in the wrongdoing), and the wrongdoing continues. Presumably, the more serious the wrongdoing is perceived to be, the more harm it would cause if not stopped. Most researchers agree that perceptions of seriousness are significantly associated with the observer’s intention to report the wrongdoing (Ayers & Kaplan, 2005, p.  134; Cassematis & Wortley, 2013, p.  627; Harvey et al., 2009, p. 73; Kaplan et al., 2009, p. 283; King, 1999, p. 429; Klaas

98 

T. UYS

et al., 2012, pp. 320–321; McLain & Keenan, 1999, p. 262; Richardson et al., 2012, p. 188; Robinson et al., 2012, p. 216; Vadera et al., 2009, pp. 564–565). Jones et al. (2014, p. 656) linked this to the sense of unfairness and anger that observers experience in cases of serious wrongdoing. If observers perceive the wrongdoing to be particularly harmful, they are also more likely to feel a need or moral responsibility to stop the wrongdoing, by reporting it to someone who can make a difference. Ayers and Kaplan (2005, p.  130) found an association between an increased perception of the seriousness of the wrongdoing and personal responsibility to report the wrongdoing on the one hand and higher intentions to report on the other. This belief that it is one’s duty to report wrongdoing is referred to as an individual propensity to blow the whistle (Cassematis & Wortley, 2013, p. 620). A high individual propensity to blow the whistle is more likely to be present if an individual’s concern has broadened from the more particular harm to the self to a concern with harm to society more generally, or even what McLain and Keenan (1999, p. 262) call “increasingly abstract conceptualizations of wrongdoing.” Various researchers have stressed the dilemma of the professional whose role obligates them to raise concerns about questionable social conditions and practices that they become aware of as part of executing their duties (Attree, 2007, p.  394; Klaas et  al., 2012, p.  320; Miceli et  al., 2008, p. 139). Lavena (2014, p. 5) refers to a public service motivation where employees see it as their responsibility to protect the public interest. On the other hand, Miceli et  al. (2008, p.  39) indicate that if the observer believes the wrongdoing has already been reported or that the organization is busy addressing it, they would be less likely also to blow the whistle. King (2000, pp. 14–15) argued that: employees that perceive an unethical corporate culture may be less likely to communicate questionable behaviour. An employee may sense that the organisation and other co-workers are aware of the wrongdoing, and feeling no personal obligation to report the incident, the employee might conclude that the problem must be trivial to the organisation as well as its members.

In contrast to the predictions of the diffusion of responsibility theory, Robinson et al. (2012, p. 225) found that observers are less likely to blow the whistle if the wrongdoer is the only other person who is aware of the wrongdoing taking place.

4 

VOICE AND SILENCE: WHO BLOWS THE WHISTLE AND WHY?  

99

The second determinant identified by the TRA relates to the influence of significant others on the intention of the observer of wrongdoing to report their suspicions. The normative beliefs that flow from the approval by referent groups lead to the development of a perceived norm.

Perceived Norms and Normative Beliefs The social environment has a strong influence on people’s intentions and actions. People experience pressure to behave in particular ways as a result of their belief that this is in line with the demands, desires, or expectations of significant others. In addition, normative pressure could result from the belief that influential others are themselves engaging in the behavior in question. Fishbein and Azjen (2010, p. 131) distinguish between injunctive norms, which refer to appraisals of what the expected or preferred course of action should be in a particular situation, and descriptive norms, which flow from our perceptions whether others are performing the particular behavior. The development of behavioral beliefs and a perceived norm about how to respond to perceived wrongdoing is the result of a process of sensemaking. Observing wrongdoing could act as a disruptive event that triggers sensemaking to allow the observer to resubmerge in the status quo. Interactions with significant others serve as sensemaking resources that lead to a shared view of whether the situation is acceptable and what action, if any, is required (Blenkinsopp & Edwards, 2008, pp. 199–201). This process emphasizes the collective aspect of employee behavior where employees decide how to respond from talking with and observing their peers (Milliken et al., 2003, pp. 1465–1466). Within the workplace, collective sensemaking enables employees to gain shared understandings of their workplaces by focusing on the internalization and institutionalization of workplace behavioral norms. Various factors influence the extent to which an individual will succumb to group pressure to conform to the perceived norm concerning the expected response to observing wrongdoing. If the group seems to be an authoritative, unified force that opposes whistleblowing, the individual member would be more likely to remain silent when confronted with wrongdoing. Silence is also the possible result in a highly cohesive group with a unanimous and credible majority or where the group controls highly valued rewards, which guarantees individual dependence. In contrast, members who have received idiosyncrasy credits as a result of their

100 

T. UYS

perceived competence will experience more freedom to distinguish themselves from others in the group through not conforming to the perceived norm. Greenberger et al. (1987, p. 534) sums it up nicely: The greater the perceived strength, cohesiveness, and credibility of the group, the greater the dependence of the focal member, and the greater the ambiguity in the environment the less likely the focal members will behave in a manner in opposition to group norms and will blow the whistle.

The overarching organizational culture usually reflects the accepted behavioral beliefs and perceived norms regarding behavioral expectations in an organization. Organizational culture encompasses a cognitive framework of attitudes, values, behavioral norms, and expectations that guide the behavior of organization members (Greenberg & Baron, 2003, p. 515). As such, it also steers decision-making when the organization is confronted with wrongdoing. Organizational culture could act as a resource to determine the organizational propensity or, to put it in simpler terms, the perceived level of organizational approval for whistleblowing (Cassematis & Wortley, 2013, p. 620). For Miceli et al. (2008, p. 117), the essence of organizational culture has to do with the extent to which a corporate culture prioritizes compliance. On the one hand, a strong emphasis on compliance should discourage wrongdoing, which reduces the need for whistleblowing, while creating a perception of a receptive attitude toward dealing with complaints, thereby reducing the likelihood of reprisals. On the other hand, it could also be argued that: emphasis on compliance creates so much bureaucracy or over-controls employees that it undermines the development of ethical values, good decision making, and trust in management. (Miceli et al., 2008, p. 117)

Loyens (2013, pp. 241–245) employed Grid-Group Cultural Theory (GGCT) to identify four types of organizational culture as well as the types of peer reporting associated with each culture. The types are based on high or low levels on two dimensions. The first is ”grid,” which indicates to what extent externally imposed rules, instructions, and authority constrain individual lives, as well as how much room there is for negotiation. The second is “group,” which refers to the extent to which individuals’ integration into a bounded unit of actors limits their individual choice.

4 

VOICE AND SILENCE: WHO BLOWS THE WHISTLE AND WHY?  

101

Each of the four organizational cultures has an impact on the behavior and values of employees, including the type of peer reporting style that they would prefer. While all four cultures are usually present in any organization to varying degrees, one organizational culture tends to dominate, which means that its compatible peer reporting style will also be dominant. The most constrained, but also supportive, organizational culture is hierarchy, where high grid and high group ensure that the organization functions in terms of prescribed roles and responsibilities legitimized by the attachment of organizational members to a distinct group. Within the hierarchical culture, peer reporting will be conducted in line with rules, instructions, and procedures where individuals feel it is their responsibility to report perceived misconduct. Reporting will not take place in the hierarchical culture if members believe it is not their duty to do so, or if they consider being a team player to be more important. While the fatalism culture also is characterized by an emphasis on operating within a system of rules, members lack the support offered by group affiliation and feel exposed to unpredictability and chance. In this context, both reporting and not reporting would result from a desire to survive in a perilous and unpredictable environment. Fatalists are likely to turn a blind eye to the wrongdoing except if they are concerned that they would be blamed for the misconduct if it is eventually discovered. The organizational culture of individualism is characterized by low grid and low group, with the emphasis on members exercising their entrepreneurial skills in a competitive environment to maximize individual advantage and resolving conflicts through individual-level bargaining and negotiations. In line with the entrepreneurial spirit of individualism, the decision to report or to keep quiet would be opportunistic and strategic with an eye to the ensuing personal benefits of either course of action. The fourth type of organizational culture is egalitarianism. With its high group and low grid, the focus is not on formal rules and procedures but on resolving issues through deliberation and group negotiation. A high value is placed on solidarity and prioritizing the welfare of the group over individual interests. Here reporting would occur in line with a higher moral principle or to protect the group against harm. In an egalitarian culture, observers of misconduct would refrain from reporting wrongdoing if they consider this action to be disloyal and a betrayal of the group. They would also not report if the unethical behavior is reframed as the accepted way to act as a member of the team.

102 

T. UYS

When considering the influence of organizational loyalty on whistleblowing, it is important to distinguish it from professional loyalty. While organizational loyalty refers to the emotional attachment or commitment that employees display toward their organization, professional loyalty refers to their emotional attachment to or identification with their professions. Researchers argue that employees with high levels of professional commitment would be more likely to raise their concerns outside the organization than those with high levels of organizational loyalty, as the latter would be more sensitive to the social ostracism or rejection that an external disclosure about organizational problems could elicit (Tangirala & Ramanujam, 2008, p. 204; 214). Paeth (2013, p. 559) frames this in terms of choosing between competing sets of moral obligations. Apart from the impact of organizational culture on whistleblowing intentions, some researchers have considered the influence of national culture as well. Studies compared cultural distinctions in whistleblowing behavior between American and Jamaican managers (Sims & Keenan, 1999), American and Taiwanese accounting students (Brody et al., 1999), Indian and American managers (Keenan, 2002), Croatian and US managers (Tavakoli et  al., 2003), Chinese and American managers (Keenan, 2007), and Turkish and Iranian university students (Oktem & Shahbazi, 2012). After comparing the professional judgments of Australian, Indian, and Chinese-Malaysian accountants, Patel (2003) concluded that employing whistleblowing as an internal control mechanism would have a greater likelihood of success in Australian culture. Park et al.’s (2005) study of the effect of Confucian ethics and collectivism on whistleblowing intentions among South Korean public servants demonstrated the complexity of the relationship between whistleblowing and cultural factors. A further study by Park et al. (2008) compared the cultural orientation and attitudes of South Korean, Turkish, and British university students toward different forms of whistleblowing in terms of horizontal and vertical individualism and collectivism. These studies highlighted the importance of considering the impact of national and cultural differences on employees’ perceptions of and responses to wrongdoing. Most of these studies employed the four distinctions developed by Hofstede (1991) in his theory of international cultures. These are: (i) Power-distance: The extent to which employees are unperturbed about approaching or contradicting their superiors. Where power-­ distance is large, power is centralized, and subordinates are

4 

VOICE AND SILENCE: WHO BLOWS THE WHISTLE AND WHY?  

103

expected to comply with instructions without hesitation. Management initiates contact. (ii) Uncertainty avoidance: A high uncertainty avoidance culture evades ambiguity and unpredictability through emphasizing rules and procedures for all situations. (iii) Collectivism/individualism: In this type of culture, people give precedence to group membership and group achievements above individual wellbeing. (iv) Femininity/masculinity: A feminine culture values relationships, cooperation, and security, rather than financial success and advancement. This distinction reflects the expressive/instrumental distinction traditionally associated with gender roles. Each of these distinctions has an impact on individual and organizational whistleblowing propensity, the expression of perceptions of wrongdoing, fear of retaliation for whistleblowing, and the expressed likelihood of blowing the whistle. In societies where a high power-­ distance is dominant, employees would be less likely to challenge established authority patterns by blowing the whistle. In high uncertainty avoidance cultures, the emphasis would be on following the rules, and unauthorized disclosures of perceived wrongdoing are likely to be discouraged. Collectivist cultures emphasize the promotion and maintenance of harmonious working relationships. In this context, it is more likely that whistleblowing would be viewed as an act of betrayal when it exposes organizational wrongdoing rather than individual wrongdoing. Similarly, a feminine culture would avoid confrontation in conflict situations and would, therefore, be less likely to expose perceived wrongdoing through whistleblowing. Trongmateerut and Sweeney (2013) conducted a cross-cultural investigation of the influence of subjective norms on whistleblowing by comparing the collectivist Thai and the individualistic American culture. Their findings showed a direct influence of subjective norms and attitudes for whistleblowing on whistleblowing intentions, and also an indirect effect of subjective norms on whistleblowing intentions through their impact on attitudes. The collectivist Thai participants had significantly stronger subjective norms in support of whistleblowing than the individualistic American participants and held significantly more favorable attitudes toward whistleblowing than their American counterparts, which contrasts with previous studies. Also, subjective norms for whistleblowing had a

104 

T. UYS

stronger impact on attitudes toward whistleblowing in the Thai group, and both subjective norms for and attitude toward whistleblowing impacted more strongly on the intentions of the Thai group to blow the whistle. They also experienced a greater indirect influence of subjective norms on their intentions to blow the whistle than the Americans. While these findings demonstrate that subjective norms strongly influence whistleblowing attitudes and intentions across divergent cultures, the views of referent others seem to play a much more critical role in collectivist cultures. Two important conclusions can be drawn from Trongmateerut and Sweeney’s (2013) study. First, they demonstrate that whistleblowing is not necessarily an individualistic process, by allowing for “circumstances where whistleblowing involves giving voice to collective concerns or activating collective interests” (Vandekerckhove et al., 2014c, p. 55). Second, their findings indicate that any whistleblowing situation could involve different conceptions of group, social or organizational loyalty, also that both group and societal culture influence the management of these conflicting loyalties. The third set of beliefs that impact the intention to behave in a particular way relates to people’s views pertaining to the personal and environmental factors that could assist or hinder them from acting. These are called control beliefs, which result in perceived behavioral control over performance of the behavior.

Perceived Behavioral Control and Control Beliefs According to the TRA, perceived behavioral control refers to: people’s general expectations regarding the degree to which they are capable of performing a given behavior, the extent to which they have the requisite resources and believe they can overcome whatever obstacles they may encounter. (Fishbein & Azjen, 2010, p. 169)

In short, people have perceived behavioral control over a particular action if they believe they have the capacity and the autonomy to engage in the behavior. Some researchers talk of psychological empowerment: “a sense of being confident in one’s abilities, having the freedom to do one’s own thing, and/or protection that stems from psychological security and safety”

4 

VOICE AND SILENCE: WHO BLOWS THE WHISTLE AND WHY?  

105

(Vadera et  al. 2013, p.  1256). If people are psychologically empowered, they are more likely to take the risks required to engage in behavior that deviates constructively from the organizational norms, such as whistleblowing (Appelbaum et  al., 2007, p.  592). They also display feelings of selfworth and self-efficacy, as well as a belief in the efficacy of their actions, and that they will be able to initiate changes successfully (Vadera et al., 2013, pp. 1256–1257). A study among professionals in Canada and the United States showed a direct relationship between self-efficacy and the propensity for internal whistleblowing (MacNab & Worthley, 2007, p. 416). Perceived behavioral control is directly related to the distribution of power in an organization. Organizational power relationships necessarily imply asymmetrical control over resources, opportunities, and coveted outcomes, as well as the resulting dependencies that accompany the exercise of power. Morrison and Rothman (2009) employed the approach-­ inhibition model of power to explain how organizational power imbalances tend to deter the reporting of wrongdoing. The basic argument is that having high formal power activates the approach system of power-holders and de-activates their inhibition system. The reverse tends to take place in the case of people with low power. As a result power-holders hold highly positive views of their competence and effectiveness while being overly critical of the performance and competence of their subordinates. They also become less likely to monitor and censor inappropriate social behavior, thereby violating the norms of politeness in their interactions and creating an image of inaccessibility. This tendency intensifies the feelings of futility and fear among the powerless, which confirms that speaking up is pointless and dangerous. Perceived behavioral control also is affected by the comparative power of the whistleblower vis-à-vis the wrongdoer. Rather than being sanctioned, a powerful wrongdoer is more likely to be protected by the organization. A powerful offender is also in a stronger position to retaliate against the whistleblower and create obstacles in the way of speaking up (Harvey et al., 2009, pp. 74–75). On the other hand, organizations also may be more likely to respond positively to whistleblowers on whom they rely heavily (Miceli & Near, 1992, pp.  188–189). Miceli et  al. (2012, p. 944) found that observers who perceived themselves as having leverage to stop the wrongdoing were more likely to blow the whistle. This tendency indicates that even low-level workers could have idiosyncratic power in the particular situation that provides them with perceived behavioral control.

106 

T. UYS

Interestingly, Robertson et  al. (2011, pp.  226–229) found that the intention of auditors to take action was greatest if the wrongdoer had a reputation for poor performance and was not likable. Performance and likeability were found to be complementary when contrary, but substituted for each other when at least one was positive. Therefore, if a poor performer was likable, or a less likable wrongdoer had a reputation for good performance, auditors showed less of an inclination to act.

Conclusion The literature seems to provide us with sufficient evidence that if individuals have a favorable attitude toward personally blowing the whistle and perceive normative pressure to do so, they will form a positive intention toward engaging in whistleblowing. They also need to believe that they have control over the behavior. The contribution of each determinant to the strength of the intention varies between contexts and between actions. Fishbein and Azjen (2010, p. 21) caution that perceived behavioral control might not necessarily translate into actual control over the performance of the behavior, however. The observer of wrongdoing also should have real control over blowing the whistle through possessing the requisite skills and abilities in a context where environmental constraints are relatively absent. Smaili and Arroyo (2019, p.  100) argue that whistleblowing is more likely to occur to the extent that the observer of wrongdoing has the opportunity, and in particular, the resources to do so. They distinguish between resources internal and external to the organization: Internal resources include procedures, controls, codes of ethics, shareholder activism, and corporate governance mechanisms. External resources include legal protections, compensation, and the absence of sanctions or retaliation. (Smaili & Arroyo, 2019, p. 100)

Whistleblowers are more likely to blow the whistle if they perceive the organization to be responsive to complaints and they trust the complaint recipient, and if the company has a well-designed and communicated whistleblowing program so that they perceive a culture of organizational justice. Determining which individual is the more likely whistleblower is a complex matter. As the Prosocial Behavior Model shows, even the prospect of someone developing an awareness that an act is wrongful is

4 

VOICE AND SILENCE: WHO BLOWS THE WHISTLE AND WHY?  

107

influenced by a variety of factors, including the comprehensiveness and quality of the information on which they base their judgment, cultural variations in perceptions of wrongfulness, and the appropriate response, as well as the extent to which processes of normalization and rationalization convince people that morally dubious practices are acceptable. The perceived harmful consequences of wrongful behavior also play a role and are crucial in persuading observers that wrongdoing has occurred. Similarly, an intricate interplay of factors impacts the eventual intention to blow the whistle. The Theory of Reasoned Action identifies people’s attitudes, perceived norms, and perceived behavioral control concerning whistleblowing as informing their intention to engage in the behavior. If people have a positive mindset about whistleblowing, view the organizational norms as supportive of making disclosures, and believe that they have the situation under control, they are likely to show a firm intention to blow the whistle on organizational wrongdoing. A firm intention is directly related to the likelihood that the behavior will be executed, provided that the potential whistleblowers possess the necessary skills and abilities, and can overcome any environmental constraints preventing them from making the disclosure. In combining the two models, we arrive at a clearer picture of the factors that influence people’s intention to blow the whistle when becoming aware of wrongdoing. Both the POB model and the TRA emphasize the crucial impact of negative consequences on the decision to blow the whistle. Unfortunately, retaliation against the whistleblower, an approach of killing the messenger rather than dealing with the message, tends to be a common occurrence in organizations when confronted with disclosures of organizational wrongdoing. This response is often not anticipated, as whistleblowers think that they are doing the right thing. The next chapter considers the nature, likelihood, and effects of retaliation in creating private troubles for the whistleblower.

References Alford, F. C. (2003). Women as Whistleblowers. Business and Professional Ethics Journal, 22(1), 67–76. Anvari, F., Wenzel, M., Woodyatt, L., & Haslam, A.  S. (2019). The Social Psychology of Whistleblowing: An Integrated Model. Organizational Psychology Review, 9(1), 41–67.

108 

T. UYS

Appelbaum, S.  H., Giulio, D.  I., & Albert, M. (2007). Positive and Negative Deviant Workplace Behaviors: Causes, Impacts, and Solutions. Corporate Governance, 7(5), 586–598. Arnold, D.  F., & Ponemon, L.  A. (1991). Internal Auditors’ Perceptions of Whistle-Blowing and the Influence of Moral Reasoning: An Experiment. A Journal of Theory and Practice, 10(2), 1–15. Attree, M.  J. (2007). Factors Influencing Nurses’ Decisions to Raise Concerns About Care Quality. Journal of Nursing Management, 15, 392–402. Ayers, S., & Kaplan, S. E. (2005). Wrongdoing by Consultants: An Examination of Employees’ Reporting Intentions. Journal of Business Ethics, 57(2), 121–137. Bashir, S., Khattak, H. R., Hanif, A., & Chohan, S. N. (2010). Whistle-blowing in Public Sector Organizations: Evidence from Pakistan. The American Review of Public Administration, 41(3), 285–296. Bjørkelo, B., Ryberg, W., Matthiesen, S.  B., & Einarsen, S. (2008). When You Talk and Talk and Nobody Listens: A mixed Method Case Study of Whistleblowing and its Consequences. International Journal of Organisational Behavior, 13(2), 18–40. Blenkinsopp, J., & Edwards, M. S. (2008). On Not Blowing the Whistle: Quiescent Silence as an Emotional Episode. Research on Emotion in Organizations, 4, 181–206. Blonder, I. (2010). Public Interests and Private Passions: A Peculiar Case of Police Whistleblowing. Criminal Justice Ethics, 29(3), 258–277. Brody, R. G., Coulter, J. M., & Lin, S. (1999). The Effect of National Culture on Whistle- Blowing Perceptions. Teaching Business Ethics, 3(4), 385–400. Caillier, J. G. (2013). Do Employees Feel Comfortable Blowing the Whistle When Their Supervisors Practice Transformational Leadership? International Journal of Public Administration, 36(14), 1020–1028. Cassematis, P. G., & Wortley, R. (2013). Prediction of Whistleblowing or Non-­ reporting Observation: The Role of Personal and Situational Factors. Journal of Business Ethics, 117(3), 615–634. Chang, Y., Wilding, M., & Shin, M. C. (2017). Determinants of Whistleblowing Intention: Evidence from the South Korean Government. Public Performance & Management Review, 40(4), 676–700. Chiu, R. K. (2003). Ethical Judgment and Whistleblowing Intention: Examining the Moderating Role of Locus of Control. Journal of Business Ethics, 43, 65–74. Colvin, G. (2002). Wonder Women of Whistleblowing. Fortune, 146(3), 56. Edwards, M. S., Ashkenasy, N. M., & Gardner, J. (2009). Deciding to Speak Up or Remain Silent Following Observed Wrongdoing: The Role of Discrete Emotions and Climate of Silence. In J. Greenberg & M. S. Edwards (Eds.), Voice and Silence in Organizations. Emerald. Fishbein, M., & Ajzen, I. (2010). Predicting and Changing Behavior: The Reasoned Action Approach. Psychology Press and Taylor and Francis.

4 

VOICE AND SILENCE: WHO BLOWS THE WHISTLE AND WHY?  

109

Ghani, N.  A., Galbreath, J., & Evans, R. (2011). Predicting Whistle-blowing Intention among Supervisors in Malaysia. Journal of Global management, 3(1), 1–18. Greenberg, J., & Baron, R. A. (2003). Behavior in Organizations: Understanding and Managing the Human Side of Work (7th ed.). Prentice Hall. Greenberger, D. B., Miceli, M. P., & Cohen, D. (1987). Oppositionists and Group Norms: The Reciprocal Influence of Whistle-Blowers and `Co-Workers. Journal of Business Ethics, 6, 527–542. Harvey, P., Martinko, M. J., & Douglas, S.C. (2009). Causal Perceptions and the Decision to Speak Up or Pipe Down. In J. Greenberg & M. S. Edwards (Eds.), Voice and Silence in Organizations. Bingley, UK: Emerald. Henik, E. (2008). Mad as Hell or Scared Stiff? The Effect of Value Conflict and Emotions on Potential Whistle-Blowers. Journal of Business Ethics, 80, 111–119. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-­007-­9441-­1 Hirschman, A. (1970). Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States. Harvard University Press. Hofstede, G. (1991). Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind. McGraw-Hill. Janusz, B. D. (2013). When Women Blow the Whistle. Herizons. Jones, J. C., Spraakman, G., & Sánchez-Rodríguez, C. (2014). What’s in it for Me? An Examination of Accounting Students’ Likelihood to Report Faculty Misconduct. Journal of Business Ethics, 123, 645–667. https://doi. org/10.1007/s10551-­013-­2015-­5 Kaplan, S., Pany, K., Samuels, J., & Zhang, J. (2009). An Examination of the Association between Gender and Reporting Intentions for Fraudulent Financial Reporting. Journal of Business Ethics, 87(1), 15–30. Keenan, J.  P. (2002). Comparing Indian and American Managers on Whistleblowing. Employee Responsibilities and Rights Journal, 14(2/3), 79–89. Keenan, J.  P. (2007). Comparing Chinese and American Managers on Whistleblowing. Employee Responsibilities and Rights Journal, 19(2), 85–94. King, G., III. (1999). The Implications of an Organization’s Structure on Whistleblowing. Journal of Business Ethics, 20(4), 315–326. King, G., III. (2000). The Implications of Differences in Cultural Attitudes and Styles of Communication on Peer Reporting Behaviour. Cross Cultural Management. An International Journal, 7(2), 11–17. Klaas, B.  S., Olson-Buchanan, J., & Ward, A.-K. (2012). The Determinants of Alternative Forms of Workplace Voice: An Integrative Perspective. Journal of Management., 38(1), 314–345. Lavena, C.  F. (2014). Whistle-Blowing: Individual and Organisational Determinants of the Decision to Report Wrongdoing in the Federal Government. American Review of the Public Administration, 46, 1–24. Sage Publications.

110 

T. UYS

LePine, J. A., & Van Dyne, L. (1998). Predicting Voice Behavior in Work Groups. Journal of Applied Psychology, 83(6), 853–868. Liyanarachchi, G.  A., & Adler, R.  W. (2010). Accountants’ Whistle-blowing Intentions: The Impact of Retaliation, Age, and Gender (Accountancy Working Paper Series). Gregory Liyanarachchi & Ralph Adler. http://hdl.handle. net/10523/1573 Loyens, K. (2013). Towards a Custom- Made Whistleblowing Policy. Using Grid-­ Group Cultural Theory to Match Policy Measures to Different Styles of Peer Reporting. Journal of Business Ethics, 114(2), 239–249. MacNab, B. R., & Worthley, R. (2007). Self-Efficacy as an Intrapersonal Predictor for Internal Whistleblowing: A US and Canada Examination. Journal of Business Ethics, 79, 407–442. Mclain, D., & Keenan, J. P. (1999). Risk, Information, and the Decision about Response to Wrongdoing in an Organization. Journal of Business Ethics, 19(3), 255–271. Mesmer-Magnus, J.  R., & Viswesvaran, C. (2005). Whistleblowing in Organizations: An Examination of Correlates of Whistleblowing Intentions, Actions, and Retaliation. Journal of Business Ethics, 62(3), 277–297. Miceli, M. P., & Near, J. P. (1992). (1992). Blowing the Whistle – The Organizational and Legal Implications for Companies and Employees. New  York: Lexington Books. Miceli, M. P., & Near, J. P. (2013). Some Implications of the Voice Literature for Research on Whistle-Blowing. In R. J. Burke & C. L. Cooper (Eds.), Voice and Whistleblowing in Organizations: Overcoming Fear, Fostering Courage and Unleashing Candour. Edward Elgar Publishing. Miceli, M.  P., Near, J.  P., & Dworkin, T.  M. (2008). Whistle-blowing in Organisations. Routledge. Miceli, M. P., Near, J. P., Regh, M. T., & Van Scotter, J. R. (2012). Predicting Employee Reactions to Perceive Organizational Wrongdoing: Demoralization, Justice, Proactive Personality, and Whistle-blowing. Human Relations, Sage, 65(8), 923–954. Miceli, M.P. & Near, J.P. (1992). Blowing the Whistle – The Organizational and Legal Implications for Companies and Employees. New York: Lexington Books. Milliken, F. J., Elizabeth, W. M., & Patricia, F. H. (2003). An Exploratory Study of Employee Silence: Issues that Employees Don’t Communicate Upward and Why. Journal of Management Studies, 40(6), 1453–1476. Morrison, E. W., & Rothman, N. B. (2009). Silence and the Dynamics of Power. In J.  Greenberg & M.  S. Edwards (Eds.), Voice and Silence in Organizations. Emerald. Near, J.  P., & Miceli, M.  P. (1985). Organizational Dissidence: The Case of whistle-­blowing. Journal of Business Ethics, 4, 1–16.

4 

VOICE AND SILENCE: WHO BLOWS THE WHISTLE AND WHY?  

111

Oktem, M.  K., & Shahbaz, G. (2012). Attitudes toward Different Forms of Whistleblowing in Turkey and Iran. Middle-East Journal of Scientific Research., 12(7), 945–951. Paeth, S.  R. (2013). The Responsibility to Lie and the Obligation to Report. Journal of Business Ethics., 112(4), 559–566. Park, H., Blenkinsopp, J., Oktem, K. M., & Omurgonulsen, U. (2008). Cultural Orientation and Attitudes toward Different Forms of Whistleblowing: A Comparison of South Korea, Turkey, and the U.K. Journal of Business Ethics., 82(4), 929–939. Park, H., & Blenkinsopp, J. 2009. Whistleblowing as planned behavior – A survey of South Korean police officers. Journal of Business Ethics, 85(4), 545–556. Park, H., Rehg, M. T., & Lee, D. (2005). The Influence of Confucian Ethics and Collectivism on Whistleblowing Intentions: A Study of South Korean Public Employees. Journal of Business Ethics., 58, 387–403. Patel, C. (2003). Some Cross-Cultural Evidence on Whistle-Blowing as an Internal Control Mechanism. Journal of International Accounting Research., 2(1), 69–96. Ponemon, L. (1994). Whistle-blowing an Internal Control Mechanism: Individual and Organizational Considerations. Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, 13(2), 118–130. Reiss, M. C., & Mitra, K. (1998). The effects of individual difference factors on the acceptability of ethical and unethical workplace behaviors. Journal of Business Ethics, 17(14), 1581–1593. Richardson, B. K., Wang, Z., & Hall, C. A. (2012). Blowing the Whistle Against Greek Hazing: The Theory of Reasoned Action as a Framework for Reporting Intentions. Communication Studies, 63(2), 172–193. Robertson, J. C., Stefaniak, C. M., & Curtis, M. B. (2011). Does Wrongdoer Reputation Matter? Impact of Auditor-Wrongdoer Performance and Likeability Reputations on Fellow Auditors’ Intention to Take Action and Choice of Reporting Outlet. Behavioral Research in Accounting, 23(2), 207–234. Robinson, S.  N., Robertson, J.  C., & Curtis, M.  B. (2012). The Effects of Contextual and Wrongdoing Attributes on Organizational Employees’ Whistleblowing Intentions Following Fraud. Journal of Business Ethics, 106(2), 213–227. Rothschild, J., & Miethe, T. D. (1994). Whistleblowing as Resistance in Modern Work Organizations. In J.  M. Jermier, D.  Knights, & W.  R. Nord (Eds.), Resistance and Power in Organizations (pp. 252–273). Routledge. Senekal, A., & Uys, T. (2013). Creating an Ethogenic Organisation: The Development and Implementation of a Whistleblowing Policy. African Journal of Business Ethics, 7(1), 32–39.

112 

T. UYS

Simon, J. (2013). Locating Gender and Resistance Through a Feminist Application of Gramsci’s “Organic Intellectual”: An Analysis of Time Magazine’s 2002 “Person(s) of the Year”. Southern Communication Journal, 78(1), 56–69. Sims, R.  L., & Keenan, J.  P. (1998). Predictors of External Whistleblowing: Organizational and Intrapersonal Variables. Journal of Business Ethics, 17(4), 411–421. Sims, R. L., & Keenan, J. P. (1999). A cross-cultural comparison of managers’ whistleblowing tendencies. International Journal of Value-Based Management, 12(2), 137–151. Smaili, N., & Arroyo, P. (2019). Categorization of Whistleblowers Using the Whistleblowing Triangle. Journal of Business Ethics, 159, 95–117. Tangirala, S., & Ramanujam, R. (2008). Employee silence on critical work issues: The cross-level effects of procedural justice climate. Personnel Psychology, 61, 37–68. Tavakoli, A.  A., Keenan, J.  P., & Crnjak-Karanovic, B. (2003). Culture and Whistleblowing. An Empirical Study of Croatian and United States Managers Utilizing Hofstede’s Cultural Dimensions. Journal of Business Ethics, 43, 49–64. Teo, H., & Caspersz, D. (2011). Dissenting discourse exploring alternatives to the whistleblowing/silence dichotomy. Journal of Business Ethics, 104(2), 237–249. Trongmateerut, P., & Sweeney, J. T. (2013). The Influence of Subjective Norms on Whistle-blowing: A Cross-cultural Investigation. Journal of Business Ethics, 112(3), 437–451. Vadera, A. K., Aquilera, V. R., & Caza, B. B. (2009). Making sense of the Whistle-­ Blowing’s Antecedents: Learning from Research on Identity and Ethics Programs. Business Ethics Quarterly, 19(4), 553–586. Vadera, A.  K., Pratt, M.  G., & Mishra, P. (2013). Constructive Deviance in Organizations: Integrating and Moving Forward. Journal of Management, 39(5), 1221–1276. Van Dyne, L., & LePine, J. A. (1998). Helping and Voice extra-role Behaviour: Evidence of Construct and Predictive Validity. Academy of Management Journal, 41(1), 108–119. Vandekerckhove, W., Uys, T., Rehg, M. T., & Brown, A. J. (2014c). Understandings of Whistleblowing: Dilemmas of Societal Culture. In A. J. Brown, D. Lewis, R. E. Moberly, & W. Vandekerckhove (Eds.), International Handbook on Whistleblowing Research. Edward Elgar. Winardi, R.  D. (2013). The Influence of Individual and Situational Factors on Lower-level Civil Servants’ Whistle-blowing Intention in Indonesia. Journal of Indonesian Economy and Business, 28(3), 361–376. Zakaria, M., Razak, S. N. A. A., & Yusoff, M. S. A. (2016). The Theory of Planned Behaviour as a Framework for Whistle-Blowing Intentions. Review of European Studies, 8(3), 221–236. Zhang, J., Chiu, R., & Wei, L. (2009). Decision-making process of internal whistleblowing behavior in China: Empirical evidence and implications. Journal of Business Ethics, 88, 25–41.

CHAPTER 5

Personal Troubles: The Impact on the Whistleblower

Introduction In promoting an active citizenry, C.  Wright Mills (1959) believed that acquiring a sociological imagination assists individuals to achieve a better understanding of and more control over the structural forces that shaped their lives. Rather than understanding their lives in terms of the local milieu of private troubles, a sociological imagination enables them to connect their biographies with more significant structural and historical trends (Mills, 1970, p.  15). They would, therefore, come to understand their ostensibly private troubles as public issues that extend beyond their domain. For whistleblowers, the reverse occurs. They believe they are engaging in a public issue: the recognition and exposure of perceived wrongdoing in the workplace. Their ultimate goal is to ensure that the wrongdoing ceases. However, they soon realize that the public issue they address has become a private trouble due to the retaliation they receive in response to their disclosure. Empirical research conducted mainly in the global north, suggests that the incidence of retaliation rarely exceeds two-fifths of all whistleblowers (Smith, 2014, p.  233). However, the experiences of the South African whistleblowers, as described in Chap. 3, demonstrate the devastating impact of reprisal, where it does occur. This chapter explores whistleblowing as a private trouble by considering the adverse ways in which organizations respond to whistleblowers as well as the impact that this has on the whistleblower’s relationships and circumstances. These impacts include financial pressures, deteriorating © The Author(s) 2022 T. Uys, Whistleblowing and the Sociological Imagination, https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-39445-3_5

113

114 

T. UYS

relations with colleagues, family, and friends, and the toll these strains have on the whistleblower’s mental wellbeing and self-confidence. The final part of this chapter looks at whistleblowers’ responses to these challenges.

Whistleblowing as a Personal Trouble Whistleblowers are often under the impression that they are acting in the best interests of the organization or broader society. They believe that as loyal employees, or organizational citizens, it is part of their responsibility to disclose suspicions of wrongdoing so that the allegations are investigated before they escalate, and have serious detrimental consequences for the organization or broader public, or harm the organization’s reputation or the public’s confidence in governance. In contrast, the employer, or those implicated, who may be in positions of power, may view the revelations of the whistleblower as insubordination and disloyal to the organization, especially if it reveals entrusted information the employer, or those in power, does not want to be exposed (Uys & Senekal, 2008, p. 40). Whistleblowing, therefore, disturbs the stability of an organization. Through disclosing information about perceived wrongdoing, the whistleblower deviates from organizational norms that define appropriate behavior in the group. These norms might define the supposedly wrongful activities as standard practice in the organization. Some members of the organization might be reliant on the practices continuing or might fear that the potential harm to organizational reputation caused by the disclosure of wrongdoing could lead to a termination of operations and a loss of jobs. They might also consider blowing the whistle a violation of “a moral obligation of loyalty to the group and, sometimes, professional norms of autonomy and self-regulation” (Greenberger et al., 1987, p. 529). As social systems, organizations generally respond to the destabilizing effects of whistleblowing by attempting to restore harmony and balance in the collective body (organization). Greenberger et al. (1987, pp. 534–538) distinguished between two possible ways in which this could occur, the “genetic” and “functionalist” approaches. The former refers to the organization attempting to restore a sense of unity by altering its norms. A better term might be to call it a transformative response. The transformative organization would, therefore, address the concerns raised by the whistleblower. When following the latter approach, the organization’s response is reactionary aimed at maintaining the status quo. In a

5  PERSONAL TROUBLES: THE IMPACT ON THE WHISTLEBLOWER 115

reactionary response the  organization pressurizes the whistleblower to drop the complaint, or if unsuccessful, removes the whistleblower from the group, either psychologically or physically. The Transformative Response to Whistleblowing The transformative model argues that the kind of response that whistleblowers receive depends on their credibility and competence, and the idiosyncrasy credit they have accumulated. The higher the perceived integrity of the whistleblower, the more likely it is that colleagues will accept the whistleblower’s view that a particular behavior is unacceptable and needs addressing. Similarly, whistleblowers will be influential in changing the norms if they are perceived as competent. Competence is often associated with the whistleblower’s consistent opposition to the wrongful behavior. On the other hand, the whistleblower who initially conformed to organizational norms, thereby accruing idiosyncrasy credits, might be more influential. Furthermore, whistleblowers who are similar to the group members on all dimensions other than the difference of opinion that led to the whistleblowing are also more likely to be influential in changing group norms. A change is also more likely to occur if the whistleblower receives social support from colleagues or if the broader prevailing norms are consistent with the changes that the whistleblower is striving for (Greenberger et al., 1987, pp. 536–538). The Reactionary Response to Whistleblowing However, the altering of group norms is seldom the likely response in a whistleblowing scenario. The breakdown of group consensus that results from a disclosure of suspicions of wrongdoing is often followed by attempts to restore order through convincing the whistleblower to conform by dropping the complaint, a reactionary response. Initial efforts would focus on getting the whistleblower to see the error of his or her ways. If the whistleblower does not respond in the desired direction, threats could escalate and eventually result in expulsion from the group (Greenberger et  al., 1987, p.  536). If the whistleblower’s concerns are rejected internally, and the whistleblower does not back down, the organization retaliates against the whistleblower (Miceli et al., 2008, p. 11).

116 

T. UYS

Retaliation Against Whistleblowers Dworkin and Baucus (1998, p. 1287) identified four stages through which retaliation progresses. The first is nullification, where verbal abuse, rebukes, or criticisms of their work performance are used in an attempt to convince the whistleblower to withdraw the allegations. The second is isolation, which includes efforts to transfer or reassign the whistleblower and restrict their access to information and other resources, thereby successfully insulating other members of the organization from the whistleblower. This stage is followed by defamation, where the organization seeks to destroy the whistleblower’s credibility or reputation. The final stage is expulsion, which entails coercing the whistleblower to leave the organization, either willingly or reluctantly. As the stories of South African whistleblowers described in Chap. 3 show, retaliation generally does not follow this pattern neatly. It could include some or all of these phases, and the stages could occur in any order or simultaneously. However, these four stages provide a useful categorization of what Cortina and Magley (2003) called “work-related retaliation.” Work-Related Retaliation Work-related retaliation can take on many forms, ranging from subtle indications of displeasure to drastic victimization. Initially, management might pretend to take the issue seriously, but in reality, they could just be blowing “hot air.” They often engage in stonewalling, where inquiries fall on deaf ears, and memos remain unanswered (Hunt, 1995). Organizations resort to personal harassment, constructive dismissals, transfers to another section, or the implementation of disciplinary proceedings in an attempt to silence the whistleblower. If possible, where the threat to authority, or practices or vested interests, is perceived to be great, the whistleblower is fired or suspended immediately, or otherwise, processes are initiated, which would justify termination of employment (such as abruptly downgrading performance evaluations) (Bashir et al., 2010, pp. 8–9). Lennane’s (1993, p. 668) study demonstrated this pattern of behavior by organizations. Only three of the 31 people who blew the whistle at the organization that employed them were still working there at the same level at the time of completing the questionnaire. Of the original 35 respondents, only ten were working full-time in any capacity.

