What's the Meaning of "This''?: A Puzzle about Demonstrative Belief 9781501741074

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What's the Meaning of 'This''?

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David

F.

Austin

What's the Meaning of

A

''This''?

Puzzle about Demonstrative Belief

Cornell University Press

ITHACA AND LONDON

Copyright

©

1990 by Cornell University

All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or

parts thereof,

must not be reproduced

in

any form without permission

in

writing from the publisher. For information, address Cornell University Press, 124 Roberts Place, Ithaca,

First

New

York 14850.

published 1990 by Cornell University Press.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Austin, David

F., 1952What's the meaning of "this"? David F. Austin, cm. p.

:

a puzzle about demonstrative belief

/

Includes bibliographical references.

ISBN 0-8014-2409-7 2. Proposition 1. Belief and doubt. 121 '.6 dc20 BD215.A97 1990

—

(Logic)

I.

Title.

89-22110

Printed in the United States of America

S The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials 739.48-1984.

For

S.

Milton Jones,

who gave me such

my first

philosophy teacher,

a good start with

all this

Contents

Preface

1.

ix

Introducing Individual Propositions

i

Propositions

i

Propositions: Purely Qualitative

Kripke's

Modal Objection: What

and Individual Aristotle Could Not

3

Have Been Messy Shopper and Lewis's Two Gods

9

Perry's

2.

3.

11

Getting Rid of Individual Propositions? The Augmented Messy Shopper The Two Tubes Case The Examples Made Parallel

16 16

20 25

Why

Puzzling Pierre Does Not Suffice

27

Have

We

31

It's

Just

Gotten Rid of Individual Propositions?

Me Now:

Schiffer's

Schiffer

on

Belief

32

View

33

Pay Attention! Loaring the

36

Boom

38

Being There

41

and Sense Data Modal Objection

Russell

51

A

54 vii

Contents

4.

Rigid Belief Transformed: Plantinga and

Ackerman

on Essences

56

Plantinga's Proposal

57

Transformed Essences and the

The Greater Ignorance

5.

Two Tubes

Puzzle

of Smith: First Objection

59 61

Smith's Otherworldly Ignorance: Second Objection

62

Ackerman' s Essences

67

Believing Less by Believing More: Stalnaker and the Defeat of Belief

73

Possible Worlds, Propositions,

and Pragmahcs

Diagonalizing Assertions

The Persistence

77

of the Puzzle

83

Diagonalization and Demonstrative Belief

84

Eye Got Here First Believing Too Much by Believing More Diagonalizing Everywhere Interpretive Doubts: The Iceman Cometh

88

An

Unacceptable Counterintuitiveness?

Postscript: Stalnaker

Two

90 91 93

97

and Hintikka on Propositional

Identity 6.

74

99

Nontraditional Analyses of Belief:

Self-Attribution

and Character

Chisholm: All Belief

Lewis on

Belief

103

Is Self-Attributive

103

and the Two Tubes Puzzle

110

Three Terms Suffice

112

Kaplan's Unhelpful Character

115

Postscript:

Why

the Puzzle

Remains a Puzzle

Appendix: Must We Say What He Believes? On Semantics and Pragmatics in Belief Attribution Some Hard Data The Incorrectness of Russell and Frege Sensitive

and

149

151

of Belief

Vlll

143 144

Insensitive Attribution: Triadic Analyses

The Sensitivities of Richard The Insensitivities of the Naive View and Soames Chaos and Contextualism

Bibhography Index

135

152 of

Salmon i55

159

161

169

Preface

This book

is

intended to help readers understand one impor-

tant philosophical problem.

The problem concerns

and remind and clear and simple as I could make it, to nonspecialists and to graduate belief

sides at the intersection of contemporary philosophy of

language. The exposition, as is

intended to be accessible

who are just beginning their study of these specialties. used an earlier version of the book in a senior seminar and found that a fair portion of the material can be understood by bright, highly motivated undergraduates. I have also presented much of this material to specialist audiences and have found that my approach clarifies the problem significantly. Here, in outline, is what I have to say. Recent literature on philosophy of mind and language develops a variety of examples that raise serious problems for the traditionstudents

I

al

analysis of belief (and the other so-called propositional attitudes)

as a two- term relation

between

a believer

and

a proposition.

The

best-known examples involve beliefs typically expressed through use of the indexicals 'T' and ''now" (Kaplan 1977; Perry 1979; Lewis 1983a) or proper names (Kripke 1979). Because of the attractiveness of the traditional analysis and the initial absence of any clear alternative, the puzzles raised by these examples are ix

Preface

My purpose here is to provide a critical test case for any

genuine.

theory of propositional attitudes by presenting

(in

Chapter

2) a

puzzle about beliefs typically expressed using demonstratives

and

to convince the reader that "the puzzle

is a puzzle" (Kripke Because this puzzle can equally well be construed as a 1979, 239). puzzle about beliefs typically expressed using proper names, it may also be viewed as a sharpened version of Kripke's puzzle.

Adding

a puzzle about demonstrative belief

will help to highlight similarities

and

is

also useful since

differences

among

it

the three

types of puzzles and to guide us in the search for a comprehensive solution.

In the

first

section of Chapter

sitional analysis of belief.

I

1, 1

outline the traditional, propo-

then introduce the powerful intuitions

that underlie Saul Kripke's

modal and epistemic arguments

for

the 'directly referential' nature of proper names, indexicals, and

demonstratives. Using examples given by Kripke, John Perry,

and David Lewis, belief.

two

I

indicate the application of these intuitions to

So applied, the intuitions suggest a distinction between

sorts of propositions: purely qualitative

thesis suggested

is

and

individual.

The

that a straightforward account of the intuitions

promised only by an analysis that incorporates individual propproper names, indexicals, or demonstratives are to be analyzed as relating the believer to just such a proposition, true only in those situations where the very entity that may be referred to exists and has the attributed is

ositions: beliefs typically expressed using

property.

Chapter 2 presents the central example of the book, the Two Tubes case. I use it to show, in this chapter and the succeeding ones, that the promise of individual propositions is bound to be broken. Since propositions must be either individual or purely qualitative,

we must

therefore reject the traditional, two-termed

analysis of propositional attitudes

if

we

are to remain faithful to

1. The case constitutes a genuine countwo assumptions hold: (A) it is possible for a believer to believe an individual proposition with a contingent thing other than himself as a constituent; and (B) the believer in the Two Tubes case is in optimal conditions for believing an indi-

the intuitions of Chapter

terexample only

if

vidual proposition with a contingent thing as subject constituent.

X

Preface

however, a few theorists who attempt to save the by rejecting one or another of these assumpin Chapters 3-6, I provide a critical assessment of their

There

are,

traditional analysis tions;

views.

Chapter 3 begins with a discussion of Stephen Schiffer's views belief, as they are presented in his paper "The Basis of Reference/' He proposes to reject assumption (A) and recommends the

on

strategy of restricting the possible contingent constituents of indi-

vidual propositions to those that can be referred to or thought

about using the indexicals "I" or "now."

I

argue that Schiffer

may

need, in conflict with his stated aims, to allow demonstrative

about incorrigibly

belief either

known

visual field locations or

about nonexistent or incomplete objects. The problem that he faces in accounting for simple perceptual beliefs

same

is

virtually the

which prompted Russell to introduce sense data as objects of acquaintance, and I discuss a sense data solution to the Two Tubes Puzzle. Finally, I observe that the strategy built on a rejection of (A) is bound to run afoul of the powerful modal as that

intuitions of

Chapter

1.

Chapter 4 introduces the essence views of Alvin Plantinga and Ackerman, which may be seen as attempts to solve this just-mentioned modal difficulty. They agree that proper names Felicia

and demonstratives express individual essences referred

to.

of the objects

Plantinga' s proposal conflicts with the epistemic intu-

Chapter 1. Using an analogue of the Two Tubes case, I argue that he may also be unable to say which essences are initions of

Ackerman' s proposal respects both the modal and the epistemic intuitions of Chapter 1, but has several serious problems, which she herself points out. Among them are these: it is logically impossible that the two believers believe the same proposition (belief is 'essentially private'); it is logically impossible that one believer believe the same proposition at two

volved in our

beliefs.

different times (belief

Chapter 3 considers sis of

is

'ephemeral').

how one might

save the traditional analy-

propositional attitudes by rejecting assumption (B) of the

Two Tubes many, and Stalnaker.

Puzzle. This appears to be the course favored by it

A

finds an eloquent

and

forceful advocate in Robert

simple modification of the

Two Tubes

case provides xi

Preface

a

paradigm of

belief persistence that,

however, his strategy can-

not accommodate. His strategy therefore gives a strongly counterintuitive account of cognitive

dynamics, making

it

possible to

more in just those circumstances where one would expect retention of belief. Chapter 6 turns to (allegedly) nontraditional analyses of belief: Roderick Chisholm's and David Lewis's self-attributive analyses and the triadic account suggested by what David Kaplan writes in believe less

by believing

"Demonstratives.''

more than

I

observe that self-attributive analyses are

little

and so heir to all its defects. The account suggested by what Kaplan writes is either clearly refuted by the Two Tubes case or is lacking in crucial notational variants of Schiffer's view

details required for a solution to the puzzle.

In the Postscript,

give a comparative assessment of ap-

I

Two Tubes Puzzle, and I place it in by pointing out the puzzle's similarities to the

proaches to resolving the historical context

'problem of sense data'

(as

it

bedevils direct realism in the theory

of perception). Correlatively,

I

indicate the bearing of

Meth-

odological Solipsism on future attempts to solve the puzzle.

conclusion

is

that although the puzzle remains a puzzle,

it

My

gives

us reason to supplement, rather than completely to abandon, the

use of propositions in the analysis of thought; and

supplementing solution must do tions of Chapter i. In the Appendix,

I

briefly discuss

culties facing theorists

and third-person

to

remain

some

I

say what a

faithful to the intui-

of the additional diffi-

who attempt to devise a semantics for first-

belief attribution. After giving a bit of back-

recent work that presupposes a Naive view defended by Nathan Salmon and Scott Soames and the complex views of Mark Richard. I offer a partial assessment of these proposals using the

ground,

I

concentrate on

some

triadic analysis of belief: the

Two Tubes needs

to

case

and

its

variants, indicating

where further work

be done.

The reader

will find

no solution

to the

puzzle proposed here.

I

go no further than offering a clear statement of the problem, adding a few suggestions about constraints on a solution. Nor do I attempt a comprehensive survey of all, or even all the best, theories of belief that might reasonably be applied to solve the xii

Preface

puzzle. 1 Instead, clearest

I

discuss

what

I

believe to be the best

views that address the puzzle 2. Absent from even

at its three

stated in Chapter

and

main points

this restricted

survey

is

any discussion of avowedly and essentially functionalist theories of belief. I have found no such theory to be as clearly formulated as those theories I do discuss. I also note that functionalism has been repudiated by one of its originators (Putnam 1988), and a refutation of it has been given which I find conclusive (Kripke 1984).