5  PERSONAL TROUBLES: THE IMPACT ON THE WHISTLEBLOWER 117

Getting rid of the whistleblower is often not considered enough. Whistleblowers frequently suffer character assassination and blacklisting, despite verbal, or even written, promises that the organization will not do anything to harm their future careers (Alford, 2001, p. 19; Davis, 1989, p. 5; Glazer & Glazer, 1989, p. 137; Greene & Latting, 2004, p. 221; Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005). In some instances, the company might even resort to attempts to get the whistleblower declared mentally unstable (Rothschild & Miethe, 1994, p. 265). In Lennane’s study (1993, p.  669), more than half of the respondents were put under pressure to consult a psychiatrist. The experiences of Allison Pedzinski when she disclosed irregular share transactions by one of the executive directors of Standard Bank stock brokerage Andisa Securities, where she was a senior compliance officer, is an example of how vindictive organizations, or managers, are when disclosures of wrongdoing cast them in a bad light, and illegal practices are exposed. Pedzinski disclosed the irregularities to her immediate superior as well as to others in the SCMB Group compliance structures. At the time, a back problem compelled her to work a half day. Six weeks after making the disclosures, she received a letter informing her that she would be required to work full-time for operational reasons. When she indicated that her physical condition prevented her from doing so, and negotiations about a possible redeployment broke down, her position was declared redundant, and she lost her job. In his Labor Court judgment two years later, Justice Leeuw found that the dismissal was automatically unfair and that the company’s “reason for dismissal based on operational requirements was spurious and a sham. Respondent used Applicant’s health condition as ammunition in order to rid itself of an employee who proved herself to be diligent and committed in the execution of her duties” (Pedzinski v Andisa Securities, 2005). George,1 a lawyer employed in the financial sector, shared similar experiences. Oral and later written warnings were followed by a constructive dismissal when he was transferred to another section, where he was overqualified for the post. He lost his private office and secretary and was moved to an open-plan environment. Contact with members of his former

1  I refer to the whistleblower only by first name, a pseudonym, if the information referred to stems from the interviews that I have conducted. References to whistleblowers by first name and surname indicate that the information is in the public domain.

118 

T. UYS

department was therefore severed, and he was told to abide by the “culture” of the organization. Mike Tshishonga, who blew the whistle at the South African Department of Justice about the irregular appointment of liquidators, described his experiences as follows: I would go the office and no job was coming to me. I had my desk, computer and everything but not work. I would go there, do nothing and leave the office at knockoff time. (Mangena, 2015, p. 42)

Social Retaliation Work-related retaliation is often accompanied by social retaliation, which entails practices aimed at marginalizing whistleblowers in the organization as well as society in general (Alford, 2001, p. 131). Colleagues and superiors become progressively less friendly. They isolate the whistleblower through closing ranks and identifying the whistleblower as a “troublemaker” or “not one of us” as a form of intimidation. They are separated from their peers, subordinates, and superiors, to minimize their impact on the organization and to ensure that they cannot mobilize any support for their position among their colleagues (Uys, 2000). When others start to portray the whistleblower as exhibiting a disagreeable social characteristic, the whistleblower becomes stigmatized (Bjørkelo et al., 2008, p. 71). This labeling as a social deviant often results from the whistleblower violating social norms that support, or at least tolerate, wrongdoing (Miceli et al., 2008, pp. 128–129). The whistleblower might even be socially ostracized, receiving no invitations to meetings or social events, and co-workers whom they previously considered to be friends now avoid them (Davis, 1989, p.  5; Rothschild, 2008, p.  890). Where work-related retaliation usually comprises formal, conspicuous antagonistic actions recorded in the whistleblower’s employment history, social retaliation tends to consist of informal, undocumented anti-social behaviors (Miceli et  al., 2008, pp. 14–15). Max, a whistleblower in the public sector, was disillusioned by the response he got from his colleagues, and this is clearly shown in the following comment: It’s a good thing that when you are having difficulties, you start to see who your real friends are. In the office, I don’t remember anyone of my senior

5  PERSONAL TROUBLES: THE IMPACT ON THE WHISTLEBLOWER 119

colleagues calling me to offer support. But when you meet them in the street, they say we are with you. Some support you but are afraid. They worry, will I be kicked out, and so on and so forth, if I show sympathy. There was word that anybody who showed sympathy will be dealt with.

The retaliation against Max even posed a threat to his wife, who was employed in another public service department. Her colleagues were concerned that she might follow her husband’s example. The cabinet minister responsible for the department where she worked, requested her redeployment to another division in a much lower post where she had no duties. After tolerating the humiliation and boredom for about six months, she eventually negotiated an agreement to leave the employ of the department. Physical Retaliation Whistleblowers sometimes live in fear for their lives as a consequence of blowing the whistle. The Guptaleaks whistleblowers left South Africa for an undisclosed destination abroad, when the exposure of their identities seemed imminent. They believed that it would never be safe to live in South Africa again and that they needed to build new lives for themselves and their families outside the country (Dlamini, 2018, p. 20). Whistleblower Thabiso Zulu survived an apparent assassination attempt in November 2019 after testifying to the Moerane Commission about massive looting and corruption in the Harry Gwala District Municipality in KwaZulu-Natal province. The Moerane Commission was appointed to investigate political killings in KwaZulu-Natal. Police Minister Bheki Cele’s reluctance to provide Zulu with state protection prompted the South African Human Rights Commission to take the matter to court. In March 2020, the Pretoria high court ruled that the Minister of Justice should provide Thabiso Zulu with witness protection. However, on May 3, 2020, he left the witness protection program just over a week after he had entered it. He wanted to be provided with protectors, to be protected as a citizen. He felt that it was unfair that he had to go into hiding, uprooting “his life and his identity while those responsible for the corruption and wrongdoing can go on living their lives as they wish” (Wiener, 2020, p. 408). At the end of July 2020, following protest action in the Pietermaritzburg region of KwaZulu-Natal, he was arrested on charges of intimidation and incitement to commit public violence. The National Prosecuting Authority

120 

T. UYS

(NPA) withdrew the charges, citing insufficient evidence to justify pursuing the case. Zulu viewed this as evidence that “state resources were being used by KZN politicians to silence those fighting for justice” (Duma, 2020). In extreme cases, whistleblowers have also lost their lives as a result of their disclosures. As described in Chap. 3, some South African whistleblowers have paid with their lives for raising concerns about wrongdoing, either because they were murdered to silence them or because they were unable to afford their medical expenses after losing their jobs. A further example of a whistleblower who sacrificed his life is that of Xola Banisi, an employee at the parastatal Bloem Water in the Free State Province, whose body was found next to his car outside his girlfriend’s house with three bullet wounds in September 2014. He had approached the Public Protector about suspected double invoicing and payments by Bloem Water for the same training to different service providers and was working with the Hawks Anti-Corruption Unit at the time. He previously had reported receiving death threats to the police (Thamm, 2015, p. 2). Two more recent cases are those of Moses Tshake and Philemon Ngwenya, both whistleblowers who provided evidence of the fraudulent diversion of state funds intended to empower 100 black emerging farmers as part of the Gupta-linked Estina dairy farm project in the Free State Province in central South Africa. Tshake’s injuries from being kidnapped and tortured were so severe that he died in hospital. Ngwenya was found murdered in his home in October 2018 (Moroe, 2020). On 23 August 2021, Babita Deokaran, a senior Gauteng health official, died in a hail of bullets following her disclosures about personal protection equipment (PPE) tender fraud (Bhengu, 2021). These are just a few examples of the many South African whistleblowers who have lost their lives in pursuit of the public interest. It should be kept in mind that retaliation against whistleblowers could also take the form of omissions. Organizations could refrain from taking positive actions, such as a promotion or a salary increase as a reprisal for the whistleblowing. Such inaction is often even more challenging to prove with any certainty than the more informal, social kinds of retaliation, but, nonetheless, it could have a palpable effect on the whistleblower’s life.

5  PERSONAL TROUBLES: THE IMPACT ON THE WHISTLEBLOWER 121

The Effects of Retaliation on the Whistleblower Researchers generally agree that the retaliation suffered by whistleblowers has a ruinous effect on all aspects of their lives and those of their families (Glazer & Glazer, 1989; Miceli et al., 2008; Miethe, 1999; Rothschild, 2008; Uys, 2008). Smith (2014, p. 232) distinguishes between two senses of suffering experienced by whistleblowers: the one entailing objective loss or injury and the other the subjective distress that follows on the actual loss or harm. Whistleblower researchers generally assume that whistleblowers’ objective loss is connected with their personal feelings of injury. Effects on the Whistleblower’s Finances Retaliation often takes the form of a disruption of the whistleblower’s work life through transfers, changes in work assignments, or termination (Smith, 2014, p. 245). There are many instances where the loss of their careers as a result of being blacklisted, or the questioning of their credibility or competence, and the expenditures they incur in their struggle for vindication, ruined them financially (Rothschild & Miethe 1994, p. 267). The example of John Muller, as described in Chap. 3, is a case in point. Even though he had exposed an extensive fraudulent scheme regarding the issuing of licenses for learner’ and driver’s licenses in Mpumalanga Province, or perhaps because of it, he was hounded out of his job. Five years later, he passed away in “penury and obscurity” (Kadalie, 2011), unable to afford the medical treatment he desperately needed. Another example is that of Ken, a Safety and Security Manager at a company manufacturing explosives, who provided evidence of a senior employee’s misconduct to the board of directors of the company. He responded to the organization’s call for a disciplinary hearing by applying for a court interdict in terms of the Protected Disclosures Act (2000). Despite a finding in his favor, Ken’s employer continued to investigate his work culminating in a disciplinary hearing finding him guilty of insolence and insubordination. Five months after reinstatement, he was fired. The loss of income forced him to sell his house and incur loans to pay for his mounting debts and find the necessary funds to start over in a new field (Uys & Smit, 2016, p. 65).

122 

T. UYS

Psychosocial Effects of Whistleblowing Apart from the adverse material consequences when they lose their careers, whistleblowers suffer psychosocial effects. As Deb et  al. (2011, p.  317) indicate, the material deprivation, loss of social identity and role, amiguity, unassigned time, and stigmatization that generally accompany losing your job are hugely stressful. The organization’s reprisals tend to have a disastrous effect on whistleblowers’ self-image and confidence, and they are inclined to develop feelings of insecurity, depression, and anxiety (Davis, 1989; Glazer & Glazer, 1989; Miceli et  al., 2008; Miethe, 1999; Rothschild, 2008; Uys, 2008). Some whistleblowers felt that their previous experiences had effectively silenced them as a whistleblower and that the culture of silence in their organizations is reinforced by a climate of fear so that whistleblowers fear for their own and their family’s wellbeing (Jackson et al., 2010a, p. 2198). Wendy Addison’s experience is a typical case that encapsulates the above. She was working as treasurer of Leisurenet, a South African company operating the Health & Racquet Club franchise, when she came across evidence of corruption perpetrated by the two Leisurenet joint chief executives. When her attempt to blow the whistle anonymously through a phone call to the South African Revenue Service resulted in her being exposed as a whistleblower, she was ridiculed and started receiving anonymous death threats. Soon after arriving in London on a “self-­ imposed exile in the UK,” she landed a job as treasurer at the Virgin Group. However, six months later, her employment at Virgin was terminated when it impeded Richard Branson’s proposed takeover of Leisurenet. Identified as a whistleblower of a listed company and fired by Virgin, she became unemployable and was forced to survive through begging, a welfare grant, and squatting in an abandoned house with her then 12-year old son for the next five years (Seeliger, 2011). Addison (in van de Velde, 2013) summed up her experiences as follows: As a whistleblower, you don’t just lose your job.… You also lose your colleagues, friends and family. They turn away from you, because they don’t believe you. But fear seldom provides good guidance. We are being raised with the idea not to stick one’s nose in other people’s business and to keep to ourselves. But injustice is injustice. This can not be tolerated.

5  PERSONAL TROUBLES: THE IMPACT ON THE WHISTLEBLOWER 123

Peters et al. (2011, pp. 2909–2912) identified three dominant themes in a study of the impact of whistleblowing on the emotional health of whistleblowers, as well as on the subjects of the whistleblowing disclosures in the field of nursing. The first was “overwhelming and persistent distress”. Participants described tearful episodes, incidents of alcohol abuse, a loss of confidence, a reluctance to participate in social occasions, and ongoing depressive symptoms. Second, participants experienced acute anxiety, panic attacks, and hypervigilance, and third, they were troubled by “nightmares, flashbacks, and intrusive thoughts”. During an interview, Kate, a South African whistleblower who reported on fraud in a multinational IT company, mentioned her feelings of depression six times and also described how she had considered suicide. And Yvonne explained how she started doubting herself after raising concerns about mismanagement and the falsification of results in a university research center: Then you are bombarded for many months with the idea that you are not good enough, you are the problem, you do not fit in, you are too inexperienced, then I think it does not matter how strong your self-image is, it does have an effect on you.

In their study of the use of mental health as a weapon in whistleblower retaliation, Kenny et al. (2019) described how organizations engaged in normative violence by characterizing whistleblowers as mentally unstable and untrustworthy individuals. Fearing additional stigma, this attack on their credibility often leads to a suppression of any visible signs of stress and a denial of mental health issues. Ironically, whistleblowers simultaneously tend to use mental health discourses to demonstrate the impact of organizational retaliation. Kenny et al. (2019, p. 812) describe the unbearable situation whistleblowers find themselves in: On the one hand, whistleblowers are retaliated against because of their disclosures, which harms their mental health and well-being, and they are then seen as unreliable and untrustworthy outcasts because of the suffering that the wrongdoing organizations inflicted upon them in the first place. On the other hand, they rely on the mental health discourse to draw attention to their plight and to defend the validity of their claims.

124 

T. UYS

Effects on Physical Health The physical health of whistleblowers also often is affected negatively. During her Labor Court case, Allison Pedzinsky described how emotional stress exacerbated her back problem in 2003. The strain on her marriage and the deterioration in her social life led to her developing an asthmatic condition (Pedzinski v. Andisa Securities, 2005, p. 99). A year after blowing the whistle, and facing constant harassment, John Muller’s health had deteriorated to such an extent that he was compelled to apply for a severance package on medical grounds (Arenstein, 2003, p. 2). Mark van der Riet, a scientist responsible for verifying the quality of coal provided to Eskom, passed away due to a stress-induced heart attack purportedly mere hours after finalizing his submission to the Zondo commission about the delivery of substandard coal by the Gupta’s Brakfontein mine. He previously had spent more than 21 months in limbo after reporting to Eskom management that the quality of about half of the coal this mine provided was below the required standard (Blenkinsop, 2019). Effects on Interpersonal Relations in the Workplace Retaliation has a severely detrimental effect on interpersonal relations in the workplace. The whistleblower’s working relationship with his/her supervisor is generally damaged irretrievably (Cortina & Magley, 2003; Rehg et al., 2008). The negative image or label of being a troublemaker is often assumed to be an accurate characterization of the whistleblower. Colleagues start interpreting the whistleblower’s behavior differently, which impacts interpersonal interactions. Self-fulfilling prophecies that seem to validate the negative label arise. Respondents in Milliken et al.’s (2003, p. 1470) study described how being negatively labeled led to “loss of trust, respect and credibility, social rejection and weakened interpersonal ties, diminished power and hence difficulty getting cooperation and buy-in.” They, therefore, lose the social capital flowing from their social network of relationships that is essential to perform their jobs successfully (Milliken et  al., 2003, pp.  1471–1472). Jackson et  al. (2010b,  p. 41) found that hostile attitudes, distrust, and bullying from colleagues destroyed former collegial relationships. While bullying by superiors tends to be work-related, colleagues engage in social-relation-related and person-related bullying. Superiors respond to the disclosure by engaging in unwarranted monitoring of the

5  PERSONAL TROUBLES: THE IMPACT ON THE WHISTLEBLOWER 125

whistleblower’s work or withholding feedback about the whistleblower’s performance. Colleagues are likely to engage in bullying through ignoring or excluding the whistleblower or spreading gossip about him/her. Physical bullying in the form of threats of violence or intimidating behavior could also occur (Park et al., 2020, pp. 595–596). Some co-workers would shun the whistleblower in order not to become contaminated, while others openly become enemies. At best, colleagues start looking at the whistleblower “as they would someone dying of cancer” (Davis, 1989, p. 8). Rothschild (2008, p. 891) described the paralyzing effect on other employees in the workplace of the example made of the whistleblower through retaliation. Apart from shunning their former colleague, they also think twice about engaging in disclosures about perceived wrongdoing.  Effect on Relationships with Family and Friends The whistleblower’s intimate relationships likewise are affected negatively. Marriages are destroyed, and relationships with family and friends are put under strain. For John, the failure of his marriage was a direct result of the tensions he experienced at work. His wife could not identify or sympathize with the problems he was experiencing. He interpreted her request for a divorce as a sign that he should make a new beginning. Soon after the divorce was granted, he not only changed his job but also moved to a different city in a different province. Audrey described how the experience of retaliation caused a strain in her marriage and family life: My husband would have liked me to stop. We love each other but at one stage he wanted to divorce me. Your whole life goes on hold. Am I doing the right thing? Is my husband going to forgive me for this? I am short-­ tempered with my son. I have been a bad mom. I am consumed by what has happened.

In an interview reported on the Corruption Watch (Talane, 2013) website, Sililo Tshishonga, the wife of Mike Tshishonga, described how death threats forced them to “move out of a home I really loved, sell very quickly and move into a secure complex.” This had an extremely negative impact on their two boys:

126 

T. UYS

You could see they were bewildered, with their world being changed and shaken. It wasn’t easy… The eldest had to repeat grade 11 because he was affected negatively by what was happening and at some point he was suicidal. So I had to be psychologist and mother; I had to always watch out for signs of depression.

The Whistleblower’s Responses to Retaliation In his book Whistleblowers: Broken Lives and Organizational Power, C.  Fred Alford (2001, p.  38) identified four narratives that reflect the people the whistleblowers became as a result of their traumatic experiences. The first he called “the choiceless choice,” where whistleblowers generally express a compulsion to disclose the wrongdoing that they perceive in order to remain true to their beliefs. For the nurse whistleblowers in Jackson et al.’s (2010a, p. 2198) study, this meant being able to effectively advocate for their patients’ rights, which could only be achieved by taking up the role of the stigmatized whistleblower. Becoming a whistleblower was the only way in which they could gain support for their concerns. The second entails remaining “stuck in static time, filled with meaningless motion, an endless sequence of events, because the storyteller cannot bear to bring the story to an end and so finally know its meaning” (Alford, 2001, p.  48). Glazer and Glazer (1989, p.  155) view the experience as dominating the whistleblower’s life: “[t]he anger that drove them forward threatened to overwhelm their lives, leaving them permanently scarred.” Similarly, Miethe (1999, p. 78) describes how “the act of whistleblowing and its consequences become a master status that totally engulfs and overrides other aspects of one’s life.” The rehashing of events and the obsession to restore one’s reputation that often accompanies this master status could harm the whistleblower’s relationship with family and friends, especially if the latter do not understand or support his/her commitment to continue the fight to the “bitter end” (Uys, 2008). A third narrative is the whistleblower’s need to make sense of it all, to find a way of dealing with the knowledge that those in positions of authority make a habit of lying and expecting their subordinates to cover up for them, which they routinely do. The whistleblower needs to find alternative sources of meaning and do so by constructing a world in which everything that happens is meaningfully connected to the whistleblower’s actions. This attempt to prove that the organization is out to destroy the

5  PERSONAL TROUBLES: THE IMPACT ON THE WHISTLEBLOWER 127

whistleblower, because of his or her disclosures, might seem paranoid to bystanders. However, for Alford (2001, p. 54), this paranoia confirms a hard truth: “that if the organization feels sufficiently threatened by the individual, it will remove him, not just beyond the margins of the organization but all the way to the margins of society.” The final narrative emerges when the whistleblower abandons the search for meaning by disconnecting from the consequences of his or her actions. Alford (2001, pp. 57–58) calls this “living in the position of the dead,” a release from the constraints of continually watching yourself or being concerned with what other people think. Only a small number of whistleblowers achieves some form of liberation through realizing that they are not living in an essentially just world, thereby relieving themselves from taking responsibility for the ethical transformation of their organization. Elements of these narratives are evident in Solly Tshitangano’s reflections on his experiences as the Limpopo textbook scandal whistleblower. In an interview with Daily Maverick Hlongwane, 2012), he mused: “The whole system was failing me. You’d think that if I have a dispute with an HOD [head of department] over a contract, and I reported the matter to the MEC, he would investigate. After that comes the premier—he failed to appoint an independent auditor to look into my complaint.” He rejected Angie Motshekga’s denials of having been made aware of his allegations, as he had received one letter of acknowledgment from the national department of basic education. His attempt to contact the presidency via the presidential hotline also came to nothing. “If you listen to all the speeches that the politicians give about fighting corruption, I thought that they would jump into this,” he said. John Muller, who blew the whistle on a licensing scam in the Mpumalanga traffic department, provides another example of a loss of faith in a just world as a result of the retaliation he suffered: Those bastards have destroyed my life. I can’t find another job anywhere in South Africa as a traffic cop because they gave me a reputation as a troublemaker… It is soul-destroying. I was a traffic cop for 29 years, since 1971. I loved the job and put my neck on the line to do the right thing. And in return, they’ve stolen everything from me. (In Arenstein, 2003)

Alford’s description of the four narratives reflects some elements of the ambiguous loss of relationships, a loss associated with ambiguity in the

128 

T. UYS

boundaries of relationships, or a lack of clarity about the status of connections (Boss, 2007). Ambiguous loss is generally characterized by overall perceptions of uncertainty and loss of control, elusiveness in the boundaries of roles and responsibilities, anxiety and stress, and conflict in relationships (Huebner et  al., 2007, p.  114). While Ambiguous Loss Theory mainly focuses on two kinds of loss—psychological presence and physical absence, or physical presence and psychological absence of significant others in family relationships—it is not difficult to identify the struggle of dealing with a loss that lacks clarity, evident in Alford’s narratives  as ambiguous loss. Michela Wrong (2009) provided a disturbing account of the experiences of John Githongo, a Kenyan whistleblower. Her depiction of the mental churning, a form of mourning that he went through in coming to terms with the fact that President Kibaki, the leader he had trusted to free Kenya from the scourge of corruption, had feet of clay, demonstrated the ambiguous loss he suffered: Like an accident victim sitting dazed in Accident & Emergency, John needed to go through the necessary stages of disbelief and denial before he could digest his loss. The time it took—not months, but years—was a testament to the depth of his belief, in that bright post-election dawn of 2003, that NARC could break with Moi’s2 grubby ways. For John, who like so many Kenyans had believed he was taking part in an ethical rebirth, this really was a grieving process. (Wrong, 2009, p. 217)

Organizations often employ the notion of employees being one big, happy family in order to generate loyalty and commitment to the organization (Casey, 1999, p. 175). Coming across perceived wrongdoing leads to the observer developing a sense of ambiguity about how to respond. McNamee (2001) describes the value- and role conflict produced by “guilty knowledge,” the realization that in a very murky situation, one needs to weigh the moral imperative of disclosing what you know to prevent harm up against the conflicting feelings of institutional loyalty and betrayal. The retaliation that often follows a disclosure exacerbates this ambiguity and associated feelings of guilt. Victoria Johnson (2004, p. 52) 2  Daniel Toroitich arap Moi, a Kenyan politician, served as President of Kenya from 1978 to 2002. His presidency was considered dictatorial and autocratic, and he was accused of human rights abuses and corruption.

5  PERSONAL TROUBLES: THE IMPACT ON THE WHISTLEBLOWER 129

concluded a chapter she wrote about her experiences describing the remorse she felt about the way she dealt with her “guilty knowledge”: I feel a deep sense of ambiguity over what I did—whatever one may say about doing the right thing, it does not change the fact that I broke a fundamental social rule by betraying someone I worked closely with and who trusted me. No matter which way I think about it, or try to rationalize it, that fact will never go away, and so my memory of the time is always tinged with an underlying sense of discomfort and shame.

Similarly, John Githongo acknowledged: “The hardest part,… has been coming to terms with the betrayal of my tribe, my class” (in Wrong, 2009, p. 331). Organizations generally retaliate against whistleblowers in order to silence them while discouraging other observers of wrongdoing from treading the same path. The retaliation that they suffer and the attack on their credibility and reputation often has a profound effect on shaping their identity and their vision of themselves. Whistleblowers transfer their loyalty and commitment from the organization to the cause they are fighting for. Ironically, it is often the attempts by the organization to discredit and silence the whistleblower, which leaves them no choice but to escalate their disclosures from an initial internal disclosure to a public exposure in order to assert their dignity and integrity. Liyanarachchi and Adler’s (2010, p.  23) research showed that Australian accountants in the age group 35 to 44 years, for example, were more willing to blow the whistle following strong rather than weak retaliation. They offered explanations such as the middle-age group being more altruistic or having more confidence in their ability to continue their career despite retaliation. It could also be a result of the emotions, especially anger, invoked by retaliation. However, none of these explanations indicate why this pattern of behavior was apparent only in the 35- to 44-year age group. Research has shown that many whistleblowers respond to retaliation after an internal disclosure by turning to external channels. Whistleblowers might go the external route because they see no other way of stopping wrongdoing that they find unbearable. The enhanced visibility that accompanies an external disclosure could also provide greater protection. In some instances, external whistleblowing is seen as a way to counter the procedural injustice of the retaliation that followed the internal disclosure

130 

T. UYS

(Rehg et al., 2008, p. 227). Female whistleblowers, especially, were found to be more likely to use external channels when confronted by retaliation (Rehg et al., 2008, p. 235). Whistleblowing, therefore, constitutes a new form of worker resistance in contrast to the more collective forms, such as union activity (Rehg et al., 2008; Rothschild, 2008, p. 899; Rothschild & Miethe, 1994, p. 269; Uys, 2000, p. 265). The experiences of Nico Alant very clearly demonstrate the transformation from loyal employee to political activist, or engaged citizen. He started his journey as a whistleblower believing that it was expected of him as part of his job to query problematic applications for the  approval of exchange control transactions from the commercial banks. He thought that the commercial bank employees’ negligence in rigorously evaluating applications often led to fraudulent transactions receiving Reserve Bank approval. When his inquiries into specific transactions were ignored and approvals granted over his objections, he requested a review of Bank procedures and further investigations into employee negligence. The wrangling that ensued eventually culminated in his departure from the Reserve Bank in 1993, but he continued his struggle of getting his concerns investigated by approaching the then Minister of Finance, and the Office of the Public Protector, presenting papers at academic conferences and giving evidence at a commission of inquiry as well as at two court cases. His persistent attempts to get his concerns investigated came to an end eight years after leaving the Reserve Bank when the Reserve Bank’s application for a High Court interdict to prevent him from disclosing the affairs of the Bank was settled out of court. Through the whistleblower’s persistence in making ever-escalating disclosures, the organization’s attempt to reduce the public issue raised by the whistleblower to the private trouble of a problematic employee is undercut, and the spotlight remains firmly on the public issue. However, that does not necessarily mean that the whistleblowing is effective, in the sense that it has led to the termination of the wrongful behavior within a reasonable time frame (Miceli et  al., 2008, p.  135). As the selection of whistleblower stories in Chap. 3 showed, corrective action by authorities was generally slow in coming, if at all, with significant detrimental effects on the whistleblower’s career and relationships. The narratives identified by Alford paint a very bleak picture of the struggle of whistleblowers to deal with the retaliation they experience. In one of the few investigations of the topic, Glazer and Glazer (1989, pp.  206–237) explored ways in which whistleblowers could re-establish

5  PERSONAL TROUBLES: THE IMPACT ON THE WHISTLEBLOWER 131

their lives in the aftermath of retaliation. They provided examples of whistleblowers who recreated their work lives through finding a job, developing a new career or opening a private practice. They considered the attempts by whistleblowers to “make do,” the importance of the support of family and friends, and the whistleblower as survivor. The persistence of the whistleblowers described in Chap. 4 reflects the same resilience apparent in Glazer and Glazer’s (1989, p. 237) conclusion: For resisters, re-establishing a normal life has been fraught with obstacles, and many whistleblowers never completely return to their former pursuits. Even as they struggle to let go of the crisis that dominated all their waking hours, many remain committed to defending ethical behavior, to helping other resisters, and to speaking out for better whistleblower protection. They are proud that they defended their principles despite the odds against them. They do not withdraw, because the battle against abusive authority is now woven into the fabric of their beliefs and lives. To turn away would be a betrayal of all they sought to achieve.

Conclusion In an analysis of the coping strategies employed by some South African whistleblowers in dealing with the hostile reception of their disclosures, Uys and Smit (2016, pp. 66–72) identified four main themes. The first is related to the ability to appropriate intrapersonal resources, such as having an optimistic mindset and a persistent belief in honesty and justice. The whistleblowers stressed the importance of healthy, internalized values, which included their conviction that making the disclosure was ethical and justified. Second, whistleblowers relied on external resources, such as the availability of professional legal representation and tapping into social support networks, in particular, the support of close family members, friends, and senior colleagues. The third theme referred to their ability to make sense of it all through deconstructing the whistleblowing process. Apart from gathering information about the organizational wrongdoing and the most appropriate disclosure channels to use before blowing the whistle, they “tried to hold on to or rebuild their shattered assumptions that the world is benevolent and meaningful, and that the self is worthy” (Uys & Smit, 2016, p. 71). Finally, they remained firm in their conviction that blowing the whistle was the appropriate and principled response. Moving beyond their traumatic ordeal required achieving a sense of coherence, which enabled them to adjust to their changed circumstances and rebuild their lives.

132 

T. UYS

However, for whistleblowers a successful recreation of their lives does not necessarily imply the achievement of some final stage of resolution or closure. The ambiguous loss that flows from the consequences of whistleblowing resists closure. The road to resiliency and some measure of peace, Boss and Carnes (2012, p. 457) argued, is through a search for meaning. In order to come to terms with what has happened and move on requires that the whistleblower develops a tolerance for ambiguity and unanswered questions; it entails learning to live well despite the persistence of uncertainty (Boss, 2007, p. 107; Glazer & Glazer, 1989, p. 231). Organizations’ vindictive responses toward employees who raise concerns about a public issue in the interest of protecting the organization or the public from harm seems counterintuitive. Retaliation against the whistleblower transforms whistleblowing itself into a public issue. Chapter 6 attempts to unravel this paradox by exploring whistleblowing as a public issue in organizations.

References Alford, F.  C. (2001). Whistleblowers: Broken Lives and Organizational Power. Cornell University Press. Arenstein, J. (2003, November 10). Poverty-stricken Muller Speaks Out. City Press. Retrieved October 2, 2015, from http://152.111.1.87/argief/berigte/ citypress/2003/11/16/C1/23/01.html Bashir, S., Khattak, H. R., Hanif, A., & Chohan, S. N. (2010). Whistle-blowing in Public Sector Organizations: Evidence from Pakistan. The American Review of Public Administration, 41(3), 285–296. Bhengu, L. (2021, August 25). ‘It was an Assassination’ – Finance Official Babita Deokaran was Fighting for ‘Ethical Public Service’. Retrieved September 24, 2021, from https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/it-was-anassassination-finance-official-babita-deokaran-was-fighting-for-­­ethical-publicservice-20210825 Bjørkelo, B., Ryberg, W., Matthiesen, S.  B., & Einarsen, S. (2008). When You Talk and Talk and Nobody Listens: A mixed Method Case Study of Whistleblowing and its Consequences. International Journal of Organisational Behavior, 13(2), 18–40. Blenkinsop, M. (2019, January 8). Late Eskom Exec Mark van der Riet: How State Capture Turned Murderous. Retrieved September 24, 2021, from https:// www.biznews.com/undictated/2019/01/08/late-eskom-exec-mark-vander-riet-state-capture-turned-murderous Boss, P. (2007). Ambiguous Loss Theory: Challenges for Scholars and Practitioners. Family Relations, 56 (April 2007), 105–111.

5  PERSONAL TROUBLES: THE IMPACT ON THE WHISTLEBLOWER 133

Boss, P., & Carnes, D. (2012). The Myth of Closure. Family Process, 51(4), 456–469. Casey, C. (1999). “Come, Join Our Family”: Discipline and Integration in Corporate Organizational Culture. Human Relation, 52(1), 155–177. Cortina, L. M., & Magley, V. J. (2003). Raising Voice, Risking Retaliation: Events Following Interpersonal Mistreatment in the Workplace. Journal of Occupational Health Psychology, 8(4), 247–265. Davis, M. (1989). Avoiding the Tragedy of Whistleblowing. Business and Professional Ethics Journal, 8(4), 3–19. Deb, P., Gallo, W. T., Ayyagaric, P., Fletcher, J. M., & Sindelar, J. L. (2011). The Effect of Job Loss on Overweight and Drinking. Journal of Health Economics, 30, 317–327. Dlamini, P. (2018). SA Owes Gupta Leaks Whistleblowers Living in Hiding a Huge Debt: Currin. South Africa. Retrieved August 12, 2021 from https:// www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2018-09-27-sa-owes-gupta-leakswhistleblowers-living-in-hiding-a-huge-debt-currin/ Duma, N. (2020). ‘We are Facing Thugs in Uniform’-Thabiso Zulu on Failed Intimidation Case. Retrieved November 17, 2020, from https://ewn.co. za/2020/08/07/we-are-facing-thugs-in-uniform-thabiso-zulu-on-failed-intimidation-case# Dworkin, T. M., & Baucus, M. S. (1998). Internal vs. External Whistleblowers: A Comparison of the Whistleblowing Process. Journal of Business Ethics, 17, 1281–1298. Glazer, M. P., & Glazer, P. M. (1989). The Whistleblowers: Exposing Corruption in Government and Industry. Basic Books. Greenberger, D. B., Miceli, M. P., & Cohen, D. (1987). Oppositionists and Group Norms: The Reciprocal Influence of Whistle-Blowers and `Co-Workers. Journal of Business Ethics, 6, 527–542. Greene, A. D., & Latting, J. K. (2004). Whistle-blowing as a Form of Advocacy: Guidelines for the Practitioner and Organization. Social Work, 49(2), 219–230. Hlongwane, S. (2012, July 19). Limpopo Textbook Crisis: Whistleblower Out in the Cold. Daily Maverick. Retrieved December 21, 2014, from https://www. dailymaverick.co.za/article/2012-07-19-limpopo-textbook-crisis-whistleblowerout-in-the-cold/ Huebner, A. J., Mancini, J. A., Wilcox, R. M., Grass, A. R., & Grass, G. A. (2007). Parental Deployment and Youth in Military Families: Exploring Uncertainty and Ambiguous Loss. Family Relations., 56(2), 112–122. Hunt, G. (Ed.). (1995). Whistleblowing in the Health Services: Accountability, Law and Professional Practice (pp. 154–164). Arnold. Jackson, D., Peters, K., Andrew, S., Edenborough, M., Halcomb, E., Luck, L., Salamonson, Y., & Wilkes, L. (2010a). Understanding Whistleblowing: Qualitative Insights from Nurse Whistleblowers. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 66(10), 2194–2201.

134 

T. UYS

Jackson, D., Peters, K., Andrew, S., Edenborough, M., Halcomb, E., Luck, L., Salamonson, Y., Weaver, R., & Wilkes, L. (2010b). Trial and Retribution: A Qualitative Study of Whistleblowing and Workplace Relationships in Nursing. Contemporary Nurse, 36(1–2), 34–44. Johnson, V. (2004). Public Deception in Cape Town: Story of an Insider Witness. In R.  Calland & G.  Dehn (Eds.), Whistleblowing Around the World: Law, Culture and Practice, pp. 42–52. The Open Democracy Advice Centre/Public Concern at Work. Kadalie, R. (2011, January 18). Why are we so Lawless? Politicsweb, Retrieved December 20, 2014. from https://www.politicsweb.co.za/news-and-­analysis/ why-are-we-so-lawless Kenny, K., Fotaki, M., & Scriver, S. (2019). Mental Heath as a Weapon: Whistleblower Retaliation and Normative Violence. Journal of Business Ethics, 160, 801–815. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-­018-­3868-­4 Lennane, K. J. (1993). Whistleblowing: A Health Issue. British Medical Journal, 307(6905), 667–670. Liyanarachchi, G.  A., & Adler, R.  W. (2010). Accountants’ Whistle-blowing Intentions: The Impact of Retaliation, Age, and Gender (Accountancy Working Paper Series). Gregory Liyanarachchi & Ralph Adler. http://hdl.handle. net/10523/1573 Mangena, A. (2015). Death is not in my Vocabulary. Forbes Africa, October: 40–42. McNamee, M. (2001). The Guilt of Whistleblowing: Conflicts in Action Research and Educational Ethnography. The Journal of the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain, 35(3), 423–441. Mesmer-Magnus, J.  R., & Viswesvaran, C. (2005). Whistleblowing in Organizations: An Examination of Correlates of Whistleblowing Intentions, Actions, and Retaliation. Journal of Business Ethics, 62(3), 277–297. Miceli, M.  P., Near, J.  P., & Dworkin, T.  M. (2008). Whistle-blowing in Organisations. Routledge. Miethe, T. D. (1999). Whistleblowing at Work: Tough Choices in Exposing Fraud, Waste, and Abuse on the Job. Westview Press. Milliken, F. J., Elizabeth, W. M., & Patricia, F. H. (2003). An Exploratory Study of Employee Silence: Issues that Employees Don’t Communicate Upward and Why. Journal of Management Studies, 40(6), 1453–1476. Mills, C. W. (1959). Sociological Imagination. Oxford University Press. Mills, C. W. (1970). The Sociological Imagination. Oxford University Press. Moroe, I. (2020, December 11). We Need Answers about the Vrede Dairy Project. Retrieved May 31, 2021, from https://mg.co.za/opinion/2020-12-11-weneed-answers-about-the-vrede-dairy-project/ Park, H., Bjørkelo, B., & Blenkinsopp, J. (2020). External Whistleblowers’ Experiences of Workplace Bullying by Superiors and Colleagues. Journal of Business Ethics, 161, 591–601.

5  PERSONAL TROUBLES: THE IMPACT ON THE WHISTLEBLOWER 135

Pedzinsky v Adisa Securities (Pty Ltd (formerly SCMB SECURITIES (PTY) LTD) (2005) Case No. JS 396 / 04 Judgment Date 30 November 2005 Jurisdiction Labour Court, Johannesburg Judge Leeuw AJ. Peters, K., Luck, L., Hutchison, M., Wilkes, L., Andrew, S., & Jackson, D. (2011). The Emotional Sequelae of Whistleblowing: Findings from a Qualitative Study. Journal of Clinical Nursing, 20, 2907–2914. Rehg, M., Miceli, M. P., Near, J. P., & Van Scotter, J. R. (2008). Antecedents and Outcomes of Retaliation Against Whistleblowers: Gender Differences and Power Relationships. Organization Science, 19(2), 221–240. Rothschild, J. (2008). Freedom of Speech Denied, Dignity Assaulted: What the Whistleblowers Experience in the US. Current Sociology, 56(6), 884–903. Rothschild, J., & Miethe, T. D. (1994). Whistleblowing as Resistance in Modern Work Organizations. In J.  M. Jermier, D.  Knights, & W.  R. Nord (Eds.), Resistance and Power in Organizations (pp. 252–273). Routledge. Seeliger, K. (2011). The Risks of Exposing Corruption. Retrieved April 29, 2014, from http://www.thesouthafrican.com/news/the-­risks-­of-­exposing-­ corruption-­3.htm Smith, R. (2014). Whistleblowers and Suffering. In A.  J. Brown, D.  Lewis, R.  Moberly, & W.  Vandekerckhove (Eds.), International Handbook of Whistleblowing Research. Edward Elgar. Talane, V. (2013, December 10). Hard Times and Discrimination for Whistleblowers. Retrieved April 27, 2014, from https://www.corruptionwatch.org.za/hard-times-and-discrimination-for-whistleblowers/ Thamm, M. (2015, March 3). SA Whistleblowers: Assassinations, Victimisation, Marginalisation for Doing the Right Thing. Daily Maverick. Retrieved August 18, 2020, from https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2015-­03-­03-­sa-­ whistleblowers-­assassinations-­victimisation-­marginalisation-­for-­doing-­the-­ right-­thing/ Uys, T. (2000). The Politicisation of Whistleblowers: A Case Study. Business Ethics: A European Review, 9(4), 259–287. Uys, T. (2008). Rational Loyalty and Whistleblowing: The South African Context. Current Sociology, 56(6), 907–924. Uys, T., & Senekal, A. (2008). Morality of Principle versus Morality of Loyalty: The Case of Whistleblowing. African Journal of Business Ethics, 3(1), 38–44. Uys, T., & Smit, R. (2016). Resilience and Whistleblowers: Coping with the Consequences. South African Review of Sociology, 47(4), 60–79. van de Velde, P. (2013, June 17). Wendy Addison Helps Whistleblowers. Retrieved April 29, 2014, from https://speakout-speakup.org/blog/wendy-addisonhelps-whistleblowers/ Wiener, M. 2020. The Whistleblowers. Pan Macmillan South Africa. Wrong, M. (2009). It’s Our Turn to Eat: The Story of a Kenyan Whistleblower. Fourth Estate.

CHAPTER 6

Public Issues: The Impact on the Organization and the Public

Introduction While whistleblowers generally believe that their disclosures of perceived wrongdoing would lead to investigations and improvements that are beneficial to their colleagues, the organization, and the general public, their employer often takes a different view. Rather than investigating the wrongdoing, correcting it, and recognizing the whistleblower’s contribution to creating an ethical workplace,  the organization often resorts to  ruthless retaliation against the messenger while ignoring the message. These reprisals create immense personal troubles for the whistleblower, as was clearly demonstrated by the South African whistleblower stories told in Chap. 3. Retaliation also produces internal troubles for the organization in the form of possible legal costs, the creation of a stressful workplace that flows from a punitive management style, and workers becoming distrustful of management when they observe the retaliation, to mention a few. Seeing the consequences, observers of misconduct could become hesitant to raise their concerns, even if keeping quiet could have severe consequences for the organization. While the organization tries to protect its reputation by silencing the whistleblowing, retaliation could compel a whistleblower to take her or his concerns outside, resulting in the very  damage to the organization’s reputation and the loss of public trust that the organization is trying to prevent. Chapter 5 reflected on whistleblowing as a private trouble by looking at the forms retaliation could take, the effects of retaliation on the © The Author(s) 2022 T. Uys, Whistleblowing and the Sociological Imagination, https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-39445-3_6

137

138 

T. UYS

whistleblower and other role-players, and how whistleblowers tend to respond to retaliation. The organization’s paradoxical behavior, where those evidently acting in the best interests of others in the organization, or the public, are disparaged and censured, converts whistleblowing into a public issue in itself. Therefore, an action meant to resolve an organizational problem becomes a private trouble for the whistleblower and a public issue for the organization. This chapter considers this paradox by exploring when and why retaliation is likely to occur. It then looks at reasons why organizations engage in retaliation. The following section reflects on the effectiveness of whistleblowers in achieving their goal of effecting change in an organization. Finally, the chapter concludes by looking at how organizations could resolve the contradiction so that the public issue is addressed without creating a personal trouble for the whistleblower.

When Is Retaliation Most Likely to Follow a Disclosure? After reading the stories of the South African whistleblowers in Chap. 3, one could be forgiven for thinking that all whistleblowing necessarily results in severe retaliation by the organization. However, research has identified various factors that influence the nature and the severity of the reprisals. According to Miceli et al. (2008, pp. 102–104), a study of the power relationships among the social actors in a whistleblower situation will enable one to predict the likelihood of retaliation against the whistleblower. In particular, it is imperative to consider the power of the whistleblower against the  organization’s dependence on the wrongdoer, or on a continuation of the wrongdoing. Power Relationships Whistleblower power. The whistleblowers’ status in their organizations, experience, competence, and expertise determine how much power they have. These factors can provide them with legitimacy, making them less prone to retaliation when they blow the whistle (Rehg et  al., 2008, pp. 224–225). Organizations are less likely to retaliate against those who play an essential role in the organization and are difficult to replace. Reprisals are also less likely to occur against whistleblowers if they are supported by top

6  PUBLIC ISSUES: THE IMPACT ON THE ORGANIZATION AND THE PUBLIC 139

management, middle management, or co-workers. However, the relationship is somewhat weaker when the support comes from co-workers (Miceli et  al., 2008, pp.  110–111). Support provides the whistleblower with leverage over the wrongdoer. This informal power might also flow from the credibility of the whistleblower’s evidence of wrongdoing and whether the wrongdoer is aware of this (Rehg et al., 2008, p. 225). Park et al. (2020, p. 598) found that support from outside the organization did little to deter the bullying of the whistleblower. On the contrary, it might even provoke reprisals. The South African Reserve Bank, for example, considered the fact that Nico Alant approached the Attorney-­ General for advice as further evidence of his disloyalty and inability to adapt to the culture of the Bank. The trauma experienced by John Muller, who blew the whistle on the driver’s license scam perpetrated by senior officials and politicians in South Africa’s Mpumalanga provincial government, is a clear example of how weak whistleblower power enhances the severity of retaliation. While the reprisals against Muller, a relatively junior traffic officer, made his working life unbearable, eventually forcing him to apply for a severance package on health grounds, it was more or less business as usual for the scam’s perpetrators and beneficiaries. This contradiction highlights the importance of wrongdoer power in determining the extent of retaliation. Power of the wrongdoer. The influence of whistleblowers should be offset against the power of the wrongdoer. Where the wrongdoer has a higher status than the whistleblower, or the organization places more value on the contribution of the wrongdoer, it is more likely to retaliate against the whistleblower, in an attempt to shield the wrongdoer from the whistleblower’s accusations (Miceli et  al., 2008, p.  104). Harry Charlton, the so-called Travelgate whistleblower, can attest to this fact. His insistence that further investigations into the abuse of travel vouchers would reveal the complicity of higher-ranking Parliamentarians quickly led to his dismissal on spurious charges against him, and plea agreements with those already identified, presumably to protect the influential perpetrators from exposure. Similarly, Allison Pedzinski’s comparative lack of power resulted in her losing her job and the perpetrator receiving a promotion. Organizational dependence on the wrongdoing. The third element in the equation, which is often directly related to wrongdoer power, is the organization’s dependence on the continuation of the wrongdoing.

140 

T. UYS

Organizations that take the risk to engage in serious misconduct usually do so because they rely on the wrongdoing for their continued success or even their survival. Whistleblowers are, therefore, more likely to face severe reprisals if they disclose information about serious wrongdoing. Pieter van Eeden, who blew the whistle on life-threatening pollution by ISCOR (a South African parastatal steel producer), confronted the reality of a company more interested in enhancing its profits than considering the residents’ wellbeing in the areas surrounding its operations. Numerous factors play a role in determining the seriousness of wrongdoing that organizations rely on for survival. For example, the extent to which it has become entrenched in the organization, its duration, its cost and frequency, and the harm it is perceived to be causing to various constituencies such as co-workers or the general public (Rehg et al., 2008, p.  225). Therefore, reports on legal violations are significantly more likely to elicit severe retaliation than those reporting waste, probably because of the broader scope for negative publicity, managerial embarrassment, or financial penalties attached to the former (Miceli et  al., 2008, pp. 112–114). Some researchers distinguish between occupational wrongdoing where specific individuals engage in problematic behavior not condoned by explicit official organizational policy and organizational wrongdoing, which entails widespread and institutionalized suspect practices. Blowing the whistle on the former, which the organization could attribute to a so-­ called bad apple, and easy to remove without harm to the organization, is generally less likely to elicit the severe retaliation meted out to those who reveal questionable organizational practices that the organization considers essential to its survival (Bjørkelo et al., 2008, p. 31). The South African whistleblower stories told in Chap. 3 and numerous other examples in South Africa and elsewhere in the world demonstrate the vindictive reactions of organizations when whistleblowers expose serious wrongdoing. At the same time, the wrongdoers tend to  receive a slap on the wrist, at most. On the other hand, retaliation is less likely when the revealed organizational wrongdoing is obviously unlawful. Where the perceived misconduct “falls within the moral domain or has an unclear legal status, and where rectification, as a result is rather projected into the court of public opinion” (Olesen, 2018, p.  515), the organization’s  perception is  that the whistleblower’s actions are violating normative and contractual obligations. This perception will generally result in retaliation.

6  PUBLIC ISSUES: THE IMPACT ON THE ORGANIZATION AND THE PUBLIC 141

Whistleblower Persistence Skivenes and Trygstad’s (2010, p. 1085) study of whistleblowing in the Norwegian public sector investigated those whistleblowers who persisted with their disclosures by escalating their concerns to others in their organization, rather than considering exposures to their immediate supervisor sufficient. They found that whistleblowers engaging in so-called strong whistleblowing ran a higher risk of suffering retaliation. Avakian and Roberts (2012, p. 82) argued that the persistence of whistleblowers in the face of reprisals is related to their image of themselves as agents of change. They are convinced that their actions can alter the state of events. All the whistleblower cases discussed in Chap. 3 had engaged in strong whistleblowing. Most of them also turned to some agency external to the organization with the report. In most instances, the whistleblowing process stretched over several years, ranging from at least two years to more than 17 years. For example, the South African Reserve Bank continued to pursue Nico Alant for 12 years after he had raised his concerns for the first time and eight years after he had left the Bank’s employ before settling. The Travelgate whistleblower, Harry Charlton, was still fighting a Labor Court battle with the South African Parliament eight years after his exposure of the travel voucher scam perpetrated by Members of Parliament in collaboration with the designated travel agents. Seventeen years after allowing inmates to videotape the corrupt activities of prison officials at Grootvlei prison, Tatolo Setlai is still struggling to convince the Department of Correctional Services to reinstate his pension benefits. Whistleblowing Channels Research has shown that whistleblowers who use external channels have generally made their disclosures internally first. Disclosures through external channels are more likely to be associated with retaliation than when exposures occurred internally only (Miceli et al., 2008, p. 115). Rothschild (2013, p.  892) found that retaliation against external whistleblowers tended to be between 10 and 15 points higher than the various forms of reprisal experienced by about two-thirds of the internal whistleblowers in her study. Similarly, Park et  al.’s (2020, p.  598) research showed that external whistleblowers experienced much higher levels of bullying and that 52.8% of their respondents had left the company’s employ in the aftermath of their blowing the whistle. The more extreme response to

142 

T. UYS

external whistleblowers is probably primarily due to the increased potential for legal scrutiny of and judicial intervention in organizational practices that external whistleblowing, especially disclosures to the media, is likely to activate. Interestingly, a study of whistleblowing at a large military base in the United States showed that retaliation following the use of external channels was confined to female employees. Therefore, retaliation against female whistleblowers seems to increase in intensity in male-­ dominated environments (Miceli et  al., 2008, p.  108, 114–115; Rehg et al., 2008). It is difficult to determine the causal direction of the relationship conclusively; whether retaliation results from the external whistleblowing or whether the reprisals following an internal disclosure, push whistleblowers to broadcast the report more widely. Most quantitative research tends to employ a cross-sectional strategy, which means that data collection occurs at a given point in time. However, a study by Rehg et al. (2008, p. 235) found that where whistleblowers perceived wrongdoing and made their disclosures to parties external to the organization, the retaliation generally preceded the external whistleblowing and rarely the other way round. Research by Rothschild and Miethe (1994, p. 266) showed that it is often the retaliation following an internal disclosure that leaves whistleblowers with no choice but to escalate their exposures to the public domain in an attempt to restore their reputations. Rehg et al.’s (2004, p. E6) finding that comprehensive retaliation is likely to propel whistleblowers toward using external channels rather than dissuading them from future whistleblowing, supports this view. Furthermore, Rothschild (2013, p.  892) found that retaliation often followed even when there is just a suggestion that an employee might disclose some illegal or immoral organizational practices externally. Personal Characteristics of the Whistleblower Various studies have shown that personal characteristics, such as age, race, and pay, seem to have little, if any, influence on the retaliation directed at whistleblowers (Miceli et  al., 2008, pp.  105–106). The only exceptions seem to be related to education and gender. On the one hand, a meta-­ analysis by Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran (2005, p. 288) showed that retaliation and the educational level of the whistleblower (as well as job level and role responsibility) are relatively unrelated. In contrast, a Norwegian study conducted by Skivenes and Trygstad (2010, p. 1088)

6  PUBLIC ISSUES: THE IMPACT ON THE ORGANIZATION AND THE PUBLIC 143

found that highly educated whistleblowers ran a higher risk of confronting retaliation. Of all personal characteristics, the gender of the whistleblower seems to play the most prominent role in determining the comprehensiveness of the retaliation that whistleblowers endure. A study by Rehg et al. (2008) among Air Force workers in the United States, showed that women who blew the whistle were more likely to experience retaliation than men. Also, in contrast to male whistleblowers, having higher personal power did not assist female whistleblowers in avoiding retaliation. If women blew the whistle about serious wrongdoing, where a higher-level wrongdoer is involved or directly affected by the misconduct, they were generally more likely to suffer reprisals than men. They explained their findings in terms of social role theory and status characteristics theory, which argue that even where women have achieved high status in the workplace, their status as women seems to be more prominent in determining their fate. When women blow the whistle, it is seen as a violation of the stereotypical role expectation that women should be acquiescent and not assert themselves vocally. Blowing the whistle about serious wrongdoing or a high-level wrongdoer seems to exacerbate the negative response directed at the female whistleblower. The case of Allison Pedzinski demonstrates these dynamics very clearly. Her role as a compliance manager obligated her to report any wrongdoing that she came across. However, reporting illegal trading by a senior director of the financial institution where she worked, to someone higher up than her immediate supervisor (who would have been able to contain the disclosure), led to her dismissal. It is probably no coincidence that many of the high-profile whistleblowers who suffered victimization as a result of making state capture revelations were women. Organizational Characteristics The persecution of whistleblowers also may result from certain contextual factors. Interestingly, research has shown that the same organizational features likely to lead to whistleblowing would encourage retaliation against the whistleblower. The first is the organizational climate or culture. For example, Sumanth et al. (2011, p. 177) emphasized the role of an instrumental ethical climate in organizations where self-interest dominates in creating a work environment that punishes any behavior that conflicts with achieving personal goals, such as attempting to curb deceitful behavior

144 

T. UYS

through whistleblowing. A highly unethical work environment would, therefore, enhance the likelihood of retaliation against whistleblowers. On the other hand, Miceli et al. (2008 pp. 117–119) warned that the convoluted bureaucracy and control measures produced by an overemphasis on compliance, could subvert the development of the values, decision-­making practices, and trust in management required to establish an ethical work climate that discourages wrongdoing and retaliation. Whether a bureaucratic organization would be more likely to deter or encourage misconduct and retaliation depends mainly on the clarity and strength of the norms against misbehavior and bullying. An organizational culture that legitimizes unethical behavior is likely to provide grounds for justifying retaliation against whistleblowers (Sumanth et al., 2011, p. 177). Furthermore, in a hierarchical culture with strong norms favoring loyalty, and weak norms discouraging wrongdoing and retaliation, whistleblowers are likely to be victimized forcefully as an expression of commitment to the firm. Similarly, highly cohesive workgroups might have a jaundiced view of the moral rebel who challenges group solidarity and engage in punitive action against the whistleblower. This tendency could explain the increased likelihood of retaliation in smaller workgroups compared to larger workgroups (Brown & Olsen, 2008, pp.  147–148), as cohesion tends to be higher in smaller groups. Also, an organization employing performance-based reward systems is unlikely to respond positively to whistleblowing about wrongdoing perceived as supporting organizational success (Miceli et al., 2008, p. 118; Sumanth et al., 2011, p. 177). Disclosure Recipients Disclosure recipients play a crucial and complex role in the whistleblowing process (Moberly, 2014, p.  273). As indicated before, in most whistleblowing cases, internal recipients tend to be the initial recipients whose response determines how the rest of the process will play out. Retaliation is less likely to occur if the initial recipient responds competently to the disclosure, making it unnecessary for the whistleblower to take matters further. The likelihood of disclosure recipients responding competently to a revelation depends on several factors. These factors include • their immediate reaction to the report; • their initial judgments about the plausibility of the concerns; • the amount of support they provide to the whistleblower;

6  PUBLIC ISSUES: THE IMPACT ON THE ORGANIZATION AND THE PUBLIC 145

• their knowledge about organizational policies, processes, and general principles of investigation; and • their commitment to finding a way to terminate any proven wrongdoing (Roberts et al., 2011, p. 23). Unfortunately, complaint recipients often find it difficult to separate their perceptions of the messenger’s credibility from the message’s validity. They might disregard the whistleblower’s report if no other evidence of misconduct is available. Recipients could also struggle to distinguish between personal grievances and public interest disclosures, as these are often intertwined. Recipients and whistleblowers often differ radically regarding the process to be followed. While the whistleblower wants the perceived wrongdoing to be investigated and addressed, the complaint recipient might focus more on determining the correct process to manage the disclosure. This response will likely go awry if the disclosure recipient does not have the necessary skills and training to address the matter capably. Organizations should, therefore, ensure that adequate procedures are in place and that front-line managers receive training on applying the practices (Moberly, 2014, pp. 286–289).

Why Does Retaliation Occur? Whistleblowing as a Threat to Individual Justification Motives In their cognitive-emotional model of retaliation against whistleblowers, Sumanth et al. (2011) identified three types of justification motives threatened by the whistleblowers’ actions. The first is ego justification, which refers to the individual’s need to have a positive sense of self as a valued and authentic individual. The second, group justification, has to do with a similar desire about one’s group; to establish, preserve, and defend a positive image of one’s group. Finally, the third motive is system justification, where the individual has internalized the current social system as fair, appropriate, and inevitable, and therefore aspires to protect the status quo. If individual members of the organization perceive the actions of whistleblowers as threatening to any of these three motives, they are likely to counter the threat by retaliating against whistleblowers. Whistleblowing as a threat to one’s ego. The whistleblower’s willingness to challenge established structures while confronting resistance and hostility, threatens the egos of those who are not prepared to conform to the

146 

T. UYS

morality of principle above the morality of loyalty (Uys & Senekal, 2008). Whistleblowers who decide to act in terms of universally accepted abstract rules of behavior display an implicit moral superiority, rather than showing the expected commitment to the narrow interests of their colleagues or protecting the reputation of their organization. Their behavior, therefore, threatens their colleagues’ positive self-image as upstanding citizens. Whether deserved or undeserved, the resulting feelings of anger, shame, and guilt could evoke attempts to counter these perceived attacks by retaliating against the whistleblower and thereby restoring the damaged self-­ image (Sumanth et al., 2011, pp. 169–170). Individuals with high levels of Machiavellianism—the inclination to boost your personal gain by deceiving and manipulating others—are especially likely to respond with great hostility to those who challenge their moral image (Sumanth et al., 2011, p. 175). Whistleblowing as a threat to one’s group. Forsaking the morality of loyalty in favor of the morality of principle also poses a threat to a workgroup’s shared ties and solidarity. The interdependence of members required to achieve success is jeopardized if the expected reciprocal loyalty is not forthcoming. The whistleblower is viewed as disrupting the group’s shared sense of belonging and valued relationships, and retaliation follows in an attempt to restore the balance (Sumanth et al., 2011, pp. 170–171). Whistleblowing as a threat to the system. The system justification motive indicates that individuals prefer to believe that they live in a just world and that the status quo is legitimate. Therefore, the whistleblower’s attempt to root out unethical behavior in their organization is viewed as a threat to the status quo, especially by those who benefit from the corrupt system. Retaliation is an attempt to keep the established system intact and prevent the loss of status, reputation, or material rewards (Sumanth et al., 2011, pp. 171–173). Moral disengagement. The cognitive process of moral disengagement could significantly influence the likelihood of retaliation. Individuals use various psychological tactics to disengage themselves from the potential consequences of unethical behavior. We deceive ourselves in multiple ways by avoiding the truth, lying to, or keeping secrets from ourselves. Apart from allowing us to convince ourselves that the particular questionable behavior is justified, we also become convinced that others agree with us and that the whistleblower’s difference of opinion is naïve, ill-advised, and/or uninformed. Sumanth et  al. (2011, pp.  174–175) argued that whistleblowing’s perceived threat to our ego, group, or system

6  PUBLIC ISSUES: THE IMPACT ON THE ORGANIZATION AND THE PUBLIC 147

justification is likely to lead to a rationale for, and moral disengagement from, the questionable action, which, in turn, would provoke retaliation against the whistleblower. Individuals whose identification with their organization is so strong that it forms an essential source of their sense of community and feelings of belonging, tend to experience strong emotions and high levels of moral disengagement when they perceive a threat to their group. These feelings will increase the likelihood that they would retaliate against the whistleblower. Similarly, if individuals are convinced that the social system in which they operate is just and legitimate, they are more likely to respond to a threat to the system by blaming the whistleblower instead of the system, and retaliation is expected to follow (Sumanth et al., 2011, p. 176). Whistleblowing as a Threat to the Organization’s Legitimacy Organizations generally place a high value on the legitimacy accorded to their operations. Suchman (1995, p. 574) defined legitimacy as a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, value, beliefs, and definitions.

Various researchers have identified the grave threat that whistleblowing disclosures pose to maintaining organizational legitimacy (Miethe, 1999; Near & Miceli, 1985, p. 6; Skivenes & Trygstad, 2010, p. 1088). External whistleblowing is especially challenging to authority as in this instance, the “destructive information” is provided openly, on the “frontstage” of the organization, rather than the “backstage,” where it can be handled much more discreetly, and the potential loss of face is much smaller (Goffman, 1959, p. 141). The resulting widespread, primarily negative, media coverage and public objection negatively impact the organizational image or reputation (Barker & Dawood, 2004, p. 133). The “embeddedness in a system of institutionalized beliefs and action scripts” ensures the continuity and credibility of organizations. To gain active support, or even just passive acceptance, of their activities, organizations need to achieve a certain measure of credence that the organization is commendable, significant, predictable, and reliable (Suchman, 1995, pp. 574–575).

148 

T. UYS

It is notably the moral legitimacy of an organization that comes under attack when disclosing organizational wrongdoing. An organization achieves moral legitimacy when relevant audiences evaluate the organization and its activities as making a positive contribution to societal welfare. Suchman (1995, pp. 579–581) identified four forms of moral legitimacy: consequential, procedural, structural, and personal moral legitimacy. Consequential legitimacy entails positive evaluations of an organization’s outputs and the consequences that flow from these outputs. Whistleblowers who disclose information that negatively impacts organizational effectiveness attack the organization’s consequential moral legitimacy. Pieter van Eeden’s disclosures about the devastating impact of the pollution caused by ISCOR’s steel operations constituted such an attack. Nico Alant’s revelations showed that the Reserve Bank’s lack of care in issuing foreign exchange approvals resulted in widespread abuse of South Africa’s foreign exchange reserves, as well as placing a huge burden on its criminal justice system. This accusation was a similar challenge to the Reserve Bank’s consequential legitimacy. An appraisal of the extent to which an organization is employing socially accepted procedures and techniques indicates the organization’s procedural legitimacy. When Allison Pedzinski sent the report on suspected illegal trading to people higher up in the organization’s compliance structures, this was perceived as challenging her supervisor’s decision-making on this particular issue and the organization’s authority structure. Large bureaucratic organizations are generally not very tolerant of subordinates second-guessing managerial decisions (Miceli et al., 2008, p. 118). Structural legitimacy refers to the extent to which overall organizational structures allow for the appropriate and effective achievement of collectively appreciated goals. The fact that an employee needs to resort to whistleblowing to stop wrongdoing exposes critical deficiencies in the structure of an organization. At the very least, external whistleblowing reflects unclear or inadequate communication channels, and that management failed to deal satisfactorily with the whistleblower’s concerns (Bowen et al., 2010, p. 1245). Moreover, management and the accused have to spend a lot of time doing damage control and explaining what has happened. Soon after Andries Jacobs gave a video documenting members of the North East Rand Dog Unit inciting their dogs to attack illegal immigrants as part of a so-called training exercise to the police authorities, he released it to the media. This action reflected a lack of trust in the ability

6  PUBLIC ISSUES: THE IMPACT ON THE ORGANIZATION AND THE PUBLIC 149

of the organizational structures to deal with this matter fairly. The Guptaleaks whistleblowers similarly “indicated that they did not want the information to go to the police or any political leaders as they trusted nobody” (Dlamini, 2018, p. 2). The final form of moral legitimacy, personal moral legitimacy, concerns specific organizational leaders’ charisma and moral standing. Whistleblowers’ exposures often question the moral authority of senior members of the organization. Avakian and Roberts (2012, p. 76) argued that the whistleblower’s challenge of the institution’s established order, in essence, entails “… exposing the hidden intentions and actions of individuals” by questioning the credibility particular organizational members’ actions and intentions. Mike Tshishonga’s accusation that Minister of Justice, Penuell Maduna, had a nepotistic relationship with the liquidator whose appointment to lucrative contracts he tried to coerce, signified a severe assault on Maduna’s moral legitimacy. Near and Jensen’s (1983, pp. 7–8; 23–24) three possible organizational responses to the whistleblower’s questioning of its legitimacy center around the degree of public support that the whistleblower can attract. The first is a rationalistic response, where the degree of retaliation matches the degree of perceived threat. If the disclosure is made public and has merit, the retaliation would be more forceful, as this kind of exposure would signify a considerable danger to the organization. A strategic response would occur where whistleblowers deemed to represent less of a threat to the organization’s authority structure would be more likely to face reprisals. The final reaction, the entirely unpredictable response, is random, without any link to the degree of public support given to the whistleblower. Their research showed support for organizations responding strategically, in other words retaliating against the more vulnerable whistleblowers, those without support from the top management or viewed as lacking in merit. To a certain extent, retaliation can be viewed as a strategy that organizations employ to restore or repair legitimacy (Suchman, 1995, pp. 597–598). Discrediting and isolating the whistleblower enable organizations to provide a normalizing account that shifts the focus from the message to the messenger. If the organization can succeed in redefining the situation as one where a “troublemaker” does not understand the culture or functioning of the organization and is making fallacious accusations, its moral legitimacy is regained.

150 

T. UYS

Whistleblowing as a Threat to Collegial Relationships Disclosures of wrongdoing tend to have a rippling effect on relationships of trust and loyalty within the workgroup, which provides a partial explanation for the suffering that whistleblowers endure as a result of their activities. Organizations generally place a high premium on the trust and loyalty of their employees. Organizational socialization processes tend to emphasize the importance of sustaining collegial loyalty and cordial interpersonal relations, promoting actions that enhance the public image and reputation of the organization, and encouraging empathy for those who make mistakes (Peterson & Farrell, 1986, p. 8). For workgroups to function well, co-workers need to believe that others in their work environment will act in ways that are conducive to their wellbeing (Sztompka, 2005, p. 5). A whistleblower report of wrongdoing violates this trust as it destroys their co-workers’ belief in a consensual reality—the idea that everybody is working toward a common goal and achieving shared interests (Ben-­ Yehuda, 2001, p.  27). Supervisors and managers view it as questioning their competence, conduct, and integrity, and fellow employees perceive it as disloyalty; a betrayal (Paul & Townsend, 1996, p. 157). In developing his typology, Ben-Yehuda (2001, p. 36) defines betrayal as “the antagonistic violation of trust and loyalty, and hence the crossing of moral boundaries by a genuine member in the collective or dyad.” Therefore, co-workers lose their sense of an imagined community, belonging, and shared memories of a workplace they can be proud of. The whistleblower is viewed as disrupting the solidarity, care, and compassion that previously characterized workplace relationships (De Maria, 1999, p.  33). Cooperation is replaced by suspicion, often resulting in intense feelings of hurt, misery, and anger (Ben-Yehuda, 2001, p. 13). Peternelj-­ Taylor (2003, p. 530) described this process very well: Whistleblowing can create chaos within the workplace by disrupting the status quo, by undermining the trust within a particular team, or by creating an ambience of mutual suspicion that can further lead to low morale and anger on the part of team members. … Often, the flurry of activity that accompanies such a disclosure in a forensic environment can resemble a ‘witch hunt’ where every staff member’s behaviours and actions are considered suspect and scrutinized under the watchful eye of managers, other staff and security personnel.

6  PUBLIC ISSUES: THE IMPACT ON THE ORGANIZATION AND THE PUBLIC 151

The situation of the whistleblower probably can best be understood in terms of what Goffman (1959, pp.  141–165) referred to as discrepant roles. He argued that any performance entails three positions, the performers, the audience, and outsiders who neither perform nor watch the show. These roles can be distinguished from each other in terms of the functions they execute, the information they possess, and the regions they can access. The performers know what impression they want to foster while also having destructive information about the performance. The audience is generally familiar with the definition of the situation the performance constructs while remaining in the dark about any destructive information about the performance. Outsiders are unaware of the appearance of reality the performance offers and are unfamiliar with any secrets associated with the performance. While performers are involved in the front and back regions, the audience only has access to the front region, and the outsiders are excluded from both. The main focus of any team is on ensuring that its performance sustains the construction of reality that it wants to foster. Discrepant roles are played by those who possess unexpected information about it, though they are not present during a performance. The whistleblower could be viewed as a renegade who undermines the impression that the performance wants to foster by providing destructive information about it.

The Effectiveness of Whistleblowing The discussion so far focused on understanding when and why organizations (which means their representatives) retaliate against whistleblowers, thereby creating a personal trouble for the whistleblower and a public issue for themselves. Interestingly, the factors that influence retaliation against whistleblowers also tend to impact its effectiveness. Miceli et al. (2008, pp. 135–136) distinguished between effectiveness and resolution. They view resolution as a form of closure where some internal or external authority vindicates the whistleblower and punishes wrongdoers. In contrast, effectiveness entails the extent to which termination of the wrongful behavior occurs speedily and partly due to whistleblowing. Effective whistleblowing, therefore, results in organizational change that ends the wrongdoing without necessarily punishing the wrongdoers (2008, p. 136). The whistleblower’s ultimate aim is generally to effect change in the organization, with a limited interest in the treatment meted out to wrongdoers.

152 

T. UYS

Similar to their analysis of retaliation, Miceli et al. (2008, pp. 136–152) employed resource dependence theory to explore the factors influencing the willingness and ability of organizations to change questionable practices. This theory argues that the extent to which social actors possess or control resources that others are dependent upon determines their power. The power of the whistleblower, the degree of organizational dependence on the wrongdoer, and how vital the suspicious practice is to corporate wellbeing determine whistleblowing effectiveness. The Power of the Whistleblower Resource dependence theory predicts that employees with position power, those in senior positions in the organization, who have specialized expertise that is not easily replaceable, or whose skills and knowledge are in high demand at the particular point in time, should be more effective as whistleblowers. However, general position power is not equally useful in all situations. To be effective, whistleblowers need to possess situation-­specific power, that is, power relevant to the particular whistleblowing and the wrongdoing (Miceli et al., 2008, p. 139). Whether role-prescribed whistleblowing, as a situation-specific base of power, would be successful in stopping the wrongdoing depends on whether organizational policies are not only espoused but also enacted and whether there is an agreement that the particular act of whistleblowing was in actual fact role-prescribed (Miceli et al., 2008, pp. 139–140). As a compliance manager, Allison Pedzinski clearly engaged in role-­ prescribed whistleblowing. However, her whistleblowing had a negligible impact on effecting change in the organization. Engaging in role-­ prescribed whistleblowing also did not protect her from retaliation. The whistleblower is in a more powerful position and more likely to have an impact when other members of the organization perceive the whistleblowing as legitimate or credible. The whistleblower’s credibility depends chiefly on how the initial complaint recipient responds to the disclosure, how well-documented the evidence of wrongdoing is, and whether the process used is considered fair and appropriate, and, unfortunately, whether others have positive perceptions of the whistleblower’s motives. Miceli et al. (2008, pp. 145–146) also suggested that the more convinced whistleblowers are that raising concerns about wrongdoing will ensure a resolution to the problem (whistleblower self-efficacy), or that

6  PUBLIC ISSUES: THE IMPACT ON THE ORGANIZATION AND THE PUBLIC 153

they have leverage over the complaint recipient or the wrongdoer, the more effective they tend to be. In both instances, this depends on the organization being well-managed and its members displaying a high level of commitment to ethical standards. Organizational Dependence on Wrongdoers As expected, a powerful wrongdoer makes it very difficult for a whistleblower to effectively put an end to wrongdoing, especially if the wrongdoer controls more resources than the whistleblower. Top management generally finds it challenging to alienate or fire high-level wrongdoers if the organization is heavily dependent on them (Miceli et  al., 2008, pp. 146–147). The experiences of Johan Muller, who blew the whistle on the driver license scandal in Mpumalanga, South Africa, and Harry Charlton, the Parliamentary Travelgate whistleblower, bear testimony to this. In both cases, they blew the whistle on wrongdoing by high-level politicians, which resulted in investigations focusing primarily on damage control by the authorities and causing severe detriment to the wellbeing of the whistleblowers. Yet one should note how differences in their relative power led to very different outcomes for these two whistleblowers, with Charlton being able to create a new life in Australia, while Muller lost everything. Organizational Dependence on the Wrongdoing How reliant the organization is on continuing the wrongdoing also influences whether whistleblowers would succeed in ending the wrongdoing. Organizations are unlikely to risk the costly sanctions or damage to their reputation that could flow from engaging in serious wrongdoing without having compelling reasons to do so. Blowing the whistle about wrongdoing perceived to be pertinent to decision-making about the organization, or that has become entrenched, is unlikely to result in effective change, as organizations have become dependent on such behavior and might even view it as crucial to their survival. The wrongdoing might likely have become normalized, with disclosure recipients and others in the organization considering it part of the organization’s culture, the accepted way of doing business to ensure organizational prosperity. In such a corporate climate, whistleblowing is unlikely to result in organizational change (Miceli et al., 2008, pp. 148–150).

154 

T. UYS

Of all the variables associated with whistleblowing, its overall effectiveness is probably one of the most difficult to measure. Seeing that whistleblowing is a protracted process that can stretch over many years rather than an event, considering the assessment’s timing is obviously essential. The perception of effectiveness also might change over time, with the whistleblowing being judged relatively ineffective in making a difference shortly after the conclusion of the process, while observers might view its impact in a different light several years later. In addition, the use of self-­ reported data can introduce some bias. Whistleblowers’ perceptions of the effectiveness of their disclosures might differ from how outsiders view them for various reasons. At the same time, the validity of the views of outsiders is also open to questioning. Furthermore, assessing the effectiveness of whistleblowing begs the question: effective for whom? Miceli et al. (2008, p. 18) argued: We may reach a relatively objective and accurate assessment of whether an individual observed wrongdoing, blew the whistle, and suffered retaliation. It is much more difficult to make a valid and reliable estimate of whether the whistleblowing process was effective in leading to the termination of wrongdoing.

The findings of research on the effectiveness of whistleblowing have displayed substantial variation. Fewer than 30% of the whistleblowers in Van Scotter et al.’s study at a large US military base indicated that the concern they raised was partially or entirely resolved (in Miceli et al., 2008, p. 25). In contrast, 64% of the whistleblowers in a Norwegian public sector survey believed that their whistleblowing had led to improvements (Skivenes & Trygstad, 2010, p. 1085). The “Whistling While They Work” (WWTW) study explored whistleblowing across a substantial number of Australian public sector agencies. Their findings painted a more positive picture of the incidence of whistleblowing, the extent of retaliation suffered, and the effectiveness of whistleblowing in Australia (Roberts et al., 2011). While this is heartening, it is imperative to keep in mind that the more positive portrayal of the outcomes of whistleblowing tends to flow from research conducted in the Global North. In contrast, the prospects for whistleblowers in most of the Global South still seem rather bleak. It also should be remembered that retaliation and effectiveness are not mutually exclusive. As some of the South African whistleblowers can attest, having made some contribution toward improving the behavior and processes in

6  PUBLIC ISSUES: THE IMPACT ON THE ORGANIZATION AND THE PUBLIC 155

your organization does not necessarily mean that you will be able to escape retaliation. The concluding section of this chapter looks at some pointers for organizations to consider if they want to avoid the private troubles and public issues often associated with whistleblowing.

Resolving the Paradox of Whistleblowing It is clear from the above that retaliation against whistleblowers has negative consequences for the organization and the whistleblower. Instead of the public issue of organizational wrongdoing being investigated and addressed, whistleblowers generally have to cope with the personal troubles that their disclosures have brought upon themselves, their colleagues, and their networks of family and friends. Observers of wrongdoing will be reluctant to come forward without the conviction that the organization will respond positively by investigating and addressing the wrongdoing. Organizations that are serious about combatting corruption and other forms of organizational wrongdoing should demonstrate their commitment to protecting those who speak up about wrongdoing. Chordiya et al. (2020) identified four factors that play a role in enhancing perceived organizational protection for whistleblowers: an ethics-oriented climate, structural provisions for ethics management, ethical leadership behaviors, and awareness of whistleblower protection laws (Chordiya et  al., 2020, p. 527). An Ethics-Oriented Climate An ethical work climate refers to prevailing perceptions of the moral content of conventional organizational practices and procedures. Observers of wrongdoing decide whether blowing the whistle is the appropriate response based on these perceptions, as do recipients of the disclosure about how to proceed. Victor and Cullen (1988, pp.  101–105) distinguished three types of ethical climate that influence ethical reasoning in an organization: egoistic, benevolent, and principled. In an organization with a predominantly egoistic organizational climate, self-interest dominates. A benevolent climate is characterized by a focus on the wellbeing of others when making moral decisions, while the dominant reasoning in a principled ethical environment may be the interpretation and application of rules and legal requirements. Chordiya et al. (2020, p. 531) argue for an ethicsoriented climate reinforcing “ethical reasoning based on rules or laws (i.e.

156 

T. UYS

principled climates) and consideration of others (i.e. benevolent climates).” This climate would create an environment in which employees believe that the organization is serious about supporting and protecting ethical actions, such as whistleblowing. According to Hunt (1998, p. 533), a whistlegenic organization, which fails to deter and rectify wrongdoing or encourage ethical values and behavior, generates a climate conducive to whistleblowing. In contrast, Senekal and Uys (2013, p. 33) suggested that organizations should strive toward developing an ethogenic culture, one which creates an environment in which ethical concerns are raised, discussed, investigated, and resolved as part of the routine and accepted way of going about the organization’s business. Realizing this ethical environment would involve creating and strengthening an organizational culture that facilitates the disclosure of wrongdoing in a way that ensures its cessation. Berry (2004) identified seven dimensions of corporate culture that contribute to or obstruct employee reporting of organizational wrongdoing. An ethogenic culture requires that employees are vigilant, that is, that they are aware of the organization’s commitment to integrity and have a shared understanding of organizational standards. Second, a credible organization is one where employees demonstrate a belief in the espoused ethics and values of the organization employees. Third, employees should demonstrate engagement through a discernable and genuine involvement in advancing these shared standards. The fourth dimension is accountability, where employees reflect on their responsibilities involving reporting perceived misconduct. Fifth, the organizational culture should empower employees to have the authority to make decisions while taking responsibility for the outcomes. A further element that promotes an ethogenic culture is the extent to which the employees’ perception that the organization is responsive and fair encourages them to make disclosures of wrongdoing. Finally, the organizational culture should provide feasible options for raising concerns. Therefore, an ethogenic corporate culture presupposes an environment that encourages employees and management to exchange and probe issues related to possible organizational wrongdoing. In particular, systems should be in place that allow the organization to deal with disclosures of perceived wrongdoing in a way that ensures a mutually satisfactory outcome for the whistleblower, manager, and organization as a whole.

6  PUBLIC ISSUES: THE IMPACT ON THE ORGANIZATION AND THE PUBLIC 157

Ceva and Bocchiola (2020) identified two complementary moral justifications for whistleblowing: the Extrema Ratio and the Deontic views. The Extrema Ratio view: conceive whistleblowing as an exceptional individual response to some serious organizational wrongdoing … motivated either by circumstances of emergency or as a last resort, once ordinary organizational reporting mechanisms have proved unviable, unavailable, or inefficient. (Ceva and Bocchiola, 2020, p. 4)

In contrast, according to the Deontic view, whistleblowing is the execution of a general organizational duty to call organizational members who fail in their responsibilities by engaging in some form of wrongdoing to account. Therefore, an organization is required to implement effective and safe reporting mechanisms enabling observers of wrongdoing to initiate corrective action that would restore the organization’s performance to align with its power mandates of rights and duties. This view introduces the importance of an organization making structural provisions for ethics management. Structural Provision for Ethics Management When whistleblowers observe and report wrongdoing, their main objective is to prompt the organization to investigate the wrongdoing and deal with it transparently and fairly without any negative fallout for the whistleblower. It is also in the organization’s interest to keep the report internal and have it dealt with swiftly and probably with the least possible publicity. The WWTW study highlighted three main issues as crucially important in ensuring beneficial outcomes for all involved (except perhaps the wrongdoer). These are effective whistleblowing procedures, training, and specialist support (Smith, 2010, p. 719). Whistleblowing Procedures Sound whistleblowing procedures require a well-publicized policy that explains • the types of transgressions that should be reported, • the proposed recipients of the reports and recommended reporting channels,

158 

T. UYS

• the guidelines and formalities that prospective whistleblowers should follow, • how the initial disclosure recipient should deal with the disclosure, in particular regarding confidentiality issues, and supporting and protecting the whistleblower from retaliation, • as well as the kinds of investigations likely to be conducted. Investigations should be conducted unobtrusively to prevent exposure of suspected individuals to suspicion, rumors, and embarrassment before hard evidence is available. Investigators should treat the disclosed information confidentially and should protect the anonymity of employees as far as possible. The investigation needs to take place quickly, and the appropriate stakeholders should be kept abreast of the outcome of the inquiry (Senekal & Uys, 2013, pp. 36–38). Management should be aware that the concerns raised could vary substantially in nature and scope. Organizations with sufficient resources at their disposal should consider establishing specialist units that take responsibility for directing particular matters to the correct location for investigation. This unit also could be responsible for investigating concerns of a particularly sensitive or delicate nature. For these procedures to succeed, top management must unambiguously endorse the procedures. This endorsement could be problematic if some members of senior management are involved in any wrongdoing. Management should also demonstrate its commitment through making resources available for investigating the reports and correcting the misbehavior if the disclosures prove valid. Regular assessment of the organization’s internal whistleblowing system is crucial. There should be frequent opportunities for employees to indicate whether they believe that the organization’s actions correspond to its espoused commitment to promoting ethical behavior. To make internal reporting systems sustainable, a high level of trust in the organization, particularly the management structures and the internal reporting system itself, is required. A lack of confidence could lead to skepticism about the system, which could compel observers of wrongdoing to take their suspicions to an external recipient. It could even result in abuse of the system.