Although

I

my focus linguistically, by refermy concern here is with the beliefs

have characterized

ring to certain parts of speech,

typically expressed using those terms linguistic

mechanisms involved

One moral

that

and not primarily with the

in their

thought or expression.

might plausibly be drawn from

this

book

is

that

extremely detailed attention will have to be given to the nature of

such mechanisms

if

there

is

solving the puzzles, but this

philosophy of attention. (For

ever to be any real progress is

my

in

and I do not undertake that detailed an excellent example of the necessary level of de-

linguistics,

see Levin 1981). So, for the sake of simplicity,

tail,

made

not an essay in formal semantics or

I

usually re-

by the simplest subjectpredicate sentences. There are problems enough, and deep enough, raised by these examples. Furthermore, in Chapters 1-6 and the Postscript, I assiduously avoid the problems raised by third-person belief attributions (see Kripke 1979, 251-252; and the Appendix). Every puzzle I want to focus on is expressible using first-person belief sentences ('T believe that p"), although I occasionally depart from this restriction strict

attention to beliefs expressed

for the sake of

Finally,

I

convenience or

stylistic variety.

should note that beliefs typically expressed using

proper names, demonstratives, or indexicals (or some subset thereof) are taken re,

and some

called

is

by some philosophers as paradigms of belief de and labyrinthine literature on belief so-

of the vast

certainly relevant here. But

particularly regret that

my

inability to

leaves

me unable

(1982)

and Christopher Peacocke

to discuss the

work

it

is

not

my goal to guide

the

understand what they have written Evans

of the British Neo-Fressellians Gareth

(1983).

xiii

Preface

reader through that labyrinth.

What I want

to say can,

I

think, be

said without ever again using the term ''belief de re." So the use of

my last use of

it in this book (although the term be mentioned in quotations from other authors).

it

here will be

Professor Manifold, visiting Great University, the proof of a theorem

was obvious.

claimed,

and had

A member

was sketching

lemma;

just stated a

may

its

proof, he

of the audience interrupted,

objecting that the proof was not at all obvious. They argued for a while and then stepped outside, where they continued their dis-

cussion for another twenty minutes.

was

When

they returned, the

"He was right," the objector said. "It was obvious, after all." I hope that after a reader completes this book, a great deal of it will have become obvious, after all. objector

During

many

my

quite chagrined:

years of

work on

this

book,

I

have learned from

people about the topics treated here, and

acknowledge

their help.

I

it is

a pleasure to

proceed from the specific to the

general.

Chapters

i

and 2 benefited

in clarity

from detailed comments

provided by William R. Carter and David Auerbach.

Wayne Backman and Harold Levin enabled improve several sections of Chapter 3. Letters from Joseph Mendola and Max Cresswell reassured me that the arguments of the chapter were worth extended treatment. Albert Casuilo and Stephen Schiffer were helpful correspondents. A version of Chapter 4 was published in the Notre Dame Journal Formal Logic 24 (January 1983), under the title "Plantinga's Theof ory of Proper Names," and I am grateful for permission to use portions of it here. An earlier version of that paper was presented to the Herbert Heidelberger Task Force on Propositional Attitudes. Alvin Plantinga was very encouraging. Discussion and correspondence with Felicia Ackerman helped me to understand Discussions with

me

to

her views.

The main arguments

5 were discussed at a meeting on Content, a biweekly discussion mind and language held at the National

of

Chapter

of the Triangle Conference

group on philosophy of Humanities Center during the academic year 1983-84. (The group's other members were Wayne Backman, Lynne Rudder Baker, Alan Berger, Michael Ferejohn, Robert Hambourger, xiv

Preface

Harold Levin, William Lycan, Jonathan Malino, and David Sanford.) That discussion prompted me to add "Believing Too Much by Believing More" to the chapter. Conversation with Wayne Backman and Robert Hambourger further clarified the arguments. When I gave talks based on the chapter, Richard Feldman, Bernard Kobes, Hugues LeBlanc, Ralf Meerbote, and Thomas McKay asked helpful questions. Robert Stalnaker and David Lewis were generous with assistance in correspondence and Igal Kvart,

conversation.

A letter Postscript,

from David Lewis was important

and

I

am

to

Chapter 6 and the

very grateful to him for permission to repro-

duce a portion of that letter here. A discussion with him prevented me from making an error in Chapter 3 and aided me in writing the Appendix. Discussions with Thomas Blackson, Harold Levin, and Joseph Levine led to significant improvements in the last section of Chapter 6. Responding to the comments of one of the publisher's anonymous readers made the arguments of Chapters 3, 4, and 3 clearer. With amazing speed, Takashi Yagisawa provided me with helpful comments on the entire penultimate draft. I completed that and the final draft after moving to North Carolina State University.

My department head,

Robert Bryan,

who

is

retiring after

I and my good academic home, and I thank him for building it and maintaining it in such good repair. William Lycan and Lynne Baker have been valued philosophical companions since 1980. I hope they have lost track of the number of times that they have heard me describe the Two Tubes case and its variants. I assure them that the number is at most denumerable, and I thank them for their patience and encourage-

twenty-three years of superb service, has seen to

it

that

colleagues have a

ment.

The

book was adopted because I had Gareth Matthews' s practical wisdom and philo-

overall structure of this

the benefit of

sophical insight. I

thank the National Endowment

for

Humanities

for a fellow-

ship during 1987-88. The research that the fellowship sible led to significant revisions in

and

and extensions

made

fea-

of Chapters 3

6.

There are

six

philosophers

who

deserve special thanks: XV

Had

it

Preface

not been for encouragement given by Nathan Salmon and Scott

Soames,

would not have attempted

I

work. As

to publish this

publishers' readers of the penultimate draft, they gave

the most helpful criticism that

shared an

office

with

me

while

I

I

was writing

ing with him, then and since, has better than

it

some

of

have ever seen. Earl Conee the

first draft.

made each and every

would otherwise have been. I have had

of discussing triadic accounts of belief with

one of

Talk-

chapter

the privilege

their

most able

Richard. Our many talks about have been important to my understanding of the virtues and defects of contemporary work. Herbert Heidelberger's death deprived me of a good friend and a much-valued teacher, and it deprived philosophy of an extremely

and

creative proponents,

belief

and

Mark

belief attribution

able practitioner.

A

significant portion of this work's content at-

tained form in seminars and discussions with him.

Had Herb many

lived, he might well have given us satisfactory solutions to

puzzles about

The

belief, the

greatest debt of

teacher

Edmund

Two Tubes

all,

penetrating philosophers

is owed to my friend and one of the sharpest and most have ever known; there are very few

He

Gettier. I

Puzzle included.

however, is

good at the detailed, searching criticism that is a necessary prolegomenon to philosophical progress. More than anyone else, he taught me how philosophy ought to be done. Whatever is good in this book is so largely because of what I learned from as

him.

As do

one has exacted a considerable toll from the author's family. My wife, Candice Ward, has been more supportive than I had any right to hope she would be, and more tolerant than she should have been. Her expert advice on stylistic matters has been invaluable. Our daughter, Alexandra AustinWard, helped me to gain and keep a healthier perspective on

many

all

such projects,

this

important things, work included.

Finally,

I

add

a note that,

though not an acknowledgment

for

help, nevertheless deserves to be here rather than buried in a

Given the naturalness of the requirements that generate the book's central example, it had surprised me that the same thing had not been devised by others as well: if one seeks a footnote.

puzzle case involving simultaneously held, logically consistent, xvi

Preface

occurrent, demonstrative beliefs that result from direct visual perception, one

is

virtually forced to the

checking references for the

Rosenkrantz had in

fact

Two Tubes

final draft,

I

independently devised a case

the central one of this book. Although he and quite differently, the example itself rant a sharing of credit,

example. While

discovered that Gary

and

this

I

is

am

I

see

its

much

S.

like

significance

important enough to warglad to do.

David

F.

Austin

Durham, North Carolina

xvii

What's the Meaning of

''This''?

A

CHAPTER ONE

Introducing Individual Propositions

The time has come,

the author said, to talk of propositional

things.

Propositions

One

of the earliest

osition

is

found

modern

in Bertrand Russell's ''Meinong's

plexes and Assumptions,"

and G.

E.

descriptions of the notion of a prop-

Moore with

where Russell

a similar notion:

That every presentation and every than

pen

itself

to

Theory of ComMeinong,

credits Frege,

belief

must have an

object other

and, except in certain cases where mental existents hap-

be concerned, extra-mental; that what

perception has as

its

object

enters as a constituent that

an

is

commonly

called

which concerned, and not

existential proposition, into

whose

existence

is

the idea of this existent; that truth and falsehood apply not to beliefs,

but to their objects; and that the object of a thought, even

when

this object does not exist, has a Being which is in no way dependent upon its being an object of thought: all these are theses which, though generally rejected, can nevertheless be supported by arguments which deserve at least a refutation. (Russell 1973, 21) 1

What's the Meaning of "This"?

The hardiness

of the notion, at least,

is

attested to

by

its

survival,

largely intact, during the eighty-four years since Russell wrote.

Echoing the essentials of what John Perry (1979) has called "the doctrine of propositions,'' Robert Stalnaker writes.

assume that O'Leary's believing between the man O'Leary and an abstract object call it a proposition which is denoted by the expression that pigs can fly. To make this assumption is not to say very much about what sort of things propositions are: they might be complexes made up of concepts and objects, sentences of some at least initially plausible to

It is

that pigs can fly

is

a relation

—

ideal

—

language of thought, equivalence classes of sentence tokens,

functions from possible worlds into truth values. The doctrine is

independent of the

propositional objects;

all

that

is

essential

is

.

.

.

about the nature of

details of one's theory

that propositions

have

truth values that

do not vary from time

place to place.

propositions are identified with sentences or mean-

If

ings of sentences, they eternal sentences.

If

must be

person to person, or

to time,

eternal sentences, or

meanings of

propositions are identified with functions tak-

ing truth and falsity as values, they must take possible worlds as

arguments, and not indices that may have different values in same world. The received doctrine may be summed up in two theses: 1. Belief is a relation between an animate subject and an abstract object which we will call, without prejudging its nature, a their

the

proposition. 2.

Propositions have truth values, and their truth values do not

vary with time, place or person. (Stalnaker 1981, 129-130)

Perry adds a third thesis, with which Stalnaker (1981, i49n4) concurs:

The

third [thesis] has to

tions].

It is

do with how we individuate

necessary, for that S and that

S' to

.

.

.

[proposi-

be the same, that they

have the same truth-value. But it is not sufficient, for that the sea is and that milk is white are not the same proposition. It is necessary that they have the same truth condition, in the sense that they

salty

attribute to the

same

objects the

sufficient, for that Atlanta

is

same

relation.

the capital of Georgia

capital of the largest state east of the Mississippi are

sition.

[Jimmy] Carter,

second. 2

.

.

.

it

But

and

is

the

not the same propo-

seems, might believe the

[P]ropositions

this is also not

that Atlanta

must be individuated

first

in a

but not the

more

"fine-

Introducing Individual Propositions

grained"

way than

is

provided by truth-value or the notion of truth

conditions employed above. (Perry 1979, 6)

Just hov^ fine-grained the individuation conditions for propositions

must be

agreement that necessary that

examples

a subject of

Chapter 2 which suggest that the converse

in

but the issue I w^ill

some dispute, but there is w^ide for propositions p and q, p = q only if it is logically p is true if and only if q is true. (We v^ill see

is

is

not one that

assume the

sitional identity,

when I make

I

attempt to resolve.) In

w^idely accepted necessary condition for propo-

along with the two theses stated by Stalnaker,

use of the notion of proposition.

I

will also

with Russell and other writers, not only that belief relation

between

is false,

v^^hat foUow^s,

a thinking subject

the so-called propositional attitudes

and

is

assume,

a two-term

a proposition, but that

may

also,

according to the

traditional doctrine of propositions, be similarly analyzed. Thus,

O'Leary's knowing that pigs are quadrupeds his bearing the

is

be analyzed as

to

two-term relation knowing to the proposition

pigs are quadrupeds; his

wondering whether pigs can

that

fly is to

be

analyzed as his bearing the relation wondering to the proposition that pigs can fly; his fearing that pigs

can

fly is to

bearing the relation fearing to the proposition

be analyzed as his

that pigs can fly;

and

similarly for disbelieving, hoping, wishing, thinking, consider-

and a

ing, is

variety of other cognitive states.

Although the doctrine

usually taken to apply to nonoccurrent (dispositional) states, as

well as to occurrent states

— so

while he dreams of flying pigs part, involve occurrent belief. tion,

I

will

may

that for example, O'Leary

continue to bear the believing relation to

that pigs are

— my use of

it

quadrupeds

will, for

the most

For the sake of simplicity in exposi-

avoid using the brand of the doctrine that makes

propositions equivalence-classes of uses of sentence tokens

(

per-

haps under the relation "has the same meaning as"); instead, will use the complexes and possible worlds brands.

Propositions: Purely Qualitative

Some philosophers make

and Individual

a significant additional claim

the nature of the objects of belief.

I

They say

that

all

about

such objects

What's the Meaning of "This"?

and deny that they are individual. In the one finds several ways of characterizing the complementary notions of purely qualitative proposition and individual proposition. None of the characterizations is pellucid, but one can get a tolerably clear idea of what is meant by considering several of them, especially in their applications. The most common characterizations of purely qualitative propositions are negative and linguistic, and begin by talking about purely qualitative properties out of which the purely qualitative are purely qualitative literature

propositions are then 'constructed' (or with reference to which their possible

Robert

Adams

worlds truth conditions are given). For example,

...

tive

if

"We might try to capture the idea [of a by saying that a property is purely qualita-

writes,

qualitative property]

and only

if it

could be expressed, in a language

suffi-

ciently rich, without the aid of such referential devices as proper

names, proper adjectives and verbs (such as 'Leibnizian' and 'pegasizes'), indexical expressions, and referential uses of definite descriptions" (1979, 7). The element of idealization here ("language sufficiently rich") and the avoidability of the mentioned linguistic devices are two common features of specifications of purely qualitative properties (see Chisholm 1981, 5-6, 7, 10-11; and Fine 1977a, 128). Adams offers another characterization of the notion that depends on a prior understanding of a certain sort of noTiqualitative property, which he calls a "thisness":

A thisness is the property of being identical with a certain particular individual

— not the property that we

with some individual or other, but

all

my

share, of being identical

property of being identical

with me, your property of being identical with you, .

.

.

etc.

another and possibly more illuminating approach [other than

the linguistic one quoted above] to the definition of 'suchness' this].^ All

[is

properties that are, in certain senses general (capable of

being possessed by different individuals) and nonrelational are suchnesses.

More

precisely, let us say that a basic suchness

erty that satisfies the following three conditions. (1)

ness and

is

related in

one way or another

1

"Suchness"

4

not equivalent to one.

is

Adams's term

to

(2) It is

It is

is

a prop-

not a this-

not a property of being

one or more particular individuals

for purely qualitative property.

Introducing Individual Propositions

(or

to

house

This

thisnesses).

their

suchnesses are in a sense at loii

Rose Avenue,

The property

of

some basic owning the

Arbor, Michigan,

is

not a basic

not to deny that

is

relational.

Ann

.

.

.

suchness, although several different individuals have had

cause

it

erty of being a

homeowner

because having

owns.

be-

it,

involves the thisness of that particular house. But the prop-

(3)

it

is

a basic suchness, although relational,

does not depend on which particular

A basic suchness is not a

home one

property of being identical with

way or another to an extensionally defined set that among its members, or among its members' mem-

or related in one

has an individual bers, or

among its members' members' members,

an American

and

places,

to

is

suchness. For structed

must

by

itself

Thus,

if

being

not a basic suchness.

it is

These three conditions may be taken as a suchness, but

etc.

be analyzed as a relation to a set of actual people

it is it

jointly sufficient for

being

not clear that they are also necessary for being a

seems

intuitively that

any property that

con-

is

certain operations out of purely qualitative properties

be purely qualitative. The operations

the construction are of two sorts.

those expressed by erty ascribed to x

'not', 'or',

by

and

(1)

^(3x)(})(

^(3x).

I

will

may

make

On

this view,

and

the just-

aptly be represented by the

the property being mortal:

. The

there. "^ But

latter is Perry's discovery,

"now seeming

what

(2)

< Perry, and

is

to see

expresses being

a

is

a

mess-

discovered only

he learns the additional individual proposition he could express by

after

(3)

I

am

the person

I

now seem

to see over there.

'The precise role of the explanation of action in characterizing belief is not I assume here that it serves only to make the difference in (1) more vivid and carries no heavier theoretical burden.

entirely clear in Perry's essay.

^See Chapter

18

3,

"Being There/' for some discussion of one role of "there."

Getting Rid of Individual Propositions?

Perry makes his discovery by inferring express.

From

nite description (''the is

room enough

person to

room

now seem

I

maneuver

(2)

and

(3)

for

an additional

defi-

to see over there"),

and

for a saving delay in his learn-

< Perry,

ing the individual proposition I

from what

the point of view of the advocate of individual

propositions. Perry's example leaves

that

it

being a mess-maker>

think that this response to Perry exemplifies the best sort of

response available to the advocate of individual propositions. also

response was the

to

ing a mess" could not be the individual proposition a mess-maker>.

It

some embarrassing questions. Part of the claim that what Perry expressed by "he is mak-

opens the door

But what

< Perry,

being

about the circumstances of Perry's

is it

assertion that necessarily prevents Perry from believing that indi-

vidual proposition then? Are there

some

stringent necessary con-

ditions for the apprehension of individual propositions that Perry fails to

meet?

If

so,

what

are they? Presumably, Perry can in

circumstances express the individual proposition

mess-maker> by asserting "he

is

making

a mess."^

< Perry,

some

being a

What is it about Anyone who

the mirror case that prevents his doing that there?

wishes

to claim that

is trickier

questions.

coming

to believe

an individual proposition

than Perry seems to think owes us an answer to these

What would be most

desirable

is

a clear statement of

necessary and sufficient conditions under which a believer ap-

prehends a given individual proposition. I

The embarrassthey did was to bring

said that these questions are embarrassing.

ment would not be

terribly significant

if all

our attention to a gap in the view of the advocate of individual propositions. will

Gaps can sometimes be

next present a

filled satisfactorily,

but

I

To help show this, I puzzle about demonstrative belief and beliefs ex-

argue that this gap cannot be so

pressed using proper names. ^

I

filled.

will return to indexical belief later

in the chapter.

^For a theory that denies 3,

this,

see the discussion of Schiffer's theory, in Chapter

below.

'^In view of the fact that there are puzzles about demonstrative belief and beliefs expressed using proper names that are parallel to those involving indexical belief, it is perhaps misleading to speak of "the problem of the essential indexical." See

also Boer

and Lycan

1980.

19

What's the Meaning of "This"?

The Two Tubes Case Smith

is

the subject of a psychological experiment designed to

test his ability to focus his

eyes independently of each other.

He

and he has developed this ability to perfection, having spent hundreds of hours working at the microscope, one eye on the objective, the other on the paper where he draws what he sees. The experimental apparatus consists of a large, opaque screen with two small eye holes in it. Two tubes lead from the eye holes and can be oriented in a large number of direcis

a medical student,

tions to point at a uniformly red, uniformly illuminated sheet

of plastic in front of the screen. Smith

is

to look

through the

tubes simultaneously and to report what he sees as he focuses his

He is familiar with the apparatus and knows know how the tubes are oriented. At noon on the

eyes independently. that he does not

day of the experiment. Smith steps up to the screen and looks through the tubes simultaneously, taking no notice of how his eyes are in fact oriented and focusing his eyes independently. What he sees through his right eye is a circular red spot, which he dubs "this/' what he sees through his left eye is a precisely similar circular red spot, which he dubs "that."5 Because Smith is focusing his eyes independently, he does not have one, unified visual field, with right and left halves; rather, he has two, independent visual fields and at the center of each he sees a red spot.^ He thinks to himself,

(4) this is

A

red and that

is

red.

somewhat pedantic and cautious person, he

also thinks to

himself,

(5) this

=

this

and

that

=

that,

suppose Smith uses both "this" and "that" for convenience. We could conan equally useful but harder to state puzzle case by supposing that Smith uses two tokens of the syntactic type "this" (or "that"), or even that he makes two uses of one token of the type "this" (or "that") in his dubbings. ^The assumption that Smith has two independent visual fields will be of some importance for the discussion of Schiffer's view in Chapter 3 and for the discussion of Kaplan's suggestion in Chapter 6.

—

struct

20

—

Getting Rid of Individual Propositions?

an expression in part of his belief that what he is seeing exists. Smith does not know how the tubes are oriented and knows that he is ignorant, so he wonders, ''Is this = that?'' When I say he wonders in this way, I mean to be stipulating in part that he neither believes nor disbelieves what he would express by "this = that" or by "this 9^ that." He is, however, confident of the truth of the beliefs he expresses by (4) and (3). Even though Smolens, the sadistic supervising psychologist, has threatened Smith with a fatal electric shock if he (Smith) attempts to report beliefs about how things merely appear to him to be, rather than about how they are. Smith remains confident in his beliefs, a wholly rational attitude, given the optimal perceptual circumstances in which Smith knows himself to be.^ Let us then stipulate in addition that (4) and (5) not only express beliefs of Smith's, but also express propositions that he knows that he knows. To summarize, let us imagine that Smith's interior monologue goes like this: I

know

that

I

know

red and that that

=

that,

=

that or that this

#

that,

this

And

=

that or that this

about

all

is red and that this = this and that that and I know that I do not believe that this and I know that I do not disbelieve that

that this

is

of this.

#

that.

Smith

is

entirely correct; his interior

mono-

logue expresses nothing but truths.

suppose that the tubes are

Finally,

same red I

in fact

pointed at the very

spot.

claimed above that this example would cause trouble for an

advocate of individual propositions; First,

(A)

I

assume

It is

I'll

now

explain

how

it

does.

that

possible that a believer believe an individual proposition

with a contingent thing other than himself as a constituent.

Second,

I

think

it is

mal circumstances may

clear

from the example that Smith is in optiand knowing an individual

for believing

avoid 'Spot of Theseus' worries by imagining that the sheet of red

plastic is in a stasis field (of a sort familiar to readers of science fiction),

permits no change in basic constituents or their intrinsic relations.

suppose

that

Smith knows that the sheet

is

contained in such a

which

We may

field.

21

also

What's the Meaning of "This"? proposition.

He

after

is,

all,

looking straight at the red spot, his

eyes are in perfect condition, the lighting is

an

intelligent

and

reflective

person

optimal perceptual circumstances. tion to believe or

assume

know such an

excellent,

and Smith

that

he

is

in

No one is ever in a better posi-

individual proposition. So

I

also

that

(B) If (A) is true,

then Smith believes the individual proposition he

expresses by "this expresses by "that

Which

is

who knows

= this" and ^ that."

the individual proposition he

individual propositions are expressed by "this

by "that =

that," as

=

this"

and

Smith uses them? They both express the same

individual proposition, representable as the ordered triple consisting of the spot

he sees, the identity

we use we may represent

for the spot,

sees.

If

relation,

and

these facts as follows:

(6)

the proposition that Smith expresses by "this

(7)

the proposition that Smith expresses by "that

same individual

that," as

= this"= = that"= .