6  PUBLIC ISSUES: THE IMPACT ON THE ORGANIZATION AND THE PUBLIC 159

Training Observers of wrongdoing will only employ the internal procedures if they are aware of their existence and know how to use them. Therefore, all staff members should receive training about the organization’s ethical code and the process they should follow if they become aware of wrongdoing. The WWTW study showed that the initial disclosure recipient’s response is crucially important in deciding the ultimate outcome of the process (Smith, 2010, p.  713). Recipients should, therefore, receive extensive training that would enable them to manage the whistleblowing process in a mutually beneficial manner. Barnett et al. (1993, p. 133) warned that inadequate whistleblowing policies could generate an atmosphere of suspicion and fear in an organization. It is perhaps a good idea to consider identifying and training individuals who could act as whistleblowing champions. These should be employees sufficiently senior to handle disclosures appropriately and who have the confidence of other employees (Senekal & Uys, 2013, pp. 37–38). In any event, all prospective disclosure recipients should receive training in investigative techniques to ensure that they focus their attention on assessing the credibility of the message, rather than basing their conclusions on their perceptions of the messenger. Members of a specialist investigating unit must also receive proper training (Smith, 2010, p. 718). Ethical Leadership and Whistleblower Support Chordiya et al. (2020, pp. 532–534) emphasize the importance of ethical leadership in establishing enduring perceptions of organizational protection of whistleblowers. They define an ethical leader as a ‘moral person’ (an honest, caring, and principled individual making fair and balanced decisions) as well as an active ‘moral manager’ (who sets clear ethical standards and uses rewards and punishments to ensure observation of those standards). (Chordiya et al., 2020, p. 533)

Leaders set expectations about ethical conduct and its consequences. If leaders have established their legitimacy and credibility as moral leaders, followers tend to model their ethical behavior through organizational learning, imitation, and identification. The example set by leaders, therefore, will influence the response of an observer of wrongdoing.

160 

T. UYS

Vandekerckhove et  al. (2014b) identified the vital role of managerial responsiveness to whistleblowing in ensuring successful efforts to curb corruption and fraud, and strengthening corporate governance and public integrity. Effective whistleblowing requires that two broad, interrelated dimensions of managerial responsiveness should be in place: managerial responsiveness to the primary concerns aired by the whistleblower about wrongdoing; and ability or willingness to refrain from, or protect the whistleblower against retaliation or reprisals for having aired those concerns. We call these, respectively, ‘hearer action’ and ‘protector action.’ (2014, p. 306)

They argued that hearer action requires a similar kind of courage to whistleblowing: the courage to hear the whistleblower’s concerns and take investigative and remedial action. Often this requires that the initial recipients of the disclosure become speakers themselves, with all the well-known associated risks that entail. In terms of Azjen’s theory of planned behavior (a precursor to Fishbein and Azjen’s Theory of Reasoned Action, discussed in Chap. 4), managers or recipients with a more favorable attitude toward whistleblowing would be more likely to show an intention to engage in hearer action, as would those who feel under professional or social pressure (subjective norm) to do so. Perceived behavioral control when listening to a whistleblower’s concerns is of critical importance. Recipients who do not feel that they have sufficient knowledge of whistleblowing procedures, or the skills required to investigate and take remedial action, are less likely to show an intention to engage in hearer action, even if they are positive toward whistleblowing, or experience pressure to do so. The opposite is also true. High perceived behavioral control of hearer action is not in itself sufficient to encourage engagement with the whistleblower if the positive attitude toward whistleblowing or the perceived pressure to perform hearer action is lacking (Vandekerckhove et al., 2014b, pp. 318–320). A similar argument applies to protector action, that is, efforts to shield those who have spoken up from the retaliation that could follow. Again a positive attitude toward whistleblowing or perceived pressure to protect whistleblowers would most likely predispose the disclosure recipient to discourage retaliation. And again, recipients must be empowered to feel that they have the necessary behavioral control that would enable them to

6  PUBLIC ISSUES: THE IMPACT ON THE ORGANIZATION AND THE PUBLIC 161

protect whistleblowers (Vandekerckhove et  al., 2014b, pp.  321–322). Therefore, an essential element in supporting whistleblowers in their quest for righting wrongs is putting measures in place to ensure that disclosure recipients manage the whistleblower process effectively. One of the weaknesses in whistleblowing systems identified by Smith (2010, p. 718) is the deficiencies in the support provided to whistleblowers, if it happens at all. Formal support programs should be established that assess the risks faced by individual whistleblowers and supply the high-risk cases with the assistance they need to ensure positive outcomes for the whistleblower and the organization—and ultimately, of course, the public.

Conclusion This chapter analyzed whistleblowing as a public issue by exploring explanations for the paradoxical organizational response whistleblowers generally encounter. Organizations typically present themselves to the world as ethical actors whose decisions are guided by the public interest. One would, therefore, expect that the organization would respond positively to reports of wrongdoing by investigating the issue and dealing with the perpetrators. In contrast, organizations tend to focus their attention on the whistleblower’s motives and credibility and engage in retaliation. This chapter considered this conundrum by exploring when and why retaliation is likely to occur. It also examined factors that influence how effective whistleblowers could be in achieving their aim of bringing the wrongdoing to an end. The final part of this chapter discussed three of the four elements of Chordiya et  al.’s theoretical framework of organizational protection for whistleblowers: an ethics-oriented climate, structural provision for ethics management, and ethical leadership and support. The fourth element is the awareness of whistleblower protection laws. The effectiveness of legislative protection for whistleblowers is the theme of the next chapter.

References Avakian, S., & Roberts, J. (2012). Whistleblowers in Organisations: Prophets at Work? Journal of Business Ethics, 110(1), 71–84. Barker, R., & Dawood, R. (2004). Whistleblowing in the Organization: Wrongdoer or Do-Gooder? Communicare, 23(2), 119–138.

162 

T. UYS

Barnett, T., Cochran, D.  S., & Taylor, S.  G. (1993). The Internal Disclosure Policies of Private-Sector Employers: An Initial Look at Their Relationship to Employee Whistleblowing. Journal of Business Ethics, 12, 127–136. Ben-Yehuda, N. (2001). Betrayals and Treason: Violations of Trust and Loyalty. Westview. Berry, B. (2004). Organizational Culture: A Framework and Strategies for Facilitating Employee Whistleblowing. Employee Responsibilities and Rights Journal, 16(1), 1–11. Bjørkelo, B., Ryberg, W., Matthiesen, S.  B., & Einarsen, S. (2008). When You Talk and Talk and Nobody Listens: A mixed Method Case Study of Whistleblowing and its Consequences. International Journal of Organisational Behavior, 13(2), 18–40. Bowen, R. M., Call, A. C., & Rajgopal, S. (2010). Whistle-Blowing: Target Firm Characteristics and Economic Consequences. The Accounting Review, 85(4), 1239–1271. Brown, A., & Olsen, J. (2008). Internal Witness Support: The Unmet Challenge. In A. Brown (Ed.), Whistleblowing in the Australian Public Sector. ANU E-Press. Ceva, E., & Bocchiola, M. (2020). Theories of whistleblowing. Philosophy Compass, 15, e12642. https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12642 Chordiya, R., Sabharwa, J. E., Relly, J. E., & Berman, E. M. (2020). Organizational Protection for Whistleblowers: A Cross-national Study. Public Management Review, 22(4), 527–552. David, A. (2005). Whistleblowers. Who They Are and How Management Should Respond. Graziadio Business Review, 8(4), 1–7. De Maria, W. (1999). Deadly Disclosures. Wakefield Press. Dlamini, P. (2018). SA Owes Gupta Leaks Whistleblowers Living in Hiding a Huge Debt: Currin. South Africa. Retrieved August 12, 2021 from https:// www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2018-09-27-sa-owes-gupta-leakswhistleblowers-living-in-hiding-a-huge-debt-currin/ Goffman, E. (1959). The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. London: Penguin Books. Hunt, G. (1998). Whistle-Blowing. Encyclopedia of Applied Ethics, 4, 525–534. Mesmer-Magnus, J.  R., & Viswesvaran, C. (2005). Whistleblowing in Organizations: An Examination of Correlates of Whistleblowing Intentions, Actions, and Retaliation. Journal of Business Ethics, 62(3), 277–297. Miceli, M.  P., Near, J.  P., & Dworkin, T.  M. (2008). Whistle-blowing in Organisations. Routledge. Miethe, T. D. (1999). Whistleblowing at Work: Tough Choices in Exposing Fraud, Waste, and Abuse on the Job. Westview Press. Moberly, R. (2014). ‘To persons or Organizations that May Be Able to Effect Action’: Whistleblowing Recipients. In A. J. Brown, D. Lewis, R. E. Moberly, & W.  Vandekerckhove (Eds.), International Handbook on Whistleblowing Research. Edward Elgar.

6  PUBLIC ISSUES: THE IMPACT ON THE ORGANIZATION AND THE PUBLIC 163

Near, J. P., & Jensen, T. C. (1983). The Whistleblowing Process: Retaliation and Perceived Effectiveness. Work and Occupations, 10(1), 3–28. Sage Publications. Near, J. P., & Miceli, M. P. (1985). Organizational dissidence: The case of whistleblowing. Journal of Business Ethics, 4(1), 1–16. Olesen, T. (2018). The Democratic Drama of Whistleblowing. European Journal of Social Theory, 21(4), 508–525. Park, H., Bjørkelo, B., & Blenkinsopp, J. (2020). External Whistleblowers’ Experiences of Workplace Bullying by Superiors and Colleagues. Journal of Business Ethics, 161, 591–601. Paul, R. J., & Townsend, J. B. (1996). Don’t Kill the Messenger! Whistle-blowing in America—A Review with Recommendations. Employee Responsibilities and Rights Journal, 9(2), 149–161. Peternelj-Taylor, C. (2003). Whistleblowing and Boundary Violations: Exposing a Colleague in the Forensic Milieu. Nursing Ethics, 10(3), 526–540. Peterson, J. C., & Farrell, D. (1986). Whistleblowing: Ethical and Legal Issues in Expressing Dissent. Kendall/Hunt. Rehg, M., Miceli, M.  P., Near, J.  P., & Van Scotter, J.  R. (2004). Predicting Retaliation against Whistle-blowers: Outcomes of Power Relationships within Organizations. Academy of Management Best Conference Paper: 1–6. Rehg, M., Miceli, M. P., Near, J. P., & Van Scotter, J. R. (2008). Antecedents and Outcomes of Retaliation Against Whistleblowers: Gender Differences and Power Relationships. Organization Science, 19(2), 221–240. Roberts, P., Brown, A. J., & Olsen, J. (2011). Whistling While They Work: A Good-­ practice Guide for Managing Internal Reporting of Wrongdoing in Public Sector Organisations. ANU E-Press. https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt24hcvb Rothschild, J. (2013). The Fate of Whistleblowers in Nonprofit Organizations. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 42(5), 886–901. Rothschild, J., & Miethe, T. D. (1994). Whistleblowing as Resistance in Modern Work Organizations. In J.  M. Jermier, D.  Knights, & W.  R. Nord (Eds.), Resistance and Power in Organizations (pp. 252–273). Routledge. Senekal, A., & Uys, T. (2013). Creating an Ethogenic Organisation: The Development and Implementation of a Whistleblowing Policy. African Journal of Business Ethics, 7(1), 32–39. Skivenes, M., & Trygstad, S. C. (2010). When whistle-blowing works: The Norwegian case. Human Relations, 63(7), 1071–1097. Smith, R. (2010). The Role of Whistle-Blowing in Governing Well: Evidence from the Australian Public Sector. The American Review of Public Administration, 40(6), 704–721. Sage Publication. Suchman, M.  C. (1995). Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches. The Academy of Management Review., 20(3), 571–610. Sumanth, J. J., Mayer, D. M., & Kay, V. S. (2011). Why Good Guys Finish Last: The Role of Justification Motives, Cognition, and Emotion in Predicting Retaliation against Whistleblowers. Organizational Psychology Review, 1(2), 165–184.

164 

T. UYS

Sztompka, P. (2005). Trust in a Globalizing Society. Inaugural Address at the International Symposium on Sociology, March 7–9, Zaragoza. Uys, T., & Senekal, A. (2008). Morality of Principle versus Morality of Loyalty: The Case of Whistleblowing. African Journal of Business Ethics, 3(1), 38–44. Victor, B., & Cullen, J.  B. (1988). The Organizational Basis of Ethical Work Climates. Administrative Science Quarterly, 33, 101–125. Vandekerckhove, W., Brown, A. J., & Tsahuridu, E. (2014b). Managerial Responsiveness to Whistleblowing: Expanding the Research Horizon. In A. J. Brown, D. Lewis, R. E. Moberly, & W. Vandekerckhove (Eds.), International Handbook on Whistleblowing Research. Edward Elgar.

CHAPTER 7

Protecting Whistleblowers: The Effectiveness of Legislation and Organizational Support

Introduction The United Nations Sustainable Development Goal 16—Peace and Justice, Strong Institutions—focuses on achieving just, peaceful, and inclusive societies through establishing “effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels” and a significant reduction in all forms of bribery and corruption. Globally, whistleblowing is considered a crucial tool in the ongoing fight to eradicate fraud and corruption in both the public and private sectors. However, winning this fight requires robust, accessible, and widely applicable whistleblower protections that counter the significant deterrents that discourage observers of wrongdoing from speaking up. Unfortunately, whistleblowers are often seen as “enemies of the people,” the title of Magnus Haglunds’ (2009) sociological analysis of whistleblowing employing the framework of tragedy. When observers of organizational wrongdoing resolve the competing moral imperatives of corporate loyalty and adherence to overarching ethical principles by blowing the whistle, the retaliation they endure transforms whistleblowing into a tragic act (Haglunds, 2009, pp.  220–221). Whistleblowers make this choice as they see it as the only way to convince the organization to address the public issue of organizational misconduct. However, the organization views the insider’s action as a threat to its future survival. It attempts to restore the disturbance in the social order by retaliating against whistleblowers rather than addressing the message they © The Author(s) 2022 T. Uys, Whistleblowing and the Sociological Imagination, https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-39445-3_7

165

166 

T. UYS

delivered. This response results in a status degradation process, transforming the whistleblower’s social identity from insider to outsider, from valued employee to pariah (Haglunds, 2009, p.  83). Rather than the disclosure leading to a termination of the wrongdoing, it creates private troubles for the whistleblower and becomes a public issue for the organization. Haglunds (2009, p. 203) described the final stage in his analysis of whistleblowing as a tragedy as purgation, which contains the two simultaneous social processes of expelling the one considered to be the main cause behind the pains that afflicted the community, as well as the restoration of the prevalent moral order by this process of excommunication.

The retaliation suffered by a whistleblower becomes the endpoint of the story when viewing whistleblowing as a tragedy. Haglunds (2009, pp.  223–224) acknowledged that “[t]ragedy as a dramatic sequence in fiction as well as in real life is a slice of a definite span of time with a beginning, an interval, and an end” and that “life and history are continuously reconstructed according to social patterns defying tragedy.” This chapter considers ways in which the outcome of whistleblowing as a tragedy could be avoided by institutionalizing the disclosure of organizational wrongdoing. Apart from protecting whistleblowers against retaliation, legislation should also include measures encouraging organizational support to all those affected by the disclosure of wrongdoing. The chapter analyzes the effectiveness of legislation in protecting whistleblowers against retaliation and encouraging structural measures that provide organizational support to observers of wrongdoing when making their disclosures. If retaliation does not follow, blowing the whistle will not incur private troubles for the whistleblower or become a public issue for the organization. Ultimately, the focus should be on addressing organizational wrongdoing as a public issue by ensuring that facilitating its exposure results in eradicating organizational misconduct.

Institutionalizing Whistleblowing Rational loyalty entails being loyal to the organization’s explicit values and norms (Vandekerckhove and Commers, 2004, p. 229). Rather than being faithful to management or colleagues or protecting the organization’s reputation, expressing rational loyalty compels the dutiful employee who

7  PROTECTING WHISTLEBLOWERS: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF LEGISLATION… 167

observes organizational wrongdoing to blow the whistle. Institutionalizing the disclosure of wrongdoing requires creating a climate of disclosure through implementing transparent and open communication channels, a flat hierarchical structure, and the promotion of reciprocal relationships of trust. In such a corporate environment, management’s response to a disclosure would focus on the message rather than the messenger. Well-designed “normative, institutional and judicial frameworks that effectively protect whistleblowers in law—and in practice” (Feinstein & Devine, 2021, p. 4) are required to ensure the sustainability of such an organizational climate. Many legislative whistleblowing protections have been implemented globally since the United States introduced the first whistleblowing protection law in 1970 (Feinstein & Devine, 2021, p. 38). However, these protections vary significantly regarding the requirements for and comprehensiveness of the protections embodied in the legislation. During the last decade, international organizations have published various documents detailing best practices for whistleblowing protection. Five examples are • The United Nations Convention Against Corruption’s Resource Guide on Good Practices in the Protection of Reporting Persons (2015), • The OECD’s analysis of the level of commitment to whistleblower protection in both the private and public sectors in OECD countries, published in 2016, • Transparency International’s Best Practice Guide for Whistleblowing Legislation (Terracol, 2018), • The G20 High-Level Principles for the Effective Protection of Whistleblowers adopted on June 29, 2019, and • The European Parliament’s Directive (EU) 2019/1937 on protecting persons who report breaches of Union law adopted on October 23, 2019. In July 2021 Technical Committee 309 of the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) published  international standard 37002 providing guidelines  for best practices in whistleblowing management systems. A comparison of the effectiveness of these laws, regulations, and international instruments falls outside this chapter’s scope.1 So instead, the 1  For a recent comparison of the whistleblowing protections provided by the legislation of 23 countries from four regions, see Chalouat et  al. (2020), and the Government

168 

T. UYS

focus is on considering how various provisions contribute toward resolving the social dilemma of whistleblowing as personal trouble and public issue and perhaps ultimately facilitate the elimination or at least a decline in the range of organizational wrongdoing. Dworkin and Brown (2013) distinguished between four legislative models for whistleblower protection. The first is the anti-retaliation or organizational justice model, focusing on protecting whistleblowers by removing legal obstacles to disclosure, proscribing organizational retaliation, and providing civil, criminal, and employment remedies when reprisals occur. This model’s primary aim is to discourage organizations from retaliating against whistleblowers. The second model employs financial incentives or other rewards to encourage disclosure while also providing compensation for the potential loss of a job or even a career in the particular industry. The third model determines whether there is sufficient justification for disclosures to the media to warrant protection. Both these models represent refinements to the anti-retaliation model. Finally, the institutional or structural model concentrates on establishing “institutional mechanisms by which organizations take it on themselves to encourage internal whistleblowing, prevent and control wrongdoing, and prevent or self-remedy retaliation” (Dworkin & Brown, 2013, p. 679). These models are not mutually exclusive, however. For example, legislation concentrating on anti-retaliation measures does not proscribe the inclusion of institutional measures encouraging disclosures, providing rewards to whistleblowers, or implementing systems allowing protected disclosures to the media. Dworkin and Brown (2013, p. 713) even recommended the integration and reconciliation of these different approaches as “the most likely path to greater success in protecting whistleblowers and encouraging whistleblowing.”

Accountability Project’s (GAP) global analysis of whistleblower protection litigation (Feinstein & Devine, 2021).

7  PROTECTING WHISTLEBLOWERS: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF LEGISLATION… 169

Anti-retaliation Legislation Protection Against Victimization Legislation attempts to protect whistleblowers against various types of harm they could suffer due to making disclosures. In most instances, this entails providing an exhaustive list specifying particular forms of unfair treatment, such as disciplinary action, dismissal, demotion, harassment, intimidation, transferral against their will, refusal to provide a reference, or being given an unfavorable recommendation, or being denied appointment in any post. In addition, some jurisdictions follow Transparency International’s best practice guidelines by extending the scope of work-­ related detriments to include bullying and blacklisting and specifying that protection is not restricted to the listed practices (Thakur, 2018b, p. 3). The fear of violating a confidentiality agreement or the possibility of being sued for defamation could deter an observer of wrongdoing from speaking up. Consequently, adequate legislative protections should include stipulations that prohibit organizations from imposing contractual confidentiality duties that obstruct the disclosure of wrongdoing, so-called gag orders. Legislation should also grant immunity from legal action in light of the possible chilling effect the threat of defending a court case could have on observers of wrongdoing when contemplating whether to come forward (Feinstein & Devine, 2021, pp. 19–21; Thakur, 2018b, p. 4). Transparency International (Terracol, 2018, p.  25) recommends a waiver of liability as best practice, which prohibits bringing criminal or civil proceedings against someone who revealed wrongdoing. Employers sometimes argue that shielding whistleblowers from litigation opens the door for false and malicious disclosures. Therefore, whistleblowing legislation often opts for the defense approach, which allows the whistleblower to use the claim of a protected disclosure as a defense in civil or criminal proceedings. Unfortunately, the latter form of protection is less effective in encouraging observers of wrongdoing to come forward. They have to confront the unnerving prospect of having to defend their disclosures in a court of law, with the attendant threat of high financial costs and reputational damage (Thakur, 2018b, p. 4). In extreme cases, whistleblower retaliation might endanger their safety or even their lives or those of their family members. Revelations about organized crime or grand corruption are especially likely to give rise to a need for physical protection. Some countries consider their witness

170 

T. UYS

protection scheme as providing sufficient protection to whistleblowers. However, many whistleblowers do not comply with the requirements for witness protection. The information they possess might not be of such a nature that it qualifies as evidence in a court of law. Therefore, the existence of a witness protection scheme does not compensate for the absence of measures aimed at providing personal security for whistleblowers (Terracol, 2018, pp. 27–28). Anonymity and confidentiality are critical elements of sheltering whistleblowers from victimization, so legislation should allow whistleblowers to make anonymous disclosures. Alternatively, whistleblower legislation should prohibit authorities from revealing the whistleblower’s identity or providing any identifying information without his or her explicit consent. Keeping the whistleblowers’ identity a secret prevents retaliation and should move attention to the message rather than the messenger (Chalouat et al., 2020, p. 20; Feinstein & Devine, 2021, p. 18; Terracol, 2018, pp. 18–21; Thakur 2018b, p. 3). However, in the absence of explicit provisions criminalizing the deliberate unmasking of a whistleblower’s identity, the focus tends to remain on the whistleblower, as could be seen in the debate that ensued about the identity of the anonymous intelligence community whistleblower who raised concerns about President Trump’s dealings with Ukraine (Allyn, 2019). Likewise, during her testimony at the South African Zondo Commission of Inquiry into State Capture, Dudu Myeni, the former South African Airways (SAA) board chair, repeatedly exposed the identity of an anonymous whistleblower, “Mr. X,” despite advocate Kate Hofmeyer’s frequent admonitions, not to do so (Wildschut, 2020). What Can Be Disclosed? The question arises as to what types of misconduct would qualify as protected disclosure. In some jurisdictions, a protected disclosure is defined in broad terms, such as any action that threatens or harms the public interest. Unfortunately a definition of what is understood by the public interest, is often not provided. While the flexibility of this type of definition permits an expanded application to many situations, its openness to interpretation could lead to uncertainty and discourage some observers of wrongdoing from speaking up (Terracol, 2018, p. 8). In other instances, the legislative provisions provide a list of qualifying behaviors. The South African Protected Disclosures Act (PDA), promulgated in 2000 and amended in 2017 (PDAA), for example, specifies that

7  PROTECTING WHISTLEBLOWERS: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF LEGISLATION… 171

a protected disclosure furnishes information showing the involvement of an employer, or an employer’s employee or worker in • committing a criminal offense, or a failure to comply with a legal obligation, • a miscarriage of justice, • danger to the health or safety of an individual, or the environment, • unfair discrimination, or • the deliberate concealment of any of the above. It is important to note that the exposed conduct may have occurred in the past, could currently be happening, or could be anticipated to happen in the future. Using a closed list specifying reportable misconduct provides clarity but runs the risk of omitting relevant forms of wrongdoing either by accident or on purpose. Therefore, Transparency International’s best practice guidelines recommend a hybrid model that lists the covered categories of misconduct while allowing disclosures about pertinent cases of wrongdoing not mentioned in the list. A hybrid model achieves the best of both worlds: the clarity of a list of categories while not inadvertently excluding valid reasons for blowing the whistle (Terracol, 2018, p. 9). Who Should Be Protected? Best practice guidelines generally recommend that protection should extend beyond the traditional designation of an employee to include a wide range of stakeholders who could have privileged access to organizational information, including contractors, temporary workers, consultants, trainees, and volunteers. The 2017 South African Protected Disclosures Act Amendment, for example, expanded protections to include all workers rendering services to an employer or client, whether on a permanent or temporary basis. It stopped short of extending protection to applicants, though, despite its inclusion of the denial of employment opportunities in the definition of occupational detriment. This omission is a concern. Prospective employers may likely view their earlier disclosures at a former organization in a negative light, leading to a reluctance to appoint whistleblowers (Thakur, 2018a, p. 4). While several countries have implemented dedicated whistleblowing legislation protecting public sector whistleblowers, there is considerable variation in the protection provided to private sector employees. In some

172 

T. UYS

countries, legal provisions explicitly protect private sector whistleblowing. However, in most cases, these provisions only entail encouraging companies to set up internal whistleblowing policies and structures without making it mandatory to do so or restrict protection to disclosures of contraventions of corporate law (Chalouat et al., 2020, p. 14; Lewis et al., 2014, p. 367). This reluctance to provide robust protection to private sector whistleblowers is of concern. The South African state capture saga offers ample evidence of the interconnectedness of public and private sector corruption and the need for fighting the battle on both fronts. Chalouat et al. (2020, pp. 14–15) highlight the absence of explicit protection for public and private sector employees whose work duties require that they report wrongdoings, such as auditors, accounting officers, bank inspectors, and compliance officers. They stress that: These workers constitute “islands of honesty” and help monitor not only the flow of money in public and financial services but also the ethical character of those entrusted with the responsibility to put public finances to good use.

When Does a Disclosure Qualify for Protection? As a tool in the fight against corruption, whistleblower protection requires a balancing act of the competing needs of fighting corruption and protecting freedom of expression in the workplace, on the one hand, and ensuring the privacy of information and the expectation of employees’ organizational loyalty on the other (Soltes, 2012, p. 927). In attempting to achieve this balance, legislators often make particular demands the whistleblower needs to comply with before the disclosure would trigger protection. Soltes (2012) identified three approaches used by legislators when establishing a standard for determining whether a disclosure qualifies for protection, each with increasingly more stringent demands placed on the whistleblower. The Reasonable Belief Approach requires that the whistleblower should have a reasonable belief that the information provided and the allegations made in the disclosure are substantially accurate. In this instance, whistleblowers do not need to provide evidence that wrongdoing has occurred, and their subjective opinions are sufficient to allow making a disclosure (Chalouat et al., 2020, p. 18; Soltes, 2012, p. 931).

7  PROTECTING WHISTLEBLOWERS: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF LEGISLATION… 173

In addition to the whistleblower demonstrating a reasonable belief in the truthfulness of the reported allegations, the Specific Offense Approach requires that “any qualifying disclosure must specifically point to the underlying breach of a law or obligation” (Soltes, 2012, p.  934). The whistleblower, therefore, needs to provide concrete facts corroborating the allegations in the disclosure. This additional requirement could discourage observers of wrongdoing from coming forward. They might be unsure whether they have sufficient evidence of wrongdoing to qualify for protection from retaliation if they raise their concerns. Those who have made disclosures might find themselves exposed to victimization if the authorities do not deem the evidence provided sufficient to qualify for protection. The Multiple Hurdles Approach adds two further requirements before disclosures would qualify for protection. The first is that the recipient needs to be unaware of the improper conduct revealed by the whistleblower. The second requirement is that the whistleblower should disclose confidential information about impropriety that would otherwise not become known, which is unlikely to be the situation if the disclosure happens internally. Therefore, the Multiple Hurdles Approach requires that the disclosure has to take place “outside the scope of regular employment duties or outside of regular employment channels” (Soltes, 2012, p. 939). Obliging whistleblowers to make external disclosures prevents the employer from resolving the problem internally without detriment to its reputation while also harming employee-employer relationships. Soltes (2012, p. 941) considers the Reasonable Belief Approach ideal (the first approach) in giving clarity to observers of wrongdoing whether they have sufficient information to be in a position to make a protected disclosure without placing unnecessary burdens on the whistleblower. He also recommends the use of the disinterested observer test to determine whether a belief is reasonable. This test entails asking whether a disinterested observer familiar with the relevant facts of the matter would conclude that improper action is taking place (Soltes, 2012, p. 939). All three approaches include the requirement that the whistleblower should make a disclosure in good faith, without specifying what is meant by this requirement. While the expectation that whistleblowers should not make false claims is justified, a good faith disclosure requirement often moves attention from the message to the messenger. The focus becomes the motives of the whistleblower, which “are notoriously difficult to identify and may well change in the process of reporting, for example, when an

174 

T. UYS

internal disclosure is ignored or results in the worker suffering reprisals” (Lewis et al., 2014, p. 362). Rather than being propelled by purely altruistic or purely self-interested motives, the whistleblower also could have mixed motives. As Santoro and Kumar (2018, p. 32) argue: A whistleblower can act upon reasons that are independent of the burdens of complicity: truth-telling and public interest are among them. A whistleblower can also act upon less noble reasons, including self-gain, rancor against a colleague, and even in the pursuit of a reward when the law permits it. More often, a whistleblower acts upon mixed reasons, where the good motives for disclosure are reinforced by personal incentives.

Organizations often respond to disclosures by attacking the credibility of whistleblowers, by questioning their motives, rather than addressing the substance of their allegations. If the employer succeeds in proving a lack of good faith in some countries, such as the United States, India, and South Africa, the whistleblower is liable for criminal sanction (Chalouat et al., 2020, p. 22; Thakur, 2018b, p. 2). Similar concerns crop up in situations where legislation excludes protection if the whistleblower gains some personal advantage from the disclosure. This requirement again focuses on the messenger rather than the message and undercuts the purpose of whistleblower protections. Thakur (2018b, p. 2) puts it well: While it may seem unsavoury for a whistleblower to benefit from a disclosure, the fact remains that whether or not a whistleblower obtains an advantage resulting from his or her disclosure has no bearing on whether the conduct reported was wrongful. The proper focus in protecting whistleblowers is unearthing wrongful conduct. Benefits that may accrue to whistleblowers following a disclosure are, strictly speaking, irrelevant.

Therefore, whistleblowers should receive protection against retaliation irrespective of whether their motives for raising concerns were self-­ interested or altruistic. Furthermore, Alford (2001, p. 32) argued that the whistleblower should not need to be morally or intellectually pure to qualify for protection: To demand that genuine whistleblowers be among the most rational, ethical, well-balanced, and humane of humans would obscure most of what is important by making it impossible to ask the right question. Not “Who is

7  PROTECTING WHISTLEBLOWERS: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF LEGISLATION… 175

the whistleblower and is his case sounder than sound?” but “What can we learn from the experience of the scapegoat?”

The Government Accountability Project and International Bar Association joint report on the state of global whistleblower protection legislation (Feinstein & Devine, 2021, p. 16) suggests the need for “protection against spillover retaliation at the workplace.” Spillover retaliation could occur against those associated with, or who assisted, the whistleblower and those on the brink of making a disclosure. The report also indicates that protection should extend beyond the workplace to include protecting family members and “all those who participate in or are affected by the organisation’s activities” (Feinstein & Devine, 2021, p. 17). How Should Disclosures Be Made and to Whom? Research has shown that whistleblowing tends to be a prolonged process rather than a single event. As such, observers of wrongdoing tend to raise their concerns on numerous occasions and employ various reporting channels. Anti-retaliation legislation generally specifies the requirements associated with different recipients or reporting avenues that ensure that the disclosure qualifies for protection. Vandekerckhove et al. (2014, p. 299) identified a growing trend towards ‘three-tiered’ whistleblowing regimes: first, measures to encourage and protect whistleblowing inside the organization; secondly, measures to encourage and protect whistleblowing to independent, publicly accountable agencies (e.g., a regulatory or a parliamentary ombudsperson) if internal whistleblowing is not effective or appropriate; and only thirdly, protection of public whistleblowing (e.g. to the media) where neither of the first two tiers are effective to resolve the matter.

Research has shown that most observers of wrongdoing prefer turning to recipients internal to the organization to raise their concerns (Miceli et al., 2008, p. 8; Terracol, 2018, p. 32; Vandekerckhove & Phillips, 2016, pp.  13–15). Anti-retaliation legislation generally aims to encourage employees to blow the whistle internally first and provide an incentive for employers to implement internal mechanisms for dealing with disclosures. A positive response from such an internal recipient is the best-case scenario for both the whistleblower and the organization. The whistleblower

176 

T. UYS

does not experience reprisals, and the organization has the opportunity to investigate the allegations without the possible reputational damage that often accompanies more public exposures. However, there are various instances where internal whistleblowing might not have the desired effect. The organizational recipient might ignore the whistleblower’s concerns, engage in a cover-up or put processes in motion to make the issue go away by getting rid of the messenger, thereby compelling the whistleblower to take the matter further. The whistleblower might have reason to believe that top management is involved in the wrongdoing, or experience could show that it is unlikely that the disclosure will meet with a positive response (Vandekerckhove & Phillips, 2016, p. 14). In many jurisdictions, protection legislation allows for disclosures to regulators or enforcement agencies as the second tier of reporting channels when internal whistleblowing proved unsuccessful. While the information is no longer contained within the organization, it is not publically available either. The expectation is that the second-tier recipient will investigate the allegations and take the necessary actions to set matters straight. If second-tier reporting also fails, the whistleblower could decide to go public by approaching the media as a last resort. Allegations of organizational wrongdoing and the organization’s failure to deal with the disclosure in a timeous and proper manner are now in the public domain. In many jurisdictions, disclosures to the media are not protected or have to meet very stringent requirements. For example, whistleblowers might have to show that they had pursued all lower-tier avenues or that the wrongdoing was unusually grave, requiring a speedy response. What Relief Should a Whistleblower Be Able to Claim, and How Do They Access Relief? According to the Transparency International guidelines, whistleblowers who have suffered unfair treatment should have access to “a full range of remedies [that] cover all direct, indirect and future consequences of any reprisals” (Terracol, 2018, p. 50). The focus is on restoring whistleblowers’ circumstances to what they would have been if they had not disclosed wrongdoing and suffered retaliation. This relief should include the possibility of returning the whistleblower to the same or a similar position to that held prior to experiencing retaliation, reinstating canceled contracts, permits, or licenses, and erasing any negative records that could result in

7  PROTECTING WHISTLEBLOWERS: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF LEGISLATION… 177

blacklisting (Terracol 2018, pp. 50–51). Unfortunately, this reinstatement is often not possible. Instead, employers claim an irretrievable breakdown in relations, or they reinstate the whistleblower just to dismiss the person again on some trumped-up charge a few months later. Whistleblowers also should be entitled to financial compensation for economic harm and suffering. Kenny and Fotaki (2019, p. 5; pp. 12–14) identified tangible and intangible costs that whistleblowers suffer after making a disclosure, where tangible costs are quantifiable and primarily financial in nature. A key tangible cost is a loss of income, even if whistleblowers remain in their posts. In many cases, whistleblowers are exposed to extended periods of unemployment as their former employers often blacklist them after being forced out of their jobs. They, therefore, struggle to access the resources to meet their living costs. Ideally, whistleblowers should receive assistance for legal fees and litigation costs to ensure that they are in a position to access their right to protection against retaliation (Feinstein & Devine, 2021, p. 30; Terracol, 2018, pp. 52–54). Unfortunately, very few jurisdictions have such provisions in place. In addition, whistleblowers often incur other financial expenses such as healthcare and career change costs and expenses related to attending whistleblower support or advocacy groups (Kenny & Fotaki, 2019, pp. 15–16). A more indirect expense that anti-retaliation legislation does not consider is related to the amount of time that whistleblowers need to devote to furthering their cause. Kenny and Fotaki (2019, p. 19) argue that whistleblowers are generally engaged in two occupations: working on one’s case to dispute the retaliation that has occurred and continuing to advocate for the exposure of the original wrongdoing. To either of these ends, little help is available or accessible.

The negative impact of the inordinate amount of time that whistleblowers need to spend on issues related to their disclosures is exacerbated by the fact that the organization controls the process. It is generally in the employer’s interest to drag out a case hoping that a lack of financial resources and the resultant emotional strain would force the whistleblower to concede defeat. The employer also might entangle the whistleblower in a prolonged media campaign, which means that the whistleblower has to do battle on multiple fronts (Kenny, 2015, p. 81).

178 

T. UYS

Whistleblower protection guidelines generally require that whistleblowers who believe that they have experienced victimization after disclosing organizational wrongdoing should have access “to a fair hearing before an impartial forum, with full right of appeal” (Terracol, 2018, p.  54). How whistleblowers should proceed to exercise this right is generally not very clear. In most instances, whistleblowers have to approach the courts or some employment tribunal. These actions would again require substantial financial resources. Although whistleblowers do not need to provide conclusive evidence that their allegations hold, they generally have to convince a court or tribunal that they had suffered retaliation (or occupational detriment) as a consequence of the disclosure. In practice, whistleblowers find it challenging to prove that their employers had initiated disciplinary proceedings or dismissed them as a direct result of disclosing perceived wrongdoing (de Maria, 2006, p. 652). Employers often argue that their action against the employee is related to the whistleblower’s poor work performance. Whistleblowers generally experience increasing isolation and tensions in relations with colleagues in the workplace after making a disclosure. As a result, their work performance suffers, and personal ties break down. Under these circumstances, whistleblowers find it difficult to prove that disciplinary charges of poor work performance and alleged incompatibility with colleagues directly resulted from disclosing alleged irregularities. The employer controls the disciplinary process, and most procedures do not allow external legal representation, which exacerbates the whistleblower’s difficulties in successfully presenting their defense. The Transparency International guidelines recommend a reversal of the burden of proof, moving the responsibility to the employer to prove that the actions they took against the whistleblower were not related to the disclosure. Introducing this reverse onus in legislation could make a significant contribution toward enabling whistleblowers to overcome obstacles to accessing relief (Feinstein & Devine, 2021, p. 25; Terracol, 2018, pp. 55–56; Thakur, 2018d, pp. 2–3). Effectiveness of Anti-retaliation Legislation Anti-retaliation legislation’s primary purpose is to dissuade employers from persecuting employees who raise concerns about suspected wrongdoing in the organization, therefore, addressing the personal troubles resulting from whistleblowing. Achieving this goal entails introducing

7  PROTECTING WHISTLEBLOWERS: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF LEGISLATION… 179

measures that pressure employers to focus on the message rather than the messenger. In this way, the employer, as well as the employee, is protected. Employees can raise their concerns to somebody in a trust position without fearing victimization. In addition, employers receive an early warning of problems that arise, which allows them to deal with them before they become a public embarrassment (Camerer, 2001, p.  3). Ideally, anti-­ retaliation legislation aims to attain this balance. However, the legislation will need to resolve various inadequacies. A significant shortcoming is anti-retaliation legislation’s implicit assumption that the employer and the whistleblower have equal resources. In reality, the organization and the whistleblower never engage on a level playing field. Feinstein and Devine (2021, p.  69) stress the “dramatic power imbalance between the employer and the employee in terms of time, resources and access to evidence” that is apparent from the beginning of a case of whistleblower retaliation. This power imbalance is exacerbated in countries like South Africa, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, where “loser pays” rules are enforced. The uneven power relations between whistleblower and employer could have a severe chilling effect on the observer of wrongdoing’s inclination to raise concerns. Feinstein and Devine (2021, pp. 69–70) recommend measures that could assist in leveling the balance of power between whistleblower and employer. They propose that whistleblower cases should be exempt from the “loser pays” principle where it applies to civil litigation. Second, anti-retaliation legislation should ensure access to affordable counsel by making adequate provisions for the reimbursement of legal fees. The inclusion of alternative dispute resolution programs could speed up the resolution of disputes. Finally, whistleblowers should be able to seek interim relief, which could include remaining on the payroll until the case is resolved. Feinstein and Devine (2021, pp. 27–28) argue that “relief must be sufficiently comprehensive to cover all the direct, indirect and future consequences of the reprisal.” The whistleblower should be “made whole,” which may include the payment of damages for medical bills, indirect financial consequences and intangibles, such as pain and suffering, emotional distress or loss of reputation. In non-employment contexts, it could require relocation, identity protection or withdrawal of litigation against the individual.

In some instances, legislation moves beyond providing protection against retaliation to incentivizing observers of wrongdoing to come forward through offering financial rewards. The oldest such legislation dates

180 

T. UYS

from the American Civil War with the introduction of the US False Claims Act in 1863. This Act gives individuals the right to file a qui tam action against federal contractors if they believe the latter had perpetrated fraud against the government. Should the action be successful, the whistleblower could claim between 15 and 30% of the awarded reparations. The high awards paid to US whistleblowers due to successful suits brought in terms of the Federal False Claims Act in recent years have raised their visibility. John Kopchinski, a former Pfizer sales representative, received more than $51 million in September 2009 for his part in exposing fraudulent activities employed by Pfizer in marketing the drug Bextra. Cheryl Eckard was awarded $96 million in October 2010 for providing information about GlaxoSmithKline’s fraudulent manufacturing practices in Puerto Rico (Lipman, 2012, p. 4). In March 2014, a filing with the US district court in Manhattan disclosed that the JPMorgan Chase whistleblower, Keith Edwards, would receive $63.9 million for his role in unmasking the company’s fraudulent activities concerning securing government insurance for mortgages that did not qualify (Stempel, 2014). Another example is the so-called bounty program of the US Securities and Exchange Commission (Fasterling, 2014, p. 342). In a press release on April 16, 2020, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) announced that it had awarded over $400 million to individual whistleblowers since the start of its program in 2012. The website of the law firm, Zuckerman Law (Zuckerman & Stock, 2021) provided a list of the largest SEC whistleblower rewards to date, the highest of which was an amount of $114 million, awarded in 2020. Five of the highest SEC whistleblower awards were issued in 2020 alone, amounting to $241 million. Despite some evidence of the advantages of reward programs for uncovering corporate fraud (Faunce et al., 2014, pp. 392–402), globally, many legal systems are reluctant to implement such programs. Researchers are concerned that using rewards as an inducement to blow the whistle might detract from the moral stance usually associated with whistleblowing and undermine the whistleblower’s credibility. Current reward programs do not take the harm suffered by those who expose financial wrongdoing or the disclosure’s contribution to the public interest into account. Only a tiny proportion of those who speak up benefits from the program (although the amounts are often astronomical) as pay-outs depend on whether financial penalties were imposed. Also, only those who expose financial wrongdoing qualify for a reward, which devalues the

7  PROTECTING WHISTLEBLOWERS: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF LEGISLATION… 181

sacrifices of non-financial whistleblowers and makes such whistleblowing less attractive (Gentilin, 2016; Kanda, 2020; Lubisi & Bezuidenhout, 2016, pp. 53–56; Msomi & Nene, 2020). On the other hand, the apparent success of the USA FCA program in encouraging whistleblowers to come forward has intensified calls to incorporate the US version of the bounty model into whistleblower protection regimes internationally (Olsen, 2014, p.  191). For Lewis et  al. (2014, p.  375), a particular advantage of a reward program is the fact that “it focuses attention on the wrongdoing (albeit financial) rather than on the connection between the disclosure of information and any retaliation suffered.” In conclusion,  while anti-retaliation legislation plays a crucial role in alleviating the private troubles of whistleblowers through providing remedies to those who suffer reprisals, these measures remain predominantly reactive: it is only the whistleblower who has suffered detriment, and is able to successfully prosecute or sue for relief, or have their complaint taken up by those in authority, who is ‘protected’ (or more accurately, compensated in some way for damage suffered). (Brown et al., 2014, p. 459)

In addition, the measures should be sufficiently effective to act as a wide-ranging deterrent compelling organizations to respond positively to disclosures from the outset. The protection should, therefore, be proactive by discouraging employers from engaging in reprisals. Dworkin and Brown (2013, p. 679) argued that the implementation of a structural model should supplement anti-retaliation legislation, which entails: the establishment of institutional mechanisms by which organizations take it on themselves to encourage internal whistleblowing, prevent and control wrongdoing, and prevent or self-remedy retaliation.

The Structural Model of Whistleblower Protection While the initial focus of whistleblowing protection legislation was on preventing retaliation to the whistleblower after disclosure, the drafters of best practice principles have come to the realization that the inclusion of proactive measures that form part of institutional arrangements is needed.

182 

T. UYS

These include implementing internal reporting mechanisms, practices related to the investigation of disclosures, and enforcement mechanisms. Internal Reporting Mechanisms Whistleblowing’s primary purpose is to expose and eliminate wrongdoing. Fulfilling this purpose requires that a disclosure reaches a recipient, who is best placed to deal with the reported wrongdoing quickly and safely. The employer is generally considered to be best suited for this role. Observers of wrongdoing generally prefer raising their concerns internally first (Vandekerckhove & Phillips, 2016, p.  14). They only turn to external authorities or the media if internal processes for handling their reports did not result in a positive outcome. Whistleblowers who bypass internal channels to approach external avenues are more likely to experience reprisals than those who go the internal route first (Smith, 2014, pp. 242–243). It is vital that observers of wrongdoing know who the preferred recipients are and what the best course of action is if they want to raise concerns about wrongdoing. According to the Transparency International best practice principles, whistleblowing legislation should compel organizations to implement multiple internal reporting mechanisms that facilitate the internal exposure of wrongdoing. These procedures could include making anonymous concern boxes available; installing phone hotlines and a designated email address; and appointing an ombudsperson or compliance officers (Terracol, 2018, pp.  32–35). Ideally, they should be “accessible and reliable and guarantee confidentiality or anonymity” (Terracol, 2018, p. 35). In addition, they should allow observers of wrongdoing to circumvent superiors who might be complicit and advise them how to report to credible recipients who can correct the misconduct before reputational damage occurs. Unfortunately, companies often restrict their internal channels to the implementiation of anonymous hotlines that do little “to promote and encourage a culture of openness, transparency and accountability” (Camerer, 2001, p. 6). Martin Welz (2004, p. 7) argued that companies have a hidden agenda with the implementation of anonymous hotlines: I suspect that these facilities are aimed at stopping theft from corporations, rather than at ensuring they behave ethically. While most major corporations and state institutions pay lip-service to the principle of transparency and the protection of whistleblowers, experience has taught me that they can be as

7  PROTECTING WHISTLEBLOWERS: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF LEGISLATION… 183

determined and vindictive as the criminal fraternity when it comes to hunting down those they see as squeelers.

Internal whistleblowing procedures should also allow observers of wrongdoing to directly approach some external regulator or authority without raising their concerns internally first. However, whistleblowing legislation generally places extra burdens on whistleblowers who wish to expose the wrongdoing publically, such as that the alleged misconduct should be of an “exceptionally serious nature” (Thakur, 2018c, p.  3). Transparency International argues that when whistleblowers make “public disclosures in cases of urgent or grave public or personal danger, or persistently unaddressed wrongdoing that could affect the public interest” (Terracol, 2018, p. 41), no additional requirements should apply. The effective implementation of internal whistleblowing procedures requires that the “process of voicing concerns (chain of command and who should be contacted) should be clearly communicated in the organisation” (Senekal & Uys, 2013, p.  36). All staff should receive general training about the internal process to follow should they become aware of ethical and legal violations. Managers and those responsible for the implementation of the organization’s whistleblowing policy should receive special training that focuses on the legal framework, maintaining confidentiality, ensuring feedback, providing reassurance, record keeping and safeguards to ensure against leaks, and matter of internal and external accountabilities. (Terracol, 2018, p. 34)

In addition, top management should actively endorse the process in regular communications to ensure employees that they do not need to fear victimization should they make a disclosure. A regular assessment of the organization’s internal whistleblowing system should occur, particularly by determining whether employees believe that the organization practices what it preaches when promoting ethical behavior. Finally, an organization’s internal whistleblowing procedure should contain robust user protection in the form of “transparent, enforceable and time mechanisms to follow up whistleblowers’ complaints of unfair treatment” (Terracol, 2018, p. 35). The protection should contain three components. (1) Procedures for restoring whistleblowers to their previously held positions should be in place. (2) Those engaging in reprisals against whistleblowers, whether deliberately or through negligence,

184 

T. UYS

should be disciplined. (3) Internal procedures should also include strategies to advise and support disclosers from the beginning of the process, regardless of whether any retaliation is occurring or expected (Terracol, 2018, p. 35). A successful outcome for the internal whistleblowing process will not be possible without addressing both the personal troubles caused by retaliation and the public issue of organizational wrongdoing. Whistleblowers make disclosures in the hope that the organization will investigate and stamp out organizational wrongdoing. Employers tend to respond by focusing on the messenger—the whistleblower—while disregarding the public issue—the perceived wrongdoing. The success of whistleblowing mechanisms depends on a quick and thorough investigation of the disclosures and transparency in communicating the investigations’ outcomes to all appropriate stakeholders. Investigation of Disclosures Anti-retaliation legislation tends to focus attention on the messenger rather than the message—that is whether the whistleblower’s actions comply with the requirements that qualify for protection against retaliation. However, successful whistleblowing requires addressing the public issue of organizational wrongdoing by focusing on the message; this means investigating the whistleblower’s allegations to establish whether or not they are true. Whistleblowers will only achieve their purpose of uprooting wrongdoing if their disclosures are investigated. Therefore, best practice principles advocate that organizations implement investigatory procedures that obligate the disclosure recipient to assess the merits and determine what further actions are needed, especially the need for an independent investigation: Procedures and processes must be developed, and the individuals or bodies designated to handle disclosures should be provided with sufficient capacity, powers and resources to investigate and deal with the potential wrongdoing. (Terracol, 2018, p. 46)

The whistleblower responsible for the disclosure should be kept in the loop about the progress of the investigation through receiving progress reports, making inputs to the process, and assisting in deciding whether

7  PROTECTING WHISTLEBLOWERS: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF LEGISLATION… 185

the achieved resolution is satisfactory (Terracol, 2018, p.  47). Feinstein and Devine (2021, p. 33) stress the importance of a transparent process, with the entire investigation being a matter of public record. Enforcement Mechanisms An essential element of institutional arrangements aimed at promoting whistleblowing relates to the available enforcement mechanisms. Transparency International advocates for the establishment of a whistleblower complaints authority (Terracol, 2018, p. 65). The primary responsibilities of such an independent agency would be to • accept, investigate, and resolve whistleblower complaints of retaliation, • scrutinize the adequacy of investigations of whistleblower allegations, • provide whistleblowers with free and confidential specialist advice and support, • advise employers on the implementation of effective internal whistleblowing mechanisms and review such frameworks once in operation, • assemble and publish material about the functioning of statutory and institutional whistleblowing frameworks, • implement public awareness programs about whistleblower protection and frameworks. Finally, Transparency International argues for the consolidation of all laws dealing with whistleblowing into one comprehensive law “that is designed, monitored and regularly reviewed with the involvement of all relevant stakeholders” (Terracol, 2018, p. 66). Designated legislation will ensure that whistleblowers and employers have clarity on their rights and obligations and that loopholes, overlaps, and contradictions that undermine the effectiveness of whistleblowing measures are avoided. Establishing institutional measures involves providing assurance of non-victimization to prospective whistleblowers, implementing whistleblowing procedures, including sanctions against perpetrators of retaliation, the investigation of the whistleblower’s claims by an independent agency, and providing protection and support to whistleblowers. If such institutional measures are implemented effectively, the primary concern of the whistleblower, namely, that the perceived wrongdoing should be investigated and dealt with, is addressed. In addition, institutionalizing

186 

T. UYS

the authorized disclosure of wrongdoing also addresses the organization’s concerns regarding obedience, confidentiality, accountability, and reputation. This approach balances the rights of the whistleblower, the public interest in the disclosure, and the employer’s interests.

Conclusion Resolving the dilemma of whistleblowing in the first instance entails the success of provisions aimed at preventing or at least discouraging organizations from retaliating against whistleblowers. Whistleblowing researchers generally agree that fear of retaliation is a significant disincentive for observers of wrongdoing to come forward. Therefore, legislation aimed at protecting whistleblowers tends to place a strong emphasis on measures that prevent or at least discourage retaliation, thereby mitigating the whistleblower’s personal troubles. Secondly, it is necessary to develop measures that encourage and facilitate disclosures of wrongdoing. These measures allow whistleblowers to act as organizational citizens through encouraging the reporting of “bad news” and enable whistleblowers to “speak truth to power.” If organizations respond positively to these disclosures and address the wrongdoing internally before it becomes public knowledge, they can avoid the public issues related to whistleblowing. Finally, the dilemma of whistleblowing is only resolved if organizations and authorities implement processes to investigate the whistleblower’s claims and, if found valid, take effective action to deal with the revealed misconduct. Ultimately, the success of whistleblowing is directly related to resolving the public issue of wrongdoing.

References Alford, F.  C. (2001). Whistleblowers: Broken Lives and Organizational Power. Cornell University Press. Allyn, B. (2019). Can Trump Legally Out the Whistleblower? Experts Say it Would not Violate Any Laws. Retrieved October 13, 2020, from https:// www.npr.org/2019/11/06/776481504/can-­t rump-­l egally-­o ut-­t he­whistleblower-­experts-­say-­it-­would-­not-­violate-­any-­law Brown, A. J., Meyer, D. P., Wheeler, C., & Zuckerman, J. (2014). Whistleblower Support in Practice: Towards an Integrated Research Model. In A. J. Brown, D. Lewis, R. E. Moberly, & W. Vandekerckhove (Eds.), International Handbook on Whistleblowing Research. Edward Elgar.

7  PROTECTING WHISTLEBLOWERS: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF LEGISLATION… 187

Camerer, L. (2001). Protecting Whistle Blowers in South Africa: The Protected Disclosures Act no. 26 of 2000. Anti-Corruption Strategies, Institute of Security Studies. Occasional Paper No. 47-2001. http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ paper/47/paper47.html Chalouat, I., Carrión-Crespo, C., & Licata, M. (2020). Law and Practice on Protecting Whistle-blowers in the Public and Financial Services Sectors. Working Paper No. 328. Geneva: International Labour Organization. De Maria, W. (2006). Common Law—Common Mistakes? Protecting Whistleblowers in Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and the United Kingdom. International Journal of Public Sector Management, 19(7), 643–658. Dworkin, T. M., & Brown, A. J. (2013). The Money or the Media: Lessons from Contrasting Developments in US and Australian Whistleblowing Laws. Seattle Journal for Social Justice, 11(2), 653–713. Fasterling, B. (2014). Whistleblower Protection: A Comparative Law Perspective. In A.  J. Brown, D.  Lewis, R.  E. Moberly, & W.  Vandekerckhove (Eds.), International Handbook on Whistleblowing Research. Edward Elgar. Faunce, T., Crow, K., Nikolic, T., & Morgan, F. M. (2014). Because They Have Evidence: Globalizing Financial Incentives for Corporate Fraud Whistleblowers. In A.  J. Brown, D.  Lewis, R.  E. Moberly, & W.  Vandekerckhove (Eds.), International Handbook on Whistleblowing Research. Edward Elgar. Feinstein, S., & Devine, T. (2021). Are Whistleblowing Laws Working? A Global Study of Whistleblower Protection Litigation. Government Accountability Project and the International Bar Association. Gentilin, D. (2016). Should Whistleblowers Receive a Reward for Speaking Up? Ethical Systems. Retrieved May 21, 2021, from https://www.ethicalsystems. org/should-­whistleblowers-­receive-­a-­reward-­for-­speaking-­up/ Haglunds, M. (2009). Enemies of the People: Whistle-blowing and the Sociology of Tragedy. Acta Universitatis Stockholmiensis. Kanda, K. (2020). Whistleblower Reward Schemes: Who Really Benefits? Project Speak Up Stop Harm. Retrieved May 21, 2021, from https://protect-­advice. org.uk/whistleblower-­reward-­schemes-­who-­really-­benefits/ Kenny, K. (2015). Constructing Selves: Whistleblowing And The Role Of Time. In D. Lewis, & W. Vandekerckhove, (Eds.), Developments in Whistleblowing Research 2015. London: International Whistleblowing Research Network. Kenny, K., & Fotaki, M. (2019). Post-disclosure Survival Strategies—Transforming Whistleblowers Experiences. NUI Galway. Lewis, D., Devine, T., & Harpur, P. (2014). The Key to Protection: Civil and Employment Law Remedies. In A.  J. Brown, D.  Lewis, R.  E. Moberly, & W.  Vandekerckhove (Eds.), International Handbook on Whistleblowing Research. Edward Elgar. Lipman, F.  D. (2012). Whistleblowers: Incentives, Disincentives, and Protection Strategies. John Wiley and Sons, Inc..

188 

T. UYS

Lubisi, S., & Bezuidenhout, H. (2016). Blowing the Whistle for Personal Gain in the Republic of South Africa: An Option for Consideration in the Fight Against Fraud? Southern African Journal of Accountability and Auditing Research, 18(1), 49–62. Miceli, M.  P., Near, J.  P., & Dworkin, T.  M. (2008). Whistle-blowing in Organisations. Routledge. Msomi, S., & Nene, S. (2020). Whistleblowing in South Africa. Retrieved May 21, 2021, from https://www.wylie.co.za/articles/incentivising-­whistleblowing­in-­south-­africa/ Olsen, J. (2014). Reporting versus Inaction: How Much Is There, What Explains the Differences and What to Measure. In A. J. Brown, D. Lewis, R. E. Moberly, & W.  Vandekerckhove (Eds.), International Handbook on Whistleblowing Research. Edward Elgar. Santoro, D., & Kumar, M. (2018). Speaking Truth to Power—A Theory of Whistleblowing. Springer. Senekal, A., & Uys, T. (2013). Creating an Ethogenic Organisation: The Development and Implementation of a Whistleblowing Policy. African Journal of Business Ethics, 7(1), 32–39. Smith, R. (2014). Whistleblowers and Suffering. In A.  J. Brown, D.  Lewis, R.  Moberly, & W.  Vandekerckhove (Eds.), International Handbook of Whistleblowing Research. Edward Elgar. Soltes, K. (2012). Facilitating Appropriate Whistleblowing: Examining Various Approaches to what Constitutes Fact to Trigger Protection under Article 33 of the United Nations Convention against Corruption. American University International Law Review, 27, 925–954. Stempel, J. (2014). JPMorgan Whistleblower Gets $63.9 million in Mortgage Fraud Deal. Business and Financial News, Breaking US & International News. Reuters.com, www.reutersreprints.com Terracol, M. (2018). Best Practice Guide for Whistleblowing Legislation. Transparency International. Thakur, C. (2018a). Whistleblower Protection: Does South Africa Match Up? Part 1. Helen Suzman Foundation. Retrieved October 15, 2019 from https:// hsf.org.za/publications/hsf-­briefs/whistle-­blower-­protection-­does-­south-­africa-­ match-­up-­part-­i Thakur, C. (2018b). Whistleblower Protection: Does South Africa Match Up? Part 2. Helen Suzman Foundation. Retrieved October 15, 2019 from https:// hsf.org.za/publications/hsf-­briefs/whistle-­blower-­protection-­does-­south-­africa­match-­up-­part-­ii Thakur, C. (2018c). Whistleblower Protection: Does South Africa Match Up? Part 3. Helen Suzman Foundation. Retrieved October 15, 2019 from https:// hsf.org.za/publications/hsf-­briefs/whistle-­blower-­protection-­does-­south-­africa-­ match-­up-­part-­iii

7  PROTECTING WHISTLEBLOWERS: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF LEGISLATION… 189

Thakur, C. (2018d). Whistleblower Protection: Does South Africa Match Up? Part 4. Helen Suzman Foundation. Retrieved October 15, 2019 from https:// hsf.org.za/publications/hsf-­briefs/whistle-­blower-­protection-­does-­south-­africa-­ match-­up-­part-­iv Vandekerckhove, W., & Commers, R. M. S. (2004). Whistle Blowing and Rational Loyalty. Journal of Business Ethics, 53, 225–233. Vandekerckhove, W., & Phillips, A. (2016, December 9). Setting the Scene for Whistleblower Protection. In Checkmate to Corruption: Making the Case for a Wide-ranging Initiative on Whistleblower Protection. Public Services International. Retrieved November 10, 2017 from https://www.world-psi. org/sites/default/files/documents/research/en_checkmate_to_corruption.pdf Vandekerckhove, W., Brown, A. J., & Tsahuridu, E. (2014). Managerial Responsiveness to Whistleblowing: Expanding the Research Horizon. In A. J. Brown, D. Lewis, R. E. Moberly, & W. Vandekerckhove (Eds.), International Handbook on Whistleblowing Research. Edward Elgar. Welz, M. (2004). Protecting Whistleblowers. Noseweek, 60(7), 7. Wildschut, K. (2020). Whistleblower Protections: Are Whistleblowers Protected as They Take on South African’s Corruption Crisis? Retrieved May 15, 2021, from https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/whistle-­blower-­protections-­are­whistle-­83887/ Zuckerman, J., & Stock, M. (2021). SEC Whistleblower Program: What Are the Largest SEC Whistleblower Awards? Retrieved June 24, 2021, from https:// www.zuckermanlaw.com/sp_faq/largest-­sec-­whistleblower-­awards/

CHAPTER 8

Assisting Whistleblowers in Advancing Social Justice in the Workplace

Introduction The disclosures made by whistleblowers, especially in the Global South, often result in members of the organization where the exposure of wrongdoing occurred, retaliating against the whistleblower. This outcome is evident from the recent experiences of South African whistleblowers who unmasked the relations of state capture between various politicians, government officials, and people in business. Whistleblowers generally view their disclosures as prosocial behavior or an expression of organizational citizenship. They believe that they are acting in the organization’s best interests by trying to prevent wrongdoing that is detrimental to colleagues, the organization, and the general public. They are under the impression that they are addressing a public issue and that their employer would investigate the wrongdoing, correct it, reward them, or at least be grateful. Instead, the organization often responds with relentless retaliation against the whistleblower while sweeping the wrongdoing under the rug. These reprisals create immense personal troubles for the whistleblower. They experience an extensive decline in their quality of life due to the adverse material consequences of losing their careers. In many instances, their subsequent  feelings of uncertainty, apprehension and  depression have a devastating effect on their self-image and confidence. Interpersonal relations in the workplace could be harmed or even destroyed. They could also suffer damage to their relationships with family and friends. © The Author(s) 2022 T. Uys, Whistleblowing and the Sociological Imagination, https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-39445-3_8

191

192 

T. UYS

When organizations respond to the disclosures by disparaging and censuring the whistleblower, who is ostensibly acting in the best interests of others in the organization, they transform whistleblowing into a public issue for the organization. As a public issue, whistleblowing is, in essence, an accusation against the organization and against co-workers. At the very least, the negative organizational response demonstrates the inadequacy of communication channels and management failure in dealing satisfactorily with the whistleblower’s concerns. A punitive management style creates a stressful workplace and damages collegial relationships. Co-workers become distrustful of management when they observe the retaliation. They could become unwilling to admit that things are going wrong or to disclose any suspicions of wrongdoing, even when these omissions could prove costly (David, 2005, pp.  2–3). Retaliation could also compel the whistleblower to go public with their concerns, resulting in harm to the organization’s reputation and the loss of public confidence. Therefore, an action meant to resolve an organizational problem becomes a personal trouble for the whistleblower and a public issue for the organization. A related public issue is the eradication of organizational wrongdoing. Whistleblowing can be seen as an attempt to restore an ethical workplace where organizational wrongdoing is eliminated, and organizational justice is realized. An ethical workplace is fundamentally one that implements principles of fairness of processes, outcomes, and the treatment of organizational members. Ultimately, organizational justice can only be sustained or restored in organizations where the mechanisms dealing with the exposure of the perceived wrongdoing enhance perceptions of fairness in the organization. In the previous chapter, the focus was on addressing the dilemma of whistleblowing by applying best practice principles in designing legal protections for whistleblowers and implementing institutional measures to ensure the investigation and elimination of organizational wrongdoing. In this chapter, I view whistleblowing processes and outcomes through a social justice lens. Finding effective solutions to the personal troubles and public issues flowing from whistleblowers’ actions requires facilitating social justice in the workplace. Justice will be restored if organizational members are encouraged to act against the abuse of power and corruption in organizations by blowing the whistle, and the organization responds positively to the disclosures by investigating the claims and taking the necessary corrective steps.

8  ASSISTING WHISTLEBLOWERS IN ADVANCING SOCIAL JUSTICE… 

193

As a point of departure, I explore how perceptions of workplace fairness relate to whistleblower processes and outcomes. I then provide an overview of the role of clinical sociologists and other practitioners in assisting organizations in resolving social problems in the workplace. Finally, the chapter concludes with an analysis of the possible involvement of clinical sociologists in designing and implementing interventions that would ensure better outcomes for the whistleblower, the organization, and others involved. These interventions would assist whistleblowers in dealing with the aftermath of the organization’s response to their disclosure through advancing individual and organizational resilience, and creating an environment where whistleblowers assist in eradicating the public issue of organizational wrongdoing, without suffering the personal troubles often associated with their actions.

Whistleblowing and Organizational Justice Members of an organization generally consider three aspects when developing their perceptions of fairness. The first is distributive justice, where members believe that rights, costs, and resources are distributed fairly among members of the organization. Second, procedural justice relates to whether they view the processes used to decide how to allocate resources as fair. Members of the organization should feel that these processes are sound, principled, and inclusive. Finally, in determining interactional justice, they consider whether interpersonal exchanges in the workplace are fair. Interactional justice entails two forms. First, interpersonal justice is apparent when organizational members treat each other with dignity and respect. On the other hand, perceptions of the fairness of the information used when making decisions and providing explanations for these decisions determine the level of informational justice (Crawshaw et al., 2013, p. 888). Organizations displaying a high allegiance to organizational justice tend to achieve significant benefits. Employees are more likely to commit to achieving organizational goals and objectives. The perceptions of benevolence and integrity flowing from high levels of organizational justice increase their job satisfaction and trust in both superiors and the organization as a whole. This ensures low staff turnover, good interpersonal relations, and good performance (Beckley, 2014, p.  186; Seifert et  al., 2014, p. 159). On the other hand, perceptions of injustice could result in attempts to eliminate or discourage unfair behavior or processes. Employees who feel unjustly treated could also engage in counterproductive work behavior such

194 

T. UYS

as retribution against perceived perpetrators, organizational deviance, or sabotage. Crawshaw et al. (2013, p. 892) explained that “From the point of view of the wronged individual, these seemingly anti-social acts are justified, as a way to ‘even the score’ when someone has behaved unfairly.” Creating a workplace where perceptions of organizational justice issues are dominant is, therefore, crucial for the proper functioning of an organization. As far as whistleblowing is concerned, research has demonstrated that organizational members who perceive the related procedures, outcomes, and interactions with superiors as fair are more likely to raise concerns about suspected organizational wrongdoing (Seifert et al., 2010, p. 707). Near et al. (1993) argued that legalistic organizational protections would be more conducive to encouraging whistleblowing, and urge organizational members to respond positively to disclosures, than legal protections implemented by the state through anti-retaliation legislation. Legalistic protections are whistleblowing procedures that the organization has implemented of their own accord (the so-called structural model). The whistleblower and the recipients of the disclosures of wrongdoing are more likely to perceive these procedures as fair, both in terms of procedural and distributive justice (Seifert et al., 2010, p. 708). What should whistleblowing arrangements look like for organizational members to perceive them as fair? Table 8.1 reflects various aspects related to whistleblowing that organizations need to consider in implementing systems that would generate perceptions of organizational justice. The interests of all the stakeholders involved in or affected by the act of whistleblowing should be taken into account when determining the level of organizational justice in an organization. First are the whistleblowers who want their concerns about perceived wrongdoing addressed. The organization or employer, on the other hand, needs to engage in risk management. The primary focus of the suspected wrongdoers is on dispelling the credibility of the whistleblowers and their disclosures. Fellow employees or members of the organization are mainly concerned with maintaining good relationships. The state is another stakeholder whose primary interest is in maintaining good governance and avoiding reputational damage. Finally, the public has a stake in ensuring that social justice is achieved. Procedural Justice Procedural justice refers to perceptions of the fairness of the processes aimed at achieving particular outcomes. Organizations should implement mechanisms that allow observers of wrongdoing to raise their

8  ASSISTING WHISTLEBLOWERS IN ADVANCING SOCIAL JUSTICE… 

195

Table 8.1  Whistleblowing and organizational justice Procedural

Distributive

Interactional Interpersonal

Informational

Mechanisms to disclose

Wrongdoing eliminated or reduced

Treatment during and after disclosure

Access to information about disclosure mechanisms and outcomes

Procedures for responding to disclosures

Freedom of expression

Rational loyalty

Feedback about the progress of investigations

Procedures for investigating disclosures Procedures detailing access to resources

Good governance and compliance

Supportive Accountability management culture

Positive and ethical A climate of trust work environment

Access to information about available resources

concerns without fearing negative consequences. They should describe the recommended channels for reporting misconduct and the prerequisites that qualify internal, external, or public disclosures for protection against retaliation. These procedures should be applied consistently across people and time, conform to established ethical standards, and provide precise guidelines without displaying any inherent bias (Seifert et al., 2010, p. 710). Lind and Kulik (2009, p. 149) stress the value of voice opportunities in strengthening organizational members’ feelings of fair treatment. Objectively speaking, when voiced concerns produce solutions to organizational problems, organizational members receive visible evidence that exercising organizational voice is effective. They are then inclined toward viewing the processes allowing voice as fair (Lind & Kulik, 2009, p. 149). However, if organizations do not follow up on the voiced concerns and turn a deaf ear, employees could become frustrated and lose faith. Retaliation against those who exercised voice about wrongdoing will exacerbate the feelings of unfairness. In addition, it might give rise to counterproductive work behaviors that negatively impact the organization’s functioning, such as incivility, absenteeism, or even theft (Le Roy et al., 2012). Therefore, organizations should move beyond implementing disclosure channels to ensuring that efficient procedures for dealing with disclosures are in place. These include detailing appropriate responses that

196 

T. UYS

would protect the whistleblower against retaliation while investigating the whistleblower’s concerns. Vandekerckhove et al. (2014b, p. 316) consider “hearer action”—whether the disclosure recipient responds to the disclosure through investigation and remedial action that eliminates the wrongdoing—a crucial component of effective whistleblowing. Finally, procedures should specify what resources are available to all stakeholders: the whistleblower, the accused, the disclosure recipient, and the bystanders to guarantee compliance with the processes. For example, whistleblowers should have access to legal advice and representation, as well as counseling services. In addition, Mitchell (2008, p. 202) argued that: There is special need for effective resources to be devoted to investigation by the organisations involved. Areas shown as requiring more attention include the training of investigators, the professionalisation of investigation practices, clearer differentiation between investigation roles and other institutional roles and mechanisms for ensuring that complainants are dealt with sensitively and kept informed of the progress and outcome of the investigation.

Distributive Justice Stakeholders perceive organizations as exercising distributive justice when they view the outcomes of decisions and the distribution of resources as fair. Organizations should therefore execute whistleblowing procedures in such a manner that they achieve the desired results. This would entail that the disclosure recipient took the disclosure seriously and put the necessary processes in place to ensure that the whistleblower’s concerns are investigated without any detrimental consequences to the whistleblower’s position in the organization.  In addition, the perceived outcomes should contradict the possible perception that organizations design policies to contain whistleblowing rather than eradicating organizational wrongdoing. Whistleblowers focus their efforts on the termination of wrongdoing and would be satisfied with any outcome that achieves this goal. Distributive justice entails that procedures ensure the protection of the whistleblower’s freedom of expression in raising concerns about perceived wrongdoing. Simultaneously, the accused in the disclosure should be given a fair opportunity to defend him/herself. Decision-makers should base their determinations regarding the whistleblower’s claims on accurate information and exercise control over information and reputations fairly. Achieving distributive justice requires a positive and ethical work environment in pursuit of the principles of good governance. Good governance requires that

8  ASSISTING WHISTLEBLOWERS IN ADVANCING SOCIAL JUSTICE… 

197

organizational objectives should be morally defensible, that these objectives should be pursued in a moral way and that “both the ends and the means for achieving corporate goals should be morally sound” (Rossouw, 2002, p. 141). Therefore, reports from employees who are trying to promote moral conduct in the organization should be met with a response that would culminate in enhancing moral behavior in the organization. Interactional Justice Organizational members determine the level of interactional justice based on the fairness of interpersonal exchanges in the workplace (Crawshaw et al., 2013, p. 888). Colquitt (2001) identified two components of interactional justice. The first is interpersonal justice, where people feel that the treatment they receive is fair and respectful. Therefore, interpersonal justice requires that authorities and third parties deal with whistleblowers and other stakeholders both during and after the disclosure in ways that recognize their dignity and are polite and respectful. For the whistleblower, this means that the disclosure recipient takes their concerns seriously and sets processes in motion to investigate their suspicions of wrongdoing without the whistleblower having to suffer retaliation. Unfortunately, the whistleblower is often perceived to be disloyal to the organization and its members. Vandekerckhove and Commers (2004, p. 229) argued for a reconstruction of organizational loyalty as loyalty to “the explicit set of mission statement, goals, value statement and code of conduct of the organization which is judged as legitimate,” so-called rational loyalty. Understanding loyalty as rational loyalty removes the dilemma of conflicting loyalties that the whistleblower faces. Viewing organizational commitment as loyalty to the explicit values and norms of the organization compels the loyal employee to blow the whistle when observing wrongdoing. Therefore, whistleblowers should receive the organization’s support and appreciation for their attempts to ensure that the organization abides by its core values. Achieving interpersonal justice requires a supportive management culture where senior management is viewed as actively encouraging disclosures and protecting those who raise their concerns. Managers should be appointed to act as mentors to both the whistleblowers and those accused of wrongdoing (Brown et  al., 2014, p.  480). However, Brown et  al. (2014, p. 487) identified several reasons why managers might be hesitant to throw their full weight behind ensuring an effective whistleblowing regime. First, managers might not consider the wrongdoing as sufficiently

198 

T. UYS

serious or have doubts about the report’s credibility due to suspicions about the whistleblower’s motive. Second, managers might be reluctant to make waves in the organization or believe that taking action would be futile. Third, senior management might be complicit in the wrongdoing or could have ignored evidence for its occurrence in the past. Fourth, taking the matter further could be regarded as disloyal to friends, colleagues, or the organization as a whole. Finally, managers’ reluctance to address the whistleblower’s claims could be due to the possible impact of the disclosure on their own reputation or that of others. In establishing perceptions of interpersonal justice, organizations should make active efforts to overcome these obstacles to creating an environment sympathetic to whistleblowing. An environment conducive to observers of wrongdoing raising their concerns to someone in a position to address the wrongdoing requires that employees must perceive that the procedures in place are fair and reasonable, that management is supportive of whistleblowing, and that management will take appropriate action in resolving the alleged misconduct (Seifert et al., 2010, p. 714).

Informational justice is the second form of interactional justice. Achieving informational justice is related to the quality of the information available to organizational members about the organization’s functioning. Informational justice refers to whether people are given explanations for events and whether they view these explanations as timely, sufficiently specific, and truthful. In the whistleblowing context, employees should receive information about what procedures they should follow when they become aware of organizational wrongdoing and the resources available to support them in their endeavor. Observers of wrongdoing should be familiar with the type of transgressions to be reported and where they should address their disclosures. In addition, they should receive explanations why managers followed specific procedures or allocated resources in a particular way (Hassink et al., 2007, p. 40). Whistleblowers should be informed of the progress of investigations into the wrongdoing. They should also know what steps the organization is taking to protect them against retaliation. Transparency about outcomes could enhance satisfaction with whistleblowing systems. Doberstein and Charbonneau (2020, p. 14) found that reports on the number of disclosures and verdicts of wrongdoing boosted the confidence of Canadian

8  ASSISTING WHISTLEBLOWERS IN ADVANCING SOCIAL JUSTICE… 

199

public servants in the whistleblowing protection regime, provided these results “show public servants that their claims result in not only investigations, but official findings of wrongdoing.” Providing such information will convince employees that management is taking issues of corporate governance and accountability seriously. Achieving organizational justice entails convincing all stakeholders that the organization is pursuing procedural and distributive justice. Near et al. (1993, p. 406) argued that organizations should: improve the system satisfaction of both the whistle-blower and other organization members who observe the whistle-blowing activity, by trying to create mechanisms that would increase the perceived level of procedural justice…we believe that legal stratagems must focus on the system and outcome satisfaction of all the parties involved, including other organization members who are potentially affected by the whistle-blowing, as well as the whistle-blower.

The level of organizational justice or satisfaction experienced by organization members, in general, is directly related to their satisfaction with the system (procedural justice) and/or their satisfaction with the outcomes (distributive justice). Whistleblower satisfaction would be highest if they felt that the organization’s response to their disclosures is fair and the outcomes positive, that is, the wrongdoing was terminated, and there was no retaliation against the whistleblower. Similarly, organization members affected by disclosures would experience the greatest satisfaction if they believed everyone followed fair reporting procedures and averted harm to the organization. This could include that the whistleblower used internal channels rather than airing their concerns publicly, thereby minimizing damage to the organization’s reputation.

Clinical Sociology in Pursuit of a Better World in the Workplace Conceptualizing Clinical Sociology Fritz (2021, p. 3) identifies three traditions in the discipline of sociology: science (empirical approach, using a combination of rigorous observation and inference), humanities (a study of aspects of the human condition such

200 

T. UYS

as literature, languages, culture or history using methods that might be primarily critical, analytical or speculative), and practice (intervention and analysis as well as practical research).

Sociological practice encompasses two main strands: applied sociology, which entails conducting use-based research to solve social problems, and clinical sociology. Clinical sociologists focus on improving people’s wellbeing by designing and, in some instances, also implementing interventions based on an analysis of problem situations. These interventions could consist of developing policies, programs, or campaigns and evaluating existing interventions. They generally employ diverse quantitative and qualitative research methods when conducting assessments, and integrate a range of theoretical approaches when designing interventions. In designing, implementing, and evaluating interventions, clinical sociologists attach increasing importance to taking the human rights of all involved in the intervention into account. Clinical sociology is therefore rights-based. Clinical sociologists could perform many roles, such as organizational consultant, social impact assessor, community organizer, mediation and conflict resolution, program developer or evaluater, counselor or advocate. Wellbeing and Resilience Dodge et  al. (2012, p.  230) defined wellbeing as the availability of resources that individuals require to address the psychological, social, and physical challenges they face. A problem situation would occur when the available resources and the challenges are in disequilibrium and individuals do not have access to the resources they need to defeat the adversities that confront them. Clinical sociologists could play a role in restoring this equilibrium by helping individuals identify and claim the resources they need to manage and overcome their stressful circumstances. They, therefore, assist individuals in building their resilience— their ability to withstand and recover from disruptive life events and stressors by appropriating coping resources. This role is vital within the organizational context. In addition to building the resilience of individual organizational members, it is necessary to ensure overall organizational resilience. Organizational resilience is generally viewed as strengthening organizational processes designed to improve an organization’s overall functioning and expansion, including “the ability to quickly process feedback and

8  ASSISTING WHISTLEBLOWERS IN ADVANCING SOCIAL JUSTICE… 

201

flexibly rearrange or transfer knowledge resources to deal with situations as they arise” (Sutcliffe & Vogus, 2003, p. 104). Denyer (2017, pp. 10–19) distinguishes between defensive behaviors that protect against threats and progressive behaviors that promote growth and prosperity. Defensive behaviors entail establishing operating procedures that solve known problems while including precautionary measures to counteract potential problems. These procedures and measures provide consistency in the organization’s functioning. However, defensive behaviors also include the flexibility of mindful organizing where organizational members take cognizance of what could go wrong and are empowered to exercise their judgment when identifying problems. On the other hand, progressive behaviors include performance optimization and adaptive innovation. Performance optimization enhances organizational resilience by continually improving work procedures and refining and extending existing assets and competencies, while adaptive innovation relates to the organization’s ability to adapt to a changing environment. Clinical sociologists have a role to play in advising organizations on improving both their defensive and their progressive behaviors. Interventions Aimed at Promoting Organizational Justice Clinical sociologists play an important role in assisting organizations in resolving social problems in the workplace. They attempt to strengthen organizational resilience by designing interventions based on their analysis of the material, relational, and subjective dimensions of the wellbeing of individual employees and the organization as a whole. Nielsen (2013, p.  1030) defined organizational interventions as “planned, behavioural, theory-based actions that aim to improve employee health and wellbeing through changing the way work is designed, organized and managed.” These interventions can take various forms, depending on the requirements of the organization and its members. The clinical sociologist’s activities could remain on the level of analysis, where the aim is to understand but not necessarily intervene. When focusing on analysis, they would restrict themselves to assessing the nature of the organization’s problems and identifying whether aspects of the organization’s structure, processes, or culture, or a combination of these, need attention. From there, the involvement could develop into prevention work where the focus is on avoiding or pre-empting a problem or dealing with it when it is still at an early stage.

202 

T. UYS

The act of whistleblowing leads to private troubles for the whistleblower and public issues for the organization. More importantly, it exposes organizational wrongdoing as a public issue. Resolving the personal troubles and public issues related to whistleblowing and organizational wrongdoing are not mutually exclusive activities. Therefore, in addressing whistleblowing, clinical sociologists need to design and/or implement interventions that would ensure better outcomes for all affected stakeholders. Clinical sociologists could become involved in damage intervention and possible control when an organization is undergoing dramatic changes or is facing large-scale problems that threaten its survival. The clinical sociologist would then engage in the entire process, from an initial assessment of the nature and extent of the problem to designing and implementing possible solutions to the problem or problems. Clinical sociologists could play an essential role in assisting whistleblowers in dealing with the aftermath of the organization’s response to their disclosures—their personal troubles. This involvement requires that they analyze the whistleblower’s problems and design workable interventions that would provide feasible coping strategies to deal with the negative impact of retaliation. For example, interventions could strengthen whistleblowers’ resilience by developing support systems for whistleblowers before, during, and after the disclosure is made. These support systems could include counseling services, support groups, and advice centers. In many countries, civil society organizations, such as the Government Accountability Project (GAP) in the United States, Public Concern at Work in the United Kingdom (now known as Protect), the European Center for Whistleblower Rights, and the Platform to Protect Whistleblowers in Africa (PLAAFF), provide support to whistleblowers. When working with whistleblowers, clinical sociologists should be familiar with the services these organizations offer and direct the whistleblower to the appropriate agency. Clinical sociologists could also assist these organizations in strengthening the services they provide. Mediation between the whistleblower and the organization creates a win-win situation that enables whistleblowers to “speak truth to power” without detriment to the organization’s reputation. Fritz (2021, p. 201) defines mediation as

8  ASSISTING WHISTLEBLOWERS IN ADVANCING SOCIAL JUSTICE… 

203

a creative, humanistic, and flexibly-structured process in which an impartial individual or individuals (third party) help disputants identify their individual and mutual interests and perhaps reduce or resolve their differences.