Smith uses

it,

expresses the

proposition:

the proposition that Smith expresses by "this

(8)

We

=

also true that "this

It is

and the spot he

for the identity relation,

= that"=

.

therefore have the result that:

(C)

If

Smith believes the individual proposition he expresses by = this" and the individual proposition he expresses by

"this

"that

=

((C)

would

still

"or," in itself

makes (D)

it

It is

he believes the individual proposition he

that," then

expresses by "this

=

that."

express a truth

an odd

result.)

if

the "and" were replaced by an

But Smith's interior monologue

equally clear that not the case that Smith believes the individual proposition

he expresses by 22

"this

=

that."

Getting Rid of Individual Propositions?

=

seems that (D) for.^ The trouble for the advocate of individual propositions is that, on that view, all of (A), (B), (C), and (D) are true. But they are also inconsistent and so can't all be true. Before returning to discussion of Perry's Augmented Messy Shopper and indexical belief, I want to mention one, rather common, possible line of response to the Two Tubes case. (It has often been the first response that I have encountered after presenting the case.) One might try to save individual propositions by using a metalinguistic strategy: Smith does not believe the inAfter

all.

must be

Smith wonders,

true

"Is this

Smith's ignorance

if

that?"

is

to

So

it

be accounted

dividual propositions expressed using the demonstratives "this"

and

"that," but instead believes the metalinguistic propositions

(9) "this

is

red and that

is

red" expresses a true individual

=

that" expresses a true individual

proposition (10) "this

=

and

this

that

proposition

and he wonders

metalinguistically

whether

"this

=

that" ex-

presses a true individual proposition. In the absence of considerable further detail, refute this suggestion.

It is,

it is

not possible to

however, worth indicating,

in a pre-

liminary way, the sort of reply that this kind of response de-

we may suppose that Smith has the metahe could express by (9) and (10), it is clear from the example (I would claim) that he also believes the propositions expressed by the sentences mentioned in (9) and (10). Second, even if we were to grant that the metalinguistic response works in the case as described, we can add a bit to the example to disable this kind of response. (I think that this second reply amounts to a clarification of the first. It doesn't much matter how we count the serves. First, although

linguistic beliefs

replies.)

Assume

that

it

is

possible for a believer to refer to

and

demonstrate the propositions that he or she believes. ^ Let us then ^There are additional problems here. For example. Smith's wondering,

=

that?"

is,

on the view being that

=

that?" But,

^Here, of course,

is

one point

and "Is wonder that. this?"

"Is this

as his wondering, "Is this

=

by hypothesis, Smith knows better than

to

criticized, the

at

same

which additional

detail is

needed before a

refutation can be given.

23

What's the Meaning of "This"? stipulate that

Smith knows that he knows the following metalinthem as he would):

guistic facts (to state

what I dub "this" what I dub "that" = this" expresses the proposition that this = this = that" expresses the proposition that that - that - that" expresses the proposition that this - that

(11) this is

(12) that is (13) "this (14) "that (15) "this

if anyone can ever know such metalinguistic facts. Smith Not only are his perceptual circumstances optimal, as re-

Surely,

does.

corded (This

in (B), above,

is

but so are his 'metalinguistic circumstances'.

a metalinguistic version of (B), above.)

If

we

allow, in

addition, that Smith can demonstrate these individual proposi-

by an appropriate focusing of his mind's eye), then (I would suggest) the problems raised by the Two Tubes case are merely deferred, and not solved. Suppose that Smith says tions (perhaps

(16) this proposition is

expressed by "this = this"

(17) that proposition

expressed by "that = that"

and then wonders original

is

"Is this proposition

problems would recur

in

=

that proposition?"

The

semantic ascent. (This kind of

reply would also seem to render implausible a suggestion made by Heidelberger [1982] which, when applied to this case, would have it that although Smith asserts the individual propositions involved, he does not believe them.^o Clearly, he does both.) I have described the Two Tubes case as an example of demonstrative belief, but it can easily be redescribed as an example of beliefs expressed using proper names. Suppose that Smith dubs what he sees through his right eye "Harold" and dubs what he sees through his left eye "Maude." Then substitute "Harold" for "this" and "Maude" for "that" throughout the original description." lOYYhen 28, 1981,

I last discussed the Two Tubes case with Heidelberger, on December he expressed a strong inclination to adopt instead what we took to be

Stalnaker's view.

'^Unless I put myself in circumstances similar to Smith's, it seems that 1 cannot use "this" and "that" to express his beliefs and his ignorance. But it seems that

24

Getting Rid of Individual Propositions?

The Two Tubes case is designed to necessary and sufficient conditions

satisfy the strictest plausible

for

someone's believing an

individual proposition with a contingent thing other than the believer as a constituent, that

But

if it

succeeds in doing

is, it is

this,

designed

to

individual propositions to give such conditions

above, a gap that cannot be

filled satisfactorily.

concluding that the reply

justified in

mented Messy Shopper on behalf

In order to

make

(B) true.

I

is,

as

claimed

I

We would then be

offered to Perry's

Aug-

of the advocate of individual

propositions, although of the best sort,

The Examples Made

make

then the failure of an advocate of

is

not one that succeeds.

Parallel

clear the parallel

between the problems pre-

sented by these two cases. Perry's and the I'wo Tubes,

out Perry's in the same fashion as

I

did the

will lay

I

Two Tubes case in the

last section.

The that

force of Perry's

it is

tions,

example depends

possible for a believer to learn

in part

some

with the believer as a constituent, in

on an assumption

individual proposi-

much the same way as

one learns individual propositions about others. assumption rather conservatively as follows: (A')

It is

I

will

put this

possible that a believer believe an individual proposition

with the believer as a constituent, where the proposition expressed by the believer in a sentence of the form, a

synonymous

"I

is

not

am f " (or

expression).

seems that one way we could learn individual propositions with others as constituents is by seeing others. In Perry's example, he not only seems to see himself, but he also does see himself in the mirror and comes thereby to have the beliefs described in It

some quite dissimilar circumstances in which I can acquire these names and use them correctly to attribute beliefs to Smith. I defer consideration of problems raised by third-person belief attribution until the Appendix, where 1 provide a brief introduction to some recent work on the semantics and pragmatics of belief attribution. I do assume, however, that even if there are two causal chains involved, (say, one for "this" and another for "Harold"), they can share an initial segment, in a dubbing situation. there are

25

What's the Meaning of "This"? his example. Because of

some contingent facts about human

eyes.

Perry's seeing himself as he does requires a device that changes

the path of the illuminating light rays, but

how

it is

hard to understand

the contingent need to use such a device (for example, mir-

rors or lenses) could reduce the effectiveness of the example.

example could be eliminated if we were to indulge in a bit of science fiction and suppose that the believer in the example has his eyes on long stalks so that he can use his eyes to view himself more directly. 12 So, as in the Two Tubes case, the believer seems to be in optimal conditions for learning the rele-

Even

this feature of the

vant individual proposition: (B') If (A') is true,

then Perry believes the individual proposition he

expresses by "he

is

making

a mess."

Since the individual proposition Perry expresses by "he a mess'' "I

is

just the individual proposition expressed

am making (C)

a mess,"

we

by

is

making

his use of

have:

If

Perry believes the individual proposition he expresses by "he

is

making

a

mess," then Perry believes the individual proposi-

he expresses by

tion

"I

am making

a mess."

is, when Perry sees himself in the mirror, he has thereby made Perry's discovery. But it is equally clear from the example that when he first sees himself in the mirror,

That

(D') Perry

by

Again,

it

"I

does not believe the individual proposition he expresses

am making

a mess."

would seem

that (D')

must be held

advocate of individual propositions

why

Perry then

to straighten

up

fails to

if

stop pushing his cart

his sugar sack. But not

all

be true by the

to

an account

is

down

to

be given of

the aisle and

of (A'), (B'), (C),

be true since they are inconsistent. To make the parallel between the two examples closer

and

(D') can

^2We may also suppose that the stalk-eyed believers one ever sees both of anyone's eye stalks.

26

live in a

still,

we

world where no

Getting Rid of Individual Propositions?

might have Perry consider the propositions he'd express by "I = I," "he = he," and "I = he" (or grammatical variants thereof). According to the advocate of individual propositions, the same belief is expressed thrice over. But that's wrong. Again, a strategy of semantic ascent

would be no help

for reasons precisely parallel

to those discussed in the last section.

Why

Puzzling Pierre Does Not Suffice

In case

you have not yet met him,

let

me

introduce you to the

world's greatest logician. Puzzling Pierre (Kripke 1979). He was raised as a monolingual French speaker, and although not geographically omniscient, he has

amassed

a great deal of informa-

London and has come to believe, as he often puts it, est jolie." Soon after his twenty-fifth birthday (when he is

tion about

"Londres

height of his powers as a logician), he

kidnapped by the Lakatos Collective and taken to London, where he is confined to a dingy area near the London School of Economics and forced to at the

is

He

participate in degenerating research programs.

learns En-

from the bottom up, so to speak, without translating between it and French. Without abandoning any of his prior geographical beliefs, he comes to believe, as he now puts it, "London is not pretty." Feeling understandably sorry for himself, he thinks, mixing French and English in a single sentence, "London sure isn't pretty, mais Londres est jolie; I sure wish I were in Londres instead." Given the facts of Pierre's situation, and some assumptions about translation and disquotation, we face a genuine glish

puzzle, says Kripke. able to us

and

On

the basis of the linguistic evidence avail-

of Pierre's manifest

French and English,

it

seems

competence as a speaker of

clear that

we

can apply "disquota-

tion" to Pierre's English utterances to get:

(18) Pierre believes that

where the known

is

not pretty,

principle of disquotation to

^^Some of these not

London

at the

which Kripke appeals

details are revealed here for the first time.

time that Kripke wrote

"A Puzzle about

Many

of

is:

them were

Belief."

27

What's the Meaning of "This"?

(DQ)

If (in

a given context) S sincerely, reflectively

and compe-

tently assents to sentence "p", then S believes the proposi-

tion that p (expressed

by "p"

in the context).

(Please excuse the use/mention devastation.) translation of "Londres est jolie"

it

,

With the

seems equally

correct

clear that dis-

quotation yields (19) Pierre believes that

Kripke

never

London

would what is what is

insists that Pierre, as the w^orld's greatest logician,

contradiction in his beliefs pass unnoticed;

let a

expressed by the that-clause in expresses by the that-clause in are

pretty.

is

what

(18)

(19).

does not contradict

But

if

individual propositions

Pierre believes, then his beliefs are contradictory: (18)

expresses ; and (19) expresses ; so individual propositions won't do. How,

we

though, are

Chapter

1

if

to respect the doxastic

what

and modal

intuitions of

Pierre believes are not individual proposi-

tions?i4

Given the economy and ingenuity of this example, is there any need for yet another? After all, one should not multiply examples beyond necessity. A decade of experience with students (graduate and undergraduate), other philosophers (specialists and nonspecialists), and a burgeoning literature on the case ot Puzzling Pierre has convinced me that another example is needed. Here's why. The use of two languages in the Pierre case, and the consequent need to appeal to a principle of translation, have led to some unfortunate commentary. There is a large philosophical literature on translation, and issues concerning it can become quite tangled. Some have denied that translation preserves the meaning of the names "London" and "Londres." The bilingual presentation of the case may also have led some to focus on the very words that Pierre uses in his utterances, proposing that what Pierre really believes are the propositions that what "London" refers i^This

is

not exactly

to present purposes.

28

how

Kripke argues.