Mediation processes allow for an internal resolution of the dispute between the whistleblower and the organization, and minimize the adversarial nature of formal legal proceedings. Lower costs and risks are involved, which levels the playing field between the whistleblower and the organization. In addition, the mediator can guide parties to identify mutual interests and outcomes applicable to their situation. Control over the resolution remains in the hands of the parties, which gives whistleblowers the opportunity to keep the concerns they raised on the table for discussion. Day (2012, p. 634) argued that: Disputes resolved through mediation focus on mutual gains and future interactions, and this approach may result in more sustainable solutions and outcomes than a traditional approach.

Finally, clinical sociologists are often engaged in working with the external environment to deal with organizational issues, such as whistleblowing. They could play a crucial role in advising policy-makers about improving the regulatory environment within which whistleblowing occurs. Apart from designing interventions, clinical sociologists could also be asked to evaluate interventions that have been implemented. Evaluating the effects of the intervention requires providing answers to the following questions: • Did the required changes in the employees’ values, knowledge, and attitudes occur? • What are the indications that employees who participated in the intervention have acquired the necessary resources and have become empowered? • Were the desired changes in working procedures and working conditions achieved? • Are there signs of improvements in employee health and wellbeing? (Nielsen & Abildgaard, 2013, pp. 289–290)

204 

T. UYS

Promoting Organizational Justice Whistleblowers would respond more resiliently to the outcomes of their disclosures if they view the organization’s structure and processes dealing with disclosures as achieving organizational justice. Clinical sociologists should advise organizations to treat whistleblowers and other stakeholders during and after the disclosure in ways that recognize their dignity and are polite and respectful. Whistleblowers should feel the organization used fair processes (procedural justice) to deal with their disclosures and achieved fair outcomes (distributive justice). At its best, the wrongdoing would be terminated, and no retaliation against the whistleblower would take place. Those in positions of power in the organization should be encouraged to view whistleblowers as loyal to the organization’s explicit values and norms, in other words, an expression of rational loyalty (Vandekerckhove & Commers, 2004, p. 229). Accomplishing perceptions of organizational justice require both defensive and progressive measures to strengthen organizational resilience, systems that ensure that the private troubles of the whistleblower and the public issues for the organization are addressed. Observers of wrongdoing should be given the opportunity to raise their concerns in ways that protect them against retaliation. Clinical sociologists should advise organizations on the implementation of whistleblowing procedures and policies that enable them to deal with whistleblowers in a mutually beneficial way. These policies should implement confidential reporting systems in organizations that allow whistleblowers to report the “bad news,” without the retaliation that often results from such disclosures. Employees would have to be made aware of the existence of these channels and receive training on how to proceed when observing wrongdoing. Procedures should be in place for investigating the disclosure, while the accused is given a fair opportunity to defend him/herself. All stakeholders in the process: the whistleblower, the accused, and the bystanders should have access to the financial and other resources needed to ensure consistent, ethical, and accurate processes. A relationship of trust between superiors and subordinates is needed where subordinates have the assurance that they will not be victimized if they use these channels to report unethical behavior. Organization should be advised how to guarantee compliance with the processes. In this way, a positive and ethical work environment is ensured in which the organization follows principles of good governance.

8  ASSISTING WHISTLEBLOWERS IN ADVANCING SOCIAL JUSTICE… 

205

If whistleblowers employ internal channels rather than airing their concerns publicly, damage to the organization’s reputation is minimized. The creation of a perception of organizational justice will forestall the public issues associated with whistleblowing from occurring. Those affected by the whistleblowing would experience the greatest satisfaction if they believed that fair reporting procedures had been followed and harm to the organization had been averted. Ultimately, to address the public issue of wrongdoing successfully, organizations need to cultivate processes that prevent organizational wrongdoing from happening in the first place. Therefore, clinical sociologists should advise organizations on implementing both proactive and reactive ethics management systems. Reactive systems focus on discouraging unethical behavior by implementing punitive measures aimed at punishing transgressions. On the other hand, proactive systems promote ethical conduct by emphasizing the advantages that organizations and their stakeholders could derive from acting ethically (Groenewald, 2020, p.  10). The organization’s ethical codes should visibly demonstrate its commitment to an ethical work environment that places the public interest first. Advancing Organizational Justice Through the Organizational Culture Addressing the public issues of whistleblowing and organizational misconduct might require changes to the organizational culture. This is often difficult to achieve. In order to succeed, it is necessary to include everyone who will be affected by the planned intervention in the change effort. A good starting point is to get clarity on the organizational vision and direction and the optimum culture that would support this vision. Behaviors and values in the current culture that are not aligned with the organization’s vision and direction should be identified by obtaining various types of feedback from employees, teams, and managers. Specific strategies and tools should be used to reinforce the desired culture and actions that reflect this culture. It is essential that the senior leadership team should be on board from the start so that it is clear that commitment to the suggested changes comes from the top. Organizations should regularly review their reward system to ensure that it promotes desirable behaviors. The introduction of an ethical work environment should be supported by orientation and training programs, mentoring and

206 

T. UYS

coaching, job socialization, and regular communication of expectations and the corporate values to ensure buy-in (Potgieter, 2016, pp. 50–53). The organizational culture should establish an environment that would facilitate the exchange of ideas that could lead to the disclosure of organizational wrongdoing by employees—that is, an environment in which organizational citizenship behavior could flourish. According to Evans (2008, p. 272), promoting disclosures of organizational wrongdoing requires that organizations shift from a hierarchical organizational culture to one that is egalitarian. A hierarchical culture demands that organizational members subject themselves uncritically to imposed regulations while demonstrating a strong allegiance to the organization. In this culture, the perceived disloyalty of whistleblowers is considered more threatening to the organization than the substance of the allegations. In contrast, an egalitarian culture empowers employees to challenge the authority structures as an expression of their commitment to the principles of the organization. An egalitarian culture produces an environment “in which employees believe that they will not be shunned or punished for reporting wrongdoing, but instead will be supported or praised” (Brown et al., 2014, p. 470). Berry (2004) developed a conceptual framework consisting of seven dimensions of organizational culture that facilitate or obstruct employee reporting of organizational wrongdoing. Employees would be more or less likely to raise their concerns to the extent that they • receive communications about the organization’s commitment to integrity and have a shared understanding of organizational standards (vigilance); • believe in the organization’s espoused ethics and values (credibility); • experience a personal state of authentic involvement in the organization (engagement); • see it as their responsibility to report perceived misconduct (accountability); • have the authority to make decisions while taking responsibility for the outcomes (empowerment); • draw courage from their belief that the organization is responsive and fair (courage); and • finally, the organizational culture provides feasible options for raising concerns(options).

8  ASSISTING WHISTLEBLOWERS IN ADVANCING SOCIAL JUSTICE… 

207

It is evident that the cultural dimensions Berry identified as conducive to whistleblowing behavior are all more or less associated with an egalitarian organizational culture. In contrast, Loyens (2013) approached the association between organizational culture and whistleblowing from a different angle. She argued that all four organizational cultures identified by the grid-group cultural theory could give rise to disclosures, but that the reporting styles would differ. While egalitarian cultures inspire disclosures flowing from a sense of righteousness and empowerment, in a hierarchical culture observers of wrongdoing would blow the whistle if they believe it is their duty to do so. In individualistic cultures, whistleblowers make strategic and opportunistic calculations of the personal benefit that whistleblowing could bring. Finally, a fatalistic culture might encourage defensive reporting where the whistleblower wants “to escape complicity so as to protect personal integrity and the ability to live with oneself” (Loyens, 2013, p. 245). Loyens suggested that practitioners should consider the reporting style favored by the predominant organizational culture when designing a whistleblowing policy and should incorporate the most effective mix of whistleblowing instruments for a particular organization. Finding this balance would require research analyzing the effect of particular whistleblowing measures on reporting behavior.

Conclusion As a clinical sociologist, I view sociology’s purpose as extending beyond merely trying to understand social dilemmas to also finding solutions for the social ills that plague us. The ability to apply our sociological imagination is a valuable tool in helping us achieve this goal. It impels us to view the social world from the perspective of others, focusing on the social circumstances that produce social problems rather than on the individual. It makes us realize that social problems are rooted in the “deep, hidden, structural, and cultural resources and constraints that influence social life, including the chances for agential efforts” (Sztompka, 2004, p. 256). Employing one’s sociological imagination focuses our attention on the relationship between history and biography. Individuals begin to understand that their immediate, personal social settings are directly linked to the distant, impersonal social world around them that helps to shape them. People’s daily lives and experiences, therefore, are shaped by forces beyond their control. Analyzing the connection between social milieu and social

208 

T. UYS

structure assists us in distinguishing between “the personal troubles of milieu” and “the public issues of social structure” (Mills, 1970, p. 14). Research on whistleblowing has focused extensively on the whistleblower’s private troubles in the wake of retaliation, attempting to identify mechanisms that would help improve the personal circumstances of the whistleblower. However, employing the sociological imagination reveals that one should also address the context within which personal troubles emerge. The personal situations and characteristics of individuals are not the exclusive sources of personal troubles. The concrete settings of private troubles in time and space should always be considered. The well-documented retaliation that whistleblowers are exposed to, especially in developing countries, demonstrates the devastating personal consequences that the organizational response to their disclosures could have for the whistleblower and his/her family, friends, and colleagues. While whistleblowers believe that they are engaging a public issue by exposing perceived wrongdoing in the workplace, the retaliation they receive focuses their minds on their personal troubles. Worldwide organizations have introduced whistleblowing policies focusing on whistleblower protection. More than 30% of the world’s countries have introduced national whistleblower laws. However, as Feinstein and Devine’s (2021) review of these laws show: “too often rights that look impressive on paper are only a mirage of protection in practice.” Effective protection for whistleblowers requires that the public issues associated with whistleblowing are addressed. The responses that whistleblowers receive from organizations, governments, and the public reveal structural issues that turn whistleblowing itself into a public issue. More importantly, effective whistleblowing demands that the public issue of organizational wrongdoing becomes the focus of attention. As noted, clinical sociologists could play a critical role in resolving the private troubles of the whistleblower by enhancing their resilience when dealing with the aftermath of the organization’s response to their disclosures. Their efforts could focus on developing support systems for whistleblowers, providing counseling, acting as a mediator between the organization and the whistleblower, and engaging in advocacy to improve legal protection for whistleblowers. A narrow focus on resolving the whistleblower’s personal troubles is not sufficient, however. The public issue of whistleblowing also needs to be confronted. Organizations should address the structural vulnerabilities that whistleblowing and its aftermath exposed. Strategies should include

8  ASSISTING WHISTLEBLOWERS IN ADVANCING SOCIAL JUSTICE… 

209

implementing confidential reporting systems, and changing the organizational culture and corporate values to create an ethical work environment that places the public interest first. As Evans (2008, p.  277) puts it: “Effective internal communication channels would permit a culture of criticism and debate, turning dissent into a source of strength, and thus the whistleblower’s concerns into a strategic advantage.” Ultimately, the public issue of organizational wrongdoing should be the center of attention. Clinical sociologists could facilitate social justice in the workplace by creating a climate where organizational members are encouraged to act against the abuse of power and corruption in organizations by blowing the whistle, and organizations respond positively by investigating and eradicating wrongdoing, thereby restoring justice in the workplace.

References Beckley, A. (2014). Organisational Justice: Is the Police Service Ready for It? Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism, 9(2), 176–190. Berry, B. (2004). Organizational Culture: A Framework and Strategies for Facilitating Employee Whistleblowing. Employee Responsibilities and Rights Journal, 16(1), 1–11. Brown, A. J., Meyer, D. P., Wheeler, C., & Zuckerman, J. (2014). Whistleblower Support in Practice: Towards an Integrated Research Model. In A. J. Brown, D. Lewis, R. E. Moberly, & W. Vandekerckhove (Eds.), International Handbook on Whistleblowing Research. Edward Elgar. Colquitt, J.  A. (2001). On the Dimensionality of Organizational Justice: A Construct Validation of a Measure. Journal of Applied Psychology, 86, 386–400. Crawshaw, J. R., Cropanzano, R., Bell, C. M., & Nadisic, T. (2013). Organisational Justice: New Insights from Behavioural Ethics. Human Relations, 66(7), 885–904. David, A. (2005). Whistleblowers. Who They Are and How Management Should Respond. Graziadio Business Review, 8(4), 1–7. Day, A. (2012). To Mediate or Adjudicate: An Alternative for Resolving Whistleblower Disputes at the Hanford Nuclear Site. Seattle Journal of Social Justice, 11, 617. Denyer, D. (2017). Organizational Resilience. BSI and Cranfield University. Doberstein, C., & Charbonneau, É. (2020). The Origins and Effects of Public Servant Confidence in Whistleblowing Protection Regimes. Public Administration, 98(3), 643–658. Dodge, R., Daly, A. P., Huyton, J., & Sanders, L. D. (2012). The Challenge of Defining Wellbeing. International Journal of Wellbeing, 2(3), 222–235.

210 

T. UYS

Evans, A. J. (2008). Dealing with Dissent: Whistleblowing, Egalitarianism, and the Republic of the Firm. Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research, 21(3), 267–279. Feinstein, S., & Devine, T. (2021). Are Whistleblowing Laws Working? A Global Study of Whistleblower Protection Litigation. Government Accountability Project and the International Bar Association. Fritz, J. M. (Ed.). (2021). International Clinical Sociology (2nd ed.). Springer. Groenewald, L. (2020). Whistleblowing Management Handbook. The Ethics Institute. Hassink, H., De Vries, M., & Bollen, L. (2007). A Content Analysis of Whistleblowing Policies of Leading European Companies. Journal of Business Ethics, 75(1), 25–44. Le Roy, J., Bastounis, M., & Poussard, J.  M. (2012). Interactional Justice and Counterproductive Work Behaviors: The Mediating Role of Negative Emotions. Social Behavior and Personality: An International Journal, 40(8), 1341–1355. Lind, E. A., & Kulik, C. T. (2009). Hear Me Out: Voice and Justice. In J. Greenberg & M. S. Edwards (Eds.), Voice and Silence in Organizations. Emerald. Loyens, K. (2013). Towards a Custom- Made Whistleblowing Policy. Using Grid-­ Group Cultural Theory to Match Policy Measures to Different Styles of Peer Reporting. Journal of Business Ethics, 114(2), 239–249. Mills, C. W. (1970). The Sociological Imagination. Oxford University Press. Mitchell, M. (2008). Investigations: Improving Practice and Building Capacity. In A. Brown (Ed.), Whistleblowing in the Australian Public Sector. Canberra: ANU E-Press. Near, J.  P., Dworkin, T.  M., & Miceli, M.  P. (1993). Explaining the Whistle-­ Blowing Process: Suggestions from Power Theory and Justice Theory. Organization Science, 4(3), 393–411. Nielsen, K. (2013). Review Article: How Can We Make Organizational Interventions Work? Employees and Line Managers as Actively Crafting Interventions. Human Relations, 66(8), 1029–1050. Nielsen, K., & Abildgaard, J. S. (2013). Organizational Interventions: A ResearchBased Framework for the Evaluation of both Process and Effects. Work & Stress: An International Journal of Work, Health & Organisations, 27(3), 278–297. Potgieter, T. (2016). Organisational Culture. In A. Werner (Ed.), Organisational Behaviour: A Contemporary South African Perspective. Van Schaik Publishers. Rossouw, D. (2002). Business Ethics in Africa. Oxford University Press. Seifert, D. L., Stammerjohan, W. W., & Martin, R. B. (2014). Trust, Organizational Justice, and Whistleblowing: A Research Note. Behavioral Research in Accounting, 26(1), 157–168.

8  ASSISTING WHISTLEBLOWERS IN ADVANCING SOCIAL JUSTICE… 

211

Seifert, D.  L., Sweeney, J.  T., Joireman, J., & Thornton, J.  M. (2010). The Influence of Organizational Justice on Accountant Whistleblowing. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 35(7), 707–717. Sutcliffe, K. M., & Vogus, T. J. (2003). Organizing for Resilience. In K. S. Cameron, J.  E. Dutton, & R.  E. Quinn (Eds.), Positive Organizational Scholarship: Foundations of a New Discipline (pp. 94–110). Berrett-Koehler Publishers. Sztompka, P. 2004. Shaping Sociological Imagination: The Importance of Theory. In J. C. Alexander, G. T. Marx, & C. L. Williams (Eds.), Self, Social Structure, and Beliefs: Explorations in Sociology. University of California Press. Vandekerckhove, W., & Commers, R. M. S. (2004). Whistle Blowing and Rational Loyalty. Journal of Business Ethics, 53, 225–233. Vandekerckhove, W., Brown, A. J., & Tsahuridu, E. (2014b). Managerial Responsiveness to Whistleblowing: Expanding the Research Horizon. In A. J. Brown, D. Lewis, R. E. Moberly, & W. Vandekerckhove (Eds.), International Handbook on Whistleblowing Research. Edward Elgar.

References

ABN Newswire (2012, May 23). Millhouse, Inc. Plc (FRA:M77) Appoints Harry Charlton as Managing Director. Retrieved December 22, 2014 from https:// www.abnnewswire.net/press/en/72705/Millhouse-Inc-plc-(FRA-M77)Appoints-Harry-Charlton-as-Managing-Director.html Abrahams, C. (2016). Twenty Years of Social Cohesion and Nation-building in South Africa. Journal of Southern African Studies, 42(1), 95–107. Abramson, A. (2020). Trump’s Attack on Vindman May Violate Whistleblower Protection Laws. But Challenging It Could Be Risky. Retrieved October 13, 2020, from https://time.com/5783160/trumps-­attack-­on-­vindman-­may-­ violate-­whistleblower-­protection-­laws-­but-­challenging-­it-­could-­be-­risky/ Agence France-Presse in Washington. (2021). US Government Appeals UK Ruling Against Julian Assange’s Extradition. Retrieved June 19, 2021, from https://www.theguardian.com/media/2021/feb/12/us-­g overnment-­ appeals-­uk-­ruling-­against-­julian-­assanges-­extradition-­joe-­biden-­wikileaks Akhtar, S. (1994). South Africa: A Rainbow Nation in the Making. Pakistan Horizon, 47(3), 55–62. Alant, N. (2002). Whistleblowing in South Africa. Paper Presented at the Short Course in Corruption Prevention at the University of Pretoria on July 11. Alant, N., & Uys, T. (1999). Whistleblowing: Fighting Fraud in Organisations. Paper to be Presented at the Conference on Fraud and the African Renaissance to be Held at Uganda Martyrs University from 8–10 April. Aleem, Z., & Collins, S. (2019, December 28). Trump Is Trying to Out the Alleged Ukraine Whistleblower on Twitter. Vox. Retrieved July 02, 2020, from https://www.vox.com/policy-­a nd-­p olitics/2019/12/28/21040471/ trump-­impeachment-­whistleblower-­name-­retweet-­twitter

© The Author(s) 2022 T. Uys, Whistleblowing and the Sociological Imagination, https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-39445-3

213

214 

REFERENCES

Alford, F.  C. (2001). Whistleblowers: Broken Lives and Organizational Power. Cornell University Press. Alford, F. C. (2003). Women as Whistleblowers. Business and Professional Ethics Journal, 22(1), 67–76. Alleyne, P. (2016). The Influence of Organisational Commitment and Corporate Ethical Values on Non-Public Accountants’ Whistle-Blowing Intentions in Barbados. Journal of Applied Accounting Research., 17(2), 190–210. Allyn, B. (2019). Can Trump Legally Out the Whistleblower? Experts Say it Would not Violate Any Laws. Retrieved October 13, 2020, from https:// www.npr.org/2019/11/06/776481504/can-­t rump-­l egally-­o ut-­t he-­ whistleblower-­experts-­say-­it-­would-­not-­violate-­any-­law Andon, P., Free, C., Jidin, R., Monroe, G. S., & Turner, M. J. (2018). The Impact of Financial Incentives and Perceptions of Seriousness on Whistleblowing Intervention. Journal of Business Ethics, 151, 165–178. Andregg, M. (2016). Ethical Implications of the Snowden Revelations. The International Journal of Intelligence, Security, and Public Affairs, 18(2), 110–131. Ansell, A.  E. (2004). Two Nations of Discourse: Mapping Racial Ideologies in Post-apartheid South Africa. Politikon, 31(1), 3–26. Anvari, F., Wenzel, M., Woodyatt, L., & Haslam, A.  S. (2019). The Social Psychology of Whistleblowing: An Integrated Model. Organizational Psychology Review, 9(1), 41–67. Appelbaum, S.  H., Giulio, D.  I., & Albert, M. (2007). Positive and Negative Deviant Workplace Behaviors: Causes, Impacts, and Solutions. Corporate Governance, 7(5), 586–598. Arenstein, J. (2003, November 10). Poverty-stricken Muller Speaks Out. City Press. Retrieved October 2, 2015, from http://152.111.1.87/argief/berigte/ citypress/2003/11/16/C1/23/01.html Arnold, D.  F., & Ponemon, L.  A. (1991). Internal Auditors’ Perceptions of Whistle-Blowing and the Influence of Moral Reasoning: An Experiment. A Journal of Theory and Practice, 10(2), 1–15. Ash, L. (2016, December 30). Yuliya Stepanova: What Do Russians Think of Doping Whistleblower? BBC News. Retrieved June 21, 2021, from https:// www.bbc.com/news/magazine-­38406627 Attree, M.  J. (2007). Factors Influencing Nurses’ Decisions to Raise Concerns About Care Quality. Journal of Nursing Management, 15, 392–402. Avakian, S., & Roberts, J. (2012). Whistleblowers in Organisations: Prophets at Work? Journal of Business Ethics, 110(1), 71–84. Awner, J.  L., & Dickins, D. (2012b). Rewards Programs Do Not Motivate Whistleblowers. In N.  Berlatsky (Ed.), Whistleblowers: Opposing Viewpoints (pp. 62–71). Greenhaven Press. Ayers, S., & Kaplan, S. E. (2005). Wrongdoing by Consultants: An Examination of Employees’ Reporting Intentions. Journal of Business Ethics, 57(2), 121–137.

 REFERENCES 

215

Bagashka, T. (2014). Unpacking Corruption: The Effect of Veto Players on State Capture and Bureaucratic Corruption. Political Research Quarterly, 67(1), 165–180. Bakaj, A. P., & Zaid, M. S. (2020, March 1). We Represented the Whistle-blower. The Law Needs Urgent Help. The New York Times. Retrieved March 04, 2020, from https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/01/opinion/whistleblower-­ intelligence-­community.html Banda, C., Sepotokele, T. W., Matsena, D., Warby, V., & Zondi, M. (2002, June 19). The Two Big Questions after Video Exposé of Prison Scandal. The Star. Barker, R., & Dawood, R. (2004). Whistleblowing in the Organization: Wrongdoer or Do-Gooder? Communicare, 23(2), 119–138. Barnard, R. (2020). Introduction: Comparative Thinking in an Age of Corruption. Safundi, 21(4), 373–381. Barnett, T., Cochran, D.  S., & Taylor, S.  G. (1993). The Internal Disclosure Policies of Private-Sector Employers: An Initial Look at Their Relationship to Employee Whistleblowing. Journal of Business Ethics, 12, 127–136. Barnett, T., & Vaicys, C. (2000). The Moderating Effect of Individuals’ Perceptions of Ethical Work Climate on Ethical Judgements and Behavioural Intentions. Journal of Business Ethics, 27, 351–362. Bashir, S., Khattak, H. R., Hanif, A., & Chohan, S. N. (2010). Whistle-blowing in Public Sector Organizations: Evidence from Pakistan. The American Review of Public Administration, 41(3), 285–296. Basson, A. (2012, May 13). “Papa lived and died ANC’. City Press. Retrieved June, 3, 2015 from https://www.news24.com/news24/Archives/City-Press/ Papa-lived-and-died-ANC-20150429 Basson, A. (2019, November 11). Adriaan Basson: How the ANC Failed its Principled Son, Vernie Petersen. City Press. Retrieved January 26, 2020, from https://www.news24.com/news24/Columnists/AdriaanBasson/adriaan-­basson-­ how-­the-­anc-­failed-­its-­principled-­son-­vernie-­petersen-­20191111 BBC News. (2019). Julian Assange: A Timeline of Wikileaks Founder’s Case. Retrieved April 16, 2020, from https://bbc.com/news/world-europe11949341 BBC News. (2020). NSA Surveillance Exposed by Snowden Ruled Unlawful. Retrieved November 17, 2020, from https://www.bbc.com/news/ technology-­54013527 Beckley, A. (2014). Organisational Justice: Is the Police Service Ready for It? Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism, 9(2), 176–190. Benkler, Y. (2011). A Free Irresponsible Press: Wikileaks and the Battle over the Soul of the Networked Fourth Estate. Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties, 46(2), 311–397. Ben-Yehuda, N. (2001). Betrayals and Treason: Violations of Trust and Loyalty. Westview.

216 

REFERENCES

Berghel, H. (2012). WikiLeaks and the Matter of Private Manning. IEEE Computer Society. University of Nevada, Las Vegas. Berghel, H. (2014). Mr Snowden’s Legacy. IEEE Computer Society. University of Nevada, Las Vegas. Bernal, P. (2016). Data Gathering, Surveillance and Human Rights: Recasting the Debate. Journal of Cyber Policy, 1(2), 243–264. https://doi.org/10.108 0/23738871.2016.1228990 Berry, B. (2004). Organizational Culture: A Framework and Strategies for Facilitating Employee Whistleblowing. Employee Responsibilities and Rights Journal, 16(1), 1–11. Bezuidenhout, J, & Davis, R. (2017). 2017 Daily Maverick South African Persons of the Year: The Whistle-blowers. Retrieved August 08, 2020, from https:// www.dailymaverick.co.za/ar ticle/2017-­1 2-­2 1-­2 017-­d aily-­m averick-­ south-­african-­persons-­of-­the-­year-­the-­whistle-­blowers/ Bhengu, L. (2021, August 25). ‘It was an Assassination’ – Finance Official Babita Deokaran was Fighting for ‘Ethical Public Service’. Retrieved September 24, 2021 from https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/it-was-anassassination-finance-official-babita-deokaran-was-fighting-for-­ethical-publicservice-20210825 Bhorat, H., Buthelezi, M., Chipkin, I., Duma, S., Mondi, L., Peter, C., Qobo, M., Swilling, M., & Friedenstein, H. (2017). Betrayal of the promise: How South Africa Is Being Stolen. State Capacity Research Project, 1–72. Bies, R. J., & Moag, J. F. (1986). Interactional Justice: Communication Criteria of Fairness. In R.  J. Lewicki, B.  H. Sheppard, & M.  H. Bazerman (Eds.), Research on Negotiations in Organizations (Vol. 1, pp. 43–55). JAI Press. Bigo, D. (2019). Shared Secrecy in a Digital Age and a Transnational World. Intelligence and National Security, 34(3), 379–394. https://doi.org/10.108 0/02684527.2019.1553703 Biography.com Editors. (2020). Chelsea Manning Biography. Retrieved August 03, 2020, from https://www.biography.com/activist/chelsea-­manning Bjørkelo, B. (2013). Workplace Bullying After Whistleblowing: Future Research and Implications. Journal of Managerial Psychology., 28(3), 306–323. Bjørkelo, B., Einarsen, S., & Matthiesen, S.  B. (2010). Predicting Proactive Behaviour at Work: Exploring the Role of Personality as an Antecedent of Whistleblowing Behaviour. Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology., 8, 371–394. Bjørkelo, B., Ryberg, W., Matthiesen, S.  B., & Einarsen, S. (2008). When You Talk and Talk and Nobody Listens: A mixed Method Case Study of Whistleblowing and its Consequences. International Journal of Organisational Behavior, 13(2), 18–40. Blaylock, D. (2014, April 15). Pulitzer Prize A ‘Validation’ for Snowden: Daily Whistleblower News. GAP. Protecting Corporate, Government & International

 REFERENCES 

217

Whistleblowers Since 1977. http://www.whistleblower.org/blog/04152014-­ pulitzer-­prize-­validation-­snowden-­dailywhistleblower-­news Blenkinsop, M. (2019, January 8). Late Eskom Exec Mark van der Riet: How State Capture Turned Murderous. Retrieved September, 24, 2021 from https:// www.biznews.com/undictated/2019/01/08/late-eskom-exec-mark-vander-riet-state-capture-turned-murderous Blenkinsopp, J., & Edwards, M. S. (2008). On Not Blowing the Whistle: Quiescent Silence as an Emotional Episode. Research on Emotion in Organizations, 4, 181–206. Blonder, I. (2010). Public Interests and Private Passions: A Peculiar Case of Police Whistleblowing. Criminal Justice Ethics, 29(3), 258–277. Bok, S. (1980). Whistleblowing and Professional Responsibilities. In D. Callahan & S.  Bok (Eds.), Ethics Teaching in Higher Education (Vol. 11, pp. 277–295). Springer. Bollier, D. (1991). Citizen Action and Other Big Ideas: A History of Ralph Nader and the Modern Consumer Movement. Center for Study of Responsive Law. Retrieved April 23, 2014, from https://nader.org/biography/essential-­ nader/citizen-­action/ Bolsin, S.  N. C., Faunce, T.  A., & Oakley, J. (2005). Practical Virtue Ethics: Healthcare Whistleblowing and Portable Digital Technology. Journal of Medical Ethics, 31, 612–618. Boss, P. (2007). Ambiguous Loss Theory: Challenges for Scholars and Practitioners. Family Relations, 56 (April 2007), 105–111. Boss, P., & Carnes, D. (2012). The Myth of Closure. Family Process, 51(4), 456–469. Bosua, R., Milton, S., Dreyfus, S., & Lederman, R. (2014). Going Public: Researching External Whistleblowing in a New Media Age. In A.  J. Brown, D. Lewis, R. E. Moberly, & W. Vandekerckhove (Eds.), International Handbook on Whistleblowing Research. Edward Elgar. Bothma, P., & Prins, J. (2000, November 8). Polisiehonde Oefen op Mense, wys Skokvideo. Beeld. Retrieved December 24, 2014, from http://152.111.1.88/ argief/berigte/beeld/2000/11/08/1/14.html Bouville, M. (2008). Whistle-Blowing and Morality. Journal of Business Ethics, 81, 579–585. Bowden, P. (2014). In the Public Interest: Protecting Whistleblowers and Those Who Speak Out. Tilde Publishing and Distribution. Bowen, R. M., Call, A. C., & Rajgopal, S. (2010). Whistle-Blowing: Target Firm Characteristics and Economic Consequences. The Accounting Review, 85(4), 1239–1271. Brinsfield, C.  T., Edwards, M., & Greenberg, J. (2009). Voice and Silence in Organizations: Historical Review and Current Conceptualizations. In J.  Greenberg & M.  S. Edwards (Eds.), Voice and Silence in Organizations. Howard House.

218 

REFERENCES

Brkic, B. (2010, January 15). Mail & Guardian journalist on hit list over stadium corruption reporting. Retrieved August 26, 2014 from https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2010-01-15-mail-guardian-journalist-on-the-hitlist-over-nelspruits-stadium-corruption-reporting/ Brodie, N. (2000). A Perfect Murder. Style, April, 45–49. Brody, R. G., Coulter, J. M., & Lin, S. (1999). The Effect of National Culture on Whistle- Blowing Perceptions. Teaching Business Ethics, 3(4), 385–400. Brown, A.J. & Donkin, M. (2008). Introduction. In A.J.  Brown (ed), Whistleblowing in the Australian Public Sector: Enhancing the Theory and Practice of Internal Witness Protection Management in Public Sector Organizations. ANU E-Press. Brown, A., & Olsen, J. (2008). Internal Witness Support: The Unmet Challenge. In A. Brown (Ed.), Whistleblowing in the Australian Public Sector. ANU E-Press. Brown, A. J., Meyer, D. P., Wheeler, C., & Zuckerman, J. (2014). Whistleblower Support in Practice: Towards an Integrated Research Model. In A. J. Brown, D. Lewis, R. E. Moberly, & W. Vandekerckhove (Eds.), International Handbook on Whistleblowing Research. Edward Elgar. Budd, J. W., Gollan, P. J., & Wilkinson, A. (2010). New Approaches to Employee Voice and Participation in Organizations. Human Relations, 63(3), 303–310. Buqa, W. (2015). Storying Ubuntu as a Rainbow Nation. Verbum et Ecclesia, 36(2), 1–8. Bushnell, A. M. (2020). Reframing the Whistleblower in Research: Truth-tellers as Whistleblowers in Changing Cultural Contexts. Sociology Compass.https://0-­ doi-­org.ujlink.uj.ac.za/10.1111/soc4.12816. Caillier, J. G. (2012). Agency Retaliation Against Whistle-Blowers. Public Integrity, 15(1), 29–50. Caillier, J. G. (2013). Do Employees Feel Comfortable Blowing the Whistle When Their Supervisors Practice Transformational Leadership? International Journal of Public Administration, 36(14), 1020–1028. Calland, R., & Dehn, G. (2004). Whistleblowing Around the World: Law Culture and Practice. The Open Democracy Advice Centre (ODAC); Public Concern At Work (PCaW). Calland, R., & Stober, L. (2004, September 14). Whistle-blowing in Crisis in South Africa. Business Day. Camerer, L. (1996). Ethics and the Professions: Blowing the Whistle on Crime. Africa Security Review, 5(6), 48–54. Camerer, L. (2001). Protecting Whistle Blowers in South Africa: The Protected Disclosures Act no. 26 of 2000. Anti-Corruption Strategies, Institute of Security Studies. Occasional Paper No. 47-2001. http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ paper/47/paper47.html Carr, I., & Lewis, D. (2010). Combating Corruption Through Employment Law and Whistleblower Protection. Industrial Law Journal, 39(1), 1–30.

 REFERENCES 

219

Casey, C. (1999). “Come, Join Our Family”: Discipline and Integration in Corporate Organizational Culture. Human Relation, 52(1), 155–177. Cassematis, P. G., & Wortley, R. (2013). Prediction of Whistleblowing or Non-­ reporting Observation: The Role of Personal and Situational Factors. Journal of Business Ethics, 117(3), 615–634. Ceva, E., & Bocchiola, M. (2019). Is Whistleblowing a Duty? Polity Press. Ceva, E., & Bocchiola, M. (2020). Theories of whistleblowing. Philosophy Compass, 15, e12642. https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12642 Chalouat, I., Carrión-Crespo, C., & Licata, M. (2020). Law and Practice on Protecting Whistle-blowers in the Public and Financial Services Sectors. Working Paper No. 328. Geneva: International Labour Organization. Chang, Y., Wilding, M., & Shin, M. C. (2017). Determinants of Whistleblowing Intention: Evidence from the South Korean Government. Public Performance & Management Review, 40(4), 676–700. Chatterjee, A. (2019). Measuring Wealth Inequality in South Africa: An Agenda. Development Southern Africa, 36(6), 839–859. Chipkin, I., & Ngqulunga, B. (2008). Friends and Family: Social Cohesion in South Africa. Journal of Southern African Studies, 34(1), 61–76. Chiu, R. K. (2003). Ethical Judgment and Whistleblowing Intention: Examining the Moderating Role of Locus of Control. Journal of Business Ethics, 43, 65–74. Chordiya, R., Sabharwa, J. E., Relly, J. E., & Berman, E. M. (2020). Organizational Protection for Whistleblowers: A Cross-national Study. Public Management Review, 22(4), 527–552. CityPress. (2003). Poverty-stricken Muller Speaks Out. http://152.111.1.87/ argief/berigte/citypress/2003/11/16/C1/23/01.html CityPress. (2012). Former Rustenburg Mayor Found Guilty of Murder. Retrieved November 11, 2013, from  https://www.news24.com/news24/Archives/ City-Press/Former-Rustenburg-mayor-found-guilty-of-murder-20150429 Clarke, M., & Bassett, C. (2016). The Struggle for Transformation in South Africa: Unrealised dreams, Persistent Hopes. Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 34(2), 183–189. Cock, J., & Munnik, V. (2006). The Poisoner and the Poisoned: An Account of the Struggle of the Steel Valley Community against Pollution from the Vanderbijlpark Steel Works. Centre for Civil Society at the University of Kwazulu-Natal. Cohen, N. (2014). Snowden to Receive Truth-Telling Prize. The New  York Times Company. Colquitt, J.  A. (2001). On the Dimensionality of Organizational Justice: A Construct Validation of a Measure. Journal of Applied Psychology, 86, 386–400. Colvin, G. (2002). Wonder Women of Whistleblowing. Fortune, 146(3), 56. Corruption Watch (2012, July 6). Diary of a Whistleblower. Retrieved April, 27, 2014 from https://www.corruptionwatch.org.za/diary-of-a-whistleblower/

220 

REFERENCES

Corruption Watch. (2021). COVID-19 TERS Corruption at Work. Retrieved May 3, 2021, from https://www.corruptionwatch.org.za/wp-­content/ uploads/2021/02/TERS_Corruption-­Watch_R3_31Jan2021.pdf Cortina, L. M., & Magley, V. J. (2003). Raising Voice, Risking Retaliation: Events Following Interpersonal Mistreatment in the Workplace. Journal of Occupational Health Psychology, 8(4), 247–265. Cowan, K., Masondo, S., Karrim, A., & du Toit, P. (2021). IN FULL | Axed Eskom boss Solly Tshitangano was ‘Intent on Promoting the Interests of Econ Oil. Retrieved June 09, 2021, from https://www.news24.com/news24/ southafrica/investigations/eskomfiles/in-­f ull-­a xed-­e skom-­b oss-­s olly-­ tshitangano-­was-­intent-­on-­promoting-­the-­interests-­of-­econ-­oil-­20210529 Crawshaw, J. R., Cropanzano, R., Bell, C. M., & Nadisic, T. (2013). Organisational Justice: New Insights from Behavioural Ethics. Human Relations, 66(7), 885–904. Dadawala, V. (2020). What We Can Learn from the Gupta Brothers. Safundi, 21(4), 486–492. David, A. (2005). Whistleblowers. Who They Are and How Management Should Respond. Graziadio Business Review, 8(4), 1–7. Davis, M. (1989). Avoiding the Tragedy of Whistleblowing. Business and Professional Ethics Journal, 8(4), 3–19. Davis, M. (2003). Whistleblowing. In H. LaFollette (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Practical Ethics (pp. 539–563). Oxford University Press. Davis, R. (2018, August 15). #GuptaLeaks Whistle-Blowers Speak Out For The First Time. Retrieved August, 8, 2020 from https://www.dailymaverick. co.za/article/2018-08-15-guptaleaks-whistle-blowers-speak-out-for-thefirst-time/ Davis, R. (2020a). Cruel, Cruel Country: Impoverished State Capture Whistleblowers Beg Banks for Relief. Daily Maverick. Retrieved June 09, 2021, from https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-­10-­17-­impoverished-­ state-­capture-­whistle-­blowers-­beg-­banks-­for-­relief/ Davis, R. (2020b). Outpouring of Support for State Capture Whistle-blowers. Daily Maverick.. Retrieved October 25, 2020, from https://www.dailymaveri c k . c o . z a / a r t i c l e / 2 0 2 0 -­1 0 -­2 4 -­o u t p o u r i n g -­o f -­s u p p o r t -­f o r-­s t a t e -­ capture-­whistle-­blowers/ Day, A. (2012). To Mediate or Adjudicate: An Alternative for Resolving Whistleblower Disputes at the Hanford Nuclear Site. Seattle Journal of Social Justice, 11, 617. de Bruin, P. (2001, May 22). Reserwebank Veg in Hof Oor Geheime. Die Burger. Retrieved January 22, 2021, from http://m24arg02.naspers.com/argief/ berigte/dieburger/2001/05/22/7/4.html de Bruin, P. (2005, July 18). Kyk weg as jy korrupsie sien. Beeld, 14. De Maria, W. (1999). Deadly Disclosures. Wakefield Press.

 REFERENCES 

221

De Maria, W. (2005). Whistleblower Protection: Is Africa Ready? Public Administration and Development, 25, 217–226. De Maria, W. (2006). Common Law—Common Mistakes? Protecting Whistleblowers in Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and the United Kingdom. International Journal of Public Sector Management, 19(7), 643–658. De Villiers, J. (2020). SATURDAY PROFILE | Journalist Mandy Wiener: ‘SA Fails Whistleblowers Both Culturally and Legislatively. News24. Retrieved September 27, 2021, from https://www.news24.com/news24/analysis/ saturday-­p rofile-­j ournalist-­m andy-­w iener-­s a-­f ails-­w histleblowers-­b oth-­ culturally-­and-­legislatively-­20200926 Deb, P., Gallo, W. T., Ayyagaric, P., Fletcher, J. M., & Sindelar, J. L. (2011). The Effect of Job Loss on Overweight and Drinking. Journal of Health Economics, 30, 317–327. Denyer, D. (2017). Organizational Resilience. BSI and Cranfield University. Desai, A. (2008). Xenophobia and the of the Refugee in the Rainbow Nation of Human Rights. African Sociological Review/Revue Africaine de Sociologie, 12(2), 49–68. Die Burger. (2001). Hof. Retrieved January 22, 2015, from http://m24arg02. naspers.com/argief/berigte/dieburger/2001/05/26/2/21.html Dlamini, P. (2018). SA Owes Gupta Leaks Whistleblowers Living in Hiding a Huge Debt: Currin. South Africa. Retrieved August 12, 2021 from https:// www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2018-09-27-sa-owes-gupta-leakswhistleblowers-living-in-hiding-a-huge-debt-currin/ Doberstein, C., & Charbonneau, É. (2020). The Origins and Effects of Public Servant Confidence in Whistleblowing Protection Regimes. Public Administration, 98(3), 643–658. Dodge, R., Daly, A. P., Huyton, J., & Sanders, L. D. (2012). The Challenge of Defining Wellbeing. International Journal of Wellbeing, 2(3), 222–235. Dommisse, J. (1996, August 7). Regulering in SA Skiet Ver te Kort. Die Burger Laaste. Retrieved January 22, 2015, from http://152.111.1.87/argief/ berigte/dieburger/1996/08/07/15/5.html Dudai, R. (2012). Informers and the Transition in Northern Ireland. British Journal of Criminology, 52(1), 32–54. Duma, N. (2020). ‘We are Facing Thugs in Uniform’-Thabiso Zulu on Failed Intimidation Case. Retrieved November 17, 2020, from https://ewn.co. za/2020/08/07/we-are-facing-thugs-in-uniform-thabiso-zulu-on-failed-intimidation-case# Dungan, J. A., Young, L., & Waytz, A. (2019). The Power of Moral Concerns in Predicting Whistleblowing Decisions. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 85, 103848. Dworkin, T. M., & Baucus, M. S. (1998). Internal vs. External Whistleblowers: A Comparison of the Whistleblowing Process. Journal of Business Ethics, 17, 1281–1298.

222 

REFERENCES

Dworkin, T. M., & Brown, A. J. (2013). The Money or the Media: Lessons from Contrasting Developments in US and Australian Whistleblowing Laws. Seattle Journal for Social Justice, 11(2), 653–713. Eddington, P. R. (2019, June 6). The Snowden Effect, Six Years on. Commentary. Edgar, T. (2017). Beyond Snowden: Privacy, Mass Surveillance, and the Struggle to Reform the NSA. The Brookings Institution. Edwards, M. S., Ashkenasy, N. M., & Gardner, J. (2009). Deciding to Speak Up or Remain Silent Following Observed Wrongdoing: The Role of Discrete Emotions and Climate of Silence. In J. Greenberg & M. S. Edwards (Eds.), Voice and Silence in Organizations. Emerald. Egan, M. (2020). A Government Agency Just Paid a Record $114 Million to an Anonymous Whistleblower. Retrieved October 23, 2020, from https://edition.cnn.com/2020/10/23/business/sec-­r ecord-­w histleblower-­a ward/ index.html Elliston, F.  A. (1982). Civil Disobedience and Whistleblowing: A Comparative Appraisal of Two Forms of Dissent. Journal of Business Ethics, 1, 23–28. Emmett, M. (2020). SAA Whistle-blowers: ‘We Want to See People Being Charged—Then We Will Feel Vindication. Daily Maverick. Retrieved November 17, 2020, from https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/ article/2020-­1 1-­1 2-­s aa-­w histle-­b lowers-­w e-­w ant-­t o-­s ee-­p eople-­b eing-­ charged-­then-­we-­will-­feel-­vindication/ Epatko, L. (2014). Former Defense Secretary Gates calls NSA leaker Snowden a ‘traitor’. Retrieved April, 21, 2014 from https://www.pbs.org/newshour/ nation/gates-on-snowden Evans, A. J. (2008). Dealing with Dissent: Whistleblowing, Egalitarianism, and the Republic of the Firm. Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research, 21(3), 267–279. Eyal Press (2013). Whistleblower, Leaker, Traitor, Spy. Retrieved March 12, 2014, from https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2013/08/05/whistleblower-leakertraitor-spy/ Farred, G. (2001). Where Does the Rainbow Nation End? Colouredness and Citizenship in Post-apartheid South Africa. CR: The New Centennial Review, 1(1), 175–199. Farrington, D. (2013). What Is Meant By The Term ‘Whistle­Blower’. Retrieved April 5, 2014, from https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-­way/2013/ 06/10/190380255/what-we-mean-when-we-say-whistleblower Fasterling, B. (2014). Whistleblower Protection: A Comparative Law Perspective. In A.  J. Brown, D.  Lewis, R.  E. Moberly, & W.  Vandekerckhove (Eds.), International Handbook on Whistleblowing Research. Edward Elgar. Faunce, T., Crow, K., Nikolic, T., & Morgan, F. M. (2014). Because They Have Evidence: Globalizing Financial Incentives for Corporate Fraud Whistleblowers. In A.  J. Brown, D.  Lewis, R.  E. Moberly, & W.  Vandekerckhove (Eds.), International Handbook on Whistleblowing Research. Edward Elgar.

 REFERENCES 

223

Fazekas, M., & Tóth, I.  J. (2016). From Corruption to State Capture: A New Analytical Framework with Empirical Applications from Hungary. Political Research Quarterly, 69(2), 320–334. Feinstein, S., & Devine, T. (2021). Are Whistleblowing Laws Working? A Global Study of Whistleblower Protection Litigation. Government Accountability Project and the International Bar Association. Fenster, M. (2012). Disclosure’s Effects: WikiLeaks and Transparency. Iowa Law Review, 97, 753–807. Fishbein, M., & Ajzen, I. (2010). Predicting and Changing Behavior: The Reasoned Action Approach. Psychology Press and Taylor and Francis. Fitzgibbon, W., & Hudson, M. (2021, April 3). Five Years Later, Panama Papers Still Having a Big Impact. Impact. Retrieved June 06, 2020, from https:// www.icij.org/investigations/panama-­papers/five-­years-­later-­panama-­papers-­ still-­having-­a-­big-­impact/ Flynn, K. (2006). Covert Disclosures: Unauthorized Leaking, Public Officials and the Public Sphere. Journalism Studies, 7(2), 256–273. Fonseca, X., Lukosch, S., & Brazier, F. (2019). Social Cohesion Revisited: A New Definition and How to Characterize It. Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research, 32(2), 231–253. Francis, D., & Webster, E. (2019). Poverty and Inequality in South Africa: Critical Reflections. Development Southern Africa, 36(6), 788–802. Francis, D., & Webster, E. (2019). Inequality in South Africa. Development Southern Africa, 36(6), 733–734. Frenkel, R., & Gupta, P. (2019). Yo-yo Culture: Thinking South Africa After Marikana. Social Dynamics, 45(2), 175–182. Fritz, J. M. (Ed.). (2021). International Clinical Sociology (2nd ed.). Springer. Gabbatt, A. (2019, September 25). Why Is the Trump-Ukraine Whistleblower Scandal So Serious? The Guardian. Retrieved February 18, 2020, from https:// w w w. t h e g u a r d i a n . c o m / u s -­n e w s / 2 0 1 9 / s e p / 2 3 / b i d e n -­u k r a i n e -­ trump-­whistleblower-­scandal-­latest-­explained-­how-­serious Gaurav, K. (2021). ‘Not Disappointed’: US Whistleblower Snowden After He Goes Unpardoned by Trump. Hindustan Times. Retrieved June 19, 2021, from https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-­news/not-­disappointed-­us-­ w h i s t l e b l o w e r-­s n o w d e n -­a f t e r-­h e -­g o e s -­u n p a r d o n e d -­b y -­t r u m p -­ 101611153427190.html Geary, D. (2009). Radical Ambition: C.  Wright Mills, the Left, and American Social Thought. University of California Press. Gellman, B., & Harrell, E. (2010). 3 Julian Assange. WikiLeaks, 174(26), 90–94. Gentilin, D. (2016). Should Whistleblowers Receive a Reward for Speaking Up? Ethical Systems. Retrieved May 21, 2021, from https://www.ethicalsystems. org/should-­whistleblowers-­receive-­a-­reward-­for-­speaking-­up/

224 

REFERENCES

Ghani, N.  A., Galbreath, J., & Evans, R. (2011). Predicting Whistle-blowing Intention among Supervisors in Malaysia. Journal of Global management, 3(1), 1–18. Gifford, G. (2001, November 21). Dogged by shadow of retaliation. The Star. Retrieved December 24, 2014, from https://0-reference-sabinet-co-za. ujlink.uj.ac.za/webx/access/samedia/IMAGE2/200111/35/ 15200116141.pdf Gifford, G. (2018, August 27). Another Whistleblower is Humiliated. Daily Maverick. Retrieved August 29, 2018, from https://www.dailymaverick.co. za/article/2018-08-27-another-whistle-blower-is-humiliated/ Glazer, M. P., & Glazer, P. M. (1989). The Whistleblowers: Exposing Corruption in Government and Industry. Basic Books. Goffman, E. (1959). The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. London: Penguin Books. Goldman, R. (2013). Hero. Traitor. Whistle-Blower. Spy. What to Call NSA Leaker Ed Snowden? Retrieved March 12, 2014, from http://abcnews. go.com/US/nsa-leaker-edward-snowden-whistle-blower/print?id=19374578 Gong, T. (2000). Whistleblowing: What Does It Mean in China? International Journal of Public Administration, 23(11), 1899–1923. Gosztola, K. (2013). When Intelligence Leaders Call Snowden a ‘Traitor,’ He’s More Likely to be Granted Permanent Asylum. Retrieved April 21, 2014, from https://shadowproof.com/2013/10/30/when-intelligence-leaders-callsnowden-a-traitor-hes-more-likely-to-be-granted-permanent-asylum/ Gottschalk, K. (2019). Race Still Colours South Africa’s Politics 25 Years After Apartheid End. The Conversation. Gqubule, T. (2017). No Longer Whispering to Power: The Tenure of Thuli Madonsela. Jonathan Ball. Greenberg, J., & Baron, R. A. (2003). Behavior in Organizations: Understanding and Managing the Human Side of Work (7th ed.). Prentice Hall. Greenberger, D. B., Miceli, M. P., & Cohen, D. (1987). Oppositionists and Group Norms: The Reciprocal Influence of Whistle-Blowers and `Co-Workers. Journal of Business Ethics, 6, 527–542. Greene, A. D., & Latting, J. K. (2004). Whistle-blowing as a Form of Advocacy: Guidelines for the Practitioner and Organization. Social Work, 49(2), 219–230. Greenwald, G., MacAskill, E., & Poitras, L. (2013). Edward Snowden: The Whistleblower Behind the NSA Surveillance Revelations. The Guardian., 9(6), 2. Griffiths, D., & Prozesky, M. L. (2010). The Politics of Dwelling: Being White/ Being South African. Africa Today, 56(4), 22–41. Groenewald, L. (2020). Whistleblowing Management Handbook. The Ethics Institute. Gutierrez, A., & McLaren, P. (2012). To Be or Not to Be a Snitch or a Whistle-­ Blower: Years of Silence at Penn State. Cultural Studies—Critical Methodologies, 12(4), 309–316.

 REFERENCES 

225

Habib, A. (1997). South Africa-the Rainbow Nation and Prospects for Consolidating Democracy. African Journal of Political Science/Revue Africaine de Science Politique, 2, 15–37. Haglunds, M. (2009). Enemies of the People: Whistle-blowing and the Sociology of Tragedy. Acta Universitatis Stockholmiensis. Harvey, P., Martinko, M. J., & Douglas, S.C. (2009). Causal Perceptions and the Decision to Speak Up or Pipe Down. In J. Greenberg & M. S. Edwards (Eds.), Voice and Silence in Organizations. Bingley, UK: Emerald. Hassink, H., De Vries, M., & Bollen, L. (2007). A Content Analysis of Whistleblowing Policies of Leading European Companies. Journal of Business Ethics, 75(1), 25–44. Henik, E. (2005). Ethical Decision-making in the Domain of Whistle-blowing: How Issue Characteristics Affect Judgments and Intentions. Retrieved May 9, 2014, from https://escholarship.org/uc/item/3q38f5bh Henik, E. (2008). Mad as Hell or Scared Stiff? The Effect of Value Conflict and Emotions on Potential Whistle-Blowers. Journal of Business Ethics, 80, 111–119. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-­007-­9441-­1 Herb, J. (2013). NSA Leak Is Treason, Says Feinstein. The Hill. https://thehill. com/homenews/senate/304635-­nsa-­leak-­is-­treason-­says-­sen-­feinstein Hirschman, A. (1970). Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States. Harvard University Press. Hlatshwayo, R. (2012, February 1). Who killed Jimmy Mohala? Sowetan Live. Retrieved August 26, 2014 from https://www.sowetanlive.co.za/ news/2012-02-01-who-killed-jimmy-mohlala/ Hlongwane, S. (2012, July 19). Limpopo Textbook Crisis: Whistleblower Out in the Cold. Retrieved December, 21, 2014 from https://www.dailymaverick. co.za/article/2012-07-19-limpopo-textbook-crisis-whistleblower-outin-the-cold/ Hofstede, G. (1991). Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind. McGraw-Hill. Huebner, A. J., Mancini, J. A., Wilcox, R. M., Grass, A. R., & Grass, G. A. (2007). Parental Deployment and Youth in Military Families: Exploring Uncertainty and Ambiguous Loss. Family Relations., 56(2), 112–122. Hunt, G. (Ed.). (1995). Whistleblowing in the Health Services: Accountability, Law and Professional Practice (pp. 154–164). Arnold. Hunt, G. (1998). Whistle-Blowing. Encyclopedia of Applied Ethics, 4, 525–534. Iheduru, O.  C. (2004). Black Economic Power and Nation-building in Post-­ apartheid South Africa. Journal of Modern African Studies, 42, 1–30. Ilyushina, M. (2020a). Edward Snowden gets permanent residency in Russia lawyer. Accessed on 2020-10-22 from https://edition.cnn.com/2020/10/22/ europe/edward-snowden-russia-residency-intl/index.html

226 

REFERENCES

Ilyushina, M. (2020b). Edward Snowden Says He Will Apply for Russian Citizenship. Retrieved March 11, 2020, from https://edition.cnn. com/2020/11/02/europe/edward-­s nowden-­r ussian-­c itizenship-­i ntl/ index.html Inkster, N. (2014). The Snowden Revelations: Myths and Misapprehensions. Survival, 56(1), 51–60. Jackson, D. (n.d.). Who is an employee? The question addressed. Retrieved May 9, 2014, from http://phpbb.labourguide.co.za/viewtopic.php?f=2&t=343 Jackson, D., Peters, K., Andrew, S., Edenborough, M., Halcomb, E., Luck, L., Salamonson, Y., & Wilkes, L. (2010a). Understanding Whistleblowing: Qualitative Insights from Nurse Whistleblowers. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 66(10), 2194–2201. Jackson, D., Peters, K., Andrew, S., Edenborough, M., Halcomb, E., Luck, L., Salamonson, Y., Weaver, R., & Wilkes, L. (2010b). Trial and Retribution: A Qualitative Study of Whistleblowing and Workplace Relationships in Nursing. Contemporary Nurse, 36(1–2), 34–44. Janusz, B. D. (2013). When Women Blow the Whistle. Herizons. Johnson, L. (2013, November 06). John Boehner: Edward Snowmen Is a Traitor. The Huffington Post Johnson, N. C. (2017). A “Massive and Unprecedented Intrusion”. A Comparative Analysis of American Journalistic Discourses Surrounding Three Government Surveillance Scandals. Digital Journalism, 5(3), 318–333. https://doi.org/1 0.1080/21670811.2016.1251330 Johnson, R. A. (2003). Whistleblowing, When it Works and Why. Lynne Rienner Publishers. Johnson, V. (2004). Public Deception in Cape Town: Story of an Insider Witness. In R.  Calland & G.  Dehn (Eds.), Whistleblowing Around the World: Law, Culture and Practice, pp. 42–52. The Open Democracy Advice Centre/Public Concern at Work. Jones, J. C., Spraakman, G., & Sánchez-Rodríguez, C. (2014). What’s in it for Me? An Examination of Accounting Students’ Likelihood to Report Faculty Misconduct. Journal of Business Ethics, 123, 645–667. https://doi. org/10.1007/s10551-­013-­2015-­5 Jubb, P. B. (1999). Whistleblowing: A Restrictive Definition and Interpretation. Journal of Business Ethics, 21(1), 77–94. Kadalie, R. (2011, January 18). Why are we so Lawless? Politicsweb.  Retrieved December, 20, 2014 from https://www.politicsweb.co.za/news-and-­analysis/ why-are-we-so-lawless Kanda, K. (2020). Whistleblower Reward Schemes: Who Really Benefits? Project Speak Up Stop Harm. Retrieved May 21, 2021, from https://protect-­advice. org.uk/whistleblower-­reward-­schemes-­who-­really-­benefits/

 REFERENCES 

227

Kaplan, S., Pany, K., Samuels, J., & Zhang, J. (2009). An Examination of the Association between Gender and Reporting Intentions for Fraudulent Financial Reporting. Journal of Business Ethics, 87(1), 15–30. Kaptein, M. (2011). From Inaction to External Whistleblowing: The Influence of the Ethical Culture of Organizations on Employee Responses to Observed Wrongdoing. Journal of Business Ethics, 98(3), 513–530. Keenan, J.  P. (2002). Comparing Indian and American Managers on Whistleblowing. Employee Responsibilities and Rights Journal, 14(2/3), 79–89. Keenan, J.  P. (2007). Comparing Chinese and American Managers on Whistleblowing. Employee Responsibilities and Rights Journal, 19(2), 85–94. Kempton Express. (2017, October 31). Body of Murdered Van Riebeeck Park Environmentalist Found in Cupboard. Retrieved July 06, 2021, from https:// kemptonexpress.co.za/160097/gruesome-­murder-­shocks-­community/ Kenny, K. (2015). Constructing Selves: Whistleblowing And The Role Of Time. In D. Lewis, & W. Vandekerckhove, (Eds.), Developments in Whistleblowing Research 2015. London: International Whistleblowing Research Network. Kenny, K., & Fotaki, M. (2019). Post-disclosure Survival Strategies—Transforming Whistleblowers Experiences. NUI Galway. Kenny, K., Fotaki, M., & Scriver, S. (2019). Mental Heath as a Weapon: Whistleblower Retaliation and Normative Violence. Journal of Business Ethics, 160, 801–815. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-­018-­3868-­4 King, E., Samii, C., & Snilstveit, B. (2010). Interventions to Promote Social Cohesion in Sub-Saharan Africa. Journal of Development Effectiveness, 2(3), 336–370. King, G., III. (1999). The Implications of an Organization’s Structure on Whistleblowing. Journal of Business Ethics, 20(4), 315–326. King, G., III. (2000). The Implications of Differences in Cultural Attitudes and Styles of Communication on Peer Reporting Behaviour. Cross Cultural Management. An International Journal, 7(2), 11–17. Klaas, B.  S., Olson-Buchanan, J., & Ward, A.K. (2012). The Determinants of Alternative Forms of Workplace Voice: An Integrative Perspective. Journal of Management., 38(1), 314–345. Klein, M. (2018). Unsung Hero. Retrieved July 08, 2020, from https://nationalbarcouncil.co.za/2018/06/03/unsung-­hero/ Kloppers, P. (1997). Behoort die whistle blower beskerm te word? Stellenbosch Law Review, 8(2), 237–248. Kohn, S.  M. (2012). Rewards Give Whistleblowers a Motivation to Reveal Wrongdoing. In N.  Berlatsky (Ed.), Whistleblowers: Opposing Viewpoints (pp. 50–61). Greenhaven Press. Kuenda, L. (2011). Whistleblower: The Mike Tshishonga Story. Abunda Publishing Services.

228 

REFERENCES

Kumar, M., & Santoro, D. (2017). A Justification of Whistleblowing. Philosophy and Social Criticism, Sage, 43(7), 669–684. Labuschagne, P. (2017). Patronage, State Capture and Oligopolistic Monopoly in South Africa: The Slide from a Weak to a Dysfunctional State? Acta Academica, 49(2), 51–67. Laganparsad, M., & Peacock, B. (2016). Former ANC Heavyweight Penuell Maduna in Legal Battle with Ex-wife over Multimillion-rand BEE Deal. Sunday Times. Retrieved July 08, 2020, from https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-­ t i m e s / n e w s / 2 0 1 6 -­0 7 -­2 4 -­f o r m e r -­a n c -­h e a v y w e i g h t -­p e n u e l l -­ maduna-­in-­legal-­battle-­with-­ex-­wife-­over-­multimillion-­rand-­bee-­deal/# Lahneman, W. J. (2016). IC Data Mining in the Post-Snowden Era. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 29(4), 700–723. https://doi. org/10.1080/08850607.2016.1148488 Lai, A. (2012). Timeline: Julian Assange’s Extradition Battle. Retrieved May 04, 2013, from http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/16/world/europe/assange-­ extradition-­timeline/ Lampert, N. (1985). Whistleblowing in the Soviet Union: Complaints and Abuses under State Socialism. Macmillan. Lashmar, P. (2017). No More Sources? Journalism Practice, 11(6), 665–688. Lavena, C. F. (2014). Whistle-Blowing: Individual and Organisational Determinants of the Decision to Report Wrongdoing in the Federal Government. American Review of the Public Administration, 46, 1–24. Sage Publications. Le Roy, J., Bastounis, M., & Poussard, J.  M. (2012). Interactional Justice and Counterproductive Work Behaviors: The Mediating Role of Negative Emotions. Social Behavior and Personality: An International Journal, 40(8), 1341–1355. Lefebvre, S. (2018). Why Are State Secrets Protected from Disclosure? The Discourse of Secret Keepers. The International Journal of Intelligence, Security, and Public Affairs, 20(3), 204–229. https://doi.org/10.1080/2380099 2.2018.1532184 Lennane, K. J. (1993). Whistleblowing: A Health Issue. British Medical Journal, 307(6905), 667–670. LePine, J. A., & Van Dyne, L. (1998). Predicting Voice Behavior in Work Groups. Journal of Applied Psychology, 83(6), 853–868. Lepore, J. (2019, September 23). Edward Snowden and the Rise of Whistle-­ blower Culture in Permanent Record. The New  Yorker. Retrieved May 31, 2020, from https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/09/23/edward-­ snowden-­and-­the-­rise-­of-­whistle-­blower-­culture le Roux, R. (2010). The Protected Disclosures Act 26 of 2000: Is This as Good as It Is Going to Get for Whistleblowers? A Review of Some Recent Jurisprudence. Stellenbosch Law Journal, 3, 508–527. le Roux, K. (2017, October 3). Sygnia Offers Gupta whistle-blower Bianca Goodson a Job. Retrieved August, 8, 2020 from https://www.capetalk.co.za/ articles/274922/sygnia-offers-gupta-whistle-blower-bianca-goodson-a-job

 REFERENCES 

229

Leventhal, G.  S. (1980). What Should Be Done with Equity Theory? New Approaches to the Study of Fairness in Social Relationships. In K.  Gergen, M.  Greenberg, & R.  Willis (Eds.), Social Exchange: Advances in Theory and Research (pp. 27–55). Plenum Press. Lewicka-Strzalecka, A. (2011). Whistleblowing at Work: The Polish Perspective. In M.  Arszulowicz & W.  W. Gasparski (Eds.), Whistleblowing: In Defense of Proper Action (pp. 171–180). Transaction Publishers. Lewis, D., Devine, T., & Harpur, P. (2014). The Key to Protection: Civil and Employment Law Remedies. In A.  J. Brown, D.  Lewis, R.  E. Moberly, & W.  Vandekerckhove (Eds.), International Handbook on Whistleblowing Research. Edward Elgar. Lewis, D., & Uys, T. (2007). Protecting Whistleblowers at Work: A Comparison of the Impact of British and South African Legislation. Managerial Law, 49(3), 76–92. Lewis, D. B. (2010). Introduction. In D. Lewis (Ed.), A Global Approach to Public Interest Disclosure: What Can We Learn from Existing Whistleblowing Legislation and Research? (pp. 1–6). Edward Elgar. Leys, J., & Vandekerckhove, W. (2014). Whistleblowing Duties. In A. J. Brown, D. Lewis, R. E. Moberly, & W. Vandekerckhove (Eds.), International Handbook on Whistleblowing Research. Edward Elgar. Lind, E. A., & Kulik, C. T. (2009). Hear Me Out: Voice and Justice. In J. Greenberg & M. S. Edwards (Eds.), Voice and Silence in Organizations. Emerald. Lipman, F.  D. (2012). Whistleblowers: Incentives, Disincentives, and Protection Strategies. John Wiley and Sons, Inc.. Liyanarachchi, G.  A., & Adler, R.  W. (2010). Accountants’ Whistle-blowing Intentions: The Impact of Retaliation, Age, and Gender (Accountancy Working Paper Series). Gregory Liyanarachchi & Ralph Adler. http://hdl.handle. net/10523/1573 Longhurst, K. (2016). Implementing the DCFTA in the Context of State Capture: Assessing the Position of Small and Medium Enterprises. Eastern Journal of European Studies, 7(2), 145–164. Loyens, K. (2013). Towards a Custom- Made Whistleblowing Policy. Using Grid-­ Group Cultural Theory to Match Policy Measures to Different Styles of Peer Reporting. Journal of Business Ethics, 114(2), 239–249. Loyens, K., & Maesschalck, J. (2014). Whistleblowing and Power. In A. J. Brown, D. Lewis, R. E. Moberly, & W. Vandekerckhove (Eds.), International Handbook on Whistleblowing Research. Edward Elgar. Lozano, E., Joyce, A., Schiemann, R., Ting, A., & Yahyavi, D. (2010–2011). WikiLeaks and Whistleblowing: Digital Information Leakage and Its Impact on Society. Retrieved April 05, 2014, from http://cs.stanford.edu/people/eroberts/cs181/projects/2010-­11/WikiLeaks/background.html

230 

REFERENCES

Lozano, E., Joyce, A., Schiemann R., Ting, A., & Yahyavi, D. (2011). WikiLeaks and Whistleblowing: Digital Information Leakage and Its Impact on Society. Retrieved April 05, 2014, from http://cs.stanford.edu/people/eroberts/ cs181/projects/2010-­11/WikiLeaks/background.html Lubisi, S., & Bezuidenhout, H. (2016). Blowing the Whistle for Personal Gain in the Republic of South Africa: An Option for Consideration in the Fight Against Fraud? Southern African Journal of Accountability and Auditing Research, 18(1), 49–62. Lutchman, C. (2020). Thuli Madonsela’s Optimistic Outlook for SA and Her Views on a Corruption TRC. Retrieved October 23, 2020, from https://www. iol.co.za/thepost/news/thuli-­madonselas-­optimistic-­outlook-­for-­sa-­and-­her-­ views-­on-­a-­corruption-­trc-­65864db1-­7fd8-­413c-­a10d-­0271cf33c5d5 MacAskill, E. (2019, September 13). Snowden. The Guardian. Retrieved June 23, 2020, from https://www.theguardian.com/us-­news/ng-­interactive/2019/ sep/13/edward-­s nowden-­i nterview-­w histleblowing-­r ussia-­a i-­p ermanent-­ record Mackey, R. (2010). ‘Operation Payback’ Attacks Target MasterCard and PayPal Sites to Avenge WikiLeaks. Retrieved May 04, 2014, from http://thelede. blogs.nytimes.com/2010/12/08/operation-­p ayback-­targets-­mastercard-­ and-­paypal-­sites-­to-­avenge-­wikileaks/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0 MacNab, B. R., & Worthley, R. (2007). Self-Efficacy as an Intrapersonal Predictor for Internal Whistleblowing: A US and Canada Examination. Journal of Business Ethics, 79, 407–442. MacNab, B.  R., Brislin, R., Worthley, R., Jenner, S., Lituchy, T., MacLean, J., Munoz-Aguilera, G., Ravlin, E., Tiessen, J. H., Bess, D., & Turcotte, M.-F. (2007). Culture and Ethics Management: Whistle-blowing and Internal Reporting within a NAFTA Country Context. International Journal of Cross-cultural Management, 7(1), 5–28. Macur, J. (2019, December 26). The Whistle-blowers Next Door. The New York Times. Retrieved June 06, 2021, from https://www.nytimes.com/2019/ 12/26/sports/olympics/yuliya-­stepanova-­russia-­doping.html Madar, C. (2012). Alleged WikiLeaks Whistleblower Bradley Manning Is a Hero. In N. Berlatsky (Ed.), Whistleblowers (pp. 143–151). Greenhaven Press. Majendie, M. (2020a, July 31). The ‘Real’ Threat to Russia’s Former Doping Mastermind. BBC News. Retrieved August 02, 2020, from https://www.bbc. com/news/stories-­53596997 Majendie, M. (2020b, November 2). Whistleblowers Vitaly and Yuliya Stepanov Living in Fear But Have No Regrets as Doping Saga Heads to Court. Evening Standard. Retrieved June 21, 2021, from https://www.standard.co.uk/sport/ vitaly-­and-­yuliya-­stepanov-­doping-­interview-­whistleblowers-­b39669.html Makhode, T. (2005). Reinstatement of Mrs Vicky Breytenbach. Media Release. Retrieved June 08, 2021, from https://www.education.gov.za/Newsroom/

 REFERENCES 

231

MediaReleases/MediaReleases/2005/tabid/183/ctl/Details/mid/583/ ItemID/2665/Default.aspx Makhulu, A. M. (2020). Trump, Zuma, Brexit: Anti-Black Racism and the Truth of the World. Safundi, 21(4), 493–503. Mangena, A. (2015, October). Death Is Not in My Vocabulary. Forbes Africa, 40–42. Mannion, R., Blenkinsopp, J., Powell, M., McHale, J., Millar, R., Snowden, N., & Davies, H. (2018). Understanding the Knowledge Gaps in Whistleblowing and Speaking Up in Health care: Narrative Reviews of the Research Literature and Formal Inquiries, a Legal Analysis and Stakeholder Interviews. Health Services and Delivery Research, 6(30), 1–189. Mansbach, A., & Bachner, Y.  G. (2010). Internal or External Whistleblowing: Nurses’ Willingness to Report Wrongdoing. Nursing Ethics, 17(4), 483–490. Mariotti, M., & Fourie, J. (2014). The Economics of Apartheid: An introduction. Economic History of Developing Regions, 29, 113–125. Martens, L.T. & Crowell, A. (2002). Whistleblowing: A Global Perspective. In C.V. Krishna Rao (ed), Whistleblowing: An Introduction. Lemag Books. Martin, B. (1999a, September 6–8). Reflections on Being President of Whistleblowers Australia Inc. The Whistle. Martin, B. (1999b). Whistleblowing and Non-violence. Peace and Change., 24(1), 15–28. Martin, B. (2014). Research that Whistleblowers Want–and What They Need. In A.  J. Brown, D.  Lewis, R.  E. Moberly, & W.  Vandekerckhove (Eds.), International Handbook on Whistleblowing Research. Edward Elgar. Martin, P. (2010). The Status of Whistleblowing in South Africa: Taking Stock. Open Democracy Advice Centre. Masnick, M. (2014). James Clapper Giving Speeches to Students, Begging Them to Stop Thinking of Ed Snowden as a Hero. Techdirt. McGregor, M. (2007). Blowing the Whistle  – Disclosures to the Media. The Quarterly Law Review for People in Business, 15(4), 160–163. Mclain, D., & Keenan, J. P. (1999). Risk, Information, and the Decision about Response to Wrongdoing in an Organization. Journal of Business Ethics, 19(3), 255–271. McNamee, M. (2001). The Guilt of Whistleblowing: Conflicts in Action Research and Educational Ethnography. The Journal of the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain, 35(3), 423–441. Mesmer-Magnus, J.  R., & Viswesvaran, C. (2005). Whistleblowing in Organizations: An Examination of Correlates of Whistleblowing Intentions, Actions, and Retaliation. Journal of Business Ethics, 62(3), 277–297. Miceli, M. P., & Near, J. P. (1992). Blowing the Whistle – The Organizational and Legal Implications for Companies and Employees. New York: Lexington Books. Miceli, M.P. & Near, J.P. (2010). When do Observers of Organizational Wrongdoing Step Up? Recent US Research on the Factors Associated with

232 

REFERENCES

Whistleblowing. In D.  Lewis (ed), A Global Approach to Public Interest Disclosure: What Can We Learn from Existing Whistleblowing Legislation and Research? Edward Elgar. Miceli, M. P., & Near, J. P. (2013). Some Implications of the Voice Literature for Research on Whistle-Blowing. In R. J. Burke & C. L. Cooper (Eds.), Voice and Whistleblowing in Organizations: Overcoming Fear, Fostering Courage and Unleashing Candour. Edward Elgar Publishing. Miceli, M.  P., Dreyfus, S., & Near, J.  P. (2014). Outsider ‘whistleblowers’: Conceptualizing and Distinguishing ‘bell-Ringing’ behavior. In A. J. Brown, D. Lewis, R. E. Moberly, & W. Vandekerckhove (Eds.), International Handbook on Whistleblowing Research. Edward Elgar. Miceli, M.  P., Near, J.  P., & Dworkin, T.  M. (2008). Whistle-blowing in Organisations. Routledge. Miceli, M. P., Near, J. P., Regh, M. T., & Van Scotter, J. R. (2012). Predicting Employee Reactions to Perceive Organizational Wrongdoing: Demoralization, Justice, Proactive Personality, and Whistle-blowing. Human Relations, Sage, 65(8), 923–954. Miceli, M. P., Roach, B. L., & Near, J. P. (1988). The Motivations of Anonymous Whistle Blowers: The Case of Federal Employees. Public Personnel Management, 17(3), 281–296. Miethe, T. D. (1999). Whistleblowing at Work: Tough Choices in Exposing Fraud, Waste, and Abuse on the Job. Westview Press. Milliken, F. J., Elizabeth, W. M., & Patricia, F. H. (2003). An Exploratory Study of Employee Silence: Issues that Employees Don’t Communicate Upward and Why. Journal of Management Studies, 40(6), 1453–1476. Mills, C. W. (1959). Sociological Imagination. Oxford University Press. Mills, C. W. (1970). The Sociological Imagination. Oxford University Press. Mitchell, M. (2008). Investigations: Improving Practice and Building Capacity. In A. Brown (Ed.), Whistleblowing in the Australian Public Sector. Canberra: ANU E-Press. Moberly, R. (2014). ‘To persons or Organizations that May Be Able to Effect Action’: Whistleblowing Recipients. In A. J. Brown, D. Lewis, R. E. Moberly, & W.  Vandekerckhove (Eds.), International Handbook on Whistleblowing Research. Edward Elgar. Mofu, B. (2020). South Africa: Re-imagining the Rainbow Nation. Sociology International Journal, 4(3), 67–68. Mogakane, T. (2012). Mabona Served the People, Says Legislature … But, Did He Really? Ziwaphi, 6(20). Retrieved December 22, 2014, from http://www. ziwaphi.com/ziwaphi/Mabona_served_the_people,_says _legislature.htmI Molefe, T. (2006, 27 January). Exposé Prison Head Finally Gets the Chop. Sowetan. Moore, L., & McAuliffe, E. (2012). To Report or Not to Report? Why Some Nurses Are Reluctant to Whistleblow. Clinical Governance: An International Journal, 17(4), 332–342.

 REFERENCES 

233

Moore, M.  A., Huxford, J., & Bethmann, J.  B. (2012). National Security Whistleblowers and the Journalists Who Tell Their Stories: A Dangerous Policy Dance of truth-Finding, Truth-telling and Consequence. Corruption, Accountability and Discretion, 47(19), 227–246. Moroe, I. (2020, December 11). We Need Answers about the Vrede Dairy Project. Retrieved May, 31 2021 from https://mg.co.za/opinion/2020-12-11-weneed-answers-about-the-vrede-dairy-project/ Morris, R. (2005, June 3). Whistle-blower Takes on Andisa Securities. Retrieved June, 3, 2013 from https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/economy/ whistle-blower-takes-on-andisa-securities-752233 Morrison, E. W., & Rothman, N. B. (2009). Silence and the Dynamics of Power. In J.  Greenberg & M.  S. Edwards (Eds.), Voice and Silence in Organizations. Emerald. Mothepu, M. (2021). Uncaptured: The True Account of the Nenegate/Trillian Whistleblower. Cape Town: Penguin Books. Msomi, S., & Nene, S. (2020). Whistleblowing in South Africa. Retrieved May 21, 2021, from https://www.wylie.co.za/articles/incentivising-­whistleblowing-­ in-­south-­africa/ Mulder, N. (2001). Honde-lede kry tot 7 jaar Tshwete en Selebi sê geregtigheid seëvier. Beeld. Retrieved December 24, 2014 from https://0-reference-­ sabinet-­co-za.ujlink.uj.ac.za/document/SAM15200118218 Mulder, N. (2003). 2 van honde-eenheid skuldig Regter verwerp hul weergawe na immigrante-aanranding. Beeld. Retrieved December 24, 2014 from https://0-­ r e f e r e n c e -­s a b i n e t - c o - z a . u j l i n k . u j . a c . z a / w e b x / a c c e s s / s a m e d i a / IMAGE2/200302/36/1520032608.pdf Murphy, K. (2014). Edward Snowden a traitor but US spy review is welcome, says Julie Bishop. Retrieved April, 21, 2014 from https://www.theguardian. com/world/2014/jan/23/edward-snowden-a-traitor-but-us-spy-reviewis-welcome-says-julie-bishop Nader, R., Petkas, P.  J., & Blackwell, K. (Eds.). (1972). Whistle Blowing: The Report of the Conference on Professional Responsibility. Grossman Publishers. Nan, W. (2011). On Whistleblowing: From the View of Engineering Ethics. In M. Arszulowicz & W. W. Gasparski (Eds.), Whistleblowing: In Defense of Proper Action (pp. 83–94). Transaction Publishers. Navasky, V. (1980). Naming Names: The Social Costs of McCarthyism. Retrieved February 20, 2012, from http://www.english.illinois.edu/maps/mccarthy/ navasky.htm Nayir, D.  Z., & Herzig, C. (2012). Value Orientations as Determinants of Preference for External and Anonymous Whistleblowing. Journal of Business Ethics, 107(2), 197–213. NBC News. (2006). Moussaoui Formally Sentence, Still Defiant. Retrieved April 28, 2014, from http://www.nbcnews.com/id/12615601/ns/us_news-­ security/t/moussaoui-­formally-­sentenced-­still-­defiant/#.U13JDFWSzTo

234 

REFERENCES

Ndhlovu, F. (2019). South Africa’s Social Transformation Policies: Raciolinguistic Ideologies and Neoliberal Rhetoric. Journal of Multicultural Discourses, 14(2), 131–151. Near, J.  P., Dworkin, T.  M., & Miceli, M.  P. (1993). Explaining the Whistle-­ Blowing Process: Suggestions from Power Theory and Justice Theory. Organization Science, 4(3), 393–411. Near, J. P., & Jensen, T. C. (1983). The Whistleblowing Process: Retaliation and Perceived Effectiveness. Work and Occupations, 10(1), 3–28. Sage Publications. Near, J.  P., & Miceli, M.  P. (1985). Organizational Dissidence: The Case of Whistle-blowing. Journal of Business Ethics, 4(1), 1–16. Near, J.P. & Miceli, M.P. (1996). Whistle-blowing: Myth and Reality. Journal of Management, 22(3), 507–526. News24. (2004). CT Whistleblower Looks Back. Retrieved December 12, 2014, from http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/CT-­whistleblower-­looks-­ back-­20040421 News24. (2019). NPA Ready to Prosecute Culprits in Controversial Estina Dairy Farm Project—Reports. Retrieved August 19, 2020, from https://www. news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/npa-­ready-­to-­prosecute-culprits-­in-­ controversial-­estina-­dairy-­farm-­project-­reports-­20191119 Nicolson, G. (2018, August 15). The cost of truth – whistle-blowers speak. Daily Maverick. Retrieved August, 8, 2020 from https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/ article/2018-08-15-the-cost-of-truth-whistle-blowers-speak/ Nicolson, G. (2020, March 6). Diary of a Whistle-blower: Mosilo Mothepu’s Courageous Fight against State Capture. Retrieved August, 8, 2020 from https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-03-06-diary-of-a-whistleblower-mosilo-mothepus-courageous-­­fight-against-state-capture/ Nie, J., & Elliott, C. (2020). Humiliating Whistle-blowers: Lie Wenliang, the Response to Covid-19, and the Call for a Decent Society. Bioethical Inquiry, 17, 543–547. Nield, D. (2014, April 21). Snowden Is No Hero, Says Bill Gates. Digital Trends. http://www.digitaltrends.com/computing/snowden-­h ero-­s ays-bill-­ gates/#!E9cT3 Nielsen, K. (2013). Review Article: How Can We Make Organizational Interventions Work? Employees and Line Managers as Actively Crafting Interventions. Human Relations, 66(8), 1029–1050. Nielsen, K., & Abildgaard, J. S. (2013). Organizational Interventions: A ResearchBased Framework for the Evaluation of both Process and Effects. Work & Stress: An International Journal of Work, Health & Organisations, 27(3), 278–297. Nkosi, B. (2012, September 13). Section 27 Challenges Department to Stop ‘Lying’ about Textbooks. Retrieved December, 21, 2014 from https://mg. co.za/article/2012-09-13-section27-challenges-department-to-stop-lying-abouttextbooks/

 REFERENCES 

235

Noack, R., & O’Grady, S. (2019, April 11). How Ecuador Soured on Assange. Washington Post. Retrieved July 28, 2020, from https://www.washingtonpost. com/world/2019/04/11/how-­ecuador-­soured-­assange/ Noseweek. (1999a). Reserve Bank Rushes to Silence its Whistle-blower. Noseweek, 26: 5–8. Noseweek. (1999b). What the Reserve Bank Doesn’t Want You to Know About David Jenkins and the Murder of Simon Law. Noseweek, 27 (5), 11. Nyst, C. (2015). Today Is a Great Victory Against GCHQ, the NSA and the Surveillance State. The Guardian. Retrieved February 15, 2015, from http:// www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/feb/06/great-­v ictor y-­ against-­gchq-­nsa-­surveillance-­state Oktem, M.  K., & Shahbaz, G. (2012). Attitudes toward Different Forms of Whistleblowing in Turkey and Iran. Middle-East Journal of Scientific Research., 12(7), 945–951. Olesen, T. (2018). The Democratic Drama of Whistleblowing. European Journal of Social Theory, 21(4), 508–525. Olesen, T. (2019). The Politics of Whistleblowing in Digitalized Societies. Politics & Society, 47(2), 277–297. Olesen, T. (2020). Whistleblowing in a Time of Digital (in)visibility: Towards a Sociology of ‘grey areas’. Information, Communication & S­ ociety.https://doi. org/10.1080/1369118X.2020.1787484. Olsen, J. (2014). Reporting versus Inaction: How Much Is There, What Explains the Differences and What to Measure. In A. J. Brown, D. Lewis, R. E. Moberly, & W.  Vandekerckhove (Eds.), International Handbook on Whistleblowing Research. Edward Elgar. Orr, L. H. (1989). Is whistleblowing the same as informing? In A. Pablo Iannone (Ed.), Contemporary Moral Controversies in Business. Oxford University Press. Paeth, S.  R. (2013). The Responsibility to Lie and the Obligation to Report. Journal of Business Ethics., 112(4), 559–566. Park, H., Bjørkelo, B., & Blenkinsopp, J. (2020). External Whistleblowers’ Experiences of Workplace Bullying by Superiors and Colleagues. Journal of Business Ethics, 161, 591–601. Park, H., & Blenkinsopp, J. 2009. Whistleblowing as planned behavior – A survey of South Korean police officers. Journal of Business Ethics, 85(4), 545–556. Park, H., Blenkinsopp, J., Oktem, K. M., & Omurgonulsen, U. (2008). Cultural Orientation and Attitudes toward Different Forms of Whistleblowing: A Comparison of South Korea, Turkey, and the U.K. Journal of Business Ethics., 82(4), 929–939. Park, H., Rehg, M. T., & Lee, D. (2005). The Influence of Confucian Ethics and Collectivism on Whistleblowing Intentions: A Study of South Korean Public Employees. Journal of Business Ethics., 58, 387–403.