I

have adapted (DQ) and the discussion

Getting Rid of Individual Propositions?

and

to is not pretty,

liance

on

what "Londres"

that

refers to

some

a disquotational principle has led

is

The

pretty.

only real issue concerns defeasible linguistic evidence for

person belief

attribution.^^

And

then there

London, a

belief is about, the city of

is

re-

to think that the third-

the thing that the

vast, multipartite entity v^ith

obscure or vague identity conditions: there are more apparent routes of doxastic access

than there are roads

to it

in

provides the friends of qualitative propositions with too say and makes vv^ith

tion.

it

far easier

than

should be

it

This

it.

much

to

for others to get av^ay

vague gestures in the general direction of a possible soluThe appearance of contra dictoriness in Pierre's beliefs

Kripke's insistence to the contrary notwithstanding

some

to claim that the puzzle

ity of

such contradictory

is

— has

led

resolved by denying the possibil-

one might claim

belief. Correlatively,

that Puzzling Pierre's 'cognitive dynamics' are less stable than

somehow lost the belief in (19) when he acquired the belief in (18). And there is a disadvantage in first presenting the puzzle using a name "London" already in common use: it may lead one to think that it is only when the Kripke maintains and that Pierre

—

—

causal chain linking believer to object has exceeded the

segment

in a

dubbing

and the term

situation,

achieved linguistic currency, that the puzzle can I

initial

in question

has

arise.

believe that these attempts to avoid or minimize the puzzle

are in error.

Rather than meet them head on, however,

the following suggestion, which

To

is

as

much

I

offer

pedagogical as philo-

and minimize confusion, let us divide our labors with such puzzles into two (related) parts, one primarily concerning belief and another focusing on belief attribution and communication. In view of the preceding, we then need sophical:

force clarity

a case with the following six features:

i^But notice that Kripke did not entitle his paper tion."

A

correct account of belief attribution

puzzles about

us to the

belief.

It

should be a one-

"A Puzzle about

Belief Attribu-

clearly relevant to solving these

But a proper emphasis on belief attribution should not blind puzzles are equally ones about belief, whether or not they

fact that these

involve beliefs actually attributed by ^^I

is

(i)

offer

no catalogue

alleged errors are fairly

had not been made

someone other than

the believer.

of citations to the allegedly mistaken literature. All these

common, both

in print,

it

would

and in discussion. But even if they be useful to suggest ways of avoiding

in print still

them.

29

What's the Meaning of "This"?

no translation between natural languages between idiolects in a single language, (ii) To defer consideration of problems raised by third-person belief attribution, idiolect case, involving

or even

the case should invoke first-person ('reflexive') belief attribution,

any.

if

(iii)

There should be no apparent contradictoriness in the What the belief is about should be as simple

believer's beliefs, (iv)

as

is feasible,

to help avoid the distractions

engendered by com-

plex objects with obscure or vague identity conditions, (v) doxastic

and epistemic access

be as direct as possible:

direct,

The

of the subject to the object should

unmediated,!^ visual contact. This

feature will help to emphasize the fact that puzzles aplenty arise

even

in a paradigmatic

dubbing situation and

dal intuition to operate at obviously

full

will allow the

strength.

I

contact so that advocates of the Primacy of the Visual I

mo-

choose visual

may join in;

confine attention to the visual sense to avoid questions about

whether

different senses, say, vision

different relevant information.

and touch,

(vi)

yield essentially

Issues concerning differ-

may

also dis-

belief, stable

and per-

ences between occurrent and dispositional belief tract,

so

let

us seek obviously occurrent

throughout any period of time in the example. Each of these six features will help to give a puzzle case the sharpness needed to force real clarity in any proposed solution. These requirements are rather stringent and they are well met in the Two Tubes example. 20 That is why I add it to the extant sistent

—

stock of examples. 21

1^1

use these terms in their colloquial senses, without a great deal of philosophiI take up loaded senses in Chapter 3. thus seek to stay clear of the Molyneux Question.

cal loading.

i^In the version of the

Two Tubes example

described in this chapter, this re-

vacuously since all the relevant beliefs are held simultaneously, at noon on the day of the experiment. In Chapter 5, I present a persistence version of the example in which such stability and persistence are (nonvacuously)

quirement

is

satisfied

important features. 20Some, but not all, of these six requirements are met in Kripke's Paderewski case (Kripke 1979). The Two Tubes example was concocted independently of Kripke's examples; it is a descendant of puzzle cases devised by Edmund Gettier in 1976 before he or I had heard of Kripke's examples. It is similarly independent of the Bugsy Wabbit case (Salmon 1986). See also the Preface. 21A modest modification to the Two Tubes example yields a clear case of what Kvart has called "divided reference" (Kvart 1989): Suppose that the tubes

Igal

30

Getting Rid of Individual Propositions?

Have

We

Gotten Rid of Individual Propositions?

Let's briefly consider

we

how

things stand now. In the

flrst

chap-

arguments and examples to between a believer and a purely qualitative proposition. Perhaps no knockdown proof was given, but the arguments and examples were very persuasive. As a way of saving the view that belief is nevertheless a two-term relation between believers and propositions, ter,

show

it

took a close look

at several

that not every belief consists in a two-term relation

was suggested

that

some

beliefs,

those typically expressed

using indexicals, demonstratives, or proper names, are relations to individual propositions. 22 In this chapter,

developed

to

help

show

either. If propositions

two examples were

that individual propositions

must be

won't do,

either qualitative or individual, the

would then suggest that belief is between a person and a proposition; this

considerations of this chapter

not a two-term relation

view would have to be given up. however, a few diehards who attempt to avoid the latter result by rejecting either (A) and (A') or (B) and (B'), and I assess their views in the next four chapters. Schiffer is up next. traditional

There

are,

point at two different spots, but Smith believes (falsely) that the tubes are pointed at just

one

spot.

Smith could then use "this"

(or "that") to refer simultaneously to

is red" and "this = this" would each simultaneously express two individual propositions. To simplify discussion, I will not consider the phenomenon of divided thought and reference, though it must

two

spots,

and

his uses of the sentences "this

eventually be addressed in any adequate solution to the 22

As

indicated in Chapter

1,

individual propositions

Two Tubes Puzzle. may be said to involve

thisnesses of objects, rather than the objects themselves; but

cussion of such views until Chapter

I

am

deferring dis-

4.

31

CHAPTER THREE

Ws

Schiffer

In

Me Now:

Just

on

Chapter

2,

Belief

I

argued that neither demonstrative

belief,

names

consist

indexical belief, nor beliefs expressed using proper

two-term relation between a believer and an individual proposition. In my argument, I assumed that in a

(A)

possible that a believer believe an individual proposition

It is

with a contingent thing other than himself as a constituent.

In this chapter,

nies (A).

I

I

discuss the views of Stephen Schiffer,

who

de-

concentrate on his presentation in "The Basis of Refer-

ence'' (1978). For those

who

are impatient about getting to the

is one way Schiffer describes the relevant part of and 'now' are the only logically proper names that eschewing, as we should, Ruswe need to recognize, and sell's foundationalism, we need not recognize irreducibly de re knowledge of sense data or bodily sensations (1978, 201-202)." How, then, do other singular terms function, on Schiffer's view? The story that leads up to the punch line answers that question, and I turn to it in the next section. In the following sections of this chapter, I present criticisms of Schiffer's view and argue that he would do well to move closer to Russell's own view

punch

line,

his view: "

here

T

.

32

.

.

It's

Just

Me Now:

Schiffer

on

Belief

''Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Descrip-

in

anywhere else book do I attempt to refute any view that simply denies either the modal or the doxastic intuition presented in Chapter 1; any attempted refutation would almost certainly be seen as question-begging by the view's proponents, of whom Schiffer is tion/' (1952, chap. V.) Neither in this chapter nor

in this

one. But

I

think that

pressed by those

That

my

one cf

is

main tasks

to

and

to other

we might

far the case

modal and doxastic

can be

intuitions.

in this chapter.

mental

call

at least part of the

meaning

of

be functionally specified: "[T]o say that a person

and such certain ways

believes such related in

the

by claiming that

Schiffer begins is

show how

useful to

View

Schiffer's

"believes"

it is

who have

is

to

states.

to say that

he

is

in a state

which

is

sepsory input, to behavioral output,

Of

special concern to us will be

what

the internal functional role of a mental state

namely, the relations of that

and counterfactual,

state, actual

to

other mental states" (1978, 178). The relations in question are those that must be met by the beliefs of any "minimally rational

person (ibid.)." Schiffer does not give a complete list of these, but he does give three clear examples of such relations: If S is a minimally rational person, then at any given time, S believes that

(i) if

(ii) if

and (iii) if

then S does not believe that not-p;

p,

S believes that p and S believes that

q,

then S believes that p

q;

S believes that p and S believes that q and S desires that q and

S believes that

if

p,

then q only

if r;

then,

ceteris paribus,

S desires

that r

for

any propositions, p, q and r.^ (i) is a central premise in argument for the part of his view of interest here. 2 It is

Schiffer's list

on minimal rationality, including (i), is given These constraints were formulated in discussions with

of sixteen such constraints

by Brian Loar

(1981, 72).

Schiffer.

^Schiffer

does not

explicitly restrict the

propositions, but for the purposes of this causes.

(It

rational during

does seem

much

to

my

make many

V

and to contingent can ignore the problems mathematicians less than minimally

range of

'p',

discussion,

'q,'

I

of the time they seek proofs of theorems.)

33

What's the Meaning of "This"?

not far from the

meaning

(i)

to the denial of (A), above.

Given that

of "believes" (at least as the term

is

(i)

is

part of

applied to 'mini-

we may suppose that it is a necessary Suppose it is possible that, at a given time, a believer, S, believes an individual proposition, , with some contingent

mally rational' believers), truth.

object, X

#

S, as a constituent.

Then, Schiffer claims,

claim with examples of the same sort that

it is

possible

He

supports his

we have

already con-

that at that time, S also believes that not-.

sidered in the previous two chapters.

The Two Tubes case can easily be modified to provide an espesharp example: Suppose that Smith suffers a momentary defect of color vision, which makes the red spot he sees through his left eye appear green, and that he is unaware of this defect; he cially

will

then believe the individual propositions that he could express

by "this is red and that is not red and this that." But then, at one time, he would believe that , and he would believe that not-, in violation of Schiffer's constraints on minimal rationality. Given these assumptions, it follows that no one can, at one time, ever believe an individual proposition, that p, and also then believe that not-p,

if

p has a contingent thing other than the

that

believer as a constituent.

we

can get from the preceding

is

a necessary condition for

believing an individual proposition:

if

S believes an individual

All

proposition, that p, with contingent thing,

then X =

more the punch

x, as a

constituent,

view than this, as line quoted at the beginning of already suggested in this chapter. Schiffer finds sufficient conditions for believing an individual proposition by considering examples derived from ones given by Perry and by Castaneda (see Chapter i, and citations to Castafieda's work in Perry 1979). Here's what he says: "If S.

But there

is

to Schiffer's

Ralph says, 'I am handsome,' then Ralph, if sincere, believes himself to be handsome, and this self-ascriptive belief is irreducibly de re [that is, belief in an individual proposition ]. But if Ralph says, 'He's an ugly fellow,' referring to a man in a photograph, who happens to be Ralph, then this [is] a non-self-ascriptive belief [and] does not differ in kind from the beliefs that Ralph has about any other material .

.

.

.

34

.

.

It's

object

and ...

is

Just

Me Now:

Schiffer

on

Belief

not irreducibly de re" (Schiffer 1978, 199).

amnesiac

Schiffer also alludes to a case of a "sensorily deprived

[who] might nevertheless

know

himself to be conscious" (1978,

Dick 1984, 246-247.) Generalizing on such examples, Schiffer concludes, "Not all beliefs that a person might have about himself are irreducibly de re) only those which he can ex200). (See also

press with the pronoun 'Y , and which beliefs" (1978, 199).

There

we might

a similar class of

is

call self-ascriptive

examples

for belief

we saw in Chapter 1. Schiffer makes use of these to what we might call "present-ascriptive beliefs," on

about time, as introduce

analogy with self-ascriptive

What applies

beliefs.

Summarizing, Schiffer says:

to the thoughts expressible

with "I" applies

tis

that the complete content of the thought

by

his utterance of "I

tion is

also, muta-

mutandis, to the thoughts expressible with "now," and

1).

one

f to the definition sche-

The generalization

will

be needed

such beliefs as one expressible by "red

in accounting for

pills

to me now to be in just nine locations.'') Two kinds of problems with (Di) and its generalizations ought to be mentioned

appear here.

First,

it

is

notoriously difficult to give a satisfactory and noncir-

cular account

"normal perceiver" and "standard circumOne recent writer has argued

of

stances," as well as of "typically."

is no unique set of standard condiunder which an object has given phenomenal properties

very persuasively that "there tions"

and

that the notion of standard conditions

is

strongly interest-

(Hardin 1983 and 1988). A great deal of work needs to be done on these notions before they achieve respectability. relative

Second, one will need to postulate

infinitely

many

rules of

inference in order to account for valid inferences of the form

(IS)

for n

>

F f

is

w-instantiated

is

instantiated at least n

-

\

times

1.

My point here has been not to show that Schiffer's view cannot meet the problems

I

have been raising

rather to demonstrate that

2iTye 1989

50

came

to

my

some

for

it

substantial

in this section,

work remains

attention too late to be taken into account.

but

to

be

It's

done

in

defending the view.

I

Just

hope

Me Now: that

I

Schiffer

on

Belief

have succeeded

in that

limited goal. 22

turn next to a brief discussion of the historical predecessor to

I

view and

Schiffer'' s

to adverbial theories of sensation, Russell's

some of the problems I have raised for Schiffer's view, but it, too, rejects (A). Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a view more extreme than Russell's in placing

view. Russell's use of sense data avoids

on the possible constituents

restrictions

of individual proposi-

tions.

Russell and Sense Data

Suppose that we were to try resolve the Two Tubes Puzzle in way: when Smith thinks "this is red and that is red," his belief is more perspicuously representable as this

(9)

the object of which this'

which

that'

is

an appearance

an appearance

is

is

is

red and the object of

red

(where the primes on the demonstratives are meant

same

to indicate

and "that" preceding (9)). meant to entail the existence of an object, X, which is an appearance, and which is, in some sense, of the spot he then sees, and a distinct object, y, which is an appearance, and which is also of the spot that he then sees; x and y will that they're not the

As Smith could use

be exactly

alike,

it,

as the "this"

(9) is

except for their being located in different visu-

Smith wonders, "Is this = that?," he wonders whether or not these two appearances are appearances of the al fields.

same

When

object.

In order to prevent the

same

sort of

problem from arising about

An

example, attributed to David Lewis, which raises some additional queshow exactly we are to understand the predicate "appears to me to be over there," is reported in chapter 4 of Hintikka 1975, 67: "Suppose that I see John in a glass, but that I cannot tell perceptually whether it is a looking glass or a transparent glass panel. Don't I then see John without seeing where he is even in 22

tions about

my own visual visual space,

space?"

even

if I

I

am inclined to think that would see where John I

example may suggest that there

is

is

in

my

whole scene to be a hallucination, but the more to appearance than meets the eye.

also believed the

51

What's the Meaning of "This"?

must be held that x and y are necessarily such that Smith cannot wonder, at the time he preceives them, 'Is x = y?" It would be ad hoc simply to stipulate this without any further explanation. What more can be said

X and y as arose about the spot seen,

it

about the nature of such appearances to achieve the desired sult?

We

must keep

in

mind

that

possible,

it is

re-

on any plausible

construal of "perceptual property,'' to have beliefs about one's

appearances not solely about their perceptual properties; for example. Smith

may

think to himself, "this'

is

my

ance." Simply requiring that appearances have

perceptual properties they appear

nores this possibility.

On

that the appearances

have

(to

and only the

the believer) to have ig-

the other hand, all

favorite appearall

it is

wrong

to

suppose

and only the properties they

are

believed (by the believer) to have; for suppose that Smith believes

something of the form, "this' is an appearance of something that and is F. " Then his belief, together with the latter supposition, will entail that there really is an F, whatever F may be. True belief cannot be that easy to achieve; it must be possible to make some mistakes about what one perceives. Russell's view, in "Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description," seeks to avoid this problem, and may usefully be seen as partially motivated by such puzzles as the Two Tubes Puzzle. ^3 Thus, the view imposes severe restrictions on the possible constituents of exists

propositions.

The fundamental this:

principle in the analysis of propositions ...

wholly of constituents with which

We

is

Every proposition which we can understand must be constituted

shall say that

we have

we

are acquainted.

which any process of

acquaintance with anything of

are directly aware, without the intermediary of

ference or any knowledge of truths.

.

.

we in-

.

23Some of the reasons for introducing sense data need not, therefore, come from an argument from illusion; puzzles about veridical perception raise questions to which sense data provide answ^ers. An argument from illusion is needed to establish that sense data are private mental objects; their being mental and private does not of course follow from their being useful in solving the Two Tubes Puzzle.

52

It's

We

have acquaintance

and

senses,

— thoughts,

memory

tance in

Me Now:

on

may we have

with the data of what

feelings, desires, etc.;

Belief

be called acquain-

with things which have been either of the outer

senses or of the inner sense. Further, certain, that

Schiffer

with the data of the outer

in sensation

in introspection

inner sense

Just

we have

it

acquaintance with

probable, though not

is

Self, as that

which

aware

is

of things or has desires towards things. In addition to our acquaintance with particular existing things,

we

also

have acquaintance with what we such as whiteness,

to say, general ideas .

.

.

On Russell's view,

there are in the Tw^o Tubes case tv^o exactly

similar red, circular sense data, x

visual field locations,

and

and

of w^hich

y,

w^hich differ only in their

Smith

is

directly av^are.

believes that the physical object v^hich causes x

He

red (similarly

is

and he w^onders if it's the same object that causes both x That is, he believes what he could more perspicuously

for y);

and

is

and so

Awareness of universals is called conceiving, and a universal which we are aware is called a concept. (1952, 32, 25, 28)

on. of

shall call universals, that

diversity, brotherhood,

y.

express as follows: (3z)(w)[(w causes

(10)

this'

if

(11) (3z')(w)[(w causes that'

And he wonders

as he could think

(3z){(w)(w causes

(12)

causes that'

where this'

if,

this'

and only

if

if

z

z

=

rendering of

= w)

''the

I

know

of

tion in Russell's writings. ^4

no

clear, direct

It is

and Casullo

this'

its

=

answer

objects that that'?"?

—

is

to this ques-

an important insight of sense

^^But see Russell 1956. See also Broad 1952, chaps. 8 II);

(3z')[(w)(w

thing that causes

about the nature of acquaintance and

impossible for Smith to wonder, "Is

not yet answered.

sec.

&

z']},

the thing that causes that'." But our original question

is it it

it,

and only — w) &

if z'

(12) is the Russellian

=

What make

if

and only if z = w) & z is red] and only if z' = w) & z is red]

if

and

9;

Casullo 1984 (esp.

1986.

53

What's the Meaning of "This"?

datum

chaps. 8 and 143

by Russell, Moore (1957), Broad (1952, Carnap, and Goodman (1977, 112, 130-133, 139, 246, and references to Carnap's work therein),

theory, recognized

— 144,

9),

245

that there

is

—

an irreducibly demonstrative element

datum theory

in perception,

foundation. The

an insight

built into sense

difficulties

presented for Schiffer's theory in ''Being There" sug-

gest to

me

work on

been neglected

that this insight has

belief

and

reference.

at its

Of

course, sense

in some recent datum theory is

not the only possible proposal about what to include in a restricted class of possible constituents of individual propositions.

Once one opens

the door to demonstrative belief about 'extraordi-

nary' objects, one

may wish

to consider the nonexistent objects of

Terence Parsons (1980); the inexistent objects of William G. Lycan (1987); or the existent but incomplete objects of Kit Fine (1982) as possible constituents. (As David Lewis has reminded us, there are

many

things one can do easily with nonexistent objects that

are difficult or perhaps impossible without them. See, for example,

Lewis 1983b.)

My main point here is that, whatever the prop,

the aforementioned door

A

is at

least ajar.

Modal Objection

There remains one serious, albeit standard, objection to be to Schiffer's view. In Chapter 1, I presented an intuition, forcefully and skillfully deployed by Kripke, the use of which

made

allows him to argue that description theories of indexicals, demonstratives, and proper

names

give the

wrong

truth conditions

by uses of sentences containing such terms (Kripke 1980, 6-15). Schiffer's view is inconsistent with that intuition, though it makes 'exceptions' for "I" and "now." Suppose, for example, that Sarah or Stephen fixes her or his attention on some one pill or cup and believes, "that one is red." The proposition believed thereby is, on the aforementioned intuition, an individual proposition true only in those worlds in which the for propositions expressed

very object actually attended to exists and

is

red. Schiffer rejects

and the intuition on which it is based, saying, "[N]o one who had understood and accepted the description theory this claim

54

It's

would

in the least

Just

Me Now:

Schiffer

that Stephen's belief,

and any other

himself and the time of his belief

exist;

those propositions. Even

about the essential nature of times, claim that

what

my

all,

constitu-

put aside questions

remains counterintuitive to

existence for

used by

its

me when

I

truth.

take these facts about Schiffer's view to be sufficiently objec-

tionable

the

we

"that's a rock" expresses (as

attend to a rock) requires I

it

entails

which Stephen

they are, after if

view

about a contingent

belief

object, are true only in those possible situations in

all

Belief

be inclined to accept'' the intuition (1981, 60-

61). In addition to rejecting the intuition, Schiffer's

ents of

on

by themselves

Two Tubes

cussing in this section gests a

to

make examining

other approaches to

Puzzle worthwhile. The problem is

I

have been

who

taken seriously by Plantinga,

way of resolving it. Roughly,

his idea

is

dis-

sug-

that the properties

expressed, say, by demonstratives, are expressed by definite descriptions of the form, "the object

which

is

actually F,"

and

that

they therefore express essences of the object thought about. discuss Plantinga's suggestion

and Ackerman's

I

related use of es-

sences in the next chapter.

55

CHAPTER FOUR

Rigid Belief Transformed: Plantinga and Ackerman on Essences

Because Schiffer holds

that,

except for 'T' and "now," sin-

gular terms for contingent objects are nonrigid, his view to the

modal

philosophers

criticism

who

with which

I

ended the

is

last chapter.

open

Some

are nevertheless sympathetic to the view that

proper names, demonstratives, and some indexicals have or bear significant epistemic relation to definite-descriptive content are

One such

troubled by this modal criticism.

philosopher, Alvin

Plantinga, has suggested a compromise. In "The Boethian

Com-

promise," he recommends a method for securing rigidity while retaining definite-descriptive content. Although his proposals are

directed only at proper names, of providing a resolution to the of this chapter,

I

like Plantinga's,

I

will

adapt them for the purpose

Two Tubes

Puzzle. In the last part

Her view, some of the

discuss the views of Felicia Ackerman.

embraces essences, but

it

avoids

problems for Plantinga's view. As she herself is quick to point however, her view has some rather serious problems of its

out,

own; nonetheless it may well to the Two Tubes Puzzle.^

^Felicia

Ackerman = Diana

56

F.

offer the

Ackerman.

optimum

essence-solution

Rigid Belief Transformed

Plantinga's Proposal

The relevant part

of Plantinga's theory

may be summarized

as

follows: (E)

Proper names express essences.