236 

REFERENCES

Patel, C. (2003). Some Cross-Cultural Evidence on Whistle-Blowing as an Internal Control Mechanism. Journal of International Accounting Research., 2(1), 69–96. Paul, R. J., & Townsend, J. B. (1996). Don’t Kill the Messenger! Whistle-blowing in America—A Review with Recommendations. Employee Responsibilities and Rights Journal, 9(2), 149–161. Pedzinski v Andisa Securities (Pty) Ltd (2005). Case No. JS 396 / 04 Judgment Date 30 November 2005 Jurisdiction Labour Court, Johannesburg Judge Leeuw AJ. Peternelj-Taylor, C. (2003). Whistleblowing and Boundary Violations: Exposing a Colleague in the Forensic Milieu. Nursing Ethics, 10(3), 526–540. Peters, K., Luck, L., Hutchison, M., Wilkes, L., Andrew, S., & Jackson, D. (2011). The Emotional Sequelae of Whistleblowing: Findings from a Qualitative Study. Journal of Clinical Nursing, 20, 2907–2914. Peterson, J. C., & Farrell, D. (1986). Whistleblowing: Ethical and Legal Issues in Expressing Dissent. Kendall/Hunt. Ponemon, L. (1994). Whistle-blowing an Internal Control Mechanism: Individual and Organizational Considerations. Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, 13(2), 118–130. Potgieter, T. (2016). Organisational Culture. In A. Werner (Ed.), Organisational Behaviour: A Contemporary South African Perspective. Van Schaik Publishers. Potipiroon, W., & Wongpreedee, A. (2020). Ethical Climate and Whistleblowing Intentions: Testing the Mediating Roles of Public Service Motivation and Psychological Safety Among Local Government Employees. Public Personnel Management, 00 (0), 1–29. Sage. Protect. (2020). The Best Warning System: Whistleblowing during COVID-19— An Examination of the Experiences of UK Whistleblowers During a Global Pandemic. Retrieved May 31, 2021, from https://public-­concern-­at-­work. s3.eu-­w est-­1 .amazonaws.com/wp-­c ontent/uploads/images/2021/ 04/06154333/Protect-­Covid-­19-­Report-­2020.pdf Public Protector Facebook Page Post. (2019, November 22). Retrieved June 09, 2021, from https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=561211564448560 Quinn, B. (2021). Julian Assange Refused Bail Despite Judge Ruling Against Extradition to US. Retrieved June 19, 2021, from https://www.theguardian. com/media/2021/jan/06/julian-­assange-­refused-­bail-­despite-judge-­r uling-­ against-­extradition-­to-­us Rademeyer, A. (2005a, April 20). Onnie wat verklik oor gekul se salaris bevries. Beeld. Retrieved December 20, 2014, from http://152.111.1.88/argief/ berigte/beeld/2005/04/20/B3/11/02.html Rademeyer, A. (2005b, June 6). Onnie wat klik oor matrieks afgedank. Beeld. Retrieved December 20, 2014, from http://152.111.1.88/argief/berigte/ beeld/2005/06/06/B1/02/05.html

 REFERENCES 

237

Rademeyer, A. (2005c, August 16). Korrupte onnies kry ‘lawwe’ straf ná Mpu’langa-bedrog. Beeld. Rashid, S. (2021, February 18). Penuell Maduna bio: age, wife, qualifications, salary, books, net worth. Retrieved July 15, 2021 from https://briefly.co. za/94678-penuell-maduna-bio-age-wife-qualifications-salary-books-networth.html Rehg, M., Miceli, M.  P., Near, J.  P., & Van Scotter, J.  R. (2004). Predicting Retaliation against Whistle-blowers: Outcomes of Power Relationships within Organizations. Academy of Management Best Conference Paper: 1–6. Rehg, M., Miceli, M. P., Near, J. P., & Van Scotter, J. R. (2008). Antecedents and Outcomes of Retaliation Against Whistleblowers: Gender Differences and Power Relationships. Organization Science, 19(2), 221–240. Reiss, M. C., & Mitra, K. (1998). The effects of individual difference factors on the acceptability of ethical and unethical workplace behaviors. Journal of Business Ethics, 17(14), 1581–1593. Richardson, B. K., Wang, Z., & Hall, C. A. (2012). Blowing the Whistle Against Greek Hazing: The Theory of Reasoned Action as a Framework for Reporting Intentions. Communication Studies, 63(2), 172–193. Ries, N. (2020). Thugocracy: Bandit Regimes and State Capture. Safundi, 21(4), 473–485. Roberts, P. (2014). Motivations for Whistleblowing: Personal, Private and Public Interests. In A.  J. Brown, D.  Lewis, R.  E. Moberly, & W.  Vandekerckhove (Eds.), International Handbook on Whistleblowing Research. Edward Elgar. Roberts, P., Brown, A. J., & Olsen, J. (2011). Whistling While They Work: A Good-­ practice Guide for Managing Internal Reporting of Wrongdoing in Public Sector Organisations. ANU E-Press. https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt24hcvb Robertson, J. C., Stefaniak, C. M., & Curtis, M. B. (2011). Does Wrongdoer Reputation Matter? Impact of Auditor-Wrongdoer Performance and Likeability Reputations on Fellow Auditors’ Intention to Take Action and Choice of Reporting Outlet. Behavioral Research in Accounting, 23(2), 207–234. Robinson, S.  N., Robertson, J.  C., & Curtis, M.  B. (2012). The Effects of Contextual and Wrongdoing Attributes on Organizational Employees’ Whistleblowing Intentions Following Fraud. Journal of Business Ethics, 106(2), 213–227. Rossouw, D. (2002). Business Ethics in Africa. Oxford University Press. Rossouw, G.J. (2005). Business Ethics and Corporate Governance in Africa. Business & Society, 44(1), 94–106. Rothschild, J. (2008). Freedom of Speech Denied, Dignity Assaulted: What the Whistleblowers Experience in the US. Current Sociology, 56(6), 884–903. Rothschild, J. (2013). The Fate of Whistleblowers in Nonprofit Organizations. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 42(5), 886–901.

238 

REFERENCES

Rothschild, J., & Miethe, T. (1999a). Whistle-blower Disclosures and Management Retaliation: The Battle to Control Information about Organization Corruption. Work and Occupations, 26(1), 107–128. Rothschild, J., & Miethe, T. D. (1994). Whistleblowing as Resistance in Modern Work Organizations. In J.  M. Jermier, D.  Knights, & W.  R. Nord (Eds.), Resistance and Power in Organizations (pp. 252–273). Routledge. Rothschild, J., & Miethe, T.  D. (1999b). Disclosing Misconduct in Work Organizations: An Empirical Analysis of the Situational Factors that Foster Whistleblowing. In Harper & Simpson (Ed.), Research in the Sociology of Work (Vol. 8). Jai Press. Ruby, F., Goggin, G., & Keane, J. (2017). “Comparative Silence” Still? Journalism, Academia, and the Five Eyes of Edward Snowden. Digital Journalism, 5(3), 353–367. https://doi.org/10.1080/21670811.2016.1254568 Santoro, D., & Kumar, M. (2018). Speaking Truth to Power—A Theory of Whistleblowing. Springer. Satgar, V. (2012). Beyond Marikana: The Post-apartheid South African State. Africa Spectrum, 47(2–3), 33–62. Sawyer, K. R. (2014, May 15). The Partnership Called Whistleblowing. Available at SSRN https://ssrn.com/abstract=2437407 or https://doi.org/10.2139/ ssrn.2437407 Schroeder, F. (2005, December 2). Landmark Court Ruling Favours Whistleblower. Retrieved June 3, 2013 from https://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/ landmark-court-ruling-favours-whistleblower-260358 Seekings, J. (2008). The Continuing Salience of Race: Discrimination and Diversity in South Africa. Journal of Contemporary African studies, 26(1), 1–25. Seeliger, K. (2011). The Risks of Exposing Corruption. Retrieved April 29, 2014, from http://www.thesouthafrican.com/news/the-­risks-­of-­exposing-­corruption-­ 3.htm Seifert, D. L., Stammerjohan, W. W., & Martin, R. B. (2014). Trust, Organizational Justice, and Whistleblowing: A Research Note. Behavioral Research in Accounting, 26(1), 157–168. Seifert, D.  L., Sweeney, J.  T., Joireman, J., & Thornton, J.  M. (2010). The Influence of Organizational Justice on Accountant Whistleblowing. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 35(7), 707–717. Semuel, A. (2020, March 16–23). 2002 Person of the Year: The Whistleblowers. Time, 122. Senekal, A., & Uys, T. (2013). Creating an Ethogenic Organisation: The Development and Implementation of a Whistleblowing Policy. African Journal of Business Ethics, 7(1), 32–39. Sherry, S. (2006). Counterblow. Retrieved April 29, 2014, from http://www. lyonsbriviklaw.com/cases_counterblow.html

 REFERENCES 

239

Simon, J. (2013). Locating Gender and Resistance Through a Feminist Application of Gramsci’s “Organic Intellectual”: An Analysis of Time Magazine’s 2002 “Person(s) of the Year”. Southern Communication Journal, 78(1), 56–69. Sims, R.  L., & Keenan, J.  P. (1998). Predictors of External Whistleblowing: Organizational and Intrapersonal Variables. Journal of Business Ethics, 17(4), 411–421. Sims, R. L., & Keenan, J. P. (1999). A cross-cultural comparison of managers’ whistleblowing tendencies. International Journal of Value-Based Management, 12(2), 137–151. Singer, M., Mitchell, S., & Turner, J. (1998). Consideration of Moral. Intensity in Ethicality Judgments: Its Relationship with Whistleblowing and Need-for-­ Cognition. Journal of Business Ethics, 17, 527–541. Sirota, D. (2012). Whistle-Blowers vs. Leakers. Retrieved March 12, 2014, from www.salon.com/2012/06/11/whistleblowers_v_leakers/ Skivenes, M., & Trygstad, S. C. (2014). Wrongdoing: Definitions, Identification and Categorizations. In A.  J. Brown, D.  Lewis, R.  E. Moberly, & W.  Vandekerckhove (Eds.), International Handbook on Whistleblowing Research. Edward Elgar. Skivenes, M., & Trygstad, S. C. (2010). When whistle-blowing works: The Norwegian case. Human Relations, 63(7), 1071–1097. Smaili, N., & Arroyo, P. (2019). Categorization of Whistleblowers Using the Whistleblowing Triangle. Journal of Business Ethics, 159, 95–117. Smit, N. & Botha, N. M. (2011). Is the Protected Disclosures Act 26 of 2000 Applicable to Members of Parliament? Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg, 4, 815–829. Smith, R. (2010). The Role of Whistle-Blowing in Governing Well: Evidence from the Australian Public Sector. The American Review of Public Administration, 40(6), 704–721. Sage Publication. Smith, R. (2014). Whistleblowers and Suffering. In A.  J. Brown, D.  Lewis, R.  Moberly, & W.  Vandekerckhove (Eds.), International Handbook of Whistleblowing Research. Edward Elgar. Snowden, E. (2019). Permanent Record. Palgrave Macmillan. Soeken, D. R. (1986). J’ Accuse. Psychology Today, 20(8), 44–46. Soeken, K.  L., & Soeken, D.  R. (1987). A Survey of Whistleblowers: Their Stressors and Coping Strategies: Washington: Supt. of Docs., Congressional Sales Office, U.S. G.P.O. Soltes, K. (2012). Facilitating Appropriate Whistleblowing: Examining Various Approaches to what Constitutes Fact to Trigger Protection under Article 33 of the United Nations Convention against Corruption. American University International Law Review, 27, 925–954. South Africa, Republic of. (2000). Protected Disclosures Act (Act No. 26 of 2000). Government Gazette.

240 

REFERENCES

Spencer, M., & Spencer, J. (2014). When it all Goes Bad: Criminal Remedies. In A.  J. Brown, D.  Lewis, R.  E. Moberly, & W.  Vandekerckhove (Eds.), International Handbook on Whistleblowing Research. Edward Elgar. Stempel, J. (2014). JPMorgan Whistleblower Gets $63.9 million in Mortgage Fraud Deal. Business and Financial News, Breaking US & International News. Reuters.com, www.reutersreprints.com Strack, G. (2011). Whistleblowing in Germany. In M.  Arszulowicz & W.  W. Gasparski (Eds.), Whistleblowing: In Defense of Proper Action (pp. 109–124). Transaction Publishers. Suchman, M.  C. (1995). Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches. The Academy of Management Review., 20(3), 571–610. Sumanth, J. J., Mayer, D. M., & Kay, V. S. (2011). Why Good Guys Finish Last: The Role of Justification Motives, Cognition, and Emotion in Predicting Retaliation against Whistleblowers. Organizational Psychology Review, 1(2), 165–184. Sutcliffe, K. M., & Vogus, T. J. (2003). Organizing for Resilience. In K. S. Cameron, J.  E. Dutton, & R.  E. Quinn (Eds.), Positive Organizational Scholarship: Foundations of a New Discipline (pp. 94–110). Berrett-Koehler Publishers. Sztompka, P. 2004. Shaping Sociological Imagination: The Importance of Theory. In J. C. Alexander, G. T. Marx, & C. L. Williams (Eds.), Self, Social Structure, and Beliefs: Explorations in Sociology. University of California Press. Sztompka, P. (2005). Trust in a Globalizing Society. Inaugural Address at the International Symposium on Sociology, March 7–9, Zaragoza. Talane, V. (2013, December 10). Hard Times and Discrimination for Whistleblowers. Retrieved April 27, 2014, from https://www.corruptionwatch.org.za/ hard-times-and-discrimination-for-whistleblowers/ Tangirala, S., & Ramanujam, R. (2008). Employee silence on critical work issues: The cross-level effects of procedural justice climate. Personnel Psychology, 61, 37–68. Tavakoli, A.  A., Keenan, J.  P., & Crnjak-Karanovic, B. (2003). Culture and Whistleblowing. An Empirical Study of Croatian and United States Managers Utilizing Hofstede’s Cultural Dimensions. Journal of Business Ethics, 43, 49–64. Teo, H., & Caspersz, D. (2011). Dissenting discourse exploring alternatives to the whistleblowing/silence dichotomy. Journal of Business Ethics, 104(2), 237–249. Terracol, M. (2018). Best Practice Guide for Whistleblowing Legislation. Transparency International. Terreblanche, C. (2003, October 2012). Penuell Maduna Throws in the Towel, Retrieved December 20, 2014 from https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/ penuell-maduna-throws-in-the-towel-114463 Thakur, C. (2018a). Whistleblower Protection: Does South Africa Match Up? Part 1. Helen Suzman Foundation. Retrieved October 15, 2019 from https:// hsf.org.za/publications/hsf-­b riefs/whistle-­b lower-­p rotection-­d oes-­ south-­africa-­match-­up-­part-­i

 REFERENCES 

241

Thakur, C. (2018b). Whistleblower Protection: Does South Africa Match Up? Part 2. Helen Suzman Foundation. Retrieved October 15, 2019 from https:// h s f . o r g . z a / p u b l i c a t i o n s / h s f -­b r i e f s / w h i s t l e -­b l o w e r-­p r o t e c t i o n -­ does-­south-­africa-­match-­up-­part-­ii Thakur, C. (2018c). Whistleblower Protection: Does South Africa Match Up? Part 3. Helen Suzman Foundation. Retrieved October 15, 2019 from https:// h s f . o r g . z a / p u b l i c a t i o n s / h s f -­b r i e f s / w h i s t l e -­b l o w e r-­p r o t e c t i o n -­ does-­south-­africa-­match-­up-­part-­iii Thakur, C. (2018d). Whistleblower Protection: Does South Africa Match Up? Part 4. Helen Suzman Foundation. Retrieved October 15, 2019 from https:// hsf.org.za/publications/hsf-­b riefs/whistle-­b lower-­p rotection-­d oes-­ south-­africa-­match-­up-­part-­iv Thamm, M. (2015, March 3). SA Whistleblowers: Assassinations, Victimisation, Marginalisation for Doing the Right Thing. Daily Maverick. Retrieved August 18, 2020, from https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2015-­03-­03-­sa-­ whistleblowers-­assassinations-­victimisation-­marginalisation-­for-­doing-­the-­ right-­thing/ The Labour Court of South Africa. (2006). Mike Tshitshonga vs The Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and the Director-General of the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development. Case No JS 898/04. The Republic of South Africa. The Public Disclosures Act, 2000 (Act 26 of 2000). The Republic of South Africa. The Public Disclosures Amendment Act (Act 5 of 2017). Tilley, A. (2014, April 17). Of (silver) bullets and whistleblowers. Daily Maverick. Retrieved November 19, 2014, from https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/ opinionista/2014-04-17-of-silver-bullets-and-whistleblowers/ Thompson, B. (2002, July 26). Sex, Warders, Whistle-blosing and Videotape. The Mail&Guardian. Retrieved June 09, 2021, from https://mg.co.za/ article/2002-­07-­26-­sex-­warders-­whistleblowing-­and-­videotape/ Toor, A. (2016). Obama Says He Can’t Pardon Snowden, Even Though He Could. Retrieved June 19, 2021, from https://www.theverge. com/2016/11/21/13697072/obama-­snowden-­pardon-­nsa-­trump-­pompeo Trimikliniotis, N., Gordon, S., & Zondo, B. (2008). Globalisation and Migrant Labour in a ‘Rainbow Nation’: A Fortress South Africa? Third World Quarterly, 29(7), 1323–1339. Trongmateerut, P., & Sweeney, J. T. (2013). The Influence of Subjective Norms on Whistle-blowing: A Cross-cultural Investigation. Journal of Business Ethics, 112(3), 437–451. US Securities and Exchange Commission. (2020). SEC Awards over $27 Million to Whistleblower. Retrieved July 28, 2020, from https://www.sec.gov/news/ press-­release/2020-­89 Uys, T. (2000). The Politicisation of Whistleblowers: A Case Study. Business Ethics: A European Review, 9(4), 259–287.

242 

REFERENCES

Uys, T. (2008). Rational Loyalty and Whistleblowing: The South African Context. Current Sociology, 56(6), 907–924. Uys, T. (2010). Speaking Truth to Power: The Whistleblower as Organizational Citizen in South Africa. In D. Lewis (Ed.), A Global Approach to Public Interest Disclosure: What Can We Learn from Existing Whistleblowing Legislation and Research? (pp. 109–127). Edward Eglar. Uys, T., & Senekal, A. (2008). Morality of Principle versus Morality of Loyalty: The Case of Whistleblowing. African Journal of Business Ethics, 3(1), 38–44. Uys, T., & Smit, R. (2016). Resilience and Whistleblowers: Coping with the Consequences. South African Review of Sociology, 47(4), 60–79. Vadera, A. K., Aquilera, V. R., & Caza, B. B. (2009). Making sense of the Whistle-­ Blowing’s Antecedents: Learning from Research on Identity and Ethics Programs. Business Ethics Quarterly, 19(4), 553–586. Vadera, A.  K., Pratt, M.  G., & Mishra, P. (2013). Constructive Deviance in Organizations: Integrating and Moving Forward. Journal of Management, 39(5), 1221–1276. van de Velde, P. (2013, June 17). Wendy Addison Helps Whistleblowers. Retrieved April, 29, 2014 from https://speakout-speakup.org/blog/wendy-addisonhelps-whistleblowers/ van den Bosch, R., & Taris, T. W. (2014). The Authentic Worker’s WellBeing and Performance: The Relationship Between Authenticity at Work, Well-Being, and Work Outcomes. The Journal of Psychology, 148(6), 659–681. van der Berg, A. (2007). Summary and comment on the Final Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of Corruption, Maladministration and Violence in the Department of Correctional Services— “the Jali Commission”. Commissioned by the Civil Society Prison Reform Initiative A project of the Community Law Centre, University of the Western Cape CSPRI Research Report No. 13. Van Dyne, L., Ang, S., & Botero, I. S. (2003). Conceptualizing Employee Silence and Employee Voice as a Multidimensional Constructs. Journal of Management Studies, 40(6), 1359–1392. Van Dyne, L., & LePine, J. A. (1998). Helping and Voice extra-role Behaviour: Evidence of Construct and Predictive Validity. Academy of Management Journal, 41(1), 108–119. van Niekerk, S. (2000). Nog hondbytvoorvalle teen Gautengse eenheid bekyk. Beeld. Retrieved December 24, 2014, from http://152.111.1.88/argief/ berigte/beeld/2000/11/09/1/12.html van Rooyen, M. (2008, March 12). Hof sê Stelai moet weer aangestel word. Volksblad. Vandekerckhove, W. (2006). Whistleblowing and Organizational Social Responsibility: A Global Assessment. Ashgate Publishing Limited.

 REFERENCES 

243

Vandekerckhove, W. (2010). European Whistleblower Protection: Tiers or Tears? In D. Lewis (Ed.), A Global Approach to Public Interest Disclosure: What Can We Learn from Existing Whistleblowing Legislation and Research? (pp. 15–35). Edward Edgar. Vandekerckhove, W. (2014). Virtue Ethics and Management. In S.  Van Hooft (Ed.), The Handbook of Virtue Ethics (pp. 341–351). Acumen. Vandekerckhove, W., & Phillips, A. (2019). Whistleblowing as a protracted process: A study of UK whistleblower journeys. Journal of Business Ethics, 159(1), 201–219. Vandekerckhove, W., Brown, A. J., Moberly, R., & Lewis, D. (2014a). Strategic Issues in Whistleblowing Research. In A. J. Brown, D. Lewis, R. E. Moberly, & W.  Vandekerckhove (Eds.), International Handbook on Whistleblowing Research. Edward Elgar. Vandekerckhove, W., Brown, A. J., & Tsahuridu, E. (2014b). Managerial Responsiveness to Whistleblowing: Expanding the Research Horizon. In A. J. Brown, D. Lewis, R. E. Moberly, & W. Vandekerckhove (Eds.), International Handbook on Whistleblowing Research. Edward Elgar. Vandekerckhove, W., & Commers, R. M. S. (2004). Whistle Blowing and Rational Loyalty. Journal of Business Ethics, 53, 225–233. Vandekerckhove, W., & Phillips, A. (2016, December 9). Setting the Scene for Whistleblower Protection. In Checkmate to Corruption: Making the Case for a Wide-ranging Initiative on Whistleblower Protection. Public Services International. Retrieved November 10, 2017 from https://www.world-psi. org/sites/default/files/documents/research/en_checkmate_to_corruption.pdf Vandekerckhove, W., & Phillips, A. (2019). Whistleblowing as a Protracted Process: A Study of UK Whistleblower Journeys. Journal of Business Ethics, 159(1), 201–219. Vandekerckhove, W., & Tsahuridu, E. (2010). Risky Rescues and the Duty to Blow the Whistle. Journal of Business Ethics, 97(3), 362–380. Vandekerckhove, W., Uys, T., Rehg, M. T., & Brown, A. J. (2014c). Understandings of Whistleblowing: Dilemmas of Societal Culture. In A. J. Brown, D. Lewis, R. E. Moberly, & W. Vandekerckhove (Eds.), International Handbook on Whistleblowing Research. Edward Elgar. Venter, F. (2018). The Limits of Transformation in South Africa’s Constitutional Democracy. South African Journal on Human Rights, 34(2), 143–166. Victor, B., & Cullen, J.  B. (1988). The Organizational Basis of Ethical Work Climates. Administrative Science Quarterly, 33, 101–125. Vingiano, A.G. (2013). Edward Snowden NSA: Is the CIA Employee a “Leaker” or “Whistle-blower”? Retrieved December, 3, 2014 from http:// mic.com/articles/47515/edward-snowden-nsa-is-the-cia-employee-aleaker-or-whistle-blower

244 

REFERENCES

Vinten, G. (1994). Whistle While You Work in the Health-related Professions? The Journal of the Royal Society for the Promotion of Health, 114, 256–262. Visser, O., & Kalb, D. (2010). Financialised Capitalism Soviet style? Varieties of State Capture and Crisis. Archives Européennes de Sociologie/European Journal of Sociology/Europäisches Archiv für Soziologie, 52, 171–194. Wahl-Jorgensen, K., Bennett, L. K., & Cable, J. (2017). Surveillance Normalization and Critique. News Coverage and Journalists’ Discourses around the Snowden Revelations. Digital Journalism, 5(3), 386–403. Walden, S., & Edwards, B. (2014). Whistleblower Protection in International Governmental Organizations. In A.  J. Brown, D.  Lewis, R.  E. Moberly, & W.  Vandekerckhove (Eds.), International Handbook on Whistleblowing Research. Edward Elgar. Walsh, P.  F., & Miller, S. (2016). Rethinking ‘Five Eyes’ Security Intelligence Collection Policies and Practice Post Snowden. Intelligence and National Security, 31(3), 345–368. Waters, S. (2018). The Effects of Mass Surveillance on Journalists’ Relations with Confidential Sources. A Constant Comparative Study. Digital Journalism, 6(10), 1294–1313. Welz, M. (2004). Protecting Whistleblowers. Noseweek, 60(7), 7. Wemple, E. (2013). Edward Snowden: Leaker, Source or Whistleblower? The Washington Post. Werner, A. (2011). Organisational Behaviour: A Contemporary South African Perspective. Van Schaik Publishers. Wiener, M. 2020. The Whistleblowers. Pan Macmillan South Africa. Wildschut, K. (2020). Whistleblower Protections: Are Whistleblowers Protected as They Take on South African’s Corruption Crisis? Retrieved May 15, 2021, from https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/whistle-­blower-­protections-­are-­ whistle-­83887/ Williams, P. (2013). Analysis: Why Edward Snowden isn’t a Whistle-blower, Legally Speaking. Retrieved December 22, 2014 from https://www.nbcnews. com/news/us-news/analysis-why-edward-snowden-isnt-whistle-blowerlegally-speaking-flna6c10366884 Wilmot, S. (2000). Nurses and Whistleblowing: The ethical issues. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 32(5), 1051–1057. Winardi, R.  D. (2013). The Influence of Individual and Situational Factors on Lower-level Civil Servants’ Whistle-blowing Intention in Indonesia. Journal of Indonesian Economy and Business, 28(3), 361–376. Wintour, P. (2021). Britain Is Damaging its Reputation by Keeping Julian Assange in Jail, Says Partner. Retrieved June 19, 2021, from https://www.theguardian. com/media/2021/apr/11/britain-­risks-­damaging-­reputation-by-­keeping-­ julian-­assange-­in-­jail-­says-­partner-­stella-­moris

 References 

245

Wrong, M. (2009). It’s Our Turn to Eat: The Story of a Kenyan Whistleblower. Fourth Estate. Zakaria, M., Razak, S. N. A. A., & Yusoff, M. S. A. (2016). The Theory of Planned Behaviour as a Framework for Whistle-Blowing Intentions. Review of European Studies, 8(3), 221–236. Zhang, J., Chiu, R., & Wei, L. (2009). Decision-making process of internal whistleblowing behavior in China: Empirical evidence and implications. Journal of Business Ethics, 88, 25–41. Zuckerman, J., & Stock, M. (2021). SEC Whistleblower Program: What Are the Largest SEC Whistleblower Awards? Retrieved June 24, 2021, from https:// www.zuckermanlaw.com/sp_faq/largest-­sec-­whistleblower-­awards/

Index1

A Accountability, 4, 10, 18, 28, 36, 49, 182, 186, 199, 206 Alant, Nico, 12, 52–56, 130, 139, 141, 148 Alford, C. Fred, 31, 33, 36, 92, 117, 118, 126–128, 130, 174 Ambiguous loss, 62, 100, 103, 127–129, 132 Anonymity, 1n1, 10, 35–38, 42, 61, 74, 122, 158, 170, 182 Anti-retaliation legislation, 177–181, 194 Anti-retaliation model, 168, 179 Applied sociology, 200 Assange, Julian, 1, 5, 6 Azjen, Icek, 84, 89, 90, 96, 99, 104, 106, 160 B Berry, Benisa, 156, 206, 207 Bocchiola, Michele, 27, 157

Breytenbach, Vicky, 64–65 Brown, A.J., 33, 144, 168, 181, 197, 206 Burden of proof, 178 C Cambridge Analytica, 10 Ceva, Emanuela, 27, 157 Challenging prohibitive behavior, 85 Challenging promotive behavior, 85 Channels, 5, 17, 32, 33, 53, 86, 95, 129, 131, 141–142, 157, 173, 175, 176, 182, 195, 199, 204, 205 Charlton, Harry, 68–70, 139, 141, 153 Chordiya, Rashmi, 155, 159, 161 Clinical sociology, 18, 193, 199, 200, 202, 203, 205, 208 Cohesion, 38, 144 Communication channels, 17, 31, 53, 148, 167, 192, 209

 Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

1

© The Author(s) 2022 T. Uys, Whistleblowing and the Sociological Imagination, https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-39445-3

247

248 

INDEX

Confidentiality, 18, 31, 39, 158, 169, 170, 182, 183, 186 Corruption Watch, 11, 71, 125 COVID-19, 11, 12 Culture, 4, 31, 91, 94, 98, 100–104, 106, 118, 122, 139, 143, 144, 149, 153, 156, 182, 195, 197, 200, 201, 205–207, 209 D de Maria, William, 4, 30, 178 Defensive behaviors, 201 Denyer, David, 201 Deontic view, 157 Devine, Tom, 167, 168n1, 169, 170, 175, 177–179, 185, 208 Disclosure, 5, 9, 14, 16–18, 27–42, 60, 67, 86, 87, 89, 95, 97, 102, 107, 113–115, 124, 128, 129, 131, 138–145, 149, 150, 152, 153, 155, 156, 158–160, 166–178, 180–184, 186, 193, 195–198, 202, 204, 206 Dworkin, Terry M., 115, 116, 168, 181 E Education, 91, 127, 142 Effects of retaliation, 121–126 financial effects, 121 interpersonal relations in the workplace, 124 physical health, 124 psychosocial effects, 122 relationships with family and friends, 125–126 Ellsberg, Daniel, 2, 3 Employees, 16, 17, 26, 29–31, 84, 98, 99, 117, 120, 121, 130, 142, 148, 156, 166, 171, 173, 178, 179, 197, 201, 203, 206

Enforcement mechanisms, 182, 185 Ethical climate, 143, 155 Ethogenic culture, 156 European Center for Whistleblower Rights, 202 External whistleblowing, 5, 33–35, 42, 86, 87, 102, 106, 129–131, 141, 142, 148, 158, 173, 178, 182, 183, 195, 203 Extra-role behavior, 85 Extrema Ratio view, 157 F False Claims Act, 25, 180 Feinstein, Samantha, 7, 167, 168n1, 169, 170, 175, 177–179, 185 Fishbein, Martin, 84, 89, 90, 96, 99, 104, 106, 160 Freedom of expression, 8, 172, 196 Fritz, Jan Marie, 199, 202 G Gender, 91, 96, 103, 142, 143 Goffman, Erving, 147, 151 Good faith, 173, 174 Goodson, Bianca, 74 Government Accountability Project, 26, 167n1, 175, 202 Grieve, Keith, 66–67 Gupta emails, 74–75 Guptaleaks whistleblowers, 119, 149 H Haglunds, Magnus, 38, 165, 166 Hess, Mark, 57–58 Hirschman, Albert, 83, 84 Hotlines, 36, 38, 182

 INDEX 

I Idiosyncrasy credit, 115 Informers, 37, 38 Institutionalizing whistleblowing, 17, 18, 166–168 Internal whistleblowing, 5, 32–35, 53, 57, 67, 71, 87, 94, 95, 102, 105, 106, 129, 137, 141, 142, 144, 157–159, 168, 172, 174–176, 181–185, 195, 199, 203, 205, 209 Interventions, 12n4, 18, 58, 64, 193, 200–203, 205 Investigation of disclosures, 3, 184–185 J Jacobs, Andries, 58–59, 148 Johnson, Victoria, 7, 9n3, 30, 31, 61–62, 128 K Kenny, Kate, 123, 177 Klein, Adam, 50–52 Kumar, Manohar, 3, 36, 174 L Leaker, 35, 36 Legitimacy, 6, 13, 41, 85, 138, 147–149, 159 Lewis, David, 67, 68, 172, 174, 181 Loyalty, 17, 30, 40, 73, 83, 84, 93, 102, 104, 114, 128, 129, 144, 146, 150, 165, 166, 172, 195, 197, 204 M Manning, Chelsea, 3, 6n2, 35n1, 39 Mediation, 18, 200, 202, 203

249

Miceli, Marcia P., 27, 30–34, 36, 38, 41, 84–86, 88, 91, 93, 94, 98, 100, 105, 115, 118, 121, 122, 130, 138–142, 144, 147, 148, 151–154, 175 Mills, C. Wright, 13–15, 113, 208 Mohlala, Jimmy, 75–76 Mothepu, Mosilo, 73, 74 Motives, 6, 13, 16, 35, 40, 41, 145–147, 152, 161, 173, 174 altruistic, 40, 41 mixed, 41, 174 self-serving, 40 Muller, John, 56–57, 121, 124, 127, 139, 153 Multiple Hurdles Approach, 173 N Nader, Ralph, 26 O Occupational wrongdoing, 28, 42, 49, 63, 67, 68, 140, 171, 178 Organizational culture, 31, 100–102, 144, 156, 205–207, 209 Organizational justice, 106, 168, 192–199, 201–207 distributive justice, 193, 194, 196, 199, 204 interactional justice, 193, 197, 198 procedural justice, 193–196, 199, 204 Organizational misconduct, 5, 18, 25, 27, 28, 86, 165, 166, 205 Organizational support, 18, 166 Organizational wrongdoing, 4, 14, 15, 17, 18, 27–30, 32, 33, 39, 85, 89, 103, 140, 155, 156, 166, 184, 192, 194, 202, 205, 206

250 

INDEX

P Panama Papers, 1, 1n1, 10 Pedzinski, Allison, 67–68, 117, 124, 139, 143, 148, 152 Personal troubles, 13–18, 43, 50, 78, 107, 113, 137, 155, 166, 178, 181, 184, 186, 191, 192, 202, 204, 208 Phakoe, Moss, 75, 77–78 Physical retaliation, 119–120 Platform to Protect Whistleblowers in Africa, 72, 74, 202 Policy whistleblowing, 85 Politics of truth, 13, 14, 18 Power relationships, 105, 138 Privacy, 7, 8, 172 Private sector, 50, 78, 172 Progressive behaviors, 201 Prosocial Organizational Behavior, 84, 88–90, 95, 96, 107 Protect, 11, 72, 74, 202 Protected Disclosures Act, 12, 49, 50, 59–72, 78, 121, 170, 171 Protected Disclosures Amendment Act, 13 Public interest, 2, 14, 16, 17, 36, 39–43, 50, 98, 145, 161, 170, 174, 180, 183, 186, 205, 209 Public issues, 13–18, 42, 43, 50, 78, 113, 130, 132, 138, 151, 155, 161, 165, 166, 168, 184, 186, 191, 192, 202, 204, 205, 208, 209 Public sector, 78, 118, 141, 154, 171 Public whistleblowing, 5, 33–35, 175

Q Qui tam system, 25, 180 R Reactionary response to whistleblowing, 114, 115 Reasonable Belief Approach, 172, 173 Recipients, 16, 27, 33–35, 37, 38, 42, 97, 106, 144–145, 152, 153, 155, 157–160, 173, 175, 176, 182, 184, 194, 196, 197 Reputation, 15, 17, 18, 28, 76, 86, 106, 114, 116, 126, 127, 129, 137, 146, 147, 150, 153, 166, 173, 179, 186, 192, 198, 199, 202, 205 Resilience, 17, 86, 131, 193, 200–202, 204, 208 Resource dependence theory, 152 Retaliation, 5, 14–16, 18, 32–34, 36, 42, 74, 83, 87, 90, 96, 97, 103, 106, 107, 113, 116–121, 123, 125, 127–130, 137–152, 154, 155, 158, 160, 161, 165, 166, 168–170, 173–179, 181, 184–186, 191, 192, 194, 195, 197–199, 202, 204, 208 stages, 52, 87, 116, 128 Reverse onus, 178 Reward, 5, 25, 38, 40, 99, 144, 146, 159, 168, 174, 179–181, 191, 205 Rodchenkov, Grigory, 10 Role-prescribed whistleblowers, 5, 16, 31–32, 42, 152

 INDEX 

251

S Santoro, Daniele, 3, 36, 174 Setlai, Tatolo, 65–66, 141 Snowden, Edward, 1–5, 7–9, 16, 26–30, 32, 34, 35, 39, 40, 42 Social justice, 192, 194, 209 Social retaliation, 118–119 Sociological imagination, 4, 13–15, 18, 113, 207, 208 Sociology of tragedy, 165, 166 Soltes, Kristian, 172, 173 Specific Offense Approach, 173 Spillover retaliation, 175 State capture, 50, 72–75, 78, 143, 172, 191 Status, 7, 29, 32, 35, 38, 96, 99, 114, 126, 128, 138–140, 143, 145, 166 Stepanova, Yuliya, 9 Strong whistleblowing, 34, 141 Structural model, 168, 181–186, 194

Trust, 17, 30, 53, 62, 63, 67, 100, 106, 124, 137, 144, 148, 150, 158, 167, 179, 193, 204 Tshishonga, Mike, 63–64, 118, 125, 149 Tshitangano, Solly, 70–72, 127

T Thakur, Cherese, 169–171, 174, 178, 183 Theory of Reasoned Action, 84, 89–90, 95, 99, 104, 107 actual control, 90, 106 attitude, 5, 89, 95, 96, 100, 104, 106, 160 behavioral beliefs, 89, 95, 99, 100 perceived behavioral control, 90, 104–107, 160 perceived norm, 89, 99, 100 Transformative response to whistleblowing, 6, 114, 115 Transparency International, 167, 169, 171, 176, 178, 182, 183, 185

W Waiver of liability, 169 Weak whistleblowing, 34 Wellbeing, 17, 41, 88, 103, 114, 122, 140, 150, 152, 153, 155, 200, 201, 203 Wenliang, Li, 11 Whistleblower credibility, 11, 97, 100, 115, 116, 121, 123, 124, 129, 139, 145, 147, 149, 152, 159, 161, 174, 180, 194, 198, 206 persistence, 141 protection, 131, 155, 161, 167, 168, 168n1, 172, 175, 181–186, 208

U Ukraine whistleblower, 10 V van Eeden, Pieter, 59–60, 140, 148 Vandekerckhove, Wim, 34, 40, 104, 160, 161, 166, 175, 176, 182, 196, 197, 204 Victimization, 17, 32, 65, 67, 116, 143, 169–170, 173, 176, 178, 179, 183, 185 Voice, 79, 83–87, 104, 195

252 

INDEX

Whistleblower (Cont.) responses to retaliation, 126–131 suffering, 4, 18, 29, 121, 123, 141, 150, 174, 177, 179 support, 18, 202, 208 Whistleblowing channels, 142 intentions, 84, 91–93, 102, 103 procedures, 18, 37, 157, 160, 183, 185, 194, 196, 204 WikiLeaks, 1, 6, 26, 34, 35n1

Witness protection, 58, 119, 169–170 Work-related retaliation, 116 Wrongdoing, 4–6, 14–18, 26–32, 34–42, 49, 61, 62, 64, 65, 71, 78, 84, 85, 87–90, 92–103, 105–107, 113–115, 117–120, 123, 125, 126, 128, 129, 131, 138–140, 142–145, 148, 150–161, 165–173, 175–186, 191, 192, 194–199, 202, 204–209