Plantinga's

main proposal about which essences are expressed by

proper names (Al)

is:

The essences

that a proper

name

expresses are expressed by

descriptions of the form "the f-in-a,"

a-transform of the predicate "f

Because tives

I

and

am

where "f-in-a"

is

the

.

concerned here with questions about demonstra-

indexicals,

I

will

assume, with one qualification

to

be

noted, that versions of (E) and (Al) also apply to demonstratives

and indexicals. My one qualification is to leave open the question of whether a version of (Al) also applies to "I" and "now." Although, as I have already stated in Chapter 2, I believe that these indexicals ought to be accorded no 'special treatment,' one might wish to exempt them from the transformation of (Al). In what follows, I will focus on applications of a version of (Al) to demonstratives in attempting to resolve the Two Tubes Puzzle. Plantinga does not offer a general account of which descriptions express the essences expressed by proper names, demonstratives, and indexicals, though he makes several suggestions based on views about proper names held by Russell, Frege, about which descriptions Searle, and Donnellan and Kripke one might associate with them. I will not discuss those sugges-

—

tions here;

it

will suffice for

my

purposes

to

use syntactically

simple suggestions based on Russell's views. (The suggestions ignore sense data and are Russellian without being those that

would likely have offered.) and (E) (the a-transform principle and the Essence principle, respectively) need some further explanation; specifically, more needs to be said about what Plantinga means by "essence," "express," and "a-transform." Russell himself

Both

(Al)

57

What's the Meaning of "This"?

About what names,

etc.,

and

definite descriptions express,

Plantinga has this to say:

A definite description "the F" expresses the same property as "is the sole F." (b) A proper name, N, expresses (in English)

(1) (a)

does

a property, F,

if

there

a definite description, D, in English or

is

some extension of English, such that: (i) D expresses f and (ii) N and D are intersubstitutable salva propositione in sentences of the form,

I

will also

't

is

f

(1978, 134)

suppose that

indexical tokens.

(i)(b)

holds for uses of demonstrative and

(i)(b)(ii) is

based on the following principle of

on which Plantinga seems

propositional identity,

(2)

S

a person

is

and only

I

=

Proposition p

if

proposition q

and ^4

is

A

S has

is

and only

if

necessarily, (S)(i4)[if

a propositional attitude, then S has

to

Aiopii

q)].

will not try to say exactly

that the connection

if

clearly to rely:

clear

how

(i)(b)(ii) is

enough

based on

(2); I

hope

for present purposes.

Plantinga characterizes the notion of an existing entity's es-

sence as follows:

an essence of x =^f

(3) e is

has

(i)

e is a

necessary that

e; (iii) it is

necessary that

(y)(if

y has

e,

if

property;

possible that x

(ii) it is

x exists, then x has

then x =

e;

and

(iv) it is

y).

Plantinga characterizes notions of a-transforms for both predicates

(4)

and

properties:

The a-transform proper

(5)

((5) is

name

of a predicate, "f,"

is

"f-in-a,"

where "a"

is

a

of the actual world.

The a-transform of a property, f is the world-indexed property of being f-in-a, where "a" is a proper name of the actual world. ,

can be written without a use-mention confusion;

clear

enough

as

it

stands.)

The following

trust that

relationship

hold between a-transform predicates and properties:

58

I

if

is

it

said to

the predi-

Rigid Belief Transformed

cate ''F" expresses the property F, then the a-transform of "F" (that

"f-in-a'')

is,

expresses the property being f-in-a (1978, 133).

Finally,

(6)

X has property f in state of affairs is

actual, then x has

not hard to

show

=^f

it is

necessary that,

w

if

f

Plugging in "a" for "w" in It is

w

has F in a/'

yields a definition of

(6)

that for

any

object, x,

the sole F, then the a-transform

and property,

of F, being F-in-a, is

F,

if

x

is

an essence

of X.2

Two Tubes

Transformed Essences and the

Puzzle

Plantinga considers one of the most important features of his

theory to be that names,

etc.,

may

express essences that are log-

ically

equivalent but epistemically inequivalent. (Essence

ically

equivalent to essence

which to

e is

know

ing that

if

there

e is log-

no possible world

epistemically inequivalent to essence

or believe that an object has it

is

exemplified by an object that does not exemplify

e is

Essence

e'

has

e'

(1978, 133, 134).)

e

e' if it is

in e'

possible

without knowing or believ-

Among the examples he gives of

pairs of logically equivalent but epistemically inequivalent es-

sences are being Socrates's

a (both had by morning

Plato);

best student in a, being Aristotle's teacher in

and

being a heavenly body last visible in the

in a, being a heavenly

body

first visible in the

evening in a

(both had by Venus). Presumably, Plantinga' s reason for thinking that these pairs of properties are epistemically inequivalent their

is

that

'nonworld indexed portions' are epistemically inequivalent.

Let us

now

see

how

^For a proof that relies

(Al)

and

(E)

allow Plantinga to resolve the

on S5 axioms, see Plantinga

1974, 72. Plantinga takes the

notion of logical necessity as primitive, and explains the notion of possible world in

terms of

it,

the notion of a state of affairs, the notion of a state of affairs'

obtaining (or being actual), and several logical notions. For present purposes, v^e

may assume

that propositions are just states of affairs

maximal consistent propositions. The actual world

and

will

that possible worlds are be assumed to be the true

maximal, consistent proposition. See Plantinga 1981.

59

What's the Meaning of "This"?

Two Tubes

way

Puzzle in a

that accounts for Smith's rational

ignorance and avoids the modal objection to which Schiffer's

view is open. Suppose that, according "this'' as

now

to a Russellian theory.

Smith uses

semantically equivalent to (or short for) "the object that

appears to

me

to

be on the right"; and that he uses "that" as now appears to me to be on the left/'^

short for "the object that

two portions

Recall these

(7)

I

know

(8)

I

do not know

that this

=

of Smith's interior

monologue:

this.

that this

=

that.

Plantinga's view provides an explanation for the truth of (8):

the two demonstratives, as used by Smith, express for

different, epistemically inequivalent essences: "this," as

uses

expresses the property that he could express by "being

it,

the object that

now

appears to

as "that," as Smith uses

it,

me to be on

a."

(7)

and

(8)

(on Plantinga's view)

(7')

now

appears to

me

to

be on the

thus be rewritten more perspicuously

as:

now appears to me to be on the right now appears to me to be on the right in a. I don't know that the object that now appears to me to be on the right in a is the object that now appears to me to be on the left in I

know

in (8')

may

the right in a"; where-

expresses the property that he could

express by "being the object that left in

and Smith Smith

(7)

a

is

that the object that

the object that

a.

When

they are thus rewritten,

it

seems easy to see how both knowledge in (7') is differ-

could be true, for the object of Smith's

ent from the object of his ignorance in

(8').

one of any description theory. What is distinctive about Plantinga's view is its also having the consequence that the propositions expressed in (7) and (8) are contingent truths. This may be seen most easily if we add the following to Smith's interior monologue:

The

latter virtue is also

^At the risk of being tedious, I would once again remind the reader that these descriptions are not faithful to Smith's perceptual situation. See Chap. 3, note 15. But we need some pair of definite descriptions for the present discussion.

60

Rigid Belief Transformed

I

(9)

know

that this

is

the object that

now appears to me

to

be on the

right.

we

are to avoid the modal objection made against Schiffer's what Smith knows in (9) must be a contingent truth. Plantinga's view secures this result, for what (9) says is just what If

view,

Smith could equally well express by (9')

I

know

in

And

a

is

now appears to me to be on the right now appears to me to be on the right.

that the object that

the object that

the proposition

known

here

is

contingent: there are worlds

which the very spot that Smith does in fact see remains unobserved by anyone, and so appears to no one in any way; it is a merely contingent truth that Smith happens to observe it at all, and a contingent truth that it looks the way it actually does to him. So Plantinga's view seems to have a clear modal advantage over the sort of description theory advocated by Schiffer. in

The Greater Ignorance of Smith: I

will next present

two

First Objection

criticisms of Plantinga's proposal, the

which is a simple one. There seems to be no question that, (7) and (9) express truths. Now, as Plantinga notes, there seem to be propositions that some of us are unable to believe because we do '"not even possess the concepts necessary to apprehend [them]'' (1978, 133). As an example, he mentions first

as

of

Smith uses them,

the proposition that twenty-seven eighths of the definite integral,

from zero

to two, of the function

/(jc)

=

is

odd, which, he says,

those of us with "an imperfect grasp of the calculus" are unable

even

to believe.

Suppose, then, that Smith,

like

students, has never studied The Nature of Necessity,

most medical is

unfamiliar

with possible world semantics, has never heard of any work in semantical theory, and has never ty.

wondered about logical

necessi-

In short, suppose that Smith does not even possess the con-

cepts necessary to apprehend propositions of the form "the F in a is

G" and

so, for

example,

is

unable even to believe the proposi61

What's the Meaning of "This"? tions involved in

Smith as able

(7')

and

wrong

thus

to include these in his interior

these therefore do not

by

(9'). It is

his uses of

''this''

tell

have described monologue, and

to

us any propositions that he expresses

or "that."

Plantinga might try to argue, in response, that Smith does not lack the concepts necessary to tions because

we

all

apprehend a-transform proposi-

acquire such basic concepts in learning

how

have even the simple perceptual beliefs of the sort Smith has. But since he is willing to grant that those with an imperfect grasp of the calculus may not be able to grasp many of its propositions, I don't see how he would argue for that claim. (I doubt that he would try.) Nor do I see any room in the doctrine of propositions (see Chapter 1) for making sense of 'partially grasped proposito

tions'; there is tially

no more room

than there

is

for 'par-

take seriously,

it

bedevils

for the latter

believed propositions'.

Although

this objection is

one that

I

many proposals besides Plantinga's (for example, Schiffer's). What is distinctive about Plantinga's proposal is (Al), the a-transwant next to consider an objection focuses more squarely on that principle. form

principle,

and

I

that

Smith's Otherworldly Ignorance: Second Objection

My second objection is somewhat more complex than the first. have noticed that Plantinga has introduced a new name as part of his proposal: "a." The purpose of my second objection is to force investigation of the question, "which essence, if any, does 'a' express?"

The reader

I

will

names

will

now in

describe a situation involving a pair of co-referential

which

linguistic

behavior just

but for which Plantinga's proposal that the referent of the

by means world." Suppose also tionlessly,

name "a" of the

is is

like

Smith's

is

involved,

unable to account.'* Suppose fixed, rigidly

definite

and connota-

description "the actual

that the referent of the

name

"/5" is fixed,

^This example was developed in January 1978. A similar example was presented by Saul Kripke in a talk he gave at the APA Western Division Meetings, held April

25-27, 1980.

62

Rigid Belief Transformed

and connotationlessly, by means of the definite descripworld most often named by Plantinga." As a matter of fact, the actual world is the possible world most often named by Plantinga, but Smith, whom we may suppose is aware of the fixing of "a" and "P," doesn't keep up with the philosophirigidly

tion ''the possible

cal literature, so

when he

=

considers "a

from it or withholds assent although Smith will assert

to

it.

Thus,

p," he either dissents

we may suppose

now appears to me to be on the right now appears to me to be on the right

(10) the object that

object that

as part of his interior

monologue, he

in

a

is

will refrain therein

that,

the

from

asserting

now appears to me to be on the right now appears to me to be on the right.

(11) the object that

object that

We

P

is

the

cannot account for the asymmetry in Smith's attitudes by

supposing that he knows

by

in

(lo),

but does not

(ii). The reason names "a" and

is

know

that (lo)

what he could express what he could express by

(or believes) (or believe)

and

(ii) differ

only with respect to the

both of which have been stipulated to be

connotationless; consequently, the very

same proposition

is

ex-

pressed by both, as Smith uses these sentences. This case therefore presents us with linguistic facts just like those presented

the

Two Tubes

example, but the former case

is

by

not one for which

Plantinga's proposal can account.

This line of reasoning does not, of course, present a counterex-

ample

a-transform principle. But it does, I from whatever appearance of explanaderives from consideration of the Two Tubes case

to (Al), Plantinga's

think, detract considerably

tory

power

and

other, similarly problematic examples.

(Al)

How

might Plantinga reasonably reply? He might either deny could speak a language in which some terms are rigidly and connotationlessly fixed a denial that seems implausible or he might insist that his proposal is a proposal about how, as a matter of fact, English names, demonstratives, and indexicals that

we

—

—

63

What's the Meaning of "This"?

work (where

how

the evidence for

they work

linguistic be-

is

havior like Smith's). The purpose of such insistence would be to

provide room for application of (Al) to "a" and

thus forcing a

between the propositions Smith would express by (lo) and (ii). This may be done by explaining how "a" and differ in connotation: they might have different connotations or one might lack any connotation, while the other had some connotation. So, it might be held, as an empirical thesis about English, that by attempting to stipulate that be fixed, rigidly and connotationlessly, on the possible world most often named by Plandifference

tinga,

we

instead bring

about that

it

being the possible world most often

expresses the essence

named by Plantinga

would

the object of Smith's ignorance in (ii)

in a. If so,

be, as

then

he could put

it,

now

the object that

object that

This

still

leaves

now

me

appears to

appears to

to

named by

possible world most often

me

to

open the question

be on the right in the Plantinga in a

be on the

of

is

the

right.

whether or not "a" has

connotation. Let us examine what a proponent of Plantinga's

view may have If

that

to say in

answer.

"a" has a connotation, then what

we

is its

connotation? Note

cannot explain Smith's behavior with

(lo)

and

(ii)

by

claiming that, instead of fixing "a" connotationlessly on the actual

world,

we

bring

it

about

that, contrary to

"a" expresses the property being is

had only contingently by

For then the subject of (lo) (lo)

would not express

our stated intention,

the actual world

a, the

— a property that

world which

is

in fact actual.

would not express an essence, and

a contingent truth, true only in those

worlds in which the spot actually seen exists; instead, what it expresses would be true in any world in which Smith believed himself to be seeing some spot or other that appeared to be in the center of his current right visual

Could we instead hold

field.

that "a" expresses the essence being the

actual world in a; or the essence being identical to a?

we may

More generally,

ask: Should Plantinga hold that "a" expresses an essence

that can also be expressed

64

by some term or predicate containing a

Rigid Belief Transformed

That is: Does (Al), the a-transform principle, apply to The answer to all these questions seems clearly to be "no" because the proposals they offer simply fail to answer the

use of

''a"?

''a" itself?

question, "what, in each of

There

its

are, of course, at least

uses, does

two

'a'

express?"

alternatives

here: hold that (Al) does not apply to "a"

itself,

open

to Plantinga

although

(E) does;

by means of the description "the actual world" (or its synonyms) can one fix "a," rigidly and connotationlessly, on the actual world (and thus abandon both (Al) and (E) in the case of "a"). Of these two alternatives, I think that the first is not only preferable, but would be preferred by Plantinga. My reason for thinking so is that the second alternative saddles one with a possible worlds version of the Two Tubes Puzzle. In fact, we have or hold that only

already introduced the materials for such a version in the discussion of (lo)

be

made

and

(ii),

above. All that remains

is

for the

analogy to

explicit.

So suppose that "a" and

"y5"

and

are fixed, rigidly

and connota-

Smith is aware of the fixing. Let us abbreviate the predicate obtained from (lo) by substituting "x" for "a" by "Rx." Smith's interior monologue will then go like

tionlessly, exactly as above,

that

this:

(12)

1

know

wonder:

a =

we

that is

I

know

that:

« = pi, and

P, or that

^

is

I

a = a and ^ = ^ and a is R, but I is p R?, and I don't know that

wonder:

R.

from applying either (Al) or (E) here, a by-nowproblem recurs. Given our assumptions here, the proposition that a — a simply is the proposition that a = p, and Smith can't know one without knowing the other; similarly, for him to know that a is R (that is, to know what he would express by (10)) is for him to know that ^ is R (that is, what he would express by (11)). So he can't wonder as he does, after all. But this is wrong. The parallel between the cases can be made even closer if we suppose that it is somehow^ possible to think demonstratively about possible worlds. Smith might then think, "that world is a, and this world is 13, but I wonder, is this world the actual world?" If

refrain

familiar

If

we

grant the possibility of demonstrating worlds, then

65

I

think

What's the Meaning of "This"? that

we must also grant the

possibility of

wondering in this way.^ a glance' which world is

Perhaps an omniscient being can 'see at most of the rest of us can try to resolve such ignorance only by comparing what we know with what a entails; at best, actual, but

however, that

will leave the

nonomniscient with

infinitely

many

candidates for the status of actual world. In Chapter

2,

I

how would argue against a Two Tubes Puzzle. One of Plan-

indicated roughly

metalinguistic solution to the

I

purposes in offering his view is to avoid such metasolutions to puzzles about belief and reference (1978,

tinga's stated linguistic

135). Hence, in this case, he cannot consistently hold that when Smith thinks to himself "a is K," he thereby entertains the metalinguistic proposition that '"a is expresses a truth." Given what "a is K" expresses as Smith would use it, adopting the latter

K

would be tantamount to holding one never believes an a-transform proposition, but always

sort of metalinguistic solution

that

instead believes a metalinguistic proposition to the effect that the

corresponding a-transform sentence expresses some true proposition.

None ple.

of

my

criticisms

Each of them

But since

it

is

is

weighs against

(E),

the Essence princi-

directed at (Al), the a-transform principle.

the latter that

is

distinctive of Plantinga's view,

these criticisms raise serious questions about the acceptability of that view. It is, of course, still open to Plantinga to hold that "a" expresses an essence of the actual world (or that some uses of "a" express

different,

epistemically

world). But then he

inequivalent

owes us an account

essences of

how

of

the

actual

ordinary English

speakers come to grasp such an essence, without there being a specification of

it

in

terms of a-transforms. (Plantinga concedes as

50n analogy with the Jones lottery example (see Chapter 5), we might consider God's possible worlds lottery, with the property being the actual world to be conferred on the winner; the roles of "a" and "Victor" would then be exactly parallel. For a fuller development of the analogy, see Austin 1983. ^If we suppose that we are world-bound individuals, as David Lewis suggests, then, perhaps, we 'can't miss' when we attempt to demonstrate the actual world. As one of Lewis's most vocal critics, however, Plantinga cannot avail himself of this reply. Plantinga maintains that there are infinitely many worlds in which we and our demonstrations

66

exist.

Rigid Belief Transformed

much

in 1983, 364-365, 3961117.) Plantinga's proposal seems,

therefore, to

have

little

more

to

recommend

it

than a view which

simply postulates multiple, epistemically inequivalent essences of

each object, to be expressed by proper names, demonstratives,

and

indexicals used to refer to the object.

Such a view would have

the advantages of stipulation over honest theoretical

all I

toil.^

turn next to discussion of the views of Felicia Ackerman,

who

holds that uses of tokens of demonstratives, indexicals, and proper

names express essences not

expressible

by any

definite de-

scription.

Ackerman' s Essences

Ackerman

sets out to give a theory of

names, demonstratives,

indexicals (and natural-kind terms) that preserves the following

three plausible principles:

The Essence Principle: Each use of a proper name, demonstrative, or indexical

and so such terms are

expresses an essence,

rigid

designators.

The Propositional Attitude Principle:

If

"Ti" and "T2" are singular

terms which are not interchangeable salva

whenever used in and "T2" have different

veritate

propositional attitude contexts, then "Ti"

connotations. (The connotation of a singular term that term expresses,

and which

is

to

determining what proposition

in

which the term

The Causal

on

Principle:

and only

if

the property

is

expressed by the sentence token

occurs.)

An

entity, x, is the referent of a

a particular occasion) of a

ical if

is

that term's semantic contribution

token (as used

proper name, demonstrative, or index-

x has a particular complex causal relation to the

token of the term so used, regardless of what entity, properties the users of the term believe

its

if

any, has the

referent to have. (1979, 6-

11)

^ight

Plantinga avail himself of the advantages of Kaplan's "dthat" operator?

(See Chapter 6.)

I

no advantages here. If the operator is introduced into made in "The Greater Ignorance of Smith," above, will Whether or not it is so introduced (and what could keep that see

English, then the objection

return in

full force.

from being, or even having been, done?), the problems raised worldly Ignorance," above, will still have to be faced.

in "Smith's

67

Other-

What's the Meaning of "This"?

(Ackerman calls this complex causal relation "R.") One qualificamust be added to the Propositional Attitude Principle: Acker-

tion

man

intends

to

it

apply to particular uses of tokens of singular

terms and not, primarily, to their syntactic types. This qualification renders the Propositional Attitude Principle less persuasive

than

it

might seem

For "Ti" and "Ti" to be

at first reading.

t seems to mean that (i) S "... Ti ... used and (ii) had S used instead, the resulting token would have expressed a true proposition. But this is not

interchangeable for a person S at a time

refuted by showing that rectly

used

.

.

.

preserved truth.

Ti

.

.

How,

it is .

logically possible for S to

so that the substitution

then,

is

have

cor-

would have

the principle to be applied to

what for Ackerman is one most important applications, she uses it to argue for the conclusion that no proper name, etc., has the same connotation as any definite description.^ She says that it is logically possible that a person, S, believe that T is T, without believing that T is the f where F is any property whatever. She concludes that ''T" and establish differences in connotation? In

of

its

,

"the F" are not interchangeable salva veritate in

all

belief contexts,

and uses the Propositional Attitude Principle to conclude, further, that 'T" and "the F" differ in connotation. If we make explicit

the necessary reference to particular tokens as used at par-

by

the argument seems to be

this: suppose that, at With that token, he then expresses a proposition, P, which we may represent as an ordered set of connotations: and , that he also believes So the inconsistency presented in Chapter 2

Two

Nontraditional Analyses of Belief

Before evaluating Kaplan's suggestion, I want to guard against two misunderstandings of it. We must not misunderstand Kaplan's suggestion by mistaking it for Plantinga's Boethian compromise. According to the latter, if Smith believes what he expresses by (3), then what he believes is more perspicuously expressible as

But

here and

the object that has appearance

(8)

this

now

a

in

is

red.

cannot be Kaplan's answer, because, as noted above, the

"dthat" operator

is

stipulated to yield a directly referential term,

not synonymous with a reference-fixing description.

Nearly enough, Plantinga's Boethian compromise says that what a rigidified description

expresses

is

a constituent of the proposition be-

lieved, but Kaplan's suggestion says instead that

description denotes

is

a constituent instead.

object that has appearance

here now']"

demonstrative's character, that character

is

what

a rigidified

Although "dthat['the

may

not

represent the

itself

a constituent

of the proposition determined. In this instance, the character of (3)

determines the content of

namely, the individual proposi-

(3),

tion . But the latter

is

not the proposition expressed

(8). Kaplan would clearly reject the Boethian compromise. Nor does Kaplan's suggestion construe Smith's beliefs as being

by

about which characters determine which propositions in a given

The latter would hold he knows) that

context. that

Smith believes (and knows

determines

(5")